

11

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

משכד רופה

יועץ אפיני

ארהב

19/08/11 - 31/08/11

תיק מס'

12

מחלקה

4610/12-א



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פיזי: 4610/12-א

מזהה כריט R00036g

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-9

תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

13

שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון
טופס מברק

א/תק

דף 1 מתוך 1
דחיפות: מיידי
סוג: בלמ"ס

אל : מנהל הסברה.

דע : מצפ"א, לשכת המנכ"ל.

תאריך, זמן: 19.10.89
מספר המברק:

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

המשרד:

459

רעידת האדמה - סיוע ישראלי

בתקשורת היום אזכורים על הצעת הסיוע הישראלית לנפגעי רעש האדמה.
הדבר הוזכר בחדשות הבוקר של ה-NBC (TODAY); ב-"וושינגטון
טיימס" במאמר על ההצעות לסיוע של מדינות שונות; אוזכר בתדרוך
דובר הבית הלבן והופיע גם בסוכנויות הידיעות.

לידיעתכם.

רות ירון
כ/תק

שמה סן שיה 3
ג' אג' 1
ב(צ'ור 1
ג צבא 2
ה'ה' 1
ג' 1
הסבה 3
1
2

1/1

449
2/2449
2/2

THE WASHINGTON POST

J.S. Takes Two-Pronged Approach to Israel on Peace Process

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States chided Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir yesterday for making "unhelpful and disappointing" comments about the U.S. role in the Middle East peace process. But Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens conferred by phone for almost 40 minutes about ways to start an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, and the Shamir issue never came up.

By taking this two-pronged approach, the Bush administration seemed first to be sending Shamir a public signal to soften the strident one he has used recently toward the United States. And secondly,

Baker's talk with Arens indicated that the administration does not want the search for a peace formula to be sidetracked by a quarrel with Shamir.

In two speeches this week to his hard-line Likud bloc, Shamir insisted Israel would not allow the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to take part in talks about the future of the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The United States has proposed a Cairo meeting in which Israelis and a specially-chosen group of Palestinians would discuss ground rules for elections in the occupied areas, and Baker has registered impatience with Israel's objections.

But Shamir regards the proposed meeting as a disguised means of

nudging Israel into negotiations with the PLO. He told his Likud audience he would remain firm even if it led to tension with the United States, the Jewish state's principal ally and supplier of \$3 billion annually in military and economic aid.

Yesterday, State Department spokesman Margaret Tutwiler replied that Shamir's statement "was unhelpful, and we're disappointed." She added, "We're not looking for a fight or confrontation with Israel . . . Our only purpose is to help the government of Israel advance its own peace initiative."

In the context of the carefully worded diplomatic language the State Department normally uses for public pronouncements, Tutwiler's words stood out as an unmistakable

rebuke to Shamir. When a reporter noted that Shamir's remarks implied Israel had lost its U.S. friends, she replied, "That's ludicrous."

Tutwiler and White House officials said that after Shamir made his speeches, he spoke by telephone with President Bush on Tuesday. Administration officials said Bush and Shamir discussed the prime minister's comments, but refused to elaborate. Shamir is expected here next month for a White House meeting with Bush and Baker.

Tutwiler said that although Arens and Baker talked for almost 40 minutes yesterday, "Shamir's statements never came up; they were not discussed." Except for an expression of condolence from

Arens about the death toll in the San Francisco earthquake, the conversation was devoted exclusively to discussing ways of starting the peace dialogue, she said.

Asked if Baker had left the U.S. rebuttal to her while he continued his efforts to keep Arens engaged in discussion of the peace process, she responded, "He moves in mysterious ways."

Other U.S. officials who asked not to be identified said Shamir's remarks probably were prompted by a desire to build support within the American Jewish community for Israel's position and by a hope that the threat of confrontation would force the administration to back down.

END

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2/2

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 19.10.89

17311

נכנס **

שמו

חוזם: 10,17311

אל: המשרד

יעו"ם: מצב/1221, דומא/266

מ-: נר: 706, תא: 191089, זח: 1530, דח: ב, סג: שמ

תח: ג: מצפא

נד: 5

11
אנכ

שמו/בהול

אל: אומן - פלג / וושינגטון (בנפרד/117).

דע: לשכת המנכ"ל, כנסיות, מצפ"א, הסברה, מצ"ד, רומא

מאת: אורי גורדון, מרדכי ידיד - ניו יורק.

מסמך הבישופים הקתולים.

לאור דבריו לגורדון כי יש לראות במברק שלב ראשון לקראת עיבוד תיוטה, ותוך שימוש במקודות המופיעות במברק - להלן הצעתנו למבנה ולתוכן המסמך, שהיא גם על דעת הקונכ"ל :-

פסקה ראשונה - למדנו את תיוטת המסמך אשר נציגי הועדה המנסחת באדיבותם העבירו אלינו. תוך הערכה לכוונות הטובות של מוססי המסמך, עלינו להביע אכזבתנו מטיוטת המסמך הפוגעת בתהליך השלום הנוכחי.

פסקה שניה - אחרי קשיים רבים נמצא בסיס למז'מ והוא יוזמת השלום הישראלית, היוזמה נתקבלה ע"י ממארה ומצרים. הזמירות לגבי ניסוחים לקידום היוזמה משקפת את העובדה שההתקדמות היא על גשר צר מאוד. כל הרוצה בקידום התהליך צריך להיזהר שלא להכשילו או להכביד עליו. ההתקדמות היא קשה אולם היא מכה שורשים ולא נראית נוסחה אלטרנטיבית שתהווה בסיס אלטרנטיבי, אם המשא ומתן הנוכחי יעלה על שרטון. נוסחה כמוצג בתיוטה המעניקה טריטוריה וריבונות

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לפלטטינאים היא מעבר לעמדת ממארה ואף מעבר למה שתבטא בנקודות שהעלה הנשיא מובארק - 2 גורמים המעורבים אקטיבית במז'מ. נוסחה כזאת תהיה בעלת השלכות שליליות בשטח, היא תחזק את ידי הקצוניים במחנה הערבי, ותכביד על אלה המוכנים להמשיך במאמצים לקידום יוזמת השלום היחידה הקיימת.

אפילו עמדת האפיפיור ה- RECORDED, שעליה אנו מצטערים אינה מדברת מעבר להשוואה בין זכויות היהודים והפלסטטינאים להומלנד. התיוטה שלפנינו מרחיקה לכת הרבה מעבר לעמדה הנ"ל של האפיפיור.

פסקה שלישית - דחיתת תחולתם של מסמכי יסוד כ-242 וקמף דיויד, שהתקבלו בעקבות מאמצים של ממארה'ב ושעבורם שילמה ישראל מחיר יקר, בתיוטה שלפנינו, מעלהאשאלה כמה זמן יעבור עד שיוחל בדחיקת תחולתו של ההסדר אליו אנו חותרים עתה. יתר על כן מזיק קידום PROMOTING מעמד מסמכים כגון: הכרזת פאז מ-1982 (מדינה פלסטטינאית ללא מז'מ ללא הסכם, ללא יחסים דיפלומטיים) או הודעת ערפאת מדצמבר 1988.

אורי גורדון - מרדכי ידיד.

רע

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כנסיות, רביב, הסברה, תפוצות, ר/מרכז, ממד

** נכנס
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שמו

חוזם: 10,17918
אל: המשרד
יעדים: גנבה/269, מצב/1314
מ-: ווש, נר: 518, תא: 201089, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: שמ
תח: גס: ארבל
נד: ג

ארה"ב

שמו/מידי

אל: סמנכ"ל ארבל

דע: מצפא, נאום-השגריר (הועבר) ג'נבה השגריר

מאת: לש' השגריר וושינגטון

פגישה עם בולטון

1. השגריר נפגש לא'צ עם ע. המזכיר לאירגונים בינ"ל ג'ון בולטון

2. בשיחה הודה השגריר לבולטון פעם נוספת על פעילותו למניעת שינוי במעמד אש"פ בסוכנויות האו"מ בכלל ולאחרונה באונסק"ו.

כן העלה, בהמשך לפגישות שטיין את נושא U.P.U. כדי להבטיח שלא יהיה שינוי במעמד אש"פ.

3. בנושא מינוי בלנשאר, לא היה בולטון מעודכן. סיפר שנפגש השבוע עם מזכ"ל האו"מ ולא שמע ממנו דבר על כך. אתמול עשה בניו יורק וגם כן לא שמע דבר. הבטיח שיעמוד בקשר עם פיקרינג ואברם ויטפל בנושא.

לש' שגריר.

17

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל, סייבל, משפט, ר/מרכז, ממד

** נכנס

יודי

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חוזם: 10,17284

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1228

מ-: ווש, נר: 464, תא: 191089, זח: 1400, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

א"ת 2

יודי/רגיל.

אל: מזכיר הממשלה א. רובינשטיין.
ממנכ"ל. סמנכ"ל צפ"א.

מאת עודד ערן.

חהכ' כהן וסולודר - פולארד.

א. חברות הכנסת כהן וסולודר ביקרו את ג'ונתן פולארד ב-16.10. הביקור אורגן על ידי השגרירות (אך במקביל היתה פנייה גם של הרב אבי וייס שהתלווה לשתי החכ'יות במהלך ביקורן בארה"ב). הדיווח שנמסר לי על ידי שתי החכ'יות על פגישתן זהה במידה רבה למה שהופיע בעתונות הישראלית ולכן לא אוסיף. הן ציינו את היחס החיובי אליהן מצד שלטונות הכלא.

ב. ב-17-18/10 ביקרו השתיים בווינגטון וקיימו סדרת פגישות שכולה אורגנה על ידי אבי וייס. השלשה דיווחו על פגישות אלו לחמ' הן בפגישה בשגרירות ב-17/10 והן טלפונית.

הן נפגשו בנפרד עם חברי הקונגרס המילטון, אקרמן, גילמן אנגל, פקסטון, פיין, ברטון, ג'ורג' מילר, מל לוין לארי סמית והסנטורים הטש ות'רמונד. לדבריהן, ביקרו באייפאז אך לא הצליחו להפגש עם תום דיין כפי שרצו.

ג. לדבריהן, הן התרכזו בבקשה לפעולה קונגרסיונלית למען שחרורו של פולארד, ומצאו נכונות לפעולה שנועה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בין נכונות מיידית ואקטיבית, כמו מצד קונגרסמן ברטון לבין נכונות לפעולה במסגרת של קבוצה סלקטיבית (המילטון, לוין ואחרים). ורתיעה מסויימת, כמו מצד קונגרסמן סמית, שהדגיש במיוחד את הבעיתיות שיש ליהדות ארה"ב בנקודה זו. לדברי החכ'יות, כל שומעיהן אמרו, שלא חשו בכל מעורבות ממשלתית ישראלית בנושא וכי לא קיבלו כל פנייה מנציגי ישראל בנידון. כל אנשי שיחן ביקשו לקבל חומר בנושא, והבטיחו לעיין וללמוד אותו היטב.

כהערכה צדדית אוסיף, שמצאתי כמעניינת את נכונות קונגרסמן המילטון לפגוש את השתיים, והדבר נובע, לדעתן ממערכת יחסים אישיים בין המילטון לבין אביו של פולארד.

ד. ביקשתי מהחכ'יות שעם בואן לארץ ידווחו בהרחבה למזכיר הממשלה על ביקורן.

ערן.

לב

תפ: שהח, סשהח, ממנכל, ממה, בנצור, מצפא, מזכיר הממשלה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 20.10.89

17285

** נכנס

10 ד'י

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חוזם: 10,17285

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1230

מ-: ווש, נר: 465, תא: 191089, זח: 1430, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: אפסוק

נד: @

אריק!

סודי/רגיל

אל: סמנכ' ל אפסוק

יועץ מדיני לשה'ח

מאת: עודד ערן.

אתיופיה.

התקשר קן שטיין בשם הנשיא לשעבר קרט, שקרא בעתון
על פגישת שה'ח עם עמיתו האתיופי בניו יורק.
ע'מ לשאול באם, הנושא, שהוא, קרט, טיפל בו, עלה
והאם יוכלו לקבל דיווח מאיתנו בנקודה זו.
אנא תשובתכם.

ערן.

לב

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, רהמ, הדס, מאפ, 1, בנצור, מצפא

** נכנס
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שמור

חוזם: 10,16601

אל: המשרד

יעדים: לונדון/344

מ-: נוש, נר: 440, תא: 181089, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: גס: צפא

נד: 8

אוניברסיטה

שמור/מיידי.

אל השגריר לונדון

דע: מ'. שילה-יועץ לענייני תפוצות.

מאת: שגרירות, וושינגטון

ביקור יו"ר מועדון הנשיאים סימור רייך.

1. במסגרת ביקורו בבריטניה יועד רייך לשיחה עם רוהמ' תאצ'ר.

2. השיחה נקבעה ל-7.11.29 ב-1630.

3. רייך מעוניין לפגוש בבוקר (א'ב?) ה-29.11 לקבלת תדרוך.

4. אנא אישורך להצעת רייך.

שטיין.

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות, איר, 2, איר 1

6406

מכאן תוכלו שעות ימי ע"פ 052

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

490

2/5 327

October 19, 1989

The Honorable James Baker
Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:


Congress has traditionally played an important role in the formulation of U.S. arms transfer policies. Indeed, Congress has supported the vast majority of arms transfers proposed by the Executive Branch, particularly those that met a specific defense need of an ally and did not pose a threat to regional stability. However, there have been times when Congress has expressed its concerns with regard to a specific sale because it believed that the sale would damage overall U.S. interests.

We have specific questions about the proposed transfer of M-1 tanks to Saudi Arabia. For example, we would like to know: about the strategic threat necessitating this sale; about the type of armor, ammunition, and improvements the tanks will have as well as what components will be in the total package; whether these are replacement tanks or additions to the existing Saudi inventory; where the tanks will be based; the type of controls—if any—on deployment; and their effect on the overall military balance in the region.

These are the kinds of questions which need to be discussed in consultations between the legislative and executive branches. While we would have hoped that there would have been greater consultation with Congress before a decision was reached on the M-1 sale, we nonetheless believe there is still an opportunity to address our concerns during this prenotification period. We think this could facilitate the forging of a consensus on this particular sale and hopefully lead to more routinized consultative procedures between the branches on arms transfer policies.


Thank you for your consideration.


Sincerely,



Mel Levine, M.C.



Vin Weber, Sec.
Republican Conf.


Lawrence J. Smith, M.C.


Richard Gephardt
Majority Leader


William Brownfield, M.C.


William Gray
Majority Whip


Steny Hoyer, Chair


Ben Gilman, M.C.


Howard Berman, M.C.

Edward Feighan
Edward Feighan, M.C.

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Gary Ackerman
Gary Ackerman, M.C.

Harry Johnston
Harry Johnston, M.C.

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Mervyn Dymally
Mervyn Dymally, M.C.

Eni Faleogavaega
Eni Faleogavaega, M.C.

Olympia Snowe
Olympia Snowe, M.C.

Porter Goss
Porter Goss, M.C.

James McClure Clarke
James McClure Clarke, M.C.

Stephen J. Solarz
Stephen J. Solarz, M.C.

Howard Wolpe
Howard Wolpe, M.C.

Gus Yatron
Gus Yatron, M.C.

Tom Lantos
Tom Lantos, M.C.

Peter Kostmayer
Peter Kostmayer, M.C.

Ano Houghton
Ano Houghton, M.C.

Dan Burton
Dan Burton, M.C.

Elton Gallegly
Elton Gallegly, M.C.

Newt Gingrich
Newt Gingrich
Minority Whip

Robert C. Romo
Robert C. Romo, M.C.

Donald Payne
Donald Payne, M.C.

Chris Smith
Chris Smith, M.C.

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Robert Torricelli
Robert Torricelli, M.C.

Ted Weiss
Ted Weiss, M.C.

Doug Bosco
Doug Bosco, M.C.

Wayne Owens
Wayne Owens, M.C.

Eliot L. Engel
Eliot Engel, M.C.

John Miller
John Miller, M.C.

Sam Gejdenson
Sam Gejdenson, M.C.

19/10

LEVINE SENDS LETTER TO SECRETARY BAKER EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER
M-1 TANK SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA

Congressman Mel Levine (D-CA), along with Congressman Larry Smith (D-FL), a bipartisan majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the bipartisan leadership of the House, today sent a letter to Secretary of State James Baker raising questions about the proposed transfer of M-1 tanks to Saudi Arabia.

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While noting that Congress has supported the vast majority of arms transfers proposed by the Executive Branch, the letter states that Congress at times has expressed concerns over sales which it believed would damage overall U.S. interests. Even though it takes no final position on the M-1 sale, the letter does ask "...about the strategic threat necessitating this sale; about the type of armor, ammunition, and improvements the tanks will have...; whether these are replacement tanks...; where the tanks will be based; the type of controls--if any--on deployment; and their effect on the overall military balance in the region."

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The letter concludes by expressing disappointment over the extent of consultation to date between the legislative and executive branches, and suggests that these are concerns which must be addressed before a resolution on the sale is reached.

In a separate statement, Levine said that a sale of this magnitude needs to be scrutinized very carefully. "In light of the fact that the Saudis have received over \$30 billion worth of military goods and services in the past eight years from the U.S., I am troubled that they still have yet to meet many basic U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East. In particular, their performance on the peace process has been abysmal. Their vote just two days ago to deny Israel's credentials at the U.N. underscores that the Saudis continue to cast their lot with the most radical and rejectionist Arab countries." He also urged that the sale be examined in terms of furthering U.S. foreign policy priorities in the Mideast--such as slowing the regional arms race--and not, for example, in terms of whether the sale will reduce the unit cost of the M-1.

A copy of the letter is attached.

END

דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: שמור		כתובת:
תאריך וזמן העבור: 19.10.89 - 12:00	ארה"ב	חל: מקטי"ח משהבי"ט סמנכ"ל צפ"א
פס' פרוק: 463 הפסרד:		דע:
303 67		פאת: עודד ערו

אייפאייק - צייני

ראשי אייפאייק (לוי, אשר, וינברג, מיציל ודיין) נפגשו ב- 17/10 עם מזכיר ההגנה צייני. בשיחה עלו הנושאים הבאים:

1. עסקה סעודית - צייני הסביר כי העסקה חיונית ליחסים בין ארה"ב וסעודיה ושמוטב, מבחינתה של ישראל, שאם היא יוצאת לפועל, שארה"ב ולא ספקיות אחרות תהיה מעורבת.
2. הסיוע לישראל - ראשי אייפאייק עמדו על הקושי הגובר והולך עבור ישראל כתוצאה מירידת כח הקניה של הסיוע לישראל. צייני, אף שגילה הבנה, אמר, שגם ארה"ב עומדת בפני קשיים, והוא הדגיש זאת באומרו, שארה"ב תצטרך לצמצם ב- 180.000 חייל את מצבת כ"א שלה.
3. מחשב-על. - ראשי אייפאייק העלו זאת בעקבות הכתבה ב"ניו-יורק טיימס" בנידון, ורואן, שנכח בשיחה, אמר שהדעת לא נותנת שזה ימנע מישראל. הוא הבטיח לפעול נמרצות לאישור מכירתם למוסדות מדע בישראל.
4. ש"פ אסטרטגי - צייני דיבר על נושא זה כחיוני למערכת היחסים בין ישראל וארה"ב וכי יעקב אישית אחריו.

ערו

שמה סשה רהט דמחל 3
 הדיסד דמ רח זמן 4
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

תפוצה: 36

א"ת
קמ"ו
מכתב

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שגרירות ישראל ביושנינגטון
טופס מברק

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דף 1 מתוך 2
דחופות: בהול
טורגז גלוי

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה.

דע :

תאריך, זמן: 19.10.89
מספר המברק:

מאת: עתונות, יושנינגטון.

449

המשרד:

נא להעביר בהול בפקס לפזנברג

ג'ון גושקו בכתבתו על שתי הגישות בהן נוקסת ארה"ב ביחס לירי
בנושא תהליך השלום.
האחת - ארה"ב מביעה מורת רוח מדבריו של שמיר, במרוך מחמ"ד
השתמשו בביטויים: "לא מועיל ומאכזב".
השניה - ארה"ב ממשיכה (דרך דברי שמיר) בשת"פ עם ישראל לחפש
דרכים לקדם את תהליך השלום.

יושנינגטון פוסט, 19.10.89.

עתונות

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THE WASHINGTON POST

J.S. Takes Two-Pronged Approach to Israel on Peace Process

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States chided Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir yesterday for making "unhelpful and disappointing" comments about the U.S. role in the Middle East peace process. But Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens conferred by phone for almost 40 minutes about ways to start an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, and the Shamir issue never came up.

By taking this two-pronged approach, the Bush administration seemed first to be sending Shamir a public signal to soften the strident one he has used recently toward the United States. And secondly,

Baker's talk with Arens indicated that the administration does not want the search for a peace formula to be sidetracked by a quarrel with Shamir.

In two speeches this week to his hard-line Likud bloc, Shamir insisted Israel would not allow the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to take part in talks about the future of the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The United States has proposed a Cairo meeting in which Israelis and a specially-chosen group of Palestinians would discuss ground rules for elections in the occupied areas, and Baker has registered impatience with Israel's objections.

But Shamir regards the proposed meeting as a disguised means of

nudging Israel into negotiations with the PLO. He told his Likud audience he would remain firm even if it led to tension with the United States, the Jewish state's principal ally and supplier of \$3 billion annually in military and economic aid.

Yesterday, State Department spokesman Margaret Tutwiler replied that Shamir's statement "was unhelpful, and we're disappointed." She added, "We're not looking for a fight or confrontation with Israel . . . Our only purpose is to help the government of Israel advance its own peace initiative."

In the context of the carefully worded diplomatic language the State Department normally uses for public pronouncements, Tutwiler's words stood out as an unmistakable

rebuke to Shamir. When a reporter noted that Shamir's remarks implied Israel had lost its U.S. friends, she replied, "That's ludicrous."

Tutwiler and White House officials said that after Shamir made his speeches, he spoke by telephone with President Bush on Tuesday. Administration officials said Bush and Shamir discussed the prime minister's comments, but refused to elaborate. Shamir is expected here next month for a White House meeting with Bush and Baker.

Tutwiler said that although Arens and Baker talked for almost 40 minutes yesterday, "Shamir's statements never came up; they were not discussed." Except for an expression of condolence from

Arens about the death toll in the San Francisco earthquake, the conversation was devoted exclusively to discussing ways of starting the peace dialogue, she said.

Asked if Baker had left the U.S. rebuttal to her while he continued his efforts to keep Arens engaged in discussion of the peace process, she responded, "He moves in mysterious ways."

Other U.S. officials who asked not to be identified said Shamir's remarks probably were prompted by a desire to build support within the American Jewish community for Israel's position and by a hope that the threat of confrontation would force the administration to back down.

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Q Is the initiative to have Egypt, Israel and this government meet dead now that the PLO has apparently said they don't like it?

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MR. FITZWATER: We don't believe it's -- that it is dead. We will continue to pursue the peace process in the region, to talk to all parties with the Shamir elections concept as the starting point or centerpiece for discussions. And there have been setbacks and there have been difficulties and barriers that have been erected, but nevertheless, we still think there is opportunity for progress and we will continue to pursue that direction.

Q We're not sending any millions to help them carry on the election, are we?

MR. FITZWATER: We're still at the embryonic stage of discussing the elections, so we haven't gotten to money.

Q -- of this three -- of this Israel, Egypt, US mission to try to get this thing going?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't have any information on the specifics, but I'm not aware of that.

Q What about -- did the President lament the Israeli Cabinet's rejection of the Mubarak plan and urge them to reconsider?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, of course, we have said before that we still believe the Shamir elections proposal is a valid starting point and worthy of discussion. We lament criticisms in various directions. It's difficult to say exactly what's been rejected by who and so forth, so we'd prefer to take the --

Q They rejected the 10 points.

MR. FITZWATER: Well, the Party did. See, now you've got to get into all kinds of definitions --

Q (Inaudible).

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I don't think I can go into it from here. But there's all kinds of nuances to that in terms of who rejected what. Suffice to say there have been setbacks, there have been rejections, we continue to pursue the process.

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הימים. (מהחלטת המשך הראשונה, או מהשניה, או מהתאריך בו,
 כמקווה יעבור חוק ההקצבות עצמו.)
 בהתייעצות עם יועצים משפטיים ואחרים נראה שכמעט בלתי ניתן
 לקבל חו"ד מישפטית ברורה שתקבע את הפירוש הנכון בסוגיה זו. ע"מ
 לוודא שאכן אגף התקציבים לא ייאחז באי הבהירות הנ"ל במטרה לנסות
 לעכב את העברת הסיוע, נשתדל להכליל הבהרה בנוסח החלטת המשך
 השניה שכאמור תתקבל ככל הנראה ב- 26 לחודש.

א/ת 1/2

ס ו ד י - ב י ו ת ר

18 באוקטובר 1989
853

אל : ראה"מ (לעיניו בלבד)

שיחת טלפון שה"ח ארנס - מזכיר המדינה בייקר 18.10.89
השיחה ביוזמת ארנס ומתנהלת לאחר שבייקר משיב טלפון.

בתחילת השיחה מדברים על האסון בסן-פרנסיסקו. בייקר מוסר פרטים וארנס מזכיר שיחתו עם בראון ואת נכונותנו לסייע אם יש צורך בכך.

בהמשך מביע ארנס אכזבה מהצבעת הערבים באו"ם בנושא כתב האמנה ומזכיר שיודע שארה"ב התאמצה להניאם מהצבעה כזו.

בייקר משיב כי האמריקאים היו תחת הרושם ש"דוקא חשבנו שהצלחנו לזכות בכמה קולות".

ארנס משיב כי לא היו ביניהם קולות של ערבים ומציין שמבחינת הציבור בישראל, הצבעת הערבים נחשבת כמבחן לכוונותיהם. מצער שלא שינו מנהגם.

בייקר:

מציע שנדון בשורש הבעיה.

ארנס:

ראה"מ דיבר עם הנשיא ואני מבין שהנשיא הציע שנתייעץ כיצד להניט את הדברים. שוחחנו בטלפון ללא יכולת להתקדם. אולי תשלחו מישהו או שאנחנו נשלח מישהו, נשב יחד ונבחן אם ניתן להגיע לדבר מה.

בייקר:

ניתן לדבר על זה, אבל איני בטוח שזו הדרך הטובה ביותר. זה כרוך ב-visibility.

You have seen what they have said in Bagdad. Why d'ont you talk to the P.M. to give some consideration to using that as a political cover that you need with some of the people pressing you not to proceed, and then consider going along with the framework and relying on side assurances with respect to the two issues that concern you. I am confident we can satisfy you, provided it remains discreet. you ought to rely on us. accept the framework and we will give you assurances on the agenda: Opening statement, but then addressing the election issue, and if other issues are raised, only on the bases of your initiative.

ארנס:

אתה יודע שאיננו מאושרים באשר ל-opening statement, אבל חושבני שניתן להגיע לסיכום. כחובן שאם נפעל בצורה נכונה, אם כפי שאתה מציע באמצעות side assurances או בדרכים אחרות. אני לא חושב שנוכל לעשות זאת בטלפון, עדיף לשלוח אנשים שלכם אלינו או שלנו אליכם.

בייקר:
I ^{do} hesitate to do it, but I will not rule it out. What I have suggested would protect you, and you would posture yourself so that if it fails- its the other's fault. Sending somebody here or there, raises the visibility and therefore. make for problems. the approach I suggest: accept the framework, maybe with some few changes, and rely on private assurances. You should know we are long way from closure on the other side.

ארנס:
באופן עקרוני, אני רוצה לומר שייחכן שההצעה לשינויים ב- basic framework בנוסף למכתב לוואי, יש בה הגיון וייחכן שתוביל להסכמה.

בייקר:
Be careful. For it to have a chance (כדי שזה יצליח), it must be very modest changes. You make any changes and the Egyptians will come back at us with changes.

ארנס:
את הרעיון הכללי אני אולי קונה, אך אני בספק אם ניתן להשיג זאת באמצעות הטלפון. גם גישתך מצריכה discussion.

בייקר:
We can mull it over, but I'm not coming over there.

ארנס:
אינני חציע זאת.

בייקר:
We need to make sure that this is not perceived as an American proposal. Think about the framework and assurances. You would not be expected to sit down with a delegation to which you would object.
(בהמשך מזכיר בייקר את המונח דיאלוג ראשון, וארנס מעיר לו שיש רק דיאלוג אחד לפני הבחירות וגם נושא הסדר הביניים יהיה נתון לחו"מ רק עם הנבחרים אחרי הבחירות. כן מציין ארנס שייחכן שמצרים רוצה לעקוף את הבחירות ע"י הארכת הדיאלוג ללא קץ וזאת באמצעות העלאת נושאים שונים לסדר היום. צריך להקפיד שלא נוסט מהמסלול).

ארנס:
למה כה חשוב ענין opening statement.

בייקר:
We need opening statement. We can't put it together without it.

ארנס:
אנו חודאגים, ויש לנו סיבה טובה לכך, שיעשה נסיון לעקוף את כל רעיון הבחירות.

(בהמשך בנוגע ל-assurances אומר ארנס):
אני חבין את הרצון שלך שה- assurances יהיו discreet, אבל אנו נידרש להראות את ה-assurances.

בייקר:
Don't use the word assurances, but we will support you on that. I don't mind writing them down.

בהמשך חוזר ארנס לאפשרות להפגיש בין נציגים בלי שהגנין ידלוף.

בייקר:
You run the risk of not reaching closure. I want the U.S. and Israel to reach closure, then it won't be your fault if you don't make progress.

ארנס:
מה עמדת המצרים?

בייקר:
I don't know. I have not talked to Meguid, I may speak to him today, or he can call me, I was hopeful that you and I could reach closure.

ארנס:
מבחינתי יש חשיבות לעמדה המצרית. זוהי אינפורמציה רלוונטית מבחינתי.

בייקר:
If you would accept, then we can tell them to put up or shut up.

ארנס:
האם הנשיא לא הציע שיהיה: "Some kind of 'get together'?"

בייקר:
The President just said that we have to put our F.M. in touch.

ארנס:
אנחנו נחשוב אצלנו ואני מציע שאתם תחשבו על האפשרויות לקיים פגישה. אני מוטרד שלא נוכל להגיע לסיכום ללא מפגש. אפילו לשיטתך, לא נוכל להגיע למסקנה מיד, ונצטרך לדון בניסוח ואנו נרצה להכניס תיקונים, וזה יצריך מהלכי הלך ושוב.

בהמשך ארנס מזכיר שוב לבייקר שאחד: that there might be role for small modifications.

הדברים יהיו פחות קשים עבורנו אם נוכל כאן או שם להוריד מילה, להוריד למשל את המילה negotiations ולהשאיר רק negotiations. התוספת של negotiations ל-elections, לגמרי לא תואמת את עמדתנו. הזכרת negotiation תאפשר הכללת כל נושא בדיאלוג.

בייקר:
If they are truly minor.

ארנס:
ייתכן שיהיו שינויים קטנים, שניתן להכניס ולא יגרמו לקשיים מהם אתה מודאג.

בייקר:
accept this concept and we will pitch it over to the Egyptians, we will give you private assurances in writing.

בהמשך -
בייקר: יש אנשים, לפעמים אפילו אני, שחושבים שאינכם רציניים לגבי היוזמה.

ארנס:
אינך צריך להיות בין האנשים האלה. אין ספק שאנו מחויבים ליוזמה. חשוב שתבין את רמת הדאגה אצלנו. זה לא רק עניין של לחצים פנימיים. ראה"מ מוזאג שבסוף נכנס למלכודת, לדו-שיח עם אש"פ ושם ידברו על מדינה פלשתינית וזכות השיבה. אלה דברים הנחשבים עבור ישראל לסכנת מוות.

בייקר:
You are not going to find Palestinians in the territories (חשנה) we have got to prevent the perception, but how can we act as guarantors that the PLO won't say that they represent them.

ארנס:
הבעיה היא באפשרות שיווצר דימוי שהחברה' האלה
Were sent by the PLO ,or represent the PLO.

בייקר:

Then you will have the right to leave.

בסיום מבקש בייקר לקבל תשובה להצעתו מחר ככל האפשר. ארנס מצידן שנחשוב על הרעיונות.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

October 19, 1989

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

TO: The Honorable Albert Bustamante
FROM: Yoram Ettinger, Minister for Congressional Affairs

Subject: U.N. General Assembly Vote on Israel's Accreditation

1. On Oct. 17, 1989 the U.N. General Assembly rejected (95 to 37 with 15 abstentions) the attempt to deny Israel its U.N. accreditation.
2. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Libya and the rest of the Arab Bloc (except Egypt) led the campaign to delegitimize Israel. They also exerted pressure on Third World countries to do likewise. A few of them succumbed to that coercion. Oman voted with Egypt, but declared it to be erroneous.
3. This vote may refocus one's attention on the broader context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and on the wider scope of the continuing threat to Israel's security.
4. It reflects the sole strategic common denominator binding together countries, which have otherwise been fragmented over religious, ethnic, economic, military and territorial issues. Some 30 inter-Arab conflicts are currently active!
5. The Arab vote undermines any contention that Glasnost is reaching the Middle East.
6. It is at variance with the claim that the Arabs have finally accepted Israel as an integral element in the region.
7. The Arab campaign to delegitimize Israel is consistent with the daily anti-Semitic and anti-Israel content of the (state-controlled) Arab media, and with the attitude demonstrated by the education systems in the Arab countries toward Israel -- both of which mold Arab public opinion on Israel.
8. The Oct. 17, 1989 performance by the Arab Bloc at the U.N. sheds light on the obligation -- conferred upon Israel by its surroundings -- to display caution, rather than hastiness, when it comes to entering negotiations.
9. The Oct. 17, 1989 Arab vote must not be allowed to undermine the peace process, but it certainly demonstrates the need to be aware of the realities of the "Middle Eastern Neighborhood".

Respectfully,

Yoram

END

סגירות ישראל / וושינגטון

סוּפּוּס מְבִרָה

דף / מחור 10 דפים

סגור בטחוני - בלתי

דחיסות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 1700

מס' מברק 443

אל: המשרד, בטחון, גיו יורק

אמ"ק

280

אל: מצטי"א, מעי"ת, אמ"ק

58

דע: יועץ רה"מ לחקטורה, יועץ שהביט לחקטורה
גיו יורק, אמ"א, אמ"ק/ק"מ, ג'וקר צ"מ

October 18, 1989 ליום דבר מחמי"ד

Q What is your response to what Prime Minister Shamir said yesterday?

MS. TUTWILER: Before I have a response for you, as you know, I think Marlin confirmed today, the Prime Minister called President Bush yesterday afternoon. What you don't know is that Foreign Minister Arens called Secretary Baker this morning, and they were on the phone approximately, I'd say, anywhere from 20 to 40 minutes.

On a specific reaction to the Prime Minister's comments from yesterday, I would tell you that we've said all along that all sides should refrain from statements that make it harder to advance the peace process. The statement he made yesterday was unhelpful, and we're disappointed. We're not looking for a fight or confrontation with Israel. That goes without saying, and everyone knows that. Our only purpose is to help the government of Israel advance its own peace initiative.

Q Well what about PLO statements recently?

MS. TUTWILER: I answered that --

Q Well just to follow up, if I may ask about Mr. Shamir's statement. Mr. Shamir also indicated -- and I'm quoting -- "this time, the battle against the United States is hard. It's a miracle that thus far, we have held out our own against the world when no element supports our position."

I mean, even in Israeli rhetorical criteria, this is an extraordinary statement, suggesting that Israel has no friends in the United States. Could you perhaps react directly to this -- to this point?

MS. TUTWILER: I just did. I said it was unhelpful, and it was disappointing.

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Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including the number 3 and various scribbles.

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Q No, I'm asking whether it's acceptable to you that there are no more friends --

MS. TUTWILER: That's ludicrous. The United States and Israel are good friends and good allies, and have been for many, many years, and that's very well known.

Q Do you accept the inevitability inherent to what he said, we must accept the assumption that we may be entering a tense period with the US. Is there such an inevitability?

MS. TUTWILER: I do not have a characterization on that. I tried to answer it for you by saying we're not looking for a fight or confrontation with Israel.

Q Can you tell us anything more about the Secretary's conversation with Minister Arens?

MS. TUTWILER: The entire conversation was devoted to continuing to work on the framework, and that was his entire conversation.

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Q So --

Q So, wait a minute. So on the one hand, you have this confrontational language that you're not looking for, but seems to exist anyway in public; and on the other hand, you're still discussing the substance of the proposal?

MS. TUTWILER: Absolutely, we're still discussing it. As I keep saying, and I've said it every day I think for the last eight or nine days, we are still engaged. We still are working on getting the Israelis and the Palestinians to a dialogue. One person earlier this week had asked me wasn't this dead. I said no, I would think by the activities of the last 24 hours, that would prove what I was saying was in fact correct. They are still very much engaged, still very much working on this.

Q Could you characterize the -- I realize you're not the White House spokesman.

MS. TUTWILER: I'm not.

Q It's possible, however, that this question may not get raised at the White House today --

MS. TUTWILER: It did, and Marlin refused to characterize it, and I'm not at liberty to characterize it --

Q Characterize what?

MS. TUTWILER: The President's conversation with the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon.

Q Would you say that it -- that that -- that your description of a moment ago of the tenor of the conversation with Foreign Minister Arens applies also to the conversation with the Prime Minister.

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MS. TUTWILER: Absolutely not. And Secretary Baker's conversation with the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister Shamir's statements, or what we've read that he said yesterday, never came up -- was not discussed.

Q Margaret, Shamir's statement did not come up in their conversation?

MS. TUTWILER: Not once.

Q In this conversation with Arens?

MS. TUTWILER: In the conversation with Arens.

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Q But we can't draw that conclusion about the conversation with the President -- because you don't speak for the President.

MS. TUTWILER: I'm not at liberty to characterize the President's conversation with Shamir.

Q Did the Secretary and Mr. Arens discuss the Baghdad results, the Baghdad declarations?

MS. TUTWILER: Yes.

Q The Prime Minister, if I may add there, also said that it is hard for the Americans to give them up -- Baker's five points -- although we have given them our unequivocal answer. If that's right -- if such an unequivocal answer has been given, then the five Baker points are dead. And still, apparently, if the Prime Minister is right, you refuse to acknowledge that reality.

MS. TUTWILER: So, who are you saying said that?

Q Mr. Shamir -- yesterday.

MS. TUTWILER: It's a direct quote --

Q Yeah.

MS. TUTWILER: -- or it's just someone's interpretation?

Q No, no -- it's a direct quote.

MS. TUTWILER: I don't want to get into a back-and-forth with the Prime Minister of Israel, but Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Arens this morning spent, as I characterized, anywhere from, I believe, 20 to 40 minutes, on the telephone discussing the framework.

Q I'm not sure I understand what's going on here. The United States is calling the Israeli Prime Minister's remarks "unhelpful," and it's saying this --

MS. TUTWILER: And "disappointing."

Q -- and disappointing.

MS. TUTWILER: His remarks of yesterday.

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MS. TUTWILER: -- prior to when he talked to the President.

Q Yeah, but you won't say anything about the conversation with the President, is --

MS. TUTWILER: But I want to make clear those remarks were made prior to when he talked to President Bush.

Q Right, but we don't know -- you're not telling us that anything has changed as a result of that conversation because you're not telling us anything about that conversation. So --

MS. TUTWILER: What could it have changed?

Q -- all we are left -- well, all -- you're just suggesting that because it was made before the presidential conversation, that perhaps there was some change. We have no way of knowing that.

MS. TUTWILER: No, I'm not trying to do that.

Q Okay -- good.

MS. TUTWILER: What we're on is trying to get to a dialogue, which I keep saying this entire exercise has been about for weeks, of getting the Israelis and the Palestinians to a dialogue which, after all, is Prime Minister Shamir's initiative, his election proposal.

That has never changed, as far as we're concerned. When I'm down here every day telling you that Secretary Baker is honestly and truly engaged, still willing to stay engaged, is working on this, that hasn't ever changed.

Q If I may continue my question --

MS. TUTWILER: Sure.

Q -- what I see happening here is the United States is publicly calling the Prime Minister of Israel's remarks disappointing and unhelpful, but the exponent of foreign policy for the United States, James Baker, did not officially convey that point of view to the Israeli government when he had his conversation with the representative of the Israeli government yesterday. So, through official channels, there is no -- there appears to be, to us anyway from the outside --

MS. TUTWILER: There's no reason for it to come up. His entire -- the first part of his conversation, to be perfectly honest with you -- was Foreign Minister Arens expressed his deep condolences and sympathy to the earthquake [victims], asked Secretary Baker a number of questions about the earthquake. They went right into discussing the framework. So, you know, you can draw your own conclusions.

Q But, Shamir's remarks were about -- had to do with the US proposals on the --

MS. TUTWILER: People make remarks all the time.

Q -- framework. Why are they unhelpful?

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Q Margaret, has anything happened since these remarks were made by Mr. Shamir that has given the United States some hope that there -- that this position he took in these remarks may not be Israel's position?

MS. TUTWILER: We have never assumed or been operating on the premise that Israel was not supporting its own initiative and working towards that end. We've never done that. You all may have and many of you all have asked me many days ago, "This is just over. Why are you doing this? Et cetera, et cetera." I've never said that, because they are still working towards this goal.

Q -- but Shamir said yesterday that nobody in the United States [is] supporting Israel initiative.

MS. TUTWILER: Excuse me?

Q Mr. Shamir said yesterday that there is nobody in the United States that still supports the Israel initiative.

MS. TUTWILER: Well, I'd refer you back to the record of Secretary Baker, of myself out here as the spokesperson. It's got to be at least over a hundred times when I have said: We wholeheartedly support the Shamir election initiative. I've said it at least three times today. So, I'm -- I don't understand, I don't know.

Q Just a followup. I asked you a couple of days ago, and may I ask it again; maybe there is a will coming from Secretary Baker first to let Shamir and President Bush meet and then to try to work out the frame?

MS. TUTWILER: No. I couldn't come to your same conclusion.

Q And Mr. Shamir is coming to Washington mid-November?

MS. TUTWILER: I've heard that, yes.

Q Yeah, well, so maybe this -- these discussions between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Arens and Meguid will be delayed until after --

MS. TUTWILER: You should not reach that conclusion.

Q But you've just passed a very serious judgment on -- on the Israeli Prime Minister. You suggested what he said was ludicrous. And this sounds increasingly as a moment of truth, perhaps, in US-Israeli relations, because, if the Prime Minister of Israel makes a major statement, such a magnitude, that is characterized as unhelpful and ludicrous --

MS. TUTWILER: I said "disappointing."

Q No, I'm pretty sure you used the word "ludicrous." I mean --

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MS. TUTWILER: That was in response to another question.

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Q Yeah, yeah.
MS. TUTWILER: In a direct question, which was the first question I got today -- Did we have a comment on Prime Minister's statements yesterday? -- I've now said this, I think, four times -- I said the statement was unhelpful and that we were disappointed. That was part of five points that I said.

Q But I'm asking you again about the ludicrous characterization, and perhaps you can elaborate on that, because that sounds to my undiplomatic ears a little bit tougher than usual in characterizing statements of prime ministers.

MS. TUTWILER: That was in characterization, I believe, of your question, sir, "Was Israelis and Americans not friends?" Something to that effect.

Q I was, in fact, quoting the Prime Minister, who suggested that.

MS. TUTWILER: I don't accept that the Prime Minister accepted that, nor do I accept the Prime Minister believes that.

Q Well, he said that.

MS. TUTWILER: Well, fine, go ask him to interpret it for you. Ralph?

Q There's a lot more questions to ask about this, Margaret. I find it -- I find it difficult to understand how you can stand there and criticize the Prime Minister's statement, and then a moment later dismiss it as something that really has no bearing at all on the continuing discussions between the US and the Israeli government on the Shamir initiative. But that seems to be what you're saying is, "Yeah, they're making these statements, but pay no attention to them. They're --"

MS. TUTWILER: I didn't say, "Pay no attention." I characterized them --

Q Well, you said, "People make statements all the time."

MS. TUTWILER: That's true, but that -- I'm telling you the honest truth. They are engaged or working -- Jim Baker and Moshe Arens this morning --

MS. TUTWILER: -- for 40 minutes on the telephone. I told you the Prime Minister called the President yesterday.

Q But what'd he say?

MS. TUTWILER: They didn't talk about the weather.

Q But they -- you didn't tell us what they --

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MS. TUTWILER: I mean, there's a reason that he called.

Q You didn't tell us that they talked about the initiative, though, either.

MS. TUTWILER: Well --

Q And you did tell us that Arens --

MS. TUTWILER: -- if I start down that road --

MS. TUTWILER: -- then I'll be characterizing the President's conversation, which I am not specifically at liberty to do. Nor was Marlin.

Q We assume that the -- that Prime Minister Shamir and the United States government are working on the Shamir election initiative or continuing to do that. And on the -- on the Secretary's framework --

MS. TUTWILER: That's definitely my assumption and always has been. (Pause.) There isn't -- there isn't another proposal that we've been working on -- we're working on that. And we're also working -- back to the thing that I know gets you all confused -- is the framework that Secretary Baker suggested to bridge the gap to get you to Israelis and Palestinians having a dialogue concerning elections.

Q But we don't want to make the assumption -- you're willing to make the assumption or tell us that you agree with the assumption that the Israelis are working on this initiative.

MS. TUTWILER: Why would I think otherwise?

Q I don't know.

MS. TUTWILER: Minister Arens called Secretary Baker this morning. I characterized it, except I had forgotten his first comments were about the earthquake. The entire conversation -- the entire conversation -- was concerning this issue -- the whole thing. So, that would say to me, someone is engaged, someone is interested, someone is working. I couldn't characterize it the opposite way. I would have a hard time doing that.

Q Except if you listen to the Prime Minister's comments.

Q (So far, you've ?) identified that someone as Foreign Minister Arens.

MS. TUTWILER: That's how this has always been done.

Q Are you satisfied that Minister Arens, when he speaks -- calls Mr. Baker and talks with him about this, is speaking with the authority and backing of the Prime Minister of Israel?

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MS. TUTWILER: I have no reason to believe that he does not. And just as Secretary Baker has the authority of the President of the United States when he's speaking, you assume his counterparts do in other countries.

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Q But, that goes -- it seems to go against Shamir's public statement yesterday that Israel --

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Q -- has rejected this framework proposal of the United States.

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MS. TUTWILER: -- you all need to get your colleagues over in Jerusalem to ask for a better clarification of the Prime Minister's statements. I have given to you --

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Q Well, why do we have to --

MS. TUTWILER: -- all the United States has to say about the Prime Minister's statement in two words -- "unhelpful, disappointing." That's all we have to say about it.

Q But, in the parlance of what is normally said from the podium where you're standing, that is, highly vivid, charged, and colorful language --

MS. TUTWILER: That's your characterization of it --

Q In this -- no, in this -- (some laughter) -- no, in the context, and given that, you know, I mean, this -- people who institutionally --

MS. TUTWILER: I understand.

Q -- have listened to these things for years, I think, would not dispute that.

MS. TUTWILER: Well, every day's a new day.

Q So, given that, why has the United States not asked for this clarification?

Why are you telling the press that they should go and ask for a clarification? Because it would -- because what the Prime Minister said would seem to have a direct bearing --

MS. TUTWILER: Well, it would seem to me --

Q -- on what we're trying to do.

MS. TUTWILER: -- and you've got as good a brain as anybody in this room -- if this was such a burning issue with Secretary Baker, it seems to me it would have been the first thing he brought up this morning on the phone. I'm telling you it did not come up once.

Q Well, if -- then basically, the assumption from that is that the Secretary does not regard this as a burning issue. Therefore, why in your guidance does the --

MS. TUTWILER: Because I was asked a question --

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MS. TUTWILER: -- and that is the Department's --

Q -- disappointing and unhelpful?

MS. TUTWILER: -- answer based on the direct question that we knew I would get, that I got, that I answered, that I said the Prime Minister's statements were made yesterday prior to his phone call to the President of the United States.

Q Margaret, to go back to the Secretary's conversation with Minister Arens --

MS. TUTWILER: Yes?

Q -- for a moment. As they discussed the framework, was the nature of that discussion working out details within the framework, or was the nature of the discussion whether the framework can be preserved at all?

MS. TUTWILER: There -- it's a little of both, to be perfectly honest with you. And as I described the other day, I said that since there's such serious conversations and debates going on, that that obviously has led to other -- another level of detail that I believe I said. So, that whole, entire conversation is still going on, including framework, including now, which I said the other day, more specifics.

Q But the discussion does include on the table whether this -- the framework is -- explicitly whether the framework's going to fly at all.

MS. TUTWILER: Well, that's always been on the table. I mean that's something that's going to work or is not going to work.

Q Well, no, I -- my question really is whether the framework will continue to be -- whether one can even continue talking about the details of the framework.

MS. TUTWILER: They are absolutely, positively still discussing the framework. Positively. That has not changed.

Q Would it be a fair assumption, then, to say that Secretary Baker, in pursuing his efforts to get agreement on a framework, has chosen to ignore what the Prime Minister of Israel said?

MS. TUTWILER: It did not come up in his conversation at all today with Foreign Minister Arens.

Q Has he --

Q Then one would have to assume he decided to ignore it, and yet to trot you out here to the podium to give them a couple of whaps up side the head -- (laughter).

MS. TUTWILER: He moves in mysterious ways -- (laughter).

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Q -- of the Prime Minister, Mr. Shamir said one more thing in an interview with the Jerusalem Post this morning. He characterized the PLO rejection in Bagdad of the five points as a move that is going to, quote, "energize our efforts to seek peace through our peace initiative." Do you accept this characterization?

MS. TUTWILER: I don't have a specific comment on that. I do have for you, which is similar to what I said yesterday, is that we've said from the beginning that all parties should refrain from imposing conditions that will preempt progress and make it difficult to move forward. Palestinian participation in this process is vital to its success, but if Palestinians want to participate, they must find a way to engage practically in a dialogue with Israel. Statements coming out of Bagdad yesterday were also unhelpful.

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** נכנס
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סודי

חוזם: 10,15887
אל: המשרד
יעדים: מצב/1050
מ-: ווש, נר: 401, תא: 171089, חז: 1300, דח: מ, סג: 10
תח: @ גס: צפא
נד: @

מק

סודי/מידי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

מחשב על: שיחת השגריר - ברטולומיאו (16.10).
לשלך 234 מ - 5.10.

כללי:

1. השגריר נועד ביוזמתו לשיחה עם ברטולומיאו בכדי לברר העכוב באישור בקשת מכון וויצמן לרכישת מחשב על.

2. השתתפו בשיחה מצידם: WENDT (נציג בכיר לנושא טכנולוגיה אסטרטגית), דה-קייין (ס/עוזר המזכיר לנושאים פוליטיים-צבאיים) והירש. מצידנו: הציר והח"מ.

תוכן השיחה:

א. השגריר פירט הסיבות לבקשת מכון וויצמן לרכישת המחשב. (IBM 0903/502).

ב. ברטולומיאו התנצל על העיכוב במתן התשובה. העיר כי בינתיים הגיש מכון וויצמן בקשות נוספות. (סה"כ ארבע). כמו כן נמצאות בקשות מהטכניון ותע"ש בבדיקה.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ג. הסביר את העיכוב במתן תשובה באי השלמת בחינת מדיניותם לגבי האימפקט שיש לייצוא מחשבים (לא רק לישראל) על נושא ה-PROLIFERATION. ציין קיומם של חילוקי דעות בין הסוכנויות הממשל המעורבות בנושא.

ד. בכונתו לזמן השבוע דיון בנושא במגמה לסיים עוד השבוע תהליך קבלת החלטות שתאפשר מתן תשובה לשתי בקשות מכון וויצמן (מחשב על ו-UPGRADING של מחשב נוסף).

ה. ברטולומיאו סבור שניתן למצוא דרך להתגבר על חלק מהדאגות העומדות ביסוד העכוב. כונתו ליישום נוהלי בטחון שיספקו חלק מהבעיות הכרוכות בשימוש לא מבוקר של המחשב.

ו. בתגובה לדברי השגריר על כך שבמחשב לא תעשה פעילות הקשורה בפיתוח או ייצור נשק גרעיני, העיר דה-קייין כי מצפים לקבלת בטחונות לא רק בנושא הגרעין, אלא גם לגבי אי השימוש במחשב לצרכי פיתוח טילים.

ז. ברטולומיאו ציין כי לאחר גיבוש עמדתם בכונתם לשוחח עמנו לגבי יישום נוהלי הבטחון. סיפר כי שוחחו על כך עם ברזיל. נוהל הבטחון שעבדו, שתיושם לגבינו ולגבי ברזיל תספק את צרכינו וצרכי ארה"ב.

ח. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר, הביע ברטולומיאו תקווה שיסיימו הדיונים בשבוע שבועיים הקרובים. מקווה שנוהלי הבטחון שיתקבלו יקלו בעתיד על פישוט וזירוז נוהל מתן תשובה לבקשות דומות.

עד כאן תוכן השיחה.

שטיין.

לב

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, רהמ, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ

6406

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6406

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

נכנס

סודי

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אגף
מנהל
אגף
אגף

חוזם: 10,15887

אל: המשרד

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מ-: ווש, נר: 401, תא: 171089, זח: 1300, דח: מ, סג: 10

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על נושא ה- PROLIFERATION. ציין קיומם של חילוקי
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כי מצפים לקבלת בטחונות לא רק בנושא הגרעין, אלא
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לבקשות דומות.

עד כאן תוכן השיחה.

שטיין.

לב

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, רהמ, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ



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ישראל בניו יורק

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אל: ציר הסברה וושינגטון, מנהל הסברה, מצפ"א
דע: סמנכ"ל אמית"ק, צוות העיון

השר אהוד אולמרט באוניברסיטת קולומביה

ב-16/10 הופיע השר אולמרט באוניברסיטת קולומביה בפני כ-100 סטודנטים, בחסות מכון מז"ח. האוירה הייתה חמה תרתי משמע (...מזוג האוויר לא פעל...). השאלות היו כמעט כולן עוינות, קריאות בינדים מצד סטודנטים פרו פלשתינאים, הערות עוקצניות ולעיתים טונים גבוהים. אולמרט פתח בהרצאה של כחצי שעה בה הדגיש הנקודות הבאות:

1. חכנית הכחירות היא אולמנט מרכזי ביוזמת השלום של ישראל ונועדה לקבוע בדרך דמוקרטית מי מכין תושבי השטחים ייצגם במו"מ. התנגדות ישראל להשתתפות פלשתינאית מחוץ לשטחים נובעת מכך שהדבר יפתח פתח לאלו הטוענים לממוש זכות השיבה. מו"מ עם אש"פ פירושו הסכמה שבסופו של התהליך תוקם מוי"נה פלשתינאית. ביוון שזה הנושא האחד והיחיד במצעו של אש"פ.

2. הצורך בהסדר בינדים נחוץ כדי לאפשר הסתגלות הצדדים לדיו קיום וכדי לכחון כיצד מתבצע ההסכם. החלטה 242 מתיוחסת לנסיגה משטחים אך לא להתחייבות לנסיגה לפני חתילת המו"מ עצמו. ישראל קבלה 242 אך לא מוכנה להתחייב לחוצאות המו"מ.

3. חכנית עשר הנקודות המצרית נועדה להכניס אש"פ בדלת האחורית. מה שנראה לאחדים כפרטים טכניים מהווה עבורנו משמעות קיומית. שני הצדדים, הפלשתינאי והישראלי, יצטרכו להתפשר ולקחת סיכונים.

4. מבחר שאלות/תשובות:
א. התנגדות ישראל למדינה פלשתינאית נובעת מהסיבות הבאות:
- אם תוקם מדינה כזו כיום הקמתה יבואו ערביי ישראל בדרושה לאוטונומיה שפרושה חסול ישראל. ערביי ישראל מזדהים בגשית עם האינטרסות ועם חלומות לאוטונומיה.
- לא ניתן יהיה להגן על 400 ק"מ של גבול מפעילות טרור. טרוריסט בודד מקלקליה יוכל להפיל כל מטוס שימריא מנחב"ג.
ב. מדוע זכות שיבה ליהודים אך לא לערבים? זכות השיבה של יהודים, העקרון הבסיסי ומהותה של ישראל כמקוט מבטח לניצולי השואה. לערבים יש 22 מדינות אחרות לחזור אליהן. זכות שיבה לערבים עלולה להפוך את ישראל למדינה דו לאומית והיא מסורה להרסם ישראל.

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זכות השיבה לאוטונומיה/ישות פלשתינאית את חוקט תלויה בהסדר הסופי ולא כדאי לדון בפרטי ההסדר הסופי שאז לא יהיה סבוי לחסדר ביניים.

ג. האם תכרי אש"פ תושבי השטחים יוכלו להשתתף בבחירות? לא, החברים פרמליה באש"פ לא יוכלו להשתתף. יחד עם זאת לא נבדוק בציווחיהם.

ד. מדיניות ישראל בשטחים לאור זכוונות השואה? (סטודנט יהודי) נמאס לי תחושות האשמה של יהודים כאן בהקשר זה. צרין להיות כרוי שאט משהו עומד לזרוק בקבוק מולוטוב עלי זכותי המוסרית לירות בו. כיוון שאחרת אני אמות, זהו מצב קשה, מכאיב מאד, וטראגי. ללא פתרונו קלים אלא אם כן משהו מצד העלמותה של ישראל. לקוט ולעזוב חד צרדית, ללא חסור איכנו פתרון. יוזמת השלום של ישראל נועדה ליצור תהליך פוליטי וזו הדרך היחידה.

ה. הזכוונות להפציע הכור האטומי בעיראק והיעדר זכות הערבים להפציע דימונה? ישראל מעולם לא רצתה להרוס מדינה אחרת. לנו יש הזכוונות והנסיון מ-47, של כוונות השמר והרס של הערבים. זהו אלמנט האי שיוויון המובנה בסכסוך.

ו. המצב הפוליטי בישראל - ותהליך השלום? המערך יתמוך בכל הסדר שלום שהליכוד ישיג. לא להפך. ללא קשר מי תהיה המפלגה השלטת תמיד יהיה צורך בקונסנזוס לאומי שיקח בחשבון דעותיו של מחצית מהעם שתומכת באופוזיציה.

ז. במהלך השאלות ותשובות הדגיש והבהיר אולמרט בהקשרים שונים את הקנטסקט ההיסטורי-גיאוגרפי של הסכסוך. 67,47, וכו' וכן המאזן האסטרטגי, שהבעיה העיקרית מבחינת ישראל איך להגדיל את הסיכויים לשלום תוך חקטנת הסכסוכים למינימום.

אברוני

ל. ס. ג.

אקדמאים/ניו-יורק
ציון אברוני
17 באוקטובר 1989

דתיפות: מידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק 18	דף: 1
סוג: שמור		פתוח: 1
תאריך וזמן מעור: 17.10.89 - 16:00	מנהל הסברה נאום ניו-יורק	אל:
כס' פרוק: הנשרד:		דע:
56 415	כאת: עודד ערן	

כתב האמנה
לשלך 648



אם לא חלה טעות בדיווח שאנו קיבלנו, הרי שגם עומאן הצביעה בצורה חיובית. אני מציע לנצל זאת - טוב, בהנחה שהדיווח מדויק, ולאמר, שאם עומאן יכולה לעשות זאת, אין כל סיבה שמדינות ערב, שאין להן נגיעה ישירה לסכסוך, לא יוכלו לעשות זאת.

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ערן

מה שכתבתי לך לפני כמה ימים
הוא נכון ונכון
אולי כדאי להגיד
למנהל הסברה
לומר שיש
לעשות זאת

תפוצה: 36

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 14 דפים

סלדו בסמוני בלמים

דחיסות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח

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אל: המשרד, בטחון, ניו יורק

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אל: מצטי"א, מעי"ח, גל"פ

דע: יועץ רח"ם לחקטורה, יועץ שב"ט לחקטורה
ניו יורק, טל"מ, אמין/קסי"ח, אמ"כ-3

October 16, 1989 תדרוך דובר מחמי"ד ליום

- Q Any reaction to Shamir's interview in Ma'ariv, Margaret?
- Q Which picks up on --
- Q Can we start there?

MS. TUTWILER: Okay, let's start with that. Our understanding of what the Prime Minister said is, quote, "Why go all the way to Cairo when both sides, the Israelis and Palestinians, are here?" Quote, "After all, this would be a meeting to discuss only technical matters concerning the modalities of the elections." Quote. "Israel would send a delegation of officials knowledgeable on the subjects rather than a delegation of politicians." Quote, "This would be a preliminary stage only and it should not be portrayed as a major international effort -- event."

- Q (Off mike) -- speech?
- Q And what is our reaction?

MS. TUTWILER: Our reaction to that is that there is no problem with that. He is not speaking, so there is no confusion of a possible meeting between the four -- the three foreign ministers.

Q He, Shamir?

MS. TUTWILER: Shamir. This is about Israelis --

Q No, no, no --

MS. TUTWILER: -- and Palestinians.

Q Right, but he is limiting to modalities, which is one of the key --

Q But essentially what he is saying is that, "We don't need this meeting that Secretary Baker has suggested --

MS. TUTWILER: We think he's referring to a -- which -- to
הוא מתייחס לאפשרות של פגישה טכנית בין ישראל ופלסטין
בנוגע לשינוי הממשל בירושלים

another meeting which does not -- the two aren't -- right, aren't connected. In other words, if the Israelis and the Palestinians ever decide to sit down and talk, then what he is saying -- and, I mean, let him interpret his own words, I shouldn't do this -- you don't need a bunch of politicians, you can use the technical expert people to do that meeting. That does not rule out or rule in a different meeting which we are still working on, which is a meeting on the overall framework.

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Q So, the meeting --

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MS. TUTWILER: Which is what we believe --

Q Wait a minute, wait a minute. The meeting he is talking about is the Palestinian-Israeli meeting that would precede an election, not the three-way meeting. And it's at that meeting, where he, having followed what Arens has been telling Mr. Baker, is asking that only technical issues come up, modalities of holding these elections, and Mr. Baker, apparently is in favor of letting the Palestinians bring up issues. But I don't -- you know, you haven't spoken to that. And now you have an opportunity with Shamir saying what he's been saying. What should that Palestinian-Israeli meeting be confined to, or should it not be restricted?

MS. TUTWILER: Let me do this, let me tell you where we are, okay?

Our discussions are continuing. At this point we are discussing a lot of different questions. We are discussing things beyond the framework, there are other issues, like procedures for getting the dialogue off the ground, i.e. like an agenda; the issue of composition is being discussed. But we are not discussing lift. Composition does not mean who would come.

Everything we have been doing has been to try to implement the Shamir election proposal. What you see right now is a fair amount of debate. Secretary Baker's idea, or points, are still relevant, and the reason why you're having all these questions now, in our opinion, is because that framework is being seriously considered, discussed and debated.

Q Do you get any impression that Prime Minister Shamir is trying to shoot down Prime Minister Shamir's initiative?

MS. TUTWILER: That'd be a little weird, wouldn't it?

Q It would, but do you think he's doing it?

MS. TUTWILER: No, we believe that Prime Minister Shamir, just as President Bush, Secretary Baker, everyone is, to our knowledge, supporting the Shamir election proposal.

Q Why does he keep throwing additional roadblocks in its way?

X

X

X

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MS. TUTWILER: You'd have to ask him, but I don't characterize these as roadblocks. I characterize this as a lot of conversation at many different levels. It's still going on. I tried to explain to you, because of what the framework points have now generated, you now have a different level of questions and debates. I gave you some literal specifics of things that are being discussed. And our interpretation of that is that this entire exercise is being very seriously treated.

Q Margaret, you told us just now, what -- when you say "specifics" about what you were talking about, you said that there was being discussed -- that what was being discussed was procedure for a dialogue, including an agenda. And then you said the issue of composition was being discussed, and you described two things that the discussion on composition is not. Could you tell us what the discussion on composition is?

MS. TUTWILER: I said one thing it's not; I said one thing it was.

Q Well, it's not lists, you said, and it's --

MS. TUTWILER: I said we are not discussing list, and I said composition does mean who would come.

Q It does mean -- you said it doesn't.

MS. TUTWILER: Sorry. I must have misspoke.

Q Yeah, you misspoke.

MS. TUTWILER: Or either it's my cold.

Q Yeah. Focus on one track in particular. Secretary Baker has proposed --

MS. TUTWILER: Right.

Q -- if the parties meet certain conditions --

MS. TUTWILER: Correct.

Q -- first, a meeting in Washington. He's been engaged in a dialogue with Minister Arens on this for the past week.

MS. TUTWILER: And Minister Meguid.

Q And Minister Meguid. Okay. As we left --

MS. TUTWILER: I should point out to you that this weekend he spoke more than once to Minister Meguid. He has not spoken to Minister Arens. Other people have been dealing with other officials in the Israeli government. And he probably will be speaking with Minister Arens today.

Q My question was, where does that stand?

MS. TUTWILER: Where that stands is that he is still working on this. He

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is still pursuing his efforts to get to a -- the whole exercise is about getting EIsraelisF to talk to EPalestiniansF in this dialogue about elections. He is still pursuing, if it would be useful, this framework -- which we have not ever put on the record, but said on Friday we would be willing to put on the record in the exact text -- to help the parties move towards or get to ElectionsF. I can tell you that he mentioned to me this morning that someone has said: In order to assist in bringing peace to the EMiddle East,F you've got to be part obstetrician. The idea being that there will be no birth until the partners themselves determine it will happen. We are simply trying to assist, and can only hope that the parties will determine that they want it to happen.

Q Margaret, you quoted Shamir extensively. Did you --

MS. TUTWILER: I did what?

Q You quoted Shamir extensively at the very beginning of this.

MS. TUTWILER: Right, because there was a little confusion on some of the wires that we read this morning about exactly what he said, so I want to tell you that --

Q I do --

MS. TUTWILER: -- we got a cable text of what he said.

Q I do understand. But did you detect the seriousness you are looking for in his -- in these phrases, particularly out of his Ma'ariv interview?

MS. TUTWILER: We've never doubted that he was serious in supporting his proposal.

Q Margaret, do you believe that what Shamir said to Ma'ariv limits Israel's acceptance of the dialogue that you say is the object of the exercise, or is he just talking for publication?

MS. TUTWILER: Again, you'd have to ask the Prime Minister. It would be really highly inappropriate for me to characterize what he meant.

Q Do you think what he said limits your options?

MS. TUTWILER: No. We believe that we are all still working on the Shamir election proposal, and that's what Secretary Baker is engaged in.

Q Apropos of that, though, Margaret --

MS. TUTWILER: Yes?

Q -- you seem to suggest that Shamir's statements this morning, which you quoted, don't in any way present an obstacle necessarily; that he's wrestling with this issue. But what Shamir has said is that, essentially, there is no need for a meeting in Washington. He has not said that in so many words --

MS. TUTWILER: He has not said that on the record.

Q Right. I mean -- okay. There's no need for a meeting in Washington. There's no need for a meeting in Cairo. We and Palestinians living here can get together and talk about the modalities of elections. Well, the meeting in Washington and the meeting in Cairo were intended to do that.

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you've quoted him as saying that there's no need for that, we can talk to Palestinians.

Given the fact that Palestinians themselves have already said "we're not ready to engage in a dialogue with Israel about elections without the approval of the EPLOF," and since the Egyptians, the United States and Israel have offered a compromise here that deportees would be involved in the dialogue, and when Shamir says he'll only talk to West Bankers, he's effectively killing that compromise, as well. How can we stand and say, "Well, there's really nothing negative about this. He's clearly wrestling with the issue." He's not "wrestling" with the issue.

MS. TUTWILER: That's your interpretation.

Q He's choking the issue. (Laughter.) I mean, it --

MS. TUTWILER: I can't say that.

Q Yes. But, I mean, how would you, I guess, characterize -- I want to go back, having laid that out, and how -- I want on the record exactly how we then characterize what Shamir has done today.

MS. TUTWILER: We characterize it by reading back his literal, exact quotes that we have from our government official there on the ground. I have to characterize it by saying we are not upset by it;

we do not think it's a step backwards; we -- all I can say to you is that we support the Shamir election proposal. And we do not view that as a -- for lack of a better word -- rejection of Secretary Baker's points on the framework. The framework concept or whatever is still what Secretary Baker and the other foreign ministers and officials who are involved are working on and what has prompted all these other questions and debates -- and I have now told you on the record that they've gone now to another level of detail than they were in last week -- would lead one to believe that this is very much still everyone engaged.

Q Well, could we break what he said down into at least two specific things? He is saying there's no need for meetings in advance of Israelis meeting Palestinians. Egypt --

MS. TUTWILER: I did not read that he said that.

Q Well, that's certainly the inference.

MS. TUTWILER: I read he said, "Why go all the way to Cairo when both sides, Israeli and Palestinian, are here?" Our reaction to that statement --

Q Right.

MS. TUTWILER: -- the Prime Minister didn't say they couldn't meet in Cairo. We have seen virtue in the Egyptian suggestion that an Israeli and Palestinian delegation meet in Cairo to begin a

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dialogue designed to implement the Shamir election proposal.

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Q You've seen virtue, and you still do, I assume.

MS. TUTWILER: That's a correct assumption.

Q All right, now how about the -- great, now we've got one point covered. How about the second point, which is when Israelis

MS. TUTWILER: I've answered this.

Q -- meet with Palestinians in advance of elections, the meeting should address the way of holding these elections --

MS. TUTWILER: No one's ever said it wouldn't.

Q No, Mr. Baker --

MS. TUTWILER: I don't understand.

Q No, Mr. Baker --

MS. TUTWILER: I said last week that Mr. Baker's four points were not about a specific list of names and modalities. Right?

Q Forget names.

MS. TUTWILER: So, what are you asking me?

Q All right. Now, let me put the -- well, I'll put it in a question form. If I -- we -- I think we all understand Shamir to be saying, "When Israelis meet Palestinians they should discuss the arrangements of holding elections." Is the US -- does the US concur that the meeting should have that limited an agenda?

MS. TUTWILER: I've never thought that when the Israelis and the Palestinians, when and if they sit down and get this dialogue going, wouldn't be discussing specifics. I don't get it. Of course they'd have to discuss specifics.

Q Well, specific isn't the word I'm really looking for. I'm looking for whether they should -- what the

Israelis are saying is that since the Israelis have proposed Elections --

MS. TUTWILER: Right.

Q -- and the elections are to lead to negotiations when all issues would be open, the pre-election meeting with Palestinians should be -- should deal exclusively with conducting these elections. And we're asking if that is the US view, does the US take

MS. TUTWILER: I understand now what you're asking me.

Q -- that limited a view of the meeting? That meeting, not

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later on.

MS. TUTWILER: Right, and you know that now that I understand literally exactly what you are asking me, I can't answer that question for you because we've never gone on the record and said whether we believe it's going to deal with anything else.

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Q Margaret --

Q May I put the question a different way?

MS. TUTWILER: Yeah.

Q Does this mean that the Israelis and the Palestinians are going to negotiate in absence of the Egyptians and the Americans? Second point --

MS. TUTWILER: How would I be able to answer that for you?

Q Well, second point, does this mean that the meeting which is proposed by Mr. Shamir will replace the meeting of Washington, or that two meetings will take place?

MS. TUTWILER: I told you that our understanding of this -- but, again, ask the Prime Minister. Secretary Baker's five points, the fifth point of which would be, if the four points are a reached agreement and he's dealt with these two foreign ministers on, then it might be a good idea if we all get together and have a meeting. My understanding, from people who know, that that is still operative. What Prime Minister Shamir said is concerning Israelis and Palestinians is a different type of thing, is my understanding. But again, you know, ask him, but that's our interpretation of it. The two are not necessarily interconnected, even though they are both dealing with the same, big subject -- if that makes any sense.

Q Margaret, I appreciate your view, or your description of what the Prime Minister meant when he said that, "There is no point in going to Cairo."

MS. TUTWILER: Right.

Q Would you parse the rest of that sentence where he says, "The Israelis and the Palestinians are already here?" Because, without getting into lists, some of the Palestinians that I think everyone but Shamir wants at this meeting, are not in Israel or the West Bank, and in fact, are not allowed in.

MS. TUTWILER: And what would you like me to try to answer?

Q I'd like to say whether you believe that Shamir in this statement is saying that people who have been expelled from the West Bank or other members of the Palestinian diaspora are not going to be included in the meetings?

✱

✱

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MS. TUTWILER: You'd have to ask him.

Q Well, do you -- how do you read it?

MS. TUTWILER: I don't have an interpretation for you. On that, you'd have to ask him.

Yes?

Q Let me just pursue this framework business for a second. The four points that the United States has not publicly disclosed

MS. TUTWILER: Right.

Q -- constitute what you earlier in this briefing referred to as "the framework," which you now say the foreign ministers have gone beyond discussing --

MS. TUTWILER: I've said, because the framework was -- has been so seriously viewed, it has prompted, for the last several days, for the discussions to go to a different level of detail than was originally in the four points -- debate, detail. And I gave you some examples. The framework -- they -- the four points -- is still trying to be worked out --

MS. TUTWILER: -- by these three ministers.

Q So my question was -- I think you've just answered it -- which was, if they have discussed -- if they're going beyond the framework, does that mean they've agreed on the framework and they're now working on the details?

MS. TUTWILER: No, no, no, no, no.

Q But you're -- what you're saying is, they haven't even agreed on the framework; they're now --

MS. TUTWILER: Right.

Q -- asking a lot of other questions.

MS. TUTWILER: Because they view the framework as so serious, it prompted these other discussions, debate, questions. And they have gotten to a different level of detail. But, no, the framework has not been agreed to.

Q And I suppose you would view that new level of detail --

MS. TUTWILER: As positive.

Q -- as being a positive development?

MS. TUTWILER: Absolutely.

MS. TUTWILER: No. We view as a positive at how serious everyone is taking -- trying to get on the framework.

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50-234-382

9/14

Q Are the contents of discussions of the next readout (?) from the framework of which you have described for us now mostly coming from the Israelis or from the Egyptians?

MS. TUTWILER: It's coming from everybody. So I couldn't --

Q Even from the United States?

Q: Comment on meeting that took place

between President Mubarak and President Qaddafi in Mersa Matruh and later on in Tobruk?

MS. TUTWILER: I have a comment on what we think about that, yes. (Pauses to look through guidance.)

Our position on Libya, its support for terrorism and other regional activities involving destabilization is well known. We have made known to Egypt our views and concerns, and President Bush and President Mubarak discussed the question of Libya during President Mubarak's recent trip to Washington. Egypt makes its decisions concerning its relations with its neighbors. We are confident that Egypt understands our position on ELibyaF.

Q Would you care to tell us what the Egyptians said when you told them about your concern? Did they respond? Did they say --

MS. TUTWILER: I think they know; they're well known.

Q Yeah. But I mean, they didn't have some countering argument about people you meet with, did they? (Laughter.)

MS. TUTWILER: Not that I remember.

Q Do you welcome the resumption of relations between the two countries?

MS. TUTWILER: I've stated our position on ELibyaF. I've stated what we think about the two people meeting.

Q What is worrying you about the meeting with Qaddafi, between Mubarak and Qaddafi? What's worrying the United States about it?

MS. TUTWILER: I didn't say we were worried. I said that it's a long-standing position. You know what our position is on what we think of Libya and what we think of Qaddafi and so there's nothing new in that. It doesn't come as a surprise to you or to anybody else.

Q Has there been another EPLOF meeting?

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10/14

MS. TUTWILER: On Friday.

Q There was?

MS. TUTWILER: Yes.

Q What was the question?

Q A PLO meeting.

MS. TUTWILER: Bob Pelletreau. He met on Friday.

Q Do you want to call this "a meeting" or "a contact?"

MS. TUTWILER: It was an informal meeting.

Q You mean, they didn't wear dress suits. What's an informal meeting? (Scattered laughter.)

MS. TUTWILER: An "informal meeting" is where it's more informal than his formal meetings is the only way I know how to characterize it for you -- (scattered laughter) -- and this one, we characterize as "informal." I'll answer your question, because I'm going to get asked it, he specifically did not discuss the five points, but did get into the importance of getting a dialogue underway and what it would take to do so.

Q There were reports from the PLO today that the PLO is, in fact, rejecting the Secretary's five points. Doesn't this sort of end it right there?

MS. TUTWILER: No. We have discussions in our dialogue about what it would take to get to a dialogue now between Israelis and EPalestinians and the importance of the PLO going along with such a dialogue and doing nothing to block it. If we are ever to get the process off the ground, Palestinians are going to have to find a way to respond positively.

Q What about this report? In other words, you are treating the Israeli thing as if it really isn't an obstacle. It, in fact, reflects that there's a live thing going on.

MS. TUTWILER: I didn't say that the PLO statement was an obstacle.

Q No, that's what I'm asking you. That's right. Exactly. I'm asking you in a parallel way: What do you think this PLO statement is? Do you think it's sort of one -- you know, publicity, and privately, they're interested in this dialogue or --

Q To quote back, we're not upset, it's not a step backward. Is that parallel language that would apply to the PLO that you did for Mr. Shamir's?

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11/14

MS. TUTWILER: No, because this question came at me as a flat-out rejection. Shamir is talking about someone's quote. So they're not two exactly equal alike. As I said on Friday, and I'll say again today, and we've used many other times, in a period where there is heightened activity, it is not surprising that there may be statements or comments that are made by people reflecting different opinions and things that are said at the moment and we know of his statement. I've told you what our opinion is, is that they need to not do things that block the dialogue -- the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, again, which is what this whole, entire exercise is about and

has been about for weeks.

Q Isn't it important that both sides don't block the dialogue?

MS. TUTWILER: It's important that -- correct, and Secretary Baker has said that before, is that no one should put up what he refers to as "deal-breakers."

Q If Pelletreau doesn't talk to the five -- doesn't discuss the five points with the PLO, who does? Or do you depend on Egypt for that?

MS. TUTWILER: Well, we went through that a little bit last week.

MS. TUTWILER: And the Egyptians are talking to the Palestinians.

Q Margaret, can I follow up for a second? Last week I asked you whether -- if the United States had received from the PLO, through whatever means it might have received it, a response to the Secretary's --

MS. TUTWILER: Points?

Q -- the Baker proposal. Has -- now that there has been a meeting with the PLO, since -- now that chronologically there has been a meeting with the PLO following the creation of the Baker proposal, has the United States received from the PLO, through whatever channel, either at the meeting or through any other channel, a PLO response to those -- to that proposal?

MS. TUTWILER: Not that I personally am aware of, and I know that the points were not discussed in the Pelletreau meeting.

Q Well, you said that Pelletreau didn't discuss them. Did the PLO discuss them?

MS. TUTWILER: My understanding is the points were not discussed. Now, I can go back upstairs and try to get a more

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50-234-302

12/14

literal thing, but I asked this morning because I knew you all would ask me.

Q Can I ask you a question on this? Why you are not discussing this point with the Palestinians while they are the party concerned in this problem?

MS. TUTWILER: Excuse me?

Q Why you are not discussing the five points with the Palestinians while you are encouraging them to join these efforts?

MS. TUTWILER: The -- as I've said many days out here, the Egyptians are talking to the Palestinians.

Q You are not speaking to them.

MS. TUTWILER: I said in our dialogue, Bob Pelletreau, on Friday did not specifically discuss Baker's five points.

MS. TUTWILER: And I've said the honest truth. The five points were not discussed.

Q Right, but that doesn't get to the question of, if the United States expects and anticipates and understands that the Egyptians are talking to the Palestinians, and the United States has a dialogue with the Palestinians, why would the United States not raise these issues with the Palestinians?

MS. TUTWILER: Because we are dealing with the Foreign Minister of Egypt. I have said 100 times out here, the Egyptians are talking to the Palestinians. And that is just -- whether you agree with the decision or the mode of operating, that's the way it is, and that's the way we're doing it.

Q Just because the --

Q You're, in effect, making a conscious decision to require the Palestinians to discuss this issue through a third party.

MS. TUTWILER: No. Let me tell you what our goal is, and --

Q -- face-to-face meetings with them.

MS. TUTWILER: -- you know as well as I do how sensitive, how delicate, how very difficult this is. And if your goal is to get EIsraelisF and EPalestiniansF to EelectionsF, you'll do whatever you can

have to get to that goal. We are still wholeheartedly supporting the Shamir election proposal, and for whatever ways -- and you obviously are free to criticize them -- the best way to pursue this, in several people's opinion, is the EEgyptiansF are talking to the Palestinians. Secretary Baker is very involved with the foreign ministers, and he is pursuing -- trying to get to what, after all,

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50-234-354

13/14

Prime Minister Shamir initiated, his election proposal, and to get Israelis and Palestinians to the dialogue for the elections. So that's the way they're doing it.

Q But there is another construction that's possible: By not bringing it up to the Palestinians, you do two things. You avoid a rejection and you don't put direct pressure on them. How about that construction?

MS. TUTWILER: What?

Q By not asking one of the parties whether they will go or not go for something, you, for one thing, avoid pressuring them and you also avoid news you don't want to hear, which is a rejection. You work through an intermediary. Isn't that a possible reason for that? Why not ask the -- you know you need the EPLDF to get this off the ground. You're on the phone with Jerusalem every chance you can -- B. Why not get the PLO on the record on that directly? Why go through Mubarak?

MS. TUTWILER: Our goal is to get Israelis and Palestinians to a dialogue. And maybe what you're suggesting might not be the best way to do that --

MS. TUTWILER: -- and maybe this way might eventually get you there. For whatever reason --

Q -- are the Israelis requesting that the United States not deal with the PLO on this subject?

MS. TUTWILER: Not that I am literally, personally aware of.

Q Can I put it in a different way, ma'am? Does this mean that you don't want to pass a message from the Secretary of State to the PLO?

MS. TUTWILER: Our channel to the PLO is Ambassador Pelletreau. It's not the Secretary of State.

Q Margaret, isn't there an inconsistency in, on the one hand, not criticizing Shamir for saying he doesn't see any need for a meeting outside -- in Cairo somewhere, and on the other hand saying --

and does the US not say -- that this Palestinian delegation would need to have deportees on it as well. How can you, how can you say that you have no criticism of Shamir when he's saying he wants -- he doesn't see a need for a meeting outside Israel, when he has deported some of the people that --

MS. TUTWILER: I responded to that. I don't have anything beyond how I responded about what our view was -- is of him saying he'd rather meet in Israel. He didn't say he wouldn't meet in Cairo.

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SO-234-382

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Q Any reaction to General Aoun's statements in recent days in which he rejected compromises being worked out by the Lebanese parliamentarians meeting in Taif, Saudi Arabia?

MS. TUTWILER: I don't have anything specific on him, other than to say that his comments and other such comments, we find unconstructive. As we said last week, we are disappointed by the negative comments from various elements concerning the ongoing

efforts of Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia. We applaud the courage of Lebanon's parliamentarians, as well as their determination to bring peace to their troubled country. Threats and negative comments do not contribute to their important efforts and only serve to prolong Lebanon's agony.

Q Yeah, but he has been issuing these veiled threats against the parliamentarians.

MS. TUTWILER: Right. Well, we find them very unconstructive.

Q Have you conveyed these -- your views to the General?

MS. TUTWILER: Um --

Q Repeating those statements? In fact, he --

MS. TUTWILER: And we said they're negative on Friday. They're negative today. And they're unconstructive. I can't answer for you if there's someone who's given them to him directly, since we don't have anyone there on the ground. But I don't know that answer to that literally.

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Smoothing the Track for Tank Sale

Presentation of Saudi Deal Contrasts With Reagan-Era Strategy

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration is planning to sell Saudi Arabia the U.S. Army's most advanced tank and the pro-Israel lobby in Congress isn't howling.

The reason lies in what may be the most sophisticated arms pitch to Congress in many years by an administration apparently highly sensitized to the Reagan administration's failings on arms sales to Arab nations.

"It's a success story so far because it involved thorough consultation and an early decision to take into account congressional concerns," said Steve Rosen, director of foreign policy issues for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. "We support the efforts underway to avoid a confrontation and reconcile this tank sale with Israel's security."

Such a compliment from AIPAC, usually considered the most vociferous lobby against U.S. arms sales to Arab nations, is a rarity.

The main administration strategist for the Saudi tank sale has been Janet G. Mullins, assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs and a veteran of the prolonged 1981 battle over the sale of AWACS surveillance aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

In that battle, Mullins was squarely on the other side—as an aide to Sen. Bob Packwood (R-Ore.), who led the Senate opposition to the sale. That experience left an impression on her, as well as providing ideas about how to approach Congress on controversial military sales.

The tanks in question—315 in a package worth \$3 billion—are the next generation of the Abrams, the main Army battle tank. Known as the M-1A2, the tank is scheduled for delivery to the Army in late 1992 and to Saudi Arabia a year later.

WP

The Saudis would get an export version that would exclude some of the most sophisticated U.S. technology, like the use of super-hard armor, but still provide the kingdom with a tank able to outclass the Soviet T-72s in the arsenals of neighboring Iraq and Iran.

It's the kind of sale AIPAC and other pro-Israeli groups normally mobilize their supporters in Congress to kill even before the White House has had time to put out a formal notification of intent to sell.

But this time, the administration got off the mark first, even with AIPAC leaders, to discuss the sale in exhaustive detail and present as convincing a case as possible to any member of Congress who cared to listen.

"We were going to do it right, even if it killed us," Mullins said in an interview.

The presentation was not just an appeal based on Saudi Arabia's defense needs and U.S. strategic interests in the Persian Gulf. Mullins and Defense Department specialists demonstrated how 40 states—led by Michigan, Connecticut, Ohio, California and Indiana—would reap hundreds of millions of dollars of business and thousands of "man-years" of employment.

They had figures, too, to show that the dollar-strapped U.S. government would take in \$680 million in revenue and the Army would save \$150 million to \$180 million in outlays on its purchase of the tank.

From the start, the contrast with the Reagan administration's approach to such controversial arms sales has been striking.

In the Reagan years, it was not uncommon for the White House to spring an informal, or formal, notice of such a sale on Congress at 4:58 p.m. on a Friday hoping to avoid notice and delay an immediate confrontation.

Then, it would keep the first 20-day "informal notice" of a sale classified in hopes that this would dampen discussion and give the administration time to mobilize enough votes to bulldoze the sale through Congress.

Only during the subsequent, 30-day "formal" notice period would the Reagan administration make public its case for the sale, by which time AIPAC and others would have generated a letter signed by two-thirds of the Senate killing, delaying or modifying the deal.

Mullins said she and her colleagues in the State and Defense departments spent "months" working up the administration's case for the Saudi tank sale, ending with two weeks of "intense discussions" with the congressional leadership and 25 or so "key players."

The administration, at her request, held up the informal notification "about a month" to complete

the process of advance consultations. It was delayed again for five days, until last Wednesday, because Mullins needed more time "to reach all the senators we wanted to reach."

Then, in a change of procedure, the normally classified "informal" notification was immediately unclassified and made public. On Thursday, the State Department held a special briefing to put its case to the public.

For once, administration officials appeared reasonably confident of success.

"We've done our homework," said one briefer. "We're not going to predict what might happen but we have reason to believe people liked the way we approached the Hill and are satisfied with what they heard in the briefings."

Rep. Lawrence J. Smith (D-Fla.), who often takes the lead with Rep. Mel Levine (D-Calif.) in opposing Arab arms sales, agreed that the Bush administration had shown a new approach, but warned that the process of consultation was not finished as far as he is concerned.

He said a group of House members will be sending a letter to Secretary of State James A. Baker III asking for further consultations and requesting an overall review of the Arab-Israeli balance of power in


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light of the continuing Arab arms buildup. He also said he wants to hold a hearing on the sale.

"I think this still needs to go through the public process," he said.

THE SAUDI TANK SALE: WHERE THE MONEY WOULD GO



State	Total Income	Total Employment
CALIFORNIA Hughes Aircraft, El Segundo: rangefinder	\$124.5 million	3,899 man-years
GEORGIA	\$37.5 million	1,181 man-years
INDIANA GM-Allison, Indianapolis: transmission	\$121.7 million	3,803 man-years
MICHIGAN General Dynamics: tank; electrical equipment Cadillac-Gage, Warren: turret drive	\$387.7 million	12,115 man-years
NEW YORK Watervliet Arsenal: gun barrel	\$60.4 million	1,873 man-years
OKLAHOMA	\$7.6 million	238 man-years
SOUTH CAROLINA	\$11.2 million	348 man-years

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SOURCE: Defense Department

THE WASHINGTON POST

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אל: ס/שה'ח סמנכל הסברה, מעת, מצפא

דע: שגריר/ציר הסברה וושינגטון

מאת: קונכל

סרט תעודה PBS . בהמשך להתברקות הקודמת, בשעה טובה
 הושלמה הכנת הסרט המתמקד בראיה הישראלית של האינטיפאדה.
 כל הצדדים הלוגיסטיים טופלו.

PBS (שבה הוגדר הסרט כהצגה חזקה POWERFUL של הראיה
 הישראלית) הודיע כי הסרט יוקרן כנראה בחודש ינואר.

המפיקים משתדלים להקדימו לדצמבר.

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה

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*Zionist Organization of America**Office of the President*

October 11, 1989

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The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D.C. 20525

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are deeply concerned regarding today's news report (The New York Times by Thomas L. Friedman) of the position being taken by the State Department on the Middle East peace process.

While there may be understandable differences between the United States, Israel and Egypt as to how this process should be implemented, it is inappropriate for an "unknown" Administration official to suggest that Mr. Shamir, or any leader of the government in Israel, is looking for "excuses" and may not be "serious" about seeking peace.

Mr. Secretary, I respectfully suggest that this type of rhetoric is not only counterproductive, but it also denigrates the people of Israel who have democratically elected its officials who are all, I am sure, concerned with the attainment of peace.

The Zionist Organization of America, an organization of American citizens, strongly continues to believe that the United States should not enhance the position and credibility of the PLO, an international terrorist organization, headed by Yasir Arafat. We fully concur with Israeli leaders who believe that there should not be recognition, direct or indirect, of the PLO. It is a position which we strongly support and one which we urge you, as well as the leaders of Israel, to maintain steadfastly.

It should be remembered that the PLO is not Egypt, and that Yasir Arafat is not Anwar Sadat. Thus, America cannot denounce terrorism and yet grant credence to Yasir Arafat who is the world's most notorious terrorist. We cannot condemn those who commit terrorist acts and yet conduct negotiations with the PLO.

The attainment of peace is the noblest of objectives. But a policy that is based on acquiescence to terrorism by legitimizing the PLO will bring neither peace to the Middle East nor honor to our country. We urge that the American Administration refrain from suggesting or implying that Israel should take steps which, directly or indirectly, compromise what is considered to be its vital self-interests.

Sincerely,

Milton S. Shapiro

103,80

שומר	דחיפות:	טופס מברק קשר ניו-יורק	15	דף: 1 מקור: 3
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מסמך הבישופים הקתוליים.

1. נפגשנו היום עם נציגי SCA (מועצת בתי הכנסת האמריקאים) השתתפו רבי בנפורת, רבי שונפלד והנרי מיקלמן. מצידנו נכחו הקונכ"ל, דר" אורי גורדון והח"מ.
2. דיווחו כי נקבעה להם ישיבה בווינגטון ב-30 באוקטובר עם חברי הועדה שניסחה המסמך. הקונכ"ל ניתח המסמך מזוית ראיתנו וציון כי תגובות הארגונים היהודיים עד כה לא היו נחרצות. גורדון התייחס ללחצים נגדיים מהצד הערבי והפרו-ערבי והדגיש כי דרוש לחץ מכסימלי להביא לשיפור הטיוטה. הח"מ הציע גיוס מידי של כל הרבנים חברי המועצה ובני שיחינו ביקשו לקבל תגובתנו למסמך (באופן בלתי רשמי) כדי לעשות שימוש בטיעוננו, במגעי הרבנים עם בישופים נבחרים ברחבי ארה"ב.
3. מצ"ב הודעתם/תגובתם הראשונית למסמך.

מרדכי ידיד

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560/88

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SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA STATEMENT

On October 10, representatives of the Synagogue Council of America and three other Jewish organizations met at the invitation of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops for four hours to react in depth to the 40 pages document which was being circulated in draft form to U.S. Catholic bishops. Representing the NCCB were John Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop William H. Keeler and Archbishop Roger Mahony -- the three co-chairmen of the National Conference of Catholic Bishop's committee drafting a Middle East policy statement.

The document expressed concern for Israel's security in the face of continuing hostility by the Arab states, and urged continued United States support for Israel. It called on the Arab states to **recognize Israel and on the Palestinians to abandon violence and terrorism.**

Nevertheless, because it seems to call for the acceptance by Israel of the concept of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state, it raises disturbing questions.

It seems to go far beyond the Papal call for a Palestinian homeland, by stressing territory and sovereignty and ignoring other possible solutions. Secondly, it prejudices what can only be achieved through the process of negotiations, which is the domain of the political entities rather than religious bodies.

Thirdly, it characterizes the Intifada as a "cry for justice" and not as the Israelis maintain, a continuation of a war the Arabs have waged for the last 42 years. While the document seeks to present a balanced approach, it nevertheless fails to give an historical overview of the confrontation. As an example, it neglects the fact that the Arabs rejected a sovereign state in 1947 and refused Israeli attempts to negotiate peace since 1967 (Khartoum Declaration). This has been the guiding element of Arab policy as evidenced by its refusal to amend the pLO Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel.

We do not see this document in its present form as helpful to the peace process because it tends to favor those elements in the Palestinian community and in the Arab world which have not yet rescinded their call for Israel's destruction.

Among the concerns presented to the Catholic bishops by the Synagogue Council at this meeting were:

1. Document does not provide a factual historical context for discussing the Palestinian problem. The Palestinian refugee was not created by the establishment of the State of Israel, their "homelessness" and their "refugee" status was created by Arab states who first rejected the UN resolution for partition which would have established two sovereign entities in Palestine in 1947.

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in 1947. Further, the Arab nations urged the Palestinians to abandon their homes and refused all these years to resolve the ensuing Palestinian refugee problem. Thus, the current "statelessness" of the Palestinian. The assertion regarding "the long-denied rights" of the Palestinian people does not assign historic and primary responsibility to the Arab nations that to this day determine the destiny of the Palestinian people.

2. The document's call for the right of the Palestinians to select their own representatives but does not address the matters of PLO interference in Palestinian self-determination and Arab intimidation of those Palestinians who have stepped forward to try to work with the Israelis towards a solution.

3. While there is reference to the fact that with the exception of Egypt, the Arab states are still in a state of war with Israel, this document does not acknowledge explicitly and sufficiently that the overwhelming Arab belligerency is the major stumbling block towards peace.

4. We find that the repeated use of such terms as "territorial rights", "Palestinian sovereignty", "homeland", "secure boundaries" -- leaves open to interpretation that the Catholic Bishops seem to be calling for an independent sovereign state -- something which our own country has carefully not advocated.

5. Intifada. The reference to "human rights", "religious freedom and justice, do not take into account the historic violation of the Palestinian people by their Arab brothers. The violence in the West Bank and Gaza has been exacerbated by Arabs killing Arabs and Arabs threatening Palestinians who wish to negotiate with Israel towards a settlement.



מזכירות הממשלה

5.1 תעודת ציטוט

ירושלים, י"ז בתשרי התש"ן
16 באוקטובר 1989

ס ו ד י

אלהא

אל: ראש הממשלה

מאת: מזכיר הממשלה

שלום רב,

הנדון: שיחה עם השגריר בראון

להלן משיחת י. בן-אהרן והח"מ עם בראון והציר פאריס (16.10):

- א. בראון פתח ושאל האם חמש הנקודות של ארה"ב כפי שפורסמו ב"ג'רוסלם פוסט" הן מה שבידינו, שכן הן שונות מן הגירסה שנמסרה לישראל על-ידי הממשל. אמרנו כי בידינו הגירסה הנכונה ואלה אנו מתייחסים.
- ב. בראון חזר על דברים שמסר אתמול הציר בווישינגטון מפי דניס רוס, קרי כי מניד התקשר לבייקר וטען כנגד פרסומים כאן שיוחסו לראש הממשלה בקשר לכך שהמדובר בשיחות "טכניות" בדרג נמוך, שלא יהיו בקהיר ועוד (הערה: משיחתי עם הציר ערן עלה אלמנט של טענה אמריקנית כלפינו, כאילו יש הסתייגות משיתופם). השבנו כי המדובר ברעיון לשיחות של מומחים, וכך גם היה במו"מ האוטונומיה בשעתו, כמובן בהכוונת הדרג המדיני. אין כמובן כוונה לדחוק את ארה"ב, אלא יש רצון בשיתופה, וראש הממשלה גם ימצא דרך לתת לכך את הביטוי המתאים.
- ג. מצדנו הזכרנו את אי הנחת הנגרות כתוצאה מ"אי ההבנות" שמפרסמים לגביהן מדי פעם בקשר לשיחות שר החוץ-בייקר. אמרנו כי יש די בעיות לגוף העניינים, ואין צריך להעמיד "אי הבנות" מיותרות.
- ד. בראון (שצ"ן, אנב, כי טרם קיבל את רישום דניס רוס על השיחה המשולשת, בטענה שרום טרם הספיק להדפיסו) ציין כי ס. מרידור שוחח עמו והסביר לו את האשתלשלות והוא העבירה לווישינגטון - והפרספציה משם שונה.
- ה. חזרנו על כך שצ"ן שבייקר יבקר בארץ כדי להכין את המצב מקרוב, דבר שאין לו תחליף.

- ו. אמרנו כי הנושאים מורכבים, הכנייה העיקרית המטרידה את ראש הממשלה היא דחיקתנו בעצם למו"מ עם אש"פ על כל המשתמע מכך באשר לשאיפות אש"פ. אין לצפות מראש הממשלה בשום מועד, כולל לקראת ביקורו, שיסכים לכך. בראון אמר שצ"ן באוזני ראש הממשלה ב-21.9, כי אין כוונה אמריקנית להביא בדלת האחורית למו"מ ישראל-אש"פ.
- ז. הזכרנו כי נושא פתרון-הקבע, שהערבים לוחצים כל כך להבטיח שאכן יידון, מצוי במחויבותנו בקמפ דייוויד וביוזמת השלום על לוח הזמנים שלה.
- ח. בראון ציין כי בייקר מקדיש עתה זמן רב לנושא. ביקש שלא נקרא לשיחות המוצעות "טכניות".

ב ב ר כ ה,

אליקים רובינשטיין

העתק: שר החוץ
מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה



7... מתוך... 1... ידועה על ידי...

מזכירות הממשלה

ירושלים, י"ז בתשרי התש"ן
16 באוקטובר 1989

ס ו ד י

אורה

אל: ראש הממשלה ✓
שר הבטחון
שר החוץ

מאת: מזכיר הממשלה

שלום רב,

הנדון: דו"ח זכויות האדם של ארה"ב

- א. השגריר כראון כשיחה עם הח"מ (16.10) בהשתתפות הציר פאריס הגלה מיזמתו את הנושא, ואמר כי מחקרב מועד הדו"ח השנתי, והוא ער לביקורת שהיתה באשר לדו"ח דאשתקד ולכן עומד במגע הדוק עם מחמ"ד כדי לבדוק את הטיוטה. עם זאת ציין כי לא היתה זו שנה טובה.
- ב. אמרתי כי אשתקד התרעמנו, בנוסף על תוכן הדו"ח, על ההדלפה המוקדמת שמיקדה בפרק הישראלי את כל תשומת הלב. אמר שהוא ער לכך. לשאלתי אמר שהוא מצוי בקשר עם גורמים שונים במשרדים הנוגעים בדבר. הוספתי כי ראוי לבדוק בשבע עיניים סיפורים שמעבירה, למשל, הקונסוליה בירושלים ושיש צורך לאמתם לפני פרסום.
- ג. מרוח הדברים חשתי כי הטיוטה שבעבודה לא תהא לנו מקור נחת רוח.

ב ב ר כ ה,

אליקים רובינשטיין

העתק: מתאם הפעולה ביו"ש ועזה
מצפ"א-ארב"ל, משרד החוץ

18

דחיפות: מייד	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
סוג: שמור		כתובת: _____
תאריך וזמן העבור: 16 באוקטובר 1989 18:30		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק: הפסד: 1146 239	אורה	דע: מקשיח/משהביט מנכ"ל אוצר ציר כלכלי - כאן
		כאמ"ק. לקונגרס

קונגרס: קיצוץ בתקציב הפדרלי
בהמשך לתברקינר 348 ו-372.

היום 16/10 נכנס הקיצוץ האוטומטי (SEQUESTER) לתוקפו. ביום ו' בלילה העביר הסנאט את ה-BUDGET RECONCILIATION BILL ועתה ממתינים לפתיחת הקונגרס בין שני הבתים. ההנחה שעדיין רווחת היא כי ה-SEQUESTER יבוטל בסופו של דבר.

לדברי הסנטור רדמן, יצטרכו לפעול באופן מייד ככל הניתן שכן ככל שמשך ה-SEQUESTER יארך כך יפחתו הסיכויים לבטלו.

ורגל ורגל ורגל
יהודית ורגל ורגל.

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תפוצה: 36

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שמו"ר /
אה"ב 261.04

אלו מע"ת, מצפ"א, הסברה
דעו יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשהב"ט, לע"מ, דו"צ,
קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה, וושינגטון

מצבנו בתקשורת

1. כללי
הדיווח יסקור התקופה מסוף ספטמבר ועד יום ו' 13.10.
2. נושאים מרכזיים בתקשורת עפ"י היקף הדיווח:
א. נושאים פנימיים 1. הפלות
2. סופת ההוריקאן: הוגו
3. חקיקה בהקשרי בריאות ורווחי הון
4. ועידת החינוך
ב. נושאי חוץ
1. פגישת בייקר - שוורדנזה
2. נסיון הפיכה בפנמה
3. התסיסה במז' גרמניה וכינוס המפלגה
הקומוניסטית בהונגריה.
4. הצעת הנשיא בוש בעצרת הכללית בהקשרי נשק כימי.
3. ישראל
א. הדיווחים על הנעשה בישראל והשטחים עמדו בסימן ביקוריהם של מ"מרה"מ, שה"ח ונשיא מצרים בארה"ב.
ב. בהקשרי השטחים: התקשורת הכתובה המשיכה בתיאורים קבועים על המתרחש כאשר בשבוע האחרון היקפם התרחב במיוחד נוכח הדיווחים שהגיעו מבית סחור . הבוטה מכולס T. PHELPS מ- NEWSDAY (10 אוק') שהישווה את אי תשלום המיסים למסיבת החתן בבוסטון 1773 (הוברק בנר 289). עניין בית סחור זכה לסיקור בתקשורת האלקטרונית, לאחר תקופה מסוימת בה לא הוזכרה האינתיפאדה.
ג. בהקשרי התהליך: בזמן הביקורים דיווחה התקשורת הכתובה והאלקטרונית על ההתפתחויות כמעט על בסיס יומי כאשר במספר מקרים נושאינו מסוקר בעמודים הראשונים בעתונות הכתובה. לקראת ישיבת הקבינט ולאחריה ניתן היה להבחין שנושא התהליך עובר לכתיבה מערכתית וכ"כ ספ-ספ בהיקף רחב יותר משלושת החודשים שקדמו לו. ניתוח כללי של המאמרים מעלה את הנקודות הבאות:

מצרים

* למצרים תפקיד בתהליך השלום.
* הצעת מובראק הגיונית, מתונה בתפיסתה.

ארה"ב

* פ"א לארה"ב להדגיש את מחויבותה לתהליך.
* פ"א לארה"ב למעורבות על אף דחיית הקבינט.

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כחון-27

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ישראל

לאחר זמן חזרה התפיסה שהממשלה מדברת בשני קולות. המילים
ליכוד ומערך חזרו למונחים במקום ממשלת ישראל.
אלו ישראל התקשרו מילים כ-BLOCK, POSTPONE, REJECT.
לפני החלטת הקבינט המאמרים צידדו בקבלת הרעיונות המצרים
ע"י ישראל ולאחריה השתררה תחושת אכזבה ואף ביקורת. הביטוי
המשמעותי לקו שצויין היה המאמר ב-DT מיום ראשון שעבר
(7.10).

בתקשורת האלקטרונית חשוב לציין שנסיון ההפיכה בפנמה תפס את
כותרות חדשות החוץ ולאחריה המתרחש במז' גרמניה ורק אח"כ
נושאי התהליך.
בסוף השבוע, שלאחר קבלת החלטת הקבינט ב-MEET THE PRESS
וברכו שלושת הנושאים יחדיו תוך שהמזכיר בייקר הואשם שהממשל
מוכן באמת להתמודד עם אתגרים במדיניות החוץ.
זה היה ביטוי לביקורת כנגד הממשל על אי פעילותו בנושאי
חוץ.

משיחות טלפון ראשונות ומשתי הפגישות הראשונות שקיימתי אני
חש:
א- קידומו של התהליך חייב במידה מסוימת של מעורבות
אמריקאית מעבר למה שעד כה הורגש ובוטא. מידת המעורבות
תגדל ביחס ישיר לפוטנציאל ההצלחה. בייקר לא יסתכן
בכשלון.
ב- אם לא יתקיים מפגש שלוש שרי החוץ בווינגטון אחרי
סוכות. השלב הבא הינו ביקור רה"מ ופגישותיו עם הממשל
במחצית נוב'.

סיכום

1. נושא התהליך שוב מעסיק את כותבי המאמרים והטורים.
2. על ישראל הוטחה ביקורת הולכת וגוברת -- ולפעמים אף
הוגדרה כסרבנית.
3. מידת המעורבות האמריקאית במזה"ת מבוקרת ע"י המקומיים
המכלול רחב של אי-עשייה בסך הכל מדיניות החוץ.

לבנון

נסיון הפיוס האחרון בלבנון זכה לסיקור בתקשורת הכתובה
והאלקטרונית תוך הבעה של אופטימיות זהירה ביותר שאולי
הפעם יצלח המהלך. בהקשר לבנון מספר דיווחים -- גם
באלקטרונית -- על חטיפת שני עובדי הצלב האדום.

ירדן

דיווחים על הבחירות המתקרבות בירדן תוך סיקור הסיכונים
והסיכויים של המלך.

כ"ה

הערתו סקירה ראשונה לאחר ימים בתפקיד.

9/10/89

6/10/89

עתונות/ניו-יורק
ובל רחם
14 באוקטובר 1989

** נכנס
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10 ד

חוזם: 10,14309
אל: המשרד
יעדים: מצב/896
מ-: גובה, נר: 121, תא: 131089, חז: 1200, דח: ר, סג: 10
תח: א גס: צפא
נד: א

10/11/89

רגיל/10 ד
לנמען בלבד
מנהל מצפא
ארהב-ישראל

שגארהב אברם ניצל הזדמנות ארוחת צהריים שערך לשגריר אליאב (ובהשתתפות מארש ופטרוסון מצידו, מילוא וולדן מצידנו) כדי להמליץ 'באורח אישי ושלא לדיווח' שממישראל תענה להצעות מזכיר המדינה. אברם דיבר בדאגה עמוקה על הדרדרות תדמיתנו בתקשורת ומעמדנו במישל. העלה רעיון שרהם יצהיר על נכונותו לפתוח בשיחות שלום עם כל מנהיג מדינה ערבית וייתייצב למחרת בגשר אלנו כדי להמתין למנהיגי ערב - מהלך שיזכה לדעתו באהדת הציבור האמריקאי. תועיל גם לדעתו קריאה שלנו למנהיגי ערב להצהיר שהם מוכנים לשלום מלא עם ישראל תמורת שטחים ובדרך זו להעמיד למבחן פומבי את תדמיתם בתקשורת כ'רודפי שלום'.

אברם נתן להבין שהצעותיו מתייחסות לתיקוני תדמית ושאינן לשלום ביחס למהות.

מצידנו הגבנו כמתבקש ובתום השיחה נשמע אברם פחות בטוח בתכלית רעיונותיו.

מילוא.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

** נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 10,14360

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/894

מ-: ווש, נר: 357, תא: 131089, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: מצפא

נד: @

א/כה' 2

סודי/מידי

אל : מצפא, מנהל מזח 2

מאת: שטיין, וושינגטון

ג'סי ג'קסון.

שלכם 426 מ-11/10

ובהמשך לשלי מספר 574 מ-26/9

1. בעקבות שיחתו עם ג'סי ג'קסון התקשר ספרסטין (נציג ארגונו של הרב שינדלר בווינגטון המקורב לג'קסון) ודווח:

א. ג'קסון אינו מתכנן כעת ביקור בישראל.

ב. אישר קבלת הזמנות ממספר ארגונים. לא נענה לאף אחת מההזמנות.

ג. השניים (ג'קסון וספרסטין) סיכמו לשוב ולשוחח בנושא לקראת סוף אוקטובר.

2. בפגישה שאקיים עם ספרסטין בשבוע הבא בכוונתי לחזור ולבקשו לנסות ולהוריד את ג'קסון מהרעיון לקיים ביקור בישראל בכלל, וביקור בחסות ארגון ערבי בפרט. במידה וג'קסון יתעקש אציע (על דעת השגריר) שימליץ לג'קסון לקיים ביקור בלי חסות תוך שספרסטין יציע לו לפנות אלינו (ישירות או באמצעות ספרסטין) לסייע לו בהכנת

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תכנית.

3. עפי התשובות שנקבל נכלכל דרכינו.

שטיין

17

תפ: שהח, ששהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סי יבל, סולטן, מזתים

דתיפות מיידית	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קד: 1
סוג: בלמים	טופס פרוק 19	פתוק: 2
תאריך וזמן חשור:	אל: מצפ"א	
פס' פרוק: הפסד:	אח"כ	דד:
349	פאת: ק. לקונגרס	

קונגרס: ויזח לערפת.

להלן מכתב בנדון מטעם הקונגרסמן ביל גרין לנשיא בוש.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר,
ורנאי ורנאי פתוק.

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תפוצה: 36

BILL GREEN
18TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE:
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
HUD-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1110 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20518
(202) 225-2438
NEW YORK OFFICE:
LINCOLN BUILDING
90 EAST 42ND STREET, ROOM 2308
NEW YORK, NY 10165-0018
(212) 626-4468

October 5, 1989

349 2/2

President George Bush
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I write today to add my voice to the scores of others from the House and Senate who have written to strongly urge you to reject any request by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat for a United States visa. As you know, Arafat may seek such a visa in order to address the United Nations in New York.

You will recall that last November the U.S. State Department denied Arafat a visa in accordance with Public Law 100-202 which allows our Government to deny a visa request for reasons of foreign policy or national security or if the Attorney General knows or has a reasonable belief that the applicant "has engaged, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, in a terrorist activity...".

I continue to have serious reservations about the wisdom of maintaining the dialogue that our government has opened with the PLO, which was begun despite the opposition of our strongest ally in the Middle East, Israel. To date, the U.S. has gotten little from Arafat for its efforts. The PLO has not undergone any miraculous transformation from a terrorist organization to a peace seeking one. In fact, Fatah, the PLO's largest faction--founded and chaired by Yasir Arafat--has recently called for an escalation of the "armed struggle" and has adopted a series of resolutions contradicting Arafat's commitments of last December to renounce terrorism, recognize Israel's right to exist, and accept U.N. resolutions 242 and 338.

To grant Yasir Arafat a visa would provide the PLO with yet another unwarranted political success and seriously undermine Israel's peace initiative. As you know, Arafat and the Fatah Congress have rejected Israel's peace plan, despite your strong support and the backing of the U.S. Congress.

In short, Mr. President, Arafat has earned no reward and should not be given a visa to enter this country for any purpose. Now more than ever our Nation needs to speak with one voice against terrorism.

Sincerely,



Bill Green
Member of Congress

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 13.10.89

14195

סודי

נכנס

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חוזם: 10,14195

אל: המשרד

יעדים: בטחון/570

מ-: ווש, נר: 323, תא: 131089, חז: 1300, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: א גס: צפא

נד: א

אנכי ✓

סודי/רגיל

אל: מקש'ח משהב'ט

סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: רמש'נ ניו יורק (בטחון-העבירו נא)

מאת: עודד ערן

12 גאות

קיבלתי סיכום דיון/הכנה והעברתי הצעותינו לסדר היום לדיק קלרק (13.10.89). להלן שתי הערות מצידו.

1. הם ירצו לתת, קרוב לודאי, תדרוך על עיראק - פוליטי וצבאי.

2. בנושא ההצבה מראש הוא מציע, שאנו נפתח ונתייחס לערך היורד של הסיוע הצבאי ולקשיים היוצרימבעיות רציניות עבורנו בתחום המלאים. אח'כ שנתייחס לתקדים תאילנד וקוריאה מבחינת ההסעההמראש. הם יתנו הסבר קצר בנקודה זו והוא מבקש שאז נציע את הקמת הקבוצה המשותפת, כאמור בשלכם 3 (ב).

חג שמח

ערן.

רע

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, ממנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

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לתיסות: מידי	שגירות ישראל / ווסינגטון	ק: 1
סוג: עמור	טופס פרוק 19	פתוק: 2
תאריך נוסח חבירה: 13.10.89		אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק: ממשיך:	אמת!	דצ:
337		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

חוק תקציב מחמ"ד - תרשאות: לויז - עדכון

1. אחמול (12.10) נפגשו הקונגרסמנים, ה-confereres של ביתנ"כ כדי לתכנן את מחלביהם. רציב רשימת ה-confereres משני הבתים. סוכם שבמחלך השבוע הבא יפגשו בציגי שני הבתים ברמת עוזרים כדי להכין הקונטרנס. ביום ה' הבא (19.10) יפגשו שוב הקונגרסמנים (ל-confereres עם פאסל וימליצו בפניו (עפ"י סיכום הישיבה של אחמול) על נושאים נוספים שהיו רוצים לכלול בחוק תקציב מחמ"ד. הקריטריון היחיד שנקבע להכללת הנושאים הללו היא שחם עברו כבר בביתנ"כ (כלומר יש אפשרות להכיל נושאים המצויים בחוק סיוע חוץ אשר לא יעבור ככל הנראה עד סוף השנה).
2. הקונטרנס יפתח, ככל הנראה, בשבוע שמתחיל ב- 23.10 אולם טרם הוחלט עדיין סופית. ביתניים קיבל פאסל הבטחה/החתיבות מהסנטור מיטציל שחוק סיוע החוץ יעבר בסנט בינואר או פברואר 1990 וזו הטיבה שהקונטרנס על חוק כספי מחמ"ד (שהטנאט מעוניין בקיומו) עוכב עד כה. במשיר לעקוב ולדרווח.

ורנאי דרנגר
יחודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה: 36
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Urban Affairs, for consideration of sections 911, 921, 933, 1021, 1025, and 1030 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Mr. DONALD, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. CARR, Mr. WYLLIE, and Mr. BRUNER.

As additional conferees from the Committee on Education and Labor, for consideration of section 134 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. HAWKINS, WILLIAMS, and CUMMASON.

As additional conferees from the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for consideration of sections 221 through 228 of the House bill and sections 808, 701 through 707, and 1025 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. DINGELL, MARKEY, and RINALDO.

As additional conferees from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, for consideration of section 1061 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. USALL, VENTO, and YOUNG of Alaska.

As additional conferees from the Committee on the Judiciary, for consideration of sections 138 and 218 of the House bill and sections 111, 114, 120, 131, 503, 504, 1008, 1037, 1042, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, and 1057 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. BROOKS, EDWARDS of California, MONTANON of Connecticut, FISH and SMITH of Texas.

As additional conferees from the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, for consideration of sections 1013, 1038, and 1044 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. JONES of North Carolina, BRUNER, DYSON, DAVIS, and YOUNG of Alaska.

As additional conferees from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, for consideration of sections 100, 121, 141 through 152, 151 through 154, 1011, and 1051 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. FORD of Michigan, ACKERMAN, SIXONEKI, HORTON, and MORZELLA.

As additional conferees from the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, for consideration of sections 118 and 221 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. ANDERSON, OSWENYAR, DUSCO, HANSEN-SCHMIDT, and PERAI.

As additional conferees from the Committee on Rules, for consideration of sections 1002 and 1036 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. DEXTER, BELLEFON, and QUILLEN.

As additional conferees from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for consideration of section 1008 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. BELLEFON, McCURDY, and LIVINGSTON.

SE CONFEREES - 1)
- : חגגה ד

APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 1487, FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1990 AND 1991

The SPEAKER. The Chair appoints the following conferees on H.R. 1487, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal years 1990 and 1991:

From the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for consideration of the entire House bill and the entire Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. PARCELL, HAMILTON, SOLARI, WOLFE, CROCKETT, GIBSONSON, DYMALLY, SMITH of Florida, BERMAN, BROOMFIELD, GILMAN, LACOMARTINO, LEACH of Iowa, ROTH, and Ms. SNOWE.

As additional conferees from the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of sections 1016 and 1030 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. MAVROULES, McCURDY, and McCRAVY.

As additional conferees from the Committee on Banking, Finance, and

CONFEREES - 1)
- : חגגה ד

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דתיפות: רגיל	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דף: 1
סוג: שמר		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן העבור: 11.10.89	מנהל מצפ"א.	אל: מנהל מצפ"א.
פס' פבוק: הפסוד: 1/2 254	דצ: ס/שר חרוץ, ס/שר העבודה, סמנכ"ל צפ"א, אלון-הסתדרות, שגריר, ציר.	דצ: ס/שר חרוץ, ס/שר העבודה, סמנכ"ל צפ"א, אלון-הסתדרות, שגריר, ציר.
	פאת: אלי כחז-קגז.	פאת: אלי כחז-קגז.

הנדון: ועידת AFL-CIO, 12-16.11.89, החלטות על ישראל.

כידוע (ראה דיווחיננו הקודמים) הפורום העליון של AFL-CIO, הינה הועידה החוקתית המתכנסת אחת ל-4 שנים, והפעם בתאריך שבנדון. בארוע זה ישתתפו כ-3,000 צירים וחנושא הבינלאומי יהווה הפעם - גזלת הכותרת, בעיקר עקב הופעתו של לך ואלנסה וכך נציג האיגודים המקצועיים הלא-פורמאליים מליטא שבברה"מ. במשך החודשים האחרונים ניהלנו מגעים עם המח' הבינלאומית של AFL-CIO, בראשותו של תום קאן, כדי להבטיח נוסח חיובי לגבי החלטות ועידה בנושאים שלנו. פעילותנו באוראגון (ראה מברקנו 482 מיום 22.9.89), היתה כאמורחלק מהכנת תשתית תומכת בכרוך הנ"ל. בא"צ היום עם תום קאן, ראינו תוצאה ראשונית של האמור לעיל. כאשר במצ"ב טיוטת הצעה החלטה שאושרה ע"י הנשיא ותהווה הצעה רשמית לוועידה. תוכנה מדבר בעד עצמו. בהנחה שחלוצים האנטישוראליים לא יהיו גדולים מדי, זו גם ההצעה שתקבל. במידה ולא-השינויים יהיו קלים בלבד. בעת קבלת החלטה זו ב-14.11.89, נדאג לתת לה פרסום בהתאם. בשולי הדיווח מא"צ שלעיל, כדאי לעיין טוב שמשלחת נשיא AFL-CIO ממדינות חסערב, זוכה להתענינות גדולה מאוד בצמרת הפדרציה. עפ"י המלצתו של תום קאן, אדבר מחר עם ג'ים בייקר, נציג AFL-CIO באירופה, ואבקשו להצטרף למשלחת הנ"ל. על חיוביותו של האיש כבר דווח רבות.

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 תפוצה: 36 -

Israel and the Middle East

Despite the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East remains a region of great hostility. Hostage taking and terrorism are near daily occurrences. In Lebanon, the mounting toll of destruction and violence shows no signs of abating. In other

countries in the region, basic human rights and worker rights are violated massively by governments with no democratic accountability.

In this sea of violence and oppression Israel stands as a beacon of democratic rule. Despite a long history of Arab aggression, Israel continues to extend basic democratic rights to all its citizens Arabs and Jews alike. It remains a thriving democracy in which the basic freedoms of association, speech, press, religion, and assembly are respected.

For nearly two years, the Palestinian intifada and the violence it has inspired has on occasion led to the unnecessary use of force by the Israeli Defense forces. Such use of force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cannot be excused and must be denounced resolutely. But credit must also be given to the Israeli authorities' commitment to punish all who use indiscriminate violence.

The unfortunate climate of tension bred by the PLO-inspired intifada is not conducive to negotiations between Israel and responsible Palestinian leaders. Nonetheless, Israel's commitment to dialogue is clear. Over the years, Israel has proven its willingness to negotiate withdrawals from other territories it had occupied temporarily to protect itself from its Arab neighbors, having returned vast tracts of occupied land to Egypt and withdrawn troops from Lebanon.

The tragedy of the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is their inability in the face of PLO intimidations to develop leaders willing and able to negotiate with Israel.

The frustrations of Palestinians living on the West Bank and Gaza Strip are understandable. But their use of violence is not. They are the victims of factionalism within their own ranks and of an utter lack of concern for their plight on the part of the Arab world, which sees in their permanent refugee status an instrument for instability and aggression against Israel.

The AFL-CIO has a strong bond with Israel, a nation built by the trade union movement. We have an equally strong bond with Histadrut-- the General Confederation of Labor. In this time of great difficulty we applaud Histadrut in its determined efforts to defend the basic rights of all who toil in Israel. We urge our affiliates to continue their support for the American Trade Union Council for Histadrut.

In reaffirming our bond with Histadrut, we note with dismay the appearance of a number of self-styled trade union groupings purporting to represent Palestinian workers. Some of these groupings have served as front organizations for terrorist PLO operations and intimidation. Legitimate trade unions have nothing in common with random political terrorism. The AFL-CIO denounces such fundamentally anti-worker entities.

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דתיפות: מידי	שגדירות ישראל/וויסינגטון	ק: 1
סוג: שמור	טופס פרוק	כתוך: 1
תאריך וזמן העור: 13.10.89 - 15:30		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק: הפסיד:	ארה"ק	דע: מנכ"ל אוצר ציר כלכלי-כאן
348		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

קונגרס: קיצוץ בתקציב הפדרלי.

- מאחר והסנאט, עד לשעה זו (יום ו' אחה"צ), טרם הצליח להגיע לתסכמה על ה- **BUDGET RECONCILIATION BILL** ייכנס ככל הנראה ה- **SEQUESTER** (קיצוץ אוטומטי **ACROSS THE BOARD**) לתוקפו ביום ב' ה- 16/10. הקיצוץ בגובה של 5.3% צפוי להיות זמני.
- מצפים שבשבועיים-שלושה הקרובים תושג הסכמה תקציבית, שלאחריה רוב הקיצוץ יוחזר על כנו- **WILL BE RESTORED** (הקיצוץ של 0.4% לטובת תכנית הסמים, יישאר בעינו).
- אם הקיצוץ אכן ייכנס לתוקפו ויימשך מעבר ל- 30/10, (מועד קבלת ה- **ESF**), תקבל ישראל 94.7% מסך ה- **ESF**. 5.3% יעוכבו (**WITHHELD**). עייס ניסיון העבר (להוציא במקרה של שנה אחת), הקונגרס החזיר בד"כ בספי הקיצוץ.

לאחר הקיצוץ תתכנה שתי אפשרויות (עדיין לא יודעים בברור):

- ישראל תקבל החזר בגובה של 5.3% מאוחר יותר לאחר פעולת חקיקה מצד הקונגרס.
- ישראל תקבל החזר בגובה של 5.3% מינוס הערך היחסי של מספר ימי הקיצוץ.

מכל מקום, ההחלטה הסופית תעשה עיי ה- **סנאט** (האגף התקציבי של הממשל), עייס הנחיות שיקבל מהקונגרס ומהממשל.

יחידת ורנאי דרנגר
'האגף ורנאי פכני'.

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מפד - 1

תפוצה: 36 + חלפ' x

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 5 דפים
סוג בטחוני: שמור
דחיפות: בהול להבוקר
תאריך: 13.10.89

ארה"ק

46 338

אל: מנכ"ל אוצר, חשב כללי, נווה/אוצר
דע: לשכת שר אוצר, לשכת שר האנרגיה, מנכ"ל חוק, מנכ"ל תמ"ס, מצפ"א,
כלכלית ב'/משה"ח, עמוט רובין/משרד רוה"מ, סרוסי/ניו-יורק

מאת: פיני דרור / וושינגטון

הנדון: עדכונים בנושא חקיקה

1. ערבויות להלוואות לעולי רוסיה -

כזכור אנו פועלים כבר מספר חודשים להעברת חקיקה שתאפשר מתן ערבויות ארה"ב להלוואות לשיכון עולי רוסיה בארץ. הנושא קיבל תאוצה ותהודה רבה כאן, בעיקר אחרי ביקור שר האוצר. כללית, יש תמיכה לנושא בקונגרס ובמידה מסוימת גם בממשל. עם זאת עקב עומס חקיקה לא נראה שיתאפשר להעביר את החוק במסגרת חוק ההקצבות הנוכחי. ככל הנראה יזום הקונגרס את החקיקה לאחר סיום הכנת חוק התקציב לשנת 1990, בתחילת השנה הבאה. כמסתבר מהמסמך המצורף, הצעת החוק (שנוסחה בעצה עם יועצינו המשפטיים) מטפלת בכל הנקודות הבעייתיות בתכנית הערבויות של AID כגון סכום הערבויות, פטור מהיטלים שונים, וכד', במטרה להפוך את ההלוואה לאטרקטיבית. אנו ממשיכים במאמצי ההסברה בקונגרס ובממשל במטרה להכין את הקרקע להעברת החקיקה ברגע שהדבר יסתייע.

2. הורדת סף הריבית למיחזור חובות F.M.S.

הצעת חקיקה המאפשרת מיחזור חובות FMS בריבית של עד 8% התקבלה בסנט. הנושא צריך עדין לעבור דיון בין שני הבתים והסכמה הדדית לנוסח החוק. לאחרונה התעוררו מספר שאלות טכניות הקשורות לרמת ההפסד הפוטנציאלי לאוצר האמריקאי ממיחזור נוסף. הנושא מטופל על ידנו ואנחנו מקווים שבסופו של דבר תקבל חקיקה שתאפשר מיחזור נוסף.

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כה"ן ס'ס'ת'ק 3 תמ"ס 4 רובין/אה"ה 1 אה"ה 1 אה"ה 2
ח-ס'אוצר, צמח אצ"ב

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3. חקיקת מס בנושא מחקר ופיתוח מחוץ לארה"ב.

כזכור העביר בית הנבחרים הצעת חוק המפלה בין מחקר ופיתוח בארה"ב ובחו"ל. הצעה זו לו התקבלה היתה פוגעת קשות במחקר ופיתוח האמריקאי בארץ. לאחר מאמץ הוצאה הצעת החוק מגירת הסנט. יוזם החוק המורשה ג'ייקובס שוכנע להודיע ליו"ר הוועדה בבית הנבחרים שאין לו ענין עוד בקבלת החוק. מהלכים אלו ואחרים המתקיימים בימים אלו מגבירים את הסיכויים שאכן הצעת החקיקה תרד מסדר היום ותוצא מהגירסה הסופית של חוק המס.

עם זאת הנושא עדין בעיצומו ואנחנו דואגים שחברי הקונגרס משתתפי ה-Conference יהיו מודעים ואוהדים להשקפתנו בנדון.

4. דמי משתמש (User Fee)

במסגרת חוק התקציב הוכנסה פיסקה הפוטרת את ישראל מהיטל בטן 0.17% מערך היצוא הישראלי לארה"ב. רוב הסיכויים שהפיסקה תתקבל גם על דעת הסנט ותוכנס לחוק.

6. חקיקה להטבות מס לקידוחי נפט בארץ

על פי בקשת שר האנרגיה פעלנו להשוואת תנאי המס לקידוחי נפט בארץ לאלו של ארה"ב. בשלב זה לא הסתייע הדבר וככל הנראה ידחה לשנת החקיקה הבאה, וזאת עקב ההתנגדות העקשת של סנטור מצנבאוס עימו נפגש השר במטרה לבקשו לטפל בנושא בעונת התחיקה הנוכחית.

פיני דרוז

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DRAFT
10/12/89HOUSING AND OTHER CREDIT GUARANTY PROGRAMS

During the fiscal year 1990, total commitments to guarantee loans shall not exceed \$[5]25,000,000 of contingent liability for loan principal [of which \$400,000,000 shall be made for the sole purpose of providing housing and infrastructure in Israel for Soviet refugees.] Provided, That the President shall enter into commitments to guarantee such loans in the full amount provided under this heading, subject only to the availability of qualified applicants for such guarantees: Provided further, That guarantees issued under this heading shall guarantee 100 per centum of the principal and interest payable on such loans: Provided further, That no loans guaranteed under this heading shall be issued or held by the Federal Financing Bank: Provided further, That pursuant to section 223(e)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 borrowing authority provided therein may be exercised in such amounts as may be necessary to retain an adequate level of contingency reserves for the fiscal year 1990: [Provided further, That with respect only to the \$400,000,000 in commitments to be made for housing and infrastructure in Israel referred to above, (i) the guaranties shall be

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made available for loans made during or anytime after fiscal year 1990, in increments of not less than the smaller of \$150,000,000 or the amount requested by the borrower, upon review of the borrower's actual or planned expenditures by the Agency for International Development solely to ascertain that such amounts have or will be expended for the purposes stated herein.

(ii) section 223(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not apply and (iii) no guarantee fees provided for in section 223(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or elsewhere shall be charged:] Provided further, That section 222(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out "September 30, 1990" and inserting in lieu thereof "September 30, 1991" [and by striking out "\$2,158,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$2,558,000,000".]

[LANGUAGE ADDED TO H.R.2939 AS REPORTED
BY THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
IS BOTH BRACKETED AND UNDERLINED.]

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DRAFT
10/12/89

EXPLANATION OF LEGISLATION

The legislation provides for \$400 million in housing guaranty commitments for Israel to allow Israel to meet housing and infrastructure requirements attributable to the arrival of unprecedented numbers of Soviet emigrants over the next several years. It is intended that, in the case of these commitments, the need and desirability for such housing and infrastructure and Israel's capacity to plan and implement a program to meet such needs are established so that the administrative processing of requests for guaranties should be limited to A.I.D. review of actual or planned expenditures to ascertain conformity with the purposes set forth in the legislation. In order to further facilitate the process, it is intended that guaranties issued pursuant to the commitments be in increments of no less than the smaller of (1) \$150 million, or (2) the amount of drawdown requested by the borrower. Because of the limited assistance and processing required of the U.S. in respect of such guaranty commitments, it is determined that no guaranty fees shall be charged. It is anticipated that A.I.D. will afford Israel the flexibility required to best meet its housing and infrastructure needs on a timely basis and to minimize its borrowing costs subject to the guaranties.

END

נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 10,14336

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/899, מנמת/216

מ-: ווש, נר: 326, תא: 131089, זח: 1500, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

סודי/רגיל.

אל: מנהל מצפ'א.

דע: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ'.

מאת: ק. לקונגרס.

הנדון: מפגש השגריר משה ארד - סנטור רוברט דול, מנהיג המעוט.

נוכחים: עוזרו של הסנטור לנושאי חוץ, אלפרד ליינ ויורם אטינגר.

ארד: אפתח בגלוי לב ואתיחס לאכזבתנו מתגובתך הראשונית ל'פרשת עובייד', אם כי אנו ערים לקשריך המיוחדים עם משפחת היגינס. כוונותינו היו טהורות ולא התעלמנו או זלזלנו בשקולי ארה"ב. מטרתנו היתה לשנות המצב בו חיילינו שבויים ואי-אפשר לשחררם.

רצינו לוודא גורלם ולשחררם. אנו נכונים לשחרר, תמורת אנשינו והחטופים ממדינות המערב, את השייך ושיעים נוספים הכלואים בישראל. לא רצינו לתאם אתכם, משום שהיינו גורמים בכך למתיחות מיותרת ביחסינו, ומעמיסים עליכם אחריות ומעמסה שאינן שלכם. אני מבין את המניעים לתגובתך הראשונית, אך רוצה להבטיחך שמטרתנו היתה ונשארה להביא לשינוי, חיובי במצב השבויים והחטופים. יתכן והשינוי אינו מידי ומהווה נושא לטוח הארוך. אנו

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

רגישים לחיי החטופים האמריקאים, ולכן נמנעים מלהפציץ מן האויר או לתקוף אחדים מבסיסי הטרור בלבנון, שמא יפגעו החטופים העלולים להימצא שם. אני גם רוצה להבטיחך - שבניגוד להשערה שהעלית לפני מס' שבועות - לא התיחסתי אליך בצורה בלתי הוגנת.

דול: שמעתי על דבריך כלפי מפיו של סקורופט.

ארד: אכן שוחחתי עמו וציינתי כי התפלאתי לשמע תגובתך הראשונית שלא הועילה למצב החדש. נמנעתי מחזרה על התבטאות זאת בפורומים יהודים, וודאי שלא עשיתי זאת בפומבי. סקורופט היה ביקורתי והבהרתי לו את עמדות ישראל. הבוקר הערתי אותו כדי לתדעו בנושא נחיתת מיג 23 מסוריה בישראל.

דול: האם אמרת לסקורופט כי הבית הלבן ביקשני לומר את הדברים אשר אמרתי בנושא עובייד?

ארד: לא אמרתי זאת. אכן שאלתי אותו אם הבית הלבן עומד מאחורי דבריך, אך לא טענתי שאכן כך הדבר.

דול: כבר מזמן לא שמעתי על הפרשה.

ארד: שמענו מן השייך רבות על פעילות הטרור של חיזבאללה. החטיפה של היגינס תוכננה בביתו. רכב החטיפה חנה בביתו של השייך, ואחרי המעשה בילו החוטפים בביתו. לא שמענו ממנו רבות בנושא יחסי אירן חיזבאללה.

דול: מה קורה במזה'ת? יש הרבה נקודות, לשמיר-4, לבייקר-5, למובארך-10, יחד-19.

ארד: אנו ממשיכים בתהליך, מתייעצים עם ארה"ב ולומדים את כל הנקודות. רה"מ' עומד לבקר כאן בחודש הבא וידון בנושא כדי לקדמו. אפשר לדון יותר לעומק. אם אתה מעוניין.

דול: תמונות האינתיפאדה מזיקות לתדמיתכם, ולכן סקרי דע'ק לאחר פרשות עובייד היו שליליים לגבי ישראל.

ארד: סקרי דע'ק אלו נערכו - בשלב מוקדם של הפרשה-כאשר רישום הדווחים על הריגתו של היגינס היה טרי. סקרים מאוחרים יותר, שנערכו לאחר שנודע כי היגינס

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הוצא להורג לפני 'פרשת עובייד', מוכיחים שהציבור גילה הבנה למניעה של ישראל. אין ספק שהריגת היג'נס התבצעה לפני הפעולה, ולא בעטייה. כנקודה אחרונה בשיחה ברצוני להזמין רשמית לבקר בישראל. רהמ' וממ' רהמ' הסמיכוני להזמין. ואני ממליץ לקבלה. מאז ביקורך האחרון חלפו כ-13 שנה, והביקור יתרום לעדכוניך במתרחש.

דול: אשתי, שרת העבודה, אכן כמהה לחזור ולבקר בארץ אך הדבר תלוי בלוח הזמנים של הסנאט.

דול: נפגשתי עם מנהיגים יהודים בניו יורק ודנו בהרבה נושאים, כגון יהדות בריהמ', עסקת הטנקים הסעודית ו'פרשת עובייד'. לצערי נמנע ממני להתייחס בצורה הראויה למרבית הנושאים, מכיון שהם בחרו להתמקד ב'פרשת עובייד'.

ארד: באשר לעסקת הטנקים, ברצוני להתייחס לסיפור הקשור לרהמ' המנוחה, גולדה מאיר, אשר הודיעה לממשל - אחרי מלחמת '67 - כי הטנקים האמריקאים אשר היו אמורים (לפי מחויבות ירדנית) לא לחצות את הירדן, אכן נמצאים... מערבית לירדן. יש לנו עמדה עקרונית נגד אספקת נשק למדינות ערב הנמצאות במצב מלחמה אתנו.

דול: מספר סנטורים בכירים נפגשו עם נציגי הממשל כדי לדון בעיסקה.

ארד: אני מבין שהממשל מעוניין שוב להגביל את מיקום הטנקים, והפעם לגבול הסעודי-עיראקי. ברצוני להסב תשומת הלב לרשת הדרכים המשוכללת העשויה להחיש העברות הטנקים אל הגבול הירדני הקרוב מאד לשטח ישראל.

דול: מה לגבי הפסקת האש בלבנון?

ארד: לפי שעה היא נישמרת בבירות, אם כי המקום השקט ביותר הוא דר' לבנון. מדהים הוא שסוריה GETS AWAY WITH MURDER.

דול: המלך פאהד הבטיח להביא להפסקת אש מהותית.

ארד: התקווה-אם כי היא קטנה - תמיד קיימת.

אטינגר.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סי יבל, סולטן

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שיחת טלפון סלי רוס 12/10 , 21:50

השיחה ביוזמתו של רוס.

רוס: בייקר ביקש למסור שהוא מאוד לא שקט שלא הודענו לרבי. אחד הדברים שמישה אמר לו, שחשובה מאוד ממשלת אחדות. אנחנו עובדים עם ממשלת אחדות, והם (המערך) מתלוננים. המזכיר במצב מביך. ביקש אישור מישה לדווח למערך, לבקשתו לא עשה זאת וזה כבר נמשך הרבה זמן. יש המון דוחים בתקשורת. הוא נוטה לבקש מבראון ללכת לרבי. אם מישה מאוד מתנגד - לא יעשו זאת.

סלי: לפני כ- 4 שעות אלייקים רובינשטיין דווח לרבי לפי הנחיית ראה"מ: הן נקודותיכם והן תשובותינו. לדעתי, סיכוי סביר שיעשה אותו דבר עם פרס.

רוס: אני פחות מוטרד לגבי פרס מאשר לגבי רבי.

סלי: תוכל להודיע למזכיר שיש לו סיבה אחת פחות לאבד סבלנות.

רוס: הסיפורים על איבוד סבלנות לא יוצאים מאיתנו.

סלי: הסיפור שהופיע בווינגטון פוסט - שטויות. ארנס ביקש מחני לומר, שאם אדבר עם דניס, שאגיד שהדווח אינו נכון.

ארנס דיבר היום עם ג'קסון דיל. כשארנס פגש אותו הוא לא היה מודע לפרסום הסיפור. ארנס אמר לו בפגישה שמאוד מעריך את מאמצי המזכיר, ושכדי להגיע להסכם, נדרש זמן. אמר שבין שלושה השרים הוא פועל באילוצים הקשים ביותר, נאלץ להתמודד עם דברים שבייקר ומגיד לא צריכים להתמודד עמם. ארנס המשיך ואמר כי אנו ממשיכים להתייעץ. יש סיכויים להצליח. דני נוה, עמיתי, טלפן לדיל ואמר לו, שלא יודע מי המקור שלו, ויעריך אם ימצא דרך לתקן את הרושם.

רוס: מקוה לראות זאת מחר.

סלי: ולקול ישראל אמר ארנס, שאינו מאמין בדווח על impatience, זה לא הרושם שהמזכיר עשה עליו. אנו עוסקים בנושאים החיוניים לקיום ישראל, חשוב שנהיה סבלניים כדי להבטיח את האינטרסים שלנו.

רוס: אין בזה רע.

סלי: זה הקו שלנו.

רוס: הקו שלנו, כפי שמרגרט אמרה גם היום (אני מתכוון איתה מידי יום לתדרוכיה): "המזכיר עובד עם עמיתיו, מנסים למצוא מסגרת לקדם היוזמה הישראלית". איננו סוטים מזה. אנו בסירה אחת. איננו יכולים לשלוט על מי שמדבר.

סלי: בנושא התקשורת אנחנו לא במצב של ע/א מגיד. חשוב שנשמור על צינורות פתוחים.

רוס: בהחלט. עוד דבר שרציתי לומר הוא בנוגע לעניין שעליו דיברתי, ה composition של המשלחת. אני חושב שאם יש certain kind of assurances, שאתם רוצים מהמזכיר - תקבלו אותם.

סלי: זה מאוד מעניין. אעביר זאת לבוס שלי.

רוס: ייתכן ובייקר יטלפן לארנס מחר. ינסה לדבר עם מגיד, ואח"כ ידווח לארנס.

סלי: ביננו - מישה פוגש מחר את רבין לדון במצב.

רוס: זה יהיה מאוד reassuring מבחינת בייקר, הוא מרגיש שמצוי במצב מאוד קשה.

סלי: גם אנו במצב קשה. מקוה שנגיע למקום הנכון ויחדיו.

נושדד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

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* אל: שר החוץ-לעיניו בלבד.

* דע: ראש הממשלה - לעיניו בלבד.

* מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון.

* להלן משיחה בארוחת צהריים עם בוב גייטס, סגן היועץ

* לבטחון לאומי של הנשיא בוש.

* 1. הנשיא מעודכן באורח שוטף על פעילותו של המזכיר

* בנושא קידום התהליך ושיחותיו עם שרי החוץ ארנס ומגיד.

* 2. הנשיא סבור שנייר חמש הנקודות שהועבר על ידי בייקר

* מהווה 'בסיס הוגן' להסכמה המתבקשת מישראל להתחיל

* השיחות הפרלימנריות עם הפלשתינאים.

* 3. הנשיא והמזכיר סבורים שהגיע הזמן עת על ראש הממשלה

* להוכיח שהוא עומד מאחורי יוזמתו מאפריל ושמשלת ישראל

* רצינית בהכרזותיה על מחויבותה ורצונה לקידום התהליך.

* 4. המזכיר סבור שלא ניתן להענות לבקשתו של שה'ח

* להכניס שינויים בהצעה והתבטא בצורה חדה ובמילים קשות

* על הסחבת אשר לדעתו נוקטים הישראלים.

נושדד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

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* 5. בתשובה להשגותי הוא הודה שאכן המזכיר השתמש בזמנו

* בביטוי 'TO DETERMINE' כאשר דובר על הרכבת

* המשלחת הפלשתינאית על ידי ארה"ב, ישראל ומצרים.

* לא השיב על יתר השגותי בטענה שהוא אינו בקיא בפרטי

* הנוסחאות אך מהר להוסיף שאין לו כל ספק שהנשיא מתייצב

* במלוא סמכותו מאחורי הצעות המזכיר.

* ארד

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING, SUBJECT: PROPOSED SALE OF TANKS TO SAUDI ARABIA
 ATTRIBUTION: STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL; DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL
 THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1989

RICHARD BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. This is a background briefing on the sale of -- proposed sale of tanks to Saudi Arabia. As for attribution, let's do it to State Department and Defense Department officials as appropriate. Briefers today are

*** (names of briefers deleted), and we have with us from the Defense Department ***** (names of briefers deleted).

With that said, let's turn it over to *****.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: ***** is here because he knows what a tank is.

The Saudis have decided to procure slightly over 300 modern tanks. They have looked at a number of tanks, and they have discussed this with us actually over a number of years. And they

have decided now that they would like to buy the tanks from the United States, in particular the M1A2. And we have informed the Congress that we'd like to go ahead with the sale of 315 of those, plus associated equipment. And as you've seen in the fact sheet, most of the associated equipment is trucks of one variety or another. These tanks would begin delivery in 1993, late in 1993.

We have done the normal sort of review and scrub of this proposed sale that we do with all sales. But in the Middle East, we always look a little bit more closely.

If you look at this sale from a Saudi perspective, we feel it is an appropriate weapon and appropriate number of weapons given the threat environment in which they -- in which they live. They live in a particularly bad neighborhood. They have, from their perception and from ours as well, over the course of the next 20 years, the likelihood of threats from almost all angles. They're a very small country in terms of population, and a very big country in terms of territory. Therefore, they need to have a tank which is a good, modern quality tank, and they need to have one that they can trust the support system, the training, and they like the support system and the training and the spare parts that they get from the United States.

Naturally, we've also looked, as we always do in the Middle East, at the risk to the security of Israel that such an arms sale

would pose. And we have decided that this -- while this is a very capable weapon system -- and I don't want to by any means suggest that 315 of the world's best tank is not a significant addition to one's inventory -- that despite that, this is not a change in the military balance in the Middle East that would negatively affect Israel. You need only, I think, to look at a topographical map of Saudi Arabia to realize that tanks would have a very difficult time indeed getting from Saudi Arabia to Israel in a combat situation. In any event,

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the Saudis aren't likely to be using them in that part to any great extent. As the Saudis see their threats, in their discussions with us, they see the threats mainly coming from the Northeast. That's where their traditional threat approach has been, and that's where we expect the majority of these tanks to be stationed.

Q EIRAN and EIRAQ, you mean?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Iran and Iraq, right.

And again, I point out that these tanks begin to be delivered in 1993, will be delivered over the period of three years and would have an expected lifetime of over 20 years. When you look at the sale, you have to look at it in that regard.

So from a military perspective, we think the Saudis need them. From a military perspective vis-a-vis Israel, we do not think it's a threat. We maintain our commitment to Israel to maintain their qualitative edge over any possible combination of opponents.

Viewed economically, as pointed out in the fact sheet, this is a sale which will have an immediate effect of about \$3 billion. And the result in -- immediately: 57,000 man-years of employment in the United States.

Politically, this is part of our very long traditional relationship with Saudi Arabia. It has symbolic importance politically as well as real importance militarily. It's part of a consistent pattern of the United States of having a close military cooperation relationship with the Saudis that goes back over 40 years.

So I won't repeat what's in your fact sheet. Let me just open it up for your questions.

Q Did the -- does the Israeli government and AIPAC agree with your assessment of the lack of negative impact on the security of Israel?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to speak for either the Israeli government or AIPAC, but I think you can -- you know

that the Israeli position on all arms sales by Middle Eastern countries -- to Middle Eastern countries, except for Eegypt, with which they have signed a peace treaty, is that they are opposed, and that's their position. But, I think you have been able to see over the years that there are some where they oppose more vocally than others, and I would leave it to you to judge how vocal their opposition is to this one. I haven't heard very much in the way of vocal opposition.

u From either Israel directly or AIPAC?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: From anyone.

Q Can you tell us about the offsets Israel has been offered to take the place of the sale?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Israel has not been offered offsets to take the place of the sale.

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Q I wonder what comfort the Israelis would derive from your comment that these tanks are not likely to be used like that to any great extent, "like that" meaning against Israel. 4/12

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: "Like that" meaning in the Northwest.

Q To any great extent, so then --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We don't expect that there will be very many of these tanks based in the Northwest. Our discussions with the Saudis indicate that the most likely place -- the place where most of them will end up is in the Northeast, that the second most likely place they will end up is in the South. Now, will there be some in the Northwest? Yeah. That is where the Saudi armored training school is, but the vast bulk of these tanks will be stationed where there are threats to Saudi Arabia, and there are threats to Saudi Arabia from the Northeast and from the South. And so, when I say it's not likely that they will be to any great extent in the Northeast -- in the Northwest rather, that's based on our conversations with the Saudis and the fact that they do have an armored training school in the Northwest, therefore, there will be a few that will show up there, but not to any great extent.

Q When you say South, does that mean South Yemen?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Yeah.

Q Do you plan to sell Airplanes F to Saudi Arabia?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We have sold airplanes to Saudi Arabia. We have no immediate plans to sell additional aircraft. As you undoubtedly are aware, the Saudis are in their preliminary planning phase on the replacement of their older aircraft, the F-5. They have told us that they are in that preliminary planning phase. We have not had any serious discussions with them about that replacement program.

Q Have they expressed any interest in the F-18?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, when I say they're in their preliminary planning phase, that means that they are looking at the F-18, the F-16, the EFA, the Rafale -- all of the potential aircraft which are replacements they are interested in. But we have not had serious discussions with them about the F-18.

Q Does the US believe that proceeding with this sale could potentially influence that subsequent purchase of aircraft from the United States?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: I don't think so. I don't see that there's any connection.

Q Could you -- I haven't had time to read this. What kind of armor are on these tanks?

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STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, there are classified details about the systems and subsystems on the tank, and I can't get into all of that. But suffice it to say that this is the export version of the M1A2.

Q -- Every time that, in this press briefing room, the subject of armored vehicles have come up in -- sometimes in the case of EConventional Forces in EuropeF --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Mmm-hmm. (In acknowledgement.)

Q -- they have been described by various briefers as the most destabilizing and dangerous weapons since essentially they

have only an offensive role, and that if you are really worried about threats from somebody else's tanks, what you do is you buy helicopters or TOWs or -- now, I guess, there's a new howitzer out that hits it from the top side. So what will you answer when that answer (sic) comes up, that if they're really worried about tanks, they ought to buy anti-tanks?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: I spend a lot of time worrying about the military balance in Central Europe, and I spend a lot of time worrying about the CFE negotiations. And maybe you can ask ***** opinion. But, all I have ever read and all I have ever learned about armor, is that the best weapon to kill a tank is a tank, and if anyone doubted that, they could look at the last war in the Middle East where our empirical analysis and the Israeli empirical analysis -- and some of that was done jointly -- both indicate that you need tanks to defend against tanks.

Q Do you expect any opposition in the Congress?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We haven't heard any. We have extensively briefed the Congress, but I'll ask ***** to talk about that.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: (Off mike) -- a complete answer. We've done extensive briefings on the Hill; we've done our homework. We're not going to predict what might happen, but we have every reason to believe that people like the way we approached the Hill on the issue, and are satisfied with what they've heard in their briefings.

Q What's the next step from the Congress now?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We're in the 20-day informal notification period now, as you know, which then is followed by a 30-day formal notification period.

Q Is it immediately followed?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Yes. As soon as the 20 days expire we begin the 30-day --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Back here.

Q If the United States did not agree to provide 315 M1A2s, how would that affect the balance of power in the Middle East?

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STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: It wouldn't affect it at all. Someone else would sell them. 6/12

Q -- Now, if nobody provides the latest model version of tanks, how would you assess the --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Nobody -- I'm sorry?

Q If nobody, including the United States, doesn't provide their latest tanks to Saudi Arabia, and with the Saudis having just the current inventory of weapons, how would that affect the future balance in the Middle East?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, I -- I don't accept the premise. I think the likelihood that someone will sell a very modern tank to Saudi Arabia in the next year is very high. And as I say -- said at the outset, the Saudis have had discussions with other people, and if for some reason the United States had said no, they would have bought them from someone else.

Q What's the competition? Who were the other likely --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: The main competition is the British Challenger II --

Q Yes. It's on the fact sheet --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: -- which is a tank which is looking for a start-up customer. It's a very modern tank, but obviously by virtue of the fact they're looking for a start-up customer it's a state-of-the-art tank. Saudi Arabia could have been that start-up customer. That would have given us a number of problems, not only in terms of not having the relationship with the Saudis, both political and military; it would have also meant that the possibility of our selling the M1A2 to the British would have been greatly reduced, because once they had a start-up customer for the Challenger II they probably would have bought it themselves as well. Thirdly, it would have introduced the Challenger II into the worldwide market for tanks. So the fact that we have been able to proceed with this sale, I think, has blocked the Challenger II at least for now.

Q Do you expect that this will open the door for the visit -- for King Fahd to come to Washington?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Let me ask ***** to talk about that.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We don't think that this is related at all. The cancellation of his visit before, as some of you are aware, was the reason of Lebanon. And if you've been following events in Taif for the last week or so, you know how intensively involved the Saudis are, and we accept that explanation. And I wouldn't tie it to this particular sale or -- (off mike).

Q Can we back to this armor thing? I see -- I found now here that it does have applique armor in the -- I don't know why you're saying it's classified. It's right here -- now, that I've found it, it's right here. "The M1A2 has applique armor."

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: The fact that it has applique armor is not classified. The details about what type of applique armor are classified.

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Q The weapon report said that the armor was uranium-based, but that in this case of the Saudis a conciliatory offer to Congress had been made that they would not be provided with the uranium armor. 7/12

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Let me just leave it where I left it before, which is to say this is the export version of the tank, and there are some components which are different from the US Army version. Beyond that, I don't want to get into it.

Q Well, in that case, just to continue on the export part, would that mean, then, that the same kind of armor would be sold on the tank should the tank be sold to a non-Middle Eastern customer?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: The composition of any weapon system that we sell usually differs from the composition in the US Army or US Air Force or US Navy inventory. It is also the case that we take into account the customer, sometimes, and we take into account the region of the world in which the weapon system is going to be deployed. If it's a ENATOF customer, typically it gets a version that's a lot closer to the US Army version for inter-operability with US forces in NATO. I don't want to look at hypothetical other versions of the tank for hypothetical other customers. Let's just leave it that this is an export version of the M1A2 and it differs in some respects from the US Army version.

Q ****, when you said the main competition is the Challenger II, then it's fair to conclude that the Saudis have just expressed a preference for this tank and that, if this deal does not go through for some reason, then they would probably turn to the Challenger II. Would that be a fair summation?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: That is my guess, yeah.

Q Okay.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Yeah?

Q Have you been contact with the Israeli government? And I wonder if you have any idea what is the Israeli attitude for this arms sale?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We have been in contact with the Israeli government fairly extensively, as is our normal dialogue with them on security issues in the Middle East. And I think their attitude is as I characterized it earlier. They're opposed to all arm sales

to Middle Eastern States that haven't signed a peace treaty with them.

Q Well, surely you must have a better idea as to whether their opposition will be pro forma, vociferous, or somewhere in between. (Light laughter).

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Now, I don't want to be repetitive here, but you be the judge of whether or not you think they're being

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vociferous.

Q Well you briefed them, we didn't, and so it --

STATE DEPT OFFICIAL: Well, I haven't heard anything vociferous. —

Q -- 400 million.

Q ***** I don't know if this question is for you or for ***** but you decide that. In two places in the background paper, you make the assertion that Saudi Arabia wants to see a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. In another place, it says that Saudi Arabia is committed to a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only supporting element in the -- in this paper, anyway, is a reference to Saudis pressing for Egypt's readmission to the Arab League. Can you cite some other evidences of Saudi commitment to a peaceful solution and to a negotiated Arab-Israeli settlement?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, I think if you look overall -- don't just look at the Arab-Israeli issue, but look overall at Saudi foreign policy. They have been very helpful, very constructive, whether it's been in Afghanistan, over the course of eight years, whether it's in the Persian Gulf situation in '87 with reflagging and the introduction of the US fleet.

As regards the current situation, they're being very constructive in Lebanon, and that directly affects the environment for a Middle East peace. They are taking the lead trying to put Lebanon back together again. They have been very helpful in the reintegration of Egypt into the Arab world, which again contributes to the overall environment for a Middle East peace.

Look at the Fahd plan; if you look at the Fez communiqué, all of which I think contributed to moving in the right direction.

But let me ask *****.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: I would just add the last point, just elaborating a little bit, that in the Fahd plan, which was adopted by the Arabs, they did in fact talk about -- the exact quote is "the recognition of the right of all the states in the region to live in peace," which was something that the Saudis pushed for and was adopted and has since had reiterated in several other Arab summits since then.

Q Have there been any recent indications of Saudi assistance, for example, in the United States effort to get Palestinians and Israelis talking with one another, to select the Palestinian delegation, to improve the condition of Palestinians in the Territories -- any one of the numerous US goals which have been worked on. Have the Saudis done anything in any of those areas that you could point out to me?

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STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: ~~Yes, we feel that in their conversations with the Palestinians that they have exercised a very moderating influence.~~

Q Have they -- I just wondered if they'd altered their position towards Israel per se, that you've seen at all.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Over what timeframe?

Q Pick a year. Let's try a year. (Laughs).

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, it's been going on in encouraging the Palestinians to enter the process and to work on the dialogue, the kind of things the Secretary's been very active in doing. So I think he'd say, yes, that there's been a very positive influence -- (off mike) --

Q Is there any possibility to use parts from the production -- the co-production in Egypt -- of the M1A1?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: No, the United States arrangement with Egypt requires that we give permission for any third-country sales. Also, many of these parts -- I can't give you a proportion but a significant number of the parts from the M1A1 are not interoperable with the M1A2. But, in any event, the major point is that we have control over transfers from the Egyptian line.

Q Is the M1A2 actually in production? Because this says that the --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- first production -- so it's a start-up?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: The United States Army procurement is the start-up. This is the second customer.

Q When will it be -- you said it will be an improved version and they're not going to get it until 1993. Where is it so far in production? I mean, is it actually being used by the United States Army? Is it still in --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: No, it's not in production.

Q Not in production at all?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We expect it to enter the US Army inventory in late 1992 -- and into the Saudi inventory, initial deliveries, if everything is on schedule, about a year later.

Q Do you plan to sell any more arms to the Arab countries apart from Saudi Arabia?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Yes, hopefully. (Laughs).

Q Yes? To whom, sir?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: No, we have no other major arms sales scheduled for this year. But do we plan to continue arm sales in general to EArabF countries? Yes.

Q And to Israel?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: And to Israel.

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Q The \$3 billion, you will get all together within the next few months, and it will not be in installments between now and, say, 1993? 10/12

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: No, no. No, the normal arrangement with the customers, such as Saudi Arabia is that we enter into what we call a dependable undertaking that has progress payments. So, it's not a lump sum up front.

Q Is this sale a first installment or are they likely to need more than 315 as some of their older tanks --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: We have had no indication from them that they have any requirement for additional tanks beyond the 315. I don't want to rule that out for all time, but we have just not heard a thing from them that indicates that.

Q When you say "no major arms sales this year," are you referring to the US government's fiscal year which just began, or are you referring to the relatively short period of time --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: No, [when] we work on arm sales, we work on a calendar-year basis. As you may be familiar, there is a requirement under law to give a report to the Congress in late January on anticipated arms sales during that calendar year. If you

go back to that report this -- that was a classified report, but this tank sale was flagged in that report, in January, as a potential sale. What I am saying is that we have no additional major arms sales left in this calendar year. We have not yet begun developing our plan for next year.

MR. BOUCHER: Last question.

Q I guess we'd be remiss -- just to follow that, we'd be remiss if we didn't ask whether you could extend the time period beyond the next, say, two months, give us an idea of when the next major arms sale might be?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: No, I think I meant to answer that by saying we have not yet begun to develop the plan for next year; we really haven't.

MR. BOUCHER: Over here for the last one.

Q What impact would the failure of this sale have on the US Army plans?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, it would cost the government overall about \$680 million if we didn't go ahead with this -- in lost revenues that result from a number of things. First of all, from lowered unit costs to the United States Army, and secondly, from tax revenues. The United States EArmyF right now is able to maintain with this sale

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two M-1 production lines and I don't want to speak for the Defense Department, I'll let **** (name deleted) do that, but I think there is at least some doubt as to whether or not we would maintain two production lines, if we didn't have this sale.

(To colleague): Do you want to --

DEFENSE DEPT. OFFICIAL: That's right. You mentioned specifically the US Army. (Off mike) -- talking US Army, between \$150 [million] and \$180 million -- (off mike) -- in actual outlays for the Army --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: He's saying that it would cost the United States Army how much?

DEFENSE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Between \$150 [million] and \$180 million.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: 150-[million] to 180-million dollar immediate impact on the Army budget, if we didn't go ahead with this sale, and either the Michigan or the Ohio production line would certainly be in jeopardy. But the overall benefit to the US Treasury is 680 million [dollars], based on these initial cost estimates.

Q That is just for the tank itself as well --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Yeah.

Q Not for the --

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: And let me assure you that our staff has gone over these costing figures with some detail and you're not looking at hyperbolic figures. Quite the opposite. All of the estimates of financing in this white paper are extraordinarily conservative and the average multipliers that we use for these sales have not been used, so that we have a very credible set of numbers here, all of which we expect to be exceeded in terms of financial benefit.

Q Before you go, at the briefing -- the noon briefing today, there was a question on an unrelated subject that it was suggested might be addressed in this forum. Could we do that? ENicaraguaF?

Q Yeah, the accounting rules on the ESovietF direct supplies to Nicaragua?

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Accounting rules?

Q In other words, when the Secretary says we have no reason to doubt that they have cut off direct aid to Nicaragua -- direct arms aid, and then the Pentagon figures, which I'm told are the State figures as well, indicate that it's down by 50 percent.

✱

✱

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Well, that'd be like 250-million-dollars'-worth.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Look, I used to do this stuff when I was in the Intelligence Bureau; I haven't done it for about six months. What I can tell you -- and it's not much -- is that when the Soviets say they have stopped military -- or delivering military equipment, that's a very narrow definition of the term "military equipment." They have not delivered an end item, a weapon system, a full-up weapon system. They have continued supplying non-weapon system military-related items -- ammunition, spare parts, that sort of thing, consumables, and trucks, things that don't shoot. And there have been -- there have been continued deliveries of weapon systems from ECubaF, and obviously the original source of the material going to Cuba is the Soviet Union.

Q Not all of it.

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Not all of it, but in this case, most of the stuff that we're talking about -- a vast, vast bulk of it. But, as to numbers and counting rules, I've erased those tapes -- I'm sorry. (Laughter.)

STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL: Maybe -- maybe I can add a little bit to that. On the -- the statements the Soviets have made have been about sending weapons to Nicaragua. And so, the numbers that are in the Defense paper they put out today about 50 percent cuts

are about military deliveries. The Secretary has said, I think, on the record, "We don't challenge their assertion that they have stopped sending weapons." But these are numbers -- these are numbers about military delivery as a whole, including the kind of things he was talking about.

Q Thank you.

END

11/17/77
2/22/81
12/16/84

- WE ARE GREATLY DISAPPOINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER AND OUR SUBSEQUENT DEMARCHE CONCERNING PANAMA.

- THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT, EXPRESSING CONCERN AT THE "INTERRUPTION" OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WAS UNDERMINED BY THE CONCRETE ACTION OF SENDING THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR BACK TO PANAMA ON SEPTEMBER 5, MAKING HIM THE FIRST AMBASSADOR TO RETURN TO PANAMA FOLLOWING THE RECALL OR DELIBERATE ABSENCE OF AT LEAST 13 AMBASSADORS.

- THE RETURN OF ISRAEL'S AMBASSADOR SO SOON AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF AN ILLEGAL PUPPET REGIME IN PANAMA IS AN ACTION WHICH DETRACTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY NEEDED FOR THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY IN PANAMA, A GOAL WHICH WE HOPED WE SHARED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.

- WE REITERATE OUR REQUEST THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL PROMPTLY RECALL ITS AMBASSADOR TO PANAMA.

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THE WASH

Israelis Object to Parts of Baker Plan For a Dialogue With Palestinians

Both Likud and Labor Criticize U.S. Handling of Proposals

By Jackson Diehl
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, Oct. 11—Senior Israeli officials have raised objections to a proposal by Secretary of State James A. Baker III intended to set up a dialogue between Israel and a Palestinian delegation, and both sides of the divided government coalition are expressing irritation with Washington's role in the latest rounds of Middle East diplomacy.

Baker has drawn up five "suggested points" on how agreement could be reached in three-way consultations among Israel, Egypt and the United States on the composition of a Palestinian delegation and the basis for its eventual negotiations with Israel. The step was aimed at averting an impasse in moves toward Palestinian-Israeli dialogue following the Israeli cabinet's rejection last Friday of an Egyptian plan for talks.

Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens had pressed a reluctant Baker to submit his ideas in writing, apparently believing that they could provide a political formula more acceptable to his right-wing Likud Party than the Egyptian plan. However, senior government sources said today that Arens and other Likud leaders had been disappointed by the document and contended Baker had retreated from positions he had previously discussed with Arens.

Arens has now communicated his problems to Baker and Israel is withholding public comment on Baker's points while awaiting further contacts with Washington. "We're a little bit frustrated," said one senior official, who spoke on condition he not be named. The official contended that "the Americans sympathize with the concerns of the Egyptians but they don't understand our concerns."

Leaders of the left-wing Labor Party, which unsuccessfully urged Likud to accept the Egyptian offer to arrange talks with the Palestinians, today confirmed the continuing rift in the governing coalition by endorsing Baker's points. But Labor leaders are also expressing frustration with recent U.S. diplomatic activity in the Middle East, saying that the reluctance of the

Bush administration to play more than a peripheral role until now has helped to block any progress.

Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the key Labor Party actor in the recent diplomatic maneuvering, told a parliamentary hearing Tuesday that Washington had contributed to the breakdown of the recent Egyptian initiative by not being "completely sincere" with Israel about its own role in it. Rabin suggested that the United States had prodded Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to make his proposals for talks, then failed to fully embrace the plan once it appeared or to act aggressively on its behalf.

Rabin had observed last week that "if the Americans suddenly become willing to become active partners in a diplomatic move for which they are responsible, then for me this will be a truly pleasant surprise . . . but it would be a total reversal of their recent inclination not to get their hands dirty."

U.S. officials have stressed that the Bush administration continues to regard the six-month-old Israeli plan for elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as the focus of Middle East peace efforts, and that Baker does not intend to supplant either the Israeli or Egyptian initiatives with his own.

The Egyptian plan was meant to complement the Israeli elections proposal by setting up Israeli-Palestinian talks to discuss the elec-

tions as well as other issues and setting out conditions under which elections could be held.

Although Baker's points have not been publicly released, accounts here said they include assertions that the main purpose of the peace process is the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue; that Egypt's participation in the proposed three-way talks would not be seen as a substitute for the Palestinians, with whom Egypt would consult; that the Israeli election plan would be the basis for any Israeli-Palestinian talks; that Israel would have to approve the composition of any eventual Palestinian delegation; and that a meeting in Washington of Baker, Arens and Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel-Meguid could be arranged as a way of advancing the process.

Officials said that Arens and other Likud leaders objected to Baker's conception because they believed it implied that Israel would be presented with a list of Palestinian names drawn up by Egypt in consultation with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Likud ministers also felt that the Baker points did not provide sufficient assurances that any talks between Israel and the Palestinians would be devoted exclusively to the mechanics of Israel's proposal for elections in the occupied territories. Egypt had suggested that the talks would cover such questions as Israel's eventual exchange of occupied territory for peace.

The senior Likud source charged that Baker had not held to language he worked out with Arens last week in three telephone conversations, including more specific assurances that Israel would actively participate in nominating members of the Palestinian delegation and would have the right to veto individuals.

w/n

Egypt also has not yet accepted Baker's proposals. Its ambassador to Israel, Mohammed Bassouni, spoke with reporters after meeting Arens here today. Addressing Israel's demands for a veto over the composition of the Palestinian delegation, he said, "Nobody can choose the delegation of the other party. You are never able to choose the people you will talk with. I think the Palestinians themselves have all the right to choose their delegation."

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11 באוקטובר 1989
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אל : שה"ח
דע : ראה"ח

להלן הערכות עודד ערן, לאחר שיחות עם רוס, נכון ל- 11/10

1. האוירה בתקשורת הכתובה ובקרב חלק מחברי הקונגרס מאופיינת באכזבה מעמדת המשלת ישראל ובספקנות גוברת לגבי עמדת הליכוד, כאשר לתהליך המדיני. גם אנשים כחל לויין, מתנבאים ברוח דומה. (ארד שמע מטטואילר ביטויים של ציפיה מתוחה לתשובה ישראלית חיובית).
2. ערן מציע, ליצור דימוי של חשיבה, התייעצות, התלבטות אצל ראה"ח, שה"ח ומקורביהם.
3. להערכתו, בשלב זה, ממתנינים האמריקאים בעיקר לתשובה המצרית, שלה מצפים היום (יום ד'). (מאוחר יותר מסר ערן מפי רוס, כי לא מצפים לתשובה לפני יום ו'. ארד שמע מטטואילר, שלא מצפים לפני יום שבת-ראשון לתשובה).
4. אם התשובה תהיה חיובית בעיקרה, יפעילו להערכתו מייד לחץ על ישראל לקבל הצעתם, ללא תיקונים.
5. אם התשובה המצרית תכלול דרישות לשינויים מהותיים, ייכנסו להערכתו, למו"מ נפרד עם ישראל ועם מצרים.
6. כאשר להרכבת המשלחת הפלסטינית, מעריך שהאמריקאים יצדדו בשילוב ירושלמים ומגורשים, אך לא מעריך שיצדדו ב"אנשי חוץ".
7. כאשר לסדר היום, עמדתם, שהשלב הראשון יהיה, הצהרות פתיחה כלליות, מייד לאחר מכן דיונים רק בנושא הבחירות.
8. לדבריו, הביטוי negotiation כחלק מסדר היום בניסוח האמריקאי, בה לענות על צרכי מצרים כאשר ל- 10 הנקודות. עם זאת, מעשית, לא יצדדו לדעתו בהרחבת סדר היום מעבר לאמור לעיל.
8. אינו רואה כל סצנריו בו יצדדו האמריקאים בפרישה שלנו מן השיחות, לרבות הכרזת המשלחת על עצמה כמשלחת אש"פ. עם זאת, כשציין ערן שמשלחת ישראלית תעזוב השיחות אם הפלסטינים יגדירו עצמם כאש"פ, אמר רוס שמבין זאת.

סודי - ב י ו ת ר

11 באוקטובר 1989
837

ארכיון

אל : ראה"מ

שיחת טלפון שה"ח ארנס - מזכיר המדינה בייקר, 10/10

השיחה ביוזמת בייקר.

בייקר מדווח שקיבלו השינויים שהצענו ורשמום לפנייהם. מצפה לשינויים מקבילים מהמצרים. כנראה רוצים להכניס לנוסח את 10 הנקודות ולהבטיח את אזכור התיעצויותיהם עם הפלסטינים. גם לישראל וגם למצרים קשיים והנוסח שהוצע על ידו, עונה על צרכיו של כל צד.

מציע להגיע להסכם לקיום הדו-שיח. טוען שאינו מבין מה מפריע לישראל, ומציין שישראל תוכל תמיד לעזוב את שולחן הדיונים.

ארנס מציין, כי אין ברצוננו לנטוש תהליך ושואל מדוע לא ניתן לחזור להצעת בייקר המקורית בדבר הרכבה משותפת של משלחת. מזכיר שמובראכ הסכים לכך בניו-יורק בפניו (ארנס) וכן בפני הנשיא בוש.

בייקר משיב שלא התיימר לדבר בשם המצרים וכי להערכתו:
"If we redraft, we will not get closure"

בהמשך דנים בתפוצה.

לקראת סיום בייקר חוזר לציין, שהמצרים רוצים לדבר עם הפלסטינים, כי יש להם צרכים משלהם. מביע תמיהתו, מה עוד רוצה ישראל, משום שלדעתו ענה על בקשתינו, שלא לדבר עם אש"פ, וכי עד שלא תהיה ישראל מרוצה מרשימה, לא יתקיים דו-שיח.

הוסיף ואמר:
"We want to see that happen"

ארנס מבטיח להתעביר לראה"מ ומבקש מהמזכיר לחשוב על הצעתו.

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13

שגרירות ישראל בווינגטון
טופס מברק

1/2
כמה?

דף 1 מתוך 2
דחיפות ומידי
סוג גלוי

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה.

דע :

תאריך, זמן: 11.10.89
מספר המברק:

מאת: עתונות, ווינגטון.

המשרד:

1/2

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רא"ב מאמר מערכת מה- "ווינגטון טיימס", 11.10.89:-

המאמר קשה, ובמיוחד הקטעים המסומנים.
זהו מאמר המערכת השני ברציפות שהינו כה קשה לעניינו.
בכוונתי להפגש עם עורך עמוד המערכת לשיחה בנדון.

י"ן

- 6 -

מס' קט' 3
מס' קט' 1
מס' קט' 2
מס' קט' 3
מס' קט' 1
מס' קט' 2
מס' קט' 3
מס' קט' 1
מס' קט' 2
מס' קט' 3

2/2 252

Power politics and Israeli housing

Whether the source is economic, military or moral, a nation's power is measured by its success in influencing the actions of other nations. For two decades, successive U.S. administrations have insisted that it is in our interest to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and to end the state of war between Israel and the Arab world. But for two decades the United States has scrupulously restrained itself from pressuring Israel to behave in a manner that will realize this goal. So, the Israeli cabinet last Friday rejected a peace proposal advanced by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Some Israelis characterize the vote as a gambit designed to wheedle concessions out of Mr. Mubarak. Whatever the case, the United States should respond by making some fundamental demands of the Israeli government.

Here in Washington two weeks ago, Israeli Labor leader Shimon Peres may have provided the vehicle for making such demands. A few days before President Bush met with Mr. Mubarak, who would pitch his plan for bringing Israelis and Palestinians together to discuss Israel's West Bank election proposal, Mr. Bush met with Mr. Peres, who wanted to solicit U.S. guarantees for \$400 million in low-interest loans. Israel intends to use the loans to build housing for Soviet-Jewish emigres. Some of this housing would be built in the occupied territories.

Housing for Soviet emigres — or even the presence in Israel of Soviet emigres — is more closely linked to the peace process than is immediately apparent. One high-ranking Israeli official visiting here this spring laid

out his vision of a "permanent settlement" for the West Bank: It would always be part of Israel, he explained. And if the United States would close, or at least narrow, the opening for Soviet Jews to come here, a massive migration from the Soviet Union to Israel could moot the demographic problems Israel faces in absorbing more than 1.5 million Palestinians.

The first part of this scenario is already unfolding. Last year the United States began closing the door to Soviet-Jewish emigration. For the first time the Immigration and Naturalization Service declined to consider all Soviet Jews as refugees. This meant that they no longer would receive automatic, subsidized resettlement in the United States. Nonetheless, while a record 8,442 Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union in September, only 12 percent (or 1,042) chose to move to Israel. Most of the rest came to the United States. This will change next year. Jews who leave the Soviet Union with exit visas for Israel will no longer be able to stop in Vienna or Rome and apply for U.S. visas.

Israel now expects to receive up to 100,000 Soviet Jews over the next three years, and it wants Uncle Sam to co-sign on housing for every one of them — even if it means erecting fortified villages on property confiscated from Arabs on the West Bank. Here's where the president can use his leverage. Rather than signing on the line, Mr. Bush ought to tell Israel that the United States won't loan a dime for housing until Israel sends a delegation to Cairo to meet with Palestinians and try to negotiate a secure peace in the region.

ד"ר: $\frac{1}{5}$ מחוק: 5	טופס מצרף קשר ניו-יורק	דחיקות: בהול
אל: סלמי מרידור לשכת שח"ח (לעיניו בלבד)	סיוג: שמור	תזח: 1/1/83
דע: בן אהרון לשכת רוהמ (לעיניו בלבד)	מל מדיקי	
מאת: מרדכי יריד	0 0385	

שיחת אלבז - מנהיגים יהודיים

מצב תרבות השיחה כמי שהועברה אלי ע"י אקולט וונליין, בנו גם
והיחסות ליברי אלבז בטוביית זכות הטיבה.

סני' אלבז
מל מדיקי

מרדכי יריד

2 2
למח קמ

תאריך: שם השולח: אישור:

KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER
425 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

September 29, 1989

C O N F I D E N T I A L

RE: Meeting with Egyptian Chief of the Cabinet
of the President for Foreign Affairs, Qussama Elbaz

Last evening, a small delegation representing the Presidents' Conference met with Qussama Elbaz to discuss the current relationship between Egypt and Israel, primarily focusing upon the Shamir Initiative and Mubarak's 10-Point plan.

1. Mubarak Plan. Elbaz confirmed what Peres had told us in the afternoon, namely, that the ten points that constitute the Mubarak plan are not preconditions to negotiations with Israel, but rather an initial bargaining position that will be put on the table by the Palestinian negotiators at the beginning of the discussions that are contemplated by the Shamir Initiative. Obviously, however, the portions of the plan that relate to the identity of the negotiators on behalf of the Palestinians and, specifically, the insistence upon the choice of two Palestinians that are not residents of the "territories" must be resolved prior to the negotiations themselves. Elbaz stressed that it should not be overly difficult to agree upon the identity of the negotiators without getting bogged down over the Israeli "veto." For example, the Egyptian representatives could meet with the Israeli representatives and review a list of names and after a discussion of the individuals involved, conclude on the ones that are acceptable to Israel. In this way it will not look like an absolute veto by Israel, but, on the other hand, Israel need not accept anyone it does not wish. (Of course, this does not relate to the issue of the two non-territory representatives, which will be discussed below.)

All parties agree that, although the representatives will not have been identified as members of the PLO leadership, after all is said and done, the PLO will be giving direction to the negotiators on the positions to be taken at the table.

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Elbaz repeatedly stressed that the Mubarak plan is not intended to supplant the Shamir Initiative; it is merely an attempt to clarify and amplify elements of ambiguity in the Shamir Initiative. For example, the elements of the plan referring to supervision of the election, the identification of those entitled to vote, the prior acceptance by Israel of the election results, and similar items, are not in contradiction to the Shamir proposal, but, rather, intended to amplify it.

He had to acknowledge, however, that there were specific points of the Mubarak plan that, in effect, diverge substantially from the Shamir proposal. For example, the latter focused totally on the mechanism for the election of Palestinian representatives and specifically noted that subsequent to the elections, there would be negotiations with respect to an interim period -- all the provisions of the Camp David treaty -- and only after some years of "living together" and confidence building would the parties sit down and attempt to work out the long-term solution. The Mubarak plan wants the parties at this point in time -- prior to the elections -- to resolve that there will be an eventual exchange of "territories for peace." In addition, the Mubarak plan insists upon a total cessation of settlement activity in the territories during this interim period. Elbaz acknowledged this point, but insisted that these items had to be included within the plan in order to convince the Palestinians to go along with it. Simply put, the Palestinians are suspicious that, under the Shamir approach, the peace process will stop immediately after the elections or, at most, the agreement on the interim relationship. Elbaz claims that, consequently, Mubarak had to give the Palestinians an indication that this is the beginning of the process, not the end. As he put it, Israel and the Palestinians fear two opposite horrors. Israel is afraid to move forward because they do not know what will be the end; the Palestinians are afraid to move forward because they fear that there will be no end, therefore, they want to know now what lies at the end of the tunnel.

Focusing on the point in the Mubarak plan that insists on representatives from outside the territories to be included in the Palestinian delegation, Elbaz stated that that position was adopted to remove the fear that exclusion of such representatives was intended to divide the Palestinian people between those within the territories and those outside and, thereby, in addition, divide the authority of the PLO. It was felt that a delegation that was composed solely of residents of the territory would not have the same initiative or, for that matter, the right, to discuss items such as the "right of return," compensation for those that decide not to return, and the general issue of a Palestinian state. At the same time, Elbaz emphasized that the plan specifically avoided any reference to the PLO, to a Palestinian state, or to a right of self-determination, and that was intentional.

2. Peace Negotiations. Elbaz stressed his general optimistic outlook for the future. He claimed that the gap between Israel and the Arab nations is narrowing and all recognize it was a tragedy in the past to let opportunities for peace pass and, consequently, this time, the parties are attempting to move forward on the path of peace. What is different in the current situation from the past is that even the Arabs recognize that, in order to move forward, there should not be overly ambitious goals; in the present situation, the modest target is to get representatives from both sides around the table to sit down and reason together. He feels there is a great deal of goodwill on both sides. In that connection, he is gratified by the fact that many Arab leaders have accepted the Mubarak plan and even those that have not publicly done so or have publicly come out against it are not attempting to convince the Palestinians to stay away from the negotiating table. For example, President Qadafi of Libya stated that the whole idea is stupid, but has not suggested that the Palestinians should not try. President Saddam Hussein of Iraq has given his support for the Mubarak approach.

3. Jordan. There have been close consultations between Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan on this issue. Interestingly, King Hussein was quite troubled by the recent border incidents between Jordan and Israel and believes that, more likely than not, they were instigated by Syria in order to escalate tension with Israel.

King Hussein has already met with Arafat twice in order to convince the latter to join in the negotiations. He also offered that, at a subsequent juncture, he would join them, also.

4. Shamir-Mubarak. Elbaz was questioned hard on the failure of Mubarak to meet with Prime Minister Shamir, especially in light of his reaching out to invite Defense Minister Rabin to Egypt and then meeting Finance Minister Peres in the United States. He was told that these gestures had been clearly interpreted by people within and without Israel as an attempt by Mubarak to undermine Shamir and to reflect favoritism towards the leaders of the Labor party. Elbaz embarked on a lengthy response with respect to this issue in which he repeatedly declared the lack of intent to reflect favoritism and, in that connection, noted that Mubarak was meeting with Foreign Minister Arens Friday (this morning). He added that there are other ways of communicating besides personal meetings and, in that connection, stated that there was a series of correspondence between Mubarak and Shamir and, indeed, on September 23, the day before Mubarak left Egypt, he received a letter from Shamir to which he will shortly respond.

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As to a proposed meeting with Shamir, Elbaz took the position -- which was also adopted by Peres when he met with us earlier that afternoon -- that such a meeting would, in effect, be a Summit and all parties realize that there must be adequate preparation for that type of conference. Summits, by their nature, require joint agreement on something. If a meeting is held and each side comes out of it holding separate press conferences in which he states his position and what was wrong with the other's, that would be a substantial step backwards in the peace process rather than forward. Elbaz assured us that they were working on that very matter right now and they are preparing for a meeting that would end with agreement on one or more items of substance.

All in all, Elbaz was his usual verbose self, very confident of his position, but going out of his way repeatedly to assure us of Mubarak's good intentions in setting forth his plan.



Julius Berman

/slh