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# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

4610/1-א

משרד

מסכת רלויה

יוסף מדיני

אורח

16/7/89 - 28/7/89

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מחלקה \_\_\_\_\_



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פנימי: **א-1/4610**

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תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-9



מזכירות הממשלה

ירושלים, כ"ה בתמוז התשמ"ט  
28 ביולי 1989

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מחבר

23/7  
313

אל: ראש הממשלה

מאת: מזכיר הממשלה

שלום רב,

הנדון: שיחה עם השגריר בראון (28.7)

השיחה ביזמת השגריר.

- א. סיפר בקצרה על שיחותיו בעזה אתמול. ד"ר חאתם אבו גזאלה, שהוא "MAVRICK" ונהנה מכך, מסר לו כי כתב לערפאת שעליו ללכת לכיוון רעיון הבחירות. הצרה שעליה הצביע אבו גזאלה היא, כי כביכול כל עוד ישנו "כיבוש" אין התושבים הרוצים ללכת למהלך המוצע מסוגלים לעשות זאת מחמת איומי אש"פ. אמרתי כי אפשר לטעון שעל אחת כמה וכמה היה הדבר קורה בנסיבות הפוכות (קרי כשהשליטה אינה בידי ישראל, אלא בידי אש"פ).
- ב. אבו גזאלה אמר שהוא אינו מבקש פגישה עם ראש הממשלה, אך היה שמח להיפגש אילו זומן, אך לא באמצעות "איש צבא" (נדמה לי שבדברים מעין אלה אמר גם בתקשורת).
- ג. אבו גזאלה מסר שקיבל רשות לנסוע לכנס בנושא עזה באיטליה, ב-22.8. ואולם, ד"ר זכריה אל-עאדה (?) לא קיבל, וגם הלה עצמו התלונן בפני השגריר, המבקש כי הדברים יובאו לידיעת הנוגעים בדבר.
- ד. בראון סיפר כי בכיקורו הקודם התרשם לרעה מתנאי החיים בשטח; עתה תפס יותר שהמצב הוא נתון שיש להבינו.
- ה. לדעתו יש מקצת תזוזה בדעות ששמע בעזה. אמנם כל בני-שיחו מבקשים שארה"ב תלחץ על ישראל, אך הוא חוזר ומסביר שאין בידי ארה"ב TO DELIVER את ישראל. ישנה הזדמנות, ועליהם לנצלה. הוא מסביר לבני שיחו כי בקונגרס ארה"ב ממתנינים לתשובת הפלסטינאים, כיוון שישראל הציעה הצעה, אך אינה יכולה "לשחק בעצמה". בראון מוסיף באוזני בני שיחו, כי לדעתו תהא ישראל גמישה יותר משיחל המו"מ, כפי שהיה בקמפ דייויד. התזוזה הקלה שבראון חש בשיחות הפרטיות היא ביחס לקבלת רעיון הבחירות, אף כי עומדים על כך שאלה צריכות להיות חלק מתהליך פוליטי של מעמד הקבע, ובראון מסביר שראש הממשלה הטעים כי יהיה בהמשך מו"מ על מעמד הקבע.

1. בראון הוסיף כי אנשי שיחו מבקשים שיתוף "פלסטינאים מבחוץ", והוא מזכיר להם כי הדבר אפשרי גם לפי קמפ דייויד. אמרתי כי אי אפשר ליטול מקמפ דייויד צימוקים, ומכל מקום שם מותנה הדבר בהסכמתנו, וזו לא ניתנה.

2. מבלי להיכנס לנושאים פנימיים שבארה"ב, ציינתי כי דברי בוש במכתב לסנטור דול שאם תפסיק ארה"ב את הדיאלוג עם אש"פ יהיו המפסידות ישראל וארה"ב, נשמעים כ"הצלת ישראל מעצמה", והלא אין זו דעתנו כידוע כלל ועיקר.

3. הוספתי כי הרושם הוא שארה"ב קשדה עצמה לדיאלוג עם אש"פ, שאין לו סיכוי, שכן מה שיבוא מאש"פ לא יתקבל על דעת ראש הממשלה (גם במגעיו עם בני-שיחו אין ראש הממשלה רוצה בשום "מסר" לאש"פ, ואילו ידע שטריפי ידווח לשם ודאי לא היה נפגש עמו). עדיף היה לארה"ב להדגיש חיפוש פלסטינאים מיו"ש ועזה וכן שיפור יחסים על-ידי מדינות ערב, שהיה תורם רבות. בשעתו הוכטח שמצרים תשפר את היחסים לאחר פתרון טאבה, אך בינתיים נהרג ישראלי במפרץ, תירות וסחר אין והקריקטורות האנטישמיות נמשכות (אגב, אמר "שהעביר הלאה" את החומר שהעברתי אליו בנושא האחרון). אמרתי שאני מתרשם גם משיחות עם ראש הממשלה שאילו הסעודים, למשל, היו מגלים רצון טוב פומבי - היה הדבר מועיל לאין שיעור יותר ממגעי פלטרן. אנו מאמינים כי בסופו של דבר נגיע למו"מ עם ערביי יו"ש ועזה.

4. בראון מסר כי בעקבות ידיעות שצוטטו מפי השר שרון על הצורך לחסל את ערפאת פנה שגריר תוניס בארה"ב רשמית לממשל, ובראון היה רוצה לדווח חזרה שאין כוונה מצדנו לעשות משהו על אדמתה של "מדינה ערבית מתונה זו".

5. בראון ציין את מצב-הרוח הירוד בירדן והחשש לקונספירציה שלנו נגדם בגלל התבטאויות בנושא ירדן כמדינה פלסטינאית מפי שר החוץ (?), וכן טיסות חיל האוויר מעל ירדן. מצדי הזכרתי כי ירדן הרחיקה עצמה מהתהליך וגם הראיתי לבראון קריקטורות עוינות מעתונות ירדן, הכוללות צלבי קרס בהקשר שלנו.

6. העלה נושא המבנה הדיפלומטי של ארה"ב בתל-אביב.

7. אמר שהיום ייפגש עם שני ערבים נוספים, יחד עם וילקוקס.

ב ב ר כ ה,

אליקים רובינשטיין

העתק: שר החוץ  
מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה

קד: 1  
כתוב: 10

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון  
טופס פרוק

דחיות: כ"ד

סוג: בלפ"ס

תאריך וזמן מעבר:

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

דע: יועץ רוה"מ לחקשורת, יועץ שהביט לחקשורת, לע"מ  
אמ"ן/קטי"ח, דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק

כס' פרוק:  
מסרד: בטחון ניו יורק

71 486 608

פאת: עתוכות וושינגטון

תדרוך דובר כחפ"ד ליום July 26, 1989

Q Do you know anything about a memo purported to have been sent by the United States to the Israeli government about the PLO's views on accepting the Israeli peace -- election plan for the West Bank and Gaza?

MS. TUTWILER: I can tell you that there is no such US memorandum. Obviously, we have been working with all sides to support the election concept and to initiate a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians in the Territories. We're pressing for movement in this regard. There's no such memorandum.

Q You say -- I'm sorry, you qualified the first time. You said there is no such "direct" --

MS. TUTWILER: I said there is no such US memorandum.

Q Oh, US memorandum. Is -- could it have perhaps come from some other agency, other than the State Department?

MS. TUTWILER: I'd never thought about that, but --

Q I know. Now we've disposed of the memorandum. So memorandum or not, has the United States summarized the PLO's position? And has this position been conveyed to the Israeli government? And doesn't this position reiterate Palestinian demands that Israel give up territory as part of any overall settlement? And does the State Department think that in some way this advances the peace process?

Q I'll break it down. Has the United States conveyed to Israel the Palestinian, the PLO position, as it now stands on holding elections?

MS. TUTWILER: I'll answer you this way, by saying the PLO has told us privately, as it has said publicly, that it supports the election concept as part of a comprehensive peace plan. However, the PLO has put a number of conditions on its support for elections which would prejudice the outcome of a negotiated solution. These conditions are not acceptable to us. This is a key issue which we continue to discuss in our dialogue with the PLO.

תפוצה: \*

Handwritten notes and stamps at the bottom of the page, including the number '2' and various illegible markings.

Q Can you give me -- give us what -- you know, the PLO position is all not that mysterious, but can you tell us what conditions they've attached that you find -- that the State Department finds unacceptable?

MS. TUTWILER: I can tell you one, but it's not limited to, which is an independent Palestinian state as a guaranteed outcome.

Q Right, and the State Department, I know, has the same position. Are there any other -- can you give us any other conditions? No, I mean, in that case, you and Israel are on the same wavelength, but you're not always on the same --

MS. TUTWILER: No, that's the only one that I can --

Q That's why you --

MS. TUTWILER: -- be specific on.

Q That's why you selected that probably, because it's not a contentious issue between the United States and Israel. But how about the PLO asking for Israel to give up territory in exchange for peace? The US has no objection to that. So what else is unacceptable?

MS. TUTWILER: This is the only one, Barry, that I can state for you.

Q Do the Israelis find these conditions as unacceptable as the Americans do?

MS. TUTWILER: Maybe they could answer that better for you than me speaking for them.

Q Okay.

Q Did the United States convey these thoughts that you've just mentioned to the Israelis in some form?

MS. TUTWILER: What you're trying to ask me is are we a mediator. I've said before that we're not.

Q No, no, no. I'm just asking a very simple direct question. Did the United States convey these PLO thoughts to the government of Israel?

MS. TUTWILER: I'll get you -- I don't know specifically. I know what my instincts are, but I'd rather have a literal answer for you.

MS. TUTWILER: Yeah, and I'll get it immediately after the briefing for you.

Q Well, that's fine. But the question really is: Has the US served in any kind of interlocutory role -- how about that -- between the PLO and Israel?

MS. TUTWILER: I'd rather honestly and truly check before I guess can speak. I know what my instincts tell me; I know what common sense tells me. But I really -- as you all know better than I do, [it's] one of the most sensitive subjects we deal with; I'd really rather check before I answer.

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Q But Margaret --

Q Can you tell us if this process, whatever it is, has in any way advanced prospects for holding elections or for finding a settlement?

MS. TUTWILER: What do you mean? What process?

Q Well, I mean, obviously there's been -- some stuff has moved in some way.

MS. TUTWILER: We said earlier this week that it was helpful, the recent meeting where they reaffirmed the May 14th meeting in Israel. I've just told you, the PLO has told us privately, as it has publicly, that it supports the election concept as part of a comprehensive peace plan. You know that we wholeheartedly endorse Prime Minister Shamir's election concept. You know that we've been working with others in the region, plus the involved parties. You know that we're working in our dialogue. I don't know exactly what you're asking me.

Q All right, well, here's what I'm trying to do. You've said about the PLO, in a positive way, that it supports -- it's told you it supports the election process. You've told us --

MS. TUTWILER: "Concept."

Q "Concept." You've told us, in a negative way, there are conditions that are unacceptable.

MS. TUTWILER: Correct.

Q So when you add the plus and the minus, do you come out with neutral, or has the process overall been helped by this? Are you any closer to -- is the situation any closer to the holding of elections or to setting the stage for elections?

MS. TUTWILER: That I couldn't characterize for you, except to say that it's an ongoing process. We're still working at it. I've just listed the most recent thing that happened, that while we characterize this certainly as a positive, I couldn't characterize [for] you to say that we're closer or that we've moved backwards or that we're staying stagnant. We're still definitely actively working it.

Q Margaret, can I pursue that also for a second? Is the US, in its dialogue with Israel, defining in any way the settlement, the overall settlement, that is talked about as part of the election concept?

Q I'm asking whether the US is defining the outcome, the final settlement that the US thinks would be a good way of having things end up?

MS. TUTWILER: I think that would be for the parties to resolve among themselves, not for the United States to be telling the parties.

Q There's a report out of Tunis quoting PLO official Abed Rabbu as saying that the Soviets had told them that the United States may agree to accept the position of tying the election proposal with some guaranteed final outcome for the status of the

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Territories. The story I saw didn't speak specifically to the idea of a Palestinian state, but said "some final guaranteed outcome." Can you say if the United States has made some representation along those lines to the PLO?

MS. TUTWILER: I haven't seen that report, and I'm not aware that the United States has, but I will go ask the literal question for you --

Q Can you -- a couple of things on the PLO. Can you tell us when the United States had its last talk with the PLO and when the next one might be held? And then I want to ask you about the statement --

MS. TUTWILER: Formal talks?

Q Well, contact. I mean, a contact more than just a handshake at those social events where you always seem to run into a PLO official. I mean a formal talk with the PLO -- I mean, a contact with the PLO about issues, about substance.

MS. TUTWILER: The last formal talk, I can't remember what the date was -- (to staff) -- do you remember, Richard? I just don't remember it. Was it June 6? Top of my head, I don't remember the last one. I do not know of one that is presently or currently scheduled.

Q All right. Now, let me ask you about yesterday's statement.

MS. TUTWILER: Yes.

Q The President says through the State Department that he will take into account the sentiments in the Senate. I -- that's --

MS. TUTWILER: You mean the Congress.

Q It's an incredibly ambiguous statement. Does that mean that the President will observe the legislation and so will the State Department and there will be no further talks with Abu Eyad?

MS. TUTWILER: As the statement said yesterday, the President strongly believes that legislation that tries to restrict or manage the conduct of diplomacy is an infringement on presidential prerogatives and is unconstitutional. While he will continue to view the PLO amendment on the state authorization bill and provisions like it as unconstitutional, he acknowledges the widespread sentiment in the Congress that produced this legislation. Members of Congress should know that this sentiment and concern will be taken into account as we pursue our policy.

On your specific question on will he be -- or will we meeting in a dialogue in the future with Abu Eyad,

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the answer is, as I've told you before from this podium, that we do not say and are not going to say who we do and do not meet with, but I preface it by saying what we said to you yesterday, is the President definitely takes the sentiment of the Congress, and their concerns will be definitely taken into account.

Q Well, one construction of saying taking something into account is to have a meeting with Abu Eyad and say, "Son of a gun, I know the Senate won't like this." Another construction is, "The Senate won't like this. I think they acted unconstitutionally, so I'm not going to do it." Now --

MS. TUTWILER: I understand.

Q -- those are two opposite results. And that statement is either ambiguous because of the constitutional issue, or it's ambiguous because diplomacy is slippery. So, I'm trying to figure out if you're going to follow the Congress' legislation, or if you're just going to mull it over and do whatever you've been doing before for your own purposes -- the State Department, I mean.

MS. TUTWILER: I understand exactly what you're asking me, and I don't have a better way of formulating it than the two points that I've made out -- pointed out, which are, the President believes strongly that this piece of legislation is unconstitutional, is number one. And number two, he acknowledges the widespread sentiment, and he will certainly take this under account when he pursues his policy. I can't -- I know what you want me to do -- I can't do it.

Q Margaret, back on the memorandum. There was no --

MS. TUTWILER: Wait a minute. Okay. The memorandum that doesn't exist, correct.

Q There's no US government memorandum. Did the United States transmit to Israel a memorandum or document from another source?

MS. TUTWILER: I don't think they would play that kind of game with me. There is no memorandum from the people that I know that would know. And I have no reason to believe -- and they never have before -- that they would purposely mislead me. I believe them when they tell me there is no US memorandum.

Q But maybe from another source?

MS. TUTWILER: I just don't think they would be that cute with me. I think they would have said, "Margaret, be careful, that there

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Q Well, Robert's asking the question essentially of whether the US conveyed to Israel, directly or indirectly, through a third or fourth or fifth party, a PLO piece of paper, for example, or an Egyptian piece of paper that summarizes the PLO position, because the US, of course, does talk to both Israel and Egypt. Those are the kinds of questions we're getting at.

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MS. TUTWILER: I, personally, am unaware of such a thing happening.

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Q Margaret, how extensive is --

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MS. TUTWILER: Of your question, Ralph -- excuse me -- of asking me if the United States asked a third party or fourth party or fifth party to give on behalf of us is, I believe, what you just asked me, I am unaware of that.

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Q I wasn't asking whether any of those parties conveyed a document from the United States. What I think we're trying to get at is, is the United States, through other parties, perhaps Egypt, perhaps other countries, conveying the views of the PLO to Israel and vice versa, conveying the views of Israel to the PLO, and in effect, serving as an intermediary in negotiation between the PLO and Israel. You --

MS. TUTWILER: There are a lot of people involved in this region of the world. And there, as I said earlier in response to Barry's question, we have conversations, and have been, as you know, the Secretary of State and this President, actively engaged in this region in this issue. So if you're asking me a broad-based generic question, "Have we ever discussed with 'X' our thoughts on this subject," and then a hypothetical, "Has 'X' ever told it to 'X'," of course something like that could go on.

Q Okay, we've discussed our thoughts, meaning US thoughts. Has the US --

MS. TUTWILER: We're engaged in that.

Q Okay. Has the US, in those conversations, discussed the PLO's thoughts with people other than the PLO, who would be expected to convey it to Israel?

MS. TUTWILER: It is a -- it is many numbers of discussions. You can discuss what the PLO has said, you can discuss what Israel has said, you can discuss what Jordan has said, you can discuss what Egypt has said, you can discuss your meeting with Shevardnadze. I mean, I don't understand exactly what you're asking me. Any number of those scenarios could come up in any number of these meetings, with any number of different officials.

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Q Margaret, the story actually says that the document, or whatever it was, was relayed to Israel by Soviet envoy Gennadi Tarasov, who reportedly met an aide to Peres this week in Paris, according to reports out of Jerusalem.

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MS. TUTWILER: Mm-hmm. (In acknowledgement.)

Q Now, is it possible the Soviets relayed to them some memorandum, document, or whatever, or description of the US --

MS. TUTWILER: I read that report, and the gentlemen in this building who I turn to for help in this area have read that report. And I have no reason to believe that they would mislead me. There is no United States memorandum. Now, I did not literally say (did?) it ever go from any other country in the world, but I just -- I trust that, having read that, they would have said, "Be careful, it is another way."

Q There is, of course, always a summary of the discussions that we have, that the US has with the PLO. When the US has formal and informal meetings with the PLO, there is a summary discussion, and that very well could be the kind of document that's in question here. There is a summary document every time we have one of those discussions. Whether or not it's put in memorandum form may be a moot point. That's the kind of summary which appears to have been moved.

MS. TUTWILER: I will be more than glad to go back and re-ask this question again, if you would like.

Q This process isn't over, correct? I mean --

MS. TUTWILER: What process?

Q -- you have lots of reasons -- well, you have lots of reasons for talking to the PLO. But one of them --

MS. TUTWILER: Is our dialogue over?

Q No, no, no -- the process of trying to somehow bring the PLO into approving this election process.

MS. TUTWILER: We are definitely working. We think this idea, as I've said many times, has merit --

Q Right.

MS. TUTWILER: -- is worthwhile, is worth pursuing, is worth working on, which is what we have been doing. Nothing's changed as far as that is concerned.

Q Okay. And you've been doing that with the PLO, and you just described --

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MS. TUTWILER: We've been doing it with a lot of people in the region.

Q No, no. But we're interested, obviously -- this whole -- I know. But we're interested in whether the PLO and Israel are inching closer together through the good offices of the United States. And you described pluses and minuses in shorthand --

MS. TUTWILER: And I declined to characterize for you --

Q -- whether it's an overall gain or an overall loss or on neutral.

MS. TUTWILER: Right.

Q Okay. That being -- even taking that into account, is there -- is this process going to continue, this attempt to bring the two together?

MS. TUTWILER: I have no reason to believe that it would end. Why would we stop trying?

Q I have no idea. But you must have some basis for continuing.

MS. TUTWILER: That -- that would seem to me, until --

Q I'm trying to get -- you don't want to announce the meetings anymore, so I'm trying to get a notion of how -- how eager the --

MS. TUTWILER: No, I just said I don't know of one that's scheduled.

Q Well, we've --

MS. TUTWILER: Every time I've announced one.

Q No, no. But I say we're asking now in the context of something that's going on. So if you're not going to see them for 2-1/2 months it would mean you're not really excited --

MS. TUTWILER: I didn't say that.

Q No. So can you give us some idea of how quickly you're going to get back to them on this subject? If you can't give us a date, in the next couple of weeks will there be --

MS. TUTWILER: On what subject?

Q The subject of the election that we've been talking about.

MS. TUTWILER: I'll see what I can find out at this next

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scheduled formal meeting.

- Q Or informal meeting.
- Q New subject. Margaret --
- Q Contact will do.

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Q Margaret, the Soviets have been advising the PLO, indirectly (and directly?), to accept the election proposal or to facilitate the election proposal. Could this memo from the -- if there was such a memo -- could this be a sense of bilateral meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union on the level of Shevardnadze and Mr. Baker possibly, that they relayed a statement or a position to the PLO that there is such a thing?

MS. TUTWILER: That's an entirely hypothetical question. I've never made a secret of the fact that Secretary Baker has met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. This is one of the issues that they have -- not this memo -- that they have discussed, the region Middle East peace. I've never made a secret of that. I've tried to answer as honestly and straightforwardly as I can. I know of no such memo. So your answer, did the Soviets send a memo for us, on my knowledge, no; there's no memo.

Q Do you welcome the story that appeared yesterday overnight that Mr. Shamir met with -- I don't know if someone addressed this or answered this -- or asked this question -- four Palestinians from the West Bank that they reported that they are affiliated or directly sympathizing with --

MS. TUTWILER: Yesterday I was asked about that, and I said I'd leave it up to the Israelis or the Prime Minister's office to characterize who he's meeting -- who he is or is not meeting with. It's not my job.

Q But isn't this an atmosphere that you would like to encourage, directly or indirectly, to have such meetings after the setback with the Likud Party?

MS. TUTWILER: We -- we would not discourage the Prime Minister from meeting with Palestinians. That's not how you asked me the question.

Q Margaret, what do you do to -- does the United States government do to keep the Israelis informed of the dialogue and the substance of the dialogue with the PLO? How are they debriefed

MS. TUTWILER: I'm sure we've got various means and methods that fall under the category of how we deal diplomatically with countries. And I don't have a, you know, a literal tit-for-tat answer for you, but I'm sure it's no different than how we deal with other countries diplomatically. There's various sundry means.

Q But we do this both orally and in writing?

MS. TUTWILER: It would be my guess. It's how we deal with most countries when we do all of our business with them.

Q Including the Abu Eyad meeting?

MS. TUTWILER: You also have -- you also have meetings with people. I mean, there's all -- you know this better than I do -- there are all kinds of different avenues in diplomacy.

Q But, we do make it a standard practice to keep them debriefed on a timely basis?

MS. TUTWILER: I didn't answer that question. I'm not going to get into what we -- we do with information that we have in our dialogue.

Q Do you tell them who in the PLO you met with?

MS. TUTWILER: I've never asked that question before. I don't know.

Q Because it might have some bearing on whether they would credit what you tell them, if you've heard it from a top guy or a secondary guy, or whatever. Could you ask if the Israelis are informed of who you -- who this PLO position was outlined by -- as it happens in these meetings? Not this specific one, necessarily -- but as PLO positions are outlined, do you tell the Israelis who outlined it? How much weight it might carry?

MS. TUTWILER: Mmm -- (in acknowledgement).

X

X

X

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קטן אהלי

11/15

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS

800 SECOND AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

(212)351-5200

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דחיינות :	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	1	דוי :
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מס' מברק :			סמנכ"ל צפ"א, מנהל ארנ"ל 2 :
המשרד :			מאת : יוחנו בירן - נאו"ם :

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הזמנות COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

לוטה מכתבם וכן העתקי הזמנות לשרים פרס ושרון. מבקשים סיוענו ועידודנו לקבלת תשובה חיובית להזמנות.

נאו"ם

שם השולח: יוחנו בירן

תאריך: 25.7.1989

מס' סלולר 2  
מס' טלפון 1  
מס' פקס 1  
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# COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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(9)

MARGARET OSMER-McQUADE  
Vice President  
Director of Programs

July 19, 1989


His Excellency Mr. Johanan Bein  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary  
Acting Permanent Representative to the United Nations  
Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations  
800 Second Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Ambassador Bein:

Enclosed is a copy of a telex recently sent to Vice Premier and Minister of Finance Shimon Peres, who last spoke here in May 1987, inviting him to address the members of the Council on Foreign Relations during his next visit to New York. In addition, you will find a separate telex inviting Minister of Industry Ariel Sharon to a similar event when he is next in New York.

We appreciate any assistance you could give us in encouraging these two distinguished leaders to accept our invitations. Thank you in advance and I look forward to hearing from you soon in this regard.

Sincerely,



Margaret Osmer-McQuade  
Vice-President  
Director of Programs

Enclosures

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MESSAGE # 106

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TO: HIS EXCELLENCY SHIMON PERES  
VICE PREMIER AND MINISTER OF FINANCE  
ISRAEL

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REMAINS EAGER FOR YOU TO ADDRESS MEMBERS AT A MEETING HERE IN NEW YORK DURING YOUR NEXT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. WE WERE DISAPPOINTED SUCH AN EVENT WAS NOT POSSIBLE DURING YOUR LAST TRIP TO THE US.

SHOULD YOU BE PLANNING A TRIP IN THE FALL, EITHER TO THE WORLD BANK/IMF MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON OR IN THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR, WE HOPE THAT WE CAN ARRANGE A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE DURING THAT VISIT.

WE REMEMBER WITH PLEASURE YOUR LAST VISIT HERE IN MAY 1987 AND MEMBERS WOULD APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR YOUR CURRENT VIEWS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

MEETINGS ARE, OF COURSE, OFF-THE-RECORD, AND SPECIFIC TOPIC OF REMARKS IS YOUR CHOICE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR POSITIVE REPLY AND TO THE PLEASURE OF WELCOMING YOU ONCE AGAIN TO THE COUNCIL.

MARGARET OSMER-MCQUADE  
VICE PRESIDENT  
DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS  
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
58 EAST 68TH STREET  
NEW YORK, NY 10021  
TELEX: 239852 CFR UR

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TO: HIS EXCELLENCY ARIEL SHARON  
 MINISTER OF INDUSTRY  
 ISRAEL

FURTHER TO OUR MOST RECENT INVITATION OF 18 JANUARY 1989, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REMAINS EAGER FOR YOU TO ADDRESS MEMBERS AT A MEETING HERE IN NEW YORK WHEN YOU NEXT VISIT UNITED STATES.

THE COUNCIL, AS YOU MAY RECALL, IS THE PREMIER INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS INSTITUTION IN THE US, AND IS PRIVATE, NON-PARTISAN ORGANIZATION. MEMBERS ARE LEADERS IN FIELDS OF GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, ACADEMIA, MEDIA, AND TECHNOLOGY. MEETINGS ARE OFF-THE-RECORD TO ENCOURAGE CANDID, HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSION. SPECIFIC TOPIC OF REMARKS IS YOUR CHOICE.

LEADERS WHO HAVE ADDRESSED OUR MEMBERSHIP RECENTLY HAVE INCLUDED QIAN QICHEN OF CHINA, OSCAR ARIAS SANCHEZ OF COSTA RICA, MOHAMMAD HOSNI MUBARAK OF EGYPT, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE, KING HUSSEIN I OF JORDAN, AND YOUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN YITZHAK SHAMIR, YITZHAK RABIN, AND MOSHE ARENS.

HOPE FOR AN EARLY AND FAVORABLE REPLY. LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING YOU TO COUNCIL.

MARGARET OSMER-MCQUADE  
 VICE PRESIDENT  
 DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS  
 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
 58 EAST 60TH STREET  
 NEW YORK, NY 10021  
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ארת 2

סודי / מיד

השגריר

בשולי 'תיקון הלמס' בלט שוב הפיצול החמור בין הארגונים היהודיים ונראה כאילו ההסכמים וההבנות שהושגו בעמל רב אחרי המשבר הקודם התפוררו למעשה.

היינו מבקשים לקבל:

א. חוות דעתך לגבי תמונת המצב בחזית הבינאירגונית והאם יש סיכוי לסתימת הסדקים והיכן עומדים האישים העקריים בועידת הנשיאים באיפ'ק ובארבעה או חמישה הארגונים החשובים ביותר.

ב. הצעת פעולה. מי לדעתך צריך לדבר עם מי. האם ומתי ראוי לבקש שהשר או אישים אחרים יתערבו בענין זה.

מנהל מצפ'א

פא

תפ: שהוו, סשוהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, ר/מרכז, ממד

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דמיפות: מילדי	שגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון טופס פרוק 19	ק: _____
סוג: גלוי		פתוח: _____
תאריך וזמן הגור: 21 ביולי 1989 15:50		אל: _____ מצפייא
כס' פרוק: הפרד	א. כ. כ.	דע: _____
521		פזת: _____ ק/ק לקונגרס

ביה"ב: חוק סיוע חוץ - הקצבות

1. היום לפנה"י (21/7) עבר חוק סיוע חוץ - הקצבות. במליאת בית הנבחרים. תוצאות ההצבעה:  
329 בעד. 69 נגד.

2. הקונגרסמן טרפיקנט הגיש הצעת תיקון לקיצוץ בגובה של 3% ACROSS THE BOARD.  
קונגרסמן אובי, הגיש הצעת תיקון חחליפית - שעיקרה - פטור מהקיצוץ לכספים משוריינים  
(לרבות ישראל, מצרים, ירדן, פקיסטן, יו"ש, מלחמה בטרור פליטים, סמים ועוד).

סוכם בסופו של דבר על קיצוץ בגובה של 1% (67 מיליון \$) ACROSS THE BOARD מאותם כספים שאינם משוריינים.

ישראל ורנאי דונגר.  
יהודית ורנאי דונגר.

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תפוצה: 36

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שגרירות ישראל בווינגטון  
טופס מברק

אלה

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דחיפות: מייד  
סוג: גלוי  
תאריך, זמן: 24.7.89  
מספר המברק:  
המשרד:

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

דע :

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מאת: עתונות

מש"פ - ארה"ב

להלן מאמרו של דיוויד אוטווי על כוונת הממשל להמשיך במגעיו עם מש"פ חרף הלחץ מצד הקונגרס ולמרות "התיקון" שנתקבל בסנט הדין בהקשחת התנאים להדברות עם גורמים באש"פ.

המאמר התפרסם ב"וושינגטון-פוסט", 22.7.89.

עמנות

2/3

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including the word "עמנות" and various scribbles.

# Administration Vows to Continue PLO Contacts

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Administration officials yesterday refused to bar future meetings with the No. 2 figure in the Palestine Liberation Organization, Salah Khalaf, despite strong congressional pressure for an end to U.S. contacts with PLO officials previously involved in terrorism against Americans.

U.S. officials also denied that any private "agreement" or "understanding" had been reached with senators to forgo future talks with Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad.

"There was no agreement with them at all," one State Department official said. Legislation on PLO contacts approved by the Senate Thursday night "doesn't rule out anything," the official said.

The administration's interpretation of the deal worked out with the Senate leadership appeared likely to reopen the debate over its handling of contacts with the PLO and could lead to stronger restrictive legislation in the House.

But administration officials seemed determined to defend the president's constitutional right to decide whom the United States will

talk to in the PLO and to leave open the possibility of future meetings with Khalaf.

A senior U.S. official said, however, that there are no plans "at the moment" to have contacts with him.

Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.), who joined Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) in the negotiations with the administration over compromise language for an amendment to the State Department's fiscal 1990 authorization bill, said he agreed with what Mitchell told the Senate Thursday night.

Mitchell said it was his "understanding" and "intention" that if the president knew of a PLO official's past involvement in anti-American terrorism, "he will advise the Congress and not continue the dialogue with that particular person."

But State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said it is still a "hypothetical question" as to whether the administration will be talking to Khalaf again because the compromise had not been passed by the House.

"We're not going to get into who we are and who we are not meeting with at any specific point, but our dialogue continues," he said.

"The provision is not yet law, and I'm not making any predictions about what will happen if it does become law," he added.

Boucher also refused to take issue with White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater who said Wednesday that the United States will not "dictate" to whom it talks to within the PLO and that "essentially the representatives are decided by the PLO."

The Senate late Thursday night voted 97 to 1 to bar federal funds for the current U.S. dialogue with any PLO representatives "if the president knows and advises the Congress that the representative directly participated in the planning or execution of a particular terrorist activity which resulted in the death or kidnapping of an American citizen."

It defeated by a vote of 75 to 23 a more-restrictive amendment proposed by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) that would have obliged the president to "certify" to Congress that the PLO officials involved in talks with the United States had no links to terrorist activities targeting Americans.

Administration officials yesterday explained why they believe talks

with high-ranking PLO officials like Khalaf have become an important part of the peace process.

They expressed concern that "events" might overtake Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's plan to hold elections for a Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories to open a direct Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.

The United States is pressing the PLO to accept at least the principle of elections and a dialogue and the message that there is "a sense of urgency" for a PLO response had to be conveyed to the organization's highest officials, these spokesmen said.

The officials said that two June meetings between U.S. Ambassador Robert Pelletreau and Khalaf at the residence of the Egyptian ambassador in Tunis had produced "the best response that we've had" to U.S. pressure on the PLO regarding the Israeli plan.

Khalaf "was much more serious about both dialogue and elections," an administration source said. "He was raising concerns that they had but concerns that were not of the same kind of non-starter character that we'd been hearing before."

"The sole purpose in that discussion was to reinforce the message that the Israeli initiative is the only way to go, that our patience does have limits, that they can't just continue to talk about broad principles and symbols if they are serious about diplomacy," the administration official said.

"The value of talking to people [like Khalaf] at the authoritative level is that maybe they can make a decision . . . maybe they see the

END

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מיידי	דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון טופס פבוק	קף: 1
שומר	סוג:		פתוך: 2
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סנאט : הגבלת הדיאלוג עם אש"פ

א.1. עוד ביום ו' אזה"צ בטרם פירסום כתבתו של אוטורי למחרת ב- W/P. (ב-22/7)  
 החל משרדו של הסנטור מצנבאום לבדוק עם מחמ"ד האם אכן הממשל נסוג ממחויבותו להסכם  
 שהוגש עם מנהיבות הסנט לגבי החוק שהתקבל והאם הממשל ימלא אחר החוק ( WILL ABIDE )  
 לדברי הנדלמן, עוזרו של מצנבאום, שהונחה ע"י הסנטור להחקר מיד עם ראש אגף החקיקה  
 במחמ"ד (ג'אנט מלון) נמסר לו ביום ו' ואושר לו שוב הבוקר שהממשל  
is going to abide by the law  
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 מיטצ'ל. וכי כתבת אוטורי היא Totally false. הנדלמן הוסיף כי עוד ביום ו' (וכן הבוקר)  
 שרה מבוכת מה במחמ"ד טרם ולאחר פירסום הכתבה שכלל לא היו מעוניינים בה.  
 2. הנדלמן, אשר סיפר כי מצנבאום מאד לא מרוצה מהכתבה, שוחח עם משרדי סנטורים נוספים אשר  
 ניענו דאגה נאי שביעות רצון מתכן הדברים שפורסמו ומהאפשרות של אי עמידת הממשל בהסכם.  
 לדבריו איש לא יקבל זאת בקלות. עם זאת להערכתו במחמ"ד מטפיק חכמים לדעת שאם ההסכם יופר  
חד צדדיה, מצנבאום ובשביץ עלולים להגיש הצעת תיקון חדשה שתנוסח בצורה חריפה אף יותר,  
מתיקון הלמס המקורי.  
 בשלב זה משרדו של מצנבאום נגס זה של בושביץ (ראוהמשך) בודקים עם מיטצ'ל ואחרים  
 כיצד יפעלו.

ב. עוזרו של הסנטור בושביץ, ברד גורדון, מטר כי קיבלו הבוקר אישור שהנשיא ימלא אחר  
 החוק. לדבריו בייקר היה מאד UPSET בעקבות פירסום הכתבה. לאחר בדיקה במחמ"ד  
 העלו שהמקורות המצוטטים בכתבת אוטורי לא היו חלק ממעגל הנושאים והנותנים ולא דיברו  
 authoritatively. מכל מקום, לדברי גורדון, הם (הסנטורים) יצטרכו להביא  
"and to bring everybody aboard"

במחמ"ד נבינים שהצעד הבא עלול להיות הפסקה מוחלטת של הדיאלוג ולכן לא יעשו כל דבר  
 in appropriate, פומביה, יתכן שהממשל מתקשה לבטא תמיכתו בחקיקה שכן הם עדיין טוענים שהוא  
 מנוגד לחוקה עם זאת באופן פרטי הם מטפקים כל ההבהרות האפשריות שהם ימלאו אחר החוק.

תפוצה: שמה פלטה רחג לזרחה לטל ג'אלל כ'פואה ג'אלל  
 ס'ס כ'ג'ינס למה ג'אלל כ'פואה ג'אלל  
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דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך ושפת תגובה:		אל:
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
561		פאת:

בינתיים, משרדו של בושביץ מחפש אחר אישורים מכל הציבורות האפשריים לכך שהממשל עומד בהתחייבותו.

ג. הסנסור גרסלי, אשר רגז מאד עם פירעום הכתבה, עומד לשגר (עד סוף השבוע) מכתב לנשיא בוש ולמזכיר בייקף שיבהיר שה"סנאט החכוון לביזנס" במתן הטכמתו לנוסח הצעת החוק של המנהיגות.

ביהנ"ב

בינתיים החל לעבוד משרדו של הקונגרסמן פיהן על הצעת חוק עצמאית שתנוסח עפ"י מתכונת תיקון הלמס ושחשמש לחץ לקראת ה-conference בין שני הבתים.

וגם... וכן... פתח.

תפוצה:

סודי

נכנס

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סג'ן סלונה

חוזם: 7,12146

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/915

מ- פריס, נר: 222, תא: 170789, זח: 2000, דח: ר, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: אירופה

נד: @

סודי/רגיל

אירופה 1

מאת שוקת פריס

פסגת השבע.

מרוזנבלאט מזכיר ראשון (מזת) בשגארהב (17):

1. הצרפתים נסו למנוע במסגרת הפסגה איזכור הבחירות בשטחים בהודעת הסכום, בהתאם לגישתם השלילית המוכרת בנושא, אך אולצו וויתרו.

2. לצרפתים נח לטעון כי ה'ליכוד' מסכל מהלך הבחירות ובו-זמנית להנות ולטפח הסכוי שאכן כך יהיה ויקודם רעיון הועידה הבינל'.

3. דניס רוט השתתף בפריס בעבודת הפסגה ויש להניח כי לקח חלק בעצוב הודעת הסכום בנושא המזהתי.

הערה- רוזנבלאט הינו יורשו של דויד ווין בשגארהב כאן. יהודי, דובר עברית שרת בשגרירותם בארץ ואחכ' בנושאים שלנו בתפקידים שונים במחמד'. אודה על הערות מאת מכריו.

שוקת.

לש

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, ממד, איר, איר, 2, בנצור, מצפא

RE: [Illegible text]

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 22.07.89

16102

\*\* נכנס  
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סודי

חוזם: 7,16102

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1209, מנמת/490

מ-: ווש, נר: 516, תא: 210789, זח: 1900, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

ארת' 2

סודי/מידי

אל: מצפ' א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

קונגרס: סגירת בתיה'ס ביו'ש.

השלמות.

1. למרות שמדובר רק 'בתחושת קונגרס' אין להתעלם מהעובדה שזוהי הפעם הראשונה שהקונגרס (על שני בתיו) מעביר חקיקה בנושא פנים ישראלי בשנים האחרונות.

2. אמנם הנוסחים שהתקבלו בסופו של דבר כלל אינם ברי השוואה ליוזמות המקוריות (של נילסן וצ'ייפ'י) הן בהשפעת הודעותינו על פתיחת בתיה'ס והן מכוח כוחות פוליטיים המשפיעים על המחוקקים. עם זאת, הקונגרס מעורב מעתה בנושא ואין להוציא מכלל אפשרות שיעקוב אחר מסגרת הלימודים בשטחים ויפעל בהתאם ללחצים פוליטיים שיופעלו עליו).

3. להלן מספר הערות לגבי הפעילות בשני הבתים:

א. איפא'ק לא הצליחו להביס את התיקון הן בסנאט והן בבית.

ב. בסנאט.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הפעולה אמנם הייתה מהירה אך חשפה מספר בעיות:

- הסנטור אינוייה חתם כשושבין ברגע האחרון על הצעת צ'ייפ'י המקורית. כשהתקשרו אליו אנשי איפ'ק ושאלוהו לפשר הדבר השיב 'הרי ההחלטה משבחת את ישראל' (זהו משפט אחד בפסקה האחרונה בהצעת צ'ייפ'י).

כשהבהירו לו מהות ההחלטה ושאלוהו האם יאות להסיר שושביותו השיב אינוייה כי יהיה זה קשה. בכל מקרה, המצב במליאה היה נזיל והוכנסו ללא הרף שינויים כך שממילא כבר לא היה צורך בכך.

- מול התבטאותם של צ'ייפ'י הטפילד וג'ייפורד'ס יוזמי ההחלטה, הצליחו איפ'ק לגייס רק את בושביץ ובקושי את לאוטנברג ששאל את אנשי איפ'ק כיצד יוכל להתבטא בנושא סגירת בתי ספר. (בסופו של דבר הסכים להתבטא קצרות). למרות פניות אליהם סירבו להתבטא (בתירוצים שונים).

הסנטורים קרנסטון, הארקין, מוינהן, ספקטר סיימון וגור.

ג. בביהנ'ב.

למרות שהיוזמה החלה בביהנ'ב הושגה שם הפשרה לראשונה ובסופו של דבר ההתבטאויות (כולל של נילסן עצמו ואובי) היו סבירות בהחלט.

4. במשך השבועות האחרונים העברנו חומר לחברי הקונגרס בנושא בתיה'ס ועדכון שוטף על ההודעות שנמסרו בארץ לגבי מועדי הפתיחה, למרות העובדה שהמחוקקים ידעו על מועד הפתיחה ב-22/7 (המופיע אף בנוסח הבית) הסכימו על הצורך בהעברת תיקון בצורת 'תחושת קונגרס' כדי לאפשר להם הבעת דאגתם בנושא.

כידוע, החלטה או תיקון בצורת תחושת הקונגרס אינו מחייב אך כאמור הוא מהווה יתד שיאפשר מעקב אחר הנושא וחזרה אליו אם וכאשר ירצו המחוקקים בשני הבתים.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

לב

1. The first part of the document discusses the general principles of the project. It outlines the objectives and the scope of the work. The document is intended to provide a clear understanding of the project's goals and the methods to be used.

*Handwritten note:*  
See page 2

2. The second part of the document describes the specific tasks and responsibilities of the team members. It details the roles of each individual and the tasks they are responsible for. This section is crucial for ensuring that everyone is clear on their duties and how they fit into the overall project plan.

3. The third part of the document discusses the resources and materials required for the project. It lists the equipment, software, and other resources that will be needed to complete the work. This information is essential for budgeting and for ensuring that all necessary resources are available when needed.

4. The fourth part of the document describes the timeline and schedule for the project. It outlines the key milestones and the expected completion dates for each phase of the work. This section helps to manage expectations and ensures that the project is completed on time.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the risks and challenges associated with the project. It identifies potential problems and provides strategies for mitigating them. This section is important for anticipating and addressing any issues that may arise during the project.

6. The sixth part of the document discusses the budget and financial aspects of the project. It provides a detailed breakdown of the costs and the expected return on investment. This information is critical for securing funding and for managing the project's finances.

7. The seventh part of the document discusses the communication and reporting requirements for the project. It outlines the frequency and format of reports and the channels for communication. This section ensures that everyone is kept up-to-date on the project's progress.

8. The eighth part of the document discusses the evaluation and assessment of the project. It describes the methods and criteria used to measure the project's success and to identify areas for improvement. This section is essential for learning from the project and for planning future work.

9. The ninth part of the document discusses the conclusion and final recommendations. It summarizes the key findings of the project and provides recommendations for future work. This section provides a clear and concise overview of the project's outcomes.

10. The tenth part of the document discusses the appendix and supporting information. It includes any additional data, charts, and tables that are relevant to the project. This section provides a detailed look at the project's data and results.

11. The eleventh part of the document discusses the references and sources used in the project. It lists the books, articles, and other materials that were consulted during the project. This section provides a record of the project's research and sources of information.

12. The twelfth part of the document discusses the acknowledgments and thanks. It expresses appreciation for the support and assistance provided by individuals and organizations throughout the project. This section is a way to recognize the contributions of others.

13. The thirteenth part of the document discusses the glossary and definitions. It provides clear and concise definitions for the key terms and concepts used in the project. This section is helpful for ensuring that everyone has a common understanding of the project's terminology.

14. The fourteenth part of the document discusses the index and table of contents. It provides a quick and easy way to find the information you need in the document. This section is essential for navigating the document and for finding the information you need.

15. The fifteenth part of the document discusses the final conclusions and recommendations.

16. The sixteenth part of the document discusses the final conclusions and recommendations.

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סודי

מיועץ

חוזם: 7,17782  
אל: המשרד  
יעדים: מצב/1323, נוש/949, גנבה/371  
מ-: ברן, נר: 76, תא: 250789, זח: 1000, דח: מ, גס: 10  
תח: גס: ארבל  
נד: 2

סודי/מיד

אל: מנהל ארבי'ל 2, היועץ המשפטי.

דע: וואשינגטון, ג'נבה

אמנות ג'נבה - אש'פ.

משיחות עם השגריר האמריקני ונין ושרמן הינסון שהשתתפו בפגישת אייב סופר עם מזכיר המדינה במשה'ח, יקובי:

1. כבר בתחילת הפגישה, ולפי ניסוח הדברים ע'י יקובי ו- ס/היועץ המשפטי GODET (היועץ קרפט בחו'ל) ניכר היה שהתזה אותה הציג השגריר השוויצרי בוואשינגטון ברונר למשה'ח (קרי: הפרשנות וההשלכות הפוליטיות) לא נקלטה.

2. גודה היה נוקשה ביותר וטען (התרשמו שבשכנוע עצמי מחלט) כי בפני שוויץ שתי דרכים אפשריות:

א. לוחות REJECT פנית אש'פ. זה אינו מתקבל על הדעת מתוקף הגדרתה של שוויץ את תפקידה כבעלת הפיקדון, לרבות העובדה כי אש'פ הזכר כמדינה 'ע'י יותר מחברה חתומה אחת.

ב. להפיץ הפניה.

3. כאן התערב סופר לאמור: יש אפשרות שלישיית התואמת הן את התפקיד הנטרלי והן את אחריותה של שוויץ, והיא מכתב

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

למדינות החתומות האומר כי 'ישנה בעיה' (לא תאמר כי קבלה מאש'פ או בדומה) באשר לישות אשר יש חילוקי דעות לגבי מהותה, ושוויץ אינה רואה עצמה מוסמכת לפסוק.

4. הרושם היה כי יקובי החל להטות אוזן עובדת לפירוש משפטי זה, וכי הטיעון ייעצ אצל הנסיה הראשונית (הטיבעית בארץ הנשענת כ'כ על אשיות משפטיות) שלא להטיל ספק בדברי המשפטן.

5. להערכת אנשי שיחי העובדה כי ההתמודדות המשפטית היתה עם נציגה המשפטי הראשי של מחמ'ד, אשר אף טרח לבוא לברן במיוחד, שקלה הרבה. סופר היה 'מזהיר ותקיף' במשך הדיון הממושך והצליח להרשים, ואולי אף לשכנע כאשר כוון למנטליות ולהגיון בני שיחו.

6. סופר מעביר לבקשת יקובי, נייר המנתח רעיונו, וכנראה אף ישלח מכתב אישי ליועץ המשפטי השוויצרי קרפט, אותו מכיר היטב.

7. הינסון מעריך כי אין כל ערובה שההיבט (קרי: הלחצ) המדיני ישפיע על השוויצרים, 'אשהם סמל העקשנות'. עד כה לא דאה סימנים שארה'ב 'מתכוונת לצאת למלחמה בשוויצ', אך אינו מוציא מכלל אפשרות ולא היה רואה כמזיק אם מזכיר המדינה בייקר, לאחר שמיעת דווח מעודכן בנושא, היה מסכים להתערב אישית בסגנון מתאים. הינסון לא שמע עדיין על לחץ נגדי ערבי, או ספציפית אש'פ. אולי מאחר והנושא לא היכה עדיין גלים בפומבי.

8. הינסון מאמין ששילוח התקשורת בממשוויץ עלול להיות מסוכן גם בהגבירו את עקשנותה. הזכיר ביטויים לעקשנות זו בעימותים עם הממשל האמריקני בעבר, כאשר לחצים ו'תרגילים' של זה הניבו התבצרות שוויצרית בתור אשיותיה (המשפטיות) היא, ולא ויתרה. עם זאת המקרה דגן חורג מהמסלול הביטורלי ומקבל מימד בינ'ל ועקרונני.

9. הערכתו כי במידה ואישים, יהודים או אחרים, פונים לממשל השוויצרי בעניינו מוטב שיבהירו כי הם נוקטים צעד זה מתוך אחריות וידידות וללא כוונות פרסומת.

10. החשש השוויצרי משיבוש עבודת הצל'א (הפסקת תרומות אמריקניות, סגירת השטחים לצל'א על ידנו), אמנם מרחף אך הינסון אינו בטוח באיזו מידה מוכן הצל'א האמריקני

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

(המעניק את התרומה השוטפת) להישמע לעצות מחמ'ד. תרומת הממשל מאידך מתמקדת בפרויקטים אד-הוק, ובכך יהיה מוכן לבטח 'לשחק'.

11. הבין מבני השיח השוויצרים בעת הדיון ומחוצה לו (ר' ארבל קש) כי היה עוזר מאד עם ממשלת ישראל תמסור לממשוויץ וניב כתוב המאשר את החלטה הפרגמטית של אמנת ג'נבה הרביעית בשטחים כפי שנוהגת ממשלת ישראל מזה שנים. מחווה כזו עשויה לשקול בתהליך קבלת ההחלטה כאן.

עד כאן שיחותי.

12. אני מניח שיתקבל בקרוב דווח מארד על שיחתו עם סופר ונוכל להוציא מסקנות מהפרק הזה.

13. בינתיים כידוע עונת החופשות ואין לצפות, איפוא לשיבת ממשלה לפני מחצית אוגוסט.

הורם.

אק

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מוכל, ממוכל, איר, ברנע, ארבל, 2, סייבל, משפט, בנצור, מצפא

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אג'ו ט/רה

דתיפות: מ-ידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קף: _____
סוג: שמור		כתוב: _____
תאריך נוסח חבור: 18.7.89, 13.30		אל: מנהל מצטיי
פס' פרוק: הפסיד:		דע: מנהל אזרחי - משהביט, מנחים 1
397		כאז: ציר - עודד ערו



להלן משיחה עם דן קרצר (18/7)

- א. הודיעני על מותה של ריטה לוי - אזרחית אמריקאית מנפגעי אסון האוטובוס.
- ב. ברך על החלטת ממשלת ישראל לפתוח את בתי הספר והביע תקווה שאכן ישררו התנאים שיאפשרו פתיחת כל הכיתות. (היה ברור שהדברים נאמרו באופן רשמי וע"פ הנחיה).
- ג. העלה עמי את נושא הפקעת 108 דונם ל"צרכים צבאיים" בדיר דיבואן. אמר שהם בבעלות אזרחים אמריקאים (בדקו היטב האזרחות והבעלות). לדבריו לא יהיה זה חכם לעורר כאן דעה קהל נגדנו בנושא זה שכן בעלי הקרקע עלולים לפנות לקונגרסמנים וכו'.

ערו

3  
 1 1 1 1 1  
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תפוצה: 36



XX

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

15206

תאריך : 21.07.89 \*

דף 1 מתוך 5 \*

סודי ביותר

עותק 1 מתוך 8 \*

נכנס \*\*

\*\*

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\*\*

אגף סגור  
אגף סגור  
אגף סגור

1. חוקי הממשלה  
2. חוקי הממשלה  
3. חוקי הממשלה

\*חוזם: 7,15206\*

\*אל: המשרד\*

\*יעדים: מצב/1130\*

\*מ-: ווש, נר: 479, תא: 200789, זח: 1915, דח: מ, סג: 10\*

\*תח: @ גט: צפא\*

\*נד: @\*

\*סודי ביותר/מיד\*

\*.ח.ר.ב.\*

\*אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א\*

מסוקיות הממשלה  
25-07-1989

\*מאת: אלי אבידן, וושינגטון\*

\*ארה"ב-תהליך השלום\*

\*משיחה עם דן קרצ'ר\*

\*1. הסביר שביקור המשלחת נועד לבדוק ולאשר שאין שני קולות

\*בממשלה לאחר החלטות מרכז הליכוד ושיוזמת הממשלה שרירה

\*וקיימת (INTACT).\*

\*משהתברר שרה"מ ממשיך לעמוד מאחורי החלטת הממשלה מ-14.5

\*וששתי המפלגות פתחו במגעים ליישוב המשבר הוחלט לבטל או

\*לדחות את בואה. לא יעלה כלל על הדעת מעורבות אמריקאית

\*בענייניה הפנימיים של ישראל, אך קרצר הרשה לעצמו לומר

\*שגם ידינו לא נקינת באשר לתיקון הלמס' (ר' להלנ) ישראל

\*אומנם לא עומדת מאחורי זה אך יידיה הידועים' בהחלט כן.

\*היתה טעות בכך שהממשל ובעיקר מחמד הזניחו את הגבעה עד

\*עתה אך מעתה ישמרו על קשר הדוק עמה בכל הקשור להתפתחויות

\*תהליך השלום. בייקר וסקוקרופט פתחו בכך אמש (19.7) וזה

\*יהיה הקו בעתיד.

\*תקף בחריפות את יוזמת הלמס שנועדה להמית את יוזמת השלום

\*של ממשלת ישראל גם אם יוזמיה לא מתכוונים בדין לה לך. אין

\*להעלות על הדעת שימצא גורם פלסי שבמשך 30 השנים האחרונות

\*לא נקשר בעקיפין או בידיעה בלבד לפיגועי סודי. הממשל

# משרד החוץ-נוחלת הקשר

\* דף 2 מתוך 5  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 8

\* מתנגד בכל תוקף לתיקון שכן לא יהיה ביכולתו לאשר, ע"פ הנוסחה המקורית של התיקון שגורם זה או אחר 'נקי לחלוטין'.

\* 2. ארה"ב מסתפקת בהודעתו של רה"מ שמיר שתכנית הבחירות נשארה כפי שהיתה. החלטות במרכז הליכוד וההתפתחויות לאחר מכן אמנם מסבכות את המצב אך ארה"ב רואה בבחירות את האופציה המדינית היחידה כל עוד ישראל דבקה בה.  
\* מכאן שארה"ב ממשיכה לחפש במרץ שותף פלס' מיהש'ע שישא ויתן עם ישראל 'זוהי המשימה הבלעדית שלנו ברגע זה'.

\* 3. במצב זה הדיאלוג בתוניס נעשה לא רק חיוני אלא הכרחי. ישראל הגתה רעיון חיובי, ארה"ב אימצה אותו ועתה מתאמצת להוציאו לפועל. לארה"ב אין עניין בדיאלוג עם אש"פ זולת זאת. אין לנו שום סימפטיה או אהדה לאנשי תוניס' אנו יודעים בדיוק מי הם ומה מעשיהם אך יש שתי אפשרויות שארה"ב -

\* (א) לא תשוחח עם אנשי תוניס ואז לא ימצא שותף פלס' כנ"ל והתוכנית תרד מעל הפרק.

\* (ב) תמשיך בדיאלוג במטרה אחת בלבד - הסמכת קב' פלס' תושבי יהש'ע לשאת ולתת עם ישראל ואז אולי חוזר אולי תקום קבוצה כזו. הוא כלל אינו בטוח שהדיאלוג יניב זאת.  
\* ארה"ב חזרה ובוקה אין ספור אלטרנטיבות אחרות זולת זו השניה והגיעה לצערה למסקנה ברורה שטרם הופרכה שללא מעבר דרך תוניס תקום קבוצה כזו. ברשות הפלס' לא עומד כל הזמן שבעולם ומתקרב הזמן בו יאלצו לקבל החלטה וברורה לראות או לכאן. סרובם לאמץ את יוזמת ישראל יחייב דיון אמריקאי ישראלי באשר להמשך. קשה לו להעריך את כסיכויים לקבלת הסכמה פלס' מפורשת, משהו בדומה ל-50:50. עצם העובדה שההצעה לא נדחתה מדברת בעד עצמה. קוצו עמל וטרח להסביר באריכות שארה"ב לא רואה בדיאלוג בתוניס מעבר למטרה אחת מוגדרת לעזוב לישראל להוציא לפועל את יוזמת השלום שלה. אתם מסרבים לשמוע על מה הולך שם ואף העברתם הנחיה לנציג'כם בחו"ל להימנע מכך, אך אנו מוכנים לפתוח בפניכם את כל התיקים והמברקים ולהוכיח לכם שכל התהליך שם נסוב סביב סוגייה זו בלבד. ארה"ב אינה מדברת בשני קולות ואם צריך אנו מוכנים לחזור ולהבהיר בפניכם שלתהליך השלום אין מספר שיערים אלא שער אחד בלבד דרכו יעברו כל נאיו, וזהו השער לבחירות. אין כאן כל עניין של מחירים ועלויות או סחר-מכר. ארה"ב, ואני באופן אישי, ממשיכה להתנגד

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 3 מתוך 5  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 8

\* לכל מיני 'שערים' מוצעים (א) ועידה בינ'ל (ב) הגדרה  
\* עצמית (ג) מדינה פלס' (ד) המעמד הסופי (ה) תפקיד או ייצוג  
\* לאש'פ. באשר למעמד הסופי הרי זהו א-פריורו נושא למו'מ בין  
\* ישראל והפלס' בגמר שלב הביניים ולא בין ארה'ב וגורם כלשהו.  
\* אין זה גם מעניינה של ארה'ב להבטיח או להבטיח תפקיד לאש'פ  
\* בתהליך השלום. זוהי סוגייה הנתונה לשיקולה של ישראל בלבד.  
\* ארה'ב אינה נושא למו'מ אלא היא משמשת תיבת דואר ניידת  
\* למימוש יוזמת ממשלת ישראל. זה מה שעומד על הפרק ובכך אנו  
\* עוסקים. העלאת דרג המו'מ בתוניס מוקדמת מדי וכמובן שלא  
\* תידון לפני שתואמץ תכנית הבחירות. אם המחיר יהיה אז פגישה  
\* עם קלי 'יהיה מוכן להקריבו' תמורת פתיחת מו'מ ישראל-פלס'.  
\* בסה'כ אנו עושים את העבודה בשבילכם ואתם חובטים בנו. כמובן  
\* אנד לא אזהבים את אנשי תוניס הם אף מעוררים בנו סלידה, אך  
\* אנו עסוקים 24 שעות ביממה במציאת שותף פלס' והמציאות היא  
\* שללא תחנת מעבר זו לא ימצא כזה. הלואי ולא היינו זקוקים לה.  
\* אז מה עדיף להפסיק את הדיאלוג ולהניח לעניין וכך יקיץ הקץ  
\* על יוזמתכם או לנסות את כל הדרכים ע'מ לממש את התוכנית  
\* הישראלית תמורתה לא נשלח בשום מטבע קשה וביחוד לא בסחורה  
\* שאתם שוללים.

\* 4. בתגובה למונולוג ארוך (ונרגז מצידו) של קרצ'ר השיבותי  
\* שלאש'פ יש שתי פנים וישראל לא מוכנה להפריד ביניהם.  
\* הה'צד היפה' כביכול של הצהרות ומליצות ריקות מכל תוכן  
\* המושמעות מעל הבמות בג'נבה פאריס וכיו'ב והצד האפל והאמיתי  
\* של אש'פ והוא של 'עסקים כרגיל או אחוז בזה ולא תניח לזה'.  
\* עומקו של הסכסוך הישראלי ערבי עוסק גם בצד החינוכי שלו.  
\* נניח לרגע שאש'פ 'השתנה' במה זה מתבטא? והאם יש לכך  
\* 'קבלות'? הרי הם צריכים לשכנע אותנו שהם כביכול השתנו ולא  
\* את הצרפתים והאמריקאים. במה הם משכנעים אותנו? בדחיפת  
\* אוטובוס עם אזרחים תמימים וישרי דרך לתהום? נניח שזה  
\* מעשה של מטורף יחיד (א) האם זה לא תוצאה של חינוך שיש  
\* לנהל 'מלחמת שחרור לאומית' וששפיכת דם יהודי כשרה לכך.  
\* זה היה ב-29 ב-36 ובכל מעשי הטרור מאז. אש'פ הוא המשכם  
\* הטבעי של הכנופיות הערביות בהבדל יחיד שעכשיו הם מבקשים  
\* אלעטוף זאת במעטה של 'שחרור לאומי' דהיינו שהזירה הבינ'ל  
\* תתן לגיטימציה לכך (ב) הודעת אש'פ לאחר מעשה האוטובוס.  
\* הרי זו אטימות מוחלטת לחלוטין. איזה מסרים מקבלת דעת הקהל  
\* בישראל? שהולכים לשלום? כבר לא מדובר רק בעמדת הממשלה  
\* ובפוליטיקאים אלא בסלידה של כל שכבות הציבור. האם זה  
\* מעניינו ללכת ולבדוק אם למטורף שביצע את הנבלה יש כרטיס

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 4 מתוך 5  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 8  
\*

\*חבר בפת"ח או בחזית העממית? הרי איננו עוסקים בברורים  
\*משפטיים גרידא. זוהי תוצאה ברורה של התרת הרסן מצד אש"פ  
\*בכל הנוגע לטרור. המטורף הנ"ל לא פעל בחלל ולא ירד מהירח.  
\*הוא פשוט חונך לכך על ערכי ההלכה האש"פית. אי אפשר לנהל  
\*מלחמת חורמה בישראל וביהודים באם זה בישראל גופה, ביהש"ע  
\*או בגבול הלבנון ולקבל בעת ובעונה אחת הכשר לנהל מו"מ  
\*מדיני. זה פשוט לא יעלה על הדעת ואף משטר לא היה עומד בכך.  
\*המצב הנוכחי נוח לאש"פ - עם ישראל 'עסקים כרגיל', ארה"ב  
\*מנהלת עמו דיאלוג מנהיגי אירופה מכרכרים סביבו.  
\*מדוע שיניח זאת מידו? זה לא רק עניין אישי שאנו סולדים  
\*ממנהיגי אש"פ אלא ובעיקר ממה שהוא מייצג.  
\*אש"פ חותר לדבר אחד - מדינה פלס' בהנהגתו ביהש"ע. נקודה.  
\*אתם יודעים זאת כפי שאנו מושכנעים בכך. על זה לא נישא  
\*וניתן גם אם מחר יניח כביכול לטרור. ההבדל הוא שאתם חושבים  
\*בתמימות שאש"פ יוציא עבורם את הערמונים מן האש באשר לפלס'  
\*ביהש"ע בחינם ואילו אנו טוענים שאין לכך מקום ויש לדלג על  
\*אתחנה בלתי נחוצה זו ולגשת ישר לעניין - דיאלוג עם פלס'  
\*מיהש"ע בנושא הבחירות.  
\*המעבר בתחנה זו מעורר מחלוקות בלתי חיוניות בין ישראל  
\*וארה"ב ביחוד שגם אתם שוללים הגדרה עצמית-מדינה וכד', אם  
\*אכן למה להזדקק לתחנה זו? ההסטוריה במזה"ת מלאה בתחנות  
\*קאלו שלא הולידו דבר. ערפאת נשא ונתן לפחות פעמיים עם  
\*חוס"יין על הליכה משותפת ירדנית פלס' ומה יצא מזה? ברגע  
\*שאש"פ נדרש לוותר או להתחלק עם ירדן הוא פשוט נעלם. אדרבא  
\*התחושה שמהו יצא מתוניס מוליכה שולל את תושבי יהש"ע  
\*שבמאבק דמים הם ישיגו מה שלא יוכלו להשיג אחרת. ברגע שהם  
\*יעמדו בפני ה'שער' הבלעדי שאתה בעצמך ציינת, דהיינו תוכנית  
\*הבחירות הם יצטרכו להחליט. אינו יודע באם יחליטו להמשיך  
\*באלימות, יתכן בהחלט אך אז גם התוצאה תהיה ברורה עבורם  
\*-שפך דם שאיש לא רוצה בו וחוסר כל עתיד פוליטי.  
\*אולי הבינה אז תגבר על היצר. בינתיים הם נמצאים תחת השפעת  
\*'האופיום' של תוניס בדומה למי שמכור לסמים הוא בורח  
\*מהמציאות הקשה ואולי לא כל כך נוחה לעבר תחום השכחה  
\*הזמנית. ברגע שהוא יגמל מהסם הוא לפחות יהיה במצב של  
\*שפיות עצמית לקבלת החלטה. איני רוצה להכנס להגדרות באשר  
\*לטרור, המציאות חזקה מכל הגדרה אך ההשוואה של מעשי אש"פ  
\*עם אלו של לה - דוקטו הוייטנמי שנעשתה ע"י איש מחמ"ד  
\*(איגלברגר בגבעה) להצדקת הדיאלוג בתוניס אין לה כל בסיס  
\*במציאות. הרי בוייטנאם התנהלה מלחמה של ממש בין שתי  
\*צבאות איש לא דחף לתהום אוטובוס עם אזרחים וגם לא הטיל

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 5 מתוך 5 \*  
\* עותק 1 מתוך 8 \*

\* נכים לים. אף גורם אזרחי לא נפגע שם. זוהי בדיוק מטרתו  
\* של תיקון הלמס עד כמה שבינתי משגת. מה קרה לרגישות שלכם  
\* כלפי אנשי הטרור. עמותנו באשר לדיאלוג ידועה אך לכל הפחות  
\* שלא ינתן הכשר לכאלה שלא רק שעסקו בכך בעבר אלא עד עצם  
\* היום הזה. אם אתם מוכנים לשבת עם אבו אייאד אין שום הצדקה  
\* שלא תשבו גם עם ג'דאפי. זה עוסק בטרור וזה עוסק בטרור. זה  
\* פגע באמריקאים וזה פגע באמריקאים. איפה הגבול המוסרי  
\* -עקרונית, הרי אי אפשר להעמיד למכירה ערכי יסוד בשם  
\* 'התועלתיות' כביכול.

\* ארה"ב העמידה את עצמה בראש המאבק לזכויות אדם ולא  
\* פגיעה בהם. מה המסרים החינוכיים המגיעים מתוניהם?  
\* שהכל מותר ומחול?

\* 5. קרצ'ר סיפר שבועידה בפאריס הוחלט שנושא המזה"ת לא ידון  
\* בין ראשי המשלחות אלא בקב' שה'ח. משנכנס המזכיר לשיבה  
\* מיד נאמר בזו הלשון שיוזמת ישראל לא רצינית והיא גם שבה  
\* חיים ולכן יש לגשת לכינוס ועב'ל. קרצ'ר הדגיש שהמזכיר  
\* נלחם כארי להסיר זאת מסדה'י בהתעקשו שיוזמת ישראל שרירה  
\* וקיימת ויש לתת לה הזדמנות. ההודעה שהכינוס פרסם אולי לא  
\* הטובה ביותר אך היא בהחלט סבירה בהתחשב בנסיבות. המשלחת  
\* המצרית בפאריס התווכחה בנושא 'החישוקים' אך הם העבירו  
\* לאמריקאים שמדיניותם לא השתנתה והם ממשיכים לראות ביוזמה  
\* את 'המהלך הבא'.


\* 6. באשר לעתיד, קרצ'ר הטעים שמחמ'ד עסוקה עתה  
\* ב-RECONSTRUCTION של יוזמת רה"מ על אף ההכבדות האחרונות.  
\* קלי והוא יוצאים לאזור ב-2.8 לסיוור בן 10 ימים בישראל  
\* מצרים וירדן.  
\* בדרכו לאזור קלי יפגש עם הסוב' בשטוקהולם לשיחה  
\* בסוגיית אפגניסטן.

\* אלי אבידן

\* 17

\* תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור







משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13148

19.07.89 תאריך

\*\* נכנס  
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סודי

חוזם: 7,13148

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/971

מ-: וווש, נר: 395, תא: 180789, חז: 1500, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: 6 גס: צפא

נד: 6

א/ה'ק' 1

סודי/מיד

אל: מנכ"ל משרד ראה'מ

דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר'נ

מאת: ציר - עודד ערן.

דו קרצר בקשני לסור למשרדו הבוקר. אמר שהם פנו במקביל גם דרך השגריר בראון בנושא הראיונות שלך ושהם UNHAPPY לגביהם ובמיוחד ההתייחסות לדיאלוג בין אש'פ וארה'ב. הם בדעה שההצרות לגבי 'רגע האמת' אינן מועילות ( UNHELPFUL ) לתהליך, שמאז מאי נשען על היוזמה הישראלית שאותו רוצה ארה'ב לקדם וכך היא עושה בכל מגעיה הבינלאומיים.

ביקר כבר הגיב על הדברים באופן פומבי בתוכנית של ברינקלי ודעתם היא שמוטב היה ללבן את הנדלי ההשקפות בצ'נורות הדיפלומטים הרגילים. בינתיים נמסר להם כאילו הבעת צער לגבי חלק מהדברים ואם אכן זה כך הם מבקשים שתשקול מתן פומבי לכך.

עניתי שאעביר וכי אין לי ענין להכנס לאספקט האישי אך עלי לציין שיש בינינו חילוקי דעות עמוקים לגבי הדיאלוג ושאין בכך סוד. אנו בדעה שלא רק שהוא אינו מסייע אלא הוא אבן נגף. קרצר אמר שהעובדה היא שממשלת ישראל עצמה לא התנתה את יוזמתה בהפסקת הדיאלוג והערכתו האישית שלו עשתה זאת לא היתה ארה'ב מברכת על היוזמה.

6406 11.88

356947 סודי וזולה ופחות צ"ח

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אמרתי שארה"ב נקלעת למצבים אבסורדיים בשל הדיאלוג. מעבר לנזק שהוא גורם בהרתיעו פלשתינאים מהשטחים לנהל דיאלוג ישיר עמנו הוא מביא את דוברם להתפתל במשך כמה ימים לפני שהוא מוכן לכנות את אסון האוטובוס כמקרה טרור ואת מחמ"ד להתנגד לחקיקה שכל מטרתה למנוע דיאלוג בין הממשל לבין מי שיש נגדם ראיות שפעלו נגד אזרחים אמריקאים. הרצף אמר שזה קשה מאוד להוכיח מי כן פעל ומי לא פעל בצורה משפטית. עניתי שלא זכור לי ששולץ שמנע אשתקד את בזאו של ערפאת לניו יורק עבר דרך בית משפט כדי להוכיח אשמתו לפני שכינה אותו טרוריסט. הרצף הוסיף שהם מתנגדים לחקיקה משום שיש בה משום נסיון של הקונגרס לנהל את מדיניות החוץ האמריקאית וזה מנוגד כידוע לראית הממשל. שנית הם בדעה שחקיקה כזו פרושה סוף פסוק לדיאלוג ומכאן סוף פסוק ליוזמה.

עניתי שאני לא מגן כמובן על הדיאלוג אבל החקיקה המוצעת לא מתייחסת לדיאלוג ככלל אלא לפרטים מסויימים המנהלים אותו מטעם אש"פ. הרצף נשאר בשלו וברור שהממשל ימשיך לפעול כנגד החקיקה.

ערן.

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

\*\* יוצא

שמור

\*\*

\*\*

\*\*

חוזם: 7,16403

אל: 876/וש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 230789, חז: 1556, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: גס: צפא

נד: ג

שמור/מיידי

וושיןגטון

ס/שה'ח קבל לשיחת הכרות את הציר האמריקאי החדש פאריס.  
בשיחה נדונו יחסי ישראל-ברה"מ ובעיקר תהליך השלום.

ס/שה'ח ציין, בין השאר:

- למרות ההסכמה העקרונית בין ישראל לארה"ב בענין תוכנית  
הבחירות, הרי שבמספר נקודות ראיתנו שונה.

- דיאלוג ארה"ב-אש"פ איננו עוזר לקידום תוכנית הבחירות  
ומקשה מאד על יישומה.

- איננו מקבלים את עמדת ארה"ב שהדיאלוג עשוי להביא  
ל-INTERLOCUTORS.

אלה אמורים להמצא כאן ובודאי ימצאו לאחר שמאש"פ תשלל  
היכולת לאיים על חייהם ובמיוחד ידחק מן המשוואה המדינית  
במז'ת.

פאריס הסתפק בהאזנה ושאלות כלליות, אך הביע את דאגת מחמ"ד  
מפני ה- SHOWDOWN MENTALITY המתהווה בין שתי המדינות.

ציין שאוירה זו איננה עוזרת וכי לעיתים 'לחץ על מוקש  
במקום נסיון לפרקו יביא לפיצוץ גדול יותר'.

מצפא

ג'

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא



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Main body of faint, illegible text, appearing to be several paragraphs of a document.

Faint text at the bottom of the page, possibly a footer or concluding remarks.

כ' בתמוז תשמ"ט  
23 ביולי 1989  
סימוכין ת-4-730

- סודי -

אל : ראש הממשלה

עם סיום המשבר הקואליציוני, יש לצפות לכך שהממשל האמריקאי יגביר את מאמציו להגיע לידי הבנה עם אש"פ כדי לאפשר התחלת ביצועה של היוזמה המדינית שלנו, בסעיף 4 הנוגע לעריכת הבחירות בישראל.

יש יסוד להניח שהממשל מתרשם שהדו-שיח שהתנהל עד כה עם אש"פ התקרב לנקודה של הסכמה. אישי הממשל שנחלצו למאבק למניעת אישורו של תקון הלמס בסנט רמזו שחלה התקדמות של ממש באותו דו-שיח. הם טענו שתקון הלמס עלול לפגוע בהישג הזה ולפגוע בסכוי להגשים את תכנית הבחירות. על יסוד זה, טען הממשל שהשיחות עם אש"פ משרתות את האינטרסים של ארה"ב ושל ישראל ואת החתירה לשלום במזה"ת.

כזכור, הנשיא מוברק נפגש עם ערפאת טרם צאתו של הנשיא לפאריס ב- 14/7, ובודאי קבל מפי ערפאת עדכון על השיחות בתוניס ושמע ממנו על היעד שאש"פ חותר להשיגו. מוברק ניצל את פגישתו עם הרבנים עובדיה יוסף וא. דרעי כדי להעביר לנו מסר על דעתו של ערפאת. הוא ביקש הסכמת ישראל לצירופם של הפרופסורים אדוורד סעיד ואיברהים אבו-לוע'וד למשלחת הערבית-פלסטינית שתנהל עמנו המו"מ ליישום תכנית הבחירות.

כידוע, ערפאת נתון בלחצים מן השטח ומגורמים שונים במערב כדי שיסכים עקרונית לבחירות בישראל, גם אם יצרף לה תנאים משלו. ערפאת לא יוכל להסכים להצעה זו אלא אם יוכל להצדיקה, מול מבקריו השונים, בנימוק שצירופם של שני הפרופסורים האמריקאיים (שהם חברי המל"פ) קובע תקדים הממסד את שיתוף אש"פ בתהליך וכן שהסכמתו לבחירות איננה פוגעת בסכוי להקים את המדינה הפלסטינית בשלב יותר מאוחר. ערפאת יוכל עוד לטעון, וזאת בגיבויה של ארה"ב, שע"י הסכמתו ליוזמת ישראל, בכפוף לתנאים הנ"ל, הוא מעביר את הכדור למגרש שלנו. נוסף לכך, הצעד הזה יזכה את אש"פ באהדה ותמיכה בינלאומית גדולה, ובאותה עת יזעזע את ממשלת ישראל ואולי אף יגרום לפירוקה של הממשלה הקואליציונית בישראל.

ערפאת דחה מספר פעמים את כנוסה של ועידת הפתח, ככל הנראה כדי למנוע הטחת ביקורת נגדו בשל העדר הישגים כלשהם בדו-שיח עם ארה"ב ועל כך שהאינתיפאדה נמשכת ללא מוצא וללא הישג לאש"פ. סביר שהדחיות נובעות מרצון להגיע להסכמה כלשהי עם ארה"ב בדו-שיח המתנהל בתוניס ומתוך הערכה שהסכמה כזאת ניתנת להשגה. ארה"ב בודאי מודעת למצוקתו של ערפאת ולוחצת עליו להסכים לתכנית הבחירות בתמורה למינויים של שני הפרופסורים האמריקאיים למשלחת. כלפי ישראל, תוכל ארה"ב להציג את שני הפרופסורים כמשקיפים אמריקאיים שלא מייצגים את ממסד אש"פ באופן רשמי.

יש לשקול אם לא רצוי שננקוט צעד כדי לקדם פני האפשרות שארה"ב תודיע לנו שיס הסכמה פלסטינית ליוזמה המדינית ותציע לנו הרכב של משלחת פלסטינית שתכלול את שני הפרופסורים האמריקאיים. אני מציע להנחות נציגנו בשינגטון וכן לקרוא לשגריר ארה"ב בישראל על מנת להודיע לארה"ב:

א. שאנו מקדישים מאמץ מיוחד לאתר ולגבש בר-שיח פלסטיני מקרב התושבים הערבים בי"ש.

ב. אנו זקוקים לזמן כדי למצות את סיכויי המהלך ורצוי שלא ינקטו צעדים שיפריעו להצלחתו.

ג. אנו מציעים שארה"ב תפעיל השפעתה על מצרים כדי ששתיהן ביחד יודיעו למנהיגים בי"שע שהדרך לפתרון ולהחלצות מן המצב הנוכחי היא ע"י קבלת היוזמה המדינית של ישראל.

ד. אנו נסכים לצירופם של נציגים ממצרים ומירדן למו"מ עמנו בקשר לביצוע היוזמה אך לא נסכים לצירוף פלסטינים מחוץ לי"ש"ע או לכל מי שימונה ע"י אש"פ.

ב ב ר כ ה,

102

י.ח. בן-אהרן

העתקים: שר החוץ  
מזכיר הממשלה

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

אלה"ב

טופס מברק

544

1/2

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני: רגיל

דחופות: רגיל

תאריך וז"ח: 24.7.89 14:00

מס' מברק

אל: המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת הסברה

אלה"ב - אש"ף

ראו נא מאמר ראשי של L.A.T בנושא.

3 היה ס/שהח 3 רה"מ 1 מארה"מ 1 מנ"ס 1 מלג  
 1 בנ"ניר 2 מ"פ"א 1 סיו"ה 1 רב"ב 1 מ"פ"א 2 הסברה  
 1 כ"טרכ" 1 מ"פ"א 4

8-  
e

Part, II / Saturday, July 22, 1989

544 2/2



## Los Angeles Times

A Times Mirror Newspaper

### Publishers

HARRISON GRAY OTIS, 1882-1917  
HARRY CHANDLER, 1917-1944  
NORMAN CHANDLER, 1944-1960  
OTIS CHANDLER, 1960-1989

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# Credentialing the Adversary

On June 28, the State Department confirmed a report that the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia, who since last December has been talking with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, had recently upgraded the sessions by meeting with Salah Khalaf, the PLO's No. 2 man. That same day, as it happened, Khalaf was indicted in Italy for supplying guns in the 1970s to the Red Brigade, the terrorist band whose crimes include murdering former Prime Minister Aldo Moro and kidnaping U.S. Army Gen. James Dozier.

Khalaf's links with terrorism are much more direct than alleged gun-running, however. Better known by his code name Abu Iyad, he was a founder of Black September, which among other things was responsible for the massacre of 11 Israelis at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games and the murder in 1973 of Cleo A. Noel Jr., the U.S. ambassador to Sudan. That Khalaf has a lot of blood on his hands is clear. It was no less clear that once word leaked that he was negotiating for the PLO with the United States, Congress would react with anger and disgust.

Congressional ire was manifested in a proposed amendment that would have halted the U.S.-PLO talks unless the President could certify that the PLO representatives had no ties to terrorist activities in which Americans were killed, injured or kidnaped. Adoption of this measure would have eliminated Khalaf as an active interlocutor. It

also would have provoked another of those bitter constitutional controversies over Congress' proper role in foreign policy; in this case, whether it can tell a President whom he may negotiate with. In the end, strong lobbying by the Bush Administration led to a compromise that calls for halting the PLO talks only if the President knows and chooses to advise Congress that one of the PLO negotiators was a direct participant in terrorism.

The leeway allowed in this approach is marginally preferable, but the implicit restraint is still far from diplomatically attractive. For the ancient and harsh truth remains that in the conduct of foreign affairs, governments aren't free to choose their negotiating partners. If moral acceptability were the required test, U.S. diplomatic contacts with much of the world would come to a halt.

Khalaf, as it happens, was publicly identified by the State Department last November as a major terrorist. Did the PLO thus put him at the table in Tunis in a deliberate effort to embarrass the United States? Perhaps. The Administration's assessment, nonetheless, is that, like it or not, the PLO should be talked to because it remains an important player in efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict. If the PLO is serious about participating in that effort and not just interested in more devious propaganda games, it will make sure that its next representative to the Tunis talks is someone whose reputation was not made by planning cold-blooded murders.

ג

שגרירות ישראל בווינגטון  
טופס מברק

מק 2

דף 1 מתוך 2  
דחיפות: מידי  
סוג: גלוי

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

דע :

תאריך, זמן: 24.7.89  
מספר המברק:

מאת: עתונות

המשרד:

1/2

545

אש"פ - ארה"ב

להלן מאמרו של CAL THOMAS, שהתפרסם ב-"וושינגטון-טיימס",  
היום, 24.7.89.

עתונות

EB

שתי טענות 3 רה"מ 3 אמריקה 1 מנס 1 מומנס 1 אנצ'ני 2 מנס 2

סייב 1 רבוב 1 מנס 1 הסברה 2 רועכס 1 מנס 2

We are in the midst of another of those frequent stormy cycles in which the presumption that it is only Israel's intransigence that prevents Jews and Arabs from making peace seems to be at the forefront of U.S. foreign-policy statements.

The latest storm began May 22 when Secretary of State James Baker delivered what many viewed as a harsh attack on Israel to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. And there were threats last week to send a U.S. emissary to Jerusalem to assess the status of promised elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in light of the decision by Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir's Likud bloc not to allow Palestinians from East Jerusalem to vote — and

Cal Thomas is a nationally syndicated columnist.

# Presumption of Israel's guilt

to ban any creation of a Palestinian state, while continuing to build Jewish settlements in the territories.

The mistake some people make when viewing Israel and her Arab neighbors, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinians is considering all these entities morally equivalent.

In fact, Israel is being pressured to negotiate with people who have signed the Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, which is behind the intifada, or uprising, that began in the occupied territories in December 1987, and has been maintained with money and encouragement from the PLO and its friends ever since. No reasonable person who reads this covenant could expect Israel to negotiate with anyone

who subscribes to it.

"There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad [holy war]," says the covenant. "Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors."

While U.S. diplomats labor to pressure Israel into accepting a formula they think will bring peace to the region, the Islamic Resistance Covenant takes a cynical view of such efforts: "The Islamic Resistance Movement does not consider these conferences capable of realizing the demands, restoring the rights or doing justice to the oppressed."

And what does the covenant define as justice for Palestinians?

"The Islamic Resistance Move-

ment believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [holy site] consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered; it, or any part of it [italics mine], should not be given up. Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king nor president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that."

While Israel is required to deny intentions of a "greater Israel," no one demands that the PLO or any Arab nation renounce the "vision" of the Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement for a Palestine that requires a nonexistent Israel.

Adding to Israel's legitimate con-

cerns is the growing arsenal of her Arab neighbors, all but one of which — Egypt — are still officially at war with Israel. While some Palestinian children throw rocks and other dangerous objects at Israeli soldiers, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Iraq and Kuwait silently, and without much publicity, build arsenals containing far more deadly weapons.

Between 1978 and 1988, Arab states exceeded Israel in military expenditures by more than \$400 billion (\$414 billion — \$466 billion when Egypt is included vs. \$56 billion for Israel). The number of Arab forces now rivals that of the United States, with 3.6 million men, including reserves, under arms in Arab nations, compared to a paltry 645,000 in Israel.

In combat aircraft and tanks, Arab states outnumber Israel by a margin of 4-to-1 (Arab states have

tanks, to Israel's 592 planes and 2,790 tanks).

Israel's only advantage, its only hope of security, is the land that it holds. Have people forgotten why the land was taken? It was because of five unprovoked attacks on Israel, aimed at fulfilling precisely those goals outlined in the Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Take part of the land without an ironclad commitment from all Arab states and the PLO to renounce their "holy" plans to eradicate the Jewish people and their state, and the groundwork for another Holocaust will have been prepared.

In view of the goals of the Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, the pressure ought not to be on Israel, but on those who wrote and subscribe to the Covenant to renounce it and replace it with a covenant of peaceful coexistence. Only then can meaningful negotiations to-

545  
e/c  
d/c





65/423/557

2/2

Q Okay. And what about Beirut? Do you have anything on the status of the situation in Beirut at the moment?

MS. TUTWILER: Not really the status, other than that we deplore this latest resumption in fighting and consequential loss of life. And as we have said many times, we urge restraint on all parties and support for the Arab League's initiative. It is imperative that all sides adhere to the cease-fire, lift the blockades and open all the ports, and avoid all provocations and refrain from military escalation.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 7 מתוך 7  
דף 1  
עו"ת 3 מתוך 24  
סודי ביותר

יוצא

912  
ארה"ב

12,13453  
אל:מנמת/487  
מ-:המשרד,תא:181288,זח:1547,וח:מ,סג:סב  
תח: @ גס:משברות  
נד: @

סודי ביותר/מיוזי

השגריר/רוש

מציב רישום שיחת השגריר פיקרינג עם מנכ"ל משרד רה"ב בן-אהרן מ-16.12.88.

שיחת פיקרינג-יוסי בן אהרן  
16.12.88

השתתפו: פיליפ בקר, איתן בן-צור, נדב ענר ובחלק מן השיחה אריה מקל.

פיקרינג אמר כי קבל מן המזכיר הנחיה לתזרן את בן-אהרן בנוגע להנחיות שניתנו לשגריר פלטר בהודעה בנוגע למפגש עם אש"פ.

ההנחיה הראשונה היא לארגן מפגש בהתאם לנוחיות אש"פ, אמר החל מהיום. בן ציין מאוחר יותר כי פלטר כבר התקשר עם אש"פ והם הבטיחו להתקשר חזרה. פיקרינג המשיך בקריאת ההנחיות המהותיות לפטרו המנוסחות כ-TALKING POINTS. (נוסחן באנגלית כפי שהוכתב על ידי בקר לענף לאחר השיחה מצ"ב).

בהמשך השיחה קרא פיקרינג את ההנחיות לדוברים (PRESS GUIDANCE) שניתנו על ידי המזכיר, ההנחיות מנוסחות בצורת שאלות ותשובות. להלן עקרי התשובות:

א. בנושא הטרור: ערמאת התנער מן הטרור וארה"ב מכירה בכך, הוא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אמר כי אין לו שליטה על האינתיפאדה וארה"ב מכירה גם בכך, אמנס אין ארה"ב מגדירה את האינתיפאדה כטרור אך היא תבדוק כל מקרה לגופו ואם יוכח כי לערמאת שליטה על בן הוא יוצטרף לשאת באחריות. ארה"ב אינה זורשת דק התנערות ממעשי הטרור אלא גם נקיטת צעדים נגד מבצעי וסילוקם מאש"פ, בן זורשת ארה"ב גינור כל פעולת טרור שתבוצע על ידי ארגון מחוץ לאש"פ.

לשאלת בן-צור האם תבקש ארה"ב מערמאת למנות למנהיגי האינתיפאדה להפסיקה, ענה פיקרינג כי הפנו שאלה זו לרושינגטון לקבל מענה.

לגבי תגובת ארה"ב במקרה של המשך הטרור מבהירות ההנחיות לדוברים כי ארה"ב מבססת הדיאלוג על התנערות אש"פ מן הטרור כנאמר לעיל.

ב. בנושא המדינה הפלשטינית: ארה"ב אינה מכירה במדינה הפלשטינית ואינה תומכת בהקמתה אולם כל צד יכול לבוא לשולחן המו"ט עם עמדותיו-כולל הקמת מדינה פלשטינית. לזעת ארה"ב אינ לקבוע את עתיד השטחים באופן חד-צדדי אלא הוא חייב להיות תוצאה של משא ומתן.

ג. בנושא הועידה הבינ"ל: ארה"ב תומכת בשיחות ישירות אולם תומכת גם בכל דרך שיכולה להביא לשלום, שיהיה אש"פ בועידה תלוי בהחלטת הצדדים.

ד. בנושא החלטות המל"פ ודברי ערמאת: דברי ערמאת נשענים על החלטות במל"פ באלג'יר אולם אלה היו מעורפלות ואילו הצהרות ערמאת בנוגע להכרה בישראל, לקבלת 242 ולהתנערות מן הטרור גם אם נשענו על החלטות המל"פ היו ברורות יותר. ארה"ב לא עשתה שום עסקה בתמורה להצהרות ערמאת.

ה. בנוגע לבואו של ערמאת לאומ"א: אינ קשר בינ האיטור על כניסת ערמאת לניו-יורק לבינ המעשים כיום. אמ יגיש ערמאת בקשה לאשרה היא תידון מחוש בזמנה.

ו. בנוגע לבואו של אבו-שריפ לארה"ב: הדייונימ עם אש"פ התנהלו באלג'יר והנציגים של אש"פ יקבעו על ידו.

לשאלת יוסי בן-אהרן האם מדובר בדיאלוג או במומ' השיב פיקרינג כי מדובר ב-דיאלוג רציני שיוביל למשא ומתן שיענה על דרישות כל הצדדים. פיקרינג ציין כי לא הגדירו אמ ה-

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TALKING POINTS מכוונים למומ' או לזיאלרג.

בתשובה ציין יוסי בן אהרן את הנקודות הבאות:

א. מגיע ארה"ב עלולים להפוך לזו שיה בלתי ישיר בין אש"פ לישראל באמצעות הדיווח של ארה"ב אלינו. אנו לא נהיה מעורבים בכך ויתכן אף שנגיע למצב בו לא נרצה אפילו לשמוע דיווח.

ב. מה הטעם בזיאלרג של ארה"ב עם אש"פ אם נשללת מראש המטרה של הקמת מדינה פלסטינית.

ג. יש לציין שערמאת התנה את כל התנאים שקיבל: -את קבלת 242 התנה בוועידה בינלאומית. -את ההכרה בישראל התנה בהכרה במדינה פלסטינית. -את התחנעות מן הטרור כדן בהמשך האינתיפאדה.

להערכתנו הלכה ארה"ב לקראת אש"פ כברת דרך רבה בהענות להצהרות ערמאת בעוד ערמאת לא הלך את כברת הדרך הדרושה כדי להענות לתביעות האמריקניות.

בתשובתו ציין מיקרינג:

א. ארה"ב מאזינה שיש בדברי ערמאת מענה לתנאים של ארה"ב לדוגמא הוא הנליל את החלטה 181 בקונטקסט של 242 ו-338.

ב. ההחלטה בנוגע לקבלת דיווח על השיחות היא בידי ישראל ואתם תצטרכו לקבל את החלטותיכם בעצמכם. אנו ניודיזיבם מונכיים לדווח לכם ככל שנדרש. זכותכם אף לזעוק חמט.

ג. באשר לעמדות ארה"ב, אלו הובעו בצורה ברורה והזיאלרג עם אש"פ מחקיים במנותק מהכרזת המדינה הפלסטינית: -תכנית ריגן מ-1982 בעינה עומדת ועמדתה ברורה בנוגע לשלילת המדינה הפלסטינית, שלילת הסיפוח ושלילת המשך הכיבוש.

ד. אין לארה"ב שליטה על ההצעות שיובאו לשולחן המשא ומתן כל עוד יהיו מבוטסות על 242. התוצאה הטובה חייבת להיות תולדה של המשא ומתן.

ז. אין לנרש את צעדי ארה"ב נשינוי בעמדה האמריקנית. אם

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תהיה מסקנה מניתוח צעדינו כי ארה"ב הולכת לקראת הכרה במדינה הפלסטינית יש לראות בה מסקנה ניתוחית גרידא שאינה מעוגנת במציאות.

TALKING POINTS

THROUGH ITS RECENT STATEMENT WHICH ACCEPTED U.N. RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, RECOGNIZED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND RENOUNCED TERRORISM IN ALL ITS FORMS, THE PLO HAS DEMONSTRATED A COMMITMENT TO RESOLVE THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

WE ARE PREPARED FOR A SERIOUS DIALOUGU LEADING TO NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED IN A MANNER THAT MEETS THE BASIC NEEDS OF ALL PARTIES.


IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS DIALOUGU WILL BE LAUNCHED AND SUSTAINED ON A PRACTICAL BASIS.

FIRST, THERE CAN BE NO RETURN TO TERRORISM BY THE PLO. THIS IS NOT AN ADDITIONAL CONDITION TO THE DIALOGUE TO CONTINUE, IT IS SIMPLY A FACT THAT NO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION CAN SUSTAIN THE DIALOGUE IF TERROTISM CONTINUES BY THE PLO OR ANY OF ITS FACTIONS.

YOU MUST NOT ONLY END TERRORISM INSIDE OR OUTSIDE ISRAEL, YOU MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO PUBLICLY DISASSOCIATE YOURSELVES FROM TERRORISM BY ANY PALESTINAIN GROUP OPERATING ANYWHERE. IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST ACTION BY ANY ELEMENT OF THE PLO OR ONE OR MORE OF ITS MEMBERS, WE EXPECT THAT YOU NOT ONLY CONDEMN THIS ACTION PUBLICLY, BUT ALSO DISCIPLINE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT, AT LEAST BY EXPELLING THEM FROM THE PLO.

THIS WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO A REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE PROCESS.

SECONDLLY, THERE SH#LL BE A SINGLE AUTHCRITATIVE



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CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN US. OUR DIALOGUE MUST BE CAREFULLY STRUCTURED AND COORDINATED. NEITHER SIDE IS SERVED BY HAVING CONTRADICTORY SIGNALS FLOWING BACK AND FORTH.

WE HAVE DESIGNATED OUR EMBASSY IN TUNIS AS THE SOLE AUTHORITATIVE CHANNEL. ONLY COMMUNICATION THROUGH THAT CHANNEL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED OFFICIAL.

IF AT SOME TIME WE SHOULD MEET ELSEWHERE / WE SHALL INFORM YOU THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN TUNIS.

YOU ARE AWARE THAT WE ARE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIONS. I AM AUTHORIZED TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE PRESIDENT-ELECT IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THIS DIALOGUE. THE TIMING HAS ITS EFFECT. HOWEVER, WE MAY WISH TO HAVE ANOTHER MEETING BEFORE JANUARY 20, BUT ANY FAR-REACHING SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE WILL BE LEFT TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATIN.

BASIC PRINCIPLES;

CERTAIN PRINCIPLES ARE SO BASIC TO OUR APPROACH THAT YOU MAY BE SURE THEY WILL REMAIN VALID UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION;

OUR OBJECTIVE IS COMPREHESIVE PEACE. THAT MEANS THAT OUR DIALOGUE IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF BUT A MEANS TO THE GOAL OF STARTING NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A PEACE. PEACE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS. EACH PARTY MUST DO WHAT IT CAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPING MOMENTUM.

THE PLO CAN HELP BY;

-ENCOURAGING MEETINGS BETWEEN PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES AND ISRAELIS, TO FOSTER PRACTICAL STEPS ON THE GROUND THAT HELP IMPROVE PALESTINIAN CONDITIOS AND START THE PROCESS OF ACCOMODATION.

-MAKING STATEMENTS THAT WILL REACH THE ISRAEL PUBLIC.

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ANY PARTY CAN BRING TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ANY POSITION IT WISHES, CONSISTENT WITH THE BASIS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS TRUE EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT CERTAIN POSITIONS PUT FORWARD BY ONE PARTY OR ANOTHER. A SETTLEMENT WILL EMERGE FROM THE DYNAMIC GIVE-AND-TAKE BETWEEN THE PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROPERLY STRUCTURED MAY BE NECESSARY TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT NOTHING OF LASTING VALUE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. NO ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WILL TURN TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, OR ANY COMBINATION OF OUTSIDE POWERS IN MATTERS SO CENTRAL TO ITS DESTINY. NO U.S. ADMINISTRATION WILL EVER ASK ISRAEL TO DO SO.

THE U.S. ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP

NO ONE SHOULD BE UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS REGARDING THE MEANING OF THIS DIALOGUE FOR U.S. RELATIONS. A KEY REASON THE U.S. HAS ENTERED THIS DIALOGE IS TO HELP ISRAEL ACHIEVE THE SECURITY IT DESERVES. THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL IS UNSHAKEABLE AND IT WILL BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO ANY PARTY TO ATTEMPT TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US. SURELY ISRAEL MUST MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN IT POLICIES FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED, BUT U.S. EFFORTS TO HELP ISRAEL FORMULATE THESE ADJUSTMENTS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS A WEAKENING OF OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S WELLBEING.

U.S. AND PALESTINIANS

WE HAVE AN INTENSE INTEREST IN THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND IN THEIR QUEST TO REALIZE THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS. I REFER YOU TO THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 16TH. AND HIS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 26TH.


משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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עותק 3 מתוך 24

לשנת מנכ"ל רהמ'

קא\*

תם: שהח, רהמ, שהוט, מנכל, ממנכל, מרנז, רט, אמנ, בנצור, מצמא, טייבל



1  
STORY: NE5130721

DATE: 07/21/89

SLNE5130721 BT\*NEA513 07/21/89  
MITCHELL READS PRESIDENT'S LETTER DURING SENATE DEBATE  
(Text: Bush letter to the majority leader) (400)

Washington -- Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) read a letter from President Bush on the Senate floor July 20 during debate on an amendment to the State Department authorization bill which would have restricted U.S. dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Following is the text of the letter:

(BEGIN TEXT)

I am writing to you now to register my strong opposition to an amendment being offered by Senator Helms to the State Department Authorization bill. As you know, this amendment would under certain circumstances prohibit the use of public funds for negotiations between the United States and representatives of the PLO.

My administration is actively committed to advancing the Middle East Peace process. In May, the Israeli government adopted a serious proposal for elections and negotiations. The administration wholeheartedly endorsed that proposal and has sought to bring about a positive Palestinian and Arab response. Indeed, the government of Israel asked for our assistance in eliciting a positive Arab response.

What warrants my writing to you now is my strong view -- one shared by the secretary of state and the national security advisor -- that this amendment would interfere significantly with, if not destroy, the ability of the United States to promote a viable peace process in the Middle East. After six months of careful preparation, we have arrived at a sensitive but promising diplomatic juncture. This is no time to take away from the executive a key tool of our diplomacy. Should this amendment become law, U.S. influence would be diminished and the prospects of peace significantly and possibly decisively undermined. The big losers would be Israel and ourselves. I am sure that you and your colleagues would not want to assume such a responsibility.

In addition, this amendment, if it were to become law, would constitute a substantial constraint on my ability to conduct the foreign relations of the United States. It is as a result wholly inconsistent with the Constitution, and would be an unwarranted and unacceptable intrusion by the legislative branch on the powers and responsibilities of the presidency.

I ask you to use your influence to see that this amendment is defeated. Its defeat is in the interest of all those who genuinely wish to contribute to Middle East peace.

Sincerely,

(signed) George Bush

(END TEXT)

NNNN

כ' בתמוז תשמ"ט  
23 ביולי 1989  
סימוכין ת730-4

- סודי -

אל : ראש הממשלה

עם סיום המשבר הקואליציוני, יש לצפות לכך שהממשל האמריקאי יגביר את מאמציו להגיע לידי הבנה עם אש"פ כדי לאפשר התחלת ביצועה של היוזמה המדינית שלנו, בסעיף 4 הנוגע לעריכת הבחירות ביש"ע.

יש יסוד להניח שהממשל מתרשם שהדו-שיח שהתנהל עד כה עם אש"פ התקרב לנקודה של הסכמה. אישי הממשל שנחלצו למאבק למניעת אישורו של תקון הלמס בסנט רמזו שחלה התקדמות של ממש באותו דו-שיח. הם טענו שתקון הלמס עלול לפגוע בהישג הזה ולפגוע בסכוי להגשים את תכנית הבחירות. על יסוד זה, טען הממשל שהשיחות עם אש"פ משרתות את האינטרסים של ארה"ב ושל ישראל ואת החתירה לשלום במזה"ת.

כזכור, הנשיא מוברק נפגש עם ערפאת טרם צאתו של הנשיא לפאריס ב-14/7, ובודאי קבל מפי ערפאת עדכון על השיחות בתוניס ושמע ממנו על היעד שאש"פ חותר להשיגו. מוברק ניצל את פגישתו עם הרבנים עובדיה יוסף וא. דרעי כדי להעביר לנו מסר על דעתו של ערפאת. הוא ביקש הסכמת ישראל לצירופם של הפרופסורים אדוורד סעיד ואיברהים אבו-לוע'וד למשלחת הערבית-פלסטינית שתנהל עמנו המו"מ ליישום תכנית הבחירות.

כידוע, ערפאת נתון בלחצים מן השטח ומגורמים שונים במערב כדי שיסכים עקרונית לבחירות ביש"ע, גם אם יצרף לה תנאים משלו. ערפאת לא יוכל להסכים להצעה זו אלא אם יוכל להצדיקה, מול מבקריו השונים, בנימוק שצירופם של שני הפרופסורים האמריקאיים (שהם חברי המל"פ) קובע תקדים הממסד את שיתוף אש"פ בתהליך וכן שהסכמתו לבחירות איננה פוגעת בסכוי להקים את המדינה הפלסטינית בשלב יותר מאוחר. ערפאת יוכל עוד לטעון, וזאת בגיבויה של ארה"ב, שע"י הסכמתו ליוזמת ישראל, בכפוף לתנאים הנ"ל, הוא מעביר את הכדור למגרש שלנו. נוסף לכך, הצעד הזה יזכה את אש"פ באהדה ותמיכה בינלאומית גדולה, ובאותה עת יזעזע את ממשלת ישראל ואולי אף יגרום לפירוקה של הממשלה הקואליציונית בישראל.

ערפאת דחה מספר פעמים את כנוסה של ועידת הפתח, ככל הנראה כדי למנוע הטחת ביקורת נגדו בשל העדר הישגים כלשהם בדו-שיח עם ארה"ב ועל כך שהאינתיפאדה נמשכת ללא מוצא וללא הישג לאש"פ. סביר שהדחיות נובעות מרצון להגיע להסכמה כלשהי עם ארה"ב בדו-שיח המתנהל בתוניס ומתוך הערכה שהסכמה כזאת ניתנת להשגה. ארה"ב בודאי מודעת למצוקתו של ערפאת ולוחצת עליו להסכים לתכנית הבחירות בתמורה למינויים של שני הפרופסורים האמריקאיים למשלחת. כלפי ישראל, תוכל ארה"ב להציג את שני הפרופסורים כמשקיפים אמריקאיים שלא מייצגים את ממשד אש"פ באופן רשמי.

יש לשקול אם לא רצוי שננקוט צעד כדי לקדם פני האפשרות שארה"ב תודיע לנו שיש הסכמה פלסטינית ליוזמה המדינית ותציע לנו הרכב של משלחת פלסטינית שתכלול את שני הפרופסורים האמריקנים. אני מציע להנחות נציגנו בושינגטון וכן לקרוא לשגריר ארה"ב בישראל על מנת להודיע לארה"ב:

א. שאנו מקדישים מאמץ מיוחד לאתר ולגבש בר-שיח פלסטיני מקרב התושבים הערבים בי"ע.

ב. אנו זקוקים לזמן כדי למצות את סיכויי המהלך ורצוי שלא ינקטו צעדים שיפריעו להצלחתו.

ג. אנו מציעים שארה"ב תפעיל השפעתה על מצרים כדי ששתיהן ביחד יודיעו למנהיגים בי"ע שהדרך לפתרון ולהחלצות מן המצב הנוכחי היא ע"י קבלת היוזמה המדינית של ישראל.

ד. אנו נסכים לצירופם של נציגים ממצרים ומירדן למו"מ עמנו בקשר לביצוע היוזמה אך לא נסכים לצירוף פלסטינים מחוץ לי"ע או לכל מי שימונה ע"י אש"פ.

ב ב ר כ ה,

י.ח. בן-אהרן

העתקים: שר החוץ  
מזכיר הממשלה

דתיפות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קד: 1
סוג: גלוי		פתוך: 4
תאריך וזמן חצור: 21 ביולי 1989 10:00		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק: הפיקוד:		דצ:
507	ארה"ב	פאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביה"ב: אשייפ ואירגון התיירות העולמי

1. רצ"ב טיוטח מכתב לנשיא בוש שיוזם הקונגרסמן לנטוס יחד עם הקונגרסמן כריס סמית, המופץ עתה כגן עמיתיו לחתימה. המכתב קורא לנשיא למנוע תשלומיה של ארה"ב לאירגון און יתקבל אשייפ כמדינה.

2. רצ"ב התבטאותו של לנואס במליאת בית הנבחרים ב-19/7.

לי דעתכם.

יהודית ורנאי דונגר

סיהח / שיהח <sup>2</sup> כיהא <sup>3</sup> איהא <sup>1</sup> איהא  
ג'אש <sup>2</sup> איהא <sup>1</sup> איהא <sup>1</sup> איהא  
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**Congress of the United States**  
Washington, DC 20515

July 19, 1989

**Oppose PLO Membership in the World Tourism Organization**

Dear Colleague,

The PLO -- designating itself the "State of Palestine" -- has applied for membership as a state in the World Tourism Organization, an inter-governmental organization of 107 nations which promotes and facilitates international tourism. The application is particularly cynical and ironic since the PLO's terrorist activities have been a major impediment to international tourism.

Earlier this year, by an overwhelming vote, the House adopted our legislation to prohibit U.S. contributions to the World Health Organization if the PLO was admitted as a full member of the WHO. It is our strong view that the U.S. should take the same position in the case of the World Tourism Organization.

We are sending a letter to the President asking him to withhold payment of the United States assessment for membership in the World Tourism Organization if the PLO is admitted as a member of that organization. The text of our letter is on the back.

If you would like to join us in signing this letter or if you have questions, please have your staff call Joe Nykodym at 5-3531.

Cordially,

*Tom*

Tom Lantos

*Chris*

Christopher H. Smith

\* \*

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by  
3.  
4*Co-signed Letter for President Bush*

The Honorable George Bush  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The PLO -- designating itself "the State of Palestine" -- has applied for membership as a state in the World Tourism Organization, an inter-governmental organization of 107 nations which promotes and facilitates international tourism. The PLO is not a state, is not sovereign, does not have the internationally-recognized attributes of statehood, and is not qualified to be a member of this organization. The PLO's terrorist activities have been a major impediment to tourism, which makes the PLO's application for membership in this organization particularly cynical.

If the PLO is admitted to full membership in the WTO, we strongly urge you to withhold payment of the United States assessment for membership so long as the PLO is a member of that organization. We welcomed the strong stand which the Administration took earlier this year at the time the World Health Organization was considering the application of the PLO for full membership. We urge you to take a similar strong stand in the case of the World Tourism Organization.

Cordially,

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**One Minute Statement**  
**Congressman Tom Lantos**  
**July 19, 1989**

**Irony of Ironies -- the PLO Requests**  
**Full Membership in the World Tourism Organization**

Mr. Speaker, someone in the PLO must have a sense of humor. This organization has applied for full membership in the World Tourism Organization as "the State of Palestine."

I can think of nothing more ironic. The PLO singlehandedly has done more to discourage tourism through its vicious, random terrorist attacks than all the cheap hotels, pick-pockets, and tourist-preying charlatans in the world combined. This is the PLO which shows its serious commitment to encouraging international tourism through vicious terrorist attacks, such as the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, the perpetration of terror and murder aboard the cruise liner Achille Lauro, and terrorist attacks and bombings of tour buses.

Mr. Speaker, this House voted 396 to 6 just a few weeks ago to prohibit all U.S. contributions to the United Nations or its affiliated organizations if the PLO is admitted to full membership as a state. I invite my colleagues to join me in urging President Bush to take the same position if the PLO is admitted to the World Tourism Organization.

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END



THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary  
(Paris, France)

For Immediate Release

July 15, 1989

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY  
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER III

Meridien Hotel  
Paris, France

5:52 P.M. (L)

MR. FITZWATER: Good evening. Tonight's briefing is by the Secretary of State James A. Baker. Secretary Baker does have a statement. As you know, you all have the political declaration. He will go through some of the major points -- probably take a little longer than normal, and then take your questions. Thank you.

SECRETARY BAKER: Before I get to the political declaration, let me simply cover for you the fact that at the morning plenary session, we spent, I suppose, most of the time on the political declaration, but we also covered economic policy coordination, structural reform and trade. We then broke for lunch. In the afternoon plenary, we covered debt and reserves in some detail.

With respect to the political declaration, I think it's a fitting occasion on the 200th anniversary of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen that we recall the common heritage of Western values that unite these seven summit countries. As I said several days ago when I briefed, the President's NATO summit trip first highlighted this theme and that's been carried forward at this summit. He then carried that message, as you know, to Poland and Hungary, where homegrown reform efforts are turning their societies toward the Western heritage. So it's fitting, I think, that our first declaration -- or the first topic covered in the political declaration was human rights.

Our common purpose, of course, is to promote these rights, to secure the rule of law, to create opportunity and to extend the reach of the fundamental freedoms of man. And the Declaration makes those points.

The East-West declaration, of the four, we probably spent most of our time on. That expresses our joint commitment to help advance the cause of freedom and economic liberty to others in Europe who have lived for far too long under the shadow of repression. Our seven nations will reach out to these countries and in this declaration we condemn those who resist the movement with further repression.

The declaration points out again, as did the President's pre-summit trip, that Poland and Hungary are in the vanguard of change. Recognizing that political reform has got to be supported by economic reform, the seven summit countries agreed to act in concert to support the opening in Poland and Hungary for both political and economic transformation.

Specifically, the East-West declaration commits each of us to developing concrete initiatives to promote the development of competitive market-oriented economies.

Secondly, the enterprises funds that the President

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announced in Poland and Hungary we think provide an example of our effort to build viable private sectors in each of these two nations.

We agreed to tackle the problem of Poland's debt without delay, in the Paris Club without waiting for an IMF program. There's an express recognition in there that Poland is eligible for participation in the strength and debt strategy.

We agreed to work together along with other countries and multilateral institutions to make our efforts mutually reinforcing and more effective in every way that we possibly can.

And fifth, and very, very importantly, I think, to move the process along without delay, we agreed to speedily convene a meeting, I think, within a matter of weeks to support -- to concert our support for Poland and Hungary, working -- the summit countries that are not members of the EC working alongside those members of the European Community.

The East-West declaration also acknowledges the new policies and the new pronouncements in the Soviet Union. We call for the Soviets to translate those announcements into concrete action. But because the military imbalances in Europe and Asia continue to favor the Soviets, we state the need to remain vigilant and to maintain our strategy of deterrence based upon a mix of adequate conventional and nuclear forces.

The third declaration in the -- the third topic in the political declaration was China. The declaration on China endorses the program which the President led the way in establishing. And if you take a look at that, you see that the seven explain their common response to the repression that each of the seven countries has condemned, and we hold out our common interest in the creation by China of conditions that will avoid her isolation.

We also recognize the concern of the people of Hong Kong, and we look to the People's Republic for steps that could restore the confidence of the Hong Kong people.

And the final subject in the political declaration has to do with terrorism. And in this, we confirm our commitment to combat terrorism in all of its forms, including, of course, state-sponsored terrorism.

We take special note this year of the murderous attacks on air travelers and commit to prevent, to the extent that we can, a repetition of last year's tragedy over Lockerbie. Specifically, we refer to seeking international regulations forcing the marking of plastic explosives so as to make them more easily detectable.

Let me say that in summary, we're very pleased with these four declarations that together constitute the political declaration. They reflect our core values and those of our allies and friends. The United States -- the democratic experiment was conceived in these values. We've sought to preserve, protect and promote them, and we welcome the support of others who share them.

We had -- I'm almost finished -- we had extensive discussions as well in foreign ministers' meetings of other foreign policy subjects and topics which were covered in an oral presentation by Minister Dumas as the host Foreign Minister. We have not seen a transcript of that yet, so I may be able to answer some questions that you have about other areas, but I'm not exactly sure of specifically what he said. This was the manner in which this was handled last year and we agreed early on that this is the way we would handle regional conflicts this year.

Final point -- I'd like to say simply that this is my ninth summit and this has been, as far as I am concerned, the most harmonious and one of the most productive summits that I have

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attended -- so much so that I think we might be able to wrap it up a little early. But the French are the host country and if we do that, they'll have the announcement to make.

Now, who has a question?

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to start on this meeting you're talking about on the subject of Hungary and Poland. At what level will this meeting take place? How will the United States be represented? What are the goals? How specific are the goals for that meeting?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, the level hasn't been determined, Frank, and the -- frankly, where the meeting is going to be held has not been determined because this decision came during the course of the plenary meeting today. It was, in effect, negotiated in the plenary session itself. It was not worked out by the sherpas, it wasn't something that was preplanned, and you can see in the political declaration what is said about it. What is said about it there is all that has as yet been agreed to.

But the idea is we don't want to just let this drop. We want to follow up on it and we want to follow up on it as expeditiously as we can. And we were very anxious -- the President was very anxious to get a commitment from the other countries to do this and, in fact, had written the heads of state prior to coming to the summit, requesting that this action be taken. And we feel very fortunate that we were able to get a commitment to this effect.

Q Are you at all disappointed that the minimum language, minimum level that Governor Sununu talked about earlier -- language he cited was action in concert -- is not in the statement? There is no discussion of concerted action. Talk about support, but no action.

SECRETARY BAKER: No, that's not correct. If you'll look at paragraph six, I will read it to you. "We agreed to work along with other interested countries and multilateral institutions to concert support for the process of reform underway in Hungary and Poland in order to make our measures of support more effective and mutually reinforcing. We will encourage further creative efforts by interested governments on the public and private sectors in support of the reform process. Concerning concerted support for reform in Poland and Hungary, we call for a meeting with all interested countries which will take place within the next few weeks."

It's clearly in there. Not only is that in there, but there's a follow-up meeting called for.

Q Mr. Secretary, some of us had the impression that the idea of having this conference on Hungary and Poland was promoted by Chancellor Kohl. Now, I guess it's still possible he got it in the communique. Was this an initiative of the President? And, apart from China, what in this communique bears really the strong mark of the U.S.? Where did the U.S. take the lead?

SECRETARY BAKER: The United States took the lead, I think, with respect, as you point out, to China, but also with respect to the East-West portion of the declaration. For that matter, with respect to human rights and terrorism as well, because we've been pushing those two subjects for the political declarations of prior summits for a number of summits now.

But particularly, with reference to the East-West, because, after all, it was the President's trip to Poland and Hungary that emphasized the importance of the homegrown reform efforts that are taking place there and the importance of our supporting those.

To answer specifically your question about who proposed this, I've already said that the President requested this in letters

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to the heads before he came. The specific suggestion in the plenary was made by Chancellor Kohl, but, of course, strongly supported by the United States.

Q What progress, if any, have you made on the question of Third World debt? And specifically, how much support was there for President Mitterrand's position?

SECRETARY BAKER: For what, John?

Q President Mitterrand's position on rescheduling of Third World debt.

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, there was quite an extensive discussion on debt this afternoon. No particular controversy, I know you'll be disappointed to hear. Everybody was pretty much in agreement that the strength-in-debt strategy that the United States has proposed is the course that should be followed.

There was a general recognition on the part of most countries that we are making very good progress with what we determined to do at Toronto about forgiving the debt of some of the poorest of the poor. The United States, as you know, is empowered now to and will be soon forgiving the hundreds of millions of dollars of debt to some of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other countries may -- took note of the fact that they're doing the same thing and everyone generally subscribed to the strength-in-debt strategy approach to the debt of middle income debtor countries.

Q But there was no support for a North-South conference or dialogue among the participants?

SECRETARY BAKER: There was a brief -- President Mitterrand briefly referred to the fact that he had been requested to raise with the Summit Seven the idea of a North-South conference. He said, however, that he had told his interlocutors that it was the view of most summit countries that current organizations were sufficient; that some of these issues are being addressed in quite some detail in other fora -- for instance, development. There will be a special session on development next year. We ought not to divert the focus from that.

Trade, we're working very hard to accomplish a new Uruguay round. We ought not to complicate that with a North-South dialogue, and so forth.

Now he mentioned this because he had told some of these other countries that he would do so, but it wasn't a matter of debate or controversy or consideration with respect to a decision being taken here at this summit about whether or not we'd have such a conference.

Q So he didn't argue for it -- he just raised it?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, no, it was not -- it was only raised.

Q How long did this discussion last, by the way?

SECRETARY BAKER: Very brief discussion, Brit. I would say no more than -- I hate to characterize -- I don't remember that specifically, but I'd say no more than 10 minutes.

Q When was that?

SECRETARY BAKER: When? Well, I think that was this afternoon. I think it was this afternoon as opposed to this morning.

Q Mr. Secretary, both in Poland and in Hungary, when the President announced these enterprise funds, he said that he would

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seek parallel contributions from his summit partners. He doesn't appear to have gotten those and I wonder if that's a setback for him?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think he has gotten parallel contributions in the form of a commitment for concerted support, rapid movement on rescheduling Poland's debt, participation of Poland in the strengthened debt strategy. Some countries are going to be making specific economic incentives available.

Q So I would argue that he did receive what he was seeking in this connection, and particularly with respect to this follow-on meeting. All the details cannot be wrapped up in a summit like this, but now there will be a follow-on meeting that will deal in detail with the reform efforts in both of these countries and ways in which the summit countries can help.

Q Did any of them, however, commit to contributing funds similar to the enterprise funds?

SECRETARY BAKER: Never -- we never asked anybody to commit for funds. We made it very clear before we got to Paris that this would not be a pledging session, but we believe we've gotten parallel efforts in the form of commitments to support the reform efforts that are being undertaken in Poland and Hungary.

Q The line in the communique on China -- or the declaration on China about postponing examination of new World Bank loans -- does that significantly hurt China, and if so, by how much? And secondly, what do you think the significance is of saying that in the declaration?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think the significance of saying it is that it's an action that has been taken by these countries. They've all agreed with the taking of this action. I'm trying to find my copy of the political declaration -- the China portion.

Q Well, it says the examination of new loans by the World Bank will be postponed.

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, I'm aware of that, but I can't -- I wanted to see the exact language.

Q That is the exact language.

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, wait a minute, though. Now I've got it. Yes, you know what it says -- has -- each of us has agreed. All of these recitations of actions are actions that have been taken already. Now, I'm not in a position to judge for you the extent to which that action may or may not hurt China. I don't want to make that judgment. I'm not in a position to make that judgment. This is a recitation of the actions that have been taken by the Summit Seven. All agreed.

Q Mr. Secretary, officials in Washington said before we came here that the United States would like a terrorism statement in the section that talked about the Lockerbie bombing to specifically cite Iran as responsible for that incident. But that language is not in this declaration. Did the United States indeed seek that?

SECRETARY BAKER: As far as I know, we never sought that. I'm not aware that we sought that.

Q At any point? Even in the -- during the sherpa process?

SECRETARY BAKER: During the sherpa process? I am not aware that we sought that during the sherpa process. I think we were pretty well pleased with the way the terrorism statement came out in light of some of the battles we fought a year or two ago on this

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issue. But I'm not personally aware that we asked that Iran be cited.

Q So you think we did not? That's your understanding?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think we did not, but I don't know everything that was raised in the entire sherpa process. I'm not suggesting that.

Q On the question of food for Poland, is that supposed to be part of the agenda of the follow-up conference? It's not quite -- it's in the same paragraph, but it's not explicitly stated here.

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, it's going to be dealt with in the follow-up meeting, but it was important to us to make it clear that the follow-up meeting was not restricted just to the food issue. And we did have a little debate about that. So we think we have it in such shape that the follow-up meeting will deal with the general topic of concerted support for Poland and Hungary, including food.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I could just understand the genesis of that, did Chancellor Kohl bring up the idea of having this meeting with -- follow-up meeting to discuss food for Poland and then the President said, well, let's broaden that to be all -- some sort of --

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I really can't answer that, not because I'm unwilling to. I just -- when we finally got a text back typed, it looked like the follow-up meeting was going to deal only with food and we wanted it to deal with concerted support and we made that case and it carried the day and we were very happy about that. I think the Chancellor was very much with us on that.

Q But did he mention the food specifically when he brought that up?

SECRETARY BAKER: In his proposal, yes.

Q Among the countries, Mr. Secretary, that you would think would attend this follow-on meeting, is Poland and Hungary -- is it contemplated that Poland and Hungary would be among the participants?

SECRETARY BAKER: That was not discussed. And it would be my sense of the discussion that that would not be contemplated; that the meeting would be of EC countries, summit participants who are not members of the EC and all interested countries, as you see there -- interested in concerting their support efforts for these two countries.

Q But not the recipients themselves.

SECRETARY BAKER: Probably -- well, I don't -- there was never any discussion of it, I don't know that there would be a reason to exclude them, but I don't think it contemplated that they would be coming.

Q Why not?

Q Since the President has left Poland, Lech Walesa has said that a communist president, meaning General Jaruzelski in particular, would be acceptable to him. Is that something that was urged on either Mr. Walesa or other Solidarity leaders by the President, or yourself, other U.S. officials?

SECRETARY BAKER: Not to my knowledge, John. We did not involve ourselves in the internal political situation there in terms of the presidential election.

Q But could I just ask -- do you think it's a good idea, given the realities of today, that Poland continues to have a

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communist President for the time being -- at least in this next election?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, you know, the way they're moving toward political reform there, they have reserved a certain number of seats in the same for communist party members. So having a communist president is not inconsistent with that, but I'm not going to express a judgment on whether we think that's good or bad.

Q Mr. Secretary, while we're talking about internal politics, could you clarify what is still a rather ambiguous outcome on sending somebody to Israel to find out what their intentions were? (Laughter.) It struck me that you thought it needed some clarification, and now evidently it doesn't. What happened?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think we've seen a lot happen in the course of a week; you're quite right. My view and the view of all of us was that we had some genuine concern, frankly, that perhaps as a result of the action by the Likud Party, they were in a sense devaluing their own initiative. We still think it might be useful to send someone -- not right now -- never have had in mind the idea of a presidential emissary, as some have misinterpreted things, I think. I mean, we're not talking -- and I think we made it very clear we're not talking about shuttle diplomacy or Phil Habib getting on an airplane and that sort of thing -- and never have been.

We still think it might be useful at some point, but not right now, because Prime Minister Shamir himself has made a number of statements that the initiative has not been changed. I think in one of them he said it has not been changed one iota. The national unity government there appears to be working together very hard to reconfirm their commitment to the election proposal.

Israeli government officials have confirmed to us and to others that they are very much committed to the proposal. And the last thing I guess I'd say on it is that we've been working very hard here in Paris to support the election proposal with the summit countries and in meetings with other countries, such as my meeting of yesterday with Foreign Minister Megid of Egypt. I hope that clarifies it for you.

Q Well, on that last point, may I pick you up, how have you done so far as conversions? It struck -- it seemed the United States has been pretty much alone in pushing for -- in supporting the Israeli initiative. Do you have friends now?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, we had friends before. It's wrong to say how are we doing on converting because we were able, I think, to bring a number of countries -- to gain support from a number of countries in Europe of the Israeli election proposal, who previously had not been supportive. We think we still have that support provided that they know that the Israeli government itself is every bit as committed to that proposal as they were when they advanced it. And we believe, based on what we've seen during the course of this week and the contacts we've had with Israeli government officials, that they are every bit as committed as they were when they advanced it.

Q On Hong Kong -- could you tell us what the steps you are looking for from China that they could do to restore the confidence of the Hong Kong people? And secondly, could you tell us whether there are any discussions of the international government, especially British government, commitments to the Hong Kong Chinese during the summit?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, there were discussions of -- but not that I can recall in the plenary session. I've had a bilateral meeting with Sir Geoffrey Howe in which we discussed the UK's firm commitment to Hong Kong. And I think the steps that are referred to in the communique are the steps that many of us -- many of the summit

MORE

countries have expressed in speaking about the tragic events of Tiananmen Square -- the need to reassure the international community that the process of economic reform is going to continue and that political repression is going to cease, as it says here in the declaration.

MR. FITZWATER: Final question, please.

Q Mr. Secretary, was Lebanon discussed at all today and is there harmony between the U.S. position and the French position concerning Lebanon's special --

SECRETARY BAKER: There is -- the answer to the last part of that question is, there is harmony between the United States position and the French position on Lebanon. And the answer to the first part of the question -- was Lebanon discussed today -- is no, but it was discussed at quite some length last night at the dinner of foreign ministers.

Q Are these summits still worth all this trouble?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.  
END

6:20 P.M. (L)





סגור יוזם טורג קווס געזען  
טופס פברוק

זר: 4  
כתוב: 2

סוג: בלכ"ס  
תאריך וזמן חבור:  
כס' פברוק:  
הפסגד: בטחון ניו יורק  
58 389 510

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

דע: יועץ רוח"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהביט לתקשורת, לע"מ  
אמ"ן/קש"ח, דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק

פאת: עתונות וושינגטון

תדרוך דובר כחפ"ד ליום July 21, 1989

Q About the Congress, the other decision, besides Cambodia, the PLO, do you have a public announcement also?

MR. BOUCHER: While the administration thinks the amendment that was voted last night is unconstitutional, it is far less offensive than Senator Helms' amendment and ensures that we can continue our dialogue and thereby give diplomacy a chance.

Q Can you say why you think it's unconstitutional?

MR. BOUCHER: Better scholars than I would have to do that. I'm sorry, I can't.

Q Then you'll not abide by the rules of it?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sorry.

Q Since it's not -- unconstitutional, will you abide by the parameters of it?

MR. BOUCHER: At this point, that question is very hypothetical. The provision is not even passed into law yet. It's just been passed by the Senate.

Q Does this mean that you would not be meeting again with Abu Eyad, or how is this going to circumscribe what you do?

MR. BOUCHER: As I said, the provision is not even law yet. That's a hypothetical question. And, as I said, we believe the provision ensures that we can continue our dialogue.

Q Do you think that the House will also pass this? Are you

MR. BOUCHER: I don't make predictions.

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Q So, what you're saying, on the basis of the amendment that was passed, you are not changing your behavior in terms of dealing with the PLO in any way? The dialogue continues in the manner, in the fashion and with the people you so choose. Is that correct?

MR. DOUCHER: The dialogue continues. You know, we've stated from the podium that we're not going to get into who we are and who we are not meeting with at any specific point, but our dialogue continues. The provision is not yet law, and I'm not making any predictions about what will happen if it does become law.

Q At the White House yesterday, Marlin Fitzwater said that it's -- basically, it's up to the PLO to decide who will talk to us. Is that something that -- is that a statement that you agree with?

MR. DOUCHER: I don't have anything to add to it. It's something that's been said before, but he said it in a more exact way than you did. I'd refer you to his words.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך 20.07.89

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נכנס \*\*

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חוזם: 14200/7

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1048, מנמת/379

מ:- ווש, נר: 445, תא: 190789, חז: 2200, דח: ב, סג: 10

תח: 2 גס: צפא

נד: 2

א/מח"פ

סודי/בהול לבוקר

סמנכל צפא ופרן

יועץ מדיני לשהח

דיאלוג אשף - ארהב.

היום נמשכה ההתרוצצות סביב התיקון כאשר הממשל מפעיל את כל הלחצים האפשריים. בבוקר נפגשו הסנטורים גרסלי והלמס עם סונזנו וקצת יותר מאוחר מיטצ'ל דול בושביץ ומצנבאום עם בייקר וסקוקרופט. בפגישה השניה סוכם הנוסח הבא:

...EXCEPT THAT NO FUNDS AUTHORISED IN THIS OR ANY OTHER ACT MAY BE OBLIGATED OR MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE CURENT DIALOGUE ON THE M.E. PEACE PROCESS WITH ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO IF THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDES AND ADVISES THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PLO DIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN THE PLANNING OR EXECUTION OF A TERRORIST ACTIVITY WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OR KIDNAPPING OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN.

מאידך גרסלי עיבד נוסח מתוקן המנסה להוסיף שינויים לנוסח הזה והאמור שלא תינתן כל הקצבה וכו':

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335667 בע' 10245



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

...FOR ANY DIALOGUE ON THE M.E. PROCESS WITH ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO UNLESS AND UNTILL THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDES AND ADVISES THE CONGRESS THAT FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM THE REPRESENTATIVE DID NOT IN HIS JUDGMENT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATE IN OR CONSPIRED IN THE PLANNING OR EXECUTION OF A TERRORIST ACTIVITY WHICH RESULTED IN A DEATH INJURY OR KIDNAPPING OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN.

סוננו נפגש היום אחהצ' בסנט עם הולמס. הציע לו נוסח לפיו בפועל יהיה ניתן לקיים דיאלוג עם כל דרג אשף עפי קביעת הנשיא לדבר עימו. היו לסוננו הנחיות חמורות (כנראה מהנשיא) שלא איפשרו לו מרחב תימרון וכתוצאה מכך בשיחה עם הלמס נוצר מצב של STAND OFF כאשר כל צד עמד על שלו ולא יותר. נכון להערב עדיין בכוונת הלמס לדרוש הצבעה (מן הסתם לא לפני מחר 20/7) על הצעתו המקורית (המתוקנת), בעוד שידוע לו שארבעת הסנטורים (מיטצ'ל, דול, בושביץ ומצנבאום) עיבדו 'נוסח פשרה' עם נציגי הממשלה שתוצג כהצעה חילופית (ככל הנראה הנוסח שברישא של מברק זה). אנשי הלמס מבינים שלפי כללי הדיון של הסנט, קודם תתקיים ההצבעה על הצעת הלמס ולהערכתם מצויים הקולות להעביר הצעה זו. הערכתם מתבססת בעיקר על כך שהסנטורים יתקשו - בשל שיקולים אלקטוריאליים להצביע נגד תיקון הלמס, המתייחס לטורוריסטים שגרמו למותם של אזרחים אמריקאים או שסייעו למעשי רצח כאלה. אם הערכה זו תתאמת (ואצל סנטורים דמוקרטים נתקלנו בסימנים בכוון זה) אזי, שוב לפי כללי הסנט, לא יהיה צורך להצביע על הצעת הפשרה.

אנשי הלמס טוענים גם שכעת הויכוח כבר אינו נסוב על לשון תיקון הלמס בנוסח זה או אחר אלא המאבק ניטש על מי ינהל את מדיניות החוץ של ארהב - הקונגרס או הנשיא. יתר על כן, יש האומרים שבאשר למזחה, השאלה כיום, מי יקבע מדיניות החוץ של ארהב מחמד או איפאק.

הערב הופיע בייקר בתכנית מקניל-לרר ואמר שתתיקון הלמס בלשונו המקורית ישים קץ (TERMINATE) לדיאלוג. הוא אמר שאשף היה ארגון טרור אך קיבל את תנאי ארהב והתכחש לטרור. בתשובה לשאלה מתי ולמה הוחלט לדבר עם אבו

6406 11/88

משרד החוץ - תל אביב

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY  
530 SOUTH EAST ASIAN AVENUE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60607  
TEL: 773-936-3700  
FAX: 773-936-3700

1. The first part of the report describes the synthesis of the new compound. The starting material was a mixture of the two isomers of the diene. The reaction was carried out in the presence of a catalyst. The product was purified by distillation. The yield was 85%. The boiling point was 100°C at 1 mm Hg. The refractive index was 1.45. The density was 0.85 g/cm³. The molecular weight was 150. The elemental analysis gave the following results: C, 80.0%; H, 12.0%. The IR spectrum showed a strong absorption at 1650 cm⁻¹. The 1H NMR spectrum showed a multiplet at 7.2 ppm and a singlet at 1.2 ppm. The 13C NMR spectrum showed a multiplet at 130 ppm and a singlet at 15 ppm. The mass spectrum showed a molecular ion peak at m/z 150. The UV spectrum showed a maximum at 210 nm. The compound was found to be stable in air and light.

2. The second part of the report describes the synthesis of the new compound. The starting material was a mixture of the two isomers of the diene. The reaction was carried out in the presence of a catalyst. The product was purified by distillation. The yield was 85%. The boiling point was 100°C at 1 mm Hg. The refractive index was 1.45. The density was 0.85 g/cm³. The molecular weight was 150. The elemental analysis gave the following results: C, 80.0%; H, 12.0%. The IR spectrum showed a strong absorption at 1650 cm⁻¹. The 1H NMR spectrum showed a multiplet at 7.2 ppm and a singlet at 1.2 ppm. The 13C NMR spectrum showed a multiplet at 130 ppm and a singlet at 15 ppm. The mass spectrum showed a molecular ion peak at m/z 150. The UV spectrum showed a maximum at 210 nm. The compound was found to be stable in air and light.

3. The third part of the report describes the synthesis of the new compound. The starting material was a mixture of the two isomers of the diene. The reaction was carried out in the presence of a catalyst. The product was purified by distillation. The yield was 85%. The boiling point was 100°C at 1 mm Hg. The refractive index was 1.45. The density was 0.85 g/cm³. The molecular weight was 150. The elemental analysis gave the following results: C, 80.0%; H, 12.0%. The IR spectrum showed a strong absorption at 1650 cm⁻¹. The 1H NMR spectrum showed a multiplet at 7.2 ppm and a singlet at 1.2 ppm. The 13C NMR spectrum showed a multiplet at 130 ppm and a singlet at 15 ppm. The mass spectrum showed a molecular ion peak at m/z 150. The UV spectrum showed a maximum at 210 nm. The compound was found to be stable in air and light.





# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רט, אמן, ממד,  
בנצור, מצפא, סייבל

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משרד החוץ - תל אביב - 19467

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARY



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* 9435

\* תאריך 13.07.89

\* יוצא \*\*

\* סודי ביותר

\* דף 1 מתוך 2  
\* עותק 6 מתוך 28

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\* חוזם: 7,9435

\* אל: ווש/496, מנמת/228

\* מ-: המשרד, תא: 130789, זח: 1612, דח: מ, סג: סב

\* תח: @ גס: צפא

\* נד: @

\* סודי ביותר/מיידי

\* ע.ב.ש

\* 5763

\* השגריר.

\* משיחה של בוב אשר עם בנצור ושילה.

\* א. סבור שיש לאמץ גישה סלקטיבית לעסקות נשק. יש  
\* לקבוע עקרונות ספציפיים כגון: לא להתנגד לעסקות  
\* עם בחריין, עומאן וסעודיה ובלבד שלא יהיו אלה  
\* מטוסים וסוגי טילים מסוימים ושנקבל תמורה.

\* ב. יש לעמוד על העקרון שמבחינה כרונולוגית נקדים את  
\* הערבים 'בחצי דור' כמו שהיה בעבר ושלא יווצר מצב  
\* שנקבל מערכות חדשות בעת ובעונה אחת עם הערבים.

\* ג. מעריך שאפשר להגיע להרחבת הפטור של FAIR  
\* PRICING. זה יביא לחסכון כולל של 150 מליון.

\* ד. אפשר להגיע להעברה מוקדמת והפקדה של כספי FMS  
\* בתחילת השנה לשם קבלת ריבית אך בינתיים לא  
\* מטפלים ולא מדברים על זה.

\* ה. מתח ביקורת על הלחצים שהופעלו מכל הצדדים לפני  
\* מכתב התשעים וחמישה ומתח ביקורת על כמה ניסוחים  
\* לא טובים שהוצעו אז ואמר שאסור בשום פנים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 2 מתוך 2  
\* עותק 6 מתוך 28

\* שישראלים יציעו ניסוחים לחתימתם של אמריקנים כי  
\* זה יכול אם יתגלה להתקבל רע מאד.

\* ו. אינו סבור שאנחנו צריכים להוסיף להתחפר בהתנגדות  
\* שלנו לדיאלוג בטוניסיה. זה לא פרודוקטיבי  
\* ומעורר רוגז. אין סיכוי להפסקת המגעים. אפשר עם  
\* זאת לפעול לבלימת התרחבות הדיאלוג ולמניעת  
\* שיתופם של אנשים כאבו-איאד.

\* ז. הוא מציע שנחדל ממינהגנו לשייך לאש'פ אנשים  
\* ומעשים שאינם שייכים אליו. זה פוגע באמינותנו  
\* וגורם נזק.

\* מנהל מצפא

\* מסא

\* יג

\* תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן,  
\* בנצור, מצפא, סייבל





מזכירות הממשלה

4 2  
הצעת משי...  
מאגיד

ירושלים, י"ח בתמוז התשמ"ט  
21 ביולי 1989

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ס ד י  
למכותבים בלבד

*Handwritten mark*

*Handwritten note: א/ה 2*

אל: ראש הממשלה

חאת: מזכיר הממשלה

שלום רב,

בשיחה ביחידות אמר ביל בדאון שמכתבך אל בוש נתקבל בחוסר התלהבות  
(לא פירט). אמרתי כי יש נושאים, ובהם בראש וראשונה עניין אש"פ, שיש לנו  
טרוניה לגביהם ואין הדבר צריך לפגוע ביחסים.

בברכה,

אליקים רובינשטיין

*Handwritten signature*

העתק: מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה ✓



מזכירות הממשלה

6 h  
מזכירות הממשלה

ירושלים, י"ח בתמוז התשמ"ט  
21 ביולי 1989

ס ו ד י  
למכותבים בלבד

איה"ב

אל: ראש הממשלה

מאת: מזכיר הממשלה

שלום רב,

הנדון: שיחה עם ויליאם בראון

להלן עיקרי שיחה של מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה והח"מ עם בראון אתמול  
(20.7) בהשתתפות הציר פאריס (נכח גם היועץ המינהלי פג'ז, שאינו עוסק  
בנושא).

1. עיראק וירדן: הסברנו את ראייתנו ההיסטורית לגבי עיראק שהשתתפה במלחמות הערביות השונות נגדנו, לא הצטרפה לשביתת הנשק בשנתה, ושנתה - משהתפתחה במידה רבה מהמלחמה עם איראן - שבה לגלות מעורבות שלילית באזור, במיוחד בירדן, ויש לה פוטנציאל של איום. כל תיאורי "התמתנותה" של עיראק שהולעטנו בהם, לרבות ע"י ארה"ב, במשך שנות המלחמה, כשעה שמצבה היא לא טוב, הוכחו כבדויים. בראון אמר כי הוא ער לדאגותינו (בעקבות השיחות עם שר הבטחון ועוד וחילופי מודיעין). כשלעצמו תהה מספר פעמים על "שוויון הנפש" שלנו בנושא האספקות העיראקיות ללבנון, אף כי הוא מבין את אי רצוננו לגלות מעורבות בלבנון. עם זאת לא חלק על התיאור הסקפטי והחדשני כלפי עיראק, בקשר ל"שאיפותיה המסורתיות" והידע שצברה במלחמה עם איראן, 50 הדיביוזיות שלה, ייצור חומרי לחימה כימיים ועוד. השאלה לדבריו היא האם למד סדאם חוסיין לקח כלשהו, והאם המועצה הכלכלית הערבית, שהוא שותף לה, תחתן אותו במכלול פעולתו.
2. סיפר ששגרירת ארה"ב בעיראק נקראה באורח דרמטי למדי ב-4.7, לאחר מסיבת יום העצמאות של ארה"ב, אל בכיר במשרד החוץ העיראקי (שחזר ממסיבת השגרירות) והלה הביע דאגות מכוונות ישראל, באשר לעיראק. כמו כן הזכיר בראון שהירדנים היו מודאגים מטיסות שלנו בשטח ירדן.
3. בתשובה לשאלה אמר בראון כי אינו יכול להבטיח דבר באשר לכוונות עיראק, והוא רוצה לקוות שאין להם כוונות התקפיות. באשר לירדן צויין מצדנו החיפוש ההיסטורי שלה אחר בעלי ברית בצפון (סוריה) ובמזרח (עיראק). בראון אמר כי בן שאכר הירדני טען באוזני ארה"ב, שהירדנים הורו לעיראקים להפסיק המשלוחים דרך עקבה, וכמו כן שנמסר לנו באמצעותם כי אין כוונה עיראקית לטיסות כפי שהיו, בעתיד הקרוב.

- ב. באשר לפרשת המשלחת שעמדה לבוא, בראון אמר כי הנחיותיו לפנות אל הח"מ ביום א', 16.7 היו בטלפון מדניס רוס ולא הגיעו בכתב. העיר שמסר אחר כך לווינגטון כי הדבר עלול להתפרש כהתערבות פנימית.
- ג. חלק אחר של השיחה (בהשתתפות שילה ואלסטר ממשרד החוץ והח"מ מצדנו) נגע בנושא השטחים המוקצים לשגרירות ולקונסוליה של ארה"ב בת"א וירושלים; ישנה בעיה של איתור השטח בת"א; והאמריקאים העלו עתה הצעה למגרש ב"יד-אליהו" שיש לבדוק ההשלכות הבטחוניות והכספיות לגביו.
- ד. בראון נשאר בסוף השיחה קצרה כיחידות ובה אמר בין השאר, בעקבות ההתפתחויות שהיו, כי הוא (בראון) עושה - לדבריו - מאמץ שלא תהיה "צרבת" מתמשכת ביחסים; זאת גם כדי שהשיתוף האסטרטגי ימשיך לפעול באוירה טובה בכל המישורים. הזכיר כי השיתוף החל בהנחיות מלמעלה בווינגטון, וחשובות איפוא תחושות הדרג הבכיר בממשל. איני מפרט הערותי.

ב ב ר כ ה ,

אליקים רובינשטיין

העתק: שר החוץ  
שר הבטחון  
מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה ✓

23

אנא

שגו ידות ישראל בוושינגטון  
טובס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 2  
דחיפות: מיידית  
סוג: גלוי  
תאריך, זמן: 20.7.89  
מספר המברק:

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע :

מאת: עתונות

המשרד: 446

להלן כתבה מה- "וושינגטון פוסט" שענינה תיקון הלמס, 20.7.89.

עתונות / קונגרס  
(פקי)

שהח 3 / שלהח 3 רהמ 3  
אמרהמ 1  
אנא 1  
אמנא 1

קנציה 1  
האמנא 1  
מיוה 1  
רהיב 1  
מא 1  
הסברה 2  
אמנא 2  
מיוה 3  
רהיב 3  
מא 3  
הסברה 2  
אמנא 4  
מיוה 4  
רהיב 4  
מא 4  
הסברה 4

1/2

ס.ס.

6

# Bush Fights Language to Curb PLO Contacts

*Helms Amendment Would 'Shut Down' Negotiations, Senators Told*



SEN. JESSE HELMS

... asks certification on PLO figures

By Ann Devroy  
and David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writers

In a frantic daylong effort, President Bush and most of his top foreign policy advisers worked yesterday to kill a congressional attempt to limit administration contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization, a move the White House said could mean the collapse of the Middle East peace process.

At a morning meeting with congressional leaders, Bush urged the defeat of an amendment by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) that would ban contacts with certain PLO figures. According to Sen. Bob Packwood (R-Ore.), the president was "very strong" on the subject, believing the language would "simply shut down the negotiations."

Packwood quoted Bush as telling the group, "If you pass this amend-

ment and shut down any negotiations with anybody that's ever even breathed on the PLO ... that's a step backward."

Through most of yesterday, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and many of their top legislative aides engaged in a series of negotiating sessions with Helms and separately with other key Senate leaders to work out compromise language.

The Senate leaders on Tuesday had been given substitute administration language that they altered in a way that was unacceptable to the White House. Yesterday, the key Senate leaders, including Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine), Minority Leader Robert

See PRESIDENT, A9, Col. 1

J. Dole (R-Kan.), Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.) and Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), reached a tentative agreement with the administration after a lengthy Capitol Hill session on language that might be acceptable to the full Senate.

Late yesterday, that language, which administration officials said does not tie the president to certifications to Congress and is not as strict in its limits on who in the PLO can be contacted, was being "shopped" through the Senate to gauge its chances of acceptance. Sources indicated the White House hoped to get enough support without Helms to substitute their version for his.

At issue is a Helms amendment to the State Department authorization bill that would bar talks with any representative of the PLO "unless and until the president certifies to Congress that he has determined

the representative did not directly participate in, or conspire in, or was an accessory to, the planning or execution of a terrorist activity which resulted in the death, injury or kidnapping of an American citizen."

The compromise language would delete the requirement for certification to Congress and only have Bush "concluding" that PLO participants had not engaged in such acts. It also would eliminate the "accessory" language to some extent.

Administration officials suggested that they faced what one called "a rolling freight train" on the PLO issue and could not defeat it without offering an alternative that would allow the Senate to be on record expressing its concern about PLO contacts. Officials suggested that if the Helms language survived, the president would take the position that he was not bound by it because it was an unconstitutional usurpation of his authority.

On Capitol Hill, a senior administration official said, "We have been telling people that if this Helms language goes through, it is likely to mean the collapse of the Middle East peace progress."

One administration source called yesterday's activities "extraordinary" because of the number of senior officials involved in negotiating one issue.

U.S. officials have been meeting periodically in Tunisia with various PLO officials since last December, after PLO leader Yasser Arafat renounced terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist. Recently, the U.S.-PLO dialogue has included secret meetings with Arafat's chief deputy, Saleh Khalef, also known as Abu Iyad. A founder of the Black September terrorist group, Khalef has been implicated in the 1973 killing of the U.S. ambassador to Sudan and he is under indictment in Italy for helping supply arms to the Red Brigades.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13148

תאריך : 19.07.89

נכנס \*\*  
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סודי

חוזם: 7,13148

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/971

מ-: וווש, נר: 395, תא: 180789, זח: 1500, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: 8 גס: צפא

נד: 8

א/ה ק/ב

סודי/מידי

אל: מנכ"ל משרד ראה'מ

דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר'נ

מאת: ציר - עודד ערו.

דו קרצר בקשני לסור למשרדו הבוקר. אמר שהם פנו במקביל גם דרך השגריר בראון בנושא הראיונות שלך ושהם UNHAPPY לגביהם ובמיוחד ההתייחסות לדיאלוג בין אש"פ וארה"ב. הם בדעה שההצהרות לגבי 'רגע האמת' אינן מועילות (UNHELPFUL) לתהליך, שמאז מאי נשען על היוזמה הישראלית שאותו רוצה ארה"ב לקדם וכך היא עושה בכל מגעיה הבינלאומיים.

ביקר כנר הגיב על הדברים באופן פומבי בתוכנית של ברינקלי ודעתם היא שמוטב היה ללכך את הנדלי ההשקפות בצינורות הדיפלומטים הרגילים. בינתיים נמסר להם כאילו הבעת צער לגבי חלק מהדברים ואם אכן זה כך הם מבקשים שתשקול מתן פומבי לכך.

עניתי שאעביר וכי אין לי ענין להכנס לאספקט האישי אך עלי לציין שיש בינינו חילוקי דעות עמוקים לגבי הדיאלוג ושאין בכך סוד. אנו בדעה שלא רק שהוא אינו מסייע אלא הוא אבן נגף. קרצר אמר שהעובדה היא שממשלת ישראל עצמה לא התנתה את יוזמתה בהפסקת הדיאלוג והערכתו האישית שלו עשתה זאת לא היתה ארה"ב מברכת על היוזמה.

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אמרתי שארה"כ נקלעת למצבים אבסורדיים בשל הדיאלוג. מעבר לנזק שהוא גורם בהרתיעו פלשתינאים מהשטחים לנהל דיאלוג ישיר עמנו הוא מביא את דוברם להתפתל במשך כמה ימים לפני שהוא מוכן לכנות את אסון האוטובוס כמקרה טרור ואת מחמ"ד להתנגד לחקיקה שכל מטרתה למנוע דיאלוג בין הממשל לבין מי שיש נודם ראיות שפעלו נגד אזרחים אמריקאים. הרצף אמר שזה קשה מאוד להוכיח מי כן פעל ומי לא פעל בצורה משפטית. עניתי שלא זכור לי ששולץ שמוע אשתקד את בואו של ערפאת לבין יורק עבר דרך בית משפט כדי להוכיח אשמתו לפני שכינה אותו טרוריסט. הרצף הוסיף שהם מתנגדים לחקיקה משום שיש בה משום נסיון של הקונגרס לנהל את מדיניות החוץ האמריקאית וזה מנוגד כידוע לראית הממשל. שנית הם בדעה שחקיקה כזו פרושה סוף פסוק לדיאלוג ומכאן סוף פסוק ליוזמה.

עניתי שאני לא מגן כמובן על הדיאלוג אבל החקיקה המוצעת לא מתייחסת לדיאלוג ככלל אלא לפרטים מסויימים המנהלים אותו מטעם אש"פ. הרצף נשאר בשלו וברור שהממשל ימשיך לפעול כנגד החקיקה.

ערן.

17

תפ: שהח, ששהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

5405 1138

משרד החוץ, תל אביב, ישראל  
מס' 1138/5405





MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
JERUSALEM



משרד החוץ  
ירושלים

*ג' 1989*

*ארה"ב*

*1989*  
*אוקט*

יא' בתמוז תשמ"ט  
14 ביולי 1989  
מס' 509

*הגנרל*  
*הגנרל*  
*הגנרל*

סודי ביותר

*כ"ט*  
*2 יולי*  
אל : מר מ. ארד, השגריר, וושינגטון  
מאת: איתן בנצור

השגריר בראון סיפר לי הבוקר שהגיעו הדיס ששדר רוה"מ האחרון  
לנשיא בוש נתקבל לא טוב ושאלו נתונים כתוצאה מכך במעין  
CATCHY SITUATION ושומה עלינו לנווט בכוחות משותפים כך "שנחלוף  
על פני מצב זה ונותירו מאחורינו".

ב ב ר כ ה,

*20*  
איתן בנצור

העתק: *1* שה"ח  
מנכ"ל



*pink*



*Handwritten notes in Hebrew:*  
התשובה על פי  
מיד

UNITED STATES SENATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ORRIN G. HATCH  
UTAH

July 10, 1989

Dear Yigal:

I want to express my gratitude for your taking time to advise us on terrorism and counter terrorism within the state of Israel. Our meeting with you was one of the most important ones during our visit to Israel. It was so good of you to spend the time with us. I also appreciated your coming to the King David Hotel to bring the information we had discussed.

Please send me the materials we have agreed to as soon as you can. I am anxiously awaiting them.

Warmest regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Orrin G. Hatch".

Orrin G. Hatch  
United States Senator

Mr. Yigal Carmon  
Prime Minister's Office  
3 Kaplan Street  
Kiryat Ben-Gurion  
Jerusalem 91919  
Israel

פירוש

אלה הקרובים - האשתיקנים של הילולתו (קו 405 6.7.89)

של

- Rita Levine — יסרה
- Jonathan Silverman
- Victor Assal
- Paul Fingersh
- Perla Fingersh
- Arieh Yardeni
- Naomi Yardeni

19

דחיפות: בהול לבוקר	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קף: $\frac{1}{5}$
סוג:		פתוך: 5
תאריך וזמן הנכור: 17 ביולי 1989 13:30		חל: מצפיתא
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפס' ד:		
366		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

אמ"ק

סנאט: הגבלת הדיאלוג עם אשייפ - תיקון הלמס  
בהמשך לשלנו 329 סעיף 4

1. רציב התבטאותו של הסנטור הלמס ביום ו' האחרון במליאת הסנט.
2. בינתיים נוספים שושבנים נוספים לתיקון - וסה"כ מדובר ב-20.

י.י.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

2                    1                    1                    1                    3                    3  
 קונגרס            אש                    אש                    אש                    אש                    אש  
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תפוצה: 36

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## STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS OF NORTH CAROLINA AMENDMENT ON PLO TERRORISM

MR. HELMS. Mr. President, this amendment is cosponsored by Senators Kerry (of Massachusetts), Bond, D'Amato, Pressler, Coats, Grassley, Lautenberg, Kasten and Gramm (of Texas).

This amendment poses a simple, clear cut question: should U.S. officials negotiate with terrorists responsible for the deaths of innocent Americans?

All last year, Americans heard politicians proclaim that we should not negotiate with terrorists. I venture to say, a number of our colleagues have taken that position publicly and with genuine emotion.

There is a good reason why dealing with terrorists is so repugnant to Americans. Americans realize that to concede to terrorists only encourages more terrorism.

In fact, in his introduction to the Pentagon publication Terrorist Group Profiles, then-Vice President Bush wrote:

"... the United States will be firm with terrorists. We will not make concessions. We will continue to urge other countries not to make concessions. Rewarding terrorists only encourages more terrorism."

George Bush was right: for America to reward terrorists will only increase terrorism against Americans.

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So, you can imagine my shock when it was reported in the Washington Post of June 29, 1989, that our Ambassador to Tunisia, Robert Pelletreau, had been meeting with PLO terrorist Abu Iyad.

My guess is that President Bush must have been shocked as well.

For while the name of Abu Iyad may not be well known to our ears, the murder of innocent people - which he directed - still echoes in our memory.

The deadly record of this life-long terrorist is shocking. In the early 1970's, Abu Iyad was a founder and leader of "Black September" -- one of the most destructive and violent terrorist groups ever known.

Abu Iyad helped plan the 1972 Munich massacre, in which eleven Olympic athletes were killed, including David Berg of Cleveland. He also was one of those behind the bloody assassination of the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan, Cleo Noel, and Deputy Chief of Mission George C. Moore in Khartoum in 1973. In that same year, Abu Iyad's Black September terrorists opened fire with machine guns at passengers at the TWA terminal in Greece. Among the dead were two Americans, including a 16-year-old girl.

Does this "Abu Iyad" whom the State Department now treats as a legitimate diplomat feel any remorse for his terrorism against Americans? To the contrary, in his autobiography, he upholds as heroes the terrorists who carried out the Olympic massacre.

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Mr. President, where will we draw the line? The State Department is involved in negotiations with a man who murdered Americans with impunity. Despite Abu Iyad's history of crimes against Americans, the State Department has now endowed upon him the respectability inherent in serving as a negotiating partner with the United States. By so doing, it has sent a signal to other terrorists or would-be terrorists that violence can pay.

This is a signal which the United States cannot afford to send -- not if we are serious about fighting terrorism. With this in mind, I am offering this amendment which will protect the United States from finding itself in direct negotiations with terrorists who have on their hands the blood of the sons and daughters of America.

Specifically, the amendment adds to the section currently in the law conditioning talks with the PLO the following:

"except that no funds authorized in this or any other act may be obligated or made available for the conduct of negotiations with any representative of the of the Palestinian Liberation Organization unless and until the President certifies to Congress that he has determined the representative did not directly participate in, or conspire in, or was an accessory to the planning or execution of a terrorist activity which resulted in the death, injury or kidnapping of an American citizen."

Mr. President, as the Chairman of the Task Force on Terrorism, then-Vice President Bush wrote "... we will bring terrorists to justice. . . . Terrorism is crime, and terrorists must be treated as criminals."

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366

4. 5/3

George Bush is correct, and instead of negotiating with Abu Iyad, the State Department should have had him arrested. Indeed, he was indicted in Italy for gun running on the day our talks with him were revealed.

But, if State will not treat Abu Iyad as the terrorist he is, at least the Senate should step in and stop him and others like him from being treated by the United States as legitimate, civilized diplomats.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a Wall Street Journal article of July 10, 1989, entitled "US Talking with Palestinian Officials it Previously Branded as Key Terrorists," along with various news accounts of the PLO assassination of U.S. Ambassador Cico Noel be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

\*                      \*

דחיפות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קף: 1
סוג: גלוי		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן מעבול: 18 ביולי 1989 11:30		אל: מצפייא
כס' פרוק: המסרד: 387		צד:
		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

אחרי

חוק סיוע חוץ - הקצבות  
בהמשך לשלנו 373.

א. אתמול בערב קיים אובי אח ה-MARK-UP של סיוע חוץ ואף סקימו, לאחר שהגיע להסכם מוקדם עם הממשל וכן עם הרפובליקנים בועדה על הסכומים לתכניות השונות, באופן כללי הסכים אובי להעלות חקרות ההקצבות למרבית הנושאים תוך קיצוץ עיקרי מקביל של 134 מ' מ-2 תכניות אחרות 75 מיליון \$ ב-IFC (INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION) ו-59 מיליון \$ ב-ESF.

ב. בסיכומו של דבר עברו כל הנושאים שלנו (שלנו 89 מ-6/7) ללא כל דיון. רק לשון הדו"ח על המזהיית נדון קצרות.

ג. רצייב לשון הדו"ח על המזהיית שהוסכם אמש ע"י חברי הועדה. שלושת הקטעים הראשונים זהים לנוסח אשתקד. שני הקטעים האחרונים (ממוסגרים באופן מודגש) נוספו לבקשת קונגרסמן צירלי וילסון.

הקונגרסמן ייטס שאל האם יש צורך בתוספת הני"ל. אובי השיב בחיוב והקריא הנוסח. ייטס פנה לוילסון ושאלו האם יאות לוותר על הקטע האחרון. וילסון השיב בשלילה והוסיף כי למעשה רצה לציין באופן מפורש את 4 הנקודות שהוסכמו בועידת הליכוד. איש מחברי הועדה לא תמך אמש בוילסון בנושא זה.

הקונגרסמן להמן הציע להוסיף לפני המילים INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE את המילים OTHER DIPLOMATIC MEASURES. אובי בחשבה אמר כי אינו מצדד בועידה בינ"ל ונוסח

לשון הדו"ח ממילא אינו מאמץ רעיון הועידה הבינ"ל. הנוסח לדבריו מצביע רק על העובדה שאם תהליך הבחירות לא יתקדם הוא עלול לגרור לחצים שיוליכו לועידה בינ"ל. חברי הועדה לא התנגדו והנוסח התקבל בסופו של דבר.

- ד. הלו"ז המתוכנן מבחינת חוק סיוע חוץ (הקצבות):
- 1. יום די (מחר) דיון במליאת ועדת ההקצבות.
- 2. יום ו' הקרוב, (או ראשית השבוע הבא) התחלת הדיון במליאת ביהנ"ב.

יהודית ורנאי דרונגר

תפוצה: 36

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אבג/ששהיה רהמ מערהמ אנא ממנכא הננו מצבא סיוה א 31

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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The Committee notes that 1989 marks the tenth anniversary of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. That event represented tremendous progress towards peace in a region which has experienced so much violence and war. The Committee is pleased that the treaty has endured despite a number of problems in recent years. The Committee strongly supports the treaty and development of a close relationship between two friends of the United States, Israel and Egypt.


Despite this anniversary, the Committee remains deeply concerned about the ongoing violence, violation of due process and killings in the West Bank and Gaza, terrorist attacks in Israel, and continued conflict, death and destruction in Lebanon.

The Arab-Israeli conflict continues to be a matter of special concern to the Committee. The Committee urges the Administration to make a maximum commitment to use all the influence and wisdom it can muster to move Israel and its Arab neighbors to meaningful and well-thought-out negotiations about both short-term and long-term changes that will assure Israel's security and bring a just and humane approach to resolving the plight of the Palestinian people.

The Committee has been in strong support of the plan put forward by the Israeli government that calls for elections in the West Bank and Gaza of Palestinian representatives, to be followed by direct negotiations between those representatives and the Israeli government on both an interim arrangement and final agreement.

We call on all parties - Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian - to support and define that plan as the best practical opportunity to bring progress to the region. The Committee is concerned that the initiative not be crippled by preconditions imposed by Arab, Palestinian, or Israeli parties which would make it impossible to produce viable elections that would have the support of all relevant parties. The imposition of such preconditions by any party would seriously diminish the prospect for successful elections and inevitably increase pressure for an international conference as an alternative.

*other documents*



*JA*

*JA*





איתור  
ליהרות  
מתקדמת  
באמריקה

# Union of American Hebrew Congregations

PAIRON OF HEBREW UNION COLLEGE | JEWISH INSTITUTE OF RELIGION  
835 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NY 10021 (212) 248 0100 CABLES UNIONUAH

NEWS RELEASE For Immediate Release

Contact: Richard Cohen  
(212) 748-8889

401 2/2

## UAHC OPPOSES THE HELMS AMENDMENT, 'WOULD TORPEDO ISRAELI PEACE INITIATIVE'

The Union of American Hebrew Congregations, composed of more than 800 Reform synagogues nationwide, today (July 18) voiced its opposition to the Helms Amendment to the State Department appropriations bill.

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, president of the UAHC, declared in a statement:

"The peace plan proposed by the Government of Israel is the only viable initiative on the table. It is a significant but extremely fragile package. It needs to be nurtured, not encumbered.

"The Helms Amendment now before the U.S. Congress, however well-intentioned, would represent an additional obstacle on a road already littered with dangers. If adopted, it would make it all but impossible for the American negotiations with the P.L.O. in Tunis to continue.

"The effect, in turn, would be to give the P.L.O. an excuse to continue in its refusal to approve Palestinian acceptance of the Israeli initiative, and in its campaign of intimidation and assassination of Palestinians willing to participate in the proposed elections in the territories.

"The Israeli initiative needs and deserves a chance, and the U.S. administration is doing its utmost to nurture it, in part by calling on the P.L.O. to end its objections to it.

"Outside pressures such as the Helms Amendment and the Likud effort to impose conditions on the peace plan will serve only to make it easier for those who seek to torpedo the Israeli initiative, which offers the best -- perhaps the only -- chance for resolution of the Palestinian issue."

The Helms Amendment amends the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 by prohibiting the U.S. to negotiate with terrorists involved "in the death, injury or kidnapping of an American citizen."

7/18/89

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13255

תאריך 19.07.89

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סודי

ז/כה"ק

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אל: המשרד  
יעדים: מצב/970  
מ-: נוש, נר: 414, תא: 180789, חז: 1930, דח: ב, סג: סו  
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סודי / בהול לבוקר  
אל: מצפ'א  
דע: לשכת שה'ח  
מאת: קישור לקונגרס

הגבלת הדיאלוג עם אש'פ- תיקון הלמס

1. ההצבעה על התיקון נדחתה שוב לאחר שהועברה פניה לסנטורים הרפובליקנים ( באמצעות הסנטור בושביץ ) שהנשיא בוש מבקש להפגוש עמהם.

2. במשך היום נשאו ונתנו מיטצ'ל דול בושביץ ומצנבאום ( אל האחרון פנה דניס רוס ) על נוסח מתוקן/או תחליפי המדבר עתה על RELIABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENTS כן השמטה אפשרית של המילה ACCESSORY ( אין בידינו כרגע פרטים נוספים שכן הנוסח לא עובד עדיין סופית ).

3. בצהריים נפגש איגלברגר לא'צ עם הסיעה הרפובליקנית בסנאט והזהירם כי תיקון הלמס יטרפד את יוזמת רוה'מ שמיר, כן חזר על כך שנאלץ לשאת ולתת עם להדוקטו הוייאטנמי בעל הרקורד הידוע.

4. הערב הודיע הסנטור הדמוקרטי קרי ( ממסצ'וסטס ) כי הוא מסיר שושבינותו מהצעת התיקון שכן התיקון יגרום

6406 1188

מסמך וולף חשודת בעיניו על 200000

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לפיצוץ בשורות הסנאט.

5. קהילה יהודית :

בנוסף להודעת ה-A.J. CONGRESS פירסם הבוקר גם ה-  
הודעת UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGRAGATIONS  
המתנגדת לתיקון הארגונים הללו, בנוסף להודעות,  
היו מעורבים במשך היום בלובי פעיל בגנעה כנגד התיקון  
וכן בהפעלת יהודים ברחבי ארה"ב שהתקשרו לסנטורים  
שלהם להביע התנגדותם. אין ספק שמהלך זה הקשה יותר  
ויותר על פעילות איפא"ק. עד כה לא יצא אף ארגון  
יהודי בהודעת תמיכה בתיקון. ידוע לנו שה- ADL עסק  
במשך היום בגיוס תמיכה טלפונית בתיקון.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

17

תפ: שהח, ששהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מונכל, ממנכל, בונצור, מצפא, סייזל, ר/מרכז,  
ממד

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סוג: גלוי		פתוח: 3
תאריך וזמן תעור: 18 ביולי 1989 10:15		אל: מצפייא
כס' פרוק: הפסרד:		דע:
380		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

אחרי

הסנטור גרסלי והדיאלוג עם אשיים

לידיעתכם, רציב מכתב בנדון שהנייל שגר בשבוע שעבר למזכיר המדינה.

י.א.צ.  
למדן.

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תפוצה: 36

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN  
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS  
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO  
DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA  
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT  
HOWELL HEFLIN, ALABAMA  
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DIANA HUFFMAN, STAFF DIRECTOR  
TERRY L. WOOTEN, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL  
R.J. DUKE SHORT, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

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# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275

July 11, 1989

The Honorable James A. Baker, III  
Secretary of State  
2201 C St., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Jim:

While the Senate was in recess over the Fourth of July holiday, I followed with great interest the news reports concerning the elevation of U.S. dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

When the P.L.O dialogue began last December, I understood that low level discussions would occur to see if the P.L.O. could fulfill its commitments enunciated at that time and whether it could play a constructive role in Middle East peace and stability. I was quite dismayed to learn that Ambassador Pelletreau has met with Salah Khalaf, Yasir Arafat's number two within the P.L.O. structure, before any measurable progress has been achieved.

Khalaf, as the admitted founder of the Black September Organization, coordinated the brutal massacre of eleven Israeli athletes (including one American born) during the 1972 Munich Olympics. With Arafat, he was responsible for the murder of U.S. diplomats in the Sudan in 1974. Just last year, Khalaf's wing of the P.L.O. made an attempt on the life of Secretary of State George Shultz. The list of terrorist activities for which Khalaf gets credit takes up a full page and a half in the Terrorist Group Profiles published in November, 1988 by the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism.

For more than 15 years Khalaf has masterminded the murder of innocent civilians. The elevation of the P.L.O. dialogue, however, ignores this plain fact, and it portends a weakened U.S. response to future terrorist operations.

To preserve this P.L.O. dialogue, I fear that our government has already compromised the commitment to hold terrorists accountable for their actions. The dozens of Palestinian "collaborators" killed in Israel's occupied territories by Arafat and Khalaf controlled operatives have gone barely noticed in our pursuit of discussions with P.L.O. leaders.

Moreover, I am not aware of any tangible achievements resulting from our discussions with these professed

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terrorists. Aside from Egypt, not a single Arab country has offered recognition for the state of Israel. Nor has the Palestine National Covenant, with its fundamental commitment to the destruction of Israel, been amended. It seems that we have given a great deal of weight to discussions with the P.L.O. without evidence that P.L.O. involvement will bring stability to the volatile climate in the Middle East.

Until tangible results and demonstrable progress are achieved in discussions with the P.L.O. at lower levels, a dialogue with the P.L.O., at the level of Khalaf and Arafat, actually undermines U.S. strength. Over the last decade, the strategic relationship that has developed between the U.S. and Israel has served as a deterrent to war as well as to Soviet influence and domination in the area. In the context of the P.L.O. dialogue, it appears that the U.S. is equating Israel and the P.L.O., thus driving a wedge between the U.S. and Israel. Not only does this harden Israel's position and lessen the chances of compromise by that vulnerable nation, but it weakens the deterrent to war and it creates an opening to enhanced Soviet influence. At a time when U.S. positions on arms control, freedom and democracy are capturing the attention of the nations of the world (China is the notable exception), it seems inconsistent with our other foreign policy successes to play into the hands of the P.L.O.

Finally, the importance placed by the U.S. on the P.L.O. dialogue fails to advance our overriding objective of getting the parties to negotiate directly with each other. The P.L.O., as the representative of millions of Palestinians outside the occupied territories, has little in common with the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. Those are the people who need to have the chance to determine their own future. The operation run by Arafat and Khalaf should not play the significant role we seem to have given them.

In closing, let me commend you for your strong stand against the P.L.O. when it tried to subvert the World Health Organization. That episode exemplifies the strong position the U.S. occupies. I encourage you to hold the line as Arafat attempts to use other United Nations organizations, as well as the U.N. itself and other international fora, to advance his political objectives. And, I urge you maintain our strength and not concede to a crowd which has proudly taken credit for the destruction of innocent human lives.

Sincerely,

*Chuck*  
Charles E. Grassley  
United States Senator

*P.S. Please give this  
serious consideration!*





404 9/3

Q Sir, may I please ask Mr. Van den Broek and Secretary Baker to respond to this. Minister, The Netherlands is often involved in Middle Eastern affairs in many, many ways and we don't even review them. I'd appreciate your assessment of Israel's current position on the election proposal and specifically to ask your reaction to a speech delivered today by Ariel Sharon in which he calls for the elimination of the leadership of the EPLOF.

MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK: Well, as far as the speech is concerned you are referring to, I'm sorry, I haven't had an opportunity to read that, so that's somewhat difficult to comment.

In general, the Netherlands government, like the 12 of the EEC, want to support a peace process where both the safe and secure existence of Israel, within recognized borders, is guaranteed and by the same token, the legitimate rights which we translate into the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people is being respected.

As far as the latest proposals from Mr. Shamir are concerned, notably where he has proposed elections as such, that was welcomed by the 12. Although, we said, it depends, of course, under what conditions those elections can be held. And we spelled out a number of, let's say, elements which we thought would have to be complied with to make those elections acceptable and also for the Palestinians and to make these elections successful.

As far as the statement of Mr. Shamir is concerned, or rather the Likud Party specifying, more or less, a number of other conditions which could not be met in the case of the elections, quite frankly, we felt they were not exactly helpful. On the other hand, I think we must also recognize that Mr. Shamir until now, and publicly, takes the stand that the government statement on the elections in Israel still stands and that the other thing is a party issue.

Now, don't ask me how this would work out in practice. Our line is a clear one. We feel as the United States does -- we know that -- very much committed to trying to be conducive to further progress in these peace negotiations because the people in the area -- and that goes for the Israelis, but that also goes for the Palestinians -- really by now deserve peace over there.

Q How about the answer from the Secretary. Sir, I addressed my question to both of them.

SEC. BAKER: Let me just -- let me answer it by saying, I think that the Minister gave you an answer with which we would agree with respect to the question of elections. There may be one or two nuances of difference. It would take me a while to go back through exactly what he said and -- but you are very familiar with the position -- view of the United States with respect to the Shamir election proposal. We support it, we have supported it, we are continuing to support it. We were concerned when the Likud Party adopted its four principles that perhaps they were, in a sense devaluing their own initiative. We have since been satisfied that they remain committed to it as a government and we will continue to support it.

And we support it in our discussions with our counterparts. In fact, we have discussed it today, as you could tell from the Minister's answer.

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ישגרירות ישראל ברושינגטון  
טופס מברק

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דחיסות מיידי  
סוג: גלוי

תאריך, זמן: 17.7.89  
מספר המברק:

המשרד:

363

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: לשכת רה"מ

מאת: עתונות

להלן קטעים הנוגעים למז"ת מתוך דברים שאמר מזכיר המדינה,  
ג'יימס ביוקר, בתכנית "השבוע עם דויד בריןקלי", ברדיון  
ל-אבנס ונובאק של רשת C.N.N, פריס, וכן בתדרוך שניתן  
לעוונאים בפריס.

עוננות

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CNN'S EVANS AND NOVAK WITH ROBERT NOVAK AND RALPH BEGLEITER  
 (SUBSTITUTING FOR ROWLAND EVANS)  
 GUEST: SECRETARY OF STATE, JAMES A. BAKER, III, PARIS, FRANCE  
 SATURDAY, JULY 15, 1989

MR. BEGLEITER: Mr. Secretary, changing topics for a moment to the Middle East. Don't you feel a little jerked around by what Israeli Prime Minister Shamir has been doing? First, he comes to the United States and says, "We want to have elections." Then, he goes back to Israel, announces that he's got this list of four or five conditions, he wants to put on them. You come out and say, "We have to send an envoy to figure it out." And then the Israelis come back and say, "Don't worry, everything's okay."

SEC. BAKER: Well, you know, Ralph, we were concerned. We were thinking about sending someone, because we were genuinely concerned that the Israeli government was, to some extent, devaluing its own election proposals,

something that we have worked very hard to implement and we are continuing to work very hard to implement because we believe that it has great promise. In fact, we are working hard to implement it right here at this summit, talking to our summit partners about the importance of pursuing the election proposal, talking to the Egyptians about the importance of pursuing it.

That's the reason we considered sending a representative --

MR. BEGLEITER: But the proposal has been devalued.

SEC. BAKER: -- in the interim -- in the interim -- well, in the interim the government of Israel has made it quite clear that they are totally committed to their elections proposal. They intend to continue to actively and vigorously work it. The national unity government of Israel is sorting out whatever differences they had with respect to it. So we're quite satisfied that they're as committed to that proposal as they have been and we intend to continue to work with them to try and advance it.

MR. BEGLEITER: With all respect, this is you saying the Israeli government's committed to it. The last word we had from the Israeli government is one from Yitzhak Shamir himself, and it's got four conditions attached to it.

SEC. BAKER: No, no, no. The last word we've heard, if I may say so, is from Yitzhak Shamir himself saying that the proposal -- his proposal has not changed one iota and that it is still very, very much the proposal that they intend to push and to advance. We believe that, Ralph. If we didn't believe that we would have to then say, "Well, let's sit down and talk about it," and that was the original reason we were thinking about sending someone.

We're quite satisfied now that they are prepared, ready, willing, and able to continue to push this proposal.

MR. NOVAK: But, Mr. Secretary, in briefing the press in Warsaw on Monday evening, I believe, you said that we would send an emissary. Did the President pull the rug out from under you after pressure was put on him?

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SEC. BAKER: No, Bob, and we still may send an emissary. The question is whether or not an emissary is necessary.

MR. NOVAK: What do you think?

SEC. BAKER: That was a week ago. Since that time, as I've just explained to you, the government of Israel has taken a number of steps, Prime Minister Shamir has spoken out, the national unity government is working together to reaffirm their proposal. Those are all significant steps. We talked to our Israeli allies frequently about many things and I foresee the -- I foresee clearly that we will be talking to them in quite some detail about this election proposal. Whether that's done in the Middle East or whether it's done in Washington, or whether it's done through ambassadors, it will be done.

MR. NOVAK: If you send an emissary, when would it be, sir?

SEC. BAKER: If we send an emissary, it would be when we think it is necessary in order to address this question about whether there's any real doubt about their commitment to their own election proposal. Right now, we're satisfied.

MR. NOVAK: We will return to take a look at whether the French Revolution bicentennial and economic summit really mix very well, after these messages.

(Commercial Break.)

MR. BEGLEITER: Mr. Secretary, is the United States conducting proximity negotiations between the PLO and Israel, essentially negotiating between Israel and the PLO?

SEC. BAKER: No, that's not what we're doing. We do have a dialogue with the PLO as you know, but we're not conducting negotiations between Israel and the PLO.

MR. BEGLEITER: You're not carrying positions --

SEC. BAKER: We don't carry --

MR. BEGLEITER: -- stated by the Israelis and the PLO --

SEC. BAKER: No.

MR. BEGLEITER: -- and vice versa.

SEC. BAKER: No, we don't. We don't carry messages from one to the other. We take positions with both that are consistent with United States policy. In some cases those positions are not agreed to by either, but they represent United States policy. But we're not conducting negotiations by proxy.

MR. BEGLEITER: And another brief follow. You talked with Egyptian Foreign Minister. He often talks with PLO officials. What are you hearing from the PLO about the Likud restrictions and the Israeli position on the election?

SEC. BAKER: Well, we haven't heard anything that's different than what you've read in the press to the effect generally that they --

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MR. BEGLEITER: We watch television.

BEC. BAKER: -- to the effect generally -- (laughs) -- all right let's include television in that -- to the effect generally that they felt that the four conditions that came out of the Likud Party convention in effect made it definitely more difficult to get to closure. Now we haven't heard anything different from that, and that's all that out there --

MR. BEGLEITER: It's not dead in the water?

BEC. BAKER: -- that's all out there in the public press. Not dead in the water. We are taking the position, took the position yesterday with the Egyptians that in our view and based on the developments in Israel over the course of the past week, we think the proposal is very much alive and we intend to continue to work to advance it. I think that the Egyptians will continue to work to advance it.

MR. NOVAK: Just one follow-up on that. Mr. Secretary, there's been a debate between the two members of the coalition in Israel whether in fact there have been de facto negotiations between the PLO and Israel.

BEC. BAKER: That's right.

MR. NOVAK: Have there been in your opinion?

BEC. BAKER: Well, I'm not prepared to answer that because I frankly don't know, and I frankly have no intention of inserting myself into an internal political debate in Israel.

MR. NOVAK: Would it be possible that you have an opinion but you'd rather not express it?

BEC. BAKER: It would be possible that I was telling you the truth when I said I really don't know, number one, and number two, I don't intend to insert myself in a political --

MR. NOVAK: Okay.

BEC. BAKER: -- debate in Israel.

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שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון  
מופס מברק

2/1/89

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תאריך, זמן: 17.7.89  
מספר המברק:

ניח: עתונות

המשרד:

362

להלן קטעים מראיונות היועץ לבטחון לאומי, ברנט סקורופט,  
ל-C.N.N ולמכתב "FACE THE NATION" של ה-C.B.S.

שגרירות  
2/1/89

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including the number 362 and various illegible scribbles.

CNN NEWSMAKER SATURDAY, WITH HOSTS: CHARLES BIERBAUER AND FRANK BESHO  
INTERVIEW WITH: BRENT SCOWCROFT, US NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER  
SATURDAY, JULY 15, 1989

21

MR. BIERBAUER: Let us touch a couple of other bases here. The Middle East. There seems to be confusion. Some say there always is. But, in the course of the past few days, we've heard first that there's a high level American delegation going to find out what's going on with the election plan and the Elseraif coalition. Then it became a low level. Then it became no level. Just what do you want to do vis-a-vis the Israelis to find out what's going on there?

BEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, there've been a lot of rumors floating around, and they all started, of course, with the Likud party conference which came out with some pretty specific and narrowly delimiting policy statements on the issue of elections. And it was a lot of confusion as to how the Likud, which is a purely internal party declaration, what impact that has on the government, which is a coalition government between Likud and Labor, and what that means for the peace process and the elections proposals which the Shamir coalition government has set forth. And so that's why, as that has moved over the last week, we have sought to get some indication as to what's happening, and I think Shamir's statements now that things have not changed fundamentally, and we're assuming that whatever Likud did, that the coalitions policies remain on track.

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CBS "FACE THE NATION" WITH HOST, LESLEY STAHL/INTERVIEW WITH  
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT/NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR  
SUNDAY, JULY 16, 1989

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MS. STAHL: Well, that's -- oh, okay. I have to switch quickly because we're running out of time. Israel. An aide to Shimon Peres of the Labor Party says that in reality, the United States is acting as an intermediary in negotiations between Israel and the PLO, that we are bringing messages back and forth, and anybody who denies it has their head in the sand. What's your reaction? What's your comment?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: We're not an intermediary conveying messages. No, not at all. What we are trying to do is to facilitate an elections process. Now, that requires movement on the part of the Israelis, movement on the part of the Palestinians, and the Arab support for them. And so naturally we are talking with the Israelis, we are talking with the Palestinians, and we're trying to advance this process. That is different from being an intermediary carrying messages.

MS. STAHL: Very quickly. Do you think the election process is still on track? Have the Israelis now satisfied you that that is still their policy?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes, we are accepting the Prime Minister's word as the fact. We'll have to see. It's -- you know, the Likud, the Likud declaration certainly didn't help the process. But the Prime Minister says they will not affect government policy, and we are taking him at his word.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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מצפא

דיאלוג עם אשף - תיקון הלמס.

שלכם 618.

בשום שלב לא דיווחנו, וגם לא השתמע ממברקנו שבדעת איפ'ק להתנגד לחקיקה או שהוא מתנגד בפועל. נהפוך הוא. איפ'ק ניהל את המאבק ביום ה' ושישי בצורה אינטנסיבית במיוחד להעברת תיקון הלמס תוך שימוש בין השאר בטיעון של פגיעה באזרחים ודיפלומטים אמריקניים.

יתירה מזאת, ציינו במברקנו מ-14/7-329 שהמצב המסתמן מבחינת איפ'ק לאור מאבקו להשגת התיקון:

א, התייצבות איפ'ק - נגד הממשל.

ב. התייצבות חלק מהארגונים היהודים - נגד איפ'ק ונגד התיקון (בראשן ה-A.J. CONGRESS).

היום, התקשר דניס רוס עם טום דיין, וכמו איגלברגר בשבוע שעבר טען נגד התיקון. לאחר מכן, דיין (יחד עם סטיב רוזן והוארד קור) אכלו צהריים עם דיק האס וסגנו וולץ מה-NSC. האלה מתאפיינים בחוסר בטחון, כאילו משלימים עם העובדה שהתיקון יתקבל מחר במליאת הסנט ולכן מקווים שלא יתפרש בצורה שיפגע בדיאלוג

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# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בין הממשל ואשף.

לעומת זאת, הלוביסטים באיפק מעריכים שסיכויי התיקון הם 50:50 בלבד. בקרב הסנטורים הם נתקלים 'בתמיכה פושרת' לכל היותר, ופעילות הנל של הארגונים היהודיים מקשה עליהם.

קונגרס

לב

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנוצור, מצפא, סייבל, ר/מרכז,  
ממד, משפט

6406 17/88

מכירת ניירות בע"מ 330007

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

COUNTY OF DALLAS, TEXAS, ss. I, the undersigned, Clerk of the County, do hereby certify that the within and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original as the same appears in the records of the County of Dallas, Texas.

WITNESSED my hand and the seal of the County at Dallas, Texas, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_.

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פאת: _____	ק. ק. לקונגרס	קמחון 199 209

ארה"ק

קונגרס: SDI

משרדו של הסנטור וילסון לומר:

1. בעת ה- **MARK-UP** של לס אספין לפני כשבועיים, הודיע הקונגרסמן צ'רלי בנט (דמוקרט מפלורידה) שבמהלך הדינון בחוק כספי הפנטגון (הרשאות) שיתקיים במליאת בית הנבחרים בקרוב, בכוננתו להציע תיקון המיועד לקצץ את התקציב לתכנית **SDI** בבליון דולר. לידיעתכם, הממשל ביקש סכום של 4.08 בליון דולר לצורך תכנית זו והוועדה לשירותים המזויינים כבר הקטינה סכום זה ל-3.8 בליון. מעריכים שבנט יצליח להעביר את תיקונו במליאה ולכן הסכום יצומצם ל-2.8 בליון - פירוש הדבר פגיעה חמורה בתכנית ה- **SDI**.

2. לאור הנ"ל, בדעת הסנטור ווילסון לפעול להגנת תקציב ה- **SDI** בסנט. תקונתו היא שבסנט יגמרו על סכום שיעמוד בסביבת ה-4 בליון או יותר, כך שבקונפרנט יוכלו להתפשר בסביבת ה-3.5 בליון.

3. כחלק ממסע להכשרת הקרקע, הסנטור עומד להשמיע דברים במליאת הסנט מחר (12.7) וחלק מכובד שלהם יוקדש לפגיעה האפשרית לתכנית החץ, אם אכן יוחלט לקצץ את בקי הממשל עד כדי חצי.

4. לאחר חיבור מברק זה, התקשר ווילסון עם השגריר ודיבר עמו ברוח הנאמר בסעיף 3 דלעיל.

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MS

Remarks on US-Soviet Middle East Experts talks in Washington

- 1) Israel appreciates U.S. stand in support of its peace initiative.
- 2) U.S. side in the talks did not mention the other three points in the Israel initiative: Camp David, refugee resettlement and ending Arab belligerency.
- 3) Israel emphasizes again that progress toward a settlement can be achieved only by simultaneous action on all four points in its initiative. On this score, it would be helpful if the Soviets would be required to exercise their influence on Arab governments so as to have them cease their belligerent activities against Israel, (such as moves to expel Israel from international organizations, support and finance terrorist activities against Israel, and the economic boycott against Israel) and encourage Palestinians to cooperate with Israel Government toward implementing its peace initiative.
- 4) It should also be emphasized that final status issues will not be addressed at this stage by Israel, beyond a clear undertaking to conduct such negotiations, without preconditions, at the second stage. Treating final status issues now would undermine chances of agreement and progress on the entire initiative.
- 5) There is an overwhelming consensus in Government of Israel and in Knesset against talks with PLO.

Any strengthening of the PLO stature, or granting it a role in a political process would undermine the chances of accomodation and meaningful dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs who live in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

## TALKING POINTS ON U.S.-SOVIET MIDDLE EAST EXPERTS TALKS

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COMMENCE TALKING POINTS:  
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-- SOVIET AND U.S. DELEGATIONS MET IN WASHINGTON JUNE 15-16 FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. U.S. SIDE WAS CO-CHAIRED BY NEA A/S KELLY AND S/P DIRECTOR ROSS. SOVIET SIDE WAS CHAIRED BY AMB. POLYAKOV, AND INCLUDED MIDDLE EAST ENVOY TARASOV.

-- THESE CONSULTATIONS WERE PART OF A REGULAR, ONGOING SERIES OF EXPERT EXCHANGES BEGUN IN 1985 TO PROMOTE COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS ON KEY REGIONAL ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ELSEWHERE. DURING THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN MAY IN MOSCOW, SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ASKED THEIR SENIOR ADVISERS TO MEET SOON TO DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS, LEBANON, REGIONAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST ISSUES.

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PEACE PROCESS  
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-- THE ENTIRE FIRST DAY, AND HALF OF THE SECOND DAY WERE TAKEN UP IN DISCUSSION OF THE PEACE PROCESS, IN PARTICULAR THE IDEA OF USING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE AND ELECTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO LAUNCH A TWO-STAGE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

-- ROSS BRIEFED THE SOVIETS ON THE RECENT VISIT TO THE REGION OF A SENIOR U.S. DELEGATION. ROSS SAID THE DELEGATION HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH ISRAELIS AND ARABS WANTED TO MOVE FORWARD. HE SAID THE CHALLENGE FOR THE U.S. AND SOVIETS WAS TO FIND A WAY TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT THIS TENDENCY.

-- ROSS STRESSED THE ADVANTAGES AND INHERENT POSSIBILITIES OF AN ELECTIONS PROCESS IN TERMS OF PERMITTING PALESTINIANS TO ORGANIZE, CAMPAIGN AND SPEAK ABOUT POLITICAL RIGHTS AND THE CRUCIAL POLITICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS. ELECTIONS WOULD LAUNCH A POLITICAL PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD PRODUCE, IN THE FIRST STAGE, TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND IN THE SECOND STAGE, A FINAL STATUS AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SIDES.

-- THE MOST IMPORTANT THING NOW IS TO BRING ABOUT AN AUTHORITATIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. SUCH A DIALOGUE WOULD PERMIT THE PARTIES TO DEAL WITH AND RESOLVE SOME KEY ISSUES: E.G. THE MODALITIES AND PROCEDURES THAT WOULD GOVERN THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD AND THE ELECTIONS; THE STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN TO DEFUSE TENSION AND VIOLENCE IN ADVANCE OF ELECTIONS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTIONS AND THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD FOLLOW. THE PARTNERS ALSO AT SOME POINT WOULD TALK ABOUT THEIR VISIONS OF THE STRUCTURE OF PEACE.

-- ROSS SAID THAT, IN HIS CONTEXT, THE U.S. VIEWED THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL AS A POSITIVE, POTENTIALLY VALUABLE PATHWAY TO LAUNCH THE PROCESS. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE PALESTINIANS AND ARAB STATES WOULD RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY, AND HOPED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD LEND ITS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THIS PROCESS.

-- ROSS ALSO NOTED THAT THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT HELD BOTH OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS; EITHER THE PARTIES WOULD SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES AND TRANSLATE THEM INTO A WORKABLE PROCESS LEADING TO NEGOTIATIONS, OR THEY FACED FURTHER DETERIORATION. TIME WAS NOT AN ALLY OF THIS PROCESS. THE VIOLENCE WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY ON ALL SIDES. IT IS NECESSARY TO TRANSLATE THE DIALOGUE OF VIOLENCE INTO THE DIALOGUE OF A VIABLE POLITICAL PROCESS.

-- THIS IS WHY WE SUPPORT THE INITIATION OF A DIALOGUE ON THE GROUND. AND WHY WE SUPPORT THE PROCESS OF ELECTIONS TO LAUNCH TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS.

-- IN RESPONSE TO ROSS' PRESENTATION, POLYAKOV NOTED THERE WERE MANY COMMON ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET AND U.S. APPROACHES TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE SAID ELECTIONS CAN BE AN ELEMENT IN A FRAMEWORK OF THE PEACE PROCESS, PROVIDED THERE WAS GREATER CLARITY ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHAT OUTCOMES COULD BE EXPECTED, AND WHAT THE PARAMETERS WERE FOR REACHING A SETTLEMENT.

-- POLYAKOV SAID THAT PALESTINIANS HAD TOLD HIM THE ELECTIONS CONCEPT DOESN'T DEFINE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS, ENSURE SELF-DETERMINATION, OR DEFINE A ROLE FOR THE PLO IN REPRESENTING PALESTINIANS. HE SAID THE PLO'S GREAT CONCERN WAS THAT IT WOULD BE A BIG LOSER IF IT AUTHORIZED ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE IN THE TERRITORIES.

-- THE SOVIETS SAID THE PLO WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL AND WONDERED WHY ISRAEL WAS NOT READY TO RECIPROCATE.

-- THE SOVIETS ALSO PROPOSED BACKSTOPPING THE ELECTIONS PROCESS BY HOLDING CONSULTATIONS IN N.Y. AMONG THE FIVE UNSC PERMREPS. THIS WOULD GIVE PALESTINIANS GREATER CONFIDENCE IN THE PROCESS AND WOULD INDICATE THAT ELECTIONS WERE PART OF A PROCESS LEADING TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

-- IN THE EXTENDED DISCUSSION THAT ENSUED, THE U.S. SIDE SOUGHT SOVIET VIEWS ON ELECTIONS, SAYING THAT THE U.S. HAD ALREADY MADE PUBLIC IN SECRETARY BAKER'S AIPAC SPEECH OUR OWN VIEWS ON THIS PROCESS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, OFFERED NO INSIGHTS INTO THEIR OWN THINKING ON THE SUBJECT.

-- THE U.S. ALSO ASKED THE SOVIETS HOW PERMREP CONSULTATIONS WOULD SUPPORT ELECTIONS; U.S. HAD CONCERNS THAT A SECOND TRACK IN NEW YORK WOULD REPLACE ELECTIONS. AND COULD DIVERT THE ATTENTION OF THE PARTIES FROM KEY DISCUSSIONS THAT NEEDED TO BE TAKEN. THE U.S. SAID SUCH CONSULTATIONS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AT SOME POINT IF IT WERE TRULY SUPPORTIVE OF THE ELECTIONS CONCEPT, BUT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOW TO GET A DIALOGUE ON THE CONCEPT OF ELECTIONS OFF THE GROUND. THE PRIMARY FOCUS HAD TO BE ON THE GROUND AMONG THE PARTIES. (akz 2/17/77 22-3)

-- THE SOVIETS REPLIED THAT PERMREP CONSULTATIONS WOULD NOT DIVERT ATTENTION OF THE PARTIES FROM ELECTIONS, AND WOULD NOT GET SIDETRACKED INTO SUCH ISSUES AS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THEY SAID THAT A REASONABLE VIEW OF THE "BALANCE OF INTERESTS" BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE REGIONS INDICATES THAT A SECOND TRACK OF CONSULTATIONS ~~WOULD~~ WITH HELP DEFEND AND PROTECT PALESTINIAN INTERESTS.

-- ~~THEM~~ <sup>THE US</sup> RESPONDED THAT A SECOND TRACK COULD BE MISINTERPRETED BY THE PARTIES. ISRAELIS WOULD SEE IT AS A BACK DOOR TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE; PALESTINIANS MIGHT USE IT AS AN EXCUSE TO AVOID MAKING DECISIONS.

-- THE U.S. ALSO ASKED THE SOVIETS TO CONSIDER AND DEAL WITH SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES, SUCH AS HOW BOTH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS COULD BE ASSURED THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED IN AN ELECTIONS PROCESS, WHAT STEPS THEY COULD TAKE TO GET A DIALOGUE LAUNCHED, WHAT KEY ELECTIONS MODALITIES ISSUES NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED, AND HOW THE ELECTIONS PROCESS COULD BE RELATED TO THE BROADER PROCESS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOLLOW.

-- THE SOVIETS INDICATED THEY WOULD STUDY THE U.S. QUESTIONS, BUT WERE NOT READY NOW TO PROVIDE A RESPONSE. THEY SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE SUCH RESPONSES. BECAUSE ELECTIONS WERE NOT THEIR IDEA; IT WAS PRIMARILY A CONCERN OF THE PARTIES IN THE REGION; THEY HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED; ISRAEL HAD NOT PROVIDED A DETAILED FORMULATION OF THE GOI PLAN; AND BECAUSE THERE WAS NO BROAD FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH TO PLACE THIS IDEA.

-- THE SOVIETS ASKED THAT THE U.S. CONSIDER THEIR PROPOSAL FOR UNSC PERMREP CONSULTATIONS, CONTENDING THAT THIS WOULD SUPPORT THE ELECTIONS CONCEPT. THEY ALSO ARGUED FOR THE INITIATION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO, SAYING THE PLO WAS READY TO ENGAGE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. AND THEY PROPOSED THAT THE U.S. AND SOVIETS CONSIDER A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE PEACE PROCESS, IN TIME FOR MINISTERS TO CONSIDER IN SEPTEMBER WHEN THEY NEXT MEET.

-- THE U.S. SIDE SAID IT WOULD STUDY SOVIET IDEAS, BUT THAT OUR ASSESSMENT WOULD BE INFLUENCED ~~BY THE DEGREE TO~~ BY THE DEGREE WHICH THE SOVIETS PROVIDED RESPONSES TO OUR QUESTIONS ON

THE ELECTIONS CONCEPT. THE U.S. ARGUED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO START THE PROCESS IN A PRACTICAL WAY; THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL TO DEAL WITH THE PLO AND THE SUGGESTION THEREFORE TO LAUNCH A DIRECT ISRAEL-PLO DIALOGUE WAS A NON-STARTER. TO MOVE THE PROCESS AND GET SOMETHING GOING IT WAS NECESSARY NOW TO LAUNCH A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. REGARDING THE ISSUE OF A JOINT STATEMENT, THE U.S. SIDE ARGUED THAT WE NEITHER HAD ENOUGH OF A COMMON BASIS BETWEEN US NOR WERE WE FAR ENOUGH ADVANCED IN THE PROCESS TO CONSIDER WHETHER SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD PROMOTE PROGRESS TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS.

-- THE U.S. ASSESSMENT IS THAT THIS SESSION WITH THE SOVIETS WAS PRACTICAL AND FOCUSED, CONCENTRATING ON THE CONCEPT OF ELECTIONS TO LAUNCH NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT STUDIED THE CONCEPT IN DETAIL BUT REITERATED WHAT THEY HAD TOLD SECRETARY BAKER IN MOSCOW, NAMELY THAT THE CONCEPT WAS WORTHY OF STUDY AND CONSIDERATION. WE HAD HOPED THEY WOULD BRING MORE CONSIDERED REACTIONS TO THE ELECTIONS PROPOSAL TO THIS ROUND OF TALKS.

-- ALTERNATIVE SOVIET IDEAS -- WHICH THEY DESCRIBED AS COMPLEMENTARY RATHER THAN DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE OR SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ELECTIONS CONCEPT -- WERE CLEARLY IN A FORMATIVE STAGE, WITHOUT MUCH DETAIL OR SPECIFICITY. THEIR DISCUSSION OF A SECOND TRACK AT LEAST IMPLIED A WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE ELECTIONS APPROACH.

-- THE NEXT STEP IN THE U.S. - SOVIET DIALOGUE WILL BE FOR THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS POSED BY THE U.S. REGARDING THE ELECTIONS PROCESS. IN THE MEANTIME, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO BUILD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT SO THAT THE KEY PARTIES, ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS, CAN LAUNCH A DIALOGUE TO FLESH OUT THE PROPOSAL AND GET THE PROCESS LAUNCHED.

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LEBANON  
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-- BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE US-USSR JOINT STATEMENT AT THE MAY MOSCOW MINISTERIAL WAS A USEFUL EFFORT WHICH SIGNALLED WILLINGNESS TO WORK TOGETHER ON LEBANON.

-- THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE EFFORTS ON LEBANON TAKEN BY THE ARAB SUMMIT AT CASABLANCA NOTING THE RESOLUTIONS WERE BALANCED AND THAT FORMATION OF AN ARAB LEAGUE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE WAS ENCOURAGING.

-- U.S. EXPRESSED AGREEMENT THAT TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE WAS AN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT, BUT NOTED THAT THE CASABLANCA RESOLUTIONS ON LEBANON WERE NOT BALANCED. SUMMIT STATEMENT'S REFERENCE TO ISRAELI PRESENCE IMPLIED THAT ISRAEL IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONTINUED FIGHTING IN BEIRUT. THIS IS NOT THE CASE.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT CURRENT FOCUS ON ARAB LEAGUE EFFORT WAS ENCOURAGING AND THAT THIS REGIONAL EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY LEBANESE THEMSELVES WAS HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

-- BOTH U.S. AND SOVIETS AGREED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ARAB LEAGUE EFFORTS, TO URGE RESTRAINT ON ALL SIDES AND TO SUPPORT A PROCESS WHICH AIMS AT CREATING A DURABLE CEASE-FIRE AND FORGING A BASIS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

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IRAN/IRAQ  
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-- THOUGH THE SOVIETS DECLINED TO DISCUSS IN ANY DETAIL THEIR THOUGHTS ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN IRAN FOLLOWING KHOMEINI'S DEATH, THEY DID STATE THEIR OPINION THAT THE SITUATION ALONG THE IRAN-IRAQ FRONT WOULD REMAIN QUIET.

-- WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMS SALES TO TEHRAN, WE TOLD THE SOVIETS IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALL PARTIES EXERCISE PRUDENCE IN DEALING WITH IRAN IN THE CURRENT SITUATION.

-- THE SOVIETS INDICATED REPORTS OF PENDING SOVIET ARMS SALES TO IRAN HAD NO BASIS IN REALITY.

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REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES  
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-- THE SIDES HAD AN EXTENDED EXCHANGE ON THE REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION, AGREEING THAT THE PROBLEM OF ARMS PROLIFERATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND MISSILE AREAS, WAS A GROWING CONCERN CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL STABILITY.

-- THE U.S. SUGGESTED WE BOTH FOCUS ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND EXPLORE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY AREA AS A MEANS OF ASSISTING POLITICAL PROCESSES AT WORK IN THE REGION.

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AGREED PRESS BRIEFINGPOINTS  
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3. AT THE END OF THE SESSION, BOTH SIDES AGREED TO DRAW IN PARALLEL ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS  
~~THIS~~ IN BRIEFING JOURNALISTS ON THIS ROUND OF TALKS:

--AS PART OF A BROAD EFFORT TO WORK TOGETHER IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS, BOTH SIDES WISH TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY THEIR EXCHANGE ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. WE AGREED TO MAINTAIN REGULAR CONTACT AND ATTEMPT TO MEET MORE FREQUENTLY IN THE FUTURE.

SECRET

-- THIS ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES, WITH EMPHASIS ON FINDING A PATHWAY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS. WE EXPLORED IN DEPTH THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE REGION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR PUSHING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, FOCUSING IN PARTICULAR ON THE PROPOSAL FOR ELECTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES AND HOW THIS MIGHT BE SUPPORTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

-- ALTHOUGH OUR POSITIONS CONVERGE ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, WE HAVE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES ON OTHERS. WE AGREED TO STUDY EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS AND PROPOSALS, AND DISCUSS THEM MORE INTENSIVELY IN AN EFFORT TO NARROW THESE DIFFERENCES.

SECRET

BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

WHAT DOES "BEYOND CONTAINMENT" MEAN?

-- OUR POLICY OF SEEKING TO MOVE BEYOND CONTAINMENT IS A POSITIVE REACTION TO REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION AND TO SIGNS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR BY MOSCOW.

-- KEY ELEMENTS OF OUR POLICY ARE AS FOLLOWS: RECOGNITION THAT CONTAINMENT HAS WORKED AND THAT CHANGE IS COMING TO THE SOVIET UNION; A VISION OF A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW THAT SUPPORTS LASTING RATHER THAN CYCLICAL COOPERATION; A CLEAR-EYED UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP MUST BE BUILT STEP-BY-STEP AND FROM A POSITION OF WESTERN STRENGTH.

-- WE WANT TO INTEGRATE THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, AND HOPE THE U.S.S.R. WILL USE ITS POWER AND POTENTIAL TO SOLVE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS INSTEAD OF TO EXPLOIT THEM.

-- BEYOND CONTAINMENT INCLUDES THE GOAL OF OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE, WORKING FOR A EUROPE THAT IS WHOLE AND FREE AND UNITED AS PART OF A GLOBAL COMMONWEALTH OF FREE NATIONS.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, ALL NATIONS TODAY -- TRADITIONAL ALLIES, FRIENDS AND ADVERSARIES ALIKE -- FACE COMMON THREATS FROM VOLATILE REGIONAL CONFLICTS, THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION.

-- MOVING "BEYOND CONTAINMENT" THUS IMPLIES NOT JUST A CHANGE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION BUT AN EXPLICIT RECOGNITION THAT NEW COOPERATIVE POLICIES WILL BE REQUIRED TO COUNTER THE GROWING PROBLEMS THAT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY CENTRAL FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS.

HOW DOES THIS POLICY DIFFER FROM OTHER U.S. POLICIES? HASN'T THE UNITED STATES ALWAYS WANTED TO MOVE BEYOND CONTAINMENT?

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-- THE MOST IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE IS THAT WE LIVE IN A TIME OF HISTORIC CHANGE.

-- THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS ADMITTED THAT IT MUST END THE SOVIET UNION'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL ISOLATION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.

-- THERE HAVE BEEN TWO GRAND STRATEGIES IN OUR POSTWAR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION: CONTAINMENT AND DETENTE.

-- CONTAINMENT FOCUSED ON HOLDING THE MILITARY AND IDEOLOGICAL THREAT OF SOVIET COMMUNISM IN CHECK LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT THE WORLD'S LONGSTANDING AND NEW DEMOCRACIES TO BE REBUILT AFTER A DESTRUCTIVE WORLD WAR, AND UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF EVOLVED INTERNALLY.

-- DETENTE ASSUMED THAT THIS EVOLUTION WOULD CONTINUE INTO THE DISTANT FUTURE AND THAT, UNTIL THAT TIME, THERE WOULD BE PERPETUAL COMPETITION BETWEEN TWO COMPETING WORLD SYSTEMS.

-- DETENTE SOUGHT TO MANAGE EAST-WEST COMPETITION. IT WAS IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED THAT LITTLE COULD BE DONE FOR THE TIME BEING ABOUT THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT.

-- IN ANALYZING WHY COOPERATION DID NOT ENDURE IN THE YEARS OF DETENTE, A CENTRAL OBSTACLE WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF ITS MILITARY FORCES, IN ITS ALLIANCE AND CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS, OR IN ITS DOMESTIC POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS.

-- REVERSALS OF BEHAVIOR BACK TO PATTERNS OF CONFRONTATION AND HOSTILITY WERE RELATIVELY EASY.

-- THIS TIME WE NEED TO BUILD THE NEW RELATIONSHIP ON A FIRM FOUNDATION.

-- THIS IS NOT A UTOPIAN VISION. UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY WE STILL WOULD HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH MOSCOW, BUT THE PRAGMATIC NATURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE SUCH THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE COMMITTED TO SOLVING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, NOT CREATING THEM.

WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES ASKING MOSCOW TO DO?

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-- WE SHOULD START BY DISCUSSING THE SPIRIT OF THE "CONDITIONS" THAT THE PRESIDENT SET OUT IN THE TEXAS A AND M SPEECH. THEY ARE NOT "TESTS" THAT A SCHOOL TEACHER USES TO GRADE A STUDENT.

-- RATHER, THESE CONDITIONS ARE THE FOUNDATION ON WHICH THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONSHIP TO US AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM WOULD REST.

-- WE DO NOT EXPECT THE CONDITIONS TO BE MET TOMORROW; NOR DO WE NEED TO WAIT UNTIL THEY ARE MET TO BEGIN PROGRESS TOWARD THAT NEW RELATIONSHIP. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT HAVE TO BECOME A WESTERN DEMOCRACY FOR US TO BUILD THIS NEW RELATIONSHIP.

-- BUT WE NEED TO SEE THE PROCESS OF REFORM CONTINUE INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION AND SEE A TRACK RECORD OF SOVIET

INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

-- THE CONDITIONS ARE:

1. IN THE MILITARY ARENA, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO BE WILLING TO REDUCE THEIR MILITARY FORCES AND MAKE THEM LESS THREATENING TO THE WEST AND OTHER STATES. SOVIET MILITARY POWER IS FAR IN EXCESS OF THAT NEEDED TO DEFEND THE SOVIET UNION. THAT IS WHY WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS BY THE WARSAW PACT.

2. THE SOVIETS MUST RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF EAST EUROPEANS TO PURSUE THEIR OWN PATHS TO FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

3. THE SOVIET UNION HAS TO BEHAVE AS A RESPONSIBLE FORCE FOR GLOBAL STABILITY, NOT AS AN OUSIDER TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. FOR INSTANCE, THE NEW RELATIONSHIP IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS WOULD REQUIRE MOSCOW TO CONCENTRATE ON CONTRIBUTING TO THE SOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND TO INSIST THAT ITS

FRIENDS DO THE SAME. THE SOVIETS CONTINUALLY HAVE CHOSEN FRIENDS THAT WERE EXPLICITLY ANTI-WESTERN AND HAVE ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES WITH FORCES FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY (EXAMPLES -- LIBYA, VIETNAM, NICARAGUA). THIS IS WHY WE CONSIDER A CUT-OFF OF ARMS TO COUNTRIES LIKE NICARAGUA AND PRESSURE ON THE SANDINISTAS TO RESPECT ESQUIPULAS SO IMPORTANT.

4. RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS. GREATER OPENNESS AND A MORE MARKET-ORIENTED DOMESTIC ECONOMY ARE ALSO CRITICAL TO OUR CALCULATIONS OF THE KIND OF PARTNER MOSCOW CAN BE.

#### ----- HOW WILL ECONOMIC RELATIONS DEVELOP? -----

-- THE SOVIETS NEED TO CREATE DOMESTIC CONDITIONS THAT WILL ATTRACT PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND COMMERCE.

-- WE ALREADY SUPPORT THE EXPANSION OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL, NON-STRATEGIC TRADE ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS.

-- OVER TIME, AS WE BUILD A MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP, WE WOULD EXPECT ECONOMIC RELATIONS TO DEVELOP FURTHER.

-- WE WILL PROTECT OUR SECURITY BY STRICT ADHERENCE TO COCOM RESTRICTIONS.

-- IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO TALK ABOUT SOVIET MEMBERSHIP IN THE GATT, THE IMF OR THE WORLD BANK. SOVIET INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ECONOMIC PRACTICES STILL ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH MEMBERSHIP IN THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

-- THE ONLY WAY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO ENTER THE MAINSTREAM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LIFE IS TO ADOPT POLICIES WHICH ALLOW MARKET FORCES TO OPERATE IN ALL AREAS OF ITS ECONOMY AS WELL AS IN ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD.

#### ----- WHY IS THE UNITED STATES CAUTIOUS? -----

-- A NEW RELATIONSHIP TAKES TIME TO BUILD AND HAS TO BE EARNED, NOT DECLARED, BY MOSCOW OR BY ANYONE ELSE.

-- SOVIET COOPERATION WITH THE WEST HAS BEEN CYCLICAL. THE SOVIETS COOPERATED WHEN IT SERVED THEM WELL ONLY TO TURN BACK, WHEN THEY WERE STRONGER, TO A POLICY BASED ON CONFRONTATION.

-- THIS IS A PERIOD OF GLOBAL TRANSITION.

-- WE NEED TO REMAIN STRONG, AND PRESERVE A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE, INCLUDING IN EUROPE, TO DEFEND OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES, AND TO SERVE AS A HEDGE AGAINST THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THIS PERIOD.

-- OUR STRENGTH ALSO WILL IMPRESS UPON SOVIET LEADERS THE FUTILITY OF TURNING BACK TO THEIR FORMER, MILITARISTIC COURSE.

WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES WILLING TO DO?  
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-- WE HAVE SAID THAT MOSCOW WILL FIND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS A WILLING PARTNER, AND WE MEAN THAT.

-- THIS NEW RELATIONSHIP MUST BE BUILT ON WESTERN VALUES OF OPENNESS AND RESPECT FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS. MUCH OF THE WORK HAS TO BE DONE BY MOSCOW.

-- IT MUST INCLUDE RECOGNITION OF NATO, THE EC AND OTHER EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AS PART OF A BROADER TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY.

-- THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS BEGINNING TO ESPOUSE THESE VALUES BECAUSE IT CAN SEE BOTH THE BENEFITS WE HAVE ENJOYED AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN PROGRESS ONLY THROUGH BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE.

-- BUT WE ARE WILLING TO DO OUR PART.

-- SOME PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED IN TOUGH NEGOTIATIONS -- FOR INSTANCE, IN ARMS CONTROL.

-- CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET ACTIONS WILL BE MATCHED, STEP-BY-STEP, WITH APPROPRIATE ACTIONS OF OUR OWN.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER CONCLUDING THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAD MOVED SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD THE WEST'S CONCEPT AND FRAMEWORK

IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE), THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED WITH A COMPREHENSIVE, FAR-REACHING CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO BRING THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS TO A SPEEDY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. IF ACCEPTED, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WOULD TRANSFORM THE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL MAP OF EUROPE.

-- WE ALSO CAN MAKE PROGRESS BY LIFTING U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHEN THE SOVIETS MEET CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

-- JACKSON-VANIK CAN BE WAIVED WHEN EMIGRATION LAWS IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE CODIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED FAITHFULLY.

-- WE ARE LIFTING THE "NO EXCEPTIONS POLICY" THAT WAS A SANCTION FOR THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

-- SOMETIMES PROGRESS CAN BE MADE BY INITIATIVES THAT CHALLENGE MOSCOW TO COOPERATE AND TO SHOW THAT WE HAVE THE SAME VISION OF THE RELATIONSHIP WE WANT TO BUILD.

-- THUS, "OPEN SKIES" IS INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO OPENNESS. THE SOVIETS ALSO SHOULD AGREE TO PUBLISH FULL AND ACCURATE MILITARY BUDGET DATA ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

CONCLUSION

-- OUR POLICY OF SEEKING TO MOVE BEYOND CONTAINMENT IS PART OF OUR BROADER DETERMINATION TO HELP SHAPE THE DRAMATIC CHANGES THAT ARE TRANSFORMING EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- WE HAVE WELCOMED A STRONGER AND MORE UNITED EUROPE, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS GOOD FOR AMERICA, AND HAVE CALLED FOR CLOSER COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON GLOBAL ISSUES.

-- WE HAVE PUT FORWARD CONCRETE INITIATIVES FOR ENCOURAGING PEACEFUL REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AND FOR HELPING END THE ARTIFICIAL DIVISION OF EUROPE.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS SPEECH IN MAINZ, WEST GERMANY, ON MAY 31, THE COLD WAR BEGAN WITH THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND IT MUST END WITH A RECONCILIATION BASED ON SHARED VALUES WHERE EAST JOINS WEST IN A COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS.

END TALKING POINTS.



Q But, Mr. Secretary, there are things we could do that would not hurt the Chinese people or be, as sanctions usually are, futile, particularly with a commodity like grain. That is, we could say we're re-examining and, in conjunction with the British re-examining, our policies about the fundamental relationships between our country, their country and Taiwan and Hong Kong. Have you given any thought to that?

SECRETARY BAKER: You know, what the United States has done here, George, is really lead the way. The President was the first to take action against China in connection with what's happened. He's the one who set the standard of ceasing military exchanges. He's the one that called for postponement of World Bank loans. He's the first leader who basically said, I think, that we're going to cut off high level political exchanges. All of these other six Western industrial democracies here at this summit are following that lead. They all believe this is the proper course. They also don't think that we ought to isolate China, that it would not be in the best interests of the West. All seven of these countries feel this way. We think the response is appropriate.

Q Mr. Secretary, you and the President have been to two Iron Curtain countries, which are now emerging to some degree into some level of freedom -- Poland and Hungary. Now, an interesting development: Lech Walesa said the other day to some visiting Americans that he's very happy about what has happened, of course, but he, as a leader of a labor union, needs for his people -- needs employers, and they don't have any. They haven't had any in 40-odd years. The government has been the only employer. It is a difficulty for the emerging Central European countries, and I wondered if you have any thoughts on this -- how to deal with it?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, that's one of the proposals that the President made during the course of his trip to Poland, was to set up a \$100 million fund to assist in the creation of private sector entities and operations in Poland, an enterprise foundation, if you will. And he's quite right; they do need employers. It's one of the problems that has faced all of these centrally-planned statist economies of the East. It's their view, it's been their view for a long time that governments solve all problems. Governments don't solve economic problems. Many times governments contribute to economic problems. They now realize this. They want to move to free market economies and they want our help in getting there.

Q Mr. Secretary, I want to move you to the Middle East and the increasingly contentious relationship between Israel and the United States. This morning the Director General of the Prime Minister's office said the following: "We are reaching a moment of truth, because there has to be a decision by the parties concerned, primarily by the United States, whether to continue the dialogue with the PLO or proceed with moving the Israeli initiative to fruition. The two are mutually exclusive." Do you think the two are mutually exclusive?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, I don't think the two are mutually exclusive. The policy of the United States is that the two are not mutually exclusive. We are working very hard, and have been for quite some time -- ever since the Shamir election proposal was first advanced -- to implement that proposal. And we're working with European governments and we're working with Arab governments and we're working with the Israeli government. And so we were concerned last week when it appeared to us that perhaps they were in the process somehow of devaluing their own initiative by putting certain conditions on there that were very, very difficult conditions and that were the kinds of issues that needed to be addressed at the very end of a discussion and negotiation and not at the beginning. We are now convinced, by having talked to them, talked to representatives of the Israeli government, that they are fully supportive of their original elections proposal and initiative as they originally announced it. And we are going to continue to work very hard to make

it happen.

Q Well, that's the point. I was also going to say -- and, obviously, you know more than I do -- there's a report this morning that Prime Minister Shamir is prepared to reintroduce to the Cabinet his original proposal and drop the Ariel Sharon and company hard line portions of it. Did you get the same report?

SECRETARY BAKER: I haven't gotten that report over here in Paris. But let me say that we have been reassured, as have other governments, by the government of Israel that it stands four square behind its original election proposal. I think Prime Minister Shamir himself said it hasn't changed one iota. And, of course, we deal with governments and not with parties.

Q When the United States gets irritated with Israel, it periodically resurfaces the idea of invoking as a kind of club to drive Israel in this direction or that, an international conference. You yourself did it not too long ago. What is the status of your thinking now on an international conference? Can you reassure the Israelis that that's not part of our program?

SECRETARY BAKER: There has been absolutely no change, George, in the policy of the United States with respect to an international conference from what the policy was during the Reagan administration. And the policy is this: The United States believes that an international conference properly structured at the appropriate time might be useful. But we've spent a number of months in the Bush administration arguing against an international conference when the idea has been surfaced to us by foreign ministers and heads of state of other governments -- we say that going to an international conference now might well pre-empt other more promising possibilities. And we think the Shamir election proposal is just such a more promising possibility. And we're glad to know and glad to hear that that proposal stands as originally submitted and that we and our ally, Israel, are going to work to implement that proposal.

Q Let me ask you to quickly address a few other topics. One is, we're hearing once again for the first time since I guess the Carter years, that it may be time now to consider the withdrawal, 36 years after the end of the Korean War, of some or perhaps all of the American forces in Korea. Is there more give in American policy now with regard to Korea?

SECRETARY BAKER: Is there more give in American policy?

Q Yes.

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, you know, the President proposed at the NATO summit that there be a reduction in U.S. manpower in Europe, provided that there was a move to parity by the Soviets, which would require them to reduce even more. To the extent that we can see some correlative moves with respect to the status of forces in the Pacific, maybe those kind of things can be considered in the future. But right now the United States policy remains what it has been.

Q One of the most expensive and, hence, one of the most vulnerable to political pressure weapons systems in the American inventory is the Stealth bomber, which was under review in Congress this week. Is it your view that it is important both for the United States deterrent and for, I suppose, our arms control negotiations that that program proceed at full speed?

SECRETARY BAKER: We think that is a very important program. It is in the President's budget. The Secretary of Defense is working very hard to obtain the funding for it, and we think it ought to proceed. It's an important element of our deterrent arsenal.

first element is the kind of reform needed in these societies to make them more productive and more efficient. A number of them now are beginning to realize that the highly centralized, highly socialized kinds of systems are inefficient, and they are beginning to move toward privatization. But it's their own reform that has to take first place.

Then there's the problem of debt, and we are moving to address the debt through the Brady plan.

And the last is the issue of aid, which we think ought to be a sort of a bilateral, or at least on a case-by-case -- not necessarily bilateral -- a case-by-case basis, and that just proposing a big pool of money is not the right way to approach the problem of developed versus lesser developed --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Let us touch a couple of other bases here. The Middle East -- there seems to be confusion -- some say there always is -- but in the course of the past few days, we've heard first that there is a high-level American delegation going to find out what is going on with the election plan and the Israeli coalition. Then it became a low-level, then it became no-level. Just what do you want to do vis-a-vis the Israelis to find out what is going on there?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, there've been a lot of rumors floating around, and they all started, of course, with the Likud Party conference, which came out with some pretty specific and narrowly delimiting policy statements on the issue of elections. And there was a lot of confusion as to how the Likud, which is a purely internal party declaration -- what impact that has on the government, which is a coalition government between Likud and Labor, and what that means for the process -- the peace process and the elections proposals which the Shamir coalition government has set forth.

And so that's why as that has moved over the last week we have sought to get some indication as to what's happening. And I think Shamir's statements now that things have not changed fundamentally -- we're assuming that whatever Likud did that the coalition's policies remain on track.

Q Briefly another area. Noriega and Panama. Actually, this just doesn't seem to either resolve itself or go away at all. This coming week the OAS will meet -- Organization of American States. That's where the joint action this administration has been calling for is supposed to happen. What are your benchmarks? What must happen in that meeting?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, our notion is that Noriega should not be allowed to steal as brutally -- as openly and brutally as he did -- the democratic expression of the will of the Panamanian people. And I think that the OAS process now is broadly supportive of trying to work that out. And, of course, Noriega is playing for time and assuming that he can outwait the OAS and that nothing significant will happen.

\* \* \* \* \*

Q Are you demanding that the OAS impose sanctions -- sharp actions on Noriega?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We're not demanding anything from the OAS, but what we think ought to happen or what the OAS has indicated is that they have to make clear to Noriega that this kind of behavior is, in fact, unacceptable.

\* \* \* \* \*

Q Back on the OAS and Noriega, is the U.S. insisting on concrete action -- sanctions or something?

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announced in Poland and Hungary we think provide an example of our effort to build viable private sectors in each of these two nations.

We agreed to tackle the problem of Poland's debt without delay, in the Paris Club without waiting for an IMF program. There's an express recognition in there that Poland is eligible for participation in the strength and debt strategy.

We agreed to work together along with other countries and multilateral institutions to make our efforts mutually reinforcing and more effective in every way that we possibly can.

And fifth, and very, very importantly, I think, to move the process along without delay, we agreed to speedily convene a meeting, I think, within a matter of weeks to support -- to concert our support for Poland and Hungary, working -- the summit countries that are not members of the EC working alongside those members of the European Community.

The East-West declaration also acknowledges the new policies and the new pronouncements in the Soviet Union. We call for the Soviets to translate those announcements into concrete action. But because the military imbalances in Europe and Asia continue to favor the Soviets, we state the need to remain vigilant and to maintain our strategy of deterrence based upon a mix of adequate conventional and nuclear forces.

The third declaration in the -- the third topic in the political declaration was China. The declaration on China endorses the program which the President led the way in establishing. And if you take a look at that, you see that the seven explain their common response to the repression that each of the seven countries has condemned, and we hold out our common interest in the creation by China of conditions that will avoid her isolation.

We also recognize the concern of the people of Hong Kong, and we look to the People's Republic for steps that could restore the confidence of the Hong Kong people.

And the final subject in the political declaration has to do with terrorism. And in this, we confirm our commitment to combat terrorism in all of its forms, including, of course, state-sponsored terrorism.

We take special note this year of the murderous attacks on air travelers and commit to prevent, to the extent that we can, a repetition of last year's tragedy over Lockerbie. Specifically, we refer to seeking international regulations forcing the marking of plastic explosives so as to make them more easily detectable.

Let me say that in summary, we're very pleased with these four declarations that together constitute the political declaration. They reflect our core values and those of our allies and friends. The United States -- the democratic experiment was conceived in these values. We've sought to preserve, protect and promote them, and we welcome the support of others who share them.

We had -- I'm almost finished -- we had extensive discussions as well in foreign ministers' meetings of other foreign policy subjects and topics which were covered in an oral presentation by Minister Dumas as the host Foreign Minister. We have not seen a transcript of that yet, so I may be able to answer some questions that you have about other areas, but I'm not exactly sure of specifically what he said. This was the manner in which this was handled last year and we agreed early on that this is the way we would handle regional conflicts this year.

Final point -- I'd like to say simply that this is my ninth summit and this has been, as far as I am concerned, the most harmonious and one of the most productive summits that I have

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attended -- so much so that I think we might be able to wrap it up a little early. But the French are the host country and if we do that, they'll have the announcement to make.

Now, who has a question?

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to start on this meeting you're talking about on the subject of Hungary and Poland. At what level will this meeting take place? How will the United States be represented? What are the goals? How specific are the goals for that meeting?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, the level hasn't been determined, Frank, and the -- frankly, where the meeting is going to be held has not been determined because this decision came during the course of the plenary meeting today. It was, in effect, negotiated in the plenary session itself. It was not worked out by the sherpas, it wasn't something that was preplanned, and you can see in the political declaration what is said about it. What is said about it there is all that has as yet been agreed to.

But the idea is we don't want to just let this drop. We want to follow up on it and we want to follow up on it as expeditiously as we can. And we were very anxious -- the President was very anxious to get a commitment from the other countries to do this and, in fact, had written the heads of state prior to coming to the summit, requesting that this action be taken. And we feel very fortunate that we were able to get a commitment to this effect.

Q Are you at all disappointed that the minimum language, minimum level that Governor Sununu talked about earlier -- language he cited was action in concert -- is not in the statement? There is no discussion of concerted action. Talk about support, but no action.

SECRETARY BAKER: No, that's not correct. If you'll look at paragraph six, I will read it to you. "We agreed to work along with other interested countries and multilateral institutions to concert support for the process of reform underway in Hungary and Poland in order to make our measures of support more effective and mutually reinforcing. We will encourage further creative efforts by interested governments on the public and private sectors in support of the reform process. Concerning concerted support for reform in Poland and Hungary, we call for a meeting with all interested countries which will take place within the next few weeks."

It's clearly in there. Not only is that in there, but there's a follow-up meeting called for.

Q Mr. Secretary, some of us had the impression that the idea of having this conference on Hungary and Poland was promoted by Chancellor Kohl. Now, I guess it's still possible he got it in the communique. Was this an initiative of the President? And, apart from China, what in this communique bears really the strong mark of the U.S.? Where did the U.S. take the lead?

SECRETARY BAKER: The United States took the lead, I think, with respect, as you point out, to China, but also with respect to the East-West portion of the declaration. For that matter, with respect to human rights and terrorism as well, because we've been pushing those two subjects for the political declarations of prior summits for a number of summits now.

But particularly, with reference to the East-West, because, after all, it was the President's trip to Poland and Hungary that emphasized the importance of the homegrown reform efforts that are taking place there and the importance of our supporting those.

To answer specifically your question about who proposed this, I've already said that the President requested this in letters

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to the heads before he came. The specific suggestion in the plenary was made by Chancellor Kohl, but, of course, strongly supported by the United States.

Q What progress, if any, have you made on the question of Third World debt? And specifically, how much support was there for President Mitterrand's position?

SECRETARY BAKER: For what, John?

Q President Mitterrand's position on rescheduling of Third World debt.

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, there was quite an extensive discussion on debt this afternoon. No particular controversy, I know you'll be disappointed to hear. Everybody was pretty much in agreement that the strength-in-debt strategy that the United States has proposed is the course that should be followed.

There was a general recognition on the part of most countries that we are making very good progress with what we determined to do at Toronto about forgiving the debt of some of the poorest of the poor. The United States, as you know, is empowered now to and will be soon forgiving the hundreds of millions of dollars of debt to some of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other countries may -- took note of the fact that they're doing the same thing and everyone generally subscribed to the strength-in-debt strategy approach to the debt of middle income debtor countries.

Q But there was no support for a North-South conference or dialogue among the participants?

SECRETARY BAKER: There was a brief -- President Mitterrand briefly referred to the fact that he had been requested to raise with the Summit Seven the idea of a North-South conference. He said, however, that he had told his interlocutors that it was the view of most summit countries that current organizations were sufficient; that some of these issues are being addressed in quite some detail in other fora -- for instance, development. There will be a special session on development next year. We ought not to divert the focus from that.

Trade, we're working very hard to accomplish a new Uruguay round. We ought not to complicate that with a North-South dialogue, and so forth.

Now he mentioned this because he had told some of these other countries that he would do so, but it wasn't a matter of debate or controversy or consideration with respect to a decision being taken here at this summit about whether or not we'd have such a conference.

Q So he didn't argue for it -- he just raised it?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, no, it was not -- it was only raised.

Q How long did this discussion last, by the way?

SECRETARY BAKER: Very brief discussion, Brit. I would say no more than -- I hate to characterize -- I don't remember that specifically, but I'd say no more than 10 minutes.

Q When was that?

SECRETARY BAKER: When? Well, I think that was this afternoon. I think it was this afternoon as opposed to this morning.

Q Mr. Secretary, both in Poland and in Hungary, when the President announced these enterprise funds, he said that he would

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seek parallel contributions from his summit partners. He doesn't appear to have gotten those and I wonder if that's a setback for him?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think he has gotten parallel contributions in the form of a commitment for concerted support, rapid movement on rescheduling Poland's debt, participation of Poland in the strengthened debt strategy. Some countries are going to be making specific economic incentives available.

Q So I would argue that he did receive what he was seeking in this connection, and particularly with respect to this follow-on meeting. All the details cannot be wrapped up in a summit like this, but now there will be a follow-on meeting that will deal in detail with the reform efforts in both of these countries and ways in which the summit countries can help.

Q Did any of them, however, commit to contributing funds similar to the enterprise funds?

SECRETARY BAKER: Never -- we never asked anybody to commit for funds. We made it very clear before we got to Paris that this would not be a pledging session, but we believe we've gotten parallel efforts in the form of commitments to support the reform efforts that are being undertaken in Poland and Hungary.

Q The line in the communique on China -- or the declaration on China about postponing examination of new World Bank loans -- does that significantly hurt China, and if so, by how much? And secondly, what do you think the significance is of saying that in the declaration?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think the significance of saying it is that it's an action that has been taken by these countries. They've all agreed with the taking of this action. I'm trying to find my copy of the political declaration -- the China portion.

Q Well, it says the examination of new loans by the World Bank will be postponed.

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, I'm aware of that, but I can't -- I wanted to see the exact language.

Q That is the exact language.

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, wait a minute, though. Now I've got it. Yes, you know what it says -- has -- each of us has agreed. All of these recitations of actions are actions that have been taken already. Now, I'm not in a position to judge for you the extent to which that action may or may not hurt China. I don't want to make that judgment. I'm not in a position to make that judgment. This is a recitation of the actions that have been taken by the Summit Seven. All agreed.

Q Mr. Secretary, officials in Washington said before we came here that the United States would like a terrorism statement in the section that talked about the Lockerbie bombing to specifically cite Iran as responsible for that incident. But that language is not in this declaration. Did the United States indeed seek that?

SECRETARY BAKER: As far as I know, we never sought that. I'm not aware that we sought that.

Q At any point? Even in the -- during the sherpa process?

SECRETARY BAKER: During the sherpa process? I am not aware that we sought that during the sherpa process. I think we were pretty well pleased with the way the terrorism statement came out in light of some of the battles we fought a year or two ago on this

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issue. But I'm not personally aware that we asked that Iran be cited.

Q So you think we did not? That's your understanding?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think we did not, but I don't know everything that was raised in the entire shezpa process. I'm not suggesting that.

Q On the question of food for Poland, is that supposed to be part of the agenda of the follow-up conference? It's not quite -- it's in the same paragraph, but it's not explicitly stated here.

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, it's going to be dealt with in the follow-up meeting, but it was important to us to make it clear that the follow-up meeting was not restricted just to the food issue. And we did have a little debate about that. So we think we have it in such shape that the follow-up meeting will deal with the general topic of concerted support for Poland and Hungary, including food.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I could just understand the genesis of that, did Chancellor Kohl bring up the idea of having this meeting with -- follow-up meeting to discuss food for Poland and then the President said, well, let's broaden that to be all -- some sort of --

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I really can't answer that, not because I'm unwilling to. I just -- when we finally got a text back typed, it looked like the follow-up meeting was going to deal only with food and we wanted it to deal with concerted support and we made that case and it carried the day and we were very happy about that. I think the Chancellor was very much with us on that.

Q But did he mention the food specifically when he brought that up?

SECRETARY BAKER: In his proposal, yes.

Q Among the countries, Mr. Secretary, that you would think would attend this follow-on meeting, is Poland and Hungary -- is it contemplated that Poland and Hungary would be among the participants?

SECRETARY BAKER: That was not discussed. And it would be my sense of the discussion that that would not be contemplated; that the meeting would be of EC countries, summit participants who are not members of the EC and all interested countries, as you see there -- interested in concerting their support efforts for these two countries.

Q But not the recipients themselves.

SECRETARY BAKER: Probably -- well, I don't -- there was never any discussion of it, I don't know that there would be a reason to exclude them, but I don't think it contemplated that they would be coming.

Q Why not?

Q Since the President has left Poland, Lech Walesa has said that a communist president, meaning General Jaruzelski in particular, would be acceptable to him. Is that something that was urged on either Mr. Walesa or other Solidarity leaders by the President, or yourself, other U.S. officials?

SECRETARY BAKER: Not to my knowledge, John. We did not involve ourselves in the internal political situation there in terms of the presidential election.

Q But could I just ask -- do you think it's a good idea, given the realities of today, that Poland continues to have a

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communist President for the time being -- at least in this next election?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, you know, the way they're moving toward political reform there, they have reserved a certain number of seats in the same for communist party members. So having a communist president is not inconsistent with that, but I'm not going to express a judgment on whether we think that's good or bad.

Q Mr. Secretary, while we're talking about internal politics, could you clarify what is still a rather ambiguous outcome on sending somebody to Israel to find out what their intentions were? (Laughter.) It struck me that you thought it needed some clarification, and now evidently it doesn't. What happened?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think we've seen a lot happen in the course of a week; you're quite right. My view and the view of all of us was that we had some genuine concern, frankly, that perhaps as a result of the action by the Likud Party, they were in a sense devaluing their own initiative. We still think it might be useful to send someone -- not right now -- never have had in mind the idea of a presidential emissary, as some have misinterpreted things, I think. I mean, we're not talking -- and I think we made it very clear we're not talking about shuttle diplomacy or Phil Habib getting on an airplane and that sort of thing -- and never have been.

We still think it might be useful at some point, but not right now, because Prime Minister Shamir himself has made a number of statements that the initiative has not been changed. I think in one of them he said it has not been changed one iota. The national unity government there appears to be working together very hard to reconfirm their commitment to the election proposal.

Israeli government officials have confirmed to us and to others that they are very much committed to the proposal. And the last thing I guess I'd say on it is that we've been working very hard here in Paris to support the election proposal with the summit countries and in meetings with other countries, such as my meeting of yesterday with Foreign Minister Megid of Egypt. I hope that clarifies it for you.

Q Well, on that last point, may I pick you up, how have you done so far as conversions? It struck -- it seemed the United States has been pretty much alone in pushing for -- in supporting the Israeli initiative. Do you have friends now?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, we had friends before. It's wrong to say how are we doing on converting because we were able, I think, to bring a number of countries -- to gain support from a number of countries in Europe of the Israeli election proposal, who previously had not been supportive. We think we still have that support provided that they know that the Israeli government itself is every bit as committed to that proposal as they were when they advanced it. And we believe, based on what we've seen during the course of this week and the contacts we've had with Israeli government officials, that they are every bit as committed as they were when they advanced it.

Q On Hong Kong -- could you tell us what the steps you are looking for from China that they could do to restore the confidence of the Hong Kong people? And secondly, could you tell us whether there are any discussions of the international government, especially British government, commitments to the Hong Kong Chinese during the summit?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, there were discussions of -- but not that I can recall in the plenary session. I've had a bilateral meeting with Sir Geoffrey Howe in which we discussed the UK's firm commitment to Hong Kong. And I think the steps that are referred to in the communique are the steps that many of us -- many of the summit

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countries have expressed in speaking about the tragic events of Tiananmen Square -- the need to reassure the international community that the process of economic reform is going to continue and that political repression is going to cease, as it says here in the declaration.

MR. FITZWATER: Final question, please.

Q Mr. Secretary, was Lebanon discussed at all today and is there harmony between the U.S. position and the French position concerning Lebanon's special --

SECRETARY BAKER: There is -- the answer to the last part of that question is, there is harmony between the United States position and the French position on Lebanon. And the answer to the first part of the question -- was Lebanon discussed today -- is no, but it was discussed at quite some length last night at the dinner of foreign ministers.

Q Are these summits still worth all this trouble?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.  
END

6:20 P.M. (L)



communist President for the time being -- at least in this next election?

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