

10

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

א/4605/8

מסרה רובי

יועץ מבין

אכרוב

7/21/87 - 7/12/11

תיק מס'

8

מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פנימי: א-8/4605

מזהה פריט: R00035xc

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-7 תאריך הדפסה: 10/08/2020

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 3 מתוך 20

* יגיעו למסקנה, שרק באמצעות כאלה ניתן לשכנע את ארהב *
* והדבר מעורר דאגה רבה. *

* מיקרינג השיב שהוא מבין היטב את דברי רהמ' *
* וכי הוא העביר, בשבוע האחרון, הערכות דומות לרוש'. עם *
* זאת, ברוש' ישנם כאלה שדוחפים להצבעה בעד ההצעה *
* ומתקיימים ברוש' דיונים על שינוי המונח CONDEMN *
* אל- DEPLORE, אם כי *

* מיקרינג עצמו איננו מבין מהו ההבדל הממשי בין שני *
* המונחים האלה. *

* מיקרינג טען שהציבור בארהב' מושפע ע"י מאד מן *
* הצילומים בטלוויזיה. הוא הבטיח להעביר לאלתר את *
* דברי רהמ' לנוש' ולציין שחל שיפור בשליטת כוחות *
* הבטחון במצב, ושהצבעה נגד ישראל במועצה' טרם תוסיף *
* שמן למזורה. *

* רהמ' הדגיש שוב, לסיום, שאנו מתכשפים דרכים *
* לשים קץ למהומות, וזאת ללא עימות, ובדרך האנושית *
* ביותר. *

* אריה מקל-לשבת רהמ' *

* אתם: שהח, רהמ, מכבל, ממכבל, שהבט, ורנע, ארבל, בירן, מצמא *

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

21 דצמבר 1987
ל' כסלו תשמ"ח

- ש מ ר -

אל: מצפ"א

הנדון: ווין וובר - תמיכה בישיבות

ראו נא הפנייה המצורפת משלושה קונגרסמנים לשר האוצר המבקש תמיכה במוסדות תורניים בארץ. וובר אינו יהודי אך הוא תומך עקבי ופעיל בנושאים שלנו ומשום כך נעתרו לו ^{לסג'ר} וויין לפנייתו להצטרף למכתב.

במידה ושר האוצר מתכוון להשיב, נודה אם תודיעונו מה תשובתו, ונשמח להעבירה. לחילופין נודה להנחיותכם כיצד להשיב.

בברכה,
טובה הרצל

העתק: לשכת שר האוצר
לשכת רה"מ ✓

ציר, ציר כלכלי, למדן - כאן

VIN WEBER
2D DISTRICT, MINNESOTA
106 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 226-2331
P.O. Box 279
NEW ULM, MN 56073
(507) 354-6400
919 SOUTH 1ST STREET
WILLMAR, MN 56201
(612) 235-6820
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MARSHALL, MN 56258
(507) 532-9611

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES
RURAL DEVELOPMENT,
AGRICULTURE AND
RELATED AGENCIES
LABOR, HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES AND
EDUCATION

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

December 16, 1987

The Honorable Moshe Nissim
Minister of Finance
Ministry of Finance
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Minister,


We are writing to express our support for two building projects in your country. The first is for the Machon Alta Lubavitch school in Safed. The projected cost is \$4.5 million. The second is a building for the Jerusalem Institute of Talmudic Research in Jerusalem. The projected cost is \$3.5 million.

Both of these projects are very worthwhile and would be of benefit to many American students. We understand that you have been contacted by a number of United States Senators requesting the funding of these projects. We join in their request.

Sincerely,


VIN WEBER
Member of Congress


MEL LEVINE
Member of Congress


LARRY SMITH
Member of Congress

cc: Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir ✓
Oded Eran

200 1/2

טופס מברק

דף 2 מחזור 5 דפים

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סווג בסחונני
דחיפות
תאריך/ז"ח
מס' מברק

ג. ^{הסוג} *MOBILE CBM*. ברטון שארה"ב שינתה את הטקטיקה ע"מ להקל על ההתקדמות. בריקיאויק העמדה האמריקאית בריאויאויק היתה שלילית בנוסח "לא, אבל". עתה השתנתה ההנחה והאמריקאים מדברים בלשון "כן, אבל". עומדים על כך שצריך לחתור לאיסור מלא ושההסכם חייב גם לנסות את נושא הניסויים.

ד. הגנה בחלל. גורבצ'וב למד הלקה בריקיאויק בנושא ה- *SDI* לדחוק את הנשיא אל הקיר. לדעת ברטון, והדבר עדיין דורש הוכחה, הסובייטים שמו הצידה למשך שנה נושא ה- *SDI*. החברר שזה *ISSUE* פחות דוחק עבורם.

ה. *ABM*. "הוסכם שלא להסכים", הסובי התבטאו שהנושא "לא בוער להם" והם יכולים לסבול כפל לשון בהם נוקטים האמריקאים וחוסר החלטה מצדם. בסיכומו של דבר בנושא ה- *START* נקבעה מטגרה של *JOINT DRAFT TREATY* עם הרבה "שטחים ריקים" כפי שהיה בדיונים בנושא ה- *INF*, ואחם יצטרכו למלא הצוותים בג'ינבה בנוסח מוסכם. כ"כ נעשתה עבודה טכנית דבה בנושא האימותים, ע"פ המודל ששימש את הסכם ה- *INF*, המבוססת על הקונטפציה של *ONE SIDE INSPECTION*. ברטון הסביר שההתקדמות בנושא זיהוי מספר ראשי הנפץ, והאמותים לא נצפתה לפני 6 חדשים. הטעים שגיבוש הסכם ה- *START* נראה קל יחסית בהשוואה לשלבים הבאים, כגון דיונים מדלטיטרלים, נשק כימי וקונבציונלי. חלק מהאירופאים תומך בדיון גם בסוגיית הנשק הטקטי. הוא אישית תומך בכך.

3. בדעה שנוצר ריאליזם מסויים בצד הסובייטי. המשוכה הגבוהה - תזוזה טובי בנושאים אזוריים וז"ח אדם. האמריקאים חזרו ואמרו לאורך כל השיחות שכל זמן שלא תהיה התקדמות בשטחים אלה, גם אם לא בכל הנושאים הכלולים בהם, הדבר יפריע לקידום היחסים בין שתי המדינות. "נזהרנו, הדגיש בתשובה לשאלה, מליצור לינקג' אך הזיקה קיימת". בצד הסובי המשקל הוא על הצד הבטחוני, אך מחוור. להם שללא התקדמות בנושאים הנ"ל קשה יהיה להם להשיג גישה לטכנולוגיה וליתרונות כלכליים מערביים. הצד השני של המטבע הבטחוני הוא שלגורבצ'וב ברור שללא כלים אלה ספק אם יש מה לדבר על "פרייטרואיקה" אמיתית של הכלכלה הסובי.

4. נושאים אזוריים (סטיב יאנג).

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סוג מסחרי
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הסוגיות נדונו במסגרת האסי הפסגה + שה"ח וכן בקבוצת העבודה בראשות דיק סלומון ונבגני פרימקוב. סה"כ הוקצבו לה 12 וחצי שעות. טרם הפסגה נעשתה עבודה נכונה בפגישות שה"ח וארמקוסט - ורונצ'וב. מסתבר שהסוב' לא הביאו צוות מיוחד מטעמם המופקד על בנושאים האזוריים.

א. אפגניסטן. הסוב' מתייחסים ברצינות לסוגיות אפגניסטן. הם מודרכים משתי מערכות של שיקולים מנוגדים: מחד, נצחון צבאי אינו בהישג ידם. עלויות החזקת הכוחות במשאבים כלכליים ואנושיים. מאידך מוטרדים מהפונדמנטליזם המתפשט, חשש לאבדן יוקרה, השפעה שלילית מצטברת על מעמדו של גורבצ'וב במידה ויסתבר שהפחדון המדיני אינו משרת ואולי אף פוגע באינטרסים טוב'. העקרון שהסוב' עמדו עליו בשיחות הוא הפסקת הסיוע האמריקאי למורדים, תוך שירדז מהזיקה בין הוצאת כוחותיהם לפיוס לאומי. האמריקאים השיבו בחיוב לגבי עניין הסיוע. אך רק לאחר קביעת מועד לתחילת הפינוי. המצב שנוצר מחזיר את הצדדים לגיבנה לדיונים המשולשים קורדובה (סגן מנכ"ל האו"ם) - אפגניסטן - פקיסטן. האמריקאים אף רמזו שיתכן שה - PPA אינו ראוי (DISQUALIFY) מלהשתתף במו"מ, אך הם שומרים טעון זה לחלק הלא רשמי של השיחות בג'ינבה. ארה"ב יעשה שהסוב' יפתחו במגעים עם פקיסטן. אך לא קבלו תשובה לכאן או לכאן. יאנג מעריך שנושא ביקור ורונצ'וב באיסלאמאבאד עדיין פתוח. מסביר שהמצב בשטח לא פועל לטובת הסוב' גם מבחינת הזמן. הסוב' עלולים להקלע למצב בו יצטרכו לסגת ללא ערבויות בהנחה שה - PPA יצליח אמנם להחזיק מעמד ללא נוכחות טוב' צבאית. אך כל הסיכויים שהסוגיה תהפך אז לעניין פנימי.

ב. עירק - איראן. הסוגיה שונה ואולי אף מעיקה יותר מבעיית אפגניסטן בשל הנוכחות הצבאית האמריקאית במפרץ ושאלת יחסי הסוב' עם הערבים. המשלחת הסוב' בפסגה השאירה "סימנים מעורבים". גורבצ'וב יצר רושם שמוכן ללכת בנושא הסנקציות. שברנדזה אף חזר על כך בפני שולץ בטכס הפרידה בנמה"ח. מאץ העלו הצעה בנוגע להקמת כח או"ם. האמריקאים אינם יכולים לפטוק באם זוהי מעין "הצלה פנים" או שמא הסוב' מתייחסים אליה ברצינות. הבעיה היא יחסיהם עם איראן. אחרים מטילים כובד המשקל בנושא הערבי. ברה"מ, ע"פ חיזה זו, מבינה שללא הפסקת המלחמה עשויים יחסיהם עם הערבים ללבוש צורה שלילית ולכן יש לאלץ את איראן לקבל הפא"ש. מכאן שאפשר יהיה להעביר את ההחלטה

סופס מברק

דף 4 מחוד 5 דפים

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במצב זה האמריקאים עשויים שלא לפסול הקמה כח או"מ סימלי שיוסמך לבצע את האמנוגו, אך ארה"ב לא תאפשר יצירת זיקה ביניהם. "לא יתכן הצבת כח שלום או"מ במקום שאין ש"כ" לא יתכן להפקיד בידי אנשי צבא במקום, הכוונה למפקדי הכח, קבלת החלטות במקום הפוליטיקאים. הסובי ערים להתפוצצות אפשרית לנוכח פעולה איראנית נגד ארה"ב, מצב שיפגע גם בהם.

ג. מזה"ח. גורבצ'וב אמר לרייגן שארה"ב וברה"מ חייבות למלא תפקיד בטכסון. אין האחת באה על חשבון השנייה. ברה"מ אינה מתנגדת להרחבת האינטרסים האמריקאים באזור, אך לא תמורת דחיקת אלה של ברה"מ. לא רואה בעיה בכינוס ועידה בינ"ל. ברה"מ לא מתנגדת שתחת חסותה יתקיים דיון ישראלי-ערבי. בועדת העבודה הסובי נאותו לפרט, תחח לחץ אמריקאי, שאט סוריה, למשל, לא תהיה מרוצה ממה שיושג, קשה יהיה לצאת בהסכם (נפרד) שיהיה כגורל בסכס עם לבנון ב-83 שסוריה פוצצה אותו. בשיחת מרפי פוליאקוב הרושט הוא שאין דחיפות סובייטית בסוגיה. הסובי טרם הסירו כפל הלשון שלהם באשר להתייחסות למזה"ח, אש"פ וסוריה, בעקר בכל הנוגע לצניין השתתפות אש"פ בוועידה בינ"ל. פרימקוב אמר שהיחסים עם ישראל הם USEFUL אך בעחיד. בינתיים ישנה משלחת קונס' וזה מספק אותם. רוחח הדעה שהסובי הקימו למעשה לשכת אינטרסים בישראל שתפעל עד לכינון יחסים. יאנג מסכם התייחסות הסובי לסוגיות המזה"ח בפסגה שלברה"מ אין תחושה של דחיפות והם UNAVAILABLE הבהירות של הנושאים הקשורים ביחסיהם עם הגורמים הבינ"ל. הם ישוחחו על כך עם חסין. עדיין יש בידם מספר אופציות. הבעיה המרכזית - הבטחת הכניסה לחהלין וזה לדעתם כבר הושג. לפי שעה זה מספק אותם. האמריקאים שואפים להפגיש את מרפי ופוליאקוב בהקדם האפשרי. טרם נקבע דבר.

5. סיכום.

- א. אין לראות בפסגת וושינגטון יצירה מודל לפסגות הבאות וכל אחת נבדלת מקודמתה.
- ב. יצירת קומוניקציה בין ראשי שתי המעצמות. האמריקאים רואים בחיוב מסוד הקשר עם הממשל הנוכחי, בניגוד לדעות שימחיינו לנשיא חדש.
- ג. מיסוד דיאלוג בכל הרמות והנושאים.
- ד. מעבר מהבנת עמדות הצדדים לשלב של מאמץ לפתור בעיות-אפגניסטן.

ט ז ס מ ב ק

ד 5 מחון 5 זפים

סוג מסמך

דחיפות

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ארה"ב מבינה הבעיתיות שיש לבנה"מ בטוגיה, ויש לה כמה רעיונות שיבולים לעזור.

ה. אין מניעה להמשיך להתקדמות גם אם מרובים חילוקי הדעות בנושאים רבים כגון המכלול האזורי.

ו. ישנה זיקה אך לא לינאג' בין התקדמות בנושאים אזוריים לבין המשך ההתקדמות בנושאים אחרים - פרוק נשק. הסוב' מודעים לכך שזיקה זו עשויה לגעת בעניין אשורר הסכם ה - INF בקונגרס.

ז. נושא זכויות אדם קטור לאילוצים טוב' פנימיים, ובעיקר נושא הלאומים. אפשר וגורבצ'וב נחון ללחץ ראשי הק.ג.ב. אך יתכן שהוא עצמו מאמין בקו קטוח בנושא ההגירה היהודית למבדיל מטיפול במקרים אינדוידואלים. המזכיר מכיר ברגישות הבעיה ומוכן לכך שהנושא ידון שלא בפומבי. מאידך זו בעיה קרדינלית לארה"ב המשמשת במידה רבה את ציר היחסים עם ברה"מ.

אלי אבידן

סודי

** ירצא

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חודם: 12,13086

אל: כני/855, ורוש/594

מ-: המשרד, תא: 181287, זח: 1949, זח: 1, טג: ס

נד: 8

סודי/בהול

א.פ. 184

אל: כנאריס
ורשינגטון

נתניהו, ארד.

מרעבי'ט.

1. פיקרינג התקשר למנכ"ל המדיני ומסר לו שהרוח הנושבת
בדושינגטון היא בכיוון של המנעות. הוסיף כי ממשיך לנסות
ולשכנע להצביע נגד.

2. הוחלט שלא לפנות לדרג גבוה יותר בנושא.

לשכת מנכ"ל

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תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בירך, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל 2

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המשרד

אל: ממ"ד, מצפ"א

מאת: אלי אבידן, וושינגטון

משיחה עם ביל קוונדט.

1. סיפר שבפסגת עמאן הוצג נייר אמריקאי העוסק בכך שאין סתירה בין סעיף 6 שנהסכם השלום הישראלי-מצרי לבין מחויבותה של מצרים ^ליצה ההגנה הקולקטיבי הערבי. לבקשתי פרט שאין לו ספק באשר לעצם הצגת המסמך ושדובר ב- *NON PAPER* ללא חתימה, שחבר בזמן המו"מ הישראלי-מצרי בידי רוברט הנזל, היועץ המשפטי דאז ושקבע שאין סתירה בין הסעיף הנ"ל לחוזה ההגנה הקולקטיבי. הנייר שנמסר למצרים בידי הנ"ל ורוי אסרטון עורך המח ישראל-יה"מ דאז בגין והוחזר בחזרה לאמריקאים. במקביל הפקידה ארה"ב מסמך דומה בידי ישראל הנוגע לאותו סעיף באשר לשטחים ולזכותה של ישראל למנוע פעילות טרור וחבלה ^{המדי} (מלבנון). נייר זה הוחזר אף הוא בתגובה להתנגדות מצרית. הוא מניח ששני המסמכים תוייכו מאז, אך המצרי "נשלף" עתה, לפי כל הסימנים והתגלגל לעמאן. הוא משוכנע שאין מדובר בנייר חדש.

2. קוונדט בניגוד לאחרים אינו רואה בפסגה בעמאן נקודת מפנה באשר לעזרת סוריה בה. אסד עשה כמה "תיקונים" (*ADJUSTMENTS*), לאור פנסיבות בעולם הערבי אך לא שינה עמדותיו הבסיסיות. הוא היה ער למה שציפו ממנו שם ובהשבון קר הגיע למסקנה שהמחיר אינו כזה שלא יוכל לעמוד בו. מנגד הוא גם העריך הצפדי לו באס-התקט - הקלעות למצב של בידוד וחיכוכים עם יתר הגורמים. הוא טרם יישב (*RESOLVE*) את נושא היחסים עם טהראן בעקבות הפסגה בעמאן. וגם לא מוטרד מהנושא הישראלי-ערבי. הוא גם העריך נכונה, ע"פ קוונדט לאן נושבת הרוח בעניין מצרים ובודאי שלא הופתע מההתפתחויות. שני נושאים נמצאים אצלו עתה עדיפות עליונה: נושא הכלכלה ולבנון. נושא הסיוע הערבי נשאר פתוח והוא קבל יד חפשיה בלבנון. מבחינה זו מולאו ציפיותיו. בה"כ המוקד נשאר מזרחה לסכסוך, דהיינו במפרץ.

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3. באשר לפסגת המעצמות הבשורה המרכזית בסוגיית המזה"ח היא שבעקבות שיפור ההדברות והתקשורת בין רייגן וגורביצוב, ישנה ציפיה באזור מה היא תוליד.

4. שטחים. קוונדט הביע אכזבה מסוימת מהופעתו של שהב"ט רבין בברוקינגס בעיקר בשל התייחסותו להפגנות ביהש"ע כאל "הפרת הסדר הציבורי". הבעיה לדעתו הרבה יותר עמוקה וחמורה בעיקר בכל הנוגע לעזה. התחברותם של אלמנטים קיצוניים פוליטיים ודתיים והתעלותם מעבר לחילוקי הדעות ביניהם היא בבחינת פצצת זמן שעשויה לצאת משליטת ישראל. אין מדובר באנשי הממסד הישן אלא בדור הצעיר שלא חוות את ההיסטוריה הפוליטית והרואה בישראל הכתובת הבלעדית למצוקותיו. זהו גם הדור הבא של מנהיגי הפלס' במקומות הנ"ל. קוונדט בדעה שיש לחזור ולבדוק את הרעיון של "עזה תחילה". (א) בשל האקוטיות שבה (ב) לישראל אין "אמוציות הסטוריות חזקות" כפי שיש כלפי הגדה ויתכן אף שגם הצד הערבי - מצרים וירדן אינן פסולות שהמדובר בשתי ישויות שאינן דוקא זהות, בעלות אספקטים שונים המצריכות טיפול נפרד. אין לדעתו באימוץ רעיון "עזה בתחילה" משום יצירת חקדים באשר להסדר לגדה המערבית.

5. תכנית ברוקינגס ומזה"ח. המכון כזכור עומד לצאת, לפי לוי"ז בקיץ 88, עם מסמך ובו הוצעה לממשל באשר לפתרון הסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי. שאלתי את קוונדט איפה עומד הפרוייקט. הסביר שמדובר בגוף בין 21 חברים מכל קצוות הקשת הפוליטית - אנשי ממשל לשעבר וממכוני האקדמיה, ביניהם - קוונדט עצמו, הרמן איילטס, סם לואיס, רוי אתרטון, ריטה האוזר, פול ג'אבר, רשיד ח'ילדי, יהודית קיפר, צ'רלס מתיאס, רוברט ניומן, האל סונדרס, קן וואלק ועוד. המטרה שהעמיד לעצמו היא שהמסמך יעסוק ב-3 אספקטים תאור מצב, אופציות, המלצות. הגוף החכנט כבר כמה פעמים אך טרם הגיע למכנה משותף בעיקר באשר לפרקים הדנים באופציות ובהמלצות. הפגישה הבאה במהלך ינואר עשויה להכריע גורל הפרוייקט. יש עדיין ספק באשר למימושו בשל חילוקי דעות בין חברי הגוף הנ"ל. אמנם קיימת אפשרות של כינוס דעות שונות החת מסמך אחד, אך הוא מעדיף שהדבר יעשה בצורה של מסמך עבודה משותף.

אלי אבידן

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סוג כסחונני גלוי

דחיסות רגיל

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מס' מברק

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- אל - מצפ"א, מע"ת
- דע - יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
- יועץ שהביט לתקשורת
- מאת - עתונות - וושינגטון

סטינגרים לבחריין

להלן מחור ה"ושינגטון פוסט" 18.12.87

קולאכ
יוסי גל

Reagan Wins Big Fight Over Small Arms Deal

Missile Sale to Bahrain Has Political Price

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration has won its biggest battle over one of its smallest arms sales of the year—up to 70 Stinger antiaircraft missiles and 14 launchers worth \$7 million for the tiny Persian Gulf sheikdom of Bahrain. But its victory came only after an exhaustive lobbying effort on Capitol Hill and sticky negotiations with Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), who led the opposition to the sale and exacted his price.

In the end, Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci and national security adviser Colin L. Powell struck a deal with DeConcini a week ago allowing Stingers to go to Bahrain under some of the most stringent restrictions and conditions ever imposed on any U.S. arms sale abroad.

Though the deal was cut late last Friday, a last attempt was made to reverse it yesterday by one of the House conferees negotiating the foreign operations section of the omnibus spending bill with his Senate counterparts. The bid was defeated on a 6-to-3 vote among the House conferees, according to DeConcini's office.

In return for his cooperation with the White House, DeConcini has insisted that no other Stingers be sold to any gulf nation and that the administration drop its plan to sell more of the shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles to the sultan of Oman.

Bahrain had to agree to the same strict U.S.-dictated safeguards over the weapon as those imposed on Saudi Arabia, which has 400 Stingers. The safeguards include separate storage depots for the missiles and the launchers and spot-checks by U.S. officials to assure that all are accounted for.

In a precedent-setting procedure, Bahrain also must pledge to sell its Stingers back to the United States as soon as another U.S. air defense system can be found, but, in any case, no later than 18 months from the date of enactment of the legislation.

In addition, the president must report to Congress every three months about whatever replacement air defense system the White House and Pentagon are proposing. In the future, the president will have to notify the House speaker and Senate majority leader of any offer of Stinger sales abroad.

A State Department spokesman, reflecting the administration's disgruntled resignation to the terms of the deal, said, "There is no possibility of anything better. It is the best we can hope for and at least it will permit us to sell them to Bahrain."

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He said Bahrain had agreed to the conditions and that the administration will forward the Stingers "as soon as possible."

The administration had decided to "go to the mat" with Congress, as one White House official put it, because of the importance the administration attaches to Bahrain, which has become the logistical linchpin for the U.S. naval buildup in the gulf.

Technically, the White House does not need to submit an arms sale of less than \$14 million to Congress for approval. But the sale of the Stinger to Bahrain had generated so much opposition in Congress that the administration decided to negotiate an agreement anyway.

DeConcini regards the portable, 40-pound Stinger, which has proven to be a deadly weapon against Soviet aircraft in the hands of the U.S.-armed Afghan resistance, as the perfect terrorist weapon for shooting down civilian planes. Many pro-Israeli congressmen view the Stinger sale to Bahrain as an example of America's most sophisticated military technology being transferred to an Arab state.

Administration officials argued that Bahrain has become "a special friend" and that its role in the U.S. gulf buildup had made it especially vulnerable to Iranian threats. Bahrain, they said, had neither the time, money or training to fill the gap in its air defense system with U.S. Hawk, or other anti-aircraft missiles, and needed a quick fix immediately.

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נכנס

בלמס

חוזם: 12/13183

אל: המשרד

מ-: קומנהגן, נר: 87, תא: 181287, דח: 1320, דח: ב, ט: ג: ב

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
מאת: קומנהגן

הנושא: הקהיליה - מבגש התכבליט המדינאים

להלן נוסח הדועה לעתונות () PRESS STATEMENT שנמסרה
עתה לפרוטט ע"י היוררת הדנית:

SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

ON INSTRUCTION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE 12 MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE DANISH AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS BELGIAN AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMISSION, TODAY EXPRESSED TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THE DEEP CONCERN OF THE TWELVE ABOUT THE RAPIDLY AND SERIOUSLY DETERIORATING SITUATION ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP. THE TWELVE URGENTLY CALLED UPON THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE THE IMMEDIATE PROTECTION OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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חפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מככל, ממככל, ר/מרכז, רט, אהן, ממד, ליאור, מזתים,
אביטל, מעת, הסברה, אירא, אירב

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

** נכנס

שמור

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אל: ממ'ו טרב 1

זע: שגקהיר

מאת: אלי אבידן, רושנינגטון

מצרים

משיחה עם טרסיטה שוימרס (מצרים/NEA)

1. הסדר השלום החובות המצריים. שוימרס הסבירו, תוך הדגשה שההסכם עם ארה"ב חסוי (הפנתה אותנו למה הכלכלית) שהעקרון המנחה את הסודי החוב המצרי במסגרת 'מועדון פאריס' מפותח לכל המדינות בו. נקבע שההסדר יהיה ל-10 שנים עם תקופת חסד ל-5 שנים ושיקיף את החובות בתקופה שבין ינואר 87 ליוני 88. זהו סידור מיוחד למצרים שכן בזרן כלל מתייחסים לחקופה של עד ענה ואילו הפעם מזוור ב-18 חודשים כנ"ל.

2. העקרון השני שנקבע הוא של 'הסכם טל' דהיינו כל סוגי החובות אזרחי נצואי שמצרים אמורה היתה לפרוע בתקופה זו. החוב לארה"ב בתקופה זו עד כמה עזנור לה (העדיפה שלא להתחייב) נע בגבולות 800 מ' דולר, כולל מרכיב ה-FMS והוא גם הגדול ביותר בהשוואה לזה שחייבות ליתר חברי מועדון פאריס.

3. עקרון נוסף נודע לחישוב הריבית. העקרון שנתקבל ע"י מדינות 'מועדון פאריס' הוא שיש להבחין בין שני

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
FOR THE YEAR 1891
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACTS RELATIVE TO THE
LANDS BELONGING TO THE UNITED STATES

CONTENTS

GENERAL STATEMENT

LANDS BELONGING TO THE UNITED STATES

LANDS BELONGING TO THE STATES

LANDS BELONGING TO THE DISTRICTS

LANDS BELONGING TO THE TERRITORIES

1. STATE OF NEW YORK. The State of New York has a total area of 47,155 square miles, of which 46,800 square miles are under cultivation, and 355 square miles are in forest and timber. The State has a population of 4,500,000, and a total value of property of \$1,500,000,000. The State has a total area of 47,155 square miles, of which 46,800 square miles are under cultivation, and 355 square miles are in forest and timber. The State has a population of 4,500,000, and a total value of property of \$1,500,000,000.

2. STATE OF CALIFORNIA. The State of California has a total area of 158,337 square miles, of which 157,000 square miles are under cultivation, and 1,337 square miles are in forest and timber. The State has a population of 1,000,000, and a total value of property of \$1,000,000,000. The State has a total area of 158,337 square miles, of which 157,000 square miles are under cultivation, and 1,337 square miles are in forest and timber. The State has a population of 1,000,000, and a total value of property of \$1,000,000,000.

3. STATE OF TEXAS. The State of Texas has a total area of 695,621 square miles, of which 694,000 square miles are under cultivation, and 1,621 square miles are in forest and timber. The State has a population of 1,000,000, and a total value of property of \$1,000,000,000. The State has a total area of 695,621 square miles, of which 694,000 square miles are under cultivation, and 1,621 square miles are in forest and timber. The State has a population of 1,000,000, and a total value of property of \$1,000,000,000.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

טרגי ריבית. חובות שניתנו בריבית הנחה (CONCESSION RATE).

כגון זה ל- AID שניתן בריבית של 2 אחוז ימשיכו במסגרת ההסכם לשאת את אחר אחרז ואילו החובות שניתנו בריבית מסחרית או חובות במסגרת ה- FMS יחשבו מעתה ע"פ ריבית השוק הנהוגה בכל מדינה. פרוש המעשי הוא שהריבית הנכיל תוקטן בצורה משמעותית ותעמרו בגולות ה-3 אחוז, בתנודה לכאן או לכאן ע"פ המדינה השונות.

4. התשלומים המצרים יעשו בשתי צורות בתקופה של 18 חודש הם ישלמו אך ורק את הריבית על החובות בחקופה הנכיל ע"פ החישוב החזש ואילו לאחר מכן התשלומים יכללו גם את השלומי הקרן לרבות הריבית. פרוש הזבר שבתום המועד הנכיל החישוב יהיה ע"פ ריבית דריבית.

5. שוימרט מציינת שהמצרים למעשה יקנו זמני וחז לא שיאפשר להם מרווח נפישם בטרוח הקצר אך לא יונלו להימלט מהנבזה ככל שיחלוף הזמן. הטידור הנכיל הוא חד פעמי והיא אינה חושבת שניתן יהיה לחזור עליו פעם נוספת. המצרים מודעים לכך ולכן גם ההתבטאויות (למשל אבו גאזלה) שנושא ה- FMS טרם הוסדר. המוצא שבידי מצרים ע"מ לעמוד בתשלומים הגורמים הוא אחד מן הפניים (א) הגברת הייצוא המצרי וכן פעולות תקציביות זרסטריות שיכסו הפער הגדול שילך ויווצר בין יכולת התשלום המצרית לגובה החרו החיצוני. (ב) הכנסה ממקור חיצוני - סיוע ערבי. שוימרט פסימית באשר לשניהם שכן מדובר בסכום גבוה מאוד.

6. מצב זה מעלה את נושא הסיוע הערבי למצרים

שוימרט הסבירה שקיימת ציפיה מצרית גבוהה לסיוע מהמפרציות לאחר הידוש היחסים בעקבות פטגת עמאן. נושא זה כן מביחה ללא הסתכנות מיותרת יעמוד בשיחותיו של אבו גזלה בנווית ובמאע"ם וכן במגשים הבאים בין מצרים למדינות הנכיל. אין בידיה שום מידע בנידון שכן זהו נושא חסוי שהמצרים מעולם לא משוחחים עליו עם האמריקאים. קשה גם להטריך מידת ההשכנות הערבית והאם תצדיק ציפיה זו מעבר לקיים. מדגישה שגם אם הזבר יקרה קשה לעקוב אחר העגרות במסגרת זו. האמריקאים הגיעו למסקנה ע"פ נסיון העבר שכל חישוב הוא כמעט בלתי אפשרי. ודור להם למשל שאי אפשר להמנע מרישום מספר פעולות הנוגעות

Section 1. (a) All persons shall be equal in law. (b) It shall be the public policy of the United States to eliminate all forms of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (c) It is the purpose of this Act to enforce these principles and to prevent and to eliminate all forms of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2. (a) No person shall be denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (b) This section shall not apply to any business or enterprise which is exempt from Federal income taxation under section 513 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Section 3. (a) No person shall be denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (b) This section shall not apply to any business or enterprise which is exempt from Federal income taxation under section 513 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. (c) This section shall not apply to any business or enterprise which is exempt from Federal income taxation under section 513 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Section 4. (a) No person shall be denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (b) This section shall not apply to any business or enterprise which is exempt from Federal income taxation under section 513 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. (c) This section shall not apply to any business or enterprise which is exempt from Federal income taxation under section 513 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

למעשה לאותו תשלום/העברה שכן הוא מופיע בדי"כ בשלוש צורות אפשריות (א) תהליך האישור (ב) העברת הצ'ק (ג) ביצוע המעולה.

7. המר"מ עם מועדון פאריס' עדיין נמשך והמצרים לא נחפזים לסיימו. זהו הזגישה מר"מ מזדה"תי טיפוסי.

המצרים חוזרים ובודקים כל שלב מחכים לאישור ו/או הבהרות מהבית ורק אח"כ מאשרים. רגם זה לא תמיד עדיין טובי. במקביל ממשיך מעקב גורמי קרן המטבע הבינ"ל אחר ביצוע הסכם הרפורמות. מסתבר שגם תהליך זה לא פשוט נפי שנשמע. ההסכם היה על שקרונות אך חסר נתונים (FIGUERS) מדויקים. הקרן לוחצת לקיצוץ בטובסיוזיות אך המצרים משיקולים פוליטיים אינם מוכנים לכן המעדיפים העלאת מחירים (אנרגיה) אך לא באותה רמה שהקרן דורשת בקיצוץ הטובסיוזיות. מצב זה מאריך את המעקב מצד הקרן ומעכב הוצאת דו"ח ביניים מטעמה.

8. שאלתי לאן פני מצרים לאחר פסגת עמאן והאם צפויים תכנים חדשים ביחסים עם מדינות ערב מעבר לפורמליזציה שבחידוש. השיבה שיש פנים לכאן ולכאן. מחז ישנה ציפייה ספציפית מצד מדינה נכורית למעורבות יתר מצריה בנושא הגנת הספדף. היא מכירה בכך אך קשה לה להעלות על הדעת מעבר חרין מצד מצרים מעבר לסרמטרים של סיוע והזרחה צבאית. יש גם לזכור שיחסי מצרים ומדינות ערב הנזכרות לא החלו עם פיסגת עמאן ובמשך השנים הם מילאו גם תוכן רב כן שיש לצפות יותר לצד הפורמלי מאשר התכני. מאידך אין לה ספק שמצרים תרצה להחזיר לעצמה תפקיד הנהגת המחנה הערבי. נושאים המוגדרים כבעלי אופי נלוו ערבי יקבלו מעתה תשומת לב והזגשה מצד מצרים. הדור יתבטא בצד הרטורי של הצגת קו "לאומי" יותר. ברור לה שאם תהליך כזה יקרה ישראל כצד"ב תצטרכנה מעתה לעלם מחיר מסוים על חזרת מצרים לעולם הערבי, שלא לשכות הציפיות (והמחיר) המצריות לסיוע ערבי. היא מקווה שימצא איזון בין שני הפרמטרים שאפשר להיות עמו.

9. אין לה סיוע באשר למערכת המגעים שגורמים ערבים ובשיקר חוסיון מנהלים בקשר למצרים. גם לאזניה הגיעו שמועות על זיונים להקמת מפקדה צבאית להתערבות מהירה במפרץ (אגב רעיון יען של חסין במסגרת שה"פ הצבאי עם מצרים) אך היא מגדירה זאת כטרם זמנר (PREMATURE) ועוד חזון למועד. ביחוד באשר למעורבות כזו במפרץ.

THESE ARE THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE FBI ON THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE FBI CONCERNING THE ACTIVITY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

IT IS THE POLICY OF THE FBI TO ASSIST IN THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL MATTERS BY PROVIDING INFORMATION TO THE PROSECUTOR WHERE NECESSARY.

ON APRIL 15, 1968, THE FBI RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS [REDACTED] AND STATED THAT HE HAD INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACTIVITY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE INDIVIDUAL STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY AN INDIVIDUAL WHO OFFERED HIM \$50,000 TO ASSIST IN THE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE FBI CONCERNING THE ACTIVITY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

THE FBI IMMEDIATELY CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MATTER AND DETERMINED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO MADE THE TELEPHONE CALL WAS [REDACTED] AND THAT HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY AN INDIVIDUAL WHO OFFERED HIM \$50,000 TO ASSIST IN THE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE FBI CONCERNING THE ACTIVITY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE FBI DETERMINED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO OFFERED THE \$50,000 WAS [REDACTED] AND THAT HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY AN INDIVIDUAL WHO OFFERED HIM \$50,000 TO ASSIST IN THE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE FBI CONCERNING THE ACTIVITY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

THE FBI HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO OFFERED THE \$50,000 IS [REDACTED] AND THAT HE IS CURRENTLY AT LARGE. THE FBI IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MATTER AND IS REQUESTING YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THE MATTER.

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

באשר לסוריה ידוע לה על מגעים בדרג נמוך (לא מרטה)
אך הכדור הוא בידי אסד. ידועים לו תנאי מצרים המוכנה
להתפייסות על בסיס הקיים, דהיינו כשלמצרים יש הסכס
שלוס עם ישראל. מפקקת אם אסד יעשה צעד משמעותי
לעבר מובארן ממנו יתקול פרש שסוריה מוכנה להשלים
עם מצב של הסכס נפרד עם ישראל. הדגישה שזו בגדר דעה
מרטית שכן אינה רואה עצמה כמומחית לסוריה.

אלי אבידן .

תפ: שהח, דהח, שהוט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ליאור, מצרים,
בירן, מצפא, מינרבי, כלכליתא¹

DATE: 10/15/54
TO: SAC, NEW YORK
FROM: SAC, PHOENIX
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

17

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 1800 17 בדצמ' 87

מס' מברק

497

חמשרד

אל: מצפ"א

קונגרס - ה - CR

(1) היום הסתיים הקונפרנס בין נציגי שני הבתים (לאחר שוועדות המשנה השלימו את מלאכתן). *במשנת 1987*
 הצעת החלטת ההמשך (ה-CR), ועתה העוזרים עובדים על הניסוחים הסופיים של ההחלטה (לדוגמא, עדיין אין טקסט נקי של החקיקה בנושא הורדת הריבית על חובות ה-FMS כפי שהתקבלה אתמול בלילה (יום ליום ה'), ואם כי נאמר לנו שעניין המו"פ המשותף עבר, עדיין עובדים על המספרים בתקציב ההגנה וייתכן שלא (א לא) יוקצה מלוא ה-15 מליון דולר למו"פ משותף עם בנות ברית גדולות שאינן חברות בנאטו).

(2) בכל מקרה, התחזית היא שההחלטה תידון במליאת הבית והסנט מחר-מחרתיים. תוך תקווה לסיים את כל התהליך שבת ה-19 לכל המאוחר.

(3) לדברי עוזרים שהשתתפו בקונפרנס, הסיכומים בהחלטה תואמים את ההסכם העקרוני שהושג "בפיסגה התקציבית" ולכן סביר להניח שהנישא יחתום על ה-CR, אלא אם יוכנסו לה יסודות מדיניים (למשל ביחס לסיוע לקונטרס) שאינם מקובלים על הממשל.

למדן
 למדן

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מסלול תשמ"ח
משרד החוץ
ירושלים

אפק

כו' בכסלו תשמ"ח
17 בדצמבר 1987
53

על : ראשי הנציגויות

מאת: ידוע שה"ח לענייני התפוצות

הנדון : החלטת האו"ם 3379 - עמדתו של בריאן אורקהארט

1. במסגרת מאמצינו לגייס תמיכה של מדינות בעד ביטול ההחלטה על המשוואה ציונות-גזענות, אני מביא להלן עמדה בנדון של BRIAN URQUHART, סגן-מזכ"ל האו"ם, כפי שהובאה ב"בוסטון גלוב" מן ה-9/11/87:

URQUHART UNDERSTANDS THE DIM VIEW AMERICANS TEND TO TAKE OF THE UN. HE SEES THE TURNING POINT AS 1975 WHEN, LED BY NEARLY ALL THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, THE UN APPROVED A RESOLUTION EQUATING ZIONISM WITH RACISM. "I THINK IT WAS THE STUPIDEST THING ANYBODY EVER DID IN THE UN," URQUHART SAID. "IT SEEMED TO ME TO BE AN ABSOLUTELY MINDLESS PIECE OF PROVOCATION, AND DID NOTHING FOR THE PALESTINIANS, WHO WERE SUPPOSED TO BE THE RECIPIENTS OF THE GOODWILL".

2. נדמה לי שעדותו של מדינאי בריטי זה שהיה עד הזמן האחרון מבכירי הפקידים באו"ם, יכולה לשרת את טיעונינו דהיינו, ש-3379 לא רק עשתה עוול נורא לציונות ולעם היהודי, אלא פיחתה יותר מכל ענין אחר את דמותו, תדמיתו ומעמדו של האו"ם. ידוע לנו שהמזכ"ל חאבייר פרז דה-קוויאר שותף להערכה זו.

בברכה,

גדעון תדמור

העתק : לשכת נשיא המדינה

לשכת שה"ח

לשכת המנכ"ל

לשכת המנכ"ל המדיני

מר עוזי נרקיס, הסברה/הסוה"י

מר מ. מלמד, מנהל ארבל 2

אגפי ומחלקות המשרד

P722

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 5 דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 16:00 17 דצמ' 87

מס' מברק

המשרד

491

1/5

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מנכ"ל האוצר

קונגרס: סיוע חוץ ופריסת חובות

אנפולא זילה

1. הקונפרנס בהשחתות חברי ועדות המשנה בשני הבתים נמשך עד השעות הקטנות של ליל אמש, ולפחות שאלה קשה אחת - מימון לקונטרס (הסנט בעד, הבית לא) ממתינה לפתרונה עד היום.

2. שני היו"רים של ועדות המשנה, אינונה ואובי, נפגשו אתמול בבוקר במטרה לצמצם את מספר הנושאים השנויים במחלוקת שיוותרו לקונפרנס. כך לדוגמא, נושא פריסת החובות טובם ביניהם במהלך אותה פגישה נבקונפרנס לא נותר אלא לברך על המוגמר: הגרסה הגעה בטופו של דבר (מצורפת) ולפיה ישראל ומצרים יזכו לתנאי גירסת הסנט, ולמדינות אחרות (שיצאו זוכות מן ההפקר - התנגדותו הממושכת של אובי מלכתחילה, מאמציו להתביע את חותמו על החקיקה כאשר התברר לו שאין מנוס ממנה) תחיה אפשרות ל- buy down. דברי אובי תרגועים היו בגדר העלמה עם הצורך בחקיקה נהמציאנת החדשה.

3. ענד במהלך תדינו העלה המורשה בנוב מרזק (דמי מניג ינרק לבקשת לארי סמית) הצעה שתפסול את הפשרה בגרסת הסנט לגבי סטינגרים לבחריין. אחרי דיון קצר (וחרבותי) נבו, בין היתר, אינונה אמר שאינו מאמין שמדובר באיום לישראל, חובסה הצעת מרזק בששה מול שלנשה (מרזק, ביל גריי, ביל להמן). והפשרה (מספר מצומצם של טילים למשך 18 חודש) בעינה ענמדת.

4. נושאים אחרים הנוגעים לנו, כגון רמת הסינע (שהיתה מנסכמת מלכתחילה) לא הובאו לדינו. הדינו, שהיה פתוח בתחילתו, נסגר בשלב נו דובר על תיקונים הנוגעים למדינות, וכאמור נמשך שעות ארוכות. על השבילי (פידט) ג'נרל.

טובה הרצל
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(a) Refinancing. -- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized during FY 1988, FY 1989, FY 1990, and FY 1991 to transfer existing United States guaranties of outstanding Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit debt, or, to issue new guaranties, either of which would be applied to loans, bonds, notes or other obligations made or issued (as the case may be) by private United States financial institutions (the private lender) to finance the prepayment at par of the principal amounts maturing after September 30, 1989 of existing FMS loans bearing interest rates of ten percent or higher, and arrearages thereon. The loans, bonds, notes or other obligations are hereinafter referred to as the "private loan";

Provided, That such guaranties which are transferred or extended cover no more or no less than ninety percent of the private loan or any portion or derivative thereof plus unpaid accrued interest and arrearages, if any, outstanding at the time of guaranty transfer or extension;

Provided further, That the total amount of the guaranty of the private loan cannot exceed ninety percent of the outstanding principal, unpaid accrued interest and arrearages, if any, at any time;

Provided further, That of the total amount of the private loan, the ninety percent guaranteed portion of the private loan cannot be separated from the private loan at any time;

Provided further, That no sums in addition to the payment of the outstanding principal amounts maturing after September 30, 1989 of the loan (or advance), plus unpaid accrued interest thereon, and arrearages, if any, shall be charged by the private lender or the Federal Financing Bank as a result of such prepayment against the borrower, the Guarantor, or the Guaranty Reserve Fund (GRF), except that the private lender may include, in the interest rate charged, a standard fee to cover costs, such fee which will be set at prevailing market rates, and no guaranty fee shall be charged on guaranties transferred or issued pursuant to this provision;

Provided further, That the terms of guaranties transferred or issued under this section shall be exactly the same as the existing loans or guaranties, except as modified by the provision and including but not limited to the final maturity and principal and interest payment structure of the existing loans which shall not be altered, except that the repayments of the private loan issued debt may be consolidated into two payments per year;

Provided further, That the private loan or guaranties transferred or issued pursuant to this section shall be fully and freely transferable, except that any guaranty transferred or extended shall cease to be effective if the private loan or any derivative thereof is to be used to provide significant support for any non-registered obligation;

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Provided further, That for purposes of section 23 and 24 of the AECA, the term "defense services" shall be deemed to include the refinancing of FMS debt outstanding at the date of the enactment of this section;

Provided further, That not later than ninety days after the enactment of this section, the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) shall issue regulations to carry out the purposes of this section and that in issuing such regulations, the Secretary shall (1) facilitate the prepayment of loans and loan advances hereunder; (2) provide for full processing of each application within thirty days of its subsection 24(a) of the AECA, as amended, impose no restriction that increases the cost to borrowers of obtaining private financing for prepayment hereunder or that inhibits the ability of the borrower to enter into prepayment arrangements hereunder;

Provided further, That the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate, a copy of the text of any agreement entered into pursuant to this section not more than thirty days after its entry into force, together with a description of the transaction.

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(b) Interest Rate Reduction. -- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, there is hereby appropriated such sums as may be necessary but not more than \$270,000,000, to be made available after October 1, 1988 to the Secretary of Defense for the Defense Security Assistance Agency for deposit into a new account, to remain available until expended:

Provided, That the funds shall be used solely for the purpose of lowering the interest rate on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits which were financed through the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) for countries which do not refinance one or more FFB loans pursuant to paragraph (a) and which loans have interest rates exceeding ten percent, down to an interest rate of ten percent for the remaining life of such loans;

Provided further, That these funds shall be available only subject to a Presidential budget request;

Provided further, That it is the intent of the Congress that the funds shall be available to all countries having FMS credits from the FFB that carry interest rates in excess of ten percent.

(c) Arrearages. -- (1) None of the funds provided pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (relating to Foreign Military Sales credits) or pursuant to Chapter 2 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act (relating to the Military Assistance Program) shall be made available to any country for which one or more loans is refinanced pursuant to paragraph (a) and which is in default for a period in excess of ninety days in payment of principal or interest on (A) any loan made to such country guaranteed by the United States pursuant to paragraph (a) and (B) any other loan issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act outstanding on the date of enactment of this provision.

(2) In conjunction with any interest rate reduction pursuant to the authority provided in paragraph (b), the President shall require the country to commit in writing that within two years of the effective date of the interest rate reduction it will be no more than 90 days in arrears on the repayment of principal and interest on all loans for which the interest rate is thus reduced and will remain no more than 90 days in arrears for the remaining life of all such loans. None of the funds provided pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act or Chapter 2 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act shall be made available to any country during any period in which it fails to comply with such commitment.


(d) Purposes and Reports. -- This authority may be utilized by the President in efforts to negotiate base rights and base access agreements, and for other bilateral foreign policy matters; Provided further, That the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of



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the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate a report detailing the United States financial and foreign policy purposes served by implementation of this authority on a country by country basis not later than March 1, 1989, and a second report not later than August 1, 1989.



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דף _____ מתוך _____ דפים
 סיווג בטחוני : שמור
 דחיפות : מיידית
 } לשימוש
 } מח' הקשר
 תאריך וזמן רישום: _____
 מס. מברק : _____

אל : השגריר, וושי

1019
16154

להלן מכתב ברכה מרה"מ למזכיר המדינה. אנא העבירו אותו מיד לתעודתו.

(קשר - אנא הרצ"ב)

השולח : אריה מקל, לשכת הרה"מ אריה מקל
 אישור מנהל מחלקה : _____
 אישור לשכת המנכ"ל : א.א.
 תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) : _____
 (לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר) : _____
 16.12.87

לשימוש הקשר בלבד

התפוצה : _____
 הנושא : _____
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ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

1019 2/2
Jerusalem December 16, 1987.

Dear George,

Belatedly I extend hearty congratulations to you on your birthday and wish you continued good health, strength and further achievements. The past year ended on a high note of success in the Summit talks, to which you contributed so much in perception and preparation. We join you in the hope that further progress will be achieved towards making our world more secure and peaceful.

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir

Mr. George Shultz
Secretary of State
State Department
WASHINGTON DC
U S A

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף 1 מחוד 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מידי

תאריך/ז"ח 0930 16 בדצמ' 7

מס' מברק

414

המשרד

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני

מנהל מצפ"א

גארי הארט

רוב ראשי המפלגה הדמוקרטית, הפרשנים כותבי מאמרי המערכת והמומחים קבלו בקרירות רבה את חזרת הארט למרוץ. הרוב סבורים כי הוא לא יצליח, אך יפגע עוד יותר בסיכויי המפלגה הדמוקרטית. רק מעוט סבור שאף כי לא יצליח הרי יעורר עניין במרוץ המוקדם ויאפשר אחד משניים - או שאחד המועמדים הקיימים יביטו באיובה וניו-המפשייר ועל-ידי כך יופיע כמועמד מוביל רציני או שחדבר ייצור לחץ על מועמד נוסף להכנס למרוץ כדי להציל את המפלגה הדמוקרטית - קומו או ברדליי. היחיד המביע תמיכה בצעדו של גארי הארט הוא בעל הטור ביל ספייר"בניו-יורק טיימס".

במשאל מידי שערך העתון "USA TODAY", מכלל הנשאלים 43% סבורים כי טוב עשה הארט שחזר למרוץ ו-41% שללו את צעדו.

מבין הדמוקרטים שנשאלו 29% תומכים בהארט, 15% בדוקקיס, 12% בג'קסון, 6% בג'הארדט, 6% בסימון, 5% בגור, 1% בבאביט, לא יודעים במי לבחור 12%, אלה שאינם מרוצים מאף אחד 10 אחוזים.

במשאל שנערך לפני פרישתו מן המרוץ זכה הארט בתמיכה של 41%. במשאל טלפוני בניו-המפשייר בלבד יוצא הארט במקום השני, אולם דוקקיס היוצא במקום הראשון מאבד תמיכה רבה להארט, בעוד ששאר המועמדים סימון, ג'הארדט וג'קסון כמעט ולא משנים את אחוזי התמיכה בהם.

ידידים יהודים שתמכו בהארט לפני פרישתו עדיין אינם ממהרים לחזור למחנהו, והם ממחינים לראות כיצד יעבור הגל הראשון של תגובות.

דני בלור

Handwritten notes and numbers at the bottom of the page, including "2", "1", "3", "3", "2" and some illegible text.

ס ו פ ס מ ב ד ק

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

33

דף מחזור ון זעים

סוג בטחוני שמור

המשרד, ניו יורק

445 99

דיון
בהול

1/2

אל: ארבייל 2, נאו"מ

מועבייט - שיחת הציר עם דג'ריג'יאן

לבקשתכם התקבל הציר עם הח"מ אצל דג'ריג'יאן בהעדרו של מרפי. הציר פרט אחת לאחת טעוננו כבשלכם וציין ששהבייט בשיחותיו כאן (שדג'ריג'יאן נכח בהן) תאר המצב והלך הרוחות אחרי פסגת עמאן ונטיבות אשיף וידידיו להסיט תשומת הלב מהמפרץ על ידי קיום הארועים בישיע והבאת הדיון למועבייט. אין מקום לבדוק נוסחים כי הערבים עשויים לגלות "נדיבות" כביכול ולוותר על משפט זה או אחר ובלבד שיעבירו החלטה. אין, איפוא, מקום מצידנו להכנס לויכוח על נוסחים ולשובות החלטה, אלא, על פי הנחיות ירושלים מבקשים שארה"ב תטיל וטו.

דג'ריג'יאן, ציין שעמדתם נאמרה בגלוי, הם מודאגים מהמצב, מאובדן חיים וכי על ישראל לפעול למנוע תקריות שמביאות שצבא ומשטרה משתמשים בכוח קטלני (Lethal force) כן ארה"ב מתנגדת לעונשים קולקטיביים, אטימות בתים וגרושים. גם בשנה שעברה נמנעה ארה"ב בנסיבות דומות. עתה המצב הדרדר. ארה"ב מעיינת בטיוטה ותחליט לפי המצב. כרגע אין ארה"ב יכולה לומר כיצד תצביע. דג'ריג'יאן אמר שיעביר בקשת ישראל לוטו לדרגים הגבוהים, אך עמדתם תהיה עפ"י הנוסח.

הציר שב וציין שאי אפשר לקשור האחד לשני. שהבייט הדגיש שישראל פועלת במסגרת החוק ואין קשר בין הדרך שבה פועלת ישראל לאי-הסדרים הקיימים. דג'ריג'יאן שב ואמר שבשנה האחרונה היחת חדרדרות. אמנם מעשי הטרור ירדו אך מספר המהומות הפוליטיות עלה. וזו דאגה רצינית, חסכסוך הישראלי - ערבי יישאר עיקר על אף שהדאגה עכשיו היא המפרץ.

הציר אמר שזו תהיה נסיגה עם יינתן לאשיף ותומכיו נצחון על ידי החלטה במועבייט. אשיף מחפשים זאת להטטת תשומת הלב מהמפרץ. זה אינטרס של ארה"ב ושל ישראל, כל אחת מטעמה, לא לחת יד לכך.

1 1 2 2 3 3
ס'אלה אשיף 2 ס'אלה אשיף 3 ס'אלה אשיף 3
1 1 1 1 4 4 4 1
ס'אלה אשיף 1 ס'אלה אשיף 1 ס'אלה אשיף 1 ס'אלה אשיף 1

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ד 97 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיסות


תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

99/445 $\frac{2}{2}$

דג'ריג'יאן הסכים שאין עניין להעניק נצחון לצד שהוא אך התקריות זוכות לכיסוי נרחב
ורמת האלימות מדאיגה.
לשאלת הציר מתי חוכרע עמדתם ענה דג'ריג'יאן שהדבר תלוי בטיוטות.
עד כאן.

כפי שהודעתי טלפונית לניו יורק, עוד ביום ב', העלה השגריר הנושא עם ארמקוסט בעת
הפגישה עם שהב"ט וארמקוסט שאל את דג'ריג'יאן שאמר שאין בידיהם הנוסח.



מתני

11967

תאריך : 12.87. **משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר**

נכנס

בלמש

חזט: 12,11967

אל: המשרד

מ-: בני, נר: 522, תא: 161287, חז: 1600, דח: מ, טג: ב

נד: 8

בלמש/מידוי

אל-: מעת

דע-: מצמא, דושונגטון (נר 100)

טאת: עתדנזה/נירו יררע

חלק א. התשן יבוא.

NEWS SUMMARY

DECEMBER 16, 1987

EDITORIALS-

NYT, REAGAN SEEMS TO BE SABOTAGING THE SUMMIT BY MISREPRESENTING HIS CONVERSATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND STAR WARS AND BY FAILING TO MENTION HIS KNOWLEDGE OF NEW SOVIET MILITARY AID TO NICARAGUA. THIS ENDANGERS THE GAINS OF THE SUMMIT.

DN- CHANUKAH IS ABOUT HOLDING BACK EVIL, PERSECUTION AND DESPAIR. NON-JEWS SHOULD THANK JEWS FOR THE REMINDER.

OP-ED-

NYT, BAKER, HUMOROUS COLUMN ABOUT SUMMIT TRIVIA REDUNDANT COLUMNISTS AND LONG WINDINESS.

WSJ, MORRIS ABRAM, THE SOVIETS HAVE PLEDGED TO UPHOLD

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

THE RIGHT TO EMMIGRATE IN THREE INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
SO MANKIND OR REAGAN HAS THE +MORAL RIGHT..TO
BE THE TEACHER+, OR PROSECUTOR, OR JUDGE OF SOVIET
FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO THE PLEDGES. SOVIET LAWS ARE
BECOMING MORE RESTRICTIVE FOR JEWS AND DEMONSTRATIONS
WERE ROUGHLY BROKEN UP. THE TIDE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CANNOT BE STOPPED.

DN, GORBACHEV GAVE V.P. BUSH A BIG BOOST AS A RESULT
OF THEIR SUMMIT CONTACTS. IT MAY NOT LAST IF THINGS
GO SOUR.

PRESS REPORTS-

NYT, KIFNER, VIOLENCE AND RIOTING WORSENER TODAY
MOSTLY IN GAZA. YOUTHS TAUNTED AND DARED ISRAELI
TROPS IN FRONT OF A GAZA HOSPITAL. FOUR-SIX
PALESTINIANS WERE KILLED. MOBS WERE RIOTING WILDLY
AND REFORMING AFTER THE ARMY SCATTERED THEM. WOMEN
IN HEAD SCARVES GATHERED ROCKS FOR THROWING. WESTERN
JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING THIS REPORTER, HAVE BEEN
BEATEN OR WOUNDED. THE ARMY IS FRUSTRATED AND HAS
DONE SOME THINGS WHICH CAN ONLY INCREASE HATRED.
(DN, ND, NYP (PHOTO ONLY))

NYT, THE US CALLS FOR ISRAELI RESTRAINT IN HANDLING
DISORDERS.

ND, KATZ, + IN GAZA CITY, A HOSPITAL OF HORROR+
THERE IS BLOOD AND WOUNDED ALL OVER THE PLACE.
EMERGENCY ROOMS ARE WORKING OVERTIME. PEOPLE DEAD
AND WOUNDED FROM GUNSHOTS ABOUND. EARLIER, SOLDIERS
STORMED THE HOSPITAL. WITH HELICOPTERS DROPPING
TEAR GAS, THE SOLDIERS, ARMED WITH GUNS AND TRUNCHONS
BEAT THE PROTESTERS ACCORDING TO WITNESSES. A
PIOUS HEAD SCARFED NURSE SHOWED A BRUISE FROM A
BEATING.

NYT, HIJAZI, + ISRAELIS IN TANKS AND HELICOPTERS
RAID GUERRILLA BASES IN LEBANON.+ TROOPS RAIDED
VILLAGES AND HIDEOUTS NE OF THE +SECURITY ZONE.+
THEY REPORTEDLY CAPTURED 20 MEMBERS OF THE PARTY

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מחוך דפים

סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיסות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ת 140015 בדצמ' 87

מס' מברק

398

המשור

אל: מנכ"ל מדינה
מנהל מצפ"א


בחירות 88

גארי הארט: אין בחירות בלי הפתעות. גארי הארט הודיע היום בקונקורד, ניו-המפשייר כי הוא חוזר למערכת הבחירות לנשיאות, כדי להלחם על רעידת הקרקע. הוא מעדיף להפסיד מאשר ~~לפסיד~~ - אמר הארט ואמר כי אין לו כסף או מנגנון ~~ל~~ זה, אבל הוא מתכוון להלחם בכוח רעיונותיו.

התקשורת הגיבה תגובות ראשונות של הפתעה, אי-אמון וזלזול ביכולתו להשיג הישג מעשי. בחזרו למרוץ זכאי הארט למימון פדראלי של כמיליון דולר על סמך הכספים שאסף עד פרישתו מן המרוץ. נייטקן שיוכל להשתמש בכסף זה גם לפרעון חובותיו מן העבר. יש להניח, כי אם יוצא בתוצאה טובה באיובה ובניגוד-המפשייר יתחילו מחדש לזרום אליו כספי תרומות שיאפשרו לו להמשיך את המערכה. עד לתחילת מרץ מתוכננים עוד שנים עשר עימותים פומביים או טלוויזיוניים שבהם יחא זכאי להופיע.

בשיחה ראשונה עט אחד מידידיו של הארט הוא מטביר כי חלה מאמין ביכולתו, שכן רוב חצבור הדמוקרטי אינו מרוצה מאף אחד מן המועמדים. הארט הוביל במשאלים עד פרישתו, ולהערכתו פלישת דונה רייס נשכחה במידה מספקת כך שלא תשפיע על סיכוייו לצאת בעזרה מכובדת מן המדינות הראשונות.

הערכות נוספות על השפעת כניסתו המחודשת של הארט נבריק בהמשך השבוע.


דני בלור

שהי 2
רהג 3
גנא 3
גאנא 1
ביין גלבו 1
האדיכס 2
גאג 4

ירצא

בלמס

הרזם: 12,10677

אל: 464/רוש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 151287, זח: 1653, דח: ר, סג: ב

נד: @

בלמס/רגיל

אל: רושינגטון

צמי לביקור וולטרס בסוריה ומרפי בלבנון

עפ"י העתון *אלביאור אלטיאסי* (ירושלים, 12.12):

א. נציג ארה"ב באו"ם, וירנין וולטרס, יבקר בסוריה בקרוב כדי לקיים שיחות עם האחראים הסוריים להידוק היחסים הביולטראליים ולדון עמם במאפייני שה"פ בין סוריה לארה"ב.

ב. עוזר שר החוץ האמריקני לענייני המזה"ת, ריצ'רד מרפי, יבקר בלבנון כדי לדון עם האחראים הלבנוניים בדרכים למתרון הבטיחה הלבנונית.

עד כאן.

מרכז/סוריה-לבנון.

מא

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, ממנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממז, בירן, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל, ליאור, מזתים, לורנני

FORME וילי ושות' בע"מ, תל אביב 1986

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF TEXAS
AUG 14 1900

STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF DALLAS

JOHN W. WALKER, Plaintiff

vs.

THE TEXAS RAILROAD AND MECHANICAL COMPANY, Defendant

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and files this petition for judgment against the Defendant, and asks the court to grant judgment in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of \$10,000.00, with interest thereon from the date of the filing of this petition until paid.

AT TEST:

JOHN W. WALKER

Plaintiff

WITNESSED my hand and seal of office this 14th day of August, 1900.

JOHN W. WALKER, Attorney at Law

שמו

ירצא **

**

**

**

הרזם: 12,10673

אל: דודש/462

מ-: המשרד, תא: 151287, דח: 1639, דח: מ, טג: ש

נד: 2

שמו / מיידי

ע.ב.ש. 1896

ערן, מתני, אבידן

הפסגה

סאליבן משגארה"ב בקר במחלקה אתמול ומסר דיווח על פסגת רייגן-גורבאצ'וב. העלה נושאים הבאים:

א. זכויות אדם - הנושא נדון במשך 12 שעות בכל דרגי השיחות. רואים נכונות סובייטית גוברת לדון בנושא וסעיפיו השונים: הגירה, דיון במקרים ספצימיים, ברשימות, דיון על החוקים הסובייטים הנוגעים לענין, חופש דת, המתרחש במוסדות פסיכיאטריים, עיכוב יציאה "מסיבות בטחוניות". האמריקנים שמו לב לגדול במספר היוצאים מקרב המיעוט הגרמני והארמני, עליה מתונה יותר ביציאת יהודים. מעבר לנכונות לדון, הסובייטים ממשיכים להפגין קו קשה המפשיר, אם בכלל, באיטיות רבה.

ב. אמגניסטאן - ארה"ב הדגישה כי נסיגה חייבת להיות המפתח לכל התפתחות חיובית. בריהמ" קבעה LINKAGE בין נסיגה (שתבצע במשך שנה) להפסקת משלוחי נשק למורדים. לא הועלו רעיונות חדשים.

ג. מפרץ - הסובייטים מודים בכך שאיראן מתחמקת מביצוע החלטת מועבי"ט 598 בעוד שעיראק מקבלת ההחלטה. הצעתם להקמת כוח אומ" במפרץ נדחתה ע"י ארה"ב. יש אינדיקציות שבריהמ" תסכים להצטרף לייזום החלטת המשך במועבי"ט.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ד. מז"ית - הנושא נדון בקצרה בין שני המנהיגים וכן בקבוצת העבודה הנמוכה בהתאם לקוי הדיווח שלכם. בשגרירות ארה"ב ממתינים לדיווח על מגישת מרמי-מרס.

ה. START - INF - התחילו לדון במטרות ראשונים לקראת שיחות יותר מפורטות בנושא START. האמריקנים רואים הטבת שכזה כ-PROBABLE, בנתיים לא כ-POSSIBLE.

ו. נושאים אחרים שהזכיר: SDI, נשק כימי, נשק קונבציונלי, אין חידושים מעבר להודעות הרשמיות.

ככלל משתקף מהדיווח הרושם שההשג העיקרי טמון בחתימת INF והאווירה הטובה שתסייע לחידוק האמון בין שני הצדדים בתקורה שזה ימשין להניב פירות גם בעתיד בשטחים נוספים.

מצפ"א

מ/א

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רט, אמנ, ממד, בירן, מצפא, אירג

1. THE - ...

2. THE - ...

3. THE - ...

4. THE - ...

5. THE - ...

THE ...

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 1030 14 בדצמ' 87

337

המשרד

מס' מברק


אל: מנכ"ל מדינה. מנחל מצפ"א

בחירות 88

רוברטסון.

פט רוברטסון רואיין אתמול בסדויה של מרויין קאלב. בתשובה לשאלות המראיין אמר
 כי כנראה ^{יקא} מחוייב לתמיכה מנחלת בישראל, המעוז היחיד של הדמוקרטיה במזרח
 התיכון ובה הברית הנאמנה של ארה"ב. הוא אמר כי במיוחד יש להגן על ישראל מפני
 סכנה של מתקפה סובייטית, ישירה או עקיפה, וכי הוא מתנגד לרעיון הועידה
 הבינלאומית של פרס, בשל האלמנט של המעורבות הסובייטית. לעומת זאת הוא תומך
 בקו של ראש הממשלה שמיר בעד שיחות ישירות או ועידה אזורית ואם יבקר לנשיא, הוא
 ישגר הזמנות למנהיגי ישראל, ג'רדון, מצרים וסוריה לבוא ולהוועד בווישינגטון.

כאשר לתוצאות הפסגה אמר רוברטסון כי הוא יתחיל להאמין ברצינות כוונותיהם של
 הסובייטים רק כאשר יפתחו את השערים ויאפשרו למספר ניכר של יהודים לעלות לישראל.


 דני בלור

שהי 2
 רהג 3
 גנא 3
 ג'ונא 1
 ג'יק 1
 ג'לסו 2
 י/ג'יכ 1
 ג'ג 4

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ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך דפים

סוג בסחונני גלוי

דחיפות מידי

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המשיך

תאריך/ז"ח 15:30 14 דצמ'

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א

סנט: קונפרנס

בתום הדיון על החלטת ההמשך (דיוח בנפרד) מינה הסנט את נציגיו לקונפרנס כלהלן:-

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למוד

Page 517924

Senate insisted on its amendments, requested a conference with the House thereon, and appointed as conferees Senators Stennis, Byrd, Proxmire, Inouye, Hollings, Chiles, Johnston, Burdick, Leahy, Sasser, DeConcini, Bumpers, Lautenberg, Harkin, Mikulski, Reid, Hatfield, Stevens, Weicker, McClure, Garn, Cochran, Kasten, D'Amato, Rudman, Specter, Domenici, Grassley, and Nickles.

Page 517924

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סווג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות רגיל

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המשרד

תאריך/ז"ח 1330 14 בדצמ' 87

מס' מברק

אל: ממ"ד/ערב 1

מאת: הציר-יועץ, וושינגטון

משיחה עם הסן איברהים, ציר בשגרירות מצרים

1. הפסגה בווינגטון. מבראכ שלח שדרים למזכ"ל ולנשיא ערב הפסגה. בשדר שני חלקים כללי-שבחים לחתימת הסכם ה-INF ורצעים נוספים להפגת המתיחות בעולם. בחלקה השני המרצת המנהיגים לדון ולקדם נושאים אזוריים תוך מתייחסות להסדר נכשא המזה"ת (והמפרץ) באמצעות נעידה בין"ל שתשמש מסגרת למו"מ ישיר בין הצדדים.
2. פסגת עמאן. מצרים רואה כמובן את ההישג המרכזי של הפסגה בחידוש היחסים עם מדינות ערב השמרניות (ממקור אחר שמענו שתוניסיה עתה יתא, על כך בנפרד). שביעות הרצון המצרית היא בכך שהעולם הערבי צעד לעבר מצרים ושחזונו של מבראכ שהעולם הערבי דאמץ את מצרים בחזרה ללא תנאי ווסכין לקיומו של חוזה שלום מצרי-ישראלי התגשם במלאו. הערכה המצרית היא שבועידת הפסגה הרגילה הבאה תאשר שובה של מצרים לליגה, דהיונו חידוש היחסים יקבל גושפנקא פורמלית.

3. מפרץ. סוגיה זו נחשבת כהישג שני של הפסגה. לשאלה מצדי השיב שיש לתבחין בין שני תחומים (א) המפרץ בהיבט האסטי של מצרים. (ב) ההתייחסות למלחמת איראן-עיראק. בתחום הראשון הוא לא מעריך שמדיניות מצרים כלפי אזור חיוני זה תשתנה בעקבות פסגת עמאן. מדגיש שגם לפנייה מצרים קיימה קשרים אמיצים בתחומים רבים עם המדינות שס, קשרים שלא נותקו מאז חתימת הסכם השלום עם ישראל - "חלקם מעל לשולחן וחלקם מתחתיו". קשרים אלה בתחום המדיני, תרבותי וכלכלי ימשכו ללא שינוי דרמטי. באשר לתחום השני מצרים תענה לפנייה במידה ויגיעו אליה בדבר סיוע צבאי-טכני כגון משלוחי נשק - לאור התקדים של משלוחי נשק לעיראק - יועצים ומדריכים וכד'. אין לפי מיטב ידיעתו כל כוונה למעורבות מצרית צבאית ישירה. "אין להעלות על הדעת שיגור חיילים מצרים לשדה המערכה". נסיון העבר הוא שלילי לחלוטין ומצרים לא תחזור עליו.

שהיה רהג שהכנס גנא גאנא [אין] גלייה יאליכא גאג רה ולי 11/2

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף מחוד דפים

סווג בסחונני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

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הקשיתי כגון פניה כותית בעקבות תוקפנות איראנית, על כך השיב שמצדדים תתייחס לכל מצב נתון לאור קווי מדיניותה הנ"ל.


4. אש"פ. לשאלתי בעניין פתיחת המשרדים, הפנה תשומת הלב דוקא לעובדה שלראשונה מאז חתימת הסכם השלום עם ישראל הפלס' הניפו דגל על בניין המשרדים שלהם בקהיר. המשיך שיש לזכור שני דברים (א) מצרים מעולם לא הסירה הכרתה באש"פ (ב) הצעדים שנקטה - סגירת משרדקם - נאו בתגובה לחתקפות עליה בכנס המל"פ באלג'יריה. נציגי אש"פ לא גורשו מקהיר, הם המשיכו להתגורר שם ולקיים מגעים, אם כי בדרגי ממשל מצרי נמוכים. בעמאן קרו שני דברים: ערפאת התנצל על התקרית באלג'יר, הצטרפותו של אש"פ להחלטה בעניין מצרים. אח"כ בא עניין הנפת הדגל. איברהים מסכם מסכת זו בכך שאש"פ אימץ כאחרים, בעקיפין את המצב שבין מצרים וישראל קיים חוזה שלום ונתן לכך ביטוי סימבולי מאד בהנפת הדגל הפלס' על משרדיו בקהיר לצד הדגל הישראלי שם, דבר שנמנע מלעשות במשך כל השנים מאז חוזה הטלום, ביזמתו וללא כל התערבות מצרית.

5. סוריה. איברהים שולל את הידיעות על מגעים בין שתי המדינות. מדגיש שמאז המפגש בין שני הנשיאים בפסגה האיטלאמית בכווידת נוצר, למיטב ידיעתו מגע אחד נוסף והוא השתתפות מצרים במשחקי אגן היס התיכון שנערכו לא מכבר בלאצ'קיה.

6. ארה"ב. לא מתוכננים, עד כמה שידוע לו, ביקורי אישים מהשורה הראשונה בווינגטון בטרוח המייד, לא מודע לפרטים באשר להסכם לדחיית חובות עם ארה"ב וכך ההסכמים עם ערפת ספרד ורפ"ג הנחתם כימים אלה בקהיר.

אלי אבידן

.k.k



מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר
טורי

נכנס **
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חוזם: 12,11083

אל: המשרד

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נד: 8

רודי/מיוי לבוקר

אל: ממנכ"ל מדינני

ממנכ"ל צמ"א

יועץ מדינני לשה"ח

דע אורי טביר-ברזיליה (לעיניו בלבד)

שיחת ממרוה"מ ושה"ח עם מרפי (12.12 - בניו יורק)

4. מרפי פתח שדווח על הפסגה באומרו שהנושאים האזוריים לא הועלו בדרג המנהיגים.

1. אמגניסטאן. לא שמעו למעשה דבר חזש. הרגשתם של האמריקאים היתה שבטקורת נאומו של נג'יבללה בג'רג'יה היה מקום לצפיה לשינוי מהותי בעמדה הסובייטית ושגורבצ'וב יעשה את הצעד. בסופו של דבר הבהיר גורבצ'וב שבריה"מ מזכנה ומנס לטגת תוך 12 חודש אך תלה זאת בהשגת פיוס לאומי והאמריקאים אמרו שאם הנסיגה תלויה בכך שהפיוס הוא תהליך הרי שלא תהיה לעולם נסיגה. שה"ח שאל האם היה לינקג'י אצל הסובייטים בין נסיגה לבין הפסקת אספקת הנשק למוג'הידין ובענה על ידי מרפי שדובר על 12 חודשים אך לא נאמר מתי. הערכתו של מרפי היא שאחרי שהסובייטים יחליטו על יציאתם מאפגניסטאן זה יהיה עניינם שלהם לעשות זאת במהירות האפשרית על מנת לא לסבול אבדות מיותרות. האמריקאים מצפים שבשיחות בג'נבה במברואר יבואו הסובייטים עם הצעות קונקרטיות יותר. גורבצ'וב הוסיף מרפי, אמר ברגע מסוים שיש קשר בין איראן ואפגניסטאן היינו, שפעילות סובייטית כנגד

מחלקת הקשר

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

איראן עליו. לתרום להחלפת הפעילות של המוגהידון בהשראת טהרן. ארה"ב אמר מרמי המליצה בפני מוסקבה על הדברות ישירה עם פקיסטאן אך ההצעה נדחתה ולזאתו הסובייטים מעדיפים 'חלוקת עבודה' בין המעצמות כאשר כל אחת 'מטפלת' בבנות בריתה תוך כדי שהם מוקשים להוביח שהאמריקאים הם שאחראים להמשך הקונפליקט.

2. איראן - עיראק: - ארה"ב ממשיכה לדחוף החלטה שניה אחרי 598. לדעתה אמברגו הוא הצעד המעשי היחיד אך כיו לא יהיה לו אפקט מיידי. מזה 4 שנים שארה"ב דוחמת את נושא STAUNCH ולהערכתם זה חוטט כ-60-50 אחוז מהעסקות. בספטמבר הבין המזכיר מהסובייטים כאילו יהיו מוכנים למעול בכרוך החלטה שניה אך דבר לא קרה והאיראנים הצליחו בפעולות ההשגיה שלהם. משיחות הפיסגה ברור שהסובייטים לא שינו עמדתם.

העמדה האיראנית היא שהם יסכימו באופן בלתי פורמלי להמאיש אם יקום גוף בינלאומי שיחקור מיהו האחראי למלחמה ויקבלוה פורמלית כאשר ימצא האחראי. הנסיגה תעשה לפי עמדת האיראנים כאשר יוחלט על הפיצויים שעיראק חייבת להם בגין המלחמה.

מרמי אמר שבגש אמ פרימקוב פעמים לפני שהפיסגה התחילה ושמע ממנו ניסוח שונות מאלו ששמעו מגורבצ'וב (אף כי פרימקוב טען בשיחות אלו שלא מדבר בשם ממשלתו אלא כ'אזרח פרטי' פרימקוב אמר שהם WILLING TO BEGIN PREPARING החלטה שניה. הסובייטים רוצים למשוך זמן ולנהל מגעים עם שני הצדדים תוך השארת דלת פתוחה הן לטהרן והן למדינות ערב. מרמי מעריך שתוצאות הוועידה בעמאן והמגעים עם מדינות ערב מתחילים לתת אותותיהם. הסובייטים ניסו להחיות את רעיון צי אוי"מ ומבחינת ארה"ב אין זה מעשי ונאמר לסובייטים שזו הטיה מהרעיון של אמברגו וארה"ב מעוניינת להתחיל במבצע STAUNCH גלובלי כאשר ארה"ב 'מטפלת' בבנות בריתה ואילו בריה"מ באלו שלה.

אולי זה לא יהיה אמברגו מושלם אך גם תוצאות חלקיות תטייבנה לטיים המלחמה. גם הערכתו של וולטרס היא שהסובייטים זזים לאיטט.

שה"ח אמר כיו יש גירסה מעניינת שהטורים מצויגים ולפיה הם באו לעמאן מתוך מחשבה שחוסייין וצואט חוסייין מנסיס לגייס העולם הערבי נגד איראן והם הצליחו למנוע עמות מוחלט בין איראן והעולם הערבי תוך בקשה מהמתכנסת בעמאן לנסות

THESE ARE THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH CONDUCTED BY THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
IN THE YEAR 1964. THE RESULTS ARE PRESENTED IN
THIS REPORT WHICH IS BEING SUBMITTED TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

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מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ולהביא לטיי המלחמה בזרמי שלום. הסורים טוענים שהצליחו והוא שהיה לא יהיה מומתע אם יתברר שגם הסובייטים בתמונה ופעלו בכורן זה. יתכן מאוד שמקור החשיבה הזו של מניעת עימות בין איראן ומדינות ערב, הוא במוסקבה.

מרפי אמר שמשקנתו שלטוריה נגישות מוגבלת בטוהרן ועובדה היא שהטיל האיראני נפל בכורית סמוך לכינוס הועידה בעמאן. הערכתו של מרפי שיש CONSIDERABLE DISARRAY בדמשק בנושא האיראני.

1. תהליך השלוס במגישה הראשונה עם פרימקוב שאלו אינה רוצה להתחיל ומרימקוב אמר ללא הסוס שבמסרץ ושוחחו עליו שעתים. במגישה השניה דנו בתהליך ובאפגניסטאן. פוליאקוב אמר שהמשלחת הקונסולרית בישראל מקיימת מגעים רגילים וכי היעדר היהטים לא ימשן ללא סוף. לא היה יותר ספצימי בנושא.

מרפי אמר ששאל פוליאקוב האם יש תשובה לשאלות מיולי. פוליאקוב פנה לדירקובסקי ושאלו מה המצב. דירקובסקי ענה ששלח שלוש פעמים תזכורת למוסקבה אך לא קיבל תשובה.

שהיה אמר שפנה לשברזנדזה בזמנו בענין החיילים הנעדרים ולפני כשבועיים התשובה (הסורים אמרו שאין בידיהם חיילים ישראלים) הועברה על ידי המשלחת הקונסולרית. חוץ מפעילות זו גם באו אלינו בשאלה האם כתיר לסובייטים להשתתף במכרזים על הקמת מסילת ברזל בישראל. בטהיב המשלחת משועממת מובטלה ומרפי העיר שמסיבה מוזרה ולא ידועה הם עדין בישראל.

שהיה ציין גם ששגריר בריהימ באר'מ ומרימקוב בראיון ליקול ישראלי לא הועילו לקידום התהליך. מרפי אמר שאין כל ידיעה אם היתה התייחסות למז'ה במגש ריגן גורבצ'וב להוציא התייחסות ברודה ב'רושינגטון טיימס' לפיה הנשיא ריגן הביע תמיכה בוטיזה הבינלאומית. וליקוקט ציין כי היתה התייחסות לליה למזהית, כלאזורים אחרים בהודעה המסכמת.

מרפי חזר לתיאור שיחתו עם פרימקוב והאחרון גילה דאגה מהתפשטות הפרנדמנטליזם בעוד שוקיץ כשנפגשו אמר שהאמריקאים מפריזים והערבת הסכנה.

הסובייטים לפי פרימקוב מתנגדים למר'מ אלא במסגרת הועידה הבינלאומית שצריכה להיות סמכותית. פרימקוב הביע התנגדות לעסקות נפרדות והביא לדוגמא את כשלון הסכם לבנון ישראל. מרפי אמר לו שארהיב מחפשת כל זרן. הועידה אינה מטרה בפני

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

עצמה והיא תוכל לכפות או להטיל וטו. ברור, הוסיף מרבי, שהנושא הסדתי לא בראש מעייני הסובייטים.

ג. מצרים

מרבי אמר שמובארק יבוא בסוף ינואר ואבו גז'אלה לפניו במחצית ינואר. המצרים כמודן שבעי רצון מהצלחתם בעמאן. אייב טרנר יגיע למצרים ולישראל ויבדוק מה ניתן לעשות בעניין טאבה.

שהיה אמר כי להערכתו ישאר המצרים במחויבותם לשלום והם רואים בהחלטת עמאן נצחון לעמדתם. בלא שיאלצו להיכנע לדרישה הסורית. מעבר לכן השאלה היא כיצד הם יכולים בו מנית לתמוך בירון ובאש"פ ובכל הנראה תבקש מצרים להאשים את ישראל בקפאון המדיני. הדוש היחסים הדיפלומטיים יעשה המצרים ערים יותר לרגישויות הערבים ואף כי לא ינתקו יחסיהם עם ישראל הם עלולים לגלות הסתייגות מישראל. שה"ח אמר כי הוא מודאג מהמצב ואמילו אם יוכתרו בהצלחה המאמצים בנושא איכות החיים הם לא ימנעו הבטיות. המאורעות ביהודה שלמרון ועזה מוכיחים חוסר שביעות רצון בקרב התושבים. שה"ח חזר ואמר שיש משום סתירה בין עמדת מצרים התומכת בירון לבין נכונותה לפתח מחדש משרדי אש"פ בקהיר ואפשר לנחש שהפתיחה סכורה לדעת מצרים, להקל על החזרה לעולם הערבי.

לשאלת מרבי אם רואה נסיגה בעמדת מצרים ענה שהיה שיש מעין חזרונו ביחסים ומה שיותר הוא נחלת השיגרה של השנים הקודמות. לזעת שה"ח צריך לעשות מאמץ לשמור את היחסים והוא שה"ח ניסה לאחרונה לקדם היחסים בהחומים המדעי והכלכלי. שה"ח סיפר גם על שיחתו עם שיראק וקוהל שגילו עניין תכנית הסיוע הכלכלי למזה"ת והסכימו להעלות הנושא על סדר היום של המתועשות, אף כי ירון ומצרים מהססות לגלות תמיכה ברעיון. בן ישמש תחליף לתהליך המדיני.

טובאוק, מערין שה"ח, בודאי מרגיש שמצבו השתפר לאור ההצלחות בוועידה האיטלאמית, בוועידה בעמאן ובבחירות במצרים

בעניין תהליך השלום הבהיר מובארק באגרת לרה"מ שמיר שאין כל דרך לעשות שלום אלא באמצעות ועידה בינלאומית. ספק אם הוא רואה הצלחה בתוצאות ועידת עמאן בנקודה זו ויש להניח שיתרנז יותר בצד ההחלטה בעניין חידוש היחסים. יש להניח שמצרים קיבלה סיוע נדיב לפני ואחרי עמאן.

THE FIRST PART OF THE DOCUMENT IS A LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

DATE

THE SECOND PART OF THE DOCUMENT IS A REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE CENSUS TAKEN IN 1900. THE REPORT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, THE FIRST OF WHICH IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS.

THE THIRD PART OF THE DOCUMENT IS A REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE CENSUS TAKEN IN 1910. THE REPORT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, THE FIRST OF WHICH IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS.

THE FOURTH PART OF THE DOCUMENT IS A REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE CENSUS TAKEN IN 1920. THE REPORT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, THE FIRST OF WHICH IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS.

THE FIFTH PART OF THE DOCUMENT IS A REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE CENSUS TAKEN IN 1930. THE REPORT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, THE FIRST OF WHICH IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS.

THE SIXTH PART OF THE DOCUMENT IS A REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE CENSUS TAKEN IN 1940. THE REPORT IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL SECTIONS, THE FIRST OF WHICH IS A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS.

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

השגריר אמר שאל האם היו הבהרות נוספות של חוסיין לאמריקאים אחרי הפגישה שלו, של מרמי בעמאן. מרמי ענה שאין כל חידוש ושה'ח העיר שזה ה- ACCUSE של חוסיין. מרמי חוסיין שהמלך אמר שהוא נאמן למה שטובים אן אינו רואה טעם בהמשך הדיבורים על הפרוצדורה וכאשר ארה"ב תחליט אם היא תומכת בוועידה הוא יהיה מוכן להידבר עמה.

השאלה אמר שה'ח לאן מוכנים מכאן. המלך חוסיין באומריה הוא מטייל בין בירות ערב ויטע בקרוב למוסקבה. הוא מתלונן על ורשינגטון ומרגיש כמאהב מאוכזב המנסה למצוא נחומין בפיזור בין סוריה ועיראק (מרמי: חבל על האנרגיה שלו). אש"פ הגביר את הטרור והאלימות אם כי המלך חוסיין עדיין נחנה מתמיכה הערובה היא שיצאה עצומה שעליה חתומים 600-700 שתמכו בוועידה הוינלאומית, דבר שבעבר לא הצליחו לעשות.

ערן. ==

תפ: עהח, רהמ, שהוט, ממנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רט, אמן, בירן, מצפא, אירג, ממד

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20

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 14 דצמ' 87 16:00

מס' מברק

11/4

360

המשרד

67 תון - 224

אל: מצפ"א, אמלייט 1

דע: לשי רה"מ

מקשי"ח

סיוע לניקרגואה

לשלנו 380

במהלך הדיון על החלטת המשך שהתקיים במליאת הסנט בסוף השבוע שעבר, התקבל תיקון שיאפשר אספקת סיוע הומניטרי לקונטרס בסך של 9 מליון דולר בתנאי שלא יאוחר מה-17.1.88 תכנס לתוקף הפסקת אש (שהיא פרי המו"מ בין ממשלת ניקרגואה והקונטרס) ובתנאי שממניקרגואה מכבדת את הסכם גואטמלה מה-7.8.87. רצ"ב נוטח התיקון.

ז/ס ר 1513
למדן

שה"ח 2 י"ד 3 ג"א 3 ג"א 1 ג"א 1 ג"א 2 ג"א 1 ג"א 1 ג"א 4

2/4

360

gg4 w

11/10
WJF

12 **(57) SEC. 114. (a)** *There are hereby transferred to the*
 13 *President \$9,000,000 of unobligated funds, from such ac-*
 14 *counts for which appropriations were made by Department of*
 15 *Defense appropriations acts for the fiscal year 1987 or prior*
 16 *fiscal years, as the President shall designate, to provide hu-*
 17 *manitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resist-*
 18 *ance consistent with this section.*

19 **(b)** *The President is authorized to transfer or reprogram*
 20 *unobligated funds from such accounts for which appropria-*
 21 *tions were made by Department of Defense appropriations*
 22 *acts for the fiscal year 1987 or prior fiscal years, as the*
 23 *President shall designate, to provide transportation of hu-*
 24 *manitarian and other assistance previously, specifically au-*
 25 *thorized by law to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.*

3/4 360 54 ggh-67

1 (c) As used in this section, the term "humanitarian as-
2 sistance" means food, clothing, shelter, and medical supplies
3 and services.

4 (d)(1) Funds made available by subsections (a) and (b)
5 shall be available for the purposes described in sections 101,
6 102, and 104 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal
7 Year 1988 (Public Law 100-178), subject to the provisions
8 of this section, and for the same periods of time, but not to
9 exceed February 29, 1988, as such funds would have been
10 available if this section had not been enacted.

11 (2) The authority to support, monitor, and manage the
12 activities for which this section provides funds shall continue
13 until the funds transferred by subsection (a) have been ex-
14 panded.

15 (e) The requirements, terms, and conditions of the sec-
16 tions to which subsection (d)(1) refers, section 10 of Public
17 Law 91-672, section 502 of the National Security Act of
18 1947, section 15(a) of the State Department Basic Authori-
19 ties Act of 1956, and any other provision of law shall be
20 deemed to have been met for the transfer and use consistent
21 with this section of the funds made available by subsections
22 (a) and (b).

23 (f) Sections 203(e), 204(b), 207, 209(b), and 209(c),
24 and the first sentence of section 203(d), in "TITLE II—
25 CENTRAL AMERICA" in section 101(k) of the continu-

4/4

360 P1

224-67

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1 *ing appropriations resolution for the fiscal year 1987 (Public*
2 *Laws 99-500 and 99-591) shall apply with respect to funds*
3 *made available by this section.*

4 *(g) If, on January 17, 1988, a cease-fire negotiated be-*
5 *tween the Government of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan*
6 *democratic resistance is in place and the Government of*
7 *Nicaragua is in compliance with the Guatemala Accord of*
8 *August 7, 1987, then the President shall, to the maximum*
9 *extent practicable, make the unobligated balance of funds*
10 *transferred by subsection (a) available for administration*
11 *consistent with this section by nonpolitical humanitarian*
12 *international organizations.*

שגרירות ישראל / נושיןגטון

המשרד + בטחון

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223-67

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4

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיסות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ח 15:30 14 דצמ' 87

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד, מקשי"ח - משהביט
דע: השגריר, ס' מזכ"צ שהביט - כאן

סנטו טינגרים לבחריין

למברקנו 331

לעיוהכס, רצ"ב המיקון כפי שהתקבל במהלך הדיון בהחלטת ההמשך (בהצעת הסנטור דה-קונטיני)

יוסף אלון

למדן

שה" 2 יה" 3 גנ" 3 גאנ" 1 כ"ן 1 גלפ" 2 י/ג"כ" 1 ג"ג ר"מ 4 א"ן 4

2/4

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223 -67

12 **(62) SEC. 119. STINGER MISSILES. (a) PROHIBI-**
18 *TION.—Except as provided in paragraph (b), no Stinger*
14 *antiaircraft missiles may be provided, directly or indirectly,*
15 *by sale, lease, grant or otherwise, during fiscal year 1988 to*
16 *any country in the Persian Gulf region.*

17 **(b) EXCEPTION.—***Notwithstanding the prohibition in*
18 *paragraph (a), such missiles may be provided to Bahrain if*
19 *the President certifies to Congress that—*

20 **(1)** *such missiles are needed by the recipient*
21 *country to counter an immediate air threat and/or to*
22 *contribute to the protection of United States personnel,*
23 *facilities or operations;*

24 **(2)** *no other appropriate system is available from*
25 *the United States;*

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923-67

1 (3) the recipient agrees to safeguards as required
2 in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance by the United
3 States Government to protect against diversion; and

4 (4) the recipient country has agreed to a United
5 States buyback of all the remaining missiles and com-
6 ponents which have not been destroyed or fired in order
7 to return them to the possession and control of the
8 United States when another United States air defense
9 system which meets the military requirements can be
10 made available or not more than 18 months from the
11 enactment of this legislation.

12 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 3 months after the date of
13 enactment of this joint resolution, the President shall submit
14 to the Congress a report which assesses the global threat
15 caused by the proliferation of man-portable ground-to-air
16 missiles with advanced technology comparable to that of the
17 Stinger missile, without regard to the country of origin of
18 those missiles. This report shall give special emphasis to the
19 danger of such missiles being used in acts of terrorism. Fur-
20 ther, that the President review and report every 3 months on
21 the conditions and timing under which the appropriate
22 system may be delivered and the means for subsequent recov-
23 ery of any Stinger missiles sold under the authority of this
24 provision.

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1 *(d) NOTIFICATION.—Before issuing any letter of offer*
2 *to sell or provide Stinger missiles (without regard to the*
3 *amount of the sale or transfer) the President shall notify the*
4 *Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Majority*
5 *Leader of the Senate. Any such notification shall contain the*
6 *information required in a certification under section 36(b) of*
7 *the Arms Export Control Act.*

(2)

שגרירות ישראל / נוטינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מחודג דפים

סוג בסחונני גלוי

דחיפות אמר

תאריך/ז"ח 8.30

מס' מברק

באמצעות ניו-יורק גלאון
75 707 330

או: מצב
צמי מעשי, ניו-יורק
למה מלבד מאמץ; מק טיה, מלבד

בראשית: הפלטת ההמשך והקולפריס
- וואלדיין האממו (2004)

א) הפלטת ההמשך
בסיון 7-85
התחיל בסוף אמתא, והסתיים
בדלוק (בשעה 03.15). הפלטת
ההפלטת, למדינת 13-חוקי הקצבת
אלט 1988 (אכרא סיוע חודג וקציב
ההטחון) התקלה 71-7 קולוא דמ
חול 22 נקב, זאתי טלחנסא. מספר
לא מנוטל של מקוונים. פכטט בנסיד
עמ קפולת הפיק על הסיוע התקלה דא
מקוונים למאמטה לחינוכיים.

ב) הקולפריס
עם הפלטת ה-85 בסוף נכונה הצטרף
זקונה הקולפריס קיון נכונה טני הקמת
קייט-בן-בתיא ימלך אמא נכונה קיום ד
ואילו הסוף קיום ד. נכונה אינא טכונים
ימילא קיום ד אמא 3, טו קיום ד.
ו. גלאון

ל הה הפד 3 3 2 3 END 3 3 3

שגרירות ישראל / נוטינגטון

טופס מברק

דף מחוד דפים

סוג בטחוני ג'אוי

דחיסות לייצא

תאריך/ז"ח 12.12 (19.87)

מס' מברק

קטאון	נו-יורק	המל"ק
208	76	331

א: מל"ק
 ב: המל"ק, נו-יורק
 ג: מל"ק, המל"ק

סג: סטינגטון אמריקה
 - המל"ק קטאון - אמריקה

קאסגט ב-מל"ק להמל"ק קטאון היום (12)
 אולם אספקת סטינגטון אמריקה
 קטאון שיומל"ק אמריקה מל"ק
 18 חבלים, וקבוצה אלה המל"ק
 למל"ק המל"ק קטאון.
 י.א.מ.

ש"מ 2
 מל"ק 3
 מל"ק 3
 מל"ק 1
 מל"ק 1
 מל"ק 2
 מל"ק 1
 מל"ק 4
 מל"ק 4
 מל"ק 3
 מל"ק 4

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

המשרד + ניו יורק + בטחון

187 60 303

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מחוד 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מייד

תאריך/ז"ח 11:00 11 דצמ' 87

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד - ערב 3

דע: השגריר, ניו יורק

מקטי"ח - משחבי"ט

טנט: הגבלות על אספקת מטוס אפ-15 לסעודיה

לחברקנו 506 תה-22.10

1. הסנטור מצנבאום ביצל אח ההזדמנות שלשום (9.12) להצמיד את התיקון שלו בנדון לחוק טכני שבא לאשר העברת צוללות מיושנות למספנה בטלורידה.

2. כזכור, התיקון אוסר על מכירת מטוסי אפ-15 מהדגם המתקדם E-15 F, לטעודיה (דהיינו מגביל את המכירות לדגמי A, B, C, D-1); נכון קובע שלא יחיו יותר מ-60 (ששים) מטוסי אפ-15 בידי הסעודים בכל זמן נתון (התצעת הנועברה בדיפ"י).

3. לדברי עוזר⁶ תסנטור, התיקון מקובל על דעת הממשל, ולא היחה התנגדות מצד הרפובליקאים בסנט. לכן סביר להניח שהתיקון (בינזמת המורשים לארי טמית ומל לויין) יתקבל ^{ע"מ} בנית הנבחרים ניכנס לחוק בקרוב.

יוסף לנדן

שהח 3
רהא 3
שהפס 1
לנפס 3
לנפס 1
ביון 1
לנפס 2
לנפס 1
מאד רק 4
מאד 4

טופס מכרז

דף 1 מתוך 1 לפים

סוג מסחוני סנדי

דחיפות מדי

תאריך/זמן 12.87 - 19:00

מס' מברק

327

114

אל : המשרד

ניו-יורק

אל : מנכ"ל מדיני

משנה למנכ"ל

סמנכ"ל צפ"א

השגריר (ניו-יורק)

פסקה - מז"ת

התקשרתי טלפונית לדין סלומון שביהל המגעים עם הסובייטים בדרג קבוצת העבודה (הוא יוצא מחר לאירופה). לדבריו לא שלחו הסובייטים מישהו בדרג של ארמקוסט ולכן מפגש קבוצת העבודה היו מיועד בעיקר ללמוד אם יש איזה שהוא נושא שראוי להעלותו לדרג הבכיר. סלומון אמר שלא היה הרבה מעבר למה שנמסר לי על-ידי וילקוקס. הסובייטים ניפחו לזבריו את ענין הערבים בועידה הבינלאומית ואילו ארה"ב הדגישה את המו"מ הישיר ואת עובדת כינון הקשרים הדיפלומטים בין מצרים לבין מרבית מדינות ערב כאישור וחידוק לקמפ דייוויד ולמו"מ בילטרלי ישיר.

הסובייטים ציינו החשש מהתפשטות הפונדמנטליזם ומרוץ החימוש והאמריקאים, תוך שהם מסכימים, הוסיפו שהסובייטים יכולים לעזור ע"י הפסקת תמיכה בגורמים רדיקלים באזור.

לדברי סלומון יחודשו המגעים בדרגי העבודה בתחילת השנה הבאה.

הסיכום שלו שלא חל שינוי מהוחי בגישה הסובייטית מכל מה שהיה ידוע להם על עמדותיהם בנושא מז"ת, אפגניסטאן ואיראן-עיראק.

3314
ערן

מחנה המטה 9
מחנה המטה 3
מחנה המטה 1
מחנה המטה 3
מחנה המטה 1
מחנה המטה 3
מחנה המטה 9

שגרירות ישראל / נושין גטור

סופס מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

המשרד + בטחון + ניו יורק

סווג בטחוני גלוי

59 184 300

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ד 9:30 11 דצמ'

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מקשיח - משהבייט

דברת - אוצר

השגריר - ניו יורק

סנט : תקציב והחלטת ההמשך

אמש, בטעות הקטנות של הלילה, השלימה מליאת הסנט את העבודה על חוק ה- DEBT RECONCILIATION (שכולל קיצוצים בתקציב ומטים חדשים). היום יפתח הדיון על החלטת ההמשך (ה- CR) חוך תקוה שתתקבל במשך השבוע, ושהקונגרס בין נציגי שני הבתים יתחיל ביום ב' הקרוב.

הקושי הוא שאין הגבלת זמן בדיון על ה- CR, ואין בטחון שהוכוח יסתיים תוך יום-יומיים. היה נמשך עד תחילת השבוע, אזי חדחה פתיחת הקונגרס עד אמצע השבוע הבא. כזכור, יפוג תקפו של ה- CR (הקצר) השוטף ב-15 דנא, וככל הנראה לא יהיה מנוס מהעברת CR קצר נוסף שיהיה תקף עד ה-22 דנא, לפחות.

אס"מ
למדן

מחנה 3 9
מחנה 3 3
מחנה 3 3
מחנה 1 1
מחנה 2 2
מחנה 1 1
מחנה 3 3
מחנה 1 1

שבירות ישראל / וושינגטון

המשרד + בטחון + ניו יורק

61 188 304

טופס מבוט

דף ומתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות מיידית

תאריך/ז"ד 07:00 11 11 דצמ' 87

מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א

דע: השגריר, ניו יורק

מקטי"ח - משהביט

טנט : סטינגריס למדינות המפרץ

תחור שיחה עם טיס ראומר , עוזרו של הסנטור דה-קונסיני :-

1. הממשל עדיין מנסה לקדם את הנושא הני"ל, אם כי הוא מכיר בכך שהובט פעמיים בועדת ההקצנות בשבועיים האחרונים.

2. אחול ארמיטאג' ונגרו-פונטה בקרו אצל דה-קונסיני וניסו לשכנעו מחדש להסכים לפשרה עליה דובר בתחילת השבוע - כלומר, מכירת סטינגריס למדינות המפרץ (הכוונה היא לבחריין ולעומאן) תוך קבלת אישור נשיאותי לגבי הצורך במכירה והבטחות אודות נקיטת אמצעי שמירה ואמנעה חמורים ואף על פי הסכמת המדינות המקבלות למכור את הטילים חזרה לארה"ב (BUY BACK) עם השלמת הדרישה המבצעית לטילים.

הסנטור דה-קונסיני טרם החליט אם להסכים לזאת ולהציע חיקון כנדון אגב ה- CR שיידון בסוף השבוע הזה.

יוסף לומד
למדן

36

שבת 2
רבינו 3
טבת 1
מנחם 3
מנחם 1
ביתן 1
אדר 2
ולחיות 1
אבן 4
רמאן 4

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיפות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק

2 | 2

318 - P

68 - U

לפיכך הוא בעד הזחיה בטיפול. הוא מאוד מעריך את איננוה ורואה בו ידיד אך להגדרתו, איננוה הינו " A HIGH DOLLAR MAM ואילו אנכי (אובי) MAM A LOW " כוונתו לדבר עם איננוה בנדון, ואין ברצונו להביך את חברי ועדת המשנה שלו, אך אם אין מנוס ידרוש דיון בנדון לכשה- CR (החלטת ההמשך) יגיע למליאת בית הנבחרים.

4. חובן שאנו ממשיכים במאמצינו מכל הכוונים האפשריים - ולא נרפה. מיוחד גם לצ'ין כי אנו עוקבים מקרוב ועוד נדווח.

למזל

ירצא **

טודי

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חוזם: 12,8717

אל:ני/538, ורוש/376, בטחון/199

מ-:המשרד, תא:111287, זח:1916, דח:מ, טג:ט

נד:ט

טודי/מיודי

216.04

נ.מ.107

נאו"ם,

דע: שגודשינגטון, לשכת שהב"ט, לוברני,
שחור - בטחון העבירונא

שיחת גולדינג - שהב"ט (10/12).

א. לגולדינג נלרו ממקד יוניפיל, הגנרל האגלונד והיועץ
הפוליטי של החיל, הוטר. מצדנו השתתפו לוברני, ראש
אמ"נ, תא"ל שחור, קצינים בכירים והח"מ.ב. גולדינג ביקש למסור תנחומי מזכ"ל האו"ם על קרכנות צה"ל
בצמון של השבועות האחרונים. מצד שני הביע שמחתו על
יחסי העבודה הטובים שנוצרו בין ממקד יוניפיל לבין אלוף
פקוד הצמון.ג. גולדינג הביע שביעות רצונו מ- 'ניסוי' אל-הוקבן שכל
הצדדים, כולל אמל תרמו להצלחתו. הגזרה שקטה מאז ומקד
מאמצי חיזבאללה דז מזרחה. הזכיר לשהב"ט שאנו מדברים
כבר שנתיים על מבחן (טסט) ליכולתם של יוניפיל ואמל
לשמור על השקט באיזור והנה שניהם עברו הטסט הראשון. אי
לכן הגיע הזמן להמשיך בתהליך של 'צעדים קטנים', כשכל
צעד נוסף יהיה תלוי בהצלחה קודמו. מבין רצוננו שלא
להסתכן יתר על המידה אך ההצלחה באל-הוקבאן מחייבת
בדיקה האפשרויות הבאות. לדעתם 'המשולש המערבי' שמטביב

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-441100) (P)
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) (P)
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

RE: [Illegible]

ON [Illegible]

IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU [Illegible]

YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS MATTER IS APPRECIATED.

VERY TRULY YOURS,
[Illegible Signature]



Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is arranged in several paragraphs and is difficult to decipher due to its low contrast and the texture of the paper.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

טובים שנוכל לשכנע לאחד להתיר ביקור הצליא בכלא אל-חיאט. כן ציין השר שלצליא יש מגעים שוטפים עם לאחד וזה מתיר ביקורי משפחות מחוץ לאיזור הבטחון אצל עצירים באל-חיאט.

ה. גולדינג הבטיח להעלות הנושא עם ברי ולווח באמצעות הוטר.

מנהל ארבי'ל 2

אש

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, ממנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רט, אמן, ממז, בירן, מצפא, ליאר, מזת יט, סייבל, ברנע, ארבל 2



8716

תאריך : 12.87 **משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר**

שמרר

ירצא **

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חוזם: 12,8716

אל: ניו/539, ווש/377

מ-: המשרד, תא: 111287, דח: 1915, דח: מ, טג: ש

נד: 8

שמרר/מיידי

נ.מ. 106.

216.04, 205.03/ועידה בינ'ל.

נאר'ים.

דע: שגרירות.

שיחת גולדינג- שה'ח.

בשלנו ח/7553 מה-10 דצמבר, טעיף ד', יש לקרוא בסוף
המשפט האחרון 'המטגה' חוזר 'המטגה הנוכחית' ולא 'במטגה',
כפי שנכתב בטעות.

מנהל ארבי'ל 2

אש

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רט, אמן, ממד, בירן, מצפא,
ליאור, מזתיט, ברנע, ארבל, 2, טייבל

8.82
KODAK
הודף ושות' בע"מ, תל. 35647



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SECRET

*Reagan to Visit Moscow;
Arms Talks to Continue*

2/43

319

Summit Declared 'Success'; Reagan, Gorbachev Sidestep SDI Issue

By Don Oberdorfer and Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev completed their Washington summit meeting yesterday with a mutual declaration of success after reaching an accommodation that sidesteps the crucial issue of limiting the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

The two leaders' agreement to set aside the intense four-year-old dispute about Reagan's "Star Wars" was revealed in a joint written statement issued more than five hours after Reagan and Gorbachev said goodbye in a rainswept exchange of remarks on the White House South Lawn. Both leaders expressed the hope they can move on to a new agreement that could bring cuts of 50 percent in strategic, long-range nuclear weapons.

Reagan called the three-day summit, which fascinated Americans and Russians and attracted a global television audience, "a clear success." Gorbachev, responding in kind as aides shielded the two leaders with umbrellas from a downpour, said that "a good deal has been accomplished."

The two leaders finished the first superpower summit on U.S. soil in 14 years with characteristic flourishes. Gorbachev held a nearly two-hour news conference at the new Soviet Embassy compound on Mt. Alto on Wisconsin Avenue. Reagan ended the day with a nationally televised speech from the Oval Office in which he claimed the summit had made more progress to halt the arms buildup than any meeting since World War II.

In a joint statement, the two leaders said Gorbachev had renewed his invitation for Reagan to visit Moscow for their next summit in the first half of 1988 and that "the president accepted with pleasure." Reagan said in his address that he hoped they could continue in Moscow "what we achieved in these past three days."

The final day of the summit also brought a compromise agreement that the two nations would reduce their total strategic ballistic missile warheads to 4,900 each under the possible new arms-reduction treaty, ending a dispute over the precise ceilings in this category of nuclear weapons. The United States currently has about 8,000 such land-based and submarine-based warheads, and the Soviet Union has about 10,000 warheads.

The leaders also took another step toward a prospective strategic arms agreement, agreeing to establish a ceiling on the number of sea-launched cruise missiles and to seek a mutually acceptable way to verify that these limits are complied with. This agreement was the first U.S. acceptance of the principle of limiting such weapons, which the Soviets have insisted must be constrained in a future strategic arms accord.

Reagan and Gorbachev both expressed satisfaction with the progress made at the summit but said much more must be done to continue the momentum

See SUMMIT, A90, Col. 1

SUMMIT, From A1

achieved with the signing Tuesday of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

"The INF Treaty, as proud as we are of it, should be viewed as a beginning, not an end," the president said.

The most important accords, concerning strategic defense, were agreed to by the two leaders only minutes before they made their official farewells at 2:25 p.m. in a 20-minute departure ceremony at the diplomatic entrance of the White House.

Far from trumpeting their progress on the knotty issue of space defense, neither Reagan nor Gorbachev mentioned it in his departure statement from the White House and Reagan barely referred to it in his address to the nation last night. The striking reticence about the key result of the summit appeared to reflect the last-minute nature of the deal, which in effect is an agreement to disagree about this politically sensitive subject, which caused the previous Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik last October to end in disarray.

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4/43

319

The key arms control aides, however, met at the White House beginning about 10:30 a.m. in an effort to resolve some of the strategic-space arms issues, which both sides had publicly identified as the top priority for progress at the current summit. This group of five—Nitze, Akhromeyev, U.S. arms negotiators Max M. Kampelman and Ronald Lehman and Soviet arms adviser Viktor Karpov—worked until 1:30 p.m. while their superiors were having lunch in the Family Dining Room of the White House.

At this point, with the summit due to end with final departure statements at 2 p.m., Shultz and Shevardnadze, joined by Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci and national security adviser Colin L. Powell, excused themselves from the lunch to rejoin the arms control experts.

Much progress had been made on the questions of numerical limits on ballistic missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles and other questions. But the two sides were still not agreed on how to handle their conflicting interpretations of what is allowed to be

done in the way of space-based testing and development under the ABM Treaty. This has been a crucial question and the cause of intense argument ever since Reagan proposed his SDI program in March 1983, and especially since the administration unveiled its new interpretation of the ABM Treaty in October 1985.

The final formulations were worked out by Shultz, Shevardnadze and the other high-level officials, working together with the arms control experts while the leaders and a few key aides finished their lunch.

While the departure statements were delayed for 25 minutes, the Soviet arms experts and Shevardnadze then briefed Gorbachev in the White House map room while Shultz and the U.S. arms experts were doing the same for Reagan in the White House library.

An administration official said that the departure statements were "deliberately on the bland side" because it was not known when they were being written how far the leaders and their arms experts would get in the final formulations.

The key accommodation is reflected in a paragraph of the joint statement saying that "the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time."

The Soviet Union continues to maintain that the ABM Treaty bans much research, testing and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, while the Reagan administration continues to insist on a broad interpretation that would permit expanded SDI tests and development.

"The important point is that neither side is limited in terms of the testing, research and development they are permitted to do under the ABM Treaty as that side determines the ABM Treaty applies to them," said a senior White House official in a briefing on yesterday's accords. "In other words, nothing that was done today restrains U.S. or Soviet strategic defense research, development or testing efforts."

Gorbachev, asked to explain the Soviet position on this provision of the joint statement, repeatedly declined to do so at his news conference. He did acknowledge that he doesn't believe his meetings with Reagan this week made the expansion of the arms race into space any less likely. He added that stopping such a move "remains the goal of the Soviet Union."

The settlement which seems to have been reached on the SDI issue was foreshadowed last week by the comments in Washington of Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov. He said it was made more acceptable to the Soviet Union because Congress has passed and Reagan has signed into law a ban on using federal funds for any SDI tests that would violate a strict, or limited, interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

X

X

Ignoring the gloomy weather as he said goodbye to Gorbachev, Reagan said, "This summit has lit the sky with hope for all people of goodwill. And as we leave, it is up to both sides to ensure that the luster does not wear off and to follow through on our commitments as we move forward to the next steps in improving the relations between our countries and peoples."

Gorbachev responded similarly. He called the INF Treaty "an unprecedented step in the history of the nuclear age" and said, "today the Soviet Union and the United States are closer to the common goal of strengthening international security."

Both leaders acknowledged that differences remained on regional and human rights issues, and that a timetable for withdrawal of the estimated 115,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan, on which some U.S. officials had hoped for a breakthrough at the summit, had not been achieved.

But Gorbachev confirmed in a news conference held three hours after the departure ceremony that he officially put forward a proposal to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 12 months, "maybe less."

The Soviet leader said, however, that "from the first day" a Soviet timetable for withdrawal is announced, the United States must agree to a "beginning of the end to arms and financial supplies to the insurgency forces" fighting the Soviet troops and the Soviet-sponsored government in Kabul.

Gorbachev said that if this happened, the Soviets would cease military operations on the day the timetable for troop withdrawal is announced.

A U.S. official said that Reagan, in his private discussions with Gorbachev, had stuck to the position that the Soviets should announce a timetable for troop withdrawal "without preconditions." The official called the results of the Afghanistan discussions "somewhat disappointing" but said it is still possible the Soviets would set down a withdrawal timetable within the next few months.

In his departure remarks Reagan said that he and the Soviet leader had "bluntly" expressed different views on Afghanistan and other regional wars, but had agreed "that it is necessary to search for real political solutions to these conflicts The door has been opened, and it will stay open to serious discussion of ending these regional conflicts."

One of the few areas where Gorbachev seemed to go out of his way to stress his differences on regional issues with Reagan was the Iran-Iraq war, now in its eighth year.

Gorbachev made it clear in his news conference that he does not yet believe the time has come for the U.N. Security Council to begin considering a resolution, which the United States strongly favors, imposing a U.N. embargo on Iran for refusing to accept an earlier resolution demanding a cease-fire.

"I think we have not yet exhausted the potential of the first resolution," he said.

Nonetheless, Gorbachev said discussions would continue with the United States over how to cooperate in bringing the war between the Persian Gulf neighbors to an end.

The most significant and potentially far-reaching advance of the Washington summit, concerning the meaning of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and future research and testing work on a space-

based antimissile defense like Reagan's SDI program, came in the last hour of the three days of meetings, according to U.S. sources.

A working group on arms control issues, headed by U.S. arms adviser Paul H. Nitze and Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, met in seclusion Tuesday afternoon, Wednesday morning, Wednesday afternoon and Wednesday night from 11 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.

Thursday morning at 8, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, accompanied by Nitze, met Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze accompanied by Akhromeyev at the Soviet Embassy to review the state of the bargaining. It was decided then to brief the top leaders.

Shultz and Nitze went to the White House to see Reagan, while Shevardnadze and Akhromeyev conferred at the Soviet Embassy with Gorbachev. Because of these briefings and the last-minute negotiations, the morning session of the Reagan-Gorbachev talks, planned to begin at 10:30 a.m., did not get under way until noon.

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Moscow Rights Seminar Encounters Harassment

Meeting Seen Test of New Soviet Policies

By Celestine Bohlen
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Dec. 10—An independent seminar on human rights, seen as a test of the Kremlin's tolerance for open discussion, opened in a private apartment here today after authorities suddenly closed down a rented public meeting place for "disinfection."

Representatives of human rights monitoring groups from Czechoslovakia, the United States and Sweden attended the seminar's opening, but a number of international figures from West Germany, Poland and elsewhere were refused visas by Soviet authorities. Several Soviet participants also have been stopped, or strongly discouraged, from attending, organizers said.

Lev Timofeyev, head of the Press Club Glasnost, which organized the seminar, said the series of obstacles should not be regarded as "coincidental."

"It shows the serious inability of Soviet organs to carry on a dialogue with independent public opinion," said Timofeyev, a former political prisoner and coordinator of the four-day seminar. But overall, he said, he saw the official response as a sign that authorities want to avoid a "direct scandal" over the seminar, which opened on the United Nations' International Human Rights Day and the last day of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States.

The unofficial seminar is one of the byproducts of Gorbachev's policy of "openness" and his campaign to broaden the public's participation in political and economic decisions. Over the last year, Gorbachev's policies have led to the freeing of almost 200 political prisoners, the opening of debate in the official press and the establishment of scores of unofficial groups and journals.

But since the late summer, the police and the KGB security forces have adopted stricter tactics limiting public demonstrations and curbing dissident activity. Two days ago, 20 members of the seminar's organizing committee were visited at their apartments and handed notices, signed by assistant local prosecutors, warning them that the seminar was illegal.

A week ago, the organizers were told by the Moscow executive council that they would not be given an official public meeting place, but they were not forbidden from meeting.

The plans for the seminar, announced in September by the Press Club Glasnost, call for sessions on such topics as the rights of the disabled, freedom of speech and religion, and international trust and disarmament. The sessions are to be held over the next three days in various Moscow apartments, with a concluding meeting scheduled for another public hall.

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A senior U.S. official cautioned last night that "lots of work" remains to be done on various aspects of the strategic defense issue. But he said that the accord reached at the White House yesterday "takes the edge off" this contentious issue.

On the final day of the summit, Gorbachev continued to dazzle U.S. officials and ordinary Americans with a confident, whirlwind style reminiscent of an up-and-coming western politician. The Gorbachev motorcade stopped abruptly on Connecticut Avenue near L Street NW as the Soviet leader was en route to the White House for his final meeting with the president. Out popped Gorbachev to shake a few hands.

During the departure ceremony Gorbachev said that "in bidding farewell to America, I am looking forward to a new encounter with it in the hope that I will then be able . . . to meet face-to-face with its great people, to chat and to have some lively exchanges with ordinary Americans."

The rain-drenched audience on the South Lawn broke into spontaneous applause and Reagan, who has often expressed the hope that Gorbachev would be able to travel across the country and "see America," responded with a broad smile.

Gorbachev departed for the Soviet Union from Andrews Air Force Base at 9 p.m., 76 hours after he arrived, with a scheduled stopover in East Berlin to brief Warsaw Pact leaders. Meanwhile, Shultz departed for Brussels and a briefing of North Atlantic Treaty Organization leaders.

Reagan finished the day with his nationally televised speech in which he contended that "persistence and consistency" in U.S. policy had paid dividends in the new agreement.

As a result of the summit, the editors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists announced that the hands of the well-known "doomsday clock," which appears on the front cover of the magazine, will be adjusted backward to an extent yet undetermined in the next issue to reflect a lessened danger, because of the signing of the INF Treaty and "the great improvement in the Soviet-U.S. relationship overall." The magazine's symbolic clock, reflecting its estimate of the danger of nuclear annihilation, has been at three minutes to midnight for the past four years.

Staff writers David Hoffman, David B. Ottaway, David Remnick and R. Jeffrey Smith contributed to this report.

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Damp Departure From Andrews

As an aide shields them against last night's rain, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife, Raisa, wave goodbye before boarding their plane at Andrews Air Force Base. Gorbachev departed for the Soviet Union at 9 p.m., 76 hours after he arrived in the United States, with a scheduled stopover in East Berlin to brief Warsaw Pact leaders. At right, well-wishers wave as the Aeroflot jetliner pulls away from the departure area.

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At a press conference opening the seminar, Sergei Kovalyov, another organizer and former political prisoner, suggested that authorities were trying to discourage the event in Gorbachev's absence, perhaps to embarrass him. But most observers here saw the response to the seminar as part of a developing trend to curb any challenge to government control under the conditions of *glasnost*, or openness.

The opening session of the rights seminar had been scheduled to take place in a meeting hall in the Kirov region of northern Moscow, rented in advance with a deposit of 300 rubles—about \$450 at the official exchange rate. But when participants arrived this afternoon, along with a number of western journalists, they found a padlock on the door and a sign saying the hall was closed for a "sanitation day."

"The official reason is the hall needed an urgent disinfection," said Sergei Petrov, spokesman for the seminar. He said inquiries would be made later about retrieving the deposit.

The group moved to an apartment in central Moscow, followed by unmarked police cars and surveillance vans that parked ostentatiously outside the entrance to the apartment. Timofeyev said the closing of the public hall presented the group with an "unexpected, complicated situation, but it has not affected our intentions."

Once officially ignored, world opinion about human rights in the Soviet Union now seems to be officially recognized here. Recently, an official committee was created to raise awareness of human rights problems. It is to be headed by a prominent newspaper commentator, Fyodor Burlatsky.

One of the key speakers at the seminar, Jan Urban, is a member of the Czechoslovak dissident group Charter 77. He arrived yesterday after a companion, Venek Silhan, was detained by police at the Prague airport.

Urban said the Moscow seminar was viewed as "a very important event" in Czechoslovakia, a test to see "if it will be possible for unofficial movements like Solidarity [in Poland] and Charter 77 to come and discuss freely." The Soviet Union announced a year ago that it would hold an official human rights conference in Moscow in 1988, but western governments have insisted that certain rights be guaranteed before they agree to participate.

"If this seminar is not possible because of repression by the KGB, then it shows Moscow is not prepared and these words are just words," said Urban.

Although Soviet visa authorities denied entry to Petra Kelly, a leader of the West German Greens party, to attend the seminar, several American participants were allowed into the country after listing the unofficial Glasnost club as their sponsor.

Among those attending from the United States are Martha Henderson, of Humanitas, a California rights group, Jan Kovarich of Washington's International Parliamentary Group for Human Rights in the Soviet Union and representatives of U.S. Jewish and Ukrainian groups.

Physicist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Andrei Sakharov, viewed as the father of the Soviet human rights movement, will not attend the seminar, according to Kovalyov.

"He said he will follow it with interest and read its reports. He said he supports it," said Kovalyov. "But he said he intuitively feels he should not take part."

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SDI Accord Raises More Questions

Formula Papers Over Dispute On Research, Weapons Policies

9/43

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

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President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reached an accord on space-based missile defenses yesterday that raises as many questions as it resolves, according to senior U.S. officials who participated in the discussions.

As the end of their three-day meeting drew near, the two leaders accepted a complicated formula on the troublesome missile-defense issue that skirts a vigorous and lasting dispute over scientific research and the direction of the U.S. and Soviet weapons policies.

"I would not use the word breakthrough . . . because there is still lots of work to be done on this issue," said a senior U.S. arms control official last night.

"What we have erected is a much better platform to do the work . . . [that] takes the edge off" persistent U.S. and Soviet wrangling over Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program to develop and deploy a ballistic missile defense, the senior official said.

Perhaps reflecting lingering uncertainty about whether the issue has been resolved or simply finessed for now, neither Reagan in his televised speech nor Gorbachev in his press conference played up the accord on SDI as a major achievement.

According to the compromise language developed as an "instruction" to U.S. and Soviet arms negotiators in Geneva, both sides agreed to observe the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty "as signed," and may not withdraw from the treaty or abrogate its provisions for a period of time to be agreed upon later.

The period of time is expected to be somewhere between the current Soviet position of 10 years and the current U.S. position of seven years.

The accord was a compromise between the initial Soviet position that both sides should observe the treaty as it was "signed and ratified" in 1972 and the U.S. position that both sides simply agree to observe the treaty without further qualification.

The Reagan administration objected to any reference to the treaty's ratification because the ratification record has been interpreted by Congress as supporting a view that realistic space tests are barred under the treaty. The administration has embraced an interpretation of the treaty allowing such tests, which it believes are necessary to pursue the SDI research program. But Congress has voted to prohibit the administration from operating under that interpretation through next Oct. 1.

The accord does not mean the two sides are agreed

See ARMS, A31, Col. 1

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Accord Reached on Space-Based Missile Defenses

ARMS, From A29

on whether missile defenses are valuable or on the type of scientific research that can be pursued during the period in which both sides abide by the ABM Treaty, U.S. officials said.

"The Soviets have a different view of strategic defense, and they strongly made the case that . . . we should not pursue" SDI, a senior administration official who advises the president on national security issues said at a press conference yesterday. "The president just as strongly reiterated his case that we believe . . . [SDI] is the direction we should be moving in the future."

In his press conference yesterday, Gorbachev said the Soviet Union is "resolutely opposed to SDI. We shall not build up an SDI in our own country If the Americans have all that much money, let them squander that money away."

The two sides agreed to paper over their dispute by explicitly al-

lowing missile defense "research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty."

The senior official briefing reporters yesterday said the administration has interpreted this convoluted statement in the two leaders' joint communique to mean that realistic space tests can be conducted as soon as the congressional legislation constraining them expires next October. "We have not given up anything on SDI with respect to our ability to pursue the program," the official said.

Other U.S. officials acknowledged, however, that the Soviets still maintain the ABM Treaty bars realistic space tests of missile defense weapons. By agreeing to such ambiguous phrasing, the officials said, the Soviets have essentially reserved the right to complain about a future U.S. decision to conduct such tests.

"It doesn't nail that down," the senior arms control official said.

"On the basis of what is in the [joint] statement, I would see no basis for them to object" to U.S. space tests, the presidential adviser said. But he added, "I don't know what they might or might not do in the future" in response to U.S. tests.

The statement in the joint communique specifies that, three years before the end of the period in which both sides have pledged not to withdraw from the treaty, they must conduct "intensive discussions of strategic stability." This obligation, suggested by the Soviets, will provide each side an opportunity to tell the other why SDI does or does not contribute to "stability."

Afterwards, each side is "free to decide its own course of action," according to the joint communique.

This phrase was interpreted by some officials as a substantial concession by the Soviets because it leaves the United States free to carry its SDI research and development to fruition.

"If an effective strategic defense capability has been developed, we will have the ability and the right to deploy it," the presidential adviser said. "Nothing in today's joint statement . . . constrains that."

But other officials called the language troubling because it allows the Soviets to respond as it sees fit to deployment of a U.S. missile defense system.

The Soviets have maintained in Geneva negotiations that any U.S.-Soviet treaty capping the number of strategic offensive weapons would "cease to be in force if either party proceeded with practical development and deployment of an ABM system beyond the provisions of the ABM Treaty."

Several U.S. officials said last night that nothing Gorbachev said or agreed to during the summit indicated he has abandoned this position, nor did the United States indicate it was willing to accept this position.

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Summit Declared 'Success'; Leaders Sidestep SDI Issue

*Two Nations Find New Way
To Conduct Their Business*

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

Propelled by the imperatives of political self-interest and the burden of the arms race on their nations, President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev demonstrated this week they have found a new way to do business with each other.

Gone was the tentativeness of Geneva or the recklessness of Reykjavik. For the first time since Gorbachev came to power and Reagan decided the time had come to do business with the Russians, both leaders came to the table ready to deal—albeit modestly—and ready to acknowledge where they were unable to deal.

In the joint statement they issued last night, for example, they decided to finesse the issue of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on which the Iceland summit foundered 14 months ago.

In Reykjavik, Reagan stalked out because he could not accept the Soviet demand that research on his proposed missile defense system be confined to the laboratory. The Soviets have dropped that demand, and now both leaders have reduced to writing a vague formulation on SDI that postpones the day of reckoning and allows them to disagree without disrupting their relations. It may even permit them to reach a second arms control agreement on long-range strategic weapons next year.

Nor did they find common ground this week on the difficult issues of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan or human rights, but they did not walk away in acrimony on either count. They declared they would probably

meet again next summer, even if they do not have another treaty to sign.

And they signed the treaty to eliminate medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles in a celebration of mutual satisfaction. After years of angry rhetoric in which Reagan predicted the demise of communism in the "dustbin of history" and the Soviets depicted Reagan as a nuclear-crazed cowboy, the two leaders found themselves talking in virtually the same language of hope and optimism. It often seemed during this summit that Gorbachev and Reagan could have read each other's speeches without anyone noticing the difference.

Reagan's senior advisers had said before the summit

See MEETING, A30, Col. 1

Superpower Leaders
Show They've Found
a New Way to
Conduct Business

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MEETING, From A1

that they wanted to send a political message to the American people that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was a "first step" toward reductions in strategic arms. Yesterday those advisers said they were surprised to find Gorbachev doing their work for them from his arrival through his remarkable final news conference last night.

In a comment that could have been lifted from a dozen Reagan speeches, the Soviet leader said on his departure from the White House that the INF Treaty is "an unprecedented step in the history of the nuclear age: the signing of the treaty under which the two militarily and strategically greatest powers have assumed an obligation to actually destroy a portion of their nuclear weapons."

In a subtle—but for the Soviets, enormously important—gesture to the Soviet leader, Reagan's speeches in Gorbachev's presence were scrubbed clean of the confrontational anti-Soviet insults that studded his rhetoric for years. There were no comments about the failing Soviet economy, the Soviet missile defense effort or alleged Soviet violations of earlier arms control treaties.

"The president's views have changed for the better, as have mine," Gorbachev said during his marathon news conference last night when a questioner asked about the disappearance of the "evil empire" tone in the president's utterances. "I think we now have more understanding between the president and myself," Gorbachev said.

But that "understanding" came only after Reagan and Gorbachev spent years testing each other and finally making concessions.

For example, last night Gorbachev reiterated his determination to frustrate Reagan's dream of a global missile defense system, though he said he would be willing to allow the United States to squander its money in pursuit of the dream. But Gorbachev did not insist that the joint statement include new restrictions to limit the program, which Congress has curtailed until nearly the end of Reagan's term. For Gorbachev it was a concession, but a relatively painless one, to simply wait until later.

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And Gorbachev put an optimistic spin on this temporizing compromise by recalling how difficult questions that held up completion of the INF Treaty were ultimately resolved. He listed several of those contentious issues—all of them points on which the Soviets ultimately made the biggest concessions, though he didn't point that out.

Reagan, too, has come a long way in deciding to do business with Gorbachev. In the early years of his presidency, Reagan felt he had the luxury of waiting out the Soviets, a tactic that he celebrated last night as "persistence and consistency" which led to agreement on the mid-range missile treaty. The unspoken reality is that Reagan can no longer use this tactic in the far more complex phase of reducing the superpowers' strategic arsenals. He is running out of time.

While Reagan insisted for years that he wouldn't have a summit without the promise of concrete results, he has all but agreed to that now. The White House announced that Reagan would go to Moscow next summer even without final agreement on a treaty to reduce strategic weapons.

"They want a smooth roll into the history books," commented a former White House official.

More immediately, Reagan's new way of dealing with Gorbachev may prove to be the hoped-for salve to heal his wounded presidency after a year of waning influence. Polls conducted in the first two days of the summit for the White House show that Reagan's public approval rating has returned to the level it was before the Iran-contra affair brought it down last November.

The summit marked a happy political coincidence for both leaders. Reagan defended his military buildup and rigid posture as worthwhile and sought to capitalize on the leverage they created before he leaves office. Gorbachev, eager to show concrete achievements at a time when his domestic reforms have yet to produce them, likewise wanted to show he could maneuver the most stridently anti-Soviet U.S. president into a more cooperative posture.

The summit was a success because both Reagan and Gorbachev wanted it to succeed. They appeared to have come to the same conclusion—that the time was ripe to improve Soviet-American relations, even if their biggest differences could not be resolved.

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BY FRANK JOHNSTON—THE WASHINGTON POST

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan applaud as White House summit departure ceremony concludes.

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Gorbachev's Stop Delights Crowds

Soviet Leader Stops In the Name of Glasnost

Curbside Chat Horrifies Guards, Delights Lunchtime Crowds

By David Remnick and Lois Romano
Washington Post Staff Writers

Mikhail Gorbachev's limousine screeched to a halt at noon yesterday, and in an instant there was a hysterical buzzing around the car. Horrified security agents yelled to the crowd, "Keep your hands out of your pockets!" People on the sidewalks watching the Soviet leader's motorcade to the White House thought something had gone terribly wrong.

Not until they saw Gorbachev's unmistakable pate bob up in the crowd did everyone realize that they were witnessing not a disaster but a classic, American-style whistle stop at one of Washington's busiest intersections: Connecticut Avenue and L Street NW.

With an interpreter trailing him, Gorbachev stepped up to the first woman he saw, shook her hand and said, "Hello, I'm glad to be in America. I'm glad to be friends with all of you."

The cars in the motorcade ahead of Gorbachev's boxy ZIL limousine didn't seem to realize at first

See STOP, A32, Col. 1

STOP, From A1

what was happening. When they did, the drivers slammed on the brakes and backed up at a terrific speed. The District police made furious U-turns on their motorcycles, and flatfoots beat it down the street with their hands on their holsters.

"It looked like a scene out of the Keystone Kops," said Leslie Kobylinski, who was on a break from her job at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

"He's out!" one police officer shouted. "He's shaking hands!"

Surrounded by nervous security agents in dark suits, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. spent two minutes at the curb in front of 1050 Connecticut Ave. waving, schmoozing and shaking hands with a half-dozen people. He worked the crowd as if he were the front-runner in an upcoming District of Columbia primary.

Calm amid the giddiness, Gorbachev told Lise Murphy, a passer-by, "My people are pushing me very hard to come to a better understanding of the American people."

It took a few moments before everyone joined in the spirit of the moment. "Some people seemed hesitant to shake hands with him," Murphy said. "They said, 'May I shake your hand?' and he reached right over and grabbed their hand. He seemed like a presidential candidate."

When restaurateur Duke Zeibert saw what was happening on the street below, he bolted to the balcony of his popular eatery barking, "Come on up and have lunch! We have borsch!"

And Howard McNamara, a bartender at Zeibert's, managed to snap a roll of photographs of Gorbachev being mobbed by the lunchtime crowd.

George Bush came out of Gorbachev's car looking very vice presidential as he stood nearby on the street and shook hands with a much smaller crowd. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stood to the side smiling as if Gorbachev's impromptu stop in the middle of Washington was a daily event.

American security officials dread spontaneity, but that has been one of Gorbachev's political trademarks since he came to power nearly three years ago. After a month in office, he worked the crowd at a Leningrad shipyard, and last year on the way to an airport in New Delhi he called for his car to stop so he could meet with a group of Indians by the highway.

By the time he made his stop yesterday, Gorbachev was already an hour late for an appointment at the White House with President Reagan.

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Connecticut Avenue had been cleared for Gorbachev. The side streets were shut off by barriers and police. Yards and yards of clear pavement. Squad cars everywhere. People standing on the street barely took notice of the helicopters whipping their blades overhead. Washingtonians have seen motorcades before.

Then the long string of cars and vans and motorcycles came snaking down the street.

Suddenly, Gorbachev's limo put down nasty screech marks. The car behind him almost slammed into its rear fender. In front of the Soviet Embassy on 16th Street NW, a police officer's radio crackled with an ominous message: "We have a traffic problem at Connecticut and L."

"I thought, 'My God, something's happened to him!'" said April Grierson, a phone company employe who was walking to lunch.

"I was sure something bad had happened," said Betsy Caine. "I was frightened."

Twenty or 30 security officials jumped out of various cars. "They were everywhere," Caine said. Agents leaped on a row of newspaper vending machines and helped form a protective cocoon around Gorbachev. They started looking to and fro as if they were watching a hysterical tennis match.

A Secret Service spokesman later said Gorbachev's decision to stop "was a little unusual. All we do is plan their security. If they want to walk or stop, that becomes part of the game plan."

Crowds quickly clogged every corner of the intersection.

Gorbachev leaned over the New York Post box—"NEW NAZI ATROCITIES BARED!"—and won the crowd. People flashed him the peace sign and yelled, "Welcome!"

"I was born and raised in D.C. and I've never even seen any U.S. president live before," said Pat Simonds. Gorbachev, said Barrie Kessler, a computer consultant,

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"is a great PR man."

At Duke Zeibert's, waiters and customers rushed to the balcony. Gorbachev looked up at the expense-account crowd and waved. The 40 people on the balcony and the crowd on the street burst into applause as television cameras rolled.

"Even from the balcony you could sense the charisma of the man," said Raleigh Schein, director of advertising at The Washington Post. "It was almost like a parade or a celebration. There was a world leader out shaking hands and you kind of felt the world was going to be okay. None of us wanted to let go of the moment. It was such a warm moment, of love. I'm a cynic, but I got chills."

"For about a minute there, I felt like a part of history," said John Williams, 24, executive assistant for the Council for Court Excellence. "As a Republican, I've always had a basic distrust of the Soviets. But this! It won't make a drastic change, but it softened me up a little. He must have done this all on his own. It showed a basic trust of the American people."

Indeed, Gorbachev told Bush that he decided to stop the motorcade because people in the Soviet Union react "favorably" to interacting with their leaders.

"I was driving along with him in the back seat of his car and we were getting a warm reception from the American people," Bush told a group of reporters later in the day.

Gorbachev spoke to the crowd in Russian, and his interpreter kept pace. "We come from two great countries," Gorbachev said. "It was so good to come here."

As he was turning to go back to his car, the applause grew louder and Gorbachev could not resist lingering at the door. He and Bush stood together and waved, looking very much like a triumphant campaign ticket. As the car drove away, Gorbachev kept his palm pressed to the window in farewell.

By the time he made it to the White House, he was an hour and a half late. As the car rolled up in the White House driveway, the president was there to greet it.

"I thought you'd gone home," Reagan said to Gorbachev.

Gorbachev smiled. "I had a chat with a group of Americans who stopped our car."

Staff writers Henry Allen, Chuck Conconi, Jeffrey Frank, Sari Horwitz, Caryle Murphy and Linda Wheeler contributed to this report.


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Eager pedestrians and anxious security officials compete to get close to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, center. © HOWARD T. McMANAMA



"I thought you'd gone home," Reagan joked with Gorbachev when Soviet leader arrived 1 1/2 hours late at White House. ASSOCIATED PRESS

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Gorbachev Displays Verve, Impatience

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Forcefulness, Grasp of Issues Shown During Lengthy News Conference

By Gary Lee
Washington Post Foreign Service

17/43

Mikhail Gorbachev put the full force of his personality on display for the American news media and public last night in a sweeping and energetic performance of nearly two hours at a packed news conference here at the end of his three-day summit with President Reagan.

He showed a grasp of detail on every issue, a sharp contrast to what American audiences have become used to with Reagan. But unlike the ease with which the president deals with controversy, Gorbachev once again flashed the impatience and resentment that surface quickly over some of the demands that Americans make of the Soviet leadership, especially the barrage of human-rights questions that journalists posed.

Gorbachev's stake in a positive outcome of this meeting was very high, and he spoke passionately of how he and his new partner, Ronald Reagan, had made "considerable headway" in talks about strategic nuclear arms and how this had paved the way for a broad range of future agreements.

Yet, between the lines of Gorbachev's positive thinking, it was clear that stalemate rather than progress between the two superpowers was the norm on the tougher bilateral issues. Gorbachev reported little progress in his broad objectives of ending the war in Afghanistan on terms that would let him withdraw gracefully. Nor was there any noticeable progress on two of his most high-profile campaigns: for a ban on chemical weapons and a nuclear test ban.

And yet, in his tour of the horizon of his first visit to the United States, the Soviet leader declared success across the board, brushing adroitly past the thornier issues in the talks on arms control and other areas.

Since closer relations with the United States lie at the center of the foreign policy Gorbachev has fashioned, success in his third summit with Reagan was considered crucial.

Gorbachev appeared eager to portray the U.S.-Soviet relationship as infused with a strong positive impulse. Asked about his relations with Reagan, which have undergone stormy periods, Gorbachev said: "Our dialogue is more businesslike. There is more of a constructive approach, and I'll even venture to say that I think we trust each other more."

Stressing the positive, Gorbachev said that in the negotiations for a proposed 50 percent reduction in strategic, or long-range, nuclear weapons, the superpowers had reached agreements for cuts in sea-launched cruise missiles and for new sub-limits on land-based missiles.

Gorbachev also reported that the two sides had agreed to adhere to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, adding, "and

See GORBACHEV, A36, Col. 1

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Gorbachev's Session With Media Shows Force of Personality

GORBACHEV, From A29

that includes the process of research, development and, if necessary, tests which are allowed under that treaty."

The Soviet Union has been opposed to testing components of

**"You're pulling me
the wrong way."**

—Mikhail Gorbachev

Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative program, which Soviet officials have argued in the past is prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

On the politically charged subject of Afghanistan, Gorbachev announced that the timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal, a crucial ingredient for efforts to end the 8-year-old military conflict, will be 12 months. U.S. and other outside aid to rebels opposing the Soviet-backed regime ruling Afghanistan and Soviet military aid should end simultaneously with the start of Soviet troop withdrawals, he added.

Gorbachev declined to announce when the Soviet troops will start leaving, however. He also blurred the crucial issue of the nature of the government that will rule in Kabul after the troops have withdrawn, saying that Moscow will not insist that it be pro-Soviet, but that Washington should not insist that it be pro-American.

He said that from the day western aid to rebel forces is ended, Moscow will begin pulling out its troops. But apparently Gorbachev did not obtain an agreement from the Reagan administration to stop supplying aid to Afghan insurgents if Soviet troops withdraw.

During his 72-minute opening statement at the news conference, Gorbachev complained that he is asked too many questions about Soviets forbidden to emigrate or still imprisoned for political offenses. And he flashed into one of the most animated moments of his trip.

"Is that a dialogue?" he asked. "Is that an interview? That's not what the media is for."

"I'm not trying to accuse any of you," Gorbachev added. "I'm just trying to say that the media has to go for some *perestroika*," too, in a reference to his policy of reconstruction or reform.

Following his expansive opening statement, Gorbachev gave journalists brief and often perfunctory answers to their wide range of questions. Asked whether he or the audience should be disappointed with the results of the summit, he said, "You're pulling me the wrong way. I cannot add anything to what I've said in my introductory remarks."

Gorbachev, who left last night to brief Warsaw Pact allies in East Berlin, also said he will report to the Soviet people when he returns home.

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


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During 72-minute opening statement, Gorbachev complained of queries on emigration, political prisoners.

PHOTOS BY HARRY MALCHAYAN—THE WASHINGTON POST



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A Blase Town Flips for Gorby

Final Day in America Filled with Frenzy and Surprises

By Sandra Saperstein Torry
and John Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writers

In a frenzied final day filled with the unexpected, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reached out to meet some average Americans, then boarded his huge Aeroflot jet to leave the city that he has captivated for the past three days.

Gorbachev seemed to be everywhere: on the sidewalk at Connecticut Avenue and L Street under twinkling Christmas trees, grasping the hands of thrilled passersby; back at his embassy, charming American youngsters; holding forth to a worldwide press assembled at the Soviet compound on Wisconsin Avenue NW; and then waving from the steps of his rain-slicked plane at Andrews Air Force Base.

It was the first time in his three-day visit that he had gone beyond the politicians and actors and insiders to make a gesture to those who had been waiting on Washington sidewalks to catch his eye. Americans seemed enthralled by his touch.

The city's excitement was expressed by a 10-year old boy who waited with a crowd in the rain near the Soviet compound on Wisconsin Avenue NW for Gorbachev's arrival to meet with reporters. As his huge black ZIL limousine drove past, Gorbachev smiled and waved.

"I thought it was awesome," said schoolboy Haven Pell. "I'm going to write a composition about it."

The frantic pace of Gorbachev's final day in Washington seemed in keeping with the super-charged atmosphere his visit had created. In his brief stay and limited forays around the city, Gorbachev got a taste of America's diversity. He saw beaming office-workers and waving youngsters—while within three blocks of his embassy he and his government were vilified in several different languages by groups as diverse as Ukrainians and Ethiopians.

Even as the Soviet motorcade was departing the city last night, contractors hired by the Secret Service were dismantling the huge concrete barriers near his embassy that were the most visible signs of the intense security surrounding the visit. The miles of yellow police ribbon and battalions of officers around town seemed to evaporate as quickly as they had appeared in the pre-dawn hours Monday. Law enforcement personnel breathed a sigh of relief, as they readied the city's downtown streets for their first normal rush hour in days.

Russian-language signs for "Men" and "Ladies" on the restrooms.

Gorbachev's constant comings and goings on 16th Street NW spawned a set of Gorby groupies. Jane Hathaway watched through binoculars all week from her desk at the Independent Petroleum Association until her boss told her someone might misunderstand her intentions. She came to the corner as often as she could to catch sight of the motorcade, and when she was disappointed Wednesday at a fleeting glimpse, she joked, "Maybe tomorrow I can throw my body on top of his limousine."

Workers at the Madison Hotel at 15th and M streets NW, home to more than 200 Soviet diplomats for the past days, found the Soviets delightful.

"I think the people are lovely," said a woman who checks coats near one of the hotel's restaurants. "They're very gracious. They're very polite . . . I find them like us, very ordinary people."

Even U.S. Chief of Protocol Selwa Roosevelt was struck by Washington's embrace of the visitor. "Washington is fairly blase," she said. "We have celebrities here every week, but this time so many are waiting for a glimpse."

Yesterday's day of communion followed a night marred by at least one unpleasant incident, still unresolved. There was a telephone threat on Gorbachev's life made to police headquarters Wednesday night. Police traced the call to a downtown phone booth, where witnesses helped police locate a man, whom they later arrested on a charge of escaping from a halfway house.

The Secret Service and FBI are continuing to investigate the incident, according to a D.C. police official. Both federal agencies declined to comment.

Officials involved in the massive security effort surrounding Gorbachev's visit said it was too early even to estimate the cost.

Hundreds of D.C. police officers have been working 12-hour shifts since Saturday, manning security barricades, escorting motorcades and handling demonstrations. They have been joined by U.S. Park Police, who also escorted motorcades and had primary responsibility for keeping order at demonstrations in Lafayette Park and on the Mall. The Secret Service, which is in charge of the entire operation, has provided round-the-clock protection to Gorbachev, his wife and several other top-ranking members of his entourage.

"It's a costly event," Assistant D.C. Police Chief Isaac Fulwood said. "But we don't even know how much yet . . . It's expensive."

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The last send-off came at about 8:50 p.m. as a steady rain pelted the parking ramp at Andrews. Gorbachev and his wife Raisa walked up the soggy red carpet, turned for a final wave and nod, and disappeared into the Soviet airplane.

As the plane lifted off at 9 p.m., Air Force officers immediately prepared for what they called a "wheels-up pizza party" in a nearby tent.

Americans marked his departure in different ways.

A class of seventh graders in Owensboro, Ky., sent 70 pounds of children's blue jeans to Gorbachev, destined, they hoped, for children in the Soviet Union. "It was our way of getting in on the peace talks," said Lisa Newcom, the teacher. "We were sending a gesture of freedom and good will and peace on the seventh-grade level. We thought it was something we could do."

The big brown cardboard box ended up at the Vista Hotel, near 15th and M streets NW, along with a load of other cardboard boxes addressed to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. There was a box marked "Girl Scout Peanut Butter Sandwich" from Lafayette, La., and another box, marked "Fragile," containing a colored print titled "Doves of Peace" from Greenwich, Conn. The artist, Lee James Pantas, said he wrapped it "on impulse" and sent it off "to this man of peace."

In Washington, 15 students, who also looked to Gorbachev as a symbol of peace, had worked for days to meet him. And when they did, yesterday at the Soviet Embassy, they found it "absolutely incredible," as 17-year-old Heather Iliff later said. The Severna Park, Md., high school student said Gorbachev was "an incredible, vivacious, friendly man."

Classmate Lisa Fletcher, also 17, said that if any members of the group had negative preconceptions, such thoughts were "blown away."

The warm feeling apparently was mutual for the Soviet leader. At his press conference, he referred to his meeting with the young people, saying that they, unlike adults, are able to "quickly find a common tongue They are thinking about how we should live in this world," a phenomenon which he called "remarkable."

Adults too, perhaps jaded by the almost routine visits of foreign dignitaries in this town, have reveled in the summit all week. In Mel Krupin's restaurant, where celebrity-watching is almost on the menu, a visit by a small delegation of Soviets had diners on their feet, toasting and offering to buy drinks for the visitors. At the Market Inn, a Capitol Hill haunt, the management wanted the Soviets to feel right at home. They placed

Though it is difficult to compare events, the 34-hour visit of Pope John Paul II in 1979 ran up a \$950,000 overtime bill for D.C. police and U.S. Park Police. The largest chunk of that was for the city police overtime, about \$800,000.

John White, spokesman for Mayor Marion Barry, said the State Department will be billed for the costs of the Gorbachev visit because the operation was mounted at the request of the federal government.

During the past six days, law enforcement agencies have had to contend with more than a dozen demonstrations, most of them decrying some aspect of Soviet policy—and almost all of them peaceful. The rallies' organizers used Gorbachev's last day in the United States to reflect on their efforts.

Organizers of the large rally Sunday on behalf of Soviet Jews were elated at their turnout, and said its size—more than 200,000 participants, or the equivalent of about one in 30 of the nation's Jews—was "an extraordinary mandate," said Pamela Cohen, president of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews.

Her group is following up on Sunday's rally with a new campaign to press for more Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and increased human rights. The campaign will organize boycotts and use other tactics against companies and banks that do large amounts of business with the Soviets. Among the targets, she said, could be companies owned by Armand Hammer, who has done business with the Soviets for years, and PepsiCo Inc.

Myron Wasyluk, Washington representative of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, said that his organization's rally, which brought 1,500 people to Lafayette Park Monday to protest Soviet treatment of Ukrainians, was carried live on Voice of America radio to millions of Ukrainians. "Any voice of support from the White House or the Ukrainian community here for the Ukrainians there is heartening to them," said Wasyluk. "We made the point."

Yesterday, Fulwood made a private point, with a foreign colleague. He exchanged color pictures and badges with the head of the KGB detail guarding Gorbachev. "His parting words to me were that he wished the American people well and that he was my friend."

Staff writers Victoria Churchville, Lynne Duke, Keith Harriston, David Hilzenrath, Sari Horwitz, Eugene Meyer, Tracey A. Reeves, Carlos Sanchez, Molly Sinclair, Laura Sessions Stepp, Martin Weil, Linda Wheeler and Jeffrey Yorke contributed to this report.

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For Bush the Candidate, Embassy Breakfast Is Political Prize



By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

Vice President Bush claimed a long-awaited political prize yesterday in the Gold Room of the Soviet Embassy.

There he met Mikhail Gorbachev face to face over mounds of caviar, sour cream and blini. He introduced American guests from Iowa, New Hampshire and Texas. They talked about farming, high technology and energy in a breakfast session that is destined to find its way immediately into the vice president's campaign speeches.

After an unexpected delay while Gorbachev consulted privately with advisers, the Soviet leader then provided his guest with an additional bonus on the way to the White House. They climbed out of Gorbachev's limousine at Connecticut Avenue and L Street NW and worked the crowd, waving together in a running-mates' embrace—a scene right out of the American political handbook.

For Bush, the meeting was another carefully planned event in a campaign that has sought to highlight his foreign policy experience and his support of the Intermediate-

Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed this week by Gorbachev and President Reagan. He was the only Republican presidential candidate to win the attention of Gorbachev for a full-scale meeting, although his chief rival, Senate Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) claimed eight minutes alone with the Soviet leader.

While Bush said he had not politicized the session, a Dole spokeswoman accused the vice president of making it "so blatantly political it defies description." Spokeswoman Katie Boyle said, "I'm surprised Bush didn't invite Gorbachev to Des Moines for a fundraiser."

This comment rankled Bush advisers who nonetheless acknowledged the obvious political overtones of the event.

Within hours of the breakfast, Bush was putting it to advantage. He used a satellite link to conduct interviews with five local television stations about his meeting—four of the stations were in Iowa or New Hampshire markets. Bush has appeared on one network television broadcast every morning of the summit. He also accompanied Gorbachev to Andrews Air Force Base last night and participated in the farewell ceremony.

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At left, Vice President Bush meets with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev before their breakfast at Soviet Embassy. At table, Bush looks on as Raisa Gorbachev chats with Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

PHOTOS BY RICH LIPSKY—THE WASHINGTON POST

As with the meetings he held in Poland with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, the vice president is planning to recall the Gorbachev breakfast session in his campaign speeches. He leaves today for two days of events of Iowa, including an address on U.S.-Soviet relations on Saturday morning at the University of Iowa.

Bush had 23 minutes alone with Gorbachev in the Red Room after arriving at the embassy, and they talked about Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and arms control, a source said. Then they moved to the Gold Room for breakfast. Bush had invited his New Hampshire campaign chairman, Gov. John H. Sununu, who also is chairman of the National Governors' Association; former U.S. representative Cooper Evans of Iowa, a Bush supporter; Robert Brooks, principal of Valley High School in Des Moines, which has a student letter exchange with Soviet students; Mayor Henry Cisneros of San Antonio, and Dr. Mary Good, president of the American Chemical Society here.

According to a participant, the guests parried with Gorbachev throughout the breakfast. Sununu, a supporter of the controversial Seabrook nuclear power plant,

talked about nuclear power with the Soviet leader. The participant quoted Gorbachev as telling Sununu that the "devastation" of the Chernobyl nuclear accident "was even greater reason to advance our talks on nuclear weapons."

Evans, the former congressman, pressed Gorbachev on whether American soybean growers should plan on greater production with hopes of selling more to the Soviets, according to the participant. Gorbachev responded that the Soviets have a storage problem, and said many Soviets are afraid to rely on the United States as a food source, an apparent reference to the grain embargo imposed by President Jimmy Carter in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Bush, widely viewed to be running second in Iowa behind Dole, then made a pitch to the Soviet leader that is certain to be greeted warmly by Iowa farmers. According to the participant, Bush said there is "widespread recognition that agricultural products should not be a political weapon and I know of no one in this administration nor anyone who might head a future administration who would advocate using grain as a weapon."

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In a discussion of high technology with Cisneros, Gorbachev said the Soviets have "learned lessons" about importing technology, the participant said. He suggested that Soviet technology purchases in the West had weakened the Soviet machine-building industry, calling this an "import plague." Gorbachev said efforts are being made to improve Soviet capabilities, according to the participant.

Gorbachev also touted Soviet progress in high-technology computers, saying five "supercomputer" projects are under way and he has placed a priority on putting computers in schools.

Before reporters were ushered out, Bush was asked whether he wasn't playing politics by inviting guests from Iowa and New Hampshire. Bush smilingly countered that Sununu was elected to the governors' association post by Republicans and Democrats.

When a reporter noted that his guests seemed to be concentrated in the two states with early presidential campaign tests, Bush noted that Cisneros was from Texas.

The vice president held up three fingers. "Three states," he said.

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U.S., Soviet Brass Agree to Consider Exchanges

By Gary Lee and Molly Moore
Washington Post Staff Writers

Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, a negotiator credited with breaking deadlocks at the Geneva nuclear arms talks, yesterday agreed with top U.S. military leaders to consider unprecedented exchanges between superpower military officers.

The decision, which could ease relations between U.S. and Soviet military services, came during an extraordinary meeting of Akhromeyev, Soviet first deputy minister of defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon.

The superpowers have no established military-to-military contacts, such as official visits or educational meetings, although both countries' forces participate with other armed forces.


The military leaders agreed they should discuss better communication between the armed forces, but stopped short of suggesting joint military operations or major exchange programs, knowledgeable Pentagon officials said.

The official said military leaders on both sides at the meeting "seemed to think it was a good idea."

Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hosted Akhromeyev at breakfast, and the marshal then visited with the full Joint Chiefs of Staff for about 25 minutes in "the tank," their conference room.

Akhromeyev, 64, described by Crowe as "very much a soldier's soldier and very forthright," is the highest-ranking Soviet official ever to visit the Pentagon.

Akhromeyev's unusual visit underlines the pivotal role he and another senior Soviet of-



BY LARRY MORRIS—THE WASHINGTON POST

Adm. Crowe, left, and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev salute honor guard as they enter the Pentagon.

ficer, Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, have played in Moscow's negotiations with the United States.

According to U.S. negotiator Maynard W. Glitman, a Chervov suggestion last June cleared the way to the agreement eliminating all U.S. and Soviet shorter- and medium-range missiles (INF) that President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed Tuesday.

At the talks, Chervov dropped Soviet insistence on retaining 100 intermediate-range warheads, which helped overcome U.S. negotiators' fears that a partial elimination would be impossible to verify, Glitman said.

Akhromeyev also helped the two sides overcome last-minute differences over INF verification last month, Glitman said.

The Soviet military was sometimes "very imaginative and useful," during the INF talks, Glitman, who headed the U.S. delegation.

Akhromeyev's trip to a building full of officers who spend most of their time figuring

out ways to counter his government's military might caused a flurry of consternation, enthusiasm and outright awe.

He met with Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci and a small group of top officials for about 65 minutes Wednesday afternoon, then returned for his early morning sessions with the military brass yesterday.

"You can't trust the Russians as far as you can throw them," said one longtime Pentagon employe. "I think they're very deceitful."

But one young military officer countered, "Anything that would bring the two countries closer together and further away from any kind of armed conflict is good. If you can do that without giving away any kind of national secrets or the blueprints to the Pentagon, that would be great."

As for the chances of Akhromeyev leaving the Pentagon with any secrets, one officer commented, "The marshal won't learn anything in this building he doesn't already know."

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Push for Freer Trade, Business Leaders Urged

26/43

By Elizabeth Tucker
and Stuart Auerbach
Washington Post Staff Writers

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev appealed yesterday to a group of top U.S. business leaders to help thaw economic relations between the two superpowers.

In a frank discussion with 70 business executives, including the heads of major corporations such as Pepsico, AT&T, and Xerox, Gorbachev entreated the United States to drop trade restrictions and to grant the Soviet Union the same "most favored nation" status that other U.S. trading partners have, participants reported.

In his news conference last night, Gorbachev revealed that the summit's joint communique will include the need to reduce American restrictions on U.S.-Soviet economic cooperation, most of them ordered by Congress. "You can't conduct a political dialogue without strengthening economic ties," he asserted.

Gorbachev apparently chose to address the group because he has set as a high priority upgrading the lackluster Soviet economy by bringing in western technology and expertise.

"It's a great beginning," said industrialist Armand Hammer, who heads Occidental Petroleum Corp., which has announced a joint venture for the largest petroleum complex ever built in the Soviet Union.

Hammer said the treaty eliminating medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles, signed by Gorbachev and President Reagan, "sets the stage for improvements in economic relations to come." Hammer, who knew Lenin, has been involved in trade with the Soviets for more than 70 years.

Gorbachev pressed yesterday for increased trade between the two countries and repeal of U.S. restrictions, specifically the 1972 Jackson-Vanik amendment that ties trade to increased Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Gorbachev also asked the United States to drop "onerous tariffs," said Charles E. Hugel, president of Combustion Engineering Inc., a Connecticut petroleum engineering firm that is the

first U.S. company to conclude a joint venture under new rules set by Gorbachev's regime.

"He did make quite a point about concern about the consistency of trade without political intervention," Hugel said. Gorbachev cited particularly the "enormous impression" made on the Soviet people when President Jimmy Carter ordered a grain embargo after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

"Their people suffered as a result of that . . . and it has left them with concern about doing business with us," he said. "Every time we take this kind of action all it does is cut off the opportunity for American companies to do business around the world and the void is filled by companies of other countries," he said.

Bill Andrews, Chairman of SSMC, formerly Singer Sewing Machine Co., said Gorbachev made it clear that joint ventures will help the Soviet leader implement his reforms by setting a management example. "By entering joint ventures, people throughout the country would get a different attitude about work," he said. But Gorbachev remained unbending on allowing U.S. companies to set up shop on Soviet soil without Soviet participation. Allen F. Jacobson, chairman of 3M Corp., said Gorbachev "talked mainly about joint ventures rather than the broad range of specialized industry that it takes to make an economy like ours tick or being able to have our own business out there."

3M has no plans to form a joint venture with the Soviet Union, but Jacobson recounted some of Gorbachev's talent for salesmanship and public relations.

"I told him our company makes Scotch brand tape . . . and he grabbed me and told me, 'You have a good business. We'd like you to sell Scotch tape in our country,'" Jacobson said.

Participants in the meeting described Gorbachev as intelligent, forceful and charismatic and said he spoke without notes. "He is a great communicator," said Walter C. Klein, chairman of Bunge Corp., a big grain and food processing company.


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AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

Industrialist Armand Hammer makes point to Gorbachev at meeting this week.

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Remarks by Leaders At Departure Ceremony

Associated Press

Transcript of remarks by President Reagan and translated remarks by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the White House departure ceremony:

Reagan: Mr. General Secretary, these last few days have been exciting indeed for both of us. For our fellow countrymen who have followed the course of our discussions, I am pleased to report that upon the completion of our business, that this summit has been a clear success. *(Applause.)*

Like the star on the top of the national Christmas tree, which was lit the evening you arrived, Mr. General Secretary, this summit has lit the sky with hope for all people of good will.

And as we leave it—leave, it is up to both sides to ensure that the luster does not wear off and to follow through on our commitments as we move forward to the next steps in improving the relations between our countries and peoples.

I believe both the general secretary and I can walk away from our meetings with a sense of accomplishment. We have proven that adversaries, even with the most basic philosophical differences, can talk candidly and respectfully with one another and, with perseverance, find common ground.

We did not hide from the weighty differences that separate us. Many of them, of course, remain.

One of my predecessors, President Franklin Roosevelt, once said, "History cannot be rewritten by wishful thinking."

Our discussions in that spirit were straightforward and designed to open a thoughtful communication between our governments on the critical issues that confront us.

Our exchange on the subject of human rights underscored the priority we in the western democracies place on respect for fundamental freedoms. I am pleased that during this summit, we addressed this area of heartfelt importance and have ensured a continuing dialogue on human rights at the highest levels of our governments.

Our discussions on regional conflicts were no less to the point. These conflicts continue to take a heavy toll in lives and impose a heavy burden on East-West relations.

The general secretary and I expressed different points of view. We did so bluntly and, for that reason alone, our talks have been useful in this area.

Moreover, we agreed that it is necessary to search for real political solutions to these conflicts. But, so far, we cannot be satisfied with what has been achieved.

We must now press ahead in the search for political solutions that advance the cause of peace and freedom for the people suffering in these wars. The door has been opened, and it will stay open to serious discussion of ending these regional conflicts.

And as far as open doors, Mr. Gorbachev and I both agree on the desirability of freer and more extensive

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personal contact and the breaking down of artificial barriers between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States.

As I said in my welcoming remarks, the fact that our governments have disagreements should not prevent our peoples from being friends.

Of course, the greatest accomplishment of these three days was the signing of a treaty to eliminate a whole class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons.

Another one of my predecessors, a president I've admired since my youth—Calvin Coolidge—once said, "History is made only by action."

Well, it took enormous effort and almost superhuman tenacity on the part of negotiators on both sides, but the end product is a treaty that does indeed make history. It is in the interest of both our peoples, yet I cannot help but believe that mankind is the biggest winner.

At long last, we have begun the task of actually reducing these deadly weapons rather than simply putting limits on their growth. The INF treaty, as proud of it as we are, should be viewed as a beginning, not an end. Further arms reduction is now possible.

I'm pleased some progress has been made toward a strategic arms reduction treaty over the last three days.

Individual agreements will not, in and of themselves, result in sustained progress. We need a realistic understanding of each other's intentions and objectives, a process for dealing with differences in a practical and straightforward manner. And we need patience, creativity and persistence in achieving what we set out to do.

As a result of this summit, the framework for build-

ing such a relationship has been strengthened. I am determined to use this framework.

My goal, which I believe you share, Mr. General Secretary, is a more constructive relationship between our governments—long lasting, rather than transitory, improvements.

Together, we can bring about a more secure and prosperous future for our peoples and a more peaceful world. Both of us are aware of the difficult challenges and special responsibilities inherent in this task.

During World War II, when so many young Russians served at the front, the poem "Wait for Me" became a prayer spoken on the lips of Russian families who dreamed one day of the happiness that their reunion would bring.

The cause of world peace and world freedom is still waiting, Mr. General Secretary. It has waited long enough.

General Secretary Gorbachev, Mrs. Gorbachev, it is good that you came to America. Nancy and I are pleased to have welcomed you here.

Your visit was short, yet I hope you'll take with you a better sense of the spirit and soul of the United States of America.

And, when you get back to Moscow, please pass on to the Soviet people the best wishes of the American people for a peaceful and prosperous new year.

Thank you, and Godspeed on your journey. [*Applause.*]

Gorbachev: Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mrs. Reagan, ladies and gentlemen.

In these last hours before our departure for home,

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Remarks by Leaders At the Departure Ceremony

DEPARTURE, From A32

we note with satisfaction that the visit to Washington has, on the whole, justified our hopes.

We have had three days of hard work, of business-like and frank discussions on the pivotal problems of Soviet-American relations and on important aspects of the current world situation. A good deal has been accomplished.

I would like to emphasize, in particular, an unprecedented step in the history of the nuclear age: the signing of the treaty under which the two militarily and strategically greatest powers have assumed an obligation to actually destroy a portion of their nuclear weapons, thus, we hope, setting in motion the process of nuclear disarmament.

In our talks with President Ronald Reagan, some headway has been made on the central issue of that process, achieving substantial reductions of strategic offensive arms, which are the most potent weapons in the world, although we still have a lot of work to do.

We have had a useful exchange of views, which has clarified each other's positions concerning regional conflicts, the development of our bilateral ties and human rights.

On some of these aspects, it seems likely that we can soon identify specific solutions, satisfactory both to us and to other countries.

A useful result of the Washington talks is that we have been able to formulate a kind of agenda for joint efforts in the future. This puts the dialogue between

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our two countries on a more predictable footing and is undoubtedly constructive.

While this visit has centered on our talks with the president of the United States, I have no intention of minimizing the importance of meetings with members of Congress, with other political leaders, public figures, members of the business and academic communities, cultural figures and media executives.

Such contacts enable us to gain a better and more profound knowledge of each other, provide a wealth of opportunities for checking one's views, assessments and even established stereotypes.

All this is important, both for policy-making and for bringing peoples and countries closer together.

These meetings have confirmed the impression that there is a growing desire in American society for improved Soviet-American relations. In short, what we have seen here is a movement matching the mood that has long been prevalent among Soviet people.

In bidding farewell to America, I am looking forward to a new encounter with it, in the hope that I will then be able to see not only its capital but also to meet face-to-face with its great people, to chat and to have some lively exchanges with ordinary Americans.

I believe that what we have accomplished during the meeting and the discussion will, with time, help considerably to improve the atmosphere in the world at large and in America itself in terms of its more correct and tolerant perception of my country, the Soviet Union.

Today, the Soviet Union and the United States are closer to the common goals of strengthening international security. But this goal is yet to be reached. There is still much work to be done, and we must get down to it without delay.

Mr. President—Mr. President, esteemed citizens of the United States, we are grateful for your hospitality, and we wish success, well-being and peace to all Americans. Thank you and goodbye. *[Applause.]*

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Gorbachev Statement And News Conference

Excerpts from the translation of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's opening statement and responses to questions at a news conference:

I have to apologize for being late We can now regard the visit as having been completed I realize that it is natural that you are interested . . . [in] our assessment of the results of this visit so perhaps in my introductory remarks I will use up more time than usual This has been my third meeting in the last 2½ years [with President Reagan], and this in itself says a great deal . . . about the dynamism of the political dialogue between the U.S. administration and the leadership of the Soviet Union We can say that Geneva, Reykjavik were not in vain as were not in vain other steps taken by our side as well as by the U.S. administration.

. . . And I should like to begin my assessment of this visit first . . . by saying that it has become a major event in world politics. I would even go so far as to say that we might even talk about beginning a new phase and an important phase from the standpoint of Soviet-American bilateral relations and . . . the world situation. Much has taken place during the negotiations . . . I should like to find some very precise words . . . to convey the nature, the character of the talks and correctly to summarize the political results

First . . . we can talk about a deepening political dialogue After we completed our negotiations with the president today, we have issued a joint statement . . . at the highest level. This fact alone bears witness to a certain dynamism and a certain level achieved in our political dialogue. The importance of that document lies in the fact that it shows both the range and the content of the discussions In reading this document, you will be able to gauge both the degree of mutual understanding and accord on various questions and you will also feel, I trust, that this document . . . is confirmation of the fact that serious discord still remains.

. . . What do we assess on the positive side in that document? Firstly, the president and I have noted that in relations . . . certain progress has of late been achieved. Secondly . . . we have agreed that what has been achieved today is based on Geneva and Reykjavik that made possible the steps aimed at improving strategic stability and lessening the danger of conflicts.

. . . We have forcefully reaffirmed the solemn declaration of Geneva. We deemed it necessary to do this once again We declared, reaffirmed that nuclear war should never be fought and cannot be won, that we are fully determined to prevent any war between our countries, nuclear or conventional, and that we shall not seek to achieve military superiority. This is something that we regard as an undertaking of unlimited duration by the two great nations before the entire world community.

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time, there should be no withdrawal from the treaty. That is what we inscribed in our joint statement. We agreed that we would continue intensive discussion of strategic stability.

It has also been defined that if the U.S.S.R. and United States fail to agree after the time limit for the treaty to be in effect, then each side will have the right to determine its mode of action. As you see, we have moved significantly ahead on the problem of nuclear and space arms . . . the most important and the most complex problem

Thirdly, when we reach common positions on eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and addressed the problems of reducing strategic offensive arms, the question of conventional arms and of chemical weapons have come to the fore

We believe it necessary to discuss . . . such questions as a corridor with limited armaments, first and foremost of an offensive nature. We should also ponder the principle of sufficiency and in general the problem of comparing military doctrines from the standpoint of transforming them into purely defensive ones the American side treated our invitation to this kind of an analysis very seriously, displayed interest, and we have agreed to address this problem in a concrete way

Here, too, we are trying to be realists. Probably, this is a process which will have to go through certain phases. We can't resolve everything at one fell swoop, but we have to start by sitting down at the negotiating table. We have . . . to lay our cards on the table and start speaking about concrete things . . . , let's say, the corridor with limited armaments in order to lessen the confrontation. That would be a significant achievement, and that could be done right now without delay

We also talked about chemical weapons in the same spirit. The importance that they be eliminated is obvious. This question has long since been under discussion and, until recently, those negotiations had reached some progress

We exchanged views . . . on a whole spectrum of other questions—regional, humanitarian. The examination of regional problems was not easy

There is a broad desire throughout the world to resolve existing regional conflicts through political means

What we need is new approaches and, most important, both we and the Americans and other countries should unconditionally recognize that each nation has the right to its own choice. That is the key element and the point of departure. Regional solutions cannot be divorced from the question of human rights and humanitarian issues. What can be higher than the right to security, to life, to settling their national affairs as they choose? What can be more favorable for democratic forums and processes unless it is the reliable security of each country?

In short, all this is interlinked, and this is what we would like to arrive at, notably in Afghanistan—a settlement which would make it possible to put an end to the internal bloody conflict, to prevent the possibility of its recurrence.

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Thirdly, emphasis has been put on the special responsibility devolving on the Soviet Union and the United States for the quest for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and build up a safer world for mankind entering the third millennium.

Fourthly, while realistically assessing the fact that differences still exist . . . some . . . very serious indeed, we do not regard them as being insurmountable. On the contrary, they urge us on toward greater dialogue.

Summing up this conceptual portion of our joint statement, I can say that, at the highest level of our two states, it has been recognized that they are now emerging from the long, drawn-out confrontation, that they are prepared to leave it behind us . . . this is an important political result . . .

[In this] consists the essence of a transition to a new phase in Soviet-American relations. Further, in the course of the visit, work has been completed—and it took us many years to reach this point—on preparing a treaty to eliminate intermediate- and short-range missiles on a global basis . . .

Secondly, at the central attention of the negotiations . . . was the problem of a radical reduction in strategic offensive arms. I would say that that problem took up most of our time and . . . some parts were resolved at the time when the participants in the official farewell ceremony were already waiting for us on the South Lawn . . .

We were talking about a reduction by one-half. It is a complex issue. On the whole, both sides came to the conclusion that on this road, too, we must make a serious breakthrough resting for a support on the experience that we accumulated over the preceding phase in the negotiations and that—including the experience gained in preparing the INF treaty—and this should be done . . .

We achieved significant—and I use that word because it is the correct word, I've given careful thought to this—we have achieved considerable headway on this problem which is the major one for the Soviet Union, the United States and for other nations . . .

At long last, we . . . developed the problem of limiting the deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. The American side has agreed to establish limits for such missiles over and above the 6,000 warheads and to conduct a search for mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations . . .

Mutual understanding in the field of verification is a consequence of the successful work done in preparing the INF Treaty . . .

The president and I, with due regard for preparing the treaty on strategic offensive arms, have instructed the delegations in Geneva to elaborate an agreement which would make it incumbent upon both . . . sides to comply with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

And that includes the process of research, development and, if necessary, tests which are allowed under the ABM Treaty and that, for an agreed period of

We said outright that . . . we're not seeking any outcome under which there has to be a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, but the American side must clearly say that it is not seeking . . . to install a pro-American regime in Afghanistan. In a free, non-aligned, neutral Afghanistan, there must be set up a government on the basis of reconciliation and on the basis of taking into account cooperation among all elements and national reconciliation . . .

The political decision on a withdrawal of Soviet forces has been taken. We've named the time limit—12 months, maybe less . . . As we see it, we can name the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet forces but this must, at the same time, become the . . . beginning of an end to arms and financial supplies to the insurgency forces. From the very first day this is declared, our troops will start pulling out, will stop taking part in military operations, that all military action is ceased and a process of the political solution of the problem begins in which we through our influence can be helpful. But the main thing would be up to the actual various forces within Afghanistan itself, all of the sides concerned . . .

We discussed also regional conflicts relating to Central America, the Middle East, southern Africa, the situation in the Persian Gulf . . . On bilateral relations, the Soviet position . . . was the following: The U.S.S.R. and the United States are world powers possessing major economic, intellectual and military potentials, and their weight in international affairs is immense. That determines their role and . . . responsibility.

For . . . the many years of confrontation, acute rivalry, has yielded nothing but harm. We have proved to each other many times that we can live without one another, without trading, without having any extensive scientific or cultural contacts, without any cooperation in the solution of global issues. The question is, however, is that the only thing that we are going to prove to each other?

Does this not recall the labors of Sisyphus. Do two great nations, two world powers—should they not ponder the entire situation which has come into being as a result of acute struggle throughout the postwar years? We must think all this over and . . . I said to the president and his colleagues, do you not think that the politicians of our two countries are lagging behind the mood of their peoples? We see in our country, and we see the mood of the American people and we feel that . . . they want to see changes . . . for the better in the situation.

They are starting to act themselves, they're establishing contacts, searching for all sorts of ways and means, starting from the children and going all the way up to the wisest people . . . They are coming to a realization that we must turn the pages of confrontation and begin a new phase. These are very powerful imperatives, and they should be reflected in the policies of our governments.

I wish to assure you that . . . within the Soviet leadership, there are no two opinions. There is one opinion, and a firm decision has been taken. We are in favor of a decisive improvement in relations with the United States . . . This is necessary for our peoples and . . . the entire world.

I reminded the president that the world was really ridiculing the way in which our two countries are developing their relations. A lot has been said about this. Take any problem, and it would appear that we simply have to have a head-on collision. We're really taking the wrong path and . . . can go much too far unless we stop, and our peoples have sensed this. But, in both countries, it is the people who have elected those who govern them, and it is therefore the tasks of the governments to solve the problems at hand . . .

In my discussion with the media executives, I explained why I am not all that in favor of giving interviews, because four or five interviews in a row, and I got one and the same questions. Then what are we going to talk about? To beat the air? To try and prove that we have not 4,000, not 2,000, not 500 but only 22 individuals who are imprisoned in our country for having infringed the law, infringed those two well-known articles of the penal code?

That there are only 222 persons who have been refused permission to leave, those who in their younger years were connected by their work with defense industry, with state secrets, with computer technology. No matter what you say, no matter what you shout at us, we shall not let them go before their knowledge of these secrets has evaporated.

Such is the present-day world, and we are forced to take this into account. And yet all of these interviews boil down to . . . just to those questions, as if we are agreeing to give interviews not just to try and search for the truths, to point each other towards serious thinking. But all the aim seems to be to somehow drive the politician into a corner. Is that a dialogue? Is that an interview? That's not what the media is for.

People want to live a better life. People want to have a better understanding of each other. They want to communicate with each other, to make friends. And how much the press tries to inflame quite different feelings and sentiments and not proceeding from any true *glasnost*.

I'm not trying to accuse any of you or to assert that the politicians are all that good or that the people of the media are so bad. No, but I'm just trying to say that the media has to go in for some *perestroika*, too, and to master some new thinking. Do you agree with me? Let's do it together. We're all in the same boat. Or is it all clear in your minds? Everything's clear? Then I envy you if everything is clear in your minds. At the same time, I regret it if everything is clear in your minds . . .

Availing myself of this opportunity, I want to return to one thought. That is the reaction of Americans, the feelings they have expressed in these days. And I would like . . . the visit of this delegation is drawing to a close, I want to say thank you to all Americans for their hospitality, for their openheartedness, for their cordiality.

that *glasnost*?

I can say that, where the laws are broken, then those who have to confirm that . . . legality exists have to take measures. Incidents sometimes occur but only when the law is infringed. And yet . . . nothing really happened, and there was an incident but it petered out.

There had been some hints from some of your colleagues before you arrived here that there could be some progress on offensive weapons without an insistence first on an agreement on defense, that there could be some compromise on strategic defense. It seems as though those are still linked. We're told by administration officials that you reasserted that linkage and insisted on restraints on defense in the private talks. Do you see any way that, between now and a visit to Moscow by the president, there could be a treaty on offense without first reaching agreement on defense? Or is that linkage permanent?

. . . We will work hard to make the president's visit to the Soviet Union culminate in the signing of that treaty. We shall be acting constructively on the basis of the principles which are made public in the document that I referred to . . .

Diego Cordovez . . . the United Nations mediator on Afghanistan, . . . would like to begin a new series of negotiations in January or February to help create a political settlement, an interim government in Afghanistan . . . Do you support those efforts to create an interim government in Afghanistan? And if such an effort were to succeed before the summer of next year, and the United States were willing to end its arms to the [rebels] at that time, would you begin the troop withdrawals . . . next summer . . . ?

I think I tried to elucidate in detail what our approach is but, since that question does arise, let me just say that we would welcome it if there is a new meeting in January, February. And we, for our part, will insofar as possible, since it's a question that concerns the Afghans themselves, but we will endeavor to be helpful in that process.

I believe that, if these two questions are interlinked, all the rest are anyway, the question of troop withdrawals and that of ending arms supplies and the financing . . . then I think we could find some positive results, even in the coming months. We have agreed with the president to continue consulting each other and making a more detailed study of the positions of the sides . . .

. . . Two questions . . . Do you think that you were able to change President Reagan's ideas about the Soviet Union in your meetings with him and, in particular, the statement he made six or seven years ago that the Soviet Union is an "evil empire"? And . . . have you changed any of your ideas about the United States based on these three days that you've been here?

I guess that the president's views have changed for the better—as have mine . . .

And they can rely on it that this will be heard in the Soviet Union, in the Soviet people, and it will meet with sincere and human response in our hearts. I want them to hear these words.

And, upon my return home . . . I will describe my impressions of my visit to this country. The visit, of course, was such that it was limited to Washington alone. But yet, even so, we were short of time. I should like to come back when the situation allows. When the process is under way to stimulate such developments, I would like to come back again and come into contact with people, with Americans. That is a sincere desire.

And I would like to wish the American people good achievements, the realization of their hopes. I wish to assure Americans that, in the Soviet people, they have a reliable partner in all that concerns peace, cooperation and common progress for all . . .

In your speeches you've talked about a process of democratization in the Soviet Union. Now that you've had at least a fleeting encounter with American concepts of democracy, I wonder if you could tell us what you've learned here about that and what specific differences you see between American ideas of democracy and your own ideas of democratization?

I have felt that it is necessary both in our country and in yours to try to fathom what values are those that underlie Soviet society and what are the values . . . which underlie our society. And this problem has been the subject of a serious dialogue with the president in a one-on-one discussion and during the plenary meeting and also in my discussion with the congressional leaders. And we have reached agreement.

Let us take this question concerning democracy, human rights, the humanitarian questions. Let us withdraw them from the plane of political speculations onto the plane of a real study of the values which the American people have in pursuing their choice and what the Soviet Union is seeking, which the people in the Soviet Union who made their choice in 1917. And we reached agreement that we should do this even at the level of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress by organizing meetings, seminars in which we could discuss these matters.

We are prepared to characterize the situation in our country and to express our views on how we see the situation developing in the United States, and the American side would be free . . . to express what it wants to say. That is, I want to put this on a serious footing. I think that we will find that this will be very useful . . .

On several occasions during the past week, beginning most notably with last Sunday outside the Soviet foreign ministry, your authorities arrested and roughed up nonviolent peaceful demonstrators. Did that have your personal approval, and is that *perestroika*, is

It appears that both you and President Reagan are of the opinion that in this three-day summit you have significantly altered the course of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It would appear as well that, in the three days of summitry, that somehow the relationship between you, one to the other, was altered. What changed, and how did it change between you and the president?

Yes, I think the agreements we have made in these past three days will be of importance for the development of relations between our two nations, on condition of course that we remain true to our obligations and agreements. I want to assure the American people and the administration that we shall act responsibly, proceeding all of the arrangements and agreements entered into.

And I want to say that, to respond to the second part of your question, I think we now have more understanding between the president and myself. We now have in our dialogue, it's more businesslike. It's more of a constructive approach, and I will even venture to say that I think we trust each other more . . .

You said that the Soviet Union was also working in the [space-based missile defense] field—

I never said that.

The question is—

I know what I say.

After your meeting with Mr. Reagan, what will you be instructing your experts to do in this field? Will they speed up their work or slow it down?

I said that we were not addressing ourselves or working on our defensive system. I said that we were engaging in fundamental research which in the very specific areas encompass problems which in the United States are within the limits of SDI [the Strategic Defense Initiative].

That I said, but I said we were resolutely opposed to SDI. We shall not build up an SDI in our own country, and that is what we are urging the U.S. administration to do. But, if the U.S. administration does not heed our opinion, if it does build up the SDI, it'll be assuming full responsibility because then strategic stability will be undermined, and a new sphere will be opened up in the arms race with unpredictable consequences.

If the Americans have all that much money, let them squander that money away. We will find an answer along other lines. Our response will be asymmetric, which will be 100 or perhaps more times cheaper. That is what I have always said . . .

. . . You've always said that the important thing is to stop the extension of the arms race into outer space. Has your meeting here this week made that any less likely?

I don't think so. I can confirm that it remains the goal of the Soviet Union to prevent the extension of the arms race into space.

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Text of Reagan's Address to Nation

Text of President Reagan's speech last night:

Good evening. As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary [Mikhail] Gorbachev is leaving on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of three historic days here in Washington in which Mr. Gorbachev and I continued to build a foundation for better relations between our government and our peoples.

During these three days, we took a step—only a first step, but still a critical one—towards building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms buildup.

I am referring to the treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in postwar history because it is not just an arms-control but an arms-reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, the agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new with far-reaching implications. On-site inspections and short-notice inspections will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That's why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of war but can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty, and all that we've achieved during this summit, signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work toward the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last three days and the entire summit process. Soviet-American relations are no longer focused only on arms-control issues. They now cover a far broader agenda, one that has, at its root, realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I've often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of

freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so, too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That's why it was vital to establish a broader summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms reductions but also people-to-people contacts between our nations and, most important, the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

This is the summit agenda we have adopted. By doing so, we have dealt not just with arms control issues but also with fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism and human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid, and far more realistic footing.

It also means that while there is movement—indeed, dramatic movement—in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in that area as well as in these other critical areas that I have mentioned, especially, and this goes without saying, in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

So much work lies ahead. Let me explain:

■ On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the issues of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Cambodia, Angola and Nicaragua. I continue to have high hopes—and he assured me that he did, too—that we can have real cooperation in resolving regional conflicts on terms that promote peace and freedom. This is essential to a lasting improvement in our relations.

■ So, too, on human rights, there was some very limited movement: resolution of a number of individual cases, in which prisoners will be released or exit visas granted. There were assurances of future, more substantial movement, which we hope to see become a reality.


■ And, finally, with regard to the last item on our agenda—scientific, educational, cultural and economic exchanges—we agreed to expand cooperation in ways that will break down some of the artificial barriers between our nations. For example, agreement was reached to expand and improve civil air service between our two countries.

But let me point out here that while much work is ahead of us, the progress we've made, especially in arms reduction, does reflect a better understanding between ourselves and the Soviets.

It also reflects something deeper. You see, since my first meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American

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BY FRANK JOHNSTON—THE WASHINGTON POST

Reagan poses for pictures before his television address.

people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

Your support over these last seven years has laid the basis for these negotiations; your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength, to liberate Grenada, to strike hard against terrorism in Libya, and more recently, to protect our strategic interests and bolster our friends in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of helping freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia and other places around the globe.

And when last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away SDI—our Strategic Defense Initiative that could erect a space shield against ballistic missiles—your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal, and will back their president on matters of national security. In short, your support for our foreign policy goals—building a safer peace as we advance the cause of world freedom—has helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table. It makes it possible now to hope for a real, fundamental improvement in our relations.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Well, believe me, I think I can answer that question. I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge that he has behind him a

people who are strong and free and alert and resolved to remain that way. People like you.

And it is this kind of informed and enlightened support, this hidden strength of democratic government, that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

Now that the treaty's been signed, it will be submitted to the Senate for the next step, the ratification process. I will meet with the leadership of Congress here tomorrow morning, and I am confident that the Senate will now act in an expeditious way to fulfill its duty under our Constitution.

To this end, let me explain the background. In the mid and late 1970s, the Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new, mobile intermediate-range missiles, capable of destroying major cities and military installations in Europe and Asia. This action was an unprovoked, new dimension of the threat against our friends and allies on both continents, a new threat to which the democratic nations had no comparable counter.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy a limited number of our own INF missiles as a deterrent but at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new nuclear threat. And we set out to do this with a zero-option; it meant the complete elimination of these missiles on both sides.

Well, at first, many called this a mere propaganda ploy, some even here in this country. But we were persistent, our allies steadfast, and eventually the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our INF Treaty.

As you see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles, which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty, have been a major threat to the security of our friends and allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating 400 deployed warheads while the Soviet Union eliminates 1,600, or four times as many.

Now, let me also point out that this does not, however, leave NATO unprotected. In fact, we will maintain a substantial deterrent force on the ground, in the air and at sea. Our commitment to NATO's strategy of being able to respond as necessary to any form of aggression remains steadfast.

And with regard to verification, as I have mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of on-site inspections and short-notice inspections not only at potential missile deployment sites but at the facility where the Soviet SS20 missiles and their components have been assembled. We have a verification procedure that assures each side that the missiles of the other side have been destroyed and that new ones aren't built.

See REAGAN TEXT, A35, Col. 1

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Text of Reagan's Address to Nation 319

REAGAN TEXT, From A34

Here, then, is a treaty that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you too that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies and friends. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major democracies, as has Secretary [of State George P.] Shultz and our diplomats. This treaty has full allied support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reduction efforts, the question of human rights and regional conflicts are still problems in our relations. But I'm pleased that some progress has been made in these areas also.

Now, in addition to these candid exchanges on our four-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for a Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range or strategic nuclear arms as I have proposed in the START negotiations. He and I made real progress toward our goal first agreed to at Geneva—to achieve deep, 50 percent cuts in our arsenals of those powerful weapons. We agreed that we should build on our efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty at the earliest possible date; and we've instructed our delegates in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reduction in these offensive weapons—along with the development of SDI—would do much to make the world safer. For that reason, I made it clear that our SDI program will continue, and that when we have a defense ready to deploy, we will do so.

About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that, as nuclear weapons are reduced, it becomes all the more important to redress the disparities in conventional and chemical weapons, where the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States and our allies.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of American foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1982, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the postwar era: the threat of nuclear war and the threat of nuclear totalitarianism. And that's why, by pursuing SDI, which is a defense against offensive missiles, and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction by which nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So, too, we are saying that the postwar policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom, that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the human dignity that their creator intended. I believe we gained some ground with regard to that cause in these last few weeks.

Since my first days in office, I have argued that the

future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom—freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years—from Latin America to Asia—we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. But I told him then, and I have said since then, that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many—a dream that still shines out the world. You know, a couple of years ago Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant Nicholas Gage. It's the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the postwar era: the Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story, Nicholas Gage finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years, but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like her. As he tells it: "and her final cry . . . was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words—the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people in a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee, the carpenter whose birth into the poverty of a stable we celebrate—it is these words that we remember as the holiday season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom—the gift that is ours as Americans, the gift that we seek to share with all the world—depends on its strength on the spiritual source from which it comes.

So during this holly season, let us also reflect that [in] the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that possessed by all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this nation and ask Him for His help and guidance, so that we might continue this work of peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

To sum up then: This summit was a clear success; we made progress on each item in our four-part agenda. Mr. Gorbachev and I have agreed to meet in several months in Moscow to continue what we have achieved in these past three days. I believe there is reason for both hope and optimism.

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Joint Statement By Reagan, Gorbachev

Text of the joint U.S.-Soviet summit statement:

Ronald W. Reagan, president of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Washington on Dec. 7-10, 1987

The president and the general secretary held comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.

They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik. They took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over the last two years of important agreements in some areas of this agenda.

The president and the general secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve nuclear superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive cooperation in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing, they will also contribute, with other nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

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Reagan and Gorbachev walk together to White House.

weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] will be reduced to a level approximately 50 percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side

Taking into account the preparation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war

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I. Arms Control

The INF Treaty. The two leaders signed the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. This treaty is historic both for its objective—the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms—and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

Nuclear and Space Talks. The president and the general secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50 percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. . . .

The negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50 percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the joint draft START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] treaty text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6,000 warheads, 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles, the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament, and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw

Nuclear Testing. The two leaders welcomed the opening on Nov. 9, 1987, of full-scale, step-by-step negotiations, in accordance with the joint statement adopted in Washington on Sept. 17, 1987, by the secretary of state of the United States and the minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R. . . .

The leaders also welcomed the prompt agreement by the sides to exchange experts' visits to each other's nuclear testing sites in January 1988 and to design and subsequently to conduct a joint verification experiment at each other's test site. . . .

Nuclear Nonproliferation. The president and the general secretary reaffirmed the continued commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the adherence since their last meeting of additional parties to the treaty, and confirmed their intent to make, together with other states, additional efforts to achieve universal adherence to the treaty.

The president and the general secretary expressed support for international cooperation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under further-strengthened IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards and appropriate export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The leaders agreed that bilateral consultations on nonproliferation were constructive and useful, and should continue.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. The leaders welcomed the signing on Sept. 15, 1987, in Washington

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of the agreement to establish nuclear risk reduction centers in their capitals. The agreement will be implemented promptly.

Chemical Weapons. The leaders expressed their commitment to negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed progress to date and reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. The United States and Soviet Union are in favor of greater openness and intensified confidence-building with respect to chemical weapons both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. They agreed to continue periodic discussions by experts on the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

Conventional Forces. The president and the general secretary discussed the importance of the task of reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments. The two leaders spoke in favor of early completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate for negotiations on this issue, so that substantive negotiations may be started at the earliest time with a view to elaborating concrete measures

II. Human Rights

The leaders held a thorough and candid discussion of human rights and humanitarian questions and their place in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

III. Regional Issues

The president and the general secretary engaged in a wide-ranging, frank and businesslike discussion of regional questions, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East, Cambodia, southern Africa, Central America and other issues. They acknowledged serious differences but agreed on the importance of their regular exchange of views. The two leaders noted the increasing importance of settling regional conflicts to reduce international tensions and to improve East-West relations. They agreed that the goal of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on these issues should be to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom and security. Both leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

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ment in Geneva to cooperate in the preservation of the environment, the two leaders approved a bilateral initiative to pursue joint studies in global climate and environmental change through cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone, and through increased data exchanges pursuant to the U.S.-Soviet Environmental Protection Agreement and the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In this context, there will be a detailed study on the climate of the future. The two sides will continue to promote broad international and bilateral cooperation in the increasingly important area of global climate and environmental change.

Cooperative Activities. The president and general secretary supported further cooperation among scientists of the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries in utilizing controlled thermonuclear U.S. fusion for peaceful purposes. They affirmed the intention of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to cooperate with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Japan, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the quadripartite conceptual design of a fusion test reactor.

The two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy toward establishing a permanent working group in the field of nuclear reactor safety and expressed their readiness to develop cooperation in this area.

The president and the general secretary agreed to develop bilateral cooperation in combatting international narcotics trafficking. They agreed that appropriate initial consultations would be held for these purposes in early 1988.

They also agreed to build on recent contacts to develop more effective cooperation in ensuring the security of air and maritime transportation.

The two leaders exchanged views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and cooperation on issues relating to the Arctic. They expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional cooperation among the Arctic countries on these matters, including coordination of scientific research and protection of the region's environment.

The two leaders welcomed the conclusion of negotiations to institutionalize the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based global search and rescue system, operated jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Canada.

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IV. Bilateral Affairs

The president and the general secretary reviewed in detail the state of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. They recognized the utility of further expanding and strengthening bilateral contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

Bilateral Negotiations. Having reviewed the state of ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a number of specific bilateral issues, the two leaders called for intensified efforts by their representatives, aimed at reaching mutually advantageous agreements on: commercial maritime issues, fishing, marine search and rescue, radio navigational systems, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. maritime boundary and cooperation in the field of transportation and other areas.

They noted with satisfaction agreement on the expansion, within the framework of the U.S.-Soviet Air Transport Agreement, of direct air passenger service, including joint operation of the New York-Moscow route by Pan American Airways and Aeroflot, and on the renewal of the U.S.-Soviet World Ocean Agreement.

People-to-People Contacts and Exchanges. The two leaders took note of progress in implementing the U.S.-Soviet General Exchanges Agreement in the areas of education, science, culture and sports, signed at their November 1985 Geneva meeting, and agreed to continue efforts to eliminate obstacles to further progress in these areas. They expressed satisfaction with plans to celebrate jointly the 30th anniversary of the first Exchanges Agreement in January 1988. . . .

Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative. With reference to their November 1985 agree-

Trade. The two sides stated their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. They instructed their trade ministers to convene the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commercial Commission in order to develop concrete proposals to achieve that objective, including within the framework of the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. They agreed that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations.

Diplomatic Missions. Both sides agreed on the importance of adequate, secure facilities for their respective diplomatic and consular establishments and emphasized the need to approach problems relating to the functioning of embassies and consulates general constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

V. Further Meetings

The president and the general secretary agreed that official contacts at all levels should be further expanded and intensified, with the goal of achieving practical and concrete results in all areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

General Secretary Gorbachev renewed the invitation he extended during the Geneva summit for President Reagan to visit the Soviet Union. The president accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place in the first half of 1988.

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Glasnost Winning Friends,

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Influencing People—Some Reluctantly

Soviet children "want the same things my grandchildren want. They want an education. They want to live good."

— MARGARET LOGAN, 66

As for Gorbachev, "I think he's a good con man. I'm irritated because I think we're all being snowed."

— BILL PAYNE, 30

"Now it's like the Russians are more like us. They're just as scared as we are."

— FELIPE MESA, 11th grader

By Marc Fisher and Lynne Duke
Washington Post Staff Writers

When Felipe Mesa was in military school two years ago, "everyone was gung ho. Everyone wanted to torture the Commies, and so did I."

No more. Mesa is older (in 11th grade) and, he said, wiser.

"Now it's like the Russians are more like us," said Mesa, a student at Banneker High School in Northwest Washington. "They're just as scared as we are."

Score one for Mikhail Gorbachev and *glasnost*.

Around the Washington area this week, in shopping malls and schools, in homes in the District and the suburbs, people who saw the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting only through newspapers, television and tangled traffic were nonetheless conducting their own summits.

In dining room conversations and corner store chats, people are trading impressions of the unusual Soviet leader and predictions about the fate of the world.

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At Banneker, the District's academic high school, the summit provoked the latest in a series of heated face-offs between Robert Rogers and Todd Goren, the Tom Braden and Pat Buchanan of the junior class, in temperament if not in doctrine.

"Gorbachev is a more European, more 20th century leader," Rogers said. "There's great promise in the Soviet Union."

"They're still ducking human rights," Goren said. "*Glasnost* is PR. The change is in the leader, not the government."

Challenged to defend the Soviets even in the face of last weekend's beating of demonstrators on a Moscow street, Rogers said, "Demonstrators need to be beaten and punished when they break the law."

The class erupted in jeers and looked to Goren for a quick retort.

Goren simply moaned and rolled his eyes.

While many of the Banneker students seemed to be studying news reports of the summit, plenty of people have paid only casual attention to the diplomatic negotiations in their own city.

"I work six days a week, till 9:30, and I have not been able to follow it," said Eleanor Bertsch, who owns the Olive Branch, a Christian bookstore in Rockville.

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"I just wonder how substantial it all is really. I still kind of question the Soviets. But I would like to think the best."

"I heard something about it, but I don't like politicians," said Maria Bacallao, a housewife in the Pet-

worth section of Northwest Washington. "They can talk and do whatever, but we still live our lives."

But most of the several dozen people interviewed for this article had formed new and generally favorable, if still cautious, attitudes toward Gorbachev and the Soviets this week.

Cedric Whitaker, a grocery clerk who lives in Deanwood in Northeast Washington, said Gorbachev "seems more trustworthy than the ones before him. I'd like to know more about him. But I still have reservations because he's a Russian."

"The Soviets seem a lot more serious than the Americans," said Angela Alsobrook, an 11th grader. "Reagan seems to be joking about the whole thing."

Gorbachev's constant presence on American TV and his unusual appearance in a television interview made many people suspicious.

"The Soviet Union is still the Soviet Union," said George Kelly, a Banneker junior. "The only thing that's changed is how they present themselves to us in the '80s, the decade of facile doubletalk."

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Kelly was the only member of his class to raise his hand when asked whether there is a good possibility of a nuclear war in his lifetime. Nearly all his classmates believe that U.S. and Soviet leaders understand that no one can win a nuclear war. But Kelly dismissed that reasoning.

"The weapons are there," he said. "My life expectancy is supposed to be to my mid-seventies. Since there hasn't been a nuclear weapon used in 43 years, I figure the odds are pretty much against not having another one in my lifetime."

Such terrifying thoughts led Jeanne Andrews of Bethesda to sit down with her 9-year-old son this week to ask him to write a letter to Gorbachev, inviting the general secretary to his school.

"But he had been watching something on TV about human rights and he said, 'Mom, I'm not going to invite him if he keeps families separated,'" Andrews said.

She bought a greeting card yesterday for her son, who will make his first confession in church next week. "The peace in one's heart is a small start for peace on earth," the card said.

"I don't know about Gorbachev," said Andrews, a mother of four. "I saw these Christians on TV who came from Russia, and they said you really can't trust the man. But wouldn't it be wonderful if you could?"

At International House, an Indian grocery in Rockville, owner Hira Chand said he learned in his native Burma not to trust the Russians.

"But some agreement is better

than no agreement," he said, "even if they try to break the agreement."

Chand was amused by the irony of Ronald Reagan, the man who called the Soviet Union the "evil empire," sitting down to seek peace with Gorbachev.

"I suppose it's not very surprising that a man leaving office wants to show people that he can be peaceful," the shopkeeper said. "After all, he doesn't have a third term to run for."

Bill Payne, a 30-year-old grocery clerk from Falls Church, saw the summit as Reagan's attempt to change history's view of his presidency.

"I honestly think this is something for Reagan, to set him in history, like Carter wanted to get the hostages out of Iran before his presidency was over," Payne said.

As for Gorbachev, he said, "I think he's a good con man. I'm irritated because I think we're all being snowed. We're playing pianos, 'Moscow Nights,' so everybody cries. There's not a dry eye in the place. Big deal. Really. Big deal."

But John Wentworth, an editor who lives in Adams-Morgan, credited Gorbachev with generating the summit. "It's wonderful how Gorbachev flushed Reagan out of hiding," he said. "I suppose we are a modicum safer now. But the only way you could truly reduce arms is to legislate all profits out of war contracts."

Adults and teen-agers alike spoke of the deep mistrust of Soviets that has long been engrained in American society.

Margaret Logan, 66, one of a group of women from the Barney

Senior Center shopping at the Rhode Island Avenue Shopping Center in Northeast, remembered growing up with the belief that the Soviet Union was all bad. She has changed her mind.

Gorbachev "is a younger man. A lot of things are going to change in Russia," she said. Soviet children "want the same things my grandchildren want. They want an education. They want to live good."

Logan was especially struck by Gorbachev's appearance at Tuesday night's state dinner at the White House. "I liked Gorbachev when he didn't change and put on a bow tie like everybody wanted him to," she said. Gorbachev wore a business suit. Reagan wore a tuxedo.

Despite reservations, there was a general willingness to consider the

Soviets anew, to open a window to peace.

"The revealing thing for me was how the Soviet Embassy took in those children who came by with flowers, and the White House wouldn't let them in and somebody tossed out the roses," said Patrick Dwyer, owner of Patrick's Good Food in Adams-Morgan. "That tells you something about how insensitive bureaucracy can be; what we have to deal with to get somewhere on this."

"You need to start some place," said Ari Rosner, a Banneker student. "A lot of Americans think Russians are evil, subhuman beings who walk around like robots. And it is kind of surprising that Reagan's involved in striving toward peace. But if you're too skeptical, they'll never get anything done."



מדינת ישראל

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תאריך 11/12/11

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OTHER WORK

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UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



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משרד ראש הממשלה

אל: לשכת רח"מ

מצפ"א

מאת: הציר-יועץ, רושינגטון

הועד להגנה על עתונאים

לשלכם 208

מ"ב המכתבים המבוקשים.

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Committee To Protect Journalists

36 West 44th Street, Room 911, New York, N.Y. 10036 • 212/944-7216

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ABC News

*Affiliations are listed
for identification only*

December 26, 1985

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Prime Minister Shimon Peres
Office of the Prime Minister
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Prime Minister Peres:


The Committee to Protect Journalists was deeply distressed to learn that the body of Hassan Abdul-Halim, a 35-year-old journalist employed by the Al Fajr Arabic daily, was found on December 21 near the settlement of Beit Horon on the West Bank.

According to our information, investigators examining Mr. Abdul-Halim's body estimated that he was killed one month perviously. He had been missing from his home in Biddu, near Ramallah, since October 3.

At the time of his disappearance, Mr. Abdul-Halim was on assignment for Al Fajr investigating the circumstances under which land transfers have been effected on the West Bank. We understand that at present details are emerging in Israeli newspapers and courts of illegal land transfers, and although several theories for Mr. Abdul-Halim's death have been advanced, we fear that his murder may be directly related to land fraud issues.

Thus, we urge you to ensure a thorough and vigorous investigation of Mr. Abdul-Halim's murder, so that those responsible are brought to justice. We would very much appreciate being informed of any developments in the case.

Yours Sincerely,



Barbara Koepfel
Executive Director

Executive Director
Barbara Koepfel

CPJ Affiliate
London
Caroline Moorehead
The London Times

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- cc. Office of the Attorney General, Jerusalem
- Office of the Military Attorney General, Central District
- Ministry of the Interior, Jerusalem
- Ambassador Meir Rosen, Washington D.C.
- West Bank Journalists' Association
- The Newspaper Guild
- World Press Freedom Committee
- Freedom House
- The Society of Professional Journalists
- American Newspaper Publishers Association
- Congressional Friends of Human Rights Monitors
- Congressional Human Rights Caucus
- International Federation of Journalists
- International Press Institute
- Index on Censorship
- International PEN
- Amnesty International (Dutch Section)
- Center for Investigative Journalism (Canada)

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לשכת ראש הממשלה
PRIME MINISTER'S BUREAU

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Jerusalem April 2, 1986
Ref.: 1-DS-518-1

Ms. Barbara Koepfel
Executive Director
Committee to Protect Journalists
36 West 44th Street, Room 911
New York, N. Y. 10036
U.S.A.

Dear Ms. Koepfel,

The Prime Minister has asked me to acknowledge receipt of your letter to him of December 26, 1985 regarding the death of Hassan Abdul-Halim.

Upon being informed of the disappearance of the Al Fajr journalist on October 5, the police force began an immediate search. His body was discovered on December 20, and was transferred to the institute for forensic medicine. The pathological findings show, unequivocally, that his death was caused by the detonation of an explosive charge, which he apparently held in his hands, while kneeling on the ground. No other signs of violence were found.

I trust that the findings of the police investigation satisfy your concern for a fellow journalist.

Sincerely yours,



Boaz Eppelbaum
Head of
Prime Minister's Bureau.

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 מאריך וזימה 15:00 - 11.12.87
 משרד מדינת ישראל

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אל : מנכ"ל מדינה
 משנה למנכ"ל
 סמנכ"ל צפ"א
 השגריר ארד - ניו יורק

פסגה - נושאי מז"ח.
 להלן דיווח וילקוקס.

השיחות הרגיונליות נמשכו 10 שעות בקבוצות העבודה. ניהלו אותן סלומון מהתכנון המדיני במחמ"ד ואיבגני פרימקוב.

מז"ח.

וילקוקס מסר כי מרפי נפגש בשבת, טרם תחילת הביקור הרשמי, עם פרימקוב וכי מרפי התרשם שלא חלה חזוזה כלשהי בעמדות הסובייטיות. כשיצאנו אבידן והח"מ מהפגישה עם וילקוקס נתקלנו במרפי שסיפר כי אמר לפרימקוב שיבחר באיזה משלושה הנושאים ברצונו לפתח. פרימקוב ציין ללא היסוס איראן-עיראק.
 וילקוקס אמר ששני הצדדים הביעו דאגה מהמתיחות ואי היציבות באיזור וממרוץ החמוש הסובייטים ציינו כי רואים בוועידה הבינלאומית את המסגרת למו"מ אף כי הם מכירים בצורך בשיחות ישירות היכולות להעשות במסגרת הוועידה. הוועידה לדעתם צריכה להיות סמכותית (Plenipotentiary). הסובייטים הביעו התנגדותם לעסקות נפרדות ולכן עומדים על קיום הוועידה הבינלאומית. בוועידה זו צריכים להשתתף כולם (וילקוקס לא ידע להגיד אם היה דיון בנושא היצוג הפלשתינאי) כולל סוריה. כאשר הביעו הסובייטים התנגדות לעסקות נפרדות ציינו שלא יסכימו לעסקה נפרדת ירדנית-ישראלית ושגורלה יהיה כגורל הסכם ישראל-לבנון מ-1983.

הצד האמריקאי אמר כי הוועידה הבינלאומית אינה מטרה בפני עצמה. הוועידה לא תוכל לכפוח ולא תוכל להטיל רוטו. וילקוקס אמר ש"דחפוי" הסובייטים לכוונן היחסים הדיפלומטיים מחדש ולשפר נושא ההגירה היהודית. הציעו גם ששתי המעצמות תפעלנה בקרב בנוח בריחן באיזור ליצירת אווירה מתאימה שתאפשר מו"מ.

פרימקוב אמר כי העדר היחסים לא ימשך ללא קץ (Indefinitely) וכי המשלח הקונסולרית בישראל מקיימת מגעים פוליטיים שוטפים (Regular) אך לא פרט.

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אפגניסטן

פרימקוב דיבר על נסיגת הכוחות הסובייטים ולא כרך אותה בהקמת ממשלה לאומית רחנה. הסובייטים דרשו הפסקה לאלתר של אספקה הנשק למורדים אך נענו בשלילה והעמדה האמריקאית התקיפה בנושא היא שרק יציאתם של הכוחות הסובייטים היא שתביא להפסקת המשלוחים. הסובייטים, אמר וילקוקס, אינם מדברים יותר בצורה אבסולוטית על נג'יבוללה והדגישו את הצורך בפסרה בין הצדדים הנוגעים לדבר. ארה"ב דרשה מהסובייטים תאריך ברור ומוגדר לנסיגה אך לא ניתן תאריך כזה. האמריקאים מצפים לראות אם תחול החקדמות מעשית כלשהיא בשיחות הקרבה בנושא בג'נבה.

איראן-עיראק

פרימקוב אמר שבדיה"מ מוכנה להתחיל בהכנת נוסח להחלטה שניה אך הוסיף שאמוץ החלטה כזו לא יוכל להיעשות בטרם ימצא המזכ"ל את המנדט שלו עי"פ 598. וילקוקס ציין שכאשר עלה נושא זה בשיחת שני המנהיגים גורבצ'וב כבר לא חזר על נוסחה זו ועתה לא ברור להם מי ביטא את העמדה העדכאנית הסובייטית שכן גורבצ'וב כלל לא התייחס להחלטה שניה. יתכן מוסיף וילקוקס, שהדיבורים בדרג פוליאקוב על החלטה שניה משקפים את רצון הדרג הפקידותי במוסקבה להפיס את דעת הערבים. פרימקוב חזר לרעיון של צי בינלאומי במפרץ בפקוח ה- Military Staff Comm. של מועבי"ט, גוף ששבק חיים ואילו גורבצ'וב דיבר על כח שלום כאשר האמריקאים עונים שכדי שיוקם כח כזה צריך שישרר שלום קודם לכן ושלום כזה ניתן בין השאר להשיג על ידי המשך להחלטה 598.

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