

# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

15/08/2020 / 21609 / 15

משרד ראש

יו"ר מדינה

ארה"ב

10/7/89 - 18/7/89



שם תיק: היתוך המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה ביז: 4609/15-א

מזהה מדינה: R000366

מסמך: 2-111-2-4-8

תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

תיק מס:

15

מסמך

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10013

תאריך : 14.07.80

נכנס \*\*

סודי

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,10013

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/723

מ-: ווש, נר: 288, תא: 130789, חז: 2000, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: צפא

8: ד

אחת

סודי / מידי

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: קישור לקונגרס

בהנב'א: סיוע חוץ לישראל - הקצבות: דיון על יוזמת ישראל והחלטות ועידת הליכוד ופתיחת בתיה'ס ביו'ש.

1. היום בבוקר, בישיבה של הקוקוס הדמוקרטי של ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות (ועדתו של אובי), ביקש הקונגרסמן צ'רלי וילסון לקיים דיון בשבוע הבא (כנראה ביום ו') במליאת ביהנב'ח, בנושא החלטות ועידת הליכוד, בעת הדיון על חוק סיוע חוץ - הקצבות. בנוסף לכך נדונו הצעות לשגר מכתב לרה'מ ולכלול הנושא בלשון הדו'ח הנלווה לחוק. צ'רלי וילסון, אף אמר כי ישקול להכניס התייחסות ללשון החוק חוזר ללשון החוק שתביע תקוה שהיוזמה תמשך ללא תנאים מוקדמים. קונגרסמן להמן התנגד לדרישתו של וילסון ושלל שאר ההצעות שהוצגו, הצטרף אליו גם מט מקי שלדברי אחד הנוכחים היה חיובי מאד. אובי הסתפק באומרו שנעשו אליו מספר פניות מצד קונגרסמנים וקיימת תחושה של אי נוחות לגבי החלטות הליכוד וכי יש לעשות משהו בנדון.

2. א. בישיבה שהתקיימה היום אחה'צ אצל המצליף, נדונה האפשרות של קיום 'ויכוח כללי' (GENERAL DEBATE) בן שעה שיוקדש בלעדית לנושא החלטות ועידת הליכוד ולאחר מכן יקיימו דיון בהצעתו של קונגרסמן נילסן בנושא פתיחת בתיה'ס ביו'ש ואף יקיימו הצבעה.





## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ב. אובי, שהשתתף בישיבה אצל המצליף אמר, ששעה של 'ויכוח כללי' על המזה'ת תספק את צ'רלי וילסון וגם קונגרסמן נילסון. דיויד בוניור, ס/המצליף, טען שלדעתו זה לא יספק את נילסון שכן יש לו מחוייבות מאובי להגיש הצעתו ואף להצביע עליה (אובי אינו מחוייב לנוסח של נילסון אלא רק לעצם הגשת ההצעה). אובי, לדבריו מעוניין למנוע החלטה והצבעה ועדיין משוכנע ששעה של 'ויכוח כללי' תספק את נילסון.

ג. בסופו של דבר, סוכם על שעתיים של 'ויכוח כללי' על החוק (כלי לקבוע נושא מיוחד) וכל אחד יתבטא בנושא שירצה. לדברי אובי נושא המזה'ת באופן כללי ויוזמת ישראל והחלטות הליכוד באופן ספציפי יעלו בדיון וגם הוא מתכוון להתבטא בנושא זה. איפ'ק החל בגיוס כללי של ידידיו לקראת 'הויכוח הכללי' כדי שיסיטו הדיון לכיוון אש'פ, מנהיגיו ופעולות טרור.

3. כן סוכם לכלול בלשון הדו"ח הנלווה לחוק סיוע חוץ - הקצבות, את הנוסח הבא (אינו סופי):

תומכים ביוזמת רה"מ שמיר מביעים צער ודאגה לגבי התנאים שהוצמדו ליוזמה שימנעו מהיוזמה לשמש כאלטרנטיבה מעשית ומהאפשרות שכשולן יוזמת הבחירות תביא ללחצים לכינוסה של ועידה בינ"ל. בכוונת קונגרסמן להמן להוסיף לנוסח, כי עד כה לא נענה אף אחד בצד הפלסטיני והערבי ליוזמה. כן יפעל להוצאת איזכור הוועידה הבינ"ל.

4. לגבי הצעת נילסון לפתיחת בתי'ס עדיין קיימים חילוקי דעות בקרב ידידיו על דרך הפעולה. לדעת ברמן יש לאפשר לנילסון להגיש הצעתו (שכן נעשה DEAL) ואז יגיש הוא הצעתו החלופית (SUBSTITUTE).

להערכת לארי סמית אסור לאפשר לנילסון להגיש ההצעה ויש לנסות למנוע בעדו האפשרות של הגשתה כבר בועדת ה-RULES. (נילסון לא יכול להגיש הצעתו השליכת לחוק ההרשאות, בדיון על חוק הקצבות ולכן זקוק ל-RULE שיגן עליו) הערכתו היא שהסיכויים לכך בועדה די טובים.

5. העירוב מלכתחילה של שני הנושאים נעשה ע"י צ'רלי וילסון ואובי, אולם יתכן שאובי עצמו יפעל לשכנועו של נילסון לותר על הצעתו גם על רקע הודעתו.

נמשיך לעקוב ולדווח.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר



THE FIRST OF THESE IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RURAL ONE, AND THE  
PEOPLE ARE USED TO A SLOW AND  
EASY LIFE. THE SECOND IS THE  
FACT THAT THE COUNTRY IS A  
RURAL ONE, AND THE PEOPLE ARE  
USED TO A SLOW AND EASY LIFE.

THE THIRD IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RURAL ONE, AND THE  
PEOPLE ARE USED TO A SLOW AND  
EASY LIFE. THE FOURTH IS THE  
FACT THAT THE COUNTRY IS A  
RURAL ONE, AND THE PEOPLE ARE  
USED TO A SLOW AND EASY LIFE.

THE FIFTH IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RURAL ONE, AND THE  
PEOPLE ARE USED TO A SLOW AND  
EASY LIFE.

THE SIXTH IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RURAL ONE, AND THE  
PEOPLE ARE USED TO A SLOW AND  
EASY LIFE. THE SEVENTH IS THE  
FACT THAT THE COUNTRY IS A  
RURAL ONE, AND THE PEOPLE ARE  
USED TO A SLOW AND EASY LIFE.

THE EIGHTH IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RURAL ONE, AND THE  
PEOPLE ARE USED TO A SLOW AND  
EASY LIFE. THE NINTH IS THE  
FACT THAT THE COUNTRY IS A  
RURAL ONE, AND THE PEOPLE ARE  
USED TO A SLOW AND EASY LIFE.

THE TENTH IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RURAL ONE, AND THE  
PEOPLE ARE USED TO A SLOW AND  
EASY LIFE.

THE ELEVENTH IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RURAL ONE, AND THE  
PEOPLE ARE USED TO A SLOW AND  
EASY LIFE.

THE TWELFTH IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RURAL ONE, AND THE  
PEOPLE ARE USED TO A SLOW AND  
EASY LIFE.







# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* 10253

\* תאריך 14.07.89 \*

\* יוצא \*\*

\* סודי ביותר \*

\* דף 1 מתוך 1 \*  
\* עותק 4 מתוך 18 \*

\* \*\*  
\* \*\*  
\* \*\*\*

\* חוזם: 7,10253 \*

\* אל: 520/וש \*

\* מ-: המשרד, תא: 140789, זח: 1355, דח: ב, סג: סב \*

\* תח: גס: צפא \*

\* נד: 8 \*

א  
נ  
ח  
ב

\* סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר \*

\* צ.א. 507 \*

\* השגריר \*

\* משיחה עם השגריר בראון (14/7).

\* (1). אמר שהודעת הנשיא על ביטול ביקור משלחת איגלברגר וחבריו באה לו - ולעמיתיו במחמ'ד עם היה בקשר - בהפתעה.

\* (2). הוסיף שהוא וחבריו במחמ'ד מפרשים הודעת הנשיא כפותחת פתח להגם שהאפשרות לכך קלושה) לשיגור שליח נשיאותי מיוחד במתכונת ה-SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY לקידום היוזמה המדינית. במילים אחרות: בראון עדיין נערך לבואם האפשרי של משלחת או שליח מיוחד לישראל בזמן הקרוב.

\* (3). בראון נתבשר שהוא עתיד להיות מוזמן בקרוב ע"י ועדת החוץ של הסנט לשימוע לקראת אישורו כשגריר, הליך שנתמהמה בשל מינויו בתקופת פגרת הקונגרס. הוא מעריך כי יהיה נתון לחקירת שתי וערב של חברי הועדה על מיכלול יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב.

\* בנצור \*

\* פא \*

\* תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא \*



100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* 9334 \*

\* תאריך : 14.07.89 \*

\* דף 1 מתוך 3 \*

\* עותק 1 מתוך 4 \*

\* \*\* נכנס סודי ביותר \*

\* \*\* \*

\* \*\*\* \*

\* חוזם: 7,9334 \*

\* אל: המשרד \*

\* יעדים: וווש/470 \*

\* מ-: בטחון, נר: 8, תא: 130789, זח: 1517, דח: ב, סג: סב \*

\* תח: 8 גס: צפא 983 \*

\* נד: 8 \*

\* \*

\* \*

\* \*

\* \*

\* סודי ביותר/בהול \*

\* \*

\* לנמען בלבד \*

\* \*

\* אל: משהח סמנכל לפרן וצפא א. בן צור לעיניו בלבד \*

\* \*

\* דע: השגריר וושינגטון \*

\* נ.צ. וושינגטון \*

\* ק' קישור לקונגרס וושינגטון, מנכל משה'ח \*

\* \*

\* לעיניהם בלבד \*

\* \*

\* מאת: משהב'ט הממונה על קשרי חוץ \*

\* \*

\* סימן המחבר: אב/1070 \*

\* \*

\* הנדון: ארה'ב מניעת תפוצת סק'ק הצעות חוק \*

\* קונגרסמן ברמן וסנטורים מקיין + גור \*

\* למברק ק' לקונגרס נר: 198 מ-11.7.89 \*

\* \*

\* 1. על בסיס הצעת החוק המתוקנת, ודיווח ק' קישור לקונגרס \*

\* שבסימוכין קיימנו הערכת מצב מחודשת. \*

\* \*

\* 2. המדיניות שנקבעה על דעת מנכל משהב'ט ושהב'ט היא [REDACTED] \*

\* על [REDACTED] \*

\* יסוד הנחה שלא ניתן למנוע את עצם החקיקה. \*

\* \*

\* 3. לדעת משהב'ט רצוי כי הפעולות הנדרשות להשפעה על לשון \*



חסוי



חסוי

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 3  
עותק 1 מתוך 4

\* החוקים לא תעשנה במישרין [REDACTED] אלא בעדינות  
\* מירבית ובעקיפין [REDACTED].

\* 4. להלן קו הפעולה המוצע כפי שהתגבש אצלנו:

\* א. המטרות

\* אחת. להבטיח שחברות ישראליות הקשורות בתעשיות אירונאוטיות  
\* ובנוטאי החלל (כגון התע"א) תוכלנה להמשיך ולייצא רכיבים  
\* מערכות שאינם קשורים למערכות שיגור כפי שהן מוגדרות  
\* ב-MTCR (הצעת החוק של מקיין מחמירה אף יותר מהגדרות ה-  
\* MTCR).

\* שתיים. להבטיח שהסנקציות תחולנה רק על 'מדינות LDC פחות  
\* מפותחות' ועל חברות במדינות LDC, וזאת על בסיס הנחה כי  
\* אכן ישראל אינה LDC בפרשנות המקובלת בגבעה.

\* שלוש. להבטיח שהחוק יחול על העתיד.

\* ב. השיטה

\* להביא לשינוי ניסוח בהצעות החוקים להשגת המטרות הנל:

\* אחת. לקבוע בחוקים כי את רשימת ה-LDC

\* (PROSCRIBED LDC'S LIST) עליהן יחול החוק יקבע הנושא.

\* שתיים. לקבוע בחוקים ש-FOREIGN PERSON פרושו לצורך החוק פרט  
\* או חברה במדינה הנמצאת ברשימה הנל.

\* שלוש. רצוי למצוא דרך ניסוחית שתבטיח שהחוק יחול על העתיד.

\* 5. להערכתנו התיקונים הנל יצמצמו הנזק וניתן אף להסביר  
\* בנקל שהחוק על תיקוניו אכן יבטיח מניעת פרוליפרציה למדינות  
\* העולם השלישי, כפי שהיתה הכוונה במקור.

\* 6. אודה על הנחיותיך בהתאם, בהקדם האפשרי.

\* בברכה

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 3  
עותק 1 מתוך 4

\* ד"ר חנן אלון  
\* הממונה על קשרי חוץ

\* מס

\* אק



חסוי



חסוי

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10801

תאריך : 15.07.89

נכנס \*\*

סודי

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,10801

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/805, מנמת/260

מ-: ווש, נר: 329, תא: 140789, זח: 1900, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: פ גס: צפא

נד: פ

אנר

מידי/סודי

אל: מצפא

דע: לשכת שהח

מאת: קישור לקונגרס

סנאט: הגבלת הדיאלוג עם אשף-תיקון הלמס

בהמשך לשלנו 290 ו-291

1. התיקון של הלמס גרם להתרוצצות רבה בסנאט משך כל היום. בסיכומי של דבר הנוסח שונה במעט (בלחץ הממשל) וההצבעה נדחתה ליום ב' או ג' הקרוב.

2. להלן התרחשות העניינים:

א. פעילות הממשלה.

אחת. המזכיר בייקר התקשר עם הלמס הבוקר ב-0600 מפריז וביקשו לא להגיש התיקון. הלמס סירב להיענות לבקשת המזכיר.

שתיים. החל מאתמול בשעות אחהצ' המאוחרות ובמשך הבוקר התקשרו איגלברגר וכן אנשי אגף החקיקה במחמד עם סנטורים ומשרדיהם לנסות לשכנעם להתנגד לתיקון הלמס.

בין הסנטורים עמם שוחח איגלברגר היו בושביץ ומצנבאוס. המיעון שהציגו היה שהתיקון 'יהרוג' את יוזמת שמיר. לבסוף





## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ביקש מבושביץ לפנות להלמס בבקשה שלא להגיש התיקון ולנסות לבלום המהלך.

שלוש מעניין לציין שמצוות המזהה במחמד נשמעה נימה קצת שונה. להערכתם התיקון יכול להקנות להם LEVERAGE על אשף, שכן יאמרו בתוניס שהקונגרס מאבד סבלנותו כלפי אשף, לא עומד לרשותם עודף זמן ועליהם לשנות דרכם ולהפסיק לדחות ההצעות.

3. באמצע הבוקר, במיוחד לאחר שהוברר לנו היקף הפעולה של מחמד והתפקיד 'שהועיד' איגלברגר לבושביץ, התקשר השגריר עם בושביץ והסביר לו כי אם התיקון לא יעבור  
YOU WILL SEND A TERRIBLE WRONG MESSAGE TO THE PLO  
TERRORISTS AROUND THE WORLD AND TO YOUR ISRAELI  
FRIENDS. THE AMENDMENT MUST BE MAINTAINED  
בושביץ אמר כי הוא מבין את המסר וימשיך לעבוד על נוסח קביל כדי שהתיקון יוכל לעבור.

### 4. הפעילות במליאת הסנאט

הלמס הגיש התיקון במליאה ודיבר עליו בהרחבה. (נעביר נוסח דבריו לאחר קבלתו) תוך כדי דבריו של הלמס הגיע בושביץ למליאה (לאחר שיחתו עם השגריר) והחל להכניס שינויים טכניים/סמנטיים. הלמס שהתנגד להכנסת תיקונים כלשהם, העביר פתק לסנטור גרסלי שנאם באותה עת לטובת התיקון וביקשו להגיש SECOND DEGREE AMNDMENT שפרושו בלימת הגשות כל תיקון נוסף. גרסלי אכן הגיש תיקון זה אולם מאחר ולא היתה הסכמה כללית לא התקיימה ההצבעה היום.

ב. בושביץ שהחל לשאת ולתת על התיקון עם הלמס סבר כי אם הנוסח יובהר דיו ניתן יהיה להסתפק בהכללתו בחוק (כספי מחמד) ולא יהיה צורך בקיום הצבעה.  
הלמס מצידו דרש קיומה של הצבעה.

### 5. פשרה על הנוסח

אחצ' התקשר עוזרו של בושביץ וסיפר כי לאחר מומ' בין הלמס לבושביץ הושגה הסכמה על הכנסת תיקון לתיקון הלמס שיאמר (ראו נא מברקנו 291)

UNTIL THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES TO CONGRESS THAT HE  
HAS DETERMINED IN HIS JEDGEMENT THERE IS NO RELIABLE  
INTELLIGENCE THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE DIRECTLY PARTICIPA



הנכס הנ"ל יישאר בבעלות הממשלה עד אשר יתקבל  
החלטת הממשלה.

הנכס הנ"ל יישאר בבעלות הממשלה עד אשר יתקבל  
החלטת הממשלה.

הנכס הנ"ל יישאר בבעלות הממשלה עד אשר יתקבל  
החלטת הממשלה.

הנכס הנ"ל יישאר בבעלות הממשלה.

הנכס הנ"ל יישאר בבעלות הממשלה עד אשר יתקבל  
החלטת הממשלה.

הנכס הנ"ל יישאר בבעלות הממשלה עד אשר יתקבל  
החלטת הממשלה.

הנכס הנ"ל יישאר בבעלות הממשלה.

הנכס הנ"ל יישאר בבעלות הממשלה עד אשר יתקבל  
החלטת הממשלה.

UNTIL THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIED TO CONGRESS THAT HE  
HAS DETERMINED IN HIS JUDGEMENT THERE IS NO RELIABLE  
INTELLIGENCE THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATE

TED IN, OR CONSPIRED IN OR WAS AN ACCESSORY

הסנטור פ. הסכים לתיקון זה.  
הכוונה עתה לקיים VOICE VOTE ביום ב' הקרוב, ואם  
לא יצליחו, אזי ביום ג' יקיימו ROLL CALL VOTE.

6. מנהיגות הסנט

הבעיה עדיין היא עמדתם של מיטצ'ל ודול. מיטצ'ל מסר היום כי  
הוא מעוניין לדבר עם תום דיין. השניים, המהווים מנהיגות  
הסנאט ועובדים עם הממשל אינם מעוניינים להרגיז את בייקר  
ומעוניינים לשמש כמדינאים המסייעים לתהליך השלום. מניחים  
שפגישת מיטצ'ל - דיין תתקיים ביום ב'.

7. איפ'ק

לפנה'צ' נפגשו תום דיין ואסתר קורץ עם איגלברגר. לדברי  
איגלברגר בטווח הארוך תשלם ישראל המחיר של תיקון זה שכן  
לדעתו זה יפגע בתהליך השלום ואין זה באינטרס של  
ישראל. הוסיף כי זה יפגע בנושא ובמזכיר בייקר. כן אמר:  
WE GOT THE MESSAGE LOUD AND CLEAR

8. הקהילה היהודית

א. הממשל ככל הנראה פנה למקס פישר לגייסו כנגד התיקון.  
פישר ככל הנראה אכן מתנגד לו.

ב. ה-AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS מתנגד לתיקון.  
שוקלים פירסום הודעה פומבית וכן שיגור מכתבים לסנטורים.

ג. בשלב זה ה-ADL וה-A.J. COMMITTEE תומכים בתיקון.

9. סיכום

א. אין ספק שכרגע מדובר במאבק של כוח בין הממשל לבין איפק  
והשאלה העומדת עתה על הפרק מי יזכה במאבק זה.

ב. הממשל פנה ככל הנראה ישירות ו/או בעקיפין למנהיגי  
הארגונים היהודים במטרה לגייס תמיכתם לצידו ושוב עלולה  
לחזור המתכונת של הערכות חלק מהארגונים כנגד איפ'ק.

ג. יש לציין כי איפק נשאלו במשך היום האם גם מפלגת העבודה





תתמוך בתיקון.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגור

לב

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמנ, ממד,  
מצפא, סי יבל





# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9435

תאריך: 13.07.89

יוצא \*\*

סודי ביותר

דף 1 מתוך 2  
עותק 4 מתוך 28

\*חוזם: 7,9435

\*אל: ווש/496, מנמת/228

\*מ-: המשרד, תא: 130789, זח: 1612, דח: מ, סג: סב

\*תח: גס: צפא

\*נד: \*

\*סודי ביותר/מייד \*

\*ע.ב.ש \*

\*5763 \*

\*השגריר \*

\*משיחה של בוב אשר עם בנצור ושילה.

\*א. סבור שיש לאמץ גישה סלקטיבית לעסקות נשק. יש לקבוע עקרונות ספציפיים כגון: לא להתנגד לעסקות עם בחריין, עומאן וסעודיה ובלבד שלא יהיו אלה מטוסים וסוגי טילים מסוימים ושנקבל תמורה.

\*ב. יש לעמוד על העקרון שמבחינה כרונולוגית נקדים את הערבים 'בחצי דור' כמו שהיה בעבר ושלא יווצר מצב שנקבל מערכות חדשות בעת ובעונה אחת עם הערבים.

\*ג. מעריך שאפשר להגיע להרחבת הפטור של FAIR PRICING. זה יביא לחסכון כולל של 150 מליון.

\*ד. אפשר להגיע להעברה מוקדמת והפקדה של כספי FMS בתחילת השנה לשם קבלת ריבית אך בינתיים לא מטפלים ולא מדברים על זה.

\*ה. מתח ביקורת על הלחצים שהופעלו מכל הצדדים לפני מכחב התשעים וחמישה ומתח ביקורת על כמה ניסוחים לא טובים שהוצעו אז ואמר שאסור בשום פנים

א/נה'2

6408-1100

משרד החוץ, תל אביב





# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 2 מתוך 2  
\* עותק 4 מתוך 28

\* שישראלים יציעו ניסוחים לחתימתם של אמריקנים כי  
\* זה יכול אם יתגלה להתקבל רע מאד.

\* 1. אינו סבור שאנחנו צריכים להוסיף להתחפר בהתנגדות  
\* שלנו לדיאלוג בטוניסיה. זה לא פרודוקטיבי  
\* ומעורר רוגז. אין סיכוי להפסקת המגעים. אפשר עם  
\* זאת לפעול לבלימת התרחבות הדיאלוג ולמניעת  
\* שיתופם של אנשים כאבו-איאד.

\* 2. הוא מציע שנחדל ממינהגנו לשייך לאש"פ אנשים  
\* ומעשים שאינם שייכים אליו. זה פוגע באמינותנו  
\* וגורם נזק.

\* מנהל מצפא

\* סא

\* יג

\* תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן,  
\* כנצור, מצפא, סייבל





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* 9334

\* תאריך: 14.07.89

\* נכנס \*\*

\* סודי ביותר

\* דף 1 מתוך 3  
\* עותק 2 מתוך 4

\* \*\*

\* \*\*

\* \*\*

\* חוזם: 7,9334

\* אל: המשרד

\* יעדים: ווש/470

\* מ-: בטחון, נר: 130789, זח: 1517, דח: ב, סג: סב

\* תח: 985 גס: צפא

\* ד: 985

אברהם

\* סודי ביותר/בהול

\* לנמען בלבד

\* אל: משהח סמנכל לפרן וצפא א. בן צור לעיניו בלבד

\* דע: השגריר וושינגטון

\* נ.צ. וושינגטון

\* ק' קישור לקונגרס וושינגטון, מנכל משה'ח

\* לעיניהם בלבד

\* מאת: משהב'ט הממונה על קשרי חוץ

\* סימן המחר: אב/1070

\* הנדון: ארה'ב מניעת תפוצת טק'ק הצעות חוק

\* קונגרסמן ברמן וסנטורים מקיין + גור

\* למברק ק' לקונגרס נר: 198 מ-11.7.89

\* 1. על בסיס הצעת החוק המתוקנת, ודיווח ק' קישור לקונגרס

\* שבסימוכין קיימנו הערכת מצב מחודשת.

\* 2. המדיניות שנקבעה על דעת מנכל משהב'ט ושהב'ט היא

\* על

\* יסוד הנחה שלא ניתן למנוע את עצם החקיקה.

\* 3. לדעת משהב'ט רצוי כי הפעולות הנדרשות להשפעה על לשון



חסוי



חסוי

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 2 \* מתוך 3  
\* עותק 2 \* מתוך 4

\* אלא בעדינות

\* החוקים לא תעשנה במישרין  
\* מירבית ובעקיפין

\* 4. להלן קו הפעולה המוצע כפי שהתגבש אצלנו:

\* א. המטרות

\* יחת. להבטיח שחברות ישראליות הקשורות בתעשיות אירונאוטיות  
\* ובנושאי החלל (כגון התע"א) תוכלנה להמשיך ולייצא רכיבים  
\* ותת מערכות שאינם קשורים למערכות שיגור כפי שהן מוגדרות  
\* ב-MTCR (הצעת החוק של מקקין מחמירה אף יותר מהגדרות ה-  
\* MTCR).

\* שתיים. להבטיח שהסנקציות תחולנה רק על 'מדינות LDC פחות  
\* מפותחות' ועל חברות במדינות LDC, וזאת על בסיס הנחה כי  
\* אכן ישראל אינה LDC בפרשנות המקובלת בגבעה.

\* שלוש. להבטיח שהחוק יחול על העתיד.

\* ב. השיטה

\* להביא לשינוי ניסוח בהצעות החוקים להשגת המטרות הנל:

\* אחת. לקבוע בחוקים כי את רשימת ה-LDC

\* (PROSCRIBED LDC'S LIST) עליהן יחול החוק יקבע הנשיא.

\* שתיים. לקבוע בחוקים ש-FOREIGN PERSON פרושו לצורך החוק פרט  
\* או חברה במדינה הנמצאת ברשימה הנל.

\* שלוש. רצוי למצוא דרך ניסוחית שתבטיח שהחוק יחול על העתיד.

\* 5. להערכתנו התיקונים הנל יצמצמו הנזק וניתן אף להסביר  
\* בנקל שהחוק על תיקוניו אכן יבטיח מניעת פרוליפרציה למדינות  
\* העולם השלישי, כפי שהיתה הכוונה במקור.

\* 6. אודה על הנחיותיך בהתאם, בהקדם האפשרי.

\* בברכה

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 3 \* מתוך 3  
\* עותק 2 \* מתוך 4

\* ד"ר חנן אלון  
\* הממונה על קשרי חוץ

\* טא

\* אק



חסוי



חסוי

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9986

תאריך : 14.07.89

נכנס \*\*

סודי

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,9986

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/718, מנמת/241

מ-: ווש, נר: 287, תא: 130789, זח: 1900, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: 8 גס: צפא

נד: 8

א/ה 2

סודי/מידי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"נ

דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח, מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: השגריר וושינגטון

שיחה עם עוזר המזכיר ג'ון קלי.

בעקבות הדיווחים ברדיו ובטלויזיה בארץ על התבטאותו של הנ"ל בדבר קיום מגעים סודיים כביכול בין ישראל לאשפ', צלצלתי לקלי וביקשתי להבהיר מה התכוון בדבריו.

קלי השיב שבתגובה לשאלת לי המילטון כי לא ידוע לו על קיומם של מגעים כאלה ובאשר לדיווחים בעיתונות ובמידע חסוי ישמח לשוחח בישיבה סגורה.

קלי טרח להעביר אלי מיד נוסח עדותו שהועברה אליכם עוד אתמול אך ביקש להוסיף כי לא הייתה בכוונתו לאשר או אף לרמוז כאילו ידוע להם על קיום מגעים ישירים סודיים או גלויים בין ישראל לאשפ'.

ארד

לב

תפ: שוהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל









OFFICE

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

1950

נושדד-הודד-כודד קוד הדקד

* * *	נכנס	סודי ביותר	מתוך 2	* דף 1
* **			מתוך 8	* עותק 1

[illegible]

7,10803:0710\*

\*ל: המשרד

◎:0'78'\*

\*מ-פר'ס, נר: 196, תא: 140789, חז: 2030, ד: חס: 10

\*תח:פ גס:א'רופה

2:71\*

\*סודי ביותר/דחוף

\*אל: שר החוץ-למכות בלבד-ח.ר.ב.

\*דע: ראש הממשלה-למכות בלבד-ח.ר.ב.

\*מאת: השגריר/פר"ס

\*הנדון: בוש-מובארך.

\*שגרירה החדש של ארה"ב בפריס (ידיד נעורים של בוש ומקורב  
\*אליו) אישר לי (14/7) שבזמנו נמנע מלהעריך פגישות בי-  
\*לטרליות אך הוא פגש בעת ארוחת הערב החגיגית של אתמול את  
\*מובארק שהשמיע בפניו דאגה רבה מההתפתחות הפנימית בארץ  
\*ומהאפשרות של פגיעה חמורה בסיכויי חידוש תהליך השלום.  
\*לדברי השגריר מובארק היה בוטה ולא נרתע מלהפציר בבוש  
\*להתגייס לקידום התהליך.

\* עוד מסר שבוש נמנע מתגובה והבטיח למובארך ששה"ח בייקר  
\* וסקוקרופט ידברו עם עבדול מאג'יד וגאלי הנמצאים בפמליית  
\* מובארך.

\*השגריר הבטיח לי שבסוף השבוע הבא נפגש כדי שיוכל למסור לי  
\*פרטים נוספים על שיחות בוש. עוד ציין שבוש הסכים להפגש  
\*לשיחה מיוחדת רק עם נשיא מכסיקו בגלל יחסי השכנות. השגריר  
\*מעריך שנושא המזה'ת לא יידון בפסגת השבע ושלא צפויה  
\*הודעה מיוחדת בנושא-מלבד אולי ענין לבנון.



ДЖС'Г : 98.50.21

E0801 •

\* TP 1      2011 5

УДК 62-50

917-1-101

1010

\*0110:5080:5

\* 425 ± 15 000 000 000

\* \* \* \* \*

\*0-187'0, LG:891, DM:987041, IM:0E0S, GM:T, OA:UE

\*00115 401947127

\*CT: 6

\*OIT' I' IPI\IPI

\*ИЗДАНО ГОДИШНО-ОБЩЕЕ ИЗДАНИЕ-П.Р.С.

ЭТО НЕ ЯВЛЯЕТСЯ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЕМ НЕПРАВИЛЬНОСТИ

[illegible]

\*GCT 112413-01 EMBG.

[illegible][illegible]

\*החלטת הוועדה להקים את המוסד להגנה על זכויות יוצרים  
 \*החלטת הוועדה להקים את המוסד להגנה על זכויות יוצרים  
 \*החלטת הוועדה להקים את המוסד להגנה על זכויות יוצרים  
 \*החלטת הוועדה להקים את המוסד להגנה על זכויות יוצרים  
 \*החלטת הוועדה להקים את המוסד להגנה על זכויות יוצרים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2  
עותק 1 מתוך 8

סופר

ל

תפ: רהמ, שהח



1. 17 2 2017 2  
2. 17 2 2017 2

3. 17 2

4. 17 2

5. 17 2, 2017

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10804

תאריך : 15.07.89

נכנס \*\*

שמור

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,10804

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/799

מ-: פריס, נר: 197, תא: 140789, זח: 2030, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: גס: אירופה

נד: 8

שמור/רגיל

אל : אירופה 1

דע : לשכת שר החוץ

מאת: השגריר פריס

הנדון: מיטראן.

בקבלת הפנים שערך הנשיא מיטראן באליזה היום, התקרב  
ביוזמתו אלי לחץ את ידי והתעניין במצב בארץ.

נפתחה בינינו שיחה קצרה שנתקיימה לעיני מצלמות הטלביזיה.

סופר,==

מס

תפ: שוה, סשוה, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, איר1





XX  
משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 18.07.89

12330

סודי

נכנס

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,12330

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מנמת/298

מ-1100, נר: 343, תא: 170789, זח: 1600, דח: ר, סג: סו

תח: גס: צפא

נד: 8

מחלקת  
הקשר

סודי / ח.ר.ב./רגיל

אל: מנהל מצפ'א, אירופה 3 - ח.ר.ב.

דע: ממ'ד/ח.ר.ב.

יגאל כרמון - יועץ רהמ לטרור/ח.ר.ב.-מנמת-העבירונא

ארה'ב - ברה'מ - מפגש מומחים בנושא טרור.

1. בעקבות פרסום הכתבה ( בנפרד ) בוויניגטון פוסט  
על מפגש המומחים לנושאי טרור התקשרתי לדסקאי מזה'ת  
במשרד ללוחמה בטרור במחמ'ד לקבלת דוח.

2. לאחר שבדק בקשתי ( הערה: עובדת קיום המפגש הודלפה  
לכתב העתון וזאת למורת רוחם של האמריקאים המעוניינים  
לשמור על חשאיות המגעים ותוכנם ) זומנתי לשמיעת דוח  
מפיו של ראש המשרד ללוחמה בטרור באסבי שעמד בראש  
המשלחת האמריקאית לשיחות.

3. להלן סכום שיחתנו ( שבמהלכה נמנע האיש מלהכנס  
לפירוט יתר לגבי סכומים אופרטיביים שהושגו ):

א. בדברי הקדמה ציין כי למפגש האחרון קדמו שורת מפגשים  
רשמיים ולא רשמיים.

ב. הסובייטים היו אלה שיזמו עריכת המפגש. ארה'ב  
רואה יוזמה זו במסגרת המאמץ הסובייטי לשנות דימויים  
בנושא הטרור.





## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ג. ארה"ב דחתה מספר הצעות הסובייטיות (בשנים האחרונות) לקיום דיאלוג שכן, לנוכח הדגש הסובייטי על רטוריקה לא ראו כל אפשרות לקיום דיאלוג רציני.

ד. מאז תחילת ממשל בוש מבחינים בשינוי בגישת ברה"מ לנושא הטירור. ואכן, בעקבות שיחות בייקר-שוורנדרה במוסקווה (אפריל) החליטה ארה"ב להיענות לבקשת ברה"מ לקיים מפגש מומחים.

ה. להערכת באסבי ניתן להבחין בראשיתו של שינוי בחשיבה הסובייטית בנושא הטירור. מקורו של השינוי הוא בכך שחשים עצמם חשופים במידה גוברת והולכת לטירור פנימי תופעה אותה הגדיר כרצינית.

ו. בעקבות המפגש מתרשם באסבי שקיימת נכונות סובייטית לדון בנושאים בילטרליים קונקרטיים. לדברי באסבי טרם קיבלו נכונות סובייטית לדון באופן קונקרטי בדרכים למנוע טירור לובי וסורי.

ז. במהלך המפגש התגלתה נכונות סובייטית להכיר בעובדה שחלק מהקבוצות (דוגמאת אבו נידאל וחזבאללה) מאיימות לא רק על המערב אלא גם על ברה"מ.

ח. במהלך המפגש התייחסו הסובייטים לחטיפת המטוס (עם הילדים) שנחת בנתב"ג. הביעו סלידתם מהאירוע. ראש המשלחת הסובייטית ציין כי לאירוע ולדרך טיפולה של ישראל בפרשה היה 'PROFOUND IMPACTS' על מדיניותה המסורתית של ברה"מ בהקשר לחילוף בני ערובה. האירוע, ציינו הסובייטים נתן להם פרספקטיבה שונה לגבי סוגית שתה"פ עם ממשלות זרות. באסבי ציין כי עמיתו הסובייטי העלה פרשת החטיפה מספר פעמים במהלך המפגש.

ט. לדברי באסבי, ניתן היה להבחין בשיחות בהיעדר רטוריקה לגבי הטירור ככלי מאבק של תנועות שחרור. רואה בכך חלק משינוי גדול יותר שעיקרו נטישת קליינטים מסורתיים לטובת מדיניות פרגמטית.

י. בתשובה לשאלתי האם נכנסו לסוגית הגדרת הטירור (במטרה ליצור בסיס משותף לדיון) השיב בשלילה. טען כי במתכוון לא רצה לקיים דיון בנושא הגדרות. יחד עם זאת סיפר כי טען במפגש שכל צד יכול לתמוך במטרות/יעדים



1. THE FIRST PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR.

2. THE SECOND PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR.

3. THE THIRD PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR.

4. THE FOURTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR.

5. THE FIFTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR.

6. THE SIXTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR.

7. THE SEVENTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR.

8. THE EIGHTH PART OF THE REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR. IT IS A SUMMARY OF THE  
WORK DONE DURING THE YEAR.

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

פוליטיים של תנועות שחרור. אך יש להסכים שלא קיימת הצדקה פוליטית לטירור. באסבי ציין כי הסובייטים הסכימו עקרונית עם קביעה זו.

יא. ארה"ב ניצלה המפגש כדי לעלות ( פעם נוספת ) בקשתה שברה"מ תפעיל השפעתה המרסנת על מדיניות וארגונים העוסקים בטיירור. באסבי לא נכנס לפרטים אך בתשובה לשאלתי ציין כי הצד הסובייטי לא היה מעוניין לדון בפעילות 'החזית העממית לשחרור פלסטין המפקדה הכללית'. באסבי הסביר הסירוב בחוסר רצון סובייטי להכנס לדיון במעורבות סוריה בטיירור.

יב. באסבי ציין כי החליפו מידע לגבי איומים ספציפיים.

יג. לקראת כינוס עצרת האו"מ התקיים דיון במס' הצעות החלטה בנושא המאבק בטיירור ( חטיפת מטוסים לדוגמה ) הצפויות לעלות לדיון.

יד. באסבי לסיום, תאר את הדיון וחילופי המידע כרציני ומועיל. יחד עם זאת הוסיף כי מוקדם לקבוע את מידת רצינותם של הסובייטים. ימתינו לשינויים קונקרטיים בהתנהגות ברה"מ. ( הערה: בהקשר לשינויים סיפר כי בראש משלחת ברה"מ עמד היועץ המשפטי של משה"ת. לדברי באסבי מעניין יהיה לראות האם במסגרת השינוי בחשיבה הסובייטית בנושא הטיירור נראה גם שינוי ארגוני. ציין כי אינו רואה הגיון שהנושא יטופל ע"י היועץ המשפטי. לדבריו הרגיש האיש בחוסר נכונות שעה שהדיון עבר מהתחום הליגאלי לתחום המעשי ).

טו. בתשובה לשאלתי ציין כי לא נקבע תאריך למפגש הבא. סיפר כי במקביל לפניית ברה"מ לארה"ב לקיים המפגש פנתה ברה"מ למספר מדינות במע' אירופה לקיום מפגשים.

על שאלת באסבי האם פנו אלינו לא ידעתי להשיב. רואה הפניות הסובייטים כחלק מהמערכה לשינוי תדמיתם.

עד כאן דברי באסבי.

לבקשתו המפורשת של איש שיחי שמרו נא על חסיון המידע.

שטיין



1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a copy of the original letter, and is signed by Abraham Lincoln.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967 O 345-000

[illegible]

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a formal communication, and it is written in a very formal and dignified style. The President expresses his regret that he cannot continue to serve the country, and he expresses his confidence in the future of the country.

BY, ANDERSON, JAMES, JR., OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, FOR THE PLAINTIFFS.  
V. THE CHICAGO & NORTH DAKOTA RAILROAD COMPANY, FOR THE DEFENDENTS.  
JAMES W. HARRIS, CLERK OF THE COURT, HAS BEEN APPOINTED CLERK OF THE COURT.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 07-07-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW/SJS/STP/STP

中国医药出版社 地址：北京市东直门内大街165号 邮编：100027 电话：010-64015000 传真：010-64015000 网址：http://www.cmpub.com.cn

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, איר, 3, ר/מרכז



RE: WIT, CORR. ALCY, ALCY, ELZIF, ALCY, WIT, ALCY

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 17.07.89

11622

יוצא \*\*

סודי

חוזם: 7,11622

אל: וווש/618

מ-: המשרד, תא: 170789, זח: 1448, דח: ב, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: צפא

נד: 8

ארת

סודי/בהול

512 .א.צ

קישור לקונגרס

דע: השגריר

דיאלוג עם אש"פ - הצעות חקיקה

1. להערכתנו, אין להעלות על הדעת שאיפ"ק יתנגד לנוסח החקיקה המוצע, גם ללא התיקונים. חקיקה זו שמטרתה הגבלת הדיאלוג עם העוסקים בטרור נוגעת גם לאזרחים אמריקניים שנפלו קורבן לטרור.

2. גם לו קיבל איפא"ק הצעת הממשל לפעול נגד החקיקה, סביר להניח כי לא היה בכוחו להניא את הלמס מיוזמתו. במקרה כזה, איפא"ק עלול היה לעמוד במצב של חולשה מול הממשל.

3. לפיכך, איפא"ק לא יכול להגרר למחלוקת זו ולהרתם לפעולה נגד הצעת החקיקה.

4. מעניינו שהצעת החוק של הלמס תתקבל שהרי אנו סבורים שהדיאלוג האמריקאי-אש"פ הוא לרועץ מבחינת יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב וסיכויי התהליך המדיני והשלום באזורנו.

מצפא

מג



17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

1. 17.07.78.72

2. 17.07.78.72

3. 17.07.78.72

4. 17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

17.07.78.72

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סי'יבל, משפט



TO: HHS, OMB, FDA, SEC, AEC, DHEC, EPA, DOT, O' ET, OMB

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 11.07.89

6951

סודי

נכנס

\*\*  
\*\*  
\*\*  
\*\*

חוזם: 7.6951

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/486

מ-: נוש, נר: 170, תא: 100789, חז: 1900, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: 0 גס: צפא

נד: 0

אח"כ

סודי/מידי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן

דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

אסון האוטובוס.

כפי שמסרתי לכם טלפונית הבעתי ביום ו' (7.7) תמיהתנו ותדהמתנו על המנעות דובר מחמ"ד מלהגדיר המעשה כפעולת טרור. העליתי הנושא בפני איגלברגר, קימט וסגנו של קלי ( JACK COVEY ).

הבוקר הובטח לי כי בתדרוך הדובר היום יגדיר הדובר באופן ברור את הארוע כפעולת טרור.

בני שיחי ציינו כי הסתייגות הדובר מלעשות זאת ביום ו' נבעה מרצונם לברר פרטים נוספים על השתייכותו של המחבל והרקע למעשהו.

השבתי כי תמוה העניין לאור העובדות שהתפרסמו מיד ואשר לא ניתן היה להטיל ספק כלשהו לגבי אמיתותם.

כמו כן הסבתי את תשומת ליבם להצהרות הפומביות של דוברי אש"פ ודוברים אחרים, בעקבות האסון ואשר היה בהן משום הבעת תמיכה והערכה לפעולת הטרור.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ארד,

אש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, מצפא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6952

תאריך: 11.07.89

נכנס \*\*

סודי

חוזם: 7,6952

מל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/483

מ-: ווש, נר: 172, תא: 100789, זח: 1900, דח: ב, ס: 10

תח: 6 ס: צפא

נד: 6

א/חמ"א

סודי/בהול

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"נ

דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

לשלך ווש, 293 מהיום.

1) איגלברגר אשר הודיע לי אתמול על ביקורם הצפוי בארץ אמר כי ייצאו מווינגטון רק לאחר שובו של המזכיר והנשיא מאירופה. על כן קרוב לוודאי לא יעזבו את ארה"ב לפני ה-20 ביולי.


להערכתו המשלחת תצא ב-24 שעות לאחר שובם של הנשיא והמזכיר.

2) ציין שכמובן ביקורם יהיה תלוי בהתפתחויות בתוך הקואליציה.

3) על יסוד השיחות שקיימתי עימו בימים האחרונים ולאור ההחלטה על הצבתו בראש המשלחת האמורה לבוא ארצה אני סבור שאנו נראה במעורבות ישירה ואינטנסיבית יותר של איגלברגר במסגרת מאמצי ארה"ב לקדם יוזמת השלום.

אני רואה בכך התפתחות חיובית אשר תגביר בווינגטון המודעות לרגישויות הפוליטיות בישראל בהקשר להגלית





## מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

השלום.

דבריו של המזכיר בוורשה היום, בהם נמנע מלאשר דבר  
בואו של איגלברגר - נראים לי יותר כנסיון להשאיר  
לעצמם מרחב תמרון לגבי מועד ביקור המשלחת.

מאחר ולא היה ידוע להם על מועד הדיון וההחלטה במפלגת  
העבודה לגבי השארותה בממשלה רצה המזכיר לשמור לעצמו  
האפשרות לשלוח המשלחת לארץ עוד לפני שובו לארה"ב  
ואזי היה נמנע מאיגלברגר לעמוד בראש המשלחת.

ארד.

רש

תפ: שהח, טשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20315

TO: THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
FROM: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

1.

2.

3. [Illegible]







משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

המנובלות 78 ש"ע.

4. תנאי הליכוד:

24. נגד מדינה פלשת'נאית.

ב. אי מתן זכות בחירה לערביי מזרח ירושלים.

א. אשף מ'נן פרטנר.

קייסינג'ר איננו מבין מדוע אלו תנאים גרועים.

5. כל השטחים שבהם יערכו בחירות יהפכו בסופו של דבר למדינה פלשתינאית. איננו מאמין בהצבעת ABSENTEE של ערביי מזרח ירושלים, כי כל שטח שבו תערך הצבעה יהפך למדינה עצמאית. לכן על ישראל לקבוע את קו הגבול לפני ההצבעה. אחרת היא תמצא לידה מדינה פלשתינאית בקו 1967.

6. אם לא מסכימים למדינה פלשתינאית אז אין לנהל מו"ם עם אשף. אם מנהלים מו"ם עם אשף, אז ברור שמנהלים מו"ם על מדינה פלשתינאית. אין GIMMIK בנדון.

7. על הויכוחים הפומביים בישראל ובחול בקרב יהודי ארהב להפסק. ויכוחים אלו רק יביאו להגברת הלחץ על ישראל. הויכוח הפנימי הנל יביא בהדרגה:

א. לדוגמה - ליטוי מציה של עמדת ישראל.

ב. 77 לחץ על ישראל ולהכתבת עמדות שהיא אינה רוצה בהן.

8. על ישראל לנהל מו"ס עם ארהב ולקבוע תכנית מגובשת. ישראל חוששת מתשובות ארהב במו"ס זה. אולם התשובות שישראל תקבל מארהב במהלך מו"ס עמה תהינה נוחות וקלות יותר לישראל מאשר התשובות שהארועים יכתובו.

9. מתנגד לועידה בינלאומית - אולם אי אפשר לדבר בעת ובשונה אחת על התנגדות לועידה ועל תמיכה בה.

10. על ישראל וארהב להגדיר מהות השלום, הבטחון וכיצד  
הן כולאות את עתיד האזור.

11. התכנית הנוכחית שישראל וארה"ב תומכות בה טובה:

א. ה'א מתנגדת לשת' מד'נות.

ב. מציעה בחירות כדי לספק שאיפות הערבים.





## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ג. אולם יש לקבוע עכשיו את קווי הגבול כדי למנוע נסיגה לקו 1967.

ד. אסור שהתכנית תהווה תהליך שבסופו תקום מדינה אשפית. ה. התכנית אולי לא תבטיח שלום הבע, אך ניתן להגיע להסדרים שיחזיקו מעמד זמן רב כמו ההסדרים עם הסורים בגולן. יש להגיע ביטח להסדרים פרגמטיים שיבטיחו כבוד ( DIGNITY ) לערבים ובטחון לישראל ויחזיקו מעמד זמן רב.

ו. האינסיפאדה - קשה, אך כל הסדר שטומן בחובו נסיגה לקו 1967, לא יבטיח שהאינסיפאדה לא תעבור מישע לגליל.

12. על יהודי ארהב לזכור שאסור להם לחזור על מעשה ויטנאם של לחץ פומבי על ישראל, כי בהקשר המזתי ישראל איננה ארהב אלא היא ויטנאם.

13. אם ישראל והקהילה היהודית יתלכדו ויקבעו מה ניתן להשיג במוס ומה לא ניתן להשיג, ואם ארהב תגבש עם ישראל עמדה כנל ניתן להגיע להסדר יציב.

14. בראשית דבריו ציין שאיש אחד גורבאצ'וב אינו יכול לשנות את מהלך ההיסטוריה ומגמות ברהם, ועל הציבור במערב להתפכח ולנהוג בזהירות מירבית.

הקונכל.

אק

תפ: שהח, קשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, רס, אמן. מצפא, מעת, הסברה

SAOR 4434

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר



1. The first of these is the fact that the  
information is being disclosed to the public.  
2. The second is the fact that the information  
is being disclosed to the public in a form  
which is not the original form in which it  
was obtained.

3. The third is the fact that the information  
is being disclosed to the public in a form  
which is not the original form in which it  
was obtained.

4. The fourth is the fact that the information  
is being disclosed to the public in a form  
which is not the original form in which it  
was obtained.

5. The fifth is the fact that the information  
is being disclosed to the public in a form  
which is not the original form in which it  
was obtained.

6. The sixth is the fact that the information  
is being disclosed to the public in a form  
which is not the original form in which it  
was obtained.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8901

תאריך : 13.07.89

נכנס \*\*

סודי

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,8901

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/647

מ-: וווש, נר: 229, תא: 120789, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

אזהרה

סודי / מדי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

ארה"ב - מז"ת.

העתונאים הישראלים בווינגטון נפגשו אתמול לפגישה  
DEEP BACKGROUND ( לא לשימוש ) עם קלי. הדברים  
נמסרו לי תוך הבטחה שלא נעשה בהם שימוש :

1. הרבה לדבר בשבח יוזמתנו.

החלטת הממשלה מ-14/5 היא ההחלטה החשובה ביותר שקיבלה  
ישראל בעשר השנים האחרונות כאשר שתי המפלגות התאחדו  
מאחורי החלטה העשויה לשנות את המז"ת. קלי סרב להתייחס  
להחלטת מרכז הליכוד 'שלא בהכרח מוליכה קדימה'  
ואמר שארה"ב נאחזת בדבר הליגלי היחיד הקיים ( החלטות  
הממשלה והכנסת ) וממשיכה בקידום יוזמתנו ולנסות לשכנע  
הערבים. ציין שארה"ב איננה מתערבת במדיניות הפנים  
של ישראל.

2. לא הוחלט עדיין מי ישתתף במשלחת שתצא ארצה בשבוע  
הבא. מטרת המשלחת לבדוק האם ישראל ממשיכה להיות נאמנה  
ליוזמה המקורית. אין למשלחת מסר ספציפי.

3. אין כל תכנית לפגישה עם ערפאת. בפגישות עם אבו  
איאד פעל פלטרו לפי הנחיות מווינגטון. הפגישה עם





## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אבו-איאד היתה APPROPRIATE אך ארה'ב לא היתה מודעת לכך שהפגישה יכולה להיות שנויה במחלוקת. בתשובה לשאלה האם החליטו לא להפגש יותר עם אבו-איאד אמר קלי שישמרו על חופש הפעולה שלהם במפגשים עם אנשי אש'פ.

4. החליטו לאפיין את פיגוע האוטובוס כמעשה טרור לאור מידע נוסף שקיבלו ששני ארגונים לקחו על עצמם אחריות, אם כי לא ברור האם הם באמת אחראים לפיגוע.

5. ועידה בינלאומית - היא תמיד אחת הדרכים האפשריות לקידום פתרון הסכסוך אך לא הדרך המהירה ביותר.

6. כמה סעיפים בהודעת הקהילה האירופית היו קונסטרוקטיבים וכמה לא.

7. יש שינוי בניואנסים בעמדה הסובייטית שבעבר היתה 'נעולה' על נושא הועידה הבינלאומית וכיום מוכנה לדון בנושא הבחירות. בשיחות עם הסובייטים לפני כשלושה שבועות העלו האמריקנים את נושא חידוש היחסים עם ישראל ונענו בשלילה. נושא הטיסות הישירות לא עלה.

8. אצל הפלסטינים יש שינוי. בעוד שבעבר דברו על חיסול ישראל מוכנים לדון כיום ברצינות ברעיון הבחירות.

פלג

רש

תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא





# משרד החוץ - מחלקת המשפט

8669

\* תאריך : 12.07.89

\* דף 1 מחוך 2

\* עותק 1 מתוך 12

\*\* יוצא

סודי ביותר

\* חוזם: 7,8669

\* אל: 440/ווש

\* מ-: המשרד, תא: 120789, זח: 2012, דח: ב, סג: סב

\* תח: ג גס: שהח

\* נד: תפ/ נתונה

י/ו ק/ב

\* בבהול/סודי ביותר - ח.ר.ב.

\* 513

\* אל: וושינגטון

\* שגריר. (למכותב בלבד).

\* 1. בדיונים במשרד הועלה רעיון לשגר את יועץ רוהמ לטרור, יגאל כרמון, לתדרכים ופגישות בקונגרס, בתקשורת וכן בממשל בנושאים שבתחום טיפולו תוך התמקדות על אופיו האמיתי של אשפ ואי עמידתו בהתחייבויות שכביכול נתן לשולץ כשארזה החליטה לפתוח בדילוג עמו.

\* 2. מוצע לשגר במועדים 18-27/7. מבקשים למחר בבוקר חוות דעתך בבהול אם ניתן לארגן עבורו סדרת תדרכים בגבעה (מחוקקים ועוזריהם), תדרכי תקשורת ופגישות במחמד כל זאת במטרה ברורה לעורר עניין ציבורי רב ככל האפשר בנושא. כוונתנו העיקרית הינה לנקוט ביוזמה משולבת במספר חזיתות. זאת על ידי התמקדות הקונגרס והתקשורת על הרקורד האשפי האמיתי. בנוסף עשוי הדבר לסייע בעיגון יוזמת חקיקה בשלב מאוחר יותר.

\* 3. אנא חוות דעתך האם ניתן לצפות שתוצאות ביקורו יביאו לשימוע בועדת המשנה בביהן לקראת סוף החודש - תחילת אוגוסט ואז ליוזמת שימוע מצד מחוקקים במליאת ועדת החוץ (ביהן או סנט) בראשית ספטמבר עם שוב הגבעה לפעילות.

\* 4. ניתן כמובן לשקול גם הסתייגות בידידים על מנת להשיג





# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\*  
\* דף 2 מתוך 2 \*  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 12 \*

\* פעולה אפקטיבית ביותר. \*

\* 5.אנא תשובתך בבהול - הנל על דעת סמנכלים בנצור ורביב. \*

\* ס מנהל מצפ'א \*

\* יא \*

\* אק \*

\* אתפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב \*



IN RE: [REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] has been advised that [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED]

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7356

תאריך: 11.07.89

יוצא \*\*

שמו

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,7356

אל: 378/וש

מ-ה: המשרד, תא: 110789, זח: 1515, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: גס: צפא

נד: 8

א/כח

שמו/מיידי

שגריר, ציר

1. התקשר בראון למסור שבעקבות שיחתו עם שה"ח צפויה התבטאות נשל הדובר או משהו בפמליית המזכיר שתעלה את הגדרת חומרת אסון האוטובוס בקטגוריית הטרור.

2. בראון אמר שרוס הודיעו שאיגלברגר וחבריו יבואו לביקור של יממה כשיעדם ישראל בלבד - מועדי ביקורם הטנטטיבי 18-19 ביולי.

3. מחמ"ד ימסור לעיתונות שביקור המשלחת יהיה בנוסח שממשלת ארה"ב מבינה שיש זמנת ממשלת ישראל עדיין תקפה והמשלחת תיבדוק אם אמנם הבנה זו נכונה וכו'.

4. איגלברגר וחבריו יבקשו להיפגש עם רוה"מ, ממרוה"מ, שה"ח ושהב"ט.

בנצור

אי

אק

תפ: שהו, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמנ,  
בנצור, מצפא, ממד



RECEIVED

DATE

NOV 10 1964

1964

1964

NOV 10 1964

NOV 10 1964

NOV 10 1964

NOV 10 1964

NOV 10 1964

NOV 10 1964

NOV 10 1964

NOV 10 1964

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 11.07.89

7690

710

NY 1.9

蛋蛋

◆◆

著者

44

7,7690:0200

130744: 7N

מ-:המשרד, תא: 110789, זח: 1740, דח: ב, סג: סו

ת:ח 01:צפא

3:71

סודי/בהול

השגריר, גל

ג'ון בקר משגרירות ארה"ב מסר לי זה עתה שקבל מברק האומר שדובר מחמ"ד קבל הוראה לומר בתדרכו היום שמעשה האוטובוס הוא ACT OF TERRORISM אבל נמנע מלומר זאת משום שלא נשאלה כל שאלה בענין זה.

אנא טיפולך הדחוף.

מנהל מצפ"א

NE

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא





11 צא \*\*

שמו

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,6472

אל: ווש/339, מנמת/160

מ-: המשרד, תא: 100789, ח: 1628, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

אחרי

שמו/מיידי

ע.ב.ש. 5757

השגריר, קישור לקונגרס.

שיחות האץ'

הדיווח המלא על ביקור האץ' בדיפ'.

להלן רישום שיחותיו עם שה'ח ורה'מ.

רה'מ

רה'מ הביע צערו על כך שישראל איננה זוכה להבנה מלאה מצד ארה'ב בנושא תהליך השלום, לדבריו ככל שמייחסת ארה'ב חשיבות לאש'פ היא מפחיתה מנכונות הפלסטינים לטול יוזמה עצמאית וחלק בתהליך. הדבר גורר הפחתת האמון שלנו בכוונות האמריקניות משום שאנו יודעים שכוונות אש'פ אינן לשלום. רה'מ הביע חששו כי המצב עלול להדרדר לכך שערפאת יוזמן להפגש עם בייקר בבית הלבן. התפלא על הנאיביות האמריקנית 'האם אין ארה'ב יודעת מה אש'פ רוצה מאתנו, מדוע הם כה נאיבים, בפעם הראשונה בחולדות היחסים בינינו, איננו מבינים מה קורה עם האמריקנים'.

האורח ששמע בקשב רב את דברי מארחו אמר שאמנם בשעתו התפעל והתרשם מדברי ערפאת בג'נבה אך הוא מתרשם ומקבל את עמדת שמיר עוד יותר מכך.





Order No. 90-0000000000000000

השר פתח בהתייחסות ליוזמת השלום של ישראל: הבהיר כי היוזמה מתווה קווים כלליים במטרה לקבוע הדרכים לתחילת התהליך. אם יתחיל מו"מ - יש סכוי להתקדמות. הבעיה באזורנו היא שאין עם מי להתחיל התהליך, אין פרטנר, תאר את ארבע הנקודות ביוזמת רה"מ: תפקיד מובראק, מדינות ערב, הבחירות בשטחים וסוגית הפליטים. הביע אכזבה ישראל מתגובת הקהילה האירופאית אשר נצמדה לנוסחאות העבר לבנושא שלוב סין בועב'ל אמר כי



[illegible]

1. Вопросы к тексту

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

משרדי החוץ בדנמרק וגרמניה הבינו כי הסינים מעוניינים לבוא לועב'ל אך טוב שלא הוזמנו מכוון שיש להם תנאים וסיגים נוספים ומניעים הם, בין השאר, לשחק משחק (משלהם).

על הדיאלוג ארה"ב-אש"פ אמר השר כי אש"פ מהווה המחסום העיקרי גורם המרתיע את מדינות האזור (ירדן - בשל כך יצא חוסיין מהתהליך), מפעיל טרור נגד האוכלוסיה המקומית וכל זמן שנוצרת בקרב הארגון תחושה של גידול ביוקרתו לא רק שהדבר אינו עוזר, אלא מקשה.

הטרור נמשך ומופעל ע"י ארגונים המסונפים לאש"פ. לפיכך, אש"פ לא עומד בהתחייבותו להפסקת הטרור. כשנפתח הדיאלוג אש"פ-ארה"ב הוצג הדיאלוג כתקופת מבחן לבאות, כבדיקה האם אש"פ מקיים התחייבותיו. ובינתיים, לא רק שאש"פ אינו עומד בדבריו, אלא יש הרחבה של הדיאלוג.

השמועות כי ארה"ב העלתה דרג הפגישות עם אש"פ אינן מסייעות בקידום היוזמה ויוצרות, בקרב הפלסטינים כאן, התחושה שרק אש"פ הוא הכתובת..

לשאלת הסנאטור אודות המעורבות הרצויה של ארה"ב השיב השר כי כיום שרויות רוב מדינות האזור בפחד או חוסר רצון לעשות שלום ולפיכך, יש ליצור תמריצים שיעודדו אותן לפתוח עמנו בדיאלוג. כדוגמת חוסיין - למרות רצונו למעורבות הרי הוא חושש לעשות כן והוא מושפע מבעיותיו מבית.

עוד אמר שה'ח: 'ככל שתתקדמו יותר עם אש"פ, כך יעמיק הקבר שתכרו לחוסיין, מכוון שאש"פ לוטש עיניו לעבר הממלכה'. הדגיש הצורך להמריץ ולעודד את חוסיין (באמצעות הגברת סיוע החוץ) גם מכיוון שמובראק ('איש מענין ואמיץ') אינו רוצה להיות היחיד במשחק השלום.

בנושא מדינות ערב בכללותן אמר הסנאטור כי יש ליידע הקהילה היהודית בארה"ב בחשיבות מדינות ערב המתונות וכי יש לתת להן 'גזרים'. על כך השיב השר כי נקודה מס' 2 ביוזמה נובעת מהעובדה שרבות מהמדינות המתונות השתתפו בעבר במלחמה נגדנו ונמצאות גם כיום באופן רשמי במצב מלחמה נגדנו.

הבעיה העקרית, הדגיש השר, הם הסורים (אסאד כחלק מדמויות ה-WILDMEN באזורנו), אשר יתכן והיו נוהגים ביתר ריסון לו היו זוכים לביקורת הקהילה הבינ'ל.

0605 1158

0605 1158



1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a formal communication, and it is written in a very formal and dignified style. The President begins by addressing the Congress, and then he proceeds to discuss the state of the Union. He mentions the progress of the country, and he also mentions the difficulties that the country is facing. He then goes on to discuss the policy of the administration, and he concludes by expressing his confidence in the future of the country.

1. The first step is to identify the problem. This involves understanding the situation and the goals that need to be achieved.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

2. The second part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

3. The third part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

4. The fourth part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

5. The fifth part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

6. The sixth part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

7. The seventh part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

8. The eighth part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

9. The ninth part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

10. The tenth part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a stylized, possibly cursive, font. The addresses are also written in a similar style.

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לשאלת האץ' על ברה'מ ציטט ארנס דבריו לשברדנדה בפברואר (בקהיר) כי על ברה'מ לדבר עם הסורים ולנסות להפעיל עליהם את השפעתם.

בנושא מעורבות מצרים בקידום היוזמה - אמר השגריר בראון כי ארה'ב הציעה למובארק לפגוש את שמיר בווינגטון, אולם מובארק דחה ההצעה בזמנו. על כך אמר שה'ח כי ראה מכתב השאלות ששלח מובארק לרה'מ באמצעות המורשה גרין, וכי זהו סוג הדברים שמובארק ושמיר צריכים לדבר עליהם בועידת פיסגה ביניהם. השגריר בראון אמר כי שמע שמובארק חושש פן יובך ויזשפל אם ילך לפסגה מבלי שיקבל אף שעל אדמה. על כך הגיב השר כי מובארק יודע ששמיר לא יביך אותו, גם אם לא תהיינה כל התוצאות הרצויות.

על סעודיה אמר בראון כי נראה שהיא כבר לא נמצאת בחזית ההתנגדות (שגריר סעודיה בארה'ב נפגש עם יהודים, נלחמו פחות ב-ITU).

ובחזרה ליוזמת ישראל: שה'ח אמר כי יש לקרוא לשבע המדינות המתועשות לקחת חלק בשיקום מחנות הפליטים. לשאלת האטש האם יש מסר שברצון שה'ח להעביר לבוש באמצעותו, ביקש שה'ח להעביר לנשיא בוש כי על ארה'ב להמשיך ולתמוך ביוזמת השלום על כל ארבע הנקודות שבה. יש לקדם היוזמה כמיקשה אחת ולא רק לתמוך בבחירות.

מצפ'א

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא



1. The first step is to identify the problem. This involves understanding the situation, gathering information, and defining the problem clearly. 2. The second step is to generate possible solutions. This involves brainstorming ideas and considering different perspectives. 3. The third step is to evaluate the solutions. This involves comparing the pros and cons of each solution and selecting the most viable one. 4. The fourth step is to implement the solution. This involves putting the chosen solution into action and monitoring its progress. 5. The fifth step is to evaluate the results. This involves assessing the effectiveness of the solution and making adjustments as needed.

[illegible]

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very long letter, and it contains a great deal of information about the state of the country at that time. It is a very important document, and it is one of the most interesting documents in the collection.

024227

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5785

תאריך: 07.07.89

יוצא \*\*

סודי

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,5785

אל: 293/וש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 090789, זח: 1556, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: גס: צפא

נד: 0

1/מ  
2/מ

סודי / מיידי לבוקר

שגריר, ציר

השגריר בראון סיפר כי אמש התקשר עמו רוס, שעה קלה לפני המראתו עם הנשיא בוש לפולין, לבקשו להעביר מסר מהמזכיר בייקר לפיו אגלבוגר, קלי ורוס ישוגרו ארצה לשיחות על עתיד היוזמה המדינית בשבוע הבא. המזכיר ביקש להעביר המסר לרוה'מ, שה'ח, ממרוה'מ ושהב'ט והוסיף מסר נוסף לממרוה'מ ושהב'ט ובו בקשה לא להחפז בהחלטתם אם לפרוש מממשלת האחדות הלאומית. בראון העביר המסר באמצעות מזכיר הממשלה שהודיעו שהשלושה יהיו אורחים רצויים. בראון הוסיף שבואם של השלושה תלוי בהתרחשויות הפוליטיות בארץ במשך השבוע.

בנצור

סש

רח

תפ: שהח, טשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור



1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.





2/8

conditions attached by the Likud Party?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not commenting on those specific conditions. I mean, I'm not trying to characterize those. I'm just saying that that's what we think about partisan declarations.

Q Are you aware that one part -- one portion of the Israeli government is against all of these restrictions which were imposed by Mr. Shamir's Likud Party, which is Mr. Peres' party. And the chances are that they may withdraw in the next 24 hours from the coalition in Israel. Are you aware of that?

67  
81  
8

MR. BOUCHER: I am aware that there is an issue here in Israel; domestic politics that I said I wasn't going to get into, and I reiterate one more time, we deal with governments, we deal with the Israeli cabinet proposal. We've been working on that proposal very actively.

Q When you say you support their position, their initiative -- at the current stage, also, with all of the restrictions? You are supporting this?

MR. BOUCHER: We support the Israeli cabinet proposal, the proposal that was adopted in May. That's what we've been working on. That's what we expect to continue to work on.

Q The proposal with the restrictions or with the proposal that was presented to you in May?

MR. BOUCHER: The position we have from the Israeli government is the cabinet proposal adopted in May.

Q And you don't think these conditions will affect these proposed elections? It will not affect it, these conditions?

MR. BOUCHER: Affect is a pretty broad term. We deal with what the government has given us.

Q Yeah, Richard, have you taken into account at all what the Prime Minister of Israel has said publicly within the last 24 hours?

Q He's part of the government. He's the head of it. (Chuckling.)

MR. BOUCHER: True, he is. But the government -- we work with government, with not just parts of government. We deal with government, and that's what we're dealing with in this issue, an Israeli government proposal. And we intend to keep working on it.

Q Isn't this sort of like the captain of the ship --

\*

\*

Ⓢ



3/8

Q -- you suggesting that a public statement by the Prime Minister of Israel does not represent the view of the government of Israel? Is that the impression you want to leave here, that you're parsing somehow? That the Prime Minister makes a statement and you don't think that's representative of the Israeli government position?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not trying to undercut or characterize that statement. I told you that things said at party meetings, issues in domestic politics, I'm not trying to get into. I'm trying to deal with the proposal that is on the table that we've been working on for some time. It's an Israeli government proposal, and that's where our efforts have been focused and will continue to be focused.

67  
81  
8

Q But things change. The United States government occasionally changes its position, and the President of the United States occasionally makes statements which reflect the position of the United States government. Now the cabinet position taken a month ago was the government position at that time and has been. Now the Prime Minister of Israel has spoken again. You're essentially saying, "Turn the clock back. Don't pay any attention to this latest statement by the leader of the government of Israel."

MR. BOUCHER: You'd have to ask the Israeli leadership, the Prime Minister, I guess, whether what he said to a party meeting constitutes a proposal by the Israeli government. We have a proposal by the Israeli government. We think it's important. We want to work on it. We have worked on it. We want to continue working on it.

Q Have you asked the -- are you asking the Israeli Prime Minister what he meant?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything specific on that. I'm sure we're in touch with the Israelis all the time.

Q Could I just ask you, Richard? The Palestinian leaders from Tunis to the West Bank have all said that this has slammed the door in the peace process, that this demonstrated that the Israelis were never serious about their proposal. Are you suggesting that they tone down the rhetoric and still go on

pursuing this? I mean, they seem to consider this thing just ruined by the conditions put on by the Likud.

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not trying to speak for them. I'm trying to give you the views of the United States on this issue.

Q Have you met with the Palestinians in the last 24 hours?

MR. BOUCHER: Not that I'm aware of or --

✱

✱

✱



4/8

Q Do you expect to have a guidance that's going to make some sense later this week?

Q That certain kinds of partisan declarations do not advance the prospects for peace?

MR. BOUCHER: Mm-hmm. (In acknowledgement.)

Q What kind of partisan declarations?

MR. BOUCHER: I said that partisan declarations, particularly if they appear to be more restrictive, or to impose conditions, do not advance prospects for peace.

Q You won't say whether the declarations adopted at the Likud convention yesterday are an example of that type of party declaration?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't want to jump into what happened at a particular party meeting yesterday. I think this comment describes the whole series of issues.

Q Excuse me. The election proposal was that of Prime Minister Shamir. Now, Prime Minister Shamir has modified it. And can you tell us what the US reaction to this new modified Shamir's election plan?

MR. BOUCHER: I just gave you a US reaction.

MR. BOUCHER: I just gave you the US position on the election plan, as presented to us by the Israeli cabinet, as we've been working with it, and I gave you a statement that said we're not going to jump into Israeli partisan politics. We do have a general view of partisan declarations, and I gave you that as well.

you are -- are you advising everybody from this podium, including the Palestinian leadership, to just ignore what this partisan declaration came from the Likud, and stick with what proposal the UN

accepted in May of this year, which was the resolution of the Israeli cabinet?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not providing any specific advice like that. I'm describing the US government view of the proposal; I'll be glad to go over it again if you want me to. But we will continue our efforts in support of the Israeli government's proposal. We see it as providing a realistic way to advance the peace process.

MR. BOUCHER: That is our interest.

Q Will you please mention that proposal -- that proposal you accepted in May? Will you please -- I mean, go over that again to -- for the record.

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sorry -- I don't have the details of everything here. I think it's a very --

X

X

X

67

81

8



Q And you're sticking with your position, you're sticking with your position -- the earlier position which Dennis Ross and others in the area, when they met with Palestinians here and in the Middle East, that the Palestinian Arabs in East Jerusalem have the right to vote and they have the right for running for elections and all of these details which have been overruled by the Likud Party's resolutions yesterday?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to accept your characterization of all the details, and I don't have the entire record of what we said on it. I think the authoritative statement on it was in the Secretary's speech at AIPAC.

Q Back to the PLO for just a second, the PLO issued a statement in Tunis this morning calling for an escalation of the intifada and asking for another meeting with the United States in the wake of the Shamir statement. Does the United States plan to meet with the PLO again to discuss this latest statement by the Prime Minister of Israel? And do you have any comment on the PLO's call for an escalation of the intifada?

MR. BOUCHER: I'll take them in reverse order. I don't have any comment on the quote that you cited there.

There are, as far as I know, no specific meetings scheduled with the PLO. But we do have a dialogue with the PLO in Tunis. It's an ongoing dialogue. And yes, we would expect to have further discussions of this proposal.

Q Going back to my colleague's statements earlier, the Secretary of State made it very clear on several occasions that he?

would like to see East Jerusalem Arabs participating in the voting. Many of the things which he said that he would like to see happen are exactly what Shamir has now overruled. Do you mean to say that your boss says one thing and you're saying something else?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I'm not. I'm saying I don't have with me the entire record of those statements we've made about East Jerusalem and voting and all that sort of stuff. I cited the Secretary's statement to AIPAC. I'm sure there are others that express a clear view of what the United States approach is to these election proposals.

MR. BOUCHER: That view, as far as I know, has not changed.

Q And you stand by all of that?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

Q And you don't think yesterday's events make any change in the formal election proposal of the government of Israel?

MR. BOUCHER: That's a question you have to ask the government of Israel. I can describe what the United States is working with here.

5/8

67

81

8

\*

\*

\*



Q But Shamir is the head of state. Do we accept the view that when he speaks, he speaks for the government of Israel?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not -- you know, I'm not trying to characterize that. I've been asked that in different ways. And to characterize Shamir's remarks, you'll have to ask Shamir.

Q I'd like to ask you, but I'm almost afraid because it'll be rhetorical: Why are you evading the question?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have an answer to that; I'm sorry. It's not a serious question either.

Q Do you agree with Shamir that the proposals are still alive, are intact?

MR. BOUCHER: I -- we agree. We believe that we have a proposal. It constitutes the position of the Israeli government. We've supported the proposal. We'll continue to support the proposal in our diplomacy. And we've pointed to the moves that are necessary to work this proposal out in more detail.

Q But can you tell me what would the State Department's reaction be to, for example, to the call by the Israeli government to stop the intifada as a pre-condition to the election proposal? What is your reaction to that?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any specific reaction to this.

Q And you don't have any specific reaction to the participation of East Jerusalem Palestinians in the election either do you?

MR. BOUCHER: I have nothing today beyond what was said before and I said I'll stand by what was said before, but I don't have the entire record with me here.

Q Related to that, Richard, do you have any comment on the incident in which a bus apparently was commandeered and driven into a gully on the road from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv today?

MR. BOUCHER: We condemn this senseless tragic incident. This again points to the urgent need to replace violence with dialogue and accommodation. Our condolences go to the families of the victims of the crash and we wish a speedy recovery to the injured.

Q Do you know the details of that? What are you condemning?

MR. BOUCHER: We don't have a lot of details.

Q What are you condemning then? I mean --

MR. BOUCHER: The reports indicate that a bus plummeted off the edge of a highway after a passenger wrenched the steering wheel from the driver.

Q I see and based on that, your statement is valid. I see

6/8

67

81

8

X

X

X



MR. BOUCHER: That's right.

Q And do you know -- I mean, has that been reported by the US consulate because they gave no -- not really clear information. I was talking to Jerusalem and they still -- (inaudible) -- to know the details of it. You apparently do know the details.

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know full details on exactly what happened at the incident other than these initial reports.

Q -- you agree with some points which these four conditions stated, as the American administration, right?

MR. BOUCHER: Which four conditions are you referring to?

Q The Likud points -- you agree with some of them, right?

MR. BOUCHER: I said I'm not going to jump into the specifics of what was said at a party meeting in Israel.

Q The Likud is adopting almost your position -- like against -- you are against Palestinian state, so they adopted some of your points, right?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to try to compare and contrast here. I think our positions on these things, on Palestinian states and others have been stated many times and they're pretty clear.

Q Can you take a request that we possibly could have a briefing on this issue as soon as possible by one of the Near East bureau -- a specialist who dealt with the Palestinians and the Israelis? I would say, perhaps on the record, Mr. Dennis Ross or his deputy to come and speak to us and answer questions, because this is quite -- you know, you are leaving a lot of ambiguities in the air and we would like some clear position, if you would.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I'm sorry you're displeased with what I'm telling you, but I will look into the possibility.

Q Richard, can I ask one other question on a former subject, please? Again, my understanding is that you're still dealing with the pre-yesterday Likud party modification. What -- and again, are you expecting or are you waiting to see if this new modified election plan is presented to the Israeli cabinet or Parliament and voted upon, and then you would react to it once it has gone through those processes, or what?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not asking for anything like that specifically to happen. I'm saying that we're dealing with a government proposal, a government proposal and an idea that we have that we think has merit. We're working with that idea with the concerned parties, and we're hoping to develop it and to flesh out its details.

Q No, I understand you're not waiting for them, you're not asking for them to do it, but you really have not commented on it --

67  
81  
8

X

X

X



8/8

MR. BOUCHER: That's right.

Q -- and I'm trying to understand you calling the previous one the Israeli cabinet plan.

MR. BOUCHER: That's right.?

Q Are you waiting to see if this plan would be presented to the cabinet, voted upon, and then you would react to it, or what?

MR. BOUCHER: We're not -- we're not waiting for anything. We're actively pursuing the elections idea; we're pursuing it in our discussions with governments in the region, in our discussions with the PLO; we're working with the parties, we're calling upon the parties to help flesh out its details.

Q But this is a -- one of the parties just fleshed out its view of the details yesterday. (Scattered laughter.) What do you think of those?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, you're using "parties" in a different sense.

Q What do you think of that fleshing out process? Huh?

MR. BOUCHER: You're using the word "parties" in a different sense. We're dealing with the Israeli government.

Q No, I'm dealing with the Prime Minister of Israel. I mean, you're the one that wants to take the "Emperor has no clothes" stance.

Q Shamir is the Prime Minister of Israel --

MR. BOUCHER: I can confirm that.

Q -- and he speaks for both parties. Both parties agree that he will be the Prime Minister of the government of Israel, and he is Prime Minister of Israel. I mean, it really is kind of a little bit -- I mean, I --

MR. BOUCHER: Shamir is the Prime Minister of Israel. But he was also speaking at a Party meeting. And I'm not getting into partisan politics in Israel. I've said what we think about partisan

declarations, but I've said that we do have a peace plan and an elections proposal on the table that we want to work with, that we want to pursue.

And I've said it's time for Palestinians to accept the elections proposal and enter into dialogue with the Israelis to flesh out the details. That's the work that has to be done, to flesh out the details of the proposal that is on the table.

X

X

X

דחיות:

בוול

טופס מברק  
קשר ניו-יורקדף: 1  
מחיר: 3

סיוג: שמור

תזוח: 06/700

חש מדיקי

0149

28-011

מנהל מצפ"א, כנצור - טמכ"ל מצפ"א

דע: השגריר וושינגטון

מאת: טגן הקובכ"ל

יוזמת השלום.

1. מצ"ב הודעת סימור רייך - ועידת הנשיאים המגיבה על תוצאות ישיבות מרכז הליכוד.
2. מנגעים ומשיחות עם נציגי ארגונים יהודיים עולה כי עמדת סימור רייך אינה משקפת נכונה הלכי הרוח בקרב הארגונים היהודיים. מפסובציגים הביעו דאגה כי ההתניות שאומצו במרכז הליכוד נשתקים היוזמה, אלוים הביעו חרדה למדיניות חוץ בשני קולות ולעימות עם חמימשל. אייב פוקסמן העדיף לא לצאת בשום הודעה יוזמה במצב זה של עניינים וזו עמדתם של כמה ארגונים נוספים.

מרדכי ידיד

ג.ב.

מצ"ב הודעת הקונגרס היהודי אמריקאי.

3 3 1 1 3 1  
 סה ס סה סה סה סה  
 סה סה סה סה סה סה  
 1 1 1 1 1 1  
 4 1 1 1 1 1



JUL - 6 - 89 THU 8:30

149/28

P. 02

Contact: Richard Cohen  
(212) 758-6969

For Immediate Release

2  
3

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS  
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE 'GRATIFIED' THAT  
ISRAEL'S PEACE INITIATIVE REMAINS INTACT

Seymour D. Reich  
Chairman

Malcolm I. Hoenlein  
Executive Director

Commenting on the action of the Likud Central Committee Wednesday (July 5), Seymour D. Reich, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, said today:

"I am gratified that the Government's peace initiative remains intact. The Presidents Conference has enthusiastically welcomed and endorsed the four-point peace plan offered by the Government. It is a positive and forward looking proposal that has great potential for advancing the peace process in the Middle East.

"The Israeli peace initiative challenges the Palestinian Arabs to participate in elections to constitute a self-governing authority during a transitional period leading toward negotiations for a permanent solution.

"The Israeli initiative also calls on Egypt to meet with Israel, to reaffirm the peaceful principles of the Camp David accords and to work together in widening the circle of Arab-Israel peace.

"It calls on all Arab states that remain at war with Israel to cease their anti-Israel propaganda, to end their economic boycott and come to the negotiating table to work out a comprehensive settlement.

"And it calls for an international effort to improve the living conditions of the Arab refugees in camps in the West Bank and Gaza and to provide opportunities for self-support and for genuine hope of a better future -- an endeavor in which Israel is prepared to be a partner.

"These are creative, positive proposals. I am very pleased that they remain the policy of the government of Prime Minister Shamir."

7/5/89

*news*

## AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

STEPHEN WISE CONGRESS HOUSE, 18 EAST 84TH STREET • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10028 • 877-1500

Contact: Andrea Binder  
212-360-1541  
July 5, 1989

For Immediate Release

149/28

3/3

AJC WELCOMES LIKUD ENDORSEMENT OF SHAMIR PLAN  
BUT EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER DISABLING AMENDMENTS

The following statement was issued today by Robert K. Lifton, president, and Henry Siegman, executive director, of the American Jewish Congress, on Israeli Prime Minister Shamir's proposals for elections for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza:

The American Jewish Congress has been fully supportive of Prime Minister Shamir's proposals for elections in the West Bank and in Gaza. Indeed, we consider it a major advance over previous plans, for his proposals provide a direct and enhanced role for Palestinians in negotiations with Israel.

While we are pleased that the basic proposal for elections has been affirmed by the Likud's Central Committee, we are deeply concerned that the conditions reportedly attached to the plan may present major impediments to its implementation.

Minister of Justice Dan Meridor has pointed out, correctly, that the action of the Likud does not bind the government. We urge Prime Minister Shamir and his government not to permit anything that transpired at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Likud to compromise the integrity of the proposals the Israeli cabinet has put forward. If that were to happen, prospects for peace would have been dealt a damaging blow.

\*\*\*\*\*

AB1070389  
ELEC:IC:AJ:OIR



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 30.06.89

21939

סודי

נכנס \*\*

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 6,21939

אל: המשרד

יעדיסומצב/1498, מנמת/494

מ-: נוש, נר: 745, תא: 290689, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: גס: צמא

נד: פ

אורי

מיידי/סודי

אל: מנהל מצמא

דע: לשכת שהח

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

פגישת השגריר - עוזר המזכיר ל-NEA קלי (29/6).

1. השגריר זומן לפגישת היכרות עם קלי (שנכנס בשבוע שעבר לתפקידו).

2. השיחה הוקדשה רובה ככולה לסקירת ההתפתחויות האחרונות בסוגיית התהליך המדיני. נושאים נוספים שנדונו קצרות היו: ביקור קלי בישראל והגירוש.

3. להלן סיכום השיחה:

א. ביקור קלי בישראל:

(1) בתשובה לשאלת השגריר ציין קלי כי מעוניין להגיע ארצה משטוקהולם מקום בו עתיד לשוחח עם הסובייטים בנושא אפגניסטן. המועד המשוער לביקור הוא: 2-3/8.

(2) קלי סיפר כי למרות קירבתו לישראל (שירת בלבנון) מעולם לא ביקר בה.

ב. תהליך המדיני

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

- (1) השגריר סקר בפני קלי את מהלכי ישראל בתקופה האחרונה. ציין כי אנו נמצאים בעיצומה של יוזמה דיפלומטית נועזת שכמות לא היתה מאז הסכמי ק. דיוויד.
- (2) ישראל ציין שואבת עידוד מתמיכת הממשל ביוזמה ובמאמציו להשיג תמיכת מדינות ערב אירופה ובריהמ' למציאת פרטנר פלסטיני עמו נוכל לדון על יישום רעיון הבחירות.
- (3) לישראל ברור כי לכשימצא הפרטנר נצטרך לדון עמו בפרטי הרעיון.
- (4) על רקע המאמץ לעיל, חזר השגריר והביע הסתייגותנו מהדיאלוג אותו מנהלת ארהב עם אש'פ. השגריר ציין כי לדיאלוג אין השפעה חיובית על המאמץ לקידום היוזמה. המשך הדיאלוג, גורע מרצון הפלסטינים ביש'ע לשקול הקמת קשר עמנו.
- (5) השגריר הביע אכזבתנו, צערנו בעקבות הדווח על העלאת רמת המגעים עם אש'פ. מהלך זה ציין לא יעודד פלסטינים ביש'ע ליטול יוזמה ולהצטרף לתהליך שבקידומו אנו מעוניינים.
- (6) מאזן הדיאלוג האמריקאי-אש'פ מצביע על עליה משמעותית במעשי הטירור בשטחים ובנסיגות החדירה בגבולנו עם לבנון של קבוצות הנתונות לשליטתו של אש'פ. השגריר ציין הגידול המשמעותי במספר הפלסטינים הנהרגים ע'י אש'פ בגלל נסייתם לאמץ את היוזמה.
- (7) השגריר הזכיר את עמדת רייגן (בעקבות פתיחת הדיאלוג) על כך שארהב תשפוט את אש'פ לא רק עפי הצהרותיו אלא גם עפי מעשיו. לאור מעשי אש'פ, יש אמונה גוברת שתשומת הלב ניתנת יותר להצהרות אש'פ מאשר למעשיו. היוקרה ממנה נהנה אש'פ על רקע מגעיו עם ארהב ומדינות אירופה אינו מסייע לעידוד פלסטינית ביש'ע לבסס עצמם כברי שיח לגיטימיים עמנו. אנו רואים בכך התפתחות DISTRESSING.
- (8) קלי בתגובה סיפר כי בשיחות שקיים עם סנטורים חברי ועדת החוץ לפני השימוע פירט (לבקשתם) את תפיסתו הפילוסופית לגבי הסכסוך. בדבריו ציין שדאגתו הראשונה במסגרת תפקידו תהיה שישראל 'MUST NOT PERISH'. עקרון זה הדגיש ישמש כקו מנחה לגישתו, להמלצותיו למזכיר ולשיחותיו עם הערבים. קלי הוסיף כי בדבריו בפני ועדת החוץ של הסנאט התייחס ליחס הידידות המסורתיים בין שתי המדינות, אשר אסור שיפריעו





## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ליחס ארהב עם מדינות ערב.

(9) קלי ציין כי רשם בסיפוק דברי השגריר לגבי הערכתנו את עמדת הממשל בנושא היזמה. שותף להערכת השגריר על כך שזו היזמה החשובה ביותר מאז ק. דיויד.

(10) קלי ציין כי מופתע לטובה מהשינוי שחל בעמדת מדינות ערב כלפי ישראל מאז הגיע לאיזורנו לפני 25 שנה (שירת בתורכיה). אז הן הצהירו על רצונן להשמיד את ישראל וכיום הן מדברות על מו'מ' עמנו. חושב שזו הזדמנות אותה יצרה ישראל.

(11) בהתייחסו לנושא הדיאלוג עם אש'פ ציין כי מודע לחילוקי הדעות עמנו. בהתייחסו לדברי רייגן ציין כי אינם סבורים שאש'פ נושא באחריות לכל נסיון חדירה.

(12) באשר להעלאת דרג המגעים ציין קלי כי ארה'ב לא הודיעה שבכוונתה להגבילם לאיש מסויים. סבורים שהמאמץ הדיפלומטי (כלפי אש'פ) הינו חשוב ומועיל. ארהב מנסה לשכנע אש'פ לנטוש האלימות ולאפשר לפלסטינים בשטחים לשוחח עמנו. רואים בכך מאמץ חיובי ובכוונתם להמשיך בדיאלוג בתקווה שיצלח.

### ג. גירושים

(1) קלי שהתייחס לנושא ציין כי שמעו בדאגה לגבי הגירושים וכי עמדתם בנושא מוכרת לנו.

(2) השגריר ציין כי עמדתם ידועה לנו. כדי להבהיר את הסיבות להחלטתנו השאיר השגריר נייר ובו פירוט הרקורד של המגורשים.

(3) קלי ציין ללא קשר לרקורד שארה'ב שוללת הלגיטימיות של המהלך. במידה והמגורשים עברו על חוק יש למצות עמם את הדין בערכאות המשפטיות המקובלות.

(4) השגריר ציין כי הגירושים אינם נוגדים את האמנת ג'נבה הרביעית. חזר על עמדתנו לגבי יישום האמנה וסיפר כי נשיא הצ'א (בביקורו בישראל) רשם לפניו עמדתנו לגבי יישום פרגמטי של האמנה. השגריר הוסיף כי מגורשים (שקיבלו התראה מוקדמת לגבי הכוונה) ניתנה האפשרות למצות ההליך המשפטי. השגריר הפנה תשומת לב לדברי שהב'ט שציין כי יהיה מוכן לשקול החזרתם כעבור שלוש שנים במידה ותחול רגיעה במצב והמגורשים לא יהיו מעורבים בפעולות טרור.



THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

TO THE HONORABLE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE SENATE  
ON APRIL 10, 1913, AND BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ON APRIL 15, 1913, RELATIVE TO THE  
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND OFFICE  
ON THE PROGRESS OF THE LAND OFFICE  
DURING THE YEAR 1912.

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND OFFICE  
HONORABLE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ALBANY, NEW YORK, JANUARY 1, 1913.

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND OFFICE  
HONORABLE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ALBANY, NEW YORK, JANUARY 1, 1913.

ALBANY, NEW YORK.

PRINTED BY THE STATE OF NEW YORK  
AT THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND OFFICE.

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND OFFICE  
HONORABLE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ALBANY, NEW YORK, JANUARY 1, 1913.

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND OFFICE  
HONORABLE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ALBANY, NEW YORK, JANUARY 1, 1913.

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND OFFICE  
HONORABLE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ALBANY, NEW YORK, JANUARY 1, 1913.

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

השתתפו בשיחה שארכה כ-40 דקות: קורצר, הירש, עוזר  
ברסק, הציר והח'מ'.

שטיין

לב

תפ: שחח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, דס, אמנ, ממד,  
בוצור, מצפא, טייבל, משפט, ליאור, מזתים



# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4204

תאריך : 06.07.89

יוצא \*\*

שמו

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,4204

אל: 216/ש, מנמת/91

מ-: המשרד, תא: 060789, ח: 1756, רח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: גס: משפט

נד: 8

1/1 חק"מ

שמו/רגיל

שגריר, ציר שטיין

ד.מ. 886

תהליך השלום

מתוך שיחה עם מרשל בריגר 5/7.

לפני בואו נפגש עם דוס וקורצר וכאן עם וילקוקס. לדבריו:

1. הממשל פועל נמרצות בטונים באמצעות פלטרו וביו"ש באמצעות וילקוקס לקדם ענין הבחירות.

2. הממשל יוצא מההנחה שאש"ף יסכים לבחירות כפוף לתנאים שמטרתם שליטה אשפ"ת על המועמדים.

3. הממשל מעריך כי כאשר יהיה ברשותם אישור עקרוני של אש"ף אף שכול בתנאים, הנושא יהפך לויכוח על תנאים בנסיבות שבה ישראל הציעה בחירות, ואש"ף עקרונית מקבל הרעיון, דעת הקהל בארה"ב לא תאפשר לישראל לסרב לקיים הבחירות א"ר בגלל ויכוח על תנאים.

4. מכתב הסנטורים התקבל בממשל כקידה של הקונגרס לקהילה היהודית אך לא כצעד המופנה כנגד הממשל או כנגד בייקר. יחד עם זאת המכתב חיזק את מעמד איפא"ק.

סיבל

1977

1977

1. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the results of the study conducted during the period from January 1, 1977, to December 31, 1977. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

2. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

3. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

4. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

5. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

6. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

7. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

8. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

9. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

10. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

11. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.

12. The study was conducted in order to determine the effect of the new program on the performance of the system.



# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

טא

לש

תפ: ששהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ששהבט, בוצור, מצפא, סייבל,  
ר/מרכז, ממד, רס, אמנ





# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* 21000

\* תאריך : 29.06.89 \*

\* דף 1 מתוך 6 \*

\* עותק 1 מתוך 12 \*

\* נכנס \*\* \*

\* \*\* \*

\* \*\*\* \*

\* חוזם: 6,21000 \*

\* אל: המשרד \*

\* יעדים: מצב/1438 \*

\* מ-: ווש, נר: 697, תא: 280689, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: סב \*

\* תח: פ גס: צפא \*

\* נד: פ \*

\* \*

\* \*

\* \*

\* \*

\* סודי ביותר - ח.ר.ב / מיידי \*

\* \*

\* ח.ר.ב \*

\* \*

\* אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א \*

\* \*

\* דע: לשכת שה' ח, לשכת רוהמ' \*

\* \*

\* מאת: אלי אבידן-וושניגטון \*

\* \*

\* משיחה עם דן קורצ'ר. \*

\* \*

\* תהליך השלום. \*

\* \*

\* 1. ארה"ב נמצאת כעת בעמדת המתנה על רקע האטה מסויימת \*

\* שחלה באינטנסיביות של הפעילות הדיפ' בהקשר לתהליך \*

\* השלום. המתנה זו מוכתבת לה בכורח שני גורמים \*

\* \*

\* (א) כינוס מרכז חרות ב-5.7 העשוי להשפיע על יזמת ממשלת \*

\* ישראל. הנחתו היא שרוהמ' ישיג את תמיכת המרכז ביזמתו \*

\* המדינית. \*

\* \*

\* (ב) קבלת תשובה מחייבת (COMMITTED) מצד הפלס' \*

\* לתהליך הבחירות. "אני מודע לכך שאתם לא רוצים לשמוע \*

\* מה הולך בתוניס" אולם פלסרו אמר במפורש לאנשי שיחו \*

\* שם שאשפ' לא מקובל עליה כשותף בתהליך ושלא תנהל עמו \*

\* שום מומ' באשר לנושא הבחירות. הדבר היחיד שארה"ב \*

\* עומדת על כך הוא שתקום נציגות פלס' מיהש"ע שתאמץ \*

\* \*

ארה"ב

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00  
\* 29.08.89 : 17.00  
\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

017 2 110

0101

00010

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00

\* 29.08.89 : 17.00



\* דף 2 מתוך 6 \*  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 12 \*

\* את הבחירות ותשא ותתן עם ישראל בכל הכרוך בכך. הוא  
\* עצמו מתנגד נמרצות ( VEHEMENTLY ) לכל מיני הצעות  
\* הבאות מכיוון אש'פ כגון שהוא ימנה את הנציגים (כפי  
\* שערפאת התבטא בראיון ל'פייננשל טיימס') או שנושאים  
\* הקשורים לבחירות יסוכמו מראש. כל התכנית היא עניין  
\* למומ' בין ישראל ונציגי הש'ע. יתר על כך ארה'ב  
\* גם לא רוצה לדעת מראש מה תהיה עמדת הצדדים בכל המכלול  
\* הסובב את הבחירות- היכן ישראל ו/או הפלס' יוותרו והיכן  
\* לא. נוח לה להמצא במצב של משקיף על תהליך ישיר בין  
\* שני הצדדים. רואה את בעיית מזרח ירושלים כקושי המרכזי  
\* בדיון שיתקיים בין הצדדים לכשיגיעו למומ' בעניין הבחירות.

\* 2. הדגיש שלמחמ'ד אין לו'ז אופרטיבי, אף שהוא עצמו  
\* סבור שלגורם הזמן יש חשיבות וככל שהוא יקצר כך ייטב  
\* אך הוא בעמדת יחיד. הממשל גם לא עוסק בהתוויית תרחיש  
\* לפחות לא עפ' מיטב ידיעתו, אלא בכפוף להתפתחויות בזירה  
\* עצמה-בישראל ובמחנה הפלס' כמוזכר בסעיף הראשון.

\* 3. לשאלה מה הוא צופה שיתרחש לאחר השגת הסכמה פלס'  
\* לבחירות והאם ארה'ב רואה עצמה במצב שהיא חייבת לתת  
\* פיצוי לכך, השיב שאין זה סוד שאש'פ מנסה להשיג מארה'ב  
\* מחויבות כלשהי בשני מישורים, בין אם התהליך יתקיים  
\* ובין אם לאו- התקשרות לתהליך המדיני בשלב מסוים, הסכמה  
\* לעקרון הגדרה עצמית. ארה'ב שוללת את נושא ההגדרה  
\* העצמית שפרושה בקוד המזהה'י מדינה פלס' אך גם שמסרבת  
\* לקשור עצמה לעניין שיתופו של אשפ' משתי סיבות מובנות

\* (א) אין סיכוי שישראל תסכים לכך ומכאן אין טעם לעסוק  
\* ברעיון היפוטטי לחלוטין.

\* (ב) ארה'ב לא רואה את אשפ' כשותף לגיטימי למומ'.  
\* אמנם הוא מילא את תנאי ארה'ב כלשונם ( LITERALLY )  
\* באשר לדיאלוג עמו אך מכאן ועד להכשרתו כצד פעיל  
\* בתהליך, הדרך ארוכה. הגבתי ואמרתי שיש לנו ויכוח  
\* באשר ל'מילוי התנאים' ולתבונה שבדיאלוג עמו. המאזן  
\* מאז תחילת הדיאלוג לפני כחצי שנה הוא שלילי לחלוטין  
\* מכל הבחינות. הסתירה בין מה שערפאת אמר בגנבה והתנהגותו  
\* בשטח מעידה על מצב בלתי הפיך מבחינתנו. פעולות הטרור  
\* בישראל ומחוצה לה-גברו מאז ואף קיבלו מימד אכזרי חדש  
\* שח'טיפת חיילים ורציחתם בדם קר. הגברת החדירות





# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 3 מתוך 6 \*  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 12 \*

\* מגבול הצפון למטרות מלקוח לשם סחיטה. כל זאת בשעה  
\* שגורמי אשפ' קוראים ופועלים להגברת האינתיפאדה. טרור  
\* זה הפך ציני 'במשחק החטיפה' של כריס ג'ורג' ושילוחו  
\* בלוויית מכתב עם תנאים. מה נשאר איפוא מה 'תנאים  
\* המילוליים' שאשפ' קיבל על עצמו?  
\* הגיון פשוט מורה על מסקנה אחת- אשפ' מפרש את הדיאלוג  
\* עם ארה"ב כמתן היתר לפעולות טרור. זו בודאי לא  
\* הייתה כוונת ארה"ב אך חושבני שבשיקוליה לנהל מומ'  
\* נעלם דבר אחד ש'הדרך לגיהנום שזורה בכוונות טובות'  
\* עפ' האימרה הידועה. אשפ' על כל פנים מממש כלל זה, הגם  
\* שאין להטיל ספק בכוונותיה הבאות טובות של ארה"ב.  
\* קורצר השיב שנושא הטרור נמצא באופן מתמיד על סדה'  
\* בתוניס וארה"ב אומרת את דעתה בתקיפות, אך קיים לדעתו  
\* 'שטח אפור' באשר להגדרת טרור, אך בעיקר מי עומד  
\* מאחוריו, דהיינו זיהוי הגורם האחראי לו כאשר מדובר  
\* בגופים שונים באשפ'. עניתי לו לסיום שיתכן שאשפ'  
\* הוא מעין סופרמרקט עם מחלקות שונות אך גם אם נקבל  
\* טיעון זה הרי שבכל סופרמרקט קיימת הנהלה אחת האחראית  
\* למה שמתרחש בתחומו בין אם ההנהלה יודעת על כך או לא  
\* בסופו של דבר היא חייבת לתת את הדין לכל מה שמתרחש  
\* בבניין. זאת ועוד גם אם נניח שקיים מצב היפוטיטי לחלוטין  
\* של הבחנה בין 'טרור אזרחי' ל'טרור צבאי', מה שלא  
\* קיים מבחינתנו, איך אפשר להסכים לו בשעה שכולם עסוקים  
\* במאמץ ליצור אוירה למומ' לשלום ואשפ' הרי טוען שהוא  
\* חלק ממנו. ההתנגדות לאשפ' אינה נחלת ממשלת ישראל  
\* בלבד. הפרספציה בדעת הקהל בישראל היא שרמת האלימות  
\* של אשפ' על סוגיה היא כעת 'במיטבה' ואין בנמצא  
\* שום 'מסרי שלום' כביכול ממנו.

\* 4. באשר לתרחישים הרי שארה"ב עומדת מול סבך (PUZZLE)  
\* שהוא אינו יודע כיצד ניתן יהיה לצאת ממנו. כל תרחיש  
\* אמריקאי לקידום תהליך הבחירות שהוא יכול לעלות על  
\* דעתו בלתי ישים במציאות.

\* (א) ניהול מומ' חשאי עם אשפ' מאחורי גבה של ישראל  
\* שבתמורה להסכמתו לבחירות ארה"ב תאות לראות בו צד בזמן  
\* כל שהוא במומ' לשלום.

\* (ב) מאמץ להביא להסכמת ישראל למתן עמדתה כלפי אשפ'  
\* בתמורה לכך שהפלס' ינהלו עמה מומ' על יזמת הממשלה.





# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 4 מתוך 6 \*  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 12 \*

\* (ג) הצגת 'אולטימטום' לאשפ' לקבל את היוזמה הישראלית  
\* ללא כל פיצוי או תגמול בבחינת TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT .  
\* זהו התרחיש הפחות מסוכן אך סיכוייו אפסיים.  
\* הוא עצמו סבור שאשפ' בסופו של דבר יקבל את נושא  
\* הבחירות בלוויית תנאים מצידו. השאלה מה ידרוש. ארה"ב  
\* לא פוסלת העלאת דרג הדיאלוג אם כי דרג זה לא יספק  
\* את מה שאשפ' ידרוש. ארה"ב גם לא תצא עם קביעה שאשפ' פ  
\* לעולם לא יהיה צד למומ' בכפוף לתנאים ולהסכמה ישראלית.  
\* הנושא יראה כפתוח אך כל אחד ידע מה נדרש מאשפ'. מנוי  
\* וגמור עם ארה"ב שלא לעשות שום צד מאחורי גבה של ישראל  
\* אלא בשיתוף עמה ולהסכים לתנאים שהיא עצמה, כלומר  
\* ארה"ב לא תוכל לעמוד בהם. הנעלם הגדול הוא האם ישנו  
\* בנמצא תרחיש רביעי שיהיה מקובל על כולם. בכך הוא  
\* מוגיע כרגע את מוחו.

\* 5. כאב הראש האמריקאי לא מסתיים בכך. הוא קיים גם בצד  
\* הטכני של תכני הבחירות. כיצד תתפרסם ההודעה על קיומו  
\* של גוף פלס' מיהש'ע למומ' עם ישראל.

\* אין לו ספק שהיא צריכה להתפרסם ביהש'ע, אך ע"י מי?  
\* שמא ע"י כרוז מטעם הפלס' ובעת ובעונה אחת בעתון מקומי  
\* כגון 'אלפג'ר' וכך יצאו שני הצדדים שבעימ' בעיה  
\* נוספת עשויה להתעורר באשר למקום השיחות. מה יקרה  
\* אם הפלס' יתבעו עריכתן מחוץ לאזור כגון בגנבה  
\* ואולי אף בווינגטון או בכל מקום אחר. מה תהיה עמדת  
\* ישראל?

\* ברור לו שהפלס' יתפשו מקום כזה בו יוכלו להקים מרכז  
\* תקשורת עם תוניס לקבלת הוראות בחסות התביעה למקום  
\* נייטרלי משוחרר מלחצים. צריך לזכור שמדובר בהרבה  
\* סימבוליקה שדניס רוס טבע לה מטבע לשון בנוסח  
\* SYMBOLICS OF ONE SIDE DRIVE OUT THAT OF THE OTHER.  
\* SIDE.

\* 6. קורצ'ר הקשה על התגובות בישראל לנאום בייקר ולהאשמה  
\* של 'שיויוניות' (EVENHANDNESS) בין ישראל והפלס'  
\* קרי אשפ'. מחוייבותו של הממשל הנוכחי לישראל אינה  
\* נופלת מזו של קודמו, שלא לדבר על הקשרים ושהפ' האסטרטגי.  
\* יתכן שהוא מבטא זאת בצורה שונה אך זה עניין של סגנון





## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 5 מתוך 6  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 12

\* \* ולא תוכן. המזכיר שניסח זאת באגרת לשה' ח' ארנס יכול  
\* \* לרשום לעצמו הישגים לא קטנים ואף מרשימים מבחינת  
\* \* ישראל-

\* \* (א) הורדתה של הועידה הבינ'ל במתכונת המקורית מסדה' י'.

\* \* (ב) תמיכה ללא סייג ביזמת ממשלת ישראל. ארה'ב מתייחסת  
\* \* במלוא הרצינות ליזמת רוהמ', על אף הטענות הבאות מצד  
\* \* הערבים שאין מדובר במהלך שיש עמו תכלית או שההתבטאויות  
\* \* בישראל מרוקנות אותו מכל תוכן.

\* \* (ג) עמידה קשיחה מול בריהמ' כפי שקרה גם בשיחות האחרונות  
\* \* בבוש. כל עוד לא תוכיח כוונותיה במעשים.

\* \* (ד) התנגדות לשיתוף אשפ' בגלל ה- RECORD שלו ועוד.  
\* \* ארה'ב לא נרתעת מכך שהיא מצויה כעת באש צולבת משני  
\* \* הצדדים-ישראל על רקע נאום בייקר ומצד הפלס' הטוענים  
\* \* שארה'ב לא עושה מספיק. לארה'ב למרות הפרספציה אין  
\* \* שום מנוף עליהם, מנוף שלא יסכן את יחסיה עם ישראל.  
\* \* אין שום שיויון. ישראל בת ברית הנאבקת כעת עם עצמה  
\* \* באשר למחירו של השלום לעומת אשפ' שהמירב שיכול להצביע  
\* \* הוא על עצם קיום דיאלוג. מה שלפנינו עתה הוא שצריך  
\* \* לשים מאחורי הגב את נאום המזכיר באייפא'ק ולבחון  
\* \* את הדרכים להתקדמות משותפת בתהליך. (אין ספק שהמסר  
\* \* 'הרועם' שלנו בעניין הנאום נקלט היטב והממשל מחפש  
\* \* דרך לצאת ממנו. א.א.א.).

\* \* 7. שאלתי את קרצ'ר היכן עומדות מדינות ערב. השיב שארה'ב  
\* \* נלאתה כבר מלהדגיש בפניהן שהיא מצפה לתמיכתה ביזמת  
\* \* הבחירות, אך לשווא. 'תלמדו מהנסיון של מצרים עם ישראל'  
\* \* אך דבר לא זז אצלם. נוח להם להסתגר מאחורי גבו של  
\* \* אשפ' למרות שהם מוטרדים מריכוז עצמה מדינית בידו, בעיקר  
\* \* בזירה הבינ'ל. הם טוענים שהמנוף שלהם כלפיו יורד  
\* \* ככל שהוא זוכה לתמיכה בינ'ל. ארה'ב תעלה הנושא עם  
\* \* פהד אך קרצ'ר סקפטי מאוד. ארה'ב הציעה, למשל, (קרוב  
\* \* לוודאי לסעודיה) שיעשו מחווה בתחום החרם הערבי. לא  
\* \* מצפים מהם שיכריזו בפומבי על ביטולו, אך לפחות היו  
\* \* מזמינים, ולו בחשאי חברה המופיעה ברשימת החרם, הדבר  
\* \* היה מתקבל כמסר חיובי מהם בעניין השלום. התשובה  
\* \* מתחמקת ובנוסף שהדבר יטופל באם יחל מומ' לשלום וכד'.





# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 6 מתוך 6  
עו"ת 1 מתוך 12

8. לבנון. ועדת ה-3 שנוסדה בקזבלנקה היא עד עתה עניין  
של רוטינה והוא לא חוזה לפעילותה עתיד שונה מקודמותיה  
אם כי ישנה סקרנות לעקוב אחר המעורבות הסעודית בה  
ומה אומר מתן גושפקנא של המלך לה. מודאג ממשלוחי האמל'ח  
העיראקי לנוצרים. המפתח הוא בידי סוריה. חושש שברגע  
שתגיע למסקנה שנחצה קו אדום מבחינתה היא תרד מהגדר  
ותנקוט בצעד מכאיב כלשהו. כרגע הסורים, לפחות כלפי  
חוץ נראים שלווים, אך חושש שלא לזמן רב. עד כאן.

9. קרצ'ר הדגיש שהוא נאות לפרט מחשבותיו בידיעה מראש  
שהשיחה נשארת בינינו. התחייבתי. אנא דאגו שהיא תשאר  
נחלת המכותבים בלבד.

אבידן

לב

תפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור





י"ד בתמוז תשמ"ט  
17 ביולי 1989  
סימוכין ת-4-575

אל : ראש הממשלה  
שר חוץ

הנדון: שיחה עם שגריר ארה"ב

השגריר בראון התקשר והתייחס לראיון שלי עם סוכנות רויטרס מאתמול (16.7.89) שבו אמרתי, בין היתר, שהדו-שיח של ארה"ב עם אש"פ מחבל בקידום היוזמה המדינית של ישראל, שאנו מתקרבים לרגע של אמת ביחסים בין שתי המדינות בגלל אותו דו-שיח שהדו-שיח עם אש"פ לא יכול לדור בכפיפה אחת עם יוזמת השלום שלנו.

בראון אמר שהוא מצטער DISTRESSED על הדברים שאמרתי ועל הביטויים הקשים שבהם השתמשתי. הגבתי שאין דרכי לעטוף דברים קשים בכפפות-משי, דוקא בגלל יחסי הברית בין שתי המדינות אנו מרגישים עצמנו פגועים ע"י יחסה של ארה"ב בנושא חיוני זה. הוספתי שדברי נבעו מחשש אמיתי שבמוקדם או במאוחר נעמוד בפני מסרים או דרישות מאש"פ באמצעות ארה"ב ונצטרך אז להגיב וכתוצאה מזה יתפתח מצב מאד לא נעים בינינו לבין ארה"ב.

כן ציינתי באזני השגריר שכל יום אנו מקבלים דיווחים על הסתה של אש"פ/ערפאת ומעורבות ישירה שלו ושל ארגונו בטרור ובאלימות נגד יהודים בישראל. באותה עת ערפאת מוליד שולל את ארה"ב, הממשיכה לנהל עמו דו-שיח מתורבת תוך התעלמות ממעורבותו בטרור. יתר על כן, רק עתה נודע לנו שארה"ב הסמיכה את פלטרו להפגש עם כל חברי הועדה המבצעת של אש"פ, שמשמעותו גם ערפאת וגם אבו-איאד. האם כל זה לא מחייב אותנו להשמיע קול של אזהרה ומחאה?

בראון חזר על הבעת צערו והקריא לי ציטוט מתוך דברי המזכיר בתשובה לשאלה שהשתמכה על דברים שאמרתי בראיון. המזכיר הגיב שהדו-שיח עם אש"פ ויוזמת השלום של ישראל אינם MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE, וכי ארה"ב ניצבת מאחורי יוזמת השלום של ישראל.

רצ"ב הקטע מתוך דברי המזכיר.

ב ב ר כ ה,

י.ח. בן-אדרן

העתיקים: סגן שר החוץ, מר ב. נתניהו  
היועץ המדיני לשר החוץ, מר סלי מרידור



A: No, I really said it would hurt the Chinese people is the primary reason we will continue. If we cut it off, it would hurt the Chinese people, and that's one of the things that the president said right off the bat he didn't want to do. That's not the kind of action we ought to be taking.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there are things we could do that would not hurt the Chinese people or be, as sanctions usually are, futile, particularly with a commodity like grain. That is, we could say we're reexamining -- and, in conjunction with the British -- reexamining our policies about the fundamental relationships between our country, their country, and Taiwan and Hong Kong. Have you given any thought to that?

A: You know, what the United States has done here is really lead the way. The president was the first to take action against China in connection with what's happened. He's the one who set the standard of ceasing military exchanges. He's the one that called for postponement of World Bank loans. He's the first leader who basically said, I think, that we're going to cut off high-level political exchanges. All of these other six Western industrial democracies here at this summit are following that lead. They all believe this is the proper course. They also don't think that we ought to isolate China, that it would not be in the best interests of the West. All seven of these countries feel this way. We think the response is appropriate.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you and the president have been to two Iron Curtain countries which are now emerging to some degree into some level of freedom, Poland and Hungary. Now, an interesting development. Lech Walesa said the other day to some visiting Americans that he's very happy about what has happened, of course, but he, as a leader of a labor union, needs, for his people, employers. And they don't have any. They haven't had any for 40 odd years. The government has been the only employer. It is a difficulty for the emerging central European countries, and I wondered if you have any thoughts on this? How to deal with it?

A: Well, that's one of the proposals that the president made during the course of his trip to Poland -- to set up a 100 million dollar fund to assist in the creation of private sector entities and operations in Poland. An enterprise foundation, if you will. And he's quite right. They do need employers. It's one of the problems that has faced all of these centrally planned statist economies of the East. It's their view -- it's been their view for a long time -- that governments solve all the problems. Governments don't solve economic problems. Many times governments contribute to economic problems. They now realize this. They want to move to free market economics. And they want our help in getting there.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I want to move you to the Middle East, to the increasingly contentious relationship between Israel and the United States. This morning, the director general of the prime minister's office said the following: "We are reaching a moment of truth because there has to be a decision by the parties concerned, primarily by the United States, whether to continue the dialogue with the PLO, or proceed with moving the Israeli initiative to fruition. The two are mutually exclusive." Do you think the two are mutually exclusive?

A: No, I don't think the two are mutually exclusive. The policy of the United States is that the two are not mutually exclusive. We are working very hard, and have been for quite some time, every since the Shamir election proposal was first advanced, to implement that



proposal. And we're working with European governments, and we're working with Arab governments, and we're working with the Israeli government. And so we were concerned last week when it appeared to us that perhaps they were in the process, somehow, of devaluing their own initiative by putting certain conditions on there that were very, very difficult conditions and that were the kinds of issues that needed to be addressed at the very end of a discussion and negotiation, and not at the beginning. We are now convinced -- we are now convinced, by having talked to them, talked to representatives of the Israeli government -- that they are fully supportive of their original elections proposal and initiative as they originally announced it, and we are going to continue to work very hard to make it happen.

Q: Well, that's the point. I was also going to say, and obviously you know more than I do, there's a report this morning that Prime Minister Shamir is prepared to reintroduce to the cabinet his original proposal and drop the Ariel Sharon and company hardline portions of it. You get the same report?

A: I haven't gotten that report over here in Paris, but let me say that we have been reassured as have other governments by the government of Israel that it stands foursquare behind its original election proposal. I think Prime Minister Shamir himself said it hasn't changed one iota. And of course we deal with governments and not with parties.

Q: When the United States gets irritated with Israel it periodically resurfaces the idea of invoking, as a kind of club to drive Israel in this direction or that, an international conference. You yourself did it not too long ago. What is the status of your thinking now on an international conference? Can you reassure the Israelis that that's not part of our program?

A: There has been absolutely no change in the policy of the United States with respect to an international conference from what the policy was during the Reagan administration. And the policy is this: the United States believes that an international conference, properly structured at the appropriate time, might be useful.

But we've spent a number of months in the Bush administration arguing against an international conference when the idea has been surfaced to us by foreign ministers and heads of state of other governments. We say that going to an international conference now might well preempt other, more promising possibilities. And we think the Shamir election proposal is just such a more promising possibility. And we're glad to know and glad to hear that that proposal stands as originally submitted, and that we and our ally, Israel, are going to work to implement that proposal.

Q: Let me ask you to quickly address a few other topics. One is we're hearing once again, for the first time since, I guess, the Carter years, that it may be time now to consider the withdrawal, 36 years after the end of the Korean War, of some or perhaps all of the American forces in Korea. Is there more give in American policy now with respect to Korea?

A: Well, you know the president proposed at the NATO summit that there (would) be a reduction in U.S. manpower in Europe, provided that there was a move to parity by the Soviets which would require them to reduce even more. To the extent that we can see some correlative moves with respect to the status of forces in the Pacific, maybe those kind of things can be considered in the future, but right now the United States policy remains what it has been.



AMERICAN EMBASSY  
TEL AVIV, ISRAEL  
FAX 972-3-663449

TO:

NAME:

YOSSI BEN-AHARON

C/O:

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

TELEFAX #:

FROM:

AMTB. BROWN

OFFICE:

EXT.


DATE:

7/17/89

MESSAGE:

AS DISCUSSED ON  
THE PHONE

AUTHORIZED BY:



DATE:

SIGNATURE OF AMERICAN HEAD OF SECTION ONLY

/

STORY: GS703071A

DATE: 07/16/89

SLGS703071A BT\*GLS703 07/16/89

1Ur

Tx

WEST MUST CONTINUE RESOLVE IN DEALING WITH EAST, BAKER SAYS  
(Transcript: interview on Brinkley program) (2600)

Paris -- Secretary of State Baker says that of the 15 economic summits held by the major industrialized countries since 1974 the just concluded meeting in Paris dealt for the first time with the consequences of the failure of communism rather than with the threat of communism, but he says that too will require "continued resolve."

Interviewed July 16 on David Brinkley television interview program, the secretary said, "It's important that we maintain our strength and resolve. That's what got us to this point, in our view. That's the reason that the Soviet Union and their Eastern European allies are moving in the direction of the West -- because we have been strong."

During the program, Baker also discussed the current situation in Poland and Hungary, the current status of the Shamir election initiative in Israel, the future status of U.S. troops in South Korea, the situation in China, and funding for the Stealth bomber program.

Following is a transcript of the interview:

(begin transcript)

Question: ...It has been a busy week and for some time now everybody in the world will be assessing it and just trying to decide what it accomplished and whether it was good, bad or indifferent. What -- give us your assessment first before we go into anything else.

Answer: Well, I, of course, think it's been a good week. For one thing, this is the first of these summits -- I think there's been 15 of them -- someone said this is the first one that has not had to deal primarily with the threat of communism but with the consequences of its failure. And I believe that's true. I think the president had an excellent visit to both Poland and Hungary, two Eastern bloc countries that are moving in the direction of the West, that are subscribing to Western values, that are embracing some home-grown reform that we want to support. So we think it's been a good trip to Eastern Europe and we think we've had a good economic summit here.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I'm interested in your characterization of the agenda, that is, coping with the failures, not the threat, of communism. While you've been doing that, the secretary of Defense, Mr. Cheney, has been trying to sell an expensive defense budget to Congress. How would you characterize, having seen Eastern Europe now and having looked over the Iron Curtain or what's left of it, how would you characterize the Soviet military threat and what's required of us in responding to it?

A: I think that what's required of us in responding to it is continued resolve. We must maintain our will and we must maintain our strength. And the communique from the economic summit just issued here reflects that fact. There's still a significant imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union in conventional forces in Europe, so it's important that we maintain our strength and resolve. That's what got us to this point, in our view. That's the reason that the Soviet Union and their Eastern European allies are moving in the direction of the West, because we have been strong. The NATO Alliance has been, in



the past 40 years, I think it's fair to say, the most successful alliance that we've seen. So, I think the threat is there and I think we have to maintain our strength, and all seven summit countries recognize that in this communique here.

G: You've been in the two Eastern European countries where change has accelerated most dramatically -- Hungary and Poland. Both of them have in place bureaucracies reluctant to give up their perquisites. How does the United States plan to condition its aid to use it as a lever to get these countries to move toward free market institutions?

A: We made the mistake -- not just the United States but other Western nations -- in the '70s of giving concessional and subsidized assistance to some of these countries without properly conditioning it, and it was not used to good effect. So I think there's a feeling on the part of all the countries here that we must properly condition any assistance that's offered. At the same time, these countries are reaching out to us, and we've got to lend them a helping hand. We've got to show them, assist them if you will, in moving toward a free market economic system. This is something they very much want to do. Hungary is considerably farther out in front of Poland, we think, economically. Poland has just recently seen some rather dramatic political movement. But we've got to properly condition aid, or the effect that we all want and that they want, quite frankly, won't happen.

G: Mr. Secretary, the summit leaders roundly condemned China's repression of the students and other elements there, and yet are we correctly informed that the Bush administration now intends to allow American grain farmers to continue to sell grain and wheat to the Chinese?

A: Well, the president has made it very clear that he does not intend, has not intended, to disrupt commercial relations. He doesn't want to, he said from the very beginning, I think, he doesn't want to take action that would hurt the Chinese people. A refusal to sell grain to China would not only hurt the Chinese people; it would hurt a lot of American farmers probably, although that's not the reason he would go ahead and permit grain sales. But he has no plans to prohibit grain sales. We believe frankly that the response of the United States government to unfortunate circumstances in China has been the right response. It has been a measured response. We have expressed our outrage and sorrow. And we've taken certain specific actions having to do with military transactions and high level exchanges politically.

G: As you know, Mr. Secretary, not as many actions as Congress would have you take, and Congress is moving forward to requiring stronger measures. Will you go along with the congressional intent?

A: We will observe the law as we all take oath to do, but I should point out to you that in both the House and Senate bills there are provisions that give the president a considerable degree of flexibility in carrying out those laws. If he finds it not in the national interest to take certain action, then he doesn't have to take them.

G: Well, Mr. Secretary, I guess I'm asking about the level of hypocrisy here. You say that you've condemned China in strong terms in words, and yet, here just this weekend, you've confirmed now that we'll continue to sell wheat to them, because, as you point out rather candidly, it's in the interest of American farmers.



A: No, I really said it would hurt the Chinese people is the primary reason we will continue. If we cut it off, it would hurt the Chinese people, and that's one of the things that the president said right off the bat he didn't want to do. That's not the kind of action we ought to be taking.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there are things we could do that would not hurt the Chinese people or be, as sanctions usually are, futile, particularly with a commodity like grain. That is, we could say we're reexamining -- and, in conjunction with the British -- reexamining our policies about the fundamental relationships between our country, their country, and Taiwan and Hong Kong. Have you given any thought to that?

A: You know, what the United States has done here is really lead the way. The president was the first to take action against China in connection with what's happened. He's the one who set the standard of ceasing military exchanges. He's the one that called for postponement of World Bank loans. He's the first leader who basically said, I think, that we're going to cut off high-level political exchanges. All of these other six Western industrial democracies here at this summit are following that lead. They all believe this is the proper course. They also don't think that we ought to isolate China, that it would not be in the best interests of the West. All seven of these countries feel this way. We think the response is appropriate.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you and the president have been to two Iron Curtain countries which are now emerging to some degree into some level of freedom, Poland and Hungary. Now, an interesting development. Lech Walesa said the other day to some visiting Americans that he's very happy about what has happened, of course, but he, as a leader of a labor union, needs, for his people, employers. And they don't have any. They haven't had any for 40 odd years. The government has been the only employer. It is a difficulty for the emerging central European countries, and I wondered if you have any thoughts on this? How to deal with it?

A: Well, that's one of the proposals that the president made during the course of his trip to Poland -- to set up a 100 million dollar fund to assist in the creation of private sector entities and operations in Poland. An enterprise foundation, if you will. And he's quite right. They do need employers. It's one of the problems that has faced all of these centrally planned statist economies of the East. It's their view -- it's been their view for a long time -- that governments solve all the problems. Governments don't solve economic problems. Many times governments contribute to economic problems. They now realize this. They want to move to free market economics. And they want our help in getting there.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I want to move you to the Middle East, to the increasingly contentious relationship between Israel and the United States. This morning, the director general of the prime minister's office said the following: "We are reaching a moment of truth because there has to be a decision by the parties concerned, primarily by the United States, whether to continue the dialogue with the PLO, or proceed with moving the Israeli initiative to fruition. The two are mutually exclusive." Do you think the two are mutually exclusive?

A: No, I don't think the two are mutually exclusive. The policy of the United States is that the two are not mutually exclusive. We are working very hard, and have been for quite some time, every since the Shamir election proposal was first advanced, to implement that



proposal. And we're working with European governments, and we're working with Arab governments, and we're working with the Israeli government. And so we were concerned last week when it appeared to us that perhaps they were in the process, somehow, of devaluing their own initiative by putting certain conditions on there that were very, very difficult conditions and that were the kinds of issues that needed to be addressed at the very end of a discussion and negotiation, and not at the beginning. We are now convinced -- we are now convinced, by having talked to them, talked to representatives of the Israeli government -- that they are fully supportive of their original elections proposal and initiative as they originally announced it, and we are going to continue to work very hard to make it happen.

Q: Well, that's the point. I was also going to say, and obviously you know more than I do, there's a report this morning that Prime Minister Shamir is prepared to reintroduce to the cabinet his original proposal and drop the Ariel Sharon and company hardline portions of it. You get the same report?

A: I haven't gotten that report over here in Paris, but let me say that we have been reassured as have other governments by the government of Israel that it stands foursquare behind its original election proposal. I think Prime Minister Shamir himself said it hasn't changed one iota. And of course we deal with governments and not with parties.

Q: When the United States gets irritated with Israel it periodically resurfaces the edge of invoking, as a kind of club to drive Israel in this direction or that, an international conference. You yourself did it not too long ago. What is the status of your thinking now on an international conference? Can you reassure the Israelis that that's not part of our program?

A: There has been absolutely no change in the policy of the United States with respect to an international conference from what the policy was during the Reagan administration. And the policy is this: the United States believes that an international conference, properly structured at the appropriate time, might be useful.

But we've spent a number of months in the Bush administration arguing against an international conference when the idea has been surfaced to us by foreign ministers and heads of state of other governments. We say that going to an international conference now might well preempt other, more promising possibilities. And we think the Shamir election proposal is just such a more promising possibility. And we're glad to know and glad to hear that that proposal stands as originally submitted, and that we and our ally, Israel, are going to work to implement that proposal.

Q: Let me ask you to quickly address a few other topics. One is we're hearing once again, for the first time since, I guess, the Carter years, that it may be time now to consider the withdrawal, 36 years after the end of the Korean War, of some or perhaps all of the American forces in Korea. Is there more give in American policy now with respect to Korea?

A: Well, you know the president proposed at the NATO summit that there (would) be a reduction in U.S. manpower in Europe, provided that there was a move to parity by the Soviets which would require them to reduce even more. To the extent that we can see some correlative moves with respect to the status of forces in the Pacific, maybe those kind of things can be considered in the future, but right now the United States policy remains what it has been.

Q: One of the most expensive -- and hence one of the most vulnerable to political pressure -- weapon systems in the American inventory is the Stealth bomber, which was under review in Congress this week. Is it your view that it is important both for the United States deterrent, and for, I suppose, our arms control negotiations, that that program proceed at full speed?

A: We think that is a very important program. It is in the president's budget. The secretary of defense is working very hard to obtain the funding for it, and we think it ought to proceed. It's an important element of our deterrent arsenal.

Q: Even given the fact that the Soviet threat now seems to be very, very hard to define?

A: Well, I don't know that the Soviet threat is hard to define. I'm not sure I would agree with that. The Soviet threat is still very much there in terms of the imbalance of forces that they have, both nuclear and conventional. Now, they are saying the right things, and if we see them taking action to reduce those forces and to get to parity so that the threat is reduced, then we can take a look at the kind of thing you're suggesting, but not until then.

(end transcript)

NNNN



|                 |   |                                      |
|-----------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| דף: _____       | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון<br>טופס פרוק 10 | דחפנות:                              |
| כתוב: _____     |   | סוג: שמור                            |
| אל: _____       | מציפיא                                    | תאריך וזמן מעור: 17 ביולי 1989 13:00 |
| דע: _____       |   | כס' פרוק: _____                      |
| כאח: ק. לקונגרס | הפעלה: _____                              | ארה"ב<br>362                         |
|                 |   |                                      |

בית הניב: ועדת החוץ - לו"ז

עד ליציאת הקונגרס לפגרת הקיץ ב-4/8-3 מתכננת ועדת החוץ מספר שימועים כולל בנושאים שלנו:-

1. מתוכננים שימועים בנושא אירופה (בעקבות ביקור הנשיא ופטגה המתועשות) ולבנו.

2. כן מתוכננים שימועים (בשבוע האחרון של עבודת הקונגרס) בנושא תהליך השלום. לדברי מייק ואן-דוזן, שימועים אלה שיתמקדו בדו"ח מכון יפה, ומשמעותו מבחינת התהליך. ישאו אופי אקדמי ויופיעו בפני הועדה עדים <sup>14</sup> <sup>הצטרף</sup> פרופסורים וחוקים. ציין במיוחד הופעת נציג/נציגים של ה-A.J. CONGRESS. לדבריו מספר קונגרסמנים פנו להמילטון ושאלו האם ניתן לעשות בועדה FOLLOW UP לדו"ח, והמילטון החליט אכן לקיים השימועים.

3. ואן דוזן הפנה תשומת ליבי לכך שהמילטון התחייב בתחילת השנה לקיים שימועים בנושא ז"א בשטחים והמילטון נתון תחת לחץ עצום לקיימם. עם זאת, לדברי ואן דוזן IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. במקביל ידוע לנו שואן דוזן, בשם המילטון, לוחץ לקיים השימועים בשתיים עם ועדת המשנה לז"א בראשות הקונגרסמן גאס יטרון. עד כה הצליח האחרון לעמוד בלחצים ולסרב ויחכן שזוהי הסיבה לקביעת ואן דוזן שאין עתה סיכויים לקיים שימועים בנדון.

4. כמו כן צפויה הועדה לקיים דיון או שניים סגורים בנושא המזה"ת (נדווח עם קבלת מידע) ולאחר את המלך פאחד שיבקר בעיר בסוף החודש.

3.1

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: 36  
1 2 3  
הודיה ורנאי דרנגר



- סודי -

יג' תמוז תשמ"ט  
16 ביולי 1989  
5780

1  
Pank

אל : שה"ח  
ס/שה"ח  
מנכ"ל וחברי הנהלה  
שראשי נציגויות צפ"א

מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

דף מצפ"א מס' 47  
לשבועים המסתיימים ב- 14.7.89

#### חוק סיוע חוץ:

מליאת בית הנבחרים אישרה ברוב גדול את חוק הסיוע (הרשאות). עם תום פגרת חג העצמאות האמריקני החלו הליכי החקיקה בועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות. היו"ר, אובי, הבהיר בשיחות מקדימות שהסיוע לישראל (ומצרים) ישורין. הפרוט הוא:

- סיוע כלכלי 1.2 בליון דולר
- סיוע בטחוני 1.8 בליון

לש"פ אזורי (תיקון וקסמן) 7 מליון, למש"ב 5 מליון, למחקר באוניברסיטאות 1.5 מליון לקליטת עליה 25 מליון ולסיוע ליו"ש 12 מליון.

ועדת החוץ של הסנט אשרה את חוק הסיוע, יתכן והחוק לא יגיע כלל להצבעה במליאה ויועבר ישר לועדת ההקצבות.

#### חוק כספי הפנטגון:

ועדת השרותים המזוינים בבית הנבחרים אישרה את תקציב ההגנה 305.5 בליון דולר. נסיונו של היו"ר אספין למנוע תוספות ושינויים בפרק הרכש, לא הצליח, והועדה דחתה את הצעת הממשל לרכש צבאי, בתחומים אחדים היו תוספות ובתמורה קצצה הועדה בתחומים אחרים שבינתיים לא פגעו בפרויקטים בעלי השלכה או נגיעה לישראל.

#### עוזר המזכיר קלי:

עוזר המזכיר לענייני מז"ת, קלי, הופיע בפני ועדת המשנה לארופה ומז"ת. בעדותו הכתובה התייחס לזממה הישראלית, לבחירות בשטחים, לדיאלוג עם אש"פ, לועידה בינ"ל, לזכויות אדם וכיו"ב - הכל ברוח מדיניותה הידועה של ארה"ב. בשולי הופעתו קיים פגישה נפרדת עם קבוצת יידיי ישראל (לארי סמית, מל לוין, לנטוס, ברמו, גילמן) שדברו עמו קשות על שלא הודיעו מיד כי הפגוע באוטובוס הוא מעשה טרור (וקראו בפניו את הודעת רדיו מוסקבה). בקרו בתקיפות את ההודעות החוזרות של הממשל המזכירות את האופציה של ועידה בינ"ל. קלי חזר על כך כי לא חל שינוי במיקוד מאמצי הממשל ביוזמת השלום.





- 2 -

לפרסום רב זכו חילופי הדברים בין קלי לבין המורשה המילטון אשר ציטט את  
השר פרס כאילו דיאלוג עם אש"פ הולך ומיתרקם (TAKING SHAPE). קלי השיב  
על כך כי אינו יודע על דיאלוג רשמי אך ישנם דיווחים מסווגים על מגעים  
שעליהם יהיה מוכן לדון בישיבה סגורה.

#### תגובות לפגוע באוטובוס:

במשך ששה ימים נמנע דובר מחמ"ד מלאפיין את הפגוע באוטובוס כמעשה טרור.  
הענין עלה בשיחה בין שה"ח ושגארה"ב ובין השגריר ארד לבכירים במחמ"ד.  
שתיקתה של ארה"ב בלטה במיוחד על רקע דברי הגינוי החד-משמעיים שהשמיע  
רדיו מוסקבה. דובר המשרד השמיע בקורת קשה על ההתחמקות האמריקנית. בסופו  
של דבר אמר דובר מחמ"ד כי הפיגוע הוא אכן מעשה טרור. בחילופי דברים  
ממושכים עם העתונאים טרח הדובר להדגיש שאש"פ הגדיר את המעשה כטרגדיה ועל  
כן הם רואים אותו כחף מכל אשמה.

#### דיאלוג ארה"ב-אש"פ:

הידיעות על פגישותיו של פלטרו עם אבו-איאד הביאו לגל מחאות. יו"ר ועידת  
הנשיאים יצא בהודעה חריפה בה אמר כי העלאת הפרופיל של אש"פ יגדיל את  
הלגיטימיות שלו ויהפוך את ארה"ב לכלי משחק בידיו. הדבר מחבל במחויבות  
ארה"ב ליצירת אמון בין הצדדים לסכסוך. יו"ר נאקראק, ביאלקין, יצא בהודעה  
דומה ואף אמר לבכירים במחמ"ד עמם נפגש כי העלאת דרג המגעים עם אש"פ לא  
הותירה ברירה בידי הארגונים היהודים אלא להגיב. גם אייב פוקסמן מא.ד.ל.  
וראשי ארגונים אחרים יצאו בהודעות.

בפגישת קלי עם חברי הקונגרס היהודיים (הנזכרת למעלה) תבעו המורשים  
שהממשל יתיעץ עם ועדת המשנה למז"ת וארופה בטרם יעשה צעד להעלאת דרג  
המגעים עם אש"פ. קלי אישר שבכוונתו לנהוג כך. הסנטור קוני מק שיגר מכתב  
מודאג לבייקר ואמר שאין זה מתקבל על הדעת שהדרג יועלה בלי התיעצות  
בקונגרס. ישנם בקונגרס כאלה המבקשים להביא את פלטרו לשימוע. בתדרוך  
לעתונאים ישראלים אמר קלי שאין כל תכנית לפגישה עם ערפאת והוסיף כי לא  
היו מודעים לכך שהפגישה עם אבו-איאד תהיה עד כדי כך שנויה במחלוקת.

בתוך כך נולדה הצעת תיקון לחוק כספי מחמ"ד בשושבינות הסנטורים הלמס וקרי  
ושענינו איסור לקיים מו"מ עם טרוריסטים האחראים לרצח אמריקנים. הממשל  
כבר הביע דאגתו נוכח התיקון המוצע ופנה לאיפא"ק בבקשה שלא לתמוך בו.  
בתיקון אומרים המציעים: "הסכומים המוקצים בחוק זה או בכל חוק אחר לא  
יוכלו לשמש לקיום מו"מ עם נציגים של אש"פ אלא אם ועד אשר יאשר הנשיא  
לקונגרס שהגיע למסקנה שאלה לא השתתפו במישרין או קשרו קשר או שמשו עזר  
לתכנון ולבצוע של פעילות טרוריסטית שכתוצאה ממנה מת, נפצע או נחטף  
אמריקני".

הצעת התקון תידון בסנט בשבוע הבא. גם בקנדה יש סימנים להעלאת דרג המגעים  
עם אש"פ. נציג אש"פ באוטבה בקש ממשרד החוץ שקדומי יוזמן לבקור רשמי  
בסתיו במהלך ביקורו בעצרת. הקנדים מסרו בינתיים שאינם מתכננים כרגע דבר  
אך "ששר החוץ קלארק שומר לעצמו את הזכות לפגוש כל אישיות באש"פ אם דבר  
זה יקדם את תהליך השלום..."





- 3 -

אש"פ ואמנת ג'נבה:

במאי השנה פנה אש"פ לממשלת שוויץ, נאמנת אמנת ז'נבה, בבקשת הצטרפות למדינות החתומות. אף שממשלת שוויץ אינה מכירה במדינת פלשתיין, היא רואה חובה לעצמה כ- DEPOSITARY להפיץ את פניית אש"פ. מלבד פנייתנו לשוויצרים שלא להפיץ הבקשה, פנינו במקביל למדינות מערביות כדי שאלו תצטרפנה ללחץ על ממשלת שוויץ, ובכלל זה ארה"ב. הלחץ האמריקני עשוי להביא לחשש שוויצרי שהתרומה האמריקנית לצל"א תפגע. הממשל פנה לממשלת שוויץ בבקשה שלא תפיץ הפניה, תוך הדגשת תפיסתה של ארה"ב שאין לממשלת שוויץ חובה להפיצה. כן הפעילה ארה"ב לחץ על אש"פ עצמו (הן ישירות בתוניס והן בבירות ערביות) שיחזור בו מפנייתו - אך ללא הענות. כרגע שוקלת מחמ"ד דרישה מממשלת שוויץ (הנראית נחושה בדעתה להפיץ המסמך בספטמבר) להפיץ, לפני פניית אש"פ, את עובדת קיומו של הוויכוח לגבי חובת שוויץ כ- DEPOSITARY.

בקונגרס: הסנטורים גרסלי, דה-קונסיני, קסטן והאטש פנו לשגריר שוויץ בארה"ב והמורשה ברני פרנק יזם, בנוסף לשיחה, מכתב בנושא עליו חתמו שבעה מורשים. לאחר פגרת ה-4 ביולי ינסו נציגינו ליזום מכתב ועליו מספר רב ככל האפשר של חתימות חברי קונגרס הקוראים לממשלת שוויץ להמנע מהפצת הפניה.

גירוש מהשטחים: החלטת מועבי"ט:

בעקבות גירוש שמונה תושבי השטחים - 29/6 ביקש שגריר סוריה, יו"ר הקבוצה הערבית באו"ם, כינוס מועבי"ט. נציגי הקבוצה הבלמ"זית הגישו הצעת החלטה בגנות ישראל ולאחר מגעים עם ארה"ב הסכימו לרכבה ולהסתפק ב"הבעת צער עמוק" (DEEPLY REGRETS).

הצעת ההחלטה התקבלה במועב"ט בתמיכת 14 חברות המועצה ובהימנעות ארה"ב, אף שנציגינו באו"ם ובוושינגטון פנו מספר פעמים בבקשה שארה"ב תטיל וטו.

בדברי ההסבר להצבעתם ציין שגארה"ב הצורך ב"פרספקטיבה נכונה" ושהדיון במועבי"ט לא ייסיע להפגת המתח, להשגת רגיעה או להפסקת הגירוש. ריבוי הגירוש לא יביאו את הצדדים למו"מ. הוא חזר על תמכיתה "בכל לב" של ארה"ב ביוזמה הישראלית לערוך בחירות ביו"ש ועזה כהתחלה לתהליך השלום, אך הדגיש התנגדותה העקרונית של ארה"ב לגירוש.

ועידת הליכוד - תגובות בארה"ב:

בתשובה לשאלות כתבים סירב דובר מחמ"ד (6/7) להתייחס לבעיות פוליטיות פנימיות של ישראל, ואמר כי מחמ"ד מתייחסת רק ליוזמת הממשלה הישראלית וחומכת בה. עם זאת, הוסיף שהצהרות חד-צדדיות, בפרט אם הן מוסיפות הגבלות ליוזמה, אינן מקדמות את סיכויי השלום.

בתדרוך עיתונאים בוורשה אמר המזכיר בייקר ששליח הממשל יגיע למזה"ת כדי לברר עד כמה נשארה ממשלת ישראל מחויבת ליוזמתה. התוספות ליוזמה, שהתקבלו בוועידת הליכוד, מעלות ספקות באשר לרצינות כוונותיה של ישראל, שכן התוספות "אינן מסייעות" לתהליך. (בינתיים הודיע הנשיא בוש שהשליח או המשלחת לא ייצאו כנראה לישראל).





- 4 -

בעיתונות ברחבי ארה"ב התפרסמו מאמרי מערכת רבים וקריקטורות שביקרו בחריפות את ה"תוספות" לעקרונות שמיר (ואת שמיר עצמו) כפוגעים בסיכויי השלום.


ועידת הנשיאים, בתום דיון במצב הפיזה הודעה שתמכה ביזמת השלום כפי שהתקבלה בקבינט ובכנסת. כן קראה לשמר את ממשלת האחדות בהיותה תנאי הכרחי לקידום יזמת השלום.

הועד היהודי-אמריקני הביע דאגתו מהאפשרות שהחלטות הליכוד עלולות להוביל לעמדות נוקשות שיחסמו את התקדמות יזמת השלום וימנעו בפירוק ממשלת האחדות. יש חשיבות עליונה שממשלת ישראל תגלה נכונות לשאת ולתת, ללא הגבלות מוקדמות על הדרך לקיים הבחירות ולקידום התהליך. רק כך ניתן להבטיח את התמיכה המאוחדת שישראל כה נזקקת לה, שכן פירוק ממשלת האחדות תביא לפיצול ביהדות ארה"ב ותחליש את התמיכה בישראל בשעה קריטית זו.

הקונגרס היהודי-אמריקני קרא, בהצהרתו, שלא לפגוע ביזמת השלום המקורית ולא לכבלה, שכן פגיעה ביזמת שמיר תפגע קשות בסיכויי השלום. בהנחיות שפרסם נאקראק לסניפיו קבע הארגון שעיקר יזמת השלום אינו בהחלטה מפלגתית כלשהיא אלא בקיום המדיניים עליהם הסכימה ממשלת ישראל. תכנית "ארבע הנקודות" לא שונתה ונאקראק ממשיך לראות בה את מדיניות ישראל כל עוד לא תכריז ממשלת ישראל על שינויה.

#### קיסינג'ר

קיסינג'ר נזקק בשבועיים האחרונים פעמים אחדות לנושא ישראל והמז"ת בנאומים ובהופעות פומביות. בדבריו אימץ קו תקיף. אש"פ לא יסתפק ביש"ע ולא יסכים לפרוז והוא מדבר על קו '47 ועל החלטת מועבי"ט 181. כל אלה הם בבחינת סכנה חמורה לישראל. קיסינג'ר מקבל את תנאי הלכוד השוללים מדינה פלשתינית, מגע עם אש"פ ושיתוף ערביי ירושלים בבחירות. מו"מ עם אש"פ יסתיים במדינה פלשתינית ושיתוף ערביי ירושלים בבחירות עלול להביא לחלוקתה מחדש. קיסינג'ר מחייב מו"מ בין ישראל לארה"ב שבסופו הסכם על תכנית משותפת והליכה משותפת. יהיה זה מו"מ קשה אך תוצאותיו לישראל תהיינה יותר טובות מאשר התשובות המוכתבות על ידי האירועים. קיסינג'ר מזהיר מפני גלישת האינטפדה לגליל והוא ממליץ וחוזר וממליץ על תמיכה מלוכדת של יהדות ארה"ב בישראל.

ב. ר. ה.  
  
מיכאל שילה

|                                     |   |             |
|-------------------------------------|---|-------------|
| דחיות: מ י ד י                      | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון<br>טופס פרוק 12 | קף: _____   |
| סוג: ש מ ר                          |   | פתוך: _____ |
| תאריך וזמן חבור:<br>14.7.89 - 18:00 | אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופריין                    |             |
| פס' פרוק:<br>הפסיד:                 | דע: מנהל מצפ"א                            |             |
| 324                                 | פאת: לשכת השגריר, וושינגטון               |             |

### משלחת אמריקאית

1. לארי איגלברגר וג'ון קלי התקשרו ומסרו לשגריר כי בפאריס נמסרה הודעה לפיה אין בכוונתם לשלוח משלחת לישראל בשבוע הבא.
2. ג'ון קלי הוסיף שממשיך בהכנותיו לקיים ביקורו בארץ בראשית אוגוסט, כפי שכבר הודיענו.

א/רפ"ק ינ  
לש' השגריר

סיה סן טהה 3 חהא 3 אג'קאג גש 1 א'גש 1 ב'ש'ה 2 ג'ז'ה 2



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10011

תאריך : 14.07.89

נכנס \*\*

סודי

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,10011

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/721

מ-: נושא, נר: 290, תא: 130789, זח: 2030, דח: ב, סג: סו

תח: גס: צפא

נד: 8

סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: מצפ' א

מאת: קישור לקונגרס

סנאט: חוק כספי מחמ' ד-הרשאות: הגבלת הדיאלוג עם אשפ'.

1. בנפרד הצעת תיקון בשושבינות הסנטורים הלמס וקרי שבכוונתם להגיש במליאת הסנאט מחר בבוקר בעת הדיון על החוק. נושא התיקון-איסור מומ' עם טרוריסטים האחראים לרצח אמריקנים.

2. הערב התקשר איגלברגר עם תום דיין והפציר בו לא לתמוך בהצעת התיקון, שכן זה עלול 'להרוג' את יוזמת רוהמ' שמיר.

דיין אמר כי עליו לחשוב עוד בנדון ולא התחייב.

לידיעתכם

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

אק

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

ארת'ר

1977 1 25 10:12  
1977 1 25 10:12  
1977 1 25 10:12  
1977 1 25 10:12  
1977 1 25 10:12  
1977 1 25 10:12  
1977 1 25 10:12  
1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12

1977 1 25 10:12



|                                      |  |                       |
|--------------------------------------|--|-----------------------|
| דחיפות: בהול לבוקר                   | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון<br>טופס פרוק | זר: 1                 |
| סוג: - שלר -                         |  | פתוק: 2               |
| תאריך יוסן חבור:<br>1989 יולי 132000 |  | אל: מצפ"א             |
| כס' פרוק:<br>הפסוד:                  |  | דע:                   |
| 291                                  |  | קיסור לקונגרס<br>כאת: |

סמט: חוק כספי מחמ"ד - הרשאות: הגבלת הדיאלוג עם אש"פ

✓  
Jesse Helms

א סט"ס

כהמשך אלפנו 290.  
להלן תצטרף התיקון:-

3 1 1 1 2  
סמט / שלם גוש א / גוש ב / גוש ד 3 סא

שגריר זר שט"ץ קולוס וורוב

1989-07-13 22:02

2/2  
291  
AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EX. \_\_\_\_\_ Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: To prohibit negotiations with terrorists responsible for the murder, injury or kidnapping of an American citizen.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES-- 101 Cong., 1 Sess.

S. 1160

H.R. \_\_\_\_\_ (or Treaty \_\_\_\_\_) short title

(title) A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1990 for the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Board for International Broadcasting, and for other purposes

- ( ) Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and ordered to be printed  
( ) Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

Intended to be proposed by Mr. Helms (for himself and Mr. Kerry, Mr. Bond, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Coats, Mr. Pressler, \_\_\_\_\_)

Viz: At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

Sec. \_\_\_\_ PROHIBITION ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH TERRORISTS  
RESPONSIBLE FOR AMERICAN DEATHS.

Section 1302(b) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2151), is amended by adding at the end thereof, the following:

" , except that no funds authorized in this or any other act may be obligated or made available for the conduct of negotiations with any representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization unless and until the President certifies to Congress that he has determined the representative did not directly participate in, or conspire in, or was an accessory to the planning or execution of a terrorist activity which resulted in the death, injury or kidnapping of an American citizen."

\* \* \*



500/c  
PREDD BRIEFING BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER ON THE PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT POLITICAL DECLARATION, PARIS, FRANCE, SATURDAY, JULY 15, 1989

Q Mr. Secretary, while we're talking about internal politics, could you clarify what is still a rather ambiguous outcome on sending somebody to Israel to find out what their intentions were? It struck me that you thought it needed some clarification and now evidently it doesn't. What --

SEC. BAKER: Well, I think we've seen a lot happen in the course of a week. You're quite right. I -- my view and the view of all of us was that we had some genuine concern, frankly, that perhaps as a result of the action by the Likud Party, they were in a sense devaluing their own initiative.

We still think it might be useful to send someone, not right now. Never have had in mind the idea of a presidential emissary as some had misinterpreted things, I think. I mean, we're not talking -- and I think we made it very clear we're not talking about shuttle diplomacy or Phil Habib getting on an airplane, and that sort of thing, and never have been. We still think it might be useful at some point, but not right now, because Prime Minister Shamir himself has made a number of statements that the initiative has not been changed. I think in one of them he said it has not been changed one iota. The National Unity government there appears to be working together very hard to reconfirm their commitment to the election proposal. Israeli government officials have confirmed to us and to others that they are very much committed to the proposal.

And the last thing I guess I'd say on it is that we've been working very hard here in Paris to support the election proposal with the summit countries and in meetings with other countries, such as my meeting of yesterday with Foreign Minister Meguid of Egypt. I hope that clarifies it for you.

Q On the last point there, could you -- how have you done so far as the conversion? It seems the United States has been pretty much alone in pushing for -- in supporting the Israeli initiative. Do you have friends now?

SEC. BAKER: No, we had friends before. It's wrong to say how are we doing on converting, because we were able, I think, to bring a number of countries -- to gain support from a number of countries in Europe of the Israeli election proposal who previously had not been supportive. We think we still have that support, provided that they know that the Israeli government itself is every bit as committed to that proposal as they were when they advanced it. And we believe, based on the -- on what we've seen during the course of this week and the contacts we've had with Israeli government officials, that they are every bit as committed as they were when they advanced it.

28 28 28

33

שגרירות ישראל ברושיןגסון  
טופס מברק

סלוקה 7

דף 1 מתוך 3  
דחיפות: מיוחד  
סוג: כללי

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע : לשכת רה"מ

תאריך, זמן: 13.7.89  
מספר המברק:

מאת: עתונות

המשרד:

264

להלן הקטעים המותיים מתוך ראיון של הנשיא בוש במטוסו  
בדרך לפאריס.

יוסי גל

יוסי גל

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
61  
62  
63  
64  
65  
66  
67  
68  
69  
70  
71  
72  
73  
74  
75  
76  
77  
78  
79  
80  
81  
82  
83  
84  
85  
86  
87  
88  
89  
90  
91  
92  
93  
94  
95  
96  
97  
98  
99  
100



2/3 264

Q Who are you going to send to Israel as an emissary?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, there isn't any emissary going from the President of the United States; there's no determination of that at this point.

Q Are you saying that the Secretary of State might send an emissary --

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I'm saying that we have people go to Israel all the time and to other countries in the area. But when you say who am I sending as an emissary, I was putting that in the context of past high-level shuttle diplomats or something of that nature, and there are no plans for that. I reserve the right to send people anytime I think it's in the interest of the United States, but there are no plans for that kind of level diplomacy.

Q Why is the US making --

PRESIDENT BUSH: But if somebody felt it was worthwhile, somebody over there would welcome a special emissary from the President, I'd be very open-minded about that. But there are no plans. You asked me whether there are plans.

Q -- find out what's going on in terms of --

PRESIDENT BUSH: We've got a very able Ambassador over there who knows a great deal about what's going on and has excellent contacts with the government.

Q What do you think is going on over there? Shamir has simply restated what his position has been all along. Why is the US so shook up over this?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I don't know that the US is so shook up, but they know the United States' policy, and the United States' on settlements, for example, has not changed -- and it is not going to change. And so we might as well be frank with our friends, because that's what friendship is about. And so I want to see things go forward in terms of the peace process over there. And we want to see the election process go forward. And if anybody can make a case for me that the recent deliberations in that party will enhance the election process, then I'd say, great. But I'm afraid other people are looking at it saying what's happened does not enhance the possibilities of election. So the US policy is set, and I'm the President of the United States, and Israel is a friend and will remain a friend, but I have to say what our policy is. And so I don't think there's a great heartburn here, but I want to just continue to articulate what we believe.

Q -- Shamir said -- what should be important from the very start -- so I'm trying to figure out why the United States is so distressed --

✱

2/3

✱

✱

3/3 264

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I can't -- you go ahead and talk to the State Department about that. You're talking to the President. I use the policy, after a lot of input from the State Department and I

want the US policy to succeed. We've thought out very carefully what we think is best and our support is for our principles. And they've got great difficulties inside of Israel. I understand that,

I understand the political pressures. But I can't be varying US policy every day to accommodate political change. I'm not going to do that.

Q: How about the Palestinians ---

PRESIDENT BUSH: Keep encouraging them to do what they ought to do -- to participate in this election process. Absolutely. And deplore the kind of violence that we see when a bus is carried over a cliff and carrying a lot of innocent people to their death, or innocent people getting killed in other ways -- on both sides. I mean we have to stand for something. And I'm going to continue to try to do that.

✗

✗

✗

3/3





2/2 279

Q General, the President made some more comments today regarding Israeli settlements. Could you please spell out, what is the administration's apparent message to Israel at this point regarding the peace process?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think the message is that we are naturally interested and we have been supporting what the Israeli government has announced as the process of elections. And we are interested in whether or not there has been any change in government policy. I think it doesn't go any further than that.

Q There has been a change? You think there has been a change?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yeah, what Likud does is a party matter, and what we deal with is the Israeli government. And all the talk about has there or has there not been a change in Israel, is there not going to be a -- some kind of a

delegation, or what have you, to the Israelis was just to ascertain, in the wake of the Likud conference, whether or not there has been a change in Israeli government policy. I think that's not clear at this point.

\*

\*

2/2



זמן הפצה 7:38

מסודר

מסודר

מסודר

מסודר

בחול -- 0738 13 יוני 88

אם מזכיר לדו"מ/ע. נבו-באמצעות מנכ"ל המוסד -- בהוד

מאת: לשכת ראש המוסד/י. די-גובר

כודי מיותר -- 1308

מברק מוויינגטון - בחול פנה

לחנן מברק לידיע:

עדות שלי בביה"נ.

1. רצב הקטעים הרלבנטיים מהיכונן הדברים בין המיסטון

לשכ:

צטט

YYY

000

REP. HAMILTON: I HAVE SEEN REPORT AFTER REPORT ABOUT INDIRECT ISRAELI-PLO TALKS, SECRET TALKS THROUGH THE MAROCCANS, INDIRECT TALKS THROUGH US, EGYPTIAN AND WEST BANK PALESTINIANS. EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS ARE SAYING THE ISRAEL-PLO CHANNEL, AND I'M QUOTING HIM NOW, 'IS BECOMING VERY CLEAR AND VERY SUBSTANTIVE, 'END OF QUOTE. FINANCE MINISTER PERES HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AN OFFICIAL DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IS NOW GOING ON BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE PLO. AND THE QUESTION ON MY MIND, I GUESS, IS DO WE HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THAT? ARE THOSE REPORTS ACCURATE? WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT IT?

MR. KELLY: CONGRESSMAN, I THINK IT'S AN EXAGGERATION FOR ANY PRESS REPORT TO SAY AN OFFICIAL DIALOGUE IS GOING ON BETWEEN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THE PLO. I DON'T THINK THAT'S REALITY. THERE'S A LOT OF PRESS REPORTING ABOUT IT----

REP. HAMILTON: THE QUOTE WAS FROM FINANCE MINISTER PERES AND HE SAID THAT AN OFFICIAL DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IS 'TAKING SHAPE,' THOSE ARE HIS WORDS.

MR. KELLY: OH, TAKING SHAPE, I'M SORRY, I UNDERSTOOD YOU TO SAY 'TAKING PLACE'. I DON'T KNOW OF ANY OFFICIAL DIALOGUE THAT'S TAKING PLACE. THERE ARE REPORTS BOTH IN THE PRESS AND IN CLASSIFIED REPORTING ABOUT CONTACTS. I'D BEEN HAPPY TO GO IN THE LATTER WITH YOU IN A CLOSED SESSION.

000

|                  |                                 |                              |
|------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| דף: 1<br>מחנך: 3 | טובס מברק<br>קשר ניו-יורק 13    | דחיות: מידי                  |
| אל:              | מנחם מצפ"א, בנצור - סמנכ"ל צפ"א | סיוג: שמור                   |
| דע:              | פלג רושינגטון                   | תז: 13/400                   |
| מאת:             | סגן הקונכ"ל                     | מס מדיק: 66 - V/11<br>0 0361 |

ראש העיריה קוץ'.

במסגרות טקס קבלת פרס "עמית ירושלים": מטעם מדי קולק. קוץ' העכיר ביקורת נגד עתונאים המציינים דימוי שלילי לישראל. במיוחד יצא חוצץ נגד פאט האמיל שפרסם בשבוע שעבר בניו יורק פוסט דעתו בעת קיצוץ הסיוע האמריקאי לישראל אלא אם כן ישראל תציית לרצון ארה"ב. הדגיש כי הסיוע הניתן לא לוקח בחשבון פיחות הדולר ומידי שנה מאבד מערכו. חזר ואמר כי יש לתת לישראל סיוע כספי צבאי ומוטרי לו היא זקוקה וזכאית.

ווישינגטון - מצ"ב דבריו כפי שסוכמה ע"י בטי ארנברג להפצה לקונסוליות.

מרדכי ידיד

$\frac{2}{100} \times 100 = 2\%$

W. H. N.



SUMMARY OF REMARKS OF MAYOR EDWARD KOCH  
UPON HIS RECEIPT OF GUARDIAN OF JERUSALEM AWARD  
at ADL, New York, July 13, 1989

361/66

2  
3

Mayor Edwar Koch received the Guardian of Israel award from Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem at a breakfast at the ADL offices on July 13, 1989. It was presented to him on behalf of Mayor Kollek by Director General of the Jerusalem Municipality Aharon Sarig. Mayor Koch was deeply moved by the award and the follwing is a summary of his remarks :

It is a great honor to receive this scroll - I will honor it as I do the Torah. This means more to me than the Legion d'Honneur I received from President Mitterand since I am a son of David and I consider myself a son of a faith more than 5,000 years old.

I represent a city comprised of many ethnic groups and I speak out against the oppression of members of all those ethnic groups - I am against the system of apartheid in South Africa, against the oppression of Communist regimes in South America, against the oppression of the Irish and against Arab feudal lords who would want to push Israel into the sea. No other ethnic group in this city has asked me to desist from speaking out against the oppression of its people. No one has asked me to stop talking and to let someone else do the talking. I am not ashamed to speak out for my own people. I uphold the tenet of Hillel the Elder, " If I am not for myself then who will be, if I am for myself alone then who am I, and if not now when?" To their discredit, a few members of the Jewish community have asked me not speak out but I am not ashamed.

Some journalists perpetrate a negative image of Israel with malice aforethought. Pete Hamill wrote an obscenity that appeared in the New York Post last week asking that the United States curtail aid to Israel unless Israel does what the United States wants. This is an outrage. It was also an outrage to compare the imprisonment of rock-throwing Palestinians who seek to undermine Israel to Jewish victims of Nazi concentration camps. Others like Hammil, Tony Lewis, Reeves pillory Israel.

361 / 66

3  
3

Israel is not above criticism but talk is cheap when your own life is not on the line. I do not myself defend Israel in the army, in the field. It is Israel who has to make her own decisions where and when to draw the line.

The United States does not threaten other countries with cutting off aid when they don't comply with their wishes. The NATO European countries receive \$130 billion per year and they do not conform to all the wishes of the United States. In addition they demand that U.S. soldiers be posted there and endanger their own lives if need be. Israel doesn't demand that.

I thought that Sadat was a martyr for peace. I had also hoped that Mubarak would behave to a similar standard but recently I saw him embracing Quadaffi - how can you depend on leaders such as these?

Why should American Jews excoriate Israel daily as is done in the media? On the contrary, we should give Israel the financial, military and moral support that she needs and deserves. This is what the United States understood was necessary when Israel was called upon to relinquish the Sinai - the U.S. understood the need for recompense for all the effort Israel had put into that area.

I was extremely worried when in the 1970's Israel was at war and was desperately waiting for the arms it badly needed and the United States was dangerously delaying delivery.

We also failed to open the gates to allow the Jews of Europe to come when Hitler was still willing to send them to us. Jews need protection - we are a small people.

I take this award seriously, as a charge and as requirement - and I will not be found wanting.

Betty Ehrenberg



10

|                     |                           |                 |
|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| דמיפות: מידי        | שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון | ק: 1            |
| סוג: גלרי           | טופס פרוק                 | כתיב: 16        |
| תאריך וזמן חבור:    |                           | אל: מצפייא      |
| 13 ביולי 1989 10:30 |                           |                 |
| כס: פרוק            |                           | דע: לשכת שהייה  |
| הפסד:               |                           | לשכת רהימ       |
| 256                 |                           | כאז: ק. לקונגרס |

ביחניבו עדות קלי  
בהגשן לשלכו 242.

רצ"ב החלק האחרון של תמליל הדיון.

אחרי

ורא ורנאי פנא  
יהודית ורנאי דרגר,

סה ס/סה 3  
סה 3  
סה 1  
סה 1  
סה 2

ד.ס.

תפוצה:

256

2  
16

and

certainly this is but a piece of the terrorist activities and the murder and the attempted terrorism as well as actual terrorism that's taken place, what's our response?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, first of all, I was indeed aware of those incidents. Having lived in Lebanon, I know that there are a lot of different Palestinian gangs that operate in that country. I know that many of them are capable and do mount operations that are not at the behest of the leadership of the PLO. I know that some of those organizations are actively opposed to Arafat and what he stands for and believe that his endorsement of 242 and 338 was an error and would like nothing better than to put him into what they believe would be a difficult position.

REP. ACKERMAN: Ambassador, understanding that, there are some groups within the contexts that I just read that are opposed to Arafat and would like to do him whatever disservice they may, but certainly within those 11 that I cited, there are quite a few mainstream organizations, including Mr. Arafat himself, including his second in command, including his spokespersons -- does not my reading and understanding of what seems to be common language instructions to Ambassador Pelletreau that people who engage, participate and yet do not even denounce these acts be condemned by the PLO and be expelled from the PLO? Doesn't this fly in the face of the conditions that we've set? Have they not violated those conditions and do we not continue to sit patiently with these murderers, pretending that their activities are not continuing?

MR. KELLY: The activities that you described happened, absolutely, Congressman.

REP. ACKERMAN: And is that not contrary to the conditions that we set?

MR. KELLY: We do not believe that these were the directed operations of the PLO high command.

REP. ACKERMAN: Have they been denounced by the PLO? Have any of those -- any one -- pick one. I gave you 11, pick one. Which one has been denounced by the PLO in conjunction with the terms of the conditionality of our talks? One out of 11. Not one?

MR. KELLY: I do not believe so, no.



256

3  
16

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Engel.

REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you.

REP. ENGEL: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Many people have said factions of the PLO, that it's not al Fatah which is Yassir Arafat's faction, but it's other factions. You referred to them, Mr. Ambassador, as "gangs." I think the very important point that Mr. Ackerman is making and that I would like to make is Mr. Arafat has not condemned any of them. Mr. Arafat's group has not condemned any of these attacks. And if Mr. Arafat purports to be the leader of the whole PLO, not just the Fatah faction, then he ought to be taking a very active role in condemning these terrorist acts. And if he is not speaking for the whole PLO, then why are we sitting down and talking to him?

MR. KELLY: Well, we're not talking to him, we're talking to his lieutenants and we're telling them that they ought to be condemning and they ought to be getting out of this operating mode.

REP. ENGEL: But it goes back to how long are we going to say that without any kind of action on their part. I think that you've witnessed today the frustration of many of us in the United States Congress that we continue to talk to them and we really don't see, other than a few words which are meaningless, we really don't see? any change in their actions.

Mr. Ambassador, what have we done to try to get our European allies or the Saudis, Mr. Mubarak, actively involved in trying to promote the election plan, Mr. Shamir's election plan?

MR. KELLY: We have talked to -- let me take them in the order you mentioned -- to other nations, to the Europeans, and we note that -- oh, it would have been about the 26th of June, within a day or two of that, the European Community at its summit meeting in Madrid, in its statement on the Middle East did, acknowledge or recognize the government of Israel's position of May 14th as -- I don't have the exact text in front of me -- but in effect, as a positive contribution moving towards peace in the Middle East. And we certainly had earlier conveyed that message to the Europeans

and have been emphasizing that this is -- this provides a potential door to progress. And so, there has been recognition and public acknowledgement by the Europeans of the value of the government of Israel's position. (Coughs.) Excuse me.

We have discussed the position, the proposal, with other Arab governments in the area. They have made a variety of public statements about it. None have endorsed the proposal in its totality. Some of them have acknowledged publicly that this might provide a means towards progress in the area, and so there has been

if you will, at least a conditional endorsement on the part of some Arab governments. Some have had nothing to say about it, and some Arab government spokesmen have condemned it. It's a mixed report.



256

4  
16

REP. ENGEL: You know, we're always talking of the so-called "moderate Saudis" -- that's a word that we throw around a lot, or the administration has thrown around, in coming to Congress and saying, "Well, let's sell the Saudis planes, because they're moderate, they're our friends," etcetera, etcetera. It seems to me if they chose, and if they really were moderate -- and I really question whether they are -- they could play a very, very constructive role since they bankroll a lot of the PLO, and they have a lot of influence in general -- could play a very constructive role in getting the PLO and the Palestinians to accept these proposals for elections. And I really believe that our government, instead of putting such public pressure on the Israelis, ought to put some public pressure on other people that we think are so-called "moderates," like the Saudis.

I'm wondering if we could -- if I could ask you about the Soviet Union and their -- the agreement, the treaty that they signed with Iran. What moves are we taking? Obviously, the Soviet Union has always had very close relations with Iraq, and have always traditionally been the ally, at least in the past few decades, of the Iraqis when there was hostility toward Iran, when the Shah was there, and even in the early years of the Ayatollah. What are doing -- you can tell us -- to perhaps talk to the Iraqis? Perhaps there is some annoyance on their part with the Soviets -- I'm sure there is -- in signing the agreement with the Iran government. What are we doing to perhaps work on this -- on the Iraqis to perhaps moderate them, and try to get them to change some of their hard-line positions with regard to the United States and with regard to the Middle East?

MR. KELLY: There has been worry, concern, by Iraq, by other countries in the Gulf over the reports of the expanded Soviet-Iranian relationship, these economic and trade deals, and the reported agreement on defensive assistance, whatever that may mean in exact terms. And we've discussed this with the government of Iraq, and with other governments in the Gulf. They are concerned, they are apprehensive.

I think because some of them, particularly Iraq, have a very significant relationship of their own with the Soviet Union, I am confident that the government of Iraq has raised this with the Soviet Union, and no -- I have no doubt complained about it. What response they were given, I do not know, but certainly it is a matter of concern, and it's one that we're going to be bringing up again with the Soviet Union because, I think, a rearmed, hostile Iran is in no one's interest anywhere.

REP. ENGEL: But I would like our government -- the point I was trying to make is, I would like our government to perhaps take advantage of this in terms of openings with the Iraqis to try to, perhaps, get them to change some of their policies in the past, and perhaps swing a little bit more towards the West, or towards some

END



256

5/16

kind of moderation. And I hope --

MR. KELLY: Good advice, and something we have in mind.

REP. ENGE: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Secretary, I know you've been here a long time, and we certainly appreciate the patience you've had in responding to the many questions of members. I do have, still, a few more questions, and I will try to get through them quickly because you've had a long ordeal this morning.

First, on Echemical weaponsF ad ballistic missile proliferation. I want to get a sense of what the administration is doing about that problem. Are we talking to suppliers? Are we seeking negotiations? Are we supporting some kind of an on-site inspection regime? What is it we're doing at this point?

MR. KELLY: The previous administration, Mr. Chairman, put in place the missile technology control regime, which involves the United States and the six other nations which are members of the industrialized summit, which is going to be meeting tomorrow in Paris. And that's an agreement by each to adopt unilateral export controls on technology and equipment which would contribute to people developing a long-range ballistic missile capability. That doesn't involve the Soviets and the Chinese, and we have talked to both of them about the problems that some of their sales present in the Middle East region.

On the chemicals weapons front, we've been working with the Australian group, called -- because it's chaired by the Government of Australia, which attempts to find agreement among exporters to limit precursors of chemicals which could lead to the production of chemical weapons or sale of things that would facilitate plans. Now, obviously, the facts on the ground in the Middle East tell us that those efforts haven't been universally successful. We are most concerned by the chemical weapons plant in Libya; we're concerned by facilities in other countries. But we are working with the supplier countries.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you expect -- is there any reason to think we'll have progress soon, significant progress?

MR. KELLY: In terms of an exporter cutoff? I think progress will probably be incremental. I hope someday it will be airtight.

REP. HAMILTON: Is is already too late?

MR. KELLY: No, not if, through the President's initiative at the Chemical Weapons Conference in Geneva, there can be ultimate agreement on a verifiable chemical weapons agreement which would lead to the destruction of stockpiles.

256

6  
16

REP. HAMILTON: Is it possible to get an agreement on chemical weapon initiative without getting into the nuclear weapon control issue, because the Arab states feel that the chemical weapon capabilities are counterbalanced to --

MR. KELLY: That's the horn of the dilemma. When we discuss chemical limitations with the Arabs, they want to bring up nuclear limitations. The two have not been delinked.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, let me ask you some questions on the West Bank and Gaza. It's the 20th month now of violence. Do you see any signs of it abating?

MR. KELLY: No. And indeed the statistics of the last few months show an increase in violence.

REP. HAMILTON: The trend is the other way, more violence?

From where you sit, do you think the intifada is likely to go on indefinitely?

MR. KELLY: I hope not indefinitely. There are no near term --

REP. HAMILTON: You don't see --

MR. KELLY: -- prospects --

REP. HAMILTON: You don't see any signs of it stopping though?

MR. KELLY: I don't see any signs of a downturn.

REP. HAMILTON: We had a study come out by the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights in New York, noting some disturbing trends in Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza. Are you aware of that study?

MR. KELLY: I haven't seen that particular study, no, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: They are talking about beatings while in custody, and use of gunfire at close range, and misuse of plastic bullets, and so forth. You are not aware of that study at all?

MR. KELLY: I haven't seen that, I'll make it a point to get a hold of a copy of it.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, I just wondered, we have not then discussed it with the Israelis I presume?



256  $\frac{7}{16}$ 

MR. KELLY: Discussed that study?

REP. HAMILTON: That's correct.

MR. KELLY: Not to my knowledge. No, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: There is legislation being considered in the Knesset now which would have the effect of cutting off outside funds to Palestinian self-help and development projects. Are you aware of that pending legislation?

MR. KELLY: I am not, Congressman.

REP. HAMILTON: Would you take a look at that and see what you think the impact of that might be on our programs?

MR. KELLY: I will indeed, and I'd be happy to supply you a position for the record, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, the schools have been closed in the West Bank for 19 months. What are we saying to the Israelis with respect to that policy?

MR. KELLY: We have talked to the government of Israel about the benefits that might flow from a reopening of the schools. Thus far they have not decided to reopen the schools.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you think they are considering seriously the possibility of reopening the schools?

MR. KELLY: I just don't know the answer to that question, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Is it our view that the policy contravenes international conventions which protect institutions devoted to the care and education of children?

MR. KELLY: On the exact legal point, I don't know. I'd be happy to answer for the record, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: All right. On the deportation question. About 56 Palestinians, I think, have been deported. Do these deportations violate existing international conventions in your view?

MR. KELLY: It is our view that they do, yes.

REP. HAMILTON: Are we seeking to try to end the deportations?

MR. KELLY: We have repeatedly brought our views before the government of Israel.

REP. HAMILTON: So, it's on our agenda with Israel. Is that

256

8/16

correct?

MR. KELLY: It is, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: There have been a number of violent incidents involving settlers in the West Bank. Have they been increasing lately?

MR. KELLY: That is my impression, but I am not confident the statistics bear me out. We should take a look at that.

REP. HAMILTON: What is the Israeli policy today regarding the use of force by settlers?

MR. KELLY: We should supply a detailed answer for the record. In a nutshell, I believe that the Israeli policy is that settlers are to act only in self-defense.

REP. HAMILTON: Would you check that for me, please?

MR. KELLY: I'd be happy to.

REP. HAMILTON: And I am also informed that there are a number of American citizens involved in that.

MR. KELLY: There are a number of American citizens at settlements in the West Bank who are active.

REP. HAMILTON: And any implication of that from your point of view I would certainly be interested in. I would like to ask a few questions with regard to the Soviet Union as well. What is the dialogue today between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the Middle East? Do you meet, are you scheduled to meet with your Soviet counterpart?

MR. KELLY: Secretary Baker, of course, met with Shevardnadze in early May in Moscow and discussed among other issues, the Middle East. Then in mid-June, the 18th or 19th -- I can't remember exactly, Mr. Chairman -- Dennis Ross, the Director of Policy Planning and I co-chaired two days of talks with the Soviets here in Washington to talk about the Middle East peace process and other issues in the Middle East. There is no next meeting scheduled. We agreed with them to be in contact through respective embassies as things come up. But I anticipate we will be meeting again with them sometime in the next several months.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you think the Middle East is a higher priority for the Soviets than it was previously?

MR. KELLY: External actions would indicate yes because the Soviet Foreign Minister toured the area which no Soviet foreign minister had done in many years, and they've been active. So, I



256

 $\frac{9}{16}$ 

think the answer is yes.

REP. HAMILTON: So, they're seeking to improve their ties with Egypt and Jordan, the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia?

MR. KELLY: They are indeed, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, what about the Soviet relationship with Israel? Are they about ready to restore diplomatic relations, do you think?

MR. KELLY: I don't think a restoration is imminent, Mr. Chairman. They have discussed it as a potentiality and they've had direct talks, as you know, with officials of the government of Israel. There are some moves, such as the recent El Al flights to Soviet Armenia to bring back victims of the earthquake which indicate increased contacts between the two countries, but I don't anticipate an early recognition.

REP. HAMILTON: Are they making progress on the questions of emigration and trade and consular issues?

MR. KELLY: The indications are that emigration of Soviet Jewry is an issue on which progress is being made. I'm not actually up to date on trade contacts between Israel and the Soviet Union.

REP. HAMILTON: Are we having discussions with the Soviet Union with respect to international terrorism, particularly as it reflects -- as it manifests itself in the Middle East?

MR. KELLY: We have had an exchange with the Soviet Union on international terrorism worldwide. It wasn't just focused on the Middle East.

REP. HAMILTON: And are you getting anywhere? Are you getting any cooperation?

MR. KELLY: I didn't handle the contacts, Mr. Chairman. My understanding is that there was -- this sounds like "diplomatie," but I think there's a point to it -- there was an exchange of views and on some of the issues, there was more substance to the conversation.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you have any reason to think that the Soviets will be helpful to us in getting our hostages out of Lebanon?

MR. KELLY: I would certainly hope so, Mr. Chairman. I haven't seen any concrete evidence of that. But that is something --

REP. HAMILTON: Do you have -- do you have --

256

10  
16

REP. HAMILTON: You have. Do you have anything to report to us at all about the hostages?

MR. KELLY: I'm sorry to say that there's no good news to report.

REP. HAMILTON: What is the status of the US-Soviet discussions on the question of chemical weapon proliferation, missile proliferation in the Middle East?

MR. KELLY: On missile proliferation, the Soviets have indicated that they're going to act -- these aren't their words, these are mine -- to limit themselves from putting in long-range systems. On chemical proliferation, the Soviets have taken some pleasure in pointing out that it has been allies of the United States who have often contributed to chemical proliferation in the Middle East.

REP. HAMILTON: What's the next step?

MR. KELLY: With the Soviets or with the allies?

REP. HAMILTON: No, with the Soviets.

MR. KELLY: We're going to keep talking to them about the proliferation issue. I think they're conscious of the dangers there.

REP. HAMILTON: Is this scenario where we have a common interest with the Soviet Union?

MR. KELLY: I would hope we have a common interest, because obviously --

REP. HAMILTON: On the basis of your discussions, do you think we do have?

MR. KELLY: I think so because of their --

REP. HAMILTON: Do the Soviets think so?

MR. KELLY: I believe they do, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you see growing friction in the Soviet-Syrian relation?

MR. KELLY: Friction, no. No, Mr. Chairman, I don't.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you see any change in the Soviet-Syrian military relationship? Are the Soviets cutting back their arms to Syria?



256

11  
16

MR. KELLY: I have not noted any significant changes. No, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Is Moscow pressing Syria to pay its debt -- on its military debt?

MR. KELLY: I am told that is the case, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Is the King's position in Jordan, his political position eroding?

MR. KELLY: The King has announced plans to hold parliamentary elections, and I believe that the idea is that, with greater participation on the part of the public, the King's position will be maintained.

REP. HAMILTON: Is he asking for those elections because he senses his position is eroding?

MR. KELLY: I don't know the answer to that question. That has been speculated by some commentators.

REP. HAMILTON: The United States government -- we do not feel his position is eroding?

MR. KELLY: No, Mr. Chairman, I think we do not.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, he had some riots, didn't he, this spring that led to the resignation of the Prime Minister. Who were these people that rioted in Jordan?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, I'm not expert on that. If I could supply you an answer for the record.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you have any reason to think there's some danger, some risk, of political instability in Jordan?

MR. KELLY: I think, in a country that's confronted with grave economic difficulties as Jordan is and which has had active representative participation, the risk exists.

REP. HAMILTON: I wanted to ask a question or two with respect to an earlier question that Mr. Torricelli had asked on US compensation for the victims of Iran Flight 655 last summer. Will the United States recognize the jurisdiction of the World Court in the lawsuit Iran has brought against the United States because of

256

12  
T6

the incident?

MR. KELLY: May I submit an answer for the record, Mr. Chairman?

REP. HAMILTON: You may. Have we not determined the position yet?

MR. KELLY: We may well have, but I don't want to get it wrong.

REP. HAMILTON: (Laughs.) On -- with respect to Egypt, what is the status of the talks taking place between the EIMFF and the Egyptian government?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, an IMF team was out in Egypt a week or two ago. They are now back in Washington. There is an internal IMF review underway. There may be a decision within the next few days, and if not that, in a week.

REP. HAMILTON: Are you optimistic that the talks can be concluded successfully?

MR. KELLY: I have not been briefed on the results of the IMF team's trip. I'm looking forward to getting that in the next day or two.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you expect a conclusion of an agreement soon?

MR. KELLY: I hope so.

REP. HAMILTON: Within a month?

MR. KELLY: Until we're briefed on the results of the team's trip, I can't answer that, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, can we expect that the available US cash transfers that now total \$230 million to be released to Egypt only after the talks are resolved with the IMF?

MR. KELLY: I think that would be a major progress mark, yes, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: In other words, the funds will not be released until those talks with the IMF are resolved --

MR. KELLY: That's my understanding --

REP. HAMILTON: -- is that correct?

MR. KELLY: -- Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, is each reconsidering the M-1 tank



256

13/16

co-assembly project?

MR. KELLY: I have read that in the press. My understanding is the Government of Egypt tell us it is not reconsidering.

REP. HAMILTON: With regard to Syria, are we getting any cooperation from Syria today with respect to the American hostages in Lebanon?

MR. KELLY: For the last several years, Mr. Chairman, the Syrians have told us they would do everything they possibly can to help. It's a matter of debate as to whether they have done everything they possibly can.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you know anything they've done?

MR. KELLY: Of recent vintage??

REP. HAMILTON: Anything, anytime.

MR. KELLY: I know for a fact that they intervened actively to try to get Charlie Glass out after he was kidnapped. I am not aware of other active intervention of that type.

REP. HAMILTON: Are they helping at all to curb the activities of extremist Palestinian groups which have safe haven and support from Syria?

MR. KELLY: I have seen no evidence that they are, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Are there any trends in Syria that support international terrorism?

MR. KELLY: The trends are there, in that there are groups that remain in Syria or in Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon which engage in international terrorism.

REP. HAMILTON: Has Abu Nidal left Syria?

MR. KELLY: He has removed himself and his headquarters to Libya. His operatives still operate in Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon.

REP. HAMILTON: Why does Syria continue to give safe haven to Jibril's PFLP group?

MR. KELLY: I don't know -- I don't know their explanation of it, Mr. Chairman. We believe that they should not provide safe haven to Jibril and his group.

REP. HAMILTON: Is it accurate that a suspect in the Pan Am 103 tragedy is hiding in Syria?

256

14  
16

MR. KELLY: Is hiding in Syria?

REP. HAMILTON: Now.

MR. KELLY: I don't know the answer to that question, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Are we getting any cooperation from Syria with respect to the investigation of that accident?

MR. KELLY: Syria has told us that if evidence in the investigation points to the involvement of people within Syrian jurisdiction, that the Government of Syria will take action against them.

REP. HAMILTON: We will have, Mr. Secretary, a number of questions to submit to you in writing. You've indicated responses to some of the matters you were not sure about. We would appreciate, of course, that you got those responses to us within the next week or so.

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Secretary, can you confirm that there are no Iraqi Frog missiles in Lebanon?

MR. KELLY: I cannot confirm there are no Iraqi Frog missiles there. We have no evidence that they have arrived.

REP. HAMILTON: -- arms in general continue to pour into Lebanon?

MR. KELLY: Yes, to all elements. In the last week or 10 days a lot of governments have announced they're cutting it off. The shipments which were en route had been launched before those statements. We'll have to see whether there's any proof to that.

REP. HAMILTON: The Frog missiles then may have been sent, but we don't have any confirmation of their arrival. Is that right?

MR. KELLY: We have no evidence that they were landed, if you will, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we have evidence they were sent?

MR. KELLY: We have good reason to believe that there were Frog



256

15  
16

missiles shipped. We do not have evidence that they were brought ashore.

REP. HAMILTON: What are we trying to do to stop the arms flow into that country?

MR. KELLY: We have talked to the various countries involved and told them that we think that now, more than ever, restraint is needed.

REP. HAMILTON: Various countries involved being?

MR. KELLY: Iraq, ESyriaF, EJordan, Egypt.F We have not talked to Iran since we don't have relations with them nor have we talked to ELibyaF.

REP. HAMILTON: I wanted to ask a question or two about Iran. How do you state US policy to Iran today??

MR. KELLY: US policy towards Iran is that we would like to see normal relations restored. To do that, the Iranians will have to take action to bring about the safe, immediate release of our hostages in Lebanon, and will have to stop involvement in international terrorism. We are willing to discuss this with an authorized representative of the government of Iran.

REP. HAMILTON: Are those preconditions to talks?

MR. KELLY: They are not preconditions to talks, but they are preconditions to a restoration of normal relations.

REP. HAMILTON: So, we are prepared to talk with authoritative persons of the Iranian government, period. That's our policy. And the Iranian policy is what, they are prepared to talk to us, are they not?

MR. KELLY: They have not responded to those offers. The President reiterated this in his inaugural speech. There has been no meaningful response from any competent Iranian authority.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we have a reliable channel to get communication back and forth to Iran?

MR. KELLY: We have high confidence that we can send a message to Iran that reaches it's destination. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, there are many other questions, of course. We've had an unusually long session because of the long lapse since this subcommittee has had an opportunity to visit with an Assistant Secretary. We thank you for your appearance this morning and this afternoon. We certainly look forward to our relationship with you over a period of time now.

1989-07-13 12:10

1408039

256

11  
~~16~~  
16

We do have some questions that we will submit to you promptly.

MR. KELLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: The subcommittee stands adjourned.

END?.EOF

END



|                                     |                           |                  |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|
| ד"ר: $\frac{1}{4}$<br>מחיר: 22      | יוכס מברק<br>קשר ניו-יורק | דחיפות:<br>נ"כ   |
| אל: מנהל טעפ"א, כנצור - סמנכ"ל צפ"א | סיוג: שמור                | תזח: 13 11-      |
| דע: השגריר וושינגטון                | מס מדיק: 62-11            | מאת: סגן הקונכ"ל |
|                                     | 0 0334                    |                  |

אחות

יוזמת השלום.מצ"כ מכתב אייב פוקסמן מה- 10 ביולי 89 למזכיר המדינה והודעתם לתקשורת.

מרדכי יריד

1  
 2  
 3  
 4  
 5  
 6  
 7  
 8  
 9  
 10  
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 15  
 16  
 17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25  
 26  
 27  
 28  
 29  
 30  
 31  
 32  
 33  
 34  
 35  
 36  
 37  
 38  
 39  
 40  
 41  
 42  
 43  
 44  
 45  
 46  
 47  
 48  
 49  
 50  
 51  
 52  
 53  
 54  
 55  
 56  
 57  
 58  
 59  
 60  
 61  
 62  
 63  
 64  
 65  
 66  
 67  
 68  
 69  
 70  
 71  
 72  
 73  
 74  
 75  
 76  
 77  
 78  
 79  
 80  
 81  
 82  
 83  
 84  
 85  
 86  
 87  
 88  
 89  
 90  
 91  
 92  
 93  
 94  
 95  
 96  
 97  
 98  
 99  
 100



2/4

0 0331/62

July 10, 1989

The Honorable James Baker III  
Secretary of State  
2201 C Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing to express our concern that the Administration's desire to continue its dialogue with the PLO has resulted in a softened U.S. position toward the organization -- one which we believe may ultimately work against American interests. We would like to bring several examples from recent days to your attention.

First is a July 1 statement by an Administration official which, as reported in The New York Times, indicated that the government considers the PLO to have wiped the slate "clean" following Yasser Arafat's renunciation of terrorism and recognition of Israel last December.

It is true that the words spoken by Arafat in Geneva contrasted significantly with the language of terror with which he has been commonly associated. But the PLO has far to go before its slate can be considered clear of violence and rejectionism. Indeed, the Palestine National Covenant, which calls for Israel's destruction, remains intact as the PLO's founding charter. High ranking PLO officials, including Arafat's chief aide Salah Khalaf, with whom the Administration has engaged in talks continue to call for armed struggle against Israel. And the intifada, which has cost hundreds of lives since its start in 1987, receives daily fuel from PLO financial support and instruction. Regrettably, the official's comment ignores these realities and in the process signals the PLO that the U.S. will not hold it accountable for its actions.

Secondly, rather than condemn last week's attack on an Israeli passenger bus as a brutal act of terrorism, the State Department, steering clear of any political comment, merely expressed sorrow about the tragedy. We believe this was not only wrong but counterproductive. Terrorists will undoubtedly interpret Washington's measured response as a sign that the Administration is willing to tolerate a great deal to keep the dialogue alive.



3/4

The Honorable James Baker III  
July 10, 1989  
Page Two

0 0331/62

Finally, Mr. Secretary, two days ago you indicated that Washington will consider organizing an international conference should Prime Minister Shamir's peace initiative fail to progress. This statement, like those mentioned above, tends to reinforce the Palestinian and Arab rejectionism that has been the cause of the stalemate. After all, what incentive is there for Palestinians to change their negative attitude toward the election proposal when U.S. support for an international conference appears to be right around the corner?

Mr. Secretary, it has taken 25 years, Israeli strength and a great amount of pressure for the PLO to move at all from its policy of rejectionism. Suggestions of softness in the Administration's position toward the organization will do little to encourage further steps in this direction. U.S. interest lies in opposing terrorism and in moving the parties, particularly those who have long been negative, toward peace. We urge you to ensure that the desire for dialogue with the PLO does not stand in the way of these vital interests.

Sincerely,

Abraham H. Foxman  
National Director

AHF:ab

Anti-Defamation League

823 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017



of B'nai B'rith

(212) 490-2525 FAX: (212) 867-0779

NEWS

LYNNE SANNIELLO  
Director, Communications Division

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

0 033: / 62

8/4

New York, NY, July 11...The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith has expressed its concern to Secretary of State James Baker III that "the Administration's desire to continue its dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization has resulted in a softened U.S. position" towards the PLO "which may ultimately work against American interests."

In a letter to Secretary Baker (dated July 10), Abraham H. Foxman, ADL's national director, pointed out that "it has taken 25 years, Israeli strength and a great amount of pressure for the PLO to move at all from its policy of rejectionism." "Suggestions of softness in the Administration's position toward the PLO," Mr. Foxman went on to say, "will do little to encourage further steps in this direction." He further stated that "U.S. interest lies in opposing terrorism and in moving the parties, particularly those who have long been negative, toward peace."

Mr. Foxman's letter gave the following as examples of a softened U.S. position:

- A July 1 statement by an Administration official that the government considers the PLO to have wiped the slate clean following Yasser Arafat's renunciation of terrorism and recognition of Israel last December. Citing calls for armed struggle against Israel still being made by high ranking officials and the intifada, which has PLO financial support and instruction, Mr. Foxman said that the Administration official's comment "ignores these realities and in the process signals the PLO that the U.S. will not hold it accountable for its actions."
- The State Department's failure to condemn last week's Arab attack on an Israeli bus which left 14 dead and 27 injured "as a brutal act of terrorism" rather than merely expressing sorrow about the tragedy.
- Secretary Baker's recent remarks that Washington will consider organizing an international conference should Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's peace initiative fail to progress. Mr. Foxman said Mr. Baker's comments "tend to reinforce the Palestinian and Arab rejectionism that has been cause of the (Israeli-Arab) stalemate." He added that Palestinians would have no incentive to change their negative attitude toward the Israeli election proposal if they think U.S. support for an international conference is imminent.

The full text of Mr. Foxman's letter is attached.

#

AJ-A;C-A;DC-A;IP-A;MPC-A;MP-A;BHFOR-A;BHN-A-89





קונסוליה הכללית של  
ישראל בניו יורק

CONSULATE GENERAL  
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

800 SECOND AVENUE  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

(212) 351-5200

**בהול**

|              |                                     |         |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|---------|
| דחיפות: כהול | טופס מברק                           | דף: 1   |
|              | קשר ניו יורק                        | מחור: 2 |
| סוג: שמור    | אל : מנהל מצפ"א, בנצור- סמנכ"ל צפ"א |         |
| חז"ח: 121130 | דע : השגריר, וושינגטון              |         |
| מס' מברק:    | מאח : סגן הקונכ"ל, ניו יורק         |         |
| 0 0278       |                                     |         |

53- ווייטנאם

ועידת הנשיאים - יוזמת חשלום

בהמשך למברקי 264 מצ"ב הודעה ועידת הנשיאים שנוסחה ואושרה  
על ידי הארגונים היהודים הארציים בעקבות פגישתם.

מרדכי ידוד

*Handwritten signature*

אישור:

שם השולח: מרדכי ידוד

תאריך: 12.7.89

סיה ס/טה גש ג/גש בנצור- סמנכ"ל צפ"א  
הסמכה  
2



Contact: Richard Cohen  
(212) 758-6969

For Immediate Release

**CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS  
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS**

278/S3 2/2

Seymour D. Reich  
Chairman

Malcolm I. Hoenlein  
Executive Director

**STATEMENT BY SEYMOUR D. REICH, CHAIRMAN  
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations**

The Conference of Presidents held a full and comprehensive discussion Tuesday (July 11) of recent events in Israel. The following represents a consensus of the views voiced at that meeting:

- 1) We express again our strong support of the peace initiative put forward by Prime Minister Shamir, approved by the Israeli Cabinet, ratified by the Knesset and praised by President Bush and Secretary Baker. This initiative is a positive and forward-looking proposal that offers the best possibility for advancing the peace process in the Middle East.
- 2) We are pleased that our own government has reiterated its support and endorsement of the Israeli plan. We urge the Administration to continue its efforts to gain acceptance of the plan by the Palestinian Arabs as the basis for negotiating a settlement.
- 3) We deeply regret the refusal of the Palestinian Arabs to come to the peace table. Their failure to move forward toward negotiations in the three months since Prime Minister Shamir made the initiative public has undermined the peace process.
- 4) Peace can come only if the people and the government of Israel are united on a course of action. That course has been charted by the unity government's peace plan. We call on all parties to do whatever is necessary to assure the continuity of that initiative. It has our wholehearted support. It merits renewed endorsement by the United States government. It deserves full and positive consideration by the Palestinians to whom it is directed.

The question of how best to resolve the Palestinian issue is one that affects the very destiny of the Jewish state. We believe our government and the American people understand the passions expressed in Israel on all sides of the question, and appreciate the nature of Israel as a vigorous and open democracy. On an issue of such life-and-death importance, there will of course be differences in any free society. The issue in Israel is not whether to make peace but how best to achieve it. All Israelis yearn for the day when Israel is fully accepted by her Arab neighbors as a sovereign, independent nation in the Middle East -- the day when there will be an end to the war and hostility that have plagued Israel's life as a nation since it achieved independence 41 years ago.

7/12/89

X

X

X

END





2  
10

STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN H. KELLY  
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

JULY 12, 1989

208

2/10

I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TODAY TO DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN WHAT I HOPE WILL BE A SERIES OF REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ON THE REGION. TODAY, I WILL FOCUS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS, IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF, AND LEBANON.

ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

A LONGSTANDING INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS TO ASSIST IN EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THIS APPROACH IS BASED ON KEY PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING THAT OF THE EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE. FOR A SETTLEMENT TO BE ACHIEVED AND TO BE DURABLE, ISRAEL MUST ENJOY SECURITY WITH DEFENSIBLE BORDERS. A SETTLEMENT MUST PROVIDE SECURITY AND RECOGNITION FOR ALL STATES IN THE REGION, AS WELL AS PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

PRINCIPLES ALONE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT GUARANTEE A SETTLEMENT. WE ARE EMBARKED ON A PRAGMATIC APPROACH, DESIGNED TO END THE



203

3/10

CURRENT TRAGIC CYCLE OF CONFRONTATION AND TO GET ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS ENGAGED IN A PRACTICAL PROCESS. AN AUTHORITATIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA COULD ENABLE THE PARTIES TO BREAK DOWN WALLS OF MISTRUST, ALTER THEIR RISK ASSESSMENTS AND FOCUS ON WAYS TO NEGOTIATE. SUCH A DIALOGUE WOULD ALSO HELP TO STRUCTURE ELECTIONS, IN ORDER TO LAUNCH A POLITICAL PROCESS INVOLVING NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND FINAL STATUS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. PROGRESS ON THOSE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES WOULD PERMIT RESOLUTION OF OTHER DIFFERENCES THAT NOW SEPARATE ISRAEL AND OTHER ARAB STATES.

TWO FACTORS NOW GUIDE OUR THINKING. FIRST, WE SEE REAL OPPORTUNITIES RESULTING FROM CHANGED THINKING IN THE REGION. ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS HAVE <sup>and other arabs</sup> BEGUN TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED TO ENGAGE ONE ANOTHER DIRECTLY. ISRAEL HAS PUT FORWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE, WHICH FOR THE FIRST TIME ADDRESSES PALESTINIANS AS ISRAEL'S KEY NEGOTIATING PARTNER. THE PLO HAS FINALLY ACCEPTED UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. EGYPT HAS GAINED READMISSION TO THE ARAB LEAGUE WITHOUT COMPROMISING ITS PEACE WITH ISRAEL. THESE EVENTS ILLUSTRATE CHANGES IN THINKING ON ALL SIDES THAT ARE POSITIVE AND WORTH PURSUING.

SECOND, HOWEVER, THE PARTIES CONTINUE TO FACE SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES THAT HAVE BLOCKED PROGRESS TO PEACEMAKING IN THE PAST. <sup>since</sup> GAPS BETWEEN POSITIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARE BROAD. MUTUAL

228

11/10

SUSPICIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN HEIGHTENED BY VIOLENCE, AND LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES FACE DIVISIONS WITHIN THEIR OWN COMMUNITIES. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, A HIGH VISIBILITY INITIATIVE BY AN OUTSIDE PARTY CANNOT SUCCEED. SIMILARLY, PREMATURE FOCUS ON MECHANISMS LIKE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WILL ONLY DISTRACT THE PARTIES FROM THE DIFFICULT DECISIONS THEY MUST MAKE TO ESTABLISH A LASTING PEACE.

IT IS WITHIN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S PEACE INITIATIVE. THE ISRAELI ELECTION PROPOSAL IS A SERIOUS EFFORT THAT WE ENDORSE WHOLEHEARTEDLY. IT HOLDS GREAT PROMISE AND IS WORTH BUILDING UPON. WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE DISTRACTED BY POSITIONS THAT DO NOT ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS. THE MAY 14 PROPOSAL ADOPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS A SERIOUS EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE PALESTINIANS DIRECTLY IN A POLITICAL PROCESS. IT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ASPIRATIONS THAT MUST BE SATISFIED. THE INITIATIVE DESERVES A SERIOUS AND POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARAB STATES.

MANY QUESTIONS STILL NEED TO BE ADDRESSED ABOUT HOW WE GET TO ELECTIONS, THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS. THESE CAN AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE, DESIGNED TO PAVE THE WAY FOR ELECTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS. BEGINNING A PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI DIALOGUE IS THE FIRST PRIORITY.



208

LET ME SAY A WORD HERE ABOUT THE U.S. DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF. IT IS A MEANS TO ADVANCE A PRACTICAL AND WORKABLE PEACE PROCESS. IN BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL MEETINGS WE PRESS THE PLO TO GIVE PRACTICAL MEANING TO ITS COMMITMENTS OF LAST DECEMBER: ITS RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM AND ITS RECOGNITION OF THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. WE ALSO ARE TRYING TO MODERATE PLO POSITIONS ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND CREATE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE CAN WORK. WE ARE NOT TRYING TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE PLO AND ISRAEL. WE ARE SEEKING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PLO IS READY TO ACT RESPONSIBLY IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

I HAVE NO MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS TO REPORT, BUT RATHER THE CONTINUED EFFORTS OF OUR DIPLOMACY TO MOVE ALL SIDES TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS SLOW AND PAINSTAKING WORK. IT HAS MANY OPPONENTS IN THE REGION, WHO SEEK TO PERPETUATE THE CONFLICT RATHER THAN RESOLVE IT. IT IS, NONETHELESS, THE WAY TO PROCEED IN A PROCESS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS, BOTH ISRAELI AND ARAB. THERE IS A LONG WAY TO GO. I REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN BUILD ON WHAT HAS BEEN DONE AND ELICIT A POSITIVE ARAB AND PALESTINIAN RESPONSE, SO THAT ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD AND NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE LAUNCHED.

IRAN

ELSEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAN CONTINUES TO COMMAND

228

ATTENTION BECAUSE OF ITS SIZE, LOCATION AND INFLUENCE. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF KHOMEINI'S PASSING ON IRAN'S INTERNAL POLITICS. THE LEADERSHIP MOVED QUICKLY IN AN OUTWARD DISPLAY OF UNITY TO CLOSE RANKS AROUND KHOMEINI'S SUCCESSOR, PRESIDENT KHAMENE'I, BUT KHOMEINI'S DEATH LEAVES THE FUTURE COURSE OF IRAN UNCLEAR. 6/10

IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER IRAN WILL MOVE IN A MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION. BY THAT I MEAN WHETHER IRAN WILL END ITS SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND ADHERE TO THE ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR, AND WHETHER IRAN WILL USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THOSE HOLDING OUR HOSTAGES IN LEBANON TO HELP GAIN THEIR SAFE, IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE. WE HOPE SO, BUT OBVIOUSLY HAVE NO ASSURANCE IT WILL. THE BURDEN OF PROOF CLEARLY IS ON IRAN TO SHOW IT IS PREPARED TO BEHAVE RESPONSIBLY. ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED, NOT WORDS.

WE ARE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN CLOSELY. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT IS IN OUR AND IRAN'S INTERESTS TO RESUME NORMAL RELATIONS. PRESIDENT BUSH HAS REITERATED THIS POSITION, BUT UP TO NOW WE HAVE HAD NO MEANINGFUL REPLY FROM TEHRAN.

LET ME RESTATE FOR THE RECORD OUR POLICY: WE ARE READY TO TALK TO AUTHORIZED IRANIAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. HOWEVER, ANY SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WILL REQUIRE AN END TO IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND IRANIAN HELP IN FREEING OUR HOSTAGES.



THE GULF

228

7/10

THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE PERSIAN GULF HAS BEEN IN EFFECT NOW FOR CLOSE TO ONE YEAR. ALTHOUGH IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE NOT SIGNED A PEACE TREATY TO END HOSTILITIES, WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE CEASE-FIRE CONTINUES TO HOLD. WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UN EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE TWO FORMER BELLIGERENTS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND TO CONCLUDE A LASTING SETTLEMENT.

SINCE I HAVE RESTATED FOR THE RECORD OUR POLICY VIS-A-VIS IRAN, LET ME DO THE SAME FOR OUR POLICY TOWARD THE REST OF THE GULF. THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT THE PERSIAN GULF IS AN AREA OF VITAL STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. PRESIDENT BUSH AND THIS ADMINISTRATION ARE COMMITTED TO DEFEND OUR VITAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA: THE FREE PASSAGE OF OIL THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ AND THE SECURITY OF FRIENDLY REGIONAL STATES. THIS COMMITMENT IS AS FIRM AS THE COMMITMENTS OF THE REAGAN AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS SIMILARLY DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND ELSEWHERE.

IF I MAY OFFER A PERSONAL OBSERVATION, AS ONE WHO WAS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE FORMULATION OF OUR GULF POLICY, I THINK THE REASON OUR POLICY HAS SUCCEEDED OVER THE YEARS IS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS THAT THE POLICY MEET OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS.

THE SECURITY OF OUR INTERESTS IN THE GULF RESTS ON SECURITY <sup>8</sup>/<sub>10</sub>  
COOPERATION WITH THE MEMBER NATIONS OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUN-  
CIL, INCLUDING ARMS SALES. DURING OUR ESCORT AND OTHER DETERRENT  
OPERATIONS WE LEARNED DAILY THE IMPORTANCE OF "INTEROPERABILITY"  
OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IN A VARIETY OF WAYS WE FOUND THAT COMMON  
EQUIPMENT, SIMILAR TRAINING AND LIKE-MINDED PLANNING GREATLY  
ENHANCED THE COOPERATION AND ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS.

AMONG THE STATES WITH WHICH WE ENJOY THIS COOPERATION IS  
SAUDI ARABIA. WE WILL BE PLEASED TO WELCOME KING FAHD ON A STATE  
VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES JULY 26-30. WE INTEND TO REVIEW THESE  
ISSUES WITH HIM WHEN HE VISITS.

#### LEBANON

MOVING ON TO LEBANON, LET ME BEGIN BY SAYING THAT THE SITUA-  
TION IN BEIRUT REMAINS EXTREMELY VOLATILE. BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED IN  
PRINCIPLE AN ARAB LEAGUE CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, SEA AND  
LAND BLOCKADES CONTINUE. A CROSSING WAS OPENED IN BEIRUT LAST  
WEEK, BUT THE SEA BLOCKADE REMAINS UNRESOLVED OVER THE ISSUE OF  
ARMS SHIPMENTS. THESE BLOCKADES HAVE CAUSED SEVERE SHORTAGES OF  
FUEL AND FOOD, PARTICULARLY IN THE CHRISTIAN ENCLAVE OF EAST  
BEIRUT.

THE CEASE-FIRE REMAINS UNFULFILLED. SHELLING CONTINUES ON A  
DAILY BASIS. THE U.S. STRONGLY URGES AN END TO THE INVOLVEMENT OF



228

FOREIGN FORCES AND RESTRAINT IN THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM FOREIGN SOURCES.

9/10

ON JUNE 14, THE PRESIDENT MET WITH PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL, FOREIGN MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA, TO DISCUSS THE EFFORTS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE TO RESOLVE THE LEBANON CRISIS. THE PRESIDENT WELCOMED THE COLLECTIVE EFFORTS OF THE LEADERS OF SAUDI ARABIA, MOROCCO AND ALGERIA. HE EXPRESSED OUR SUPPORT FOR THEIR MANDATE TO PURSUE URGENTLY A POLITICAL PROCESS IN LEBANON THAT LEADS TO ELECTIONS, REFORMS AND A NEW NATIONAL CONSENSUS.

THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO DO ALL IT CAN TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT WILL BRING LEBANON'S TURMOIL TO AN END. WE BELIEVE A POLITICAL DIALOGUE AMONG THE LEBANESE IS ESSENTIAL FOR LEBANON TO REGAIN ITS STABILITY AND SECURITY. SUCH A DIALOGUE IS A NECESSARY STEP TOWARD RESOLUTION OF LEBANON'S SUFFERING, WHICH HAS GONE ON FAR TOO LONG. ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT SHOULD SHOW RESTRAINT AND FLEXIBILITY AT THIS CRUCIAL POINT. ALL CONCERNED SHOULD PROMOTE A POLITICAL PROCESS THAT IS DEVOID OF THREATS AND COERCION AND THAT LEADS TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND REFORM. THE GOAL OF ALL FRIENDS OF LEBANON MUST BE A REUNITED AND SOVEREIGN COUNTRY, FREE OF FOREIGN FORCES AND ARMED MILITIAS, IN WHICH THE LEBANESE PEOPLE LIVE IN HARMONY.

BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

228

10/10

ONE FURTHER ISSUE OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO US IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA IS THE SPREAD OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE WEAPONS RAISE THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE TO A NEW ORDER OF MAGNITUDE IN A REGION IN WHICH STRONG CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES ALREADY EXIST AND THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IS HIGH.

BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH RANGES OF UP TO 2500 KILOMETERS (1,552 MILES) ARE NOW ENTERING THE INVENTORIES OF SEVERAL STATES IN THE REGION. THE PRESENCE OF THESE WEAPONS MAY ENCOURAGE POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES TO LAUNCH PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS OR TO ACQUIRE SIMILAR WEAPONS AS A DETERRENT. THIS PROSPECT BECOMES EVEN MORE TROUBLING WHEN LINKED TO THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. THE NEED FOR CONCERTED AND ENERGETIC ACTION HAS BEEN DRAMATICALLY ILLUSTRATED BY THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY BOTH PARTIES IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, BY IRAQ'S USE OF CW AGAINST ELEMENTS OF ITS OWN POPULATION, AND BY LIBYA'S ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE FULL-SCALE CW PRODUCTION CAPABILITY. THE ADMINISTRATION IS AT THE FOREFRONT OF SUCH ACTION, ENCOURAGING THE COORDINATION OF EXPORT CONTROLS THROUGH THE INFORMAL MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, AND PURSUING EFFORTS TO CONTAIN CW PROLIFERATION.

THIS CONCLUDES MY PREPARED STATEMENT. I LOOK FORWARD TO ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.





JUL 12 '89 09:09 ISRAEL CONSULATE L.A.

# Israel's Initiative Can Plant Seeds of Middle East Peace

P.1/1

237

By MOSHE ARAD

The Associated Press

There is today a chance to launch a comprehensive peace process to end the 41-year-long Arab-Israeli conflict. It won't come easily; the situation is too complex, too rife with passion and history to lend itself to quick fixes. Still, as once-intractable regional conflicts from Afghanistan to Angola now wend their way toward resolution, why not the Arab-Israeli deadlock as well?

Two months ago, the Israeli Cabinet approved a bold peace initiative that addresses the conflict's two basic elements: the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians and the belligerency of the Arab states, with the notable exception of Egypt since 1979, against Israel.

The plan aims to achieve a promising new beginning in our troubled region. President Bush underscored the point last month when he referred to the Israeli initiative as "an important contribution" to the peace process. Secretary of State James A. Baker III added: "The Israeli proposal . . . deserves constructive Palestinian and broader Arab response." Those views were reaffirmed in a June 8 letter to Secretary Baker signed by 95 U.S. senators who expressed unreserved support for Israel's peace initiative. "It is our conviction that Israel's offer is both sincere and far-reaching," the legislators wrote.

The initiative contains four key points.

—Reaffirming the principles of the Camp David accords and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the plan calls for a summit meeting of the leaders of Egypt, Israel and the United States to press for a comprehensive peace in the region built on a firm foundation of Israeli-Egyptian peace and the principle of direct negotiations.

—Genuine peace means an end to the abnormal state of belligerency, economic boycotts and hostile propaganda conducted by the Arab world (apart from Egypt) against Israel. Instead, it is time for those countries to recognize Israel's reality and join with us in pursuing bilateral and regional cooperation.

—Mindful of the inexcusable tragedy of Palestinians kept in squalid refugee camps by Arab governments and Palestinian leaders more interested in fanning hatred of Israel than permitting decent housing, Israel is prepared to join with the world community in a major rehabilitation effort to address living conditions and economic development in these areas. Such an international effort need not await a political solution nor be a substitute for one. Basic humanitarian consideration ought to be the driving force.

—Israel calls for free, democratic and secret elections, in an atmosphere devoid of violence, threats and terror, in the West Bank and Gaza to permit the Palestinian Arab residents to select their own indigenous representatives. These elected leaders would then conduct negotiations for a transitional period of self-rule. Some critics have suggested that self-rule means little more than "garbage collection." In fact, self-rule would include responsibility for all areas affecting the lives of the residents, with the sole exceptions of foreign policy, security and matters affecting Israel's interests living in these areas.

Further, the plan specifies that not later than the third year after the onset of the transitional period, negotiations with the elected Palestinian leadership would begin for achieving a permanent solution. At the final status talks, which should also include Jordan, our neighbor with the longest common border, all proposed options for an agreed settlement will be reviewed.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, referring to the territories, declared in a speech in New York in April: "We have a 3,000-year claim on them. The Arabs say they have a claim on them, too. It is their right to put their claim against ours. That is what negotiations are for. We shall present our claim and they will present theirs and we shall reach a settlement. It will not completely satisfy either side, but we shall be able to live with it."

The Likud Party's debating this issue last week did not affect the initiative approved by the government May 14.

Israel is prepared to negotiate over these difficult issues with the elected leaders of the West Bank and Gaza. It is not, however, prepared to conduct talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The simple fact is that, notwithstanding the media and diplomatic attention given the PLO in the past year, this organization, which perfected the art of modern-day terror, including hijacking, murder and aid to other anti-Western terrorist organizations, has not changed its fundamental character. Although the PLO may have adopted more dulcet tones for Western consumption, no one should be misled.

The PLO covenant calling for the elimination of Israel remains unchanged. Indeed, the PLO's logo, found, for example, on the shoulder patch worn by Arafat and on the stationery used by the PLO to apply for full membership in the World Health Organization this year, shows the Palestinian flag over a map of Israel—all of Israel, pre-1967 and post 1967. Attempted terrorist incursions into Israel continue unabated. Several have been publicly claimed as the work of the PLO-affiliated Democratic Front for the Liberation of the Palestine, one of whose leaders, Yasser Abed-Rabbo, actually heads the PLO team negotiating with the United States in Tunisia.

Wednesday, July 12, 1989 / Part II

7



- 12

237

In a June 12 interview with the French Arabic-language periodical, *Al Yom Assabe*, Rabbho, commenting on Israel's right to exist, stated: "Some of the Israeli parties who met with us . . . presented us with joint documents or ideas which included talk about the principle of a right of self-determination for two peoples on the land of Palestine. We reject this. . . . [I]t is impossible for the Israelis to become a part of the region or of its people, tradition or culture. The problem of Zionism, as an idea, as an ideology and as a realization, will be the subject of the future struggle."

In recent weeks, more than 40 Palestinian Arabs have been killed by fellow Arabs for such "heinous" crimes as advocating cooperation and coexistence with Israel.

True, the Israeli peace initiative does not propose to end the conflict in one fell swoop. Rather, it seeks to plant the seeds of mutual trust and confidence-building. There simply is too much anger and suspicion on all sides, the gaps currently are too wide to focus on the terms of a final settlement. Accordingly, any realistic approach to peace in the region must be two-pronged, involving, first, interim, and then final status talks. Echoing longstanding U.S. policy, then-Secretary of State George P. Shultz emphasized this point last September when he noted that "peace between Israel and its neighbors will need time and growing mutual good will to succeed. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza this means there must be a transitional period."

There is a serious Israeli peace plan on the table. It deserves the careful consideration of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who now have a chance to move from the streets to the peace table. It merits the support of Egypt, the engagement of Jordan and, yes, why not Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria as well? Once the plan's basic approach is accepted, let differences over the details become the focus of discussion and negotiation.

The road to peace is fraught with risks for all sides. But is there a better alternative? Israel's desire for peace is genuine, our yearning for an end to four decades of war, terror and regional isolation profound. A workable peace plan is on the table, but two months have passed with no positive response. Will the Palestinians and Arab political leaders once again miss a real chance to add the Arab-Israeli conflict to the growing list of regional trouble spots in the midst of peaceful resolution?

*Moshe Arad is Israel's ambassador to the United States.*

18

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

ארה"ב

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני: גלוי

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך וז"ח: 12/7/89-11:00

מס' מברק

219

אל: המשרד

אל: מצפ"א

ארה"ב - ישראל

מצ"ב כתבת גושקו ואוטאוי ב- 12/7 ב-W.P.

13 פלג

3 3 3 3  
מחלקת מידע ג'נרל ג'נרל ג'נרל  
השירות לביטחון רגיל  
המספר 2  
0.0



2/2

219 7

A20 WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 1989

THE WASHIN

# U.S. Is Pressing Israelis Not to Shatter Coalition

## Foreclosure of Palestinian Elections Feared

By John M. Goshko  
and David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Bush administration and prominent American Jews are pressing Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and leaders of the Labor Party not to break up their coalition government for fear such a move would abort a U.S.-backed plan for Palestinian elections in Israeli-occupied territories.

Israeli sources said that Max Fisher, a prominent Republican Party fund-raiser, called the Labor Party's top leaders, Finance Minister Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, last weekend. According to the sources, Fisher told them he had been asked by "the highest level of the administration" to urge them to avoid any move that might harm chances for peace talks.

Labor, the junior partner in the coalition headed by Shamir's Likud bloc, has threatened to quit the government because Shamir bowed to pressure from his party's right wing and endorsed severe election restrictions that are regarded as impossible for the Palestinians to accept.

Shamir's backtracking from the election plan he proposed in May triggered fears within the administration of an abrupt end to U.S. hopes of turning the Shamir initiative into a basis for solving the Palestinian problem.

U.S. officials are worried that Israeli voters may turn to Likud hard-liners led by Trade Minister Ariel Sharon, who advocates annexation of the occupied territories and tough military measures to suppress the *intifada*, as the Palestinian uprising is known.

Secretary of State James A. Baker III, in an apparent effort to pull Shamir away from the hard-liners, warned that the United States might then have to accept an international peace conference, which Shamir vehemently opposes. Baker also announced that he will send a high-level emissary—widely expected to be Deputy Secretary Lawrence A. Eagleburger—to ascertain whether the Shamir government still backs its initial election plan.

A senior administration official sidestepped questions about Fisher and denied that the administration was "going to get into telling the Israelis how to engineer their own politics." But, he added, "We're anxious to have an Israeli government that can move forward on the peace process."

Similar concerns about the threat to the peace process also have stirred the American Jewish community. Although much of this concern has been kept private, these anxieties were reflected in a letter sent to Shamir yesterday by the leadership of the influential American Jewish Committee.

The letter warned that Shamir's acceptance of restrictions on his own plan could halt the peace process, break up the coalition and make it difficult for American Jews to justify support of Israel. It added:

"If this were to occur, Israel will be seen as the party chiefly responsible for the deterioration that is likely to ensue both within the territories and in relations between Israel and the United States."

Representatives of several other American Jewish organizations, while reluctant to be quoted, said privately they share these views and are endeavoring to make them



YITZHAK SHAMIR

... endorsed severe election curbs

known to both the Likud and Labor leaderships.

They said that the Israeli government should ease Likud's demand that Palestinians in East Jerusalem be excluded from elections and that talks be on the basis of no surrender of Israeli sovereignty over the territories, no dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organization and no elections until the *intifada* is ended.

In a closely related development, the United States moved yesterday to defuse Israeli anger over the initial U.S. failure to condemn as terrorism the incident last Thursday in which a Palestinian caused a bus to veer off a cliff, killing 14 Jews and seriously injuring others.

An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman yesterday characterized the U.S. lack of forthright condemnation as "a license to kill to every Palestinian individual or organization."

In reply, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said, "There is no license being offered." He said that the United States still does not know the reasons for the violent bus tragedy, but he added: "On the basis of available evidence now, it was clearly a terrorist attack."

\*

\*

END







(3) 2/2 247 2/2  
accustomed to the fact that it's talking to the United States government, and if it wants to say something, it can say it.

X REP. HAMILTON: I have seen report after report about indirect Israeli-PLO talks, secret talks through the Moroccans, indirect talks through US, Egyptian and West Bank Palestinians. European diplomats are saying the Israel-PLO channel, and I'm quoting him now, "is becoming very clear and very substantive," end of quote. Finance Minister Peres has acknowledged that an official dialogue with the PLO is now going on between the Israelis and the PLO. And the question on my mind, I guess, is do we have any knowledge of that? Are those reports accurate? What do you know about it?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, I think it's an exaggeration for any press report to say an official dialogue is going on between the Israeli government and the PLO. I don't think that's reality. There's a lot of press reporting about it --

REP. HAMILTON: The quote was from Finance Minister Peres and he said that an official dialogue with the PLO is "taking shape," those are his words.

X MR. KELLY: Oh, taking shape, I'm sorry, I understood you to say "taking place." I don't know of any official dialogue that's taking place. There are reports both in the press and in classified reporting about contacts. I'd been happy to go in the latter with you in a closed session.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, I would like to pursue that certainly with you. Now, I want to ask also with regard to the PLO dialogue, what have we accomplished so far in this PLO dialogue?

MR. KELLY: I think --

REP. HAMILTON: Has there -- can you point to any change in PL policy due directly, for example, to the US-PLO talks?

MR. KELLY: I can't point to any explicit change in PLO policy Congressman. I hope that we are beginning to broaden their vision and have an impact on them on the potentialities of abandoning armed efforts to change.

REP. HAMILTON: You think -- you continue to think they enhance our interests in the region and promote the search for peace do you

MR. KELLY: That they do, sir?

REP. HAMILTON: The talks do.

MR. KELLY: The talks, yes I do. I believe that they help fulfill our objectives.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we now recognize the PLO?

X X X





16

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

אח"כ

טופס מברק

דף 1 מחוך 4 דפים

סוג בשחוני: גלוי

דחיפות: בהול

תאריך וז"ח: 12/7/89-13:00

מס' מברק

238

אל: המשרד

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

"הועד היהודי האמריקני". למברקי מהיום מצ"ב פאקס שקיבלתי מ-AJC  
שבמכתב לרוה"מ הוכנסו מספר שינויים.

פלג

13

שם 3 ס/שם 3 רחל 3 אחיה 1 ג'א 1 ב'א 2 ג'א 2  
ה'כ 1 ג'א 2 ס'א 2 ס'א 2 ס'א 2

## FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE  
165 E. 58th Street  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 751-4000 FAX: (212) 319-0975

\*\*\*\*\*

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES  
INCLUDING COVER SHEET 2DATE: July 12, 1989TIME: X10:00AM 11:30 AMTO: Mr. David Peleg, Minister of Inf.FROM: George GruenFIRM: Israel EmbassyDEPT: International RelationsFAX #: 202 363-4155

MESSAGE AREA

**URGENT**

I have just learned that in the Israel Office some changes were made in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the letter to Prime Minister Shamir. We agree with the changes. Attached is the final text as transmitted to Prime Minister Shamir. Best regards.

☐ IF THIS BOX IS CHECKED, PLEASE FAX BACK TO CONFIRM RECEIPT OF THIS FAX.

RESPONSE AREA

DID YOU RECEIVE THIS MESSAGE GARBLED? IF SO, CHECK THE BOX BELOW AND FAX BACK. WE WILL RESEND.

☐ THE ABOVE FAX WAS RECEIVED GARBLED. PLEASE REPEAT FAX.

FAX OPERATOR \_\_\_\_\_



AS FINALLY SENT

The American Jewish  
Committee
 Institute of Human Relations  
 105 East 88 Street  
 New York, New York 10022-2746  
 212 / 61 4000/FAX: 212 319 0975  
 Office of the President
Shalom D. Comay  
President
 Alfred H. Mezos  
 Chas. Board of Governors  
 Mimi Alperin  
 Chas. National Executive Council  
 Bruce M. Ramer  
 Chas. Board of Governors  
 Robert S. Jacobs  
 Chas. Executive Committee
Walter A. Gipe, Jr.  
ExecutiveJack Lapin  
SecretaryDavid F. Squire  
Executive DirectorIra Silverman  
Executive Director

Vice Presidents

Bernard Abrams  
Executive DirectorNorman E. Alexander  
Executive DirectorMots S. Berger  
Executive DirectorHerbert B. Cohen  
Executive DirectorJoseph R. Goldstein  
Executive DirectorE. Robert Goodkind  
Executive DirectorDavid Hirschhorn  
Executive DirectorCathy R. Mendelson  
Executive DirectorElaine Poterok  
Executive DirectorRobert S. Rifkind  
Executive DirectorMary Shapiro  
Executive Director

Honorary President

Morris B. Abram

Theodore Ellensoff

Howard I. Friedman

Arthur J. Goldberg

Philip E. Hoffman

Richard Moses

Elmer L. Winter

Meynard I. Wishner

Executive Council

Nathan Appelman

Morris H. Borgeson

Morton K. Blaustein

David B. Bloomer

Martin Gang

Ruth R. Goddard

Andrew Goodman

Alvin C. Greenberg

Raymond F. Kravis

William Rosenwald

Shirley M. Szabad

Ellie D. Waterman

Executive Council

Max M. Fisher

Sol M. Linowitz

Honorary Chair

Board of Governors

Lee Novas

Executive Vice President

Bertram H. Gold

John Stawson

July 11, 1989

 Honorable Yitzhak Shamir  
 Prime Minister  
 The State of Israel  
 Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

We wish first to convey to you and to the people of Israel our deepest sympathy for the families of the victims of the fanatical attack on the bus to Jerusalem and our hope for the speedy recovery of the survivors. We reaffirm our steadfast solidarity with the Government of Israel in its struggle to combat terrorism and to achieve a just, secure and lasting peace.

As you may know, the American Jewish Committee was among the first American Jewish organizations publicly to support your comprehensive peace initiative including the proposal for Palestinian elections which you outlined during your visit to the United States and which was subsequently adopted by the Government of Israel. In the statement issued by our Board of Governors at AJC's Annual Meeting in Washington on May 19, we characterized Israel's proposal as "the best present hope for both Israel and the inhabitants of the territories to move from the present state of conflict to a political solution...." In doing so we were moved by your words to us that the status quo is not acceptable to Israel or the Arab inhabitants of the territories.

We have worked to encourage the Administration and the Congress to support your government's peace plan and to reassure the American public that Israel is actively seeking a just political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict including a solution that recognizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, as agreed at Camp David. We were gratified when President Bush and congressional leaders supported Israel's peace plan, which left open for future negotiations the modalities of elections and other sensitive issues.

We are now deeply concerned that the decisions taken recently by the Likud Central Committee could lead to rigid positions that foreclose further progress toward implementation of the peace plan and result in a breakup of the National Unity Government. If this were to occur, Israel could be seen as the party chiefly responsible for the deterioration that is likely to ensue both within the territories and in relations between Israel and the United States. In this respect, we are mindful of President Bush's own views on this matter as privately expressed to you.

238 3/4

238 4/4

To allay apprehensions it is now of the utmost importance that the Government of Israel indicate its readiness to negotiate with an open mind the modalities that will enable the elections to be held and the peace process to go forward. Only if this is done will it be possible to enlist in this country the united support which Israel so urgently needs. We also urge you to reassure the other parties in the Government that you will pursue the peace plan without prior constraints imposed by any political party. In our opinion, the breakup of the National Unity Government will cause a division within American Jewry that will be harmful to our efforts on behalf of Israel and will weaken general support for Israel within our country at this critical time for Israel.

Best wishes for continued strength for Israel and our people.

Respectfully,

Sholom D. Conay  
President

Alfred H. Moses  
Chairman  
Board of Governors

Ira Silverman  
Executive Vice-President

SDC:jb





216

29-217



The American Jewish  
Committee

Institute of Human Relations  
165 East 56 Street  
New York, New York 10022-2718  
212 751-4000/FAX: 212 319-0975  
Office of the President

Sholom D. Comay  
President

Alfred H. Moses  
Chair, Board of Governors  
Mimi Alperin  
Chair, National Executive Council  
Bruce M. Ramer  
Chair, Board of Trustees  
Robert S. Jacobs  
Chair, Executive Committee

Walter R. Gips, Jr.  
President  
Jack Lepin  
Secretary  
David F. Squire  
Associate Treasurer

Ira Silverman  
Executive Vice President

#### New England

Bernard Abrams  
Orange County, CA  
Norman E. Alexander  
Windsor  
Meta S. Berger  
Chicago  
Herbert B. Cohen  
Atlanta

Jerome R. Goldstein  
New York  
E. Robert Goodkind  
Washington  
David Hirschhorn  
Baltimore

Cathy R. Mendelson  
Los Angeles  
Elaine Patschek  
Windsor  
Robert S. Rifkind  
New York  
Mary Shapiro  
Boston

#### Long Island Branch

Morris B. Abram  
Theodore Ellenoff  
Howard I. Friedman  
Arthur J. Goldberg  
Phillip E. Hoffman  
Richard Maass  
Elmer L. Winter  
Maynard I. Wishner

#### Executive Vice Presidents

Nathan Appleman  
Morris H. Bergreen  
Morton K. Blustein  
David B. Blooman  
Martin Gong  
Ruth R. Goddard  
Andrew Goodman  
Alan C. Greenberg  
Raymond R. Kravis  
William Rosenwald  
Shirley M. Seabad  
Ellie D. Waterman

#### Honorary Chair, National Institute for

Max M. Fisher  
Sol M. Linowitz

#### Honorary Chair, Office of the President

Leo Nevas

#### Executive Vice Presidents

Bartram H. Gold  
John Stawson

July 11, 1989

Honorable Yitzhak Shamir  
Prime Minister  
The State of Israel  
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

We wish first to convey to you and to the people of Israel our deepest sympathy for the families of the victims of the fanatical attack on the bus to Jerusalem and our hope for the speedy recovery of the survivors. We reaffirm our steadfast solidarity with the Government of Israel in its struggle to combat terrorism and to achieve a just, secure and lasting peace.

As you may know, the American Jewish Committee was among the first American Jewish organizations publicly to support your comprehensive peace initiative including the proposal for Palestinian elections which you outlined during your visit to the United States and which was subsequently adopted by the Government of Israel. In the statement issued by our Board of Governors at AJC's Annual Meeting in Washington on May 19, we characterized Israel's proposal as "the best present hope for both Israel and the inhabitants of the territories to move from the present state of conflict to a political solution...." In doing so we were moved by your words to us that the status quo is not acceptable to Israel or the Arab inhabitants of the territories.

We have worked to encourage the Administration and the Congress to support your government's peace plan and to reassure the American public that Israel is actively seeking a just political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict including a solution that recognizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, as agreed at Camp David. We were gratified when President Bush and congressional leaders supported Israel's peace plan, which left open for future negotiations the modalities of elections and other sensitive issues.

We are now deeply concerned that your recent declaration to the Likud Central Committee could lead to rigid positions that foreclose further progress toward implementation of the peace plan and result in a breakup of the National Unity Government. If this were to occur, Israel will be seen as the party chiefly responsible for the deterioration that is likely to ensue both within the territories and in relations between Israel and the United States. In this respect, we are mindful of President Bush's own views on this matter as privately expressed to you.

\* \*



29-213

16  
In order for us to continue to be effective in our efforts in this country on behalf of Israel, we strongly urge that you make clear your continuing commitments to the peace plan by words and acts that will leave no room for doubt. We also urge you to reassure the other parties in the Government that you will pursue the peace plan without prior constraints imposed by any political party. In our opinion, the breakup of the National Unity Government will cause a division within American Jewry that will be harmful to our efforts on behalf of Israel and will weaken general support for Israel within our country at this critical time for Israel.

Best wishes for continued strength for Israel and our people.

Respectfully,

*Sholom D. Comay*

Sholom D. Comay  
President

*Alfred H. Moses*

Alfred H. Moses  
Chairman  
Board of Governors

*Ira Silverman*

Ira Silverman  
Executive Vice-President

SDC:jb

\*                      \*

JUL-12-89 WED 8:55 AMERICAN JEWISH COMM.

P. 04

# NEWS FROM THE Committee



The American Jewish  
Committee

Institute of Human Relations  
165 East 86 Street  
New York, New York 10022  
212 751-4000  
Morton Yarmon  
Director of Public Relations

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism and promotes human rights for all; works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between Americans and Israelis; defends democratic values and speaks their realization in American public policy; and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the U.S.

## FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, July 11... The American Jewish Committee today urged Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to "make clear your continuing commitment" to the peace initiative that included his proposal for Palestinian elections, as outlined during his visit to the U.S. and subsequently adopted by the Israeli Government.

In a letter, written in Hebrew and signed by President Sholom D. Comay; Alfred H. Moses, Chairman of the Board of Governors, and Ira Silverman, Executive Vice President, the AJC warned Mr. Shamir that his recent declaration to the Likud Central Committee, which accepted four conditions to the elections plan, "could lead to rigid positions that foreclose further progress toward implementation of the peace plan and result in a breakup of the National Unity Government."

"If this were to occur, Israel will be seen as the party chiefly responsible for the deterioration that is likely to ensue both within the territories and in relations between Israel and the United States," the AJC leaders asserted.

\*

\*



29-217

6 In their letter they reminded Mr. Shamir that AJC was among the first American Jewish organizations publicly to support his peace initiative, adding that a statement by AJC's Board of Governors in May 1989 characterized Israel's proposal as "the best present hope for both Israel and the inhabitants of the territories to move from the present state of conflict to a political solution." They continued:

"In order for us to continue to be effective in our efforts in this country on behalf of Israel, we strongly urge that you make clear your continuing commitment to the peace plan by words and acts that will leave no room for doubt.

"We also urge you to reassure the other parties in the Government that you will pursue the peace plan without prior

Theodore Ellenor, President; Leo Nevas, Chair, Board of Governors; Robert S. Jacobs, Chair, National Executive Council; Edward E. Bicos, Chair, Board of Trustees  
Ira Silverman, Executive Vice-President

Washington Office, 2027 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington DC 20036 • Israel Hq.: P.O. Box 1538, Jerusalem 91010, Israel  
South America Hq. (temporary office) 165 E. 66 St., New York, NY 10022-2746

CSAE 1707

K

A

29-217

6 constraints imposed by any political party. In our opinion, the breakup of the National Unity Government will cause a division within American Jewry that will be harmful to our efforts on behalf of Israel and will weaken general support for Israel within our country at this critical time for Israel."

The AJC leaders opened their letter to Mr. Shamir with an expression of "our profound sorrow" for the victims of the recent "fanatical attack" on the bus to Israel, and reaffirmation of "our steadfast solidarity" with the Israeli Government in its struggle against terrorism and to achieve "a just, secure and lasting peace."

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism and promotes human rights for all; works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between Americans and Israelis; defends democratic values and seeks their realization in American public policy; and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the U.S.

09-960-149

X X \*



|  |                         |                            |
|--|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| דתיקות: בחול לבוקר                       | שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון | דף: 1                      |
| סוג: גלוי                                | טופס פרוק               | כתוב: 154/154              |
| תאריך וזמן תכנון:<br>12 ביולי 1989 15:00 |                         | חל: מצפייא                 |
| כס' פרוק:                                |                         | דצ: לשכת רה"מ<br>לשכת שה"ח |
| המסרד:<br>242                            | אח"כ                    | כמות: ק/ק לקונגרס          |

ביה"ב: עדות קלי בפני ועדת המשנה לאירופה  
והמזה"ח שליד ועדת החוץ

1. רצ"ב חומליל המלא של השאלות והתשובות בין הקונגרסמנים לק"י.

2. השתתפו בדיון: המילטון, לנטוס, לארי סמית, מל לויין, אקרמן, פיהן, אנגל, גילמן, טוריסלי וגייין מירט.

3. הנושאים שנדונו בנהלך הישיבה: שליחות איגלברגר, דו"ת השלום ותקפותה לאזור ועידת הליכוד, ועידה בינ"ל, הדיאלוג עם אשי"פ, אבו איד, התקפה על אוטובוס אגד והגדרתה כטרור, מדיניות ארה"ב כלפי ישראל, הבעיות בין המערך לליכוד, החלטות ועידת הליכוד, קשרי ישראל עם אשי"פ, נשק לסעודיה, טגירת בתי"ט ביו"ט, גירוסים, אלימות מצד המחבלים, מעשי החיגורים ונזק פתיחת הדיאלוג,

ברה"מ - חידוש יחסים עם ישראל, סיחות האמרי עם הסובייטים בנושא שרור ועדיפות המזה"ח אצל הסובייטים.

4. הישיבה ארכה כשעתיים וחצי והתמקדה כמעט בלעדית בחליך השלום.

ישראל וק"י  
יחידת ורבאי דרבגר.

השם קשה: 154/154  
גלוי (נא) 154/154  
אח"כ 154/154  
עשה לא ה/מ/ל/א א"פ י"ט 154/154  
השם קשה: 154/154

תפוצה: ש"ח קשה לא ה/מ/ל/א א"פ י"ט 154/154

soon, and we'll have a fact sheet on the Secretary's CFC announcement just momentarily. 2.   
 5/1

END?.EOI BCD

HEARING OF THE EUROPE & MIDDLE EAST SUBCMTE OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS CMTE/RE: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST/CHAIR: REP. LEE HAMILTON (D-IN)/WITNESS: JOHN KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS/WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 1989  
F-3-1 page# 1

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Secretary, I think we'll go ahead and start, because members are voting and you can begin on your statement.

The meeting of the Subcommittee will come to order. The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets today in open session to review policy issues and developments in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf. Although the Subcommittee had extensive foreign aid hearings, this is the first open session in the 101st Congress to review US policy towards the Middle East with the new administration. Much has happened since January, and we'll want to cover a lot of ground with you today.

Of particular interest to the Subcommittee will be the status of efforts to further the search for peace in the Middle East, the prospects for ElectionsF in the EWest BankF and EGazaF, the situati,

in the West Bank and Gaza, and trends in the uprising now in its 20th month, the substance of and progress in the United States-PLD talks, the situation in Lebanon, and the status of efforts to implement UN Resolution 598 to end the Iran-Iraq war.

We are pleased to have with us today Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs John H. Kelly, to discuss these and other issues. This is Secretary Kelly's first appearance before the Subcommittee in his new assignment. He has had a long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service. He served recently as United States Ambassador to Lebanon.

Secretary Kelly, we welcome you before the Subcommittee. We certainly wish you well in your new assignment, and we look forward to the opportunity to work with you in the months ahead.

You have a prepared statement. That prepared statement, of course, will be entered into the record in full. You may proceed if summarize it if you would before we turn to questions, and I'm quite sure that members will be coming in very shortly. You may proceed, sir.

MR. KELLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you especially for those kind remarks of welcome. I have an abbreviated version of the prepared statement. With your permission, I'll proceed to read that.

REP. HAMILTON: Yes.



242 3/55

3  
54

MR. KELLY: I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee today, Mr. Chairman, to discuss recent developments in the Middle East. I welcome the opportunity to begin what I hope will be a series of regular consultations on the region. Today, I'll focus on the Arab-Israeli peace process, Iran, and Lebanon.

A long-standing interest of the United States in the Middle East is to assist in efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict through direct negotiations, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This approach is based on key principles, including that of the exchange of territory for peace. For a settlement to be achieved and to be durable, Israel must enjoy security with defensible borders. A settlement must provide security and recognition for all states in the region, as well as providing for the political rights of the Palestinian people.

Principles alone, however, will not guarantee a settlement. We're embarked on a pragmatic approach designed to end the current tragic cycle of confrontation and to get Israelis and Palestinians engaged in a political process. An authoritative dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza could enable the parties to break down walls of mistrust, alter their risk assessments, and focus on ways to negotiate. Such a dialogue would also help to structure elections.

In order to launch a political process involving negotiations on interim arrangements and final status of the Occupied Territories, two factors now guide our thinking. First, we see real opportunities resulting from changed thinking in the region. Israelis and Palestinians -- and, I might add, the other Arabs -- have begun to acknowledge the need to engage one another directly. Israel has put forward a constructive initiative. The PLO has finally accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist. Egypt has gained readmission to the Arab League, without compromising its peace with Israel. The parties continue to face significant obstacles that have blocked progress in the past. Gaps between positions on substantive issues are still broad. Suspensions between the parties have been heightened by violence. Leaders on both sides face divisions within their own communities.

It is within this context that we support the government of Israel's peace initiative. The Israeli election proposal is a serious effort that we endorse wholeheartedly. It holds great promise, and we believe is worth building upon. The May 14 proposal adopted by the government of Israel is a serious effort to engage Palestinians directly in a political process. It acknowledges that the Palestinians have political rights and aspirations that must be satisfied. The initiative deserves a serious and positive response from the Palestinians and the Arab states.

242

54

Moving to Iran, Mr. Chairman. That country continues to command attention because of its size, location, and influence. It is too early to assess the impact of the Ayatollah Khomeini's passing on the internal politics of Iran. The leadership moved quickly in an outward display of unity to close ranks around Khomeini's successor, President Khamenei, but, Khomeini's death leaves the future course of Iran unclear. It is too early to tell whether Iran will move in a more positive direction, or remain isolated among the international community.

Mr. Chairman, I will conclude with a couple of remarks about Lebanon. The situation in Beirut remains extremely volatile. Both

sides have accepted in principle, an Arab League call for a cease-fire, however, sea and land blockades continue. A crossing was opened in Beirut a few days ago, but the sea blockade remains unresolved over the issue of arms shipments. These blockades have caused severe shortages of fuel and food, particularly in the Christian enclave of East Beirut. The cease-fire remains unfulfilled, shelling continues on a daily basis. The US strongly urges an end to the involvement of foreign forces, and restraint in the shipment of arms from foreign forces.

On June 14, the President met with Prince Saud al-Faysal, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, to discuss the efforts of the Arab

League to resolve the Lebanon crisis. The President welcomed the collective efforts of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Morocco,

Algeria. The President expressed our support for their mandate to pursue urgently a political process in Lebanon that leads to elections reforms and a new national consensus.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my summarized presentation of the lengthier oral statement. And I would be honored to try to address your questions and those of your colleagues.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Many things to cover with you today. I want to begin with the peace process and the announcement in the paper today -- and I guess yesterday as well -- that the United States plans to send Mr. Eagleburger to Israel. And as stated in the paper, his purpose is to persuade the Labor Party -- one of his purposes is to persuade the Labor Party not to leave the coalition. He is making such a trip, I presume?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, that's still undecided. Secretary Baker told the press Monday, in Europe, that there would be someone going to Israel next week. But the Secretary and the President have not yet decided whether or not it will be Secretary Eagleburger, Director of Policy Planning Ross, myself, or a combination of the three of us.

REP. HAMILTON: I see. It's a rather extraordinary thing, isn't it, for the United States to inject itself to that extent into



242

SH

Israeli domestic politics, to go over there and to tell them that we think Labor ought to stay within the coalition?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, I'm a little distressed at that interpretation of the trip. The purpose of the trip would be to have an exchange with members of the Israeli Government about the peace process, what its prospects are, and what we can do to be supportive of that process. It's not our intention that anyone would go there to interfere in Israeli domestic politics, but rather to have a healthy exchange with members of the Government, as we try to do on a regular basis.

REP. HAMILTON: So, you would make no statement on behalf of the United States Government to the effect that you would hope that the Labor Party would stay within the grand coalition?

MR. KELLY: No, Mr. Chairman. I think that's something that the parties in Israel have to decide for themselves.

REP. HAMILTON: And what -- how will you handle the recommendations of the Likud Party with respect to the election

242

6  
5/4

proposal? Will you try to ensure that the Likud Party positions with respect to the election does not become Government policy?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, we're still operating on the basis that the Government of Israel's May 14th proposal on the peace process, on negotiations with Palestinians from the territories and on elections is the operative and legally binding basis for the Israeli Government to proceed.

REP. HAMILTON: Do you think Prime Minister Shamir is not bound by the Likud Party statement?

MR. KELLY: We believe that the Government decision of May 14 remains binding. Now, we have said publicly that we believe that the conditions set at the Likud Party conference last week did not advance the process. But we hope that the process can move forward on the basis of the May 14th decision of the Government of Israel, and that's the basis we're operating on and that's what we want to push forward with.

REP. HAMILTON: How do you view the conditions set by the Likud Party?

MR. KELLY: Well, as I said, sir, we have -- we have said publicly that we do not believe that they advance the process. Clearly, they represent strongly held feelings.

REP. HAMILTON: Would they disrupt and destroy the process?

MR. KELLY: We do not believe they will destroy the process. We think --

REP. HAMILTON: If they become Government policy, you do not believe they will destroy the process?

MR. KELLY: If they became Government policy, obviously they would make it more difficult. But we do not believe that the final act has been played, that any curtain has come down on the Israeli Government's May 14th proposal, and we're continuing to try to accentuate the positive.

REP. HAMILTON: And your view is that the Prime Minister is not bound by the Likud Party?

MR. KELLY: The Prime Minister has to speak for himself, Mr. Chairman.



242

JF  
54

REP. HAMILTON: No, I understand that.

MR. KELLY: But as we understand it, Likud ministers --

REP. HAMILTON: Does the action of the Likud Party commit the Prime Minister to carrying out the proposals adopted by the Likud Party --

MR. KELLY: As we understand it, Mr. Chairman --

REP. HAMILTON: -- as the leader of the Government?

MR. KELLY: As we understand it, Likud ministers are going to promote those positions within Government councils. However, our interpretation is that the decision of the Government of May 14 is still the operative binding premise.

REP. HAMILTON: All right. What is the US strategy at this point for getting the dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians started? What is our strategy?

MR. KELLY: Our strategy is to attempt to persuade the Palestinians that their interest lies within a dialogue with the Government of Israel that could lead to elections.

REP. HAMILTON: Will we try to produce Palestinian names that are acceptable to Israel?

MR. KELLY: Will we, ourselves, Mr. Chairman?

REP. HAMILTON: Yes.

MR. KELLY: No, I don't foresee that that's our responsibility.

I think it will be up to the Palestinians to work out who their representatives are going to be, but obviously, in a realistic world, those have to be people that the Israelis are willing to sit down and talk to.

REP. HAMILTON: All right. I want to come back to that and I certainly want to explore with you the US-PLO dialogue. May I say to the members of the Committee that I know we'll have a lot of interest in this hearing. It's the intention of the Chair to try to

enforce fairly strictly the five-minute rule, and I'd request that members not ask question once the red light appears -- ask further questions. We'll come back to you on the next round.

Mr. Smith?

REP. LAWRENCE SMITH (D-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You've got to go quick with the green light. Mr. Kelly, it's a pleasure to have you here. For the first time, we all look forward to a significant days with the conversations that have been had between unnamed, high-level

242

8  
54

officials in the State Department and the press, where the press, and it's quoted in one article today, where the press has reported that there are in fact, for instance, quote "A senior official? traveling with Secretary of State Baker told reporters over the weekend the US may consider organizing an international peace conference if Israel adds so many conditions to its proposal for elections in the West Bank and Gaza that it becomes impossible for Palestinians to accept."

That is something that we were not aware at all that the administration was talking about. And all of a sudden, injecting this kind of new dialogue into it gives life to the argument that the Palestinians have always made, at least amongst themselves, "You

don't have to do anything, we just sit back and wait, and let everything else self-destruct around us."

For the last six months, unless I am mistaken, the State Department hasn't reported any significant movement, either the PLO or the Palestinians in the territory on almost any issue, and certainly since the time Shamir was here and unveiled his proposal, nobody has endorsed it. Am I correct?

MR. KELLY: That is correct.

REP. SMITH: Therefore, with this new wrinkle now added by unnamed officials in the State Department, even if it's not the Secretary himself, they are being rewarded, so to speak, for not having made any moves at all, although we've been for the last six months, contrary to 20 prior years of policy, discussing issues with them and talking to them at the highest levels, including talking to known, wanted terrorists -- people who are under extradition by our allies. We've talked to them in Tunis and yet we have had no forward progress at all, and now our own State Department is saying things that are an anathema to the Israelis. Can you explain to me why that's happening? On what basis these statements would be made, and of what benefit they would be ultimately in the long run, to bring Israel -- are we now convinced we have to beat Israel over the head and let the PLO just move at their own pace or do nothing at all?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, let me try to shed some light on that.

On Monday, the Secretary of State said on the record, in front of the TV cameras, that we don't think the time is right for an international peace conference. When this administration came into office last January, the international peace conference seemed to be the center of attention and what everyone was talking about. The action of the government of Israel in proposing talks with Palestinians from the territories and elections, has shifted the ground very constructively, and we've been trying to assist that shift. We've been arguing with the Europeans, with the Soviets, with the Arabs, and with the PLO that negotiations between Palestinians in the territories and the government of Israel in the



9/54  
242 9/54  
REP. SMITH: Well why, again, are there reports in the paper by unnamed high, State Department officials that this State Department is about ready to talk in terms of an international conference? On

the second, July 2nd, in a New York Times report, an administration official is quoted as saying, "In the context of US-PLD dialogue, PLD leaders have started with a clean slate and the US would disregard any past involvement in terrorism." Another attempt, apparently to push Israel further over, onto some desired level of cooperation in terms of this whole process, that apparently the State Department doesn't believe Israel has achieved -- is it our policy now to by selectively leaking things, that the PLD are no longer terrorists, and that the State Department is going to now talk about a multi-national conference. Are we of the opinion that we are in a mode, or is it a State Department opinion we have to be in a mode of beating Israel over the head somehow, and treating the PLD with kid gloves? That's never gotten us anywhere, neither has the opposite. And I want to know whether or not we've changed our policy?

MR. KELLY: The answer, Congressman, is no, our emphasis is still on the government of Israel's proposal. That's what we're promoting. We are not shifting to support an international peace conference.

REP. SMITH: So, the State Department now refutes that it is at any time prepared to endorse the multinational conference concept. That is, under current circumstances -- is that correct?

MR. KELLY: In the mode we are now, we're not looking to the international peace conference. Now, we have said that at a future date under the proper conditions, as a support to negotiations, we don't rule out the possibility of an international -- but that's not the focus of our diplomatic effort or push.

REP. SMITH: And those negotiations are with direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians --

242

34

MR. KELLY: That's right.

REP. SMITH: -- and other parties like Jordan.

MR. KELLY: That's right.

REP. SMITH: We still maintain that.

MR. KELLY: That's right.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Gilman.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to welcome Secretary Kelly before us. We look forward to working with you in the days ahead, and you're in a particularly hot seat these days. And we hope that you're going to be able to make a significant contribution to the peace process.

Mr. Kelly, what is our position now with regard to an international conference? We've seemed to be wavering from one direction to another. I know Secretary Baker and the President have said on a number of occasions that we do not support an international peace conference in the Middle East. Have we changed that position? Can you set that forth for us today?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, we are still convinced that the May 14th proposal by the government of Israel offering negotiations with Palestinians in the Territories, which could lead to elections, are the sensible way to go. We've been deemphasizing the international conference and trying to shift the focus to direct contacts among the parties, which we think is the way to make some progress.

We have argued that with our friends in Western Europe; we have argued that with Arab states in the region; we have argued that with Soviet officials; and we have argued that with the PLO. So we are? not putting the emphasis, or shifting the policy of the United States, to support now an international conference. That does not mean that we rule out the international conference under all possible scenarios in the future as a support to direct negotiations but we don't think the international conference is the way to go.

REP. GILMAN: So we still maintain that -- the position we've adopted earlier.

MR. KELLY: Yes, we're opposed to an international conference involving Israel and the Arab nations.

REP. GILMAN: Many of us are disturbed about the people that we are meeting with in the -- who are the PLO -- ostensible PLO representatives. And I gather that we made a policy statement that we would not meet with people who are further engaged in terrorism. And we've started with the slate being clean after Mr. Arafat



242

54

declared that he would rule out terrorism, except within the boundaries of Israel apparently.

How do we explain that we're now meeting with people like Abu Iyad, who has just been -- an order of extradition -- came out of Eltalyf because of his involvement in supplying arms to the Red Brigade, and meeting with people who are involved in the Black September group? How do we explain that in relation to our policy of trying to negotiate with a group that has declared themselves not to be involved with Eterrorism?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, what we're attempting to do is to persuade the leadership of the PLO that "armed struggle," or whatever they call it, the path that they have followed for several decades, is a dead-end path; that the path of success is the path of negotiation between Palestinians in the territories and the Government of Israel and the abandonment of terrorism and of armed methods against anyone.

Now, as a New York Times editorial has put it a week or so back, the US role in part of this, in support of the Government of Israel's proposal, is to persuade the PLO that this is a sensible course for them to follow. "To persuade" implies contact, and that is why we are having contact with some of the people in the PLO leadership who certainly have records which draw questions, to put it mildly, on anybody's part. For better or for worse, the membership of the PLO Executive Committee involves a number of individuals who may well have been involved in terrorist activities in the past. We are trying to persuade them and convince them that terrorism, that arms struggle offers no solution. It's not up to us

to sell Israel to the PLO; it's up to the Palestinians to sell themselves to Israel, as people who have abandoned violence, as people who are willing to go on the political track to try to advance the cause of their people.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, I would hope we would pick better representatives with regard to our discussions. We've even cut off our relationships with the People's Republic of China because of their violation of human rights, and now we're suddenly sitting down at a table with people who are not only declared terrorists but have been found by courts and other jurisdictions that they've committed acts of crime. And it seems to me that we do ourselves a disservice by sitting down at a negotiating table with people of that nature, and I would hope we'd take another look at that policy. It leaves a great deal to be desired.

Can you tell us what our policy position is now with regard to Lebanon?

MR. KELLY: On Lebanon, Congressman, I have, as you know, some personal experience there and a sense of personal grief.

242

12  
5/1

REP. GILMAN: That's why I ask you. As a former ambassador, I'm certain you have some concerns.

MR. KELLY: I have a sense of grief that that country continues to suffer. The latest effort among many over the last 14 years to bring peace to Lebanon is this try now by the leaders of three Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Morocco to bring about a national reconciliation in Lebanon. Their plan, in a nutshell, involves a cease-fire on the ground, which still hasn't been accomplished; a meeting of parliamentarians which would lead to elections and reform in Lebanon; and a withdrawal of foreign forces, all foreign forces, whether they be Syrian, Iranian or Israeli. And that's a wonderful objective. We are trying to land positive public support to that effort. We're talking to the Europeans about it, we discussed it with the Soviets a few weeks ago. We are talking to the Arab parties and we're talking to the players on the ground in Lebanon. The President met a few weeks ago with the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia and publicly endorsed this effort. And so, we're doing everything we can to try to be supportive.

REP. GILMAN: I would hope we'd make some progress in that direction. We make a lot of statements about condemning the stone throwing in Israel and yet, thousands of people are being killed yearly in Lebanon as that country goes down the drain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Lantos.

REP. TOM LANTOS (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kelly, I want to welcome you, look forward to a long and constructive and ~~and~~ cordial relationship. We met each other many years ago and it was a very constructive meeting, and I hope all of our future meetings will be

I'm going to give you an opportunity to rise to the level of candor that Secretary Shultz attained in a public hearing last year. This was at the outrageous human rights violations that the Chinese perpetrated in Tibet, killing large numbers of innocent people. And the State Department representative with whom I appeared on a television program danced around the issue as to whether, in fact, there was any human rights violation, and he wasn't sure and so on. And George Shultz, on the witness stand, publicly contradicted that wishy-washy statement and said, "That's right. It was an outrageous violation," and so on.

You have your chance now. After that outrageous terrorist attack on the bus within Israel, for days and days and days, the State Department was not quite sure whether, in fact, it was a terrorist attack or not. I want to read a statement to you, and I'd like to ask you to listen carefully:

"The tragic event on the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road is an act of terrorism directed against innocents. There is no justification for  
END



24 242  
acts of this kind. Whatever the motive may be, it is the obligation

of every sane man, no matter what his position on the political developments in the Middle East may be, to condemn this abominable act in the strongest terms. I hope that the Palestinian national leadership will also react in this fashion and will prove that its declaration to distance itself from terrorism in all its forms is not a mere political declaration but that it expresses the de facto Palestinian policy. From a humanitarian standpoint, this is a horrendous crime. But also, from an operative political standpoint this is a crime.

You have your chance now. After that outrageous terrorist attack on the bus within Israel, for days and days and days, the State Department was not quite sure whether, in fact, it was a terrorist attack or not. I want to read a statement to you, and

like to ask you to listen carefully:

"The tragic event on the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road is an act of terrorism directed against innocents. There is no justification acts of this kind. Whatever the motive may be, it is the obligation

of every sane man, no matter what his position on the political developments in the Middle East may be, to condemn this abominable act in the strongest terms. I hope that the Palestinian national leadership will also react in this fashion and will prove that its declaration to distance itself from terrorism in all its forms is not a mere political declaration but that it expresses the de facto Palestinian policy. From a humanitarian standpoint, this is a horrendous crime. But also, from an operative political standpoint this is a crime perhaps no less horrendous. The bloody attack on the bus has delivered a severe blow to the peace process in the Middle

East."

You know who said this? Moscow Radio said this. Moscow Radio denounced this outrageous terrorist act, while the State Department was still dithering about, trying to get evidence whether it was a terrorist act. And only when it was forced, by news reporters' persistent questioning, did you guys finally say, "Yes, it was terrorism."

Can you now state whether the State Department's position was initially sound, in wondering whether this was terrorism, and what its position is now on this issue?

MR. KELLY: The position now, Congressman, as we said yesterday to the press, is that it indeed was a terrorist act.

REP. LANTOS: Why did it take you this long to make up your mind then? Radio Moscow was so clear in its condemnation, so eloquent in its condemnation, before our own State Department.

14  
54

242

11  
54

MR. KELLY: The -- the --

REP. LANTOS: The 14 dead were not enough evidence?

MR. KELLY: I'm sorry, sir?

REP. LANTOS: The 14 dead -- dead people -- 14 civilian, innocent dead people was not enough evidence for you that terrorism occurred?

What does this do to the moral standing of our anti-terrorism?

MR. KELLY: The -- the first reaction in Washington was that this was a -- a terrible, heinous act. What we did not know, Congressman, was whether it was the act of an organized terrorist group or the --

REP. LANTOS: Now you do.



13  
54

242

344

MR. KELLY: --- or the act of one deranged individual.

REP. LANTOS: Now you do.

MR. KELLY: The evidence still is not clear. But certainly, in the sense that this man was acting against Israeli citizens, he was not a man acting on Mars ---

REP. LANTOS: So, nothing --

MR. KELLY: -- it was a --

REP. LANTOS: -- has changed?

MR. KELLY: --- terroristic act.

REP. LANTOS: So, nothing has changed between your knowledge now and the knowledge an hour after the event happened; is that what you're saying?

MR. KELLY: We know more about the individual, yes. Our knowledge had changed.

REP. LANTOS: Yes, but you still don't know whether he's part of an organized group?

MR. KELLY: We do not.

REP. LANTOS: Okay. So, you could have condemned it as an act of terrorism right off the bat, couldn't you have?

MR. KELLY: An hour afterwards, we didn't know his name --

REP. LANTOS: Well, how about a day afterwards?

MR. KELLY: We ---

REP. LANTOS: You were just trying to waffle, Mr. Kelly. Those are the facts. And your inability to condemn what was a stupid policy, it was just plain stupid. You did not condemn a terrorist act that the whole world, including Radio Moscow, designated as a terrorist act. You did not want to hurt the feelings of Arafat and the people you are negotiating with in Tunis.

Let me ask a second question because time is short. I find it remarkable that we now have a sort of reverse policy of what common sense would dictate. You treat your negotiations with the PLO in Tunis involving convicted terrorists, involving people who were responsible for the most heinous crimes such as the Olympic massacre

at Munich and other terrorist acts in total secrecy and total privacy. Nobody knows what's happening. Certainly members of this Committee don't know what's happening. But you put public pressure

on our friend and democratic ally, the state of Israel.

Now, there is no reason for Mr. Eagleburger, for whom I have the highest regard, to go to Israel and find out whether they really want peace or not. The last 40 years of Israel's history, during the course of which it was invaded by countries determined to wipe it off the face of the map, its stated public policy to meet with all of the leaders of all of the neighboring states, with Assad, with Hussein, with the Saudis, with everybody in the neighborhood who runs a hostile state, is clear evidence of this. Mr. Eagleburger has plenty of work to do right here. What is the purpose of your thinking about -- Mr. Baker thinking about sending Mr. Eagleburger or you to Jerusalem?

MR. KELLY: If I may, Congressman, and I believe the Chairman asked the same question about the trip. If I can fill in very briefly. A final decision hasn't been made on whether it's going

be Secretary Eagleburger, whether it will be Dennis Ross, the Director of Policy Planning, whether it will be me or a combination of the three of us, but set that aside. The purpose of the trip is what's important. And the purpose is not to ask the government of Israel whether it's committed to peace, we are convinced that it is. The purpose of the trip would be to have a regular interchange with members of the government of Israel on how they see the process going, what can we do to be supportive --

REP. LANTOS: That's not the impression you get. You get the impression of a hysterical move which is certainly warranted by circumstances. You have a dialogue through your ambassadors, our ambassador there and their ambassador here. Mr. Eagleburger should stay here, there are plenty of other things to deal with. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Mrs. Meyers.

REP. MEYERS: Welcome, Secretary Kelly, glad to have you with us.

MR. KELLY: Thank you very much.

REP. MEYERS: There are those who suggest that despite the party plenum, Likud is being forced to move more to the political center and that Shamir's rhetoric is because -- he's being forced to maintain a tough public position, but that he too, would like to move more toward the political center. Do you think this is an accurate perception??

MR. KELLY: I think it's difficult to -- if you look into the inner thought processes of any individual -- I think we have to deal with governments and politicians on the basis of what they say. And in that sense, we consider the May 14th decision of the government of Israel to have been an historic one. The National Unity government decided something that hadn't been -- of a status that



hadn't been decided, atart of people who are extremely supportive of Israel, that they would like to see more flexibility on the part of the government, and more moving toward flexibility in the peace process.

Do you see the Shamir government as having any more flexibility at all than the positions taken at the Party plenum might indicate?

MR. KELLY: As we said publicly, Congresswoman, after the Likud Party conference, we thought that the conditions that were set forth at the conference were an impediment to moving the process forward. But we are trying to accentuate the positive, in the sense that we are still operating on the basis of the formal governmental decision of May 14th. And we hope that we're going to be able to be supportive and pursue that proposal and that that proposal will be one that opens doors.

REP. MEYERS: What kind of a role do you see that the surrounding countries might be able to play in bringing about a resolution? Is there a role for EJordanF to play, or have they -- have they just taken themselves completely out of the picture?

MR. KELLY: The surrounding countries can play a crucial role, both in urging moderation on the PLO and in enhancing contacts with -- and promoting contacts with the Government of Israel. Jordan has not dealt itself out of the peace process. And when the King of Jordan was here several months ago, he reiterated his interest in the process and talked about the constructive role that Jordan would be willing to play in the future -- for instance, in the context of a final status arrangement in which Jordan would be willing to consider confederation with some sort of Palestinian entity.

So, the Jordanians have not dealt themselves out. They are still active. They still have not ruled out the possibility, at some point in time, of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

REP. MEYERS: What about the role of Syria?

MR. KELLY: Well, the ESyriansF, I believe, have taken a more recalcitrant position about the peace process. Syria has generally said publicly that it would adopt positions which represent an Arab consensus. This is a rather fuzzy statement and could mean, therefore, that the most extreme position that prevents a consensus would be the consensus that Syria might support.

But we believe Syria has a role to play in a comprehensive settlement, that their best hopes, as do everyone's best hopes for hope, when the time comes, Syria will be prepared to play a role in the peace process.

REP. MEYERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. LEVINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CONTINUED?.EOF



242

19  
34

I'd like to join my colleagues in welcoming you, Mr. Secretary and reiterate that we are looking forward to a close relationship, and to underscore the importance to this Subcommittee of the issues that you're dealing with; and to urge you respectfully and strongly -- and I know that you share this concern -- to have as many consultations and as close of a relationship as possible. I think it would be very helpful in terms of this process.

I wanted to follow up on a question that Mr. Smith asked when he was raising questions about the international conference suggestions that we've read about in the press. He referred to a press article about 10 days ago. I happened to see in both the LA Times and the New York Times just last weekend the same set of suggestions on the Secretary's trip to Brunei from high-ranking administration officials that there may be a resurrection by Secretary Baker of the United States initiating an international conference. I was pleased to hear your statement today that that is not our policy and that the Secretary of State on the record on Monday indicated that we continue to strongly support the election proposal and that we are not proposing at this time an international conference. That is the Secretary's position, is that correct?

MR. KELLY: Yes, sir.

REP. LEVINE: I must confess that in the context of being pleased about hearing that I am baffled about what are very clearly mixed signals that come from this administration. And if you'll indulge me just for a minute or so, they are not just on the international conference. You have the mixed signals on the one hand of the contradiction between the reports that we've alluded to in the press and your reiteration today of our position on the international conference. But they have occurred on other issues as well.

And this Secretary and this administration now sadly, and I think unfortunately counterproductively, have engaged in a pattern of conduct over the course of the last several months: the public criticism of Foreign Minister Arens when he was here; the speech that the Secretary gave at AIPAC which may have been balanced and even-handed in its entirety, but which had one intention and one clear intention in mind as was admitted by some administration spokespeople privately and that was to send a signal to the Israelis; and then the elevation of the dialogue of the PLO only a few days, at least in its disclosure, before the Likud meeting in Israel on July the 5th. I worried that that pattern of conduct would inadvertently undermine Shamir to the benefit of the very far right in the Israeli political process, with Sharon et al being able

20/54

242

EW  
SH

to say to Shamir, "Look you come up with a pretty dramatic and far-reaching election proposal and you get three pokes in the eye by the Secretary of State and the Bush administration," and then we have, sadly, the conditions that were imposed at the Likud conference.

Can you explain to me just what our policy is with regard to the election proposal and how we can move toward being more consistent in terms of encouraging whatever that policy is, rather than providing the kind of mixed messages which sadly have unintended negative consequences in terms of the peace process?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, I see our policy as being aimed at producing results and the results that we're trying to get are negotiations between Palestinians in the Territories and the government of Israel, which could lead to elections. Nothing more, nothing less. That doesn't mean the international conference or it doesn't mean various other circuitous paths that people describe. I

would beg to differ, I hope there was no discourtesy shown to the Israeli foreign minister during his visit of a couple of months ago.

I know that everyone in the administration would deplore such.

Clearly, as someone wrote in one of this morning's newspapers, in a relationship as intimate as the one between the United States and Israel, there are an awful lot of contacts and there are sometimes disagreements about tactics. But I see the disagreements as being about tactics, when they arise, and not about objectives or about goals. And the goals are to alter the patterns of behavior in the Middle East, away from violence, towards acceptance of Israel and towards dealing with Israel as a legitimate, fair, proud, sovereign entity in the Middle East.

No administration has a perfect record, and I'd be surprised if we do. But that is our objective and our goal, and we want to keep our eyes set on that objective goal and work to enhance it. And in practical terms, that means support for the Government of Israel's May 14th proposal.

REP. LEVINE: Well, Mr. Secretary, I'm relieved and pleased to hear your answer, and I support it and welcome it. I would only comment that I think it is most likely to be most effectively implemented with maximum consultation between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch and also between the administration and our friends from Israel.

I think, unfortunately, in light of that very clearly expressed goal, it has been implemented thus far with a great deal of clumsiness, which has been quite counterproductive, in the early parts of this year. And I hope that we will keep our eye on the ball between now and the -- hopefully, putting the flesh on the skeleton of this process.



REP. ROBERT TORRICELLI (D-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelly, I, too, would like to welcome you to the Committee and look forward very much to working with you. I'm certain you've already ascertained your years of experience in Lebanon will serve you well in preparing you to deal with this Committee. (Laughter.)

Mr. Kelly, perhaps you could help me understand, as well, a point that several have approached. This point at which the administration decides that it would shift its position with regard to support for the current proposal for elections to eventual negotiations, as opposed to an international conference; is the only

occurrence which shifts that policy a determination that the May proposal by the Israeli Government for elections is, in substance, no longer on the table? As long as you believe, in substance, that proposal is still on the table, American policy does not shift; is that how you characterize it?

MR. KELLY: I think that's fair, Congressman, if I may add one other element -- and that would be, obviously, if the proposal matured and was brought to fruition and a negotiation between Palestinians and the Government of Israel was fruitful and at that point we agreed that it would be -- you know, it would give a helpful impetus in one way or another, we wouldn't rule out an international conference in that context.

REP. TORRICELLI: The international conference proposal is held in reserve and will remain such unless you are convinced the election proposal is, in substance, no longer on the table? Is that the position you've attempted to outline here today?

MR. KELLY: I think that's --

REP. TORRICELLI: And that determination will, in part, be reached by this mission to Jerusalem?

MR. KELLY: No, that's not the intention of the people who will go to Jerusalem, whenever they get decided to be.

REP. TORRICELLI: So then there's not an effort being made to further clarify the Israeli position. You're simply operating with the assumption, unless you are persuaded otherwise, that the election proposal in substance remains on the table.

MR. KELLY: We are persuaded that the substance remains on the table --

REP. TORRICELLI: Let me get --

MR. KELLY: -- and that's the basis on which we're operating.

REP. TORRICELLI: Let me get some of that substance to see if

22  
54

242

54

we can't -- you cannot help me understand whether, in fact, the substance of the proposal has changed or simply is being described for internal political purposes, in Israel perhaps, differently.

With regard to settlements, is it your belief that in reserving the right politically to continue settlements during the preliminary stages of election or through those elections -- does that have a difference, in fact, in that -- are there funds available, plans in the works -- that settlements will, in fact, occur during this period? Or are they -- is the Likud simply reserving a right that is unlikely to be exercised in any account?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, my understanding that -- is that the current government of Israel is proceeding with some settlements, as they agreed when they formed the government last autumn.

REP. TORRICELLI: So you believe that in fact these new clarifications that have been made in the election proposal with that regard does have substance?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think that was happening before the Likud Party conference. I should also add that --

REP. TORRICELLI: Do you believe it will continue to the new year?

MR. KELLY: -- the United States has been on the record --

REP. TORRICELLI: All right. Let me just go through a couple of others. The decision about people in East Jerusalem not being able to vote as said in the party conference -- that does not, to your understanding, preclude the fact that, however that those people could vote in the elections, simply not in that political jurisdiction. Does that remain open in your mind?

MR. KELLY: Yes. We would argue that that issue remains open.

REP. TORRICELLI: But, as you would interpret what happened at



the party conference, that option still remains available?

MR. KELLY: Yes, because we take the government proposal of May 14th, as the operative working premise.

REP. TORRICELLI: And the question that it must be free from violence when these elections would occur? That of course, does not necessarily mean that it must be without incident, but it must be clear that any coordinated effort to disrupt life on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem has ended.

MR. KELLY: Well, we certainly would hope the violence would end as soon as possible.

REP. TORRICELLI: I know that, but I'm asking you to help interpret for me, what has happened at the party conference, and to what extent it means that the original proposal remains alive? Now, if in fact there is a commitment to continue settlements, but in substance settlements may not occur during this period anyway, there is a decision that people will not be able to vote in East Jerusalem, but those same people can vote elsewhere; that there must, I think fairly, be a commitment that the elections and life on the West Bank will not be disrupted during this period, but that does not mean that any incident by any individual will be interpreted that elections cannot occur. Then, in substance it would appear to me that there is no reason for us to despair, that the original proposal cannot continue, or that a reasonable interpretation of even what happened at the Likud Party Conference must lead us to conclude that we have to abandon this approach.

MR. KELLY: No curtain has fallen on the May 14th proposal, you know. The last act has not been played -- no.

REP. TORRICELLI: In all these reasonable interpretations of what happened at the party conference, in your mind, can indeed have some substance to them? The reasonable interpretations I've just tried to outline? So that there is not a reason to despair at the moment and go to plan B here which --

MR. KELLY: We are not despairing. We are operating on the premise that the government's decision of May 14th is still operational?

REP. TORRICELLI: I understand that. Let me just, in the moment I have remaining then, to take a second issue. Could you outline for me where the Iran-Iraq talks are at the moment?

MR. KELLY: There is intermittent contact, there is no progress. Both sides still argue about questions such as POWs,

regularity?

24  
31

242



242

25/54

MR. KELLY: They are not meeting face to face, they are communicating through the United Nations.

REP. TORRICELLI: On a regular basis, or is it broken?

MR. KELLY: I don't begin to address both the humanitarian and the geopolitical issues that are involved.

REP. TORRICELLI: Are both sides for the moment -- it appears that neither is pushing the other to make any progress -- are both for the moment content with the status quo?

MR. KELLY: I don't think they're content with the status quo because it still involves mobilization, troop presence and certain of the

REP. TORRICELLI: But the concessions that would be required at this point for either side to make progress are simply out of range?

MR. KELLY: I don't think they're out of range. For instance, we think that both sides ought to be able to dispose of the prisoner of war problem promptly, if there's good will there. They can exchange lists of who they have and begin the process of trading prisoners.

REP. TORRICELLI: Let me just --

MR. KELLY: But for one reason or another, neither side is willing to do that.

REP. TORRICELLI: Still on Iraq -- Iran, then, for a moment, this latest exchange of good will and trade promises with the Soviets and the new Iranian government, does it have more substance than such promises and communications in the past? In your mind is this a real economic and political --

MR. KELLY: I think there's no doubt that this represents an increased economic trade relationship. What the full implications are are hard to judge. We don't know for instance whether this vague assertion that there is going to be defense cooperation means that new weapons systems are going to go to Iran, which we would oppose, or whether it's going to be spare parts or old things they have. So there are a lot of unanswered questions.

REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you, Mr. Kelly.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Owens.

REP. WAYNE OWENS (D-UTAH): Mr. Secretary, welcome. I appreciate your testimony this morning. I apologize I was not here for the prepared statement, but I have glanced through it and would like to ask you a question. I hope I'm not repetitive. You say on page three that leaders of both sides face division within their own

242

communities. Under these circumstances, a high visibility initiative by an outside party cannot succeed. And you further elaborate on that on page four, when you say we are not trying to mediate between the PLO and Israel.

I'm a little surprised, because I thought that's exactly what we were trying to do, that we were trying to be of assistance to the two sides in coming together.

MR. KELLY: We are trying to be of assistance. The government of Israel doesn't want us to mediate with the PLO and in that sense we're not mediating. We're not carrying messages back and forth because the government of Israel doesn't communicate with the PLO, either through another route or through us. Now that's their sovereign decision and we respect that. We are talking to various people. They hear what we're saying when we make a comment to a PLO

representative that we think that the plan endorsed by the Israeli government on the 14th of May makes good sense and offers some hope of progress, if that's what he's interested in, for Palestinians.

I guess one could split hairs and argue about whether that is intrinsically mediation or not. We're communicating a message, yes. We're not actually carrying messages between the sides in that sense of being a mediator.

REP. OWENS: Is that the differentiation you would make between the role which Jimmy Carter played 12 years ago and your decision not to be more highly visible?

MR. KELLY: I think -- I think President Carter's role was a bit different at Camp David, because, A, he had both parties there and they were willingly acknowledging his involvement as an intermediary, and the parties currently are not. The Government of Israel does not -- has not asked us to mediate with the PLO.

REP. OWENS: And is that the reason that you are not saying, "Here is a moderate position, say, on elections"?

MR. KELLY: Well, we are saying that.

REP. OWENS: And that suggests you come in --

MR. KELLY: But, you know, that's a judgment we've found on our own. We're not saying that in behalf of the Government of Israel.

HEARING OF THE EUROPE & MIDDLE EAST SUBCOMTEE OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS CMTE/RE: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST/CHAIR: REP. LEE HAMILTON (D-IN)/WITNESS: JOHN KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS/WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 1989  
F-3-6 page 4

We are saying, "We have -- we think this is the way to go. We think



interaction, by discussion, by negotiation, and not by armed struggle or violence or terrorism."

REP. OWENS: So, is this statement that you're not mediating a distinction without a difference?

MR. KELLY: Is beauty in the eye of the beholder? I mean,

2/7<sup>th</sup>  
1.8128



242  $\frac{27}{55}$

242

87  
28  
54

we're -- we're giving our opinion, we are not carrying -- it is important, in the sense that we are not carrying messages from the Government of Israel. They do not want us to carry messages from them to the PLO. They do not want to communicate through us. And we respect and honor their position. So, in that sense, the distinction is a valid one, I believe, Congressman.

REP. DWENS: Yet, an aide close to Prime Minister Shamir said last week that the all is now in the court of the United States to move this process along. He was referring, I think, specifically to the problems between Labor and Likud in the coalition Government. What is your position? What is our position? What are we saying to Labor? Is it as reported in the press, that we are strongly urging them not to leave the Government, not to break up the coalition?

MR. KELLY: They have to -- like all parties, they make their own decisions on what's best for their country and for their party.

REP. DWENS: Given the diplomatic niceties -- we understand, of course -- what is our position --

MR. KELLY: Well, we've said -- we have said that we believe that the conditions adopted by the Likud Party conference don't advance the peace process. But we've also said that we believe that the legal Government decision of May 14th is still the operative basis on which to proceed and that is the basis on which we're operating in our conversations with either politicians in the state of Israel or in our conversations with European or Arab governments or the PLO.

REP. DWENS: What did the -- I think it was Yehi Ben Aron as I recall, who said that the future of the coalition government is now up to the United States and the Labor Party. What do you suppose he meant by that, and is that the role you see yourself playing?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, I really don't want to get into, you know, speculating about his meaning there. Obviously, in an intimate relationship as the United States and Israel have, we talk to a lot of their politicians, they talk to a lot of us and a lot is exchanged back and forth. But I really don't think it's up to us to try to stage manage domestic politics in Israel.

REP. DWENS: Do we have a position on whether Labor ought to stay?

MR. KELLY: No, we do not have a position on that, either for or against, and we're not going to.



242

34

REP. DWENUS: Well, you're not advising them in any public form at all on that issue?

MR. KELLY: No, we're not going to have a public position on an issue like that. That is obviously up to the parties in Israel to sort out among themselves.

REP. DWENUS: What about the judgments that you have made on whether the PLO is dealing in good faith on the emerging possibility of an election process? What -- Abu Eyad has said that the PLO might accept less than total Israeli withdrawal before elections. Do you think that the PLO in these negotiations is acting in good faith? Is that an accurate statement of the PLO's position?

MR. KELLY: I don't know, Congressman, whether they're acting in good faith or not. Over time we're going to have to judge by their deeds what they do and the concrete results. And frankly, to me good faith is not an issue that I'm looking for every day. Obviously, one always wants to have good faith in a negotiation but you never -- or in a conversation -- you never know whether you're going to get it. What you will know about is whether we get any results.

And what we are trying to do is to persuade them that there is a proposal on the table, put there by the government of Israel in its action of May 14th, which opens some potentialities, some doors the way to progress for their people. And, my goodness, they shouldn't pass up the opportunity. You know, opportunity is there. It doesn't come always. Let us move the process forward. So that's what we're trying to do. Whether they're operating in good faith I don't know. But we will know whether or not they ever act on these proposals.

REP. DWENUS: One very, very fast question --

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Feighan.

REP. DWENUS: -- which will come later -- (laughter) -- thank you.

REP. FEIGHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, welcome to the Committee and congratulations on your assignment.

The decision late last year by Secretary Shultz to begin a dialogue with the PLO obviously was a very dramatic shift in American foreign policy in the region. And because it was so dramatic, it would seem to be a shift that would be very tightly managed and very closely watched. While that dialogue may be undertaken at some level in New York by Ambassador Pickering with the PLO representative there, and while there may be State Department officials meeting with PLO representatives who may come to Washington on occasion, is it correct -- am I correct in

242

39  
34

understanding that the center of that dialogue is to be taking place in Tunisia, directed by Ambassador Pelletreau?

MR. KELLY: Pelletreau is the sole authorized representative. If I may, Congressman, you mentioned a contact in New York by Ambassador Pickering with the PLO. There was a contact but there's an important distinction here. Pickering was that month the president of the United Nations Security Council. He met with the fellow -- with the representative only in his international capacity. He opened the conversation by saying to the

PLO rep, "I am not here as the American representative. I am here" -- it was a ten minute conversation. It ended with a reaffirmation that this was in his international hat. It's a rotating job. Everybody has the duty once in awhile. So I wouldn't count that as an American contact with the PLO. Pelletreau is the channel.

REP. FEIGHAN: I appreciate that clarification. The -- because this was such a dramatic shift and because the potential for such dangerous and unintended consequences are very real, the management -- the decisionmaking I assume is taking place at the very highest levels, particularly in terms of who Ambassador Pelletreau is authorized to meet with. Has he met with representatives of the PLO other than executive committee members?

MR. KELLY: Of lower rank?

REP. FEIGHAN: Yes.

MR. KELLY: Yes.

REP. FEIGHAN: So he is not restricted in those representatives who he may meet with? Is that a fair conclusion?

Let me ask the question a different way, who is he authorized to meet with?

MR. KELLY: He's authorized to meet with the representatives of the PLO who -- with whom we've been meeting since December and with members of the PLO executive committee.

REP. FEIGHAN: Now, when he meets with an individual as notorious as Abu Eyhad, someone who is reprehensible in his conduct as a terrorist, that I assume requires specific authorization from someone above the ambassador.

MR. KELLY: That's right. His contacts are authorized by Washington.

REP. FEIGHAN: Now, from whom would the authorization have come



1-07-12 19:49

1406039 10

Ambassador Pelletreau was back in the United States on consultations

31  
SF

242

END

242

and met with responsible people and the Secretary of State and was authorized to meet with members of the PLO Executive Council.

REP. FEIGHAN: So, he has sort of a general authority to meet with members of the Executive Council. When he's planning that meeting, he doesn't have to contact your office or the Secretary's office and say, "Next Tuesday I'm going to meet with" --

MR. KELLY: He stays -- he stays in very close contact, Congressman. And the impression I -- I'm trying not to convey here is that Pelletreau is free-lancing in Tunis; he's not. He's not out on -- you know, on a leash -- off the leash, making up his own script there.

REP. FEIGHAN: I don't know that --

MR. KELLY: What he's doing --

REP. FEIGHAN: -- I wouldn't prefer to think that that was the case.

MR. KELLY: No, I think, on a serious matter like this, it's something that the government ought to be responsible for.

REP. FEIGHAN: Ambassador, it's been reported that the PLO is seeking to elevate the level of the meetings, above Ambassador Pelletreau's rank, and, as well, to change the venue to either a European capital or even to Washington. Is there any consideration being given to elevating the level of those discussions or to changing the location?


MR. KELLY: There is not current consideration to elevating the discussions. And let me be explicit on that. There have been a lot of newspaper stories that some American official, me or somebody else, is going to meet with Yasser Arafat. That is not planned. That's not in the works. And in terms of changing venue, no, we have no plans to change venue to Europe or Cairo or anywhere else. It's Tunis, and it's Pelletreau.

REP. FEIGHAN: And I assume that if there were -- if consideration were being given to raise the level of the discussions or to change the venue, there would be prior consultation with members of this Committee?

MR. KELLY: That would certainly be my intention, Congressman.

REP. FEIGHAN: I appreciate that. Let me, in my final moments, ask if I could engage in a few questions regarding Lebanon, a topic that you are thoroughly and painfully familiar with. The apparent failure of the Arab League to bring about a permanent cease-fire and now the increasing likelihood of the introduction of more





242

33  
54

role in the process. Is that your conclusion, and if so, how would you translate that into specific action?

MR. KELLY: Let me very quickly answer those points. Congressman. First of all, the Arab League effort is not dead. I understand the three ministers from the Arab League countries are in Damascus, if not today, tomorrow, meeting again with the Syrians. It's an active process. Sure, the cease-fire needs to be implemented, the shelling has to stop. But there's ongoing active diplomacy. Secondly, with the question of introduction of advanced weapons which you raised, missiles in Lebanon, specifically in the Christian enclave, we have no evidence that such missiles are in the Christian enclave. And I believe that the risk of an introduction of those systems is diminished.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Ackerman.

REP. GARY ACKERMAN (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

REP. HAMILTON: And then Mr. Engel after Mr. Ackerman.

REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador -- Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, let me welcome you and get back to a question I understand was raised earlier and that is the bus incident. It's my

understanding that one of the three conditions that we had for opening the dialogue with the PLO was that they denounce terrorism. As a matter of fact, Ambassador Pelletreau received instructions stating, and I think I should read them directly, that the PLO "must not only end terrorism inside or outside Israel, but must also be prepared to disassociate itself from terrorism by any Palestinian group anywhere. We expect that it not only condemn this action publicly, but also discipline those responsible for it, at least by expelling them from the PLO."

This taken in light of the fact that Mr. Arafat's spokesman, Basam Abu Sharif, stated on the radio, and I'll quote him, "This is not terrorism, the terrorists are Shamir and his government. Whoever defends his rights and resists occupation is not a terrorist." Are we playing a game of semantics? Will we say they



242

34  
54

55

have to denounce terrorism -- renounce terrorism, where they commit acts, which are obviously in the minds of any right thinking person a terrorist act, and they just redefine the word so that anything they do is not terrorism, and then we just continue the dialogue as if nothing happened?

MR. KELLY: No, I hope we're not playing a semantic game, Congressman. Pelletreau was instructed on Friday to try to bring up short, Mr. Bassam Abu Sharef, and tell him we found that that commentary was unacceptable.

REP. ACKERMAN: To do what to him?

MR. KELLY: To tell him that we found that commentary unacceptable.

REP. ACKERMAN: To bring him up short?

MR. KELLY: I'm sorry, that's a slang expression I probably shouldn't have used.

REP. ACKERMAN: All right, but does that mean that we expect -- just from the language on the original instructions, it didn't say to "bring him up short," or anything like that. It says that we expect them to disassociate themselves from it, and to condemn it publicly, and to condemn anybody who participated in it, and to expel them from the PLO. Are our instructions, being that this has been flagrantly violated obviously, are our instructions to Mr. Pelletreau going to be to ask Mr. Arafat to condemn Mr. Sharef, to expel him from the PLO?

MR. KELLY: Mr. Sharef? Abu Sharef?

REP. ACKERMAN: Yeah.

MR. KELLY: In the sense -- no. We --

REP. ACKERMAN: He did not condemn this act.

MR. KELLY: I know.

REP. ACKERMAN: He obviously --

MR. KELLY: Pelletreau told him that we thought he should condemn and denounce this act.

REP. ACKERMAN: Pardon?

MR. KELLY: And Pelletreau told Abu Sharef that the United States believes that he should condemn and denounce this act.

REP. ACKERMAN: And he, in fact, did that afterwards?

242 35  
54

MR. KELLY: No.

REP. ACKERMAN: Well, what are we going to do about it?

MR. KELLY: We're going to keep attempting to persuade these people that the path to progress, that the objective, is to abandon violence, to abandon terrorism --

REP. ACKERMAN: If they violate the conditions upon which our exception to speaking with them exists upon, should we not stop talking to them? Or shall we encourage them to continue acts of terrorism, violence and murder by completely ignoring what our instructions were?

MR. KELLY: We certainly are attempting to discourage them from that sort of conduct, from endorsing that kind of terrorism and from moving at all in that direction. We're trying to shift the way of operating into constructive political exchanges and away from this whole --

REP. ACKERMAN: Is this constructive engagement?

MR. KELLY: I'm sorry?

REP. ACKERMAN: Is this constructive engagement?

MR. KELLY: Not in the sense that it's been used with -- in the southern Africa context, no.

REP. ACKERMAN: But why don't we -- if they have violated the conditions of the talks, why are we still talking?

MR. KELLY: We are attempting to persuade them that there is on the table, Congressman, a May 14 proposal by the government of Israel which offers the prospect of progress for the Palestinians. And we're trying to get the Palestinians within the Territories to agree to discussions with the government of Israel. And, as a New York Times editorial has put it last week, the role of the US is to persuade the PLO to change its tactics. We're trying to persuade them and we're trying -- and to do that means having contact with them to persuade them that the policy they've followed for the last 25 years is a bankrupt one.

REP. ACKERMAN: Are you saying that the fact that we have agreed to sit down and talk with them, and have indeed done so with conditionality, that they can then violate the conditionality with impunity and we will continue to talk to them? Does that not give them license to continue on their merry way, after it takes us one full week to very weakly, at a very low level, make the kind of condemnation that we did yesterday? ourselves? Is this not encouragement to them that nothing is going to happen, they can get away, literally, with murder?



36  
54

242

13  
54

MR. KELLY: We certainly hope not, Congressman. That is not --

REP. ACKERMAN: Well --

MR. KELLY: -- our objective.

REP. ACKERMAN: -- where is our -- where is our big stick? Isn't our big stick that we're going to talk to them or not talk to them?

MR. KELLY: We believe that it is worthwhile to try to persuade them to go along with the proposal by the Government of Israel for negotiations between Palestinians in the Territories and elections, and we believe that to persuade necessitates some contact.

REP. ACKERMAN: It seems to me you've given up your entire leverage, you've given up your entire principles upon which the discussions were based, and you've given license and encouragement to the continued commission of terrorist acts which you've put no shield on whatsoever.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Engel.

REP. ENGEL (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it's good to see you. I want to, first of all, identify with some of the remarks made by my colleagues, particularly the remarks made by Mr. Levine about the mixed signals that the administration seems to be sending out. It's very disturbing and I think it's been a pattern in the six months that we've seen Mr. Baker and some of the other administration officials saying certain things. It seems to me it's been wholly designed to put public pressure on the state of Israel, and that's always where it seems to lead. And I think it's very unfair and doesn't help the peace process.

And I want to just agree with Mr. Levine that I think that these types of actions undermining Shamir and I think led to him being perhaps boxed into a corner to take some of these positions that he

37  
54

242

35  
35

we want to take in his coalition. When there's talk of international conferences, when there's talk about meeting with the PLO and doing all these things, I just think it's very unhelpful publicly to strengthen Mr. Shamir against his ultra right wing. And I really am very, very upset and disturbed about that.

The whole question of the international conference, now I heard you say -- and please correct me if I'm wrong -- that the international conference is not really on the table so long as the election proposals are on the table. Secretary Baker made a similar remark several months ago. Doesn't that send a signal to some of the more intransigent Palestinians, saying that "Hey, you know we can scuttle the election proposal and just drag it along and drag it along, and ultimately, if it flops, the Americans will back us on an international conference"?

MR. KELLY: No, absolutely not, Congressman. We have not said to anybody, and I certainly hope we haven't implied to anybody that all they need to do is sit tight and refuse the proposal for contacts between Palestinians in the Territories and the government of Israel and the election plan, and sooner or later, somebody's going to deliver to them the international conference. That's not our intent. We've conveyed that same message not just to the Palestinians but to the Europeans and to the Soviets, too, so that -- you know -- a waiting game in that sense is not going to pay off for them.

REP. ENGEL: Because Secretary Baker did make similar remarks several months ago, saying ultimately if all these things failed, the Israelis would have to perhaps sit down with the PLO at a conference. And I just think again that remarks such as those are just totally off base and unhelpful, and I said the same thing to the Secretary when he appeared before our whole committee.

I want to follow a point that Mr. Ackerman was making before, and it's in your prepared remarks, where you said the PLO has finally accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist. And I would respectfully say -- I think perhaps they've accepted it in words only, not in deeds. And I'm a big believer in that actions speak louder than words, to coin an old cliché.

The PLO covenant still declaring the destruction of the state of Israel as an avowed goal of the PLO remains in place. Mr. Arafat has not moved to remove that covenant; there's been no renunciation of terrorism; there have been many, many terrorist attacks by the PLO against the state of Israel since the PLO purportedly renounced terrorism. And yet, it seems to continue with impunity, with no renunciation, and I think that the point made before by my colleague is very, very well taken. How long will we allow the PLO to say one



38  
54

242

27

MR. KELLEY: Congressman, I think this gets back to a question that one of your distinguished colleagues raised about "Are they operating in good faith?" And I said I don't know. And that's not really the standard to measure them by. The standard is going to be results. As you say

39/54

242

EJF

actions speak louder than words. You talked about the PLO Covenant.

I decided, in preparing myself for this meeting yesterday, I was trying to study a lot of things. And one of the things I did was go

back and read the document yesterday, because you know, the last time I read it was many years ago. And it really is an outrageous document, and it really is, you know, something that is so irrelevant to the process that we're engaged in pushing, that by all

means, yes, they ought to condemn it, and get rid of it, and forget it. Null and void isn't good enough. They ought to consciously do something about that document, and you're right. Actions will be needed. This is not a dialogue of infinite duration. On the same token, you know, I don't think we're in a position to put a date certain where the cut off point comes, but actions obviously have to

be forthcoming. It is not an indefinite dialogue.

REP. ENGEL: Well, I'm glad to hear you say that, because I think that we again convey the wrong message. I wanted to also follow up on something that Mr. Owens asked. He mentioned whether or not our government was encouraging the Labor Party to stay in the coalition, and I think you said, "No, that we're not encouraging one way or another." Does that mean that the newspaper accounts that we've all been reading are inaccurate?

MR. KELLY: I think that as a government we must avoid involvement in the internal politics of Israel. In a relationship, as a New York Times writer put it today, "As intimate as that between US and Israel, there are a lot of conversations among a lot of people." But we, as a government, have got to stay out of getting involved in domestic politics there.

REP. HAMILTON: The subcommittee will begin a second round of questioning.

Mr. Secretary, I wanted to clarify one point in response to questions recently asked you. Are you saying that the PLO has violated the conditions of the agreement that we had with the PLO when we began the so-called "substantive dialogue?"

MR. KELLY: Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure I would call it an agreement, but you know, we all saw Arafat on television --

REP. HAMILTON: Well, have those conditions been violated? We entered into discussions with the PLO when we said that the PLO had fulfilled certain conditions. And in answering some of the previous questions, I got the impression that it was your view that the PLO has in fact violated now some of those conditions since that dialogue began.



40/54

242

55

MR. KELLY: Not in the sense that we have not found the PLO directly involved in cross-border terrorist raids or things like?

2) REP. HAMILTON: Do we have any evidence of the PLO involvement in any of the terrorist actions that have occurred inside Israel?

MR. KELLY: No, none that I know of, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: All right. Now, I want to try to get your sense of how actively the United States should be involved in trying to further the peace process through the elections. When I talked with you earlier, you indicated, for example, you did not think it was the role of the United States to bring forward names -- Palestinians in the dialogue. Do you see, for example, the role of the United States in trying to provide suggestions to narrow the gap between the Israelis and the Palestinians on the election proposal? Is that an appropriate role for the United States?

MR. KELLY: We want to be helpful, Congressman --

REP. HAMILTON: Well, in being helpful, does that mean we're going to provide suggestions as to how the gap can be narrowed?

MR. KELLY: Certainly, yes. From time to time we will make suggestions about how we think the gap can be narrowed.

REP. HAMILTON: One of the questions is whether or not the PLO will agree to meetings between Palestinian representatives in the Israeli government on the modalities of the election. Is it your sense that the PLO can accept such talks?

MR. KELLY: Not at present, no, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: The PLO has mentioned the possibility of using two American citizens in such talks. What is your position and what is the Israeli position on the involvement of Palestinian Americans in these talks?

MR. KELLY: There's an interesting point, if you'll permit me there. We read an interview in the Financial Times of London by Yassir Arafat in which he talked about the potential involvement of two American citizens in a dialogue. We have not heard anything like that through our contacts with the PLO, in other words, our conversations with Pelletreau. I think that what we are witnessing there, Congressman, is the fact that for a couple of decades the PLO sent signals or attempted to convey messages or signals through newspaper interviews, through visiting professors, through a myriad of different people who bumped into them from time to time.

REP. HAMILTON: Okay, let me --

MR. KELLY: I don't think the organization has quite gotten

4/54 242 27

accustomed to the fact that it's talking to the United States government, and if it wants to say something, it can say it.

REP. HAMILTON: I have seen report after report about indirect Israeli-PLD talks, secret talks through the Moroccans, indirect talks through US, Egyptian and West Bank Palestinians. European diplomats are saying the Israel-PLD channel, and I'm quoting him now, "is becoming very clear and very substantive," end of quote. Finance Minister Peres has acknowledged that an official dialogue with the PLO is now going on between the Israelis and the PLO. And the question on my mind, I guess, is do we have any knowledge of that? Are those reports accurate? What do you know about it?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, I think it's an exaggeration for any press report to say an official dialogue is going on between the Israeli government and the PLO. I don't think that's reality. There's a lot of press reporting about it --

REP. HAMILTON: The quote was from Finance Minister Peres and he said that an official dialogue with the PLO is "taking shape," those are his words.

MR. KELLY: Oh, taking shape, I'm sorry, I understood you to say "taking place." I don't know of any official dialogue that's taking place. There are reports both in the press and in classified reporting about contacts. I'd been happy to go in the latter with you in a closed session.

REP. HAMILTON: Well, I would like to pursue that certainly with you. Now, I want to ask also with regard to the PLO dialogue, what have we accomplished so far in this PLO dialogue?

MR. KELLY: I think --

REP. HAMILTON: Has there -- can you point to any change in PLC policy due directly, for example, to the US-PLD talks?

MR. KELLY: I can't point to any explicit change in PLO policy Congressman. I hope that we are beginning to broaden their vision and have an impact on them on the potentialities of abandoning armed efforts to change.

REP. HAMILTON: You think -- you continue to think they enhance our interests in the region and promote the search for peace do you

MR. KELLY: That they do, sir?

REP. HAMILTON: The talks do.

MR. KELLY: The talks, yes I do. I believe that they help fulfill our objectives.

REP. HAMILTON: Do we now recognize the PLO?



42/54

242

*[Signature]*

MR. KELLY: As a government, no sir. And we have actively opposed the attempt by the PLO to be treated and accredited as a state in international organizations.

REP. HAMILTON: What about this phrase "substantive dialogue"? What does that really include? What does it mean? It does not mean negotiations.

MR. KELLY: It does not mean negotiations. I think to put it in common terms, it means to talk turkey, to talk seriously with people.

REP. HAMILTON: Does it mean that US officials can have conversations with PLO people when they meet them around the world?

REP. FEIGHAN: Not around the world. The only channel is Pelletreau in Tunis.

REP. HAMILTON: What distinction do you make between "substantive dialogue" on the one hand and "negotiating" on the other?

MR. KELLY: Negotiating, I think, is an effort to agree to formal positions which will be mutually agreed at some point in time.

4/7/54

242

102

And that is not our effort with the PLO. Our effort is to persuade them to go along with the Israeli proposal that there would be contacts between Palestinians and the government of Israel.

REP. HAMILTON: Now, how many times have we met with the PLO in Tunis?

MR. KELLY: I don't have the number at my fingertips, sir.

REP. HAMILTON: Have we met -- we draw a distinction of some kind. We have formal meetings --

MR. KELLY: We do. We've had three formal meetings, the last of which was June 8th.

REP. HAMILTON: Does Mr. Pelletreau meet with the PLO official informally on a regular basis?

MR. KELLY: Informally -- not on a scheduled basis. There probably have been -- oh, I don't know -- a dozen, 18 meetings in six months.

REP. HAMILTON: All right. Mr. Smith.

REP. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelly, let me take us from where we are today since we've discussed that in a, I think, a fairly significant way -- but where we're going to be tomorrow, and the Chairman's talked about it. You

said that the State Department is interested in results; the administration is interested in results. We started to talk with the PLO in December. I've indicated that there have been an increase in the number of EterroristF attacks -- severity and incidence. You've said that while there have been, and significant terrorist attacks, you have not been able to link the PLO general command -- Arafat or the others underneath -- with those attacks.

I believe, of course, that anybody who would be doing that on the other side and then take credit for it would be kind of dumb. All they have to do is do it, and if they don't take credit for it and the people that are doing them can't be directly linked, they can do anything they damned please because, as you've testified apparently, we're not going to hold against them their prior record

It has been indicated by people in the State Department that to some degree the PLO started with a clean slate after December's Arafat statement. Now, if that's the case -- if all of this is given, and you've testified to most of this -- if that's the case,



informally, Pelletreau has in fact broadened his contacts with them both formally and informally.

MR. KELLY: Excuse me, sir, not formally. In the formal sessions, they're the same as we started with in December.

REP. SMITH: Well, he didn't meet with Mr. Khalaf, and I doubt very seriously whether he was going to -- until just a few weeks ago, June 8th.

The bottom line, however, is we've gone through this exercise for six months. I'd like you to tell me, today, after this six-month period or longer, whether the PLO has taken any single step closer to peace; has endorsed any proposal whatsoever, either thrown out -- I'm sorry, that's the wrong word -- either offered up by the United States or by the Israelis -- and, of course, the new proposal which was in May by Mr. Shamir -- whether any -- any of those or any other tangible, observable, objectively capable, for recording purposes, significant progress has been made through these talks? If "yes," I'd like to hear about it. If none, I'd like you to tell me how long we're going to go through this process.

Mr. Engel I believe is correct: If they do nothing and we keep talking and we keep talking and we keep closing our eyes -- there is the text -- at some point we're going to get disgusted with no progress being made and just say to ourselves, I believe, "Well, this proposal is a dead issue. Let's go on to the next one." And the only one that we have at this moment is the multinational conference.

So, would you indicate for the Committee how much, if any, progress has been made, what tangible, identifiable progress can be recorded. And if there hasn't been any, how long the State Department intends to stay at this before either we will break off talks with the PLO because they haven't moved at all or we'll try to bludgeon Israel into moving further from its own particular stand at this time?

MR. KELLY: Congressman, there is no tangible progress that I can point to. It's an effort at persuasion. It's obviously tough. We're trying to get these people to abandon the ideas that they have held for 25 or 30 years or longer. I don't know how long that's going to take. I do know this is not an unlimited dialogue, where they sit and stonewall. I do think there's one interesting phenomena (sic) in the area, which I hope the PLO is part of, and that is the fact that the subjects of dialogue have changed a lot in the last decade or two. When I first had my first exposure to the Middle East about 25 years ago, all one ever heard from any Arab government, or Arab, was how they were going to go about driving Israel into the sea. Now, Arab governments, and Arabs, and Palestinians argue among themselves and with others about whether or not the election proposal is a

10/54 242 45/54  
profitable way, a rewarding way for Palestinians to advance their cause. I would certainly argue, and I would think you would agree that, at least in the crude sense, the terms of the dialogue, or

discussion, have changed for the better. That doesn't mean anybody's home free yet.

REP. SMITH: I understand, and I appreciate the significance that. The difference is what has happened in the last six months since the United States has entered into what is in fact a new course, which for us was a change of 20 years worth of policy -- years worth of policy at least, maybe 20. What are we getting for it now? Now that Israel has offered up a unique plan, which people said it wouldn't have done six or eight months ago, where has anybody else moved in the process, if we're so intent on helping. Although we're not negotiating, we're not bringing messages back

forth, we're there trying to convince people? What have we convinced the PLO of?

MR. KELLY: There is nothing we can hold up and hand out, but we think it is a worthwhile objective, Congressman.

REP. SMITH: And how long do we think we're going to stay in that mode? Do we have --

MR. KELLY: That's a tough one to answer. I mean even if we had it fixed in our mind, I'm not sure it'd be prudent to say it publicly.

REP. SMITH: Would we be ready to affix blame for the failure to move forward at some point in time, if in fact the PLO does not change its position at all?

MR. KELLY: Absolutely, Congressman.

REP. SMITH: So, we can count on you at some point if that happens, and nobody wants to see it happen, but if it happens --

MR. KELLY: We want to see progress, but obviously --

REP. SMITH: -- we can count on you to be back here blaming the PLO for not moving.

MR. KELLY: This is not an open ended dialogue with an unlimited calendar.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Levine.

REP. SMITH: Thank you very much.

REP. LEVINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, Mr. Secretary, am heartened by your testimony today, it is helpful, and I will just mention again that I hope that it is a consistent message of the State Department.



46/54

242

52  
55

On this issue of the dialogue that so many of my colleagues have been raising: As you may know it was I who introduced the language that was ultimately the basis for the statutory conditions

that the PLD had to meet in order for the dialogue to begin, first in 1983 and again in '84 and again in '85 when it became permanent law. And even though it was my language and my legislation, when Secretary Shultz called and other people in the Department called and indicated that they intended, I might emphasize in the context of some consultations with the Congress, to open a dialogue, I and other people on this committee who have been skeptical from where the PLD comes on this issue, supported the opening of that dialogue.

We did not stand up and criticize it. We said that we thought that given the Secretary's track record on this issue, it was something if he believed it was worth trying that we should try. And he received and maintained consistent congressional support for his efforts.

Now, as you heard, particularly I think of the very eloquent question of Mr. Ackerman, who appropriately referred back to the specific language from the State Department at the time of the beginning of the dialogue, that our State Department spelled out a course of conduct that they expected the PLD to meet. It was not met. In fact, to the contrary, it has been -- in terms of the expectation of the condemnation of terrorist activity, it has been very explicitly not been met, and yet we not only continue the dialogue but we elevate it in terms of dealing with known terrorists.

And I would just say for the record at this point in time that the sad fact is, Mr. Secretary, you guys look like you're being taken. You look like we're doing all the giving and doing none of the getting, that the PLD can change the terms, change the conditions we go along, and I am pleased and relieved for the first time to hear that you indicate that this is not an indefinite dialogue, and I hope that the interlocutors with whom you're involved understand that you do have people on the Hill that are looking very critically and very carefully at this point, at the track record, which appear

47/54

242

TOS  
53

thus far to be all giving on our part and no getting. And I say that for the record, because I think it's important that you take that back in whatever context and method you have to inject it into the process.

I was a little -- yeah, go ahead.

MR. KELLY: May I say, Congressman -- may I respectfully disagree? I don't think it's been all giving and no getting. I think our --

REP. LEVINE: Well, what have we --

MR. KELLY: I think our successful --

REP. LEVINE: What have we gotten?

MR. KELLY: -- effort to keep the PLO out of the World Health Organization speaks for itself.

REP. LEVINE: Can I just stop you at that point? Why did the PLO even continue to pursue it? We're supposed to be getting something from the PLO dialogue. We had to get something there by going to the international community. We didn't get that from the PLO. We got that from other people in the world. What have we gotten from the PLO?

MR. KELLY: In terms of tangible things that we can point to?

REP. LEVINE: Yes.

MR. KELLY: Nothing.

REP. LEVINE: Well, that's just my point. I'm glad to hear you think we're getting something, but in the next sentence you tell me we're getting nothing from the PLO. I guess we're getting something from others. What have we gotten from the P-L-O?

MR. KELLY: We are trying to persuade them, Congressman, that there is a better course for them to try to help their people than the empty path that they have been treading for, lo, these decades.

REP. LEVINE: Mr. Secretary, that is why we have supported you when you initiated the dialogue, but we are becoming increasingly skeptical that it's yielding results.

I must say that I was unhappy to hear your testimony that the press reports with regard to our encouraging Labor to stay in the coalition are inaccurate. I was relieved to hear that we were sending somebody to encourage Labor to stay in the dialogue. I think that would have been a constructive activity. For the record

I just want you to know my views on that.



48/54

242

115

Let me just ask one other question, and it's about Lebanon. I am deeply saddened, as I think members on both sides of the aisle are across the board, with regard to what's happening on the ground in Lebanon.

I'm also frustrated by what appears to be the deafening silence from our administration with regard to Lebanon. We say a heck of a lot less about the tragic death and devastation of Lebanon than we say about the most subtle aspect of a change in policy with regard to Israel. Lebanon is one of the most tragic, sad crises on the globe, which I know you are very well aware of -- perhaps better than any of us are. What can we do, and why can't we be louder and more visible and more aggressive, in terms of at least staking out position with regard to Lebanon. It seems that we've abandoned the poor, struggling, suffering country, and left it to the cruelest possible fate.

MR. KELLY: Congressman, let me make two points. One, in one way or another, we say something about Lebanon two or three times every week, and most of it doesn't get reported. I mean, obviously there are things that, in terms of abandoning Lebanon, or turn -- turn our back -- well, I'll give you an example, if you'll forgive me a personal one. At my confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I was asked a similar question. In response to the question, I said it would be ignoble of the United States to turn its back on Lebanon, to let that country bleed to death unnoticed and unmourned, and that we needed to work with our international partners to try to bring this war to an end.

I felt that statement very, very deeply from within my own -- my own being. I mean, it's the kind of statement that a government official can make, and I'm trying to back that up with a little activity, since I've got an office that has something to bring to bear. It doesn't get any notice. It gets a little notice here and there among people who watch very closely, but it's just not a -- it's -- the bad news that's on the front page every day is the violations of the ceasefire and so on. We are working, we are active, we have talked to the Europeans about it, we've talked to a lot of Arab governments, we've talked to the Soviets about it. We are trying to bring peace to that country, and perhaps a lot of it is unnoticed activity.

REP. LEVINE: You will get extensive support in this Committee and the Congress in those efforts. We commend you for them. Thank you?

MR. KELLY: Thank you, Congressman.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Torricelli.

REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kelly, could you state for me the status of our offer to give compensation to the victims of Iran Air 655, please?

49/54 242

MR. KELLY: This is being handled by our lawyers, so I'm not your best witness on the case. But my understanding is that we are about ready, if we have not already done so, to communicate a compensation offer to the governments other than that of ElranF, which had passengers on the aircraft.

REP. TORRICELLI: So, the decision then -- that was going to be my next question -- the decision has been made to approach governments of third nations and simply hold in abeyance the offer with Iran?

MR. KELLY: Again, I'm not your best witness, but my understanding is that the plan is to deal with third governments and to attempt to deal then with non-governmental organizations such as the International Red Cross with regards to the victims in Iran.

REP. TORRICELLI: But to your knowledge, either communication with the Iranian government or families within Iran at the moment is not occurring.

MR. KELLY: That's my understanding. I think we made some efforts through international organizations, I believe that the efforts were unavailing because, I think, the government of Iran interposed itself into the process.

REP. TORRICELLI: To your knowledge, are there law suits filed against the United States government now by families of victims?

MR. KELLY: I honestly don't know the answer to that, Congressman.

REP. TORRICELLI: And has a judgment been made whether to accept the jurisdiction of the World Court in the event that such suits are filed?

MR. KELLY: I know that's been under consideration, if I may submit the answers for the record.

REP. TORRICELLI: But there is not a judgment on it. Could you then -- what you do know about the status of compensation from the ElraqiF government on the Stark incident? Do you know the answer to that question?

MR. KELLY: There has been a transfer of the funds from the government of Iraq to compensate the victims of the American servicemen who died --

REP. TORRICELLI: To the families?

MR. KELLY: Sorry?

REP. TORRICELLI: To the families.



50  
54

242

23

MR. KELLY: To the families, yes.

REP. TORRICELLI: But to the United States government?

MR. KELLY: That I do not know, sir. I can check and supply i  
for the record.

REP. TORRICELLI: It's my understanding first that the costs  
finally are bringing the Stark back to service -- there's some \$820  
million. If you could verify whether indeed that is an accurate  
cost, and second compare what has been provided from the Iraqi  
government against that number, if you would.

MR. KELLY: I'll be happy to supply that for the record,  
Congressman.

REP. TORRICELLI: Third, King Fahd's visit to Washington.  
Should we be expecting, without me asking you today for details,  
announcements on any arms sales?

MR. KELLY: The administration has been considering the matter  
of arms sales. There is no current intention to announce any arms  
sales during the King's visit. Indeed, if there is a subsequent  
decision, there will have to be obviously pre-consultation with  
members of the Congress, as well as the 20 and 30 day notification  
periods.

REP. TORRICELLI: From the perspective of this moment, you,  
based on your own consultations with the administration, do not  
expect an announcement during this visit?

MR. KELLY: I do not, no, sir.

REP. TORRICELLI: Two issues with regard to the sale of Main  
Battle Tanks. I have read that the EkuwaitisF have decided not to  
purchase an American tank, but might be interested in a Yugoslavian  
tanks.  
If you would respond to that and the status of the on-again/off-agai  
discussions with the Saudi Arabia with regards to the M-1 tank.

MR. KELLY: Th Kuwaiti governmnet announced publicly, I beleiv  
around the last days of June, that it had decided to procure a tank  
Yugoslavia. We have discussed that with the Kuwaiti government and  
they  
have confirmed that to us.

REP. TORRICELLI: To the extent that they are precluding the

51/54

242

22/2

M-17

MR. KELLY: I'm not -- I do not know whether the door is totally closed, but a decision has been made by the Kuwaitis to procure tanks from Yugoslavia, yes.

With regard to a tank sale to Saudi Arabia, that would fall in the realm of things that might be considered for announcement during the King's visit in the last week of July. There are no -- there's no intentions to make any announcement on that now. It remains a possibility. There have been no decisions.

REP. TORRICELLI: Well, simply to state this one member's opinion, but time and again when we are asked by our friends in the region to sell items which we consider potentially to be contrary to the security interests of the United States or our friends in the region, we often do so in any case because of the needs of various Arab states. In this one instance, Kuwait could have purchased from the United States something that probably not only that met its needs but had some advantages for the United States, and did not pose, in my judgment, serious security problems for our friends or for ourselves. They did not do so.

In my judgment, that reflects poorly upon the Kuwaiti government. It reflects poorly upon future requests to purchase things in the United States that might be more questionable. I'm disappointed they made the decision.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HAMILTON: Mr. Ackerman.

REP. ACKERMAN: Thank you, MR. Chairman. I must say that I'm a little bit disillusioned with the actions that our State Department has taken with regard to the PLO, and I'm a little bit disappointed with some of the responses that I've heard here today. Maybe we could clear it up. Before you were asked "do we recognize the PLO?" and you said "not as a government." But what we have done in sitting down and talking to the PLO is we have given them a legitimacy, a credibility that heretofore they have not had. And then we had set conditions for sitting down and giving them that kind of recognition, conditions that I read to you which were very, very explicit to Ambassador Pelletreau having to do with the condemnation of violence and the expulsion from the PLO of anybody who participates in it. And then we went ahead and we knowingly or unknowingly, giving the benefit of the doubt, ignored those conditions, giving complete legitimacy to the PLO claim that those are not acts of terrorism, although they're callous and wanton acts of bloody -- cold blooded murder.

The Chairman very appropriately asked you if the PLO has violated the conditions of our talks. And you said you did not believe so because there was no cross border terrorism. Conditions



52/54

242

JP

have nothing to do with cross border terrorism. That's only a part of it. And in further answering, you said you were unaware of any acts of PLO terrorism. Let me just cite a few things to you if I might. There are a couple, more than two, and perhaps you can respond to them separately.

On December 26, 1988, four gunman from the Popular Struggle Front tried to infiltrate Israel by sea but their rubber dinghy capsized off the Lebanese coast. That's cross border. Number two, on December 28th, three gunmen from the Palestinian Liberation Front were killed by Israeli soldiers while they were cutting a hole in the Israeli-Lebanon border fence near Kibbutz Manara -- that's cross border.

Number three, on February 5th of 1989, five gunmen from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and one from the PLF, were killed by Israeli troops inside the security zone in southern Lebanon. The PFLP leader, George Habash declared that the PFLP, quote, "will not only keep up the armed struggle, but will also escalate it, and diversify its forms and methods."

Number four, on February 23rd, three gunmen from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine were killed by the Southern Lebanon Army, in southern Lebanon. Documents found on the terrorists indicated their intention to attack the civilian settlement in Zarit, in northern Israel. In keeping with historic policy, the DFLP claimed to have successfully reached Zarit. Radio Voice of the Mountain, from Lebanon reported that, quote, "The DFLP announced this afternoon that one of its groups had attacked an Israeli enemy patrol at the Zarit settlement road junction."

Number five, on March 2nd, 1989, four gunmen from the DFLP were killed by Israeli troops in Southern Lebanon. Again, the DFLP claimed to have actually infiltrated the Zarit settlement. The manifesto found among the documents on the bodies of the slain terrorists was addressed to the settlers of Zarit, as well as the soldiers and the officers of the Israeli army.

Number six, on March 13th, 1989, three gunmen from the PLF were killed by Israeli troops less than a mile from Lebanon-Israeli border. Again, the PLO group claimed to have actually infiltrated Israel. Quote: "In the statement issued yesterday, the Palestine Liberation Front said that one of its groups managed at 0100 to breach the wire border fence and went deep in the direction of al-Manara settlement." This from Palestinian radio.

Number seven, April 8th of this year, gunmen from the PSF drowned in the north of Darosha-Hanikra (ph) border between Lebanon and Israel when their rubber dingy was shot and sunk by an Israeli patrol vessel. A PSF spokesman claimed responsibility and said the attack had been claimed on a Israeli town.

Those are just seven cross-border incidents that I would like



S 3/54

242

you to be aware of that obviously violate even the narrow interpretation that it has to be cross-border terrorism that was so as a conditionality for our talks. But certainly it's not just cross-border, but our conditionality was all forms of terrorism had to be denounced, and those who committed it and the groups that committed it had to be expelled.

More recently, on June 4th, the PLO's DFPLP faction led by Naif Hawatmeh -- I'm sure I mispronounced his name and did him great disservice -- attempted to carry out a terrorist infiltration of Israel's northern border. This was the third such DFPLP attempt and the ninth carried out by a mainstream PLO faction. The three-man terror squad on its way to take civilian hostages in the Israeli kibbutz of Misgash Am was intercepted while trying to break through the border fence. The terrorists, two Palestinians and one Kuwaiti, were killed. An Israeli Bedouin soldier died in the clash. The Gulf News Agency carried out the following report from a press conference with Yassir Arafat in Kuwait two days later. Quote: "The PLO chairman praised the participation of Kuwaiti martyr Fawzi Abal Rasul in Sunday's commando raid on Israeli targets in occupied Palestine saying, 'Fawzi's blood has mixed with that of the two Palestinian martyrs who died with him in the operation.'"

Secondly, at the same time, the Kuwait press conference, Yassir Arafat also stated -- this, on June 6th -- "the PLO will not stop the armed struggle. I did not ask anybody to refrain from military operations."

And three, on May 3rd, 1989, the Palestinian terrorists stabbed two elderly Israeli Jews to death and wounded three others in Jerusalem. Later that day, PLO leader Yassir Arafat was asked in a interview on the Arab language radio Monte Carlo if he viewed the incident as part of the legitimate Palestinian uprising. Arafat stated, "Certainly. The Palestinian people is acting in self-defense. We will continue the uprising with renewed determination. The uprising will continue wave after wave until the Palestinian flag is hoisted over Jerusalem, the capital of the Palestinian state."

And finally, four, on May 18th, three members of a Palestinian organization called the Assault Group, which was wanted for carrying out terrorist attacks against fellow Arabs opened fire with automatic rifles and grenades at an Israeli patrol in Beit Ulat (sp?) near Hebron. One Israeli was killed and another critically wounded. The three terrorists were killed in the ensuing gunfight. When asked for a reaction to the incident, Abu Eyhad, second in command to Arafat in the PLO hierarchy told Kuwait News Services on May 20th, quote, "It is the right of the Palestinian people to defend itself by every means. The Beit Ulat operation was in the context of self-defense, especially since there has been no renouncement of the principle of the armed struggle. On the contrary, we declared that the armed struggle will continue until the enemy will obey and abandon his haughtiness."



Now, you know, I suppose taken on face value you were unaware  
of any of this, but now that you are aware of all of this

54  
—  
54

242



משרד החוץ

*Handwritten signature*

לשכת השר

ח' בתמוז תשמ"ט  
11 ביולי 1989  
507

*Handwritten initials*

*Handwritten notes in a circle: "אזהרה" (Warning) and "אם יש" (If there is)*

אלל : שה"ח

חאח: יועץ מדיני

הנדון: שיחת טלפון עם ביל בראון

היום 11/7 התקשר ביל בראון בשעה 17.30 וביקש למסור :

א. לדובר מחמ"ד יש נוסח, בתשובה לשאלה, הקובע כי על בסיס האינפורמציה הידועה, ארוע האוטובוס היה פעולת טרור. ביומיים האחרונים לא נשאל ועל כן לא פורסם.

ב. שוחח עם דניס בגדאנסקי. לדבריו, אין חדש בנוגע למשלחת. עדיין לא הוחלט על חוזה או הרכב.

הודיתי על האינפורמציה. ציינתי כי באשר למשלחת, האינפורמציה היתה ידועה מתוך דברי המזכיר בוורשה. אנב, הוספתי, "רק בינינו" הסגנון שהמזכיר בחר בו מצער. אני לא מושתמש בסגנון זה אפילו כלפי בנותי, ואף אחת מהן עוד לא בת 41.

ראש המחשלה הביע מחויבותו להמשיך היוזמה וכך גם שה"ח. במיוחד בנסיבות אלה, חבל שהמזכיר בחר לשתמש בסגנון זה.

דע: רוה"מ

*Handwritten initials*

דשס : סלי



נכנס

בלמט

חוזם: 7,6740

מל: המשרד

יעדים: וושה/352, מצב/462, מנמח/166

מ-שיקגו, נר: 25, תא: 100789, זח: 1100, דח: מ, ט: 10, בל

תח: 2, גס: צפא

נד: 0

בלמט/מיירי

מל: מנהל מצפא

ט/מנכל צפא.

זע: השגריר

דוד פלד-וויטנינגטון.

הנרי היטינגטון

קייטינגטון נאם ב-9.7 בארוחת ערב בשיקאגו מטעם ידידי  
מכון ויצמן בנוכחות למעלה מ-2000 איש שכללו את נשיא  
מכון ויצמן, חתני פרס נובל וראשי הקהילה בשיקאגו.

להלן עיקרי דבריו שהתקבלו בתשואות רמות:

1. מסיבות בטחוניות אין מקום לשתי מדינות בשטח ארץ  
ישראל.

2. אינו מאמין שמנהיגי אשף יסתפקו במדינה ביטוח או  
שערפות יסכים למדינה מפורזת ללא צבא. אף מנהיג אשפי  
לא הסכים לקוי 1967 שגם הם אינם ניתנים להגנה. הם  
מדברים על קוי 1947 לפי החלטת אום 181. מדינה פלשתינאית  
בקוי 1967 תהווה סכנה בטחונית חמורה לישראל ולאחריה  
יבוא תורו של הגליל.

3. יש להפסיק לדבר על שלום במונחים אבסטרקטים ויש  
לקבוע מהם התנאים הדרושים כדי לחיות בשלום בטריטוריה

א/ההק



## משרד החוץ-כחולקת הקשר

המוגבלת של יטע.

4. תנאי הליכוד:

א. נגד מדינה פלשתינאית.

ב. אי מתן זכות בחירה לערביי מזרח ירושלים.

ג. אשף אינו פרסנר.

היסינג'ר איננו מבין מדוע אלו תנאים גרועים.

5. כל השטחים שבהם יערכו בחירות יהפכו בסופו של דבר למדינה פלשתינאית. איננו מאמין בהצבעת ABSENTEE של ערביי מזרח ירושלים, כי כל שטח שבו תערך הצבעה יהפך למדינה עצמאית. לכן על ישראל לקבוע את קו הגבול לפני ההצבעה, אחרת היא תמצא לידה מדינה פלשתינאית בקו 1967.

6. אם לא מסכימים למדינה פלשתינאית אז אין לנהל מו"ם עם אשף. אם מנהלים מו"ם עם אשף, אז ברור שמנהלים מו"ם על מדינה פלשתינאית. אין אימאט בנדון.

7. על הויכוחים הפומביים בישראל ובחול בקרב יהודי ארהב להפסק. ויכוחים אלו רק יביאו להגברת הלחץ על ישראל. הויכוח הפנימי הנל יביא בהדרגה:

א. לדה-לגטימציה של עמדת ישראל.

ב. ללחץ על ישראל ולהכתבת עמדות שהיא אינה רוצה בהן.

8. על ישראל לנהל מו"ם עם ארהב ולקבוע תכנית מגובשת. ישראל חוששת מחשבויות ארהב במו"ם זה. אולם החשובות שישראל תקבל מארהב במהלך מו"ם עמה תהינה נוחות וקלות יותר לישראל מאשר החשובות שהארועים יכתיבו.

9. מתנגד לוועידה בינלאומית - אולם אי אפשר לדבר בעת ובעונה אחת על התנגדות לוועידה ועל תמיכה בה.

10. על ישראל וארהב להגדיר מהות השלום, הבטחון וכיצד הן רואות את עתיד האזור.

11. התכנית הנוכחית שישראל וארהב תומכות בה טובה:

א. היא מתנגדת לשתי מדינות.

ב. מציעה בחירות כדי לספק שאיפות הערבים.



## משדר החוק-בחלקת הקשר

ג. אולם יש לקבוע עכשיו את קווי הגבול כדי למנוע נסיגה לקו 1967.

ד. אסור שהתכנית תהווה תהליך שבסופו תקום מדינה אשפית. ה. התכנית אולי לא תבטיח שלום קבע, אך ניתן להגיע להסדרים שיחזיקו מעמד זמן רב כמו ההסדרים עם הטורים בגולן. יש להגיע ביטחון להסדרים פרגמטיים שיבטיחו כבוד ( DIGNITY ) לערבים ובטחון לישראל ויחזיקו מעמד זמן רב.

ו. האינטיפאדה - קשה, אך כל הסדר שסומן בחובו נסיגה לקו 1967, לא יבטיח שהאינטיפאדה לא תעבור מישע לגליל.

12. על יהודי ארהב לזכור שאסור להם לחזור על מעשה ויטנאם של לחץ פומבי על ישראל, כי בהקשר המזתי ישראל איננה ארהב אלא היא ויטנאם.

13. אם ישראל והקהילה היהודית יתלכדו ויקבעו מה ניתן להשיג במוסד ומה לא ניתן להשיג, ואם ארהב תזבש עם ישראל עמוה כנל ניתן להגיע להסדר יציב.

14. בראשית דבריו ציין שאיש אחד גורבאצ'וב אינו יכול לשנות את מהלך ההיסטוריה ומלמות ברהם, ועל הציבור במערב להתפכח ולנהוג בזהירות מירבית.

הקונכל.

אק

תפ: טוהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבמ, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, רט, אמן.  
מצפא, מעת, הסברה