

# מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

א/4609 / 2

משרד ראש

יוסף מדינ

ארה"ב

23/3/89 - 24/2/89

מחלקה

תיק מס'

2



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פנימי: א-2/4609

מזהה פריט R00036

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-8

תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020



A. Mehal  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 24, 1989

Dear Mr. Levinson:

I have been asked to respond to your letter of January 23, 1989, also signed by Abraham H. Foxman, sharing your thoughts on developments in the Middle East on behalf of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. In particular, you urge us to deny a United States visa to Yasser Arafat, should he seek one.

We have no record of Mr. Arafat's having applied for a visa for an April visit. We cannot speculate in advance on visa cases of this nature. If and when we receive an application, we will consider it in the light of all the relevant factual and legal circumstances.

The United States remains firmly committed to pursuing a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Our policy is founded on unchanging principles: that peace is only achievable through direct negotiations based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and that a settlement must provide for the security of all states in the region and for the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.

On December 14, as you point out, Mr. Arafat, speaking in Geneva as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism. This represents a fundamental change in PLO positions, fulfilling longstanding U.S. conditions for the start of a substantive dialogue with that organization. In keeping with our oft-stated intention to open a dialogue if our conditions were met, the U.S. Ambassador in Tunis met with PLO representatives for the first time on December 16.

Our dialogue with the PLO is not an end in itself. We view the dialogue as one more step toward the beginning of direct negotiations among the parties in the region, which alone can lead to peace. Nor does the start of a dialogue imply U.S. acceptance of an independent Palestinian state. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza must be determined in negotiations, not through unilateral acts by either side. This does not, however, prevent the PLO from pursuing its desire for an independent state at the negotiating table.

Burton S. Levinson,  
National Chairman,  
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith,  
823 United Nations Plaza,  
New York, NY.




The firm U.S. stance against terrorism is not affected by our decision to open a dialogue with the PLO. On the contrary, we will use the dialogue to stress that there can be no return to terrorism by the PLO anywhere. We will press the PLO to disassociate itself from whatever acts of terrorism may occur and, if undertaken by elements under the authority of the PLO, to discipline those responsible at least by expelling them from the organization. We will not be able to sustain a dialogue if PLO terrorism continues. You correctly note that we stated that Mr. Arafat's January 1 response to a question in Riyadh was "inconsistent with Arafat's December 14 renunciation of terrorism and with the U.S.-PLO dialogue."

The U.S. commitment to Israel's survival and security remains unshakable. We will not allow any party to drive a wedge between us. One reason we have entered into the dialogue with the PLO is to help Israel achieve the security it deserves. This security can best be achieved and guaranteed over the long term in the context of a comprehensive peace.

All parties have a responsibility to contribute to advancing the peace process. I can assure you that the U.S. will continue actively to pursue the search for peace in the Middle East.

Thank you very much for your letter.

Sincerely,



William A. Kirby  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Bureau of Near Eastern and  
South Asian Affairs

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National Director  
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BERNARD D. MINTZ  
NORMAN MOLLEN  
HOWARD NATH  
HOWARD R. NATHAN  
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Assistant to the National Director  
MARVIN S. RAPPAPORT

General Counsel  
ARNOLD FORSTER



Anti-Defamation League  
of B'nai B'rith

January 23, 1989

The Honorable James A. Baker, III  
Department of State  
2201 C Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We write on behalf of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith to urge you to deny a United States visa to Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. We understand that Arafat will seek a visa for the purpose of attending the April 1989 convention of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.

In late December 1988, ADL called upon the Reagan Administration to adopt strict guidelines by which to determine the PLO's actual commitment to Arafat's pledge made in Geneva, in which he articulated the PLO's renunciation of terrorism. Specifically, we urged the Government to make clear to Arafat and to all PLO representatives that they will be held accountable for any violations of the Geneva commitment in word or in deed. We further stated our belief that such violations should result in an immediate halt to the PLO's discussions with Washington.

It has become increasingly clear in recent weeks that serious discrepancies exist between the Geneva statement and those of many high-ranking PLO officials, the most egregious of which was made by the PLO Chairman himself. According to The New York Times of January 19, the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh is in possession of a recording of a January 1 address by Yasir Arafat. In that speech, the PLO Chairman declared: "Whoever thinks of stopping the intifada before it achieves its goals, I will give him 10 bullets in the chest" -- a statement which was appropriately characterized by the State Department as a "threat" and "inconsistent with Arafat's December 14 renunciation of terrorism and with the U.S.-PLO dialogue."

No matter the words spoken by Arafat in Geneva, it is clear from this and other recent statements and actions that the PLO has yet to demonstrate a true commitment to end its reliance upon terror as a political tool. Through his failure to live up to the U.S. conditions, Arafat has proven himself to be no more ready for peace today than in years past.



The Honorable James A. Baker, III  
January 23, 1989  
Page two

Mr. Secretary, we urge you therefore to bar Arafat's entry. In the process, the U.S. will impress upon the world community its continued commitment to fight terrorism, to promote a real peace process, and to reject empty political gestures parading as meaningful steps toward peace.

We look forward to learning your response to the course of action recommended herein.

Sincerely,

Burton S. Levinson  
National Chairman

Abraham H. Foxman  
National Director

BSL-AHF/nmh

דחיפות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דף: _____
סוג: שמור		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן חבור: 1800 22 במרס '89		אל: _____
כס' פבוק: הפסד:		דע: _____
593	שג" וושינגטון	פאת: _____

טיבט

לשלכם 626 מ-18.3

שיחה (22.3) עם ס/מנהל מח' סין.

1. מאס כניסת: הממשל החדש שיאר חדלתי למח שני מברקים.

2. המברק הראשון נשלח לנשיא בוש עם כניסתו לתפקידו. המברק השני נשלח למזכיר המדינה בעקבות ההסגנות נחטלת משטר צבאי.

3. שני המברקים שחיו כמעט בעלי תוכן זהה. (המברק לנשיא כלל ברכות לרגל בחירתו) נכללים משפטים המרמזים במברק לרונח"מ. (סעיף א' בשלכם).

4. התשובות על שתי הפניות נעשו באמצעות עוזר המזכיר לז"א שיפטר (רואים זאת בנושא של ז"א). בחשובתו מציין שיסטר תמיכת ארה"ב בדיאלוג בין הדלתי למלך טיין מציינים חשיבות הדיאלוג כדרך לפתרון חבצית. מביעים צער על האלימות ותקווה שהעניינים ירגעו. כמו כן חזרנו על צמדתם לפיה רואים בטיבט חלק מסין.

5. את חשבותיכם למברקים שלחו למשרד הטיבטי בניו יורק.

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תפוצה: שמור ציר ולטין ארכיב.

END





1 MODERNIZATION.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the  
2 Board for International Broadcasting for radio transmitter  
3 construction and modernization \$27,845,000 for the fiscal  
4 year 1990. Amounts appropriated under this subsection shall  
5 remain available until expended.

6 (c) BROADCASTING RELAY STATION IN ISRAEL.--

7 (1) There is authorized to be appropriated to the  
8 Board for International Broadcasting for the costs  
9 associated with construction of a relay station in  
10 Israel, \$194,000,000 for the fiscal year 1990 and  
11 13,000,000 for the fiscal year 1991. Amounts appropriated  
12 under this subsection shall remain available until  
13 expended.

14 (2) Not less than 10 percent of the amounts which are  
15 authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1), and  
16 which are available for contracts with United States  
17 contractors, shall be made available only for contracts  
18 and subcontracts with economically and socially  
19 disadvantaged enterprises (within the meaning of section  
20 133(c)(5) of the International Development and Food  
21 Assistance Act of 1977).

22 SEC. 402. PROCUREMENT OF LEGAL SERVICES.

23 Section 26 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act  
24 of 1956 ( 22 U.S.C. 2698) is amended in subsection (b) by  
25 inserting " , the chairman of the Board for International



י"ג אדר ב' תשמ"ט

20 מרץ 1989

תיק: 102.1.4

דף מס' 1 מתוך 1 דפים.



שטוקהולם

- סודי -

שגרירות ישראל

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אל: מנהל אירופה 2

מאת: מ.לוי, שטוקהולם.

הנדון: פגישון מזכיר המדינה בייקר עם שה"ח אנדרסון.

ממקור טוב שראה דו"ח על הפגישה הנ"ל בוינה שהתקיימה ב- 6.3.

להלן עיקרי החלק המזה"תי כשיחת בייקר - אנדרסון בוינה:  
אנדרסון פתח בציינו שלפי הכנתו ארה"ב בוחנת אפשרויות פעולה כמזה"ת וביקש שארה"ב תפעל באופן מהיר יותר, אחרת הגורמים השוללים (disruptive forces) את התהליך יגברו.

בייקר השיב כי בעיית קצב ההתקדמות אינה נובעת מכניסת הממשל החדש לתפקיד אלא מתוך שכנוע שהגישה הנכונה היא התקדמות של צעד אחר צעד.  
אנדרסון העיר כי נפגש בוינה עם משלחת מאש"פ והם ציינו בפניו כי במחנה הפלשתינאי בתוך ומחוץ לאש"פ יש המתנגדים למדיניות ערפת. לדברי אנדרסון יש מקום לזרז התהליך לפני שהמתנגדים לדו - שיח בתוך אש"פ ובישראל יצברו תאוצה.  
בייקר הגיב כי עתה לא הזמן לקיים ועידה בינלאומית. זו גישה לא נכונה. יש לפעול בדיפלומטיה שקטה ע"מ להשיג התקדמות צעד אחר צעד וכך ארה"ב פועלת עתה כלפי ישראל. ידוע להם כי יש גורמים בישראל ואש"פ שמעוניינים בהפסקת הדו-שיח. ארה"ב מעוניינת להמשיך בדו-שיח והוא מקווה שאש"פ ינהג באופן כזה שיאפשר המשך הדו-שיח עמו.  
בייקר מנה בפני אנדרסון שתי דרישות מאש"פ:

- א. על אש"פ להשליט מרותו על הגורמים הטרוריסטים ולהסתייג מפיגועים בהתאם לנדרש.
  - ב. יש לארה"ב כמה הצעות (לא פירט) אשר יוגשו לאש"פ, אך חשוב לזכור שהצדדים המעורבים ישירות בסכסוך הם שיצטרכו לבסוף להגיע לשלום ביניהם.
- קיימת עתה הזדמנות לשלום ויש לנצל, אך חייבים לנהוג בזהירות. ישראל מצויה עתה במגננה (on the defensive) בשל פתיחת דו-שיח עם אש"פ ודו"ח מחמ"ד על זכויות אדם. יש להמחין עד שיגיע הרגע המתאים שבו קיים סיכוי להצליח במהלך. אין טעם ללחוץ עתה ב (too high level) במישור גבוה מדי ובאופן בולט מדי. (too visible).

בפגישה נדונו גם שני נושאים אחרים: בריה"מ וסוגיית אמל"ט. אנדרסון פתח הפגישה בציינו כי המערב צריך לסייע לגורבצ'וב. הוא סבור שהקמת יחסי מסחר ותנועת תיירות בין שבדיה לאסטוניה תסייע לגורבצ'וב. בייקר הביע תקווה כי גורבצ'וב יצליח במדיניותו. סבור כי המפתח להצלחה טמון בתוך בריה"מ ולא במערב.

מכירה  
מרדכי לוי.



העתק: משנה למנכ"ל.







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5. סוכס על דיווח והתעדכנות הדריים באורח שוטף ועל שיתוף פעולה מוגבר בתחום ההסברה - ביחוד בתחום החדרת כתבות "רכות" על ישראל.
6. נודה על חתיחסוונט לסעיפים 2-3 לעיל.



בינה - ידיר

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תאריך 4.1.89  
השולח: ברוך בינה  
אישור: .....





דף 1 מתוך 4 דפים  
סיווג בטחוני :  
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דחיפות :  
מידי  
לשימוש } תאריך וזמן רישום :  
מח' הקשר } מס. מברק :  
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אל : לש' השגריר, ווש'

אל : לש' השגריר, ווש'  
מאת : אריה מקל

עפ"י בקשתכם להלן קורות החיים של רה"מ.  
(קשר - אנא הרצ"ב)

השולח : אריה מקל  
אישור לשכת המנכ"ל : \_\_\_\_\_  
תאריך וזמן חיבור ( ימולא ע"י השולח ) 22.3.89  
אישור מנהל מחלקה : \_\_\_\_\_  
( לציון תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר )

לשימוש הקשר בלבד

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PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR

Yitzhak Shamir was born in 1915 in Ruzinoy, Poland. He received a Jewish education, graduating from the Hebrew Secondary School in Bialystok, and was a member of the Betar (Revisionist) youth movement. He began studying law in Warsaw but interrupted his studies to emigrate, in 1935, to Eretz-Israel (Palestine), where he enrolled at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His parents and family remained in Poland, where they were later killed in the Nazi Holocaust.

In 1937 Mr. Shamir joined the IZL (Irgun Zvai Leumi - National Military Organization) and, in 1940-41, following a split within the IZL, joined LHI (Lohamei Herut Israel - Israel Freedom Fighters), of which he was a leader until Israel gained independence in 1948. Both of these organizations were underground movements fighting British colonial rule in Palestine. After the murder of LHI commander "Ya'ir" (Avraham Stern), Mr. Shamir re-organized the LHI Central Committee - together with Dr. Israel Sheib-Eldad and the late Natan Yellin-Mor - and coordinated its organizational and operational activities. Twice - in 1941 and 1946 - he was arrested by the British Mandatory authorities; he escaped twice. After the second escape, from a detention camp in Eritrea, he reached the French colony of Djibouti, by way of Ethiopia, and was given political asylum in France - returning to Israel in May 1948, when Israel gained its independence.

From then until 1955 Mr. Shamir remained out of the limelight and was engaged in the management of a number of commercial ventures. From 1955 to 1965 he held a senior post in one of Israel's security services, the Mosad. In the years that followed he returned to private commercial activity; during this time he was also active on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

In 1970 Mr. Shamir joined the Herut movement and was elected to its Executive Committee, directing the Immigration Department and, later, the Organization Department. In March 1975 he was elected Chairman of the Executive Committee, a post to which he was re-elected unanimously in March 1977. He was elected to the Eighth Knesset as a



representative of the Likud in December 1973, and served as a member of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee and of the State Control Committee of the Knesset.

On 17 May 1977 he was elected to the Ninth Knesset and, upon its convening on 13 June 1977, was elected Speaker of the House. He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1980, following the resignation of Moshe Dayan. During his term of office, he steered the negotiations leading to the implementation of the Peace Treaty with Egypt; initiated contacts with African states, leading to the resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and a number of these states; he directed the negotiations that culminated in the Agreement with Lebanon in May 1983.

Following Prime Minister Menachem Begin's resignation, Yitzhak Shamir was elected by Herut's Central Committee to succeed him and he began to serve as Prime Minister on 10 October 1983, continuing at the same time in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Shamir government remained in power until 13 September 1984. During these eleven months, there were several important political developments, and a number of initiatives were undertaken in the economic sphere, which, however, did not come to fruition because the national elections were moved up to 23 July 1984 (more than a year before the scheduled date.)

A short time after the establishment of the government Yitzhak Shamir visited Washington, accompanied by Defence Minister Moshe Arens. The talks held with President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz and Defence Secretary Weinberger resulted in the adoption of a number of decisions and understandings that marked a turning point in the relations between the two countries. A framework for strategic cooperation was established, and a Free Trade Area between the United States and Israel was set up.

For the 1984 election the Likud campaigned under the leadership of Yitzhak Shamir. He addressed election rallies throughout Israel and called for the establishment of a national unity government after the election.

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The elections resulted in a near-deadlock between the two major blocs, with the Likud receiving 41 seats in the new Knesset and the Alignment 44 seats. As a result, neither bloc was able to form a government based on a narrow coalition of parties. Mr. Shamir's call for the establishment of a unity government was accepted by Shimon Peres. Following intensive talks over a period of several weeks, a national unity government was formed which, for the first time in the history of the state, included both major blocs in equal representation. The government was based on a rotation agreement under which Mr. Peres served as Prime Minister and Mr. Shamir as Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs for the first period of 25 months, following which the two leaders were to change roles for another 25 months' period.

In accordance with the Rotation agreement Mr. Shamir was invited by the President in October 1986 to form the government for the second half of the Unity Government's term of office. He presented his Government to the Knesset on October 20, 1986 and was installed as Prime Minister after a vote of confidence by a large majority (82 to 17).

This Shamir-led government concentrated on the strengthening of the economy and inaugurated a process of privatization. The relationship with the United States was further consolidated when the U.S. Administration accorded to Israel the status of a major non-Nato ally. On Israel's 40th. Anniversary a new comprehensive agreement institutionalizing all the former agreements between the United States was signed between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Shamir.

On November 1, 1988 Mr. Shamir led the Likud in the elections for the 12th. Knesset. While the results were close, Likud emerged with a narrow margin over the Labour Alignment. Accordingly, Mr. Shamir was once again entrusted with the task of forming the government. After 50 days of very complicated and protracted negotiations, he succeeded - as in 1984 - to compose a broadly based government of national unity. On Thursday 22 December, 1988, the Knesset gave its confidence to the (third) Shamir-led government by 84 votes to 19.

Mr. Shamir is married and has two children.



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סופס מברק צפון

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

דף 1 מתוך 4 דפים  
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בלמ"ס

דחיפות :

מידי

לשימוש } תאריך וזמן רישום: \_\_\_\_\_  
מח' הקשר } מס. מברק: \_\_\_\_\_

אל: לש' השגריר, ווש'  
מאת: אריה מקל

עפ"י בקשתכם להלן קורות החיים של רה"מ.  
(קשר - אנא הרצ"ב)

השולח : אריה מקל  
אישור לשכת המנכ"ל : \_\_\_\_\_  
תאריך וזמן חיבור ( ימולא ע"י השולח ) 22.3.89  
( לציון תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר ) \_\_\_\_\_

לשימוש הקשר בלבד

התפוצה :

הנושא :

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PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR

Yitzhak Shamir was born in 1915 in Ruzinoy, Poland. He received a Jewish education, graduating from the Hebrew Secondary School in Bialystok, and was a member of the Betar (Revisionist) youth movement. He began studying law in Warsaw but interrupted his studies to emigrate, in 1935, to Eretz-Israel (Palestine), where he enrolled at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His parents and family remained in Poland, where they were later killed in the Nazi Holocaust.

In 1937 Mr. Shamir joined the IZL (Irgun Zvai Leumi - National Military Organization) and, in 1940-41, following a split within the IZL, joined LHI (Lohamei Herut Israel - Israel Freedom Fighters), of which he was a leader until Israel gained independence in 1948. Both of these organizations were underground movements fighting British colonial rule in Palestine. After the murder of LHI commander "Ya'ir" (Avraham Stern), Mr. Shamir re-organized the LHI Central Committee - together with Dr. Israel Sheib-Eldad and the late Natan Yellin-Mor - and coordinated its organizational and operational activities. Twice - in 1941 and 1946 - he was arrested by the British Mandatory authorities; he escaped twice. After the second escape, from a detention camp in Eritrea, he reached the French colony of Djibouti, by way of Ethiopia, and was given political asylum in France - returning to Israel in May 1948, when Israel gained its independence.

From then until 1955 Mr. Shamir remained out of the limelight and was engaged in the management of a number of commercial ventures. From 1955 to 1965 he held a senior post in one of Israel's security services, the Mosad. In the years that followed he returned to private commercial activity; during this time he was also active on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

In 1970 Mr. Shamir joined the Herut movement and was elected to its Executive Committee, directing the Immigration Department and, later, the Organization Department. In March 1975 he was elected Chairman of the Executive Committee, a post to which he was re-elected unanimously in March 1977. He was elected to the Eighth Knesset as a



representative of the Likud in December 1973, and served as a member of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee and of the State Control Committee of the Knesset.

On 17 May 1977 he was elected to the Ninth Knesset and, upon its convening on 13 June 1977, was elected Speaker of the House. He was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1980, following the resignation of Moshe Dayan. During his term of office, he steered the negotiations leading to the implementation of the Peace Treaty with Egypt; initiated contacts with African states, leading to the resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and a number of these states; he directed the negotiations that culminated in the Agreement with Lebanon in May 1983.

Following Prime Minister Menachem Begin's resignation, Yitzhak Shamir was elected by Herut's Central Committee to succeed him and he began to serve as Prime Minister on 10 October 1983, continuing at the same time in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Shamir government remained in power until 13 September 1984. During these eleven months, there were several important political developments, and a number of initiatives were undertaken in the economic sphere, which, however, did not come to fruition because the national elections were moved up to 23 July 1984 (more than a year before the scheduled date.)

A short time after the establishment of the government Yitzhak Shamir visited Washington, accompanied by Defence Minister Moshe Arens. The talks held with President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz and Defence Secretary Weinberger resulted in the adoption of a number of decisions and understandings that marked a turning point in the relations between the two countries. A framework for strategic cooperation was established, and a Free Trade Area between the United States and Israel was set up.

For the 1984 election the Likud campaigned under the leadership of Yitzhak Shamir. He addressed election rallies throughout Israel and called for the establishment of a national unity government after the election.

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The elections resulted in a near-deadlock between the two major blocs, with the Likud receiving 41 seats in the new Knesset and the Alignment 44 seats. As a result, neither bloc was able to form a government based on a narrow coalition of parties. Mr. Shamir's call for the establishment of a unity government was accepted by Shimon Peres. Following intensive talks over a period of several weeks, a national unity government was formed which, for the first time in the history of the state, included both major blocs in equal representation. The government was based on a rotation agreement under which Mr. Peres served as Prime Minister and Mr. Shamir as Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs for the first period of 25 months, following which the two leaders were to change roles for another 25 months' period.

In accordance with the Rotation agreement Mr. Shamir was invited by the President in October 1986 to form the government for the second half of the Unity Government's term of office. He presented his Government to the Knesset on October 20, 1986 and was installed as Prime Minister after a vote of confidence by a large majority (82 to 17).

This Shamir-led government concentrated on the strengthening of the economy and inaugurated a process of privatization. The relationship with the United States was further consolidated when the U.S. Administration accorded to Israel the status of a major non-Nato ally. On Israel's 40th. Anniversary a new comprehensive agreement institutionalizing all the former agreements between the United States was signed between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Shamir.

On November 1, 1988 Mr. Shamir led the Likud in the elections for the 12th. Knesset. While the results were close, Likud emerged with a narrow margin over the Labour Alignment. Accordingly, Mr. Shamir was once again entrusted with the task of forming the government. After 50 days of very complicated and protracted negotiations, he succeeded - as in 1984 - to compose a broadly based government of national unity. On Thursday 22 December, 1988, the Knesset gave its confidence to the (third) Shamir-led government by 84 votes to 19.

Mr. Shamir is married and has two children.





Emergency work on a broken water main.

The New York Times/Fred R. Conrad

## The Region

should force the Mayor to make specific appropriations, said Robert Esnard, Deputy Mayor for Policy and Physical Development. The infrastructure amendment, he said, will make sure the public and elected officials get the "proper information" to make judgments on how much harm the deferral of repairs might cause.

"What this does is to elevate maintenance of infrastructure to a very public level," he said.

The public attention, supporters say, should put new pressure on the city to keep up with upkeep. "The theory is that sunshine makes the difference, that bridges fall apart because they are ignored," said Gene Russianoff, a staff attorney for the Public Interest Research Group. "This puts a spotlight on what they are doing to keep the city from falling apart."

The City Transportation Commissioner, Ross Sandler, said that while it will take two years to draw up the inventories and work out maintenance schedules, it will be worth it. Each city budget is a political battle, he said, and as a rule, money for maintenance is the first casualty.

Take the case of the 86-year-old Williamsburg Bridge. Year by year, before it was closed for two months' worth of emergency repair work in 1988, money was channeled away from maintenance to needs that seemed greater at the time.

### Rust on the Bridges

For lack of a formal maintenance schedule, the money that was available was spent haphazardly. Some areas of the bridge were painted repeatedly while more corrosion-prone areas went untouched for 15 years. Over time, the lapses led to the severe corrosion of girders, causing the bridge's closing. Last month, two lanes of the Manhattan Bridge were closed because support beams were nearly rusted through.

"Bridges are designed to last 100 years, but the people who maintain them are on a year-to-year budget," Mr. Sandler said. Over the decades, he said, the greatest obstacle to maintaining the city's infrastructure is that no one knows what is going on, and the amendment "will keep us from losing sight of the long-term perspective."

It has often been lost sight of in the past. The Charter Revision Commission, chief sponsor of the amendment, noted that a state comptroller's report in 1979 found that the city ostensibly saved \$78.4 million by deferring water-main repairs between 1969 and 1976, but that clearing the backlog eventually cost \$92.7 million.

Julian Palmer, state executive director of Common Cause, said the time was ripe for the charter amendment primarily because of public concern about rusting bridges, bumpy streets, sewage overflows and littered parks, all contributing to a perception that the city is growing increasingly shabby.

Nevertheless, Mr. Russianoff said it would be wrong, if not impossible, to mandate that specific amounts be spent for maintenance of roads, bridges and other structures. "There are competing priorities," he said. "Perhaps we as a society prefer to fight child abuse rather than make sure our bridges are in tiptop shape."

## One More Time, Koch Bares His Soul

By RICHARD LEVINE

WITH his first book, "Mayor," Edward I. Koch landed simultaneously on the best-seller list and in hot water, not that he seemed to mind. In a catalogue of confrontation and conflict that some found both mean and entertaining, Mr. Koch wrote of making President Carter turn gray, Representative Charles B. Rangel sweat, former Deputy Mayor Herman J. Badillo twitch and then City Council President Carol Bellamy cry.

The Mayor of New York City noted in the foreword in 1984 that friends had warned him not to publish the book while in office, because "it will make new enemies." It doubtless made some.

If anything, though, it may have emboldened Mr. Koch. About two years later he produced "Politics," a sequel that was less successful commercially and has also proved troublesome politically.

Some questioned Mr. Koch's decision to go on a promotional tour for the book when the municipal corruption scandal was starting to unfold. And when, in response to a state commission's investigation, Mr. Koch acknowledged that the Talent Bank, a job referral operation he founded partly as an affirmative action effort, was also used to disperse

political patronage, at least to entry-level job applicants, the first few sentences of "Politics" took on new relevance. "Patronage is not illegal, and patronage does not necessarily corrupt," the book began. "It is simply not the best way to run a government."

Mr. Koch's latest effort, "His Eminence and Hizzoner," is being published on the eve of a campaign he regards as his toughest, and it may be helpful, at least in the short term. For one thing, the Mayor has John Cardinal O'Connor as his co-author, an association that will not hurt Mr. Koch with Catholic voters who are an important part of his constituency. But the book may also plant the Mayor more firmly to the right on the political spectrum, which is not always the best location in a Democratic primary election in New York City.

In the book, the Mayor and the Cardinal, in alternating chapters, take on topics ranging from gay rights to housing to "God and Man at City Hall." While the Cardinal's contributions tend to be formal and unsurprising, the Mayor's more colloquial sections document his evolution from Greenwich Village reformer to someone who, on many questions at least, would generally be regarded as a conservative (though he prefers to call himself a "liberal with sanity.")

Mr. Koch is uncomfortable with abortion on demand, for tuition tax credits for parents with children in parochial schools, against racial and religious quotas and not against a constitutional amendment permitting prayer in public schools. Perhaps undercutting some recent city budget initiatives for the poor, he wonders whether "we are misguided to help some people as much as we do."


Surprisingly, Mr. Koch's chapters contain more about his family and his upbringing than the earlier books. He reveals that his mother had several abortions and writes touchingly of her death. He also talks about his days in the Army and his civil rights work in the South.

By now, though, many New Yorkers may not feel they need to know more about a three-term incumbent who once said, "Every day, seven days a week, 365 days a year for 11 years, I have been mentioned in at least one story in the newspapers, on the radio or on television."

Not that he is satisfied. Mr. Koch is already talking about his next book, a collection of his frequently acerbic letters. He is thinking of calling it "All the Best."

In his new book, the Mayor's tone was conservative.

## HIS EMINENCE AND HIZZONER



John Cardinal O'Connor and Mayor Edward I. Koch

A Candid Exchange

## A List of Repairs For New York City

By MICHEL MARRIOTT

NEW YORK CITY has started taking inventory. Last November, city voters overwhelmingly approved what seemed to be a simple, not to say obvious, notion: a requirement that officials take an accounting of the badly aging infrastructure of roadways, bridges, parks and buildings, and draw up a plan for regular maintenance.

At the least, the plan's backers believe it will provide a tickler to agencies that have not kept systematic maintenance records. But despite the long history of neglect that was epitomized by the two-month closing of the Williamsburg Bridge last year — and for similar reasons — the plan includes no guarantees the work will be done. Because the city has so many other needs, and mayors need budgeting flexibility to deal with them, even the plan's most ardent supporters agreed there was no way to mandate that money be made available to carry

out all needed repairs every year.

"You can't go up to the Mayor and say, 'You have to fund this,'" said Robert A. Cropp, a research associate for the Citizens Budget Commission, a government watchdog group. "The Mayor could say, 'Look, we have a tremendous problem with homelessness, with AIDS.'"

Under the charter amendment adopted in November, city agencies are required to provide an annual update describing the condition of each capital asset under their care and giving a schedule, certified by registered architects and engineers, of the maintenance it needs.

The city must also publish a four-year plan of estimated maintenance costs. In each year's executive budget, the Mayor must request the money needed to maintain city properties. If the Mayor's proposed budget does not match the maintenance costs, the Mayor has to explain why.

Nothing in the amendment's wording defines what constitutes an acceptable explanation. But no charter amendment can or

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# We Support The Prime Minister's Conference on Jewish Solidarity With Israel

We the undersigned -- the members, observers and former chairmen of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations -- fully support the call of the national unity government for the Prime Minister's Conference on Jewish Solidarity with Israel.

Whatever our individual points of view, we are unified in our commitment to Israel's security, its independence, its economic vitality and the well-being of its citizenry.

We stand with the people of Israel as they face continuing external dangers

and internal problems. We support Israel in its 40-year quest for a just and lasting peace.

We are dedicated to maintaining the strong bonds between the United States and Israel -- a special relationship, based on common ideals, commitments and goals, that is of great importance to both countries and to Western interests.

We believe this gathering to be particularly significant at this time. We look forward to meeting in Jerusalem, Israel's capital, to demonstrate the solidarity of world Jewry with Israel.

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אל חייצאו אותו וחוצה ואל הפעילו לחץ על ממשלת ישראל כאמצעות ממשלות זרות.

השר דיבר עקרונית להשגת שלום באזורינו השלום עם מצרים ומחוזו, ביטול הטכס השלום עם לבנון משנת 82.

ישראל המוקפת על ידי מדינות בעלות משטרים דיקטטוריים - לוב, סוריה, עיראק שאינן רואות בשלום עם ישראל.

איומי אשף נגד מנהיגים מלטיניאיים והרואים לקיים עמנו דיאלוג.

האופציה הירדנית: חוסיין משך ידיו מהגדה ואינו מוכן לדבר עמנו.

אי אפשר לחשוב על תהליך השלום ופוט' ללא ירדן. אנו מחפשים את הסנהיגים המלטיניאיים בטוחים המוכנים לנהל מומ' עמנו.

אם אשף יהא הנציג הבלעדי של המלטיניאיים הרי זה סופו של חוסיין.

מסוכן לחת לערפאת את המנדט ליוצג את המלטיניאיים והייס בישראל ובירדן.

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- ב. הגברת המאמצים למציאת בני שיח אוטנטיים מקרב האוכלוסיה בשטחים.
- ג. הבאת מדינות ערביות לשולחן המו"מ.

שה"ח אמר כי דיבר על כך עם נשיא ארה"ב-ועט בייקר והדברים סקובלים עליהם.

השר הכריז טאין עימות עם האדמיניסטרציה האמריקאית כפי טרונת בכותרות העיתונות הישראלית. אדמיניסטרציות כוש המשיך לחזק ברית הידידות בין ארה"ב וישראל.

בסיוט דבריו ענה למנהיגים היהודים ודיבר על חווית האחריות המוטלת עליהם

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בחקופה קריטית זו, אם יחודי בריה"מ לא יעלו לישראל זו תהיה טרגדיה וראיה שלא עמדת במבחן המנהיגות, זה הזמן להסגין טולידריות ואס נעשה זאת נחגבר על המשברים. בחשובה לשאלות אשר שה"ח - אנו חומכים בהצעת בייקר להוריד המטות. צריך להוציא הדרכים לעשות זאת. באשר לחכניה "יומם טנטר" אמר כי הפער בין הצדדים עצום ולא ניתן לגישור. בפתרון טובי, יש אורך בהסדרי ביניים בשלב ביניים, 2. הומעת שה"ח במני המועצה ליחסי חוץ.

בהופעתו בפני מליאת המועצה ב-17 במרץ, שה"ח הביע את אומן הנקודות שבנאום בפני ועידת הנשיאים, המשתתפים הקשו בשאלות על טיטול כוכיות אדם ובחטוואה לזרא"פ.

בקשו לדעת היש סיכוי שישראל תמיה חקוקה כלשהיא לחהליך השלום. הטר הטיב כי ישראל שילמה מחיר יקר במלחמות שנכפו עלינו ואין מריגה כמוה טכמוזה לשלום באזורנו.

ישראל תמשיך למעול להשגת השלום.

3. מבישת שה"ח ארגס עם פרופטורים.

ב-16/3 נפגש שה"ח עם קבוצה של ב-35 פרופטורים בכירים ונשיאי אוניברסיטאות, רובם יהודים, מאזור ניו יורק.

המפגש היה כיוזמתנו, ואורגן ע"י אפמ"י בטיוענו. בדבריו התייחס שה"ח לעשור להסכם השלום עם מצרים, ועדכן הנוכחים במהלכים המדיניים האחרונים, כולל עמדותינו בהקשר להסדר ביניים, לנציגות הפלשתינאים למו"מ וכו'. השאלות היו, בין השאר, בנושא הצפייה ליוזמת ישראליות, חכניה רבין, אופי ההסדר הסופי ומדוע לא לבחון את האופציה של מו"מ עם אש"פ וכו'. חסר העיר, בין השאר,

בהקשר לחכניה רבין: שהיא לא נדונה בממשלה, אך זו בהחלט אופציה רצינית שחשקל.

בהקשר ליוזמת ישראליות: בשבועות הקרובים במהלך ביקור זה"ס יש לצפות ליוזמת ישראלית כלשהיא.

וכן לא כדאי לדון במאפייני ההסדר הסופי לפני שמסכמים הסדרי ביניים. יחכן שהרעיונות של שני הצדדים לגבי ההסדר הסופי ישנו במהלך המו"מ. (עולה)

ג' ציון יאנון



דף: 4	שם: מברק	דחיות:
מקור: 5	קשר ניו-יורק	
אל:		סוג:
		תור:
דע:		מס מס' 003 00
מאת:		0 0545

-4-

4. אגודת הידידות ישראל - אמריקה.  
החסימה בחלקו הראשון של הביקור. השתתפו כ-1,000 איש.
5. מבישת ושר עם מוכ"ל ואו"ם.  
המבישה קויטה ב-17 במרץ בארבע עיניים.
6. חקשורת.  
א. לא קויטו אירועי חקשורת בחלק הראשון של הביקור בניו-יורק לפני הביקור המדיני בווינגטון.  
א"ע של אגודת ידידי ישראל-אמריקה היה האירוע היחיד שהיה מותר לחקשורת, כוסה על ידי CNN שהשתמשה בו כאילוטרציה ראשונה לביקור.  
ב. בחלקו השני של הביקור נפגש שה"ח עם 12 מבכירי החקשורת הניו-יורקית וביניהם ברברה וולטרס מ-איו.בי.סי. ולטטר קריסטל מתקביל-לרר וכן עם שלושה ארגוני חקשורת לאומיים N.B.O - נכחו 11 מאנשיהם וביניהם כל טגבי הנשיא.  
ניו-יורק סיימס - השתתפו 11 עורכים ובהם המו"ל ארתור סלזברגר העורך הראשי, טקס מרינל ותרסח החדיש של העתון צ'רלט מרייט שהיה עד לאחריהם טגריר ארה"ב גברוטניה.  
ניוז ניק - השתתפו שש העורכים והבכירים.  
כל הסיחות היו לציטוט ולייחוס.
- ג. הנושא המרכזי שעלה בכל הסגישות היה הביקור בווינגטון ומה בדיוק אמרו שחי הממשלות זו לזו.  
שה"ח הדגיש כי אין משבר כמו עדות בעתונות הישראלית.  
נשאל על צעדים שישראל עשויה לנקוט בהם, כדי להקל על המות (ברוח החבה חוט טרידמן מ-12/3). עוד נשאל על אש"ף ורעיון הוציאה הבינלאומית, בו הזמן נשאל על הסתרחש בארצות השכנות לגו.  
בכל המגישות - על אף שנשאלו שאלות נוקבות - (כגון מדוע לא נחיר

אישור:

שם השולח:

תאריך:



דחפנות:	י"ד : 5 מתוך: 5 מופס מברק יקשר ניו-יורק
סיוג:	אל:
תלח:	
מס מריקי 113 11	דע:
0 0545	מאת:

-5-

הנפת דגלי מלטסין) - הרי שהאווירה הייתה ידידותית (נרשם על ידי  
ברוך בינה).

הערה: יש ציפיה טכניקור הבא של שה"ח בניו-יורק מקווים עצמו בהשתתפות  
מנהיגות יהודית-אמריקאית, סטודנטים וגורמי עליה.

מרדכי יריד



אישור:

שם השולח

תאריך:

END

## CARTOON COMMENT IN THE ARAB PRESS

Cartoonists have played a major role in expressing political trends in Arab politics. Unlike Western cartoonists, they have been perceived to represent the regime itself by serving as its mouthpiece, or represent a major threat to the survival of the regime by supporting dissident elements and insurgencies.

A most outstanding cartoonist, Naji al-Ali, was murdered in London in July 1987 by Arafat's own Special Operations Unit, headed by Col. Hawari. Naji al-Ali was known for his anti-Arafat cartoon-editorializing.

## ARAB ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PLO



(the above cartoon was published in the Syrian daily al-Thawra on February 25, and contends that Arab support for the uprising lags behind international support)

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


# INTER-ARAB POLITICS



(the above cartoon was published in the Syrian daily al-Ba'ath on February 24)

## THE PLO -- A TURNING POINT? -- A KUWAITI VIEW



(the above cartoon was published in the Kuwaiti daily al Rai al-Aam on January 1, and depicts a Palestinian throwing a rock on an Israeli -- the shape of the rock is that of Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean)

## THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR -- A KUWAITI VIEW



(the above cartoon was published in the Kuwaiti daily al Qabas on February 28, and is based on a play of words in Arabic: "rash-di," in Arabic, means "spray it")





דף: 2	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס מבוק	לחידות: מ י ל י
כתוב: 14		סוג: ג ל י
אל:		תאריך ושכח מעבור:
דע:		כס' מבוק:
כאח:		הכשרה: 520

IT'S MY VIEW, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THE SOVIETS COULD BE HELPFUL IF THEY REESTABLISHED RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND IF THEY SUPPORTED A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS. ABOVE ALL, I THINK THEY COULD RESTRAIN REDICAL STATES WHICH ARE OPPOSED TO PEACE, SUCH AS LIBYA. WE AGREED THAT OUR RESPECTIVE REGIONAL EXPERTS WOULD GET TOGETHER SOON.

3. לאחר שהמזכיר הקריא עדותו (חועברה כבר בגפרוד) ופירט בקשת התקציב של הממשל הגיב אובי בהציגו את ה- Chairmans's Mark (הצעת היו"ר לחוק ההקצבות). לדבריו, העדר הכנסות ומיסים (בהתאם למדיניות בוש) והצורך להשיג את היעד של גר' לשתיא 1990 משמעותם חקטנת סיוע חחוץ. עפ"י הצעתו של אובי (רצ"ב פירוט הצעתו) לאחר התאמה של 3.6% כדי להגיע ל- current services budget level יופחת כל Account בסך של כ-9.8% כדי להשיג היעד של 100 ביליון \$ לפי גר'. משמעות הדבר הפחתה בסך של 1.4 ביליון \$ לעומת הבקשה הנוכחית של הממשל (13.257 ביליון \$ לעומת הבקשה של 14.657 ביליון \$) או הפחתה של בערך 1 ביליון דולר לעומת שתיא 1989.

בעקבות הצגה זו של הקיצוץ הנדרש התפתחו חילופי דברים בין אובי למזכיר :

בייקר : אנו מעונינים לעבוד ולדון עמכם בנוגע לביטול חשיונים כדי לאפשר יתר גמישות לממשל. עם זאת, יהיו מספר שריונים שנרצה להסכים ביחד שעליהם להמשיך. הממשל מעוניין לדון עם חועדה לגבי החלטותיה על קיצוצים, אולם אין פירושו של דבר שאני מסכים עמו שגישתך נכונה.

אובי : אינני מציע קיצוץ אוטומטי (sequestration) אני מעוניין למונעו. אולם

תפוצה:

דחיות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קף: 3
סוג: ג ל ו י		פתוח: 14
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד: 520		כאח:

התחליף התקציבי דורש להגיע לרמת הוצאות הזדה לסכום שיקבע עבור הקיצוץ האוטומטי. מטרי היא להציג מה יהיה החלק שלנו בנטל הקיצוץ וכיצד נחלק הכספים.

בייקר : מבין את כוונת אנבי אולם הנחותיו אינן במקומן. בשלב כה מוקדם של התהליך התקציבי. זו טעות ומסקנה מוקדמת מידי להניח שלא יושג הסכם תקציבי כולל בקונגרס של מדיניות בוש (חתנגדות להעלאת מיסים). (התייחס גם לפסגה התקציבית של 87).

אובי : יתכן שיושג הסכם, אולם הוא לא יכלול חכנסות חדשות, ובהעדר כאלה, זה (הצעתו) כל מה שתוכל לקבל.

בייקר : הביע תקווה שאובי לא יסיק מסקנות כבר בתחילת התהליך התקציבי. בהתייחס לחישובי אובי על הצורך בקיצוץ של 9.8% הגיב בייקר כי זהו נתון פסימיסטי מאוד.

אובי : לא. אלה נתוני OMB (האגף התקציבי של הממשל).

בייקר : לא. אלה נתוני CBO (האגף התקציבי של הקונגרס).

אובי : לא. נתוני CBO הם 16%. הסביר לבייקר כי עפ"י נתוח הממשל את התקציב, % הקיצוץ האחיד לתכניות Non-Defense, כפי שמוגדר סיוע חוץ לפי ג"ר, הוא 9.8%. במסגרת חילופי הדברים עבר מוקד הויכוח לתקציב ההגנה כאשר בייקר טבור שהתקציב לא הוגדל ואילו אובי אינו מסכים.

בייקר : חמטרה הבסיסית של הדיונים בין ועדות התקציב למנהל ה- OMB וחבית הלבן היא למנוע קיצוץ אוטומטי. מה שאתה (אובי) עושה בהצעתך, אתה משתמש בהשפעה של קיצוץ אוטומטי על התקציב. זה לא ייושם, כפי שאני מבין, ע"י ועדות אחרות ולפיכך חכנס

תפוצה:



זמירות: מ ל ד י	סגירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קף: 4
סוג: ג ל ר י		כתוב: 14
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		כאת:
524		

למעשה למי"מ כשידין כבולות. הצלחנו ב-1987 להשיג גידול צנוע בפונקציה 150 או לפחות להגן עליו ולכן אינני מבין מדוע יש להניח, כבר בתחילת התהליך, שלא נצליח גם השנה.

אובי : מה שאתה שוכח שהגנת הפסגה התקציבית על סיוע החוץ ב-87 היתה בקונטקסט של הסכם שאיפשר הגדלת הכנסות והפחתת בהוצאות. אם נגיע להסכם דומה כמו לפני שנתיים נוכל לתת יותר כספים לבקשותיך, אולם בהעדר הכנסות חדשות, הקונגרס לא יכול להמנע מהחחיבותו להגיע ליעד קיצוץ הדפיציט של 100 ביליון \$. יתכן שניתן להתאים תכניות בתוך המסגרת הקיימת אולם אין לצפות מהקונגרס להסכים לגישה חיובית יותר כלפי סיוע חוץ מאשר כלפי חינוך, בריאות או הגנה, וזה מה שהממשל מבקש מאתנו לעשות.

בייקר ואובי חמשיכו ב"פינג פונג" תוך שבייקר מנסה להגן על פונקציה 150 ולקבוע שאין מקום לוותר מראש.

אובי : ציין כי מסכים שבעת הצעת החוק (Mark-up) יכלל דו"ח לוואי שיציין אילו Accounts הועדה תסכים להגדיל סכומיה אם עפ"י הסכמי פסגה תקציבית יושגו כספים נוספים או יוגדלו החכנסות. "בהעדר הסכם כנ"ל לא נוכל לדחוס 15 ביליון \$ לשק של 30 ביליון \$". הויכוח בין בייקר לאובי המשיך בנוגע לרמה הבסיסית של הכנת החוק. לפי בייקר אובי מתחיל הכנת החוק מרמה של Sequester שאיננה משאירה לו כל מרחב תמרון ואילו אובי הטעים שהוא מתחיל מרמת הנחה שאין הכנסות חדשות.

בסופו של דבר ביקש בייקר מאובי לשקול מחדש גישתו כדי שניתן יהיה לעבוד ביחד למען צרכי הבטחון הלאומי ויחסי חוץ של ארה"ב.

קונגרסמן פורטר - ביקש תבהרות מאובי לגבי עמדתו ביחס להעלאת מיסים.

תפוצה:

דתימות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון מחלקת פקוק	דף: 5
סוג: ג ל ו י		כתוב: 14
תאריך וזמן חצירה:		אל:
כס' פקוק:		דצ:
הפסרד: 829		פאת:

אובי : תהיה זו טעות אם המסלוגת הדמוקרטית תנסה להכריח את הנשיא להעלות מיסים. עלינו לאפשר לבוש לבוא לציבור האמריקני בסוף השנה ולהצהיר כי שמר על הבטחתו לא להעלות מיסים. יתכן שלאחר מכן נוכל להפטר מהבטחות מטופשות כגיל להתחיל לעבוד בשנה הבאה (הקדלת הכנסות).

פורטר : הגירת מבריח"מ : ישנן מספר קבוצות הדוחקות בממשל להשעות תקנות ג'קסון-וניק לאור הגידול בהגירת היהודים מבריח"מ בשנה האחרונה. הפציר בממשל לא לעשות כן עד אשר המספרים לא ישתוו לקחות או יעלה על הרמות הקודמות: 18,000 אשתקד ו- 51,000 ב-1979 וכן עד אשר הרפורמות לא תמוסדנה, תהסוכנה קבועות ותבטחנה זכויות הגירה בחוק. האם זכיצד נשקל הקושי בממשל.

בייקר : חל אמנם שינוי משמעותי בנוגע להגירה וזה גורם ללחצים על המשאבים שלנו. יש עוד מקום לשיפורים ויש צורך במיסוד הרפורמות שהתבצעו על בסיס אד-הוק, עד שנחליט על שינוי בג'קסון וניק.

קונגרסמן מקין - תמך באובי בנושא החקציב, קרא לשתי"פ ותיאום בין כל זרועות הממשל. החלק הנוגע למזה"ת ואש"ם, הובקע בנפרד.

אובי - בהמשך לדברי מקין (אותו שיבח על ידיעתו והבנתו במזה"ת) שאל היכן עומד המזה"ת בסולם העדימויות של הממשל.

בייקר - יחסית בעדיפות גבוהה. איננו מחפשים low-key מעורבות במזה"ת. כפי שאמרתי לשרי החוץ של נאט"ו, לסובייטים ולאחרים הנשיא, וממשל זה מתכוונים להיות פעילים בנוגע למזה"ת.

תפוצה:



דחיות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס מברק	קד: 6
סוג: ג ל ר י		כתוב: 14
תאריך וזמן מעור:		אל:
כס' מברק:		דע:
הפסיד:		פאת:
224		

But we think that it is very, very important that the timing of that activity, if you will, be correct, and that we ought not to be so anxious to demonstrate concern for the problem or a willingness to be involved that we undertake initiatives which are not well thought out and which have little chance of success. By the same token, we are anxious not to avoid opportunities that present themselves, opportunities that might present themselves as a consequence of change -- relatively recent changes in the situation, such as the dialogue that Mr. McHugh made reference to.

So it's a case of wanting to move in a reasoned and well thought out way at the right time, Mr. Chairman; at the same time, not passing up opportunities to move the peace process along. Frankly, there have been so many failures in this process, that we're very anxious that when we do move that we have at least assessed that we have a reasonable chance of success in making something work. And that's why, frankly, we are talking to the parties now about steps that can be taken to improve the situation on the ground in the Occupied

Territories, steps that can be taken to improve the climate, steps that can be taken that might create an atmosphere that could help us get to direct negotiations. And if direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians other than the PLO can bring about peace, then we shouldn't rule those out. If, on the other hand, it takes something beyond that, then that's the way we ought to go.

קונגרסמן קולמן - מדיניות מכירות נשק במזה"ת .

בייקר : מדיניות מכירות נשק למדינות ערביות מחוננות חזקוקות לכך, לצרכי הגנתן, איננה סותרת תמיכתנו החזקה בישראל ובטחונה. יש לנו מחוייבות לא למכור מערכות שתחתורנה תחת יתרונה חאיכותי חצבאי של ישראל. הלכה למעשה לישראל יתרון צבאי על כל קומבינציה

תפוצה:

לחיות: מיד	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	זר: 7
סוג: גל		כתוב: 14
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
תעודת:		כאח:
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צפויה של כוחות ערביים. חשוב שתמשכנה להיות מדינות ערביות מתונות במזה"ח שתמוכנה בחיפושנו אחר השלום ואין זה עומד בסתירה למכור להן נשק הגנתי לגיטימי.

קולמן - חייב הדברות ותקשורת בין הממשל לקונגרס לגבי מדיניות מכירות נשק זו כדי למנוע מחלוקות ואי-הבנות.

בייקר - הסכים עם קולמן. על הממשל להתייעץ עם הקונגרס לפני כל עסקה, ומאידך, על הקונגרס להמנע מחסימה מוקדמת של עסקות באמצעות הפצת מכתבים. יש צורך ביצירת אמון בין שני הצדדים.

קולמן - אולי כדאי שתבהירו יותר מהות העסקות (הביא כדוגמה ה-AWACS והסטינגריס).

בייקר : אחד מהמאבקים הקשים ב-1981 היה מכירת ה-AWACS לסעודיה. אינו חושב שיש משהו שיעצן היום שהמכירה לא היתה במקומה לאור מה שהתרחש במפרץ.

אובי - פליטים. זרם הפליטים לארה"ב הולך וגובר (מבריה"מ, אפריקה, אסיה) ואילו הממשל קורא לקיצוץ בתקציביו. תוך שלושה חודשים לא יוותרו כספים לממן יציאת יהודי בריה"מ ופליטים אחרים העוזבים את בריה"מ. כיצד בכוונת הממשל לפעול.

בייקר - אנו בודקים את כל שאלת הפליטים ונתייעץ עמכם לאחר ה-1.5.89. בינתיים אנו מבקשים 100 מיליון \$ כ-Supplemental לשתיא 1989 כדי לעמוד בלחץ הגובר.

אובי הופתע מבקשת הממשל ושאל את בייקר מהיכן יקחו כסף זה ?

כן שאל האם לממשל בקשות נוספות ל-Supplemental.

תפוצה:



דף: 8	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	יחידות: מ י ד י
כתוב: 14		סוג: ג ל ר י
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כאח:		תעודת: 520

בייקר אשר התנצל על כי בקשתם לא הועברה, הוסיף כי בכוונתם לבקש מימון נוסף לקונטרס. לקראת סוף השימועים החליפו שוב בייקר ואובי דברים בנושא גישתם לחקציב וסיכמו לנסות לשתייפ.

4. נושאים נוספים שעלו בשימועים: בעיות אוכלוסין (סין), קפריסין, הונג קונג, אפריקה, המשך סיוע לקונטרס, ניקרגואה, דרום קוריאה, פנמה - מצב פנים והתעלה, מקסיקו, חובות העולם השלישי, ונצואלה ורפורמות כלכליות, ג'מיקה וחמשטר חחדש, מימון בנק EX-IM.

5. הקונגרסמנים התחלקו בעמדותיהם עפ"י מפתח מפלגתי כאשר הדמוקרטים תומכים באובי ואילו הרפובליקנים בבייקר.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר  
אחראי צינור

תפוצה:

'D/C 1/03/91' 11/30/91

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How the Tentative Compromise  
Amounts were Decided Upon

Arriving at the Compromise

The Special Analysis of the FY 1990 Budget clearly explains how the Sequestration process works under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation.

Simply explained, a "Current Services" 1990 budget is created by OMB. Basically, that budget is a 3.6 percent increase, item by item, over amounts provided in FY 1989.

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation requires that the estimated "Current Services" deficit for FY 1990 may not exceed \$100 billion.

The OMB projected Current Services deficit is \$126 billion. Consequently, the legislation requires that budget cuts be made through "sequestration" formula in order to achieve a deficit of \$100 billion.

For Non-defense programs OMB tells us in its Special Analysis of the budget that a "Uniform reduction percentage" of 9.8 must be applied to every item individually.

Gramm-Rudman Required Reduction Rate Applied to Foreign Assistance

For Foreign Assistance, Export Financing and Related Programs a 9.8 percent cut required by GRH sequestration results in total funding being cut \$1.4 billion from the President's request, or about \$1 billion from the current year level of \$14.3 billion.

President's Request As The Base

We decided that rather than ignoring the President's budget, as we often have in the past, we would use the Presidential FY 1990 request as the base from which cuts must be made to reach the level required to avoid sequestration.

In this way we would be able to provide some new Presidential initiatives such as the IMF facility, the Philippines initiative, the International Financial Corporation, Afghan assistance, etc.

These programs would have been immediately excluded if we had started with the 1990 Current Services base.



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### Mandatory and Ex-Im Bank Level Adjustments

Next we basically accepted the Presidential request for mandatory items such as operating expenses and payment to the Foreign Service Retirement fund. Operating expenses for AID were reduced to reflect an \$11 million operating expense transfer to the State Department.

We also salvaged the Export-Import Bank by providing \$500 million for direct loans. The Administration had requested \$0 (requesting instead \$100 million for the "war chest").

### Across the Board Reduction

We then cut all the remaining programs an equal amount to get down to the \$13.3 billion sequestration target.

All of these actions resulted in the figures on the computer run entitled "GRH cut from FY 1990 request--which is column four.

### Other Adjustments to Formula

Finally, we made a series of adjustments to programs that have a broad degree of support in the Committee, the House and by both political parties.

For example, some of the judgments are as follows:

1. President's Request. Funds for several accounts are funded at the President's request level, rather than at the formula:

- Peace Corps
- American Schools and Hospitals
- International Disaster Assistance
- International Narcotics Control
- Migration and Refugee Assistance
- Emergency Migration And Refugee
- Anti-terrorism Assistance
- Trade and Development Program

2. Inter-American Investment Corporation and Asian Bank Development Fund. Reductions were made in these accounts.

3. IMF, Enhanced Structural Facility. Funds were provided at a level of \$75 million to initiate a new Presidential initiative.

4. International Organizations and Programs. Cuts recommended by the Administration for UNICEF (\$26.5 million) and other programs such as the UN Environment Program were rejected.

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5. Sub-Saharan Africa. Funding was provided at \$500 million instead of the formula's \$487 million.

6. Philippines Special Initiative. \$100 million is included to facilitate the beginning of the Administration's new Philippine initiative, instead of \$0 which would have been provided by the formula.

7. Economic Support Fund. \$24 million was added to the formula level for ESF making the total \$2.9 billion .

8. World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. Provide \$0 funding for the hard loan window of the World Bank and \$0 funding for the Inter-American Development Bank until realistic third world debt policy is in place.





# SPECIAL ANALYSES BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

The resulting 1990 current services deficit is \$126.9 billion, \$88.1 billion lower than the \$160.0 billion deficit for 1989. The deficit is projected to decline further each year, falling to \$8.7 billion in 1994.

Table A-2. CURRENT SERVICES TOTALS

(In billions of dollars)

	1988 actual	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Budget authority .....	1,185.5	1,271.9	1,337.5	1,419.9	1,462.4	1,512.0	1,550.1
(On-budget) .....	(944.0)	(1,005.1)	(1,048.6)	(1,107.4)	(1,130.7)	(1,157.6)	(1,175.8)
(Off-budget) .....	(241.5)	(266.9)	(288.9)	(312.5)	(331.8)	(354.4)	(374.2)
Receipts .....	909.0	975.5	1,057.5	1,136.7	1,208.6	1,278.1	1,341.7
(On-budget) .....	(667.5)	(708.7)	(768.6)	(824.2)	(876.8)	(923.8)	(967.5)
(Off-budget) .....	(241.5)	(266.9)	(288.9)	(312.5)	(331.8)	(354.4)	(374.2)
Outlays .....	1,064.0	1,135.5	1,184.5	1,238.3	1,278.3	1,315.0	1,350.4
(On-budget) .....	(861.4)	(924.7)	(964.4)	(1,006.6)	(1,037.4)	(1,065.1)	(1,092.4)
(Off-budget) .....	(202.7)	(210.9)	(220.1)	(231.7)	(240.9)	(249.9)	(258.0)
Surplus or deficit (—) .....	—155.1	—160.0	—126.9	—101.6	—69.7	—36.9	—8.7
(On-budget) .....	(—193.9)	(—216.0)	(—195.7)	(—182.3)	(—160.5)	(—141.4)	(—124.9)
(Off-budget) .....	(38.8)	(56.0)	(68.8)	(80.8)	(90.9)	(104.5)	(116.2)

## SPECIAL ANALYSIS A

A-47

### SEQUESTRATION CALCULATIONS

If no changes were made in the current G-R-H budget baseline estimates before the final sequestration report in October, a sequestration of \$26.1 billion, the difference between the current deficit and the target of \$100 billion, would be determined using the following steps, as shown in Table A-19.

Table A-19. SEQUESTRATION CALCULATIONS FOR 1990

(In billions of dollars)

FISCAL YEAR  
**1990**

	Estimate
Required deficit reduction .....	26.1
Defense Programs: *	
Total required outlay reductions .....	13.0
Estimated outlays associated with across-the-board sequesterable budgetary resources .....	194.3
Uniform reduction percentage .....	6.7
Nondefense programs:	
Total required outlay reductions .....	13.0
Estimated savings from automatic spending increases .....	
Estimated savings from the application of special rules:	
Guaranteed student loans .....	•
Foster care and adoption assistance .....	•
Medicare .....	1.5
Other health programs .....	0.2
Amount remaining to be obtained from uniform percentage reductions of budget resources .....	11.3
Estimated outlays associated with across-the-board sequesterable budgetary resources *	115.3
Uniform reduction percentage .....	9.8
Memorandum:	
Defense with all military personnel accounts exempt:	
Total required outlay reductions .....	13.0
Estimated outlays associated with across-the-board sequesterable budgetary resources .....	116.7
Uniform reduction percentage .....	11.2

\* Excludes Federal Emergency Management Agency accounts

\* Includes \$6.6 billion in estimated 1991 outlays for the Commodity Credit Corporation that can be affected by a 1990 sequester and \$3.0 billion in outlays from offsetting collections

\* \$50 million or less

First, one-half of the required deficit reduction, \$13.0 billion, would be assigned to defense programs (budget accounts in the



national defense function, 050, excluding the Federal Emergency Management Agency) and the other half to nondefense programs.

Second, savings from eliminating automatic spending increases in three specific programs—the National Wool Act, the special milk program, and vocational rehabilitation—would be applied to the required reduction in outlays for nondefense programs. For 1990, only vocational rehabilitation state grants (4.2 percent) and the special milk program (2.6 percent) are estimated to have automatic spending increases. Savings from eliminating these adjustments would be \$47 million.

Third, the amount of outlay savings to be obtained by applying four special rules would be calculated. These special rules are for guaranteed student loans, foster care and adoption assistance, Medicare and certain other health programs. For the guaranteed student loan program, two changes would occur automatically if a sequester were triggered. First, under current assumptions, the statutory factor for calculating the quarterly special allowance payments to lenders would be reduced by 0.25 percentage points. Second, a student's origination fee would increase by 0.5 percentage points. For foster care and adoption assistance, a sequestration would eliminate increases in foster care maintenance payment rates or adoption assistance payment rates taking effect during the fiscal year. The reductions are limited to the extent that they can be made by reducing Federal matching payments by a uniform percentage across States. For Medicare and certain other health programs, reductions under a sequester order are limited to 2 percent. The estimated savings, \$1.7 billion for 1990, from these special rules would be applied toward the required spending reductions in nondefense programs.

The reductions in defense programs and remaining reductions in nondefense programs would be taken on a uniform percentage basis, computed separately for each category. The uniform reduction percentages are computed from outlay estimates. The remaining outlay savings to be achieved separately in defense and nondefense spending would be divided by the estimated outlays associated with sequesterable budgetary resources in each category. The two resulting uniform reduction percentages for defense and nondefense would then be applied separately to all of the remaining sequesterable budgetary resources (budget authority, credit authority, and other spending authority) in each category. Under current estimates, the uniform percentage reductions would be 9.8 percent for nondefense programs. For defense programs, the uniform percentage reduction would be 6.7 percent if military personnel accounts were sequesterable and 11.2 percent if these accounts were exempted from sequestration.

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## FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED AGENCIES

16:08 3/09/89 PAGE 7

	FY 1989 Enacted	FY 1990 Request	GRH 9.8% cut of Curr. Serv.	GRH out from FY 1990 Request	Tentative Compromise	Tentative compared with FY 1990 Request	
16100 RECAP							16100
16350 Military Assistance Programs:							16350
17010 Foreign Military Financing Program:							17010
17020 Grants and concessional loans.....	4,272,750,000	5,027,000,000	3,992,765,238	4,340,276,351	4,340,276,351	-686,723,649	17020
17030 Military Assistance.....	467,000,000	40,432,000	437,902,960	40,432,000	40,432,000	---	17035
17040 International Military Education and Training.....	47,400,000	54,500,000	44,293,812	47,054,915	47,054,915	-7,445,085	17040
17042 Subtotal, military assistance programs.....	4,787,150,000	5,121,932,000	4,474,961,810	4,427,763,266	4,427,763,266	-694,168,734	17042
17045 Guarantee Reserve Fund.....	939,500,000	719,545,000	719,545,000	719,545,000	719,545,000	---	17045
17050 Special Defense Acquisition Fund.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	17050
17070 Peacekeeping operations.....	31,689,000	33,377,000	29,612,660	28,817,466	33,377,000	---	17070
17100 Total, military assistance programs.....	5,758,339,000	5,874,954,000	5,224,119,470	5,176,125,732	5,180,685,266	-694,168,734	17100
17120 Economic Support Fund.....	3,258,500,000	3,349,100,000	3,044,977,012	2,894,048,251	2,918,000,000	-431,100,000	17120
17210 Development Assistance:							17210
17230 International organizations and programs.....	226,115,000	209,000,000	211,298,010	180,449,127	240,000,000	+31,000,000	17230
17240 Bilateral Development Assistance.....	3,012,448,270	3,312,588,000	2,877,445,850	2,942,442,583	2,984,988,673	-327,599,327	17240
17240 Subtotal, non-bank development assistance.....	3,238,563,270	3,521,588,000	3,088,743,860	3,122,891,710	3,224,988,673	-296,599,327	17240
17270 International Financial Institutions.....	1,314,629,730	1,787,384,225	1,228,484,312	1,543,214,942	1,409,191,519	-378,192,706	17250
17280 Total, development assistance.....	4,553,193,000	5,308,972,225	4,317,228,172	4,666,106,652	4,634,180,192	-674,792,033	17280
18000 Total, titles I, II & III.....	13,570,032,000	14,532,926,225	12,546,324,654	12,736,280,635	12,732,865,458	-1,800,060,767	18000
18010 Export assistance:							18010
18100 Budget authority effect of Ex-im limitations.....	495,000,000	100,000,000	648,204,240	500,000,000	500,000,000	+400,000,000	18100
18120 Other.....	25,000,000	25,000,000	23,336,544	21,584,823	25,000,000	---	18120
18150 Total, export assistance.....	720,000,000	125,000,000	671,540,804	521,584,823	525,000,000	+400,000,000	18150
18155 Total, all titles.....	14,290,032,000	14,657,926,225	13,257,865,458	13,257,865,458	13,257,865,458	-1,400,060,767	18155

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 21.03.89

יוצא \*\*

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סודי/מיידי

ערן. שטיין.

התקשר היוז. אמר בין היתר שברצונו להביע צערו על הודעת  
שר התיירות פת שקרא לדבריו לישראלים להימנע מלבקר בטאבה  
להוציא שם מטבע זר וכו'. היוז אמר שהוא מקוה שעתה  
משנסתיימה פרשת טאבה יתנהל המעבר דרך מסוף הגבול הישראלי  
ללא תקלות שהרי הכל יעקבו אחרי מהלך הדברים שם.  
הביע תקוותו שסידורי המעבר והצהרות כנ'ל לא יהפכו לאבן  
נגף נוספת.

בנצור

תפ

אק

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ליאור, מצרים





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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תאריך : 21.03.89

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חוזם: 3,15699

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סודי/מידי

(תפוצה-מצומצמת)

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

דע: סמנכ'ל מצפ'א, הציר/שטיין-ווישינגטון (בנפרד נר  
(120

מאת: נאו' מ-יששכרוף

שיחה עם ג'ון הירש

אחת) נפגשתי לשיחה עם ג'ון הירש (מחמ'ד) ביום ו'  
בערב, לפי בקשתו. הירש שהה בניו יורק לרגל הופעתו  
של שה'ח ארנס בפני ועדת הנשיאים. אני מניח שהדברים  
ידועים לכם כבר, אך למען הסדר הטוב, להלן עיקרי הנקודות  
שמסר:

א. להערכתו האישית, החלטת שולץ לפתוח בדו-שיח עם אש'פ  
היתה יותר כתוצאה מנסיבות מצטברות של קבלת תנאיה  
של ארה'ב, מאשר כתוצאה של תוכנית ששלביה תוכננו  
ונקבעו מראש על ידי שולץ. לדבריו, אחד היסודות העיקריים  
מאחורי החלטתו של שולץ, היתה הערכתו של דניס רוס  
שרק באמצעות דו-שיח ישיר עם אש'פ יהיה ניתן לבחון  
את אמיתות כוונותיו של ערפאת והשינויים שהתרחשו  
בארגון, אם בכלל. אישית, הוא נשאר סקפטי למדי לגבי  
'השינוי' באש'פ.

ב. ציין שהפגישה הבאה עם אש'פ תהיה ביום ד' (22/3)





## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בתוניס, ובפגישה זו מתכוון שגרירם בתוניס לבחון את נכונותו של אש'פ לנקוט בצעדים ממתנים בשטחים. כן דיבר על כוונת ארה'ב להתחיל בתהליך השיכנוע כלפי אש'פ של התרת מו'מ' בין ישראל לבין נציגי השטחים.

ג. ציין שהפגישה הבאה תהיה למעשה הפגישה הראשונה בה ידונו בנושאים מהותיים. בפגישה הראשונה דיברו על טרור בשניה על אסון פאן-אם ובשלישית על ידיעות שקיבלה ארה'ב על נסיון אפשרי להתנקש בשגרירם בתוניס ואנשי אש'פ שהיו מעורבים בדו-שיח עם ארה'ב. הידיעות התייחסו לנסיונות מצד גורמים לוביים אך לאחר מכן הסתבר שהיו גורמים סוריים.

ד. אש'פ מאד חושש מנציגים מקומיים בשטחים הואיל והם מהווים ערעור לסמכותו, ולכן מתנגד לבחירות. סיפר שפייסל חוסייני היה אמור להופיע בקונגרס בפני ועדת המילטון, אך אש'פ עמד על כך שחוסייני יופיע בלווית נביל שעת' בלבד, ולכן העניין לא יצא אל הפועל.

ה. להערכתו, ספק רב אם תושבי השטחים יהיו מוכנים לפתוח במו'מ' ישיר עם ישראל בלי הסכמתו של אש'פ ולכן הדו-שיח בין ארה'ב לאש'פ מיועד ללחוץ על על אש'פ בהקשר זה.

ו. מוברק אמור להגיע לווינגטון ב-30/31 למרץ וחסיין יגיע לאחר רה'מ' שמיר. לדעתו, עצם נכונותו של חוסיין להגיע לווינגטון הוא צעד חיובי לאור המתיחויות שהיו בין המלך לבין ארה'ב בתקופה האחרונה.

ז. הביע תקווה שרה'מ' שמיר יגיע לארה'ב עם הצעות מוחשיות לגבי פתרון הבעיה בשטחים, ומקווה שביקור שה'ח ארנס תרם לכך.

נאו'מ.  
ע/ש

חו

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא





יוצא

בלמס

חוזם: 3,15975

אל: ני/720, לונדון/368

מ-: המשרד, תא: 210389, זח: 1329, דח: ב, סג: בל

תח: 8 גס: ארבל

נד: 8

נ.מ. \\*0\*\ 216.04

בלמס/בהול

קשדן-לונדון.

דע: נאו'ם

יוניפיל - הריגת 3 אירים.

1. להלן מיחידת הקישור לכוחות זרים:

'היום (21) 09:40 נהרגו 3 חיילי אום אירים כתוצאה מעלית משאית או'ם על מוקש דרומית מזרחית לברעשית'.

2. אלוף פקוד צפון הציע ליוניפיל עזרתנו ככל שתידרש.

3. בקירבת מקום האירוע נמצאת עמדה של צדל ואפשר להניח שהמוקש הונח ע'י כוחות מקומיים העוינים לצד'ל במטרה לפגוע בחייליו. לתשומת לבכם שמדובר באפשרות סבירה אך לא ודאית.

ארבל 2

רש





דחיות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	ק"י: 1
סוג: ג ל י	טופס פדוק	כתוב: 14
תאריך וזמן חבור: 20.3.89 - 22:00		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פדוק: 522	לשכת ס/שה"ח צ"ר בל"ז - כ"א	דע:
	פאת: ק. לקונגרס	

סגאט: עדות המזכיר בייקר בועדת ההקצבות

ב-15.3 הופיע המזכיר בייקר בפני ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות שליד ועדת ההקצבות. נכחו הסנטורים: ליידי (יו"ר), דה קונסיני (אריזונה), לאוטנברג (ניו-ג'רסי), קסטן (זיסקונסין) ספקטר (פנסילבניה), רדמן (ניו-המפשייר) הטפילד (אורגון) ודמאטו (ניו-יורק).

1. בייקר מסר עדותו ברוח זו שבועדת ההקצבות בביתנ"ב.

2. חלק השאלות והתשובות:

קסטן

- א. סבור שניתן להגיע לפסגה תקציבית.
- ב. בנוגע לשריונים - הבעיה היא שהעוגה הולכת ומצטמקת ויש לעצור השחיקה הזו.
- ג. לגבי המזה"ח - רצ"ב חילופי דברים בין קסטן ובייקר לגבי אש"ם, מעורבותו בטרור, אי קיום התנאים האמריקנים וחמשך הדיאלוג.

**KASTEN:**

As you're aware, Senator Inouye and I wrote Secretary Shultz a letter toward the middle of December in which we tried to encourage him, or ask him to outline the situation with regard to our dialogue and discussions with the PLO to try to get a sense of what we were really asking for and what the parameters of that kind of discussion might be. As you know, we began talking to the PLO because they made some statements that we had been asking them to make for what, 13 or so years --

1 SEC. BAKER: Ten years.

תפוצה: 36



דתיקות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל/וויטינגטון	דף: 2
סוג: ל ג י	טופס פברוק	כתוב: 104
תאריך ושכח חבור:		אל:
פס' פברוק:		דף:
מספר:		
522		כאח:

SEN. KASTEN: They made the statements and we began a dialogue. The question is, do those statements have any meaning? The question is, can they be saying one thing in public statements and doing another thing in action? And I'd like, if I could, to get your ideas here in terms of the parameters. What are the circumstances in which we would say, "We've had it. No more. We're not talking any more with you"? What kind of guidelines do we have?

And let me first of all say in terms of terrorism -- well, let me first of all say, there are a list of statements that Arafat has made that in effect contradict some of the statements that he made at our request in the press conference in December. He has taken positions that, although he said he was renouncing terror, in effect has still not accepted the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Has he in fact accepted unequivocally Israel's right to resist? We've seen statement of Israel's right to exist. We've seen statements on both sides of some of those issues. Are we

watching every single thing that they say, and when they say something that's off the reservation, we're saying, "Stop"?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I think you asked -- your question was under what circumstances would we consider we'd have to take a second look at the -- at the process we are now involved in -- that is, the dialogue. And I think we would have to take a second look if somehow there was a clear denial of Israel's right to exist, if there was a -- if there was a resort to terrorism by Arafat and the elements of the PLO which he controls or has the ability to control. I think if we saw either of those things, clearly we would want to -- we would have serious questions about continuing the dialogue.

Let me say that the dialogue is not an end in and of itself. We think it could be useful only if it can lead to constructive moves toward furthering the peace process. So, that's the purpose of it, and that's the way we would -- I think that's the -- that's the circumstances under which we would consider terminating it.

תפוסה:



דמיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 3
שוג: י ל ג	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 15
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל:
פס' פרוק:		דע:
מפסרד:		
522		פאת:

SEN. KASTEN: Well, Mr. Secretary, let me just take a couple of specific examples. He talked about the efforts of recognizing the Israel, the other kinds of things. And then, not long afterwards, when we started talking -- or certain Palestinian leaders starting talking about the possibilities of dialogue with Israel, possibilities of working toward at least some discussions, the Arafat response called for 10 bullets in the chest of Major Freaj of Bethlehem when he started discussing the possibilities of working with Israel. I don't think that that's consistent with the public statements that he made. I don't think that the continued uprising is consistent, the violence. And I don't think the continued border crossings, the continued terrorists infiltrating from Lebanon are consistent.

And specifically, what are your rules? I mean, we're trying to encourage a dialogue, I would assume, between modern Palestinians and the people in Israel.

SEC. BAKER: That's right.

CHAIRMAN LEAHY: And we want to -- we want to work that. Now, 10 bullets in the chest, to the mayor doesn't work in that direction. How are we going to -- where are we going to go from where we are?

SEC. BAKER: Well, we're going to continue for the time being the dialogue, Senator Kastan,

to see if we can, as I say, make tangible progress in a way that would contribute to peace in the Middle East, until we see some clear renunciation of the principles which he very clearly embraced when he made that statement, principles that the United States had been saying for 13 years: "If you say these things, we will talk to you. If you do not say them and mean them -- if you say them and mean them, we'll talk to you. If you don't say them and mean them, we won't." And it was going on for 13 years. Now, we will apply our judgment to whether or not he recants any of those or whether or not he departs from his renunciation of terrorism, and we'll have to look at the facts and circumstances; probably we'll have to look at facts and circumstances in the aggregate.

תפוצה:



דתיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 4
סוג: ג ל י	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 14
תאריך ושם הענף:		אל:
פס' פרוק:		דף:
מספר:		כא:
522		

I think that, with respect to terrorism, you can get all sorts of different arguments about the appropriate definition of the term, what does it constitute when it's directed, for instance, against military targets; when it's military to military, can it be terrorism? I thought that, frankly, when we lost 250 Marines in their sleep in Lebanon, that was terrorism, even though those were military personnel. But I don't think you can put -- I don't think you can tie this all up in a very neat little definitional package.

SEN. KASTEN: Well, Mr. Secretary --

SEC. BAKER: Terrorism is terrorism, and I think we'll -- I think we will know it when we see it.

SEN. KASTEN: I believe that we ought to demand that Arafat eliminates the policy of the so-called "armed struggle." I think that we ought to take into consideration the violent demonstrations, the rock-throwing, the Molotov cocktails, arson, that whole group. I think we also ought to demand that he support West Bank elections for talks with Israel. We ought to have them end this policy of intimidation that I spoke about with the "ten bullets in the chest" to Mayor Freaj. I think we ought to be demanding these things, and I think they ought to be part of the overall dialogue and the parameters in order to continue these discussions.

SEC. BAKER: That would be, of course, adding conditions that we had not had for a period of 12 or 13 years with respect to initiating a dialogue.

We are, Senator Kastan, as you probably know, trying to encourage concrete steps on the ground, in the area, that would tend to defuse tensions, that would tend to create a better atmosphere, that might ultimately help us get the parties into direct negotiations. That's, after all, the only way we're going to ultimately see peace in the Middle East, is if we have Israelis and Palestinians talking to each other.

תפוצה:



מחפשות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	ק: 5
סוג: ג ל ר י	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 14
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
תעודת:		
522		כאח:

SEN. KASTEN: I just hope that some of the ideas and concepts that I've expressed here are included in this ongoing dialogue; but that's what I'm trying to say.

SEC. BAKER: There have to be --

SEN. KASTEN: The actions have to match the words.

SEC. BAKER: Senator, let me just say this, though. There has to be, if you're going to make progress toward peace in this very -- with respect to this very, very intractable problem, it's our view that you ought to start on the ground. There ought to be a series of mutually reciprocal and reinforcing steps. Both sides need to take some steps. We've made the point that we don't think that now is the time to go out here and have a big high-visibility, high-level international conference, as many people around the world, quite frankly, are suggesting. We think there needs to be some steps taken on the ground. Some of the things you mentioned might well be steps that could be taken on that side of the equation. But there have to be some steps taken on the other side as well.

פ. ל. י. ט. י. ס. לאחר שנים של תביעה לאפשר יציאת יהודי בריה"מ אני מגיעים למצב שבו באפריל יאזל המימון לקליטת פליטים, ברומא תקועים פליטים ואנו נאלצים לסרב ל-16%-18% מהמרוויגנים (לעומת 2%-3% בעבר). הסנטורים לייחי, קנדי, קסטן, דמאטו ומיקולסקי הגישו הצעת חוק שתאפשר מימון לבעייה המיידית של פליטים. לדברי קנדי הועדה המשפטית מוכנה להעלות, בהתעצות עם הממשל את מספר הפליטים מ-25 אלף ל-50 אלף. מהעמדת הממשל (התייחס גם לבקשת הממשל ל-100 מיליון \$).

בייקר - חזר על דבריו בביהנב"ח: נעשית בדיקה כללית. ביקשו Supplemental ל - 100 מיליון \$ לשתי"א 1989.

תפוצה:

דף: 6	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דיווחות: מיד
כתובת: 104	טופס מבוק	סוג: גלו
אל:		תאריך וזמן מעבר:
דע:		כס' מבוק:
פאת:		חשד:
		522

ספקט - תזכיר לאשים ולטרור ולדברי בייקר בביתנביח בנושא מוי"מ בין ישראל לאשים.  
לאחר מכן הצטרף גם לייחזי :

SEN. SPECTER:

Mr. Secretary, let me talk to you now about the subject of the PLO and terrorism, and the very difficult questions which are raised in the Mideast peace process. And I'm sorry if I missed some of the discussion. I know you were talking about it, but I had to be in other committees, and I was on the floor briefly.

I note a quotation attributed to you in this morning's [Washington] Post to this effect, quote: "It is an element of our policy to promote direct negotiations which can be meaningful between Israelis and Palestinians. Now, if you can't have the direct negotiations that are meaningful but do not involve negotiations with the PLO, then I suppose my original answer would cover the question, we would then have to see negotiations between Israelis and representatives of the PLO."

Is that about accurate?

SEC. BAKER: I think so, roughly; yes.

SEN. SPECTER: Okay. The concern that I have is this,

my concern is that the PLO has a record of terrorism, Arafat personally having been involved in the murder of our ambassador in the Sudan back in 1974, many acts involving others -- the Israeli athletes in Munich, involvement in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. And one of the things that I think the United States has not done an adequate job on is in telling the world what the facts are about Arafat, so that he is regarded highly in most places in the world, thought of as a diplomat and is accorded great, great respect.

תפוצה:



דמיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 7
סוג: ג ל ו י	טופס פבוק	כתוב: 14
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל:
פס' פבוק:		דע:
תקשרי:		
522		פאת:

Now we have the situation where Arafat has really shot his way into the bargaining room. He has shot his way into the bargaining room because people are afraid of him. We have the case of Mayor Freaj in Bethlehem. And I had occasion to talk to Mayor Freaj shortly after he had made the proposal that the Intifada ease off and that the Israelis ease off, that there be a cooling off period in the administered territories. And then Arafat made the statement that he would put 10 bullets into the body of anyone who tried to interfere with the Intifada. Now Arafat later denied saying that --

SEC. BAKER: That's right.

SEN. SPECTER: -- and the problem that he found on that case was that there was a tape recording of his statement. And to be precise, he did not identify Freaj by name in the statement, but in the context that it was made, it was clear that the conversation related to Freaj. I had occasion to visit with Mayor Freaj on January 12th, just a few days after the incident occurred, and he was very circumspect in his language, that he wasn't blaming anybody, because he wanted to live the next day. But it was plain that he was scared out of -- scared to death by what had happened.

Now, the object -- I agree with the first part of your statement that I know that this is an extraordinary subject and there aren't any easy answers at all, and the question is whether there are any answers. I realize that. And the goal of having representatives of the Palestinians -- and I think there are many in Israel who are capable of being representatives of the Palestinians to come forward and talk with the Israelis other than the PLO.

SEC. BAKER: Mmm-hmm. (In acknowledgement.)

SEN. SPECTER: But if you say that you want to give the Palestinians a chance to have representation other than the PLO, but if that doesn't work out, then you may have to go to the PLO, then isn't that really an open invitation for the PLO to make sure that the Palestinians never have meaningful negotiations because the PLO will terrorize them?

תפוצה:



דף: 8	שגרירות ישראל/וועינגטון	דתיפות: מ י ד י
כתוב: 14	טופס פברק	סוג: ג ל י
אל:		תאריך וזמן חשור:
דצ:		פס' פברק:
פאת:		מספר: 522

SEC. BAKER: No, I don't think so. I don't think so at all, Senator. It seems to me that what I've expressed there is the view that it would be -- first of all, you're not going to have peace without direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. If that can be accomplished through a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, that would be, of course, a preferred approach but that we ought not to rule out categorically, absolutely and unequivocally consideration of going beyond that if it's necessary to move toward peace in the Middle East. That's all I said and that's what I mean and that seems to me to be an eminently reasonable position to take.

SEN. SPECTER: But Mr. Secretary, if Arafat and the PLO know that they can move from the wings to center stage, if the other Palestinians do not have fruitful negotiations with the Israelis, isn't that an open invitation for Arafat and the PLO to terrorize the other Palestinians?

SEN. BAKER: I don't think so Senator, and I didn't say that they, that they would move. But I do think it's important that we simply not categorically, absolutely, totally and completely rule out under any and all circumstances, any dialogue that might lead to peace. I just don't think we ought to do that.

SEN. SPECTER: Well, I would agree with the generalization except that I would disagree with the context that you were quoted yesterday and as you say, that's about what you said, where we know that the PLO engages in acts of terrorism and if they have an incentive to stop the other negotiations between the Palestinians -- let me ask you this --

SEN. BAKER: Look at what's happened with -- those negotiations have led to the situation that we now are experiencing in the occupied territories, Senator, which is, I'm sure you would agree, a total unsatisfactory result for all parties.

תפוסה:



דמיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 9
סוג: ג ל י	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 144
תאריך וזמן מעור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
המספר:		
522		פאת:

SEN. SPECTER: Well, I agree, but if a man like Mayor Freadj sticks his head up, and he doesn't get shot down because the bullet misses, and then he won't put his head up again, what incentives are there for Palestinians to come to talk to the Israelis if the PLO will take over if they fail?

SEN. BAKER: Let me simply repeat your words when you posed the question. You're quite right, this is a very -- this is an extraordinarily difficult area, a very intractable situation, and my view is that we ought to explore all reasonable means that might move us in the direction of peace and that we could be faulted if we did not.

SEN. SPECTER: Well, you and I agree on that statement. We just may disagree on what's reasonable. Let me ask you one final question and that is, if the PLO engages in terrorism to discourage other Palestinian representation, would that then rule out the PLO as an acceptable negotiator in your opinion?

SEN. BAKER: I will decline to do for you what I declined to do for Senator Kasten, and that is try and define in each and every circumstance under hypothetical cases when we might or might not break off our dialogue. We can't do that because there are definitional problems and

if the PLO resorted to terrorism, failed to keep their commitment to renounce terrorism, it would be an occasion for the United States to break off its dialogue.

SEN. SPECTER: Well, I -- I can understand the difficulties in defining it, as you articulate it. I think it is a little different when you come to the question of what the United States would say about PLO representation if they, in fact, caused the vacancy by shooting their way into the --

SEN. BAKER: I think what -- I guess what I'm saying is I would decline to speculate on hypotheticals. We'd have to address those questions as and when they occurred.

תפוצה:



דמיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס מברק	דף: 10
סוג: ג ל ג		כתוב: 14
תאריך וזמן חגורה:		אל:
כס' מברק:		דף:
תפסרד: 522		פאת:

SEN. SPECTER: Well, I appreciate what you have said before about the State Department, about the range PLO terrorism. I think -- I think you're on the right track. I know you inherited the policy of talking to the PLO. And I believe these discussions are very good because they have an exchange of ideas as to what we think and what policies we would ask you to consider.

SEC. BAKER: You know, Senator, if I may just say one other thing, I've seen a lot of foreign leaders during the course of the past seven or eight weeks, all of whom would really like to see the United States move a bit more aggressively in this area, toward the support of some high-level, high-visibility international conference or other -- or other initiative in the Middle East. And it's been my constant reply to them that we really believe that we ought to do whatever we can to improve the atmosphere on the ground first, see if we can improve the atmosphere so that we might ultimately get to a position where negotiations could take place. Some people fault that as too low-key an approach and so forth, but that, nevertheless, is the approach that we have -- that the President has opted to pursue. And frankly, we were pleased this morning to see that approach endorsed, at least for the time being, by one of the lead editorials in one of our nation's major newspapers.

So, this is what we're trying to do, and we really ought to -- we really ought to at least be willing to explore every reasonable avenue that could move the process forward.

SEN. SPECTER: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN LEAHY: Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, just for a moment on this last subject. I do agree with your unwillingness to go into

תפסרד: 522



דחופות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 11
סוג: ג ל י	טופס פרוק	כתובת: 104
תאריך ושעת חשיבה:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דף:
מספר: 522		כאח:

each and every hypothetical on this or any other touchy subject of that nature. I also appreciate your willingness though, expressed willingness to you and your department to keep us generally briefed on what's going on.

You know, it's my impression in discussions with people in the Middle East and people who are far more expert on the Middle East than I, that the United States is about the only country that really has credibility with all the parties over there -- the Arab world and with the Israelis. And more and more you're going to find the United States looked to for a solution. You talk about speaking with other world leaders, say, "Why aren't you moving aggressively?" and so on and I think that that's a natural reaction because they see us as in the pivotal role.

Whatever solution we come out with, or whatever solution we're willing to recommend and ultimately of course, the individual countries are going to have to decide whether they accept it or not, well, whatever we suggest is going to be a workable solution, it's going to be also in many aspects, an unpopular solution. If there's an easy and popular solution, it would have been grabbed long before you and I every got to this discussion and a whole lot of people would be considering themselves, rightly so, national heroes, for having come up with that. But there isn't any.

And, so what we're going to need, whatever recommendations you make, it's going to have to have broad US support. That means the administration is going to have to be behind it and the Republican and Democratic leadership in the Congress is going to have to be behind it. I cannot think of any that is going to really work over there on a recommendation from this country if some of the parties, inimical to each other, think that we're are splitting apart and whatever support there is here because then they'll divide and conquer routine work. Also, in the countries involved, even within the governments of the countries involved and I think especially of Israel, the one democracy there, the government

תפוצה:



דחיות: ת"ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	ת"ד: 12
סוג: גל י	טופס פרוק	פתוח: 14E
תאריך וזמן העבר:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
תעודת: 522		כאח:

is going to have to make recommendations that's going to be unpopular in their own country and unpopular within their own government. And to get the kind of cover necessary, they're going to have to point to some pretty solid support here in the United States.

I admit that I'm probably stating the obvious, but I would hope that all of us would realize that maybe there is a real opportunity now for the United States to move forward in that kind of recommendation. But it works only if we're united on it. And then some of the leaders, political leaders, not only in Israel, but in other countries involved, can take steps that they might not have been able to take otherwise, if they could point to that solid backing here. If they can't point to it, maybe I'm being overly pessimistic, but I don't think that they'll do anything at all.

ספקט קרא למעורבות יתר של מובראק בתהליך השלום.

The funding for Israel and Egypt is not conditioned, but the statement of law says this, that "it is the sense of the Congress that the recommended levels of assistance for Egypt and Israel are based in great measure on their continued participation in the Camp David Accords and upon the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty."

There are frequently calls made for suggestions to Israel, let's not call it pressure, let's call it suggestions. I think that there might be more suggestions usefully made to the Egyptians and to President Mubarak. When he first came to the United States in 1982 after succeeding President Sadat, it seemed to me that he was a lot more outgoing when he addressed a group of senators in 5-207. And I've had occasion to get to know President Mubarak and to observe him, and I think generally he is a very strong ally of the United States and has done some very good work.

תפוצה:



דתיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	13 14	דף: 13 כתוב: 14
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In his efforts to bring Egypt back into the Arab fold, he has made that, I think, clearly his highest priority. And I don't quarrel with that. I think that's in Egypt's interest, I think it helps the United States, I think it helps Israel, and it's very good for Egypt to be on solid ground with the other Arab States. But I believe, Mr. Secretary, that there is more that President Mubarak could do in this process. And in talking to him, and also talking to King Hussein, they are recognizing the PLO at this time. But it seems to me that they are not --

SEC. BAKER: Wait, I'm sorry, I didn't understand what you just said. They are what?

SEN. SPECTER: Recognized -- the PLO -- and they are pressing the PLO as the spokesman for the Palestinians. And as my prior line of questions and discussion with you suggested, I have grave concerns that that's going to work out in the long run. Listen, whatever works, so be it. If it's acceptable to the parties involved, we are making suggestions from a great distance and I think they ought to be viewed as suggestions only and not pressure. Ultimately, the Palestinians and the Israelis will have to work it out.

But I just wanted to make this one suggestion to you: that I believe that President Mubarak could -- I'm sure he could do a great deal more and I think he might be inclined to do more. When the Egyptian Ambassador was recalled from Israel in 1983, he made a commitment to return the Ambassador within one to two weeks in June and he didn't follow up for a very long time because of his own reasons. And there was some very strong support from the United States for President Mubarak to do that. And my own sense is that he could be much more of a forceful player there. And where you have very substantial foreign aid and you have it with a reference on sense of the Congress, it seems to me that that is an issue that

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דחילות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	ז'ר: 14
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is worth talking about. And there are many of us who do talk to him about that and I just wanted to call that to your attention because I believe that he could well be the key to unlocking new doors in the Mid-East.

נושאים נוספים שעלן בשימועים: הצעת אובי בביהנביח, אנגולה, ועדת הלסינקי, מדיניות כלפי אמריק"ז, אלסלבדור (בחירות), האיטי, סנמה, הרעב בסודאן, פליטים, קמבודיה, סמים, בנות הבית וחלוקת נטל שווה.

אברהם ורנאי פנקס  
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה:





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4 THE BOSTON GLOBE MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1989

# Jewish groups show support for Israel

## Meeting of solidarity opens in Jerusalem

By Mary Curtius  
Globe Staff

JERUSALEM - More than a thousand leaders of world Jewish organizations gathered in Jerusalem yesterday for a three-day meeting designed to show their unwavering support for Israel.

"The physical presence of Jewish leaders here sends a message that we're supporting the Israeli government and people," said Malcolm Hornlein, executive director of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations.

That is the message Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir hopes to take with him to Washington next month, when he holds his first round of talks on prospects for Middle East peace with the Bush administration.

"In view of the recent developments in the Middle East, there is an urgent need to strengthen the relationship of solidarity between Israel and all Jews around the world," Shamir wrote in the invitation he extended last month to 1,400 Jews.

"The government of Israel expects the entire Jewish people to stand at Israel's side in its quest for peace, security and prosperity, which are vital to the very existence and development of the world's one and only Jewish state."

Hornlein and Seymour Reich, chairman of the Conference of Presidents, said that the Jewish leaders coming to Jerusalem are

not here to endorse specific policies but to show a general commitment to Israel and the government's search for peace. Both said the conference should allay any suspicions that there is a split between world Jewry and Israel.

"There have been some differences," Reich said. "The 'who is a Jew' issue created friction, created tension. . . . There has been anxiety in the West over Israel's handling of the Intifadah. 'If a prime minister can give an assurance of moving forward, it is appropriate for world Jewry to come and listen."

"I don't expect Shamir to unveil any peace plan to this conference," Reich said in an interview. "I expect him to bring a peace initiative to Washington."

Shamir is scheduled to meet Bush in the first week of April. The prime minister will carry with him a proclamation from this conference stating world Jewry's support for Israel and the country's search for peace, as well as its resistance to pressure from outside governments.

Shamir is on the record as opposing any further territorial concessions by Israel, as opposing any talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization and as favoring limited autonomy as the solution to the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Some prominent Jewish figures said they decided to stay away from the solidarity con-

stay away from the conference.

James Aviad, a member of Peace Now, a grass-roots Israeli group, said that the organization had decided against a counterdemonstration outside the convention hall where the conference will be held.

The group fears that the gathering will be interpreted as a rubber stamp of Shamir's policies, Aviad said. "But I just couldn't bear standing outside again, looking so small against such a big gathering," he said.

mir's Likud bloc. Gur is a member of the center-left Labor Alignment that shares power with Likud in the unity government.

Labor and Likud have carefully divided the chairmanship of committees that will meet to discuss various issues at the conference, so that each party has an equal number of committee chairs. Key ministers from both parties will address the plenary sessions and study groups.

Hornlein said that only a few "fringe elements" had opted to

ference for fear that their presence would imply support of Shamir's positions. But most mainstream leaders came.

"How could you refuse such an invitation?" said David Clayman, Jerusalem office director of the American Jewish Congress. Clayman said that leaders of the congress hesitated before agreeing to come but were convinced of the bipartisan nature of the conference when two Cabinet ministers, Ehud Olmert and Mordechai Gur, were named to organize the meeting. Olmert is a member of Sha-

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END







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הערך אר"ל 2: לגבי טיעון מפקד יוניפיל ביחס ל"הגבלות" על חנועה  
צה"ל וצד"ל ראו מברקנו מ-5/2 (נר 1012 לנאו"ם ונר 1014 לווינגטון)  
שהחיס לטיעון דומה של גולדינג. בסיכום שהושג בפגישת דרגי עבודה של  
צה"ל ויוניפיל ב-4/9/87 אין הגבלות על חנועות צה"ל "שגרירות"  
במסגרת "פעילות מבצעית" בגזרה הנורווגית.

ב) דו"ח מפקד היחידה רצ"ב.

אר"ל 2  
אריה טנא  
20 במרץ 1989

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לוח תפוצה

הנדון: דו"ח פגישה עם מפקד יוניפי"ל ב-16.3.89

1. ב-16.3.89 נפגשתי לפגישה בארבע עיניים עם מפקד יוניפי"ל - Lt. Gen. Wahlgren, עפ"י בקשתו. השיחה ארכה כשעה.

2. להלן עיקרי הדברים:

- א. התייחס לפעילות שיוניפי"ל עושה למנוע חדירת רד"ל לבנון וציין שהוא שוקל לצייד חלק מגדודי יוניפי"ל במכ"מים נגד אדם ובאמצעי ראיית לילה. הדגיש שהצעותיו בנושא נמצאות בבחינה והוא מקווה שיענו בחיוב. העיר שרק חלק מגדודי יוניפי"ל מתאימים להפעיל ציוד מתקדם כזה.
- ב. ציין שהגדוד הנורבגי פועל רבות למנוע חדירת גורמים מווייטים לגזרת גורמים אלה טוענים שהגדוד פועל באופן חד צדדי נגדם ומתעלם מתנועות צה"ל וצד"ל במרחב. על מנת לבצע את תפקידו בצורה טובה צריך שנהיה לגדוד שליטה על הגזרה. הנושא מחייב תאום ובדיקה עם פצ"ן. ההסכמים הקיימים לגבי תנועת צה"ל וצד"ל במרחב נמצאים בבדיקה בין קישור לאו"ם צפון וק. קישור לצה"ל ביוניפי"ל.
- ג. העלה את שאלת ההדדיות ביחס יוניפי"ל כלפי גורמים לבנוניים מקומיים והיותו של צד"ל. טען שהוא מנוע ע"י החלטות מועבי"ט לקיים קישור עם צד"ל אך הוסיף שלמרות זאת מתקיימים קשרים ומתבצע תאום.
- ד. ציין מס' פעמים במהלך השיחה את עניין הירי הכלתי מבוקר של גורמים בצד"ל לעבר עמדות יוניפי"ל וכוחותיו במרחב. מקרי הירי ללא כל סיבה לעבר עמדות או"ם הם רבים ולמרות "הגורם האנושי" הקשור לאיכות חיילי צד"ל ובעיתיות הפיקוח עליהם, הנושא מהווה נעיה חמורה.

*[Handwritten signature]*

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ה. ציין שהבין מאלוף פצ"ן שחייל צד"ל שירה והרג חייל אירי לאחרונה הורחק מהכח אך הוסיף שהוא שמע מגורמים מקומיים שלא כך הדבר והחייל נשאר בשרות העיר שהוא מקווה שמה ששמע מאלוף פצ"ן, נכון - עניתי שלמיטב ידיעתי החייל אכן הורחק מצד"ל.

ו. העלה את נושא הפגיעה בשני החיילים הנורבגים ע"י ירי טנק צה"ל והתעניין האם הגורמים האחראים אכן עמדו לדיון, ציין שגורמי האו"ם בניו-יורק מתעניינים בכך. עניתי שלמיטב ידיעתי הם אכן הועמדו לדיון.

ז. ציין ששוחח לאחרונה עם גורמים באמל וציין לפניהם את מקרי החדירה הרבים דרך שטחם לאחרונה, והדגיש לפניהם את הנוק הצפוי בעקבות החדירות לתושבי הורוס, והוא מקווה שהמסר נקלט.

ח. לקראת סיום דבריו ציין, חצי בבדיחות הדעת, שהוא "ישלח לי חשבון" על הנוק שנגרס לרק"מ של הגדוד הנורבגי בתקרית האחרונה עם טנק צה"ל והוסיף שאקבל על כך דווח בכתב.

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חיים מפקד  
יפרח - תא"ל  
היחידה



ד"ר: <u>1</u>	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דמיפות: מדי
כתוב: <u>14</u>	טופס פרוק <sup>14</sup>	סוג: גל
אל: מצפ"א		תאריך ודפן חנוכה: 20.3.89 - 22:00
דע: לשכת ס/שה"ח 3 יר בלבל - כא/		פס' פרוק: <u>תקדרי:</u> <u>522</u>
פאת: ק. לקונגרס		

סגאט : עדות המזכיר בייקר בועדת החקצבות

ב-15.3 הופיע המזכיר בייקר בפני ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות שליד ועדת החקצבות. נכחו הסנטורים: לייחי (יו"ר), דה קונסיני (אריזונה), לאוטנברג (ניו-ג'רסי), קסטן (ויסקונסין) ספקט (פנסילבניה), רדמן (ניו-המפשייר) הטפילד (אורגון) ודמאטו (ניו-יורק).

1. בייקר מסר עדותו ברוח זו שבועדת החקצבות בביחנ"ב.

2. חלק השאלות והתשובות :

קסטן

א. טבור שניתן להגיע לפסגה תקציבית.

ב. בנוגע לשריונים - הבעיה היא שהעוגה הולכת ומצטמקת ויש לעצור השחיקה הזו.

ג. לגבי המזה"ת - רצ"ב חילופי דברים בין קסטן ובייקר לגבי אש"ם, מעורבותו בטרור, אי קיום התנאים האמריקנים וחמשך הדיאלוג.

KASTEN:

As you're aware, Senator Inouye and I wrote Secretary Shultz a letter toward the middle of December in which we tried to encourage him, or ask him to outline the situation with regard to our dialogue and discussions with the PLO to try to get a sense of what we were really asking for and what the parameters of that kind of discussion might be. As you know, we began talking to the PLO because they made some statements that we had been asking them to make for what, 13 or so years --

SEC. BAKER: Ten years.

מחשבות / שאלות / תשובות / הערות / מידע / אחר

תפוצה: 36 + כפסגת

דתיקות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל/וואשינגטון	קד: 2
סוג: ג ל ו י	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 104
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל:
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SEN. KASTEN: They made the statements and we began a dialogue. The question is, do those statements have any meaning? The question is, can they be saying one thing in public statements and doing another thing in action? And I'd like, if I could, to get your ideas here in terms of the parameters. What are the circumstances in which we would say, "We've had it. No more. We're not talking any more with you"? What kind of guidelines do we have?

And let me first of all say in terms of terrorism -- well, let me first of all say, there are a list of statements that Arafat has made that in effect contradict some of the statements that he made at our request in the press conference in December. He has taken positions that, although he said he was renouncing terror, in effect has still not accepted the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Has he in fact accepted unequivocally Israel's right to resist? We've seen statement of Israel's right to exist. We've seen statements on both sides of some of those issues. Are we

watching every single thing that they say, and when they say something that's off the reservation, we're saying, "Stop"?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I think you asked -- your question was under what circumstances would we consider we'd have to take a second look at the -- at the process we are now involved in -- that is, the dialogue. And I think we would have to take a second look if somehow there was a clear denial of Israel's right to exist, if there was a -- if there was a resort to terrorism by Arafat and the elements of the PLO which he controls or has the ability to control. I think if we saw either of those things, clearly we would want to -- we would have serious questions about continuing the dialogue.

Let me say that the dialogue is not an end in and of itself. We think it could be useful only if it can lead to constructive moves toward furthering the peace process. So, that's the purpose of it, and that's the way we would -- I think that's the -- that's the circumstances under which we would consider terminating it.

תפוצה:



דמיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון	דף: 3
טלוג: ג י ל י	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 15
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SEN. KASTEN: Well, Mr. Secretary, let me just take a couple of specific examples. He talked about the efforts of recognizing the Israel, the other kinds of things. And then, not long afterwards, when we started talking -- or certain Palestinian leaders starting talking about the possibilities of dialogue with Israel, possibilities of working toward at least some discussions, the Arafat response called for 10 bullets in the chest of Major Frenj of Bethlehem when he started discussing the possibilities of working with Israel. I don't think that that's consistent with the public statements that he made. I don't think that the continued uprising is consistent, the violence. And I don't think the continued border crossings, the continued terrorists infiltrating from Lebanon are consistent.

And specifically, what are your rules? I mean, we're trying to encourage a dialogue, I would assume, between modern Palestinians and the people in Israel.

SEC. BAKER: That's right.

CHAIRMAN LEAHY: And we want to -- we want to work that. Now, 10 bullets in the chest, to the mayor doesn't work in that direction. How are we going to -- where are we going to go from where we are?

SEC. BAKER: Well, we're going to continue for the time being the dialogue, Senator Kastan,

to see if we can, as I say, make tangible progress in a way that would contribute to peace in the Middle East, until we see some clear renunciation of the principles which he very clearly embraced when he made that statement, principles that the United States had been saying for 13 years: "If you say these things, we will talk to you. If you do not say them and mean them -- if you say them and mean them, we'll talk to you. If you don't say them and mean them, we won't." And it was going on for 13 years. Now, we will apply our judgment to whether or not he recants any of those or whether or not he departs from his renunciation of terrorism, and we'll have to look at the facts and circumstances; probably we'll have to look at facts and circumstances in the aggregate.

תפוצה:



דמיפות: מ י ד י	סגירות ישראל / ווסינגטון	דף: 4
פנוג: ג ל ו י	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 14
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I think that, with respect to terrorism, you can get all sorts of different arguments about the appropriate definition of the term, what does it constitute when it's directed, for instance, against military targets; when it's military to military, can it be terrorism? I thought that, frankly, when we lost 250 Marines in their sleep in Lebanon, that was terrorism, even though those were military personnel. But I don't think you can put -- I don't think you can tie this all up in a very neat little definitional package.

SEN. KASTEN: Well, Mr. Secretary --

SEC. BAKER: Terrorism is terrorism, and I think we'll -- I think we will know it when we see it.

SEN. KASTEN: I believe that we ought to demand that Arafat eliminates the policy of the so-called "armed struggle." I think that we ought to take into consideration the violent demonstrations, the rock-throwing, the Molotov cocktails, arson, that whole group. I think we also ought to demand that he support West Bank elections for talks with Israel. We ought to have them end this policy of intimidation that I spoke about with the "ten bullets in the chest" to Mayor Frenj. I think we ought to be demanding these things, and I think they ought to be part of the overall dialogue and the parameters in order to continue these discussions.

SEC. BAKER: That would be, of course, adding conditions that we had not had for a period of 12 or 13 years with respect to initiating a dialogue.

We are, Senator Kastan, as you probably know, trying to encourage concrete steps on the ground, in the area, that would tend to defuse tensions, that would tend to create a better atmosphere, that might ultimately help us get the parties into direct negotiations. That's, after all, the only way we're going to ultimately see peace in the Middle East, is if we have Israelis and Palestinians talking to each other.

תפוצה:



דמיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון	ק: 5
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תפסרד:		
522		כאת:

SEN. KASTEN: I just hope that some of the ideas and concepts that I've expressed here are included in this ongoing dialogue; but that's what I'm trying to say.

SEC. BAKER: There have to be --

SEN. KASTEN: The actions have to match the words.

SEC. BAKER: Senator, let me just say this, though. There has to be, if you're going to make progress toward peace in this very -- with respect to this very, very intractable problem, it's our view that you ought to start on the ground. There ought to be a series of mutually reciprocal and reinforcing steps. Both sides need to take some steps. We've made the point that we don't think that now is the time to go out here and have a big high-visibility, high-level international conference, as many people around the world, quite frankly, are suggesting. We think there needs to be some steps taken on the ground. Some of the things you mentioned might well be steps that could be taken on that side of the equation. But there have to be some steps taken on the other side as well.

ד. פ. ל. י. ט. י. ס. לאחר שנים של תביעה לאפשר יציאת יהודי בריה"מ אני מגיעים למצב שבו באפריל יאזל המימון לקליטת פליטים, ברומא תקועים פליטים ואנו נאלצים לסרב ל-16%-18% מהמרוויינים (לעומת 2%-3% בעבר). הסנטורים לייחי, קנדי, קסטן, דמאטו ומיקולסקי הגישו הצעת חוק שתאפשר מימון לבעייה המיידית של פליטים. לדברי קנדי הועדה המשפטית מוכנה להעלות, בהתיעצות עם הממשל את מספר הפליטים מ-25 אלף ל-50 אלף. מהעמדת הממשל (התייחס גם לבקשת הממשל ל-100 מיליון \$).

בייקר - חזר על דבריו בביהנב"ח: בעשית בדיקה כללית. ביקשו Supplemental ל - 100 מיליון \$ לשתיא 1989.

תפוצה:

דף: 6	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	יחידות: מ י ד י
כתוב: 144	טופס פרוק	סוג: ג ל י
חל:		תאריך וזמן חבירה:
דע:		כס' פרוק:
פאת:		תעודת:
		522

ספקט - התייחס לאשים ולטרור ולדורי בייקר בביתנב"ח בנושא מו"מ בין ישראל לאשים.  
לאחר מכן הצטרף גם לייח: -

SEN. SPECTER:

Mr. Secretary, let me talk to you now about the subject of the PLO and terrorism, and the very difficult questions which are raised in the Mideast peace process. And I'm sorry if I missed some of the discussion. I know you were talking about it, but I had to be in other committees, and I was on the floor briefly.

I note a quotation attributed to you in this morning's [Washington] Post to this effect, quote: "It is an element of our policy to promote direct negotiations which can be meaningful between Israelis and Palestinians. Now, if you can't have the direct negotiations that are meaningful but do not involve negotiations with the PLO, then I suppose my original answer would cover the question, we would then have to see negotiations between Israelis and representatives of the PLO."

Is that about accurate?

SEC. BAKER: I think so, roughly; yes.

SEN. SPECTER: Okay. The concern that I have is this,

my concern is that the PLO has a record of terrorism, Arafat personally having been involved in the murder of our ambassador in the Sudan back in 1974, many acts involving others -- the Israeli athletes in Munich, involvement in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. And one of the things that I think the United States has not done an adequate job on is in telling the world what the facts are about Arafat, so that he is regarded highly in most places in the world, thought of as a diplomat and is accorded great, great respect.

תפוצה:



דמימות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל/וועינגטון	7
סוג: ג ל ו י	טופס פבוק	14
תאריך ושכח מעבור:		אל:
פס' פבוק:		דע:
תקשיר:		פאת:
522		

Now we have the situation where Arafat has really shot his way into the bargaining room. He has shot his way into the bargaining room because people are afraid of him. We have the case of Mayor Freaj in Bethlehem. And I had occasion to talk to Mayor Freaj shortly after he had made the proposal that the Intifada ease off and that the Israelis ease off, that there be a cooling off period in the administered territories. And then Arafat made the statement that he would put 10 bullets into the body of anyone who tried to interfere with the Intifada. Now Arafat later denied saying that --

SEC. BAKER: That's right.

SEN. SPECTER: -- and the problem that he found on that case was that there was a tape recording of his statement. And to be precise, he did not identify Freaj by name in the statement, but in the context that it was made, it was clear that the conversation related to Freaj. I had occasion to visit with Mayor Freaj on January 12th, just a few days after the incident occurred, and he was very circumspect in his language, that he wasn't blaming anybody, because he wanted to live the next day. But it was plain that he was scared out of -- scared to death by what had happened.

Now, the object -- I agree with the first part of your statement that I know that this is an extraordinary subject and there aren't any easy answers at all, and the question is whether there are any answers. I realize that. And the goal of having representatives of the Palestinians -- and I think there are many in Israel who are capable of being representatives of the Palestinians to come forward and talk with the Israelis other than the PLO.

SEC. BAKER: Mmm-hmm. (In acknowledgement.)

SEN. SPECTER: But if you say that you want to give the Palestinians a chance to have representation other than the PLO, but if that doesn't work out, then you may have to go to the PLO, then isn't that really an open invitation for the PLO to make sure that the Palestinians never have meaningful negotiations because the PLO will terrorize them?

תפוצה:



ד"ר: 8	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דתיקות: מ י ד י
כתוב: 14E	טופס פרוק	סוג: ג ל י
אל:		תאריך וזמן חכור:
דע:		פס' פרוק:
פאט:		מקשר: 522

SEC. BAKER: No, I don't think so. I don't think so at all, Senator. It seems to me that what I've expressed there is the view that it would be -- first of all, you're not going to have peace without direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. If that can be accomplished through a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, that would be, of course, a preferred approach but that we ought not to rule out categorically, absolutely and unequivocally consideration of going beyond that if it's necessary to move toward peace in the Middle East. That's all I said and that's what I mean and that seems to me to be an eminently reasonable position to take.

SEN. SPECTER: But Mr. Secretary, if Arafat and the PLO know that they can move from the wings to center stage, if the other Palestinians do not have fruitful negotiations with the Israelis, isn't that an open invitation for Arafat and the PLO to terrorize the other Palestinians?

SEN. BAKER: I don't think so Senator, and I didn't say that they, that they would move. But I do think it's important that we simply not categorically, absolutely, totally and completely rule out under any and all circumstances, any dialogue that might lead to peace. I just don't think we ought to do that.

SEN. SPECTER: Well, I would agree with the generalization except that I would disagree with the context that you were quoted yesterday and as you say, that's about what you said, where we know that the PLO engages in acts of terrorism and if they have an incentive to stop the other negotiations between the Palestinians -- let me ask you this --

SEN. BAKER: Look at what's happened with -- those negotiations have led to the situation that we now are experiencing in the occupied territories, Senator, which is, I'm sure you would agree, a total unsatisfactory result for all parties.

תפוסה:



מ י ד י	לתיפוח:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 9
ל ו ג	סוג:	טופס פברוק	כתוב: 14
תאריך וזמן העבר:			אל:
עם פברוק:			דע:
התעוד:			
522			כאח:

SEN. SPECTER: Well, I agree, but if a man like Mayor Freed sticks his head up, and he doesn't get shot down because the bullet misses, and then he won't put his head up again, what incentives are there for Palestinians to come to talk to the Israelis if the PLO will take over if they fail?

BEN. BAKER: Let me simply repeat your words when you posed the question. You're quite right, this is a very -- this is an extraordinarily difficult area, a very intractable situation, and my view is that we ought to explore all reasonable means that might move us in the direction of peace and that we could be faulted if we did not.

SEN. SPECTER: Well, you and I agree on that statement. We just may disagree on what's reasonable. Let me ask you one final question and that is, if the PLO engages in terrorism to discourage other Palestinian representation, would that then rule out the PLO as an acceptable negotiator in your opinion?

SEN. BAKER: I will decline to do for you what I declined to do for Senator Kasten, and that is try and define in each and every circumstance under hypothetical cases when we might or might not break off our dialogue. We can't do that because there are definitional problems and

if the PLO resorted to terrorism, failed to keep their commitment to renounce terrorism, it would be an occasion for the United States to break off its dialogue.

SEN. SPECTER: Well, I -- I can understand the difficulties in defining it, as you articulate it. I think it is a little different when you come to the question of what the United States would say about PLO representation if they, in fact, caused the vacancy by shooting their way into the --

SEN. BAKER: I think what -- I guess what I'm saying is I would decline to speculate on hypotheticals. We'd have to address those questions as and when they occurred.

תפוח:

שגרירות ישראל/וועינגטון	דף: 10
טופס פרוק	מס': 14
מס' פרוק:	אל:
מס' פרוק:	דע:
מס' פרוק: 522	מאת:

SEN. SPECTER: Well, I appreciate what you have said before about the State Department, about the range PLO terrorism. I think -- I think you're on the right track. I know you inherited the policy of talking to the PLO. And I believe these discussions are very good because they have an exchange of ideas as to what we think and what policies we would ask you to consider.

SEC. BAKER: You know, Senator, if I may just say one other thing, I've seen a lot of foreign leaders during the course of the past seven or eight weeks, all of whom would really like to see the United States move a bit more aggressively in this area, toward the support of some high-level, high-visibility international conference or other -- or other initiative in the Middle East. And it's been my constant reply to them that we really believe that we ought to do whatever we can to improve the atmosphere on the ground first, see if we can improve the atmosphere so that we might ultimately get to a position where negotiations could take place. Some people fault that as too low-key an approach and so forth, but that, nevertheless, is the approach that we have -- that the President has opted to pursue. And frankly, we were pleased this morning to see that approach endorsed, at least for the time being, by one of the lead editorials in one of our nation's major newspapers.

So, this is what we're trying to do, and we really ought to -- we really ought to at least be willing to explore every reasonable avenue that could move the process forward.

SEN. SPECTER: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN LEAHY: Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, just for a moment on this last subject. I do agree with your unwillingness to go into

תפוצה:



דתיקות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קד: 11
סוג: ג ל י	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 101
תאריך וזמן חניכה:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
חשד: 522		כאח:

each and every hypothetical on this or any other touchy subject of that nature. I also appreciate your willingness though, expressed willingness to you and your department to keep us generally briefed on what's going on.

You know, it's my impression in discussions with people in the Middle East and people who are far more expert on the Middle East than I, that the United States is about the only country that really has credibility with all the parties over there -- the Arab world and with the Israelis. And more and more you're going to find the United States looked to for a solution. You talk about speaking with other world leaders, say, "Why aren't you moving aggressively?" and so on and I think that that's a natural reaction because they see us as in the pivotal role.

Whatever solution we come out with, or whatever solution we're willing to recommend and ultimately of course, the individual countries are going to have to decide whether they accept it or not, well, whatever we suggest is going to be a workable solution, it's going to be also in many aspects, an unpopular solution. If there's an easy and popular solution, it would have been grabbed long before you and I every got to this discussion and a whole lot of people would be considering themselves, rightly so, national heroes, for having come up with that. But there isn't any.

And, so what we're going to need, whatever recommendations you make, it's going to have to have broad US support. That means the administration is going to have to be behind it and the Republican and Democratic leadership in the Congress is going to have to be behind it. I cannot think of any that is going to really work over there on a recommendation from this country if some of the parties, inimical to each other, think that we're are splitting apart and whatever support there is here because then they'll divide and conquer routine work. Also, in the countries involved, even within the governments of the countries involved and I think especially of Israel, the one democracy there, the government

תפוצה:



דחופות: מ י ד י	12 שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון	דף: 12
סוג: ג ל ו י	טופס פברוק	כתוב: 14F
תאריך נדפן תעבור:		אל:
כס' פברוק:		דע:
תעודת: 522		פאת:

is going to have to make recommendations that's going to be unpopular in their own country and unpopular within their own government. And to get the kind of cover necessary, they're going to have to point to some pretty solid support here in the United States.

I admit that I'm probably stating the obvious, but I would hope that all of us would realize that maybe there is a real opportunity now for the United States to move forward in that kind of recommendation. But it works only if we're united on it. And then some of the leaders, political leaders, not only in Israel, but in other countries involved, can take steps that they might not have been able to take otherwise, if they could point to that solid backing here. If they can't point to it, maybe I'm being overly pessimistic, but I don't think that they'll do anything at all.

ספקטור קרא למעורבות יתר של מובראק בתהליך השלום.

The funding for Israel and Egypt is not conditioned, but the statement of law says this, that "it is the sense of the Congress that the recommended levels of assistance for Egypt and Israel are based in great measure on their continued participation in the Camp David Accords and upon the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty."

There are frequently calls made for suggestions to Israel, let's not call it pressure, let's call it suggestions. I think that there might be more suggestions usefully made to the Egyptians and to President Mubarak. When he first came to the United States in 1982 after succeeding President Sadat, it seemed to me that he was a lot more outgoing when he addressed a group of senators in 5-207. And I've had occasion to get to know President Mubarak and to observe him, and I think generally he is a very strong ally of the United States and has done some very good work.

תפוצה:



דחילות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 13
סוג: ג ל י	טופס מברק	כתוב: 14
תאריך ושעה חשיבה:		אל:
כס' מברק:		עד:
המספר: 522		כאח:

In his efforts to bring Egypt back into the Arab fold, he has made that, I think, clearly his highest priority. And I don't quarrel with that. I think that's in Egypt's interest, I think it helps the United States, I think it helps Israel, and it's very good for Egypt to be on solid ground with the other Arab States. But I believe, Mr. Secretary, that there is more that President Mubarak could do in this process. And in talking to him, and also talking to King Hussein, they are recognizing the PLO at this time. But it seems to me that they are not --

SEC. BAKER: Wait, I'm sorry, I didn't understand what you just said. They are what?

SEN. SPECTER: Recognized -- the PLO -- and they are pressing the PLO as the spokesman for the Palestinians. And as my prior line of questions and discussion with you suggested, I have grave concerns that that's going to work out in the long run. Listen, whatever works, so be it. If it's acceptable to the parties involved, we are making suggestions from a great distance and I think they ought to be viewed as suggestions only and not pressure. Ultimately, the Palestinians and the Israelis will have to work it out.

But I just wanted to make this one suggestion to you: that I believe that President Mubarak could -- I'm sure he could do a great deal more and I think he might be inclined to do more. When the Egyptian Ambassador was recalled from Israel in 1983, he made a commitment to return the Ambassador within one to two weeks in June and he didn't follow up for a very long time because of his own reasons. And there was some very strong support from the United States for President Mubarak to do that. And my own sense is that he could be much more of a forceful player there. And where you have very substantial foreign aid and you have it with a reference on sense of the Congress, it seems to me that that is an issue that

תפוצה:

דחילות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	זק: 14
סוג: ג ל ר י		מתוך: 14
תאריך וזמן מעור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד: 522		כאת:

is worth talking about. And there are many of us who do talk to him about that and I just wanted to call that to your attention because I believe that he could well be the key to unlocking new doors in the Mid-East.

נושאים נוספים שעלן בשימועים : הצעת אובי בביהגבי"ח, אנגולה, ועדת הלסינקי, מדיניות כלפי אמרי"ז, אלסקבדור (בחירות), האיטי, פנמה, הרעב בסודאן, פליטים, קמבודיה, סמים, בנוח הבית וחלוקת נטל שווה.

אברהם ורנאי פנקס  
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה:



# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

15063

תאריך 20.03.89

יוצא \*\*

שומר

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חוזם: 3,15063

אל: 728/וש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 200389, זח: 1439, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: א גס: צפא

נד: א

שומר/מיידי

ע.ב.ש. 4894

ורנאי.

המורשה ווקסמן. שלכם 447.

1. להלן הפגישות שנקבעו עבורו:

שהב'ט - 29 דנא, שעה 11:00 בירושלים.

שר האוצר - 28 דנא, שעה 16:00 (אין אפשרות אחרת).

רה'מ - 28 דנא 8:45.

2. מנסים לארגן את הפגישה עם התיאום בשטחים וד'ר טולצ'ינסקי

ל- 29 דנא, לפני פגישתו עם שהב'ט.

3. מנסים ככל האפשר לתאם תוכניתו עם תוכניתם (החדשה) של

עוזרי ועדת הבריות.

מצפ'א

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מאור





\*\* יוצא \*\*  
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שמו

חוזם: 3,14333

אל: 643/ני

מ-: המשרד, תא: 190389, זח: 1307, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: 8 גס: ארבל

נד: 8

שמו/רגיל

ביין.

שיחת שה'ח - מזכ'ל. שלך 526.

א. לפי אמצעי התקשורת (ראה קטעים המועברים בנפרד) המצטטים  
דובר האו'ם הושמעה מפי המזכ'ל 'מעין מחאה' בעניין  
יוניפיל.

ב. מוזר שדובר האו'ם הרשה לעצמו להביא דברים כאלה מתוך  
שיחה 'בארבע עיניים'. יש להניח שיד גולדינג בדבר  
ומשאירים לשיקולך כיצד לטפל בנושא בהזדמנות קרובה.

ג. מבינים מתוך דיווחך שנושא גולדינג, כפי שהצעת בשלך 241  
מה-8, לא הועלה.

מנהל ארבל 2

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, ברנע, ארבל2, ליאור,  
מזתים, סייבל, משפט





-שמור-

אל: רה"מ  
המנכ"ל  
מזכיר הממשלה

מאת: אריה מקל

שיחה עם פרופ' פרד באליצר

הנ"ל פרופ' מקליפורניה, יהודי, רפובליקני ובעל קשרים טובים בממשל. שימש יועץ בממשל ריגן - תחת "פיקודו" של לין נופציגר. הוא גם בעל קשרים מסחריים ופוליטיים טובים במדינות שונות במזרח הרחוק, ושימש תקופת מה כשגריר ארה"ב בברונאי. להלן דעותיו ועצותיו:

1. הנשיא בוש איננו מעוניין לטפל עתה בענייני חוץ רציניים והממשל לא ערוך לכך, אך הוא נדחף לכך ע"י דעת הקהל, המיתקפה ההסברתית של אש"ף וכו'. בוש היה שמח אילו סיפקנו לו עובדות משכנעות שהיו מונעות ממנו את הצורך לעסוק עכשיו ברצינות בבעיות המזהות.

2. על רה"מ להדגיש בביקורו בשיחות עם בוש את ערכה האסטרטגי של ישראל כידידה האמיתית היחידה של ארה"ב במזה"ת, (באליצר הגיש לי מיסמך רחב היקף שכתב בנושא זה). יש להגיש "ניירות" משכנעים בנושא זה גם ליועצים קרובים לנשיא. יש לומר לנשיא שהדיאלוג ארה"ב - אש"ף מחליש את יחסי ארה"ב - ישראל, ומכך ניבנים רק הסוב'.

3. ישראל צריכה לשאוף לברית רשמית (FORMAL ALLIANCE TREATY), עם ארה"ב ולא להסכים לשום ויתורים נוספים בנושא הפלש' ללא ברית כזו. יש לקדם את שתה"פ האסטרטגי עוד יותר ולהציע לאמר' עוד BASING RIGHTS.

4. הקונגרס חזק כיום יותר מן המימשל. יש לשים דגש על תדרכים לחברי קונגרס נבחרים, משתי המפלגות. גם להם יש להסביר את חשיבותה של ישראל כבעלת ברית אסטרטגית. אין למתוח באוזניהם בקורת על הנשיא, ועם זאת יש לזכור שחברי קונגרס מחפשים חומר כדי לנגח את המימשל. רצוי לעודד את סאם נאן, ג'סי הלמס, פיט ווילסון מקליפורניה ואחרים לדבר בפומבי על חשיבותה של ישראל מבחינה אסטרטגית.

5. אסור לעורר ציפיות מופרזות ולהבטיח דברים שלא נוכל לקיימם. עדיף לעזוב את ווש' עם כמה BAD FEELINGS מאשר לפגוע בעוצמת היחסים. החיפוש בכל מחיר אחר "הרמוניה לטווח קצר" ייצור "בעיות בטווח הארוך".

#### 6. אישים במימשל וסביבו:

א. סגן הנשיא קוויל - מאוד ידידותי. בעל צוות עוזרים מעולה ובראשם בילי קריסטל (יהודי, הבן של ארווינג קריסטל), וקארן לורדס - יועץ לבטחון לאומי.

ב. שר המיטחר מוסבכר - מאוד מקורב לנשיא. אגרסיבי. אומר לנשיא את אשר על ליבו, ללא כחל וסרק.

ג. DON KOLL - איש עסקים מקליפורניה. מאוד מקורב אישית לנשיא. (היה איתו בסוויטה במלוננו בדאלאס כשציפה לתוצאות הבחירות). מעוניין לבקר בארץ - וכדאי להזמין.

ד. יהודים: בניגוד לריגן - אין לבוש ידידים יהודיים. גורדון זקס וג'רי ווינטראוב אינם מקורבים באמת.

7. בטכס כדאי שמארחי רה"מ יהיו פיל גראס, לויד בנטסן ומושל טכסס - קלמנס. לג'ים רייט - יש עתה בעיות של "אתיקה" בקונגרס.

8. תקשורת: גוברת והולכת חשיבות כלי התקשורת המקומיים (טלוויזיה ועיתונים), ורצוי שרה"מ ו/או עוזריו יקדישו מזמנם גם לתדרכים של גורמים אלה, בביקורים בערים השונות.

בברכה

אריה מקל









משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

14097

תאריך : 18.03.89

נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 3,14097

אל: המשרד

מ-: נ"י, נר: 352, תא: 130389, זח: 1400, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: מזתים

נד: @

מייד/סודי

אל: מצרים

מאת: נאומ' - יששכרוף

הדחתו של חסן עיסא.

1. במהלך שיחתי עם אבול גהייט ביום ו' (10/3) שעליה דיווחתי בנפרד (נר 330) הלה התייחס לפרשה הנ'ל.

2. אבול גהייט ציין שבעת שיחות מדיניות מהסוג שהיו בנושא טאבה, נציג משרד החוץ המצרי אינו רשאי ליצור כל משבר בשיחות אלא לפי הנחיות מפורשות של הממונים עליו. לדבריו, חסן עיסא יצר תקרית דיפלומטית שלא בהתאם להנחיותיו, ובעיתוי גרוע ביותר לקראת סיכום חיובי של השיחות.

התנהגות זו של עיסא הצביעה על כך לממוניו, שהוא אינו אמין בביצוע הנחיות והוא עלול גם לנהוג כך במקרים אחרים, ולכן הודח. אבול גהייט בהתייחסו לפרשה לא ניסה כלל להצדיק את עיסא.

נאו'מ.

פא





17

דחילות: רגיל	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	ק: 1
סוג: שמור		כתוב: 3
תאריך וזמן מעור: 15:30 - 17:3.89		אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
487		פאת: לשכת השגריר

עשור להסכם השלום

ראו-נא ברכות הנשיא בוש וחנשיא לשעבר קרטר לרגל ארוע שמארגן הבונדס בשגרירות לציון העשור.

Y.  
לשכת השגריר

3 שנה סלמה 3 רמז 2 גזירה 1 גזירה 1 גזירה 1 גזירה 1 גזירה 2

תפוצה:

36 תאריך

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1989

487

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I am pleased to join in commemorating the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Signed by Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat -- two statesmen so different in background, yet so alike in courage and goodwill -- this historic treaty proved that peace can be brought to even the most troubled areas through negotiation.

Today, my Administration is committed to building on the foundation of these great leaders. As we celebrate the extraordinary achievement of ten years ago, we must also recognize the challenges that remain. Our greatest tribute to those whose strength and vision made the 1979 Peace Treaty a reality is to continue their work.

The United States will continue to play an active role in the search for lasting peace in the Middle East, realizing that great results can be won through patience, diplomacy and perseverance. This anniversary is a moving reminder that peace is possible -- and worth our every effort.

*George Bush*





JIMMY CARTER

March 22, 1989

487 <sup>3</sup>/<sub>3</sub>

To the State of Israel Bonds

Rosalynn and I are pleased to send our warm regards to each of you attending this very important event. We are glad that the tenth anniversary of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty is being remembered in this special way. I know that the State of Israel Bonds has been an important link between Americans and the State of Israel and has played a major role in developing a modern infrastructure which has made possible Israel's tremendous economic and social progress over the past four decades.

The Camp David Accords have been one of the most integral components for continued talks between belligerent nations in the Middle East. It is my firm belief that the peace agreement signed ten years ago by President Anwar Sadat, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and me can be the foundation for renewed peace talks in the Middle East. My hope is that the peace treaty can convince future Arab, Israeli, American and other world leaders of the benefits of continued negotiations.

It is gratifying to know of the positive impact that this treaty has had in our world's history. Rosalynn joins me in sending you our warm best wishes as you observe and celebrate this significant anniversary.

I would also like to acknowledge the major role that Meir Rosenne, the President of State of Israel Bonds, played in making the Camp David Accords a reality.

Sincerely,

The State of Israel Bonds  
710 Broadway  
New York, New York 10003

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

טופס מברק  
דף: 1 מתוך: 3 דפים  
סוג בשחוני: גלוי  
דחיפות: רגיל  
תאריך/ז"ח: 17/3/89-09:45

$$\frac{1}{3} \quad 461$$

אל: המשרד

אל: ערב 2/ממד

ראיון אבן איאד ל"מיאמי הראלד" (16/3).

מצ"ב חראי 11.

פ'ל ג'



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[illegible]



# PLO aide: U.S. must accept Palestinian right to a state

PLO / from 1A

the first time that Chairman Yasser Arafat's moderate Fatah branch of the PLO halted raids from Lebanon into Israel in November to avoid casualties and upsetting peace efforts.

Khalaf, 55, who co-founded Fatah with Arafat and ranks as No. 2 leader in the PLO, said he had read only news reports of Secretary of State James Baker's proposals for Israeli and PLO concessions but "in general opposed the idea."

Baker wants the PLO to order a full halt to cross-border raids and reduce the violence of the Palestinian uprising in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. He wants Israel to free Arab prisoners and relax economic pressures on Palestinians, as "confidence building" measures prior to in-depth peace talks.

Baker submitted the proposals to Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens when he visited Washington this week, and U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Robert Pelletreau is expected to put them to the PLO at the negotiations next week.

But the U.S. proposals, said Khalaf, involve "details that should be included in substantive peace negotiations. We must start with the important principles, then later we can go on to details."

The key principle, he added, was that although the PLO has accepted Israel's right to exist, Washington rejects the Palestinians' right to self-determination and to establish an independent state on the West Bank and Gaza.

"If they do this, then we can discuss everything else," said Khalaf. "Each step that can lead to peace we will accept. But there must be a state at the end of the road."

"At the meeting next week we're going to put this on the table," he said of the U.S.-PLO talks, the second substantive session since the

Reagan Administration lifted a 13-year-old ban on such talks in December after Arafat accepted Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism. Four other meetings in Tunis have been largely procedural.

Khalaf's statements underlined the importance of PLO insistence on the recognition of Palestinian rights to independence as a precondition to any peace plan — unless a U.N.-sponsored peace conference can be held, an idea rejected by Israel.

Most European countries have accepted the principle and more than 90 nations have officially recognized the independent state proclaimed by the Palestine National Council, the PLO parliament, in November.

But the Israeli government and most of its citizens remain adamantly opposed to the idea, and Washington has endorsed only Palestinian "political rights," saying that an independent state could pose a threat to Israel.

Khalaf on the other hand welcomed a proposal last week from a top Israeli think tank for direct Israeli-PLO talks over a 10-15 year "transition period" ending, if all goes well, with Palestinian independence.

The plan by the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies has "very good substance," he said, even though it takes too long and fails to mention the future of 3 million Palestinians living in exile outside the territories.

A former hard-liner who now strongly supports the PLO's recent shift toward moderation, Khalaf said he was "not optimistic" about peace because Bush is off to a "shamefully slow start in setting his Middle East policies."

Referring to his own recent videotaped message to Israel offering direct negotiations, Khalaf admitted that if he had said that three years ago "PLO radicals would have

hanged me. Now almost everyone agrees with what I said."

"But there are PLO extremists and [Moslem] fundamentalists, and they will cause a lot of damage to us and to the world," he warned, unless moderates prove their way is effective "by the end of the year."

On military activities, Khalaf insisted that while the PLO has forsworn terrorism, it has not given up the right to armed struggle against Israel. "We have given no promises to anyone," he said.

But he confirmed that Fatah has stopped infiltration attempts that Israel to avoid disrupting peace efforts. Arafat has been loath to admit this publicly, apparently for fear of further angering his radical critics.

"A true politician is one who chooses the opportune moment," Khalaf said, adding that in any case Israeli border defenses had long ago turned such raids into "suicide operations."

Khalaf dismissed four failed border infiltrations since Nov. 14 by the two radical and pro-Syrian PLO factions — all of whose gunmen were killed — as "attempts to say 'We're Here' and prove their love for Syria."

But he played down the military differences with the Popular and Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine, saying that far more serious was their opposition to Fatah's moderate policies.

"But we're happy with the differences. That's democracy," he said with a smile.

On Israeli politics, Khalaf said he did not believe that Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has the "leadership qualities" needed to make peace but added that his hawkish Likud Party offers more hope than the dovish Labor Party of Finance Minister Shimon Peres.

"Hawks are always more powerful than doves," he said.

MM/PAGE 3 of 5



# PLO presses its demand for homeland

by JUAN O. TAMAYO  
Herald Staff Writer

**TUNIS** — The PLO's second-highest leader said Wednesday that President Bush must accept the Palestinian right to self-determination before the PLO agrees to new U.S. proposals for easing the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The comments by Salah Khalaf, known as Abu Iyad, augured ill for talks between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization, expected next week in Tunis, the first such substantive negotia-

## Islam on the rise / 26A

tion since Bush was inaugurated in January.

In a 70-minute interview at his comfortable Tunis home, Khalaf also said Bush was off to a "shamefully slow" start on the Middle East, and that Israel's rightist Likud Party can make peace better than the moderate Labor.

Khalaf in addition confirmed for

Turn to PLO / 25A

## IN THE WORLD

From Herald Wire Services

### ISRAEL

#### American refusenik ends long ordeal

**TEL AVIV** — Abe Stolar, a U.S. citizen who was allowed to leave the Soviet Union after living there for 58 years, arrived in Israel with his family Wednesday.

Stolar, a 77-year-old Chicago native, moved with his communist parents to the Soviet Union in 1931. He fought in the Red Army against the Nazis and first applied to emigrate to Israel in 1974 after reading about the Nazi holocaust of European Jews.

and grenades. They were wounded, but no troops were hurt, the army said.

PAGE 2A

#### Settlers stake out new West Bank site

**TALMON** — Jewish settlers drove a mobile home up a hillside through rain and hail Wednesday to stake a new settlement in the occupied West Bank.

In the occupied Gaza Strip, two teen-age Palestinian guerrillas were captured after they infiltrated from Egypt and attacked an Israeli military outpost with a rifle

PAGE 1A

HIA/PAGE 2 OF 5



דמי פות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל/ווישינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: גלוי	טופס פבוק	כתוב: 5
תאריך וזמן חבור: 16:18 17 מרץ 1969		אל: מצמ"א
כס' פבוק: הפסד:		דע:
482		כאת: ק"ל לקרנגרס

אש"פ - תזכיר ביקור בועדת ההקצבות בביה"ח

רצ"ב נוסח חילופי הדברים בין קונגרסמן מטמקין והמלכיר בנושא ההדברות עם אש"פ.

האיחור בדינוח נובע על רקע ביקור שה"ח. דינוח על עדויותיו של המלכיר בפני ועדות ההקצבות בשני הבתים נעביר בשבוע הבא.

י"ל - ונא' צנער  
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

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תפוצה: -36-

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I would hope that you could speak for the administration as a whole in consulting with us and reaching some very difficult decisions. Frankly, what I've found in the past is that each agency in our government defends its own programs in negotiations with us and there is no comprehensive administration view upon which we can rely in terms of making some painful cuts. And, if we do reach that point where it's evident that there are going to be some painful cuts, which I know you would prefer to avoid, I trust that you will be able to speak for the administration and give us some guidance on where the priorities really are most important.

I would like to first ask you about our policy in the Middle East. It's my understanding that at least two very important goals of American foreign policy in the Middle East have been first, to assure a strong and secure Israel and, secondly, to encourage a process of negotiations which would bring the parties in that region together to deal with the underlying political problems which create instability.

I have no doubt that we will, with your support, continue to provide adequate assistance to Israel to assure its strength and security. But, I am concerned about the second goal of our policy. As the Chairman and, I think, you yourself have indicated, there is some dormancy in the political process in the Middle East, specifically around the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship.

In your statement, you indicated that one of your messages to the Soviet Foreign Minister was to encourage the Soviets to promote direct dialogue between the Palestinians and the Israelis. I presume that is an essential part of our own policy. The difficult question, of course, has always been, what Palestinians? Who negotiates for the Palestinians? We have now opened up a dialogue with the PLO, based upon Mr. Arafat's statements of a few months ago. The question is whether our policy includes encouraging direct negotiations between the Israelis and the PLO as a way of getting progress going on the very difficult political issues surrounding both Israeli security, which, of course, is quite legitimate as a concern, and the legitimate interest of the Palestinian people in having some control over their own lives.

SEC. BAKER: Mr. McHugh, first of all, let me say that, as I indicated to the Chairman, clearly if we get to the point -- or when we get to the point, if we're going to get there, that there are going to be reductions from the levels requested, we would want to work very closely with you

ETX

CONTINUED ON PAGE 30-1



BAKER-03/14/89

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to determine where those reductions would least harm American foreign policy and national security interests. We would very much welcome the opportunity to do that rather than being presented with a fait accompli.

I would hope that we would be able to speak with one voice. It's one of the problems that I have noted upon taking over this job, and we hope and believe that we're not going to have each and every bureau and agency up here lobbying you individually. If we do, and they are State Department bureaus and agencies, you have only to pick up the phone and let me know, and I hope it will stop. I know it will stop overtly and I hope it will stop covertly. If it's obviously where you have the Department of Treasury involved, we will want to work that out, but I have a very close working relationship with the Secretary of the Treasury and I hope we could work those things out so that you would find a focal point within the administration that you could deal with if we ever get to that point. So, thank you for suggesting that.

You're quite right that -- well, your statement of our -- of our policy in the Middle East, I think, is accurate, as I heard it. We, of course, support UN Resolution 242 and 338. We support -- we think those resolutions mean land for peace, and that ultimately, that's the key to peace in the Occupied Territories. We obviously support a strong and secure Israel, and we'll continue to do so, and that is fundamental. At the same time, we have to, I think, respect the rights of the Palestinian people. And we have said many times that we see that peace is not going to be delivered in the Middle East by other parties; it's going to come only from direct negotiations between the parties.

The United States does not oppose an international conference on this matter, although we think an international conference right now might be a bit premature before certain work is done on the ground to improve the atmosphere or to improve the climate. We retain the Reagan administration's policy with respect to an international conference to the effect generally that we would support one that is properly structured at the right time.

You mentioned the Soviet Union. In our discussions with the Soviet Union, we frankly told them we welcomed their interest in the Middle East, and we do.

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HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCMTE

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This is the most intractable foreign policy problem I'm aware of. It's been there for a long, long time. If we're going to move toward peace, we're going to need the good faith efforts of anybody who can contribute to that process. At the same time, we suggested to the Soviet Union that -- a couple of things they could do by way of concrete steps we thought would contribute to the process. It's not enough just to go to the region and say you want to see peace in the Middle East, and "Let's have a UN Security Council membership-sponsored international conference." That they might start being helpful in a concrete way by normalizing their relations with Israel, by reducing or eliminating their support for some radical elements -- dissident elements, frankly, of the PLO that are headquartered in another country. That they might stop, for instance, their support of radical regimes in the regions such as Libya. But these would be concrete steps that they could take to demonstrate their bona fides. If they did that, we would welcome their assistance and participation in solving this problem.

REP. MCHUGH: Mr. Secretary, my question is, Is it an element of our policy at this stage to promote negotiations directly between the Israeli government and the PLO? I'm not here to defend the PLO or to suggest what our policy should be. Indeed, like most all Americans, I have grave concerns about many of the activities of the PLO. But frankly, each time I've been in the Middle East and talked with Palestinians, they have always said that their sole representative is the PLO, and therefore, if there are to be meaningful negotiations, it must be directly between the PLO and the Israelis.

We are now talking with the PLO in an informal -- or formal dialogue. And my question is whether or not, given the current circumstances in the Middle East, and I think the perception on the part of all of us that negotiations are critically important to promote the political process, is it time for the Israelis and the PLO, or some representatives of the PLO, to discuss together these underlying political problems which are promoting instability at an increasing rate? I think all of us are disturbed by what's happening in the West Bank and Gaza, and I'm not blaming any one party for that, because it's a reflection of the failure of the parties to come to grips in a meaningful way

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HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCMTE  
BAKER-03/14/89

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with the underlying problems. It seems to me that, despite these difficulties, this is an opportune time to come to grips with these problems, but there has to be negotiations among parties who have the credibility in each of their respective communities.

And my question specifically is: Is it an element of our policy to promote direct negotiations between the Israeli government and the PLO at this time?

SEC. BAKER: It is an element of our policy, Mr. McHugh, to promote direct negotiations which, as you put it, can be meaningful between Israelis and Palestinians. Now, if you can't have direct negotiations that are meaningful, that do not involve negotiations with the PLO, then I suppose my original answer would cover the question: We would then have to see negotiations between Israelis and representatives of the PLO. It may be that you can have meaningful negotiations that do not involve the PLO, it may be that you can't. Our policy -- let me state it one more time -- is simply that we think there needs to be direct negotiations which are meaningful; meaningful direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.

REP. MCHUGH: Based upon your knowledge of the Middle East, are there Palestinians who can conduct negotiations credibly for the Palestinian community, who are not affiliated or supportive of the PLO?

SEC. BAKER: I think that remains to be seen.

REP. MCHUGH: You don't know?

SEC. BAKER: I don't think that -- I don't think that we know at this time, Mr. McHugh; no. I think that several years ago, perhaps there would have been. There are many other questions involved here, of course, and that is what the position of King Hussein might or might not be vis a vis negotiations. So all of these things have to be looked at, and I don't think that you can -- that you can answer that in a -- just a black and white response.

REP. MCHUGH: Well, my time is up, Mr. Secretary. I would be delighted if there were Palestinians who could credibly negotiate for that community who are not PLO representatives or supporters or affiliates. But, frankly, I don't find them in the Palestinian community, and therefore, I'm led reluctantly to the conclusion that if there are to be negotiations that are meaningful, they will have to, in some form, involve the PLO and the Israelis.

SEC. BAKER: We may ultimately conclude that, Mr. McHugh. But right now, our position is that there ought to be direct, meaningful negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.

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NEA PRESS GUIDANCE

THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1989

Lebanon

465 2/3

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE HEAVY EXCHANGE OF SHELLING AND CONSEQUENT LOSS OF LIFE MARCH 14 IN BEIRUT. THE FIGHTING ILLUSTRATES YET AGAIN LEBANON'S URGENT NEED TO ESCAPE THE DOWNWARD CYCLE OF VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION.

WE URGE ALL SIDES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND TO AVOID CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AT ALL COSTS. WE CALL ON GEN. AWW AND DR. HUSS TO COOPERATE AND COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH ONE ANOTHER, TO WORK TOGETHER TO RESTORE AND INVIGORATE LEBANON'S LEGITIMATE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. WE CALL ON ALL LEBANESE TO SUPPORT THESE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. THE GOAL WHICH WE STRONGLY SUPPORT AND WHICH ALL PARTIES MUST WORK FOR IS WELL-KNOWN AND HAS NOT CHANGED: THE RESTORATION OF LEBANON'S UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND THE DISBANDMENT OF THE MILITIAS.

(MORE)

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(Lebanon)

THE FIGHTING MARCH 14 THREATENS TO DESTROY THE ARAB  
LEAGUE'S PEACE INITIATIVE ON LEBANON. THE UNITED STATES  
ACTIVELY SUPPORTS THIS INITIATIVE, AND ENCOURAGES THE ARAB  
LEAGUE TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORT. WE CALL ON THE LEBANESE AND ALL  
OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES TO JOIN IN THIS SUPPORT. THE SUFFERING  
OF INNOCENT LEBANESE CIVILIANS HAS CONTINUED FAR TOO LONG, AND  
LEBANON'S PEACE AND STABILITY MUST BE RESTORED.

XXX

END



דחיות: בחול	דף: 1 מתוך: 7 טופס מכתב קשר ניו-יורק
סיווג: שמור	אל: יוסי בן-אהרן/מנכ"ל משרד
תאריך: 192100	בחול
מס מכתב: 0 0546 e // 114	דע: השגריר רוטינגטון, בנצור / מנכ"ל צפ"א, מאת: ס/הקונכ"ל - ניו-יורק.

### ביקור רו"מ,

הומטק לשיחתנו להלן הצעותינו לחלקו השני של ביקור רו"מ.

1. א"ב עם אינטלקטואלים בחסות אלי ויזל (לא הכרחי בביתו).  
 קיימת אפשרות גם לקיים אירוע זה בחסות אפמ"י כפי שהיה  
 הביקור שה"ח (אך עם אינטלקטואלים אחרים מאלו שהשתתפו  
 בפגישה עם הה"ח).
2. א"צ או פגישה בשעות אחה"צ עם ה- Foreign Policy Association  
 אירוע זה פתוח לחקירות בניגוד לאירועים ב- Council Of Foreign Relations  
 קחו בחשבון כי בפני המועצה הופיע לאחרונה ה"כ בני בגין  
 ושה"ח ארנס.
3. Council Of Jewish Federation ביקור שרה"מ יופיע בסטודיו  
 התכנית הלוויין הטלביזיוני שלהם ומחבורה לפורציות היהודיות  
 ברחבי ארה"ב. חכניה של כ-45 דקות.
4. מוצע לקיים עצרת ישראלים בקונגרס קולג' ב-11 באפריל. ההכנות  
 והטיפול ירוכזו על ידי שלושת משרדי הקבוצה והרשות בקונסוליה.
5. עצרת עם בניו-ג'רסי. מצ"ב מכתבו של דוד מלאך מנכ"ל  
 מרציות משרד-ווסט בניו-ג'רסי - לשיקולכם.
6. פגישה עם נציגי אוצר וחזרה - בקשתם צורפה למברקי 14 § מת-28 פבר'.
- הבריקונא התייחסותכם.
7. אירועי חקירות בנמרד.
8. גב' שולמית שמיר.
- א. גטיאח ויצו גב' אהליון סומר ביקשה אישור גב' שולמית שמיר להשתתפותה  
 בא"צ ב-11 באפריל. איינה כי הוכר אושר לה עקדוניה.
- מצ"ב חליפת מברקים בגדון. האירוע יקויים בבית של James Cayne

אישור:

שם השולח:

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לה ס/מרה רחא ומהא ונכא ונכא ונכא ונכא ונכא ונכא ונכא ונכא ונכא

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כטרעייטו פאט וויא האמארחט.

ישתתפו כ-100 איס.

ה. הבריקו נא אט נקבעו לה חכמיות נוספות.

מרדכי יריד

אישור:

שם השולח:

תאריך:



United Jewish Federation of MetroWest  
COMMUNITY RELATIONS COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM  
60 GLENWOOD AVE. EAST ORANGE, NJ, 07017  
8903-4405

TO: MORDECHAI YEDID, VICE-CONSUL GENERAL  
FROM: DAVID M. MALLACH  
SUBJECT: VISIT TO NEW JERSEY BY PRIME MINISTER  
DATE: March 10, 1989

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3/7

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This memorandum is in response to our conversations about the possible visit of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to the MetroWest community during his trip to the United States in late March or early April.

We would be very pleased to have the Prime Minister in our community and would make every effort to insure as valuable and meaningful a visit as is possible. Obviously the specific date would affect our plans and would have an impact on the locations and other logistical issues, but I believe that those issues are technical problems which can be worked out without major problems.

The location of the community rally with the Prime Minister would be one of the large synagogues in the Livingston or Short Hills communities. There are three that could accommodate above 2000 people: B'nai Jeshurun, the largest, B'nai Abraham, the most convenient, and Beth Shalom, a backup in case the other two are not available. On the whole all three are available during the first week in April. If the travel to the New Jersey community were to be by helicopter, we could arrange with the West Orange or Livingston police for landing at one of a number of locations. There are police landing sites, there is also a landing site at St. Barnabas Hospital, a good locations for any of the three places mentioned above. This would not be a problem.

We would publicize the rally as broadly as possible in New Jersey, not only in MetroWest. We would invite the Jewish Federation in the region to join us. This would include the United Jewish Community of Bergen County, the Northern Jersey Federation, the Clifton-Passaic Federation, the Central Jersey Federation, and the Greater Middlesex Jewish Federation. We would keep the other ones informed of the plans and invite their members, but realistically, we could not expect significant participation from their membership. My expectation is that we would have a crowd of above 2000 people. We will do all we can to make it as large as possible, and if three thousand attend or more we will be pleased. We see this as a Jewish communal expression of support and solidarity with Israel and would promote it with that theme in mind.



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VISIT TO NEW JERSEY BY PRIME MINISTER  
March 10, 1989  
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With regard to inviting politicians, public figures, etc. we will respond to the suggestions of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. The availability of such public figures will be influenced by the date of the event. From our perspective, we will be very pleased to invite the congressional delegation, the governor, and some other key figures. This will need to be discussed when we confirm that the visit is happening.

The program would essentially be a series of greetings, as short as possible, and the Prime Minister. We would like to have the president of each sponsoring Federation be recognized, and have the representatives of the larger ones say a few words. We would add some comments from the politicians if they are present, an invocation by a prominent local rabbi, singing of Hatikva and Star Spangled Banner, and that would be it. The Prime Minister's speech would be the great majority of the program. We can assume the time would run about one and a quarter hours.

Since this is going to be happening soon, the issue of dates needs to be worked out. The one time that would present a major problem to our community would be Sunday, April 9, 1989. On that day we have a major community celebration planned with a program in place. It would not be possible to have the Prime Minister there as the central feature and it be inappropriate to have him as an "add-on". Some other dates are better or worse, but the choice should be based on the schedule of the Prime Minister.

From a staff point of view, the full resources of our community would be dedicated to the success of such a community event. I would have primary responsibility for the rally, and the shlichim, Yaacov Broder and Yossi Shohat, would be involved in a significant manner.

Please call me to discuss this further to answer any questions that may come up. We look forward to having the Prime Minister of Israel in New Jersey if it can possibly be arranged.

Copies: Ya'acov Broder  
Howard Charish  
Murray J. Laulicht  
Ron Meier  
Yossi Shohat





**THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL  
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION—WIZO**

130 East 59th St. • Suite 1206 • New York, NY 10022

FAX 212-751-6818

Tel. 2

Consultative status  
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PAGE 1 OF 1

BY FAX TO:

972-3-258-267

March 3, 1989

PRESIDENT  
Evelyn Sommer

VICE-PRESIDENTS  
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Lea Freund

TREASURER  
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Maria Biller  
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Jana Fallo  
Susan Shankman

Michal Modai  
Chairman  
World WIZO Executive  
Tel Aviv, Israel

Dear Michal:

As discussed during the Plenary Meeting, WIZO New York wishes to honor Mrs. Shamir at a luncheon during her April visit to New York.

Please FAX answer immediately, with possible dates.

Sincerely,

Evelyn Sommer  
President

P.S. Michal, as you recall, Mrs. Shamir accepted our invitation to be honored in New York.

0 0546

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Chile  
Colombia

Denmark  
Ecuador  
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Finland

Germany  
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& Ireland  
Greece

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Holland  
Honduras  
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Mexico  
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# THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL ZIONIST ORGANIZATION—WIZO

130 East 59th St. • Suite 1204 • New York, NY 10022

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3 Pages Including This Cover Letter

Tel. # 212-751-6461

Fax # 212-751-6818

BY FAX TO:  
953-0317

0 0548 / 114

6/7

8 March 1989

PRESIDENT  
Evelyn Sommer

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Maya Cohen  
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Maria Miller  
Sonia Igra  
Jana Fallo  
Susan Shantman

Deputy Consul Mordechai Yedid  
Consulate General of Israel  
800 Second Avenue  
New York, NY 10017

Dear Deputy Consul Yedid:

After our telephone conversation earlier today,  
I am sending you, by Fax, the correspondence in  
regard to the WIZO event planned in honor of Mrs.  
Shamir.

I will call you tomorrow for dates.

Sincerely yours,

*Evelyn Sommer*

Evelyn Sommer  
President

## WIZO FEDERATIONS:

Israel  
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Luxembourg  
Bolivia  
Brazil  
Canada

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Costa Rica  
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Ecuador  
El Salvador  
Finland  
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Germany  
Gibraltar  
Great Britain  
& Ireland  
Greece

Guatemala  
Holland  
Honduras  
Italy  
Japan

Jamaica  
Kenya  
Mexico  
New Zealand  
Nicaragua

Norway  
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Uruguay  
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Venezuela  
Zambia  
Zimbabwe



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יציג - הסתדרות עולמית  
לנשים ציוניות

WIZO - WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL  
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

MAR 00 1989

CONSULTATIVE STATUS WITH  
E.C.O., S.O.C., U.N.  
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Zaire  
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114  
7/7

Mrs. Evelyn Sommer  
President  
WIZO - U.S.A.  
130 East 59th Street  
Suite 1204  
New York - N.Y. 10022  
U.S.A.

Dear Evelyn,

Michal has asked me to reply to your fax.  
She spoke with Mrs. Shulamit Shamir who in principal  
accepts to be your guest during her visit to the  
United States with Prime Minister Shamir.

Unfortunately she cannot at this stage set a date and  
she will only be able to do so prior to her departure.

Michal is currently on vacation and sends her love.

All the best,

*Dolly*  
DOLLY FAITELSON  
Secretary General  
World Wizo Executive

DF/15

me too!

ADDRESS: 35, DAVID HAMELOCH BLVD., TEL-AVIV, ISRAEL, TEL. 257321-5, P.O.B. 83159, CODE 61831, CABLES: ISRAWIZO TEL-AVIV

TELEX: 37779 COIN L ATT. WIZO

FAX: 972-02-250267

דחפחות: מייד	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס בקור	1 צד:
סוג: שמור		2 כתוב:
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל: מצפ"א
17 במרץ 1989 10:30		
כס' פברק:		דע: לשכת שהיח
הכשרה:		
1/2 456		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביהתיב: ועדת משנה לאירופה וחמזה"ח

א. אתמול (16/3) נפגשו המילטון ומספה חברי הועדה (ביניהם מל לויין, לוקנס, קרוקט וסולרז) עם החכיים יוסי שריד, יאיר צבן, חנה סניורא ופאסל חוסייני.

1-הנושא העיקרי שבדון היה אפשרות קיום בחירות בשטחים. סניורא וחוסייני, לא הוציאו מכלל אפשרות קיום הבחירות בתנאי שתהיה הוכחה שאלה תהיינה חלק מתהליך רחב יותר ושישראל לא תנסה להפריד בין הפלסטינים החיים בשטחים לבין אלה שמחוצה להם. הם הביעו ספקות האם ישראל WILL ABIDE BY THE RESULTS. מייק ואן דוזן שנכח בהגישה אמר למשתתפים (כדבריו) כי הם מאמינים שישראל תהיה מוכנה TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSURANCES. סניורא וחוסייני חזרו על כך ש-CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES אפשריים בתנאי שיהיו חלק מתהליך רחב יותר. 2-לגבי תקופת הביניים, אמרו החכיים צבן ושריד שלדעתם יש צורך ב-10 שנים ואילו חוסייני וסניורא דיברו על 5 שנים.

3-מנהיגות מקומית, לדברי המילטון, מטרת הבחירות תהיה ליצור מנהיגות מקומית שתגשר בין ישראל ואש"פ כל עוד ישראל מסרבת להדבר עם אש"פ. כמו כן על אש"פ לתת מספיק אמון במנהיגות המקומית כדי שזו תפעל כ-MIDDLE MAN. לדברי ואן דוזן סניורא וחוסייני DIDN'T RULL IT OUT אולם חזרו על כך שיש לשכנעם שתבחירות הם שלב וחלק מתהליך כללי רחב.

4-יורדן - נושא חזרתה לתהליך כמעט ולא הוזכר בדיון. לדברי ואן דוזן אינם רואים את חוסיין מצטרף לתהליך.

5-ארת"ב - מייעדים לה תפקיד חשוב. ובמיוחד, במסגרת הפגת המתח, מעוניינים שתשיג הסכם (תוך מו"מ עם אש"פ וישראל) לפיו מחד, ישראל תצא מלבנון ומאידך קבוצות פלסטיניות בדרום לבנון יחדלו מלתקוף את ישראל.

6-החכיים - לדברי ואן דוזן היו מאד PROTECTIVE. ניסו להדגיש חשיבות הדברות ישראל עם הפלסטינים, שללו התניית הסיוע לישראל מכל וכל והדגישו חשיבותו, מודעים לעובדה כי מייצגים % לא גבוה באוכלוסייה (כ-30%) הוסיפו כי אח ישראל תפתח במו"מ עם אש"פ,

תפוצה: 36 - שהם סולמה רחג גנכט גנכט גנכט גנכט גנכט

סאלי גנכט גנכט גנכט גנכט גנכט גנכט גנכט גנכט גנכט גנכט



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סוג:		כתוב: 2
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הפרד:		כאת:
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להערכתם 80% מהציבור בישראל יתמוך במהלך כזה. לדבריהם, הציבור מעוניין מספיק לצאת מהמצב הנוכחי כדי לתמוך במוי"מ עם אשי"פ. בסה"כ התרשם ואן דוזן כי החכיים היו חיוביים מאוד.

ב. המילטון בפגש אתמול לשיחה אישית עם נביל ש"ת.

1- נושאי השיחה דמו לשיחה עם החכיים והפלסטינים לעיל. אם כי, לדברי ואן דוזן, בפגישה זו דיבר המילטון יותר מאשר בפגישה הקודמת. הבהיר לש"ת שתי נקודות עיקריות: התהליך לא יהיה מתיר. על אשי"פ לעשות יותר.

2- בנוגע למוי"מ אמר ש"ת כי הח גמישים. לדבריו אם הקונטקסט יהיה הגדרה עצמית יהיה קל להשיג הפסקי"ש (הפחתת אלימות) ובחירות. אם יגידו לאוכלוסיה שהגדרה עצמית תתכן רק בעוד 6-7 שנים, יקל לשנות את תמצב הנוכחי.

בהקשר זה העיר ואן דוזן שברור וידוע שאנחנו מפרשים המינוח של הגדרה עצמית כמדינה פלסטינית עצמאית.

3- התרשמותם משעיית היתה חיובית מאוד. ואן דוזן הוא מאד ARTICULATE וקל יותר לדבר עמו מאשר עם ערפת ואחרים באשי"פ, כאדם, וכן גישתו, מרשימים ומעניינים. אינו ארוגנטי גמיש ובטוח בעצמו.

ואן דוזן סיפר כי ש"ת עגיד להפגש עם ישראלים נוספים בזמן הקרוב.

ובא-ונואי צונזר.  
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה:







526 <sup>2</sup>/<sub>2</sub>

שה"ח חזר שוב על עמדתנו-והתירתנו למו"מ ישיר ואמר כי נשמו את המזכ"ל יוכל לסייע כדי להביא הצדדים לשולחן המו"מ הישיר.

המזכ"ל עבר לנושא לבנון וכוחות יוניפי"ל. ביקש כי שה"ח ישוחח עם שר הבטחון במגמה להביא לרגיעה באיזור וריסון צר"ל.

שה"ח הזכיר התבטאותו של המג"ד הנורבגי שהשווה פעילותנו לזו של הנאצים, אך הוסיף כי כללית בישראל השתפרה הדעה לגבי פעילות יוניפי"ל וישנה הערכה לרצונם הטוב ולתיפקודם.

המזכ"ל עבר למצב ביש"ע ולצורך למצוא דרכים כדי למתן האלימות.

שה"ח הסביר הנושא והרגיש כי בעיית מחנות הפליטים היא מרכיב חשוב במצב. יש במחנות רבים המרגישים שאין להם מה להפסיד, ולכן פונים לקיצוניות. העובדה שהמחנות קיימים אחרי 40 שנה, זהו מחול רציני של מדינות העולם ושל הקהילה הבי"ל.

שה"ח הוסיף שפעילות המזכ"ל ואישיותו תרמו רבות לשיפוץ דעת הקהל בארץ כלפי האו"ם. הוא נתפס אישית כידיד וכפועל נאמנה לקידום השלום בעולם.

המזכ"ל הודה והוסיף כי שמע על ביקור רוע"מ שמיר בקרוב וישמח לראותו.

4. לתקשורת אנו מודיעים רק כי היתה שיחה בארבע עיניים לשם הכירות וחילופי דעות על המצב באיזור והורכים לקידום תהליך השלום.

5. נציג אש"פ, טרזי הודיע אתמול על מסיבת עיתונאים באו"ם היום ב-1100 (שעת פגישת המזכ"ל-שה"ח), כשהופיעו עיתונאים היום מצאו על הדלת הודעה כי מסיבת העיתונאים בוטלה...

נאו"ם

שם השולח: יוחנן ביין

תאריך: 17.3.1989



דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: שמור	טופס סגור	כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן מעור:		אל: ממגכ"ל, מצפ"א
פס' כבוק:		דע: ממ"ד
הפסרד:		כאת: שג' נושינגטון
437		

### ארה"ב - קהילה: קהילת המזרחית

1. בשיחה (16.3) עם הדסקאית המטפלת בקהילה באגף המחקר התייחסה למגעי ארה"ב (שיחות בייקר עם עמיתיו) עם ה-12 בכלל "הטרניקה" בפרט בנושא תהליך השלום ולתפיסת ה-12 את מקומם בקידום התהליך.

### 2. להלן סכום שיחתנו:

- א. מטרת הטרניקה בשיחותיה עם בייקר הייתה להעביר התחושה של דחיות אותה חש ה-12 בכל מה שנוגע לתנועת תהליך השלום, ה-12 בדעה שמאז כינוס תמל"פ בנוב' חלר התפתחות בשטח המחייבות תגובה קרי יזמה מדינית שאם לא כן, אנו עלולים לתחמץ הזדמנות (נוספת).
- ב. במסגרת ההתפתחות לעיל סבורת ה-12 שמצב של ערפאת *precarious* ובמידה ולא יעשה דבר מצבו יחמיר.
- ג. ה-12 מצפות שארה"ב תוביל תהליך אליג יצטרפו. מעריכה שה-12 אינם חושבות במונחים של, מה יחיה במידה נארה"ב (מסיבות כלשהן) לא תנקוט במהלך כלשתנא. השאלת הציצבת בשלב הנוכחי מבחינתן היא מתי (תנקוט ארה"ב ביזמה) ומה (תהא תכנת). מעבר לכך, אינה מתרשמת שנעשתה חשיבה.
- ד. והיה נארה"ב לא תנקוט ביזמה, אשת שיחי אינה סבורה שנהיה צפריים לפעלחות אירופית עצמאית. אם תחלוף לה שנה של חעדר עשיה אמריקאית אזי אינה מאציאה מכלל אפשרות ניסוח הצהרה נוסח ונציח.
- ה. בין הסיבות לעמדה לעיל הוא ריאליזם גובר אצל ה-12 ביחס למגבלותיה (קרי יכולתן לפעול עצמאית ולהשפיע).
- ו. להערכתה חשלימו ה-12 עם העובדה שלא יוכלו להשביע דרישת ישראל לאמץ "עמדה מאוזנת". במילים אחרות, ברור להן שלא יוכלו למלא תפקיד של "מתווך הגון" בין ישראל לשכנותיה. לפיכך, הן מקדישות עיקר המאמץ לתן עמדות אש"פ

תפוצה: 36

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
המסרד:		כא:
437		
<p>מדינת-ערב שנים חלקן יש להן מערכת יחסים הדוקה וטובה יותר חזר שיש לארה"ב. על ארה"ב [לפי אותה תפיסה] למתן את ישראל.</p> <p>ז. אשת שיחא מעריכת שאנר צפוניים לחתימה צניגה בין ארה"ב ל-12 בנושא המזה"ח. שאיפת ה-12 תהיה להכניס תשומת לב לחשיבה האמריקאית.</p> <p>ח. חזרה מטפר טעמים על הצורך לפקוח עין על ברה"מ שעלולה להפתיע בגקיסט יזמשת. בהיעדר מדיניות אמריקאית ברורה אינה מוציאה מכלל אפשרות חגובה אוחדת מצד ה-12 ליזמת טכניקית. אחרי הכל הפער בין עמדות ה-12 לאלו של ברה"מ אינו גדול.</p> <p>ט. בצד המסידן המוגבל של ה-12 ציינה את בריטניה נצרכת כשחקניות עצמאיות בחוקי הברית במדעיביט.</p> <p>י. כדי להכניס הנושא למנטכסט הנכון העירה לפינס שדה"י של ה-12 כולל נושאים בוערים שחשיבותם עולה על זו של המזה"ח. הנושא בהא הידיעה המעסיק אותם הוא תמיכתו לקראת 1992. על ה-12 להשקיע מאמץ רב כדי לגשר על פני הפער בנושא. מתחום יחסי החוץ ציינה את יחסי מזי-מעי חנר דגש על המצב במזא"ר בנושאים שיזכר לטימורל אינטנסיבי.</p> <p>שטיב</p>		
תפוצה:		



~~152~~

דף: _____ כתוב: _____	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק		דחיות קגיל
אל: _____	לשכת רוה"מ		סוג: _____ שומר
דע: _____	הציר, ציר הסברה - כאן מצפא		תאריך וזמן מעור: _____ 15 1200 מרץ 89
כא: _____	קונכל, וושינגטון		כס' פרוק: _____ מספר: _____ 392

בקשת אבירי מלטה

לבקשת מונטיפיורי לפגישת עם ראש הממשלה, בהשתתפות רבנותתפות ראש המסדר קולאקובסקי:  
 להזכיר כי נבצר מראש המסדר לחיפוש עם רה"מ בטקס שחתקדים אשתקד, משום שהטקס היה  
 בירושלים, והאיש זקן וחלש. אני מבין שחנא בקש אישית לאפשר לו את המפגש בהזדמנות  
 בזקורו של רה"מ, הפגס, בארה"ב, כך שאין לראות בקשה זו כסתם בקשה לפגישת חוזרת.  
 חנני ממליץ על היענות חיובית, אם רק ניתן לשבץ הפגישת בתוכניתן של רה"מ.  
 הודיעונוניעל החלטתכם.

א. ס. ו.  
א. ו. מ. ו.

א. ו. מ. ו.

א. ו. מ. ו.  
2

א. ו. מ. ו.  
3

תפוצה: 10 - 10

