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# מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

תיק מס'

מסרד רותם

יועץ מדיני

ארה"ב

30/089 - 7/11/89

מחלקה

תיק מס'

111

4610/14 - א



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פנימי: 4610/14-א

מזהה פריט: R00036g

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-9

תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4657

תאריך : 07.11.89

\*\* נכנס

שמו

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חוזם: 11,4657

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/412

מ-: קנברה, נר: 15, תא: 071189, זח: 1300, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: אפסוק

נד: @

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שמו / רגיל

אל: אוקיאניה, יועץ תפוצות, הסברה

ביקור מר סימור ריך נשיא בני ברית בארהב

1. מטרת הביקור היחה להעניק מדליה לרה'מ הוק עבור פעולותיו ההומניטריות (יהדות בריה'מ וידידותו לישראל).

2. בהופעותיו, בסעודה החגיגית לרגל הענקת המדליה, במועדון העתונות הלאומי והאחרות שם הדגש על ישראל והסברת מדיניות השלום שלה. ריך הופיע גם בפני פורמים אקדמאיים.

3. במהלך הביקור נפגש לשיחות עם רה'מ הוק ומנהיג האופוזיציה פיקוק.

4. ריך לא מצא חידושים בדברי רה'מ הוק שחזר וטען שעל ישראל לקחת סיכונים למען השלום, לנוכח ההזדמנויות הנוכחיות. פיקוק ציין ידידותו וידידות מפלגתו לישראל.

5. שוחחתי עם מר ריך פעמים מספר לפני נאומו בטקס הענקת המדליה ולפני פגישתו עם רה'מ הוק). בדיעבד נראה לי שבמידה רבה התפרצתי לדלת פתוחה כאשר בקשתיו לעמוד בדבריו על הסולידריות של העם היהודי עם ישראל לנוכח מי שטוענים כאן (ביניהם רה'מ הוק), שישראל מאבדת מידידיה גם בקרב העם היהודי. אכן, מרכזיותה של ישראל בחיי יהדות התפוצות ורגשות אהבת ישראל היו שזורים כחוט השני בכל הופעותיו.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA  
 FROM: SAC, [REDACTED]  
 SUBJECT: [REDACTED]  
 RE: [REDACTED]

SECRET

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6. חשיבות הביקור והתועלת שבו מצאו ביטויים בש בשיחותיו של  
מר ריך עם המנהיגות הפוליטית של אוסטרליה ובהופעותיו  
בעיקר בקרב הקהילה היהודית.

7. מכתב בדיפ.

קידר

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, הדס, אוקיאניה, תפוצות,  
בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה

א. שאלה: מהו המושג "התאמה" במסגרת תורת המשפט?  
ב. כיצד מתבטא המושג "התאמה" במסגרת תורת המשפט?  
ג. מהי חשיבות המושג "התאמה" במסגרת תורת המשפט?

א. שאלה: מהו המושג "התאמה" במסגרת תורת המשפט?

ב. כיצד מתבטא המושג "התאמה" במסגרת תורת המשפט?

ג. מהי חשיבות המושג "התאמה" במסגרת תורת המשפט?

א. שאלה: מהו המושג "התאמה" במסגרת תורת המשפט?  
ב. כיצד מתבטא המושג "התאמה" במסגרת תורת המשפט?  
ג. מהי חשיבות המושג "התאמה" במסגרת תורת המשפט?





משרד החוץ-מוחלקת הקשר

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* דף 2 מתוך 2 \*  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 6 \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

\* שאנו מדברים עם ארהב ומצרים אך לא עם אשפ' בייקר \*  
\* מצייין ששוחח על כך עם שהח המצרי עבד אל מגיד. שהח \*  
\* ארנס מצייין כי מבין שעדיין אין תשובה ממצרים. בייקר \*  
\* משיב שעד כה אין לו תשובה ממצרים, אך עבד אב מגיד \*  
\* SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING \*  
\* BY TUESDFY EVENING. ארנס מעלה החשיבות בתמיכה אמריקאית \*  
\* בכל נקודות היוזמה הישראלית, ומעלה אפשרות שארהב תתייחס \*  
\* באופן מעשי לנושא הפליטים. \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

\* לקראת סיום מבקש ארנס שייעשה כל מאמץ שהמכתב שיכין \*  
\* המזכיר יתאם את החלטת הקבינט ולא יחייב דיון נוסף. \*  
\* ככל דבר אחר יגרום לקשיים עצומים, וזאת בנוסף לבעיות \*  
\* הפוליטיות שכבר קיימות בארץ בעקבות ההחלטה. על כן \*  
\* מבקש ארנס שוב מבייקר שיורה לאנשיו לוודא התאמה מלאה \*  
\* בין המכתב המוצע לבין ההחלטה. \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

\* ס'ל' \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

\* רע \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

\* תפ: רהמ \*  
\* \* \* \* \*





\* שיחת שה"ח ארנס (יפנ) עם מזכ"ר המז"ח בייקר  
\*(אוסטרליה)\*

\* השיחה נתקיימה ביוזמת שר החוץ:ב - 7/11/89, שעה 16:30  
\*שעון יפן. להלן עיקרי השיחה:

\* ארנס מוסר על החלטת הקבינט. בייקר מציין בתגובה כי  
\*שמח על ההחלטה וכי הוא עובד על DRAFT של מכתב בנוגע  
\*ל ASSURANCES. ארנס שואל את בייקר אם  
\*ראה את הבטחונות כפי שהוצעו בהחלטת הקבינט, וביקר  
\*משיב בחיוב ומציין כי לגבי אחד מהם ייתכן שיהיה  
\*להם קושי. בייקר ממשיך ואומר כי חשוב שלא יהיו כל  
\*UNCERTAINTIES OR AMBIGUITIES ON THE NATURE OF  
\*OUR UNDERSTANDING. ארנס מציין כי חשוב ביותר שהניסוח  
\*יהיה כזה שיתאם את ההחלטה הישראלית ולא יחייב חזרה לקבינט.

\* בהמשך מציין ארנס כי ההתרחשויות בקהיר גרמו לישראל  
\*קושי רב, ונוצר רושם שמדובר בהדברות בין ישראל לאשפ'.  
\*המצרים טוענים שההחלטה צריכה להתקבל ע"י אשפ', ואשפ'  
\*רוצה בטחונות מארהב. זה גורם קושי אדיר וחשוב להבין

### נושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 2 מתוך 2  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 6

\* שאנו מדברים עם ארהב ומצרים אך לא עם אשפ'. בייקר  
\*מציין ששוחח על כך עם שהח המצרי עבד אל מגיד. שהח  
\*ארנס מציין כי מבין שעדיין אין תשובה ממצרים. בייקר  
\*משיב שעד כה אין לו תשובה ממצרים, אך עבד אב מגיד  
\*SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING  
\*BY TUESDAY EVENING. ארנס מעלה החשיבות בתמיכה אמריקאית  
\*בכל נקודות היוזמה הישראלית, ומעלה אפשרות שארהב תתייחס  
\*באופן מעשי לנושא הפליטים.

\* לקראת סיום מבקש ארנס שיעשה כל מאמץ שהמכתב שיכין  
\*המזכ"ר יתאם את החלטת הקבינט ולא יחייב דיון נוסף.  
\*כל דבר אחר יגרום לקשיים עצומים, וזאת בנוסף לבעיות  
\*הפוליטיות שכבר קיימות בארץ בעקבות ההחלטה. על כן  
\*מבקש ארנס שוב מביקר שיוורה לאנשיו לוודא התאמה מלאה  
\*בין המכתב המוצע לבין ההחלטה.

\* סלי.

\* רע

\*תפ: רהמ



טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים  
סוג בטחוני: גלוי  
דחיפות: רגיל  
תאריך רו"ח: 6/11/89  
מס' מברק:

א.מ.ק. 11

אל: המשרד

137

אל: יועץ שה"ח לתפוצות. מצפ"א  
דע: רונן/לוס-אנג'לס

"הועד היהודי האמריקני"

במסגרת הכנס החצי-שנתי של ה-AJC שהתקיים בלוס-אנג'לס התקיים ארוע  
חגיגי בו נאמו הנשיא לשעבר ריגן והבמאי סטיבן שפילד. <sup>שפילד</sup> בנפרד נעביר  
דברי ריגן על ישראל. נשיא ה-AJC קומי, <sup>קומי</sup> שלב בנאומו ביקורת  
בישראל (הדברים בנפרד). הקונכ"ל <sup>ק.מ.</sup> ידווחפרוט על הארוע.

3/13  
פסק

ש.ה.מ. 10/16 ט.ה.מ. 1  
א.מ.ק. 11  
ה.מ.מ. 10/16 ט.ה.מ. 1  
א.מ.ק. 11  
ש.ה.מ. 10/16 ט.ה.מ. 1  
א.מ.ק. 11

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STORY: NX1071106

DATE: 11/06/89

SLNX1071106 BT\*nxe107 11/06/89  
STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6  
(Transcript: Middle East excerpts) (4910)

Washington -- The following are the Middle East excerpts of November 6 regular noon State Department briefing. The briefer was Richard Boucher:

(BEGIN EXCERPTS)

Q: Where do we stand now on the Baker five points? And what happens next?

MR. BOUCHER: Okay. I hope you've all noted that Margaret (Tutwiler) made some comments on behalf of the Secretary in Australia. My comments here will amplify that somewhat.

So, as the Secretary said, we view Israeli acceptance of the the five points as a very positive step. We're pleased and encouraged by it, it's a clear step forward. Of course, there is still much to do and many details to be worked out before it would be possible to put together a pre-election Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. For now, we look forward to receiving an Egyptian response. We're prepared to continue working to see if a dialogue can be put together.

Q: Does the Egyptian response, as you understand it, incorporate the wishes of the Palestinians?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, we all know that the Egyptian government has been working very closely with Palestinians to develop a response as they develop their response to the five points. But it's an Egyptian answer that we're waiting for.

Q: There have been reports in Israel that the PLO has now demanded it's own guarantees from the United States, such as support for a Palestinian state and PLO participation in any peace talks. Is this accurate?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't -- I just checked, and as far as I'm aware, we haven't received anything like that here.

Q: Could I ask you about the play now between the United States and the Israelis? The Israelis accepted, but want six points covered, or assurances given. Is that the next step so -- is that -- well, I can put it to you two ways. Is the Secretary's review over, or is there more that the United States is going to do with additional Israeli requests?

MR. BOUCHER: I think in the end, what the Israeli cabinet called them were "assumptions" about the peace process. These are Israeli views essentially of what needs to be done now. We know that both Israel and Egypt are likely to request certain clarifications or understandings about the process. We have made clear to both sides that we're prepared to discuss these issues once agreement is reached on the overall framework. We have also made clear that any assurances or understandings need to be consistent with the spirit of the five points and the process they're designed to facilitate.

Q: You said a lot there. So do you take the six points as things that don't require U.S. action, necessarily -- the Israelis making assumptions on their own? There's no -- no language needs to be changed so far at Israel's request, correct?

MR. BOUCHER: I think that's, in fact, what Israel said, is that they weren't changing the language in the five points; they wanted to make certain assumptions about what needs to be done now.

SLNX1061106 BT\*nxe106 11/06/89

EDITORIAL: ANOTHER EXODUS OF EAST GERMANS (480)

(Following is an editorial, broadcast by the Voice of America November 5, reflecting the views of the U.S. government.)

Yet another exodus of East Germans has begun. Since the East German government lifted the ban on visa-free travel to Czechoslovakia last week, more than 8,000 East Germans have fled across the border. The travel ban was issued a month ago in an effort to stem the flow of refugees fleeing East Germany in search of greater freedom in the West. As many as 20,000 East Germans passed through Czechoslovakia on their way to West Germany before the East German border was sealed.

While it is a positive step that the East German government has allowed visa-free travel to Czechoslovakia to resume, the leadership still has far to go in establishing freedom of travel to all countries as a fundamental right protected by law. Many of the recent refugees chose to flee their homeland because they have no faith in Communist Party leader Egon Krenz's promises to carry out reforms. As one refugee said, "Krenz is making a lot of promises, but we do not believe him. We do not see any future, and certainly not for our children."

It is little wonder that many East Germans are wary of Krenz's promises. Following a recent meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Krenz expressed great enthusiasm for the reforms taking place in the Soviet Union and talked about how similar reforms could be enacted in East Germany. These statements, however, were made by the same man who applauded the Chinese government's brutal crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square last spring and vowed to maintain the Communist Party's leading role in East Germany.

Nevertheless, many have chosen to stay in East Germany, taking to the streets to demonstrate in favor of democracy and to pressure the government into enacting reforms. Over the past month, hundreds of thousands of citizens have staged massive peaceful demonstrations demanding an open media and election reforms. New Forum, one of the largest opposition groups with a membership of 50,000, continues to seek official recognition. In East Berlin, workers have founded the Independent Reform Enterprise Trade Union. Members of this free trade union are demanding the right to strike and travel freely.

If these citizens are to feel they have reason to remain in East Germany, they must have the hope that they will be able to participate in the shaping of their society. On the basis of Krenz's actions so far, however, it appears that he has only limited changes in mind. With the number of refugees fleeing East Germany again soaring, it is clear that this is not enough. The U.S. government supports the East German people in their call for action from the new leadership, not just words.

NNNN

Q: But beyond that --

MR. BOUCHER: And as I'm saying here, we need -- we are prepared to discuss these issues. We expect that clarifications, understandings will come from both Egypt and Israel. As long as these are consistent with the spirit of the five points and the process they're designed to facilitate, we're prepared to discuss them.

Q: Let's go another millimeter -- can I go another millimeter further?

MR. BOUCHER: Sure.

Q: "Discuss." Does that mean that you're prepared -- the U.S. is prepared to get into the language again, or is that pretty much over with?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I can't say it's over with because we're awaiting the Egyptian response before we decide whether the text is agreed by both sides.

Q: Unless my television screen was lying last night, certain members of the Israeli inner cabinet who voted on this described their -- what you're calling "assumptions" as "conditions," and said that they wanted them in writing from the United States. Are we prepared to do that?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything at this point on that, John. I think it would have to be based on the discussions before you decided whether to reduce them to writing. As you know, throughout this process there have been discussions that were later reduced to writing.

Q: Well, one of these assumptions is that the United States will, as I believe it was once again described on television last night, side with Israel in any dispute about the legitimacy of the composition of the Palestinian delegation. Are we prepared to do that?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not prepared to get into specifics about the conditions, assumptions, requests, whatever we're going to call them, about specific points raised by either party at this point.

Q: You said you're awaiting Egypt's response.

MR. BOUCHER: That's right.

Q: Again on her question, are you giving the Palestinians or the Egyptians any assurances that addresses the Palestinians' concerns? Because they have concerns, too. And my second question is concerning a statement today by Faisal Husseini. He said if the United States guarantees that the PLO is out, no Palestinians are going to be in, in the peace process. Could you -- do you have any response to this?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any -- I haven't seen the statement by Faisal Husseini, so I think --

Q: Assurances. Are you giving any assurances to the Palestinians?

MR. BOUCHER: On the question of assurances, your question didn't make clear whether you thought we've been asked for any. I'm not aware that we've been asked for any assurances on the Palestinian side, because the Egyptians who are most closely in touch with the Palestinians have not responded to us yet. But I did make clear right out front that we do expect both Israel and Egypt to have clarifications, understandings that they want reached in this process, and we're prepared to discuss those.

Q: Yes, but you always said that both sides have concerns, and we're going to address both sides' concerns. Did you address the concerns of the Palestinians in dealing with the Egyptians on this

issue? Did you give any guarantee --

MR. BOUCHER: We've been dealing -- we've been dealing with the Egyptians on this issue. I think Friday -- said that we'd summarized the discussions -- the Secretary had summarized the discussions in a letter shortly before he left. We have Israeli responses. We're awaiting an Egyptian response.

Q: But have you had discussions with the Egyptians? You remember the last peace plan just sort of fell apart by -- people didn't say no, it just sort of disintegrated. Hasn't there been -- one would think that, having gotten something you find encouraging from the Israelis, the Secretary or somebody in his behalf would have hit the telephone over the weekend and gone to the Egyptians, who you've talked to. Have you talked to the Egyptians since the Israeli inner cabinet, or whatever it is, made this move?

MR. BOUCHER: You mean yesterday?

Q: Well, I guess --

MR. BOUCHER: So essentially, you're asking have we talked to the Egyptians today. I'm not aware that we have, but I'm sure we'll be talking to the Egyptians very soon. It's possible the Secretary in Australia has already done that. But, you know, I'm sure we'll be talking to the Egyptians right away.

Q: And could I ask you one other thing? Let's jump ahead. What is the next step after the U.S. five-point proposal is accepted? What would be the next step?

MR. BOUCHER: For us to give them to you.

Q: Huh?

MR. BOUCHER: For us to give the points to you, Barry.

Q: Which version?

Q: No, no, no. Is it Arab -- is it Palestinian-Israeli talks with or without U.S. participation in Cairo?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, Margaret --

Q: Not in Cairo?

MR. BOUCHER: Margaret made clear, I think, right at the beginning, when the five points first came out, that the fifth point involved a meeting between Israel, Egypt and the United States. Unless there are some further modifications that I'm not aware of now, then that would be the next step. But as you know, the goal is to get to an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue that would prepare the elections.

Q: Richard --

Q: Can I follow up on the question of the state of play?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

Q: The next step is a three-way meeting, but you seem to have interposed a new step in between today, when you said that even after you have acceptance by both sides -- if you should receive acceptance from the Israeli -- from the Egyptian side -- then there would be discussions on concerns or assumptions, or whatever you want -- or views, whatever you want to call them, raised by each side. Would those discussions on assumptions and views have to precede -- are they preconditions? Must they be successfully concluded before the fifth point is achieved and a three-way meeting is held? Or does it happen at the three-way meeting?

MR. BOUCHER: I assume that those would be discussions that -- whenever the meeting was scheduled, that those discussions could be there, they could be before. There's no -- I don't have any fixed timetable as to when those discussions have to occur, and they're certainly not preconditions for a meeting.

Q: But -- but we were trying to -- in trying to determine whether anything has actually moved forward here, it raises the question of whether the United States thinks the Israelis and the Palestinians are any closer to negotiations on the subject of elections today than they were yesterday. Or are there discussions to be held in between which essentially would rake over a lot of the ground of the discussions that have been held over the last couple of weeks?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, the answer to that is right up front. Yes, we do think that things are moving forward. I said right up front it's a very positive step, the fact that the Israeli cabinet has accepted the framework. We're pleased, we're encouraged and it's a clear step forward.

Q: You think that --

MR. BOUCHER: But we don't come to closure until both sides have agreed.

Q: Richard, a point of clarification, if you would?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

Q: Assuming a best case scenario where things do move forward and there is a dialogue, as Secretary Baker called it, in Cairo or someplace else, is the plan -- is the plan definitely one way or the other for the United States to take part or not to take part, or is this something that's possible but not clarified the other way? Some of us have been arguing about that.

MR. BOUCHER: I don't in fact know the detailed answer but I think that's a question answer at this point either.

Q: Are you prepared to say, yes, that the Secretary will see the Israeli Prime Minister is he comes here next week?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not aware that anything's been scheduled.

Q: Did -- forgive me. I am really still not clear, though, on something, and that is, you're welcoming Israel's acceptance. But Israel's acceptance is on condition that you give them the written assertion. So are you, therefore, saying that if you welcome Israel's acceptance you are de facto going to give them that written assertion or not? I mean, you're making a big speech saying, yes, you welcome Israel's acceptance of it, but their acceptance is conditional.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay. Their acceptance was not written, as I read it, the way you're saying it, first of all. Second of all, what we've said for the last several weeks -- what Margaret said, what I've said, what the Secretary said -- was we're working on a framework, that there were always more details that had to be discussed and worked out. I said that again today. There's still much to do.

We said that we expect clarifications and understandings will be requested by both Egypt and Israel, and we're prepared to discuss those. I don't have an answer for you right now if, you know, these assurances will be provided in a specific form or the list requested or whether that will go in writing, but that's certainly a subject for further discussion.

Q: But you seem to be saying that these clarifications or whatever -- first of all, do you -- does the Secretary have them in hand, or are you just reading about them in the press?

MR. BOUCHER: Does the Secretary have them in hand?

Q: Yes.

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know whether he has them in hand. I'm sure he knows about them in great detail. We have received them here.

Q: You have received them?

MR. BOUCHER: We have them here.

Q: Okay, and second of all, by saying that you welcome them, the assumption here is that they, these clarifications or assumptions or whatever they are, don't negate the basic points. Is that right?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I don't want to comment on the specifics of, yes, this one does or doesn't. I said that we look forward, we will be prepared to discuss these kind of issues, and then the basic condition for acceptance that we put on it is, we've made clear that any assurances or understandings need to be consistent with the spirit of the five points and the process they're designed to facilitate. It's in that light that we'll discuss --

Q: And at this point you don't know if they are within the spirit?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm just not taking a position at this point, Barry.

Q: Richard, has Israel given the United States a conditional or an unconditional acceptance of the framework?

MR. BOUCHER: The Israeli Cabinet attached certain assumptions about the process. I think that was the words they used. Those are the words I'm using. They have accepted the framework, the five points, and we see that as a very positive step. There are, of course, many more things to be done.

Q: (Off mike) -- accept the conditions then? If you received the assumptions and you are pleased that they accepted the framework --

MR. BOUCHER: No. This is not --

Q: -- so they accept the conditions.

Q: Richard, in the --

MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't. I'm not taking any view on the attached assumptions at this point. Those are things that need to be discussed. They have to be consistent with the five points and what we're doing.

Q: Richard?

MR. BOUCHER: You're going back and forth between, you know, what the Israelis called it, which was assumptions and which are part of the details and part of the things that have to be worked out, and calling them conditions as if they're preconditions to acceptance. But that's not what the Israeli government said.

Q: Richard, you say they are assumptions as you have just told us now.

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

Q: Does the U.S. accept those assumptions? You do because you're saying you welcome them, et cetera, et cetera. Am I correct so far?

MR. BOUCHER: This is a process. As many of you who know the Middle East know, it goes step by step from one step to another. We've put a lot of emphasis in the past few weeks about getting a basic framework agreed for how we can approach this Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. We've worked with the Israelis. We've worked with the Egyptians. The Israelis, in accepting the five points, accept the basic framework. There are many other things to be discussed, and we'll be discussing those.

But I don't have, you know, acceptance, rejection of the assumptions at this point. I don't have -- we're just not at that stage right now.

Q: Richard, the point -- I think the point that we're trying to

get at is that you said they accept the basic five points, but they attached certain assumptions. And you told us this morning how encouraged, how welcoming the U.S. (was) of those assumptions. So, we assume that you accept the five points and the Israeli assumptions attached to them. Is that wrong?

MR. BOUCHER: That's wrong. That's not what I said.

I'm just not getting into one, two, three, four, five, whether I accept every single one of those. And I think that's understandable at this stage in the process. We have to hear from Egypt on the basis -- on the basics which are the five points, and we have to discuss a lot of these issues.

Q: Richard, we're trying to find out what Israel gave to the United States. Did it give to the United States a conditional acceptance or an unconditional acceptance of the five point framework?

MR. BOUCHER: I can't characterize it any better than the Israelis have.

Q: Richard, can you just clarify one thing? Okay. Now, the acceptance -- or the assumptions they have with the acceptance. Are these part of the whole package now, and are you welcoming the whole package with the assumptions or are you're welcoming only the five points without the -- can you clarify this?

MR. BOUCHER: We're welcoming Israeli acceptance of the five points, and we're saying we're willing to discuss the assumptions, clarifications, understandings that Israel and Egypt might want.

Q: Richard, can -- (inaudible) -- whether the Secretary's five point -- can you say now, now that you have an acceptance from one party, whether the Secretary's five points have changed since he originally proposed them?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah. The Secretary sent back, I think last week, a slightly amended text. That one included bracketed language regarding one particular sentence. The Israeli Cabinet expressed its preference to delete that sentence. We will await the Egyptian response, of course, before deciding whether the deletion is agreed to by both parties.

Q: Richard, will the United States release, when it makes public the Secretary's five points, as it has pledged to do, will it make public the bracketed language? And while I'm at it, will the -- does the Secretary's pledge to make public the five points include a pledge to make public any views, assumptions, conditions, clarifications, assertions, or whatever -- whatever language you choose -- whatever words you choose to apply to them that are attached to those five points?

MR. BOUCHER: The pledge to make the five points available was the pledge to make them available. If the deleted sentence is not there, it won't be there; if it is there, it will be there. It depends how they work out. As for whether we explain anything -- everything and everything that went on in terms of words in and words out during this whole process, and whether we explain all the assumptions that we think other parties are making about things, I think we'll have to wait for the moment.

Q: When will --

Q: (Off-mike) -- please. Some of us haven't had a chance to ask him about this. This is very interesting. Now, when Margaret made a promise to publicize the five points, we assumed that those were the five points at that time.

MR. BOUCHER: Is that a conditional assumption or an

unconditional assumption?

Q: It's an unconditional assumption. Well, wait. So, when you publish the five points -- I mean, this is Ralph's question; it's a good one. We can see how this thing was molded and shaped and adapted --

MR. BOUCHER: Will we go through the whole "Who shot John and where --"

Q: Not necessarily. Just give us the texts as they changed.

Q: That wasn't the question, you know, "who shot John?" It was --

Q: No, no, no.

Q: -- will the -- will the Secretary's five points be released, and will it then be the five points that everybody's accepted as well be released? And your answer was no. Your answer was it'll -- you're only going to release what is ultimately agreed to, not what the Secretary proposed, which was the original promise.

MR. BOUCHER: My answer -- I'll check with Margaret on that one. Okay. My answer is I'm sure we'll release the final five points when they're agreed or not agreed, as we've always said. Whether we go back to the beginning with the version that existed in the beginning, I think that's the question I can't answer.

Q: That was the promise. He's got a good point. That was the promise, to release the five points.

MR. BOUCHER: Maybe we'll release the original points and not the final ones, I don't know.

Q: Well, good, because we get the final ones from the Israelis, no problem -- (laughter).

Q: (Off-mike.)

MR. BOUCHER: Okay, let's --

Q: Can I try another subject?

MR. BOUCHER: Let's try to be careful about this, and let me stop a second on the five points, I mean let's try to be careful about this and not get into an incredible level of detail. I think, you know, you have our commitment to give you the five points, we said we would do that when we get to the end of the process whether it's successful or not. We'll do that and I'm sure we'll be prepared to answer as many of your questions as we can.

Q: Lest we be faulted for not asking this question, can you tell us, please, what the bracketed language is that you made reference to a moment ago?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I'm sorry, I can't.

Q: Richard, in a previous stage --

Q: Can I --

(Cross talk.)

MR. BOUCHER: Let's slow down a little bit. Let's slow down a little bit. Let's try to do it rationally.

Q: In a previous stage, Secretary Baker made it very clear that he cannot accept or approve conditions or demands from Israel because other parties are going to make conditions or demands. Now, does this apply to assumptions?

MR. BOUCHER: That's not what the Secretary said. The Secretary said he would review ideas and suggestions, modifications from either side and that, of course, one had to be careful of not getting into a back and forth of reciprocal modifications to modifications and things like that. But, he said, as I have said today, that we are open to ideas and we want to discuss them.

Q: Now, what --

Q: Richard, let me just ask you one -- it might be a technical question. You spoke about a bracketed sentence. Is that the only modification? Can you tell us that much?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I said the Secretary sent a slightly amended text that included bracketed language.

Q: (Off mike) --

MR. BOUCHER: That's right.

Q: -- so there's more than the bracketed language that's been changed?

MR. BOUCHER: That's right.

Q: The second thing is, is that are we talking with the PLO in Tunis about these developments on the five points?

MR. BOUCHER: I discussed what we're talking to the PLO in Tunis about I think last Friday, and I really don't have anything to add today.

Q: Talking about these five points?

MR. BOUCHER: We're talking about the process, I characterized it again on Friday, and the process that we are engaged in. I don't have anything else.

Q: You don't -- you're not telling us specifically whether you're talking about the five points. This is what I'm trying to get at.

MR. BOUCHER: We expressed to the PLO, and I think the words on Friday, again, were more extensive, our view that they should go along with the process that was going on and that they should not block it.

Q: Richard, have you been able to establish contacts with the new Lebanese president during the last 24 hours at least?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm -- basically, I'm not sure if we have at this point, if we've talked to him.

Q: (Off mike) -- can I -- on Lebanon?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

Q: You've been calling on General Aoun to respect the results of the parliamentarians' decision to ratify the Taif agreement and the election of the new president.

MR. BOUCHER: That's right.

Q: Yet, the General continues his -- what you called his "confrontational tactics," and this morning he sent some of this young toughs to rough up the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, and he continues to challenge the legitimacy of the parliament's decision. Are you in contact with the General? And what's your view on the situation?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not aware of any direct contacts with the General that we've had. I mean, certainly I think we made a clear statement yesterday, which if you don't have, we have in the press office for everybody, about the election of the new president in Lebanon. As for the confrontation at the -- I guess it's the seat of the Maronite Catholic Patriarch, frankly, we're shocked that followers of General Aoun violated the sanctity of the seat of the Maronite Patriarch. We strongly deplore any mistreatments that were suffered by the Patriarch Sfeir.

Q: By the?

Q: By the patriarch himself. There were reports of that as well.

Q: That sounds like the way people write stories when they don't know if something happened. If it happened, they're against it. You

said "any." Were there any?

MR. BOUCHER: Well actually, I said "any," but my guidance says "the mistreatment suffered by," so I assume there was, yes.

Q: - Okay.

Q: Richard?

MR. BOUCHER: Any further mistreatment we would not like either.

Q: Are General Aoun and his associates still on the list of forces or factions you are in contact with with regard to the situation in Lebanon, or he is just out of the picture?

MR. BOUCHER: I am not aware, as I said, of any specific contacts with people in Lebanon in the last day or so. But he's, you know, he remains the commander of the armed forces, and we would expect to continue to have contacts with him as appropriate.

Q: Do you have any contacts with other countries in this region who have influence on General Aoun? Are you getting in touch with them and asking them for help with him?

MR. BOUCHER: We've been in touch with a large number of countries throughout this process of reaching national reconciliation in Lebanon. We've been strongly supporting the Taif accords in our diplomacy, and talking to a lot of people. And I'm -- I'm not sure when our last set of contacts were, but we're very -- you know, we've been working very closely, almost on a day-to-day basis with a lot of the countries involved, so I'm sure we're in touch.

Q: Richard? Richard, let me ask you just one question.

MR. BOUCHER: Let's -- can we go over here first?

Q: Yeah, I just wanted to know if there are any steps -- are you contemplating any steps -- the administration -- to assist the results -- I mean, to assist the new movement towards the elected official (or president?) taken over in Lebanon? Are you planning anything? Are you contemplating any such things having been -- having for many years called on things to happen there the way they did now?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, our statement of yesterday, I think, made very clear our view that we warmly welcomed his election, and we look very much forward to being able to work with him. We -- I'm not quite sure what other kinds of steps you're asking about, but we certainly do look forward to supporting and working with the duly elected president of Lebanon.

Q: I can think of one step right away. Is the administration considering returning its diplomatic mission to Lebanon now that it has an elected president?

MR. BOUCHER: That's something we certainly keep under review, and we do want to go back to Beirut, but it's -- it was explained at the time and I'd have to refer to it again as essentially a security decision based on whether we can have a safe and effective embassy there.

Q: And that hasn't changed in your view with the weekend's events in Lebanon?

MR. BOUCHER: The situation on the ground, you know, we keep under close watch, and when it does change to the point where we think we can have a safe and effective presence there, I'm sure we'll go back.

Q: Richard, the original idea, as I understand it, was that Shamir would see the President on November 15th, and then he would go to Cincinnati and address the Council of Jewish Federations on the following night. As of now, nine days before the magic number date of November 15th, both the State Department and White House says there's

no scheduled meeting, although there's -- it's been in the works for a long time. What is the reason for not being on the schedule?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't -- I don't have any reasons for it today. I think just -- all we can do is note the fact that -- I'm not aware of anything on the schedule.

Q: Reports from the Sunday Correspondent (?) that the U.S. is seeking to have better ties with Libya, do you have anything on that?

MR. BOUCHER: I have nothing on that, and I haven't seen the reports, but we made a statement not too long ago about Libya's continued support for terrorism, which I think gives our view pretty strongly.

Q: Any comment on the proposed Catholic Bishops statement on the Middle East peace process that has been announced in Baltimore?

MR. BOUCHER: No.

(END EXCERPTS)

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STORY: NX1081106

DATE: 11/06/89

SLNX1081106 BT\*nxe108 11/06/89  
WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6  
(Transcript: Middle East excerpts) (215)

Washington -- The following are Middle East excerpts from the November 6 White House briefing. The briefer was Marlin Fitzwater:  
(BEGIN EXCERPTS)

Q: The Israeli government has taken a vote now on the Baker plan for the elections over there, but again has added the proviso that the PLO not be included. Does this move things any further along? It appears to be the same thing that Shamir's been pushing.

MR. FITZWATER: Well, Secretary Baker responded to this question this morning, and first of all, I would like to offer the points that he made, which were one, that we welcome the Israeli Cabinet decision and believe that it provides fuller impetus for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. We are encouraged by the decision and by the progress that it portends. We hope that Egyptians and the Palestinians will also respond soon. The government of Egypt is working intensively, including consulting with Palestinians, who has not provided a response so far. So, we still think there is a lot of work to be done, but we think it is a positive sign in terms of moving the process forward.

Q: Is the President going to meet with Shamir when he comes?

MR. FITZWATER: Nothing's scheduled yet.

(END EXCERPTS)

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Delivered: Sun 5-Nov-89 22:15 EST Sys 197 (67)

bject: PALESTINIAN :palestinian peace talks remains long and difficult asked  
\* Reuters

il Id: IPM-197-891105-200410552

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-MIDEAST-BAKER 1STLD (WRITETHROUGH)

AKER SAYS U.S. WILL LOOK AT ISRAELI DEMAND FOR PLO PLEDGE  
ds: updates with Baker comments)

By Alan Elsner

●NBERRA, Australia, Nov 6, Reuter - Secretary of State  
mes Baker said Monday the United States needs to consider  
refully an Israeli demand for a written assurance that would  
clude the Palestine Liberation Organization from Middle East  
ace talks.

Baker, in Australia to take part in a meeting of Pacific  
m nations, told reporters the road to Israeli-Palestinian  
ace talks remains long and difficult.

Asked for his reaction to Sunday's vote by Israel's inner  
binet to accept conditionally his five-point peace initiative,  
ker said:

"Of course we've said we're pleased they've accepted the  
neral framework.

"But this is just the first of what will probably be a  
ry long and complicated and difficult process."

Israel's policy-making inner cabinet voted nine to three to  
cept Baker's five points, intended to pave the way for Israeli  
alstinian talks on elections in the occupied West Bank and  
za Strip.

But acceptance was made conditional on the United States  
oviding a written assurance that Israel would not have to  
gotiate with the PLO.

The U.S. opened a diplomatic dialogue with the PLO last  
ar after its leader Yasser Arafat said the body accepted  
rael's right to exist and renounced terrorism.

But Israel still denounces the PLO as an organization bent  
the destruction of the Jewish state and will have nothing to  
with it.

Asked if he would provide Israel with the assurance it  
nts, Baker said: "We'll have to look at the detail of that."

Earlier, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler  
id Baker was still waiting for a reaction from Egypt to the  
raeli decision.

Baker put forward his five points last month after the

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Israelis rejected an Egyptian election formula.

The five points have not been published but Israeli spokesmen said two of them were unacceptable.

Israel demanded a veto over the Palestinian delegation to exclude the PLO and asked for assurances that the talks be limited to the proposed elections.

Israeli officials reported last week that Baker had made some changes in his plan to meet their concerns.

U.S. sources said the changes were minor. Baker himself said that making changes to accommodate one party risked bringing new demands from the other side.

At the heart of U.S. policy is the assumption that Israel must be ready to cede occupied territory for peace.

But that premise is not shared by Israel's hardline Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who believes Israel should keep the territories for ever.

A Palestinian uprising raging there for almost the past two years has claimed over 700 lives.

Shamir is due to visit Washington next week where discussions are likely to center on the proposed Palestinian elections which would be the first held in the territories since municipal elections in 1974 when PLO supporters won most of the seats.

Nearly all the mayors then elected have since been deported by the Israelis.

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דתיפות: מזגדי	שגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: שמור		כתוב: 16
תאריך וזמן תעבור: 6 בנוב' 1989 15:00		אל: מצפייא
פס' פרוק: הפסד:	אלהק	דע: מקשייח/משהבייט
146		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

קונגרס: עסקת הטנקים לסעודיה

1. רצייב תשובת הממשל לסנטור פל ולקונגרסמן לויין על מכתביהם בנדון.
2. השימועים בביהנייב יתקיימו מחר בבוקר.

תקיות גילם  
יהודית ורנאל דרנגר.

<sup>1</sup> 31    <sup>2</sup> 31    <sup>1</sup> 31    <sup>1</sup> 31    <sup>1</sup> 31    <sup>1</sup> 31    <sup>3</sup> 31    <sup>3</sup> 31  
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סי.ס.

תפוצה: 36 סי.ס.

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U) Thank you for your letter of October 19, 1989, requesting additional information regarding the proposed sale of 315 M1A2 tanks and other equipment to Saudi Arabia. We appreciate your taking time to let us know your concerns regarding this matter. Indeed, many of the questions you raise are precisely those which we examined in determining that there are sound policy reasons for proceeding.

(U) Your letter raised several specific questions. The Saudis requested 315 tanks based upon their own assessment of requirements. The quantity requested is reasonable given the Saudi's need to replace a similar number of increasingly obsolescent tanks and the threat they face. We have no indication that the Saudis plan to buy more M1A2s in the foreseeable future. As you know, under the terms of any FMS sale, the Saudis cannot transfer this equipment to any third party without U.S. Government permission.

(U) While press reports have indicated that the Saudis are planning to buy the Brazilian Osorio tank, we do not believe they have made a decision to do so. We believe that their consideration of the Osorio, like their consideration of the British Challenger II, is primarily a hedge against a disapproval of the Abrams sale. However, it is possible that the Saudis may eventually proceed with an Osorio purchase in order to achieve a high-low mix of modern tanks. (The Osorio, although it has a 120mm gun, is a lighter, less heavily armored tank than the M1A2.)

**(DELETED)**

The Honorable  
Claiborne Pell,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
United States Senate.

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(U) The Saudis also will not receive depleted uranium (DU) ammunition, but rather a tungsten round. We will not provide the Saudis the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) to be installed on U.S. M1A2s but instead will equip the Saudi tanks with the Position-Navigation System, which provides position location, heading reference, and range and bearing waypoints. For reasons of communications security, we will not provide the SINGARS frequency-hopping radio to be incorporated in the U.S. Army M1A2. The Saudis may elect to purchase two items that the U.S. Army does not plan to install on its M1A2s for reasons of affordability:

- Driver's Thermal Viewer--enables the driver to see through smoke, fog, and dust and to drive in darkness.

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- Inter-Vehicle Information System--allows expanded communications between tanks.

(U) ~~The Administration has an unshakable commitment to the security of Israel. Pursuant to this commitment, we conduct a complex program of arms transfers as well as providing financial support for Israeli domestic defense production and selected third-country procurements. Enclosed you will find a summary of the major ongoing and potential programs for upcoming years.~~

(U) The information listed under letters (A) through (P) of Section 35(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act is also enclosed. Letters D, H, and I of this enclosure provide our assessment of the effect the sale will have on the regional arms balance. In addition, I am enclosing for your information a copy of additional information provided to members of the House of Representatives in response to a request from them.

(U) You may recall that, in his confirmation hearings in January, Secretary Baker pledged to consult closely with the Congress on all matters of mutual concern, and especially on arms sales. We look forward to discussing these and any other questions you may have during the informal and formal notification periods, and would welcome an opportunity for further direct consultations.

Sincerely,

  
Janet G. Mullins  
Assistant Secretary  
Legislative Affairs

Enclosures

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B**M1A2 ABRAMS TANK**

A. Description and capabilities of the articles and services to be offered: 315 M1A2 tanks with 630 AN/PVS-5C Night Vision Goggles, 347 M2 (.50 cal) Machine Guns, and 693 M240 (7.62mm) Machine Guns. These items are issued together as a complete Abrams tank system. Other items of MDE to be offered include M88A1 Recovery Vehicles, and 175 M998 Utility Trucks (HMMWV). Non-MDE items will include logistics support such as trucks, ammunition, USG/contractor technical assistance, spare parts, tools, test equipment, publications, training aids/devices, and the possible design/construction of maintenance facilities ranging from organizational to depot level support for the tank. The M1A2 is the next generation of the Abrams tank. It will be an improved version of the M1A1 now in production, containing the following proposed upgrades: (1) Applique armor to protect the tank against advanced Soviet-made weapon systems; (2) A commander's independent thermal viewer (CITV) which enables the tank commander to acquire new targets in the dark while the gunner is engaging others. The CITV also permits the commander to hand-off targets for the gunner to engage independently; (3) An improved commander's weapon station which provides improved visibility and ballistic protection, an enlarged hatch, and protection against directed energy weapons; (4) Position-navigation system which improves position location, heading reference, and range and bearing to waypoints; (5) A carbon dioxide laser rangefinder which provides an improved all-weather target engagement capability, and improved safety for friendly troops; and (6) A systems integration package to consolidate operational functions to reduce the burden on the crew. The Saudi version of the M1A2 will differ somewhat from the version produced for the U.S. Army. Some modifications will be made to meet the Royal Saudi Land Forces' peculiar environmental needs or for interoperability with other Saudi equipment. In addition, the Saudis may elect to purchase several items that the U.S. Army has decided against installing in its own M1A2s, such as: (1) A driver's thermal viewer which enables the driver to see through smoke, fog, and dust and to drive in darkness; and (2) An inter-vehicle information system which allows improved communication between tanks.

B. Estimate of number of U.S. Government and U.S. civilian contract employees required in-country in support of the proposed sale: An estimated 330 people will work on the program in country. They will participate in initial survey and provide training, logistical support, and quality assurance services in support of the proposed sale.

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C. Name of the contractors expected to provide the articles or services:

M1A2 Tank: General Dynamics Land Systems Division  
Textron Lycoming  
Allison Transmission Division, General Motors Corp  
Hughes Aircraft Company  
PNC Corporation  
Denner Corporation

Ordnance: M551 Recovery Vehicle - BMY Corp  
HMMWV Utility Truck - LTV/AM General Division  
HEMTT - Oshkosh Truck Corp  
HET - Oshkosh Truck or PACCAR  
5 Ton Trucks - BMY Corp  
Machine Guns - SACO Defense Systems Corp and FN Manufacturing  
Ammunition - Olin and/or Honeywell Corps

Training Devices: General Electric Corp  
ECC International Corp  
Burteck Corp  
Perceptronics Company  
Teledyne Brown Corp

D. Evaluation, prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, of the manner, if any, in which the proposed sale would -- (i) contribute to an arms race; (ii) increase the possibility of an outbreak or escalation of conflict; (iii) prejudice the negotiation of any arms controls; or (iv) adversely affect the arms control policy of the United States: The proposed sale of 315 M1A2 tanks will not significantly affect the regional military balance nor Israel's military superiority vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia. The sale would introduce no new capability into the area since comparable tanks have already begun to enter the armies of Egypt, Israel, and Iraq. With the addition of the M1A2 tank, Saudi Arabia would have a capability that it does not now possess to defend against the increasingly modern armor threat posed by other armies in the region.

This sale is not likely to increase the possibility of the outbreak of conflict. A Saudi ground force, even one equipped with the M1A2 tank, would be an unlikely threat to Israel. Saudi Arabia has never played a significant role in any of the Arab-Israeli wars. Moreover, movement of a large Saudi tank force would be readily detectable and thus vulnerable to interdiction by Israel's superior air forces. Further inhibiting Saudi Arabia's ability to concentrate its forces against Israel is its requirement to position a major portion of its armor forces well from the Israeli border to deal with potential threats from all directions.

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The sale of M1A2 tanks is not likely to prejudice the negotiation of arms control arrangements. By improving the Saudi deterrent against attack and increasing Saudi Arabia's confidence in its own security, the sale could reduce somewhat the volatility of the region. The sale would not adversely affect the arms control policy of the United States.

E. Reasons why Saudi Arabia needs the M1A2 tank and how Saudi Arabia intends to use them: Saudi Arabia has a requirement for the M1A2 Abrams tank to enhance its territorial security through the strengthening and modernization of its tank forces. The Saudis see modernization as a key ingredient not only for their own deterrent capabilities but also for effective participation in regional defense. Acquisition of the M1A2 tank will enable them to replace outdated systems and the improved maneuverability and firepower of the M1A2 will provide a greater defensive capability.

F. Impact on military stocks and preparedness of the United States: This proposed sale will have a favorable impact on military stocks and military preparedness of the United States. All items to be provided will be from new procurements made specifically for the program. Adding Saudi requirements to U.S. procurements will increase the efficiency of plant operations. The total requirement will not exceed the production capacity of the U.S. production base.

G. Reasons why the proposed sale is in the U.S. national interest: The M1A2 tanks that will be provided to Saudi Arabia underscore the U.S. Government's publicly expressed commitment to assist Saudi Arabia in enhancing its defensive capability. This sale will also support a broader strategy designed to block Soviet penetration into the region, contribute to regional stability, and strengthen security in Southwest Asia, an area of vital interest to the United States. Furthermore, it will contribute to the economic well-being of the U.S. by generating employment and revenue and reducing the trade deficit.

H. Impact of the proposed sale on military capabilities of Saudi Arabia: Acquisition of the M1A2 tank improve the Saudi armor inventory since it is markedly superior to existing Saudi main battle tanks in firepower and armor protection. However, an improvement in overall Saudi military capabilities would be dependent on numbers of Saudi personnel, training and logistical considerations.

I. Impact of this proposed sale on the relative military strengths in the region: The addition of 315 M1A2 Abrams tanks to the Saudi inventory would not result in any appreciable change in the relative military strengths of countries in the region. Several countries have or are already programmed to receive MBTs generally comparable to the M1A2: Iraq (T-72); Syria (T-72); Egypt (M1A1 programmed); Israel (latest version of the Merkava).

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Moreover, armor inventories in this region are among the largest in the world and the armor forces of Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Israel all dwarf those of Saudi Arabia with or without the M1A2.

- J. Estimate of the levels of trained personnel and maintenance facilities needed and available to utilize effectively the articles and services proposed for sale: The proposed sale would provide all of the facilities required to effectively utilize the equipment offered. The construction component of this case will offer one armor school, one ordnance school, seven organizational maintenance facilities, five direct support maintenance facilities, five direct support technical supply facilities, one general support maintenance facility, one depot maintenance facility, two training aids fabrication shops, two training simulator facilities (underground). The proposed sale will provide all required training for operators and maintenance personnel. The training package will be tailored after further consultation with the customer.
- K. Extent to which comparable articles and services are available from other countries: The British Challenger II, the Brazilian Osorio, and the French AMX-40 are comparable vehicles available from other countries.
- L. Impact on the proposed sale on U.S. relations with countries in the region: Sale of M1A2 tanks is crucial to maintaining the strong security relationship which the United States and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed for over four decades. This sale also will demonstrate to Saudi Arabia and other states in the region the intention of the United States to continue assisting its friends in meeting their legitimate defense needs. We are continuing to strengthen our close security relationship with Israel. This sale will not affect adversely Israel's qualitative military edge or our firm commitment to maintain that edge.
- M. Description of any agreement proposed to be entered into by the U.S. for the purchase of M1A2 Abrams tanks: None.
- N. Projected delivery dates of the articles and services to be offered: Vehicle delivery is forecasted to start in mid-1993 and continue at a rate of 105 vehicles per year.
- O. Description of weapons and levels of munitions required as support for this sale: The Saudis will not receive depleted uranium (DU) ammunition in view of the statutory restrictions on the export of such ammunition. Instead of the DU penetrators found in U.S. kinetic energy rounds, the Saudis will receive rounds containing tungsten penetrators. Main gun ammunition (120mm) programmed as part of this sale is approximately 75 rounds per tank of M830 high explosive anti-tank ammunition and 160 rounds per tank of armor piercing fin stabilized discarding sabot-tungsten ammunition. These amounts, along with ammunition for the .50 caliber and 7.62mm machine guns integral to each tank, constitute a standard basic combat load for each tank. The

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sale also includes two years of training ammunition, based on the U.S. Army training syllabus.

P. Analysis of the relationship of the proposed sale to projected procurements of the same item: All of the MDE described will be in production for the U.S. Government by the proposed delivery date. The U.S. procurements of many major vehicle components are on a multiyear basis that support vehicle deliveries from September 1991 through April 1996. Procurements to support this sale will be by separate contracts for many items and services. For other items the procurements will be combined for maximum savings and commonality.



Washington, D.C. 20520

OCT 31 1989

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Dear Mr. *Levine*:


Thank you for your letter of October 19, 1989, concerning the proposed sale of 315 M1A2 tanks to Saudi Arabia. We appreciate your taking time to let us know your concerns regarding this matter. Indeed, many of the questions you raise are precisely those which we examined in determining that there are sound policy reasons for proceeding.

You may recall that, in his confirmation hearings in January, Secretary Baker pledged to consult closely with the Congress on all matters of mutual concern, and especially on arms sales. The Administration believes this proposed sale is an important matter, and we hope you will be available to consult with us about it.

In your letter, you raised a number of specific questions. The attached, classified enclosure provides answers for these questions. I hope they will be helpful to you in understanding the reasons why we believe this sale is in our national interest. In our view, the sale will not be harmful to the interests of others in the region with whom we have close ties, including Israel to whose defense we are unshakeably committed.

Should you have further questions or need more information, we would welcome the opportunity for further discussions.

Sincerely,



Janet G. Mellins  
Assistant Secretary  
Legislative Affairs

The Honorable  
Mel Levine,  
United States House of Representatives.

146. 4/16

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Proposed Sale of the M1A2 Tank to  
Saudi Arabia

1. What is the strategic threat necessitating this sale?

(DELETED) 1

-- (U) Although weakened by war, Iran has an active rearmament program underway and may be a major threat again in three to five years.

(DELETED) 2

-- (U) The Marxist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which has a continuing history of border disputes with Saudi Arabia, has been rearmed by the Soviets since its 1986 civil war and now has over 500 tanks.

-- (U) The Saudis do not see the threat as static. In the 1960s it was an Egyptian force sent by Nasser to Yemen.

(DELETED) 3

2. What type of armor, ammunition, and improvements will the tanks have, and what components will be in the total package?

(DELETED) 1

146 12/16  
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(U) The Saudis will not receive depleted uranium (DU) ammunition in view of the statutory restrictions on the export of such ammunition. Instead of the DU penetrators found in U.S. kinetic energy rounds, the Saudis will receive rounds containing tungsten penetrators. Main Gun ammunition (120mm) programed as part of this sale is approximately 75 rounds per tank of M830 High Explosive Anti-Tank ammunition and 160 rounds per tank of Armor Piercing Pin Stabilized Discarding Sabot-Tungsten ammunition. These amounts, along with ammunition for the .50 cal and 7.62mm machine guns integral to each tank, constitute a standard basic combat load for each tank. The sale also includes two years of training ammunition, based on the U.S. Army training syllabus.

(U) The Saudi M1A2s will incorporate the following improvements to the M1A1:

-- (U) Survivability Features (reactive applique armor)--to protect against advanced Soviet-made weapons systems.

-- (U) Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer--enables the tank commander to acquire new targets in the dark while the gunner is engaging others.

-- (U) Improved Commander's Weapon Station--provides improved visibility and ballistic protection, an enlarged hatch, and protection against directed energy weapons.

-- (U) Position-Navigation System--while we will not provide EPLRS (the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System--an improvement available only on U.S. tanks), we will equip the Saudi tanks with the less capable Position-Navigation System, which provides position location, heading reference, and range and bearing waypoints.

-- (U) Carbon Dioxide Laser Rangefinder--replaces earlier laser rangefinder to provide an all-weather target engagement capability and improved safety for friendly troops.

-- (U) Systems Integration Package--consolidates operational functions to reduce the burden on the crew.

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-3-

(U) The Saudis may elect to purchase several items that the U.S. Army does not plan to install on its M1A2s:

-- (U) Driver's Thermal Viewer--enables the driver to see through smoke, fog, and dust and to drive in darkness.

-- (U) Inter-Vehicle Information System--allows expanded communications between tanks.

(U) In addition to EPLRS, we will not provide the SINGARS radio found on the U.S. Army M1A2, due to communications security considerations.

(U) Components of the Total Package Are:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE) items:

M1A2 Tanks	315
AN/PVS-5C Night Vision Goggles	690
M2 Machine Guns, .50 cal	345
M240 Machine Guns, 7.62mm	630
M88A1 Recovery Vehicles	30
M998 Trucks (HMMWV)	175

Non-Major Defense Equipment (MDE) items:

Trucks:

Heavy Tactical Trucks (HEMTT)	224
Heavy Equipment Transporters (HETS)	29
5 - ton	268

Contractor Logistics Support

Program Management Office

Corps of Engineers Design/Construction

Training Aids/Devices

MIT/TAFT

Ammunition

Spares and support equipment

146 4/18 ~~3~~

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3. Would the M1A2 be a replacement tank, or an addition to the existing Saudi tank inventory?

**(DELETED)**

**(DELETED)**

4. Where will the tanks will be based?

**(DELETED)**

5. What types of controls --if any-- would be placed on Saudi deployment of these tanks?

(U) This sale would be subject to the same controls (equipment is for defensive use only, no retransfer without U.S. consent and no third party access without U.S. consent) that apply to all other FMS sales. If we are not satisfied that these conditions are being met, there is an array of steps that we can take, ranging from asking questions to cutting off spare parts and other support.

**(DELETED)**

(U) The Saudis have an excellent record of honoring their commitments on previous sales -- and have not played a significant role in any war against Israel.

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6. What effect would this sale have on overall military balance in the region?

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Arabian Peninsula and Vicinity



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חוזם: 11,4594

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/398, ווש/219

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אמק

שמור/מידי

אל: יועץ שה'ח לתפוצות, מצפ'א

דע: פלג-ווש

מאת: ס.הקונכל

ועידת הנשיאים

1) ועידת הנשיאים יוצאת היום בהודעת תמיכה בהחלטת הקבינט בישיבה שקוימה היום עם המנכ'ל ראובן מרחב, ביקש מלקולם הונליין שכל ארגון ארצי יצא גם בהודעת תמיכה נפרדת.

2) בדבריו בפני ועידת הנשיאים, פרט המנכ'ל את האתגרים והמטרות העומדים בפני משרד החוץ בשנים הקרובות. המנכ'ל הרחיב לגבי תהליך השלום, ניתח החלטת הקבינט והביע אמונה כי נמשיך להתקדם לקראת השגת הסדר במז'ת. נציג אייפאק דיווח על התגובה החיובית של מזכיר המדינה על החלטת הקבינט.

3) המנכ'ל השיב על מיכלול שאלות בנושאי לבנון, עיראק איראן, אתיופיה, EEC, תפקיד בריה'מ בתהליך השלום דרא'פ-ישראל, תורכיה וארמניה. בנושא הסיוע האמריקאי המנכ'ל אמר כי אם מאמצינו נגד החרם הערבי יוכתרו בהצלחה נהיה פחות תלויים בסיוע האמריקאי. הודה לארגונים היהודיים על פעילותם בנושא יפן. המנכ'ל סיים דבריו

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MAIL  
 NO: 100  
 DATE: 11/10/68  
 TIME: 10:00 AM

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE MAIL DELIVERED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE VETERANS AFFAIRS ON NOVEMBER 10, 1968. THE MAIL WAS DELIVERED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE VETERANS AFFAIRS AT 10:00 AM.

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE MAIL DELIVERED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE VETERANS AFFAIRS ON NOVEMBER 10, 1968. THE MAIL WAS DELIVERED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE VETERANS AFFAIRS AT 10:00 AM.

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בציננו כי מיכה שילה נכנס לתפקידו כיועץ שה'ח לתפוצות  
ועומד לבקר בארה'ב.

4) אייב פוקסמן הודה למנכ'ל על ציון האתגרים העומדים  
בפני משרד החוץ ואמר כי הארגונים ירתמו ויסייעו בהשגתם.

מרדכי ידיד.

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות

על ידי שיתוף פעולה עם כלל המעורבים בתהליך  
המיון והסיווג.

אנחנו מציעים לכם להשתתף בהכשרה  
על מנת שתוכלו לנהל את המערכת בצורה  
אפקטיבית.

אנחנו מציעים.

גם

זה: שבת, ראשון, חג, חג המולד, חג העצמאות, חג העבודה, חג העצמאות, חג העצמאות, חג העצמאות, חג העצמאות

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פס' פרוק: הפסד:	אלה"ק	דע: קביט וושינגטון
155		פאת: הסברה, וושינגטון

הפגנות נגד רוח"מ בסינסינטי

ראו-נא ידיעת הייסיסינטי פוסטי מ-1/11 המציב,

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The Cincinnati Post, Wednesday, November 1, 1989 **9A**

# Arabs, Jews aim protests at Shamir

By Laurie Patrie  
Post staff reporter

Two Greater Cincinnati organizations — one Jewish and one Palestinian — plan a demonstration during the Cincinnati visit of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir later this month.

The groups will protest the Jewish occupation of Palestinian territories.

Shamir will speak at 8:30 p.m. Nov. 18 during the general assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations. The national convention, which will run Nov. 15 to 19, is being held in the Albert B. Sabin Cincinnati Convention Center.

"This is an opportunity to make it clear that there are many people, both Arabs and Jews, in this country who think the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza needs to end in order to realize Palestinian rights and to get Israel out of the very awkward situation into which it has gotten itself," said Jon Weisberger of New Jewish Agenda.

New Jewish Agenda is a national organization of progressive Jews involved in political issues and concerns of Jewish culture and worship.

The Cincinnati chapter was founded in 1983.

Joining New Jewish Agenda in the protest will be the Intifada Coalition, an organization of Arab groups based at the University of Cincinnati. Intifada is the Arabic word for the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories of the Middle East.

Weisberger said the two groups plan a vigil from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. outside the convention center so they can be seen by delegates leaving for dinner and returning for Shamir's talk.

The groups plan a rally during the talk.

The protest is not against the Jewish community, but against Shamir and the policies of the Israeli government, Weisberger said.

"We are concerned about human rights issues, but also believe that just as Israelis have a right to a national existence and independent state, so Palestinians have the same right," Weisberger said.

Frank Strauss, director of communications for the Council of Jewish Federations, said the protest acknowledges a "wide diversity" of opinion among American Jews regarding the occupation.

"We would hope that they would keep in mind that it is one thing to sit here in the United States and protest these policies and quite another to be in Israel where you're living under threat of violence and terrorism," Strauss said.

Also appearing at the conference will be U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh. His talk at 7 p.m. Nov. 18 is expected to include reflections on his recent trip to the Soviet Union.

For more information on the general assembly, call the Cincinnati Jewish Federation at 351-3800.



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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



13 שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון



טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים  
סוג בטחוני: שמור  
דחיפות : רגיל  
תאריך וז"ח : 2/11/89  
מס' מברק :

ארה"ב

אל: המש"ד

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אלו מעפ"א

ביקורת על ישראל

דוד האריס, הנציג הווינגטוני של AJC, הוזמן לפני כשבוע ליום עיון במחמ"ד ל NGO'S. נכחו כ- 170 איש (מהארגונים היהודיים היה גם הרב מילר). יום העיון נוהל ע"י איגלברגר. את התדרוך המזת"י נתן קובי. השאלות שהופנו אליו היו כולן עוינות. האריס ניסה להסיט את הדיון לכיוון אחר ע"י שאלה על מדיניותה המזת"ית של בריה"מ וקובי "משך" את תשובתו עד לתום הזמן שהוקצה לתדרוך. הרושם שנשאר היה קשה.

פלג

2 המסמך  
1 ג'מ  
1 רביב  
2 ג'ט  
1 ב'מ  
1 ג'א  
1 ג'א  
3 ע'מ  
36

ס.ס.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2833

תאריך : 04.11.89

\*\* נכנס

10 ד'י

\*\*

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חוזם: 11,2833

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/257

מ-: נוש, נר: 105, תא: 031189, זח: 1830, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: א ג ט צ פ א

ד: א

אמ' 2

10 ד'י/מיד

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע: לשכת שהב'ט (הועבר לבט' בנר 82)

אלי רובינשטיין, מזכיר הממשלה

מאת: השגריר וושינגטון

בשיחה עם בוב קימט הבוקר העלה שוב נושא איתור קרקע למבנה עבור שגרירות/קונסוליה ארה"ב בת"א. קימט ציין כי הדחיות הממושכות ואי היכולת לאתר קרקע אשר תשביע את רצונם מתחילה להתפרש במחמ"ד ובממשל בצורה שעלולה לפגוע במערכת היחסים בינינו. הוא, אישית, אמנם אינו סבור שיש כוונה כזו אך יש במחמ"ד התובעים להעלות את זה לדרג המזכיר ואולי אף הנשיא.

השבתי כי נעשו מצידנו מאמצים רבים למצוא קרקע מתאימה עבורם וודאי שאין במסגרת השיקולים שלנו כל רצון להפוך הנושא לבעיה שתעכיר יחסי שתי המדינות. עליהם להבין עם זאת שההצעות שהצענו להם עד עתה היו בהחלט סבירות אך נמשיך למצוא לעניין פתרון נאות.

ארד

17

1917

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
 OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF  
 THE UNITED STATES  
 HAS THE HONOR TO ACKNOWLEDGE  
 THE RECEIPT OF THE  
 CHECK FOR THE AMOUNT OF  
 \$100,000.00  
 PAID TO THE NATIONAL BANK OF  
 THE UNITED STATES  
 BY THE NATIONAL BANK OF  
 THE UNITED STATES  
 ON THE 15TH DAY OF  
 JANUARY 1917.

W. H. WALKER

MANAGING DIRECTOR

RECEIVED BY THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE AMOUNT OF \$100,000.00

ON THE 15TH DAY OF JANUARY 1917

THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE UNITED STATES  
 HAS THE HONOR TO ACKNOWLEDGE  
 THE RECEIPT OF THE CHECK FOR THE AMOUNT OF  
 \$100,000.00 PAID TO THE NATIONAL BANK OF  
 THE UNITED STATES BY THE NATIONAL BANK OF  
 THE UNITED STATES ON THE 15TH DAY OF  
 JANUARY 1917.

THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE UNITED STATES  
 HAS THE HONOR TO ACKNOWLEDGE  
 THE RECEIPT OF THE CHECK FOR THE AMOUNT OF  
 \$100,000.00 PAID TO THE NATIONAL BANK OF  
 THE UNITED STATES BY THE NATIONAL BANK OF  
 THE UNITED STATES ON THE 15TH DAY OF  
 JANUARY 1917.

W. H. WALKER

MANAGING DIRECTOR

מסודי החזון-מחלקת הקשר

2832

\* תאריך : 04.11.89 \*

\* דף 1 מתוך 2 \*

\* עותק 1 מתוך 10 \*

נכנס סודי ביותר

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\*\*  
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\* חוזם: 11,2832 \*

\* אל: המשרד \*

\* יעדים: מצב/254 \*

\* מ-: ווש, נר: 107, תא: 031189, זח: 1815, דח: ב, סג: סב

\* תח: @ גס: צפא \*

\* נד: @ \*

מ/ח  
2

\* סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר \*

\* ח.ר.ב. \*

\* אל: מנכ"ל רה"מ \*

\* דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח \*

\* מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון \*

\* תהליך השלום - ביקור רה"מ. \*

\* 1. שוחחתי במשך היום עם לרי איגלברגר, ברנט סקוקרופט

\* בוב קימט וג'ון קלי ומסרתי להם על הגישה החיובית

\* אשהסתמנה בדיונים שהתקיימו הבוקר במסגרת הארבעה על

\* מכתב המזכיר ועל מסמך 5 הנקודות. \*

\* רה"מ ירצה לדעת כמובן מהות ההבהרות מבעוד מועד, אך

\* אני סבור כי הפערים שבין עמדותינו לעמדות ארה"ב

\* הצטמצמו בצורה משמעותית. \*

\* לאור זה הוספתי כי עליהם להזדרז בקבלת החלטה על קביעת

\* מועד לפגישה בין רה"מ לנשיא בוש. \*

\* 2. בשיחותי עם איגלברגר וסקוקרופט עמדתי על החומרה

\* הרבה בה אנו רואים דבריו של הנשיא מובראק מאתמול

\* כי יעביר חמש הנקודות לאש"פ להחלטתם. אמרתי כי איננו

\* יכולים להבין מה מניע את מובראק לצאת בהצהרות כאלה



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*  
\* דף 2 מתוך 2 \*  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 10 \*  
\*

\*אלא אם ברצוננו להכשיל התהליך ולהביך את ישראל.\*

\*איגלברגר השיב כי גם הם בדעה שדבריו של מובראק לא  
\*מועילים והנחה את שגרירם בקהיר לתת ביטוי לעמדתם  
\*ולביקורתם על דברי מובראק.\*

\*ארד\*

\*אק\*

\*תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל

TO THE HONORABLE SENATE  
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS  
COMMISSIONERS OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE  
REPORT  
ON THE  
LANDS BELONGING TO THE STATE  
AND THE  
LANDS BELONGING TO THE UNITED STATES  
IN THE  
COUNTY OF DALLAS  
FOR THE YEAR  
1880



76 2/3

A34 FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1989

# Israel Studies Revisions of Baker's Plan

By Jackson Diehl  
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, Nov. 2—Secretary of State James A. Baker III has revised his plan for Israeli-Palestinian talks in an effort to meet the objections of Israel's ruling Likud party, but the changes are unlikely to satisfy Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, official sources said here today.

Officials said Baker telephoned Foreign Minister Moshe Arens Wednesday night to discuss revision of his five-point "framework" for arranging the proposed talks, which would be convened as a way of advancing Israel's own plan for elections in the occupied territories.

The revisions were in response to Israeli demands that the Palestine Liberation Organization not be allowed even an indirect role in the preliminary talks, and that the agenda be strictly limited to the technicalities of arranging the elections. Baker also requested that Israel formulate a response to his plan in the coming week, officials said.

Foreign Ministry sources described the changes as a step forward, but a source close to Shamir said this evening that it was unlikely he would be satisfied with them.

"There will have to be more clarifications," the source said. "All of these discussions have muddled the waters and we need to make it clearer."

Another official said that even if the cabinet now approves the Baker framework—which is meant to involve the United States, Israel and Egypt in arranging negotiations—Israel would still seek further "assurances" from the United States. Shamir's Likud leadership wants the Bush administration to guarantee that the PLO will be given no influence in naming the members of the eventual Palestinian delegation or in setting its agenda.

In a telegram to Baker last week, Arens sought changes that would have assured Israel a veto over the composition of the Palestinian delegation. However, sources here said Baker had not changed language in the plan that says Israel will participate in talks only if an "acceptable" Palestinian delegation is formed.

Israeli sources said Baker's changes included deleting a section referring to "consultations" between Egypt and unspecified "Palestinians," a reference Israel took as approval for Cairo to act as a conveyor of PLO views. Baker also reportedly added a phrase making clear that the Israeli-Palestinian talks will concern only elections and "the negotiating process."

Sources in Cairo said Egypt has received Baker's revisions and relayed them to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat today.

NOV 19 1989

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# Why Israel Insists on its Strategy

*Peace is more attractive to Palestinians inside the territories than to the PLO in Tunis.*

The Middle East peace process appears to have gotten so bogged down in arcana that only diplomats and specialists can follow its twists and turns. The public has lost interest. But the occasional reports and leaks that penetrate the public perplexity leave one clear impression: that behind the obfuscation, it is Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's nagging insistence on procedural details that is keeping us from the dawn of Middle East peace—and keeping this administration from a diplomatic triumph, the first ever Israeli-Palestinian talks.

The impression is false. Shamir has made a large issue of two points. But they are about as procedural as Churchill's refusal to negotiate with Hitler.


Point 1. Israel has proposed a peace initiative: free elections in the occupied territories to produce Palestinian negotiators to work out some interim peace ("autonomy") that would end the Israeli military occupation. After three years of living together this way, after having had time to reassess each other's worst assumptions about the other's ultimate intentions, then and only then do negotiations start on a final peace, because only then can they have any chance of success.

Elections, negotiation, interim solution, final status. Everybody but the PLO has accepted this idea in principle. Nevertheless, an Egyptian 10-point plan pointedly puts the ultimate "final status" issue—Israel's giving up the West Bank—on the table before the first words are exchanged or the first ballot cast.

Shamir's "wrangling" is about demands for an ironclad American guarantee that the initial talks will be about elections and not a Pandora's box of unresolvable "final status" questions. Israel does not want to start talks that are destined from day one to fail and for which failure it is sure to be blamed.

Point 2. The question of Palestinian representation. Israel's other wrangle is to insist that the Palestinian negotiators who will arrange the elections be insiders (West Bankers) and not outsiders (Palestinians living abroad and representing the PLO establishment in Tunis).

This is not a procedural point, because the only talks that can possibly succeed are talks between Israel and the insiders. It is true, of course, that insiders and outsiders both swear allegiance to PLO.



BY T. GIBSON

(Those who refuse to have a way of getting shot: 125 of those killed during the intifada are Palestinians killed by other Palestinians). But there is a natural divergence of interests between insiders and outsiders in the Palestinian movement, just as there was a natural divergence between insiders and outsiders in the Algerian war and between insiders (Viet Cong) and outsiders (Hanoi) in South Vietnam.

On every major issue, the insiders' divergent interest is more favorable to peace:

• Occupation. It is the insiders, not the outsiders, who suffer daily the dislocations and casualties of the intifada. Their objective is thus to end the Israeli occupation quickly. For the outsiders, the intifada is a political boon. It puts them on the map. It revives an issue that had been dead for years. They are in no hurry. They can hold out to the last West Banker for their maximal demands.

• Elections. The first freely elected Palestinian leadership ever, though nominally pledged to Yasir Arafat, will enjoy a status and legitimacy that will rival that of the aging rejectionists in Tunis. Precisely for that reason the PLO is not happy about elections. It will give West Bankers a potentially rivalrous, potentially more moderate political voice.

• Final status. It is conceivable that West Bankers would trade an end to occupation for a Palestinian entity that truly renounces all designs on Israel proper. The outsiders will not. The vast majority of them come not from the West Bank but from Israel proper. Their interest, their program, is to use the West Bank as a staging point for returning to—retaking—what is now Israel.

In sum, the insiders have a more urgent need for

peace now and a more moderate objective for the final peace to come. That is what prompted Israel to propose, and the United States to back, West Bank elections. The whole point of the election idea is to get the peace process moving by exploiting the natural divergence of interests between insiders and outsiders and shifting the center of political gravity from the latter to the former.

Talks with outsiders—representatives of the PLO in Tunis—are guaranteed to fail. But don't you have to negotiate peace with your enemies? The answer to that fatuity is: There are enemies and there are enemies. You negotiate with enemies whose objective is somehow to settle with you. With those who want only to expunge you, there is nothing to negotiate.

Another famous argument is that one side does not have a right to interfere in choosing negotiators for the other side. Nonsense. Vietnamese, Cambodians, Angolans, Afghans, Nicaraguans routinely make demands regarding which of their enemies they will or will not sit down with. So did Churchill and Roosevelt. Because everybody understands that who you negotiate with determines whose legitimacy you recognize, whose agenda you are prepared to discuss and ultimately which outcome will prevail.

Israel does not want to negotiate with PLO outsiders because it understands that such negotiations can only be about a single issue: a PLO state. For most Israelis, that is a prescription for national suicide. They are not interested into entering a negotiation whose purpose is to work out the finer modalities of their demise.

That may look like procedure in Washington. In Jerusalem, it is life and death.

WP

3/3  
9/4

3/3

3

1/1

1 ק 2/c

שגרירות ישראל בושינגטון  
טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1  
דחיפות: מידי  
סיווג: גלמ"ס

אכ : מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

דע : יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת,  
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ,  
אמ"ן/קש"ח, דובר צה"ל, נ"י.

תאריך, זמן:  
מספר המברק:

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

המשרד: קמ"א 4

7 54 60

November 2, 1989

תדרוך דובר הבית הלבן ליום

Q Is it true that the US has caved in to Israel in eliminating the Egyptian role, as reported in the paper today, and that the President's going to go ahead and see Shamir?

MR. FITZWATER: There still has been no meeting scheduled between the President and the Prime Minister on his trip. On the other question, the matter is still being discussed by Secretary of State Baker and other parties in the region, certainly including Foreign Minister Meguid and Foreign Minister Arens. They have had any number of communications, both by telephone and by letter, but at this point there's been no change in the situation. We still want to pursue the peace process around the elections concept proposal of Prime Minister Shamir. We still think it has an active chance, and that's what we're pursuing.

MR. FITZWATER: We still believe it has an active chance.

Q Well, did you -- you know the story I'm referring to in the Post today?

MR. FITZWATER: Must not.

Q The New York Times --

Q No, it was the Washington Times -- (inaudible) --

MR. FITZWATER: Yeah, oh, Secretary Baker responded to that, and -- I think -- but I don't have a definitive answer. I guess I better refer you to State. That was on the -- wasn't that the story that he changed his five-point plan, or something like that? And I think what he said was that he had not changed his five-point plan, but that he'd had innumerable discussions about it, about the general process, essentially the situation has not fundamentally changed.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including words like "אמ"ן", "קמ"א", "מברק", and "שגרירות".

ק"מ 2 אר"ק

ארה"ק

משרד ראש הממשלה  
ירושלים

המנהל הכללי

ד' בתשרי תש"ן  
2 בנובמבר 1989  
סימוכין 2- ד"ש 203-6

- סודי -

אל : ראש הממשלה

הנדון: שיחה עם שהגריר בראון

השגריר ביקש להפגש עמי ב- 30/10/89 "ללא הנחיות מן הבית". הוא קבל הנחיה להפגש עם שר הבטחון ולומר דברים ברורים בקשר למצב ובקשר לעמדת ארה"ב על מסמך "חמש הנקודות".

בראון מצא לנכון למסור לנו את הנקודות שמתבקש למסור לשר רבין והוסיף שלמען הסדר וההגיונות וכדי שלא יקלע לאי-נעימות פנימית בין-מפלגתית הוא אמר לשהב"ט שבדעתו למסור הניר למזכיר הממשלה. רבין לא הביע התנגדות לכך.

רצ"ב ההערות שמסר לי השגריר בראון.

ב ב ר כ ה,

י.ח. בן-אהרן

העתק: מזכיר הממשלה

הנהגת המדינה  
הנהגת הממשלה  
הנהגת הכנסת  
הנהגת הרשות  
הנהגת הרשות  
הנהגת הרשות  
הנהגת הרשות  
30/10/77

-- IN OUR VIEW, THE FIVE POINTS MEET ISRAELI NEEDS BOTH ON THE ISSUE OF WHO ISRAEL WILL BE TALKING TO AND WHAT ISRAEL WILL BE TALKING ABOUT.

-- THE KEY ISSUE IS TO USE THESE POINTS TO ADVANCE THE GOI INITIATIVE. THE U.S. ISN'T DEVIATING FROM THE GOI INITIATIVE; IN FACT WE HAVE INVESTED A GREAT DEAL IN TRYING TO MAKE IT WORK.

-- ISRAEL SHOULD RESPOND QUICKLY AND POSITIVELY TO AVOID THE PERCEPTION THAT IT IS STALLING OR WALKING AWAY FROM ITS OWN INITIATIVE.

-- WITH A YES ON THE FIVE POINTS IN HAND, THE U.S. AND ISRAEL WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER EVERY STEP OF THE WAY AND INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A POSITIVE ARAB RESPONSE.

-- THE SECRETARY TALKED TO FOREIGN MINISTER ARENS WEDNESDAY AND CONVEYED MUCH THE SAME MESSAGE.

-- THE KEY POINT IS FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE FIVE POINTS; WE ARE ASKING THE SAME OF EGYPT.

-- ONCE THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE FIVE POINTS, THE U.S. IS CONFIDENT THAT ANY OTHER ISSUES OF CONCERN TO ISRAEL CAN BE ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED.

-- ISRAEL CAN'T DICTATE WHICH PALESTINIANS IT WANTS TO TALK TO. BUT NO ONE IS GOING TO FORCE ISRAEL TO TALK TO PALESTINIANS IT DOESN'T WANT TO TALK TO. WE WON'T BE A PARTY TO ANY SURPRISES IN THE PROCESS.

-- ON THE AGENDA, IT WILL REFLECT THE REALITY OF IDEAS THAT ARE ON THE TABLE: THIS MEANS DEALING WITH HOW TO MOVE TO ELECTIONS AND THEN TO NEGOTIATIONS AS REFLECTED IN THE GOI'S INITIATIVE. OPENING STATEMENTS MIGHT BE A USEFUL WAY TO TAKE CARE OF ANY OTHER AGENDA PROBLEMS.

-- THE U.S. HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE GOE AND IS URGING THEM TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE POINTS AS WELL.

-- ON THE BASIS OF THESE CONVERSATIONS, THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY BAKER ARE PERSUADED THAT THERE'S A REAL CHANCE TO MOVE AHEAD AND THAT EVERYONE IS INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE COSTS OF SAYING NO.

-- WITH AGREEMENT IN HAND, A DATE CAN BE SET FOR A TRILATERAL MEETING AMONG ISRAEL, EGYPT, AND THE U.S. IN THE INTERVENING PERIOD WE CAN WORK OUT SOME ISSUES RELATED TO THE DIALOGUE, SPECIFICALLY COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION AND THE AGENDA.

-- NOW IS THE TIME FOR COOPERATION, NOT PARTISAN POLITICS. THERE'S TOO MUCH POLITICS AND UNHELPFUL STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM ALL SIDES. WORKING TOGETHER WE CAN GET THIS PROCESS TO MOVE FORWARD.

11/12/89

ד' חשון תש"ן  
2 בנובמבר 1989  
סימוכין 2- ד"ש 205-6

המנהל הכללי

אל : ראש הממשלה

הנדון: שיחת טלפון מג'ורג' קליין ב- 2/11/89  
שעה 17:00 שעוננו

קליין השתתף בארוחה בבית הלבן וישב ליד שולחן הנשיא ביחד עם סוננו וסקוקרופט.

תיאר את הדברים ששמע מפיהם במלים THEY ARE IN A BAD MOOD.

בני שיחו טענו שהם הלכו מעל ומעבר לקראת דרישות ישראל והתגובה שלנו מתוארת על-ידם כבלתי רצינית. סגן הנשיא ניגש אל קליין לאחר מכן והפציר בו לעשות משהו כדי שהמצב לא ידרדר לגמרי. סוננו היה הקשה מכולם ואמר בהתייחסו אלינו: THEY WENT DOWN THE ROAD OF NO RETURN.

שאלתי את קליין מה הוא אמר להם בתגובה והוא השיב שאמר להם שהם מגזימים וכי דאגותיה של ישראל אמיתיות. לכן השיבו לו האמריקאים: אם כן מדוע בא שמיר והציע את הבחירות בשטחים? בהקשר זה ציינו שדבריו של שהב"ט רבין נשמעו להם יותר ריאליסטיים.

ג'ורג' קליין סיכם:

- צריך להשיב ב"הן" או "בלאו" למכתבו של בייקר כי לא נראה לו שנוכל עוד להמשיך בהברות.

- אם יוחלט לקבל את נוסחת בייקר, הוא מיישם שרה"מ יפנה לנשיא בוש אישית - אולי אף בשיחת טלפון - יודיע לו על ההסכמה, יפרט את דאגותינו ויציין שהוא שם מבטחו בנשיא בוש שימנע התפתחויות שליליות מבחינתה של ישראל.

ב ב ר כ ה,

י.ח. בן-אהרון

אוריאל  
ד' בתשרי תש"ן  
2 בנובמבר 1989  
סימוכין 2- ד"ש 202-6

17

17/11/89

- סודי -

דו"ח שיחת טלפון של הנשיא בוש עם ראש הממשלה י. שמיר  
(נמסר לח"מ ע"י רה"מ לאחר השיחה)  
ביום ב' 16/10/89

הנשיא בוש בירך את ראש הממשלה על יוזמתו לקיים השיחה.

בהתייחסו לחילופי הדברים בין שר החוץ ארנס לבין המזכיר בייקר, הנשיא אמר שרצוי שהשניים יפגשו וישתדלו ליישר ההידורים כדי לסלק חשדות מן הצד הישראלי. בוש התייחס לדברים שהתפרסמו באמצעי התקשורת, בשם רה"מ, כאילו ארה"ב לוחצת על ישראל להתדיין עם אש"פ ואמר שלא כך פני הדברים, וכי ארה"ב איננה נושאת עיניה לעימות עם ישראל. הנשיא הוסיף שזו יוזמה מדינית של ישראל וארה"ב מסייעת למימושה.

רה"מ הגיב שהוא שמח לשמוע מהנשיא שהוא מבין את עמדתה העקרונית של ישראל שלא לדון עם אש"פ. צריך על-כן לבחון את הדרכים כדי להבטיח שלא מדובר במפגש עם אש"פ, או עם אנשים שימונו ע"י אש"פ.

הנשיא התייחס למוברק ושיבח אותו על עזרתו לקידום התהליך. באשר לחילוקי הדעות שנתגלו בקשר למסמך שנועד להיות בסיס לקיום השיחות ("חמש הנקודות"), הנשיא בוש הציע לרה"מ שישראל תעבד נוסח שנראה לה לגבי המסגרת לשיחות ולו"ז.

בוש נתן להבין שהוא בקי בפרטי ההדברות בין שרי החוץ וחזר על דבריו שאין לארה"ב כל כוונה לדחוף את ישראל לעבר אש"פ כיוון שהוא יודע את יחסה של ישראל לארגון זה. עוד ציין בוש שלדעתו אין בחמש הנקודות סכנה שהמסמך יוביל לפגישה עמם. אותו דבר נכון לגבי סדר היום של ההדברות המתוכננת עם נציגים פלשתינאים, שיהיה מוגבל לענין הבחירות. מכל מקום, סיכם הנשיא, אפשר לעבד נוסחה מקובלת.

רה"מ הגיב שאיננו חפץ להכנס לפרטי חילוקי הדעות, והחשוב שארה"ב תבין את עמדתה של ישראל בקשר לאש"פ שרי החוץ ימשיכו בחילופי הדברים כדי לגבש הסכמה.

הנשיא סיכם בהביעו שוב קורת רוח על רוח השיחה.

17/11/89

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 02.11.89

1003

נכנס \*\*

סודי

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1/2 אלה



חוזם: 11,1003  
אל: המשרד  
יעדים: מצב/81  
מ-: ווש, נר: 19, תא: 011189, חז: 1500, דח: מ, סג: 10  
תח: א גס: צפא  
נד: א

סודי / מידי

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

ביקור ג'סי ג'קסון.

1. לאחר שהודיע שאין בכוונתו לבקר בישראל ( לפי שעה ) שב ג'קסון למיודעי ספרסטין וסיפר לו כי בכוונתו להיענות להזמנת הארגונים הערביים ולקיים הביקור עוד במהלך הסתיו הקרוב.

2. בנסיון להניע האיש מלקיים הביקור נועצתי בדיויד האריס וקודמו בתפקיד בוכביינדר, שהבטיחו לבדוק כיצד ניתן להוריד ג'קסון מלמשש תכניתו.

3. בוכביינדר שוחח עם רון בראון ( יו"ר המפלגה הדמוקרטית ) והעמידו על ההשלכות שעלולות להיות לביקור ג'קסון בחסות ארגונים ערביים על הקהילה היהודית. לאחר שבדק הנושא עם עוזרו האישי של ג'קסון, הודיע בראון ל**בוכביינדר כי ביקור ג'קסון אינו עומד על הפרק.**

4. בכוונת האדונים ספרסטין, האריס ובוכביינדר להפעיל גורמים מקורבים לג'קסון במטרה להניעו מקיום ביקור בעיתוי הנוכחי. במידה ולא יצליחו, יבקשוהו לערוך הביקור ללא חסות כלשהיא תוך הסתייעות בשירותינו.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5. הערה: מאחר והאיש משנה דעתו חדשות לבקרים, לא אופתע אם נשמע בקרוב על שינוי נוסף בתכניתו.

שטיין

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא



XX  
משרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 02.11.89

1036

נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 11,1036

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/82

מ-: ווש, נר: 36, תא: 011189, חז: 2000, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

@ נד:

✓ אר 2

סודי / מיידי

סמנכל צפא ופרן

הסנטור לאוטנברג ומטוס פאן אם 103

פנתה עוזרתו של הסנטור וביקשה לקבל אישור לידיעה שהחלה להתפרסם כאן הבוקר ( A P , A B C תחנות רדיו), לפיה המוסד העביר התרעה מוקדמת (יום לפני התפוצצות המטוס) בצינורותיו הוא לגורמים אמריקאים על אפשרות ביצוע מעשה טירור במטוס פאן אם.

לדבריה, לאור העובדה שפאן אם הגישו היום תביעה משפטית נגד שלטונות ארה"ב ולאור מעורבותו העמוקה של הסנטור בנושא, זקוקים לאישור מצידו, בין אם נרצה להעביר האישור לרקע בלבד ובין אם נאשר מתן פומבי עפ"י נוסח מסוים וכו' ]

אנא הנחיות בחוזר.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

רש

תפ: שה, סשה, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, רם



XX  
משרד החוק-מחלקת הקשר

1002

תאריך : 02.11.89

\*\* נכנס

107

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חוזם: 11,1002

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/80

מ-: ווש, נר: 21, תא: 011189, זח: 1500, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: צפא

@: נד

✓ אלה ק

סודי / מידי

אל: מצפ' א', ארבי' 2 ( למכותבים בלבד )

דע: מזת' יים 2

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

ארה' ב - דו' ח ז' א.

1. בשיחה ( 31.10 ) עם שיפטר ( ביזמתו ) סיפר כי דו' ח הקונכ' ל וילקוקס התקבל.

2. לשאלתי ביחס לתוכן הסתפק בהבעת פנים ממנה ניתן היה להבין כי מוטב שלא אשאל.

3. לבקשתי כי ייעשה מאמץ למנוע הדלפת הקטע הנוגע לנו השיב כי נקט ( וינקוט ) בצעדים שיקטינו סיכויי ההדלפה.

4. בכוונת השגריר להפגש עם שיפטר בזמן הקרוב ולבקשו לאפשר לנו להעיר הערותינו טרם פרסום הדו' ח ולא בדיעבד.

שטיין

רש











דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: בלמים	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 2
תאריך ושפת העבודה: 1 בנוב' 1989 14:45	מר בנימין נתניהו - ס/שה"ח	אל:
פס' פרוק: הפסד:	יוסי בן-אחרון - מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ סלי מרידור - יועץ מדיני לרה"מ סמנכ"ל צפ"א, מצפ"א	דע:
23	ק. לקונגרס	כאת:

רצ"ב מזכר שהפצנו לכל חברי הקונגרס.

קונגרס. בלמים

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ס. א.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

23  
2

November 1, 1989

To :  
From : Yoram Ettinger, Minister for Congressional Affairs  
Subject : PLO PERFORMANCE REASSESSED

1. International terrorism : According to a Department of State report, published on August 25, 1989 :

"... The primary source of Japanese Red Army funds is believed to be Palestinian factions, primarily the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - PFLP... Japanese Red Army member, Yu Kikumara was arrested on the New-Jersey Turnpike carrying three 18-inch anti-personnel pipe bombs intended for use in a terrorist attack in the U.S., possibly against a Navy recruiting office in Manhattan ... Kikumara was convicted in a U.S. District Court and sentenced to 30 years in prison in early 1989 ..."

In fact, the JRA - which remains " a serious threat " according to the report - is not only funded, but also trained, by the PFLP, a mainstream PLO group.

2. The Hizballah - PLO connection : A May 27, 1989 terrorist attack on the town of Metulah, in the Upper Galilee, was one of a few such operations carried out jointly by Hizballah and PLO factions, among them the PFLP. Hizballah's Chief of Operations, Imad Mourniye, was a member of Fatah's Force 17, which is headed by a confidant of Arafat, Abu Tayyib. The Force 17-Hizballah connection has its roots in the early 1980's. It is reported that upon the April 1988 elimination of Abu-Jihad, some of his associates joined the ranks of Hizballah in Lebanon.

3. More on Fatah's terrorism : A Fatah cell, uncovered on October 27, 1989, planted explosives in civilian sites in Haifa and other parts of the pre-1967 boundaries of Israel. Other such cells have been uncovered since the December 1988, ostensible, renunciation of terrorism by the PLO. Most of these cells were activated by Force 17, which constitutes the praetorian guard of Arafat and other leading personalities of Fatah.

4. Over 100 Palestinians have been Killed - since the December 1988 enunciated dialogue between the PLO and the U.S. - by PLO operatives in Gaza, Judea and Samaria. This regretful phenomenon (recently reaching a rate of almost one murder per day) has been carried out under the directives of the PLO. PLO leaflets specify the identity of the targeted individuals and the timing of their execution.

5. The December 1988, supposed, renunciation of terrorism by the PLO followed an earlier PLO commitment to renounce terrorism, as was proclaimed in Cairo in November 1985. Both have been abrogated.

May the road rise to meet you,

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 31.10.89

26489

סודי

נכנס \*\*

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חוזם: 10,26489

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/2006

מ-: ווש, נר: 779, תא: 311089, זח: 1300, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: א גס: אפסוק

נד: א

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ארה"ב

סודי/מיד

אל: יועץ שה'ח לתפוצות, מנהל מא'פ 1

דע: מצפ'א,

ארבל-כאן

מנכ'ל

מאת: לשכת השגריר, וושינגטון

יהודי אתיופיה.

1. פנה לשגריר סנטור קרנסטון וביקש עדכון על מאמצינו לשחרור יהודי אתיופיה. לדבריו, שמע במחמ'ד על יציאה של יהודים מאתיופיה בקצב הנע בין 100-200 איש לחודש.

2. נודה לקבלת עדכון.

לש' שגריר.

יג

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, הדס, מאפ, תפוצות, בנצור, מצפא



משרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

26525

\* תאריך : 31.10.89

\* דף 1 מתוך 2

\* נכנס כנסודי ביותר 16 עותק 1 מתוך 2

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\* חוזם: 10,26525

\* אל: המשרד

\* יעדים: ווש/1217

\* מ-: בריסל, נר: 389, תא: 311089, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: 10

\* תח: גס: אירופה

\* נד: @

ארכיב 1/2

\* סודי ביותר/מידי

\* אל: המנכל, אירופה 1, מצפא

\* דע: השגריר וושינגטון

\* מאת: השגריר/בריסל

\* משיחה עם יאנוצי הבוקר ביוזמתו

\* חזר עם הטרויקה מפגישה בושינגטון. נפגשו כמובן עם הצמות האמריקנית, אך מבחינתנו שיחותיהם החשובות ביותר היו עם רוס, ובמיוחד עם הממונה עליו KENMIT.

\* האירופאים הופתעו מפניה של בן שיחם שביקשם לפנות אלינו עלמנת להעביר את תחושת התיסכול ואי-שביעות הרצון מאיתנו. יאנוצי הדגיש שזו פעם ראשונה שהאמריקאים מבקשים מהאירופאים להעביר מסר אלינו. לדבריו, אמרו האמריקאים שהדרישות שלנו מפגש משולש לא יכולות חוזר לא יכולות להיות קבילות.

\* מצב זה הוא בלתי נסבל קודם כל מפני שבייקר לא יכול להרשות לעצמו לספוג מפלה, מה שיותר גרוע בעיני האמריקאים הוא שהם פוחדים ממפלה בנושא למובראק. דבר שיהיה חמור למובראק עצמו, חמור לאמריקאים, אבל חמור גם לישראל.

\* יאנוצי לא חוזר לא יודע אם יש לשהח צרפת דומא, היור התורן, כוונה להעביר לנו מסר כנ"ל. אנשי הטרויקה

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 \*  
מתוך 2 \*  
עותק 1 \*  
מתוך 16 \*

\*  
לא דנו ביניהם בנושא בתום ביקורם בווינגטון, בינתיים  
\* ינוצי מספר לנו הנ"ל על בסיס אישי, ומבקש לשמור  
\* את המקור בסוד, כי לא הוא אישית אמר להעביר לנו את  
\* המסר.

\*  
לש\*

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\*תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, איר, בנצור, מצפא

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 01.11.89

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סודי

נכנס

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חוזם: 11,35

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/16, מנמת/3

מ-: ווש, נר: 805, תא: 311089, זח: 1900, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: & גס: צפא

נד: &

א/נכ"ל

סודי / רגיל

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

בינב'ח : פגישת בייקר עם חברי וועדת החוץ.

הבוקר נפגש המזכיר לא'ב עם חברי וועדת החוץ. נכחו כ-20 קונגרסמנים. במהלך הפגישה העלו מספר משתתפים את נושא תהליך השלום. בייקר הקריא את 5 הנקודות שלו ופירט את עמדת ארה'ב.

לאחר מכן תיאר את הסתייגויות ישראל כפי שנכללו במכתב שה'ח ארנס. בייקר אמר שאיננו אופטימי ומסופק אם יוכל להפתח כל דיאלוג במצב הנוכחי שכן קשה מאד להניח שאש'פ לא יתן אור ירוק למשלחת פלסטינית.

כאשר בייקר התייחס להסתייגויות הישראליות מ-5 הנקודות הבן מדבריו ש-2 בקשות תיקון ישראליות הן NON-STARTER.

האחת - הגדרת משתתפי המשלחת הפלסטינית - מיו'ש ועזה.

השניה - מחיקת קהיר כמקום מפגש.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

רש

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# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד,  
בנצור, מצפא, סי'יבל, סולטן

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* תאריך : 01.11.89

\* דף 1 מתוך 1

\* עותק 1 מתוך 16

סודי ביותר נכנס

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\* חוזם: 11,34

\* אל: המשרד

\* יעדים: בטחון/13, מצב/15

\* מ-: ווש, נר: 803, תא: 311089, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: 10

\* תח: א גס: צפא

\* נד: א

אכתב

\* סודי ביותר/ מיידי

\* אל : סמנכל צפא

\* מאת: עודד ערן, הציר, וושינגטון משהבט/מקשח

\* דרא'פ'

\* דיק קלארק מסר שבדיון הסגור בוועדת החוץ של הסנט שאל

\* אותו סנטור סימון על ש'פ' בין ישראל ודרא'פ' בנושא

\* הטילים. קלארק ענה שהוא מקבל AT FACE VALUE את תשובת

\* ישראל שלא חודשו כל החוזים אחרי 1987. אמרתי שבכך

\* הוא מאשר בעקיפין שיש ש'פ' אך שהוא החל לפני 1987.

\* קלארק אמר שהוא לא יכול בדיון סגור עם סנטורים לשקר

\* כזי אחרת הוא צפוי לעמוד לדיון. קלארק אמר שסימון היה

\* היחיד ששאל. לסימון, כפי שקלארק יכול היה להבחין

\* היתה גם שאלה בעניין הלבאי אך הוא לא שאלה.

\* קלארק אמר שסוקולסקי נציג הפנטגון (אגב, לשעבר עוזרו

\* היהודי של סנטור קוויל בנושאי הגנה), חרג בתדרוך

\* אתמול כאשר אמר משפט שסנקציות עשויות להועיל בנסיבות

\* מסויימות, משפט שהוצא בעת קבלת האישורים המוקדמת

\* לתדרוך.

\* ערן

\* רש



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

25404

\* תאריך : 31.10.89 \*

\* דף 1 מתוך 1 \*

נכנס

סודי ביותר

\* עותק 1 מתוך 16 \*

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\* חוזם: 10,25404 \*

\* אל:המשרד \*

\* יעדים:מצב/1945 \*

\* מ-:ווש,נר:743,תא:301089,זח:1300,דח:ר,סג:טב \*

\* תח: @ גס:צפא \*

\* נד: @ \*

אנה

\* סודי ביותר/רגיל \*

\* אל:סמנכ'ל צפ'א \*

\* מאת:עודד ערן \*

\* SUPER COMPUTER \*

\* בשולי שיחה טלפונית בשבוע שעבר אמר קלארק, שלהערכתו

\* תדחה ההחלטה בנידון עד אחרי יעבור זעם והוא מניח

\* שזה יהיה בסוף דצמבר תחילת ינואר. לא אמרתי לו

\* זאת, אך זה נראה לי כאופטימי למדי.

\* ערן.

\* לב

\* תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ

26218

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 31.10.89

\*\* יוצא  
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סודי

חוזם: 10,26218  
אל: וווש/1209, בטחון/1287  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 311089, זח: 1633, דח: מ, סג: 10  
תח: @ גס: צפא  
נד: @

1/ק  
2/ק

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סודי/מידי

10301

אל: שטיין/וושנינגטון


דע: מקש"ח, משהב"ט

כתבות NBC

להלן מתוך שיחה עם ד"ר סת קארוס (מומחה לעניינים צבאיים, כעת חבר חוקר באקדמייה הימית ברוד איילנד, בהשאלה ממכון אינדיק, איש איפא"ק לשעבר)

א. כתבות NBC חמורות: הן נקלטות כמהימנות בקרב הציבור הואיל והן משקפות ומחזקות מוסכמות שכבר קיימות אצל האיש ברחוב לגבי פעילות ישראל בתחומים השונים (גרעין, טילים, לביא). לפיכך לא חשוב אם ישנם אי-דיוקים בכתבות -  
THEIR POINT IS WELL TAKEN

ב. החוגים המקצועיים העוסקים בשני הנושאים הראשונים במשרדים השונים (מח"ד, פנטגון, CIA ועוד) מתוסכלים מאד. בנושא הגרעיני ופרוק הנשק בכלל אינם מסכימים עם גישתו הכללית של השגריר קנדי המכוונת למנוע עימותים והם סבורים שמשך 10 השנים האחרונות ישראל מטופלת בכפפות של משי ללא סיבה. במח"ד אין לברתולמיו זמן לטפל בנושאי פירוק הנשק והמקצוענים הנ"ל אינם יכולים לקדם עמדתם בתוך המערכת.



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לפיכך, טבעי שהם מחפשים מפלטים אחרים וסביר להניח שלא יפסיקו מההדלפות המכוונות - ולו רק במגמה לקדם האג'נדה שלהם, הכוללת לבוי חששות הסובייטים בכדי להגביר רצונם לפעול לצמצום הפצת טכנולוגיית טילים. בין מקצועניים אלה יש גם המתנגדים לפרוייקט החץ כי רואים בו דרך עקיפה למימון פיתוח כושר הבליסטי של ישראל..

3. מבחינתם כתבות NBC מועילות מאד:-

בעניין הגרעיני, התאפשר להם לתקוף שתי מטרות בבת אחת: ישראל ודרא'פ.

באשר להעברת טכנולוגיית טילים הם מתייחסים לישראל כאל חוטא ואין זה משנה אם לטענתה היא אינה מעבירה טכנולוגיה אמריקאית למדינות שלישיות. ביסודו של דבר היא נחשבת כגורם המפיץ טכנולוגיות - ויש לקרוא אותה לסדר.

באשר ללביא, בידי גורמים רשמיים בווישינגטון מידע לפיו דרא'פ תרמה תרומה מכובדת לפיתוח הלביא ועתה נשאלת השאלה מה היא קיבלה כתמורה בעד השקעתה. בנוסף קיימת מורת רוח בשל העתקת מהנדסי הלביא לדרא'פ כי לפי החוק האמריקאי ניתן למנוע תופעה כזו (דוגמת האיסור על עבודה בטחונות בלוב) ולכן לא מובן מדוע ישראל מתירה לאזרחים פרטיים לעשות כרצונם.


4. בסך הכל יש לישראל בעיה שהיא גדולה ממרכיביה הנפרדים. כל אחד מהתחומים הנ"ל שייך למכלול של שת'פ צבאי עם דרא'פ ושת'פ כזה הינו בגדר מוקצה מן המיאוס בקרב מגזרים נרחבים של הציבוריות האמריקאית. טענתנו שלא נחתמו חוזים חדשים בתחום זה מאז מרץ 1987 אינה מוסיפה וייתכן שבשלב זה היא כבר גורעת.

5. באופן בסיסי יש לישראל בעיה אקוטית נוספת והיא בעיה האמינות. זו מכה כללית אך במקרה דנא:

לא מתייחסים ברצינות לעמדתנו בנושא נשק גרעיני.

שימת הדגש על אי-העברת טכנולוגיית אמריקאיות הקשורות ללביא מובנת אך לא משכנעת.

קיים שקט רועם בדבר פיתוח טילים עם דרא'פ.



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר


6. מעל ומעבר לנ"ל, להערכת האמריקאים, רשמיים ואחרים, אין דבר שישראל לא תעשה למען בטחונה וייתכן שיש לראות דברי הסנטור מיטצל בהקשר זה - כאילו החליט לנקוט ב'טיפול הלם' עמ'נ לזעזע את ישראל משויון נפשה באומרו שעלינו לבחור בין דרא'פ וסיוע אמריקאי.

מנהל מצפ"א

ל.כ.

לש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ



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מיידי	דחיפות:	טופס מצרף	דף: 1
		קשר ניו-יורק	מחוך: 1
בלמ"ס	סיוג:		אל:
3117-	תזוח:	אלכה"ב	יועץ שח"ח לתפוצות, מצפ"א
	מס מנדק:		דע:
205 - 011			וושנינגטון
0 1216			מאת: רל"ש הקונכ"ל



היום נערכה מסיבת עיתונאים על ידי בכירים בקהילה היהודית שתצהירו על תמיכתם כדייויד דינקינס לראש עיריית ניו יורק. מטרת האספה חיתה להחזיר לדינקינס את המומנטום בקרב היהודים ולהפיג חששות בגין יחסיו עם ג'סי ג'קסון. ~~האספה~~ דיק רביץ, הווארד סקוודרו, ג'ון שפירא, לסטר פולק, טד אלנוף, פגי טישמן, אנדי וטומס טיש - היו כרשימת התומכים. כולם הביעו תקווה שעכשיו יבוא סוף לפקפוקים. דינקינס אמר שלפי דעתו הקהילה היהודית משוכנעת כנאמנותו לעניין היהודי אך אין לו בטחון שכך יוצג הדבר בתקשורת.

לשכת הקונכ"ל

שיהם / 3  
 ג'קסון / 1  
 ג'אנס / 1  
 ג'אנס / 2  
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שם השולח: כטי ארנברג  
מ.א. ארנברג

תאריך: 31.10.89

END



SECRET

# John Glenn

## News Release

IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  
October 30, 1989

Contact:

Rebecca Bell (202) 224-9799  
Leonard Weiss (202) 224-4751

### GLENN OPPOSES SUPERCOMPUTER EXPORTS TO NATIONS SEEKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES

2/6

Washington, D.C. -- Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) today urged the Bush Administration not to approve U.S. export licenses for supercomputers to nations building nuclear weapons or long-range missiles. Supercomputers are useful in developing and producing such weapons of mass destruction.

Glenn stated: "I have heard that our government may soon be approving several applications for licenses to export multipurpose supercomputers to Brazil, India and Israel. I have also heard that there is a split within the Administration -- fortunately, in my opinion -- concerning the wisdom of approving such sales."

"These rumors of pending approvals, if true, raise profound questions about the direction of our policies to stop the global spread of nuclear weapons and missiles," Glenn said. "Since it is virtually impossible to safeguard such computers against unauthorized uses, how can we possibly justify selling such devices to nations that specifically refuse to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -- nations that are also working on long-range ballistic missiles?" asked Senator Glenn, author of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

In a Senate floor statement, Glenn said today that "The world looks to the United States for leadership to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles. Our ability to continue this leadership can only be weakened to the extent that we prove unable -- or unwilling -- to exercise the type of discipline that we expect of our trading partners."

"I am not opposed in principle to exports of supercomputers," Glenn later explained. "But selling supercomputers to countries that may be pursuing nuclear weapons or long-range ballistic missiles would be an extremely ill-advised move. I can think of nothing to justify such sales."

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~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

U.S. Senate, 31 October 1989

**SUPERCOMPUTERS AND SUPER BOMBS**

10/31/89 TPE

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Mr. President, I have spoken many times about the threats facing the nation and international peace from the global spread of nuclear weapons. Although it has recently become fashionable to campaign against the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and missiles -- a campaign that I support wholeheartedly -- there is a danger that our preoccupation with such weapon systems might distract our attention from the still serious, and I am afraid growing, nuclear threats we face from abroad.

**Out of Sight, Out of Mind**

Many Americans believe that this threat has lessened over the years; after all, no additional nations have formally announced a nuclear detonation since India set off its so-called "peaceful nuclear explosion" back in May 1974. And a decade has passed since the occurrence of that "mystery flash" in the South Atlantic which many believe was a clandestine nuclear test. If proliferation could be defined merely by the detonation of a nuclear explosive, then history does suggest some progress in stopping the global spread of the bomb.

Unfortunately, proliferation also takes place through a more insidious route: nations can acquire both a weapons capability and a nuclear arsenal without having to take the step of actually exploding, or even assembling, one of these devices. Whenever proliferation occurs in specialized laboratories rather than at nuclear weapons testing sites, there will be the danger of complacency.

We have been hearing a lot from this Administration lately about the importance of education to our country's future. Yet we have seen little to indicate that the Administration is serious about its responsibility to educate the American people about nuclear proliferation -- one of the gravest threats facing global security and our nation's future. Anyone who has read the Administration's most recent Annual Report to Congress, required by Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act -- or for that matter, any of the earlier Annual Reports -- surely understands what I am saying.

We would do well to recall the words of James Madison:

A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce, or a tragedy, or perhaps both.

Over the next few weeks, I will be making a series of brief statements about various specific challenges we face from the global spread of nuclear weapons. I do not intend just to scare people -- but to stimulate some thinking and action. There is nothing to be gained from participating in a Conspiracy of Silence about the problem of nuclear proliferation.

**Supercomputers and Bombs**

Today, I will address the contributions that supercomputers make to the development of nuclear weapons and the need for tough export controls to ensure that such computers are not used for such purposes.

10/31/89 TPE 3/6

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Almost 40 years ago, America and the Soviet Union detonated nuclear explosives based on the fusion of hydrogen isotopes. As devastating as the city-busting fission bombs were that detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the new H-Bombs, or "Supers," were a hundred times more powerful.

Because the early Supers and their ballistic missile delivery systems were designed without the benefit of today's modern supercomputers, some people have concluded that it is silly for us to restrict our exports of such computers. "We need the markets," we are told. "If we don't sell, we will just lose the business to our foreign competitors," others declare. "You don't need a supercomputer to build a Super Bomb or long-range missile," some assert.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the Record at the end of my remarks an article that appeared in the New York Times on August 20, 1989 which summarizes many of these claims.

When you look closely at these arguments, however, they are not very convincing. Surely they do not suffice to justify rolling back existing export controls over sales of such devices to nations known to be actively developing nuclear explosives or long-range, nuclear-capable delivery systems.

First, sales of supercomputers are not going to reverse our trade imbalance, and even the most fervent believers in free trade admit to the need for some limits. Do we truly want a laissez faire global market in the technology for building weapons of mass destruction? Most of the world market for such computers is found in advanced countries that have committed themselves not to acquire or promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I believe that it is neither in our economic nor our security interests to sell supercomputers to nations lacking impeccable nonproliferation credentials.

Second, it is worth noting that the United States presently faces very little foreign competition in the field of supercomputers -- in fact, our only serious competitor, Japan, has shown little interest in marketing its supercomputers to nations engaged in activities associated with nuclear or missile proliferation. Of course this could change. If it does, however, it would be far wiser for us to negotiate some limits on this trade rather than simply try to "out-export" a foreign competitor in this sensitive area.

Third, it is a curious argument indeed to claim that because the Superpowers acquired their Supers without supercomputers, it is therefore bad policy to restrict the sale of such devices today. The question immediately arises: whose word should we rely upon when it comes to determining the utility of supercomputers for making bombs? Who can speak with greater authority on this issue, our bureaucrats or our bomb designers? Surely nobody knows bombs like the scientists in our nuclear weapon labs know bombs. And I for one have considerable respect for the competence of these labs when it comes to their judgments about the relevance of supercomputers for advanced nuclear designs.

#### Views of the Nuclear Weapon Labs

I would like to draw my colleagues attention to a useful, straightforward reference describing how supercomputers are used to develop or improve nuclear weapons.

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In January 1986, America's three nuclear weapon labs -- the Los Alamos National Lab, the Lawrence Livermore National Lab, and Sandia National Laboratories -- published (under the auspices of the Department of Energy) an unclassified report called, "The Need for Supercomputers in Nuclear Weapons Design." The following extracts clearly identify the utility of supercomputers for the design and advancement of nuclear weapons.

• "Large-scale computers are essential to carrying out the weapons program mission. Computers provide essential understanding and enable us to simulate extremely complicated physical processes...Computers enable us to evaluate performance and safety over the decades of a weapon system's lifetime... computers enable us to verify weapon designs within testing limits."

• "With large-scale computers, we have been able to improve our designs by optimizing design parameters, while reducing the number of costly experiments in the design process ... Tests involving high explosives have been reduced from 180 tests for a 1955-vintage weapon to fewer than 5 for today's weapons because of computation."

• "Computers enable us to extrapolate to new capabilities...it is this computational capability, driven by the needs of the weapons design, that has made possible new concepts and enhanced safety in weapons."

• "The inability to calculate solutions to complex problems [during the years of the Manhattan Project] hampered development and forced weapons designers to build in large margins against error (e.g., large amounts of high explosive, which increased weight to such an extent that some designers were uncertain the devices could actually be carried by existing aircraft)...It has been estimated that a team of scientists using the calculators of the 1940s would take five years to solve what it takes a Cray computer one second to perform."

• "Without supercomputers, the nation's nuclear weapons program would be deprived of much of its vitality... supercomputing is essential...in providing us with a tool to simulate the complex processes going on during a nuclear explosion...computers enable us to infer real-environment weapon performance from underground nuclear tests."

• "The computer becomes absolutely essential in the evolution of a design that will survive the fratricide threat...the computer is essential in designing a system whose vulnerability to an ABM attack is reduced to an acceptable level."

• "[Computers] enable the designer to 'test' ideas before actually committing to hardware fabrication...computing capabilities are absolutely critical to progress in new designs."

The report I have just quoted leaves no doubt whatsoever about the many contributions that supercomputers can make to a nuclear weapons program. Sure bombs can be made without them. But that is not the point -- if supercomputers reduce the cost or expand the time required to acquire or perfect a nuclear weapon or a nuclear-capable missile, then they should be controlled. Although it is true that any nation can, with enough determination, probably acquire a nuclear weapon in the long run, we are under no obligation to make that objective any easier to achieve. That is why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act requires controls over "all export items...which could be, if used for purposes other than those for which the export is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes" (Section 309c).

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Holding To Our Standards

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It is useful to recall just how our system of export controls implements this section. Part 778.4 of the Code of Federal Regulations lists specific nonproliferation-related criteria to be met by exporters seeking validated licenses to export of nuclear-related commodities or technical data. The criteria include:

- The importing country's status as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
- Whether the importing country has all its nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or equivalent full scope safeguards
- Whether there is an agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy between the U.S. and the country concerned
- The importing country's public statements and policies concerning nuclear developments and non-proliferation
- The extent of cooperation in non-proliferation policy generally (indications such as willingness to consult on international non-proliferation issues)
- Intelligence data on the importing country's nuclear intentions and activities

It seems to me that these are reasonable standards. I have nothing at all against exporting supercomputers to nations that can satisfy all of these standards, and there are many such nations. I recognize the importance of such computers for a wide variety of legitimate scientific and economic development ends.

But once we start watering down our standards to accommodate political or economic interests of the day, where will this process end? Will our nuclear-weapon-related technology some day become, as former NRC Commissioner, Victor Gilinsky, once warned, "the modern day equivalent of glass beads and Indian blankets"? I, for one, hope that day never comes.

The world looks to the United States for leadership to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles. Our ability to continue this leadership can only be weakened to the extent that we prove unable -- or unwilling -- to exercise the type of discipline that we expect of our trading partners. I hope that America's nuclear-related exports never put us through a national humiliation like West Germany experienced when its lax export control practices helped Libya to acquire a chemical weapons plant.

Our ability to avoid this fate can only improve to the extent that we have some informed discussion about the problem we face. I hope that my series of brief statements on nuclear proliferation threats we face today, will help us to avoid either of James Madison's darkest fears of tomorrow: farce. . . or tragedy.

END



לשכת הכלכלה

2/6

**EMBASSY OF ISRAEL**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**  
 MINISTER (ECONOMIC AFFAIRS)



שגרירות ישראל  
 ושינגטון  
 ציר כלכלי

October 20, 1989

107 792

Dr. Carol Edelman  
 Assistant Administrator  
 Bureau for Asia & Near East  
 Agency for International Development  
 Room 6724  
 320 21st Street, N.W.  
 Washington, D.C. 20523-0070

Dear Dr. Edelman:

According to the understanding between the Agency for International Development ("AID") and the Government of Israel ("GOI"), we reviewed Israel's experience under the Cash Transfer Program ("CTP") in the calendar year 1988 and in the first half of 1989.

The data on the development of total imports from the U.S. to Israel in recent years show clearly that the shift in the economic assistance program to cash transfers did not have an adverse impact on Israeli imports from the U.S.

Pursuant to the assurances which were given to AID, the dollar level of Israel's non-defense imports from the U.S. during the fiscal year 1989 exceeded the level of U.S. economic assistance provided during that year.

The enclosed Table shows that exports of civilian U.S. manufactured goods to Israel amounted in calendar year 1988 to \$2153 million, a 16 percent increase over 1987. In 1988, total civilian imports to Israel from the U.S. exceeded economic aid by 80 percent. In the first half of 1989 such exports increased by further 11 percent over their level in the first half of 1988.

The Table also shows that the dollar level of grain and other agricultural products imported to Israel amounted in Calendar Year 1988 to \$339 million. In the first half of 1989, such imports amounted to \$194 million. The GOI has used its best efforts to induce Israeli importers, whenever feasible, to purchase U.S. grain and other agricultural products.

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Dr. Carol Edelman  
October 20, 1989

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
Page 2

As in previous years, the competitiveness of U.S. capital suppliers was assured. Imports to Israel of U.S. manufactured machinery, medical photographic and electrical equipment, vehicles, aircraft and vessels increased from \$1002 million in 1987 to \$1065 million in 1988 (+6 percent). From 1980 to 1988, such imports increased by 67 percent.

U.S. flag vessels have benefited as well consistent with the GOI policy to encourage the use of such vessels, whenever feasible.

Our experience under the CTP confirms the effectiveness of the program vis-a-vis the Commodity Import Program, in terms of providing opportunities to U.S. suppliers to export to Israel. We are pleased that these results bear out the confidence that AID and other U.S. Government agencies placed in us in shifting from the Commodity Import Program to the CTP. In the coming year the GOI will take the necessary measures to assure that U.S. suppliers will not be disadvantaged by the termination of the Commodity Import Program.

Very sincerely,



Pinhas A. Dror  
Minister (Economic Affairs)

IMPORTS OF GOODS FROM THE U.S. (C.I.F.)  
(In millions of U.S. Dollars)

(1981 - 1987) January - December Period  
(1987 - 1988) January - June Comparison

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Jan. - 1988	June 1989
Animals and Products of Animals	7	10	8	9	7	5	9	11	6	4	4
Plants and the Products thereof	396	455	382	375	324	324	301	276	333	179	190
Oils and Fats of Animals	6	6	3	2	4	4	3	5	8	2	3
Processed Foods, Beverage Tobacco	23	31	28	32	33	22	26	31	64	27	37
Minerals	3	3	4	4	6	4	10	6	14	7	5
Chemical Products	80	84	88	79	81	66	92	107	143	69	79
Rubber and Plastics	43	39	39	38	36	34	41	54	54	27	32
Processed Leather and Furs	3	4	5	5	2	6	4	6	5	3	3
Wood and Products thereof	4	5	5	4	4	5	8	15	18	8	12
Paper and Cardboard	36	52	49	49	57	47	67	99	103	48	65
Textiles and Products thereof	37	65	45	34	37	45	44	56	49	28	23
Footwear	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	4	2	2
Articles of Stone, Cement & Ceramic	9	10	11	11	14	16	15	17	17	8	10
Precious Stones	138	43	42	41	50	71	106	106	136	71	102
Metals	105	124	105	82	105	132	104	98	96	44	61
Machinery & Electrical Equipment	440	486	522	583	619	608	671	665	734	321	424
Vehicles, Aircraft and Vessels	136	120	102	248	176	106	111	196	183	75	83
Optional Photography, Medical Equipment	61	75	79	94	115	144	136	141	148	73	78
Miscellaneous	4	6	7	5	4	5	6	8	15	7	8
Works of Art	12	4	0	3	3	6	3	6	21	2	2
Unclassified Commodities	5	7	19	24	35	27	25	26	12	10	23
<b>TOTAL IMPORTS</b>	<b>1,549</b>	<b>1,630</b>	<b>1,542</b>	<b>1,723</b>	<b>1772</b>	<b>1,679</b>	<b>1,789</b>	<b>1,932</b>	<b>2153</b>	<b>1,115</b>	<b>1246</b>

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
MINISTER (ECONOMIC AFFAIRS)



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון  
ציר כלכלי

October 20, 1989

Dr. Carol Edelman  
Assistant Administrator  
Bureau for Asia & Near East  
Agency for International Development  
Room 6724  
320 21st Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20523-0070

Dear Dr. Edelman:

In conjunction with the shift in 1979 of the U.S. economic assistance program to Israel from the Commodity Import Program ("CIP") to cash transfers, the Government of Israel ("GOI") provided certain assurances regarding the impact of the shift on U.S. exports to Israel, and access of U.S. suppliers to the Israeli markets. These assurances were based upon the conditions then existing.

In my March 15, 1989 and May 1, 1989 letters, I advised you about the changes in the past conditions resulting from the GOI's comprehensive privatization program which also impacts grain imports. As I indicated, under this program, the GOI will no longer purchase grain on Government accounts; rather, all grain imports are being gradually transferred to private hands. As explained in my memorandum of July 20, 1989 addressed to MarAd (with a copy to you), this transfer of responsibility is a major component in the policy to liberalize the Israeli economy, a policy that has been strongly encouraged by the United States Government ("USG"). It is generally believed that the resulting changes in the environment will foster the ultimate goals of the GOI and USG through the more economically viable environment that is being produced.

In the context of the economic assistance program and the current environment, as described above, I would like to take this opportunity to convey to you, on behalf of my Government, our assurances for FY 90, as follows:

1. The GOI shall take all steps to ensure that the dollar level of Israel's non-defense imports from the U.S. will be at least equal to the level of U.S. economic assistance obligations during the year, so that U.S. suppliers would not be disadvantaged

Dr. Carol Edelman  
October 20, 1989

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Page 2

by the termination of the CIP, and the level of cash transfers made to Israel does not cause an adverse impact on the total amount of non-military exports from the U.S. to Israel.

2. With regard to GOI procurement of large capital equipment items which U.S. suppliers might furnish, special measures would be taken as necessary to ensure that they may compete on terms at least as favorable as those offered by prospective third country suppliers.

3. Although the GOI will no longer be responsible for purchasing grain or shipping it to Israel, the GOI shall use its best efforts to induce Israeli importers, whenever feasible, to purchase U.S. grain and other agricultural products and to employ U.S. flag vessels.


The GOI believes that Israeli importers are likely to continue to purchase a large share of their grain in the U.S. and continue to use a fair share of U.S.-flag vessels, whenever U.S. prices are competitive with world prices.

In the summer of 1990, the GOI will review again the experience under the cash transfer procedures, and a report of the findings will be provided by September 1990.

Over the past few years, the level of Israel's non-defense imports from the U.S. has grown as indicated in the report submitted to AID in September 1989.

My Government is prepared to discuss with the USG what reasonable steps it could take to make American sources of supply more attractive to Israeli importers.

Very sincerely,



Pinhas A. Dror  
Minister (Economic Affairs)

END

דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק 18	קד:
סוג: גלוי		פתוך:
תאריך וזמן העבור: 31 באוק' 1989 16:45		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק: הפס"ד:	א/ק"ב	דצ:
798		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

קונפרנס: חוק כספי מחמ"ד - הרשאות

1. היום אח"צ (31/10) נפגשו נציגי 2 הבתים לפגישתם השניה. נכחו מצד ביהנ"ב: פאסל, סולרז, בירוויטר, דימלי, גיינדסון, ברמן, ברומפילד, לגומרסינו, סנו ווולפה. מצד הסנאט: פל, חלמס, סרבינס ודוד.
2. פל הודיע כי נמסר לו שלדו"ח הקונפרנס שלחוק כספי מחמ"ד-הקצבות, הוכנס WAIVER המבטל הצורך בחוק ההרשאות. בכוונתו היום אח"צ להגיש תיקון נגדי ולהיאבק בתיקון זה. סוכם על דעת שני הצדדים כי גם במקרה שה-WAIVER יתקבל (היינו שפל יכשל במאבקו) ימשיך הקונפרנס על חוק ההרשאות.
3. הישיבה ארכה כמחצית השעה מבלי להגיע להחלטה מוסכמת על דרך ניהול הקונפרנס. סוכם שהעוזרים ינסו להגיע לרשימה מצומצמת ומוסכמת של תיקונים שיכללו בדיוני הקונפרנס.
4. הישיבה הבאה נקבעה ליום ג' הבא 7/11.

יהוא ורנאי ז"ל  
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 תפוצה: 36

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 30.10.89

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חוזם: 10,25390

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1918

מ-: גנבה, נר: 292, תא: 301089, זח: 1800, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

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ארהב

רגיל/1071

מנהל מצפא - לנמען בלבד

ארהב-ישראל

לשלנו 121 מ-13.10

בשיחת יחיד שהזדמנה לי עם אברם (לא בהקשר הפגישה שבשלנו  
289) שוב שח דאגתו העמוקה על מצב היחסים בין שתי  
המדינות, כולל עמדת התקשורת. ציין שהוא מוטרד מאוד  
מן הסיכונים הקיימים בנושא, שהוא י"כה חיוני וקיומי  
לכולנו, וכאן דיבר כמוזן כיהודי. גם בשיחות מזדמנות  
אחרות הוא מבטא מחשבות אלה, וברור שהדברים יוצאים  
מהלב. הוא עומד לצאת לארהב לכ-10 ימים ב-8.11, ויתכן  
וירצה לקיים שיחה מקפת עם ארד בווינגטון.

אליאב

יג

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא



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חוזם: 10,25513

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1948, מנמת/476

מ-: ווש, נר: 746, תא: 301089, זח: 1500, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

אלכפ"ח

סודי/מיד

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

פגישת השגריר עם הסנטור רוב.

ב-24/10 נפגש השגריר עם הסנטור רוב. נכח עוזרו לעניני חוץ ומצידנו אטינגר והח'מ.

א. התהליך המדיני -

השגריר עדכן את הסנטור לגבי ההתפתחויות האחרונות בתהליך המדיני. ( ברוח דיווחנו המפורט על השיחה עם המילטון). הסנטור שאל על השתתפות נציגי אש"פ במשלחת הפלסטינית. מבין התנגדות ישראל להשתתפות נציגי תונים אולם לדבריו, רבים הטוענים כי כל מי שיצורף למשלחת יהיה לו SOME COLORATION OF PLO.

השגריר הבהיר עמדתנו לגבי השתתפות נציגי השטחים בלבד שלא היו בעבר חברים באש"פ ומעורבים במעשי טרור. לא נוכל להסכים שנציגים אלה יבואו לשולחן הדיונים ויאמרו שהם מייצגים את אש"פ או מונו ע"י אש"פ- תונים. מהות היוזמה הישראלית היא יצירת מנהיגות פלסטינית אלטרנטיבית שתתמקד בענין החיים בשטחים. חשוב למשקיפים להבין עמדת הממשלה הדוגלת בהסכם ביניים שרק לאחריו יפתח הדיון בהסדר סופי. לשאלת רוב על עמדת ישראל לגבי 10 הנקודות של מוברק הסביר השגריר ש-10 הנקודות

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אינן מתייחסות רק ל- MODALITIES של הבחירות אלא גם לעקרון של שטחים תמורת שלום, הפסקת התנחלויות והשתתפות פלסטינית ממז' ירושלים בבחירות. אין לדעת ישראל מקום לדון בנושאים אלה לפני חוזר לפני פתיחת מו"מ מהותי. בהקשר זה סיפר הסנטור כי בראשית ספטמבר במסגרת ביקור באירופה הזמינו הסנטור ספקטור להצטרף לביקור בתוניס ואלג'יר. רוב מיהר לציין כי לא נפגשו עם אנשי אש"פ אלא עם אנשי השגרירות. התרשם מהתדרוכים שקיבלו שהקהילה הבינל' מאמינה שהצעת מוברק היוותה נסיון קונסטרוקטיבי לקידום התהליך. לגבי 5 הנקודות אמר רוב כי הוא מבין מדברי השגריר שישראל קיבלה אותם באופן עקרוני. השגריר אישר והוסיף שקיבלנו בלונדון בקשה לתיקונים, מתקיימות שיחות בנוון וחילופי אגרות. רוב שאל, מהו הצעד הבא המתחייב ובאיזה מגרש נמצא עתה הכדור. השגריר סיפר על העברת מכתב שה'ח למזכיר בייקר ועל מפגש 3 שה'ח בווישינגטון ובעקבות זאת פגישת המשלחות בקהיר. חזר שוב על דאגותינו בהקשר להרכב המשלחת הפלשתינית וה- AGENDA.

רוב התייחס ביוזמתו לנאום בייקר בוועידת אייפא"ק שם גם הוא הופיע. להערכתו, בייקר יכל היה להימנע מהטונים הצורמים ולקבל יותר תמיכה לנאום. השגריר הבהיר הערותינו לנאום והוסיף, כי למרות הנאום, ארה"ב תומכת ביוזמת ישראל. אנו חלוקים עם ארה"ב לגבי הדיאלוג עם אש"פ ואיננו סבורים שהוא מועיל. אש"פ מתנגד לתהליך וליוזמה ומחשש לסיכון מעמדו כנציג הבלעדי של העם הפלסטיני, מעורב הגברת האלימות בשטחים. בהקשר לזה התייחס להסלמת התופעה של חיסול פלסטינים ע"י פלסטינים. הסנטור שאל על מצב הרוח בישראל, בין השאר גם על רקע חילוקי הדעות בין שני הגושים הפוליטיים. השגריר השיב, כי קיימת דאגה לגבי האלימות והאספקטים המכוערים של אינתיפאדה. קיימת הבנה בשני הגושים שיש למצוא פתרון פוליטי ולא צבאי לבעיה.

### ב. עסקת הטנקים עם סעודיה.

לשאלת רוב עד כמה אנו מודאגים מהעיסקה, השיב השגריר כי אנו מאד מודאגים ופרט בנושא. התייחס לסעודיה הנחשבת כמתונה ודרך הצבעתה על כתב ההאמנה של ישראל המצאותה במצב מלחמה עם ישראל, וקרבתה לגבול הדרומי של ישראל. כן ציין שנוסיונות משתנות במז'ת ויכולת העמידה בלחצים של מדינות ערב, בעת משבר עם ישראל, הינה קטנה. השגריר הזמין את רוב לביקור בישראל ל ביקר

1952

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY  
530 SOUTH EAST ASIAN AVENUE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60607

TO: THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

FROM: DR. J. H. GOLDSTEIN, CHICAGO  
DR. R. F. SCHWENKER, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: POLYMERIZATION OF VINYL MONOMERS  
BY CATIONIC MECHANISM

Enclosed for the Bureau are two copies of a report  
describing the results of our studies on the polymerization  
of vinyl monomers by a cationic mechanism. The report  
contains a summary of the experimental work and a  
discussion of the results. The report is being  
submitted to you for your information and for  
possible publication in the Journal of Polymer Science.

Very truly yours,  
J. H. Goldstein

1952

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY  
530 SOUTH EAST ASIAN AVENUE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60607

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Very truly yours,  
J. H. Goldstein

## מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ב-84). הלה השיב כי ייתכן שיעשה זאת בשנה הבאה.

יהודית ורנאי-דרנגר

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד,  
בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, סי יבל

\*\* נכנס

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חוזם: 10,25556

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1950, מנמת/477

מ-: ווש, נר: 747, תא: 301089, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

ארה"ב

100 ד / מיד

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

פגישת השגריר עם הקונגרסמן לי המילטון.

1. ב-24/10 נפגש השגריר עם המילטון ( יו"ר ועדת המשנה לאירופה והמזה"ת שליד ועדת החוץ ). נכחו אטינגר והח'מ.

2. השגריר התרכז ב-3 נושאים: התהליך המדיני, עסקת הטנקים עם סעודיה והמצב בשטחים. ( לאור השמועות על רצונו של המילטון לקיים שימועים בנושא א"א בשטחים ).

א. התהליך המדיני

אנו מצויים עתה בעיצומו של תהליך. יום קודם לכן העביר מכתב שה'ח לבייקר המבהיר שישראל תקבל עקרונות את עמסגרת שהוצעה ב-5 הנקודות של בייקר בלוויית שינויים. השגריר התייחס לבעיית הרכב המשלחת הפלסטינית ולסדר היום במפגש קהיר ( האג'נדה ). עמדתנו היא כי האג'נדה חייבת להתמקד בלעדית ב-MODALITIES של הבחירות בשטחים. כל שאר הנושאים חייבים להדחות עד לאחר שתורכב משלחת של אישים שנבחרה בבחירות ועמה נדבר. הנושא העיקרי עליו אנו חלוקים הוא התפקיד שייועד לשלוש המדינות (קרי: ישראל מצרים וארה"ב) בקביעת הרכב המשלחת

RECEIVED  
FEBRUARY 1964  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT :

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הפלסטינית. בפגישות שה'ח- בייקר- מגיד בניו-יורק הושגה הסכמה לפיה 3 המדינות יקבעו ביחד הרכב המשלחת. יתרה מזאת, בייקר במס'ע, לאחר פגישה מוברק- בוש חזר על כך והוסיף " ISRAEL WILL HAVE A CHOP... ". בנקודה זו, קטע המילטון את השגריר ואמר כי הוא מבין מדברים אלה כי הכוונה היא שלכל צד תהיה זכות וסוד. השגריר אישר זאת, והמשיך דבריו ואמר כי לאחר שהגענו לשלב שבו הנקודות נוסחו באופן רשמי מצאה ישראל עמדה פחות מחוייבת מצד ארה"ב, דבר המעמידנו בנחיתות לעומת 5 הנקודות. כעת אנו בשלב של חילופי אגרות ומאמצים להשגת הסכמה. לשאלת המילטון האם תתקיים פגישה משולשת ( של שה'ח ) בוושנינגטון השיב השגריר כי מעריך שהפגישה אכן תתקיים. לשאלה נוספת של המילטון האם ניתן להבין מכך שהמכשולים הוסרו וה- PRE-NEGOTIATIONS יפתחו במהרה השיב השגריר כי להערכתו בשלב זה הפערים צומצמו. השגריר ביקש לסכם דאגות רה"מ כדלקמן:

1) מעוניין למנוע מצב שבו נציגי ישראל יגיעו לפגישה בקהיר ויגלו כי במשלחת הפלסטינית כלולים גם נציגי אש"פ ולא רק נציגי השטחים המסכימים לכל הקונספט של היוזמה הישראלית.

2) אינו מעוניין שנציגי ישראל יגלו בקהיר שהאג'נדה איננה מתמקדת רק ב- MODALITIES של הבחירות אלא גם בנושאים למו"מ על הסדרים עתידיים.

השגריר אישר דברי המילטון שאמר כי לגבי הנקודה ה-1 הוא מבין שהדאגה שלנו היא שלא ישתתפו נציגי תוניס. המילטון המשיך כי מוברק, בעת ביקורו בוושנינגטון דיבר על 2 פלסטינים מחוץ ליו"ש שיכללו במשלחת הפלסטינים. הוא מבין מדברי השגריר כי בעייה זו טרם נפתרה והשיחות בוושנינגטון יעסקו ב- MODALITIES של הבחירות ובהרכב המשלחת. השגריר אמר כי ישראל צעדה צעדים משמעותיים קדימה תוך התחשבות בעמדת ארה"ב וכדי להמחיש מחוייבות ישראל ליוזמת ישראל ולשלום. בהקשר זה הוסיף כי כל הטענות לגבי נסיגת רה"מ כביכול ממחויבותו ליוזמה, משוללות כל יסוד וההיפך הוא הנכון. המילטון אמר כי אין לו כל התרשמות כזו כלפי רה"מ. לגבי הנקודה ה-2 ( שציין השגריר ), חושב שהשגריר צודק בהחלט, ויש למקד הדיון בפגישה בקהיר על ה- MODALITIES ולא לקיים כל מו"מ מהותי. שכן, המטרה היא לסכם נוהלים ומכניזם לקיום בחירות הוגנות. השגריר עבר לנושא מתן ערבויות מצד הממשל לישראל וציין

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

כי עמדת ארה"ב היא שניתן לדון בנושא רק לאחר הסכמה עקרונית על 5 הנקודות ולא לפני כן. עבור ישראל, נושא המו"מ והתהליך הוא נושא משמעותי וקיומי. לפיכך ביקשנו לדעת מה אופי הערבויות בשלב הרבה יותר מוקדם. לשאלת המילטון האם נכון הדבר שהממשל לא הבהיר מהות הערבויות השיב השגריר בחיוב והסביר כי קבלת ערבויות תקל על תהליך קבלת ההחלטות בישראל. שכן, רה"מ מעוניין בכנות לקדם הנושא ומוזאג מאפשרות כניסה לשדה מוקשים. המילטון שאל על מועד ביקורו של רה"מ. השגריר השיב כי הביקור מתוכנן לאמצע נובמבר אולם טרם נקבע מועד מדויק.

### ב. עסקת הטנקים עם סעודיה.

לאחר שהשגריר העלה הנושא אמר המילטון כי בשבוע הראשון של נובמבר יתקיימו שימועים בנושא. אמנם ישאלו שאלות רבות, הקונגרס יביע סקפטיות, ויהיו אף כמה שיתנגדו אולם בסופו של דבר העסקה תעבור. משהביע השגריר דאגתו מהעסקה אמר המילטון כי השימועים יסייעו מבחינת הטלת מגבלות ולחץ על הסעודים ומבחינת FUTURE POSSIBLE SALES והוסיף כי הוא מבין את דאגת ישראל. להערת השגריר כי הוא מקווה שדאגת ישראל הנובעת משיקולים בטחוניים טהורים. תלקח בחשבון השיב המילטון בחיוב והוסיף כי אין ספק שמדובר ב- MAJOR ARMS DEAL.

### ג. המצב בשטחים.

ל הערה: כפי שידווחנו בפתח המברק, הנושא הועלה ביוזמתנו לאחר שהוברר לנו שהמילטון מעוניין בקיום שימועים בלעדיית בנושא ז"א בשטחים והחל להפעיל לחץ על קונגרסמן יטרון ואחרים. הללו עמדו בהתנגדותם וביקשו גם סיוענו. השגריר סקר המצב בשטח. התייחס לגל הגובר של אלימות וטרור בחודשים האחרונים נגד פלסטינים. המספר הוכפל בחודשים האחרונים ועבר את ה-100. שיעור המחוסלים הפלסטינים מגיע היום כבר ל-1 ליום. זהו חלק ממאמץ כללי ליצור אווירת אלימות והרס כדי למנוע משלטונות צה"ל האפשרות לפעול. לחץ עצום מופעל על צה"ל והחיילים ועם זאת סה"כ מספר הפלסטינים המעורבים באירועים קטן מאד. לשאלת המילטון האם מספר הפגיעות בישראלים גבר לאחרונה, השיב השגריר בחיוב ופירט האירועים בהם הושלכו בקבוק תבערה על מכוניות אזרחיות ישראליות. השגריר המשיך והוסיף כי אינו מוציא מכלל אפשרות שככל

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR  
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שתהיה התקדמות בתהליך והמו'מ יפתח, תגבר האלימות.  
מזכיר זאת על רקע האשמת ישראל בהפעלת כוח יתר כלפי  
התושבים. ברצונו להבטיח לקונגרסמן שצה'ל נתון להנחיות  
נוקשות להביא למינימום עימות. עם זאת, כאשר ישנם  
מקרים של השלכת בקבוקי מולוטוב, אין ברירה אלא להגיב  
בצורה נוקשה. המילטון ציין כי מתקרב יום השנה השני  
לאיתפדה ושאל האם לדעתו היא עלולה להמשך שנה נוספת.  
השגריר השיב כי אינו יכול להתחייב. לדעתו, אם התהליך  
המדיני יתקדם, תהיה אולי בהתחלה החרפה מסויימת באלימות  
כדי להוכיח השליטה על הרחוב. המילטון הגיב כי הוא  
מבין זאת והוסיף כי מניח שתקוותם ותקוותנו היא שככל  
שהמו'מ ימשיך להתקדם כך תלך האלימות ותשכח. השגריר  
ציין, כי העלה בנושא מאחר ומבין שישנו כוונות לקיים  
שימועים בנושא. לפיכך, הוא מבקש לשמור זאת OFF THE  
AGENDA. המילטון ענה כי הוא נתון ללחץ בנושא. הוא אמנם  
אינו חושב שהזניח את נושא השטחים שכן שאל שאלות רבות בנושא  
במהלך השימועים שהתקיימו בשנה האחרונה. אולם ישנם  
קונגרסמנים אחרים המעוניינים בשימועים(?). הוא (המילטון)  
אינו רוצה להתחייב אולם אינו מעוניין להפריע לתהליך, אינו  
מחוייב לכל תאריך ומאד רגיש לבעיית העיתוי (אמר כי יכול  
להיות שזה לא יתקיים כלל השנה). לפיכך, מוכן להתייעץ עם  
השגריר בנושא לפני החלטה על קיום שימועים כאלה. קיים  
סגמנט משמעותי בדעה'ק האמריקני, שחלקו תמיד ביקר  
את ישראל ואחר שלא עשה כן, המוטרד היום מהתנהגות  
ישראל בשטחים. מניח שדאגה זו תדעך עם התקדמות בשיחות.  
חזר שוב על כך שאינו מעוניין לגרום לקשיים לתהליך  
המדיני. אמנם אין פירושו של דבר שהוא מקבל עמדתנו  
אולם מאד רגיש לה.  
( הערה: יום לאחר הפגישה התקשרו ממשרדו של המילטון  
למשרד ועדת המשנה לזכויות אדם והודיעו כי 'בגלל  
בעיות לו'מ' לא יתקיימו לפי שעה שימועים בנושא).

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 31.10.89

25540

סודי

נכנס

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חוזם: 10,25540

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1947, בטחון/1251

מ-: ווש, נר: 738, תא: 301089, זח: 1530, דח: ב, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

@ נד:

ארכיון

סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפ' א, סגן מנהל פר' נ

דע: סמנכ' ל צפ' א ופר' נ, מע' ת, סברה, מקש' ח/משהב' ט  
יועץ תקשורת רזה' מ, יועץ תקשורת שהב' ט, עתונות  
ניו יורק, נספח צבאי - כאנ(הועבר), ניו יורק /רמש' נ

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

ישראל - דרא' פ - כתבות NBC : סיכום.

1. רשת ה- NBC הקרינה סידרה של שלוש כתבות  
בנדון שהוקרנו בראש מהדורות הערב במשך שלושה לילות  
רצופים:-

א. 25.10.89 - שת' פ גרעיני ישראל - דרא' פ.

ב. 26.10.89 - העברת טכנולוגיות וייצור ה'לביא'  
בדרא' פ.

ג. 27.10.89 - שתפ' פ עם דרא' פ בפיתוח טילים בליסטיים  
ויכולתה של ישראל לייצר פצצת-מימן.

בעקבות כתבות אלה, שידרה הרשת, בד' כ במהדורת חדשות  
הבוקר, תגובות ופאנל שיחה על הנושאים שהועלו בכתבות.

2. מספר הערות על הכתבות עצמן:-



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א. בסה"כ, לא היו בכתבות גילויים חדשים ו/או פרטים חדשים. כל הנושאים שפורטו בכתבות פורסמו כבר בעבר בתקשורת, בדרך זו או אחרת.

ב. הכתבה המקיפה ביותר (גם מבחינת זמן שידור) הייתה הכתבה הראשונה (25.10). כתבה זו עוררה מספר רב ביותר של תגובות-

(1). פניות טלפוניים רבות לפני שדור התוכנית ופניות רבות מאוד לאחר שידורה באותו ערב (ראה שלי נר 649).

(2). מאותה מהדורת חדשות (חדשות הערב - NBC 19:00) ואילך, שודרה הידיעה על ממצאי ה- NBC - שת"פ גרעיני ישראל- דרא"פ - בכל מהדורות הערב והלילה של הרשתות האחרות (E, ABC, CBS, FOX וכ"ו), כולל בתחנות מקומיות של הרשתות השונות.

- CNN שידר הידיעה בכל אחת ממהדורות החדשות שלו באותו ערב ובמשך מרבית היום והערב למחרת (26.10). העתונות הכתובה למחרת שידור הכתבה (26.10) היתה מלאה בדווחים אודות הכתבה ובמקרים מסוימים גם פרשנויות ותגובות בנדון. תחנות רדיו - בעיקר התחנות של הרשתות הגדולות ובתחנת ה-NPR (NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO) שידרה הידיעה.

ג. ביום שלאחר שידור הכתבה הראשונה היו 99 אחוז מהפניות הטלפוניות למשרדנו (עשרות רבות של פניות) בנושא הכתבה. כמעט ולא היו כלל פניות בנושא התהליך המדיני שהיה עד אז בראש נושאי ההתעניינות של הפונים.

3. הייחוד בכל שלוש הכתבות והסיבות, להערכתך, לכך שהנושא זכה להיות שיא תקשורתי כה גדול הם:

א. זו פעם ראשונה ששודרו כתבות כה מקיפות ומלאות בנושאים אלה. הייחוד היה בהרכבת התמונה המלאה והכוללת - שכן, כאמור, הפרטים השונים שודרו כבר בעבר כפרטים בודדים. הייחוד היה במכלול ובתמונה המקפת שהצטיירה מהצילומים בארץ (אתרי פיתוח ושיגור) ובדרא"פ (מפעל האורניום וכ"ו).

ב. יחוד נוסף - ביסוס כל הטענות על מסמכים רשמיים:

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the State to the Governor, dated 18th March 1914. It contains a report on the progress of the work done during the year 1913.

2. The second part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

3. The third part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

4. The fourth part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

5. The fifth part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

6. The sixth part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

7. The seventh part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

8. The eighth part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

9. The ninth part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

10. The tenth part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

11. The eleventh part of the document is a report on the work done during the year 1913, prepared by the Secretary of the State. It contains a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the State.

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שת"פ גרעיני - הכתב הדגיש הסתמכותו על מסמכי ה-CIA.

העברת טכנולוגיות ה"לביא" - על בסיס מסמכי ה-CIA וציון מפורש של נכונות ה-CIA לפרסם ה"הוכחות מוצקות" שבידיו.

היכולת לייצר פצצת מימן - בהסתמך על ד"ר ויח הפנטגון שהוכן לפני שנה (שלי נר 682) בכתבה זו (השלישית) אף הוצגו צילומים מוגדלים של ציטוטים שנלקחו, לטענת הכתב, מהדו"ח עצמו.

כלומר, תיעוד ההאשמות נגד ישראל על-פי מסמכים רשמיים אמריקניים, נתן לטיעונים רמת אמינות גבוהה במיוחד.

ג. התיעוד הרשמי של הטיעונים עורר עניין רב מבחינת אספקט נוסף: העלאת שאלות ביחס למידת הידיעה ורמת הידיעה של הממשל אודות "פעולות" ישראל. עוד בכתבה הראשונה הודגש שלמזכיר המדינה בייקר היתה "ידיעה מלאה" על הנושא והוא, בייקר, בחר שלא להעלות הנושא בשיחותיו עם שה"ח ארנס.

ד. העיון של שידור הכתבות תרם אף הוא רבות להפיכתן למוקד תקשורת.

כאמור בדוחות קודמים, מזה מספר שבועות שישראל "זוכה" לעיסוק תקשורתי מוגבר בה, בעיקר בהקשר תהליך המדיני. העלאת הטיעונים בכתבות על רקע המתיחות, או מה שנתפס בעיני התקשורת כמתיחות ביחסי ארה"ב-ישראל, פתחה פתח לפרשנויות רבות, נוסח:-

1. לפני ביקור רוג'מ - הפעלת לחץ על ישראל כדי שממשל ישראל תקבל העמדה האמריקנית בנושא תהליך השלום ("חמש הנקודות" של בייקר).

2. כדי להכשיל עסקה שכביכול הבשילה בממשל על כוונה לאשר ייצוא מחשבי-על לישראל.

3. להביך את ישראל כדי למנוע (או להפסיק) פעילות ישראלית נגד כוונות הממשל למכור הטנקים לסעודיה.

ה. בסוס הכתבות על מסמכי ה-CIA והפנטגון - הוסיף משקל לפרשנות אודות "לחץ" ו"יד מכוונת" של גורמים בממשל נגד ישראל.



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## מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1. בסוף הכתבה השניה (26.10) השמיע הכתב משפט לפיו אם יתברר כי האשמות נכונות עלולה ישראל להפסיד כספי הסיוע (שלי נר 684). אזהרה או איום זה 'נתפס' בפרשנויות רבות, בעיקר על רקע הקרקע הנוחה שהייתה לטיעון זה בתקשורת לאחרונה (ראה דיווחי בהקשר לתהליך המדיני נר 495 מ- 20.10 סעיף 2(ג)).

4. תגובות דוברי מחמ'ד היו, בד'כ, מתוננות וזהירות תוך התמקדות בשני אלמנטים-

א. טעון ליגליסטי - אין לנו הוכחות לאמיתות הטענות וההאשמות על שת'פ גרעיני והעברת טכנולוגיות מישראל לדרא'פ.

ב. טעון פוליטי - דעתנו בנושא הפצת נשק גרעיני - ידועה. השמענו כבר בעבר מספר פעמים את דעתנו זו לישראל. לפיה על ישראל לחתום על ה-NPT ולהצטרף למשטר הפיקוח על הטיילים-MTCR.

במקביל לתגובות פומביות ממתנות אלה, רבו, בתקשורת הכתובה תגובות אחרות, קשות יותר, והמבססות האשמות נגד ישראל, מפי 'פקידים' בפנטגון ו'בכירים' אחרים בממשל, שלא זהו בשם או בתפקיד. ע'פ מספר התגובות האלה בתקשורת הכתובה, נוצר הרושם של נכונות בקרב אגפים מסוימים בממשל לדבר על הנושא, ולבסס הטענות נגד ישראל.

5. לתגובות הפומביות הללו יש להוסיף, כמוכן, את דבריו של הנשיא בוש (28.10) שגם אם היו זהירים בד'כ (אין הוכחות לבסוס הטענות) פורשו ע'י התקשורת כרמז וכאזהרה כלפי ישראל ('העברת טכנולוגיות אסורות הינו טאבו... הדבר יסבך את המצב...').

6. האפקט המצטבר מבחינה תקשורתית הינו קשה, ואין ספק שרושם זה יחלחל גם לרמות נוספות בקרב דעת-הקהל וציבור מקבלי ההחלטות בענייננו. ההאשמה העיקרית המצטיירת וזו שתשאר, להערכתי, לטווח רחוק יותר ותחלחל לרמות אחרות היא: - שתוף הפעולה והקשרים עם דרום אפריקה. ההאשמות והטענות על היכולת הגרעינית, על היכולת לפתוח טילים בליסטיים ארוכי טווח, ועל היכולת לייצור פצצת מימן - עם כל היותם קשים, יש בהם 'קבילות' מסויימת לאור מצבה הבטחוני של ישראל והאיום עליה. הם נתפסים



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

כבעלי פוטנציאל ל'הבנה' - אפשר להבין, גם אם מתנגדים לסיבות המניעות את ישראל לפתח נשק כזה. הטעון הקשה ביותר, שלגביו לא מוכנים לפתח 'הבנה' או 'קבילות' הוא ההאשמה על שתוף-פעולה וקשרים הדוקים עם דרא'פ, מעבר למהות התחום בו יש שתוף פעולה.

7. לסכום, מספר מילים על הכסוי התקשורתי בסוף שבוע זה: מאז ום שישי בבוקר חלה ירידה ניכרת ברמת ובכמות הדיווח התקשורתי: הרשתות האחרות לא מדווחו הושתות האחרות לא מדווחות עוד, אין כמעט דווחי רדיו והנושא עבר מהעמודים הראשונים לעמודים הפנימיים, ומכתבות גדולות לאזכורים ודווחים שוטפים.

דברי הנשיא בקוסטה-ריקה (28.10) 'החיו' הנושא מעט

בדיווחים התקשורתיים אולם, הנושא כמעט ולא אוזכר בתוכניות סוף-השבוע השונות בתקשורת האלקטרונית, אלא בשוליים - כשאלה אחת מיני רבות בשיח עתונאים על סיכום השבוע אצל 'מקניל-לרר' עתונאי ה-WP, מרק שילדס התייחס למשקע המצטבר ביחסי הממשל

וישראל כשהוא מונה את 'חטאי ישראל' החל מפרשת פולארד כשאלה אחת בראיונות עם הסנטורים דול ומיטשל ('פגוש את העתונות' שעסק בעיקר בנושא התקציב).

בסה'כ ניכרת רגיעה תקשורתית, שהיא, להערכתי, זמנית: הנושא ישוב לכותרות במשך השבוע על רקע השימועים ב'גבעה' שיעסקו בהצעות החוק בנושא טילים בליסטיים. אין ספק כי זהו רק פסק-זמן והתקשורת תשוב ותעסוק בנושאים אלה, שכן- מבחינה תקשורתית, יש בהם כל האלמנטים הנחוצים ל'סיפור תקשורתי טוב'.

מילה אחרונה לגבי תגובתנו (הודעת משהב'ט) :- הן מתקבלות בגחוך ובחוסר אמון ע'י מרבית הפונים.

לאור השבוע הצפוי לנו בו הנושא בודאי יועלה שוב, חשוב שנוערך בהתאם.

רות ירון.

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, רביב, מעת, הסברה, הדס, מאפ2, סי יבל, ר/מרכז, ממד, פזנר, ואא

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY  
530 SOUTH EAST ASIAN AVENUE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60607

TO: [Name]  
FROM: [Name]  
SUBJECT: [Subject]

[Faded text body]

[Faded text body]

[Faded text body]

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

25332

תאריך : 30.10.89

נכנס \*\*

100 ביור

דף 1 מתוך 1

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\*חוזם: 10,25332

\*אל: המשרד

\*יעדים: מצב/1902

\*מ-: ווש, נר: 728, תא: 301089, זח: 1115, דח: מ, סג: 10

\*תח: @ גס צפא

\*נד: @

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\*100 ביור/מיד

\*ח.ר.ב.

\*אל: יועץ מדיני לשה'ח

\*דע: לשכת ראה'מ

\*מאת: שג' וושינגטון

\*בפגישת אקראי עם טוני ויין, מנהל המח' להיבטים אזוריים

\*במשרד ללוחמה בטרור (מחמ'ד) ב-26.10: נתבקש להכין

\*דו"ח למזכיר בעקבות ביקור יגאל כרמון בושינגטון.

\*אמר שאנשיהם 'WERE NOT AMUSED' נוכח העובדה שכרמון נמנע

\*-לדבריו- מלפנות אליהם על מנת לדון בחומר שבידיו, ופנה

\*לתקשורת. אמר שכרמון אמר לשגריר בראון כי הוא עומד להגיע

\*לאטלנטה, אך לא ציין שיגיע לושינגטון (עותק מן החומר

\*של כרמון אודות פעילות הטרור של אש'פ הגיע לידי ויין

\*מהשגריר בראון).

\*עניינית- חזר על טיעונו המוכרים בדבר הבעיתיות שיש

\*להם עם חומר החקירות שלנו.

\*אמיתי.

\*יג

\*תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל





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קונסוליה הכללית של  
ישראל בניו יורק

CONSULATE GENERAL  
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

✓ ז' כ"ה

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שמור/מיון  
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אל : מצפ"א, יועץ שה"ח לתפוצות

דע : סמנכ"ל צפ"א, לשכת השר, השגריר וושינגטון

מאת : קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

פגישות טדי קולק עם המועמדים לראשות העיר.

טדי קולק נפגש ביום א' בבוקר עם המועמד הדימוקרטי דויד דינקינס במעונו הפרטי ובהשתתפותו של ראש העיר קוץ'. התנהלה שיחת כלמוסין קוץ' הישרה ואינה קלילה ומבודחת. דינקינס אמר את כל הדברים המצופים על - ידידותו לישראל, יחסו לירושלים והערצתו לטדי. התעניין בנושאי קליטת אחיופים והפרסומים בעניין ש'פ עם דרא"פ, אמר כי בדצונו לבקר בארץ אם יבחר להכנות בניין ההסתדרות שייקרא על שמו. טדי דיבר על חשיבות תפקיד ר' העיר בעלת האוכלוסיה היהודית הגדולה בעולם, הבהיר כי לא יתעה בבחירות הביע הערכה עמוקה לראש העיר היוצא על יחסו היחודי לישראל. בצהריים נפגש קולק עם רודולף ג'וליאני שביקש ללמוד מטדי כיצד הוא מנהל את העיר, הביע אהדתו בסוגיות השונות וגם כן את מבוקשו לבקר בארץ אם יבחר. אגב לאחר הבחירות בדעתי לפנות לראש העיר החדש כדי שיעמוד כראש משלח ה-2000 שמארגנת הפדרציה.

בנתיים החריף מאד המרוץ בין דינקינס לג'וליאני כאשר הפעם בסקרים הצטמצם מכ- 30% ל- 5-12% לטובת דינקינס. לדעת הפרשנים וכנראה המועמדים הקול היהודי מהווה המפתח לנצחון. לאחר נצחונו במוקדמות העידו הסקרים כי דינקינס יזכה במרבית הקולות היהודים. אך עם התערערות מעמדו ודימויו בעקבות פרשת מכירת מניות לבנו צפו על פני השטח ספקות בצבור היהודי גם כלפי יחסו של דינקינס ליהודים. הוא מוחקף במסע הבחירות שלו בעיקר על יחסיו עם ג'סי ג'קסון.

יהודים אחרים כולל מנהיגים בקהילה כגון פגי טישמן, לסטר מולאק, נוח דיר מביעים חמיכה בדינקינס ומוכנים להעיד על יחסו החם ליהודים ולישראל. מכל מקום לתוצאות הבחירות ונתוח מרכיב הקול היהודי יהיו השלכות כבדות משקל על יחסי יהודים-שחורים בעיר בשנים הקרובות.

1 אורי סביר  
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מה סגרה אה אה  
בזאת אה אה אה  
אישורו א.ס.ג.

קונכ"ל ניו יורק  
30 באוקטובר 1989



שגרירות ישראל בווינגטון  
טופס מברק

א/הק

דף 1. מתוך 4  
דחיפות: בהול לבוקר  
סוג: שמור

אל : סגן מנהל פר"נ

דע : מצפ"א.

תאריך, זמן: 30.10.89  
מספר המברק:

מאת: שתוכות, ווינגטון.

המשרד:

1/4 762

ישראל-גרעין

התקשר מריו דיטריך, כתב השבועון הגרמני "שטרן" בווינגטון וביקש  
תגובתנו לידועה הבאה:

הגיע אליו ממקורותיו חומר מדיפלומט ארגנטיני לשעבר, הכולל  
מסמכים אודות תוכנית מלפני כמה שנים לשתוף-פעולה גרעיני בין  
דרא"פ-ארגנטינה-גרמניה, תוכנית לה, לדבריו, שותפה גם ישראל.

העביר לנו המאמר הרצ"ב, הכולל פרטים. אמר שיש בידיו גם מסמכים  
רישמיים המתעדים הפרשה, אך אינו יכול בשלב זה להראותם.  
ביקש לבוא ולראותני מחר כדי לקבל תגובתנו.

אודה להתייחסותכם בהול.

רות ירון

א/קב"א

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including names like 'א/קב"א' and 'רות ירון'.

MARIO DEDERICHS  
Washington Bureau Chief

**stern**   
The German Magazine

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FAX TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THREE (3) PAGES

TO: Mrs. RUTH YARON, EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

RE: NUCLEAR

Dear Mrs. Yaron,

the following is the text of the article I told you about in our telephone conversation. The author is an American free-lance writer who is an expert on intelligence operations. For the time being, I cannot reveal his name and I have to ask you to treat this material confidentially. Thank you very much for your helpful attitude. I hope to hear from you soon.

Sincerely,



starts text:

GERMANY'S SECRET NUCLEAR ARSENAL

West Germany, not Israel, helped South Africa develop the atomic bomb, according to a former diplomat of the Argentine government who personally examined a copy of the secret nuclear protocol between Bonn and Buenos Aires. The former diplomat, who is now living in exile and asked not to be identified for fear of reprisal, stated that he had access to the secret archives of the Argentine foreign ministry in his official capacity and saw the original text of the treaty with West Germany.

The document, which was an annex to a trade treaty, called for the Federal Republic of West Germany to secretly fund and assist research efforts in Argentina and South Africa for the purpose of developing a working nuclear weapon. In return for extensive West German funding, the Government of Argentina agreed to build an atomic reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. The Government of South Africa agreed to build the actual nuclear devices for West Germany and test them. The treaty called on both signatories to share their research with Germany, and to keep their stockpiles of nuclear material in cold storage until requested by Bonn.

According to the Argentine diplomat, the nuclear treaty was executed in the 1960's as a result of West German expectations that sooner or later the United States of America would withdraw its NATO military forces from West

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German territory. Long-range planning was begun to prepare for the possible absence of an American nuclear shield. Because of intense Soviet opposition to Germany's possession of atomic weapons, Bonn determined to develop a stand-by nuclear option by funding weapons development on foreign soil. South Africa and Argentina were approached because of the large colonies of German scientists resident in both countries. Priority was given to the development of tactical nuclear warheads capable of being mounted in artillery shells or on short range missiles.

Several deliberate disclosures by U.S. intelligence agencies to the press provide startling confirmation that the secret nuclear development program described by the diplomat was actually carried out. The New York Times ran a series of articles citing evidence from CIA sources that Argentina had constructed a reactor during the 1970's capable of producing weapons grade plutonium. During the 1980's, the U.S. Air Force leaked word that one of their space satellites had observed the characteristic double blink of a nuclear flash off the coast of South Africa. This week, NBC news reported that South Africa has perfected an artillery-fired nuclear warhead. Today, the headlines of American newspapers announce that South Africa has successfully tested an Israeli medium range missile.

West Germany's darkest secret is that all of these programs originated with them. Bonn's nuclear development protocol is so sensitive, that according to the former Argentine official, there was only one leak in the last twenty years. During the 1970's, a brief mention of the West German treaty appeared in an obscure Italian publication. The journalist promptly died under mysterious circumstances.

There is reason to believe that Israel acquired its nuclear technology by successfully infiltrating German intelligence over a long period of time. According to a 1985 interview with John McIntyre, an American intelligence officer who worked with the predecessor of the BND, Israeli agents had penetrated West German intelligence almost from the moment of its inception after World WWII. Mr. McIntyre, who is now deceased, stated that he worked with Jewish agents inside General Reinhard Gehlen's Pullach compound during the late 1940's.

One of Mr. McIntyre's colleagues independently confirmed that during the 1950's Israeli intelligence had penetrated a joint German-American smuggling operation in which he was personally involved. In the 1960's Israeli intelligence infiltrated a covert West German program to sell missile technology to the Egyptian government, and publicly exposed it.

There is evidence that Israeli intelligence also learned

-3-

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of the West German treaty to develop nuclear weapons during the 1960's. Soon after Bonn signed the nuclear protocol with Argentina and South Africa, the Government of Israel conducted a complete volte face and became one of South Africa's most important military suppliers for the next twenty years, despite severe international criticism. Israel's abrupt change of policy toward a notoriously anti-semitic state could be explained by South Africa's membership in Germany's covert nuclear partnership.

The Israeli government insists that their Cabinet decided on March 18, 1987 not to enter into any new defense contracts with South Africa, but refused to discuss any agreements that had been struck prior to that time. According to today's New York Times, Israel may have provided its Jericho missile technology under a previous deal with South Africa.

The American Government has long suspected that in return for high quality Israeli conventional arms, South Africa has been trading nuclear technology and materiel. This week, U.S. intelligence leaked information that Israel now has the stand-by capability to produce two hundred tactical warheads, which are "only a screw turn away" from being active devices.

While not denying the reports outright, spokesmen for the Government of Israel have insisted that since 1975, Israel has not engaged in any nuclear weapons research. However, that does not explain whether Israel previously benefitted from German nuclear research done in Argentina and South Africa.

The state of Israel, like West Germany, has frequently voiced apprehension that a withdrawal of American support would leave them defenseless. Unlike Germany, Israel is surrounded with states that threaten its very existence with a growing arsenal of chemical weapons and sophisticated conventional missiles, much of which are the acknowledged product of German manufacturers. Indeed, Israel may have been compelled to develop its own atomic arsenal after learning that Bonn was secretly violating the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Israeli fears about the spread of German weaponry are amply justified. Only last year, the Federal Republic acknowledged that it had done little to prevent German companies from selling nerve gas equipment to Israel's worst enemies. In Samara, a chemical weapons plant is already in operation using modern German equipment and a nerve gas formula invented by the Nazis and tested on Jews at Auschwitz. When Israel learned of Bonn's illegal nuclear program, they may have joined the arms race in self-defense.

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סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן תעבור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסיד:		פאת:
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These missiles will be very difficult to target yet could effectively strike key air bases, air defense facilities, naval installations, and command and control centers and could threaten more massive attacks.

As you know from recent news reports, Israel is reported to be cooperating with South Africa on missile projects. Such reports have been and continue to be a matter of serious concern at the highest levels of DoD. In fact, DoD discussed the possibility of Israeli-South African collaboration at the highest levels with the Israeli Ministry of Defense. DoD believes such collaboration is in no one's security interest.

נתינת תשובה

7. בחלק השאלות והתשובות, התייחס פאסל לדברי נציג הפנטגון על קשרי ישראל-דראיים וביקש הבהרות.

קלק השיב באופן כללי לגבי יכולת השליטה של הפצח טילים בליסטיים. בהקשר של ישראל-דראיים אמר כי אם אכן יש אמת בדיווחים על קשרי שתי הממשלות חרי שחקיקה זו (של ברמן) might mandate terminating certain projects with Israel. (הערה: בתום השימועים, לעתונאים שניגשו אליו, חזר קלרק על נוסח זה והוסיף כי פרויקט "חחץ" עלול להיות הראשון בין הפרוייקטים שיבוטלו).

8. שאר הישיבה, שנמשכה למעלה משעתיים, נסובה סביב: התנגדות הממשל (כל 4 העדים) להצעת החוק של ברמן ובעיקר למרכיב הסנקציות, החשיבות בהמשך פעולה בילטרלית שקטה שהניבה הצלחות בשנה האחרונה חיזוק משטר ה-MTCR והרחבתו.

9. לאחר הישיבה הפומבית התכנסו חברי הקונגרס ונציגי הממשל לישיבה סגורה.

10. מעבירים העדויות הכתובות ותמליל השימועים בדיפי הקרוב. 'הגלפ' ו'א' פתרו. יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה: 36

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דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / אוסינגטון טופס פרוק	1
סוג: שמור		3
תאריך וזמן תכנון: 30.10.89 - 16:00		אל: מקשי"ח משהבי"ט סמנכ"ל צפי"א ופר"ן
פס' פרוק: הפסרד:	אלהק	דצ:
קמחן 523	757	פאזת: עודד ערו

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"גאזח"

להלן רשימת המשתתפים משני הצדדים.

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תפוצה: שגריר, ציר, שטיין, נספח צה"ל אינ"ם

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS  
JPMG MEETING  
NOVEMBER 7-9, 1989  
OFFUTT AFB, NEBRASKA

ISRAELI DELEGATION:

Ministry of Defense

Maj. Gen. (ret) David Ivry, Director General  
Haim Carmon, Deputy Dir. Gen. for Int'l Security Assistance  
Dr. Hanon Alon, Director for Foreign Affairs  
Dr. Dov Shefi, Legal Advisor  
Reuben Kokolevich, Assistant to the Director General

Israeli Defense Force

MG Dani Yatom, Chief of Plans and Policy, General Staff  
Moshe Kochonovsky, Director, New York Purchasing Mission  
BG Yosef Snir, Deputy Chief of Logistics  
COL David Yahav (IDF Legal Department)  
COL Jonathan Lerner, Strategic Planning  
LTC Alex Schneider, Strategic Planning  
COL Zvi Shtauber, Strategic Planning

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Eitan Ben-Tsur, Deputy Director General for North America  
Robie Sabel, Legal Advisor

Israeli Embassy, Washington

Ambassador Moshe Arad  
Deputy Chief of Mission Oded Eran  
R.Adm. Avraham Ben-Shosan, Defense Attache  
Maj. Shlomy Maayan, Assistant to the Defense Attache  
Shimon Stein, Political Counselor

Office of the Prime Minister

Elyakim Rubinstein, Cabinet Secretary

TOTAL ISRAELIS: 20

523

757

3/3

-2-

## UNITED STATES DELEGATION:

Department of State

Richard A. Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State (PM)  
Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)  
Charles Duelfer, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (PM)  
Dan C. Kurtzer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)  
Mark Parris (DCM, Embassy Tel Aviv)  
Jack Segal (Pol/Mil Officer, Embassy Tel Aviv)  
COL Joseph Koz (Defense Attache, Embassy Tel Aviv)  
COL Joseph Bavaria (NEA/RA/PM)  
William Siefken, (PM/ISP)  
Genevieve Pratt, (NEA/IAI)  
John Hirsch, (NEA/IAI)  
Wayne White (INR)  
Christopher Dell (T)  
W. Craig Davidson (PM/ISP)

Other Agencies:

David Welch (NSC)  
Arthur Hughes (DASD, NESAs)  
John Wagner (OSD/ISA)  
Lt. Col. Jack Connor (OSD/ISA)  
John Rowe (DSAA)  
R. Adm. Merrill Ruck plus 8 military officers (JCS, EUCOM,  
Embassy Tel Aviv DATT)  
Capt. Richard Francona (DIA)  
Name TBD (CIA)

TOTAL U.S. DEL: 30

אורה"ב ✓

שגרירות ישראל בושינגטון  
טופס מברק

ברואל  
למספר 758  
מזכיר

דף 1 מתוך 8  
דחיפות: מידי  
סוג: אש"פ

תאריך, זמן: 30.10.89  
מספר המברק

המשרד:

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אל: שגרירות ישראל, טקסאה

דע: (הוא) :  
מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

1-2: תפקידו נא בקס

יועץ רה"מ לטרור - תקשורת  
בהמשך למברקנו

1. פגישותיו של יועץ רה"מ לטרור, כרמון, עם נציגי התקשורת הניבו מספר רב של דווחים ומאמרים (רצ"ב).
2. במרביתן, מעבר לדווח אודות ממצאי הדו"ח שהציג כרמון, יש התייחסות אוהדת וחיובית לטעון הישראלי, לפיו אש"פ - גם הזרם המרכזי - טרם חדל מפעילותו הטרוריסטית, וזאת בניגוד להתחייבויותיו כלפי הממשל האמריקני.
3. מבין כל הכתבות העתונאיות, מן הראוי לשים לב במיוחד לטור של סטיבן רוזנפלד ב-WP מה-27.10.89. אין ספק שמספר שורות של הבנה לטעון הישראלי בנוגע לאש"פ מפיו של מבקר כה חריף וקיצוני כסטיבן רוזנפלד - הן בעלות ערך. רוזנפלד כתב את טורו לאחר ששמע את הרצאתו של כרמון ב-AEI, שלאחריה התבטא באזני נוכחים: "זו הייתה ההרצאה הטובה ביותר ששמעתי בנושא אש"פ והטרור מזה 20 שנה...".
4. כאמור, במרבית הדווחים הדיס לטעוננו אודות אש"פ - כך שלפגישותיו של כרמון עם התקשורת כאן, היו בהחלט תוצאות חיוביות.

על-כך התודה ליועץ רה"מ לטרור.

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Stephen S. Rosenfeld

# PLO: Terror and Talk

Those of us who believe Israel's best hope for peace lies in working things out with the PLO have a special obligation not to blink at indications that the PLO, despite its public renunciation of terrorism, still conducts and condones it and cheers it on—and not just the fringes and crazies but the Fatah mainstream commanded by PLO chairman Yasser Arafat.

The matter is of acute political relevance because by neglecting a concern that stirs deep Israeli anxieties the United States would be shrinking its capacity to engage Israel in diplomacy aimed at an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

The Israelis are now circulating detailed allegations of acts of PLO terrorism said to be committed by Fatah against civilians inside pre-1967 Israel in the 10 months since Arafat formally renounced terrorism and America responded by opening a dialogue with the PLO in Tunis.

Washington is reviewing these new allegations—against a backdrop of skepticism toward old allegations. Found to fall short of U.S. standards of the definition of terrorism and of due process, these earlier claims were attributed to policy-driven intelligence analysis. The Likud government is intent on breaking the U.S.-PLO connection in order to stay in office and to spoil any diplomatic campaign that might cost Israel its territorial ambitions on the West Bank. Israel's Labor defense minister, it is observed, has stated that mainstream PLO groups in Lebanon have in fact quieted down.

I confess to my own suspicions of the Likud government's style and goals. Yet it is disingenuous to use such reservations to evade the question of PLO terrorism. Without getting to a level of detail where an outsider has no license, I am prepared to believe that the PLO does something less than the Israeli government alleges but something more than Washington now acknowledges.

The State Department is customarily to be found in a studied posture looking into Israeli contentions and calling for higher standards of definition and evidence. It has its valuable reasons: to hold Palestinian terrorism and Israeli reactions to it within bounds sufficient to keep alive its battered effort to nudge the two camps into negotiation. But unquestionably this attitude nourishes

among some Israelis a conviction that American intelligence judgments are themselves policy-driven, framed to justify a U.S.-PLO dialogue that, in opening, the United States told Israel "no American administration can sustain . . . if terrorism continues by the PLO or any of its factions."

It is not enough to point out, as many do, that Palestinians have a full sense of being victims of Israeli terrorism themselves. This is the way of the moral shrug. It neglects the crucial distinction between Palestinians who set out to throw bombs at buses and Israelis who set out to keep order in the streets. If we cannot make this distinction, there is no point to complaining about terrorism anywhere.

Better for the United States to speak repeatedly and clearly to the PLO, lest the parts of the Palestinian constituency and psyche that condone "armed struggle" be encouraged by seeming American indifference, and lest Israelis decide that Americans are giving bomb-throwers a quiet wink.

Official assertions that this is precisely what the United States is doing in the private dialogue have to be set against the more guarded statements officials make in public. American diplomats had said they would insist that Arafat condemn acts of PLO terrorism and discipline those responsible; their failure to make him deliver hurts American credibility. Official intimations of understanding for the difficulties Arafat is said to face in bringing hotheads to heel don't help much either.

The argument is still running over whether "armed struggle" is essential, strategic and irreducible for the PLO, or tactical, passing and negotiable. Perhaps the best that can be said at this point is that, regardless of what any one of us believes or expects, the evidence for conclusive objective judgment is not in.

Still, no one should ever have thought that its dialogue with the PLO gave Washington the leverage to wean the PLO easily or quickly from terrorism. The Israelis are right to demand performance, but they are wrong to demand it all at once. It cannot be forgotten that, by their own traditional methods of counterterrorism and limited diplomacy, they have utterly failed to banish this scourge.

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# Israel says PLO violated pledge; U.S. questions report

By Chris Hedges  
Dallas Morning News

JERUSALEM — Yasser Arafat's Al Fatah wing of the PLO repeatedly has violated its December pledge to halt terrorist attacks inside Israel, according to an Israeli intelligence report, but some U.S. officials have questioned the report's conclusions.

The United States demanded the pledge as a condition for its dialogue with the PLO, and U.S. officials this week called the Israeli charges "debatable."

They said the Israeli decision to publicize Al Fatah's alleged involvement in terrorism was part of a campaign to sabotage the dialogue between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Washington.

But the report's allegations could lead congressional supporters of Israel to challenge the Bush administration's policy of talking to the PLO, and come at an awkward time for the Bush administration.

The State Department is trying to broker an agreement to bring together Israeli and Palestinian negotiators to talk about proposed elections in the Israeli-occupied territories. Israel has demanded assurances from

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d that the PLO will have no role in such discussions.

Since Dec. 15, when the U.S. dialogue with the PLO began, more than 70 terrorist acts involving firearms, explosives and Molotov cocktails have been carried out by Al Fatah, according to the report.

Of those attacks, the report said, 12 took place inside Israel's pre-1967 borders and the rest in the occupied territories, the West Bank and Gaza.

It is those 12 attacks that Israeli officials argue were violations of the conditions set for talks between the United States and the PLO.

"These groups are under Arafat's command," said Yigal Carmon, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's adviser on counterterrorism.

"If Arafat had wanted these activities to stop, they would have stopped. He allocates the money to these cells and issues their commands. If we accept that these cells carried out these activities against Arafat's will, then we must accept that Arafat does not control his own organization."

On Dec. 16, one day after the State Department began talks with the PLO, U.S. Ambassador to Israel

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*Since Dec. 15, more than 70 terrorist acts reportedly have been carried out in Israel and its occupied territories.*

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Thomas Pickering informed the Israeli government that the agreement to meet with the PLO stipulated that "no American administration can sustain the dialogue if terrorism continues by the PLO or any of its factions."

The PLO was required in the agreement to "publicly disassociate yourselves from terrorism by any Palestinian group operating anywhere" and to fore swear all attacks inside Israel's pre-1967 borders and abroad.

U.S. officials, when questioned about the Israeli report, have argued that it does not appear to constitute compelling evidence for abandoning the dialogue.

"I am not sure that Fatah has taken credit for any of these acts," said a Bush administration official, in a phone interview from Washington.

"We would probably resist calling a lot of these incidents terrorism," said the official, who refused to be named. "These kinds of things go on all the time in Israel. The fact that some local boys call themselves Fatah and go out and toss a Molotov cocktail doesn't mean they are Fatah."

The 12 attacks inside Israel's pre-1967 borders were attributed to the PLO on the basis of interrogations of members of four Al Fatah cells.

U.S. officials have refused to accept reports from interrogations as evidence, in part because of Israel's security agency, Shin Bet, has in the past obtained confessions through the use of torture.

"If the information from interrogations fits with other information we have, then we can find it credible."

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said the administration official, "but we always try and place this information in context to determine its credibility. Information derived from interrogations alone is not enough."

The report describes how in June, Israeli intelligence officials broke up an Al Fatah cell in Bethlehem, run by an organization known as the Western Sector, said to be under Arafat's personal command. Israeli officials say the cell placed an explosive device in West Jerusalem in May.

That same month, a Force 17 cell was broken up in the village of Al-Zawiya near Kalkilia. Force 17 is an Al Fatah group in charge of the personal security of top PLO leaders, including Arafat.

Force 17 was blamed in the report for a series of attacks, including the placement of explosive devices at two bus stations and a synagogue in March near the city of Petah Tikva.

The attacks described in the report also include the firing of rockets from outside Israeli borders on civilian targets inside Israel. They include nine infiltration attempts aimed at targets inside the country.

The PLO has repeatedly defended its cross-border attacks, in which

armed Palestinians try to infiltrate into Israel, as "military operations." PLO spokesmen have said that those attacks do not come under the definition of terrorism and will continue.

The PLO has also defended the anti-Israeli violence associated with the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories.

Israeli officials say they do not believe that Arafat approves each terrorist attack. But they do hold him responsible for the decision to continue these attacks.

"The PLO may or may not have ignited the violence, but there is no doubt whatsoever that the PLO is encouraging it," reads an internal government report on the PLO by Carmon, Shamir's adviser.

The Israelis contend that since the dialogue began, 99 Arab residents in the occupied territories suspected of collaborating with Israeli authorities have been murdered by "shock troops" operating under the directives of the PLO's Unified Command.

The State Department has not included the violence in the occupied territories under its definition of PLO terrorism prohibited under the terms of the U.S.-PLO dialogue.

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**INTERNATIONAL**

**Israel Argues PLO Continues Terrorism, Violating Pledge, but U.S. Is Skeptical**

By WALTER S. MURBERG

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Israel has launched a new effort to prove the Palestine Liberation Organization continues to practice terrorism, and thus to persuade the U.S. to break off talks with the group. U.S. officials, however, said they aren't buying the Israeli argument.

Israeli counterterrorism officials provided the State Department with a 20-page list of recent terrorist incidents they attribute directly to forces controlled by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Mr. Arafat publicly renounced terrorism Dec. 15, satisfying the U.S. precondition for a direct "dialogue" with the PLO.

A U.S. counterterrorism official said experts are studying the Israeli list. "We have no independent evidence linking Fatah to any acts of terrorism since Dec. 15, 1988," he said, referring to the specific PLO group that Mr. Arafat heads. "So far, this list doesn't change our view. Israel wants to end the dialogue, but our analysts take a different view than theirs."

**Informing Congress**

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's top adviser on counterterrorism, Yigal Carmon, was here Monday to present the report to members of Congress, reporters and others. Mr. Carmon said he also presented the list last week to William Brown, U.S. Ambassador to Israel.

Separately, the New York Times reported that the Israeli government had provided its correspondent in Jerusalem with different documents that Israel said prove the PLO has been conducting terrorism from the occupied Arab territories. The State Department said it hasn't yet seen copies of those papers.

"If the dialogue was based on the assumption that Arafat or the PLO would stop terrorism, and we have evidence of continued terrorism, what would be the logical conclusion?" Mr. Carmon asked.

Israel has long claimed Mr. Arafat never meant to renounce terrorism, particularly because he and his lieutenants reserved the right to press "armed struggle"

against the Jewish state. Now, Jerusalem says it is backing up its contention with detailed accounts of alleged terrorist acts and plans linked to Mr. Arafat. It blames most of these on Fatah.

The new accusations come at a delicate time in U.S. efforts to bring about talks between Israel and Palestinian representatives. The State Department said it had received a new letter on the subject from Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, restating Israel's previous objection to negotiating with any Palestinian tied to the PLO.

Deciding what constitutes "terrorism" can be a legalistic exercise. The U.S. defines it as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents." To meet the U.S. criteria, Israel contended it only listed incidents that involved civilians and occurred inside its pre-1967 borders.

**Links Are Questioned**

At the heart of Israel's report is a list of a dozen incidents Jerusalem attributes to Fatah, including the use of bombs and Molotov cocktails. But U.S. officials say they aren't satisfied these incidents constitute terrorism because they may be offshoots of the Intifadah, the Palestinian rebellion in the occupied territories, which the U.S. doesn't classify as terrorism. In addition, the officials say Israel hasn't presented convincing evidence these acts were ordered by Fatah or by any group Mr. Arafat controls.

U.S. terrorism experts also say they are highly uncertain about the veracity of the separate documents leaked to the New York Times. The papers, which Israel says were discovered in Israeli-occupied Gaza, refer to terrorist acts to be carried out in the name of a group called "the Revolutionary Eagles."

Some supporters of Israel say U.S. policy on Palestinian terrorism is colored by an intense desire to maintain the dialogue with the PLO. But State Department officials accuse Israel of leaking questionable claims to embarrass the U.S.

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# Israeli Report Says Arafat Group Ordered 12 Attacks on Civilians

Associated Press

JERUSALEM, Oct. 25—An Israeli report made available today alleged that Palestine Liberation Organisation leader Yasser Arafat's guerrilla faction has ordered 12 attacks on Israeli civilians since Arafat promised in December to abandon terrorism.

Groups affiliated with the PLO carried out 18 infiltrations or rocket attacks across Israel's borders in the period, said the report, prepared by Yigal Carmon, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's anti-terrorism adviser.

Carmon called the attacks "a violation of the commitment Arafat gave to the United States" when it resumed talks with the PLO 10 months ago. He said it "shows he [Arafat] can't be trusted and that you can't do business with him." Shamir's party strongly opposes the resumed U.S.-PLO dialogue.

Anat Kurz, head of a terrorism research group at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, expressed a contrasting opinion, however. She said Arafat had restrained militants in order to preserve his diplomatic initiative, but that the PLO had difficulty controlling organisations that sprang up during the Arab uprising against Israeli occupation.

"Most of what we call terror activities have been conducted by locally affiliated elements and unorganized groups," she said.

Sources said U.S. officials also remain unpersuaded by Israeli claims of terrorist involvement by Arafat's Fatah group because they are based on interrogations. The credibility of such information was diminished after a 1987 investigation revealed the use of torture by the Shin Bet security service.

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# PLO still committing terrorist acts, Israel claims

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Palestine Liberation Organization continued to carry out terrorist attacks inside Israel and along that country's borders after the PLO pledged to halt terrorism last year, a senior Israeli counterterrorism official charged yesterday.

Yigal Carmon, special adviser for counterterrorism to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Sharnir, said his office on Oct. 16 supplied the U.S. Embassy in Israel with a report documenting 12 terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel and 18 cross-border raids by groups linked to mainstream factions of the PLO.

The attacks included the use of knives, bombs, Molotov cocktails and Soviet-made rockets, he said.

Mr. Carmon also confirmed that Israel had obtained secret letters

from a document cache in Israel revealing PLO attempts to hire local killers to assassinate Palestinians.

A PLO spokesman denounced the Israeli charges as "disinformation." State Department officials said they had received the Israeli government report and were investigating the terrorism charges.

"These are facts and not the Israeli point of view," Mr. Carmon said in a telephone interview from New York, where he is visiting. "And the facts it [the report] presents are troubling and a cause for concern."

"The PLO is not living up to its commitment, not in deeds nor in words," he said.

The report appears to be part of a campaign by the Israeli government to derail talks between the PLO and the Israeli administration that began last year, after Chairman Yasser Arafat on Dec. 14 renounced the use

of terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist.

A State Department official, who asked not to be named, said the department has requested copies of the secret letters that were discovered in Israel. Mr. Carmon said he was confident they would be turned over in the near future.

"We expect the PLO to abide by its commitments made by Chairman Arafat," State Department spokeswoman Nancy Beck said yesterday.

"We have looked into and will continue to look into reports of possible PLO involvement" in terrorism, she said. "As part of this process, we continue to talk to the PLO about terrorist activities by Palestinian groups in the region, some of whom are outside the PLO umbrella."

PLO spokesman Hasan Rahman, director of the Palestine Affairs Center in Washington, said the PLO "ad-

heres totally" to the non-terrorism pledge made by Mr. Arafat.

Mr. Rahman said the reports about PLO terrorism were an Israeli diversionary tactic.

"Whenever they [the Israelis] are boxed in politically, in order to cover up for intransigence and for not being forthcoming on the peace process, they wage this kind of campaign of disinformation and distortion," Mr. Rahman said.

Mr. Rahman said the incidents of violence were connected to the Intifada, the uprising in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, or to Israel's continuing strife with neighboring Lebanon.

Mr. Carmon said the report was based on Israeli intelligence and government reports. He said American criteria were used to define the terrorist acts, and the scope of the report was limited to incidents carried out or directed by the PLO or Fatah, the paramilitary wing of the organization under the control of Mr. Arafat.

Fatah includes several factions recognized as terrorist groups by the U.S. government.

Attacks associated with the uprising in the occupied territories were excluded from the report, Mr. Carmon said, because of concern that critics would charge these actions are not linked directly to the PLO.

"By far the largest group with paramilitary characteristics is Fatah," the report states. "Arafat, as

commander of Fatah, maintains centralized control over the organization through orders and instructions, approval of plans and allocation of funds necessary for the execution of terrorist operations."

The report also lists details of PLO "Unified Command" directives

that resulted in the murder of 99 Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza by "shock troops."

Mr. Carmon said the directives were drafted in Israel and then "checked, corrected and approved by PLO headquarters in Tunis [Tunisia]" before being sent back to Israel to be printed and distributed as leaflets.

Mr. Carmon said a handwritten document from a Fatah operative dated Aug. 18, first revealed Tuesday by The New York Times, disclosed a clandestine PLO operation to assassinate Palestinians believed to be cooperating with Israeli government and to attribute the murders to a fictional group dubbed "The Revolutionary Eagles."

"This is a specific example of the type of things they [the PLO] are doing and the way they are doing it," Mr. Carmon said.

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# Israel says Arafat's Fatah faction has ordered attacks on civilians

ASSOCIATED PRESS

JERUSALEM - An official report made available yesterday said Yasser Arafat's guerrilla faction has ordered 12 bombings and attacks on Israeli civilians since the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization promised in December to abandon terrorism.

Groups affiliated with the PLO carried out 18 infiltrations or rocket attacks across Israel's borders in the same period, the report said.

Yigal Carmon, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's adviser on terror-

ism, prepared the report and provided a copy to the Associated Press.

It comes at a time when Israel and the United States are at odds over PLO involvement in peace efforts and coincides with a campaign against the US dialogue with the PLO begun 10 months ago, soon after Arafat renounced terrorism.

In his report, Carmon said the attacks "are a violation of the commitment Arafat gave to the United States and show he can't be trusted and that you can't do business with him."

He urged the United States to "suspend the dialogue temporarily until Arafat keeps his commitments."

Israel defines the PLO as a terrorist organization and refuses to deal with it.

Thomas Pickering, then the US ambassador, gave Israel a pledge a day after the US-PLO talks began Dec. 15 in Tunis that "no American administration can sustain the dialogue if terrorism continues by the PLO or any of its factions," the report said.

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TOM BROKAW: U.S. concerns about Israel's nuclear missile program and its ties to South Africa. Kids with AIDS, some new hope tonight. Now, they can get the drug AZT. And big trouble for American carmakers: too few customers. Too many cars.

HIT:

ANNOUNCER: NBC NIGHTLY NEWS with Tom Brokaw.

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: Good evening. We begin tonight with additional details on the military ties between Israel and South Africa, including the development of nuclear missiles. Israel and South Africa today denied a joint missile deal. But there were signs that it did exist. It is, as you might expect, a very sensitive issue and NBC Pentagon correspondent Fred Francis, who brought us last night's exclusive report on the nuclear missile deal, is back tonight with more on the relationship and the U.S. reaction. Fred.

HIT:

FRED FRANCIS: Tom, privately, senior U.S. officials are confirming that Israel does have a secret relationship with South Africa to build Doomsday weapons. The sources tell NBC News that Israel ignored Washington's discreet protest and appears to be expanding the secret relationship.

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Despite official denials, Israelis were inundated with news of the Israeli South African missile deal.

Well-documented reports traced Israel's two decades of military cooperation with the outlaw state, military deals the government of Yitzhak Shamir said, ended two years ago.

MAN: The stories of NBC about Israeli...it's, it's pure lies.

FRANCIS: The State Department took a different tack. While denying that Secretary of State Baker had full knowledge of the deal, it said the U.S. is concerned about Israel's weapons programs.

WOMAN: Our Ambassador in Israel has discussed similar reports and the overall question of proliferation on a number of occasions with Israel's Ministry of Defense.

FRANCIS: But while Baker claims not to have full knowledge of the missile deal, Herman Cohen, the Department's Africa specialist, indicated to reporters in June he was aware of the cooperation.

HERMAN COHEN: I'm assuming that any cooperation on an intermediate-range ballistic missile comes under existing contract. We're not expecting any, any view on that.

FRANCIS: But intelligence sources told NBC News that the CIA is prepared to lay out the evidence of the Jerusalem-Pretoria missile pact to the appropriate committees of Congress. The sources said the evidence is irrefutable. Few military analysts in either Washington or Israel were surprised by news of the secret missile deal.

South Africa's military has long been a major trading partner for Israel's military industry, spending hundreds of millions of dollars each year. The South African assault rifle is a knock-off of the Israeli Galil. South Africa's missile boats and anti-ship missiles were developed by Israel. South Africa's Cheetah, for example, is a copy of the Israeli Kafir fighter and now NBC News has learned that Israel has transferred much of the technology for its canceled Lavi fighter bomber to South Africa. The development of the Lavi was paid for largely by the U.S. Congress with one-and-a-half billion dollars in aid

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to Israel. More than seventy-five Israeli engineers are working in South Africa with the permission of the Israeli government.

And for its part of the continuing cooperation, South Africa is building this missile development complex outside Capetown, where both countries will work on a new, sophisticated, long-range missile, which the CIA calls Ira Three.

Tom, if Washington makes its evidence public, Israel would be in jeopardy of losing billions of dollars in U.S. aid. So, the stakes are very high.

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: Thank you very much, Fred. We'll look forward to tomorrow on all of this.

Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachev was saying today that he wants to get rid of nuclear missiles. The Soviet President proposed turning the Baltic Sea area, next door to the Soviet Union, into a nuclear-free zone. Gorbachev spoke on the second day of his visit to the Soviet Union Baltic neighbor, Finland. He said he will scrap all Russia's nuclear missile submarines in the Baltic by 1991 and, he said, Soviet missiles have been redeployed out of range of Northern Europe.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration was signaling Moscow today. It is prepared now to discuss the idea of cutting back on military bases in Europe. That proposal came earlier this week from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. In the past, the Soviets have called for the elimination of U.S. bases in Europe. Now, they're talking about reductions and, apparently, that may be possible.

And another sign of these exceptional times. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and East Germany's new Communist leader, Egon Krenz, talked on the telephone for about twenty minutes today about relations between their two countries. Krenz reportedly said that East Germany would remain a Socialist country and he urged West Germany to respect East German's citizenship. As tens of thousands of East Germans flee into West Germany, they're immediately granted citizenship in West Germany.

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Also coming up here tonight on NBC NIGHTLY NEWS: AZT, the best drug yet for AIDS, it's now gonna be available for kids with AIDS.

HIT: COMMERCIAL

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: There is good news to report tonight for children who could really use some good news: Children with AIDS. A drug that can prolong their lives now will be available to them for the first time. NBC's Robert Hager.

HIT:

ROBERT HAGER: At University of Maryland's medical center in Baltimore, this woman's daughter is infected with AIDS. But she's been one of a very few children permitted to take AZT as an experiment. Rachel Rossow works with some others.

RACHEL ROSSOW: In the words of one of our foster mothers, AZT gives them back their childhood. And she said she refers to it as the vial of hope.

HAGER: But in spite of the fact that AZT is the only drug known to prolong life for some adult AIDS patients, it wasn't until today that the government gave permission at least to make AZT available for almost all children with AIDS, more than eight hundred of them. Food and Drug Commissioner, Dr. Frank Young.

DR. FRANK YOUNG: These small children have no hope in the absence of having some sort of a drug like AZT.

HAGER: The government said one reason for the delay was that until recently AZT was available only in capsules. Now, it's in a syrup, easier to cut to child-size doses. But some critics said AZT's manufacturer, Burroughs-Wellcome, was also to blame for the delay. New York Congressman Ted Weiss.

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(CROWD NOISE)

And today in that same city a politician who had been outspoken in his opposition to drug smugglers was machine gunned to death.

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: Other news from that same part of the world, more or less. The White House said today that President Bush soon will promise to inform Congress about any covert action within a few days of the time that they're carried out. Congress and the administration already have agreed to cancel all previous guidelines restricting Presidential actions during a foreign coup, such as the one, unsuccessful, against Panama's Noriega. The administration now will draw new guidelines.

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: Also coming up here tonight on NBC Nightly News, Fred Francis with still more on Israel's research now on a hydrogen bomb.

And on Assignment: Earth, tonight, Roger O'Neil on one of the most dramatic rivers in the American West, running through a deep, beautiful canyon, a river threatened by development.

HIT:

COMMERCIALS

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: NBC's report of a partnership between Israel and South Africa in developing nuclear missile technology today drew another angry response from Israel. Prime Minister Shamir denounced the report, and said it could drive a wedge between his country and the United States. But the story doesn't end there. Tonight, NBC's Fred Francis reports about concerns that Israel may

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try to use America's advanced computer technology to build a hydrogen bomb.

Fred?

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FRED FRANCIS: Fred, NBC News has obtained a Pentagon study which details advances in Israel's nuclear weapons program, advances which analysts say will enable Israel to make powerful hydrogen bombs, as well as highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles.

This road leads to Israel's Sirek nuclear reactor, where some of the advanced research is being done. This 1987 Pentagon study says of Sirek's capability, quote, It should be noted that the Israelis are developing the kind of codes which will enable them to make hydrogen bombs.

WOMAN: There are certainly indications from the kind of research that the Israelis have been engaged in and the kind of materials they've been getting ahold of that they are working seriously on some kind of a hydrogen bomb option.

FRANCIS: Shortly after Israel put a satellite into orbit with its Shavit missile, experts at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory questioned the scientific intent of the Israel space program, writing, quote, If Israel wanted to place a warhead of less than one ton on this missile, the necessary adjustments are easily within their capabilities.

All of this is troubling to senior US policy makers, who question why the present Israeli government is developing weapons far beyond its security needs and sharing some of the technology with South Africa.

The Washington Post reported today that when the US protested the technology transfer to South Africa, it was told to mind its own business.

So when Israeli institutions applied for a Cray super computer used by American firms in weapons research, senior US officials

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suspected the super computer would be used illegally. Those officials have stalled the request.

That has not stopped Israeli support groups in the United States from trying to raise the more than 10-million dollars needed to purchase the super computer.

At this dinner in Washington, last month, the supporters were told the super computer was for the security of Israel.

MAN: I am not going to repeat the technological justifications for this essential tool for keeping Israel in the forefront of high technology and, quote, also safe.

MAN: If you give a super computer to Israel, there is no way to ensure that South African missile and nuclear weapon scientists won't use it.

FRANCIS: In the long term, it will be difficult for the US to deny a super computer to an ally such as Israel, but one official said, if they get one, the Israelis will have to be more honest with us than they are right now.

Tom?

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: Thank you, Fred.

The chairman of a House subcommittee reviewing the Navy's investigation of that explosion on board the USS Iowa says disturbing questions remain unanswered. He said he seriously questions the Navy's conclusion that the explosion probably was caused by the wrongful act of a seaman. FBI investigators also say they found no evidence to support that conclusion. However, the Navy stands by its finding. Forty-seven sailors were killed in the explosion.

HIT:

TOM BROKAW: When American journalist Terry Anderson was kidnapped by pro-Iranian terrorists in Lebanon, he was 37 years old. Today, still being held hostage, he marked his 42nd birthday.

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יועץ רה"מ לטרור - תקשורת  
בהמשך למברקנו

1. פגושותיו של יועץ רה"מ לטרור, כרמון, עם נציגי התקשורת הניבו מספר רב של דווחים ומאמרים (רצ"ב).
2. במרביתן, מעבר לדוח אודות ממצאי הדו"ח שהציג כרמון, יש התייחסות אוהדת וחיובית לטעון הישראלי, לפיו אש"פ - גם הזרם המרכזי - טרם חדל מפעולותו הטרוריסטית, וזאת בניגוד להתחייבויותיו כלפי המחשל האמרוקני.
3. מבין כל הכתבות העתונאיות, מן הראוי לשים לב במיוחד לטור שכ סטיבן רוזנפלד ב-WP מה-27.10.89. אין ספק שמספר שורות של הבנה לטעון הישראלי בנוגע לאש"פ מכיו של מבקר כה חריף וקיצוני כסטיבן רוזנפלד - הן בעלות ערך. רוזנפלד כתב את טורו לאחר ששמע את הרצאתו של כרמון ב-AEI, שלאחריה התבטא באזני נוכחים: "זו היתה ההרצאה הטובה ביותר ששמעתי בנושא אש"פ והטרור מזה 20 שנה...".
4. כאמור, במרבית הדווחים הדיס לטעוננו אודות אש"פ - כך שלפגישותיו של כרמון עם התקשורת כאן, היו בהחלט תוצאות חיוביות.

על-כך התודה ליועץ רה"מ לטרור.

י. כו.  
דו"ח ירון

מ.ל.

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

# PLO: Terror and Talk

Those of us who believe Israel's best hope for peace lies in working things out with the PLO have a special obligation not to blink at indications that the PLO, despite its public renunciation of terrorism, still conducts and condones it and cheers it on—and not just the fringe and crazies but the Fatah mainstream commanded by PLO chairman Yasser Arafat.

The matter is of acute political relevance because by neglecting a concern that stirs deep Israeli anxieties the United States would be shrinking its capacity to engage Israel in diplomacy aimed at an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

The Israelis are now circulating detailed allegations of acts of PLO terrorism said to be committed by Fatah against civilians inside pre-1967 Israel in the 10 months since Arafat formally renounced terrorism and America responded by opening a dialogue with the PLO in Tunis.

Washington is reviewing these new allegations—against a backdrop of skepticism toward old allegations. Found to fall short of U.S. standards of the definition of terrorism and of due process, these earlier claims were attributed to policy-driven intelligence analysis. The Likud government is intent on breaking the U.S.-PLO connection in order to stay in office and to spoil any diplomatic campaign that might cost Israel its territorial ambitions on the West Bank. Israel's Labor defense minister, Itzhak Mordechai, has stated that mainstream PLO groups in Lebanon have in fact quieted down.

I confess to my own suspicions of the Likud government's style and goals. Yet it is disingenuous to use such reservations to evade the question of PLO terrorism. Without getting to a level of detail where an outsider has no license, I am prepared to believe that the PLO does something less than the Israeli government alleges but something more than Washington now acknowledges.

The State Department is customarily to be found in a studied posture looking into Israeli contentions and calling for higher standards of definition and evidence. It has its valuable reasons: to hold Palestinian terrorism and Israeli reactions to it within bounds sufficient to keep alive its battered effort to nudge the two camps into negotiation. But unquestionably this attitude nourishes

among some Israelis a conviction that American intelligence judgments are themselves policy-driven, framed to justify a U.S.-PLO dialogue that, in opening, the United States told Israel "no American administration can sustain... if terrorism continues by the FLO or any of its factions."

It is not enough to point out, as many do, that Palestinians have a full sense of being victims of Israeli terrorism themselves. This is the way of the moral shrug. It neglects the crucial distinction between Palestinians who set out to throw bombs at buses and Israelis who set out to keep order in the streets. If we cannot make this distinction, there is no point to complaining about terrorism anywhere.

Better for the United States to speak repeatedly and clearly to the PLO, lest the parts of the Palestinian constituency and psyche that condone "armed struggle" be encouraged by seeming American indifference, and lest Israelis decide that Americans are giving bomb-throwers a quiet wink.

Official assertions that this is precisely what the United States is doing in the private dialogue have to be set against the more guarded statements officials make in public. American diplomats had said they would insist that Arafat condemn acts of PLO terrorism and discipline those responsible; their failure to make him deliver hurts American credibility. Official intimations of understanding for the difficulties Arafat is said to face in bringing hotheads to heel don't help much either.

The argument is still running over whether "armed struggle" is essential, strategic and irreducible for the PLO, or tactical, passing and negotiable. Perhaps the best that can be said at this point is that, regardless of what any one of us believes or expects, the evidence for conclusive objective judgment is not in.

Still, no one should ever have thought that its dialogue with the PLO gave Washington the leverage to wean the PLO easily or quickly from terrorism. The Israelis are right to demand performance, but they are wrong to demand it all at once. It cannot be forgotten that, by their own traditional methods of counterterrorism and limited diplomacy, they have utterly failed to banish this scourge.

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# Israel says PLO violated pledge; U.S. questions report

By Chris Hodges  
Dallas Morning News

JERUSALEM — Yasir Arafat's Al Fatah wing of the PLO repeatedly has violated its December pledge to halt terrorist attacks inside Israel, according to an Israeli intelligence report, but some U.S. officials have questioned the report's conclusions.

The United States demanded the pledge as a condition for its dialogue with the PLO, and U.S. officials this week called the Israeli charges "debatable."

They said the Israeli decision to publicize Al Fatah's alleged involvement in terrorism was part of a campaign to sabotage the dialogue between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Washington.

But the report's allegations could lead congressional supporters of Israel to challenge the Bush administration's policy of talking to the PLO, and come at an awkward time for the Bush administration.

The State Department is trying to broker an agreement to bring together Israeli and Palestinian negotiators to talk about proposed elections in the Israeli-occupied territories. Israel has demanded assurances from

Secretary of State James A. Baker III that the PLO will have no role in such discussions.

Since Dec. 15, when the U.S. dialogue with the PLO began, more than 70 terrorist acts involving firearms, explosives and Molotov cocktails have been carried out by Al Fatah, according to the report.

Of those attacks, the report said, 12 took place inside Israel's pre-1967 borders and the rest in the occupied territories, the West Bank and Gaza.

It is those 12 attacks that Israeli officials argue were violations of the conditions set for talks between the United States and the PLO.

"These groups are under Arafat's command," said Yigal Carmon, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's adviser on counterterrorism.

"If Arafat had wanted these activities to stop, they would have stopped. He allocates the money to these cells and issues their commands. If we accept that these cells carried out these activities against Arafat's will, then we must accept that Arafat does not control his own organization."

On Dec. 16, one day after the State Department began talks with the PLO, U.S. Ambassador to Israel

*Since Dec. 15, more than 70 terrorist acts reportedly have been carried out in Israel and its occupied territories.*

Thomas Pickering informed the Israeli government that the agreement to meet with the PLO stipulated that "no American administration can sustain the dialogue if terrorism continues by the PLO or any of its factions."

The PLO was required in the agreement to "publicly disassociate yourselves from terrorism by any Palestinian group operating anywhere" and to forswear all attacks inside Israel's pre-1967 borders and abroad.

U.S. officials, when questioned about the Israeli report, have argued that it does not appear to constitute compelling evidence for abandoning the dialogue.

"I am not sure that Fatah has taken credit for any of these acts," said a Bush administration official, in a phone interview from Washington.

"We would probably resist calling a lot of these incidents terrorism," said the official, who refused to be named. "These kinds of things go on all the time in Israel. The fact that some local boys call themselves Fatah and go out and toss a Molotov cocktail doesn't mean they are Fatah."

The 12 attacks inside Israel's pre-1967 borders were attributed to the PLO on the basis of interrogations of members of four Al Fatah cells.

U.S. officials have refused to accept reports from interrogations as evidence, in part because of Israel's security agency, Shin Bet, has in the past obtained confessions through the use of torture.

"If the information from interrogations fits with other information we have, then we can find it credible."

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said the administration official, "but we always try and place this information in context to determine its credibility. Information derived from interrogations alone is not enough."

The report describes how in June, Israeli intelligence officials broke up an Al Fatah cell in Bethlehem, run by an organization known as the Western Sector, said to be under Arafat's personal command. Israeli officials say the cell placed an explosive device in West Jerusalem in May.

That same month, a Force 17 cell was broken up in the village of Al-Zawiya near Kalkilia. Force 17 is an Al Fatah group in charge of the personal security of top PLO leaders, including Arafat.

Force 17 was blamed in the report for a series of attacks, including the placement of explosive devices at two bus stations and a synagogue in March near the city of Petah Tikva.

The attacks described in the report also include the firing of rockets from outside Israeli borders on civilian targets inside Israel. They include nine infiltration attempts aimed at targets inside the country.

The PLO has repeatedly defended its cross-border attacks, in which

armed Palestinians try to infiltrate into Israel, as "military operations." PLO spokesmen have said that those attacks do not come under the definition of terrorism and will continue.

The PLO has also defended the anti-Israeli violence associated with the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories.

Israeli officials say they do not believe that Arafat approves each terrorist attack. But they do hold him responsible for the decision to continue these attacks.

"The PLO may or may not have ignited the violence, but there is no doubt whatsoever that the PLO is encouraging it," reads an internal government report on the PLO by Carmon, Shamir's adviser.

The Israelis contend that since the dialogue began, 99 Arab residents in the occupied territories suspected of collaborating with Israeli authorities have been murdered by "shock troops" operating under the directives of the PLO's Unified Command.

The State Department has not included the violence in the occupied territories under its definition of PLO terrorism prohibited under the terms of the U.S.-PLO dialogue.

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**INTERNATIONAL**

# Israel Argues PLO Continues Terrorism, Violating Pledge, but U.S. Is Skeptical

By **WALTER S. MURBERG**

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Israel has launched a new effort to prove the Palestine Liberation Organization continues to practice terrorism, and thus to persuade the U.S. to break off talks with the group. U.S. officials, however, said they aren't buying the Israeli argument.

Israeli counterterrorism officials provided the State Department with a 20-page list of recent terrorist incidents they attribute directly to forces controlled by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Mr. Arafat publicly renounced terrorism Dec. 15, satisfying the U.S. precondition for a direct "dialogue" with the PLO.

A U.S. counterterrorism official said experts are studying the Israeli list. "We have no independent evidence linking Fatah to any acts of terrorism since Dec. 15, 1988," he said, referring to the specific PLO group that Mr. Arafat heads. "So far, this list doesn't change our view. Israel wants to end the dialogue, but our analysts take a different view than theirs."

### Informing Congress

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's top adviser on counterterrorism, Yigal Carmon, was here Monday to present the report to members of Congress, reporters and others. Mr. Carmon said he also presented the list last week to William Brown, U.S. Ambassador to Israel.

Separately, the New York Times reported that the Israeli government had provided its correspondent in Jerusalem with different documents that Israel said prove the PLO has been conducting terrorism from the occupied Arab territories. The State Department said it hasn't yet seen copies of those papers.

"If the dialogue was based on the assumption that Arafat or the PLO would stop terrorism, and we have evidence of continued terrorism, what would be the logical conclusion?" Mr. Carmon asked.

Israel has long claimed Mr. Arafat never meant to renounce terrorism, particularly because he and his lieutenants reserved the right to press "armed struggle"

against the Jewish state. Now, Jerusalem says it is backing up its contention with detailed accounts of alleged terrorist acts and plans linked to Mr. Arafat. It blames most of these on Fatah.

The new accusations come at a delicate time in U.S. efforts to bring about talks between Israel and Palestinian representatives. The State Department said it had received a new letter on the subject from Fatah Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, restating Israel's previous objection to negotiating with any Palestinian tied to the PLO.

Deciding what constitutes "terrorism" can be a legalistic exercise. The U.S. defines it as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents." To meet the U.S. criteria, Israel contended it only listed incidents that involved civilians and occurred inside its pre-1967 borders.

### Links Are Questioned

At the heart of Israel's report is a list of a dozen incidents Jerusalem attributes to Fatah, including the use of bombs and Molotov cocktails. But U.S. officials say they aren't satisfied these incidents constitute terrorism because they may be offshoots of the intifada, the Palestinian rebellion in the occupied territories, which the U.S. doesn't classify as terrorism. In addition, the officials say Israel hasn't presented convincing evidence these acts were ordered by Fatah or by any group Mr. Arafat controls.

U.S. terrorism experts also say they are highly uncertain about the veracity of the separate documents leaked to the New York Times. The papers, which Israel says were discovered in Israeli-occupied Gaza, refer to terrorist acts to be carried out in the name of a group called "the Revolutionary Eagles."

Some supporters of Israel say U.S. policy on Palestinian terrorism is colored by an intense desire to maintain the dialogue with the PLO. But State Department officials accuse Israel of leaking questionable claims to embarrass the U.S.

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# PLO still committing terrorist acts, Israel claims

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON POST

The Palestine Liberation Organization continued to carry out terrorist attacks inside Israel and along that country's borders after the PLO pledged to halt terrorism last year, a senior Israeli counterterrorism official charged yesterday.

Yigal Carmon, special adviser for counterterrorism to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, said his office on Oct. 16 supplied the U.S. Embassy in Israel with a report documenting 12 terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel and 18 cross-border raids by groups linked to mainstream factions of the PLO.

The attacks included the use of knives, bombs, Molotov cocktails and Soviet-made rockets, he said.

Mr. Carmon also confirmed that Israel had obtained secret letters

from a document cache in Israel revealing PLO attempts to hire local killers to assassinate Palestinians.

A PLO spokesman denounced the Israeli charges as "disinformation." State Department officials said they had received the Israeli government report and were investigating the terrorism charges.

"These are facts and not the Israeli point of view," Mr. Carmon said in a telephone interview from New York, where he is visiting. "And the facts it [the report] presents are troubling and a cause for concern."

"The PLO is not living up to its commitment, not in deeds nor in words," he said.

The report appears to be part of a campaign by the Israeli government to derail talks between the PLO and the Israeli administration that began last year, after Chairman Yasser Arafat on Dec. 14 renounced the use

of terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist.

A State Department official, who asked not to be named, said the department has requested copies of the secret letters that were discovered in Israel. Mr. Carmon said he was confident they would be turned over in the near future.

"We expect the PLO to abide by its commitments made by Chairman Arafat," State Department spokeswoman Nancy Beck said yesterday.

"We have looked into and will continue to look into reports of possible PLO involvement in terrorism, she said. "As part of this process, we continue to talk to the PLO about terrorist activities by Palestinian groups in the region, some of whom are outside the PLO umbrella."

PLO spokesman Hasan Rahman, director of the Palestine Affairs Center in Washington, said the PLO "ad-

heres totally" to the non-terrorism pledge made by Mr. Arafat.

Mr. Rahman said the reports about PLO terrorism were an Israeli diversionary tactic.

"Whenever they [the Israelis] are boxed in politically, in order to cover up for intransigence and for not being forthcoming on the peace process, they wage this kind of campaign of disinformation and distortion," Mr. Rahman said.

Mr. Rahman said the incidents of violence were connected to the Intifada, the uprising in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, or to Israel's continuing strife with neighboring Lebanon.

Mr. Carmon said the report was based on Israeli intelligence and government reports. He said American criteria were used to define the terrorist acts, and the scope of the report was limited to incidents carried out or directed by the PLO or Fatah, the paramilitary wing of the organization under the control of Mr. Arafat.

Fatah includes several factions recognized as terrorist groups by the U.S. government.

Attacks associated with the uprising in the occupied territories were excluded from the report, Mr. Carmon said, because of concern that critics would charge these actions are not linked directly to the PLO.

"By far the largest group with paramilitary characteristics is Fatah," the report states. "Arafat, as

commander of Fatah, maintains centralized control over the organization through orders and instructions, approval of plans and allocation of funds necessary for the execution of terrorist operations."

The report also lists details of PLO "Unified Command" directives

that resulted in the murder of 99 Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza by "shock troops."

Mr. Carmon said the directives were drafted in Israel and then "checked, corrected and approved by PLO headquarters in Tunis [Tunisia]" before being sent back to Israel to be printed and distributed as leaflets.

Mr. Carmon said a handwritten document from a Fatah operative dated Aug. 18, first revealed Tuesday by The New York Times, disclosed a clandestine PLO operation to assassinate Palestinians believed to be cooperating with Israeli government and to attribute the murders to a fictional group dubbed "The Revolutionary Eagles."

"This is a specific example of the type of things they [the PLO] are doing and the way they are doing it," Mr. Carmon said.

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# Israel says Arafat's Fatah faction has ordered attacks on civilians

ASSOCIATED PRESS

JERUSALEM - An official report made available yesterday said Yasser Arafat's guerrilla faction has ordered 12 bombings and attacks on Israeli civilians since the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization promised in December to abandon terrorism.

Groups affiliated with the PLO carried out 18 infiltrations or rocket attacks across Israel's borders in the same period, the report said.

Yigal Carmon, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's adviser on terror-

ism, prepared the report and provided a copy to the Associated Press.

It comes at a time when Israel and the United States are at odds over PLO involvement in peace efforts and coincides with a campaign against the US dialogue with the PLO begun 10 months ago, soon after Arafat renounced terrorism.

In his report, Carmon said the attacks "are a violation of the commitment Arafat gave to the United States and show he can't be trusted and that you can't do business with him."

He urged the United States to "suspend the dialogue temporarily until Arafat keeps his commitments."

Israel defines the PLO as a terrorist organization and refuses to deal with it.

Thomas Pickering, then the US ambassador, gave Israel a pledge a day after the US-PLO talks began Dec. 15 in Tunis that "no American administration can sustain the dialogue if terrorism continues by the PLO or any of its factions," the report said.

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