

משרד

מנהל  
המבחן

# מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

2

5158/10-א

לשם מנהל משרד המבחן  
חומר נסיון - תיק ללא שם  
מבחן המבחן  
1.9.1975 - 4.3.1978

מס' תיק מקורי

מדינת ישראל  
ארכיון המדינה

מחלקה



שם תיק: בן-אהרון - תיק ללא שם

מזהה פני: 5158/10-א

מזהה פריט: R000341a

כתובת: 3-312-5-7-3 תאריך הדפסה: 03/11/2020

תשובה לאל

SECRET/PERSONAL

INTERIM REPLY

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I believe that I was the first one to encourage your initiative and involvement in the peace process, and I still have the highest regard for your involvement.

I have given much thought to the peace process you launched by your visit in the Middle East and, especially, to the ideas mentioned in your letter of March 4, 1988.

In the talks held in Jerusalem, and even previously, we have discussed at length some of the issues you have raised in your letter. But there are still subjects we have not discussed at all and others in need of clarification.

When you first initiated the rejuvenation of the stalled peace process, we were told that you intended to concentrate on substance rather than to continue the sterile discussion on procedure which led nowhere. You even conveyed to us your deep impression and appreciation of the road covered in the Autonomy negotiations, which came to a standstill in 1982 due, as President Mubarak said recently, to pressure exerted on Egypt by Arab countries. You added that you were sure that by addressing the substantial issue of Autonomy, we would all to feel better in regard to procedure.

To our surprise, matters of substance were not addressed in your letter and what we have now are ideas pin-pointed ostensibly on procedure. Moreover, the proposed procedures, which have a profound bearing on the substance of the negotiations may, adversely, affect our national interests.

In our discussions I stressed, and am still stressing, that the renewed peace process should be based on the Camp David Agreement. The reason for our strict adherence to this agreement is the premise that commitments, made in good faith, entrenched in an international agreement reached by a process of direct negotiations and signed by the parties on their own free will, must not be taken lightly.

Israel, taking into special consideration its vulnerable position, must insist - as any other country would, including the U.S. - on the fulfilment of such obligations.

But beyond that, the Camp David Agreement provided a new and positive norm in the Middle East, not only by the way it was arrived at, i.e. by direct negotiations, but also by its contents. It highlighted the basic procedural principle, that negotiations on peace between Israel and its neighbours must be direct negotiations and that this process will lead from a transitional arrangement to negotiations on the final status of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district and to a Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.

Needless to say, this procedure is still acceptable to us and we understand that its basic principles were intended to be incorporated in your proposal. But, since the transitional arrangement was not addressed in our discussions, I would like to raise some questions with regard to your proposal and suggest some ideas of our own which can, I am sure, enhance the prospects of peace.

In your letter you refer to a "comprehensive peace". I assume that by this expression you mean a Peace treaty between Israel and each of its neighbouring countries. If that is what is intended, it should be stated explicitly. Although I am sure that this is what you have in mind, I would like to know if it is acceptable to any one of the Arab countries. If not, let them say it openly so this matter will be clear and certain.

Your letter refers to the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people". Although this concept appeared in the Camp David Agreement, it did so in a particular context, namely, that the solution emerging at the end of the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

A "comprehensive peace" providing for the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people", without mentioning Israel at all can be intelligently interpreted as adhering to the provisions of the Palestinian charter.

Since the commitment to adhere to the Camp David agreement by all the parties involved, namely Egypt, Israel and the U.S., is still in

force and since the Camp David agreement is the agreed method for implementing Resolution 242 and 338, it is needless to say that we accept them.

The proposed time-table, which we had an opportunity to discuss in the course of our meetings, negates the logic of the transitional arrangements. Prior implementation of the transitional arrangements coupled by a trial period would give the negotiations on the final status greater impetus and greater prospect of success. I think that this is the true meaning of the term "Interlocking" the transitional arrangements and the negotiations on the final status.

In this context I would like to mention again President Reagan's statement that the United States will not be a party to any negotiation of final status issues until the transitional period is underway.

You point out that the United States will submit a draft agreement for the parties' consideration at the outset of the negotiations of the transitional arrangements.

Usually, such a draft is offered at a later stage of the negotiations, after matters of substance have been examined directly by the parties, and not at the outset of the negotiations. Otherwise, it will lead to negotiation between the parties and the U.S. rather than between themselves and this might be seen as an attempt at imposing a solution.



The United States should adhere to the role of rendering its good offices to the parties without taking a stand in any substantial issue.

At any rate, as I have said before, no steps have yet been taken to examine the subjects for negotiations on the transitional arrangements and to what has already been achieved, which I believe, you rightly described as "breath-taking". I shall mention my own proposals on this subject below.

The most surprising element in your letter was the new concept of the international conference, which has "landed" on us after the semantic play with such ideas as international "element", "event", or "auspices". I would really like to know what made you change your mind on this issue.

The international conference is required by the Arabs as a means to exert pressure on Israel. Why should the United States who, I am sure would never agree to such a conference in its own international relations, be a party to such an idea?

In response to your previous initiative and, in order to give Jordan the international "umbrella" she demanded, I consented to your suggestion of an international opening of the direct negotiations at the Summit of the two super-power leaders. You regarded this agreement on my part as an act of statesmanship. Unfortunately, the idea was rejected by

Jordan. I suppose the reason for this rejection was that such an opening lacked the element of pressure. I would add that my agreement, in the parameters I described then, still stands.

However, that proposal is as distant from the proposal you now submit as East is from West.

Now you propose an on-going, full-fledged international conference, with the participation not just of the U.S. and the Soviet Union but of the parties involved, the U.N. and other parties who have no connection whatsoever to the issues at hand.

Getting the Soviet Union involved in an international opening was not meant as an agreement with its unfriendly positions vis-a-vis Israel but rather as a manifestation of hope that the Soviets would use their influence on some Arab countries, especially Syria, to refrain from exerting pressures on Jordan in the course of the negotiations.

Even then, we said that prior to the Soviet Union's participation in the international opening it must re-establish its diplomatic relations with Israel and ease the situation of Russian Jewry. Paradoxically, their situation has worsened since the enacting of the "Glasnost" in the Soviet Union due to growinwg anti-Semite feelings among Soviet population.



Getting the Soviet Union involved as an equal partner, along with China, who never had diplomatic relations with Israel, in an ongoing international conference must be seen making the situation still worse.

We are not prepared to see the U.N. actively involved in setting the ground for negotiations concerning the fate of the State of Israel. An organization which has been the breeding ground for a continuous venom directed against us, including a resolution, equating Zionism with racism, is not fit take part in any peace process.

Moreover, in his role of issuing invitations to the parties concerned, the U.N. Secretary General, bound by the U.N. rules and political circumstances, will issue an invitation to the PLO. Your letter, I am sorry to say, suggests no way of preventing it. Moreover, it even paves a way to PLO participation by neglecting a precondition set forth by the U.S. in its Memorandum of Agreement with Israel of 1.9.1975, namely recognition of Israel's right to exist.

As you rightly pointed out in our discussions, it is not we who are in need of such recognition. This precondition was set by the U.S. in response to pressures to include the PLO in the negotiating process inspite of its declared aim, inscribed in the Palestinian Charter and even in its recent announcements, to liquidate the State of Israel. The murderous attack on a civilian bus in the Negev last week, is a tragic demonstration of these aims.

Israel have never expressed readiness to negotiate with the PLO, and will not accept the deletion of this precondition.

If the U.S. conditions remain valid, it should be stated explicitly. The U.S. should declare, as you and we understand, that the PLO cannot be a party to any peace process.

Your proposal states that the international conference could receive status reports from the parties to the bilateral negotiations in a manner to be agreed (by whom?). Indeed, you also state that the conference will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached. But is it reasonable to expect that the participants will sit as mere onlookers at the time they receive these reports? And if not, what will they do?

The concept of the international conference can only mean, continuous pressure and, from our point of view, also unfriendly pressure, by irrelevant parties. Our entering into such a conference would, in effect, be equivalent to introducing "a healthy person into a sick bed".

You, more than others, understand the connotation of involving outside elements in negotiations between sovereign states - a procedure that would offend any country, especially a democratic state.

In the Camp David Agreement a mechanism was prescribed whereby for the selection of Palestinian representatives by agreement to ensure that PLO members would not sit at the negotiating table. In your proposal, there is no such mechanism.

It would be inconceivable that a "Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation" would present itself at the negotiations without there having been a prior consultative process which will decide by agreement on the composition of the Palestinian element in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

I join you wholly in your view as to the centrality of the United States in the process. But I doubt that the mode proposed by you will achieve this effect. It would seem to me that the concept of a conference will, with all due respect, even undermine the strategic interests of the U.S. itself, which has for many years successfully neutralized Soviet involvement in the peace process.

Our own proposals are anchored in the principles and understandings which are the basis of Camp David Agreement. It contained a balanced recognition of all the parties concerned, including Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs, as well as a reference to the refugee problem. We are aware that Jordan was not a party to the Camp David Agreement and we do not claim that it be bound by it. We do, however, stand by the principles, binding Israel, Egypt and the U.S., which have not lost any of their validity. These principles are, among others,

bilateral negotiations - as were conducted with Egypt - and taking into account the interests of Israel and Jordan (interests that were taken into account in the Agreement itself).

The principles suggested by us are as follows:

1. We are prepared to immediately resume negotiations on arrangements for a transitional period with Jordan and Palestinian Arab representatives who will be incorporated in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Palestinian element will have to be agreed upon. The negotiations may be opened by a one-time event under the two super-powers auspices, with the conditions as to the Soviet Union which we enumerated in October 1987.
2. Israel is ready to submit its proposals without delay. The powers and responsibilities of the body that will constitute the self-governing Authority (Administrative Council) of the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza shall include, among others, a legal system, agriculture, finance, civil service, education and culture, health, housing and public works, transportation and communication, labor and welfare, municipal matters, local police, religious affairs, industry, commerce and tourism. The Self Governing Authority (Administrative Council) will operate in coordination and cooperation with us as may be necessary.

We shall also submit at the negotiations our detailed proposals with regard to specific issues, such as land and water.

Needless to say, everything will be done to assure our security, to which we shall be responsible.

3. We shall do everything in our power to conclude the negotiations on the transitional arrangements at aa early a date as possible.
4. Upon the implementation of the transitional arrangements, we propose to enter into negotiations with Jordan on practical arrangements for cooperation in such spheres as tourism, ecology, water sources, passage of merchandise and other matters of common concern.
5. As soon as possible and not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, we are ready to begin negotiations aimed at determining by agreement the final status of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district and simultaneously to negotiate a peace treaty with Jordan.

As is well known we live up to our obligations so there is no basis to Jordan's concern that we will refuse to deal with the final status.

6. Parallel to our negotiations with Jordan, we are ready to conduct negotiations with Syria and Lebanon on peace treaties.

7. We shall gladly accept U.S. participation in every stage of the negotiations.
8. As we previously pointed out, it is necessary to deal as soon as possible, with some aspects of the refugee problem, even before the conclusion of the negotiations. Provision on this matter is also found in the Camp David Accord.

To claim that it is possible to deal with the refugee problem only within the framework of a comprehensive peace is not only inhuman but it serves the aims of Arab countries to perpetuate the problem. We have done, and still do, what we can to replace refugee camps in the Gaza district by permanent housing but we lack sufficient resources to expedite the implementation of our programme.

In our opinion, a solution to the refugee camps problem is necessary from a humane point of view and vital from a moral point of view.

We are ready to submit a detailed programme for the replacing of the refugee camps based on our previous experience and on the actual consent of the camp residents themselves.

An international effort under American leadership, could well promote the solution of this painful subject.



In conclusion, I would like to stress that there may be those who desire peace as we do but there is no one who desires it more than we do. We shall not rest until we reach direct negotiations and achieve peace.

But to achieve these objectives the process must be based on an honorable, voluntary and sovereign will, and on our values and interests.

We live in a region which does not adhere to values common to the U.S. and Israel. Democracy does not exist in any of our neighboring countries. If our human values were comparable to those of our neighbors, the recent events in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district would have long ago become a forgotten bad dream. However, alongside the adherence to our values, no one may take away from us the right to existence in accordance with what we understand to be our own vital interests.

We, therefore, accept a significant part of your proposals and request clarifications regarding other parts.

After receiving these clarifications, we shall submit our full response which will be bound by the spirit of friendship and cooperation characterizing our mutual relations, which is one of the firm foundations of the free world and provide us with a source of pride and satisfaction.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir

4.388 - 11 950 2

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1988

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I set forth below the statement of understandings which I am convinced is necessary to achieve the prompt opening of negotiations on a comprehensive peace. This statement of understandings emerges from discussions held with you and other regional leaders. I look forward to the letter of reply of the Government of Israel in confirmation of this statement.

The agreed objective is a comprehensive peace providing for the security of all the States in the region and for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

Negotiations will start on an early date certain between Israel and each of its neighbors which is willing to do so. These negotiations could begin by May 1, 1988. Each of these negotiations will be based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, in all their parts. The parties to each bilateral negotiation will determine the procedure and agenda of their negotiation. All participants in the negotiations must state their willingness to negotiate with one another.

As concerns negotiations between the Israeli delegation and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, negotiations will begin on arrangements for a transitional period, with the objective of completing them within six months. Seven months after transitional negotiations begin, final status negotiations will begin, with the objective of completing them within one year. These negotiations will be based on all the provisions and principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Final status talks will start before the transitional period begins. The transitional period will begin three months after the conclusion of the transitional agreement and will last for three years. The United States will participate in both negotiations and will promote their rapid conclusion. In particular, the United States will submit a draft agreement for the parties' consideration at the outset of the negotiations on transitional arrangements.


His Excellency  
Yitzhak Shamir,  
Prime Minister of Israel.

Two weeks before the opening of negotiations, an international conference will be held. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be asked to issue invitations to the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. All participants in the conference must accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounce violence and terrorism. The parties to each bilateral negotiation may refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the conference, in a manner to be agreed. The conference will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached.

Palestinian representation will be within the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Palestinian issue will be addressed in the negotiations between the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations. Negotiations between the Israeli delegation and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation will proceed independently of any other negotiations.

This statement of understandings is an integral whole. The United States understands that your acceptance is dependent on the implementation of each element in good faith.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "George P. Shultz", with a stylized flourish at the end.

George P. Shultz

יכתבתי פ' יקרינח



SECRET

28-FEB-1988  
4-PRO'-809

PEACE PROCESS CONCEPT

- \* The objective is a comprehensive peace.
- \* Negotiations based on U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338 will start on an early date certain, between Israel and each of its neighbours which is willing to do so. (May 1).
- \* As concerns negotiations between an Israeli and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation:
  - \* Negotiations will begin on arrangements for a transitional period with the objective of completing them within six months.
  - \* Seven months after transitional negotiations begin, final status negotiations will begin with the objective of completing them within one year. That is, if transitional talks start on May 1, final status talks will start on December 1.

- \* Final status talks will start before the transitional period begins. The transitional period will begin three months after the conclusion of the transitional agreement and will last for three years.
- \* The U.S. will participate in both negotiations and will promote their rapid conclusion. In particular, the U.S. will submit a draft agreement for the parties' consideration at the outset of negotiations on transitional arrangements.
- \* An international conference or auspices will launch the negotiations and serve as a reference point for them in an agreed manner. It will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached. The U.N. Secretary General will issue invitations to the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Five permanent members of the U.N.S.C. Palestinian representation will be within the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
- \* All participants in the conference must accept U.N.S.C. resolutions 242 and 338 and renounce violence and terrorism.
- \* The Palestinian problem will be dealt with in the negotiations between the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations. Negotiations between Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation will proceed independently of any other negotiation.

הסכם לאנדר

SECRET/MOST SENSITIVE

(Accord between the Government of Jordan, which has confirmed it to the United States, and the Foreign Minister of Israel, ad referendum to the Government of Israel. Parts "A" and "B", which when they become public upon agreement of the parties, will be treated as U.S. proposals to which Jordan and Israel have agreed. Part "C" is to be treated, in great confidentiality, as commitments to the U.S. from the Government of Jordan to be transmitted to the Government of Israel.)

A Three-Part Understanding Between Jordan and Israel

- A. Invitation by UN Secretary General
- B. Resolutions of the International Conference
- C. The Modalities Agreed Upon by Jordan-Israel

A. The Secretary General will issue invitations to the five permanent members of the Security Council and the Parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to negotiate a peaceful settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338 with the objects of bringing a comprehensive peace to the area, security to its states and to respond to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

B. The Participants in the Conference agree that the purpose of the negotiations is the peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Resolutions 242 and 338 and a peaceful solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The Conference invites the Parties to form geographical bilateral committees to negotiate mutual issues.

C. Jordan and Israel have agreed that: (I) the International Conference will not impose any solution or veto any Agreement arrived at between the Parties; (II) the negotiations will be conducted in bilateral committees directly; (III) the Palestinian issue will be dealt with in the committee of the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations; (IV) the Palestinians' representatives will be included in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; (V) participation in the Conference will be based on the Parties' acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and the renunciation of violence and terrorism; (VI) each committee will negotiate independently; (VII) other issues will be decided by mutual agreement between Jordan and Israel.

The above understanding is subject to approval of the respective Governments of Israel and Jordan. The text of this paper will be shown and suggested to the U.S.A.

11/4/87  
London

SECRET/MOST SENSITIVE

17.1.88 - 11.1.88

ראש הממשלה  
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, January 17, 1988

Dear George,

As you may know, we are awaiting confirmation from the White House regarding the schedule for our visit to Washington in March. I am looking forward to seeing President Reagan and you and to having a comprehensive exchange of views about the present situation and the outlook for the future.

Meanwhile, I thought it would be useful to convey some of our thoughts on current events.

The disturbances in the Gaza region, which later spread to Judea and Samaria, are a negative and sad development. They are a setback to what we have always wanted to achieve, both in our relations with the Palestinian Arab population and in the peace process. Ironically, it seems that at least in part the disturbances were the result of our own leniency, our tolerant attitude to the influx of extremist influences and, even, our hesitation in applying strong measures at the very beginning of the violent demonstrations.

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
Secretary of State  
WASHINGTON DC  
U S A



The recent terrorist hang glider attack on one of our camps, where six of our soldiers were killed, triggered a wave of euphoric excitement and expectation that Israel's military strength could be broken. The terrorist organizations seized the opportunity to launch a campaign of incitement. Violent confrontations with our security forces followed. These developments, coupled with the very strict instructions to the army not to open fire except in very extreme circumstances, have made control of the situation much more difficult to achieve. As a result, there has been an erosion of our military's deterrent influence on potential trouble-makers.

In any case, those who incited and instigated the riots should not come away rewarded, or with the feeling that their actions can cause Israel to deviate from its policy. By signaling readiness to change our policy, we would be undermining the chances of restoring calm now, and creating incentives for riots in the future whenever Israel refuses to yield to Arab demands. More important, we would be forsaking and endangering the moderate leadership among the Palestinian Arabs, those who still believe in a negotiated settlement with us, thus delivering the arena to the extremists, the PLO terrorists and the Islamic fundamentalists. This would also jeopardize Jordan's participation in the peace process.

The Palestinian Arab population has been exposed to a massive barrage from Arab and international spokesmen, the media and a variety of visitors who came here to condemn and preach to us. This contributed to an impression that Israel was being unanimously condemned and that we were bending under the universal pressure. These factors have combined to create an atmosphere of tension and expectation, which fed the disturbances.

Of course, we are not oblivious to the fact that there are other underlying causes for the unrest. Arab governments have for a long time blocked any action to improve the lot of the Palestinian Arabs and especially housing for the refugees. Similarly, they have refused to hold peace negotiations with us and rejected our proposals and offers to move the peace process forward. Now they are saying that the absence of a political solution and frustration among the refugees were the causes of the unrest. Unfortunately, the international conference

proposal is being exploited by some of our adversaries as a means of evading their responsibility and shifting the onus on Israel. It is a mark of U.S. statesmanship and responsibility that you have maintained a restrained position on this controversial issue. In this context, I read with appreciation your statement on the unshakeable relationship between our two countries in your press conference of January 7, 1988.

As the various positions on the international conference have crystallized with time, it is absolutely clear that in such a setting we would be faced with a unanimous demand - except from the U.S. - to withdraw to the June 1967 lines and negotiate with the PLO. I am therefore as determined as ever in my opposition to the international conference.

I agreed, after some hesitation, to your last proposal to meet with King Hussein under the auspices of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., because I was eager to begin negotiations with Jordan. I was disappointed by the King's negative response. Had King Hussein been really interested in an international opening for direct negotiations, he would have responded favourably.

In this context, I would like to draw your attention to some developments in the recent Arab summit in Amman. We have all hailed the summit resolution that sanctioned the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt as a positive step. However, we have since discovered that the summit adopted a series of secret and very extreme resolutions on the Arab-Israel issue. It remains to be seen how much of an impact these resolutions will have on Egypt and its quest for a pan-Arab role.

The Amman resolutions could not have come about without a prior entente between King Hussein and President Assad, in which the King adopted Syrian positions and committed himself not to part with Syria in his policy toward Israel and the peace process.

The Arab leaders in Amman decided that Israel was a threat to the existence of the Arab nation, that the Arab governments should achieve "strategic parity" with Israel, that there should be no separate agreements with Israel and that they should remain committed to the Fez Plan that in effect calls for the establishment of a PLO state in the areas of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and sanctions the "right of return" of Palestinians to pre-1967 Israel.

The Amman summit was a repetition of an inevitable phenomenon in Pan-Arab conferences: the adoption of the views of the most radical common denominator. It also illustrated what would happen at an international conference: the presence of radicals would make compromise impossible. I fear King Hussein has entrenched himself behind the international conference idea because it enables him to enjoy the support of the Arab states without requiring him to do anything to move the peace process forward. The peace process will not have much of a chance unless King Hussein musters the courage to begin dealing with us directly on the substantive issues.

Egypt, having returned to the Arab fold, is now at a crossroad. Because of its inherent pivotal position, it can either adopt a leadership role in influencing and moving other Arab states toward accommodation with Israel, or adopt the Arab consensus and position itself as a spokesman of Arab extremism. President Mubarak may be testing the various reactions before he makes his choice. In this connection, his visit to Washington and what he hears from you can play a crucial role. You might consider proposing to him that the U.S. would convene a preparatory meeting of representatives of Egypt, Jordan and Israel to discuss modalities for peace negotiations, including the participation of Palestinian representatives.

In his current visit to the Persian Gulf states, President Mubarak defended Egypt's relations with Israel and its commitment to peace with Israel. This is a positive move. But we are concerned with the rising profile of Egyptian relations with the PLO and the very rabid and ugly treatment of Israel and the Jewish people by the establishment media in Egypt. The pattern of Egypt's conduct seems to point to a policy of compensating for its diplomatic relations with Israel by engaging in anti-Israel activities in all other spheres. If

this should turn out to be the case, it would be a great pity. Egypt can afford to play a constructive role and help bring us, Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs to a negotiating context and influence the other Arab states to adopt a moderate course. In a revealing recent interview (in the Kuwait daily, "al-Anba'" Jan. 6, 88) President Mubarak chastized the Arab governments for pressing Egypt to break the Autonomy talks, adding that by now the Autonomy would have been well into its implementation stage.

Our first obligation now is to achieve a restoration of calm and to make sure that the disturbances will not be registered by the extremists as a victory over Israel. But we are also devoting much thought to the next steps in the political sphere.

I want to share with you some preliminary thoughts. I hope that by the time we meet in March we shall have a detailed presentation for discussion.

I believe in a two-pronged approach to the issue: one relating to the situation of the Palestinian Arab refugees and the other to the peace process.

The Refugee Problem : We can no longer afford to permit the Arab governments to block any move for their resettlement in order to perpetuate the issue and use it against Israel. We have already prepared a detailed master-plan for the resettlement of the refugees. Although we expect the Arabs to do everything in their power to sabotage its implementation, we are determined to go ahead with various housing projects, especially in the Gaza region. We would like to launch an international plan for the housing and resettlement of refugees. But we will proceed only after consultation with you and after the U.S. has considered the prospects of international support for the plan. The importance of solving this problem cannot be overstated. The camps are a shameful blot on the conscience of mankind and they are breeding grounds for terrorism and religious fanaticism. Unless dealt with now, the whole issue of the refugees can become an insurmountable obstacle to peace talks.

The Peace Process : We will try to counter the debilitating impact of the international conference idea by making our own peace proposal. It is based on the Camp David Accords, which remain our policy, but takes into consideration that Jordan was not a party to the Accords. It is composed of the following elements:

1. Negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. They could be held under U.S. auspices and with Egyptian participation. The Palestinian delegates will be non-PLO representatives who are approved by both Jordan and Israel. We will devote special efforts to secure the participation of responsible and representative Palestinian Arabs in the joint delegation. The subject of the negotiations will be the establishment of a self-governing authority for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza in all spheres, excepting security and foreign relations. The talks will be held without prejudice to the positions of the sides on the issues of borders and sovereignty.
2. When the self-governing authority is established, Israel and Jordan will start negotiating on means of cooperation on such matters as access, commerce, transit of Jordanian goods through Israeli ports, joint tourism programs, participation of Palestinians in the Jordanian parliamentary elections, etc.
3. A transitional period of five years is vital to the process because it is designed to enable the establishment of conditions of peaceful coexistence and create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations on critical issues that remain to be resolved. These talks will begin in the third year between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian self-governing authority for the purpose of determining the final status of the areas in question.



The strength and validity of this approach lies especially in the attempt to postpone the treatment of the most sensitive issue of sovereignty until as latest possible date, without prejudice to the positions of the parties and without freezing the situation on the ground. King Hussein is constantly misrepresenting Israel's position on this crucial issue by stating that we consider the territorial issue non-negotiable. He knows very well that the Camp David Accords stipulate explicitly that negotiations on the final status are to begin in the third year after the Autonomy is established.

Let me conclude by saying that almost ten years after the signing of the Camp David Accords, it is clear that the logic behind them and the proposals contained in them offer the only workable concept for moving toward a solution. We are convinced that there is no other way, because they contain a framework that will preserve the interests of all sides to the maximum extent possible.

I intend to set up a special team to prepare and draft detailed proposals on both subjects.

I hope these thoughts provide you with a basis for discussion in our forthcoming meeting, to which I am very much looking forward.

With best regards and wishes,

Sincerely,

Yitzhak Shamir



23/11

23/11 - 2023

## REFUGEE CAMPS IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA DISTRICT

### A PROPOSAL

#### A. BACKGROUND

##### 1. Camps and Refugees - 1987

	Judea & Samaria	Gaza District	TOTAL
Total Population	836,000	545,000	1,381,000
Refugees	280,000	367,000	647,000
Camps	18	8	26
Camps Population	83,000	183,000	266,000
Families in Camps	14,000	31,000	45,000

About 15% of camp dwellers are not refugees nor "registered persons" in UNRWA's records.

##### 2. Standard of Living

A wide gap exists between the individual wellbeing of the refugees and the poor appearance of the refugee camps:

- In 1982 UNRWA ceased to distribute the basic food rations, directing them only to the needy or "hardship cases", recognizing by this act the fact that the main body of refugees is in no need of basic assistance.

- Israel's statistical abstract shows that households in refugee camps in Gaza district are not lagging far behind the households in towns in Judea, Samaria and Gaza district, and are better off than households in villages in these areas, in household facilities and possession of durable goods:

	Judea and Samaria		Gaza District	
	Villages	Towns	Refugee Camps	Towns
Kitchen	75.8%	93.4%	94.3%	95.8%
Water Source:				
Running Water	49.5%	91.0%	68.5%	83.2%
Tap in Courtyard	15.3%	7.3%	29.4%	15.0%
Toilet	85.5%	99.8%	97.4%	98.7%
Bathroom	44.3%	77.7%	65.8%	78.7%
Electricity:				
Around the clock	46.4%	98.2%	94.4%	93.7%
Part of day	41.0%	1.0%	0.7%	0.1%
Gas or electrical cooking:				
Electric refrigerator	85.3%	83.1%	82.2%	89.8%
Washing Machine	55.2%	93.8%	75.1%	83.0%
TV Set	23.3%	75.0%	34.3%	47.1%
Private car	72.0%	97.7%	81.4%	88.9%
	6.2%	22.0%	7.0%	20.6%
Average number of persons per household	6.50		6.45	
Median housing density (persons per room)	2.7		2.6	

- There is no problem of unemployment in Judea, Samaria and Gaza district.:

- \* In Judea and Samaria 96.2% of the Labour force (age 14+) are employed. 30.7% are employed in Israel.
- \* In Gaza district 98.5% of the labour force are employed. 46.1% are employed in Israel.

## B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

1. Apart from the political problem, the humanitarian problem now lies not with the refugee population as a whole, of which only a minority live in refugee camps, but in the miserable appearance of the refugee camps, which actually became poor urban suburbs of towns, managed unskilfully by UNRWA.
2. The main problems of the Refugee camps are:
  - The lack of proper housing due to unplanned individual enlargements of the basic and original "shelters" built "temporarily" in the first half of the 50's.
  - The lack of proper and modern infrastructure like roads, public buildings and facilities, open spaces and parks for recreation, etc.
  - The lack of proper municipal and community facilities and services like sewers, street cleaning, garbage collection, street-lighting, etc.
  - The lack of central municipal planning and proper municipal laws, and the lack of a development master-plan.

## C. PROGRAMME GUIDELINES

### 1. Housing

The main drive must be by building new houses for or by the refugees. This can be done in three alternative ways:

- Building new neighbourhoods near the camps, based on modern infrastructure.
- Building of individual houses on available spaces in towns near the camps.
- Building new houses on the outskirts of the existing camps, relying on improved camp services.

The programme will be based both on individual planning for each family and on special planning for each refugee camp, according to its own particular condition.

The programme will be based on maximal participation of the camp residents in both planning and execution.

## 2. Infrastructure

The programme will be based on adopting modern criteria in constructing the overall basic facilities such as schools, clinics, community centers, etc.

Moreover, the programme will be based on providing modern municipal services to every inhabitant and on modern environmental planning.

## 3. Basic Services

In order to provide the refugees with the same services provided for the non-refugee population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza district two main steps will be taken:

- Existing camps and new housing projects will be integrated into nearby local municipalities and the more remote camps will receive independent municipal status.

- Present services provided by UNRWA will be integrated with those provided for the population in these areas.

## D. COST AND FINANCING

### 1. Basis of Cost Estimate

- Estimated cost is based on number of families in the camps (31,000 in Gaza district and 14,000 in Judea and Samaria.)

- Estimated Cost Per Family in U.S. \$:

	Judea & Samaria	Gaza District
Infrastructure	6,300	3,150
Public Buildings (Education, health, religion) & Commercial centers.	3,700	3,100
Housing Units (120 sq. m.)	29,000	24,000
Total	39,000	30.250

- Due to the fact that the projects will be spread over several years a growth of about 1,000 families per year in Gaza district and of about 500 families per year in Judea and Samaria, must be taken into consideration.

2. Estimated Costs in millions of U.S.\$.

	Judea & Samaria	Gaza District	Total
Planning	15	10	25
Development of Infrastructure	88	98	186
Education, health and religious institutions and commercial centers	52	96	148
Integrating services	20	40	60
Construction	406	744	1,150
TOTAL	581	988	1,569
5 Years increase	98	151	249
GRAND TOTAL	679	1,139	1,818

NOTES

(1) This estimate does not include the cost of lands required for the project.

(2) The plan is designed for a time span of five to eight years.

(3) The plan is based on experience and conclusions drawn from the ongoing rehabilitation programme implemented in Gaza district. This programme already housed 11,000 families comprising of about 66,000 persons.

2. Financing

Financing the projects will be drawn from several sources:

- Private investors and contractors.

- Inhabitants interested in building their own houses or in purchasing their own homes from private contractors.



- Contributions by International and (hopefully) Arab organizations and states.

E. CONCLUSIONS

Former experience, based on several years of implementing rehabilitation programmes in Gaza district, teach us that the main problem lies in convincing the refugee population and refugee-oriented organizations that this programme is meant for their own good.

The housing projects in Gaza district were a success. More refugees are joining in the programme, and more are waiting to participate if and when more investments will be drawn in and more financial resources will be allocated to it.

Showing the refugees that this programme has serious financial backing will convince them to take part in it.

This task is the responsibility of the international and Arab communities.

SECRET

February 29, 1988.

AUTONOMY FOR THE INHABITANTS OF JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DISTRICT

In order to provide full Autonomy to the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district (hereinafter: the inhabitants), Israel is ready to negotiate its details with Jordan and Egypt, and with representatives of those inhabitants, paving the way to negotiations on the final status of these areas and to negotiations on a Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.

PROPOSAL

A. The Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council)

1. Elections

- A Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) ("SGA(AC)") will be elected by the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.
- The elections will be free, based on the preservation of the rights of peaceful assembly, free expression and secret ballot, and appropriate measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

- Free electoral campaigning will be guaranteed subject to the measures mentioned above and in accordance with the agreement on election modalities. The election will be organized, conducted and supervised by a Central Electoral Commission, composed of authorized Israeli civilian personnel and of local Palestinian Arabs to be agreed upon, together with other civilians - individual and institutions - as worked out and agreed upon.

Implementation of the detailed electoral modalities will be worked out by Israel and Jordan.

## 2. Structure and Procedure of the SGA(AC)

The SGA(AC) will consist of one body. The number of its members will be appropriate to and determined by the practical functions to be fulfilled by its members. It will allocate its functions among its members and will determine the rules of procedure relating to its own proceedings.

### 3. Jurisdiction

The SGA(AC) should have jurisdiction over the Arab Inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district and over the relevant physical infrastructures to be agreed upon, subject to the general agreement.

### 4. Powers and Responsibilities of the SGA(AC)

The Powers and Responsibilities which will be transferred to the SGA(AC) are in the following domains:

- (1) Administration of Justice - Supervision of the administrative system of the courts in the areas; dealing with matters connected with the prosecution system and with the registration of companies, partnerships, patents, trademarks, etc.
- (2) Agriculture - All branches of agriculture and fisheries, nature reserves and parks.
- (3) Finance - Budget of the administrative council and allocations among its various divisions; direct taxation.

- (4) Civil Service - Appointment and working conditions of the Council's employees (Today, the civil service of the inhabitants of Judea-Samaria and Gaza, within the framework of the Military Government's Civilian Administration, numbers about 17,000 persons.)
- (5) Education and Culture - Operation of the network of schools in the areas, from kindergarten to higher education; supervision of cultural, artistic and sporting activities.
- (6) Health - Supervision of hospitals and clinics; operation of sanitary and other services related to public health.
- (7) Housing and Public Works - Construction, housing for the inhabitants and public works projects.
- (8) Transportation and Communications - Maintenance and coordination of transport, road traffic, meteorology; local postal and communications services.

- (9) Labour and Social Welfare - Welfare, labour and employment services, including the operation of labour exchanges.
- (10) Municipal Affairs - Matters concerning Arab municipalities and their effective operation.
- (11) Local Police - Operation of the local police force, and maintenance of prisons for criminal offenders sentenced by the courts in the areas.
- (12) Religious Affairs - Provision and maintenance of religious facilities for all religious communities among the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.
- (13) Industry, Commerce and Tourism - Development of industry, commerce, workshops and tourist services.



## 5. Cooperation and Coordination

In view of the links and the free movement that will prevail between Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district and Israel and for the general welfare of the inhabitants, arrangements will be agreed upon, in a number of domains, for cooperation and coordination with Israel.

Naturally, in case of Jordan joining in the negotiations, arrangements can be negotiated for coordination and cooperation between Israel, the SGA(AC) and Jordan, in view of the economic ties and the open bridges between Judea, Samaria and Gaza district and Jordan.

The SGA(AC) will operate, therefore, in its spheres of competence in three ways:

- As appropriate in the local domains allocated to it.
- In coordination with Israel, in spheres relating both to Israel and the inhabitants of the areas; coordination meaning joint planning, leaving the implementation to the SGA(AC).

- In cooperation with Israel, in the spheres affecting both Israel and the inhabitants of the Areas; cooperation meaning joint operation from the higher level of planning to the lower level of implementation.

Details of these domains will be worked out in the negotiations.

#### 6. Residual Powers and Responsibilities

Powers and responsibilities which are not transferred to the SGA(AC) will be reserved to Israel.

The powers and responsibilities of the SGA(AC) will not apply to the Israeli Defence Forces nor to Israeli civilians in Judea, Samaria and Gaza District. Israelis will not participate in the elections for the SGA(AC).

## 7. Implementation

When the SGA(AC) is established and inaugurated, the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn. There will be an orderly transfer from the military government to the SGA(AC) of those powers and responsibilities which will be exercised by the SGA(AC) in accordance with the agreement.

### B. Special Issues

#### 1. Security

All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to ensure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond.

- A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

- Arrangements will be implemented to ensure internal and external security and public order.
- To assist in providing internal security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the SGA(AC).

According to the agreement:

- The strong local police force may include Jordanian citizens.
- Jordan may cooperate with Israel in joint patrols and in manning of control posts to ensure the security of the borders.

## 2. Water

- (1) The subject of water in Judea, Samaria and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status.
- (2) During the transitional period, every additional development of water resources in the Judea, Samaria and Gaza District and their use will be based on the following:

- a. the present use of water by the inhabitants of the Judea  
Samaria and Gaza District and Israel will not be  
adversely affected;
- b. a unanimous decision of Israel and the SGA(AC).

(3) A joint body of Israel and the SGA(AC) will be authorized to deal with the changing needs of water, and with the preparation of development projects for the benefit of all those involved, which will be jointly decided upon by Israel and the SGA(AC).

Israel proposes the establishment of a Joint Israeli-Jordanian body in order to develop and use water resources for the benefit of all.

### 3. Land

(1.) The subject of land in the Judea, Samaria and Gaza District will be determined in the course of the negotiations on the final status.

(2.) During the transitional period -

- (a) lawful private possession and ownership of land by any person will be protected without any discrimination on grounds of religion, national or ethnic origin, residence or citizenship
- (b) land in the possession of or allocated to or administered by localities inhabited by Israelis and lands included in the Israeli security locations will be administered by an authority designated by Israel;
- (c) uses of other lands will be subject to approval by a joint body of Israel and the SGA(AC).

#### 4. Laws

(1.) The laws and orders in force in Judea, Samaria and Gaza District and all powers vested by virtue of them shall remain in force.

(2.) The SGA(AC) will have powers to promulgate regulations in its spheres of competence, and to modify existing legislation as per the general agreement subject to coordination and cooperation with Israel, as mentioned above.



(3.) Jordan is invited to participate in a joint committee with Israel and the SGA(AC) which will be established to examine existing legislation in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, and determine unanimously which laws will remain in force, which will be abolished, and will decide on ways of changing the laws in these areas.

5. The Continuing Committee

Jordan and Egypt are invited to constitute along with Israel and representatives of the SGA(AC), during the transitional period, a continuing committee, to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from Judea, Samaria and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

The Committee may also deal with other matters of common concern (e.g. economic cooperation, etc.)

The Committee will take its actions and resolutions on the basis of unanimity.

The United States will be invited to participate in the Committee.

6. The Refugee Problem

(1) A long-range program for improving the living conditions of refugee camps residents will be prepared.

(2) Jordan and Egypt and other interested parties are invited to participate in efforts to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

C. Negotiations on the final status

(1) As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine by agreement the final status of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, and its relationship with its neighbours.

(2) These negotiations will take place between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and representatives of the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

D. Negotiations on Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan

(1) As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place aiming at concluding a Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.

(2) These negotiations will take place between Israel and Jordan which will be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants.

(3) These negotiations will be based on the principles of Security Council Resolution 242 and will resolve among other matters the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements.

These negotiations will take into consideration the outcome of the negotiations on the final status and will also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs and their just requirements.

February 21, 1988.

THE ARAB REFUGEE CAMPS PROBLEM IN JUDEA-SAMARIA AND GAZA

1) The Refugee Problem : An Obstacle To Peace

The refugee problem, created by the Arab invasion of Israel in 1948, is one of the issues which must be resolved as part of an overall settlement. But the nature of the problem has changed. The refugees who stayed in the "camps" for 40 years, producing 2nd. and 3rd. generations of camp dwellers (an unprecedented phenomenon in the modern era), and the deliberate refusal of the world community, and in particular the Arab States, to permit their rehabilitation, have turned the refugee camps into more than a tragic consequence of war. They have become one of the most insidious causes of the prolongation of the conflict. It is in the refugee camps that deprivation, frustration and irredentism foster, and it is their dwellers who provide much of the cannon fodder for terrorism, riots and unrest.

Realistically, the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be resolved through a magic formula. Mutual trust and understanding must be developed and nurtured before real peace can be achieved. The elimination of the refugee camps in Judea-Samaria and Gaza will help remove irrationality, hatred and fear from political discourse. The Arab notion that nothing should be done for the refugees as long as a political settlement has not been achieved is morally wrong and unjust.

## 2) The Present Situation

There are 183,000 persons (about 31,000 families) in 8 refugee locations in the Gaza district, and 83,000 in 18 locations in Judea-Samaria. Many of them may be neither refugees nor offspring of refugees but former residents of villages and towns for whom life in a refugee camp is a step up. Regardless of their origin, they all profess desire "to return to their homes in Haifa, Jaffa, Acre and Lod", i.e. in the State of Israel. The world's refusal to allow, let alone help, Israel to improve their living conditions or even provide municipal amenities, for fear of 'lending permanence' to their existence and 'depriving' them of refugee status has been unconscionable. It cannot help but encourage the refugees to believe that they would indeed one day "return to their homes".

If the dismal image of these camps, which the world professes to abhor, is ever to be alleviated, the international community must help make the refugees understand that there is no such option. They will never be resettled in areas of pre-67 Israel.

The reasons for this are well known:

1) The displacement of the refugees was caused by the Arab war of aggression against Israel. The responsibility for their plight lies therefore with the Arab states.

2) An equal, if not larger, number of Jews were forced to leave the Arab countries as a result of the same wars. Over 700,000 of these refugees were absorbed in Israel. The estimates of Arabs who left in 1948 are around 550,000. In effect, a population exchange took place as a consequence of wars intended to push Israel into the sea.

3) The Arab leaders have repeatedly declared their insistence that "the refugees return to their homes". This is tantamount to a call to undermine Israel's existence.



### 3) The Options

There are three options for the refugees:

- i) Staying in their present condition
- ii) Resettling in Arab countries, possibly with international assistance
- iii) Relocation in permanent housing near their present locations.

i) The Arab countries, with the acquiescence of the international community, prefer the status quo. It is not the refugees' welfare that interests them, but Israel's discomfiture at having to deal with a hostile, bitter population in ever-worsening, crowded conditions while unable to do anything about it. After 40 years, this option looms as not only cynical but inhuman, unspeakably cruel and unacceptable.

ii) The combination of good employment opportunities and living under Arab sovereignty is available only in Arab countries. Since the refugees cannot anyway ever return to their original homes, countries like Jordan, Syria, Egypt or the Gulf states could offer them an environment that is no more foreign to them than Judea-Samaria and Gaza. The many Palestinian Arabs who have successfully settled in those

countries prove what two Palestinian researchers have noted: the Palestinians are culturally, linguistically, racially and religiously identical with the Arabs of their host countries. Regrettably, there is no sign of Arab willingness to emulate Israel's absorption of refugees nor of international inclination to encourage it.

iii) Israel has always been willing to resettle the refugees in their present locations. The refugees work in Israel or in the areas administered by Israel, and are in many respects integrated in these areas. Moving into better housing in the neighborhood would appreciably improve living conditions without causing dislocations. The Camp David agreement draws no distinction between permanent residents and refugees: all will be subsumed under the autonomy arrangements to be agreed upon by Israel, Jordan, Egypt and representatives of the inhabitants. The latter will also be entitled to take part in the negotiations for a permanent solution for Judea-Samaria and Gaza.

#### 4) Practical Steps

i) Gaza. As a result of UNRWA inaction in various fields, mainly in supplying the refugee camps with such services as sewers, electricity, water, housing, etc. the military government has had to provide the camps with these services, both directly and through the nearby municipalities and local councils.

Since living conditions in the Gaza district were appreciably worse than in Judea-Samaria, a refugee-rehabilitation department was established in the military government in Gaza in 1971. Its goals were to improve the basic living conditions of the camp residents. The proposed solution was to build new and modern neighborhoods near the camps and move the camp population into them. The overall program envisioned the construction of 2.5 million square meters of living space for some 31,000 families. To date, some 10 new neighborhoods have been constructed, housing some 11,000 families. To encourage the refugees to participate in the new housing projects, they were given an opportunity to acquire the land and to build their homes as they wish. (Many of the families had never owned any property or assets.) Their old shelters in the camps would be demolished as soon as they moved, to alleviate the overcrowding.

There has been resistance to the new projects for the following reasons: a) It contradicts the political stand of the PLO and the Arab states, which oppose any rehabilitation and change of status for the refugees. b) The U.N. General Assembly continues to adopt resolutions calling on Israel "to take immediate and effective steps to return the refugees involved to the camps." c) The change to modern housing requires a change in the lifestyle of the refugees. d) The program endangers UNRWA's hold over the refugees and its status at the United Nations.

However, there is growing understanding among the refugees of the benefits of the program. Its main consequences are: a) The transformation of the refugee into a permanent urban resident of the Gaza district; b) The alleviation of the density problem by urbanizing the whole area; high-rise apartment blocks are the best solution; c) reducing dependence on services provided by UNRWA; d) the strengthening of his links with the permanent residents and with the local authorities providing municipal and government services, thus contributing to the implementation of the Camp David accords.

ESTIMATED COST:

The estimated cost amounts to \$ 30,250 per family as follows:

Infrastructure development	\$ 3,150
Public services institutions	\$ 3,100
Average building cost (120 sq. m.)	\$24,000

These figures do not include land cost.

So far, 31,000 families live in camps, but, for the sake of planning, we have to take into consideration an additional 1,000 families per year, and 5-8 years as a probable period of carrying out such a project. Therefore our calculation will be based on a solution for 36,000 - 39,000 families.

The estimated cost of relocating 36,000 families on the basis of \$ 30,250 per family will therefore amount to \$ 1,139,000,000.

ii) Judea-Samaria. While the rehabilitation of the Gaza camps was begun in 1971, the problem of the camps in Judea-Samaria has remained relatively untouched. The reasons are that the conditions there were not as bad, and that the resistance of the camp inhabitants

to change has been greater. Israel proposes improving the condition of living of the Judea-Samaria refugees by building new homes for them on land they would themselves own, with proper infrastructure and communal services. The refugees will maintain their own homes and would be employed in constructive jobs. They would be integrated socially, economically and administratively into the regular population with equal rights and equal status in Judea and Samaria. There will be individual planning for each family and special planning for each camp according to its particular conditions. Existing camps and new housing projects will be integrated into nearby local authorities, with the more remote camps receiving independent municipal status. The program will seek maximal residents' participation, both in planning and execution, adopting modern criteria in adopting basic facilities such as schools, clinics, community services et al. The program includes the integration of the services now provided by UNRWA strictly to refugees with those provided for the general population of Judea and Samaria.

#### ESTIMATED COST

So far, only 14,000 families live in camps, but, for the sake of planning, we have to take into consideration an additional 500 families per year, and 5 - 8 years as a probable period of carrying out such a project. Therefore, our calculation will be based on a solution

for 16,500 - 19,000 families.

The estimated cost for a family living in camp amounts to \$39,000 as follows:

Infrastructure development	\$ 6,300
Public services institutions	\$ 3,700
Average building cost (120 sq. m.)	\$29,000

These figures do not include land cost.

The estimated cost of the program for 16,500 families on the basis of \$ 39,000 per family will therefore amount to \$ 679,000,000.

The total estimated cost for all the refugee camps inhabitants in both areas will therefore reach the amount of \$1,818,000,000.

The program will take 5 to 8 years to be fully implemented. The estimated cost - \$1.818,000,000. Israel expects that states and international organizations interested in resolving the refugee problem, both from the humanitarian and the political point of view, will participate in the project.



5) Conclusion

Keeping the refugee camps in their present condition until a final settlement is reached and encouraging the refugees' hope to retrieve their original homes is cruel and unconsciounable. It will needlessly prolong suffering, uncertainty and frustration and contribute to promoting terrorism, tensions and war. A program to improve their living conditions will contribute immeasurably to the relaxation of tensions and to normalcy, and pave the way to the implementation of the autonomy proposals agreed on by Egypt, Israel and the United States at Camp David.

קד' 310' של הממשלה

## קווי היסוד של חכמי הממשלה

במרכז פעולתה של ממשלת האחדות הלאומית המתייצבת לפני הכנסת

הלאומית-עשרה יעמדות המשימות הבאות:-

1. (א) הכרת אחדות הגורל ושוחפות המאבק לקיומו של העם

היהודי במולדת ובתפוצות הגולה;

(ב) התמודדה ביצירת התנאים החברתיים, הכלכליים והרוחניים

להגשמת ייעודה המרכזי של מדינת ישראל - קיבוץ

גלויות העם היהודי במולדתו;

(ג) החשת העליה מכל הארצות, עידוד העליה מארצות הרווחה,

ומערכה מתמדת במאמץ להציל יהודים נרדפים, להביאם

לחוף מבטחים ולממש את זכותם לעלות ארצה.

2. יעדיה המדיניים המרכזיים של הממשלה בחקופת זאת הם:

המשך חוליין השלום באזור והרחבתו, כיסוס השלום עם מצרים

ולציאת צה"ל מלבנון תוך הבטחת שלום יישובי הצפון.

3. (א) הממשלה תעשה למען סיפוח יחסי ידידות וקשרי-גומלין

בין ישראל לבין כל מדינה שוחרת שלום;

(ב) הממשלה תוסיף לשקוד על העמקת יחסי הידידות וההכנה

השוררים בין ארצות-הברית לישראל;

(ג) הממשלה תעשה לחידוש היחסים הדיפלומטיים עם

ברית-המועצות ועם מדינות באסיה, באפריקה

ובאמריקה-הלטינית שניחקו יחסיהן עם מדינת ישראל.

4. מדיניות החוץ והבטחון של ישראל תהיה מכוונת להבטיח

עצמאותה של המדינה, חיזוק בטחונה וכינון שלום עם כל

שכנותיה.

./הממשלה

5. הממשלה תשקוד על הגברת עוצמתו של צה"ל, כוח הרחעתו וכיבוש עמדותיו מול כל איום צבאי, וחפעל בחקיפות נגד הטרור מכל מקור שהוא.

6. ירושלים השלמה בירת ישראל הנצחית היא עיר אחת בריבונות ישראל שאינה ניתנת לחלוקה; לכל בני הדתות תימשך ותובטח תמיד גישה חופשית אל המקומות המקודשים להם וחופש הפולחן.

7. הממשלה תוסיף להעמיד את שאיפת השלום בראש דאגתה ולא תחסוך כל מאמץ לקדם את השלום.

8. הממשלה תפעל לקידום ולחיזוקם של היחסים ההדדיים עם מצרים על-פי חוזה-השלום.

הממשלה תקרא למצרים למלא חלקה בחוזה-השלום עם ישראל ולהעניק לו משמעות ותוכן כפי שעולה מרוחו של החוזה ומכוונות הצדדים החתומים עליו, לרבות חידוש מלא של הייצוג והקשרים הדיפלומטיים בין שתי המדינות.

9. הממשלה תפעל להמשך תהליך השלום על-פי המסגרת לשלום במזרח-התיכון שהוסכם עליה בקמפ-דייביד ולחידוש המשא-ומתן לכינון האוטונומיה המלאה לחושבים הערבים ביהודה, בשומרון ובחבל-עזה.

10. ישראל תקרא ליורד לפתוח במשא-ומתן לשלום כדי להביא לפתיחת דף חדש באזור, למען פריחתו ושיגשוגו. ממשלת ישראל חרוך בהצעות שירדן העלה במשא-ומתן. /ערכי.

11. ערביי יהודה, שומרון וחבל-עזה ישחפזו בקביעת עתידם כאמור בהסכמי קמפ-דייוויד.

12. ישראל תחנוד להקמח מדינה פלשתינאית נוספת בחבל-עזה ובשטח שכין ישראל לירדן.

13. ישראל לא תישא ולא תחן עם אש"ף.

14. במשך תקופת כהונתה של ממשלת האחדות לא יחול שינוי בריבונות ביהודה, בשומרון ובחבל-עזה, אלא בהסכמת המערך והליכוד.

15. (א) יובטח קיומם ופיתוחם של הישובים שהוקמו על-ידי ממשלות ישראל ועל היקף פיתוחם יוחלט בממשלה;

(ב) 6 - 5 ישובים יוקמו תוך שנה. קביעת שמוחיהת תיעשה בהסכמת הדדית תוך שבוע מעת הקמת הממשלה;

(ג) ביצוע ההחלטות של ממשלות קודמות על הקמת ישובים שטרם הוקמו וששמוחיהם יפורטו ברשימה שחצורף תוך שבוע מעת הקמת הממשלה; יהיה בשנים שלאחר-מכן, במועדים שתקבע ממשלת האחדות הלאומית במליאה;

(ד) הקמת ישובים חדשים תהיה טעונה אישור רוב שרי הממשלה.

./הממשלה

16. הנמשלה תעשה כל אשר דרוש להבטיח את שלום הגליל.

ייקבעו סידורי כסחון אשר יאפשרו הוצאת צה"ל מלבנון, חוץ  
פרק זמן קצר שיוגדר על-ידי הממשלה.

17. המדיניות הכלכלית-חברתית חפצל:-

(א) להקטנת חלוחה הכלכלית של המדינה על-ידי הפחתת  
הגרעון במאזן החשלוים, גידול היצוא וצמצום  
היבוא;

(ב) לייצוב המשק על-ידי בלימת האינפלציה;

(ג) לחידוש צמיחת המשק חוץ קיום חסוקה מלאה;

(ד) לשינוי מכנה המשק על-ידי הגדלת של ענפי היצור  
והיצוא וביסוסם והקטנת חלקט של השירותים  
הציבוריים והמינהליים;

(ה) לעידודם של אזורי ההתיישבות ברחבי הארץ וערי  
הפיתוח ולהרחבתם, לחלוקה צודקת של הנטל בין חלקי  
הציבור ולקיום חקין של מערכות החינוך, הבריאות  
והדור.

18. לשם השגת יעדים אלה חפעל הממשלה:-

(א) להקטנת ההוצאה והצריכה הציבורית-האזרחית  
והכסונית - ולכלימת הצריכה הפרטית;

(ב) להשגת הסכם כלכלי-חברתי עם ההסדרות, המעסיקים  
ושאר גורמי המשק;

(ג) לעידוד החסכון הלאומי לצורכיו, באמצעות חיזוק  
האמון בו וקיום התחייבויות הממשלה, בהתאם לחוק  
שנחקבל בכנסת בנושא זה;  
/לקידומו.

(ד) לקידומו ולפיתוחו של שוק ההון תוך הקטנה הדרגתית של חלק הממשלה בו;

(ה) לרפורמה במיסוי לשם עידוד התפוקה, להעמקת הגביה ולחלוקה צודקת של נטל המסים;

(ו) לחמיכות במוצרי היסוד שיבטיחו זמנות סדירה וישמשו כמכשיר לחכונת החקלאות תוך חתירה לשיעור קבוע של חמיכות ומחיר לצרכן;

לשירות זה, צריכות שיתפו עובד שבו מינימום הצמוד לשכר הממוצע במשק;

(ח) לחקיקת חוק משפחות ברוכות ילדים.

19. הממשלה תפעל:

(א) ליעול ולהרחבת חשית השירותים הטכנולוגיים לפיתוח החקטיה, לריבוי ההשקעות ולהקמת מפעלים עתירי-מדע;

(ב) לכיסוס החקלאות ולהרחבת ייצואה;

(ג) לעידוד החיירות הנכנסת וחיירות הפנים;

(ד) לקיום מדיניות שיכון ומכונת לקליטת עולים חדשים, לדירות של זוגות צעירים ומשפחות ברוכות ילדים;

(ה) לבניית דירות להשכרה בדמי-שכירות סכירים, במיוחד לזוגות צעירים ולמשפחות ברוכות ילדים;

(ו) להרחבת והעמקת מפעל שיקום השכונות.

20. הממשלה תפעל למניעת ירידה ולהחזרתם למולדת של האזרחים שעזבו.

./הממשלה



21. הממשלה חפץ להמשיך פיתוחו של המיגזר הערבי והדרוזי, ולהשלמת חכניות-מיתאר ביישובים הערביים והדרוזיים כדי לאפשר נעחיו בניה לפי חכניות-המיתאר.

22. ייעשו מאמצים מיוחדים לקליטת המשכילים מבין בני המיעוטים, בשירות המדינה ובמוסדות ציבור שונים, כדי לקדם את שיתופם באחריות, ממלכתית וציבורית.

23. הנמשלה חבדוק את נושא ההקדשים המוסלמים.

24. יישמו עקרון ובעלות הלאומית על הקרקע. חוקם ועדת-שרים לדון על מקרים חריגים.

25. החלטה על מכירת נכסים עסקיים שבבעלות המדינה חחקבל על-ידי הנמשלה.

26. המדיניות הכלכלית והחברתית חושחוח על חכנית כוללת שחובא לידיעת הכנסת והציבור, וחופעל במחואם ובעקביות להשגח יעדיה.

27. (א) הממשלה תמשיך לפעול להבטחת שווי זכויות מלא לכל החושבים ללא הבדל דת, גזע, לאום, מין או עדה;

(ב) הממשלה חיזום חקיקת חוק נגד הסחה גזענית, בנוסף להוראות החוק הקיימות בעניין זה.

28. הנמשלה חבדוק אפשרויות של ביצוע רפורמה בשלטון המקומי; חיבחה חלוקת החפקידים והסמכויות בין השלטון המרכזי והמקומי; ייקבעו סדרי מימון וייבחנו מקורות-המימון שיבטחו פעולה חקינה של השלטון המקומי.

./הממשלה

29. (א) הממשלה חפץ לעקירת הפשע והאלימות ולהחדרת ההכרה בעליונות שלטון החוק;

(ב) יוגבר כושרה של המשטרה להילחם בפשיעה על כל גילוייה.

30. אחדות העם וחיי חברה מתוקנים מחייבים טיפוח סובלנות הדדית וחופש מצפון ודת. הממשלה תמנע כל כפייה דתית וזבטי-דתית מאיזה צד שהוא; תבטיח צרכי הדת הציבוריים כאמצעות המדינה; תקיים חופש דת ומצפון לכל העדות הלא-יהודיות ותספק על חשבון המדינה את צרכיהן הדתיים, ותבטיח חינוך דתי לכל הילדים שהוריהם רוצים בכך.

31. יישמר הסטטוס-קוו במדינה בעניני דת.

32. החינוך יושחת על ערכי הנצח של עם ישראל.

55. הנמשלה חקיים את כל ההתחייבויות הבינלאומיות של מדינת ישראל.

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אברהם יצחק - אברהם יצחק

August 31, 1982

His Excellency  
Menachem Begin  
Prime Minister of the  
State of Israel  
Jerusalem

Dear Menachem:

Much has happened since we last met here in Washington in June. We have both been witness to historic events, culminating in the departure of the PLO from Beirut and from its dominant position in Lebanese affairs. The population in the north of Israel is now secure, I pray that it will remain so and will devote my efforts to support Israel to that end.

As you know from our Oval Office discussions in June concerning Lebanon and the peace process, I have been struck by the opportunities which may now lie before us with the PLO militarily weakened and the Soviet Union shown once again to have minimal impact on the truly significant developments in the Middle East. I have given this situation a great deal of soul-searching thought in an effort to determine how best to take advantage of it in a way that will promote the interests of both the United States and Israel.

I have concluded that now is the appropriate time for us to mount a major new effort in the Camp David Peace Process. Indeed, I have concluded that history would not forgive us if we failed to do so. We now have a unique opportunity to take a major step toward a comprehensive peace which provides for the security of Israel while recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

I have been very much swayed in my consideration of how best to proceed by a number of statements by you and others in Israel on the desirability of having additional parties join our negotiations. I have concluded that, if this is to be achieved, we must be prepared to demonstrate the richness of Camp David.

Accordingly, I am asking Ambassador Lewis to share with you my thoughts on the key issues which must be resolved if we are to achieve genuine peace, as Israel and the United States so devoutly wish. I am well aware that some of your views vary considerably from some of the positions I have decided to espouse. I am convinced, nevertheless, that taken together the positions I advocate can lead to the just, comprehensive and durable settlement promised by the Camp David framework. Armed by that conviction, I intend to stand by those positions with total dedication.

Wherever our negotiations may lead, I pledge to you my absolute commitment to Israel's security. Indeed, our overriding objective in the negotiations will continue to be to secure for Israel the peace and normal relations with its neighbors which are the best guarantee of that security.

Furthermore, in keeping with Camp David, the U.S. will not be a party to any negotiation of final status issues until the transitional period is underway. I nevertheless consider any party, including the United States, free to pronounce itself on such issues at any time.

You will note my position on settlements during the transitional period. Let me assure you that this position does not detract from my deep conviction that Jews have the continuing right to live peacefully in the West Bank and Gaza.

My friend, I am convinced that we are about to embark together on a journey of historic dimensions. I know that the road will not be easy, but I am determined to stay the course, confident that the world will judge our efforts as necessary to ensure the permanent security of Israel. I take comfort in the fact that you have already travelled a difficult road to a successful destination of peace with Egypt. I will look to you for counsel and sustenance as we work in the cause of peace.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

אברהם ב"ר - ר' נ - 82



مقام رئيس الجمهورية

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

ن. س.



الرئيس

The President

April 20, 1982.

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Thank you for your letter of April 19 which I read with great interest. As I told you in my letters dated March 21 and April 16 and the oral messages I conveyed to you through Minister Sharon, the Arab Republic of Egypt is determined to fulfill all its obligation under the Camp David accords and the Peace Treaty in good faith. Likewise, we expect Israel to do the same. This is the only course that is compatible with our interest, and infact, with the interest of all peoples of the Middle East. When I repeated several times since I assumed office that peace to us is a strategic goal and not a tactical maneuver, I wanted to deepen the commitment of both peoples to the ideal of peace. You would also recall that I made it a point to state that the completion of final withdrawal from Sinai will cement the relations of peace and open new avenues for cooperation and interaction. This being our record, it is abundantly clear that we intend to keep our word and honor our commitment. It is inconceivable that we violate our undertakings for we believe that such a conduct could not generate any benefit to either party. Since we took the first step on the road to peace, we pledged ourselves to work for a comprehensive and durable peace. A fragile or shaky arrangement would undermine our purpose and set back our efforts.

In the " Framework For Peace in The Middle East ", we made a commitment to enter into " negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects ". In order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of

.. / ...





authority, while taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, it was agreed that there would be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. A self-governing authority would be freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to provide them with full autonomy. The self-governing authority would replace the military government and its civilian administration which are to be withdrawn. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining forces into specified security locations. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues would be negotiated, with the participation of representatives of the inhabitants, not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period.

On March 26, 1979 as we signed the historic Peace Treaty, we signed a letter containing a commitment to negotiate continuously and in good faith to conclude these negotiations at the earliest possible date. The purpose of these negotiations was stated as follows: "to agree, prior to the elections on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority (administrative council), define its powers and responsibilities and other related issues". We intend to continue negotiating with you, with the help of the United States as our full partner, until we reach agreement. It is vital that we set in motion the process of solving the Palestinian question, because we are determined to reach a just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict in accordance with the provisions of the Camp David Framework which remains the only binding document between our two countries.



The President

- 3 -

This is our policy today and it will remain unchanged in the future. We are most willing to accelerate the pace of progress in these negotiations in order to advance the cause of comprehensive peace and widen the scope of the negotiations. We want to attract other parties to the conflict to the table of negotiations. This is the best guarantee for regional security and stability.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I am certain that you realize the importance of solving the problem of the location of the boundary line near Taba as soon as possible. As I told you before, I want to eliminate any possible source of friction in the future. I want us to cooperate together in order to give our pioneering step all the necessary elements for durability and continuous growth. I can not emphasize to you adequately the need to avoid any controversy in the months and years to come. Therefore, it is crucial that we agree on a formula for settling this disagreement through arbitration by a certain date. The last development we want to see is a prolonged and protracted conflict over a point that has a symbolic significance to our people. Fixing a date for settling the matter will not hurt the legitimate interest of either Party. It is a technical point that does not require much investigation and litigation. To repeat my favorite line: Let us concentrate on the future with hope and optimism. I count on your wisdom and good judgment.

With best wishes,

Yours Sincerely

Mohammed Hosni Mubarak



ר' מנחם בגין

April 20, 1982

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The pursuit of peace among nations represents the foremost goal of American foreign policy, for only through peace can the peoples of the world achieve security, prosperity and hope for future generations. I know that the Egyptian and Israeli peoples, having suffered the ravages of war for so many years, share this vision of peace and hope. Thus it was that the Egyptian and Israeli peoples, through their leaders, broke the psychology of war and embraced in peace. In these times of tensions and violence throughout the world, the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty therefore represent the highest standard against which other efforts to achieve peace must be measured. As we approach the completion of the first stage of the Camp David Framework, I therefore wish to take this opportunity to reaffirm with you the commitments of peace.

As you know, the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel and the Camp David Framework Agreement continue to be central elements in the security policy of my Administration for the region. It is therefore in the United States' abiding security interests to ensure that the Treaty of Peace is rigorously applied and respected and that challenges to it from whatever quarter are met and overcome. I am committed to this end.

The Multinational Force and Observers created by the Protocol between Egypt and Israel can play an important part in ensuring respect for the Treaty of Peace. The Multinational Force and Observers is instructed by the Protocol to supervise the implementation of Annex I of the Peace Treaty and to employ its best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms. The Protocol also provides for MFO arrangements ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace. I realize that the effective implementation of these MFO duties is of critical importance to Israel. I therefore reaffirm our full support for the MFO and the effective implementation of its responsibilities, in accordance with the letter of the United States to you at the time of the signing of the Protocol.

His Excellency,  
Menachem Begin,  
Prime Minister of the State of Israel,  
Jerusalem.

The ability of the State of Israel to provide for its self-defense is a vital interest of the United States. Accordingly, as I have previously stated, I am determined to see that Israel's qualitative technological edge is maintained and am mindful as well of your concerns with respect to quantitative factors and their impact upon Israel's security. It goes without saying, Mr. Prime Minister, that fulfillment of the binding obligations contained in the Agreements entered into between the United States and Israel, particularly since 1973 in the context of the peace process, remains a central aspect of our policy.

It is equally in our security interest to resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. You, President Mubarak, and I are in agreement that the Camp David Framework Agreement is the only agreed plan to resolve this problem. It is for this reason that the United States remains committed to make its best efforts to pursue an early and successful conclusion of negotiations for full autonomy and the establishment of a Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, as called for in the Camp David Framework Agreement.

In order to succeed in this task, all sides must maintain the spirit of friendship and cooperation which has marked our efforts to date. As a full partner in this effort, let me assure you of America's commitment to peace and continuing support.

Mr. Prime Minister, I am fully sensitive to the anguish you and the people of Israel are experiencing in these difficult days and the weight of responsibility you bear in facing the risks which remain. I am convinced that history will show that your sacrifices have ensured the security of the State of Israel and the Jewish people.

With my highest regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan



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April 20, 1982

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With my highest regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

הסכם קואופרציה  
באמצעות



# The Framework of Peace in the Middle East

Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menahem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America at Camp David from Sept. 8 to Sept. 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it:

## PREAMBLE:

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts.

After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive humane efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace, so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

The historic initiative by President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations between all states.

To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace and security with

it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.

Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighbourly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbours which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis.

With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

## A. WEST BANK AND GAZA:

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian People should participate in

negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages.

(A). Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government.

To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration to both the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(B) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will



participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(C) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbours, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period.

These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbours, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements.

The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

—1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

—2) Submitting their agreement to

a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

—3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

—4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

## **B. EGYPT-ISRAEL**

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agreed to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to

negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

## **C. ASSOCIATED PRINCIPLES**

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbours — Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

(A) Full recognition,

(B) Abolishing economic boycotts,

(C) Guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this framework.

# The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel

*Following is the official text of the agreement signed at the White House by Presidents Carter and Sadat and Prime Minister Begin - 17 September 1978.*

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of UN Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between 2 and 3 years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

- (a) The full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and Mandated Palestine;
- (b) The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
- (c) The use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras-en-Naqb and Sharm-el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;
- (d) The right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of

Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendible freedom of navigation and overflight;

(e) The construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

(f) The stationing of military forces listed below.

## Stationing of Forces

- A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometres east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.
- B. Only UN forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. to 40 km.
- C. In the area within three kilometres east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed 4 infantry battalions and UN observers.
- D. Border patrol units, not to exceed 3 battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not in-

cluded above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

UN forces will be stationed:

- A. In part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea, and adjacent to the international border, and
- B. In the Sharm-el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the UN with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: Full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

## Interim withdrawal

Between 3 months and 9 months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Mohammed, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.



# Loose ends after Camp David

## CARTER, BEGIN, SADAT EXCHANGE LETTERS

*Full texts of nine letters between Israel, Egypt and the United States released by the White House on Friday. All letters from Mr. Carter are dated September 22 1978, all the other letters are dated Sept. 17 1978.*

### TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN:

I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after my return home I will submit a motion before Israel's parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the following question:

If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you in favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas?"

The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free from the usual parliamentary party discipline to the effect that although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both of the government and the opposition benches will be enabled to vote in accordance with his own conscience.

### TO PRESIDENT SADAT FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the latter's decision.

In this connection, I understand from your letter that Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotiations on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

### TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT SADAT:

In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the settlements:

1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty.

2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty.

3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "framework" shall be void and invalid.

### TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, describing how you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's letter to me on this subject.

### TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT SADAT:

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem.

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored.

2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.

3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian People in the West Bank.

4. Relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the city are null and void and should be rescinded.

5. All peoples must have free access to the city and enjoy the free exercises of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination.

6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives.

7. Essential functions in the city should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the city shall be undivided.

### TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN:

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 — Israel's parliament (the Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "The government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the state to any part of the Eretz Israel Land of Israel — (Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel.

### TO PRESIDENT SADAT FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, setting forth the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost of the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969.

### TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT SADAT:

In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the implementation of the comprehensive settlement.

To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian People, Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian People.

### TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FROM PRESIDENT CARTER:

I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:

A) In each paragraph of the agreed framework document the expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs."

B) In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.

הסכם קאפ - ביולי



# מסגרת לכריתת חוזה שלום בין מצרים ובין ישראל

כדי להשיג שלום ביניהן, מסכימות ישראל ומצרים לשאת ולתת בתום לב, במטרה לכרות, תוך שלושה חודשים מחתימת מסגרת זו, חוזה שלום ביניהן.

מוסכם כי:

האתר בו יתנהל המשא-ומתן יהיה תחת דגל האומות המאוחדות, במקום או במקומות שעליהם יוסכם באורח הדדי.

כל עקרונות החלטת האו"ם 242 יחולו בפתרון זה של הסכסוך בין ישראל ובין מצרים. תנאי חוזה השלום יוצאו אל הפועל בין שנתיים עד שלוש שנים לאחר שייחתם חוזה השלום, אלא אם כן יוחלט אחרת בהסכמה הדדית.

הצדדים הסכימו על הענינים דלקמן:

(א) החלתה המלאה של ריבונות מצרית עד לגבול הבין-לאומי המוכר בין מצרים ובין ארץ-ישראל המנדטורית;

(ב) הנסיגה של כוחות מזוינים ישראלים מסיני;

(ג) השימוש בשדות התעופה שהותירו הישראלים ליד אל-עריש, איתם, עציון ואופירה, למטרות אזרחיות בלבד, לרבות שימוש מסחרי אפשרי בידי כל האומות;

(ד) הזכות למעבר חופשי של אניות ישראליות דרך מפרץ-סואץ ותעלת-סואץ על בסיס אמנת קונסטנטינופול מ-1888 החלה על כל האומות; מיצרי טיראן ומפרץ-עקבה הם נתיבי מים בין-לאומיים, שיהיו פתוחים לכל האומות לחופש שיט וטיסה, בלתי מופרע ובלתי ניתן להתלייה;

(ה) סלילת כביש בין סיני ובין ירדן, ליד אילת, שבו יובטח מעבר חופשי לצרכי שלום, למצרים ולירדן; וכן

(ו) הצבת כוחות צבאיים כמפורט להלן.

## הצבת כוחות

א. לא יותר מדיביזיה אחת (ממוכנת או רגלית) של כוחות מזוינים מצריים תוצב בתוך איזור הנמצא כ-50 קילומטר (ק"מ) ממזרח למפרץ-סואץ ולתעלת-סואץ.

ב. רק כוחות האומות המאוחדות ומשטרה אזרחית, המצוידת בנשק קל לביצוע תפקידי משטרה רגילים, יוצבו בתוך איזור הנמצא מערבה מן הגבול הבין-לאומי ומפרץ עקבה, שרוחבו משתנה מ-20 ל-40 ק"מ.

ג. באיזור הנמצא בתחום 3 ק"מ ממזרח לגבול הבין-לאומי יהיו כוחות ישראלים מוגבלים, שלא יעלו על ארבעה גדודי חיל-רגלים, ומשקיפי האומות המאוחדות.

ד. יחידות משמר הגבול, שלא יעלו על שלושה גדודים, יתווספו למשטרה האזרחית בשמירת הסדר באיזור שלא נכלל לעיל.

התייחסו המדוייק של האזורים דלעיל יהיה כפי שיוחלט עליו במהלך המשא-ומתן לשלום.

יכול שיתקיימו תחנות להתראה מוקדמת, כדי להבטיח מילויים של תנאי ההסכם.

כוחות האומות המאוחדות יוצבו (א) בחלק מאיזור סיני הנמצא בתחום של כ-20 ק"מ מהים-התיכון והגובל בגבול הבין-לאומי, ו- (ב) באיזור שארם-א-שייך, כדי להבטיח חופש מעבר דרך מיצרי טיראן; וכוחות אלו לא יפזו אלא אם כן אישרה מועצת-הבטחון של האומות המאוחדות פינוי כאמור כהצבעת פה אחד של חמש החברות הקבועות.

לאחר שייחתם חוזה השלום, ולאחר שתושלם נסיגת הביניים, יכוננו יחסים נורמליים בין מצרים ובין ישראל, ובכללם הכרה מלאה, לרבות יחסים דיפלומטיים, יחסי כלכלה ותרבות, שימת קץ לחרמות

כלכליים ולמחסומים לתנועה חופשית של טובין ובני-אדם, והגנה הדדית על אזרחים באמצעות הליכי משפט הוגנים.

## נסיגת ביניים

בין שלושה עד תשעה חודשים לאחר חתימת חוזה השלום, ייסוגו כל הכוחות הישראלים מזרחה מחקו הנמשך מנקודה שממזרח לאל-עריש אל ראס-מוחמד. על המיקום המדוייק של קו זה יוחלט בהסכמה הדדית.

בשם ממשלת הרפובליקה הערבית של מצרים:

מוחמד אנואר אל-סאדאת,

נשיא הרפובליקה הערבית של מצרים

בשם ממשלת ישראל:

מנחם בגין,

ראש ממשלת ישראל

ועד לחתימה: גימי קרטר, נשיא ארצות הברית של אמריקה



## מסגרת לשלום במזרח התיכון שהוסכם עליה במחנה דוד

מוחמד אנואר אל-סאדאת, נשיא הרפובליקה הערבית של מצרים, ומנחם בגין, ראש ממשלת ישראל, נפגשו עם ג'ימי קרטר, נשיא ארצות הברית של אמריקה, במחנה דוד, מן ה-5 בספטמבר עד 17 בספטמבר 1978, והסכימו על המסגרת דלקמן לשלום במזרח התיכון. הם מזמינים צדדים אחרים לסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי להצטרף אליה.

### הקדמה

החתימה לשלום במזרח התיכון חייבת להיות מונחית על-ידי האמור לקמן:

- הבסיס המוסכם להסדר בדרכי שלום של הסכסוך בין ישראל ובין שכנותיה היא החלטה 242 של מועצת הבטחון, על כל חלקיה.
- לאחר ארבע מלחמות במשך 30 שנה, וחרף מאמצי אנוש נמרצים, המזרח התיכון, שהוא ערש התרבות ומקום לידתן של שלוש דתות גדולות, עדיין אינו נהנה מברכות השלום. עמי המזרח התיכון עורגים לשלום, כך שניתן יהא להסב את משאבי האזור הנרחבים, האנושיים והטבעיים, לעיסוקי שלום וכדי שאזור זה יוכל להיות דוגמא לדו-קיום ולשיתוף פעולה בין אומות.
- היוזמה ההיסטורית של הנשיא סאדאת בביקורו בירושלים, וקבלת הפנים שערכו לו הכנסת, הממשלה ועמה של ישראל, וביקור הגומלין של ראש הממשלה בגין באיסמעיליה, הצעות השלום שהעלו שני המנהיגים, וכן קבלת הפנים החמה שבה קידמו עמי שתי הארצות את יעודי השליחויות הללו, יצרו הזדמנות חסרת תקדים לשלום שאין להחמיצה אם נרצה לחסוך מן הדור הזה והדורות הבאים את טרגדיות המלחמה.
- הוראות מגילת האומות המאוחדות והנורמות המקובלות האחרות של המשפט והלגיטימיות הבין-לאומיים מספקים עתה תקנים מקובלים לניהול יחסים בין כל המדינות.
- כדי להשיג מערכת של יחסי שלום, ברוח סעיף 2 של מגילת האומות המאוחדות, דרוש משא ומתן בעתיד בין ישראל ובין כל אחת משכנותיה המוכנה לשאת ולתת עמה על שלום ובטחון. לשם ביצועם של כל ההוראות והעקרונות שבהחלטות 242 ו-338.
- השלום דורש כיבוד ריבונותה, שלמותה הטריטוריאלית ועצמאותה המדינית של כל מדינה באזור ואת זכותה לחיות בשלום בתוך גבולות בטוחים ומוכרים, חופשית מאיומים או ממעשים של שימוש בכוח. התקדמות לקראת מטרה זו עשויה להחיש תנועה לקראת עידן חדש של התפייסות במזרח התיכון, שיאופיין על-ידי שיתוף-פעולה בקידום התפתחות כלכלית, בשמירת יציבות ובהבטחת בטחון.
- הבטחון מוגבר על-ידי מערכת של יחסי שלום ועל-ידי שיתוף-פעולה בין אומות הנהנות מיחסים נורמליים. נוסף לכך, בהתאם לתנאי חווי שלום, יכולים הצדדים, על בסיס של הדדיות, להסכים על הסדרי בטחון מיוחדים כגון אזורים מפורזים, אזורים של הגבלות על כלי נשק, תחנות להתראה מוקדמת, נוכחותם של כוחות בין-לאומיים, קישור, אמצעים מוסכמים לפיקוח, והסדרים אחרים שהצדדים יסכימו כי הנם מועילים.

### מסגרת

בהביאם את הגורמים הללו, נחושים הצדדים בהחלטתם להגיע להסדר צודק, מקיף ובר-קיימא במזרח התיכון על ידי חתימתם של חווי שלום המבוססים על החלטות מועצת הבטחון 242 ו-338 על

כל חלקיהן. מטרתם היא להשיג שלום ויחסי שכנות טובים. הם מכירים כי כדי שהשלום יתמיד, עליו להקיף את כל אלה שנפגעו באורח העמוק ביותר מן הסכסוך. לפיכך הם מסכימים כי מסגרת זו, לפי המתאים, מכוונת מצדם להוות בסיס לשלום לא רק בין מצרים ובין ישראל אלא אף בין ישראל ובין כל אחת משכנותיה האחרות המוכנה לשאת ולתת בדבר שלום עם ישראל על בסיס זה. כשמטרה זו לנגד עיניהם הם הסכימו לפעול כאמור לקמן:

### א. יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה

1. מצרים, ישראל, ירדן ונציגי ערביי ארץ-ישראל צריכים להשתתף במשאומתן על פתרון בעית ערביי ארץ-ישראל על כל היבטיה. כדי להשיג מטרה זו צריך שיתנהל משאומתן בדבר יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה בשלושה שלבים:

- (א) מצרים וישראל מסכימות, כי כדי להבטיח העברה מסודרת וכדרכי שלום של הסמכות, ובהתחשב בצרכי הבטחון של כל הצדדים, יהיו הסדרי מעבר לגבי יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה לתקופה שאינה עולה על חמש שנים. במטרה להעניק אוטונומיה מלאה לתושבים, יסוגו, על-פי הסדרים אלה, הממשל הצבאי הישראלי ומינהלו האזרחי, לכשתבחר בבחירות חופשיות על-ידי תושבי השטחים הללו רשות של מינהל עצמי כדי להחליף את הממשל הצבאי הקיים. כדי לשאת ולתת על פרטי הסדר המעבר תוזמן ממשלת ירדן להצטרף למשאומתן על בסיס מסגרת זו. הסדרים חדשים אלה צריכים להתחשב כיאות הן בעיקרון המינהל העצמי של תושבי השטחים האלה והן בצרכי הבטחון הלגיטימיים של הצדדים המעורבים בדבר.
- (ב) מצרים, ישראל וירדן יסכימו על הדרכים לכינונה של רשות המינהל העצמי הנבחרת ביהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה. משלחות מצרים וירדן יוכלו לכלול ערבים ארצישראלים מיהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה או ערבים ארצישראלים אחרים, כפי שיוסכם עליהם באורח הדדי. הצדדים ישאו ויתנו על הסכם אשר יגדיר את סמכויותיה ואחריותה של רשות המינהל העצמי, שיופעלו ביהודה, שומרון, וחבל עזה. תהא נסיגה (a withdrawal) של כוחות מזוינים ישראליים ותהיה פריסה מחדש של הכוחות הישראליים שישארו לאזורי בטחון שיפורטו. ההסכם יכלול גם הסדרים להבטחת בטחון הפנים והחוץ והסדר הציבורי. יוקם כוח משטרה מקומי חזק אשר יוכל לכלול אזרחים ירדניים. נוסף לכך, כוחות ישראליים וירדניים ישתתפו בסיוורים משותפים ובאיוש עמדות פיקוח, כדי להבטיח את בטחון הגבולות.
- (ג) כאשר תיכון ותיחנך רשות המינהל העצמי (מועצה מינהלית) ביהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה תחל תקופת המעבר של חמש שנים, מוקדם ככל האפשר, אך לא יאוחר מן השנה השלישית לאחר תחילתה של תקופת המעבר, יתנהל משאומתן כדי לקבוע את המעמד הסופי של יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה ואת היחס ביניהם ובין שכניהם, וכדי לכרות חוזה שלום בין ישראל ובין ירדן, וזאת עד לסיומה של תקופת המעבר. משאומתן זה יתנהל בין מצרים, ישראל, ירדן ונציגיהם הנבחרים של תושבי יהודה, שומרון, וחבל עזה. יכונסו שתי ועדות נפרדות, אך קשורות זו בזו, הוועדה האחת, המורכבת מנציגי ארבעת הצדדים, אשר ישאו ויתנו ויסכימו על המעמד הסופי של יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה, ועל היחס ביניהם ובין שכניהם, והוועדה השנייה, המורכבת מנציגי ישראל ומנציגי ירדן, כשאל האחרונים יצטרפו נציגיהם הנבחרים של תושבי יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה. כדי לשאת ולתת על חוזה השלום בין ישראל ובין ירדן, תוך התחשבות בהסכם שהושג בדבר המעמד הסופי של יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה, המשא ומתן יתבסס על כל הוראותיה ועקרונותיה של החלטת מועצת הבטחון 242. המשא ומתן יקבע בין שאר ענינים, את מיקומם של הגבולות ואת אופיים של הסדרי הבטחון. הפתרון שינבע מן המשאומתן חייב להכיר גם בזכויות החוקיות של ערביי ארץ-ישראל וכצרכיהם הצודקים. בדרך זו ישתתפו ערביי ארץ-ישראל בקביעת עתידם הם באמצעות:
- (1) המשאומתן בין מצרים, ישראל, ירדן, ונציגי התושבים של יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה, כדי להסכים על המעמד הסופי של יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה ועל נושאים תלויים ועומדים אחרים, עד לסיומה של תקופת המעבר.



- (2) הגשת הסכמתם להצבעה על-ידי הנציגים הנבחרים של תושבי יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה.  
 (3) מתן אפשרות לנציגים הנבחרים של תושבי יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה להחליט כיצד יקיימו מינהל עצמי באופן המתיישב עם הוראות ההסכם אשר להם.  
 (4) השתתפותם, כנקבע לעיל, בעבודתה של הועדה הנושאת ונותנת בדבר חווה השלום בין ישראל ובין ירדן.

2. יונקטו כל הצעדים הדרושים וייעשו כל ההסדרים כדי להבטיח את בטחונן של ישראל ושכנותיה במשך תקופת המעבר ולאחריה. כדי לסייע בהבטחת בטחון כאמור תכונן רשות המינהל העצמי כוח משטרה מקומי חזק. הוא יורכב מתושבי יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה. המשטרה תקיים קשר מתמיד, בענייני בטחון הפנים, עם קצינים ישראלים, ירדניים ומצריים שיתמנו לכך.  
 3. במשך תקופת המעבר יהוו נציגיהן של מצרים, ישראל, ירדן ורשות המינהל העצמי ועדה מתמדת, כדי להחליט, מתוך הסכמה, על העקרונות להכנסתם של בני-אדם שעזבו את יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה ב-1967, יחד עם אמצעים נחוצים כדי למנוע אנדרלמוסיה ואי-סדר. ועדה זו תוכל גם לטפל בנושאים אחרים בעלי ענין משותף.  
 4. מצרים וישראל יפעלו זו עם זו, וכן עם צדדים מעוניינים אחרים, כדי לקבוע נהלים מוסכמים לשם ביצוע מהיר, צודק וקבוע של הפתרון לבקעת הפליטים.

## ב. מצרים – ישראל

1. מצרים וישראל מתחייבות שלא להזיק לאיום או לשימוש בכוח כדי לישב חילוקי דעות. כל חילוקי דעות ייושבו באמצעי שלום. בהתאם להוראות סעיף 33 של מגילת האומות המאוחדות.
2. כדי להשיג שלום ביניהם, מסכימים הצדדים לשאת ולתת בתום לב, במטרה לחתום תוך שלושה חודשים מחתימת מסגרת זו, על חווה שלום ביניהם; ושהם מוזמנים את הצדדים האחרים לסכסוך לפתוח בעת ובעונה אחת במשא-ומתן, ולחתום על חווי שלום דומים. במטרה להשיג שלום כולל באזור. המסגרת לחתימת חווה שלום בין מצרים ובין ישראל תנחה את המשא-ומתן לשלום ביניהם. הצדדים יסכימו על האופנים ועל לוח הזמנים לביצוע התחייבויותיהם לפי החווה.

## ג. עקרונות נלווים

1. מצרים וישראל מצהירות כי העקרונות וההוראות המתוארים להלן צריך שיחולו על חווי השלום בין ישראל ובין כל אחת משכנותיה – מצרים, ירדן, סוריה ולבנון.
2. החתומים יכוננו ביניהם מערכות יחסים שהן נורמליות לגבי מדינות השרויות בשלום האחת עם זולתה. לשם כך הם צריכים להתחייב לקיים את הוראותיה של מגילת האומות המאוחדות. הצעדים שיש לנקוטם לענין זה כוללים:

(א) הכרה מלאה

(ב) ביטול חרם כלכלי

(ג) מתן ערובות לכך כי בתחום שיפוטם ייהנו אזרחיהם של הצדדים האחרים מן ההגנה של הליכי משפט הוגנים.

3. החתומים צריכים לבדוק אפשרויות לפיתוח כלכלי בהקשר של חווי שלום סופיים. כדי לתרום לאוירת השלום. שיתוף הפעולה והירידות. שהיא מטרתם המשותפת.
4. ניתן להקים ועדות תביעות. לשם יישוב הדרי של כל תביעות כספיות.
5. ארצות-הברית תזמן להשתתף בשיחות על עניינים הקשורים באופני ביצועם של ההסכמים ועיבודו של לוח הזמנים להוצאה לפועל של התחייבויות הצדדים.
6. מועצת-הבטחון של האומות המאוחדות תתבקש לתמוך בחווי השלום ולהבטיח כי לא יפרו את הוראותיהם. החברות הקבועות של מועצת-הבטחון יתבקשו לאשר את חווי השלום, ולהבטיח כי

הוראותיהם יכובדו. הן גם יתבקשו להתאים את מדיניותן ופעולותיהן להתחייבויות הכלולות במסגרת זו.

בשם הריפובליקה הערבית של מצרים:

מוחמד אנואר אל-סאדאת  
 נשיא הרפובליקה הערבית של  
 מצרים

בשם ממשלת ישראל:

מנחם בגין  
 ראש ממשלת ישראל

ועד לחתימה: ג'ימי קרטר, נשיא ארצות-הברית של אמריקה

## נוסח החלטת מועצת הבטחון של האומות המאוחדות 242

מ-22 בנובמבר 1967. אומץ פה אחד במושב ה-1382.

## מועצת הבטחון.

בהביעה את דאגתה המתמדת למצב החמור במזרח-התיכון. בהטעימה כי אין להסכים לרכישת שטח על-ידי מלחמה וכי יש צורך לפעול למען שלום צודק ובר-קיימא שבו כל מדינה באיזור תוכל לחיות בבטחון. בהוסיפה להטעים כי כל המדינות החברות, בקבלן את מגילת האומות המאוחדות, נטלו על עצמן התחייבות לפעול בהתאם לסעיף 2 של המגילה.

1. מאשרת כי מימושם של עקרונות המגילה דורש כינונו של שלום צודק ובר-קיימא במזרח-התיכון. שעליו לכלול את החלתם של שני העקרונות דלקמן:

- (1) נסיגה של כוחות מזוינים ישראלים משטחים שנכבשו בסכסוך האחרון;
- (2) שימת קץ לכל טענות לוחמה או מצבי לוחמה וכיבוד ריבונותה, שלמותה הטריטוריאלית ועצמאותה המדינית של כל מדינה באיזור, וזכותה לחיות בשלום. בתוך גבולות בטוחים ומוכרים. חופשית מאיומים או ממעשים של שימוש בכוח;

2. מוסיפה ומאשרת את הצורך

(א) לערוב לחופש השיט דרך נתיבי מים בין-לאומיים באיזור;

(ב) להשיג ישוב צודק של בעית הפליטים;

(ג) לערוב לאי-פגיעה בשטחה של כל מדינה באיזור ולעצמאותה המדינית על-ידי אמצעים הכוללים כינונם של אזורים מפורזים;

3. מבקשת מאת המזכיר הכללי למנות נציג מיוחד אשר יצא למזרח-התיכון. לכונן ולקיים מגעים עם המדינות הנוגעות בדבר כדי לקדם הסכם ולסייע למאמצים להשיג הסדר מוסכם בדרכי שלום בהתאם להוראותיה ולעקרונותיה של החלטה זו;

4. מבקשת מאת המזכיר הכללי לדרוש למועצת הבטחון על ההתקדמות שבמאמצי הנציג המיוחד בכל ההקדם האפשרי.

נוסח החלטת מועצת הבטחון של האומות המאוחדות 338.  
אומץ על-ידי מועצת הבטחון במושב ה-1747, בימי 21 ו-22 באוקטובר 1973.

מועצת הבטחון,

1. קוראת לכל הצדדים ללחימה הקיימת לחדול מכל ירי ולשים קץ לכל פעילות צבאית מיד, לא יאוחר מ-12 שעות לאחר רגע אימוצה של החלטה זו, בעמדות שאותן הם תופסים עתה;
2. קוראת לכל הצדדים הנוגעים בדבר להתחיל מיד לאחר הפסקת האש בביצוע החלטת מועצת הבטחון 242 (1967) על כל חלקיה;
3. מחליטה כי מיד ובעת ובעונה אחת עם הפסקת האש, יתחיל משא ומתן בין הצדדים הנוגעים בדבר, בחסות נאותה, שמטרתו לכונן שלום צודק ובר-קיימא במזרח התיכון.



## חילופי מכתבים בין נשיא ארצות-הברית, ראש ממשלת ישראל ונשיא מצרים

מכתב ראש ממשלת ישראל מנחם בגין אל נשיא ארצות הברית ג'ימי קרטר, 17.9.1978:

אדוני הנשיא,

אני מתכבד להודיעך כי במשך שבועיים ימים לאחר שובי הביתה אני הצעה לפני בית המחוקקים של ישראל (הכנסת) להחליט בשאלה דלקמן:

אם יוסכם במשך המשא ומתן לכריתת שלום בין ישראל ובין מצרים על כל הנושאים התלויים ועומדים, האם הנך בעד הוצאתם של המתיישבים הישראליים משטחי סיני הצפוניים והדרומיים, או שאתה בעד השארתם של המתיישבים הנזכרים בשטחים אלה.

ההצבעה, אדוני הנשיא, על שאלה זו תהא חופשית לחלוטין מן המשמעת המפלגתית הפרלמנטרית הרגילה. כך שאף על פי שהקואליציה נתמכת עתה על ידי 70 מ-120, כל חבר כנסת, כפי שאני מאמין, הן מספסלי הממשלה והן מספסלי האופוזיציה, יוכל להצביע בהתאם למצפונו.

בכנות,

מנחם בגין

מכתב ההעברה של נשיא ארצות-הברית ג'ימי קרטר אל נשיא מצרים אנואר אל סאדאת, 22.9.78:

אדוני הנשיא,

אני מעביר בזאת העתק מכתב אלי מאת ראש הממשלה בגין, המפרט כיצד הוא מציע להציג את שאלת ישובי סיני לפני הכנסת לשם החלטתה.

בקשר לכך, אני מבין ממכתבך, כי אישור הכנסת לפינויים של כל המתיישבים הישראליים מסיני בהתאם ללוח זמנים תוך התקופה שפורשה לשם הוצאתו אל הפועל של חוזה השלום היא דרישה מוקדמת לכל משא ומתן בדבר חוזה שלום בין מצרים ובין ישראל.

בכנות,

ג'ימי קרטר

לוט: מכתב מאת ראש ממשלת ישראל מנחם בגין

מכתב נשיא מצרים אנואר אל סאדאת אל נשיא ארצות-הברית ג'ימי קרטר, 17.9.78:

אדוני הנשיא,

בקשר ל"מסגרת להסדר בסיני", העומדת להחתם היום, הייתי רוצה לשוב ולאשר את עמדתה של הרפובליקה הערבית של מצרים לגבי הישובים:



1. כל המתיישבים הישראליים חייבים להיות מפונים מסיני בהתאם ללוח זמנים תוך התקופה שפורטה לשם הוצאתו אל הפועל של חוזה השלום.
2. הסכמתם של ממשלת ישראל ושל מוסדותיה החוקתיים לעיקרון יסודי זה היא איפה דרישה מוקדמת לפתיחתו של משא ומתן לשלום לשם כריתתו של חוזה שלום.
3. אם לא תמלא ישראל אחרי התחייבות זו, תהא ה"מסגרת" בטלה וחסרת תוקף.

בכנות,

מוחמד אנואר אל סאדאת

**מכתב ההעברה של נשיא ארצות-הברית ג'ימי קרטר לראש ממשלת ישראל מנחם בגין, 22.9.1978:**

אדוני ראש הממשלה,

קיבלתי את מכתבך מן ה-17 בספטמבר 1978, המתאר כיצד הנך מתכוון להניח את שאלת עתידם של הישובים הישראליים בסיני לפני הכנסת, לשם החלטתה. לוט העתק ממכתבו של הנשיא סאדאת בנושא זה.

בכנות,

ג'ימי קרטר

לוט: מכתב מאת הנשיא סאדאת

**מכתב נשיא מצרים אנואר אל סאדאת לנשיא ארה"ב ג'ימי קרטר, 17.9.1978:**

אדוני הנשיא,

אני כותב לך כדי לשוב ולאשר את עמדתה של הרפובליקה הערבית של מצרים לגבי ירושלים:

1. ירושלים הערבית היא חלק בלתי נפרד מן הגדה המערבית. יש לכבד ולהשיב זכויות ערביות חוקיות והיסטוריות בעיר.
2. ירושלים הערבית צריכה להיות בריבונות ערבית.
3. התושבים הפלשתינאיים של ירושלים הערבית זכאים להשתמש בזכויותיהם הלאומיות הלגיטימיות, בהיותם חלק מן העם הפלשתינאי בגדה המערבית.
4. יש להחיל לגבי ירושלים את החלטות מועצת הבטחון השייכות לענין, ובמיוחד החלטה 242 ו-267. כל הצעדים שנקטה ישראל כדי לשנות את מעמדה של העיר הם אין ואפס ויש לבטלם.
5. לכל העמים צריכה להיות גישה חופשית לעיר והם צריכים להנות מחופש הפולחן והזכות לבקר במקומות הקדושים, ולעבור אליהם, בלא הבחנה או הפליה.
6. המקומות הקדושים של כל אמונה יכול שיועמדו תחת המינהל והפיקוח של נציגיה.
7. פעילויות חיוניות בעיר צריכות להיות בלתי מחולקות, ומועצה עירונית משותפת המורכבת

ממספר שווה של חברים ערביים וישראליים, יכולה לפקח על ביצוען של פעילויות אלה. בדרך זו תהא העיר בלתי מחולקת.

בכנות,

מוחמד אנואר אל סאדאת

**מכתב ראש ממשלת ישראל מנחם בגין לנשיא ארצות-הברית ג'ימי קרטר, 17.9.1978:**

אדוני הנשיא,

אני מתכבד להודיעך, אדוני הנשיא, כי ביום 28 ביוני 1967 פירסם וקיבל בית הנבחרים של ישראל (הכנסת) חוק לאמור:

"המשפט, השיפוט והמינהל של המדינה יחולו בכל שטח של ארץ ישראל שהממשלה קבעה בצו." על יסוד חוק זה נתנה ממשלת ישראל צו ביולי 1967, כי ירושלים הנה עיר אחת, שאינה ניתנת לחלוקה, בירת מדינת ישראל.

בכנות,

מנחם בגין

**מכתב נשיא ארצות-הברית ג'ימי קרטר לנשיא מצרים אנואר אל סאדאת, 22.9.1978:**

אדוני הנשיא,

קיבלתי את מכתבך מן ה-17 בספטמבר 1978, המפרש את עמדת מצרים לגבי ירושלים. אני מעביר העתק מאותו מכתב אל ראש הממשלה בגין, לידיעתו.

עמדת ארצות הברית לגבי ירושלים נשארה כפי שהצהירו עליה השגריר גולדברג בעצרת הכללית של האומות המאוחדות, ביום 14 ביולי 1967, ולאחר מכן השגריר יוסט, במועצת הבטחון של האומות המאוחדות, ביום 1 ביולי 1969.

בכנות,

ג'ימי קרטר

**מכתב נשיא מצרים אנואר אל סאדאת לנשיא ארצות-הברית ג'ימי קרטר, לגבי התחייבות מצרים לנהל מו"מ על יהודה ושומרון גם ללא הצטרפות ירדן למשא ומתן, 17.9.1978:**

אדוני הנשיא,

בקשר ל"מסגרת לשלום כמזרח התיכון" אני פונה אליך במכתב זה, כדי להודיע על עמדת הריפובליקה הערבית של מצרים לגבי ביצועו של ההסדר הכולל.

כדי להבטיח את ביצוען של ההוראות הקשורות בגדה המערבית ובעזה, וכדי להגן על הזכויות הלגיטימיות של העם הפלשתינאי, תהא מצרים מוכנה ליטול על עצמה את התפקיד הערבי הנובע מהוראות אלה, בעקבות התיעצויות עם ירדן ונציגי העם הפלשתינאי.

בכנות,

מוחמד אנואר אל סאדאת

מכתב נשיא ארצות-הברית ג'ימי קרטר לראש ממשלת ישראל מנחם בגין על הגדרת המונחים "העם  
הפלשתינאי" ו"הגדה המערבית", 22.9.1978:

אדוני ראש הממשלה,

אני מאשר בזאת כי הודעת לי את האמור לקמן:

- א. בכל פסקה שבמסמך המסגרת המוסכם, הביטויים "פלשתינאים" או "העם הפלשתינאי"  
מפורטים ומובנים, ויפורשו ויוכנו על ידך כ"ערביי ארץ ישראל".  
ב. בכל פסקה שבה מופיע הביטוי "גדה מערבית", הוא מובן ויוכן על ידי ממשלת ישראל כיהודה  
ושומרון.

בכנות,

ג'ימי קרטר





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 1, 1975

SECRET

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to inform you that the U.S. recognizes that the Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement entailing withdrawal from vital areas in the Sinai constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace and imposes additional heavy military and economic burdens on Israel.

I want to assure you that the U.S. will make every effort to be fully responsive within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation on an ongoing and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements as well as to Israel's economic aid needs, all of this based on the requests submitted by Israel, joint studies and previous U.S. Presidential undertakings.

Further to those undertakings, it is my resolve to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs. Realizing as I do the importance

SECRET



of the Interim Agreement to the Middle Eastern situation as a whole, the U.S. will make every possible effort to assist in the establishment of conditions in which the Agreement will be observed without being subjected to pressures or deadlines.

In the spirit of the special relationship existing between the United States and Israel and in light of the determination of both sides to avoid a situation in which the U.S. and Israel would pursue divergent courses in peace negotiations, the U.S. will take the position that these are negotiations between the parties. As I indicated to you in our conversation on 12 June 1975, the situation in the aftermath of the Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement will be one in which the overall settlement can be pursued in a systematic and deliberate way and does not require the U.S. to put forward an overall proposal of its own in such circumstances. Should the U.S. desire in the future to put forward proposals of its own, it will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to refraining from putting forth proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.

The U.S. will support the position that an overall settlement with Syria in the framework of a peace agreement must assure Israel's security from attack from the Golan Heights. The U.S. further supports the position that a just and lasting peace, which remains our objective, must be acceptable to both sides. The U.S. has not developed a final position on the borders. Should it do so it will give great weight to Israel's position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights. My view in this regard was stated in our conversation of September 13, 1974.

Sincerely,



Gerald R. Ford

His Excellency  
Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister of Israel

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE  
GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND  
THE UNITED STATES

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The Geneva Peace Conference

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1. The Geneva Peace Conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the United States and Israel.

\* 2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva Peace Conference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the Conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants.

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SECRET

-2-

3. The United States will make every effort to ensure at the Conference that all the substantive negotiations will be on a bilateral basis.

X 4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose.

5. The United States will seek to ensure that the role of the cosponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Government and the Government of Israel of December 20, 1973.

6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure that the Conference will be conducted in a manner consonant with the objectives of this document and with the declared purpose of the Conference, namely the advancement of a negotiated peace between

HC  
Y.A

SECRET

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Israel and each one of its neighbors.

Yigal Allon  
Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of Israel

Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of State

For the Government of  
the United States

K  
Y.A. -