

15

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

אן / 4609 / מן אפר 13

משורר ורבה

יוסף מדיני

אברהם

24/4/89 - 26/89

תיק מס'

תיק מס'

13

מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פיו: א-4609/13

מזהה פריט: R00036f

תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-8



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 43.5
 מיכל מס': 4609 / א
 תאריך התעודה: _____
 שם מחבר התעודה: _____
 סוג התעודה (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

תיק מס': 13
 שם הנמען: _____

28/5/1989
 8/6/1989

- מכתב
- מברק
- תזכיר או מיזכר
- דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון
- פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

72/14

-2-

2/2

מספר נציגי ארגונים יהודיים ציינו חשיבות יוזמת השלום והשינוי שהתחולל בדעת הקהל מאז הוצגה. סימור רייך אמר כי ועידת הנשיאים התייצבה מאחורי יוזמת השלום הישראלית ונציג הקונגרס אמר כי דברי השר יש בהם להרוס את יוזמת השלום. כתשובה השר ציין כי אין מטרת שליחותו להרוס היוזמה או לשכנע היהודים לשנות דעתם אלא להמחיש את הבעיות והסכנות שישראל עומדת בפניהן. היוזמה עושה את מלאכת ההסברה קלה יותר אך אין זו המטרה המרכזית. החשוב מכל בטחון ישראל וקיומה. בתשובה לשאלות נוספות אמר השר כי רק לאחרונה הנחה ראה"מ חד משמעית להביא את האינטסדה לסיוט. זה נעשה באיחור של 18 חודשים. הביע תקווה שההנחיה תבוצע וחושג. השר ציין כי בעבר טיפל במצב הרבה יותר מסובך והסדיר הוחזר על כנו, אך לא פירט מהם הצעדים שלדעתו ניתן לנקוט בהם כדי להביא להתקוממות לסיומה.

מרוכי ידיו

2.6.89

שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון
טופס מברק

אמ"מ

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ח, הסברה.

1/3

דע : יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת,
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת,
מנהל לע"מ, ניו-יורק
מאת: שתונות

דף 1. מתוך 3.
דחיפות: מייד
סוג: שמו

תאריך, זמן: 31.5.89
מספר המברק:

המשרד: 728
663
104

יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב ; לאחר נאום המזכיר - דו"ח תקשורת 31.5.89

ככל שחולף הזמן מאז נאום של מזכיר המדינה בייקר לפני הכנס השנתי של השדולה היהודית בוושינגטון מתבהרת יותר ויותר תמונת הכוונות שמאחורי הנאום. כך לפחות התמונה המתקבלת משיחות עם עוונאים ומכתבות מפורטות שהופיעו כאן בימים האחרונים.

אליבא דתום פרידמן, אשר על נסיומו המזת"י העשיר וקרבתו ל"מקורות בכירים" במחמ"ד אין חולקים רבים, מהווה נאום המזכיר נקודות מפנה וסוף עידן ירח הדבש שבין שתי המדינות. ימי הקרבה האינטימית בין י-ם לוושינגטון, אומר פרידמן, עברו מן העולם כתולדה מהתפכחות אמריקאית לנוכח שורת אירועים וההתפתחויות בזירה המזת"ית, העיקריים שבהם :

ההתקוממות בשטחים, המזעור של מעורבות בריה"מ במזרח התיכון, סוף מלחמת איראן-עירק ולבסוף מה שמקובל כאן כהכרת ראש אש"פ בישראל. כל אלה בנגוד בולט לאכזבת שולץ מהערבים נוכח מפלת לבנון, להתקפות הטרור ולפעילות נגד שליט לוב-פעולות שדחפו את וושינגטון וירושלים האחת לזרועות רעותה במחיר זניחת החפוש אחר השלוט.

כתוצאה מכל הנ"ל, ובתשובה לכל המתלבטים עד כמה היה נאום של מזכיר המדינה מכוון ומחושב, החליט הממשל על רפוי במציאות ("REALITY THERAPY") ועל חנוך מחדש ("RE-EDUCATION") של כל השחקנים במגרש המזת"י תוך כדי שמוש בלשון גרורה יותר וחד משמעית יותר של העדפות אמריקאיות.

תהא הכוונה המקורית אשר תהא, עוזריו של בייקר מתפארים במספר הטלפונים וקריאות העדוד שהגיעו למשרדו של בייקו מגורמים בגבעה ובקהילה היהודית והודו לו על הנאום ועל העדודות שננקטו. עד כאן פרידמן.

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including names like 'פרידמן' and 'אמ"מ'.

קשה לפקפק באמיתות הדברים. עוזרו של בייקר לא ציין את מה שהיה ברור בסוף השבוע שעבר - התמיכה במזכיר המדינה בתקשורת האמריקאית היא כמעט מקיר לקיר. להוציא חוגים מעטים (ג'יין קירקפטריק הוסיפה "נקודות זכות" למדד התקשורת שלנו) הרי שדבריו, המנוסחים בבהירות, של המזכיר נפלו כאן בהחלט על אזניים קשובות.

גם ג'והן גושקו מה "ווינגטון פוסט" משתמש באותו מנח - כוונון (ADJUSTMENT) כדי לתאר את העובר על הגישה למז"ת מצד הממשל של בוש-בייקר לעומת רייגן-שולץ. אך שלא כפרידמן הנזקק לסופרלטיבים (END OF AN ERA, TURNING POINT) אומר גושקו כי בחינה מדוקדקת של הנאום לא יכולה לגלות חדושים או עמדות אמריקאיות שלא היו ידועות לפני כן וכי אירונית היא העובדה שכל הרעש מתעורר סביב נאום שהוא בעקרו תמיכה חד משמעית בתכנית השלום של רה"מ שמיר.

אליבא דפקידים שרואיינו לכתבתו מדובר כאן בעיקר כשוני בסגנון ובהעדר הבנה מצד הישראלים לאישיותו של המזכיר הנוכחי המנסה לזכור ביתר בהירות ושאינו חש צורך SUGARCOAT TO כל הצהרה שלו על המז"ת בקביעה ובהבטחה כי יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב חשובים מכל.

זמן מועט אחרי הנאום, אמר לי גושקו, כי לולא הקטע המפורסם (הוויטור על חזון ישראל הגדולה) היה הנאום צונח אי שם על שולחנותיהם של המומחים שהיו מתיחסים אליו כאל "עוד נאום" ומנתחים בקפידה את נסוחיו בהם לא היו מוצאים חדושים משמעותיים.

כהערת אגב, ספר לנו רולי אבנס, ושמענו על כך גם מאחרים, כי מזכיר המדינה נפגע מעצמת הבקורת עליו בישראל.

מכל העולה מן הדווחים בתקשורת ומשיחות עם כתבים ועיתונאים ניתן לסכם אם כך את העמדה האמריקאית הנוכחית כדלהלן:

1. ארה"ב תומכת בהצעתה של ישראל לקיים בחירות בשטחים. ההצעה נראית לארה"ב, כרגע, כדבר הריאלי היחיד העומד על הפרק.
2. ארה"ב אינה עושה סוד מעמדותיה המסורתיות היא רק תמשיך ותנסח אותם ביתר עצמה - הצורך בסיום הכיבוש הישראלי, הצורך בפתרון על הבסיס של שטחים תמורת שלום, הצורך במענה מדיני למצוקתם של הפלסטינים והדיאלוג עם אש"פ החייב להמשך.
3. ארה"ב מנצלת את הדיאלוג שלה עם אש"פ כדי לקיים את תפקיד המתווך בין ישראל לאש"פ. דברי המזכיר ב-"MEET THE PRESS" וגם בנאומו לפני איפא"ק לא מותירים ספק מי לדעתו צריך לתת האור הירוק. ב-NBC אמר המזכיר בפרוש כי ארה"ב בקשה מאש"פ שיתיר לפלסטינאים בשטחים להצביע ולקחת חלק בבחירות.
4. ארה"ב יודעת שהסכמתו של אש"פ חיונית להתחלת מהלך כזה.
5. המו"מ האמריקאי עם אש"פ אינו מטרה בפני עצמה. ארה"ב חסידת "המקל והגזר" כלפי ערפאת. הגזר- המשך ואולי העלאת דרג השיחות עם אש"פ תוך הענקת יתר אמינות לארגון דבר המסייע בחזק מעמדו הבינלאומי. המקל - הפסקת השיחות.

- 6. ארה"ב מסכמת לעצמה כי מה ששמעה מתושבי היישובים היא ענין רב בבחירות, אי רצון להחמיץ הסכמי הסמון וזהו יך זה המדה הצורן לקבל ברכת אש"פ לתהליך.
- 7. מטרתנו, אמר פקיד בכיר לגושקו, אינה להלחח עם ישראל כי אם להבהיר לעצמנו עד הקיץ האם תכנית שמיר יכולה (האם בגלל כך לווה הנשיא בוש את אורחו לצפות ביום הנושא את אותו השם במוזיאון החלל?) האם היא נתנת לבצוע ומה המימעות מבחינותיה של ארה"ב.


לבסוף נחזור ונציין כאן כמה נקודות אותן חוו שומעים וקוראים בתקשורת :

א. אף אחד מן הארועים, אותם מקובל לראות כמייקפים את סגנונו של בייקר (דבריו בגבעה בתום בקורו של השר זאנבס על כך כי יתכן וישראל תאלץ בסופו של דבר לשוחח עם אש"פ, הצהרתו של הנשיא בעת בקור מובראק על הצורך בסיום הכבוש ונאומו האחרון של המזכיר) אינם כוללים סטיות של ממש מעמדות אמריקאיות מסורתיות. ההבדל הוא בעיקר זה של נחיצות וסגנון מחד והשמיות שעוד טרם ברור עד כמה הן משקפות שנוי מזונויות. בהיות מזכיר המדינה ובמידה מסוימת הממשל הנוכחי התגלמות הפרגמטיזם בכל הנוגע למדיניות המז"ת לא יחס הימשל, אם יזכה שבידיו יותר מאשר קצה של חוט להיות תקין וברוטאלי יותר. אחרי הכל הוא זוכה כאן לתמיכה במדיניות, תמיכה שכל ממשל היה מיחל לה הן מהקונגרס והן מדעת הקהל ובמידה לא מיטה גם מהעתונות.

ב. שקולי הפוליטיקה הפנימים בישראל לא נעלמו מעיניו של המזכיר ואנשי צוותו ועם כל הבנתם לקשייו של רה"מ מחוגי מפלגתו הווי, הרי שההליכה על הסף מבחינתם שווה את המאמץ שהו"תו ברור עמדות.

ג. פעם נוספת מוכחת כאן התיאוריה שבוושינגטון של היום הרי הממשל הוא זה הקובע את ההתייחסות היומית אלינו, לשבט או לחסד, די באמירה פומבית המלווה בכמה תזוויכים (ה-PATTERN הוא שיחות רקע עם תום פריזמן וג'ון גושקו) כדי לקבוע את התייחסות התקשורת אלינו. עד לנאום המזכיר יכולנו לזקוף לזכותנו נקודות מקדום תכנית השלום של ממשלת ישראל ופה ושם ראינו נצנים לפעולתנו. דבריו של המזכיר שינו את המצב לחלוטין.

נחזור ונדגיש, כי כל האמור לעי ל משקו את זווית הראיה של התקשורת האמריקאית את אשר התרוש פה בשבועות האחרונים.

יוסי אל


Handwritten signature or initials in the top left corner.

טו די ביותר

שיחת שה"ח ארנס - השגריר בראון (14.6)

רשם סלי.

הפגישה לבקשת בראון כדי למסר המכתב המצורף מבייקר.

לאחר קריאת המכתב, אמר ארנס שלא נראה שיש בו חידושים : די ברור לו בעקבות הנאום, שבייקר רצה TO TALK TOUGH עם ישראל. זו גישה לא נכונה ואינה יכולה להועיל לתהליך. אנחנו בטוחים שזה היה נאום רע. נראה שבייקר חושב אחרת, כנראה שעוד נצטרך לשוחח על זה. אין שום הגיון בדיבור על תוצאות המו"מ בשלב זה. מספיק קשה לשכנע הציבור בארץ, על רקע האלימות להסכים לבחירות לנציגות למו"מ, ובלתי אפשרי לשכנע אנשים שיש הצדקה כלשהי להודיע מראש על תוצאות המו"מ.

בראון: ב-3.6 שלח שוורנדזה מכתב לבייקר ממנו מוסר לנו את הפסקה הבאה:
AS FAR AS THE IDEA OF ELECTIONS IS CONCERNED, IT IS WORTH STUDYING. APPARENTLY IT WILL BE VIABLE AND ACCEPTABLE FOR ALL THE PARTIES ONLY WHEN IT INCORPORATES CLEAR-CUT PROVISIONS WHICH IN THEIR ENTIRETY, WOULD OUTLINE SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR THE START AND DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND ATTAINING A COMPREHENSIVE AND FINAL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

בראון : ביקר אתמול בעזה, נפגש עם מספר אנשים, ובהם (בנפרד) שנים מבני א-שאווה, אחד בנו של רשארד והשני כנראה בן דודו עיסס. שניהם הביעו עמדה שבמקום הגיסוק עם אש"פ יש פשוט להחזיר הענין לירדן ולמצרים ואח"כ - נראה מה יהיה. אח"כ נפגש עם שלושה אנשים (שני רופאים, מהם אחד שנפגש עם דניס רוס, והשלישי - ראש לשכת עורכי הדין). להלן עיקר שיחותיו:

בראון אמר להם שלא בא כדי להפריד בינם לבין אש"פ - הם יודעים שלארה"ב דו-שיח עם אש"פ, למורת רוחה של ישראל. רוצה לדבר על יוזמת רה"מ : "זה הדבר היחידי על השולחן" וכרוך בהפגנת אומץ רב מצד שמיר. אתם ערים לקשיים הפוליטיים בישראל ושיהיה לכם ברור שלא תקבלו דבר יותר טוב. הייתי בארץ בזמן שיחות האוטונומיה, ותארו לכם שלא הייתם מחמיצים ההזדמנות אז - האם מצבכם היום לא היה טוב יותר? בני שיחו השיבו בהנהון לשאלה והקשו : מה עמדת ארה"ב בענין ההגדרה העצמית והמדינה העצמאית? בראון : אנחנו תומכים בהגדרה עצמית כמעט בכל מקום בעולם אבל לא כאן. כפי שזה נראה עכשיו, כאן הגדרה עצמית פירושה מדינה עצמאית ואנחנו נגדה. בחשובה לשאלתם מדוע אין ארה"ב מוכנה להסכים למדינה עצמאית השיב שהנימוקים כדלהלן:

א. IT IS NOT VIABLE

ב. אם נדבר גלויות - הישראלים מקשיבים לא רק למה שאתם אומרים לנו באנגלית אלא גם לנאמר בערבית.

ג. הדבר העיקרי שלמדתי מדו"ח יפה הוא הבעיות הקשות, כלכליות ואחרות, הקשורות בישות פלשתינאית. שלא לדבר על מדינה.

כאן פנה לארנס: אני מתכוון להמשיך לשוחח איתם ומציג להם את עמדת הממשל האמריקני כפי שאני מבין אותה. דיברתי גם עם וילקוקס ואמרתי שחשוב שיעשה אותו דבר. יש לי תחושה שיש לעניין סיכוי. חזר לשיחות בעזה:

בתשובה לשאלת הערבים על הצהרות שמיר בדבר "אף שעל" השיב בראון שלשמיר בעיות פוליטיות. גם הם פוליטיקאים ובודאי מבינים שעל פוליטיקאים להתאים הרטוריקה לנסיבות. הם שאלו למה הישראלים לא הסכימו ל-CHANGES שהם הגישו ובראון, לאחר בדיקה במשרדו, סבור שהמדובר בנייר שהגיש ספטאווי.

בראון הציג לבני שיחו את הדינמיקה של בחירות, אח"כ מו"מ, ואח"כ SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY ואחרי שלוש שנים ואולי פחות, והדגיש שיש כאן מקום לגמישות, מו"מ על הסדר הקבע. האם לא תוכלו להתמודד עם מצב של ממשל עצמי כשהכל בידיכם חוץ מבטחון וחוץ ועוד כ-2500 מתיישבים באזור "ומי יודע כמה מהם באמת ישנים פה?"

הערבים שאלו לגבי חופש הבחירות וההבטחה שהנבחרים לא יגורשו כפי שנעשה אחרי 76. בראון השיב שהבחירות הקודמות היו חופשיות ואתם יודעים שגם אלו יהיו חופשיות - התהליך כולו יהיה UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT גם אחרי הבחירות ה-SPOTLIGHT ישאר. יהיה פה גודר של עתונאים וסנטורים ואולי סטיב סולרז וג'ימי קרטר, ואנחנו נהיה שם גם אחרי הבחירות, נהיה חלק מכל התהליך. זה מה שאני יכול לומר לכם ברגע זה.

כן סיפר בראון על פגישתו עם ראש המנהל האזרחי בעזה וששמח לשמוע שהפסקת הדיג לא באה כעונש קיבוצי אלא כדי למנוע נסיון לברוח מהאזור (וזאת בהתבסס על מידע מוצק).

בכל מקרה מציע לנו שאחרי ישיבת המרכז נשקול מחדש את מדיניות המקל והגזר, וכידיד מציע להימנע מצעדים שיובילו להסלמת העוינות בין הצדדים.

סיפר שנפגש עם שר המשפטים המתעתד לומר לבייקר שאנחנו רואים בדאגה רבה את הדיאלוג שלהם עם אש"פ והשלכותיו השליליות על סיכויי היוזמה. בראון ציין שיש כאן בעיה קשה משום שמצד שני ישראל מציינת כל העת את רמת ה-INTIMIDATION מצד אש"פ ולא ברור כיצד פותרים זאת.

ארנס : בייקר מחייחס באופן EVENHANDED לישראל ולאש"פ.

בראון : אינני חושב שזה המצב, בשום אופן אין זה היחס.

ארנס : באמת מעולם לא היה כך אך נראה כ- NEW DEPARTURE בימינו. גם דימוי הוא מציאות וכך נתפס הנאום אצל הערבים, בישראל ובאמריקה.

בראון : שואל על ביקור גאלי.

ארנס : מברך על הביקור אך לא הביא מסר. אולי (חוזר על הספק) מטרת הביקור הייתה להבטיח את חלקה של מצרים בתיווך בין ישראל והפלשתינאים. גאלי אמר לנו שידוע לו שגם ארה"ב יכולה לעשות זאת, וראוי שגם למצרים יהיה חלק.

June 14, 1989

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"Message from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Arens"

Dear Misha:

I received your letter of May 26, and reviewed it carefully. I very much regret that you found the speech disappointing. My remarks were in no way intended to offend or surprise you; nor were they designed to contradict the approach that we have been pursuing together on the peace process these past several months. Indeed, now more than ever Israel and the United States are embarked on a course that requires close cooperation and partnership. And now more than ever you and I have to continue to engage in a spirit of mutual trust and confidence. On this basis I know we can move ahead. And it is in this same spirit that I want to offer some comments on the issues you raised in your letter.

It is important to recall the diplomatic and political environment that our two countries faced as recently as January. Then, the international community and your Arab neighbors were fixated on convening an international conference immediately as a means of getting to negotiations. At the same time, the Palestine Liberation Organization assumed that it was only a matter of time before the international community would deliver its objective of an independent state through such a conference. The PLO further assumed that through its dialogue with the United States it could drive a wedge between Israel and the United States.

Within five months, however, we have changed this environment. With resolute American leadership and creative Israeli thinking, the bases of moving forward toward negotiations have been altered. There is no longer a question of the immediate convening of an international conference. There is no longer an assumption that a Palestinian state is a foregone conclusion simply because of a PLO announcement. We've proven through our action on WHO that we were determined to block PLO efforts to build momentum for Palestinian statehood and international recognition of that. And there is no basis on which to believe that the strategic relationship between Israel and the United States can be shaken by any party, including the PLO. I am personally committed to strengthening the bonds of strategic cooperation as we pursue peace and cope with a more dangerous military environment in the region.

Together, the United States and Israel have worked to shape a negotiating process to be launched by free and fair elections. You and we understand the importance of this concept, and you and we have offered a chance to the Palestinians to move through a democratic process to negotiations on the key issues of the conflict. This is an opportunity that they and other Arabs should not miss; it is an opportunity created by Israel and the United States. I have made very clear to my European colleagues, minister Shevardnadze, and our Arab friends that Israel has given us something to work with; now it is time for the Arab world and Palestinians to do likewise.

The question facing our two countries, as we plan together how to move forward, is to develop the right mix of diplomatic tools designed to encourage a positive Palestinian response. This is an issue, you recall, that we discussed during your recent visit to Washington, and which we discussed also with the Prime Minister and his staff during their visit in March. The fact is that concerns remain strong in Arab minds about Israeli policy. This is unfortunate; but they exist and must be dealt with if there is to be an Arab partner for the process in which we are engaged.

Toward this end -- that is, our shared objective of bringing to this process a Palestinian partner -- the United States has exerted tremendous private and public efforts. In our public diplomacy, and most recently in my speech of May 22, we have sought to define our own views on some issues of greatest concern. In doing so, we have neither sought to break new ground nor to focus attention on final status issues -- those issues least amenable to resolution in the near term. We have sought to convey the continuity of our principles and the need for realism. On some of our principles and related issues, there are fundamental differences of view between the U.S. and the Arabs; and on some there are differences between the U.S. and Israel. It is also true that these differences have persisted for over two decades and despite hundreds of public statements by both sides. There is nothing new or different about recent statements by U.S. or Israeli officials -- we both seek a constructive and positive Arab and Palestinian response to a workable process for moving to negotiations.

There is still a great deal of work to be done, and thus our efforts -- our collective efforts -- need to be focused on how to move forward. The United States will never lose sight of the fact that issues related to the Arab-Israeli peace process directly affect Israel's fundamental security. As we move

ahead, let there be no doubt that President Bush and I are firmly committed to attention on final status issues -- those issues least amenable to resolution in the near term. We have sought to convey the continuity of our principles and the need for realism. On some of our principles and related issues, there are fundamental differences of view between the U.S. and the Arabs; and on some there are differences between the U.S. and Israel. It is also true that these differences have persisted for over two decades and despite hundreds of public statements by both sides. There is nothing new or different about recent statements by U.S. or Israeli officials -- we both seek a constructive and positive Arab and Palestinian response to a workable process for moving to negotiations.

There is still a great deal of work to be done, and thus our efforts -- our collective efforts -- need to be focused on how to move forward. The United States will never lose sight of the fact that issues related to the Arab-Israeli peace process directly affect Israel's fundamental security. As we move ahead, let there be no doubt that President Bush and I are firmly committed to Israel's security and to advancing the peace process in a way that recognizes this fundamental reality. In this spirit I strongly believe that we and you can make progress working together, each in his own way, but always toward our common goal of peace.

Jerusalem, May 26, 1989
943

Dear Mr. Secretary,

The text of your address delivered at the AIPAC policy conference reached me in Brussels while I was presenting Israel's peace initiative to the Foreign Ministers of the EEC. I am sure you will not be surprised that I found the content and tone of your speech gravely disappointing.

Your AIPAC speech was not consistent with our discussion held in your office only a few days earlier. Then you assured me of your wholehearted support for Israel's peace initiative without hinting at the "visions" of a permanent settlement that you presented at AIPAC. As you know Israel's peace initiative is based on the assumption that debate on the form and shape of the permanent settlement is best postponed until after the interim arrangement has been put into place. Focusing attention now on the differences regarding the final status can only hinder the start of negotiations.

For many years now it was in the nature of the special relationship developed between Israel and the United States that we not make our differences public but rather treat them in the privacy of the conversations between representatives of our two countries. At AIPAC you chose to confront Israel publicly with positions which you know are contrary to ours.

Your speech came at a time when Israel had launched an important peace initiative and was looking for your assistance in enlisting support for it. I am not at all sure that your remarks will engender such support, whereas I am concerned that they will raise Arab expectations, harden Arab positions, and make Arab acceptance of our peace initiative less likely.

Equally troubling was the presence in your speech of several new elements as well as the absence of traditional elements of American policy regarding Israel's most vital interests and its security. It is my view that for Israel and the United States to continue to work together towards the advancement of peace, it is essential that we work in concert and that our policies be marked by continuity and consistency.

Mr. secretary, let me express my hope that with your assistance Israel's peace initiative will be an historic milestone in progress towards peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Moshe Arens

דמיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: שמור		פתוק: 2
תאריך וזמן תכור: 12 1100 ביוני 1989	מצפ"א, אירופה 1,2	אל:
כס' פרוק:	ממ"ד	דע:
הפסיד:		פאת: שגי וושינגטון
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מחלקת

פסגת נאטו: ההיבט האמריקאי

1. בשיחה עם עוזרו של בלקוויל (מנהל מח' אירופה במועצה לבטחון לאומי) לנושא נאטו תאר הרקע להצעה (בנושא הנשק הקונבנציונלי) אותה חשף בוש בפסגת נאטו ומשמעויותיה.

2. להלן סכום שיחתנו:

- (1) איש שיחי ציין בפתח השיחה כי הבטיט הקונצפטואלי להצעה הקונקרטיה מוחה הצי בוש בפסגה היה מטקנות ה - review אותה ערכה הבירוקרטיה ואשר אותן פיתח הנשיא בסדרת נאומים בנושאי מדיניות בשבועות השקדמו לפסגה. בדיעבד ניתן לומר שהעתונות טעתה בהערכתה את משמעות הנאומים.
- (2) נאומי בוש מסמנים שינוי משמעותי במדיניות ממשל בוש בהקשר למזי אירופה. השינוי מוצא ביטוריו בנכונות ממשל זה לגלות מעורבות (גדולה יותר מכל ממשל בעבר) בתהליך הרפורמות.
- (3) שינוי משמעותי נוסף ניתן לראות בהצהרת בוש בדבר הצורך להתקדם מעבר למדיניות הבלימה, בניגוד לרעיון הדטנט שיצא מנקודת הנחה של המשך התחרות הבינמעצמתית והצורך להביא להרפיה במתיחות עיני יצירות כללי משחק חדשים כוונת הנשיא היא להביא התחרות (כפי שהובנה עד היום) לידי סיום.
- (4) ביסוד התפיסה לעיל ההכרה שנוצרו הזדמנויות חדשות אשר לא היו בעבר המאפשרות לממשל לנסות לפתח מדיניות חדשה. תכלית מדיניות זו היא להביא לשילוב ברה"מ בקהיליה הבינ"ל קרי להגיע לנורמליזציה מלאה עיני שתיים ברה"מ תוך נסיון לסייע לה להשגת מטרתה (רפורמות כלכליות ופוליטיות). הסיוע יעשה עיני מתן תמריצים (הסרת ג'קסון וניק לדוגמא) שיבהירו לברה"מ היתרונות של שתיים.

(5) גם אם על פני השטח לא ניתן להבחין בהיקף השינוי הפילוסופי (אחרו תאר לעיל) הינו ללא תקדים.

תפוצה: 321-1-11

דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל:
פס' פרוק: הפסד:		דע:
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- (6) כוונת הממשל לקבוע סד"י אשר יוביל אותם מעבר לעידן המלחמה הקרה. אין בכך כדי לקבוע שהמלחמה הקרה כבר הסתיימה. כל אשר ניתן לקבוע בשלב זה הוא שמתחילים להוצר תנאים שעשויים להביאה לידי סיום.
- (7) הצעתו של הנשיא בנושא הנשק הקונבנציונלי ציין מהווה תחילת יישום התפיסה של "מעבר לבלימה" (beyond containment) את הסכמת הנשיא לכלול בהצעתו את המטוסים וכ"א (קטיגוריות עליהן סירב נאטו לדון בעבר במסגרת שיחות וינה) תאר איש שיחי כחלק מהתפיסה של ביצול הזדמנות שנוצרה (בעקבות הצעות גורבצ'וב). במידה ונאטו יצליח בשיחות וינה (CFE) להשיג קיצוץ משמעותי במספרי הטנקים וארטילריה יקדז הדבר באופן משמעותי את הקיצוצים הצפויים כתוצאה מהכללת מטוסים וכ"א.
- (8) במידה וברה"מ תאמץ הצעת הנשיא יביא הדבר לשינויים משמעותיים בהיערכות ומבנה הצבא הטובייטי אותם יתקשה כל מנהיג שיביא אחרי גורבצ'וב לשנות.
- (9) הצעת הנשיא נטלה את העוקץ מהמחלוקת בנושא המודרניזציה והמו"מ בנושא הנשק הגרעיני לטווח קצר (SNF) שאימה לשבש את הצלחת הפסגה. על רקע הטיפול האינטנסיבי של העתונות בטוגית ה- SNF הדגיש איש שיחי כי ההחלטה לדחות הטיפול בנושא הכניסה הנושא לפרטפקטיבה הנכונה, הצעת הנשיא חשובה יותר מבחינת השלכותיה על בטחון אירופה.
- (10) בהקשר לעיל הצביע איש שיחי²⁴ פילוסופי נוסף (לו נתן הנשיא ביטוי בנאום שנשא לפני הפסגה) הנוגע בטוגית ההרועה הגרעינית. בניגוד לממשל רייגן הבהיר בוש כי גם במצב של שלום אין אלטרנטיבה להרתעה הגרעינית.
- (11) איש שיחי סיכם באומרו כי היעד המרכזי של נאטו בשנים הקרובות יהיה להתגבר על חלוקת אירופה.

שטיינ

תפוצה:

H

מיידי	דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
גלוי	סוג:		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן חבירה: 1989 יוני 132000			אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק: הפסד:			דע:
11/11	293		פאת: ק/ק לקונגרס

סנט: סיוע חוץ (הקצבות)

אמ"מ

להלן קטעים על טק // קים ולוחמה כימית, על הסיכסוך ועל הסיוע עבור ישראל, מצרים וישי"ע מתוך ההחלטות הכתובה של פול הייר בשימועים שהחקימו הינם (13.6).

ההחלטות המלאה בדיפ היוצא מחר.

ו.ו.
קונגרס

למה סגרת מה אמרת לי שאתם הוציאתם את זה
למה אמרת לי שאתם הוציאתם את זה

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A CHANGING REGION

We also see grounds for hope in recent developments in the Near East and South Asia. On March 26, Israel and Egypt celebrated 10 years of peace, demonstrating not only the strong commitment of both countries to their relationship, but that negotiations, not war, offers the path to a just settlement of the issues which have divided the region. On February 15, the last Soviet combat troops left Afghanistan, reducing the threat of Soviet expansion in South Asia. On November 16, 1988 Pakistan held free, democratic elections and in December Prime Minister Bhutto formed a new government. In August 1988, a cease-fire was reached in the Iran-Iraq War, reducing the immediate threat from Iran to the moderate Gulf states and the region as a whole. We welcome these developments and can be proud that US policies and our assistance programs contributed to the environment that helped in bringing them about.

BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

An issue which is of serious concern to us in the Middle East and South Asia is the spread of ballistic missiles and

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chemical weapons. These weapons add special dangers to a region in which strong conventional military forces already exist and the potential for conflict is high.

Ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 2500 kilometers (1,552 miles) are now entering the inventories of several states in the region. These systems may encourage potential adversaries to plan preemptive attacks on the missiles or to acquire similar weapons as a deterrent. The horrible experience of chemical weapons use in the First World War resulted in international agreement to forswear the use of these weapons in conflicts. Recently we have seen an erosion of these international norms. The need for concerted and energetic action has been dramatically illustrated by the use of these weapons by both parties in the Iran-Iraq War, by Iraq's use of CW against elements of its own population, and by Libya's attempts to acquire full-scale CW production capability.

This Administration has made clear that it is committed to seeking an end to the proliferation of these powerful, destabilizing weapons, and we have been active on a number of fronts. The United States and six of its allies established a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987 to curb the

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uncontrolled supply of missile-related technology. The US has approached other supplier countries on a bilateral basis to express our strong opposition to the spread of ballistic missiles. We have also initiated a dialogue with several states in the Middle East and South Asia to explore ideas for combatting the spread of these destabilizing weapons.

We are making a similar effort directed at chemical weapons, for which our goal remains a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban. We are also focusing on the immediate problem of CW proliferation in those countries which we believe pose the greatest threat to actually use these weapons. We have launched a major diplomatic effort to stop Libya's program and will remain vigilant to Libya's attempts to acquire CW capability.

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Before describing our individual assistance programs, let me say a few words about the search for peace in the Middle East. The goal of our policy is a comprehensive peace through negotiations, based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. These negotiations, in our view, must involve

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territory for peace, security and recognition for Israel and all states in the region, and Palestinian political rights.

The immediate task is how to begin negotiations. Frankly, the gap between the parties remains wide. The situation in the West Bank and Gaza remains difficult. The Palestinian uprising, or intifada, which began in December 1987, continues. The level of violence remains high, making the prospect of negotiations more difficult. Our efforts will focus on helping create an environment in which negotiations can be launched and sustained.

We are committed to advancing the peace process and remain active, as demonstrated by the productive visits to Washington by President Mubarak, Prime Minister Shamir, and King Hussein; as well as subsequent talks with the Soviets and continuing discussions in the region. The Israeli Government has adopted a proposal for elections which we believe is an important and positive step towards constructing workable negotiations. Details of the proposal must still be developed and many issues must be resolved, but we believe it deserves a constructive Palestinian and broader Arab response. We also call on all parties to help create an atmosphere which is conducive to a

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renewed peace process.

Let me now turn to our military and economic assistance programs in the region.

MIDDLE EAST

Israel: A fundamental premise of US foreign policy since 1948 has been support for Israel's security. Our links with Israel are broad and deep, based on shared values, common interests, and a commitment to democracy and freedom. Israel and the United States have developed an effective program of strategic cooperation and institutional links which reinforce our close ties in the political, military, and economic areas.

Our proposed assistance program for Israel in FY 90 consists of \$1.8 billion in Foreign Military Sales Financing (FMSF) and \$1.2 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF), all provided on a grant basis. Within the \$1.8 billion total for military assistance, we are providing additional benefits to Israel. \$400 million, for example, is authorized for offshore procurement (OSP) expenditures in Israel. Our direct offsets program with Israel, purchases of Israeli defense articles and

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services, will total \$100 million in FY 90. By mutual agreement, these offsets will be terminated at the end of FY 92.

Our economic assistance of \$1.2 billion in ESF is also important in supporting economic stability and structural reform. Israel uses these funds to repay FMS loans made by the US to Israel prior to 1985 and for commodity imports. In 1988, Israel refinanced \$4.75 billion in FMS loans under FMS debt reform legislation, resulting in debt service savings of approximately \$150 million annually over the next five to ten years.

Egypt: Egypt is an important and valued partner of the US. Egypt's leadership in the Arab-Israeli peace process, its influence as a force for moderation in a turbulent region, and its support for peaceful resolution of regional conflicts are all congruent with US values and objectives. Egypt has also resumed a central role in the Arab world; last month it was readmitted to the Arab League. Egypt made no concessions to regain its position and remains fully committed to peace and to a stable bilateral relationship with Israel.

Internally, Egypt's most pressing problem remains the

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economy. Egypt's budget and balance of payments remain deeply in deficit. Arrears on external debts are mounting steadily. In March, the Government of Egypt outlined a series of promising reform measures, such as liberalization of the agricultural and industrial sectors whose implementation deserves our strong support. We are encouraging Egypt to consolidate these measures into a program that can command the broad support of the IMF, the World Bank, and the Western donor community. A new IMF program could then pave the way to another debt rescheduling which would provide critical relief to Egypt's balance of payments and facilitate a resumption of economic growth.

For fiscal year 1990, the Administration is requesting a total of \$2.3 billion in combined military, economic, and food assistance to Egypt. Our FMSF request of \$1.3 billion in grant assistance will permit the Egyptians to continue to meet their urgent military modernization needs. Designed to facilitate Egypt's replacement of aging, obsolete Soviet equipment with fewer but better quality US items, the modernization program has focused heavily on armor and air requirements. Our \$815 million ESF request for Egypt balances support for Egyptian economic stabilization and development objectives. For

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balance of payments support, we plan to allocate a portion of our ESF program in the form of a cash grant, and additional amounts for commodity imports.

Jordan: The Palestinian uprising has significantly altered Jordan's relationship with the West Bank and its Palestinian population. In July 1988, King Hussein decided to sever most remaining administrative links between Jordan and the West Bank. In doing so he did not opt out of the peace process with Israel. Jordan, an important force for moderation in the Middle East with the longest border of any state with Israel, remains a critical factor in any comprehensive settlement.

The US and Jordan share important objectives and have worked together to support peaceful resolution of regional disputes, to oppose political radicalism, and to provide military assistance to the moderate Gulf states. The US and Jordan have had a bilateral military-to-military relationship for many years. Jordan also plays a vital role in the effort to curb world-wide terrorism.

Jordan's economy is in serious difficulty. It was hard

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hit by recent cuts in subsidies from Gulf governments as well as reductions in remittances from Jordanians working abroad. The Jordanian government has responded with a strong adjustment program and has reached an agreement with the IMF. Recent disturbances in southern Jordan over austerity measures underline the seriousness of the problem.

These economic difficulties come just as US aid to Jordan has declined sharply. Last year (FY 89), we requested \$48 million in FMSF credits, but due to budget constraints we were able to actually provide only \$10 million. I hope that we can avoid a similar result this year. For FY 90, we are requesting \$48 million in FMSF, \$2.2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET), and \$35 million in ESF. This will help us continue our important cooperation with Jordan.

West Bank and Gaza: The unrest in the West Bank and Gaza is a vivid reminder that the future status of the Occupied Territories and the 1.6 million Palestinians who live there are at the center of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unemployment and underemployment cause hardships and contribute to instability and violence. Over the medium-term, economic development and self-reliance can give Palestinians a larger stake in a peace

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
settlement and encourage moderate forces within the Palestinian community.

Our assistance program in the West Bank and Gaza began in 1975 with strong Congressional support. Notwithstanding the current difficulties, we remain committed to fostering economic development in the territories and improving living conditions there, largely through grants to private voluntary organizations (PVO's) such as Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children Federation, and American Near East Refugee Aid.

For FY 90, we are requesting \$12 million in ESF for these activities in the territories. This will fund projects to improve health, water, and sanitation; to develop agricultural credit and private sector activities; and to construct schools and roads. The Palestinians, Israel, and Jordan have welcomed the program. PVO's have continued to operate and administer projects despite the disturbances. The program represents the US commitment to a secure future for the Palestinians and all states in the region.

✓ 160 3 ✓

Lebanon: We remain deeply concerned about the deteriorating conditions in Lebanon. Partition has deepened



Shimon Peres

Q: Why are you using the word "hope?" You are in a position that you can say: Elect me prime minister, and that is what we are going to make of Israel — instead of fantastic fighter pilots, I will make fantastic professors and inventors.

A: My real problem, I believe, as a person, as a leader, is the mistrust

of so many people toward the Arabs. Because of wars and terror, they may feel that what I am suggesting is a little-bit naive, innocent, ahead-of-time. So, just by proclaiming the things that I consider profound historically and right politically — I do not have a large enough audience.

Q: Do you see, in a normal situation, say 20-30 years from now, your grandchildren will marry Arabs?

A: No. No. We are such a small people that we have to be very sensitive not to lose even in small numbers, our minimal composition as a people. You know, as I said before, the Jewish people are great in spirit but small in body. We lost, and lost and lost

Q: But how can you envision a real democratic state, where people live in peace, do everything together, going to the same schools, and not having a natural mix of population, where young people fall in love, get married?

A: I do not suggest that the state will intervene in love. That is an entirely private choice and decision. But, psychologically and from a mental point of view, I would like to keep our people with their own identity. I would not use imposed laws or

rules — we don't have any, even today. I will try to explain to our youngsters — let's remain alive. You cannot have Jewishness without Jews.

Q: Mr. Peres, during the process of establishing a possible future Palestinian state, there will be a situation where Israeli settlements that are right now in Arab territories, will have to be returned to Israel. Do you agree with my question?

A: No. I think they can remain where they are. As there are Arab settlements under Jewish rule, there can be Jewish settlements under non-Jewish rule.

Q: In a Palestinian state?

A: In a Jordanian-Palestinian state.

Q: Mr. Peres, are you a ladies' man?

A: What do you mean?

Q: Does the other sex trigger your fancy a lot?

A: Yes. I like very much the saying of Engels: "Every woman is a civilization in her own right."

Q: Mr. Peres, are you attracted to women?


A: Otherwise I would not be a man.

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1989 3/13

Let's give back territories . . .

Ranan R. Lurie, political cartoonist for Cartoonews International and senior political analyst for S. News & World Report, was interviewed during a recent visit of the Mideast. In this interview, questions Israeli Labor Party leader Shimon Peres.



TEL AVIV, Israel
Mr. Lurie: Mr. Peres, would you insist on retaining all the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

Mr. Peres: DEFINITELY NOT.
Q: Can you give me a definition of what you would not mind to be included in the Palestinian state?

By and large, densely populated areas I would give back to the Palestinians, without any hesitation. Strips of land that are necessary for our security — we would keep for ourselves. For example, I would give back, probably, 95 percent of Gaza; I would give control of major cities on the West Bank . . .

... what do you mean, "control"? Would you give the cities back to the Palestinians, yes or no?

Without hesitation, then.)
YES, SIR! I see no reason why I should administer Nablus or Hebron.

You are a very clever politician, trying to wedge you out of your usual expressions like "admission": What you mean is let the cities, like Nablus and Hebron, be part of the Palestinian state, period.

I would prefer, of a Palestinian state.
Really, Mr. Peres . . .

OK: Definitely not part of Israel. I would try very hard to have an alternative to Jordanian rule, because we have problems that I have to clarify: talking about political situation, military deployment. Militarily, I'd like to see just two armies: Jordanian and Israeli. Jordanian reaching the waters of the Jordan

River from the east, and Israeli army reaching the waters from the west. And then, I don't see any reason why we should dominate, administer, govern, whatever expression you want, the lives of the Palestinian people. The tiny little River Jordan cannot serve as a knife — to cut the Palestinian body into two halves.

Q: On one hand you are saying: Let them have free elections. Do you really intend for the forthcoming elections to be free?

A: Yes. One hundred percent . . .

Q: "One hundred percent" . . . OK . . . But, on the other hand, you proclaim that your wishful thinking would be a Palestinian-Jordanian state. If, for instance, the elected Palestinians will decide to become part of Norway, that should be their prerogative, because this is the meaning of free elections. While I respect your personal ambition, you seem to indulge in other people's interests.

A: Not so. I am aware of the fact that we are in disagreement — that

is why we need negotiations. When the Palestinians will elect their leaders-representatives, they shall come with their set of ideas, and we shall come with our set of ideas.

Q: Basically, you really want to "free" Israel from the massively populated Arab areas, period. Correct or incorrect?

A: YES. Plus peace — these are the plans

Q: The second thing is, you are ready to agree, eventually, to a Palestinian state that would be demilitarized?

A: Again, I would have to express our preferred solution. And it is to see a Jordanian-Palestinian federation. My experience shows that when two parties are in disagreement, the results may be a third position that neither of the two parties ever suggested or took into consideration.

Q: How can your position live with

Mr. Shamir's and Mr. Sharon's political mentality?

A: It can live for a very short time: basically, we are divided about the future of the state. I belong to a party which is for a territorial compromise — what Arabs and Americans call "land for peace." I say it openly, and I will pay the price for it.

Q: Mr. Sharon claims that there is a Palestinian state east of Jordan, and Shamir and him want to claim all the territories in Israel proper; as a result — Israel in 20 years from now will have the Arab majority. Would these be "reasonable solutions," from your point of view?

A: No. You know, some of them are presuming that the Palestinians residing on the West Bank, and Gaza, will remain forever Jordan's citizens. If you shall not find the solution, Jordan may denounce their citizenship, and then they will become the citizens of Israel. Today, they are already 38 percent of the people residing between Jordan River and the Mediterranean. And, clearly, when I am speaking about the Jewish state, the only way to make a state Jewish is to have a Jewish majority. I would not rely on any other means that can't guarantee the nature of our country as a democratic country, and nature of our state but by having a clear majority.

Q: When are you going to stand up and say: "Enough is enough. This is exactly what my conscience dictates to me, even if I will not have any position in any Cabinet, I will have clear conscience of doing the right thing."

A: The minute I decide to stop dealing with strategies and become a preacher. I am not a preacher, I am not giving a sermon. I am telling to our people again and again: For 4,000 years we did not dominate the Arab people; let's give back territories for peace and for the moral character of our country. Let's understand the Palestinian people have their own desires.

Q: Let's take the Golan Heights. That area presents a very interesting situation, from YOUR point of view, since it has no Arabs whatsoever, and thus there is no need, from a social point of view, to "get rid" of hostile population. Yet, it is not, in biblical terms, "Israel proper." Would you be willing to return the Golan Heights?

A: Well, I don't feel I have to make all the declarations in the world simply because you are asking questions. But I will say the following: Assad is, strategically, the most extreme Arab leader. I do not see him accommodating in the near future. So the problem does not exist. Basically, we have said that 242 applied to the Golan Heights as well. And the consideration will be strategic.

Q: How can you make the Israeli society, and Israel more attractive, much more attractive, not only to Russian Jewish potential immigrants, who clearly say they want to go to America instead of to Israel?

A: In 1948, the charm of Israel was the statehood, the return of Jewish life, after interruption of 2,000

years. In 1989, the charm of Israel must be peace. The combination in the state created against so many odds, and the peace introduced against so many doubts, is the most dramatic combination that I can think of.

Q: But peace is a normal situation, and it is not enough for Israel to be "normal." Also Vermont is not in a war with its neighbors, which is a normal situation. Israel has to be attractive to future immigrants.

A: Well, the chances that Israel or the Jewish people will become normal are very little . . . (laughter) — we are an unusual people, so we were, so we shall, probably, remain. The "specialty of the house" of Israel and Jewish people is the clear preference of the spiritual judgment and achievement. I hope that Israel is to become a center of learning, a spiritual center, a center of knowledge, a center of non-conformism, intellectually speaking.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* תאריך : 17.06.89 *

* דף 1 מתוך 4 *

* עותק 5 מתוך 24 *

נכנס סודי ביותר

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* חוזם: 6,12171 *

* אל: המשרד *

* יעדים: מצב/865, מנמת/251 *

* מ-: ווש, נר: 401, תא: 160689, זח: 2000, דח: ב, סג: סב *

* תח: @ גס: צפא *

* נד: @ *

מחלקת

* סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר *

* אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר'נ *

* דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח *

* מאת: ציר - עודד ערן *

* שיחת השר מרידור - המזכיר (16.6.89) *

* בתחילת השיחה אמר המזכיר כי הוא היה רוצה לבקר בישראל

* בבהקדם. מרידור אמר כי אכן ביקור כזה חשוב שכן רק

* כך אפשר להתרשם מההשלכות הגאוגרפיות של פתרונות

* שונים וכמה מדינה פלשתינאית מסוכנת לישראל. רוס

* השיב ואמר שאכן מרגרט טטוילר שעבורה היה זה ביקור

* ראשון התרשמה מאוד בנקודה זו. השר מרידור אמר שישראל

* צעדה מחצית הדרך ויש כאלו המבקרים את ישראל שאף

* יותר מכך. עתה על הערבים לתת תשובה. רוס אמר שבשיחות

* עם הסובייטים (המתנהלות מאתמול בווינגטון ע.ע.)

* אמר לסובייטים בכל הדרכים האפשריות שישראל הגישה

* תוכנית רצינית מתוך כוונה להגיע לדו שיח רציני

* עם הפלשתינאים ועתה צריך הצד הערבי להתייחס בחיוב.

* מרידור המשיך באומרו כי ישראל נוטלת על עצמה סיכונים

* בהצעה שהגישה ומה שאנו שומעים הוא מאוד מדאיג.

* בבקבלנקה חזרו מדינות ערב על העקרונות השלילים כגון

* עקרון השיבה, ירושלים כבירת המדינה הפלשתינאית

* ואזכורה של ישראל רק במסגרת נסיגה. את ראה"מ שמיר

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* דף 2 מתוך 4 *
* עותק 5 מתוך 24 *

* מאשימים באמירה כגון 'אף שעל' אבל האם עלינו לעשות
* עוד ויתורים כאשר הצד השני לא רק שאינו מגיב על יוזמת
* ישראל, אלא מגיב עליה בשלילה ?

* רוס אמר שבכל המגעים עם הסובייטים ועם הערבים ארה"ב
* אומרת שהישראלים יהיו מוכנים להתייחס לשאלות שונות
* הקשורות להצעת הבחירות אלא שתחילה עליהם לקבל תשובה
* עקרונית חיובית. המזכיר הוסיף שהדברים נאמרו לא רק
* לסובייטים, אלא גם לאירופאים ואחרים והרעיון לדעתו
* ALIVE והוא דוחף אותו כ- VIABLE POSSIBILITY
* לדברי המזכיר כך גם נאמר למובראק וחוסייין. הרעיון
* נראה למובראק אך פחות לחוסייין. מובראק הביע נכונות
* לנסות. רוס ציין שמובראק תומך לחלוטין ברעיון הבחירות.
* מה שצוין עתה הוא דיאלוג מוסמך (AUTHORTATIVE DIALOGUE)
* בין ישראל והפלשתינאים.

* מרידור אמר כי צריך לזכור שביוזמה יש 4 מרכיבים. אם
* רוצים ליצור אמון בישראל צריך להתחיל במאמץ לפתרון
* בעית הפליטים הערבים ולשכנע מדינות ערב ובודאי כאלו
* שאין להן נגיעה ישירה לסכסוך, להתחיל במגעים עם ישראל.
* רוס ענה שאכן בראיון שנתן ב- WORLDNET
* הוא התייחס לנקודה זו. מאידך התחלה בנושא פתרון שאלת
* הפליטים אפשרית אם תהיה התקדמות בנושא הבחירות.
* בייקר הוסיף שאי אפשר להתקדם בנושא הפליטים בלי
* שתהיה התקדמות בנושא הבחירות. השר מרידור ציין שבמכתבו
* למזכיר הקודם, כתב ראה'מ שמיר שפתרון נושא הפליטים
* חיוני על מנת להתקדם בתהליך השלום. פליטי 1948
* הם ה- RAISON D'EIRE
* של אש"פ וישראל לא תנהל דיאלוג כלשהוא עם אש"פ.

* המזכיר אמר -שאל מדוע אי אפשר לנהל דיאלוג עם הפלשתינאים
* בשטחים ובמקביל דיאלוג עם אש"פ בתוניס. 'דן אומר
* שזה לא יקרה' אמר המזכיר 'אך צריך לעשות כל מאמץ
* ישיר ובאמצעות האירופאים -עם מיטראן דיברנו לפני
* הפגישה עם ערפאת -מובראק והסובייטים. אולי זה לא
* יקרה אבל אם רוצים לקדם את הרעיון אסור להשאיר
* אף אבן בלתי הפוכה.

* מרידור ענה באומרו שעלינו לשאול את עצמנו האם מנהיג
* מקומי מבית לחם למשל יהיה מוכן לקום וליטול על עצמו

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* דף 3 מתוך 4 *
* עותק 5 מתוך 24 *

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*סיכון ואחריות אם כאשר במקביל מתקיים דיאלוג בין
*אש"פ לבין ארה"ב. לכן על ארה"ב לומר לפלשתינאים
*'לחטוף' את רעיון הבחירות וליטול את גורלם בידיהם
*במקום להשאירו, לשווא, בידי אש"פ. לצורך זה, הדיאלוג
*עם אש"פ רק מזיק.

*
*רוס חזר ואמר כי כך אכן אמרו בשיחותיהם השונות והמזכיר
*הוסיף שמובראק וחוסיין באו לביקוריהם בווינגטון
*עם כוונה לומר לא לרעיון הבחירות ולא יהיה זה מוגזם
*לומר שארה"ב שכנעה אותם ולפחות את מובראק.
*רעיון הבחירות מקובל על ארה"ב ויש רק 'הבדל קטן'
*וזה בענין 'תוניס' אך חשוב שלא נשאר אבן אחת לא הפוכה.

*
*מרידור אמר שהאלימות והאינתיפאדה מדאיגות את ישראל
*שכן הן עלולות ליצור אצל הפלשתינאים הרגשה שבעזרתן
*ניתן להגיע לפתרון. רוס אמר שבשיחותיו עם הפלשתינאים
*בעת ביקורו האחרון אמר שאין פתרון באמצעות האינתיפאדה.

*
*בשלב זה כאשר היה נראה שהשיחה הגיעה לסיומה, אמר בייקר
*כי אינו יכול לתת לשר מרידור לעזוב בלא להעלות
*את נושא ההתנחלויות שעלה בעת ביקורי ראה"מ, שה"ח
*ושהב"ט. מרידור אמר שממשלת ישראל אינה יכולה לקבל
*החלטה שליהודים אין זכות לחיות בשטח מסויים. קיים
*ויכוח למי שייך חלק זה של ארץ ישראל. אמירה או החלטה
*שיהודים לא יכולים לחיות בחלק זה פרושה סגירת אופציה
*אחת של פתרון, אופציה שחלק גדול בישראל מאמין בה.

*
*רוס אמר שישראל הניחה על השולחן יוזמה חיובית ואין
*צורך שהיא תשגר מסר הפוך. המזכיר ציין כי ארה"ב
*רוצה שהקהיליה הבינלאומית תתן מלוא תמיכתה ברעיון
*הבחירות. לא ברור, הוסיף המזכיר, כמה זמן יעבור
*עד שהתוכנית תישא פירות ועוד כמה זמן תוכל ארה"ב
*לדחות את לחצי האירופאים בנושא הועידה הבינלאומית.
*ההתנחלויות יוצרות קושי 'למכור' את התוכנית. מרידור
*הגיב באומרו שב-1978 כאשר הוסכם על ק.ד. היו 5000
*מתנחלים ואילו עתה יש 80000 ואולי על הערבים להסיק
*מסקנות מסרובם לנהל מו"מ עם ישראל.

*
*המזכיר אמר שהלחצים עליהם ילכו ויתגברו לכנס ועידה
*בינלאומית על מנת לדון במתחולל בשטחים ובדרכים לפתרון.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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* דף 4 מתוך 4
* עותק 5 מתוך 24
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*ארה'ב תתקשה להסביר מדוע היא מתנגדת לדון בפורום
*כזה בנושא כה סבוך כאשר ישראל, למענת כל אלו שרוצים
*בועידה בינלאומית, 'פותרת', דה פקטו, את הבעיה
*בהתנחלויות.

*
*מרידור אמר שאנו שומעים שחוגים מסויימים באירופה שוקלים
*שינוי 'הצהרת ונציה'. יתכן שארה'ב תוכל לעודד זאת.
*יש להתרכז באספקטים החיוביים ולראות היכן אפשר
*להתקדם. כאשר הוא קורא את החלטות קזבלנקה הוסיף
*מרידור הוא מתמלא דאגה. בייקר אמר שהוא מבין זאת אך
*הוא מבקש שגם ישראל תבין את ארה'ב העושה מאמצים לשכנע
*את האירופאים שישראל אינה מנסה להרוויח זמן (STALL)
*כפי שכמה מהאירופאים מאשימים את ישראל, ע'מ להקים
*התנחלויות. מרידור ענה שיש מבחן פשוט שהערבים יכולים
*להעמידנו בו וזה להתייצב לשולחן המו'מ.
*המזכיר אמר -

*'אנו תומכים בכס. אנו יודעים שאתם מחפשים בר-שיח.
*אמרת לראה'מ שאנו רוצים לקדם רעיון הבחירות יחד
*אך יש אובדן תמיכה. אם יש גורם שעשוי להביא לשינוי
*חיובי זה נושא ההתנחלויות. ארה'ב לא תוכל להתמיד
*בהדיפת הלחצים לאורך זמן. אם לא תהיינה התנחלויות
*ייגבר כושר העמידה של ארה'ב בלחצים אלו'. מרידור ענה
*שעלינו לשכנע את הפלשתינאים שאין דרך טובה יותר מרעיון
*הבחירות. רוס אמר שכמו דברים אחרים ההתנחלויות הן
*סמל המקשה על הצד הערבי. מרידור ענה שגם עבורנו
*ההתנחלויות הן סמל.

*
*השיחה כולה כולל החלק בארבע עיניים נמשכה 45 דקות.
*

*בצד האמריקאי נכח רק רוס. בצידנו השגריר ארד והח'מ
*

*ערן.
*

*לב
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*תפ: שהו, סשו, רה, ממרה, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ב

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** נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 6,12170

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/868, מנמת/252

מ-: ווש, נר: 404, תא: 160689, חז: 1800, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: א גס: צפא

נד: א

ארה"ב

סודי/מידי

אל: ממנכ"ל

סמנכ"ל צפ"א

מאת: ציר - עודד ערן

שיחות מז'ת

בעת שהיכינו לשיחת המזכיר עם השר מרידור מסר דניס רוס לשגריר על השיחות עם המומחים הסובייטים שהתנהלו אתמול והיום. לדבריו יש חדשות טובות וחדשות רעות. הטובות הן שהסובייטים תומכים בבחירות. הרעות הן שהם אינם אומרים באיזה בחירות.

שנית הסובייטים שאמנם לא מתעקשים יותר על ועידה בינלאומית רוצים עתה במפגשים בלתי פורמלים של חמש הקבועות. רוס מוסיף שארה"ב צריכה לקבל תמונה יותר ברורה על העמדה הסובייטית לגבי הבחירות ועל מה רצונם לשוחח במסגרת ה-5. רוס הוסיף: "WE ARE IN FAVOR OF THEIR INCLUSION BUT WITH THAT COMES RESPONSIBILITY."

הם לא יסכימו שברה"מ תהפוך את השיחות הבלתי פורמליות לצינור עקיף או להצגת אלטרנטיבות לרעיון הבחירות. השגריר אמר כי הסכנה ברורה שזה בדיוק מה שיקרה. רוס ענה "

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010:0710
NY:0000
NY:0000
10:000-10:000
NY:0000

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

BETWEEN ISRAEL AND FALESTINIANS IS UNDER WAY WE
CAN HAVE INFORMED TALKS AMONG FIVE.
THIS WILL GIVE THEM A STAKE. THEN WE CAN ASK THEM
TO SUPPORT THE DIALOGUE. BUT THE DIALOGUE IS A
PRECONDITION

..

ערן.

17

תפ: שהיו, סשוח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן,
בנצור, מצפא, ממד

RECORDING
TO SUPPORT THE DIALOGUE. BUT THE DIALOGUE IS A
THIS WILL GIVE THEM A STAKE. THEN WE CAN ASK THEM
CAN HAVE INFORMED TALKS AMONG FIVE.
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIANS IS UNDER WAY WE

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RE: WT., SW., P., GBX, DARGA, WPER, DICT, DACT, GABGE, PD, HGT,
LXIG, DZON, DGT

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11218

תאריך : 16.06.89

נכנס **

107

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חוזם: 6.11218

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/790

מ-: ווש, נר: 358, תא: 150689, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: א גס: צפא

נד: א

מחלקת

מידי/סודי

אל : מצפא

דע : הישור לקונגרס,

סביר/ניו-יורק (F ר ני נר 43)

מאת: ציר הסברה, וושינגטון

הקהילה היהודית.

מצהריים עם סטיב סילביגר הנציג הוושינגטוני של

'הקונגרס היהודי האמריקני':

1. ב-22/6 תתקיים בווינגטון פגישה של מנכ"ל ADL
הקונגרס, הקומיטי והרפורמים עם איפאק לדיון בנושא
ה-ARROW (מברקי 99 מ-5/6) ובנושא פעילות איפאק
בעידוד מכתבי סנטורים וחברי הקונגרס המבקרים את נאום
המזכיר.

2. סילביגר דיבר בתקיפות נגד איפאק ותוס דיון אישית
המשאירים רושם של נטיה ברורה לצד הרפובליקנים הגורמת
לרוגז רב אצל דמוקרטים (שרבים מהם הוא מכיר מתקופת
עבודתו כלוביסט של תנועת העבודה).

3. לדעת סילביגר החלטת איפא'ק לפעול להחתמת סנטורים
וחברי קונגרס על מכתב המבקר את נאום המזכיר היא טעות
חמורה, מאחר והנאום לא חידש מאומה במדיניות ארה"ב

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10443 חלקי ופחות בעיתו, עק. 13444

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ומאחר ועימות עם המזכיר יפגע ביחסי הקהילה היהודית עם הממשל. התווכחנו ארוכות. ציינו שאיפא'ק אמרו שרעיון המכתב אינו שלהם אלא של הישראלים. אמר שהחלטת איפא'ק להוביל הביקורת על המזכיר ביודעם שתגובת הקהילה היהודית לנאום מפולגת היא תמוהה, והוסיף שממאמר ה-MER השבוע משתמע שלדעתם הנאום הביא להחרפת האלימות בשטחים.

4. סיפר על הניואנסים בארגונו ביחס לישראל כאשר הבעיה שלזיגמן אין אמון שיוזמתנו היא יותר מתרגיל ביחסי ציבור. לעומת זאת זיגמן תקיף נגד כל מגע עם אש'פ בניגוד לאישים יהודיים אחרים (סילברמן) שנפגשו עם נביל שעת.

פלג

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

THESE ARE THE RESULTS OF THE TESTS CONDUCTED ON THE
MATERIALS SUBMITTED TO THE LABORATORY FOR ANALYSIS.
THE TESTS WERE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
METHODS DESCRIBED IN THE TEST PLAN AND THE RESULTS
ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE TENSILE STRENGTH OF THE MATERIALS WAS
DETERMINED TO BE 100,000 PSI. THE ELONGATION
AT BREAK WAS 10%. THE YIELD POINT WAS 50,000 PSI.
2. THE IMPACT RESISTANCE OF THE MATERIALS WAS
DETERMINED TO BE 10 FT-LB. THE CHARPY IMPACT
RESISTANCE WAS 10 FT-LB.

END
P

TEST REPORT NO. 1000, DATE 1/10/77, BY J. D. SMITH

נשכר החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 12171

* תארי 17.06.89

* נכנס **

סודי ביותר

* דף 1 מתוך 4
* עותק 4 מתוך 24

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WZ

אמ"ק

* חוזם: 6,12171

* אל: המשרד

* יעדים: מצב/865, מנמת/251

* מ-: ווש, נר: 401, תא: 160689, זח: 2000, דח: ב, סג: 10

* תח: גס: צפא

* נד: 8

* סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר

* אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

* דע: יועץ מדיני לשה'ח

* מאת: ציר - עודד ערן

* שיחת השר מרידור - המזכיר (16.6.89)

* בתחילת השיחה אמר המזכיר כי הוא היה רוצה לבקר בישראל
* בהקדם. מרידור אמר כי אכן ביקור כזה חשוב שכן רק
* כך אפשר להתרשם מההשלכות הגאוגרפיות של פתרונות
* שונים וכמה מדינה פלשתינאית מסוכנת לישראל. רוס
* השיב ואמר שאכן מרגרט טטוילר שעבורה היה זה ביקור
* ראשון התרשמה מאוד בנקודה זו. השר מרידור אמר שישראל
* צעדה מחצית הדרך ויש כאלו המבקרים את ישראל שאף
* יותר מכך. עתה על הערבים לתת תשובה. רוס אמר שבשיחות
* עם הסובייטים (המתנהלות מאתמול בוועינגטון ע.ע.)
* אמר לסובייטים בכל הדרכים האפשריות שישראל הגישה
* לתוכנית רצינית מתוך כוונה להגיע לדו שיח רציני
* עם הפלשתינאים ועתה צריך הצד הערבי להתייחס בחיוב.

* מרידור המשיך באומרו כי ישראל נוטלת על עצמה סיכונים
* בהצעה שהגישה ומה שאנו שומעים הוא מאוד מדאיג.
* בקזבלנקה חזרו מדינות ערב על העקרונות השלילים כגון
* עקרון השיבה, ירושלים כבירת המדינה הפלשתינאית
* ואזכורה של ישראל רק במסגרת נסיגה. את ראה'מ שמיר

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 4
עותק 4 מתוך 24

* סיכון ואחריות אם כאשר במקביל מתקיים דיאלוג בין
* אש'פ לבין ארה'ב. לכן על ארה'ב לומר לפלשתינאים
* 'לחטופ' את רעיון הבחירות וליטול את גורלם בידיהם
* במקום להשאירו, לשווא, בידי אש'פ. לצורך זה, הדיאלוג
* עם אש'פ רק מזיק.

* רוס חזר ואמר כי כך אכן אמרו בשיחותיהם השונות והמזכיר
* הוסיף שמובראק וחוסיין באו לביקוריהם בווינגטון
* עם כוונה לומר לא לרעיון הבחירות ולא יהיה זה מוגזם
* לומר שארה'ב שכנעה אותם ולפחות את מובראק.
* רעיון הבחירות מקובל על ארה'ב ויש רק 'הבדל קטן'
* וזה בענין 'תוניס' אך חשוב שלא נשאר אבן אחת לא הפוכה.

* מרידור אמר שהאלימות והאינתיפאדה מדאיגות את ישראל
* שכן הן עלולות ליצור אצל הפלשתינאים הרגשה שבעזרתן
* ניתן להגיע לפתרון. רוס אמר שבשיחותיו עם הפלשתינאים
* בעת ביקורו האחרון אמר שאין פתרון באמצעות האינתיפאדה.

* בשלב זה כאשר היה נראה שהשיחה הגיעה לסיומה, אמר בייקר
* כי אינו יכול לתת לשר מרידור לעזוב בלא להעלות
* את נושא ההתנחלויות שעלה בעת ביקורי ראה'מ, שה'ח
* ושהב'ט. מרידור אמר שממשלת ישראל אינה יכולה לקבל
* החלטה שליהודים אין זכות לחיות בשטח מסויים. קיים
* ויכוח למי שייך חלק זה של ארץ ישראל. אמירה או החלטה
* שיהודים לא יכולים לחיות בחלק זה פרושה סגירת אופציה
* אחת של פתרון, אופציה שחלק גדול בישראל מאמין בה.

* רוס אמר שישראל הניחה על השולחן יוזמה חיובית ואין
* צורך שהיא תשגר מסר הפוך. המזכיר ציין כי ארה'ב
* רוצה שהקהיליה הבינלאומית תתן מלוא תמיכתה ברעיון
* הבחירות. לא ברור, הוסיף המזכיר, כמה זמן יעבור
* עד שהתוכנית תישא פירות ועוד כמה זמן תוכל ארה'ב
* לדחות את לחצי האירופאים בנושא הועידה הבינלאומית.
* ההתנחלויות יוצרות קושי 'למכור' את התוכנית. מרידור
* הגיב באומרו שב-1978 כאשר הוסכם על ק.ד. היו 5000
* מתנחלים ואילו עתה יש 80000 ואולי על הערבים להסיק
* מסקנות מסרובם לנהל מו'מ עם ישראל.

* המזכיר אמר שהלחצים עליהם ילכו ויתגברו לכנס ועידה
* בינלאומית על מנת לדון במתחולל בשטחים ובדרכים לפתרון.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* דף 4 מתוך 4 *
* עותק 4 מתוך 24 *

* ארה"ב תתקשה להסביר מדוע היא מתנגדת לדון בפורום
* כזה בנושא כה סבוך כאשר ישראל, לטענת כל אלו שרוצים
* בוועידה בינלאומית, 'פותרת', דה פקטו, את הבעיה
* בהתנחלויות.

* מרידור אמר שאנו שומעים שחוגים מסויימים באירופה שוקלים
* שינוי 'הצהרת ונציה'. יתכן שארה"ב תוכל לעודד זאת.
* יש להתרכז באספקטים החיוביים ולראות היכן אפשר
* להתקדם. כאשר הוא קורא את החלטות קזבלנקה הוסיף
* מרידור הוא מתמלא דאגה. בייקר אמר שהוא מבין זאת אך
* הוא מבקש שגם ישראל תבין את ארה"ב העושה מאמצים לשכנע
* את האירופאים שישראל אינה מנסה להרוויח זמן (STALL)
* כפי שכמה מהאירופאים מאשימים את ישראל, ע"מ להקים
* התנחלויות. מרידור ענה שיש מבחן פשוט שהערבים יכולים
* להעמידנו בו וזה להתייצב לשולחן המו"מ.

* המזכיר אמר -

* 'אנו תומכים בכס. אנו יודעים שאתם מחפשים בר-שיח.
* אמרתי לראה"מ שאנו רוצים לקדם רעיון הבחירות יחד
* אך יש אובדן תמיכה. אם יש גורם שעשוי להביא לשינוי
* חיובי זה נושא ההתנחלויות. ארה"ב לא תוכל להתמיד
* בהדיפת הלחצים לאורך זמן. אם לא תהיינה התנחלויות
* יגבר כושר העמידה של ארה"ב בלחצים אלו'. מרידור ענה
* שעלינו לשכנע את הפלשתינאים שאין דרך טובה יותר מרעיון
* הבחירות. רוס אמר שכמו דברים אחרים ההתנחלויות הן
* סמל המקשה על הצד הערבי. מרידור ענה שגם עבורנו
* ההתנחלויות הן סמל.

* השיחה כולה כולל החלק בארבע עיניים נמשכה 45 דקות.

* בצד האמריקאי נכח רק רוס. בצידנו השגריר ארד והח"מ

* ערן.

* 17

* תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, בנצור*

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PELLETREAU MEETS WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVES

(Transcript: ambassador's statement to the press)

Tunis -- Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau met June 8 with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the Carthage guest house in the suburbs of Tunis. After the meeting, Pelletreau told reporters that the dialogue has progressed "to consideration of serious and practical ways to progress in a step-by-step fashion toward the goal of a comprehensive settlement through negotiations...."

"The major focus of our dialogue today was the concept of elections in the occupied territories to launch a political negotiating process to deal with both transitional arrangements and final status," he said. "It is our hope that the PLO will seriously consider this idea and that Palestinians and Arab governments will respond constructively."

Following is a transcript of Pelletreau's statement:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Today we held the third formal session of our dialogue with the PLO. This dialogue has progressed from initial contacts to discussion of substantive issues and today to consideration of serious and practical ways to progress in a step-by-step fashion toward the goal of a comprehensive settlement through negotiations, based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principles of territory for peace, security and recognition for Israel, and Palestinian political rights.

The major focus of our dialogue today was the concept of elections in the occupied territories to launch a political negotiating process to deal with both transitional arrangements and final status. I stressed the belief of the U.S. government that elections provide a way forward, and that the proposal put forth by the government of Israel is a constructive and workable one, deserving of a positive Palestinian response. I noted that such elections should be free and fair, open to the media and outside observers, and entail as broad participation as possible.

It is our hope that the PLO will seriously consider this idea and that Palestinians and Arab governments will respond constructively. This is the way to move ahead through elections to negotiations.

We also discussed the recent Arab summit and developments in the occupied territories. We expressed grave concern at the continuation of attempted cross-border raids by Palestinian groups into Israel from southern Lebanon. Such activity cannot help but harm efforts to move the peace process forward, and should be condemned by all those who share with us that goal.

As on previous occasions, our discussions today were serious and probing. We again wish to thank President Ben Ali and the Tunisian government for their assistance in support of this dialogue.

(END TEXT)

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the United States.

Others argue that the deal shortchanges the United States and would give the Japanese a major leap forward in building a civil aviation industry which could rival America's.

Proponents on the other hand, argue that the agreement would strengthen U.S.-Japan ties and provide new technology to American manufacturers. Others in favor of the accord view it as an opportunity for U.S. firms to profit from the business that will be gained by this arrangement with Japan, while at the same time helping the Japanese upgrade their defense forces.

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U.S. COULD NOT SUPPORT RESOLUTION ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
(Text: Pickering Security Council statement)

United Nations -- Thomas Pickering, U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, says the United States could not support a U.N. Security Council draft resolution on Israeli-occupied territories because "it is unbalanced" -- making "sweeping condemnations of Israeli policies and practices without any reference to any of the serious acts of violence by the other side."

In explanation of the United States' vote against the draft resolution June 9, Pickering said, "we have been, and are, sensitive to the concerns of other members and of the international community over the troubled situation in the occupied territories."

Following is the text of Pickering's remarks:

(BEGIN TEXT)

I will now make an explanation of vote as the permanent representative of the United States.

The United States fully shares the concerns of other council members over the situation in the occupied territories. We are deeply disturbed by the continuing violence there, and the hardship this imposes on the local population.

We deplore the bloodshed that has occurred in the occupied territories. We appeal again to all parties to refrain from acts of violence. We appeal in particular to the government of Israel to utilize methods of maintaining order in the territories that do not result in unnecessary deaths and casualties or impose unacceptably high costs on the Palestinian population as a whole. The recent escalation in attacks by Israeli settlers against unarmed Palestinians is an especially disturbing development. So too is the increase in violence committed by Palestinians against other Palestinians suspected of cooperation with Israeli authorities. And we view with serious concern the recent increase in attempted cross-border raids by Palestinian groups. Israelis and Palestinians alike must do their share to reduce tensions and to replace confrontation with political dialogue.

As members of this council are aware, the United States is engaged in active efforts to help bring this about. We seek an end to the violence not only to alleviate human suffering, but also to help create a climate in which a workable negotiating process can succeed. We remain convinced that the problem of the occupied territories can be resolved only through a negotiated settlement for a comprehensive peace based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

In his May 22 address before the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Baker enunciated clearly the U.S. approach to the occupied territories and the broader Middle East peace process. He reaffirmed the basic principles guiding our policies in the region. With these principles in mind, our focus is on the pragmatic question of how to get such negotiations for a full peace underway.

As a practical step in this direction, we believe that free and fair elections in the occupied territories, grounded in a broader political process provide a basis for moving ahead. In this regard we

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with that of professional risk assessors.

There are also other differences between the perceptions of the general public and the perceptions of the professional risk assessors.

Slovic reports that when experts judge risk, their responses correlate with technical estimates of possible fatalities averaged over a number of years. Judgments of risk by lay people are related more to other characteristics, such as catastrophic potential: the possibility of a large number of deaths at one time is more horrible to the public than the possibility of an even larger number of deaths spaced out over time.

Recent research has identified several other factors that influence how the public evaluates a potential hazard. For example, voluntary risks are far more acceptable than imposed ones; people are more comfortable and more willing to accept risk when they are in control; the familiar is more comfortable than the unfamiliar; and natural risks are more acceptable than those that are man-made.

According to the experts, the fact that most people do not reason in purely statistical terms makes it difficult for them to gauge most risks in their lives. For example, more than 30 percent of regular smokers will die from some disease connected to smoking cigarettes, but many people react more forcefully to the evidence that there may be a one-in-a-million risk of getting cancer from chemicals found in drinking water.

According to Slovic, the public will accept risks from voluntary activities such as skiing that are about 1,000 times as great as it would tolerate from involuntary hazards such as food preservatives.

Peter Sandman, head of the environmental communication research program at Rutgers University, puts it this way:—If you dragged someone to a mountain, put boards under his feet and pushed him downhill, your actions would be considered outrageous. Ask that same person to take a ski trip with you and the picture changes drastically.

Radon is another example. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that up to 20,000 lung cancer deaths may result each year in the United States from long-term exposure to geological radon, a radioactive gas that can seep into homes from the ground. But despite much publicity, relatively few people have had their homes tested for its presence. According to experts, this is because people traditionally think of their home as a safe place.

According to Gregory of the National Science Foundation, efforts to bridge the gap between how the public perceives risk and how best to explain it has created a burgeoning new field called "risk communication." A National Academy of Sciences panel on risk perception and communication is expected to issue a report later this year, and new centers for risk communication are being established at several universities.

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have welcomed the initiative of the Israeli government, while acknowledging that much work needs to be done by Israelis and Palestinians to flesh out and define the Israeli proposals and to bridge differences between Israel and the Arabs over how such elections would be conducted. We do not underestimate the difficulties involved in this process. But this should not deter us from trying. We see no other workable alternative.

Over the years, the United States has repeatedly urged addressing the Arab-Israeli problem; the Security Council refrain from unhelpful, divisive, one-sided rhetoric. Instead we have urged that the council use its considerable authority to help reduce tensions and foster a spirit of accommodation and mutual trust in the region. We regret that, as on other occasions, the draft now before the council has again fallen short of this goal.

My government has carefully reviewed the draft resolution before the council today and proposed changes to the text that we believed would have been constructive. There is much in this draft as tabled with which we agree. For example, we agree that the Geneva Convention of 1949 is applicable to the occupied territories, and we have repeatedly urged Israel to abide by its responsibilities as the occupying power under that convention. We have publicly condemned the actions of settlers taking the law into their own hands. Also, we have consistently stated our firm opposition to deportation of Palestinians from the territories, a practice we believe is inconsistent with the Geneva Convention. Secretary Baker in his recent speech urged that schools in the occupied territories be reopened as we have done numerous times in the past directly to the government of Israel.

We cannot, however, support this draft because it contains other elements that are unacceptable. It is unbalanced, in that it makes sweeping condemnations of Israeli policies and practices without any reference to any of the serious acts of violence by the other side. It appears to be oblivious of the political and security context in the occupied territories. Most specifically the text does not condemn violence from all quarters, nor does it affirm that all parties have a responsibility to help reduce tensions. Such fundamental principles should be the basis for any official pronouncement on the situation in the occupied territories by the council which is charged under the charter with maintaining international peace and security.

The United States takes seriously its responsibilities as a member of the Security Council. In considering this draft resolution, I can assure you that we have been and are sensitive to the concerns of other members and of the international community over the troubled situation in the occupied territories. We appreciate the position of those who have helped to try to bring into this proposed resolution the key principles to which we have referred. In determining our position, however, we must ask ourselves: Does the proposed council action advance, or detract from, efforts to achieve peace in the region? Does it help to bring the parties together, or does it deepen existing divisions? Does it enhance the role of the council, and the United Nations generally, in the peace process? On balance, we must regretfully conclude that the draft resolution before the council does not meet these key tests. The United States must therefore vote against it.

(END TEXT)

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CHINESE POLITICAL SITUATION "VERY CLOUDED"

(Article on State Department news briefing)

By Russell Dybvik

USIA Diplomatic Correspondent

Washington -- With Beijing remaining "an armed camp" and the political situation there "very clouded," the State Department refused to speculate on the possible meaning of television appearances by Deng Xiaoping and other key Chinese leaders June 9 or on who may be in charge in China.

In his first public appearance since May 16, Deng, the country's principal leader, appeared June 9 on Beijing television along with Premier Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun.

"We noted the appearance this morning on TV of the chairman and other leaders," spokesman Margaret Tutwiler told a news briefing. "I am not going to speculate on the possible meaning of this appearance in terms of the political situation in China."

While the situation in China is "relatively calm," she said, Beijing is still an "armed camp."

Asked if the United States believes a political power struggle is still going on in China, Tutwiler replied: "We think that it's a very clouded situation and that we aren't in a position to judge at this time who is in charge of what."

"To be perfectly honest," the spokesman added, "it seems to me that would be something the Chinese should be telling us instead of us trying to sit back here and guess."

Recalling that President Bush tried to place a telephone call to Deng on June 8, Tutwiler pointed out "that phone call has not yet been completed."

She could not confirm reports that Chinese security forces had begun a roundup of student leaders in Beijing, but emphasized "if it is true, it is another very disturbing infringement on human rights. It is a step backwards, and rounding up students will not extinguish the appeal and need for democratic reform."

Asked why she described Beijing as "an armed camp," Tutwiler said it would have been "irresponsible" for her to say that everything was normal in the Chinese capital. "It's not normal," she emphasized.

"It is an armed camp. There is still martial law. That's not normal. That's not business-as-usual."

When reporters pressed her to denounce the Chinese leaders for publicly congratulating military officials for last weekend's action in crushing the pro-democracy demonstration of students and workers on Tiananmen Square, Tutwiler pointed out that President Bush, Secretary of State Baker and other U.S. government and Congressional leaders have described as "outrageous" and "deplorable" what she called "the massacre in the square."

"So we would definitely have a different opinion of it," she added. "I don't know of any instance where the president would approve of what went on in that square on Saturday night."

The spokesman declined to say what measures the United States might take should the reported crack-down on Chinese students spread. She recalled that in his June 8 news conference President Bush said he opposed withdrawing U.S. diplomatic representation from Beijing or imposing economic sanctions.

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RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 6151

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RUEHMA/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 7008

RUFHSH/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 5226

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VOA/BRN:ARABIC, NEA; MACDILL FOR USIA REPRESENTATIVE
BILL MURPHY.

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION (JUNE 12), U.S. MIDEAST

POLICY: U.S. VETO OF U.N. RESOLUTION; LATEST ROUND OF
U.S.-PLO TALKS

1. SUMMARY:

THE PRESTIGIOUS, INTERNATIONALLY-CIRCULATED NEWSPAPER
"AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT" RAN AN EDITORIAL ON THE U.S. VETO
OF THE LATEST U.N. DRAFT RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL.
IT SAID, "WASHINGTON'S INSISTENCE ON FINDING SOME KIND
'MIDDLE LANGUAGE' BETWEEN ISRAELI 'OPPRESSION' AND
PALESTINIAN 'VIOLENCE' WOULD HAVE DIVESTED THE DRAFT
RESOLUTION OF ITS POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND
TRANSFORMED IT INTO A MERE CONDEMNATION OF A SPECIFIC
SECURITY SITUATION CREATED (JOINTLY) BY ISRAELIS AND
PALESTINIANS. BOTH PARTIES, THEREFORE, WOULD HAVE
DESERVED THE SAME CENSURE!"

THE SAME PAPER ALSO CARRIED AN INTERVIEW OF ITS
WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT WITH AN UNIDENTIFIED "STATE
DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL" WHO EVALUATED THE RESULTS OF THE
THIRD ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE P.L.O. FROM THE USG
PERSPECTIVE.

[Handwritten signature]
[Red handwritten text: 513 and Arabic script]

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(END OF SUMMARY)

2. EDITORIAL:

- "AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT" WROTE: "WASHINGTON'S REASON FOR VETOING THE (DRAFT) RESOLUTION DOES NOT ONLY LIE IN THE CLAIM THAT THE APORESAID RESOLUTION DOES NOT CONDEMN PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE, BUT IS TO BE FOUND IN A MORE IMPORTANT ISSUE. WASHINGTON (SAYS IT) INSISTS ON STOPPING THE INTIFADA AS AN ENCOURAGEMENT FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE P.L.O.. IN FACT, WASHINGTON WANTS TO STOP THE INTIFADA IN RETURN FOR AN ASSURANCE FROM ISRAEL THAT IT WILL TALK WITH THE P.L.O. WITHOUT, HOWEVER, ANY COMMITMENT FROM ISRAEL THAT IT WILL ABIDE BY (THE RESULTS OF) SUCH A DIALOGUE.

- "MOREOVER, WASHINGTON'S INSISTENCE ON FINDING SOME KIND 'MIDDLE LANGUAGE' BETWEEN ISRAELI 'OPPRESSION' AND PALESTINIAN 'VIOLENCE' WOULD HAVE DIVESTED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF ITS POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND TRANSFORMED IT INTO A MERE CONDEMNATION OF A SPECIFIC SECURITY SITUATION CREATED (JOINTLY) BY ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS. BOTH PARTIES, THEREFORE, WOULD HAVE DESERVED THE SAME CENSURE!

- "IN FACT, THE PURPOSE OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS NOT MERELY TO CONDEMN ISRAELI OPPRESSION FOR BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT ALSO TO CONDEMN THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION'S ATTEMPT TO PREVENT PALESTINIANS FROM EXPRESSING THEIR DEMANDS FOR FREEDOM AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

- "NOT ONLY DOES THE U.S. STAND BY ISRAEL'S SIDE, BUT IT IS STILL OPPOSED TO THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION."

3. EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL:

- "AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT" PUBLISHED AN EXCLUSIVE ARTICLE ON WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE THIRD ROUND OF U.S. - P.L.O. DIALOGUE. THE ARTICLE BY THE PAPER'S WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT MUHAMMAD SADEQ WAS HEADLINED: "STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TO AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: WASHINGTON SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF (THE LATEST) SESSIONS OF THE DIALOGUE WITH THE P.L.O. RAISING THE DIALOGUE TO A

HIGHER LEVEL DEPENDS ON MOVEMENT REGARDING THE ELECTIONS PLAN."

- SADEQ ASKED, "WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR THROUGH THE DIALOGUE? HOW DOES THE U.S. EVALUATE THE DIALOGUE? WILL THE U.S. RAISE IT TO A HIGHER LEVEL?"

- "A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ANSWERED: "AFTER THE THIRD ROUND OF TALKS, AND DESPITE THE FACT WE STILL DO NOT AGREE WITH THE P.L.O. AND THEY DO NOT AGREE WITH OUR PROPOSALS, BUT ALSO DON'T REJECT THEM, THE DIALOGUE IS HEALTHY, VERY INTENSE, IMPORTANT, AND USEFUL. THIS DIALOGUE IS HERE TO STAY AND WILL CONTINUE. IT WILL REMAIN AT ITS CURRENT LEVEL, HOWEVER, UNTIL THE P.L.O. ACCEPTS WHAT WE HAVE DEMANDED."

- "ON THE TOPICS RAISED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE IN THE LAST ROUND, HE SAID: "THE PRINCIPAL TOPIC WAS ELECTIONS IN THE GAZA STRIP AND THE WEST BANK. WE HAVE ASKED THE P.L.O. TO ALLOW PALESTINIANS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO START A DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON ELECTIONS. THIS WILL FINALLY LAUNCH A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE PROCESS THROUGH WHICH THE PALESTINIANS WILL DECIDE THEIR FUTURE.... AS FOR THE PALESTINIAN ANSWER, HE SAID: "THEY NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED OUR PROPOSALS. THEY HAVE AFFIRMED THAT THEY DO NOT TRUST SHAMIR, OR HIS PROPOSALS. THEY SAID THE PRIORITY IS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON, AND DEFINITION OF, JUST WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE; NAMELY, SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE PALESTINIAN STATE."

- "ON THE RESULTS OF THE THIRD ROUND OF TALKS, HE SAID: "IT IS WRONG TO BELIEVE WE CAN QUICKLY AND EASILY ATTAIN THE DESIRED RESULTS, OR THAT NOT BEING ABLE TO ATTAIN THEM (NOW) MEANS FAILURE. THE FACT THAT THE P.L.O. HAS MOVED TOWARDS ACCEPTING THESE ELECTIONS PROPOSALS, AND ALLOWING PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ISRAELIS, IS AN OPTIMISTIC SIGN. THE POSITIVE ROLE OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR CONTINUAL DIALOGUE WITH APAB LEADERS, EUROPEANS, AND THE P.L.O., ALSO RAISES OPTIMISM."

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: NEA PRESS GUIDANCE (UNUSED) JUNE 1, 1989

FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCES WERE DEVELOPED FOR USE IN JUNE
1 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING BUT WERE UNUSED.

US REACTION; ARAB SUMMIT

Q: WHAT IS THE US REACTION TO THE ARAB SUMMIT HELD MAY
23-26 IN CASABLANCA?

A:-- YOU RECEIVED A FULL READOUT ON OUR VIEWS ON THE
LEBANON-RELATED ASPECTS ON MAY 30.

--AS NOTED LAST WEEK, THE US WELCOMES THE SUMMIT'S
DECISION TO READMIT EGYPT.

--AS FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, THE SUMMIT LEFT THE DOOR OPEN
TO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ELECTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES. NOW THAT THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT ARE IN
HAND, THE US WILL BE URGING ALL PARTIES TO TAKE THE KIND
OF CONCRETE STEPS -- LIKE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE--
THAT CAN LEAD TO PROGRESS ON THE ISSUE.

Q: THE SUMMIT ESTABLISHED TWO FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEES. ONE
CHAIRD BY KING HASSAN TO UNDERTAKE INTERNATIONAL
CONTACTS ON THE PEACE PROCESS. WILL THE US MEET WITH
THIS GROUP?

A:--AT THIS POINT, THAT QUESTION IS HYPOTHETICAL, SINCE A
PROPOSAL FOR SUCH A MEETING HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Q: WHAT IS THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL REGARDING ACTION ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES? WILL THE COUNCIL RESUME DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE?

A: THE ARAB GROUP YESTERDAY REQUESTED A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THIS REQUEST WAS MADE TO THE BRITISH UN AMBASSADOR IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE MONTH OF MAY.

--THE US HAS ASSUMED THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE. IN THE COURSE OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS ON THE AGENDA FOR THE MONTH, AMBASSADOR PICKERING WILL HEAR THEIR VIEWS ON HOLDING A MEETING ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

LIBYA: STATUS OF RABTA CW PLANT

Q: WHAT IS THE US ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LIBYAN CW FACILITY AT RABTA?

A:--AS WE HAVE STATED BEFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT, WITHOUT ADDITIONAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE RABTA FACILITY, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR LIBYA TO ACHIEVE FULL SCALE PRODUCTION.

--FOR THIS REASON, WE HAVE CALLED ON ALL COUNTRIES TO END ANY ASSISTANCE THEY -- OR THEIR FIRMS -- MIGHT BE PROVIDING TO THE LIBYAN CW PROGRAM. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.

Q: HAS THE FACILITY ALREADY PRODUCED SMALL AMOUNTS OF CW?

A:--I HAVE NO FURTHER COMMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE RABTA FACILITY.

ITALIAN MERCHANT MARINE MINISTER TO LIBYA

Q: ITALY'S MERCHANT MARINE MINISTER PRANDINI HAS

ANNOUNCED PLANS TO TRAVEL TO TRIPOLI LATER THIS WEEK. THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST VISIT BY A MINISTER FROM AN EC COUNTRY SINCE EC SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA WERE IMPOSED IN 1985. WHAT IS THE US GOVERNMENT'S REACTION?

A:--US POLICY TOWARDS LIBYA REMAINS UNCHANGED. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT EC SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN DEMONSTRATING TO THE LIBYAN LEADERSHIP THE COST OF SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. ITALY, LIKE OTHER EC MEMBERS, IS AWARE OF THE US VIEW REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF EC MEASURES. BAKER

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BAKER SEES SIGNIFICANT ROADBLOCKS IMPEDING SOVIET REFORMS

(Article on remarks at National Press Club)

by Edmund F. Scherr

USIA Diplomatic Correspondent

Washington -- Secretary of State Baker says Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform movement faces some "significant" problems that must be overcome if his efforts to restructure Soviet society are to succeed.

Responding to questions after addressing the National Press Club June 8, Baker cited specifically "the resistance of a rather entrenched bureaucracy to change," major economic problems, and the unrest among various ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, he emphasized that U.S. officials "very much want 'perestroika' (restructuring) to succeed." He said, "We think it is in the best interest of the United States... We think it will produce a more stable, a more secure and a more open Soviet Union."

"We would like to see reform go forward," he said, noting that the process of political reform "may be a bit ahead of the economic reform process."

"They have major steps to take to find their way to a market economy," the secretary told questioners. It is the U.S. view, he said, that democratic reform -- political and economic -- should proceed apace.

When Gorbachev visits West Germany next week, Baker said, U.S. officials hope he will respond to President Bush's proposals for conventional force cuts in Europe and for Soviet reductions in short-range nuclear forces (SNF). --

"The time is ripe for Gorbachev to respond positively to the opportunities presented by NATO's initiatives (on conventional arms cuts)," Baker stressed.

Also next week, the secretary said, "Gorbachev can sustain this new spirit (to reduce military tensions in Europe) by answering our call, by announcing a real cut in Soviet SNF forces."

In his prepared remarks, the secretary pointed to a series of regional problems in the world that, if untended, can affect nations near and far "with grim consequences."

"Perhaps it's time for our friends and alliance partners to consider mechanisms to deal collectively with such regional conflicts," Baker said.

He pointed out, for example, that a number of NATO countries were "very helpful" when the United States sent ships into the Persian Gulf to ensure freedom of navigation during the Iran-Iraq war. The British and Dutch and others sent in ships, while Japan, an ally but not a NATO member, "helped" pay the bill for the gulf operation, he noted.

Britain also was helpful in resolving the Angola-Namibia problem, Baker noted, adding that Spain, a NATO member, can be "very influential" with regional conflicts in Latin America because of its cultural relationships with that area.

"There is no reason why with this very vital, vibrant and effective alliance, we shouldn't coordinate our efforts to solve" some of the regional conflicts "which represent the real threat... to world peace today," the secretary emphasized.

Commenting on developments in Iran after the death of Ayatollah

Handwritten notes in red ink, possibly "My 10/10" and "11/11/11".

Fifth, environmental laws must be firmly enforced. President Bush is asking for additional funds to hire more prosecutors in the Justice Department's environmental office. Tougher regulations will soon be announced on cleaning up hazardous waste sites, he said.

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Khomeini, the secretary said that "change is clearly going to take place now in Iran. It is my own view that in all probability there will be a significant struggle for power" in Iran, "and it remains to be seen whether there will be in the future any basis for our improving our relationships with that country."

He repeated the U.S. conditions for improving relations with Iran -- that "Iran should bring about the immediate release of U.S. citizens held by Iranian-supported groups in Lebanon" and Iran should "renounce state-sponsored terrorism."

And when asked about reports that an Iranian official said that his nation would work to free the Americans being held hostage in Lebanon if the United States helps to free Iranian nationals reportedly being held by Christian militias in Lebanon, Baker responded that "we have provided Iran on several occasions with all the information that we have with regard to the disappearance of these four Iranians in Beirut in 1982."

Baker said the formal meeting in Tunisia June 8 between U.S. Ambassador Robert Pelletreau and a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) "had a fair amount of substance."

He repeated that this dialogue with the PLO "cannot be, should not be an end in and of itself. It can only be productive if it can move us forward toward the goal of peace in the Middle East," he said.

"Our dialogue (in the three formal meetings) has progressed from initial contacts to now the discussion of substantive issues, and today to a consideration of serious and practical ways that we might progress by a step-by-step fashion towards the goal of a comprehensive settlement through negotiations" based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, he said.

He added that "we, of course, support the proposal that (Israeli) Prime Minister Shamir has advanced for elections in the occupied territories" -- in the context of a way to launch a political negotiation. "We think that this is meaningful. We think that this gives us something to work with" to try to move things forward towards peace in the Middle East.

The meetings with the PLO now are "private" meetings, but "they are not being held behind anybody's back," Baker said.

On the issue of the nature of a new government in Afghanistan, Baker emphasized that "we will continue our support for the right of the Afghan people to self-determination."

He said this is an issue of the "transfer" of power, not the sharing of power with the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. "We don't think that there can be self-determination for the Afghan people," he said, if the current regime remains in power.

Concerning the continued work of an Organization of American States (OAS) commission to bring about a democratic change of power in Panama, Baker noted that since all countries in Latin America except Cuba and Nicaragua, "agree with us that there should be a transfer of power in Panama, we are very hopeful that when the mission goes down there, they will be able to move the process forward."

On the issue of South Africa, Baker said that the Bush administration is working with Congress to find an "agreed course" toward achieving the same goals regarding that nation. He noted that there are differences on the use and effectiveness of sanctions against South Africa.

"We would like...to convince the Congress that we have the same

ends in mind. We seek the abolition of apartheid, which we think is deplorable, and we seek the institution of a non-racial, representative government in South Africa....Our difference of opinion is on the best way to get there," Baker said. If the United States can speak with one voice, it "might have some impact on what happens in South Africa, because we are having scant impact now."

Asked about his May 27 Rome meeting with South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha, the secretary noted that Botha said again that his party would abolish apartheid.

"The question, of course, is when," Baker said. "The key is implementation, but I thought that it was fairly significant" that in this first high-level meeting with representatives of the ruling National party in South Africa and the Bush administration "that they would be so definitive in their comments" and their goal of abolishing apartheid, Baker said.

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עיקרי הדברים שנאמרו בפגישה
בין מזכיר המדינה של ארה"ב,
ג'יימס בייקר, לבין נציגים
יהודיים ביום 16.6.89

(כפי שדווחו לדן מרידור ע"י סימור רייך,
יו"ר ועידת הנשיאים, וע"י ברטון לוינסון,
יו"ר הליגה נגד השמצה).

בפגישה, שנמשכה כ-45 דקות, השתתפו מזכיר המדינה בייקר ודניס רוס מצד הממשל וה"ה
מקס פישר, בוב אשר, סימור רייך, ברטון לוינסון ואד לוי, נציגי הארגונים
היהודיים.

הפגישה נערכה ביזמת מקס פישר (כנראה עפ"י בקשת בוב אשר).

למעשה נתבקשה פגישה עם הנשיא בוש, שלא יכול היה לראותם, ויראה אותם רק כשישוב
מן הועידה הכלכלית. בינתיים נפגשו עם מזכיר המדינה.

הנציגים היהודים דברו על מעמדה המיוחד של ישראל ועל מצבה המיוחד באזור ונגד
היוס השווה - EVENHANDEDNESS - בינה לבין הערבים. עמדו על חשיבות הקשרים בין
ארה"ב לבין ישראל. הודו למזכיר המדינה על פעולת ארה"ב בארגון הבריאות העולמי,
על הפעולות באו"ם (הטלת וטו?) ועל הסיוע בקדום תהליך השלום.

שאלו אם יש שנוי במדיניות ארה"ב כלפי ישראל בעקבות נאום בייקר לפני איפא"ק.

אמרו שיש לבנות אמון במדיניות ארה"ב אצל הישראלים. הסבירו שרוה"מ מותקף בארץ
בגלל הסכונים הנובעים מן היוזמה שלו. בקשו לא להתחייב לענייני מעמד-הקבע של שטחי
יש"ע "המערך והלכוד לא יסכימו על כך". אמרו למזכיר שהיהודים מאוחדים בתמיכתם
בישראל וביזמת רוה"מ.

המזכיר בייקר אמר שאינו משווה בין ישראל לבין אש"ף או הפלשתינאים וכי הממשל
לא עשה דבר שיוכל להוביל למסקנה כזו. הוא מחויב לבטחון ישראל ולקדום השלום דרך
הצעת הבחירות.

הממשל קבל את הצעת שמיר בחמימות רבה. ירדן ומצרים אמרו בתחילה שהיזמה נועדה
להרוויח זמן, אך ארה"ב שכנעה אותן שהעניין רציני ואינו נועד למשוך זמן. הסוביטים
גם הם נענו למאמצי השכנוע של ארה"ב. ישראל צריכה בן-שיח. ארה"ב תמשיך לפעול עם
ערביי יש"ע, כדי לעודד לקבל את ההצעה.

דניס רוס הוסיף שבגלל מאמציו של בייקר הצליחה ארה"ב לשכנע בארגון הבריאות העולמי שלא לקבל את אש"ף.

המזכיר בייקר אמר שאין שנוי ביחסים בין ארה"ב לישראל. הסובייטים הסכימו לתהליך בלי לדבר על ועידה בינלאומית. "WE WILL NOT DELIEVER ISRAEL".

המזכיר בייקר אמר שהתקשורת שבשה את משמעות הנאום שנשא לפני איפא"ק. היא התמקדה רק בקטע אחד ולא פרשה אותו נכון. "תוס דייין, אד לוי ובוב אשר - הרי אמרתם לי שהנאום היה טוב, מיד אחרי הנאום!" "התקשורת שבשה את המשמעות, אך זה היה בסדר, כי זה הגביר את הלחץ".

דניס רוס אמר שהערבים אינם מאמינים לשמיר.

המזכיר בייקר הדגיש שההתנחלויות מהוות בעיה חמורה ויוצרות מצב קשה. בקהילה האירופית אומרים שההתנחלות היא ספוח דה-פקטו. הוא מסכים לבקורת שנשמעה על הבטוי "GREATER ISRAEL" שהשתמש בו. "בקריאה מחדש של הנאום הייתי מוחק משפט זה".

הנציגים היהודים אמרו שהם מסכימים לבקורת בענין ההתנחלויות, אך מדובר על החדשות בלבד. ההתנחלויות הקיימות הן צורך בטחוני.

המזכיר אמר: "אינני חייב להגן על הישנות. אני מדבר על החדשות". (דניס רוס: בנו כבר 3 חדשות). המזכיר הוסיף שהוא מרוצה מדבריהם של הנציגים בענין ההתנחלויות ומבקש שהם יעזרו לו בכך.

הנציגים היהודיים העלו את העובדה שיש חדירות צבאיות מלבנון וכי זה טרור ממשי. כן אמרו שהיחסים עם ישראל נמשכים כבר 41 שנים והמזכיר בייקר כאילו התעלם מכל זה בנאומו.

המזכיר בייקר אמר: "יש לי מניע אנוכי, אני רוצה לראות התקדמות בענין זה (תהליך השלום)" הוא הוסיף שהוא עוזר לישראל למצא שותף פלשתיני למו"מ "כפי ששמיר וארנס בקשו".

את הסובייטים הוא שאל מדוע לא ידברו ישירות עם ישראל והם השיבו לו שהם נתנו לישראל רשות להכנס לבניינה במוסקבה, אך לא זכו לצעד תגובה שביקשו בקשר לרכוש סוביטי בירושלים.

המזכיר בייקר הוסיף ש"אנחנו מפסידים בקרב על דעת הקהל" וכי אם התכנית של הבחירות לא תצליח, "נהיה בבעיה: תעלה מחדש הדרישה לוועידה בינלאומית והאינתיפאדה תגבר.

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U.S., PLO DISCUSS ELECTIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
(Revised article incorporating Baker remarks)

Tunis -- The United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization discussed elections in the Israeli-occupied territories for more than four hours on June 8.

After the meeting, the third session of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau told reporters that "The major focus of our dialogue today was the concept of elections in the occupied territories to launch a political negotiating process to deal with both transitional arrangements and final status."

Pelletreau, who is the sole channel for substantive U.S. contacts with the PLO, said, "It is our hope that the PLO will seriously consider this idea and that Palestinians and Arab governments will respond constructively."

"I noted that such elections should be free and fair, open to the media and outside observers, and entail as broad participation as possible," he said.

In a statement to the press, Pelletreau said:

"This dialogue has progressed from initial contacts to discussion of substantive issues and today to consideration of serious and practical ways to progress in a step-by-step fashion toward the goal of a comprehensive settlement through negotiations, based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principles of territory for peace, security and recognition for Israel, and Palestinian political rights."

Pelletreau said they also discussed the recent Arab summit and developments in the occupied territories. "We expressed grave concern at the continuation of attempted cross-border raids by Palestinian groups into Israel from southern Lebanon," Pelletreau said. "Such activity cannot help but harm efforts to move the peace process forward, and should be condemned by all those who share with us that goal."

(In Washington, Secretary of State Baker echoed Pelletreau's remarks on the progress of the dialogue to "discussion of substantive issues.")

(Responding to questions during an appearance at the National Press Club, Baker said, however, that "the dialogue we are maintaining with the PLO, we have said on many occasions, should not be and cannot be, as far as we're concerned, an end in and of itself. It can only be productive if it can move us forward toward the goal of peace in the Middle East.")

"We, of course, support the proposal that Prime Minister Shamir has advanced for elections in the Occupied Territories, particularly when you consider that he advanced that proposal in the context of a way to launch a political negotiation," Baker said. "We think this is meaningful. We think this gives us something to work with, to try and move things forward toward peace in this very, very difficult part of the world, and with respect to this very, very intractable problem."

(Baker explained that the United States now has a dialogue with the PLO "because the PLO has acceded to the three conditions that the United States laid out there as preconditions for such a dialogue 13 years ago." He also pointed out that the meetings with the PLO are not secret; "they're private meetings, but they're not being held behind anybody's back.")

Yaser Abd Rabbu, head of the PLO delegation, described the

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meeting as an opportunity to discuss "various important issues."

He also expressed the PLO's "strong interest" in the United States' recent statements about ending Israel's occupation, annexations and settlements.

However, citing the position reached at the Casablanca summit, Rabbu said elections are only possible after Israel withdraws from the occupied territories and under the supervision of an international peace process. He added that discussions between the US and PLO delegations would continue in the near future.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

טופס מברק

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סוג בטחוני גלוי

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אל: המשדד

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אל: מנהל הסברה

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מצ"ב הסקר (ללא הטבלאות).

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Israel and the Intifada:

Findings of the April 1989 Roper Poll

ס.ו

David Singer
Renee Cohen

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INTRODUCTION

As part of its ongoing research activities, the American Jewish Committee has been conducting regular probes of the attitudes of the American public toward Israel and American Jews. Since 1984 this work has been carried out in conjunction with the Roper Organization, which has fielded the same four AJC "proprietary"* questions once each year** (January 1984; April/May 1985; June 1986; February 1987; April 1988; April 1989). The four questions deal with the following issues: sympathies in the Middle East conflict; the reliability of Israel as an ally of the United States; perceptions of the loyalty of American Jews; and perceptions of Jewish power in the United States.

The findings reported here are from a Roper poll conducted between April 15 and April 22, 1989. The AJC sought to use the poll as a vehicle for gauging the ongoing response of the American public to the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza, which began in December 1987. Toward that end, the Roper

*"Proprietary" questions are specially commissioned by clients. They are incorporated into the regular battery of questions that the Roper Organization poses 10 times a year as part of its syndicated subscription service, Roper Reports.

** Findings for the period 1984-1987 are reported in David Singer and Renae Cohen, Probing Public Sentiment on Israel and American Jews, American Jewish Committee, 1987; findings for the period 1985-1988 appear in David Singer and Renae Cohen, In the Wake of the Palestinian Uprising, American Jewish Committee, 1988.

Organization fielded the AJC's four standard questions***, plus three additional proprietary questions dealing with Israel's response to the Palestinian uprising, solutions to the problem of the Palestinians in the Middle East, and views regarding Israel's refusal to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

In conducting the April 1989 poll, the Roper Organization interviewed 1,986 respondents in their homes. Those interviewed constituted a representative national sample of men and women, 18 years of age and older.

FINDINGS

The findings of the Roper poll indicate that between April 1988 and April 1989, Israel's standing with the American public was virtually unchanged. During the same period, pro-Arab sentiment on the part of Americans increased hardly at all, remaining at a decidedly low level. Finally, the American public continued to view American Jews in a positive light.

The results of the Roper poll are reported in detail in a series of tables in the Appendix. Among the salient findings are the following:

- * Sympathy with Israel in the Middle East conflict stood at 36%, while sympathy with the Arab nations was at 13%.

*** In 1989, the question about sympathies in the Middle East conflict took two forms. Half the respondents were asked to choose between Israel and the Arab nations; half between Israel and the Palestinians.

In April 1988, the figures were, respectively, 37% and 11% (Table 1). When given a choice between Israel and the Palestinians--the first time the American Jewish Committee has inquired about this matter--the figures were only slightly different: 34% and 14%, respectively (Table 2).

- * A plurality of respondents (44%) view Israel as a reliable ally of the United States. In April 1988, the figure was 43%. With regard to the Arab nations, pluralities of respondents see Egypt (40%) and Jordan (43%) as not reliable, while a majority (59%) see Syria as such (Table 3).
- * Respondents are almost equally divided between those who think the Israeli government's response to the Palestinian uprising has been "too harsh" (30%) and those who think it has been "about right" (28%). The comparable figures in April 1988 were 28% and 26%. A smaller percentage (8%) think the response has been "too lenient" (Table 4).
- * When asked about preferred solutions to the problem of the Palestinians in the Middle East, a majority of respondents (56%) answer "Don't know," either because they have not followed the situation closely enough (33%) or because they are uncertain as to which particular solution they prefer (23%). Of those indicating a

preference, 13% favor the "return of major portions of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordanian rule, with appropriate security arrangements for Israel"; 10% favor "Israeli military control of all of the West Bank and Gaza, with local self-rule for the Palestinians"; 9% favor the "establishment of an independent Palestinian state in all of the West Bank and Gaza"; 8% favor the "establishment of a Palestinian homeland in all of the West Bank and Gaza in federation with Jordan"; and 5% favor "Israeli annexation of all of the West Bank and Gaza" (Table 5).

- * A plurality of respondents (42%) think Israel is right in refusing to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) because it is a terrorist group; 32% think Israel is wrong (Table 6). In April 1988--prior to the opening of U.S.-PLO dialogue--the figures were 44% and 27%, respectively.
- * Twice as many respondents disagree (43%) with the statement "Most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States" than agree (21%) with it. In April 1988 the figures were 48% and 24%, respectively (Table 7).
- * Only 8% of respondents believe Jews have too much power in the United States, the same figure as in April 1988. All of the following were cited ahead of Jews as having too much power in the United States: business

corporations (47%); news media (45%); labor unions (34%); Arab interests (23%); Orientals (23%); and blacks (14%). The figure for the Catholic Church and Hispanics were 8% and 6%, respectively (Table 8).

While the primary aim of the Roper poll is to probe the attitudes of the American public at large, some noteworthy subgroup differences do emerge for a number of the questions (Tables 9-16):

- * People who are better educated are somewhat more likely to be favorable toward Israel and American Jews than those who are less well educated.
- * People with higher household incomes are somewhat more likely to be favorable toward Israel and American Jews than those with lower household incomes.
- * Whites are somewhat more likely to be favorable toward Israel and American Jews than blacks.
- * Republicans are somewhat more likely to be favorable toward Israel and American Jews than Democrats or Independents.
- * Protestants and Catholics differ little in their attitudes toward Israel and American Jews.

CONCLUSION

The results of the Roper poll indicate that, between April 1988 and April 1989, Israel's standing with the American public was essentially unchanged, with only a very slight increase in pro-Arab sentiment. As for American Jews, they continued to be seen by the American public in a positive light.

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דתיפות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קרי: _____
סוג: גלני	טופס פרוק	כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן העבור: 191800 יוני 1989		אל: "מצפ"א, משה"ח; מקש"ח, משהב"ט
פס' פרוק:		דע: רמשי"ן, ניו-יורק
תפסרז: <u>191</u> <u>07</u>		כאזת: ק/ק לקונגרס
74 349 439		

בית הנבחרים: חוק כספי הפנטגון (הרשות)
 לשלכו 400 (נר 318 לבטחון; 67 למשי"ן)

להלן כתבה מתוך השבועון NEAR EAST Report. מה-19.6.89. *לפי האספי*
 השמיץ באוזני עורך הפרסום דברים דומים מאד לאלה שבמסרנו במברקנו הנ"ל.

Aspin Says Israel Aid Well Spent

"Israel's peace initiative is a good start," Rep. Les ASPIN (D-WI), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told NER. When asked if the Arab states were doing enough, Aspin replied: "We are never totally satisfied with the Arabs. We need to lean on them about peace."
 Aspin expressed his support for the Arrow anti-ballistic missile project and said the program was small and should not be affected by cuts in the budget for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Other programs that benefit Israel, however, may not remain unscathed in the process of determining defense priorities.
 Defense Secretary Richard Cheney deleted two popular programs from his budget request -- the V-22 Osprey and the F-14. Given the popularity in Congress of these weapons,

Aspin said it was very possible they would be funded, in which case money would have to be taken away from the Navy and Marine accounts. Israeli-made weapons systems such as the CLNAS [Cobra Laser/Designator Night Attack System] and the Tald [Tactical Air Launched Decoy] are funded in these accounts. Aspin denied any direct correlation between the inclusion of the V-22 Osprey and F-14 and deletion of the programs benefitting Israel, but he acknowledged the latter might be

"We are never totally satisfied with the Arabs. We need to lean on them about peace."

vulnerable to cuts.
 "Absent further developments," Aspin said, "Israel is in good shape" in terms of the Middle East military balance. He added that U.S. aid was "well spent" by Israel.
 Aspin was particularly happy with the level of strategic cooperation between Israel and the United States and looked forward to enhancing the relationship. "There is a lot we can do," he said. One area where the relationship might be expanded, he suggested, was in the purchase of Israeli off-the-shelf items that have already been proven. This would save the United States the expense of research and development of new weapons. The principal obstacle to such an approach, Aspin noted, was the Pentagon's prejudice against weapons "not invented here." M.B. □

אספי
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דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קף: 1
סוג: שמור		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן הגור: 1700 15 ביוני 1989		אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק: הפסרד:		דע:
1/2 362		פאת: שג' וושינגטון

11/10/89

פגישת השגריר - יו"ר המפלגה הדמוקרטית

1. השגריר נועד (13.6) לפגישת היכרות עם דון בראון היו"ר החדש של המפלגה.

2. בשיחה נדונו הנושאים הבאים:

א. ביקור בישראל

1) השגריר הזמין את בראון לבקר בישראל. בראון הודה על ההזמנה. מקורו שיוכל להגיע בטתיו. סיפר על ביקוריו בישראל (שלשה במספר) במהלך למד מקרוב את בעיותנו, הביע הזהות העמוקה עם מאבקנו.

ב. עמדת המפלגה הדמוקרטית בנושא הסכסוך:

1) על רקע הפעילות במספר מדינות (לאחרונה במטצ'וסטס) לאימוץ מצע אנטי ישראלי ציין בראון את התערבותו הפעילה לדחיית התצעות האנטי-ישראליות. בראון הדגיש הצטרך במעקב אחרי הפעילות בשטח מצד אנשים המנסים להשחיר דימוי ישראל. בראון חזר על מחויבתו ותמיכתו בתמשך היחסים המיוחדים בין שתי המדינות וציין כי יעשה מאמץ שמחויבות זו תמצא ביטוייה במדיניות מפלגתו.

2) השגריר ציין עניננו בשת"פ והביע נכונות להירתם למאמץ להסביר עמדתנו בפורומים השונים של המפלגה.

ג. תהליך השלום:

1) לבקשת בראון פירט השגריר את יוזמת רוה"מ על מרכיביה השונים. ציין כי אין אלטרנטיבה ליזמה וכי עיקר המאמץ כיום הינו למציאת פרטנר פלסטיני למו"מ עמנו. הוסיף כי בהיעדר פרטנר אין מקום בשלב זה להכנס לפירוט נוסף של רעיון הבחירות.

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תפוצה: 36- שנה ארבעה חודש 284 1/2

דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פגוק	דף: 2
סוג:		פתוך: 2
תאריך וזמן חגורה:		אל:
כס' פגוק:		דע:
הפסרד:		כאת:
2/2 362		

ד. דראיפ :

- (1) בראון העלה הנושא. עמד על הרגישות הקיימת בקרב הקהילה השחורה בארה"ב כמו גם בקרב חוגים יהודים לגבי יחסל ישראל - דראיפ. התייחס לשתייפ הצבאי וביקש לדעת מטגרת כללית של מועדי פקיעת החוזים בין שתי המדינות. בראוף ציין כי נושא זה מעיב על יחס הקהילה השחורה כלפי ישראל וכי יש למצוא דרך קונסטרוקטיבית להשיב לביקורת. השגריר בתגובתו התייחס להחלטות הקבינט בנושא דראיפ. ציין את התיקף המזערי של הסחר והזכיר את השיקול של קיום קהילה יהודית בדראיפ בקביעת מדיניותנו כלפי דראיפ אשר כיום אינה שונה מזו של הקהילה האירופית.

ה. אירועים לזכרו של מרטין לותר קינג :

- (1) בראון אשר השתתף באירוע האחרון ציין את התרשמותו העמוקה מהאירוע והרכב השמתתפים. השגריר הציע לבראון לשאת את הנאום המרכזי בטקס הבא. בראון נתן הסכמתו העקרונית.

עד כאן עיקרי השיחה שהתנהלה באוירה ידידותית ביותר. בפגישה השתתפו: סגניתו היהודיה של בראון ועוזרתה והח"מ.

שטי 12

תפוצה:



סודי -

יג' סיוון תשמ"ט
16 ביוני 1989

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מכתב
ק"פ

אל : שה"ח
ס/שה"ח
מנכ"ל וחברי הנהלה
ראשי נציגויות צפ"א

מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

דף מצפ"א מס' 45

לשבועיים המסתימים ב- 16.6.89

תמיכה ביזמת השלום:

תשעים וחמישה סנטורים כתבו למזכיר המדינה מכתב תמיכה ביזמת השלום של ממשלת ישראל. את המהלך הובילו הסנטורים לאוטנברג (דמוקרט מניו-ג'רסי) ובושביץ (רפובליקני ממינסוטה). במכתבם אומרים הסנטורים כי בחירות בשטחים ייצרו מנהיגות פלשתינאית וכי זהו צעד ראשון לקראת שלום צודק ובר-קימא. את יזמת ישראל כינו "רצינית ומרחיקת לכת" וקראו למאמץ אמריקני לשכנע אחרים במעלותיה. הם קוראים למדינות ערביות נוספות להצטרף לתהליך וממליצים בעקר לירדן ולמצרים לנסות ולשכנע את הפלשתינאים ללכת לבחירות.

בהודעה לעתונות אמר לאוטנברג: "היו מי שאמרו שהתמיכה בישראל נחלשה. חושבני שמכתב זה מעמיד את המצב על אמיתותו".

בנפרד פרסמו רבים מן המחוקקים הודעות אישיות. סנטור פיט וילסון מקליפורניה כתב לבייקר: "לא יהיה זה בחכמה לתבוע ויתורים מישראל לפני שיתנהל מו"מ על בטחונות שהסטטוס העתידי של השטחים לא יהווה איום על בטחונה ועצמאותה". וילסון גם הזכיר כי אש"פ עודו מוביל את האינתפדה, הוא לא ויתר על המאבק המזוין ועודו מחזיק באמנה שלו. הוא מסיים בתביעה לתמיכה חזקה בתכנית שמיר שהיא דרך דמוקרטית מול דרכם של זורקי אבנים.

המורשה להמן מפלורידה הכניס את היזמה כלשונה לרקורד הקונגרסיונלי, המורשים גילמן (ניו-יורק), ברומפילד (מישיגן), קונטה (מסצ'וסטס) ורבים אחרים שבחזה בנאומיהם בקונגרס.

באמצע השבוע נוספו מורשים רבים לחותמי מכתב דומה בנוסחו לזה של הסנטורים שיצא מטעם בית הנבחרים.



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ארה"ב-אש"פ

נציג אש"פ באו"מ טרזי נפגש עם השגריר פיקרינג. האמריקנים הדגישו שאין בכך פתיחת צנור הידברות חדש עם אש"פ וכי פיקרינג קים את הפגישה בתוקף תפקידו כיו"ר תורן של מועבי"ט לחודש יוני. הם אמרו כי הנוהג מחייב כל יו"ר לפגוש את אלה המבקשים לראותו וכי השיחה נסבה רק על ענינים פרוצדורליים הנוגעים למועבי"ט. טרזי מצידו ניסה לנפח את הענין לכדי "פריצת דרך" ואומר כי פגישה כזו לא נערכה מימי שגרירותו של אנדרו יאנג.

בינתיים נערכה פגישה נוספת של פלטרו בטוניס, השלישית במספר. השיחה נסבה על תכנית הבחירות בשטחים. פלטרו (עפ"י הודעתו לעתונות) הדגיש את היתרונות ביזמה הישראלית וכי יזמה זו ראויה לתגובה חיובית מן הצד הפלסטיני. אח"כ הביע פלטרו את דאגתה של ארה"ב מהנסיונות החוזרים ונשנים של חוליות מחבלים לחדור לישראל ותבע להפסיקם ולגנותם.

בייקר אף הוא התיחס לדיאלוג עם אש"פ (בנאומו בפני מועדון העתונות הלאומי) ואמר בין היתר כי "הפגישות אינן סודיות, הן פרטיות אך אינן נערכות מאחרי גבו של מישהו".

מנהיגות בית הנבחרים:

יו"ר בית הנבחרים רייט התפטר מתפקידו (ומן הקונגרס בכלל). היו"ר נאשם ונחקר בשורה של ענינים הנוגעים לאתיקה של הבית ולא ראה לפניו דרך אלא לפרוש.

זעזוע ותדהמה פקדו את הבית גם בשל התפטרותו של המצליף הדמוקרטי טוני קוהלו, גם הוא בשל מעשים פיננסיים חריגים.

קונגרסמן ביל גריי מפילדלפיה מצא אף הוא את שמו משתרבב בחרושת שמועות אך טהר עצמו במהירות ובתקיפות. אתמול הצליח להיבחר כמחליפו של קוהלו. גריי נחשב ידיד ישראל ואילו בוניור שרץ נגדו והפסיד הוא בעייתי מבחינתנו.

על רקע כל המהומה הזאת מיהרו למנות יו"ר חדש, תומאס פוליי ממדינת וושינגטון. פוליי, ידיד אמת לישראל, היה עוזרו ומקורבו של סנטור סקופ ג'קסון ומשהו מיחסו של האחרון לישראל דבק בו. הוא איש מקובל והכל סומכים על שיפוטו ושקול דעתו. בלט בשעתו בהתנגדותו לכל סיוע לקונטראס אך כאשר הנושא הגיע לדיון ידע להציע פשרות. הוא עצמו נחשב לליברלי אך מחוז הבחירה שלו אינו כזה ועליו לתמרן איפוא את דרכו בזהירות. פוליי הוא בן ששים ומכהן בבית מזה עשרים וחמש שנים.

דניס רוס - WORLDNET

ב- 14 דנא "התחבר" רוס בטלביזיה לבירותיהן של סעודיה, ירדן ומצרים וענה לשאלות שנורו אליו משם.



מן הדברים הראויים לצטוט:

1. אנו מאמינים שהצעת ישראל לעריכת בחירות היא חשובה מאד משום שפרושה הוא שהישראלים אומרים לראשונה שידברו במישרין עם הפלשתינאים.
2. בחירות, מעצם הגדרתן, צריכות להיות חפשיות והוגנות. פרוש הדבר שעליהן להיות חפשיות מאלימות ולחץ ושלפלשתינאים צריכה להישמר הזכות לנהל מלחמת בחירות, לנאום ולקיים אסיפות באופן פחות או יותר חופשי.
3. דעתנו על ההתנחלויות פשוטה: הן אינן תורמות לאוירה שתאפשר ליצור אמון. למעשה עמדתנו היא שההתנחלויות הן מכשול ליצירת תהליך שלום שיוביל לאיזושהו מקום.
4. מנחים אותנו כמה עקרונות (מונה אותם), "... וכמו שאמר המזכיר בנאומו, לפלשתינאים צריך שתהיה בסופו של דבר זכות לממשלה עצמית (SELF GOVERNMENT)".
5. לא סיפוח ולא מדינה פלשתינאית יספקו מירשם ליציבות. מדינה פלשתינאית עצמאית לא תהיה בסופו של דבר בעלת כח-חיות (IS NOT GOING TO BE VIABLE).
6. איננו מעוניינים להרויח זמן ואסור שתכנית הבחירות תתפס על-ידי מישו כמכשיר לקניית זמן. מי שסבור שע"י בזבוז זמן ירויח משהו משלה את עצמו.
7. ובאשר לאש"פ, הוא לא הצליח לשכנע את הישראלים על מחויבותו לשלום. עם זאת ישנו דיאלוג בין ארה"ב לאש"פ ומצידנו הוא מנוהל על ידי פקיד אמריקני בכיר מאד.
8. הטלנו וטו על החלטת מועבי"ט לא משום שאנחנו מצדיקים או תומכים במעשי ישראל בשטחים. למעשה בנאומנו במועצה הבענו דאגה מיוחדת ממעשי המתנחלים בשטחים אך באותו הזמן דעתנו היא שהרבה מן האלימות בשטחים הוא, במקרים רבים, תוצאה של פרובוקציה.
9. על הערבים ללכת אל מעבר לרטוריקה. לדוגמא: אי אפשר להתנגד לישראל באופן רפלקסיבי בכל ארגון בינלאומי. ואי אפשר בלי הרף לנסות לסלק את ישראל מכל ארגון. כל העניין של חרם אינו מעיד על רצון ונכונות להתפייסות. הנוסחה של ציונות גזענות מצביעה על שלילת כל אפשרות של הידברות עם ישראל.
10. באשר לשאלת "ההגדרה העצמית", הגדרה עצמית במז"ת פירושה אחד: מדינה פלשתינאית ואת דעתנו על מדינה אתם יודעים.



GSP

- א. לפני שנה הוגשה לנציב הסחר של ארה"ב עתירה מטעם הארגון הפרו-ערבי - A.D.C ובה נדרשה הסרת מעמד ה-G.S.P (המעניק הקלות מכס לסחורות המיוצאות לארה"ב) מישראל. הרקע לדרישה: הפרת זכויות העובדים הערביים. העתירה נדחתה. במהלך בדיקתה החליט נציב הסחר להפריד בין בדיקת שמירת זכויות הערבים העובדים בשטחים לבין אלה העובדים בישראל כדי להמנע מהכרה משתמעת בסיפוח השטחים לישראל. בהמשך להליך הפרדה זה, הוחלט להסיר את מעמד ה-GSP מהשטחים, וכתוצאה מכך תתבטלנה הקלות המכס על מוצרים שמקורם בשטחים החל מ-1.7.89.
- בעקבות זאת עולה החשש, כי ארה"ב תעניק מעמד GSP לשטחים בנפרד מישראל. להענקת מעמד זה לשטחים כישות נפרדת, עלולה להיות, כמובן, משמעות פוליטית. כרגע נראה שאין מחמ"ד מתכוונת ליזום פעולה כזו, אך המצב עלול להשתנות אם יתחיל ה-A.D.C בפעילות להענקת מעמד GSP לשטחים.
- ב-1.6.89 שוב הגיש ה-A.D.C עתירה להסרת מעמד ה-GSP מישראל על רקע הפרת זכויות העובדים. מכיוון שבעתירה לא נכלל מידע נוסף על זה שנבדק בשנה הקודמת, מעריכים במ' ישראל במחמ"ד כי העתירה לא תגיע לשלב עריכת השמוע (אלא אם תוצגנה ראיות חדשות בהמשך).

הקונגרס - דיונים בנושא לבנון

המורשה פיהן העלה בפני ועדת החוץ של בינה"ב הצעת החלטה הקוראת להפסקת אש מיידית בלבנון, קוראת לצדדים להכנס למו"מ לפיוס, תומכת במאמצים הבינ"ל לפיוס ומגנה את סוריה על האלימות אותה היא מפעילה נגד לבנון והעם בלבנון, וקוראת לסוריה להסיג את כל כוחותיה מלבנון.

בעדותו בפני ועדת החוץ אמר נד ווקר (1.6.89) כי כדי לפתור את בעיית לבנון יש צורך לא רק במאמץ של גופים בינ"ל אלא גם של מדינות בודדות. ווקר העיד כי לארה"ב אינטרס להשתתף במאמצים לסיים את הסכסוך שכן האלימות שם תגרום להתפתחות סכסוך אזורי ובנוסף, לבנון הפכה למרכז לטרור ולסחר בסמים. בשל סכנות אלה תומך הממשל במאמצי הליגה הערבית לפיוס לאומי בלבנון.

תחנת "קול אמריקה" בערבה (VOA)

ועדת החוץ בסנט אשרה (8/6) ללא מתנגדים הרשאה בסך 194 מיליון דולר להמשך בניית התחנה.

קדם לאישור ויכוח בתוך הוועדה בין היו"ר סנטור פל לבין סנטורים אחרים, באשר לאפשרות להקצות כספים בסדר גודל כזה אשר בסופו של דבר יבואו על חשבון כספים שהוקצו לכיסוי חובות ארה"ב לאו"ם בהתאם להבטחת הנשיא בוש.



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קיים גם ויכוח בין נציגי מחמ"ד (אשר בקשו לאשר את הסכום הנ"ל - אך מבלי לציין מהיכן יש לקחת את הכסף לבין נציגי הרשות לשידור בינ"ל (BIB) שתמכה בהקצבה ללא כל הסתייגויות.

כרגע מאושר הסכום הנ"ל גם ע"י ועדת החוץ בביה"נ אך יש לצפות לבעיות ברגע שועדת ההקצבות בשני הבתים, ביחוד בביה"נ, יצטרכו לתקצב את ההרשאה. ככל הנראה, יאושרו כ- 75 מיליון דולר להקצבות השנה ושאר הסכום יפרס לעתיד.

סיוע חוץ

מליאת ועדת החוץ בביה"נ המשיכה ב-MARK-UP של חוק כספי סיוע החוץ ב- 1 וב- 6 ליוני. בין שאר הנושאים שנדונו ו/או אושרו יש לציין את הבאים:

- תיקון מש"ב: אושרו 5 מיליון דולר עבור שת"פ עם מש"ב (CDP) ועוד 2.5 מיליון דולר לתוכניות מחקר של האוניברסיטאות בישראל (CDR).

- תיקון סמית: בתיקון נקרא הנשיא, במדה וירצה למכור גשק למדינה במזה"ת שברשותה טילים בליסטיים סיניים, לאשר את העובדות הבאות:

שלאותה מדינה אין ראשי חץ ביולוגיים, כימיים וגרעיניים עבור טילים אלה ובנוסף שאותה מדינה לא מממנת את התוכנית הגרעינית של עיראק.

התיחסות לנעשה בשטחים ולתכנית הבחירות

דובר מחמד (BOUCHER) אודות התגים שנתבקשו פועלים פלשתינאים לענוד (1.6.89):

"אנו רואים זאת כפעולה תוקפנית. עפ"י השקפתנו, דרישה זו מהווה סתירה לערכים דמוקרטיים. אולם, עלי להדגיש כי דרישה זו אינה מדיניות של הממשל הישראלי".

בדברו על האלימות שהפעילו מתנחלים כנגד ערבים אמר הדובר:

"ארה"ב ביטאה כבר הסתייגותה המוחלטת מכל סוג של נטילת החוק לידיים. ממשלת ישראל בטאה גם היא התנגדותה לפעולות מתגרות". עוד הוסיף שארה"ב תובעת מהצדדים המעורבים להמנע מפעולות התורמות להעלאת רמת האלימות.

ארה"ב במועצת הבטחון של האו"ם:

במועצת הבטחון של האו"ם (6/6) הטילה ארה"ב ווטו על הצעת גינוי לישראל בנושא פעולות ישראל בשטחים. נציג ארה"ב הסביר ההצבעה נגד הצעת ההחלטה בכך ש"ההצעה אינה מאוזנת בכך שהיא מגנה מדיניות ישראל ופעולותיה ללא כל התייחסות לפעילות האלימה החמורה של הצד השני. הטקסט אינו מגנה אלימות של כל הצדדים ואין הוא מאשר את מחויבות כל הצדדים לסייע בצמצום המתיחות.



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אלמנטים כה יסודיים ראוי שיהיו הבסיס לכל הכרזה רשמית של המועצה (הדנה במצב בשטחים הכבושים) המחויבת מתוקף הצהרת היסוד שלה לתמיכה בשלום ובבטחון בינ"ל".

תגובות לנאום בייקר בכנס איפא"ק

1. הסנטור מוינהן יצא בהודעה מיוחדת וביקורתית כלפי הנאום. הוא הדגיש שהממשל חייב לקדם מדיניות ברורה ולא מעורפלת העלולה ליצור מבוכה אצל ידידים ותתפש לא נכון אצל אויבי החופש. הוא מבקר את המזכיר על השימוש במושג "ישראל הגדולה" שעלול לדבריו לסייע דוקא לקיצוניים שהרי בישראל עצמה אין יותר כאלה המשתמשים במושג זה. בהודעה הוא מבקר גם את מדריך הטלפון של מחלקת המדינה המנסה להתחמק מהכרה בירושלים כחלק מישראל וזהו סימן נוסף למדיניות המעורפלת.
2. הסנטור הלמס בשימוע של ג'ון קלי תקף בחריפות את אלה במח' המדינה החושבים שהמפתח במזה"ת הינו מתן לגיטימציה לאש"פ. אשר למושג "ישראל הגדולה" לא שמע אישים בעלי אחריות בישראל המשתמשים במושג זה.
3. חבר הבית מל לויין, במהלך שימוע בנושא לבנון ויוזמת השלום, ציין שהטון ששלט בנאום בייקר היה EVENHANDED.
4. בקהילה היהודית התגובות נחלקו. מנהיגות יהודית המקורבת לרפובליקנים ולממשל נפגשה עם ריצ'רד האס וביקרה והתריעה על תוצאות אפשריות מנאום בייקר. A.J.C. והקונגרס תמכו בבייקר כך גם אירגון הקהילות הרפורמיות.

ב ב ר כ ה,

מיכאל שילה

אברהם

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סודי ביותר

שיחת שה"ח ארנס - השגריר בראון (14.6)

רשם סלי.

הפגישה לבקשת בראון כדי למסר המכתב המצורף מבייקר.

לאחר קריאת המכתב, אמר ארנס שלא נראה שיש בו חידושים: די ברור לו בעקבות הנאום, שבייקר רצה TO TALK TOUGH עם ישראל. זו גישה לא נכונה ואינה יכולה להועיל לתהליך. אנחנו בטוחים שזה היה נאום רע. נראה שבייקר חושב אחרת, כנראה שעוד נצטרך לשוחח על זה. אין שום הגיון בדיבור על תוצאות המו"מ בשלב זה. מספיק קשה לשכנע הציבור בארץ, על רקע האלימות להסכים לבחירות לנציגות למו"מ, ובלתי אפשרי לשכנע אנשים שיש הצדקה כלשהי להודיע מראש על תוצאות המו"מ.

בראון: ב-3.6 שלח שוורנדרה מכתב לבייקר ממנו מוסר לנו את הפיסקה הבאה:
AS FAR AS THE IDEA OF ELECTIONS IS CONCERNED, IT IS WORTH STUDYING. APPARENTLY IT WILL BE VIABLE AND ACCEPTABLE FOR ALL THE PARTIES ONLY WHEN IT INCORPORATES CLEAR-CUT PROVISIONS WHICH IN THEIR ENTIRETY, WOULD OUTLINE SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR THE START AND DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND ATTAINING A COMPREHENSIVE AND FINAL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

בראון: בייקר אתמול בעזה, נפגש עם מספר אנשים, ובהם (בנפרד) שנים מבני א-שאווה, אחד בנו של רשארד והשני כנראה בן דודו עיסם. שניהם הביעו עמדה שבמקום העיסוק עם אש"פ יש פשוט להחזיר הענין לירדן ולמצרים ואח"כ - נראה מה יהיה. אח"כ נפגש עם שלושה אנשים (שני רופאים, מהם אחד שנפגש עם דניס רוס, והשלישי - ראש לשכת עורכי הדין). להלן עיקר שיחותיו:

בראון אמר להם שלא בא כדי להפריד בינם לבין אש"פ - הם יודעים שלארה"ב דו-שיח עם אש"פ, למורת רוחה של ישראל. רוצה לדבר על יוזמת רה"מ: "זה הדבר היחידי על השולחן" וכרוך בהפגנת אומץ רב מצד שמיר. אתם ערים לקשיים הפוליטיים בישראל ושיהיה לכם ברור שלא תקבלו דבר יותר טוב. הייתי בארץ בזמן שיחות האוטונומיה, ותארו לכם שלא הייתם מחמיצים ההזדמנות אז - האם מצבכם היום לא היה טוב יותר? בני שיחו השיבו בהנהון לשאלה והקשו: מה עמדת ארה"ב בענין ההגדרה העצמית והמדינה העצמאית? בראון: אנחנו תומכים בהגדרה עצמית כמעט בכל מקום בעולם אבל לא כאן. כפי שזה נראה עכשיו, כאן הגדרה עצמית פירושה מדינה עצמאית ואנחנו נגדה: בתשובה לשאלתם מדוע אין ארה"ב מוכנה להסכים למדינה עצמאית השיב שהנימוקים כדלהלן:

א. IT IS NOT VIABLE

ב. אם נדבר גלויות - הישראלים מקשיבים לא רק למה שאתם אומרים לנו באנגלית אלא גם לנאמר בערבית.

ג. הדבר והניקוי שלמותי מו"ח יפה הוא והבעיות והקשות, כלכליות ואחרות, הקשורות בישות פלשתינאית. שלא לדבר על מדינה.

כאן פנה לארנס: אני מתכוון להמשיך לשוחח איתם ומציג להם את עמדת הממשל האמריקני כפי שאני מבין אותה. דיברתי גם עם וילקוקס ואמרתי שחשוב שיעשה אותו דבר. יש לי תחושה שיש לעניין סיכוי. חזר לשיחות בעזה:

בתשובה לשאלת הערבים על הצעות שמיר בדבר "אף שעל" השיב בראון שלשמיר בעיות פוליטיות. גם הם פוליטיקאים ובודאי מבינים שעל פוליטיקאים להתאים הרטוריקה לנסיבות. הם שאלו למה הישראלים לא הסכימו ל-CHANGES שהם הגישו ובראון, לאחר בדיקה במשרדו, סבור שהמדובר בנייר שהגיש ספטאווי.

בראון הציג לבני שיחו את הדינמיקה של בחירות, אח"כ מו"ח, ואח"כ SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY ואחרי שלוש שנים ואולי פחות, והדגיש שיש כאן מקום לגמישות, מו"ח על הסדר הקבע. האם לא תוכלו להתמודד עם מצב של ממשל עצמי כשהכל בידיכם חוץ מבטחון וחוץ ועוד כ-2500 מתיישבים באזור "ומי יודע כמה מהם באמת ישנים פה?"

הערבים שאלו לגבי חופש הבחירות וההבטחה שהנבחרים לא יגורשו כפי שנעשה אחרי 76. בראון השיב שהבחירות הקודמות היו חופשיות ואתם יודעים שגם אלו יהיו חופשיות - התהליך כולו יהיה UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT גם אחרי הבחירות ה-SPOTLIGHT ישאר. יהיה פה גודל של עתונאים וסנטורים ואולי סטיב סולרו וג'ימי קרטר, ואנחנו נהיה שם גם אחרי הבחירות, נהיה חלק מכל התהליך. זה מה שאני יכול לומר לכם ברגע זה.

כן סיפר בראון על פגישתו עם ראש המנהל האזרחי בעזה וששמח לשמוע שהפסקת הדיג לא באה כעונש קיבוצי אלא כדי למנוע נסיון לברוח מהאזור (וזאת בהתבסס על מידע מוצק).

בכל מקרה מציע לנו שאחרי ישיבת המרכז נשקול מחדש את מדיניות המקל והגזר, וכידיד מציע להימנע מצעדים שיובילו להסלמת העוינות בין הצדדים.

סיפר שנפגש עם שר המשפטים המתעתד לומר לבייקר שאנחנו רואים בדאגה רבה את הדיאלוג שלהם עם אש"ף והשלכותיו השליליות על סיכויי היוזמה. בראון ציין שיש כאן בעיה קשה משום שמצד שני ישראל מציינת כל העת את רמת ה-INTIMIDATION מצד אש"ף ולא ברור כיצד פותרים זאת.

ארנס : בייקר מתייחס באופן EVENHANDED לישראל ולאש"ף.

בראון : אינני חושב שזה המצב, בשום אופן אין זה היחס.

ארנס : באמת מעולם לא היה כך אך נראה כ-NEW DEPARTURE בימינו. גם דימוי הוא מציאות וכך נתפס הנאום אצל הערבים, בישראל ובאמריקה.

בראון : שואל על ביקור גאלי.

ארנס : מברך על הביקור אך לא הביא מסר. אולי (חוזר על הספק) מטרת הביקור היתה להבטיח את חלוקה של מצרים בתיווך בין ישראל והפלשתינאים. גאלי אמר לנו שידוע לו שגם ארה"ב יכולה לעשות זאת, וראוי שגם למצרים יהיה חלק.

June 14, 1989

"Message from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Arens"

Dear Misha:

I received your letter of May 26, and reviewed it carefully. I very much regret that you found the speech disappointing. My remarks were in no way intended to offend or surprise you; nor were they designed to contradict the approach that we have been pursuing together on the peace process these past several months. Indeed, now more than ever Israel and the United States are embarked on a course that requires close cooperation and partnership. And now more than ever you and I have to continue to engage in a spirit of mutual trust and confidence. On this basis I know we can move ahead. And it is in this same spirit that I want to offer some comments on the issues you raised in your letter.

It is important to recall the diplomatic and political environment that our two countries faced as recently as January. Then, the international community and your Arab neighbors were fixated on convening an international conference, immediately as a means of getting to negotiations. At the same time, the Palestine Liberation Organization assumed that it was only a matter of time before the international community would deliver its objective of an independent state through such a conference. The PLO further assumed that through its dialogue with the United States it could drive a wedge between Israel and the United States.

Within five months, however, we have changed this environment. With resolute American leadership and creative Israeli thinking, the bases of moving forward toward negotiations have been altered. There is no longer a question of the immediate convening of an international conference. There is no longer an assumption that a Palestinian state is a foregone conclusion simply because of a PLO announcement. We've proven through our action on WHO that we were determined to block PLO efforts to build momentum for Palestinian statehood and international recognition of that. And there is no basis on which to believe that the strategic relationship between Israel and the United States can be shaken by any party, including the PLO. I am personally committed to strengthening the bonds of strategic cooperation as we pursue peace and cope with a more dangerous military environment in the region.

אין פשרה יש להעביר
אלהים ק"ל

Together, the United States and Israel have worked to shape a negotiating process to be launched by free and fair elections. You and we understand the importance of this concept, and you and we have offered a chance to the Palestinians to move through a democratic process to negotiations on the key issues of the conflict. This is an opportunity that they and other Arabs should not miss; it is an opportunity created by Israel and the United States. I have made very clear to my European colleagues, minister Shevardnadze, and our Arab friends that Israel has given us something to work with; now it is time for the Arab world and Palestinians to do likewise.

The question facing our two countries, as we plan together how to move forward, is to develop the right mix of diplomatic tools designed to encourage a positive Palestinian response. This is an issue, you recall, that we discussed during your recent visit to Washington, and which we discussed also with the Prime Minister and his staff during their visit in March. The fact is that concerns remain strong in Arab minds about Israeli policy. This is unfortunate; but they exist and must be dealt with if there is to be an Arab partner for the process in which we are engaged.

Toward this end -- that is, our shared objective of bringing to this process a Palestinian partner -- the United States has exerted tremendous private and public efforts. In our public diplomacy, and most recently in my speech of May 22, we have sought to define our own views on some issues of greatest concern. In doing so, we have neither sought to break new ground nor to focus attention on final status issues -- those issues least amenable to resolution in the near term. We have sought to convey the continuity of our principles and the need for realism. On some of our principles and related issues, there are fundamental differences of view between the U.S. and the Arabs; and on some there are differences between the U.S. and Israel. It is also true that these differences have persisted for over two decades and despite hundreds of public statements by both sides. There is nothing new or different about recent statements by U.S. or Israeli officials -- we both seek a constructive and positive Arab and Palestinian response to a workable process for moving to negotiations.

There is still a great deal of work to be done, and thus our efforts -- our collective efforts -- need to be focused on how to move forward. The United States will never lose sight of the fact that issues related to the Arab-Israeli peace process directly affect Israel's fundamental security. As we move

Fundamental differences - אין פשרה

differences אין פשרה

ahead, let there be no doubt that President Bush and I are firmly committed to attention on final status issues -- those issues least amenable to resolution in the near term. We have sought to convey the continuity of our principles and the need for realism. On some of our principles and related issues, there are fundamental differences of view between the U.S. and the Arabs; and on some there are differences between the U.S. and Israel. It is also true that these differences have persisted for over two decades and despite hundreds of public statements by both sides. There is nothing new or different about recent statements by U.S. or Israeli officials -- we both seek a constructive and positive Arab and Palestinian response to a workable process for moving to negotiations.

There is still a great deal of work to be done, and thus our efforts -- our collective efforts -- need to be focused on how to move forward. The United States will never lose sight of the fact that issues related to the Arab-Israeli peace process directly affect Israel's fundamental security. As we move ahead, let there be no doubt that President Bush and I are firmly committed to Israel's security and to advancing the peace process in a way that recognizes this fundamental reality. In this spirit I strongly believe that we and you can make progress working together, each in his own way, but always toward our common goal of peace.

↓
(2) 01'2N
460'-1'2N

Jerusalem, May 26, 1989

943

Dear Mr. Secretary,

The text of your address delivered at the AIPAC policy conference reached me in Brussels while I was presenting Israel's peace initiative to the Foreign Ministers of the EEC. I am sure you will not be surprised that I found the content and tone of your speech gravely disappointing.

Your AIPAC speech was not consistent with our discussion held in your office only a few days earlier. Then you assured me of your wholehearted support for Israel's peace initiative without hinting at the "visions" of a permanent settlement that you presented at AIPAC. As you know Israel's peace initiative is based on the assumption that debate on the form and shape of the permanent settlement is best postponed until after the interim arrangement has been put into place. Focusing attention now on the differences regarding the final status can only hinder the start of negotiations.

For many years now it was in the nature of the special relationship developed between Israel and the United States that we not make our differences public but rather treat them in the privacy of the conversations between representatives of our two countries. At AIPAC you chose to confront Israel publicly with positions which you know are contrary to ours.

Your speech came at a time when Israel had launched an important peace initiative and was looking for your assistance in enlisting support for it. I am not at all sure that your remarks will engender such support, whereas I am concerned that they will raise Arab expectations, harden Arab positions, and make Arab acceptance of our peace initiative less likely.

Equally troubling was the presence in your speech of several new elements as well as the absence of traditional elements of American policy regarding Israel's most vital interests and its security. It is my view that for Israel and the United States to continue to work together towards the advancement of peace, it is essential that we work in concert and that our policies be marked by continuity and consistency.

Mr. secretary, let me express my hope that with your assistance Israel's peace initiative will be an historic milestone in progress towards peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Moshe Arens



- סודי -

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

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אוריאל

Handwritten notes and signature

אל: מנהל מצפייא
מאת: ק/ק לקונגרס.

הנדון: פגישת השגריר עם הקונגרסמן הווארד וולפה

ב-7/6/89 נפגש השגריר עם הקונגרסמן וולפה (יהודי דמוקרטי ממישיגן) ביוזמת האחרון. היוזמה לפגישה נולדה לאחר פגישת שהבייט עם ועדת החוץ בה נטל חלק גם וולפה.

1. וולפה פתח הפגישה באומרו כי ביקש הפגישה לאן בעקבות הפגישה עם שהבייט (עליו העביר ביקורת על תשובותיו בהקשר לרעיון הבחירות בשטחים והטיפול באינתיפדה) אלא כדי להביע תסכולו העמוק וכן של רבים כמוהו. לדבריו יש להמתין רק לאירוע/משבר מסויים כדי שישראל תמצא עצמה במצב קשה ונחות והגדיר זאת כ-embarrassed ואז התהליך יהיה מידי וחד ולא תהליך ממושך והדרגתי.

"יאנו מחזיקים האצבעות בסדקים הנפערים בסכר אולם אין כל הבנה בישראל - *PRECISLY HOW ERODED IS ISRAEL'S POSITION IN CONGRESS, AND THAT SCARES THE HELL OUT OF ME*"

וולפה התייחס למספר נושאים בולטים שעל ליבו.
א. ילדים בשטחים חייבים להפסיק להפגע ולמות.

"I'M SICK AND TIRED OF RATIONALIZATIONS"

בין אם מדובר בילד יהודי או ילד ערבי, אני חש בתסכול קשה.

ב. מסכים ליוזמת הבחירות בשטחים, אך לצערו היוזמה היא תוצאה של תגובה ללחץ אמריקני ואין תחושה של מחוייבות ישראלית ליוזמה.

ג. יחסי ישראל-דראיפ, אין כל הצדקה להמשך שתהייפ הצבאי - חוזים לטווח ארוך ומויפ, ואינו מתכוון יותר להגן עלינו בנושא, בסופו של דבר כל העניין יתפוצץ.

ד. יוזמת הריבית על ה-FMS (על כך דיווח בנפרד) - אינו יכול להאמין שנרצה לבקש כספים נוספים על פני ה-3 ביליון \$ ולסכנם. אינו יודע "מה יקרה לכם". השגריר הגיב כי איננו מקדמים את הנושא.



2. השגריר ארד התייחס באריכות ליוזמת השלום. זוהי היוזמה המדינית החשובה ביותר מאז הסכם השלום שנחתם עם מצרים. הסביר מרכיב הבחירות ביוזמה שהינו חלק מתכנית שלימה. ביוזמה קיימים אלמנטים נוספים. קיימת הבנה שהפתרון לסכסוך הישראלי הוא על בסיס 242, קריאה לפתרון בעיית הפליטים ושיקומם ללא קשר לבחירות, מו"מ בין ישראל למדינות ערב. כל מה שאנו שומעים הוא על הפלסטינים ביו"ש. שמענו ביקורת רבה על דרך התנהגותה של ישראל בשטחים, התייחס לדברי וולפה על מותם של ילדים. ארד שאל את וולפה אם היה צריך להתמודד באיזור הבחירה שלו עם מצב דומה לזה בשטחים כיצד היה נוהג? אם היה צריך להמנודד עם אלימות שמקורה גם בנוער וילדים כיצד היה פועל? וולפה אמר כי המספרים מדברים בעד עצמם. 300 הרוגים פלסטינים מול 20 ישראלים. המשיך בלהט רב ובטונים גבוהים כי אי-נו עומד להצדיק יותר המעשים ועומד להפסיק להיות שקט.
- השגריר שאל וולפה מה הוא ממליץ לעשות כאשר זורקים אבנים. וולפה - החיילים אינם מאומנים מספיק.
- השגריר - שאל האם יודע וולפה לכ-75% מההרוגים היום הם פלסטינים המחוסלים ע"י פלסטינים. מדוע אין *OUTCRY* לגבי תופעה זו?
- וולפה - אני מודאג ביחס לישראל.
- השגריר - האם אתה מעוניין שהאירועים יתפתחו כמו בסין?
- וולפה - זה יהיה עוד יותר גרוע. ישנן אלטרנטיבות לשימוש בנשק חם (*LETHAL FORCE*) מה שקורה לישראל *IS KILLING ME*. במיוחד רמת הדה-הומניזציה של הדברים הנראים ונשמעים מעל מסכי ה-TV. המגיעים מישראל. זה גורם לכם נזק עצום.
- מתפתחת תפיסה שחלה מידה רבה של דה-הומניזציה בהתבטאויות הישראליות (הכאות, שבירת עצמות וכו'). אם היה מדובר בילדים יהודים התגובות היו שונות.
3. השגריר דחה על הסף דבריו של וולפה וטון התבטאותו. סגרנו בתי הספר כדי שלא יהרגו ילדים. הנושא חשוב לנו לא פחות מאשר עבורך. אנו מציעים הצעה לבחירות למנהיגות, ואז יש התעלמות מההצעה ומתיחת ביקורת.
- וולפה - אני תומך בבחירות בשטחים. אולם קבעתם מראש כיצד ומי יטול חלק בהם ובינתיים האלימות נמשכת נעשים מעצרים רבים ובתים נהרסים. יש צורך ב-*CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES* ופעולות אלה אינן משרתות צורך זה.
- שגריר - מה אתה מציע. אנו מוכנים לקבל מנהיגות שתבחר בבחירות חופשיות. ואילו אתה מעוניין ב-*MODALITIES* ובפרטים כשכרגע ישנו ווקום.



וולפה - בבחירות מדובר גם בהשתתפות אנשי אשייפ ?
שגריר - רק אלו שמפירים החוק ומשתתפים בפעולות סרור לא יוכלו להשתתף בבחירות. פלסטינים מהשטחים מתראיינים באופן קבוע בטלביזיה הישראלית ומופיעים במפגשים בישראל ואין כל בעייה לגביהם, למרות שמביעים דיעותיהם.

וולפה - אם היה לנו בטחון ביוזמה, היה הדבר מקל עלינו אולם הצהרות רה"מ המביעות התנגדות י"לשטחים תמורת שלום, מקשות מאד.

שגריר - אין להתעלם מהקשיים הפנים פוליטיים בישראל.

וולפה - המצב מאד מדכא אותי שכן אני מדבר כחבר קונגרס יהודי

ABOUT ISRAEL

שגריר - עליך להבין שאסור לה לישראל להכנע בגלל לחץ שיופעל עליה.

וולפה - איש לא מציע זאת. בהקשר זה התייחס לנאום בייקר באיפייק ואמר שאינו מבין מה הביקורת של רה"מ על הנאום. הנאום היה *RIGHT ON TARGET* ותגובת רה"מ אינה מסייעת. כל האלמנטים אליהם התייחס, מצטברים, וזה הבסיס לדאגתו.

התנצל מספר פעמים על מידת הרגשנות והטונים הגבוהים בהם דיבר אך פשוט היה מעוניין להעביר תחושת השחיקה במעמדה של ישראל. הוסיף כי בחדרי חדרים, יושבי ראש מפתח של ועדות עיקריות, (בודאי התייחס לוועדת החוץ בה 3 יוניר יהודים - וולפה, סולרז וגיי־דנסון - י.ד.) יהודים ואחרים מביעים דאגה רבה. לראשונה מאז 11 שנים שהוא בקונגרס, הוא חש -
THAT WE ARE IN A DIFFERENT BALL-GAME. מקווה שיבינו שהתפיסה הישראלית שגוייה.

הערה: כאמור, חלקים מהשיחה התנהלו בטונים מאד גבוהים ומתוחים עד להירגעו של וולפה. וולפה ידוע כקיצוני שבין הדמוקרטים הליברלים היהודים רגשן ונוטה להתפרץ. עם זאת, גם בהנחה שנסנן דבריו ונכניסם לפרופורציה המתאימה, אין להתעלם מהדאגה שהביע ואפילו מחלק קטן ממנה.

בברכה,

ישראל ורנאי זרנגר

יהודית ורנאי זרנגר.

העתק: לשכת שהבייט
לשכת רה"מ
לשכת שהייח
השגריר
י. למדן.

נכנס **

שמור

**
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חוזם: 6,9102

אל: המשרד

יעדים: וווש/447, מצב/633

מ-: הונדורס, נר: 33, תא: 130689, זח: 1200, דח: מ, סג: שמ

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אמלט

שמור/מידי

אל: מנהל אמלט א

דע: השגריר וושינגטון

סמנכל שפי

מצפא

רן קוריאל - וושינגטון

שיחה קצרה עם סגן נשיא ארה"ב דן קוייל

בקבלת פנים שהתקיימה אמש (12 ביוני) מטעם נשיא הונדורס לכבוד סגן נשיא ארהב, דן קוייל, המבקר כאן (ביקור בן יממה אחת), נזדמן לי להחליף כמה מלים עמו. בקבלת הפנים נכחה צמרת המדינה וכן הסגל הדיפלומטי ובסך הכל כמה עשרות איש.

ב. לאחר שסגן הנשיא לחץ את ידי הנוכחים, שהוצגו לו על ידי נשיא הונדורס, הוא עמד בפנינת האולם וקיים שיחה עם כמה אישים. כעבור כמה דקות ניגש אלי השגריר האמריקאי וביקשני, ביזמתו, לבוא לשוחח עם דן קוייל. היה זה כאשר סגן הנשיא סיים שיחה עם השגריר של סין הלאומנית (טאיואן), היועץ בשגרירות ארהב אמר לי, לאחר מכן, כי שני השגרירים היחידים שהוזמנו לשוחח עם קוייל היו הסיני והישראלי.

ג. סגן הנשיא פתח ושאל על מערכת היחסים בין ישראל להונדורס. השבתי, כי היחסים הם מצויינים והוספתי שיש שיתוף פעולה פורה בין שתי המדינות ושישראל מעניקה סיוע נכבד להונדורס בתחומים שונים ומגוונים. ציינתי גם, כי

6406 H.88

מסמך 55 ויקרי ודעות צ"ח. ת"ר. 334407

ШТЛГ

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ПІСЬО: 2019, 6
НА: ПІСЬО
ВІД: 1.11.19, 2019
ВІД: 1.11.19, 2019, ПІСЬО: 2019, 6
ПІСЬО: 2019, 6

ВІД: 1.11.19, 2019

НА: ПІСЬО

ВІД: 1.11.19, 2019

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לפני כשנתיים ביקר הנשיא אפקונו בישראל בלוויית פמליה נכבדה. בתשובה לשאלתו אמרתי לו, כי יש לנו שגרירות תושבת בהונדורס מזה 3 שנים וכי אני השגריר התושב הראשון כאן. לאחר מכן הוא שאל על מערכת יחסינו עם אמלט בכלל וציינתי, כי יש לנו יחסים דיפלומטיים מלאים וטובים עם כל מדינות אמלט, פרט לניקרזואה וקובה. בהקשר לניקרזואה העיר קוייל כי, 'הסנדיניסטים התייחסו באכזריות לקהילה היהודית שהיתה שם ושרפו בתי כנסת'. לאחר מכן התערב בשיחה השגריר האמריקאי בריגס, המסיים בימים אלה שרותו כאן והעובר לווינגטון לכהן כממונה על ענייני אמלט במועצה לבטחון אומי, ואמר כי ברצונו להדגיש שקיימים יחסי שיתוף פעולה טובים וידידותיים מאד בין שגרירי ארהב וישראל בהונדורס והוסיף, כי שגרירות ישראל במדינה זו פעילה מאד ונוכחותה של ישראל כאן מורגשת היטב. נעים לי מאד היה לשמוע את דברי השגריר האמריקאי שנראה היה כי נקלטו בתשומת לב על ידי סגן הנשיא קוייל. בסיום ציינתי בפני סגן הנשיא כי אני שמח על הכבוד והתענוג שהיה לי לשוחח עמו.

ד. לידיעתכם.

כהן

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, שפי, אמלט, בנצור, מצפא, ר/מרכז, ממד

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דחיסות: מידידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	זקף: 4
סוג: שמור	טופס פברוק	כמות: 4
תאריך וזמן חגורה:		אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א יועץ מדיני לשה"ח
כס' פברוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
324		כמות: ציר - עודד ערן

נאום בייקר

בהמשך למברקי 323 רצ"ב הנ"ל.

ערן

2 1 1 1 1 2
 שיה סאשה ג'נל ג'נל ג'נל ג'נל ג'נל
 2 1 1 1 1 2

תפוצה: שג"ר, ציר, קונגרס, שטיין, ארכיב

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Elements of Concern in Baker Speech

1. Harsh Language

--"For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel" (Whose vision? No Israeli government has ever officially supported the concept of a "greater Israel". Only Syria has spoken of and acted upon its vision of a "greater Syria")

--"forswear annexation" [Again, who in Israel is seriously talking about annexation? Israel has clearly demonstrated that it is not interested in annexation by doing nothing to annex the West Bank or Gaza throughout its 21 year control of the territories (despite the fact that those territories were secured as the result of a defensive war Israel was forced to fight.)]

-- "stop settlement activity" (The platform of this national unity government provides for the building of just eight new settlements, several of which have already been built. Settlements have proven never to be an obstacle to peace.)

-- "allow schools to reopen" (Israelis are the first to want the schools to reopen since they were the first to allow universities in the West Bank at all. Schools cannot be reopened, however, as long as they serve as centers for violent activities.)

-- "reach out to the Palestinians as neighbors who deserve political rights." (Hasn't Israel already done so by offering Palestinians the ultimate political right - free and fair elections?)

-- Palestinians should achieve "full political rights." George Shultz had previously just talked about "political rights."

2. Omissions

-- Israel needs secure borders.

-- While supporting "territory for peace", the U.S. does not expect Israel to return to the pre-1967 borders.

-- Jerusalem must remain undivided.

3. Balance

-- Listed what all parties to the conflict are expected to do to move the peace process forward, including the Arab states, Israel, the Palestinians and the Soviet Union. He was equally tough on all four, thereby putting a close friend and ally who

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has proposed an important initiative on the same plane with all the Arab states, the Palestinians and the Soviet Union.

4. Timing

-- Baker presented these harsh words just as Arens and Rabin were in Washington discussing the details of the election proposal, thus undercutting the two architects of the Israeli initiative.

The Problems:

1. Public expressions of differences with an ally are bound to create an impression and reality of tensions. They divert attention from positive diplomacy.
2. These statements have proven counterproductive to the peace process. They weaken the moderates in Israel and convince the radicals in the Arab camp that, since the U.S. is moving away from Israel, there is less need to make compromises.
3. "Evenhandedness" is not "even" in its effects. As Israel's, principal ally, America cannot be "neutral" without tipping the balance away from Israel.
4. Why focus on final status issues now? What is needed is steps to start the process, without provoking an immediate impasse over ultimate issues that cannot be resolved at this stage.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

The U.S. needs to make every diplomatic and public effort to 1) find an Arab partner(s) with whom Israel can negotiate and 2) provide the type of public and private reassurances Israel needs to move forward in the unknown waters of this peace proposal. Specific steps the Administration should take to move the peace process forward include:

- a) Publicly lay down markers for the U.S./PLO dialogue to continue. Specifically, publicly call for an end to the dialogue if the PLO does not endorse Israel's proposal.
- b) Mount a major diplomatic campaign to get the Arab states to take concrete steps towards peace with Israel: to end their state of war with Israel; to end their economic boycott of Israel; to vote to rescind the U.N. "Zionism is racism" resolution and to vote against expelling Israel from the United Nations.
- c) Halt the policy of undermining the peace process by public statements emphasizing differences with Israel. As Baker himself stated: "the best way to be productive (with Israel) is through consultation rather than confrontation."

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d) Given the ammunition the Baker speech has given the right wing in Israel, it is important for Bush to demonstrate his unqualified support for Shamir and his proposal. This could be in the form of highly personal and strongly supportive phone call or letter to Shamir from the President.

Finally, there should be regular Senate meetings with Baker to see what specific actions Baker has taken along these lines and to assess the progress that has been made in finding that Arab partner.

END

30

שגרירות ישראל / אושינגטון טופס פרוק

דף: 1
סתיו: 2

לחפיות: מידי

סוג: שמור

תאריך וזמן הנכר:

13 ביוני 1989 14:15

אל: מא"פ, מצפ"א

כס' פרוק:

הפסד:

271

ד"צ: ממ"ד/ביני"ל 2
ממ"ד/איסוף ביני"ל 1

פחות: שגרירות, אושינגטון

אמ"ע

ארה"ב - ברה"מ, אפריקה

להלן משיחה (12.6) עם PASSAGE, האוראי לנושאי אפריקה במועצה לבטחון לאומי.
(פאסג' לא השתתף במפגש האיזורי ברומא, השתתף הנמובה עליו מילר):

1. הנסקנה הבולטת מדבריו של פאסג' לגבי התרשמות הצד האמריקאי מהשיחות עם הסובייטים, היא אישור חד משמעי להערכת שרווחו מזה זמן שהסובייטים מתקפלים מאפריקה. האמריקאים התרשמו שאדמישין בא למפגש ללא AGENDA מגובשת והערכתם היא שזהו ביטוי נוסף לחוסר העניין באפריקה בדרגים הגבוהים ברה"מ. לדברי פאסג' הסובייטים מודיעים לקליינטים שלהם באפריקה: למוזמביק ולאתיופיה שהם מצמצמים את מעורבותם. ביטוי נוסף למגמה זו רואים בפינוי הכנחות הקובאנים מאתיופיה ומוזמביק. פינוי הכנחות הקובאנים מאנגולה מתנהל גם הוא עפ"י ההסכם והקובאנים מפנים גם את ציודם. בנושא זה היה וושש אמריקאי שהציוד לא יפרנה ואזי יהיה קל לשוב ולאישור - פינוי הציוד מהווה אישור לרצינות הפינוי. לגבי אנגולה הרחיק פאסג' לכת וציין שהוא אינו משוכנע שהסובייטים מחויבים היום אפילו לשרידות ה-MPLA.

2. אדמישין הציע הנשך שהי"פ בין ברה"מ וארה"ב באפריקה ופאסג' העיר שבעוד שביחס להשגת ההסכם באנגולה/נמיביה, ארה"ב הייתה זקוקה לסובייטים הרי שבשאר האיזורים לא ברור מה היתרונות בשי"פ זה, מה גם שאין ספק שהכוונה לטיוע אמריקאי מוגבר, דבר שהוא בעייתי לנוכח מיעוט המשאבים שבידי הממשל.

3. לגבי הצד האמריקאי ניתן להתרשם מהשיחה עם פאסג' ונשיחות נוספות לגבי שתי התפתחויות:
א. ירידת העניין הסובייטי באפריקה נכתוצאה ממנו הצמצום בעימות האסטרטגי באפריקה כולל בקרן אפריקה, משחררת את הלחץ על ארה"ב להגיב על לחץ סובייטי מקביל ונחתנת לממשל אח

1	2	3	3	3	3
1	2	1	1	1	1
4	3	4	1	4	4

דתיקות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	צף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן תכור:		אל:
פס' פברק:		דצ:
הפטרד:		
241		פאת:

האפשרות ליזום ולהגיב בעיתוי שיהיה לו נוח ואולי אף לצמצם מעורבות

ב. עוזר המזכיר החדש כהן נוקט גישה חדשה המוצאת ביטוי בנכונות להדבר עם כל הצדדים בסכסוכים השונים. כך נפגש כהן בביקורו האחרון בסודאן עם רוהיימ סודאן ובמקביל פגש את גרנג בבון ואחייכ בווישינגטון; האמריקאים מקיימים מגעים עם ה-EPLF ובמקביל מוכנים ככל הנראה להתחיל בדיאלוג עם מנגיסטו (על כך בנפרד). ובאותה חבילה, במהלך השימועים על אישור מיבוינו בסנאט לא שלל כהן את האפשרות לדיאלוג אמריקני עם "רבאמו" במגמה להגיע להסדר במוזמביק.

ד.ק. קוריאל/עמרני

1000

תפוצה:

דתימות: כ"ד	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	1
סוג: בלבים		2
תאריך וזמן הנכונ:		חל: מצפ"א, מע"ח, תח"ד
כס' פרוק:	יועץ רוה"מ לחקשורת, יועץ שהביט לחקשורת, לע"מ	דצ:
תפסרת: בטוון נו יורק	תח"ן/קטי"ח, דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק	
47 295 388		פחות: צמות וושינגטון

אמ"ק

תדרוך דובר כחפ"ד ליום June 16, 1989

Q Do you have any comment on Israel's closing down the 'Holy Land News Service run by Dr. Nusseibeh in --

MS. TUTWILER: Yes, I do. We are disturbed by actions such as this at a time when Israel has put forth a positive and constructive initiative aimed at reaching out to Palestinians. It's hard to see how this step can be helpful. In general, both sides should refrain from actions that run counter to the need for Israelis and Palestinians to build a dialogue. Moreover, we strongly support freedom of the press everywhere in the world. If Mr. Nusseibeh is believed to have engaged in illegal activities, he should be afforded an appropriate open judicial proceeding.

Q Don't you think -- don't you see that this is rather strange, you know, that this -- these pressures has been escalating of cracking down on Palestinian activists or people who could have a very serious role in the peace process, like Mr. Nusseibeh and others?

MS. TUTWILER: I think I just answered that.

Q Will you raise the subject today with the Justice Minister of Israel, who is meeting Mr. Kimmitt?

MS. TUTWILER: He's also met with Secretary Baker and I don't know if the topic was raised or not.

Q What's a Justice Minister doing meeting with the Secretary of State? I thought --

MS. TUTWILER: The Secretary of State meets with all types of officials from all types of countries.

Q Is there any justice problem between Israel and the United States? Or what did they discuss? Can you tell us?

MS. TUTWILER: It's no different than any number of officials

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including the name 'KESHAR-WASHINGTON' and other illegible text.

47 - 295 - 388

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Q Are you able to say anything more today about the meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union at the expert level on the Middle East?

MS. TUTWILER: No, I re-checked that and apparently it really is the policy here not to do readouts after experts meetings. The meetings were constructive yesterday, I can tell you that, because I talked to Dennis this morning; and they're again meeting today. And that was all they were scheduled to do.

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דף: 1 תתוך: 4	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	זתיפות: מיידי
		סוג: שמור
אל: מצפ"א, משה"ח; מקשיח/משהביט	תאריך וזמן תעבור: 16 ביוני 1989 15:30	
דצ: יסנה צה"ל, טאן. האש"ן, ת"ו-ו"ר	כס' פרוק: הפסדי: 400	כמות: ק/ק לקונגרס
	כסאון 318 משן 76	

10/10

ביה"ב: חוק כספי הפנטגון (הרשות)

סאספין

1) גיו"ר הוועדה לשירותים מזויינים (המכהן גם כיו"ר הוועדה להצטיידות) הודיע באמצע השבוע הזה שהוא דוגל במדיניות של "NO-ADDS" (כלומר, מדיניות של "אין תוספות" בכל הקשור להצטיידות בטחונות).

2) לעיונכם, רצ"ב הודעה לעיתונות בנדון, יחד עם מנכ"ל שאספין הפיץ לחברי מליאת הוועדה.

3) אספין יכנס את ועדת המשנה שלו ביום ג', ה-20.6, ובכוונתו לדרוש הצבעה על העיקרון של "NO ADDS".

4) לדברי עוזרו, וורן נלסון, אם אספין יזכה, כל הנושאים שלנו יהיו בסדר, למעט נושא רכישת ה-TALD (השימשונים) כי כידוע חיל-הים האמריקאי לא רשט בקשה בנושא זה לשתיי 90 בעת הגשת הצעת הממשל לחקציב הפנטגון. לאחר מכן הגישו אמנם בקשה, אבל מאחר וזו איננה חלק אינטגרלי של הבקשה הרשמית, היא נחשבת כ-ADD-ON.

5) מאידך אם הצעת אספין לא תתקבל, יתכנו ADD-ONS בתנאי שהם בבחינת REVENUE NEUTRAL. כך תהיינה התוצאות פרדוקסליות מבחינתנו:
א- הבקשות להצטיידות ב-CLNAS בשתיי 90 ודוגמאותיהן יצאו ליפול קורבן לצורך להשאר במסגרת ה-REVENUE NEUTRAL.
ב- לעומת זאת, הבקשה לרכישת המששונים לשתיי 90 תתקבל כ-ADD-ON.

6) יצויין שהבקשה למויפ עבור TALD-F (המששונים המשופרים) בסך של 6 מיליון \$ (שהוגשה אף היא באיחור) לא תידון ע"י וועדת המשנה של אספין אלא ע"י תת הוועדה למויפ, בהקשר הקונגרסון רונלד דלאמס. לפיכך איננה קשורה לגזרה הנייל שאספין רוצה לאמץ בכל הקשור להצטיידות וייתכן איפוא שבקשה זו תתקבל.

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תפוצה: 2/1 סשה, 3/1 נהא, 1/1 מחרהא, 1/1 מוא, 1/1 האש, 2/1 מלפ, 1/1 מרה

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4/4

Chairman Les Aspin

News Release

House Armed Services Committee

2120 Rayburn House Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20515

FOR RELEASE: Wednesday, June 14, 1989. IMMEDIATE
For further information, contact Warren Nelson (202) 225-2191

ASPIN PROPOSES NO-ADDS APPROACH FOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT

WASHINGTON -- Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) of the House Armed Services Committee today said he was proposing that the committee adopt a no-adds policy this year for the defense procurement budget.

Aspin, who is chairman of the Procurement Subcommittee as well as the full committee, made the proposal in a memorandum distributed to committee members today.

A copy of the memo is attached.

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CHARLES E. BENNETT, FLORIDA
 G. V. SONNY MONTGOMERY, MISSISSIPPI
 RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIFORNIA
 PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLORADO
 BEVERLY S. BYRON, MARYLAND
 NICHOLAS MAVROULES, MASSACHUSETTS
 EARL HUTTO, FLORIDA
 IKE SKELTON, MISSOURI
 MARVIN LEATH, TEXAS
 DAVE MCCURDY, OKLAHOMA
 THOMAS M. FODLIETTA, PENNSYLVANIA
 ROY DYSON, MARYLAND
 DENNIS M. HERTEL, MICHIGAN
 MARLYN LLOYD, TENNESSEE
 NORMAN SISISKY, VIRGINIA
 RICHARD RAY, GEORGIA
 JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA
 FRANK MCCLOSKEY, INDIANA
 SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, TEXAS
 GEORGE (BUDDY) DARDEN, GEORGIA
 TOMMY F. ROBINSON, ARKANSAS
 ALBERT G. BUSTAMANTE, TEXAS
 GEORGE J. HOCHBAUECKNER, NEW YORK
 JOSEPH E. BARNHART, MAINE
 OWEN S. PICKETT, VIRGINIA
 H. MARTIN LANCASTER, NORTH CAROLINA
 LANE EVANS, ILLINOIS
 JAMES H. BILBRAY, NEVADA
 JOHN TANNER, TENNESSEE
 MICHAEL R. McNULTY, NEW YORK

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 Washington, DC 20315
 ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS
 LES ASPIN, WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN

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 JIM MICRERY, LOUISIANA
 RONALD K. MACINTOSH, KENTUCKY

G. KIM WINCUP, STAFF DIRECTOR

June 14, 1989

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Members of the Committee
 FROM: Chairman Les Aspin
 RE: How to deal with Add-Ons

The long-awaited markup is about to begin. Your offices have been notified of the current schedule. My purpose in this memo is to outline for all Members of the committee a proposal I plan to bring to a vote next week in the Procurement Subcommittee and, if approved, to the Full Committee thereafter.

Next Tuesday, June 18, in the Procurement Subcommittee mark, I will move at the opening that we adopt the Cheney Procurement Title as submitted -- i.e., with no add-ons.

I have decided to take this somewhat unorthodox approach for several reasons.

First, while the Cheney budget lacks a true strategic underpinning, we are in no position this year to impose a strategic vision of our own. We are in a period of ferment. We're waiting to see if the Gorbachev initiatives really pan out. And the entire country is still sorting through how to respond in that case. In essence, this is an interim budget.

Second, while the budget may not be perfect, it's a darn good product -- especially given the 39 days Dick Cheney had to put it together. He deserves an up-or-down vote. And, in his first year in office, I think he deserves a vote of confidence. Many of us were critical of the Weinberger budgets for their failure to set priorities, terminate marginal programs or emphasize economic order quantities. Dick Cheney has taken a remarkable first step.

Third, I have received requests for more than \$6 billion in add-ons -- but there's no room for even the deserving add-ons, let alone the ones

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that go oink. In previous years, budget submissions have been packed with filler -- often \$5 billion to \$10 billion worth -- that we could slice off and replace with more deserving programs. But Dick Cheney did what we usually do. He has scrubbed the budget of those inflated discretionary management funds, contract savings, unexecutable programs and other dollars we used to shake out of the budget tree. To insert any volume of add-ons this year would require the wholesale axing of requested items that are defensible military requirements and that have substantial political support in the House.

Therefore, I will move at the opening of the Procurement Subcommittee mark Tuesday that we adopt the Cheney Procurement Title as submitted. That will be the only order of business in this session. In adopting the Cheney Procurement Title, I am referring to the dollars; we would consider at another session any and all language amendments that Members have to offer.

Should the Procurement Subcommittee approve this motion Tuesday, I will then call a Full Committee session the next day solely to take up the Procurement Title's dollar items. The other subcommittees will not all have finished their markups at this point. My reason for this schedule is to see if the Full Committee will support the no-adds approach for the Procurement Title. If not, the Procurement Subcommittee will return to work Thursday to consider a chairman's mark that will pinpoint add-ons to be added on and cut-offs to be cut off.

During the following week, on Tuesday and Wednesday, we will schedule the Full Committee complete markup. If the no-adds approach was approved the previous week, this Full Committee session will receive the Procurement Subcommittee's report on language items and on DoE programs as well as all the other subcommittee reports. If the no-adds approach was rejected the previous week, this Full Committee session will take up the usual package of Procurement Subcommittee reports -- dollars, language and DoE.

This is admittedly an unorthodox approach, albeit not unheard of. I will be supporting the no-adds policy for the reasons outlined above. I will not be twisting any arms or concocting any deals, however. I simply await the Members' judgment on whether they prefer to have me put together a chairman's mark or like the concept of going with a no-add policy for this one unique year.

In any event, Ron Dellums and I will schedule a joint session of the two subcommittees to iron out projects that are splayed over the two subcommittees. This will not be a joint markup, but rather an informal meeting designed to keep our two subcommittees from going in different directions. You may recall two years ago when one subcommittee voted full speed ahead on the Seawolf while another voted to fund a search for a Seawolf alternative.

KS 3/

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דף: 2	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דתיפות:
כתובת: 5		סוג:
אל:		תאריך וזמן תגובה:
דצ:		כס' פרוק: הפסד:
כמות:		2/3 374

ערב מתחמשות באופן מסוכן ביותר (טקייקים, גשק כימי וכיו"ב). היהודים הינם
 Fixated בנושא האיגתיפאדה, אך ברגע מצביעים שינויים במאזן הכוחות במזה"ת,
 משתנה טון הויכוח. לדעתו, על כולנו לעשות עבודה טובה יותר בהסבירנו את האיגתיפאדה
 אך בו זמנית עלינו להצביע על האחדות וההתחמשות הערבית התולכת והגוברת. אייטאייק
 מכין נייר וטבלאות בעניין זה ויעשה מאמץ להפיק תועלת נרחבת ומירבית מכלים אלה.

(ב) אשר: חזר לדברי השגריר, עבור שאייפאייק מבין היטב מה עליו לעשות עי"מ לקדם את
 ווהליך השלום. השאלה העקרית היא: האם יש שותף לישראל? זו המטרה והיימטריה"
 שותחיה עלינו לפעול.

בנושא אחר, שאל לעמדתנו בדבר האפשרות של חלוקה מוקדמת של ה-FMS (בדומה לחלוקה
 המוקדמת של ה-ESF). השגריר הבהיר את התנגדותנו לרעיון זה (המצריך חקיקה מיוחדת)
 בשלב זה, ונימק את עמדתנו בחתום לסיכום הדיון בנדון שהתקיים לא מזמן בשגרירות
 בהשתתפות מנכ"ל בטחון ומנכ"ל אוצר (ראו-נא הסיכום בדיפי האחרון מאת יהודית
 זרבגר). בתגובה העיר דין שאם כך עמדתנו, על אייפאייק לרדת מחעניין - לעייע
 לפחות.

(ג) רוזן: הועניין לגבי נסיון אפשרי מצד ערפאת להשתתף בעצרת הכללית הבאה של האו"ם
 כ"נשיא מדינה". השגריר השיב שנתנגד לנסיון כזה. מכאן השיחה התפתחה בכיוון
 המאבקים האחרים עם אשי"פ העומדים על הפרק (ILO, אונסקו, אמנת ג'נבה) והשגריר
 מסר עיזכונים.

(ד) רוזן: שאל לגבי כוונתנו בחתום ההתנחלויות. השגריר הטביר את עמדתנו עי"פ ההסכם
 הקואליציוני.
 בעקבות זאת ובתשובה לשאלה נוספת מלוי, העיר ארד שככל הנראה טרם החליט הנמשל באם
 לחזור למדיניות קרטרי בנושא ההתנחלויות (כאשר טענו שההתנחלויות הן בלתי-חוקיות).

תפוצה:

דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 3
סוג:		כתוב: 13
תאריך ושם תכנון:		חל:
כס' פרויקט:		דצ:
תפסרז:		פאות:
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כיום הונגדותם הינה פוליטית ויש לקוות שלא יאמצו את הגישה הלגליסטית ששררה בימי קרטור, בינתיים, מאז וקופה זו, הנמצב בשטח השתנה וכיום נמצאים ביו"ש כ-80,000 יהודים שהם כ-10-8 אחוזים מהאוכלוסייה הכוללת. לא עולה על הדעת שממשלה ישראלית ללשהי, אם בראשות הליכוד או כל מפלגה אחרת, תסכים למניעת השארות התושבים הישראליים בהתנחלויות ובמרכזים העירוניים בישיע. הווה אומר, כל פתרון קבוע, יוזא מה שיהא, יהיה קביל רק בתנאי שהוא מאפשר המשך הנכחות היהודית בישיע ותנועה חספסית לישראלים באיזורים אלה, כך הדין לגבי שתי המפלגות הגדולות בארץ. לנושא זה השלכות למערכת היחסים בין ישראל וארה"ב בטווח הארוך ויש לקוות שלא יהיה לאבן בוטן למערכת היחסים האלה, כשלעצמו, הוסיף השגריר, אינו יודע מה מקור הייובסטייה" זו אצל הנשיא. ייתכן ששורשיה בתקופה שבוש שרת כשגריר ארה"ב ליד האוי"ם, אך העניין פיזוט לא מובן. שומעיו לא ידעו להשכילנו, ולוי העיר שיש מעין חידוש בעמדת בוש-*ITS AN INSERT*, כדבריו (רוצה לומר, מישתו "הכניס לו לראשי").

(ה) לוי המשיך וביקש לדעת מה עושה השגרירות כלפי הארגונים היהודיים שנחננו בטוי לזעתם שנאום בייקר לא היה כל כך רע. השגריר מסר על שיחותיו עם נציגי ה - AJC, ה - AJ. CONG (הרב שינדלר ואנשיו. כ"כ מסר על הופעתו בשבוע שעבר בפני מועדון הנשיאים, כאשר קרא לאחדות השורות בתוך הקהילה היהודית ולתמיכות הווזקה ביוזמת השלוט. לוי ברך על מאמצים אלה באומר שלמנהיגים היהודים שלא הסתייגו מנאום בייקר יש להם "RELEVANCE" (מעמד) כלפי ישראל מקרב הציבור הרחב, ורק שגרירות ישראל יכולת להשפיע עליהם. דיין הפטיר שמעולט לא היה זמן שליכוד השורות יפה לו כשעה זו.

אסף זילבר
למדן

0.0

תפסרז:

דתיקות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
סוג: שמור		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן חבירה: 1989 9189 יוני 132100		אל: מצפ"א, ממייד
כס' פרוק: הפסיד:		דע: _____
295		כאז: ק/ק לקונגרס

ארכיב "א"

אשי"פ ומכתב 95 הסנטורים

להלן ממקור "יודע דבר":

מכתב 95 הסנטורים בא לאשי"פ בתוניס כהפתעה מרה. העריכו שב-18 החדשים האחרונים מעמד ישראל בסנט ניזוק והתמיכה בנו נחלשה עד מאד. לפיכך הופתעו לגמרי ואף היו המומים מהפגנת הכוח שבמכתב הסנטורים ומהתמיכה ביוזמה הישראלית המקופלת בו.

י. א. ל. למדן

שנה סמטה יבוצו דמיה דאלו דאנא דאנא דאנא דאנא דאנא

תפוצה: 36

דף: -	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דתיפות: רגיל
סתיו:		סוג: בלמיט
אל: מצפ"א, כלכלית	תאריך ויפן חגור: 131900 יוני 1989	
דע: א. דברת, אוצר	כס' פרוק: הפסד:	
פאת: ק. לקונגרס	291 1/3	

אחתה

ביה"ב: חוק כספי סיוע חוץ (הרשאות)

MARK-up

1. היום, 13/6 המשיכה ועדת החוץ ב-

2. הקונגרסמן טוריסלי הגיש תיקון בנושא חרם מסחרי או חרם המוטל על ידי מדינות זרות כנגד מדינות זידותיות לארה"ב או כל ישות אמריקנית. בדברי ההסבר שלו להצעת התיקון, התייחס טוריסלי לחרם הערבי כנגד ישראל והסביר כי כשם שהקונגרס מבקש דיווח שנתי על הפרת זכויות אדם כך בכוונתו לבקש בהצעת התיקון דיווח שנתי ממזכיר הסחר על מדינות הממשיכות במדיניות החרם הערבי כלפי ישראל. הסיבות לדברי טוריסלי לתיקון:
 - א. אין מדיניות זו הוגנת כלפי ישראל מבחינה כלכלית.
 - ב. אין זה הוגן כלפי חברות אמריקניות (המוחרמות כתוצאה ממדיניות זו בשווקים זרים).
 - הקונגרסמנים לוויין ומילר תמכו בטוריסלי וביקשו מחברי הועדה לתמוך בתיקון חשוב זה. הצעת התיקון התקבלה ללא כל התנגדות.
3. רצויב הצעת התיקון אשר כפי שתוכלו לראות נוסחה באופן כללי מבלי להזכיר ישראל מפורשות.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

לה סמרה רחא דארד אונס דאונס כוזלה זילא כין זר

תפוצה: -24-

13/6

TORRIC103

2/3 291

127) 071
188 228
139 177

AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN AID COMMITTEE
PRINT DATED MAY 22, 1989
OFFERED BY MR. TORRICELLI

Page 549, add the following after line 24:

1 SEC. 1303. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH FOREIGN BOYCOTTS.

2 (a) POLICY.--

3 (1) IN GENERAL.--In accordance with other provisions
4 of law, it is the policy of the United States to oppose
5 restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or
6 imposed by foreign countries against other countries
7 friendly to the United States or against any United
8 States person.

9 (2) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES.--It is
10 further the policy of the United States to encourage the
11 major trading nations of the world engaged in the export
12 of goods or technology or other information to refuse to
13 take actions, including furnishing information or
14 entering into or implementing agreements, which have the
15 effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade
16 practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by any foreign
17 country or association of foreign countries against a
18 country friendly to the United States or against any
19 United States person.

XXX

1 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.--The Secretary of Commerce
2 shall issue an annual report detailing the extent to which
3 members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
4 encourage actions, including the furnishing of information or
5 entering into or implementing agreements, which have the
6 effect of furthering or supporting boycotts fostered or
7 imposed by any foreign country or association of foreign
8 countries against a country friendly to the United States or
9 against any United States person.

XXX

דתיקות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קף:
סוג:		פרק:
תאריך וזמן תכנון:		חל:
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		פאת:
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דנא). ארח"ב בדעה שעל הטובייטים לחדש את היחסים הדיפלומטיים עם ישראל. היא תקווה גם שהטובייטים יפצירו בערבים לעיין ברצינות בהצעות הישראליות.

4. בנפרד קטעים מתוך ההתבטאות הכתובה של הייר. קהתבטאות במלאה, יחד עם ההתבטאות הכתובה של אדלמן, בדיפי היוצא מחר (14.6).

5. תמליל השימועים יהיה מוכן בתחילת השבוע הבא. נעיין בו ומידת הנחוץ, עוד נדווח.

יוסף ארנב
למדן

תפוצה:



מזכירות הממשלה

4
הענין מס' 1

ירושלים, י"ג בסיון התשמ"ט
16 ביוני 1989

ס ו ד י

אל : ראש הממשלה ✓

מאת: מזכיר הממשלה

אלהים

שלום רב,

הנדון: עמדת ארה"ב בקשר למדינה פלסטינאית

שאלתי את שגריר ארה"ב בראון (15.6) מה עמדתם לאשורה בנושא זה, כיוון שיש החשים אי-בטחון בנחישות גישתם וחוששים מסחף. אמר כי העמדה היא שהם מתנגדים למדינה פלסטינאית (בלא תוספות כמו "בשעה זו").

הם מוסיפים אמנם לעתים שאם הצדדים יגיעו להסכם שונה - בבקשה, אך עמדתם ברורה. עוד הזכיר כי הוא עצמו אמר זאת במפורש לבני שיחו בעזה, והוסיף - כפי שדווח - כי אינם תומכים גם ב"הגדרה עצמית" כיון שהיא, בהקשר דנן, "מלת קוד" למדינה.

בברכה,

אליקים רובינשטיין

העתק: מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה



מזכירות הממשלה

ירושלים, י"א בסיון התשמ"ט
14 ביוני 1989

ס ד י

אחמה

אל: ראש הממשלה ✓
שר החוץ

מאת: מזכיר הממשלה

הנדון: שיחה עם השגריר בראון

בראון בא לבקשתו לשיחה קצרה.

א. מסר שהעביר תשובה מהמזכיר בייקר לשר החוץ ארנס למכתב שר החוץ בעקבות הנאום באיפא"ק - הגדיר את התשובה כבאה לפייס (הראה לי את נוסח המכתב; שמתי לב שאין התייחסות לשלוש הנקודות האחרות שביוזמה, מלבד הבחירות). הוסיף בע"פ שאין זה נכון שארה"ב נוקטת גישת "איזון" בינינו לאש"פ.

ב.1. דיווח על פגישתו בעזה עם פאיז אבו רחמה, ד"ר זכרי ורופא נוסף (חיידר אל-שאפעי) שאמר שאינו זוכר את שמו, במסעדת הדגים "ספינת האהבה".

2. השיחה נמשכה שעתיים. לדבריו טען באוזניהם שאין ארה"ב רוצה לתקוע טריז בין הפלסטינאים שביו"ש ועזה לבין אלה שמחוצה להן, אך "ראו מה הפסדתם בכך שלא הצטרפתם לחו"מ האוטונומיה בשעתו; האם מצבכם לא היה טוב לאין שיעור"? הוסיף באוזניהם, בתשובה לשאלות, כי ארה"ב אמנם בדרך כלל מראשי המדברים בעד הגדרה עצמית, אך זו אינה עמדתה בנושא הפלסטינאי כיוון שהיא רואה מושג זה כמשמיע מדינה פלסטינאית עצמאית שהיא אינה תומכת בה. הזכיר כי אמנם ערפאת אמר מה שאמר (242 וכו') אך ישנם ג'בריל ואחרים, והישראלים חוששים מתכניות הפלסטינאים. כמו כן אינו רואה חיות כלכלית למדינה פלסטינאית עצמאית. אחד העזתים אמר שסאדאת הבטיח לערפאת בשעתו שטח נוסף עד אל-עריש.

ג. באשר לעניין חופש הבחירות שאותו העלו העזתים, אמר בראון כי הבחירות המוניציפליות ב-1972 ו-1976 הוכיחו את היכולת לקיימן כהלכה, ובנוסף, יהיה צבא של עתונאים ואחרים שיבטיח חופש הבחירות. שאלו אם ישראל לא תעצור אחר כך את הנבחרים. כן דיברו על נסיגה ישראלית ממרכזי אוכלוסייה. מכל מקום, בראון חש אצלם תסכול רב.

ד. כשלעצמו הסביר להם לדבריו באריכות את הצורך להיות פתוחים ליוזמה הישראלית. הכחיש באוזני כי אמר להם שעליהם לקבל את היוזמה ב"תיקונים" כפי שפורסם בעתון. לדבריו הם מבינים כי שגו בעבר בדחיית יוזמות שונות, אך אינו יכול לומר שמקבלים את המוצע עתה.

ה. שאלתי האם דובר בנושא הפליטים. לא השיב ישירות אך ציין שמדיניות ארה"ב במקומות שונים בעולם בנושאי פליטים היתה שישובו למקומם ומכאן אחד הקשיים לעסוק בכך במתכונת הנחוצה כאן; הבינותי מהדברים שבני-שיחו דיברו על זכות השיבה ואמרו שמחילא רק מעטים ישובו. באשר לעצם תביעתנו לעסוק בנושא הפליטים, הזכיר כי איגלברגר נמצא בימים אלה בג'נבה בוועידה בנושא פליטי הודו-סין (ראו נא המצ"ב), והוא - בראון - הציע פנימית במחמ"ד שיעניינו את איגלברגר (משרכש מודעות לנושא כזה) גם בנושא פליטי יו"ש ועזה. שאלתי אם אין מקום ששגרירנו בארה"ב יפנה לאיגלברגר בשובו בהקשר לכך. אמר שכן, אך "בצורה נינוחה". מומלץ כי אכן תהיה פניה.

ו. נושא אחר שהזכיר בראון היה טענת התושבים לענישה קולקטיבית (נושאי דיג). אני מבין שהעלה זאת גם עם ראש המינהל האזרחי ברצועה.

ז. בראון אמר שכדעתו להמשיך במגעים עם פלסטינאים בעזה וגם הלך במחנות הפליטים. הוא עצמו לדבריו "אתנו", ואל נא נקדיש יתר תשומת לב לפרסומים כאלה ואחרים.

לידיעה.

כ ב ר כ ה,
א. ס. א. מ.
ב/אליקים דובינשטיין

העתק: חנכ"ל משרד ראש המחשלה

SLNE2110613 BT*nea211 06/13/89
U.S. WOULD RESETTLE UP TO HALF OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES
(Article on Eagleburger remarks to conference) (670)
By Robin Neumann
USIA European Correspondent

Geneva -- Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger says the United States will resettle up to half of the world's Indochinese refugees, but he warns that the flow will not cease "until Vietnam reforms its system."

Eagleburger made the remarks in a speech on the first day of the June 13-14 International Conference on Indochinese Refugees (ICIR), which was called by the United Nations -- under the auspices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) -- to seek a solution to the recent upsurge in boat people fleeing Vietnam and landing in neighboring first-asylum countries in Southeast Asia.

"We all must remain steadfast in our common commitment to provide funding and resettlement, and to stand together as partners in finding an effective solution to this continuing tragedy," Eagleburger told conference participants, including Vietnam.

He called for the adoption of the draft Comprehensive Plan of Action before the conference. The plan calls upon first asylum countries providing temporary refuge to grant a safe haven to all asylum seekers, whether they arrive by boat or overland from Vietnam; for resettlement countries to continue to resettle bona fide refugees (those meeting the conditions of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees -- essentially that they fear persecution if returned to their countries); and for Vietnam to facilitate voluntary repatriation and expand the emigration of those of its citizens qualifying for orderly departure programs (legal means of leaving Vietnam).

"By adopting here and now this humanitarian and practical plan of action, we will have embraced the beginning of a solution to one of the most appallingly difficult problems of our times," Eagleburger said.

For its part, he said, over the next three years the United States will resettle 22,000 of the 52,000 Vietnamese refugees in first asylum countries in mid-March this year. In addition, the United States anticipates being able to accept "up to 50 percent" of Indochinese arriving after that date as long as they are determined to be refugees.

The plan endorses the screening of new asylum seekers to determine if they are genuine refugees -- and not persons fleeing for reasons other than persecution -- and provides for the eventual repatriation to their country of origin for those determined not to be refugees.

Eagleburger said Indochinese asylum seekers not found to be refugees "are ultimately the responsibility of their country of origin." But, he added, the United States is "unalterably opposed" to the involuntary or forced repatriation of asylum seekers until "dramatic improvements" occur in Vietnam's economic, political and social life.

"For more than a decade conditions in Vietnam have repelled large segments of its population," Eagleburger declared. Therefore, "To

Vietnam, we say: Accept responsibility for the well-being and human rights of your citizens. Initiate the reforms -- economic, social, and political -- that will encourage your people to remain in their cities and villages."

The deputy secretary of state also called on Vietnam to make orderly departure programs "truly viable" by agreeing to a target of at least 6,000 orderly departures per month and by granting all those eligible for orderly departure "the right to emigrate freely."

The orderly departure programs are essentially for those Vietnamese with relatives abroad. Since 1984 the United States has been calling for an expansion of the programs to include the resettlement in the United States of reeducation camp detainees and Amerasians (mixed American-Asians) and their family members.

The United States will continue to carry out its responsibilities toward Indochinese refugees "fully and generously," Eagleburger said. He noted that since the last Indochinese refugee conference in 1979, the United States has contributed over 500 million dollars to the care and support of Indochinese refugees, and thousands of millions of dollars in resettlement costs, and that since 1975 the United States has accepted 900,000 Indochinese refugees.

NNNN

בנצור

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, משפט, ליאור, מזתים,
כהן, כלכליתב', מתאסשטחים, אוצר, דברת, תמס, מנכלעבודה,
פרובין/ממרהמ, יועמש/עבודה

ΣΙΣΙΓ

ΕΗ

ΠΕ: ΩΠΠ, ΟΩΠΠ, ΑΙΣΤ, ΑΒΙΣΤ, ΣΙΣΙΓ, ΑΣΣΗ, Σ' ΕΣ, ΑΩΣΩ, Σ' ΗΙΓ, ΒΠΠ' Ο,
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ΘΓΙΕ' ΙΛΑΒΓΠΠ, ' ΓΑΑΩΛΑΙΣΙΤΠ

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סודי

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סודי - לעיניהם בלבד / מידי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"נ - לעיניהם בלבד

יועץ מדיני לשה"ח - לעיניהם בלבד

מאת: ציר - עודד ערן

מכתב הסנטורים.

אתמול הגיעו לווינינגטון בוב אשר ואד לוי ע"מ לטפל במכתב כאשר בקשתם היא שזה יהיה פרויקט שלהם ושאלנו בשגרירות לא נפעל להשגת חתימות במקביל. יחד עם טום דיין ואתסר קורץ הם נפגשו עם מספר סנטורים (מיטצ'ל בושביץ, לוין, דיקונסיני ואחרים). התגובה לרעיון המכתב ונוסחו כפי שהוא ידוע לכם היתה לפי בוב אשר עמו שוחחתי הבוקר, 'חלשה' כאשר הסנטורים טוענים שמכתב כזה עלול להקשיח את המזכיר ולאצו להתעכב על העמדות שבהן נקט בנאום. במהלך הפגישות הועלו רעיונות חדשים שאין תלות ביניהם :

1. מכתב של המנהיגות (מיטצ'ל ודול) לבייקר.

2. פגישה של מספר סנטורים (לוין, פקווד, ספקטר, אינויה, דיקונסיני) עם בייקר כאשר המטרה היא להעמידו על הנקודות שישנן ואינן בנאום ולומר שהשוואת ישראל לאש"פ אינה הדרך הנכונה להתייחס לבת ברית ישראל. בפגישה כזו יבקשו הסנטורים התייחסות פומבית של בייקר לנקודות שהם יעלו בפניו, תוך בקשה שהוא יכלול בה גם תמיכה בלתי מסוייגת ביוזמה הישראלית וקריאה לערבים לקבלה. בהקשר זה אוסיף שהושגו 78 חתימות בסנט על המכתב המברק יוזמת ישראל והיום

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הוא יוצא בליווי הודעה לעתונות.

בוב אשר בדעה שאם תהיה הענות חיובית של בייקר מה טוב ואם לאו הרי שגם בכך יהיה איתות ברור שיחייב לפחות את איפא'ק לפעולה נמרצת. הוא היה בדרכו הבוקר לפגישה עם מקס פישר ע'מ להביאו להסכים לפגישת המנהיגות היהודית עם בייקר בענין הנאום.

ערן

רד

תפ: שהח, בנצור

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF SUCH A MOVE, BUT WISH TO KNOW WHETHER LEGALLY SUCH AN OPINION COULD BE RENDERED EITHER AS THE BASIS FOR A NEW PROCLAMATION OR AS A BASIS FOR CONTINUING GSP TO THE TERRITORIES WITHOUT ISSUING A NEW PROCLAMATION.

מנהל משפט כללי

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, סי יבל, משפט, בנצור, מצפא, כהן,
כלכליתב', ליאור, מזתיים, מתאסשטיים, אוצר, דברת, תמס, מנכלעבודה,
רובין/ממרהמ, יועמש/עבודה

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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM



משרד החוץ
ירושלים

ח' סיוון תשמ"ט
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אל : תפוצת דף מצפ"א

מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

אני מבקש להפנות תשומת לבכם לשני הטכסטים המצורפים ולהמליץ על קריאתם:

א. דברי תום דיין בפני תת-הוועדה של ועדת ההקצבות בנושא הסיוע לישראל.

ב. עדותו הכתובה של תום דיין שנמסרה לוועדת החוץ של הסנט בנושא נשק כימי.

ב כ ה כ ה.

מיכאל שילה

Written Testimony

Controlling the Proliferation
of Chemical Weapons

Submitted to the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

by

Thomas A. Dine

Executive Director
American Israel Public Affairs Committee

May 9, 1989

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony on controlling the proliferation of chemical weapons, particularly in the Middle East region.

In recent years, a number of developments have taken place in the Middle East that threaten Israel's security and have justly moved the chemical weapons issue to the top of America's and the world's agenda.

First, several Arab states in the region - Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria - have developed the capability, aided by West European industrial firms, to wage chemical warfare. Apparently, their stocks of chemicals are sufficiently large so as to cause massive casualties if used against unprotected civilians in Israel's major population centers. Iraq, for example, is thought to be operating five chemical complexes that are capable of producing 50 tons of Tabun and Sarin nerve gas and 720 tons of mustard gas per year, while Libya is putting the finishing touches on a chemical weapons facility that will be capable of producing five tons of mustard gas daily.

Second, a number of these Arab nations have sought and are developing ballistic missile technology that will allow them to deliver their chemical warheads directly on Israeli territory. Using ballistic missiles armed with chemical warheads, Iraq

showed in its recent war with Iran how inaccurate but destructive these two technologies in combination can be. Given that there is at present no effective defense against missiles armed with chemical warheads, military planners in states considering using this capability are able to contemplate a high probability of incurring great death and destruction. And given that these weapons are inaccurate, unrecallable terror weapons -- in contrast to highly accurate counterforce systems -- they seriously increase the risk of pre-emptive strikes in a crisis.

Third, in the Iran-Iraq war, by using chemical agents, Iraq breached the ban against the use of chemical weapons that has existed since World War I. In so doing, Iraq, unfortunately, suffered only minimal condemnation from the world community. As a result, the use of poison gas now seems to have a legitimacy that it has not had during most of this century.

Together, these and associated other factors raise serious questions about what the spread of chemical weapons might mean for the security interests of Israel as well as those of the United States. Concerning Israel chemical weapons could be used against Israeli airbases and mobilization centers in the opening phases of an Arab offensive during a future conflict. And it would require only a few attacks with chemically-armed missiles to incur a high number of civilian casualties. While Egypt

possessed chemical weapons during the 1973 Middle East war, it opted not to employ them. Today, however, following the Iran-Iraq War and the spread of these new technologies around the Middle East, the situation might well be different in the event of hostilities. Certainly, the calculus regarding the costs and benefits stemming from their use by Arab states may well have changed in the minds of military planners in light of recent developments.

In the face of this dangerous situation, Israel's policy toward the use of chemical weapons is one of deterrence. The Government of Israel favors a chemical weapons-free zone in the Middle East and has made clear on a number of occasions that any use of chemical weapons against Israel would inflict the most serious consequences upon the perpetrator. At the same time, Israel has taken a variety of measures to defend itself from the dangers posed by chemical weapons in the hands of its enemies. Its intelligence community has stepped up the monitoring of Arab production capabilities. Israel has been forced to implement a comprehensive civil defense program to defend its population against chemical attack. Gas masks and other protective gear have been stockpiled and training is offered to the general public on the steps to be taken in the event of a chemical weapons attack. Further, a range of initiatives have been instituted at military facilities such as airbases so that operations can be sustained in a chemical environment. Finally, and perhaps most

significantly, the United States and Israel have embarked on a joint research project to develop an anti-tactical ballistic missile system. The so-called Arrow ATBM project, which has been underway for about a year, justly commands broad bipartisan support in the Congress. While still in the research and development stage, this joint ATBM project may prove to be a model for countries wishing to defend themselves against missiles with chemical warheads.

Given the growing threat from the spread of chemical weapons to American and Israeli interests, it is not surprising that both the U.S. Executive and Legislative branches have turned their attention to the problem in recent days. To his credit, George Bush highlighted the importance of this issue during the recent presidential campaign when he repeatedly made chemical weapons his highest arms control priority. In a September speech in Baltimore, candidate Bush observed:

"I thought we had banished forever the sight of human beings tortured by chemical warfare. The sight of a mother trying desperately to shield her child against the drifting winds of death. That's why an international effort to make sure

chemical weapons are never--never
used again will be at the top of my
agenda as president!"

And in a major campaign foreign policy address in Toledo in
October, Bush declared:

"I want to be known as the President who,
working with our allies, the Soviets and
others, led to the elimination of chemical
warfare and chemical weapons...if I'm elected
President, if I'm remembered for anything, it
would be this: A complete and total ban on
chemical weapons."

Since taking office, President Bush has usefully pursued
this issue on several fronts. He has attempted to tighten our
export control procedures regarding chemicals. He has supported
active U.S. participation in the Australia Group, the 19-member
grouping formed to try to control the spread of chemical weapons
and the 7-nation Missile Technology Control Regime designed to
stop the export of technologies that aid the building of
surface-to-surface missiles. Finally, the United States has

continued to pursue multilateral negotiations in Geneva to conclude a Chemical Weapons Convention aimed at prohibiting the development, production, possession and transfer of chemical weapons.

While these and other administration efforts are useful steps, more must be done on an urgent basis. For with every passing day, civilians in Israel and elsewhere are increasingly threatened by the spread of chemical weapons and possible attack, either by terrorists or by belligerent states. Accordingly, Congressional initiatives designed to prevent the spread and possible use of chemical weapons are critical. I commend this Committee, particularly Chairman Pell and Ranking Member Helms, for the leadership they have demonstrated on this issue.

Without analyzing here the pros and cons of all the different legislative initiatives recently introduced regarding chemical weapons, I believe that the United States ought to take the lead by enacting new legislation now to deal with this growing threat. Among other things, such legislation should:

- 1) Provide mandatory sanctions against nations that use chemical weapons;
- 2) Provide mandatory sanctions against companies and other suppliers of

materials and technology which aid
the proliferation of chemical
weapons;

- 3) Broaden and tighten export controls
on chemicals;
- 4) Encourage bilateral U.S.-Soviet
efforts to control chemical weapons
proliferation; and
- 5) Spur international efforts to
control the spread of chemical
weapons and ballistic missile
technology.

Allow me to say a word about these objectives. Concerning
sanctions, it is long overdue that the United States put some
teeth in its effort to get chemical weapons proliferation under
control. This effort should include sanctions against both those
nations that use chemical weapons and those companies and
individuals that aid the spread of related technologies. Only by
enacting mandatory sanctions will would-be chemical weapons
proliferators take seriously American concern over this issue.

On the matter of export controls, much more can be done than has been done thus far. During the Reagan Administration, tightening controls over the export of sensitive technology to Eastern Europe was a high priority effort. Tightening controls over the export of materiel applicable to chemical weapons production should be at least as high a priority item in the Bush Administration. West German and Japanese support for a Libyan chemical weapons plant and apparent American companies' support for an Iraqi missile plan underscore the need to strengthen international controls on the export of new technologies. Here, in addition to reorganizing our own export control efforts and initiating new international arms control efforts, we should encourage the building of a chemical weapons database similar to that used to keep track of the export of nuclear material worldwide.

If the superpowers are serious about bringing the global spread of chemical weapons under control, they must set a good example. For most of the postwar period, superpower cooperation regarding the development and transfer of chemical weapons materiel has been extremely unlikely, given divergent American and Soviet geopolitical interests. In the current era, such cooperation is at least conceivable. This is one area where the United States can and should make a greater effort to test

the Gorbachev regime's intentions. Why not press the Soviets to bear down on the Syrians, the Libyans and the Iraqis concerning chemical weapons?

On the international front, serious, new U.S. initiatives are needed to move forward the work of the Australia Group and also the Missile Technology Control Regime, two efforts that are useful but limited in scope and membership. Further, vigorous efforts should go forward in Geneva to try to complete a global ban on chemical weapons. For such a global ban to make sense, it would have to be global in character and adequately verifiable. Otherwise, such an agreement would increase incentives for would-be cheaters to violate the agreement, thus undermining deterrence and stability in such tense regions of the world as the Middle East. On the other hand, if global and verifiable, a Chemical Weapons Convention could create a framework that would usefully provide countries with strong international incentives to refrain from acquiring, producing, or transferring chemical weapons. Such a Convention could also bring into being an agreed-upon basis for international action against those countries which do not comply with the agreement.

The efforts that are outlined above are but first steps that the United States should take to deal with the growing chemical

weapons threat to the security of the United States and its friends such as Israel. Mr. Chairman, more must be done about this very serious problem and the sooner, the better. Chemical weapons must not be viewed in the Arab World or in the Third World generally as the weapons of the future.

STATEMENT BY
THOMAS A. DINE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (AIPAC)
BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS
APRIL 24, 1989

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify before this distinguished Subcommittee on behalf of aid to Israel. Appearing with me is Ms. Ester Kurz, AIPAC's Legislative Director. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) appreciates the opportunity to express its views on the proposed Foreign Assistance Act for FY 1990 and the importance to the United States of relations with Israel.

AIPAC is a domestic organization of American citizens who value a strong partnership between our country and Israel. On our Executive Committee sit the presidents of the 46 major American Jewish organizations representing more than four and one-half million active members throughout the United States.

The FY 1990 foreign assistance authorization request of the Administration reflects vital needs for U.S. foreign policy. It addresses current circumstances in key global spots and it tries to redress some of the cuts in the 150 budget function over recent years. Foreign assistance is only a tiny fraction of the overall federal budget. Cuts in foreign aid will not meaningfully contribute to the attainment of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit target. Cuts in foreign assistance will, however, cripple America's foreign policy goals.

Economic and military aid serves our national interest—both at home and abroad. We urge you to support full funding of the Administration's foreign assistance request. We urge you to preserve the Congressional prerogative to earmark. We urge you to vote for \$3.0 billion in economic and military aid to Israel.

The situation in the Middle East in general and in Israel in particular has remained troubled since I last testified on behalf of foreign aid a year ago. Therefore, it is especially important not to lose sight of basic facts. The United States has a particular moral and strategic interest in Israel, the one democracy and our only reliable ally in the Middle East. It is the only country in the region with meaningful free elections, a robust free press, checks and balances to prevent and correct abuses of authority, extensive protections for the rights of individuals and minorities, basic equality for women, and other safeguards and rights that are typical of a free society. On that score, the affinity between the United States and Israel was demonstrated last November when both countries went to the polls to elect new governments and an orderly transfer of power took place in Washington and Jerusalem. Voter turnout by the citizens of Israel, Jew and Arab, ranged in the area of 80 percent, among the highest rates in the democratic world.

Israel stands in sharp contrast to other countries of the region, which include feudal monarchies like Saudi Arabia, where power is permanently concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy princes and where average citizens are under constant surveillance by the religious police and internal security forces; dictatorships like Iraq, where the government has evicted as many as 500,000 Kurdish citizens from their homes in a raze-and-destroy campaign and used poison gas against its own citizens; or radical fundamentalist regimes like Iran, which terrorizes its minorities, suppresses its middle class, and, until last summer, routinely shipped off its youth to be slaughtered in war. The combination of extremism and fundamental Islam which Israel confronts each day in the region is best exemplified by the Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence against author Salman Rushdie—a threat which received widespread support throughout the Muslim world—because the novelist's views as expressed in fiction were deemed blasphemous.

In public opinion poll after poll for 41 years, when the American people have been asked what is known as the standard question about the Middle East, namely, "in the Middle East

situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations?" they have resoundingly reaffirmed their sympathy for the Jewish state and their conviction that Israel is a democratic ally whose security and well-being are vitally important to the United States. A *Washington Post/ABC News* poll released two weeks ago indicated that American support for Israel has reached an all-time high. Israel continues to enjoy a more than four-to-one advantage over the Arab states in the hearts of Americans. Clearly, Americans do not agree with all policies of the Government of Israel any more than they do with all the policies of our own government. But, a great majority of Americans support Israel's survival and defense and very few would want to tamper with the security assistance which is Israel's vital lifeline.

Indeed, the absolute amount of our aid to Israel is substantial. But it is comparatively one of the most cost-effective investments that the United States makes in support of its common interests. U.S. expenditures in support of our European allies in NATO, for example, are more than 40 times the size of our aid to Israel. And we get a good return on our money to Israel.

Mr. Chairman, since I last testified, the deep, broadbased partnership between the United States and Israel continued to flourish. The relationship between the United States and Israel is steadfast and strong.

Partners for Peace

First and foremost, Mr. Chairman, the United States and Israel are partners for peace. Last month we celebrated ten years of peace between Israel and Egypt, a peace mid-wifed by the United States. Indeed, the viability of that historic achievement was vividly demonstrated by Israel's recent relinquishment to Egypt of Taba, a flyspeck of territory in the Sinai, in accordance with the decision arrived at by an arbitration panel, a mechanism provided for in the U.S.-brokered treaty. Israel proved once again that it lives up to its commitments.

We are pleased to observe that the close consultation between the United States and Israel in the search for peace that was the hallmark of the outgoing Reagan Administration continues to serve as the model for the new Bush Administration. Prime Minister Shamir's visit to Washington proved a milestone. He offered an important substantive proposal for advancing the peace process—elections to be held in the West Bank and Gaza which would empower legitimate Palestinians to negotiate with Israel first over interim arrangements in the territories, followed by negotiations for a permanent agreement. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker recognized and highlighted the opportunities inherent in these ideas, signaling that they would serve as the focus of American efforts in the weeks ahead.

The two governments are agreed on the need for easing tensions between Israelis and Palestinians and for direct negotiations between Israel, the Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza, and the Arab states on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Both governments are in fundamental accord on the absolute necessity for a long-term transitional period to precede any final status solution. Moreover, Israeli Premier Shamir, Foreign Minister Arens and Finance Minister Shimon Peres, leader of the Labor Party, agree with the U.S. assessment that Jordan continues to have a key role to play in determining the future of the territories despite King Hussein's July 31, 1988, decision to disengage from the West Bank.

The ongoing violent demonstrations in the West Bank and Gaza lend added urgency to the search for peace. For 16 months, the uprising leadership has consistently advocated in its frequent manifestos to the local population—as in Calls Number 32 and 35 for example—throwing rocks, hurling molotov cocktails, wielding knives, and arson against the "Zionist enemy." As a democratic state in a hostile environment with enemies on three of its four borders and a hostile population under its control, faced with the threat of terrorism, Israel has groped for the most humane methods to control mob violence. The intifadah, or uprising, has been expensive for Israel. And, Israel's handling of the intifadah has been the focus of extraordinary media coverage sparking extensive criticism. To be sure, there are flaws in Israel's intifadah management. Israelis have been the first to point them out. But, as Israel's political and military leaders have repeatedly

pointed out, the bottom line is that the problem requires a political solution. As Prime Minister Shamir declared in the rose garden at the White House, "Our two governments are agreed that the status quo is not desirable and not satisfactory. None of us wants to see it continued."

To advance the peace process requires confidence-building measures on both sides. This was the logic behind the series of tangible measures to improve the quality of life for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza on which the U.S. and Israeli governments cooperated closely since 1983. These measures, which had originally been coupled with King Hussein's ambitious West Bank development plan, were directed toward nurturing a stable Palestinian leadership in the territories with a stake in coexistence with Israel and Jordan. Such projects could become an integral part of future transitional arrangements in the territories in the peace process. AIPAC strongly supports increased U.S. funding for such measures and calls upon our European allies and Japan to contribute substantially as well.

In the final analysis, however, as President Bush eloquently implored during the Premier's visit, "no political process can succeed in a political vacuum....The Palestinians, the Arab states and other interested parties must demonstrate that they too are willing to make peace a reality." Israel's neighbors—the Palestinians in the territories and the surrounding Arab states—must, as Egypt did years ago, demonstrate their commitment to live in peace with the Jewish state.

It is in this context that one must evaluate the initiation of a "substantive dialogue" between the United States and the PLO on the basis of certain rhetorical formulations by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat in December 1988. The key question, however, is one of substance not semantics. The PLO needs to take tangible steps towards peace, in recognition of Israel and the renunciation of terrorism, to be considered a constructive party to any discussions. Among the concrete measures for the PLO to take would be: abandoning "armed struggle" in all its forms—including an end to disturbances in the West Bank and Gaza; disbanding the terror network under Arafat's control; amending the PLO Covenant, which calls for the "elimination of Zionism in Palestine"; ceasing demands for a Palestinian state before peace talks; abandoning the "strategy of phases," which seeks the elimination of Israel and the overthrow of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan stage by stage; and, ending the onslaught of anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations. This is the time for Arab states, like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq to publicly call for peace with Israel and put an end to the Arab economic boycott of Israel.

But instead of pursuing confidence-building measures, the PLO has pursued confidence-eroding measures. Within weeks of "renouncing terrorism" in Geneva to satisfy U.S. conditions, Arafat threatened Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij with "ten bullets in the chest" for proposing a truce in the territories. The PLO and the uprising leadership have continued to call for physically intimidating or assassinating those believed to cooperate with Israel. In the last 12 months, dozens of residents of the West Bank and Gaza have been murdered by their fellow Palestinians.

Moreover, Arafat-aligned factions of the PLO have participated in nine abortive terrorist attacks against Israel since Arafat's Geneva proclamation. Not a single member of the PLO—not Arafat, not his deputies—said a public word denouncing any of these incidents. In fact, Faruq Qaddumi, known as the PLO's "foreign minister," declared, "The PLO is not prepared to condemn operations which any Palestinian organization or faction undertakes." At the outset, President Reagan warned that if the PLO failed to live up to its word, the United States "would certainly break off communications." The PLO must match its deeds to its words for the U.S.-PLO dialogue to continue.

As for the Arab states, in October 1988, all the Arab states, save Egypt, voted to expel Israel from the United Nations, including Jordan and Morocco. In November, Saudi Arabia and Qatar joined forces with Syria to oust Israel from the International Telecommunications Union. And, the Arab boycott of Israel, led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, continues unabated.

Nevertheless, we are confident of the abilities of the Bush Administration, with the backing of Congress, together with the Government of Israel to vigorously pursue peace.

Strategic Partners

But to achieve peace and maintain it requires strength, particularly in the Middle East where the forces of radicalism must be deterred. In this area, too, the United States and Israel are strategic allies. Both countries have strengthened and enhanced each other's military posture.

Israel's status as a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States was made permanent last year with the removal of a requirement for annual review. This is a significant step forward in the strategic relationship. It will continue to enable the two nations to expand the scope of strategic cooperation. This is not an area of special benefits, grants or loans. Rather, it is a logical extension of the alliance which has blossomed since November 1983 when the United States and Israel enunciated the policy of expanding cooperation, particularly joint military planning and exercises, to meet threats to mutual interests in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean.

On April 21, 1988, the United States and Israel signed an historic Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) institutionalizing the strategic cooperation agreements of the past five years. The MOA serves as a fundamental building block in our strategic partnership with Israel, which has to date been broad and wide ranging. In the words of former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci during his visit to Israel this past November, military relations between the United States and Israel "could not be better." This was reiterated by another Pentagon official who said "together we have achieved more in the last eight years to evolve (the) spirit of cooperation than at any other period in the history of our relationship."

Israel has participated in joint naval exercises with the Sixth Fleet designed to strengthen U.S. antisubmarine warfare capabilities in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. It continues to provide access to its ports for regular ship visits by the Sixth Fleet. Indeed, when the President ordered a naval task force to the Persian Gulf in 1987, elements of that fleet, led by the carrier USS John F. Kennedy, called on the port at Haifa. As recently as last week, Sixth Fleet carriers were being serviced there. U.S. naval operations in the Gulf have been greatly assisted by use of the Israeli-made "Pioneer" remotely-piloted vehicle deployed on the battleship U.S.S. Iowa. This pilotless drone has proved instrumental in conducting reconnaissance and surveillance, and has been described as a "tremendous success" by the Navy.

Israel makes facilities available for the storage and maintenance of U.S. materiel for American use in a conflict. It provides Kfir aircraft at no charge to the U.S. Marine's Aggressor Squadron to help train American fighter pilots. It has provided access to bombing ranges in the Negev desert for training exercises for U.S. Navy fighter pilots. It has engaged in military training exchanges with the U.S. Marines. It has staged joint military exercises with American special anti-terrorist forces. These cooperative military efforts have proved mutually beneficial and will be continued and expanded as the overall strategic relationship continues to grow.

Israel has entered into formal arrangements to provide access to its sophisticated hospital facilities for U.S. military casualties in a conflict. These facilities have already been used to treat U.S. personnel injured in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy Annex in east Beirut in 1983 and on several other occasions.

Israel has shared with the United States the lessons of its combat experience in Lebanon, where Israel successfully used American equipment against Soviet weapons. It has undertaken joint research and development projects with the Pentagon to build on the technological expertise acquired from decades of conflict. In December 1987, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Defense Minister Rabin signed a Memorandum of Understanding enhancing Israel's ability to participate in joint defense R & D efforts with the U.S. The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines continue to express great interest in testing and procurement of Israeli defense systems. Indeed, Israeli technology accounted for over half of the funds in FY88 for evaluation of items from Major Non-NATO Allies.

Israel is also one of only a few countries—including Great Britain, West Germany, and Japan—to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on mutual threat and the benefits of cooperation and shared technology in the Strategic Defense Initiative and continues to participate in this effort. Specifically, Israeli technology will be key to the successful development and deployment of an Anti Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) system. A \$158-million agreement on co-development of the Arrow interceptor missile was finalized in July 1988, and it will be ready for testing within several years. ATBM has become an increasingly vital priority for the U.S. in the wake of the signing of the INF treaty.

The United States military has continued to expand its purchases of sophisticated Israeli defense technology. Among the estimated \$300 million in contracts in 1988 were major agreements on new mortars and communications systems for the U.S. Army. The U.S. Air Force is very interested in acquiring several Israeli missile systems.

Diplomatic and Trade Partners

Israel's role as an ally of the United States, however, goes well beyond the confines of military cooperation in the Middle East.

At the United Nations, Israel voted with the United States on 80 percent of the General Assembly resolutions introduced in the 42nd session (the most recent available figures), the highest rate of cooperation of any country in the world, higher even than Great Britain or Canada. This contrasts with 31 percent for Turkey, and 35 percent for Greece—America's NATO allies in the eastern Mediterranean. It also contrasts with 14 percent for Egypt, 12 percent for Saudi Arabia, and 13 percent for Jordan—and the Soviet Union's 10 percent record.

In the information war, Israel agreed several years ago to an American request to proceed with plans to install a Voice of America transmitter in the Negev desert to enhance American broadcasts to Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Eastern Europe, at the risk of worsening the plight of Soviet Jews. By contrast, two of America's NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, refused to host the VOA transmitter because of their unwillingness to endanger their relations with Moscow. Reportedly, Oman also turned down an American request.

Moreover, at a time when American exports face protectionist trade barriers around the world—when even our closest allies refuse to eliminate unfair trade practices, and indeed are erecting new barriers to American products—the historic U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement continues its phased implementation. A major step was taken on January 1st of this year, when Israel eliminated a host of tariffs in order to put American goods on equal footing with those from Europe. The success of this unprecedented agreement paved the way for a similar agreement between the U.S. and Canada.

At the end of the day, American exporters want to know if the Free Trade Area has led to a growth in trade. Since its signing in 1985, U.S. exports to Israel have increased by 34 percent. This means more sales, and profits, for American business. In fact, Israel is second only to Canada in terms of per capita imports of U.S. products.

And so, Mr. Chairman, in the peace process, in strategic cooperation, in the diplomatic arena, and on the trade front, Israel is today one of our foremost partners in the world, working with the United States toward regional and global security.

Partners in Strengthening Israel's Economy

Israel and the United States have also cooperated in other bold initiatives over the past several years. Working together, they have successfully undertaken to rescue Israel's economy from the severe distress it was suffering just a short while ago.

Over the past three years, Israel has demonstrated how U.S. foreign assistance, in combination with strong and well-conceived corrective measures in the economy, can turn economic distress into an opportunity for recovery. Israel's recovery program has included some of the toughest austerity measures ever imposed by a democracy. The Congress, the people and the President of the United States were partners in this process, because a critical ingredient has been U.S. economic assistance. U.S. aid was the decisive safety net required to undertake such a bold initiative. Earlier this year, the *Wall Street Journal* called Israel's stabilization program a "mini-miracle."

Today, Israel is striving to go beyond stabilization, to address the underlying structural changes required for sustained economic growth. 1988 was a landmark year in these efforts. Israel held the line on inflation for the third consecutive year. Israel's new Finance Minister, Shimon Peres, waited only a few days after his appointment to launch an initiative to further trim inflation from its current 16% annual level. Israel's foreign currency reserves remain strong, at \$3.4 billion.

In 1985, Israel's annual budget deficit was 15 percent of Gross National Product (GNP). Today, Israel's budget deficit is just three percent of GNP. Israel has held the line on government spending, a feat we can well appreciate here in Washington.

At the same time, the government continues to slash subsidies of public transportation and basic food products such as milk, bread and eggs. Such cuts are painful, and cause upward inflationary pressure in the short term. Moreover, the health and education budgets will constrict this year once again. Still, within Israel's National Unity Government there is broad consensus on the need for such measures.

The Israeli government has imposed new user fees on education and health care, and Finance Minister Peres is advancing a plan to reduce the number of workers employed by the government by 10 percent over a three year period. This is a bold step for the Finance Minister. Israel has long embraced the concept of full employment. Today, unemployment in Israel is close to seven percent of the workforce. Capital market reform continues to progress.

Israel continues to move down the long road of privatizing government-owned companies. Last year, the Israeli government asked a major U.S. financial institution, the First Boston Corporation, to develop a strategy to achieve this goal. The Israeli government is already executing the prescribed approach. It has already sold off the Paz Oil Company, as it will soon do with the Israel Chemicals, Ltd.

Last month, the International Monetary Fund issued an authoritative report confirming Israel's success in stabilizing its economy:

We are impressed with your success in restraining military spending and in reducing subsidies....We are particularly impressed with the most recent national wage agreement which called for no increase in basic wages at all this year....The central problem is to get investment moving again....The focus of discussion has accordingly shifted from economic stabilization to growth....The pressure to do better yet should be unrelenting.

The United States has a vital interest in Israel's economic well-being for several reasons. First, the economic health of our major allies and fellow democracies is inherently a vital interest for the United States, because in a very profound sense, the free nations stand or fall together. Second, the economy of Israel is the bedrock of the nation's ability to sustain its own defense, and for this reason Israel's economic health is essential to the stability of the region. And third, it is a vital interest of the United States to ensure that Israel continue on the path of economic growth and self reliance. This is something we can do, and for our own interest, must do.

The challenge for the United States, and for this Subcommittee, as we look to the year ahead, is to continue a program that is working, and to take the steps that are necessary to

reinforce and indeed accelerate the recovery to which the United States has already contributed so much. The foreign assistance program before you is truly an investment in Israel's future.

Although the level of aid to Israel has remained steady for four years, the real value of that aid has declined. There has been a steady erosion in the value of Economic Support Funds and Foreign Military Sales credits to all aid recipients. Based upon information provided by the Congressional Budget Office, Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Defense, our aid package to Israel has eroded in value by some 15 percent since 1986, as illustrated in Chart I.

While Israel's FMS debt burden has been somewhat reduced due to the highly successful refinancing program, overall U.S. Government-related debt remains high. In spite of the Cranston Amendment requirement that economic aid to Israel be greater than Israel's debt service to the U.S., in FY90, Israel's debt obligations to the American government will total \$1.37 billion. In fact, Israel's debt due on U.S. government loans and guarantees will exceed the \$1.2 billion mark well into the next decade.

For these reasons, it is ever more urgent to explore ways to stretch the FMS dollar. One proposal currently being advanced is the Comprehensive Fair Pricing initiative. By eliminating certain surcharges which are imposed on each FMS transaction, Comprehensive Fair Pricing will significantly increase the buying power of scarce military assistance funds. Comprehensive Fair Pricing would apply to all FMS recipients, for all FMS transfers. We strongly urge you to support this proposal.

Maintaining Israel's Vital Qualitative Edge

Beyond the challenge of economic recovery, the program before you is essential for a second reason. This is the fact that our assistance to Israel over the coming year will have a critical impact on the security of the Jewish state.

In past years, I have related to this committee a bleak description of the erosion in Israel's margin of security. This has resulted to a great degree from the very financial and budgetary austerity measures that were necessary to rescue Israel's economy. Regrettably, that assessment, while improving, still captures the essence of the situation. Indeed, the effects of recent years' defense budget cuts will continue to be felt well into the 1990s.

The austerity measures cut Israel's defense spending by about 20 percent in a two year period—one of the largest reductions ever imposed by a democracy in so brief a timespan. Since 1986, Israel's annual defense expenditures have remained stable in absolute terms, and therefore have actually decreased in real terms. While Israeli military planners have attempted to make the cuts without eroding Israel's narrow margin of safety, reductions of this magnitude have, inevitably, added to the element of risk in many areas.

In recent years, active combat units were disbanded, reduced in size or converted into reserve formations. Large numbers of vital aircraft have been mothballed, effectively grounding 15 percent of Israel's combat force. This has decreased the number and size of army brigades and air force squadrons available to meet a surprise attack, weakening the basis on which Israel's security has rested since the conclusion of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

At least one of Israel's mechanized/armored divisions has been dissolved, resulting in the withdrawal of several hundred tanks from the IDF battle order. This means a serious decline in Israel's visible deterrent capability as well as a decline in its war-fighting ability.

The impact of past reductions in training time is still being felt, and has been made worse by the demands of dealing with the intifadah. The expenditure of ammunition in training is still being curtailed. There have been serious cuts in the number of flying hours allowed aircraft pilots, resulting in 20 percent of pilots being dropped in order to continue training for the remainder.

Israeli pilots now are able to fly fewer training hours than their American or Jordanian counterparts. In terms of actual funds, it is estimated that it costs the Israeli Defense Forces \$970 per hour to operate a Merkava tank engine, \$2,687 per hour to operate a missile boat and \$13,708 per hour to fly an F-15 fighter.

Reserve readiness has been cut. For several years the number of reserve days served by Israeli soldiers was decreased, although it was increased recently to cope with the demands of service in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, because of the amount of time both regular and reserve troops are now spending in riot control duties on the West Bank, they have less time to train for their primary mission of conventional defense. Israel had been forced to increase its forces in the administered territories by four or five times the level present two years ago. As a result, reserve units will continue to be less prepared for conventional warfare than they were in the past.

Thousands of active duty military personnel have been released from the IDF. This has meant the loss of a great many highly-skilled individuals who will be sorely missed by the Israeli armed forces.

Morale has been lowered. Pay cuts and personnel releases have produced an exodus of highly trained and motivated professionals and have lowered morale generally. Riot control service in the West Bank and Gaza has placed an added strain on the troops. These factors threaten to undermine a key aspect of Israel's military superiority—its large qualitative advantage in personnel.

Ammunition and equipment stockpiles have suffered deep cuts, in order to lessen the impact of reductions in other areas. This has reduced Israel's ability to sustain its forces in combat. In order to reduce expenses, the armed forces have continued to draw down their stockpiles without full replacement. General Menachem Eitan, chief of the IDF Logistics Branch recently pointed out the urgency of this situation, stating that the Israeli Army must "close the gap created in the last three to four years between current and operational levels" of stores.

Many programs, such as continued acquisition of new Merkava III tanks, helicopters and naval vessels, have been delayed.

Expenditures on research and development have been significantly curtailed. This has diminished Israel's ability to develop and produce the unique new weapons and countermeasures needed to counter increasingly sophisticated weapons entering Arab arsenals. This further diminishes Israel's qualitative advantage over its opponents. In 1988, as in previous years, Israeli defense industries were forced to reduce their staffs and plant facilities and thus are less able to support Israel's military needs.

These cuts in Israel's defense budget have made American FMS aid to Israel all the more important. In particular, this money has helped upgrade Israel's Air Force—whose margin of superiority over its adversaries remains the cornerstone of Israel's security doctrine—particularly, through the acquisition of 60 additional F-16 fighters to fill the gap created by the cancellation of the Lavi. We specifically wish to thank this Committee and the Congress for earmarking increased funds for procurement of defense items in Israel. Permitting "offshore procurement" of this type helps ease the crisis faced by Israel's defense industry.

Another key program that will be funded through the FMS account is the upgrading of Israel's Navy, which must confront the colossal growth of hostile Arab navies like that of Syria, which has doubled its fleet of combat vessels since 1982. After years of delay due to budget constraints, Israel has finally been able to fund the building of new submarines and missile corvettes.

The termination of the Lavi in 1987, which was to have been the centerpiece of Israeli industrial potential, was a hard blow for the country, and its effects are still being felt two years later. It was initially thought that cancellation of the program would free substantial funds for

other urgently needed defense projects. However, the Israeli military has only been able to reallocate a small portion of this money. The remainder of these funds has been used in areas directly associated with the Lavi's discontinuation.

Overall, Israel faces long-term reductions in the size of its military forces. What is lost in quantity must be made up in the qualitative enhancements provided through the development and use of advanced technologies.

The Arab Military Buildup

Despite reductions in oil revenues in recent years, Israel's enemies continue to purchase more and newer weapons to add to their already bulging arsenals. (See Charts II and III.) They have placed orders for billions of dollars worth of new weapons each year, and have tens of billions of dollars more still in the pipeline from past years. Since 1973, the leading Arab nations still at war with Israel have spent roughly \$400 billion on their armed forces. U.S. arms sales in the region have begun to increase again after several years of decline, growing from \$7 billion in FY87 to \$12 billion in FY88. Arab nations at war with Israel are continuing to spend approximately \$30 billion annually on their military forces. According to the last set of figures released by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, four of the eight largest arms importing nations in the world are Arab nations at war with Israel: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Syria. And, it may be significant that despite its economic problems, Egypt was the next largest importer.

Syria has expanded and improved its armed forces since its defeats in the 1982 fighting. All branches of Syria's military have grown as a result. There is a growing disparity in standing armed forces—approximately 400,000 for Syria as compared with 150,000 for Israel. This could serve to increase Syria's incentive for a surprise attack. Syria's president, Hafiz Assad, has made very clear that his goal of "strategic parity" with Israel is a synonym for war preparations. Indeed, according to one estimate, the Syrians devote half their national budget to the armed forces, spending \$1 billion more than Israel each year. As part of that buildup Syria has increased by 50 percent the number of divisions in its army. These troops have been reequipped with the latest model tanks, artillery, and other equipment available to the Syrians. The Syrians studied carefully the fighting in Lebanon in 1982 and have incorporated lessons from that campaign into their doctrine and training.

Syria's navy has also been a major beneficiary of this buildup, seeing its number of combat vessels double in the years since the Lebanon war as well as the addition of previously unavailable capabilities. These new capabilities are the result of Syria's acquisition of modern Soviet Kilo-class submarines, and a new coastal defense missile, the Sepal, with a range of about 180 miles.

Syrian air defense and air forces have also benefitted in this expansion. The losses of 1982 have been replaced, and more advanced types of anti-aircraft missiles and aircraft have entered service. New anti-aircraft systems have included the SA-5, SA-11, SA-13, and SA-14 missiles. Syrian pilots have been trained in the Soviet Union on one of its most advanced fighters, the MiG-29, the first squadron of which has been delivered, with the transfer of a second squadron expected in the near future. Of even greater concern are reports that Damascus will purchase Su-24 fighter-bombers. These potent aircraft in Syrian hands will seriously increase the military threat to Israel.

The Syrians have also acquired Soviet-built SS-21 tactical ballistic missiles, another piece of first-line equipment for Soviet forces facing NATO. These missiles are much more accurate and dangerous than the earlier Soviet-built Frog and Scud tactical missiles in the Syrian armory. The accuracy of these new missiles increase Syria's 'first-strike' attack abilities against key Israeli installations including air bases and mobilization points. This comes at the same time as a major effort by Syria to build up its chemical warfare capabilities. Two factories are currently producing a variety of nerve gas agents which can be deployed as warheads on Syria's ballistic missiles.

Jordan, too, has continued its military buildup. The Jordanians have placed orders to increase inventories of tanks, artillery, helicopters, anti-aircraft systems, vehicles, air-to-air missiles, and other munitions. According to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Jordan, a country with a gross national product of \$4 billion (1984) took delivery of nearly \$4 billion in arms in the four-year period between 1981 and 1985.

A key part of Jordan's military buildup plan appears to focus around increasing its air defense capability through the acquisition of advanced fighter aircraft and mobilization of its batteries of Improved Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. If Jordan succeeds in its search for this capability, then it will be in a position to directly threaten Israel's margin of air superiority. Jordan recently announced that it is purchasing both the Mirage 2000 and Tornado fighter aircraft, both of which will add significantly to the Kingdom's ability to challenge Israel in the air.

Moreover, Jordan has one of the Arab world's most modern and qualitatively superior ground forces. The highly-trained Jordanian Army has purchased offensively-oriented equipment such as mine field breaching devices and assault bridging equipment.

Libya, despite its massive arsenal of Soviet-supplied weaponry, has until recently had only limited capability to directly attack Israel. The Qaddafi regime has now obtained the capacity for aerial refuelling of its attack aircraft from West Germany, giving them the means to reach Israel. This is particularly alarming in light of the recent revelations concerning the Libyan chemical weapons plant, also developed with Western assistance. And, the Soviet supply of six Su-24 long-range strategic bombers further enhances the Libyan threat.

Since 1980, Iraq, which has sent forces to fight Israel in three wars, has more than tripled the size of its armed forces. Indeed, since the beginning of this decade, Iraq has become the world's leading arms importer, taking delivery of weapons worth an average of over \$3 billion every year. With the end of the Gulf War, it can be expected that the enormous arsenal accumulated in Iraq will be at least in part available for use against Israel, as it has been in the past. Moreover, the Iraqi armed forces are battle-hardened; they are better organized, better trained and more fully mechanized and modernized as a result of their seven-year war with Iran.

Iraq has extended the range of its surface-to-surface Scud missiles. This enhancement enables Iraqi missiles, possibly armed with chemical warheads, to reach Israel from launch points in western Iraq.

More ominous still, are reliable reports that Iraq is engaged in a crash program to build nuclear warheads for use with a strategic missile.

Despite steep reductions in oil revenues, Saudi Arabia continues to order weapons on a grand scale. It leads the Arab states in military expenditures, this year spending over \$17 billion on its military, a sum equal to 75 percent of Israel's entire GNP. In each of the years 1981-1985, it was the world's second largest importer of arms. Current Saudi military expenditures per regular soldier are almost twice American expenditures (approximately \$262,000 to \$136,000). And, as Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan has made clear on several occasions, the focus of this military buildup is Israel, not Iran or the Soviet Union. Therefore, not only does it seek to acquire military capabilities far beyond its own legitimate defense needs, it continues to fund Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi arms purchases and PLO terrorist activities against Israel. As is by now well known, Saudi Arabia has also recently acquired intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a variety of warheads up to 1500 miles. These Chinese systems represent an entirely new class of missile in the region and their deployment is without justification.

As part of this huge ongoing military buildup, Saudi Arabia has been seeking steadily to increase the size and combat capabilities of its air force. An important aspect of this particular effort has been the Saudi attempt to enhance the fighting qualities of the combat aircraft it has acquired from the United States. In this it has been partially successful, to the detriment of Israel's security. The sale of further American aircraft enhancements or replacements to Saudi Arabia

cannot but lessen the opportunity for Israel to expend its resources on projects more productive for its society than on countering an ever-extending range of Arab military power.

Last year, Saudi Arabia and Great Britain announced what has been widely described as the "arms deal of the century," worth over \$50 billion according to many sources. The centerpiece of this sale is the purchase of yet more advanced Tornado fighter-bombers, capable of attacking deep inside Israel.

Mr. Chairman, the Arabs purchase these arms from dozens of different nations around the globe. Our country has been a major supplier to these nations, selling billions of dollars of military goods and services to avowed enemies of Israel. American sales of new weapons systems to hostile Arab nations have had a particularly profound impact on the military balance between Israel and those states because American technology is often superior to that of competing weapons. These sales have significantly raised the cost to Israel of maintaining its own defenses, exacerbating the strain on Israel's economy, and, barring any changes in American policy, will continue to do so in the future.

The chemical weapons threat to Israel continues to grow. Both Syria and Iraq have developed their abilities to the point where they are manufacturing their own deadly chemical weapons, and in the case of Iraq, have used them on numerous occasions in its war against Iran. In March 1988, Iraq used its chemical arsenal against in the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing an estimated 5,000 Iraqi citizens and seriously wounding an equal number. Iraq again attacked the Kurds with chemical weapons in August on an even wider scale.

The realization of what was earlier an approaching threat has forced Israel to take in its turn precautionary steps to protect its population and soldiers from similar attacks, again at further cost to itself. Israel has had to initiate a massive civil defense program to protect its citizens, as well as invest in protective measures to keep airbases and other military facilities operational in a chemical environment.

Overall, what we have is a pattern of accelerated Arab buildup while Israel substantially cuts its forces. The dramatic contrast in forces is demonstrated in Chart III. The effort to maintain the qualitative edge adds to the burden on the Israeli economy, further worsening the quantitative gap in the Arab states' favor.

Mr. Chairman, we are all proud of Israel's achievements, but realistically it is impossible to have this combination of trends without a diminution of security. Israel's margin of safety is, inevitably, reduced by the austerity measures it has been forced to take in past years.

Today, I come before you to ask that you take the very serious security risks facing Israel into account when you consider the level of aid to Israel for FY 1990. What this Subcommittee does will have a direct impact on Israel's security, in a situation where there is little room for error. Moreover, any reduction in aid will send the wrong signal to Israel's enemies.

Let me sum up, Mr. Chairman, the conclusions of my testimony. Our aid to Israel has been a wise investment, because Israel is our one democratic friend and most reliable ally in a critical region of the world. But this year aid to Israel is particularly important for three reasons.

The first is to prevent any further erosion in Israel's narrow margin of security in a situation where its forces have been cut while those of its adversaries are rapidly growing. Moreover, in this era of concern over allied burden-sharing, it is important to remember that while we devote roughly \$170 billion to the defense of NATO, whose members spend an average of only five percent of the GDP on defense, Israel spends almost 25 percent of its GDP on defense (see Chart IV).

The second reason aid is particularly important again this year is to stay the course on the economic recovery and growth program on which Israel has embarked. This is no time to reduce our effort.

Last, but not least, Mr. Chairman, aid is an important tool to advance the peace process. Israel must feel confident of American support and commitment as it takes risks for peace.

Israel is aware, however, of America's budget constraints and thus has not increased its aid request over the past four years. Indeed, in 1986, the Government of Israel, acting as a responsible partner in the foreign aid process, returned \$51.6 million in ESF funds to the U.S. Treasury despite the economic pressures it was facing.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the strong friendship you, this Subcommittee, and the House, have demonstrated toward Israel, and for this opportunity to explain the importance of FY 1990 aid to Israel and to America.



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לכבוד
מר יצחק שמיר
ראש המחשלה

1. חצ"ב נייר שרשיג עודד ערן הכולל תדרוך רקע שנתן מזכיר המדינה בייקר לג'ון וולאק.
2. למותר לצייין חשיבות שמירת החיסיון.

ב ב ר כ ה ,
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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

יום ה' 17.5.89



סודי

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

אל: השגריר
מאת: ע. ערן

הנדון: לקראת ביקור שר החוץ

ברצוני להעלות על הכתב כמה הרהורים לקראת ביקור שר החוץ כאן.

א. אני רואה זחילה נמשכת במדיניות ארה"ב לכוון של even-handedness במיוחד בכל מה שקשור למקומו של אש"פ בתהליך. יש גורמים בתוך המערכת האמריקאית שאולי שותפים לרצוננו לבנות מנהיגות מקומית על חשבון מעמדו של אש"פ אך נראה לי שבדרגים הגבוהים יותר (ביקר - סקוקרופט) רווחת ההנחה שלא ניתן לפעול בלי להתייחס לאש"פ כשותף שווה ערך בכל המהלכים. אני מסב תשומת לב לנייר שנכתב ע"י ג'ון וולאק על סמך תדרוך רקע שניתן לו ע"י המזכיר. (מבקש להתייחס לנייר כחסוי).

ב. להערכתי ינסו אש"פ ובנפרד ברה"מ לגבות מחיר, בהמשך התגבשות התהליך, תמורת הסכמה לתמוך ברעיון הבחירות, אש"פ עלול להיות הנזק העיקרי מבחירות כאלו שכן לראשונה בתולדותיהם תהיה לפלשתינאים נציגות נבחרת שהיא איננה, על פני הדברים לפחות, מתוך אש"פ עצמו ובכך יש ערעור על התואר שאימץ אש"פ לעצמו "הנציג הלגיטימי של העם הפלשתינאי". ע"ת לאזן פגיעה כזאת בתדמית עלול אש"פ לדרוש ועידה בינלאומית שרק במהלכה הוא יהיה מוכן לתת הסכמתו לבחירות. איני מוציא מכלל אפשרות שבמקרה וכל שאר האמצעים יכשלו תלחץ ארה"ב על קיומה של ועידה כזו ועל "הרגיל" של הסכמה לנוכחות אש"פית בוועידה כזו. נראה לי שיש צורך להתריע בהקדם האפשרי בפני הממשל על עמדתנו הנחרצת בנושא זה.

ג. ענין ההתנחלויות הולך ותופח לסלע מחלוקת מרכזי בין ישראל וארה"ב. מכמה מקורות במחמ"ד ובבית הלבן נמסר לנו על כך שהענין מכעיס ביותר את הנשיא עצמו וממקור במועצה לבטחון לאומי נאמר לי שאל לנו להוציא מכלל אפשרות יוזמה אמריקאית לגיבוי ישראל בנקודה זו.

בברכה
עודד ערן



העתק: סמנכ"ל צפ"א
יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

79"2 7/10/82

MIDEAST ?

i think they cud play an important role.

5-13-84

its a start.

*they are a part of the process and heres how we prove it to them:
e show them shamir's words and tell them what we told the egyptians,
nd the jordanians and the israelis. we say its part of a process and
e say, look we're glad to have you in there. this idea that the
oviets shldnt participate in the middle east is balanoy as far as i'm
ncerned. its a typical problem, we need all the help we can get:
ome on in the water's fine. lets talk.

what you can say, it is our belief that if we saw actions instead of
ords, the sovs could indeed be very helpful in the middle east. both
ere are alot of things they cud do: they cud stop giving jets to
ibya; they cud recognize israel's rite to exist and they cud lean on
yria; they cud stop consorting with some of the more radical elements

in the region. you can sure say that on the record.

it mite be appropriate at the right time if it was properly structured. if you jump rite off and go to an intern confer, you mite you preaspt more promising opportunities.

PLO open on neutral observers ?

*we've told both sides: no deal breakers, dont you come in here, israel, and say that the intifada has to stop before we can move down this trail. and dont you PLO say that israel has to withdraw from the territories.

mistake for US to put own plan on table ? minute you get caught in that trap you go to the area and you got about three weeks and if you dont make significant progress in 3 weeks, boy the deals over, its dead, its done, thats it, everybody pronounces it dead.

you need little steps. we need little steps, need something discernible but way to get those is to keep pushing thru the channels we're now using and working the process the way we are now. have some lower level person talk to them, but you dont want to have abig conf now; shldt start with shuttle

time becomes a reason for no other reason but they'll think you're stalling.

john, way we do that talk to them about it; they mite stáll and thats when we have to do this, what we have to say is here the questions thayt have to be addressed: what about intern supervision; who can vote in east jerusl, what about outisde the territories; we've got to close these gaps and we really start working on it with the israelis and the plo pushing to close those gaps, to get resolution, maybe you do belgium, good idea; thats what you got to do; cant set up a committae bec if you formalize it the israelis will pull out;

q. arafat need something discernible to shore him up. why not reopen PLO office here, or raise level of the dialogue.

a. you're correct but its not what we do john its what the israelis do; suppose they stop patrolling around mosques and open the schools and do a few things like that there on the ground in the area; really not so much what we do -- altho we can give the PLO some things if we get a position from israel thats too rigid and not rite in terms of moving this process along, we come back and publicly say no, this is not the way to do it. the PLO is very appreciate...of the human rites report was very import in their calculus; what i said was important that you cant rule out abosutely unconditionally in advance ever talking to somebody if it'll lead to peace. at that time 50 % of israelis were synpathetic.

he's gng to need some shoring up in ways that strengthen him with his own constituency ?

a. he is and wa're gng to have to do it.

q. two hats ?

a. we've already in effect done that. we already got the israelis to agree that whoever is elected they will deal with. it doesnt matter once they are elected, they deal with them. if they should then choose to affiliate with the PLO, of if it turned out they are PLO, they will deal with them! we'll make sure of that.

q. reopen PLO office here ?

a. thats counterproductive.

q. raise level of dialogue in tunis ?

a. there are things like that you can do. we dont have any of those in the pipeline rite now but sure there are alot of things you can do. this decision we took on WHO we took bec its gng to move the peace process backward, not forward. its a hell of a bootstrapping.

25.5.1989

אמק

ס ד י

אל: סמנכ"ל לקשרים בינלאומיים ורשות ההשקעות

מאת: מנהל תחום קשרים בינלאומיים

הנידון: מעמד GSP לשטחים

1. ביטול ה-GSP לגבי השטחים הוא פועל יוצא של פסיקת ה-USTR, שלצורך מערכת העדפות מכס אלה השטחים אינם חלק מישראל. להזכיר, זו הסיבה שלא נפגעו זכויות ה-GSP של ישראל, למרות הפרות לכאורה של תנאי ההעדפות בניהול השטחים.
2. אי לכך, החל מ-1 ביולי יעברו השטחים למעמד של MOST FAVORED NATION (MFN), שהוא נחות ל-GSP מבחינת המכס על יצוא לארה"ב.
3. הקונסנטוס הפוליטי בישראל מחייב המשך הפיתוח הכלכלי בשטחים. כל עיכוב בחידוש מעמד ה-GSP הוא פגיעה במטרה זו.
4. אני ממליץ לתמוך ביומה זו. אין בתמיכה זו משום הכרה בעצמאות השטחים, כי אם הכרה במעמד נתון, שאין הם חלק אינטגרלי של מדינת ישראל.

בברכה,

ד"ר דוד נוה

העתקים: סגן השר

יועץ מדיני לממרוה"מ

סמנכ"ל

ציר כלכלי וושינגטון

קישור קונגרס, וושינגטון

3660

1/27/89

Written Testimony

Controlling the Proliferation
of Chemical Weapons

Submitted to the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

by

Thomas A. Dine

Executive Director

American Israel Public Affairs Committee

May 9, 1989

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony on controlling the proliferation of chemical weapons, particularly in the Middle East region.

In recent years, a number of developments have taken place in the Middle East that threaten Israel's security and have justly moved the chemical weapons issue to the top of America's and the world's agenda.

First, several Arab states in the region - Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria - have developed the capability, aided by West European industrial firms, to wage chemical warfare. Apparently, their stocks of chemicals are sufficiently large so as to cause massive casualties if used against unprotected civilians in Israel's major population centers. Iraq, for example, is thought to be operating five chemical complexes that are capable of producing 50 tons of Tabun and Sarin nerve gas and 720 tons of mustard gas per year, while Libya is putting the finishing touches on a chemical weapons facility that will be capable of producing five tons of mustard gas daily.

Second, a number of these Arab nations have sought and are developing ballistic missile technology that will allow them to deliver their chemical warheads directly on Israeli territory. Using ballistic missiles armed with chemical warheads, Iraq

showed in its recent war with Iran how inaccurate but destructive these two technologies in combination can be. Given that there is at present no effective defense against missiles armed with chemical warheads, military planners in states considering using this capability are able to contemplate a high probability of incurring great death and destruction. And given that these weapons are inaccurate, unrecallable terror weapons -- in contrast to highly accurate counterforce systems -- they seriously increase the risk of pre-emptive strikes in a crisis.

Third, in the Iran-Iraq war, by using chemical agents, Iraq breached the ban against the use of chemical weapons that has existed since World War I. In so doing, Iraq, unfortunately, suffered only minimal condemnation from the world community. As a result, the use of poison gas now seems to have a legitimacy that it has not had during most of this century.

Together, these and associated other factors raise serious questions about what the spread of chemical weapons might mean for the security interests of Israel as well as those of the United States. Concerning Israel chemical weapons could be used against Israeli airbases and mobilization centers in the opening phases of an Arab offensive during a future conflict. And it would require only a few attacks with chemically-armed missiles to incur a high number of civilian casualties. While Egypt

possessed chemical weapons during the 1973 Middle East war, it opted not to employ them. Today, however, following the Iran-Iraq War and the spread of these new technologies around the Middle East, the situation might well be different in the event of hostilities. Certainly, the calculus regarding the costs and benefits stemming from their use by Arab states may well have changed in the minds of military planners in light of recent developments.

In the face of this dangerous situation, Israel's policy toward the use of chemical weapons is one of deterrence. The Government of Israel favors a chemical weapons-free zone in the Middle East and has made clear on a number of occasions that any use of chemical weapons against Israel would inflict the most serious consequences upon the perpetrator. At the same time, Israel has taken a variety of measures to defend itself from the dangers posed by chemical weapons in the hands of its enemies. Its intelligence community has stepped up the monitoring of Arab production capabilities. Israel has been forced to implement a comprehensive civil defense program to defend its population against chemical attack. Gas masks and other protective gear have been stockpiled and training is offered to the general public on the steps to be taken in the event of a chemical weapons attack. Further, a range of initiatives have been instituted at military facilities such as airbases so that operations can be sustained in a chemical environment. Finally, and perhaps most

significantly, the United States and Israel have embarked on a joint research project to develop an anti-tactical ballistic missile system. The so-called Arrow ATBM project, which has been underway for about a year, justly commands broad bipartisan support in the Congress. While still in the research and development stage, this joint ATBM project may prove to be a model for countries wishing to defend themselves against missiles with chemical warheads.

Given the growing threat from the spread of chemical weapons to American and Israeli interests, it is not surprising that both the U.S. Executive and Legislative branches have turned their attention to the problem in recent days. To his credit, George Bush highlighted the importance of this issue during the recent presidential campaign when he repeatedly made chemical weapons his highest arms control priority. In a September speech in Baltimore, candidate Bush observed:

"I thought we had banished forever the sight of human beings tortured by chemical warfare. The sight of a mother trying desperately to shield her child against the drifting winds of death. That's why an international effort to make sure

chemical weapons are never--never
used again will be at the top of my
agenda as president!"

And in a major campaign foreign policy address in Toledo in
October, Bush declared:

"I want to be known as the President who,
working with our allies, the Soviets and
others, led to the elimination of chemical
warfare and chemical weapons...if I'm elected
President, if I'm remembered for anything, it
would be this: A complete and total ban on
chemical weapons."

Since taking office, President Bush has usefully pursued
this issue on several fronts. He has attempted to tighten our
export control procedures regarding chemicals. He has supported
active U.S. participation in the Australia Group, the 19-member
grouping formed to try to control the spread of chemical weapons
and the 7-nation Missile Technology Control Regime designed to
stop the export of technologies that aid the building of
surface-to-surface missiles. Finally, the United States has

continued to pursue multilateral negotiations in Geneva to conclude a Chemical Weapons Convention aimed at prohibiting the development, production, possession and transfer of chemical weapons.

While these and other administration efforts are useful steps, more must be done on an urgent basis. For with every passing day, civilians in Israel and elsewhere are increasingly threatened by the spread of chemical weapons and possible attack, either by terrorists or by belligerent states. Accordingly, Congressional initiatives designed to prevent the spread and possible use of chemical weapons are critical. I commend this Committee, particularly Chairman Pell and Ranking Member Helms, for the leadership they have demonstrated on this issue.

Without analyzing here the pros and cons of all the different legislative initiatives recently introduced regarding chemical weapons, I believe that the United States ought to take the lead by enacting new legislation now to deal with this growing threat. Among other things, such legislation should:

- 1) Provide mandatory sanctions against nations that use chemical weapons;
- 2) Provide mandatory sanctions against companies and other suppliers of

materials and technology which aid
the proliferation of chemical
weapons;

- 3) Broaden and tighten export controls
on chemicals;
- 4) Encourage bilateral U.S.-Soviet
efforts to control chemical weapons
proliferation; and
- 5) Spur international efforts to
control the spread of chemical
weapons and ballistic missile
technology.

Allow me to say a word about these objectives. Concerning
sanctions, it is long overdue that the United States put some
teeth in its effort to get chemical weapons proliferation under
control. This effort should include sanctions against both those
nations that use chemical weapons and those companies and
individuals that aid the spread of related technologies. Only by
enacting mandatory sanctions will would-be chemical weapons
proliferators take seriously American concern over this issue.

On the matter of export controls, much more can be done than has been done thus far. During the Reagan Administration, tightening controls over the export of sensitive technology to Eastern Europe was a high priority effort. Tightening controls over the export of materiel applicable to chemical weapons production should be at least as high a priority item in the Bush Administration. West German and Japanese support for a Libyan chemical weapons plant and apparent American companies' support for an Iraqi missile plan underscore the need to strengthen international controls on the export of new technologies. Here, in addition to reorganizing our own export control efforts and initiating new international arms control efforts, we should encourage the building of a chemical weapons database similar to that used to keep track of the export of nuclear material worldwide.

If the superpowers are serious about bringing the global spread of chemical weapons under control, they must set a good example. For most of the postwar period, superpower cooperation regarding the development and transfer of chemical weapons materiel has been extremely unlikely, given divergent American and Soviet geopolitical interests. In the current era, such cooperation is at least conceivable. This is one area where the United States can and should make a greater effort to test

the Gorbachev regime's intentions. Why not press the Soviets to bear down on the Syrians, the Libyans and the Iraqis concerning chemical weapons?

On the international front, serious, new U.S. initiatives are needed to move forward the work of the Australia Group and also the Missile Technology Control Regime, two efforts that are useful but limited in scope and membership. Further, vigorous efforts should go forward in Geneva to try to complete a global ban on chemical weapons. For such a global ban to make sense, it would have to be global in character and adequately verifiable. Otherwise, such an agreement would increase incentives for would-be cheaters to violate the agreement, thus undermining deterrence and stability in such tense regions of the world as the Middle East. On the other hand, if global and verifiable, a Chemical Weapons Convention could create a framework that would usefully provide countries with strong international incentives to refrain from acquiring, producing, or transferring chemical weapons. Such a Convention could also bring into being an agreed-upon basis for international action against those countries which do not comply with the agreement.

The efforts that are outlined above are but first steps that the United States should take to deal with the growing chemical

weapons threat to the security of the United States and its friends such as Israel. Mr. Chairman, more must be done about this very serious problem and the sooner, the better. Chemical weapons must not be viewed in the Arab World or in the Third World generally as the weapons of the future.

2/2/89

STATEMENT BY
THOMAS A. DINE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (AIPAC)
BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS
APRIL 24, 1989

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify before this distinguished Subcommittee on behalf of aid to Israel. Appearing with me is Ms. Ester Kurz, AIPAC's Legislative Director. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) appreciates the opportunity to express its views on the proposed Foreign Assistance Act for FY 1990 and the importance to the United States of relations with Israel.

AIPAC is a domestic organization of American citizens who value a strong partnership between our country and Israel. On our Executive Committee sit the presidents of the 46 major American Jewish organizations representing more than four and one-half million active members throughout the United States.

The FY 1990 foreign assistance authorization request of the Administration reflects vital needs for U.S. foreign policy. It addresses current circumstances in key global spots and it tries to redress some of the cuts in the 150 budget function over recent years. Foreign assistance is only a tiny fraction of the overall federal budget. Cuts in foreign aid will not meaningfully contribute to the attainment of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit target. Cuts in foreign assistance will, however, cripple America's foreign policy goals.

Economic and military aid serves our national interest—both at home and abroad. We urge you to support full funding of the Administration's foreign assistance request. We urge you to preserve the Congressional prerogative to earmark. We urge you to vote for \$3.0 billion in economic and military aid to Israel.

The situation in the Middle East in general and in Israel in particular has remained troubled since I last testified on behalf of foreign aid a year ago. Therefore, it is especially important not to lose sight of basic facts. The United States has a particular moral and strategic interest in Israel, the one democracy and our only reliable ally in the Middle East. It is the only country in the region with meaningful free elections, a robust free press, checks and balances to prevent and correct abuses of authority, extensive protections for the rights of individuals and minorities, basic equality for women, and other safeguards and rights that are typical of a free society. On that score, the affinity between the United States and Israel was demonstrated last November when both countries went to the polls to elect new governments and an orderly transfer of power took place in Washington and Jerusalem. Voter turnout by the citizens of Israel, Jew and Arab, ranged in the area of 80 percent, among the highest rates in the democratic world.

Israel stands in sharp contrast to other countries of the region, which include feudal monarchies like Saudi Arabia, where power is permanently concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy princes and where average citizens are under constant surveillance by the religious police and internal security forces; dictatorships like Iraq, where the government has evicted as many as 500,000 Kurdish citizens from their homes in a raze-and-destroy campaign and used poison gas against its own citizens; or radical fundamentalist regimes like Iran, which terrorizes its minorities, suppresses its middle class, and, until last summer, routinely shipped off its youth to be slaughtered in war. The combination of extremism and fundamental Islam which Israel confronts each day in the region is best exemplified by the Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence against author Salman Rushdie—a threat which received widespread support throughout the Muslim world—because the novelist's views as expressed in fiction were deemed blasphemous.

In public opinion poll after poll for 41 years, when the American people have been asked what is known as the standard question about the Middle East, namely, "in the Middle East

situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations?" they have resoundingly reaffirmed their sympathy for the Jewish state and their conviction that Israel is a democratic ally whose security and well-being are vitally important to the United States. A *Washington Post*/ABC News poll released two weeks ago indicated that American support for Israel has reached an all-time high. Israel continues to enjoy a more than four-to-one advantage over the Arab states in the hearts of Americans. Clearly, Americans do not agree with all policies of the Government of Israel any more than they do with all the policies of our own government. But, a great majority of Americans support Israel's survival and defense and very few would want to tamper with the security assistance which is Israel's vital lifeline.

Indeed, the absolute amount of our aid to Israel is substantial. But it is comparatively one of the most cost-effective investments that the United States makes in support of its common interests. U.S. expenditures in support of our European allies in NATO, for example, are more than 40 times the size of our aid to Israel. And we get a good return on our money to Israel.

Mr. Chairman, since I last testified, the deep, broadbased partnership between the United States and Israel continued to flourish. The relationship between the United States and Israel is steadfast and strong.

Partners for Peace

First and foremost, Mr. Chairman, the United States and Israel are partners for peace. Last month we celebrated ten years of peace between Israel and Egypt, a peace mid-wifed by the United States. Indeed, the viability of that historic achievement was vividly demonstrated by Israel's recent relinquishment to Egypt of Taba, a flyspeck of territory in the Sinai, in accordance with the decision arrived at by an arbitration panel, a mechanism provided for in the U.S.-brokered treaty. Israel proved once again that it lives up to its commitments.

We are pleased to observe that the close consultation between the United States and Israel in the search for peace that was the hallmark of the outgoing Reagan Administration continues to serve as the model for the new Bush Administration. Prime Minister Shamir's visit to Washington proved a milestone. He offered an important substantive proposal for advancing the peace process—elections to be held in the West Bank and Gaza which would empower legitimate Palestinians to negotiate with Israel first over interim arrangements in the territories, followed by negotiations for a permanent agreement. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker recognized and highlighted the opportunities inherent in these ideas, signaling that they would serve as the focus of American efforts in the weeks ahead.

The two governments are agreed on the need for easing tensions between Israelis and Palestinians and for direct negotiations between Israel, the Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza, and the Arab states on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Both governments are in fundamental accord on the absolute necessity for a long-term transitional period to precede any final status solution. Moreover, Israeli Premier Shamir, Foreign Minister Arens and Finance Minister Shimon Peres, leader of the Labor Party, agree with the U.S. assessment that Jordan continues to have a key role to play in determining the future of the territories despite King Hussein's July 31, 1988, decision to disengage from the West Bank.

The ongoing violent demonstrations in the West Bank and Gaza lend added urgency to the search for peace. For 16 months, the uprising leadership has consistently advocated in its frequent manifestos to the local population—as in Calls Number 32 and 35 for example—throwing rocks, hurling molotov cocktails, wielding knives, and arson against the "Zionist enemy." As a democratic state in a hostile environment with enemies on three of its four borders and a hostile population under its control, faced with the threat of terrorism, Israel has groped for the most humane methods to control mob violence. The intifadah, or uprising, has been expensive for Israel. And, Israel's handling of the intifadah has been the focus of extraordinary media coverage sparking extensive criticism. To be sure, there are flaws in Israel's intifadah management. Israelis have been the first to point them out. But, as Israel's political and military leaders have repeatedly

pointed out, the bottom line is that the problem requires a political solution. As Prime Minister Shamir declared in the rose garden at the White House, "Our two governments are agreed that the status quo is not desirable and not satisfactory. None of us wants to see it continued."

To advance the peace process requires confidence-building measures on both sides. This was the logic behind the series of tangible measures to improve the quality of life for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza on which the U.S. and Israeli governments cooperated closely since 1983. These measures, which had originally been coupled with King Hussein's ambitious West Bank development plan, were directed toward nurturing a stable Palestinian leadership in the territories with a stake in coexistence with Israel and Jordan. Such projects could become an integral part of future transitional arrangements in the territories in the peace process. AIPAC strongly supports increased U.S. funding for such measures and calls upon our European allies and Japan to contribute substantially as well.

In the final analysis, however, as President Bush eloquently implored during the Premier's visit, "no political process can succeed in a political vacuum....The Palestinians, the Arab states and other interested parties must demonstrate that they too are willing to make peace a reality." Israel's neighbors—the Palestinians in the territories and the surrounding Arab states—must, as Egypt did years ago, demonstrate their commitment to live in peace with the Jewish state.

It is in this context that one must evaluate the initiation of a "substantive dialogue" between the United States and the PLO on the basis of certain rhetorical formulations by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat in December 1988. The key question, however, is one of substance not semantics. The PLO needs to take tangible steps towards peace, in recognition of Israel and the renunciation of terrorism, to be considered a constructive party to any discussions. Among the concrete measures for the PLO to take would be: abandoning "armed struggle" in all its forms—including an end to disturbances in the West Bank and Gaza; disbanding the terror network under Arafat's control; amending the PLO Covenant, which calls for the "elimination of Zionism in Palestine"; ceasing demands for a Palestinian state before peace talks; abandoning the "strategy of phases," which seeks the elimination of Israel and the overthrow of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan stage by stage; and, ending the onslaught of anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations. This is the time for Arab states, like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq to publicly call for peace with Israel and put an end to the Arab economic boycott of Israel.

But instead of pursuing confidence-building measures, the PLO has pursued confidence-eroding measures. Within weeks of "renouncing terrorism" in Geneva to satisfy U.S. conditions, Arafat threatened Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij with "ten bullets in the chest" for proposing a truce in the territories. The PLO and the uprising leadership have continued to call for physically intimidating or assassinating those believed to cooperate with Israel. In the last 12 months, dozens of residents of the West Bank and Gaza have been murdered by their fellow Palestinians.

Moreover, Arafat-aligned factions of the PLO have participated in nine abortive terrorist attacks against Israel since Arafat's Geneva proclamation. Not a single member of the PLO—not Arafat, not his deputies—said a public word denouncing any of these incidents. In fact, Faruq Qaddumi, known as the PLO's "foreign minister," declared, "The PLO is not prepared to condemn operations which any Palestinian organization or faction undertakes." At the outset, President Reagan warned that if the PLO failed to live up to its word, the United States "would certainly break off communications." The PLO must match its deeds to its words for the U.S.-PLO dialogue to continue.

As for the Arab states, in October 1988, all the Arab states, save Egypt, voted to expel Israel from the United Nations, including Jordan and Morocco. In November, Saudi Arabia and Qatar joined forces with Syria to oust Israel from the International Telecommunications Union. And, the Arab boycott of Israel, led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, continues unabated.

Nevertheless, we are confident of the abilities of the Bush Administration, with the backing of Congress, together with the Government of Israel to vigorously pursue peace.

Strategic Partners

But to achieve peace and maintain it requires strength, particularly in the Middle East where the forces of radicalism must be deterred. In this area, too, the United States and Israel are strategic allies. Both countries have strengthened and enhanced each other's military posture.

Israel's status as a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States was made permanent last year with the removal of a requirement for annual review. This is a significant step forward in the strategic relationship. It will continue to enable the two nations to expand the scope of strategic cooperation. This is not an area of special benefits, grants or loans. Rather, it is a logical extension of the alliance which has blossomed since November 1983 when the United States and Israel enunciated the policy of expanding cooperation, particularly joint military planning and exercises, to meet threats to mutual interests in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean.

On April 21, 1988, the United States and Israel signed an historic Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) institutionalizing the strategic cooperation agreements of the past five years. The MOA serves as a fundamental building block in our strategic partnership with Israel, which has to date been broad and wide ranging. In the words of former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci during his visit to Israel this past November, military relations between the United States and Israel "could not be better." This was reiterated by another Pentagon official who said "together we have achieved more in the last eight years to evolve (the) spirit of cooperation than at any other period in the history of our relationship."

Israel has participated in joint naval exercises with the Sixth Fleet designed to strengthen U.S. antisubmarine warfare capabilities in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. It continues to provide access to its ports for regular ship visits by the Sixth Fleet. Indeed, when the President ordered a naval task force to the Persian Gulf in 1987, elements of that fleet, led by the carrier USS John F. Kennedy, called on the port at Haifa. As recently as last week, Sixth Fleet carriers were being serviced there. U.S. naval operations in the Gulf have been greatly assisted by use of the Israeli-made "Pioneer" remotely-piloted vehicle deployed on the battleship U.S.S. Iowa. This pilotless drone has proved instrumental in conducting reconnaissance and surveillance, and has been described as a "tremendous success" by the Navy.

Israel makes facilities available for the storage and maintenance of U.S. materiel for American use in a conflict. It provides Kfir aircraft at no charge to the U.S. Marine's Aggressor Squadron to help train American fighter pilots. It has provided access to bombing ranges in the Negev desert for training exercises for U.S. Navy fighter pilots. It has engaged in military training exchanges with the U.S. Marines. It has staged joint military exercises with American special anti-terrorist forces. These cooperative military efforts have proved mutually beneficial and will be continued and expanded as the overall strategic relationship continues to grow.

Israel has entered into formal arrangements to provide access to its sophisticated hospital facilities for U.S. military casualties in a conflict. These facilities have already been used to treat U.S. personnel injured in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy Annex in east Beirut in 1983 and on several other occasions.

Israel has shared with the United States the lessons of its combat experience in Lebanon, where Israel successfully used American equipment against Soviet weapons. It has undertaken joint research and development projects with the Pentagon to build on the technological expertise acquired from decades of conflict. In December 1987, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Defense Minister Rabin signed a Memorandum of Understanding enhancing Israel's ability to participate in joint defense R & D efforts with the U.S. The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines continue to express great interest in testing and procurement of Israeli defense systems. Indeed, Israeli technology accounted for over half of the funds in FY88 for evaluation of items from Major Non-NATO Allies.

Israel is also one of only a few countries—including Great Britain, West Germany, and Japan—to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on mutual threat and the benefits of cooperation and shared technology in the Strategic Defense Initiative and continues to participate in this effort. Specifically, Israeli technology will be key to the successful development and deployment of an Anti Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) system. A \$158-million agreement on co-development of the Arrow interceptor missile was finalized in July 1988, and it will be ready for testing within several years. ATBM has become an increasingly vital priority for the U.S. in the wake of the signing of the INF treaty.

The United States military has continued to expand its purchases of sophisticated Israeli defense technology. Among the estimated \$300 million in contracts in 1988 were major agreements on new mortars and communications systems for the U.S. Army. The U.S. Air Force is very interested in acquiring several Israeli missile systems.

Diplomatic and Trade Partners

Israel's role as an ally of the United States, however, goes well beyond the confines of military cooperation in the Middle East.

At the United Nations, Israel voted with the United States on 80 percent of the General Assembly resolutions introduced in the 42nd session (the most recent available figures), the highest rate of cooperation of any country in the world, higher even than Great Britain or Canada. This contrasts with 31 percent for Turkey, and 35 percent for Greece—America's NATO allies in the eastern Mediterranean. It also contrasts with 14 percent for Egypt, 12 percent for Saudi Arabia, and 13 percent for Jordan—and the Soviet Union's 10 percent record.

In the information war, Israel agreed several years ago to an American request to proceed with plans to install a Voice of America transmitter in the Negev desert to enhance American broadcasts to Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Eastern Europe, at the risk of worsening the plight of Soviet Jews. By contrast, two of America's NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, refused to host the VOA transmitter because of their unwillingness to endanger their relations with Moscow. Reportedly, Oman also turned down an American request.

Moreover, at a time when American exports face protectionist trade barriers around the world—when even our closest allies refuse to eliminate unfair trade practices, and indeed are erecting new barriers to American products—the historic U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement continues its phased implementation. A major step was taken on January 1st of this year, when Israel eliminated a host of tariffs in order to put American goods on equal footing with those from Europe. The success of this unprecedented agreement paved the way for a similar agreement between the U.S. and Canada.

At the end of the day, American exporters want to know if the Free Trade Area has led to a growth in trade. Since its signing in 1985, U.S. exports to Israel have increased by 34 percent. This means more sales, and profits, for American business. In fact, Israel is second only to Canada in terms of per capita imports of U.S. products.

And so, Mr. Chairman, in the peace process, in strategic cooperation, in the diplomatic arena, and on the trade front, Israel is today one of our foremost partners in the world, working with the United States toward regional and global security.

Partners in Strengthening Israel's Economy

Israel and the United States have also cooperated in other bold initiatives over the past several years. Working together, they have successfully undertaken to rescue Israel's economy from the severe distress it was suffering just a short while ago.

Over the past three years, Israel has demonstrated how U.S. foreign assistance, in combination with strong and well-conceived corrective measures in the economy, can turn economic distress into an opportunity for recovery. Israel's recovery program has included some of the toughest austerity measures ever imposed by a democracy. The Congress, the people and the President of the United States were partners in this process, because a critical ingredient has been U.S. economic assistance. U.S. aid was the decisive safety net required to undertake such a bold initiative. Earlier this year, the *Wall Street Journal* called Israel's stabilization program a "mini-miracle."

Today, Israel is striving to go beyond stabilization, to address the underlying structural changes required for sustained economic growth. 1988 was a landmark year in these efforts. Israel held the line on inflation for the third consecutive year. Israel's new Finance Minister, Shimon Peres, waited only a few days after his appointment to launch an initiative to further trim inflation from its current 16% annual level. Israel's foreign currency reserves remain strong, at \$3.4 billion.

In 1985, Israel's annual budget deficit was 15 percent of Gross National Product (GNP). Today, Israel's budget deficit is just three percent of GNP. Israel has held the line on government spending, a feat we can well appreciate here in Washington.

At the same time, the government continues to slash subsidies of public transportation and basic food products such as milk, bread and eggs. Such cuts are painful, and cause upward inflationary pressure in the short term. Moreover, the health and education budgets will constrict this year once again. Still, within Israel's National Unity Government there is broad consensus on the need for such measures.

The Israeli government has imposed new user fees on education and health care, and Finance Minister Peres is advancing a plan to reduce the number of workers employed by the government by 10 percent over a three year period. This is a bold step for the Finance Minister. Israel has long embraced the concept of full employment. Today, unemployment in Israel is close to seven percent of the workforce. Capital market reform continues to progress.

Israel continues to move down the long road of privatizing government-owned companies. Last year, the Israeli government asked a major U.S. financial institution, the First Boston Corporation, to develop a strategy to achieve this goal. The Israeli government is already executing the prescribed approach. It has already sold off the Paz Oil Company, as it will soon do with the Israel Chemicals, Ltd.

Last month, the International Monetary Fund issued an authoritative report confirming Israel's success in stabilizing its economy:

We are impressed with your success in restraining military spending and in reducing subsidies....We are particularly impressed with the most recent national wage agreement which called for no increase in basic wages at all this year....The central problem is to get investment moving again....The focus of discussion has accordingly shifted from economic stabilization to growth....The pressure to do better yet should be unrelenting.

The United States has a vital interest in Israel's economic well-being for several reasons. First, the economic health of our major allies and fellow democracies is inherently a vital interest for the United States, because in a very profound sense, the free nations stand or fall together. Second, the economy of Israel is the bedrock of the nation's ability to sustain its own defense, and for this reason Israel's economic health is essential to the stability of the region. And third, it is a vital interest of the United States to ensure that Israel continue on the path of economic growth and self reliance. This is something we can do, and for our own interest, must do.

The challenge for the United States, and for this Subcommittee, as we look to the year ahead, is to continue a program that is working, and to take the steps that are necessary to

reinforce and indeed accelerate the recovery to which the United States has already contributed so much. The foreign assistance program before you is truly an investment in Israel's future.

Although the level of aid to Israel has remained steady for four years, the real value of that aid has declined. There has been a steady erosion in the value of Economic Support Funds and Foreign Military Sales credits to all aid recipients. Based upon information provided by the Congressional Budget Office, Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Defense, our aid package to Israel has eroded in value by some 15 percent since 1986, as illustrated in Chart I.

While Israel's FMS debt burden has been somewhat reduced due to the highly successful refinancing program, overall U.S. Government-related debt remains high. In spite of the Cranston Amendment requirement that economic aid to Israel be greater than Israel's debt service to the U.S., in FY90, Israel's debt obligations to the American government will total \$1.37 billion. In fact, Israel's debt due on U.S. government loans and guarantees will exceed the \$1.2 billion mark well into the next decade.

For these reasons, it is ever more urgent to explore ways to stretch the FMS dollar. One proposal currently being advanced is the Comprehensive Fair Pricing initiative. By eliminating certain surcharges which are imposed on each FMS transaction, Comprehensive Fair Pricing will significantly increase the buying power of scarce military assistance funds. Comprehensive Fair Pricing would apply to all FMS recipients, for all FMS transfers. We strongly urge you to support this proposal.

Maintaining Israel's Vital Qualitative Edge

Beyond the challenge of economic recovery, the program before you is essential for a second reason. This is the fact that our assistance to Israel over the coming year will have a critical impact on the security of the Jewish state.

In past years, I have related to this committee a bleak description of the erosion in Israel's margin of security. This has resulted to a great degree from the very financial and budgetary austerity measures that were necessary to rescue Israel's economy. Regrettably, that assessment, while improving, still captures the essence of the situation. Indeed, the effects of recent years' defense budget cuts will continue to be felt well into the 1990s.

The austerity measures cut Israel's defense spending by about 20 percent in a two year period—one of the largest reductions ever imposed by a democracy in so brief a timespan. Since 1986, Israel's annual defense expenditures have remained stable in absolute terms, and therefore have actually decreased in real terms. While Israeli military planners have attempted to make the cuts without eroding Israel's narrow margin of safety, reductions of this magnitude have, inevitably, added to the element of risk in many areas.

In recent years, active combat units were disbanded, reduced in size or converted into reserve formations. Large numbers of vital aircraft have been mothballed, effectively grounding 15 percent of Israel's combat force. This has decreased the number and size of army brigades and air force squadrons available to meet a surprise attack, weakening the basis on which Israel's security has rested since the conclusion of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

At least one of Israel's mechanized/armored divisions has been dissolved, resulting in the withdrawal of several hundred tanks from the IDF battle order. This means a serious decline in Israel's visible deterrent capability as well as a decline in its war-fighting ability.

The impact of past reductions in training time is still being felt, and has been made worse by the demands of dealing with the intifadah. The expenditure of ammunition in training is still being curtailed. There have been serious cuts in the number of flying hours allowed aircraft pilots, resulting in 20 percent of pilots being dropped in order to continue training for the remainder.

Israeli pilots now are able to fly fewer training hours than their American or Jordanian counterparts. In terms of actual funds, it is estimated that it costs the Israeli Defense Forces \$970 per hour to operate a Merkava tank engine, \$2,687 per hour to operate a missile boat and \$13,708 per hour to fly an F-15 fighter.

Reserve readiness has been cut. For several years the number of reserve days served by Israeli soldiers was decreased, although it was increased recently to cope with the demands of service in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, because of the amount of time both regular and reserve troops are now spending in riot control duties on the West Bank, they have less time to train for their primary mission of conventional defense. Israel had been forced to increase its forces in the administered territories by four or five times the level present two years ago. As a result, reserve units will continue to be less prepared for conventional warfare than they were in the past.

Thousands of active duty military personnel have been released from the IDF. This has meant the loss of a great many highly-skilled individuals who will be sorely missed by the Israeli armed forces.

Morale has been lowered. Pay cuts and personnel releases have produced an exodus of highly trained and motivated professionals and have lowered morale generally. Riot control service in the West Bank and Gaza has placed an added strain on the troops. These factors threaten to undermine a key aspect of Israel's military superiority--its large qualitative advantage in personnel.

Ammunition and equipment stockpiles have suffered deep cuts, in order to lessen the impact of reductions in other areas. This has reduced Israel's ability to sustain its forces in combat. In order to reduce expenses, the armed forces have continued to draw down their stockpiles without full replacement. General Menachem Eitan, chief of the IDF Logistics Branch recently pointed out the urgency of this situation, stating that the Israeli Army must "close the gap created in the last three to four years between current and operational levels" of stores.

Many programs, such as continued acquisition of new Merkava III tanks, helicopters and naval vessels, have been delayed.

Expenditures on research and development have been significantly curtailed. This has diminished Israel's ability to develop and produce the unique new weapons and countermeasures needed to counter increasingly sophisticated weapons entering Arab arsenals. This further diminishes Israel's qualitative advantage over its opponents. In 1988, as in previous years, Israeli defense industries were forced to reduce their staffs and plant facilities and thus are less able to support Israel's military needs.

These cuts in Israel's defense budget have made American FMS aid to Israel all the more important. In particular, this money has helped upgrade Israel's Air Force--whose margin of superiority over its adversaries remains the cornerstone of Israel's security doctrine--particularly, through the acquisition of 60 additional F-16 fighters to fill the gap created by the cancellation of the Lavi. We specifically wish to thank this Committee and the Congress for earmarking increased funds for procurement of defense items in Israel. Permitting "offshore procurement" of this type helps ease the crisis faced by Israel's defense industry.

Another key program that will be funded through the FMS account is the upgrading of Israel's Navy, which must confront the colossal growth of hostile Arab navies like that of Syria, which has doubled its fleet of combat vessels since 1982. After years of delay due to budget constraints, Israel has finally been able to fund the building of new submarines and missile corvettes.

The termination of the Lavi in 1987, which was to have been the centerpiece of Israeli industrial potential, was a hard blow for the country, and its effects are still being felt two years later. It was initially thought that cancellation of the program would free substantial funds for

other urgently needed defense projects. However, the Israeli military has only been able to reallocate a small portion of this money. The remainder of these funds has been used in areas directly associated with the Lavi's discontinuation.

Overall, Israel faces long-term reductions in the size of its military forces. What is lost in quantity must be made up in the qualitative enhancements provided through the development and use of advanced technologies.

The Arab Military Buildup

Despite reductions in oil revenues in recent years, Israel's enemies continue to purchase more and newer weapons to add to their already bulging arsenals. (See Charts II and III.) They have placed orders for billions of dollars worth of new weapons each year, and have tens of billions of dollars more still in the pipeline from past years. Since 1973, the leading Arab nations still at war with Israel have spent roughly \$400 billion on their armed forces. U.S. arms sales in the region have begun to increase again after several years of decline, growing from \$7 billion in FY87 to \$12 billion in FY88. Arab nations at war with Israel are continuing to spend approximately \$30 billion annually on their military forces. According to the last set of figures released by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, four of the eight largest arms importing nations in the world are Arab nations at war with Israel: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Syria. And, it may be significant that despite its economic problems, Egypt was the next largest importer.

Syria has expanded and improved its armed forces since its defeats in the 1982 fighting. All branches of Syria's military have grown as a result. There is a growing disparity in standing armed forces—approximately 400,000 for Syria as compared with 150,000 for Israel. This could serve to increase Syria's incentive for a surprise attack. Syria's president, Hafiz Assad, has made very clear that his goal of "strategic parity" with Israel is a synonym for war preparations. Indeed, according to one estimate, the Syrians devote half their national budget to the armed forces, spending \$1 billion more than Israel each year. As part of that buildup Syria has increased by 50 percent the number of divisions in its army. These troops have been reequipped with the latest model tanks, artillery, and other equipment available to the Syrians. The Syrians studied carefully the fighting in Lebanon in 1982 and have incorporated lessons from that campaign into their doctrine and training.

Syria's navy has also been a major beneficiary of this buildup, seeing its number of combat vessels double in the years since the Lebanon war as well as the addition of previously unavailable capabilities. These new capabilities are the result of Syria's acquisition of modern Soviet Kilo-class submarines, and a new coastal defense missile, the Sepal, with a range of about 180 miles.

Syrian air defense and air forces have also benefitted in this expansion. The losses of 1982 have been replaced, and more advanced types of anti-aircraft missiles and aircraft have entered service. New anti-aircraft systems have included the SA-5, SA-11, SA-13, and SA-14 missiles. Syrian pilots have been trained in the Soviet Union on one of its most advanced fighters, the MiG-29, the first squadron of which has been delivered, with the transfer of a second squadron expected in the near future. Of even greater concern are reports that Damascus will purchase Su-24 fighter-bombers. These potent aircraft in Syrian hands will seriously increase the military threat to Israel.

The Syrians have also acquired Soviet-built SS-21 tactical ballistic missiles, another piece of first-line equipment for Soviet forces facing NATO. These missiles are much more accurate and dangerous than the earlier Soviet-built Frog and Scud tactical missiles in the Syrian armory. The accuracy of these new missiles increase Syria's 'first-strike' attack abilities against key Israeli installations including air bases and mobilization points. This comes at the same time as a major effort by Syria to build up its chemical warfare capabilities. Two factories are currently producing a variety of nerve gas agents which can be deployed as warheads on Syria's ballistic missiles.

Jordan, too, has continued its military buildup. The Jordanians have placed orders to increase inventories of tanks, artillery, helicopters, anti-aircraft systems, vehicles, air-to-air missiles, and other munitions. According to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Jordan, a country with a gross national product of \$4 billion (1984) took delivery of nearly \$4 billion in arms in the four-year period between 1981 and 1985.

A key part of Jordan's military buildup plan appears to focus around increasing its air defense capability through the acquisition of advanced fighter aircraft and mobilization of its batteries of Improved Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. If Jordan succeeds in its search for this capability, then it will be in a position to directly threaten Israel's margin of air superiority. Jordan recently announced that it is purchasing both the Mirage 2000 and Tornado fighter aircraft, both of which will add significantly to the Kingdom's ability to challenge Israel in the air.

Moreover, Jordan has one of the Arab world's most modern and qualitatively superior ground forces. The highly-trained Jordanian Army has purchased offensively-oriented equipment such as mine field breaching devices and assault bridging equipment.

Libya, despite its massive arsenal of Soviet-supplied weaponry, has until recently had only limited capability to directly attack Israel. The Qaddafi regime has now obtained the capacity for aerial refuelling of its attack aircraft from West Germany, giving them the means to reach Israel. This is particularly alarming in light of the recent revelations concerning the Libyan chemical weapons plant, also developed with Western assistance. And, the Soviet supply of six Su-24 long-range strategic bombers further enhances the Libyan threat.

Since 1980, Iraq, which has sent forces to fight Israel in three wars, has more than tripled the size of its armed forces. Indeed, since the beginning of this decade, Iraq has become the world's leading arms importer, taking delivery of weapons worth an average of over \$3 billion every year. With the end of the Gulf War, it can be expected that the enormous arsenal accumulated in Iraq will be at least in part available for use against Israel, as it has been in the past. Moreover, the Iraqi armed forces are battle-hardened; they are better organized, better trained and more fully mechanized and modernized as a result of their seven-year war with Iran.

Iraq has extended the range of its surface-to-surface Scud missiles. This enhancement enables Iraqi missiles, possibly armed with chemical warheads, to reach Israel from launch points in western Iraq.

More ominous still, are reliable reports that Iraq is engaged in a crash program to build nuclear warheads for use with a strategic missile.

Despite steep reductions in oil revenues, Saudi Arabia continues to order weapons on a grand scale. It leads the Arab states in military expenditures, this year spending over \$17 billion on its military, a sum equal to 75 percent of Israel's entire GNP. In each of the years 1981-1985, it was the world's second largest importer of arms. Current Saudi military expenditures per regular soldier are almost twice American expenditures (approximately \$262,000 to \$136,000). And, as Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan has made clear on several occasions, the focus of this military buildup is Israel, not Iran or the Soviet Union. Therefore, not only does it seek to acquire military capabilities far beyond its own legitimate defense needs, it continues to fund Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi arms purchases and PLO terrorist activities against Israel. As is by now well known, Saudi Arabia has also recently acquired intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a variety of warheads up to 1500 miles. These Chinese systems represent an entirely new class of missile in the region and their deployment is without justification.

As part of this huge ongoing military buildup, Saudi Arabia has been seeking steadily to increase the size and combat capabilities of its air force. An important aspect of this particular effort has been the Saudi attempt to enhance the fighting qualities of the combat aircraft it has acquired from the United States. In this it has been partially successful, to the detriment of Israel's security. The sale of further American aircraft enhancements or replacements to Saudi Arabia

cannot but lessen the opportunity for Israel to expend its resources on projects more productive for its society than on countering an ever-extending range of Arab military power.

Last year, Saudi Arabia and Great Britain announced what has been widely described as the "arms deal of the century," worth over \$50 billion according to many sources. The centerpiece of this sale is the purchase of yet more advanced Tornado fighter-bombers, capable of attacking deep inside Israel.

Mr. Chairman, the Arabs purchase these arms from dozens of different nations around the globe. Our country has been a major supplier to these nations, selling billions of dollars of military goods and services to avowed enemies of Israel. American sales of new weapons systems to hostile Arab nations have had a particularly profound impact on the military balance between Israel and those states because American technology is often superior to that of competing weapons. These sales have significantly raised the cost to Israel of maintaining its own defenses, exacerbating the strain on Israel's economy, and, barring any changes in American policy, will continue to do so in the future.

The chemical weapons threat to Israel continues to grow. Both Syria and Iraq have developed their abilities to the point where they are manufacturing their own deadly chemical weapons, and in the case of Iraq, have used them on numerous occasions in its war against Iran. In March 1988, Iraq used its chemical arsenal against in the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing an estimated 5,000 Iraqi citizens and seriously wounding an equal number. Iraq again attacked the Kurds with chemical weapons in August on an even wider scale.

The realization of what was earlier an approaching threat has forced Israel to take in its turn precautionary steps to protect its population and soldiers from similar attacks, again at further cost to itself. Israel has had to initiate a massive civil defense program to protect its citizens, as well as invest in protective measures to keep airbases and other military facilities operational in a chemical environment.

Overall, what we have is a pattern of accelerated Arab buildup while Israel substantially cuts its forces. The dramatic contrast in forces is demonstrated in Chart III. The effort to maintain the qualitative edge adds to the burden on the Israeli economy, further worsening the quantitative gap in the Arab states' favor.

Mr. Chairman, we are all proud of Israel's achievements, but realistically it is impossible to have this combination of trends without a diminution of security. Israel's margin of safety is, inevitably, reduced by the austerity measures it has been forced to take in past years.

Today, I come before you to ask that you take the very serious security risks facing Israel into account when you consider the level of aid to Israel for FY 1990. What this Subcommittee does will have a direct impact on Israel's security, in a situation where there is little room for error. Moreover, any reduction in aid will send the wrong signal to Israel's enemies.

Let me sum up, Mr. Chairman, the conclusions of my testimony. Our aid to Israel has been a wise investment, because Israel is our one democratic friend and most reliable ally in a critical region of the world. But this year aid to Israel is particularly important for three reasons.

The first is to prevent any further erosion in Israel's narrow margin of security in a situation where its forces have been cut while those of its adversaries are rapidly growing. Moreover, in this era of concern over allied burden-sharing, it is important to remember that while we devote roughly \$170 billion to the defense of NATO, whose members spend an average of only five percent of the GDP on defense, Israel spends almost 25 percent of its GDP on defense (see Chart IV).

The second reason aid is particularly important again this year is to stay the course on the economic recovery and growth program on which Israel has embarked. This is no time to reduce our effort.

Last, but not least, Mr. Chairman, aid is an important tool to advance the peace process. Israel must feel confident of American support and commitment as it takes risks for peace.

Israel is aware, however, of America's budget constraints and thus has not increased its aid request over the past four years. Indeed, in 1986, the Government of Israel, acting as a responsible partner in the foreign aid process, returned \$51.6 million in ESF funds to the U.S. Treasury despite the economic pressures it was facing.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the strong friendship you, this Subcommittee, and the House, have demonstrated toward Israel, and for this opportunity to explain the importance of FY 1990 aid to Israel and to America.