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# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

משרד ראש

יוסף מדיני

אורה

4/8/89 - 2/8/89

תיק מס'

3

מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פנימי: א-4610/3

מזהה פריט: R00036g

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תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

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להלן תבואה מאת הוועדה-הלאומית, 4.8.89.

מלך

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תפוצה: 2

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THE WHITE HOUSE/WASHINGTON, DC/REGULAR BRIEFING/BRIEFERS:  
MARLIN FITZWATER; MICHAEL BOSKIN, CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF  
ECONOMIC ADVISORS/FRIDAY, AUGUST 4, 1989

Q Marlin, given the nature of the events in the Middle East over the last 24 hours, is the Justice Department going to drop the attempt to extradite over there or is --

MR. FITZWATER: There is no attempt to extradite.

Q I thought there was.

MR. FITZWATER: No. No charges have been filed. You don't extradite until there's charges.

Q There's no criminal investigation of any kind on our part?

MR. FITZWATER: I'm not aware of anything that's been done at this point.

John?

Q Yesterday you said they were exploring the possibility of doing it.

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I have been reminded since then that I should not have said that, because that refers to internal deliberations of the Justice Department, which they don't discuss. But there have been -- publicly, there have been no charges and no extradition.

Q Isn't this a little bit beyond, though, an internal matter of the Justice Department, as far as --

MR. FITZWATER: No.

Q -- the deliberations there go, and --

MR. FITZWATER: There are hundreds of investigations going on there and they never comment on them and I should not have yesterday.

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STAFF: What he said was, if he had, he would not be saying it here.

MR. FITZWATER: Yeah, but he -- oh, get me the transcript, will you?

Well, in that case, I will say that he did not make final decisions, and you can attribute it to me. Now, let's see what the President said here. Um -- (pause) -- where is it, Bill? Halfway down the line here.

"Question: Have you made a decision to take military action if another American hostage is killed?

"The President: I wouldn't. If I had made such a decision," which I think you can safely interpret to mean that he had not --

Q Tell me --

MR. FITZWATER: All right. Well then, I'm telling you he had not -- "I expect this would be the last place I'd be talking about it." I talked to the President about this very question before he came out. I know what he intended to say, I know what he said, and I know what the truth is. And he had not.

Q Well, when you get into the question of what a final decision is, has he -- did he make a tentative decision to strike, and just waiting to put a signature on paper?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't intend to engage in that discussion. We don't discuss --

Q (Off mike.)

MR. FITZWATER: Because we don't discuss military options, and it serves no purpose for us to do it. Terry?

Q Have targets been identified, though?

MR. FITZWATER: We don't discuss military planning.

David?

Q Marlin, can you tell us, though, without discussing the planning, was there a debate internally about the wisdom of this idea of choosing these targets, or was the President essentially sitting at a table where everybody indicated as a concept, this is a good idea. He led us to believe in the photo op the other day that the targets were so amorphous and so forth that it would be very difficult. I just wonder if there had been a consensus or if there was division?

MR. FITZWATER: The President had three meetings with his security advisors in three days, discussed a number of issues,

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MARLIN FITZWATER; MICHAEL BOSKIN, CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF  
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MR. FITZWATER: It means that, as we have said before, we think it's likely that he's dead, but we still do not have confirmed evidence that he is; and therefore we maintain that basic presumption, yes.

Tom?

Q Marlin, at this point, does the White House feel like it's gone beyond the stage of simply staying off threatened executions, and is now at a point in process where it's moving toward hostage release?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we are hopeful that that is the process -- direction that we're in. But it is very difficult to say. The -- it certainly is encouraging, in terms of the freeze of the sentence against the hostage that occurred yesterday, Cicippio. It is encouraging that the Red Cross is interested in helping facilitate a release of some sort, and that we have these words from the new leader of ElranF. But -- and I think those do point to a good direction, but on the other hand, we can't give it much more precision than that.

Q Do you feel like -- (Inaudible) -- how you deal with the 48-hour execution deadline, that sort of thing?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we have, in that sense. On the other hand, there still is a threat that Mr. Cicippio could be killed at any point, pending other kinds of releases regarding Elsralf.

John?

Q Marlin, should we interpret the President's comments on Rafsanjani as a signal that we might be wanting to establish direct contact with him or with the government there about the release of the hostages?

MR. FITZWATER: No, I would not interpret it that way. I think the President was expressing his hope for an improved situation; but as far as I know, we don't envision any direct contact.

Bill?

Q What would be the -- well, what are the obstacles in the way at this point of opening some sort of direct discussion with the Iranians?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, our situation remains the same it has been. We don't have direct contacts with Iran. We would have to -- we have always said we would have to see evidence of a changed

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THE WHITE HOUSE/WASHINGTON, DC/REGULAR BRIEFING/BRIEFERS:  
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policy on their part, and we want to encourage that. But at this point, we don't see any evidence of change.

Q Would the United States be --

MR. FITZWATER: We've also said the hostages -- that the release of the hostages is the first and best way to demonstrate a changed attitude, and that remains the same.

Q Would -- I'm trying to figure out what it would take to bring the two sides together, possibly, so that we -- in order to work for --

MR. FITZWATER: I can't speculate any further than that, other than the release of --

Q (Off-mike) -- dialogue, if the prospect of release of the hostages was at the other end of it?

MR. FITZWATER: We aren't willing to make those kinds of speculative commitments, but we have always said the release of the hostage would create the kind of environment where we might be able to see some other kinds of opportunities.

Q Marlin, have there been any private communications through the third channels to back up public, somewhat encouraging words of Rafsanjani? Is the President planning any further diplomatic initiative himself today -- phone calls, the rest, if you can tell us about it?

MR. FITZWATER: To take those in reverse order, I'm not aware of any new efforts by the President. There have been any number of exchanges of information with Iran through other parties during the last several days. The diplomatic process that was set in motion the last few days continues, and I urge that you not think of things having stopped yesterday afternoon or this morning. But there still are a lot of people talking to a lot of people in the region about how to get the hostages out, about the relationships of the United States to the hostage situation and to other countries in the region. So there is a considerable amount of diplomatic activity that's still going on which the President is directing in terms of monitoring it and keeping reports on it. I mean, it was available to make directional changes at any point, and we just have to wait and see how those progress.

Q In this any number of exchanges with Iran, have there been similarly hopeful or encouraging signs?

MR. FITZWATER: Similarly -- similar to Rafsanjani's statement? I don't think there's anything privately that has approached the encouraging level of the public statement he has made. Here again, please keep in mind that the principal method of communication is through the news media, that the Hezbollah and Iranians quite often use that. I saw a comment this morning someone

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THE WHITE HOUSE/WASHINGTON, DC/REGULAR BRIEFING/BRIEFERS:  
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made that they learn more from the news media from the government. And that is to be expected. That's where the government learns a good deal of what these countries' attitudes are, because they tend to use their state-run radio systems for that purpose.

Julia?

Q Marlin, could you talk about who gets responsibility or credit for the assistance this time? Is -- does ESyriaF get some of it, does the ESoviet UnionF share of it? And how about Israel?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we want to give credit for everybody at this point, and in fact we believe everybody deserves some of the credit. We certainly cannot pinpoint, even if we wanted --

Q -- (Off-mike) -- too much credit --

MR. FITZWATER: We cannot pinpoint, even if we wanted to, some individual or some one move that's responsible for the progress made so far.

Q Doesn't Syria get some of the credit, though?

MR. FITZWATER: Everybody gets some credit.

Q Marlin, the --

MR. FITZWATER: Let's go over here. Yes, Linda.

Q You were talking about the public exchanges with Iran as opposed to what you all are hearing through channels. Is it still very conflicting? Do you still not trust what you're hearing publicly from Rafsanjani?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we're always skeptical of what we hear. The short answer is yes. Pat?

Q Rafsanjani has only been president for a day. What kind of control or power does he really exercise in Iran? We've heard so much over the years about all the factions and --

MR. FITZWATER: I can't give you that kind of analysis, Pat. I don't know. Brit?

Q Marlin, why do the President's repeated and, for him, quite emotional expressions of concern for the hostages and their families, which were -- which occurred again in the Oval Office today, when he was talking about Mr. Cicippio and his wonderful family up in Pennsylvania and how, despite the warnings, that he was entitled to the President's concern and all these other people's concern and so forth -- why should we not conclude that once again we have a United States policy toward the Middle East, and particularly toward the situation there, which is purely or almost totally hostage-driven?

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THE WHITE HOUSE/WASHINGTON, DC/REGULAR BRIEFING/BRIEFERS:  
MARLIN FITZWATER; MICHAEL BOSKIN, CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF  
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MR. FITZWATER: The -- well, I would make two points. One is that the President and a number of us have been through these kinds of episodes before. We have been through the Iran-contra situation. We have experienced the tugs at the heartstrings that can occur in these kinds of situations. And I think everyone is cautious not to let their emotions become a directing force. And similarly, we want to be sensitive. I know that -- I believe the EState Department ha

done a good job in maintaining liaison with the families, and I know that President Bush has been very insistent that the State Department increase that activity and be as responsive to them as possible.

As is always the case in these kinds of incidents, you never have as much information as families want or deserve. But nevertheless, everyone is conscious of the need to be sensitive and responsive but, at the same token, not -- but, by the same token, not to let that rule the policy deliberations.

Secondly, I don't believe that is the major driving factor. The -- certainly the situation is driven by the hostages and the reality that they create of American citizens in trouble and our long tradition of Ehuman rightsF concerns being at stake. America is a compassionate country, and we have preached that compassionate policy to countries around the world. And I believe that will continue to be a guiding policy of this country.

In addition, there are -- there are matters here in terms of relations with Iran, with Syria, with other countries in the Middle East. There are policy considerations with regard to the peace process, relations with Israel. And all of these forces come to play in terms of guiding our deliberations during this time. So, I don't think it's led by that factor.

Nick?

Q You've characterized Rafsanjani's statement this morning as "encouraging." But it comes with a condition, and that is that the United States place pressure on Israel for the release of the people that it holds. Now, doesn't that imply that Rafsanjani is proposing a negotiation for the release of the hostages, that is something that we have said we won't do?

MR. FITZWATER: It implies that we should be skeptical, as I said we have always been in the past, that we have a long history of discussions and statements related to Iran that always seem to end up in demands or pleas of one kind or another. So, we are mindful of that; you're absolutely right. And that's why the President is fairly cautious in saying we're encouraged. And we pursue this possibility, but we keep our eyes open.

Michael?

Q Are we being kept informed, either voluntarily or at our

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THE WHITE HOUSE/WASHINGTON, DC/REGULAR BRIEFING/BRIEFERS:  
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request, by the Israelis of the progress, whatever, on this swap they may be working on? And along with that, do we talk with -- did the -- when the President made his personal phone calls, did he make any personal phone calls to anyone in Israel?

MR. FITZWATER: No calls to Israel. We are in constant contact with them through the State Department. Of course, Assistant Secretary Kelley is there now. So, there is continuous deliberation.

Peter?

Q Marlin, could you -- going back to what you said a little while ago about the Red Cross, could you elaborate on what that -- their involvement is at this point, including who they have contacted?

MR. FITZWATER: We don't have a lot of information. The press reports indicate that the

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THE WHITE HOUSE/WASHINGTON, DC/REGULAR BRIEFING/BRIEFERS:  
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Red Cross is involved in at least looking at the situation. We have seen the Red Cross referred to by a number of other countries, including Iran, over the last several days. I don't know how definitive our knowledge is. I do not have very much on what they are doing. But, obviously, we have always said we are willing to help anyone who can seek the release of hostages and talk to anyone and go to any lengths to get their release. And if the Red Cross can be helpful, we certainly would be supportive.

Q So is the administration in touch with them? Has the subject of American hostages --

MR. FITZWATER: I don't know. I'd have to check and see that, Peter. I did talk briefly with the General about it, but there's some uncertainty about our contacts.

Mark?

Q Marlin, what is your response to Rafsanjani's specific demands that the pressure be placed on Israel?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we have not commented directly on that aspect of it because it does relate to Israel and not directly to us. We continue to watch the situation, and our general response is we believe in the unconditional release of all the hostages.

Leo?

Q In terms of gaining the release of the hostages, is the administration willing to consider some reciprocal US moves as part of a wider solution, which is the kind of a proposal that Rafsanjani seems to be hinting at?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, like what? What do you mean?

Q Well, in terms of normalization of relations, freeing of assets -- if not simultaneously, sequentially. Obviously you'll want to see the hostages released first. But are you willing to consider some signals to Iran that if, in fact, the hostages are released, A, B, and C could follow?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we aren't -- we can't speculate on future moves like that, Leo, and talk about it in terms of what we would do and what we would say and so forth. But we make the opening step in saying that -- that it's encouraging and we hope it's productive. And we'll have to see where it leads.

Q That's why I was asking the question, because when you describe Rafsanjani's statement as "encouraging", his statement does open the way for something -- a wider package than just release of

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THE WHITE HOUSE/WASHINGTON, DC/REGULAR BRIEFING/BRIEFERS:  
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the hostages. To the extent that you look at his statement favorably, it would seem to suggest that you, too, would be willing to go down that road.

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we just have to wait and see. We just aren't willing to speculate in advance.

John?

Q Well isn't it that -- one further question --

MR. FITZWATER: Whoops! Leo's still here.

Q Some time ago the President himself, I believe -- as a matter of fact, in his inaugural message -- suggested that the US would be forthcoming in improving relations with Iran if the hostage situation were resolved. Now we're at a much more specific point in terms of applying that concept to the present situation. Have -- aren't you, in effect, suggesting, signaling that the US would not just stand still and leave everything to be done by Iran, but that there would be some forthcoming gestures at this end?

MR. FITZWATER: The President said good will begets good will, and that still is our belief.

Deborah?

Q Marlin, two questions. First, yesterday you cautioned us not to expect any changes in ship movements. Could you update that?

MR. FITZWATER: No.

Q In other words, we're at the same place? Don't expect any quick changes in the movement of ships and where they're going?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't believe I commented on that. I don't know where the ships are going.

Q No, that's exactly what you said.

Q No, you said don't expect any quick --

Q Don't expect any quick changes in the status of the ships -- (off mike) --

MR. FITZWATER: Oh, okay. All right, well, if I said that, I stand behind it. (Laughter.) Now what's the question?

Q What's the status today?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't know. I'd refer you to the Pentagon.

Q (Off mike)--- b-i-i-i-i-g ships --

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Q Could you characterize the level of diplomatic activity today as compared to yesterday afternoon? Is the pressure still on as much?

MR. FITZWATER: Yes, I -- I -- that's one of the points I wanted to make, that there still is a lot of activity going on in terms of -- in terms of communications between various countries, between foreign ministers, ambassadors. I don't anticipate heads-of-state calls, but that certainly is a possibility. But we continue to pursue all these diplomatic moves.

Q Following-up on the calls, you said earlier that he has not been calling Israel. Why not Israel if he's been making so many calls, which include the heads of -- (inaudible).

MR. FITZWATER: Because we've had high-level and continuous contacts with Israel. Assistant Secretary Kelly is there; our ambassador is there. There have been continuous talks. Secretary Baker has talked to Arens and others. So there have been continuous discussions there at various levels.

Q So -- so are you saying that there is no -- this has no significance as far as the United States saying to Israel, "Hey, you guys didn't consult us when you took Obeid, and so we're not going to be quite as close right now?"

MR. FITZWATER: We are close. We're very close. We're discussing it constantly at all levels. But your question has no significance -- (laughing lightly) -- yeah, I mean --

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| 22 - כסח"ן   | עתונות, ניו יורק                                  | מאת:              |

**ON MY MIND**  
A. M. Rosenthal

## The Next Terrorist Crisis

WASHINGTON

**T**he Israelis did not kidnap the sheik. They captured him.

The difference is not a matter of semantics but of the most profound political and moral importance. It is the difference between terrorism and antiterrorism.

For a long time to come, it will be remembered around the world that when the Bush Administration faced its first crisis, its immediate reaction was to act as if it could not recognize that difference.

For years, Sheik Abdul Karim Obeld directed the very band of killers that specialized in kidnapping, torturing and murdering innocent foreign bystanders, mostly American, to help it achieve its political goals.

That is the classical definition of terrorism.

Finally the Israelis were able to strike back at the sheik and his Hezbollah terrorists by sending in a commando force to capture him. They wanted to free his victims, Israeli and foreign, and to put a plain price on future kidnapping, the bill to be presented to the terrorist chiefs.

That is antiterrorism.

Do we really have to debate, define and discuss terrorism and antiterrorism? It is staggering that we even have to talk about it after all these years.

Now, the terrorists have postponed the murder of one more American. There are reports the United States sent a warning that the terrorist bases would be attacked.

But terrorism is too valuable a weapon for the death squads and their paymasters to give up until they know the U.S. has a consistent policy of fighting it wherever and whenever it appears — even without the catalyst of

How will  
the U.S.  
meet it —  
and the  
one after?

NY Times  
Aug 4, 89

מל"ח מצפ"א הסברה  
יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ  
יועץ תקשורת לשתכ"ס  
לע"מ דו"צ  
קש"ח מזכיר הממשלה  
עתונות ניו יורק

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לשם השוואה

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an Israeli commando raid. This country has no such policy now.

So one day the terrorists will strike again, another kidnapping, another plane blown up in flight.

President Bush himself raised the question of the basic American attitude toward terrorism. He implied at the beginning of the crisis that all "kidnappings" were the same. He went on to call for the immediate release of "all, all" of the "hostages."

Then Senator Robert Dole contemptuously denounced Israel for "freelancing." It was an exhibition of tight-lipped fury that disgusted many of his friends around the country who happen to hope well for Israel. It put a knowing smirk on the faces of his detractors, a loud "I told you so."

Suddenly Israel becomes target and villain. Israel — not the sheik, not his Iranian paymasters or the Syrians. The arms he gets go through Syria. His bands live and train in Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon.

Israel did what the United States did when it could — reached out to grab a terrorist careless enough to get within grabbing reach.

This is a statement by an American official in 1985:

"We need to extend the reach of U.S. laws to those who would kidnap or murder U.S. citizens overseas. . . .

"This last year we have acted as never before — in seeking extradition of the Achille Lauro hijackers from Italy and of the T.W.A. hijackers from Lebanon and putting a price on the head of the P.L.O. leader of the Achille Lauro hijacking. And, of course, in October U.S. Navy planes forced out of the air a [Egyptian] jet carrying the murderers of Leon Klinghoffer."

That statement was made by George Bush, then Vice President of the United States and in charge of its antiterrorist activities.

What happened to George Bush?

The Presidency happened — the Presidency and all its responsibilities, stresses and hard choices. We can sympathize with a President. But we can still expect him to remember today what he said yesterday.

Next month, next year — another crisis until the President adopts a consistent antiterrorist policy and strategy, lets the world know what it is and stands by it.

Now there is no one in Washington or anywhere else who can predict what Mr. Bush will do the next time.

Will he act swiftly or wait while the hostages continue to waste away, as did his predecessors? If Israel sees a chance to take action against terrorism again, will it hesitate too long itself, out of insecurity in the steadfastness of an American President?

Will President Bush be willing to stand up now and say what Vice President Bush had to say about going after terrorists?

President Bush need not announce tactical moves in advance. But terrorism will not end until his enemies know he can be counted on to fight against them — and his allies know he can be counted on to fight alongside them.

It is the not knowing that brings about the taking of hostages, their murder, and one crisis following another. □



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Wall St Journal - Aug 4 '89

**'Out of Respect...'**

Yesterday's announcement by Hezbollah that it had, in effect, suspended the execution of Joseph Cicippio was phrased in a way that might be of future interest to Americans concerned about how to fight terrorism.

"Out of respect for the intervention by the parties and states with whom America pleaded to mediate and stop the execution, we declare the freezing of the death sentence and its substitution with an initiative," said the Hezbollah statement. In other words, there are some people in the world for whom the terrorists have respect. The way to bring pressure on terrorists is to bring pressure on their masters.

Iran obviously was first choice. In the language of diplomatic niceties, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler yesterday said, "We have been in touch with Iran through a variety of channels and at this time have no reason to believe that Iran is not dealing with this matter in a serious way."

More to the point, the Associated Press quoted an anonymous administration official Wednesday to the effect that Iran had been told: "If anything happens to the hostages we hold you responsible."

In other words, it may be hard to find out where terrorists are hiding—although we are not convinced that it is impossible—but it is always possible to know the address of a sponsoring government. Moammar Gadhafi learned that lesson when he narrowly escaped U.S. Air Force F-111s three years ago.

In the case of the Hezbollah, there are most likely several governments

with some degree of responsibility. Certainly the long, bloody arm of Iran's late ruler, the Ayatollah Khomeini, manipulated the Hezbollah fanatics. But they also were operating from territory controlled, if you can call it that, by another shadowy character, Hafez al-Assad of Syria. And Syria is a client state of the Soviet Union, which even under *glasnost* has not forsworn the employment of KGB intrigues to further its intricate global ambitions.

Ms. Tutwiler indicated that these other two players also were consulted in U.S. diplomatic efforts to save Mr. Cicippio. What motives each might have to cooperate are subject to speculation. Soviet overtures to the West are founded heavily on its own deep economic problems, for example. But Iran, at least, probably has some understanding of the potential cost of noncooperation, given the enmity it has earned in such generous quantities from the American people and government.

So the terrorists are showing some "respect." The crisis isn't over, as presidential spokesman Martin Ritzwater made clear yesterday. The terrorists still are demanding that the Israelis release their top fanatic, Abdul Karim Obeld, and now have proposed to give a longer list of names to the Red Cross. Maybe they are in a mood to deal. Maybe they are not. But if they are not, their friends in Tehran and elsewhere should keep in mind that states can be held responsible for the forces they unleash on the world. Sometimes the calling to account is less than pleasant.



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## The Editorial Notebook

# Let Viewers Judge 'Days of Rage'

Should public television broadcast "Days of Rage: The Young Palestinians"? It should indeed. Most viewers will readily sense the pro-Palestinian sympathies of its producer, Jo Franklin-Trout. Yet even in the current turmoil over terrorism, Americans need to listen to the documentary's aggrieved voices. They are part of the problem.

This 90-minute film on the West Bank uprising is justifiably faulted for its skewed history and interviews with unrepresentative Israelis, who tend to be either ranting settlers or ardent peaceniks. Ms. Franklin-Trout's softball questioning of Palestinians seems an invitation to indict Israeli repression; never once does she refer to sins of violence by Palestinians.

And the film is manipulative, as cameras dwell relentlessly on wounded children and grieving mothers.

Yet it insults the intelligence of viewers to suggest, as some have, that they need protection from a film whose bias is obvious. Public television has broadcast without fuss deeply felt documentaries on British rule in Northern Ireland and on racism in South Africa. Courageously, the public system in 1980 rebuffed a State Department protest — and horrified objections by Mobil Oil — in airing "Death of a Princess," a "dramatized documentary" on the execution for adultery of a Saudi princess.

WNET is due to present "Days of Rage" on Sept. 6, with a one-hour "wraparound," meaning the film will be preceded and followed by a critical discussion. This may seem excessively cautious. But it is better than total rejection of the documentary by WNYC, whose program di-

## Grown-Up Audiences Can Account for Bias

rector likened it to Leni Riefenstahl's notorious paean to Hitlerism, "Triumph of the Will." It's hard to see a likeness between that film of diabolic brilliance exalting a supposed master race and Ms. Franklin-Trout's home-movie-quality interviews with Palestinians.

By all means show her film, and let it stir argument. There's nothing fake about the problem depicted. Every foreign journalist who visits the West Bank hears variations of the same stories: homes blown up to punish whole families, rubber bullets that maim on impact, a criminal justice system that can jail without rudimentary safeguards, the shuttered schools and curfewed houses that abet extremism.

It is to Israel's credit that Ms. Franklin-Trout could make this critical film about a 20-month uprising against a 22-year occupation. Israelis themselves anguish over a protracted crackdown that can turn pain and imprisonment into routinized statistics. A film trying to endow those numbers with some humanity does not deserve comparison to Nazi propaganda.

The same negative reflexes led Joseph Papp to cancel a New York Public Theater performance of a Palestinian play, "The Story of Kufur Shamma," which deals poignantly and poetically with homelessness. Fortunately, the play was performed at the Dance Theater Workshop last week, and Mr. Papp has had second thoughts: he plans to ask both Israeli and Palestinian groups to his theaters. Americans have brains enough to judge what is compelling in the Palestinian case.

KARLE MEYER

Aug 10  
NY Times - Aug 4, 89

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# Make the Terrorists

By Barry Rubin

JERUSALEM

**A**fter the apparent murder of Lieut. Col. William Higgins and the threats to execute hostage Joseph Cicippio, America again has to decide whether to appease, ignore or fight terrorism. The current approach of changing the nation's policy with each headline not only fails to deter terrorism but actively encourages it.

Clearly, nothing is gained by attacking those (in this case Israel) who are battling terrorism. Diverting attention from the terrorists' guilt and dividing America from Israel are precisely the results the murderers seek. To follow that path would give them a propaganda and political victory that would only encourage further acts of terrorism.

Unfortunately, the right approach to combating terrorism is not nearly as obvious. So far, the U.S. has yet to get it right.

The pattern is by now familiar — terrorists act, Washington reacts and, in the end, the U.S. swears to do it differently next time.

After the Iran hostage crisis, we vowed never again to be humiliated. Last year, after the Iran arms deal was revealed, Americans learned the folly of the White House trying to obtain the release of American hostages in Lebanon as soon as possible and at any price. After that, we were determined to get tough on terrorism.

But this wouldn't be the first time the U.S. has taken a tough stand.

Barry Rubin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is author of "Istanbul Intrigues."

## Pay

NY Times  
Aug 4, 89



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American planes "kidnapped" an Egyptian plane carrying the terrorists who hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise ship and murdered an American in 1985.

The U.S. military bombed Libya in retaliation for a Libyan-backed terrorist attack in Berlin that killed an American soldier. Although the Libyans engineered the murder of two hostages in Lebanon as retaliation, their leader, Muammar el-Qaddafi,

## Bush is right to consider retaliating.

was intimidated and abstained from terrorism for more than two years. American leaders pointed to this as an example of how counter-terrorist strikes could work.

The U.S. pressed West Germany and Greece to extradite captured terrorists who had killed Americans. Both countries resisted, fearing for their own people. Greece freed another terrorist who murdered a little girl in a Rome synagogue.

In each case, the U.S. ignored the concerns of European states that their citizens would be taken hostage or killed. These worries were seen as cowardly and inviting further terrorist attack.

Most recently, the U.S. approach has been to ignore terrorism, to say that the hostages' plight is a tragic one but there is not much that can be done. At times, this is a sensible tactic. Yet, it also presents problems.

For example, investigators now be-

lieve they have clear evidence that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command was responsible for the bombing of an American airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, last December. There is also mounting evidence that Iran was directly involved in the attack.

But this story will not soon be publicly told, at least not by U.S. officials. If it were, then Washington would have to do something about it.

The Bush Administration is not likely to stage a retaliatory attack on Syria or Iran. It would be too politically costly abroad and too controversial at home. Besides, an attack might fail or have high casualties.

Ignoring terrorism thus not only fails to deter attacks but also cripples the U.S. ability to penalize either the murderers or their sponsors.

That leaves retaliation, the only method that has proven effective in the past. Indeed, if Hezbollah or its backers thought the U.S. would retaliate, they never would have dared to kill Colonel Higgins — if he was in fact murdered in late July.

President Bush, who is said to be threatening to retaliate if the second hostage execution is carried out, has several options. He can support those who are fighting terrorism; press for effective economic sanctions, to which Iran and Syria are now quite vulnerable; arrest terrorists, extradite them and try them for their crimes; and take judicious military action, though stopping short of an outright attack on Syria or Iran.

Such a counter-terrorist policy would not only deter future hostage-taking and violence but would also help ease the anger that all Americans feel about terrorist attacks. □



*NY Times - Aug 4, 89*

# White House Reaffirms Anti-Terrorist Policy While Taking Steps to Work Around It

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 3 — Faced with a crisis in the Middle East, the Bush Administration today reaffirmed the American policy of not negotiating with terrorists, even as it took steps to get around that prohibition in practice.

The policy was most clearly articulated in 1986 by the Task Force on Combating Terrorism, headed by George Bush, who was then Vice President. But for President Bush, as for some of his predecessors, the temptation and the perceived need to deal indirectly with hostage-takers has become overwhelming.

The United States, through intermediaries like Switzerland and Japan, has urged Iran to obtain the release of American hostages held by Shiite Muslim groups in Lebanon, and Administration officials said Washington had hinted simultaneously that Teheran might be rewarded for its efforts.

In the past, the United States has urged other countries to follow its

policy of making no deals with or concessions to terrorists. But this week, when Israel told the United States of its proposal to negotiate an exchange of Shiite prisoners for Israeli soldiers and foreign hostages in Lebanon, Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d delivered a deliberately ambiguous response, saying, "The United States can neither concur in, nor object to, the proposed action."

## Code Words and Nuanced Policy

While such an exchange would have violated American policy if it had been undertaken by the United States, the Bush Administration said that Israel, as a sovereign country, was free to pursue a different policy. The United States' failure to object has led to some confusion about the American policy.

There was already substantial confusion because of the Iran-contra affair, in which the Reagan Administration sent weapons to Iran in a desperate effort to gain the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Mr. Bush said in 1986 that he supported President Rea-

gan's efforts to "open a channel to Iran" by selling weapons to Teheran. The United States has often criticized Iran for supporting terrorists, and was thrown into a crisis when Iranians seized hostages at the American Embassy in Teheran in 1979.

Clayton E. McManaway Jr., who retired in April as associate coordinator of the American counterterrorism program, said today that the Bush Administration's "overall handling of the latest crisis has been good."

But he said: "There is an understandable tendency to use simple code words for a nuanced policy. When the U.S. says, 'We will not negotiate,' that gives people the wrong impression, suggesting that we won't talk. In fact, under U.S. policy as I understand it, we will talk to anyone, but won't make concessions."

## Talking and Negotiating

L. Paul Bremer, former chief of the State Department's counterterrorism program, said there was "an important distinction" between talking and

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negotiating with terrorists. "We will always talk to anybody about the welfare of American hostages, but we will not negotiate because that implies making concessions," he said.

Margaret D. Tutwiler, the State Department spokeswoman, acknowledged the confusion over American policy when she said today that "an incorrect construction has been put on the overall message" from the United States to Israel. "Our statement was balanced on purpose to explain why we could not take a position" for or against the proposed exchange of prisoners and hostages, she said.

The latest crisis began Friday when Israeli commandos abducted a leader of the Iranian sponsored Party of God, Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid, from his home in southern Lebanon.

#### Clear and Consistent Policy

On Monday, a terrorist group linked to the Party of God said it had hanged an American hostage in revenge for the abduction. Another Shiite group threatened to kill a second American

hostage, Joseph James Cicippio, the acting comptroller of the American University of Beirut, if Israel did not release the sheik.

Mr. McManaway said, "It's disturbing that there seems to be a growing tendency to allow a perception of parallelism between Sheik Obeid, a proven terrorist, and Cicippio, an innocent schoolteacher."

Israel says Sheik Obeid was involved in the 1988 kidnapping of Lieut. Col. William R. Higgins of the United States Marines, the hostage reported to have been hanged on Monday.

Mr. Bremer said it was important for the United States to be clear and consistent in its policy toward terrorism because two million Americans live overseas, many of them in "places that are very dangerous."

#### Israel's Anti-Terrorist Stance

In 1981, when President Reagan welcomed home 52 Americans who had been held captive in Iran, he said that "our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution" against interna-

tional terrorists.

But American officials have often refrained from imposing such retribution, because they could not identify the terrorists with certainty or could not strike back without harming innocent civilians. "Our principles of justice will not permit random retaliation against groups or countries," said the study group headed by Mr. Bush.

Israel is known for having a firm policy against terrorism and has often retaliated against those responsible for terrorist attacks. But in the current hostage crisis, the United States has portrayed itself as having a tougher policy than Israel, because Washington says it will not negotiate with terrorists.

Israeli officials find the Bush Administration's position paradoxical, inasmuch as they have been trying unsuccessfully for seven months to persuade the United States to cut off talks with leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization linked to terrorist acts in the past.



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Yasir Arafat, left, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, with President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia at the opening session of the Palestinian congress yesterday in Tunis.

## Arafat to Continue Diplomatic Effort in Mideast

By YOUSSEF M. IBRAHIM

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Aug. 3 — Yasir Arafat, the Palestine Liberation Organization chairman, said at a Palestinian congress in Tunis today that the P.L.O. would continue its recent diplomatic efforts to reach a Middle East settlement.

"There is no going back on the course that Palestinians have taken," Mr. Arafat was reported to have told 1,000 delegates of the Fatah movement, the largest group in the P.L.O., which is holding its first congress in nine years.

Mr. Arafat comments reaffirming his commitment to a peaceful process to gain an independent Palestinian state followed expressions of bitter disappointment by Mr. Arafat and other Palestinians toward the United States. In several recent interviews, Mr. Arafat accused the United States of delaying peaceful efforts to give Israel time to crush the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories.

Younger Palestinians in Fatah and some leaders of the 20-month uprising have said the P.L.O. gave too many concessions to Israel without bearing fruit for the Palestinians. Those included the renunciation of terrorism and the recognition of Israel's right to exist, which Mr. Arafat pledged last

### The leader says 'There is no going back.'

year to get the United States to drop its ban on contacts with the P.L.O.

Arafat Criticizes U.S.

Mr. Arafat asserted today that the P.L.O.'s peaceful gestures had not been matched with good will from the Americans, who he said had failed to press Israel to agree to talks with the P.L.O.

"We have the right to ask the United States administration and President how long they will continue to deny our people's right to self-determination," Mr. Arafat said. "And how long the suffering of my people will go on and how many other wars must be fought for the region to break out of the cycle of blood."

Mr. Arafat reiterated what he said at a Palestine National Council meeting last year: that the uprising against Israeli occupation has begun a "new stage" in the Palestinian campaign for self-determination, one that offers more "realistic" chances for a Palestinian homeland.

Nevertheless, he said, the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza "will not stop until the conclusion of a peace treaty" and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state "with Jerusalem as its capital."

Endorsement of Arafat Expected

The opening of the five-day Fatah meeting in Tunis was somewhat overshadowed by the threats by Lebanese extremists to execute American hostages, a subject that the Fatah officials said they would discuss as part of a review of the overall situation in Lebanon, where half a million Palestinians live.

Despite the expected doubts about Mr. Arafat's peaceful overtures, senior Palestinian officials in Tunis said they expected the conference to end on Sunday with an endorsement of Mr. Arafat's line. Those policies were sanctioned in Algeria last year by a meeting of the Palestine National Council, often described as a Palestinian parliament in exile.

Mr. Arafat founded the Fatah movement some 25 years ago and has been its leader since. While other organizations grew out of it, Fatah has remained the dominant group. It largely controls the umbrella organization of the P.L.O.



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THE NEW YORK TIMES, FR

# U.S. Official Meets With Palestinians

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Aug. 3 — A group of Palestinians met with a visiting senior American official today and laid down hard-line conditions for peace negotiations with the Israelis.

Several American officials who have visited Jerusalem, including former Secretary of State George P. Shultz, have also tried to meet with Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories during the 20-month uprising. But most of all of the Palestinians refused, suggesting that the Americans meet with the Palestine Liberation Organization instead.

Today, however, 13 of the 14 Palestinians invited to meet with Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly attended. But the first thing they made clear was that they considered themselves only agents for the Palestine Liberation Organization, which officially sanctioned meetings like this last month.

Mr. Kelly, who is here on a get-acquainted visit with both Israeli and Palestinian leaders, met earlier with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and other Israeli officials.

At the start of their meeting with Mr. Kelly, the Palestinians handed him a letter that said: "We view our meeting today as part of the ongoing dialogue between the United States and the P.L.O."

"This meeting would indeed have had greater import and significance had it been preceded by official talks between yourself and P.L.O. officials," the letter added.

Palestinians attending the session said later that the language of the letter angered Mr. Kelly. They said he urged them to take advantage of the "golden opportunity" presented by Israel's peace initiative.

Mustafa Natsheh, the former deputy mayor of Hebron, said the group told

Mr. Kelly that elections in the territories "must be part of a comprehensive settlement, as a means to more, but not the target of the problem."

Palestinians described the two-hour meeting with Mr. Kelly as stormy and said he accused the group of "playing polemics" by asserting that the encounter was part of the United States dialogue with the P.L.O.

"The atmosphere wasn't friendly, but it was the frankest expression of views we've had so far," said a Palestinian participant who asked not to be identified. He said Mr. Kelly flatly told the group the United States opposes the creation of a Palestinian state.

Radwan Abu Ayyash, a journalist in the delegation, said Mr. Kelly told the group "he would not deliver us to the negotiation table, and said we have to make our own way."

## Points Made in the Letter


The Palestinians' letter also called on the United States to "demonstrate a genuine commitment" to the peace process by accepting these points:

Recognition of Palestinian "self-determination," which in Palestinian parlance means a Palestinian state.

Action by the United States to force the Israelis to withdraw from the occupied territories.

An international peace conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Equal treatment of Palestinians





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Equal treatment of Palestinians and Israelis on all matters of "independence, sovereignty, security, recognition, national rights and guarantees."

As Mr. Kelly met with the Palestinians, there was more violence in the occupied Gaza Strip. A hand grenade thrown at a passing Israeli patrol wounded three Israeli soldiers and three Palestinian civilians, army and Arab reports said. Troops opened fire after the blast, wounding more than a dozen Palestinians in the town of Khan Yunis. The Associated Press quoted hospital officials as saying.

#### Some Arab Schools Reopen

JERUSALEM, Aug. 3 (Reuters) — Israel has reopened more than 300 West Bank Arab junior high schools that have been closed for most of the 19-month Palestinian uprising.

About 69,000 Palestinian children in grades seven, eight and nine returned to 324 schools Wednesday without incident, said a spokeswoman for the Israeli military authorities on the West Bank. The move marks the second stage in a gradual reopening of West Bank schools announced on July 12.

The army allowed elementary students and 12th graders to return last month after students' parents and school principals gave assurances that the children would not demonstrate during class hours.



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But while the military option may fade for a few days, the hostage drama is opening intriguing diplomatic possibilities. One is that Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who took office just yesterday, is heeding U.S. threats that Iran would be held responsible for the death of Mr. Cicippio and is helping to restrain the terrorists. The captors said they were putting off Mr. Cicippio's killing "out of respect for the intervention by the parties and states with whom America pleaded to mediate and stop the execution."

If he is willing to restrain the terrorists, Mr. Rafsanjani could use the current crisis to demonstrate to the Bush administration that he will temper Iranian behavior. White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said the administration can't point to "any specific improvements" in relations with Iran, but he said the White House hopes the groundwork has been laid for improvements in the future.

The other diplomatic possibility is that Hezbollah and its splinter terror groups may be considering the Israeli offer of a swap in which Sheikh Abdel Karim Obeid, the captured Shiite religious leader, and other Lebanese Shites held by Israel would be released in return for all Western hostages in Lebanon. Publicly, Hezbollah has rejected the idea. But Israeli officials insist that there remains a chance for some kind of exchange.

—John J. Fialka contributed to this article.



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### הלקי רוח ב- TRI - STATE

בסיום שבוע דרמטי זה להלן נסיון לשקף תמונת המצב ב- TRI - STATE לאור שיחות שניהלתי היום עם מנכ"ל הפדרציות היהודיות בערים המרכזיות מחוץ לניו-יורק.

ככלל, התמונה העולה ממרבית המקומות, שיום שני השבוע (31.7) היה היום הקשה ביותר, באותו יום - היום בו הופצה תמונת היגיוס החלוץ ושודרה תגובת סנטור דול - היו התבטאויות רבות כנגדנו, עשרות אנשים התקשרו TALK SHOWS, התקיפו אותנו ולמצער הביעו תמיהה על פעולתה של ישראל שלא התחשבה באינטרסים אמריקניים.

החל ביום רביעי החל להשתקף שינוי משמעותי אשר בה לידי ביטוי בעתונות יותר אובייקטיבית, במאמרי מערכת מאוזנים, בפרשנויות רחוחות הוליוודיות המקומית ובקריאות טלפוניות רבות ל- TALK SHOWS, קריאות המביעות תמיכה בישראל והבנה למניעיה. בכמה מקומות תחנות רדיו קיבלו חומר ממנכ"ל הפדרציות ושידרוהו מיד.

יצוין כי ב"יום שני הקשה" - היום בו הותקפנו רבות - הושמעו באולבני קריאות אנטישמיות בתכניות רדיו ואיומים הופנו לכמה בתי - כנסת בעיר.

בהרטפורד - פעלה הפדרציה בעידוד מטלפנים רבים למשרדו של סנטור דול בגנות דבריו.

בכל רחבי קונטיקט ציינו לטובה סנטור דול (מקונטיקט) ודבריו לטובת ישראל.

לסיכום: נכון לכתיבת שורות אלו, עש"ק "שבת חזון", מתגלה ברחבי ה TRI - STATE הבנה רבה יותר, אפילו ביטויי הערכה (והערצה סמויה) להתנהגותה תוך ציפיה דרוכה לגבי הבאות והבעת תקווה לסיום מהיר ומוצלח של הפרשה.

שבת שלום!

אורי פלטי

"ציון האש" תפזי ושיה גלוקה"

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NY Post - Aug 4, '89

# Don't make Israel take the rap for the Mideastern madness

**Y**EAR in and year out, in the public discourse of this country, more nonsense is uttered about the Middle East than about any other topic with the possible exceptions of Marilyn Monroe's mind and Elvis Presley's whereabouts.

And Minority Leader Robert Dole's eruption against Israel following pro-Iranian terrorists' boasts that they murdered Lt. Col. William R. Higgins in response to Israel's arrest of one of their leaders was as nonsensical as anything said hitherto this year about Marilyn Monroe's mind.

These vile creatures have been stockpiling hostages for years. These are renegade murderers, completely beyond the province of logical discourse, legal norms and any simulacrum

BY R. EMMETT TYRRELL JR.

of decency.

It did not take the arrest of Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid by an Israeli commando unit to provoke them. Any move by any other nation on earth might have ignited their afflatus to violence.

Moreover, their hate is not owing to roving UN peace-keeping forces or American foreign policy or the existence of the State of Israel.

Without the United Nations, the United States, the State of Israel or any of the other bees that we are told bring agitation to the bonnets of these malcontents, the Middle East would still be a cauldron of bitter rivalry, warfare and that peculiar variety of depraved treachery that has

characterized the area for centuries.

The wars of Syria, Iran, and Iraq make it clear that the Middle East does not need Israel as a *casus belli*.

Would Lebanon be the Switzerland of the Levant in the absence of Israel? Would Syria, Iran and Iraq all be budding Taiwans intent on economic development without Israel around?

History and culture make the *enrages* of the Middle East what they are . . . not Israel. The bellicose writings of ancient holy men, centuries of war and clan rivalries, the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire — all conspire to make the region seethe with rage, anar-

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chy and terrorism.

The Israelis are about the only people who know how to deal with *enrages*, else Israel would have been extinguished long ago.

The key to Israeli success is that Israel has a policy for dealing with terrorists that takes precedence over any consideration for hostages. Israel hits back hard.

Those who murdered Lt. Col. Higgins are dedicated to creating in Lebanon an Islamic republic on the Iranian revolutionary model.

They are accused of having undertaken numerous attacks on Americans, including the 1983 suicidal truck bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, the 1984 bombing of the U.S.

Embassy annex and the kidnapping and incarceration of most, perhaps all, Western hostages.

Now Americans are giving themselves over to all the tiresome rodomontade about murdering innocent hostages, but by fastening our attentions on hostages we are like mice fetched by the cheese.

Better it would be to fasten our attention on the trap that holds the cheese and on those who set the trap.

The trap is paid for and the trappers are directed by Iran. Those who murdered Higgins are state-supported terrorists and America needs a policy for dealing with state-supported terror.

The peaceful aftermath of

our bombing of Libya suggests what that policy should be. When we had evidence that Libya supported violence against Americans we bombed Libya.

A bombing strike against Iran need not be an assault against populations.

Iran derives some \$11 billion in oil revenue annually. Then it directs and bankrolls terror against Americans.

Our government already has adopted plans for bombing Iran's main petroleum-processing and shipping facility, Kharg Island. It is time to execute those plans. A less prosperous Iran will have other things on its mind than terror against America — for instance, the Iraqi army along its western border.



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NY Post - Aug 4, 89

# ARE WE WITNESSING THE CARTERIZATION OF GEORGE BUSH?

BY ANDREW STEIN

**I**N 1988 George Bush wrapped himself in the mantle of Ronald Reagan's presidency and campaigned for the White House against the ghost of Jimmy Carter.

But spineless "Carterism" is the way Bush, the candidate, might well have characterized now-President Bush's response both to the brutal murder of Lt. Col. William R. Higgins and to the earlier capture by Israeli commandos of Sheikh Qabdel, a leader of the Hezbollah terrorist group.

Carter's inept handling of the Iran hostage crisis might be explained by his relative inexperience. Like other world leaders, and even many Middle East experts, he was surprised and caught off guard by the full fury of Khomeinist barbarism.

There is no such excuse for President Bush's illogical and insidious criticism of the Israeli operation, or the morally obtuse parallel he drew between that operation

## OPINION

and the seizure of American hostages by terrorists.

When Bush said that the Israeli capture of a notorious terrorist commander was a "kidnapping" and that it "doesn't help the cause of peace," the words were music to the terrorists' ears.

This was Carterite language in its purest form. It emboldened the Hezbollah fanatics, strengthening their belief that hostage-taking and other forms of terrorism may drive a wedge between the U.S. and Israel.

Bush's remarks then led others, including Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan.), to imply — incredibly — that Israel even deserves some of the blame for the execution of Col. Higgins, despite the fact that there are reasons to believe Higgins was killed months ago. In any event, no matter the date of Higgins' murder, Dole's remarks were exactly what

159 | 42 | 21

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the murderers wanted to hear from American officials.

Yet it would be just as plausible to argue that it was the president's premature criticism of Israel that encouraged the terrorists to commit murder by leading them to think Israel would be blamed for the deed.

One thing is certain: the language of moral equivalence utilized by the Bush administration in discussing the current crisis will only encourage the terrorists. In calling on "all parties who hold hostages in the Middle East to release them forthwith as a humanitarian gesture," the president places an American ally and America-hating terrorists in the same moral category.

Quite a boost for the thugs of Hezbollah.

To suggest, moreover, that both Israel and the terrorists hold "hostages" is morally perverse. The Americans in Leba-

non are indeed hostages: They were innocent non-combatants.

Sheik Obeld, on the other hand, is the leader of a terrorist organization waging a murderous war against the state of Israel. He has been linked with the slaughter of the American Marines in Lebanon and with the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut.

This is more than a question of semantics. When the Bush administration blurs such elementary moral and political distinctions, it suggests — ominously — that Washington is unable to differentiate between its friends and enemies in the Mideast.

The scapegoating of Israel indicates that the president may not have assimilated the lessons of the first hostage crisis. Let's just hope this doesn't mean that America is back on the unhappy road toward appeasement of international terrorism.

*Andrew Stein is president of the New York City Council.*



159/42/21

5/6

## MARY McGRORY

Newsday

Aug 4, 88

# Bush's Hands Are Also Tied By Terrorists

**W**HEN 57 Americans were taken hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the presidency of Jimmy Carter went into a decline. He called off the election campaign of 1980, stayed in the Rose Garden, prayed and publicly brooded.

Ronald Reagan adopted a stern public stance and vowed never to negotiate. But just seven years almost to the day of the traumatic hostage seizure, Reagan was exposed for having not only negotiated with Iran, but for having attempted to buy our people back with weapons.

The families of the hostages have been at the White House gates, crying that the country has forgotten the captives.

But if too much is made of the hostages, the maniacs who hold them will be even more convinced of their worth and will be reluctant to hand them back. Carpet bomb the spiritual or actual homeland of the perpetrators? Would Americans tolerate hundreds, maybe thousands, of deaths to ransom eight lives?

President Bush is reviewing the excruciating texts of these crises, finding out, like his predecessors, how little the leader of the world's greatest country can do. In the long haul the only hope may be to insist on peace in the Middle East and bring the whole area into some kind of stability.



Bush has expressed outrage at the sickening cruelty of the alleged execution of Lt. Col. William Higgins, and made it clear that he shares the country's rage and revulsion at the sight of Higgins, a Marine colonel serving the United Nations as a troop supervisor, twisting slowly, slowly on the gallows.

His role model may be the colonel's wife, Robin Higgins, herself a Marine officer, who is conducting herself with dignity. She lets it be known that she wishes to have the facts about her husband's death — if he is indeed dead. She would like to know what happened to him, how and when.

The when has assumed enormous political significance. The Israelis, who precipitated the crisis by kidnapping a Shiite Muslim cleric who richly deserved it, say the colonel has been dead for a year. To many Americans, notably Sen. Bob Dole, R-Kan., the Israelis did one of their flashy commando raids with no regard for the fate of Higgins.

Dole said bitterly on the Senate floor that it would be "refreshing" if Israel would let us know when she was going to pull off something that would endanger our people.


This is a crisis within the crisis. None but Dole dares criticize Israel for its wretched timing. Iran, which owns the terrorist group Hezbollah, has a new government, and its leader, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, has indicated a desire to rejoin the company of civilized nations.

The radioactivity of the issue is appreciated on Capitol Hill. On Tuesday, the subject of Oliver North's pension haunted the debate on the defense bill for six hours. Sen. Steve Symms, R-Idaho, thought the Government Accounting Office decision to deprive that recently convicted felon of his military pension should be struck down by the Senate. North is, of course, a most stunning example of what happens to those who think you can do business with hostage-takers.



159/42/21  $\frac{6}{6}$  Newsday - Aug 3, 89

THE  
**DOUG  
MARLETTE**  
EDITORIAL  
CARTOON



"I FORGET—DID WE TAKE A HOSTAGE IN RESPONSE TO AN EXECUTION IN RETALIATION FOR KIDNAPPING A TERRORIST?... OR DID WE KIDNAP A TERRORIST IN RETALIATION FOR TAKING A HOSTAGE IN RESPONSE TO AN EXECUTION?"



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2791

תאריך : 03.08.89

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חוזם: 8,2791

אל: 124/וש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 030889, זח: 1610, דח: ב, סג: 10

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סודי/בהול לבוקר

השגריר

בא'ע של בראון לקלי אמש סיפר לי פאריס שהובא לידיעתם  
שהמזכיר קיבל שדר משה'ח סוריה לפיו סוריה מפעילה השפעה  
מרסנת על האירגונים המחזיקים בבני ערובה אמריקאים  
ואחרים. פאריס אמר שההתייחסות ל"אחרים" מרמזת כנראה גם  
לחיילי צה"ל. כמובן שאין הם יודעים משך תחולתה ומידת  
יעילותה של פעולת ריסון זו. פאריס ציין גם שהאמריקאים  
הופתעו מנוסח דברי התנחומים של הסורים בעקבות רצח  
היג'נס.

פאריס אמר שהוא העביר מידע על השדר של שה'ח סוריה  
ללוברני.

בנצור

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לש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמנ, ממד,

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וושיןגטון

השגריר - לעיניו בלבד

להלן שיחות הטלפון בין שה'ח ארנס למזכיר המדינה  
שעיקרן שנמסר לי ע'י סלי מרידור ב- 1.8.89.

ארנס פתח: אנחנו עוברים זמנים לא קלים ורציתי TO TOUCH  
 BASE חשוב שנתאם עמדות. אני רוצה להביע הערכתנו לעמדת  
 ארה'ב ולעמדת הנשיא בזמן לחץ וקשיים. אנו מעריכים זאת.

בייקר: בשיחתנו, בזמנו, אמרנו אחד לשני שאנו לא אוהבים  
הפתעות. מענין, אולי יש לכם עוד הפתעות בסל.

ארנס: מבין את הערתך. אולי זה אפילו מוצדק. חשוב שנדון  
 בזה אחרי שהאבק ישקע.

חשוב TO COORDINATE POSITIONS כדי שנוכל להגן על  
 האינטרסים שלנו ונגדיל את הצ'אנס של האנשים לחיות.  
 חשוב שיחד נקבע עקרונות.

אנחנו מעוניינים ב DEAL, אבל בשום אופן אסור להכנע. שמענו  
 את דברי הנשיא התואמים את הצעתינו להחלפה כללית.

בייקר: אנחנו, ארה'ב, לא יכולים להיות ולא נהיה שותפים

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לשום DEAL. אמריקה לא תעשה DEAL עם טרוריסטים. זו המדיניות שלנו.

מזכיר את נושא אירנגייט.

אתם, ישראל, מדינה ריבונית ונכבד כל החלטה שלכם בענין זה.

ארנס : זה טוב מאוד. אני חושב שעמדתכם טובה. מה שהדאיג אנשים פה, שיהיה לחץ על ישראל להכנע לדרישות של החוטפים. חשוב שידעו שארה"ב לא תומכת בעמדות כאלה.

בייקר : רושם זה אינו נכון. הוריתי לדוברת מחמ'ד לומר חד משמעית, בתשובה לשאלה, שלא ביקשנו מישראל לשחרר את יאסר עוביד.

ארנס : הנקודה השניה שרציתי להעלות הוא שחשוב שתודגש אחריותם של הרוצחים למעשי הרצח.

בייקר : מאה אחוז. הם האחראים.

אמרתי - DON'T DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE REAL ISSUES  
ארנס : THAT IS FINE

נקודה שלישית שרציתי להעלות היא אחריותם של האירנים והסורים. חיזבאללה הם סטודנטים של חומיני ונעזרים באירנים. בני הערובה נמצאים באזור הנתון לשליטה סורית. השאלה היא איזה לחץ ניתן להפעיל על שתי מדינות אלה כדי למנוע רציחות.

בייקר : שלחנו מסרים לאירנים, לרבות דרך היפנים. מהאירנים קיבלנו חזרה תגובה חסרת ערך. התגובה של הסורים יותר חיובית ונראה שסוריה יותר מתונה. הם לפחות אומרים שהם מנסים לעזור.

ארנס : העמדה הסורית יותר מתונה להערכתנו עקב העמדה התקיפה האמריקנית ולכן אנו חושבים שלחץ נוסף יעזור. אנחנו חושבים שאם הסורים יתאמצו, אולי ישיגו תוצאות. האם יש לכם אינפורמציה על פיה הסורים מנסים באופן פעיל לאתר בני הערובה?

בייקר : אין לנו אינדיקציה לעשייה בפועל, אך גישתם נראית

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE  
SOURCE ON THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGEDLY SUSPECTED SUBJECT.

THE SOURCE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY  
RESIDING IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

THE SOURCE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY  
EMPLOYED AS A SECURITY GUARD AT THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT.

THE SOURCE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY  
RESIDING IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND IS EMPLOYED AS A SECURITY  
GUARD AT THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT.

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THE SOURCE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY  
RESIDING IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND IS EMPLOYED AS A SECURITY  
GUARD AT THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT.



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

יותר חיובית.

ארנס : אני מאמין שההתמתנות של הסורים היא תוצאה של הלחץ וחשוב שיישמר לחץ עליהם.

בייקר : אני מסכים שהשינוי הוא תוצאה של לחץ אמריקאי.  
(ניתן היה להבין מדברי בייקר שלא ראה עד לשיחה את תשובות רבין לבראון ושאל לגביהן.)

ארנס : אני חושב שרבין נתן תשובות לביל בראון והן צריכות להיות אצלכם בשעה זו.

בהמשך שוב חוזר בייקר על דבריו שנתן הוראה לא להסיט את ההתעניינות מהנושא העיקרי ומסכים שוב שאסור שתיווצר פרספציה של לחץ על ישראל.

מסכימים לשמור על קשר תכוף וכי יהיה ניתן להשתמש גם בביקור קלי להמשך המגעים, במידת הצורך.

לפי בקשת בייקר מחליטים לשמור במידת האפשר על- LOW-KEY, AND TO DOWN PLAY IT

לקראת סיום שוב מציינים שאחר שקיעת האבק יישבו וידונו כיצד למנוע REPETITION OF SUCH SITUATIONS לאחר רבע שעה התקשר בייקר מיוזמתו וביקש לדבר עם ארנס. מסר:

כי ברגע זה קיבל הודעה מה 'CHARGE' שלהם בדמשק, על פיה הסורים הודיעו שהיו בקשר עם אירן וחיזבאללה וקיבלו הודעה שהאיומים להוציא להורג את שני החטופים, הושהו  
(WERE SUSPENDED)

כמובן שאין לו הערכה לכמה זמן הדחייה. חשב שיהיה נכון לשתף את ארנס באינפורמציה זו.

ארנס : מציין לקראת סיום שיש החושבים שהיגינס למעשה לא נרצח בימים האחרונים.

איתן בנצור

בנצור.

אמ

אילן

## THE OFFER

YOUT AM BIRTHDAYS OF THE MONTH OF JANUARY

[illegible][illegible]

THESE RESULTS WERE OBTAINED BY MEANS OF THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE: A SAMPLE OF 1000 INDIVIDUALS WAS SELECTED AT RANDOM FROM THE 1980 U.S. CENSUS. THE SAMPLE WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS OF 500 EACH. THE FIRST GROUP WAS INTERVIEWED BY TELEPHONE IN 1981, AND THE SECOND GROUP WAS INTERVIEWED BY TELEPHONE IN 1982. THE INTERVIEWING PROCESS WAS CONDUCTED BY THE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AND THE RESULTS WERE ANALYZED BY THE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS.

1990年12月10日，在“世界环境与发展”首脑会议上，117个国家领导人一致通过了《世界环境与发展宣言》。宣言指出，人类只有一个地球，人类对环境的污染和破坏，已到了危及人类生存的程度。宣言强调，各国应本着“公平”和“共同但有区别的责任”原则，共同保护地球环境。宣言还提出，各国应制定和实施环境政策，防止、控制和减少污染，保护和改善环境，以保障人类健康，促进可持续发展。

LOW-LEVEL - The amount of radiation that is considered to be safe for the general public. It is the level of radiation that is considered to be safe for the general public. It is the level of radiation that is considered to be safe for the general public.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. IT IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE. IT IS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS, ELECTRONIC OR MECHANICAL, INCLUDING PHOTOCOPYING, RECORDING, OR BY ANY INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, WITHOUT PERMISSION IN WRITING FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES.

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ВНЕШНЕ-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО СССР И СОВЕТСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

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# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, שהבט

地址：上海市，020000，7000，0000，0000



# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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\* תאריך : 03.08.89 \*

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\* עותק 3 מתוך 12 \*

נכנס

סודי ביותר

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\* חוזם: 8,3025 \*

\* אל: המשרד \*

\* יעדים: בטחון/190 \*

\* מ-: ווש, נר: 98, תא: 030889, זח: 1110, דח: ב, סג: סב \*

\* תח: & גס: צפא \*

\* נד: & \*

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\* סודי ביותר/בהול להזעיק \*

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\* ח.ר.ב. \*

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\* אל : שה'ח \*

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\* דע : רה'מ', שהב'ט \*

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\* מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון \*

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\* התקשר דניס רוס וביקש לחזור, בהמשך לשיחתך עם בייקר \*

\* על בקשתם שלאור עדינות המצב לא ננקוט צעדים צבאיים \*

\* בתגובה לנסיון חדירת המחבלים בגבול לבנון משלשום. \*

\*

\* כל פעולה כזו עלולה ליצור לנו בעיה קשה ביותר במצב \*

\* רגיש זה ולסבכה עוד יותר. ביקש לחזור ולהדגיש כי מסר \*

\* זה בא על דעת הגורמים הבכירים ביותר בממשל. \*

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\* ארד. \*

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\* תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל \*

1. אליהו גולני  
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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

טופס מברק

אמ"ק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים  
סוג בטחוני: גלוי  
דחיפות : מידי  
תאריך וז"ח : 3.8.89 12:15  
מס' מברק : 111

אל: המשרד

אל: מצפ"א / הסברה

פעולות צה"ל

מצ"ב קריקטורה מצוינת שהופיעה הבוקר ב "מיאמי הראלד".

פלג

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להם ששה אנש' אומנ'ס אנצ'ר

רבים אחד המכה  
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22A THE MIAMI HERALD, THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1989 - EDITORIAL PAGE

# The Miami Herald

## JIM MORIN'S VIEW

IN ORDER TO BATTLE THE  
SCOURGE OF TERRORISM  
IT IS IMPERATIVE WE  
SEVERELY PUNISH  
THOSE SCOUNDRELS  
WHO ARE DIRECTLY  
RESPONSIBLE!...



AND WITH SURGICAL STRIKES,  
GO GET THOSE VILE KIDNAPPERS  
AND MURDERERS AND  
BRING 'EM TO  
SWIFT, TOUGH,  
MERCILESS  
JUSTICE!!



WHAT? THE ISRAELIS  
DID EXACTLY THAT  
AND A HOSTAGE  
WAS KILLED IN  
RETALIATION?...



HOW COULD  
ISRAEL  
BEHAVE SO  
IRRESPONSIBLY?!



*MORIN*  
The Miami Herald

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THE WHITE HOUSE/WASHINGTON, DC/REGULAR BRIEFING  
BRIEFER: MARLIN FITZWATER/THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1989

Q Could I get the floor on the EMiddle East? Last night, senior administration officials were expressing a fair amount of at least guarded optimism that EIranF and ESyriaF have intervened successfully to put off the Cicippio death threat this morning. It seems to have been extended for at least several hours. Is the administration now feeling that the immediate situation has eased substantially or not?

MR. FITZWATER: I think our conclusion would be that the situation is -- is about the same. It's very difficult to express very much optimism when we still have one hostage whose life is under threat and others who are in captivity with no immediate prospect for release.

We have been pursuing a diplomatic course that has brought a lot of pressure to bear on a lot of different people. Clearly, the winds are swirling in the region in terms of trying to ~~secure~~ <sup>secure</sup> their release and trying to influence the Hezbollah and others who might hold these prisoners. But I would be very reluctant to express any specific optimism at this point.

Q You mean we have not moved at all? And in these four hours, nothing is going to be done to try to save this man's life?

MR. FITZWATER: There is immeasurable activity that has been underway for several days, that remains underway at this time, and will continue to be. We work through every possible channel available to us to secure the release of the hostages.

Q What kind of -- with the ships moving in, what kind of military threat should the captors feel they face if they kill Cicippio?

MR. FITZWATER: I think the best description is the one the President gave yesterday of prudent planning. I would stick with my guidance to you yesterday not to read too much significance into it. But it is prudent to be prepared, and we maintain that posture.

Q A follow-up. Is there -- do you have a specific warning to the captors about -- if anything happens to the hostages?

MR. FITZWATER: No -- no.



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Q What level of personal contacts does the President maintain with the families of the hostages?

MR. FITZWATER: The families of the hostages have had personal and continuous contact with the EState Department. State has tried to keep them informed.

I've seen press reports from many of them that they have talked to the State Department to receive the best information we have available at the time. Exactly how many calls they've received, how often, I don't know, although the interviews I've seen on CNN with members of the family would suggest that most of them have had fairly continuous contact with the State Department.

Q But not the President himself? He has not had personal contact?

MR. FITZWATER: No.

Q What's your reaction to the videotape making Cicippio read this statement?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, the -- we have seen the tape, obviously, as everyone has. The -- there doesn't seem to be a

lot of doubt about that, although the message and what he says, of course, we don't know what the conditions were in terms of what he had to say

and how he said it, and that sort of thing. So we don't have any conclusions along that line.

Q Did you know that he was alive prior to release of that videotape?

MR. FITZWATER: Our position on -- our knowledge has not changed. We have not received information on any of the hostages as to whether they were dead or alive.

Q So at least now you know he's alive.

MR. FITZWATER: We've assumed everyone is alive until we know otherwise.

Q The US believes that he was reading somebody else's statement? Is that what the conclusion is?

MR. FITZWATER: No. We don't have a conclusion.

Q Yesterday you said that we're getting more and better information all the time, and then the President, a little bit later said that he's having great difficulty getting information. Can you reconcile those two statements?

MR. FITZWATER: Yeah, the same way I did yesterday. We're getting more and better information all the time, but we never have enough.

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Q Just to clear this up, though, Marlin, no final decision has been made to strike militarily if Cicippio is killed. Is that correct?

MR. FITZWATER: That's correct.

Q If could back to my earlier question. We were told last night that, quote, "Syria has promised", end quote, that as far as they're concerned there will be no further executions. Can you comment one way or the other on that? Has the US received any such

MR. FITZWATER: I don't know who told you that, but I'd

question those sources pretty carefully. I'm not aware of anything like that.

Q Based on the report, the ECIAC saying it's probable that Higgins was killed before Monday, and then EShamirF saying that he had given hard evidence to the United States that Higgins was killed at least six months ago, can you say now more about the evidence that Colonel Higgins was, in fact, killed before Monday than you have up till now?

MR. FITZWATER: There isn't a lot more I can say. The -- Israel

has been fairly open about their belief in that situation; a number of stories out there yesterday and today. Our own analysis is that we really cannot make a positive conclusion. Clearly there is a lot of evidence in that direction, but our analysts still are not willing to say positively that they know exactly when or how he might have been killed.

John?

Q How would you describe the role of the Syrian foreign minister? Would you describe it as helpful at this point, or too early to tell?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't believe we can -- well, first of all, I don't know that we'd want to, but we would not want to characterize the actions of any country or individual in this, except to say that we have undertaken any number of efforts to consult with them, certainly all the countries in the Middle East. Our final measure is whether or not the hostages are released. And we think it's counterproductive to talk about who's being helpful and who's not in the interim process. We have called for the release of all hostages, for their safekeeping in the interim, and that's the standard by which we judge everyone's contributions.

Q Why do you think they gave him four more hours? And what will the President do during that time? Is he making more phone calls?



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MR. FITZWATER: We, of course, cannot have any definitive knowledge as to why they extended the deadline. We hope it's because they have been swayed by world opinion and pressure from others that this is not appropriate behavior. In one way, it's simply a testament to the cruelty of the situation that you keep having these deadlines extended. There shouldn't be any deadlines at all. And to put the families through a two-day deadline and a one-day deadline, a four-day deadline, is a fairly cruel situation. So we continue to call for the release of the hostages, and that's our bottom line.

Q Is the President making calls?

MR. FITZWATER: The President continues to call various people, as he did yesterday.

Q Marlin, if I'm not mistaken, wasn't Cicippio one of the people who remained in Lebanon after the United States government had warned all United States citizens to get out? And that being the case, how much claim does such a person have on the diplomatic resources of the United States if he falls into trouble after ignoring his government's warnings?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we have continually warned people not to be in Lebanon. We have continually warned them of the danger of kidnapping and other kinds of violence in that country. And we have repeatedly asked over the years that people not be there. You're quite right that some have chosen to remain anyway. Mr. Cicippio, I believe, is one of those. On the other hand, every American citizen deserves the response and attention of his government. In this case, we have eight hostages there now. We have a considerable history of hostage problems in the area. And I don't think that is an issue on which we would judge our actions in this case or at this time.

Bill?

Q Marlin, the UN Undersecretary General is in Lebanon today. He was on American television programs this morning. And among the people who's talking to, he's still finding some who are suggesting to him that they think that Colonel Higgins is still alive. What's the state of play on that as far as the White House is concerned?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, the -- you can find speculation on various points on that. For example, the Israelis have put out some information that Obeid has indicated that he said he was alive. But no one -- we don't know, as a bottom-line kind of thing. We don't have a body. We have asked various sources to help in recovering his body. That's what the Undersecretary is there to do. He is meeting, I understand, with Fadlallah,

and we'll have to wait and see what the outcome of that is. But despite the film, and despite any number of conclusions, there can be no absolute conclusion on that until we see his body.

Q On what basis are you proceeding? Is it just on that, or are you going ahead on the basis of assuming that he's dead and hoping that something different will --

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we have said that there appears to be a very high probability of his death, but we know far less about the circumstances surrounding it.

Q Marlin, what's the government view currently of an Israeli swap? Would we be pleased if it took place, reluctantly acquiescent, or how would you characterize it?

MR. FITZWATER: Our position is that we do not negotiate with hostage-takers. We do not trade or make deals with the kidnappers. We have made that position known publicly many times, and that is our position with regard to anybody who asks or wants to know.

Q No, but the question I was asking was what our view of an Israeli swap would be.

MR. FITZWATER: The answer is the same.

Q Well, how do you then respond to the story this morning saying that Baker winked at the whole idea?

MR. FITZWATER: I'd say it's not true. We've stated our position, Secretary Baker told them his policy statement. I know exactly what Secretary Baker said on the airplane, and what he said was that our policy is very clear that we don't negotiate with hostage takers.

Q Did we say that we would not oppose --

MR. FITZWATER: We said they're a sovereign nation, we don't tell them what to do. But our policy is very clear.

Q Did we say that we would not object if they did engage in a swap?

MR. FITZWATER: They said we don't tell them one way or another. We simply tell them what our policy is and how we

they're a sovereign country, they have a different policy on terrorism than we do, they do trade for hostages, we don't. They do negotiate with terrorists, we don't. And so, we don't tell them what to do, but we let them know what we think is best and how we do it, and that's what we did.

Q If the Israelis took that as an implicit approval to go ahead with negotiations, would that be a logical conclusion from what Baker had said in your view?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, that was not our purpose.



Q You said that an awful lot of pressure has been applied in this case. Given the fact that the people who we believe are involved don't seem to respond very much to public opinion, are you suggesting that something has been done beyond a bunch of phone calls and messages saying, "We disapprove of it," or "we think this is awful, you know, you ought to stop it," and that sort of thing. Are you trying to imply that something on that has been done?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, of course, of course.

Q Well, that would almost suggest the implication of some military action --

MR. FITZWATER: Oh, no, no, no. There's a whole range of hundreds of different things between there and there. There are diplomatic overtures and discussions that are held on pressure points, and people that are talked to and argued with, and so forth; a wide range of activities that we would never comment on that take place well in between the range that you described.

Q Can I ask you about those frozen funds that lawyers are always talking about at The Hague? The Iranians and the Americans meet almost every day. Is that something that is simply not negotiable at this time, or there's no new impetus behind that because of this situation? When you talk of the various talks that are going on, is that something that you would consider outside the realm, because that would look like bargaining for hostages?

MR. FITZWATER: That's right, it's not negotiable. The two are not tied. We don't -- we will not tie the Iranian assets to the hostage release in any way.

Karen?

Q Back on the question of Israeli policy versus ours, do you have any information to support the theory that Israel did interpret Secretary Baker's comment to mean that we would raise no objection to their following their own policy on trading, negotiating, et cetera, for hostages?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't have any information from them.

Q Marlin, we've said that we don't know exactly where to hit or how to hit. By the Israelis' evidence, Obeid has confessed to being involved in the Higgins kidnapping. He's -- how would the United States feel about his -- if he were punished with death or executed for that involvement?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we won't speculate on that. As a legal matter, of course, that would have to be reviewed. There's no warrant for his arrest, no charges at this time. But that would have to be reviewed as a legal matter and pursued through normal legal channels.

Q Is the US doing that, reviewing it with an eye toward possibly asking for his extradition?

MR. FITZWATER: The EJustice Department, I am told, is looking into the case. But where they are, I don't really know.

Q Marlin, Senator Moynihan yesterday said that Israel, under the Geneva Convention on Human Rights, had a perfect right to seize Obeid, and also the US, under that same convention, signed by Syria, Lebanon and Iran, has a right to take certain actions, like going to the UN Security Council.

Why haven't we done that?

MR. FITZWATER: We -- why haven't we done what?

Q Gone to the Security Council and said, "These states are violating UN convention -- the Geneva Convention, which bars hostage-taking and executions." And under that convention, according to Senator Moynihan, local commanders are responsible for what happens under their control.

MR. FITZWATER: I'd have to refer you to State on the UN situation. I don't know. We've had so many overtures to the UN, I'm just not familiar with the history about what we've done and what we haven't done. We may have, for all I know.

Q Do you disagree with Senator Moynihan that Israel had a right to seize Sheik Obeid under international --

MR. FITZWATER: I don't have enough knowledge to make any comment.

Q What exactly is the Department of Justice looking into in regard to the Obeid matter?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't know. I'd refer you to Justice.

MR. FITZWATER: John? I'll come back, Lesley.

Q In the past, whenever the President has been asked about Obeid, he has said that all people in the region held against their will should be released.

MR. FITZWATER: Right.

Q We are given to understand that he means Israel should release Obeid. We also would not want to see Israel trade -- you say publicly that we would not want to see Israel trade Obeid for the hostages.

Q I'm not sure he said that.

Q Did you say that, Marlin?

MR. FITZWATER: I didn't say a thing in either case. No. You're wrong on two counts. Do you want to try for a third one?



Q What's wrong on the first one?

MR. FITZWATER: We have said that we would like to see all hostages released; and we have stated our policy.

Q If the United States policy has been that we do not negotiate with terrorists or hostage-takers, what can you point to in the past 10 years that shows that that policy works?

MR. FITZWATER: The very strong belief -- first of all, the policy is based on the strong belief that if you negotiate with hostage-takers that you only invite them to take more hostages, and others to take hostages, and you create a cycle of never-ending kidnapping that the country cannot stand by and abide.

How do you prove that negative? How do you prove kidnappings that didn't happen? I don't know. But we still believe it and we have had every expert possible look at it. We -- the policy has been confirmed by the best thinkers that we can come up with, by most people who take a look at it. And it's true, other countries don't have the same conclusion, but their situations are different.

And I don't know how you prove a negative, but nevertheless, we firmly believe in it.

Now I would say that the Iran-contra situation certainly shows one of the major flaws in dealing with hostage-takers. And if you'd

like a long interview with Ollie North and others, you could --

Q But you got people out under it.

MR. FITZWATER: Yes?

Q Do we deal with --

MR. FITZWATER: Wait a minute. Did Helen Thomas here put herself in the league with Ollie North? (Background talk.) I want to get this on the record -- (laughter). Do you approve of [the] Iran-contra situation now? Are we turning this around?

Q You traded -- you traded -- you traded for Jacobsen.

MR. FITZWATER: I never thought I'd live long enough to stand at this podium and see it.

Q You traded for Jacobsen --

Q Today, Rafsanjani's going to be sworn in as the head of Iran. Does our government have a comment on that? Are we sending a message directly, indirectly? And what do we think about it?

Q But what is our comment on this, and are messages being sent, and whatever else you can tell us about it?

MR. FITZWATER: Ahh, well we certainly are hopeful that the elevation of Rafsanjani is a positive sign for US relations. I don't believe we can point to any specific evidence yet that that is the case. And again, our optimism is very guarded. We have not -- using once again the release of the hostages as the bottom-line, we have not seen any reason to believe it's made a difference at this point. Nevertheless, the -- we are hopeful that his presence would spell some opening for a changed relationship with the West,

and feel that there must be some -- some cracks in the -- in the structure that Khomeini created against the United States. But at this point, other than hope, there is not much evidence there to go on.

Q What about yesterday's statement from Rafsanjani, deploring terrorism?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, the problem there is there are statements on all sides. You can say that's a good statement, and then you can look at the statement of the Interior Minister, or whoever it was, who said, "Death to all Americans." So, it depends on how you read it.

John?

Q Will you give any message to Rafsanjani of congratulations, or is that basically it?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't anticipate that, no.

Q From the guidance you gave us yesterday about not attaching significance to the ship movements, are we to believe then that they --

MR. FITZWATER: Well, not any significance, but --

Q Well, but are the commanders there under -- captains under any instructions other than routine exercises? You said they just went out a few hours earlier --

MR. FITZWATER: Yeah.

Q -- it's strictly routine exercises?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't know how their -- what their specific orders are, but I think for our purposes here, in a public sense, that's essentially correct, that they are not under any special orders. Now that doesn't mean -- I mean they obviously are under special orders in terms of where they go and what they do, but once again, in our context, the answer has not changed.



Q Marlin, how do you explain --

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Q What about these reports that if Cicippio is killed that there are -- there will be a military retaliation? Some people have said that rather flatly.

MR. FITZWATER: Right. (Acknowledging the question.) We would not speculate, first of all, on any military decisions or tactical actions. We have been reviewing this matter; no final judgments to that effect have been made. Obviously, that will be a very grave situation, and we would be prepared to deal with it as best we could, and I would not preclude any options one way or another. But, at this point, we have not made final

Q -- is it at least an extension of the -- (laughter in response to Mr. Fitzwater's comment) -- is it at least an extension of the opportunity to do something about Cicippio's situation? And is anything special being done in these hours, the few there are, that have -- that hasn't been done before?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, that's the -- is, of course, the positive aspect that I referred to, that while there are so many reasons that one can't be very optimistic about an extension of a deadline like this, it at least does give everyone more time to talk, it gives more time for the hostage-takers to consider their situation and has to be helpful in that sense.

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 BRIEFER: MARLIN FITZWATER/THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1989  
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MR. FITZWATER: I don't really know what their attitude it is, although our dialogue with the EPLOF -- I would argue with you that that it is not negotiation for hostages. Yes?

Q Marlin, there was one TWA hijacking where we, while maintaining we would not exchange prisoners for hostages, clearly smiled when Israel did that since they were our people who got out. Why shouldn't the Israelis conclude that that we're suggesting the same position right now. Our position is we won't, but we'll be very happy if they do?

MR. FITZWATER: I can't speculate on their reaction. You can ask them. Helen?

Q Cicippio spoke of "us", "we", but only in terms of himself, do we feel that there is an imminent threat to any other life?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I think in this kind of situation there is an increased concern for all of the hostages. Whenever you have a situation like this, there is anxiety and uncertainty and fears on all sides and that is always a formula for possible danger and the hostage safety is of paramount importance for us and one that is

ever-present in guiding our statements and our actions in the Middle East. John?

Q You talk about no negotiating. The biggest, I guess, negotiation of all was what Jimmy Carter did to get the people out of Tehran. Did that set a precedent, an unfortunate precedent that the United States has been paying for throughout all of the 1980s?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I'm pretty reluctant to place any historical blame. There have been all kinds of difficult episodes here. As I was suggesting yesterday, the last decade has been filled with hostage episodes that have -- some have ended successfully, some have not. All have been filled with dread and fear and trepidation and there doesn't seem to be any specific lesson that one can draw from a past episode to another.

You can also point to the Iran-contra episodes and all of the incidents that were brought up earlier and draw different conclusions from them. So, but --

Q But it seems you have drawn a conclusion that there should be no negotiations. The TWA hostages in '84, there were negotiations, intensive negotiations --



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MR. FITZWATER: Well, I refer you to the Vice President's report on -- Task Force report on terrorism of a year and a half, two years ago, which is our most definitive statement and the policy that we are following today. That study was made after most all of these cases took place. It reflects the history and the lessons learned by the hostages taken during the Carter administration, as well as those taken during the Reagan administration. And on the basis of all of those collectively, it was that Task Force's conclusion that the "no negotiation" policy is the only right one. And you're going to find all shades of disagreement on that. I know on television we've seen experts of every stripe. But I think most feel that that is a policy that is correct for the United States, and one that has to be maintained.

Q Did the Vice President -- then-Vice President write that while Iran-contra was going on?

MR. FITZWATER: Much of it occurred during that period

Q He knew we were negotiating when he made this policy. I mean, how do you know -- how do we know it's just not lip service right now?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I'm not -- I can't go back and tell you how it was written, but I can tell you that the President feels very strongly about and has expressed that in any number of meetings, and that everyone in the administration feels that is the correct policy to follow.

Q Does the movement of the ships around the Middle East constitute a form of negotiation? We used to call it "gunboat diplomacy" in Latin America.

Q Say yes.

MR. FITZWATER: You can -- (light laughter). I can't characterize these things.

Q Marlin, two questions. There's been a lot of cryptic statements about Iran's degree of influence over the hostage-takers. Will the United States hold Iran responsible if anything happens to Cicippio or any of the other hostages?

MR. FITZWATER: We don't -- we don't have definitive information on who's holding the hostages or who is responsible, and therefore, we can't offer judgments at this point.

Q One other thing -- one other question. You said that there have been no final decisions made about what would happen to Cicippio. Have there been preliminary decisions made?

MR. FITZWATER: There have been preliminary decisions made of every kind. The President's made many, many decisions about information to be collected and people to be talked to, and courses of action --

Q -- how we would respond if anything happens to Cicippio.

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MR. FITZWATER: Well, we won't comment on specific decisions of that kind. But you may be assured that all of the foundation planning has been done, and considerations of every scenario have been taken, and we will pursue this to the best of our ability. But we won't comment on specific courses of action.

Q (Off-mike) -- responsibility, that your -- that your statement said, "No final judgment on military options," is a sort of a semantic technicality that a decision has -- a preliminary decision or some kind of a decision, in principle, has been made, and some final order has yet to be given. So --

MR. FITZWATER: Well, that's the way the --

Q -- could you clarify that denial, and tell us whether it's a denial or a "non-denial denial?" (Laughter.)

MR. FITZWATER: That --

Q Yeah!

MR. FITZWATER: -- that's always a difficult issue to discuss with the press. And we find that on a lot less substantial issues whether it's signing a -- signing a bill or something else -- the point at which a decision is made. Is it the point at which the document goes to the office and the signature is affixed? Is it the point at which early discussions take place?

Q Nooo! President Bush has a lot --

MR. FITZWATER: When you review the history of the decision-making process of President Bush, I think you'll see a process whereby he discusses these things with a lot of people, makes a lot of preliminary decisions. There probably are courses of direction that can be ascertained early on in the process.

MR. FITZWATER: But at the same time, the rites of the final judgment are always retained.

Q Wave the white flag!

Q In other words, he's made up his mind, but he can still wimp out.

MR. FITZWATER: And the decision is not made till the decision is made; it's like the fat lady that sings.

Q Is there a decision to brief this afternoon after developments occur in Lebanon?



דחיפות: מיד

טובים מכר  
קשר ניו-יורקדף: 1  
מחנך: 2

סיוג: שמור

תזכ: 0117-

אל: המשרד - ארבל 2

מס מדיק: 6/מ/מ-6

דע: משהב"ט-אכ"א נפגעים, ו-ש-שלי

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מאת: נאו"ם - אהרן יעקב

פגישת תמי ארד עם השגריר פיקרינג (1.8.89)

1. הפגישה נערכה בבניין המשלחת האמריקנית. השתתפו מצידט: פיקרינג וראש לשכתו. השתתפו מצדנו: גב' ארד, תא"ל חרמש (נציג אכ"א), יששכרוף והח"מ.
2. פיקרינג אמר כי הוא שמח על ההזדמנות לפגוש את גב' ארד, למרות שהפגישה מתקיימת על רקע זמנים קשים. הוא אישית חש סימפטיה למצבה ומקווה שיוכל לסייע לה כמיטב יכולתו.
3. גב' ארד סיפרה כי בביקורה בארה"ב היא נפגשה עם אנשים שונים בעניין בעלה. היא בקשה לפגוש גם את פיקרינג בתקווה שיוכל לסייע לה בקשריו. היא מבינה שהזמנים קשים ומצטערת על האפשרות שבני ערובה אמריקאים יפגעו. לא ברור לה מהי מטרות הטרוריסטים, אך ברור לה שהם מנצלים את מצוקתם של בני הערובה ושל משפחותיהם כדי לקדם את ענייניהם. היא הדגישה שכל רצונה הוא שינתן לה להיות בקשר עם בעלה. אין היא מבקשת את שיחרורו המידי אולם בהיותו שבוי מלחמה היא מצפה שינהגו כלפיו על פי הוראות אמנת ג'נבה. היא אינה יודעת מי מחזיק בבעלה אבל מתור מה שנמסר לה על ידי רשויות צה"ל היא יודעת לבטח כל הוא חי. היא הזכירה כי בתה בת האובד אינה מכירה את אביה ושואלת שוב ושוב מתי ישוב. לה, לאט, אין תשובה של ממש לשאלה זו. היא מבקשת איפוא, כי פיקרינג יעשה כמיטב יכולתו כדי לסייע לה.
4. פיקרינג אמר כי אין דרך קלה לפתור את הבעיה משום שהגורמים המחזיקים בשבויים אינם אמונים על שיקולים הומניים. הוא הזכיר כי מדיניות ארה"ב היא שאין לעשות עסקה עם אלה המחזיקים בבני הערובה. יחד עם זאת עושים שלטונות ארה"ב כמיטב יכולתם כדי לפתור את הבעיה. הוא הוסיף כי האירועים האחרונים מסבכים את המצב, שהיה מסובך גם בלוא הכי.
5. פיקרינג הזכיר את החלטת מועבי"ט מאתמול בעניין בני הערובה, אך ציין כי להערכתו החלטה זו לא תספיק על הגורמים המחזיקים בבני הערובה. הוא ציין כי האו"ם עושה כמיטב יכולתו בעניינו של הקולונל היגינס, שעבד בשירות האו"ם. הוא גם ספר כי ארה"ב פנתה למדינות שונות, בכללן מדינות המקיימות קשרים עם איראן, בבקשה שיסייעו בפתרון הבעיה.

אישור:

שם השולח:

תאריך:

מס' 3  
מס' 2  
מס' 1  
מס' 1  
מס' 1  
מס' 2  
מס' 1

דחיפות:

טובס מברק  
קשר ניו-יורקדף: 2  
מחור: 2

סיוג:

אל:

תזח:

מס מדק:

גלמן - 6

דע:

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מאת:

6. פיקרינג הזכיר כי כעת מאיימים הטרוריסטים ברציחתם של כו ערובה אמריקאי נוסף ושל טרי ויט. ממשלת ארה"ב מתוסכלת משום שאין דרך קלה לפתור את הבעיה. הוא הוסיף כי הוא מברך על דברי שהב"ט רבין, שהציע להחליף את המנהיגים השיעיים שנתפסו בבני הערובה האמריקאים והשבויים הישראליים. יחד עם זאת הדגיש כי עמדתם היא שארה"ב אינה יכולה לעשות עסקה עם הטרוריסטים. הוא הזכיר את שיחתו עם שהב"ט רבין בעת ביקורו בארה"ב, שבה נדון גם ענין שבוי צה"ל בלבנון, ואמר כי אם ישנם רעיונות חדשים לפתרון הבעיה - ישמח לשמוע עליהם.

7. יששכרופ מסר לידי פיקרינג את נוסח דברי שר הבטחון מהבוקר, והזכיר דיווחי עיתונות מביירות לפיהם היגיוס כבר עונה ונרצח לפני כשנה. פיקרינג אמר כי גירסה זו מוכרת גם לו אולם הדגיש כי להערכתו מוטב שלא לעשות כה שימוש רב מדי, שמא ירצחו הטרוריסטים כו ערובה נוסף רק כדי לקיים את אמינותם. הוא אמר כי השמועה על דחיית ביצוע גזר הדין נגד שני בני הערובה הנוספים היא מעוררת ויוצרת פתח לתקוה שגזר הדין לא יבוצע כלל. לסיום דבריו הכטיח פיקרינג שוב כי יעשה כמיטב יכולתו כדי לסייע לגב' ארד בענינה.

נאו"ם

שם השולח: אישור:

אחר: יעקב

1.8.89

תאריך:



שגרירות ישראל בווינגטון  
טופס מברק

אל : הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א

דע : 1. נפ"א לתקשורת, י. שהם"ט לתקשורת  
ימ"ח/קט"ח, י"ג.  
מאת: עתונות

דף 1. מתור. 9  
דחיפות: מידי  
סוג: אד"י בל"א י"ס  
תאריך, זמן: 3.8.89  
מספר המברק:

המשרד:

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להלן דברים שאמר דובר הבית הלבן, FITZWATER, בתדרוך לעתונאים  
אתמול, 2.8.89.

עתונות  
פ"ב

לוח 3 ס/שהח 3 ההא 1 מאנהא 1 אנא 1 אנא 1 הנצור  
מציא 2 ס"הא 1 רבוב 1 הסיקרה 2 פלנר 1 הולמז  
ממא 3 רמ 5 א/מ 4 א/מ 1 א/מ 1

MR. FITZWATER: Let me just cover that, first of all. The President is going to meet with the EBAhraiñiF Minister of Foreign Affairs at 1:15. We'll have open photo/writing pool at the top.

All right, the President did meet again at 11:00 this morning, until approximately 12:15 or 12:20, with his advisors on the hostage situation. He received an update from the various members on the status of our knowledge. I would say that not very much has changed in an action sense, but we are -- we do continue to monitor the situation in the EMiddle EastF, as well as to assess all of the policy options. The -- you are aware of a variety of ship movements that were confirmed by the Pentagon yesterday. Many of those are movements that were scheduled to take place anyway. Some of them, the time frame is only off a little bit. But my overall guidance to you is not to read a lot into those movements.

Q What are they for, then?

MR. FITZWATER: The -- well, as I said, many of them were scheduled to take place anyway. Many of them relate to the training exercises and the planned missions that they were on to begin with. And again, I would not attach a great deal of significance to them.

Patrick?

Q Well, why hurry them up?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, one was four hours, for example.

Q Pardon me?

MR. FITZWATER: One was four hours, for example. If there's any "hurry up" at all, it was essentially just we are in a period where we're -- of some uncertainty in the world, a period where various activities are being assessed. It always pays to operate with the appropriate amount of preparedness. But I wouldn't go beyond that.

Q Well, that would come to the question of if you're not accelerating --

MR. FITZWATER: (Aside to staff) Can you -- can you get me my glasses, Bill -- somebody? Get one of the people there to get them off my desk.

(Returning) Yes?

Q Considering the situation, that would raise the question -- if you're not accelerating these timetables for operations, why not?

MR. FITZWATER: I think we're about where we want to be. The ships are there. Some have left a little early, but generally speaking, they're in appropriate places. I couldn't answer that question without commenting on military operations, which we aren't prepared to do.

Helen?

Q Marlin, can we save the life of Cicippio?

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MR. FITZWATER: We -- we're not aware of any change in the condition or the status of Mr. Cicippio or any of the other hostages. We don't have information on them specifically. We have heard threats about him and about Terry Waite, which we have no way of independently confirming or having any direct knowledge of. So, as far as we are concerned, there's no change in his status. 3/9

Q Well, what's the EIsraeliF --

Q Marlin, if --

MR. FITZWATER: Jerry?

Q If Cicippio or some other hostage were killed, would the likelihood of military action increase?

MR. FITZWATER: I wouldn't speculate, Jerry. We take the situation as we're faced with it. As you know, we have been involved in a series of informational and assessment meetings, and keeping abreast of the situation while conducting other kinds of affairs as well. And we'll continue to do that.

Frank?

Q Marlin, can you provide some insight into how the diplomatic contacts are going, whether there have been any new ones today or new initiatives, what you're hearing back from the Soviets and other Arab states in the region?

MR. FITZWATER: I can't give you any details on our discussions. We don't discuss diplomatic responses, except to say that from the beginning we have had a very active program of contacts with countries in the region, other countries, allies and so forth, to discuss the situation, to bring pressure to bear, to ask them to use whatever influence they have to discuss the status of their knowledge, to ascertain any special information that might be available. Those contacts obviously are continuing. It's pretty hard to go into -- we don't -- well, as I said, we wouldn't want to go into any details, but you can be assured that the State Department, through our diplomatic channels, is making every overture possible.

Q Has the President made any more calls today?

MR. FITZWATER: The President has made some calls, which again we would not want to go into. But he is calling various leaders, as appropriate, to apprise them of the status of our review, as well as to seek any information they may have.

Q Who has he called, Marlin? You gave us two names yesterday, the Pope and the ETurkishF Prime Minister. Who has he called today?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I would prefer not to go into names, simply in order to not divulge our information and -- so we simply won't do that.

Chris?

Q Did the President meet with the Israeli Ambassador? Why was he here?

MR. FITZWATER: He was here to have a previously scheduled lunch with Bobbie Kilberg of the Communications Office.

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Q Did the President (have him up ?) while he was here? 4/9

MR. FITZWATER: No, did not meet with -- at least as of five minutes ago -- with the President or NSC Advisor or Deputy NSC Advisor. As far as I know, he's not scheduled to.

Q Marlin, what do we think the role of EIranF is at this point? Do we hold them -- can you give us some sense of how much responsibility we're placing on their shoulders? And any more on the communications, indirect or direct, with Iran?

Q Question, please.

Q Iran.

MR. FITZWATER: The -- we have always believed that Iran has a degree of influence over the Hezbollah and the situation in ELebanonF, in Beirut. Other countries obviously have a degree of influence as well. Syria has a sizable troop contingent there, has a more direct presence. They actually control parts of the city and parts of the area. So both of those countries have a direct role. But at this

Q There is some sense that a great deal of your diplomatic effort is aimed at getting Iran specifically to order their people to back off. And the other question is, do you know if Cicippio's alive?

MR. FITZWATER: We don't have any knowledge one way or another of any of the hostages, in terms of their condition.

Q Well, what about Iran? Is that the focus --

MR. FITZWATER: We assume -- let me back up. We assume they are all alive until we are able to confirm otherwise. On Iran, I would say that our interest in this matter diplomatically extends to a number of countries, a number of parties in the region who have an interest. I would not give one emphasis over another. That -- their aspect has been overplayed in some stories; rather, that there are any number of possibilities here for people who have influence.

Steve?

Q Anything new to learn from the study of the Higgins videotape, in terms of how long he might have been dead, whether it was him? Any new information at all?

MR. FITZWATER: We have no new conclusions to report.

Bernie?

Q Marlin, have we asked the Israelis to release the Sheik -- I mean, directly asked him to do that?

MR. FITZWATER: No, we have not.

Q We have not asked them to release the Sheik?

MR. FITZWATER: No, no.

David?

Q Marlin, going back to the President's calls, if you can't give us names

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of specific leaders or countries, can you characterize at all, were these leaders in the region, or was he calling EEuropeanF leaders to ask about -- to share information and see what they may have learned? Any characterization you can give us along those lines?

MR. FITZWATER: No, really all of the above. He's talked to leaders from the region, from the Middle East --

Q Today?

MR. FITZWATER: -- from the allies. No, over the last several days.

Yes, Maureen?

Q What else is Bush going to be doing on this today? I mean, does he have other meetings, or making more calls?

MR. FITZWATER: No, nothing else planned. I wouldn't anticipate any more meetings or actions today.

Q What about phone calls? Is he spending any time on this at all for the rest of the day?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't think so. He has a full afternoon of meetings. Let's see here. We have --

Q Can you give us some sense of what --

Q How about the --

MR. FITZWATER: -- Florida Governor; Illinois' candidate for Governor; environmentalist meeting; Governor Sununu. So at least up through about 4:00.

Q Could you give us a sense of what proportion of his time is now being devoted to dealing with the hostage matter and the Middle Eastern situation and what is being devoted to other matters now?

MR. FITZWATER: I couldn't -- I couldn't give you any definitive numbers on it. I would say that he is having a lot of other meetings and issues to consider. This morning he had a statement on the Disability Act. We see a full schedule of meetings this afternoon. He probably won't have anything on this this afternoon. We don't have any meetings scheduled for tomorrow. So it is not -- is not a preoccupying force certainly. I'm prepared to -- well -- Michael?

Q Yesterday you seemed to cast some doubt on the veracity of the threat against Cicippio, saying you had no way to measure its authenticity. The history of these Hezbollah groups, with the possible expectation of Higgins and Buckley, is that deadlines for executing hostages have been set in the past and repeatedly postponed. How seriously are you taking this threat against Cicippio? Do you believe it's genuine and that there is a good chance he could be executed tomorrow?

MR. FITZWATER: I do not accept your characterization of my comments yesterday. We said yesterday that we take these threats seriously, and that is the same case today. I added yesterday, and I repeat today, however, that we have no confirming information about them. We have no direct information about the validity of the threats or how they could or would be carried out, but that does not mean we don't take them seriously.

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Q (Off mike) -- operating under the assumption that the threat is genuine and that he would die at 11:00 tomorrow morning unless something else happens?

MR. FITZWATER: We take the threat seriously. We continue to monitor the situation.

Peter?

Q Marlin, what is the administration's analysis of the conflicting reports that -- on the one hand, there is a report this morning that says that Iran has gotten the message and that it's pressuring the hostage holders to spare the lives of the Americans, and then there's another story quoting sources there saying that if any military action is taken, they'll all be killed.

MR. FITZWATER: I would say that we have conflicting reports, just as you do; that it is very difficult to read the situation there in terms of all the various sources that are speaking out on these matters. And there are conflicting reports.

Q Do you think that Iran has gotten the message? Do you have any -- any way to confirm whether Iran --

MR. FITZWATER: You mean gotten the message in terms of knowing our position and how we feel about it? Yeah, there's no doubt about that.

Bob?

Q What makes you say that?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, there's no doubt about that, because we've sent them messages just like we've sent other people in the region messages. We've had diplomatic discussions. There's no question --

Q So your response is they have told those people to spare the lives?

MR. FITZWATER: I can't judge their response, but I have no question that they know how we feel.

Bob?

Q How many leaders did the President speak to today?

MR. FITZWATER: We're not willing to say, but he's spoken to some.

Q Marlin, are any of the diplomatic channels being pursued today actually new and different from the ones pursued yesterday, or are they follow-ons?

MR. FITZWATER: Well -- (pause) -- well, that's hard to say. There are so many diplomatic channels that have been pursued in terms of ambassadors making overtures and embassies in various countries providing us information, those kinds of things, that it's pretty hard to say what's new and what's old at this point. We're talking to a number of people. I don't think we can characterize it that way.

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Q Has the EPLOF indicated a willingness to help, Marlin?

MR. FITZWATER: I'm not aware of any discussions with the PLO.

Q We have not been in contact directly or indirectly?

MR. FITZWATER: I just -- I'm not aware of any. I don't know whether we have.

Paul?

Q Are the options -- are there -- did priorities in the options change at all? Is diplomacy now the leading option

to get the release of the hostages? And is the military option still on the table?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, diplomacy has always been the leading option, and the appropriate course to be pursued in these kinds of cases from the very beginning. Diplomacy has always been the primary force for trying to seek international action of whatever kind. From the very beginning, we have had extensive outreach through diplomatic channels, and those continue. The military situation stays the same, and that is that it's always under review, but we don't speculate on military action.

Nick?

Q Marlin, given all the reports of the amount of information that the Israelis are getting from the Sheik, would you say that we have better information now than we did prior to the start of this incident on who is holding the hostages and where they're being held and things of that kind?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, again, it's pretty difficult to try to get into degrees and gradations of good, better, best. We have good information and we always want better information. Our knowledge grows by the minute. But there's always a good deal that we don't know about the hostage situation.

Michael?

Q What is the President's goal right now with these meetings and with what he's doing? He's making efforts to get the hostages released, but that's not been a priority in this situation. Is he just trying to keep Cicippio and any other hostage from being killed this week? Is he just responding to the Sheik's abduction by the Israelis? What is the goal right now? What is he trying to accomplish?

MR. FITZWATER: The goal is the same as it has always been, to ensure the safety of American hostages and their release. And we have worked for that for some time; we continue to work to that goal.

Q But he hasn't had meetings every day with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense et al --

MR. FITZWATER: We've had people working on it continually for at least six, seven years.

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Q Well, what happens next? You say there's no meeting on this scheduled tomorrow even though there's a deadline for the death of one of the hostages. When does he plan to meet again? 8/9

MR. FITZWATER: There will be updates as necessary, but nothing's scheduled.

Q There is no formal meeting scheduled in the near future at all? 50

MR. FITZWATER: No. 12

Q Is there a time when Bush is expected to make some kind of decision as to what he's going to do -- if he's going to wait? 107

MR. FITZWATER: We don't impose any artificial deadlines. We just continue to monitor the situation, to work it diplomatically, to continue to pursue all the avenues that we have before us and respond and make decisions as the time is right.

Tom?

Q Marlin, is the President disappointed at the Israelis who have chosen not to release Sheik Obeid?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, they're a sovereign state; we don't tell them what to do. They're aware of our position on hostage-taking and these kinds of situations, but we don't register any characterization on their motives one way or another.

John?

Q Marlin, yesterday, I believe you said there would be these regular update meetings. I would like to know if the decision not to hold one, not to schedule one tomorrow, is because they've decided there is nothing particular they had to say or talk about tomorrow, or because there's a deliberate effort to lower the profile further.

MR. FITZWATER: No, we've had two or three. Just the feeling was we didn't need one tomorrow. There are continuous flows of information to the President from his National Security Advisor, continuous channels of information from the State Department. And if another meeting is needed, why, it'll be held, but at this point we didn't think it was necessary.

Terry?

Q We're not talking about all the people the President's called. Has he called the President of ESyriaF today?

MR. FITZWATER: Again, I don't want to say who he has and who he hasn't called.

Q Marlin, you have been saying that Israel's a sovereign state and we don't tell them what to do. Senator Dole yesterday, for the second day, blasted the Israelis and blasted their -- (inaudible). Do you feel his comments are helpful, harmful or you have no comment?

MR. FITZWATER: I don't have any comment on Senator Dole. He's free to say whatever he wants -- no.

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Q You don't want to suggest that a lot of people share his views -- (inaudible) --

MR. FITZWATER: Well, I said that earlier. That's probably still the case.

Q Was the White House aware that he was going to say what he was going to say -- you know -- yesterday or the day before?

MR. FITZWATER: No.

Q Marlin?

MR. FITZWATER: Helen?

Q You put us in a very strange position of puzzlement here. The man has a deadline on his head tomorrow and you say you're not going to meet. Are you trying to take this crisis away from the White House totally? I mean, what are you really trying to do? You act like nothing is on the front burner and, you know, that this is all a charade.

MR. FITZWATER: No, we're trying to manage this situation as well as any number of other issues. But it clearly is one of priority importance and we're dealing with it in a methodical and planned way. The meetings that have been held clearly indicate the degree of involvement that the various officials in the administration have. This is simply the best way we see to deal with the problem. It has nothing --

Q You said we're getting information every minute, more and more information every minute. Are we getting it from the Israelis?

MR. FITZWATER: From all sources.

Q Marlin, you said that there's a history in the Middle East that this group holding Cicippio -- that Iran, in fact, clearly has influence over that particular group. To what degree does the US believe that they influence the group that's holding Cicippio?

MR. FITZWATER: Well I just can't give degrees of influence or specific groups. They have influence, but there are various factions. Sometimes it appears to be greater than others, sometimes less. There's just no way to give a quantifying account of that.

Michael?

Q Yeah, Marlin, is there plans or does the President feel any obligation to report further personally to the American people on the situation and on his deliberations this week?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, he is reporting to -- through me every day this week. He's had other public meetings. But the American public is getting a fairly full accounting through the news media of events to this point. And I'm sure there'll be more opportunity --

Q Is that a "no," that there are no plans for him to personally --

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| דחיות: מידדי       | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון<br>טופס פבוק | ק: 1                    |
| סוג: גלוי          |  | סתיו: 9                 |
| תאריך וזמן חבור:   |  | אל: מצפיה               |
| 3 באוג' 1989 19:45 |  |                         |
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| הפסד:              | מחמ                                    | דע:                     |
| מחמ<br>87          |  | פאת: ק. לקונגרס         |

סנאט: בני הערובה

להלן התבטאויותיהם של הסנטורים דיאמטו, קוני מק, ווילסון מאתמול 2/8.

ופלמ ונא צרנץ.  
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

שהם ס/שהם רהמ<sup>3</sup> אחיהם מנא<sup>1</sup> ממנא<sup>1</sup> מלכ  
אנצין<sup>1</sup> מצפא<sup>2</sup> דיומ<sup>1</sup> מל<sup>2</sup> הסקרה<sup>2</sup> ולמח<sup>1</sup>  
ממ<sup>3</sup> ס"ב<sup>1</sup>

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# U.S. Senator Al D'Amato

## ██████████ of New York ██████████

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### SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO'S STATEMENT TO REPORTS OF LT. COL. WILLIAM HIGGINS MURDER

In response to reports of hostage Lt. Col. Robert Higgins brutal murder at the hands of his captors, U.S. Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-C-NY) said;

We have to let the terrorist groups and those who sponsor them know that we are going to seek the culprits. We want justice, and it's not enough just to talk.

I'm going to support the President, I think he's going to take some very tough action, and even if that action results in military strikes, whatever force is necessary, we've got to protect our citizens.

I don't think that Col. Higgins was murdered yesterday, I think he was murdered quite a while ago. I believe that the Hezbollah used this to cover up the fact that the Colonel was already probably brutally tortured and died and just then used that photo.

I think it's important that we confirm that. I don't think you're going to see the Colonel's body made available to his family, and understand that this is supposedly a very religious fanatical group who under ordinary circumstances would have in the past made the bodies available.

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I venture to say that the body will not be made available for a long time and if and when it is, it will be made available in a state that it's impossible to make an autopsy to confirm the time when on or about the time of death.

I think it's about time that we join, all of us together, in taking on the terrorists and being more aggressive.

For the life of me, I can't see how we spend billions of dollars on defense and have not adequately integrated our intelligence-gathering operations with others, friendly allies, including the Israelis, and even the Soviets as it relates to undertaking the challenge against terrorism.

I'm heartened by the response of the Soviets. But now I think it's a time for action, and I will support President Bush in any call for action that he undertakes.

The fact of the matter is that the longer we take in not responding, the greater the risk, the greater the threat to other Americans, countless, because we embolden, we give them the opportunity to believe that the United States is the "sleeping giant" who is afraid, who is impotent.

I would urge the President's counselors and the President to seek out a course of action that will bring home in a very forceful way to these killers, to these thugs, to these terrorists; that the United States will not be bullied, and we will take very strong measures.



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August 1, 1989

United States Senator Connie Mack made the following remarks today following a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In that hearing, Mack had the opportunity to question the State Department nominee for Amb. on Counter Terrorism, Morris Busby.

Here is Mack's statement regarding U.S. policy on terrorism and Israel's responsibility in the current events involving Lt. Col. Higgins:

"Israel has a history of strong and effective action against terrorism from which we could learn a great deal. The man in Israeli custody right now, Sheikh Obeid, is responsible not only for the murder of Col. Higgins, if it occurred, but probably for the truck bombing that killed 241 American Marines in October 1983."

"Israel's capture of Sheikh Obeid is completely consistent with actions the United States has taken in the past and with international law, which does not protect terrorists from capture, whether on international territory or not."

"In March 1973, Salah Halaf, the number two man in the PLO and a founder of Black September, masterminded the murder of U.S. diplomats Cleo Noel and George Moore. Sixteen years later our Ambassador is meeting Salah Halaf as if he is diplomat, not a terrorist. How do we know that the State Department won't be meeting with the killers of Col. Higgins sixteen years from now?"

"I believe that the United States should have a consistent policy towards terrorism. Where is the consistency in sitting down at the table with the very people who have engaged in terrorist activities in which American diplomats were murdered?"

"I believe this inconsistency leaves questions in the minds of terrorist groups as to the real consequences of their actions by the United States."

"I support President Bush in his effort to gather factual evidence and to seek the counsel of his top advisors. Congress is united in its support of the President's deliberation on this sensitive and volatile matter."

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

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## STATEMENT FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

SENATOR CONNIE MACK

August 1, 1989

Mr. President, I would like to comment on the tragic and emotional issue of the possible murder of Col. William Higgins by Hizballah terrorists in Lebanon. I share the outrage expressed by the President and many Members of Congress and am saddened that once again terrorists have killed an innocent American. I, like many Americans, am angered that too often the United States allows terrorists to go unpunished.

I do not have any easy answers concerning what we should do in response to such a crime. I do have some thoughts, however, regarding what we should not do if we are serious about addressing terrorism.

First, while terrorists cannot always be punished, they should at least not be rewarded. I am deeply concerned that our policy of holding official talks with the PLO is an example of rewarding terror. Decades of terror are the PLO's only diplomatic credential. It is hard to imagine an effective anti-terrorism policy that sanctions meetings with Salah Halaf, a PLO terrorist directly implicated in the murder of two American diplomats and 11 Israeli Olympic athletes.

How can we seriously pledge to bring terrorists to justice when we treat terrorists who murder Americans as diplomats?

Second, in the current situation, we must not let the terrorists succeed in driving a wedge between the United States and our closest ally in the region, Israel.

Israel has a history of strong and effective action against terrorism from which we could learn a great deal. The man in Israeli custody right now, Sheikh Obeid, is responsible not only for the murder of Col. Higgins, if it occurred, but for the truck bombing that killed 241 American Marines in October 1983.

Israel's capture of Sheikh Obeid is completely consistent with actions the United States has taken in the past and with international law, which does not protect terrorists from capture, whether on international territory or not.

As former Secretary of State George Shultz stated, "It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or airspace, from



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attacking them on the soil of other nations, or from using force against states that support, train, and harbor terrorists or guerrillas. International law requires no such result. A nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or pre-empt future attacks, to seize terrorists or to rescue its citizens when no other means are available. The law requires that such actions be necessary and proportionate, but this nation has consistently affirmed the right of states to use force in exercise of their right of individual or collective self-defense."

We should not condemn our allies when they prudently exercise their right of self-defense, especially when they are acting against terrorists who have murdered Americans. We certainly should not equate the capture of a terrorist such as Sheikh Obeid with the holding of hostages by his group, Hizballah.

I support President Bush in his effort to discern the facts and to seek the counsel of his top advisors. I understand the difficulties in devising an effective response to terrorism such as we are experiencing in Lebanon. If we are to deter future terrorism, however, we must restore a measure of consistency and steadfastness to our anti-terrorism policy.

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Mr. WILSON. I thank my friend from Pennsylvania. Not at all parenthetically, Mr. President, I commend him for the amendment that he is proposing. I ask my friend from Pennsylvania, he is a member of the Intelligence Committee. I am not. I do not wish that in responding he violate any security or confidence.

But to establish the facts, we do not know at the present time whether or not Colonel Higgins is alive and we do not know whether or not he was executed as is contended by the Hezbollah. Is that correct.

Mr. SPECTER. I would respond to the distinguished Senator from California by saying that all I know about Colonel Higgins is what I read about him in the newspaper and that is, it appears that he has been executed. However, when the execution occurred, we do not know for sure.

Mr. WILSON. I would ask my friend what I am sure will seem a rhetorical question. It seems to me this makes a rather compelling case for the amendment that he is pressing.

The question, I suppose, would be: Does he agree? Obviously, he does because he is offering the amendment.

Let me then ask him this question. The Israeli Government has conducted a raid and they have abducted Sheikh Obeld. In the New York Times editorial to which the Senator from Minnesota made reference, the statement is made that a democracy, a civilized nation, is required to defend itself and in fact the quote is that, in terms of the options available, "Yes, that includes military operations for both the rescue of hostages or kidnaping of terrorists."

Is it not true, I would ask my friend from Pennsylvania, that Sheikh Obeld has been very clearly identified as the mastermind of terrorist operations, including the abduction of Western hostages, including American citizens?

Mr. SPECTER. I would respond to my friend from California by saying that the information which we have received is just that.

Mr. WILSON. Does my friend agree with the New York Times, and I will tell him that I do, that a civilized nation, in order to defend itself and avoid risking the taking of further of its citizens as hostages, is fully justified in conducting the kind of operation that resulted in the kidnaping of this terrorist chief?

with the exception of Egypt, and that the response of Sheikh Obeld is in the context of self defense. Beyond that where you have specific acts of criminality, the extra territorial jurisdiction is something that Israel can rely upon, just as the United States relied upon extra territorial jurisdiction in the case of Fawaz Yunis.

One of the things I think people do not understand and it is a message I have brought forward on a number of occasions that the Supreme Court of the United States in very blunt language in *Kerr versus Illinois* said it was appropriate in law enforcement—this is language of the law enforcement in 1886—to kidnap and bring to his country and against his will. *Kerr* was in Peru and then another civil libertarian Justice Hugo Black said in 1962 that it was appropriate to bring a person into the jurisdiction of a State by "forcible abduction."

So that when we are dealing with criminals, they do not have to be a terrorist. They can be guilty of much lesser offenses, as these two cases involved, *Kerr* being a fraud case; that is a hardball matter and that kidnaping and forcible abduction is appropriate.

When Israel took that action, and many have criticized Israel for taking that action, it was entirely consistent with international law, with United States law, with recognized principles even for those who were noted civil libertarians.

Mr. WILSON. I thank my friend and, in fact, I think he has very eloquently, complete with citations, made the point that is in the New York Times editorial "without that right of self defense civilized nations would all be held hostage by the most brutal."

Let me ask a further question of my friend: Given the fact that some of the criticism of Israel has been on the basis that there was not adequate consultation with the United States about what the impact of this abduction of Sheikh Obeld might mean in terms of American interests, would he agree that it is also quite arguable that if we are seen in the United States as essentially controlling decisions of the Israeli Government, that that would in itself have a very, very dangerous effect in terms of prompting the Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations to seize yet more Americans to bring greater pressure upon this Government in order to in turn bring pressure upon Israel?

Mr. SPECTER. The distinguished Senator from California raises a very good question which I will answer in a couple of ways. One is that Israel is a sovereign nation and has a right to defend itself.



pretty poor job up until now.

I have faith in our President and I think some people have misread him. I think he has the intestinal fortitude to do what should and must be done. This is one Senator who will support whatever action our President chooses to take, including the use of military force. Some people say, "Oh, do you mean that you would place at risk other lives by this?"

I would suggest that if we do not take some real action, risking lives is exactly what we are going to be doing: not only those who are held hostage now but we are going to precipitate a situation where terrorists will believe that they can continue to act and the United States will remain nothing more than a big, helpless giant.

Mr. President, before I conclude, let me say that there is no doubt in this Senator's mind that the terrorists attempted to mask the true circumstances of the murder of Colonel Higgins. We have heard from reports abroad, that there is a good likelihood that the colonel was killed some time ago. For anyone to say: Maybe he is alive is speaking nonsense. What poppycock. The terrorists actually masked the killing of the colonel.

They did not want to make a trade. Do you want to trade when you give somebody 24 hours? They could not trade because Colonel Higgins in all likelihood had already been murdered.

They can disprove this by making available the body of the colonel, but they haven't.

I think, Mr. President, it is about time for us to say to the Iranian leaders that we are going to hold you responsible for these acts of terrorism, because the evidence is conclusive and overwhelming in situation after situation. We should tell them to be prepared to pay the price.

We have the ability. I think the American people will support our President if he decides to use force.

Let us understand that state-sponsored terrorism and the use of these groups by the Iranians and other governments is nothing less than war. We have to be realistic and understand that sometimes the use of deadly force is absolutely necessary if we are going to defend our people and their legitimate interests. I support the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator SPECTER, in his undertaking of this amendment and his courage in coming forward and placing this in the public view for discussion. We cannot continue to do nothing and give further encouragement to Iranians and others who have used this form of dreadful war. And that is what it is, it is a dreadful war which terrorists are waging on humanity.

I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania and thank him for his courtesy.

THIRTY EIGHT MINUTES REMAIN. Thirty eight minutes remain.

Mr. SPECTER. I do yield for a question.

Mr. WILSON. I thank my friend from Pennsylvania. Not at all parenthetically, Mr. President, I commend him for the amendment that he is proposing. I ask my friend from Pennsylvania, he is a member of the Intelligence Committee. I am not. I do not wish that in responding he violate any security or confidence.

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Mr. WILSON. Does my friend agree with the New York Times, and I will tell him that I do, that a civilized nation, in order to defend itself and avoid risking the taking of further of its citizens as hostages, is fully justified in conducting the kind of operation that resulted in the kidnapping of this terrorist chief?

Mr. SPECTER. I would say to my friend from California that there is no question about the propriety of Israel's conduct under international law for a number of reasons. One reason is that Israel continues to be in a state of war with the nations in the Mideast.



...the extra territorial jurisdiction is something that Israel can rely upon, just as the United States relied upon extra territorial jurisdiction in the case of Fawaz Yunis.

One of the things I think people do not understand and it is a message I have brought forward on a number of occasions that the Supreme Court of the United States in very blunt language in *Kerr versus Illinois* said it was appropriate in law enforcement--this is language of the law enforcement in 1886--to kidnap and bring to his country and against his will. Kerr was in Peru and then another civil libertarian Justice Hugo Black said in 1952 that it was appropriate to bring a person into the jurisdiction of a State by "forcible abduction."

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Mr. WILSON. I thank my friend and, in fact, I think he has very eloquently, complete with citations, made the point that is in the New York Times editorial "without that right of self defense civilized nations would all be held hostage by the most brutal."

Let me ask a further question of my friend: Given the fact that some of the criticism of Israel has been on the basis that there was not adequate consultation with the United States about what the impact of this abduction of Sheikh Obaid might mean in terms of American interests, would he agree that it is also quite arguable that if we are seen in the United States as essentially controlling decisions of the Israeli Government, that that would in itself have a very, very dangerous effect in terms of prompting the Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations to seize yet more Americans to bring greater pressure upon this Government in order to in turn bring pressure upon Israel?

Mr. SPECTER. The distinguished Senator from California raises a very good question which I will answer in a couple of ways. One is that Israel is a sovereign nation and has a right to defend itself. As the distinguished Senator from Virginia pointed out, it is surrounded 360 degrees by hostile forces on all sides, and it has to make its own decisions for its own self defense.

Second, if Israel starts to clear its judgments with the United States, it

simply makes the United States a party to the action. It makes the United States involved. It is analogized to the 1981 action by Israel in taking out the Iraqi nuclear reactor where the action was independent so that there was no complicity or involvement by the United States.

If Israel is to check every movement with the United States, it goes against its sovereignty and it makes the United States, in effect, a party to that action.

It seems to this Senator that when the news of Colonel Higgins' assassination broke 2 days ago there was great concern and there was great anguish all over the world, including in the U.S. Congress. There were a number of responses which were made. This Senator refrained from saying anything. I could go back to the books and reanalyze the situation and deal with it in a principle context with the citations of authority as to what the United States ought to do by way of arrests, abduction, if necessary, to bring these terrorists to justice and what Israel had done.

Some people responded critically of Israel because of the horrible situation which, apparently, the result of which befall Colonel Higgins. Some criticized the United States for not telling it what to do. Israel was not under any obligation. In fact, it did the United States a favor in not communicating that information. It was under no obligation to do so. In fact, it would put the United States in a compromised position. What happens next? Are they to check with us on everything? Are we our brother's keeper?

Mr. WILSON. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Pennsylvania. I think his response is a correct one. I do not wish to take more of his time. I would say there seems to be a swelling chorus on this floor. I would associate myself with the remarks not only of the Senator from Pennsylvania but those that I heard made by the Senator from Georgia, the Senator from Virginia, and the eloquent commentary from the Senator from Minnesota.

It seems to me that we should not rush to judgment in a situation where there is, in fact, a justification cited by the Senator from Virginia for our ally to make its own decisions based upon its own needs and also we should reflect, as has the Senator from Pennsylvania, on the consequences if, in fact, we were seen as dealing in effect with an agent of the United States.

There is a very grave danger, in my judgment, that the United States would be subjected to the kind of pressure that would lead to the taking of yet more hostages. I think, Mr. President, that the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania is a

focused very wisely upon the setting which we find ourselves in the Middle East.

I thank him for the generosity yielding some of his time to my questions, and I thank him for his amendment which I support.

Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield for the purposes of letting the Senator from Virginia concur in his observations that we should not have an informal ordination between two sovereign nations on this issue of covert action.

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WILSON TYPED



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3444

תאריך : 04.08.89

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חוזם: 8,3444

אל: המשרד

יעדים: בטחון/241, מצב/300

מ:- ווש, נר: 138, תא: 030889, ח: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: א גס: צפא

נד: א

אמ"ק

סודי/מידי

אל : מנהל מצפא

לשכת שהח

לשכת שהבט

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

קונגרס: בני ערובה

1. היום שוחח השגריר עם הקונגרסמנים המילטון ופאסל  
ועם הסנטורים קסטן, דמאטו, הטצ' ומצנבאוס.

2. להלן עיקרי הדברים:

המילטון - השגריר הביע הסתייגותו מדברי הביקורת שהשמיע  
המילטון. המילטון השיב שהשגריר ודאי שם לב לעובדה  
שהסתייגותיו לא התייחסו לגבי זכותה של ישראל לפעול  
כראות עיניה להבטחת בטחונה ושלוש אזרחיה אלא התמקדו  
בהיבט הנוגע לשלומם של האזרחים האמריקנים שעלולים  
להיפגע כתוצאה מפעולותיה של ישראל.  
חזר והדגיש כי ודאי שמנו לב לכך שדבריו כלל אינם דומים  
אלה של הסנטור דול.

פאסל - השגריר הודה לו על התבטאויותיו הפומביות החיוביות.  
פאסל בתגובה אמר כי יש לעמוד על המשמר והמערכה טרם  
הסתיימה. מכל מקום, הפעולה הישראלית ראויה לשבח.

קסטן - שוחח עם המזכיר בייקר שסיפר לו על שיחותיו עם שהח,

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בייקר אמר לו שהינחה את דוברת מחמד שלא להאשים את ישראל  
באחריות לרצח היג'ינס אפילו בצורה עקיפה ולהדגיש זכותה  
הלגיטימית של ישראל לפעול בנושא הטרור כראות עיניה.

דמאטו והטצ' - השגריר הודה להם על התבטאויותיהם ותמיכתם.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

אש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, בנצור  
מצפא, סייבל

1. ВНЕШНЕЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ - ПОСЛАНИЕ КЪ РАССЛАННЫМЪМЪ  
2. ВНЕШНЕЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ - ПОСЛАНИЕ КЪ РАССЛАННЫМЪМЪ  
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7. ВНЕШНЕЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ - ПОСЛАНИЕ КЪ РАССЛАННЫМЪМЪ  
8. ВНЕШНЕЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ - ПОСЛАНИЕ КЪ РАССЛАННЫМЪМЪ



# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3423

תאריך : 04.08.89

נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 8,3423

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/292, מנמת/75

מ-: נוש, נר: 127, תא: 030889, זח: 1700, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: ג: ס: ארבל

נד: 8

אברהם

מיידי/סודי

אל : ארבל 2

מאת : אלי אבידן, וושינגטון

מעטונאי בעל מקורות טובים כאן ובשטח.

1. איראן הודיעה לצלי'א בשם השיעים בלבנון שהם מוכנים לחילופי חטופים. הסורים שגם הם מקיים מגעים עם גורמי הצלי'א הוסיפו שמדובר בחילופין בשני אופנים אפשריים.

(א) החזרת החטופים ללא הישראלים תמורת שיך עביד  
והשיעים שבידי ישראל.

(ב) החזרת החטופים הזרים והשבויים הישראליים תמורת הנל וכן הלבנונים והפלס' שישאל מחזיקה בדרום לבנון. המקור מוסיף שאין הכוונה לפלס' עצורי האינתיפאדה.

אלי אבידן

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, בנוצור, מצפא, ליאור, מזתים, ברנע, ארבל2, סי יבל, משפט

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# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3442

תאריך: 04.08.89

דף 1 מתוך 1

סודי ביותר 14 עותק מתוך 4

נכנס \*\*

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חוזם: 8,3442

אל: המשרד

יעדים: בטחון/237, מצב/290

מ-: ווש, נר: 144, תא: 030889, זח: 2100, דח: ב, סג: סב

תח: גס: צפא

נד: ג

ארכיב

סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר

אל: לשכת שהבט

דע: לשכת רה'מ', לשכת שהח

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

פרשת שייח עובייד

ממקורות יהודים וקונגרסיונליים הגיעו אלי פניות שברור

שמקורן בממשל הממליצים להבטיח ששהותו ומעוררו של שייח

עובייד בישראל תוסדר מבחינה משפטית למקרה שבבוא העת

תתעורר השאלה האם ישראל נהגה בהתאם לנורמות המקובלות

במשפט הבינל ובתפיסתה את האיש.

סביר שרמזים אלו הועברו אלינו בצורה בלתי ישירה כדי

שהממשל במידה ויבקש בבוא העת הסגרתו של שייח עובייד

(ראו פניית מספר חברי קונגרס לנשיא) יוכל להתבסס

על כך ששהותו בישראל היא בהתאם למשפט הבינל.

אוד

רש

אתפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מוכל, ממנכל, בנצור, סייבל

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\*בשמה שקיים חתום על המסמך

\*הוא ציין כי הם הופתעו מהפעולה הישראלית מאחר ולדבריו

\* וְיָמַת הַיּוֹנָה בַּלַּיְתָּהּ פְּלוּרָל יֵשׁ שְׁלֹשׁ כֻּמָּה בַּיּוֹמִי מִמַּשְׁלֵל שֶׁיֵּשׁ יָמֵי שְׁלֹשׁ שָׁנִים

\*לא תנקוט בכל פעולה אשר עלול

\*בני ערובה אמריקאים בלבנון.

\*המזכיר סבור כי ישראל היתה צריכה לקחת בחשבון שפיעולתה

\*בשבוע שעבר עלולה לסכן חייהם של בני ערובה אמריקאים.



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\*תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מוכל, ממנכל, בנצור, סי יבל





# U.S. Tacitly Backed Israel Hostage Swap

By Ann Devroy  
and Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Bush administration gave tacit approval in confidential discussions Monday to Israel's offer to trade a kidnapped Shiite Moslem leader and other Shiite prisoners for Israelis and Westerners being held in Lebanon, administration sources said yesterday.

A U.S. statement that it would not "object" to the proposed swap, which was provided to Israel by Secretary of State James A. Baker III in a telephone conversation from Paris, suggests a greater U.S. role in Israel's offer to exchange the kidnapped Abdul Karim Obeid than had previously been acknowledged by either government.

The previously unreported discussion was interpreted by Israeli officials as a green light for the proposed prisoner-hostage exchange. State Department officials said the discussion was not a U.S. authorization for Israel to propose the swap, though they conceded that Baker made it clear the administration would not oppose the deal being proposed by the government in Jerusalem.

U.S. policy, repeated yesterday by State Department spokesman Margaret Tutwiler, is "that we make no concessions to terrorists holding official or private Americans hostage." Under this

See POLICY, A20, Col. 1

## POLICY, From A1

policy the United States could not itself have made a swap offer such as Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced Monday. Rabin's announcement came shortly after the deadline set by a militant Moslem group for the killing of Lt. Col. William R. Higgins but before news of his death was reported.

Official sources said the U.S.-Israeli deliberations on the prisoner-hostage swap began Monday morning when U.S. Ambassador to Israel William A. Brown met with Rabin in what one source described as a tense meeting that included discussion of the implications and likely aftermath of the kidnapping of Obeid last Friday.

The United States was not informed in advance of the kidnapping, both the Israeli and U.S. governments have stated, despite its possible impact on U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon. President Bush indirectly criticized it Friday, only hours after it was reported, saying that kidnapping is not helpful to the cause of peace.

Rabin, in the conversation with Brown, said the Israeli government intended to announce publicly that it would swap Obeid and all other Shiite prisoners it is holding for three Israeli prisoners held by Shiite groups in Lebanon and all foreign hostages being held there. He said, however, that Israel would not make such a proposal if the United

States criticized it, and asked what the U.S. attitude would be.

Brown immediately sent a message through State Department channels relaying Rabin's question. The Rabin query was sent on to Baker, who was winding up a three-day visit to Paris to participate in an international conference on Cambodia.

After some discussion with others, according to State Department sources, Baker telephoned Brown with the U.S. response. As recited by these sources yesterday, Baker said, "Our policy is we do not negotiate with terrorists. Israel has a different policy. As a result of these various policies, the U.S. government can neither concur in, nor object to, such an Israeli proposal. We cannot authorize any action on our behalf."

The statement from Baker that Washington would not object to such a swap proposal by Israel, even though it is in conflict with U.S. policy, evidently was enough for Rabin to move ahead. In mid-afternoon Monday, Rabin announced the proposed prisoner-hostage exchange.

Late Monday night, after receiving the news and viewing videotapes of Higgins's death, Bush issued a statement calling on "all parties, who hold hostages in the Middle East to release them forthwith, as a humanitarian gesture." Israeli officials said this was in line with the swap offer Rabin had made earlier in the day.

WP p. 1

תפוצה:





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7. למרות שהחלטה (למיטב ידיעתנו) טרם נתקבלה, מעריך כי הוצאתו להורג של טיספיר תאלץ את הנשיא לשקול ברצינות לצוץ מהלך צבאי. עבור שצעד כזה בנסיבות שיוצרו יזכה לתמיכה ציבורית רחבה.

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ד. ס. ס.

תפוצה:



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| דחיפות: בחול לבוקר                  | סגרירות ישראל/וויסינגטון<br>טופס פרוק | קד: 1                         |
| סוג: שמור                           |                                       | כתוב: 6                       |
| תאריך וזמן מעור: 3 באוג' 1989 17:20 | מצי"א                                 | אל:                           |
| פס' פרוק: 88<br>תפרד: 143           |                                       | דע: לשכת שהי"ח<br>לשכת שהבי"ט |
|                                     | קישור לקונגרס                         | כאת:                          |

ביה"ב: בני הערובה

רצ"ב מכתב לנשיא בוש ששוגר אליו היום אח"כ/ביוזמת הקונגרסמן לארקין סמית (רפובליקני ממיסיסיפי).  
(הערה ללשכת שהבי"ט: הני"ל השתף בא"צ עם שהבי"ט בפסקגולה).  
על המכתב חתומים 60 קונגרסמנים מרביחם רפובליקנים.

לדברי עוזרו של סמית, היענות הקונגרסמנים לחתום על המכתב היתה מיידית. רבים מהם הביעו תסכול מהמדיניות האמריקנית בעבר כלפי הטרור וחצורו במדיניות נוקשה ופעילה כלפי הטרוריסטים.

יהודה ורנאי דרנגר.  
יהודה ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה:

AUG 3 '89 18:05 FROM CONG LARKIN SMITH

PAGE.002

**LARKIN SMITH**

5TH DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

RANKING MEMBER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES  
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEES:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

CRIME

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

CONGRESSIONAL TRAVEL &  
TOURISM CAUCUS  
STEERING COMMITTEE

88

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**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

August 3, 1989

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
518 CANNON HOUSE BUILDING  
202: 225-5772DISTRICT OFFICES:  
#1 GOVERNMENT PLAZA  
SUITE 224  
GULFPORT, MS 38501  
801: 864-7570FEDERAL BUILDING #215  
701 MAIN STREET  
HATTIESBURG, MS 38401  
801: 862-3246COUNTIES:  
FOREST, GEORGE, GREENE,  
HANCOCK, HARRISON,  
JACKSON, JONES, LAMAR,  
PEARL RIVER, PERRY, STONE,  
WAYNE

The Honorable George Bush  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are all saddened and outraged by the murder of Marine Corps Lt. Col. William Higgins by Shiite Moslem terrorists in Lebanon. That a member of the United Nation's peacekeeping contingent would be kidnapped and murdered by the Hizbollah reflects the depravity of the Hizbollah, in which Sheik Obaid was a commander.

Contrary to some of the signals being sent from Washington, the murder of Lt. Col. Higgins was not the result of improper action by Israel. Rather this murder was a continuation of the unconscionable terrorist act that began with his kidnapping. It was an irrational act that no reasonable mind can say was an appropriate response to the arrest of a notorious terrorist.

As a commander in the Hizbollah, Sheik Obaid was responsible for all Hizbollah terrorist operations in South Lebanon. Sheik Obaid actively participated in the kidnapping of Lt. Col. Higgins, and in fact provided his home for use in the kidnapping.

The Hizbollah was responsible for the 1983 bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut in which 61 people were killed and the 1983 bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut in which 239 marines were killed.

The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, enacted by the United States Congress, grants authority to the United States to apprehend for trial anyone who commits an act of terrorism against an American citizen anywhere in the world. Sheik Obaid certainly falls into that category. Therefore, we request that the United States ask Israel to extradite Sheik Obaid from Israel to the United States at an appropriate time for the purpose of criminal prosecution, reserving the flexibility for a prisoner exchange, if that option becomes viable.



*Chris M.C.*  
CHRIS M.C.

*Porter J. Goss, M.C.*  
PORTER J. GOSS, M.C.

*Jack Buechner, M.C.*  
JACK BUECHNER, M.C.

*Newt Gingrich, M.C.*  
NEWT GINGRICH, M.C.

*Vin Weber, M.C.*  
VIN WEBER, M.C.

*David Dreier, M.C.*  
DAVID DREIER, M.C.

*Jerry Lewis, M.C.*  
JERRY LEWIS, M.C.

*Bill Lowery, M.C.*  
BILL LOWERY, M.C.

*Bill Paxon, M.C.*  
BILL PAXON, M.C.

*Larry E. Craig, M.C.*  
LARRY E. CRAIG, M.C.

*Joe Barton, M.C.*  
JOE BARTON, M.C.

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Sincerely,

*Larkin Smith, M.C.*  
LARKIN SMITH, M.C.

*Steve Gunderson, M.C.*  
STEVE GUNDERSON, M.C.


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DICK ARNEY, M.C.

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
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
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
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CLYDE C. HOLLOWAY, M.C.




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
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
HOWARD COBLE, M.C.



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JOHN J. RHODES, III, M.C.



JOE SKEEN, M.C.



CASS BALLENGER, M.C.




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
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
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
VIN WEBER, M.C.



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JERRY LEWIS, M.C.



BILL LOWERY, M.C.





















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
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JIM MCCREERY, M.C.  
JOHN G. ROWLAND, M.C.  
J. RHODES, M.C.  
HELEN DELICH BENTLEY, M.C.  
RICHARD H. BAKER, M.C.  
DUNCAN HUNTER, M.C.  
STEVE BARTLETT, M.C.  
FRED UPTON, M.C.  
DENNY SMITH, M.C.  
BILL THOMAS, M.C.  
BUZ LORENS, M.C.  
J. DENNIS HASTERT, M.C.  
MICKEY EDWARDS, M.C.  
DEAN GALLO, M.C.  
ARTHUR RAVENEL JR., M.C.  
BILL MCCOLLUM, M.C.  
LAMAR SMITH, M.C.  
STEVE SCHIFF, M.C.  
GREG LAUGHLIN, M.C.  
BOB STUMP, M.C.


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
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TOM DELAY, M.C.




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
DON SUNDQUIST, M.C.




CRAIG THOMAS, M.C.




MEL HANCOCK, M.C.



JIM LIGHTFOOT, M.C.




CURT WELDON, M.C.




RON MACHTLEY, M.C.




CHRIS SMITH, M.C.




BOB MCEWEN, M.C.




PETER SMITH, M.C.



JAMES T. WALSH, M.C.



MIKE PARKER, M.C.



JIM KOLBE, M.C.





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106

PRESIDENT BUSH AND MUHAMMAD BIN MUBARAK AL KHALIFA, MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BAHRAIN/ANSWER QUESTIONS IN THE OVAL OFFICE  
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC/WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1989

Z-3-1-E page# 1

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Q (In progress) -- Mr. President, are you trying to seek  
justice in the hostage crisis? Do you think that there's --

PRESIDENT BUSH: We've already started --

Q -- any other hostage that is in danger?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, we are considering that that might well  
be the case, given statements that we've seen. And yes, indeed, I  
-- my old friend, we have started to discuss it, and I'm not going  
to put words in his mouth, but he expressed his concern. You're  
free to say something if you want to. It's your -- you're our  
guest.

MINISTER MUHAMMED: Mr. President, I would like to express our  
condemnation for such terrorist acts, which we think is not aimed  
against United States, but against all humans everywhere. This man,  
Colonel Higgins, is an international figure; he represents the  
United Nations. He is an American citizen, but he is a world  
citizen. And the attack on him is really against us all, and we  
think worldwide -- not only condemnation, but action should be taken  
to stop such acts.

Q What action are you going to take, Mr. President? Are  
you considering anything?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, you can just rest assured that we are  
going about our business in a -- I'd say a prudent way, and not --  
with a heavy heart, obviously, because of the feeling that the  
Minister expressed on behalf of the whole world, but the feeling  
that I feel just so personally about what happened to Colonel  
Higgins.

But I would just leave it, Helen, that please assume we are --  
we are thinking prudently about this matter in every way possible.  
We have exercised every diplomatic channel that I can think of --  
some personal, some through our Secretary of State and our National  
Security Advisor. We've been in touch, I have personally, with many  
world leaders, and our State Department has fleshed this out. So  
we're leaving no stone unturned. But regrettably, as you know sir,  
we're dealing with less than a full deck when it comes to  
information. It is very hard when you're dealing with this kind of  
cowardice and this kind of dastardly act to --

Q Mr. President, do you have any --

PRESIDENT BUSH: -- get all the -- all the information that you  
need to make a decision.

Q You said you've received assurances from many of the

Z

JA



PRESIDENT BUSH AND MUHAMMAD BIN MUBARAK AL KHALIFA, MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SAUDI ARABIA/ANSWER QUESTIONS IN THE OVAL OFFICE  
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC/WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1989

-3-1-E page# 2

other countries that you've contacted that they will be able to help with the situation. Is there anything you can tell us today that you have some new confidence about?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I feel that everybody I have talked to, and including my distinguished guest here, would do everything they can to try to help. And yet, they face the same problems that we face when it comes to information and trying to find out exactly what happened. We are not dealing with all the facts, but I have had assurance after assurance from world leaders that they want to help. I'm sure you know, I was very recently on the phone with Margaret Thatcher, and many others, several others today, and quite a few yesterday. And so it transcends religion; it transcends alliances. It gets in, as the Minister said, to a matter that concerns the entire civilized world. And so we will keep on trying.

And in the meantime, we've got -- got to go about our business, and I'm doing that. I'm not -- but I don't want anyone in this country or around the world to think that it is anything of other than tremendous concern. But we must prudently move on with the business of our country.

(Cross talk.)

Q Mr. President, would it help if the Israelis released Sheikh Obeid?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I have made clear the position of the United States that I think a release of everyone held against their will would be a good thing.

STAFF: Thank you. Lights.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Thanks a lot.

STAFF: Thank you. Just go through please.

Q How about -- (inaudible) -- Mr. President? Are you planning any kind of military action?

PRESIDENT BUSH: We are prudently planning. Like, that's all I'm going to say about it.

END

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3

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# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2307

\* תאריך : 03.08.89 \*

\* דף 1 מתוך 5 \*

\* עותק 1 מתוך 12 סודי ביותר נכנס \*\* \*

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\* חוזם: 8,2307 \*

\* אל: המשרד \*

\* יעדים: מצב/197, בטחון/164 \*

\* מ-: ווש, נר: 88, תא: 020889, זח: 1830, דח: מ, סג: סב \*

\* תח: פ גס: צפא \*

\* נד: פ \*

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\* סודי ביותר/מיד \*

\*

\* ח.ר.ב. \*

\*

\* אל : סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופרנ' \*

\*

\* דע : יועץ מדיני לשה"ח, לשכת שהב"ט \*

\* לשכת רה"מ' \*

\*

\* מאת: שג' וושינגטון \*

\*

\* שייחת השגריר - סקורופט (1.8) \*

\*

\* 1. בפתח הפגישה (שהתקיימה לבקשת השגריר) סיפר השגריר

\* כי סנטורים עמם נפגש סיפרו על שמועות שלפיהן דחתה

\* ישראל בקשת הממשל לשחרר את עובי"ד. הוסיף כי נאמר

\* לו שאלמלא שמועות אלו, לא היה הסנטור דול מתבטא

\* כפי שהתבטא. השגריר הבהיר לאנשי שיחו כי פניה כזו

\* לא נעשתה. \*

\*

\* 2. השגריר עמד על ההשלכות השליליות שיש לשמועות מאין

\* אלו על היחסים הוסיף כי הדימוי שמתקבל הוא של מאמץ

\* אמריקאי לקחת מרחק מישראל ונסיון להאשים אותנו באחריות

\* להריגת קולונל היג'נס. שמועות ודימויים אלו הדגיש

\* השגריר אינם יוצרים אוירה חיובית ועלולים להשפיע לרעה

\* על היחסים לאחר שאירועים אלו יהיו מאחורינו. \*

\*

\* 3. בהתייחסו לשיחתו עם איגלברגר ולשאלות אותן העלה



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\*13. AMT:7062,8

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*  
\* דף 2 מתוך 5  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 12  
\*

\* המזכיר במכתבו לרוה'מ' האחרון העיר השגריר כי האירועים  
\* סביב עובייד כמו גם חטיפתו של היג'נס לא החלו ביום  
\* שישי (28/7).  
\*

\* 4. סקורופט שאישר דברי השגריר העיר כי המצב הפך לאקוטי  
\* שכן, פעולתנו יצרה מצב חדש. האירוע של חטיפת עובייד  
\* יצר שרשרת אירועים.  
\*

\* 5. מכאן ועד לטענות התקשורת בדבר קשר ישיר בין פעולתנו  
\* והריגת היג'נס הדגיש השגריר המרחק הרב. השגריר חזר  
\* והתייחס להשלכות השליליות של הדימוי שהצליח לחדור  
\* חלקית לתודעת הציבור ולפיו, לא זו בלבד שהממשל מנסה  
\* להתרחק מ ישראל, אלא שישראל מוצגת כאחראית למותו של  
\* היג'נס וככזו שאינה מגלה רגישות לחיי החטופים וזאת  
\* בשעה שגם לנו יש מספר שבויים שאת חייהם אנו מסכנים  
\* גם כן.  
\*

\* 6. סקורופט בתגובה העיר כי חיילינו אינם מהווים את  
\* אותו LEVERAGE כמו החטופים האמריקאים שערכם בעיני  
\* הטיוריסטים עולה על ערך שבויינו.  
\*

\* 7. השגריר ציין כי המצב אותו מתאר סקורופט הוא תוצאה  
\* של הדרך שבה ארה"ב בחרה להציג הנושא.  
\*

\* 8. סקורופט הוסיף כי תשומת הלב במקרה ושבו ישראל  
\* יוצא להורג תהיה קטנה בהשוואה לתשומת הלב בעקבות  
\* הוצאה להורג של חטוף אמריקאי. מעמדן השונה של שתי  
\* המדינות, והיחס השונה לגבי דרך הטיפול בטיוריסטים  
\* חזר סקורופט וציין הוא שגורם לכך שמשמעות הוצאה  
\* להורג היא שונה.  
\*

\* 9. השגריר ציין משמעות האירוע תלויה באופן התייחסות  
\* ארה"ב לנושא. הוסיף כי הקירבה בין ארה"ב לישראל  
\* בסוגיית המאבק בטיור גדולה יותר מקירבה למדינות  
\* אחרות. ומכאן שיש לעשות מאמץ ולמנוע הדיפרנציאציה  
\* אותה העלה סקורופט.  
\*

\* 10. סקורופט חזר ועמד על השוני מבחינת האימפאקט הפוליטי  
\* והרווחים שאותם יכולים הטיוריסטים להשיג מחטיפת  
\* בני ערובה אמריקאים לעומת בני ערובה ישראלים.  
\*



\* 4109 E      0817 St

\*שם פרטי  
\*שם משפחה  
\*תאריך לידה

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\*החלטות ועניינים שיש להם חשיבות רבה  
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\*החלטות שיש להם חשיבות רבה  
\*החלטות שיש להם חשיבות רבה  
\*החלטות שיש להם חשיבות רבה

\*01. סקטור המסחר והשירותים  
\*02. סקטור המסחר והשירותים  
\*03. סקטור המסחר והשירותים  
\*04. סקטור המסחר והשירותים  
\*05. סקטור המסחר והשירותים  
\*06. סקטור המסחר והשירותים  
\*07. סקטור המסחר והשירותים  
\*08. סקטור המסחר והשירותים  
\*09. סקטור המסחר והשירותים  
\*10. סקטור המסחר והשירותים

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*  
\* דף 3 מתוך 5  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 12  
\*

\*  
\* 11. בהתייחסו לפעולת צה"ל הדגיש השגריר כי היתה מכוונת  
\* לתפיסתו של עובייד אשר היה מעורב בביצוע ותכנון מעשי  
\* טירור כולל חטיפתו של היגינס. בהתייחסו לדברי הנשיא  
\* (בסוף השבוע שעבר) הקשה השגריר: "לאפיין את פעולתנו  
\* כאקט המנוגד למאמצי השלום, איזה מאמצי שלום יש לנו  
\* עם חזבאללה?".

\*  
\* 12. השגריר הוסיף כי לנוכח היעדר מידע בדוק לגבי  
\* נסיבות ועיתוי מותו של היגינס, נסיון להגיע למסקנות  
\* ולניסוח מדיניות חדשה הינו מוקדם ועלול להחליש נחישות  
\* מדינות אחרות להיאבק בטירור. השגריר ציטט מדברים  
\* שהשמיע בוש במהלך דיון במכון יונתן ב-79:-

\*  
\* "IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY KNOWN CURE OR PREVENTION  
\* I MUST URGE DRASTIC SURGERY AS THE ONLY REASONABLE  
\* COURSE AND BY THAT I MEAN DETERMINED ACTION FIRMNESS  
\* UNDER THE DURESS OF BLACKMAIL AND SWIFT AND EFFECTIVE  
\* RETRIBUTION".

\*  
\* 13. בהמשך לדברי איגלברגר לשגריר העיר סקורופט:

\*  
\* א. הצהרת הנשיא ביום שישי החולף נעשתה בהיעדר כל מידע  
\* מצידנו לגבי סיבו, עיתוי ומטרות תפיסתו של עובייד.  
\* מאחר והנשיא נשאל לא יכל היה להתחמק ממתן תשובה.  
\* השגריר בתגובה הזכיר כי מיד לאחר המבצע העברנו מידע  
\* לשגריר בראון. סקורופט העיר בתגובה: "מידע לא  
\* העבר אלינו לא אז וגם לא עכשיו לגבי המטרות האמיתיות  
\* של פעולתכם. כונתי למידע שהיה מאפשר לנשיא לדעת מה  
\* יורה".

\*  
\* ב. ארה"ב אינה תומכת ברעיון של ביצוע עסקות לשחרור  
\* החטופים. לו זו היתה מדיניותם, כי אז היו לוחצים  
\* על כוונת לשחרר העצורים הכלואים אצלם. לדבריו לא  
\* היה קשה להעריך כי לאחר תפיסת השייך ירצה ארגון  
\* החזבאללה להפעיל לחץ על ארה"ב. הוסיף: "ומהו אמצעי  
\* טוב יותר מהיגינס?". השיקול של מניעת סיכון חיייהם  
\* של החטופים האמריקאים עומד לנגד עיניהם בקביעת מדיניותם



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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 4 מתוך 5 \*  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 12 \*

\* במזה'ת בשנים האחרונות. 'בכנות, אני חושב שזו  
\* היתה בעיה תקשורתית בינינו שלא שיתפתם אותנו בתוכניותיכם  
\* ולא עזרתם לנו להבין מטרותיכם. שאלותיו של לארי  
\* לא היו צריכות להשאל'.

\* 14. השגריר ציין כי להערכתנו עשינו (בפעולה) שירות  
\* לנו ולהם. סבור שטוב עשינו שלא נועצנו בהם. אילו  
\* היינו עושים זאת היינו מכניסים אותם ואותנו למצב  
\* אקשה.

\* 15. סקורופט הוסיף כי לדעתו בתכנון פעולה מסוג זה  
\* צריכים להלקח בחשבון תוצאות צפויות של הפעולה אחרי  
\* הביצוע. אנו צריכים להסביר המוטיבים וכל זאת כדי  
\* שיינו מה עשינו ומדוע לא ספרנו להם. כל זה ציין  
\* לא נעשה.

\* 16. ארה'ב הדגיש סקורופט אינה מנסה להתרחק מישראל.  
\* אך אין ספק שהפעולה סיבכה את המצב אותו הגזיר כקשה  
\* מאוד מבחינתם.

\* 17. השגריר ציין כי פעולתנו עשויה ליצור אופציות  
\* חדשות שלא היו קודם לכן. הוסיף כי הדימוי של התרחקות  
\* יקשה מאוד לחזור לנקודה שבה היינו ערב הפעולה.

\* 18. סקורופט ציין כי להערכתו מנעה הצהרת הנשיא (31/7)  
\* הוצאות נוספות להורג. זו היתה מטרת ההצהרה. לא היה  
\* בדבריו כונה להעביר מסר לישראל. לדבריו היו מעדיפים  
\* שלא לצאת בהצהרות. יחד עם זאת, שתיקת הנשיא עלולה  
\* היתה לגרום להוצאתו להורג של חטוף נוסף דבר שהיה  
\* גורר ביקורת על הנשיא שלא עשה דבר.

\* 19. השגריר ציין כי יש לנסח מדיניות אשר תהפוך לקיחת  
\* בני ערובה לדבר לא אטרקטיבי והוסיף כי ניתן לתאר  
\* גישתם כלפי בני הערובה האמריקאים כ- BENIGN NEGLECT.

\* 20. סקורופט דחה הטענה כאילו ניתן לאפיין את מדיניותם  
\* בנושא בני הערובה כ- BENIGN NEGLECT. הוסיף כי תפיסתם  
\* של בני ערובה ישראלים אינה עומדת בראש סולם העדיפויות  
\* של הטירוריסטים. חושב שהשיקול המנחה את החוטפים הוא  
\* לקיחת בני ערובה שנותנים להם פרסום מירבי. 'תפיסת



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\* 001 2

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\*א.ר. (ה'תשנ"ב) ז'שט ווערענדיגט ים זייצ פראגאט.  
 ז'ה. סתם זענען דא ז'שט זענען דאס. סתם ז'ה.  
 זענען זענען דאס ז'ה ז'ה ז'ה ז'ה ז'ה ז'ה.  
 ז'ה.

[illegible]

\*ה'תשנ"ב חשוון כ"א  
\*ה'תשנ"ב חשוון כ"א  
\*ה'תשנ"ב חשוון כ"א

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\*91. חתום על שם הממשלה: ד"ר חיים שנייד  
 \*92. חתום על שם הממשלה: ד"ר חיים שנייד  
 \*93. חתום על שם הממשלה: ד"ר חיים שנייד

המחלקה לא תפיק תוצאות חיוביות אלא אם כן תהיה  
התאמה בין המידע שהתקבל מהמקורות השונים  
למידע שהתקבל מהמקורות השונים. במקרה  
הזה, המידע שהתקבל מהמקורות השונים  
יהיה זהה למידע שהתקבל מהמקורות השונים.

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 5 מתוך 5 \*  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 12 \*

\* ישראלים אינה נותנת פרסום מירבי'.

\* 21. בהתייחסו לדווחי התקשורת ציין כי אינם שולטים  
\* בפרסום. לדבריו העניקה העתונות במערב יתרונות רבים  
\* לטירוריסטים בכך שאפשרה להם להעביר המסר שלהם.

\* 22. גייטס (סגנו של סקורופט) העיר כי שעה ששבוינו  
\* הם אנשי צבא הנכנסים לקטגוריה של שבויי מלחמה הרי  
\* שהחטופים האמריקאים (להוציא היגינס) הינם אזרחים  
\* תמימים הבדל זה הוא שגורם לכך שהאימפאקט הפוליטי  
\* הוא שונה (הערה: בכך ביקש גייטס לחזק את טענת סקורופט  
\* לגבי השוני שבין אנשינו המחזקים בידי החזבאללה לאנשיהם).

\* 23. סקורופט ביקש לסיים בהערה אישית של ידיד. לדבריו  
\* מאז ינואר חש שהתקשורת בין שתי המדינות איננה כפי  
\* שהיתה זכורה לו בעבר. איננו חש באותו אופן וחילופי  
\* דעות לגבי בעיות ופרספקטיבות שאותן היה רוצה לראות.  
\* אינני חש שממשלתי מתנהגת אחרת ממה שזכור לי'.

\* 24. השגריר הגיב כי מצטער לשמוע שזו תחושתו. מקווה  
\* שיעשה ככל יכולתו כדי לשנות המצב.

\* 25. לסיום חזר השגריר והביע תקווה שממשל יפעל להכחשת  
\* השמועה שישראל דחתה, כביכול, בקשת הממשל לשחרר את  
\* עובדיד.

\* 26. סקורופט הבהיר כי לא יודע על העברת מסר זה. אינו  
\* סבור שהשמועה יצאה מהממשל.

\* השתתפו בשיחה: גייטס, האס והח'מ'.

\* שטיין. =

\* רש

\* תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור





\* 2307

\* תאריך: 03.08.89

\* נכנס \*\*

\* סודי ביותר

\* דף 1 מתוך 5

\* עותק 2 מתוך 12

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\* חוזם: 8,2307

\* אל: המשרד

\* יעדים: מצב/197, בטחון/164

\* מ-: ווש, נר: 88, תא: 020889, ח: 1830, דח: מ, סג: סב

\* תח: &amp; גס: צפא

\* נד: &amp;

\* סודי ביותר/מיד

\* ח.ר.ב.

\* אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופרנ'

\* דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח, לשכת שהב"ט

\* לשכת רה"מ

\* מאת: שג' וושינגטון

\* שיחת השגריר - סקורופט (1.8)

1. בפתח הפגישה (שהתקיימה לבקשת השגריר) סיפר השגריר כי סנטורים עמם נפגש סיפרו על שמועות שלפיהן דחתה ישראל בקשת הממשל לשחרר את עובייד. הוסיף כי נאמר לו שאלמלא שמועות אלו, לא היה הסנטור דול מתבטא כפי שהתבטא. השגריר הבהיר לאנשי שיחו כי פניה כזו לא נעשתה.

2. השגריר עמד על ההשלכות השליליות שיש לשמועות מאין אלו על היחסים הוסיף כי הדימוי שמתקבל הוא של מאמץ אמריקאי לקחת מרחק מישראל ונסיון להאשים אותנו באחריות להריגת קולונל היג'נס. שמועות ודימויים אלו הדגיש השגריר אינם יוצרים אווירה חיובית ועלולים להשפיע לרעה על היחסים לאחר שאירועים אלו יהיו מאחורינו.

3. בהתיחסו לשיחתו עם איגלברגר ולשאלות אותן העלה

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 2 מתוך 5

\* עותק 2 מתוך 12

\* המזכיר במכתבו לרוה"מ האחרון העיר השגריר כי האירועים סביב עובייד כמו גם חטיפתו של היג'נס לא החלו ביום שישי (28/7).

\* 4. סקורופט שאישר דברי השגריר העיר כי המצב הפך לאקוטי שכן, פעולתנו יצרה מצב חדש. האירוע של חטיפת עובייד יצר שרשרת אירועים.

5. מכאן ועד לטענות התקשורת בדבר קשר ישיר בין פעולתנו והריגת היג'נס הדגיש השגריר המרחק הרב. השגריר חזר והתייחס להשלכות השליליות של הדימוי שהצליח לחדור חלקית לתודעת הציבור ולפיו, לא זו בלבד שהממשל מנסה להתרחק מישראל, אלא שישראל מוצגת כאחראית למותו של היג'נס וככזו שאינה מגלה רגישות לחיי החטופים וזאת בשעה שגם לנו יש מספר שבויים שאת חייהם אנו מסכנים גם כן.

6. סקורופט בתגובה העיר כי חיילינו אינם מהווים את אותו LEVERAGE כמו החטופים האמריקאים שערכם בעיני הטירוריסטים עולה על ערך שבויינו.

7. השגריר ציין כי המצב אותו מתאר סקורופט הוא תוצאה של הדרך שבה ארה"ב בחרה להציג הנושא.

8. סקורופט הוסיף כי תשומת הלב במקרה ושבו ישראל יוצא להורג תהיה קטנה בהשוואה לתשומת הלב בעקבות הוצאה להורג של חטוף אמריקאי. מעמדן השונה של שתי המדינות, והיחס השונה לגבי דרך הטיפול בטירוריסטים חזר סקורופט וציין הוא שגורם לכך שמשמעות ההוצאה להורג היא שונה.

9. השגריר ציין משמעות האירוע תלויה באופן התייחסות ארה"ב לנושא. הוסיף כי הקירבה בין ארה"ב לישראל בסוגיית המאבק בטירור גדולה יותר מקירבה למדינות אחרות. ומכאן שיש לעשות מאמץ ולמנוע דיפרנציאציה אותה העלה סקורופט.

10. סקורופט חזר ועמד על השוני מבחינת האימפאקט הפוליטי והרווחים שאותם יכולים הטירוריסטים להשיג מחטיפת בני ערובה אמריקאים לעומת בני ערובה ישראלים.







משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 5  
עותק 2 מתוך 12

11. בהתייחסו לפעולת צה"ל הדגיש השגריר כי היתה מכוונת לתפיסתו של עובייד אשר היה מעורב בביצוע ותכנון מעשי טירור כולל חטיפתו של היג'נס. בהתייחסו לדברי הנשיא (בסוף השבוע שעבר) הקשה השגריר: 'לאפיין את פעולתו כאקט המנוגד למאמצי השלום, איזה מאמצי שלום יש לנו עם חזבאללה?'

12. השגריר הוסיף כי לנוכח היעדר מידע בדוק לגבי נסיבות ועיתוי מותו של היג'נס, נסיון להגיע למסקנות ולניסוח מדיניות חדשה הינו מוקדם ועלול להחליש נחישות מדינות אחרות להיאבק בטירור. השגריר ציטט מדברים שהשמיע בוש במהלך דיון במכון יונתן ב-79:-

'IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY KNOWN CURE OR PREVENTION I MUST URGE DRASTIC SURGERY AS THE ONLY REASONABLE COURSE AND BY THAT I MEAN DETERMINED ACTION FIRMNESS UNDER THE DURESS OF BLACKMAIL AND SWIFT AND EFFECTIVE RETRIBUTION'.

13. בהמשך לדברי איגלברגר לשגריר העיר סקורופט:

א. הצהרת הנשיא ביום שישי החולף נעשתה בהיעדר כל מידע מצידנו לגבי סיבו, עיתוי ומטרות תפיסתו של עובייד. מאחר והנשיא נשאל לא יכל היה להתחמק ממתן תשובה. השגריר בתגובה הזכיר כי מיד לאחר המבצע העברנו מידע לשגריר בראון. סקורופט העיר בתגובה: 'מידע לא העבר אלינו לא אז וגם לא עכשיו לגבי המטרות האמיתיות של פעולתכם. כונתי למידע שהיה מאפשר לנשיא לדעת מה יקרה'.

ב. ארה"ב אינה תומכת ברעיון של ביצוע עסקות לשחרור החטופים. לו זו היתה מדיניותם, כי אז היו לוחצים על כוונת לשחרר העצורים הכלואים אצלם. לדבריו לא היה קשה להעריך כי לאחר תפיסת השייך ירצה ארגון החזבאללה להפעיל לחץ על ארה"ב. הוסיף: 'ומהו אמצעי טוב יותר מהיג'נס?'. השיקול של מניעת סיכון חיייהם של החטופים האמריקאים עומד לנגד עיניהם בקביעת מדיניותם

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 4 מתוך 5  
עותק 2 מתוך 12

במזה"ת בשנים האחרונות. 'בכנות, אני חושב שזו היתה בעיה תקשורתית בינינו שלא שיתפתם אותנו בתוכניותיכם ולא עזרתם לנו להבין מטרותיכם. שאלותיו של לארי לא היו צריכות להשאל'.

14. השגריר ציין כי להערכתו עשינו (בפעולה) שירות לנו ולהם. סבור שטוב עשינו שלא נועצנו בהם. אילו היינו עושים זאת היינו מכניסים אותם ואותנו למצב קשה.

15. סקורופט הוסיף כי לדעתו בתכנון פעולה מסוג זה צריכים להלקח בחשבון תוצאות צפויות של הפעולה אחרי הביצוע. אנו צריכים להסביר המוטיבים וכל זאת כדי שבינו מה עשינו ומדוע לא ספרנו להם. כל זה ציין לא נעשה.

16. ארה"ב הדגיש סקורופט אינה מנסה להתרחק מישראל. אך אין ספק שהפעולה סיבכה את המצב אותו הגדיר כקשה מאוד מבחינתם.

17. השגריר ציין כי פעולתנו עשויה ליצור אופציות חדשות שלא היו קודם לכן. הוסיף כי הדימוי של התרחקות יקשה מאוד לחזור לנקודה שבה היינו ערב הפעולה.

18. סקורופט ציין כי להערכתו מנעה הצהרת הנשיא (31/7) הוצאות נוספות להורג. זו היתה מטרת ההצהרה. לא היה בדבריו כונה להעביר מסר לישראל. לדבריו היו מעדיפים שלא לצאת בהצהרות. יחד עם זאת, שתיתק הנשיא עלולה היתה לגרום להוצאתו להורג של חטוף נוסף דבר שהיה גורר ביקורת על הנשיא שלא עשה דבר.

19. השגריר ציין כי יש לנסח מדיניות אשר תהפוך לקיחת בני ערובה לדבר לא אטרקטיבי והוסיף כי ניתן לתאר גישתם כלפי בני הערובה האמריקאים כ- BENIGN NEGLECT.

20. סקורופט דחה הטענה כאילו ניתן לאפיין את מדיניותם בנושא בני הערובה כ- BENIGN NEGLECT. הוסיף כי תפיסתם של בני ערובה ישראלים אינה עומדת בראש סולם העדיפויות של הטיירוסיטים. חושב שהשיקול המנחה את החוטפים הוא לקיחת בני ערובה שנותנים להם פרסום מירבי. 'תפיסת

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 5 מתוך 5  
עותק 2 מתוך 12

ישראלים אינה נותנת פרסום מירבי'.

21. בהתייחסו לדוחי התקשורת ציין כי אינם שולטים בפרסום. לדבריו העניקה העתונות במערב יתרונות רבים לטיירוסיטים בכך שאפשרה להם להעביר המסר שלהם.

22. גייטס (סגנו של סקורופט) העיר כי שעה ששבויינו הם אנשי צבא הנכנסים לקטגוריה של שבויי מלחמה הרי שהחטופים האמריקאים (להוציא היג'נס) הינם אזרחים תמימים הבדל זה הוא שגורם לכך שהאימפקט הפוליטי הוא שונה (הערה: בכך ביקש גייטס לחזק את טענת סקורופט לגבי השוני שבין אנשינו המחזקים בידי החזבאללה לאנשיהם).

23. סקורופט ביקש לסיים בהערה אישית של ידיד. לדבריו מאז ינואר חש שהתקשורת בין שתי המדינות איננה כפי שהיתה זכורה לו בעבר. איננו חש באותו אמון וחילופי דעות לגבי בעיות ופרספקטיבות שאותן היה רוצה לראות. אינני חש שממשלתי מתנהגת אחרת ממה שזכור לי'.

24. השגריר הגיב כי מצטער לשמוע שזו תחושתו. מקווה שיעשה ככל יכולתו כדי לשנות המצב.

25. לסיום חזר השגריר והביע תקווה שממשל יפעל להכחשת השמועה שישראל דחתה, כביכול, בקשת הממשל לשחרר את עובייד.

26. סקורופט הבהיר כי לא יודע על העברת מסר זה. אינו סבור שהשמועה יצאה מהממשל.

השתתפו בשיחה: גייטס, האס והח"מ'.

שטיין. =

רש

תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור



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MS. TUTWILER: As I tried to articulate, this is aimed at the system not at any specific country, and it's something the administration thinks is well worth looking at in order to give us the very flexibility that you allude to in light of, let's take a for instance, the unbelievable changes that have gone on in Eastern Europe.

Q So you are not at all necessarily opposed to the outcome of what he's proposing?

MS. TUTWILER: The only way I want to characterize it for today is as I have, is that we have discussed this, the Secretary has discussed it with the Minority Leader and that I have said there are meetings scheduled to further discuss this -- with the congressional leadership.

Q The administration appears to be looking at it from an earmarking point of view --

MS. TUTWILER: Correct.

Q I -- it sort of struck me that what the Senator is saying is that we are looking at a very different world, and because of that different world money is going to have to be allocated in different ways in the future. Is that how the administration also views it?

MS. TUTWILER: Without specifically commenting on the specifics of Senator Dole's proposal that was in the newspaper today, we have said in this basket, or this subject, yes, we as an administration are concerned about earmarks because they do the very thing you have just mentioned. They limit an administration, a President's flexibility to react to changes that happen in the world. Margaret when is this meeting that you have scheduled with the Hill -- Hill leaders?

MS. TUTWILER: There are none -- there are none that are scheduled right this moment that I know of, but they'll be soon.

Q Well, if you have no earmarks, would the administration be inclined of its own accord to redistribute some of the money a little bit? That's a matter of priority not earmarks. I mean what is the administration's thinking? Is it your view that more money needs to go to countries like Eastern Europe and a little less to those who are getting a lot right now? I mean that's a priority matter.

MS. TUTWILER: The way we choose to view this is that we believe that an administration and a President needs more flexibility -- without getting into the specifics of your question of someone gets less, someone gets more, someone gets just about as much, I am not going to do that. We very strongly feel that earmarking limits a President's flexibility.

Q But you need to. When you go off to Capitol Hill, you -- in order to get money you have to tell them what your priorities are before they give you money. And the administration lists their priorities all the time. And this is a broader question about priorities, not earmarking.



MS. TUTWILER: The question came at me as "does the administration have a response to Senator Dole's article that's in the paper today?" I've answered the question. I've said what the administration's position is in general on this. Any negotiations or discussions, at a time that the Secretary of State will be doing on behalf of the President and the administration will be done in private. I'm sure.

Q Margaret, can I put that maybe -- try it a different way? Is it the case that the administration feels that in order to respond to the recent events, it needs more flexibility in order to increase aid to Eastern European countries that are trying to throw off shackles of communism?

MS. TUTWILER: The administration needs more flexibility. That is one "for instance" which you have mentioned, which I have mentioned of Eastern Europe. There are other changes that go on in the world -- EPanamaF comes to mind -- where the administration needs more flexibility. As you know, Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and the Deputy Secretary of the ETreasury DepartmentF are currently working on recommendations for funds for Panama. That is another "for instance" example of where an administration needs flexibility to find funds.

Q Can we -- can we also assume that the total aid budget is not going to be increased in these times of budgetary constraints, so if some people get more, other people, logically speaking, will have to get less?

MS. TUTWILER: There is a certain pie, as you all know, and it all gets divided. And if you have it already earmarked, already determined where it's going to go without leaving an administration flexibility, that can present, in our opinion, a president and an administration a problem. You're constrained.

Q Margaret, would you --

Q Margaret, despite what you said about the system, is -- are you sending a message specifically to Israel here to be more flexible?

MS. TUTWILER: I'm not sending a message to anyone, to any country. And that's why we were very specific to say that this was a problem, as we see it, or this is aimed at the system, not at any one country.

Q The new EbudgetF due out the 29th of January -- will these consultations with the congressional leaders take place before that date?

MS. TUTWILER: I don't know. I'll ask for you. I don't know. All I know is soon.

Q Margaret, you stated --

Q Margaret, does this have anything -- a follow-up please? Does this have anything to do with the problem of Third World debt? Is it in the minds of those who are discussing the problem?



MS. TUTWILER: If a situation popped up in the Third World that was -- fell into the line of a changing situation, something you did not anticipate, something you had not thought of, it all goes under the category -- I don't how to better explain this -- of flexibility being given to a president and to an administration, whether it's Third World, whether it's Panama, whether it's Eastern Europe, to be able to react and allocate your resources to a changing world.

Q And this President wants, with a --

MS. TUTWILER: More flexibility.

Q -- with a limited pie, this President wants to reallocate the pie.

MS. TUTWILER: I did not say that.

Q No? You want the flexibility to be able to reallocate the pie.

MS. TUTWILER: In principle, the President wants -- without taking this specific, this moment in time -- in principle, his belief of flexibility to allocate funds in a changing world.

Q Well, let's take this moment in time since the world is changing. So it sounds to me like what the President wants is the ability to redistribute the pie. However much is in there, he wants -- this President, this administration -- wants the ability to rewrite the way that those dollars go out.

MS. TUTWILER: I am only answering this as a general -- as a point of principle. I am not specifically discussing this budget, next year's budget, the year after that's budget. I am not doing that. I was asked for a

Leader floated this morning or put in the newspaper this morning. And our administration is taking the opportunity to voice our opinions in principle, in general, on flexibility for this administration and future administrations.

Q Margaret, did the Senator float this idea at the behest of Mr. Baker?

MS. TUTWILER: Not to my knowledge -- no.

Q Did Mr. Baker tell him to go ahead and try it out? Isn't he the trial balloon for the administration?

MS. TUTWILER: You'd have to ask the Senator. That is not -- I haven't heard anything along those lines, Barry. And instead of -- I want to take back the word "float." I should not have used "float." This was his --

Q (Inaudible.)

MS. TUTWILER: This was his idea that he put out. We're responding to his idea. And I said that the Secretary has discussed this matter and that there are meetings planned.



Q I know, and while you talk about general principles and all, for years, administrations, Democratic and Republican, have argued strenuously and sometimes futilely that foreign aid is a very necessary tool of foreign policy. Congress is -- it's a very small part of what is spent by this government overseas. And usually, the tug of war is with a reluctant Congress -- convincing people on the Hill that foreign aid is an inexpensive way to promote foreign policy.

It sounds to me as if this administration, based on what you said today and what Mr. Dole said, is about to change things. In other words, you're talking about a pie as if a pie is always finite. And you're going to rob from Peter to pay Paul. It's -- aren't

countries that need -- the assumption would be that countries that are receiving aid that now will get less aid weren't deserving of the aid in the first place. Wouldn't it be better to expand the pie and take it out of, maybe, programs like ESDIF, perhaps?

MS. TUTWILER: That's a decision for others to make, and you're assuming that decisions have been made. I don't believe I've come out here and said any type of decision has been made.

Q No, but you're making --

MS. TUTWILER: I've said --

Q -- a different sort of case about foreign aid --

MS. TUTWILER: I'm making a case for flexibility, which seems eminently reasonable and falls in line with what you're saying. This department does believe that foreign funds are very necessary, very important, do support our foreign policy, et cetera. All an administration is asking for is for a consideration of allowing, whether it's this president or the next president, flexibility to take into (effect ?) things change. The world changes. Look at Eastern Europe today.

Q Is there an extent to which this is being floated or brought up right now at a time when Baker is admittedly frustrated with the EMideastF peace process and its pace?

MS. TUTWILER: No.

Q Is this a coincidence?

MS. TUTWILER: Correct.

Q On your very first statement you made about this debate, you made a reference to the constitutional side of it. What does this have to do with the Constitution?

MS. TUTWILER: A president's constitutional authority is to conduct the foreign policy of this country. That is what we mean by this, that a president needs -- he is elected by the people for some flexibility. I don't understand why somehow I'm not getting through here. That is all we are talking about, is a president having flexibility to make decisions, to consider, to be able to have

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the option, to have the flexibility to look at in light of changing situations. I've given two. Alan mentioned Eastern Europe, and so did John McWethy. We've talked about Panama. Things change during a year. The best example is last year.

Q This gives the impression of a confrontation, a constitutional dispute --

MS. TUTWILER: No.

Q -- between the Capitol Hill and the White House.

MS. TUTWILER: Between where?

Q Between the Congress and the presidency.

MS. TUTWILER: It is something that is being discussed. It is something they are meeting on. I don't know how more forthcoming to be.

Q Margaret --

Q Margaret, can you -- can you explain to me the rationale of the Congress increasing the aid this year to Israel \$661 million over the \$2 billion that Israel receives?

MS. TUTWILER: No. Maybe you can best address your question up on the Hill.

Q Margaret, you cited the President's constitutional responsibilities in the foreign policy area. The answer that you always get on this from the Congress is, Congress has the constitutional responsibility to appropriate the money and to exercise some oversight over how it is spent, and that the reason that you have earmarks is that too often the administration has tended to ignore the will and intent of Congress in implementing congressional appropriations and legislation the way they have directed it to be done. How would you respond to that?

MS. TUTWILER: No one is suggesting, and I don't believe that I have today, that Congress should not also fulfill its constitutional duties. The only suggestion that I have made -- Senator Dole speaks for himself -- is that we believe as an administration, this President does, to have flexibility in making these types of decisions. It's as simple as that. No one has stood up here, or I haven't, and said anything contradictory about the Congress and the Congress' authority and the Congress' rights.

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Q -- with a little flexibility perhaps. There is a report in the New York Times that one of the two Lebanese governments -- the one that ESyriaF backs -- is about to send, or maybe has already sent, a delegation here to ask for military aid. There are confusing signals though from Beirut whether such a move is afoot. Are you prepared to consider military aid to the Syrian-backed government?

MS. TUTWILER: I'm prepared to tell you that the Finance Minister will visit the US January 17, 18, to discuss a variety of bilateral issues. This is his first visit to the US as a Finance Minister. Specifically regarding military aid, I don't have anything for you,

Q Well, I don't know if that means that you have nothing to announce, or it's not a subject for discussion with the Finance Minister?

MS. TUTWILER: I have to live with the answer as I've given it. I've confirmed that he's coming. I've given you the date. And the only characterization I have is it's to discuss a variety of bilateral issues.

Q But Margaret --

Q This -- this is a follow-up. Apart from this visit, have you received any request for aid from the President Hrawi government?

MS. TUTWILER: This is the only way I have to characterize this today, is that this gentleman is visiting and they're going to be discussing a variety of issues.

Q On the same subject, there is a report from Paris that the ESaudiF Foreign Minister, Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, will be coming to Washington -- he arrived in Washington today -- and he will be meeting with US officials regarding Lebanon. Do you have anything on this?

MS. TUTWILER: I haven't heard about that one.

Q Margaret, back on the Dole matter, is --

MS. TUTWILER: Yes?

Q -- is the administration opposed to reducing aid to those top five countries? Is that where your problem is, that you don't want to reduce that aid?

MS. TUTWILER: I'm not going to answer that question.

Q Because Bush's proposal would have you, you know, would be such that it would allow flexibility to give money elsewhere where you would like. Where they're earmarking is these top five countries here, taking it from them. Is that your objection, that you don't want to take money away from Israel and EEgyptF and some of the others?



MS. TUTWILER: I'm not going to answer those types of questions because that assumes that certain types of decisions have been made, et cetera. I have told you our view of this. I have said this is aimed at the system. I have refrained from characterizing whether it means give more aid to Country A, take money from Country E. I'm just not going to do that.

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Q Margaret, the Israeli Foreign Minister -- I mean, the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, called for a greater Israel and expansion, and said that the territories are for ESovietF E JewsF to be resettled there. Do you have any comment on that?

MS. TUTWILER: We have seen the press reports which you refer to and are seeking to clarify what he actually said. We do not provide US government resources or funds for settlement of new EimmigrantsF in the Occupied Territories. Our current program is explicitly limited to Israel and not the Occupied Territories.

Q Do you have anything to tell us about the visit by Mr. Meguid, Foreign Minister of Egypt?

MS. TUTWILER: Foreign Minister Meguid is here. He will meet with Secretary Baker this afternoon. He is predominantly here to discuss the IMF and Egypt, and obviously -- to answer your question before you ask it -- they will discuss the peace process.

Q Will he meet with Rabin? Will there be a three-way meeting?

MS. TUTWILER: No. Those two have nothing to do with each other, and the predominant reason that Foreign Minister Meguid is here is concerning the IMF and Egypt.

Q Margaret, do you know, is he carrying a list of Palestinian names that might be possible participants in an Israeli-EPalestinianF dialogue?

MS. TUTWILER: If he is, I don't know about it.

Q Are you aware of the new five points that both Arafat and Mubarak drafted last Saturday, about this dialogue?

MS. TUTWILER: What is your question?

Q If you're aware of these five points, or what is your comment to them.

MS. TUTWILER: I haven't seen the new five points and I haven't heard about their new five points that were drafted this weekend.

Q If there won't be a three-way meeting, do you know whether Meguid plans to meet with Rabin? Have you heard anything about that?

MS. TUTWILER: I have no idea.

MS. TUTWILER: You'd have to ask him or ask the Defense Minister. I don't know. The Defense Minister -- I don't know when he gets to Washington -- but his meeting with Secretary Baker isn't till much later this week. Alan says he's in town.

Your statement about US provides no aid for funds to the settlement, but how is that policed? I mean, is there any chance that some of the aid does make its way to, say, Russian immigrants?

MS. TUTWILER: I don't know specifically how it's policed, Connie. I just -- that is our policy. I'll see if it is, indeed, policed.

continuing.

Q Margaret, to go back to Mr. Shamir's statement and what you said. When you get the full text of this statement, what course of action is the United States going to be taking to stem such extreme statements? The Egyptians are complaining about -- and Mr. -- Dr. Meguid said yesterday that Mr. Shamir ought to cease and desist all of these inflammatory statements. What --

MS. TUTWILER: Until, as I've prefaced my remarks on the Prime Minister's -- or the press reports that we had seen of what the Prime Minister had said, I can't flesh this out for you any more, because that would be assuming that I have -- or the Department has thoroughly studied and reviewed what indeed he did say. So I don't have a further elaboration for you. I restated what our policy was. I don't have a further elaboration.

Q What's on the agenda for Mr. Rabin-Baker meeting? Do you have a --

MS. TUTWILER: Same thing I said it was last week, to discuss a whole host of subjects.



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| דחיפות: רגיל                      | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון | קף: 1                       |
| סוג: גלוי                         | טופס פרוק                 | פתרון: 2                    |
| תאריך ופני חשור:<br>2.8.89, 19.00 |                           | אל: מצפ"א                   |
| כס' פרוק: 94                      |                           | דע: לשכת שה"ח<br>לשכת שהב"ט |
| הפסד: 44                          |                           | כאח: יהודית ורנאי-דרנגר     |

### בהנב"ח: ועדת המשנה לאירופה והמזרח

1. היום לפנה"צ התקיימו בועדה, ביוזמת הקונגרסמן המילטון, שימועים בנושא דו"ח מכון יפה - האופציות לפתרון מדיני במזרח"ת והמצב הנוכחי.
  2. הערה: ואן דוזן בשם המילטון מסר כי פנו אליו מספר קונגרסמנים וביקשו לקיים השימועים הללו.
  3. נכחו הקונגרסמנים: המילטון, לארי סמית, בן גילמן, הווארד ברמן, הווארד וולפה, סטיב סולרז, ווין אואנס, ג'ים ליץ', ג'יין מירס ובאז לוקנס. (שלושת האחרונים לא התבטאו ו/או שאלו שאלות).
  4. העדים הפרטיים שהופיעו בפני הועדה היו: הנרי סיגמן (A.J. Congress); סטיבן סטיגל (UCLA) ויוסי אלפר ממכון יפה, באוניברסיטת ת"א.
  5. יוסי אלפר - פתח בתיאור הלוגיסטיקה של הכנת הדו"ח, המשתתפים שנטלו חלק בכתיבתו ועבר על 6 האופציות שהוצגו והמסקנות אליהם הגיעו המחברים.
- הנרי סיגמן - התייחס ל-3 נושאים עיקריים:-
- א. דו"ח יפה והשלכותיו.
  - ב. תיקון הלמס - קרא חלק ממאמרו שפורסם ב-1/8 בג'רוזלם פוסט. הוסיף שהתיקון היה גורם להפסקת הדיאלוג דבר שאין הם מסכימים לו ולכן תמכו בפשרת הסנטור מיטצ'ל.
  - ג. חטיפת עובייד והקולונל היגנס - זוהי בושה להטיל האשמה על ישראל. הישראלים הם הקורבנות הכי פופולרים והם אלה המתמודדים יום עם הבעיה. יהיה זה בלתי נסלח ובלתי צודק אם כתוצאה מההתכחשות שלנו נצא כנגד בת ברית קרובה שלנו מאחר והיא ביצעה פעולה שאנו היינו בעצם מעוניינים לעשות בעצמנו.

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| סוג:             | טופס פבוק                 | כתוב: 2 |
| תאריך וזמן מעור: |                           | אל:     |
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| הפסד:            |                           | פאת:    |
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סטיבן ספיגל - התייחס להערתו של אלפר כי גם אמריקנים תשתתפו בחיבור הדו"ח ואמר

כי הם אמנם נתנו את שמם אך אינם מסכימים עם הממצאים.

ספיגל העלה 4 הסתייגויות עיקריות מהקביעות בדו"ח:

א. ארה"ב איננה יכולה לחבטיח התוצאות (כפי שמתקבל הרושם מהדו"ח).

היא יכולה לכל היותר לסייע ולהקל על התקדמות התהליך.

ב. מדינה פלסטית יבית עצמאית - איננה באינטרס האמריקאני לתמוך בכך בשעה זו. מה עוד

שאיננו חושב שמבחינה כלכלית יכולה מדינה כזו להתקיים וישנן חרבה שאלות פתוחות

ובלתי ידועות.

ג. על העולם הערבי להיות יותר מעורב. יש צורך בשימת דגש יתר על כלל העולם הערבי

ולא רק על החיבט הפלסטיני.

ד. ביקר נכונות הדו"ח להחליט על התוצאות לפני התחלת התהליך.

6. רוב השאלות והתשובות התמקדו בשאלת הסטטוס קוו, יוזמת ישראל והבחירות המוצעות, אש"ף

והחלטות ועידת הליכוד.

7. אלפר היה לא פעם בדפנסיה, במיוחד בעקבות שאלותיהם של הקונגרסמנים סמית וגילמן

שטענו שהמסקנות אינן ריאליסטיות דיין.

8. נעביר בדו"פ העדויות הכתובות וכן סיכום השאלות והתשובות.

אלפר ורנאי דרנגר

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה:





EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 5 דפים  
סוג בטחוני: גלוי  
דחיפות: מיידית  
תאריך וז"ח: 2.8.89 17:00  
מס' מברק: 112

אל: המשרד

ארה"ב

אל: מצפ"א/ הסברה

מאמרי מערכת

מצ"ב לקט של מאמרי מערכת מהיום שרובם טובים למדי.

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## Terrorism's victims

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Sen. Bob Dole spoke with misguided anger Monday when he said, "I would hope the Israelis would take another look at some of their actions, which they must know in advance endanger American lives." The minority leader also said that "a little more responsibility on the part of the Israelis would be refreshing."

Dole's remarks echo the frustration of official Washington. Like many, he has voted for billions in weapons systems, yet discovers that battleships and aircraft carriers are not effective in the back alleys of Beirut.

Nevertheless, this frustration does not justify his conclusion. First, he has demeaned the memory of Col. Richard Higgins, who bravely gave his life in the cause of peace.

Second, Dole's lashing out at a US ally blames the victim. Many Americans have died in terrorist acts in the Mideast, but in the whole cycle of violence and retribution, Israelis have been terrorism's chief victims. From the 1972 Olympics in Munich to last month's attack on civilians in a bus, Israel has borne the brunt of the assassination policies followed by terrorists and their chief sponsors, Iran and Syria.

Now, more than ever, is the time for reaffirming the alliance between the US and Israel, not falling into the rhetorical trap set by terrorists. Their murder of Colonel Higgins — whenever it took place — was in part aimed at driving a wedge between what Hezbollah calls "criminal America and the Zionist enemy."

Israel is not the problem in the Mideast; terrorism is.

Israel's conduct in quelling the Palestinian uprising has been criticized by many, including this newspaper. Ironically, even as Dole spoke, the Israeli supreme court rebuked the government for the army's policy of razing the homes of Palestinians. Israel is a democracy and even under siege remains a country under the rule of law. The supreme courts in Damascus and Tehran do not command much respect.

Second-guessing Israel's abduction of Sheikh

Abdel Kareem Obaid is a luxury for armchair theorists abroad. Israel must live with constant threats of terrorism; tut-tutting about kidnapping a noted terrorist misses the point.

No one knows whether the abduction of Obaid will be a success. But despite executions and threats of execution, such an action has better prospects for success than maneuvering battleships and aircraft carriers. Terry Anderson of the Associated Press has been held hostage since March 16, 1985. American policy makers have been unable to free him or the 15 other captives, eight of them Americans. If Israel's bold move works, then the chorus of ritualistic condemnation of Israel may fall necessarily — and momentarily — silent.

Many Mideast problems do indeed focus on the counterproductive folly of Israeli policy in the West Bank, but many of the region's ailments — the spread of Shiite fanaticism, for instance — have nothing to do with Israel. Too many in the Mideast, in Europe and now, alas, in the US, are using every development in the Mideast to gang up on Israel.

"If Higgins has been hanged, then Israel certainly pulled the rope," the English-language Kuwait Times said yesterday. The rope was more likely pulled by Iran or Syria, but the timorous Kuwaitis, whose oil fields are threatened by Iran far more than by Israel, do not wish to offend their Shiite neighbors.

Along with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are often called "moderate" states that are more or less aligned with the US. Neither, however, is a democracy, and neither has been able to persuade the terrorist groups in Lebanon to stop their torture and murder of Western hostages.

Since 1976, Beirut, once the Paris of the Mideast, has been reduced to rubble. The city's glories are now haunted by a legacy of terrorism and murder. Somewhere in southern Lebanon, the terrorists stand ready to murder again.

The responsibility for that terrorism lies in Damascus and Tehran, not in Jerusalem.

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## Posting Higgins in Lebanon Was Folly

Americans and especially the family of Lt. Col. William R. Higgins may cling to doubts that the hanged man in Monday's grisly terrorist videotape was really him. There can be no doubt, however, that his civilian and military superiors erred grievously when they let him take command of the U.N. force in Lebanon in the first place and thus expose himself to abduction.

Rich Higgins, as his friends know him, was no ordinary Marine officer. Intrepid, ambitious and passionate on the subject of the war in Lebanon, he lobbied for appointment as chief of the U.N. peacekeepers after prepping himself by poring over the best intelligence data on Lebanon that America could get in his capacity as military aide to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

Not only was he aware of the most sensitive information out of the Mideast and of our sources there, he read and prioritized *everything* that ultimately wound up on his boss's desk — contingency battle plans, the gleanings of spy satellites, you name it. He was a prize catch for any of America's enemies, but particularly for one as ruthless as the self-styled Organization of the Oppressed on Earth. Brave and committed though Lieutenant Colonel Higgins was, mil-

itary analysts in Washington doubt he could have withstood the months of unspeakable abuses to which he doubtless was subjected.

Ordinarily, for obvious security reasons, an officer privy to all these secrets would not receive so hazardous a posting. Rich Higgins did anyway, not because he was the best qualified (he wasn't) but because he was a gung-ho Marine who wanted the Lebanon job and he had friends in high places.

This is no knock on Lieutenant Colonel Higgins. After seven years in desk jobs, he yearned for action and for a useful mission. It was up to his bosses, including Mr. Weinberger, to recognize the mortal danger implicit in his new assignment. That should have been crystal-clear to them in the aftermath of the 1983 kidnap-murder of William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut.

President Bush, in his frustration, may bemoan the scarcity of options at his disposal to respond to terrorist outrages such as Monday's presumed murder. One positive move he can make, though, is to tighten procedures for high-level personnel moves so that crucial intelligence assets like Messrs. Buckley and Higgins no longer fall into the hands of Hezbollah like ripe fruit.

## THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION

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PAGE A-12. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1989

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18A THE MIAMI HERALD, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1989

# The Miami Herald

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## A terrorist murder

**T**HE MURDER of Marine Lt. Col. William Higgins by Moslem extremists is an outrage, whether it happened on Monday or much earlier. The captivity of all hostages by Mideast terrorists is outrageous. The force of the West's condemnation should be directed at the terrorists and governments that support them.

Though he knows that it may be futile, President Bush was right to call for release of all hostages by every side. Until such an abandonment of violence someday is negotiated, the region will remain torn between Western nations' rightful refusal to yield to terrorists' demands and the terrorists' belief that hostage-taking is an effective weapon against Israel and its allies.

This stalemate has lasted for years. It may have been broken by Israel's capture of a terrorist leader and the news of Colonel Higgins's death. Israel's capture of Moslem cleric Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, reportedly a senior leader of the Party of God group that held Mr. Higgins, could precipitate movement on the hostage issue at last.

Soon after the terrorists' deadline for killing the Marine, Israel offered to swap all its Islamic prisoners, including the sheik, for the foreign hostages held by terrorist factions, many supported by Iran and Syria.

No deal. Instead, another group threat-

### HOW CAN U.S. RESPOND?

ened to kill American Joseph Cicippio on Tuesday, then delayed the deadline. The Israeli offer stands. If the terrorists don't respond, Israel should try Mr. Obeid and, if he's found guilty, execute him.

Some U.S. leaders blame Israel for Colonel Higgins's death. That's muddled thinking. Islamic terrorists killed the U.S. Marine, a member of the U.N. peace-keeping force in the region. Terrorists hold the other eight U.S. hostages. The guilt is theirs.

What more can the Bush Administration do? Militarily, its options are few. Diplomatically, it can search out pressure points on Iran and Syria, which need economic and other support both from U.S. allies and from the newly cooperative Kremlin. Iran is calculating; so must be the United States.

Washington must not buckle to terrorists, however. To do so would encourage more hostage-taking. *The Herald* has called on both the Reagan and Bush Administrations to reveal their policies toward gaining the hostages' release. Washington cannot abandon these men, but neither can it yield to fanatics. Rather, it must hold to principle, seek peace while waging war against terrorism, and wait in pain and in grief.

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
THE ORANGE COUNTY

## Register

A FREEDOM NEWSPAPER

"Let the people know the  
truth and the country is safe."

Abraham Lincoln



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## EDITORIALS

## Forever hostage

The claimed execution of Marine Lt. Col. William Higgins and the fate of the other hostages held in the Middle East points up major weaknesses in American foreign policy. What, one wonders, has become of the ostensible principle that the US military, the State Department, and the rest of the government exist to help US citizens?

An American passport once guaranteed its bearer protection from attack anywhere in the world. Or so it was thought. Whenever an American was threatened or hurt, the US government mobilized to help him. But now, when a crisis strikes — an airplane is hijacked, a war breaks out — the first thing American victims do is to get rid of their passports.

Col. Higgins was not an American tourist, but a ranking officer of the US military. It may be time to acknowledge that our government can do precious little to assist either classification of American abroad. Military officers know when they sign up that they may endanger themselves. American travelers, known to be on their own, may be less tempting targets. Still, that kind of conjecture, intriguing though it may be, ignores a decent sense of obligation. Why, after all, do we spend \$300 billion a year for national defense when Americans know they cannot be protected when traveling abroad?

President Bush understandably wants to respond in a sensible, prudent way to the hostage crisis. Unless he resolves the crisis, he will become the third president in a row to be victimized by the radical regime in Iran. The Iranian hostage crisis played a major role in Jimmy Carter's disgrace and

defeat in 1980. The Iran arms scandal cast a cloud over the final two years of Ronald Reagan's presidency. And now the hostage crisis threatens Mr. Bush, whose own State Department reports that the Iranian regime has armed, backed, and "largely directed" the Hezbollah, which claims to have killed Col. Higgins and which holds most of the other hostages.

What can be done? Former hostage David Jacobson challenges the State Department wisdom that we must never talk with the captors, noting the police custom of talking with kidnappers to gain as much information from them as possible before taking action. Foreign-service handwringing, says Mr. Jacobson, has bureaucratically preempted any kind of effective response.

But even Mr. Jacobson, echoing the United Nations, expressed displeasure with Israel's decidedly unprofessional capture last week of Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, a Hezbollah religious leader tied to the abduction of American and Israeli hostages. The UN's useless response was to issue a blanket condemnation of both Israel and the Hezbollah.

Whatever mistakes Israel may have made, the two actions are strikingly different. The failure to distinguish between them shows the United Nations to be starkly underserving of the \$1 billion it receives annually from US taxpayers. The organization (the Nobel Peace Prize notwithstanding) has not advanced peace in the Middle East, nor has it been adept at protecting Americans. At the top of the President Bush's agenda should be a thorough review of our relations with the United Nations.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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תאריך : 03.08.89

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חוזם: 8,2203

אל: המשרד

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נד: א

אח"כ

שמו/בהול לבוקר

אל מנהל מצפא

דע יהודית ורנאי-וושינגטון

סנטור לוגר LUGAR

מרשה גולדסטין מנהלת ה-J.C.R.C של אינדיאנפוליס שוחחה עם עוזרו של סנטור לוגר באינדיאנה מר צ'ארלס אנדריאה, המוסר שהינו איש מודיעין לשעבר, מסר שהסנטור קיבל טלפונים רבים המבקרים את ישראל.

להערכתו הדבר מחזמר והקהילה פועלת להביא לכך שהסנטור יקבל טלפונים חיוביים. אנדריאה ציין שעיקר התסכול בקרב אנשים בגבעה נובע מעתוי הפעולה הישראלית מכיוון שהיו מגעים עם רפסאנג'ני בנושא החטופים. כמו כן אין רפסאנג'ני שולט עדיין בכל הפלגים באיראן וקיימת בהחלט אפשרות שחלק מהמולות יפעל על דעת עצמו ובתנאים שהקימו. לדבריו ההערכה היא גם שישראל טעתה בשיקול כאשר לא העריכו שהחזבאללה יתנכלו לבני הערובה האמריקאים. לדעתו החזבאללה יוציאו להורג את סיספייו

על מנת להגביר את המתח בין ארהב לישראל ואת הלחץ עליה. להערכתו היגינס נרצח כבר מזמן. הסנטורים הבכירים בגבעה ממתינים לראות מה יעשה הנשיא בטרם שיגיבו.

אורי בר-נר

הקונכל

רש





## מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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השגריר שוחח אתמול והיום עם הסנטורים וילסון, לוגר, ספקטר, בושביץ, קרל לויין, דהקונסיני ונפגש עם אינווייה וקסטן.

הבהיר להם עמדתנו בנושא וביקשם לשקפה במידת האפשר בהתבטאויות במליאת הסבאט תוך ציון העובדה שישראל פעלה במסגרת מאבקה בטרור, והאשמה מוטלת על החיזבללה בלבד. רוב הסנטורים הבטיחו להתבטא במליאה.

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קונגרס: קולונל היגינס

1. ממשרדו של הקונגרסמן ברמן מסרו לבו שבעקבות מסע של הקונגרסמן, החודעה שלו לעתונות וציטוט דבריו בעתונות הכתובה החלו לקבל טלפונים לא נעימים הן מאיזור בחירתו והן מחוצה לו המבקרים דבריו של ברמן ביחס לתמיכתו בישראל. בצד זה ציינו אנשי ברמן, החקבלו גם מספר טלפונים חיוביים.
  2. גם במשרדו של הסנטור לוגר באינדיאנה, החלו לקבל טלפונים ביקורתיים נגד הסנטור על הופעותיו הפומביות שדחו בין השאר הטלת האשמה על ישראל. השגריר שמע על כך מאנשי ה-ADL ולדברי הקונכ"ל בשיקגו ההערסקה היא כי הטלפונים מתוזמרים ע"י גורמים ערביים.
- עד כה לא שמענו בדיון ממשרדים נוספים.

ישראלית ורנאי דרנגר.

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| תאריך וזמן מעור: |                          | אל:     |
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סטיבן ספיגל - התייחס להערותו של אלפר כי גם אמריקנים תשתתפו בחיבור הדו"ח ואמר

כי הם אמנם נתנו את שמם אך אינם מסכימים עם הממצאים.

ספיגל העלה 4 הסתייגויות עיקריות מהקביעות בדו"ח:-

א. ארה"ב איננה יכולה לחבטיח התוצאות (כפי שמתקבל הרושם מהדו"ח).

היא יכולה לכל היותר לסייע ולהקל על התקדמות התהליך.

ב. מדינה פלסטית יבית עצמאית - איננה באינטרס האמריקאני לתמוך בכך בשעה זו. מה עוד

שאיננו חושב שמבחינה כלכלית יכולה מדינה כזו להתקיים וישנן חרבה שאלות פתוחות

ובלתי ידועות.

ג. על העולם הערבי להיות יותר מעורב. יש צורך בשימת דגש יתר על כלל העולם הערבי

ולא רק על החיבט הפלסטיני.

ד. ביקר נכונות הדו"ח להחליט על התוצאות לפני התחלת התהליך.

6. רוב השאלות והתשובות התמקדו בשאלת הסטטוס קוו, יוזמת ישראל והבחירות המוצעות, אש"ף

והחלטות ועידת הליכוד.

7. אלפר היה לא פעם בדפנסיה, במיוחד בעקבות שאלותיהם של הקונגרסמנים סמית וגילמן

שטענו שהמסקנות אינן ריאליסטיות דיין.

8. נעביר בדו"ח העדויות הכתובות וכן סיכום השאלות והתשובות.

אלפר ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה:





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Talking Points on Higgins' murder if proved to be true

1) The murder of William Higgins is outrageous -- brutality and barbarism of the highest order.

2) One of the major goals of the terrorists is to foster dissent among the civilized nations because of our natural compassion for human suffering. We should not, however, allow them to take our eye off the ball -- the ball being the vicious and deliberate killing of civilians as well as taking of hostages with all the torment for friends and families. This is the problem.

3) Western democracies, when faced with this kind of barbaric behavior, are often at a loss on how to act. We know it does not pay to give in; we know, as Secretary Shultz has said, that behavior rewarded is behavior repeated. But what do we do when a Terry Anderson is held for years? Different things are tried; the U.S. sends in a force trying to free our hostages in Teheran; Israel succeeded at Entebbe; the U.S. nabbed Fawaz Younis, a Palestinian terrorist, on the high seas; the U.S. abducted Rene Verdugo, a major drug trafficker from Mexico; and now Israel has nabbed a leader of Hizbollah.

There is no simple answer when dealing with often irrational killers. So we try. But let us support each other in these efforts and recognize who is evil.

From the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith



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Talking Points on Kidnapping of Shaykh Obeid

1. Responsibility for the taking and holding of American or any other hostages and threatening their lives rests squarely with the kidnappers, as the White House and State Department have emphasized. If any Americans have been killed, Hizbullah and its Iranian supporters are to blame.
2. Shaykh Obeid is the chief of Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, involved in planning a great number of attacks against Israel. Obeid is also suspected of helping to plan the February 1988 abduction of US Marine Col. William Higgins. Three Israeli hostages were being held by Hizbullah under Obeid's control. The Israelis had their own reasons for wanting Obeid.
3. The United States on at least three, possible four occasions resorted to similar actions against known terrorists or drug pushers.
  - \* In 1985, American jets intercepted Egyptian planes on which the PLO mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking, Abul Abbas, was trying to escape.
  - \* Fawaz Yunis was wanted in connection with the 1985 hijacking of a Royal Jordanian jetliner from Beirut International Airport. The plane was blown up after passengers and crew were taken off. Yunis, then a member of the Amal militia, was arrested at sea after he was lured by a former associate onto an FBI-operated yacht and eventually transferred to Andrews Air Force Base. The FBI operation was planned and carried out under the direct supervision of Oliver B. Revell, the executive assistant director of investigation.
  - \* Mahmud al-Abad Ahmad, a suspected member of the Abu Nidal terrorist organization, wanted in Israel for an attack on an Israeli bus in which one person was killed and three injured, was abducted in Venezuela by the FBI and brought to the United States. President Reagan authorized such "snatch, grab, and deliver" operations in a January 1986 intelligence decision. According to US intelligence, Ahmad headed an Abu Nidal effort to export Palestinian terrorism to the Western Hemisphere.
  - \* In January 1986, the DEA paid \$50,000 to abduct from Baja California Rene Verdugo, a reputed major drug trafficker, wanted for questioning in the murder of Enrique Camerana, a DEA agent killed by drug dealers in Mexico the year before. Verdugo was delivered to US Border Patrol officers and arrested in Calexico, south of San Diego.
4. The kidnappers of Col. Higgins threatened to execute him as early as December 1988. (NYT, 12/13/88) and at least once more after that before the most recent ultimatum (UPI, 7/31/89). Other hostages have also been pronounced dead several times.

From AIPAC



PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPT.

# ACTION

## GUIDELINES

To : Community Coordinators  
Regional Administrators

Date: August 1, 1989

From : Paul Flacks

Subject: Hostages and American Policy

### FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

Yesterday, I participated in an urgent telephone conference called by the Conference of Presidents for the professional staff of a select number of major Jewish organizations. We discussed the extremely sensitive and difficult issues relative to the alleged murder of Lt. Col. William Higgins. We thoroughly reviewed the past history of terrorism, America's response as a result of previous episodes, Israel's decision and the right to take independent action, and, of course, the reaction by Congress, the media and the American people.

You will receive under separate cover background material to assist you and the community to understand the ramifications of this episode. No matter how unfortunate, this episode must be seen in the greater context of the struggle against terrorism by the international civilized community.

A most enlightening commentary is the editorial published (Tuesday, August 1, 1989) in the New York Times. It places the blame squarely where it belongs -- on those responsible for the murder of an American official. And it clearly indicates that it would be divisive and counter-productive if we fell into the trap of scapegoating Israel.

In your discussions with the community, we suggest that you consider the following explanation which may appear to be simplistic, but today, simplistic understanding can make the difference:

Only recently a Palestinian Arab forced a bus over a cliff near Jerusalem resulting in fourteen (14) civilians dead, including Rita Susan Levine, a leader of ZOA's Young Zionist Group in Philadelphia.



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What if an ultimatum was issued by one of the terrorist groups, be it from Iran or the PLO, that unless the Arab who committed this crime is freed, an Israeli hostage would be killed? Under those circumstances, should Israel free the criminal?

What if the ultimatum for the release of this Arab criminal included the threat to kill American hostages? Would some Americans, like Senator Robert Dole, hold Israel responsible for this act of international blackmail?

Not only are these real possibilities for the future, but to equate Israeli action with crimes which known terrorists have committed is a dangerous policy. This is what Henry Kissinger told CBS television in his interview this morning.

Should Israel be held responsible for the safety of all Americans -- even when Israel takes actions in its own interest and, especially, when Israelis are being held hostage? This is to deny Israel the right to act in its own defense. And this will result in an open invitation for all international terrorists to take whatever action they wish knowing that there will be no retribution.

We are saddened by the death of Lt. Col. Higgins, and we have great sympathy for all victims and families of victims of terrorism. In our frustration and anger, we must not fall into the trap of placing the blame on the friends of the United States, especially Israel who has bravely and courageously led the fight against terrorism throughout the world.

The position of the United States should be courageous and determined. This is the time to stand with Israel against terrorism. Let not the mutual enemies of Israel and the United States cause dissension between two nations who place high value on human lives and the civilized behavior of all people.

#### ACTIONS TO TAKE

1. Urge the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Congress to reaffirm America's traditional resolve not to capitulate to or appease terrorism.
2. Letters of appreciation and support should be sent to Congressmen who, in the past 24 hours, have publicly expressed support for Israel and have urged that the United States not make Israel the scapegoat. You should immediately arrange for individuals from the communities which these Congressmen represent to make contacts. At the same time, letters to officials from ZOA members throughout the United States would be very helpful. In addition to your local Congressmen, the following should receive communications IMMEDIATELY:

Richard G. Lugar (Indiana)  
David L. Boren (Oklahoma)  
Rudy Boschwitz (Minnesota)  
Dante Fascell (Florida)  
Alfonse M. D'Amato (New York)  
Christopher Dodd (Connecticut)

Daniel K. Inouye (Hawaii)  
George J. Mitchell (Maine)

3. Communications to Senator Robert Dole should be written with great care, yet, without hesitating to express keen disappointment regarding his reaction which can only serve to embolden and encourage the perpetrators of terrorism. Senator Dole has been a good friend of Israel and it is unfortunate that he felt compelled to act in this unusual manner. While we must continue to maintain his friendship, it is equally necessary that he must understand that his widely televised statements may have been harmful to the American-Israel relationship.

Unfortunately, the recent elevation of terrorist Yasir Arafat, has given him international respectability, which is a disadvantage to all who believe terrorists should be isolated from the civilized world community. The recognition of Arafat, gives de facto encouragement for terrorists to believe that the world is willing to ignore all of the past heinous acts which they have committed against Americans, Israelis and other innocent civilians.

The tragic death of Lt. Col. William Higgins should give the United States a reason to pause, reflect, and reevaluate its present policy which has given credence and respectability to the archterrorist, Yasir Arafat. It is a policy which will not work. It is a policy which should be rescinded.

This very sensitive period requires the most careful and judicious action. The media will be filled with commentary and opinion. Those who relish the opportunity to "bash" Israel will have a field day. Friends of Israel who care for its image and who understand the need to work quickly to reinforce the American-Israel relationship will act prudently and effectively. ZOA will assume this responsibility.

Please give this your most careful and prompt attention.

cc: National Officers  
National Public Affairs Committee



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**FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION**

**STATEMENT BY THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA  
HOSTAGES AND AMERICAN POLICY**

We are saddened by the death of Lt. Col. Higgins, and we have great sympathy for all victims and families of victims of terrorism. In our frustration and anger, we must not fall into the trap of placing the blame on the friends of the United States, especially Israel who has bravely and courageously led the fight against terrorism throughout the world.

Only recently a Palestinian Arab forced a bus over a cliff near Jerusalem resulting in fourteen (14) civilians dead, including Rita Susan Levine, a leader of ZOA's Young Zionist Group in Philadelphia. What if an ultimatum was issued by one of the terrorist groups, be it from Iran or the PLO, that unless the Arab who committed this crime is freed, Israeli hostages would be killed? Under those circumstances, should Israel free the criminal?

What if the ultimatum for the release of this Arab criminal included the threat to kill American hostages? Would some Americans, like Senator Robert Dole, hold Israel responsible for this act of international blackmail?

Not only are these real possibilities for the future, but to equate Israeli action with crimes which known terrorists have committed is a dangerous policy. The New York Times in its editorial today, August 1, 1989) states the issue clearly and with considerable understanding, especially the following observations:

"As a matter of principle and common sense, Israel and other nations subjected to terrorism have a right to pre-emptive and punitive action. Yes, that includes military operations for both rescue of hostages or kidnapping of terrorists. Yes, there are risks, sometimes tragic, for the innocent. Without that right of self-defense, civilized nations would all be held hostage by the most brutal."

Should Israel be held responsible for the safety of all hostages -- even when Israel takes actions in its own interest and, especially, when Israelis are also being held hostage? This would deny Israel the right to act in its own defense. And as the New York Times suggests, it would result in an open invitation for all international terrorists to take whatever action they wish knowing that there will be no retribution.

The position of the United States should be courageous and determined. This is the time to stand with Israel against terrorism. Let not the mutual enemies of Israel and the United States cause dissension between two nations who place high value on human lives and the civilized behavior of all people.

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We applaud the members of Congress and the people of the United States who, at this difficult moment, were able to differentiate between honest concern for American interests, but understanding that these interests include a renewed resolve to reinforce the American-Israel relationship.

Unfortunately, the recent elevation of terrorist Yasir Arafat, has given him international respectability, which is a disadvantage to all who believe terrorists should be isolated from the civilized world community. The recognition of Arafat, gives de facto encouragement for terrorists to believe that the world is willing to ignore all of the past heinous acts which they have committed against Americans, Israelis and other innocent civilians.

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# NEWS FROM THE Committee



The American Jewish  
Committee

Institute of Human Relations  
185 East 55 Street  
New York, New York 10022  
212 761-4000  
Morton Yannon  
Director of Public Relations

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism; and promotes human rights. It works for the security of Israel, the peaceful understanding between Americans and Arabs; defends democratic values and speaks their defense in American public policy; and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the premier human-relations agency in the U.S.

## FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, Aug. 1 ... The following statement was issued today by Harvey Goldhamer, International Relations Director of the American Jewish Committee, on the murder of Colonel Higgins and Israel's seizure of Sheikh Obeid:

"An American, we bitterly condemn those responsible for the murder of Colonel Higgins. Our hearts go out to his wife, Major Robin Higgins, and his daughter, Christina.

"We recall that this self-styled 'Party of God' is precisely the group that claimed 'credit' for the truck bombing that killed our Marines in Beirut in 1983 and again in 1984. They have been involved in assassinations in the Middle East and in Europe, the destruction of airliners in flight, and the seizure of hostages and murder of civilians in Lebanon.

"Some have been highly critical of Israel for its seizure of Sheikh Obeid, and have equated it with the 'Party of God' abducting Colonel Higgins. But the Marine Colonel was part of a UN peace-keeping mission, while Obeid was the commander of assassination brigades. There can be no equivalence.

"To say that international law forbids seizing killers where you find them is simply incorrect. In fact, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency personnel have several times seized drug lords on the territory of other countries, and we all recall the bombing of Libya in response to terrorist attacks on U.S. servicemen in Berlin. Israel, like other nations, has the right to take direct action against those who attack its citizens or plan terrorist acts on Israeli territory.

"Hindsight may make us wish for different outcomes, but we must be careful not to confuse the victims of terrorism with those who plan it."

89-960-161  
AUG 7, 1984

Enclosed for the Committee are three copies of a statement by the International Relations Director, Harvey Goldhamer, dated August 1, 1984, regarding the murder of Colonel Higgins and the seizure of Sheikh Obeid.

Very truly yours, Robert H. Jacobs, Chair, Executive Committee

Isa Shuman, Executive Vice President

Enclosed for the Committee are three copies of a statement by the International Relations Director, Harvey Goldhamer, dated August 1, 1984, regarding the murder of Colonel Higgins and the seizure of Sheikh Obeid.

Each letter has been signed by the International Relations Director, Harvey Goldhamer, dated August 1, 1984.

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## THE CRUEL IRONY OF THE 'ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED'

By George E. Gruen, Ph.D.

Director, Middle East Affairs  
The American Jewish Committee

Who is behind the Organization of the Oppressed on Earth that kidnapped and has reportedly hanged U.S. Marine Lt. Col. William Higgins? What is the background of this shadowy terrorist cell?

This Lebanese Shi'ite faction is ideologically and operationally linked to the Iranian-backed Hezbollah (Party of God). It apparently seeks to draw its inspiration from the late Ayatollah Khomeini, who declared in a meeting with the Syrian Foreign Minister on August 16, 1979, "I hope that a party under the name of the 'Party of the Oppressed' will be formed throughout the world." This new party, which he said was to be synonymous with the Party of God, was intended "to actualize the promise of Islam, which means the reign of the oppressed over the oppressors and their inheritance of the earth."

A group bearing this name first surfaced in Beirut in December 1985, when it announced it was executing two Lebanese Jews from among four it had kidnapped in March 1985. Two additional Lebanese Jewish hostages were killed by this extremist group in February 1986, after Israel failed to meet the group's demands to release all its Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners and to withdraw from "all occupied territories."

The Organization of the Oppressed claimed that those executed had all been "apies" for Israel, but a close investigation of their personal backgrounds demonstrates that none of the victims had been involved in Lebanese politics or in the Arab-Israel conflict. The only thing they had in common was that they were born Jewish and had remained in Muslim-controlled West Beirut after most Lebanese Jews had fled the strife-torn city.



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Indeed, the random nature of the attacks on the helpless Jews was made clear in a statement by this terrorist group on December 28, 1985, warning that unless all its demands against Israel were met, it would kill not only those it had already kidnapped but would strike against other Jews "on whom we may lay our hands."

Among the best known and most highly respected of the Jewish victims was Dr. Elie Hallak, a pediatrician, who was called "the doctor of the poor," because he often treated without fee needy Lebanese and Palestinian patients irrespective of their religion or political affiliation. In a poignant public challenge to the kidnappers, his wife, Rachel, described his benevolent career and the unsuccessful efforts by his many friends to secure his release. Her open letter was published in the Lebanese press and in Le Monde (Paris), March 5, 1986. (An English translation is available.)

Well placed Lebanese sources believe that the motivation of the Organization of the Oppressed was not purely ideological or political. It is believed that more pecuniary motives were also at work: The poor Shi'ites coveted the homes and communal properties of the once prosperous Jewish community, and pressured the kidnap victims to turn over title to property and bank accounts to persons designated by the terrorist group.

The first Jew to be killed by the Organization of the Oppressed was Haim Cohen, 38, a department store accountant, who left a wife and three young children; the second was Professor Isaac Tarrab, 70, a retired mathematics teacher. The third Jew murdered was Ibrahim (Abraham) Benisti, 34, who helped run a small family shop. His body was found by the Lebanese police on February 16, 1986 in a street in Muslim West Beirut near the "green line" border with Christian East Beirut. The Beirut coroner reported that Mr. Benisti's body bore signs of torture and beatings to the head. He

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had been shot twice and then strangled. The Organization of the Oppressed also abducted and subsequently killed his brother Joseph, 33, and their father, Yehudah, 68.

This radical Shi'ite band has claimed to have executed a total of nine Jews whom it had abducted, including Isaac Sasson, 68, the president of the Lebanese Jewish community. Only three bodies have been recovered. The terrorist group has refused to release the bodies of any of the later victims, despite the urgent appeals of their families to the Lebanese authorities and to the international community. Some family members still cling desperately to the hope that their loved ones may still be alive.

More than two years have now passed since July 24, 1987, when Joseph Mizrahi, acting president of the Lebanese Jewish community, dispatched a personal appeal to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar urging him "in the name of the the most elementary human rights" to use all of his moral authority to help the Jewish community recover the remains of the murdered Jews so that they could be laid to rest in accordance with Jewish traditions. Mr. Mizrahi emphasized the gratuitous cruelty of the terrorists' behavior, since "there is no conceivable political advantage that can accrue to the killers." Moreover, he noted, "even the most bloodthirsty terrorists who have given their lives for what they believe to be their cause have been buried and nobody has contested this most elementary right to a proper burial."

As our hearts fill with fresh grief and outrage at the murder of Col. Higgins, I find tragically apt some words spoken at an ecumenical service held in New York on January 8, 1986 as a memorial for the first two-murdered Lebanese Jewish hostages and as a plea for redemption of all held captive in Lebanon. The Rev. Joseph O'Hare, S. J., President of Fordham University poignantly declared:



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"It is once again a cruel irony that the murderers of Haim Cohen and Isaac Tarrab should dare to call themselves representatives of the oppressed of the world. No greater human oppression is possible than the reduction of individual human beings to nameless symbols whose lives are snuffed out in some sterile political gesture."

August 1, 1989

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Dr. George E. Gruen is Director of Middle East Affairs for the American Jewish Committee. He has taught international relations and Middle East politics at Columbia University and at the Brooklyn and City Colleges of CUNY. He visited Lebanon in the summers of 1971 and 1982 and participated in an international conference in Paris in May 1988 that heard eyewitness reports on the plight of the Lebanese hostages.