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משרדי הממשלה

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Jerusalem, February 9, 1989

Dear President Bush,

I was very pleased to receive your greetings from our friend Jack Stein who was in Jerusalem on a short visit. He also told me of your new grandson and I extend hearty congratulations to you and Barbara on this happy occasion.

I am looking forward to our visit to the United States and to the opportunity of wide-ranging discussions with you.

Very sincerely yours,

Yitzhak Shamir

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir: See no PLO

Smearing the PLO

Shamir Shelves Israeli Intelligence Reports on Arafat's Moderation

BY ROBERT I. FRIEDMAN

JERUSALEM

SINCE 1988, Israeli Military Intelligence has prepared a number of classified reports that contradict the Israeli government's public view that the Palestine Liberation Organization's apparent move toward moderation is just one more insidious trick by a gang of terrorists dedicated to the Jewish state's destruction. A highly placed Israeli intelligence officer told the *Voice* last month that the top secret reports, which assert that the PLO is ready to accept a two-state solution, have been angrily rejected by the government.

The most recent intelligence estimate was issued in December, just after the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers and just before then-secretary of state George Shultz declared that the U.S. was prepared to talk directly with the PLO.

The report comes at a time when the Shamir government has been quietly promoting a "peace plan" to key members of the Bush transition team and the U.S. Jewish community that would grant the Palestinians limited autonomy while allowing Israel to control the Occupied Territories and continue its settle-

ment program there. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir is expected to publicly unveil this program when he visits President Bush in Washington this March. The plan hinges on delegitimizing the PLO as a negotiating partner. At the same time, Shamir has launched intensive propaganda campaigns in the U.S. and Europe to discredit the PLO as unrepentant terrorists. Israeli officials have repeatedly intimated that their views on the PLO are supported by information that comes from the country's vaunted intelligence services.

Fearful that news of the recent Military Intelligence estimate would help legitimize the PLO, Shamir's top aides have tried to purge the agency of analysts whose conclusions fail to support current Israeli government policy. The witch-hunt has gone so far as to have the minister of education remove books that present a less-than-demonic view of the PLO from state-run schools.

Shamir's attempt to stifle Military Intelligence, which is entrusted with preparing assessments of Israel's security needs, dramatically illustrates how a man driven by ideology can quash the chance for peace in a part of the world where passions often threaten to drag the region into an interminable tunnel of violence. At the same time, the conflict be-

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tween Shamir and Military Intelligence mirrors the debate raging in Israeli society about a subject once virtually taboo here—talking peace with the PLO.

It also evokes memories of debates that raged in America during Vietnam. Just as President Lyndon Johnson chose to ignore CIA estimates of North Vietnamese troop strength in South Vietnam, Shamir has repeatedly ignored intelligence reports warning that the continued occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, with their large and rebellious populations, will in the long term undermine Israel's security. While the Vietnam War never seriously jeopardized America's existence, many Israeli intelligence analysts fear that Israel will commit national suicide if it doesn't give up the dream of Greater Israel.

Asserting that the Palestinians' quest for self-determination is irreversible and inseparably linked to the PLO, the most recent Military Intelligence estimate concludes that it is an illusion to think that the government can find a "moderate" Palestinian alternative to Arafat. "The report doesn't say talk to the PLO," says a senior Israeli intelligence official who has carefully read the estimate. "It says you can't have a political process without talking to the PLO. So you can conclude that either the government talks to the PLO or there is no political process. The official view of Israeli Military Intelligence is that the PLO wants peace in return for a state in part of Palestine."

RIGHT-WING POLITICIANS in Israel have long preferred their own propaganda to intelligence reports that contradict their ideological predilections. They are fierce advocates of Greater Israel, and will allow no one—not demographers who foresee an Arab majority early in the next century, or moralists who bemoan the loss of Israel's soul, or intelligence analysts who predict America will get fed up with Israel's obduracy and end its special relationship—to spoil their drive to colonize every corner of the Occupied Territories.

Like Begin before him, Shamir and the Likud have embraced the firebrand settlers of Gush Emunim, a mystical-messianic fundamentalist movement that has spearheaded Israel's West Bank settlement drive. Gush rabbis contend that the Messiah will come after the Jewish people have returned to Israel and reclaimed Judea and Samaria—the biblical names for the West Bank—which they claim were given to them by God. For Gush and its followers, West Bank Arabs are thieves and squatters. And it makes no difference that they have lived on the land for 2000 years. "Is there a statute of limitations that gives a thief the right to his plunder?" asks Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, a leader of a yeshiva in the Mueller Quarter of Jerusalem's Old Walled City where students study the priestly texts in preparation for the Messianic Age.

For those moved by the redemptive rhythms of God and Zionism, no enemy is more insidious than the enemy that dwells

within—the unreconstructed Jew of ghetto mentality, the leftists, the Peace Now-niks, the professors, the back-stabbing press, and the generals who say the intifada will sap the army's morale before they can crush the rebellion.

Currently, the objects of Shamir's wrath are those who prepared the classified Military Intelligence report about the PLO. Military Intelligence, the largest of Israel's four security agencies, has overall responsibility for preparing Israel's annual national security assessment. The agency, which is also in charge of electronic surveillance, has a large and well-funded research staff that is drawn from academia as well as from other professions. Israel's other intelligence groups include Mossad, which is similar to the CIA, and Shin Bet, the nation's internal security police, which resembles the FBI. Another intelligence unit is run out of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. According to Ze'ev Schiff, the respected military editor for *Ha'aretz*, it is common in Israel for politicians to "evade the consequences of their decisions by scapegoating the intelligence agencies." Both Military Intelligence and Mossad were rocked in the wake of scandals emerging from the ill-fated 1982 Lebanon War. For instance, Major General Yehoshua Saguy, who headed Military Intelligence during the war, was dismissed for failing to prevent the massacre of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila. Shin Bet was

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line in June 1974, when the PLO announced its intention to establish a state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that could be used as a base to liberate the rest of Palestine. Since the PLO's founding in May 1964, its thinking has been dominated by its ultimate goal—"the liberation of Palestine" through "the armed struggle." Between 1974 and 1984, Israeli Military Intelligence chronicled the emergence of a pragmatic wing of the PLO led by Arafat, which prodded the organization increasingly in the direction of restricting itself to a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Ironically, Ariel Sharon's attempt to destroy the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 had more to do with moderating the PLO than almost any other factor. Despairing of ever destroying Israel through armed struggle, Arafat realized that diplomacy was his only recourse if he wanted to gain at least part of Palestine.

Though no intelligence agency can work in a vacuum, free of political pressure, so far Military Intelligence has refrained from supporting the political agendas of either Labor, which seeks some kind of territorial compromise to be brokered with Jordan's King Hussein, or Likud, which has vowed never to surrender an inch of the Occupied Territories.

When Shimon Peres was Prime Minister, Military Intelligence argued that Hussein would not negotiate with Israel without the consent of Arafat, and that the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories would not accept a substitute for the PLO. In 1986, when Arafat and Hussein signed an accord in Amman

that sought a confederation between a PLO-run West Bank-Gaza Strip entity and Jordan as the senior partner, intelligence analysts maintained that Israel should enter into negotiations while it had the strategic advantage, since this was as close to the Jordanian Option as Peres was likely to get. Military Intelligence presented this position to at least one closed session of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, chaired by the Labor Party's star dove Abba Eban. But at the time even Eban, who has recently called for talks with the PLO, opposed dealing with the organization.

Military Intelligence documents its findings with a wide array of evidence, including a detailed monitoring of the Arabic and PLO media and public and private remarks of PLO leaders, as well as field reports and electronic intercepts. In its current estimate, Military Intelligence used a number of criteria to support its contention that the PLO has moved toward a negotiated settlement.

First, analysts compared the '64 Palestine National Covenant to Arafat's recent declarations. "The PNC declaration speaks of accepting the principle of partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Palestinian Arab states, not of the Covenant," says an Israeli intelligence official. "The claim that Palestine is 'an indivisible territorial unit' is the backbone of the Covenant. The statement that Palestine can be partitioned, made in their recent declaration of independence, and which is intended to be authoritative and symbolic, is a denial of the essence of the Covenant."

Using the gamut of monitoring techniques, analysts also

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badly shaken by a recent investigation into its practice of systematically torturing Arab security prisoners to extract confessions.
Now, in Israel's highly charged political climate, it has even become risky for intelligence analysts to present their views. Soon after Military Intelligence released its most recent estimate on the PLO, the direc-

tor of the prime minister's office, Yossi Ben-Aharon, fired off critical letters to the head of Military Intelligence and to Israel's minister of defense, Yitzhak Rabin, according to intelligence sources. Ben-Aharon, whose counterpart in the U.S. government is Chief of Staff John Sununu, complained the estimate contradicted an Israeli law that bans talking to the PLO. He also argued that the report was biased, and if leaked could be

used by the U.S. to pressure Israel to negotiate with the PLO. Ben-Aharon incriminated in his letters that there should be a housecleaning at Military Intelligence.
However, lawyers for Military Intelligence concluded that the report did not violate Israeli law. Military Intelligence chief Amnon Shahak wrote Rabin affirming that his agency stood by the report. Moreover, no one in Israel's intelligence community

has written a serious refutation of the intelligence estimate.
FOR MORE THAN a decade, Military Intelligence has been documenting the evolution of PLO thinking as it has moved slowly away from the 1964 Palestine National Covenant, which calls for Israel's destruction, and toward Arafat's recent recognition of Israel during his historic speech in Geneva. "Arafat changed because he

saw that continued conflict with Israel would lead to a disaster for his people—not because he got nicer," says Yehoshua Harshani, a former head of Military Intelligence who is close to the agency's current views. "Arafat knows he can't destroy Israel, but Israel can annex the Occupied Territories,"—and expel its Arab inhabitants.
Military Intelligence first detected a thaw in the PLO's hard

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measured reaction to the new policy inside the Palestinian rejectionist camp. The Muslim fundamentalists, the various Palestinian rejection groups based in Damascus, and the Syrian government itself condemned Arafat for selling out the Palestinian people. They clearly didn't view Arafat's policy as a propaganda ploy designed to lull the West into slackening its support for Israel, as the Shamir government insists. Indeed, several Palestinian rejectionist leaders have already met in the Bekaa Valley to plan Arafat's assassination, according to Western press reports.

Moreover, Military Intelligence painstakingly studied the myriad of publications published by the PLO and its various factions. "The PLO has been building toward a political settlement with the Israelis for years, and you can detect it in their publications," says the Israeli intelligence source.

The PLO's recent declarations are also notable for what they do not mention. In the past, PLO officials have not minced words. When they wanted to emphasize the "strategy of stages"—the PLO's euphemism for gaining the West Bank as a base for destroying Israel—they declared this intention in their official resolutions.

Military Intelligence also has noted how the *intifada* has helped Arafat break the taboo of recognizing Israel. The uprising, which has pitted Arab youths with slingshots and an occasional firebomb against the Israeli Army, has given Palestinians a sense of pride and self-confidence after 40 years of repeated humiliations at the hands of the Israelis. On the other hand, the *intifada* has shown to the satis-

faction of Military Intelligence that the Palestinians will never accept the occupation nor abandon the PLO as the embodiment of Palestinian national identity. Even Ilseless was forced to admit this when he publicly disengaged from the West Bank last fall. Furthermore, according to a secret Israeli Army report recently leaked to the Hebrew press, senior officers believe the *intifada* cannot be halted without resorting to unacceptable levels of violence.

Finally, intelligence sources note that Arafat has kept his word and stopped terrorist attacks against Israel. When Dan Shomron, the army chief of staff, said the *intifada* can't be eradicated because it "expresses the struggle of Palestinian nationalism," was denounced by Cabinet Minister Ariel Sharon, who said such admissions by senior Israeli military officers hurt Israel's propaganda efforts abroad.

Despite the current lull in PLO military activity, Israeli intelligence analysts say Arafat will not give up violence until he has achieved a political settlement. "Armed struggle is meant to accelerate the political process, not to destroy Israel," says the intelligence source. "If Israel wants a settlement it must deal with the PLO. The whole world recognizes that. If Israel rejects the PLO it means rejecting the political process."

Ilseless is trying to make Arafat a scapegoat. If he doesn't say the magic words—he's a terrorist. If he does he's a liar. The problem is not whether the PLO has really changed, but that the Israeli political establishment has not changed. The problem is the mainstream of the PLO is ready for partition, and the Is-

raeli establishment is wed to Greater Israel. The whole situation has been reversed. The problem is not that the PLO wants to destroy Israel but that they want to coexist. The only one who still believes in the PLO Covenant is Shamir."

DEPUTY FOREIGN Minister Netanyahu swooped into New York several weeks ago, pushing the PLO's Covenant—which calls for Israel's destruction—with a vengeance. Abu Nidal himself couldn't have promoted it any better. Meeting privately with members of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Netanyahu insisted that the PLO's declarations in Geneva, Stockholm, and Algiers did not supersede its Covenant. He backed up these allegations with data cooked up by Israel's Foreign Ministry. He made much of an interview PLO official Abu Iyad gave to *Al-Yom-Al-Sabi*, a Paris-based, Arabic-language weekly magazine that has close ties to Arafat. Abu Iyad told the paper shortly before the Algiers PNC that the PLO was still committed to the "phase policy" that culminates, according to Netanyahu, with the destruction of Israel.

Abu Iyad, the number-two man in Fatah and the head of the PLO's internal security, is certainly a powerful figure. But, according to Israeli intelligence sources, his apparent refusal to accept the PLO's officially declared acceptance of a two-state solution is no different from Shamir's and Moshe Arens's opposition to Begin on Camp David. What counts in judging the PLO's real intentions, they say, is not what Abu Iyad says to a

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 newspaper, but PNC
 resolutions.

Netanyahu asked Jewish leaders to press the new Bush administration to end talks with the PLO, according to a participant in the meeting. "We could have had our own [right-wing] government," blustered Netanyahu. "We forged a coalition [with Labor] for you. We blocked 'Who's a Jew' for you. Now it's time for you to do something for us. We need you to support Shamir's peace plan!"

The convergence of propaganda and policy can best be observed in Shamir adviser Ben-Aharon's remarks during an exclusive interview with the Voice. "We can't negotiate with the PLO because what they want is legitimacy, and if we give them legitimacy," he declared, "then we have spawned the embryo of a Palestine state. And since we are against a Palestinian state west of the River Jordan--there is no purpose in talking. We are not close to dialogue. . . . If Arafat thinks he can repeat the Sadat trick and come to Israel and talk peace he's mistaken. We won't be that gullible and be disarmed by a trick of this sort!"

Ben-Aharon explains that Shamir favors giving West Bank Palestinians "a maximum degree of political self-expression. I'm deliberately refraining from using the word self-determination because it denotes statehood, which is unjustified." He says that under Shamir's autonomy plan, Palestinians could be elected to their own local authorities, and on the national

level they could vote for "some kind of Arab legislature in Transjordan because they are Jordanian citizens." Over a period of years, conceivably, a commonwealth could emerge between Greater Israel and Jordan. The West Bank would remain under Israeli control and economically linked to Israel. "We are willing to give rights to an Arab minority, but we will never permit that minority to threaten our existence and our survival. If they are willing to accept this status, fine. If not--there will be war!"

In this scenario would Jewish settlements on the West Bank continue to expand? "Oh, absolutely!" says Ben-Aharon. "The heartland of biblical Israel is here in Judea and Samaria. But the gut reason for the justification of the Jewish settlements is that it is a political message to the Arab population that we are here to stay. We are here to stay in every part of this land alongside of the Arabs. And there will not be any part of this territory west of the River Jordan that is devoid or clean of Jews."

Ben-Aharon recently slipped into Washington to drum up support for his boss's upcoming "peace plan." Reportedly meeting with Dennis Ross, a Middle East expert who was named chief of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, Ben-Aharon sought U.S. approval to crush the *intifada* before imposing its autonomy plan.

But many Israelis fear Shamir's vision of Greater Israel will ultimately cost Israel its international support. By 2020, Israeli demographers predict, Greater Israel will have as many Pales-

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tinian residents as Jews. "As time goes by the South Africanization of Israel will occur," says the Israeli intelligence official. "It will polarize Israel between those who talk about a compromise and those that say the solution to the demographic crisis is transfer—the mass expulsion of Palestinians from Greater Israel. But the Palestinians learned the lesson of 1948 when they left their homes. This time, they won't go willingly. They will have to be forced, and an attempted forced transfer would be a political disaster."

In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the Israeli official offered a second, equally bleak scenario: "The *intifada* will go on while Arafat does his utmost to broaden his respectability. Shamir will keep pushing his version of autonomy that has more in common with Peter Pan's never-never land than it does with serious diplomacy. The superpowers will get fed up and pressure Israel to settle the conflict. If Israel manages to withstand the pressure, so what? There will still be a Palestinian problem and in five or 10 years the *intifada* will erupt again."

If the PLO can't achieve an independent state through diplomacy, it will undergo a period of radicalization, the Israeli intelligence official warns. "It will try to save face. It will be engulfed by the extremists. In the territories there will be a clash, with the Palestinian Islamic fundamentalists and radicals against the pragmatists. But the pragmatists won't be able to show any results from moderation. The extremists will win and that means hell for both

sides. Ben-Aharon and Netanyahu are the best friends of Habbash and Abu Nidal."

In the final analysis, the only way Israel will be able to determine if the PLO is sincere about peace is to test them at the negotiating table. If the PLO desires a settlement, as Israeli Military Intelligence maintains, then Shamir is criminally irresponsible not to explore it. If it is a hoax, then he is criminally irresponsible not to expose it.

By entering into negotiations with the PLO, Israel is not conferring a certificate of good behavior on the organization. It will not be expected to excuse or forget past PLO atrocities. In negotiations, the Israelis will not be expected to count on good will or a change of Palestinian heart. Indeed, it's politically irrelevant whether deep in every Palestinian heart there lurks the desire to uproot and destroy the Jewish state. What matters is that a political settlement has security guarantees backed by Israeli military might.

Clearly, Shamir has a vested interest in portraying the PLO as devil-Nazis. He knows that Israel will never make peace with a Palestinian Hitler. In any case, Shamir has categorically stated that he will not talk to the PLO under any circumstances—even if Arafat makes a peace pilgrimage to Israel. Shamir and the Israeli right are playing a zero-sum game. It is a game that jeopardizes Israel's existence as well the security of the Diaspora Jewish community. "Israel was crazy to think it could make a new order in Lebanon," says the Israeli intelligence officer, "and it's crazy to

think it can do it on the West Bank. The country suffers from political autism. It is the cancer of Israel." ■

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Israel's Propaganda Network

WITHIN HOURS after former secretary of state George Shultz announced he was reversing a 13-year-old ban on talking to the PLO as its reward for renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel's right to exist, stunned Israeli Foreign Ministry officials huddled to plan a counterattack. According to well-placed sources in Israel, the strategy was simple: Paint the PLO as heinous terrorists who will stop at nothing until they occupy the cafés of Haifa and Tel Aviv.

The Foreign Ministry's point man was Benjamin [Bibi] Netanyahu, the American-born superhawk who has built a career out of demonizing PLO members as Arab-Nazis—a surefire way to arouse popular fury and acquire political power. As Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, he tirelessly promoted his theory that the PLO was being manipulated by the KGB in a sinister plot to destroy not only Israel but Western Civilization as well. Soon he was a fixture on TV news shows like *Nightline*, where he appeared so often that it sometimes seemed as though his views were the only ones that counted in Israel.

Not surprisingly, Netanyahu chose *Nightline* as a venue to express his contempt for Shultz's decision. Appearing on the program via satellite from Israel, he conveyed a ver-

itable ecstasy of alarm. The U.S. was naive, he declared, if it thought Arafat desired peace with Israel. The "terrorist organization" wants the West Bank as a base to launch its

final solution. PLO officials may make noises in English to Western audiences about recognizing Israel, he lectured, but speaking to their own constituency in Arabic they are saying something altogether different: that moderation is a ruse designed to liberate the Palestinian homeland. Behind his bald assertions, Netanyahu intimated, was Israel's vaunted national security apparatus, which has eyes and ears in every corner of the Arab World.

Meanwhile, the Israeli government began cranking out position papers outlying the PLO's "nefarious" intentions. "We wrote letters to the president and the secretary of state, and subsequently we passed it on to the media," said Yossi Ben-Aharon, the Egyptian-raised director of the prime minister's office. A soft-spoken career foreign service officer and lawyer, Ben-Aharon is one of the most powerful men in Shamir's inner circle. His views on Arabs, which are tinged with a disdain that borders on racist contempt, have heavily influenced Shamir's own thinking. "We showed again and again how statements by the PLO at Algiers at the PNC were all fabrications;

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Frequent *Nightline* guest Benjamin Netanyahu

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all clever manipulations of words that would convey different meanings to different constituencies. It's all a play on words.

"It's really difficult to comprehend the Arabs' monumental capacity for deception," Ben-Aharon went on in his heavily guarded Jerusalem office early this month. "It is really something the Western mind cannot absorb and appreciate. It is way beyond anything that Goebbels could have conjured up because for them, lying is second nature. They believe that deception is part and parcel of the art of war."

It is no coincidence that a number of Ben-Aharon's ideas began creeping into the American press. A recent column by the *Times's* A. M. Rosenthal castigating the PLO for its terrorism and duplicity read like it was dictated by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. The Israelis were so pleased with the piece that the Government Press Of-

fice in Jerusalem stuffed hundreds of copies of the column into foreign journalists' mailboxes.

One U.S. Middle East expert warns that journalists should be wary about reporting Israel's propaganda line as if it were objective truth. "There is a conscious effort being made by the Israelis to discredit the PLO," says William Quandt, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute. Quandt notes that some of the facts in a background report about PLO terrorism sent to journalists by the Israeli Embassy in Washington was of "questionable authenticity." "What commentators, journalists, pundits, academics, and American officials should be aware of is that there is a game being played," says Quandt. But isn't the PLO playing its own game by saying one thing to the West and something else for home consumption? "I don't preclude that at all," says Quandt. "Politicians do that all the time. We've just been through a political campaign in which

we saw candidates saying quite different things to different audiences. So what else is new?"

No country is better at the game of manipulating public opinion than Israel, where propaganda in the service of policy is a time-honored political tradition. Take the Media Analysis Center in Jerusalem, a propaganda mill run out of the prime minister's office. It provides background reports on the Middle East for the press and diplomats. Background no. 253, a 12-page report published in December 1988, attempts to prove the PLO's recognition of Israel at the PNC meeting in Algiers is nothing more than "rhetorical ploys targeted at public opinion." But the backgrounder deliberately cooks data and omits crucial information.

The report employs a kind of perverse Talmudic logic to prove that PLO leaders don't mean what they say—unless Israel can construe what they say as adhering to Israel's preconceived views. In all its verbal pyrotechnics, the back-

grounder fails to mention two crucial points that were not made by the PLO in Algiers. Significantly, the resolution passed by the PNC in Algiers is the first one that does not mention armed struggle against Israel. And there is no mention in the resolution of the dread Palestine National Covenant.

The backgrounder inaccurately quotes essays by Palestinian intellectuals written in PLO journals. For example, Jawad Al-Bashiti, a senior PLO intellectual, has been the PLO's most outspoken advocate of a two-state solution in the past two years. Writing in the PLO journal *Falastin Al-Thawra*, he was the first Palestinian Arab to propose that the PLO unilaterally recognize U.N. resolution 242. But the backgrounder quotes him out of context in order to make him look like a hardliner.

The backgrounder performs the same kind of surgery on the writings of Yehoshafat Harkabi, the former head of Israeli military intelligence,

who advocates negotiations with the PLO. It takes a passage from Harkabi's book, *Israel's Fateful Hour*, describing the PLO's old hard-line position, and asserts it is his current view as well as the PLO's.

This backgrounder ends by repeating Netanyahu's infamous dictum that "the PLO has been a crucial link in the international terror network, from the Pacific Ocean... to Central America. This is even alluded to in the Algiers Political Declaration, which condemns 'American imperialism and colonialism in Latin America.'" But the resolution condemns nothing of the sort. It never uses the buzzwords *American imperialism* or *colonialism*. According to a transcript of the resolution published in the November 1988 issue of the PLO monthly *Sh'un Philastinia*, no. 188, the passage reads: "The PNC condemns American attempts to threaten the independence of Central America and to intervene in their internal affairs."

—R.I. Friedman

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אנא העבירו כהולות מברקנו מספר 602 ח-2/8 לאריה מקל כלשכת רה"מ.

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שמור/מיידי

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מועב'ט-שטחים. למברקיכס.

א. מניח שבידיכם כל החומר הגלמי הדרוש להכנת התבטאות בדיון, אם וכאשר יתקיים.

ב. נראה לנו שיש להתייחס לכינוס זה של מועב'ט בתור תרגיל ערבי נוסף בהמשך לקו שלהם מאז 67 - כלומר, לנסות ולהציג את הסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי כבעיה של זכויות אדם ובצורה כזו גם לזקוף לזכותם נקודות תעמולתיות באוזניים מערביות - דמוקרטיות וגם להסיט תשומת לב המערב מההקשר ההיסטורי והפוליטי האמתי של הבעיה.

ג. בשיחותיכם עם האמריקנים כדאי להדגיש רצונם של הערבים להביך את ארה"ב ולנצל 'הרעש' שהתעורר בעקבות הגשת דוח מחמ'ד על זכויות האדם. רצוי איפא שינסו לעכב כינוס המועצה כדי שיאבד האפקט התקשורתי של הדיון. כמובן שאנו מקווים שיעמדו איתן כמו בענין ההודעה הנשיאותית ויטילו וטו על הצעת החלטה שתוגש אשר אין לצפות כי תהיה יותר 'מאוזנת' מנוסח ההודעה הנשיאותית.

מנהל ארבל 2

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תשובה: 9978, 2.
 מתי: 1998, 7/19/98.
 שם: משרד, תח: 982090, תח: 5712, תח: 8, סל: 500
 תח: 5 10: 11727
 תח: 6

שאלה: 11727

סל: 5

תח: 5712

תח: 5712-11727, 78277, 500.

ה. שאלה: 11727 על מנת להבין את המושגים המופיעים במכתב, נראה שהמכתב
 מתייחס, בין היתר, לשינוי המושגים.

ד. למה על שם המושגים המופיעים במכתב, נראה שהמכתב מתייחס לשינוי המושגים
 המופיעים במכתב, ונראה שהמכתב מתייחס לשינוי המושגים המופיעים במכתב.
 המושגים המופיעים במכתב, נראה שהמכתב מתייחס לשינוי המושגים המופיעים במכתב.
 המושגים המופיעים במכתב, נראה שהמכתב מתייחס לשינוי המושגים המופיעים במכתב.

ג. שאלה: 11727 על מנת להבין את המושגים המופיעים במכתב, נראה שהמכתב
 מתייחס, בין היתר, לשינוי המושגים המופיעים במכתב, ונראה שהמכתב מתייחס
 לשינוי המושגים המופיעים במכתב, ונראה שהמכתב מתייחס לשינוי המושגים
 המופיעים במכתב, ונראה שהמכתב מתייחס לשינוי המושגים המופיעים במכתב.
 המושגים המופיעים במכתב, נראה שהמכתב מתייחס לשינוי המושגים המופיעים במכתב.
 המושגים המופיעים במכתב, נראה שהמכתב מתייחס לשינוי המושגים המופיעים במכתב.

שאלה: 11727

500

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, מצפא, ליאור,
מזתיס, סי'יבל, משפט, ברנע, ארבל2

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6815

תאריך : 09.02.89

סודי

יוצא **

**

**

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חוזם: 2,6815

אל: 110/ש/381

מ-: המשרד, תא: 090289, חז: 1423, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: מצפא

נד: 8

Handwritten mark: פסוק

סודי/מידי

שגריר, ציר.

בדו"ח זכויות האדם של מחמ"ד שולבו ושורבבו גם הערות בעלות משמעות או מגמות מדיניות.

מנסח הדו"ח מציין בין היתר הנקודות והקביעות הבאות:

1. יו"ר אש"ף נתמך ע"י רוב הפלשתינאים. הוא הצהיר שהוא מכיר בזכות ישראל להתקיים ולחדול מטרור. ישנן סיעות פלשתינאיות אחרות שלא עשו כן.

2. אש"ף קרא להתקוממות בשטחים להימשך.

3. הסטטוס העתידי של השטחים הכבושים הוא הנושא (הבעיה) המרכזי של הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי.

ב. האינתיפאדה מוזכרת, להערכתך, לראשונה במסמך או התבטאות אמריקאית רשמית כבעלת גוון לאומי-פלשתינאי. במקום אחד נאמר שמשתתפיהם הפעילים של המהומות האזרחיות היו בעיקר גברים ונשים צעירים, המונעים ע"י לאומיות פלשתינאית. ובמקום אחר נאמר שישראל הגבירה פעולתה נגד גילויים של לאומיות פלשתינאית.

ג. מתוך הנ"ל עולה התמונה דלהלן: האינתיפאדה היא התקוממות אזרחית המונעת ע"י גילויים לאומיים-פלשתינאים, המורצת ע"י אש"ף, אשר בניגוד לסיעות פלשתינאיות אחרות, הצהיר על הכרה בישראל, הפסקת הטרור ונתמך ע"י רוב

0111

112K

0110:2186,0
02:112K
0-100000,01:980090,10:0001,11:0,01:01
00:0 10:0000
01:0

0110:2186,0

02:112K

0-100000,01:980090,10:0001,11:0,01:01
00:0 10:0000

0110:2186,0

02:112K
0-100000,01:980090,10:0001,11:0,01:01
00:0 10:0000

0110:2186,0

02:112K
0-100000,01:980090,10:0001,11:0,01:01
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0110:2186,0
02:112K
0-100000,01:980090,10:0001,11:0,01:01
00:0 10:0000

0110:2186,0
02:112K
0-100000,01:980090,10:0001,11:0,01:01
00:0 10:0000

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

האוכלוסיה בשטחים. אי לכך הבעיה העיקרית של הסכסוך היא
הסטטוס העתידי של
השטחים הכבושים.

ד.האם להערכתם משקף הנ"ל קווי התפיסה המדינית של הממשל
החדש.

בנצור

פא

תפ: שהיו, סשוח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל,
משפט, ברנע, ארבכל, ליאור, מזתים, מתאמשטחים

דחיפות: בחול לבוקר	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: גלוי		פתוח: 6
תאריך וזמן העבר: 1830 8 בפבר' 89		חל: מצפ"א הסברה
פס' פרוק: 190	מסרד: 204	דע: מקש"ח/משהב"ט עיר הסברה/כאז
מסרד: 190		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביחג"בח: דו"ח מחמ"ד השנתי על ז"א - שיקועים

- היום בעהרלים התקיימו השימועים בנושא דו"ח מחמ"ד השנתי. בוועדת המסנה לזכויות אדם של ועדת החוץ.
 - העד היחיד היה דיק שיפטר, נציג מחמ"ד (בנסרד עדותו חכתבחה) ואת השימועים ניהל קונגרסטן OWENS כמחליטו של חו"ר החולח קונגרסטן יטרון. בנסרד דברי הפתיחה של OWENS.
 - נכחו הקונגרסטנים אוקאנס, בירווייטר, כריס טמיט, ג'אן מיירס, ג'ון מילר, טוט לנטוט, טד וייס, וגרי אקוסן - הגלי ועדת זכויות אדם, ובנוסף לחטו בן גולטן חוארד ורחן, של לויזן ולארי סטיק - כחברי ועדת החוץ.
 - בהוט דברי הפתיחה של אוקאנס, שתדכזו אך ורק בישראל (על כר בנסרד) נטלו הקונגרסטנים רשות הדיבור.
- לנטום - לאחר ששיבחה שיפטר על עבודתו התייחס להתעסקות הפתלוגית של התקשורת עם מדינה אחת בלבד, והוסיף כז אין כוונתו להאשים בכך את שיפטר או הממשל. אולט כאשר עירק השתמשה בצעק כיטי נגד 8000 מאזרחיה האזרחי אידן וכאשר תוך יומיים דיכאו והרגו שלטונות אלג'יריה 800 איש שחגיגו נגד העלאת מחירו המזון, לא מצאה לנכון התקשורת לתת תשומת לב מיוחדת לכך. גם כאשר נפטרו 100-125 אלף איש מרעב בסודן כי השלטונות וחטורדים לא העבירו לחם מזון לא היה סיקור תקשורתי מיוחד.
- לא מצא ב-24 שעות האחרונות בתקשורת הבנה או התייחסות מיוחדת ל-1500 העמודים שבדו"ח מחמ"ד. יש לראות חדו"ח במרסמקטיבה הנכונה וללא דגשות ונספציות ולנסות למצוא מיכניסם טוב יותר שיאסר לציבור ולתקשורת לקלוט בעורה בכונה יותר וקלה יותר את חדו"ח.

תפוצה:	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	2
שמה מטעם ורג	אג'יריה	אלג'יריה								
הסגיר סייב	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	2

דחילות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 2
סוג:	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 6
תאריך וזמן העבור:		חל:
פס' פרוק:		דע:
תפסרד:		פאת:

במחן

190

204

בדרגות טר נייס וכרזס סמית - חזר כלליים ידחק ושיבחו מחמ"ד ושיפטר על עבודתם. סמית עמד על ח - false impression. אמתני יטול.

בז גילטן - פתח בביקורת (" I'll take issue with your opening statement ")

על דבריו של אואנס, שחתימה לאיזור טקוים בלבד - חשזח"ת ולישראל, שאל טח עם טוריה, טעודה, עירק ואירן המטר פרטים על כל אחת.

מדוע לא נאמר דבר על לבנון, "לא שטעתי תגובתך על כך". קיימת הפרק ז"א בכל האיזור חתוא. הבעיה היא שלא הצלחנו לעודד פתרון פוליטי. חתימה לאדומי אש"ם על פלסטנינים מתונים.

הביע תקוה שכל האיזורים יבדקו באופן שווה ולא יידון רק איזור אחד.

גרי אקרמן - הבעיה קעתרונת חבוקר היא החתמקדות המיוחדת ב-22 עמודים מהדו"ח על ישראל לעומת הדו"ח כולו בן 1500 עמודים - אין זה חוגן. השאלה היא מחם בעצט זכויות אדם. לדעתו על הפרת זכויות אדם ניתן לדון כאשר מדובר במדיניות שיטתית הנכסית על אנשים ובסקרה של ישראל אין זה כך. לאחר מכן דיבר אקרמן ברוח חודעתו חרשטית של דובר המטרד (שהועבר אליו חבוקר) וציין במיוחד כי בדו"ח אין איזכור לטרור פלסטניני-אש"ם נגד פלסטנינים מתונים.

גם הוא חאשים התקשורת בכך שהיא blew things out of proportions. וחזר על העובדה ושואל דמוקרטה ופתוח ולפיכך הנגישות, לבדיקת ז"א מתאפשרת.

בסוף דבריו שיבח עבודתו של שיפטר ובמיוחד בהקשר של טודן.

ג'ון מילר - מטכים לדברים שנאמרו לפניו. שאל שאלה כללית ובירך עבודת שיפטר.

מל לרינד - אינו רוצה לחזור על דברי האחרים בנוגע לישראל, אך שותף לדאגה של דיספרטורציה בהתייחסות לישראל. מבקש תגובת שיפטר. כשרואים דיווחי התקשורת לא רואים דיווח קונטקסטואלי. יש לתדגיש בדו"ח ולא רק בתקשורת שהדיווח על ישראל מתאפשר בחיותה דמוקרטית, החשטית ופתוחה.

התייחס ל-2 חיבטים של חקונטקסט וביקש תגובת שיפטר:

א. הדילמה זה - CHALLENGE בפניה נדעבת ישראל כיוצד להתמודד ולהשתלט על מפגינים

תפוצה:

דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 3
סוג:		מתוך: 6
תאריך יוסן תעבור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
תפסוד:		כאת:
190	204	

וטמריים המשליכים אבנים, סכינים ובקבוקי מולוטוב.

גט לאח' הסכמת עדמות לתנאי ארמ"ב מדרטטה הודעת מטעם תרתאת מאזוחה על חרוננו' וכך גט פורש הדבר ע"י דובר מחט"ד, כיצד יריבות פנים קרבית ששפיעה על יכולתה של ישראל להתמודד עם חדילמות שלה באיזור.

ג'אן טיפטר - בירכת שקפטר וביקשה לשאול מאוחר יותר על אירן. סמית וברטן לא טסרו העשרות שתיחה.

5. טיפטר, לפני שפתח בעדותו ביקש לתיוחס לטענות וההערות שחושטעו ע"י הקונגרסמנים נחקריא הנוסח שטטר חבוקר בסט"ע (ראו מברק גל טט' 183 החלק הראשון של דברי טופטר) שעיקרו כי לא מדובר בשטחים בהפרת ז"א טיפוסית אלא במצב שבר צבא כיבוש מגיב למחומות אזרחיות חטורות ע"י שמוש בכוח יתר ובענישת יתר. בניגוד למדינות בחט זש טאנקים ומרי פנימי (בין השטטר לאזרחים) הרי שבעייה זו (של השטחים) יכולה להפטר ע"י הסדר שלום. טכאן עבר לעדותו הכתובה (בנפרד).

6. לחלן חלק השאלות והתשובות הנוגעות לשטחים ולמזח"ת -

השובת טיפטר:

לשל לדין - קטח לנו לומר טח ניתן לעשות לגבי חכעיית הקטח של משליכי אבנים בקבוקי מולוטוב וחיילים. עיינו רק העובדות, והאלות אעה"ל זורול לחשוד עליחז כמו הוראות מתוחח באש מניעת חפרת ח - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT והעמות חיילים לדין.

לגבי האיום על פרייג', הרי שחיריבות חבן-ערבית חוזרת לטנות ח-30. בדר"ח מערייך כי ישנט הרוגים פלסטינים שנחרבו ע"י פלסטינים.

לנטוס - עירק. חזר וחעלה העדויות על שמוש בנשק כדמי ע"י עירק נגד איוגנט ועזאקיס. וחרקורד הקטח של עירק בז"א (ציטט טחד"ח) לאור הנ"ל, מדוע התנגדה מחט"ד להטיל סנקציות על עירק כפי שבאו לידי ביטוי בחצעת החוק של סל-לנטוס אשתקד.

טיפטר - לא הגיעה לגבעה עמדה רשמית כתובה.

תפוצה:

דחפיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דף: 4
סוג:		כתוב: 6
תאריך וזמן מעור:		אל:
פס' פבוק:		דע:
הפסדו:		פאת:
קמחן		
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לנטנס - (כזעם) נציג טחמ"ד בחדר זה בעדותו, הביע התנגדות לסנקציות, מה תהיה הטלעתך לבידוק.

שיפטר - (לאחר לחץ של לנטנס מספר פעמים) אשר בחתמתו, הטסקנה ברורה, לפעול עם"י התגיון המתבקש.

לנטנס - העלה נושא דוכווי החומות באלג'יריה. איזו טחאח היגישה ארה"ב?

שיפטר - אינו זוכר, יבדוק.

לנטנס - סודן - העברת מסוף.

שיפטר - אנו מאד מעורבים בנושא וקרובים לפתרון. מוכן לעדכן הקונגרסמן בנסד.

בירדנער - בתגובה לדברי הביקורת של הקונגרסמניס בנוגע לישראל אשר טחאח מקוה ששיפטר לא יעזוב הועדה ברושם שעל הדו"ח לחתאים עצמו למדינה או לששקוליס טולזיטום.

התנספת והחערות על ישראל מטבירות חינתה של ישראל חברה דמוקרטית ופתוחה בהחלט בטקומן ומבחירות חטעב לאשורק.

לאחר טכן עבר לשאלות כלליות.

אקרמן - מודה לשיפטר על החודעת חלא כתובה שתקריא בנוגע לישראל, ועדיף שהאחה מוסיעה בדו"ח. חלק על דברו של בירדנער ועדין כי יש לחינת evenhanded.

אין אפשרות לחתייחס למדינות שונות ^{ח"ת} שונה ומיוחד. יש צורך ברגישות. החיחס

ל - "WEST BANK" של כל מיני מדינות. למשל בנוגע ל - "WEST BANK" של אירלנד טגלה הדו"ח רגישות מיוחדת והטיפול היה שונה מזה של השטחים.

אט היינו מעמידים עצמנו (ארה"ב) מול ישראל מה היינו אומרים על ה - "WEST BANK" של חדלוור, המיסטישי ה - EAST-RIVER ובעינת האינדיאניט שלא נפתרה.

חש שיש לארה"ב סטנדרטים שונים לבנות בדית שונות.

שיפטר - (1) בעמ' 2, בחקדמת לדו"ח ישנה תשובה לשאלה שתועלתה.

(2) מבקש להסביר לועדה הבעייה שתועורה חשנה (החתייחס לדברי אקרמן שהדו"ח כבר מושיע חבוקר בעמ' ח-1 של ה-N.Y.T. ואתמול ב-W.S.J.) עפ"י נוהל

שחרור הדו"ח, הוטל אמברגו עד חבוקר.

תפוצה:

דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דף: 5
סוג:		כתוב: 6
תאריך וזמן הכור:		אל:
כס' פבוק:		דצ:
תפסרד:		פאת:
190	204	

אולם מיטחו חעליה לחדליף זאת ל - W.S.J וחאטברגו לא כוכד.
 ארנאנס - לא חיתה חדלפתח:טעד חועזה שכן אפילו הוא נאלץ לקרוא חדו"ח בחדר חכספת
 בנוכחות עוזר.
 שזפטר - התניחס לראיון ארנאנס חבוקר ב - NBC בו ציטט בריאן גאטבל כביכול טחדו"ח
 עמדת ארה"ב לגבי קיצוץ כסיוע למדינות מפרות ז"א.
 לדבריו חתקטר עם גאטבל אשר חתנצל על טעותו וחבטיח. לשדר תיקון מחר בבוקר.
 אקרמן - נושא הגירושים ע"י ישראל. חמגורשים חס אנשים חטעורבים בטרור, אלימות
 וחסתח. זוחי דרך להגן על חברה וזכויות האדם שלה מפני טרור ואידומיס.
 שיפטר - חסימה שאנו טעלים חנושא היא דק טאחר וחסעיף חנוגע כדבר באמנת ג'נבה ח-4
 מ-1949 מנוסח בטונחזם אנסולוטיים. זהו נושא טכני בעיקרו.
 טכאן עבר אקרמן לשאול בנושא סודן.

לארי סמית - ערב חסעודית. מדוע אין איזכור כלשהו בדו"ח למגיעת סעודיה באזרחים
 אמריקניים? זו בעיה חכמשת שנים. לעומת זאת, יש אפלויה נמשכת בטיסול חדו"ח כלפי
 מדינות טסודיות. למשל חדו"ח על בריטניה - "זה פשוט לחלך בעורה מדחיסח בשדה מוקשים
 ולעקוף חבעיות".

כשמגיעים לישראל - חכל בעתונות, חכל טמוסטן טידי יום ושעה. כדו"ח אין כל
 COUNTER-BALANCE כמו למשל איזכור טרוור ערבי נגד פלסטינים. חאס מחמ"ד לקחה בחשבון
 האטטרות של חפרת ז"א בשיגור נשים וילדים ל - front line לזרוק אבנים ובקבוקי
 מולרטובק

שזפטר - ניסינו לתטע ולסכט חאירוועים. אין זה בבחינת חדשות וחחומר טכוסט על דברים
 שחתפרטמו במשך חשנה.

לארי סמית - (בזעט דב) מי קובע מהם חסטנדרטים לסייהם יש לשפוט חמדינות ובאילו
 סטנדרטים טשתמיס

..6

.GENERAL AMERICAN PUBLIC

שיפטר - לפי ח -

תפוצה:

דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קד: 6
סוג:		פתוק: 6
תאריך וזמן חבול:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
תספוד:		כאת:
1176 190	204	

סמית - גם אם חציבור האמריקני היה יודע שחלק מתעובדות אינן נכונות היית כולל בדו"ח שיפטר - לא.

אנו מנסים לעשות כמיטב יכולתנו, ולחיות EVEN HANDED.

לארד סמית - חביב זעמו במיוחד כלפי הפרוט ב - M.Y.T. הבוקר.

שיפטר - אנו מנסים לעשות הטקטימס ומירטמתי חודעה בנוון. ואכן יש סטנדרט גבוה כלפי שיראל.

סמית - אם יש סט של סטנדרטים שונים כיצד ניתן לתערך את חדר"ח.

שיפטר - חזר על מאמצותם לחיות מאוזנים ולנסות למצוא סט אחד של סטנדרטים.

שאר הקונגרסטים שאין בנושאים הבאים -

דומניה, קובה, ברה"ט, רדיפת הבאחיים, טיבט וחסינים, הונגריה, אל פלנדור וגואטמלה.

דאויג לעיון שאלתו הנוספת של לנטוס בנוגע לשיפור שחל בברה"ט בנושא ז"א. ביקש תגובתו של שיפטר לאפשרות של שיקול טחדש לגבי תיקון ג'קסון-וורניק.

שיפטר - התחמק ואמר שמשאיר זאת לבידוק שהביע רצון לשמוע מהציבור הספציסי המתעניין בנושא.

ורנא ורנאי דרנגר
יחודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה:

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* דף 2 *
* עותק 4 *
* מתוך 5 *
* מתוך 26 *

* 2. בייקר ציין בתגובה כי לוז צפוף לא יאפשר לו להיענות
* לבקשת שהח. הביע רצונו לפגוש את שהח. הצביע כי לפני
* פגישתו עם שהח יתקיימו שיחות הכנה בדרגי עבודה. הוסיף כי
* המצב כיום שונה מבעבר וכי חשוב שנפעל במשותף במטרה להביא
* לעמדה מאוחדת (UNIFIED APPROACH)

* 3. המזכיר הביע חששו מקיום פגישות בדרג גבוה (ללא הכנה)
* המחייבות קביעת עמדות מהם קשה לסגת.

* 4. בייקר הציע כי יפגוש את שהח במחצית השניה של חודש
* מרץ. הציע את ה-16/3 כמועד נוח. במידה ושהח לא יוכל
* להתפנות במועד זה מציע כאלטרנטיבה את ה-13/3 אחהצ.
* התאריכים המוצעים הינם היחידים הבאים בחשבון מבחינתו של
* המזכיר באותו שבוע וזאת בשל HEARINGS שנקבעו לו בגבעה.

* 5. בהקשר לביקור רהם ציין המזכיר כי הבית הלבן טרם עיבד
* לוז לפגישות הנשיא עם מנהיגים זרים. ציין כי יציעו לבית
* הלבן לקיים ביקור רהם במחצית הראשונה של אפריל.

* 6. פעולות הטירור, של אשף מאז תחילת הדיאלוג עם ארהב:

* 1. השגריר התייחס לנסיון החדירה שאירע בסוף השבוע. הדגיש
* כי המדובר בקבוצה שחבריה השתייכו לארגון שהשתתף בכינוס
* המלפ באלז'יר ואשר לערפאת יש שליטה עליו. בהמשך הזכיר
* השגריר את מסע האיומים והטירור שמנהל ערפאת ומנהיגי אשף
* נגד מנהיגים ביטח הקוראים להפסקת האלימות. במעשיו ציין
* השגריר בוחן אשף את נחישות ארהב להיאבק בטרור. מעשי אשף
* אינם תואמים את הצהרותיו. אנו מקווים שלאור המקרים לעיל
* תפסיק ארהב את הדיאלוג עם אשף. בהמשך ציטט השגריר מתוך
* דברים אותם השמיע פלטרו בפגישתו הראשונה עם אשף על כך
* שארהב לא תוכל להמשיך בדיאלוג, אם אשף ימשיך לעסוק
* בטרור. (ראה חוזם 2467 מ-6/2). היינו ביקורתיים ציין,
* השגריר לגבי המהלך האמריקאי בעקבות החלטת ארהב. קבלנו
* הבטחות מרייגן, שולץ וכן מהנשיא המיועד בוש כי יבחנו
* התנהגות אשף. ההתפתחויות מאז דצמבר הדגיש השגריר מבהירות
* כי מעשי אשף אינם תואמים את הצהרותיו.

* 2. המזכיר בתגובה ציין כי ימשיכו לבחון את מעשי אשף.
* סיפר כי הורו לפלטרו להבהיר בפני אשף את דאגתם העמוקה וכי
* לא יוכלו לסבול מעשי טרור נגד אנשי צבא ואזרחים בתוך

מושרד החוץ-מוחלקת הקשר

* דף 3 *
* עותק 4 *
* מחוך 5 *
* מתוך 26 *

* ומוחץ לגבולות ישראל. הדגיש כי אינם עושים הבחינה בין
* פגיעה במטרות צבאיות ואזרחיות. המזכיר הוסיף כי אינם
* מתכוונים להפסיק הדיאלוג. מחמד ציין מטיל ספק ביכולת
* ערפאת לפקח על כל פלגי אשף ולכן יצטרכו לשפוט את ערפאת
* עפי מאמציו להטיל מרותו על הארגון. ארהב מתכוונת לבחון
* את התחייבות ערפאת לוותר על טרור עפי העובדות ועפי נכונות
* אשף לחייב עצמו לפתרון של שלום. המזכיר ציין כי אינם
* ארואים במקרה האחרון סיבה מספקת להפסקת הדיאלוג. חזר
* וציין כי הביעו בפני אשף את דאגתם הרצינית.

* 3. השגריר ציין כי יעביר המסר. הוסיף כי מקווה שבנקודה
* מסויימת תקבע ארהב קו אדום.

* 4. המזכיר בתגובה ציין כי בשלב מסויים יצטרכו להחליט על
* כך.

* 2. עמדות אירופה בנושא תהליך השלום:

* 1. השגריר ציין כי לקראת יציאתו לביקור באירופה מבקש
* להסב תשומת לבו לעמדותינו ביחס לעמדות ופעילות הארופאיות
* לקידום תהליך השלום. איננו סבורים הוסיף השגריר שהדרך שבה
* מבקשת אירופה לדחוף את ישראל לכוון של דיאלוג עם אשף הינה
* קונסטרוקטיבית. עמדה זו אינה מקובלת על ישראל. איננו
* סבורים שיזמתם תסייע לקידום התהליך. עמדת אירופה כלפי אשף
* ציין השגריר מזכירה לנו את מדיניות הפיוס בשנות ה-30 אשר
* תוצאותיה זכורות לרבים מאתנו. השגריר ציין כי מעיר זאת
* לאור העובדה שבביקורו באירופה יעלו בפניו הצעות לקידום
* התהליך.

* 2. המזכיר בתגובה ציין כי מניח שההצעות שישמע בשיחותיו
* לא יהיו קונסטרוקטיביות במה שנוגע לקידום תהליך השלום.
* הוסיף כי בתגובתו על מה שישמע אינו מתכוון להיות בוטה.
* כמו כן, אין בכוונתו להגרר אחרי הצעותיהם. הוסיף כי ישמע
* מעמיתיו על כך שלא מנהיגות ארהב אשר 'תמסור' (DELIVER)
* את ישראל' לא ניתן יהיה להתקדם. הוסיף כי הם
* (האירופאים) ככל הנראה יציעו צעדים לקידום התהליך. חזר
* על כך שאינו מתכוון להיות כן ופתוח עם האירופאיות כפי
* שהוא עמנו. המזכיר עמד על הצורך שישראל, ארהב
* והפלסטינים יגיעו להבנה שתוכל להוביל לשלום.

מוסד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* דף 4 *
* עותק 4 *
* מחוך 26 *
* מחוך 5 *

* 3. בתגובה לדברי השגריר על הצורך בקביעת מועד לקיום
* דיאלוג עם הממשל שבו נעלה רעיונותינו, חזר המזכיר על
* הצורך (בשבועות הקרובים עד למפגש עם שהח ארנס) בעבודת
* הכנה על מנת שלא נגיע לגיבוש עמדות אותן נתקשה לשנות.

* 4. לשאלת השגריר בנוגע למחשבותיו ביחס למתכונת שיחות
* ההכנה השיב שניתן לחשוב על הקמת קבוצה קטנה שתכלול נציגי
* NEA אשר יחד עם דניס רוס תעמוד עמנו בקשר. דניס רוס
* הוסיף בהקשר זה כי ישוחח עמנו בשובו מאירופה (יתלווה
* למזכיר) ביחס למיכניזם. לדעת המזכיר טוב יהיה אם נוכל
* לבוא (לפגישתו עם שהח) עם עמדה מאוחדת. הוסיף 'אולי לא
* נוכל להגיע לעמדה מאוחדת אך יש לנסות'.

* 5. השגריר הוסיף כי מניח שלמרות ההכנות המקדימות ישארו
* מספר נושאים אותם יסגרו שני השרים בפגישתם. הוסיף כי ננצל
* פגישות ההכנה לחילופי דעות ולבחינת הסיכויים להתקדמות.

* 6. המזכיר ציין כי נתן ביטוי לעמדותיו בעדותו בפני הסנאט
* ובתשובותיו לשאלות הסנטורים, המבטאות את כוון פעילותם.
* ישמחו אם ניתן יהיה להגיע לגישה מאוחדת. הדבר יחייב תזוזה
* בעמדות ישראל כמו כן גם של הצד השני. עמד על הצורך
* בבחינת דרכים לקידום התהליך אשר ימנעו העלאת רעיונות אצל
* האירופאים ואחרים.

* ד. תגובתנו בעקבות פרסום דוח ז'א:

* 1. השגריר הביע אכזבתנו מתוכן הדוח שפורסם. אנו מרגישים
* שבכתיבת הדוח העובדתי לא נלקח בחשבון הקונטקסט של
* האירועים והפרובוקציות נגד צהל מצד גורמים קיצוניים בשטח
* המשתמשים באלימות לא רק על מנת להקשות על נוכחותנו אלא גם
* במטרה להביא לנסיגתנו ללא פתרון מדיני. ישראל ציין
* השגריר, תלמד הדוח ותשיב על הטענות שהעלו נגדנו. הדגיש
* כי הצבא מודרך בפעילותו ע"י נורמות מוסריות וכי נושא כיבוד
* ז'א חשוב לצבא ולממשלה. הצבא בוחר כל העת את התנהגות
* חייליו. אותם חיילים שאינם ממלאים אחר הנהלים מובאים
* למשפט. קיוונו ציין השגריר למצוא בדוח התייחסות לדאגת
* ישראל לנסיבות שבהן היא נאלצת לפעול. לצערנו לא מצאנו כל
* התייחסות לכך.

* 2. המזכיר בתגובתנו ציין כי מבינים הקשיים והאילוצים בהם

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* 24. * * * * *

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* דף 5 *
* עותק 4 *
* מתוך 26 *
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* אנו פועלים. ציין כי לא היה לו חלק בניסוח הדוח. כידיד
* אשר הצהרותיו משמשות כהוכחה חשובה שהמצב קשה. סבור שיש
* דרכים אלטרנטיביות לדון באלימות ובסיבותיה. הוסיף (מבלי
* לפרט) שיש נושאים שמדאיגים אותו.

* 3. השגריר בתגובה ציין כי מנהיגי ישראל מסכימים עם ארהב
* ביחס לצורך במציאת פתרון פוליטי. הוסיף כי נהיה מוכנים
* לשתף פעולה בקידום השלום.

* 4. המזכיר בתגובה ציין כי 'אנו (ארהב וישראל) מאבדים
* המערכה על דעת הקהל'.

* ה. מועביט: תרגיל ההודעה הנשיאותית

* 1. השגריר הביע תודתו על עמדת ארהב בדיונים סביב פרסום
* ההודעה הנשיאותית.

* השתתפו בשיחה שארכה כ-40 דקות מצידם: פול האר, דניס
* רוס, מרגרט טוטוולר (דוברת מחמד) ארון מילר הולצמן.

* מצידנו: הציר והח'מ'.

* שטיין

* חו

* נפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן,
* בנצור, מצפא

1000

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

** נכנס
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10 ד

חוזם: 2,6504

אל: המשרד

מ-: 202, נר: 202, תא: 080289, חז: 2000, דח: ב, סג: 10

חח: 3 גס: מצפא

נד: 3

ארה"ב

בהול לבוקר

סודי/בהול

אל : מצפא

דע : מם מקשח (הועבר בנר 189)

מאת: ק.ק. לקונגרס

ביקור לס אספין

1. השגריר תידרך היום את אספין - לרוב עפי הנייר המועבר
בנפרד (הנכתב באנגלית כדי להקל על השימוש במינוח
הקונגרסינולי הטכני). נכתו וורן נלסון והח'מ'.

2. אספין אמר שהתכנית המתגבשת (בשלכם 227) נראית לו.
הדגיש את ענינו בנושא היחסים האסטרטגיים. רצונו לא רק
לקבל דוח מצב, אלא לשמוע מחשבותינו לגבי כוונות עתידיים
של מערכת יחסים אלה לרבות נושא ההצבה מראש. ככלל יתעניין
ב-דברים צבאיים כגון המצב הצבאי במזרח ומגמות במאזן
הכוחות, ענין הטקטים ומקום החץ כחלק של המענה, איום
הנשק הכימי וכיו"ב. בנוסף חשוב לו לשמוע דעותיהם של
אנשים ממגזרים שונים בחברה הישראלית (הרישמית והלא
רישמית) וכן לעמוד על אסכולות שונות בדבר תהליך השלום.
מקווה לשמוע משהח על תהליך השלום ועל השיקולים האסטרטגיים
הכלליים שלנו שהם 'לבטח' נרחבים יותר מהשיקולים
האסטרטגיים הצבאיים הטהורים. אם הוא אמור לפגוש את רה"מ,
ירצה לשמוע ממנו על החשיבה לקראת יוזמת שלום אפשרית

מצדנו.

3. לאור בקשת אספין לקבל תידרוך על מצב הכלכלה בארץ השגריר הציע שיפגש לא רק עם נציגי האוצר או בנק ישראל אלא גם עם שר האוצר, אולי ביום ו' בבוקר. אספין חייב את הרעיון.

4. וורן נלסון ציין שעומדת בעינה בקשתם להיפגש עם אישים נוספים המשקפים את מגוון הדעות בממשלה (השרים שרון וויצמן ואולי שר חרדי). כ'כ' ציין שבמוצאי שבת וביום א' בערב ישלבו ארוחת ערב עם צבי רפיח ומפגש עם המשלחת ממילווקי. שיבוצים אלה טרם נסגרו.

5. אספין מתכוון לביקור בהתלהבות. שפע רצון טוב ומצפה לשמוע מאיתנו (בעיקר משר הבטחון ואנשיו) את רשימת המשאלות שלנו לאימוץ לתוך ההצעה לחוק כספי הפנטגון (שצוות העוזרים של הוועדה כבר מתחיל להכין לקראת השימועים שיפתחו בשלהי פברואר). הוא מבין נושא ה-STRETCHERS (ראו-נא הנייר הרצב) ונכון להצעתינו (בנושא מסוקי האפצ'ה, לדוגמא, שהועלה עי השגריר). בקיצור זוהי הזדמנות פז להכניס את ה-INPUT שלנו מוקדם בתהליך ובדרג הבכיר ביותר.

6. ידוע לו על ביקור הרמטכל בארהב כעת, אך טוב יהיה אם הרמטכל יוכל להתפנות לו לזמן קצר ביום ב', ה-20 דנא.

למדן

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תפ: שהח, ששהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מאור

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NEWS BRIEFING BY RICHARD SCHIFTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1989

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MR. CHARLES REDMAN (State Department Spokesperson): Good morning. As promised, this is an on-the-record briefing on the annual human rights report, and the briefer is the Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian and Human Rights Affairs, Richard Schifter.

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Dick.

SEC. SCHIFTER: Just have a few initial remarks. As we release our annual country reports on human rights practices, we try our very best to be fair to all interested members of the media and to abide by our obligation to the Congress to coordinate the release of the reports with the overview hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights.

I deeply regret the system which we have developed and which has worked well in recent times sprang a leak this year. So much for the process.

Now, as to substance. It is not my job to determine which of our country reports is most newsworthy, but it is my job to form a judgment as to the rank order of the problems we face in the field of human rights worldwide. Our compilation contains 171 reports. Without having undertaken an exact count, I would say that we mention human rights violations in a substantial majority of the countries involved. Within that group, the introduction to the reports identifies those which in 1988 were by far the most egregious. There have also been during 1988 a number of significant positive developments in the human rights field that demonstrate that measured, thought out efforts to improve human rights conditions do pay off, even if it takes time.

In light of yesterday's and today's publicity on the subject, let me try to place our report on the Occupied Territories in context. The situation in the Israeli Occupied Territories is sui generis. It is not the typical setting for gross human rights violations, as would be mass killings or total repression. It is a situation in which an occupying army responds to serious civil disorder by using what in our judgment is excessive force or by imposing excessive punishment. That is the human rights problem with which we're dealing in the Occupied Territories. As distinct from the cases involving domestic strife, this problem can best be solved by peace settlement, a settlement which we and so many others devoutly wish would come to pass.

Let me also say that I saw a TV show this morning on which Congressman Owens appeared, and the host of the show

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ended with a quote that alleged to come from our report and it's not in our report. I just want to say somebody misspoke or got something wrong. In case you have seen that show and if you have seen our report, you may wonder. I wonder, too. It's not in our report.

I also want to say that our view of the matter is very much in tune with what the Washington Post had to say editorially today on the subject.

Q Mr. Schifter, in this case of Israel, what are the consequences of what you perceive to be a deterioration in the treatment of human rights on the -- in the Occupied Territories?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Let me just say something about what we can do here and what we can't do. We all are aware of the fact that we have a transition, and what I can speak to at this particular point is the facts as to what happened in 1988. As far as policy projections in the future is concerned, I'm in no position to offer any comments on that.

Q This year's report appears to be more blunter than usual. Also in each of the reports, you are quoting the Amnesty International and various news service. I want to ask you what standards do you observe when you reproduce this? Is it a standard of possibility, plausibility, probability, or certainty? Do you recheck all these reports before you put them in the paper to make sure that they're more or less approximating the truth?

SEC. SCHIFTER: That's a good question. Let me just say that we try our very best to verify reports that we get by checking with our embassies. And, as a matter of fact, our embassies really play a very important role in all that, in terms of checking and rechecking the allegations that have been reported to us.

Q The Israelis appear to suggest that the report is basically one-sided; it was taken out of context, didn't take into account, for instance, the fact that there is no capital punishment in Israel and so on. What would you say to that?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Look, the report speaks for itself. What we have pointed out is what the problems are. We -- as I indicated in my initial statement, there is civil unrest and there is a matter of responding to civil unrest. As we have indicated, we believe the force used was excessive.

Q In past years, I believe you've indicated that you thought that Cuba and North Korea were the worst violators of human rights. Would you care to make a -- such a ranking this year?

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SEC. SCHIFTER: The same.

Q Same two?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Oh, yes -- yes. Perhaps you may find others that rank quite high. Let me just tell you by what standard I measure this. What we are talking about here is total repression. The point I've made in the past is that if you think of the nightmare state that George Orwell envisioned in his novel "1984", if you take a look at what it is that goes on in North Korea, you come closest to it, and this is year after year, the same situation. That is a country which is -- in which the government tries, really, to turn people into automatons.

As far as Cuba is concerned, there is an effort there to try to achieve the same thing in terms of total penetration of the country by secret police, and truly spying on every citizen.

Q So you're saying that Cuba's human rights record is worse than Iran's, for example?

SEC. SCHIFTER: It's a different kind of situation. Let me just point this out: You know, when you begin to rank these things, you do run into, obviously, into some problems. If you measure it by the standard of total repression -- that is, just having a spy system that goes into neighborhoods -- yes, on that basis it is worse. If you're thinking of it in terms of the numbers of persons killed during, let's say, the last year -- no, it is not. Then the situation in Cuba is one where the numbers of persons killed for political reasons -- as a matter of fact, I think for 1988, we don't know of any. There may have been some.

Q Wouldn't that be the fundamental, the first standard, is the right to life?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Let me simply say that you can draw your own conclusions on the basis of whatever standards you want to apply. If you want to look at it in terms of total repression and the operation of a spy system, deprivation of the individual of human dignity, of his individuality, then you apply one yardstick. If you look at the number of persons who died as a result somehow of governmental action, then it's another. If you take a look at where in 1988 the single largest number of deaths occurred

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as a result of -- in that case, neglect or failure to do certain things -- it is in the Sudan, and there it's not only the Sudanese government but the opposition army as well. And, as you know, the two contending forces have denied access to food for a rather significant area in the south, and the result of that has been large scale starvation.

Q Where do you rank Syria and Iraq on your list -- Syria and Iraq?

SEC. SCHIFTER: As far as Syria's concerned, there you have also a very significant secret police operation that is very, very repressive. Iran is --

Q Iraq.

SEC. SCHIFTER: Oh, Iraq. In my introduction, I've indicated what the problems in Iraq were. First of all, we have the two chemical warfare attacks on Kurdish populated towns with a great many civilians dying from -- as a result of these chemical warfare attacks. The estimates range in the area of 8000 killed in that fashion. We have, as far as the Kurdish population is concerned, the fact that tens of thousands have fled to Turkey and tens of thousands have fled to Iran as well. And we have the large scale destruction of villages and the removal -- forcible removal -- of perhaps half a million people over a period of time from the Kurdish areas of northern and eastern Iraq to other parts of the country.

In addition to that, we have there -- our report describes an extraordinarily repressive regime, also with a very, very effective secret police force and credible reports of torture and killings.

Q Going back to one of your previous answers: In the case of North Korea and Iran, how do you verify these reports when we have no embassy there -- in either place?

SEC. SCHIFTER: We use other sources. There have been many, first of all, other people who come out of these areas that we can check with. We have other ways of checking these matters.

Q Mr. Schifter, in your report, you say that one of your responses to human rights violations is quiet diplomacy. In the case of South Korea, for example, the police and army have refined techniques



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of dealing with mass demonstrations. Did the United States government ever advise the government of Israel to seek advice from a friendly government on how to use less lethal means?

SEC. SCHIFTER: The answer --

Q And, if so, what was the response?

SEC. SCHIFTER: The answer is "yes." And the basic answer has been that -- in South Korea you have a trained police force; in the case of Israel and the West Bank it is the army, which is simply neither trained nor equipped to handle this. One ought to take a look from that point of view at the difference between Jerusalem, where there is a trained police force.

Q The uprising has now gone on what? 12-15 months. During that period was there time for the Israeli government to train the police or re-train the army? And -- (inaudible/blocked by Schifter) --

SEC. SCHIFTER: Well, that is something that you can take up with them -- that you have to take up with them. It is --

Q It's the United States government which is concerned about these violations --

SEC. SCHIFTER: There is a question as to whether an army can be easily be trained for that, or whether they can really have a substantial enough police force to -- for that.

Q The United States government didn't raise this suggestion with the government of Israel?

SEC. SCHIFTER: No. We have. I've indicated to you we have. And I've told you -- you asked me whether we raised it. The answer is "yes." And you've asked me what the response was, and I've given you the response.

Q Thank you.

SEC. SCHIFTER: Yes?

Q In the rest of the Middle East, are there other countries which have shown marked improvement this year? You've talked about Israel. You've talked about Syria and Iraq. Are there countries in the Middle East that have shown improvement?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Egypt has moved toward a more open society, a more -- increasingly, over recent years, toward greater democracy.

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Q Any others? Any other --

SEC. SCHIFTER: Tunisia, of course, a very significant change there.

Q I wasn't clear on what you said the Israeli response was to American overtures on human rights.

SEC. SCHIFTER: This was on the question of -- the question that was posed was whether we have raised the issue of whether they could follow the example of South Korea in how to deal with unrest. And the answer that we got, as I indicated, was that, in the case of South Korea, we're dealing with a police force, and they pointed out that the Jerusalem police can handle the situation in Jerusalem similarly, but that, on the West Bank and in Gaza, you're dealing with the army, and they're neither trained nor equipped to do this.

Q Sir, could you give a review, please, of the situation in South Africa and the black African countries?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Well, let me put it this way: Our reports indicate rather clearly what the situation is in each of the countries in question. I wouldn't want to generalize, but if you take a look at individual situations, you have human rights violations in a good many parts of Africa, in addition to South Africa. There's no doubt about that.

Q Would say it's getting worse?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Our reports make that very clear.

Q Would you say it's getting worse, the situation's getting worse in general?

SEC. SCHIFTER: In Africa?

Q Yes.

SEC. SCHIFTER: Well, let me put it this way: If you take a look at what happened in 1990, the killings in Burundi,

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which are described fully in our report, certainly constitute a very serious problem.

Q Mr. Secretary, was this final report approved by Secretary Shultz as the last word, or by Secretary Baker?

SEC. SCHIFTER: The report was filed on January 19th.

Q May I ask one more thing?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Sure.

Q The chapters or sections on the Middle East, were they prepared in the Middle East bureau while Assistant Secretary Murphy was in charge?

SEC. SCHIFTER: What happened -- what happens in the preparation of the reports, all of the reports are initially drafted in the embassies. They're worked on in the embassies, and then sent to Washington, and we work on these -- I should say embassies and other posts. In the case of the Occupied Territories, it's of course the Consular General in Jerusalem as well. And these reports come to the -- come to Washington, and are worked on by the regional bureaus and our bureau as well.

Q Can I ask one more question?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Yes.

Q One more question. The copy of the report that I have says on the front cover: "For Embargo, 10:00 a.m., Wednesday." I take it that's -- today is Wednesday, and 10:00 a.m. passed about 15 minutes ago.

SEC. SCHIFTER: My introductory --

Q Yet the Washington Post this morning carried a full dress story on this. Do you have any criticism of the Washington Post --

SEC. SCHIFTER: My introductory statement --

Q -- breaking the ethics of journalism? (Scattered laughter.)

SEC. SCHIFTER: My -- well, let me be very specific. As far as I can see, the first story appeared in the Wall Street Journal yesterday. And my initial paragraph referred to the fact that there was a leak. This was a leak that seems to have occurred on Monday. We regret it -- we regret this. And I suppose, under the rules of the profession, once a leak has developed, everybody feels they're entitled to leak.

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Q Last year Algeria experienced riots over economic conditions, and the government promised political reforms. Do you see any hope for change or breaking of the one-party rule in Algeria, some openness there?

SEC. SCHIFTER: There's always hope. One can hope that that would occur.

Q Do you see any positive signs, anything that gives you cause to --

SEC. SCHIFTER: Well, there was certainly a clear commitment on the part of the Algerian government to that. We'll see whether there's a follow-through on that.

Q Are your standards for judging human rights performance the same as those basically of the UN Declaration on Human Rights? It seems to me you emphasize freedom more than they do -- than the UN Declaration, which seems to equate, or draw no distinction between human -- individual liberty and economic rights, you know, the right to a job and the right to medical attention and the right to education and so forth.

SEC. SCHIFTER: The UN Declaration of Human Rights consists of 25 or 26 operative articles. If I remember correctly, 21 deal with political and civil rights, and four have some of these economic rights.

Let me simply say that the distinction that we have made is the following; that we believe that the general American public and the Congress, in the legislation that has dealt with this, has focused on the rights of the person against, essentially, the rights that limit the authority of government and also on the right of the individual citizen to vote. As far as the rights to employment, to medical care, to housing, et cetera are concerned, these really involve governmental policy.

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In years past, the argument that was often advanced in international fora was that the Leninist countries, those that profess to be socialist, are more concerned about these economic rights than we are. What has happened in recent years is that it's more and more been recognized that if you just talk about rights and don't deliver them in this economic area, you haven't accomplished a great deal. And what is so interesting is that the Soviet Union now fully recognizes as well, and if you'd just take a look at what the Soviets say about themselves these days, the first thing that they will tell you is that they have failed to deliver on the promise.

So, in this situation, it's not so much a matter of talking about theory and what it is that's put into constitutions, but what the practice is. We don't believe that the Congress, in asking us to report on these matters, wanted us to do anything other than report on these individual rights and also on worker rights. There was special legislation passed on that, and we have dealt with what we think the Congress wants us to do.

Q Mr. Schifter, on your section on the Soviet Union, you cite progress in certain areas. I'm thinking specifically of emigration. And, you also make some more general comments. I wonder if you can tell us if it's your impression that the Soviets have put machinery into place or a structure into place that will make the reforms, specifically in emigration -- lead you to believe that this trend will continue?

SEC. SCHIFTER: First of all, they have -- the only step that they have taken so far to institutionalize change, the only concrete step, is to amend their constitution so as to set up a system of electing the Supreme Soviet, which is different -- let's put it this way -- from anything that they have done in the previous 70 years. How significantly different it will turn out to be time will tell. They have said that once a new Supreme Soviet meets, it will take up the various proposed changes in the law that will change the criminal code and the code dealing with the control of religion so as to approach the standards of the Helsinki Final Act.

Q Does that include emigration?

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SEC. SCHIFTER: Emigration, too; yes.

By the way, I want to tell you, in view of the fact that you have emphasized emigration, emigration is one of the issues, as you know, that is to be raised; it's not the only issue. And it's not the only issue on which we have noted progress in the report.

Q I understand that. The reason I asked that is suppose you had a hypothetical case where you are a government, you want to make a decision based on Soviet emigration standards. If you looked at this report -- I guess what I'm asking you would be, given the data in the report, how willing would you be to base that sort of decision on the data that you have in the report?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Yes, I understand what your question is. And let me put it to you this way. While the Trade Act of 1974 has language in it that we're all aware of, the fact of the matter is that concern regarding human rights has grown since 1974 to encompass a great many other considerations. So, I'm quite sure that when decisions along these lines are made, both in the Executive Branch and in the Congress, other factors, not only emigration, will be considered.

Q Mr. Schifter, my question --

SEC. SCHIFTER: And I want to say, if you take a look at the history with regard to MFN for Romania, that's precisely what happened.

Q Well, we -- well, okay. Then, looking at those other factors, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union --

SEC. SCHIFTER: I'm not going to make any predictions.

Q Okay.

Q My question is on Cuba, sir. The government of Cuba released in March a figure of 455 political prisoners. Are those figures part of your estimate? And how -- if they are part of your estimate, how those figures were verified?

SEC. SCHIFTER: A good many of these people are people who then come to the United States, and these are names that have been turned over to us, either to us directly or the Catholic Bishops Conference.

Q Fifty Central America sections of the report were criticized by the Human Rights Watch organization, I wonder if you could respond to three specific instances. El Salvador, they said that government abuses were minimized in the report. In Guatemala,

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they said the report greatly exaggerates limited improvements in human rights, while dismissing or failing to report evidence of the continued practice of intimidation and murder by the military there. And in Nicaragua, they said there were sweeping generalizations that seemed designed to portray Nicaragua in the most negative light possible. Could you respond to those three?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Yes. As you can imagine, we disagree with that assessment. (Laughter.)

Q So -- let me --

SEC. SCHIFTER: You know, the reports really stand for themselves, after hearing that.

MR. REDMAN: Let me take maybe three more questions from people who haven't asked. Carol, back here, and then --

Q Mr. Schifter, this year as last year, you indicate in the report that there's decreasing evidence of coerced abortions in China. Could you just sort of say something about how you view the situation? Do we still consider it a problem?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Well, one important aspect of it is rather interesting, as to how there is a relationship, a close interrelationship, between economic change and social change of this kind. The fact that the system, particularly in rural areas, has changed so significantly, with farmers becoming increasingly independent economically, has also meant that the kind of pressures that may have been imposed in the past become less and less effective.

Q But is the government still trying to apply that pressure?

SEC. SCHIFTER: Well, the government -- the government has over the years said to us, time and time again, that, "we don't have any policy of forcing abortions." At the same time, people would concede that lower ranking cadres may put pressure on people in certain areas. The point I'm making is that with the increasing independence of individuals as the situation in China evolves, they have more courage to resist this kind of pressure.

Q Mr. Schifter, how are you planning to work with Israel to accept the tone of the report, knowing that they already rejected it out of hand, and you have that close relationship with Israel at all times?

SEC. SCHIFTER: I would say that one would assume that these

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matters are going to be attended to. (Laughter.)

Q How?

MR. REDMAN: Last question.

Q Mr. Schifter, do you consult with various governments before you print this report? Or do you rely just only on the embassies and consulates?

SEC. SCHIFTER: The latter.

Q Thank you.

SEC. SCHIFTER: We talk to anyone who wants to come in to talk to us afterwards about the report. We're glad to talk to them.

Q Thank you.

END

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דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
סוג:		פתוך: 2
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל:
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסוד:		
203		פאת:

5. השלב הבא העמוד הוא עדויות של קבוצות פרטיות כאמנטי, ועדת עו"ד לזכ"א וקבוצות מעקב שונות. טרם נקבע טועד אולם השימועים לאיתקיימו ככל הנראה בשבועיים הקרובים. בכל מקרה, לא יומיעו כעדים גורמים ואירגונים ערביים כלשוט.

אילנה ורנא' דרנאר.
יחודית ורנא' דרנאר

תפוצה:

Israel cites border raid in effort to block U.S.-PLO talks

JERUSALEM (Reuters) — Israel charged yesterday that the Palestine Liberation Organization had violated U.S. conditions for a dialogue by sending gunmen from Lebanon to attack its northern border over the weekend.

Israeli troops killed five guerrillas in a clash Sunday in Israel's self-declared security zone in south Lebanon. The army said the five were on their way to carry out an attack in Israel.

"This incident is a clear violation of the conditions that the United States established for contact with the PLO," Foreign Minister Moshe Arens told visiting American Jewish leaders.

In Washington, Israel formally asked the United States to break off contacts with the PLO. According to U.S. and Israeli sources, Oded Eran, deputy chief of the Israeli Embassy, met at the State Department with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs Edward S. Walker and reportedly recalled that the United States had told the PLO in their first meet-

ing in December that it would not accept terrorist attacks.]

In Tunis, a PLO official said the five men were on a military mission and did not violate the group's renunciation of terrorism. "It was a military operation. It was a response to Israeli terrorism and the aim was to attack Israeli soldiers," he said.

Mr. Arens quickly seized on the

example of a terrorist act by a branch of the PLO... that accepts the authority of Yasser Arafat," Mr. Arens said.

The United States began a low-level dialogue with the PLO after Mr. Arafat made the pledges in Geneva but warned that his words would have to be matched by deeds.

Military sources said it was the

Military sources said it was the first penetration attempt across Israel's northern border by a major PLO faction since Mr. Arafat's U.N. address.

clash with gunmen of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and a faction of the Palestine Liberation Front — both Syrian-backed members of the PLO.

"The [U.S.] administration spelled out unequivocally the conditions [for a dialogue], including no further terrorist acts by any branch of the PLO. The day before yesterday, we had an

first penetration attempt across Israel's northern border by a major PLO faction since Mr. Arafat's U.N. address.

The chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Seymour Reich, said he doubted the Bush administration would see the weekend attack as grounds to break off the

dialogue.

In Washington, State Department spokesman Charles Redman told a press briefing: "The incident involved is the kind of thing that we would look into, and we'll do that."

He declined to comment further.

[Branch officials in Washington said the administration was taking a harder line on the incident. They said Mr. Walker had pledged to look at the incident and then reply to Mr. Eran's call for a halt to the dialogue.

"We're taking the incident seriously. We are not going to condone cross-border attacks like this," said one State Department official privy to yesterday's discussions.]

In east Jerusalem meanwhile, Israeli police soaked Palestinian protesters with green dye shot from water cannon with enough force to shatter windows along the main shopping street. The cannon fired bursts of dyed water to mark suspects for arrest.

Witnesses said two policemen were slightly injured when youths in Arab headdress poured into Salah a-Din Street and began hurling stones and bricks in the worst unrest in the city in weeks.

The youths burned tires, chanted nationalist slogans and smashed car windows before police dispersed them by firing rubber bullets, tear gas and the water cannon.

In the occupied Gaza Strip, merchants staged a spontaneous commercial strike coinciding with a call by underground Palestinian leaders for a day of confrontation in protest at the killing of demonstrators.

Troops shot dead three protesters and wounded more than 50 in weekend clashes in the Gaza Strip, casting doubt on Israeli claims that a clampdown was bringing violence under control.

Yesterday, troops shot and wounded three Palestinian protesters in the Gaza Strip including a 15-year-old girl, hospital officials said. The army said two Palestinians were wounded by rubber bullets in the West Bank towns of Tulkarem and Jenin.

• Staff Writer James M. Dorsey contributed to this report from Washington.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

Israelis Say PLO Broke Antiterrorism Pledge

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, Feb. 6—Israeli officials today charged that the Palestine Liberation Organization broke its pledge to the United States to renounce terrorism with its endorsement of an apparent attempt yesterday by armed Palestinian infiltrators to conduct a raid into Israel.

The attempt—the first by PLO-related groups since the organization renounced terrorism two months ago—was “a clear and unequivocal violation of the conditions that the United States established for contact with the PLO” and Washington should respond by breaking off talks with the organization, Foreign Minister Moshe Arens told a group of American

Jewish leaders meeting here this morning.

Israeli troops in southern Lebanon opened fire on nine armed men early yesterday morning, killing five of them after the group entered Israel's self-declared security zone there. The shootings occurred about five miles from Israel's border, near Hasbaya, Lebanon.

Israeli military officials said the large amount of arms the men were carrying—automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 15 hand grenades and a gun with a silencer, plus a pair of wire cutters—and the direction in which they were heading indicated they were planning a terrorist attack inside Israel.

The army said at least three of the men belonged to George Hatash's Popular Front for the Lib-

eration of Palestine and the rest were from the Syrian-based Palestine Liberation Front.

Both are small, radical factions under the broad umbrella of the PLO and are members of the Palestine National Council, the PLO's governing body. But both contend they do not take orders from PLO leader Yasser Arafat, and they have disputed his December statement in Geneva renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel's right to exist.

Nonetheless, an unidentified PLO spokesman in Tunis endorsed the abortive raid, saying it was not terrorism because it was “a military mission” aimed at Israeli soldiers in response to what the spokesman called “Israeli terrorism,” Reuters reported.

In his first meeting with PLO officials in Tunis in December, the

U.S. representative, Ambassador Robert Pelletreau, stated Washington's demand that the organization not only desist from terrorism but dissociate itself from terrorist acts by any Palestinian group. The United States also called on the PLO to condemn publicly terrorist attacks conducted by any element of the organization and to expel those responsible.

[In Washington, State Department spokesman Charles Redman said that “the incident involved is the kind of thing that we would look into, and we'll do that,” Washington Post staff writer John M. Goshko reported. Later, Israeli Embassy minister Oded Eran, met with Ned Walker, a deputy assistant secretary of state, to make the Israeli request for a halt in the U.S. dialogue with the PLO.]

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Israeli Criticizes U.S. Over the P.L.O.

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By JOEL BRINKLEY

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Feb. 6 — Foreign Minister Moshe Arens lashed out today at the United States and other Western nations, asserting that an attempted guerrilla raid on Israel on Sunday proved that the Palestine Liberation Organization had not really renounced terrorism.

Speaking to a convention of leaders of American Jewish organizations here, Mr. Arens said he and others in Israel were "aghast to see the world's great leaders lining up to pay homage" to the P.L.O. chairman, Yasir Arafat. "People now want to be photographed shaking that man's hand."

In Washington, the Israeli Embassy formally asked the United States to halt its dialogue with the P.L.O. because of the attempted guerrilla attack. The State Department said it would look into the charges.

One Formal Meeting Held

The State Department is not expected to find it easy to determine whether the incident constitutes a violation of Mr. Arafat's vow not to engage in terrorism, since this particular clash involved Palestinian guerrillas confronting Israeli soldiers, who themselves were in occupation of a third country — Lebanon.

State Department officials acknowledged that they expected this type of incident, which the Israelis label terrorism and the Palestinians call legitimate warfare between rival armies, to

Arens says the no-terrorism pledge is broken.

constantly bedevil the United States-P.L.O. dialogue.

The dialogue was begun by the Reagan Administration in December, after Mr. Arafat's recognition of Israel and his renunciation of terrorism in all its forms. Only one formal meeting was held under the Reagan Administration.

Early Sunday morning Israeli troops in southern Lebanon killed five guerrillas who were on their way to the Israeli border. The guerrillas, four Palestinians and one Lebanese, reportedly carried pistols and automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank rockets and other weapons.

The army said it was the first attempted guerrilla raid against Israel by any P.L.O. branch since Mr. Arafat forswore terrorism in November.

The Israelis said identification found on the bodies indicated that the men belonged to two radical wings of the P.L.O. — Dr. George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Front headed by Mohammed Abbas, who masterminded the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Archimedes* in 1985.

Although both groups are members of the P.L.O., it is not clear to the State Department how much control Mr.

Arafat has over them, or if he should be held responsible for their actions.

Prepared Remarks Abandoned

Mr. Arens, who has been scheduled to speak to the convention of American Jewish organizations today, abandoned his prepared remarks and wrote a new speech after receiving word of the attempted infiltration on Sunday.

He said both P.L.O. factions involved in the attempted attack were represented at the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers last November at which Mr. Arafat renounced terrorism. But since then, Dr. Habash has publicly said he did not consider Mr. Arafat's remarks to be official P.L.O. policy and would not support them.

Still, at P.L.O. headquarters in Tunis today, an official endorsed the attempted guerrilla infiltration, Reuters reported. He said the five men killed were not on a terrorist operation.

"It was a military operation," he said. "It was a response to Israeli terrorism, and the aim was to attack Israeli soldiers."

Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported that in the occupied Gaza Strip, troops shot and wounded a 15-year-old Palestinian girl in the leg during clashes, Arab doctors said. The army said it was checking the report.

In Arab East Jerusalem, the police used rubber bullets, tear gas and a water cannon to subdue dozens of Palestinians who threw stones at cars and shop windows.

Israeli Request to U.S.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 6 — The Israeli Embassy today formally appealed to the State Department to end its dialogue with the P.L.O.

The Deputy Chief of Mission at the Israeli Embassy, Oded Eran, met with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, Ned Walker, to present the appeal.

A senior State Department official said Washington was taking the matter "very seriously," but it wanted to gather all the details from the incident, and determine who was responsible, before it made any formal response.

The official said Washington's position has always been that it would hold the P.L.O. responsible "for the activities of its constituent elements, and the P.F.L.P. is a full member of the P.L.O. executive committee."

Don't miss Sunday's Times Magazine.

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דו"ח מחמ"ד על זכויות האדם - תקשורת

בשורה ראשונה יש לומר כי דו"ח מחמ"ד יצר מצב קשה עבורנו בו התקשורת עשה עליו ודנה בו אינטנסיבית. נוצר מסד נוסף ממנו עשויים דיונים בנו בעתיד לפתוח כנקודה התחלה הגיונית ביותר. מזה יומיים שה-"ניו יורק טיימס" מכבד אותנו בכתובה בעמוד הראשון, והיום אף ציטט קטעים מן הדו"ח הנוגעים להפרות של זכויות האדם ע"י ישראל בשטחים. הקטע על ישראל, אגב, זה היה הפרק היחיד ממנו צוטטו קטעים בשלמותם. הנושא זוכה לתהודה רבה בעתונות הכתובה והאלקטרונית. אתמול (7.2.89) דנו בו ה-"טיימס" וה-"וול סטריט ג'ורנל" וחיוס גם שאר העתונים. כל מהדורות החדשות ברשתות הקדישו לנושא כתבה אחת לפחות אתמול ואחת היום. CHS שידרה אמש שתי כתבות - האחת על דו"ח מחמ"ד והשניה על תגובתם של ערביי-אמריקנים על הנעשה בשטחים. השגריר ארד התראיין אתמול בכל הרשתות והביא תגובתנו.

היום לא קיבלנו גל גדול של פניות ושאלות מהתקשורת. בעיקר כותבי מאמרי המערכת צלצלו לדעת תגובתנו (וקיבלוה). אין לדעת כיצד יכתבו אולם ניתן לומר בזהירות הראויה שהנימוק ממנו החרשמו ביותר היה שלמעשה מבקשים יוצרי האנתיפאדה לתקוע טריז בין ישראל ליודותיה, ובמיוחד ארה"ב, כך שיוכלו לחולל תהליך מדיני בלעדית ולכפות עליה הסדר לא רצוי. אפשר שידגישו תדלמה חצבאית / מדינית של ישראל.

מאפייני הכיסוי וההתייחסות:

1. ביקורת חריפה על ישראל תוך איזכור טלביזיוני של חמונות העבר הקשות ביותר.
2. גינוי לעינויים המוזכרים בדו"ח.
3. ויכוח וגיבוי על ישראל, חן מול מיעוט ההתייחסות למעב זכויות האדם בארצות אחרות המוזכרות בדו"ח, והן מול השבחים לברה"מ.
4. המחלוקת בישראל סביב הדו"ח. ביקורת ישראלים על ממשלתם.
5. השפעה אפשרית על מעמד ישראל והסיוע מארה"ב.
6. מימד כמותי - שפע של כתבות טלביזיוניות קשות מאד, אם כי לא בפתח למהדורות החדשות אלא באמצעותן.

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להלן פירוט כתבות היום ברשתות:

היום שבו הרשתות ועסקו בנו בהרחבה, כשהן כורכות FOLLOW-UP על דו"ח זכויות האדם בארועי הדוח לשנתה, ותחוות הארועי היום בתמונות ארכיב (בעיקר צילומי CBS ה"מפורסמים"). CBS במיוחד התרכזה בתרוג הישראלי. חוס פנטון מתאר שיתח האלוף מצנע עם פלסטינים הרושים הגדרה עצמית ודבריו כי לא ייתכן שגורן צבאי. עוד בכתבה דיויד הרטמן על ה-SOUL SEARCHING בחברה הישראלית והופעתו של פייצל חוסייני בכית כנסת ירושלמי, ראיון עם השר וייצמן על שאינו חושש ממו"מ עם אש"פ ושיפוטו של סרבן שרות נוסף. בסה"כ, מסכס פנטון, הסקרים מראים שרוב הישראלים מוכן לתפנית של מו"מ עם אש"פ וכי אפשר שארץ זו מוכנה כיום אולי ללכת בכיוון בו מנהיג נועז ירצה לקחתה. ABC מדגישה ביתר תוקף שלא כל הישראלים מזדהים עם דברי מנהיגיהם המגוננים על מעשי צבאם בשטחים, ומקדישה כתבת פרופיל לרן אלמגור ודרך שעבר מ-"חילד הטוב" של המסדר עד לגועל שהוא חש מול הפרות זכויות האדם. ב-NBC עומד מרטין פלטר על המחיר הכבד ביותר, שאינו רק העובדה שמתוך 20,000 נפגעים כמחצית הם ילדים, אלא שילדים אלה גדלים לשנוא את היהודים כמעט ללא שביב תקוה. CNN שידרה 3 כתבות: (1) על דברי אבו עלי מצטפא שימשיך בטרור גם אם ערפאת יפסיק, וכן שצה"ל הרג בצפון "5 PLO GUERRILLAS" (אזכור אש"פ בשמו בהקשר זה הוא מחוה נדיר מצד CNN). (2) גרינספן מתייחס לתגובות הממורמות כלפי הדו"ח בציבור הישראלי מחד, ולחסכמה לתכנו בחלקים אחרים בציבור מאידך. על תקוות הפלסטינים וחשש הישראלים מפגיעה בסיוע כעקבות הדו"ח. (3) לינדה שרער דיווחה על כפרת הדרך העצומה שעשתה האשה הפלסטינית כחברתה-הזא רשל תפקידה הקדמי באנתיפאדה. חכנית CROSSFIRE ביקשה לעמת הערב כציג ישראלי רשמי מול איש ה-ADC, וכשל סרובנו המנומס העדיפה לעסוק בסופו של דבר בנושא אחר לחלוטין. ב"מקביל/לחרר" רואיון שחב"ט, שהעביר המוקד מהארועים בשטחים שחם לזירה המדינית ולצוון בטוון טויני. גויון שאח"כ השתתפו זאב שיף, סם לואיס ופרופ' סהליה (פלסטיני). בלט במיוחד סם לואיס שהעמיד על דיוקו את ההבדל בין פלסטיני השחים לפלסטיני אש"פ.

בינה.



ת"ק אונ"ג

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משרד החוץ
15-2-1989
נתקבל

official text

INTRODUCTION

1988 Human Rights Report

This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in compliance with Sections 116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.* The legislation requires human rights reports on all countries that receive aid from the United States and all countries that are members of the United Nations. In the belief that the information would be useful to the Congress and other readers, we have also included reports on the few countries which do not fall into either of these categories and which are thus not covered by the Congressional requirement.

*Section 116(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as follows:

"The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by January 31 of each year, a full and complete report regarding ...

(1) the status of internationally recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (a) ...

(A) in countries that received assistance under this part, and

(B) in all other foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report under this Act."

Section 502(B)(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as follows:

"The Secretary of State shall transmit to Congress, as part of the presentation materials for security assistance programs proposed for each fiscal year, a full and complete report, prepared with the assistance of the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect to practices regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights in each country proposed as a recipient of security assistance."



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Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act by adding the foregoing sections of law so as to be able to consult these reports when considering assistance programs for specific foreign countries. One of the very important consequences --perhaps unintended--of these legislative provisions is that they have made human rights concerns an integral part of the State Department's daily reporting and daily decisionmaking. A human rights officer in an Embassy overseas who wants to write a good annual human rights report on the country in which he or she works must carefully monitor and observe human rights developments throughout the year on a daily basis. As a consequence he or she will report on such developments whenever something of human rights significance happens in the country of assignment. In the past 12 years, the State Department has become decidedly better informed on and sensitized to human rights violations as they occur around the globe.

Any country-specific discussion of worldwide human rights developments in 1988 must start, as did our discussion of such developments in 1987, with an assessment of the remarkable changes in the Soviet Union. Last year we said that the changes which occurred in 1987 were more than cosmetic but less than fundamental. We still cannot say that there has been a fundamental shift in the Soviet Union's approach to human rights, but there is no doubt that the changes in evidence in 1988 have profound implications, as advocates of significant systemic reform appear to have gained strength.

By the end of 1988, all persons in the Soviet Union who had been sentenced under the articles of the criminal codes which punish dissenting political or unauthorized religious activity had been set free. Plans for amendment or repeal of the so-called political and religious articles have been announced. Abuse of psychiatry has been made a punishable offense. Freedom to leave the country temporarily has been significantly expanded. Armenian, ethnic German, and Jewish emigration has increased further, as has the emigration of Pentecostals. Plans have been adopted for elections which, though not completely free and open, are no longer to be the farce they have been heretofore.

At the same time, the ability of opponents of reform to slow down progress, the existence of a powerful and pervasive secret police force, and the supremacy of the Communist Party remind us of the fact that institutional guarantees to protect the rights of the individual against unbridled state authority are still needed. Soviet reformers speak of the importance of respect for the rule of law and have underlined the vital importance of creating an independent judiciary, but that is still in the future. Nonetheless, the recognition of the need for action to secure the rights of individuals, and the fact that the defects of the existing system are now openly discussed, offer a basis for cautious hope of a better day.

The year 1988 also saw significant further advances in Hungary and Poland toward a more open society.

As far as the positive side of the ledger in 1988 is concerned, we need to note that, abiding by the provisions of the Chilean Constitution, President Pinochet submitted his candidacy for continuation in office to popular referendum. In a free and fair plebiscite the decision of the voters went against him. There is hope that in 1989 we shall witness Chile's peaceful return to democracy.

On the Asian continent, the year 1988 also saw significant steps taken by the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Pakistan toward democracy and increasing respect for the rights of the individual. By contrast, in Burma a nationwide outpouring of sentiment in favor of free elections was brutally suppressed when the military systematically killed and detained student demonstrators and leaders.

The other most significant human rights violations of the year 1988, if measured by their severity and the numbers of persons affected, took place in the context of interethnic conflicts in Iraq, Burundi, and Sudan. In each of these situations innocent civilian bystanders died as a result of guerrilla warfare or reprisals for violence by others.

The Iraqi Government employed chemical warfare against a Kurdish insurgency, killing and injuring thousands of civilians and causing tens of thousands to flee their country. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds have also been forcibly relocated within Iraq. An estimated 5,000 to 10,000 civilians were killed during ethnic violence in Burundi. Following attacks by Hutu tribesmen on Tutsis, the Tutsi-dominated military retaliated by killing thousands of Hutus. Tens of thousands of Hutus fled the country. By year's end, however, President Buyoya had succeeded in establishing a government of reconciliation consisting of members of both of these ethnic groups, and most of the Hutu refugees had voluntarily returned to Burundi.

Tragically, the interethnic conflict in Sudan, between the Sudanese Army and government-supported tribal militias on one hand, and the Ethiopian-supported Sudanese People's Liberation Army on the other, resulted in the largest number of victims in 1988. Although no accurate assessment has been made, some reports estimate that 100,000 to 250,000 civilians in southern Sudan died from starvation after elements of armed forces on each side interfered or failed to cooperate with efforts to deliver food supplies to regions controlled by the other side.

This year there are 169 separate reports. The guidelines followed in preparing the reports are explained in detail in Appendix A. In Appendix B is a discussion of reporting on

worker rights, as required by Section 505 (c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by Title V of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984).* Although the legislation requires reports on worker rights only in developing countries that have been beneficiaries under the Generalized System of Preferences, in the interest of uniformity, and to provide a ready basis for comparison, we have here applied the same reporting standards that we have applied to all countries on which we prepare reports. Appendix C contains a list of 12 international human rights covenants and agreements and indicates which countries have ratified them.

In applying these internationally recognized standards, we seek to be objective. But the reports unashamedly reflect the U.S. view that the right of self-government is a basic political right, that government is legitimate only when grounded on the consent of the governed, and that government thus grounded should not be used to deny life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Individuals in a society have the inalienable right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person; to enjoy civil liberties such as freedom of expression, assembly, religion, and movement, without discrimination based on race, ancestry, or sex; and to change their government by peaceful means. The reports also take into account the fact that terrorists and guerrilla groups often kill, torture, or maim citizens or deprive them of their liberties; such violations are no less reprehensible if committed by violent opponents of the government than if committed by the government itself.

Definition of Human Rights

Human rights, as defined in Section 116(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, include freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; disappearance due to abduction or clandestine detention; and other flagrant denial of the rights to life, liberty, and the security of the person. Internationally recognized worker rights, as defined in Section 502(a) of the Trade Act, include (A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.

Section 505 (c) of the Trade Act provides as follows

"The President shall submit an annual report to the Congress on the status of internationally recognized worker rights within each beneficiary developing country."

In addition to discussing the topics specified in the legislation, our reports, as in previous years, cover other internationally recognized political rights and civil liberties and describe the political system of each country.

We have found that the concept of economic, social, and cultural rights is often confused, sometimes willfully, by repressive governments claiming that, in order to promote these "rights," they may deny their citizens the right to integrity of the person as well as political and civil rights. There exists a profound connection between human rights and economic development. Experience demonstrates that it is individual freedom that sets the stage for economic and social development; it is repression that stifles it. Those who try to justify subordinating political and civil rights on the ground that they are concentrating on economic aspirations invariably deliver on neither. That is why we consider it imperative to focus urgent attention on violations of basic political and civil rights. If these basic rights are not secured, experience has shown, the goals of economic development are not reached either. This is a point which the Soviet Union's reformers seem to have recognized.

United States Human Rights Policy

From this premise, that basic human rights may not be abridged or denied, it follows that our human rights policy is concerned with the limitations on the powers of government that are required to protect the integrity and dignity of the individual. Further, it is in our national interest to promote democratic processes in order to help build a world environment more favorable to respect for human rights and hence more conducive to stability and peace. We have developed, therefore, a dual policy, reactive in the sense that we continue to oppose specific human rights violations wherever they occur, but at the same time active in working over the long term to strengthen democracy.

In much of the world, the United States has a variety of means at its disposal to respond to human rights violations. We engage in traditional diplomacy, particularly with friendly governments, where frank diplomatic exchanges are possible and productive. Where we find limited opportunities for the United States to exert significant influence through bilateral relations, we resort to public statements of our concerns, calling attention to countries where respect for human rights is lacking. In a number of instances, we employ a mixture of traditional diplomacy and public affirmation of American interest in the issue.

The United States also employs a variety of means to encourage greater respect for human rights over the long term. Since 1983

the National Endowment for Democracy has been carrying out programs designed to promote democratic practices abroad, involving the two major United States political parties, labor unions, business groups, and many private institutions. Also, through Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, funds are disbursed by the Agency for International Development for programs designed to promote civil and political rights abroad. We also seek greater international commitment to the protection of human rights and respect for democracy through our efforts in the United Nations and other international organizations, and in the process devised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Preparation of these annual reports constitutes an important element of our human rights policy. The process, since it involves continuous and well-publicized attention to human rights, has contributed to the strengthening of an international human rights agenda. Many countries that are strong supporters of human rights are taking steps of their own to engage in human rights reporting and have established offices specifically responsible for international human rights policy. Even among countries without strong human rights records, sensitivity to these reports increasingly takes the form of constructive response, or at least a willingness to engage in a discussion of human rights policy. In calling upon the Department of State to prepare these reports, Congress has created a useful instrument for advancing the cause of human rights.

ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES*

Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty political system and free elections. The legislature (the Knesset) can limit the government and force its dissolution. Israel has an independent judiciary. There is no formal, written constitution, but a series of basic laws defines the responsibilities of government institutions. Cabinet ministers have authority over police and security agencies and are expected to answer to the Knesset for the activities of these agencies. Public debate on issues of concern to Israelis is open and lively. A vigorous free press scrutinizes all aspects of Israeli life and politics.

Israel enjoys a relatively high standard of living. It has a predominantly market economy with substantial government participation and subsidized prices for basic commodities. Economic policy has a strong orientation toward social welfare.

Since Israel's founding in 1948, only one Arab state, Egypt, has concluded a peace treaty with Israel (1979). This hostile situation, reflected in several Arab-Israeli armed conflicts and terrorist incidents within and outside Israel, contribute to a continuing sense of insecurity on the part of many Israelis. Emergency regulations have been in effect since 1948. Israel has occupied the territories of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the eastern sector of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights since the 1967 war. Government-sanctioned Jewish settlements in the occupied territories have heightened tension with Palestinian residents. In southern Lebanon, Israel maintains a residual military presence and supports a local militia, the "Army of South Lebanon." Arab citizens of Israel, who constitute approximately 17 percent of the population, do not share fully in the rights granted to, or the duties levied on, Jewish Israeli citizens. They are clustered at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale.

The most significant human rights problem for Israel in 1988 derived from the uprising of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza against the Israeli occupation, which began in December 1987 and continued throughout 1988. (For detailed discussion, see the separate report on the occupied territories.)

*Because the occupied territories are a distinct entity, where the legal, political, and human rights environments differ sharply from those of Israel, the situation in the territories is addressed in a separate report following the report for Israel.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from*

a. Political Killing

Israeli authorities do not sanction or practice political killing.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Israeli laws and administrative regulations clearly prohibit, and provide specific penalties for, such activities. However, where security concerns predominate, these strictures have been violated. The Landau Report of 1987 held that the general security service, Shin Bet, had routinely used physical and psychological mistreatment to obtain confessions. (For further discussion, see the separate report on the occupied territories.)

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Israeli law and practice guarantee against arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. Writs of habeas corpus and other procedural and substantive safeguards are available. Defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty. Administrative detention, without charge or trial, may be imposed under emergency regulations, within procedural guidelines. The detention order is signed by the Minister of Defense, and the detainee must be brought before the appropriate district court within 48 hours of being taken into custody. On review of the case, the judge may confirm, shorten, or overturn the detention order. Absent this review, the detainee must be released. If the detention is confirmed, further judicial review must take place at least every 3 months. The detainee may appeal the determination of the district court to the Supreme Court and may be represented by counsel at each stage of the review and appeal process. However, detainees are not presented with formal statements of charges, and evidence may be presented by the Government in the review process which is withheld from the detainee and his counsel.

In 1988 seven Israeli Arabs were held in administrative detention. By the end of 1988, most of them had been released, one of them to house arrest.

As a result of the significant increase in administrative detention of Palestinians, Israel established an Emergency Detention Center in Israeli territory, at Ketziot in the Negev desert. (For a discussion of the detention camp at Ketziot, see the separate report on the occupied territories.)

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The right to a hearing by an impartial tribunal with representation by counsel is guaranteed by law. The judiciary is independent and effectively insulated from political interference. All nonsecurity trials are open. Security cases may be tried before a military court and may be partly or wholly closed to the public. The burden of justifying nonpublic proceedings falls to the prosecution. Defense counsel is present, even during closed proceedings, but may be denied access to some evidence on security grounds.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Privacy of the individual and the sanctity of home life and correspondence are protected by law within Israel. However, some Israeli Arab political activists have expressed suspicion that their mail is delayed or confiscated. There are effective legal safeguards against arbitrary invasion of the home.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including*

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Freedom of speech and press, protected rights in Israel, are limited by security-based censorship provisions. Licenses, required of newspapers, are routinely issued. All newspapers are privately owned and managed. Israeli radio and television are run by the independent Israel Broadcast Authority (IBA). The Government helps to fund the IBA and appoints its governing board, but it has little direct control over programming. The board's members are appointed by political parties and tend to support their parties' views. The independence of the IBA is protected by law, subject to censorship provisions. Movies and theater productions are subject to censorship if deemed pornographic, otherwise offensive to religious or social mores, or likely to disturb public order. Censorship board actions, rarely imposed, may be appealed in the courts. According to the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1948, it is illegal to possess, for purposes of inciting support for organizations defined as terrorist, or to distribute literature considered hostile to Israel or that issued by illegal Palestinian organizations, to display Palestinian nationalist symbols, or publicly to express support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Israelis representing almost any point of view are free to assemble and associate. The law and court rulings protect these rights. However, contact by Israelis with the PLO, its subdivisions, or other organizations classified by the Government as terrorist, or with individual members of such organizations, is illegal. In 1988 four Israelis were convicted of violating the Prevention of Terrorism Law for meeting PLO members. An Israeli who had met with PLO leader Yasser Arafat was interrogated by the police and released on bail, but he had not been formally charged as of the end of 1988.

c. Freedom of Religion

All citizens are assured freedom of religion by law. Approximately 82 percent of Israeli citizens are Jewish. Muslims, Christians, and Druze, and members of other minority religions make up the remaining 18 percent. The law of return of 1950, which abolished restrictions on Jewish immigration, and the citizenship law of 1952, which granted every Jew the right to citizenship on arrival in Israel, confer advantages to Jews in matters of immigration, residence, and citizenship. Each recognized religious community in Israel is governed in personal status matters, not by civil law, but by its own religious law. A system of religious courts coexists with the civil. The religious courts have jurisdiction in matters of marriage, legitimacy, inheritance, and conversion, thus imposing in such matters the values of the dominant tradition within each religious community on all its members.

Women's rights are limited in some religious communities. Some Jewish and Christian congregations have complained that zoning regulations are used to prevent their establishment or expansion. Missionaries are allowed to enter Israel. A 1977 antiproselytizing law prohibits the offering and receipt of material benefits as an inducement to conversion. The Justice Ministry ruled in 1979 that the law is not intended to restrict any community's religious freedom or pursuit of educational or philanthropic activities, but Christian groups are uneasy. Since its enactment, the law has not been employed. However, whether because of concern for that law or because of the practical difficulty of attracting converts across the lines of the three major faiths represented in Israel, missionaries usually proselytize within the boundaries of their own major faith. Missionaries, or persons claiming to be missionaries, have occasionally been physically attacked by individuals and, in some cases, have been harassed by Jewish religious extremists. The police have actively protected missionary groups. The Ministry of Religious Affairs cooperates with and gives financial support to various interfaith groups.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign

Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Israeli citizens can move freely within Israel except in military or security zones, or in cases where they may be confined to their neighborhood or village by administrative order under emergency regulations. In 1988 two Israeli Arabs were thus confined. Both were also administratively detained in 1988. Israeli citizens are free to travel within the occupied territories, except in those sections temporarily declared closed military areas.

Palestinian residents of the occupied territories are generally free to travel within Israel. Residents of the territories working in Israel need permits to stay overnight, although this provision is often not enforced. On occasion in 1988, they were forbidden to enter Israel. Palestinians, especially young men, were occasionally prevented from entering Jerusalem on Friday, the Muslim holy day. Israeli citizens are free to travel abroad and to emigrate, provided they have no outstanding military obligations or are not restricted by administrative order. However, travel restrictions on two Israeli Arabs, both officials of the Progressive List for Peace Party, were renewed in 1988. These restrictions applied to travel abroad and to the occupied territories. The Israeli Government did not provide official reasons for these restrictions.

The Israeli concept of repatriation, as it applies to Jews, is influenced by the right of return and citizenship for all Jews, including those Israeli citizens who have emigrated from Israel. Those Arab residents of mandatory Palestine who left the area that became Israel in 1948 have no guaranteed right to return. Israel has rejected United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948 which called on Israel to permit the return of Arabs who left in 1947-1948, or to compensate them for their losses if they choose not to return. Israel has justified its rejection of Resolution 194 on the grounds that the losses of Jews who left Arab states at that time have not been compensated. Israel has allowed the return of some Arabs, on the principle of family reunification, but has rejected the great majority of requests for return.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights* The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Israel is a parliamentary democracy, with a multitude of parties representing a wide range of political views. Even relatively small parties regularly win seats in the Knesset. However, in the 1988 elections the Kach Party was disqualified from running by a panel of the High Court on the grounds that the party was racist. All adult Israeli citizens have the right to participate in the political process and to vote.

Participation of eligible voters in national elections, including Israeli Arabs, is high by Western standards. In the 1988 elections, Israeli Arabs, representing both Zionist and non-Zionist parties, won 6 of 120 Knesset seats. Israeli Arabs actively participate in local (municipal) elections. Municipal councils, which function throughout Israel, serve in Arab towns as well, and all participate in Israeli regional councils. Women participate actively in Israeli politics. In 1988 they constituted over 40 percent of political party membership, won seven Knesset seats in the 1988 elections, but hold no cabinet posts in the new Government.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged
Violations
of Human Rights

Israel is responsive to international and nongovernmental interest in its human rights situation. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice have specially designated Human Rights offices, and other ministries have officials who respond to human rights inquiries. Human rights groups such as the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, as well as political action groups such as Peace Now, operate openly and without government interference. The Government investigates and responds to most inquiries by such organizations as Amnesty International.

The Government permits visits to Israel and the occupied territories by representatives of private international human rights groups, as well as such international bodies as the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the World Health Organization, and the International Labor Organization (ILO). In 1988 Israel accommodated a vastly increased number of visits from organizations and persons inquiring into human and civil rights issues associated with the uprising in the occupied territories.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status

Women's rights in Israel are protected by the Equal Opportunity Law, which forbids sex discrimination. For example, it requires employers to pay male and female workers equal wages for equal work. Other laws and regulations protect the rights of women employees concerning pregnancy, childbirth, and child care. The Government includes a senior adviser on the status of women, and the civil service commission and several government ministries have officers responsible for women's rights. Nongovernmental women's organizations work actively in promoting women's rights and welfare. Women are well represented in higher education and

the work force--they comprise 40 percent of university graduates, 39 percent of the overall work force, 52 percent of civil servants, and approximately two-thirds of teachers. One (previously 2) of 12 Supreme Court Justices is a woman. Women are drafted into the army but do not fill combat-related positions. Women are underrepresented at the higher levels of government and the civil service, although there is debate whether this is a result of discrimination or of career patterns different from those of men.

Israeli Arabs have made substantial educational and material progress since the founding of Israel. A few have risen to responsible positions in the Civil Service, generally in the Arab departments of government ministries. However, despite laws which guarantee them nearly the same rights as Israeli Jews, and despite government and private efforts to bridge the gap between Israeli Arabs and Jews, there is little interaction between the two communities, and many Israeli Arabs feel estranged from the mainstream of Israeli life and politics. Israeli Arabs have not attained the same quality of education, housing, or other services as Israeli Jews. Although they make up approximately 17 percent of the population, Israeli Arabs comprise less than 3 percent of the university student population and are virtually unrepresented in the higher-level professional, academic, and business ranks. The Arabic-speaking community has access to local and foreign Arabic newspapers and magazines, internal and external Arabic television programming, and Arabic-language radio services.

The Israeli Druze and Circassian communities, at their initiative, are subject to Israel's military draft, and some Bedouin Arabs serve voluntarily in special units. However, most Israeli Arabs are not subject to the draft and do not volunteer. Of the few who do volunteer, most are disqualified on security grounds. Consequently, they have less access than do other Israelis to such social and economic benefits as housing and new-household subsidies, government employment, and university scholarships, for which military service is either a prerequisite or an advantage.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

Israeli workers and employers have freely established organizations of their own choosing. Israel has a powerful free trade union movement, the General Federation of Labor in Israel (Histadrut), and a much smaller rival federation. About 80 percent of employed Israelis (including 70 percent of employed Arab Israelis) are members of Histadrut trade unions or covered by its collective bargaining agreements.

Aside from its trade union role, Histadrut owns and operates a quarter of Israel's industry and business, much of the health care, vocational training, and child care systems, and most of the health insurance and pension systems. It also includes the largest women's organization. About 60 percent of adult Israelis (55 percent of adult Israeli Arabs) are Histadrut members.

Histadrut members democratically elect their national and local officers and those of its affiliated trade unions and women's organization, choosing between political party lists. Plant or enterprise committee members are elected individually. Histadrut generally provides very effective representation, despite its role as an employer and its ties to the Labor Party, which has participated in most Israeli governments.

Histadrut participates in the meetings of the ILO, to which Israel belongs. Histadrut is affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and its individual member unions are affiliated to many of the Western international trade secretariats. Histadrut officials also have some contacts with the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.

Palestinian residents of Jerusalem have the same rights of labor association as Israelis.

About 100,000 Palestinian workers living in the West Bank and Gaza work in Israel. They and a few thousand foreigners working temporarily in Israel may not join Histadrut or other independent unions, but, if employed in the organized sector, they are entitled to union representation by Histadrut and are covered by current collective bargaining agreements at their workplace. A 1 percent union agency fee is deducted from the wages of those hired legally through the Israeli employment service. They are not eligible to vote or run for office in the elections of Histadrut or its national unions, but they can vote for and serve on plant or enterprise workers' committees. Indeed, Histadrut asks them to choose one or more committee members (proportionate to their number) wherever there are 20 of them, or at least 10 percent of the work force. (There are about 5,000 to 6,000 of these committees with 3 to 11 members at most workplaces, 30 to 70 members at multiplant enterprises, conglomerates, or large public sector bargaining units.)

The right to strike is exercised frequently. There is a legal obligation to give 15 days' notice prior to a strike or lockout, unless otherwise specified in the collective bargaining agreement. Strikes often erupt without prior notice or Histadrut authorization, although Histadrut tries to maintain discipline with a central strike fund. The Government may, and occasionally does, appeal to labor courts for back-to-work orders to restore essential public services while

Orders continue, but these orders are temporary and not granted. Labor courts include employer and employee representatives.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The right of Israelis to organize and bargain collectively is enshrined in law and freely exercised. The majority union (generally Histadrut) is the exclusive bargaining agent.

Palestinian residents of Jerusalem have the same rights under Israeli law. Nonresident workers, mostly Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, may not organize and bargain collectively on their own, but they are entitled to the protection of collective bargaining agreements and representation by the bargaining agent. However, a sizable minority work in the unorganized sector, without this protection, mostly in seasonal agriculture and small construction sites, restaurants, and garages.

The labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country. There are no export processing zones in Israel.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Israeli citizens are not subject to forced or compulsory labor.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

By law, children under age 15 may not be employed. Those aged 15 may not be employed if subject to compulsory education, except during vacations, or in apprenticeships, or with a permit from the Labor Minister under special conditions. The Minister may also allow an artistic performance by a child under age 15, with safeguards. Employment of children aged 16 to 18 is restricted to ensure time for rest and education. A labor inspection service enforces these provisions, but enforcement may be lax in seasonal agriculture and at small construction sites, where labor contractors from the West Bank and Gaza bring work crews, and in small garages and restaurants. Israeli labor exchanges in the West Bank and Gaza do not permit those under 17 to be employed legally in Israel.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

Wage income in Israel is generally sufficient to provide workers and their families a decent standard of living. Legislation in 1986 established a minimum wage at 45 percent of the average salary, calculated each April, with interim cost-of-living adjustments. An October 1988 adjustment raised it to about \$410 per month. Most wages and salaries are established in collective bargaining agreements. The Labor Minister frequently uses the 1957 Collective Agreements Law to extend private sector

wage settlements to the public sector and sectoral wage settlements to other, uncovered enterprises. Along with union representation, the Labor Inspection Service enforces labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace.

By law, maximum hours of work are 47 per week, 8 per day, 7 the day before the weekly rest, which must be at least 36 consecutive hours and should include the Sabbath (Saturday for Jews, Sunday for Christians, Friday for Muslims). Exceptions may be approved by the Labor Ministry but not to exceed 10 hours per day, or an average of 47 hours per week. By national collective agreements, the public sector moves to a 5-day, 42 1/2-hour week in April 1989, while the private sector established a maximum 45-hour week in August 1988 and an April 1990 deadline for all firms to institute the 5-day week. The normal weekly rest, Friday noon to Sunday morning, is changing to Thursday evening to Sunday morning. Those needed at work then receive equivalent rest periods on other days. Labor law provides 14 to 18 days' paid vacation per year, depending on length of service, and many paid holidays.

Palestinian residents of Jerusalem have the same rights under Israeli law and union contract and are entitled to the same working conditions as Israelis.

About half the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working in Israel find employment legally through Israeli Employment Service labor exchanges in West Bank and Gaza towns. Employers pay wages and social contributions for these workers to the Service. It deducts taxes, employee social contributions, and a 1 percent union fee, and pays the balance to the workers. The same percentage is deducted from the pay of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working legally in Israel as is deducted from the pay of Israeli workers for social contributions, and they receive equivalent pensions. However, they do not receive the same benefits from the National Insurance Institute (NII-similar to U.S. social security), because many NII benefits require residence in Israel. Thus, only 1.2 percent of the pay of the workers from the West Bank and Gaza goes to the NII, compared to 5.35 percent for an Israeli. The other 4.15 percent is an equalization deduction to keep labor costs equivalent. It goes to a special Finance Ministry fund to be used only for social and development costs in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians estimate that this amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars since 1970 and complain that the Government of Israel has not accounted for whether or how the money has been spent in the territories. The Government of Israel says that these and other expenditures in the territories are accounted for internally, in the budget for the territories, but not made public.

Nonresident Palestinian workers in Israel are covered by the

minimum wage law and by Histadrut contracts if they work in organized firms. Those hired legally receive a pension through the Labor Ministry at age 65 after at least 10 years' employment in Israel, based on earnings and years worked (the conditions and benefits of their pensions are equivalent to those of the Histadrut pensions granted to Israelis.) Legal nonresident Palestinian workers are also entitled to sick leave, severance pay, and paid vacations of 14 to 28 days per year, under law or Histadrut contract. The NII provides them workers' compensation (including disability, dependent, and survivor pensions) for occupational injury or illness and employer bankruptcy insurance. These workers are also entitled to maternity benefits (free hospital care and a small lump sum payment for female workers or workers' wives, plus 12 weeks' paid maternity leave for the former) but only for births in hospitals in Israel.

Nonresidents are ineligible for NII old-age, survivors, and disability pensions (smaller, flat rate pensions) received by most Israeli retirees in addition to their Histadrut pensions (like U.S. social security pensions), unemployment compensation, or insurance for long-term care or injury in nonoccupational accidents. They are also ineligible for NII children's allowances, funded only by employer contributions, and for NII-administered welfare programs funded by Israeli taxpayers through the budget (income support benefits for widows, orphans, mothers of dependent children, victims of disaster, those incapable of working, etc.).

The 1988 report of the ILO Director General reviewed the situation of nonresident Palestinian workers in Israel and reiterated the recommendations that there be full application in practice of the principle of equal treatment for these workers with respect to working conditions and social security treatment. Histadrut has been unsuccessful in ensuring that West Bankers and Gazans working in Israel receive their full legal rights and benefits and in persuading many to present claims, despite Arabic-language broadcasts, pamphlets, and workplace posters explaining rights, benefits, and procedures. In 1988 Histadrut began to hold seminars on this subject for these workers and for Arab employees of Israel's West Bank and Gaza labor exchanges. Histadrut has succeeded in reinstating only a small percentage of nonresident Palestinian workers dismissed for absences during the uprising. It has been more successful in helping them get severance pay.

About half the West Bankers and Gazans who work in Israel come illegally, with labor contractors or individually, evading taxes and social contributions (which their employers also evade), but losing social benefits. In unorganized enterprises, their wages and working conditions are often below Israeli legal standards, particularly in seasonal agriculture and small restaurants,

garages, and construction sites. In 1988 the Labor Ministry began enforcing the requirement that they be hired through labor exchanges. Labor Ministry inspectors detected about 12,000 illegal workers from the West Bank and Gaza and over 4,000 employers hiring them illegally, and filed criminal court complaints against the employers. The Civil Administration assesses small fines against the illegal workers. In January the Labor Ministry instituted fines of about \$280 per worker against employers as a quick and efficient alternative to long and difficult criminal cases.

Most workers from the West Bank and Gaza are required to return home each night. Since the uprising began in December 1987, an increasing number stay overnight in Israel during the week, often on the employer's premises. Israeli government policy is now to grant permits to sleep in Israel to all who seek them, and the number of permits has more than doubled to about 6,000, according to the Employment Service. The Labor Ministry inspects employers to ensure decent accommodations before issuing permits to them for their West Bank employees to sleep on the premises. Many of those who work illegally also stay overnight illegally in Israel, often in unsatisfactory quarters. Labor Ministry inspectors recently took action against some workers staying overnight without permission.

THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

The West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip are areas occupied by Israel in the 1967 war which remain under Israeli occupation. The West Bank and Gaza continue under military government; Israel has unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem and it has extended its civilian law, jurisdiction, and administration to the Golan Heights.

The United States considers Israel's occupation to be governed by The Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Israel denies the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank and Gaza, but states that it observes the Convention's humanitarian provisions in those areas. Israel applies Jordanian law in the West Bank and British mandate law in Gaza, as well as its own military orders which have changed these laws significantly.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for the government of the occupied territories, functions through a civil administration (CIVAD) under the Defense Ministry. Personnel from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the National Police, the Internal Security Service (Shin Bet), the Border Police, Israeli Civilian Ministries, and Palestinian employees participate in this apparatus. There are no Palestinian elected political bodies above the municipal level. Municipal elections, last held in 1976, were discontinued, and many elected officials were later removed or deported for alleged security reasons.

This report differs from many others in this compilation because of the greater detail available on the situation in the occupied territories by virtue of Israel's open and democratic society. The human rights situation described in this report also differs from all others in this compilation in that most of the occupied territories remain after 21 years under military government, and are, therefore, subject in part to military law. That circumstance, in turn, was one of the consequences of the 1967 war between Israel and its neighbors.

Since 1948 only Egypt has concluded a peace treaty with Israel (1979), as a result of which Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula. Although the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which most Palestinians support, has stated that his organization recognizes Israel's right to exist and renounces terrorism, there are Palestinian factions which have not done so. The PLO has called for the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza to continue, and the future status of the occupied territories is now the central issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Civilian unrest, reflecting Palestinian opposition to the occupation, has resulted in a number of outbreaks of violence during the last 21 years, which in turn have led periodically to sharp crackdowns by Israeli military forces. Beginning in December 1987, the occupation entered a new phase, referred to as the intifada, when civilian unrest became far more widespread and intensive than at any time heretofore. The active participants in these civil disturbances were primarily young men and women motivated by Palestinian nationalism and a desire to bring the occupation to an end. They gathered in groups, called and enforced strikes, threw stones and firebombs at Israeli security forces and civilian vehicles, or erected barricades and burned tires so as to interfere with traffic. The Israeli Government has regarded the uprising as a new phase of the 40-year war against Israel and as a threat to the security of the State. The Israeli Defense Forces, caught by surprise and untrained and inexperienced in riot control, responded in a manner which led to a substantial increase in human rights violations.

The West Bank (including East Jerusalem) had been annexed by Jordan in 1950. Even after the occupation of these areas by Israel in 1967, Jordan considered them its territory, recognized Palestinian residents of these areas as citizens of Jordan, and continued to provide financial support to the West Bank. Israel tacitly accepted these arrangements. A marked change occurred, however, in July 1988, when King Hussein announced a significant reduction in administrative and financial support for the West Bank and Gaza. Since July the Israeli Government has taken additional steps to deny the PLO access to the territories and to crack down harder on expressions of Palestinian nationalism.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from*

a. Political Killing

Political killing is not condoned by Israel and is not practiced by the Israeli Government in the occupied territories.

In hundreds of confrontations between IDF troops and Palestinians throwing stones or Molotov cocktails or engaging in other forms of disorder, however, the IDF frequently responded with gunfire in which casualties resulted. Precise figures on casualties are not available and estimates vary depending on the source and counting criteria. Figures compiled from press, Palestinian, and Israeli government sources indicate that 366 Palestinians were killed in 1988 as a result of the uprising, most of them by the IDF, some by Israeli settlers. Thirteen

Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians for suspected collaboration with Israeli authorities. Over 20,000 Palestinians were wounded or injured by the IDF. Eleven Israelis have been killed in the intifada. According to IDF statistics, approximately 1,100 Israelis have been injured.

Most Palestinian deaths resulted from the use of high velocity, standard service round bullets by the IDF during attempts to halt incidents involving stones, firebombs, or fleeing suspects. According to IDF regulations, live fire is permitted when soldiers' lives are in real and immediate danger. Only a specific attacker may be shot at and fire is to be directed at legs only and it may be used against fleeing suspects only if a serious felony is suspected and as a last resort. Soldiers may fire only after exhausting all other means--including tear gas, rubber bullets, and warning shots. These guidelines were often not followed. Soldiers frequently used gunfire in situations that did not present mortal danger to troops, causing many avoidable deaths and injuries.

In September IDF policy was changed to allow the firing of plastic bullets in order to stop demonstrations or instigators of demonstrations in situation that do not threaten the lives of security forces and to increase injuries. The IDF claims plastic bullets are less lethal than lead bullets. While no precise figures are available, several deaths were attributed to plastic bullets, and nonlethal casualties increased after they were introduced. Other fatalities included at least 13 reported deaths by beating and at least 4 deaths from tear gas used by the IDF in enclosed areas. Exact figures are unavailable and estimates vary. There have been reports of several instances in which Palestinian wounded died because of IDF delays of ambulances or because, for whatever reason, there were delays in moving the wounded to a hospital. There were five cases in 1988 in which unarmed Palestinians in detention died under questionable circumstances or were clearly killed by the detaining officials.

Israeli authorities in some cases prosecuted or took disciplinary action against security personnel and settlers who killed Palestinians in violation of regulations. However, regulations were not rigorously enforced and punishments were usually lenient and there were many cases of unjustified killing which did not result in disciplinary actions or prosecutions.

b. Disappearance

Israel does not sponsor or condone disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment

Torture is forbidden by Israeli law, and Israeli authorities claim they do not condone it. In 1987 the report of a special judicial commission headed by ex-Supreme Court President Landau confirmed that the Shin Bet had for many years illegally used physical and psychological pressure to obtain confessions from security suspects. The report recommended that limited and clearly delineated "physical and psychological pressure" (which it defined in a secret annex) should be allowed to be applied in appropriate circumstances. Reports of beatings of suspects and detainees continue, as do reports of harsh and demeaning treatment of prisoners and detainees. Palestinians and international human rights groups state that other practices, including forcing prisoners to remain in one position for prolonged periods, hooding, sleep deprivation, and use of cold showers have continued since the Landau report. Many convictions in security cases are based on confessions. Attorneys are normally not allowed to see clients until after interrogations are completed. The International Committee of the Red Cross is allowed access 14 days after arrest.

Since the uprising began in December 1987, the number of Palestinian prisoners has risen from about 4,700 to about 10,000. According to IDF figures released November 28, 5,656 Palestinian were being held in prisons or detention centers. Seven military detention centers were added to two existing facilities, but there is serious overcrowding. Conditions at military detention facilities vary. Abuse of prisoners was particularly severe at the new facility at Dahariya, but conditions there improved after personnel changes were effected and disciplinary measures were taken. There was widespread beating of unarmed Palestinians in early 1988 in uprising incidents and of persons not participating in violent activities. On January 19, the Minister of Defense announced a policy of "force, might, and beatings" to put down the uprising. He later said there was no policy of "beating for beating's sake" and that some soldiers were exceeding orders. Nevertheless, in late January and February Palestinian and foreign physicians, human rights organizations, and the international and Israeli press reported widespread incidents in which IDF troops used clubs to break limbs and beat Palestinians who were not directly involved in disturbances or resisting arrest. Soldiers turned many people out of their homes at night, making them stand for hours, and rounded up men and boys and beat them in reprisal for stone-throwings. At least 13 Palestinians have been reported to have died from beatings. By mid-April reports of deliberate breaking of bones had ended, but reports of unjustifiably harsh beatings continued. The Attorney General of Israel criticized this policy and declared it illegal.

IDF personnel are subject to discipline for violating procedures

in beating cases. Four such cases have been publicized. A total of 66 soldiers have been accused of abuses in connection with their service in the occupied territories. Of these, 36 were convicted and sentenced, 2 were acquitted, and 28 are awaiting trial. Those convicted received light punishment ranging from suspended sentences to imprisonment for 2 1/2 months.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Thirty six Palestinians were deported in 1988, compared to nine in 1987. These deportations contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention in the view of the United States. The Israeli Supreme Court has disagreed in a formal decision..

The use of administrative detention greatly increased in 1988. While the peak number of administrative detainees at any one time is uncertain, the number was 2,600 in September 1988. As of November 28, Israeli government figures put the number at 1,590. Most were detained for 6 months, although 20 percent of detention orders were renewed. Administrative detentions are ordered by district military commanders. In March regulations were changed to suspend temporarily the automatic review of administrative detention after 96 hours, as formerly required, although a detainee may appeal to a military judge. Secret evidence is often used as grounds for administrative detention, and it is not made available to detainees and their lawyers on grounds that confidentiality is required for security reasons. Such rulings can be appealed to the High Court, which has the right to review the secret evidence, but there have been no reversals. According to the IDF, as of early October 1988 there were 587 cases in which detention periods had been shortened or canceled.

Israeli authorities maintain that administrative detention is used only against persons recently and repeatedly engaged in actions threatening security, and that political views and activities are not grounds for detention. However, Israel defines "security" very broadly, and in many cases individuals appear to have been detained for political activities which the authorities regard as a security threat. Many individuals, including academics, journalists, and human rights workers, who have not engaged in or advocated violence or other acts threatening security, have been detained, including many members of "popular committees," banned organizations which support the uprising in various ways, including nonviolent activities. Israeli officials have confirmed that in some instances, release of a detainee depends upon the behavior of the people in the area where the detainee lives.

Since March the IDF moved over 2,000 administrative detainees at various times from the occupied territories to a detention camp

in the Negev desert near Ketziot inside Israel. At its maximum in 1988, the camp held nearly 3,000 detainees but by the end of 1988 the number had dropped to approximately 1,200. Transferring prisoners from occupied territories, in the view of the United States, contravenes the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, the Israeli Supreme Court, in dismissing a petition brought by Ketziot detainees, held the Convention's provisions could not be enforced by an Israeli Court since they have not been incorporated into domestic Israeli law. The Court held, on the basis of a 1988 order relating to military detention and a section of a 1987 law amending and continuing emergency regulations, that Israeli military commanders were empowered to order detention inside Israel proper and that detainees may be held in Israel if the order is issued in Israel. Conditions at Ketziot are rigorous and there is overcrowding. Prisoners are required to live in tents not designed for extended periods of confinement.

Persons arrested for common crimes in the occupied territories are usually provided the opportunity for bail, access to an attorney, and a statement of charges, although these rights are sometimes delayed. Individuals may be held in custody without a warrant for 96 hours, and may be held without formal charges for up to 18 days. The normal detention period after charges are filed is 60 days before trial. A High Court judge may approve 3 months extensions.

Security detainees are usually not allowed bail and are usually denied access to counsel for 18 days. Access may be denied indefinitely for security reasons if officials believe granting access would impede the investigation. Many security suspects are arrested without warrants. The law permits this for up to 96 hours. Officials at times have declined to confirm detentions to consular officers who have inquired on behalf of nationals of their countries. Denial of notification of arrest to third parties, including immediate family members, is common and under the law can be extended for up to 14 days. Section 78(D) of Military Order 1220 of March, 1988, permits incognito detention for a period of 8 days if a court order is obtained. Despite improvements in record keeping, the authorities had difficulty keeping track of all detainees. At times families of some detainees did not know if or where relatives were being held. Detainees are often not told the reasons for their detention.

The IDF greatly expanded the use of curfews, including confinement to houses, in Palestinian areas where violence had erupted, or where the authorities believed there was potential for violent protests. Curfews, often prolonged, caused severe hardship to all residents.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Palestinians accused of nonsecurity offenses are tried publicly in local courts by Palestinian judges, except when jurisdiction has been transferred by military order. Palestinians accused of security offenses, which are loosely defined under Israeli law, are normally tried in Israeli military courts and are entitled to counsel. Charges are brought by military commanders. In 1988, because of the large number of uprising-related security offenses, the military courts were heavily overburdened with thousands of cases, resulting in long delays before trial. Most military trials are public, though access is controlled and is limited in some cases; defense attorneys are always present. Consular officers are allowed to attend military court proceedings involving foreign citizens, but there have been delays in gaining admission. Palestinian minors are treated as adults in security offenses. Acquittals are rare in security cases.

The great majority of convictions in military courts are based on confessions. These are recorded in Hebrew, which many defendants are unable to read. There are numerous affidavits that confessions are often obtained by physical and psychological coercion. The 1987 Landau Commission report confirmed such practices on the part of the Shin Bet, as well as systematic perjury before the military courts. There is no appeal of military court verdicts to the Supreme Court, except on broadly interpreted procedural grounds, although the area commander may commute a sentence. The Ministry of Defense has ordered the establishment of a military appeals court by January 1, 1989. Nonjudicial administrative orders of the military government may be appealed to area military commanders and to the Supreme Court. The court almost never reverses CIVAD or military orders when security is the rationale.

Most Israeli residents of the occupied territories accused of security and ordinary offenses are tried in the nearest Israeli district court under Israeli law. These courts are presided over by professional judges, and standards of due process and admissibility of evidence are stricter than in military courts.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Military authorities may enter private homes and institutions without a warrant in pursuit of security objectives. In 1988 forced entries often resulted in beatings and destruction of property, as well as arrests. Security officials frequently questioned Palestinians about their political views, and such interrogation in some cases involved short-term detention.

At least 154 houses of Arabs were demolished or sealed for security reasons, affecting over 1,000 people. Of the 154, 101

were totally demolished, 7 partially demolished, 43 totally sealed, and 3 partially sealed. Israeli authorities took these actions after the occupants were accused of involvement in security incidents, but prior to trial and conviction. Demolitions sometimes cause inadvertent damage to neighboring houses. The decision to demolish or seal a house is made by the area military commander. In the West Bank village of Beita in April, the IDF demolished 16 houses before obtaining the legally required orders. Twelve of the house owners have accepted the CIVAD's offer of compensation ranging from 10 to 100 percent. The other four are continuing negotiations. The occupants, who are often served with the demolition order only hours before it is to be carried out, have no right of appeal. If they learn of the order in time, they can apply to the High Court for an injunction. In 1988 the court granted temporary injunctions, but overturned no orders. Owners are not allowed to rebuild their homes without a permit, making the punishment one of indefinite duration. House demolition as punishment of families is enforced only against Arabs in the occupied territories. It contravenes the Fourth Geneva Convention in the view of the United States. The Israeli Supreme Court has held it is lawful under proper circumstances.

Mail and telephone conversations in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem are sometimes monitored. In April, Israel cut off international telephone service for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, citing security reasons. The Supreme Court upheld the order. Individuals may appeal to the military commander for special permits for telephone service.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including*

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

As part of the effort to halt the uprising, the Israeli authorities imposed increasing restraints on freedom of expression and press in 1988, citing security reasons. Palestinians believe that these restraints are arbitrary and politically motivated. The international law of occupation permits an occupying power to restrict freedom of expression and the press. Some criticism of Israeli policies by the Arabic press, most of which is located in East Jerusalem, was allowed. On at least three occasions there was a temporary ban on the distribution of East Jerusalem's Arab press in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian publications are required to submit to the military for precensorship all copy relating to the security, public order, and safety of Israel and the occupied areas. In practice, this requirement is very broadly defined. Some reports and editorials related to the uprising and Palestinian political goals were permitted, but censorship increased, and hundreds of articles and editorials were expurgated. Israeli authorities administratively detained at least 39 Palestinian

journalists and editors for alleged security reasons, and numerous others were interrogated. The major Palestinian news agency was closed for 6 months in March, and the order was extended for 1 year in September. An Arabic news magazine was closed indefinitely, and all four Arabic dailies were banned at least once from distribution in the West Bank and Gaza for periods of up to 45 days.

A permit is required for publications imported into the territories. Imported materials may be censored or banned for anti-Semitic or anti-Israel content or support for Palestinian nationalism. Possession of banned materials, such as uprising leaflets, is outlawed. The IDF periodically declared the occupied territories or certain areas closed in order to exclude local and international journalists; IDF personnel in the territories often issued such orders on the scene to bar access by journalists. Reports by foreign journalists are subject to censorship under a system of self-regulation. Israeli authorities temporarily suspended the credentials of five foreign correspondents for alleged violations of censorship regulations.

Israeli authorities closed all Palestinian universities in the West Bank and in Gaza all year for alleged security reasons on grounds that they were contributing to violence. All vocational, secondary, and elementary schools in the West Bank had been closed for over 6 months, the major part of two semesters, but began to reopen on December 1. Schools in Gaza were open for most of the school year. Alternate, off-campus classrooms organized by parents and teachers were sometimes banned on security grounds. Displaying the Palestinian flag or its colors or Palestinian nationalist slogans is proscribed, as is publicly expressing support for the PLO. Individuals have been detained, or beaten, or forced to take down flags and erase nationalist graffiti. Property owners can be fined for not removing graffiti. At present, it appears that no one has been charged with a crime for this offense. The IDF spokesman has stated that displaying flags or possessing nationalist literature, including intifada leaflets, can be construed as membership in a popular committee, an offense punishable by up to 10 years in prison. There have been no known prosecutions for this offense.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Political parties and other groups viewed as primarily political are not permitted. Public meetings of more than 10 people require permission. Palestinians often ignore this, but various meetings were broken up or prevented by the IDF.

In 1988 public services by municipalities and the civil administration were curtailed by a sharp decline in tax revenues

caused by strikes, a tax boycott, and economic dislocations related to the uprising. As a result, Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-help organizations assumed greater roles to provide alternate services. Israeli authorities took increasingly strict measures to curb such organizations because of concern they were supporting the uprising and the PLO and encroaching on municipal and CIVAD authority. Activities banned included home classes organized because of forced school closures and relief to families with relatives killed, injured, or detained in the uprising. Individuals involved in such activities were sometimes placed in administrative detention, interrogated, or denied permission to travel on grounds they were supporting the uprising. The Association for Defense of Civil Rights in Israel expressed concern over a military order banning "popular committees," local organizations which support the uprising in various ways, including nonviolent activities. The Federation of West Bank Professional Unions was closed for a year, for alleged security reasons.

c. Freedom of Religion

Freedom of religion exists in the occupied territories. No group or sect is banned on religious grounds. Muslim and Christian holy days are freely observed. Both faiths operate various private schools and institutions. Religious publications circulate freely. Israel protects Muslim and Christian holy places and assures freedom of access. Security forces entered the Haram Ash-Sharif, sacred to Muslims, once in 1988 to break up demonstrations. Tear gas was fired into the Al-Aqsa mosque once, but security forces largely restricted their activities to monitoring access of worshipers to the area. Israel facilitates travel into Jordan for Muslim pilgrims to Mecca by expediting exit clearances and extending hours of bridge operation.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Freedom of movement was restricted periodically in the West Bank and Gaza by scores of IDF curfews (the Palestinian legal rights organization al-Haq estimates as many as 1,600), which were often prolonged to discourage protest activities. Durations of curfews ranged from a few hours to several weeks. During prolonged curfews, with one week-long exception, people were usually allowed to leave their houses to obtain food and medical care for short, defined periods. Curfews caused severe hardship.

On at least three occasions, the IDF issued orders, blockaded villages for long periods, or took other measures to prevent farmers and merchants from harvesting and selling produce or

exporting it to Jordan. Israeli authorities asserted that the measures were taken to persuade residents to stop stone throwing and other uprising activities or to reveal the whereabouts of suspects.

Approximately 100,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza travel daily to work in Israel. Workers need permits to stay overnight, but this requirement is not always enforced. Many workers stayed home during general strikes called by the uprising leadership, some because of coercion, but in most cases voluntarily.

Thousands of Palestinians in the territories travel abroad each year, but Israeli authorities imposed increasing restraints on travel in 1988. Some political activists were forbidden to travel abroad by military commanders' orders or faced delays in obtaining exit visas or laissez passers.

There are no obstacles to emigration. Israel sometimes refuses to renew laissez passers of Palestinians from the territories who live or work abroad, on the ground that they have abandoned their residence, although they may not have acquired foreign citizenship. Those who obtain foreign citizenship are ordinarily not allowed to resume residence in the occupied territories. They are permitted to return as tourists only, and sometimes are denied entry entirely. Enforcement of the 3-month limit for tourist visas for stays by Palestinians appears to be ad hoc. Requests for family reunification are granted only on a restricted basis. Persons who marry Palestinians in the occupied territories generally are not allowed to take up residence there. Entry or residency permission is frequently denied spouses, relatives and children, following the emigration of the head of the household. Israel has also denied the return of many former West Bank Palestinians who were not present in the territories,

for whatever reason, at the time of the 1968 census conducted after the June War. Palestinians claim many thousands of family reunification requests are pending. According to the Government of Israel, in 1988, 300 applications for family reunifications were approved, involving 607 people. Israeli officials acknowledge that family reunification is limited for demographic and political reasons and assert that the laws of occupation do not require Israel to permit immigration into the territories. Restrictions on residence, reentry, and family reunification do not apply to Jews, whether or not they are Israeli citizens.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights' The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The West Bank and Gaza are ruled under occupation by the Israeli Ministry of Defense through a military governor and civil administration. Palestinians are not permitted to participate

in significant public policy decisions concerning land and resource use and planning, taxation, trade, and industry. Municipal elections were last held in 1976, and various mayors were dismissed thereafter on security grounds. Only four elected mayors remain. In 1985 Israel appointed Palestinians to fill vacancies, but some have resigned or ceased working because of the uprising, and, in some cases, threats from Palestinians. There was an attempt to assassinate one appointed mayor in 1988. No Palestinian political parties or overtly political organizations are permitted.

Jerusalem is governed as part of Israel. Arab residents of East Jerusalem are permitted to vote in municipal elections; about 20 percent voted in 1983.

As a result of King Hussein's July 1988 announcement, West Bank Palestinians lost representation in Jordan's Parliament.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged
Violations
of Human Rights

Israel normally permits international human rights groups to visit the occupied territories. It states that it cooperates with a number of such organizations, and officials are generally available for meetings with international organizations on human rights issues. However, those organizations often consider Israel's responses to be inadequate, not all inquiries receive answers, and some groups' requests for meetings with officials or access to detention facilities have been denied.

The Government of Israel stepped up pressure on indigenous human rights organizations in 1988. Five field workers of Al Haq, a Palestinian legal rights organization, either were detained administratively or had detention orders renewed. In addition, two members of the Palestinian Human Rights Information Center and two Gaza human rights lawyers were detained.

Many local groups, Israeli and Palestinian, are concerned with human rights. Their publications and statements are generally allowed to circulate in the occupied territories. Coordination between Arab and Israeli human rights groups continued to grow in 1988.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status

Jewish settlers in the occupied territories are subject to Israeli law while Palestinians are subject to Israeli military occupation law. Under the dual system of governance applied to Palestinians and Israelis, Palestinians are treated less

favorably than Jewish settlers in the same areas on a broad range of issues, such as the right to legal process, rights of residency, freedom of movement, sale of crops and goods, land and water use, and access to health and social services. Jewish settlers involved in security violations have generally been treated more leniently than Palestinians guilty of similar offenses. Crimes against Israelis are often prosecuted more vigorously than offenses against Palestinians. In June the Supreme Court upheld Israel's authority to deny residency to and deport a Palestinian political activist, born in East Jerusalem, who had acquired foreign nationality. Jews retain residency rights under the Israeli law of return, regardless of having acquired foreign nationality.

The use of land by Israeli authorities for military purposes, roads, settlements, and other Israeli purposes which restrict access by Palestinians, discriminates against Palestinians and adversely affects their lives and economic activities. Approximately 2.5 percent of the total area of the West Bank and East Jerusalem has been turned over to Israeli nationals for residential, agricultural, and industrial use by settlers. Palestinians do not participate in the Higher Planning Council, which plans land use in the territories and exercises certain powers transferred from local, municipal, and village councils in 1971.

Israel funds basic services for Palestinians, primarily from tax revenues collected in the occupied territories. In 1988 revenues dropped sharply because of the economic disruption of the uprising and a Palestinian tax boycott. As a result, Israel announced cutbacks in regular services to Palestinians. In July fees at government hospitals for Arabs in the territories were doubled, and referrals to Israeli hospitals were curtailed. Israeli settlers have ready access to Israeli hospitals. Palestinians and persons of Arab descent entering Israel at the airport or the West Bank at the Jordan River bridges, regardless of citizenship, are subject to extensive searches, and many complain of harsh or humiliating treatment. Israel limits funds visitors may bring into the occupied territories for Palestinian use to \$1,100 per person every 2 months unless Israeli authorities grant permission in advance. Arab residents of the territories returning from travel may bring in amounts over \$550 only with advance permission. Undeclared funds were frequently seized from Arab-Americans at points of entry and confiscated. Restitution is taking place. There is no limit on funds for Israeli use.

Section 6 Worker Rights

The applicable sections for West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working in Jerusalem and Israel are contained in the country report for Israel. Palestinian residents of Jerusalem have the

same rights and are governed by the same law as workers in Israel.

a. The Right of Association

Palestinians working in the West Bank are covered by the 1960 Jordanian labor law, which permits any group of 20 or more in a single trade or establishment to form a union. In 1988 approximately 100 unions functioned in the West Bank; of these, 31 were licensed by the Israeli Civil Administration. Many are affiliated with one of three umbrella federations. Any person can hold union office who has not been convicted of a crime. West Bank unions must submit lists of candidates to the CIVAD 30 days before elections; a candidate convicted of a political offense may be banned from running for office. Similar rules apply in Gaza.

In 1988 Israeli authorities, citing security concerns, actively discouraged union activities in the West Bank. Israeli authorities state that the West Bank umbrella federations and many individual unions are fronts for illegal political organizations rather than trade unions. Israel claimed that no legitimate union activities were disrupted, and that its actions were intended to prevent illicit political activity.

Palestinian workers in the West Bank have the right to strike. There were no strikes by unions during 1988 on strictly labor issues. The commercial strikes and stop-work actions which Palestinians mounted in the territories came in the wider political context of the uprising.

The West Bank umbrella labor federations have no direct affiliations to any external regional or international organizations.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Jordanian law applies in the West Bank; Palestinian unions in the West Bank have the right to organize and bargain collectively. Under the prevailing circumstances of the uprising, it is clearly impossible to engage in collective bargaining. Unions have tended to limit their activities to educating workers about their rights, representing them in shop floor disputes, and providing members with health insurance and legal advice. The situation is similar in Gaza, where Egyptian law applies. There are no export processing zones in the occupied territories.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

There is no forced or compulsory labor in the occupied territories. Under existing law applicable to the occupied

territories, there is no statutory ban on forced labor. Forced labor is, however, banned (except under certain exceptional circumstances) by the Fourth Geneva Convention.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

A 1978 ordinance of the Israeli authorities raised the minimum working age in the West Bank and Gaza to 14 years.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

In the West Bank, Jordanian law allows a maximum workweek of 48 hours, except for certain hotel, food service, and cinema employees, whose workweek is 54 hours. There is no minimum wage provision in the West Bank or Gaza, nor is there effective enforcement of the maximum hours law.



official text

02/08/89

(Following not for release before 1500 GMT, February 8)
U.S. REPORT SEES "CAUTIOUS HOPE" FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN USSR
(Excerpts* Introduction to 1988 human rights report)

Washington -- The State Department, in its report on worldwide observance of human rights in 1988, says changes in the Soviet Union offer "cautious hope for a better day" for human rights there.

In its annual report to Congress, the department says these Soviet changes have "profound implications, as advocates of significant systemic reform appear to have gained strength."

The report, released February 8, covers 169 countries. The State Department is mandated by law to report to Congress on the status of internationally recognized human rights in countries that receive assistance from the United States and all other countries which are members of the United Nations.

Along with the Soviet changes, the report found "significant further advances in Hungary and Poland towards a more open society." And it also highlighted human rights progress last year in Chile, South Korea, Taiwan and Pakistan. The most significant human rights violations last year, if measured by their severity and the number of persons affected, the report says, took place in Iraq, Burundi and Sudan.

Following are excerpts from the introduction to the report by Richard Schifter, assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs.

(begin excerpts)

Any country-specific discussion of worldwide human rights developments in 1988 must start, as did our discussions of such developments in 1987, with an assessment of the remarkable changes in the Soviet Union. Last year we said that the changes which occurred in 1987 were more than cosmetic but less than fundamental. We still cannot say that there has been a fundamental shift in the Soviet Union's approach to human rights, but there is no doubt that the changes in evidence in 1988 have profound implications, as advocates of significant systemic reform appear to have gained strength.

By the end of 1988, all persons in the Soviet Union who had been sentenced under the articles of the criminal codes which punish



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dissenting political or unauthorized religious activity had been set free. Plans for amendment or repeal of the so-called political and religious articles have been announced. Abuse of psychiatry has been made a punishable offense. Freedom to leave the country temporarily has been significantly expanded. Armenian, ethnic German, and Jewish emigration has increased further, as has the emigration of Pentecostals. Plans have been adopted for elections which, though not completely free and open, are no longer to be the farce they have been heretofore.

At the same time, the ability of opponents of reform to slow down progress, the existence of a powerful and pervasive secret police force, and the supremacy of the Communist Party remind us of the fact that institutional guarantees to protect the rights of the individual against unbridled state authority are still needed. Soviet reformers speak of the importance of respect for the rule of law and have underlined the vital importance of creating an independent judiciary, but that is still in the future. Nonetheless, the recognition of the need for action to secure the rights of individuals, and the fact that the defects of the existing system are now openly discussed, offer a basis for cautious hope of a better day.

The year 1988 also saw significant further advances in Hungary and Poland toward a more open society.

As far as the positive side of the ledger in 1988 is concerned, we need to note that, abiding by the provisions of the Chilean constitution, President Pinochet submitted his candidacy for continuation in office to popular referendum. In a free and fair plebiscite the decision of the voters went against him. There is hope that in 1989 we shall witness Chile's peaceful return to democracy.

On the Asian continent, the year 1988 also saw significant steps taken by the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Pakistan toward democracy and increasing respect for the rights of the individual. By contrast, in Burma a nationwide outpouring of sentiment in favor of free elections was brutally suppressed when the military systematically killed and detained student demonstrators and leaders.

The other most significant human rights violations of the year 1988, if measured by their severity and the numbers of persons affected, took place in the context of interethnic conflicts in Iraq, Burundi, and Sudan. In each of these situations innocent civilian bystanders died as a result of guerrilla warfare or reprisals for violence by others.

The Iraqi government employed chemical warfare against a Kurdish insurgency, killing and injuring thousands of civilians and causing tens of thousands to flee their country. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds have also been forcibly relocated within Iraq. An estimated 5,000 to 10,000 civilians were killed during ethnic violence in Burundi. Following attacks by Hutu tribesmen on Tutsis, the Tutsi-dominated military retaliated by killing thousands of Hutus. Tens of thousands of Hutus fled the country. By year's end, however, President Buyoya had succeeded in establishing a government of reconciliation consisting of members of both of these ethnic groups, and most of the Hutu refugees had voluntarily returned to Burundi.

Tragically, the interethnic conflict in Sudan, between the Sudanese Army and government-supported tribal militias on one hand, and the Ethiopian-supported Sudanese People's Liberation Army on the other, resulted in the largest number of victims in 1988. Although no accurate assessment has been made, some reports estimate that 100,000 to 250,000 civilians in southern Sudan died from starvation after

elements of armed forces on each side interfered or failed to cooperate with efforts to deliver food supplies to regions controlled by the other side.

This year there are 169 separate reports.

Definition of Human Rights

Human rights, as defined in Section 116(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, include freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; disappearance due to abduction or clandestine detention; and other flagrant denial of the rights to life, liberty, and the security of the person. Internationally recognized worker rights, as defined in Section 502(a) of the Trade Act, include (A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.

In applying these internationally recognized standards, we seek to be objective. But the reports unashamedly reflect the U.S. view that the right of self-government is a basic political right, that government is legitimate only when grounded on the consent of the governed, and that government thus grounded should not be used to deny life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Individuals in a society have the inalienable right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person; to enjoy civil liberties such as freedom of expression, assembly, religion, and movement, without discrimination based on race, ancestry, or sex; and to change their government by peaceful means. The reports also take into account the fact that terrorists and guerrilla groups often kill, torture, or maim citizens or deprive them of their liberties; such violations are no less reprehensible if committed by violent opponents of the government than if committed by the government itself.

We have found that the concept of economic, social, and cultural rights is often confused, sometimes willfully, by repressive governments claiming that, in order to promote these "rights," they may deny their citizens the right to integrity of the person as well as political and civil rights. There exists a profound connection between human rights and economic development. Experience demonstrates that it is individual freedom that sets the stage for economic and social development; it is repression that stifles it. Those who try to justify subordinating political and civil rights on the ground that they are concentrating on economic aspirations invariably deliver on neither. That is why we consider it imperative to focus urgent attention on violations of basic political and civil rights. If these basic rights are not secured, experience has shown, the goals of economic development are not reached either. This is a point which the Soviet Union's reformers seem to have recognized.

U.S. Human Rights Policy

From this premise, that basic human rights may not be abridged or denied, it follows that our human rights policy is concerned with the limitations on the powers of government that are required to protect the integrity and dignity of the individual. Further, it is in our national interest to promote democratic processes in order to help build a world environment more favorable to respect for human rights and hence more conducive to stability and peace. We have developed, therefore, a dual policy, reactive in the sense that we continue to oppose specific human rights violations wherever they

occur, but at the same time active in working over the long term to strengthen democracy.

(end excerpts)

(Preceding not for release before 1500 GMT, February 8)



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(Following not for release before 1500 GMT, February 8)

ARTICLE ON STATE DEPARTMENT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

By Edmund F. Scherr

USIA Diplomatic Correspondent

Washington -- In its annual survey of global human rights observance, the State Department notes continued improvement in human rights in the Soviet Union but stresses that "institutional guarantees" of individual rights in that country are still needed.

The report, released February 8, says that by the end of 1988, "all persons in the Soviet Union who had been sentenced under the articles of the (Soviet) criminal codes which punish dissenting political or unauthorized religious activity had been set free."

By law, the State Department sends to Congress each year a report on the status of internationally recognized human rights in all countries that receive assistance from the United States and all other countries that are members of the United Nations. The document on human rights for 1988 covers 169 separate reports.

While pointing out the need for legal guarantees of rights and an independent judiciary in the Soviet Union, the document says that "nonetheless, the recognition (there) of the need for action to secure the rights of individuals, and the fact that the defects of the existing system are now openly discussed, offer a basis for cautious hope of a better day."

The report also notes "significant further advances" in the Warsaw Pact nations of Hungary and Poland "toward a more open society."

And in other positive events last year, the document cites the "free and fair plebiscite" in Chile and the hope for 1989 that Chile will have a peaceful return to democracy.

It also notes the "significant steps" taken by South Korea, Taiwan and Pakistan "towards democracy and increased respect for the rights of the individual."

In contrast, it lists among the most significant human rights violations of 1988, the brutal suppression by the Burmese army of a nationwide outpouring of sentiment for free elections.

Other significant violations, "if measured by their severity and



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the number of persons affected," took place in the context of "interethnic conflicts" in Iraq, Burundi and Sudan, the report says.

"The Iraqi government employed chemical warfare against a Kurdish insurgency, killing and injuring thousands of civilians and causing tens of thousands to flee their country," the document says.

While an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 civilians died in ethnic violence in Burundi, the report notes that by the end of 1988, President Buyoya had succeeded in establishing a government of reconciliation.

In the Sudan, the report notes, ethnic violence coupled with the warring sides' failure to cooperate in food relief efforts, contributed to much starvation in the conflict-torn south; some reports estimate that 100,000 to 250,000 civilians died from starvation.

Following are highlights of some country reports:

-- Somalia* The fighting in the north produced civilian casualties as well as serious human rights abuses. Civil and political rights, including freedom of expression and association, remained tightly controlled, and the government continued to use detention as a primary tool for limiting them.

-- South Africa* The human rights situation in South Africa continued to deteriorate in 1988 as the government took additional harsh measures to repress opposition to apartheid, including nonviolent political activity.

-- Argentina* Human rights concerns in 1988 focused more on accounting for past abuses during military rule than on policies of the current civilian government. Politically motivated bombings continued through 1988 at a disturbing, but not destabilizing, rate. In general, the government continued its good record for protecting human rights in 1988.

-- Cuba* In 1988 the human rights situation was characterized by continuing repression tempered by limited improvements in selected areas. These steps, however, have not altered in any basic manner the fundamentally repressive nature of the Cuban system. Serious human rights violations continue across a wide spectrum of activity.

-- Nicaragua* With the situation exacerbated by the conflict between the government and the resistance forces, there continued to be charges against both sides of such human rights abuses as politically motivated killings, disappearances, torture and illegal detentions.

-- China* During 1988 there were some improvements in the human rights situation but also some important setbacks. While China's authoritarian structure remains in place, there is reason to expect that this liberalization trend will continue in coming years. China, however, continues to place important restrictions on basic political and civil rights.

-- North Korea* North Korea did not improve its poor human rights performance in 1988. Respect for basic human rights and human dignity is scant.

-- South Korea* Following up on progress made during the last half of 1987, the overall human rights situation continued to improve. The major remaining human rights problem is political prisoners. While the pace of positive political change is accelerating and the Roh government's commitment to democracy seems firm, the evolution of South Korea's democracy is not yet complete.

-- Philippines* There were signs of deterioration in the human rights situation in 1988, despite strong popular support for President

Aquino's reform agenda and her frequently expressed commitment to the preservation of human rights. Political forces on both the far left and the far right continue efforts to destabilize the government.

-- Poland* The exercise of human rights remains restricted. Nevertheless, freedom of speech has continued to grow unevenly, opposition views are increasingly read in the official press, despite censorship, and Poles have access to a wide range of independent publications. In late 1988 the Solidarity leadership and other opposition elements could meet openly without harassment. A number of independent associations, some with declared opposition leanings, were legalized during 1988.

-- Iran* Major human rights abuses continued in Iran in 1988. These included at least several hundred political executions, continuing arbitrary detentions, the repression of freedom of speech, press and association, and the use of torture in repressing political opposition.

-- Israel and the occupied territories* The most significant human rights problem for Israel in 1988 derived from the uprising of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza against Israeli occupation. The Israeli Defense Forces, caught by surprise and untrained and inexperienced in riot control, responded in a manner which led to a substantial increase in human rights violations.

(Preceding not for release before 1500 GMT, February 8)

BOB DOLE
KANSAS

United States Senate
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

February 13, 1989

2
5

408 2/5

His Excellency Moshe Arad
Ambassador
Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive
Washington, D. C. 20008


Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of my letter of today's date to Finance Minister Shimon Peres.

As you are developing Minister Peres's schedule for his visit to the United States, I will appreciate your allocating time for a meeting with me and my colleagues as outlined in the letter.

Thank you in advance for your courtesy, and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,


BOB DOLE
Republican Leader

Enclosure

JB DOLE
KANSAS
SENATE HART BUILDING
(202) 224-4621

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
FINANCE
RULES

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

February 13th 1989

The Honorable Shimon Peres
Vice Premier and Minister of Finance
Ministry of Finance
Hakiryia
P.O. Box 883
1 Kaplan Street
Jerusalem, Israel 91008

408 3/5

Dear Minister Peres:

Congratulations on the assumption of your new duties as Minister of Finance. You will no doubt have many challenges facing you in the weeks and months ahead, but I am confident you will meet each one with success.

It is my understanding you will be visiting the United States in the very near future, and it is my hope that during that visit you will be able to meet with me and a small group of my colleagues to discuss -- among other things -- the potential for financial support for three educational projects in Israel which are important to Israelis and many Americans alike.

The Machon Alta Lubavitch School in Safed requires \$4.5 million for badly needed building and dormitory facilities; the Jerusalem Institute of Talmudic Research is also in need of funding for a new building, at an estimated cost of \$3.5 million; and the Vishnitz Institution of B'nei Brak is in need of financial assistance in the amount of \$8 million for capital construction and operations. Private American donations account for more than 60 per cent of these institutions' budgets, but the relatively minor \$16 million requested in expenditures for these three projects is very important to the many American students, and Israeli students as well, who attend these institutions.

I am anxious to discuss this matter personally with you, and although you will no doubt have a very busy schedule while in Washington, I am hopeful you will be able to allocate time to meet with me during your visit.

Thank you in advance, and best wishes.

Sincerely,


BOB DOLE
Republican Leader

6/9

1027 1/1

Handwritten signature/initials

1/4

4/5

408 4/5

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem,

July 17, 1988.
525-4

Dear Senator Cranston,

I thank you and your colleagues for your letters of June 21, 1988 regarding three educational projects in Israel.

Upon receiving them, and in appreciation of your special friendship for our country, I consulted my colleagues, the Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance, as well as our Legal Advisers.

Unfortunately, in addition to the reasons explained in my former letter, we also encounter serious legal problems related to this request.

The question of Government support to non-governmental institutions was recently raised before the Supreme Court of Israel following a report by the State Comptroller considering serious irregularities in the handling of allocations to such institutions. In the course of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the Attorney General gave an undertaking in regard to the subject of financial support to such institutions. He issued binding directives to all Government offices whereby applications of such institutions have to be dealt with in accordance with clear and specific criteria.

Henceforth, all institutions must submit their request for financial support to the relevant Government Ministry. A special committee was established to consider these applications in accordance with clear-cut criteria and regulations. It was specifically stated there can be no discrimination in favour of any institution by giving it preferential treatment.

The Hon. Senator Alan Cranston
United States Senate
Washington DC

Handwritten mark

5/5

1987-07-18

14:35

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05

2/4 7/9

1097

408 5/5


-2-

There is no doubt in my mind that your request is on behalf of a very worthy cause. However, in the light of the above, the Government cannot approve assistance to any institution unless it conforms to the procedures that have now been laid down.

I hope that you appreciate and understand the position we have taken. May I ask you kindly to bring my explanation to the attention of the co-signatories of your letter.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir



END

KIRK DOUGLAS


February 15, 1989

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am honored to receive an invitation to attend such an important conference. Unfortunately, my schedule will not enable me to participate, but I appreciate your invitation.

Please extend all my best wishes to the Prime Minister. I had the opportunity of talking with him several years ago in Israel for a short time, and it would have been wonderful to see him again.

Sincerely,



KD:km

Ambassador Moshe Arad
Embassy of Israel
Washington, D.C.
c/o The Honorable Noam Semel
Consul for Cultural Affairs
Consulate General of Israel
800 Second Avenue
New York, New York 10017

נכנס **
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שמו

חוזם: 2,10845

אל: המשור

מ-: נוש, נר: 344, תא: 140289, חז: 2000, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: 8 גס: פרנ

נד: 8

רג'ל/שמו

אל : פרן

דע : שג' בון, מצפא

אביב עבור /המוסד

מנמת עבור /אמן/מחקר/

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

רפ'ג - ארהב : נשק כימי

1. רל'ש ס/ שהח אותו שאלתי לפשר ביקורו של שר המדינה
SCHAUBLE בשבוע החולף חילק את תשובתו לשניים:

א. היבט סובסטנטיבי:

1. בשיחתו עם האורח חזר מזכיר המדינה על כוונת ממשל
בוש לפעול במלוא הרצינות להגבלת הפצת נשק כימי.
ביקר הביע תקווה שהארועים האחרונים לא יפגעו במירקם
היחסים הביטורליים.

2. שר המדינה הבהיר כוונת ממשלתו לנקוט בכל האמצעים
החוקיים העומדים לרשותה (ובמקרה הצורך לחוקק חוקים
נוספים) כדי להגביל ייצוא ציוד וידע לייצור נשק
כימי.

ב. הרקע לביקור:

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1. לדברי איש שיחי יש לראות את עיתוי ביקורו של SCHAUBLE בקונטרסט הפנים רפג'י. הקנצלר מקווה שהביקור יפחית את לחץ הביקורת המוטחת כלפיו (כלפי ממשלתו) בכך שיוכל לומר כי רפ'ג נוקטת בצעדים להתמודד עם הנושא.

2. עיתוי ביקורו של SCHAUBLE 'שחרר' את מזכיר המדינה מהצורך להקדיש לנושא מקום נרחב (יחסית) במסגרת פגישותיו בבון. המזכיר יוכל להסתפק באיזכור הנושא והפניה לשיחותיו עם אורחו.

2. אמשיך להתעניין בנושא.

שטיין

חז

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, ממד, בנוצור, מצפא, איר, פרנ

0408 0138

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נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 2,10847

אל: המשרד

מ-: ווש, נר: 346, תא: 140289, זח: 2100, דח: ב, סג: סו

תח: פ גס: מצפא

ג: ד:

סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל : מ'מ' מקשח (הועבר בנר 282)

דע : מנהל מצפא, רמשן ניו-יורק (הועבר בנר 41)

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביקור אספין וחוק כספי הפנטגון (לשת'א '90)

לשלנו 202 למשהח (189 למשהבט)

1. בהמשך לשיחתנו הטלפונית אתמול (13/2) ולמברקי הנ'ל, ביקור אספין מהווה הזדמנות פז לקדם עניינינו במסגרת החוק הנ'ל. עוזריו של אספין כבר נוחנים את הדעה להכנת הצעת חוק ומיותר לציין חיוניות הכללת עניינינו מראש בתוך הצעת יור הוועדה THE CHAIRMAN'S MARK לעומת כל אפשרות חקיקתית אחרת (תיקונים בוועדה, המלאה וכדומה).

2. לפיכך רצוני להמליץ ששר הבטחון או מנכל בטחון יעבור על 'רשימת הקניות' שלנו עם אספין ונלסון. מן הראוי גם שיצביעו על נושאים בעייתיים וישאלו את אספין אם הוא יכול להציע פתרונות חקיקתיים תוך ניצול האפשרויות הקיימות כבר בחוק או תוך הכנסת שינויים בחוק החדש לשת'א 1990.

3. לדוגמא, בענין ה-APACHES, רצב תיקון חדש מתוך חוק כספי הפנטגון לשת'א 1989, המאפשר השאלת צ'וד צבאי לידי מדינות נאטו וה-MNNA לשם מופ'. האם יהיה

7-10-50
WASH DC
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
100-100000

RE: [Illegible]

TO: [Illegible]

FROM: [Illegible]

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]

[Illegible text block]

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[Illegible text block]

נושרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

ניתן ליישם תיקון זה על עסקת ה-APACHE?

4. כ'כ' קיימים תיקונים הנוגעים ל:-

א. הסכמי רכש ו-CROSS-SERVICING עם בנות ברית (לרבות MNNA).

ב. ביטול היטלים על מכירות מסויימות לנטו (בלבד).
האם ניתן - במאמץ של 'חשיבה יצירתית' מצד אספין ועוזריו - להפיק תועלת מתיקונים אלה?

5. מעבירים בנפרד התיקונים הנ"ל, יחד עם הקטעים הנוגעים בדבר בתוך דוח הקונפרנס.

6. בהתייעצות עם הציר עלינו על מסגרות נוספות הקיימות כבר בחוק שיכולות לחול בצורה זו או אחרת על-APACHE ועל כלים נוספים - למשל, אספקת עודפי ציוד (SURPLUS) בחינם לבנות ברית באגף הדרום מזרחי של נאטו (תיקון שהושג לפני שנתיים וכן הסדרי החכירה (הדדית ללא תשלום ומתוך מלאי הפנטגון בתשלום).

7. בכל אחת מהאפשרויות האלה צריכים כמובן להרחיב הכוונה המקורית של התיקון - לדוגמא, להחיל מושג מו'פ' על טייסת של מסוקי APACHE בתנא מדבר במשך 5-10 שנים, או לקבוע ש-'SURPLUS' יכול לחול על פריטים וציוד חדישים ולא רק על ציוד שייצא מכלל שימוש בצבא ארהב.

לשיקולכם.

למדן

חו

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

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** נכנס

סודי

חוזם: 2,10849

אל: המשרד

מ-: ווש, נר: 347, תא: 140289, חז: 2010, דח: ר, סג: סו

תח: פ גס: מצפא

נד: פ

סודי/רגיל

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

פגישת קונגרסמן וויין אוואנס עם ערפת.

אתמול 13/2 נפגש אוואנס עם ערפת. הפגישה ארכה למעלה מ-4 שעות. כמו כן נפגש עם 8 מתוך 15 חברי הועד הפועל למשך כ-8 שעות.

1. להלן דיווח ראשוני על שיחתו עם ערפת (התקבל מאחד מתומכיו היהודיים).

תיקון האמנה

לדברי ערפאת לאמנה אין משמעות WAS TOTALLY SUPERCEDED
ע"י הצהרותיו בג'נבה והצהרות אחרות. אין האמנה משמשת כמסמך אופרטיבי. אמר לאוואנס כי ניתן לצטטו בהקשר זה והסביר כי מבחינה פוליטית קשה לו לבטל האמנה.

- בפגישה הקרובה של הליגה הערבית תוצג החלטה שתאמץ הודעת אש"פ המכירה בזכות קיומה של ישראל, והוא ערפת, ינסה להשיג הסכמת מדינות הליגה לאיזכור ישראל באופן ספציפי.

טרור

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ההחלטה מדרום לבנון לפני כשבוע לא היתה מעשי ידיו
WAS NOT HIS
DOING

לדברי ערפת הטרור אינו פועל יותר לטובתם והוא
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

אינתיפדה

לשאלת אוואנס מדוע מנוהלת האינתיפדה בצורה כה אלימה
השיב ערפת כי אין הדבר כך

לדבריו, יש אלפי כלי נשק בשטחים ורק בגלל עמדתו של
ערפת לא נעשה שימוש בנשק זה. זריקת אבנים מבחינתו
איננה דרך אלימה.

אוואנס הציע לאמץ את גישת 'גנדי' של פסיביות וערפת
דחה אותה מיד.

תביעות ערפת

ערפת רוצה בלגיטימציה ע"י ישראל שתישא ותתן עמו
כנציג.

מוכן לפגוש כל נציג ישראלי בכל מקום באופן פרטי או
פומבי 'כשהכל מונח על השולחן - בטחון, גבולות, כלכלה
בעיות מימ'. הוא מעוניין בגבולות פרה-67' אם ניתן
להגיע לכך, אולם כאמור 'הכל על השולחן'.

מנהיגות בשטחים

אוואנס ביקש עפ"י המלצת מחמ"ד לקבל שמוח 10 פלסטינים
שיסכים או יתיר להם להדבר עם הישראלים. תשובת ערפת
היתה כי אינו סומך על איש ואין לו ערבויות שיבטיחו
שישראל לא תפגע באנשים אלה. אין ערבויות שישראל וארה"ב
יוכלו לתת לו WHICH WILL SATISFY HIM ON THIS ISSUE
למעשה, דחה ההצעה שמחמ"ד רצתה לבדוק אותו בגינה.

איום על פרייג'.

אוואנס שאל את ערפת בנוגע להודעתו שניתנה בריאד לגבי
האיום על פרייג' וירית 10 כדורים לחזהו.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
3120

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT, 5712 SOUTH DICKENS STREET, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637

1968

TO THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND

RE: [Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

נושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לדברי אוואנס לגבי שאלה זו (בניגוד לשאר השיחה) היה ערפת נזעם ביותר ' HE WAS MAD AS HELL AT ME '.
ערפת הסביר כי לא היה זה איום אלא בתגובה לשאלת ידידו המשורר אמר ' בכל מי שמתנגד לאינתיפדה, אירה 10 כדורים בחזהו ואני מצפה שתעשו גם לי כך אם אתנגד לאינתיפדה'.
לפי אוואנס, ניסה ערפת לעשות רציונאליזציה לבחירה גרועה של מילים.

2. התרשמותו הכללית של אוואנס היא שערפת היה מאוד גלוי (CANDID) בשיחתו עימו.

3. אוואנס מתכוון לנסוע למזה'ת ב-22.3 לביקור במצרים סעודיה, עיראק ירדן וישראל. אין לו תכניות נוספות להפגש עם ערפת עם זאת, אמר לו ערפת שאם ירצה (אוואנס) לפגשו בקהיר או ריאד יתאים את לוח הזמנים שלו לזה של אוואנס.

4. אוואנס חזר היום לארה"ב. מניחים שבימים הקרובים ימסור רשמיו לאיפא'ק ולעמיתיו הקונגרסמנים וסביר להניח שינסה ליצור קשר גם עם השגריר. כמו כן מניחים שיכין דיווח מפורט עבור ועדת המשנה לאירופה והמזה'ת ועבור מחמ"ד.

5. אין ספק שאוואנס בחינת OBSESSED לגבי הייעוד שמצא לעצמו ונראה שבכוונתו להמשיך להתמסר למשימה זו במלוא המרץ.

עוד נדווח.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

ח

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, ליאור, מזתים

סודי

נכנס

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חוזם: 2,10849

אל: המשרד

מ-: 100ש, נר: 347, תא: 140289, זח: 2010, דח: ר, סג: 10

חח: 8 גס: מצפא

נד: 8

סודי/רגיל

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

פגישת קונגרסמן וויין אוואנס עם ערפת.

אחמול 13/2 נפגש אוואנס עם ערפת. הפגישה ארכה למעלה מ-4 שעות. כמו כן נפגש עם 8 מתוך 15 חברי הועד הפועל למשך כ-8 שעות.

1. להלן דיווח ראשוני על שיחתו עם ערפת (התקבל מאחד מתומכיו היהודיים).

תיקון האמנה

לדברי ערפאת לאמנה אין משמעות WAS TOTALLY SUPERCEDED ע"י הצהרותיו בג'נבה והצהרות אחרות. אין האמנה משמשת כמסמך אופרטיבי. אמר לאוואנס כי ניתן לצטטו בהקשר זה והסביר כי מבחינה פוליטית קשה לו לבטל האמנה.

- בפגישה הקרובה של הליגה הערבית תוצג החלטה שתאמץ הודעת אש"פ המכירה בזכות קיומה של ישראל, והוא ערפת, ינסה להשיג הסכמת מדינות הליגה לאיזכור ישראל באופן ספציפי.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ההחלטה מדרום לבנון לפני כשבוע לא היתה מעשי ידי
WAS NOT HIS
DOING

לדברי ערפת הטרור אינו פועל יותר לטובתם והוא
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

אינתיפדה

לשאלת אוואנס מדוע מנוהלת האינתיפדה בצורה כה אלימה
השיב ערפת כי אין הדבר כך

לדבריו, יש אלפי כלי נשק בשטחים ורק בגלל עמדתו של
ערפת לא נעשה שימוש בנשק זה. זריקת אבנים מבחינתו
איננה דרך אלימה.

אוואנס הציע לאמץ את גישת 'גנדי' של פסיביות וערפת
דחה אותה מיד.

תביעות ערפת

ערפת רוצה בלגיטימציה ע"י ישראל שתישא ותתן עמו
כנציג.

מוכן לפגוש כל נציג ישראלי בכל מקום באופן פרטי או
פומבי 'כשהכל מונח על השולחן - בטחון, גבולות, כלכלה
בעיות מימי'. הוא מעוניין בגבולות פרה-67' אם ניתן
להגיע לכך, אולם כאמור 'הכל על השולחן'.

מנהיגות בשטחים

אוואנס ביקש עפ"י המלצת מחמ"ד לקבל שמות 10 פלסטינים
שיסכים או יתיר להם להדבר עם הישראלים. תשובת ערפת
היתה כי אינו סומך על איש ואין לו ערבויות שיבטיחו
שישראל לא תפגע באנשים אלה. אין ערבויות שישראל וארה"ב
יוכלו לתת לו WHICH WILL SATISFY HIM ON THIS ISSUE
למעשה, דחה ההצעה שמחמ"ד רצתה לבדוק אותו בגינה.

איום על פרייג'.

אוואנס שאל את ערפת בנוגע להודעתו שניתנה בריאד לגבי
האיום על פרייג' וירית 10 כדורים לחזהו.

THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

STANDARD

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לדברי אוואנס לגבי שאלה זו (בניגוד לשאר השיחה) היה ערפת נזעם ביותר " HE WAS MAD AS HELL AT ME ".
ערפת הסביר כי לא היה זה איום אלא בתגובה לשאלת ידידו המשורר אמר 'בכל מי שמתנגד לאינתיפדה, אירה 10 כדורים בחזהו ואני מצפה שתעשו גם לי כך אם אתנגד לאינתיפדה'.
לפי אוואנס, ניסה ערפת לעשות רציונאליזציה לבחירה גרועה של מילים.

2. התרשמותו הכללית של אוואנס היא שערפת היה מאוד גלוי (CANDID) בשיחתו עימו.

3. אוואנס מתכנן לנסוע למזה'ת ב-22.3 לביקור במצרים סעודיה, עיראק ירדן וישראל. אין לו תכניות נוספות להפגש עם ערפת עם זאת, אמר לו ערפת שאם ירצה (אוואנס) לפגשו בקהיר או ריאד יתאים את לוח הזמנים שלו לזה של אוואנס.

4. אוואנס חזר היום לארה"ב. מניחים שבימים הקרובים ימסור רשמיו לאיפא'ק ולעמיתיו הקונגרסמנים וסביר להניח שינסה ליצור קשר גם עם השגריר. כמו כן מניחים שיכין דיווח מפורט עבור ועדת המשנה לאירופה והמזה'ת ועבור מחמ"ד.

5. אין ספק שאוואנס בבחינת OBSESSED לגבי הייעוד שמצא לעצמו ונראה שבכוונתו להמשיך להתמסר למשימה זו במלוא המרץ.

עוד נדווח.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגור.

10

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבס, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, ליאור, מזתים

1. The first part of the document discusses the general principles of the project and the objectives to be achieved. It also outlines the scope of the work and the resources available for its completion.

2. The second part of the document describes the methodology used in the study, including the data collection methods and the statistical techniques employed for data analysis.

3. The third part of the document presents the results of the study, which show a significant correlation between the variables under investigation. These findings are discussed in detail and compared with previous research in the field.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the implications of the study and offers suggestions for further research. It also provides a conclusion based on the findings and a summary of the key points discussed throughout the report.

5. The fifth part of the document contains the references cited in the text, which provide a list of sources used for information and data in the study.

6. The sixth part of the document is the appendix, which contains supplementary information that supports the main text of the report, such as raw data and detailed calculations.

** נכנס
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סודי

חוזם: 2,9797

אל: המשרד

מ-: ווש, נר: 308, תא: 130289, חז: 1800, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: מצפא

נד: 8

סודי / רגיל

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

תהליך השלום : בעקבות שיחת בייקר - ארד .

1. בשיחה (13.2) עם ארון מילר (אגף תכנון מדיני) העריך כי אין לראות בהצעה (שהעלה המזכיר בייקר בשיחתו עם השגריר) לקיים שיחות הכנה בדרגי עבודה טרם בואו של שה'ח ארנס משום אינדיקציה לגיבוש נהלי עבודה חדשים בסוגיא המזה'תית.
2. מילר סבור שההצעה היא שילוב של רעיון של דניס רוס וכוונת המזכיר שלא להיות מעורב בשלב שבו הוא לומד את הנושא במו'מ ללא הכנה מוקדמת. בייקר לדברי מילר רואה בשיחות המקדימות הכנה טובה לפגישתו עם שה'ח ארנס.
3. בהקשר למקום עריכת שיחות ההכנה ציין ששיגור שליח אמריקאי עלול לעורר ציפיות. מכאן סבור שיעדיפו לקיים השיחות בווינגטון.
4. לשאלה ביחס לאופי הדיאלוג עם מצרים (שגריר מצרים נועד עם המזכיר אחרי פגישה עם שגרירנו) ציין כי איננו צופה (בשלב זה) לקיום שיחות הכנה במתכונת דומה לזו שמעוניינים לקיים עמנו ערב ביקור הנשיא

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 1952.05.22

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מובארק.

שטיין

ח

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, סייבל

** נכנס

10 ד'

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חוזם: 2,9795

אל: המשרד

מ-: 100, נר: 306, תא: 130289, חז: 1815, דח: ר, 10: ג

תח: 8 גס: מצפא

נד: 8

סודי / רגיל

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

תהליך השלום: בעקבות שיחת ארד - בייקר.

1. בשיחה עם ס/מנהל מח' ישראל הולצמן (שנכח בפגישה עם המזכיר) התייחס למספר היבטים שעלו בשיחה.

2. להלן נקודות משיחתנו.

א. גיבוש עמדה מאוחדת (UNIFIED POSITION):

(1) ציין הקושי שבו אנו (אנחנו והם) עלולים להיתקל בהשגת היעד לעיל שאותו הציב המזכיר.

(2) סבור שישראל תצטרך לקבל החלטות קשות.

(3) בנסיבות הקיימות סבור כי במקום להתרכז במאמץ לגיבוש עמדה מאוחדת יש לחתור לתאום עמדות כאשר שני הצדדים יגבשו חלוקת עבודה שבמסגרתה שני הצדדים יקחו במערכת השיקולים שלהן את האינטרסים של הצד השני.

(4) בתשובה לשאלתי לגבי הדיאלוג עם מצרים וירדן מעריך כי בשלב זה ימקד הממשל את תשומת ליבו בדיאלוג עמנו. נימק זאת באופי היחסים המיוחדים עמנו. ציין כי הכוונה ככל הנראה תהיה להגיע לתאום עמדות עמנו ורק בשלב שני לשלב את מצרים וירדן.

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משרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

ב. שיחות בדרגי עבודה .

1) מעריך שכוונת בייקר בהצעתו היא לנסות ולהגיע לליבון ראשוני של רעיונות ואיתור שטחי מחלוקת לפני פגישת בייקר עם שה'ח ארנס.

2) אשר למיכניזם מעריך שהצוות בראשו יעמוד דניס רוס יכלול את ה- NEA והמועצה לבטחון לאומי.

3) לו'ז העמוס של המזכיר בתקופה הקרובה מקטין הסיכוי לביקור דניס בישראל מכאן שעיקר עבודת ההכנה תצטרך להתבצע בווישינגטון.

ג. אוריה:

1) כמוני, חש את השינוי בסגנון העבודה של בייקר בהשוואה לקודמו. את חדר העבודה של המזכיר החליף חדר ישיבות רשמי. את מקום השיחות עם שולץ אשר הסתיימו לא אחת ללא החלטות ברורות ואופרטיביות תפס סגנון עבודה עסקי ר'ל פגישות ענייניות המסתיימות בהחלטות לביצוע.

שטיין

ח

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סי'בל

2. מידע כללי

1) שם המעביד: מ.א.ד.ת. (מחלקת אג"מ) - משרד הביטחון והגנה
2) שם המעביד: מ.א.ד.ת. (מחלקת אג"מ) - משרד הביטחון והגנה

3) תפקיד המעביד: מ.א.ד.ת. (מחלקת אג"מ) - משרד הביטחון והגנה

4) מידע נוסף: מ.א.ד.ת. (מחלקת אג"מ) - משרד הביטחון והגנה

3. מידע

1) שם המעביד: מ.א.ד.ת. (מחלקת אג"מ) - משרד הביטחון והגנה
2) שם המעביד: מ.א.ד.ת. (מחלקת אג"מ) - משרד הביטחון והגנה
3) שם המעביד: מ.א.ד.ת. (מחלקת אג"מ) - משרד הביטחון והגנה

מ.א.ד.ת.

מ.א.ד.ת.

מ.א.ד.ת. (מחלקת אג"מ) - משרד הביטחון והגנה
מ.א.ד.ת. (מחלקת אג"מ) - משרד הביטחון והגנה

** נכנס

סודי

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מקור חלקי

חוזם: 2,9795

אל: המשרד

מ-: ווש, נר: 306, תא: 130289, חז: 1815, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: פ גס: מצפא

נד: 0

סודי / רגיל

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

תהליך השלום: בעקבות שיחת ארד - בייקר.

1. בשיחה עם ס/מנהל מח' ישראל הולצמן (שנכח בפגישה עם המזכיר) התייחס למספר היבטים שעלו בשיחה.

2. להלן נקודות משיחתנו.

א. גיבוש עמדה מאוחדת (UNIFIED POSITION):

1) ציין הקושי שבו אנו (אנחנו והם) עלולים להיתקל בהשגת היעד לעיל שאותו הציב המזכיר.

2) סבור שישראל תצטרך לקבל החלטות קשות.3) בנסיבות הקיימות סבור כי במקום להתרכז במאמץ לגיבוש עמדה מאוחדת יש לחתור לתאום עמדות כאשר שני הצדדים יגבשו חלוקת עבודה שבמסגרתה שני הצדדים יקחו במערכת השיקולים שלהן את האינטרסים של הצד השני.

4) בתשובה לשאלתי לגבי הדיאלוג עם מצרים וירדן מעריך כי בשלב זה ימקד הממשל את תשומת ליבו בדיאלוג עמנו. נימק זאת באופי היחסים המיוחדים עמנו. ציין כי הכוונה ככל הנראה תהיה להגיע לתאום עמדות עמנו ורק בשלב שני לשלב את מצרים וירדן.

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משרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

ב. שיחות בדרג' עבודה .

1) מעריך שכוונת בייקר בהצעתו היא לנסות ולהגיע לליבון ראשוני של רעיונות ואיתור שטחי מחלוקת לפני פגישת בייקר עם שה'ח ארנס.

2) אשר למיכניזם מעריך שהצוות הראשוני יעמוד דניס רוס יכלול את ה- NEA והמועצה לבטחון לאומי.

3) לו'ז העמוס של המזכיר בתקופה הקרובה מקטין הסיכוי לביקור דניס בישראל מכאן שעיקר עבודת ההכנה תצטרך להתבצע בווישינגטון.

ג. אוריה:

1) כמוני, חש את השינוי בסגנון העבודה של בייקר בהשוואה לקודמו. את חדר העבודה של המזכיר החליף חדר ישיבות רשמי. את מקום השיחות עם שולץ אשר הסתיימו לא אחת ללא החלטות ברורות ואופרטיביות תפס סגנון עבודה עסקי ר'ל פגישות ענייניות המסתיימות בהחלטות לביצוע.

שטיין

ח

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל

נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 2,9797

אל: המשרד

מ-: 110, נר: 308, תא: 130289, ח: 1800, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: מצפא

ג: ד

סודי / רגיל

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"נ

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

תהליך השלום : בעקבות שיחת בייקר - ארד .

1. בשיחה (13.2) עם ארון מילר (אגף תכנון מדיני) העריך כי אין לראות בהצעה (שהעלה המזכיר בייקר בשיחתו עם השגריר) לקיים שיחות הכנה בדרגי עבודה טרם בואו של שה"ח ארנס משום אינדיקציה לגיבוש נהלי עבודה חדשים בסוגיית המזה"תית.
2. מילר סבור שההצעה היא שילוב של רעיון של דניס רוס וכוונת המזכיר שלא להיות מעורב בשלב שבו הוא לומד את הנושא במו"מ ללא הכנה מוקדמת. בייקר לדברי מילר רואה בשיחות המקדימות הכנה טובה לפגישתו עם שה"ח ארנס.
3. בהקשר למקום עריכת שיחות ההכנה ציין ששיגור שליח אמריקאי עלול לעורר ציפיות. מכאן סבור שיעדיפו לקיים השיחות בושינגטון.
4. לשאלה ביחס לאופי הדיאלוג עם מצרים (שגריר מצרים נועד עם המזכיר אחרי פגישה עם שגרירנו) ציין כי איננו צופה (בשלב זה) לקיום שיחות הכנה במתכונת דומה לזו שמעוניינים לקיים עמנו ערב ביקור הנשיא

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מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מובארק.

שטיין

חו

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, סייבל

SECRET

NO. 1

DE

RE: WPA, OSHA, FBI, DARTS, WREN, SICK, SICK, (VACC), TO, NO, SICK,
ELECT, SICK, SICK

** נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 2,9797

אל: המשרד

מ-: 110, נר: 308, תא: 130289, חז: 1800, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: 9 גס: מצפא

נד: 9

סודי / רגיל

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

תהליך השלום : בעקבות שיחת בייקר - ארד .

1. בשיחה (13.2) עם ארון מילר (אגף תכנון מדיני) העריך כי אין לראות בהצעה (שהעלה המזכיר בייקר בשיחתו עם השגריר) לקיים שיחות הכנה בדרגי עבודה טרם בואו של שה'ח ארנס משום אינדיקציה לגיבוש נהלי עבודה חדשים בסוגיא המזה'תית.

2. מילר סבור שההצעה היא שילוב של רעיון של דניס רוס וכוונת המזכיר שלא להיות מעורב בשלב שבו הוא לומד את הנושא במו'מ ללא הכנה מוקדמת. בייקר לדברי מילר רואה בשיחות המקדימות הכנה טובה לפגישתו עם שה'ח ארנס.

3. בהקשר למקום עריכת שיחות ההכנה ציין ששיגור שליח אמריקאי עלול לעורר ציפיות. מכאן סבור שיעדיפו לקיים השיחות בושינגטון.

4. לשאלה ביחס לאופי הדיאלוג עם מצרים (שגריר מצרים נועד עם המזכיר אחרי פגישה עם שגרירנו) ציין כי איננו צופה (בשלב זה) לקיום שיחות הכנה במתכונת דומה לזו שמעוניינים לקיים עמנו ערב ביקור הנשיא

01/10/1952, 2
 10/10/1952
 0-1110, 17:00, 11/10/1952, 10:00, 11/10/1952, 10:00
 01/10/1952
 17:00

דמי ג' : 98.50.47

דמי ג' : 98.50.47

דמי ג' : 98.50.47

דמי ג' : 98.50.47

1. דמי ג' : 98.50.47
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2. דמי ג' : 98.50.47
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4. דמי ג' : 98.50.47
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 דמי ג' : 98.50.47

משרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

מובארק.

שטיין

חו

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, סי'יבל

** נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 2,9795

אל: המשרד

מ-: ווש, נר: 306, תא: 130289, חז: 1815, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: מצפא

נד: 8

סודי / רגיל

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

תהליך השלום: בעקבות שיחת ארד - בייקר.

1. בשיחה עם ס/מנהל מח' ישראל הולצמן (שנכח בפגישה עם המזכיר) התייחס למספר היבטים שעלו בשיחה.

2. להלן נקודות משיחתנו.

א. גיבוש עמדה מאוחדת (UNIFIED POSITION):

1) ציין הקושי שבו אנו (אנחנו והם) עלולים להיתקל בהשגת היעד לעיל שאותו הציב המזכיר.

2) סבור שישראל תצטרך לקבל החלטות קשות.

3) בנסיבות הקיימות סבור כי במקום להתרכז במאמץ לגיבוש עמדה מאוחדת יש לחתור לתאום עמדות כאשר שני הצדדים יגבשו חלוקת עבודה שבמסגרתה שני הצדדים יקחו במערכת השיקולים שלהן את האינטרסים של הצד השני.

4) בתשובה לשאלתי לגבי הדיאלוג עם מצרים וירדן מעריך כי בשלב זה ימקד הממשל את תשומת ליבו בדיאלוג עמנו. נימק זאת באופי היחסים המיוחדים עמנו. ציין כי הכוונה ככל הנראה תהיה להגיע לתאום עמדות עמנו ורק בשלב שני לשלב את מצרים וירדן.

2,972,077
 17:00
 10:10, 11:10, 12:00, 13:00, 14:00, 15:00, 16:00, 17:00
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17:00

17:00
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17:00 - 17:00

1. 17:00 - 17:00

2. 17:00 - 17:00

3. 17:00 - 17:00

4. 17:00 - 17:00

5. 17:00 - 17:00

6. 17:00 - 17:00

7. 17:00 - 17:00

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ב. שיחות בדרג' עבודה .

1) מעריך שכוונת בייקר בהצעתו היא לנסות ולהגיע לליבון ראשוני של רעיונות ואיתור שטחי מחלוקת לפני פגישת בייקר עם שה"ח ארנס.

2) אשר למיכניזם מעריך שהצוות בראשו יעמוד דניס רוס יכלול את ה- NEA והמועצה לבטחון לאומי.

3) לו"ז העמוס של המזכיר בתקופה הקרובה מקטין הסיכוי לביקור דניס בישראל מכאן שעיקר עבודת ההכנה תצטרך להתבצע בוושינגטון.

ג. אזירה:

1) כמוני, חש את השינוי בסגנון העבודה של בייקר בהשוואה לקודמו. את חדר העבודה של המזכיר החליף חדר ישיבות רשמי. את מקום השיחות עם שולץ אשר הסתיימו לא אחת ללא החלטות ברורות ואופרטיביות תפס סגנון עבודה עסקי ר'ל פגישות ענייניות המסתיימות בהחלטות לביצוע.

שטיין

חז

תפ: שהח, ששהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל

נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 2,9797

אל: המשרד

מ-: וווש, נר: 308, תא: 130289, חז: 1800, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: מצפא

נד: 8

1. יצא ל...
2. ...
3. ...
231.5

סודי / רגיל

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

תהליך השלום : בעקבות שיחת בייקר - ארד .

1. בשיחה (13.2) עם ארון מילר (אגף תכנון מדיני) העריך כי אין לראות בהצעה (שהעלה המזכיר בייקר בשיחתו עם השגריר) לקיים שיחות הכנה בדרגי עבודה טרם בואו של שה'ח ארנס משום אינדיקציה לגיבוש נהלי עבודה חדשים בסוגיא המזה'תית.
2. מילר סבור שההצעה היא שילוב של רעיון של דניס רוס וכוונת המזכיר שלא להיות מעורב בשלב שבו הוא לומד את הנושא במו'מ'מ ללא הכנה מוקדמת. בייקר לדברי מילר רואה בשיחות המקדימות הכנה טובה לפגישתו עם שה'ח ארנס.
3. בהקשר למקום עריכת שיחות ההכנה ציין ששיגור שליח אמריקאי עלול לעורר ציפיות. מכאן סבור שיעדיפו לקיים השיחות בושינגטון.
4. לשאלה ביחס לאופי הדיאלוג עם מצרים (שגריר מצרים נועד עם המזכיר אחרי פגישה עם שגרירנו) ציין כי איננו צופה (בשלב זה) לקיום שיחות הכנה במתכונת דומה לזו שמעוניינים לקיים עמנו ערב ביקור הנשיא

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 0-110, 01:000, 01:0000, 11:000, 11:000, 11:000, 11:000
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2. 010:0000 01:0000 01:0000 01:0000
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משרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

מובארק.

שטיין

חו

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, סייבל

ВІСНІВ.

ШОС'І

ПІ

НЕ: ШЛП, ОШСЛ, ГСВ, ДОГРВ, ШСГО, ВІС'І, ДАІС'І, Г'Л'В'С'І, Г'В, НДІ, С'В'І,
С'ІС'І, С'В'І, С'І'І'І

01:10:2828,2
 01:10:2828
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01:10:2828

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01:10:2828 - 01:10:2828

1. 01:10:2828
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2. 01:10:2828

3. (UNITED POSITION) 01:10:2828

4. 01:10:2828
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5. 01:10:2828

6. 01:10:2828
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7. 01:10:2828
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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ב. שיחות בדרגי עבודה .

1) מעריך שכוונת בייקר בהצעתו היא לנסות ולהגיע לליבון ראשוני של רעיונות ואיתור שטחי מחלוקת לפני פגישת בייקר עם שה'ח ארנס.

2) אשר למיכניזם מעריך שהצוות בראשו יעמוד דניס רוס יכלול את ה- NEA והמועצה לבטחון לאומי.

3) לו'ז העמוס של המזכיר בתקופה הקרובה מקטין הסיכוי לביקור דניס בישראל מכאן שעיקר עבודת ההכנה תצטרך להתבצע בוושנינגטון.

ג. אוריה:

1) כמוני, חש את השינוי בסגנון העבודה של בייקר בהשוואה לקודמו. את חדר העבודה של המזכיר החליף חדר ישיבות רשמי. את מקום השיחות עם שולץ אשר הסתיימו לא אחת ללא החלטות ברורות ואופרטיביות תפס סגנון עבודה עסקי ר'ל פגישות ענייניות המסתיימות בהחלטות לביצוע.

שטיין

חו

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, סייבל

2. משה יצא ממצרים

וַיֵּצֵא מֹשֶׁה אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם
וַיֵּצֵא אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם
וַיֵּצֵא אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם

3) - וַיֵּצֵא מֹשֶׁה אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם
וַיֵּצֵא אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם

4) - וַיֵּצֵא מֹשֶׁה אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם
וַיֵּצֵא אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם

5. משה יצא ממצרים

וַיֵּצֵא מֹשֶׁה אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם
וַיֵּצֵא אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם
וַיֵּצֵא אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם
וַיֵּצֵא אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם

וַיֵּצֵא

וַיֵּצֵא

וַיֵּצֵא מֹשֶׁה אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם
וַיֵּצֵא אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָמֵי פַרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם

דחיות: מיידי	טופס מברק קשר ניו-יורק	דף: 16 מחוק: 19
סוג: שמור		אל: מצפ"א
תזח: 1416-		
מס מדקי: 110-110	דע: שגריר וושינגטון, סמנכ"ל צפ"א, לשכת השר	
0 0402		מאת: הקונכ"ל

ועידת הנשיאים.

משיחות עם חברי המשלחת שחזרו - התרשמות היתה כד"כ טובה. רבים ציינו את האחרות היחסית בממשלה לעומת ממשלת האחדות הקודמת וכן את רצינות ההתייחסות כלפיהם. הביקור לדעת ראשי הועידה סייע בבניית הקונטקט בתוך הארגון וכלי שהוא חשוב ביותר לקראת המאבקים הצפויים.

הביקורת העיקרית שחושמעה ע"י אחדים היתה כי אין די מודעות בארץ לעומק הסחף בארה"ב הן בקונגרס והן בתקשורת.

ג'ק אחינון שהיה רידוע חרר המשלחת ריכוח אמש לנשיא בוש וראש מטה הבית הלבן סנונו על התרשמויותיו החיוביות מהביקור בארץ. הכלים האבחנה בין אש"פ לערכי השטחים והצורך בחיזוק מנהיגי שטחים שמעוננונים לנקוט כקו תרומחי. זרה לדעתו לאוזן קשרה ונאמר לו כי מצפים עתה לביקורי ראה"מ ושה"ח כדי לשמוע את רעיונותיה של ישראל לגבי קידום תהליך השלום.

אורי סביר

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אישור: י.א.

שם השולח: אורן חרור

תאריך: 14.2.89

דחיות: מידי	טופס מכרז קשר ניו-יורק	דף: 16 מחוק: 19
סוג: שמור		אל: מצפ"א
תזח: 1416-		
מס מדקי: 110-110	דע: שגריר וושינגטון, סמנכ"ל צפ"א, לשכת השר	
0 0402		מאת: הקונכ"ל

ועידת הנשיאים.

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אורי סביר

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אישור: א.ס.א. שם השולח: אורי חרזר תאריך: 14.2.89



ח' באדר א' התשמ"ט
13 בפברואר 1989
748

1000

אל : מר אריה מקל, יועץ מדיני לרה"מ.

מאת : מנהל הסברה.

הנדון: נקודות ל-WHITE PAPER

תודה על מזכרך מ-6/2.

כפי שראית, חלק מהנקודות שהצעת מצאו דרכן לנייר שהוצאנו בחגובה
לדו"ח מחמ"ד.

לסעיף "פגיעה באזרחים אמריקנים" שבמכתבך, לא צורפו הנתונים כפי
שצויין.

אודה על המצאתם.

בברכה,

יעקב לוי

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ירצא

בלמט

חרזם: 2,9425
 אל: בני/449, רוש/516, לרטאנגלט/143, אוטובה/154, לונדון/261,
 שטוקהולם/141, מזריו/158, ברויטל/182, בון/190, פריס/398,
 רומא/200, מילנו/117, קומנהגן/144, ברן/185, גנבה/219, אנקרה/118,
 ניקוסיה/129, אתונה/146, אוסלו/119, וינה/171, האג/177,
 הלסינקי/95, ווולינגטון/70, טידיני/95, קנברה/135
 מ-: המשרד, תא: 130289, דח: 1801, דח: מ, טג: בל
 ח: פ גט: הטברה
 נ: ד: פ

בלמט/מידי

נר"ח מחמ"ד לזכויות אדם.

1. להלן מתגובות חברי הקונגרס האמריקאי בשימוע הזדהים ביקורת על אופי התייחסות הזדה לישראל.

2. לשימושבם במידה דהנוטא עדיין אקטואלי אצלכם.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
 REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ISRAEL TELEVISION, 10
 FEBRUARY, 1989

1. LARRY SMITH - FLORIDA (ON DOUBLE STANDARD SET FOR
 ISRAEL)

'... FOR INSTANCE, MR. SHIFTER, DID THE STATE
 DEPARTMENT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AT ALL THE POSSIBILITY OF
 INCLUDING THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION OF SENDING WOMEN
 AND SMALL CHILDREN TO THE FRONT OF THE LINE TO THROW
 MOLOTOV COCKTAILS, WIELD KNIVES AND THROW ROCKS AT
 SOLDIERS? IS THERE ANYBODY WHO HAS A LOGICAL BRAIN
 THAT WOULD SAY THAT'S NOT A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION?
 AFTER ALL, DOES A 7-YEAR-OLD CHILD HAVE SOME KIND OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY
58 CHEMISTRY BUILDING
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637
TEL: 773-936-3700

RECEIVED
MAY 15 1964
1000 UNIVERSITY AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60607
TEL: 773-936-3700

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY
58 CHEMISTRY BUILDING
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637
TEL: 773-936-3700

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

FREE WILL?'

'WOULD YOU MIND TELLING ME BY WHOM THOSE STANDARDS ARE SET AND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DECIDING WHOSE STANDARDS WE USE IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS REPORT? IF THERE IS A DOUBLE SET OF STANDARDS, I WANT TO KNOW WHO THE HELL HAS THE RIGHT TO APPLY THEIR STANDARDS WHEN EVERYBODY ELSE IS BEING GIVEN A SEPARATE SET OF STANDARDS TO WHICH THEY MUST ADHERE?'

2. TED WEISS - NEW YORK (ON DEPORTATIONS)

'... THERE IS A WHOLE BUNCH OF COUNTRIES WHO GET TOGETHER AND THEY CALL THEMSELVES THE UNITED NATIONS, AND A BUNCH OF COUNTRIES THAT WILL CHOP OFF THE HAND OF A WOMAN WHO STOLE A LOAF OF BREAD TO FEED HER STARVING CHILDREN WILL SEND A DELEGATE TO CONDEMN ISRAEL FOR TAKING A TERRORIST AND MAKING HIM STAND IN THE CORNER OR SOMEWHERE ELSE ON THE PLANET. I MEAN IT SEEMS TO ME A PRETTY HUMANE WAY OF DEALING WITH SOMEBODY, TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM A SOCIETY WHERE THEY CHOOSE TO REEK VIOLENCE UPON .. '

הטברה/מידע

אכ

אכ

תנ: טחח, טשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, טמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצריוס, מצפא, אטויה,
מאנ, אמלט, מזתים, ארבל, חדרנה, מעט, הטברה, אמד, איר1, איר2, איר3,
לעמ, מקל/ממרה, זראב

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חרזם: 2,9324
 אל: ביירט/269, בריטל/183, ברזיליה/150, ארטובה/155, ניקוסיה/130,
 פריס/401, בון/192, רומא/201, טוקיו/249, מכסיקו/198, פנמה/61,
 לימה/156, מנילה/70, ליטבון/132, מדריד/159, מבונה/55,
 שטוקהולם/142, טרגו/29, לונדון/262, דוש/519, קרקט/160, ניו/452,
 גנבה/220
 מ-: המשרד, תא: 130289, זח: 1634, דח: ר, טג: נבל
 תח: 8 גט: ארבל
 נד: 8

בלמס/רגיל

שגרירות.

זע כאר'ם, נציגות.

הועדה לזכויות אדם.

א. הועדה לזכויות אדם מקיימת בימים אלה מושבה השנתית
 בג'נבה. מדינת כהונתכם היא אחת מ-43 חברות הועדה הזו,
 המועלת כועדה מונקציונלית של המושבה הכלכלית
 והטוציאלית של האר'ם (ECOSOC).

ב. כנכל שנה עומד על סדר יומה של הועדה טעיף המכונה 'שאלת
 ההגרה של זכויות האדם בשטחים הערביים הכבושים, כולל
 פלסטינה'. הטעיף נחשב לבעל עדיפות רנדון מדי שנה
 כראשון הטעיפים המהותיים, מיד אחרי פתיחת המושב.

ג. הדיון הזה נערך בשבוע שעבר ובמסגרתו נאמו נציגים רבים
 תוך הטחת האשמות כבדות בנו. תמצית הדברים הוברקה
 לנציגויות הנוגעות בדבר.

ד. לועדה הוגשה עד כה טיוטה של הצעת-החלטה (בעלת שני
 פרקים) המכילה במדי שנה התקפות קשות על ישראל ומגנה

1944
The following information was obtained from the records of the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, at
Washington, D. C., on August 1, 1944.

Section 16, Township 10N, Range 10E, T10N, R10E, S10W, 10th Principal Meridian, Grant County, Oregon.

Section 16

Section 16

Section 16

Section 16

The following information was obtained from the records of the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, at
Washington, D. C., on August 1, 1944.

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Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, at
Washington, D. C., on August 1, 1944.

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Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, at
Washington, D. C., on August 1, 1944.

The following information was obtained from the records of the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, at
Washington, D. C., on August 1, 1944.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אותה בין היתר על הפרת החוק הבינ"ל, בפשי מל... המעשים
נגד האנושות. כן קודמת הטיוטה למערכת האו"ם כי תקרא
למועביט להפעיל נגד ישראל אמצעים לפי נרק VII של מגילת
האו"ם (סנקציות על מדינות המאיימות או פוגעות בשלום
ומבצעות מעשי תוקפנות).

ההחלטות המכילות האלמנטים הנ"ל התקבלו ע"י הוועדה מדי
שנה מאז שנות ה-70 המוקדמות. עם זאת, לשון ההצעות
שהוגשו השנה חריפה ותוקפנית מאי פעם. בשנים קודמות
נתקבלו ההחלטות ע"י הרוב העויין של חברי הוועדה (כולל
אמ"ט ואירופה) ובהתנגדות רוב ארצות המערב.

מנהל ארבי"ל 2

מא

תפ: שחח, טשהח, רהח, ממרחמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ברנע, ארבל, ארבל, ליאור,
מזתים, טייבל, משנט, בנצור, מצמא, שפי, אמלט, איר, איר, הדס, אטיה,
מאכ

THE STATE OF NEW YORK
IN SENATE
JANUARY 15, 1914.
REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE
LAND OFFICE.

ALBANY: JAMES BROWN PUBLISHER.
1914.

RECEIVED AT THE OFFICE OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND OFFICE
JANUARY 15, 1914.

חוזם: 2,8981

אל: בני/416, ורוש/491, וינה/161, גנבה/206, בנגקוק/214, טוקיו/238,
 בייט/257, קופנהגן/134, ברזיליה/142, לימה/142, ליטבון/123,
 אוסלו/109, אוטבה/145, מכסיקו/186, קרקט/152, קנברה/124,
 אתונה/135, האג/166, ניקוסיה/121, נריס/373, רומא/189, מילנו/108,
 אנקרה/107, קינשאסה/101, טינגבור/127, בוקרשט/103, בון/175,
 מדריד/147, ריו/132, יאונדה/106, לונדון/244, בון/174, בריסל/170,
 שטוקהולם/130, מנמת/218
 מ-: המשרד, תא: 130289, זח: 1119, דח: מ, סג: בל
 תח: 8 גט: ממז
 8: 10

בלמ"ט/מיידי

נציגות

לחוזם 2,8675

מדברי טגן נשיא ארה"ב קרויל בפני כנס א.ד.ל.
 בסעיף 1 שורה אחרונה נפלה טעות.

צריך להיות:

ממשל בוש הוכיח זאת בשבוע הראשון לשלטונו כשהבהיר שיטיל
 וטו במועבי"ט.

בינ"ל 1 - מז"ד

סר

לש

תפ: שהח, טשהח, רהח, ממרחח, שהבט, מנבל, ממנבל, סמנבל, ממד, רס, אמך,
 ארבל, ארבל, מרנ, מעח, הסברה, לעמ, מתאסשטיס, תרבות, אוקיאניה,
 מצריט, מצפא, אטייה, מאנ, אמלט, מזתים, איר, איר, איר, דראט, לוברני

22

דחיסות: מידר	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
סוג: שמר		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן חבור: 13.2.89 08:45		אל: סמנכ"ל עפ"א מזת"ם
כס' פרוק: הפסלד: 285		דע: כאח: ציר - עודד ערו

דו"ח זכויות האדם

שיפטר חצוה שאם אנו רוצים להגיב על הדו"ח שנעשה זאת בפרוט רב תוך התיחסות לכל ערות או טעות שנראים לנו.

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מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	ק"י: $\frac{1}{2}$ כתוב: 2
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סוג: כלמ"ס	
תאריך וזמן העבר: 131700	אל: הסברה, מצפ"א
כס' סבוקי	דע: ציר הסברה ווש'
תפסדו: 0 0360	
95 ווייטמן	כאת: קונסול החסברה נ"י

הרב שמריהו גורארי ז"ל.
 נפטר כניו-יורק הרב גורארי שהקים ועמד במשך כמעט יובל שנים כראש המערכת
 העולמית של חב"ד.
 הח"מ ייצג הקונסוליה בהלוויתו שהתקיימה ביום א', בנוכחות עשרת אלפים חסידיו
 חב"ד.
 מוצע כי רוה"מ ושה"ח ישגרו מברקי תנחומים לתנועת חב"ד ולרבי.
מצ"ב הקטע מהניו-יורק טיימס דיום א'.

אורי פלטי

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[Handwritten signature]

תפוצה: 13.2.89 א. פלטי

תאריך: שם השולח: אישור:

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360/95

THE NEW YORK TIMES OBITUARIES SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1989

Rabbi Samarious Gourary, 91, Educator

Rabbi Samarious Gourary, the executive director for the past 48 years of United Lubavitcher Yeshivah, the educational arm of the Lubavitcher Hasidim, died after a brief illness at New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center yesterday. He was 91 years old and lived in Montclair, N.J.

Rabbi Gourary rebuilt the Yeshivah in the United States after coming here from Russia in 1940. The Yeshivah, which operates day schools, rabbinical colleges and seminaries worldwide, was founded 92 years ago in Russia by Rabbi Joseph I. Schneersohn, Rabbi Gourary's father-in-law.

Rabbi Gourary is the brother-in-law of Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the present rebbe of the Lubavitcher Hasidim, the largest Hasidic sect in the United States.

In 1985, he played a role in the bitter family dispute and subsequent court battle that began when his son, Barry S. Gourary, claimed as his inheritance and then sold more than 100 of Rabbi

Joseph I. Schneersohn's books that had survived the Holocaust.

Rabbi Gourary was reported to have ordered his son, a management consultant who was estranged from the Lubavitcher sect, to return the books and threatened to testify against him. The case was unusual because it is rare for an important dispute within the Hasidic community to be pursued in the civil courts.

A Federal District judge in Brooklyn in 1987 awarded the library to the Lubavitch community.

Rabbi Gourary was born in Kremenchug in the Ukraine in December 1897.

In addition to his son, he is survived by his wife, Channa of Montclair.

February 12, 1989
Issue 87

MIDDLE EAST CONFLICTS

SAUDI ARABIA

17 people, six of whom were military personnel, were executed the last week of November and over 300 were arrested in the predominantly Shi'ite-populated and oil-rich eastern province of Saudi Arabia. The provincial governor, Muhammed bin-Fahd (a favorite son of King Fahd), conferred with the Crown Prince of Bahrain in order to discuss joint efforts in eliminating insurgents operating in both countries (al-Rai al-Akhar, London, January 31).

SUDAN

Col. John Garang's forces have captured the strategically-located town of Nassir, situated adjacent to the Ethiopian frontier, following a siege that lasted four months (Tanjug, the Yugoslav News Agency, January 30).

SOMALIA

Egyptian military advisors are assisting Somalia in its struggle against rebels assaulting the port city of Berbera (al-Wafd, Egypt, January 19).

LIBYA-SUDAN

Libya is attempting to Arabize and take-over the Darfour region in the Western Sudan. 400 Sudanese were killed during the November-December battles and 200 villages were destroyed (al-Khiyat, a Lebanese weekly published in London, January 16).

EGYPT

Some of the Islamic activists who were rounded up by the Egyptian authorities have been transferred from the volatile Ain-Shams area to a destination outside of Cairo, while their Cairo homes have been sealed off or demolished. Shots were exchanged between two rival associations of lawyers in Cairo. Security forces have surrounded their headquarters (al-Wafd, Egypt, January 23; al-Sha'ab, Egypt, January 24; Qatar News Agency, January 24).

THE PLO'S ROLE IN ARAB POLITICS

ABD al-RAHIM AHMED, Secretary-General of the PLO's Arab Front for the Liberation of Palestine:

"The PLO has urged Arab leaders to coordinate a military response to a forthcoming Israeli offensive against PLO positions in Lebanon. So far, there has been not a single Arab response. I assume that some Arabs prefer to destroy the achievements of the PLO" (al-Anba'a, Kuwait, January 24).

OMAN'S VIEW

"...Oman prefers to establish diplomatic relations with

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states and not with organizations [a reference to the PLO]. States conduct their affairs in an orderly manner, while organizations tend to be non-disciplined... Oman will establish diplomatic ties with the Palestinian state when it is realized. Moreover, there are certain Palestinian groups whose interests are not compatible with those of Oman..." (al-Khiyat, London, January 15).

ZIYAD WAHBA, a central Fatah operative in Lebanon and Secretary-General of the National Action Committee in Lebanon:

"...The uprising will spread to the Galilee and reach more and more Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt... The uprising will encompass all villages and towns in Palestine. It will alter the shape of Arab reality..." (al-Safir weekly, Lebanon, January 17).

PLO-U.S.

ABU IYYAD, Arafat's deputy:

"...All we aspire to achieve, when it comes to the U.S., is a neutral stand [by the U.S.] and an end to its treaty with Israel..." (Uqaz, Saudi Arabia, January 27).

THE PLO -- A TURNING POINT?

ON THE INCREMENTAL POLICY

Nabil Sha'ath, a top advisor to Arafat:

"...The 'democratic state' concept means a single state in the whole of Palestine, with no distinction between Arabs, Christians, Jews and Muslims; a single state tied to all the surrounding Arab states through confederation. Even if we will gain independence in part of our land, we will not relinquish our dream of establishing a single democratic state over the whole of Palestine..." (al-Siyassa, Kuwait, January 29).

Khalid al-Hassan, a veteran confidant of Arafat:

"...We never have renounced the establishment of the democratic state. Following the realization of an independent Palestinian state, the proper circumstances will produce it [i.e., the 'democratic state']..." (al-Mussawar, Egypt, January 27). "...Changing the slogan from the 'liberation of Palestine' to 'international legitimacy' reflects a switch from a direct to an indirect strategy... The Palestinian people has not renounced its grand aim to unify Palestine on the basis of the 'democratic state,' perhaps in the shape of Switzerland. However, in view of the [balance-of-power] reality, that state will be established through democratic, rather than military means..." (al-Medina, Saudi Arabia, January 2).

ON ZIONISM

Shiekh Abd al-Hamid al-Sayekh, Chairman of the PNC:

"...The battle is between two cultures -- an Arab-Muslim and a Zionist-aggressive-settlement. Our presence in Palestine depends on terminating the other culture... The conflict will end through the victory of justice and the preservation of the existence of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians, as Arabs, have been on this soil before the emergence of Judaism, Christianity and Islam..." (al-Sharq al-Ausat, a Saudi weekly published in London, January 13).

Khalid al-Hassan:

"...The Zionist danger threatens the nation and humanity as a whole. The struggle against Zionism is global..." (al-Medina, Saudi Arabia, January 2).



ד' באדר א' התשמ"ט
12 בפברואר 1989
732

אל : הקונכ"ל, סן-פרנציסקו.
מאת : מנהל הסברה.

הנדון: שיעוני הסברה

מכתב מ-6.2

עיינתי בהרצאה שצרפת למכתבך.

את מרבית השיעונים המצויים בה, תמצא בתדרכי ההסברה שלנו
ב-SPEAKERS NOTES עליהם נוסף סגנונו האישי של הנואם שאת
הרצאתו צרפת.

בברכה
יעקב לוי

העתק: סמנכ"ל הסברה.
מצפ"א.
מר אריה מקל, יועץ מדיני לרוה"מ.
דוד פלג, וושינגטון.

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תאריך וזמן העבר: 12.2.89 13:00		אל: מעפ"א מע"ת
כס' פרוק: הפסד:		דצ: לשכת רח"ט
283		פאת: עיתונות, וושינגטון

ארה"ב - אש"פ

להלן דוח הושינגטון פוסט על מסגרת העיתונאים של המזכיר בדרכו לאירופה.

ה/איל אלן
דוסר גל

שם סלפי 3
 רח"ט 1
 מע"ת 3
 מעפ"א 1
 גלרי 2
 דוסר גל 4

תפוצה:

U.S. Chides PLO Over Border Fray

Baker Outlines Policy Principles for European Discussions

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

KEFLAVIK, Iceland, Feb. 11— Secretary of State James A. Baker III said today the United States has warned the PLO that recent Palestinian guerrilla actions "present us with great difficulty," but he added that no decision has been made "at this time" to break off the two-month-old U.S.-PLO dialogue.

Baker said the U.S. attitude was expressed to Palestine Liberation Organization officials in Tunis by Ambassador Robert Pelletreau following clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian guerrillas in southern Lebanon near the border of northern Israel last weekend.

Baker made the warning public in an airborne news conference over the North Atlantic as he flew toward meetings with European allies in his first overseas trip as secretary of state.

The unusual journey is crammed with quick meetings with all 15 of Baker's fellow NATO foreign ministers in their national capitals.

The aim is to dramatize the top priority that the Bush administration places on the allies, Baker said, and "to show them that we are serious about consulting, that we want them to be in on the takeoff so they can be in on the landing with respect to policy formulation as the administration gets started."

At the outset of the journey, Baker listed for reporters five principles of U.S. foreign policy in the

new administration that he said he would discuss with the allies:

■ The NATO alliance will play a "central role" in U.S. policy as both a military alliance and a community of common values.

■ The United States is committed to pursuing "defense and dialogue" with the Soviet Union and other East European countries.

■ The commitment continues for the United States to play a constructive role in the settlement of regional conflicts around the world.

■ The United States recognizes the importance of "collective action" in increasingly crucial transnational questions such as environmental problems, drugs and terrorism.

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■ The United States is dedicated to preserving an open international trading system and a dynamic international financial system.

On the PLO issue, Israel has charged that the weekend clashes proved PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was insincere last December in renouncing terrorism—a public pledge that was the basis for reestablishing a public U.S.-PLO dialogue after more than a decade—and asked the administration to terminate the dialogue.

While deciding not to cut off the talks at this point, Baker said, the United States told the PLO last week that "actions such as this directed against civilian or military targets inside or outside Israel is something that gives us trouble."

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Baker was cautious in discussing one of the administration's early Atlantic alliance challenges, the statement Friday by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl calling for a postponement until 1991 or 1992 of NATO decisions on modernizing short-range nuclear missiles.

U.S. officials had said earlier that key members of Congress were asking for a clear sign from the NATO alliance on the missile modernization issue by this summer as justification for approving funds for development of a short-range missile.

Baker said that, despite Kohl's public statement, there is "not necessarily a difference" between Washington and Bonn on the issue, depending on the details of what Kohl has in mind. He declined further

comment until he meets with Kohl in Bonn late Monday.

On the touchy issue of Afghanistan-related sanctions against the Soviet Union, Baker said that despite his recent comments to Time magazine, he has an "open mind" on whether the "no exceptions" ban on high-technology sales should be lifted now that the Soviets have left Afghanistan. The ban was imposed in early 1980 by the Carter administration because of the Soviet invasion.

The European allies have made clear they favor lifting the ban, and several countries have set in motion applications for high-technology sales to Moscow to bring the issue to a head in a western coordinating committee.

Baker said he was not linking the

"no exceptions" sanction to other issues such as Soviet military support for Nicaragua—an issue he brought into the discussion at a press conference yesterday in Ottawa—but he added that many things have changed since the Soviet invasion, "for better and for worse."

Baker confirmed that he will meet March 7 in Vienna with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze while eastern and western nations gather to launch a new set of conventional arms talks in Europe. But he said a more extensive set of meetings with Shevardnadze would come later.

In talking with reporters, he said he still has not decided what to do about his large stock holdings in a New York bank holding company with billions of dollars in outstanding loans to Third World countries, but was continuing to study several options.

END



February 12, 1989

Dear Friend:

Enclosed please find the speech by U.S. Vice-President Dan Quayle before the National Executive Committee meeting of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

Despite of what has been reported in the press, the address was one of the strongest statements in support of Israel made in quite a long time. According to ADL National Chairman Burton Levinson and National Director Abe Foxman, "The Vice-President's unequivocal expression of support for Israel - on moral and strategic grounds - is welcome, not only because it reassures our ally, but because it lets Israel's enemies know that only direct negotiations with Israel can bring progress."

Sincerely,

Harry Wall

National Chairman
BURTON S. LEVINSON

National Director
ABRAHAM H. FOXMAN

Chairman,
National Executive Committee
RONALD B. SOBEL

Associate National Director
JUSTIN J. FINGER

Israel - ישראל
Director: HARRY WALL
מנהל: הרי וואל

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Embargoed until delivered--approx. 12:00 Noon; February 10, 1989

TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT
TO THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE - *Natl Executive*
PALM BEACH, FLORIDA *Committee*

I am delighted to be here this afternoon and to address this distinguished gathering. Since its founding in a Chicago law office back in 1913, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith has worked hard to make the American dream a reality for all Americans. You have sought, in your own words, "to stop the defamation of the Jewish people...and to secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike." These are great aims, noble aims, and I congratulate you for the courage, wisdom and tenacity with which you have pursued them.

The A.D.L.'s record in fighting the good fight is a long and honorable one, but there's one aspect of that record that seems to me especially noteworthy: Your recognition that for civil rights to flourish at home, they must flourish abroad, as well. From the 1930's, when the A.D.L. fought Nazi propoganda in the United States, to your current efforts to develop lesson plans for schools that teach our students to distinguish between democratic and totalitarian forms of government, you have understood that the cause of democracy and human rights is indivisible. You have understood that you can't fight the bigots and the bullies at home while running away from them abroad. You have understood that you've got to stand up and be counted--both in the domestic arena and in the foreign arena.

I am here to tell you that the Bush Administration shares your basic outlook. At home, our aim is to strengthen the pluralistic threads out of which our society is woven -- to build a "kinder, gentler nation," a nation where racism, anti-Semitism and bigotry of every sort no longer deface the American landscape. Abroad, our goal is to use our power to advance the cause of liberty. We know that these two aims are linked, and we recognize that we won't succeed at either task unless we succeed at both.

Maintaining liberty at home means honoring the values that have made us free. I stressed this need only a few days after becoming Vice President, when I addressed the National Religious Broadcasters Convention back in Washington. My theme was religious liberty, and the need for all Americans to respect our First Amendment Freedoms.

In the course of my remarks, I used one of my favorite quotations--from a letter sent by George Washington to the Hebrew Congress of Newport in 1790. It goes like this: "It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights. For happily the government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support...May the Children of

-3-

the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other inhabitants, while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid."

That was the quote I read to the Religious Broadcasters, and it truly is one of the most beautiful quotes in our history. For it reminds us that at the very moment when the foundations of our nation were being laid, Americans understood that religious freedom isn't a privilege that the state can grant or withhold as it chooses; rather, it is a fundamental right, an inalienable right, that the state must uphold.

Of course, we Americans haven't always lived up to our high ideals. Our history has been marred by racism and anti-Semitism, and even today incidents occur. But these are the exception, not the rule. The rule is that the American people are deeply devoted to the principles of a democratic, just and pluralistic society. And the rule is that the Bush Administration--from the President on down--abhors and abominates all manifestations of racial and religious bigotry. Although reasonable men and women will differ over just where to draw the line between religion and the state in public affairs, there is no room to differ over the centrality of liberty, and of religious liberty. There is no difference over the need to keep America a nation where, "Every one shall sit in safety under his vine and fig tree, and there shall be none to make him afraid."

I wish it were so everywhere else in the world -- but, unfortunately, it is not. As some of you may know, I just got back from a visit to Venezuela and El Salvador. Over the course of my trip, I met with many Latin American leaders. To all these leaders, I stressed this nation's enduring support for democracy and human rights. I explained to them that our democratic convictions aren't just an afterthought or an add-on; rather, they lie at the core of our foreign policy. For the American people as a whole--for Democrats and Republicans, for Jews and Christians--democratic self-government is the best guarantee of peace and freedom, of international stability and social justice.

This national consensus on behalf of democracy is one very important reason why the United States supports democratic Israel, but it's not the only reason. I'd like to examine some of the other reasons as well. But first, let me review with you some of the recent developments in the Middle East--developments with which the Bush Administration is currently grappling.

One very troubling recent development is the proliferation of both chemical weapons and ballistic missiles throughout the Middle East. The use of chemical weapons by both Iraq and Iran during the Gulf War, Iraq's use of these weapons against the Kurds, and Libya's possession of chemical weapons, remind us all, once again, that the Middle East is an exceedingly dangerous place--and that the dangers may be increasing.

Another recent development has been Yasir Arafat's acceptance of American conditions for initiating a dialogue--that

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is, recognition of Israel's right to exist, renunciation of terrorism, and acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. But there are many reasons for looking long and hard before drawing any firm conclusions about Mr. Arafat's reversal. We need more than press conference statements and semantics. We need to see real evidence of concrete actions by the PLO -- actions for peace, and against terrorism -- before changing our fundamental attitude toward the PLO.

To begin with, we must all remember that the PLO is an umbrella organization that contains a number of political groups. Some of these groups have made it clear that they continue to reject Israel's right to exist, and continue to regard terrorism as a legitimate means of struggle, regardless of what Mr. Arafat says. Clearly, then, the nature of the PLO's commitment to peace needs to be clarified.

Second, even within Mr. Arafat's own organization, some of his lieutenants have made statements that flatly contradict their leader's peaceful protestations-- yet they are neither censured nor disciplined for their apparent insubordination. What are we to make of this? And what are we to make of the fact that Mr. Arafat himself has threatened the lives of Palestinian leaders on the West Bank who have indicated an interest in achieving some sort of peaceful accommodation with Israel? Or of the fact that the PLO Charter, calling for Israel's destruction, has not been formally revoked? Once again, simple prudence obliges us to monitor Mr. Arafat and his organization very carefully, and to probe his words very closely, before arriving at a final

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determination. Those who believe that American policy is about to undergo a basic shift merely because we have begun to talk with the PLO are completely mistaken. As Secretary of State Baker has noted, "The existence of the dialogue should not lead anyone to misunderstand our overall policy or question our enduring support for the State of Israel."

Yet another new factor in the Middle East equation is the Palestinian uprising that has gone on for over a year now, and has resulted in nearly four hundred Palestinians killed, and many more injured. Some may say that by the grisly standards of some of Israel's neighbors, a few hundred people killed in the course of a year-long uprising is not a very staggering figure. And, of course, Arab states have killed far more Palestinians than Israel has. But Israel cannot be judged by the standards of its neighbors. Israel judges itself--and is judged by others-- on the basis of the standards which prevail in the democratic West. And on the basis of these standards, the status quo on the West Bank and Gaza Strip is clearly unacceptable.

Of course the Israelis understand this as well as anyone. As you know, the recently-formed government in Jerusalem is exploring new options, examining new initiatives to deal with this crisis. We welcome these moves, and hope that they will lead to an atmosphere of mutual restraint. And we will continue to oppose the one-sided condemnations of Israel's actions that emerge all-too-often from the U.N. In fact, in its very first week on the job, the Bush Administration made it clear that we would veto a proposed Security Council Presidential statement

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harshly critical of Israel. When the sponsors of that statement toned it down somewhat, in the hope of avoiding a U.S. veto, we again informed them that it was still one-sided and unacceptable. As a result, the statement was withdrawn. There's a lesson to be learned here -- a lesson about the U.S. commitment to the truth and justice in the Middle East -- and we hope that those who sponsored this statement have learned it.

These, then, are some of the complexities facing the Bush Administration as we review U.S. policy in the Middle East. Clearly, the dilemmas are real, the choices are difficult, and the stakes are high. But the fact that a policy review is under way doesn't mean that our Middle East policy is somehow up for grabs now. On the contrary, the broad principles of U.S. Middle East policy remain firmly in place. And perhaps, during this period of review, they are worth restating.

So let's begin with the basics. The first principle of U.S. Middle East policy remains strong and unwavering support for Israel's security. Forty years ago, we supported the creation of the State of Israel for moral and humanitarian reasons. We believed that after the unspeakable atrocities committed by the Nazis, Jews needed a land they could call their own, a land in which they could live without fear. That is why we are committed, and will always remain committed to the security of Israel. We are committed to helping Israel protect itself against any combination of aggressors. And we will always make clear to the world, through moral and material support, that we are a permanent and unshakable ally of the State of Israel.

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But humanitarian and moral considerations are not the sole basis for American support of Israel. As I noted earlier, our common democratic traditions, our partnership in pursuit of peace and freedom, is another pillar of our alliance. Israel is a vibrant democracy in a part of the world where democratic institutions have not, as yet, taken hold. This situation presents Israel's democracy with daily challenges of a kind that other democracies, surrounded by peaceful neighbors, have rarely had to face. That Israel's democracy continues to flourish under these conditions is both a tribute to the courage and determination of the Israeli people, and a bond firmly linking them to the American people.

America and Israel are also linked by common strategic interests. The fact is that we have no more reliable friend in the world than Israel. And the scope of our strategic cooperation is vast. Indeed, as Secretary of State Baker pointed out during his confirmation hearings, our relationship with Israel has expanded into a "true strategic alliance" during the Reagan-Bush years. One aspect of this alliance of particular interest to me when I served in the Senate was anti-tactical ballistic missile technology. With the proliferation of ballistic missiles to the Middle East, the need for such a defense becomes increasingly obvious. I am proud that I helped to channel funds to Israel through SDI for joint research and development projects, such as the ARROW missile defense system,

and that I have worked to further U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation both in the Senate and during my visit to Israel in 1987. I know that both nations can gain enormously from such cooperation.

For all these reasons--our moral commitments, our democratic convictions, and our strategic interests -- we provide more security assistance to Israel than to any other nation. I believe that this assistance is one of the best investments we can make -- an investment not only in Israel's security, but in our own. And I know President Bush shares this conviction.

A second enduring principle underlying U.S. Middle East policy is the search for an Arab-Israeli peace based on direct negotiations between the parties. We believe that negotiations can work. We believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not intractable, and that compromises on all outstanding issues can be found. But the responsibility for making the compromises, for finding the solutions, rests with the parties themselves. Anyone who tries to shift the primary peace-making responsibility to the United States, who thinks that we can somehow be persuaded into pressuring Israel to accept a pre-cooked "solution", is only kidding himself.

A third enduring principle of our Middle East policy is that direct negotiations must be based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which include the exchange of territory for peace. Realistically, we believe that Jordan must play a part in any peace settlement. The Palestinians must participate

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in the determination of their own future, as well. We continue to believe, however, that an independent Palestinian state will not be a source of stability or a contribution to a just and lasting peace.

My friends, we should not lose sight during the current difficulties and turmoil of the fact that the last eight years have been good ones for the American-Israeli alliance. They have also been years in which the cause of democracy and human rights have made giant strides around the world. These two developments are not unrelated. For when America is truest to herself, when she takes her own principles seriously, and acts on them, both democracy and our friendship with Israel will flourish.

I want to assure you that the next eight years--the Bush-Quayle years--will be equally successful. We will continue to uphold the values of freedom and democracy that have made us great both at home and abroad. We will continue to advance the cause of human rights around the world. And we will continue to strengthen and deepen our strategic alliance with Israel.

Let me conclude these remarks on a personal note, if I might. As some of you may know, I was born in Huntington, Indiana. It was a small, decent, quiet American town--and life was safe and secure there. But then I grew up, and as I grew up I learned some new and ugly words; words like Gulag; words like Auschwitz; words like Boat People. And I learned that the safety and security that I had taken for granted were not part of the inevitable order of things. You have to work at it; you have to fight for it; and sometimes, you have to sacrifice for it.

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I went into public life to do precisely this: to help, in the words of our Constitution, "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." But securing these blessings for ourselves means helping others to secure them for themselves -- their posterity. It means working at home and abroad to make the world a little less cruel, a little more humane.

The A.D.L. has understood this all along. From your earliest days you have been an embattled organization, and all your battles have been fought on behalf of democracy and human rights. I salute you for what you have accomplished. And I trust that in the future we shall fight our battles together, side by side.

Thank you and God Bless You.

Anti-Defamation League  of B'nai B'rith

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NEWS

JAPANESE DO NOT LIKE JEWS

Jerusalem, February 12... Many Japanese hold negative attitudes toward Jews despite the fact that only one in a hundred has had direct contact with them, according to a Gallup poll commissioned by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

The poll also found that Japanese perceptions of Israel were negative, including doubts about the Jewish nation's "trustworthiness" and "commitment to peace."

The poll of 1,365 Japanese in Japan was conducted in late November. It revealed that Japanese perceptions of Jewish personal traits and characteristics "have been formed second hand" -- mainly from television programs, books and newspapers.

According to ADL, the poll was commissioned in response to the publication of a number of anti-Jewish books and articles in Japan over the past two years. In April 1987, ADL published its report on "Japan and Anti-Semitism: The Proliferation of Anti-Jewish Literature" which described a growth of anti-Semitic literature in Japan which blames the country's economic problems on American Jews.

According to the poll, Jews, when compared to Christians, Buddhists and Asians, were generally viewed negatively. Jews, blacks, Arabs and Muslims were rated more "unfriendly", "greedy", and "deceitful" than the others.

Despite the unfavorable perceptions of Jews, the more than 1,300 Japanese polled said they were as disinclined to work for a Christian employer as a Jewish one. According to ADL, this fact reflects Japanese insularity and disinclination to work for foreigners in general.

Other questions dealing with widespread stereotypes of disproportionate Jewish influence over business and the media in the West, particularly in the U.S., revealed high percentages of both agreement and disagreement. Thirty-seven percent replied in the affirmative when asked if they believed that Jews have "major control of business and finance in many countries." Forty-five percent said "no" and 18 percent said they did not know.

Asked if they "personally knew" or had any contact with Jews, only one percent of those polled replied in the affirmative, 97 percent said "no" and two percent said they did not know.

Full ADL statement is enclosed.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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* תאריך: 08.02.81 *

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ר"מ
ד"ר זבי דרז'ין
ד"ר זביק הרצ'ק

א/ח"י

* סודי ביותר/מיידי *

* השגריר *

* שלך 96 *

* הרעיון לא נראה לנו כלל וכלל. *

* נראה לנו כי הביצוע הינו בלתי אפשרי וגם לו היה, הרי
* השלכותיו הציבוריות תהיינה שליליות ביותר.

* ענוג.

* פא *

* תפ: שהח, סשהח, דהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, אירכ *

4106 2/81

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 3139

* תאריך : 04.02.89

* ז' 1 מ' 2
* עותק 4 מתוך 18 סודי ביותר נכנס **

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* חוזם: 2,3139

* אל: המשרד

* מ-: ווש, נר: 96, תא: 030289, זח: 2000, דח: מ, ג: 10: 10

* תח: 9 גס: מצפא

* נד: 9

* י'די/סודי ביותר

* אל : ממנכל, סמנכל צפא ופרו

* דע : לשכת רהם, נתיב ברטוב

* מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

* בפגישה בין הירש גודמן הנמצא כאן בביקור קצר לבין
* ALEXANDER VERSIBOW מנהל מחלקת בריהם במחמד, העלה
* האחרון רעיון שכנראה נדון עתה בחוגי מחמד.

* נוכח המצוקה והלחץ המופעל על מחמד להגדיל מכסת היתרי
* הכניסה ליהודי בריהם הועלה רעיון לנצל זמן שהותם
* של היוצאים דרך וינה ובמקום לשכנס שם משר כל תקופת
* כבידות והטיפול בניירת להטיסם ארצה לסיור של שבועיים
* די לאפשר להם לעמוד מקרוב על המציאות הישראלית
* מתוך תקווה שחלקם יעדיפו להשאר באוץ.

* רשנאו סיפר כי לפי חישוביהם הטיסה והשהות בישראל
* לא יעלו יותר מאשר אחזקתם בו ינה שבה הוצאות נשהות
* ונשהות למדי, הסוד כזה לא יחייב הכושה במעמדם של
* היהודים היוצאים מבריהם מאחר וביקורם יחשב כביקור
* אתיירותי ומכאן שבכך ניתן להפיג חששותיהם של אלה
* האחרים לאובדן מעמדם כפליטים במידה ויבואו לישראל.

* נראה לו שהרעיון הועלה בפניו מתוך תקווה שיובא לידיעתנו.
* גודמן יוצא היום ארצה ובמידה וחרצו להתעדכן בפרטים
* נוספים תוכלו להתקשר עמו ישירות, הרעיון בכל אופן

משרד החוץ

משרד החוץ

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מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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* דף 2 *
* עותק 4 *
* מתור 18 *
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* מצביע על כך שבחוגי מחמד היו רואים ברצון הגדלת מספר
* העולים ארצה מקרב היהודים היוצאים עתה את בריהם.
*

* נראה לי שהם חוששים להעלות נושא זה בפני היהודים כאן
* מתור הערכה שהארגונים היהודיים לא יהססו להכשילו.
*

* ר ד *

* מלי *

* תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנוצור, מצפא, איר3 *

** יוצא **
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שמור

חוזם: 2,6227
אל: נני/279, ווש/353, לוסאנגלס/99, אוטבה/97, לונדון/169,
שטוקהולם/87, מדריד/105, בריסל/117, בון/115, פריס/239, רומא/134,
מילנו/72, קופנהגן/87, ברן/121, גנבה/143, אתונה/87, אוסלו/74,
וינה/118, האג/107, מונטריאול/58, טורונטו/71, אטלנטה/49,
יוסטון/57, בוסטון/61, שיקגו/59, מיאמי/72, פרנסיסקו/58,
פילדלפיה/53, הלסינקי/57, ליסבון/85, וולינגטון/49, סידני/65,
קנברה/90
מ-: המשרד, תא: 080289, זח: 1924, דח: ר, סג: שם
תח: 8 גס: הסברה
נד: 8

הכרז

שמור רגיל

יוניפיל-התבטאות הקצין הנורבגי

לידיעתכם עמדתנו בנושא כפי שתואמה עם משרד הבטחון:

לנוכח העובדה שהמגד הנורבגי חוזר ומביע את דעותיו
הבזויות וזאת למרות התנערות ממשלתו והתנצלות האום,
ישראל מצפה כי פיקוד יוניפיל יסיק את המסקנות
המתחייבות כלפי הקצין זאת כמתחייב מצוננו ההדדי
בשיתוף פעולה.

הסברה מידע

אק

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצרים, מצפא, אסיה,
מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, ארבל, הדוכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר, איר, איר, 3,
לעמ, מקל/ממרמ, דראפ, משפט

54016

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

שמו

יציא

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חוזם: 2,5630

אל: 254/1,326/ש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 080289, זח: 1201, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: 8 גס: ארבל

8: נד

שמו/רגיל

השגריר וושינגטון

דע: נאו'ם, ניו יורק

ישראל-ארה"ב - המערכת האומי'ת.

1. זה זמן רב שהאו"ם מהווה זירה נוחה לאש"פ לניגוח ישראל ולהשגת יעדים מדיניים במישור הבינ"ל כשבימת האו"ם משמשת מכשיר בידיהם להכשרת קרקע זוחלת גם במישור הדו-צדדי. גם למדינות המערביות הידידותיות לישראל נוח להתחיל את מהלכי התמיכה שלהם בנושא הפלשתינאי במסגרת האומי'ת דוקא.

במידה מוגבלת יותר הדברים אמורים אף לגבי האמריקאים. התופעה בלטה במיוחד בעצרת האחרונה ובכל מה שהתרחש בעקבותיה.

2. בשבועות האחרונים קוטף אש"פ במישור הבינ"ל את פירות הישגיו בזירה האומי'ת. הערכתנו היא שכבר בחדשים הקרובים יזדקק אש"פ להישגים נוספים למיסוד וביסוס ההכרה במדינה הפלשתינאית. הקמת ממשלה זמנית על ידם עלולה להקל עליהם. אולם גם בלעדי כך הגיוני שיחתרו להישגים כשהמישור האומי'י שוב יהווה עבורם הזירה הנוחה ביותר. הדבר עלול לבוא לידי ביטוי בזימון מועב'ט, בכינוס מחודש של העצרת ובנסיונות להתקבל כמדינה משקיפה או אף מדינה חברה בסוכנויות המיוחדות.

הישג אשפ"י באחד מהתחומים האלה לא ישנה את המצב בטוח אך יזכה בלי ספק בתהודה בינ"ל ניכרת ויהווה מכשול נוסף

א"ח

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בתהליך המדיני.

3. בהתייעצות שערכנו לאחרונה עם שגרירינו בניו יורק וג'נבה וסמנכ"ל צפ"א הגענו לידי מסקנה שרצוי שנלבן את עמדת האמריקאים בהקדם תוך נסיון לתאם עמדות ומהלכים בכל הסוגיות הנ"ל ובמיוחד במה שצפוי בסוכנויות המיוחדות בחדשים הקרובים.

המנכ"ל קיבל את המלצתנו שנציע למחמ"ד דיון בנושא הארבל"י בהשתתפות שגרירנו בניו יורק, הח"מ ואתה בעצמך או עודד ערן ושמעון שטיין לפי שיקול דעתך. בודאי ננצל ההזדמנות להחליף דעות באותה הזדמנות גם בנושאים ארבל"יים אחרים. (כגון: קבלת ישראל ל-ECE וכו'... עוד נעביר אליך רשימת נושאים מלאה). כוונתנו היא שהדיון ייערך עם עוזר המזכיר לעניני ארבל"י, וילאמסון והצוות שלו. התייעצות זו נראית בעינינו דחופה למדי בהתחשב בצורך להערך לקראת הועידות הכלליות של ILO ו-ILO-2, WHO, אם מאידך וילאמסון עומד להתחלף בקרוב סביר שיהיה זה הגיוני שהדיון ייערך עם מחליפו. בכל מקרה לוח הזמנים של האירועים היה מחייב שהדיון ייערך לא יאוחר מראשית מרס.

4. אודה על חוות דעתך לגבי הנושא כולל שאלת העתוי.

5. בנפרד אני מעביר אליך העתק מזכרי בנדון למנכ"ל.

ברנע

מפ

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל2,
סייבל, משפט

** יוצא

שמור

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חוזם: 2,5931
 אל:ני/273,11וש/349
 מ-:המשרד,תא:080289,זח:1603,דח:ר,סג:שמ
 תח:פ גס:ארבל
 נד:פ

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שמור/רגיל

וושיןגטון/שטיין.

דע: נאו'ם, ניו יורק.

מועב'ט - כינוס עפ'י דרישת אש'פ. שלך 159.לסעיף 5-ב'.

1. חילופי הצעות בינינו נוגעים בשני מישורים שאינם בהכרח זהים:

א. פניה ישירה של אש'פ לנשיא מועב'ט עם בקשה להשתתף בדיון שזומן ע'י מדינה חברה. הדוגמא לכך היא פניתם להשתתף בדיון על תלונת לוב נגד ארה'ב. בתרגיל זה אכן הפסידה ארה'ב שכן הנושא טופל כענין נוהלי שלגביו אין זכות וטו.

ב. פניה ישירה של אש'פ בבקשה לזמן דיון ביזמתם. זכות זו שמורה עפ'י סעיף 35 של מגילת האו'ם למדינות חברות האו'ם ובמקרים מסוימים אף כאלה שאינן חברות. המטרה של תרגיל זה תהיה ליצור מחד תקדים שיאפשר להם בעתיד זימון מועב'ט בקלות יחסית ומאידך לרכש בזחילה ובעקיפין זכויות של 'מדינה'.

2. הנושא המעסיק אותנו איננו עמדת ארה'ב במקרה ואש'פ יחזרו על התרגיל הלובי. אנו מניחים שבמקרה כזה תחזור ארה'ב על העמדות שאותן השמיע בדיון ההוא. יהיה זה

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בחזקת מהלך ריטואלי ויש חשיבות עקרונית גם בכך, אולם הקרב עצמו כבר הוכרע לטובת אש"פ.

3. השאלה העומדת על הפרק כעת היא התייחסותה של ארה"ב לזימון חוזר זימון מועב"ט ע"י אש"פ, - להבדיל מהשתתפותו בדיון. אפשר שבני שיחכם במחמ"ד סבורים שגם נושא זה הינו פרוצדורלי גרידא. יש תקדימים לכאן ולכאן. אפשרי גם שהנשיא התורן יחליט להענות לפנית אש"פ תוך ציון שהוא עושה זאת מבלי לפסוק אם הדיון מתקיים במסגרת סעיף זה או אחר של כללי הנוהל או המגלה. במקרה זה מתקיים הדיון מבלי ששאלת מעמד אש"פ הוכרעה פורמלית. גם אם אכן סביר שבסופו של הדבר תחליט מועב"ט כי עצם זימונה הוא ענין נוהלי ואין לגביו וטו, יש חשיבות לכך שארה"ב תעמוד על כך שסעיף 35 איננו מאפשר זימון דיון ע"י אש"פ. טעון מוקדמי זה יקל עליה להטיל וטו בעת הצבעה על הצעת ההחלטה בתום הדיון המהותי.

4. לסיכום. תקוותנו היא שארה"ב תנהל מאבק אינטנסיבי לגבי עצם זימון מועב"ט ותטיל וטו על כל החלטה שתוגש אם יפסידו במערכה הנוהלית.

5. הערת סמית שלצורך הכשלת היזמה האשפית יש לגייס מלבד את ארה"ב גם את חברות מועב"ט המערביות וחלק מהבלמזיות נכונה עקרונית אלא שבהרכב הנוכחי של מועב"ט קיים סיכוי סביר שאש"פ יוכל לגייס את תשעת הקולות הנחוצים להכרעה בנושא נוהלי. אנו מכל מקום רשמנו לפנינו את הערתו ונפעל באנגליה, צרפת, פינלנד, קנדה, נפל, קולומביה וברזיל. האמריקאים בודאי יוכלו לפעל במקביל גם בבירות הנ"ל וגם אצל שאר חברות מועב"ט בבוא העת.

ברנע

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ברנע, ארבל2, בנצור, מצפא,
סייבל, משפט

י וצ א

בלמס

חוזם: 2,6234

אל: וווש/356, אוטבה/99, לוטאנגלס/101, אמלנטה/51, בוסטון/63,
טורונטו/73, יוסטון/59, מונטריאול/60, מיאמי/74, פילדלפיה/55,
פרנציסקו/60, שיקגו/61, ניו/282

מ-: המשרד, תא: 080287, זח: 2008, דח: ב, סג: בל

תח: ג: הסברה

נד: ג

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בלמס/בהול

אל: הנציגויות בארה"ב

1. בעקבות נסיונות החדירה של חוליות מחבלים (חבש, טלעאת יעקוב) בימים האחרונים טען אש"ף כי הפעולות נועדו לפגוע במטרות צבאיות ולכן אינן מהוות פעולות טרור.

2. יוזכר כי בהתבטאויות ובמסמכים אמריקנים משנים קודמות התייחסה ארה"ב לפעולות נגד מטרות צבאיות כפעולות טרור. לדוגמא:

א. בנייר של הפנטגון 'TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES' (נובמבר '88) מתוארת פעולת ארגונו של ג'יבריל ב'ליל הגלשנים' כמעשה של 'TERRORIST'.

ב. בנאום של בוש, בפני 'TASK FORCE' למלחמה בטרור (פברואר '86) הוא הגדיר את פיצוץ מכונית התופת ב-8/8/85 בריינמיין ליד פרנקפורט (בו נהרג טייס אמריקני ואשת טייס אחר) ואת הנחת הפצצה במרכז קניות צבאי אמריקני בפרנקפורט ב-24/11/85 (32 נפצעו) כפעולות טרור.

ג. בדבריו של בוש על הטרור הבינ"ל ב-21/1/86 הזכיר התכנית לפוצץ את מועדון הקצינים האמריקנים באנקרה (אפריל '85) ואת רצח החייל האמריקני ROBERT STETHEEM בטיסת TWA 847 כפעולות טרור.

4406

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ד.בביקורו במטה המרינס ליד ביירות אחרי פיצוץ מכונית
התופת שם, הגדיר בוש באוקטובר '83 את המעשה כפעולת
טרור. גם הנשיא לשעבר רייגן בדרכו לבית הלבן
ב-23/10/83 אמר אחרי הפיגוע נגד המרינס בביירות
שמדובר במעשה של טרור בינ"ל.

3.כידוע נוהג אש"פ לכנות כל פעולת טרור כפעולה נגד
'מטרה צבאית'. כך הגדיר אש"פ אף את חטיפת האוטובוס
בכביש באר שבע והרצח של 3 אזרחים שנסעו בו (2 נשים
וגבר).

הסברה/מידע

מא

ית

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה, סייבל,
משפט, ליאור, מזתים, ר/מרכז, ממד, 8מקל/ממרהמ, יועצה/טרור, לעמ

שמור

יצא

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חוזם: 2,6159
 אל: וווש/351, מנמת/151
 מ-: המשורד, תא: 080289, זח: 1755, דח: ב, סג: שם
 תח: 8 גס: הסברה
 נד: 8

שמור/בהול

השגריר

דע: ציר הסברה
 דע: יועץ רהמ לטרור (באמצעות מנמת)

נסיון חדירה - חוליית מחבלים - לקראת פגישתך עם המזכיר.

1. בנפרד מועברת אליך בפקס' תעודת זיהוי של אחד מחברי חוליית המחבלים שחוסלה בעת נסיון החדירה לרצועת הבטחון ב-28/12/88 כזכור הורכבה החוליה ממחבלים המשתייכים ל'חזית העממית לשחרור פלסטין' ו'החזית לשחרור פלסטין' (פלג טלעאת יעקוב). התעודה שייכת למפקד הכח וחייד אחמד אל יוסף.

2. נסיון רקע על החדירה. החוליה נעה על גבול איזור הבטחון צפונית-מערבית לחצבייה בליל ה-4/2/89 ונתקלה בכח צה"ל בגזרה המזרחית של איזור הבטחון.

בכוונתה היה לבצע פיגוע מיקוח באחד מישובי צפון הארץ. ברשות החולייה נמצא נשקם האישי מסוג קלצ'ניקוב, אפודי קרב צבאיים ואזרחיים (בצבע לבן), מטולי R.P.6 ופצצות, 3 טילי לאו, מגזרי תייל אדומים גדולים, אקדח עם משתיק קול, 15 רימונים, סכינים, תחמושת רבה, תרמילי גב ומזון רב בקופסאות שימורים, מכשיר רדיו. 2 מהמחבלים היו לבושים במדים צבאיים ו-

3 אזרחית.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3. נטילת אחריות
דוברי ה'חזית העממית' ו-חזית השחרור הפלסטינית נטלו עליהם את
האחריות במשותף (רויטרס 6/2):

'FIVE OF ITS COMMANDOS HAD BEEN KILLED IN
A CLASH WITH AN ISRAELI PATROL AS THEY WERE
TRYING TO ENTER NORTHERN ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN
LEBANON'.

4. להלן תרגום הנתונים בתעודה:

כותרת: 'החזית העממית לשחרור פלסטין'.
תעודת זהות צבאית.
דרגה: (כנראה) רס"ר.
תאריך הוצאת התעודה: 1/1/89
תאריך פקיעת התעודה: 31/12/89

5. תשומת לבך למספר פרטים בתעודה שייתכן ויהיו לעזר אם הנושא
יעלה בשיחתך:

א. תעודת הזהות הצבאית נופקה ע"י 'החזית העממית'. ארגון
שהשתתף בכנס המל"פ ושייך למימסד אש"ף.

ב. התעודה נופקה ב-1/1/89 כלומר 6 שבועות לאחר מל"פ באלג'יר
(15/11) ושבועיים לאחר עצרת או"מ בג'נבה בה הופיע ערפאת
בהצהרתו על התנערות מטרוור.

ג. סמל 'החזית העממית' המצוייר בראש התעודה כולל מפה
גיאוגרפית של פלסטין הכוללת לא רק השטחים אלא ישראל בקווים
שלפני מלחמת ששת הימים.

6. על חולצת אחד המחבלים האחרים מופיעה כתובת בולטת 'הפעולה
על שם החלל המפקד אבו-ג'יהאד' האיש מס' 2 של ארגון הפת"ח
וראש הזרוע הצבאית של אש"ף כלומר ניתן להצביע על שיוכה של
החוליה לאש"ף לפחות מבחינת תחושתם של חבריה.

7. לידיעתך, עותק התעודה נמסר בלעדית לכתב ה-ניו יורק טיימס
ברינקלי בארוחת בוקר היום (8) עם ס/שה"ח הבוקר במגמה
שיתן לה פרסום בולט. לאחר מכן נשחררה לתקשורת.

THE DATA THAT WERE OBTAINED FROM THE INTERVIEW WITH THE
SOURCE (NAME) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

FIVE OF THE COMMANDOS HAD BEEN KILLED IN
A CLASH WITH AN ISRAELI PATROL AS THEY WERE
TRYING TO ENTER NORTHERN ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN
LEBANON.

THE SOURCE STATED THAT:

THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE
ISRAELI PATROL WAS
KILLED IN THE
CLASH WITH THE
ISRAELI PATROL AS THEY WERE
TRYING TO ENTER NORTHERN ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN
LEBANON.

THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE
ISRAELI PATROL WAS
KILLED IN THE
CLASH WITH THE
ISRAELI PATROL AS THEY WERE
TRYING TO ENTER NORTHERN ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN
LEBANON.

THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE
ISRAELI PATROL WAS
KILLED IN THE
CLASH WITH THE
ISRAELI PATROL AS THEY WERE
TRYING TO ENTER NORTHERN ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN
LEBANON.

THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE
ISRAELI PATROL WAS
KILLED IN THE
CLASH WITH THE
ISRAELI PATROL AS THEY WERE
TRYING TO ENTER NORTHERN ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN
LEBANON.

THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE
ISRAELI PATROL WAS
KILLED IN THE
CLASH WITH THE
ISRAELI PATROL AS THEY WERE
TRYING TO ENTER NORTHERN ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN
LEBANON.

THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE
ISRAELI PATROL WAS
KILLED IN THE
CLASH WITH THE
ISRAELI PATROL AS THEY WERE
TRYING TO ENTER NORTHERN ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN
LEBANON.

THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE
ISRAELI PATROL WAS
KILLED IN THE
CLASH WITH THE
ISRAELI PATROL AS THEY WERE
TRYING TO ENTER NORTHERN ISRAEL FROM SOUTHERN
LEBANON.

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מנהל הסברה

ל.כ.

אק

תפ: שהוו, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן,
בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה, ליאור, מזת'ים, סי'יבל, משפט, ממד

** יוצא **

סודי

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חוזם: 2,5634

מל: 324/ש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 080289, חז: 1206, דח: ב, ט, ג: 10

תח: א גס: מצפא

נד: 8

8

סודי/בהול לבוקר

שגריר, ציר, שטיין, קישור לקונגרס

א. השגריר בראון הביאנו היום (7.2) דו"ח זכויות האדם של מחמ"ד תוך שהוא מציין מועדי האמברגו וששיפטר יכנס מחר (8.2) מסיבת עתונאים ואח"כ יעיד בקונגרס.

ב. אמר שהדו"ח מבוסס על דיווחי הקונסוליה הכללית בירושלים המכסה השטחים והשגרירות שמדווחת על עזה ועל ישראל. הוסיף שהוא יודע מה רב חלקו של שיפטר במיתון הדו"ח והקה"יתו והוא ממליץ שלא לגלוש להתקפות אישיות על שיפטר - כפי שקרה, למיטב זכרונו, בעבר לגבי דו"חות קודמים על ישראל וזכויות האדם.

ג. הבהרתי שתשובתנו תהיה עניינית, לגופן של טענות. נבהיר הרקע לדברים ונעמידם על אמיתותם.

ד. אמרתי לשגריר שיש הזכחות חד-משמעיות שהפעולה בצפון שלשום מצביעה על מעורבות ישירה של אש"ף בפעולות טרור נגד ישראל. הוספתי שאש"ף כופה על ארה"ב הגדרות משלו לגבי טרור, שהרי ארה"ב הודיעה לנו בראשית הדיאלוג עם אש"ף שלא תיתכן שיבה של אש"ף לטרור והנה ברור ללא ספק שאש"ף מתמיד בפעולות טרור. אש"ף מסר התחייבויותיו לארה"ב וכתוצאה ארה"ב נמצאת מפרה התחייבויות שליוו כניסתה לדיאלוג עם אש"ף.

בראון הגיב כי עוד שלשום דיווח למחמ"ד שהחוליה שנתפסה היא מסונפת לאש"ף והציג התקרית במלוא חומרתה. ציין

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שמי'בחנו של הטרור איננו רק בביצוע אלא גם בכוונות. הערת' שמשגרי החוליה החז'ע ואש'פ פרסמו הודעה הנוטלת אחריות לפעולה. בראון אמר שבל נופתע אם פגישת פלטרן עם נציג אש'ף תוקדם להיום- מחר כדי שארה'ב תשמיע תגובתה הנמרצת על התקרית האחרונה הקשורה באש'ף.

בנצור

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה, סי'בל, משפט, ברנע, ארבל2, ליאור, מזת'ים, מתאסשטחים

ВНЕШНЕПАРТИЙНОМУ РАБОТНИКУ
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯ РАБОТНИКОВ
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯ РАБОТНИКОВ
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯ РАБОТНИКОВ
ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯ РАБОТНИКОВ

СЛУЖБА

СМ

ПРИ: ШКО, ОБЩА, ГРА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА,
ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА, ОБЩЕСТВЕНА

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5637

תאריך : 08.02.89

** יוצא
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סודי

חוזם: 2,5637

אל: 325/וש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 080289, זח: 1209, דח: 1, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: מצפא

נד: 8

סודי/בהול לבוקר

השגריר, הציר

התקשר בראון למסור שהוא שוחח הלילה עם נד ווקר שהודיעו
כי לאור המידע על חיסול החולייה בצפון שהועבר בוושינגטון
וע"י הח"מ אליו ולאור העובדה שאש"ף קיבל האחריות על
הפעולה היזומה בצפון נשלחו לפלטרונ הנחיות להודיע לנציג

אש"ף שארה"ב WILL NOT COUNTENANCE

התקפות אש"ף נגד מטרות צבאיות ואזרחיות מחוץ לישראל
ובתוכה.

בנצור

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל,
משפט, ברנע, ארבל, 2, ליאור, מזתים, מתאמסטהים

