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# מדינת ישראל

## גנזך המדינה

18

מס' תיק

משרד \_\_\_\_\_  
המנהל הכללי של המבחן  
לשכת \_\_\_\_\_

*גנזך המדינה*

המנהל הכללי של המבחן

1977

מס' תיק מקורי \_\_\_\_\_



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# מדינת ישראל

משרד ראש הממשלה

22

לשכת היועץ לעסקאות  
האסטרטגיות  
האיון שרסץ האמריקאים

1977



# Foreign Affairs Research Institute

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The Soviets think  
they can win a nuclear war

22/1977

## THE GAP BETWEEN SOVIET AND UNITED STATES CONCEPTS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY

By Stewart Menaul  
Member of the Governing Council

In one of the most perceptive, penetrating and pungent articles for a long time<sup>1</sup>, Mr Richard Pipes, Professor of History at Harvard University, one of America's foremost experts on Soviet affairs, compares United States and Soviet concepts of nuclear doctrine, and in the process exposes a yawning gap between them.

He examines the credibility of the Soviet belief that they could fight and win a nuclear war and takes as his starting point, a statement by the United States SALT negotiator, Mr. Paul Warnke, in which he described Soviet nuclear doctrine as "on a level of abstraction which is unrealistic. It seems to me that instead of talking in those terms which would indulge what I regard as the primitive aspects of Soviet nuclear doctrine, we ought to be trying to educate them into the real world of strategic nuclear weapons which is that nobody could possibly win".

Mr Pipes questions Mr Warnke's qualifications for presuming to educate the Soviet military in anything, but similar views

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1. Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War. By Professor Richard Pipes. Commentary, Vol. 64. No. 1., July 1977. 165 East 56th St., New York, NY 10022, USA.



are held by all too many politicians and military planners in the NATO alliance as well as in the United States. The totally different perceptions of nuclear war articulated in Washington and Moscow go some way towards explaining why the West as a whole has consistently misperceived Soviet intentions for the last three decades. Mr Pipes puts the case succinctly when he says "American doctrine has been and continues to be formulated and implemented without due reference to its Soviet counterpart. It is assumed that there exists one and only one rational strategy appropriate to the age of thermonuclear weapons and that this strategy rests on the principle of mutual deterrence developed in the United States some two decades ago".

The Soviets do not accept this doctrine and have repeatedly said so in the not inconsiderable volumes of Soviet military literature that have become available to Western strategists in the past ten or twelve years.

After detailing United States sensitivity to casualties in war and their feeling of guilt at the creation of the nuclear weapon, Mr Pipes traces the United States evolving nuclear strategy and the divisions that took place between the military and civilian elements in the decision-making bodies on the likely effects that nuclear weapons would have on the conduct of a future war. Nuclear deterrence based on the threat of use of nuclear weapons - the massive retaliation doctrine - was eventually adopted in the Eisenhower/Dulles formula as the most effective strategy for the United States and one which provided more basic security at less cost. In Mr Pipes' view, "In the nuclear deterrent the United States found a perfect resolution of the conflicting demands of domestic and foreign responsibilities. For this reason alone its adoption was a foregone conclusion; the alternatives were either a vast standing army or forfeiture of status as a leading world power."

#### SOVIETS WANT NUCLEAR VICTORY

But the strategy of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons lasted only so long as the United States enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them, so that by 1959 when the Soviet Union had acquired a



stockpile of similar weapons and the means of delivering them, a new strategy had to be invented. This evolved as a strategy of mutual deterrence which postulated that since the United States and the Soviet Union now had the means to destroy each other, neither would contemplate war - a view not shared by the military. The new doctrine in Mr Pipes' words was launched by "physicists, chemists, mathematicians, economists and political scientists who supported the government's fiscally-driven imperatives with scientific demonstrations in favour of the nuclear deterrent. Current US strategic theory was thus born of a marriage between the scientist and the accountant. The professional soldier was jilted".

Proponents of the mutual deterrence theory believed that the nuclear weapon was the absolute weapon against which there was no defence, and, therefore, the principle objective of modern defence should not be superiority in weapons, traditionally sought by the military, but sufficiency in an adequate deterrent. The Soviet strategist N.V. Karabanov, writing in The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War dismisses that theory with "There is a profound erroneousness and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois ideologies that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war."

The deterrent philosophy was based on the principle of preventing wars rather than winning them, so that the requirement for superior forces no longer applied and Clausewitz's classical definition of war as the continuation of policy by other means was dead. Among those who supported this unwarranted assumption in the 1960s were Mr Henry Kissinger and Mr Robert McNamara, together with a bevy of civilian strategists whose approach to defence and security problems was motivated by cost-effectiveness of weapons systems, which in turn decided military strategy, rather than the other way round. Current United States strategy, according to Mr Pipes, is based on the hypothesis that all-out war is not a rational option since no winner could possibly emerge. But if the Soviet Union were so ill-advised as to attack the United States, the latter could



devastate the Soviet Union in a second strike; defence against strategic nuclear attack being technically impossible. The United States, therefore, unilaterally froze its ICBM force in 1967; dismantled almost all its defences including ABM systems, and watched while the Soviets progressed towards superiority in strategic nuclear delivery systems.

#### NUCLEAR WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

The principal differences between American and Soviet strategies are traceable to different conceptions of the role of conflict and its inevitable concomitant, firstly, violence, in human relations; and secondly, to different functions which the military establishment performs in the two societies, according to Mr Pipes. In the United States, recourse to war is regarded as a sign of failure in rational analysis and patient negotiation, while in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, conflict and violence are natural in human relations and an essential ingredient in the class struggle which will end only when the whole world adopts Communism. The late Marshal Grechko in defining the various types of wars that can and do occur even today, suggested that these wars differed only in degree from a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the West. Such conflicts were inherent in the stage of development which precedes the final abolition of classes.

Mr Pipes describes the Soviet policy-making body as a closely integrated political military structure in which "the civilian strategic theorist who, since World War II, has played a decisive role in the formulation of US strategic doctrine is not in evidence in the Soviet Union and probably performs at best a secondary consultative function". Military strategy is in the hands of the military, but the secrecy that has for so long surrounded Soviet military affairs has to a limited degree been relaxed in recent years by the availability of translated military literature which gives an insight into Soviet strategic thinking and the factors that determine their view of world affairs. Mr Pipes believes that the contents of these books and journals, despite their undoubted shortcomings, are too readily dismissed by those few Western strategists who bother to read them.

The Soviets have never accepted the idea of mutual deterrence, nor do they believe in an "absolute weapon" and, while it is true that in the immediate post-Stalin era, a new school of Soviet strategic thought supported by Mr Malenkov challenged the conventional wisdom and questioned the theory that war represented a viable policy option, it did not survive - neither did Mr Malenkov. The Soviet military establishment, with Khrushchev's support, reverted to the premise that war could not be ruled out in promoting the worldwide class struggle. Soviet nuclear strategy as it is today was formulated in the first two years of Khrushchev's premiership (1955-1957) and was not to be seriously challenged again.

Mr Pipes asserts that military power is essential to the Soviet system because the regime rests neither on tradition nor on a popular mandate. The Kremlin can only hope to control its empire through military strength, so the formulation of Soviet military doctrine in the nuclear age is almost entirely in the hands of the military. The Defence Minister is a Marshal of the Soviet Union and a member of the highest policy-making body, the Politburo. Military doctrine and strategy, therefore, are closely linked to political objectives, and since the Soviets regard warfare as a science, the higher echelons of the military establishment contain officers with science, engineering and political science degrees from Soviet universities. Almost all literature on strategy, doctrine and tactics is written by professional military experts.

#### NUCLEAR WAR FEASIBLE

Soviet military strategists acknowledge that nuclear weapons have altered some traditional concepts of warfare but not its utility. They believe that nuclear war is feasible and the basic function of war as defined by Clausewitz remains permanently valid whatever breakthroughs may occur in technology. In his book Soviet Military Strategy, Marshal V D Sokolovski says "It is well known that the essential nature of war as a continuation of policy does not change with changing technology



and armaments". Mr Pipes asserts that this spells the rejection of the whole basis on which United States strategy has come to rest. While the United States proclaims that nuclear war is not feasible, the Soviets believe that thermo-nuclear war is not suicidal but, on the contrary, it can be fought and won and those who accept the mutual deterrence theory are regarded as "bourgeois pacifists". Having studied every aspect of Western strategic thought from the mass of material which is provided by official and unofficial sources, and examined with the utmost care the lessons from the Second World War and every limited war that has taken place since, the strategic doctrine of the Soviet Union has evolved over the years to become diametrically opposed to that of the United States. For them not deterrence but victory; not sufficiency in weapons but superiority; not retaliation but offensive action. These views are to be found in nearly all the best Soviet military publications by such accepted experts as Sokolovski, Lomov, Sidorenko, Savkin and Malinovsky.

#### PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE LEGITIMATE

In any future war between the two power blocs, the Soviet view is that it would be perfectly legitimate for them to indulge in a pre-emptive strike against the United States if in their opinion they were about to be attacked. Such action has been taken by the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 and leaves no room for argument. The Soviets will decide whether or not they are about to be attacked and act accordingly. They have built up massive conventional and nuclear forces in the European theatre which go far beyond what could possibly be required for self-defence and they outnumber NATO forces in almost every category of conventional arms. Their forces are oriented for offensive action, not defensive, and in strategic nuclear delivery systems, they are attempting to achieve quantitative superiority in warheads with the introduction of a whole new range of MIRVed ICBMs. The Soviets in their strategic nuclear doctrine emphasize counterforce strategy, whereas the United States is predisposed to a countervalue, or population, targeting policy. This accords with Soviet objectives in war which are the total



destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack, his military bases, military industries and the disorganization of his armies and support forces.

But while the Strategic Rocket Forces are regarded by the Soviet High Command as the decisive branch of their armed forces, they do not rely on any one strategy or one weapon system. They believe that the all arms strategy is the only logical one and that large conventional forces are necessary for the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and the capture and occupation of his territory. In pursuit of these aims, the Soviets have not neglected their defences. They have enlarged and improved the air defences of the homeland (the PVO Strany is the largest and most modern air defence system in the world). They have provided a civil defence organization which is an integral part of the PVO Strany and which includes provision for the dispersal of vital industries as well as protection for the population. They claim, with some justification, that Soviet industrial capacity is less vulnerable to nuclear attack than that of the United States and yet the United States has virtually no civil defence policy.


As the United States enters a new round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks which will be conducted by Mr Warnke, Mr Pipes gives timely warning that "Whereas we view nuclear weapons as a deterrent, the Russians see them as a compellant, with all the consequences that follow". The Soviet doctrine is a war-fighting, war-winning doctrine and "as long as the Soviets persist in adhering to the Clausewitzian maxim on the function of war, mutual deterrence does not really exist. Unilateral deterrence is feasible only if we understand the Soviet war-winning strategy and make it impossible for them to succeed."

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# CROSSROADS

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## American Strategic Interests in the Middle East

*The following is excerpted from an address given by Dr. Joseph Churba to a conference in New York jointly sponsored by the Youth Institute and the North American Jewish Youth Council. Dr. Churba was formerly the Senior Intelligence Analyst with the United States Air Force. His book entitled The Politics of Defeat: America's Decline in the Middle East [New York: Cyrco Press] will be available for national distribution in September 1977.*

by Joseph Churba

I have selected four areas to discuss here today. First, the strategic balance; second, the intelligence capability of the United States to assess Soviet policy in the Middle East; third, Israel as a strategic asset; and fourth, the current policy of the United States including the arms balance, the PLO and our favorite general, George S. Brown.

Not long ago *The New York Times* reported that the new intelligence estimate regarding Soviet long-term strategic intentions acknowledged that Moscow is seeking superiority in weaponry and not parity. This judgment constitutes a reversal from past estimates which argued that the Soviet Union was seeking parity in arms. It was this assessment which had allowed Secretary of State Kissinger to pursue his policy of detente with the Soviet Union.

However, there were those who thought otherwise and who regarded detente as no more than a convenient rationale for the decline of American influence in global affairs. I enlist myself as one such dissenter, and there were others.



Israeli tank maneuvers: America's democratic ally in the Middle East prepares for self-defense.

Nevertheless, the fact that the intelligence community could be so wrong for so long on the vital issue of long-term Soviet intentions is what I regard to be a reflection of both their disposition and competence to determine what the Soviets want.

The estimates on the Middle East are no better. They are far from accurate. Few, if any, stand up to the rigorous academic standards of the universities. In my judgment, there was a consistent failure throughout the 1967-73 period to discern the magnitude of Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern politics, diplomacy and warfare. The record is one of chronic understatement and miscalculation regarding both the extent of Soviet capabilities, the degree of their interests in the region and their direct involvement in war and obstruction of the diplomatic process.

Policy-makers and their advisors, largely as a result of accepting the misleading abstraction of detente, failed to achieve a full and rational understanding of the Soviet role in the political processes underway in the Arab world. Analysts went to great pains to highlight the constraints and so-called dilemmas confronting Soviet policy-makers. They gave excessive attention to the presumptions of restraint, caution and responsible behavior on the part of the Soviet Union. Therefore, at critical junctures Soviet objectives and policies were perceived as either opportunistic or speculative, but not as the inexorable outcome of a genuine campaign, with major investments of resources and prestige involving the deliberate assumption of risks. Only a few dissenters perceived the Arab-Israeli conflict as a growing fissure in the founda-

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## Why Israel Opposes a Palestinian Mini-State

Israel maintains that the Palestinian problem should be solved in the framework of a settlement involving its neighbor to the East—Jordan—and not by creating a third country sandwiched between itself and that neighbor.


Jordan, itself with a Palestinian population of 960,000, offers virtually all the components of Palestinian identification: language, culture, historical background and aspiration, and national sovereignty. The country is a going concern and forms an integral part of the Arab nation, with which the self-appointed representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, the PLO, so fervently identify themselves.

An independent Palestinian State in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would not be a viable proposition. These areas cover no more than 2,200 square miles—and already have a population exceeding one million. The land, though largely agricultural, is relatively poor in water resources. One third of the current labor force is engaged in farming. Another 40 per cent work in commerce and services. Industry accounts for only 14 per cent of the labor force and for less than 10 per cent of the Gross National Product.

The economy of the areas is boosted by the earnings of the more than 50,000 inhabitants who work daily within Israel's pre-1967 borders. It can be assumed that, if the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were to become an independent Palestinian mini-State, run by the extremist PLO, that revenue would be lost, as would the considerable technological and economic aid currently extended by Israel.

Studies conducted by the United Nations and other agencies indicate that the creation of a mini-State would be followed swiftly by an influx of between 700,000 and a million Palestinians from refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. How would they be housed, employed and serviced?

It has been variously estimated that the money cost involved in attempting to create such a State would be between \$12 and \$20 billion! There is no indication where



The Youth Institute co-sponsored a delegation of young political leaders which visited Israel in January. The 15 member delegation composed of young trade unionists, Youth Institute activists and youth leaders in the Democratic

Party was hosted in Israel by the Histadrut. The purpose of the trip was to help educate the members of the delegation about Israeli society and the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

photo credit: Chris Mueller

such colossal sums of money would be obtained. Despite lip-service to the Palestinian "cause," leaders of oil-rich Arab States have not distinguished themselves in devoting their petro-dollars to helping in the rehabilitation of refugees, or even to easing their squalor.

No PLO leaders, even the most "moderate," will conceive of the Palestine mini-State as anything other than an interim solution. There has, in fact, been a hardening of attitudes. Thus, Farouk Kaddoumi, the head of the PLO's Political Department, in an interview with the Paris newspaper *Le Monde* in November 1976, welcomed the creation of such a State, saying that it "will constitute a first step in the direction of a stable and lasting peace in the Middle East." But, interviewed on the same subject on February 18, 1977, by the Italian paper *Corriere Della Sera*, he put it thus: "We are ready to create a national entity in any territory we can succeed in liberating, but our historic objective remains that of creating a secular State in all Palestine ..."

On the same day, Abu Meizer, PLO spokesman and member of its Executive Committee, said: "An independent national authority means a sovereign, national, independent State, involving no peace with, or recognition of, Israel. In our fight for the creation of our national, independent State, we are struggling for the implementation of our programme in stages, as a step towards attaining our strategic goal."

Such statements underscore Israel's concern for its physical

security. The borders of the mini-State in the East would be less than twelve miles from the sea, Tel Aviv would be within the range of medium-size artillery and the Ben-Gurion international airport would be only five miles from a potentially hostile border, with incoming passenger planes at the mercy of relatively unsophisticated ground-to-air missiles.

In the event of a Palestine mini-State becoming a reality, Israel would obviously demand its demilitarization. This would almost certainly be rejected by the PLO, which has already turned down such ideas as the one put forward by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat during the Middle East tour of US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in February 1977, for a confederation between the mini-State and Jordan. The PLO insists on full sovereignty, and, in the light of its adherence to its staged approach, its refusal to recognize Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338—a refusal reiterated by Farouk Kaddoumi in his *Corriere Della Sera* interview, it would demand the right to create and maintain an army. With the PLO's bloody history of terrorism against Israel, its continued hostility and its undisguised aim of ultimate return to Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, and Lydda, the threat to Israel is plain.

In the international arena, the PLO draws most of its support from the Soviet Union. For several years now, according to Western intelligence reports, key PLO personnel have been going to Russia for training. At the United Nations and in other international forums,

*continued on back page*



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The Youth Institute was established to educate young people about the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, emphasize the importance of preserving and extending democracy in the Middle East, and arouse student awareness of the need to defend Israel's existence and work for genuine Arab-Israeli reconciliation. Associates of and contributors to the Youth Institute receive CROSSROADS and all other publications of the organization. All contributions to the Youth Institute for Peace in the Middle East, Inc. are tax deductible.

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David J. Kopilow, Editor

## American Strategic Interests

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tion of world politics: a Soviet challenge to the global balance of power.

Even now, despite the sweeping evidence of Soviet complicity and obstruction before, during and since the Yom Kippur War, policy-makers continue to cling to their expectation that the Soviet role in the settlement will not be destructive. Dismissing the most formidable Soviet efforts to overturn the global balance, the current fashion is to proclaim that Moscow's goal is to win formal acknowledgment of its role in the region. Precisely what role is not defined, but the implication is that a definitive settlement would be an acceptable means for achieving it. After three decades of Cold War, co-existence and detente, they fail to recognize that any genuine peace settlement in the Middle East is inimical to Moscow's fundamental long-term objectives.

I prefer to believe, like many of you here, that America's paramount interest in the region is to prevent it from falling under the domination of the Soviet Union. Were Moscow allowed to establish its dominance or acquire a stranglehold on the jugular of Persian Gulf oil, the capacity of Western Europe and Japan to resist growing Soviet pressure would be drastically impaired.

Iran and Turkey would be neutralized—as in fact would be the heartland of Europe—thereby effectively isolating the United States. In short, Soviet domination would threaten the continued supply of oil to Western Europe and Japan leading to their further, and I emphasize further, neutralization. Strategically such a development

could lead to the further neutralization of Europe, encirclement of China and the eventual isolation of the United States.

Since 1967, events have focused on Soviet-Egyptian attempts to reverse the regional trend toward the status quo and the twin American-Israeli objectives of deterrence and retention of the existing balance. It is against this perspective that one views Nasser's War of Attrition (March 1969-August 1970), and the October 1973 War as being developments in an historical process yet to be completed. In both cases, the Israelis dramatically arrested the expansion of Soviet power.

First, in the sharpened contest for air superiority over the Suez Canal (July 1970) the line was drawn in a definitive manner, not by the United States, but by Israel. When five Soviet pilots were shot down towards the end of July, the IAF displayed not only a willingness to tangle with the Soviet pilots but a superior ability. This Israeli stand brought home to Moscow the threat of collision with the United States—a factor in the subsequent Soviet "exodus" from Egypt in July 1972. Similarly, Moscow's role in the Yom Kippur War was primarily strategic.

The war was a bold and calculated attempt to render the Arab states dependent upon Soviet protection, to neutralize Europe, dismantle NATO and to drive the United States out of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Viewed from another perspective, and perhaps more sharply, the Yom Kippur War was Moscow's response to the Sino-American rapprochement of the previous year. From the Soviet perspective, the Chinese-American rapprochement had tilted the balance against them. To correct the balance they upset the table in the Middle East.

*continued on next page*

## H.S. Exchange

Lorna Gayle, a Youth Institute member from New York, visited Israel on April 11-May 16th as part of an exchange program sponsored by the New York City Board of Education. She is a student at the High School of Art and Design and is President of the Honor Society in her school. The group spent two weeks attending an Israeli high school, 10 days working on a kibbutz, and one week touring the country.





## American Strategic Interests

*continued from page 3*

American support for Israel is based on a rare coincidence of moral and strategic interests. The continuing tendency, however, is to ignore Israel's growing potential as a permanent and multi-purpose access point, indispensable to any Western security structure. People tend to dismiss that in the event of an oil producer-consumer confrontation over the extortionist oil prices forced upon the West by the Arab states, the presence in the Middle East of a strong Israel could be of great value. Israel can act as a land route for supplies, as a refueling base, as a supply depot for tactical support to the United States in any confrontation with the Soviet Union or its allies. For American generals to ignore Israel's strategic value is to demonstrate contempt for the objective evidence, but this is increasingly the case in the Pentagon.

At the regional level, the argument is made that conflict and tension is traceable to the sectarian and fragmented nature of Middle East society. Inter-Arab territorial disputes, ethnic and religious rivalries, and the debate between radicals and conservatives as to the future shape and direction of Arab society—all illustrate that the Arab countries, like so many other undemocratic states, are politically unstable and therefore unreliable from the standpoint of oil resources and our strategic security. Were Israel eliminated or the Arab-Israel conflict settled, or had the problem never existed, the Arab states would remain sharply divided into two major hostile camps with a greater ability and will to go for each others' jugular. The conservative monarchies would seek American protection against Soviet supported expansionist and extremist states, including the PLO and other terrorist movements. No longer shielded by Israel, absorbing the brunt of this attack, the conservative regimes would require direct large-scale American intervention, including American troops, to survive the aggression, both overt and covert, directed from the Soviet Union. Israel thus serves as a lightning rod for these oil-rich



Advance weapons like the above TOW Missile, can only be purchased from the United States.

monarchies since it diverts the attention of the Arab radicals away from them.

We must also remember that the Arab-Israel conflict has become a test of American credibility internationally. The world will judge America by how it stands by Israel. If we upset the balance, or even allow it to wobble, the result would be regional instability, an erosion of credibility among our allies, an encouragement for our adversaries to test our credibility elsewhere, and divisive political turmoil at home. I cannot stress the importance of this last factor. What would be the domestic consequences for the United States should we abandon the Israelis in their hour of crisis? I think the results would be the death of America. It would destroy whatever moral pretensions we have in foreign policy. It would make the Vietnam debate pale into insignificance. If we cannot sustain the only strong, democratic ally between Japan and Western Europe, what in Heaven's name are we going to support?

Nevertheless, as weighty as these arguments are, the paramount rationale for a strategic alignment with Israel is rooted in what I regard to be domestic necessity. To preserve our domestic institutions and our way of life, the United States requires a global environment in which Western Europe and Japan are reasonably stable, secure, and friendly towards America, while the continents of Africa and Asia remain independent of both the Soviet Union and China. Further, to limit our costs in defense and security, it is in our interest that the Soviet Union and China remain rivals and that China remains free of Soviet influence. An encircled China would no longer effectively counter-

balance the Soviet Union on the East sustaining the triangular balance in which the American effort is relatively small. I believe that were the United States ever neutralized and reduced to a garrisoned state, we would require a quadrupled defense budget. We would probably be forced to give up our liberties, and accept a Supreme Court that offers a very strict construction of the Constitution in the name of national security. Thus, by domestic necessity I mean a global balance which would permit us to survive as a democratic society. And that does not come when you have to emphasize security alone. You cannot have both. Therefore Israel, the only secure ally in the entire region between Western Europe and Japan, is indispensable to any solid Western security structure. From this perspective, American support for a strong Israel can be motivated exclusively on national interest grounds, valid in all circumstances except in the context of a totally isolationist United States, a contingency I do not foresee.

Having posed these geo-political and strategic arguments for a strong ally of the United States in the region, I want to discuss current policy. I think most of you would agree that in the last few years excessive attention has been given to the sale of military equipment as a means for expanding our political influence in the world. Today, global arms sales total 20 billion dollars. Half of this is the American market, in itself more than an combination including the Soviet Union. In the period between 1973 and 1976 \$12 billion in military equipment has been transferred from both East and West to the Arab states. An additional \$12 billion has also been contracted for delivery beginning in 1977 to the Arab states. And there is no end in sight. This is the magnitude of the problem. How can Israel, a society dependent heavily on outside aid, sustain economically the escalating and widening arms race without being tempted either to strike in a pre-emptive manner, or to conduct a preventive war? What good is it to have a society reduced to a garrisoned state that must subordinate everything to physical security? What incentive is there for the people of Israel to remain in Israel as human beings? This is a



question that must be churning in every Israeli mind. We don't hear much of it, but this is the reality. Consequently they are particularly sensitive to what the United States is selling to the Arab countries, more specifically to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and the Gulf Sheikdoms.

There are certain presumptions behind the sales of these weapon systems to the Arab states which should be addressed regarding the Middle East balance. Assumption number one, which is the prevailing one in the intelligence community and in the Defense Department, is that the Israelis retain an indefinite qualitative superiority and can therefore defeat any combination of Arab states, in the worst case scenario. That is a war on four fronts, in the face of a Soviet air-lift and in the absence of an American air-lift. And you sit here and you say my God, these people are crazy. And I'd say you're right. Nevertheless the prevalent assumption is that the Israelis enjoy such an overwhelming qualitative edge over combined Arab forces that they do not need additional military supplies. Of course they use this rationale in order not to sell additional weapons to the Israelis.

Assumption number two is the converse. The Arab states are incapable of assimilating sophisticated military technology; despite their performance in the 1973 War. The implication of this presumption is to sell the Arab states everything

and anything. If you ask two or three-star generals who are reaching for a fourth star or who are looking to please their master, General George Brown, they will tell you: "Sell them the stuff. First of all they'll screw it up and secondly we have to recycle the petro-dollar." Suddenly the Department of Defense is in charge of our Treasury Department. Suddenly it is the business of the Department of Defense to worry about balancing the books. Traditionally, the Department of Defense was designed to conceive a strategy for war. However, this last Administration was more concerned with recycling the petro-dollar.

Presumption number three: that the Saudis and the Kuwaitis would not transfer the equipment to the "confrontation" states in the event of renewed hostilities. As the Englishman says, if you can believe that you can believe anything. And they believe that in the Pentagon.


If during a crisis situation the Saudis did not transfer this weaponry, they would by their own sin of inaction trigger an internal revolt against their feudal rulers—a theocratic, feudal monarchy built on a royal family numbering no more than five thousand. Yet, a Quaddafi Arabia is as likely as a Saudi Arabia. This is an argument the Pentagon does not want to hear. So we'll move to presumption number four. If you don't sell the Arab states this weaponry, others will sell it—the British, the French, etc.—and we

will lose our influence in the region. So why not preempt the others by selling them the weapons, thereby gaining influence: the sale of weapons equals political influence. If there are any graduate students here, I recommend this topic as a thesis for a good dissertation. Do weapons sales actually lead to increased influence?

Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Mavericks, the Sidewinders, and the Tow missile, cannot be purchased anywhere else in the world. No government on this earth has the equivalent of any of these systems. And I defy anyone to show me where the Saudis could buy this kind of equipment.

But I have inflicted you with my prejudices for perhaps too long and I cannot leave without making a comment regarding General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I couldn't care less what his private views are regarding Jews, banking, newspapers or Israel, that's his private business. But when his biased views take on the dimension of policy, then I think every American, of every persuasion has the right to raise with Congress the question of this man's competence. I could sit here and give you a lecture for another hour on what this man has said in closed sessions, behind the screens, as it were. But you have seen enough of these statements in the press. His reference to Israel as a military burden surely relates to the burden of learning the lessons of the 1973 war which the Israelis were trying to teach him. You know the consequences. He was challenged externally by then Senator Mondale, Buckley called for his dismissal; even Carter called for a reprimand. There was a lot of hostility in the Senate, and elsewhere. It so happened that Bernard Gwertzman, a *New York Times* correspondent, called me at my hospital bed (I have a lower back problem) regarding another matter when he also asked what I thought of Brown. That's all I had to hear. And he said are you sure you want to go on record, and I said definitely, all the way.

My special security clearances were lifted on the grounds that I had compromised information—which is not true. I therefore treat the entire matter as a forced resignation. Be assured the matter is far from settled.



"I told you we Egyptians could handle this equipment ourselves!" Wright—Miami Daily News

The notion that Arab states are incapable of assimilating sophisticated military technology was proven disastrously wrong in the 1973 war.



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# The American Interest in Israel's Security

HERBERT KAMPF

**W**e have lately become accustomed to hearing that the United States is supporting Israel because of a moral and sentimental commitment and because of the influence of a "Jewish lobby" in Washington. There is some truth in this claim, but it omits enough facts to make it a misleading explanation. In particular, it creates the impression that there are no American interests involved.

In international relations moral and sentimental commitments do not as a rule carry much weight when concrete national interests are involved; they cannot explain the American support of Israel during the last few years. There surely is, similarly, a "Jewish lobby"—just as there is a lobby for virtually every one of the many groups that make up American society. The influence of this lobby, however, is limited and wielded mainly in the Congress. The "Jewish lobby" has always been much weaker in those parts of the executive branch where, traditionally, the real decisions on United States foreign policy have been made. As a result, this lobby has never been able to influence American policy whenever Washington has had its own reasons for not wishing to back Israel.

Despite the existence of this "Jewish lobby," for instance, the United States did not move to help Israel when

the newly established Jewish state was attacked by its Arab neighbors in 1948 and, in the opinion of most military experts, was not expected to survive. In 1956, too, the "Jewish lobby" was unable either to prevent or to influence a decidedly pro-Egyptian American foreign policy during the Suez War and its aftermath. It is generally forgotten that the American policy of siding with Israel in its wars with the Arabs and of significant armament sales to Israel, developed only during the 1960s, when various Arab countries, including the main "confrontation states," had become Soviet clients and Washington began to realize that they could not be "won back" merely through friendly gestures.

The large-scale economic assistance Israel is now receiving began at the time of the Yom Kippur War, when Israel's survival, and the strategic role she plays in the defense of Western interests, became dependent on American aid. The "Jewish lobby" can only marginally affect American policy in the Middle East; it is unable to change the basic course of that policy even during a presidential election year, as was seen by its inability to block arms sales to Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in 1976.

**T**o account for the strong American backing generally—though not always—rendered by Israel during the last few years, America's national interests must be considered in terms of its Middle East objectives. The primary

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American objectives in the Middle East can be enumerated as follows: preventing any confrontation with the U.S.S.R.; maintaining Western access to Middle Eastern oil, if possible at halfway reasonable prices; retaining for the West—or possibly even regaining from Soviet influence—as much of the Middle East as possible; maintaining peace in the Middle East; avoiding any action in the area that would undermine the prestige and credibility of the United States as an ally of non-Communist states; preventing nuclear proliferation.

Israel helps to advance these American interests in three positive ways: Israel's existence helps promote the survival of pro-Western regimes in the Arab world; Israel strengthens Western military capabilities in the strategic Middle East; and Israel's dependence upon American support increases the Arabs' need to please Washington in order to increase their leverage against Israel. In addition, it is to the United States' distinct advantage to support Israel so as not to impair its credibility as an ally of non-Communist states. Finally, America's unique relationship with Israel is a major factor in its effort to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Israel's peculiar<sup>6</sup> position plays an important role in the survival of the relatively moderate and conservative Arab regimes that are essential for the exercise of Western influence in the region. Since Israel serves as the focus for the hostility of radical Arab regimes, it attracts much of the militancy that would otherwise be directed against moderate and conservative Arab governments. The struggle against Israel also permits some conservative regimes to identify themselves directly and sometimes actively with the pan-Arab nationalism they would otherwise fear. In addition, the financial demands of this struggle make various

Arab radical and confrontation states, as well as the so-called Palestine Liberation Organization, financially dependent on the wealthy, conservative, Persian Gulf Arab states.

The possibility of direct Israeli military intervention may also act to preserve pro-Western Arab governments, as was the case with Jordan in September, 1970, and as may have been the case with the limitation of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon early in 1976.\* In the case of a strategically located country such as Jordan, when Arab radical states cannot overthrow its conservative government, they must court it in order to secure its cooperation with the anti-Israel front. Syria has been doing this since 1975.

Israel is still militarily the most powerful state in the Arab Middle East and the only reliable ally of the United States in this oil rich area. With the additional strategic importance of being located close to the southern border of the U.S.S.R., Israel can provide military bases for the United States, and may one day be the only state in that part of the Mediterranean willing to do this. Should it ever become necessary, for instance, to seize the main Arab oil fields in the Persian Gulf—a possibility that while remote cannot be dismissed—Israel would be needed both as a base and as an ally capable of neutralizing much of the Arab military power that would otherwise be concentrated against American forces.

**A**merica's ability to exercise influence in the Arab world is also enhanced by Israel's dependence on the

\* Israel did not deter the later Syrian interventions in Lebanon between the spring and summer of 1976 because, among other reasons, these interventions were apparently viewed as directed against the armed Palestinians in Lebanon and, therefore, in Israel's own interests.



United States. The inability of the U.S.S.R. to win back for the Arabs territories lost by them in the Six-Day War of June, 1967 has convinced several Arab states that American goodwill may be more important to them in some matters than Soviet support. American influence over Israel, either in terms of territorial concessions or in limiting Israeli advances in time of war, represents an important asset in Washington's relations with Arab governments.

Moreover, because the United States and the U.S.S.R. have become openly identified as, respectively, the allies of Israel and of the Arab states, the failure to preserve Israel's existence would disastrously undermine American prestige in the entire world, as well as the credibility of the United States as an ally of nations threatened directly or indirectly by the Soviet Union. Particularly after the outcome of the Vietnamese War and following the American non-action in Angola, the destruction of Israel on the part of Arab states, some or all of whom are armed and supported by Moscow, would lead to the no doubt universal conclusion that in a crisis the allies of the United States go down in defeat while the allies of the U.S.S.R. emerge victorious. The resulting shifts in alliances would adversely affect the balance of power in every part of the world.

It is also necessary to mention perhaps the most delicate reason for the American support of Israel. While the exact state of Israel's nuclear armaments—if any—is not known in the outside world, it is generally believed that she either possesses nuclear weapons or has the capability to produce them. Should the United States permit the conventional military balance between Israel and the Arabs to shift decisively against Israel, the latter might feel compelled, for reasons of survival, to

develop nuclear weapons, if she does not already have them. The use of nuclear weapons in a war between small powers would most probably spark a nuclear arms race among many other small states; it would also set a dangerous precedent for the use of nuclear arms. Both Washington and Moscow regard these possibilities as potentially disastrous for the entire world. Only by maintaining Israel's strength, both in terms of conventional armaments and of defensible borders, is it possible to avoid these dangers.

Still, some say that Israel also represents a liability for Washington. While it is difficult to question the need to support Israel in order to maintain the prestige of the United States and its credibility as an ally, and in order not to encourage further nuclear proliferation, it is often said that support for the Arab cause would do more than support for Israel to enhance American influence in the Middle East. It is also argued that the Arab states are more important than Israel in the Middle East—Israel's usefulness was described above to some extent as a tool for exercising influence over the Arabs—and that support for Israel serves mainly to undermine Washington's influence among the Arabs.

This view is logical only superficially; it is one of the myths that has obscured the understanding of Middle Eastern problems.

**U**nited States policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict can only be understood if the American support of Israel is placed in its proper perspective. The United States has always had a strong element of evenhandedness in its Middle Eastern policy even when it has given maximum support to Israel. Other than supplying some general assistance, the United States has only sup-



ported Israel in its basic struggle for survival and by maintaining conditions—geographic, economic, or otherwise—considered essential for its survival. The United States would never condone any unfair Israeli policy toward the Arabs; American policy generally is as friendly to the Arab states as circumstances permit. The outstanding example of this American evenhandedness took place during the Yom Kippur War when the United States gave maximum support to Israel. The wartime airlift of military supplies to Israel, and the confrontation with the U.S.S.R. over Israel, were followed by strong American pressure that stopped the Israeli advance west of the Suez Canal and saved the Egyptian Army from collapse. Then, as soon as Egypt began to display additional signs of turning away from the Soviet Union and of moving toward the United States, Washington pressured Israel into making territorial concessions to the Arabs. Thus, despite its support for Israel, the United States has never acted in a manner that precluded American-Arab friendship.

"Good relations" and "friendship" can have quite different meanings in the cases of Israel and of the Arab states. Without denying the importance of the Arab states and of friendly relations with them, it should be remembered that Israel is a stable Western democracy that—for ideological, political, economic, even sentimental reasons—cannot turn against the United States. The Jewish state is not subjected to sudden changes of basic policy. Israel is a fully reliable ally from the American point of view, and an ally that has repeatedly proven its worth in battle and in other crises. On the other hand, the Arab states have frequently proven themselves to be politically unstable, subject to sudden changes of government and to sudden reversals of

policy. No matter how much time and effort Washington invests in friendly relations with an Arab state, there always exists the danger that, for purely domestic reasons, even the most cooperative Arab government will, overnight, be overthrown and replaced by one that will side with the U.S.S.R. against the United States.

In spite of all claims to the contrary, the United States is not faced with a simple "either-or" choice between Israel and the Arabs. The support of Israel's vital interests, as part of America's overall, traditionally evenhanded policy, will neither undermine nor alienate the pro-Western Arab governments. The reasons for this are, basically, that the survival of the Arab governments depends mainly on domestic factors, and that Arab policies toward the United States, as well as toward other nations, are determined by the sum total of their own national interests and emotions. Among these, the satisfaction of the Arab grudge against Israel is by no means the only, or even the paramount, factor, particularly since Arab pride and self-respect were partly restored as a result of the Yom Kippur War. This is confirmed by the apparently contradictory pattern of Arab foreign policies since Israel's establishment in 1948.

The Arabs have never refused to deal with states supporting Israel when they judged this to be in their own interest, while at the same time they have also threatened, and at times even taken, sanctions against business firms and states for maintaining friendly relations with Israel. Arab sanctions, however, tend to contain loopholes and are often directed against smaller and relatively unimportant states. These sanctions are usually limited in both scope and duration, in particular when



powerful and important states are involved. In addition, they may be undertaken at least partly for reasons unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The most important recent sanctions, the Arab oil embargoes of 1967 and of 1973, were terminated when the excitement that had precipitated them had subsided, and when plausible excuses for resuming full petroleum deliveries had been found. The more serious of these two embargoes, begun in October, 1973, was terminated, among other reasons, when one of its main objectives, the quadrupling of the price of oil, had been achieved. This economic objective was seen by many observers as a motive for the imposition of the embargo that was at least as important as the desire to pressure nations friendly to Israel. Furthermore, the Arabs lifted their embargo at a time when their economic objective had been attained but when only a very limited portion of their political objective—an Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967—had been achieved. The Arabs have not been known to maintain sanctions for any length of time against a powerful state that is important to them and whose government is not easily intimidated.

The United States is too important and too powerful for most Arab regimes to risk a serious, long-term estrangement over American support for Israel. The United States is the bastion of the Western world, without which the moderate and conservative Arab governments have no future. In addition to this, the major markets for Arab oil, paying in currencies useful to the Arabs, the major sources of the goods and services bought by Arabs with their excessive oil profits, as well as most of the areas in which surplus oil profits can be safely and lucratively invested, are almost all located either

in the United States or in nations tied to her. The Arabs are not very likely to give all this up because of American support of Israel, although they constantly try to give the impression that they are about to take such action.

**A**n example sometimes offered to support the claim that the United States is alienating the Arabs with its support of Israel is the assistance given by conservative Saudi Arabia to the PLO, even though the Saudis are eager to keep Soviet influence out of the Middle East and the PLO is a Soviet client organization.

Conservative Arab governments are genuinely hostile to Israel, to be sure, but support of the PLO represents largely a kind of "protection money" paid by these governments in order to shield themselves from the endless plots and mischief of the Palestinian terrorists and their radical allies, and to divert their murderous actions toward Israel. In addition to this important reason, Arab governments of all ideological persuasions have extended financial, political, or symbolic support to the PLO because of the requirements of Arab politics, and as part of their maneuvering and plotting against each other.

It might be argued that even if American support for Israel is not really alienating the pro-Western Arab governments, continued support for Israel will cause these governments to be overthrown sooner or later by radical, pro-Soviet revolutionaries. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the survival of any Arab regime depends primarily on domestic developments basically unrelated to the American policies toward Israel.

No one today would claim, for instance, that King Farouk of Egypt and the Iraqi monarchy would, sooner or



later, not have been overthrown, even if Israel and the Zionist movement had never existed. If any pro-Western Arab governments should fall at some future time, this will be mainly for internal reasons. These governments are assuming a sufficiently anti-Israel posture to shield themselves from charges that they are "soft on Zionism." The existence of Israel and the American support that enables Israel to play an important role in the Middle East do not, therefore, undermine the survival of pro-Western Arab governments; on the contrary, Israel's presence promotes the survival of these pro-Western Arab regimes.

Likewise, if in the future any Arab governments become hostile to the United States, this will not be because of American support for Israel but because of either internal issues or of international developments basically unrelated to this support. Contrary to popular belief, the friendly cooperation of Arab governments with states judged to be important to them is largely unrelated to the policies of these states in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

There are many examples to prove this. During and immediately after the 1956 Suez War the United States not only sided with Egypt against Israel but, more than any other nation, actually saved Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime. Yet Nasser repaid Washington by increasing ties with the Soviet Union and by turning against the United States. On the other hand, immediately after the Yom Kippur War of October, 1973, during which the United States gave the greatest support ever given by this country to Israel, Egypt turned toward the United States and moved further away from the U.S.S.R. At the same time, the United States seems to have obtained no special acknowledgments from Syria in re-

turn for pressuring Israel into signing an agreement in 1974 that returned to Syria not only all land captured by Israel during the Yom Kippur War, but Kuneitra, taken in 1967, as well. Algeria strongly objects to American support for Israel yet simultaneously engages in large-scale trade in natural gas with the United States. The United States and the Netherlands, the two nations singled out by the Arabs during the Yom Kippur War as Israel's strongest supporters and as special targets of the oil embargo, have, since the termination of the War, increased their trade with the Arab states to a far greater extent than has France, a country that has based her Middle Eastern policy since 1967 on the false premise that friendship and trade with the Arabs require a pro-Arab, anti-Israel, foreign policy.

**B**ecause the Arab states have interests that in the long run are more important to them than their quarrel with Israel, and because the United States is of the greatest importance to moderate Arab regimes and to all Arab oil producing states regardless of ideology, Washington can simultaneously support Israel's vital interests and have useful, even friendly, relations with most Arab states. Americans may have to listen to a great deal of propaganda to the contrary, and some limited, temporary sanctions might be taken by some Arab states, but any harm suffered from such limited sanctions would be much smaller than the damage to American interests that would result from the sacrifice of Israel's vital security interests. Should the United States ever permit Israel to be overcome for the sake of relations with the Arabs, it will have unnecessarily lost an irreplaceable asset in the Middle East, as well as its worldwide credibility.

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ity and prestige as an ally, in return for dubious friendships that may depend on the life of a single ruler and that can be obtained for a much cheaper price. Moreover, such friendships, if based merely on Washington's ability to extract territorial concessions from Israel, would swiftly evaporate the moment the Arabs had obtained their ends.

Obviously, the United States need not always agree with Israel on everything, and Israel will have to make territorial concessions to secure a lasting peace. The Israeli Government has always recognized these facts. But it would be foolish for the United States to try to secure Arab friendship by pressuring Israel into making territorial concessions to her neighbors that her security cannot afford, particularly at a time when there are no real reasons for believing that most Arabs are ready for a final peace with Israel.

Such American pressure is not necessary in order to maintain friendly and mutually advantageous relations with Arab states; it will not guarantee Western access to Arab oil; it will not limit Soviet power and influence in the Middle East. Instead, pressure on Israel to make concessions that endanger her security will prove to be a self-defeating policy for Washington. Aside from the dangers of nuclear proliferation, such a policy, by losing a valuable ally and much American prestige throughout the world, will merely promote a great increase in Soviet power and influence in the oil-rich Middle East—the very result that the original pressure on Israel was intended to prevent.

Strategically dangerous concessions may not yet have been forced upon Israel, but it might happen. Washington will have to consider very seriously any future Israeli assertions that withdraw-

als from strategically vital territories cannot be made without a final peace settlement, even if the consequences of such a refusal may be a renewal of war in the Middle East. For one thing, Israel will have to pay the "price in blood" of such a war and if a nation as war-weary as Israel is willing to take this risk, this constitutes a very powerful argument.

**T**he issue of unilateral Israeli concessions in the face of threats by Arab states backed by the Soviet Union—even if some of these states have temporarily cooled their relations with the U.S.S.R.—involves a problem that extends beyond the Middle East. The United States may soon have to decide if she is willing to make a determined stand on behalf of her allies and to take the necessary risks, or if she will buy a false and temporary peace with her adversaries by pressuring those allies into making concessions that can only result in their liquidation and consequent loss as American allies. The latter course will, ultimately, leave an increasingly isolated United States to face enemies more numerous and more powerful than ever who will only have been encouraged to make further and still greater demands.

It is, however, unnecessary to conjure up images of a disastrous future for the United States, difficult for most people to visualize, in order to point out that peace is not achieved by forcing allies into making suicidal concessions to enemies supported by the U.S.S.R. Should Washington force Israel to make territorial concessions that will jeopardize her ability to defend herself, or should it sell arms to the Arabs that may threaten the balance of military power in the Middle East, the result would be either a serious danger of nuclear proliferation or a situation



in which Israel will be forced to turn to the United States for her survival in case of attack. The United States will then be faced with the dilemma of either abandoning one of her most important allies in the Middle East, with all the worldwide repercussions of such a step, or of intervening with her own military forces in order to avoid another disastrous defeat for the West.

It is easy to foresee how premature territorial concessions forced on Israel could lead to another war in the Middle East that would place the United States in such a dilemma. A withdrawal from strategically vital areas would weaken Israel to the point where Arab extremists would be dangerously tempted to attack it. In this they could easily be encouraged by the U.S.S.R., which might not find peace in the area to be in her expansionist interests. Arab moderates, whose present moderation results largely from a feeling that a decisive victory over Israel is not possible, would then join forces with the extremists and cease being moderates. Moreover, turning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip over to the PLO would multiply the effectiveness of its terrorist operations to a point where war would soon become inevitable. In view of the PLO's strong ties to the U.S.S.R., a PLO state would provide the Soviets with one of their finest bases of operations in the Middle East. A forced, premature Israeli withdrawal from strategically important territories would, therefore, serve mainly to precipitate another Middle Eastern war and to enhance Soviet influence in the area.

It would be much simpler not to force Israel into territorial concessions that she cannot afford and to take any necessary risks involved to enable Israel to continue defending herself with her own forces and with conventional weapons.

To sum up, the United States is supporting Israel primarily because this support is in the American national interest, not because of moral or sentimental factors that represent, at best, secondary considerations. Israel is a key American ally in a worldwide United States defense strategy, and a major factor in retaining Western influence in the Middle East and Western access to Middle Eastern oil. Israel could even be called America's first line of defense in the Arab East. The support of an ally of this sort does not require complete agreement with all of its views, but it does require the assurance of its vital interests so that the ally may be able to continue functioning effectively in this role. In addition to providing Israel with the necessary military, economic, and diplomatic assistance, the United States must develop a common position with Israel on two paramount issues: the retention of territories that are essential for Israel's defense, and armament sales to Israel's enemies. As long as a real danger of an Arab-Israeli war exists, the United States must stand by this position even if some risks are involved, since a refusal to back Israel under these circumstances would involve far greater risks. The American national interest involves more than the mere survival of the Jewish state. The United States needs an Israeli ally that is able to defend itself with its own soldiers and to play an important role in Middle Eastern strategy. Only a strong and viable Israel can help safeguard American interests in the Middle East. Because of this, the maintenance of Israel's strategic borders and of the proper military balance between Israel and the Arab states are, in themselves, major American interests: they must not be sacrificed for the sake of a shortsighted policy of pseudo-expediency.