

6

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

מ.מ.מ.

משרד ראש

יועץ מדיני

ארה"ב

28/9/89 - 19/9/89

תיק מ.מ.

10

מחלקה

4610/10-א



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פנימי: 4610/10-א

מזהה בריק: R00036g

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-9

תאריך הדפסה: 12/11/2020

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| דחילות: מידע | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון | דף: 1 |
| סוג: שחור | טופס פרוק | כתוב: 1 |
| תאריך וזמן חבור: | | אל: מנהל מצפ"א |
| כס' פרוק: 631 | 11/10/77 | דע: יועץ מדיני לשחי"ח, נ"י |
| הפסיד: 73 | | כאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון |

החליף המדיני לשלכם 1265.

פניתי לדויד וולש במועצה לבטחון לאומי שאמר לחי"ף הוא לא יודע על הצהרה כזו ובדק במחמ"ו וגם הם לא שמעו על כך דבר. וולש הוסיף שהצהרה כזו גס לא עולה בקנה אחד עם מדיניות לפיה הנייר המצרי מחייב אולי את המצרים והפלשתינאים אך בודאי לא את ארה"ב או ישראל. וולש היה מאד החלטי בנושא ואמר את הדברים פעם בעת פניתי ופעם לאחר בדיקה. מאידך ברצוני להוסיף שגדעון רפאל הנמצא בארה"ב התקשר להודיעני ששמע על הצהרה אמריקאית צפויה ברוח המידע של פטרטון וכי שמע על כך ממקור מוסמך אך סירב לנקוב בשם.

וולש
ע"ד

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החלף המדיני לשלכם 1265
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תפוצה:

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

23800

תאריך : 28.09.

נכנס **
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סודי

חוזם: 9,23800

אל: המשרד

יעדים: ווש/1233

מ-: נ' 763, תא: 270989, חז: 2230, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: & גס: צפא

יד: &

אחרי

סודי/מיידי.

אל: וושינגטון-שגריר/ציר (לעיניכם בלבד).

דע: מנהל מצפ'א, מנכ'ל משה'ח,
מנכ'ל משרד ראה'מ' (לעיניהם בלבד).

מאת יועץ מדיני לשר החוץ (ניו יורק).

1. בשיחת שר החוץ עם עמיתו ההונגרי, מסר האחרון כי בפגישה עם שוורנדרזה הבין כי האמריקאים והסובייטים פועלים לניסוח הודעה משותפת על המזרח התיכון.

2. ההערכה ששמע היא שההודעה תכלול אלמנטים חדשים.

אם אינני טועה, היה הד לכך במסיבת העיתונאים של שוורנדרזה בתום המפגש עם בייקר. במהלכה אמר כי 'עובדים על ה- LANGUAGE של ההודעה'.

סרב למסור פרטים.

4. מה ידוע לך על העניין? אודה על תשובתכם בסודי ובתפוצה מצומצמת.

5. אגב, בשיחה מאוחרת יותר עם רוס - הכחיש מכל וכל.

סלי מרידור.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

01: The, with, Over, 0107, 0107, 0107, 0107

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|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| דחילות: מירדי | שגרירות ישראל/וואשינגטון | קף: 1 |
| סוג: שמור | טופס פרוק | פתוך: 7 |
| תאריך וזמן מעור: 28 בספט' 1989 14:30 | | חל: מצפ"א |
| כס' פרוק: תפסרז: | א/ה | דע: צ. כלכלי - כאן. מנכ"ל אוצר |
| 645 | | כחז: ק. לקונגרס |

ערביות להלוואות דיור

בהמשך לדיווחנו על פגישות ממרחיקו בקונגרס והעלאת הנושא, רצייב:-

1. בייר העמדה שלנו (הופץ על ידינו לכל המחוקקים שעמדו להפגש עם מנרהיים).

2. הדו"ח שהוכן עבור אינדיה.

יחידת ורנאי דרנגר

יחידת ורנאי דרנגר.

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תפוצה:

ני"י (ימ"ר) סל (1)
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A.I.D Housing Guarantee Program for
Resettling of Soviet Jewish Refugees in Israel

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- * Approximately 100,000 Soviet Jews are expected to immigrate to Israel within the next three years.
- * The resources needed for the absorption of these immigrants in Israel are estimated to be \$3 billion.
- * The government of Israel and the Jewish organizations around the world do not have resources of that magnitude available to them. The government of Israel will have to raise some of the money from private financial institutions abroad.
- * The U.S Agency for International Development (A.I.D), operates a special program which provides guarantees for loans intended to finance housing projects in developing countries around the world. In the past, Israel has utilized this program.
- * The A.I.D housing guarantee program provides full U.S government guarantees for countries, up to \$25 million per year per country. By utilizing these guarantees, Israel would be able to raise money for housing projects for Soviet Jews in Israel.
- * However, due to the enormous resources that are required, the current A.I.D guarantees level (up to \$100 million per year for all countries) will not suffice.
- * In order to fully benefit from the A.I.D housing guarantee program, it might be necessary to increase the guarantee level in order to provide guarantees to loans exceeding \$25 million per year without hurting other needy countries.
- * In the past, the A.I.D guarantees pool was larger, but has been reduced due to some countries defaulting in their repayment schedule.
- * There should be no concern about Israel's defaulting, since Israel has never defaulted on a single payment on any of the loans given by the U.S or any other source. Therefore, the A.I.D housing guarantee fund can be increased without creating any budgetary consequences or hurting any existing or planned projects of the fund. As with past housing guarantee projects in Israel, A.I.D will be closely involved in the implementation of the project in Israel.

Attached is some background material on the needed resources.

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Premises

1. Approximately 100,000 Soviet Jewish immigrants are expected in Israel within a period of two to three years, beginning in 1990.
2. The existing capability and resources in Israel with respect to available housing, schools, jobs and infrastructure, will not suffice to adequately absorb this enormous number of immigrants.
3. It is estimated that 44,000 of the 100,000 immigrants, will be incorporated in the labor pool of Israel (one half with an Academic degree). 40,000 will be children of grade school and kindergarten ages.
4. The absorption of these immigrants will require an investment in infrastructure including roads, water and sewage systems.
5. Based on Israel's vast past experience in immigrant absorption, we believe that the successful absorption of the first immigration wave is particularly important to the successful absorption of subsequent waves.

Resources NeededA. Housing

The settling of 100,000 immigrants in Israel will require construction of 30,000 housing facilities. The total cost for this project is estimated at \$2 billion, based on the cost of \$ 65,000 per unit (including land, development, materials and work).

B. Infrastructure

The massive immigration will create a burden on Israel's network of roads, which is already overburdened.

An additional investment of \$350 million will be needed for the construction of new roads and the improvement of existing roads.

Furthermore, Israel will need to invest \$140 million in the infrastructure of the water and sewage systems.

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C. Education

The absorption of 40,000 children will require construction of an additional 1300 classes (110 schools). The cost for this project is estimated at \$110 million. An additional \$32 million will be needed for the operation of the new schools on an annual basis.

D. Employment

40,000 new employees on the Israeli work pool will require \$400 million in training and retraining costs.

E. Total cost by year (In millions of dollars)

| | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | Total |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Housing | 800 | 800 | 400 | - | - | 2000 |
| Employment | 150 | 130 | 70 | 30 | - | 400 |
| Education | 55 | 45 | 10 | - | - | 110 |
| Roads | 60 | 65 | 65 | 80 | 80 | 350 |
| Water, Sewage | 40 | 30 | 30 | 20 | 20 | 140 |
| ----- | | | | | | |
| Total | 1105 | 1090 | 575 | 130 | 100 | 3000 |

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Q and A regarding U.S. A.I.D. Housing Guarantees for loans taken by the government of Israel for the settling of Soviet Jews in Israel.

Question: Are there any budgetary implications for this program?

Answer: There are no budgetary implications. The U.S. government will supply only the guarantees for the loans. The total current level of U.S. available guarantees should be sufficient to support this program. The HG pool of guarantees, however, should be specifically increased in order to make the program possible.

Question: Why does Israel need the U.S. guarantee for these loans? Can't Israel borrow the money itself from private sources in the United States?

Answer: Israel can borrow money in the U.S. private market. However, the interest rates and the loan conditions would be significantly disadvantageous. The government of Israel contacted several American financial institutions and learned that the most favorable conditions we could expect would make the program unfeasible. The HG guarantees would probably allow Israel to receive favorable interest rates, 30 years maturity and a 10 year grace period on the principle. These are the conditions that Jordan received on a similar program two months ago.

Question: Will this program increase Israel's debt to the U.S. government?

Answer: No. The debt will be to private financial institutions in the United States and not to the U.S. government. Only in case of a default will the U.S. government have to spend any money on the program. This is extremely unlikely in light of Israel's impeccable debt repayment record.

Question: Who will monitor the implementation of the program in Israel?

Answer: U.S. A.I.D. Housing Guarantee regulations provide for heavy involvement and monitoring of its programs abroad. The Israeli government will work closely with A.I.D. officials in order to assure that the program is properly implemented to achieve its goals in the most efficient way.

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(2) (נבואה לעולם) יהודי א"י"ה

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Daniel K. Inouye
 FROM: Richard Collins *RC* and H. Fishbein *HF*
 DATE: September 21, 1989
 RE: Est. Cost Of Soviet Jewish Resettlement In The U.S.

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What follows is a summary of the approximate cost of resettling Soviet Jews in the United States over the last five years. It is impossible to determine, with precision, the total cost of resettlement because neither the Department of State (DOS), nor the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), keeps records which discriminate between various Soviet ethnic and religious groups.

SUMMARY

- o Between 1985 and 1989, the U.S. has spent approximately \$118,288,775 from the Department of State's Migration and Refugee account on the resettlement of Soviet Jews.
- o The Depart. of State is expected to spend \$75,000,000 in 1990 on the resettlement of Soviet Jews in the U.S.
- o Approx. 40,100 Soviet Jews were resettled in the U.S. from 1985-1989 at a rough cost of \$5,000 each reimbursed by HHS to the states for cash and medical assistance.

OVERSEAS MIGRATION COSTS (Department of State)

Est. Average Resettlement Categories For Soviet Refugees

| | | |
|-------------------------|---------|---|
| Reception and Placement | \$560 | (Support for 30 days and services up to 90 days) |
| Overseas Processing | \$425 | Principally funds HIAS |
| Care & Main in Europe | \$1,320 | Est. 60 days transit time |
| Transport to the U.S. | \$740 | A loan. Repayment not inclu. |
| Total | \$3,070 | Cost assumption will change when Moscow become main processing point. |

Total Cost Of Soviet Jewish Resettlement FY 1985 - FY 1989

| | FY85 | FY86 | FY87 | FY88 | FY89 |
|----------------------------|------|-------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Av. Cost per Capita | --- | --- | \$3,295 | \$3,100 | \$3,000 |
| Refugee Admittances | 599 | 623 | 2,137 | 8,305 | 20,506 |
| Total State Dept Cost (\$) | 760 | 1,100 | 7,041,415 | 25,745,500 | 85,500,000 |

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Projected Cost Of Soviet Resettlement FY 1990

| | Rome | Moscow | Jewish Sub-Total | Grand Total |
|-----------------------------------|------------|------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Av. Cost per Capita | \$3,070 | \$1,440 | --- | --- |
| Refugee Admittances | 30,000 | 10,000 | --- | --- |
| Projected State Dept Cost (\$) | 92,100,000 | 14,400,000 | (75,000,000) | 106,500,000 |

- o The State Department estimates that approximately 70 percent of their caseload are Soviet Jewish applicants. The rest are primarily Pentacostals and Armenians.
- o 40,000 Soviet Jewish applicants currently are backlogged in Moscow.

DOMESTIC RESETTLEMENT COSTS (Health and Human Services)HIAS Cost Est. Of Resettling A Soviet Refugee In The U.S.

| | Covered by U.S.G. | Covered by Jewish Com. | Total |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|---------|
| Work and Pre-immig. Planning | \$950 | \$250 | \$1,200 |
| Amer. Joint Distrib. Com. | \$600 | \$300 | \$900 |
| Local Domestic Reset. Costs | \$956 | \$1,444 | \$2,400 |
| Intergov. Comm. for Migration | \$550 | Revolving loan transport fund | |
| Total Cost per Refugee | \$2,556 | \$1,994 | \$3,056 |

- o The Department of State estimates it costs approximately \$8,000 to resettle a refugee.
- o HHS estimates that the average cost for all refugees is \$5,000 for 24 months of cash and medical reimbursement. Under the Govt's matching grant program, HHS will match up to \$1000 private funds provided for refugee care.

JEWISH COMMUNITY FUNDRAISING

- o A \$75 million campaign, organized by the American Jewish community, is underway to raise funds for Soviet refugee resettlement. Half of this goal has been met.

ISRAEL RESETTLEMENT FUNDINGAnnual Funding For Soviet Jewish Resettlement In Israel

| | FY85 | FY86 | FY87 | FY88 | FY89 | Recom'd FY90 | FY73-FY89 |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------|-----------|
| o | \$32.5 | \$11.9 | \$25.0 | \$25.0 | \$28.0 | \$25.0 | \$377.0 |

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END



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שמור/רגיל

אל: רושינגטון
השגריר. הציר

שיחות שרי החוץ

להלן TALKING POINTS שהועברו אלינו ע"י מר בקר משג' ארה"ב.
(קיש - העבירו נא בפקס').

מצפ"א
אורלי גיל
27 בספטמבר 1989

TALKING POINTS -- WYOMING MINISTERIAL

INTRODUCTION

- THE TWO VERY PRODUCTIVE DAYS OF MEETINGS BETWEEN SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE IN WYOMING, PRECEDED BY SHEVARDNADZE'S CALL ON THE PRESIDENT, REPRESENT A LARGE STEP IN A FORWARD-MOVING PROCESS TOWARD TRANSFORMING THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP FROM CONFRONTATION TO DIALOGUE, AND NOW TO INCREASINGLY GREATER COOPERATION.

-- THE OPEN SETTING IN WYOMING UNDERScoreD MUCH OF WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT THE MINISTERIAL: OPENNESS. OPENNESS WAS REFLECTED IN BOTH THE RELAXED, INFORMAL ATMOSPHERE AND IN WHAT WAS PRODUCED AT THE MEETING: AGREEMENTS ON START VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, A POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR OPEN SKIES INITIATIVE, AN OPEN LANDS INITIATIVE TO OPEN UP THE AREAS IN THE U.S. AND USSR NOW CLOSED TO THE OTHER'S CITIZENS.

-- THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER REVIEWED THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES ON THE FIVE-PART AGENDA, REACHING CONCRETE AGREEMENTS IN A NUMBER OF AREAS AND DEFINING NEW DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK IN OTHER AREAS.

-- THE SIDES ALSO AGREED ON A SUMMIT. THE PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV WILL MEET IN THE U. . IN LATE SPRING-EARLY SUMMER 1993. WE ANTICIPATE REGULAR MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CONTACTS TO ENSURE THE GROUNDWORK IS WELL-PREPARED FOR A PRODUCTIVE AND USEFUL SUMMIT.

ARMS CONTROL

-- VERY ENCOURAGED BY PROGRESS IN BROAD RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

-- BASED ON ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF WORKING GROUPS, IDEAS IN GORBACHEV LETTER AND NEW U.S. POSITIONS, MINISTERS WERE ABLE TO MAKE ADVANCES ON SEVERAL ISSUE .

START:

-- IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S VERIFICATION AND STABILITY INITIATIVE OF LAST JUNE, THE SOVIETS BROUGHT A DRAFT TEXT OF AN "UMBRELLA" AGREEMENT THAT COULD SERVE AS AN OVERALL CONTEXT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MEASURES. A FINAL TEXT WAS AGREED AND SIGNED BY MINISTERS IN WYOMING.

-- FOR SOME TIME U.S. AND SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTERS HAVE EXCHANGED CORRESPONDENCE ON AN AGREEMENT TO NOTIFY EACH OTHER OF ONE MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISE PER YEAR. THE U.S. SIDE GAVE THE SOVIET SIDE A DRAFT TEXT FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN GENEVA IN AUGUST. WE REACHED FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT, WHICH ALSO WAS SIGNED BY MINISTERS.

- BOTH THE MINISTERS AND THE WORKING GROUPS EXAMINED OTHER VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES AND AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THESE WOULD BE EXPLORED IN GREATER DETAIL IN GENEVA.

-- PRIOR TO THE MINISTERIAL SECRETARY BAKER ANNOUNCED THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO DROP ITS PROPOSAL TO BAN MOBILE ICBMS, CONTINGENT ON THE FUNDING BY THE U.S. CONGRESS OF U.S. MOBILE ICBMS.

-- THE SOVIETS WELCOMED OUR MOVE AND, AT THE MINISTERIAL ITSELF, WE ACHIEVED ADDITIONAL PROGRESS ON MOBILE VERIFICATION.

-- THE SIDES ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT FOR DEPLOYED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES COUNTED UNDER THE 1600 START CEILING, THUS SOLVING A LONG-STANDING TECHNICAL DISPUTE OVER FUNDAMENTAL TREATY LIMITS.

-- THE MINISTERS ALSO DISCUSSED BOTH AIR-LAUNCHED BRUISE MISSILES AND SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.

KRASNOYARSK:

- RESPONDING TO A LONG-STANDING U.S. DEMAND, THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO COMPLETELY ELIMINATE THEIR ILLEGAL RADAR AT KRASNOYARSK.

DEFENSE AND SPACE:

- FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE EXPLICITLY TOLD SECRETARY BAKER THAT THE SOVIETS DROPPED THEIR LINKAGE BETWEEN A START TREATY AND A DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT.

-- THEY NOW SAY THAT START CAN BE COMPLETED AND IMPLEMENTED EVEN IF NO AGREEMENT IS REACHED BY THAT TIME ON DEFENSE AND SPACE, PROVIDED THE ABM TREATY IS BEING COMPLIED WITH.

-- SECRETARY BAKER HAS CALLED THIS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.

-- START WOULD CONTAIN THE STANDARD PROVISIONS ALLOWING WITHDRAWAL FOR REASONS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST. THE NEW SOVIET POSITION SEEKS AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING THAT VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM START.

-- SECRETARY BAKER MADE CLEAR OUR CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO THE SDI PROGRAM.

-- THE SOVIETS WITHDREW THEIR DEMAND FOR A COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY -- AND WE AGREED.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW):

-- SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) ON A BILATERAL VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AND DATA EXCHANGE PERTAINING TO THE SIDES' CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITIES.

-- THE MOU IS INTENDED TO FACILITATE PROGRESS TOWARD A MULTILATERAL CW CONVENTION. NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS DOCUMENT DOMINATED THE DISCUSSION ON CW ISSUES.

- ON OTHER CW-RELATED MATTERS, THE SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT OUTLINING GENERAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND ANNOUNCING THEIR INTENT TO CONTINUE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON CW TREATY AND NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR.

NUCLEAR TESTING:

-- THE SIDES BROKE A LONG-STANDING DEADLOCK BY AGREEING ON A PACKAGE OF VERIFICATION METHODS FOR NUCLEAR TESTS.

-- THE PACKAGE COULD INCLUDE THREE ELEMENTS: HYDRODYNAMIC, SEISMIC AND ON-SITE INSPECTIONS.

-- EACH SIDE WOULD BE FREE TO CHOOSE ITS PREFERRED VERIFICATION METHOD AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE PROTOCOL. ALL RIGHTS WOULD, OF COURSE, BE RECIPROCAL.

-- THE U.S. POSITION HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THAT TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY WE REQUIRE THE USE OF ON-SITE HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENTS (CORRTEX) WHICH GIVE THE MOST ACCURATE MEASUREMENTS OF NUCLEAR TESTS.

-- ALTHOUGH AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THIS IMPORTANT PACKAGE APPROACH TO VERIFICATION, MUCH WORK REMAINS BEFORE THE PROTOCOLS TO THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY CAN BE SIGNED.

- WE DO NOT INTEND TO SET ANY ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES FOR COMPLETING THAT WORK; NEVERTHELESS, WE INTEND TO WORK DILIGENTLY WITH THE HOPE OF SUBMITTING THE TREATIES FOR RATIFICATION NEXT YEAR.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE):

-- SINCE CFE IS A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION, IT DID NOT FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN THE WYOMING MINISTERIAL.

-- IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH, GORBACHEV AGREED TO COMPLETING THE CFE TALKS IN THE 6-12 MONTHS TIMEFRAME THAT THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED AND THE ALLIES AGREED TO AT THE MAY NATO SUMMIT.

OPEN SKIES:

— THE SOVIETS WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S OPEN SKIES INITIATIVE WHICH PROVIDES FOR MUTUAL OVERFLIGHTS BY UNARMED AIRCRAFT OVER THE TERRITORIES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO MONITOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND AGREED TO ATTEND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE REGIME.

— WHILE WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE SOVIET RESPONSE, THEIR CONCEPT SEEMS TO DIFFER FROM OURS IN SEVERAL RESPECTS.

PROLIFERATION:

— THE SECRETARY TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IMPORTANT ISSUES RELATING BOTH TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION.

— FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE OFFERED HIS HELP WITH RESPECT TO SOME SPECIFIC NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CONCERNS AND EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO HAVE EXPERTS DISCUSS, ON A BILATERAL BASIS, THE PROBLEMS OF MISSILE PROLIFERATION.

REGIONAL ISSUES

— THE DEPTH AND CANDOR OF U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUES WAS FOR THE FIRST TIME REFLECTED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT RELEASED BY THE MINISTERS.

— THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHED TO PROGRESS ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND POINTED TO THE GENERAL PATTERN OF INCREASING MILITARY SUPPORT TO SOVIET FRIENDS THAT UNDERCUTS THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

— ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, THE SECRETARY LED OFF WITH U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA, PARTICULARLY THE CONTINUING FLOW OF SOVIET BLOC WEAPONS TO NICARAGUA AND THE FMLN -- THE VAST BULK OF WHICH WAS COMING FROM CUBA.

— THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN SEEING RESULTS WITH REGARD TO LEVELS OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO CONVINCE US THAT MOSCOW WAS SERIOUS ABOUT PROMOTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE REGION.

— SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED THAT THE USSR WAS REFRAINING FROM SENDING ARMS TO NICARAGUA DIRECTLY OR THROUGH CUBA, AND WOULD PRESS BOTH COUNTRIES NOT TO SUPPORT SUBVERSION IN THE REGION.

— THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENDING SUPPORT FOR SUBVERSION IN EL SALVADOR, AND NOTED THE PROVISION IN THE ESQUIPULAS AND SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS THAT STATES MAY NOT USE THEIR TERRITORY TO SUPPORT THOSE SEEKING TO DESTABILIZE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

— SECRETARY BAKER AND MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

— THE SOVIETS PRESENTED A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF NAJIBULLAH'S LATEST PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

— THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT A TRANSFER OF POWER FROM THE NAJIBULLAH REGIME TO A BROAD-BASED COALITION WAS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO GET A POLITICAL PROCESS UNDERWAY.

— HE REPORTED U.S. EFFORTS TO URGE THE RESISTANCE TO DISCUSS THE PRISONER OF WAR ISSUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, AND TO REFRAIN FROM ROCKET ATTACKS ON THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN KABUL.

— AT THE SAME TIME, THE SECRETARY REQUESTED THE USSR TO URGE THE KABUL REGIME TO ACT ON MUJAHIDIN PRISONERS OF WAR ON A HUMANITARIAN BASIS.

— THE SIDES FOUND THE BROADEST AREA OF AGREEMENT ON LEBANON AND ISSUED A JOINT APPEAL IN SUPPORT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE TRIPARTITE EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE, LIFTING OF ALL BLOCKADES AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

— THE APPEAL ALSO CONDEMNED HOSTAGE-TAKING AND CALLED FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES.

— IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS THE U.S. FOCUSED ON HOW TO INITIATE AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE, EXPLAINING HOW THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS CONCEPT AND THE EGYPTIAN TEN-POINT PLAN OFFERED IN RESPONSE COULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR PALESTINIANS TO ENGAGE IN A PROCESS THAT ULTIMATELY COULD LEAD TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

— SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT RULE OUT THE PROSPECT OF ELECTIONS, BUT STATED THAT THEY WERE ONLY ONE OF MANY ELEMENTS LINKED TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE.

— ON CAMBODIA, THE SOVIETS POINTED OUT THAT THE CONFLICT THERE WOULD BE REACHING A NEW STAGE WHEN THE VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS WAS COMPLETED ON SEPTEMBER 27.

— THE SIDES AGREED ON THE NEED TO PREVENT THE RETURN TO POWER OF THE POL POT REGIME.

— SECRETARY BAKER STRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA FAILED TO PRODUCE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, DUE TO INFLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF VIETNAM AND THE PRK.

-- THE SOVIETS EXPLAINED IN DETAIL A SOVIET PROPOSAL TO CONTAIN THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT BY A FREEZE OR MORATORIUM ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE FACTIONS BY ALL OUTSIDE PARTIES.

-- SECRETARY BAKER SAID THAT SUCH AN IDEA WOULD BE WORTH EXPLORING IF IT WERE PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

-- SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAD A BRIEF TOUR D'HORIZON ON AFRICA, FOCUSING PARTICULARLY ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HORN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

-- THEY AGREED ON THE NEED FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA, THE NECESSITY OF IMPLEMENTING ON SCHEDULE ALL ASPECTS OF THE NAMIBIA ACCORDS AND A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE INTERNAL CONFLICTS IN ETHIOPIA.

HUMAN RIGHTS

-- THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE SUCCESS OF A SUMMIT.

-- WE HAD THE USUAL FULL EXCHANGE ON THE TRADITIONAL TOPICS OF DIVIDED FAMILIES AND REFUSENIKS. THE SOVIETS REPORTED THE RESOLUTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF CASES SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING.

-- THE SECRETARY PRESENTED A LIST OF STILL-UNRESOLVED, LONG-TERM REFUSENIK CASES, WHICH SHEVARDNADZE UNDERTOOK TO REVIEW.

-- WE PRESSED FOR EARLY ACTION BY THE SOVIETS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREED MECHANISM FOR THE REVIEW OF DISPUTED POLITICAL PRISONER CASES.

-- SHEVARDNADZE PRESENTED A LIST OF U.S. "POLITICAL PRISONERS" ON WHICH WE UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE FULL INFORMATION.

-- WE ALSO EXPLORED NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS.

-- WE DEVELOPED A JOINT WORK PROGRAM CALLING FOR EXCHANGES ON THE RULE OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONS THAT WOULD BETTER SAFEGUARD RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WILL OFFER TRAINING TO SOVIET LEGAL EXPERTS AND CONDUCT A SEMINAR ON LEGAL TOPICS WITH U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS IN MOSCOW.

-- WE ARE ALSO LOOKING TO DEVELOP COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS DEALING WITH PROBLEMS OF THE AGED AND THE PHYSICALLY DISABLED, AND WITH WORKER SAFETY, FOR EXAMPLE THE SAFETY OF MINERS.

BILATERAL

-- THE MINISTERS AND THE WORKING GROUPS HAD EXTENSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS OF BILATERAL ISSUES, WITH RESULTS SET FORTH IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.

-- WE SIGNED TWO AGREEMENTS CONCERNING MUTUAL VISITS BETWEEN INHABITANTS OF THE BERING STRAITS REGION AND THE BERING STRAITS REGIONAL COMMISSION.

-- WE ALSO SIGNED A JOINT STATEMENT ON A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH TERRITORIAL WATERS, REMOVING A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF FRICTION IN THE RELATIONSHIP.

-- THIS INTERPRETATION ACCEPTS THE RIGHTS OF VESSELS OF A FOREIGN STATE, INCLUDING NAVAL VESSELS, TO TRANSIT THE 12-MILE TERRITORIAL SEAS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY WITHOUT HINDRANCE.

-- IT STRENGTHENS OUR LONG-STANDING VIEW THAT THESE AND OTHER NAVIGATION RULES EXIST IN INTERNATIONAL LAW INDEPENDENT OF THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND, THEREFORE, ARE BINDING ON ALL COUNTRIES.

-- U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS ELABORATED AN APPROACH FOR RESOLUTION OF THE NORTHERN PACIFIC MARITIME BOUNDARY ISSUE AND WILL MEET AGAIN SOON TO PURSUE THEIR WORK.

-- THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO BEGIN TALK REGARDING THE POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF AIR ROUTES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

-- THE SECRETARY PROPOSED "OPEN LANDS," AN INITIATIVE FOR THE MUTUAL ABOLISHMENT OF "CLOSED AREAS" OFF LIMITS TO NATIONALS OF THE OTHER SIDE.

-- GIVEN GROWTH IN EXCHANGES AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACT, WE BELIEVE THIS RELIC OF "OLD THINKING" IS OUTMODED.

-- MILITARY BASES, HIGH-TECH PLANTS AND CERTAIN OTHER INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES WOULD REMAIN OFF-LIMITS.

-- THE SOVIETS SEEMED INTERESTED IN THE CONCEPT, BUT DID NOT RESPOND.

-- WE SETTLED THE QUESTION OF WHERE EACH SIDE SHOULD LOCATE CULTURAL AND INFORMATION CENTERS: THEY WILL BE PLACED IN THE NATIONAL CAPITALS.

-- WE ALSO HELD A BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION MEETING BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL TO DISCUSS LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS FOR DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS.

-- AS PART OF OUR BILATERAL AGENDA, WE ALSO HELD AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION REGARDING ECONOMIC PERESTROYKA.

- IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS INFORMAL EXCHANGE ON PERESTROYKA WILL BE A PART OF OUR BILATERAL AGENDA AT FUTURE MINISTERIALS.

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

-- THE MINISTERIAL PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO SUBSTANTIALLY DEEPEN OUR EXCHANGES ON THE NEW FIFTH ASPECT OF OUR AGENDA, TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES.

-- SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ENDORSED A WORKING PAPER CONTAINING PROPOSALS FOR EXTENDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF JUSTICE (ICJ).

-- BOTH COUNTRIES AGREE THAT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD LEAD THE WAY IN MAKING GREATER USE OF THE ICJ BY ACCEPTING ITS JURISDICTION ON MUTUALLY AGREED CONDITIONS.

-- WE AGREED TO SEEK TO DISCUSS THESE IDEAS WITH THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO DEVELOP A COMMON APPROACH TO ICJ JURISDICTION THAT CAN BE EMBODIED IN AN AGREEMENT OPEN TO ALL OTHER COUNTRIES.

-- THE SECRETARY PRESENTED THE MINISTER TWO PROPOSALS FOR INTENSIFIED ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION. TO VARYING EXTENTS, EACH BUILDS ON EXISTING ACTIVITIES OR AGREEMENTS:

- WE ENCOURAGED A RANGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXCHANGES FOCUSING ON GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS, PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND EXPERTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCESSES.

-- WE ALSO TABLED A CONCEPT PROPOSAL FOR LONG-TERM JOINT ECOLOGICAL MONITORING AND RESEARCH, AND MONITORING AND RESEARCH OF SO CALLED "NON-POINT SOURCE" POLLUTION

-- SHEVARDNADZE WELCOMED U.S. INTEREST IN EXPANDED ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR CLOSE COORDINATION IN PREPARATION FOR THE 1992 STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

-- ON GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES LIKE CLIMATE CHANGE, THE U.S. PRESSED FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION THAT WOULD SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS SUCH AS THE UNEP/WMO INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE.

-- ON COUNTERTERRORISM, WE SPECIFICALLY RELATED STATE SUPPORT OF TERRORISM TO THE RECENT TRAGIC EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND URGED THE SOVIETS TO END THEIR REFUSAL TO DISCUSS STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM.

-- WE AGREED TO STUDY SOME SOVIET IDEAS ON EXPANDING THE UN'S ROLE IN COUNTERTERRORISM, BUT UNDERSCORED THAT OUR EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT BILATERAL MEASURES WERE MORE EFFECTIVE.

-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED MATTERS CONNECTED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S.-SOVIET MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED IN JANUARY 1989 REGARDING COOPERATION IN COMBATTING THE FLOW OF ILLEGAL NARCOTICS.

-- THEY EXPRESSED A READINESS TO CONSIDER NEW IDEAS FOR BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD, AND AGREED THAT EXPERTS FROM BOTH SIDES WOULD MEET IN MOSCOW BY THE END OF THE YEAR TO CONSIDER CONCRETE PROPOSALS.

September 23, 1989

JOINT STATEMENT

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met September 22-23 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming for discussions on the entire spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations, in the course of the Foreign Minister's official visit to the United States.

The Foreign Minister also had a discussion with President Bush on September 21 at the White House, where he delivered a letter from Chairman Gorbachev which contained new ideas and proposals on security questions. They had a wide-ranging exchange of views on the overall direction and prospects for development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The two sides attach great significance to contacts between U.S. and Soviet leaders in the development of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue at this important and promising point in U.S.-Soviet relations. Based on earlier understandings between President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev, the sides agreed that the next U.S.-Soviet summit meeting will take place in the United States in late spring-early summer 1990.

Both sides agree that their common goal is to build a more stable, constructive and sustainable relationship, one in which openness and cooperation increasingly replace mistrust and competition. While significant differences remain on certain issues, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister believe that -- with continuing efforts and shared commitment to a candid dialogue aimed at finding practical and concrete solutions -- it will be possible to further and broaden the progress that has been made in recent years in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Toward this end, the discussions in Jackson Hole were productive and serious. They were complemented by the efforts of experts working groups on all parts of the five-part agenda, both in Wyoming and preceding the ministerial in Washington. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reached specific agreements in several areas, and defined new directions for work in other areas.

I

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a thorough and productive review on the range of arms control and disarmament issues. They noted with satisfaction that, since their May meeting in Moscow, the Nuclear and Space Talks, Nuclear Testing Talks, and bilateral consultations on chemical weapons have resumed.

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The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a detailed discussion of nuclear and space issues, including the ideas contained in the letters exchanged by President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev.

Regarding ABM and space, the Soviet side introduced a new approach aimed at resolving this significant issue. Both sides agree that the Soviet approach opens the way to achieving and implementing a START Treaty without reaching a Defense and Space agreement. The sides agreed to drop the approach of a nonwithdrawal commitment while continuing to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. side said it would consider carefully the other aspects of the overall Soviet approach. Both sides agreed that their negotiators would consider these issues in Geneva. They also agreed that the negotiators would discuss the U.S. invitation for Soviet Government experts to visit two U.S. facilities involved in strategic defense research.

The Soviet side stated that, guided by its long-standing goal of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime, it had decided to completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station. The U.S. side expressed satisfaction with this announcement.

At the same time, the Soviet side stressed again the necessity of removing its concerns about the U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. The U.S. side promised to consider these concerns, in consultation with its Allies.

In the interest of promoting progress in the negotiations, the Secretary announced that the U.S. side was withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs in START, contingent on the funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side expressed satisfaction with this announcement and the two sides agreed on the need further to develop provisions for effective verification for limits on mobile ICBMs. In this connection, they also reached agreement on additional elements of common ground regarding the verification of mobile ICBMs, building on the elements agreed at the Moscow summit and subsequent work in Geneva.

Both sides noted the need to resolve the ALCM and SLCM issues. On ALCMs, the Soviet side put forward a new idea concerning its approach on how to deal with ALCMs and heavy bombers.

On SLCMs, the Soviet side offered new approaches for dealing with this difficult problem. The Soviet side raised the possibility of dealing with SLCMs in a broader naval arms context. As for the Nuclear and Space Talks, the Soviet side appealed to the American side to concentrate on verification and

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said that in the context of a verification system for SLCMs, these weapons could be limited outside of the text of a START treaty on the basis of reciprocal obligations. While reiterating its willingness to study the Soviet ideas, the U.S. side for its part emphasized its doubts about the feasibility of a workable verification system for SLCMs, and noted its long-standing view that there are serious problems involved in any discussion of the limitation of naval arms.

The Soviet side responded positively to President Bush's June initiative on verification and stability measures. In this regard, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough exchange on the details of the initiative, and signed an agreement encouraging the development of such measures and outlining principles for implementing them. They also completed an agreement on the advance notification of major strategic exercises. The sides examined the other verification and stability measures and agreed to explore these further in Geneva.

The sides also agreed that, for purposes of the 1600 START limit, ballistic missiles will be defined in terms of missiles and their associated launchers, thus resolving a long-standing issue.

New instructions will be issued to negotiators to take account of the exchanges on these and other START issues.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reaffirmed the objective of early conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. To intensify efforts toward this goal, and to enhance openness and confidence between the two countries, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The MOU provides for an exchange of data on U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles, and for visits and inspections of chemical weapons sites.

The sides adopted a special joint statement on chemical weapons in which they stressed the need to conclude a chemical weapons ban and underscored their concern about the problem posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister examined the status of the nuclear testing negotiations. They noted that the verification protocol for the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty has been agreed ad referendum by their negotiators, and reached agreement to incorporate hydrodynamic and seismic monitoring, as well as on-site inspection, into the verification protocol for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as the levels above which these measurements would occur. In order to obtain a statistically significant number of data points to improve the national technical means of each side, each side will guarantee the other side the right to take on-site

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hydrodynamic yield measurements of at least two tests per year during the first five years following ratification of this treaty. After five years, each side shall guarantee one such hydrodynamic measurement a year thereafter unless otherwise agreed by the two sides. These agreements provide a framework for conclusion of the verification protocols, completing a process that began fifteen years ago. They instructed their delegations to continue intensive work to resolve all remaining issues so that these two documents can be submitted for ratification as quickly as possible.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted with approval the work being done in the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe, and called for rapid conclusion of an agreement.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed in principle to the "Open Skies" concept proposed by President Bush in May, which could make a genuine contribution to openness and confidence-building. They noted their willingness to attend an international conference on the subject.

The sides noted the importance of joint efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technology and agreed to activate bilateral consultations on this pressing problem.

II

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough and frank exchange on regional issues. The sides reaffirmed their belief that active U.S. and Soviet support for political solutions that are comprehensive and based on broad national reconciliation could facilitate the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts around the world. They noted that the two sides continue to differ on some specific aspects of the question of arms supplies and their effect on the possibility of political settlements.

They noted that a cycle of regional experts discussions had been held on Central America, Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Both sides found these discussions useful for understanding one another's views, and agreed to continue experts meetings in the future.

The sides expressed their support for efforts by the Central American countries to establish a lasting peace in that region on the basis of the Esquipulas Treaty and subsequent agreements, which include a commitment not to permit the use of their territory to support those seeking to destabilize other Central American countries. While noting their differences on certain questions, including the level of arms flows to the region, they called on all interested parties to support this process actively by respecting in full the letter and spirit of the

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accords signed by the leaders of the five Central American countries. They also called upon all states outside the region to respect the request by the Central American countries to end all military assistance to irregular or insurgent forces.

The two sides agreed on the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan on the basis of national reconciliation, one that ensures the peaceful, independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan. While their approaches differ over how to translate these principles into reality, they nevertheless agreed that a transition period is required as well as an appropriate mechanism to establish a broad-based government. The sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan.

The sides reaffirmed their support for an active Middle East peace process. Among other issues, they also exchanged views on the place in that process of an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue leading to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in which all relevant parties will participate.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister expressed in a separate joint statement their strong support for the Arab League Tripartite Committee plan on Lebanon to bring about a ceasefire, a lifting of the blockade and a dialogue among the Lebanese parties aimed at achieving a political settlement. They condemned the taking of hostages and called for the immediate release of all hostages.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister advocated a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia and a continuation of the negotiation process toward this end. At this stage, they feel it is most important to take efforts to avert intensification of the civil war and the return of the Pol Pot regime to power. The sides declared their readiness to announce, together with other states, a moratorium on military assistance to all Cambodian factions as part of a comprehensive settlement.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed on the need to implement fully and on schedule the UN plan for the granting of independence to Timor, including the holding of free and fair elections. They expressed their support for the national reconciliation process in Angola and for efforts to secure peace and stability in Mozambique. The sides also advocated a peaceful, political solution to the internal conflicts in Ethiopia and supported the negotiation process underway between the Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.

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III

Within the framework of the on-going U.S.-Soviet dialogue on human rights and humanitarian affairs, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a constructive discussion of a broad range of human rights and humanitarian issues, including the role of international accords and generally accepted standards in the field of human rights and of the Helsinki Final Act and other CERN agreements. Specific reference was made to policies and cases of exit and entry, freedom of conscience, criminal practices concerning which questions had been raised and on which information will be exchanged. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed to work to move forward on a range of programs that will promote a better understanding of each other's institutions, legislation and practices which affect human rights and humanitarian issues.

IV

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister discussed a range of questions related to the other two parts of the agenda, bilateral and transnational issues. They signed two agreements: the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Mutual Visits between Inhabitants of the Bering Straits Region and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Bering Straits Regional Commission.

A U.S.-USSR joint statement was also signed on a uniform interpretation of rules of international law governing innocent passage through territorial waters, which removes a potential source of friction in the relationship between the two countries. They endorsed a working paper containing proposals for extending the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. In furtherance of this, the sides have agreed to approach the three other Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council with a proposal to discuss this question.

U.S. and Soviet experts together elaborated an approach for resolution of the Northern Pacific Maritime Boundary issue. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister directed the experts to meet again soon to complete their work on this basis.

The two sides agreed to start talks regarding the possible expansion of air routes between the two countries.

In connection with the virtually completed agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy it was decided to accelerate completion of proposals aimed at drawing up a new agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Nuclear Energy.

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The sides reached agreement in principle that U.S. and Soviet Cultural and Information Centers would be opened in Moscow and Washington, respectively.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister approved a bilateral work program.

The sides also discussed matters connected with implementation of the U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding signed in January 1989 regarding cooperation in combatting the flow of illegal narcotics. They expressed readiness to consider new ideas for bilateral and international cooperation in this field. They agreed that experts from both sides would meet in Moscow before the end of 1989 to discuss concrete proposals.

The two sides conducted an extensive discussion on the problem of combatting international terrorism and agreed in principle that experts would meet again in early 1990.

The two sides underscored the desirability of intensifying contacts between high-level elected and appointed officials in a variety of areas.

They devoted special attention to continued and new cooperation on a range of bilateral and international environmental problems, including global and climate change, as well as the problem of various sources of pollution.

The two sides confirmed their intent to conclude an agreement on cooperation on study of the world oceans by the end of this year, and to continue their work of preparing an agreement on cooperation in the field of housing and other types of construction.

The two sides agreed to consult and cooperate with the goal of increasing the effectiveness of the UN.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed on the necessity of continuing the search for new spheres of joint action directed at qualitative movement on bilateral and transnational issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.

A detailed discussion took place, including with the participation of experts, on a range of economic questions. It was agreed that these useful discussions will be continued.

* * *

Both sides confirmed the utility of conducting regular meetings at the ministerial level for considering and resolving major problems of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

September 23, 1989

JOINT STATEMENT
ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

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During their September 22-23 meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and the USSR to pursue aggressively the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons on the basis of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban. Both sides consider the early conclusion and entry into force of a convention to this effect to be one of the highest priorities for the international community. They believe that with the active and constructive participation of all states it will be possible to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date, and call upon all parties to the negotiations to join them in achieving this objective.

The two sides also believe that greater openness between them and among others could contribute to the prospects for reaching an early agreement on an effective ban on chemical weapons. As a concrete expression of the commitment of their two countries toward this end, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The steps agreed upon in the Memorandum are intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

The verification experiment and data exchange will be conducted in two phases. Phase I involves the exchange of general data on the sides' chemical weapons capabilities and a series of visits to relevant military and civil facilities on their respective territories. In Phase II the sides will exchange detailed data and permit on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the information exchanged.

The sides also agreed to undertake a cooperative effort with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons. They agreed to reciprocal visits to monitor destruction operations of the other side, and to the exchange of information on past, current and planned destruction activities and procedures.

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The sides noted their agreement on some procedures for conducting challenge inspections and on the provisions governing the order of destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons production facilities. These two approaches will be introduced into the multilateral negotiations in Geneva in an effort to contribute to those negotiations. They also stressed the need to concentrate in the near future on resolving remaining verification-related issues. The two sides intend to pursue intensively their bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban with the view to help achieve further progress in the multilateral negotiations.

The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister expressed their grave concern about the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the illegal use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons exist and are spread. They reaffirmed the importance of and their commitment to the final declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons held earlier this year as well as their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The two sides emphasized the obligation of all states not to use chemical weapons in violation of international law and urged that prompt and effective measures be taken by the international community if that obligation is violated. In this regard, they underscored their support for the UN Secretary-General in investigating reports of violations of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law.

The sides welcomed Australia's convening of a Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons, which has just concluded in Canberra. They noted that this conference provided an important opportunity for serious discussion between government and industry representatives from around the world. The sides expressed satisfaction with the extensive and productive work accomplished at the conference and the positive results reflected in the Chairman's final summary statement.

Finally, the sides expressed the view that a truly global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons is the best means to address the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons on a durable long term basis. In the meantime, the sides emphasized their readiness to attempt to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. They intend to continue consultations on this issue.

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September 23, 1989

JOINT STATEMENT ON LEBANON

While expressing their deep concern over the absence of peace and a settlement in Lebanon, the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirm their urgent appeal to take all necessary measures to bring to an end the sufferings of the Lebanese people, and urge a continued search for a political solution of the Lebanese crisis. They reaffirm the assumption that there is no military solution to the problems of that country. A constructive dialogue between Lebanese who themselves must reach lasting agreements on peaceful arrangements in Lebanon on the basis of a balance of interests is the only rational path towards national reconciliation.

The United States and the Soviet Union welcome the resumption of the peacemaking mission of the Tripartite Committee of the Arab League on Lebanon in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the Casablanca Arab summit and the Committee's efforts aimed at a cease-fire, the lifting of blockades, and initiation of the process of political settlement. They call upon all the parties involved in Lebanese affairs to respond positively to these efforts and to do their utmost to support the Tripartite Committee's action to complete its work successfully. They also note the importance of extending strong international support for the activities of the Tripartite Committee and for their own part intend to proceed further in this direction. Both sides reaffirm their resolute position in favor of preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Lebanese state.

The United States and the Soviet Union condemn any acts of taking hostages and demand that they be set free no matter where or by whom they are held captive.

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מברק שבועי

שיחות בייקר - שוורדנדה.

1. שיחות בייקר-שוורדנדה (22-23) ופגישת
שוורדנדה-בוש (21) מוקדו בעיקר בנושאים בילטרליים ופוק
נשק. בהקשר זה נחתמו כחצי תריסר הסכמים משניים שעקרום
פקוח ובקורת הדדים. נושאי הסכסוכים האזוריים תפשו חלק
זעום בשיחות.

2. כן הגיעו הצדדים למספר הבנות, כגון: ויתור סובייטי
על התנאי שארה"ב תפסיק יוזמת 'מלחמת הכוכבים' (SOI) קודם
לחתימה על הסכם START (לצמצום הטילים לטווח ארוך ב-50 אחוז).
כן הסכימו הסובייטים להשמיד מתקן המכ"מ הענקי שהקימו
בסיביר. ההבנה הנ"ל סללה הדרך לקביעת מועד למיפגש פיסקה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בין בוש לגורבצ'וב באביב-תחילת קיץ 1990. שיפור האווירה והסרת המכשולים העקריים בדרך להסכם START, נוחים פתח תקווה שההסכם השני החשוב בנושא פרוק נשק לאחר INF ייחתם בפריסגה הקרובה.

3. הסכסוך המזהה זכה למידה קטנה של הסכמה בהשוואה לסכסוכים ומוקדי מתיחות אחרים עליהם דנו הצדדים. הקטע המזההתי בהודעה המשותפת הוא סתמי וכוללני ואומר: 'הצדדים אישרו תמיכתם בתהליך שלום פעיל. בין שאר הנושאים הם גם החליפו העקפות על מקומו של דיאלוג ישראלי-פלסטיני שיוביל להסדר כולל של הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי שבו ישתתפו כל הצדדים הרלבנטיים'. נראה שהצדדים עדיין מחזיקים בעמדותיהם המסורתיות ואין קרוב ממשי בהשקפותיהם. עם זאת מהותיות סובייטיות אחרונות ניתן להסיק שהסובייטים לא שוללים באופן עקרוני את רעיון הבחירות בשטחים ולא ייצאו נגד דיאלוג ישראלי-פלסטיני בנושא זה.

4. בנושא לבנון היה קיים מכנה משותף רחב יותר בעמדותיהם ועל כן הושגה הסכמה ואף פירסמו הצהרה משותפת מיוחדת הקוראת לפיוס לאומי ושוללת פתרון צבאי, מקדמת בברכה מאמצי הע"ר, תומכת בשלמות, עצמאות ורבונות לבנון ומגנה לקיחת בני ערובה ודורשת שחרורם בלי קשר למקום אחזקתם ולזהות שוביהם.

5. להערכתנו, במגעי שתי מעצמות העל בחדשים הקרובים יוקדשו המאמצים בעקר לנושאים בילטרליים ושל פרוק נשק, כשענין הסכסוכים האזוריים, ובכלל זה סכסוך המזרחי, יימצאו בעדיפות נמוכה יותר. אין זה אומר שארה"ב לא תמשיך באופן עצמאי בנסיונותיה להניע התהליך המדיני במזרחי.

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תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממר, רם, אמן,
הסברה, מעת, משב, תרבות, אכב, כלכל יתא', כלכל יתב', טקס, קונס, הדרכה,
מחע, מקצב, ארבל, משפט, פרנ, מאור, אוקיאניה, מצרים, מצפא, אסיה,
אמלט, מזתים, ארבל, איר, איר, איר, 3, מאפ, מתאסשטחיס, לוברנ',

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

22125

תאריך: 26.09.89

יוצא: *

שומר

חוזם: 22125/9

אל: וווש/1141, בטחון/1118, מנמח/382, אביב/341

מ:- המשרד, תא: 260989, זח: 1543, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: גס: צפא

נד: ג

ח/הק

שומר/מידי

אל: וושינגטון שטיין

דע: מקש'ח משהב'ט; אל'מ אליק חרמץ מפא'ת - משהב'ט; אל'מ


פסח מלובני, ר' זירה טכנית אמ'ן;

טילים בליסטיים, N.P.T.

1. במהלך השיחה (26.9) העלה SEGAL משג' ארה'ב אפשרות שתוקיימנה שיחות בילטרליות בין ישראל לבין ארה'ב בנושא טילים בליסטיים, הסדר שמצרים הסכימה לו וישראל דחתה אותו בעבר. מנהל פר'ן ציין שישראל לא ראתה שום תרומה בשיחות שכאלה לייצוב המצב באזור שכן הבעיה כרוכה בהפצת נשק כזה בעיראק ובסוריה. הבטיח בכ'ז להעביר את רוח הפנייה למשהב'ט.

2. מנהל פר'ן נשאל מי יעמוד בראש המשלחת ל- NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE והשיב כי לא הוחלט עדיין אך ייתכן כי נסתפק במשקיף נמוך דרג (בהיותנו NON SIGNATORY).

3. בהמשך דיווח הנציג האמריקאי על תוכן שיחה שהתנהלה עם הנציג הסובייטי ל- C.S. לפיה בריה'מ סבורה של ישראל מקום כמשקיפה ב- C.S. והציעו שישראל תראה נכונות לשמש במעמד שמעבר למשקיפה ותראה רצינות בקשר ל- 'GLOBAL BAN' מנהל פר'ן השיב כי בעקרון אנו תומכים ב- 'GLOBAL BAN' בשילוב הסדר איזורי קרי מז'ת מפורז מנשק כימי, כפי שהתבטא שה'ח כפריז ורוה'מ בעצרת האו'ם; מאחר ולא ניתן לנו להשתתף בשיחות C.S. (אף לא כמשקיפה) אין באפשרותו להתחייב לגבי ה- CONVENTION



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מבלי לראותה מראש. מנהל פר'ן הוסיף שאם תהיה עמדה איתנה של ארה"ב, קנדה ויתר המערביות להסכים לצרוף עיראק ולוב ל- C.S. בתנאי שגם ישראל תצורף, הוא מעריך שהערבים יוותרו. SEGAL סקר בקצרה התקדמות השיחות בינם לבין הסובייטים (START).

מנהל פר'ן

רכ

לש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, דהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, פרו, מצפא,
סייבל, משפט, ר/מרכז, ממד

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

22107

תאריך: 26.09.89

יוצא **

סודי

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חוזם: 22107/9

אל: ווש/1138, בטחון/1115, מנמח/381, אביב/340

מ-: המשרד, תא: 260989, זח: 1537, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: גס: צפא

נד: 8

לנהל

סודי/מיידי

13501

שטיין ווט


דע: מקש'ח משהב'ט; אל'מ אליק חרמץ מפאת - משהב'ט;

אל'מ פסח מלובני ר' זירה טכנית אמן;

שיחות לצמצום נשק כימי

בהמשך לביקורו של היועץ BECKER משגרירות ארה"ב (25.9) מסר לנו מסמך עמדה בנושא צמצום ייצור נשק כימי והפצתו בעולם, הגיע אלינו (25.9) עמיתו המזכיר הראשון SEGAL וביקש לברוק אפשרות של קיום שיחות בילטרליות ישראליות - מצריות בנושא צמצום נשק כימי על רקע דאגה רומה שהושמעה על ידי שתי המשלחות בכנס קנברה. אף כי לא ביקש לפסול שיחות כאלה עם המצרים על הסף הטעים מנהל פר'ן כי לא תצמחנה מהן תועלת רבה לישראל שכן הבעיה הנוערת כיום מבחינת ישראל היא מלאי הנשק הכימי הנערם בסוריה, עיראק, לוב וכו'. מכאן רעיון אזור מז'ת מפורז כתוספת להסכם פירוז אוניברסאלי. SEGAL ביקש לדעת אם ארה"ב תוכל לשמש מתווך בנושא הכימי; מנהל פר'ן חזר על נימוקיו וסיכם שמצרים, במסגרת הסכם השלום עליו היא חתומה עם ישראל, יכולה לפנות אלינו ישירות ובכל מקרה הוא לא מאמין שישראל תיזום ראשונה מהלך כזה.

מנהל פר'ן העיר, לסיום, שהתאכזב מכך שמנאום הנשיא בוש נעדר אזכור אי-הפסקת ייצור נשק כימי, נקודה שהועלתה ע"י



משרד-החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

המשלחת האמריקאית בקנברה, והביע תקווה כי אין בכך כדי להצביע על שינוי בעמדה האמריקאית. SEGAL הבטיח שהנושא ייבדק עם וושינגטון.

מנהל פר'ן

רכ

לש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, דהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ,
סייבל, משפט, סולטן, מצרים, ר/מרכז, ממד

1. The first part of the report is a general
description of the project and its objectives.
This includes a brief history of the project
and a statement of the problem to be solved.

2. The second part of the report is a
description of the methodology used in the
study. This includes a description of the
data collection methods and the statistical
techniques used to analyze the data.

3. The third part of the report is a
description of the results of the study.
This includes a description of the data
collected and a discussion of the findings.
The results are presented in a clear and
concise manner, with a focus on the
key findings of the study.

חסוי



חסוי

חסוי



חסוי

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| דחיפות: בהול | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון | קד: _____ |
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| כס' פרוק: | | דצ: _____ |
| הפסיד: | 1/2 | |
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טנאט: ודזה לערפת
~~בהמשך לשלבו סנכ.~~

אתמול בערב נוספו שני חותמים נוספים: הסנטורים שיש דומיניק'י ודיגיד בורן. סה"כ 68 חותמים.
 להזכירכם שאתמול התמו על מכתב דומה רק 51 סנטורים.

והלאה! כנא' להנצח
 יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

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ס.ו.

תפוצה: 36

נכנס **
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סודי

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א/הק

חוזם: 9,22681

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1783, מנמת/394

מ-: ווש, נר: 568, תא: 260989, חז: 2100, דח: ר, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: צפא

יד: @

סודי/רגיל

אל: מצפ'א, אירופה 3

דע: ממ'ד

ארה'ב-בריה'מ: מפגש בייקר - שווארדנצה

כללי:

1. להלן סיכום מפגש שני שרי החוץ וספיהיו (שיחת בוש שווארדנצה ודיוני המומחים) המתבסס על: שיחתי (26.9) עם דסקאי מזה'ת במח' בריה'מ שטופר, התבטאויות השרים ופרשנות.

2. בפתח דבריו ציין שטופר כי המפגש מבטא רצון הממשל דם היחסים עם בריה'מ ברוח התבטאות הנשיא 'BEYOND CONTAINMENT'.

באופן מעשי הכוונה לעבור ממצב של דיאלוג לשלב של שת'פ (בייקר באחד הראיונות שהעניק ציין כי שתי המעצמות עברו משלב של עימות לדיאלוג וכעת בכוונתן לעבור לפסים של שת'פ. שווארדנצה ציין כי השיחות העמידו את היחסים על מישור חדש).

3. שטופר תאר את המפגש בכללותו כפורה ביותר בתולדות המפגשים. מפגש אשר מילת המפתח לתארו (לדברי הנשיא) היא פתיחות.

4. מנה ההסכמים שנחתמו (ראה פירוט בהודעה המשותפת



513 (מ-24.9). מלב ההסכמים שנחתמו, הושגה הבנה בנושאים רבים שישמשו בסיס להמשך הדיונים.

5. שטופר התייחס בהקשר לעיל להבנה שהושגה לגבי עריכת פסגה. מעריך שהמפגש יערך בסוף מאי תחילת יוני. עד למפגש צפויים מפגשים תכופים של שני שר החוץ להכנת הקרקע (הערה: בראיון שהעניק בסיום המפגש הבהיר הנשיא כי קיום הפסגה אינו מותנה בחתימה על הסכם START וכי ניתן לתאר פסגה אשר לא תסתיים בחתימה על הסכמים. יבך מבקש הנשיא להקטין ציפיות).

תוכן השיחות:

1. פיקוח על החימוש (AC) :

א. שטופר ציין שביעות רצון הממשל מהתקדמות שהושגה בקשת רחבה של נושאים. ציין הערת שווארדנצה על כך שהדיון במכלול זה היה פרודוקטיבי יותר מכל מפגש אחר. תרומה חיובית לשיחות היה מכתב התשובה של גורבצ'וב לבוש שכלל התייחסות חיובית לשורת נושאים אותם העלה בוש במכתבו (נושאי START, אימות, CFE, שמיים פתוחים).

ב. בנושא START ציין שטופר כי שינוי בעמדת בריה'מ (החזת הלינקאז' בין SDI ל- START). (הערה: הנכונות הסובייטית להתיר הלינקאז' מבטא לדעת פרשנים רצון סובייטי להתקדם בתחום הפיקוח על החימוש והכרה בעובדה שהדרך היחידה להתקדמת בשיחות START היא על ידי יצירת הלינקאז'. עמדתה החדשה של בריה'מ אינה מבטאת נוי תכני. היא מקווה שהחתימה על הסכם START והקונגרס אשר יקפיד על פרשנות מצומצמת של הסכם ABM, ימנע הצורך בפרישה מההסכם שיחתם. לסיכום בריה'מ החליטה לדחות אך לא לבטל את התנגדותה לתכנית SDI. יצוין כי אנשי קונגרס ותקשורת מותחים ביקורת על התבונה שבהסכמה אמריקאית להתרת הלינקאז', הם סבורים שארה'ב יכולה היתה לנסות ולהשיג מבריה'מ תמורה על הנכונות להפריד בין SDI ל- START. שטופר בתגובה ציין כי הממשל אינו מתייחס לתכנית SDI כאל קלף מיקוח. מכל מקום גם לאחר הסרת מכשול לעיל יש להניח שעד להבאת הנושא לחתימה יצטרכו שני הצדדים להתגבר על מכשולים 'טכניים' רבים שלא לדבר על קשיים שהימין בקונגרס יעמיד בדרך לאשרור

ג. עוד בהקשר ל- START סיפר שטופר על טיוטת הסכם מסגרת שהוגשה על ידי הסובייטים לגבי הסכם מסגרת שיאפשר יצירת מיכניזם לאימות אסטרטגי לפני חתימה על הסכם START.
שטופר ציין חשיבות להסכם זה בעיקר מול הסנאט.

ה. שטופר ציין התייחסותם החיובית של הסובייטים לסוגיית האמצעים לאימות ויצירות בתחום הנשק האסטרטגי. בדיון קבוצת העבודה ובמפגש השרים פורטו האמצעים. ציין בהקשר זה את הודעת בייקר בדבר נכונותה של ארה"ב להסיר התנגדותה לגבי איסור בנושא טילים ביניבשתיים ניידים בתנאי שהקונגרס יסכים לממן טילים דומים (הערה: הודעת בייקר היתה צפויה. יצוין כי הדיון בקונגרס בשאלת הטיל העתידי אותו יממנו טרם הסתיים. האופציות על סדה"י הן טיל הרב ראשי MX לעומת הטיל בעל ראש חץ אחד מיג'יטמאנ).

ו. בנושא טילי השיוט המסוגרים מהאוויר (ALCM) לא הושגה הבנה. ציין בהקשר זה חילוקי דעות לגבי ההבחנה בין טיל שיוט קונבנציונלי לגרעיני ומספר הטילים שיכול מפציץ לשאת. שני הצדדים מכירים בכ שחילוקי הדעות ניתנים לגישור.

בסוגיית טילי השיוט המשוגרים מהים (SLCM) התייחס שטופר להצעת בריה'מ לקיים דיון נפרד בנושא במסגרת נשק גרעיני ימי. הוסיף כי בריה'מ הציעה לדון בנושא האימות בג'נבה ולהשאיר נושא התקרה לדיון נפרד. שטופר ציין הקושי לקיים דיון בנושא האימות בהיעדר שיטות להתמודד עם הקשיים בתחום זה. (הערה: נכונות בריה'מ לנתק נושא בעייתי זה מהסכם על הנשק האסטרטגי ההתקפי כמו גם התרת הלינקאז' לעיל מצביעה על האינטרס הסובייטי להסיר מכשולים שעלולים לעכב החתימה על START).

ח. 'סוף-סוף' ציין שטופר הסכימה בריה'מ לחסל את מתקן הרדאר בקראסנויארק ללא תנאים מוקדמים.

10/1/74.

1. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY HAS REVIEWED THE PROPOSAL FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE COMPANY BY THE OFFEROR AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS.

2. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS THEREFORE REJECTED THE OFFER.

3. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS THEREFORE REJECTED THE OFFER. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS THEREFORE REJECTED THE OFFER. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS THEREFORE REJECTED THE OFFER.

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5. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS THEREFORE REJECTED THE OFFER. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS THEREFORE REJECTED THE OFFER. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS THEREFORE REJECTED THE OFFER.

6. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS THEREFORE REJECTED THE OFFER. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE OFFEROR'S OFFER IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS THEREFORE REJECTED THE OFFER.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ט. יוזמת בוש בנושא 'השמים הפתוחים' כחלק מתהליך של בניית אמון זכתה להסכמה עקרונית של בריה'מ. במקביל העלתה ארה'ב הצעה (אותה יזם שגרירם במוסקבה) לגבי 'אדמה פתוחה' הכוונה ששתי המדינות תרחבנה מרחב התמרון של נציגיהם.

2. נשק כימי:

א. בהתייחס למזכר ההבנה שנחתם בנושא אימות חילופי ידע (ראה תוכן ההודעה המשופת) בילטרלי, ציין שטופר ההבנה שהושגה תאפשר לשתי המעצמות להוכיח למשתתפות ועידת C8 את נכונותן להתגבר על בעיית האימות. מעריך שההבנה שהושגה תסייע להשיג את היעד אותו הציב הנשיא לגבי אמנה שתאסור ייצור אחסנה ושימוש בנשק כימי. (הערה: ביוזמה אותה העלה הנשיא בוש בנושא הנשק הכימי בנאומו בעצרת יו' כדי לבטא את החשיבות והמחויבות האישית של הנשיא לקידום האמנה הגלובאלית בנושא).

3. ניסויים גרעיניים:

א. כדי לא להלאותנו בפרטים טכניים ציין שטופר שהקפאון בנושא נשבר. סוכם על חבילה שתאפשר לצדדים לעשות שימוש בשיטותיו לעקוב אחרי הניסויים שיבצעו.

ב. בכוונת הצדדים לחדש הדיון (2.10) בנושאים הטכניים שטרם מצאו פתרון כדי לאפשר החתימה על הפרוטוקולים בנושא.

קיצוץ נשק קונבנציונאלי (CFE):

א. מאחר והמדובר בנושא מולטילטרלי (נאטו וברית ורשה) לא החקיים דיון מפורט. במכתבו לבוש אימץ גורבצ'וב הצעת הנשיא למסגרת הזמן לסיום השיחות (6-12 חודש) ולחתימה על הסכם.

ב. בהתייחסו להצעה נוספת של גורבצ'וב לכינוס פסגה של ראשי נאטו וברית ורשה לחתום על הסכם ציין כי סבורים שהחלטה צריכה להתקבל על ידי נאטו. לגופו של עניין סבורים שמוקדם מדי לקבוע תאריך.

5. תפוצות טילים וטכנולוגית טילים:

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[illegible]

6. נשואים וג' נשואים:

מ. א. מ. כ. ז. :

1. 11th Nov 1950

: 11127 .2

(1) שטופר ציין כי מבין כל הנושאים הרגיונליים בנושא

נושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לבנון הושגה ההסכמה הרחבה ביותר.

(2) שטופר הוסיף כי רשמו בסיפוק העובדה שבריה"מ (לראשונה) התייחסה במסמך משותף לנושא חטופים.

ד. תהליך השלום (בהמשך לדווח הציר):

(1) בהמשך לדיון בקבוצת העבודה הסביר בייקר לעמיתו את רעיון הבחירות ואת 10 הנקודות המצריות המהוות ליבריו תגובה להצעת ישראל, כאשר יחד הן מהוות בסיס ודד פלסטינים להכנס לתהליך שיכול להוביל לפתרון קבע.

(2) שווארדנצה בתגובה ציין כי טרם גיבשו עמדה בנושא הבחירות. לגופו של עניין הוסיף כי אינם מזציאים מכלל אפשרות שהבחירות תהיינה אלמנט אחד מתוך מספר אלמנטים שיחד יהיו קשורים להסדר מקיף אותו ניתן יהיה להשיג על ידי ועידה בינ"ל. (הערה: בהתייחסו לנושא המזה"ת בנסיבת עתונאים, תאר שווארדנצה את השיחות כרציניות וסוסטנטיביות. כמו כן ציין ההסכמה שהושגה לעבוד במשותף באיזור. לבריה"מ הוסיף יש פוטנציאל מסויים לפעול כמו גם לארה"ב).

ה. קמבודיה

(1) שווארדנצה ציין כי בעקבות סיום נסיגת ויטנאם נכנס המשבר לשלב חדש.

2. שני הצדדים סכמו שיש לעשות מאמץ למנוע שובו של ל פוט.

(3) בייקר הביע אכזבה מכך שוועידת פריס נכשלה בנסיגה להשיג הסדר מקיף. את הסיבה לכך רואה בחוסר גמישות מצד ויטנאם והון סאן.

(4) בריה"מ הציעה לאתר את הבעיה על ידי הכרזת מורטוריום על הספקת נשק.

(5) בייקר בתשובה ציין שהרעיון שווה מחשבה כחלק מהסדר מקיף.

ו. צפון קוריהא:

משרד החוץ-כוחלקת הקשר

בייקר העלה דאגת ארה'ב בנושא הפרוייקט הגרעיני של צפון קוריאה (דווח בנושא נשלח לפר'נ).

ז. קרן אפריקה ודרום יבשת אפריקה:

(1) שני הצדדים קראו לפיוס לאומי באנגולה.

(2) עמדו על הצורך ביישום הסכמי נמביה.

שני הצדדים ציינו הצורך בפתרון פוליטי לקונפליקט הפנימי באתיופיה.

עַד כֵּאן חֵלֶק א'

המשך בנר 569.

NG

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, איר3, פרנ, סי' יבל

** נכנס
**
**
**

סודי

חוזם: 9,22690

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1782, מנמח/393

מ:- ווש, נר: 569, תא: 260989, זח: 2200, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: צפא

נד: 8

ארכיון

סודי/רגיל

המשך נר 568

אל: מצפ'א, איר 3

דע: ממ'ד

ח. סיכום:

שטופר סיכם פרק זה בתארו את הדיאלוג כמעמיק ומפורט (רובו ככולו). שני הצדדים הגיעו להסכמה על שורת עקרונות בסיסיים כאשר חילוקי הדעות נוגעים לקצב וליישום העקרונות.

7. ז'א:

א) שטופר ציין כי ארה"ב הדגישה בשיחות חשיבות הנושא לקידום היחסים.

ב) ציין חילוקי דעות בנושא איחוד משפחות ורפיוזניקים. בריה"מ בתגובה ציינה כי חלק גדול מהבעיות מצאו פתרונם מאז חתימת הסכמי הלסינקי.

ג. בייקר מסר לשווארדנצה רשימה של רפיוזניקים שבעייתם טרם נפתרה. שווארדנצה הבטיח לבדוק ולהשיב.

ד. לשווארדנצה לא היתה תשובה לשאלת בייקר לגבי מועד כניסתם לתוקף של תקנות ההגירה החדשות. הדבר ציין

תלוי בסובייט העליון.

ה. שטופר סיפר כי העלו הצעה להקמת מיכניזם לבחינת הנושא של עצירים פוליטיים אמריקאים.

ו. שני הצדדים שוחחו על תחומים חדשים להרחבת שת"פ בנושא ז"א (עריכת סמינרים, מפגשי מחקר, ביקורים במוסדות פסיכיאטרים וכו').

8. בילטרלי:

1) שטופר מנה ההסכמים שנחתמו (ראה מברק ההודעה המשותפת לעיל).

2) במסגרת זו סוכם על קיום מפגשים לא פורמלים של השרים לדיון בפרסרוויקה.

9. נושאים טרנס-לאומיים:

א. איכות הסביבה:

1) מעבר לנאמר בהודעה המשותפת א.מ.ל.

ב. מאבק בטירור:

1) ארה"ב העלתה נושא המדינות התומכות בטירור. דחקו בסובייטים לחדול מהתנגדותם לדון בסוגיא.

2) ארה"ב הציעה כי שתי המדינות יעבדו הערכה משותפת לגבי קבוצות הטירור השונות. כמו כן העלו הצעה לעיבוד מיכניזם של ניהול משבר במקרה של התקפה על מטוס אמריקאי או סובייטי. בריה"מ לא הגיבה להצעות.

3) שטופר צופה לפגישת מומחים בתחילת 90.

4) בריה"מ קראה להרחבת תפקיד האו"ם במאבק בטירור. על כך ארה"ב טענה כי הטיפול הבילטרלי עדיף על פני הטיפול המולטילטרלי.

ג. סמים:

סוכם על הגברת שת"פ בנושא.

עד כאן תוכן השיחות.

10. סיכום:

1) בנאומו בעצרת סיכס הנשיא את מפגש השרים. ציין את שביעות רצונו מההתקדמות ומכך שבִּרְיָה'מ הסיירה מספר מיכשולים שיאפשרו התקדמות במכלול נושא הפיקוח על החימוש. הנשיא התייחס להסכמה לעריכת פיסגא. הדגיש כי חשיבות ההישגים כסימן לגישה חדשה השוררת בין שתי המעצמות. עדיין נותרו חילוקי דעות רציניים אך הרצון לדון בהם בדרך קונסטרוקטיבית וכנה ראויים לציון.

2) בדברים אלו יש כדי לסכם את תחושת הממשל והרגשת הסובייטים לה נתן גם שווארדנצה ביטוי בסיום המפגש.

3) רצון בייקר ובוש להציג ההישגים נועד להפיג במשהו את הביקורת (מחוגי קונגרס ותקשורת) על כך שהממשל איננו מתמודד עם האתגר של השינוי המתחולל בבריה'מ ובמזא'ר.

4) נראה שאת ההישגים וההתקדמות שהושגה ניתן לזקוף ללחץ שבו מצויים שני הצדדים, גורבצ'וב זקוק להסכם בנושא START ובנושא הנשק הקונבנציונלי במסגרת מאמציו לייצב את הסביבה הבינוגושת כדי להתפנות ולהפנות משאבים למודרניזציה של כלכלת בריה'מ. בוש לעומתו נדחף לשת'פ על ידי הביקורת המוטחת כלפיו על כך שממשלו אינו מבין את גודל השעה וצורך לנצל ההזדמנות שנקרתה, ולסייע לשינויים המתחוללים בבריה'מ.

שטיין

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, איר, 3, פרנ, סייבל



UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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September 25, 1989THE WHITE HOUSE

ADDRESS BY

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GEORGE BUSH

TO THE

44TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER 25, 1989

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Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished delegates of the United Nations. I am honored to speak to you today as you open the 44th Session of the General Assembly.

I would like to congratulate Joseph Garba of Nigeria--a distinguished diplomat--on his election as President of this session of the General Assembly, and I wish him success in his presidency. I feel a great personal pleasure on this occasion. This is a homecoming for me. The memories of my time here in 1971 and 1972 are still with me today--the human moments--the humorous moments--that are part of even the highest undertaking.

Let me share one story--from one of the many sessions of the Security Council. I was 45 minutes late getting to the meeting--and all 45 minutes were filled by the first speaker to take the floor. When I walked in and took my seat, the speaker paused and said with great courtesy: "I welcome the Permanent Representative of the United States, and now--for his benefit--I will start my speech again--from the beginning." At that moment, differences of alliance and ideology didn't matter. The universal groan that went up around the table--from every member present--and the laughter that followed--united us all.

Today, I would like to begin by recognizing the current Permanent Representatives with whom I served: Roberto Martinez-Ordóñez, Blaise Rabetafika, Permanent Observer John Dube. It's wonderful to look around and see so many familiar faces--foreign ministers, members of the Secretariat, delegates. And, of course, Mr. Secretary-General, you were Permanent Representative for your country when we served together. And Under-Secretary, Abby Farah, you were a Permanent Representative back then too. It's an honor to be back with you in this historic hall.

The United Nations was established forty-four years ago upon the ashes of war--and amidst great hopes. And the United Nations can do great things. No, the UN isn't perfect. It's not a panacea for the world's problems. But it is a vital forum where the nations of the world seek to replace conflict with consensus--and it must remain a forum for peace.

The United Nations is moving closer to that ideal. And it has the support of the United States of America. In recent years--certainly since my time here--the war of words that has often echoed in this chamber is giving way to a new mood. We've seen a welcome shift--from polemics to peacekeeping.

The UN Peacekeeping Forces are on duty right now, and over the years more than 700 peacekeepers have given their lives in service to the United Nations. Today, I want to remember one of these soldiers of peace--an American on a mission of peace under the United Nations flag--on a mission for all the world. A man of unquestioned bravery

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and unswerving dedication to the United Nations ideal:
Lieutenant Colonel William Richard Higgins.

I call on the General Assembly to condemn the murder of this soldier of peace and call on those responsible to return his remains to his family. And let us all right now--right here--rededicate ourselves and our nations to the cause that Colonel Higgins served so selflessly.

The founders of this historic institution believed that it was here that the nations of the world might come to agree that law--not force--shall govern. And the United Nations can play a fundamental role in the central issue of our time. For today, there is an idea at work around the globe--an idea of undeniable force. That idea is: freedom.

Freedom's advance is evident everywhere. In Central Europe: In Hungary--where state and society are now in the midst of a movement towards political pluralism and a free market economy--where the barrier that once enforced an unnatural division between Hungary and its neighbors to the West has been torn down--torn down and replaced by a new hope for the future--new hope in freedom.

We see freedom at work in Poland, where, in deference to the will of the people, the Communist Party has relinquished its monopoly on power. And in the Soviet Union the world hears the voices of people no longer afraid to speak out, or to assert the right to rule themselves.

But freedom's march is not confined to a single continent--or to the developed world alone. We see the rise of freedom in Latin America, where one by one dictatorships are giving way to democracy. We see it on the continent of Africa, where more and more nations see in the system of free enterprise salvation for economies crippled by excessive state control. East and West, North and South: On every continent, on every horizon, we can see the outlines of a new world of freedom.

Of course, freedom's work remains unfinished. The trend we see is not yet universal. Some regimes still stand against the tide. Some rulers still deny the right of the people to govern themselves. But now, the power of prejudice and despotism is challenged. Never before have these regimes stood so isolated and alone, so out of step with the steady advance of freedom.

Today, we are witnessing an ideological collapse--the demise of the totalitarian idea of the omniscient, all-powerful state. There are many reasons for this collapse. But in the end, one fact alone explains what we see today: Advocates of the totalitarian idea saw its triumph written in the laws of history. They failed to see the love of freedom written in the human heart.

Two hundred years ago today, the United States Congress proposed a Bill of Rights--fundamental freedoms belonging to every individual,

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rights no government can deny. Those same rights have been recognized in this congress of nations--in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "A common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."

From where we stand--on the threshold of this new world of freedom--the trend is clear enough. If, for those who write the history of our times, the Twentieth Century is remembered as the century of the state, the Twenty-First must be an era of emancipation--the age of the individual.

Make no mistake: nothing can stand in the way of freedom's march. There will come a day when freedom is seen the world over to be the universal birthright of every man and woman, of every race and walk of life. Even under the worst of circumstances, at the darkest of times, freedom has always remained alive--a distant dream, perhaps, but always alive.

Today, that dream is no longer distant. For the first time, for millions around the world, a new world of freedom is within reach. Today is freedom's moment. You see, the possibility now exists for the creation of a true community of nations--built on shared interests and ideals. A true community--a world where free governments and free markets meet the rising desire of the people to control their own destiny: to live in dignity, and to exercise freely their fundamental human rights. It is time we worked together to deliver that destiny into the hands of men and women everywhere.

Our challenge is to strengthen the foundations of freedom--encourage its advance, and face our most urgent challenges. The global challenges of the Twenty-First Century are: Economic health, environmental well-being, and the great questions of war and peace.

First is global economic growth. During this decade, a number of developing nations have moved into the ranks of the world's most advanced economies--all of them--each and every one--powered by the engine of free enterprise. In the decade ahead, others can join their ranks. But for many nations barriers stand in the way. In the case of some countries, these are obstacles of their own making: Unneeded restrictions and regulations that act as dead weights on their own economies and obstacles to foreign trade. But other barriers to growth exist, and those too require effective action. Too many developing countries struggle today under a burden of debt that makes growth all but impossible. The nations of the world deserve a better opportunity to achieve a measure of control over their own economic fate and build better lives for their own people.

The approach the United States has put forward--the Brady Plan--will help these nations reduce that debt and at the same time encourage the free market reforms that will fuel growth. In just two days I will be speaking to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. I'll discuss there in more detail steps our nations can take in dealing with the debt problem. But I can say now: the new world of freedom is not a world where a few nations live in comfort, while others live in want.

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The power of commerce is a force for progress. Open markets are the key to continued growth in the developing world. Today, the United States buys over one half of the manufactured exports that all the developing nations combined sell to the industrialized world. It's time for the other advanced economies to follow suit--to create expanded opportunities for trade. I believe we'll learn in the century ahead that many nations of the world have barely begun to tap their true potential for development. The free market and its fruits are not the special preserve of a few. They are a harvest everyone can share.

Beyond the challenge of global growth lies another issue of global magnitude: the environment. No line drawn on a map can stop the advance of pollution. Threats to our environment have become an international problem. We must develop an international approach to urgent environmental issues, one that seeks common solutions to common problems. The United Nations is already at work on the question of global warming and on efforts to prevent oil spills and other disasters from fouling our seas and the air we breathe. And I will tell you now: The United States will do its part. We've committed ourselves to the worldwide phase-out of all chlorofluorocarbons by the year 2000. We've proposed amending our clean air act to ensure clean air for our citizens within a single generation. We've banned the import of ivory to protect the elephant and rhinoceros from the human predators who exterminate them for profit. And we have begun to explore ways to work with other nations--with the major industrialized democracies, in Poland and in Hungary--to make common cause for the sake of our environment. The environment belongs to all of us. In our new world of freedom, the world's citizens must enjoy this common trust for generations to come.

Global economic growth and the stewardship of our planet both are critical issues. But as always, questions of war and peace must be paramount to the United Nations. We must move forward to limit--and eliminate--weapons of mass destruction. Five years ago, at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, I presented a U.S. draft treaty outlawing chemical weapons. Since then, progress has been made, but time is running out. The threat is growing. More than 20 nations now possess chemical weapons or the capability to produce them. And these horrible weapons are now finding their way into regional conflicts. This is unacceptable. For the sake of mankind, we must halt and reverse this threat. Today, I want to announce steps the United States is ready to take--steps to rid the world of these truly terrible weapons--towards a treaty that will ban, eliminate, all chemical weapons from the earth ten years from the day it is signed.

This initiative contains three major elements:

First, in the first eight years of a chemical weapons treaty, the United States is ready to destroy nearly all--98 percent--of our chemical weapons--stockpile--provided the Soviet Union joins the ban. I think they will.

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Second, we are ready to destroy all of our chemical weapons--100 percent, every one--within ten years, once all nations capable of building chemical weapons sign the total ban treaty.

And third, the United States is ready to begin now. We'll eliminate more than 80 percent of our stockpile--even as we work to complete a treaty--if the Soviet Union joins us in cutting chemical weapons to an equal level, and we agree on the conditions--including inspections--under which stockpiles are destroyed.

We know that monitoring a total ban on chemical weapons will be a challenge. But the knowledge we've gained from our recent arms control experience--our accelerating research in this area--makes me believe we can achieve the level of verification that gives us confidence to go forward with the ban. The world has lived too long in the shadow of chemical warfare. Let us act together--beginning today--to rid the earth of this scourge.

We are serious about achieving conventional arms reductions as well. That's why we tabled new proposals just last Thursday at the conventional forces in Europe negotiations in Vienna, proposals that demonstrate our commitment to act rapidly to ease military tensions in Europe and move the nations of that continent one step closer to their common destiny: A Europe whole and free.

The United States is convinced that open and innovative measures can move disarmament forward--and also ease international tensions. That is the idea behind the Open Skies proposal about which the Soviets have now expressed a positive attitude. It is the idea behind the Open Lands proposal--permitting, for the first time ever, free travel for all Soviet and American diplomats throughout each other's countries. Openness is the enemy of mistrust, and every step towards a more open world is a step towards the new world we seek.

And let me make this comment on our meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze over the past few days. I am very pleased by the progress we made. The Soviet Union removed a number of obstacles to progress on conventional and strategic arms reductions. We reached agreements in principle on issues from verification to nuclear testing. And, of course, we agreed to a summit in the spring or early summer of 1990.

Each of these achievements is important in its own right, but they are more important still as signs of a new attitude that prevails between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Serious differences remain, but the willingness to deal constructively and candidly with those differences is news that we--and indeed the world--must welcome.

We have not entered an era of perpetual peace. The threats to peace that nations face may today be changing, but they have not vanished. In fact, in a number of regions around the world a dangerous combination is now emerging: regimes armed with old and unappeasable animosities--and modern weapons of mass destruction. This development will raise the stakes whenever war breaks out. Regional conflict may well threaten world peace as never before.

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Lincoln and his generals meeting near the end of a war that remains the bloodiest in American History. Outside, at that moment, a battle rages. And yet what we see in the distance is a rainbow--a symbol of hope, of the passing of the storm. That painting is called the peacemakers. For me, it is a constant reminder that our struggle--the struggle for peace--is a struggle blessed by hope.

I do remember sitting in this hall. I remember the mutual respect among all of us proudly serving as representatives. I remember the almost endless speeches, Security Council sessions, the receptions and receiving lines, the formal meetings of this Assembly, and the informal discussions in the Delegates' Lounge. And I remember something more, something beyond the frantic pace and sometimes frustrating experiences of daily life here: the heartbeat of the United Nations--the quiet conviction that we could make the world more peaceful, more free.

What we sought then, now lies within our reach. I ask each of you here in this hall: Can we not bring a unity of purpose to the United Nations? Can we not make this new world of freedom the common destiny we seek? I believe we can. I know we must. My solemn wish today is that here--among the United Nations--that spirit will take hold, and that all men and all nations will make freedom's moment their own.

Thank you, God bless you, and may God bless the work of the United Nations.

יחידות: בחול לבוקר

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון
טופס פרוק

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ארה"ב

כאח: ק. לקונגרס

סכאט: קיצוץ בחוקי ההקצבות

אתמול היגיעו הממשל והסכאט להסכם על קיצוץ בגובה של 0.43% ACROSS THE BOARD מכל חוקי ההקצבות כדי לממן את תכנית הסמים של הנשיא בוש.

אם ההסכם יאושר סופית, "ישוחררו" להצבעה חוקי ההקצבות בסכאט שהטיפול בהם הסתיים. הדיון בחוק סיוע חוק, לרכות הגשת תיקונים שונים (שאינן להם קשר עם ישראל), הסתיים בסוף השבוע שעבר אך לא הוצע לאור ההחלטה לעבד ההצבעות עד להשגת הסכם למימון חוק הסמים.

סה"כ עלות הקיצוץ, לפי ההסכם שהושג, תסתכם ב-800 מיליון \$ אשר תעמיד סך תקציב תכנית הסמים של הנשיא על 8.8 מיליון \$.

עלות הקיצוץ לישראל תסתכם בכ-15 מיליון \$.

ישראל ורנא' מנצח.

יהודית ורנא' דרנגר.

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תפוצה: 36



**המשלחת חקבועה
של ישראל לאומות המאוחדות**

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אמש (25/9) היתה ארוחת הערב מטעם הנשיא בוש - במטרופוליטן מוזיאום, בחדר מיוחד - הוסדרו לפי בקשת הנשיא בוש, פגישות ושיתות של הנשיא עם ארבעה שרי חוץ בלבד, כל אחד בנפרד: הונגריה, ישראל, פולין ויוגוסלביה.

קודם לארוחה היתה הבלת פנים שנוצלה למספר ניכר של פגישות נוסף על אלה שהוסדרו מראש. שה"ח ארנס פגש בין השאר את האישים הבאים :

1) סגן מזכ"ל האו"ם לעניני העצרת, ספירדס, איש מחמ"ד שנבנס לתפקידו לפני
בחדש.

סגן המזכ"ל מרה גולדינג הממונה על כוחות האו"ם בעולם. השיחה נסבה על נושא דרום לבנון. גולדינג אמר כי יבוא לארץ בינואר לקראת חידוש מנדט יוניפי"ל, ויתכן שהודם לכו אם תהיה התפתחות חיובית בלבנון. ירצה אז לבוא ולדון עם שר הבטחון.

(3) סגן המזכ"ל לאיסוף ומידע א'רימט הונגה.

(4) מנהל כושבת המזכ"ל ויאנדרה דיאל.

(5) פליישהאוז - היועץ המשפטי לאו"ם.

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6) שה"ח של ניגריה - שה"ח ארנס בירכו על בחירת שגריר ניגריה ג'ו' גארבה לנשיא העצרת, ואיחל לו הצלחה. שה"ח ניגריה אמר כי מצב היחסים בינינו נמצא בדיון הסביר הבעיות של ה"קואליציה" בניגריה בין מוסלמים לנוצרים והמדינות השונות. רוח השיחה היתה ידידותית ונמשכה כ-10 דקות.

7) שה"ח קנדה ג'ון הלרה - שענימו תהיה השיחה הרשמית היום (26/9).

8) שה"ח בולגריה (משמש עד חוזה 18 שנה) אמר שהקשרים בינינו מתפתחים יפה. יש נציגויות מסחריות ורעיות רוח"מ - הגב' שולמית שמיר - ביהרה פעמיים. שה"ח ארנס הזכיר כי היה בבולגריה ב-1962 בקונגרס אוירונאוטיקה.

9) שה"ח יפן - נקיאמה עימו ייפגש הער רשמית היום אחה"צ.

10) שגריר מאוריציוס שסיפר על ארצו, על הקשרים עם גולים מישראל בעבר וזכרונותיו מאז.

11) שגריר מינמר (בורמה) המבקש לפתח הקשרים עתה עם פתיחת המדינה ושנינו מדיניותה. (ביקרנו לפני כשבועיים רשמית בנציגות) ידע וסיפר על קשרינו ההדוקים בעבר, סיוענו המשג"י כולל הקמת צי סוחר בעזרת צי"ם.

12) שארה"ב - תום פיקרינג.

13) סגן מזכיר המדינה לארגונים בי"ל - בולטון.

מרב"ל 2 בלבד
אנא העבירו הקטעים הרלוונטיים למחלקות המתאימות.

BB

נאו"ם.

אישור:

שם השולח: יוחנן ביי

תאריך: 26.9.89



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09/21/89

KELLY TESTIFIES AT HOUSE PANEL ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS (Transcript of HFAC meeting 9/19)

Washington -- Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly testified before the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee September 19. Following is an unofficial transcript of the question and answers at the meeting which was chaired by Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana):

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

REP. HAMILTON: The meeting of the subcommittee will come to order. The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets today in open session to review policy issues and developments in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf. The Subcommittee last met in open session to discuss Middle East policy issues on July 12th, 1989. Since that time, there have been several developments, of course, in the region.

The Subcommittee will want to discuss a wide range of issues with our witness today, including developments regarding American hostages in Lebanon, the status of diplomatic efforts to further the proposal for elections in the West Bank and Gaza, the situation in Lebanon, and the latest Arab League effort to achieve cease-fire in Lebanon, and an assessment of the new Rafsanjani government in Iran.

We're pleased to have with us today Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, John H. Kelly, to discuss these and other important issues. Secretary Kelly, your prepared statement, of course, is available to members. It'll be entered into the record in full. I ask you to summarize that statement briefly, before we turn to questions. We welcome you before the Committee and we look forward to your testimony.

You may proceed, sir.

MR. KELLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee again today and discuss developments in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Mr. Chairman, I first wish to deal with our efforts to advance towards a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are some hopeful signs. On the one hand, the cycle of violence continues unabated: The human cost is high; Palestinians and Israelis continue



United States Information Service
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to fall victim to violence.

Our policy on the peace process has not changed. The peace we seek should be comprehensive, including all parties to the conflict. It should come about through direct negotiations. The negotiations should be based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and should involve territory for peace, security and recognition for Israel, and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.

The Israeli government took an important step toward the achievement of these goals through its peace initiative of May 14th. We endorsed this initiative and have continued to work to see that initiative realized.

Since my last appearance, Mr. Chairman, I visited Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. The bulk of my discussions focused on the peace process. I came away convinced that the leaders of those three countries are committed to peace and anxious to move forward if mutually acceptable mechanisms can be found. President Mubarak has been particularly helpful and energetic in seeking ways to advance the process.

In July, he advanced a ten point proposal which might provide a bridge for the Israelis and the Palestinians. It is important to remember that the Egyptian ten points are not an alternative to the government of Israeli's May proposal, but rather, represent Egypt's acceptance of the elections concept and Egyptians' views on how to get the elections -- how to get to elections and make them work. We believe the Egyptian points constitute a constructive and valuable addition to ongoing diplomatic efforts. Yesterday, Israeli Defense Minister Rabin was in Cairo for further discussions on how to bridge differences and get a dialogue started.

In my meetings with Palestinians in Jerusalem and in the U.S. dialogue with the PLO in Tunis, we have stressed the need for a constructive response to the Israeli proposal. At the same time, we have continued to stress to the PLO that we will not accept efforts to have the so-called "state of Palestine" admitted to international organizations. The administration shares the strongly-held views of Congress on this issue. So far, we have registered success in our efforts in the World Health Organization and the World Tourism Organization.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we are continuing our exchanges with the Soviets on the Middle East. Yesterday, Dennis Ross, the Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, and I met with the Soviets, and we will meet again with them this afternoon. We continue to stress the advantages of the government of Israel's elections proposal.

Turning to Lebanon, Mr. Chairman, I want to explain our decision to temporarily withdraw our embassy personnel from Beirut. The action was taken because we concluded that the mission could no longer conduct its work, and there was a significantly increased risk to our American staff. We intend to return our staff as soon as we're convinced that circumstances exist in which our presence can be reasonably safe and effective. The decision to temporarily withdraw did not represent a change in policy. It was not an abandonment of Lebanon. We are deeply committed, as a nation, to helping Lebanon through its time of trouble.

We warmly welcome the decision of the Arab League higher committee on Lebanon to reengage. On Saturday, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud announced a seven-point peace plan on Lebanon. It consists of a cease-fire, a lifting of all blockades, and a meeting of the parliament to discuss national reconciliation. It asks Lebanese

to pledge not to acquire weapons and ammunition, and asks others to pledge not to ship any to Lebanon.

We believe the Arab League's plan provides a constructive basis upon which all parties to the conflict in Lebanon can engage in a political process and find a way out of violence. We call upon all parties to stop the fighting, to lift the blockades, and to allow the political process of reconciliation to begin.

Mr. Chairman, the last subject I'll address is the continuing plight of the eight American citizens who remain hostage in Lebanon, and the separate but related question of our relationship with Iran. We continue to remind ourselves of three basic realities. First, the hostage issue involves the deliberate, cold-blooded and calculated abuse of innocent people. Second, the Iranian government gives critical financial, political and moral support to the groups which are responsible for this. Third, spokesmen for the Iranian government deny that Iran has any responsibility for the situation and condemn hostage-taking; in the next breath, without any apparent sense of shame or logical contradiction, they add that Iran will use its influence over the hostage-holders only if the US meets various conditions.

We've been mobilizing every resource to drive home a clear message to the Iranian leadership. The essence of our message is not secret. We expect the government of Iran to act to obtain the release of the hostages. Its failure to do so is a fundamental obstacle to the normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations. Our objective is to help convince the Iranian government that it is in its own best interest to act to end this practice of international terrorism.

We have no quarrel with the system of government of the Islamic Republic. That's a matter for the Iranian people to decide. We believe that a more normal relationship between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran based on mutual respect would be desirable, and we don't believe Iran should be anybody's strategic preserve. Our interests would be well-served by a strong, prosperous and non-aligned Iran. We'd like to see Iran make a contribution to stability in the Gulf instead of threatening its neighbors. We are ready to play a part in the reconstruction of the Iranian economy if Iran wants this. But none of this will be possible until the Iranian leadership turns its back once and for all on the practice of international terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my summarization of the full text of the statement. Thank you very much for this opportunity.

REP. HAMILTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I know we have a number of questions. Let's begin with the peace process. We'll proceed, of course, under the five-minute rule.

We've had a lot of activity, of course, on the search for peace in the Middle East. Your general impression is that some progress is being made?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, there is definite movement and increased contact over what there was when I last appeared before your committee in July.

REP. HAMILTON: Would you say there's been progress on the elections proposal?

MR. KELLY: Well, in that we believe that the contacts to focus on the elections proposal, the Egyptian ten-point plan which may provide a bridge to realization of the elections proposal, and a concentration of efforts is a move in the right direction, yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we support the Egyptian ten-point initiative?

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir. We have welcomed --

REP. HAMILTON: Do we support all ten points?

MR. KELLY: We have not endorsed each and every one of the ten points. What we have said is that the proposal could provide a bridge between the sides and thus we see it as a constructive contribution to the discussion.

REP. HAMILTON: What are the views of the Israelis toward the Egyptian conference initiative?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, it's clear from the public record that there is a division within the government of Israel. The Defense Minister who visited Cairo yesterday spoke publicly both in Cairo and on his return to Israel about the differing views of the merits of the Egyptian ten-point plan.

REP. HAMILTON: Labor favors it and Likud opposes it. Is that fair?

MR. KELLY: That -- grosso modo, that tends to be the division.

REP. HAMILTON: What is the PLO reaction to the Egyptian initiative?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, as is often the case, the PLO reaction has been unclear. I saw two wire service stories out of Tunis last week, one of which said PLO spokesman rejects Egyptian ten-point proposal and the other one which said a different PLO spokesman indicated that the Egyptian proposal could provide a basis on which to proceed.

REP. HAMILTON: So you don't know what the PLO position is?

MR. KELLY: We're hearing differing voices. We are returning Ambassador Pelletreau --

REP. HAMILTON: When does Pelletreau next meet with the PLO?

MR. KELLY: Sir, he has been here in the United States for a short period with his family. He left last night for Tunis and should be meeting in the very near future.

In his absence, our charge has been meeting with them.

REP. HAMILTON: In a formal meeting or informal?

MR. KELLY: In informal meeting.

REP. HAMILTON: And what does the PLO tell Pelletreau about the election proposal that the Prime Minister has put forward?

MR. KELLY: Some PLO representatives have asked a series of questions about modalities, as to how the elections would be organized, conditions under which they would be held and the possibilities of getting the sides together. They haven't taken a definitive position, but they have asked reasonable questions about how it might be arranged.

REP. HAMILTON: They do not reject it, is that correct?

MR. KELLY: I beg your pardon, sir?

REP. HAMILTON: The PLO has not rejected the plan?

MR. KELLY: No, sir, the last word --

REP. HAMILTON: They haven't approved the plan either.

MR. KELLY: That is correct, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Now why can't we get a formal PLO position? What's the problem?

MR. KELLY: I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the PLO, in posing questions to us and in contacts with Arabs about the plan -- for instance, Arafat visited Cairo three times in the last 15 days or so to talk to the Egyptians about it -- I think they're trying to evaluate its merits and consider their tactics.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you think the PLO has given the Egyptians a position on the election proposal?

MR. KELLY: I don't believe they've given them a definitive

position, no, sir. I think they have given them opinions.

REP. HAMILTON: You've been discussing with the Israelis the matter of some Palestinians from outside the West Bank and Gaza, perhaps even Palestinian-Americans, joining a delegation of Palestinians and working on the modalities of an election with the Israelis. What is the position of the Israeli government on that effort?

MR. KELLY: My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that there are differing views on the merits of those suggestions among the different members of the government of Israel.

REP. HAMILTON: Labor supports it, and Likud opposes it? Is that a fair summary?

MR. KELLY: I believe, as a broad proposition, that's right.

REP. HAMILTON: Is there an openness in Israel to examining the matter further?

MR. KELLY: There is intensive discussion in Israel to talking about the merits of these ideas.

REP. HAMILTON: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We'll come back, of course, for a second round of questioning. Mr. Lantos?

REP. LANTOS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's nice to see you, Mr. Kelly.

MR. KELLY: Thank you, sir.

REP. LANTOS: Mr. Kelly, I have a number of quick questions. Allow me to recite them and hopefully get some short answers.

We have reports that Saudi Arabia executed 36 Kuwaiti citizens; like to know what the circumstances were and what the Kuwaiti reaction to this has been.

Secondly, we have seen Syrian brutality in full swing in the shelling of the Christian civilian population of Beirut, reminiscent of the bloodbath the Syrians created in their own city of Hama some years ago. What specifically has been our reaction to this brutal massacre of innocent civilians by the Syrian military?

Thirdly, I'm wondering what the administration position is, should Arafat apply for a visa. There have been a lot of intransigent remarks by his segment of the PLO -- Fatah lately calling the establishment of Israel a mistake, calling for continued armed struggle. Are we going to reward this attitude of inflammatory statements with the issuance of a visa?

Finally, we have not yet had, or at least, I haven't seen a statement by the Bush administration with respect to the establishment of a PLO state in the West Bank and Gaza. Under the Reagan administration, both Secretary Haig and subsequently Secretary Shultz on numerous occasions made clear and unequivocal statements indicating our opposition to this. Is the Bush administration policy the same?

MR. KELLY: Thank you, sir. Sir, your first question referred to, if I understood correctly, the executions of 36 Kuwaitis by the Saudi Arabians?

REP. LANTOS: Yes.

MR. KELLY: May I ask, is that a report in this morning? I'm unfamiliar with the report.

REP. LANTOS: I will supply you the report, and maybe you can submit the answer.

MR. KELLY: I'd be happy to.

REP. LANTOS: It was some time ago, Mr. Secretary. It was a couple of weeks ago. And the indications I have is that these related to the Haj to Mecca.

MR. KELLY: Sir, I've heard reports that there may be a death

sentence against those involved in the bombing during the Haj in Mecca. To my knowledge, but I will double-check this and we'll supply it for the record, there have been no executions carried out. But I will check it and we'll supply that for the record.

REP. LANTOS: Please.

MR. KELLY: Secondly, sir, you asked what is the American reaction to the brutal Syrian shelling of Beirut. The American government on a number of occasions has publicly deplored the Syrian shelling, has described it as unnecessary, has drawn particular attention to the use of large caliber weapons such as 240 millimeter mortars, siege guns, and urged upon all parties an end to the shelling. But we have, sir, identified Syria as -- on a number of occasions -- as the party responsible for initiating another round of the fighting.

REP. LANTOS: What is the last set of statistics on this? How many people did Syria kill as a result of its indiscriminate shelling?

MR. KELLY: Sir, I can supply the detailed figures for the record. The amount of dead on both sides since this fierce round began last March is in the neighborhood of 800. My recollection is there is a rough balance of deaths on both sides, and the number of injured runs into the thousands. So this has been another terrible chapter in a series of terrible chapters in Lebanon's history. And this is why we have been supporting efforts to establish a ceasefire and get out of this inhumane cycle of slaughter of civilians.

REP. LANTOS: It seems to the observer, Mr. Secretary, that we try to maintain an absurdly even-handed position between the Christian forces, which are besieged and surrounded, and the Syrian attackers. Is that accurate?

MR. KELLY: No, it is not, sir, in that we identified, as I said, on a number of occasions, Syrian responsibility for initiation of the shelling or continuation of the shelling. So we have been attempting to describe responsibilities as they occur.

You raised, Congressman, the issue of a visa --

REP. LANTOS: Yes.

MR. KELLY: -- for Mr. Arafat. He has not applied for such a visa.

REP. LANTOS: Assuming he does.

MR. KELLY: The administration has taken the position that until -- if and when Arafat applies for a visa, we are not going to adjudicate the question. So the administration at this juncture has neither taken a decision nor -- to issue -- nor to refuse. And it will make that decision when and if Arafat applies.

REP. LANTOS: Well, Mr. Secretary, that answer is not credible. I simply do not believe that the administration doesn't have a position on the assumption that Arafat does apply for a visa. I simply do not believe that that will be a new issue and you will sit down and then debate it. I think that debate has taken place and I believe there is a position. And we would like to ask you to share it with us.

MR. KELLY: With my most profound respect, sir, we have not made a decision --

REP. LANTOS: What will be your recommendation to Secretary Baker?

MR. KELLY: Sir, I will have to hold that in confidence. It will be something that I will evaluate with my staff and I will make it to the Secretary in privacy.

REP. LANTOS: On the Kuwaiti executions, the information we have

is that the 36 Kuwaiti citizens were executed on August the 19th. I will send down the information to you. These were Kuwaiti pilgrims which the Saudis -- whom the Saudis executed. I'd be grateful to get confirmation of this. Thank you, Mr. Secretary --

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir.

REP. LANTOS: -- and Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Mrs. Meyers.

REP. JAN MEYERS (R-KAN): Glad to have you here, Mr. Kelly. What is your view of the Arab League initiative announced over the weekend? I believe you addressed it in your testimony and will you elaborate on that?

MR. KELLY: I'd be happy to. On Saturday, the Arab League Committee of Three, speaking through the Saudi Foreign Minister as its spokesman, announced a seven-point peace plan for Lebanon, which includes as a first step a ceasefire, the formation of a security committee, a lifting of the blockades on all areas -- that would mean a reopening of the seaports and the airport -- and convening of the Lebanese parliament on September 30th to discuss political reconciliation. Since that announcement on Saturday, various of the Lebanese politicians have been discussing or taking positions on the Arab League peace plan, and there is a serious debate within Lebanon over the merits of the plan. The cease-fire has not yet taken effect.

The Arab League representative, Mr. Ibrahimi, arrived in Beirut yesterday, has been meeting with General Aoun, the Christian leader, and with leaders of the Muslim community, talking about announcement of the cease-fire. The Patriarch of Maronite Catholic Church in his Sunday sermon announced support for the Arab League efforts and praised them for their efforts.

So the final word -- the final response is not yet in from the different personalities in Lebanon. We -- and, I believe, the rest of the outside world -- have publicly supported this effort to bring about a ceasefire, a lifting of the blockade, and a beginning of the political reconciliation process.

REP. MEYERS: Would you say then that you think the chances of a ceasefire are good? You said the head of the Maronite Catholic Church supports it, the Moslems support it, the rest of the world supports it -- the peace plan -- so do you think the chances of a cease-fire soon are good?

MR. KELLY: Madam Congresswoman, 15 years of other cease-fires which have failed have to make one very wary of being optimistic. I do believe that this call stands a better chance than any effort that has been made in the last year or so.

REP. MEYERS: If there isn't a cease-fire soon, do you expect a major offensive by the Syrians?

MR. KELLY: I would certainly hope not. We would oppose such, and would call on everyone else to oppose that. This is not a time for anybody, especially the Syrians, to be undertaking a major offensive. And we would certainly oppose that very vigorously.

REP. MEYERS: It seems as if our position in Lebanon has been to support the efforts of other countries. Why do we not have a more specific policy of our own? And have we gotten to the point where our influence is so low, and our ability to act so small, that all we can do is piggyback on other initiatives? Could you elaborate on that?

MR. KELLY: I'll be happy to.

The administration elected to support the efforts of the Arab League because we believed that the Committee of Three -- Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Morocco -- were in a good position to bring

influence to bear on the parties to the conflict. They have longstanding ties with all of the parties that are involved. They demonstrated in July a public evenhandedness by identifying Syria as the recalcitrant party which had been blocking progress in efforts to find a solution for Lebanon.

And so they had both credibility with the players on the ground and a certain authority for their openness and frankness in identifying Syria as the problem. So we supported the Arab League effort because we thought that it had the most reasonable prospect to have some success.

REP. MEYERS: What role do you see for us in the coming months?

MR. KELLY: Well, part of that will depend on how events play out. If the cease-fire is adopted, if the blockades are lifted, if the Lebanese Parliament meets on September 30, as proposed in this peace plan, obviously you'll have an improvement for the better in the circumstances in Lebanon. We want very much to get our embassy back into Beirut to resume direct contacts with the parties. We pass messages through others to and from them now. But obviously, we'll be vigorously supporting this reconciliation process.

I might add that our relief efforts have not been suspended even though we withdrew the embassy. The food assistance from the United States government is continuing, and we plan to continue those humanitarian efforts.

REP. MEYERS: How many people remain in Beirut?

MR. KELLY: We removed all of our American government personnel

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REP. MEYERS: No, I mean of the Lebanese. A program on National Public Radio that I heard said that Beirut was a city of a million and a half, and that only about 10 percent of them remained in the city, that people had fled everywhere else in Lebanon. Some had even gone south to the area that's occupied by Israel. That represents to me just a tragedy of major proportions, and I'm wondering how we are being able to distribute food aid. And is that picture of Beirut accurate?

MR. KELLY: No one has counted. Because the conditions are so chaotic, no one can do that. But it's clear there's been a vast evacuation of the city of Beirut by the civilian population because of six months of terrible shelling, and everyone -- or almost everyone who had the means to get out has gone somewhere else, either south to the Israeli-controlled zone, or to mountain areas away from the fighting, or outside of Lebanon to Syria or Cyprus, or what have you. So it's clear there has been a tremendous reduction of the number of people in the city itself.

We are continuing our relief efforts through the Save the Children Foundation primarily, a private voluntary organization, through church philanthropic organizations, both Christian and Muslim, and the food distribution is being undertaken throughout the country. So that if you will, as people have moved out of the city of Beirut, we have reduced the distribution in the city and augmented the distribution in areas where people have taken refuge.

REP. MEYERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Smith.

REP. LAWRENCE SMITH (D-FLA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, on September 11th, a rocket was launched from Jordan into Israel proper. The rocket exploded near the Israel towns of Shar Golan near Lake Tiberius. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the attack. Just recently at the

PLO conference, the conference issued a statement including, in quote -- basically paraphrasing that the "crime of 1948 was in the establishment of Israel." Now, Mr. Ambassador, is the PFLP aligned with Yasser Arafat's moderate wing of the PLO or does it oppose Arafat?

MR. KELLY: It's a constituent part of the PLO and sits on the executive committee. Habash, the leader of the PFLP, has often opposed Arafat over the years.

REP. SMITH: Well, where does the PFLP fit into the PLO's organizational structure? As one of the executive committee members, correct?

MR. KELLY: That's correct.

REP. SMITH: And Arafat has, as far as we know, not yet rejected the PFLP or carried on any kind of attempt to have them removed from the executive committee, correct?

MR. KELLY: That is correct, sir.

REP. SMITH: Would you tell me whether any of the PLO members who have met with Ambassador Pelletreau in Tunis are members of the PFLP?

MR. KELLY: Sir, I'd have to check that for the record. I don't have the information in my head. I'll be happy to supply it --

REP. SMITH: Let me assure you that the answer is yes. Now, would you define the act of launching a rocket from one sovereign nation into the territory of another with a civilian target as the object of the attack, as a terrorist attack as was in this case with the PFLP rocket attack for which they claim credit? Would you define that as a terrorist attack?

MR. KELLY: Yes, I would call that a terroristic act. Yes.

REP. SMITH: As part of the agreement to begin a dialogue with the PLO, the United States demanded, did they not, that the PLO renounce terrorism and speak out forcefully against acts of terror when they occur? Is that correct?

MR. KELLY: It is, indeed, sir.

REP. SMITH: What was Arafat's response to the PFLP terrorist attack, and was it consistent with the US-PLO agreement?

MR. KELLY: We don't talk to Arafat himself. We've raised the attack with PLO representatives in Tunis and told them that this was unacceptable, that it should be condemned, that they should disassociate themselves from it.

REP. SMITH: Mr. Kelly, what was Mr. Arafat's public response to the PFLP terrorist attack for which they claimed credit, as a constituent group on the executive committee of the PLO with which we are meeting in Tunis?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, I am not aware of a public response.

REP. SMITH: Therefore, and as far as you can testify, he did not renounce this attack which you, yourself have just indicated was a terrorist attack, correct?

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir.

REP. SMITH: Mr. Kelly, we've discussed this matter before. We have now been in discussions both formal and informal for the last 10 months with the PLO. Some of us, Mr. Kelly, are getting very tired of plowing old ground, but unfortunately we have no choice because old ground is the only ground where we can in fact establish our point. There is no new ground, nothing has changed. When are we going to reject the PLO's consistent involvement in terrorism and draw a line in the sand? We have an agreement with the PLO. They have breached that agreement innumerable times, have made public statements from Mr. Arafat's mouth and from the mouth of the recognized spokesman for the

PLO, that are all in violation of the basic tenets of the agreement with which we entered into the negotiations -- or discussions. When is the United States going to stop, turn around and say, "Either get off this and stop it, or we will stop negotiating." How many more terrorist attacks must people suffer from constituent groups of the PLO? How many more claims that Israel and its establishment is a crime. How many more remarks by other PLO recognized officials in connection with and in concert with Arafat, not opposed to Arafat, must claim that "We will in a two-step process first move into Israel and then destroy it"? How many more, Mr. Kelly, before we decide that we're dealing with people have never changed? How many quotes must we have? How many terrorist attacks must there be? How many times must they reject the basic agreements that we made publicly and through terrorist activity? We want an answer. I want an answer. Is there some point at which we will say, "Stop, we've had enough"? Or are we just going to go blithely on forever? And I'm very serious about this. Did you read Mr. Will's Op-Ed piece this past weekend?

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir.

REP. SMITH: I think he was right on point. I don't agree with him all the time, but on this one he was absolutely on point. And I'll tell you, Mr. Kelly, patience of a lot of members of this place are wearing very thin.

Let me ask you one other thing. There is a significant statement that you've made in your opening printed remarks and Mr. Lantos took it up with you. And that was the fact that in the Reagan administration's two secretaries of state there was a position on the state of Palestine. You call this the "so-called state of Palestine" and we oppose any move by the "so-called state of Palestine" to obtain status as a member or any other status in these international organizations. And I applaud you for that.

But you also talk about the "legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people." Can you define for me what the State Department means when it says, "legitimate political rights" if you have not yet taken the statement as the Reagan administration's two secretaries of state did with reference to statehood?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, we have discussed the issue of Palestine -- Palestinian political rights and I think the most definitive response to that was by a former Secretary of State, George Shultz last year when he was questioned about this -- if my memory is correct -- in Jerusalem. And he at that press conference -- we can supply the text for the record, but let me do my best at a recollection of it -- said that for those living in the Occupied Territories, there were the issues, as there are for all human beings, of enough to eat, shelter, meeting basic human needs, but going beyond that --

REP. SMITH: And we all agree on that.

MR. KELLY: Yes, indeed, sir. Going on beyond that, there are also the questions of how they organize themselves politically, how they would be represented, et cetera. And the reason that George Schultz, I believe, raised the matter in that sense was to talk about the political aspirations of the people and meeting some of those political aspirations but falling short of what the PLO has called for, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

REP. LAWRENCE SMITH: So, as far as we're concerned right now, the "State," quote, so-called State of Palestine concept, is not a legitimate political right. Correct?

MR. KELLY: That's right.

REP. LAWRENCE SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.

Kelly.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Gilman.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to welcome Secretary Kelly before our Committee, and we appreciate his updating us on his latest meetings in the Middle East.

Mr. Kelly, can you tell us what the latest is on the hostage negotiations or discussions, and is there any light on the horizon? Have you brought back any good news or any bad news? Can you tell us where we stand?

MR. KELLY: Since the revelation of the cruel execution of Colonel Higgins --

REP. GILMAN: Before you -- permit me to interrupt just a moment. Did we decide once and for all that Colonel Higgins has been executed prior to the Israeli intervention, or after? Have we made a decision on that?

MR. KELLY: I don't believe that there is definitive evidence either way, so I don't think the terrorism experts have made a definitive decision either way.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you.

MR. KELLY: We've been in touch, sir, with the Iranian government, which plays such a critical role on the hostage issue, through intermediaries and through public statements, to convey to them the message that we hold them responsible for the continued captivity of the hostages, and to convey to them the message that there will be no normalization of relations with the United States nor any, if you will, readmittance of Iran to the community of civilized nations as long as they do not use their influence to obtain the release of the hostages.

The Iranian government has taken contradictory public positions on the hostage issue, saying at -- in one breath -- that Iran has no responsibility and nothing to do with the American hostages or the other foreign hostages in Lebanon, and in the next breath, virtually the next sentence, saying that Iran will not use its influence with the hostage-holders until the United States meets various conditions. So --

REP. GILMAN: What conditions are they asking for?

MR. KELLY: Well, there are different things mentioned in public from time to time. Sometimes they talk about settlement of the compensation for the Iran Air disaster. The President has an offer -- the administration has an offer for compensation for the victims of the Iran Air disaster on the table. Sometimes the Iranians talk about the return or the release of military equipment which was sequestered by the Carter administration at the time of the hostage takeover in 1979. So with different people at different times, you hear different conditions. Sometimes there are demands that the United States disassociate itself from the state of Israel, or bring about or compel Israel to take certain actions. So there is a mixed and sometimes contradictory series of responses from Iranian spokesmen.

REP. GILMAN: Have we been closely coordinating with the Israel government on the hostage situation?

MR. KELLY: We have frequent contact with them on the subject. We do have two different policies, as became clear in late July, sir. The Israelis, as a conscious matter or policy, will exchange prisoners for hostages. We will not.

REP. GILMAN: With regard to the President's offer with regard to the Iranian passenger plane, have the Iranians turned that down formally?

MR. KELLY: In a formal sense, I believe not. They have made public statements about rejecting it as being inadequate, and advising other countries to have nothing to do with it. I don't take that as a formal official governmental position.

REP. GILMAN: What about Syria's role in this? Is it true that Syria has not been very helpful to date in our discussions on the hostages?

MR. KELLY: Syria's role has been mixed. At the time that the American journalist, Charles Glass, was kidnapped in Lebanon, Syria was helpful. When the death threat was issued against the American hostage Joseph Cicippio in late July, according to our information, Syria was helpful in attempting to convey the message to the hostage-holders that there should be no execution of Cicippio, and that he should be spared. On other occasions, Syrian activity has been less than what we wanted from them. So their record has been mixed, Congressman.

REP. GILMAN: So we really don't have any encouraging news at this point, with regard to the hostage situation?

MR. KELLY: Sad to say, there is no good news to report.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Secretary, there has been some rumors that we're about to recognize South Yemen once again, and reopen our diplomatic -- resume our diplomatic relations with South Yemen. Is there any basis to that? What's happening with regard to South Yemen?

MR. KELLY: The President of South Yemen surprised us a few weeks ago by announcing publicly that there was going to be a reestablishment of contacts and relations, and the administration has that question under active consideration now, sir.

REP. GILMAN: I've just been handed a copy of the Wall Street Journal article of August 21st that says, "The United States needs to put coordinated pressure on Syria as part of the hostage strategy," to go back to my hostage question. And it says, "The United States has been asking Damascus for help, but the results have been disappointment. We're just a little bit exasperated," said a senior US official. "They aren't doing all they could do." Is that a fairly accurate statement?

MR. KELLY: We've been frustrated, as I said in response to your earlier question because their record has been mixed. We believe they were helpful in helping to save the life of Joseph Cicippio. They haven't been as responsive on other requests as we would want them to be.

REP. GILMAN: Now, if the Chairman bears with me -- just one more question. Mr. Kelly, it's been argued recently that two important changes in the Middle East in recent months are the Soviets' influence is expanding, and that the United States is beginning to show some willingness to accept a greater role for the Soviets. Is that an accurate statement? Have the Soviets been more helpful, and if so, on what issues? Is it accurate that Mr. Gorbachev has been fairly blunt with President -- (clears throat) -- excuse me -- with President Assad of Syria, and told him that it's abnormal for the Soviets not to have ties with Israel, there can be no military solution to the Arab-Israeli struggle? Is that an accurate statement?

MR. KELLY: Sir, we see an ambivalence in Soviet policy toward the region, and I would disagree with the statement that the Soviets have achieved a new influence in the Middle East. Their Foreign Minister, Mr. Shevardnadze, made a visit to the Middle East in February, which was the first time a Soviet foreign minister had been to the region in 10 years. So, it's indisputable, they've been more

active. But, I wouldn't agree that they have achieved a new level of influence because, in a way, the Soviets often try to be all things to all parties, which is a tough act to do.

They're trying to have a rapprochement with Iran and maintain their continued relations with Iraq. They are a serious major benefactor in military supply, even though that contradicts their close relationship with Iraq, which is a bitter rival of Syria. They are talking about improved contacts with Israel, but they have failed to deliver on recognition -- re-recognition of Israel's -- as a state, and reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. So, while there's been new Soviet activity, some of it has been contradictory and ambivalent, and I do not believe that their influence has been significantly increased.

REP. GILMAN: So, there really isn't any expanded role at this point by the Soviets in the Middle East?

MR. KELLY: Well, we have told the Soviets that if they want to be helpful and take positive actions vis-a-vis Syria or other countries in the region, then they ought to do so. But for an expanded substantive role, I do not see it.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Feighan.

REP. FEIGHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would like, if I can, to return to the problems in Lebanon. I am very mindful of the fact that you've contributed a great deal in the course of your career to trying to bring about a long-term peace in Lebanon. But I am very disturbed by events recently and statements from American policymakers, as I would assume you would be. My colleague from California, Mr. Lantos, decried the even-handedness that he sees in the administration's reaction and response to what is taking place between the various factions in Lebanon today. I wish that that were the worst criticism that we could offer.

I was frankly appalled that the American Ambassador would make the decision, which is a very difficult decision, a decision which I think we are compelled to respect, to leave and to take our diplomatic forces out of Lebanon, and in the context of doing so, engage in such sharp, directed criticism of General Aoun and the Christian community.

Given the recent history in Lebanon, given the outrageous conduct of the Syrians, given the indiscriminate shelling of the Syrians, given the fact that the Syrians drove us out of the embassy not too long ago to seek protection on the Christian side, it just seemed inconceivable that as we departed, we would lay almost entirely the blame on General Aoun and the Christian community.

General Aoun, to be sure, has made some errors of judgment over the past few months, and there was apparently some very unfortunate rhetoric in the final days of the American presence there, but I don't know that there was the sufficient cause to direct the rhetoric and the stridency against General Aoun and the Christian community that we did. It seemed not even-handed at all, but it seemed disturbingly uneven and misdirected. Is that a misunderstanding on my part, or should the record be set straight?

MR. KELLY: Thank you for the opportunity to explain, sir. First of all, we made the decision to withdraw the American personnel at the embassy with great regret, and it was not Ambassador McCarthy's decision only, we in Washington consulted him and the decision, ultimately, is the responsibility of those of us here in Washington, to bring the Americans out of the embassy.

We had used as our standard in our internal discussions over the

last six, seven months, about maintaining our personnel in Beirut, that we wanted to do so as long as they could maintain useful contacts with the parties on the ground, and as long as security conditions did not become flagrantly dangerous.

Because of the shelling, Ambassador McCarthy had been unable to go to West Beirut since March, and so, we had had telephone contacts, but not direct personal meetings with Muslim leaders in West Beirut since March. In August, General Aoun announced that he would no longer receive the American Ambassador, or permit contacts with the American Ambassador unless and until the American government recognized him as the sole, legitimate authority in Lebanon, and McCarthy presented his credentials to General Aoun.

We regretted that action very much because we wanted to continue to have contacts with the General on a direct basis. We had not presented credentials to General Aoun, because like every other country represented in Lebanon, we did not want to make a choice between the Christian and Muslim competing governments. We believed that in the interest of trying to find a political settlement, it was important to keep up contacts with both sides.

In addition to the rhetoric and this public announcement, General Aoun's followers mounted a demonstration around the embassy, announced that the embassy would be blockaded. The demonstrators had guns, these guns were waved at American personnel entering and leaving the embassy. The leader of the demonstration, who has been a close advisor to General Aoun, announced that any American helicopters coming to the embassy would be shot down and that they would not be allowed or permitted to land. And we raised the calculation, sir, that the circumstances on the ground no longer permitted the embassy to carry out useful work in terms of contacts with the parties and that there was a clear and immediate danger to the personnel from this crowd around the embassy, which announced that this wasn't just a demonstration, this was a blockade that was going to continue and get tighter with every passing day. And so, with a great deal of regret, we made the decision to bring the American personnel out. We do want to go back as soon as we can and have direct contacts with all parties. And we have conveyed that message to General Aoun.

REP. FEIGHAN: Well, even in your recounting of the events, I find it disappointing that there is the imbalance of presentation that there is. Our American embassy was in West Beirut. Is that correct, Mr. Secretary?

MR. KELLY: It was in West Beirut until 1984.

REP. FEIGHAN: And were we or were we not driven out of the American embassy there, because of the conduct of the Syrians?

MR. KELLY: Because the embassy in West Beirut had been blown up.

REP. FEIGHAN: It just seems appropriate that -- who was it blown up by? Was it blown up by --

MR. KELLY: We believe --

REP. FEIGHAN: -- a Syrian-supported --

MR. KELLY: We believe it was blown up by Hezbollah.

REP. FEIGHAN: Which is Syrian-supported?

MR. KELLY: Which is pro-Iranian, but certainly has operated --

REP. FEIGHAN: Okay, well, we've established -- we've established why we were driven out of West Beirut, and it seems to me that at the point at which we decided to leave Lebanon in its entirety and to cease diplomatic efforts that, at least on the ground, that we might have been more honest with ourselves and with the world, had we conveyed a more fuller history of our experience -- recent experience

in Lebanon and that we were leaving not only in reaction to the expressed frustrations of General Aoun's supporters, but in much greater part because of the hostility and aggressiveness of the Syrians.

I would like to pursue, but I have my time expired, so perhaps in the second round we can continue. Thank you.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Lukens.

REP. BUZZ LUKENS (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Kelly, let me say first of all, I have the greatest admiration for what you people are attempting to do and you personally have done in the so far vain and fruitless effort to obtain peace in the Middle East. Now, I'm going to recite a couple of things, I'd like you to give me some reason to feel as moderately optimistic or even cautiously hopeful, as you seem to be, about the prospects of peace. We have Iraq, who has involved itself in gas warfare, currently rearming. Egypt has an internal human rights problem, tremendous economic strain. Israel now with a human rights problems, at least on the West Bank and Gaza, with a tremendous economic strain. Palestine is totally disunified at the -- I mean, there are 10 spokesmen every time something happens. Jordan has a political question mark now -- they've retrenched a little bit because their own internal political -- dealing with political opposition to the incumbent royalty. Syria is totally uncooperative (in?) support of terrorist army, gas capability -- we think perhaps even a nuclear -- moving toward a nuclear capability. Iran -- we can go no further -- militant, hostages, terrorism. Libya -- terrorism and gas. Saudi Arabia is just -- you know, apparently cavalierly dispatched 36 Kuwaitis with no explanation whatsoever, and is still supporting the PLO. Then we come down through the PLO.

Make me feel a little bit more optimistic about this absolute can of worms, and then we'll turn to Lebanon..

MR. KELLY: Thank you, sir. You've described a litany of awesomely serious and difficult problems.

REP. LUKENS: A potential for war?

MR. KELLY: Sir?

REP. LUKENS: The potential for total war?

MR. KELLY: And, indeed, the potential for war. And that is, indeed, the reason that the American government has been over the years, and is now, active in the Middle East, trying to bring about an improvement in the conditions -- trying to help move forward on a peace --

REP. LUKENS: Can you give me one particularly solid achievement or any series of small movements that lead -- have led you, apparently, and the Department of State to believe that there is some more hope now than there was a year ago, or six months ago? I don't see it -- it's what I'm saying.

MR. KELLY: We think there's a potentiality for movement, which is reason for hope. We see that in the contacts between cabinet ministers in the government of Israel and the Egyptians to talk about potential negotiations between representatives of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and representatives of the government of Israel.

REP. LUKENS: So, inter-Arab high-level discussions are really the basis upon which we're saying there is some potential for some modest solutions to some of these problems at the present time.

MR. KELLY: Inter-Arab discussions and discussions between Arabs and Israelis -- yes, sir.

REP. LUKENS: Then let me ask you specifically. Since we're banking everything on -- in Lebanon, and I'll move to Lebanon now, as I said -- on a ceasefire and a lifting of the blockade and eventually, hopefully, a political process for reconciliation, why -- what weapons do we have to achieve that? Given the other problems surrounding Lebanon, how can we move? General Aoun was the spokesman for the Christian Maronites, whether we like it or not, and I'm not sure he's -- I thought he was a great spokesman at first, and I think his more recent moves portray some of the volatility of that area rather than common sense, diplomatic moves toward a solution.

I don't see the solution in Lebanon. People are starving. They're shooting each other every day. Where are the players now that we've moved out? Who are the players and what are the pressures to resolve it?

MR. KELLY: The Arab League representative arrived in Lebanon yesterday. He's meeting with General Aoun and the other leaders of the different factions there to try to organize a cease-fire today, tomorrow, Thursday, in other words, in the near future, to get the blockades lifted on all parties and to hold a meeting of the Lebanese Parliament on September 30th. So, there is activity on the ground --

REP. LUKENS: Forgive me, which Lebanese parliament? There seem to be two.

MR. KELLY: No, sir. There is only one Lebanese Parliament. There are two competing governments that -- the former Prime Minister Hoss and General Aoun. But there is only one Lebanese Parliament.

REP. LUKENS: Well, last I understood that one political faction just simply wouldn't show up. You're saying that there is now potential for both sides showing and the Parliament actually is asserting itself to some extent?

MR. KELLY: There certainly is the potential, yes. We have talked to a lot of parliamentarians who are anxious to try to go to that kind of a meeting.

REP. LUKENS: If I might, Mr. Chairman, one last question. Switching quickly to Iran, has there been any movement from this new government, quote unquote, "this new administration" toward resolving the hostage issue independently of other public and privately stated demands for American action?

MR. KELLY: No, there have been contradictory signals from them, but there has been no concrete action of which we are aware.

REP. LUKENS: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Levine.

REP. LEVINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, a couple of brief comments. First of all, I'd like to associate myself with my friend Mr. Feighan's comments with regard to Lebanon. And I'd just like to ask you one quick question with regard to Lebanon and that is whether in light of the whole history that my friend from Ohio so well recounts and that you're so intimately familiar with, would the administration consider trying to encourage our allies to work together in the context of a multinational economic boycott against Syria, in light of Syria's conduct in Lebanon?

MR. KELLY: We have thought about it internally, Congressman. We have, as you know, a set of economic sanctions already in place by the United States against Syria, and the United Kingdom, which has no diplomatic relations, also has economic sanctions in place. The judgment of our European experts is that the remainder of the European Economic Community would probably not go along, absent some new heinous event.

REP. LEVINE: Well, I share that skepticism, based on a long and sad track record. I received from an unlikely European source a similar inquiry this weekend myself, which I'd like to share with you subsequently. I understand from whence the skepticism arises, but it may be worth looking into a little bit further.

I also want to mention to you, I'm sorry I didn't hear the opening remarks, either of yours or some of the members, but I reviewed your comments at the seminar that you spoke at this weekend, and I felt that your speech was superb, and I wanted to compliment you on it.

MR. KELLY: Thank you very much, sir.

REP. LEVINE: I am concerned about the comments that my friend, Mr. Smith, made, and I associate myself fully with them. And I guess the bottom line that I'm concerned about with regard to this sorry and sad PLO track record ever since the dialogue began is that the PLO seems to have concluded that the Israeli audience, to them, is borderline irrelevant. And yet ultimately, if they do not convince an Israeli audience that they have changed their stripes, whatever rhetoric, grudging or otherwise, we hear from them in the West becomes borderline irrelevant in terms of ultimately obtaining some results on the ground, unless the PLO is completely convinced that their only goal is to try to drive a wedge between the United States and Israel. I think you've made completely clear and others have that they're not going to succeed in doing that.

And I guess the question that we must ask in the context of the Arafat visa and in the context of other issues pertaining to how extensive and how significant the dialogue remains, is when will the PLO actually understand that it needs to produce something tangible with regard to moving the peace process along? And I -- I've heard your responses to it. I'm not sure there's anything further to say. But I want to associate myself with the comments of my friend, Mr. Smith. In that context, that unless we get some quid pro quo, unless we see some progress from the PLO, at some point in time, our own admonitions begin to sound fairly hollow.

Charles Redman quoted Ambassador Pelletreau as admonishing the PLO in the earliest stages of the dialogue that they will be held accountable for cross-border raids of any PLO faction, and you're very familiar with the comments at the Fatah convention, which obviously have got to cause the Israelis to be as skeptical as they are.

You talk about a division in Israel. That's completely understandable, and a hard-line view is completely understandable in the context of what the Israelis see and receive on a daily basis from the PLO.

I would simply suggest that it ought to be our paramount goal in the context of any PLO dialogue to be getting something from it, and I again emphasize, as Mr. Smith did, that Congress' patience is certainly wearing thin in the context of what we appear to be getting, which is basically nothing, from the PLO thus far.

Let me ask you two other brief questions. I have an op-ed in this morning's Los Angeles Times, by coincidence, which I will give you a copy of, urging that Secretary Baker take a trip to the Middle East, in order to underscore American concern and American staying power in support of the Israeli peace initiative.

I am very worried -- I recently returned from a three-week trip to the region in which I spoke to Gazans, West Bank Palestinians, Jerusalem notables and a cross-section of Israelis -- and I'm very worried that absent a significant American initiative, such as

something visible like a Secretary of State visit to a region he has never visited since being Secretary of State, people are going to begin to worry about the depth of our commitment to the Israeli initiative, which we have appropriately embraced, and our staying power.

I think it's important that you have been emphasizing it, as you did in your speech that I referred to, that the Egyptian initiative is not in fact an initiative but simply a bridge or an effort to try to facilitate the Israeli initiative. And I have heard from the Egyptian embassy itself that, rather than being an initiative, to the contrary, President Mubarak has simply propounded some questions in an effort to get the Israeli plan moving.

I think that the press has overstated and, frankly, misreported the nature of the Mubarak questions and that does a disservice when it is not reported, as you have emphasized it ought to be and as the Egyptian embassy has emphasized it ought to be, as simply an effort to expedite the Israeli initiative in an effort to propound questions in support of the Israeli initiative.

But in order to underscore the significant American stake, interest, involvement, and staying power, I would hope that we would consider something to underscore our resolve and our staying power, and toward that end, the suggestion I have in today's LA Times, is a visit by the Secretary of State. It can be that or something else. But I certainly hope that we do continue to emphasize that we're not hiding behind Egyptian skirts or pushing Egypt into the forefront -- that what Egypt is doing is simply supplemental and of assistance to the Israeli initiative, which is precisely what we are embracing. Somehow, I think, we need to make that clearer, particularly in light of the type of press statements that, A, over-report the Israeli initiative, and B, as in the Washington Post this weekend, emphasized we're backing away and looking to more regional initiatives. I think that those types of implications that come from Foggy Bottom do us a disservice.

MR. KELLY: May I comment, Mr. Chairman?

REP. LEVINE: Please.

MR. KELLY: I thank you very much for those remarks, and I'll look forward to reading your op ed piece, Congressman. I think you've put your finger on another number of key items, one of which is put very simply in one sentence: The Egyptian ten-point proposal is not an alternative to the government of Israel's peace proposals of May; it is a set of Egyptian views as to how the two parties might get together to talk about the government of Israel's proposals. Thank you, sir.

REP. LEVINE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

REP. HAMILTON: We'll begin a second round of questioning. Let me turn to the West Bank and Gaza, Mr. Secretary, for a moment. We've been reading reports about inter-Arab violence in the Occupied Territories, and it's increasing in recent weeks. Is that your impression, is it?

MR. KELLY: I believe that is correct, sir. I think the statistics show an increase in Palestinians killed by other Palestinians.

REP. HAMILTON: But why has that occurred?

MR. KELLY: It's impossible to know the answer in every case. Some of those may be settling of old scores, some of those may be acts of political intimidation. Some of those may be attempts, as some Palestinians assert, to eliminate so-called "collaborators".

REP. HAMILTON: And it's reported that since June, 60 percent of the violence is inter-Arab violence. Does that accord with your assessment of the situation?

MR. KELLY: I'd have to look at the figures again before I could -- in fact, I'd be happy to try to provide that for the record, our view of those figures, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Our figure is that since June, 60 percent of the violence is inter-Arab violence. You might check that and see if we're correct or not.

Now, what's the status of the schools? Are they open now? Have all grades K-12 opened?

MR. KELLY: I believe that is correct, sir. The decision was made in late July to start with a phased approach, as you know, so not all grades were opened, and I believe now all 12 are reopened.

REP. HAMILTON: And have they proceeded without incident, by and large?

MR. KELLY: By and large, that's correct. I think it is a sign -- a positive sign that the government of Israel made this decision and that those involved on the Palestinian side have not, to date, used the schools as rallying points for demonstrations.

REP. HAMILTON: When do you expect the universities to open?

MR. KELLY: I -- I believe -- if I may, I'd like to supply an answer for the record. I have --

REP. HAMILTON: Are you talking to the Israelis about opening the universities?

MR. KELLY: We did, indeed and when I was out there in August, I talked to Israeli senior officials about that. But that's a month ago. Let me take a more recent reading and get you an answer, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, there are also reports that 21 US citizens have been arrested and two US citizens have died, and that Palestinian-Americans are facing harassment. What can you tell us about that?

MR. KELLY: Well, there have been cases of American citizens arrested in which there was no prompt notification of those arrests, which would be required in view of our consular relations with Egypt (sic). We have raised those matters with the government of Egypt (sic). There have been American deaths. We have pursued active investigations, and asked the Israeli authorities to actively investigate that. There have been incidents of American citizens who were stopped at border entry points for prolonged periods of time. We have taken up those cases with the Israeli government authorities. So, we have been active in looking after the issue of American citizens visiting Israel and the -- or living in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you think the situation is improving with regard to U.S. citizens there?

MR. KELLY: My understanding is that in some areas there have been improvements at border points. Obviously we are disconcerted if we are not properly notified in the case of arrests of American citizens. We've taken that up with Israeli authorities and been told that there will be improvement there.

REP. HAMILTON: Now with respect to Lebanon, I am informed that Lebanon is in arrears to the United States on its debt payments, and that the Brooke Amendment is likely to be in effect unless payments are made. Is that accurate -- by the end of this year?

MR. KELLY: That is correct, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: What payment does Lebanon have to make now,

between now and the end of the year in order to avoid the Brooke Amendment?

MR. KELLY: I'll have to supply the exact amount for the record. My recollection is that it is in the neighborhood of 10 million dollars.

REP. HAMILTON: Can any programs, food aid, or emergency aid through the PVOs for example, continue past December if the Brooke Amendment is invoked?

MR. KELLY: My understanding, subject to correction by the lawyers, is that the President can issue a waiver to continue necessary emergency relief and feeding programs.

REP. HAMILTON: Under what circumstances are we prepared to go back to the embassy in Lebanon?

MR. KELLY: We would want to have the conviction that the embassy would be able to carry out constructive, effective work. That means having --

REP. HAMILTON: Must there be a cease-fire?

MR. KELLY: We would certainly hope that there would be a ceasefire, I would want --

REP. HAMILTON: Is it a condition precedent to our going back?

MR. KELLY: I wouldn't want to lay that down in concrete. We have operated there without a cease-fire.

REP. HAMILTON: How are we going to conduct our business in the interim?

MR. KELLY: We are in regular contact with the Lebanese Embassy here in Washington, D.C. We have from time to time asked friendly countries which have representations still in Lebanon, to convey messages for us.

REP. HAMILTON: Now what about the Syrian position? Are we working with the Syrians to see if they would be willing to pull back to the Bekaa Valley prior to a total withdrawal?

MR. KELLY: I'm sorry, prior to a total withdrawal?

REP. HAMILTON: Yes.

MR. KELLY: That is an element of the Arab League's peace plan for Lebanon. If the Lebanese parties accept that, then obviously that's an element that -- their having accepting it, we would accept. We are interested in a Syrian withdrawal from all of Lebanon. We want to see all of the foreign forces out of the country.

REP. HAMILTON: Is it possible we can get an initial withdrawal, to the valley for example, by the Syrian forces?

MR. KELLY: That is part of the plan that's being discussed now. It would be phased over an extended period of time.

REP. HAMILTON: What's the Syrian reaction to that proposal?

MR. KELLY: The Syrian public reaction has been general endorsement of the entire package.

REP. HAMILTON: Does Syria condition its withdrawal in Lebanon on an Israeli withdrawal?

MR. KELLY: Some Syrian public commentary has echoed that, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Is that their official position?

MR. KELLY: I don't believe that that is an official position of the government of Syria.

REP. HAMILTON: What are we now asking Syria to do in Lebanon? What's the United States saying to Lebanon?

MR. KELLY: First --

REP. HAMILTON: -- to Syria with respect to Lebanon?

MR. KELLY: First, we are asking for Syria to participate in

itself, and vigorously support with its friends, a ceasefire to stop the shelling and killing now.

Secondly, we are asking Syria to undertake and to encourage its friends to lift all of the blockades that are imposed, sea and air and land.

Third, we want them to support the political reconciliation process that's outlined in the plan and facilitate a meeting of the Lebanese parliament.

So we are seeking first, a ceasefire; second, a lifting of the blockage; and third, constructive political action, which could lead to the reestablishment of a functioning Lebanese government and the withdrawal of Syrian and all foreign forces.

REP. HAMILTON: What is your judgment right now, do you think the Syrians and the Christians are willing to step back from the confrontation?

MR. KELLY: Given the record of 15 years, it's hard to be optimistic, but I think that, from every side, I've heard that the people on all sides have had enough of the five or six months of horrible shelling and the death and injuries that have resulted therefrom.

I have the sense that most or all of the parties have welcomed the Arab League efforts in general. The Maronite patriarch in his Sunday sermon welcomed the Arab League effort. I have heard similar statements from Muslim efforts. So I believe there is more of a willingness to see a cease-fire now than there may have been in the past. But, Mr. Chairman, you know very well that the record in Lebanon does not give one grounds for great optimism.

REP. HAMILTON: What are the chances for a cease-fire?

MR. KELLY: You mean, numerical quantification?

REP. HAMILTON: Yeah. Fifty percent, 20 percent, 10 percent, 90 percent, what do you think?

MR. KELLY: That's a tough number to give, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Is it so tough that you're not willing to give me one?

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir. In candor, if I give a low number, that's -- that casts a negative pall, may reduce the chances of viability. So I really would not, in public session, like to give an appreciation.

REP. HAMILTON: If you give me a high number, would it enhance the chance? (Laughter.) Okay, Mr. Smith, I want to come back to Iran, and I'll do that after Mr. Smith.

MR. KELLY: Thank you, sir.

REP. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If we can, Mr. Ambassador, continue. To make the record very clear, this is just for the sake of the discussion and not as a speculation on your part. Assuming the Arab League plan is not accepted, or if, in fact, accepted, as has been the case in previous plans, lasts only a short life span, and immediately things go back to the way they are or have been, what is the United States then committed to doing vis-a-vis Syria, whom everyone who has appeared at that table, including yourself, have blamed to a large degree -- if not totally, then almost fully -- for the current conditions in Lebanon? What is the United States willing to do to help the people of Lebanon throw off the yoke of Syria in their own country -- that's what I would like to know? Do we have a policy or do we not?

MR. KELLY: The American position on that, sir, is very clear. We want to see all of the foreign forces, and that includes Syria as the

largest and most active and troublesome of the foreign forces, out of Lebanon. That is our absolute purpose.

REP. SMITH: I'm assuming now they do not get out. My question is based upon this assumption for discussion purposes and not for your speculation individually. In other words, I don't want to lend any credibility if Syria says, "Well, the United States doesn't think we'll do anything right or et cetera." I mean, this is strictly argument -- the reality. What is the United States prepared to do if nobody does anything -- just continue to tolerate the situation because that's all that can happen? Are we going to watch as the whole country, not just Beirut, turns into rubble?

People kill each other; deaths increase; the horror goes on; people starve to death because of increasing blockades and continuing blockades. And we watch one of the best and most beautiful countries in that region just completely sink into the sea and be gone forever so that Syria's maps -- which never had a border and classified Lebanon as greater Syria -- their maps become an actual geographic reality and political reality. What is the United States prepared to do with the absence of significant change in the current status?

MR. KELLY: Certainly, Congressman, we would not countenance the absorption of Lebanon into Syria --

REP. SMITH: It's almost 90 percent de facto already.

MR. KELLY: I beg your pardon, sir?

REP. SMITH: It's almost 90 percent de facto already. They are absolutely the controlling force. They are absolutely the party that motivates all the reactions. They have a blockade, as you have just indicated, of land, sea, and air. They have created a situation where the United States is once again -- well, I suppose -- I don't want to say that we tucked our tail in. We did it to protect our people, there's no question about that -- but create a situation where the United States now has no diplomatic presence. We have no presence at all. And what little bit is being done, as you indicated, is through the Save the Children Foundation. My God, what a tragedy.

MR. KELLY: Well, we want -- sir, we want to -- may I?

REP. SMITH: Sure.

MR. KELLY: We want to return as soon as possible.

REP. SMITH: Are we willing to use force to return?

MR. KELLY: I beg your pardon?

REP. SMITH: Are we willing to use force to return?

MR. KELLY: Sir, you raised the question of using force in an earlier hearing, and I gave you my opinion then, that I do not believe that the American government is -- (pauses) --

REP. SMITH: We're not at that crossroads yet, are we?

MR. KELLY: I beg your pardon?

REP. SMITH: We're not at that crossroad yet, Mr. Kelly?

MR. KELLY: I don't think we're at that crossroads. The --

REP. SMITH: Better be careful. It's right over the next hill, I can assure you.

MR. KELLY: But I did want to say, we do want to get back. We are in touch with General Aoun on circumstances under which we would be willing to return, and we hope that we're going to get cooperation.

I must report, sir, with great regret, that a week ago today, General Aoun gave another interview after we'd left accusing us of conspiring with Israel and Syria to divide the country between the two, which I would argue is patently out of the question. The idea of an American-Israel-Syrian conspiracy to erase Lebanon from the map just doesn't hold credibility. So we're hoping to see, not just a change

in the rhetoric, but also a change in the circumstances which would allow us to go back.

REP. SMITH: You don't really believe personally, do you, having been an ambassador to Lebanon and understanding that country fairly well, you don't really believe that General Aoun means that for public consumption in its entirety --

MR. KELLY: I -- I'll tell you something --

REP. SMITH: -- as opposed for domestic political consumption?

MR. KELLY: I'll tell you something that I told a number of Lebanese leaders during the years that I was there, and that is that words are dangerous because they condition attitudes and actions. And what one person may say lightly about Israel, about the Americans, about our role in the Middle East, and think, "well, I don't really mean that, so it's okay," will lead hotheads and extremists to take action based on that. So, I argued then and I would argue now that responsible political leaders ought to choose their words carefully.

REP. SMITH: I agree with you, but that leaves us with an interesting dilemma. General Aoun, who has generally tended to be supported by us, at least in his efforts to stop the fighting and to have some peace between the Christian and Muslim forces, then is in a position of saying something and being criticized by us, while the Syrians, who have a land, sea, and air blockade, and are shelling and killing people don't say anything, and therefore we don't do anything. I mean that's a strange dichotomy.

MR. KELLY: Well, we have criticized the Syrians, Congressman, for being the principal obstacle, as the Arab League publicly identified them to be, to a settlement in the process that was underway in June and July. It was Syrian obstructionism which prevented that from getting anywhere.

REP. SMITH: But General Aoun is not in the daily business of actively seeking out and killing people unless generally, the Christians are attacked. Am I right? I mean he hasn't been actively foraging into non-Christian areas, going around launching significant attacks against civilians, has he?

MR. KELLY: No, his forces have acted in retaliation.

REP. SMITH: But that is the case -- right -- but that is the case with the Syrians, and we seem to be on this even handed basis tolerating that disgraceful conduct against now, the words of General Aoun, which some of us at least feel are somewhat as the result of deep frustration, to say the least, over what is regarded as less than an active and appropriate policy of the United States, and I frankly can -- at least to some degree identify with his frustration.

What are we going to do about that? His country, he's watching it disappear. We're watching it disappear and --

MR. KELLY: What we're going to do, Congressman, is keep working on it as have American administrations for the last 15 years, Democrat and Republican, to try to get the parties and their supporters outside, to reduce the flow of weaponry, to search for political solutions, to look for ways in which Muslims and Christians can live together in peace as they once did, and live in peace with their neighbors, Israel or Syria, so that there is neither a threat across Israel's northern border, nor a threat across any other border.

REP. SMITH: Well, it strikes me as somewhat historically naive to believe that all of those things could in fact occur. Keeping weapons out of Lebanon when the Syrians are there, and the Iraqis are attempting to punish Syria for their involvement with Iran in the war, and all the other initiatives that are at time to time taken out --

you know, played out in Lebanon, do not give me great cause for optimism and it's unfortunate -- terribly unfortunate.

I just have one final question that's totally off that region -- in that region but totally off of the Middle East.

It was reported last week that the Rashid attorney in Greece petitioned the Greek Supreme Court for his client to go free, claiming that somehow Rashid had already bought off his prison sentence. In any event, while the decision was being made he ought to be let out. Number one, do you have any comment on this account? And two, has the Greek current administration, which we know may change in the elections in the next few months, communicated to us any desire to let him out, or any change that they see in terms of the final decision that may be made vis-a-vis Rashid, since the Supreme Court has indicated he is a perfect candidate for extradition?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, my understanding is that Rashid's lawyers, under a provision of Greek law which allows when you only have a small portion of a sentence remaining, one to pay a fine in lieu of doing the rest of the time, petitioned that he get out, that he pay a fine for his last two months in prison and be released. The position of the American government is that we still want him extradited and to face the charges -- the serious charges with which he is accused here in the United States. We have brought that position clearly to the intention of the current Greek government, and I am unaware of any plans by the current Greek government which would run counter to our request for extradition.

REP. SMITH: We would view his release as a very unfriendly and inappropriate action.

MR. KELLY: We would certainly agree it is unfriendly and inappropriate.

REP. SMITH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.

MR. KELLY: Thank you, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Secretary, President Mubarak is going to go to the U.N. and I understand he's expected to issue an invitation to the Israeli and Palestinian delegations to meet at a conference in Cairo. Is that correct in your understanding?

MR. KELLY: He is indeed going to the United Nations. While he is in New York, sir, it's my understanding that he will meet with the Israeli Finance Minister and the Israeli Foreign Minister separately. He'll be meeting with a number of others including President Bush.

According to the press, the Israeli Defense Minister, Mr. Rabin, announced yesterday following his Cairo visit, that if other points of discussion were worked out satisfactorily, the government of Israel would accept an Egyptian government invitation to talks in Cairo, but there is a big if in that acceptance.

REP. HAMILTON: And if the talks go well, then an invitation would be issued to the Israelis and to a Palestinian delegation to come to Cairo. Is that right?

MR. KELLY: That is correct, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, with regard to the Egyptian 10 point plan which you gave general approval to, but you indicated we had reservations about some points, what points do we have reservations about?

MR. KELLY: Sir, the actual text of the plan has not been made public by the government of Egypt. There have been various accounts in the press of what the Egyptian 10 points are, some correct and some not correct. We have, because it has not been made public by the

government of Egypt, avoided specific comment on the individual points in the plan, and would be happy to do that for you in closed session, or provide you a classified letter spelling that out. But I would ask your permission to avoid responding in public session now.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, we would like your reaction to the proposal in whatever form you can make it available to us. Now, are we, at this point, kind of relying on the Egyptians to get the PLO reaction to the Shamir proposal?

MR. KELLY: We are continuing our efforts to persuade the PLO directly in the contacts in Tunis, to respond positively to the Israeli government's proposal. We are also talking to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, as I myself did when I visited the region in August.

REP. HAMILTON: What I'm trying to find out is where is the action right now? The action is in the Egyptian plan, right? I mean that's where the real --

MR. KELLY: That's where the focus of attention is --

REP. HAMILTON: That's the focus of attention right now, and we are hoping then that the Egyptians will be able to get a PLO answer. Is that a fair statement?

MR. KELLY: That's right, but you know, we'll take a positive PLO answer whatever route it comes.

REP. HAMILTON: Any way you can get it, huh? Okay. Would you forecast talks between Israelis and a Palestinian delegation on the modalities of an election this year?

MR. KELLY: We would certainly like to see that, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you think it'll come about?

MR. KELLY: I certainly hope so but I can't tell you that it will.

REP. HAMILTON: You want to give me a percentage on that?

MR. KELLY: I beg your permission to avoid percentage qualifications.

REP. HAMILTON: Would you say that the chances for that are better today than they were a few weeks ago?

MR. KELLY: I believe that they are better today than they were two weeks ago.

REP. HAMILTON: Because of the activity that's taking place?

MR. KELLY: That is correct, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Now let's go to Iran for a few minutes. How about those peace talks about Iraq and Iran -- no progress on the question of sovereignty, is that correct?

MR. KELLY: No progress, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: No progress on prisoner exchange, is that correct?

MR. KELLY: That is correct.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we think the truce may break down?

MR. KELLY: There is that risk and there has been a public statement from a senior Iranian official in the last few days that Iran might choose to retake the territory which Iraq holds now, which the Iranians consider belongs to them. So, this kind of bellicose language is not a good sign.

REP. HAMILTON: Now both countries are putting a large part of their government's spending on rearmament, are they not?

MR. KELLY: As I understand it, that's right, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we anticipate a fifth round of talks coming up this fall?

MR. KELLY: That is correct, sir, under United Nations auspices,

yeah.

REP. HAMILTON: They've got a new Finance Minister who is a Ph.D. graduate from the University of California-Davis.

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Is that good news?

MR. KELLY: In that people who have studied in the United States and learned firsthand about our system of government and our way of thinking can help to open doors, I would say that it's generally positive. I would want to avoid saying that there is an automatic aspect to that.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, he has said that he wants to boost Iran's non-oil exports. He's said that he sees a big role for the private sector. Those are things we look upon positively. Correct?

MR. KELLY: In the area of non-strategic trade, yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Is the West united in its approach to dealing with Iran in an economic sense? Or do you have a picture of Japan and Italy and West Germany plunging in there trying to get contracts and to each his own?

MR. KELLY: There's no doubt that the Europeans and the Japanese are racing to try to secure contracts in Iran. There is, Mr. Chairman, not a comparable willingness of governments to extend credits or to underwrite these deals because of lingering questions about the reliability of the government of Iran as a credit risk.

REP. HAMILTON: Are we trying to get a common Western approach?

MR. KELLY: We have over the years --

REP. HAMILTON: What's the -- what's the forum for doing that right now?

MR. KELLY: There are intermittent conversations between ourselves and the European Economic Community and separately, on a bilateral basis, with Asian nations.

REP. HAMILTON: Are the -- are the -- is Britain negotiating with Iran, despite the Rushdie affair?

MR. KELLY: My understanding is that everything is frozen between the UK and Iran.

REP. HAMILTON: They're not negotiating.

MR. KELLY: That's my understanding, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, you got a letter to the Secretary -- to Secretary Baker signed by a large number of members of the House of Representatives asking to abandon hopes for a moderate government in Iran and recognize the Iranian resistance groups, which are seeking to overthrow the government of Iran. Have you replied to that?

MR. KELLY: I saw a reply several days ago. I am not certain whether our office of Congressional Relations has actually forwarded it at this point or not.

REP. HAMILTON: What did the reply say?

MR. KELLY: The bottom line of the reply was that the administration do not consider the Mujaheddin i Khalq organization as an organization friendly to the goals of the United States.

REP. HAMILTON: Are we meeting with the People's Mujaheddin?

MR. KELLY: Are we, sir?

REP. HAMILTON: Yes.

MR. KELLY: I believe we are not.

REP. HAMILTON: Are we dealing with any of the resistance groups?

MR. KELLY: I think from time to time Americans meet with resistance -- with figures from different resistance groups, yes.

REP. HAMILTON: American officials?

MR. KELLY: American officials, from time to time.

REP. HAMILTON: Now --

MR. KELLY: But I would say in this regard, if I may, sir, that 10 years the Mujaheddin i Khalq was trying to kill Americans officials, and while they have -- may have altered that as an active policy, they certainly have espoused goals which are very different from that the American government is interested in.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, I want to try to understand the Iranian asset issue, and I know it's complicated and it may be that we'll just have to have you write it out for us. When Iran says that it wants the assets unfrozen, what are they referring to?

MR. KELLY: In most cases, that is unclear, because these are broad general statements by Iranian government officials. There are Iranian lawyers at the Hague tribunal who deal through that tribunal with the American government officials on the variety of different financial questions which continue between the two countries, but there are -- and I have -- since our last appearance, Mr. Chairman, I know you raised it then. I've had a briefing from our attorneys on it. There are a variety of different accounts, if you will --

REP. HAMILTON: Well, let me run through it with you. There are 10 billion dollars that were marshaled, and by agreement, were transferred. Is that right?

MR. KELLY: 10 million dollars (sic) in which, sir?

REP. HAMILTON: Well, the -- we're going back now to the 1981 Algiers Accord, and that accord, of course, led to the release of the American hostages. Under that accord, the United States was obligated to send back all frozen assets.

MR. KELLY: That is correct.

REP. HAMILTON: 10 million dollars (sic) in assets were found, identified -- 10 billion dollars.

MR. KELLY: I believe much, much more than that was identified. We're talking about billions of dollars, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: 10 billion dollars, 10 billion dollars.

MR. KELLY: I can't attest to the exactness of that figure, but certainly, it's in the billions. Yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: About 4 billion dollars was given back to Iran through the banks, and 6 billion dollars was put into these -- to bank accounts to cover claims. Am I roughly correct?

MR. KELLY: I think so.

REP. HAMILTON: And you now got --

MR. KELLY: If I may correct for the record, if I may.

REP. HAMILTON: Yeah. You've now got a dollar account number one. You've got a dollar account number two, and you've got a security account. Right?

MR. KELLY: That is right, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, Iran also has other claims against the United States. They filed a claim for 10.8 billion dollars under FMS program. Is that correct?

MR. KELLY: I'm not certain, sir. Sir, I wonder if I can bring our attorneys up to try to do this, you know, in a better fashion than I am handling this.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, do you know why the Iranian FMS claim is so high? I mean, that's a very, very large figure, 10 billion dollars.

MR. KELLY: I know that there is a great dispute over what the 1979 value of various items of military equipment were. For example, an APC costs X. Do you evaluate it in 1979 dollars? What about interest? So on and so forth. So I do know there are great discrepancies --

REP. HAMILTON: And you also know that Iran has a very high FMS claim out there, right?

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, have we paid to Iran anything under the FMS claim?

MR. KELLY: I'm not certain of the answer, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Is there anything that we can do unilaterally to release funds to Iran, given the fact that claims are pending and the adjudication process is under way?

MR. KELLY: I would have to consult our attorneys to answer that and will do so for the record, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you know at what point the Algiers accord requires the United States to return the assets?

MR. KELLY: At what point in time?

REP. HAMILTON: Well -- or event, circumstance.

MR. KELLY: An agreement in the tribunal, as I understand it.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, I guess we would like to have an explanation. I'm not sure of the best way to get it. I suspect the best way to get it is to have you write to us --

MR. KELLY: All right, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: -- and address some of the questions that I've given you here. And let's get on the record a clear, unclassified status of where we stand. Is it fair to conclude from a review of the assets that there is simply not the vast sums of money here that Iran thinks there is and that, even if these funds could simply be turned over to Iran, they would not be sufficient to get the economy moving?

Two questions. The first one is: Is it fair to assume that there is simply not the vast sums of money in these accounts that Iran thinks?

MR. KELLY: That is my understanding, yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: And that, even if those funds could simply be turned over to Iran, and we're not advocating that obviously -- but even if they could, they would not be sufficient to help their economy all that much?

MR. KELLY: That is correct. Their needs are much, much greater.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, why is it that Iran thinks there is so much more in the accounts than, in fact, there are?

MR. KELLY: I would surmise that, A) because it is an extremely complex negotiation, because there are disputes over values and probably because none of the public officials who talk about it as a, you know, a very high amount of money which would solve a lot of problems have delved into the technicalities and details of the issue.

REP. HAMILTON: All right. Now, let me ask a few questions on individual countries. Ambassador Brown said the other day -- well, a few months ago in a speech that Israel was continually violating the spirit of the free trade agreement by making it hard, if not impossible, for American goods to be sold in Israel at competitive prices. Is that a problem, and has it been addressed and what progress have we made?

MR. KELLY: Sir, with your permission, I'll supply that answer --

REP. HAMILTON: Give us a full reporting to the subcommittee on the progress or lack of progress made with respect to our ambassador's complaints with respect to the free trade agreement.

MR. KELLY: I'll do that, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Did we conclude a memorandum of understanding with respect to the transfer of equipment for R and D purposes when Defense Minister Rabin was here in Washington?

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir. The Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister did conclude a memorandum of understanding.

REP. HAMILTON: And will that memorandum of understanding allow the mutual transfer of equipment on a long-term loan for cooperative R and D purposes?

MR. KELLY: May I answer that for the record, Mr. Chairman?

REP. HAMILTON: All right. Is a specific transfer to Israel now under consideration?

MR. KELLY: Under that MOU, sir?

REP. HAMILTON: Yes.

MR. KELLY: May I supply that for the record, sir?

REP. HAMILTON: All right.

REP. HAMILTON: On Egypt, we've had the reports, of course, about a crackdown by the government of Egypt and we've heard reports about 52 opposition activists who were arrested following some trouble at a steel mill. Two lawyers were arrested; 41 Shiite Muslims were arrested for plotting a coup; 15 members of the Muslim Brotherhood Group, a legal group, including a member of Parliament, were detained. A lawyer and a researcher were arrested, attached to the Arab Organization for Human Rights; harassment of Islamic groups seeking the introduction of Islamic law in Egypt. Have you been in touch with Egypt about these matters?

MR. KELLY: Our embassy in Cairo has discussed these -- yes, with varying Egyptian authorities.

REP. HAMILTON: What's happening?

MR. KELLY: Well, there have been a number of arrests. There have been cases of people who, after arrest, were beaten or abused. The Egyptian authorities have condemned that and have said they're going to take action against any of their police who were involved in such activities.

REP. HAMILTON: Is opposition to the government growing in Egypt?

MR. KELLY: That is not my impression, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Is -- are we saying to the Egyptians that their treatment of the opposition is too harsh?

MR. KELLY: We have discussed particular cases -- yes. But --

REP. HAMILTON: As being too harsh?

MR. KELLY: I don't think that's a generalized indictment of Egyptian treatment of the opposition.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, the cases I mentioned -- are they considered cases where the Egyptian government has acted too harshly?

MR. KELLY: There were incidents in the arrests in which there were reported abuses -- yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: In Jordan, there have been recent disturbances along the Jordanian border with Israel and the West Bank, infiltrations through Jordan by Palestinian guerrillas, clashes at the border, use by Jordan of Iraqi aircraft to patrol borders. Are you disturbed by those developments?

MR. KELLY: Yes, we have been.

REP. HAMILTON: Have you discussed them with the Jordanians?

MR. KELLY: Yes, we have.

REP. HAMILTON: Do they involve guerrillas or Jordanian troops?

MR. KELLY: The operations through the border certainly do not involve Jordanian troops. They're guerrillas who probably infiltrated from Syria across the Northwestern corner of Jordan to the Israeli border.

REP. HAMILTON: Why are they using Iraqi aircraft?

MR. KELLY: Why is Jordan using Iraqi --

REP. HAMILTON: Yeah.

MR. KELLY: I am not certain that they are, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: It's our understanding they are. Could you check that?

MR. KELLY: My understanding is there have been some joint flights of Iraqi and Jordanian aircraft.

REP. HAMILTON: And the aircraft are flown by whom?

MR. KELLY: I believe that the Jordanian planes are flown by Jordanians and the Iraqis by Iraqis.

REP. HAMILTON: Have we asked Jordan to stop flying the aircraft?

MR. KELLY: We have discussed the issue with the government of Jordan.

REP. HAMILTON: And what have we said to the government of Jordan?

MR. KELLY: With your permission, I'd prefer to answer that in another mode. We can supply you --

REP. HAMILTON: Okay. Saudi Arabia. The King has been scheduled to come to the United States in late July. He postponed -- he was scheduled to come to the United States this month. He again postponed. What's the problem?

MR. KELLY: The explanation offered by the government of Saudi Arabia is that the King deferred to visit in both instances because of the events in Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Arab League Committee of Three.

REP. HAMILTON: Will the visits be rescheduled?

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Will they be rescheduled for this year?

MR. KELLY: That, I don't know. We haven't talked dates with them.

REP. HAMILTON: There's been a proposal to sell Saudi Arabia 300 M-1 tanks. Is that going to be submitted to the Congress shortly?

MR. KELLY: That proposal, Mr. Chairman, is under consideration in the Executive branch now, and when that consideration is completed, depending on the decision, obviously, we would be consulting the Congress.

REP. HAMILTON: And when might you anticipate that?

MR. KELLY: In candor, I would anticipate the end of the consideration in the near future, because of the congressional calendar.

REP. HAMILTON: So you'd expect us to get that before we quit here for the fall?

MR. KELLY: If that is that administration decision, yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Is Saudi Arabia seeking to take over the cost of operating a floating barge base established by the US Navy during the tanker war?

MR. KELLY: May I submit the answer for the record, sir?

REP. HAMILTON: Do you know the status of the talks with the Saudis on this?

MR. KELLY: I do not, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you know what the Saudis want there? Do they want a continuing US presence, or do they want to reduce presence, or do they want a joint presence?

MR. KELLY: I am not certain, sir, I'll have to supply that for the record.

REP. HAMILTON: And with respect to Iraq, Iraq may have a debt of about 80 billion dollars following the war. I gather that 15 billion dollars of that is in arrears and is guaranteed trade debt to

important partners like Japan, France, Italy, and West Germany. Is there any Iraqi debt to the United States?

MR. KELLY: The government of Iraq has been making its payments on time to United States entities which are owed.

REP. HAMILTON: Are those US entities private entities -- banks?

MR. KELLY: I think that's right, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Does Iraq owe the United States government any?

MR. KELLY: I'll have to check, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Are their CC credits outstanding?

MR. KELLY: I don't believe so, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Is the subject of debt rescheduling coming up with regard to Iraq?

MR. KELLY: I haven't seen the issue recently, no sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we support international rescheduling of Iraqi debt?

MR. KELLY: I don't believe we have addressed the issue, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: There has been talk in the press about financing of military exports to Iraq by the BNL -- what is that bank -- it's an Italian bank, the second largest Italian -- are you familiar with that?

MR. KELLY: I am familiar with the reporting in the press, yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Was an American branch in Atlanta involved?

MR. KELLY: That is my understanding, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Is it accurate that the exports financed by the scheme evaded the Missile Technology Control Regime?

MR. KELLY: That I do not know. We can look into it and supply it for the record.

REP. HAMILTON: Are you investigating it now?

MR. KELLY: Yes we are, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Would you give us a report on that investigation?

MR. KELLY: Indeed we will, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: When do you expect to conclude that investigation?

MR. KELLY: I'm not certain, we'll pass that along to you as soon as we have a date.

REP. HAMILTON: There have been repressed reports on major explosions in Iraqi military industrial complex near Baghdad in mid-August. Are those reports accurate?

MR. KELLY: We know there was an extremely large explosion at a plant outside of Baghdad.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we know much more about it?

MR. KELLY: We understand that it happened at an explosives factory.

REP. HAMILTON: Is this where they were developing the Condor II missile?

MR. KELLY: I don't believe it was at that factory. I think it was at a conventional explosives factory that may be, you know, within a few miles of other installations. Our understanding, it was a conventional explosives factory that went up.

REP. HAMILTON: They are trying to develop the Condor II missile, is that correct?

MR. KELLY: There have been repeated reports of that, yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: And they are being helped by Egypt?

MR. KELLY: There had been prior cooperation. My understanding is that Egypt has terminated its cooperation in that program.

REP. HAMILTON: And Argentina?

MR. KELLY: I don't have recent data on Argentina. We can ask for that for the record.

REP. HAMILTON: Are reports accurate that Missile Technology Control Regime efforts have set back this project several years, that is the Condor II missile project?

MR. KELLY: I hope so. Let us provide a response to that for the record.

REP. HAMILTON: All right. The Soviets reported a flight last week of the ballistic missile launched from the Jerusalem area some 800 miles into the Mediterranean Sea. Did such an Israeli missile test take place?

MR. KELLY: I believe there was some sort of a test. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: By the Israelis?

MR. KELLY: That is correct.

REP. HAMILTON: Was a notice to aviators and mariners issued prior to the launching?

MR. KELLY: I do not know, sir. I can find out and supply that for the record.

REP. HAMILTON: All right, is that the second test of the ballistic missile by Israel since January of 1988?

MR. KELLY: I don't have personal certainty of the dates, but we'll -- if that's not the case, we'll let you know for the record.

REP. HAMILTON: Have we said anything to the Israelis about the launch?

MR. KELLY: We have talked with the Israelis about missilery and missile proliferation on numerous occasions.

REP. HAMILTON: Including this launch?

MR. KELLY: I'd have to check and supply for the record, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: What do we know about the Israeli ballistic missile program?

MR. KELLY: I think that would have to be handled in a closed session, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we know very much about it?

MR. KELLY: I'll have to look into that, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Purpose, size of the missile force, deployment, warheads; do you know those things at all?

MR. KELLY: I don't have that information on my fingertips. No, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Is it accurate that the North Koreans have been traveling in the Gulf seeking to promote the SCUD missile sales?

MR. KELLY: I've heard the North Koreans have been promoting those sales. Yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Are we trying to head off the purchases?

MR. KELLY: Yes, we are, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Have states in the region spoken to us about the North Korean initiative?

MR. KELLY: I don't know, sir. I'll have to provide that for the record.

REP. HAMILTON: There have been reports that the Saudis have replaced Chinese technicians on their CSS II missiles with Pakistani technicians. Are those reports accurate?

MR. KELLY: I don't know, sir. I'll have to look into that.

REP. HAMILTON: Do -- are we talking to the Saudis about that CSS II missile?

MR. KELLY: We have intermittently. Yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Have they been cooperative?

MR. KELLY: They have the CSS II missile system.

REP. HAMILTON: Are they cooperative in providing us information about it?

MR. KELLY: I don't know if our talks have been defined in terms of asking them for information about that, but rather in looking in to what kind of warheads it would -- it might handle and so on.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, you've heard here this afternoon the view, strongly expressed, that the US-PLO talks are blocking the peace process and that the United States should stop those talks immediately. How do you answer that?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, we believe that the contacts with the PLO are necessary to attempt to persuade the PLO of the merits and validity of the government of Israel's May peace proposal. We believe there's a secondary benefit in adding our voice in an attempt to influence the PLO and not, if you will, leave the field open to the Soviets and to others who have been their traditional contacts over the years.

REP. HAMILTON: Have you been disappointed thus far in the US-PLO talks?

MR. KELLY: I have been disappointed that they have not led to greater progress, yes, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Does Mr. Pelletreau now think that greater progress will soon result?

MR. KELLY: I wouldn't want to put him in that position, of putting words into his mouth, Mr. Chairman. I think he's --

REP. HAMILTON: He strongly urges --

MR. KELLY: He's a serious man, intent on doing a serious job.

REP. HAMILTON: And he strongly recommends the talks continue?

MR. KELLY: He has not recommended that they be terminated, but these are the administration's responsibility. It's not a case of Ambassador Pelletreau --

REP. HAMILTON: I understand, but he's the one sitting down there talking to them.

MR. KELLY: That's right. We're interested in his views. Vitally so.

REP. HAMILTON: In any event, the United States believes the talks are worthwhile and should continue and should intensify?

MR. KELLY: Should continue, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: And intensify?

MR. KELLY: That's not my adjective. We believe the talks are useful as they are conducted now by Pelletreau in Tunis.

REP. HAMILTON: It's a verb.

MR. KELLY: We'd like to see more movement.

REP. HAMILTON: It's a verb, isn't it? Huh?

Well, you're satisfied with the pace, I presume.

MR. KELLY: I'm not satisfied with the progress --

REP. HAMILTON: Yes, but the pace of the talks, the -- how many formal talks have we had?

MR. KELLY: We've had four formal sessions.

REP. HAMILTON: Four?

MR. KELLY: And quite a number of informal sessions.

REP. HAMILTON: About 20 informal or so?

MR. KELLY: Something like that, yes, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, in Israel, they recently have taken a number of steps to expand the use of force and imprisonment by the army and

the civil administration in the Territories. Soldiers are now permitted to shoot live ammunition during the day as well as at night to stop suspects who flee or resist arrest. The length of administrative detention in the Territories has been extended from six months to one year. Now why are the Israelis changing their policy here, making it tougher, in effect?

MR. KELLY: I think that question is best posed to them. Clearly, I guess they believe that those measures will somehow permit them to deal with the intifada.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you think they're more successful now in dealing with the violence of the intifada than they were a few months ago?

MR. KELLY: The level of violence is still high. So, you know, that's a subjective judgment.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, I understand, of course, the question is better directed to the Israelis, but when these events occur, do we not discuss it with the Israelis?

MR. KELLY: We do discuss --

REP. HAMILTON: Huh?

MR. KELLY: We do discuss them, and we --

REP. HAMILTON: And they come back and say these harsher steps are necessary --

MR. KELLY: They say it's their --

REP. HAMILTON: -- because why?

MR. KELLY: They say it's their responsibility to deal with the intifada, for law and order in the Territories, and they will make the decisions and take the actions that they believe are required.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, we understand that, of course, but their judgment is they've got to have harsher penalties, is that right?

MR. KELLY: I suppose that's right or they wouldn't have made those decisions.

REP. HAMILTON: What's our judgment?

MR. KELLY: Our judgment is that the obvious way out of it is by talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis and we have regularly brought our disagreement to the attention of Israeli authorities, when we believe excessive force or ineffective or inappropriate techniques have been used.

REP. HAMILTON: And when they use harsher steps like increasing the period of administrative detention or saying that soldiers can shoot live ammunition in the day as well as the night, we think that's a move in the wrong direction?

MR. KELLY: We would like to see a move -- we would like to see -- what do I want to say? We would like to see an elimination of the necessity for any of these techniques and a general improvement in the situation, Mr. --

REP. HAMILTON: Look, they've got a very practical problem in front of them. They've got an intifada, they've got an uprising. There's violence, it's a difficult problem to deal with. One way is to become harsher, tougher, and it appears to me that that's the direction they're moving. Is that -- do we --

MR. KELLY: And that has been their stated policy.

REP. HAMILTON: And do we approve of that?

MR. KELLY: We differ with them on techniques, Mr. Chairman, and have made that clear.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, what does that mean? Does that mean we approve or disapprove of their cracking down?

MR. KELLY: We dis -- we disagree with some of the techniques

they're using, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: And we think they're moving in the wrong direction if they get harsher?

MR. KELLY: We're sorry to see harsher tactics apply.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, you'll be glad to hear I'm about through, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate very, very much your response, as usual -- your response to my and -- mine and others who have questioned you. We will be submitting some additional questions to you. I guess I am particularly interested in the response on the Iranian claims situation, because it's very complicated and I don't feel like I've got a real grasp of it here.

We thank you, sir. The Subcommittee stands adjourned.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

14.

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1067 / 2/5

25755
שמור/מידע

אל: רושינגטון.
השגריר

רצ"ב פניית הנשיא בוש לרה"מ בעניין קולומביה, ותשובת רה"מ.

דאג-נא להעברתה.

בדיפ שולחים המקור.

בברכת שנה טובה
לשכת רה"מ
26 בספטמבר 1989

יוסף לרם - תאריך 2/5/89

1067 | 3/5

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN COLOMBIA HAS MADE IT TRAGICALLY CLEAR THAT NO NATION IS IMMUNE FROM THE VIOLENCE AND ANARCHY PERPETUATED BY DRUG TRAFFICKERS. PRESIDENT BARCO IS TAKING EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES TO BRING THESE TRAFFICKERS TO JUSTICE, TO SEPARATE THEM FROM THEIR ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, AND TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT COLOMBIA CAN AND WILL TRIUMPH OVER ITS DARKEST ENEMIES. THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS RESPONDED WITH A DECLARATION OF WAR.

WHEN ONE NATION IS BESIEGED BY THE FORCES OF EVIL, WE ALL ARE AT RISK. COLOMBIA CANNOT AFFORD TO FAIL AND CANNOT BE LEFT TO FACE THIS THREAT ALONE. THE U.S. HAS BEEN ASSISTING COLOMBIA AND MANY OTHER NATIONS OF THIS REGION IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS.

LAST WEEK, IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT BARCO'S STRONG ACTION AND THE TRAFFICKERS' DECLARATION OF WAR, I ANNOUNCED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS SENDING COLOMBIA SIXTY-FIVE MILLION DOLLARS IN EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO BOLSTER ITS LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS. WE EXPECT TO MAKE THE FIRST SHIPMENT THIS WEEK.

SIXTY-FIVE MILLION DOLLARS IS ONLY PART OF THE HELP COLOMBIA NEEDS IN THIS LIFE AND DEATH STRUGGLE. AT EVERY TURN, THE TRAFFICKERS SEEK TO OUTGUN, OUTSPEND, AND OUTMAN PRESIDENT BARCO'S EFFORT TO RESTORE THE RULE OF LAW TO COLOMBIAN SOCIETY.

I THEREFORE URGE YOU TO MAKE PUBLIC YOUR CLEAR SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT BARCO. AS WORLD LEADERS, WE MUST ALL DEMONSTRATE OUR SOLIDARITY WITH THE COLOMBIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT. I AM AFRAID THAT IF COLOMBIA CANNOT BATTLE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, NONE OF OUR SOCIETIES WILL ESCAPE THE SPREADING EPIDEMIC OF DRUGS.

SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH

1067 / 4/5

Jerusalem, September 24, 1989

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to you today in order to express our appreciation of the war you are waging against the menace of dangerous drugs and to offer our support and cooperation.

We have read with great interest and careful attention your important address of September 5, 1989 to the American people on this crucial issue, as well as the strategy outlined by the office of National Drug Control Policy, headed by Mr. Bennett. Ely Rubinstein, our Government Secretary, who chairs the council of our own newly-established National Anti-Drug Authority, recently met with Secretary Bennett, in New York to discuss the possibilities of cooperation between our two countries.

The drug threat has become a cancer that brings agony and despair to healthy societies. The determination of your administration to achieve, in your words, victory over drugs, which will necessitate hard work and time, should be emulated by all nations who face this horror. I sincerely hope that we shall be able to work together in all possible spheres of this struggle. The war on drugs must remain our common goal and cause.

Let me allude here to your message delivered by Ambassador Brown on 12 September, 1989 regarding the situation in Colombia.

Israel wholeheartedly applauds your active support for President Barco in his determined battle against the drug traffickers and the plague they have brought on his country. For many years now, we have had close working relations with Colombia in such fields as defense, agriculture, health, community development and road transport.

President George Bush
The White House
Washington DC

We have already conveyed this readiness and our full support for the Government of Colombia in a note on 24 August to the Foreign Ministry in Bogota. We offered in it "all possible assistance to confront the illegal trafficking of drugs" and reaffirmed our position regarding the war against this international scourge. We will reiterate to the Government of Colombia, both privately and publicly, our readiness to assist it in all possible ways toward the achievement of this goal.

In closing, May I repeat our sentiments of fraternity in this vital endeavor. We wish you the best of success and may God bless you.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir

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| דחפות: בחול לבוקר | שגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון | דף: 1 |
| סוג: גלמים | טופס פגוק | פתוך: 2 |
| תאריך וזמן חצור: | מצפ"א | אל: |
| כס' פברק: | אח"כ | דע: |
| תפסרד: | | |
| 536 | ק. לקונגרס. | פאת: |

סנאט: ויזה לערפת

רצ"ב רשימת 66 הסנטורים (2/3 מהסנאט) שחתמו על מכתב ליברמן-מק.
המכתב ישוגר הערב. מחר בבוקר (11:30) עומדים שני הסנטורים לקיים מסע בסנאט בנוגע
למכתב.

וילפרד ויטנא' פנא' .
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

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SENATORS SIGNING THE ARAFAT LETTER

September 25, 1989
12:00 noonRepublicans

Connie Mack
 Pete Wilson
 Charles Grassley
 Rudy Boschwitz
 Thad Cochran
 Dan Coats
 Alfonse D'Amato
 Larry Pressler
 Don Nickles
 Jesse Helms
 John McCain
 Dave Durenberger
 Conrad Burns
 Trent Lott
 William Cohen
 Phil Gramm
 Orrin Hatch
 Mitch McConnell
 Robert Kasten
 Slade Gorton
 Malcolm Wallop
 Arlen Specter
 Ted Stevens
 Steve Symms
 John Heinz

| | |
|-------------|-------|
| Republicans | 33 |
| Democrats | 33 |
| | ----- |
| TOTAL | 66 |

26. Frank Murkowski
 27. William Armstrong
 28. John Warner
 29. Christopher Bond
 30. William Roth
 31. Bob Packwood
 32. Warren Rudman
 33. Gordon Humphrey

Democrats

Joseph Lieberman
 Carl Levin
 Dennis DeConcini
 Wendell Ford
 J. James Exon
 Bob Graham
 Herb Kohl
 John Rockefeller
 Paul Sarbanes
 Alan Dixon
 Richard Bryan
 Kent Conrad
 Daniel Inouye
 Albert Gore
 Howell Heflin
 J. Bennett Johnston
 Frank Lautenberg
 Lloyd Bentsen

19. Quentin Burdick
 20. Thomas Daschle
 21. John Breaux
 22. Richard Shelby
 23. Howard Metzenbaum
 24. Daniel Moynihan
 25. Joseph Biden
 26. Harry Reid
 27. Jim Sasser
 28. Tom Harkin
 29. John Kerry
 30. Charles Robb
 31. Bill Bradley
 32. Max Baucus
 33. Donald Riegle

נכנס **
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סודי

חוזם: 9,21545

אל: המשרד

יעדים: ני/1226, מצב/1676, מנמת/356

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תח: גס: צפא

נד: 8

ארכיב

סודי/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ'א, ממד

דע: יועץ מדיני לשהח/ניו יורק

בריה'מ - ארה'ב

להלן מרוס על השיחות בין בייקר לבין שוורדנדרה על
המז'ת ברו'ומינג.

רוס הגדיר השיחות כ'לא רעות'. לדבריו, תומכים הסובייטים
בדיאלוג פלשתינאי-ישראלי וברעיון הבחירות כחלק מהמאמץ
לקדם תהליך השלום. הם לא אימצו לחלום את עשר הנקודות
של מובארק, אך רואים בהן מאמץ 'מעניין'. יחד עם זאת
הסובייטים עדיין כורכים את הסכמתם לדיאלוג ולבחירות
בפעילות בינלאומית כלשהיא, וחזרו לרעיון המפגשים של
מומחי מז'ת של 5 הקבועות, אף כי לא עומדים על כך
שמפגשים אלו יקדימו או אפילו יתנהלו בו זמנית למו'מ
על הבחירות.

השיחה על מז'ת, שערכה כ-45 דקות, נפתחה בהוצאה של
רוס, במשך כ-20 דקות, על ראיית ארה'ב את המצב.

כאשר הסובייטים בדבריהם הם התייחסו גם לאש'פ, אמר
בייקר, לפי רוס, כי ארה'ב אינה חושבת ששילוב אש'פ
במו'מ על הבחירות יקדם את התהליך, ואין היא מתכוונת
לכפות את אש'פ על ישראל.

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בענין לבנון, אין חילוקי דעות בין ארה"ב ובריה"מ ולשתיהן אין אלטרנטיבה למאמצי וועדה ה-3. מאידך התנגדות הסובייטים לפסקה בענין נסיגת הכוחות הזרים מלבנון והודו שהדבר נובע בשל התנגדות סוריה.

לשאלתי בענין הפסקה בהודעה של שחרור בני הערובה, אמר
רוט, שלא היתה כל התייחסות לש״יך עובייד והוא לא
הוזכר כלל.

171

N7

תפ: טוהח, טשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, איר, 3, סולטן, מזתים, סי' יבל

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It includes information about the sample, the data collection methods, and the statistical analysis.

3. The third part of the report is a discussion of the results of the study. It compares the findings with the previous research and discusses the implications of the study.

4. The fourth part of the report is a conclusion and a list of references. The conclusion summarizes the main findings of the study and the references list the sources used in the study.

Shamir aide declares status quo is 'tenable'

By Larry Cohler
WJW Staff Writer

Challenging a basic tenet of conventional wisdom on the Mideast, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's right hand man declared earlier this month that the status quo on the West Bank and Gaza was "tenable."

"It was [former Secretary of State] George Shultz who said, 'The status quo is untenable,'" recalled Yossi Ben-Aharon, director general of the prime minister's office. "But this problem is essentially insoluble. I know it goes very much against the American nature to imagine that a problem has no permanent solution. But there is none" for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza, he said.

In an interview with the *Washington Jewish Week*, Ben Aharon seemed to be signalling Israel's readiness to accept the current situation on the West Bank and Gaza if, as many now say is happening, Israel's elections proposal for the territories sputters out. Ben-Aharon emphasized that Israel would continue to tout the plan. But assuming the PLO continues to reject it, as he acknowledged they seemed set on doing, Israel would offer nothing more, even if no Palestinians in the territories stepped forward.

"The current government is composed of different factions with very different views," he pointed out, alluding to the two-party coalition of Labor and Likud now ruling Israel. "To get them to agree on a plan is no easy thing. You don't come up with a new one every week or month."

The United States and the PLO had each in their own way "sabotaged" Israel's plan, Ben-Aharon charged:

the PLO, through its intimidation tactics in the territories to stop any Palestinians there from coming forward to negotiate with Israel, and the United States through its insistence on continuing to dialogue with the PLO in Tunis.

That dialogue, said Ben-Aharon, had discouraged any Palestinians in the territories

"The Palestinian problem is essentially insoluble. I know it goes very much against the American nature to imagine that a problem has no permanent solution. But there is none."

from responding to the Israeli proposal without PLO approval.

Ben-Aharon rejected the contention that the Palestinian intifada had imposed economic, political and moral costs on Israel that it could not tolerate in the long run. Those who suggested this, he said, did not understand the "commitment and will" of Israel's population.

Israel's 10 percent unemployment rate, inflation and budget deficit, he said, were simply "the overhead we have to pay for living where we live."

He dismissed recent warning by Israeli Industry and Trade Minister Ariel Sharon that Israel faced a "crisis of will" with the intifada. In an interview last spring, Sharon criticized Israeli society for a

softness which, he said, was leading many Israelis into questioning the rightness of their own cause in the face of the intifada. Ben-Aharon dismissed Sharon's remarks as being motivated by "domestic politics."

Ben-Aharon said he did not believe the United States had given up on the Israeli proposal. But he conceded it was a "negative surprise" when Shamir received a letter from President Bush last week rejecting Israel's request for aid for what Shamir considered a key part of his proposal.

In the letter, Bush turned down Shamir's appeal for U.S. participation in a proposed \$2 billion program to rehabilitate the housing of Palestinian refugees on the West Bank and in Gaza. Shamir had portrayed this as one of several planks in his Mideast peace plan that was no less important than the proposal for elections. But Bush said that the solution to the Palestinians refugees' housing situation had to be part of "a comprehensive plan to resolve the conflict."

Ben-Aharon rejected the suggestion that this signalled that the administration saw the Palestinians preeminently as a people with political and even national rights that needed to be addressed rather than as refugees.

Ben-Aharon eschewed any fears that the administration might eventually turn back to supporting an international Mideast peace conference, which Israel opposes, if Is-

See Ben-Aharon, page 26

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Ben-Aharon

From page 25

rael's proposal faltered conclusively. Secretary of State James Baker's remark that the United States might have to do so, in congressional testimony last July, was merely "psychological pressure," Ben-Aharon said.

The Israeli official emphasized the degree to which the strategic relationship between the United States and Israel had become institutionalized over the last several years, during the Reagan administration. Nothing had changed this, he said. But he agreed that the two countries might

now be entering a period in which cooperation on their common strategic interests would continue even as their political interests diverged more frequently.

The Israeli-Arab conflict, said Ben-Aharon, was emerging as the striking exception to the cooling of conflicts worldwide that have been fueled by East-West tensions. This was because, in contrast to the Soviet Union's reduced commitment to countries such as Nicaragua and Afghanistan, Soviet military supply support for Syria and Iraq continued unabated, he said. ■

3/3

ISRAELI ASSURED OF U.S. SUPPORT SEARCH FOR PEACE
(Article on Baker briefing on Bush's bilaterals)

New York -- Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres was assured of the United States' continued active support in the search for Middle East peace September 25 during a 55-minute meeting with President Bush.

Secretary of State Baker, who also participated in the meeting, told a late afternoon news briefing the Israeli economy and Soviet Jewish refugees were other "major topics" covered. He offered no details on either of those issues.

Baker told questioners there was "still a very good chance" he would meet with foreign ministers of Egypt and Israel soon for a meeting to get an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue started. Baker had wanted the meeting this week when all three are in New York for the U.N. session, but scheduling problems have prevented that.

"I can't tell you exactly when that meeting will be held," the secretary said, "but I would suspect that within the course of the next week we'll be able to arrange it." It's expected the meeting will be in Washington.

"We continue to be committed to the Israeli election proposal," Baker told reporters. "We continue to view the Egyptian ten points as an acceptance, in effect, by Egypt of Israel's elections proposal."

"We continue to be committed to trying to promote direct discussions between the Israelis and Palestinians and we continue to see this as a potential way of getting there," the secretary said.

President Bush was scheduled to meet later in the day with Foreign Minister Arens of Israel and Baker said he would have "a more extensive meeting" with Arens later this week in New York.

When one reporter noted that the faction of the Israeli government led by Shimon Peres has voiced opposition to the election proposal advanced last May, Secretary Baker pointed out that "the proposal has not been rejected by, as you put it, the other part of the Israeli government. It's a matter for continued discussion and consideration."

President Bush also met with President Sarney of Brazil. Baker said they discussed the environment, the Brazilian economy, Panama and democracy, and the transition in Brazil.

President Sarney spoke of Brazil's commitment to democracy as well as the movement toward democracy in Latin America, Baker said.

Noting that Brazil will be conducting an election in November, Baker said "the two presidents agreed that the situation in Panama was regrettable when you consider that democracy there was being subverted and perverted by General (Antonio) Noriega."

The secretary said the United States thinks "it's very important to continue to note that twenty out of twenty-two Latin American nations have basically said that General Noriega is the problem. They have expressed profound regret at the fact that the will of the Panamanian people is being thwarted."

"We think it's important that they continue to maintain that position and we have every reason to believe that they will," Baker said, noting that many Latin American countries have recalled their

ambassadors from Panama.

Both President Sarney and Shimon Peres "were very congratulatory" of President Bush's address to the U.N. General Assembly earlier in the day, the secretary said.

Baker also announced that Bush will meet with President Barco of Colombia September 28 in Washington.

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מזכירות הממשלה

ירושלים, כ"ד באלול התשמ"ט
24 בספטמבר 1989

ס ו ד י

אל: ראש הממשלה

מאת: מזכיר הממשלה

שלום רב,

הנדון: שיחה עם שגריר ארה"ב באו"ם תומאס פיקרינג

השיחה נערכה ביזמתו (19.9) בדירתו בניו-יורק (לא
תוכנה מראש).

להלן נקודות עיקריות:

א. לבנון: סיפר על הרצעות הסגודיות מטעם הועדה המשותפת להחלטות
מועבי"ט בקשר לפיוס הפנימי בלבנון, הכוללות - כחובן - פסקה
שעניינה "נסיגת ישראל" - בלשוננו, כדי שאם הכל יתפרק יהיה את מי
לדאש. אמר כי הוא פועל ל"מיתון" הצעת ההחלטה לטווח רחוק
יותר. הפציר שאנו נהיה נכונים להצהיר כי אם ייראה שהעניינים
בלבנון מסתדרים וניתן להבטיח בטחוננו גם בלי להיות בדרום
לבנון, נהיה גמישים כאשר למדיניותנו שם, זאת, בלי לחייב עצמנו
יחד על המידה שכן יש עוד כבדת דרך של שנים לפני שלבנון תוכל
להיות מדינה מתפקדת.

ב. בני הערובה: שאל אם יש חדש מבחינתנו. אמרתי שלא ידוע לי כי
יש. מסר שהם עצמם והמוכ"ל, שהוא איש הגון וריאליסטי כאשר
למידת כוחו, מתוסכלים למדי; האיראנים אמנם אינם אומרים "לא"
לדעיונות השונים בנושא, אך דורשים את הפשרת כל נכסיהם, דבר שלא
יעלה על הדעת ומכל מקום העניין תקוע. העיר בהקשר לשיח' עוביד כי
כשנחטף השיח' תמה הוא, פיקרינג, האם אנו חושבים במונחים כמו
"עיסוקת ג'בריל" בשעתו, שהיתה מאד לא פופולרית בדעת הקהל
בישראל. אמרתי שאינני מניח שכן, אך יש מחויבות כוללת כלפי
החייילים.

ג. ירדן: אמר שנפגש עם הנסיך חסן לאחרונה. שמע את הנוסחה (שכבר
שמענו לא אחת) כי ירדן מעוניינת בהשתתפות בתהליך השלום בשלב
מתאים ולא תניח שהדברים יזוזו בלעדיה, אך אין פירוש הדבר
הצטרפות מיידית או קרובה. לשאלתי אמר כי חסן מנסה להקדין
יציבות, אך יש חזושה עמוקה יותר של אי-יציבות. כאשר לדעיונות
כמו של אנשי "פורין אפירס" (כקונפדרציה העשויה להיות משולשת),
ספק אם ירדן תלך לכך בשלב זה. פיקרינג עצמו חושב על הנושא
במונחים רחבים שעיקום הדיבט הכלכלי.

- ד. תהליך השלום: - העדתי כי מצייס מנסה למלא תפקיד מתווך, דבר שאולי היה חיובי אילו נהגה כהלכה ביחסיה עמנו מבחינות שונות, אך ספק אם היא ראויה לכך במצב הנוכחי. זאת הגם שהיינו שמחים אילו עודדה ערבים פלסטינאים מיוש"ש ועזה להצטרף ליוזמתנו. אמרתי כי כמתווך ארה"ב היא המקובלת עלינו יותר מאחרים, אף כי לא בכל אנו רואים עין בעין. מדבריו הכינותי כי הוא מאלה המנסים בתוך המחשול ללחוץ למעורבות יתר של ארה"ב בתהליך ולפעולות רבה יותר, ואין זו נטיית ביקר, המסתפק לפי שעה ביוזמות מן האזור עצמו. פיקרינג ציין זאת, אך הוסיף ששולץ אולי שגה בנסיון "לתפוס מדוכה" בשעתו. אמרתי כי פעולות צריכה לבוא כשרשעה כשרה לכך, אך ביקור של ביקר היה יכול להועיל להכנתו את האזור, בלי לקשור זאת בהכרח ב"פריצת-דרך" בתהליך.
- ה. ביקור ערפאת בעצרת: - אמר שטרם התקבלה פניה והאמריקנים מנסים "לשדר" שרצוי שלא תבוא פניה כזאת (חמק חלומר מה יעשו אם תבוא, אף כי ניכר שכנראה יאשרו). אמרתי עמדתנו.
- ו. ציונות-גזענות: - אמר שאינו מפסיק לעסוק בנושא בפורומים שונים, אף כי טרם באה השעה להביא להחלטת עצרת שתשלוז זאת.

כ ב ר כ ה ,

אליקים ויובינשטיין



נכ"א

מוכירות הממשלה

ירושלים, כ"ד באלול התשמ"ט
24 בספטמבר 1989

ארה"ב

ס ו ד י

אל : ראש הממשלה

מאת: מוכיר הממשלה

שלום רב,

הנדון: שיחה עם סימור רייך ומלקולם הונליין

בשיחה ממושכת בניו-יורק עלו נקודות אלה:

1. תהליך ואשלוש: מסרתי ד"ש מחך, בצירוף המסד כי על יהדות ארה"ב לחמוך כיוזמת האשלוש בלא קפיצות ונוסחאות שלא נבחנו, ולשחזר על אחדות. רייך אמר כי הוא סבור שאין צורך לשנות את היוזמה, אך עם זאת התליץ לא לפסוד כליל את גישת מובארכ. לדעתו מרבית הנקודות הקשורות לבחירות אינן בעייתיות, ובאשר לענין התושבים הערבים בירושלים - יש לדעתו להידוש לכך, גם אם לא בהכרח במועד הנוכחי כדי לא לנהל מו"מ פעמיים. לעומת זאת אין לעסוק בנושאים שהם רלבנטיים לפתרון הקבע כמו התנחלויות ו"שטחים תמורת שלום" וכדומה. הוא ממליץ למנוע שהדברים יהפכו ל"יוזמת מובארכ" במקום "יוזמת שמיר" או "יוזמת ממשלת ישראל". עוד הוסיף, כי גבואך לארה"ב בנובמבר (כדעתו לכך בארץ לפני כן, בסוף אוקטובר) אם לא ינועו הדברים, רצוי שתביא לבית הלבן חידוש כלשהו. אמרתי כי אמנם "אין בית מדרש בלא חידוש", אך אי-אפשר לבוא עם חכנית שלום חדשה מדי חצי שנה, הציע כי הקשר האישי עם בוש יישמר על-ידי שיחות טלפון ומכתבים מדי פעם (השיחה הטלפונית הייתה טובה) - למשל מכתב בנושא הסמים. באשר לאש"פ, ציינתי הפער בין מה שאנו יודעים על הנעשה בחוכו ובין ההצהרות הפומביות. אמרו שאם המדובר בחומר שניתן לשחררו רצוי לעשות כן, כי זו אינה הפרספציה בארה"ב.

2. יהדות בריה"מ: רייך והונליין הזהירו שניהם במלים חקיפות, כי יהדות ארה"ב הקריבה מה שנראה בעיניה כעמדה מוסרית (בענין כניסת יהודי ברה"מ לארה"ב) כדי לאפשר ליהודים לצאת לישראל; יהדות ארה"ב יכלה ללחוץ על הממשל ונמנעה מעשות כן (תוך כדי שיחתנו הודיע איש "בני-ברית" מושינסטון דן מריאשין לרייך כי שמוקלד, איש הקשר שלהם כקצילח מוסקבה, מוסר שיש קבוצה יהודית המארגנת הפגנה גדולה מול שגרירות ארה"ב למחנות על המדיניות החדשה; רייך כמובן מעוניין למנוע זאת ככל הניתן).

נוכח כל האמור, הפצירו כי יינתן ביטוי פומבי לכך שאנו עושים למען קליטת יהודי בריה"מ - מה גם שמאמרו של ברינקלי ב"ניו-יורק טיימס" ביום א' החולף עשה רושם קשה מאד בנושא זה, של אזלת יד (שמעתי, אגב, התיחסות לכך במקומות שבהם ביקרתי מטעם ה"בונדס"). הונליין דיבר על ועידה יהודית להצגת תכניותינו ולתביעת סיוע כספי, אמנם לא בהיקף של ועידת הסולידריות, אך בהיקף בולט. כמו-כן כי לקראת מפגש הסוכנות בסוף אוקטובר וביקור ראש הממשלה ב"עצרת הכללית" של הפדרציות בנובמבר יהיה "נייר לבן" כלשהו המציג את תכניות הקליטה, כשיכון ובתעסוקה, שכן הבטחות קודמות לא הוגשמו.

3. רייך גילה עניין באן פולרד. מסרתי על השתדלותנו למענה ללא הצלחה. הוא סבור שאין הממשל נוהג עמה כהלכה. נציג "בני-ברית" ג'ורג' ספקטור הורשה לבקרה בימים הקרובים.

4. רייך והונליין תומכים מאד במאמצינו בתחום הגירור.

5. אוסיף מלים אחדות על רושם כללי מביקורים בקהילות יהודיות אחדות; המידע על הנעשה בישראל אינו מספיק. ישנה עייפות מסוימת בנושאים ישראליים (כביכול - "תגמרו כבר משהו עם הפלסטינאים"). אף כי יש יהודים, פעילים מסורים לא מעטים, דומה שהרוב הדומם טעון "ניעור" בהקשר זה.

בברכה,
אליהם וברנשטיין

העתק: מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה

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| שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק | יד: _____ פתוק: _____ |
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| כחית: השגרירות, וושינגטון | 1/11 513 |

מפגש בייקר-שברנאדזה

רצ"ב התודעה המשותפת כפי שהתפרסמה בתום השיחות.

החלק הרגיונלי בעמ' 4-6.

שטיין

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תפוצה: -36

September 23, 1989

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JOINT STATEMENT

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met September 22-23 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming for discussions on the entire spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations, in the course of the Foreign Minister's official visit to the United States.

The Foreign Minister also had a discussion with President Bush on September 31 at the White House, where he delivered a letter from Chairman Gorbachev which contained new ideas and proposals on security questions. They had a wide-ranging exchange of views on the overall direction and prospects for development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The two sides attach great significance to contacts between U.S. and Soviet leaders in the development of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue at this important and promising point in U.S.-Soviet relations. Based on earlier understandings between President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev, the sides agreed that the next U.S.-Soviet summit meeting will take place in the United States in late spring-early summer 1990.

Both sides agree that their common goal is to build a more stable, constructive and sustainable relationship, one in which openness and cooperation increasingly replace mistrust and competition. While significant differences remain on certain issues, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister believe that -- with continuing efforts and shared commitment to a candid dialogue aimed at finding practical and concrete solutions -- it will be possible to further and broaden the progress that has been made in recent years in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Toward this end, the discussions in Jackson Hole were productive and serious. They were complemented by the efforts of experts working groups on all parts of the five-part agenda, both in Wyoming and preceding the ministerial in Washington. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reached specific agreements in several areas, and defined new directions for work in other areas.

I

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a thorough and productive review on the range of arms control and disarmament issues. They noted with satisfaction that, since their May meeting in Moscow, the Nuclear and Space Talks, Nuclear Testing Talks, and bilateral consultations on chemical weapons have resumed.

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The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a detailed discussion of nuclear and space issues, including the ideas contained in the letters exchanged by President Bush and Chairman Gorbachev.

Regarding ARM and space, the Soviet side introduced a new approach aimed at resolving this significant issue. Both sides agree that the Soviet approach opens the way to achieving and implementing a START Treaty without reaching a Defense and Space agreement. The sides agreed to drop the approach of a nonwithdrawal commitment while continuing to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The U.S. side said it would consider carefully the other aspects of the overall Soviet approach. Both sides agreed that their negotiators would consider these issues in Geneva. They also agreed that the negotiators would discuss the U.S. invitation for Soviet Government experts to visit two U.S. facilities involved in strategic defense research.

The Soviet side stated that, guided by its long-standing goal of strengthening the ARM Treaty regime, it had decided to completely dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station. The U.S. side expressed satisfaction with this announcement.

At the same time, the Soviet side stressed again the necessity of removing its concerns about the U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Great Britain. The U.S. side promised to consider these concerns, in consultation with its Allies.

In the interest of promoting progress in the negotiations, the Secretary announced that the U.S. side was withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs in START, contingent on the funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side expressed satisfaction with this announcement and the two sides agreed on the need further to develop provisions for effective verification for limits on mobile ICBMs. In this connection, they also reached agreement on additional elements of common ground regarding the verification of mobile ICBMs, building on the elements agreed at the Moscow summit and subsequent work in Geneva.

Both sides noted the need to resolve the ALCM and SLCM issues. On ALCMs, the Soviet side put forward a new idea concerning its approach on how to deal with ALCMs and heavy bombers.

On SLCMs, the Soviet side offered new approaches for dealing with this difficult problem. The Soviet side raised the possibility of dealing with SLCMs in a broader naval arms context. As for the Nuclear and Space Talks, the Soviet side appealed to the American side to concentrate on verification and

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said that in the context of a verification system for SLICMs, these weapons could be limited outside of the text of a START treaty on the basis of reciprocal obligations. While reiterating its willingness to study the Soviet ideas, the U.S. side for its part emphasized its doubts about the feasibility of a workable verification system for SLICMs, and noted its long-standing view that there are serious problems involved in any discussion of the limitation of naval arms.

The Soviet side responded positively to President Bush's June initiative on verification and stability measures. In this regard, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough exchange on the details of the initiative, and signed an agreement encouraging the development of such measures and outlining principles for implementing them. They also completed an agreement on the advance notification of major strategic exercises. The sides examined the other verification and stability measures and agreed to explore these further in Geneva.

The sides also agreed that, for purposes of the 1600 START limit, ballistic missiles will be defined in terms of missiles and their associated launchers, thus resolving a long-standing issue.

New instructions will be issued to negotiators to take account of the exchanges on these and other START issues.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reaffirmed the objective of early conclusion of a comprehensive, verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. To intensify efforts toward this goal, and to enhance openness and confidence between the two countries, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The MOU provides for an exchange of data on U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles, and for visits and inspections of chemical weapons sites.

The sides adopted a special joint statement on chemical weapons in which they stressed the need to conclude a chemical weapons ban and underscored their concern about the problem posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister examined the status of the nuclear testing negotiations. They noted that the verification protocol for the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty has been agreed ad referendum by their negotiators, and reached agreement to incorporate hydrodynamic and seismic monitoring, as well as on-site inspection, into the verification protocol for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as the levels above which these measurements would occur. In order to obtain a statistically significant number of data points to improve the national technical means of each side, each side will guarantee the other side the right to make on-site

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hydrodynamic yield measurements of at least two tests per year during the first five years following ratification of this treaty. After five years, each side shall guarantee one such hydrodynamic measurement a year thereafter unless otherwise agreed by the two sides. These agreements provide a framework for conclusion of the verification protocols, completing a process that began fifteen years ago. They instructed their delegations to continue intensive work to resolve all remaining issues so that these two documents can be submitted for ratification as quickly as possible.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister noted with approval the work being done in the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe, and called for rapid conclusion of an agreement.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed in principle to the "Open Skies" concept proposed by President Bush in May, which could make a genuine contribution to openness and confidence-building. They noted their willingness to attend an international conference on the subject.

The sides noted the importance of joint efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technology and agreed to activate bilateral consultations on this pressing problem.

II

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister had a thorough and frank exchange on regional issues. The sides reaffirmed their belief that active U.S. and Soviet support for political solutions that are comprehensive and based on broad national reconciliation could facilitate the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts around the world. They noted that the two sides continue to differ on some specific aspects of the question of arms supplies and their effect on the possibility of political settlements.

They noted that a cycle of regional experts discussions had been held on Central America, Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Both sides found these discussions useful for understanding one another's views, and agreed to continue experts meetings in the future.

The sides expressed their support for efforts by the Central American countries to establish a lasting peace in that region on the basis of the Esquipulas Treaty and subsequent agreements, which include a commitment not to permit the use of their territory to support those seeking to destabilize other Central American countries. While noting their differences on certain questions, including the level of arms flows to the region, they called on all interested parties to support this process actively by respecting in full the letter and spirit of the



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accords signed by the leaders of the five Central American countries. They also called upon all states outside the region to respect the request by the Central American countries to end all military assistance to irregular or insurgent forces.


The two sides agreed on the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan on the basis of national reconciliation, one that ensures the peaceful, independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan. While their approaches differ over how to translate these principles into reality, they nevertheless agreed that a transition period is required as well as an appropriate mechanism to establish a broad-based government. The sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan.

The sides reaffirmed their support for an active Middle East peace process. Among other issues, they also exchanged views on the place in that process of an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue leading to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in which all relevant parties will participate.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister expressed in a separate joint statement their strong support for the Arab League Tripartite Committee plan on Lebanon to bring about a ceasefire, a lifting of the blockade and a dialogue among the Lebanese parties aimed at achieving a political settlement. They condemned the taking of hostages and called for the immediate release of all hostages.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister advocated a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia and a continuation of the negotiation process toward this end. At this stage, they feel it is most important to take efforts to avert intensification of the civil war and the return of the Pol Pot regime to power. The sides declared their readiness to announce, together with other states, a moratorium on military assistance to all Cambodian factions as part of a comprehensive settlement.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed on the need to implement fully and on schedule the UN plan for the granting of independence to Namibia, including the holding of free and fair elections. They expressed their support for the national reconciliation process in Angola and for efforts to secure peace and stability in Mozambique. The sides also advocated a peaceful, political solution to the internal conflicts in Ethiopia and supported the negotiation process underway between the Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.



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III

Within the framework of the on-going U.S.-Soviet dialogue on human rights and humanitarian affairs, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister held a constructive discussion of a broad range of human rights and humanitarian issues, including the role of international accords and generally accepted standards in the field of human rights and of the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE agreements. Specific reference was made to policies and cases of exit and entry, freedom of conscience, criminal practices concerning which questions had been raised and on which information will be exchanged. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed to work to move forward on a range of programs that will promote a better understanding of each other's institutions, legislation and practices which affect human rights and humanitarian issues.

IV

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister discussed a range of questions related to the other two parts of the agenda, bilateral and transnational issues. They signed two agreements: the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Mutual Visits between Inhabitants of the Bering Straits Region and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Bering Straits Regional Commission.

A U.S.-USSR joint statement was also signed on a uniform interpretation of rules of international law governing innocent passage through territorial waters, which removes a potential source of friction in the relationship between the two countries. They endorsed a working paper containing proposals for extending the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. In furtherance of this, the sides have agreed to approach the three other Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council with a proposal to discuss this question.

U.S. and Soviet experts together elaborated an approach for resolution of the Northern Pacific Maritime Boundary issue. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister directed the experts to meet again soon to complete their work on this basis.

The two sides agreed to start talks regarding the possible expansion of air routes between the two countries.

In connection with the virtually completed agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy it was decided to accelerate completion of proposals aimed at drawing up a new agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Nuclear Energy.

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The sides reached agreement in principle that U.S. and Soviet Cultural and Information Centers would be opened in Moscow and Washington, respectively.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister approved a bilateral work program.

The sides also discussed matters connected with implementation of the U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding signed in January 1989 regarding cooperation in combatting the flow of illegal narcotics. They expressed readiness to consider new ideas for bilateral and international cooperation in this field. They agreed that experts from both sides would meet in Moscow before the end of 1989 to discuss concrete proposals.

The two sides conducted an extensive discussion on the problem of combatting international terrorism and agreed in principle that experts would meet again in early 1990.

The two sides underscored the desirability of intensifying contacts between high-level elected and appointed officials in a variety of areas.

They devoted special attention to continued and new cooperation on a range of bilateral and international environmental problems, including global and climate change, as well as the problem of various sources of pollution.

The two sides confirmed their intent to conclude an agreement on cooperation on study of the world oceans by the end of this year, and to continue their work of preparing an agreement on cooperation in the field of housing and other types of construction.

The two sides agreed to consult and cooperate with the goal of increasing the effectiveness of the UN.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed on the necessity of continuing the search for new spheres of joint action directed at qualitative movement in bilateral and transnational issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.

A detailed discussion took place, including with the participation of experts, on a range of economic questions. It was agreed that these useful discussions will be continued.

* * *

Both sides confirmed the utility of conducting regular meetings at the ministerial level for considering and resolving major problems of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

September 23, 1989

JOINT STATEMENT
ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

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During their September 22-23 meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and the USSR to pursue aggressively the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons on the basis of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban. Both sides consider the early conclusion and entry into force of a convention to this effect to be one of the highest priorities for the international community. They believe that with the active and constructive participation of all states it will be possible to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date, and call upon all parties to the negotiations to join them in achieving this objective.

The two sides also believe that greater openness between them and among others could contribute to the prospects for reaching an early agreement on an effective ban on chemical weapons. As a concrete expression of the commitment of their two countries toward this end, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange. The steps agreed upon in the Memorandum are intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

The verification experiment and data exchange will be conducted in two phases. Phase I involves the exchange of general data on the sides' chemical weapons capabilities and a series of visits to relevant military and civil facilities on their respective territories. In Phase II the sides will exchange detailed data and permit on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the information exchanged.

The sides also agreed to undertake a cooperative effort with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons. They agreed to reciprocal visits to monitor destruction operations of the other side, and to the exchange of information on past, current and planned destruction activities and procedures.

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The sides noted their agreement on some procedures for conducting challenge inspections and on the provisions governing the order of destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons production facilities. These two approaches will be introduced into the multilateral negotiations in Geneva in an effort to contribute to those negotiations. They also stressed the need to concentrate in the near future on resolving remaining verification-related issues. The two sides intend to pursue intensively their bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban with the view to help achieve further progress in the multilateral negotiations.

The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister expressed their grave concern about the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the illegal use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons exist and are spread. They reaffirmed the importance of and their commitment to the final declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons held earlier this year as well as their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The two sides emphasized the obligation of all states not to use chemical weapons in violation of international law and urged that prompt and effective measures be taken by the international community if that obligation is violated. In this regard, they underscored their support for the UN Secretary-General in investigating reports of violations of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law.

The sides welcomed Australia's convening of a Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons, which has just concluded in Canberra. They noted that this conference provided an important opportunity for serious discussion between government and industry representatives from around the world. The sides expressed satisfaction with the extensive and productive work accomplished at the conference and the positive results reflected in the Chairman's final summary statement.

Finally, the sides expressed the view that a truly global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons is the best means to address the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons on a durable long term basis. In the meantime, the sides emphasized their readiness to attempt to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. They intend to continue consultations on this issue.

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September 23, 1989

JOINT STATEMENT ON LEBANON

While expressing their deep concern over the absence of peace and a settlement in Lebanon, the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirm their urgent appeal to take all necessary measures to bring to an end the sufferings of the Lebanese people, and urge a continued search for a political solution of the Lebanese crisis. They reaffirm the assumption that there is no military solution to the problems of that country. A constructive dialogue between Lebanese who themselves must reach lasting agreements on peaceful arrangements in Lebanon on the basis of a balance of interests is the only rational path towards national reconciliation.

The United States and the Soviet Union welcome the resumption of the peacemaking mission of the Tripartite Committee of the Arab League on Lebanon in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the Casablanca Arab summit and the Committee's efforts aimed at a cease-fire, the lifting of blockades, and initiation of the process of political settlement. They call upon all the parties involved in Lebanese affairs to respond positively to these efforts and to do their utmost to support the Tripartite Committee's action to complete its work successfully. They also note the importance of extending strong international support for the activities of the Tripartite Committee and for their own part intend to proceed further in this direction. Both sides reaffirm their resolute position in favor of preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Lebanese state.

The United States and the Soviet Union condemn any acts of taking hostages and demand that they be set free no matter where or by whom they are held captive.

END

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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* אל: : ניו-יורק / עבור היועץ המדיני ושנ"ח *

* אשרת כניסה לערפאת. *

* 1. התחושה בקרב גורמי אש"פ היא שסוגית קבלת ויזה
לערפאת להופיע בעצרת לא תהווה בעיה. עם זאת, לא
 ברור אם הוגשו בקשה לארה"ב לקבלת ויזה. גורמי ממשל
 ובראשם כוש, טוענים שאין עדיין החלטה בנושא והוא
 ידון רק לאחר שתוגש בקשה.

* 2. לערפאת עניין להופיע בעצרת בניו יורק במהלך הדיון
הכללי ביחד עם ראשי מדינות. לא נראה שתוגש בקשה
לויזה אם יוערך ע"י ערפאת שהיא תדחה שכן בכך תהיה
 פגיעה ביוקרת ערפאת ובדיאלוג ארה"ב-אש"פ. א"א מן
 הנמנע, על כן, שמתנהל מו"מ מאחורי הקלעים, כאשר
 ארה"ב מנסה לגבות מחיר פוליטי מאש"פ בהקשר לעשר
 הנקודות המצריות והרכב המשלחת הפלסטינית למו"מ עם
 ישראל.

* מרכז.

* צש

* תפ: שוהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז *



11/10/89
[Signature]

official text



United States Information Service
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-- the political, economic and social conditions under which the Palestinians and the Israelis will live.

If you visit the place on the road to Jerusalem where a bus filled with human beings was propelled into a ravine in a deranged terroristic act, you cannot but be struck by the horror and the humanity of the problem. If you meet with a group of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and listen to their stories of life during the Intifada, you cannot but be struck by the human costs and tragedies that are played out every day.

If you see pictures of the devastation wrought by both sides during the Gulf war, you cannot but be struck by dangers facing all of the peoples of the region in the build-up of new and more destructive weapons systems in the area. Long-range missile systems coupled with chemical warheads pose new threats of terrible destruction. The specter of nuclear proliferation adds another dimension to this potential nightmare. These more awesome threats make more urgent the task of trying to find lasting peace.

There are geo-political issues involved in this conflict. There are strategic dimensions. There are diplomatic processes at work. But the conflict begins, and one day will end, with the emotions, desires, fears, animosities, loyalties, and aspirations of people -- real human beings. Thus, we cannot deal with the conflict as a classroom lesson on political theory.

Israelis and Palestinians and all the citizens of the Arab states have dreams to live in peace with security. The costs that they all face because of the instability are genuine and dear. Their children and grandchildren to come have a right to something better. The object of the peace process is that better life, that beautiful condition we call peace.

With the important exception of peace between Egypt and Israel, there is no peace today. The absence of war is not enough. We need to do something to reduce the prospect of war, the potential level of devastation if war does occur, and the costs of constantly preparing for war.

Let me emphasize one fundamental and enduring reality about U.S. policy in the Middle East -- nothing will undermine our unshakable commitment to Israel, its security and its well being. I visited Yad Vashem in August. I saw with my own eyes the horror of genocide, and the results of the world's silence and inaction. This will not ever happen again. I visited the memorial to the children cut off in their youth by the horrible scourge of anti-semitism. They never had a future. We owe it to them -- and to our children and grandchildren -- never to permit anything to again call into question the security of Israel.

There is, however, a motivation that flows from the privations that all endure in the region today. No one is satisfied with the status quo. This dissatisfaction provides a base on which to build. The more noble sentiments and aspirations which Arabs and Israelis share -- that wish for a better life for the children -- provide building material for the process. Flags, masks, guns, and stones are the symbols of both the dissatisfaction and the conflict. The peace process and the voices of reason are the symbols of hope for the humanity which today suffers. It is on the conviction that our common humanity deserves better that we are strengthened for our tasks. We move from that human conviction back to the diplomatic realities on which we base our daily search.

Changes in the Region

There are many things about this conflict that seem not to change, but that is not the case. The conflict has changed and so has thinking in the region.

-- The wall of Arab hostility to the existence of Israel has cracked. Today's debate is about peace processes, not about a strategy of how best to destroy Israel.

-- As ideological intensity declines in some groups, religious fervor has crept into the vacuum. This resurgence of religious fervor has altered the perspective through which the conflict is seen, not necessarily for the better.

Beyond those two attitudinal changes which have occurred over the past couple of decades, there have been in the last couple of years some watershed events which have changed dramatically the situation on the ground.

-- First came the initiation of the intifada in december of 1987.

This uprising has altered life in the occupied territories dramatically. The Intifada has changed irrevocably the way Palestinians think about themselves and the way the world thinks about Palestinians. Those who cling to the outmoded rhetoric of armed struggle as a rallying cry should remember that the difference between armed struggle and terrorism is a slippery slope.

-- The second major event was the decision by the King of Jordan to disengage from Jordan's role in the occupied West Bank in July 1988. While that decision did not remove Jordan from the peace process -- in fact, Jordan still has an important role -- the decision gave a heightened consciousness of responsibility to the Palestinians.

-- The third change was the PLO's December 1988 acceptance of U.N. resolution 242, recognition of Israel's right to exist, and the renunciation of terrorism which led to the decision by the United States government to begin a substantive dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

-- The last significant event in this series was the decision by the government of national unity in Israel last may to advance a four point proposal for achieving peace in the region. The fourth point -- election of Palestinians to negotiate with Israel on an interim settlement and final status -- has given a new life to the peace process.

It is that new life we hope to nurture. We seek to do this on the basis of our publicly enunciated principles.

Enduring U.S. Principles

The principles on which U.S. policy is based provide the intellectual and the practical context for our approach to resolution of the human problems that I described at the outset of my remarks. These principles give our policy a consistency and openness which are of value not only to ourselves but to our interlocutors in Israel and among the Palestinians.

-- We believe in a comprehensive settlement through negotiations based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. These resolutions are not empty words but describe the principles of territory for peace, recognizing the identity of Israel and her security, together with that of all of the states in the region. the principle of legitimate political rights for Palestinians is also an essential element.

-- The negotiations mentioned above must include face-to-face talks in order to succeed. We believe the elections proposal can provide the basis for such face-to-face talks.

In the first instance, talks will be needed to reach agreement on

the modalities for the elections; but the elections do not stand as a goal in and of themselves. They are a way station to negotiations on transitional arrangements which are themselves a way station to final status. We must not lose sight of what the goal is: a political settlement defining how Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arabs will relate to each other and live together over the long term.

Let there be no mistake: The United States is committed to moving to final status. But it is today's reality that we cannot move directly to final status. The gap between the parties is simply too great to allow it. Elections in our view constitute an integral part of the process leading to transitional arrangements and final status.

As for ourselves, our thinking as regards final status is well known: We do not support an independent Palestinian state, nor do we support annexation or permanent Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza. What we do support is self-government for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in a manner acceptable to Palestinians, Israel and Jordan.

At the same time, we also support the right of all parties to bring their aspirations for final status to the negotiating table. Neither the United States nor any party can impose its view of final status on the other. Only the parties to the conflict, through their own negotiations, can ensure that they will reach a mutually acceptable destination.

The process of negotiations, therefore, involves no assured outcomes and is not without risks. But parties to negotiations are protected by the nature of the process itself. Each holds a key to beginning negotiations. Each party holds an absolute veto over future progress. This applies equally to Palestinian representatives, as it does to representatives of the government of Israel.

I cite this specifically because Palestinians and Israelis have asked me -- and through me the U.S. government -- how can you guarantee that this process will not lead to some disadvantage for us?

My response is that the U.S. can make no such guarantee, but the parties who negotiate this reserve to themselves the ability to resist an inequitable agreement at any stage in the process. This is their right. The task of statesmen though, is to work so that no party will wish to exercise this right.

Potentialities for Movement

I have read frequently in the press of late and heard complaints from diplomats and others that the peace process is stagnating. It is not. The peace process is gestating. The parties are considering their tactics, their moves, how best to resolve internal tensions. Ideas are circulating. Allies of the process are looking for ways to bridge differences. For example, the government of Egypt has suggested a ten-point proposal which might provide a bridge for the Israelis and the Palestinians. We believe the Egyptian points constitute a constructive and valuable addition to ongoing diplomatic efforts. Others are in quiet contact, away from the glare of publicity, exploring ideas. The public rhetoric is tough and often appears unyielding. But if it is correct that no one wants the status quo and that the noble idea of elections offers hope for movement, we may see some progress.

There are potentialities for movement. Not all the issues are intractable. Let me give you a couple of examples of openings for progress, not perfect solutions as currently written.

-- One example of an issue to be resolved is the question of international observation of elections in the Occupied Territories.

Some have argued some form of an organized international supervisory corps. I would argue that the international media and parliamentary and public interest visitors can do everything necessary to assure all sides about the free and fair nature of the elections. The world press corps in this case would provide more assurances to people about the validity of the elections than thousands of so-called supervisors.

-- Another example of an action which could contribute to movement in the area and which could inspire renewed confidence would be a change in tactics on the issue of Israeli credentials at the United Nations General Assembly. Every year around this time, the question comes up for a vote. It is time for the Arab nations to follow the example of the PLO and acknowledge Israel's existence as a state. Israel is entitled to membership in the United Nations under the principle of universality. It is time for the Arab governments to stop the anachronistic practice of voting against Israeli credentials.

There is potential for movement. It is not for the U.S. to suggest or propose a timetable but for the two sides to work out mutually their own timetable in face-to-face negotiations. That is what the human tragedy cries out for and what shared Israeli and Palestinian aspirations demand. That is what the changes in the region open the way for, and that is what our principles and our pragmatic approach to peace support.

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5. אחת המסקנות מהתיזה בדבר מרכזיות השיקול הפנים אמריקאי בניהול המדיניות והחשש מפני השלכותיו של כשלון על דימויו של בייקר. כפולטיקאי לגבי מעורבות בתהליך השלום יכולה להיות שבקביעת מעורבות הממשל (ומעורבותו הוא) בתהליך יהיה בייקר קשוב לעמדות הקונגרס והקהילה היהודית (שתי קבוצות לחץ) בטרם יחליט על העלאת הפרופיל של המעורבות. חשש מפני עימותים (וכשלון אפשרי) יתריעו אותו מלהכנס למהלך עליו הוא עלול לשלם מחיר כפולטיקאי.

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Baker's World

If Politics Dictate the Secretary's Approach,
Some Question the Course of Foreign Policy

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20 — With one sentence on Tuesday, Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d confirmed openly what everyone suspected: that he looks at his job and the world first and foremost through the prism of American politics.

News
Analysis

It is a perspective, gained most recently as George Bush's campaign manager last year, that seems to account both for his achievements as Secretary of State and for the difficulties he has encountered.

It has also begun to provoke a larger question: What kind of foreign policy will the United States ultimately have if you take Mr. Baker out of the campaign but cannot take the campaign out of Mr. Baker?

Challenged at a news conference on Tuesday to respond to the criticism leveled the day before by the Senate majority leader, George J. Mitchell, Democrat of Maine, who argued that the Administration seemed almost frightened about the opportunities now presented by the thaw in cold war, Mr. Baker pointed to the polls, saying:

"When the President is rocking along with a 70 percent approval rating on his handling of foreign policy, if I were the leader of the opposition, I might have something similar to say."

Mr. Baker's answer has stirred controversy from the State Department to Capitol Hill, where Senator Mitchell again articulated a view his aides say he shares with many others in Washington.

"I remind the Secretary that this is not a political campaign," he said. "This is an effort, in good faith, to deal with serious questions of public policy. He will better serve the nation and the

Continued on Page A18, Column 1

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THE NEW YORK TIMES INTERNATIONAL

Baker's Beltway World: Politics Above All?

Continued From Page A1

President if he addresses the substance of my remarks, rather than resorting to accusations about politics."

When George C. Marshall served as President Truman's Secretary of State, from 1947 to 1949, he refused to vote on the ground that his advice to the President should not be tainted by his participation in the political process. Truman was known to have told him in effect, "You tell me about the world, I'll tell you about American politics and what will fly."

Mr. Baker is hardly the first Secretary of State to disdain Marshall's approach. But from the moment he settled in at his new post, Mr. Baker let it be known that he was "George Bush's representative at the State Department and not the State Department's representative at the White House."

Mr. Baker and the aides he brought with him argued that the Foreign Service was great at giving seminars about the politics of Brunel, but was totally deaf to the politics of the United States Congress, and as a result had failed to achieve as much as they could have.

To this day there is a tension — in some cases a mutual contempt — between the Secretary of State and his

Foreign Service officers. The Secretary views the department as politically naïve and the department views him as totally political, focusing entirely on what will sell at home, no matter what should sell, and worrying not only about avoiding any failure that might tarnish Mr. Bush but also about his own future Presidential prospects.

Yet Mr. Baker's first significant achievement as Secretary of State came from spending 40 hours on Capitol Hill, personally hammering out a bipartisan accord on what had been the most contentious issue in American foreign policy in the last decade: Nicaragua. The effect of that accord was to allow the United States to extricate it-

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INAL THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1989

self from a failed policy of supporting the Nicaraguan rebels while at the same time fostering the democratic process in Managua.

But that approach has not been repeated elsewhere.

"Baker is very adept at cultivating key domestic constituencies like Congress and the press, and foreign policy issues that are centered on Capitol Hill have accounted for his greatest success," said Michael J. Sandel, a Harvard University political theorist.

"His shortcoming, however, is that he has yet to appreciate that as Secretary of State the constituencies he has to deal with are far broader. That means he can't just cite polls or avoid doing something 'dumb,' as he put it, but has to articulate the ideals that animate American foreign policy and that are now finally stirring in Eastern Eu-

ropa."

Indeed, it is Mr. Baker's performance as spokesman that has drawn some of the sharpest criticism. The Secretary of State went on vacation early in August. Shortly after he left Washington, Solidarity came to power in Poland — a development that symbolized one of the highest objectives of American foreign policy for the last 40 years.

But Mr. Baker did not publicly discuss the development until his news conference on Tuesday.

Foreign policy, many diplomats say, is not just about money or decisions. It is also about music — giving voice to the deepest feelings and aspirations of the American people. It was the seeming failure of Mr. Baker and Mr. Bush to do that in response to the killing of students in Beijing and to develop-

ments in Poland that prompted Congress to try to impose its own sanctions on China and offer its own aid package to Poland.

Yet sometimes in a rapidly changing world the most idealistic policy is actually the most realistic and the most aggressive is the most prudent.

"Would there have been a Camp David treaty if Jimmy Carter had calculated the odds?" asked Charles William Maynes, editor of Foreign Policy magazine. "Would there have been an I.N.F. treaty had Reagan not had a larger vision of what was possible? More to the moment, is there going to be an effective Western response to events in Eastern Europe without American leadership?"

What's Sunday without The Times?

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ארה"ב ותהליך השלום - מכינוס המכון הושינגטוני למדיניות במזרח

השורה החתונה :

1. בכינוס מכון אינדיק הובעה תמיכה ממדיניותו הנוכחית של הממשל בתהליך המדיני. בדיונים הוצגו גישות תצדד אחר צעד כדי לתגייס לפינס. (accommodation) בין ישראל לפלסטינים; עודד פעילות הגורמים המקומיים, ובתוך כך - תמיכה ביזמת שמיר ובתכנית מאבאכ; המשיך דיאלוג ארה"ב - אש"ף, אך חנך ציפייה לאור ירוק מאש"ף לתושבי השטחים; קריאת למדינות ערב להתקדם לשלום עם ישראל.

כללי:

2. המכון הקדיש את כינוסו השנתי (15-17 ספ'), לבחינת מדיניות ארה"ב בתהליך השלום. השתתפו סקירי ממשל בכירים העוסקים בתהליך (בהם: רוס, קלי, קורצר, מילר). אנשי קונגרס (מל לניין), פקידים בכירים בעבר (בהם: פייטקו, סם לואיס, מרפי), אנשי אקדמיה (בהם שני אמריקאים ממוצא פלסטיני), עובדים נציגי שגרירות זרות (בהם נציגי ברה"מ, סין, צרפת, מצרים ובריטניה). יצויין כי מקצת המצויים ברשימה המקורית (בדף) לא הגיעו, בהם הציר הירדני סלטאן לנטפי ופרופ' אדוארד לנטבאק.
3. הכינוס כלל נאום (קלי) נחרצת (רוס) שהציג את מדיניות הממשל, שני נאומים שהציגו השקפות גורמים אזוריים (השר אולמרט, תחטין בסיך - בעבר ינעץ העתונות של סאדאת); הרצאות של משתתפים נוספים שהעלו היבטים שונים של הגורמים הפעילים (ארה"ב, ישראל, יהודי ארה"ב, אש"ף); קבוצות דיון, בהשתתפות כל הנוכחים.
4. בכינוס ניתן היה לעמוד על גישותיו העדכניות של הממשל כלפי תהליך השלום, בעל מידת התקבלותן של גישות אלה בקרב מקצוענים ונושינגטונים, העוסקים/עסקו בצורה זו או אחרת, בנושא.

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5. עמדת הממשל, קרי - דברי קלי ורוס, הוברקו על ידינו בנפרד. להלן העמדות שהובעו בדיוני הטיכום, וכן עיקרי ההוצאות-ע"פי שמיעה (מתודית - בסדר זה. בטועל הוגשו ההוצאות קודם לדיוני הטיכום).

מסקנות קבוצת הדיון:

6. השאלות שהועמדו בפני הקבוצות:

- האם ארה"ב צריכה לטפל בתהליך השלום בעדיפות גבוהה יותר?
- איזו חכמה יש לאמץ? האם חכמה חלופית לגישת הצעד אחר צעד?
- כיצד צריכה ארה"ב לכלכל מעורבותה בתהליך? האם לתינת אקטיביות?

7. מסקנות הקבוצה שהונחתה ע"י לסלי גלב, (ניר יורק טיימס): התהליך צריך לתינת בסדר עדיפות גבוה במדיניות הממשל. יש לנסות לקדם-פיקס בין ישראל לפלסטינים. לצד זאת, הרוב סבר כי אין להעלות עתה את הנושא בסדר העדיפויות מעבר למה שמושקע ע"י הממשל. יתכן שיחול בכך שינוי במשתתפים באזור יבשילג. הובעה חמיכה כללית בגישת הצעד אחר צעד הנוכחית. מיעוט ניכר סבור שהממשל לא תבחר די כי ארה"ב מנסה לדגול בעקרון של אדמה חמורה שלום. כן הועלתה חחגשת שהממשל צריך לעשות יותר בתחום ההשפעה על מדינות ערב להגיע לשלום עם ישראל.

8. הקבוצה שהונחתה ע"י ג'ורף טיסקני: חלק מהמשתתפים סבור שארה"ב אינה יכולה לפעול יותר מן הצדדים באזור. החלק האחר קרא למעורבות רבה יותר של ארה"ב, או לפחות לפיתוח חפיסה של מעורבות ע"י התמחוויות. אין חלגה לגישת הצעד אחר צעד הנוכחית. חצרים עשויה לשחק חפקיד חשוב כפטרון ללשגן של הפלסטינים, והמדינות הערביות יכולות לחרוט בחחום ה- *confidence building measures*. חבאכ יכול לעשות יותר כלפי שמיר (קרי - לפגש). צריך יהיה לצרף את ירדן לתהליך, אך עדיין לא בנקודת הזמן הנוכחית.

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תפוצה:

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|-----------------|---------------------------|---------|
| דחיפות: | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון | ק: 3 |
| סוג: | טופס פרוק | פתוך: 7 |
| תאריך ושם מעור: | | אל: |
| כס' פרוק: | | דע: |
| הפסיד: | | פאת: |
| 467 | | |

9. קבוצת סאט לואיס: הרוב קבע שרמת המעורבות הנכונה של הנשיא בכונה. לדעת הכל אין חלפה למדיניות האמריקאית הנכונה; גישת הצעד אחר צעד, וחמיכה ביזמת שמיר ובהצעת מבאר, המשתלבת בסגנון האמריקני המסורתי - צריך לסייע לקדם מני"מ ככל שניתן. היו שקראו למעורבות רבה יותר של הממשל, אך גם אלת דברג על מעורבות מאחורי הקלעים. אש"ף לתפעלת לחץ על הצדדים - רבים יותר תמכו בהפעלת לחץ על אש"ף מאשר על ישראל. אך הוטעם שלחץ יכול להיות משמעותי רק אם יבוא מתוך השטחים - על אש"ף, אך מתוך החברת הישראלית - על אש"ף. מצריט עשירה להיבט אפקטיבית, אך המנענת מבארב חסגיה עם שמיר מהונה מכשול. שררה הסכמה לדיאלוג עם אש"ף, אך הנדגט שיש לתשיג באמצעות אור ירוק לבחירות בשטחים. הועלתה הצעה [ע"י עמנוס ערן] כי מכון מחקר יכין פרויקט על התועלת הכלכלית של השלום - לישראל ולפלסטין.

מתוך ההרצאות

בארי רובין (המכון הרושינגטוני) - אש"ף דנ"ח מתכניס:

10. ערפאת נשען על התמיכה בשטחים יותר מאשר על תמיכת הפתח שבחזרת. עשרה אחוז מאנשי השורה בפתח מתנגדים לדור שומץ ערפאת החל במל"פ האחרון. בנעידם הפתח רצב גם השאר בסגנון אחר. ערפאת התרצה להם.

11. ההתייחסות באש"ף לשטחים - אנן הגנרלים, נאמם הסג"מים, קתלי [constituencies] אש"ף (עפ"י עדר העדיפות): א. פליטי 48 - בעיקר בסגריה, לבנון נכונה. ב. תושבי השטחים (למעט הפליטים). ג. ערביי ישראל, נהפלט. בירדן. אשר לזכונת הלאומיות הפלסטיניות: זכות השיבה מינעדת לערביי 48, זכות ההגדרת העצמית - לפלסטיי בישראל ובירדן, המדינה העצמאית - לתושבי השטחים. באש"ף קיימת חחנשה חזקה של אי-רצון להחשב כבוגדים בפליטים.

12. אש"ף שם דגש חזק על הצורך לפעול מול ארמ"ב ולא על הצורך לשכנע את ישראל, הנחפסת כבובה אמריקאית.

תפוצה:

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|------------------|--------------------------|---------|
| דחפיות: | שגרירות ישראל/וויטינגטון | דף: 4 |
| סוג: | טופס פבוק | כתוב: 7 |
| תאריך וזמן מעור: | | אל: |
| כס' פבוק: | | דע: |
| הפסרד: | | כאת: |
| 467 | | |

עפ"י גנרלים באש"ם - אחד הגורמים העיקריים שהגיעו את הדיאלוג עם ארת"ב הוא העובדה שתמלחמה הקרה חלפה, ולכן פחת ענינה של ארת"ב לתמוך בישראל.

13. עד האביב/הקיץ הבא יצטרך ערפאת לתראות לארגננו תוצאות ממדיניותו. שאלה בסיסית היא אם ערפאת יפעל מעבר לקונצנזוס של ארגננו.

קטיב כהן (המכון חרושניגטונק) - מפבר' תשנ"ו:

14. הישראלים והפלסטיים יחד מחפשים נצחון יחד מאשר שלום, ישראל שנאמת ליצור חנין בין השטחים לאש"ף, בין אש"ף למדינות ערב (בעיקר ירדן ומצרים), ובין אש"ף לארת"ב. נאילו אש"ף שואף להפריד בין ליכוד - מערן, ישראל - יחדות תגולתן, ישראל - ארת"ב.

חל לויין (בית"ב, קליפורניה) - מבט מתגבעת:

15. על התחשל להגביר מעורבותו בתהליך בצורת חמיכת הזקת ינחר ביזמת הבחירות הישראליות. מצרים עשויה לעייע בדחיפת התהליך אך לא לבוא במקום ארת"ב, מת גם שתשלום הקר נערב מבארק לפגוש את סמיר מגבילים את היכולת הטענית לתרגם.

16. התחשל לא תצליח לשנות עמדותיהן של מדינות ערב תאחרות. הדיאלוג עם אש"ף מפריע ינחר משהוא מועיל, קיימת טכנה של החחזקות הקצנניים בשגי התחבנות.

17. אש"ף ממשיך במאבק המזוין כנוקט בכפל לשון בין קהל למערב. הענקת אשרת לערפאת תסב נזק לתהליך. מעשי אש"ף במהלך 89 לא תאמר את הרטוריקה של סנף 88 למרנת הדיאלוג עם ארת"ב. אש"ף חייב עדיין לשכנע את הציבור הישראלי שהמדיניות שאימצ בג'נבה איננה המסך המאבק באמצעים אחרים.

18. הקונגרס מערנין לעבוד עם התחשל ומקבל את חכנית הבחירות הישראליות, 5/..

תפוצה:

| | | |
|---------|---------------------------|--------|
| דף: 5 | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון | דחיות: |
| כתוב: 7 | טופס פרוק | סוג: |
| אל: | תאריך וזמן מעור: | |
| דע: | כס' פרוק: | |
| | הפסד: | |
| כאח: | 467 | |

האגנט מוטל עתה על השלם נחצד הערבי ועל הממשל לנהוג בהתאם.

19. בחשבה לשאלה: אינו מעריך שהעמדות בקונגרס, כלפי ישראל, השתנו. לאחר שהוצגה יזמת הבחירות, והערבים ותפלי לא קבלו, ישראל אינה נתפסת כמכשול לשלום והתמיכה בה אף underscores. הקונגרס לא היה מוכנה מחלטה ועידת הליכוד וחמישראל. אכן חזרה בה (מהן).

פטיבן סטיגל (אובי) - U.S.A. - קרנים במדיניות הפנים ותהליך השלום:
20. בקרב הקהילה היהודית גברר מחלוקות ניש משבר, אך עובדה זו לא חסמית על הגישות כלפי הממשל. בנושאי החסופים, Days of rage, והאשרת לעחסות - היו מאוחדים.

21. במתחו ביקורת על דברי העתונאי טום פרידמן קבעו איסני ינדע כיצד אפשר To rethink emotional connections (שבין יהדות ארה"ב לישראל. י.א.). הערבים האמריקאים אינם מציבים אתגר רציני בפני הקהילה היהודית.

22. החברה האמריקאית אינה נוטה כיום לינזמנת במדיניות החוץ כבשנות השבעים. תממשל החדש עשוי ללחוץ על ישראל רק אם תבצע משגה ניכר, אך ^אינפיע טאדאת חדש. סיטנאציה כזו לא נראית. שב והזהיר, בכל זאת, את הממשל מפני תפעלת לחץ על ישראל.

ארוו מילר (תחמיד) - בעיות בתהליך השלום:

23. בפתיחה החיחס לדברי ביקורת כלפי הממשל שנשמעו בפני קנדימו:
א. נטען כי אינם חומכים גמרצות בישראל - תמיכהנר בתצעת תבחירות תישראלית העניקה לה אמינות. אננו נמשיך לפעול כדי לקדמה עפיי תלמיד נח - agenda.
..6/

תפוצה:

| | | |
|-----------------|--|---------|
| דף: <u>6</u> | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס כבוק | דתי/ות: |
| כתובת: <u>7</u> | | סוג: |
| אל: | תאריך וזמן מעור: | |
| דע: | פס' כבוק: | |
| כאח: | הפסד: | 467 |

ב. עד שתדיאלוג עם אש"ף יביא לתוצאות כלשהן לגיטימי להיות ספקני. באמצעות הדיאלוג מבקש המחשלה ליצור בן שיח פלסטיני לישראל ולקדם פיוס [accommodation] (ישראל-פלס). אינו מאמין שקיימת דרך אלטרנטיבית לקידום יעדים אלה.

ג. במשך עשרים השנה האחרונות, על רקע מדיניות ישראל, ירדן ואש"ף - לא התפתחה הנהגה בשטחים. הפלס' בשטחים מאותתים לאמריקאים שהנהגה שלהם מצויה בתוניס. הוא אלבנו יכול למצוא הנהגה אלטרנטיבית (לאש"ף). מאמין שתפלס' מצויה בתהליך של מעבר מתפיסות לא-ריאליסטיות לתפיסות ריאליסטיות. הניכוח במחנה הפלס' מתנהל כיום על עשר הנסודות.

24. בהוצאתו העלה הפערים בין אש"ף לישראל בנושאי הייצוג הפלס' והמעמד הסופי של השטחים (שאל/חהת אם אפשר ליישב ביניהם. בין השאר הדגיש חשיבות שיתופן של הערבים/ציון מצרים נירדן - כל אחת בשלבים שונים של התהליך).

25. אמר כי ניתן לדמות שני מסלולים לקידום התהליך: הגישה הדו-גמית, הרוויה עמימות לגבי היעד, ולעומתה - גישה חבתירות, במסגרתה ידוע היעד מראש. שאל אם ניתן למצוא תהליך שיתוף בו די עמימות כדי לשכנע את ישראל, ומספיק בתיירות לשכנע הערבים.

מרטין אינדיק - היחס בין התהליך לתוצאה

26. החזה שהעלה: משמעות הירח אש"ף בן-השיח הפלס' של ארה"ב - ארה"ב מעורבת בתהליך המוביל להקמת מדינה פלס', תוצאה המנוגדת לאינטרס האמריקאי. ארה"ב מצידת משתמשת בדיאלוג כדי להשיג תוצאה המנוגדת למטרות המינימליות הפלס'.

27. האידיל מבינה ארה"ב - תשגת הסדר פלס' שלא יסכן את יחידותיות באזור - ישראל נירדן. יש לערב את המדינות הערביות בקידום ההסדר. בעיקר מצרים. לארה"ב, אין מקל וגזר העשויים לחולל שינוי באש"ף. מצרים חשונה בהקשר זה.

../7

תפוצה:

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|-------------------|---------------------------|---------|
| דחיות: | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון | ק: 7 |
| סוג: | טופס פרוק | כתוב: 7 |
| תאריך וזמן תעבור: | | אל: |
| כס' פרוק: | | ד: 7 |
| הפסד: | | כא: 7 |
| 467 | | |

28. יש לבנות לתוך התהליך מקום לירדן. ככל שתדיאלוג תאשייפי-אמריקאי במשך יהיה קשה יותר לערב את ירדן. קיימת סכנה שהשפעת הפלסטי ^{על} ירדן חגבר במקום השפעת ירדן על הפלסטי. ירדן מקונה שתדיאלוג יכשל ואנו נמנה אליה. אם לא נצליח להכניס את ירדן לתהליך - נסים בתוצאה המנוגדת לאינטרס האמריקאי.

מהתיחסויות הקהל

29. ג'ון גאלק (עתונאי): לאחרונה נפגש עם ערפאת) - בתכנית קיימת תמונת תמראה לזן הקיימת בארה"ב. באשייף שוררת תחושה שלא קבלו מהדיאלוג דבר. אליבא ד'ערפאת - במסגרת הדיאלוג הביע נכונות לתהליך בר המדינה הפלסטי לא תהיה תנאי מנקודת, אלא נקטא שידון במדינת, נכון הביע נכונות לחקופת מעבר - אם ארה"ב תערבב לר שיטחאל. חיטרג בתנס חקופה זנ. לדידו, הוא כבר בצע כל שנדרש ממנו נלא קבל דבר. לערפאת אין חכנית פנליטית אלטרנטיבית, אך יש הנהגה אלטרנטיבית והוא חייב להשיג נקטתנ (מהדיאלוג).

30. נשמע מפקידים במחמ"ד ב"שיחות המסדרונ" - הסתייגות כלפי מת שנראה להם כנימת תדמגוגית של דברי לויץ. לביקורת על התזה של אינדיק. לגבי ירדן, נטען כי לפחות בשלב זה אין חוסין רוצה להיות מעורב משמעותית בתהליך.

31. דרי דניאל פייפט (עורך כתב העת COAB/S): תהת מדוע ארה"ב משקיעת אנרגיה רבה כל כך בשאלת המזה"ח. עפ"י מסורתה צריכה היתה לתנחן למדינת דמקרטיות - במקרה זה ישראל - לפתוריות בעינתיהו בעצמן (תדגים תוך העלאת יחסת של ארה"ב לסכסוך בקוויבק). תגובת מילר לדברינו נאמר שנאפים לעזנר בתחרון בעיה המשמיעת על בת בריתנו החשובת ביותר באזור.

אחית

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תפוצה:



- סודי -

כ"א אלול תשמ"ט
21 בספטמבר 1989

25565

א/רה"ק

אל : שה"ח
ס/שה"ח
מנכ"ל וחברי הנהלה
מנהלי מחלקות
ראשי נציגויות צפ"א

מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

דף מצפ"א 50
לשבועיים המסתיימים ב- 21 בספטמבר 1989

כללי

לאחר הפסקה של כשישה שבועות אנו מפיקים מחדש דף דו-שבועי זה. אנו תקווה שתמצאו בו תועלת ונשמח לקבל הערותיכם.

בתקופת הביניים חלו חילופי גברי במחלקה. מיכאל שילה נתמנה יועץ השר לענייני התפוצות והח"מ נכנס לתפקיד כמנהל מצפ"א החדש. רות ירון יצאה לווינגטון כדוברת השגרירות, ויוסי אוריין, שחזר מבוגוטה, הצטרף אלינו.

להבא, חלוקת העבודה במחלקה תהיה כלהלן:

משה בר : קונגרס

אורלי גיל : ממשל, תהליך השלום.

יוסף אוריין : קונסוליות (ארה"ב), יהודים, מיעוטים, כנסיות, פעילות פרו-ערבית.

אפי בן-מתתיהו : קנדה, ארה"ב ומדינות שלישיות, נושאים ארב"לים, נושאי תקשורת, איגודים מקצועיים, נושאים מדעיים.

נושאים אחרים (סחר, זכויות האדם, ביקורים ועוד) יטופלו ע"י כל אחד מהנ"ל בהתאם למקור הפניה (ממשל, קונגרס, קונסוליות וקנדה).



- 2 -

א. ארה"ב

התהליך המדיני

ס/שה"ח נפגש בנסיעתו האחרונה לארה"ב עם בכירים במחמ"ד (12-13/9). בדבריהם הדגישו התייחסותה החיובית של ארה"ב ליוזמת עשר הנקודות המצרית, לא כאלטרנטיבה ליוזמה הישראלית אלא כגשר להבאת הפלסטינים למו"מ. ארה"ב, לדבריהם, לא דנה עם מצרים ביוזמה אך היא רואה בה התקדמות ועזרה אפשרית להבאת הצדדים לשולחן המו"מ.

בתדרוך מחמ"ד שנוהל ע"י המזכיר עצמו (19/9), חזר המזכיר והביע תמיכתו האיתנה ביוזמת השלום הישראלית. לגבי היוזמה המצרית - אין היא בעיני ארה"ב אלטרנטיבה לזו הישראלית, אלא מהווה קבלת היוזמה הישראלית ע"י מצרים, והצגת ההשקפה המצרית לגבי הדרך להגשים את רעיון הבחירות.

עוד הוסיף המזכיר כי שוחח עם שרי החוץ של ישראל ומצרים והוא מקווה לפגישה משולשת עמם בעת שהותם בניו-יורק לרגל העצרת, בה ידונו בדרכים ליישום יוזמת הבחירות הישראלית.

בעדותו בפני ועדת המשנה לאירופה ולמזרח של ביה"ח (19/9) חזר עוזר המזכיר קלי ואמר כי ארה"ב לא אימצה את עשר הנקודות המצריות, אך היא רואה בהן ריכוז המאמצים בכיוון הנכון ותרומה קונסטרוקטיבית לדיון.

בדברו בפני המכון הוושנינגטוני למדיניות במזה"ת (15/9) אמר קלי: "איננו תומכים במדינה פלסטינית עצמאית ולא בסיפוח או שלטון ישראלי קבוע על הגמד"ע ועזה. אנו תומכים בממשל עצמי לפלסטינים שיהיה מקובל על הפלסטינים, ישראל וירדן".

בפני אותו פורום אמר דניס רוס (18/9) כי המטרות העיקריות של ארה"ב עתה בדרך להסדר במזה"ת הן שינוי אופי האלימות והגדרת נהלי הבחירות. ועידת הפת"ח עוררה ספקות לגבי רצינות נוכחותו להסדר, וסבלנותה של ארה"ב מתחילה לפקוע. עם זאת יש סימנים של ריאליזם באש"פ. לדעת רוס הצליחו לשכנע את הצדדים באזור שהדיאלוג הוא הדרך הריאליסטית היחידה המובילה להסדר.

שיקום הפליטים: בשיחותיו הנ"ל עם פקידי מחמ"ד דחה ס/שה"ח את ההתניה האמריקנית את ההצטרפות למאמץ מולטילטרלי לשיקום הפליטים הפלסטינים בהתקדמות בתהליך השלום, וקבע כי יש להתקדם במקביל ליישום כל ארבעת סעיפי היוזמה הישראלית בלא לינקייג'.



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הונגריה-ישראל

דוברת מחמ"ד הביעה (18.9) שביעות רצון מהחלטת הונגריה לחדש את היחסים הדפלומטיים עם ישראל, והביעה תקווה שחברות נוספות בברית ורשה תלכנה בעקבותיה. ברכות לרה"מ לצעד זה הושמעו גם מפי קונגרסמן טום לנטוס.

יהודי בריה"מ

נציגי הזרועות השונות בממשל סיכמו את כללי ההגירה החדשים מבריה"מ, שתקפה החל מ-1.10.89, וכבר החלו להעריך להנהגתם. מדובר על מכסה של 125,000 מהגרים, מתוכם עד 50,000 יהודים.

הכללים החדשים קובעים שכל מי שיקבל אשרת הגירה לישראל בשגרירות הולנד במוסקבה לא יוכל לשנות את היעד במדינה שלישית. לארה"ב יהגר רק מי שישנה את היעד במוסקבה או מי שפנה ישירות לשגרירות ארה"ב במוסקבה. כוונת הממשל היא להמנע מלהעניק ליהודים יוצאי בריה"מ מעמד פליט (המזכה את המהגר בתמיכה כספית משמעותית בממשלת ארה"ב) ולחסל בתוך שנה את מחנות המעבר בלדיספולי ובווינה.

בכירים במחמ"ד נתנו להבין כי יראו בעין יפה אם תסייע ישראל בהסרת המכשולים להנהגת הכללים החדשים העלולים להתעורר בקונגרס. יצוין, שב"ניו-יורק פוסט" כבר החלו להתפרסם דעות כנגד השינוי המוצע במדיניות ההגירה של הממשל.

נאום נסיך הכתר הירדני

ב-12/9 נאם הנסיך חסן במכון הרושינגטוני למדיניות במזה"ת (ר' מברקי ממ"ד מ-14/9, 13/9). על עיקרי נאומו זה חזר גם בפורום של אקדמאים בבוסטון. הנסיך ביקש שלא להזמין את שגריר ישראל לפורום זה, והמכון, המקורב לאיפא"ק, נענה לבקשה.

פינוי שגרירות ארה"ב מלבנון

משיחות במחמ"ד עולה כי פינוי השגרירות נבע מחששם של האמריקנים שבמציאות הלבנונית יהיה מי שיממש את התבטאויות עון בדבר הצורך בלקיחת בני ערובה אמריקנים ובהפלת מטוס האספקה של השגרירות, וכן מההפגנות הנמשכות מול פתח השגרירות.

ארה"ב הבהירה לסוריה (וכן לברה"מ ולצרפת) כי אין לראות בצעדה זה מסר פרו-סורי.



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קונגרס

1. אשרה לערפאת : בשני בתי המחוקקים החלו יוזמות לשיגור מכתבים למזכיר בייקר במטרה שלא תנתן אשרת כניסה לערפאת במדה ואכן יגיש בקשה. בסנט הסנטורים מק, וילסון, ליברמן וקרל לוי מייסדים חתימות למכתב לבייקר ובביה"נ עוסק המורשה לארי סמית בהחתמה סלקטיבית של מורשים בכירים החברים בוועדות החוץ, פעולות זרות, המשפט והשירותים המזוינים. המורשה מקנלטי מניו-יורק כבר שגר מכתב משלו בנפרד.

2. חקיקה : הצעת חוק סיוע החוץ (הקצבות) אומצה במליאת ועדת ההקצבות בסנט וכמוהו גם חוק תקציב הפנסאגון. שני החוקים בדרך לדיון והצבעה במליאת הסנטואחר כך לתאום גרסות עם הגרסאות שאומצו ע"י בית הנבחרים. כל הנושאים הנוגעים לישראל בשני החוקים נראים במצב טוב לקראת הקונפרנס אם כי לפחות נושא מרכזי אחד (הוזלת עלויות מערכות נשג גדולות - FAIR PRICING) יצריך פעולה אנטנסטיבית ע"מ להבטיח קבלת הגירסה שבהצעת הסנט. בפעולה נוספת, הקצתה ועדת המשנה לתקציב מסחר, משפטים ומחמ"ד סך - 184 מיליון דולר לתחנת VOA בערבה. בהקצבה זו בקיצוץ של 5% עקב מחסור במשאבים אולם גם כך תוכל מנהלת הפרוייקט להתקשר בחוזים רב-שנתיים וממילא לא תהיינה הוצאות בפועל למלוא הסכום השנה.

בחירות מוקדמות בניו-יורק

לאור תבוסתו של אד קוץ' בבחירות המוקדמות מטעם המפלגה הדמוקרטית מסתמן לראשונה סכוי שיבחר ראש עיר שחור לניו-יורק. את הפסדו של קוץ' תולה הקונכ"ל במספר סיבות:

- מחדלי קוץ' ומקרי שחיתות במינהל העיריה בתקופה האחרונה והרצון לשנוי לאחר 12 שנים בהן שימש קוץ' במישרה.

- שנוי המרקם חברתי בערים הגדולות ועליות משקלם של קבוצות "לא לבנות".

- סגנונו השקול והמאחד של דייויד דינקינס המבקש לגשר בין הפערים, בניו-יורק לעומת הבוטות והפלגנות המיוחסים לקוץ'.

במערכת הבחירות המוקדמות שניהל עשה דינקינס מאמץ להתקרב לקהילה, כאשר בנושאינו התבטא באופן כוללני שהיווה פשרה בין קירבתו לג'סי ג'קסון ונסיונות החיזור שלו אחר הקול היהודי.

בנובמבר יתמודד מול רודולף ג'וליאני (רפובליקאי) הנחשב לבעל סיכויים (למרות שהעיר הינה מעוז מובהק של המפלגה הדמוקרטית), זאת לאור עברו כתובע קשוח ומצליח הלוחם בפשע ובסמים.



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ביקור ג'סי ג'קסון

ב- "חדשות" הופיעה ידיעה אודות ביקורו המתוכנן של ג'קסון בארץ כאורחו של ח"כ דראושה. על פי הידיעה הביקור יהא בעל אוריינטציה פרו-פלשתינית. דראושה מסר שהביקור מאורגן ע"י קבוצות פרו-ערביות בארה"ב ומתוכנן לנובמבר הקרוב. היה מוכן לאשר כי נתבקש להיפגש עם ג'קסון ותו לא.

ב. קנדה

הסכם לשתי"פ בתחום המש"ב עם קנדה

ב- 14/9 נחתם באוטבה מיזכר הבנה בין ישראל וקנדה בדבר שתי"פ קנדי- ישראלי בהדרכת משתלמים מארצות מתפתחות בישראל. על ההסכם חתמו השגריר גור-אריה וס/נשיא CIDA (המש"ב הקנדי). ההסכם מדבר על הקצבה של 1.5 דולר קנדי לחמש שנים (300 אלף לשנה) תוך חלוקה של שני שלישי לקנדה ושליש לישראל.

לצורך יישום ההסכם אנו מצפים לבואה של משלחת קנדית במהלך אוקטובר, כדי לסכם תכנית עבודה מוסכמת עם מש"ב. ראוי להוסיף שבמהלך טקס החתימה צינו הקנדים שהם מקווים שהסכם זה מהווה בסיס לשתי"פ פורה בעתיד.

ב ב ר כ ה,

יוסף למדן

- 11/27/87 2 321 201
12/1/87
- WE ARE GREATLY DISAPPOINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER AND OUR SUBSEQUENT DEMARCHE CONCERNING PANAMA.
 - THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT, EXPRESSING CONCERN AT THE "INTERRUPTION" OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS WAS UNDERMINED BY THE CONCRETE ACTION OF SENDING THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR BACK TO PANAMA ON SEPTEMBER 5, MAKING HIM THE FIRST AMBASSADOR TO RETURN TO PANAMA FOLLOWING THE RECALL OR DELIBERATE ABSENCE OF AT LEAST 13 AMBASSADORS.
 - THE RETURN OF ISRAEL'S AMBASSADOR SO SOON AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF AN ILLEGAL PUPPET REGIME IN PANAMA IS AN ACTION WHICH DETRACTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY NEEDED FOR THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY IN PANAMA, A GOAL WHICH WE HOPED WE SHARED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.
 - WE REITERATE OUR REQUEST THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL PROMPTLY RECALL ITS AMBASSADOR TO PANAMA.

לשכת ראש הממשלה
21-9-1989
נתקבל

20 בספטמבר 1989

אריה
י

סודי

אל: רשגריר וושינגטון

רישום שיחת טלפון

ב-19.9 טלפן ג'ון בקר משגארה"כ, ע"פ הוראות למסור לסלי, והודיעני בדלקמן:

הממונה בשגרירותם בפנמה אינו מקיים שום מגעים רשמיים עם הממשלה.

רכים מהשגרירים הלטינו - אמריקאים כבר עזבו את פנמה בתוך זה או אחר. היחידים ששגריריהם עודם שם הם קובה, ניקרגואה, אקוודור ומקסיקו, כאשר לגבי השתיים האחרונות - מבינים שייתכן ומעמדם ישתנה בקרוב.

גם המערב אירופאיות שומרות על פרופיל נמוך.

בהמשך למסר שהשגריר בראון הביא לשה"ח לפני כעשרה ימים, הם ישמחו אם, במידה ונניח שגרירנו "יצא למסע קניות מחוץ לפנמה", לא יודרו לשוב.

אמיתי שאחסור.

טובה הרצל

רגותק: ט/שה"ח
מנכ"ל
סמנכ"ל אחל"ט
מנהל מצפ"א
לשכת רה"מ

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الحمد لله

#סודי ביותר/מ'ד'

*למ: ראש הממשלה (לע' 1'1 בלבד)

*מדע: לשכת שר החוץ (לש'נ"ו בלבד)

* 180 ש"ר הנחל (1941-1971)

*תחל: 79 י' מ' 77 - 17 ס' 77

תלמידי תורה: אישימות 1997 מזכ"ר המדינה - שר החוץ

3 בימים 19-20 לספטמבר ומהלך ביו הנ'ל שלוש שיחות טלפון:

1* ביוזמת בייקר - המזכיר הודיע על רצונו לקיים מפגש ולט עם ארנס ועבד אל-מגיד בניו יורק, שר החוץ העלה *המשמעויות העשויות להיות לצעדים שונים בהקשר הישראלי הפנימי.

2*. ביוזמת שר החוץ - שר החוץ הודיע למזכיר על ההחלטה לצרף שגרירנו בפנמה למשלחתנו לעצרת ה- U N . המזכיר הגיב בשביעות רצון.

3. ביוזמת בייקר - המזכיר פנה בעניין עיסקת נשק צפויה
*עם סעודיה. בכוונתם למכור לסעודים פוקי M-1 ומעונונים
*שנסיע לכך שלא תהיה התנגדות. מסר שהנושא חשוב ביותר
*לנשיא וכי במקביל בודקים הגברת ה-PRE-POSITIONING
*בישראל והגדלת ה-OFF-SHORE SALES. נראה שכוונתם
*להודיע על העיסקה עד סוף ספטמבר. שר החוץ השיב כי

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מתוך 2 2 דף #
מתוך 8 2 עותק #

*הנהגה כרוך בשתי בע'ות:

א. צבאית - במקרה שתיווצר קואליציה מלחמתית נגד ישראל.

ב.ב. מדיניות - סעודיה עומדת על המשך קיום מצב מלחמה עם ישראל ולא מסכימה לנורמליזציה.

* דה: נראה שהנושא הועלה גם בשיחותיו האחרונות של
השם הבטחון בנשינגטון.

704

מג

*תפ: רהמ, שהח, פשהח

נושדד החוק- מחלקת הקשר

15656

תאריך : 20.09.89

נכנס **

סודי

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חוזם: 9,15656

אל: המשרד

יעדים: לוסאנגלס/279, מצב/1343

מ-: נר, 573; תא: 200989, זח: 1400, דח: ב, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

אורי

סודי/בהול

אל: סלי מרידור - לוס אנגלס

דע: לשכת שה'ח

מאת: אפרים דובק

203.03

ביקור שה'ח- עצרת

1. פנה ELI BIZIK ובקש פגישה עם שה'ח ארנס עבור

עוזר מזכיר המדינה קלי.

יודע על הפגישה המתוכננת עם בייקר ליום

שישי (אותה אנו מנסים לשנות).

2. הגבתי שאני מעביר הפניה אליכם ואשוב אליו. לבקשתו

קבענו מועד טנטטיבי ליום שלישי 3/10 שעה 1500.

3. במהלך השיחה אמר ביזיק שקלי חשב על אפשרות של פגישה

משולשת עם עבד אל מגיד.

שאלתי אם הבקשה היא אמנם לפגישה משולשת. ביזיק הגיב

שאיןנו יודע ושהוא יברר זאת וישוב אלינו.

אק

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

15807

תאריך : 21.09.89

נכנס **

סודי

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חוזם: 9,15807

אל: המשרד

יעדים: וו/ש, 893/מצב/1394

מ-: נ, נר: 588, תא: 200989, זח: 1730, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: ג, גס: צבא

נד: ג

ו/הק

סודי/מיידי

אל: לשכת מזכיר הממשלה, מנהל הרשות למלחמה בסמים,

יוסי עמרני - וושינגטון

מצפ"א

ארב"ל 1

מאת: קונסול ההסברה, ניו יורק.

הנדון: פגישת דובינשטיין - בנט.

אתמול פגש מזכיר הממשלה, בניו יורק, ב' צאר הסמים

האמריקני ויליאם בנט.

א. מזכיר הממשלה פתח דבריו במסר מרה"מ המדגיש חשיבות הצורך בשת"פ במאבק בסמים ומאחל הצלחה לבנט בתכניותיו.

דובינשטיין הציג בעית הסמים בישראל, תאר הקמת הרשות הישראלית למלחמה בסמים וחשיבותה וליווה דבריו בהענקת חומר בכתב המציג הנושא ופעולות הרשות. המשיך דבריו בהציעו שת"פ בין רשויות הסמים בשתי המדינות והעלה הנקודות הבאות:

1. ברמת הבעיות הבינלאומיות - לבנון כיצרנית סמים (חשיש והרואין) וחשיבות הכללית ברשימת המימשל לגבי מדינות מייצרות ומייצאות סמים. בנט שאל אם המדובר בגידול סמים בבקעת הלבנון ונענה בחיוב.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2. שת"פ אכיפתו - רצוננו לשת"פ עם האמריקנים תוך שילובנו בהקמת מרכז למלחמה בסמים בקפריסין שארה"ב פועלת לגביו.

3. מחקר - בהביננו שבתכנית בוש יוקצו כספים רבים למחקרים - רצוננו להשתלב.

4. שת"פ בתחומי מו"פ ישראלים יחודיים למלחמה בסמים.

5. שת"פ בין משטרתו למלחמה בעבריינים ישראלים הפועלים בארה"ב או פועלים בסחר בינ"ל בסמים.

6. שת"פ בנושאי הברחת והלבנת כספי סמים.

7. נושאי חינוך למניעה - מזכיר הממשלה הודה על השת"פ הקיים וציין נושא המסלחת שביקרה לאחרונה בארה"ב ללמוד נושא חילוף רכוש.

רובינשטיין סיים דבריו בהציעו כי האמריקנים יציבו במשרדו של בנט איש קשר שיהיה בקשר עם עמרי בשגירות בוושינגטון. בנט מינה את עוזרו המיוחד צ'ק וקסלר להיות איש הקשר בשלב הקרוב.

8. בנט הודה לרובינשטיין על הפגישה והעלה נושא קולומביה.
רובינשטיין הבהיר כי ישראל עומדת עם ארה"ב ועם קולומביה בחזית המאבק בנושא הסמים, ציין כי אין לנו ידיעות על מעורבות של ישראלים בסמים, כי ישנן תקירות באשר להיבטים שונים, וכי לממשלת ישראל כממשלה, כמובן, אין שום מעורבות בנושא והיא שותפת למאבק נגד הסמים ומסתייגת מכל פעילות בכיוון אחר באורך נמרץ ביותר.

בנט שאל רובינשטיין אם היתה איזו מחווה ישראלית לקראתו של נשיא קולומביה ברקו במאבקו, סיפר כי הציע לבוש כי חשוב שכמה שיותר ראשי מדינות יביעו אהדה לברקו וכי הוא משוכנע כי תמיכה ישראלית הינה חשובה ואולי נזקק, במיוחד, לאור הפרסומים האחרונים.

רובינשטיין ציין כי דברים נאמרו על ידי ישראל ברוח זו אך הוסיף כי, לאור פניית בנט, ימליץ עם שובו ארצה בסוף השבוע, לבדוק אם ניתן להוסיף.

בנט הדגיש כי ברקו מבקש עזרה מהאמריקאים בכל התחומים ציין כי יש לזכור כי מה שעשה ועושה היה מאוד מסוכן

The first thing I noticed when I stepped out of the car was the cold. It was a sharp contrast to the warm blanket I had been sitting under. I looked up at the sky, which was a pale, hazy blue. The air was crisp and clean, a welcome change from the stuffy car.

I walked towards the building, my footsteps echoing on the wet pavement. The rain had just stopped, leaving the ground glistening. I could see the reflection of the building in the puddles. The architecture was modern, with large glass windows and a sleek design.

I entered the building, and the first thing I noticed was the smell of coffee. It was a warm, inviting scent that made me feel at home. I walked through the lobby, which was filled with people. Some were sitting at tables, while others were standing and talking. The atmosphere was relaxed and friendly.

I found a table in the corner and sat down. A server approached me and asked if I wanted anything to drink. I ordered a cup of coffee. As I waited, I looked around the room. The decor was simple and elegant, with a few plants and a large painting on the wall.

The coffee arrived, and I took a sip. It was perfect, just what I needed. I looked at my watch and saw that it was 10:30. I had time to spare. I decided to look at the menu. There were a few options, but I wasn't sure what to choose. I looked up at the server and asked for a recommendation. She smiled and suggested a chicken salad sandwich.

I ordered the sandwich and sat back down. I looked out the window and saw a few cars parked outside. The building was surrounded by trees, which were still bare from the winter. It was a quiet neighborhood, but it felt like I had found a secret spot.

The sandwich arrived, and I took a bite. It was delicious, exactly what I needed. I finished it and looked at my watch again. It was 11:30. I had time to spare. I decided to look at the menu again. There were a few more options, but I wasn't sure what to choose.

I looked up at the server and asked for another recommendation. She smiled and suggested a chocolate cake. I ordered it and sat back down. I looked out the window and saw a few cars parked outside. The building was surrounded by trees, which were still bare from the winter. It was a quiet neighborhood, but it felt like I had found a secret spot.

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מבחינתו וכי האמריקאים רוצים לקבל תמיכה בינ"ל ככל
האפשר בנושא, נוכח המצב העדין הקשור להסגרות ולמערכת
השפיטה בקולומביה.

בסיום דבריו נענה בנט להצעות השת"פ של מזכיר הממשלה
וטוכם כי הפרטים יעובדו בדרג המומחים.

רובינשטיין סיים הפגישה בהזמין את בנט לביקור בארץ.

אורי פלטי.

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל,
סייבל, משפט, מזכיר הממשלה, תורגמן, אמלם

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

15800

תאריך: 21.09.89

נכנס **

107

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ארה"ב

חוזם: 9,15800

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1395, מנמט/295

מ-: נוש, 420, תא: 200989, זח: 1700, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: 0, צפא

נד: 0

סודי/מ"ד

7א: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

תהליך השלום - שיחת נוביק - קלי (19/9)

1. השיחה (20/9) יוחדה לדיון בהצעה המצרית בעקבות פגישת שהב"מ- מובארק ובטיכונים לקיום מפגש ישראלי-פלסטינאי.

2. להלן מספר נקודות מדוברי קלי:

א. סיפר כי חברים מתת הועדה למזה"ת ואירופה בביה"נ (בפניהם הופיע ב-19/9) הביעו סקפטיות ביחס לסיכוי לכנס מפגש ישראלי-פלסטיני על בסיס הצעת מצרים בנימוק שקבלת ההצעה תפוג את ממ' ישראל.

ב. הבהיר לחברי הקונגרס כי הממשל אינו רואה בהצעת מצרים אלטרנטיבה ליוזמת ממ' ישראל.

ג. סיפר, על ביקורת (מצד מספר חברי קונגרס) על כך שארה"ב משאירה למצרים "לעשות את העבודה".
ארה"ב ציין קלי מרוצה מנכונות מצרים להירתם למשימה
מה גם, "שמהאביב שוחחנו עמם על כך".

ד. בכוונת ארה"ב לקדם התהליך. בהקשר זה ביקשו את

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It includes information about the sample size, the data collection methods, and the statistical analysis techniques.

3. The third part of the report presents the results of the study. It includes a summary of the findings and a discussion of the implications of the results. The results show that there is a significant relationship between the variables studied.

4. The fourth part of the report is a conclusion and a list of references.

5. The fifth part of the report is a list of references. It includes a list of the books, articles, and other sources used in the study.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of references. It includes a list of the books, articles, and other sources used in the study.

7. The seventh part of the report is a list of references. It includes a list of the books, articles, and other sources used in the study.

8. The eighth part of the report is a list of references. It includes a list of the books, articles, and other sources used in the study.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

פלטרן לשוב לסוניס, כדי להעביר לאש"פ מסר הקורא
לארגון שלא להחמיץ ההזדמנות ולאפשר לפלסטינים תושבי
השטחים להכנס למו"מ עם ישראל.

ה. לשאלת נוביק לגבי עמדת ירדן, השיב קלי כי היא
תומכת במאמצי מצרים. קורצר הוסיף כי להערכתו אין
סיכוי כיום להחזיר את ירדן לתהליך. יחד עם זאת מעונינת
ירדן למנוע מצב שבו יוותרו מאחור. לדברי קורצר ירדן
(למורת הנסיון במגעים עם אש"פ) מגלה סקפטיות וממתינה
לראות כיצד המהלך הנוכחי יתפתח.

השתתפו בשיחה: קורצר, הירש, דסקאי והח"מ.

שטיין

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמנ, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, סולטן, מצרים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

15836

תאריך : 21.09.89

נכנס **

שמו

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חוזם: 9,15836

אל: המשרד

יעדים: לוסאנגלוס/287, מצב/1398, מנמת/299

מ-: ווש, נר: 444, תא: 200989, זח: 1800, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: צפא

נר: @

1/2/89

שמו/רגיל

אל: ממנכל

מנהל מצפא

דע: יועץ מדיני לשה'ח - לוס אנגלוס

מאת: עודד ערן - וושינגטון

שיחות מז'ת

במסגרת השיחות הרגיונליות כהכנה למפגש וויומינג עלה גם נושא מז'ת במשך כשעה וחצי.

מקבצ שהשתתף בשיחות שלא הייתה כל תזוזה בעמדת כריהמ'.
טרסוב פיתח הסבר לוגי ממושך בדבר הצורך בתמיכה בינלאומית
בתהליך השלום שאותו סיים באומרו שהדרך הטובה ביותר
להשיג תמיכה כזו היא באמצעות דיונים בלתי פורמליים
של מומחי מז'ת של 5 הקבועות.

רוס שאלם האם גיבשו דעה כלשהיא לגבי רעיון הבחירות
וטרסוב ענה בשלילה. התשובה גרמה לתגובה נרגזת מצד
ארה'ב וקרצר טוען שאמר לטרסוב כי עוד ביוני הוצגה
בפניהם היזמה הישראלית ומאז יכולים היו כבר לגבש דעה.

התנהלה גם שיחה קצרה בנושא לבנון כאשר שני הצדדים
מסכימים למעשה שאין אלטרנטיבה לתכנית ועדת ה-3.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ערן

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמנ, ממד,
איר, בוצור, מצפא, סייב, סולטן

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

14874

תאריך : 20.09.

סודי

נכנס **

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חוזם: 9,14874

אל: המשרד

יעדים: לוסאנגלס/261, בטחון/799

מ-: ווש, נר: 407, תא: 190989, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

11/9/89

מדי/סודי

סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע: סלי מרידור, יועץ מדיני לשה'ח/לוס אנג'לס
ברטוב, נחיב

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

מדיניות ההגירה של ארה'ב - יהודי בריה'מ.

להלן משיחה עם לרי איגלברגר אתמול :

1. איגלברגר תיאר הקשיים הרבים בהם נתקלת יוזמתם
להביא לשינוי ההסדרים והטיפול במהגרים היהודים
האחרים מבריה'מ.

הממשל סבור שיוכלו להציב פקידים עד ה-1/10 בשגרירותם
במוסקבה, אשר יצטרכו לטפל בבקשות הללו. הם מודעים
לכך שאם זה לא יוסדר עד ל-1/10 הקונגרס ייזום חקיקה
אשר למעשה תכשיל את השינויים שבכוונת הממשל להנהיג.

שאלת ההדדיות שהועלתה ע'י הסובייטים - דרישתם לאפשר
מינוי עובדים נוספים בנציגויות הסובייטיות בארה'ב
מעוררת קשיים לנוכח התנגדות משרד המשפטים והאף.בי.אי.
להתיר כניסתם של סובייטים לארה'ב שהינם, פוטנציאלית
רובם ככולם אנשי השירות החשאי.

2. עוד אמר שהם פועלים בקונגרס כדי להמעיט הנזק שנגרם ע"י נציגת מחמ"ד (מתאמת נושא הפליטים) הגב' לה פונטנט שאמרה שליהודים הסובייטים האופציה לצאת לישראל וכן גם יש להם הברירה לחזור לבריה"מ. איגלברגר רמז כי הם ישמחו לקבל מאיתנו סיוע במיוחד כלפי מספר חברי קונגרס העושים להם בעיות קשות. הוא רואה בעיה חמורה יותר בבית הנבחרים מאשר בסנאט, אך סבור שבטיפול נכון וטקטי ניתן יהיה להתגבר על המכשולים.

יינתן כי נשמח לסייע ע"י קיום שיחות עם מספר קטן ל צירי בית הנבחרים תוך הדגשת עמדתה של ישראל המעוניינת בבואם של יהודי בריה"מ לישראל ולאו דוקא על ידי התייצבות פומבית מאחורי הממשל בנושא שהינו שנוי במחלוקת בין הממשל לקונגרס.

3. איגלברגר הבטיח כי הממשל לא יפריע ליוזמה שלנו להעלות את תקות הערבויות של הכספים שיעמדו לרשות AID לגייס 400 מליון דולר למטרות שיכון עבור עולים מבריה"מ. לאחר דיון ממושך בנושא ציין שיתכן כי יוכלו לסייע לנו אף כי סבור שהעיתוי של דיון בנושא ערבויות עבור שיכון לעולים מבריה"מ בישראל עלול להכביד דוקא על רצונו של הממשל לשינוי הסדרי ההגירה ליהודים מבריה"מ לארה"ב.

4. בנושא תהליך השלום חזר על העמדות שבוטאו זה מכבר לפיהן ארה"ב רואה ב-10 הנקודות המצריות ביטוי לקבלתה העקרונית של היוזמה הישראלית ע"י מצרים. למרות שנמנעו עד כה TO ENDORSE היוזמה המצרית, רואים בה חיוב רב סבורים כי יוזמה זו יכולה להיות חוליה חסרה שתביא הדברות בין ישראל והפלשתינאים.

ארד

לב

חפ: טהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, איר3

[illegible]

הנהגתו של המנהל, שיש לו סמכות מלאה, היא שיש להקדים את טובת המדינה על פני טובת הפרט. המנהל אינו יכול להקדים את טובת הפרט על פני טובת המדינה. המנהל אינו יכול להקדים את טובת הפרט על פני טובת המדינה. המנהל אינו יכול להקדים את טובת הפרט על פני טובת המדינה.

[illegible]

המסמך המצורף מתאר את תוכנית העבודה
המיושמת על ידי המשרד להגנת הסביבה
בשנת 1985. תוכנית זו כוללת את
הפעולות הנדרשות למימוש
המדיניות הלאומית להגנת הסביבה
בשנת 1985.

ΠΡΩΤΗ ΨΗΦΟ, ΟΜΩΣΤΕ, ΓΡΑΨΤΕ, ΚΑΘΕ ΓΡΑΜΜΗ, ΣΤΙΣ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΡΕΥΡΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΡΧΙΑΣ



המשלחת הקבועה
של ישראל לאומות המאוחדות
PERMANENT MISSION OF ISRAEL
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

19.9.89

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

(212) 351-5200

שאל: מנכ"ל משרד רוה"מ-מר י. כן אהרון

מאת: א. דובק-נאו"ם

הנדון: נאומי בוש באו"ם

על פי בקשתך איתרנו מספר נאומים מ-71 ו-72 תקופה בה שמש בוש נציג קבוע של ארה"ב באו"ם. לא מצאתי שום הצהרה "מרעישת". מספר התבטאויות הנן אמנם בעלות ענין מבחינתנו- לחיוב וגם לשלילה. בכל מקרה בוש לא בטא השקפותיו האישיות (כפי שעושה איש פוליטי) אלא שמש שופר לעמדות ארה"ב אשר במידה רבה עורן אקטואליות גם היום. הנושאים העיקריים היו ירושלים, הסדרי ביניים, שלום טרור ו-242 ולהלן תמצית.

ירושלים:

1. הסטטוס הסופי של ירושלים צריך להקבע במו"מ ובהסכמה בין ממשלות ישראל וירדן במסגרת הסדר כולל.
2. ירושלים צריכה להשאר עיר מאוחדת. ארה"ב אינה יכולה להסכים לפעולות חד צדדיות על כל צד שהוא לקביעת הסטטוס הסופי של ירושלים.
3. ארה"ב מתייחסת אל החלק של ירושלים שבא תחת שליטה ישראלית במלחמת 1967 כשטח כבוש שעליו חל החוק הבינ"ל הרלבנטי.
4. ארה"ב מצטערת שישראל אינה מוכנה להכיר בחובותיה על פי אמנת גנבה הרביעית.
5. כבוד המקומות הקדושים על ידי ישראל הוא למופת.

הסדרי ביניים(בזמנו נסיגת ביניים בסיני).

1. אחד הקשיים העיקריים הוא שהצדדים נסו להכניס במסגרת הסכם ביניים מושגים השייכים באורח הגיוני להסדר כולל.
2. היתרון של הסדר ביניים הוא שהוא מאפשר התקדמות מעשית תוך השארת הנושאים הקשים למו"מ עתידי.
3. אי אפשר לכתוב שלום ע"י גורמים זרים לאזור. הסדר השלום צריך להיות פרי של הסכמה בין הצדדים.
4. הבעיה המרכזית היא מציאת דרכים לעזור לצדדים להתגבר על החששות וחוסר האמון ההדדיים.





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טרור (על רקע הטבח במינכן)

1. ישראל עומדת בפני התקפות טרור והיא חשה חובתה להגיב מתוך הגנה עצמית.
2. מעל לכל ארה"ב תובעת לשים קץ להתקפות מעבר לגבול ולטרורизם.
3. הפתרון לבעיית הטרור טמון בש"פ וקשר ישיר בין הצדדים אשר יבטיח בטחון מירבי לכל אחד מהם.
4. ממשלת סודיה ממשיכה לתת מקלט, לסייע ולעודד ארגוני טרור.
5. העדר שלום במזה"ת אינו יכול לשמש עילה למעשי אלימות ע"י צד כלשהו. מדינות הנותנות מקלט ועוזרות לטרוריסטים אינן יכולות לבקש לעצמן חסינות.
6. ארה"ב מבקשת שנושא הטרורизם על כל הבטיו יקבל עדיפות העליונה בדיוני העצרת.
7. Double standard הוא כאשר תובעים שמדינה תשלוט על כוחותיה הרשמיים אך פותרים אותה מהצורך לשלוט בכוחות בלתי סדירים הפועלים מהטריטוריה שלה.

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1. לב תהחלטה הוא ששלום צודק ובר קיימא במזה"ת חייב לכלול: נסיגה ישראלית משטחים שנכבשו ב-1967 וסיום מצב מלחמה.

במידה ויש לך עניין בכך, אעביר לך הקטעים הרלבנטים.

בברכה,
אפרים דובק

העתק: השגריר ביין-כאן
מנהל ארבי"ל 2



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A26 TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1989

THE WASHINGTON

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Lonely Work in the Mideast

EGYPT IS trying to prod Israel and the Palestinians into peace talks. It's lonely work. The Europeans long ago opted out of useful Mideast diplomacy. Most other Arabs are distracted these days by Lebanon and the Arab-world conflicts it symbolizes. The Soviet Union contemplates a mediator's role, but has yet to make the essential step of resuming formal relations with Israel. The American government is currently taken with a notion of its own "frankly diminished capacity to influence events," and sidles away from open political risk-taking in this and other regional quarters.

That leaves Cairo. President Hosni Mubarak's "10 points" seek to draw Israelis and Palestinians aboard the lone diplomatic vehicle in even faint motion, the proposal for West Bank-Gaza elections that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir put forward last spring. Both Palestinians and Israelis have held back, the former suspecting the plan will not lead them to a West Bank homeland or state, the latter fearing it will. Mr. Mubarak's tactic is to draw in the moderates. Yesterday he signed up, kind of, Israel's defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, who, incredibly and however, does not speak for his prime minister. The Egyptian president is to continue his campaign at the United Nations later this month.

The intifada pushed the PLO into the avowals on Israel and terrorism that brought an American dialogue. But the intifada may be spent as a source of political leverage; its most conspicuous victims now are Palestinian "collaborators" murdered by Palestinians. PLO chairman Yasser Arafat sends to Washington signals of readiness for accommodation that he hesitates to make to his own people. His equivocation plays into the hands of the Israeli element that leans to annexation—an element that includes, on most days, Prime Minister Shamir.

The United States works mostly behind the scenes. Reserve spares Washington immediate embarrassment and puts a necessary burden of choice on others. Still, the disproportion is striking. Israelis and Palestinians are being asked to take immense chances with their whole future. American foreheads wrinkle at the thought that Mr. Arafat will ask for a visa to visit the United Nations. On this tactical question at least, there should be no hesitation: if granting a visa will help along the Mubarak initiative, grant it. Some forceful American help on the initiative's current sticking point—the Palestinians' demand, and Israel's refusal, to put Palestinians from outside the West Bank on a delegation the Israelis would meet in Cairo—could help even more.

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