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23/3/88 25/3/88

SUBJECT: MURPHY SPEECH ON PERSIAN GULF AND MIDEAST PEACE

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-- AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF
-- AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS:
-- REMARKS BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
-- RICHARD W. MURPHY AT THE CITADEL
-- CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, MARCH 22, 1988

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

IT IS A PRIVILEGE FOR ME TO BE HERE THIS EVENING AT ONE OF OUR COUNTRY'S MOST RESPECTED EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, WHERE SOME GENERATIONS OF AMERICANS HAVE PREPARED THEMSELVES FOR MILITARY CAREERS AND AND FOR LIFE IN THE SERVICE OF OUR NATION. IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO BE BACK AGAIN IN THIS CITY AND STATE WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO THE VITALITY OF AMERICA. IT IS A PARTICULAR PLEASURE TO REJOIN OLD FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES, TOO - GOVERNOR WEST, JOE TWYNAM. I SUPPOSE BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION THOUGH, JOE ADMITTED THAT MY OWN MILITARY CAREER WAS LIMITED, BUT I HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LIMITS OF THAT EDUCATION. LIKE MOST OF YOU IN THIS AUDIENCE, I

WAS ASKED TO JOIN THE U.S. ARMY BACK IN 1953. I HAD QUITE A PROMISING CAREER WHICH WAS CUT SHORT WITHIN TWO YEARS BY A FEDERAL BUDGET CUT, A FACT WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE VIEWS OF MY COMPANY COMMANDER THAT AS ONE OF THE OLDEST SERVING PRIVATES FIRST CLASS, HE THOUGHT THAT I MIGHT LOOK ELSEWHERE. BUT MY EDUCATION WITH THE MILITARY HAS BROADENED AND DEEPENED OVER THE YEARS BECAUSE WE WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH ALL THE SERVICES IN OUR STATE DEPARTMENT AFFAIRS, AND NEVER MORE CLOSELY THAN DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS IN WASHINGTON AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY. I AM HAPPY TO REPORT TONIGHT THAT THE COOPERATION BETWEEN STATE AND DEFENSE IS ALIVE AND WELL IN WASHINGTON.

I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU TONIGHT ABOUT TWO OF THE PROBLEM AREAS THAT ARE IN MY IMMEDIATE PURVIEW: OUR POLICIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THOSE TOWARD THE

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. THESE ARE TWO AREAS THAT HAVE CLAIMED THE ATTENTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION, THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY F STATE, AND THE LEADERSHIP GENERALLY, THEY ARE TWO REAS THAT THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE - AND I'D LIKE TO GIVE YOU SOME IDEA OF WHAT WE ARE DOING TO DEAL WILTH THESE CHALLENGES. I'LL TRY TO KEEP MY REMARKS SHORT ENOUGH SO WE'LL HAVE PLENTY OF TIME FOR YOUR Q ESTIONS.

FIRST, THE PERSIAN GULF:

NOW, WE DON'T HAVE A NEW OLICY IN THE GULF. IT'S BEEN CONSISTENT EVER SINCE WOR D WAR II. WHY ARE WE IN THE PERSIAN GULF? WHEY DID W AGREE TO PROTECT THOSE TANKERS, PARTICULARLY THO E REFLAGGED KUWAITI TANKERS LAST YEAR? AND WHAT ARE E DOING TO HELP END THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WHICH IS TH ROOT CAUSE OF TENSIONS IN THE REGION? EVER SINCE THE I ANIAN REVOLUTION IN 1979, THERE HAS BEEN A NEW POWERFUL MILITARY AND POLITICAL DYNAMIC THRUSTING OUTWARD FROM TE RAN. IT THREATENS TO DESTABILIZE THE ENTIRE RE ION AND IT'S PROMPTED A MORE ACTIVE AMERICAN SECURITY ROLE IN THE GULF.

IT REFLECTS OUR LONGSTAND NG STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS THERE LET ME JUST SAY A WORD ABOUT OUR INTERESTS.

LET ME BEGIN WITH U.S. ST ATEGIC INTERESTS: THE GULF IS A CROSSROAD, AN ENORMOUSL IMPORTANT CROSSROAD OF VITAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IM ORTANCE TO THE FREE WORLD. OUR STRATEGIC INTEREST IS TO ENSURE THAT IT DOES NOT COME UNDER THE DOMINATION OF A POWER HOSTILE TO THE UNITED

STATES, OUR ALLIES, OR OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION.

IN PART, BECAUSE THE AREA IS CRITICAL TO THE U.S., OVER THE PAST DECADES MOSCOW H S BEEN BUSY TRYING TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION, AND TO REDUCE OURS. YET ALL THE GULF STATES STAY WARY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THEY'RE MASTERS AT MAINTAINING THEIR POLITICAL BALANCE IN THIS VOLATILE REGION. THEY RE EMBER THEIR HISTORY AND MOVE CAUTIOUSLY.

ECONOMICALLY, WE AND EVEN MORE OUR ALLIES HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN IMPORTING OIL FROM THE GULF. FOR FIVE DECADES, OUR BUSINES ES HAVE HAD STRONG TIES TO THE REGION. IT NOW PRODUCES VER 9 MILLION BARRELS A DAY. SINCE THE OIL CRISES OF T E 70'S, WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO REDUCE AMERICA'S VULNERAB LITY TO SHORTAGES, WHETHER REAL OR PERCEIVED. NEVERTHELE S, WE AND THE OTHER WESTERN

NATIONS AND JAPAN, ARE GOING TO DEPEND INCREASINGLY ON PERSIAN GULF OIL.

WE ALSO HAVE STRONG POLITICAL TIES TO THE FRIENDLY MODERATE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF REGION. WE HAVE A MUTUAL INTEREST IN HELPING THOSE DIRECTLY THREATENED BY THE WAR AND BY THE RADICALISM THAT IS PART OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. IRAN HAS BEEN CHALLENGING THE LEGITIMACY AND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THESE STATES. IT HAS FOLLOWED A POLICY OF INTIMIDATION, OF DIRECT MILITARY PRESSURE, OF TERRORISM, AS WELL AS ATTEMPTS AT INTERNAL DESTABILIZATION. IF IRAN SUCCEEDS, THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER WOULD SHIFT DANGEROUSLY AGAINST OUR ARAB FRIENDS AND AGAINST AMERICAN AND WESTERN INTERESTS.

THIS HAS BEEN ONE OF THE BLOODIEST - IF FACT IN SHEER NUMBERS PROBABLY THE BLOODIEST - CONFLICT SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. IT HAS ALREADY CLAIMED AN ESTIMATED ONE MILLION LIVES COUNTING IRAQI AND IRANIAN CASUALTIES. IT HAS GUTTED A GENERATION IN BOTH COUNTRIES. IT HAS HAD A PROFOUND EFFECT ON MAJOR AMERICAN STRATEGIC, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. IT HAS TO BE ENDED IN ORDER TO HELP RESTORE REGIONAL STABILITY.

WE ARE PURSUING A TWO TRACK POLICY IN CONFRONTING THE WAR. THE FIRST CONSISTS OF OUR MILITARY MEASURES - CALLED INTERIM STRATEGIC MEASURES - TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS WHILE THE WAR CONTINUES. THE SECOND TRACK IS OUR PURSUIT OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO END THE WAR.

ON THE STRATEGIC FRONT, WE ARE DEALING WITH IRAN'S

EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE THE GULF ARABS. THESE INTENSIFIED IN AUGUST 1985 WITH ATTACKS ON TANKERS SERVING KUWAITI PORTS. HAD WE ALLOWED THAT THREAT TO KUWAIT'S ECONOMIC LIFELINE TO SUCCEED, THE EFFECT ON AMERICAN AND WESTERN ECONOMIC INTERESTS WOULD HAVE BEEN SEVERE. AND FOR THIS REASON, WE RESPONDED READILY TO KUWAIT'S REQUEST FOR HELP.

IT WAS LATE IN 1986 THAT KUWAIT APPROACHED BOTH MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. IT WAS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO PROTECT THE SHIPPING, NOT JUST ITS OWN FLAG SHIPPING BUT SHIPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE KUWAITI TRADE. IT MADE CLEAR IT PREFERRED TO COOPERATE FOR MOST OF THE JOB WITH THE UNITED STATES. IT ASKED US TO PUT ITS SHIPS UNDER THE AMERICAN FLAG. THIS WAS AN EXTRAORDINARY STEP IN AN EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION: UNLIKE A COMMERICAL CHARTER, THESE SHIPS BECAME AMERICAN SHIPS. THEY'RE MOBILIZABLE IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, THEY HAVE TO MEET SAFETY STANDARDS, THEY HAVE TO HAVE AMERICAN CAPTAINS, ETC. THE PROTECTION THAT OUR NAVY GIVES THEM IS THE SAME IT OFFERS TO OTHER AMERICAN FLAG VESSELS. HOWEVER, WE DID NOT ENTER INTO AN OPEN-ENDED UNILATERAL PROTECTION REGIME FOR ALL NEUTRAL SHIPPING, NOR DO WE INTEND TO DO SO. THERE ISN'T THE POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THIS COUNTRY FOR SUCH AN OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT. THERE ISN'T THE SUPPORT IN PUBLIC OPINION, AND AS YOU ALL KNOW, IF YOU DON'T HAVE THE

SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC, YOU'VE GOT NOTHING GOING FOR YOU.

THE REFLAGGED SHIPS ARE NOT PROVOCATIVE; THEY CARRY NO CONTRABAND; THEY CARRY NO WAR MATERIAL FOR IRAQ. THEY CARRY CRUDE OIL AND OIL PRODUCTS. OUR DEPLOYMENTS AND TANKER ESCORTS ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY ARE DEFENSIVE. THEY THREATEN NO ONE WHO WOULD NOT FIRST THREATEN US.

THE U.S. MIDDLE EAST FORCE THAT HAS BEEN OPERATING OFF THE ISLAND OF BAHRAIN SINCE THE LATE L94ØS DID NOT FORM CONVOYS FOR MERCHANT SHIPS UNTIL JULY OF LAST YEAR. BUT IT WAS ACTIVELY PROTECTING U.S. FLAG VESSELS OVER THOSE EARLIER YEARS. THE U.S. NAVY HAS KEPT ITS MIDDLE EAST FORCE PRESENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF OVER THE FOUR DECADES. INDEED, PROTECTING OUR FLAG VESSELS WAS THE VERY BASIS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U.S. NAVY MORE THAN 2ØØ YEARS AGO.

LAST YEAR, THE THREAT LEVEL ROSE. THERE WERE MORE FREQUENT SHIPPING ATTACKS, AND THE IRANIANS DEPLOYED A SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE CALLED "SILKWORM" WHICH HAS LED US TO STEP UP OUR OWN DEFENSES. WE DO NOT INTEND TO

EXPAND PERMANENTLY OUR NAVAL PRESENCE. WE HAD SOME FIVE SHIPS THERE ON THE AVERAGE SINCE WORLD WAR II. TODAY WE HAVE A CARRIER BATTLE GROUP OUTSIDE THE GULF AND PROBABLY L5 CAPITAL SHIPS IN AND OUT OF THE GULF. BUT WE'RE NOT INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING THAT MAJOR PRESENCE. WE'VE TOLD THIS TO THE IRANIANS AND WE'VE TOLD THIS TO THE SOVIETS, BOTH OF WHOM HAVE COMPLAINED VERY BITTERLY ABOUT OUR PRESENCE. WE'VE TOLD THEM VERY FRANKLY, THE BEST WAY TO GET US TO CUT BACK IS TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END.

THERE WAS A LOT OF CONCERN LAST YEAR. IT WAS THIS MONTH LAST YEAR WHEN THE PRESIDENT TOOK THE DECISION TO REFLAG THE KUWAITI TANKERS. CONGRESS WAS VERY BITTERLY DIVIDED; THERE WAS A LOT OF CRITICISM IN THE PRESS ABOUT OUR ACTION, AND THE PUBLIC WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE DANGERS OF DEEPER INVOLVEMENT. OUR POLICY OF ESCORTING REFLAGGED TANKERS WAS CRYSTALIZED WHEN THE USS STARK WAS HIT, COSTING THE LIVES OF 37 OF OUR SEAMEN. BUT IN THE MONTHS SINCE, I THINK ITS BEEN RECOGNIZED THAT THIS POLICY IS A SUCCESS, AND THE BURDEN IS BEING SHARED BY OUR ALLIES, IN AN EXTRAORDINARY DISPLAY OF ALLIED RESOLVE. THE BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIANS, BELGIANS AND DUTCH HAVE EITHER REINFORCED OR DISPATCHED NAVAL ASSETS TO THE GULF, AND JAPAN, AMONG OTHERS, IS MAKING A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EFFORT.

OUR GULF ARAB FRIENDS ARE ALSO PITCHING IN TO COUNTER THE INTIMIDATION. BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL HAVE AFFORDED THE U.S. MILITARY AND THE NAVIES OF OUR ALLIES UNPRECEDENTED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OVER THE PAST YEAR -- AND WITHOUT THAT SUPPORT NEITHER WE NOR OUR ALLIES COULD OPERATE A MISSION OF THIS MAGNITUDE.

BUT, PROTECTION OF THE GULF OVER THE LONGER RUN SHOULD BE A SHARED BURDEN -- SHARED BY THE PEOPLE LIVING THERE MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED. AND, WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THEM, WITH THOSE STATES TO PROVIDE THEM THE WEAPONS AND TRAINING THEY NEED TO ENHANCE THEIR OWN SELF DEFENSE.

I SAID THERE WERE TWO TRACKS, THE SECOND ONE BEING THE DIPLOMATIC ONE AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK. LAST YEAR, WE LED THE EFFORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT RESULTED IN THE UNANIMOUS PASSAGE OF RESOLUTION 598, WHICH ESTABLISHES A SOLID BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT IS FAIR TO BOTH SIDES: IT CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE, A WITHDRAWAL TO INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS, A COMMISSION ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, AS WELL AS, OF COURSE,

NEGOTIATIONS TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END.

IRAQ HAS ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION. IRAN HAS STALLED, REFUSING TO PRESENT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITH AN UNAMBIGOUS RESPONSE. BECAUSE IRAN REFUSES TO COOPERATE, WE BELIEVE THAT FURTHER ENFORCEMENT IS NEEDED IN THE FORM OF A GLOBAL ARMS EMBARGO ON IRAN TO BE MANDATED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THAT WOULD BE BINDING ON ALL N MEMBERS. WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING SUCH AN EMBARGO IN THE COUNCIL SINCE LAST FALL, BUT THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO SUPPORT IT. THIS SUBJECT IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR AGENDA WITH THE USSR. WE WILL KEEP TRYING, KEEP PUSHING UNTIL IRAN IS READY TO MAKE PEACE.

IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE DOING WHAT WE CAN UNILATERALLY WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO SQUEEZE DOWN IRAN'S WAR-MAKING POTENTIAL THROUGH CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF ARMS TO TEHRAN. OUR EFFORT IS CALLED OPERATION STAUNCH. WE

HAVE MADE SOME REAL PROGRESS, ESPECIALLY WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT BEEN COOPERATING, AND SOME EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE CONTINUING TO SELL SIGNIFICANT SUPPLIES.

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN HAS TO BE AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF OUR RESOLVE. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR WHAT WE ARE DOING IN THE GULF AND WHY. WE HAVE REMAINED STEADFAST IN OUR POLICY, AND STEADFAST IN OUR EFFORTS TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH NEW THREATS AS THEY FLARE UP. THERE IS NO MORE CERTAIN WAY TO ASSURE GULF SECURITY AND PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN THAT VITAL REGION, AND WE CAN BE PROUD OF THE WAY IT'S TURNED OUT.

LET ME TURN TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT - ANOTHER FORTY YEAR OLD PROBLEM, MAYBE TWO THOUSAND YEARS OLD DEPENDING WHICH BOOK YOU'RE READING. THE FORTY YEAR OLD STRUGGLE IS ONCE AGAIN BACK IN THE HEADLINES, BACK ON YOUR NIGHTLY TV NEWS SHOWS. THE OUTBURST OF VIOLENT, ANGRY PROTESTS BY THE YOUNG PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BEGINNING LAST DECEMBER, ISRAEL'S HARSH RESPONSE, AND THE CONTINUATION OF THIS CONFRONTATION FOR OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS ARE A VERY SHARP REMINDER THAT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, AT THE CENTER OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, MUST BE RESOLVED. AND THERE IS A NEW SENSE OF URGENCY, RECOGNITION THAT THE STATUS QUO IS UNACCEPTABLE IN HUMAN, MORAL AND STRATEGIC TERMS, BOTH FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN VERY DEEPLY INVOLVED IN EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT SINCE ISRAEL WAS BORN IN

1948 - FOR SEVERAL REASONS: THE THREAT THAT THE SERIES OF WARS POSE TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY; THE SPECIAL TIES, THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND

THE UNITED STATES; AND OUR LONG STANDING FRIENDSHIPS AND INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD.

SINCE 1967, THE YEAR OF THE JUNE WAR, OF THE SIX-DAY WAR WHICH I'M SURE YOU'VE HAD OCCASION TO LOOK AT IN YOUR TEXT BOOKS OF MODERN WARFARE, THE FOUNDATIONS FOR OUR DIPLOMACY, FOR OUR POLITICAL EFFORTS, ARE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THESE GUIDEPOSTS EMBODY THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL AND OTHER STATES IN THE REGION TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE BORDERS. THEY ALSO STAND FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF LAND FOR PEACE AS THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS FOR ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT.

WE'RE WORKING WITH THESE TWO RESOLUTIONS AS AN ANCHOR. WE CAN POINT TO SOME REAL ACHIEVEMENTS OVER THE PAST WENTY YEARS.

THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS, THE SINAI INTERIM AGGREEMENTS, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY WERE EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. THEY ARE PROOF THAT NEGOTIATIONS WORK, EVEN WHEN THE SIDES ARE SO PASSIONATELY AND BITTERLY OPPOSED AS THEY ARE IN THAT REGION.

WHILE EGYPT AND ISRAEL IMPLEMENTED THEIR PEACE TREATY, WE TURNED TO THE OTHER GOAL THAT HAD BEEN SPELLED OUT IN THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. WE PURSUED IT FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS BUT THE SO-CALLED AUTONOMY TALKS BROKE DOWN FINALLY IN 1982.

IN SEPTEMBER OF THAT YEAR PRESIDENT REAGAN PROPOSED A FRESH START AGAIN AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, THIS TIME THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS. THE APPROACH WAS DESIGNED TO LEAD, VIA A FIVE YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD, TO A FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND THEIR PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE PARTIES. AGAIN, WE WERE DISAPPOINTED. THE REAGAN INITIATIVE DID NOT LEAD TO RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE CONTINUES TO FESTER.

THREE YEARS LATER, IN 1985, THERE WAS RENEWED INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS WHEN KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AND ISRAELI LEADERS BEGAN TO SPEAK OUT IN FAVOR OF ANOTHER TRY. THERE WERE INTENSE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON, ISRAEL

AND JORDAN. AND BECAUSE THE ISSUES DIVIDING THE PARTIES TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WERE SO COMPLEX, WE FOCUSED ON PROCEDURE. WE FOCUSED ON HOW TO STRUCTURE A NEGOTIATING PROCESS. OUR THEORY WAS THAT IF A PROCESS COULD BE DEVISED AND NEGOTIATIONS LAUNCHED, THE TOUGH PROBLEMS OF SUBSTANCE WOULD YIELD MORE EASILY TO COMPPOMISES.

THIS SEARCH FOR A PROCESS, FOR THE MODALITIES, OF NEGOTIATIONS MADE SOME PROGRESS, BUT IT DIDN'T FLOURISH; IT DIDN'T GET US TO THE TABLE. ONCE AGAIN, THE PEACE PROCESS LOST MOMENTUM, AND PRESSURES IN THE PALESTINIAN

POPULACE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA CONTINUED TO BUILD. THERE SIMPLY WAS NO HOPE OUT THERE, NO VISIBLE PEACE PROCESS THAT THEY COULD POINT TO AND SAY, WELL THE TALKS ARE GOING ON, MAYBE NEXT YEAR, MAYBE THE YEAR AFTER, WE'LL BE RID OF THE OCCUPATION AND WE'LL FIND SOME NEW RELATIONSHIP, SOME NEW SELF-GOVERNMENT AND A NEW TIE BETWEEN US, ISRAEL AND JORDAN.

BUT LAST DECEMBER THE DESPAIR AND FRUSTRATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BOILED OVER IN MAJOR RIOTS. ONCE AGAIN WE ARE SEIZED WITH THE PROBLEM OF HOW REACTIVATE THE PEACE PROCESS. NO ONE, AND I MEAN THAT IN ALL SINCERITY, NO ONE NOW DOUBTS THAT THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS INTOLERABLE FOR ALL, AND THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. AND WE ARE BASING OUR CURRENT EFFORTS ON THAT.

IN THE PAST WHEN WE TRIED TO STRUCTURE A NEGOTIATING PROCESS IT DID NOT SUCCEED SINCE EACH OF THE PARTIES, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS WANTED A CLEARER PICTURE OF WHERE IT WOULD END UP BEFORE THEY WOULD START OUT. THEY WANTED SOME KIND OF GUARANTEE BECAUSE THERE'S A LOT OF RISK TO GO TO THE TABLE. AS AMERICANS, IT SEEMS PRETTY STRAIGHTFORWARD TO US. YOU'VE GOT A PROBLEM - BE IT A LABOR-MANAGEMENT PROBLEM, YOU NEGOTIATE, YOU SIT DOWN, YOU MAY FIGHT VERBALLY; IN THE OLD DAYS WE HAD FIGHTS BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND THE UNIONS OUT IN THE STREETS. BUT WE'VE LEARNED HOW TO TALK THESE THINGS OUT. IT'S BEEN MUCH HARDER TO GET THAT MIND SET IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WITH THIS LESSON IN MIND, SECRETARY SHULTZ, AT THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST, LAST MONTH LAUNCHED A NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVE THAT COMBINES ELEMENTS OF BOTH SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS THAT IS DESIGNED TO BRING THE PARTIES TO THE TABLE.

OUR APPROACH ENVISAGES NEGOTIATIONS AT AN EARLY DATE DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IN A SHORT

TIME SPAN. THESE TALKS WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS AT ANOTHER DATE CERTAIN SEVERAL MONTHS DOWN THE ROAD TO ACHIEVE A FINAL SETTLEMENT. NEGOTIATIONS FOR RAPID CHANGE ON THE GROUND IN A TRANSITIONAL PHASE AND FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT ISSUES WOULD BE CLEARLY LINKED, SO THAT NEITHER PHASE COULD BE SEPARATED FROM THE OTHER. AND SUCH A PROCESS WOULD OFFER REASSURANCE TO BOTH SIDES THAT THEIR VITAL INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED AND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD UNFOLD IN A DIRECTION THAT WAS DEFINED IN ADVANCE.

WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING, WE THINK IT SHOULD BE EASIER TO STRUCTURE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, WHICH THE U.S. INITIATIVE PROPOSES TO LAUNCH THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE CONFERENCE WE ENVISAGE WOULD PROVIDE INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES; BUT IT WOULD NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SOLUTIONS OR VETO DECISIONS WHICH THE PARTIES THEMSELVES HAVE AGREED TO.

BUT OUR GOAL IS TO ADDRESS, NOT ONLY THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, BUT A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. OUR PLAN FORSEES A SERIES OF BILATERAL TALKS THAT WOULD ALSO DEAL WITH ISRAEL'S UNRESOLVED ~~DISPUTE~~S WITH SYRIA AS WELL ~~AS~~ WITH LEBANON, THE OTHERS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

THREE WEEKS AGO, WHEN THE SECRETARY TRAVELLED TO THE REGION HE MET WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, KING HUSSEIN, PRESIDENT ASAD OF SYRIA, PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT. AND AT THE END OF THIS ROUND HE LEFT WITH EACH A LETTER OUTLINING OUR INITIATIVE AND ASKED FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE. LAST WEEK PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR CAME TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS. RIGHT NOW, AMERICAN AMBASSADOR PHIL HABIB IS OUT IN THE REGION IN EGYPT, JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND MOROCCO. THE PROCESS CONTINUES.

OUR INITIATIVE PUTS CHALLENGES TO ALL OF THE PARTIES; AND REQUIRES DIFFICULT - EVEN PAINFUL DECISIONS. BUT IT IS A REALISTIC APPROACH THAT TAKES ALL OF THEIR INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT. SO, THREE WEEKS LATER WHAT ARE THE RESULTS? NOBODY SAID YES, NOBODY HAS ACCEPTED IT, BUT THEY ARE GIVING IT A VERY SERIOUS LOOK, AND WE ARE REMINDING THEM THAT THIS IS A TIME OF CRISIS THAT DEMANDS DECISIONS.

THE RIOTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA HAVE SHOWN VERY VIVIDLY THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IS COMING BACK TO ITS ROOTS -- A STRUGGLE BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS FOR TERRITORY AND POLITICAL CONTROL.

IT'S BEEN A CRUEL HISTORY THAT THESE TWO PEOPLE ARE STILL

LOCKED IN A STRUGGLE AFTER SO MANY YEARS: THAT THE DREAM OF PEACE AND SECURITY THAT INSPIRED ISRAEL'S CREATION, AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF PALESTINIANS TO SHAPE THEIR OWN DESTINY BOTH REMAIN UNFULFILLED.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THESE TWO PEOPLE, WHOM HISTORY HAS BROUGHT TOGETHER IN THE SAME LAND, IS A GRIPPING HUMAN DILEMMA, SINCE BOTH THE JEWS AND THE PALESTINIANS HAVE CLAIMS TO JUSTICE THAT COMMAND OUR RESPECT. AND IT IS TRAGIC THAT THESE TWO PEOPLE WHO LIVE SIDE BY SIDE, WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO MUCH, AND WHOSE DESTINIES ARE SO CLOSELY LINKED, HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO COME TO TERMS WITH EACH OTHER.

BOTH HAVE AN OVERRIDING INTEREST IN FINDING WAYS TO RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES THROUGH COMPROMISE. IN THE LONG RUN THERE CAN BE NEITHER VICTOR NOR VANQUISHED IN THIS CONFLICT. AND WITHOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, BOTH ARE GOING TO BE LOSERS, CONDEMNED TO CONTINUING STRIFE AND INSECURITY.

FOR ISRAEL, THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND DEMOCRATIC DILLEMAS POSED BY CONTINUING THEIR GOVERNANCE OVER PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE LOOMING PROBLEMS THAT ARE GETTING INCREASING DEBATE INSIDE ISRAEL AND ELSEWHERE.

FOR PALESTINIANS, THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR LEADERS TO COME FORWARD - AND THEY HAVE BEEN LACKING IN THE PAST - WITH THE VISION AND SKILL TO STRUGGLE FOR THEIR RIGHTS AND THEIR ASPIRATIONS IN A REALISTIC WAY, AND TO REJECT THE FALSE PROPHETS OF ARMED STRUGGLE.

FORTUNATELY THERE ARE MANY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ARABS AND ISRAELIS, WHO UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR ACCOMMODATION AND COMPROMISE, AND WHO REALIZE THAT THE SIREN APPEAL, THE SIREN SONG OF THE EXTREMISTS, IS A FORMULA FOR MUTUAL DISASTER.

THESE REALITIES ARE BEING CONFRONTED, I'D HAVE TO SAY,

INTELLECTUALLY. STILL, THEY HAVEN'T FOUND A WAY TO DEAL WITH EACH OTHER POLITICALLY. OUR INITIATIVE OFFERS A WORKABLE APPROACH TO ANSWERING THESE PROBLEMS - THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS - AND WE HOPE THE PARTIES WILL FIND THEIR WAY TO ANSWER POSITIVELY.

SO IN THE GULF AND IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, AMERICAN INTERESTS, AND THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS ARE VERY MUCH AT STAKE. THE PROBLEMS OF SOLVING THESE SEEMINGLY INTRACTABLE STRUGGLES ARE DAUNTING, BUT THE DANGERS AHEAD

IF THE PROBLEMS REMAIN UNSOLVED ARE EVEN MORE OMINOUS. PEACE IS IMPERATIVE IN BOTH THEATERS. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE, TOGETHER WITH OUR FRIENDS, TO BRING THESE CONFLICTS TO AN END. SHULTZ
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חמשרד

אל: מצפ"א

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הסנטור דשלה ותגובת רה"ם למכתב 30 הסנטורים

בזמנו העברתי לכל החתומים על "מכתב 30 הסנטורים" העתק של תגובת רה"ם לסנטור לוין. לידיעתכם, רצ"ב מכתב בנדון שהתקבל מהסנטור טום דשלה (דמוקרט ידידותי מדקוטה הדרומית).

המכתב מבולבל במקצת (כנראה הסנטור לא שם לב שרה"ם - זלא אנוכי - חתום על המכתב לסנטור לוין), אך התוכן מדבר בעד עצמו והנימה האפולוגטית בולטת.

יוסף לנדאו

למדן

שהה רהמ מנש ממנכל בירון מדפס

THOMAS DASCHLE
SOUTH DAKOTA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 22, 1988

615

2/2

Yosef Lamdan
Congressional Liason Officer
Embassy of Israel
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Lamdan:

Thank you for your letter regarding my decision to sign a letter to Secretary Shultz in support of his peace initiative in the Middle East. I certainly understand your feelings and the depth of your concern about this matter of great importance to Israeli security.

First, let me assure you that I remain a strong supporter of Israel. I was approached by Senator Levin and other senior senators who have been longtime supporters of Israel to sign a letter to the Secretary of State expressing concern about the current stalemate in Arab-Israeli conflict. Out of my own concern for peace and Israeli security, I agreed to sign the letter.

It is indeed unforunate that ~~certain~~ aspects of the letter were highlighted in a way that distorted its general intent. In retrospect, perhaps private communication with the Secretary of State and with the Prime Minister would have been more appropriate.

For the future, though, what matters most is that friends of Israel work together. I believe we are united in the belief that Israel and her neighbors must eventually go to the table to find a peace that establishes the state of Israel as a permanent and truly secure resident of the Middle East.

While we may anguish over differences about how to get to that peace table, and even misstep on occasion, I want to remember the overriding, fundamental commitment we hold to the security and preservation of Israel. That is the tie that binds us, and it is a commitment I will never forget.

Once again, thank you for writing. Your constructive criticism is the kind that can help all of us to work together for peace in the Middle East.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Tom Daschle

Tom Daschle
United States Senate

TAD/lp

1988-03-25 22:58 1 1480126 05

31

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

המשרד

607

1/3

טיפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 25.3.88

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

טילים סיניים בסעודיה

תשומת לבכם לכתבת ה"וושינגטון פוסט" היום 25.3.88.

יוסי גל

יוסי גל

שלח רה"מ שהבט מנט ממנט בשן מנשו אביטל

מאת הסברה ולתרבות ממ"ד רק אשר 1-3-1

WP p1 2/3
cont...
607
2/3

Saudi-Israeli Tensions Worry U.S.

Bombing Practice May Presage Attack On Missiles in Arabia

By George C. Wilson
and David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writers

U.S. intelligence agencies have disclosed that the Israeli Air Force has been conducting unusually intensive low-level bombing practice runs as Saudi Arabia is sheltering its new Chinese intermediate-range missiles, officials said yesterday.

They said that the bombing practice could be in preparation for a preemptive strike against the missiles, as a senior Israeli official warned Sunday. U.S. intelligence officials, however, warned that they had no hard evidence that an Israeli bombing strike against Saudi Arabia is imminent.

The Israelis have been conducting pinpoint air raids on Palestinian targets in Lebanon in recent days, which could also explain the unusual exercises.

Amid heightening tensions, Saudi Arabia has sent a warning through the United States, diplomatic sources said, that it will retaliate with its surviving missiles, with a range of up to 1,500 miles, if Israel tries to bomb its missiles.

Although Israel and Saudi Arabia may be waging only a war of nerves, State Department officials are apprehensive and are seeking to avert an Israeli-Saudi confrontation.

Yesterday, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak sent an "urgent message" to President Reagan protesting the Israeli official's threat of a possible strike against Saudi Arabia's Chinese CSS2-class surface-to-surface missiles.

Mubarak urged Reagan to persuade Israel to halt "its irresponsible threats against Arab states" because "any aggression on Saudi Arabia constitutes a very serious development which could blow up peace," the Middle East News Agency reported yesterday.

Both Israel and Saudi Arabia have been taciturn about their military preparations, and the Saudis have provided little information

"Any aggression on Saudi Arabia ... could blow up peace."

—Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak

about their new missiles, U.S. officials said. But satellite photography and other intelligence have revealed that Israel has been flying F15 fighter bombers in attack profiles and that Saudi Arabia has been building shelters for its missiles.

Construction of two large complexes for Saudi missiles is far along, intelligence sources said, and the sites comprise many buildings, suggesting command-and-control facilities as well as shelters for the missiles, which apparently would be housed in garage-like structures with thick walls and roofs.

Saudi representatives have told U.S. officials and members of Congress in briefings that their Chinese missiles are mobile and will be kept with their launchers in constantly moving convoys rather than stored permanently in shelters such as those already detected, sources said. If the missiles are mobile, the Israeli Air Force would have a difficult time destroying them all in a preemptive strike, specialists said.

In congressional briefings, the Saudis have stressed the proliferation of missiles in neighboring countries, particularly Iran, which has repeatedly threatened to strike Saudi Arabia in retaliation for its support of Iraq.

607 3/3



BY CLARICE BORIO—THE WASHINGTON POST

With a range of about 1,500 miles, the missiles could hit Tehran as well as any target in Israel.

Saudi technicians have secretly been learning to operate the Chinese missiles for two years, including instruction in China, and thus do not need a long time to master the intricacies of firing the new weapons, sources said.

However, the U.S. bombing raid against Libya in 1986 demonstrated that developing countries can have modern weapons but be incapable of firing them accurately. The Libyans fired only a few of their Soviet-an[illegible] missiles during that raid.

Israeli officials have hinted publicly that they might bomb the Saudi missiles before they can become operational. Last Sunday over Radio Israel, Yosi Ben Aharon, an aide to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, said "the possibility always exists" that his country could destroy the missiles. "We have a reputation that we do not wait until a potential danger becomes an actual danger," he said.

Israel in June 1981 sent F16 warplanes to bomb a French-built nuclear reactor near the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, justifying the strike on the grounds that the uncompleted reactor posed a threat "to the very survival of Israel." It also bombed the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization outside Tunis in October 1985, using F15s.

China has confirmed that it supplied the missiles to Saudi Arabia, declaring that "these weapons are solely for the purpose of defense."

Saudi King Fahd sent a letter March 12 to President Reagan assuring the administration that there are no nuclear warheads on the missiles, but reaffirmed the Saudi intention to acquire the most modern weapons necessary for its defense

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף ___ מתוך ___ דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 25 מרץ 88 1730

מס' מברק

1/4

619

המשרד + לשכת רה"מ + לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת מנכ"ל רה"מ

לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר

מכתב בושביץ לרה"מ

לטעיף 5 (י"א)

במברקנו 417 מה-18.3

1) לנוחיותכם, רצ"ב המכתב, חתום ע"י 29 סנטורים, כולם רפובליקאים.

2) להזכירכם, בעבר היו פניות דומות (לטובת מוסדות חינוך אחרים) שנעשו ישירות לשר האוצר מסנטורים שונים, לרבות קסטן, בושביץ והכט.
בושביץ מבקש להפגש עם השגריר ביום ד' (30.3) בהשתתפות שניים-שלושה סנטורים נוספים, ולדון עמו בנדון. במידת האפשר, נודה לתגובה ראשונית למכתב בושביץ עד אז.

3) לידיעתכם, המכתב פרי יוזמתו של הרב בלקני, איש חרדי ואחד מגדולי המתרימים למפלגה הרפובליקאית מקרב היהדות האורתודוקסית.

לדברי עוזרי בושביץ, בלקני נלחץ ע"י התורמים שהוא מגייס, המבקשים שהוא יפעיל סנטורים לטובת מוסדות דתיים בארץ, ואילו הסנטורים מוכנים לחתום על המכתב לנוכח גודל התרומות שבלקני משיג. בושביץ מהווה נקודת המגע בסנט לא רק בגלל שהוא יהודי אלא גם מכיוון שהוא יו"ר הוועדה הרפובליקאית המווסתת כספים למועמדי המפלגה לסנט.

יוסף למדן

למדן

שהם הרבה נגד בין נגדו אודה
3 3 1 2 3

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

2/4

March 16, 1988

619

The Honorable Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister
State of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As always, it is a pleasure to see you in the United States. We wish you much success in advancing the cause of peace that the people of Israel have for so long sought.

We write to you today, however, on a different, but important, matter: to express our support for three projects in your country. All of them would be of major benefit to a great number of American students attending school in Israel. The first of these is for Machon Alta Lubavitch School in Safed. The projected cost for their building and dormitory facilities is $4.5 million. The second is a building for the Jerusalem Institute of Talmudic Research in Jerusalem. The cost is estimated at $3.5 million. Thirdly, the Vishnitz Institution of B'nei Brak has a capitol construction and operational budget of $8 million, and again needs State assistance.

We understand that you and Minister Nissim have been contacted by a number of United States Senators and Members of Congress requesting funding for these projects. To date, we are unaware of any response on any of these three very worthwhile institutions. All of them have more than 60% of their budgets covered by private American donations.

We would very much appreciate your kind attention to this matter and look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Most sincerely,

Paul Tribble

Pete Wilson

3/4 619

4/4 619

Pete Domenici

Bill Frist

Daniel Evans

Paul Coverdell

Ted Stevens

Rod Grams

Strom Thurmond

Larry Pressler

END

1988-03-26 03:28 1 1480126 04

12

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טיפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח טבת 25 מוץ 88

מס' מברק

624

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

פגישת שולץ עם חברי מל"ם.

הקונגרסמנים מל לויין וגילטמן פנו במכתב לשולץ ובו ביקשו המזכיר שלא לחיפגש עם סעיד ולוגוד. כתבו שהפגישה עומדת בסתירה להתחייבות מ-1975 ותגרום להרגשה של סחף במחוייבויות ארה"ב וכי עתוי הפגישה גרוע.

מל לויין התקשר גם לצירלי היל והאחרון אמר לו שישראל נזהרת שלא לבקר פגישות של אזרחים אמריקאים עם המזכיר. היל ולויין נשארו בעמדותיהם.

ערן

שמה מתג גשל גלגנט בין גבס'
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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

מ ר ס מ ס ר

דף 1 מתוך ___ דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 25.3.88

מס' מברק

מערך

609 1/2

אל: מצפייא , מעייית

מאת: עתונות

TRAVEL ADVISORY

להלן הנוסח שנמסר תינם לכתבים בתדרוך דובר מחלקת המדינה.

יוסי גל

שהם הגיעו עשו אנשי בין בעסו אמיתי ויש הסברה
אבטחת/מדינה

609 2/2

TRAVEL ADVISORY: STATE DEPARTMENT: MARCH 25, 1988

Text: Due to continuing distrubances in the West Bank and Gaza, the Department of State advises all US citizens to avoid travel to these areas until further notice. Americans residing in these areas should exercise particular caution. If travel to the WB is unavoidable, travelers should consult whith the Consul General in Jerusalem, and in the case of travel to Gaza, with the US Embassy in Tel-Aviv.

Our previous advisory for East Jerusalem, which has been in effect since 1982, remain unchanged. The situation in East Jerusalem (including the old city) is unpredictable and Americans should check with the Consulate General in Jerusalem before entering this area.

Under all circumstances, Americans should avoid demonstrations and other situations that have the potential to lead to violence. American travelers should carry their US passports at all times.

Any American who wishes further information on the current security situation should consult the American Embassy in Tel Aviv (654 338) or the American Consulate General in Jerusalem (234-271).

נר:	67
תאריך	25.3.88
דחיפות:	

"טיחי" נר 67

אל: י-ם

מאת: מיאמי

מעולה 67 1/2

מברק בלמ"ס

אל: סמנכ"ל אמיתי"ק
מע"ת, מצפ"א
הסברה וושינגטון, ניו יורק - ווש העבירו נא

מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית מיאמי

הנדון: דו"ח הסברה שבועי 18-25 מרץ.

השבוע תמסה ישראל חלק השוב אך לא דומיננטי בדווחי התקשורת המקומיים. ביקור גיין פטריק זכה לסיקור, כשהנ"ל מביעה תמיכה חזקה ואחדה מופגנת לישראל. מסע התמיכה בישראל שאורגן על ידו והסתדרות העיונית קבל סיקור נרחב בתקשורת האלקטרונית והכתובה.

ארוע נוסף שקיבל כיסוי הוא פסטיבל הסרטים הישראלי שהתקיים השבוע במיאמי.

בסוף השבוע הופיעו במיאמי הרלד מאמריהם של ג'ורג' שולץ ומשה ארנס בנושא הועידה הבנלאומית.

סיום ביקורו של שמיר בארה"ב ותרגלת חסיבה הגלחבה לה זכה בישראל זכו לסיקור נרחב בעתונות הכתובה. מאמרים נוספים עסקו במישוריו של שמיר ויכולתו לנהל את הפוליטיקה ויחסי החוץ של ישראל.

האיום הישראלי על תכניה הטילים הסעודית הופיע במשך מספר ימים בעתונות הכתובה בחלק מהתרחשויות במזרח התיכון.

הפצצת מחנות המחבלים בצידון גם היא הופיעה באותה מסגרת, וכן משפטי החיילים הישראלים שנאשמו בברוטליות כלפי מפגינים ערבים, הוצאות משפט ואנונו זכו לסיקור דל ביותר. והכתבות בנושא זה הנן אינפורמטיביות בלבד.

מרטין מרגר - כתב המיאמי הרלד המשיך הכפות את הארועים ביהודה ושומרון, כאשר הוא נוקט בעמדה פרו פלשתינאית ומתאר את סבלם וצערם של הערבים בסגנון ציורי ותי.

רוב הצילומים המופיעים עדיין מתמקדים במתאה של הציפור הפלשתינאי, ובהוקפנות של החיילים הישראליים.

הופיעה בכתבה במיאמי הרלד המיכה אל גור בישראל.
במטפר כתבות סוקרים נושא המשלחת הפלשתינאית לאו"מ.

במספר מאמרים בעתונים השונים הופיעו המלצות להחליף את הנתוון האמריקאי שולץ במועמדים שונים ! קיסינגיר, קרטר, ריגן ! גם מכתבי תודאים למערכת העלו הצעות מסוג זה.

הקריקטורות שהופיעו בעתונות הכתובה עסקו בעיקר בשמיר ובאנטראקציה בין שמיר ופרס

שהח רהמ שהבל מנש ממנ הבין מלבו לאור מנמ"ש ל"ב"ל מקת הסברה
ולאנס ממל הבי אשר

MAR.24 '88 19:45 CONSULATE OF ISRAEL MIAMI

מספר: 67

תאריך: 25.3.88

דחיפות:

מ ר ו ת

אל: ר-ם:

מאת: מ י א מ י

2/2 67

מברק בלמ"ס

אל:

תופעות הקונסוליה

פגישה עם עתונאים מקומיים באורלנדו.

ארוחת שנתית של המגבית באורלנדו.

פתיחת שבוע פסטיבל הקולנוע הישראלי במיאמי.

עצרת הזדהות עם ישראל בהשתתפות חציר עודד ערן.

ראיון טלפוני עם ביל ביזר מ- WINZ (יז.ו)

ראיון טלפוני עם כתבת של המיאמי הרלד.

ראיון טלפוני עם כתבת ה- JEWISH FLORIDIAN

הופעה בפני פעילי מרכז סימון ויזנטל במיאמי, בארוע לכ' וולנברג.

ראיון עם כתבת המיאמי הרלד לקראת יום העצמאות ה- 40.

שיחת חסברה עם ג'ב בוש, המזכיר לעניני מסחר בממפלורידה. (בנו של סגן הנשיא.)

ב ב ר כ ה

הקונסוליה מיאמי

END

משרד החוץ–מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק גלוי

אל: שר החוץ

מאת: שר התיירות.

דע: רוה"מ.

סיווג בטחוני: שמור.

דחיפות:

תאריך וזימן: 25 מרץ 1988

מס. מברק:

אבקשך לפעול במלוא התקפות ולהפעיל השפעתך למבוע פירסום ה TRAVEL-ADVISARY של מחלקת המדינה בארה"ב העומדת לתת תוקף מחודש להודעתה ממרץ 1982 והמציעה לאזרחי ארה"ב שלא לבקר ביו"ש עזה ומיזרח ירושלים.

לקראת חג הפסח והפסחא יש בהודעה זו מישום גרימת נזק.

ידוע לי כי שגרירנו בוושינגטון פעל בימרצות בכיוון זה אך ללא הצלחה.

ב ב ר כ ה

אברהם שריר

15

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

המשרד

620

1/3

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 25 מרץ 1730 88

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מנכ"ל רה"מ

מכתב 30 הסנטורים

לעיונכם, רצ"ב כתבה בנדון מתוך עתון ניו-יורק טיימס דהיום.

י. ל.

קונגרס-עתונות

שהה רחה גשל בין גלבסו אביטל מעל הסברה
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טופס מברק

690

שגרירות ישראל וושינגטון

Congress

Letter Critical of Israel Stirs Political Fallout

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 24 — A letter signed by 30 Senators that accused the Israeli Government of taking an inflexible negotiating position has ignited a fierce controversy among Jews and produced threats of political retribution against some lawmakers.

Some of those who signed the letter are feeling a bit "stung" by the reaction, as one put it, and worry about possible political repercussions. The hostile fallout also helped convince House members not to send a similar letter of their own to Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

Neverthless, most of the Senators who signed the letter said in interviews this week that they were glad they had made the statement and continued to stand behind it.

Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, a New Jersey Democrat who faces reelection this fall, said he had received

Some Senators say they were stung by the reaction.

"an implied threat or two" from constituents as a result of his decision to sign the letter. "I had a couple of people saying, 'I was going to send you a contribution, but now I'm going to wait,' " he said.

Mr. Lautenberg also said that those who signed could have done a better job preparing Jewish constituents for the letter. "Perhaps a few phone calls to some organizations to make sure they clearly understood our purpose would have been wiser," he said. But Mr. Lautenberg expressed a common view among the Senators when he said, "What we did was the right thing to do."

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, said he had received more than 200 calls, and they were running about 3 to 1 against the letter. Some, he added, were quite hostile and vituperative, but he said he continued to stand by the letter.

'Useful for Everybody'

"I think it was useful for everybody to know that this was our view," he said. "I've been involved in these things a long time. I'm a New Yorker, and I know there are as many views on this subject as there are people."

Some lawmakers say they feel more strongly than ever that their criticisms of Israel were justified and necessary. Calling the letter "measured and responsible," Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr., a Connecticut Republican, said he would have suffered politically if he had not signed it.

"There's no way I can speak out about the human rights issue all over the world and then close my eyes on this one," said Mr. Weicker, who faces a stiff challenge this year from Joseph Lieberman, the Connecticut Attorney General, who is Jewish.

But Senator Rudy Boschwitz, a principal organizer of the statement, said: "Yeah, we got a few hits. Some people who signed the letter say they did it because I did, and now they feel quite stung."

Emotional Clash at Meeting

The strong emotions generated by the letter were demonstrated last week, when Senator George J. Mitchell addressed a meeting of the United Jewish Appeal, and repeated many of the arguments in the letter. Later, as he tried to leave, the Maine Democrat found himself engulfed by a heated debate. On one side, two Americans angrily assailed him for criticizing Israel, while on the other side, an Israeli praised his remarks.

The main point of the letter was to praise Mr. Shultz for his peace initiative, and to express alarm at recent statements by Mr. Shamir, who seemed to be abandoning a long-held view that Israel was willing to trade captured territory for a stable peace settlement.

The hostile reaction seemed to be enhanced by Mr. Shamir, who repeatedly denounced the letter in his recent visit to the United States.

The issue has now been injected into the political campaign by Senator Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee, a contender for the Democratic nomination. With the New York primary coming up next month, Mr. Gore has aligned himself with Mr. Shamir and against the Reagan Administration's push for an international peace conference on the Middle East.

Hopefuls' Opposing Stands

Mr. Gore, who refused to sign the Senate letter, said that Mr. Shamir's objections to the American peace initiative have been given "short shrift." In so doing, Mr. Gore drew a clear distinction between himself and Gov. Michael S. Dukakis of Massachusetts, another leading contender for the nomination, who has expressed support for the letter.

In the 1984 New York primary, 22 percent of the Democratic vote was Jewish, and Mr. Gore is apparently gambling that many Jewish voters will resent the pressure being applied on Israel. But it remains a highly emotional matter on all sides, and the political benefits of stirring up the issue are not at all clear.

Senator John H. Chafee, a Rhode Island Republican who is up for re-election this year, says that organized



The New York Times

Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Democrat of New York
"I think it was useful for everybody to know that this was our view."

Moynihan says calls are running 3 to 1 against the letter.

Jewish groups, which generally support Mr. Shamir, do not necessarily speak for average Jewish citizens. The television pictures of continuing violence in the occupied territories, he said, have soured feelings toward the Israeli Government.

"People are disturbed by what's happening there," said Mr. Chafee, who did not sign the letter. "They're shocked."

One reason the letter attracted so much attention was that it was organized by Senator Boschwitz and Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, two prominent supporters of Israel who are both Jewish. And on matters involving Israel, Jewish lawmakers generally set the tone for Congressional policy.

Reliance on Colleagues

Five of the seven Jewish Senators signed the letter, including Mr. Lautenberg; Warren B. Rudman, Republican of New Hampshire, and Howard M. Metzenbaum, Democrat of Ohio. Only two did not, Arlen Specter, Republican of Pennsylvania, and Chic Hecht, Republican of Nevada.

In a similar way, lawmakers of Irish origin, such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, often play a leading role on questions concerning Ireland. In debates over South Africa, blacks exert special influence over their colleagues.

"There is an internal leadership that people defer to on issues like

END

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The New York Times

Frank R. Lautenberg
Democrat of New Jersey
"What we did was the right thing to do."

The New York Times

Rudy Boschwitz
Republican of Minnesota
"Some people who signed the letter say they did it because I did, and now they feel quite stung."

that," a Northeast Democrat said.

The letter was also highly critical of the Arabs for their refusal to recognize Israel or to negotiate with its leaders. But that element was largely ignored in news accounts, and as a result, some supporters of Israel argued that the letter came across as unbalanced and unfair.

Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, Republican of New York, was so angry that he wrote a letter to fellow Senators, arguing, "The letter from our colleagues may encourage the Arabs to dig in their heels."

Mr. Mitchell conceded that was a "fair comment" and added, "We have to make certain that we maintain pressure on both sides."

Senator Boschwitz expressed irritation at some reactions, which implied that Senators had no business criticizing Israel in public. "Sometimes, they think we shouldn't have the option of disagreeing with a policy, even though Israelis are disagreeing with it themselves," he said.

While many leading Jews are joining in the criticism, others support the letter. Moshe Arens, former Israeli Ambassador to the United States, wrote in an op-ed piece in The New York Times, "Whatever the Senators' intentions, the effect can only be harmful to Israel and the chances of getting the long-awaited negotiations started." But Hyman Bookbinder, of the American Jewish Committee, said, "I think it would be a shame and an outrage for any of these Senators to be punished for exercising their right to speak out."

Several days after the Senate letter appeared, a delegation of Jewish leaders, including Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg of Englewood, N.J., and Rita Hauser, a New York lawyer, met with a group of Jewish House members and urged them to write their own letter supporting the Shultz initiative and pressuring Mr. Shamir.

But the meeting became "quite raucous," according to one participant, and "no consensus whatsoever" emerged. Accordingly, no letter was ever drafted.

"After the Senate letter, many of us could see it was a mistake," said Representative Henry A. Waxman, who represents a heavily Jewish district in West Los Angeles. "However well-intentioned the letter may have been, it signaled to the Arab world that the United States may pressure Israel into making concessions, without any reciprocal concessions on the part of the Arabs."

Fear of Misunderstanding

"We all have this problem, particularly Jewish members, that any difference we have with Israel gets blown out of proportion," added Representative Barney Frank, a Massachusetts Democrat. "People are afraid that their small differences with Israel would be given more prominence than their large differences with the Arabs."

There is also some institutional pride, or at least an inferiority complex, at work here. As Mr. Frank put it, the House letter was shelved in part because "members of the House don't want to look like they are copying what their big brothers in the Senators are doing."

A number of Jewish House members have voiced their concerns privately to the Israeli Embasssy, and to Mr. Shamir personally when he visited last week. But with no Jewish lawmakers willing to take a public stand, the letter project collapsed.

"Without their leadership," said Representative Don Edwards of California, a prominent liberal Democrat, "none of us is going to do it."

JRS 3Y

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

המשרד

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טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 25.3.88

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

מזכיר המדינה שולץ הופיע אמש בתכנית החדשות של מקניל-לרר, להלן נוסח דבריו.

יוסי

יוסי גל

שם המג שהכל גשל גלעקל ביין גלפסו אמיטל גרת הסמהה
הלגיכן גדם הם אגן
ו ל ,ידיד מ

2/2 614

MR. LEHRER: On the Shultz peace initiative in the Middle East: did it die with Mr. Shamir when he went back to Israel?

SEC. SHULTZ: No.

MR. LEHRER: He said, before he left here -- we had a -- I had a long interview with him on this program -- he said, "I like George Shultz -- I love George Shultz -- he's a wonderful man, and yet his international Middle East peace conference idea would lead to the destruction of Israel."

SEC. SHULTZ: I can't see how that could be, because it is based on resolutions that Israel agreed to -- 242 and 348. It has a process in it that is one that Mr. Shamir has supported, namely, let's first work out transitional arrangements and then move to negotiations about what's called "final status." We have locked

those two things together in a way that he has some reservations about. But nevertheless, I think that it's a progressive idea. He is against the international conference that we have supported here as a way to get into the direct negotiations that both Mr. Shamir and we agree are the central feature. But he has described that international conference in a different way than we have. He's described it in terms of the kind of conference that I see the Soviet Union wants to have, where you gather the members of the -- permanent members of the Security Council and the people in the region, and somehow in the conference they determine the outcome. He's opposed to that; so are we. When that was proposed in the United Nations Security Council we vetoed it. We are for an international conference as a means to get to direct negotiations. And whether or not others will come to that, I don't know.

MR. LEHRER: But as long as Israel remains, or at least the leadership of Israel remains opposed, your plan ain't going anywhere, right?

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, we have to keep working at it and --

MR. LEHRER: But you haven't given up on it?

SEC. SHULTZ: Oh, no, we're not going to give up on it.

*

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות בהול

תאריך/ז"ח 25.3.88

מס' מברק

608

1/2

המשרד

אל: לשכת רוהיים

דע: מצפייא

מאת: עתונות

הטילים בסעודיה

להלן דבריו של הנשיא ריגן בענין היום.

יוסי

יוסי גל

שהם רחב שהם גשם גלגל ביין גבריאל רלחפכ לגבה רל אולם
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אביבל גבר הסברה
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REAGAN'S STATEMENTS ON SAUDI MISSILES:
MARCH 25, 1988

Q: Mr President, there have been suggestions that the Israelis might attack the new Saudi missile sites. How would the US feel about that?

President: Well, naturally we would be totally opposed to any such thing and hope that they're not considering any such act.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף ___ מתוך ___ דפים

סווג בטחון שמור

מיידי

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח 25 מרס 88 1730

מס' מברק

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המשרד + משהב"ט

אל: מצפ"א, מצרים

דע: מקש"ח

קונגרס: ייצור טנק ה - M-1 במצרים

1. רצ"ב דו"ח בנדון שהוגש בתחילת החודש לנוגעים בדבר בשני בתי הקונגרס, בהתאם להוראה מפורשת בחוק כספי הפנטגון לשת"א 1988.

2) מספר סנטורים ומורשים, בעיקר ממדינת אוהיו (שם יגרום הפרוייקט לאבטלה מסויימת) קבלו תדרוכים מיוחדים. הסנטורים מצנבאום וגלן התמקדו על שלושה נושאים:

א) בעיית סגירת קוו הרכבה באוהיו ואבטלתם של כ-3,600 פועלים. הציעו שבמקום 15 טנקים שלמים, ירכשו המצרים כ-100 טנקים כאלה בטרם יפעילו את קוו ההרכבה שלהם. בדרך להחזיק הקוו באוהיו עד אשר המפעל יזכה להזמנות נוספות לטנק ה - M-1

ב) שאלת העברת טכנולוגיות מתקדמות. שאלה זו ממשיכה להטריד את הסנטורים, בעיקר הסנטור גלן (חבר בוועדת השירותים המזויינים, וכחבר לשעבר בוועדת החוץ יוזם של תיקונים הנוגעים לבעייה זו). לדברי המתדרכים מהפנטגון, המצרים לא יקבלו הפתוחים המתקדמים ביותר שב-M-1 , לרבות שיטות הגנה חדישות (המבוססות על אורניום מדולל) שעדיין בשלבי פיתוח.

ג) שאלת מכירות למדינות שלישיות. הסנטורים דורשים שכל מכירה כזו, לא זו בלבד שתהיה כפופה להסכמת ארה"ב, אלא שהממשל תפנה לקונגרס כאילו מדובר בעיסקה בילטרלית בין ארה"ב והמדינה השלישית.

3) הסנטורים מעריכים שניתן להתגבר על כל הבעיות הנ"ל. ביקשו לקבל בקרוב הטיוטא של ה - MOU המוצע עם המצרים, עיי"מ שיוכלו לשפוט אם באו על סופקם. ומידה שהטיוטא לא תשריע אותם, שמרו הסנטורים על זכותם ליזום HEARINGS בנושא כולו.

יפה נאמן
למדן

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REPORT ON THE CO-PRODUCTION OR CO-ASSEMBLY OF THE M1 OR THE M1A1 TANK

PART 1

The status of any current negotiations by the Secretary of Defense with any foreign country regarding the coproduction or coassembly of the M1 or M1A1 tank by the United States and that country.

Discussions on coproduction/coassembly of the Abrams tank have occurred with Egypt, United Kingdom, Canada and Pakistan. These discussions have not included formal negotiations which would result in Memoranda of Agreement but have been held with representatives of these governments at various levels. Due to the uncertainty regarding the coproduction/coassembly programs with the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and Pakistan, the remainder of this report will elaborate on the the Egyptian program.

Egypt

There have been working level discussions for a coproduction/coassembly program with the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Egypt has been interested in the coproduction of the Abrams tank since 1985. The Departments of State and Defense have determined that the M1A1 is releasable to Egypt, subject to certain restrictions, and agreed, in principle, to discuss a mutually beneficial coproduction program. In November 1986, Defense Secretary Weinberger agreed to send a U.S. Army coproduction capability survey team to Egypt. The survey team concluded that Egypt is capable of initiating a phased coproduction program, beginning with limited assembly of the tank. Efforts are now underway to define the scope of a coproduction program.

The proposed program is for Egypt to coproduce tanks under a six phase program that ends in 1996. Egyptian coproduction would be done on a non-interference basis with U.S. M1A1 production. The program calls for gradually increasing Egyptian involvement in the manufacture of selected components. Egypt's first M1A1s will be fully produced in the United States. The Egyptians will then begin to assemble tanks from kits produced in the United States and shipped to Egypt.

PART 2

A comparison of the long-term effects on the United States mobilization base of production of such tank under a coproduction or coassembly arrangement with a foreign country.

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There would be a measurable benefit to the United States armor mobilization base should the Egyptian program be undertaken. The proposed Egyptian coproduction program will have wide-reaching impacts on the U.S. economy including increases in direct and indirect income totalling over $1.6 billion, employment increases of over 52,000 manyears, tax revenues of over $400 million and recoupments to the U.S. Government of about $174 million.

The economic analysis and projections do not consider the impact of expenditures for items such as spare parts, ammunition, maintenance equipment, training devices and user training. Also excluded are other U.S. employment additions related to program areas such as manufacturing technical assistance, program management, and in-plant machines, tools and tooling that might be procured in the United States.

Coproduction of the M1A1 carries with it the positive benefits to the vendor and supplier base within the U.S. economy for several reasons. First and foremost is that as long as tanks are being coproduced with Egypt, U.S.-supplied components will continue to be produced and will be in addition to any existing U.S. requirements. A second major positive benefit that accrues to the U.S. mobilization base is that as long as Egyptian-assembled M1A1's are in use in Egypt (or other authorized countries), there will be a continuing need for repair parts and major assemblies from the U.S. Both of those factors will allow producers of the second and lower-tier levels of supplies to continue production in support of the worldwide Abrams fleet. In the event of U.S. mobilization, such suppliers would then be in a position to provide high use parts to meet U.S. requirements.

In the long term-into the 21st century-the impact on the U.S. mobilization base could be of lesser significance. As the U.S. combat vehicle fleet evolves, the requirement for piece-parts, components, sub-assemblies, and major assemblies will also evolve. The U.S. combat vehicle fleet of the future may be radically different than the current fleet and may not require the same type parts (due to changed materials or configuration) as are produced today. Thus, the U.S. mobilization base will be fulfilling different requirements.

The benefits of the Egyptian tank program will be spread throughout the American economy, from small specialty manufacturing companies to producers of major items of government furnished equipment such as engines and fire control systems, to the prime contractor and U.S. Government-owned plants. Significant income and employment will be generated in the U.S. by the program. To the U.S. Government there are benefits in terms of recoupment and rental fees. There are also federal and state tax revenue benefits. In addition, there will be significant cost savings to the U.S. Army as a result of the increased procurement quantities for the Egyptian program.

PART 3

The effect an arrangement with a foreign country for the coproduction or coassembly of such tank would have on the national security of the United States.

As the only Arab country to have signed a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has become a key friend of the U.S. and has worked with the U.S. in support of a number of shared regional objectives, most importantly the forging of a lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors. U.S. security assistance demonstrates tangible U.S. support for the Egyptian Government's stand on behalf of peace. Implementation of the M1A1 coproduction program increases the likelihood that a strong self-confident Egypt will remain committed to the peace process.

Security assistance for Egypt supports a second major U.S. regional objective: promotion of regional stability. A militarily capable Egypt serves as a bulwark against the potential adventurism of radical states in the region. In this regard, Egypt has contributed to U.S. efforts to contain Libyan incursions in Chad, and has made clear that the security of Kuwait and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states threatened by Iran is of key national interest to Egypt.

The M1A1 coproduction program will benefit the Egyptian economy through job creation and the expansion of its industrial infrastructure. By permitting some of the program costs to be covered by Egyptian pounds the program will also free limited hard currency resources for other pressing domestic requirements.

U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation is the final area likely to benefit from the M1A1 program. Coproduction will require significant military-to-military exchanges. The cooperative climate this creates can encourage Egyptian support on such issues as routine transit of the Suez Canal by U.S. nuclear powered warships, participation in exercises, cooperation during and in planning for contingencies, and enhanced interoperability.

UNCLASSIFIED

ECONOMIC IMPACT

OF EGYPTIAN M1A1 PROGRAM BY STATES

COMMUNITY	DIRECT INDUSTRIAL INCOME $M	INDIRECT INDUSTRIAL INCOME $M	TOTAL INDUSTRIAL INCOME $M
MICHIGAN	$214	$205	$ 419
CONNECTICUT	157	151	308
OHIO	140	134	274
CALIFORNIA	96	92	188
INDIANA	74	71	145
NEW YORK	34	33	67
PENNSYLVANIA	31	30	61
NEW JERSEY	23	22	45
ILLINOIS	20	19	39
MASSACHUSETTS	8	8	16
BALANCE OF STATES	30	29	59
TOTALS	$827	$794	$ 1621

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UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE 3

DIRECT AND INDIRECT INCOME
M1A1 EGYPTIAN TANK PROGRAM



FY 87 Dollars - Indirect Income = Direct Income Times(X) A Factor Of .56

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EMPLOYMENT IMPACT
OF EGYPTIAN M1A1 PROGRAM BY STATES

COMMUNITY	DIRECT INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT MANYEARS	COMMUNITY SUPPORT EMPLOYMENT MANYEARS	TOTAL MANYEARS EMPLOYMENT CREATED
MICHIGAN	7,490	6,142	13,632
CONNECTICUT	5,495	4,560	10,001
OHIO	4,900	4,018	8,918
CALIFORNIA	3,360	2,755	6,115
INDIANA	2,590	2,124	4,714
NEW YORK	1,190	976	2,166
PENNSYLVANIA	1,085	890	1,975
NEW JERSEY	805	660	1,465
ILLINOIS	700	574	1,274
MASSACHUSETTS	280	230	510
BALANCE OF STATES	1,050	861	1,911
TOTALS	28,945	23,736	52,681

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DIRECT AND INDIRECT EMPLOYMENT
M1A1 EGYPTIAN TANK PROGRAM



M/Y = Manyears

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

המשרד

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טלפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 25.3.88

מס' מברק

אל: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

דע: מצפ"א, מע"ת

מאת. עתונות

USA TODAY פרסם היום את עמוד ה- JETCAPADE

על ישראל כולל הראיון עם רוה"מ המצ"ב.

יוסי

יוסי גל

שתי חמג גשל גלגל בין נצפו פצנר אביטל גסק הסכר

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PRIME MINISTER INTERVIEW

U.S., not U.N., should be peace broker

Israel's **Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir**, 72, is a short man, with a coiled physique. He smiled often during the interview with the USA TODAY JetCapade news team, but his eyes had a steely look that recalled his turbulent past in political terrorism and espionage.

Shamir was born in Poland and emigrated to Palestine in 1935, leaving his family behind. They were killed by the Nazis during World War II. In 1942, he became one of the three leaders of the so-called Stern Gang, the most violent underground organization seeking the ouster of the British occupiers of Palestine. The group was accused of several assassinations and assassination attempts.

After the State of Israel came into being, Shamir joined the Israeli secret service, becoming chief of European espionage operations.

Today, he heads Israel's conservative Likud Bloc, which opposes giving back the territory Israel won from Arab states in the 1967 war. His party shares power with the more moderate Labor Alignment of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

Shamir was interviewed by Allen H. Neuharth, David Mazzarella, Jack Kelley and Paul McMasters.

Here are his answers to some of USA TODAY's questions:

☆ ☆ ☆

On prospects for a permanent peace between Israelis and Arabs: "One of our main slogans (in upcoming elections) will be to make peace. And I am sure we will get it. We will succeed.

The Arabs are upset to understand that they are going to live together with us in this area. There is no other way but to live together. They have to take into account our interests and our presence and our aspirations for the future.

I think we have to make peace in the framework of the (1979) Camp David Agreements. The framework of the Camp David Agreements is the most realistic solution and the most appropriate for the situation of the Palestinian population in the territories of Gaza and other places."

SHAMIR: Says '79 Camp David pact still key to peace.

On the Soviet Union's role in peace negotiations: "With us, the Soviet Union doesn't have normal relations and, therefore, we don't have talks. For us, the United States is the only honest broker."

On the United Nations' involvement in the Mideast: "We don't like very much the involvement of the United Nations in the peacemaking process. They don't have a record for achievement in this regard. In the United Nations, we always have an automatic majority against us."

On the Palestinian refugee camps: "I don't know if you know the terrible conditions of these camps, which exist from 1948. They exist because the Arab countries have decided to maintain these camps for political reasons — to show the international community that the Palestinians are suffering because of the establishment of the State of Israel."

On what to do about the camps: "It would be very easy to solve this problem, to give decent conditions of life to these people, especially housing. We need the help of the international community. It's a question now, I would say, of two billion dollars. It could be done in a period of 10 years if only the rich countries of the world would contribute — and we are ready to do so also."

On the immigration to Israel of Jews from the Soviet Union: "We have to keep fighting to bring them here. We need them. They have so many qualifications. Many are professionals. We are very interested in working with the United States in their relations with the Soviet Union, so that the Soviets can be convinced to permit many of the Soviet Jews who want to get out to let them do so and come here."

On improving Israel's economy: "We have to strengthen our economy by going more in the direction of privatization. There has been a tradition of Israeli governments in the past to be inclined more toward socialistic methods. Now it's clear for the great majority of people that the only way to improve our economy is the way of privatization, of giving priority to the business sector."

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 26.03.88
דף 1 מתוך 5
עותק 3 מתוך 34

סודי ביותר

נבנס

מזרח:3/22132
אל:המשרד
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נר:ב

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל:מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל רה"מ

תהליך מדיני

להלן דיווח מרפי לשגריר ארד על השיחות עם הסובייטים
(23-24.3)

א. מרפי אמר כי השיחות בין שולץ ושברדנדזה בנושא המז"ת
נמשכו כשעה, ואילו אח"כ נפגשו הצוותים הערוכים בעניינים
מז"ת לעוד 10 נוספי שעות ביום ד' אחה"צ ויום ה בבוקר.
בנוסף הסובייטי במנו בוליאקוב, טרסוב וטורדייב. עוד
הקדים מרפי ואמר שהשיחות בעניינים ברוק הנשק ואפגניסטאן
מלאו את עיקר סדר היום במפגש השבוע רבי הסובייטים
באו עם מנדט מאוד מוגבל שעיקרו קביעת תאריך הפסגה.
ההערכה הכללית היא שהמנהיגות הסובייטית ערוכה בעיות
בנים קרי המתיחות על הרקע האתני, מרפי ציין במיוחד
את אזרביג'אן רבי מי שדוחף במערכת הסובייטית לקבלת
החלטות בנושאים בינלאומיים בוודאי נתקל בקשיים לאור
העיסוק האינטנסיבי בבעיות הפנים.

ב. מרפי אמר כי הסובייטים גילו עניין בדיאלוג רציני
וגילו גם יותר טפח על עמדותיהם מבעבר. הסובייטים
היו מעוניינים באיתור נקודות הסכמה בין שתי המעצמות
וגילו גם הערכה לעבודה הרבה ששם הצד האמריקאי בירושת
המזכיר. זה היה המסר העיקרי בדברי שברדנדזה לשולץ.
כמו כן הביעו הערכה לשיגורו, של מרפי, למוסקבה ותודה

*
* דף 2 מתוך 5
* עותק 3 מתוך 34
*
*בקשר הבהרות לשאלות שהציגו. במסגרת ההערכה הכללית
*אמר מרפי שעמדת ארה'ב לא השתנתה בצורה מהותית והיא
*עדיין נשארה דבקה בגישה המסורתית ובמיוחד בנושא המבנה
*של הוועידה. הסובייטים חזרו ובקשו לדעת 'מה העמדה
*המלאה של ארה'ב' ואילו הצד האמריקאי חזר ואמר שאין
*טעם בפרוט אף כי מובנים לומר שארה'ב מקבלת שלא יהיה
*מו"מ בלי ועידה, אך שאין המדובר בוועידה בפי שהיא
*באה לידי ביטוי בראייה הסובייטית.
*
*ג. בדבר על הוועידה בראיה הסובייטית אמר מרפי שהסובייטים
* רוצים בוועידה במשכת CONTINUOUS ומליאה
*אקטיבית המתכנסת באופן תדיר CONVENES REGULARLY
*הסובייטים אמרו שמבינים שעיקר המו"מ לא יהיה במליאה
*ובמרבן מבינים בלוועידה אין סמכות כפייה אך וטו.
*מאידך, יש סתירות, לדברי מרפי, בהצגת הוועידה כי
*בינבוד למה שהם אומרים לגבי סמכויות הוועידה הם מבקשים
*לתת לה את הסמכות לאשר הסכמים (FORMALIZE AGREEMENTS
*) ולתת ערבויות.
*
*הסובייטי רואים אפשרות של השגת הסכמי ביניים במסגרת
*הוועדות הבילטרליות ובמו כן רואים אפשרות לחמש החברות
*הקבועות לתת המלצות ב"א לחוד ובאופן קולקטיבי במו
*כך מבקשים הסובייטים לראות קבוצות עבודה מולטילטרליות
*ודיקה בין כל גופי הוועידה.
*
*מרפי מוסיף שאמר לסובייטים שהם רואים בעיני רוחם ועידה
*בינלאומית קלסית, אך שוועידה כזו לא תצלח לגבי המצב
*במז"ת והדבר הובהר לסובייטים גם בדרג המדיר. זו
*ועידה השולטת (DOMINATES)
*בתהליך וכי בראיית ארה'ב המו"מ היחיד הבא בחשבון הוא
*מו"מ בלטרלי. כאשר מפקיד הוועידה הוא לפתוח הדרך
*(LAUNCH)
*מו"מ כזה ולא לסכלו.
*
*מרפי ציין כי בסדף הדיונים בקטע זה אמר טרסוב 'אם
*כן, אתם עוינים (HOSTILE) לוועידה ולמליאה'
*ומרפי אמר שענה לו שלא זו הבעייה אלא הקונסטבציה
*וגולה, כי זו של ארה'ב לא תצלח.
*
*ד. לגי מרפי היה דיון ארוך בעניין הייצוג הפלשתינאי.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 5
בתק 3 מתוך 34

*
*הסובייטים אמרו שהם צריכים לקיים דיון ארוך עם הפלשתינאים
* בנושא זה. לדעתם, אש"פ צריך להיכלל בוועידה אך יחד
*עם זאת התרשמות הצד האמריקאי שהסובייטים אינם מוכנים
*אמירות של יצוג לא עצמאי של הפלשתינאים. הם דברו,
*למשל, על משלחת ערבית-פלשתינאית. הצד האמריקאי הבהיר
*אם עמדתו הידועה, היינו שהייצוג הפלשתינאי יהיה במסגרת
*משלחת ירדנית-פלשתינאית, וכי אין לאש"פ מקום בוועידה.
*
*ה. מרפי אמר כי מהשיחות השבוע ושיחות אחרות שקיים
*באירופה הוא מבין עתה שגם במוסקבה וגם באירופה נוצר
*הרושם שהתכנית האמריקאית היא מעין אוליטימטום ולכן
*רבו להבהיר לסובייטים שלא כן המצב. הסובייטים חזרו
*ואמרו כי יש להם תחושה שארה"ב רוצה להוציאם (EXCLUDE)
* מהתהליך ואילו הם הבהירו לסובייטים שהם מבינים שלא
*יתכן תהליך בלעדיהם. יחד עם זאת, הסבר לסובייטים
*שהתפקיד שממלאת ארה"ב כרגע ממערכת היחסים שיש לארה"ב
*עם גורמים שונים באזור, ואין כל סיבה שהסובייטים גם
*הם יפתחו מערכת יחסים בזו. ארה"ב לא תתנגד אם הצדדים
*יוכלו לבנות לברה"מ במהלך המו"מ הבילטרלי. התפקיד
*שמייעדת לעצמה ארה"ב אינו תוצאה של זכות אלא של מערכת
*יחסים. התפקיד אינו חלק של בנכה פורמלי כי פורמלית
*ארה"ב לא מייעדת לעצמה תפקיד שונה מאשר שלאר ארבע
*ההברות הקבועות של מדבי"ט. מרפי הדגיש שכאשר דיברו
*על יחסי ברה"מ במזה"ת דיברו גם על חידוש היחסים עם
*ישראל ועל הגירה מברה"מ. הסובייטים עכו שיחסיהם עם
*ישראל משתפרים (בלשון הווה). לא דברו על המשך שיפור
*וגם לא אזכרו את המשלחת הקונסולרית הישראלית.
*
*ו. מרפי מציין שדובר על הסדרי ביניים ומכנה את גישתם
*של הסובייטים כמערבלת ותמקנית. יחד עם זאת הוא מדגיש
*שהם מקבלים STAGE BY STAGE
*AGREEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE I.C. AND LINKED
* TO THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.
*
*הוא ראה הבדל בין גישה זו לגישה הערבית, הטוענת שאם
*תהיה הבנה לגבי מהות ההסדר הסופי, יהיה יותר קל להשיג
*הסדרי ביניים. הצד האמריקאי הסביר כי ראוה משיבות
*ומערבלת בהסדרי ביניים, אך שאז אמר להם כי ראוה בכך
*טיעון שכל שארה"ב רוצה הוא הסדרים נפרדים. הסדרים
*כאלו חירוניים, לדעת ארה"ב, בעיקר כאשר קיימות בעיות

מברבות.

ז. מרפי סיכם, בארבע שבשטיבי, את השיחות באומרו

1. הסובייטים לא דחו את התכנית האמריקאית.

2. אין תזוזה קונקרטית בעמדתם של הסובייטים.

3. הם ביקשו ליצור רושם אצל האמריקאים כי ניסו למתן
את הגישה הסורית - בראיה הביאו את העובדה שהסורים
לא אמרו 'לא'.

4. הסובייטים לא אמרו 'לא' לאף אלמנט, אך כי גם לא
אמרו 'כן'. רוצים בהמשך ההידברות והשאירו דלת פתוחה.

5. המזכיר יפגש שוב עם שבדנדזה בעשרת הימים האחרונים
של אוריל ואח'כ במאי, ויש להניח שהבושא יעלה שוב
בפני שיעלו המפרץ (המזכיר מוטרד מהעדר החלטת מועבי"ש
ברטבת) ואפגניסטן.

ח. לשאלת השגריר האם חלה תזוזה בעמדת הסובייטים מאז
ביקורו של מרפי במוסקבה, אמר מרפי כי לא הבחין בכך.
עמדתם לא השתנתה במיוחד במה שקשור לוועידה הבינלאומית.
לשאלה נוספת של השגריר לגבי ההבדלים בנימות ובהתייחסויות
ליוזמה במישור השרים מול מישור המומחים, אמר מרפי
כי אנשים כטורדייב או טרסוב הוסקים שניים של גבי
שניים בנושא בורדאי מעוניינים יותר, לפחות אינטלקטואלית
בור שיח, אף כי להערכתו המנהיגות הפוליטית של בה"מ
עדיין איננה ממוקדת בנושא המז"ת. הסובייטים, ומרפי
חזר על כך מספר פעמים, מרגישים באילו אה"ב מנסה
לדחוק מהתהליך.

ט. לשאלה לגבי הייעוד הפלשתינאי חזר מרפי ואמר שהסובייטים
אמרו שהם צריכים לדון עם ערפאת וביקשו לדעת מה יוכלו
לעמוד לו של עמדת אה"ב. מרפי אמר שעכה להם שבדורה
לערפאת עמדתם. מרפי הוסיף שהסובייטים לא עשו הבחנה
בין אש"פ לפלשתינאים, אך כי מקבלים כאפשרות משלחת
משותפת בהנחה שזה יהיה הפתרון המקובל על אש"פ. מרפי
מניח שהסובייטים העלו את עניין המשלחת הערבית הכוללת
גם את אש"פ, אף כי אין זו אופציה הנשקלת באדור ברציבות

דף כ מתוך כ
עותק 3 מתוך 34

בדי להיות במצב שיוכלו לומר לאש"ב שהעלו זאת בשיחות
ברוטינגטון.

לשאלת השגריר על הבדלי הנימות בין הניתוח שלו, של
מרכזי, לבין הודעת המזכיר הנחרצת בדבר הילוקי הדעות
עם הטרוייטים, אמר מרכזי שזו השאלה הקלטית של דלת
חצי פתוחה או חצי סגורה. אין ספק שהטרוייטים עדיין
נכונים על תיסתם בעניין הודעידה הבינלאומית אך הם
שואלים שאלות ומבקשים הבהרות.

יי. חביב שחזר אמש ידווח הערב למזכיר על שיחתו ראש"ב
יתליטר באם המזכיר יקיים ביקור באזור בשבוע הראשון
של אפריל.

יא. לשאלת הח"מ האם אוזכר נושא הטילים, אמר מרכזי שהוא
עצמו אמר משהו כללי על הסכנה שבהפצת הטילים והנשק
הגרעיני שתשתק לידי הפנדמנטליסטים, והטרוייטים מלמלו
משהו ברוח של הסכמה.

ערן.==

תנ: שהח/רהמ/שהבט/מנכל/ממנכל/ר/מרכז/רם/אמן/בירן/מצפא/אירג

22062 3897/1

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 26.03.88
רק 1 מתוך 2
נרתק 3 מתוך 32 סודי ביותר נבנס

מדרגה:3/22062
אל:המשרד
מ-:ורש/נר:601/תא:250388/זת:1600/דת:מ/סג:סב
נר:6

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל:מנכל מיוחד
מנכל ראה"מ /מנהל ממד

להלן משיחה עם ארקלי(25.3)

א.ארקלי חזר משיחרור עם חביב.לדבריו מבא את כל ארבעת
ראשי המדינות מרואגים מהמצב בשטחים ומן ההשלכות הצבוריות
על מדינותיהם במיוחד נכון הדבר לגבי חסן שחושש
מהשתתה מבחוץ (אלג'יר/לוב). משום כך מברכים בולב על
היוזמה האמריקאית/אך מאידך בולם גם מלאים ספקות לגבי
הנחישות האמריקאית ויכולת ארהב ל"הזיז" את ישראל.

ב.המלצתם של חביב וארקלי למזכיר היא להזור למז"ת באמריל
זאת בדי להוכיח שהיוזמה עדין "על השולחן" .מאידך
מודה ארקלי/הבעייה היא שמנהיגי האזור ישאלו את שולץ
1) לגבי תשובת ישראל:
2) לגבי עמדת ברהם.
למזכיר במובן אין תשובה מספקת לגבי שתיהן/ומכאן ההתלבטות
לגבי קיום הביקור/אך כי באמור המלצתו שלו ושל חביב
היא לקיים הביקור.ארקלי מודה שהופתע מהתרצות התבטאותו
של שולץ בענין הגישה הסובייטית לוועידה וגם אם היא
משקפת את העמדה הסובייטית בנקודה זו יתכן והיה מקום
להביא את הדברים אחרת.ארקלי מעריך כי הצליחו לשכנע
את מרוקו לפעול לדחיית מושב הליגה לבחות עד אחרי
הרמדאן .

ג.בערב הסעודית העלו את ענין הטילים .הסעודים בריאד
רבורשינגטון טרעבים שלמדינות אחרות באזור יש טילים

דף 2 מתוך 2
ברתק 3 מתוך 32

עם טילים דומים ,בדלל לישראל, ראיש אינו דורש ביקרת
עליהם .אוקלי אומר שהתוכנה ארוכות עם הנטין בנדר
על העדר ההגירון ברבישת הטילים ,שבן משמעותם מבחינת
תרשמת האיום של איראן היא שולית והיא רק חושמת את
שערדיה להתקפות מצד כל המאויימים . בנדר הציג את
רבישת הטילים בטימן "גבריות", היינו שלכולם ב"שבונה"
יש כאלו טילים ,ולכן גם הם רוצים .אוקלי אישר קיום
האגרת מטובארק (ראה הרוש-נוסט מהיום). לדבריו,הטילים
העיראקים עם ראשי הקרב הבימיים יותר מסוכנים והם
רואים אותם בחומרה רבה.אמר שלא ברור להם להלוטין
מי טייע לעיראקים בשיפור ה"סקאד" והזכיר את צפון
קוריאה, רפ"ג, ארגנטינה וטין . אוקלי רמז כי תדעו
אותנו לגבי מגעים בין טין וסוריה לגבי רכש טילים

ערן

תנ: שהה,דהמ,שהבט,מבבל,ממנבל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,בירן,מצנא

22:55

שגרירות ישראל וושינגטון

המשרד

1/2

606

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 25.3.88

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

מאת: עתונות

להלן טור של ריצארד כהן היום (25.3.88) ב"וושינגטון פוסט".

יוסי

יוסי גל

הדר גשל גלגל בירן בעבר גבריטל גאת הסברה סבנה

Richard Cohen

Two Bosses of the West Bank

JERICHO—George Bernard Shaw, playwright, theater critic and—because he was *that* good—a journalist who covered the absurdity of human nature, would have loved the West Bank. In his play "Saint Joan," a witness at the trial that condemned Joan is told—not asked—to sit. As a result, he refuses, but when the judge permits him to stand, he balks once again and takes his seat. From imaginary 15th-century France to the present-day Middle East, nothing much has changed.

Here in the Biblical city where the Israelites first crossed the Jordan River, the Palestine Liberation Organization—through leaflets and radio broadcasts—has decreed a daily strike. In the afternoon, merchants must shutter their shops and the important wholesale produce market must close. This is the way the PLO shows the Israelis who's boss.

The Israelis, though, think they are the boss. So, they have issued a different directive: shops, including the wholesale market, must be closed in the morning. They can open in the afternoon.

"There are two orders to open and close," said Shafiq Bali, a Palestinian who rents a huge farm and, in turn, sublets parcels to tenant farmers. "One is from 'The Organization.' The other is from the military authorities. And so people are wandering between. The shops can't oppose 'The Organization' and so they close all day."

Bali is the personification of the engaging Palestinian, so attractive to Westerners, so reminiscent of Jews, so evocative in fact of the Wandering Jew of old, now come full circle to Israel. Bali came from Beersheba, which is now in Israel proper, and fled in 1948 to what was then this Jordanian-occupied region. In 1967, the Israelis came again, but this time Bali stayed put: "This is our home. I don't want to be a refugee again and again. Palestine is my native home."

As the former mayor and a notable in the community, Bali dresses the part. He wears a three-piece, tan suit, white shirt and tan tie. He sits behind a desk from which he administers the farm owned by someone who lives in Jordan. He has four sons, and they, too, tell the story of the Palestinian people. Two are engineers, one is a physician and the fourth is an economist. Two sons live here, one in Jordan and one in Kuwait. This is why Palestinians are likened to Jews. They have their diaspora. They cherish education.

Summer comes early to Jericho. Tomatoes are ready for harvest and, in 40 days, watermelon will be bursting. Bananas and green peppers are grown here. Springs that were known to the ancients irrigate the area, and now that the winter rains have quit the sun ripens the fruits.

But politics has interrupted the age-old cycle. The wholesale market in town is closed, and so buyers must come into the fields to make their purchases. For even the largest farms, this is a problem (sales are way down), but small farmers are close to ruin. No major buyer will venture down a rutted dirt road for two or three boxes of tomatoes. Bali pulls his files from his desk. He estimates the debt of his tenant farmers at $100,000.

Ancient Israelites entered Jericho and, according to the Bible, slew the Canaanites, destroying "all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, and ox and sheep and ass, with the edge of the sword." Modern-day Israelis came into the same area and, in effect, colonized it. Recently, rocks were thrown at cars. A local policeman, a Palestinian, was killed. Now in reply the Jewish state resorts to economic measures. By Biblical standards, they are benign, but they amount to collective punishment nonetheless. Because all Palestinians must suffer, all Palestinians are being radicalized.

In Jericho, tomatoes are rotting in the fields. Buyers from the north come in their trucks but seem to do little business. The market for haggling, for setting prices, is closed. And so, at least with a visiting American, politics is discussed. Over and over, the farmers say they want nothing more than a Palestinian homeland. They abhor Israeli rule, want nothing to do with Jordan and, at least in the mouth of Bali, blame the United States for their plight: "All our problems come from Washington."

The problems of Palestinians and Israelis are grave—maybe unsolvable—but they are hardly new. Jews and the precursors of contemporary Arabs have been fighting for this land since time immemorial. Nothing has changed substantially since then and not much since Shaw recorded the tendency to exercise authority even when it is silly or, in this case, counterproductive. "The Israelis want to tell us that they control and not the PLO," said one farmer. Stand up, say the Israelis. Sit down, says the PLO.

Meanwhile, tomatoes rot and Palestinians seethe.

30

דחיפות: מיידי	**מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק**	דף: 1
סווג בטחוני: חדר	**טופס מברק**	מתוך: 2
תז"ח: 251630	אל : המשרד	
גר : 0 0677	דע :	
	מאת : נאו"ם	

אל : ממ"ד - סוריה/לבנון
דע : סמנכ"ל מז"תים
מאת : אסעד אסעד

1. שוחחתי עם ויקטור ביטאר הקונכ"ל של לבנון בניו יורק. התעניינתי לגבי המופיע בנר 353. סיפר שקיים דיאלוג בין האמריקנים, הסורים וג'ומייל לגבי מספר נושאים:

א) רפורמות ופיוס פנים לבנוני על בסיס ההסכם המשולש. טיפר שבנושא זה קיימת הסכמה בין הסורים, האמריקנים וג'ומאיל, שהראשונים ייצגו את מחנה השמאל/מוסלמים והאמריקנים את הנוצרים. לדעת ביטאר, ג'ומאיל היה מוכן לוויתורים ולרפורמות ולו מהטעם למצוא חן בעיני הסורים ועל ידי כך לדחות אולי מועד הבחירות לנשיאות. סיפר שלוויתורים של ג'ומאיל ישנם מתנגדים במחנה הנוצרי ובעיקר הכוחות הלבנוניים.

ב) <u>תהליך השלום</u> - לדעת בן שיחי, כדי למשוך את הסורים לתהליך השלום מוכנים האמריקניים לשלם להם במטבע לבנוני - ז"א וויתורים אמריקניים בלבנון לטובת הסורים.

ג) נושאים אחרים : אישיות המועמד לנשיאות, המעורבות האיראנית בלבנון, חיזבאללה, גורל בני הערובה וסמים.

2. ביטאר סיפר שלא ידוע לו על שליחים אחרים שביקרו לאחרונה בארה"ב מלבד אלי סאלם. עם זאת מקור אחר המקורב למשלחת הלבנונית סיפר שבמסגרת הדיאלוג שמנהלים האמריקנים - עומדים לבקר בארה"ב על פי הזמנת מזכירות המדינה מספר אישים לבנונים. הראשון שמתוכנן להגיע באפריל הקרוב המופתי של לבנון חסן חאלד, על

תאריך:	שם השולח:	אישור:

שהיה הדבר שהבטיח נשיא לבנון לאחר בצתיק הלגיכן בגלל רק איזמן
לוביני ביין בצבא

דחיפות:	**מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק**	דף: 2
סווג בטחוני:	**טופס מברק**	מתוך: 2
תז"ח:	א ל :	
נר: 677	ד ע :	
	מאת :	

מנת לברוק את עמדת המוסלמים לגבי המועמד המקובל לנשיאות והמועמד המוסלמי לראשות הממשלה. בעקבותיו יבואו להתייעצויות הפטריארך של לבנון ומפקד הצבא.

באוים

תאריך: 25.3.88	שם השולח: אסעד אסעד		אישור:

11

588

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים
סווג בטחוני: גלוי
דחיפות: רגיל
תאריך וז"ח: 24.3.88 9:00
מס' מברק:

אל: המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

סי קנן ז"ל
- לשלוח 548

ההלוויה תתקיים מחר (25.3) ותצא מטמפל סיני בוושינגטון.

השגרירות תיוצג כיאה לה ולמנוח.

יוסף למדן

למדן

שים הלג ושל מיין בבקי
ל ב ג ו ל

13

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

לשכת ראש עיריית י-ם + המשרד

565

טיפס מברק

דף ___ מתוך ___ דפים

סווג בטחון שמור

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 24 מרס 88 1300

מס' מברק

אל: אבנת

דע: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

לשלך 1034. TRAVEL ADVISORY

שוחחתי הבוקר עם צירלי היל אשר לא היה מודע למברקו של טדי.
קראתי באוזניו הנוסח וביקשתי שיעביר המברק מיד לתשומת לבו של המזכיר ומטרתי נימוקים לתמיכה בדבריו של ראש העיר.
הבטיח להעביר הנושא לתשומת לבו של המזכיר בהקדם.

יאיר ס.
אבד

שרה הגשה בנקיים בירך בכסו אבנר/עיריה
2 3 3 1 1 2 1

11

מדינת ישראל משרד הבריאות

סוג מברק

דח 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סיווג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 24 מרץ 88

מס' מברק

556

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל ראה"מ

דע: סמנכ"ל - י. שפי

הרר'.

התקשר סנטור ד'אמטו וריקש להעביר מסר לראה"מ וגו בקשתו ש"נוציא אה הרר' מיירית" הוא אומר זאת בידיד ישראל ובאחד שבודאג מההשלכות של פרשה זו. הבטחתי להעביר. ידיעתכם שהסנטור הוא אחד מראשי מנהליה של המערכה נגד נורייגה.

ערן

שים הלא נגד שפי אולמרט ו בירן
ב 3 .3 ו ו ו

27

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טלפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 24 מרץ 1845 88

מס' מברק

450 585

המשרד, ביטחון

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד 3

דע: מקש"ח - משהב"ט

בית הנבחרים: טילים סינים לסעודיה.

שג' סעודיה, הנסיך בנדר, ערך ביקורים אתמול אצל מורשים בבית הנבחרים (ויתכן גם אצל חברי הסנט) וניסה להסביר להם את הצורך הסעודי בטילים הסינים. הצגתו מלווה מפות, דיאגרמות וטבלאות המתיימרות להראות את מידת האיום על סעודיה מצד מדינות שכנות.

לדברי עוזר שהשתתף באחת מהשיחות האלה, בנדר מגלה "SIGE MENTALITY". הוא טוען שהפרספציה היא שסעודיה הינה מדינה גדולה מאד ולכן איננה מאויימת, אך האמת היא, שכמו ישראל, היא מוקפת אויבים. תוך נסיון להוכיח תזה זו, על-ידי דוגמאות הנלקחות מההסטוריה המודרנית של ארצו (לרבות מאורעות שקרו בעון לפני כמה שנים), הוא טוען שהאיום המיידי הוא כמובן מאיראן וגם מעראק. עם זאת, הוא מצביע גם על כל המדינות שבידיהן טילים ארוכי טווח, ובכלל זה הוא מזכיר את סוריה, יירן ואף ישראל, שלגבריו משוגרות לתקוף את ג'דה וריאד. בסוף עולה שעיקר הטיעון הוא שהואיל ובידי הכל טילים, מדוע שלא יהיו כאלה גם בידי סעודיה גם כן. מיותר לציין שככל שאפשר לשפוט, מאזיניו אינם משתכנעים מהצגה זו.

יוסף לנג

למדן

שהיה הכל נשל גלגלים בין בלבו רלגיתי בגלה רק אלה
2 3 1 3 1 1 2 1 4 אחרי

13

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

582

המשרד

טלפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סיוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 24 מרץ 88 1815

מס' מברק

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: אבנת/עריית ירושלים

Travel Advisory

הקונגרסמנים לנטוס, טוריצ'לי, לוין וסמית פנו כל אחד בנפרד לטטייט דיפרטמנט בנדון.

ערן

שהם רהג נשל גלגלפ בירן גלפטי אובנטלדיה
2 3 3 1 1 2 1

27

שגרירות ישראל, וושינגטון

המשרד, ביטחון	586 451

סוג	מברק
דף 1	מתוך 1 דפים
סיווג בטחוני	סודי
דחיפות	מיידי
תאריך/ז"ח	24 מרץ 1988
מס' מברק	

אל: מצפ"א - משה"ח

מקש"ח - משהב"ט

דע: נספח הגנה, נספח מודיעין - כאן

הטילים הסיניים בסעודיה.

נפגשתי היום עם סנטור גורדון האמפרי (רפובליקאי שמרני מניו-המפשייר) והוא מבקש לקבל מאתנו הערכת האיום לבטחוננו, הטמון באספקת הטילים הנ"ל לסעודיה. הוא שואל במיוחד אם זה סביר לחמש אותם בראשים כימיים או ביולוגיים. הוא מעוניין לשמוע גם על האפקטיביות של הטילים הסיניים נגד מטרות בארצות אחרות באזורנו, ובראש ובראשונה באיראן ובעראק. הוא שואל בנוסף על האפשרות של העברת הטילים למדינות ערב אחרות במקרה של התלקחות הסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי.

האמפרי הינו חבר בוועדה לשרותים המזוייניים וגם לו יגם לעוזריו קיווג ביטחוני (אמריקאי) גבוה.

אודה לכל מידע שניתן למסור לו.

אסף לנדמן

למדן

שהיה רחג שהבטל בשל גלגשל בין גלבוו רלגיכב בגבה רש אגן

2 3 1 3 1 1 2 1 4 ואיב 4

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

579

המשרד

טלפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך ___ דפים

סוג בטחוני טודי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 24 מרץ 88 1715

מס' מברק

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני
מנכ"ל ראה"מ

דע: מזכיר הממשלה

להלן משיחה עם קרייג פולר - מנהל לשכת סגן הנשיא בוש.

א. הטילים הסינים בסעודיה - הביע דאגה מהרכישה של טילים אלו ותוספת המימד החדש למזה"ת. אמר שהסעודים טוענים כנגדם שארה"ב לא יכולה להענות לכל דרישותיהם וסתרתי זאת באומרי שבמילא אין לארה"ב טילים בטווחים שהסעודים מעוניינים בהם, וגם אם היו, לא היה הגיון באספקתם לאזור. הוספתי שגם השימוש בנשק כימי על-ידי עראק צריך להדאיג.

ב. בעת השיחה על ביקור ראה"מ והמצב, אמר שגם אם לא יצא דבר מהסיבוב הנוכחי אין לו ספק שאם בוש יהיה נשיא הוא ירצה לטפל במז"ת בעדיפות ראשונה, שכן כבר בעת ביקורו האחרון באזור הרגיש מתוסכל על העדר פתרון.

ג. שוחחנו על עניין איראן-גייט ופולר התנצל על כך שאחד מאנשי הצוות מצא לנכון לפטפט בפני בוב וודוורד מהוושינגטון פוסט, ולייחס לסגן הנשיא דברים שאין בהם אמת. סקרתי בקצרה בפניו את ההתפתחויות בנושא מבחינתנו.

ערן

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

583

המשרד

ט ל ק ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 24 מרץ 88 1830

מס' מברק

אל: מנכ"ל משרד ראה"מ

דע: מנכ"ל מדיני

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

לשלכם וש/777 (חוזם 20895).

בהתאם לאמור בשלכם הנ"ל, צלצלתי אל צירלי היל ומסרתי לו על מחאתנו בשל כוונת המזכיר להיוועד עם אדווארד סעיד ואברהים אבו-לורד, ברוח תגובת ראה"מ.

צירלי הבטיח להביא הדברים לתשומת לב המזכיר, אך בדברי תגובתו המיידית ציין כי ספק רב אם הפגישה האסורה אמנם עומדת בניגוד למזכר ההבנה מ-1.9.75, מאחר וחברותם ב-מל"ף איננה נופלת במסגרת ההבטחות הכלולות במזכר הנ"ל.

בתגובה לשאלות עתונאים מסר הדובר על דבר הגשת המחאה.

ארד

שרה רחל גנל
3 3

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 14 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות בהול

תאריך/ז"ח 24.3.88

מס' מברק

1/4

561

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד

מאת: עתונות

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

להלן ממסיבת העתונאים של שולץ בתום השיחות עם שברדנדזה.

יוסי גל

שהה 3 ו' 3 ו' בגשל גדנשל בין גלבו אויחם הלגיכ
גדב רם אדן אוביטל גדר הסברה פלנר
4 ואיב מ ו' ו' פ ר

2/4

2/4 561

peace process at some length. I won't go into details about it, but I think it's quite clear that the Soviet concept of how to go about this is really sharply different from ours. In their concept an international conference with authority is at the center of the process, and in ours bilateral face-to-face negotiations are at the center of the process. And many things follow from those different orientations. Nevertheless, we have agreed that our experts will continue to consult with each other and remain engaged in that matter.

Q Mr. Secretary, it sounds as if, clearly, you're ruling out an active role for the Soviet Union in Middle East negotiations, as you have all along. But I'm wondering if they meet your qualifications for even a passive role? And what I really wish you would address, is whether you can proceed, given their position with your concept of some sort of an international setting, to -- with all those negotiations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well... Of course we will continue to work with the parties directly involved. And we will continue to try, in every way we can, to find our way to the direct, face-to-face negotiations that we believe are the only way in which you can really resolve these issues. Now, how to get there is difficult. And we will continue to push for, and at the same time, maintain the limitations on the kind of conference that we've called for. And we'll just have to see how that goes. Now, nobody seems to be ready to climb on our bandwagon, including the Soviet Union. On the other hand, everybody wants to keep it rolling, so we'll keep it rolling.

*

3/4

561 3/4

Q Mr. Secretary, the Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, last week, indicated while he rejected the idea of an international conference, he would still be quite willing to go to Moscow and have a face-to-face negotiations, the way -- according to the formula that you suggested in October. Did you think this at all, or did you bring this idea at all with you to the talks with the Soviet Minister? And also, do you think the Soviet attitude to the international conference would have been different had too many not Shamir not rejected it as he did?

CONTINUED ON PAGE 13-1

4/4

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well I can't really speculate on how the Soviets would have reacted to somewhat different circumstances, but basically they presented their idea about how to go about this process of peace in the Middle East, and it is sharply at variance, as I said, with our idea, which I presented in some detail. So that to be sure that he understood it fully, and given that posture, it didn't seem that the earlier thought that we had fitted into it at all.

Q May I follow up on that, please?

Q Let me finish up here. In light of the sharp differences you reported tonight with the Soviet Union on the Middle East peace initiative, but also in light in the reports you've received from Ambassador Habib and your talks with Prime Minister Shamir, are you ready now to return to the Middle East to pursue this process further, or do you think that would not be useful at this time?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well I haven't made any decision about that. I'm ready to go to the Middle East any time it seems as though there's even a remote chance of being constructive, I don't have to have a high probability. But I have been involved in these meetings here for the last two days and I really haven't come up for air to see what Phil's talks have produced, and I'll just have to say there's really no decision about that.

MR. REDMAN: Thank you all.

END

END

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טלפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 4 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 24.3.88

559 1/4

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד

מאת: עתונות

להלן נוסח ההודעה המשותפת שולץ - שברדנדזה בתום השיחות (24.3.88).

יוסי

יוסי גל

שהם רוצה שהבטיח לשל גמעל בירן לבחון איזה רלוונטי
לגבי רק אולם אבטיח לעלות הסברה

2/4

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JOINT STATEMENT
OF US SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ
AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE
ISSUED WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1988

2/4

Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Washington from March 21 to 23, 1988, for the second of a series of meetings to review developments in US-Soviet relations and to prepare for the meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, which will take place in Moscow from May 29 to June 2, 1988.

President Reagan received the Foreign Minister for a discussion of the state of relations and of objectives in the coming months in arms control, human rights and humanitarian questions, regional affairs, and bilateral matters.

The two sides gave priority attention to implementation of the agreements and understandings recorded in the Joint Statement issued by the President and the General Secretary in their Washington meeting, as developed further during Secretary Shultz' visit to Moscow in February 1988. Both sides have worked hard and some progress has been realized in a number of areas, but much more needs to be done.

By mutual desire, the meetings between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister began with a frank and businesslike exchange on human rights and humanitarian questions. The discussion of these issues will continue at the expert level.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister and their senior experts held extensive discussions on arms control.

They reaffirmed the strong commitment made in the Washington Summit Joint Statement to make an intensive effort to complete a Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of the Strategic Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the Treaty during the next meeting of the two leaders. The Ministers reviewed the joint draft texts of a Protocol on inspection; a Protocol on Conversion or Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms; and a Memorandum of Understanding, developed in accordance with their directive at the February Ministerial in Moscow. Reemphasizing their commitment to effective verification measures, they agreed that the negotiators in Geneva will seek to resolve the remaining differences in these documents and report on progress at the next ministerial.

*

3/4 The Ministers continued their review of the key remaining substantive issues associated with the Treaty, as well as a wide range of Treaty topics of interest to each side, including

nuclear-armed long-range air-launched cruise missiles; limitation and verification of nuclear-armed long-range sea-launched cruise missiles; and mobile ICBMs. They also reviewed issues related to sublimits on warheads within the 6000 level.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister also reviewed the progress at the Nuclear and Space Talks on the negotiations regarding the ABM Treaty as discussed at the Washington summit. They directed their negotiators in Geneva to expedite preparation of a joint draft text of a separate agreement building on the language of the December 19, 1987, joint statement issues by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, allowing consideration of any unresolved issues at the next meeting of the Secretary and the Foreign Minister in Moscow.

Taking note of further progress in US-Soviet full-scale step-by-step negotiations on issues of nuclear testing and confirming the commitment by the sides to the implementation of the agreed mandate of these negoatiations, the Ministers instructed their delegations in Geneva in particular to design and conduct as soon as possible the JVE in full conformity with the December 9, 1987 ministerial statement; complete a detailed plan and schedule for the JVE by the April ministerial; prepare a joint draft of the TTBT prototcol by the time of the JVE, to be finalized through the conduct and analysis of the JVE; accelerate work on verification issues for the PNET.

The two sides reviewed the situation on conventional arms control, with special reference to the mandate negotiations in Vienna, and expressed the hope for their completion in the context of a successful outcome of the Vienna CSCE meeting.

The Ministers discussed the ongoing multilateral and bilateral negotiations toward a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons, and instructed their delegations in Geneva to continue working constructively in this direction.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister observed a test of the communications link between the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established under the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center agreement signed on September 15, 1987.

*

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The sides held extensive talks on regional questions. They reaffirmed that the goal of the U.S.-Soviet regional dialogue should be to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom and security, and within

this context reviewed the situation regarding Afghanistan, Central America, Iran-Iraq, the Middle East, southern Africa, Cambodia and the Korean peninsula. Contacts and consultations on these issues will continue.

The two sides examined the work under way to expand areas of bilateral cooperation between the United States and the Soviet

To continue their discussions on the wide spectrum of issues to U.S.-Soviet relations and to ensure successful preparations for the Moscow summit, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to meet again in Moscow from April 21-25, 1988, and then again in the middle of May.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

March 24, 1988

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel
c/o The Embassy of Israel
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your thoughtful message of sympathy on the death of my brother. Such kind thoughts are a great consolation.

Sincerely,

Richard W. Murphy

21174 3896/1

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 24.03.88
דף 1 מתוך 2
עותק 3 מתוך 32 סודי ביותר נכנס

חוזם:21174/3
אל:המשרד
מ-:וש/נר:584/תא:240388/זח:1900/דח:מ/סג:סב
נד:@

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל:מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

תהלין מדיני

להלן משיחה טלפונית עם רוס, שהשתתף בחלק של השיחות עם הסובייטים אתמול (23.3)
פתח באומרו שהרושם הברור הוא שהסובייטים מדברים על רעידה עם מליאה בעלת סמכויות שבה יש לטעורבים בסכסוך מה לומר אך הוסיפו שאינם נשראים לנוסחה מסויימת.
הסובייטים קדמו בברכה את היוזמה האמריקאית ובמהלך יום אתמול ניסו לבדוק מה יהיה התפקיד שאותו ארה"ב מייעדת להם בוועידה, בעוד שהצד האמריקאי חזר והדגיש שהמדובר הוא לא בתפקיד הנרבע ממבנה הוועידה, אלא ממערכת היחסים שבה"מ תבנה עם הצדדים לסכסוך. הצד הסובייטי ביקש להביע את סיבת ההתנגדות האמריקאית לאופי שבה"מ מבקשת
להעניק לוועידה והצד האמריקאי הסביר שלמעשה אף צד אינו מעוניין בוועידה שלה סמכויות כפייה ווטו. בנסותו לסכם את נקודות ההסכמה בין בה"מ לארה"ב אמר רוס שהן כוללות:

1. הכרה בתפקיד שיש לוועידה בינלאומית (אף כי קיימים חילוקי דעות לגבי אופיה).

2. הכרה בצורך בהסדרי ביניים.

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 3 מתוך 32

3. המטרה היא הסדר שלום כולל.

4. ההסדר צריך להורות איזון בין האינטרסים של כל הצדדים המעורבים.

5. באמור, הטובייטים קדמו בברכה יוזמת ארה"ב.

דוס הוטיף שהטובייטים הדגישו את הדעות הרווחות בעולם הערבי. לגבי יצוג אש"פ הזכיר הטובייטים ואמרו שיקבלו כל פתרון שיהיה מקובל על אש"פ, והדגישו שהארגון צריך להיות מעורב אף כי לא קבעו באיזו דרך. הצד האמריקאי הדגיש שאם תהיה התעקשות על מעורבות נעילה וישירה של אש"פ, לא יהיה תהליך.

ערן.==

תפ: שהה/רהמ/שהבט/מנכל/ממנכל/ר/מרכז/רם/אמן/בירן/מצפא

3895/2.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

20895 תאר: 24.03.88

דף 1 מתוך 2

עותק 4 מתוך 12 סודי ביותר יוצא **

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חוזם:3,20895

אל:ווש/777

מ-:המשרד,תא:240388,זח:2103,דח:ב,סג:סב

נד:@

סודי ביותר/בהול להזעיק ח.ר.ב.

השגריר

התקשר סאליבן ומסר כי המזכיר הזמין את אדווארד סעיד ואברהים אבו לורוד להוועד עמו בשבת הקרובה. סאליבן הוסיף כי שניהם אזרחים אמר' וחברי המל'פ, וכי מדיניות ארה'ב איננה מונעת קשרים עם חברי המל'פ.

סאליבן הגדיר את מטרת הפגישה כרצונו של המזכיר לשמוע את דעותיהם של שני פלש' אמר' שבקיאים בנושא, ולהסביר להם את הגישה האמר' לגבי תהליך השלום.

סאליבן מסר כי דובר מחמ'ד אמור למסור על הפגישה, עוד הערב, בתשובה לשאלות וכי הדובר יסביר, אם יישאל, כי אש'ף והמל'פ 'אינם אותו דבר'.

הודעתי הערב לסאליבן כי ראש הממשלה רואה בהזמנת השניים למזכיר הפרה של המדיניות האמר' שהיתה קיימת עד היום לגבי אש'ף, וההבטחות הכלולות במיזכר ההבנה מ-1.9.75 סאליבן הגיב כי יעביר את הדברים מיידית לווש'.

אנא פנה מיידית בדרג הגבוה ביותר, והעבר את מחאתנו על הפגישה, ברוח תגובת רה'מ. אם תושמע הטענה שהם אזרחים אמר' אנא הסבר שהבעיה איננה אזרחותם אלא הארגון שהם מייצגים והמשמעות הציבורית והפוליטית כבדת המשקל של פגישה עם אנשים שהם חברי מוסד הגג של ארגוני הטרור. אין שום הבדל בין המל'פ לבין אש'ף. אדרבא, המל'פ הוא הגוף העליון של כל ארגוני הטרור. הפגישה הנ'ל יכולה רק לעודד את המסיתים למהומות באזורי יש'ע.

אריה מקל לשכת רה'מ

סא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

```
*                                  *
*                  דף 2    מתוך 2  *
*                  עותק 4  מתוך 12 *
*                                  *
*תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל                  *
```

מ.ק

משרד החוץ – מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק צפון

אל : השגריר, וש'

דף _____ מתוך _____ דפים
סיווג בטחוני : סודי ביותר
דחיפות : בהול- להזעיק
לשימוש { תאריך וזמן רישום: _____
מח' הקשר { מס. מברק : _____

התקשר סאליבן ומסר כי המזכיר הזמין את אדוארד סעיד ואברהים אבו לורוד להוועד עמו בשבת הקרובה. סאליבן הוסיף כי שניהם אזרחים אמר' וחברי המל"פ, וכי מדיניות ארה"ב איננה מונעת קשרים עם חברי המל"פ.

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אריה מקל, לשכת רה"מ

השולח : אריה מקל, לשכת רה"מ אישור מנהל מחלקה : _____
אישור לשכת המנכ"ל : _____ (לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)
תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) 24.3.88

לשימוש הקשר בלבד

התפוצה :

הנושא :

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טיפס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 63 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידי

תאריך/ז"ח 23 מרץ 88 0940

מס' מברק

1/63

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המשורד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנכ"ל ראה"מ

מנהל ממ"ד

דו"ח ברוקינגס.

לתקרה שלא קבלתם הדו"ח.

ערן

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21/63

February 29, 1988

TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP

FINAL DRAFT

Not for Citation or Further Distribution

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3/63

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(To be printed on the back cover)

MEMBERS OF THE BROOKINGS STUDY GROUP ON ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE

Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr., Commonwealth Fund

Hermann F. Eilts (Cochairman), Boston University

Larry L. Fabian, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

David M. Gordis, The Wilstein Institute, University of Judaism

Rita E. Hauser, Stroock, Stroock and Lavan

Paul Jabber, Council on Foreign Relations

Geri M. Joseph, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs

Rashid I. Khalidi, University of Chicago

Judith Kipper, The Brookings Institution

Samuel W. Lewis (Cochairman), United States Institute for Peace

Ian S. Lustick, Dartmouth College

Charles McC. Mathias, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue

Fouad Moughrabi, University of Tennessee

Robert Neumann, Center for Strategic and International Studies

William B. Quandt (Coordinator), The Brookings Institution

Harold H. Saunders, The Brookings Institution

Henry Siegman, The American Jewish Congress

Kenneth Wollack, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

Casimir A. Yost, World Affairs Council of Northern California

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MEMBERS OF THE STUDY GROUP

ALFRED LEROY ATHERTON, JR.
The Harkness Fellowships of the Commonwealth Fund

Ambassador Atherton was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 1974-78; Ambassador-at-Large for Middle East negotiations, 1978-79; and Ambassador to Egypt, 1979-83. He participated in Arab-Israeli peace efforts 1969-77 and in the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations, 1978-79.

HERMANN FREDERICK EILTS
Boston University

Ambassador Eilts is Distinguished University Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Relations at Boston University. He is former Ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He participated in all phases of the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations from 1973 to 1979.

LARRY L. FABIAN
Secretary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Mr. Fabian was Director of the Carnegie Endowment's Middle East Program in the 1970s. He is the co-editor of Israelis Speak: About Themselves and the Palestinians.

DAVID M. GORDIS
Wilstein Institute, University of Judaism

Dr. Gordis is Director of the Wilstein Institute on Public Policy and Vice President of the University of Judaism, Los Angeles, California. He has served as vice president of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and executive vice president of the American Jewish Committee. He was founding executive director of the Foundation for Conservative Judaism in Israel. He has written widely on Middle East matters, on the American Jewish community and its relationship to Israel, and on other areas of American and American Jewish public policy.

RITA E. HAUSER
Senior Partner, Stroock, Stroock & Lavan

Mrs. Hauser is an international lawyer; a founder and member of the Executive Committee, The International Center for Peace in the Middle

East, and a former U.S. Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

PAUL JABBER
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Paul Jabber directs the Middle East program at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 1975-82 he taught international relations at UCLA, and since 1982 he has been responsible for Middle East country risk assessment at Bankers Trust of New York. His latest book is Not By War Alone: Security and Arms Control in the Middle East.

GERI M. JOSEPH
Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs

Ambassador Joseph is a Senior Fellow at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. A former journalist and political activist, she has had a long-time interest in Middle East issues. She served as Ambassador to The Netherlands from 1978-1981.

RASHID I. KHALIDI
Associate Professor of Modern Middle East History, University of Chicago

Professor Khalidi, a Palestinian American, has taught at the American University of Beirut, Georgetown and Columbia Universities. He has written a large number of books and articles on Palestinian and Arab political history, including Under Siege: PLO Decisionmaking during the 1982 War (1986) and British Policy towards Syria and Palestine, 1906-1914 (1980).

JUDITH KIPPER
Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution

Ms. Kipper, a Middle East specialist, is a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and Senior Program Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.

SAMUEL W. LEWIS
President, United States Institute of Peace

Ambassador Lewis spent 31 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, most recently as Ambassador to Israel for eight years under Presidents Carter and Reagan. He took part in the Camp David meetings and all phases of Egyptian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli negotiations between 1977 and 1985. Since retirement he has lectured and written extensively on Middle East issues.

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IAN S. LUSTICK
Dartmouth College

Professor Lustick is an Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College specializing in Middle Eastern and international politics. He is the author of Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority (1980) and For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (forthcoming--1988).

CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS

(to be provided)

FOUAD MOUGHRABI
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

Professor Moughrabi is Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee and Director of the International Center for Research and Public Policy. He is author of Public Opinion and the Palestine Question (1987).

ROBERT NEUMANN
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Ambassador Neumann is Senior Adviser and Director of Middle East programs at CSIS, Chairman of the American/Saudi Roundtable, and Chairman of the executive committee of the Moroccan-American Foundation. He was Ambassador to Afghanistan, 1966-1973; to Morocco, 1973-76; and to Saudi Arabia, 1981. He was Director of the Department of State Transition Team for the Reagan Administration, 1980-81.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

William B. Quandt was a member of the National Security Council staff from 1972 to 1974 and from 1977 to 1979. During the latter period, he participated in the negotiations that resulted in the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Since 1979, he has been a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He has also taught at several universities. His most recent publication is Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (1986).

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution

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Dr. Saunders served on the National Security Council staff, 1961-1974, and in the State Department, 1974-1981. He was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 1978-1981. He participated in the disengagement negotiations in 1973-75, and helped draft the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. He wrote The Other Walls: The Politics of The Arab-Israeli Peace Process (1986).

HENRY SIEGMAN

(to be provided)

KENNETH WOLLACK
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

Kenneth Wollack is the Executive Vice President of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. He was formerly co-editor of the Middle East Policy Survey and legislative director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

CASIMIR A. YOST
Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Northern California

As Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (1977-1982) and while on the professional staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1982-86), Mr. Yost devoted considerable attention to Middle East issues.

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FOREWORD

In 1975 the Brookings Institution organized a study group of foreign policy specialists with a particular interest in the Middle East. The result was Toward Peace in the Middle East, a report that had considerable influence on the Carter administration's policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Early in 1987 William B. Quandt, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and a participant in the first "Brookings Report," formed a new study group with the objective of taking a fresh look at the Arab-Israeli peace process. Henry Owen, who had organized the first Brookings study group on the Middle East, was generous with encouragement and advice. The group met for the first time in May 1987 and then monthly from September 1987 through February 1988.

Events in the Middle East often seem to have the capacity to catch us by surprise. At the outset of the group's deliberations, there was concern that Americans were simply not interested in the issue of Arab Israeli peace. It was not high on the administration's foreign policy agenda and there was little public discussion of the issues. By the time the group concluded its work early this year, Israeli-Palestinian clashes were on the front page of every newspaper and new initiatives for peace were being actively considered.

This report is intended to enrich the discussion of how the United States can best promote Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. It does not offer a blueprint. It does suggest how to get the negotiating process under way and puts forward principles that should inform the efforts of any American president.

The group that produced the report was not homogeneous. Indeed, the exercise was meant to ensure that diverse views were included. The report is of particular interest because the group, despite its differences on many basic points, was still able to reach a broad consensus on how the United States should use its influence on behalf of peace in the Middle East.

In the course of the deliberations that led to this report, encouragement, advice, and support was received from many persons. Special thanks are due to those at Brookings who helped with the production of the report. Judy Buckelew and Susanne Lane, who organized the meetings of the group, kept a record of the proceedings, and produced endless drafts; Robert Faherty and Caroline Lalire for editorial assistance which transformed the draft into a finished publication; and John Armour, David Hamod, and Jack Hills for help in organizing support for the project.

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March 1988
Washington, D.C.

Bruce K. MacLaury
President

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PREFACE

This report, Toward Arab-Israeli Peace: Report Of A Study Group, is the result of many hours of discussion over a period of nearly one year. Like any collective effort, ours required much give-and-take to reach agreement. The common thread within our diverse group was a genuine commitment to the idea of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, as well as a conviction that the United States can and should play a constructive role in moving toward that goal.

Although the group was in agreement on most issues, there were differences of opinion. Most can be traced to divergent judgments about how best to achieve a durable peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

Some members favored some form of Jordanian-Palestinian association or a three-way economic and political umbrella linking Israel, West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, and Jordan in some fashion. They felt that an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would inevitably be irredentist and therefore a source of permanent instability and a threat to Israel's survival as a Jewish state. They doubted that a peace

treaty or international guarantees could ensure any lasting constraints on an independent state's military capabilities. In addition, they believed that the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) actions and program threatened American interests and the security of our friends in the region. They felt that regardless of the support the PLO may enjoy among Palestinians, efforts to include the PLO in any negotiations would impede the peace process, not promote it. They believed that there must be a fundamental change in the PLO position and, therefore, the U.S. commitment and law regarding dealings and contact with the PLO should not be altered. They also emphasized that, while Palestinian-Israeli relations are of vital concern, the United States should not discount the importance of state-to-state relationships. Along with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Arab governments must be the primary participants in direct negotiations and in the peace that follows.[1]

Others felt that a Palestinian state, even if limited to only a part of historic Palestine, would essentially meet Palestinian aspirations, would not be a threat to Israel's security, and would contribute to a lasting political settlement of the conflict between the two claimants to the same land. They also felt that any relationship between the Palestinians and Jordan should be one of equality and should be freely negotiated. In addition, they felt that since the PLO is considered by Palestinians to represent them, it must be directly involved in any negotiations relating to the future of the Palestinian people. They

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1 Kenneth Wollack considers all of the points in this paragraph to be essential. Other members in the group endorsed some of them.

believed that the primary venue for negotiations should be an international conference. Any interim agreement should be negotiated in this context, should be integrally linked to a final resolution of the conflict in a comprehensive peace, and should end the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Finally, they believed that existing obstacles in law and policy to U.S. contacts with the PLO should be removed.[2]

A third view was more agnostic on the details of a final peace settlement, arguing that the proper American role was to get a negotiating process under way and to keep it moving toward an outcome whose precise nature could not be predetermined, but which could reasonably be expected to contribute to regional stability by meeting the essential needs of all the concerned parties, especially Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians.

Our members also disagreed about how explicit the link should be between any transitional arrangements and a comprehensive settlement. Some felt that interim arrangements have intrinsic value and should stand on their own, and that insistence on explicit linkage would make agreement unattainable. Others felt that an agreed sense of direction toward an overall settlement would be necessary if transitional arrangements were to be made acceptable to the Palestinians, Syrians, and other Arabs.

These differences of opinion are, of course, not unique to our group. They are at the heart of Arab-Israeli diplomacy, and each has advocates within the United States and within the region. We have not

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2 Rashid Khalidi and Fouad Moughrabi consider all of the points in this paragraph to be essential. Other members in the group endorsed some of them.

tried to wish these differences away or to paper them over. We have tried to find acceptable compromise formulations. We have also reached substantial agreement on the nature of American interests in the region, on the realities that will govern the next round of diplomacy, on the need for building firm political foundations for any diplomatic effort, on the importance of an international framework for peacemaking, on the need for transitional steps, and on certain principles that should shape a vision of an overall peace agreement between Arabs and Israelis. This consensus, we feel, is a substantial achievement.

The discussion and drafting that produced this report began in the spring of 1987, a year that ended with the worst outbreak of violence in the West Bank and Gaza since Israel's occupation began in 1967. We have devoted conspicuous, though not exclusive, attention to the Israeli-Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the underlying instability in the occupied territories. The urgency of forward movement in a negotiating process that advances Israeli-Palestinian peace is, to us, a clear imperative for a new American administration. Our judgment rests not merely on headlines of late 1987 and early 1988, but also, and more importantly, on the underlying trends and realities in the region that led to these prolonged disturbances and to our recommendations.

A final note is in order. This report represents a broad consensus on the part of the study group. Not all members feel equally comfortable with each of the recommendations, and in endorsing the report they do not necessarily imply that they agree with each and every formulation therein.

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The members of the group have all participated as individuals. Their professional affiliations are noted only for purposes of identification.

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SUMMARY

The study group on Arab-Israeli peacemaking reached broad agreement in seven areas.

1. Urgency

Arab-Israeli peacemaking should be a high priority for any American administration. Failure to break the long-standing deadlock in the peace process endangers American national interests. The recent outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians is an indication of the explosiveness of the current situation. For the moment, the violence may compound the difficulties of moving toward negotiations. Even so, possible openings toward peace have been created and should be exploited fully.

2. New Realities

It will not suffice for a newly elected president simply to invoke the diplomatic formulas of the past. Previous initiatives contain some useful building blocks, but a serious policy cannot be developed simply by stringing these formulations together. New realities in the region require new approaches and concepts.

Among the most important of these realities are the emergence of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation as the most urgent and complex part of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the difficulty of applying the "territory for peace" formula of U.N. Resolution 242 in a straightforward manner; demographic trends that provide a strong incentive to Israelis to reach an agreement with their Palestinian neighbors to keep Israel secure, democratic, and predominantly Jewish; the deepening of the relationship between the United States and Israel to include strategic cooperation; the willingness by most Arab leaders to contemplate some form of settlement with Israel; and the renewed diplomatic activism of the Soviet Union in the region.

3. The American Role

We would like to see a continuous, high-level commitment of American resources to the Arab-Israeli peace process. American leadership can help to create the atmosphere in which negotiations can take place and can also assist in bridging differences on both procedural and substantive issues.

Given the prolonged stalemate in the peace process, attention must be paid to rebuilding the foundations for a negotiated settlement. A relationship of trust between Israel and the United States will be necessary if the peace process is to advance. The United States must also seek to enhance its credibility with Arab leaders. Consultations must

take place with all parties before it can be determined whether the circumstances are ripe for moving into formal negotiations.

4. An International Framework for Negotiations

Convening an international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most widely supported approach to negotiations. While we have some reservations about such a forum, we believe that the idea should be explored seriously by a new administration. Indeed, the effort to organize a conference could help to precipitate the political decisions necessary to negotiate a settlement. If a conference is convened, it should not impose its views on the negotiating parties or be empowered to veto the results of bilateral negotiations.

On the controversial issue of Palestinian participation, we have concluded that Palestinians should be represented in any negotiations with Israel by spokesmen of their own choosing, whether in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation or in some other configuration. The United States should have no objection to the participation of Palestinians who are on record as being prepared to coexist with the state of Israel, are committed to peaceful negotiations, can contribute to that objective, and renounce the use of force. Palestinians are unlikely to come forward to negotiate with Israel without having the implicit or explicit endorsement of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

5. Basic Principles for Arab-Israeli Peace

We believe the United States should formulate a strategy for promoting Arab-Israeli peace based on the following points:

--In order to achieve broad Arab-Israeli peace, both Israel and the Palestinians must be directly involved.

--A recognition that the area defined as the former mandate of Palestine west of the Jordan River is home to both peoples is essential to a reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians.

--Israelis and Palestinians will have to work closely with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a majority of whose citizens are Palestinians, in shaping a peace agreement. Negotiations must encompass the political and economic relationships among the three parties.

--Under international sponsorship, Israel and Syria should be encouraged to negotiate peace based on the principles of U.N. Resolution 242.

6. Transitional Steps

Within these guidelines, we believe that some form of transitional arrangements must be part of the next phase of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. The atmosphere for peacemaking would be significantly improved by the following sorts of steps, some of which could either precede formal negotiations or be part of an interim agreement:

--ceasing all forms of violence;

--ending the state of belligerency and economic and diplomatic boycott between Israel and its Arab neighbors;

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--minimizing the Israeli military presence in populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza;

--placing substantial authority in the hands of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, especially with respect to land, water, economic activity, and political organization; and

--halting new Israeli settlements and land expropriation in the occupied territories.

The United States should also support free elections to municipal councils as an essential step that would allow Palestinians to select their own leaders for purposes of self-government and as possible participants in a Palestinian negotiating delegation.

For Palestinians to find merit in these interim measures, they must be seen as part of an ongoing process that leads to negotiation of a comprehensive peace that meets their political aspirations. For Israelis to support them, they must be compatible with Israel's assessment of its security interests and be judged as having intrinsic merit.

A transitional arrangement should also be negotiated for the Golan Heights that would enhance mutual security there, return territory to Syria, and establish a new relationship of nonbelligerency as a step toward an overall peace settlement.

7. A Long-Term Vision of Peace

We believe the United States is uniquely positioned to articulate a vision of how Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arab parties can attain their rights to security and to self-determination through a political formula based on ideas of peaceful interchange, political pluralism, and the exchange of "territory for peace" as envisaged in U.N. Resolution 242. Federal or confederal arrangements that would reflect distinctive national identities, while at the same time permitting political and economic linkages among the individual political units, might be an appealing formula.

We envision a future in which borders would not be physical barriers; citizens of one political entity could live safely, and with recognized rights, elsewhere in the region; and economic transactions and movement of individuals would be subject to few restrictions. A regional economic plan with international support should complement such a political settlement and help to ensure its viability.

Jerusalem will be internationally recognized as Israel's capital under any future peace agreements. But Jerusalem is the center of Palestinian aspirations as well. Therefore, a peaceful Jerusalem should remain a unified city, with guaranteed freedom of worship and access, and political arrangements should be found that reflect the nature of the city's population.

Finally, we want to emphasize that the details of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement should not be dictated by the United States or any other outside party. From the standpoint of American interests, the important point is that any agreement be durable. The United States will doubtless benefit by a widening of the scope of Arab-Israeli peace. How that is

done is less important than that it be done, and that the process start soon.

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Introduction

Arab-Israeli peacemaking deserves to be high on the agenda of the next American administration. A prolonged impasse in the peace process could endanger U.S. national interests. Recent violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians are vivid reminders of the explosive situation in the region. For the moment, they appear to have compounded the problem of how to bring about a process of negotiation.

Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and Gaza may feel that these violent demonstrations have served their purposes, especially in influencing international and Israeli public opinion. This may explain their unwillingness to begin a negotiating process that might curtail these demonstrations. Israeli leaders, even those most positively disposed toward negotiations, may find the present moment inopportune because they fear that an agreement to negotiate now would be perceived as weakness and capitulation to violence. Nonetheless, these clashes may reawaken in all parties a recognition of the critical need to renew the

Arab-Israeli peace process. Possible openings toward peace have also been created by other regional and international developments. In sum, major obstacles to peace exist, but so do opportunities for diplomacy.

The United States has contributed significantly to Arab-Israeli peace in the past. We believe that it can and should do so again. The stalemate has lasted too long and is too deeply rooted to be overcome easily. More will be required than simply calling on the parties to the conflict to enter into negotiations. The need now is for a politically realistic strategy of peacemaking that concentrates on rebuilding the foundations for a major diplomatic effort.

A new administration should recognize from the outset that advancing the cause of Arab-Israeli peace, while challenging and complex, is necessary if American interests in the region are to be protected. Policymaking by fits and starts is bound to fail. Only a sustained and sustainable diplomatic strategy can produce positive results.

Arguments for inaction are familiar: the conflict is so intractable that no third party can hope to resolve it; it is better to let the pressures in the region build in order to create a more propitious atmosphere for diplomacy; the known, if imperfect, status quo is preferable to a risky, unknown alternative; the struggle between Arabs and Israelis has in recent years receded in importance for Arab governments and for a world preoccupied by other issues. Arguably, these perspectives justify an aloof American stance. We do not agree.

We believe it is imperative to restore a sense of possibility to the search for Arab-Israeli peace and to communicate that sense clearly to the

American public and to the parties to the conflict. A reinvigorated Arab-Israeli peace process can serve American interests. American leadership in the Middle East, already strengthened by recent measures taken in the Gulf, can be further enhanced. Israel's peace with Egypt can be deepened and complemented by peace with other Arab parties. Success cannot be guaranteed, of course, but our assessment of risks and opportunities leads us to conclude that the effort is worthwhile.

There is no need to dwell at length on why the United States should care about the Arab-Israeli conflict. The traditional list of American interests in the Middle East--concern for Soviet inroads, the danger of a war that could draw in the superpowers, the special relationship with Israel, support for moderate Arab regimes, access to the region and its resources--are all still relevant. But though U.S. interests remain constant, regional realities are undergoing rapid change. The United States can no longer protect its interests simply by replaying policies from the past.

Several distinct dangers to American interests emanate from the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. One involves the risk of a large war between Syria and Israel. Both nations are heavily armed with conventional and unconventional weapons. Each is backed by a superpower. Conflict between them, while not imminent, is a continuing possibility, and it could risk U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the avoidance of which is a vital U.S. interest. Averting Syrian-Israeli conflict will require a serious American dialogue with Syria and the Soviet Union; attentiveness to military developments on the Syrian-Israeli front and in Lebanon; and a

diplomatic strategy that holds open the door for both Israel and Syria to develop greater mutual security and peaceful relations.

A second danger involves the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. This conflict is the source of violence and bloodshed, especially in the West Bank and Gaza. It is an unavoidable issue in the U.S.-Israeli dialogue. Along with the broader Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue affects U.S. relations with many Arab countries, often making it difficult to develop and maintain broad security relations, especially with Jordan and the Gulf states.

The present relationship between Israel and the Palestinians is neither desirable nor stable, as the violent clashes in late 1987 and early 1988 have amply demonstrated. The military occupation imposes heavy costs on Palestinians who live under it. Israeli society has not escaped the pernicious effects of exercising the power of a military occupier over a prolonged period.

The occupation has deepened antipathy between Israelis and Palestinians, creating an atmosphere of fear, continuing violence, and hardening of attitudes, especially among Israeli and Palestinian youth. Jordan is also an involved party because of its concern that any severe deterioration in the present situation could adversely affect its security.

Some voices in Israel and in the Arab world are recasting the conflict in religious and ideological terms. Palestinian and Israeli extremists confront one another with grim pictures of the future, while moderate voices seek reconciliation based on the idea of a historic

compromise between the two claimants to the same land. Those who are using the language of realism and pragmatism to discuss possible ways out of the impasse have developed a range of potentially important contacts. These discussions across the political divide could provide part of the foundation for a revived peace process.

The United States, deeply involved with Israel and committed to basic principles of peace and justice, cannot be indifferent to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its broader regional ramifications. It is an engaged party. The question is what role it will choose to play.

Adding to the urgency of addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict is the protracted Gulf war between Iran and Iraq, which has profound regional implications. If Iran were to prevail in the war, many Arab regimes would feel threatened; religiously based extremism could be expected to grow; and the chances for an Arab-Israeli peace based on accommodation and mutual recognition would evaporate.

Yet another reason for concern stems from the U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli triangular relationship. The central pillar of the U.S. position in the region for the past decade, this relationship must be carefully tended. For the moment, it remains firm, but there are obvious strains. Egypt has reestablished normal relations with most of its Arab neighbors, a development viewed with ambivalence and some suspicion by Israelis, who seek assurances that their treaty with Egypt will result in real peace and full normalization of relations. But that seems unlikely unless and until there is progress toward a broader Arab-Israeli peace.

Egypt has always insisted that its peace with Israel was not achieved at the expense of Palestinian rights and that its ties to the United States and Israel can help advance the cause of Arab-Israeli peace. When there is no movement in the peace process, or when Israeli-Palestinian confrontations take place, the Egyptian regime comes under mounting domestic and Arab pressures to curtail its dealings with Israel. Any sharp deterioration of Egyptian-Israeli relations, as occurred after the 1982 war in Lebanon, could also quickly undermine U.S.-Egyptian ties and sharply set back U.S. interests in the region.

All of these considerations support the case for a broadly defined peace strategy. Time is of the essence. It may still be possible to lay some of the foundation for a sustained peace effort in the remainder of 1988. In any event, an early start in the new presidential term will be needed because peacemaking will take a long time.

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New Realities in the Region

A newly elected president will find some useful building blocks in past American-supported formulations on how to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Camp David Accords, and President Ronald Reagan's proposal of September 1, 1982, for example, embody important principles such as the exchange of "territory for peace," the establishment of "secure and recognized boundaries," negotiations between the parties concerned "under appropriate auspices," "transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza," "solving the Palestinian problem in all its aspects," and a suggestion that the West Bank and Gaza should ultimately be associated in some way with Jordan.

But the next administration cannot simply string these formulations together and call the result a serious policy. Other concepts will have to be considered, and other approaches crafted, in order to reflect new realities in the region. We believe the most important of these realities to be the following:

--The peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979 has been in force for nearly a decade. It has not yet fulfilled the most far-reaching hopes for a normal range of bilateral social, cultural, and economic ties. It has produced a relationship durable enough to prevent a return to belligerency, though not strong enough to provide much momentum in the search for a broader peace.

Egypt, while certain to be concerned with encouraging further progress in the peace process, cannot be expected to play a central role in future negotiations. The Egyptian leadership does not feel it can speak authoritatively on behalf of the Palestinians. Its primary concern is to see the peace process revived with direct Palestinian participation. Therefore, the main Egyptian role will be to help set the stage for peace talks and to encourage the process from the sidelines, not to participate in the negotiation of the details of agreements.

--The United States and Israel have a unique relationship that amounts to an unwritten alliance. It now embraces a wide range of interests, including extensive security cooperation. This relationship has widespread support from the American public and in Congress and is also understood as a fact of life by most parties in the Middle East. Any American administration is obliged by prior commitments and by domestic political realities to elaborate its peacemaking strategy in close consultation with the Israeli government. Because of the depth of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, however, the United States cannot avoid blame for many of Israel's policies in the eyes of most Arabs. This can be a complicating element in U.S.-Arab relations.

--Israel is deeply divided over the substantive details of a peace settlement, as well as over the appropriate modalities of seeking peace. Nonetheless, broad agreement currently exists on several points: no return to the 1967 lines; no independent Palestinian state; no negotiations with the PLO; no division of Jerusalem or change in its status as Israel's

capital; and support for direct negotiations with Israel's Arab neighbors on a bilateral basis.

The Likud bloc sees a limited version of autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as the basis for a long-term settlement. Likud's commitment to keep all of the territory west of the Jordan River under Israeli control, while seeking to increase the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza so as to make its retention by Israel irreversible, is rooted in ideological and security considerations. While upholding Israel's claim to sovereignty over these areas, Likud has stopped short of calling for annexation, since doing so would force it to deal with the political status of the one and one-half million Palestinians living there.

The Labor party has traditionally placed heavy emphasis on security concerns in the West Bank and Gaza. Labor seeks to advance its idea of "territorial compromise" in direct negotiations with Jordan, and recently has shown interest in establishing shared Israeli-Jordanian rule over the West Bank, at least in the form of de facto interim arrangements.

Demographic trends provide one of the most potent arguments for Israelis who favor a negotiated political settlement based on "territorial compromise" and who fear that without such a compromise Israel could become a state that would be neither predominantly Jewish nor democratic. In all the territory now under Israeli control, more Arab than Jewish babies are born each year, meaning that Arabs may eventually become a majority. Even short of becoming a majority, the Arabs are now, and will

continue to be, a large and problematic minority, raising acutely for Jewish Israelis the dilemmas of democratic enfranchisement for Arabs.

For many Israelis, a smaller but more Jewish Israel would be preferred to either the status quo or a large, binational Israel--provided, of course, that such an Israel could live in peace with its Arab neighbors. Likud and its allies are less worried by the demographic argument. They believe that the trends are not irreversible, and that in any case the Arabs can be given political status outside the framework of Israeli politics.

--Several developments raise serious doubts about the feasibility today of a straightforward "territory for peace" deal in the West Bank and Gaza as envisaged in U.N. Resolution 242. The concept of the partition of the land west of the Jordan River into two homelands, one for the Jews and one for the Palestinian Arabs, has never been the subject of serious negotiations between the concerned parties. When the West Bank and Gaza were controlled, respectively, by Jordan and Egypt, the Arabs refused to negotiate directly with Israel. After Israel occupied these territories in 1967, the initial Arab response was to reject the idea of peace and direct negotiations with Israel. Later, those Arab governments that accepted U.N. Resolution 242 took the position that negotiations within an international forum could begin only if full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines was assured at the outset. Israel rejected these terms, calling instead for face-to-face negotiations without preconditions.

In the absence of negotiations, Israel consolidated its own presence in the occupied territories, primarily through the creation of settlements

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and expropriation of lands. The Likud government that came to power in 1977 made it clear that it no longer interpreted Resolution 242 as requiring any withdrawal from the West Bank, even in exchange for full peace with its neighbors. The Labor party, by contrast, has continued to speak of "territorial compromise," without defining the practical meaning of this formulation in advance of negotiations.

Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians have become deeply entangled in one another's affairs during the more than twenty years that Israel has controlled the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Economic interrelationships are now a fact of life and could, in conditions of greater equality, be transformed into positive elements of any peace accord. What has not developed, however, is any mutually acceptable formula that provides a political expression for Palestinian national identity. Nor is there an agreed basis for coexistence, mutual recognition, and security between Israelis and Palestinians. And Israel has still not won recognition, acceptance, and full peace from its Arab neighbors.

While some of the new contacts between Israelis and Palestinians may ultimately help pave the way for peace, other developments raise questions about how the territorial dimension of a compromise can be worked out under present conditions. For example, Israeli law has been extended to East Jerusalem and to the Golan Heights. Some 65,000 Israeli settlers now have their homes in the West Bank, as do several thousand more in Gaza and Golan, along with another 100,000 or more who live in and around East Jerusalem in territory formerly subject to Jordanian rule.

From the Palestinian side, there has generally been a reluctance to state clearly that peace with Israel could be achieved if Israel were to withdraw to specified lines on the map. While Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) officials have spoken of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and have indicated a willingness to accept "all relevant U.N. resolutions, including 242 and 338," some in the PLO still call for a solution to the Palestinian problem in stages, implying that even if Israel were to withdraw to the 1967 lines, the conflict would continue until the Jewish state was dismantled. For a large majority of Israelis, these Palestinian positions, along with the perception of the PLO as an organization wedded to the use of terror, confirm their suspicion that the PLO's ultimate goal is the destruction of Israel, and they therefore refuse to do anything that might legitimize such an organization.

Meanwhile, for a whole generation of Israelis and Palestinians, the "green line" that had effectively separated their two societies from 1949 until 1967 has lost much of its earlier meaning, even though the political and cultural divide continues to be very real. Although in normal times some 100,000 Palestinians cross this line every day to work in Israel, there is still little real integration or cooperation between the two societies and peoples.

As the stalemate has continued with little hope of change, the Palestinian demand for a state has grown ever louder. Palestinian nationalism has gained in strength in the past twenty years. Palestinians are unwilling to subordinate their identity within the larger framework of

Arabism, or to entrust their fate to the existing Arab regimes. Israeli Arabs are now conscious of their identity as Palestinians, even as they are increasingly assertive as a force in Israeli politics. Within the West Bank and Gaza, and certainly among Palestinians elsewhere as well, the PLO has become widely accepted as the primary symbol of Palestinian national aspirations, even by those who disagree with specific policies and actions or who criticize its leaders.

In brief, the past twenty years have resulted in a blurring of some of the differences between pre-1967 Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. In other respects, however, the dividing lines between the two societies remain clear. These contradictory patterns severely complicate any simple application of the "territory for peace" formula of U.N. Resolution 242, while raising questions about the feasibility of other formulations as well.

--Peace with Israel is still a contentious issue in Arab domestic politics, although the Palestinian issue is no longer invariably at the top of the inter-Arab agenda. Although most Arab regimes are on record as favoring some form of settlement, no such consensus exists at the popular level, where divisions are sharp over the terms for peace, and even over its desirability. As a result, Arab political leaders who might favor accommodation with Israel are reluctant to move in that direction. This hesitancy has been particularly evident since the rise of Islamic political movements that tend to redefine the conflict in absolutist terms.

Nonetheless, there is some room for flexibility, in part because Arab governments are preoccupied by other issues, such as economic problems, the Iran-Iraq war, and demands for greater political participation and democratization. In this atmosphere, Arab rejection of coexistence with Israel has been in retreat. Peace with Israel may not have a wide constituency in the Arab world, but the idea of reaching a formal settlement with Israel is no longer taboo within the mainstream of the Arab world. This mainstream, however, remains cautious and skeptical, and a bold initiative such as former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem is therefore highly unlikely in today's environment.

--The PLO has maintained a two-track policy in recent years. It continues to call for "armed struggle" against Israel. At the same time, the dominant group within the PLO has developed a political program calling for self-determination leading to an independent Palestinian state west of the Jordan River in any area to be evacuated by Israel, an immediate end to Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the representation of the PLO, directly or indirectly, in any peace negotiations. Until the United States recognizes the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, the PLO refuses to make what it considers to be unilateral concessions, such as unconditionally accepting U.N. Resolution 242.

Some Palestinians, both within and outside the PLO, adopt a more extreme line of refusing negotiations of any sort with Israel. They call for a military solution, and openly espouse the dismantling of Israel as a

predominantly Jewish state and its replacement by a "democratic state" in all of the former Palestine mandate west of the Jordan River.

--Syria has accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 with the interpretation that they call for full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and Palestinian self-determination. Were its interpretation of these resolutions to be accepted and implemented, the Syrian regime has said that it would enter into a nonbelligerency agreement with Israel, but has ruled out the more expansive idea of normalization of relations and full peace treaties. Syria wants to be involved in any efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue and will not readily agree to limit its role to bilateral negotiations with Israel over the Golan. Because the Syrian regime fears isolation and strongly opposes separate deals, it insists on an international conference with real powers reserved for the plenary sessions. It also seems to favor a high-level dialogue with the United States, especially as its relationship with the Soviet Union has come under some strain.

Syria is pursuing the goal of achieving "strategic parity" with Israel in order to have an independent military option in the event of another war with Israel and as a necessary precondition for any negotiations. Syria also continues to support Palestinian groups that take a strongly rejectionist posture on the issue of peace with Israel.

President Hafiz al-Asad always plays his cards close to the chest, so it is impossible to know exactly where the main line of Syrian policy is headed or how Syria's attitudes might be affected if a serious peace initiative was to get under way. There are, however, some signs of change

toward a more flexible posture on a number of issues, including a decrease in support for extremist Palestinian groups and a more balanced policy toward the Gulf conflict. The impossibility of reaching real strategic parity with Israel anytime in the foreseeable future also seems to be understood by many Syrians. In addition, Syria continues to respect the terms of the 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel and has had informal security understandings with Israel in Lebanon in the past.

--Under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet position toward the Arab-Israeli conflict has become more activist and less rigid than in the 1970s. The Soviets have consistently supported U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist as an independent Jewish state. But in the past this position has been coupled with strong anti-Zionist rhetoric, along with support for the Arab interpretation of Israel's obligation to withdraw from all occupied territory and to allow the Palestinians to form a state of their own. More recently, the Soviets have reestablished a dialogue with Israel and have undertaken a number of initiatives with the Arab parties to the conflict. They have pressed for both PLO unity and PLO-Syrian rapprochement.

The primary Soviet objective seems to be to ensure that no negotiations take place outside the framework of a Soviet-supported international conference. While being very insistent on the principle of a conference, however, the Soviets have hinted at considerable flexibility on the modalities of negotiating. For example, they seem prepared to accept the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation at a conference, and so may not insist on separate PLO participation. In essence, the Soviets

argue that there must be parallel movement on the Syrian and Palestinian fronts--and that Soviet participation is essential to progress in both these arenas.

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A Strategy for Peacemaking

In the past decade and a half, the American approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict has spanned the spectrum from intense involvement at the highest level to passivity and neglect. To some extent the choice was dictated by circumstances. But it also reflected different philosophical stances toward the peace process, evident in at least three schools of thought.

One approach, closely identified with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1969-73 period, argued for an aloof stance until the right set of regional circumstances presented themselves. Then in 1974-75, in the aftermath of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Kissinger recommended active, high-level involvement, aimed at persuading Middle East leaders to rethink their positions within a strategic political framework and to move step-by-step toward agreements. Both President Richard Nixon and Kissinger believed that regional crises often created opportunities for imaginative diplomacy. This belief was not an argument for creating such crises, but it did mean that American officials were most prone to become active when the status quo had been jolted by a sudden shock.

President Jimmy Carter and his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, followed a second approach. They also were proponents of an active American role in the Arab-Israeli peace process but were less inclined than Nixon and Kissinger to wait for propitious regional circumstances.

They argued that it was too dangerous to wait until a crisis created new opportunities for diplomacy. Instead, they felt that American leadership could bring about significant change in the positions of the parties and could help to establish an agreed set of principles to guide negotiations toward a successful conclusion.

President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz have, on the whole, adopted yet another approach, preferring that the United States not commit its resources to Arab-Israeli diplomacy until the parties to the conflict are clearly ready for serious negotiations. They have been concerned about raising expectations too high by holding out the prospect of an active American role. The more the parties came to depend on Washington, they believed, the less they would be prepared to deal directly with one another.

The Reagan administration has encouraged Jordan and Israel to engage in direct negotiations, with Palestinians represented as junior partners under Jordan's tutelage. To that end, they have been prepared to explore the ideas of an international conference, of U.S.-Soviet sponsorship of direct negotiations, and of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza as an interim step toward an overall settlement. Until recently, Arab-Israeli peacemaking has received only sporadic presidential attention during the Reagan years.

We believe the next president should draw on some elements of policy from the approaches of each of his predecessors. He would be prudent to promise no more than can be delivered, to keep pressure on the parties to do as much as they can on their own, and to be alert to events that might

provide new opportunities for peacemaking. Yet he must also set a new priority and a new tone for his Middle East policy by signaling that the United States has a continuing interest of its own in seeing the conflict settled and by making the command decisions that will be needed to place the Arab-Israeli conflict high on his foreign-policy agenda. His approach will need to be articulated in ways that enlist congressional and public support for his diplomacy of peacemaking. He will have to be especially attentive to his administration's political calendar, for if he puts aside Arab-Israeli issues for too long, he may run out of time, dissipating the advantages of early diplomatic movement.

The steady, high-level commitment of resources that we urge should avoid vacillation between passivity and activism in America's Arab-Israeli diplomacy. There is less need ~~for~~ bold new initiatives than for an ongoing political dialogue, sustained and energetic involvement, and a conscious wedding of American power to the purposes of the diplomacy of peace. Much can be done through the imaginative use of existing diplomatic channels, provided that the secretary of state is himself directly engaged. The president's role, accordingly, can be properly kept in reserve, enabling him to serve more as a concerned and knowledgeable "court of last resort" on the difficult issues than as "desk officer" for the day-to-day negotiations.

The United States cannot, by itself, reinvigorate Arab-Israeli peacemaking, but what it says and does will have a substantial influence on the views of all the parties and on the eventual agenda for

negotiations. The overall posture that we urge would require a series of political discussions with all the concerned parties as early as possible.

Much of what we are recommending should be seen as the essence of diplomacy. But conventional diplomacy is never quite enough in dealing with Arab-Israeli issues. So thoroughly politicized and so complex are these issues that they call for a skillful strategy to cope with the competing claims of Arabs and Israelis, with the pull of constituents and members of Congress who care deeply about the Middle East, and with the obligations undertaken by previous administrations, especially those obligations that have evolved from the development of the special relationship with Israel.

To address the competing claims on the domestic front, the administration will need to work to ensure that Congress and the American public understand, and share in, the broad purposes of its Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy. Significant benefits can be derived if the administration seeks an active partnership with Congress in the search for Middle East peace. The valuable experience of members of Congress who have dealt with Arab-Israeli issues over the years could be tapped. An informed congressional constituency could help to promote policies based on long-term strategic considerations.

Evidence from public opinion surveys shows that American citizens would strongly support a U.S.-led peace initiative. They took great pride in the role their government played in brokering peace between Egypt and Israel, and they would no doubt do so again if the United States was

helpful in bringing about reconciliation between Israel and its Palestinian and other Arab neighbors.

As the first order of business, the United States will need to help rebuild the foundations of the peace process. That requires a sense of strategy, a series of connected moves informed by a clear political purpose, and a recognition that choices do exist. Peacemaking has been stalled too long for small steps taken outside of a wider political framework to lead very far.

Given Israel's sense of international isolation, vulnerability, and dependence on the United States, the president can make a key contribution to this broader framework by conveying to the Israeli leadership and public that he shares with Congress a personal commitment to the U.S.-Israeli relationship and to Israel's security. If the president gains Israel's trust early on in his administration, the prospects for winning Israeli acceptance of an active American role in the peace process will be enhanced. Gaining that trust can best be done if the president takes a personal interest in the conduct of the relationship, meets directly with Israeli leaders, engages in serious private discussions of the peace process before taking public initiatives, and reaffirms that economic and security relationships will be maintained.

With traditional Arab friends--especially Egypt and Jordan--the need is for close consultations on how best to revive the peace process. A wide range of useful steps can be discussed that could substantially improve the atmosphere for negotiations. To be effective, talks with both Israeli and Arab leaders cannot just be fact-finding missions. They must

actively identify the obstacles to negotiations and begin building a common approach to removing them.

It is not enough, however, to talk only with traditional friends. Syria has for too long been treated as either irrelevant to the peace process or beyond the reach of diplomacy. But Syria has the capacity to complicate or thwart the negotiating efforts if ignored, as amply shown from 1982 to 1987. A high-level dialogue between Washington and Damascus is needed to determine whether and how Syria is prepared to contribute to the peace process. The United States should be open to a fundamental improvement in its relationship with Syria. It would have to be understood that such an improvement could not take place if Syria was to support international terrorism or actively obstruct the peace process. Absent these obstacles, however, the United States should be prepared to discuss Arab-Israeli diplomacy and other regional issues with Damascus.

The United States will also need to find ways to consult at this early stage with representative Palestinians. Numerous channels for direct and indirect communication exist, even within the strictures set by current law, and efforts should be made to use them effectively to persuade authoritative Palestinian leaders that they have an incentive to support the next phase of peacemaking.

The United States also needs to consider how best to discuss Arab-Israeli diplomacy with the Soviet Union. U.S.-Soviet relations have entered a phase of serious dialogue on a wide range of issues, first and foremost on strategic arms control. The Arab-Israeli conflict has moved higher on the superpower agenda and should remain there. The United

States and the Soviet Union do not have identical interests in the region, but they share a concern for the consequences of another large-scale war, which might draw them into a direct confrontation. In addition, both countries should be worried about the possibility of an erosion of commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a growth of political and religious extremism.

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The Need for an International Framework

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Despite U.S. and Israeli calls for face-to-face negotiations between Israel and Jordan, King Hussein has insisted on an international framework for negotiations. His insistence has generated considerable discussion of the possibility of convening an international conference. Jordan, Egypt, part of the Israeli government, most Palestinians, Syria, the Soviet Union, and the United States have all expressed support for some form of international conference, even though views differ widely on details. American and Soviet diplomats, moreover, have discussed many of the details associated with an international conference.

This history should not be swept aside by a new administration. The effort to organize a conference could by itself help to precipitate the political decisions necessary to negotiate a settlement. For this and other reasons, we believe that a new administration should weigh seriously the issues associated with convening an international conference. The first priority is to create a political atmosphere in which the parties to the conflict will be encouraged to negotiate. Since bilateral negotiations by themselves appear to be unacceptable to Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians, some other formula will be needed to bring about direct negotiations. An international framework that ensures both participation in the negotiations by the key regional parties and a degree of international support for the effort seems to be called for.

Certain conditions should be met before the United States commits itself to a specific formula for reviving negotiations within an international framework. First, the parties to the conflict will have to accept the formula. Second, the United States and the Soviet Union should be in broad agreement on procedures. Third, some points of substance should already have been discussed with the negotiating parties so that negotiations can proceed from a common agenda. Extensive political dialogue will be needed to establish whether these conditions have been met.

In supporting U.N. Resolution 338, the United States endorsed the concept of negotiations "between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices" as the best way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is a suitably vague, yet useful, formula, and ~~it~~ was clearly understood at the time that it meant U.S.-Soviet auspices for the negotiations.

A further prerequisite should be satisfied before the United States presses for the convening of an international conference. Four procedural issues must be answered in ways that protect American interests and facilitate negotiations.

--Who will represent the Palestinians?

--What role will the Soviet Union play?

--What will be the authority of the plenary with respect to any agreements reached bilaterally?

--How can all parties, and especially the Syrians, be given a stake in the conference, without at the same time having a veto over its outcome?

A realistic assessment of current prospects for an international conference should assume that Israel will not alter its position of refusing to negotiate with the PLO and that the PLO will continue its policy of using all means, including violence, to achieve its goals. Perhaps these assumptions will prove wrong; if so, the problem of getting Israelis and Palestinians to talk to one another may be eased. For the time being, however, the gap between Israel and the PLO will be difficult to bridge.

Some have argued that Jordan is therefore the logical alternative to the PLO in any negotiations with Israel. King Hussein, however, is reluctant to move into negotiations without Palestinian backing, which is unlikely to be forthcoming unless the PLO gives the green light to its supporters.

We believe that Palestinians should be represented in any negotiations with Israel by spokesmen of their own choosing, whether in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation or in some other configuration. As a general guideline, the United States should have no objection to the participation of Palestinians who are on record as being prepared to coexist with the state of Israel, are committed to peaceful negotiations, can contribute to that objective, and agree to renounce the use of force. In practical terms, we recognize that Palestinians are unlikely to come forward to negotiate with Israel without having the implicit or explicit endorsement of the PLO.

The need for Soviet involvement in this stage of diplomacy is twofold. First, all the Arab parties, including Jordan, Syria, and Egypt,

want an international framework that would involve both superpowers. Second, the Soviets have some influence over the positions of Syria and the PLO and have moved toward developing a working relationship with Israel as well. If it were possible to think only in terms of an Israeli-Jordanian bilateral peace negotiation, the Soviet role would not be so important. But since Syria and the Palestinians must be included as well, then the Soviets do have a role to play stemming from their relations with these two parties.

Drawing on earlier precedents from the 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, which was convened by the secretary general of the United Nations under U.S.-Soviet cochairmanship, neither superpower would directly participate in the formal bilateral negotiations that will take place. The American and Soviet roles will be derived from the nature of their relations with the parties, not from the formal organization of the conference.

The challenge for the United States, we believe, is to pursue negotiations in ways that will give the Soviets incentives to play a constructive role. In addition to consulting with the Soviets on steps the two superpowers could each take to foster the beginning of negotiations and to find an acceptable formula for Palestinian representation, the United States should explore other procedural matters. For example, it will be important to establish the proposition that a peace conference will not be authorized to impose solutions or to veto the results of bilateral negotiations. It is also assumed that the Soviet

Union will reestablish normal diplomatic relations with Israel in the context of an international conference.

The role of the plenary sessions of the conference has become controversial. At a minimum, the plenary is needed for the symbolic purpose of starting formal negotiations. To think that there will be no other role for it, as some have maintained, is probably unrealistic. Such issues as refugee claims, peacekeeping arrangements, international guarantees, and future economic programs in the region could be dealt with in a multilateral setting if the negotiating parties were to agree. But the plenary should not be allowed to obstruct the work of direct bilateral negotiations.

The issue of Syrian participation has bedeviled all previous efforts to organize an international conference. Secretary Kissinger spent many hours in 1973 on this matter, only to be told on the eve of the Geneva conference that Syria would not participate. Nonetheless, several months later Syria did sign a disengagement agreement with Israel under the auspices of the Geneva conference. The United States should try to ensure that Syria has an incentive to participate constructively in peacemaking.

The United States should make clear its support for negotiations between Israel and Syria on the basis of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242. The United States has not accepted as final Israel's unilateral steps with respect to the Golan Heights, where Israeli law is now applied and settlements have been established. The United States has a primary interest in the stability of the Syrian-Israeli front and should support any peacekeeping measures that will help reduce the danger of war. United

Nations peacekeeping forces have played a useful role on this front and can be expected to do so again in any future settlement. This is a strong argument for keeping the United Nations involved from the outset in efforts to organize peace negotiations.

The Syrians want to be assured that their voice will be heard on the Palestinian question. They should understand that the United States will not support a Syrian veto power on this issue, but that Damascus is free to use whatever legitimate political influence it has with the Jordanians and the Palestinians to ensure that its views are taken into account. This is a matter of inter-Arab politics, not of conference procedures.

We do not unreservedly support the idea of an international conference on Arab-Israeli peace. A conference that quickly deadlocked or broke down could raise regional tensions. If better alternatives present themselves along the way, the United States should respond favorably. For the moment, however, no other idea enjoys wide support, and we are convinced that the United States is well positioned to assist in shaping such a conference and to play an effective role.

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Negotiating a Transition to Peace

Clearing the procedural hurdles on the way to an agreed international framework for negotiations is a necessary but not sufficient component in a new administration's peacemaking strategy. For the regional parties most directly involved, substantive questions are the paramount concerns, and the United States must therefore be prepared to address those questions as its peacemaking strategy evolves.

The United States should not be in the business of drawing up detailed blueprints for a final settlement, which in any case will be rejected out of hand by the parties or treated as irrelevant. Nor, however, can the United States be constructively engaged in the peacemaking process unless its strategy is guided by basic principles concerning the character and content of a peace that Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arabs can regard as viable and just.

The central problem in organizing negotiations is how to avoid at the outset the probable impasse over territorial, juridical, and other issues of a final settlement, while still addressing enough of the principles of a comprehensive peace to bring in those who want assurances that their concerns are part of the negotiating framework. This is a familiar problem in diplomacy and can be dealt with if the United States understands the core requirements of both the Israelis and Palestinians, for they are the two parties at the heart of the conflict today.

We believe the United States can develop a constructive approach to Arab-Israeli peacemaking based on an appreciation of the following points:

--The central historic compromise will have to involve Israel and the Palestinians. It cannot be negotiated over their heads.

--At the same time, the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, especially Syria and Jordan, will require direct negotiations leading to peace treaties.

--Reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians will have to stem from a recognition that the land consisting of the former mandate of Palestine west of the Jordan River is home to both peoples. Each is entitled to recognition and respect from the other as they negotiate a new peaceful relationship. Each should be able to live in security in this land. Any territorial division that might be negotiated on the basis of the principle of "territory for peace" should allow for agreed economic and social relationships between the two peoples on the basis of equality. These principles could be reflected in a variety of political arrangements to be negotiated between the parties.

--The future of both Israelis and Palestinians is closely intertwined with that of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, more than half of whose citizens are themselves Palestinians. The political and economic relationships among Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians must be negotiated.

With these broad guidelines in mind, we believe the next steps in the peace process must concentrate on concrete interim measures that meet the immediate needs of all parties to the conflict, as an integral part of

negotiating a final settlement to be embodied in peace treaties. Negotiations will deadlock immediately if the first order of business is defined as drawing up the terms of a final peace. Most of the parties to the conflict recognize that some form of transitional arrangement must be built into the next phase of Arab-Israeli peacemaking.

Both Israelis and Palestinians attach great importance to the issue of "linkage" between interim steps and an overall settlement. The Israelis maintain that it is essential for any transitional arrangement to stand on its own and not be dependent upon subsequent stages of agreement. The Palestinians and other Arab parties seek a much tighter relationship between interim steps and a final settlement.

In the past, the United States has tried to bridge this difference by emphasizing that peacemaking is a process in which the parties must participate if they wish to achieve their goals; it is not a guarantee of a specific outcome in advance. In addition, American administrations have tried to make transitional arrangements acceptable by ensuring that they met the real needs of both sides to the conflict. Finally, the United States has also been willing to hold out a picture of a final settlement and to affirm its readiness to stay the course until a comprehensive peace is reached. All of these points should continue as part of the American approach.

The idea of negotiations on interim steps or transitional arrangements has generally had minimal appeal to Arab parties for two reasons. First, those in the West Bank and Gaza who would be most immediately affected did not see much change from the prevailing situation

of occupation; those living elsewhere, meanwhile, suspected a conscious effort to split them from Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Second, the link between the transitional arrangements and an overall agreement was left vague, which raised major questions on the part of all Palestinians and other Arabs.

In view of this history, we conclude that transitional arrangements will win Palestinian support only if they are seen as firmly linked to the principles of an overall settlement. American diplomacy should therefore not only aim to make the transitional arrangements as attractive as possible to the parties in their own right, but also continue to stress that the United States will stay involved beyond the transitional stage to work for a comprehensive peace.

For the Israelis, the merit of transitional arrangements is that Israeli security concerns will be fully protected while new political arrangements are tested. During a transitional period, Israel should also receive some of the benefits of an overall peace with its Arab neighbors, at a minimum including an end to belligerency and to economic and diplomatic boycotts. If agreement on a transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza can be reached through negotiations within an agreed international framework, Israel should be able to enhance its situation internationally and with neighboring states. An agreement would also relieve Israel of some of the problems associated with the demographic challenge. As Palestinians are allowed to develop their own distinctive political institutions, quite possibly in free association with Jordan, and as the current unequal relationship between Israelis and Palestinians

is modified, the threat to Israeli principles of democracy posed by the continuing occupation will lessen.

It remains our hope that formal negotiations will be initiated promptly between Israel and its neighbors. We recognize, however, the barriers to such negotiations and are concerned about the dangerously confrontational and violent drift in relations between Israelis and Palestinians. If not reversed, these trends could further reduce the prospect of negotiations ever taking place. Israelis and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza need to consider seriously major changes in the pattern of their day-to-day interactions. Therefore, some of the measures that we would recommend as part of a transitional regime could also be envisaged as steps that the parties could carry out quite apart from formal negotiations.

For example, the atmosphere for peacemaking would be significantly improved by the following sorts of steps: ending all forms of violence; ceasing hostile propaganda; revoking the policy of deportation and collective punishment; placing substantial authority in the hands of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians; and halting the creation of new Israeli settlements and land expropriation in the occupied territories. In addition, the United States should support free elections to municipal councils as an essential step that would allow Palestinians to choose their own leaders for purposes of self-government and as possible participants in a Palestinian negotiating delegation.

For the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, a transitional regime should minimize the Israeli military presence in populated areas of the

West Bank and Gaza, and substantially increase their control over land, water, and economic and political activity. Palestinians must also be able to look forward to normal political rights of self-expression and organization.

Palestinians are unlikely to go along with transitional arrangements unless they are seen as leading to a final settlement that will meet broader Palestinian political aspirations. If that condition is met, then representative Palestinians, wherever they may reside, might be willing to enter direct talks with Israel on interim measures. Similarly, Israelis will be unwilling to enter into new arrangements unless they are seen as compatible with Israel's security and are judged as having intrinsic merit, regardless of whether or not they lead to further steps. If these conditions are met, the Israeli government is likely to agree to negotiate transitional arrangements.

Syria also has something to gain from participating in the peacemaking process. It should have an opportunity to negotiate for new arrangements on the Golan Heights that could enhance mutual security and return territory there to Syrian control. In return, Syria should be prepared to enter into a nonbelligerency agreement or its equivalent. The serious purposes to be served by such arrangements would be to engage Israel and Syria in the negotiating process; to reduce the danger of surprise attack; to provide a forum in which other issues could be usefully discussed; to dissuade the Syrians from trying to block progress on other negotiating fronts; and to create a framework for the improvement of U.S.-Syrian relations.

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A Long-Term Vision

While we are convinced that negotiations have to be carefully prepared and should focus in the first instance on two sets of transitional arrangements, one for the West Bank and Gaza and one for the Golan, we also recognize the need for a link between interim agreements and a vision of what lies ahead. There is a place for an American vision of the future in which Israelis and Palestinians, as well as Jordanians, Syrians, and Lebanese, can coexist peacefully, each with a firm political identity and genuine security. If such coexistence could be achieved, it would significantly strengthen the peace between Egypt and Israel as well. We believe, therefore, that it is useful to articulate one possible future that the United States, in good conscience, could support and that would take into account the basic positions of the parties to the conflict.

An appealing model of the future might include federal or confederal arrangements that would reflect distinctive national identities, while providing for political as well as economic linkages among the individual political units. In this vision of the future, borders would not be physical barriers; citizens of one political entity could live safely, and with recognized rights, elsewhere in the region; and economic transactions and movement of individuals would be subject to few restrictions.

We do not have in mind an exact formula for the future that can be applied in the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian triangle. We do see, however, a requirement for a political framework that captures what is

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unique for each people and gives it political expression, while at the same time recognizing a community of interests, a network of interrelationships based on equality, and security arrangements that preclude threats and the use of force in resolving differences. In addition, peace treaties should be signed and normal relations established between Israel and each of its neighbors.

Jerusalem will be internationally recognized as Israel's capital under any future peace arrangements. But Jerusalem is the center of Palestinian political aspirations as well. Therefore, a peaceful Jerusalem should remain a unified city, with guaranteed freedom of worship and access, and political arrangements should be found that reflect the nature of the city's population. Such a Jerusalem, holy to three great religions, could be a meeting place for Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

A vision of a desirable economic future is also needed as a complement to this political framework. Certainly the parties to the conflict should know that serious steps toward peace will be supported by the United States, as well as by others in the international community. They should also recognize that a major benefit of peace will be the availability of resources for domestic purposes that are now devoted to preparations for war. To help realize the economic potential of the region at peace, a major economic development plan should be organized, with the United States, Europe, and Japan taking the lead, and with contributions from others in the Middle East as well. Talk of a "Marshall Plan" for the Middle East in the absence of peace has thus far been little more than rhetoric; with peace it could become a reality.

A tragic byproduct of the wars that have swept the region in the past forty years has been the large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, both Arabs and Jews. As part of any overall settlement, their internationally recognized claims and legitimate grievances should be addressed. Those refugees who are unable to return to their homes should nonetheless be able to secure their future with generous compensation and their own political identity. Here again the international community should help.

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Conclusion

We have a relatively simple message, but if taken seriously it will involve a difficult, challenging diplomatic task. Our first point is that the Arab-Israeli conflict deserves high priority. The "peace process" needs to be activated and sustained. American leadership is essential for that to happen.

Initially, the American effort should focus on building solid foundations through dialogue with all the interested parties. For serious negotiations to begin, we believe there will be a need for international sponsorship. It will be essential to include the Soviet Union and the U.N. secretary general in the preliminary consultations and in the structuring of an acceptable international setting for negotiations. An international conference makes sense only when and if it can advance the prospects for agreement. That can only be determined through intensive talks with all of the concerned parties.

When negotiations begin, it will be necessary to have in mind an attainable near-term target, as well as an idea of the process for moving from interim agreements to a final settlement. We believe the initial focus of peacemaking should be on transitional arrangements, both for the West Bank and Gaza, and for the Golan Heights. Such arrangements should help to create the political climate in which formal peace treaties can eventually be negotiated.

We also believe the United States is uniquely positioned to articulate a future vision of how Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arab parties can attain their rights to security and to self-determination through a political formula based on ideas of peaceful interchange and political pluralism, and the exchange of "territory for peace" as envisaged in U.N. Resolution 242. Concepts of federation or confederation, respect for minority rights, economic development, and principles of democratic governance are all potential building blocks for a just, lasting, and genuine peace settlement.

Finally, we want to emphasize that the details of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement should not be dictated by the United States or any other outside party. Working out the terms of an agreement is up to the parties who will have to live with the results of negotiations. It is the durability of any agreement that should be foremost in the minds of Americans. U.S. interests, we have no doubt, will be well served by widening the scope of Arab-Israeli peace. How that is done is less important than that it be done, and that the process start soon.

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130. **SPECIFIC AMERICAN STEPS**

131. Beyond these general principles that should guide the conduct of American diplomacy in the next administration, there are some specific steps which will need to be considered at an early stage:

132. The president should send his secretary of state on an early visit to the Middle East to assess personally whether the conditions are ripe for making the Arab-Israeli peace process a high priority and to send the signal that the United States remains interested in seeking a settlement.

133. If the conditions are ripe for high level involvement, then the president and the secretary of state will need to be directly involved. If, as is more likely, a conditioning process needs to be initiated, then the president should consider appointing a special presidential envoy to oversee this process. The envoy will need to have the ear of the president, the confidence of the secretary of state, the trust of our regional partners and the support of key domestic constituencies. He or she will also need to be able to command the support of the bureaucracy. And given the character of the assignment -- encouraging a process rather than producing a breakthrough -- the envoy will need to be realistic about the possibilities for any grand solution.

134. The next president should also consider an emergency supplemental of $100 million for economic development in the territories to enable the Palestinians to take advantage of economic liberalization measures which Israel might implement as part of this process and to help relieve the plight of the refugees there. The territories are small in size and population -- a relatively small amount of aid can have a major impact.

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135. The secretary of state and/or the presidential envoy should undertake an effort to garner the support of European allies, Japan and the moderate Arab world behind this process. They may be prepared to drop their incessant calls for an international conference once they see that the U.S. is committed to an alternative process. But they will also need to be encouraged to offer their political and economic support for this process.

they support a negotiation or once again get left on the sidelines of the region's diplomacy. Only a unilateral U.S. initiative that gets some initial agreement among the local parties on the substance of a negotiation will confront Moscow with such a choice.

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אלישע

אני מניח שהיה שיר, לא נכון, בברלה.

1. ראשית הוא מוזר. אינני יודע מה הדגים לקהל כמה שהפגישה היה נכון. אין נסיון לי שמי מיקרופון הרגל איך בעולם מלא.

2. ראשית שם אין פירון (הדגים).

3. ראמין שם הנגנים Owens Wayne בקנון המוזמנים שהם/ ראמין שקרה בינם רשם ומשכירים. קשה לי אבוקם לוקחלצאת בהתאם לשירה ולשירתם הבעיה.

טובה.