

# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

12

משרד

435

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משרד רווחה

יו"ת אבני

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25/5/88 - 6/6/88

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מחלקה



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המשרד

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
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יוסי גל

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## Campaign Fund-Raising Season Opens in U.S.—for Israeli Politicians

By Glenn Frankel  
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, June 4—Israel's political parties, opening the long hunting season for campaign contributions from abroad, have collected at least \$3 million in private donations from American Jews in recent weeks and hope to raise at least \$10 million more for the November parliamentary election here.

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, leader of the left-leaning Labor Party, raised at least \$2 million at dinners and luncheons during a nine-day tour of the United States two weeks ago, according to informed party members. Among the stops were a lunch-

eon at the Hollywood mansion of billionaire oilman Marvin Davis at which the minimum donation reportedly was \$25,000.

His main political rival, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, raised several hundred thousand dollars during his visit to America in March. Shamir, who leads the rightist Likud political bloc, is scheduled to return to the United States this week on a visit that again will feature several fund-raising events. And a rising young Likud star, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's former ambassador to the United Nations, raised close to \$1 million in a recent fund-seeking foray, party members said.

The overseas fund-raising campaign is legal under Israeli law, although details of

the effort are generally closely guarded. But the electoral contest between the two major parties, which promises to be the most expensive in Israel's 40-year history, is so intense this year that some party officials are even competing in private boasting about their fund-raising abilities.

Officials who insist on anonymity estimate that Labor hopes to raise about \$5 million from the United States and Europe and \$2 million in Israel. That sum will match the \$7 million the party hopes to get from the state treasury under Israel's campaign finance law, which allows the parties to spend the same amount from private sources as they receive from the state.

Likud officials contend Labor actually is

aiming at \$10 million from overseas and that Likud hopes to raise about half that amount. Many of Israel's dozen or more smaller parties also plan to tap American supporters for funds.

"The amount involved is not only a secret, it's done so many ways and it's so difficult to trace that I don't know if anyone, including the people who do it, could provide accurate figures," said Yitzhak Galnoor, a Hebrew University political scientist who is a close follower of election campaigns here.

Israel's loosely enforced election law limits total spending according to a complicated formula based on the number of Knesset

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# Israeli Political Parties Raising Campaign Millions in U.S.

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the party wins, but it places restrictions on the amount parties can raise. While it bans corporate donations, the law does not restrict the size of individual contributions, nor does it place any limit on the amount raised abroad. The donations must be reported to the state comptroller's office but are not made public.

Because the law allows contributions of unlimited amounts, party officials say they are hunting for the wealthiest donors. "What I look for is 30 people—and believe me, they're out there—who can give \$100,000 each, because then I've got \$3 million," said a fund raiser for Likud.

Each candidate for parliament runs as part of a party list, so there are no individual campaigns. But officials say that in the past some of the more prominent candidates have raised their own campaign funds, often with contributions that have gone unreported.

For the first three decades of Israel's existence, the monopoly on overseas fund raising, like the government itself, belonged to the Labor Party and its political allies. The party collected money both directly and through affiliated organizations such as the Histadrut labor federation and the various businesses it owns. It had the celebrities—including the late prime minister Golda Meir, former U.N. ambassador Abba Eban and former ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz—who could draw major donations from the American Jewish leadership.

But with the 1977 victory of Likud prime minister Menachem Begin, a new generation of fund raisers and overseas contributors arose that was more conservative politically and more independent of the established network that had been Labor's main ally.

A major change came in 1981 when Moshe Arens became ambassador to the United States and Netanyahu his deputy. Arens—who is this year's chairman of the Likud election campaign—Netanyahu, and Likud campaign treasurer Ehud Olmert sought out new sources of American money—including, according to unconfirmed accounts, stock market financier Ivan Boesky—and established a fund-raising network that is still functioning.

"Labor has had an awesome advantage," said a senior Likud official. "But that began to change with the general shift in American Jewish life and politics. We went after the new breed—the smart scrappers on Wall Street, the new people in the game. It was a perfect match."

Ezer Weizman, who resigned as defense minister in 1980 and left Likud, also knew the game. When he formed his own political party in 1984 known as Yahad—Hebrew for together—he raised several hundred thousand dollars with the help of New York lawyer Leon Charney.

But the party fell far short of expectations in the 1984 elections, winning only three of 120 Knesset

seats, and Weizman, who reported official expenditures of about \$800,000, overspent by 13 times the legal limit on campaign expenditures, according to the state comptroller's office. Yahad was one of six political parties to exceed the limit that year.

Labor still retains its leadership in overseas fund raising. While party officials will not discuss names and amounts, newspapers here have reported that Bruce Rappaport, the billionaire former Israeli who sought government approval for the Iraqi pipeline deal that ultimately involved both then-prime minister Peres and U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese, has contributed \$1 million to Labor over the years. The much publicized memo sent to Meese by American lawyer E. Bob Wallach, middleman in the affair, suggested channeling some of the profits to Labor, a proposal Peres insists was never made to him.

When Peres visited the United States two weeks ago, Boston Globe correspondent Mary Curtius, who accompanied him on the trip, reported that his fund-raising network was set up under the auspices of Canadian distiller Charles Bronfman, who also provided Peres a private jet for the tour. Among those mentioned in recent press reports here as contributors to Labor are the families of CBS Chairman Lawrence Tisch and former U.S. commerce secretary Philip Klutznick, and Michael Eisner, chairman of Hollywood's Walt Disney Co.

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Party officials insist that neither Peres nor Shamir actually solicit funds during their meetings with potential donors. The leaders speak earnestly of the political crisis Israel faces and of their vision of the future. After they leave the room, aides collect the money.

"They don't like to do, it but they have to do it," said a senior Labor official about Peres and Shamir. As for the Americans donors, some contribute because they believe strongly in the policies of the party they support. But for many, the official said, the reason is "access and friendship."

"There's nothing more important for an American Jewish leader than to be able to say 'I can pick up the phone and call the prime minister,' or to know that when he invites the prime minister to be a keynote speaker at a meeting he'll come."

Many Americans defend the process. New York attorney Kenneth Bialkin, a past chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations who is involved this year in raising funds for Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek's reelection campaign, said American Jews give "not because they want access or influence, but because they have a real stake and responsibility for maintaining the democratic traditions of this society."

But Robert Lifton, president of the American Jewish Congress, believes overseas fund raising smacks of hypocrisy. "On the one hand," he said, "we're told by Israeli political leaders not to speak out or intervene in political decisions here, and on the other hand they go out and seek

funds from American Jews, which is surely going to give those people political influence because we know that money never comes without ties. It's the equivalent of making an American Jew a voter in the Israeli election, and it's just the opposite of what the leaders say they want."

Some Israelis have also objected to Netanyahu's latest American fund-raising efforts. "Here you have somebody who until recently was Israel's most visible public representative in the United States, and without any cooling-off period he moves into fund raising," said Hebrew University political scientist Shlomo Avineri, a member of the rival Labor Party. "It certainly raises questions of propriety."

Netanyahu refused to comment on the matter, but a supporter called the allegation "bunk," adding: "Dinitz and Eban raised money while on the job. At least [Netanyahu] resigned first."

One member of parliament, La-

bor's Menachem Hacohen, has publicly denounced as "wretched and demeaning" the practice of using visits to America by Shamir and Peres for fund raising. And another, Amnon Rubenstein of the small but influential Center Party, has waged a lonely campaign over the years to tighten the fund-raising law and eliminate loopholes.

Rubenstein has succeeded in having corporate contributions banned and in petitioning the Israeli Supreme Court to block a parliamentary measure that would have effectively abolished the legal limit on campaign spending. He said he hopes to embarrass the two major parties into approving new controls and to put a stop to the "incredible sums" they compete for overseas.

"The whole idea of the campaign finance law was to limit the parties' dependence on a few rich people," Rubenstein said, "and that purpose is being frustrated by overseas money."

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5TH JUNE 1988

SUBJECT: EGYPT-ARGENTINA-IRAQ/SS-MISSILE PROJECT

1. WE KEEP THE CIA FULLY UPDATED ON THE SUBJECT PROJECT FROM THE WORKING LEVEL (INCLUDING WRITTEN REPORTS) AND UP TO MEETINGS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE SERVICES.

2. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CIA AND US REGARDING INTELLIGENCE PERTAINING TO THIS PROJECT. THIS CONCERNS BOTH THE NATURE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN COMPANIES, AND THE STATUS OF THE PROJECT.

3. THE CIA IS OF COURSE NOT A FACTOR CHARGED WITH THWARTING THE PROJECT, NOR IS IT A VEHICLE FOR PUTTING PRESSURE ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. WE THEREFORE WERE PLEASED TO RECEIVE THE CIA'S RECENT REQUEST TO RELEASE AND PASS ON TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT PARTS OF THE MATERIAL WHICH WE HAD SENT THEM SO THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT COULD USE THIS INFORMATION TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, WHOSE COMPANIES ARE STILL SIGNIFICANTLY INVOLVED IN THE PROJECT.

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4. IT HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT CLOSE TO THE TALKS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ, WE WOULD PASS ON A DETAILED BRIEF TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT - THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY - SO THAT IT CAN BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ALL THE GOVERNMENTS OF COUNTRIES WHOSE COMPANIES ARE INSTRUMENTAL IN CONSTRUCTING THE PROJECT.

5. EGYPT, IRAQ AND ARGENTINA ARE JOINTLY DEVELOPING A TWO-STAGE BALLISTIC MISSILE WITH A RANGE OF UP TO 1000KM., WITH A WARHEAD WEIGHING 350-500KG. THE MISSILE IS DESIGNED TO CARRY VARIOUS SORTS OF WARHEADS, INCLUDING NON-CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS.

6. THE MISSILE IS BEING DEVELOPED BY EUROPEAN COMPANIES, FIRST AND FOREMOST MBB OF GERMANY, WHICH IS THE MAIN CONTRACTOR FOR THE PROJECT. ADDITIONAL COMPANIES MAINLY FROM FRANCE, BRITAIN AND ITALY ARE ALSO INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MISSILE.

7. AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE INDEPENDENT PRODUCTION OF THE MISSILE IS BEING CONSTRUCTED IN EGYPT AND IRAQ SO THAT EACH COUNTRY WILL BE ABLE TO PRODUCE THIS MISSILE ON ITS OWN. THE PRESENT PLAN CALLS FOR AN OVERALL PRODUCTION OF ABOUT 250 MISSILES IN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

8. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT IS IN AN ADVANCED STAGE AND IS PROCEEDING ACCORDING TO THE PLANNED TIMETABLE. THE FIRST FLIGHT TEST IS TO TAKE PLACE IN ARGENTINA WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

9. EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, APART FROM THOSE OF GERMANY AND ITALY, HAVE NOT YET TAKEN ANY STEPS TO PREVENT COMPANIES IN THEIR COUNTRIES FROM BEING INVOLVED IN THE PROJECT. THE ABSENCE OF INTERVENTION BY THE GOVERNMENTS CAN PERHAPS BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE FACT THAT THE COMPANIES OPERATE THROUGH FRONT COMPANIES AND NEUTRAL AGENT COMPANIES WHICH HAVE BEEN SET UP IN GERMANY, SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA, AND ALSO PARTIALLY TO THE FACT THAT MOST OF THE GOVERNMENTS AND SERVICES TEND TO BELIEVE THAT THE PROJECT IS NOT INTENDED FOR IRAQ, BUT ONLY FOR EGYPT AND ARGENTINA, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PEACE-SEEKING NATIONS.

10. THESE COUNTRIES IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROJECT IS ENTIRELY FINANCED BY IRAQ, AND IRAQ HAS BEEN GRANTED PRIORITY IN EQUIPMENT, BOTH AS REGARDS TIMING AND QUANTITY. IRAQ IS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE JOINT PROJECT WITH EGYPT AND ARGENTINA, IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A MORE ADVANCED MISSILE AND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS TO FORGE AN ABILITY TO PRODUCE THE MISSILE ITSELF, WITHOUT HAVING TO DEPEND ON ANY OUTSIDE ELEMENT.

11. THE THREAT TO ISRAEL STEMS FROM THE EFFECTIVE RANGE OF THE MISSILE, WHICH ENABLES IRAQ, FROM ITS OWN TERRITORY, TO COVER ALL OF ISRAEL FROM MOBILE MISSILE LAUNCHERS, WHICH HAVE A VERY HIGH SURVIVABILTY RATIO.

12. IF THE MISSILE PROJECT IS REALIZED, IRAQ WILL, BY 1990, HAVE OPERATIONAL MISSILES WHICH WILL THREATEN PEACE IN THE AREA IN GENERAL, AND THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL IN PARTICULAR.

13. WITH THE PASSING OF TIME, THE DEPENDENCE OF BOTH EGYPT AND IRAQ ON THE EUROPEAN COMPANIES IS DECLINING DUE TO THE INFRASTRUCTURES BEING CONSTRUCTED IN EGYPT AND IRAQ. WITH THE HELP OF DOZENS OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TECHNICIANS THESE ARE NEARING COMPLETION.

14. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS NOT SPARED ANY EFFORT IN ORDER TO INFORM THE RELEVANT GOVERNMENTS OF THE PROGRESS OF THE PROJECT:

A. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS BEING INFORMED REGULARLY THROUGH THE ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE ROLE PLAYED BY SNIA-BPD AND OTHER ITALIAN COMPANIES IN THE PROJECT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THROUGH THIS CHANNEL.

B. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN KEPT INFORMED THROUGH THE FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE FRENCH SAGEM COMPANY IN THE PROJECT HAS BEEN ANALYSED IN DETAIL VIA THIS CHANNEL.

C. THE PRIME MINISTER OF BRITAIN HAS BEEN INFORMED ON THE PROJECT BY OUR AMBASSADOR IN LONDON. DATA HAS ALSO BEEN FORWARDED THROUGH THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE BRITISH TRANSTECHNO COMPANY IN THE PROJECT.

D. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UPDATED ON AN ON-GOING BASIS THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, AND VIA THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THE DETAILED ROLES PLAYED BY THE

GERMAN COMPANIES OF MBB, MAN, WEGMAN, GPA, FBG AND MBB TT HAVE BEEN SPELLED OUT IN THIS CHANNEL.

E. THE CIA AND STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN UPDATED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE PROJECT AND ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF ALL THE EUROPEAN COMPANIES.

F. A PROTEST HAS BEEN PASSED ON TO THE ARGENTINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT ARGENTINA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROJECT, AND ARGENTINA HAS BEEN URGED TO CANCEL THE HOLDING OF THE TEST FLIGHT OF THE MISSILE ON ITS TERRITORY.

15. AT THE SAME TIME AS THE SUPER POWERS ARE MAKING SINCERE EFFORTS TO DISARM THEMSELVES OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES, AND THE INF AGREEMENT TALKS OF THE LIQUIDATION OF MISSILES WHOSE RANGE EXCEEDS 500KM, EGYPT, IRAQ AND ARGENTINA ARE IN THE ADVANCED PRACTICAL STAGES OF EQUIPPING THEMSELVES WITH 1000KM. RANGE MISSILES.

16. UNFORTUNATELY THE PROJECT ENJOYS ACTIVE ASSISTANCE OF WESTERN COMPANIES WHOSE GOVERNMENTS ARE SIGNATORIES OF THE 'REGIME' AGREEMENT. THIS AGREEMENT EXPLICITLY BANS THE TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 300KM.

17. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT MOST OF THE SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGIES BEING APPLIED IN THE PROJECT ORIGINATE FROM THE UNITED STATES. THE EUROPEAN COMPANIES ARE EXPLOITING THEM FOR THE ABOVEMENTIONED

18. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS THE CAPACITY TO INTERVENE  
EFFECTIVELY WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF GERMANY, FRANCE, ITALY,  
BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA WITH THE AIM OF STOPPING THE PROJECT. THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE IS ASKED TO USE HIS KIND OFFICES THUS TO  
INTERVENE.

PROJECT.

# THE SYRIAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

MAY 88'

## DATA

1. THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN SYRIA NUMBERS SOME 4000, RESIDING IN THE FOLLOWING TOWNS:

- A. DAMASCUS - APPROXIMATELY 3000.
- B. ALEPPO - APPROXIMATELY 700.
- C. KAMISHLI - APPROXIMATELY 160.

2. THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THE COMMUNITY

- A. THE JEWISH POPULATION IN DAMASCUS AND ALEPPO IS CONCENTRATED IN THE GHETTO IN THE JEWISH QUARTER, ALTHOUGH A FEW FAMILIES LIVE OUTSIDE THE CONFINES OF THE JEWISH QUARTER. IN THE CASE OF KAMISHLI THE JEWISH POPULATION IS DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE TOWN.
- B. THE JEWS OF SYRIA ARE PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN A RELIGIOUS WAY OF LIFE AND RECEIVE A JEWISH EDUCATION. IN RECENT YEARS THERE HAS BEEN A RELATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR ECONOMIC SITUATION (THE MAJORITY ARE MEMBERS OF THE LIBERAL PROFESSION OR WORK IN COMMERCE, AS WELL AS IN THE FIELD OF TAILORING AND AS SILVER-AND-GOLD SMITHS. BUT NONE ARE EMPLOYED BY THE GOVERNMENT). HOWEVER, THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE JEWS AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION ARE TOTALLY IRRELEVANT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS A COMMUNITY WHICH IS DEPRIVED OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUBJECTED TO SEVERE SUPPRESSION.

- C. SYRIAN JEWS ARE HOSTAGES IN THE HANDS OF THE AUTHORITIES. THEY ARE EXPOSED TO SURVEILLANCE, INTIMIDATION, AND SUPPRESSION EFFECTIVELY ASSURING THEIR OBEDIENCE AND THEIR ABSTENTION OF ANY EXPRESSION OR ACTIVITY LIABLE TO EXPOSE THEIR TRUE SITUATION TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD.
- D. EVERY JEWISH CITIZEN IN SYRIA IS IDENTIFIED AS A JEW ("MOUSSAWI") AS THIS IS REGISTERED IN HIS IDENTITY CARD AND PASSPORT.
- E. ANY JEWISH CITIZEN WHO WISHES TO GO OUT OF SYRIA FOR ANY REASON AT ALL IS OBLIGED TO WAIT MANY MONTHS (AND SOMETIMES YEARS) UNTIL HE RECEIVES A PASSPORT. IF AND WHEN HE RECEIVES HIS PASSPORT (USUALLY AFTER HAVING TO PAY LARGE BRIBES) HE IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE HIS RETURN TO SYRIA BY DEPOSING A SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL GUARANTEE.
- F. THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES SELECT THE ISSUING OF PASSPORTS TO INDIVIDUALS OR TO CERTAIN MEMBERS OF A FAMILY IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE RETURN OF THOSE GOING ABROAD.
- G. JEWS ARE FORBIDDEN TO CARRY OUT PROPERTY AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS WHICH COULD SERVE AS PART OF THEIR PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO LEAVING THE COUNTRY.
- H. TO THWART ANY ATTEMPTS AT FLEEING SYRIA THE REGIME OPERATES A SYSTEM OF CLOSE SURVEILLANCE, BOTH OVERT AND COVERT BY MEANS OF THE SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS WHICH MAINTAINS LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL IN THE JEWISH QUARTERS TO THIS END.
- I. EFFECTIVE CENSORSHIP, SURVEILLANCE ON TELEPHONES, PATROLS, CHECKPOSTS, SURVEILLANCE ON INDIVIDUALS, INTERROGATION, ARRESTS AND SURPRISE VISITS TO HOMES OF JEWS ARE ALL PART OF

THE DAILY ROUTINE.

- J. THESE METHODS ALSO PREVENT ANY UNCONTROLLED CONTACT BETWEEN THE JEWISH POPULATION AND EXTERNAL ELEMENTS - FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AND VISITORS - WHO ARE ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AUTHORITIES, THUS MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO RECEIVE AN INDEPENDENT IMPRESSION OF THE TRUE SITUATION.
- K. JEWS SUSPECTED OF HARBOURING INTENTIONS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY ILLEGALLY OR TO VISIT ISRAEL DURING THEIR STAY ABROAD ARE HELD UNDER ARREST FOR PROTRACTED PERIODS OF TIME AND SUBJECTED TO INTERROGATIONS AND TORTURE ACCOMPANIED BY TOTAL ISOLATION FROM VISITORS INCLUDING CLOSE FAMILY MEMBERS.
- L. LEGAL AID OR DEFENCE ARE CONCEPTS ENTIRELY EXCLUDED FROM THE LEXICON OF THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES. MOREOVER, IN GENERAL THE FAMILIES ARE NOT EVEN INFORMED OF THE ARREST OF ONE OF THEIR MEMBERS AND REALIZE WHAT HAS HAPPENED ONLY BY THE FACT THAT HE HAS DISAPPEARED.
- M. THE MAJORITY OF THE DETAINEES WHO ARE FINALLY RELEASED EMERGE FROM PRISON IN A MOST GRAVE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION, SOME OF WHOM BEAR THEIR SCARS AND HANDICAPS FOR MANY YEARS TO COME.
- N. THE AUTHORITIES HAVE NO QUALMS ABOUT ARRESTING WOMEN, YOUTHS AND CHILDREN AND METING OUT TO THEM THE SAME HARSH TREATMENT AS IS CUSTOMARY IN THE CASE OF MATURE MALE DETAINEES.
- O. OBTAINING THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS USUALLY INVOLVES A LONG HARROWING PROCESS OF APPEALS TO THE SECURITY PERSONNEL, ACCOMPANIED BY HUMILIATION AND BRIBES. IN SOME RARE CASES RELEASE OF PRISONERS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED THROUGH THE GOOD

OFFICES OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS WHO HAVE INTERVENED WITH THE SUPREME ECHELONS OF THE REGIME. THE SYRIAN JEWISH COMMUNITY LEADERS DO NOT DARE THEMSELVES TO APPEAL TO THE AUTHORITIES.

3. PRISONERS

A. AT PRESENT THERE ARE NINE (9) JEWISH PRISONERS, INCLUDING YOUTHS WHO HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED IN THE PAST MONTHS TO VERY HARSH INTERROGATION AND PROTRACTED TORTURE. REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED THAT IN SEVERAL CASES THERE HAS BEEN A SEVERE DETERIORATION IN THEIR PHYSICAL HEALTH ALSO EFFECTING THEIR BALANCE OF MIND. THE MAJORITY OF THE PRISONERS HELD TODAY HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED ANY VISITORS WHILST IN THE CASE OF OTHERS THE AUTHORITIES HAVE NEVER CONFIRMED TO THE FAMILIES THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AT ALL.

B. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE PRISONERS:

(1) IBRAHIM LAHAM - 42, ARRESTED WITH HIS THREE CHILDREN IN DECEMBER 1987 ON SUSPICION OF ATTEMPTING TO FLEE SYRIA. SINCE THEN IBRAHIM AND HIS 18-YEAR OLD SON, VICTOR, HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN TADMOR PRISON UNDER MOST INHUMAN CONDITION, UNDERGOING TORTURE AND SEVERE BEATING, AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE SON HAS LOST HIS BALANCE OF MIND. THE AUTHORITIES HAVE REFUSED TO PERMIT ANY VISITS.

(2) VICTOR LAHAM - SON OF IBRAHIM LAHAM (SEE ABOVE).

(3) ELI SWEID - A BACHELOR, 30 YEARS OLD, WAS ARRESTED AT DAMASCUS AIRPORT AT THE END OF NOVEMBER 1987 IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO SYRIA FROM A VISIT IN ITALY.

NOTHING MORE HAS BEEN HEARD ABOUT HIM OR OF HIS WHEREABOUTS.

- (4) SALIM SWEID - BROTHER OF ELI SWEID, 50 YEARS OLD. HE WAS ARRESTED A FEW DAYS AFTER HIS BROTHER. NOTHING IS KNOWN TODAY OF THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE TWO BROTHERS, OF THEIR CONDITION, NOR OF WHAT THEY ARE ACCUSED.
- (5) MOSHE KHALIFA - 17 YEARS OLD. HAS REQUIRED LENGTHY MEDICAL TREATMENT FOLLOWING TORTURE AND BEATING (THE NECESSITY TO RECEIVE SUCH MEDICAL TREATMENT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES). ARRESTED TOGETHER WITH FARAJ DARZIA AND KASSEM GHNEJA WHILST ON A TRIP INSIDE SYRIA.
- (6) FARAJ DARZIA - 18 YEARS OLD.
- (7) KASSEM GHNEJA - 19 YEARS OLD.
- (8) FARAJ MAMROT - 38, FATHER OF 4 CHILDREN. WAS ARRESTED AT THE BEGINNING OF 1987.
- (9) ZAKI MAMROT - 36, FATHER OF 5 CHILDREN. THE TWO BROTHERS WERE ARRESTED SUDDENLY AT THEIR WORK FOR REASONS WHICH ARE NOT CLEAR. NO ONE HAS BEEN PERMITTED TO VISIT THEM SINCE THEIR ARREST.

C. THE LACK OF INFORMATION WHICH THE FAMILIES HAVE REGARDING THE FATE OF THEIR RELATIVES, THE REFUSAL OF THE AUTHORITIES TO PERMIT FAMILY VISITS, AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF HAVING THE SERVICES OF A LAWYER TO DEFEND THEM. COUPLED WITH THE REPORTS ON THE HARSH CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE PRISONERS ARE BEING HELD, HAVE ALL SERVED TO CREATE GREAT CONCERN OVER THEIR FATE. THIS CONCERN IS HEIGHTENED BY THE FACT THAT INTERROGATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT BY MOST BARBARIC MEANS INCLUDING THE USE OF ELECTRICITY ON SENSITIVE PARTS OF THE BODY, THE WHEEL OF TORTURE, AND THE BREAKING OF BONES.

5. FAMILY REUNIFICATION

A. A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT AS RECOGNISED BY THE WHOLE CIVILISED WORLD, IS THAT CHILDREN SHOULD LIVE TOGETHER WITH THEIR PARENTS. THIS RIGHT HAS BEEN DENIED SEVERAL SYRIAN FAMILIES WHO ARE RESIDING TODAY IN THE UNITED STATES. THESE FAMILIES LEFT SYRIA WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES, LEAVING BEHIND THEM SOME OF THE SMALL CHILDREN. FOLLOWING ARE THE DETAILS OF THE FAMILIES:

- (1) SELIM SAADIA - PARENTS AND 5 CHILDREN. THE PARENTS AND 3 CHILDREN ARRIVED IN THE U.S. IN MAY 1987. TWO DAUGHTERS AGED 13 AND 15 REMAIN IN DAMASCUS.
- (2) RAHMO TAWIL - PARENTS AND 8 CHILDREN. THE PARENTS AND 4 CHILDREN ARRIVED IN THE U.S. AT THE BEGINNING OF 1986. 4 CHILDREN AGED 14-18 REMAIN IN ALEPPO.

B. REMARKS

- (1) THE SAADIA FAMILY WENT FIRST TO THE U.S. AND THEN EMIGRATED TO ISRAEL. THE FAMILY TRAVELLED TO THE U.S. WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES.
- (2) THE TAWIL FAMILY HAS REMAINED IN THE U.S. SINCE ITS ARRIVAL THERE.
- (3) WE POSSESS DETAILS OF ADDITIONAL FAMILIES IN THE U.S. WHICH CAN BE PRESENTED SHOULD IT ACTUALLY BECOME POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH THE DEPARTURE OF THE CHILDREN FROM SYRIA.

6. UNMARRIED GIRLS

A. DUE TO THE SMALL NUMBER OF AVAILABE BACHELORS IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY A MOST ACUTE PROBLEM HAS EMERGED OF FINDING

SUITABLE HUSBANDS FOR UNMARRIED ELIGIBLE GIRLS, WHOSE NUMBER TOTAL SOME 200-250. THE SYRIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE OFFICIALLY RECOGNISED THAT THE PROBLEM EXISTS AND PERMIT A SMALL NUMBER OF SUCH UNMARRIED GIRLS TO LEAVE SYRIA FROM TIME TO TIME - ALTHOUGH THIS TOO ONLY AFTER A LONG DELAY AND THE PAYMENT OF EXORBITANT BRIBES.

B. RECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN A DRASTIC DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF UNMARRIED GIRLS PERMITTED TO LEAVE SYRIA. SOME OF THE GIRLS HAD TO MARRY MOSLEMS OUT OF FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

### C O N C L U S I O N

7. IN CONCLUSION IT CAN BE SAID THAT THE SITUATION OF SYRIA JEWRY IN GENERAL IS DIFFICULT, AND THAT OF THE PRISONERS MOST SEVERE. THERE IS THE CONSTANT THREAT OF NEW UNEXPECTED AND HARSH MEASURES BEING INTRODUCED BY THE AUTHORITIES FOLLOWING POSSIBLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING A CHANGE OF REGIME IN SYRIA ITSELF.

8. THE WHOLE COMMUNITY IS AWARE OF THIS POSSIBILITY AND LIVES IN FEAR OF THE FUTURE, WHILST PRESENTLY BEING TOTALLY SUBJECTED TO THE WHIMS AND MERCIES OF THE APPARATUS OF SURVEILLANCE AND SUPPRESSION IMPOSED ON IT.

9. IT IS MOST URGENT TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO OBTAIN THE SPEEDY RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS WHO ARE LANGUISHING IN PRISON, TO UNITE CHILDREN WITH THEIR PARENTS WHO ARE ABROAD AND TO LIBERALIZE THE POLICY REGARDING THE EXIT FROM SYRIA OF UNMARRIED GIRLS.



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## THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN NORTH YEMEN

MAY 88

### BACKGROUND

1. FOLLOWING THE GENERAL EXODUS OF JEWS FROM NORTH YEMEN (THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC) WHICH ENDED IN THE EARLY 1960'S THERE REMAIN TODAY APPROXIMATELY 1000-1200 JEWS IN THE COUNTRY.
2. THEY ARE SPREAD ABOUT IN SMALL COMMUNITIES NEAR THE YEMEN-SAUDI BORDER AND ARE UNDER THE STRICT SUPERVISION OF THE AUTHORITIES.
3. THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING IS GENERALLY NOT VERY HIGH AND APPROXIMATES THAT OF THEIR MOSLEM NEIGHBOURS.

### JEWISH LIFE IN NORTH YEMEN

4. JEWS ARE PROHIBITED FROM LEAVING THE COUNTRY UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. IN THIS THEY DIFFER FROM THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN OTHER MOSLEM COUNTRIES SUCH AS MOROCCO OR TUNIS WHERE THERE ARE ALMOST NO RESTRICTUONS, OR EVEN SUCH AS SYRIA WHICH HAS SEVERE BUT NOT UNCIRCUMVENTABLE REGULATIONS.
5. THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF NORTH YEMEN IS TOTALLY CUT OFF FROM ALL OTHER JEWISH COMMUNITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

6. FREEDOM OF RELIGION IS LIMITED SOLELY TO WITHIN THE JEWS' HOMES, THERE ARE NO SYNAGOGUES. THERE IS A SEVERE SHORTAGE OF RITUAL ARTICLES, PRAYER AND OTHER HOLY BOOKS AND THE FINANCIAL MEANS TO HOLD JEWISH RITES AND FESTIVALS.

7. THERE IS A TOTAL BAN ON CORRESPONDANCE WITH THE FAMILIES OF THE JEWS OUTSIDE THE YEMEN.

8. THE JEWS ARE LIMITED IN THEIR LABOUR TO BEING SILVERSMITHS, ARTISANS IN WOOD OR METAL AND LEATHERWORKERS, THEY ARE PROHIBITED FROM TAKING UP OTHER TRADES OR FROM DEALING IN OR OWNING PROPERTY.

9. JEWS ARE FORBIDDEN TO REMOVE OR CONCEAL THEIR EARLOCKS AS THESE SERVE AS AN EXTERNAL SIGN OF THEIR JUDAISM FOR ALL TO SEE. THE HIDING OF EARLOCKS IS CONSIDERED A SEVERE CONTRAVENTION OF THE LAW.

10. DURING 1986-1987 GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF THE JEWS WAS TIGHTENED AS WAS THE MONITORING OF FOREIGNERS WHO CAME IN CONTACT WITH THEM. THE JEWS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUK (MARKET) WERE ALSO MORE STRICTLY CONTROLLED.

11. THERE ARE NOW FEARS THAT FOLLOWING THE ATTACK BY THE ISRAELI AIR-FORCE ON TERRORIST BASES IN TUNIS, THE YEMEN GOVERNMENT MAY BE WORRIED THAT A SIMILAR ATTACK MAY BE CARRIED OUT ON TERRORIST BASES IN THEIR COUNTRY AND THEREFORE THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE HOLDING THE JEWS AS HOSTAGES.

U.S. ACTIVITY FOR THE RELEASE OF YEMENITE JEWRY

12. AT OUR BEHEST, IN MARCH 1986 THE HEADS OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH LOBBY, FISHER, GORDIE ZACKS, GEORGE KLIEN - EACH VIA HIS OWN CHANNELS, APPROACHED THE VICE PRESIDENT, GEORGE BUSH AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON BEHALF OF THE YEMENITE JEWISH COMMUNITY. THIS, AFTER IT WAS LEARNED OF THE V.P.S. PROPOSED VISIT TO NORTH YEMEN.

13. AT THE END OF MARCH 86, THE THEN PRIME MINISTER SHIMON PERES, BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT IN HIS TALKS WITH MR. BUSH.

14. AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL 86 MR. BUSH VISITED NORTH YEMEN AND THE SUBJECT WAS RAISED IN TALKS BETWEEN MR. BUSH'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DON GREG AND THE YEMENITE FOREIGN MINISTER. IN RETURN THE FOREIGN MINISTER PAINTED A PICTURE ACCORDING TO WHICH THOSE JEWS WHO WISH TO DO SO ARE FREE TO LEAVE FOR ANY COUNTRY EXCEPT ISRAEL, HOWEVER HE POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE CONTENT WITH THEIR SITUATION AND HAD NOT EXPRESSED A WISH TO LEAVE.

15. FOLLOWING THESE CONTACTS WE HELD TALKS WITH DON GREG, WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL AND THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO NORTH YEMEN.

16. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO NORTH YEMEN REITERATED HIS OPINION THAT ANY AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE QUESTION OF YEMENITE JEWRY WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL YEMENITE AFFAIRS AND SHOULD THE SUBJECT BE BROACHED TO THE PRESIDENT OF YEMEN HIS REACTION WOULD WITHOUT DOUBT BE MOST NEGATIVE.

17. THIS POSITION HAS NOT LEFT US MUCH HOPE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

18. THE MAJORITY OF NORTH YEMEN JEWS YEARN FOR SALVATION (THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL). HOWEVER, FEAR OF GOVERNMENTAL REPRISAL PREVENTS THEM FROM MAKING ANY ATTEMPT TO LEAVE OR EVEN FROM EXPRESSING A DESIRE TO DO SO.

19. ANY STEPS THAT MAY BE TAKEN TO FACILITATE THE IMMIGRATION OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY FROM NORTH YEMEN AND THEIR REUNIFICATION WITH THEIR FAMILIES, OUTSIDE THAT COUNTRY, WOULD BE A WORTHWHILE HUMANITARIAN GESTURE OF THE FINEST KIND.

20. DUE TO THE LACK OF CONTACT WITH JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE REST OF THE WORLD THE JEWS OF YEMEN ARE HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING THEIR JUDAISM. ACTION TO BRING ABOUT THE OPENING OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE YEMENITE JEWS AND OVERSEAS COMMUNITIES WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO THE PRESERVATION OF THIS DWINDLING CONGREGATION AND THEIR HISTORIC TRADITIONS.

21. IT IS WORTH APPEALING TO OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS TO AGAIN CHECK OUT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE YEMEN AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW THE ABOVE.

22. WE RECOMMEND USING MR. SCHULTZ'S VISIT TO ISRAEL IN ORDER TO BROACH THE SUBJECT WITH THE AIM OF BRINGING ABOUT A FURTHER MEETING BETWEEN THE US AMBASSADOR TO NORTH YEMEN AND THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY THERE.

# THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN IRAQ

MAY 88

## BACKGROUND

1. THE IRAQI JEWISH COMMUNITY IS ONE OF THOSE IN REPRESSIVE COUNTRIES ABOUT WHOM UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION IS CLOUDED AND VAGUE.
2. THIS IS A RESULT OF THE ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM AND JEWISH COMMUNITIES ABROAD. IN FACT, IT HAS BEEN MANY YEARS SINCE THERE HAS BEEN DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY AND THEIR RELATIVES AND/OR OTHER JEWS OUTSIDE OF IRAQ.
3. THE JEWS IN IRAQ FEAR ANY KIND OF CONTACT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT WITH FOREIGNERS OR JEWS WHO MAY BE VISITING THEIR COUNTRY. THEIR RELATIVES ABROAD, WHO MAINTAIN A TENUOUS CONTACT WITH THEM (BY TELEPHONE AND MAIL) ARE ALSO CAREFUL TO AVOID TRYING TO GET ANY INFORMATION OUT OF THEM WHICH MAY BE USED AS AN EXCUSE BY THE AUTHORITIES FOR FURTHER REPRESSIONS.
4. DUE TO THE ABOVE WE HAVE ONLY PARTIAL AND FRAGMENTED INFORMATION AS TO THE SITUATION OF IRAQI JEWISH COMMUNITY.

## CURRENT CONDITIONS

5. THE IRAQI JEWISH COMMUNITY NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 250-300 PERSONS. THE GREATER MAJORITY LIVE IN BAGHDAD AND THE REST IN BASRA AND NAZRIA.

6. MOST OF THE COMMUNITY ARE AT LEAST MIDDLE-AGED (OVER 40) AND AMONGST THEM A LARGE NUMBER ARE 60 YEARS OLD AND ABOVE. THE ESTIMATION AS TO YOUNG PEOPLE OF UP TO 25 YEARS OLD IS NO MORE THAN 30-40 INDIVIDUALS.

7. IN BAGHDAD THE JEWS ARE TO BE FOUND IN SEVERAL NEIGHBOURHOODS:

A. THE OLD CITY (SHURJA) - GENERALLY THE POORER FAMILIES.

B. BATAWEEN - A NUMBER OF MIDDLE CLASS INDIVIDUALS.

C. ILWIYE - MIDDLE CLASS FAMILIES.

D. MASBAH A-RASAT - WEALTHY FAMILIES.

8. THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMUNITY CAN BE DESCRIBED AS BELONGING TO THE MIDDLE CLASS.

9. THERE ARE NO KNOWN COMMERCIAL RESTRICTIONS SPECIFIC TO THE JEWISH POPULATION. UP TO THREE YEARS AGO THERE WAS A THRIVING BUSINESS COMMUNITY BUT THIS HAS DIMINISHED DUE TO THE WAR AND THE DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMY. THE JEWS TOO HAVE SUFFERED AS A RESULT, THOUGH NOT DIRECTLY FOR THEIR JEWISHNESS. AS FAR AS IT IS KNOWN THEY ARE NOT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST IN COMPARISON WITH THE MOSLEM POPULATION.

10. MOST MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY ARE INVOLVED IN COMMERCE, IMPORT-EXPORT AND THE SMALL-SCALE MANUFACTURER OF VARIOUS GOODS. A MINORITY ARE PROFESSIONALS.

11. A COMMUNITY FRAMEWORK EXISTS AND THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE SYNAGOGUES:

- A. BABEL SHERJI - THE MASOUDA SHEMTOV SYNAGOGUE.
- B. NATHAL STREET.
- C. BATAWEEN.

12. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS NO ACTIVE JEWISH SCHOOL OR HEVRAH KADISHA (BURIAL SOCIETY) AND FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE CARRIED OUT BY MOSLEMS.

13. THE COMMUNITY COUNCIL IS EXTREMELY WEALTHY FOLLOWING LARGE BEQUESTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY OVER THE YEARS. THEY OWN, AMONGST OTHER THINGS BUILDINGS AND LAND IN THE CITY CENTER. THE COUNCIL UTILISES THE REVENUES TO SUPPORT THE NEEDY AND FOR THE UPKEEP OF THE SYNAGOGUES, AS WELL AS WHATEVER MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE GOOD OF THE COMMUNITY.

#### RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT

14. ON THIS SUBJECT TOO THERE IS NO KNOWLEDGE OF RESTRICTIONS SPECIFIC TO THE JEWS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESTRICTIONS WHICH ARE IN FORCE FOR THE GENERAL POPULATION, JEWS ARE FORBIDDEN TO GO ABROAD. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, PERMITTED TO TRAVEL FREELY WITHIN THE COUNTRY.

15. SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE AND THE JEWS SPECIFICALLY HAVE BEEN FORBIDDEN FOREIGN TRAVEL FOR VISITS OR MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ALL APPLICATIONS FOR EXIT PERMITS HAVE BEEN DENIED (THERE BEING SOME EXCEPTIONS IN SPECIAL CASES FOR THOSE WITH THE RIGHT CONNECTIONS WITHIN THE BA'ATH PARTY).

16. DESPITE THE AFORE-MENTIONED RESTRICTIONS THERE HAVE BEEN 2 OR 3 JEWS WHO WERE ALLOWED ABROAD DURING THIS PERIOD. THE TRIPS WERE ALLOWED FOR COMMERCIAL REASONS ONLY AND NO FAMILY WERE PERMITTED TO ACCOMPANY THEM.

17. AN IMPORTER OR EXPORTER WHO WISHES TO RECEIVE AN EXIT PERMIT MUST FULFIL THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:

- A. BE A MEMBER OF THE IRAQI CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND OF THE IMPORT AND EXPORT AUTHORITY.
- B. MUST RECEIVE PERMISSION FROM THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE.
- C. MUST PROVE THAT A DEAL OF 5000 DINARS HAS BEEN DONE THROUGH THE REFIDIEN BANK.

CONGRESSMAN MEL LEVIN

18. IN THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY 88, CONGRESSMAN MEL LEVIN VISITED IRAQ.

19. WHILE THERE, HE VISITED A SYNAGOGUE IN BAGHDAD IN THE COMPANY OF AN IRAQI OFFICIAL.

20. THE CONGRESSMAN REPORTED THAT ABOUT 40 MEMBERS OF THE CONGREGATION WERE THERE. MOST OF THE MEN WERE 60-70 YEARS OLD, WHILE THE WOMEN WERE SOMEWHAT YOUNGER. THERE WERE ALSO A NUMBER OF YOUNG PEOPLE PRESENT.

21. ABOUT 20 MINUTES AFTER MR. LEVIN'S ARRIVAL 4 IRAQI SOLDIERS ARMED WITH MACHINE-GUNS ENTERED THE SYNAGOGUE AND THE LEADER OF THE CONGREGATION WAS FORCED TO LEAD A PRAYER FOR THE WELL-BEING OF SADDAM

HUSSEIN.

22. AS MR. LEVIN WAS LEAVING, A BOY OF ABOUT 10 YEARS OLD STUCK TO HIM AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN WITH HIM. AT THE SAME TIME THE BOY'S OLDER BROTHER ALSO APPROACHED MR. LEVIN AND WHISPERED "SAVE US" AND PASSED THE VISITOR HIS NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER.

23. AN AIDE TO MR. LEVIN, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT, SAID THAT IN CONVERSATIONS HE HAD HAD WITH JEWS, ALL SPOKE OF THEIR HOPELESS SITUATION.

24. DURING HIS VISIT MEL LEVIN MET WITH THE IRAQI ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NAZAR HAMDOUN, AND REQUESTED HIM TO ALLOW AN ELDERLY WOMAN TO LEAVE IRAQ IN ORDER TO JOIN HER CHILDREN OVERSEAS. THE ASSISTANT MINISTER PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER BUT NOTHING HAS BEEN HEARD OR DONE SINCE THEN.

#### CONCLUSION

25. THE INFORMATION WE HAVE IS VERY SPARSE DUE TO THE SITUATION DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT.

26. IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGOUS TO UTILISE THE VISIT OF SECRETARY SCHULTZ IN ISRAEL TO APPROACH HIM TO INFLUENCE THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW THE JEWS OF IRAQ THE FOLLOWING:

- A. FREEDOM TO TRAVEL ABROAD.
- B. REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES OUTSIDE THAT COUNTRY.
- C. TO HAVE CONTACT WITH JEWISH COMMUNITIES ABROAD.

נקודות לשיחה עם המזכיר שולץ

5.6.1988

1. אנו דבקים בעמדתנו שבהעדר משא-ומתן ישיר עם שכנותינו, נקבל בברכה מעורבות אמריקאית בתהליך שלום. כל תחליף אחר יהיה שלילי ויעודד את הערבים להמשיך להתחמק ממשא-ומתן ישיר.

2. על אף שגם אתה וגם אנחנו הפרדנו, מן ההתחלה, בין המהומות בי"ש"ע לבין התהליך המדיני, ברור שגורמים רבים, וביחוד הערבים ראו את המהומות כדלק שמזין את התהליך. לכן הציפיות והתביעות עלו מעל למקובל בתנאים רגילים. ועידת הפסגה הערבית, יהיו תוצאותיה אשר יהיו, היא תוצאה של האופוריה הזאת ובודאי לא תועיל לתהליך שאנו מעוניינים בקידומו.

3. הבנה בין-מעצמתית היא ברכה לעולם וגם לנו, ביחוד בכל מה שנוגע לצמצום הנשק. בנוגע לאזורנו ולסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי חשתי שבריה"מ תרשום לזכותה הסכמה אמריקאית לוועידה בינלאומית ותמשיך באותה עת במדיניותה הנוכחית של תמיכה בקיצוניות הערבית ושל בלימת משא-ומתן דו-צדדי ישיר.

4. נקבעה לי פגישה עם שברנדזה בשבוע הבא ובדעתי לומר לו שנקבל בברכה חדוש היחסים הדיפלומטיים, אך לא נסכים להתנייתם בשום נושא מדיני ובודאי לא בוועידה בינלאומית.

5. קבלנו דיווח משיפטר בענין יהודי בריה"מ. במה שנוגע לתחום של יציאת יהודים מבריה"מ, אנו מעריכים את ההתפתחויות כטרגדיה בשבילנו. מבחינתנו, כל המאמצים שהשקענו, ביחד עם כל אלה שסייעו בעדנו, יורדים לטמיון כאשר למעלה מ-90 אחוז מן היוצאים מבריה"מ עוברים לארה"ב. התופעה של יהודים היוצאים עם ויזה ישראלית כדי לעלות לישראל ומשנים כוון ועוברים במקום זאת לארה"ב (או לארץ אחרת) מקוממת אותנו, פוגעת בנו והופכת את כל הפעולה לתרמית אחת גדולה. אנו מבקשים, על-כן -

- א. שארה"ב תסייע לנו, במידת הצורך, כדי להסדיר טיסות ישירות ממוסקבה.
- ב. שהסיוע האמריקאי לארגוני סעד המסייעים ליהודי רוסיה לעבור לארה"ב יועבר למטרה אחרת, כגון סיוע לקליטתם בישראל.
- ג. שיבוטל הקריטריון של פליט לגבי יהודי בריה"מ, בהתחשב בעובדה שהם עוברים לישראל.
- ד. שארה"ב תודיע לבריה"מ שמעתה, כל מי שרוצה להגר לארה"ב יצויד באשרה אמריקאית כבר במוסקבה.

6. יש לנו אינטרס קבוע שארה"ב תמשיך להיות הגורם בעל השפעה במזרח-התיכון ובידיה המפתח לתהליך של שלום בין ישראל ומדינות ערב. גורבצ'וב הכריז בזמן הפסגה שהסתיימה הבלעדיות האמריקאית בתחום הזה. אנו מפרשים הכרזתו כנסיון לדחוף לקיטוב באזור, כאשר בריה"מ ניצבת לצד מדינות ערב וארה"ב לצד ישראל. אילו רצה בשתוף פעולה עם ארה"ב לקידום הסדר - ולא בתחרות על מעמד והשפעה באזור - היה משנה מדיניותו כלפי הסכסוך מתמיכה מוחלטת בעמדה הערבית לקו מאוזן יותר כלפינו.

7. גם אם הפעילות האמריקאית לא תישא פרי, אנו מתייחסים אליה בחיוב כיון שהיא מנטרלת כל מיני יוזמות שליליות. יחד עם זאת, יתכן מאוד שנגזר עלינו לחיות עם הסטטוס-קוו למשך זמן ניכר בגלל השיתוק הנגרם על-ידי הקונסנסוס הערבי. לכן צריכים אנו להיערך לסטטוס-קוו בצורה שתמנע התפתחויות שליליות. זה אומר שישראל צריכה להמשיך להיות חזקה, שהברית עם ארה"ב צריכה להיות איתנה ומעמיקה והולכת, ושהדלת למשא-ומתן לשלום נשארת פתוחה לרווחה, תוך נטילת יוזמות לשם בדיקת האפשרויות להסדר.

8. אני מצטער שלא היתה הענות חיובית לקריאתנו להקים קרן לשקום הפליטים הערבים-פלסטינים ביש"ע בתחום השכון. כל שאר התחומים הנוגעים לפליטים הללו ניתנים לטיפול על-ידינו מלבד התחום של שכון, שהוא הקשה והזועק ביותר מבחינה אנושית ומוסרית. אני משוכנע שהדבר יכול להעשות ללא זיקה לתהליך השלום, ורק יסייע לו.

9. יחסינו עם מצרים מדאיגים אותנו. המצב הקיים הוא של שיתוק כמעט מוחלט בכל מישורי היחסים. החשש שלנו הוא שתימשך ההדרדרות ותגיע למצב שאין ממנו חזרה. המצרים נמנעים ממגע עמנו ולא ניתנת האפשרות אפילו לקיים עמם שיחה מעמיקה כדי להזהירם מהתפתחות מסוכנת. רצוי שתקיים עם מוברק שיחה בענין זה ותפציר בו לעשות לבלימת הנטייה הנוכחית.

10. יהדות המצוקה. מסרנו לשגריר וולטרס פרטים וניר על סוריה לקראת שיחתו עם הנשיא אסד. מודים על פעולתו. לא היו תוצאות חיוביות ואנו מבקשים לחזור ולעלות הנושא בהזדמנות מתאימה עם אסד. רק על פיו ישק דבר בענין זה. אנו מבינים שיחסי ארה"ב עם צפון תימן משתפרים. יש שם כאלף יהודים המנותקים מן העולם היהודי ומחזיקים אותם שם מסיבות שאינן מובנות לנו כלל. אנו מעבירים נירות על שתי הקהילות הללו וכן על מה שידוע לנו בקשר ליהודי עיראק לתשומת לב ולטיפול כל שניתן.

11. ההתפתחות בקשר לרכישת טילי קרקע-קרקע על-ידי מדינות האזור שלנו חמורה ביותר. דברנו בעבר על רכישת הטילים הסינים על-ידי סעודיה ונושא זה ראוי שיזכה למעקב צמוד על-ידי גורם משותף לכם ולנו, לשם התייעצות בדבר נקיטת צעדים אפשריים.

12. פרוייקט הטק"ק המצרי-עיראקי-ארגנטיני מדאיג אותנו במיוחד. מעורבות בו כמה מדינות אירופיות - צרפת, איטליה ורפ"ג, נוסף על ארגנטינה, והטכנולוגיה לפרוייקט מקורה בארה"ב והיא מועברת על-ידי אותן מדינות לצרכי הפרוייקט הזה. אנו פעלנו אצל הממשלות האירופיות שבהן מדובר וללא תוצאות. שיתפנו את ה-CIA במידע שברשותנו ואנו מבקשים טפול בדרג מדיני גבוה מצדכם כלפי אותן מדינות לבלימת הפרוייקט.

13. פתוח נשק כימי הופך לתופעת קבע חמורה ביותר באזורנו. גם בנושא זה אנו מציעים קיום קשר הדוק, קבוע ומקיף שדרכו יזרום המידע ודרכו יועברו בקשות לטפל בכל מקרה של רכישת חומרים, טכנולוגיה וכל מה שקשור בנשק זה. אין לזלזל גם במערכת של לחצים מדיניים ופומביים על המדינות העוסקות בפתוח נשק כימי.

י. ח. בן-אהרן

SETTLEMENT OF THE LAND ISSUE WITHOUT  
PREJUDICE TO THE FINAL  
STATUS OF TERRITORIES  
OCCUPIED SINCE 1967  
AND TO THE NEEDS  
AND WELFARE OF ALL  
PEOPLES CONCERNED  
AND TO THE PRINCIPLE  
OF LAND FOR PEACE  
AND TO THE NEEDS  
AND WELFARE OF ALL  
PEOPLES CONCERNED

27

Hand

WF-U11 86/84/88 (423)

SHULTZ MAKES ARRIVAL STATEMENT IN JORDAN ON PEACE TALKS  
(TEXT: SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ JUNE 4 REMARKS IN AMMAN)

WASHINGTON -- SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ ARRIVED IN  
JORDAN JUNE 4 TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON BRINGING ABOUT  
NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

ON ARRIVAL, SHULTZ SAID THAT JORDAN HAS A CRUCIAL ROLE  
TO PLAY IN THIS PEACE PROCESS, WITH THE SECRETARY SAYING HE  
LOOKS FORWARD TO "PRODUCTIVE" DISCUSSIONS WITH KING  
HUSSEIN.

THE FOLLOWING IS A TEXT OF THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL  
STATEMENT IN JORDAN.

(BEGIN TEXT)

I RETURN TO JORDAN TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON BRINGING  
ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. JORDAN HAS A  
CRUCIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN THIS PROCESS. I LOOK FORWARD TO  
PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN.

WE NEED TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE --  
AN EQUITABLE, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE BETWEEN ARABS  
AND ISRAELIS. TOO OFTEN THE DETAILS OF DAY-TO-DAY  
DIPLOMACY OVERSHADOW THE SUBSTANCE. PROCEDURE AND PROCESS  
ARE IMPORTANT TOOLS OF DIPLOMACY, BUT THEY MUST BE ANCHORED  
ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.

ANY SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT MUST BE  
BASED ON THREE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS:

FIRST, THE BASIS OF ANY NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS  
RESOLUTION 242 AND ITS CALL FOR THE EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY  
FOR PEACE. THE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 APPLY TO ALL  
FRONTS. THERE CAN BE NO GENUINE PEACE WITHOUT AN EQUITABLE  
SETTLEMENT OF THE LAND ISSUE, AND THERE CAN BE NO

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UNCLASSIFIED

USINFO 242335Z JUN 88/01

SETTLEMENT OF THE LAND ISSUE WITHOUT TRUE PEACE. THE  
EXTENT OF TERRITORIAL WITHDRAWAL, THE PACE OF ITS  
IMPLEMENTATION AND THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONS THAT WILL  
EXIST ACROSS BORDERS --ALL THESE ARE ISSUES FOR  
NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES THEMSELVES.

SECOND, THERE CAN BE NO SETTLEMENT WITHOUT ADDRESSING  
LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS. !

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USINFO 242335Z JUN 88/01

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THIRD, THERE CAN BE NO SETTLEMENT WITHOUT ADDRESSING LEGITIMATE ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS AS WELL AS THOSE OF OTHER STATES IN THE REGION.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IS MORE THAN JUST A DISPUTE OVER BOUNDARIES. IT INVOLVES IDENTITY, ASPIRATIONS, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY.

OUR INITIATIVE HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO RESPOND TO THESE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES.

FOR ALL OF THIS TO WORK, THERE MUST BE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI ACCOMMODATION. THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF WINNER-TAKE-ALL, IN WHICH ONE SIDE CAN WIN EVERYTHING IT WANTS. PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS MUST LEARN TO TREAT EACH OTHER DECENTLY, RESPECT THEIR MUTUAL RIGHT TO LIVE IN SECURITY AND FULFILL THEIR POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS.

THIS IS NOT AN EASY AGENDA. THE OBSTACLES WE FACE ARE FORMIDABLE. BUT IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED -- AND I THINK WE CAN SUCCEED -- WE MUST ADDRESS OUR EFFORTS TO THE THINGS THAT MATTER. I AM SURE OUR TALKS TODAY WILL KEEP US ON THE RIGHT ROAD TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL WE SEEK: A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE.

(END TEXT)

(MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED)

(LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED)

ITEM

BT

#7900

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UNCLASSIFIED

USINFO

242335Z JUN 88/02

הודעת: 6/3103

אל: המשדד

מ-: נ"י, נד: 124, תא: 040688, זח: 1200, דח: נ, טג: בל

תח: ט, גט: מצמא

נד: ט

בלמט/מיידי

נו 18 לרושינגטון

אל: מצמ"א

דע: רושינגטון, לשי דוח'נו, לשי שהב'ט

מאת: הקונסול הכללי ניו יורק

משאלי דעת קהל.

לבטח דאיתם את הוצאות סקר דעת הקהל שהוזמן ע"י ה  
אי.די.אל ושפורטט ב-13 במאי 1938, ונך גם את התוצאות  
הדומות למדי של סקר דעת קהל שהוזמן ע"י "הקונגרס  
היהודי האמריקני" ושפורטט בראשית ה"ז.

הממצאים מאשרים הערכות שהברקתי לבט בשנים אחדות מאז  
החלו המהומות. בענין זה נדאי לקודא גם את מאמרה של  
ג'ין קירקטריק שפורטט בעתונת שווייט בארה"ב ושתרגמו  
לעברית הרביע ב"מעריב" ב-11 במאי.

יגד

תפ: שהח, דהמ, טננל, מהנכל, שהבט, בידן, מצמא, אביטל, מעט, הסברה, דרוצ,  
נזנר, פיוטע, שהוט/לתקשורת, דרוצ-יט

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דף מחוד דפים

סוג בטחוני סודי

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 11.30 31.12.88

מס' מברק

080 נא להעביר למסאז'ר

המשרד

אל : מנכ"ל מדינה, מנהל טעפ"א.  
מאת : דני בלון, דושינגטון.

ג'קסון והמצע הדמוקרטי.

מתוך שיחה עם אן לואיס ( ביחד עם דוד נורה ) : ג'קסון דחה את תכניתו של פול קידק למצע דמוקרטי קצר, דקלורטיבי - כללי ועומד על מצע סובסטנטיבי ודוקטי יקבל זאת, אף כי המצע יהיה קצר בהרבה מזה של -84. הנושאים העיקריים המעניינים את ג'קסון במצע : המאבק בסמים, ענייני חברה ופתוח, ניצול כספי קרנות הפנסיה לפתוח ודרום אפריקה. כמו כן הוא מעוניין להישג בועידה של שינויים נוספים בכללי בחירת צירי הוועידה לקראת '92. נראה כי בנושאים העיקריים במצע הוא ישוב את מבוקשו, וברור כי בנושא דרום אפריקה הוא יקבל את כל מבוקשו, והניסוח יהיה חד וחריף. אן לואיס אמרה כי הצלחה לשכנע את ג'קסון להוציא אזכור שמי של מדינות המסייעות לדרום אפריקה או סוחרות עמה בנושאים אלו (האזכור כלל את ישראל, ברזיל, גרמניה, צרפת ויפן) ויהיה רק ניסוח כללי בלי אזכור שמות.

באשר למזרח התיכון - הטעיף הזה אינו עומד בראש יולם העדיפויות של ג'קסון, אך חלק מאנשיו מעוניינים בנושא הזה, ובמיוחד כמה ערבים - אמריקאים מתומכיו שהצלחת להכנס לוועדת המצע. היא מניחה על סמך ההתבטאויות הפומביות האחרונות של דוקטיס וג'קסון כי ניתן להגיע לנוסח מוסכם בין שני הממנות. (קראו את דו"ח ה-11.12.88)

ג'קסון עצמו היה מעוניין באזכור של זכות "ההגדרה העצמית" לפלשתינים, אך ברור לכל שהנוסח חייב להיות מטפיק מתוך כדי שלא להכריח מביעים יהודים אל מחנה בוש. לואיס ציינה בחיוב כי הובלת מחנהר בשלזאת ועדת המצע ובוועדת הניסוח שלה בחר ג'קסון אנשים מתונים ובעלי ניסיון פוליטי במפלגה הדמוקרטית ולא רדיקלים קיצוניים. המובילים יהיו וילי בראון, הספיקף של בית הנבחרים בקליפורניה, חבר הקונגרס ביל גרידי, אלינור הולמס נורטון, יו"ר הסוכנות לזכויות האדם וממשל קרטז ואן לואיס עצמה. ועדת הניסוח מתכנסת בסוף השבוע במישרזן, בראשות החושל בלאנשארד. מליאת ועדת המצע מתכנסת לקראת סוף יוני בדנוור. בוועדת המצע יכול כל חבר להשיג הסתייגות, ויש לה 3 מאקף קטן בוועדת המפלגה עצמה יש צורך ב 25% מן הצירים להושת הסתייגות. למחנה ג'קסון יהיו ל - 30% מן הוועידה.

11.12.88

דני בלון

דני בלון

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שגרירות ישראל / נושין גטון

12

טופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

מיידי דחופות

תאריך/ז"ח 3.6.88


מס' מברק

099

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א - נא פסקו זמ לאתניי איב אלקר.  
דע: לשכת רוה"מ, לשכת שה"ח  
מאת: עתונות

בעקבות הידיעות בעתונות הישראלית על גיוסי כספים בארה"ב למערכות הבחירות של חליכוד והמערך אנו נשאלים כאן האם קיימות הגבלות חוקיות או האם חלה חובת הדנוח ואם כן למי.  
אנא בחוזר.

  
יוסי גל

התא 3      גמל 2      מ"מ 1      גמל 3      me 2

טופס מברק

דף 1 מחוד 1 לפים

סוג בסחוני סודי

דחיפות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 30.11.88

מס' מברק

המשרד + בטחון

85

096

אנא הסדירו גם אגודת ארץ - דהולנד לזכר

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מקש"ח - משהב"ט

נספח חיל האוויר

נציג רפ"ל - כאן

קונגרס: פופ-איי

במשך החודש האחרון אנו פעלנו במרץ (ובדיסקרטיות) לזרז את REPROGRAMMING של כספי שת"א 1987 (17 מליון דולר) לצורך קידום הבדיקות של המערכת הנ"ל. לשם "תיכנות מחדש" של כספים כאלה חייבים להשיג את הסכמתן של ארבע ועדות בקונגרס (העדות לשרותים מזוינים וועדות המשנה לתקציב הפנטגון בשני הבתים). כידוע למשהב"ט, נכון להיום שלוש ועדות כבר הודיעו לפנטגון על הסכמתן (לא היו בעיות בועדה לשרותים מזוינים בביה"נ; הקונגרסמן צ'רלי וילסון נשא את הדגל בועדת תקציב הפנטגון; ואילו הסנטורים קנל לוין וג'וז וורנר תרמו לסגירת העניין בועדה לשרותים מזוינים בסנט). רק ועדת תקציב הפנטגון בסנט טרם אישרה את התכנית, על אף פעילות ענפה - לרבות ע"י השגריר - כלפי הסנטורים והעוזרים הנוגעים בדבר בועדה זו. הודות להתערבות האישיה של הסנטור דניס דה-קונסיני נראה עתה שהועדה מסכימה לתכנות מחדש, אך עוזרים בכירים (בעיקר המופקדים על נושא המו"פ) עדיין עוסקים בסחבת, ונך צירוף הבקשה בנושא הפופ-איי לחבילה גדולה של בקשות נוספות שטרם אושרו. עוזריהם של הסנטורים דה-קונסיני ובנט ג'ונסטון ינסו לפרוץ סכר זה בשבוע הבא (לאחר שובם של הסנטורים מפגרת יום הזכרון).

נמשיך ללחוץ.

מדי (M) בן  
למדו

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including the name "Madi" and various initials and numbers.







שניירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף \_\_\_\_\_ מחור \_\_\_\_\_ זפים \_\_\_\_\_

סווג בטחוני \_\_\_\_\_

דחיסות \_\_\_\_\_

תאריך/ז"ח \_\_\_\_\_

מס' מברק \_\_\_\_\_

2/2

10 / 91 / 107

- דבר זה חשוב לנו בעיקר לגבי ההוראות הנוגעות לרכישת "פריטים חיוניים" (CRITICAL ITEMS).
- אנו ממשיכים לקיים מגעים בנדון. חסיכויים נראים טובים.
- (5) דיקסון (בדבר הבטיח התעשייתי הבטחוני ובדבר הסודי האופ - סט).
  - כנייל-טרם נידון.
  - חרף נטיונותינו ומאמצי השיכנוע של מל רישי, עוזרו הראשי של דיקסון טרם הסכים לשינוי שבצירוף למברקנו <sup>753</sup> - 31.6. ייתכן שיסכים להבהיר את העניין בלשון הדוי"ח. אין אנו מרפים, ומימצא דרך לפנות לסנטור ישירות.
  - (6) ברי (בדבר ציוד אישי, וההגבלות על מוצרים שיש בהם סיכונים מלאכותיים).
  - לא (אלא) יידון בקונפרנס.
  - כמדווח, ממשיכים להתמוקד עם בעייה רצינית זו תוך מגמה למצוא פתרון באמצעות חוק תקציב הפנטגון.

(ג) פעילות זרה נוספת

נצייב לייצוא בטחוני הצליח לזרז את הבריטים, הרפג"ים והאיטלקים ששלחו מכתבים חשבווע לבכירי הוועדות לשירותים מזוינים והביעו הסתיגויותיהם מתיקוני בנטלי וקנדי. הקנדים מעבירים את עמדתם בע"פ ולא בכתב. הצרפתים טרם פעלו.

תד כאן.

י. א. ס. / 31.6  
למדן

98

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מדי

תאריך/ז"ח 20:00 - 6.88

מס' מברק

אל : ה מ ש ר ד

066

אל : סמנכ"ל צפ"א  
לשכת ראה"מ  
לשכת שה"ח

מז"ת בפטגה .

לפי אוקלי - שלא ידע הרבה פרטים שכן לא הגיע דווח מפורט - העלה הנשיא את הנושא בפגישה עם גורבצ'וב. רייגן אמר - לפי טקסט שהוכן לו, שארה"ב הניחה על השלחן חכנית, טובה לדעתה, לפתרון הטכסוך המזה"ת והיא מקווה שבריה"מ תתמוך ביזמה זו.

כמו כן אמר אוקלי ששיחותיו הטלפוניות עם רוס הבין שאין פריצת דרך בעמדותיה של בריה"מ אף כי התגלתה גמישות בכמה נושאים. העובדה שבריה"מ משאירה כביכול את שאלת הייצוג הפלשתינאי ומהות הפתרון בידי הערבים אינה נתפסת על ידי ארה"ב כסימן לגמישות אלא כהתחמקות מהאחריות של בריה"מ לגבי הפרטנרים שלה במזה"ת.

כמו כן הוא הוסיף שאת הקטע בתדרון רידג'ווי וניצה על המזה"ת כתב רוס וכי נקבעה פגישה בדרג מומחים ביולי. וודאי תקבלו פרט מלא מרוס עצמו בביקורו.

ערו

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and various symbols and words.

הודעת אגודה הודעה  
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הגדרות ישראל / רושינגטון

סוס מברק

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סודג בטחוני סגדי

דחיסות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 3.6.88

מס' מברק

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המשרד, בטחון, משיין-מחשבים

אל: עמנכ"ל בטחון, יועץ שהביט לתקשורת  
דע: מצפ"א, לשכת רוה"מ, לשכת שה"ח; ס/רמשיין רכש  
מאת: עחונות

רמוני גז - מברק סרמשיין 347 מ-2.6.88

כפי שאנו מדווחים זה זמן עולה חכופות נושא השמוש בגז מדמיע בתקשורת כמו גם הדווחים על הלחץ המאסיבי שמפעיל הלובי הערבי על החברה. אנו מבינים כי מכתבה של החברה לרוה"מ (שלנו 84, בטחון 76) נשאר ללא מענה וממליצים לשלוח המכתב המבוקש (מה גם שבניסוחים האלו אנו משתמשים זה זמן רב). אם "חשבר" החברה יוצר חקדים מסוכן מבחינת הישג ל-ADC על כל המשתמע מכך.

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שגרירות ישראל / נושינגטון

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דחיפות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 3.6.88

מס' מברק

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המשרד, בטחון

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה  
דע: יועץ שהביט לתקשורת, דובר צה"ל  
מאת: עתונות

כלא קציעות

להלן ספורו הנרחב של גלן פרנקל ב"ונושינגטון פוסט"היום (3.6.88).

*יוסי גל*  
יוסי גל

שם המידע 3  
הסבר המידע 2  
מספר המידע 1  
גלן פרנקל 3  
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פוסט"היום 1  
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מס' מברק 1

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# Israeli Army Allows Press Inspection Of Detention Center for Palestinians

By Glenn Frankel  
Washington Post Foreign Service

**KETZIOF, Israel, June 2**—Israel opened to foreign journalists today its controversial new military prison in the scorching Negev Desert where nearly 2,100 Palestinians are being held without charge or trial for up to six months.

Isolation and oppressive boredom appear to be the major enemies of both prisoners and guards in this remote facility 125 miles southwest of Jerusalem. The detainees—rounded up for their alleged involvement in the six-month-old Palestinian uprising—are confined for their entire terms within one small barred-wire enclosure, where they spend most of the daylight hours sitting messieurs on foam rubber mattresses in makeshift army tents to avoid the harsh sun.

Water and food supplies appear adequate, but there are no books except for the Koran, no radios and no recreational activities. And there have been no visits from family members for the past 45 days, a situation the authorities and the prisoners blame on each other.

"Living here is like living in hell," said Yusef Avri, 26, a civil engineer from a West Bank village near the

town of Ramallah who has been detained for a month. "You have to start with the arrest, which we say is illegal. The weather is no good. Living conditions are no good. It's too hot. The food is no good."

Several prisoners also claimed that detainees who mistreated or argued with guards at Bloc No. 3, one of the three large units that comprise the prison, have been kicked out of their tents to the nearby shower area and beaten. An Israeli Army reservist, who did not give his name, sought out this correspondent during today's visit and alleged that beatings occurred regularly.

"If someone talks back or has his shirt unbuttoned, they'll hit you," said the guard, who said he had been serving at the camp for nearly two weeks. "They take them into the shower room and beat them, not with instruments but with their hands and feet. It's just done out of sadism—people are bored."

The prison's veteran military commander, Col. David Tzameach, said he would investigate the allegations. "I haven't heard about it," he said. "If it's happening at all, it's an exception."


Tzameach defended conditions at the prison as "straight as a ruler in

following Army regulations," but he acknowledged he would be "very, very happy" when his assignment ended here, both because of the burden he felt and because of a paternalistic sympathy for the detainees.

"You're their father and their mother and everything," he said. "It's a terrible situation. It's bad for them. Who can they come to except for me? They need help and most of the problems I can't solve for them. They ask me, 'Why am I here?' and I can't tell them."

Israelis call the sprawling \$6 million prison facility "Tzameach," the Hebrew word for "plant," after its warty commander. But Palestinians call it "Ansar Three," after the notorious Israeli detention center in south Lebanon in which several thousand Palestinian guerrillas were held between 1982 and 1985. They consider those detained here political prisoners.

Palestinian activists have charged the prison is a torture center. A recent open letter from inmates, distributed last week by Al Haq, a Ramallah-based human rights group, alleged the Army was waging "a war of starvation and thirst and humiliation and a policy of physical and psychological destruc-



tion," and dubbed Ansar Three "the camp of slow death."

Army officials said today's visit, which took place after weeks of repeated requests by journalists, was designed in part to refute those claims. Prison authorities were alerted to the visit, and journalists were carefully escorted by armed soldiers and by Tzameach. But reporters also were allowed to spend

See DETAINERS, A34, Col. 4

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a limited time with prisoners out of hearing range of soldiers.

"We are not hiding anything," Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Shomron told a news conference last week. "We are making great efforts, in my opinion with success, to create prison conditions—it's not a resort—that are livable in accord with the regulations and rules."

Until the uprising began six months ago, the authorities rarely used administrative detention, a measure also used by the British during their mandate. In December, there were about 50 Palestinian detainees. Now the number exceeds 2,000, following a change in Army regulations in March that made it easier for local commanders to order such detentions and restricted the already limited right of legal review.

Besides condemning the detentions as arbitrary and repressive, human rights activists also contend the new prison violates the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of residents out of occupied territories "for any reason whatsoever." Ketziot's prisoners come from the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the camp is in Israel proper.

Shomron conceded that the prison's location may be a "contradiction" of the Geneva Convention but asserted that "in this situation the state law takes precedence." Other officials say it is Ketziot's very isolation, far from the occupied territories, that made it attractive to them as a detention facility.

At present, there are 2,483 prisoners at Ketziot, 2,061 of them administrative detainees, the rest convicted felons. They range in age from 16 to 68, but most are in their

late 20s or early 30s. Many are among the elite of Palestinian society—doctors, lawyers, engineers and journalists. Their incarceration is for many of them a badge of honor back in their communities, and many former detainees say they became more politically committed and radical after being sent here.

Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin told reporters earlier this week that some of those in detention might in fact be future leaders with whom Israel would someday have to negotiate. But for now, he said, they pose a threat to the restoration of law and order.

Because they have not been charged with a crime, detainees are supposed to receive special privileges, including books, radios, use of their own civilian clothing and regular family visits. But most of these privileges are denied here. Radios would constitute "an incitement," said Tzemach, although he said there are plans to install loudspeakers around the camp and broadcast Arabic music and news reports.

Newspapers arrive several times a week but are a week old and issued one for every 10 prisoners. "They don't need to check the stock market prices," said one Israeli Army major.

Prisoners complain that the Army forces family members who wish to visit to obtain special permits from the military authorities and to ride aboard special private buses that charge up to \$30 for a round trip. Tzemach said relatives have been afraid to come since early April, when activists burned a passenger bus destined for here and accused those seeking to visit of being "collaborators."

"We want them to come," Tzemach said. "It's doing a lot of damage that they're not coming because people are restless. But I

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can't force them to come—and I can't take the prisoners home."

Tzemach said Palestinians eat mostly the same food as the soldiers and get double the ration of water that is allotted the soldiers. Each of the three main compounds has its own kitchen and infirmary, staffed 24 hours a day by a doctor and three medics. In one infirmary today, a young detainee suffering from dehydration lay on a cot with an intravenous tube in his arm.

The overwhelming fact of life in

Ketziot is the desert heat, which sometimes exceeds 100 degrees at noon. The guards, who live inside the compounds in separate areas that surround the prisoner blocs, appear as listless as the detainees.

Each prisoner gets five blankets, one change of clothing, a foam mattress and a wooden floorboard. There are toothbrushes and tooth paste for everyone, but for each tent of 25 men there is only one bar of soap at a time and one disposable razor, which must be surrendered before a new one is issued.

"We live like animals," said a young detainee who called himself Bassam. "There are flies during the day and mosquitoes at night. We have rats. We have scorpions, too."

But for some, the uncertainty of not knowing exactly why they are in prison or when they may be freed is the worst punishment here. They can make a written appeal, which is heard by a three-man advisory board consisting of a military judge and two officers.

So far, the board has heard only 48 cases and recommended release in just a half dozen. Regional commanders have freed two, according to Lt. Col. Shmuel Moyal, legal adviser to Israel's southern commander, Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Mordechai, who oversees the Gaza Strip.

Few detainees have hopes their appeals will be successful. "It's a political decision," said Najib Farraj, a West Bank journalist with the El Kuds Arabic daily, as he waited outside under a corrugated tin kiosk for his case to be heard.

Prison commander Tzemach said the prisoners cause no trouble here.

"They're far away from their natural environment. They're calmer here. There are no pressures."

Nonetheless, he says he understands some of their pain. "They're bored. They're sick of being here. They feel terrible. Outside, it's calming down and they're stuck in here."

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סגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

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 סוג בטחוני...ש.מ.ו.ל.  
 דחיסות.....מ.ד.?  
 חאריב וזי"ח. 17:00 - 6.00  
 מברק מסי

אל : לשכת השר  
 לשכת רה"מ  
 דע : מצפ"א, מע"ת

גלן פרנקל מכין ספור על מאמצי גיוס הכספים של המערך והליכוד בארה"ב.  
 ה"וושינגטון פוסט" התקשר על-מנת לקבל פרטים בנדון היום, ובמיוחד התענינו  
 בליאון צ'רני-וייצמן - מפלגת "יחד" מחד ובגיוס הכספים ע"י נתניהו מאידך.

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סגירות ישראל / נושיונגטון

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תאריך/ז"ח 3.6.88

מס' מברק

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המסר, בטחון, משיין-ממש

אל:מנכ"ל בטחון, יועץ שהביט לתקשורת  
דע: מצפ"א, לשכת רוה"מ, לשכת שה"ח, ס/רמשיין, רכש  
מאת: עחונות

רמוני גז - מברק סרמשיין 347 מ-2.6.88

כפי שאנו מדווחים זה זמן עולה תכופות נושא השמוש בגז מדמיע בתקשורת כמו גם הדווחים על הלחץ המאסיבי שמפעיל הלובי הערבי על החברה. אנו מבינים כי מכתבה של החברה לרוה"מ (שלנו 84, בטחון 76) נשאר ללא מענה וממליצים לשלוח המכתב המבוקש (מה גם שבניסוחים האלו אנו משתמשים זה זמן רב). אם "חשברי" החברה יוצר תקדים מסוכן מבחינת הישג ל-ADC על כל המשתמע מכך.

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TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: PRESS BRIEFING GIVEN BY SECRETARY OF STATE  
GEORGE P. SHULTZ ON THE AIRPLANE LONDON/CAIRO - JUNE 3,  
1988

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*100-211*

1. I THINK YOU HAVE THE SCHEDULE OF WHERE WE ARE GOING TO GO AND SO FORTH AND ALSO WE JUST PASSED OUT THE ARRIVAL STATEMENT THAT I'LL MAKE WHEN WE LAND IN CAIRO. I WILL READ THIS STATEMENT OUT; SO I WON'T EXTEMPORIZE ON IT. I'LL JUST READ IT OUT. SO, LET ME JUST GO THROUGH IT WITH YOU, NOT READING IT, BUT JUST TAKING IT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH SO THAT YOU CAN SEE WHAT IT IS WE ARE TRYING TO DO. ESSENTIALLY THIS IS THE MESSAGE WITH, OF COURSE, VARIATIONS TO SUIT THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT THIS IS THE BASIC MESSAGE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO DELIVER OUT HERE IN THE FEW DAYS THAT WE WILL BE HERE.

2. FIRST OF ALL, THAT THE U.S. IS DOING ALL IT CAN TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE AREA. WE WANT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND WHAT WE NEED IS SOME VISION AND PRAGMATISM AND DETERMINATION. WE ARE STARTING IN EGYPT AS EGYPT HAS BEEN A COUNTRY THAT SUPPORTED THIS INITIATIVE AND HELPED TO CREATE IT.

3. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH BASICALLY IS SAYING TO PEOPLE THAT IF WE ARE GOING TO GET SOMEWHERE YOU HAVE TO BE READY TO COMPROMISE AND YOU CAN'T JUST THINK OF YOUR DREAM AND YOUR CAUSE AND THINK THOSE ARE THE ONLY THINGS THAT ARE LEGITIMATE. THEN WE ASK OURSELVES, WHAT ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS HERE? AND OBVIOUSLY IT COMES DOWN TO THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE TWO NATIONAL MOVEMENTS FOR

SOVEREIGNTY AND IT'S LOOKED UPON AS IN ONE LAND. IT'S NOT ANYBODY'S FAULT THAT THAT'S SO, IT IS SO AND THAT MEANS THAT IT IS A HARD PROBLEM TO RESOLVE, BUT IT CAN BE RESOLVED. NOW, IT GETS SO DIFFICULT TO DO IT BECAUSE IT IS SO HARD FOR PEOPLE TO LAY ASIDE THEIR PREJUDICES, THEIR HATREDS THAT ARE HERE, AND I THINK IT'S FAIR TO SAY OVERBLOWN DREAMS OF WHAT CAN POSSIBLY HAPPEN. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE FATE OF ZIONISM AND PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM ARE INTERDEPENDENT, ALTHOUGH PEOPLE TEND TO REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE THAT. AND WHAT WE SEE INSTEAD OF A POLITICAL DIALOGUE THAT'S NECESSARY IS A TENDENCY TO SHARPEN THE DIFFERENCES RIGHT NOW. WE'VE GOT TO START MOVING IN THE OTHER DIRECTION.-

NOW NEGOTIATIONS WORK, THEY HAVE WORKED, THEY WILL WORK. THAT'S BEEN PROVEN DRAMATICALLY IN THE CASE OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL WHERE THEY HAVE RECOVERED TERRITORY. THEY HAVE CONDUCTED THEIR CAMPAIGNS FOR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND THE TACTICS THAT HAVE BEEN USED BY OTHERS, THE TACTICS OF VIOLENCE AND THE REFUSAL TO CONFRONT REALITY, JUST HAVEN'T GOTTEN THEM ANYWHERE. IT'S JUST GOTTEN THEM MISERY.

4. NOW, NOBODY CAN BE ASSURED, OF HOW A NEGOTIATION WILL COME OUT. IF YOU WANT TO KNOW WHERE YOU ARE GOING TO COME OUT, YOU JUST CAN'T GET STARTED. SO, PEOPLE HAVE, IN A SENSE, WORKED THEMSELVES INTO A KIND OF SELF DESTRUCTIVE PATTERN HERE. SO, WE HAVE SET OUT NOW SOME GUIDES THAT I AM GOING TO TALK ABOUT TO EVERYBODY.

5. THE FIRST IS THAT THERE IS ROOM, THERE IS PHYSICAL SPACE, FOR ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS TO LIVE SIDE BY SIDE AS NEIGHBORS IN ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK AND GAZA--IT'S POSSIBLE. THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE TWO MOVEMENTS AND ONE LAND IN A BROAD SENSE DOESN'T MEAN THAT THIS ISN'T POSSIBLE. IT IS POSSIBLE. IT IS NOT AN IMPOSSIBLE PROBLEM. IT'S NOT A ZERO SUM GAME. IT OFTEN IS MADE TO APPEAR LIKE A ZERO SUM GAME BY THE WAY SOME PEOPLE TALK, BUT IT ISN'T. THE 'WINNER TAKE ALL' COMPETITION IS NOT THE WAY. A FAIR SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR PEOPLE TO SEE THAT AS A POSSIBILITY.

6. THE SECOND IS WE CAN SEE THIS TENDENCY TO GET LOCKED INTO REINFORCING CYCLES THAT GO IN THE WRONG DIRECTION, AND THESE CYCLES INVOLVE VIOLENCE AND HATRED AND

DISCRIMINATION AND SEGREGATION ARE AT ODDS WITH ANY PROCESS THAT WILL TEND TO ACHIEVE RESULTS.

7. AGAIN, BOTH SIDES FEAR ENTERING A PROCESS THAT'S NOT KNOWN IN ADVANCE. BUT THE ONE WE ARE ADVOCATING IS A PROCESS THAT CAN BE CREATIVE AND A CREATIVE PROCESS BY DEFINITION, IS ONE THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHEN YOU START WHERE IT'S GOING TO GO; BUT IT CAN GAIN CREATIVITY OUT OF THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND FINAL STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS AT THE HEART OF OUR PLAN, AND IT IS AT THE HEART OF A LOT OF TRADITIONAL THINKING, WHICH WE THINK IS GOOD THINKING--THAT YOU NEED TO START WITH TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, THAT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, WHEN THEY WORK, CAN HELP THE PROCESS OF FINDING AN ULTIMATE OUTCOME THAT YOU CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE IN. BUT JUST AS THAT IS TRUE, IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT THE EXISTENCE OF A BONA FIDE, CONSTRUCTIVE, CLEARLY WORKING SET OF NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT FINAL STATUS CAN MAKE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORKABILITY OF TRANSITION. ARRANGEMENTS. THERE IS A TWO WAY CREATIVE PROCESS POTENTIALLY HERE. THAT IS WHY IN OUR PROPOSAL WE HAVE LINKED THESE THINGS, AND IT IS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT.

8. FOURTH, I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT FOR PEOPLE TO REALIZE THAT THERE IS A GLOBAL REALITY HERE, AND EVERYBODY, EVERY COUNTRY--THE UNITED STATES IS IN A GLOBAL SITUATION, BIG AS WE ARE--AND SMALLER COUNTRIES ARE VERY MUCH SO. AND WHAT WE SEE TAKING PLACE IN THE INFORMATION AGE, IN THE BALLISTIC MISSILE AGE, IN THE AGE OF KNOWLEDGE, IS THAT THE DEFINITIONS OF BOUNDARIES AND SOVEREIGNTY ARE CHANGING. BORDERS ARE INDIFFERENT TO THE BALLISTIC MISSILE AND FOR THAT MATTER THEY ARE INDIFFERENT TO THE DESIRE OF ANY SOVEREIGN TO SHUT OUT THE OUTSIDE WORLD. WE HAVE ALL JUST COME FROM THE SOVIET UNION. WE SEE WHAT'S HAPPENING THERE, AND IN PART IT'S HAPPENING BECAUSE EVERY PLACE YOU TURN YOU TURN ON THE TELEVISION AND WHAT'S THERE -- CNN-- IT'S ALL OVER THE WORLD.

9. SO, ILLUSIONS HAVE TO GET SHED, NOT THE HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS. WE NEED THE HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS. AND WE WANT TO TRY TO GET PEOPLE TO HAVE A VISION OF WHAT TOMORROW CAN BE. SO, THESE ARE THE THINGS THAT WE WANT TO TALK ABOUT AND, TO THE EXTENT WE POSSIBLY CAN, WE WANT TO MAINTAIN THE LIFE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO KEEP THINGS MOVING.

10. SO THAT'S OUR BASIC PURPOSE HERE. THIS IS SORT OF THE MESSAGE THAT I'LL DELIVER, AND OBVIOUSLY I HAVE A LOT OF BINATIONAL THINGS TO TALK ABOUT, WHICH VARY AMONG THE COUNTRIES, WHICH WILL TAKE UP A FAIR AMOUNT OF THE TIME. BUT, AS FAR AS THE PEACE PROCESS IS CONCERNED, THAT'S THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF THIS TRIP, AND THESE ARE THE THEMES AND THE MESSAGE THAT I'LL BE TRYING TO GET ACROSS.

(INAUDIBLE)

11. QUESTION: MAY I ASK YOU ABOUT THE FIRST..., ABOUT

THE COMPETITION OF TWO NATIONAL MOVEMENTS. I DON'T REMEMBER THE PALESTINIANS LAYING CLAIM TO ISRAEL UNTIL IT WAS IN ISRAEL. WHAT ABOUT THE CLAIMS? DO YOU THINK THERE IS AN EQUAL CLAIM TO THE TWO LANDS? DO YOU THINK THERE IS EQUAL MERIT TO THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS TO TAKE OVER WHAT IS PART OF, OR MAYBE ALL OF ISRAEL?.

12. SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'M NOT GOING TO GO INTO THAT. ISRAEL IS THERE. ISRAEL IS GOING TO STAY THERE. A SECURE ISRAEL, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, IS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. A SECURE

ISRAEL MEANS THAT THERE IS NO MILITARY OPTION. SO, THAT LEAVES YOU WITH A NEGOTIATING OPTION. THE POINT IS, JUST AS THERE IS A LEGITIMATE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, AND AN ISRAEL THAT IS THERE AND WILL STAY THERE, THERE ARE ALSO PALESTINIANS. THEY ALSO HAVE ASPIRATIONS, THEY ALSO LEGITIMATE RIGHTS, OF COURSE. NOBODY EVEN ARGUES WITH THAT. YOU FIND THAT PHRASE IN CAMP DAVID. SO, THE PROBLEM IS HOW YOU RECONCILE THESE THINGS. THAT'S WHAT THE PEACE PROCESS IS ABOUT. IT'S HARD BUT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, THIS STATEMENT SEEMS TO NOTCH THE LEVEL OF YOUR ADVOCACY UP QUITE A BIT FROM THE PAST THREE TRIPS HERE, I THINK. IT'S AS IF YOU ARE ANGRY OR FRUSTRATED WITH VERY STUBBORN NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. AM I RIGHT ABOUT THAT ASSESSMENT? OR, HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE WHAT LED TO THIS DOCUMENT?

13. SECRETARY SHULTZ: ALL THAT WE HAVE TRIED TO DO IN PRODUCING THIS ARRIVAL STATEMENT IS TO SET OUT OUR VIEWS AND OUR PURPOSES AS I START MY ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE I MAKE THIS ARRIVAL STATEMENT IN CAIRO, IT'S AS THOUGH I AM ARRIVING EVERYWHERE, AND WE ARE TRYING TO SET OUT THIS MESSAGE, AND IT IS, AS WE HAVE ALWAYS HAD A POSITION OF ADVOCACY OF THE PEACE PROCESS. AND WE HAVE A SPECIFIC PLAN OF HOW WE CAN GET FROM HERE TO THERE THAT WE HAD BEFORE THE PARTIES. WE ARE TRYING TO POINT IT UP AND ARGUE FOR IT, AND GIVE REASONS, AND EXERT PEOPLE.

14. QUESTION: IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS, IF THERE IS NO MOVEMENT FROM ANY OF THE PARTIES ON THIS TRIP, DO YOU THINK THIS MAY LIKELY BE YOUR LAST TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THIS ADMINISTRATION?

15. SECRETARY SHULTZ: WE ARE GOING TO KEEP WORKING ON THIS. ALL OF THE PARTIES SEEM TO KEEP WANTING ME TO COME. AND THEY ALL, AS SOON AS YOU SEND OUT THE WORD THAT YOU MIGHT COME, THE ANSWER COMES BACK: WELCOME, COME. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT PEOPLE HAVE ANY EASY ANSWERS FOR ME, BUT THEY SEE, I THINK, UNDERNEATH IT ALL, THE SAME AS WE DO HERE, THAT'S IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO PEACE AND, AS LONG AS THERE IS SOMEBODY AROUND WILLING TO HELP, THEY WANT TO TALK.

16. QUESTION: DO YOU HAVE ANY INDICATIONS THAT ANY OF THE PLAYERS WHO HAVE FRUSTRATED YOU OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS ARE WILLING TO DO ANYTHING MORE THAN THEY HAVE DONE IN THE PAST? ARE YOU COMING HERE AGAINST THE SAME "COME AND TALK TO ME BUT I DON'T WANT TO TAKE ANY STEPS KIND OF ATTITUDE"?

17. SECRETARY SHULTZ: I DON'T HAVE ANY PARTICULAR INDICATIONS OF MOVEMENT ANYWHERE BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT I SHOULD STOP. THE SITUATION IS THAT THE PROBLEMS ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, OF COURSE, PRIMARILY TO THE PEOPLE IN THE REGION AND THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, BUT ALSO EVERYWHERE. AND SO, YOU HAVE TO BE WILLING TO WORK AGAINST THE ODDS, TO SWIM AGAINST THE CURRENT IN THE

HOPE -- BY KEEPING AT IT -- TO GRADUALLY GET SOMEWHERE IF YOU CAN, SO THAT'S BASICALLY WHAT I AM DOING. I WAS INTERESTED, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN I WENT TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN BRUSSELS TO BRIEF ON THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, THAT WAS A MAJOR EVENT, A MAJOR EVENT THAT EFFECTS EUROPE. THEY'RE VERY INTERESTED IN IT. HOWEVER, WHEN IT CAME TIME FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS AND ASK QUESTIONS AND SO FORTH, THERE WERE MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE SUBJECT. MORE THAN ABOUT START. MORE THAN ABOUT ANY OTHER SUBJECT. THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE DISCUSSED IT AND

THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THEY COULD DO THAT MIGHT HELP. PEOPLE HAVE A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD A PROBLEM THAT THEY SEE AS IMPORTANT. AND THEY ARE WILLING TO BEND THEIR BACKS TO THE EXTENT THEY CAN.

-18. QUESTION: WHAT WILL YOU TELL THE LEADERS OF THIS REGION THAT GORBACHEV HAD TO SAY ABOUT THIS PROBLEM AND WHERE HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO GO WITH IT?

19. SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, I'LL HAVE A REPORT ON OUR DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. WE HAD SOME AT THE GORBACHEV LEVEL AND SOME SHEVARDNZE LEVEL AND QUITE A BIT AT THE WORKING GROUP LEVEL AND, UNDOUBTEDLY, IT WAS WORTHWHILE. WE SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE GREAT INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT, THE SENSE THAT THERE ARE IMPORTANT PROBLEMS TO BE WORKED ON AT LEAST AS I SENSE IT, THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME MOTION BUT ALSO A PROBING AND A LITTLE BIT OF UNCERTAINTY. THEY'RE NOT READY TO TAKE POSITIONS IN A CRISP WAY AS WE HAVE ON THE PEACE PROCESS SO I WILL HAVE MORE DETAIL TO REPORT TO THE PARTIES AS I GO AROUND.

20. QUESTION: THEY ARE STILL FIRM ON A PLENIPOTENTIARY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, I ASSUME?

21. SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, THEY HAVE STARTED TO GIVE US THE WORD "EFFECTIVE" RATHER THAN "AUTHORITATIVE" AND THEY HAVE MADE A POINT OF SAYING THAT WASN'T A LOOSE SLIP OF THE TONGUE.. SO THAT'S AN INTERESTING CHANGE.

22. QUESTION: THEY DID USE THE WORD "UMBRELLA", THOUGH, I FORGET, IT WAS GEROSIMOV? AND THAT'S OUR WORD.

23. SECRETARY SHULTZ: (INAUDIBLE)

24. QUESTION: THE LAST TIME WE CAME OUT HERE YOU SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT YOU HEARD NO YES'S BUT MAYBE'S. ARE YOU GOING TO TRY TO FORCE THE PACE A LITTLE BIT THIS LEG AND TRY TO MAKE PEOPLE COMMIT THEMSELVES MORE?

25. SECRETARY SHULTZ: NO, I TRY TO PUSH OBVIOUSLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU CAN'T PUSH THESE THINGS ARTIFICIALLY. PEOPLE HAVE VERY BIG STAKES AND THEY'RE GOING TO BE CAREFUL. AND I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT. BUT THEY ALSO HAVE BIG STAKES IN SOME POSITIVE RESULT AND IT'S MY JOB IN A SENSE TO RECOGNIZE THE REALITIES THEY FACE AND TRY TO DESIGN THINGS THAT HAVE A CHANCE OF MAKING IT THROUGH THAT EYE OF THE NEEDLE, AND TO PUSH ON IT. AND THAT'S WHAT I'LL KEEP DOING IT.

26. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY THERE IS SOMETHING AS I LOOK OVER YOUR SCHEDULES FOR THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAY, THERE IS SOMETHING A LITTLE DIFFERENT THIS TRIP FROM THE OTHER TRIPS, AND FOR LACK OF A BETTER PHRASE, THERE IS SOMETHING FISHY ABOUT IT. YOU ARE GOING TO TALK TO EACH OF THESE PARTIES, EACH OF THESE INDIVIDUALS, FOR ABOUT AN HOUR OR SO. YOU OBVIOUSLY HAVE A BILATERAL SEGMENT. YOU HAVE A REPORT ON THE GORBY MEETINGS TO DO. YOU HAVE YOUR SCENARIOS THAT YOU PLAYED OUT HERE TO DEAL WITH. THE

QUESTION IS, ARE YOU ALSO PUTTING ON THE TABLE ANOTHER LETTER OR ANOTHER SCENARIO TO REPLACE THE ONE YOU PUT ON THE TABLE EARLIER WHICH CLEARLY HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS AT BY THAT TIME. IS THERE ANOTHER REFINEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL THAT IS GOING ON THE TABLE HERE NOW? I HAVE A FOLLOW UP AS THEY SAY IN THE PRESIDENTIAL NEW CONFERENCE.

27. SECRETARY SHULTZ: NO THERE ISN'T ANYTHING, NO NEW LETTER OR ANYTHING OF THAT KIND. AND IF FISHY MEANS THERE'S SOMETHING HIDDEN, THERE ISN'T ANYTHING HIDDEN ABOUT IT. WE'LL HAVE QUITE A LOT OF TALK WITH THE

EGYPTIANS. I WILL SEE BOTH PERES AND SHAMIR QUITE A LOT ALTOGETHER AND HAVE A GOOD VISIT WITH KING HUSSEIN. REMEMBER WITH PERES I RIDE BACK AND FORTH TO THE AIRPORT WITH HIM AND I'LL HAVE TWO SESSIONS WITH SHAMIR AND WITH RABIN AND I'LL HAVE A SESSION WITH MEMBERS OF THE KNESSET I HOPE. SO I'LL HAVE A LOT OF EXPOSURE AND, OF COURSE, I ALWAYS MEET WITH THE REFUSNIK COMMUNITY AND WITH ASSAD. I'LL HAVE A GOOD VISIT. IT WASN'T POSSIBLE TO HAVE TWO ROUNDS AS I HAD THOUGHT I MIGHT BECAUSE OF THE ARAB SUMMIT. IT TAKES PEOPLE AWAY ON THE ONE HAND, AND SHAMIR WAS SCHEDULED TO BE IN NEW YORK SO HE WILL BE LEAVING ISRAEL. AND SO THAT IS WHY I HAVE THE SCHEDULE DESIGNED WITH THOSE KIND OF CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND.

28. QUESTION: LET ME ASK YOU TO WHAT EXTENT THE ISSUES OF THE HOSTAGES WILL BE COMING UP ON YOUR TALKS IN THIS VISIT AND CAN YOU GIVE US A FEEL ON WHERE THINGS STAND ON THIS SUBJECT?

29. SECRETARY SHULTZ: I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO COMMENT OR TO SAY ABOUT THAT. OBVIOUSLY, IT IS JUST SOMETHING WE ARE ALWAYS CONCERNED ABOUT, BUT I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING, NO COMMENT ON IT.

30. QUESTION: READING BETWEEN THE LINES OF YOUR STATEMENT, IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT SOME SORT OF SOLUTION FOR ISRAEL IN WHICH BOTH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SAME TERRITORY. IS THIS SO? AND IF SO, HOW WOULD THIS WORK?

31. SECRETARY SHULTZ: NO, I DON'T THINK, THAT'S NOT WHAT I HAVE IN MIND. WHAT I DO HAVE IN MIND THAT WHAT YOU REGARD LEGITIMATELY AND NECESSARILY AS SOVEREIGN TERRITORY IN TODAY'S WORLD AND INCREASINGLY SO IS LESS AND LESS KIND OF AIR TIGHT. NO SOVEREIGN HAS THE ABILITY TO COMPLETELY CONTROL ITS BORDERS. INFORMATION FLOWS ACROSS THOSE BORDERS WHETHER YOU LIKE IT OR NOT, AND FOR THAT MATTER, WEAPONS OF WAR CAN COME ACROSS THOSE BORDERS IN NEW AND DIFFERENT WAYS. SO THAT MEANS THAT THE BORDER AND THE SORT OF OLD SENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY OF A HUNDRED YEARS AGO IN THE POLITICAL LITERATURE IS NECESSARILY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IT IS TODAY. SHULTZ

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LIMITED TO THE SPECIFIC STORY: 65444

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Editorial- Dukakis' Dangerous Ideas His odd departures on foreign policy all but guarantee his defeat. By Jeane Kirkpatrick Los Angeles Times Syndicate

At last we have begun the discussion of foreign policy in the 1988 presidential campaign.

In his appearance before the Atlantic Council last week, Michael Dukakis finally told us where he stands on major issues of national security. Those stands will, I believe, guarantee his defeat in November - providing, of course, that George Bush makes no serious mistakes and helps the American people understand why the Dukakis positions are extremely dangerous to the United States.

In a wide-ranging speech on security issues, Dukakis outlined a strategy differing sharply from that of recent Republican and Democratic administrations, and from traditional NATO plans.

Again and again, in his prepared text and in response to questions, Dukakis explained his priorities: to enhance U.S. nonnuclear "conventional" capacities, to eliminate several major nuclear weapons systems, including the mobile MX and the Midgetman, and of course to stop the development of a strategic missile defense.

"We don't need SDI; we need CDI ("conventional defense initiative") . . . We don't need MX missiles running around on railroad cars; we need an anti tank weapon that can stop Soviet tanks," he said.

Although Dukakis believes we have a "massive and survivable nuclear deterrent," he did not imply - nor does he presumably believe - that our security can be guaranteed by a strategy of mutually assured destruction. Otherwise he would have shown more concern with nuclear force modernization and less with enhancing conventional forces.

In fact, almost all NATO strategists strongly support enhancement of conventional forces, but they do so in a context of comprehensive force modernization. By decoupling conventional force enhancement and nuclear force enhancement, Dukakis seemed to suggest conventional forces could substitute for nuclear deterrence.

The most disturbing aspect of Dukakis' approach was his apparent unconcern with the defense of the United States itself.

The vulnerability of the United States is the most important fact of our times. Most Americans still do not understand that improvements in the accuracy and speed of Soviet missiles and the silencing of Soviet submarines have rendered the United States more vulnerable than at any time in its history. It is a new fact, it is unwelcome, we do not want to know it, we do not like to think about it. Even our "war games" do not incorporate into their scenarios the possibility of a direct threat to U.S. territory.

Yet, for the first time in our history, a potential adversary has the capacity to destroy American cities, populations, productive and defense capacities in a matter of minutes. The oceans which through two centuries have protected the United States against foreign incursions are today a medium for newly silenced submarines to gain access to those shores.

American vulnerability should be the starting point for any serious consideration of U.S. security policy. Otherwise, our discussions are as idle as the plans of French generals who, in the decade after World War I, conceived and built elaborate concrete fortifications that were exactly the sort of thing France had needed in that war. The Maginot Line proved utterly useless against Adolf Hitler's mobilized armies and blitzkrieg tactics.

France's defenses failed because her generals had failed to understand the revolution in technology and tactics of war. Conventional thinking and conventional defenses failed France, as conventional thinking and conventional defenses can fail the United States.

In our times, it is not easy to keep a nation's defenses paced with scientific innovation and military application. It is much easier and much more pleasant to think about glasnost than to keep track of Soviet research, development and deployment of improved offensive and defensive missiles - none of which has been affected by Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms.

Dukakis' first serious venture into foreign policy suggests that he has not yet faced the fact that the first responsibility of the next American president will be to provide for the defense of the continental United States. To the contrary, the types of weapons needed for such defense are precisely those Dukakis proposes to eliminate or downgrade.

One hopes that Dukakis will soon turn his attention to this most urgent problem. At the very least, he should tell us how he plans to utilize the proposed tanks to defend the United States against still-growing arsenals of Soviet land- and sea-launched nuclear missiles.

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REAGAN-GORBACHEV STATEMENT NOTES "EXPANDING DIALOGUE"

(Text: joint statement on Moscow summit) (5110)

Moscow — The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in an "expanding political dialogue" which "represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern," according to a joint statement released June 1 in Moscow.

The statement, issued following four days of talks between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev, said the two leaders "are convinced that the expanding political dialogue they have established represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern.

"They do not minimize the real differences of history, tradition and ideology which will continue to characterize the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But they believe that the dialogue will endure, because it is based on realism and focused on the achievement of concrete results."

During the course of the meeting in Moscow, the statement said, "the exchanges on S.T.A.R.T. (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground."

The statement also noted the positions of both sides on nuclear non-proliferation, chemical weapons, human rights, and regional issues, as well as other areas.

Following is the text of the joint statement:  
(begin text)

In accordance with the understanding reached during the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, and confirmed at the Washington summit in December 1987, Ronald W. Reagan, president of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Moscow May 29-June 2, 1988.

Attending on the U.S. side were Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Presidential Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; assistant to the president for national security, Colin L. Powell; ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the president and the secretary of State on arms control matters, Paul H. Nitze; special adviser to the president and the secretary of State

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on arms control matters, Ambassador Edward L. Rowney; Ambassador of the U.S. to the USSR Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were member of the politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Andrei A. Gromyko; member of the politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; member of the politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; alternate member of the politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Defense of the USSR Dimitri T. Yazov; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; assistant of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Alexander A. Bessmertnykh; and ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America, Yuri V. Dubinin.

The president and the general secretary view the Moscow summit as an important step in the process of putting U.S.-Soviet relations on a more productive and sustainable basis. Their comprehensive and detailed discussions covered the full agenda of issues to which the two leaders agreed during their initial meeting in Geneva in November, 1985 -- an agenda encompassing arms control, human rights and humanitarian matters, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. Serious differences remain on important issues; the frank dialogue which has developed between the two countries remains critical to surmounting these differences.

The talks took place in a constructive atmosphere which provided ample opportunity for candid exchange. As a result, the sides achieved a better understanding of each other's positions. The two leaders welcomed the progress achieved in various areas of U.S.-Soviet relations since their last meeting in Washington, notwithstanding the difficulty and complexity of the issues. They noted with satisfaction numerous concrete agreements which have been achieved, and expressed their determination to redouble efforts in the months ahead in areas where work remains to be done. They praised the creative and intensive efforts made by representatives of both sides in recent months to resolve outstanding differences.

Assessing the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, the president and the general secretary underscored the historic importance of their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow in laying the foundation for a realistic approach to the problems of strengthening stability and reducing the risk of conflict. They reaffirmed their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, their determination to prevent any war between the United States and Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional, and their disavowal of any intention to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders are convinced that the expanding political dialogue they have established represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern. They do not minimize the real differences of history, tradition and ideology which will continue to characterize the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But they believe that the dialogue will endure, because it is based on realism and focused on the achievement of concrete results. It can serve as a constructive basis for addressing not only the problems of the present, but of tomorrow and the next century. It is a process which the president and the general secretary believe serves the best interests of the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union,

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and can contribute to a more stable, more peaceful and safer world.

#### Arms Control

The president and the general secretary, having expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined objectives and next steps on a wide range of issues in this area. These will guide the efforts of the two governments in the months ahead as they work with each other and with other states toward equitable, verifiable agreements that strengthen international stability and security.

#### INF

The president and the general secretary signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of this historic agreement, which for the first time will eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms, and which sets new standards for arms control. The leaders are determined to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and understandings of the treaty, viewing joint and successful work in this respect as an important precedent for future arms control efforts.

#### Nuclear and Space Talks

The two leaders noted that a Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms has been elaborated. Through this process, the sides have been able to record in the Joint Draft Text extensive and significant areas of agreement and also the detail positions on remaining areas of disagreement. While important additional work is required before this treaty is ready for signature, many key provisions are recorded in the Joint Draft Text and are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the treaty.

Taking into account a Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the sides have continued negotiations to achieve a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washington Summit Joint Statement dated December 10, 1987. Progress was noted in preparing the Joint Draft Text of an associated protocol. In connection with their obligations under the protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of relevant information. The leaders directed their negotiators to prepare the Joint Draft Text of a separate agreement and to continue work on its associated protocol.

The Joint Draft Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads as well as agreement on subceilings of 4,900 on the aggregate of ICBM and SLBM warheads and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles.

The draft treaty also records the sides' agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs be reduced to a level approximately 50 percent below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded.

During the negotiations the two sides have also achieved understanding that in future work on the treaty they will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the Joint Statement of December 10, 1987, and the number of warheads which will be attributed to each new type of ballistic missile will be



subject to negotiation.

In addition, the sides agreed on a counting rule for heavy bomber armaments according to which heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and SRAMS will count as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and one warhead against the 6,000 limit.

The delegations have also prepared Joint Draft Texts of an Inspection Protocol, a Conversion or Elimination Protocol, and a Memorandum of Understanding on data, which are integral parts of the treaty. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and elaborating them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of S.T.A.R.T. The S.T.A.R.T. verification measures will, at a minimum, include:

A. Data exchanges, to include declarations and appropriate notifications on the number and location of weapons systems limited by S.T.A.R.T., including locations and facilities for production, final assembly, storage, testing, repair, training, deployment, conversion, and elimination of such systems. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the treaty is signed and updated periodically.

B. Baseline inspections to verify the accuracy of these declarations.

C. On-site observation of elimination of strategic systems necessary to meet the agreed limits.

D. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited.

E. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(I) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(II) locations where systems covered by this treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(III) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

F. Short-notice inspection, in accordance with agreed upon procedures, of locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

G. Prohibition of the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by National Technical Means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

H. Procedures that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type, including on-site inspection.

I. Enhanced observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

The two sides have also begun to exchange data on their strategic forces.

During the course of this meeting in Moscow, the exchanges on S.T.A.R.T. resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of ALCMs and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs. The details of this additional common

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ground have been recorded in documents exchanged between the sides. The delegations in Geneva will record these gains in the Joint Draft Text of the S.T.A.R.T. Treaty.

The sides also discussed the question of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Ronald Reagan and M.S. Gorbachev expressed their joint confidence that the extensive work done provides the basis for concluding the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms which will promote strategic stability and strengthen security not only of the peoples of the USSR and the USA, but of all mankind.

Guided by this fundamental agreement, the U.S. president and the general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU agreed to continue their efforts in this area energetically and purposefully. The Delegations of the two countries have been instructed to return to Geneva on July 12, 1988. It has been agreed as a matter of principle that, once the remaining problems are solved and the treaty and its associated documents are agreed, they will be signed without delay.

#### Ballistic Missile Launch Notifications

The agreement between the United States and the USSR on notifications of launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed during the Moscow summit, is a practical new step, reflecting the desire of the sides to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.

#### Nuclear Testing

The leaders reaffirmed the commitment of the two sides to conduct in a single forum full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on the issues relating to nuclear testing. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. In implementing the first objective of these negotiations, agreement upon effective verification measures for the U.S.-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, the sides agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test sites.

The leaders therefore noted with satisfaction the signing of the Joint Verification Experiment Agreement, the considerable preparation underway for the experiment, and the positive cooperation being exhibited in particular by the substantial numbers of personnel now engaged in work at each other's test sites. They also noted the substantial progress on a new protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and urged continuing constructive negotiations on effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Expressing their conviction that the progress achieved so far forms a solid basis for continuing progress on issues relating to nuclear testing, the leaders instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously the preparation of a protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and to complete the preparation of a protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty as soon as possible after the Joint Verification Experiment has been conducted and analyzed. They confirmed their understanding that verification measures for the TTBT

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will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached. They also declared their mutual intention to seek ratification of both the 1974 and 1976 treaties when the corresponding protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty are completed, and to continue negotiations as agreed in the Washington joint summit statement.

#### Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The two leaders noted that this year marks the 20th Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of the most important international arms control agreements with over 130 adherents. They reaffirmed their conviction that universal adherence to the NPT is important to international peace and security. They expressed the hope that each state not a party to the treaty will join it, or make an equally binding commitment under international law to forego acquisition of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. This will enhance the possibility of progress toward reducing nuclear armaments and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

The two leaders also confirmed their support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and agreed that they would continue efforts to further strengthen it. They reaffirmed the value of their regular consultations on non-proliferation and agreed that they should continue.

#### Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The leaders expressed satisfaction over the activation of the new communications link between the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Moscow and Washington, established in accordance with the U.S.-Soviet agreement of September 15, 1987. It was agreed that the centers can play an important role in the context of a future treaty on reducing U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms.

#### Chemical Weapons

The leaders reviewed the status of on-going multilateral negotiations and bilateral U.S.-Soviet consultations toward a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons, encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. They also expressed concern over the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

The leaders reaffirmed the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention. While noting the progress already achieved in the talks and the difficult problems with regard to effective monitoring of the global prohibition of chemical weapons and the non-use of dual-capable chemicals for chemical weapons purposes, the leaders underlined the need for concrete solutions to the problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security for all convention participants. They gave instructions to their respective delegations to this effect.

Both sides agreed on the vital importance of greater openness by all states as a way to build confidence and strengthen the foundation for an effective convention. The leaders also emphasized the necessity of close coordination on a multilateral basis in order to ensure the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable states in the convention.

Both sides strongly condemned the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. They stressed the importance of both technical and political solutions to this problem and confirmed their support for international



investigations of suspected violations. Noting the initial efforts being made to control the export of chemicals used in manufacturing chemical weapons, the leaders called on all nations with the capability of producing such chemicals to institute stringent export controls to inhibit the proliferation of chemical weapons.

#### Conventional Arms Control

The leaders emphasized the importance of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. They welcomed progress to date on development of a mandate for new negotiations on armed forces and conventional armaments. They expressed their hope for an early and balanced conclusion to the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting. The president and the general secretary also noted that full implementation of the provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe can significantly increase openness and mutual confidence.

They also discussed the situation in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna.

#### Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

They expressed their commitment to further development of the CSCE process. The United States and USSR will continue to work with the other 13 participants to bring the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting to a successful conclusion, through significant results in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

#### Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation

The leaders agreed to bilateral discussions at the level of experts on the problem of proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

#### Third Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly

The president and the general secretary noted the importance of the ongoing Third Special Session on Disarmament.

#### Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns

The president and the general secretary engaged in a detailed discussion of human rights and humanitarian concerns. The leaders reviewed the increasingly broad and detailed U.S.-Soviet dialogue in this area and agreed that it should be conducted at all levels in order to achieve sustained, concrete progress. They noted that this dialogue should seek to maximize assurance of the rights, freedoms and human dignity of individuals; promotion of people-to-people communications and contacts; active sharing of spiritual, cultural, historical and other values; and greater mutual understanding and respect between the two countries. Toward this end, they discussed the possible establishment of a forum which, meeting regularly, would bring together participants from across the range of their two societies. They noted steps already taken to establish the exchange of information and contacts between legislative bodies of both countries, as well as discussions between legal experts, physicians and representatives of other professions directly involved in matters pertaining to human rights, and between representatives of non-governmental organizations.

#### Regional Issues

The president and the general secretary thoroughly discussed a wide range of regional questions, including the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, and other issues. They expressed satisfaction with the April, 1988, conclusion in Geneva of accords on

1. The first part of the document discusses the general principles of the law of contract. It states that a contract is a legally binding agreement between two or more parties. The law of contract is concerned with the formation, performance, and breach of contracts.

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3. The third part of the document discusses the formation of a contract. It states that a contract is formed when the parties have reached an agreement on the terms of the contract. The agreement must be made in a certain way, and the contract must be supported by consideration.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the performance of a contract. It states that the parties to a contract must perform their obligations under the contract. If a party fails to perform its obligations, it may be liable for breach of contract.

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7. The seventh part of the document discusses the law of tort. It states that a tort is a civil wrong that causes harm to another person. The law of tort is concerned with the liability of a person for a tortious act.

an Afghanistan settlement. Although the discussions revealed serious differences both in the assessment of the causes of regional tensions and in the means to overcome them, the leaders agreed that these differences need not be an obstacle to constructive interaction between the United States and USSR.

They reaffirmed their intention to continue U.S.-Soviet discussions at all levels aimed at helping parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions which advance their independence, freedom and security. They emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

#### Bilateral Affairs

The president and the general secretary reviewed progress in further expanding bilateral contacts, exchanges and cooperation since their meeting in Washington, D.C. in December 1987. They noted the increasingly important role that mutually beneficial interchange between the two countries can play in improving mutual understanding and providing stability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. They stated their intention to intensify such ties.

They noted with particular satisfaction that concrete agreements had been reached in most of the areas identified at their meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington.

#### Bilateral Agreements and Cooperative Activities

The president and the general secretary welcomed the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements which open new opportunities for fruitful cooperation in the following fields: cooperation in transportation science and technology; maritime search and rescue; operational coordination between U.S. and Soviet radionavigation systems in the Northern Pacific and Bering Sea; and mutual fisheries relations.

The two leaders welcomed the recent signing of a new Memorandum on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety under the bilateral agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. There was an exchange of notes to extend that agreement.

They expressed satisfaction with the recent signing of a new protocol under the bilateral Housing Agreement for cooperation in construction research relating to extreme geological and unusual climatic conditions.

They reviewed the status of negotiations between the two countries concerning maritime shipping, the U.S.-USSR maritime boundary, basic scientific research, and emergency pollution clean-up in the Bering and Chukchi Seas. They instructed their negotiators to accelerate efforts to achieve mutually acceptable agreements in these areas at the earliest opportunity.

The two leaders welcomed the start of bilateral discussions on combatting narcotics trafficking. They noted with satisfaction ongoing consultations between the two sides concerning law of the sea, air and sea transportation safety, and areas of mutual interest in the field of law.

#### Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges

Noting the expansion of exchanges in the areas of education, science, culture and sports under the General Exchanges Agreement, the two leaders welcomed the signing of a new implementing program for 1989-91 under the agreement and expressed their intention to continue expansion of such exchanges. During the time in which this program is in force, the two sides, taking into consideration their mutual interest as well as financial and technical conditions, will conduct

negotiations on the opening of culture/information centers in the United States and the USSR with the aim of signing an appropriate agreement on behalf of the governments of both countries.

They expressed satisfaction that, over the course of their dialogue, people-to-people contacts and exchanges between non-governmental organizations have significantly increased and become one of the most dynamic elements in the bilateral relationship. They reaffirmed their commitment to further growth of such exchanges, which contribute to mutual understanding, and welcomed plans for increased exchanges of young people in the future. In this context, they expressed their readiness to consider in practical terms the idea of further developing exchanges of high school students. They cited recent joint U.S.-Soviet initiatives on culture, theater and the cinema as examples of new opportunities to engage those involved in the creative arts.

Noting the rapidly growing sports ties between the two countries, including their national Olympic committees, the two leaders expressed their support for the International Olympic movement, which promotes international cooperation and understanding through athletic competition.

#### Other Cooperative Activities

The president and the general secretary noted the successful expansion of scientific cooperation within the framework of bilateral agreements in Environmental Protection, Medical Science and Public Health, Artificial Heart Research and Development, Agriculture, and Studies of the World Ocean, and expressed their intention to continue to expand activities under these agreements in areas of mutual benefit to the two sides.

The president and the general secretary noted with pleasure the commencement of work on a conceptual design of an International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, between scientists and experts from the United States, Soviet Union, European Atomic Energy Community, and Japan. The two leaders noted the significance of this next step toward the development of fusion power as a cheap, environmentally sound, and essentially inexhaustible energy source for the benefit of all mankind.

The president and the general secretary welcomed agreement by representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, Canada and France, to institutionalize in the near future the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based, life-saving global search and rescue system.

Both leaders reaffirmed their support for the WHO/UNICEF goal of reducing the scale of preventable childhood death through the most effective methods of saving children. They urged other countries and the international community to intensify efforts to achieve this goal.

#### Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

The two leaders expressed their satisfaction with activities since the Washington summit in expanding cooperation with respect to global climate and environmental change, including in areas of mutual concern relating to environmental protection, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone and a possible global warming trend. They emphasized their desire to make more active use of the unique opportunities afforded by the space programs of the two countries to conduct global monitoring of the environment and the ecology of the Earth's land, oceans and atmosphere. They underscored the need to continue to promote both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this important area in the future.

#### Initiative for Expanded Civil Space Cooperation

Recognizing the long-standing commitment of both countries to space science and exploration, and noting the progress made under the 1987 U.S.-USSR Cooperative Agreement in the Exploration and use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, the two leaders agreed to a new initiative to expand civil space cooperation by exchanging flight opportunities for scientific instruments to fly on each other's spacecraft, and by exchanging results of independent national studies of future unmanned solar system exploration missions as a means of assessing prospects for further U.S.-Soviet cooperation on such missions. They also agreed to expand exchanges of space science data and of scientists, to enhance the scientific benefit that can be derived from the two countries' space research missions. They noted scientific missions to the Moon and Mars as areas of possible bilateral and international cooperation.

#### Arctic Contacts and Cooperation

Taking into account the unique characteristics of the arctic, the two leaders reaffirmed their support for expanded bilateral and regional contacts and cooperation in this area. They noted plans and opportunities for increased scientific and environmental cooperation under a number of bilateral agreements as well as within an International Arctic Science Committee of states with interests in the region. They expressed their support for increased people-to-people contacts between the native peoples of Alaska and the Soviet Union.

The president and the general secretary noted the positive role played by the multilateral Antarctic Treaty and emphasized the importance of U.S.-Soviet scientific and environmental cooperation in that region.

#### Trade and Economic Affairs

The two sides reconfirmed their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations and noted recent activity in this area. They reiterated their belief that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations. They welcomed the results of the meeting of the Joint U.S.-USSR Commercial Commission in April and noted with satisfaction that working groups had been created under the commission to further the establishment of better conditions under which mutually advantageous trade can develop. Taking note of the 1974 Joint Statement and Protocol amending the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation issued at the conclusion of the Joint Commercial Commission, they agreed that the commission should continue to meet to build upon the forward momentum which has been generated.

The two leaders cited expanding relations between Aeroflot and Pan American Airlines under the government-to-government Civil Air Transportation Agreement as a positive example of mutually beneficial cooperation.

#### Consulates Exchange/Diplomatic and Consular Missions

The president and the general secretary reaffirmed their agreement to open Consulates General in Kiev and New York as soon as practicable.

The two leaders discussed questions relating to ensuring adequate and secure conditions for U.S. and Soviet diplomatic and consular establishments and their personnel in each other's territory. They



agreed on the need to approach problems relating to such matters constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

Future Meetings

The president and the general secretary, recognizing the importance of their personal involvement in the development of relations in the months ahead, instructed Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to meet as necessary and to report to them on ways to ensure continued practical progress across the full range of issues. Expert-level contacts will also continue on an intensified basis.

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great satisfaction that those differences, in part, as a result of these meetings, continue to recede.

In addition, spokesmen for the Soviet government have noted the change of policy; indeed, the profound change of policy that has occurred in their own government. The United States is fully cognizant of this change and aware of its implications. In noting the differences that still stand between us, therefore, my desire has not been to sound a note of discouragement, but one of realism; not to conduct a tutorial, but to give the kind of emphatic testimony to the truth that, over the long run, removes illusion and moves the process of negotiation forward.

From our standpoint, this approach has borne fruit at previous meetings and again at this summit conference. And here, permit me to go back for just a moment to our first summit meeting at Geneva. There, we agreed on certain fundamental realities that would govern our relations, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, that the United States and the Soviet Union bear special responsibilities for avoiding the risk of war, that neither side should seek military superiority over the other. We affirmed our determination to prevent war, whether nuclear or conventional, and our resolve to contribute in every way possible, along with other nations, to a safer world.

We also set out a broad agenda and initiated a new process of dialogue to address the sources of tension in U.S.-Soviet relations. Since Geneva, we have achieved, through a sustained effort, progress across this broad agenda. Our first discussions here in Moscow focused on the important matter of human rights, individual freedoms. The United States views human rights as fundamental to our relationship with the Soviet Union and all nations. From the beginning, we've stressed this point, and are encouraged by recent signs of progress in the Soviet Union.

I believe that where people have the right to speak, write, travel and worship freely, creative energies are released. On several occasions, I've said that nations do not distrust each other because they're armed, they are armed because they distrust each other.

For the past three years, General Secretary Gorbachev and I have worked to build a relationship of greater trust. And we both recognize that one way to do that, is to improve understanding between our two countries through broader people-to-people contacts. A series of agreements to expand U.S.-Soviet bilateral cooperation, including cultural exchanges, have been concluded. We agree to expand our student exchange programs with a goal of allowing hundreds, and eventually, thousands of Soviet and American high school students to study in each others' classrooms, for our future relations, academic, cultural and other exchanges, are of greater importance.

Turning to regional issues, and Mr. Gorbachev and I agree that, there must be peaceful solutions to these conflicts. Our goal is to advance independence, security, and freedom. The Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan is significant. And we agree that building on the Afghan settlement leads to an approach to other regional problems.

Our discussions also dealt with Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf and Central America. Each of our summit meetings moved us farther toward an INF Treaty, capped by today's exchange of ratification instruments, which now makes it a reality. Each meeting has also moved us farther toward meeting the even greater challenge of crafting a treaty to reduce our strategic

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nuclear arsenals.

In Geneva, the general secretary and I agreed on the concept of 50 percent reductions. And in Reykjavik, on numerical limits for warheads and delivery vehicles. In Washington, on intensive work to complete a S.T.A.R.T. Treaty, including comprehensive verification provisions building upon those in INF. Here in Moscow, we've made important additional strides toward that objective. Verification is one of the most important and most difficult issues for us. And I'm pleased to report progress in this area too.

We've moved forward in other areas as well, including agreements on an experiment to improve the verification of existing nuclear testing treaties and on notification of strategic ballistic missile launches.

Finally, let me say how deeply moving I have found my discussions with various citizens of the Soviet Union. The monks of Danilov, the dissidents and refuseniks, the writers and artists, the students and young people, have shown once again that spiritual values are cherished in this nation. It's my fervent hope that those values will attain even fuller expression.

And now, I will be happy to take your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. President, I know you touched on this, but at your first news conference in 1981, you said that the Soviets lie and cheat to pursue their ends of world domination. What has really changed your mind? Can the American people really trust the Russians now? And I'd like to follow up.

ANSWER: Well, that was the first press conference that I'd held since being elected president. And the question that came to me was, could we believe the Russians, or would they lie to us? And my answer at that time was not expressing my opinion. I said, I will answer that with their own words. And then I cited some of the leaders of the Communist movement in the Soviet Union, that said that the only immorality was anything that slowed the growth of Socialism, and that there was no immorality in lying or cheating or doing anything of that kind as long as it advanced the cause of Socialism. Now, that was my answer. So, it wasn't an opinion. I was quoting what their leaders themselves, the beginners of that particular system have said.

Q: Well, that's what you thought then. Do you still think that, and can you now declare the cold war over?

A: I think, right now, of course, as I have said, "doveryai no proveryai", "trust but verify".

Q: Well, is that the atmosphere now?

A: But I think that there is quite a difference today in the leadership and in the relationship between our two countries. And we have held very productive meetings that I think were productive for both sides.

Q: Mr. President, on the S.T.A.R.T. Treaty, what are the areas of progress and what's the specific progress that you achieved here? And why do you think that you can achieve -- can conclude a treaty this year when the Senate leaders are urging you to go slow, and this summit, with all its momentum, wasn't able to break the impasse?

A: Well, the Senate leaders themselves brought the ratification papers here that we just received today on the INF Treaty. It meant changing their own schedules a great deal, and speeding up the ratification process. I think that we could count on them to feel the same if we are coming to final agreement on a S.T.A.R.T. Treaty.

But I would like to -- I want to remind you of one thing that we've said over and over again. The S.T.A.R.T. Treaty is infinitely

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more complex than the INF Treaty, and therefore, there's going to be continued negotiation on a number of points. And then it will depend on the Senate. Once we have agreed upon a treaty, it is their responsibility to thoroughly study that treaty and then issue ratification of it, if they find it satisfactory.

We can hope -- I would hope that before the year is out that we could eliminate the differences that still exist. But if not, I would hope that my successor would continue, because here we are getting at, I think, the most important reduction that should take place in nuclear weapons. The most destabilizing are the intercontinental ballistic missiles, in which someone pushes a button and minutes later a part of the earth blows up. And that's why -- and the thing that I expressed my hope about is that not only have we said 50 percent, but in that first meeting in Geneva the general secretary proposed the idea also of reducing by half our nuclear missiles.

Q: To follow up, sir, could you go over the areas of progress on S.T.A.R.T. that you achieved here?

A: No, I don't think that I should go on. The conversations are still going on, and there are things still being discussed, and as I say, progress has been made, or we wouldn't still be talking the way we are.

Q: Mr. President, is there something in Soviet-American relations that you would advise your successor to leave behind? And is there something that you would especially advise to take to the future?

A: Well, no, the figures themselves reveal that improvements have been made. Some 300 people have been freed from imprisonment. A number of people. The lists that we bring are names that have been brought to our attention by relatives, or friends; their own relatives for example, living in our country now. And I have brought those names to the general secretary and explained the personal interest that we have in them. And a great many of them have since been allowed to come to our country, or to other countries that they preferred such as Israel. And so I think there has been a sizable improvement, and we still are going to continue doing that.

Q: But sir, what about the fact that the very people with whom you met have now been investigated by Soviet authorities and might be subject to some form of retaliation? Since Mr. Gorbachev said today that you no longer feel that this is the evil empire, that you told him that within the Kremlin walls doesn't this contradict your new feeling of optimism about the Soviet Union?

A: No, because as I say, he has received the latest list that I brought here. And previous experiences with this -- a great many of those people have been allowed to come to our country.

Q: Sir, yesterday you did say you no longer believed the Soviet Union is an evil empire. You said that was another time, another era. What's changed? Is it just Mr. Gorbachev's succession to the general secretaryship, or have you yourself changed or expanded your view of the Soviet Union?

A: No, I think that a great deal of it is due to the general secretary, who I have found different than previous Soviet leaders have been. But that also, as we have pursued this, we have found them willing to enter into negotiations with us. And I think that enough progress has been made that we can look with optimism on future negotiations.

Q: Sir, I suppose I'm asking if you think that there's anything that you have learned, that you personally have expanded or changed



your views because you've had an opportunity to learn more about this country over the years, and about their system so that you think you are part of the process. Or is it just Gorbachev?

A: Well, a large part of it is Mr. Gorbachev, as a leader. And I think there have been changes here as they have sought to make -- well, I read "Perestroika" and I found much in it that I could agree with.

Q: Mr. President, Mr. Gorbachev said in his news conference that he thought you could have achieved more in this summit. And specifically he went on to say that on the issue of the ABM interpretation of the treaty, said that you had gone back on your word, that in Geneva you had agreed that you would no longer seek military superiority, and that by holding to SDI, the development of SDI, you were seeking superiority in outer space, and that therefore you had gone back on your word. Are you seeking superiority in outer space? Can you reach a S.T.A.R.T. agreement without some accommodation on SDI and the ABM question?

A: SDI, in my mind -- maybe some of my people wouldn't believe -- agree with me, but the whole thing was my idea -- to hand -- see if there could not be developed a defensive weapon that would make it virtually impossible for nuclear missiles to get through to their targets in another country. And, from the very beginning, I have said that if and when such a system can be developed, I would support the idea of making it available worldwide, because, since we all know how to make nuclear missiles, some time there could be a madman come along, as a Hitler came along, who could then make those missiles. But that my idea would be the sharing of the knowledge of SDI as a defensive weapon would be accompanied by the total elimination of nuclear weapons. And I happen to believe that this will be a lot better world if we get rid of all the nuclear weapons, and that is what my dream of SDI is, that it can be the tool by which we eliminate them.

Q: Well, sir, if I may follow up, Mr. Gorbachev said today that he did not believe that it is for defensive purposes.

A: I know, he had said that before. And I --

Q: Well, you failed to convince him, despite the fact that you're on such good terms with him.

A: Well, maybe he just doesn't know me well enough. But, from the very first, I have said that that is my goal for that defensive weapon. There is nothing offensive about it. It cannot hurt or kill anyone. It can just make it impossible for missiles to get through the screen.

Q: Mr. President, I want to ask you about this effort that you again stated today to try to get a S.T.A.R.T. Treaty before you leave office. You have less than eight months left in office; Mikhail Gorbachev could have 20 years. By setting up any kind of deadline, no matter how unofficial, aren't you putting all the pressure on the U.S. side?

A: Oh, no, no, we set no deadline. I said we're going to continue working toward that, and I could hope that maybe in that period of time; but, no, I am dead set against deadlines. You don't make a treaty just to simply have it be achieved at a certain point in time. The treaty is ready when it is a good treaty, and good for all sides involved, and that's what we'll do instead of setting a deadline and then saying, "Well, let's sign it because we've reached the deadline." It has to be good.

Q: If I might follow-up sir, there is also talk about a fifth



summit sometime this year to sign a treaty which might come sometime this Fall. To prevent U.S.-Soviet relations from being mixed up in politics, are you willing to rule out a summit until the presidential campaign is over in November?

A: I'd make any decision of that kind based on how I thought it could affect the situation, and if it gave a promise of success, then go for it.

Q: Mr. President, you were asked by one of the students at Moscow University yesterday about the practice in the United States of limiting presidential terms. I believe you said you were going to go out on the mashed potato circuit next year and campaign for repeal of that constitutional amendment. Were you aware that Mr. Gorbachev, as part of his reforms, is promoting the idea of limited terms for the leader of the Soviet Union, and do you think it's a good idea for the Soviet Union?

A: Well, I would hesitate to comment on that. I mean, in this system of government here, you do not have a national election in which all of the people vote to see who would be the leader. My objection to the constitutional amendment that was passed in our country limiting a president to two terms was the fact that is the only office in the United States in which all the people vote for the candidates for that office. And it seems to me that it is an infringement on the rights of our people in a democracy to tell them that they can't vote for someone because of a time limit. I think it impinges on their right to vote for whoever they want to vote for for as many times as they want to vote for them -- that is the principle of democracy.

Q: Mr. President, if I may just ask one more question on the students -- you talked a lot about how it is a positive thing for students from both countries to mix and mingle, to get to know each other, to understand each other. Do you think part of your positive feeling about the Soviet Union these days has come as a result of a greater tolerance that you've developed as a result of your meetings with Mr. Gorbachev over the past few years?

A: Well, I have found that Mr. Gorbachev and I have a very satisfactory relationship. But at the same time, I am never going to relax my belief in the need for verification of agreements that we might make, and I'm quite sure he feels the same way.

Q: Mr. President, I understand that in your first meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, he suggested the reduction of half a million military personnel as a certain conditions, but there was no followup as it were. Was this subject raised again and what was your response?

A: No, this proposal -- this has just been a suggestion made of the removal of a half a million men on the NATO line, on the European front. This has to be considered. We think that we are coming to a point -- and that he himself is willing to -- of reductions in conventional weapons along that front and conventional forces as well as the nuclear forces. But the simple removing of a half a million men would not be exactly equal, because his men -- his military would be moved a short distance back away from the front. Well, there's a 3,000-mile ocean between where our men would have to be moved and, in the event of an emergency, we'd have an ocean to cross to get our men back there and equal so that has to be considered.

Q: Mr. President, General Secretary Gorbachev, in his remarks earlier this afternoon, was talking about your comments here on human rights, and he said, "I did not have a lot of admiration for that part of the trip." When you met with the general secretary privately, we

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know, of course, that you discussed human rights. Did he say anything to you specifically about the meeting with dissidents or your remarks at Danilov Monastery or the remarks yesterday at the Writers' Union?

A: No, but I do know that he and others have had a feeling that in some way our concern with this is interfering with your internal government policies. I have explained to him, and I think maybe he has seen the point. Our country is very unique. All of us, either by ourselves or through our ancestors or our grandparents or parents came from someplace else. We're about the only nation in the world that can say that. As a matter of fact, the estimate is that one out of eight Americans trace their parentage and their heritage, if not their own emigration, to the Eastern Bloc and so, I have put it this way, that you don't stop loving your mother because you've taken unto yourself a wife. So the people in America do have a feeling for the countries of their heritage. In my case, it was a great grandfather on one side and a grandmother and grandfather on my mother's side. Well, Americans retain that feeling of friendship and loyalty to the countries that, as I say, were -- are their heritage. And so, when we feel that people are being unjustly treated, imprisoned for something that in our country would not be a crime, calling for such a sentence, our people get aroused and they come to us and they want help. They want something done.

A wife who's been waiting for eight years for her husband to be allowed to leave this country to join her, things of this kind, we don't think are really interfering with someone else's business. We think it very much our business to bring it to the attention, where we feel there is an injustice, to the government. And I have explained this to the general secretary, and I think he has seen the justice of what I've said, because many of the individuals that we've brought to his attention have now been released from confinement here and have been allowed to emigrate, come to other countries, to our country.

Q: Mr. President, Mr. Gorbachev says that he proposed a draft statement that would use the words "peaceful coexistence," and he said that your first response to that was I like it, but that when you came back from meeting with your aides, you seemed to have changed your mind. Did you and why?

A: Well, I liked the whole tone, the general tone of it, and what it was seeking to achieve was what we're both seeking to achieve.

But I said at that same time I would take it to our people, and I took it there, and they studied it and saw where there could have been certain ambiguities in there that would not achieve the general thought of what was being proposed. We were in agreement with the general thought. So, some rewriting was done by our own people, and when the total statement is released to you, I think you will find that we have achieved what it was he had with the paragraph that he proposed. And it has been achieved and improved to the point that it is clear and unmistakable, that it achieves the purpose that he had in mind.

Q: Well, if I could follow up -- you've sort of teased us now, if you could give us some sense of what you've proposed to substitute for peaceful coexistence? What's the better term that your aides have advised you to use?

A: No, peaceful coexistence -- the same -- both pieces achieve the same end, but the other one had ambiguities in it, and I don't think they were intentional, but they could have been used to justify doing something else that was not in keeping with the entire goal of the statement here.



Q: Yesterday, when you were talking to students about -- you were talking about emigration and a family in particular that had been denied a right to emigrate, and you said you blamed the bureaucracy. Do you view the emigration problems in the Soviet Union as essentially a problem of just a lethargic bureaucracy?

A: I'm afraid that I have to confess to you that I think one of the sins of government, and one with which we must deal and never have been able to be completely successful with, and this includes our own government, is that the bureaucracy once created has one fundamental rule above all others, preserve the bureaucracy. And I think that governments will always have -- find that they are having to -- to check on bureaucracy and make sure that it is not abiding by its own rules and taking the easiest course. And so I wouldn't -- pick on one government other than another.

Q: If I could follow up, you said that you believe that you persuaded Mr. Gorbachev on some of these emigration questions, but he said on human rights in the United States, that you -- that he did not find your arguments convincing. Do you consider that a failure in the summit?

A: I think that there is a mistake -- a mistaken view -- and oh, how I yearn to have him come to our country for long enough for him to see some of our country. I think that there's a mistaken view about the things that occasionally dominate the press about prejudice, racial or religious, in our country, about people, the so-called street people that apparently have no place to live, and I think that these problems -- these are socio-economic problems in our land, we have them, of course. We also try to deal with them. But I don't think that he quite could understand a recent situation. A young lady living on the sidewalks of New York, living out there on the sidewalk, winter and summer, and so, for her own sake, the police picked her up to bring her to where she could be placed in a shelter. And she took her case to court, and won her case in court, that she should be allowed to go back and sleep on the sidewalk where she had been, because that's what she preferred to do.

Well, when you have a free country, how far can we go in impinging on the freedom of someone who says "this is the way that I want to live?" And I think we could straighten him out if he saw what we did in our country.

Q: Mr. President, in this room on Monday, you heard moving stories of people who had been in prison -- dissidents, religious people, and then you went to Moscow State University and you wrote it off to bureaucracy. Is that really your view, that it is only the bureaucracy, it is not a willful policy of the government here to keep these people from emigrating?

A: No. I can't say that -- it is one -- I don't know that much about the system, but it was a question was presented to me on the basis that it possibly was a bureaucratic bungle. Maybe I should illustrate to you why I feel the way I do about bureaucracies. Once, during the war, I happened to be involved in a situation in which one level of the military wanted a warehouse full of filing cabinets -- wanted permission to destroy the files so that they could use those filing cases, and they were able to prove that the documents had no historic value, they had no bearing on present day government at all; they were just useless. And so the message went up through the ranks, requesting permission to destroy these obsolete files. And then, back down through the ranks, from the top command, endorsed by each level of command, came the reply, "Permission granted, providing copies were

The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the research and the objectives of the study. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. This includes a description of the data sources, the data collection process, and the data analysis techniques used. The third part of the report is a discussion of the results of the study. This includes a description of the findings and a discussion of the implications of the findings. The final part of the report is a conclusion and a list of references.

The methodology used in this study was a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative methods included interviews with experts in the field and a review of the literature. The quantitative methods included a survey of a large number of respondents. The data from the interviews and the literature review were used to develop the survey instrument. The data from the survey were then analyzed using statistical techniques.

The results of the study show that there is a significant relationship between the variables studied. The findings suggest that the independent variable has a positive effect on the dependent variable. This relationship is supported by the statistical analysis of the survey data. The implications of these findings are discussed in the discussion section of the report. The findings have important implications for the field of study and for the development of future research. The study also highlights the need for further research in this area.

In conclusion, the study has shown that there is a significant relationship between the variables studied. The findings have important implications for the field of study and for the development of future research. The study also highlights the need for further research in this area.

The study was conducted in a systematic and rigorous manner. The methodology used was appropriate for the research objectives. The data collected were reliable and valid. The findings of the study are based on a solid foundation of data and analysis. The study has contributed to the understanding of the relationship between the variables studied and has provided valuable insights into the field of study. The findings of the study are discussed in detail in the discussion section of the report. The study also highlights the need for further research in this area.

made of each file destroyed."

Q: Can I follow that up? Don't you think you're letting Mr. Gorbachev off a little easy on just saying it's bureaucracy?

A: No, as I said, I don't -- the way the question was framed, I thought that there was a possibility of that. No, but I just have to believe that in any government, some of us do find ourselves bound in by bureaucracy, and then sometimes you have to stomp your foot and say unmistakably, I want it done. And then maybe you get through with it. But I have great confidence in his ability to do that.

Q: Thank you, sir. You said, starting at the beginning of this year and going into this summit, that if there was this progress toward a S.T.A.R.T. Treaty, you would come together, be willing to come together a fifth time and sign it, but only if it was a good treaty. You said today -- you've referred to that today again several times. What is your judgment, your best judgment, on the basis of this summit, as to -- have you made enough progress that you now think that a S.T.A.R.T. Treaty is likely within your term?

A: I honestly cannot answer that. I don't know. Let me just give you what the mechanics are, that our people have been steadily, in Geneva -- both sides -- Soviet people and our people -- working on this treaty, knowing what we hope to achieve. And they're working there, and as I say, they've made progress. There is no way to judge, and there is no way that I would give them a date and say, Please, you have to get this by such and such a time, because that's not the way to get a good treaty. I want a good treaty.

Q: Sir, if I could follow up, is the only condition under which you would have a fifth summit with Mr. Gorbachev is if there was, in fact, what you thought was a good S.T.A.R.T. Treaty ready to be signed?

A: Well, you can't rule out -- something else might come up that necessitates our getting together and settling something, other than that particular treaty. So no one can say, no, there will be no need for a summit.

Q: Mr. President, what have you learned about the Soviet Union? What have you learned, in your first trip to Moscow?

A: I'm going to do one answer, because I've wanted to say this, and I say it any time I get a chance. I think that one of the most wonderful forces for stability and good that I have seen in the Soviet Union are the Russian women.

(end transcript)

22

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

סופס מברק

דף 1 מחובר 12 דפים

סווג בסחונני סודי

דחיסות מידי

064

אל : המשרד

דע : משהב"ט

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תאריך/ז"ח 19:00 - 2.6.88

מס' מברק

אל : מנהל מצפ"א

דע : מקטי"ח, משהב"ט

מ"מ"ד

כווית - עסקת F-18

א. רצ"ב התומר שיחולק קרוב לוודאי בתדרכים בקונגרס על העסקה. היום ניתן תדרוך לעוזרי קונגרסמנים על ידי נציגי הממשל.

ב. אוקלי סאלני היום לעמדתנו בנושא. עניתי שמעבר לחשובה הידועה המדובר כאן במטוס שעדיין לא הוכנס למזהיית ובעיסקה מסיבית הבאה מיד אחרי העסקה עם סעודיה והתדמית שנוצרת היא של פריצת כל המעצורים בנושא עסקות נשק למדינות ערב.

אמר שהוא מבקש שנחזור ונשוחח.

ערו

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2/12

# KUWAIT BASELINE AIRCRAFT

2/12

## REQUIREMENT

## EQUIPMENT

## USN Baseline/ KAF Increment

### Identification

IFF Transponder with Mode 4 .....	AN/APX-100 .....	USN
Standard NATO Size IFF Encryptor Unit Mounting and Wiring .....	KUWAIT GFE .....	KAF

### Weapon System

Multifunction A/A, A/G, Air to Sea, L.L Penetration Ground/Contour Mapping Terrain Avoidance Look-up, Look-down Radar - Type AN/APG-65 .....	AN/APG-65 .....	USN
Head-up Display (HUD) .....	AV/AVQ-28 .....	USN
VCR 8mm for HUD and Head Down Recording .....	TEAC V-1000AB-RV VTR .....	USN

### E.W. Equipment Installation

Programmable RWR (ALR-67) .....	AN/ALR-67 .....	USN
Programmable Chaff and Flare Dispenser (ALE-39) .....	AN/ALE-39 .....	USN
Automatic Programmable Wide Band Self Defense Jammer (ALQ-126B) .....	AN/ALQ-126B .....	USN
EW Jammer (ALQ-162) .....	AN/ALQ-162 .....	KAF

### Special Tactical Equipment

Night Vision Goggles (3rd Generation) .....	NVG .....	USN
Conformal FLIR/LASER POD. Lasing Acquisition and Missile Lock-on .....	AN/AAS-38 .....	USN
Ground Tactical Mission Preparation and Training and Aircraft Data Transfer Calculator (DSU Ground Station) .....	Mission Support System .....	USN
Laser Detector Tracker Pod (ASQ-173) .....	AN/ASQ-173 .....	USN

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# KUWAIT BASELINE AIRCRAFT

<u>REQUIREMENT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>USN Baseline/ KAF Increment</u>
<b><u>Communication / Cockpit</u></b>		
V/UHF AM/FM + DF on UHF/VHF - Qty. 2 Per Aircraft	AN/ARC-182	USN
Upfront Communication/Navigation, Identification System Controls and Displays	C-10380/ASQ	USN
Multifunction Displays	JP1317/A	USN
Data Transfer Unit. (Data Storage Unit)	MU-860/ASQ-94	USN
Aircraft Night Vision Goggles (NVG) Lighting Compatability	NVG	USN
<b><u>Navigation</u></b>		
WDNS (Ring Laser Gyro)	ASN-139	USN
TACAN AN/ARN118. A/A Function	AN/ARN-118	USN
VOR/ILS, Marker Beacon Receiver	ARN-514	KAF
Radar Altimeter, (Decision Height Audio Warning Set)	AN/APN-194	USN
Auto Pilot Capabilities:		
Attitude Hold, Heading Steering, Altitude Intercept*, Altitude Hold, Radial Intercept Hold*, INS Navigation*	AN/ASW-44	USN/KAF
Navigation Indicator (HSI)	IP-1535/A	USN
ADI with ILS Localizer G/P Steering Bar	AN/AVQ-28 HUD	USN
Baro Altimeter (Altitude Audio Warning Set)	HUD/ADC/ACJ	USN
Stand-by Attitude Indicator (ADI)	AN/ARU-48/A	USN
Stand-by Baro Altimeter	AAU-39/A	USN
Vertical Speed Indicator (VSI)	AVI-29/A	USN
Air Data Computer	CP-1334A	USN

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# KUWAIT BASELINE AIRCRAFT

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USN Baseline/  
KAF INCREMENT

## REQUIREMENT

## EQUIPMENT

### ENGINE/FUEL

F404 ENGINE

F404

USN

RPM, FUEL FLOW, FUEL QUANTITY  
INDICATOR AND AUDIO WARNING

ID-2389A

USN


### OTHER

INFLIGHT ID LIGHT

INFLIGHT ID LIGHT

KAF

4/18



21/5

5/12

F/A-18'S TO KUWAIT  
PERFORMANCE

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The F/A-18 represents an acquisition compromise for Kuwait in virtually all aspects of performance. As the accompanying charts clearly show, there are other aircraft which Kuwait might have selected that exceed F/A-18 performance for any specific parameter. The F/A-18 and F-16 are essentially equivalent in terms of range performance, but both have considerably shorter range than that available had another available export aircraft been chosen. The maximum speed, specific combat performance parameters, and ordnance carriage capability of the F/A-18 are all within the mid ranges of aircraft possibly chosen for sale to Kuwait or already in the Kuwait Air Force. The F/A-18 represents for Kuwait, therefore, a compromise choice - it does everything well, but is not significantly better than another aircraft they might have selected. The F/A-18 is the best possible selection for Kuwait.

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21/9

6/12

## TACTICAL AIRCRAFT COMPARISON

	A-4	F-16	F/A-18	MIRAGE 2000	TORNADO
FIRST FLIGHT	1954	1978	1978	1978	1974
LENGTH (FT IN)	40'4"	47'6"	56'0"	50'3"	54'10"
SPAN (FT IN)	27'6"	32'10"	40'5"	29'6"	45'7" (28'2" SWPT)
WEIGHT (LB) EMPTY	10800	16300	23400	15900	28000
MAX TAKEOFF	24500	37500	51900	37900	56000+
PAYLOAD (LB)	10000	13200	14750	13200	17000
MAX SPEED	0.9M	2.0M	1.8M	2.3M	2.2M
CEILING (FT)	42000	60000	50000	65000	50000+
STRIKE RADIUS (HI-LO-LO-HI)	350	450	500	350	650+


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# INTERDICTION RANGE FROM KUWAIT

## ALI AL SALEM AIR BASE



A-4M : 350 NM

MIRAGE 2000 : 350 NM

F-16C : 450 NM

F/A-18 : 500 NM


OTHER AVAILABLE  
AIRCRAFT : 650+ NM

8/12

8/12 INTERDICTION RANGE FROM KUWAIT

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ALI AL SALEM AIR BASE



- A-4M : 350 NM
- MIRAGE 2000 : 350 NM
- F-16C : 450 NM
- F/A-18 : 500 NM
- OTHER AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT : 650+ NM

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56

9/12

9/12

THE F-18 IS NOT A THREAT TO ISRAEL

o Israel is out of range of Kuwait-based F-18s, which have a strike radius of 500 miles.

--A one-way suicide mission would theoretically be possible; however, such a mission is highly unlikely-- the Israeli Air Force would be able to track the aircraft during almost its entire flight and would be waiting for it at the border; it is most improbable that Kuwait would sacrifice any or all of its air force in this way, particularly in light of the threat from Iran.

o The current generation F-16--which has already been sold to the region--and the F-18 are comparable aircraft:

--Range, payload, speed, altitude, and weapons systems are comparable--and in many cases inferior to the likely British or French alternatives;

o Although the F-18 and the F-16 are comparable aircraft, there are differences which led Kuwait to select the F-18:

--The F-18 can perform both tactical strike and fighter missions; this versatility is crucial in a small air force like Kuwait's;

--The F-18 has superior capability against small, moving ground targets such as tanks and small boats; these are among the major threats facing Kuwait;

--The F-18 is a two engine aircraft; this makes it attractive to Kuwait for the practical reasons of pilot and aircraft safety, especially in a country with a small air force and relatively few pilots;

--The F-18 is a more durable aircraft; over its active life fewer attrition aircraft will be required;

--Kuwait has a successful history of working with the U.S. Navy and McDonnell-Douglas with the A-4; in addition, many A-4 systems can be adapted for use with the F-18 with a savings in time, money, and training.

o The F-18 is a highly computerized aircraft; the U.S. retains control of the software, making unauthorized use of the aircraft's advanced systems essentially impossible.

DEFENSE SECRETARIAT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

10/12

10/12

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### TACTICAL AIRCRAFT COMPARISON

	A-4	F-16	F/A-18	MIRAGE 2000	TORNADO
FIRST FLIGHT	1954	1978	1978	1978	1974
LENGTH (FT IN)	40'4"	47'6"	56'0"	50'3"	54'10"
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CEILING (FT)	42000	60000	50000	65000	50000+
STRIKE RADIUS (HI-LO-LO-HI)	350	450	500	350	650+


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# Twin Engine Safety

Source: AFISL, Norton AFB



F-5 at 390,000 hr  
F/A-18 at 230,000 hr

USAF aircraft data from USAF Safety Center, Norton AFB, California


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# F/A-18/F-15/F-16 Peacetime Attrition Comparison

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27/12

Cumulative Losses





2/2

034

WP

END

Richard Cohen

# Jerusalem Trap

Ah, there's a little bit of John F. Kennedy in Mike Dukakis after all. When Kennedy was asked how he would announce the appointment of his brother as attorney general, he joked that he would open the door very early in the morning and whisper, "It's Bobby." In somewhat the same way, Dukakis chose the eve of the Memorial Day weekend to whisper his Middle East policy: he'll be Israel's boy.

Specifically, Dukakis said he would, as president, recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and presumably move the U.S. Embassy there from Tel Aviv: "If Israel wants its capital in Jerusalem, then as far as I'm concerned, its capital is in Jerusalem," Dukakis said.

You have to give Dukakis credit. Normally, such statements are made at the height of the pandering season, the New York primary. He abjured such posturing. Apparently, though, his prudence (not to mention his apparent unfamiliarity with the nuances of the Middle East situation) gave others a bad case of the doubts: Was Dukakis really a friend of Israel? After all, he had steadfastly refused to rule out the possibility of a Palestinian state. What were his views? Tell us, Mike, tell us.

And so he did. With a possibly close election coming up—and with the president of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee having praised Vice President Bush—Dukakis said all the reassuring things in an interview with the Los Angeles

Times. He ducked a question about whether Israel had violated human rights in jailing about 5,000 Palestinians without charges ("Dealing with civil disturbances . . . is not an easy job.") and then said that whatever Israel wants to do with Jerusalem is all right with him. AIPAC could not have been displeased.

Ever since Israel annexed Arab East Jerusalem in 1967 and proclaimed the entire city its capital, the city's status has been legally muddled but never in doubt—at least in Israel. In a country where everything is open to debate, Jerusalem simply is not. It will remain what it is—the capital of Israel, never again to be divided and not to be internationalized either.

From the Israeli point of view, this is as it should be. When East Jerusalem was occupied by Jordan, Jews were forbidden from visiting their holy places (the Western Wall, for instance), entry was blocked to the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, and Jewish cemeteries were defaced. In contrast, the Israelis have honored and protected Islamic holy places. (Of course, Arabs who cannot or will not visit Israel cannot visit Jerusalem's holy places.)

The return of Jerusalem is an Arab dream-cum-fantasy without much chance of becoming a reality. But it remains, at least in theory, an issue that Israel and the Arab states will have to negotiate, and those negotiations, more likely than not, will be held under U.S. auspices. It is for that

reason that five U.S. presidents have fudged on Jerusalem, keeping the embassy in Tel Aviv, a 45-minute commute away, while supporting Israeli policy in almost every other way.

At the moment, however, the government of Yitzhak Shamir seems willing to negotiate . . . well, nothing. As a reward—certainly not as punishment—the man who, the polls tell us, is most likely to be the next president gives Israel precisely what it has always wanted: title to Jerusalem. He brushes aside Arab concerns, preferring to deal with those of AIPAC, the foremost pro-Israel lobbying group. As president, he might have to eat the words he uttered to the Los Angeles Times.

Words are important. When pressed by their more radical colleagues, moderate Arabs are likely to say the sort of things Israeli leaders later cite to prove Arab intransigence. The same works for "the other side." Jerusalem is an emotional issue in the Arab world. Yet in attempting to assuage American Jews, Dukakis has backed into a rhetorical trap of his own. He now has to defend a position that is anathema in the Arab world and that will be—count on it!—cited by Arabs as further evidence of American insensitivity to their concerns.

In the Diaspora, Jews uttered the ancient vow that if they forgot Jerusalem, their right hand should lose its cunning. Dukakis got it precisely backward. In remembering Jerusalem, he forgot his cunning.

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**THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Office of the Press Secretary  
(Moscow, USSR)**

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**BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
BY  
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS**

**The Mezhdunarodnaya Hotel  
Moscow, USSR**

**June 1, 1988**

**5:47 P.M. (L)**

**MR. POPADIUK:** Welcome to the BACKGROUND briefing. For your information only and not for use in print or by sound and camera, the briefers are Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne Ridgway and Ambassador Paul Nitze. There will be no opening statements; they will just go to your questions.

**Q** Why can't we have them for the record?

**Q** Why not on the record?

**SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:** Before we start with questions, may I give you a correction in the joint statement, Page 4. At the bottom of Page 4, capital letter "D," two lines have been dropped in the process of reprinting this page. I will read the correct two-and-a-half line statement, and then I will go back and take it slowly for you. It should read: "continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited."

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Let me now go back and just read this slowly. The first line you have -- "continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter," and second line is "portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited." I believe they're rerunning the text that will carry the correction.

Okay, let's go to questions.

Q A very technical question. The President referred to the working groups still meeting. At the news conference, the President -- a technical question. At the news conference, the President referred --

Q Louder.

Q We can't hear you.

Q -- explain about the working groups, whether they're all done --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is, the President referred to the working groups on the START treaty still working at his press conference. What was he referring to? Answer: He was referring to the fact that the work on the START treaty continues in Geneva.

Q Secretary Gorbachev said that there was some language in this joint statement that picked up the Washington language on the ABM-SDI formulation, that it was a repetition of that

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language, plus a Soviet statement calling for a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. And indeed, Gorbachev is saying that he was getting a whole response to the question -- listed some of the -- some predictability measures that were along the line -- seeing the ones we proposed. It doesn't seem to be in this document at all.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's not in this document. I think he was referring to the negotiations going on in -- the question had to do with a statement by Mr. Gorbachev -- I'm referring to your question. Your question related to a statement by Mr. Gorbachev that in the document there was a statement relating to the December 10th summit -- Washington summit statement with some further amplification thereof. I think what he must have been referring to was the document that is under consideration and negotiation in Geneva. We discussed it here, but there was no agreement as to any progress on that, and so it was not included in the summary statement that you have.

Q Well, do you regard this as a step forward that the Soviets listed some of these things that we have been asking them to list such as exchange of data, tests, meeting of experts -- a whole long list of these things?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was a proposal of ours in Geneva that in the Protocol II, the agreement on defense in space, which is under negotiation there, that there be a -- provisions of this kind which we call predictability measures. They came back with a version of that of their own which didn't change radically what we had proposed. And it did contain the four items which Mr. Gorbachev referred to.

Q Is that progress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was progress at that time. I wouldn't say it was progress achieved here at this meeting.

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23 Q Can you elaborate on the bottom of page five where it talks about the details of common ground having been recorded in documents in Geneva? Were those documents agreed to here, and being referred to Geneva, and, if so, what are they about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, those are -- the question referred to a sentence at the -- in the last -- next-to-last full paragraph on page five in the second sentence of which it says the details of this additional common ground have been recorded in documents exchanged between the sides. The delegations in Geneva will record these gains in the joint draft text of the START treaty. What that refers to is a memorandum agreed between the two sides here in Moscow which covered the items -- the elements of agreement with respect to two subject matters -- one being long-range ALCMs, and the other being with respect to the verification of mobile ICBMs.

Now those papers are summarized in a piece of paper which we've distributed here --

Q Could you go over that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- which is called Fact Sheet on Mobile ICBM Verification.

Q Could you just in a --

Q I know it's technical, but could you just briefly tell us where -- what you agreed to on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, after a summary, what this paper does is to list the areas of common ground first with respect to road-mobile ICBMs, and there there are about nine paragraphs of specific detailed agreement with respect to a verification regime, with respect to road-mobiles. There follows

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another five paragraphs which have to do with rail mobiles -- the first section being with respect to road-mobile, then rail mobiles. And then there is another section of about six or seven paragraphs, which deals with the significant issues yet to be resolved; and then a conclusion. As indicated by the above, progress was made by the expert group in Moscow, however a significant number of key issues remain to be resolved before we will have an agreed verification regime addressing mobile ICEMs for final considerations. This is a complex subject, and the devil remains in the details.

Q Just to clear this up, this is a U.S. statement; it's not a joint statement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. These were issues which were, in fact, agreed between the two sides.

Q But this statement is a U.S. statement -- this piece of paper?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a U.S. summary of a piece of paper which is substantially the same as this, which was agreed between the two sides.

Q What would be the approximate size of these areas in which the rail mobile systems would operate? Are we talking about a whole state, or a whole country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Our proposal that they be 25 square kilometers. Their proposal was that the area be 100 square kilometers per RDA -- restricted deployment area.

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23 Q Can I ask you this question? I don't know -- is this mike working? Well, anyway, on the bottom of Page 3 of the joint statement, it says that the continued negotiations would achieve a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty, building on the language of the Washington summit joint statement dated December 10, 1987. Was the phrase "building on" accepted by the Soviets? Does it mean that the joint statement of December 10th, 1987 is no longer literally valid? Can you give us a little background on the discussion of those two words?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a good deal of discussion about that. We had agreed in the joint communique, following on the February 22nd meeting in Washington on -- that the language of the December 10, 1987 joint statement -- the two teams in Geneva should build on that December 10th language. Now, the wording in Russian is a little bit different -- at least the Russian words can be interpreted a little bit differently than just straight "building on." However, we've had a good deal of argument about that, because they were proposing to use Russian words which more directly say "based on." But the agreement we'd reached on -- we'd reached in February clearly used the Russian words that come as close to "building on" as one can do in the Russian language. So, we believe that "building on" is the right language; not based on.

Q Question?

Q In his press conference, Secretary Gorbachev spoke about having presented to the President a piece of paper with a statement on it about peaceful coexistence and other ways -- of using military force and such ideas as this. And indicated that, as I understood him after some discussion, while that was not accepted, the President liked the spirit of it, and the President I think said that something about it was in here. I can't really spot what it is about it that's in here, but could you tell us what is in there and what it means as far as the United States is concerned? What happened --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Let me take you at full length through that. On Sunday, when the President arrived,

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he met privately with General Secretary Gorbachev to begin the discussion, and in the course of the discussion of the days to follow, to talk about the topics that would be covered. I think there was even the opening of a discussion about the nature of the relationship. In the course of that meeting, General Secretary Gorbachev gave the President a piece of paper, a plain white piece of paper on which were written the following words: proceeding from their understanding of the realities that have taken shape in the world today, the two leaders believe that no problem in dispute can be resolved, nor should it be resolved, by military means.

They regard peaceful coexistence as a universal principle of international relations. Equality of all states, noninterference in internal affairs, and freedom of sociopolitical choice must be recognized as the inalienable and mandatory standards of international relations. The President, in that brief meeting, looked at that, and listened to the General Secretary's suggestion that at some point in the course of the summit, the two leaders try to arrive at some statement of the political relationship that might indicate where we have come from since Geneva, where the two leaders you will recall recorded such things as: Nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The President said he liked it, and he would ask his delegation and senior advisors to look at it, the General Secretary said, yes, let's have our advisors look at this.

In the course of the next three days, and in the development of the joint statement, the U.S. and Soviet sides had an opportunity to reflect upon the development of their relationship over the last couple of decades. The U.S. side -- we were particularly struck by the number of times that we heard in the discussion of the General Secretary's language words such as "peaceful coexistence," "guidelines," "principles of international behavior," "balance of interests," and we couldn't help but note that at least as far as our country is concerned, we have had experience with that kind of language before. It's imprecise; it says if there are two dictionaries when the United States and the Soviet Union use these words.

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9/23 9/23 We expressed the view that to the extent our relationship and our dialogue over the last two years had been able to produce some positive things, it was because even in joint statements, we had stayed away from words that had meanings of a different sort on each side, and we had attempted to record things we knew, things that were actually in common.

And over the three days then we developed what is now the last paragraph in the opening section of the joint statement -- that is that paragraph that begins "that the two leaders are convinced that the expanding political dialogue that they have established represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern." That language was agreed.

It's apparent that the General Secretary wanted another opportunity to discuss with the President his preference for his own initial proposal. And so we again today discussed the General Secretary's preference for that language, and at the end of that discussion we stayed with what had been negotiated.

Q A quick one for each of you. Supposedly there was some major progress on human rights achieved here, and it has yet to be elaborated on precisely what it was. And secondly, sir, can you give us your qualitative assessment of what it means to have summarised all of these particular areas of verification on the mobiles and the ALCMs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On human rights, if you have -- as many of you have been -- if you've been with us since Geneva, you will recall that in the Geneva joint statement there is a very small reference to the two sides dealing with humanitarian cases in a manner that is as expeditious as possible. And over the two and

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a half years, we have moved to the separate discussion of that, but we have never been able to move much beyond the words between the two sides. The two leaders discussed in an open and candid way human rights and humanitarian issues.

In that same two and a half years, we have been able, working very hard here in Moscow with our embassy, in Washington, with resources of Ambassador Schifter, Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons -- others who have been involved in this -- been able to institute and to almost make formal a very elaborate set of mechanisms for discussing human rights and humanitarian cases with the Soviet Union. In fact, even before President Reagan arrived here in Moscow, Ambassador Schifter was here and had already begun one of his periodic reviews and intensive discussions on institutional questions, on individual cases, and because of so much that is being talked about in the Soviet Union now, the various questions that are in public discussion, trends in this field.

We have seen an increase in immigration levels. We have heard from Ambassador Schifter of the resolution of cases of political prisoners. We know of individual cases that have been resolved. And we have also been able to put in place plans for exchanges of experts on legal procedure, the administration of law, forensic psychiatry and things of that sort.

I'd like to bring together then the two themes on human rights, because we think that the dialogue has taken on a -- has had a qualitative change, and that change is reflected in what is now expanded language -- expanded beyond anything that the two sides have been able to agree to before -- expanded language that is in the joint statement. And we think that for those who consistently see this dialogue on human rights as a point of friction in the relationship -- that if you look carefully at that much more expanded language, you will see the conceptual distance that we have come since Geneva.

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23 And in fact, if I could put in a plug for two parts of the agenda that often are passed over, human rights and bilateral relations, you will see in this joint statement a very real distance that has been covered over the last two and a half years in these areas. And that's what we mean -- a conceptual growth in the appreciation between the two sides of the place of this dialogue, a practical growth in how it is carried out, an increase in numbers and things of emigration and other matters.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With respect to the second question, the one addressed to me, which had to do -- what do I consider to be the significance of the agreements which we were able to arrive at with respect to air-launch cruise missiles and mobile ICBMs.

We have found that in -- the more we negotiate on these issues which have to do with START, the more evident it becomes that you need an individual regime with respect to the limitation and the verification of the limitations -- with respect to each major type of weapon system.

We had already agreed, as the joint document indicates, most of the basic limitations which we contemplate for a START agreement. We didn't get them -- we hadn't been able to get them all agreed primarily because of our difficulty in agreeing on how to count long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles and what numbers to attribute to them. We had agreed that the best way to count them was by counting the planes that are equipped to carry them and then attributing a number to those planes.

Now the first question involved here is how do you distinguish planes that are capable of carrying long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles from those that are not so equipped -- not so capable. And there I think we made considerable progress on

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that. We did also agree on all the problems of conversion and air fields and so forth and so on that are related to that.

There remains the question of how do you -- what number is the right number and how do you verify that there haven't been deployments on planes that are not supposed to have them.

We still have work to do, but I think we've reduced the number of issues from maybe 15 issues to maybe five or six.

Similarly, with respect to mobile ICBMs, there are lots of problems with respect to how to limit them, how to make the problem manageable. We think we've made substantial progress in laying out the general way in which one could make the problem manageable. We have not yet removed our proposal that we propose a ban on these mobile missiles. We've been trying -- we've always for a long time have said if we could work out a reliable method of verification, we then would permit, or agree, or negotiate with them on permitting a restricted number of them. So again, in this field, I think we've reduced the issues that we have to work through at least by half, if not more, with respect to the mobile cruise missile. We've still got important issues to deal -- to work with. You build this sort of a thing brick by brick in order to have a solid structure.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a promised follow-up here, and then we were down here.

Q Please. On human rights, at the last meeting between Mr. Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, you received a very strong hint that the Soviets would tell you here in Moscow of changes in the way they deal with religious practices, education, teaching, et cetera. I haven't heard from you anything about any loosening of constraints. Did they follow through on that very strong promise?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The discussion in -- where were we -- Geneva, I guess it was -- the discussion in Geneva was of work that was going forward in the area of law concerning religious practice. It was a discussion about the changes taking -- being put into law as a legal review is taking place in the Soviet Union. We understand that that legal review has been completed, but those changes are not ready to be implemented because there is a procedure for approving legal change. And so we were not promised that we would see such things here. We certainly were told that in the internal process in which the Soviet Union is engaged as it addresses many questions such as those that are in these Central Committee theses that have been published recently that there is an internal procedure.

There's a question down here. Yes?

Q The final statement says that the delegations have been instructed to return to Geneva for START negotiations on July 12. Why wait so long?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know of no group of people in the world, as far as I know, that have been working as hard as those Geneva -- two delegations have -- you know, first with respect to the INF Treaty and all the things that had to be polished up in that, and also with START and with respect to Defense and Space. And they deserve to have some time, you know, to recharge their batteries and then get back to work. So it was decided that -- and both sides agreed to this -- that it was only right to let them go off for a bit and then get back to work on July 12.

Q Could you -- what the problem was about conventional force structure -- and also, Ambassador Ridgway, could you tell us just what kind of threat the Soviets have made on Afghanistan, and how they discussed the whole -- implementation of the agreement?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On conventional forces, the discussion -- the brief discussion is perhaps best explained this way: there is a negotiation involving 23 countries taking place in Vienna. That negotiation is not taking place either in Moscow, Geneva, or Washington. We have allies; the Soviet Union has its allies in the Warsaw Pact -- that's where that negotiation must take place. We have used these meetings, summits, and ministerial meetings to consult, as others of our allies have consulted with the representatives of the Soviet Union over time, but we have never looked to this session to produce agreements -- ideas, thoughts, but not agreements.

The other question on Afghanistan -- there was a brief reference to discussion of Afghanistan. I don't know what you mean by threats. We didn't hear any -- we didn't hear any threats. We had a discussion of Afghanistan, we had a report on the progress of the withdrawal, and I'm not --

Q It was suggested the withdrawal -- Soviet withdrawal might be slowed down.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we expect Soviet withdrawal to continue.

Now, we've promised some questions over on this side of the room as well.

Q There is very little in the joint statement on regional issues and about the only characterization is to say the discussions revealed serious differences. Can you point to any specific points of agreement in any of these regional problems?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have, of course, found in the experience of the last three years that if we start going through those regions which we believe have come to represent tension points in the East-West relationship, we end up with nearly a telephone book of different views on each aspect of a situation. And so we have chosen not to recount all of the positions of the two sides. But we did have an opportunity for -- I would say sort of sustained, intensive discussions at the expert level here and at the ministerial level, and the President and the General Secretary discussed such matters, and I perhaps might say that concerning Southern Africa, for example, where we had a long discussion between Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker, who was here from the U.S. side and Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin. There is some indication that there's important common ground on some aspects of the search for a Namibia-Angola settlement.

This -- these indications include, or common ground would include the necessity for a settlement entailing the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Angola and the achievement of Namibian independence in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, and as some of you know who have been following this in -- there's been rather significant increased momentum in the negotiations in recent months, notably at the London meetings in early May.

The two sides have both signaled that there's a need to sustain this momentum through early follow-up exchanges in which the South Africans are prepared to participate. The two sides here were able to indicate their support for establishing September 29, 1988, which is the 10th anniversary of Security Council Resolution 435 as a target for resolving outstanding differences, and in fact, we agreed that it would be useful to register the fact of the agreement on this target date, which is what I'm doing at the moment -- finding an opportunity to do that. Now, there are important remaining differences, but I think this would be an area to which I would point as one where, for example, on agreeing to a September target date, you can conclude that there is a shared U.S.-Soviet belief that the

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problem should be solved now. I think you can expect -- we feel that this conversation between Crocker and Adamishin provided an additional impetus to the regional process, and it allows everybody to see that in fact this is taking place.

Q Do you have information that 28 refusenik families have been given permission to emigrate to the United States? Tell me something about that. I understand that one of them who is not on the list is one of the fellows who spoke the other day when the President met with dissidents. Can you clear something up. I'd also like to know whether perhaps the President's statement recently -- on this issue may have had something to do with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really believe you should not attribute importance to any one particular statement at any one particular time. The President has been consistent over the period of this dialogue in publicly stating his views on the importance of making progress, not only institutionally but with respect to specific humanitarian cases. So I think it would be wrong to suggest that somehow or another this popped up and has a particular relevance.

I do not have information on cases being resolved last week, next week, today. I just -- I cannot help you on that. Perhaps others can in the course of the day, but our sources of information are very much yours. These are individuals who are involved and sometimes they tell us and sometimes they don't.

Q Did you mean to say --

Q I understand that Ambassador Schifter has given some of these families a list of people that are --

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23 SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't help you on that. I don't know anything about lists.

Q I just want to clarify and follow up on that. The President seemed to imply in his press conference that he was under the impression that the 14 cases presented -- that Gorbachev had agreed to do something about them. You seem to be saying that that's not your information.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm not saying that at all. First of all, we have really not ever gotten into the practice of talking about lists, or numbers, or specific cases because it represents simply a potential for tragedy for all of the people we don't know, and we speak on behalf of all of those people. And I'm not aware of any commitments I think you're applying. We press, we press, we press. Cases get solved, new cases arise. We have a way of talking about them.

Q I would like to ask, do you think there's any realistic possibility of getting START this year, an election year? And in your many, many years of negotiations, do you think the Cold War is over?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're two different questions. One was is there any possibility of getting a START agreement this year, and the second one is, do you think the Cold War is over?

With respect to the first question, it's a difficult thing. We've been working on these questions and I tried to indicate the complexity of the issues -- of the details that one has to go through before one can have confidence that one has a sound agreement based upon the right limitations and that they are such that one can have reasonable confidence in their verifiability. So that whether or not we can work through and get agreement on all these issues by the end of the year I don't know.

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But certainly, we are trying to make that progress. The President wants that to happen if it can happen. Mr. Gorbachev wants it to happen if it can happen. I think the President certainly wants a sound agreement, a good agreement, not just any agreement. And we're trying to get an agreement which would be a sound agreement, which could be ratified, and which could be lived with, and which would be verifiable and have -- and reduce the risk of war. That's the main thing. So we're working at it. Whether we can really do it or not, we don't know.

Q Could you declare the Cold War over?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With respect to declaring the Cold War over, I hope it isn't over in the sense of becoming hot.

Q Ahhhh.

Q The President, before the summit, said several times he wanted to discuss the Berlin Wall with Mr. Gorbachev. Did he discuss the question of Berlin and the Berlin Wall? And what was the Soviet response?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question of the President's Berlin initiative of last year was discussed here. As you know, we await a Soviet response to an initiative by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. We do not have a response.

Q Did he discuss it -- excuse me, a follow-up. Did he -- did the President discuss it with Gorbachev?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe not. I'm going through four days in my recollection.

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23 Q May I ask you, please, did the -- during the course of the discussion on Afghanistan, did the subject of the missing Soviets ever come up? The President was asked at the University if he could help relocate these missing -- these 312 missing Soviets in Afghanistan. And secondly, Gorbachev, in his news conference, said that the two of them had gone round again on the subject of supplying arms to Central America. Were there any new initiatives there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Unless there was a private exchange at the dinner last night, I believe they did not discuss any further the question of Soviets in Afghanistan of the kind that you're talking about.

You talk about going round again on Central America, it's one of those words where you have to know how you're going to define "round." To my mind that means a couple of times over. I would say, go around again is probably a good way to put it. The discussion was -- had as its background the exchange at the Washington summit; the question of an end to Soviet arms supplies to Nicaragua; our suggestion that it was time for that to happen, as we had understood was the Soviet position in December. U.S. arms supplies to the Contras have ended. The discussion does not actually go beyond then a Soviet reply that such a consideration would have to take place in the context of ending security assistance to all of the countries of the region. And that's where it always ends, no matter how many times it seems to go around lately.

Q -- regional issue -- (inaudible) -- the Gulf. And Gorbachev said today on the Middle East there are closer positions on the Middle East peace process. (Inaudible.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The first had to do with the Gulf. There was a discussion of U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 -- our view that there ought to be a second resolution and there was an expression again of the Soviet view that while in principle, the Soviet Union thinks there might be a reason for such a

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resolution, it does not believe that the time is now.

On the Middle East, we have found in previous discussions that there is some ground on a number of general points about the Middle East and the peace process. We can agree that the region is getting more dangerous, particularly with proliferation of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. We can agree that there are some worrisome military trends and I think we can say that we both believe that there's really no acceptable alternative to an active peace process.

Some other points of general convergence that it's possible to discern when talking about these topics would be that a comprehensive peace settlement must be the goal of peacemaking efforts; that interim or transitional stages are acceptable, provided they're linked to a final status of a comprehensive agreement; that a properly structured international conference can be an acceptable mechanism for initiating negotiations, and that the conference should be based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, and that no settlement can be just and enduring unless it meets Israeli security needs, and satisfies the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

Now, once you agree on these general principles, why, then you get a continuation of the fact that we diverge, when you try to give the general principles operational content. So I think in our discussion here, one could conclude that while you have general principles, you get divergences that show that the approaches of the two sides in reality are still driven by different assumptions. So, I think that's the general -- and as far as the Secretary's trip to the Middle East, I'm simply not in a position, given my own background, which is not in the Middle East, to report on the discussion here.

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23 Q Sir, could you elaborate a little bit on the major difference remaining on the SLCM question, and what extent you have narrowed some of the issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are several issues with respect to SLCMs. The first one is that we do not believe that conventional SLCMs should be limited at all. After all, many people have longer-range conventional SLCMs and certainly we do not want to see the U.S. Navy outranged by the navies of third countries, or who have you. So, that we do not believe that conventional long-range SLCMs should be limited. It is difficult to make a distinction between nuclear-armed and long-range -- and conventionally-armed, long-range SLCMs. After all, our SLCMs are basically launched through a torpedo tube, so they have to be similar in order to be launched through the same apparatus.

Conceivably there might be some way of distinguishing conventional from nuclear-armed, but we don't quite see how that can be done. Now, that's one of the problems which is unique, I think, to the SLCM problem -- what is not the same for SLCMs as it is for air-launched cruise missiles. Because there it is possible to contemplate air-launched cruise missiles, which are clearly identifiable from nuclear-armed ones.

But then beyond that, there's a question of range. We haven't really agreed with the Soviets on the range of the SLCMs to be limited. And the final and most difficult question is how one would verify a limitation on SLCMs without interfering with the operational utility of submarines, and while still protecting the classified material on submarines. So, there are many different and quite unique problems to be overcome if one proposes to limit SLCMs. We have proposed that the best way of approaching the problem is for us to declare the maximum number that we plan to deploy, and for the Soviet side to declare the maximum number that they plan to deploy. And then we would use national technical means to -- and not really try to have a verification regime of the same type that we've developed for other systems. The Soviets don't agree with that, and

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so they want us to try to figure out a verification and method of distinguishing, which would be reliable. We haven't been able to do so, so we're divided on that issue. And I shouldn't say that we've made any progress at this meeting.

MR. POPADIUK: I'm sorry. We have time for only one more question. Let's take someone from the back.

Q From the back?

MR. POPADIUK: Yes, the back.

Q How far back is back, Roman?

Q At Mr. Gorbachev's press conference, he indicated that the Afghanistan problem was perhaps a little bit greater than you're conceding yourselves. I think he suggested that Pakistan's arming of the Mujahadeen was a violation of the Geneva Accords. I'm wondering if that was discussed in his talks with Reagan, and how Mr. Reagan responded? I'm also wondering what the U.S. would do if the Soviet Union interrupted --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was this morning, in the meeting with -- between the General Secretary and the President -- a format in which the Foreign Minister and Secretary of State reported to the two leaders on the nature of the discussions that had been taking place at the expert level, the ministerial level, and brought the issues to the President. It's in that context then, that there was this morning further discussion of Afghanistan, and I suppose I could say that as they've been doing publicly, the Soviets did accuse Pakistan of violating the Geneva Accords. We reminded them, as we have all of this week, that -- of the prior discussions and understandings that were there when this issue was taking -- was being discussed, during the period preceeding the signing of the Geneva Accords.

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23 You will recall, the topic was symmetry. The U.S. proposal was a moratorium. It was rejected. The Soviet Union refused to abstain from arms supplies to the Kabul regime, which would have resulted in cessation of U.S. and Pakistani and military assistance to the Mujahadeen. They preferred the other formulation -- sort of a flip side of a moratorium. We have stressed in the course of these meetings that we plan to stand by these understandings, and we plan to support Pakistan, which is our ally. And if you'll allow me to be just a little flip on this question of capturing forces, it would seem the resistance forces are managing quite well with some of the things they're capturing in the activities going on now. But that's the way this discussion took place.

MR. POPADIUK: Thank you.

END

6:35 P.M. (L)

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ס ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך דפים

סווג בסיוני ס ו ד י

דחייפות מ י ד י

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

21  
13

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ההתפתחויות האחרונות כגון ההתנערות ומסעותיו של המזכיר לאזנר את מידת חיוביות מציאותו של גורם פלסי לצידה של ירדן ע"מ שצרוף כזה יאפשר לירדן לנוע במסלול לקראת הסדר. המזכיר קיבל מימד אישי של עוצמת מרכיב זה. שלוב פלסי "עצמאיים" מהגדמ"ע או כאלה מחוצה לה הוך ידיעה שאש"פ עומד מאחוריהם לא התממש עד עתה. מאלכ מטעים שההתמקדות האמריקאית במציאת שותף פלסי אסור שתיצור אשלייה ולו אופטיית שארה"ב העבירה את כובד המשקל מהמרכיב הירדני לעבר המגזר הפלסי. מדיניות הממשל היא שכל הסדר בסוגייה הפלסי חייב להיות קשור בירדן. תכליתית המעמד הסופי של השטחים בכל צרוף שהוא צריך לקחת בחשבון את האינטרס הירדני כפי שגם המלך מציגו.

5. פ ס ג ה . ירדן חוששה שתקלע למצב של ל- *BOXED IN* שלא יותיר לה מרחב תמרון מדיני. חוסיין נטל על עצמו משימה לנסות ולתאם את עמדת ירדן עם יתר הגורמים הערבים ככל שניתן, ובעיקר עם סוריה. מעשית הוא פועל להשגת קונצנזוס ולו נמוך בנושא התהליך המדיני טרם הפסגה. לדעתו ניתן להשיג מכנה משותף נמוך ולהשאיר בצד בעיות השנויות במחלוקת. מכנה כזה יכול להתבסס על הנקודות הבאות : (א) תמיכה ועידוד להתנערות. (ב) חיזוק לעמדת בריה"מ. (ג) המרצת דיאלוג סוב-אמריקאי בנושא המזה"ת. (ד) מרכזיות אש"פ. (ה) ועיב"ל. הנקודה הקריטית מבחינתו תהיה בנושא הייצוג הפלסי בועב"ל כאשר קיימות שלוש אפשרויות בסדר יורד של עדיפות ירדנית - משלחת ירדנית-פלסי, משלחת ירדנית-אשפי"ת ומשלחת כל-ערבית.

6. אש"פ - ירדן . עיקר חששו של המלך הוא בתחום התנהגות אש"פ בוועידה. מאלכ לא מודע למגעים ירדנים-אשפי"ם אך הוא סבור שערפאת יפעל לדחיקת רגלי ירדן או לפחות לכבילת כל מהלך מצדה שלא בתאום/שותפות עם אש"פ. לעראפת כזכור ישנה הזמנה פתוחה לבוא לירדן אלא שהלה לא ממחר לממשה. מאלכ סובר, בהגיון רב, שערפאת מעדיף לצבור עוצמה נוספת דהיינו בפסגה ולבוא לירדן "עטור שבחים" שהוועידה ככל הנראה תעריך עליו, מצב שלא משמח את המלך.

7. ג ד מ " ע . ירדן ממשיכה להיות *DISCOURAGE* מהמתרחש שם. בגדמ"ע קם דור חדש של מנהיגים פונדמנטליסטים שלא מוכר לירדנים ואשר העמיד בצל את הגורמים הפרו-ירדנים, כפרייג' וא-שאוה, או אלה שלירדן היה שיג ושיח עמם. תופעה נוספת

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 3 מחוד דפים

סוג-בסחוני ס ו ז

דחיפות מ י ז

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

3/3

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הפועלת נגד ירדן (וישראל) ועליה שמע בביקורו שם לא מכבר הוא שכליאת אלפי פלסטי בידי ישראל כתוצאה מההתנערות נתבקה. הזדמנות נדירה לעצירים לעצב דור חדש של מנהיגים בין כאלה שבנסיבות אחרות כלל לא היו נפגשים. הסתובפותם תחת 'קורת גג אחד היא גם כור היתוך לגיבוש עמדות פוליטיות תחת השפעת הגופים הרדיקלים ביותר.

בנסיבות פוליטיות אלו המלך מרגיש שהמודעות לעמדת ירדן בנושא הפלסטי בקרב חוגים אלו שואפת לאפס והוא רואה חובה לעצמו לצאת במסע רחב להסברתה. הפסגה תתן בידי אפשרות להציג יריעה רחבה של פעלו רב השנים למען העניין הפלסטי.

8. פ נ י ס . תקופת הרמאדן המתאפיינת בד"כ ברמה פעילות נמוכה בממלכה, נוצלה ע"י חוסיין לפגישות עם מגזרים ורבדים שונים בממלכה. מאלכ מעיר שהשנה עמדה בסימן רב של פגישות עם ציבורים שונים בירדן בהשוואה לתקופה המקבילה אשתקד. רוב השיחות יוחדו לתהליך המדיני, לנושא הפלסטי ולעמדת ירדן כלפיהם.

אלי אבידן  
k.lc

טופס מברק

דף מחודג דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיסות מנדרי

תאריך/ז"ח 10:00 2.6.88

מס' מברק

המשרד + בטחון

46 047

אל: מעפ"א

דע: מקש"ח - משהב"ט

מטוסי אפ-18 לכורית

מתוך שיחה עם עוזר של הסנטור דניס דה-קונסיני:

1. הממשל עד ין מנסה לקדם את העסקה המוצעת הזאת, מתוך חשש שדה-קונסיני יביע התנגדות, נציגי מחמ"ד והפנטגון יפגשו עם עוזריו בימים הקרובים ויתדרכו אותם בנדון.

2. הסנטור אכן נוטה להסתייג מהמכירה. בין היתר ירצה לדעת מדוע הוא לא נכללה ב"רשימת יעביץ" (רשימת האסטרטגיה למכירת נשק למדינות זרות שהממשל מגיש בתחילת כל שנה לקונגרס), וכן ירצה לברר באם יש הצעות נוספות שבכוננת הממשל להגיש ושלא הור ברשימת הנ"ל. כ"כ יבקש הבהרות לגבי המדיניות המנחה את המכירה לכורית ואת המכירות הנוספות אם יש כאלה.

לידיעתכם.

אוסף אלמ 3  
למדן

המס' 3  
המס' 3  
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המס' 4  
המס' 4

15

רחוקותו רגיל	מחור:
סוג כסחוני: בלמס	אל:
תז"ח: 021730	המשרד
נר: 0 0074	דעו
	מאת: נאו"ם

אל: ארבל 2, פר"נ  
מאת: מיכל צוייגרייך

המושב המיוחד לפר"נ - 2.6.88 דיוני הבוקר

היום התכטאו נשיא קפריסין ג'ורג' וסיליו, רה"מ פינלנד הרי הולקרי  
שה"ח סין QIAN QICHEN, שה"ח צרפת רולנד דומס, שה"ח גרמ"ז  
אוסקר פישר.

להלן עיקרי הדברים:

קפריסין

דיבר על התפקיד החשוב של האו"ם בהשכנת השלום. הדגיש את חשיבות  
ועידת הפיסגה של מנהיגי שתי המעצמות ומקווה שהאווירה הטובה שהיתה  
בפיסגה תשפיע על כל העולם.  
רואה חשיבות בהקטנת השימוש בנשק קונבנציונלי וכן תומך בהסכם INF  
ובקיפוצ של 50% מן הנשק האסטרטגי שבידי שתי מעצמות העל.

פינלנד

הדגיש את חשיבות ועידת הפיסגה. הנושא שלפירוק נשק חשוב במיוחד  
למדינות קטנות.  
תמך בגישה מולטילטרלית בפירוק נשק. הזכיר את השימוש בנשק כימי  
במלחמת המפרץ ומחה נגד כך.

סין

הביע תקווה שארה"ב וכריה"מ ימשיכו בדרך שסללו בעת ועידת הפיסגה.  
הסכמי INF טובים אך אינם מספיקים. דיבר על הצורך בקיפוצ של  
50% מן הנשק הגרעיני האסטרטגי.  
שתי מעצמות העל צריכות לשיט קץ לניסויים הגרעיניים.  
דיבר על הצורך באזורים מפורזים מנשק גרעיני.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew and English, including names like 'First', 'Second', 'Third' and 'Qian Qichen'.

אישור:

שם השולח:

תאריך:

דחיסוק:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	ר"ת: 2
סוג כטחוני:		מחור: 2
תז"ח:		א ל :
נר :		ד ע :
0 0074		מאח :

צרפת


הנושא של פירוק הנשק חשוב להשכנת הבטחון והולך ביחד עם הכטחון. צרפת מנסה למנוע התרבותם של טילים ונמנית עם מדינות שמנסות למנוע הפצתם של טילים אלה. הנושא של נשק ביולוגי חשוב ודורש התייחסות ובדיקה. נשק גרעיני וקונבנציונלי הם פרי ולא מקור לאלימות.

גרמ"ז

הדגיש את חשיבות האו"ם בנושא פירוק הנשק הגרעיני. הכיע התנגדותו לשימוש בנשק כימי.

הנאומים כמלואם כדיפ'.

נאו"ם



אישור:	מיכל צוייגדייך	שם השולח:	תאריך: 2.6.88
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10

רחיטות: רגיל	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	ר"ח:
סוג כטחוני: גלוי		מתור:

תו"ח: 021930	המשרד : כטחון	א ל :
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נר : 0 0076		ד ע :
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גלוי 8		מאת : נאו"ם
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אל : ארכל 2 , פר"ו  
 דע : קש"ח וא"א (גלוי) (העכירוי)  
 מאת : טל בן-צבי

המושב המיוחד לפר"ו - נואמי אחה"צ 2.6.88

1. התבטאו אחה"צ : רה"מ איסלנד, רה"מ טרינידד וטובגו, רה"מ אירלנד, שק"ח פרו, שה"ח אוסטרית, שה"ח זאיר והקרדינל CASAROLI רחמ"מ מהאפיפיור.
2. לא היתה כל התייחסות מיוחדת בדברי הנואמים לישראל ולמזה"ת, פרט לדברי רה"מ טרינידד שציון השימוש בנשק כימי במלחמת המפרץ.
3. בנושא דרא"פ שה"ח זאיר קרא למדינות המסייעות לדרא"פ בנשק גרעיני להפסיק מיוע זה. רה"מ טרינידד ציון שמדינתו חוששת מפני ההתעצמות הגרעינית. משטר האפרטהייד, ולא ניתן להפקיד כידי משטר דיכוי זה טכנולוגיה גרעינית.
4. הנואמים במלואם ישלחו בדיפ' הקרוב.

נאו"ם

ר"ח : 1  
 דע : 2  
 מאת : 3  
 סיכום : 1  
 פתח : 1  
 סוף : 1

תאריך:	2.6.88
טפ השולח:	טל בן-צבי
אישור:	

g.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מייד

055

תאריך/ז"ח 16:30 2 יוני 88

מס' מברק

המשרד

אל : מצפ"א

מאת: הציר יועץ, וושינגטון.

מפיטר רוזמן מה-NSC רוס התקשר עמו טלפונית ומסר לו שנושא  
מז"ת לא נידון בפסגה בעזרה ראויה לציון וכי הסובייטים היו מרוצים  
מהדברים המעורפלים שאמרה רוזמן רידג'ור בהקשר זה לתיקשורת.



ד נ ד מ ת נ י

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ג/א/ס	ג/א/ס	ש/א/ס	מ/א/ס	מ/א/ס
ה/א/ס	ה/א/ס	ה/א/ס	ה/א/ס	ה/א/ס
				4

רמז	מחלקת חשבי חשבונות	15
סוג מסמך	טופס חשבו	
שומר		
תז"ח	משרד	101
021350		
נר		101
0 0057		
	נאו"ם	1

אל : ארבל 2  
 דע : משפט, לשכת רוה"מ  
 מאת : יוחנן בייך

"תרגיל" כתב ההאמנה.

שיחה עם פלישהאור היועץ המשפטי.

1. כחי "לא לעורר כלבים ושנים" - כדברי היוע"מ פלישהאור, לא זכננו ועדת כתביהאמנה לפני נאום רוה"מ ב-7 דנא.
2. בעת נאום רוה"מ יהיה היועץ המשפטי על כמת חאו"ם נכוך לכל יוזמה.
3. ועדת כתבי ההאמנה, כראשות שגריר ארגנטינה, דלפץ', תתכנס ביום כ' 13/6 אחה"צ.
4. דו"ח ועדת כתבי ההאמנה יובא לעצרת ביום ד' 15/10 כבוקר. אם יהיה ערעור ערכי - יחיה אז. פלישהאור ואני מתאמים עם שגריר פינלנד שיחיה מוכן אז "לתרגיל" הרגיל.

נאו"ם

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הכנסת ה-11 - מארץ 1.6.82

הקטע הנילוז קונטאיה אמריי

#### Regional Issues

The president and the general secretary thoroughly discussed a wide range of regional questions, including the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, and other issues. They expressed satisfaction with the April, 1988, conclusion in Geneva of accords on

an Afghanistan settlement. Although the discussions revealed serious differences both in the assessment of the causes of regional tensions and in the means to overcome them, the leaders agreed that these differences need not be an obstacle to constructive interaction between the United States and USSR.

They reaffirmed their intention to continue U.S.-Soviet discussions at all levels aimed at helping parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions which advance their independence, freedom and security. They emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

רחיטות: רגיל	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 1
סוג כטחוני: גלוי		מחור: 4
חז"ח: 012100		א ל : המשרד
נר : 0 0038		ד ע :
		מאת : באו"ם

אל : ארבל 2 , פר"ן  
מאת : טל בן-צבי , מיכל צוייגרייך

המושב המיוחד לפר"ן - 1.6.88 דיוני הבוקר

1. היום נפתח המושב המיוחד לפר"ן. התבטאו נשיא זימבבואה רוברט מוגבש - יו"ר הכלמ"ז, נשיא ארגנטינה אלפונסין, רה"מ שבדיה, רה"מ יפן ושה"ח אקוודור.
2. להלן עיקרי הדברים:

זימבבואה

כרך על פירוז דרום הפסיפיק מנשק גרעיני והזכיר הצעות לפירוז אפריקה, המז"ת, דרום אסיה, האיזור הנורדי ומרכז אירופה. בהקשר פירוז אפריקה ציין את האירוניה בדבר שדווקא אותן מדינות מערביות שמכריזות על התחייבויותן לאי הפצת נשק גרעיני בתקיפות, הופכות להיות אלה אשר נותנות את היכולת הגרעינית. לדרא"פ, מדינת-אשר סירבה לחתום על דטא או להעמיד את מתקניה הגרעיניים תחת פיקוח סבא"א.

השימוש בחל"כ מהווה ענן מכשר רעות לגורל האנושות. ההוכחות לשימוש בנשק כימי לאחרונה, מוכיח עד כמה חשוב השמדת מצבורי נשק זה. הנמצא במאגרי מדינות רבות. כרוך שפרוטוקול ג'נבה מ-1925 איננו מספיק. אנו קוראים לוועידה לנשק כימי אשר תאסור פיתוח, ייצור, אגירה ושימוש בחל"כ.

ארגנטינה

הנשיא ראול אלפונסין התייחס למרוץ החימוש המשפיע ישירות לא רק על התפתחות היחסים הטבעית בין מדינות אלא גם על צמיחה כלכלית בינלאומית, אשר כופה הגבלות על הפוטנציאל להתפתחות של כל המדינות

אישור:

שם השולח:

תאריך:

הנשק איתנו 2 בין פר"ן 1  
הנשק איתנו 3 בין פר"ן 1  
הנשק איתנו 2 בין פר"ן 1

דחיסות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	ר"מ: 2
סוג כסחוני:		מחור: 4
תז"ח:		א ל :
נר :		ד ע :
00038		מאת :

עניות או עשירות, ספקיות או צרכניות נשק. ארה"ב ובריה"מ הוכיחו את נכונותן להיכנס לתהליך ביולטרלי של פרוק נשק גרעיני, אך לא כך הדבר בשטח המשא ומתן המולטרלי בנושא פרוק נשק גרעיני. הנשיא ציין שאבגבטינה אינה בעלת מאגרי נשק כימי. ארצו רואה צורך בפתיחת דו-שיח ללא תנאים מוקדמים, עם בריטניה וצפון אירלנד בנוגע לסכסוך המתמשך על איזורי המלבינס.

שבניה

הה"מ שבניה INGVAR CARLSSON תתייחס בין היתר להסכם INF בין ארה"ב לבריה"מ כפריצת דרך בפירוק הנשק הגרעיני. ברך על הדו-שיח המתנהל בין מנהיגי שתי מעצמות-העל כסלילת דרך לפירוק נשק גרעיני ושיתוף פעולה בנושאי כסחור בינלאומיים.

הסכם INF הוא צעד היסטורי ראשון אך הנשק הגרעיני הקיים עדיין מהווה איום קטלני. הזכיר את הצהרת שטוקהולם שקראה לשים קץ לניסויים גרעיניים על ידי כל המדינות. ציין את חשיבות תפקיד האו"ם בנושא פירוק הנשק. לדעת ממשלתו הסכם על איסור בשימוש בנשק גרעיני יהיה בעל חשיבות גבוהה, אך הסכם שכזה חייב להיות נתמך ע"י נקיטת צעדים לפירוק נשק ככל התחומים כולל נשק גרעיני ונשק קונבנציונלי.

בהתייחסו ל-NPT ציין שמאז ההסכם לא נוספה כאופן רשמי מדינה בעלת נשק גרעיני ובאשר לחולשה ההסכם קשה לומר שהמדינות בעלות נשק גרעיני עמדו בהתחייבויותיהן. יש צורך שמדינות שטרם חתמו על ההסכם יעשו זאת.

חל"כ - השימוש בנשק כימי נגד העיר HALABJA הוא הפרה של פרובוקול ג'נבה 1925 וכן של חוקים בינלאומיים האוסרים שימוש בנשק זה.

יפן

הה"מ יפן ברך את ספרד וערכ הסעודית עם היכנסם ל-NPT. הסכם זה מהווה הבסיס לאי הפצת נשק גרעיני. חל"כ- לדבריו נשק כימי גורם להרס המוני, הוא מסוכן מכיוון שהוא קל לייצור ולשימוש. מצער מאד שהשתמשו בנשק זה

אישור:

שם השולח:

האריך:

רשימה:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	ר"ת: 3
סוג כספוני:	טופס מברק	מחור: 4
ת"ח:		א ל :
נר :		ד ע :
0 0038		מח:

במלחמת המפרץ. בנוגע לסכסוך במפרץ, יפן עתה מאמצים כמשך חמש השנים האחרונות לקדם דיאלוג בין שני הצדדים. יפן תומכת במאמצי המזכ"ל באיזור כנוגע למזה"ת, שה"ח של יפן SOUSUKE UNO מתכנן ביקור ומפגש עם מנהיגי מדינות האיזור, כדי לעמוד על האפשרויות לתרום לקידום תהליך השלום.

אקוודור

שה"ח אקוודור ציין שיש לתת עדיפות לנושא אי-הפצה של נשק גרעיני הגבלה על ניסויים גרעיניים וכימיים וכן הגבלה על נשק קונבנציונלי.

דיוני אה"צ

התכטאו נציגי יוון, גאמאיקה, הולנד, ונצואלה, אוסטרליה, איראן, יוגוסלביה. להלן עיקרי הדברים:

יוון

שר החוץ של יוון KAROLOS PAPULIAS התייחס לנושא השכנת השלום בתור הנושא החשוב ביותר והתפקיד של האו"ם בנושא זה. תמך בנושא אזהרים חופשיים מנשק גרעיני. דיבר על הים התיכון כ-SEA OF PEACE- הולנד

שר החוץ HANS VAN DEN BROEK

דיבר על הצורך בהקטנת השימוש בנשק גרעיני. הזכיר את המזה"ת בהקשר לאזור מפורז מנשק גרעיני.

Furthermore, the regional context would be suitable for considering nuclear-free zones as a further means to strengthen non-proliferation. Our Final Document could welcome past achievements in this respect and express the hope that in other regions, notably the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, such a zone be established as well.

איזור:

שם השולח:

תאריך:

דתי: 4	מחלקת הקשר ניגו-יורק	רחיפוק:
מתור: 4	טופס מברק	סרג בטורניג
אל:		תז"ח:
דע:		נר ז:
מאת:		0 0038

איראן

הנאום במלואו בנפרד.

בתום הדיונים היו זכויות תשובה של ארה"ב, עיראק, איראן.

הדברים במלואם יוברקו בנפרד. יש לציין שבזכות התשובה העיראקית הזכיר השגריר העיראקי את העובדה שאיראן החרימה את מועצת הבטחון ואפילו המשטר הגזעני כדרא"פ, לדברי השגריר העיראקי וכן ישראל לא עשו זאת.

הנאומים במלואם בדיפ'.

נאו"ס

איטור:

מיכל צוייגריין

שם השולח:

1.6.88

תאריך:



23:17

ט ו ס ס  
דפניס .. ז .. מתוך .. ז .. דפניס  
..... סווג בטחוני  
..... דחיפות  
..... תאריך וזיח  
..... מס' מברק

17  $\frac{2}{2}$

MR. MACNEIL: One final area, the Middle East. Are you -- the Soviets have said things today that are rather positive about your peace initiative in the Middle East. Are you -- and you're going back there yourself --

SEC. SHULTZ: Yes, I am.

MR. MACNEIL: Are you heading back with some possibility now, or promise, of Soviet participation in the process?

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, they want to participate in the process, and I think they have come to share with others, including ourselves, a sense that the situation there is not stable. It's not going to stay the same; it's going to change. The status quo is not an option. And, of course, it's a very explosive area, particularly now that we see all of these ballistic missiles and chemical weapons around. So we'd like to see something worked out, and we've had some worthwhile discussions with them. But, of course, if it's going to work out, it will have to be basically between Israel and each of its neighbors in those bilateral negotiations. That's where the action has to be. And our questions always are: Is there something we can do to help bring that process about?

MR. MACNEIL: And is that made more likely by your talks here?

SEC. SHULTZ: Well, maybe a little bit. But it's difficult. It's tough.

\*

15

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the top left, including "כנס" and "מסמך".

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	מס' : 1
טופס מברק	מס' : 2
תז"ח: 311200	מס' : 5 א
כ"ר : 0 0763	מס' : 6 ע
	מס' : 7 חת

Handwritten note: *Newsday May 28 '88*

# Soviets Say No to Israeli Emigre Plan

By Jeff Sommer  
Newsday Deputy Foreign Editor

Moscow — The Soviet Union has rejected an Israeli proposal to open a Moscow-Bucharest-Tel Aviv air route for Jewish emigrants because the Soviet Union doesn't want to be involved in a project that would "place limits on the human rights of people," a Soviet Foreign Ministry official said yesterday.

In an interview at ministry headquarters in Moscow, Gennady P. Tarassov, deputy chief for Middle East affairs, also said that an Israeli consular delegation would be arriving in Moscow "soon . . . certainly this year," the first official Israeli visit since the Soviet Union broke ties between the two countries after the 1967 Middle East war.

Tarassov said that relations between the two countries were improving but that the Soviet Union will not restore full diplomatic relations until Israel shows that it is ready to make a "fair deal" for Middle East peace.

One apparent indication of improving relations has been a dramatic increase in the number of Jews permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union. The number reached 3,528 this year

Handwritten notes in Hebrew on the right side of the page, including "מסמך" and "מס' 3".

# Soviets Reject Emigré Route

SOVIET from Page 4

through April, compared with an annual total of 914 two years ago, according to figures supplied by the National Council on Soviet Jewry.

Last year, Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, said they would support a new air route between the two countries via Bucharest, Romania, because it would have the effect of increasing the proportion of Soviet Jewish emigres who actually go to Israel. At present, emigres from the Soviet Union normally fly to Vienna, and from there are free to choose their final destination. Most choose the United States, not Israel.

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But yesterday, putting an ironic spin on frequent western accusations that the Soviet Union has committed serious human rights violations, Tarassov said

that the Soviet Union had decided against the plan.

Tarassov said, however, that the Soviet Union favors "good relations" with Israel. "We don't have anything against the Israeli people," he said. "They should live under conditions of peace and security."

He said he believed that the time is now "more ripe" for concluding a Middle East peace. Secretary of State George Shultz' efforts in the region, which are scheduled to resume after next week's Moscow summit, have brought some progress, he said, although Shultz had been "too optimistic" in expecting quick results. This is an understandable error, he said. ". . . To be optimistic is one of the particular features of the American character."

He said that an international peace conference, an idea that the Soviet Union has advocated for years, is the only way to achieve a lasting peace in the region. Tarassov said that the Palestine Liberation Organization would support a conference in which it would be only indirectly represented. In deference to Israeli concerns, the PLO would not have a place at the conference table, he said, but would have its interests represented as part of an all-Arab delegation, which would "operationally" be a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.

He said that a series of obstacles stand in the way of a conference in the near future, including Israel's continuing fears about the PLO and its reluctance to give up territories occupied in the 1967 war.

END

2/2

X63





שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך דפים

סוג כסחוני ש מ ר

דחיסות מ י ד י


תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

759/653  $\frac{2}{2}$

ב) טילים וחלייכ

מורקוסקי הביע התפעלות מכּושר הטבל/ של ישראל ותקווה הבלתי-דועכת אפילו שיבוא יום וייעשה שלום, לאור הוסר הנכונות של הפלסטינאים בפרט והערבים בכלל להגיע לפשרות ולנוכח האיום החדש לבטחוננו בטמון בטיילים הסינים שסופקו לסעודיה. עברו הימים אמנם (מלפני 1967) בהם עצם הקיום של ישראל עמד במבחן, אך בכל זאת נשקפת לנו סכנה חדשה וחמורה הנובעת מתנשק הכימי המצוי בידי מדינות ערב. כשלעצמו, הוא מופתע שארה"ב אינה מפעילה לחץ על סין (באמצעות העיסקות הקשורות למטוס האפ-8) במגמה להניעם מלמכור טילים למדינות מזהיית, ומעבר לזאת הוא נדהם שהעולם לא "מרד" כדבריו, נגד השימוש בחלייכ. השגריר הסכים עם הסנטור, באשר לטיילים הסינים, אמר שמדובר בדור חדש של טייליט וב- **PROLIFERATION** של טילים בכלל בידי הערבים. בהקשר זה התייחס השגריר להכחשתו של שר הבטחון לגבי השתתפות ישראלית בפיתוח הטיילים הסינים כביכול, ומורקוסקי העיר שכחבר בוועדת המודיעין ידוע לו שהידיעה בנדון היתה מוטעית, (הוסיף גם שהבעיות שהתעוררו בתחום המודיעין בין שתי המדינות כבר מאחורינו). באשר לעניין השימוש בחלייכ ע"י העיראקים, אמר השגריר שמדובר במישור חדש בלוחמת באיזור וההיבט המדאיג אותנו במיוחד הינו הפרספציה הגוברת אצל העיראקים לפיה **THEY CAN GET AWAY WITH MURDER** תרתי משמע - עם כל המשתמע מכך לגבי סיכסוכים אחרים באיזור. כאן היה מורקוסקי תמים דעים עם השגריר, אך מלבד הנעת דאגה, לא היתה לו מה להציע.

  
 למדן

דחיפות: סה"כ	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	1
סוג כתיבה:	טופס מברק	2
תז"ח: 311200	מס' - ע"ש הש"ר	מ"ל
כ"ר: 0 0763	בהול	ר"ע
	ע"ש - ע"ש	מ"ד

*Newsday  
May 28 '88*

# Soviets Say No to Israeli Emigre Plan

By Jeff Sommer  
Newsday Deputy Foreign Editor

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*3 3 2  
שלח את המ  
ע"ש א"י  
לד ע"ש  
מ"ד*

9 Stamber ט"פ השולח: May 30 88 תאריך:

# Soviets Reject Emigré Route

SOVIET from Page 4

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END

2/2

X63

3.6.88  
160-ארה"ב-4

לו"ז שולץ באזור

קהיר	-	יום ו'
חוזר לקהיר	-	שבת בבוקר
חוזר לקהיר	-	מוצ"ש
טס לירושלים	-	יום א' בצהריים
חוזר למצרים	-	יום א' בערב
טיסה לדמשק	-	יום ב' בבוקר
חוזר למצרים	-	יום ב' אחה"צ
קהיר	-	יום ג'
עוזב את האזור בדרכו למדריד.	-	יום ג' 12.00



שגרירות ישראל / זושנינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בסיווגי משרד

דחיסות מוגדר

תאריך/ז"ח 31.5.88 12.00

מס' מברק

1/3

המשרד

729

אלו מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ  
דע: מצפ"א (לידיעת השגריר)

פניית 29 הסנטורים למתן סיוע בבניית בנינים לבתי ספר דתיים  
למברק השגריר, נר 135 מה-5.5 (רצ"ב העתק לנוחיותכם)

התקשר מר ברד גורדון, עוזרו של הסנטור בושביץ, ולנוכח חוסר התגובה למכתב הנ"ל, ביקש לקבוע מועד לפגישה נוספת עבור השגריר עם כמה מהסנטורים החתומים על המכתב (כזכור, בזמנו נפגש השגריר עם בושביץ, האמפרי והיינץ, לבקשת בושביץ). הסברתי שהשגריר יצא ארצה ויחזור לקראת אמצע חודש יוני.

לידיעתכם.

יוסף אהרן  
למדן

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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המשרד

מנכל משרד רה"מ.

פניית 29 סנטורים למתן סיוע בבניית בניינים לבתי-ספר דתיים

ראה-נא ר"ב נוסח מכתבו של סנטור המסרי המזכיר המכתב שהוגש לרה"מ בעת ביקורו האחרון בארה"ב ע"י 29 הסנטורים.

נאמר לי בע"פ שהנושא הועבר לטיפולו של שר-האוצר, אך עד עתה לא קבלנו כל תגובה. נראה לי שלא נוכל לדחות עוד מתן תשובה ואודה לך אם תוכל להבטיח שגור תגובת רה"מ בהקדם.

א"ר 3

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# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510  
April 26, 1988

Ambassador Moshe Arad  
Embassy of Israel  
3514 International Drive  
Washington, D.C. 20008

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AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE  
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Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you last month to discuss the three schools in Israel that are in need of assistance. As you know, Senator Tribble also handed the Prime Minister a letter signed by 29 Senators expressing support for the schools.

I was disappointed to hear that during your recent trip to Israel, you did not have an opportunity to raise this matter with the Minister of Finance. I would be most appreciative if you could secure a reply from your government on this most important issue.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

*Gordon J. Humphrey*  
Gordon J. Humphrey, USS

GJH/tk

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

31 מאי 1988  
טו סירן תשמ"ח

- ש מ ר -

אל: מצפ"א

הנדון: הועידה השנתית ה-29 של איפ"א: 17 - 15 מאי 1988  
"THE FORTY YEAR PARTNERSHIP - SHAPING THE FUTURE AGENDA"

לכאורה, השינוי הדרמטי היה במעבר מ"הילטון" ל"שרתון", כאשר רוח ה- *deja vu* (הגובלת בשעמום) מרחפת על פני הועידה. אותם פרצופים, אותן סדנאות, אותם מבנים ארגוניים (קרלוצ'י במקום שולץ, אספין במקום רייט, מושל וירג' יניה במקום נציג החקלאות של טקסס וכו') ומספרים דומים בארועים - השינויים לכאן ולכאן (מעט יותר משתתפים, מעט פחות נבחרים) לא היו די גדולים בכדי לספק בשר לפרשנים למיניהם.

מעבר לשינוי המיקום, השינוי לעומת אשתקד בלט גם בהעדר מוקדי התענינות ברורים. אשתקד היו שניים. ראשית, הדגורים על ועידה בינ"ל היו אז בראשיתם והיתה סקרנות אדירה לראות כיצד יתייחס מזכיר המדינה לכפפה שזרק לו ממרה"מ. ובמילים אחרות, לנוכחים היתה הרגשה שהם צופים מקרוב במהלכים היסטוריים, וההתרגשות היתה בהתאם. השנה, כפי שמשקף מיעוט הכיסוי התקשורתי, לא היה מוטנט דרמנטי מסוג זה - דברי ממרה"מ היו צפויים. הופעת בנימין נתניהו ותחילת הועידה (כמקבל הראשון של פרס "סי קנז") נתפסה כ"משקל נגד" פוליטי, ולתשומת לבכם בקשת טום דייווין נאומו הפרוגרמטי המצורף להמנע מלערב את איפ"א ק בסכסוכים הפנימיים בארץ. המוקד השני ב-1987: בסוף השבוע שקדם לוועידה, התפרסמה בתקשורת ידיעה על כוונת הממשל לבצע עסקה סעודית גדולה. חיש-קל מצאה לה הועידה נושא להתלכד סביבו, ואמנם העסקה ירדה מן הפרק בטרם נחל הממשל המפלה הצפויה. השנה, לגישושים על מכירת המטוסים המתוכננת לכווית ניתן פרסום במועד דומה, היתה עסקה סעודית שכבר עמדה מספר שבועות על הפרק, ולגבי אף אחת מן השתיים, הועידה לא נקטה עמדה.

האם העדר התגובה נבע משיקול ענייני לגבי העסקות? או מתוך הנחה על הסכמה שבשתיקה הצפויה מצד ישראל? או מתוך מניעים לאומיים, פטריוטיים-אמריקאים, בהתחשב בתרומת כוונת וסעודיה למאמצי ארה"ב במפרץ? או מתוך חשש שארועי האינטיפאדה יקשו על איפ"א ק להאבק נגד, גם לו רצה, ולכן העדיף להמנע מעימות?



לח"מ אין תשובה חד-משמעית לשאלה אולם עצם הצורך להעלותה (ולציין הבדלי התגובה לעסקות המוצעות ב-88 וב-87) מצביעה אולי שההתנגדות הכמעט אוטומטית בעבר לכל עסקה יצרה מצב שהעדר אופוזיציה מתפרש כחולשה, ומעוררת התהיה האם אמנם השימוש בעסקות נשק ככלי פוליטי (במקום משיקולים ענייניים) היה בעבר מוגזם ובעוכרי העניין.

כפי שהאינטיפאדה מאחורי השאלות על אי-סיכול העסקות, כך ניכרה גם בהיבטים אחרים של הועידה, אם כי לא באופן בוטה, ולא היה נסיון יסודי להתמודד עם משמעויותיה, יהיו אשר יהיו. כך, לדוגמא, הסנטור מיצ' מקונל מקנטקי (הנואם המרכזי בארוחת הערב החגיגית, לצד בנט ג' ננסטון הדמוקרט) אמר שהעדר עיסוק קונגרסיונלי בנעשה כעת אינו ברוא, לא לה ולא למערכת היחסים הבינלאומית, ומתבקש מאמץ הסברתי וחינוכי. טום דיין חרג ממנהגו לדווח על מעללי איפא"ק והקדיש חלק נכבד מנאומו לנסיון לספק למשתתפים כלים להתמודד עם הארועים ובעיקר הביקורת. הארוע האחרון, לפני העליה לגבעה וההתפזרות אחריה, היה נאום של קצין חינוך ראשי שהרחיב על האילוצים במסגרתם פועל צה"ל והאנושיות שהוא משתדל לשמור עליה. אולם העיסוק בארועי החודשים האחרונים ניכר פחות בסדר היום הפורמלי מאשר באוירה: בשיחות עם משתתפים בוועידה, ובמירווח אלו מאזורים פחות מרכזיים, חזרה ועלתה השמחה לפגוש מספר כה גדול של שותפים לדיעה ולתמיכה בישראל, למרות הקשיים.

במלים אחרות, אם בעבר שימשה הועידה בעיקר כהפגנת כוח כלפי הממסד הפוליטי, הפעם מילאה את אותו תפקיד גם כלפי פנים, כלפי אנשי השדה, שנוכחו כי אינם לבד. לא שהפגנת הכוחניות הפוליטית נעדרה השנה: טום דיין קרא בשם כל נבחר ומועמד שנכח בערב (לארי סמית' ניצח במדד הדציבלים, אבל מל לויין לא היה...). וגם את שמות הפקידים ותואריהם, נציגים דיפלומטים (נציג מצרים זכה למחיאות כפיים מאוד סוערות ומושכות וגם הסיני, שהסביר אח"כ שלא בא בתפקיד, זכה לאהדה) ונציגי העם היושב בציון, אותו הגדיר דיין קולקטיבית כעודד ערן  
. and his staff

בערב הפתיחה הסתובבו מעט לבושי צבעי אש"ף, ומעבר לכך, ולהפגנה קטנה, לא ניכרה פעילות עוינת, ולמרות המימדים האדירים לא היו תקלות טכניות. בסה"כ אם לחפש מסר אחד מתוך הארוע ההמוני והמעט משעמם הזה, הוא ש"לא היו נפגעים לכוחותינו, ולא נגרם נזק". חשוב כלפי חוץ, לא פחות כלפי פנים.

לשנה הבאה בירושלים.

ב ב ר כ ה  
א/גו היין  
טובה הרצל



העתק: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

מנכ"ל מדיני

לש' רה"מ, מקש"ח - משהב"ט  
לגיון, 3 יוני, 1948, הסברה

THE FUTURE OF U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS:  
A SECURE PEACE

BY

THOMAS A. DINE  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

TO THE

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE  
29TH ANNUAL POLICY CONFERENCE  
SHERATON WASHINGTON HOTEL

MAY 15, 1988

Thank you very much Ed Levy, for that warm and generous introduction. I congratulate you on your election as AIPAC's president, and I commit myself and AIPAC's eager and effective staff to help you carry out your leadership mission into the next decade. As an AIPAC officer these last six years, you have taken on the tough tasks of spearheading AIPAC fundraising in Detroit, chairing this organization's Management Committee, providing political leadership in your own community and across the nation, and building close relationships with so many Senators and Congressmen. You have undertaken many assignments and performed them exceedingly well. By your speech this afternoon, you publicly revealed what your peers and I already know: your optimism, your faith in freedom, and your commitment to strengthening the U.S.-Israel relationship from friendship to alliance. I look forward to working with you closely and forming an inseparable bond during your years of highest responsibility on behalf of our community.

Ed, you are AIPAC's eighth president. We are blessed to have on this platform your two immediate predecessors -- Bob Asher and Larry Weinberg. Ed has already praised Bob. Let me just add a personal note. When you assumed the presidency in March 1984, Bob, you told me your goal and your strategy. I made a note. You said you wanted to gain for the American pro-Israel community more political punch. You said you wanted to activate more of our lay leadership into the political process. The result is obvious for everyone to see: AIPAC is far stronger in electoral and legislative politics at both the local and national levels than when you began your service. In the parlance of politics, you delivered. You are an important person -- and a dear, personal friend.

And to past president and chairman of the board Larry Weinberg, I again express my gratitude and respect for the wisdom and strength of character you bring to our work. Not only are you the man who hired me -- and for that I am eternally grateful

all of us to execute here in Washington and back home at state and local levels.

This is a large task. The core issues involve six different questions.

\*First, there is the Arab uprising, its meaning, and how it is understood in the United States.

\*Second, is the peace process and the search for a political solution.

\*Third, there is the bilateral U.S.-Israel relationship in light of the uprising and the peace process.

\*Fourth is the election in Israel and especially, the impact on our work when the main parties in Israel are so deeply divided, and how we deal with this.

\*Fifth, is the election in the United States, particularly the Presidential election, and how we prepare for the next Administration.

\*Finally, there is our own role in this changing and challenging situation, and what we need to do to preserve and enhance the U.S.-Israel relationship.

To begin with the first issue -- the Arab uprising. It is clear that, for better or worse, this has brought about a permanent change in the Middle East. The Palestinians in the territories have emerged as a distinct force, they are pursuing very radical demands. Jordan's influence has been dramatically reduced, and Israel is confronted with the reality that it now administers a much more hostile population. The status quo that existed before December 9, 1987, cannot be restored, and a new political solution will have to be found.

The pro-Israel community in America knows that no permanent solution can be achieved between Israelis and Arabs without a political settlement. But we also recognize that, in this extreme situation, there is no quick fix to achieve that settlement. The political process is not some magic hat out of which we can pull a rabbit with the blink of an eye. Today Israel is faced with the stark choice of surrendering to chaos or restoring order through security measures by the army and police.

For this reason, Israel's cabinet, in spite of all the divisions on other matters splitting Labour and Likud, is united on the need to end this wave of violence by talking and by taking strong measures.

struggle against Israel. Their plan is not a political program. Their plan is a demand for Israel's suicide. Even the most dovish voices in Israel have been saying to the Palestinians, as was seen on Ted Koppel's "Nightline" series from Israel two weeks ago, "Please drop this demand, because it means in reality total war against Israel, and even we cannot accept it."

The second major demand is equally unrealistic: an instant Palestinian state headed by Arafat, with its capital plunked down right in Jerusalem. No duly elected Israeli Government would entertain the relinquishing of Jerusalem. No duly elected Israeli Government would agree to the coronation of Yassir Arafat. The PLO has repeatedly said and reaffirmed that such a state would be used as a platform to move to the second step -- which is the destruction of Israel. Let me read from the official PLO program: "After its establishment, the Palestinian national authority will struggle to unite the confrontation countries to pave the way for the completion of the liberation of all the Palestinian territory." In this so-called "Strategy of Stages," the Palestinian state will be the transitional arrangement and the "final status" will be Israel's elimination.

In sum, the political program of the uprising is the "right of repatriation," the instant establishment of a PLO state, and ultimately the swallowing up the Jewish state. These demands offer Israel nothing to negotiate about.

My point to you today friends, is that this is a continuation of a war that is at least 60-years old, a war that has long been pursued by two kinds of extremists -- Arab nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists -- for the destruction of the Jewish state. This war is being misrepresented on network television as some sort of children's crusade, or an act of civil disobedience, or a modern-day version of the Palestinian David fighting the Israeli Goliath. This war is being sugar-coated in the United States, by professors and Mahatma Gandhi impersonators who go on television to depict that all they want is an end to the occupation and the beginning of co-existence. Let me stress this is not the reality of the rioter's demands.

If all the uprising wants is ending the occupation and commencing a process of co-existence, why do its leaders continue to vilify the name of Sadat? Why do they describe George Shultz as Satan and his initiative as a "imperialist plot?" Why do they describe the United States as their "arch enemy?" Why do they reject both territorial compromise and autonomy, and express hatred for both Yitzhak Shamir and Shimon Peres?

No, the radicalism of the leaders of the uprising is no accident. It is rooted in the radicalism of the Palestinian residents of the territories themselves. A public opinion poll taken in the area, under the sponsorship of the pro-PLO newspaper

to Israel's security. And it is Israel's security that is our goal.

We have directly, indeed, repeatedly communicated to the Administration and to Members of Congress that AIPAC and our community back the Administration's active involvement in a peace process. We support Secretary of State Shultz's efforts, knowing that Ronald Reagan and George Shultz are stalwart friends of Israel.

Of course, it is not necessary or possible for our community to support every element of an initiative. There are often legitimate differences of opinion among people, all of whom are concerned with peace and Israel's security. For instance, George Shultz and Shimon Peres support the idea of a non-authoritative international conference as a means to bring about direct negotiations. Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Shamir do not think it is a good idea. It is not as if people on one side of the issue want peace and security and those on the other side do not. AIPAC, as an organization, does not take a position on the non-authoritative international conference as such. That is a decision for the people and Government of Israel. We do, however, have a stake in conducting this debate over reasonable differences in a civilized manner. We oppose any assertion that anyone who does or does not go along with this idea is against peace or the security of Israel.

Another example of an honest difference of views is the debate between those who favor territorial compromise as a way to end the occupation, and those who think autonomy is a better approach. Both seek a means to reconcile an end to the occupation, with the requirements of Israeli security. Both are serious ideas, and each has advantages and disadvantages. The issues are quite complex, and I do not propose to go into the whole logic here. My point is that both major political blocs in Israel are trying to come to grips with the challenge of fashioning a political solution, as they must, with appropriate safeguards for Israeli security. Which path is the best is a decision the people of Israel must make for themselves, because it is they who will have to live with the consequences.

The United States cannot make these decisions for Israel, nor is the Reagan Administration trying to do so. The most important role for the United States is to bring to the table an Arab partner prepared to discuss in a serious manner alternative ideas for realistic political solutions.

King Hussein has for a decade been playing the tease, saying "Maybe I will, and maybe I won't." He is forever posing challenges to the United States to meet his conditions, giving us litmus tests, and sending us letters full of questions. But,

One item in particular, however, that we must oppose is the use of confrontational tactics by either the United States or Israeli governments in dealing with each other when differences arise, as inevitably they do in international affairs. We must especially oppose ad hominem criticism of officials of either government by officials of the other.

A consistently strong and close relationship between the United States and Israel serves the higher interests of both countries, is essential to Israel's security, and is a bedrock of the peace process itself.

Conversely, U.S.-Israel tensions, whatever their motives may be, reduce the incentives for the Arabs to negotiate with Israel. Such tensions contribute to the Arab illusion that they can instead negotiate with the United States and expect the United States to force Israel to accept their terms.

I know this point is fundamental, but I make it tonight because there are major voices in the bureaucracy these days, who are trying to sell George Shultz on the misguided idea that the way to move the peace process forward is by singling out Israeli leaders for public criticism. I see no sign that the Secretary of State is taking this bad advice, but we have to be ever vigilant. Equally, it is part of our job to emphasize to Israeli leaders that the United States is their vital ally, and that when differences of opinion arise, as is bound to happen from time to time, they must be expressed in a way that does not contribute to tensions that will be exploited by Israel's enemies.

This analysis leads me to my third topic, which is keeping the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship on track. This is a core principle for us. The peace process is a major priority, but it is not the only issue of the U.S.-Israel partnership. Israel is also an important ally of the United States in regional and global affairs, in the search for stability on the southern flank of NATO and in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the war against terrorism, and in many other ways. In addition, Israel needs America's support to help maintain a stable military balance in the region and deter the threat of war. If the Arabs succeeded in driving a wedge between the United States and Israel, this would hurt the search for a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the many other vital interests the United States and Israel mutually share. Even an Arab perception of a split between the U.S. and Israel would weaken Israel, make war more likely, and erode the overall position of the United States and its allies in that part of the world. The only winner would be the Soviet Union.

The current situation is made more difficult by the fourth topic I want to discuss, which is the split between the two major parties in Israel. As the Israeli election approaches, the two

Likud, an arrangement for Palestinian self-rule in an autonomous authority associated with Jordan. Both Israeli parties are committed to a political solution to reconcile Israeli security with political self-government by the Palestinians and an end to the occupation.

Neither party will accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and neither will negotiate with the PLO.

On these and many other issues there is, in fact, agreement among the Israeli parties. On some of the sub-issues, on the other hand, there are important differences. The people of Israel are coming to grips with a terrible dilemma. Many of the lands of their forefathers, to which they have yearned to return for thousands of years, are now inhabited by another people. Under these circumstances, there are no good choices, only less bad ones.

Is the best solution for the Jews to remain in these areas, in a political co-existence with the Arab inhabitants, each under their own authorities, as the Likud proposes? Or is the best solution for the Jews to withdraw from the territories to establish an international co-existence between the Jewish State and an Arab neighbor, as Labour proposes? This is not a question we can answer. It is not a question the United States Government can answer, nor Western Europeans, nor the Soviet Union, or China. It is a question for the people of Israel, and it is a question to be answered in direct and meaningful negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the residents of the territories.

We all have our opinions, but our job is to see to it that, while the debate rages in Israel, it does not spill over into the United States. We must create more understanding here at home for the difficult choices that democratic Israel is making.

This is made still more challenging by the fact that we in the United States are having our own election, which is my fifth topic. For the first time in eight years, we are going to have a change of Administration. This means not just a new President, but also a new Secretary of State, a new Secretary of Defense, a new National Security Adviser, and so on throughout the many Cabinet and sub-Cabinet posts that the President must fill. It will be a very new situation.

Let me add a personal note here. The term of public office for Ronald Reagan and George Shultz will soon be over. These last eight years have clearly witnessed the coming of age of the American-Israeli alliance. At the direction of President Reagan, the bilateral relationship has risen to heights beyond the highest hopes any of us had in 1980. The bilateral

domestic base to our policy and programs toward Israel, people who actively practice spectacularly our political citizenship. What are we to do in these difficult and potentially dangerous days ahead to fulfill our responsibilities in enhancing the U.S.-Israel partnership in all its dimensions?

Despite what is going on in Israel and what is perceived to be going on, support for Israel on Capitol Hill remains strong. That is a tribute to your active involvement in the policy-making process at all levels, but particularly in your local communities and in personal relationships with Senators, Representatives, and candidates. I applaud you for your deeds. Day after day a Member of Congress will say to me, "I just spoke to so and so, and he/she made a good point about the Israeli situation."

In the last two weeks in Congress, a major step was taken toward providing Israel \$3 billion in military and economic grant assistance when the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, led by Chairman David Obey of Wisconsin, voted out the FY 1989 foreign aid bill without controversy. In addition, that Subcommittee provided funding for resettling Soviet and other refugees in Israel; for joint U.S.-Israel development projects in the third world; for cooperative programs between Israel and Egypt; and many other measures affecting Israel in the political, economic, diplomatic, and security spheres.

The FY 1989 Defense Authorization bill passed the House last week and will pass sometime this week in the Senate. This measure further strengthens and deepens the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship begun in November 1983. Israel's status as a major non-NATO ally is now assured. A U.S. Defense Department procurement officer is directed by the legislation to be stationed in Israel to help facilitate Israeli military sales to the Pentagon. And the bill provides for continued funding for the Popeye air-to-ground missile and the Arrow anti-ballistic missile, two critical weapons projects that Israel is developing for its and NATO's use.

The Senate on Friday passed two amendments which are of particular interest to all of us. The first, sponsored by Senators Phil Gramm, Carl Levin, and Sam Nunn, prohibits the President from making any future arms sales to Saudi Arabia unless he certifies that the Saudis have not acquired chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads for their new Chinese intermediate-range missiles. In the second amendment, sponsored by our good friend, Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio, restrictions are put on the number and types of F-15 fighter jets the Saudis can possess. Both amendments passed unanimously in the full Senate.

-- To oppose all cutting or anti-Israel amendments that may be offered on the floor;

-- Support final passage.

3. The third issue is to thank your Senators and Representatives for supporting the pro-Israel measures in the Defense Authorization bill and ask them to continue that support in the Defense Appropriations bill which will be considered in June and July by both Houses.

Your work does not end when the Policy Conference is finished and you depart from Washington. The reason the U.S.-Israel relationship remains strong and unshakable, especially in time of crisis, is that you and I never end our efforts. When you return home, not only send a personal letter to Members expressing your appreciation for meeting with them, but also be in contact on a regular basis to educate, providing accurate information, perspective, back-up articles, and other supportive commentary. You are the best source your Member has on the U.S.-Israel partnership.

Continue the relationship. Meet with your Members when they are back home. Bring together a group of active pro-Israel supporters to form Congressional Caucuses that will in turn meet Congressman and constituents on a regular basis.

It is also important to meet face-to-face with candidates running for office. They, too, need education and your support. No matter who is in the White House in January 1989, the first year of any Administration has been frequently marked by tension between Washington and Jerusalem. Congress is, as Si Kenen always told us, Israel's first-line of defense.

The coming election on November 8th is crucial for all friends of Israel. Join up with a pro-Israel candidate running for election or reelection. Your participation is as crucial or more so than ever before.

This year we are seeing how state and local politics affects the U.S.-Israel relationship. For example, as the Democratic Party writes its 1988 platform, at least six state parties have had to wrestle or are wrestling with anti-Israel resolutions.

Two and a half weeks ago, just such a resolution came before the California state party, calling for an independent Palestinian state. The resolution was stopped only at the last moment. When we talk about pro-Israel political activism, we cannot afford to concentrate on the Federal and ignore state and local political developments. Not only is that where today's

stresses of nation-building and when the democratic institutions undergo a catharsis.

For those of us who passionately support Israel, witnessing the process may be frustrating and troubling. It should not be. Israel, you see, in many ways is not just a 40-years-young nation. It is a nation with an educational and university system which competes with the most advanced in the United States, Europe, and Japan. It is a nation with agricultural advances that help feed the world. It is a nation with advanced medical facilities which treat American servicemen and Arabs from the surrounding area. It is a high-tech nation. It is a nation in a hurry and with a commitment to correct those stresses evident in young nations. It is a nation dealing with its problems openly, democratically, and humanely.

I cannot help but remember another line of Harry Truman's when he was asked why he supported the establishment of Israel. He said, "I had faith in Israel even before it was established. I knew it was based on the love of freedom, which has been the guiding star of the Jewish people since the days of Moses." Thank you, Mr. Truman. We share your faith. Israel's love of freedom was true then; it is true today. Like Brahms' third symphony, Israel is a heroic work, engulfed by great contrasts, engaged by great struggles, jarred by storms, hopefully achieving serenity when that prayed for day of a secured peace is at hand.

I have faith in today's Israel, so do you.

I have faith in tomorrow's Israel, so do you.

I have faith in the fruitful and enduring partnership between the United States and Israel. All of us do and all of us are here to work in the American political arena to make the American -- and Israeli -- dream into reality.

Thank you and shalom.

שמור

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מחמ"ז - זכויות אדם. לשלי ח/17868, שלן 673 .

א. קוימנו ביום ו' דיון עם ווקיץ' משגארה'ב להכנת ביקור שימטר. השתתפו גם מזתי"ס, מצפ"א ואירומה 3.

ב. ווקיץ מסר ששימטר מבקש להקדיש עיקר ביקורו לנושא יהודי בריה"מ. ישתתף בשיחותיו של שולץ עם ראה"מ ועם שה"ח, אך מבקש לקיים שיחות נפרדות עם שהב"ט וקצינים בכירים. נך מבקש פגישות במשרד.

ג. כאן הוחלט שריכוז ההכנות יהיה בידי מזתי"ס.

ד. שימטר מבקש להקדיש לפגישותיו הנ"ל, את ה-6 וה-8 ביוני, כל יום לאחד משני הנושאים - יהודי בריה"מ וזכויות אדם בשטחים. עו לרגע זה לא הוזר לא ידוע לנו ולשגארה'ב על כוונה לקיים פגישות עם נציגים ערביים מהשטחים.

ה. בשיחה עם ווקיץ ( שהתקיימה לפני קבלת מברקן) התברר לנו שאין הוזר אין לשגדירות קשיים מיוחדים בקבלת תשובות לפניותיה והיא מקיימת מגעים ישירים הן עם משהב"ט והן במשה"ח. כשיש עיכובים הם נגרמים מצד אחד ע"י בעיות ביורוקטריות אצלנו ( שמקוים כי תיפתרנה בקרוב הודות

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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

למיחשוב ההולך ומונהג בימים אלה) ומצד שני ע"י שאלות  
כלליות מדי או חסרות פרטים מזהים המופנות לשגרירות  
מהגורמים המתעניינים בארה"ב.

דוקיץ מסר ששגארה"ב תטביר לעיתונות כי מטרת ביקורו  
העיקרית של שיפטר היא לזון במצב יהודי בריה"מ, בעקבות  
ביקורו ( השבוע) במוסקבה. הם מעוניינים למנוע בדרך זו  
הפרסומים המזיקים בעיתונות הישראלית בעקבות ביקור  
איהרן ולקראת ביקור שולץ ושיפטר.

מנהל ארבי"ל 2  
א.ב.צ

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנבל, ממנבל, ברנע, ארבל, בירן, מצמא, איר, ליאור,  
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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דע : מקש"ח

שיחת השגריר עם הסנטור בנט ג'ונסטון (27)

1. השגריר קיים היום ביקור נימוסין והכרות אצל הסנטור הנ"ל (דמוקרט מלואיזיאנה). השתתף הח"מ. כידוע, ג'ונסטון אחד מבכירי מפלגתו בסנט, ובסנט הבא בכוונתו להתמודד על תפקיד מנהיג הסיעה. (כלומר מנהיג הרב אם הדמוקרטים יוסימו להיות מפלגת הרוב, ואז מנהיג המיעוט אם יפסידו). קצת הוא חבר בעל השפעה רבה בוועדה וווקצייב ובוועדה החקצבות (בין היתר, בוועדות המשנה לפעולות זרות וכן לתקציב והפנטגון).

2. השגריר החיחס בדברי שבט לנאום שהשמיע בארוחת הערב החגיגית של אייפאייק (לפני נאום השר), בו הרחיב את הדיבור על בעיית יהודי בריה"מ. הסנטור העיר לשגריר שמדובר ב- **PERPLEXING PROBLEM** - מצד אחד במגעים עם הסובייטים יש להמנע משימוש בלחץ כבד מדי כי גישה זו עלולה להיות **COUNTER PRODUCTIVE**, ומצד שני יש להתמיד ולהעלות את הנושא בכל הזדמנות. השגריר הסכים, באמרו שחיה ולא נחמיד במאמצינו, הסובייטים יפרשו שתיקה כהרמת ידיים וכן כויתור על הוראות התיקון ע"ש ג'קסון-ווניק. הסובייטים חייבים לדעת שלא יקבלו דבר בחינם וכן שהזאגה לגבי יהודי בריה"מ אינה מוגבלת לישראלים וליהודים אלא היא נושא שמטריד את מצפון העולם החפשי כולו.

3. מכאן עברה השיחה לנושא מזה"ח והשגריר סקר בהרחבה את המצב (המתרחש בשטחים והרגיעה המסתמנת שם, תהליך השלוט, עמדות מדינות ערב והסובייטים וכיו"ב). ג'ונסטון הקשיב בקשב רב, והסתפק בשתי הערות :

(א) באשר לחוסיין, אם חשלוט חלוי בפעולה נועזת מצדו, אזי מדובר בתקוות-שווא.

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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(ב) אם הפתיחות הטוביטית ("GLASnost") תחזיק מעמד, יהיה מעניין מאוד לראות כיצד היא תתפתח (WILL PLAY OUT) כלפי מזה"ח.

- 4. השגריר העלה את נושא הטיליט הסינים שהגיעו לאיזור, בצינו שמדובר בתופעה חדשה לחלוטין. כ"כ התייחס לשימוש בנשק כימי במלחמת איראן-עיראק ולחוסר התגובה חרצינית בעולם הגדול. שקט זה מדאיג אותנו מאד. אמר. ג'ונסטון הגיב שהאמריקאים ואחרים היו צריכים להביע התנגדות נמרצות לשימוש בנשק זה, ולאחר שהתעניין בנושא, החליט שבשובו מפגרת יום הזכרון, ישא נאום בנושא במלאת הסנט. ינחה את עוזריו לחקור את הנושא וכן. להכין את ההתבטאות - ובינתיים יודה לנו לכל חומר בלמסיי אפשרי. אמרנו שנעביר את הבקשה ארצה (ראו-נא מברק מבצעי בנפרד).
- 5. הח"מ העלה נושא הפופ'-איי והסנטור הציע שנבוא בדברים עם אנשיו במגמה לזרז את הטיפול בתיקצוב מחדש (RE-PROGRAMMING) של מימון תכנית זו. הסנטור ציין שטבור שהפופ'-איי כלי מצויין ושחוא תומך בתכנית.
- 6. במהלך השיחה, השגריר הציע את שירותיו הטובים לסנטור, והלה עודד אותו לפנות אליו ישירות בשעת הצורך.

יוסף למדן

27

השגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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תאריך/ז"ת 27.5.88 9:00

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מנכ"ל רוה"מ

שיחת השגריר עם הסנטור דוד בורן (26,5)

1. השגריר נפגש אתמול עם הסנטור הנ"ל (דמוקרט מאוקלהומה, יו"ר ועדת המודיעין). נכח הח"מ.
2. לאורך השיחה (שהייתה לבבית מאוד) הדגיש בורן את אהדתו ומסירותו לישראל, אך הוא כוון את דבריו כדי להעביר בסוף הפגישה מסר פשוט וברור: הוא חש בהרעה ביחס הציבור כלפי ישראל. ישראל נמנית אמנם על 4-5 המדינות בעולט עמך יש לאוה"ב היחסים הקרובים ביותר אך מערכת היחסים שלנו עם ארה"ב איננה מובטחת ("אינה בכיס", כדבריו) ולנוכח האירועים של החודשים האחרונים יתכן "BACKLASH" נגד ישראל. בעבר היה מקבל מכתב אחד או שנים מדי חודש המסתייגים מישראל אך כיום מתקבלים 10-15 כאלה מדי שבוע; המכתבים מתריעים נגד התנהגותנו בשטחים, לרכות הפרת זכויות האדם, ומתלוננים  $\frac{1}{2}$  גדל הסיוע הניתן לישראל. בנוסף, לראשונה הוא מבחין באי-נחת בקרב הקהילה היהודית - תמיכתם הבסיסית של ידידיו היהודים בישראל נעדרת, אך מתברר ממגעים עמט אף בשבוע שעבר (קרי בזמן כנס איפא"ק) שהם אינם שלמים עם כל הנעשה על/דינו. אין מדובר בזרם גדול של דעת קהל אנטי-ישראלית אלא בסחף קל ("TRICKLE"). בכל זאת עלינו להיות זהירים, לעקוב מקרוב אחרי הלך הרוחות  $\frac{1}{2}$  (הצית: כאמור, דברים חמורים אלה הושמעו באזירה לבבית למדי. הם צורמים במיוחד מכיוון שלאחרונה נאמר לנו בדרך כלל, כי על אף המשקע הקשה של האירועים בשטחים, מסתמנת הקלה בביקורת הנמתחת על ישראל).

3. להלן נקודות גוספות מדברי בורן:-

- א. מכירות נשק למדינות ערב; גם בנושא זה היה לבורן מסר עבורנו: מוטב שישראל תגלה גמישות, תסכים לפשרות ולא תפעל (באמצעות ידידות) לכך שהקונגרס מתבקש להתנגד לכל הצעה מצד הממשל למכור נשק לערבים. הנושא עלה במסגרת התיחסות לידיעה כאילו ישראל תרמה לפיתוח הטילים הסינים בסעודיה ולאחר שכרז קיבל ללא עוררין את הכשתנו. הוא הזכיר את עסקת הנשק עם הסעודים שאושרה בשנה שעברה אחר שהסטינגרדים והכלים הפרובלמטיים האחרים הוצאו מהחבילה. הוא הביע שביעות רצון ממה שהוא תאר כתבונתנו ואם כי לא הצביע על עסקות הנשק השונות העומדות על הפרק עם מדינות ערב כיום.

מס' 3000000000

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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סווג בטחוני

דחיסות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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הרמז היה שקוף ומובן לגמרי.

ב. עניני מודיעין: בורן מסר שנחנה מפגישתו בשבוע שעבר עם ראש אמ"ן. התרשט מאוד מאישיותו ומבקיאותו. היה מרוצה לשמוע מהשגריר שביקור ר' אמ"ן היה מוצלח ושהקשרים המודיעיניים בין שתי המדינות טובים ומתחזקים. בהקשר זה, התיחס ל"מתיחויות" של השנתיים האחרונות (במיוחד פרשת פולארד) ועם זאת הביע הערכתו שבעיות אלה כבר "מאחורינו", חשגירי הגיב כמחבקש.

ג. הסכסוך ופתרון: תוך כדי סקירת השגריר על המצב באזור, העלה בורן זכרונות ביקורו בארץ (ובמצרים וסעודיה) באביב 1981 עם הווארד בייקר וסנטוריס אחרים. אמר שלאחר שעלה לרמת הגולן השתכנע שישראל לא תוכל לותר על מספר איזורים אסטרטגים, ולכן הוא סבור שיש לחתור לפתרון לפני ישראל תוסיף להחזיק במקומות החיוניים לבטחונה. שאר השטחים יהיו מפורזים ואילו הפלסטינאים יקבלו **"SEMI-AUTONOMOUS ENTITY"** ככל מקרה לא תיתכן מדינה פלסטינאית קומניסטית באזור.

ד. תהליך השלום: אגב דברי העדכון של השגריר בנושא הנ"ל, העיר בורן ששאלת ההשתתפות הסובייטים הינה **"TRICKY"**. הוא מבין אמנם את הגישה לפיה יש להעניק תפקיד לסובייטים ע"מ להביא את הצד הערבי לשולחן הדיונים ולפתוח במו"ט, אך אין לאפשר לסובייטים לשחק תפקיד פעיל ותוך כדי כך לחזור ולהשיג מחדש את חושפעה שהפסידו עקב ניתוק היחסים עם ישראל ב-1967.

ה. ביקור בישראל: הסנטור העיר שהגיע זמן שיבקר בישראל בשנית ואם כי היו גישושים ככוון זה (כזכור, לפני שנתיים השגנו לו הזמנה טאוניברסיטת בן גוריון - י.ל.) עיסוקיו הרבים כיו"ר ועדת המודיעין וכחבר בקיר בוועדת החקלאות הצרו את נסיעותיו לחו"ל. עם זאת הוא עדיין מעוניין לבקר שוב בארץ ויתכן שישקול זאת בחודשים הבאים. (הערה: מיותר לציין חשיבות ביקור כזה - יו"ר ועדת המודיעין הקודם, הסנטור דיב דורנברגר (רפובליקאי ממינסוטה) ביקר בארץ בנובמבר 1984).

בתום השיחה הציע השגריר את שירותיו הטובים לסנטור והפציר בו לפנות אליו אם יוכל להיות לעזר. מצידו בורן חילף בשגריר לא להסס להתקשר עמו בשעת הצורך.

א. מ. א. מ.  
למדן

סוג הטלפון:

טלפון 575

תאריך: ---

27/5/88

תז"ח:

א ל : מנ"ל לשכת השר, מע"ת, מצ"א

70-מ/ן : נר  
0 0748 : יס  
112-ע/ן

ע : יועץ תקשורת לרה"ט, יועץ תקשורת לשח"ס, לע"ם, רו"צ, קש"ח, מזכיר חמשת, וושינגטון

אגד מ/ן

עיתונות, ניו יורק

סכום תקשורת 14-27/5/88

התקשורת ממשיכה להרפות מאתנו וכשבוועלים האחרונים התרכזה בעיקר בענייני פסגת מוסקבה ופנמה, וכן כעיסוק שוטף וקבוע בכחירות לנשיאות. בנושאינו בלט כמיוחד המצב בכחירות, וכן מכארק עוואד, כשכיסוי השטחים מצטמצם לעמודים הפנימיים. פשיטת צה"ל בלבנון, למשל, כמעט לא סוקרה ברשתות כחדשות אותו ערב (למעט "מקניל/להרר") וגם לא קיבלנו שאלות בנושא.

ביקור ממרה"מ מיקד לזמן קצר את תשומת הלב על המצב הפוליטי בישראל ועל הכחירות המתקרבות, וכן על התהליך המדיני באזור ומעורבותה האפשרית של כרה"מ בו. אתמול נשאלנו ע"י שני עתונים על הכחירות לרשימת מפלגת העבודה אך לא ראינו שפורסם דבר מה על כך היום.

בעיתנו המרכזית מוסיפה להיות סיפור מכארק עוואד, על אף שכימים האחרונים חלה רגיעת-מה בפרסומים. יש ציפיה להמשך הדיון המשפטי ולכן ממתינים כעת הכותבים. אולם השאלות מוסיפות להגיע ומוסיפות להיות ביקורתיות. "מקניל/להרר" ביטלו ממש ברגע האחרון עימות בין הגב' עוואד לבין פעיל באחד הארגונים היהודיים (שקיבל על עצמו לייצג את הצד הישראלי) מסיבות טכניות.

נמשכות גם הפניות הביקורתיות בנושאי השטחים - ביחוד לאחר פתיחת בתי הספר. הביקורת היא משני כיוונים: הן בנושא השחתת מכנים והן על שטרם נפתחו האוניברסיטאות. השבוע גם נועדנו עם LIFE MAGAZINE בענייני כתבתם על בית החולים בעזה, והגשנו להם מכתב לפרסום בגליון הבא. (דווח בנפרד).

"ניוזדיי" עוסק במרץ בהכנת סדרה מיוחדת על ישראל, שתפורסם החל מ-5 ביוני כמשך כ-10 ימים. הסדרה תעסוק בישראל כחיכת של יובל ה-40 + מצב פוליטי/מפלגתי + אינתיפאדה + יחסי חוץ + כלכלה וכיו"ב. לצערנו מטפל טים פלפס בחיכת הפלסטיני (ידידנו ג'וש פרידמן משגיח על השאר).  
עד כאן.

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כינה 1212

תאריך: 27.5.88 שם השולח: ב. כינה איזור:

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שגרירות ישראל / נושין גטון

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טופס מברק

דף 1 מחוד 3 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 27.5.88

מס' מברק

מס' 676

1/2

676

המשרד

אל: מצפ"א, ממי"ד

דע: לשכת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות

להלן מראיון דוקסיס ל"לוס-אנג'לס טיימס".

יוסי גל

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2/2

676

Q: For a Democratic candidate, a very good test of his ability to take the heat is his stand on controversial issues like the Middle East, especially saying things that might not please the government of Israel. In your speeches you always mention your disagreements with Jesse Jackson. Precisely what are your disagreements?

A: I think that the next President's job is to do everything he can to create an atmosphere within

which Israel and its neighbors can sit down and negotiate permanent peace in the Middle East, but not to impose that settlement because trying to impose a settlement doesn't work. I don't think you negotiate with the PLO as long as they engage in active terrorism and are committed to the destruction of Israel. And I haven't seen anything in the course of the past weeks or months or years which seems to have changed that basic view. And every time [PLO leader Yasser] Arafat is pressed, he gets very ambiguous. I don't see what's so difficult about the PLO or other Arab nations standing up and doing what [former Egyptian President] Anwar Sadat did, which is basically to say: "Yes, we agree that the people of Israel have a right to exist within secure borders with dignity and freedom, and we'll negotiate on that basis." I mean, what's so difficult about that?

Q: But Sadat got all of his land back. The problem for Jordan, or Syria right now, is whether Israel is interested in giving back that land, and the government of Israel has already said that it would not give back Jerusalem.

A: Well, I don't think it is realistic to assume that all of the land is going to go back. And whatever settlement comes out of what I hope can be constructive negotiations I think will have to provide for borders different than the pre-'67 borders.

Q: Do you think this settlement would involve a Palestinian state?

A: That's a judgment to be made by the parties. As a practical matter, if Israel and/or Jordan don't want an independent Palestinian state—which is likely—you are not going to have an independent Palestinian state.

Q: You're saying that, if the government of Israel takes the position that there will be no independent Palestinian state, that the U.S. . . . ?

A: Then there isn't going to be an independent Palestinian state.

Q: So then what happens to the Palestinians?

A: That's a subject to be negotiated. I think the notion of limited autonomy leading to something more permanent makes sense.

Q: Aside from making sense, is there a fundamental human rights problem involved here? What rights do individual Palestinians living on the West Bank or Gaza have right now? Are there any that are being violated by Israel?

A: I want Israel to use maximum restraint. The President said that. I said publicly at the time that I supported him. I think that you've got to use maximum restraint wherever possible. The Israelis themselves have recognized that. Some people have been disciplined, and the procedures have been changed, but this problem isn't going to be resolved unless and until Arab leaders do what Sadat did.

Q: The Israeli army has said it is holding more than 5,000 Palestinians without charges. Do you feel that violates their human rights? Do you feel that's wrong?

A: When you're dealing with civil disturbances and occupied territories, you ought to use the maximum restraint possible.

Q: But is it wrong to hold people without charges?

A: Dealing with civil disturbances—some of which I have no doubt are being encouraged and supported from outside the occupied territories—is not an easy job, as anybody who's ever tried to deal with them knows.

Q: That's not what I'm asking. I'm asking can you hold people without charges being brought against them, without any due process, some for over a year, without that being a violation of human rights?

A: I think Israel has a responsibility to try to deal with that situation as fairly and as responsibly as it possibly can. But this situation wouldn't be a problem today, if leaders of the Arab world had done what they should have done 40 years ago or 20 years ago or 15 years ago, and that is to sit down and negotiate a permanent peace which recognizes Israel's right to exist.

Q: No matter how irresponsible or reactionary the Arab governments may be, no matter how stupid and violent the PLO may be, do the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza have any fundamental human rights that the Israeli government must respect and that the U.S. government will criticize them for not respecting? And have any of those rights been violated in the events of the last five months?

A: Yes. Yes. And the United States government has been prop-

erly critical of Israel when it used what, in our judgment, was more than the kind of restraint than what ought to be used under these circumstances.

Q: The U.S. government right now does not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Would you continue that policy?

A: If Israel wants its capital in Jerusalem, then, as far as I'm concerned, its capital is in Jerusalem. If it wants its capital in Tel Aviv, then its capital can be in Tel Aviv. That's their judgment to make.

Q: That's not the U.S. government's position right now.

A: Well, I don't happen to agree with it. I think it's a basic principle of doing business with other nations. They say their capital is in X, then that's where we go.

Q: The argument is that you're accepting the legitimacy of their control of Jerusalem.

A: Well, I do.

Q: So you do believe that all of Jerusalem then would be part of a future Israel?

A: Yes.

Q: So that Jerusalem is not negotiable.

A: Except for the rights of religious groups, which are rights that Israel has accepted.



שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מוגדג

תאריך/ז"ח 10:00 27.5.88

מס' מברק

המשרד

1/2

689

אל: מצפ"א

שלחת השגריר עם הסנטור טום הרקין (24.5)

1. השגריר נפגש ב-24.5 עם הסנטור הנ"ל, שהוא זמקוט מאידוה וחבר בוועדת המשנה לפעולות זרנג, נכחו אד לונג (עוזרו של הסנטור לעניני חו"ב) ורח"מ.

2. הרקין רואה את עמו כאחד מנושאי דגל זכויות האדם בסנט (בעקבות התענינותו הפעילה בתחום זה כקונגרסמן מ-1974 עד 1984). בזמנו נודע לנו שהוא מוטרד מאוד מהנעשה כשטחים ורק בגלל שמדובר בישראל הטכיים להתאחק ולא לתת ביטוי פומבי לתרעומתו. מענין איפוא לציין שבשיחה עם השגריר, הרקין לא ביטל את ההזדמנות להתרכז בנושא זה ורק לקראת סוף הפגישה ביקש לדעת על מצב הבג"ץ של מוחמד ערואד. לאחר שהשגריר עזב אותו בנושא, העיר הסנטור כי הואיל ופג תקפה של המשרה שבידי ערואד, לישראל הזכות המשפטית המלאה להוציאו מתחומה. מאידך, רבים אינם מוכנים את הנסיבות ורואים בו כפלטטיבאי מתוך הדוגל בתורת אי-האלימות. הסנטור הטכיים עם עוזרו לונג שהעיר שישראל תסבול צרות גדולות יותר מערואד אם יגרוש מאשר אם יתירו לו להשאר בארץ (הכוונה לפעילותו החזויה של ערואד בארה"ב אם ישוב לכאן).

3. למעשה השיחה לבשה צורה של ראיון, כאשר המזכיר שאל את השגריר סדרה של שאלות מתוך ניר (שהוכן ע"י לונג) כאלו:
- א. מה מצב היחסים עם מצרים ?
  - ב. היכן עומדת יוזמת שולץ ?
  - ג. האם נושא המזה"ת ידרן נפסגה במוסקווה ?
  - ד. מה-היא העמדה הסובייטית כיום ?
  - ה. היה ודבר לא יושג השנה, האם יש לצפות לחיזוק אי השקט כשטחים ?
  - ו. האם הסעודים עוזרים במאמצים לפתוח במז"ח ?
  - ז. היכן עומדים הסוריים ?
  - ח. מה עמדת ישראל לגבי האפשרות של מכירת מיוססים מדגם אפ-18 לכרוית ?

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ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפוס

סוג בסחונ'י

דחיסות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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4. מיותר לציין שהשגריר נתן תשובות מלאות ומפורטות לכל השאלות הנ"ל דאף הרחיב עליהן כדי לעמוד על מטפר נקודות חשובות לנו. בסך הכל הוקיץ השאיר רושם של ידידות לצד ריחוק מעניינינו (לעומת לונג, הממשיך להתעניין בנושאים שלנו מאז ביקורו בארץ בינואר 1987 עם משלחת פרויקט אינטר-צ'יינג' וכן על רקע נסיונו הקודם כעוזר במשרדו של הקונגרסמן טד ווייס מניו יורק).

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 א.ה.ל.  
 למוד

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ס ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג כטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 26.5.88

מס' מברק

1/2

135

578

654

המשרד, בטחון, ניו-יורק

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה  
דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת  
יועץ שהביט לתקשורת  
מנהל לע"מ, ניו-יורק  
מאת: עתונות

דו"ח תקשורת - 26.5.88 - 19.5

כללי

הפסגה הקרבה בין רייגן לגורבצ'וב ועמה ההסכם להגבלת נשק גרעיני (INF), שלוו בכתבות רקע על ברה"מ, תפסו את מרבית העניין של התקשורת האמריקאית בשבוע שחלף, כמו גם גורל פנמה ושליטה נורייגה וחוק חסחר האמריקאי.  
הנושאים המזיזים נותרו בד"כ בעמודים הפנימיים ולא הועלו בכותרות ראשיות של ה"פוסט" או ה"ניו-יורק טיימס" להוציא ספור הטילים הסיניים בסעודיה.  
יחד עם זאת קשה לאמר שנדחקנו לקרן זוית: המצב בשטחים, מומחים ישראלים בסין ואפשרות חידוש היחסים בין ישראל לברה"מ מילאו טורים לא מעטים בתקשורת הכתובה, בשעה שלאחנתה האלקטרונית (להוציא פעולת צה"ל בדרום לבנון) היה בנו ענין מועט יחסית.  
מלחמת המיליציות בבירות ויחסי איראן-סוריה הנובעים ממנה - יכנסו או לא הסנרים לעימות ישיר עם חיזבללה? - איבדה את תנופתה התקשורתית אך עדיין תופסת מקום לא מועט בעתונות הכתובה ומועלית בהקשר של חילופי שבויים אפשריים בלבנון. מספר תמונות של תושבים אומללים באו להמחיש את סבל האוכלוסייה האזרחית הנקרעת בין המחנות הניצים. בימים האחרונים הוזכרו גם מחנות הפליטים הפלסטינים כחלק מן המערכת המורכבת של פרברי בירות לה מחפשות סוריה ואיראן פתרונים.  
מלחמת אירן-עיראק ומדיניות ארה"ב במפרץ זכו לכיסוי עתונאי מועט.  
מאמרי המערכת והאופ.אד. עסקו בספיחי ביקור ממרוה"מ ושה"ח (למי התכוון רייגן בהודעת הכית הלבן?, לרוה"מ אליבא ד"ניו-יורק טיימס"), על מה חלוקים היהודים והשחורים?  
הסרובניקים בברה"מ והטילים הסיניים שחזרו אל ישראל כבומרנג דרך סעודיה ("וושפוסט").

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ראויים לציון שני מאמרי אופ.אד.: האחד, רולי אבנט על שהב"ט - המתואר כאדם אמיץ, הדבק בעקרונותיו בנושא האינתיפאדה, ובעיניים פקוחות לוקח את כל הסכונים הכרוכים בתפקידו, לטוב ולרע. השני, ריצארד הרווד, האומבודסמן של ה"יושפוס", התייחס לטענות ישראל וגופים יהודיים לעוות תמונת האינתיפאדה במדיה האמריקאית וטען שזו אכן מעוותת אך לצד השני - דם יהודי עדיין זוכה לכותרות יותר גדולות מדם ערבי והתמיכה האמריקאית המאסיבית בישראל תישאר בעינה.

ידיעות לא ארוכות בעמודים פנימיים דווחו על פעולת צה"ל וצד"ל דרומית לצידון. ההערכה היא שלא מדובר בהיתקלות בעייתית שכן מרבית כוחות החיזבללה נמצאים כעת בפרברי בירות והנתרים ברחו כדי למנוע עימות ישיר עם הישראלים.

### המצב בשטחים

עמד בטימן השיבה לבתי הספר. כותבים רבים תארו בפירוט את המהלך והביאו מדברי מורים ותלמידים שמרביתם הביעו שמחה על סיום החופש הכפוי. ההערכה היא שהסטודנטים השבים, שבינתיים ספגו בינה בבתי הספר המחתרתיים, יהיו הרבה יותר עוינים ומיליטנטיים מאשר ערב ההתקוממות.

הכתבות עסקו גם בבתי הספר שהושחתו על ידי הצבא, בהמשך השנאה על אף שוך האבנים והדגישו התנגדותם של ישראלים מהשמאל ל היבטים שונים של טיפול ישראל בהתקוממות, במיוחד המעצרים המנהליים - שעור כואב בנסיון לדכא את האינתיפאדה.

ספור "דרך הניצוץ" עורר עניין אף הוא ודווח בצורה מאוזנת. מובארק עוואד מופיע בהקשר לדיכוי פלסטינאים מתונים ע"י ישראל הנעשה במקביל לתלונות שאין עם מי לדבר. נימת הביקורת בכסוי השטחים נמשכת.

הסקירה הוכנה ע"י אורית גובר.



עתונות