

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

12

משרד

משרד רוה"מ

אלף חז"ל

ארה"מ

20/10/90 - 11/10/90

תיק מס'

תיק מס'

11

מחלקה

שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב
מזהה פיוז: 4612/11-א
מזהה פריט: R00036q
כתובת: 2-111-2-4-9
תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 15062

*תאריך: 20.10.90

* ** נכנס
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סודי ביותר

*דף 1 מתוך 1
*עווק 1 מתוך 1

*חוזם: 10,15062

*אל: המשרד
*יעדים: נ"י/2101, רהמט/1036, בטחון/1645, מצב/1349, אביב/1170, מנמט/891
*מ-: ווש, נר: 2167, תא: 191090, זח: 1830, דח: ב, סג: סב
*תח: ג: ארבל
*נד: ג

א/כה 1

*סודי ביותר / בהול לבוקר

*אל: ממנכ"ל

*דע: השגריר-נאו"מ, לשכת רוה"מ, מצפ"א

*מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

*הנדון: מועבי"ט

*1. שוחחתי טלפונית עם ע. מזכיר קלי ועם דניס רוס כדי להעלות בפניהם החומרה שבהתייעצויות מועבי"ט והמשך הדיון שם בסוגיית דו"ח המזכ"ל.

*2. קלי ורוס ציינו הפתעתם מהיוזמה לקיים התייעצויות במועבי"ט ולדבריי רוס, התפתחות זו היא UPSETTING כאשר מתכוונים לעבוד עם נשיא המועצה (שגריר בריטניה), כדי לרחות את הדיון. אינם בטוחים בהצלחתם, אך יעשו כל מאמץ.

*3. הוספתי, שחשוב שמועבי"ט תמנע מהחלטה כדי לאפשר זמן נוסף לפתרון הנושא. רוס ציין שההצעה שהבאתי בשיחתי עם איגלברג נראית לו מועילה ומהווה מוצא אפשרי מהמשבר, חזר על כך שיעשה כל מאמץ, אך לא יכול היה להבטיח דבר.

*4. קלי מצידו הוסיף שינחו פיקרינג לפעול בהתאם עם מזכ"ל האו"מ.

*שובל.

17

*תפ: שהח(2), סשהח(1), רהמט(0), שהבט(0), מנכל(1), ממנכל(1), ר/מרכז(2), רמ(0), אמן(1), בנצור(1), מצפא(1), ארבל(1), סייבל(1), סולטן(1), הדט(1)

750 6406
מספר טלפון משרד הקשר: 00972-02-52370007

CONTACT: HARRIET MANDEL (212) 983-4800
MICHAEL S. MILLER (212) 627-0005FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 18, 1990

001226 147 2/5

**JEWISH CONCERN FOR U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS
PROMPTS RALLIES THROUGHOUT NEW YORK**

THERE IS GROWING CONCERN WITHIN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY THAT AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IS LESSENING AND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS WILLING TO COMPROMISE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL FOR MAINTAINING AN ARAB BASED COALITION AGAINST IRAQ.

MANY CONSIDER THE ADMINISTRATION'S BACKING OF A BIASED ANTI-ISRAEL U.N. RESOLUTION; SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER'S COMPARISON OF ISRAEL'S POSSIBLE REJECTION OF A U.N. MISSION TO JERUSALEM TO ACTIONS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN; AND PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER'S COLD SHOULDER TO ISRAELI LEADERS AND WARM EMBRACE OF ARAB RULERS, AS SIGNALS OF A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL. ADDITIONALLY, IT IS DEEPLY TROUBLING THAT ONCE AGAIN THE SOVEREIGNTY OF JERUSALEM HAS BEEN THROWN INTO QUESTION.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF NEW YORK MUST SPEAK OUT WHEN WE PERCEIVE ANY SENSE OF EROSION IN THE TIME HONORED BOND BETWEEN OUR COUNTRY AND ISRAEL. RECENT EVENTS SHOULD NOT UPSET THIS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP. WE CALL UPON THE ADMINISTRATION TO UNEQUIVOCALLY REAFFIRM THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL IN WORD AND IN DEED.

THE FRUSTRATION AND ANGER OF OUR COMMUNITY IS BEING CHANNIELED INTO VARIOUS EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL THROUGHOUT THE METROPOLITAN AREA.

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF RALLIES SCHEDULED FOR SUNDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1990:

THE RALLIES WILL BE ADDRESSED BY NOTED CIVIC AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS, CONGRESSMEN, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES.

(MORE)

**MEMBER
ORGANIZATIONS,
NEW YORK
AFFILIATES
OF THE:**American Gathering And Federation of Jewish
Students Bar Mitzvah
American Jewish Congress
American Jewish Congress
American Sephardi Federation
Amos '90
Association Manhattan Jewish Community Council
Israel Jewish Council of the City of New YorkAssociation of Orthodox Jewish Community Councils
Council of Jewish Organizations of New York
Council of Jewish Organizations of Pennsylvania
Regional Jewish Community Council
Jewish Community Council of Chicago
Council of Jewish Organizations of Pittsburgh
Jewish Community Council of Albany CityJudeo Arab Alliance
Lilva Jewish Alliance
NAMA (USA)
National Council for Labor Jewry
Nevada - Hispanic Jewish Organization
National Council of Jewish Women
National Council of Young Israel

BRONX

10:15 a.m. THE HEBREW INSTITUTE OF RIVERDALE
3700 HENRY HUDSON PARKWAY
RIVERDALE, N.Y.

9/5

CONTACT: RABBI AVI WEISS
(212) 796-4730

001226 147

MANHATTAN

12:00 p.m. IN FRONT OF A.B.C. NEWS HEADQUARTERS
7 WEST 66TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.

CONTACT: DR. KEN KELLNER (ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA)
(212) 752-1757

5:00 p.m. AT CONGREGATION KEHILLATH JESHURUN
125 EAST 85TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.

CONTACT: RABBI HASKELL LOOKSTEIN
(212) 427-1000

QUEENS

2:00 p.m. IN FRONT OF VLEIGH PLACE LIBRARY
MAIN STREET AND 72ND AVE.
KEW GARDENS HILLS, N.Y.

CONTACT: RABBI FABIAN SCHOENFELD
(718) 261-9723

BROOKLYN

7:30 p.m. YESHIVAH OF FLATBUSH
1607 AVENUE J
BROOKLYN, N.Y.

CONTACT: RABBI MELVIN BURG
RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF FLATBUSH
(718) 951-8585

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The Jewish Community Relations Council of New York is the coordinating and resource body for 63 Jewish organizations in the New York metropolitan area.

Zionist Organization of America

Office of the President

4
October 16, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

001226 / 47

Dear Mr. President:

I respectfully write to express our concern about the initiative taken by the United States in the United Nations to condemn the State of Israel as a result of the violence perpetrated by a mob which attacked innocent worshipers in the holy city of Jerusalem. This sends an unfortunate message to the world.

The Zionist Organization of America strongly supported your correct and courageous decision that Saddam Hussein's oppression against Kuwait could not be accepted by the world community.

Mr. President, we fully agree with your insistence that there is no linkage between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the problem of the Palestinian Arabs. Unfortunately, the initiative the United States has taken in the United Nations undermines its credibility for in an effort to preserve the coalition it has formed in the Middle East, it has harmed a loyal ally and distracted attention from Iraq's perfidious behavior.

The United States and the nations of the world joined in formulating a resolution critical of Israel. They have permitted themselves to be exploited by a plan which undoubtedly was conceived by Saddam Hussein in concert with Yasir Arafat and the PLO. As a consequence, the anger of the world today is misdirected at Jerusalem and not Baghdad.

The loss of life in the Jerusalem confrontation is regrettable. At the same time, those who turned to violence took the risk of its consequences. Permit me to repeat the question posed by our Executive Vice President to Egypt's Ambassador to Washington, with whom he met this past week--"When 50 policemen in your country are confronted by a frenzied mob of 2-3,000 people who have no regard for their own lives, how do you contain the situation with 'restraint'". Egypt's representative had no answer. Mr. President, the same question can be asked of any police official in the United States, or that of any other nation. We believe that the standard of behavior expected of Israel is not only unrealistic but terribly unfair and unjustified. We regret that the U.S. rushed to condemn Israel in the U.N. before evidence was ascertained and verified.

The President

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October 16, 1990

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Mr. President, you are aware of the dramatic reduction in the level of violence in the territories due primarily to Israel's sincere desire to avoid bloodshed based on a non-confrontational strategy developed by Defense Minister Moshe Arens.

Mr. President, the decision by the United States to be critical of Israel under these circumstances at this point in time, may seriously damage the stature of the United States as being the champion of world morality.

Mr. President, the United States should reaffirm its special ties with Israel so that its action taken at the United Nations should not be misinterpreted as a diminution in the long and trusted relationship both countries enjoy.

Respectfully yours,

Sidney Silverman
Sidney Silverman
President

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למ/א

שמור/מידי

אל:מצפ"א

מאת:ציר לקונגרס

1227

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הנדון:תיקון הסנטורים דול-בירד לחוק סיוע חוץ.

1. מנהיג המיעוט ויושב ראש ועדת ההקצבות הציעו תיקון (נא ראה סעיף 4) אשר נדחה (tabled על ידי הסנטור קסטן) ברוב של 8:90.

2. המצדדים בחוק: דול, בירד, וואלוף, מקלור, גארן, ג'פורדס, קטבאום ופריור.

3. הרוב העצום נגד הגשת התיקון מכטא הסתייגות מן הטון הצורם, מן ההתייחסות לאיזורים בירושלים כהתנחלויות, מן הקשר השקוף בין החלטת 242 וירושלים. ההסתייגות גם נובעת מן ההכרה כי התיקון מנוגד לרוח ולשון "החלטת ירושלים" של מויניאהן ובשוויץ (20.3.90). ובמיוחד מן התחושה כי לשון התיקון ועיתויו יחריפו יחסי הממשל - ירושלים במקום לצנן הרוחות.

4. יוזמי התיקון הניחו כי ההסתייגות הרווחת ב"גבעה" ממדיניות ההתנחלות, תתורגם לתמיכה בתיקון. יש המשערים כי העלאת התיקון היותה תחליף לתיקונים דומים בנושאי ה- drawdown authority, ומאגרי הנפט (הכלולים בחוקי סיוע חוץ ותקציב הפנטגון), אם כי מוקדם לקבוע כי התיקונים האלה ירדו מעל הפרק. השערה אחרת, אשר כנראה אינה מבוססת, מעריכה כי התיקון נועד לשרת את מגמת הממשל. יתכן ומדובר ב"חיסול השכונות" גרידא, או פשוט מאד באמונת מציעי החוק בצדקתו.

5. עיקרי התיקון המצ"ל: איכלוס מזרח ירושלים (המהווה, אליכא ד'דול-בירד, איזור התנחלויות) מנוגד לרוח וכוונות 242, 338, 339; מדיניות התמריצים להתנחלויות חדשות מנוגדת אף היא להחלטות אלו; החלטת ועדת השרים מעודדת ישוב "פליטים יהודים" מכרית המועצות במזרח ירושלים, ומנוגדת ליעוד ערכויות הדיור שלא נועדו ליישב את יהודי בריה"מ בשטחים שמעבר ל"קו הירוק". הכוללים גם את מזרח ירושלים; הנשיא ידווח לוועדות הקונגרס על פעילות ההתנחלויות, מימוןן, תמריציהן, ומספרי המתנחלים; הדיווח יעודכן מידי 120 יום.

אטינגר

- 7 -

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the number '2' and various illegible scribbles.

PROPOSED DOLE/BYRD AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN AID BILL

It has been the longstanding policy of the United States to support UN Resolutions 242, 338 and 339 relating to the peaceful resolution of differences in the Middle East and to oppose actions by any party which are contrary to the intent or spirit of those resolutions.

The Congress believes that official Israeli governmental subsidies or other incentives for new settlements in any of the occupied territories are contrary to the intent or spirit of those resolutions, and do not advance the prospects for peace in the region.

The Congress regrets the October 14, 1990 decision of a Subcommittee of the Israeli cabinet to encourage an increase in the settlement of Soviet Jewish refugees in East Jerusalem. This decision is contrary to the October 2, 1990 assurance provided by Israel in conjunction with the U.S. guarantee of \$400 million in loans for the construction of housing for Soviet refugees not to direct or settle Soviet Jews beyond the "Green Line", which the U.S. believes includes East Jerusalem.

Within 60 days after enactment the President shall report to the Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Appropriations Committees of the Congress on settlement activity in all occupied territory. The report shall include a detailed assessment of Israeli law, government policies, financial subsidies, or other incentives for new settlements in any of the occupied territories, and on the number of Israeli citizens residing there. The report shall specifically address any commitment made to the U.S. government by the Israeli government in regard to settlement policies in the course of negotiation over the loan guarantee program for housing enacted in PL101-302. The report shall also assess whether U.S. sources of goods and services including advisory services are able to compete equitably for contracts let by the Israeli government for housing or other activities underwritten by funds obtained under the aforementioned loan-guarantee program. The report shall be updated every 120 days.

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2/2

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

1/3 1221
אריה

אל: מצפ"א

מאח: ק. לקונגרס

LINKAGE

מצי"ל מכתב DEAR COLLEAGUE של הסנטורים גראסלי (רפוב'), ולאוסנב (דמוק') השולל את הנדון.

יורם אטינגר

-7-

לה שיהי אצלך
רביה הסברה
האזנה
בנין
ההד
אריה

REPLY TO:

- 128 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1801
(202) 224-3744
TTY: (202) 224-4478
- 721 FEDERAL BUILDING
210 WALNUT STREET
DES MOINES, IA 50308-2140
(515) 284-4890
- 208 FEDERAL BUILDING
101 1ST STREET S E
DES MOINES, IA 50301-1227
(515) 283-8822

2/3 1221

United States Senate

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1501

October 19, 1990

REPLY TO:

- 103 FEDERAL COURTHOUSE BUILDING
820 8TH STREET
SIOUX CITY, IA 51101-1244
(712) 232-1860
- 210 WATERLOO BUILDING
521 COMMERCIAL STREET
WATERLOO, IA 50701-5497
(319) 232-8887
- 118 FEDERAL BUILDING
131 E. 4TH STREET
DAVENPORT, IA 52801-1813
(319) 322-4331

Dear Colleague:


We write to urge you to join us in a letter to the President commending him for his commitment to keep the Persian Gulf crisis separate from any other conflict in the region. In the midst of the Persian Gulf crisis, Saddam Hussein and his supporters are trying to shift the world's attention away from his unjustifiable aggression and occupation of Kuwait toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A careful examination of history refutes the validity of any linkage of the two issues. Iraq occupies Kuwait as a result of an entirely unprovoked aggression of a stronger power against a weaker one for financial and territorial gain. In contrast, Israel's presence on the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted from a war of aggression launched by Arab armies to destroy her.

Any linkage of the issue would play into the hands of Saddam Hussein. It would also divert world attention from his egregious and unprovoked attack.

This letter reaffirms our steadfast opposition to any linkage. If you would like to sign the letter, please let us know or have your staff contact Diana Rubin (Lautenberg) at 4-6822 or Diane Cohen (Grassley) at 4-6736.

Sincerely,


FRANK R. LAUTENBERG


CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

1221
3/3

October 19, 1990

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We commend your statement that it is United States policy to keep the Persian Gulf crisis separate from any other conflict in the region. We urge you to remain steadfast in this policy as Saddam Hussein and his supporters try to shift the world's attention away from his unjustifiable aggression and occupation of Kuwait toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A careful examination of history refutes the validity of any linkage of the two issues. Iraq occupies Kuwait as a result of an entirely unprovoked aggression of a stronger power against a weaker one for financial and territorial gain. In contrast, Israel's presence on the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted from a war of aggression launched by Arab armies to destroy her. In defending her very existence, Israel repelled the invading troops and captured territories.

We believe that the crisis created by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait must be addressed and resolved on its own terms, separately from other conflicts in the region. Linkage plays directly into Saddam's hands. It would only divert world attention from his egregious acts and divide the consensus you have so carefully constructed in opposition to Iraqi actions.

We will remain steadfast in our opposition to any linkage between the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict. We understand this to be your view and hope it will continue.

Sincerely,


FRANK R. LAUTENBERG


CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

אאא, חוזם: 14182

אל: רהמש/982

מ-: ווש, נר: 2154, תא: 181090, זח: 2300, חמ: סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / מיידי

מ/ס 2

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: לשכת שה'ח, לשכת רוה'מ

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

פגישת השגריר - ס/מזכיר במדינה איגלברגר (18.10)

1. השגריר נפגש עם איגלברגר ומסר לו עותק כתב האמנתו.

● בפגישה השתתפו: קרצר, נציג טקס, עוזרי איגלברגר, והח'מ.

3. הנושאים העיקריים שעלו בשיחה היו: שיגור שליח המזכ'ל, נושא ירושלים והתקשורת בין במימשל לממ' ישראל.

4. להלן סיכום השיחה:

א. לאחר שאיחל לשגריר הצלחה במילוי תפקידו, ציין איגלברגר כי 'אנו עוברים כעת תקופה קשה'. הביע תקווה שאנו מבינים עד כמה סדר יומו של הממשל עמוס, כאשר משבר המפרץ אינו הנושא המרכזי. עיקר המאמץ כיום מتركז בנושא התקציב.

ב. בתגובה לדברי איגלברגר על כך שגם סדר יומה של ירושלים עמוס הביע השגריר חשש מכך שאנו (ארה'ב וישראל) עלולים להכנס לתסבוכת אלא אם כן, נמצא דרך לצאת מכך בעוד מועד. לשתי המדינות צריך להיות אינטרס לצנן את האוירה.

ג. בהתייחסו להחלטת מועב'יט בהקשר לנושא השליח העלה השגריר הצעה פרטית אותה יעלה עם רוה'מ במידה ויקבל מהם תגובה חיובית.

● להלן פרטי ההצעה: עם פרסום מסקנות ועדת הבדיקה או בסמוך לפרסומן (השגריר העריך שהועדה תסיים עבודתה תוך שבוע או פחות), יצא יו'ר הועדה, או פקיד בכיר לניו יורק כדי למסור הדו'ח למזכ'ל האו'מ. במידה שלמזכ'ל (לאחר עיון בדו'ח) יהיו שאלות יוכל לשגר איש מטעמו לישראל לקבלת הבהרות.

ה. השגריר הבהיר, כי שיגור שליח בניגוד לרצון ממ' ישראל יחייב תגובה מצד רוה'מ. השגריר ציין כי מודע לקיומה של הצעה לשגר שליח אשר, להוציא את ממשלת ישראל, יפגש בין היתר עם פלסטינאים וארגוני ז'א. סבור שהצעה זו הינה COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. מקווה שניתן עדיין לעצור הצעה זו ולהתקדם בכיוון שהציע.

ו. איגלברגר ביקש שהות להתייעץ על כך עם כמה אנשים כולל עם המזכיר. תגובתו הטנטאטיבית היא שהסיכוי לאימוץ הצעת השגריר על רקע הלחץ בניו יורק קטן. הוסיף כי יש בניו-יורק מדינות שממתינות לתשובתה השלילית של ממ' ישראל כפי שיוכלו לבחון העלאת הצעות החלטה שיטילו סנקציות. להערכתו הצעת השגריר לא תסיר הלחץ.

ז. קרצר הביע גם כן ספק לגבי האפשרות שההצעה תקל הלחץ. הוסיף כי המידע לגבי האירועים ברפיח יגבירו עוד יותר את הלחץ בניו-יורק. על כך הגיב השגריר כי אם אכן זה המצב, כי אז כל שבוע נזכה לכינוס מועבי'ט באמתלה זו או אחרת. איגלברגר הגיב באמרו שאכן המדובר ב - VICIOUS CIRCLE.

ח. השגריר התייחס למציאות הפוליטית הפנימית בישראל.

ט. איגלברגר בתגובה ציין כי מבין את האילוצים המופעלים על רוח'מ. לדבריו היעדר פתרון עלול להוביל חלק מהמדינות המעורבות בפעילות במפרץ, וכאלה שאינן מעורבות ליצור לינקאז' (בין המפרץ למזה'ת). זאת ועוד, חלק מהמדינות האירופאיות תראינה בסירוב ישראל הזדמנות לנסות ולממש מדיניותן.

י. השגריר הביע הערכתו לטון המרגיע של דברי המזכיר בעדותו אתמול (17.10) בסנאט.

יא. אינו בטוח האם המימשל (או חלקים ממנו) מודעים לכך שרוה'מ הינו האיש שבסופו של דבר מקבל את ההחלטות. השגריר התייחס לקצר בתקשורת הקיים בין הנשיא לרוה'מ. סבור שיש לעשות מאמץ ולתקן מצב עניינים זה.

יב. איגלברגר בתגובה עמד על הצורך בדיאלוג כן וגלוי עם. מודע לכך שרוה'מ הוא שמקבל את ההחלטות. הוסיף כי חש מזה זמן שהתקשורת בין הממשל וממשלת ישראל טעונה תיקון. לדבריו אין טעם להתעסק בסיבות לכך. במקום זה יש לעשות מאמץ ולתקן המצב. מעוניין לשוחח על כך עם השגריר. הוסיף כי הערכתו חוסר היכולת להסביר עמדות היא בעיה הדדית וכי דרושה רמה מסוימת של עידון (FINESSE). חזר על כך שהתקשורת הלקויה הינה בעיה רצינית אותה יש לנסות ולתקן.

יג. בהתייחסו לבעית ירושלים הדגיש איגלברגר הצורך להמנע מדיון פומבי בנושא. ציין כי מבין רגישות נושא ירושלים בישראל. מקווה שנוכל להגיע להדברות שקטה בנושא.

יד. השגריר הדגיש כי ירושלים אינה נושא לויכוח בישראל. (NOT DEBATABLE) להערכתו חלק מהמחלוקת בנושא היתה נמנעת אילו היו מדברים פחות. מבין שזו גם עמדת המזכיר שאותה העביר לידיעת שה'ח לפני כתיבת מכתבו למזכיר. כעת הוסיף השגריר יש לנסות ולהשקיט הנושא. עד כאן באשר לנושאי השיחה העיקריים.

טו. לדיון בנושאים לעיל קדמה שיחה כללית במהלכה ציין איגלברגר כי מאחורי המשבר בנושא התקציר מסתתרים חילוקי דעות בסיסיים ביחס לגבי מערכת העדיפויות של ארה'ב. ויכוח זה, מחריף על רקע השיפור שחל במישור הבינ'ל בעקבות סיום המלחמה הקרה.

יז. איגלברגר העריך כי הדיון לגבי מערכת העדיפויות של המדיניות האמריקאית משך עוד זמן מה. צופה שבסיום הדיון יגיעו למסקנה שיצטרכו להפנות יותר משאבים לנושאי פנים מאשר לנושאי חוץ.

יז. איגלברגר הסכים לדברי השגריר על כך שהמשבר הנוכחי מצביע על כך שבמערכת השלטונית יש יותר בלמים ופחות איזונים. לדבריו המדובר בתופעה שכיחה בפוליטיקה האמריקאית בהבדל אחר והוא שבעבר לא היו לכך השלכות בינ'ל והיום יש לכך (השלכות). הוסיף כי מאז וייטנאם נמצא מוסד הנשיאות במצור. נשיאים רבים סבלו מכך וכיום תורו של בוש.

יח. לסכום נושא זה הביע איגלברגר תקווה ש-דיון בשאלה לאן פני ארה'ב יסתיים בכי טוב.

עד כאן תוכן השיחה שנמשכה כ-45 דקות והתנהלה באוירה ידידותית.

שטיין

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אאא, חוזם: 13805

אל: רהמש/959

מ-: ווש, נר: 2145, תא: 181090, זח: 1310, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי - בהול לבוקר

אל: ממנכ'ל

דע: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

בעקבות החלטת מועבי'ט

בהמשך ל- 2129 מ- 16.10

1. קרצר התקשר הבוקר (18.10) כדי למסור שהרעיונות אותם העלה בשיחתו עמו (ראה מברק לעיל) באופן לא פורמלי קיבלו גושפנקא רשמית. סיפר כי בכונת פיקרינג להציג עמדתם בפני ביין.

(הערה: עדכנתי את ביין אשר בנתיים שוחח עם פיקרינג).

2. למען הסדר הטוב חזר על עמדתם ולפיה:

- א. ארה'ב לא ויתרה על רעיון שיגור שליח
- ב. אינם עומדים על כך שהשליח יתקבל ע'י ממ' ישראל
- ג. השליח אינו יכול לבוא כתייר
- ד. השליח אינו חייב להגיע 'היום או מחר'. ניתן לתאם מועד ביקורו בסמוך לפרסום דו"ח הועדה הבודקת.

עד כאן

שטיין

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

סססס

ארה"ב

אאא, חוזם: 14154

אל: רהמש/973

מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 438, תא: 181090, זח: 1847, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/בהול

1/10/73

אל: מנהל מצפא, בנצור סמנכל, לשכת השר

דע: השגריר, פלג, וושינגטון

ביין - נאום

מאת: מרדכי ידיד - ס.קונכל ניו יורק

אירועי הר הבית והחלטת מועביט

1. להלן מפגישת ראשי ועידת הנשיאים עם פקרינג היום (18/10) לאחר שיחות קיימתי עם מספר משתתפים כולל סימור רייך.

א. פיקרינג אמר כי על אף העיצות שקיבל מהסובבים אותו שימנע מעימות עם המנהיגים היהודיים, החליט לבוא לפגישה משום שהוא סבור שהדיאלוג עם צריך להימשך. סקר באריכות הרקע להחלטת מועביט והדגיש במיוחד שתי נקודות שחברו יחדיו ואילצו אותם להצביע בעד החלטת מועביט. שימוש בנשק חם, פגיעה במקומות הקדושים. אמר כי ארה"ב עשתה מאמצים רבים לרכז ההחלטה, ועל ישראל לקבל המשלחת. חזר על נימוקי בייקר ואמר כי קיימת מבוכה בקרב הממשל האמריקאי ביחס לתגובת ישראל (אי ש'פ עם המשלחת). הדגיש כי אין לינקג' וכי תשומת הלב צריכה להיות ממוקדת על עיראק וכי הם מודאגים מהמשך ההתעסקות במועביט בסיכסוך הישראלי-פלסטינאי. פיקרינג יצא מגידרו לשכנע המנהיגים היהודים שעל ישראל לשתף פעולה עם המשלחת ואפילו בדרג נמוך.

ב. בשורה של הצהרות ושאלות הביעו ראשי ועידת הנשיאים בפני פיקרינג את כעסם ותסכולם מהמדיניות שבה נוקטת ארה"ב כלפי ישראל. כעס על התרחקות מישראל, הקרבת היחסים עם ישראל כדי להשביע רצון הערבים לשמור על הקואליציה הערבית. סימור רייך אמר לי לאחר הישיבה כי הוא לא שמע תגובת כעס עוצמתית כזאת מצידם של המנהיגים היהודיים נגד המימשל. פיקרינג נתבקש להעביר מסר לבוש ולבייקר ואין ספק שכך יעשה. בתשובה לשאלת סימור רייך כי נאום בוש בעצרת לא כלל התייחסות להחלטת האום בדבר ציונות/גזענות, אמר פיקרינג כי אכן היתה התייחסות כללית לכך בדברי בוש, ארהב החליטה לא לפעול לביטול ההחלטה משום שלא היה בטחון ברוב הדרוש. זו היתה לדבריו גם התחושה אצל הישראלים.

ג. פיקרינג לא מצא המנהיגים היהודיים מפוצלים וחלוקים בתמיכתם בישראל. יצא בתחושה כי לא השיג מטרתו.

3. לאחר הפגישה עם פיקרינג השיב סימור רייך לשאלות המשתתפים. אמר כי פגישות עם הנשיא ובייקר לא נקבעו עם ראשי ועידת הנשיאים ואולי הדבר מעיד על כך שהמימשל רוצה שגם הקהילה היהודית האמריקאית תשמור על פרופיל נמוך.

מרדכי ידיד

בנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל 2

סססס

אמה

אאא, חוזם: 14178

אל: רהמש/983

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 267, תא: 181090, זח: 2259, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס / מידי

אל : מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

הנדון: שימועים עם המזכיר בייקר

1. היום אמה"צ (18.10) הופיע המזכיר בפני וועדת החוץ של ביהנ"ב כדי לדווח על המשבר במפרץ. נוכחו כל חברי וועדת החוץ והאולם היה עמוס אף יותר מאשר אתמול בסנאט.

נאומו של המזכיר היה זהה לזה של אתמול ואף נמנע מלהקריאו.

3. הנושא הדומיננטי, כמו גם אתמול בסנאט, היה סמכויות הנשיא נהתי עצויות הקונגרס לגבי פעולה צבאית והכרזת מלחמה. כן נשאלו שאלות לגבי יעילות הסנקציות, הצעדים הבאים לפעילות דיפלומטית וצבאית, קואליצית המדינות ועוד. סיכום השימועים (בנושאים הלא ישראלים) והתמליל המלא יועברו בנפרד.

4. להלן מתוך פרק השאלות והתשובות הנוגעות לישראל:

רוס לטינן - מה הושג בביקורי שה"ח ושהב"ט בושינגטון.

בייקר - בשני הביקורים הושגו הסכמים לגבי סיוע ביטחוני מעבר ל-18 ביליון דולר.

הוסכם לשגר במהירות 2 סוללות פטריוט ששויים 114 מיליון דולר כדי לחזק את יכולת ההגנה האוירית הישראלית, 15 מטוסי F-15 ו-01 מסוקי HC-35. כ"כ הוחלט לזרז שיגור תחמושת להצבה מראש בשווי של 140 מיליון דולר.

רוס לטינן - האם זה יהיה BENEFICIAL מבחינת ייתרונה האיכותי של ישראל.

בייקר - בהחלט כן. תנו לי להוסיף שמחוייבותנו לבטחונה של ישראל ויתרונה האיכותי הוא חד משמעי. כמו כן מחוייבותנו לישראל לא קטנה אלא חוזקה ע"י נוכחותם של 200 אלף החיילים האמריקנים בסעודיה.

ברטון - ביקר בישראל ונכותל ויכול לאמוד את המצב שהתרחש ב 8/10. היו 3000 איש (פלסטינים) ואי אפשר היה להשתמש בגז מדמיע. מדוע אנו מגנים את ישראל? כאשר העיראקים השתמשו בנשק כימי נגד הכורדים לא היו החלטות או"ם, גם לא במקרים של אלימות בהודו - קשמיר (חבל פנגא'ב); אתיופיה מסוואה; ופעולות שונות של אש"פ. ISRAEL WAS SINLED OUT.

בייקר - גינינו את ישראל

BECAUSE WE WERE DEEPLY DISTURB BY THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE - היו 21 הרוגים ו-150 פצועים. כ"כ היינו מודאגים גם מהפגיעה במתפללים. היו שטענו שהצבענו בעד ההחלטה בגלל המשבר בעיראק ושמירת הקואליציה. היינו מצביעים כפי שהצבענו גם ללא המשבר בעיראק שכן חשבנו שיש לגנות זאת.

לארי סמית - האם קיימת הגבלה מוסרית בין מעשי סאדם לבין אירועי הר הבית.

בייקר - לא.

סמית - מדוע אם כך הזדרזה ארה"ב לששון את ההחלטה במועבי"ט, כדי לשמור על הקואליציה?

בייקר - כבר אמרתי שלא. היינו מצביעים בעד ההחלטה גם אם המשבר העיראקי לא היה. שכן לא יכולנו שלא לגנות את האירוע בו ראינו שימוש יתר בכוח.

סמית - למרות ההוכחות שהאירוע היה פרי תכנון מוקדם?

בייקר - איני בטוח שההוכחות אכן כאלה. מתקיימת עתה חקירה עם זאת התגובה היתה חמורה ותוצאותיה 21 הרוגים ו - 150 פצועים.

סמית - הביע צער על אובדן חיי אדם. חזר ואמר כי בייקר עצמו טוען שעדיין לא ברורות ההוכחות.

בייקר - יש מספיק הוכחות במספר הרוגים. סמית - אם אין הקבלה מוסרית, מדוע עשית כד במכתבך לשה"ח לוי. בייקר - לא עשיתי זאת.

סמית - ציטט מהמכתב.

בייקר - במכתב ציינתי שאני חושש שעלולים לעשות השוואה שלא בצדק אם ישראל לא תקבל את החלטת האו"ם. זהו מכתב פרטי שמישהו בממשלת ישראל החליט להדליפו. זה היה ניסיון להעביר מסר לידידי דויד לוי באופן פרטי על חששותי.

לויין - ביקש לקבל הבהרות לכך שארה"ב מתנגדת ללינקג'. בייקר - מפנה תשומת הלב להודעה הפומבית בנדון. תהיה זו טעות לעשות כן (לינקג'). גם הסובייטים והאחרים הצטרפו אלינו בעמדה זו.

לויין - מה עמדתך לגבי הצעת מיטראן. האם נכון יהיה לומר שזו איננה עמדתנו.

בייקר - נאמר לנו שהצעת מיטראן איננה חורגת מהחלטות האו"ם. אנו מקבלים זאת ולכן זה תואם את עמדת ארה"ב. בהמשך לשאלת לויין אמר בייקר כי המכתב לשה"ח לוי היה מסר פרטי שלא נועד ליצור לינקג'. לגבי נאום הנשיא או"ם, אמר הנשיא שלאחר פתרון בעיית עיראק, תהיינה הזדמנויות לפתור בעיות אחרות. אתה (לויין) ואני, תמכנו בקידום תהליך השלום והיית מן הדוחפים בנושא. לכן אינני חושב שקיים לינקג' אם אנו אומרים שיש לקדם את תהליך השלום.

לויין - מסכים לצורך בהפרדה. מקווה שכאשר המשבר במפרץ יסתיים תהליך השלום ינוע בקונטקסט של הכרה ערבית פומבית חד משמעית בישראל. האם אנו פועלים אצל מדינות ערב?

בייקר - ניסינו לקדם זאת עם מדינות ערב במשך 45-14 חודשים. זהו מרכיב חשוב בתהליך השגת השלום באיזור. כרגע לא מתקיימים דיונים מפורטים בנושא מסיבות מובנות (משבר במפרץ).

פיהן - שאל על סוריה.

בייקר - צופה לשת"פ בעתיד. אין לארה"ב כוונות בינתיים להסיר את סוריה מרשימת הטרור.

פיהן - מקווה להודעה בדבר הבעת צער על אובדן חיי אדם בלבנון בעקבות פלישת סוריה. זה APPROPRIATE לעשות זה לגבי לבנון כמו לגבי 21 הפלסטינים שנהרגו באירועי הר הבית.

בייקר - לומר שארה"ב נתנה אור ירוק אין זה נכון. כדאי לזכור שסוריה

----- היתה בלבנון עפ"י בקשת לבנון, ממשלה שאנו מכירים בה.

SHAMEFUL U.S. SPONSERING OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION. - אנגל
----- מדוע ארה"ב מתעלמת מפגיעה במתפללים, זריקת אבנים וכו'.

בייקר - מה שאתה בעצם אומר הוא שהחלטה היתה בלתי מאוזנת אולם מה
שבעצם קרה היתה שהתגובה היתה בלתי מאוזנת. חזר על דבריו על השימוש יתר
בכוח.

אנגל - עסקות הנשק עם סעודיה - הזדמנות למתן סעודיה כלפי ישראל.
בייקר - היו לנו דיונים עם הסעודים עוד לפני המשבר
אקרמן - החלטת האו"ם - גינוי עוד בטרם חקירה.
בייקר - אין זה כך.

השימועים נמשכו כשעתיים וחצי.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, סייבל,
רביב, מעת, הסברה

סססס

ארכי

אאאא, חוזם: 14083

אל: רהמש/979

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 263, תא: 181090, זח: 1710, חמ: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/ מיידי

אל: מצפ'א

NABLUS CRUSHERS מפעל

1. קרצר התקשר ובפיו הסיפור הבא: שמעו על כונתנו לסלול כביש (בשטחים) מנ.צ. בשם חווארה לדיר שייף. התוואי יעבור חלקית בתוך מפעל של חברה בשם: NABLUS CRUSHER. המדובר במפעל המעסיק עובדים רבים. סלילת הכביש תאלץ המפעל לצמצם פעילותו קרי לפטר עובדים. מודעים לכך שהתכנון של הכביש נעשה כדת וכדין. למרות שמועד הגשת אלטרנטיבות עבר, מבינים שלבעלי המפעל יש כעת אלטרנטיבה שלדעתם תוכל לענות על צרכנו מבלי שהדבר יפגע במפעל.

שאלתו של קרצר (שהקדים ואמר שהם אינם צד לנושא ומנסים רק לסייע) האם ניתן לעצור התחלת העבודות עד לשמיעת האלטרנטיבה של בעל המפעל?

2. קרצר ציין כי במקביל לתידוענו כאן, הנחו את בראון להעלות הנושא.

3. נודה על בדיקת הנושא וקבלת עידכון.

שטיין.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן,
מזתים, @ (מתאסשטחים)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 13804

אל: רהמש/958

מ-: ווש, נר: 2144, תא: 181090, זח: 1300, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי - בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

ערבויות לדיוור: בעקבות מכתב שה'ח לבייקר

בהמשך ל- 2139 מ- 17.10

1. במהלך שיחה עם קרצר (ראה דווח ניפרד) שאלתי לתגובת המזכיר בעקבות קריאת מכתבו של שה'ח.

2. קרצר השיב כי בעקבות הקריאה שאל המזכיר שתי שאלות:

א. האם המכתב רשמי (סיפר כי הורו לבראון לברר הנושא. לדבריו המכתב שהועבר בפאקס לשגרירותם בת'א לא נשא חתימתו של שה'ח).

ב. האם תוכן המכתב פורסם? (קרצר הפנה תשומת לבי לכך שהמכתב פורסם ב'הארצ').

3. במידה והתשובה לשתי השאלות היא חיובית, בכונת המזכיר להשיב לשה'ח. לכך הוסיף קרצר כי ככל שנדגיש את נושא ירושלים, יגרור הדבר תגובה מצידם. טרח לחזור ולהזכיר קיומם של חילוקי דעות בנושא.

שטיין

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

א/רהמ

ארכיון

אאא, חוזם: 12713

אל: רהמש/917

מ-: ווש, נר: 2139, תא: 171090, זח: 2010, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א -- לנמען בלבד

ערבויות לדיור: בעקבות מכתב שה'ח לבייקר

1. במהלך שיחתי עם מילר (ראה דווח נפרד) התייחס למכתב ההבהרה של שה'ח למזכיר. להערכתו אין במכתב דבר ש-'UNDERCUTS' ההבטחות שנתן שה'ח במכתבו.
2. לבקשתי התקשר מילר (1830) כדי למסור שהמזכיר טרם עיין במכתב. הוסיף כי ההמלצה שיעביר הדרג המקצועי למזכיר תהיה ברוח דבריו לעיל.
3. הבעתי תקווה כי במידה וזו תהייה גם דעת המזכיר יסתפקו באישור קבלת המכתב.

שטיין

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

20

מיידי	דחילות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דק: <u>A</u>
בלמ"ס	סוג:		כתוב: <u>H</u>
תאריך וזמן תגובת:	17.10.90	מצי"א	אל:
כס' פרוק:	הפסד:	מקש"ח, משהב"ט	דע:
167 325	M92	ק. לקונגרס.	פאת:

עסקת הנשק עם סעודיה

1. היום אחה"צ (17.10) הגיש הקונגרס אובי, יחד עם הקונגרסמן לויין, הצעת התנגדות (RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL) ל-3 מרכיבים בעסקת הנשק עם סעודיה.

- 150 טנקי במח
- 12 מסוקי האפצ"י
- 6 סוללות פטריות.

המשותף לשלושה מרכיבים אלו הוא שמועד אספקתם אינו מיידי. הטנקים נועדו לאספקה בעוד מספר שנים; האפצ"י בעוד 8 חודשים; הפטריות מאושים ממילא ע"י האמריקנים והחעברה לסעודים מתוכננת רק לאחר יציאת הכוחות האמריקנים מסעודיה.

- 2. רצ"ב הצעת ההחלטה. והחודעה לעיוונות.
- 3. דיווח נוסף - בנפרד.

יהוא ורנאי זינצ'ר
נהודית ורנאי זינצ'ר

מח' סלומה רחל
ה' דוד
ה' ק
ה' א
ה' א

ה' א
ה' ק
ה' א
ה' א

1990-10-17

20:59

KESHER-WASHINGTON

1480126

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10/17/90 12:34

004

101st CONGRESS
2d SESSION

H. J. RES.

(Original signature of Member)

HLC

1192,325 ²/₄

To prohibit the proposed sales to Saudia Arabia of M1A2 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, APACHE helicopters, and PATRIOT guided missile units that were reported to the Congress on September 27, 1990.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

19

Mr. OBEY (for himself and Mr. LEVINE of California) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on _____

JOINT RESOLUTION

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
2 of America in Congress assembled,

OBEY368

1192, 325 $\frac{3}{4}$

2

1 That the following proposed sales to Saudia Arabia that are
2 described in the certifications submitted to the Congress
3 pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act on
4 September 27, 1990, are prohibited:

5 (1) The proposed sale of armored vehicles (including
6 M1A2 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicle Family Systems)
7 and related defense articles and defense services
8 (transmittal number 90-78).

9 (2) The proposed sale of AH-64 APACHE attack
10 helicopters and related defense articles and defense
11 services (transmittal number 90-80).

12 (3) The proposed sale of PATRIOT guided missile units
13 and related defense articles and defense services
14 (transmittal number 90-93).

news from **congressman dave obey**

Wisconsin — 7th District Washington, D.C. 20515 (202) 225-3365

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Wednesday, October 17, 1990

1192,325 $\frac{4}{4}$

OBAY, LEVINE INTRODUCE BILL TO REDUCE SAUDI ARMS SALE

WASHINGTON, D. C.--Congressmen Dave Obey of Wisconsin and Mel Levine of California introduced a resolution today to turn down almost \$4.5 billion of the \$7.5 billion arms sale for Saudi Arabia sought by the Administration.

The Obey-Levine resolution would disapprove the sale of 6 Patriot air defense missile units, 150 M-1A2 tanks and 12 Apache helicopters.

Obey is Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Export Financing and Levine is a member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

"I am opposed to these sales for two reasons," Obey said. "First, they would accelerate the arms race in the Middle East caldron which already has massive amounts of advanced military weapons and equipment.

"Secondly, the Administration has no idea where this all will lead in terms of additional arms to the region and pressure to increase the foreign aid budget. The Administration appears to be adhocing it instead of pursuing a well thought out plan and that is dangerous."

Obey said the Administration's proposed sale was part of a larger arms package that would total more than \$20 billion. The Administration is expected to present the rest of the the proposal to Congress at the beginning of next year.

Obey noted that the items in his resolution of disapproval would not have an impact on the Desert Shield operation because they would not be scheduled for delivery for months or even several years from now.

Obey said that the sale could cost the taxpayers millions of dollars in

... the region would seek

1990-10-17 21:03

KESHER-WASHINGTON

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05

additional foreign aid and increased arms sales for themselves to redress a perceived military imbalance created by the Saudi sale.

The Congressman pointed out that, while attention had been focused on the fact that the Saudis would contribute \$14 billion for the U.S. operations and aid for countries hurt by the crisis, it also had been reported that the Saudis could reap \$40 billion in added revenue as a result of oil price increases from the crisis.

Therefore, Obey noted, the American consumer will be gouged by the Saudis for increased oil prices on top of having to pay for significant costs of the Desert Shield operation.

"I believe the Administration should take a careful look at any military weapons sales it proposes in the future, including the impact they will have on the military balance and the additional foreign aid costs which will result," Obey said.

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מס' ד	דתיקות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
שטר	סוג:		פתוח: 2
תאריך וזמן חבירה: 17.10.90		מס' א"	אל:
פס' פרוק: הפסד:		אלק' 1 7	דע:
1190			פאת: ק. לקונגרס

חקונגרסמו ברמן ומכתב בדין לשח"ח לוי - לינקאג'

דע"ב מכתב חרוף ששיגר אתמול (16.10) חקונגרסמו ברמן למזכיר בייקר אודות
מכתב חבוטה לשח"ח לוי וחלינקאג' ביד סאדאם חוסיין לישראל.

יוסף גונאי דינאר.
חודית ורנאי דרנגר.

שח"ח לוי 1
מכתב חרוף 1
חקונגרסמו ברמן 1
מכתב בדין לשח"ח לוי 1
מכתב חבוטה 2

תפוצה:

1990-10-17

21:09

KESHER-WASHINGTON

1480126

09

26TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEES

BUDGET

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JUDICIARY

CHAIRMAN, ARMS CONTROL
AND FOREIGN POLICY CAUCUS117 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON DC 20515
(202) 725-4808

DISTRICT OFFICE

14800 HINWODE BOULEVARD

11308

PANDRANA CITY, CA 91502

(818) 881-0843

(818) 784-1208

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

HOWARD L. BERMAN

October 16, 1990

1190 ²/₂

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I was genuinely incensed at reading the text of your message to Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy which, notwithstanding the disingenuous disclaimer, compares Israeli leaders to Saddam Hussein, Israel to Iraq. You "worry" that "some" will "unjustly" make the comparison. By so doing, Mr. Secretary, you are manifestly and insidiously comparing the two. If you do not think Saddam Hussein will see it that way, you continue to underestimate the perspicacity of your new enemy. ...

No one begrudges you the right to criticize Israeli behavior in any arena. You have at your disposal relevant and substantive material to do so if you wish. Why, therefore, this conjectural contrast which is not only entirely inappropriate, but so obviously plays into the hands of Saddam Hussein? What greater reward could Saddam hope to reap at this juncture than to have the United States compare these two utterly incomparable "occupations"?

The not-so-stealthy approach this administration has made over the last two weeks toward embracing this nefarious linkage risks damaging the support the administration has garnered in its handling of the crisis so far. If the attractiveness of the approach is that it assists in building solidity into our coalition with the Arab world, it is evidence that there is something deeply wrong with that coalition. If that is the case, let us address that directly. Linkage is inappropriate and unwise, and the U.S. would do well to get that word to Saddam Hussein before he capitalizes on our inexplicable ambiguity.

Sincerely,



HOWARD L. BERMAN
Member of Congress

HLB/lh

אנה'ג

אאא, חוזם: 12737

אל: רהמש/919

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 244, תא: 171090, זח: 2211, חב: סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/ בהול לבוקר

אל: מצפ'א

דע: מקש'ח משהב'ט -

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

הקונגרסמן אובי ועסקת הנשק עם סעודיה

1. שוחחתי היום עם הקונגרסמן מל לויין, אשר סיפר כי לא היה בכוונתו להצטרף ליוזמת אובי פנה אליו הבוקר וביקשו להצטרף אליו, ולויין לא יכול היה לחדור.

2. לדברי לויין בכונת אובי להפיץ עתה מכתב DEAR COLLEAGE ולהשיג עליו מירב החתימות. אנשי משרדו של אובי עמם שוחחתי אישרו כונה זו אולם לא ידעו כיצד בכוונת אובי להמשיך במהלך.

3. שלושת השיקולים העיקריים המנחים ככל הנראה את אובי הם (ולא בהכרח בסדר זה):

א. התנגדות אמיתית ודאגה מגודל והיקף העסקה.

ב. חלק ממאבקו (מאבק הדמוקרטים) בממשל על רקע התקציב. (אובי היה מעורב באופן פעיל בניסוח החלטת התקציב האלטרנטיבית של הדמוקרטים).

ג. הבחירות הקרבות והקהילה היהודית (אמנם אובי אינו תלוי בציבור בוחרים יהודים יהודים גדול, אולם משנכנסתי היום אחה'צ למשרדו היו עסוקים כולם בהכנת מעטפות לשיגור ההודעה לעיתונות הרצ'ב... לקהילה היהודית)

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, סייבל

סססס

1980-10-17

17:28

NEW-YORK/MASHAN

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הקונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בניו יורק
CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10017

(212) 351-5200

001202

1 / 5

17134
סמור/מיד
355.01

171730

אלו מנחל מצפ"א, הפואוח, סמנכ"ל כנצור
דעו השגריר, מלג וושינגטון
מאתו סגן הקונסול - ניו יורק

הנדון: אירועי תר תבית ותחלטה מועבד'ט

1. יש עימות בקרב הארגונים היהודיים להוצאות ועדת החקירה ולביצוע סהיר של מסקנותיה בתקופה שזה יבוא להרגעת המתיחות שנוצרה ביחסי ישראל-ארה"ב. סימור ריין שחזר חיום מהארץ ידוע מחר (18.10) לראשי ועידת הנשיאים. הקונסול שוחח חיום עם ריין וחיאמו קו לאיחוד השורות בקרב הארגונים השונים (בישיבה מחר) וחרגעת הביקורת שקיימת בקרב חלקים מסוימים בקהילה היהודית. כמו כן ריין זכין ראשי ועידת הנשיאים לקראת מגישתם עם השגריר מיקרינג שתחקים מחר.

2. מצ"ב הנחיות לפעולה שחוציא חיום JCRC למנחיגום וחודיים לאחר שובו של קני ביאלקין מביקורו בישראל עליו דיווח לנו.

3. שוחחנו עם ארגוני הרבנים בכדי שיגויסו רכנים שויטמו בדרשות למען נסיעה לישראל. מרטין רפאל אמר לי כי לאחר ביקור ראשי נאקראק בכותל חיום שישי 19.10 יעבור חמסר 'נאקראק בכותל', לכל חפדראנות ותקהילות ברחבי ארה"ב.

סגן הקונסול - ניו יורק
מרדכי ודיד

27 באוקטובר 1990

[Handwritten signature]

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Jewish
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Council
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JACK D. WESLER CENTER FOR INTERGROUP RELATIONS
711 Third Avenue, 12th Floor, New York, NY 10017, Tel. 212-953-4800

001202

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October 16, 1990

ACTION ALERT

To: Jewish Leadership
From: Michael S. Miller, Executive Director
Harriet Mandel, Assistant Director
Israel and International Concerns

Re: RECENT U.S. ACTIONS TOWARDS ISRAEL

During this past week, the Administration took several disturbing steps which signal a shift in U.S. policy towards Israel.

The U.S. supported a biased and unbalanced U.N. resolution singling out Israel for condemnation in the incident at the Western Wall in Jerusalem; Secretary of State Baker warned Israeli Foreign Minister Levy that some would compare Israel's rejection of the resolution to Saddam Hussein's refusal to adhere to U.N. resolutions; and Baker and Bush continue to cement their relationship with Arab leaders while distancing themselves from Israeli leaders.

It is urgent that you IMMEDIATELY contact the president and the Secretary of State on this new direction in U.S. policy. A model letter and additional "Talking Points" are enclosed. You are also urged to call on this matter. The following points should be stressed:

- * The resolution supported by the U.S. singles out Israeli response to the violence for criticism but ignores the provocation by the Palestinian Arabs.
- * The resolution refers to Jerusalem as "occupied territory", thereby calling question Israeli sovereignty over the capital of Israel.
- * U.S. efforts to maintain a coalition of Arab states, by distancing itself from America's long time ally Israel, are shortsighted.

President George Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500
(202) 456-7639

Ambassador Thomas Pickering
United States Mission to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
(212) 415-4001

Secretary of State James A. Baker III
Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

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MODEL LETTER

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Dear-----,

It is deeply troubling that our Administration has backed the recent biased and unbalanced U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel for the incident at the Western Wall and calling for a mission to the region.

It has become increasingly evident that the Iraqi aggression has come at a great cost to Israel. Our Administration's support for this one-sided resolution suggests a shift in U.S. policy towards Israel and the extent to which the U.S. is willing to go to maintain an Arab backed coalition against Iraq. Other concessions being made to maintain the coalition involve massive arms sales to these Arab countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, which threaten Israel's qualitative military edge in the region.

With regard to the events at the Western Wall, the U.N. resolution singles out the Israeli response to the riot for criticism, but ignores the provocation by the Palestinians. Israel has expressed regret over the incident, is conducting a full investigation, and will adhere to its findings. Israel understandably objects to the U.N. commission which resulted from a Security Council resolution. The United Nations is a proven foe of Israel. Moreover, the Security Council does not recognize Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem and considers Jerusalem as occupied territory. Israel and the American Jewish community are united in their recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and unified in seeing that Israel's safety, security and sovereignty is protected.

While the Administration has maintained a separation between the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Palestinian issue there is fear that our government will further compromise its relationship with Israel as it works to maintain the coalition against Iraq. Israel is a major democratic and strategic asset to our country. Long after this coalition has fallen apart, Israel will remain America's most dependable and reliable ally in the volatile Middle East.


The U.S. must resist submitting to any further one-sided U.N. resolutions, support Israel politically and financially and perform in ways which leave no doubt regarding our government's commitment to the Jewish State.

Thank you for your attention to this very important matter.

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001202

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October 15, 1990

To: Jewish Leadership
From: Michael S. Miller, Executive Director
Harriet Mandel, Assistant Director
Israel and International Concerns

Re: COMMUNICATING ON THE INCIDENT AT WESTERN WALL AND THE 10/12/90 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL

The incident of the Palestinian attack on the Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall has generated a series of negative reactions by the worldwide community, culminating in a biased and unbalanced U.S. backed U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel for violence and calling for a mission to the region. These responses have been misdirected towards Israel. The matter must be put into proper context.

TALKING POINTS:

- * Preliminary evidence indicates that the attack was premeditated and Jewish lives were seriously threatened. The international community has failed to condemn the Palestinian Arabs who started the attack. Criticism has been one-sided and has only focused on Israel.
- * Both President Bush and Secretary of State Baker have stated that Israel should have exercised greater "restraint" in response to the violence. This accusation of overreaction on Israel's part ignores the fact that orchestrated violence of this nature and magnitude, where the threat to life is involved, prompted an act of self-defense such as that employed by Israel.
- * Many, in fact, believe that Israel acted with restraint and responded reasonably and proportionately to the provocation. It is safe to say that under similar circumstances, the response in any other open, free society would have been the same.
- * The firing of live ammunition came only after Israeli police used tear gas and rubber bullets to warn the ~~attackers to halt their activities.~~
- * It is unfortunate that the U.S., Israel's closest friend and most reliable ally even during the Persian Gulf crisis, has chosen to criticize Israel in what appears to be an act determined to keep together the Arab coalition against Iraq. The U.S. seems to be sacrificing Israel to this objective.
- * Israel has generously granted each religious community the authority over sacred sites. This responsibility has been desecrated and abused by the Muslim Arabs as evidenced in this assault. Not only were Muslim sites used as bases from which this attack was launched but, the Western Wall, the most revered holy place to Jews was attacked during the Jewish festival of Tabernacles.

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- * This lawless attack plays into the hands of extremists and furthers racialism and militancy in the Middle East.
- * Israel has called for an independent commission to investigate these events; the U.N. resolution was passed before the Israeli commission presented its findings.
- * The resolution passed in the Security Council is blatantly biased. It explicitly criticizes Israel for acts of violence while only vaguely referring to Palestinian involvement; it refers to violence at a Moslem shrine, the "Haram al-Sharif" while making no reference to the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest place, where Palestinians stoned Jewish worshippers.
- * What has obviously been lost on Israel's critics is how much this planned provocation played into the hands of Israel's detractors;
 - It has served to help drive a wedge between Israel and the U.S. through the U.S. condemnation of Israel; this is already evident in the developing rift between the U.S. and Israel with regard to the U.N. mission to the region. Some will seek to blame Israel for any split in the U.S.-Arab coalition against Iraq.
 - It has sought to divert attention from the Iraqi aggression in the Gulf; and refocus attention on the Palestinian issue.
 - It has reunited bitter foes such as Iraq and Kuwait on the one issue which can possibly unite the Arab world - hatred of Israel;
 - it has fostered the linkage between the Palestinian issue and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait; this can lead to pressure against Israel to deal with the Palestinian question at a time when all efforts should be focused on containing Saddam Hussein;
 - it has revived the Intifada and with it the "David and Goliath" image between Israel and the Palestinians; violence in the territories continues to escalate again;
 - it has resuscitated the P.L.O. after the organization's embrace of Saddam Hussein;
 - it portends to again raise the issue of the status of Jerusalem. The Security Council does not recognize sovereignty over Jerusalem and considers Jerusalem occupied territory. Sending a mission on the basis of a Security Council resolution implies acceptance by Israel that Jerusalem is not the legal capital of Israel.
- * Israeli authorities as well as Jewish communities around the world have expressed regret over the loss of life and sadness that such an incident occurred.
- * ~~The resort to violence such as that used by the Palestinian Arabs against the Jewish population only provokes more violence and cannot possibly lead to peace. Those who truly want peace must show a willingness and readiness by resolving differences through negotiations.~~

IT IS URGENT TO COMMUNICATE WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND OUR ELECTED OFFICIALS TO EXPRESS CONCERN REGARDING THE U.S. POSITION ON THIS ISSUE.

1990-10-17 15:05
UNITED JEWISH APPEAL N Y TEL: 212-818-9509

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For further information, contact:
Gerald S. Nagel,
Director of Public Relations
(212) 818-9100

STATEMENT TO NEWS MEDIA

Oct. 16, 1990

The national United Jewish Appeal is aware of some speculation in the news media about the forthcoming United Jewish Appeal missions to Israel and is therefore issuing the following clarification.

The UJA has had two missions planned to leave in the next few days for Israel. Neither mission has been cancelled and both are scheduled to arrive in Israel, with hundreds of participants, in the next few days.

The UJA plans to include a visit to the Western Wall as is the custom on UJA missions.



11/11/90

מכתב
סודי ביותר

כ"ח בתשרי תשנ"א
17 באוקטובר 1990
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86670

אל : רשימת תפוצה

מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

דף מצפ"א מס' 76
לתקופה 1-18 באוקטובר 1990

א. ארה"ב
כללי

בעוד ארה"ב מוסיפה להיות מרודה במשבר המפרץ ובשאלת התקציב הפדרלי מבית, גברו והתרחבו המתיחויות במערכת היחסים בין ישראל לארה"ב. שני המוקדים העקריים שמצאו בטוי לא רק בציונור הדיפלומטי - בלשון המעטה - היו: א. סוגיית ערבויות הדיוור והפרשנויות השונות הניתנות למכתב שה"ח לבנייה בירושלים "מעבר לקו הירוק" ואף למדיניות ההתיישבות בשטחים בכלל.

ב. החלטת מועבי"ט בדבר אירועי הר הבית, חלכה של ארה"ב בעניין זה ובעמדתה של ישראל כלפי החלטה ומשלחת פנכ"ל האו"ם.

בתוך כך, פורסמו "אזהרות לנוסעים" (TRAVEL ADVISORIES) בקשר לביקורים בישראל ובשטחים, חלו התפתחויות לגבי העוסקה הסעודית והוגבר קצב הפעילות בקונגרס בנושאים הנוגעים לישראל ישירות ובעקיפין (חוקי ההקצבות לסיוע חוץ ותקציב הפנסגור ועוד).

אגב ההתרחשויות הנ"ל ניתן בטוי למדיניות ארה"ב כלפי ישראל והסוכסוך, לפעמים עם ניואנסים חדשים - ובכו נחיל:

א. מדיניות ארה"ב כלפי ישראל והסכסוך

1. מחויבות ארה"ב לבטחון ישראל וניתכוננה האוככנת

בתקופה הנדונה שב המשל לא פעם והדגיש מחויבות זו לדוגמא:

- במהלך ביקורו של שה"ח בעצרת (23.9-2.10) טען ה"ניו-יורק טוימס" בעמודו הראשון כי ארה"ב התחייבה בפני ישראל שתגיב בכח אם עיראק תתקוף את ישראל. יו"ר ועדת הנשואים שמע דברים ברוח זו בשירות שקיים עם ראשי מערכת הבטחון האמריקנית, פומבית, נמכעים האמריקנים מלאמר מפורשות מה תהיה תגובתם, המזכיר ביוקר הבהיר כי מחויבות ארה"ב לבטחון ישראל ילתו ניתנת לעירעור ואם תותקף, אזי "תהיה תגובה אמריקנית מתאימה".



- הנשיא בוש אמר לשגריר היוצא ארד (28.9.90) כי הוא מחוייב לבטחונה ושלומה של ישראל ויפעל, בתפקידו כנשיא, כמיטב יכולתו להבטיח בטחונה של ישראל.

- במכתב ערבויות הדיור (2.10.90) מוצגים בין היתר סיכומי שיחת לוי-ביקר באשר למחוייבות ארה"ב לשמירת יתרונה האיכותי של ישראל והעובדה שישראל וכולה "לסמוך על ארה"ב, בעת זו של סכנה שתעמוד במחוייבותה ותגיב באופן מתאים".

- תת מזכיר המדינה לבטחון בינ"ל, רג'ינלד ברתולומיאוא, אמר בעדותו בבית הנבחרים אנדות העיסקה הסעודית (3.10.90), כי ארה"ב מחוייבת לסיוע בשמירת עדיפותה האיכותית של ישראל על פני אויביה הפוטנציאליים.

ובמכתב מה-10.10 לסנטור ארלן ספקטר, כתב בוש כי "מחוייבות הממשל לבטחון ישראל הינו כלל ברזל (IRONCLAD). כוונתו לדאוג לכך שישראל תקבל את הסיוע הדרוש ע"פ לשמור את יתרונה האיכותי הצבאי". וכראייה לכך התייחס בוש להחלטתו לספק לישראל את מערכת הפטריוט להגנה אווירית.

- הנשיא בוש חתם ב-30.9.90 על צו נשיאותי המורה על העברת סוללות פטריוט לישראל, היחידה הראשונה תועבר בעוד מספר שבועות. בהודעת הבית הלבן (1.10.90) נאמר, כי מערכת הפטריוט תסיוע לישראל לשפר הגנתה האווירית, כולל נגד איום גובר של טילים בליסטיים המצויים במאגר העיראקי, צויין גם כי בקבלו החלטה זו הנשיא מאשר מחדש מחוייבותו הענה לידידות ישראל-ארה"ב ולבטחון ישראל. דובר הפנטגון (2.10.90) הבהיר כי לארה"ב "אינטרסים בטחוניים ארוכי טווח (LONGSTANDING) בישראל... אנו מעוניינים בקיום היתרון האיכותי של ההגנה הישראלית".

2. שאלת הנוקדה למשבר הספריץ

בנאום בעצרת (1.10.90) הכריז הנשיא בוש כי לאחר יציאתה ללא תנאי של עיראק מכווית, הוא מאמין שעשויות להיות אפשרויות לעיראק וכווית להסדר באופן קבוע את המחלוקת שלהן, למדינות המפרץ עצמן לבנות הסדרים חדשים למען יציבות ולכל המדינות והעמים באזור" להסדר את הקונפליקט שמפריד (DIVIDES) את הערבים מישראל". בוש כרז דבריו אלה בהצהרתו כי הוא שואף לפתרון המשבר במפרץ בדרכי שלום ודיפלומטיה. פרשנים רבים ראו בכך שינוי טון - ואולי כיוון - הן כלפי אופן פתרון המשבר והן בהתייחסות לזיקה בין פתרון המשבר במפרץ להסדרת הסיכסוך הישראלי-ערבי. עקב זאת גורמים בכירים בטימשל הבהירו חד-משמעית כי אין שום זיקה בין הדברים ולא היתה כל כוונה שכך ישתמע.

למרות זאת, במסר לשה"ח מה-14.10 (בקשר להחלפת מועב"ט) התייחס המזכיר בייקר בנשימה אחת לישראל ולעיראק ושוב התעוררו סימני שאלה. בבית הנבחרים הקונגרסון הווארד ברמן שגר מכתב ב-16.10 לביקר והביע תרעומת על בוסח המסר הנ"ל, ואילו הקונגרסמנים צ'אק שומר ומל לוין יזמו הצעת החלטה (בצורת "תחושת הקונגרס") הקובעת שיש לפעל במשבר במפרץ בנפרד משאר הסיכסוכים באזור המז"ת. הצעה זו נידונה בוועדת החוץ ב-18.10, התקבלה פה אחד והועברה למליאת הבית.



3. הסכסוך

- בפגישה עם נציגי האיגוד של הערביים-אמריקניים (24.9.90) ציין הנשיא בוש כי המו"ם לפתרון הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי חייב לערב "שטחים תמורת שלום" - וזאת לצד בטחון, הכרה בישראל וזכויות פוליטיות לגיטימיות לפלסטינים.

- ארה"ב שותפה להודעת שרו החוץ של 5 חברות מועבי"ט הקבוצות (29.9.90), אלה מדגישות נחישותן לתמוך בתהליך מו"מ פעול לפתרון הסכסוך בו ישתתפו כל הצדדים הרלבנטיים, מבוסס על 242 ו-338 תוך לקיחה בחשבון את זכותן לבטחון של מדינות האיזור, כולל ישראל והזכויות הלגיטימיות של העם הפלסטיני.

- במסיבת עיתונאים (9.10.90) השתמש הנשיא בוש פעמיים במונח "שאלת פלסטין". ס/שה"ח העלה העניין בשיחה עם השגריר בראון (10.10.90) והביע פליאה ותקווה שלא מדובר בשיוני מדיניות.

ב. עברונות דנו

המו"מ בנדרון הסתיים במהלך ביקור שה"ח בארה"ב והסיכומים נוסחו במכתב שהעביר שה"ח לעמיתו האמריקני ב-2.10. כעבור ימים מספר טען ביקור בפומבי שבסיכומים בין הצדדים הושגו מישראל התחייבויות מרחיקות לכת לעומת התחייבויות שניתנו בעבר, דיעה זו עוררה סקרנות בארה"ב - ובהמשך סערה פוליטית בישראל, כתוצאה משאלות הוזרות ונישנות בתדריכים היומיים של הדובר במחש"ד, פורסם סכתב השר (על דעתנו) ב-10.10, בעקבות הויכוח הציבורי בארץ שיוגר השר איגרת בסוגייה לבייקר ב-17.10. שני המסמכים מצורפים כנספח.

ג. ארועי הכ הבית והחלפת מועבי"מ

1. ממשל

עיקר מאמצי הממשל בטיפולו במשבר במפרץ טכונים לשמירת קואליציה בינלאומית רחבה כשברה"מ הינה שותף חשוב בה והנתמכת במעורבות אקטיבית של מדינות ערב, ארועי הר הבית נתפסים כמסכנים קואליציה זו שהוקמה בעמל רב, ארה"ב מוכנה לספוג ביקורת בעקבות מעורבותה בהעברת החלטה אנטי ישראלית ובלבד שתוכל לשמור על הקואליציה, הנשיא בוש והמזכיר ביקר ניפו בישראל בהתבטאויות פומביות וטענו שהיתה צריכה לנהוג ביתר אופק ולהיות מוכנה לטיפול במצבים כאלו, עם זאת הטעונו כי אינם רואים כל קשר בין המשבר במפרץ לבין הבעיה הפלשתינית. הממשל מסביר עמדתו לגבי החלפת המועצה ומשלחת משעם מיכ"ל האו"ם במסר ששיוגר המזכיר בייקר לשר החוץ ב-14.10 (שעה קלה לפני קיום ישיבת הממשלה בנושא), במסר עומד המזכיר על הצורך לקבל המשלחת ולהסב תשומת לב הבינלאומית חזרה לתוקפנותו של סאדאם חוסיין. השר העיר באזני השגריר בראון שבהחלפת מועצת הבטחון אלפנטים חמורים מבחינתנו (או איזכור ההתקפה על מתפללים יהודים, ציון הר הבית בשמו הערבי, גנור חד-צדדי), הנשיא בוש נדרש לנושא ואמר לעתונאים (15.10) כי הממשל האמריקאי מעונין לראות את החלפת מועצת הבטחון מיושמת במלואה.



דוברת מחמ"ד הביעה אכזבה מהחלטת ישראל שלא לשתף פעולה עם משלחת האו"ם (15.10). בה כרזה תקווה שנציגי מזכ"ל האו"ם יוכלו לקיים שליחותם. סגן הנשיא קוויל התבטא ב-CBS בענין ועדת החקירה שהוקמה בארץ ובתשובה לשאלה אמר שתיתכן "A WAY THAT YOU CAN HAVE THIS COOPERATION...". ב-16.10.90 הוא אמר שהמשל של תקווה שממשלת ישראל תאפשר למשלחתו של מזכ"ל האו"ם להשלים משימתה, ועוד הוסיף המזכיר כי ארה"ב היתה מצבועה בעד ההחלטה גם אם לא היה קיים משבר המפרץ וזאת בשל ההרג שהתרחש בירושלים. הודעת שר השכונן על החלטת וועדת השרים לקליטה (14.10) לאשר הקמת 15 אלף יחידות דיור בירושלים מחדדת את הבעיה ומעוררת מחלוקת עקרונית מחדש. המשל הקיב (ב-15.10) במסרים אודות החומרה בה הוא רואה המצב והאפשרות של משבר חמור ביחסים אם לא נמצא דרך לקבל את משלחת המזכ"ל - זאת באמצעות סיפור דיור ממועדון הנשיאים (שביקר בישראל בתחילת השבוע הזה) ותום דאיון מאיפ"ק.

2. הארגונים היהודיים

ניתן לאמר שאלו התיוצבו לימינו באופן אמיץ ונחרץ תוך אימוץ עמדותינו ופרסום מגובה מידית למאורעות, ובהמשך בהבעת ביקורת על משל ארה"ב בעקבות פעילותה במועצת הבטחון. ההודעות פורסמו ע"י ה-JCRC של נ"י, א.ד.ל., הקונגרס, הקומוטי, נקרא"ק והפדרציות (בערו השדה) - כאשר אלו מביעים צער על אבדן חיו אדם ומבליטים את ההתגרות של ההטון המוסלמי ביהודים ביום חגם ומתייחסים לשמועות על פעילותה הנחזית כביכול של קבוצת נאמני הר הבית, ה"וושינגטון טיימס" (11.10), מציין את תחושת הזעם שהביעו הארגונים היהודיים על תפקודה של ארה"ב בדיוני המועצה שנבעו מצרכים פוליטיים, ואילו ה"נ"י טיימס" תאר התבטאויות על "בוגדנות אמריקאית" והדגיש אחדות הדעים של הארגונים היהודיים השונים - תוך ציון כי אירגון "שלום עכשיו" הצטרף לקואליציה היהודית בנושא והבלסת עמדותיה המתנגדות לנוכחות ישראלית בשטחים.

3. הפגנות

התקיימו מספר הפגנות בעקבות ארועי הר הבית - בווינגטון, בשיקגו, בהיוסטון כאו דוות על הפגנת מעופת משתתפים שזכתה לסיקור באמצעי התקשורת ובסן-פרנסיסקו שם השתתפו כ-450 איש ששרפו את דגלי ישראל, מאידך, התקיימה הפגנה של כ-400 יהודים בניו-יורק מול בנין האו"ם במחאה על החלטת מועצת הבטחון.

4. תגובות

כסוי נרחב לנושא שלווה בצילומים, דיווחי טלוויזיה קשים וכותרות חריפות כאשר התחושה השוררת היא שדמוי ישראל נפגע דווקא לאחר תפנית משמעותית לטובתה. ההיקף הגדול של הנפגעים מיקד את מירב תשומת הלב כאשר ההתפרצות הפלשתינית מוסברת לעתים ככזאת שבאה בעקבות פרובוקציה של נאמני הר הבית. דיוני מועצת הבטחון והתבטאויותיהם הנחרצות של הנשיא בוש והמזכיר בייקר מיקדו המשך הסיקור למיכלול יחסי ישראל ארה"ב, ברשתות הטלוויזיה השונות דווחים נרחבים מהשטח עם תמונות קשות של הרוגים, בפגיעת אנשים במנוסתם, תחנת המשטרה השרופה, והרס ברחבת הכותל, מירב הכתבות בעתונות חריפות ומפנות אצבע מאשימה כנגד



ישראל, לדוגמא - ה"וויזינגטון טויסט" (10.10) הביא ציטטה מדברי טדי קולק להגדרת המאורע "מתנה לסדאם חוסיין", כאשר ה"פילדלפיה אינקוויירר" במאמר מערכת (10.10) קובע שהכוח המסוכן במזנה"ת הינו האמונות הדתיות, ועל ישראל מוטלת החובה לרסן את כנאות נאמני הר הבית הפאיימיס על המקומות הקדושים לאיסלאם, יש לציין כי ב"מיאפי הרלד" (10.10) הופיע מאמר מערכת שקול המנתח ומקבל הסברינו, אך לא פוסח מלבקר את התגובה המופרזת - וב"וויזינגטון פוסט" (10.10) מאמר מערכת המקבל הסברינו ומנהיר מפני יצירת מצב שישחק לידי סדאם חוסיין.

5. מניכונ

בסוף השבוע של ה-6 וה-7 דנא פרסם הממשל שני TRAVEL ADVISORIES בנושאינו - האחד שחינו כללי לאזורנו ובו פיסקה מורחבת ומיוחדת על ישראל המציינת החלטת הממשלה לחלוקת מסכות גזי השני הינו מיוחד לנושא השטחים וממליץ לאזרחים שלא להגיע לאזורים אלו, ובו הערה מיוחדת ומורחבת על הארועים בהר הבית ואף "התרעה" לגבי הטיפול באשויקאים בעלי שמות ערביים המגיעים לנתב"ג ובגשר אלנבי.

הודעת הממשלה על חלוקת מסכות גזי ובעקבות זאת TRAVEL ה-ADVISORIES הנ"ל ואירועי הר הבית זכו לתהודה בתקשורת ובקהילות היהודיות, מתקבלות הודעות על ביטולים ודחיות סיורים רבים לארץ, בכלל זה בופלו הגעתן של משלחות סולידריות גדולות מפילדלפיה, מוויזינגטון, וממקומות נוספים.

7. חקיקות בקונגרס ועוד

1. סיוע לושכאל

לאחר תקופה ארוכה של המתנה לקראת קבלת חוק התקציב (שטרם אוטץ) נכנסה ועדת ההקצבות בסנאט, על ועדות המשנה שלה, להילוך גבוה במגמה לסיים מלאכת קבלת חוקי ההקצבה בטרם פגור הקונגרס, ערב הבחירות הכלליות (7.11). בכלל זה עובדים כיום על שני חוקי ההקצבה הנוגעים ישירות להיבטים שונים של הסיוע עבור ישראל

- א. חוק סיוע חוץ עצמו;
- ב. חוק תקציב הפנטגון, שיש בו אלמנטים רבים הנוגעים לבטחוננו ישירות ובעקיפין.

יצויין ששר הבטחון ומנכ"ל משרדו בקרו בוויזינגטון בשבועות האחרונים והציגו רשימות נוספות של בקשות המורעות לפצנתנו לכוונת השינוי במאזן הכוחות במז"ת, כתוצאה מהמשבר במפרץ ואף לנסות ולשמור על יתרוננו האיכותי בעקבות העסקה הסעודית, חלק מבקשות אלו נמצא בסמכותו של הממשל להענקה (הפטריוט) ללא אשור הקונגרס-וחלק טעון אשורו, ואף חקיקה מיוחדת.

1. חוק סיוע חוץ (הקצבות)

כבר עבר את שלב הועדה, הדיון על הצעת החוק במליאת הסנאט נפתח ב-12.10 חודש ב-19.10 וטרם הושלם, ההצעה כוללת מספר אלמנטים חדשים, מעבר ל-3 ביליון \$ בסיוע המסורתי לישראל ואלמנטים קבועים נוספים כמו תיקון ברטו בנושא מש"ב (7.5 מליון דולר), תיקון וקסמו לשת"פ איזורי (7 מליון דולר) ועוד ועוד.



- הגדלת PRE-PO (הצבה מראש) ב-100 מיליון \$.
- OSP ("רכש מעבר לים" קרי בישראל) בגובה של 475 מיליון \$ (פירוש הדבר, תוספת של 75 מיליון דולר)
- אפשרות שימוש ב-200 מיליון \$ מתוך כספי הסיוע האגרומי (ESF) לרכישת ציוד בטחוני, (כאילו FMS).
- שחרור מהיר של עודפי ציוד צבאי עבור ישראל (ותורכיה).
- משיכת ציוד סמלאי כוחות ארה"ב בסך 700 מיליון \$.

בדיון (19.10) במליאת הסנאט הנישו הסנטורים דול ובורד הצעה שלפיה יחוייב הממשל לדנות לקונגרס בקביעות על מדיניות ההתנחלות של ישראל. עפ"י ההצעה יוחלט כי ההתנחלויות (כולל מז' ירושלים) אינן חוקיות עפ"י 242 ו-338 וישוּב יהודי ברה"מ בהן נוגד את מכתב מערבולות. ההצעה נדחתה ברוב של 90 לעומת 8.

2. הצעת חוק מקצוב הפנסיון (הקצבות). כבר אומצה ב-16.10 ע"י מליאת הסנאט.

מצד אחד ההצעה כוללת שורה של נושאים שכבר היו בטפול בשנים הקודמות וגם זכו להקצבות, כגון:-
- טייל ה"חץ" - 42 מיליון \$.
- מערכת ראוית לילה למסוק הקוברה.

הנושאים החדשים המופיעים בהצעת חוק זה כוללים בין היתר:-
- 15 מיליון \$ להרחבת נמל חיפה.
- מאגרי נפט מנוקק לטובת ארה"ב וישראל שיוקמו בישראל ותכולתם 4.5 מיליון חביות.

2. שמיטת חובות למצבנים

בתחילת ספטמבר העניק בית הנבחרים (ועדת ההקצבות) בהחלטה שאושרה במליאה, פטור (WAIVER) של 3 חודשים מתיקון ברוק (השולל סיוע ממדינות המפגרות בפרעון חובותיהן ואילולא הביטול היה פוגע במצרים). במהלך שלושת החודשים מספטמבר ועד ה-31.12.90 מתבקש הממשל האמריקאי לבחון את האופציות העומדות בפניו.

בסנאט הועלה הנושא (12.10) ע"י סנטור ריד בוועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות, הסנטור ביקש לחפש אופציות אחרות להתגייס לעזרת מצרים באם לא תהיה שמיטת חובות במתכונת עליה דיבר הנשיא. סנטורים רבים מוצאים את הנושא בעיניו וצ"כ לבקשת הסנטור ליוהי (יו"ר ועדת המשנה) החליטו שלא להגיש תיקונים בשלב הועדה ולדחותם למליאה.

הבעיה העקרונית הונה כנראה החשש של ארה"ב שתקדים של מתיקת חובות, כאמור הדיון החל ב-12.10 אך (בעת חיבור דף זה) טרם הגיעו התיקון לדיון.

3. עסקות הנשק עם מצרנים ערב

א. ערב הסעודים



כזכור, הממשל החליט לפצל ל-2 חלקים את עיסקת הנשק עם סעודיה (במתכונתה המקורית כ-20 מיליארד דולר). החלק הראשון (כ-7.5 מיליארד) הועבר לאישור הקונגרס ב-27.9.90. לקונגרס נתונים 30 יום, במסגרתם הוא יכול להצביע נגד מימוש העיסקה או חלקים ממנה. ב-3.10.90 נתקיימו בבית הנבחרים שיומועים בנדון ולמחרת (14.10) בסנאט. מטעם הממשל העידו ברתולומיאנו (תת מזכיר הסדירה לענייני בטחון בין"ל במחמ"ד) ופול וולפוביץ' (תת מזכיר ההגנה למדיניות בפנטגון). ברתולומיאנו הבהיר כי עסקת הנשק עם סעודיה תבצע בשלבים, החלק הראשון (לצרכים המידיים של סעודיה, כביכול) נדון עתה, ואילו החלק השני יוגש לקונגרס בינואר 1991. בשלב זה מתגברת בקונגרס הפעילות נגד העיסקה, גם בהיקפה המצומצם (בעקבות הפיצול). ומצדו הממשל נערך כנגד. לדברי הסנטור אלו קרנסטון, עורך הממשל מתקפה עזה בנושא באמצעות התעשיות הבטחוניות ומקשה על ידידי ישראל, כמו כן מפיץ הממשל שמועות כאילו הוסרו אי ההבנות בין ישראל לממשל בנושא הבקשות הישראליות.

בדיון מיוחד (COLLOQUY) ב-11.10 בו השתתפו שמונה סנטורים הועלו הנקודות המרכזיות נגד העסקה, וביניהן התנהגות סעודיה (אינה מתנהגת כבעלת בית אמיתית של ארה"ב) החשש מפילת הנשק לידיים עוינות, הנאמנויות והבריתות המשתנות תכופות במזה"ת, עוינות סעודיה לישראל, הפרת המאזן העדין באיזור והקטנת סיכויי השלום, הועלתה דרישה להתניית העיסקה בהצטרפות סעודיה לתהליך השלום עם ישראל וכ"כ דובר בצורך לשקול מוגבלות על השימוש בנשק ובאפשרות להסדרים מיוחדים (במקום מכירה) כגון LEASE LEND - BUY BACK ואף באבחנה בין פריטים דחופים ודרישות לטווח הארוך.

למחרת (12.10) הגיש הסנטור קרנסטון הצעת החלטה המתייחסת לאיסור ולהגבלת מכירת פריטים מסויימים המוצעים בעיסקה (המפוצלת) וביניהם משגרי הטיל פאו - 2, טנקים מדגם M1A2, מסוקים מדגם אפאצ'י ומערכת לשיגור טילים מסוג MLRS. הסנטורים ספקטור, סימון ופקווד הצטרפו ליוזמת קרנסטון. בבית הנבחרים, הקונגרסמן דיוב אובר, יחד עם עמיתו, מל ליון, הגישו הצעת החלטה דומה ב-17.10. בה הם מביעים התנגדות ל-3 מרכיבים בעיסקה: הטנקים והמסוקים הנ"ל ו-6 סוללות ה"פטריוט".

ב. בחריין ומעא"פ - הממשל העביר לאישור הקונגרס (27.9.90) פרטי עיסקת נשק עם בחריין בשווי 37 מיליון דולר (27) טנקי M60A3 ועוד). בנוסף לכך החל הממשל בתהליך התייעצויות בקונגרס לגבי מכירת 20 מסוקי אפצ'י למעא"פ ו-8 לבחריין. תגובת המחוקקים היתה נזעמת והסתדרכים מטעם הממשל אמרו שיקצצו בכמויות או יבטלו את המכירה לחלוטין.

הסנטור קרנסטון הגיש הצעה לאו-אשורה והצטרפו אליו הסנטורים ספקטור, סימון ופקווד. חבר בית הנבחרים אובר הודיע כי בכוונתו להגיש הצעה דומה בבית הנבחרים, ראוי לציון כי היוזמות הללו ננקטו בלא ש"ידידי-ישראל" עמדו מאחוריהן.



מוזכרות הממשלה

ירושלים, כ"ז בתשרי התשנ"א
16 באוקטובר 1990

סודי ביותר

תרשומות - ארה"ב-מועב"ט

(1) שיחה עם השגריר בראון (כ"ה בתשרי התשנ"א - 14.10.90):

- א. השגריר בראון התקשר ושאל על הרקע להחלטת הממשלה מהיום.
- ב. אמרתי כי ההחלטה מדברת בעדה, וסיבותיה כתובות בה - ההתעלמות מההתקפה על המתפללים היהודיים; הצגת ירושלים בירתנו כ"שטח כבוש"; והתעלמות מכך שאנו שומרים על המקומות הקדושים באורח חסר תקדים. איננו רוצים לשלם מחיר ולהיות שעיר לעזאזל בגלל "צרכים קואליציוניים" של מישהו, כשהמדובר בהחלטה לא צודקת.
- ג. בראון אמר שהוא מודאג מנטיה שיש לאנשים מסויימים לתבוע החלטות נוספות של מועב"ט. אמרתי כי אילו היו ערבים הורגים ערבים לא היה קורה דבר, כפי שאירע פעמים הרבה בעבר; כשהמדובר ביהודים שונה הדבר.

(2) שיחה עם מרטין אינדיק, מנהל "מכון בושינגטון" - כ"ו בתשרי התשנ"א (15.10.90) - (17:00)

אינדיק התקשר. ביקש, בעקבות שיחה שלו עם דניס רוס, להנחיל את התחושה כי ארה"ב רוצה לשמור את הנושא הישראלי מחוץ למועצת הבטחון, כדי לא לסייע לצדאם חוסין. רואים את אש"פ כקשור לצדאם. ארה"ב ניסתה לצמצם את הנזק שבהחלטת מועב"ט. קולו של דניס רוס מבודד בתמיכה בגישתנו. לפיכך המבוקש הוא שלא לחסום את בוא המשלחת, אף כי ניתן לסרב לראותה, לאפשר למזכ"ל לקבל את הדו"ח של ועדת הבירור. אפשר להשיג מארה"ב הבנה לעניינינו בגלל הצורך שהם נתונים בו, כדי שלא להגיע שוב למועב"ט. אמרתי כי לא נקבל את המשלחת; זוהי פגיעה בלבנו, בירושלים, והסתובבות שלהם כאן בניגוד להחלטת הממשלה היא עצמה עלבון מיותר. אין לנו כמובן כל ענין להתנגח עם ארה"ב אלא להיפרך, אך נעבר קו אדום. ציין שרצוי היה שאשוחח עם רוס.

(3) שיחה עם השגריר בראון - (כ"ו בתשרי התשנ"א (15.10.90) - 18:30)

השגריר ביקר ביוזמתו. השתתף מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ.

אמר כי הסביר לדניס רוס את החלטת הממשלה כבאה משני טעמים עיקריים: פגיעה ואי-איזון בהחלטת מועב"ט, ועקרון ריבונות ירושלים. סיפר על שיחתו עם סרה"מ ושה"ח אמש. כמו-כן הזכיר שכעסנו על העדר אזכור להשלכת הסלעים על יהודים בכותל.

סיפר על שיחה שלו עם דניס רוס. ביטא כרעיון שלו אפשרות שתחילה תפרסם ועדת הבירור את הדו"ח ואחר-כך נקבל משלחת שתפגוש אישים "מוניציפליים" וטכניים, ואולי תקיים "שיחות פרטיות עם אנשי ממשל" ותדווח למזכ"ל, תוך שמירת העקרון שלנו שאין הממשלה מקבלת אותם. נאמר לבראון כי המשלחת לא תתקבל ומוטב שלא תגיע.

(4) שיחה עם דניס רוס כ"ו בתשרי התשנ"א (15.10.90) בעקבות מטרים שביקשו לשוחח עמו, ועל דעת רה"מ:

א. רוס טען שגם אילולא המשבר העיראקי היו תומכים בהחלטה, כיוון שלדעתם היתה אלימות מופרזת ונהרגו אנשים (ציינתי כי מועב"ט אינה מתכנסת כשנהרגים מאות אנשים במקומות שונים בעולם). באשר למועב"ט הם מעונינים לשים את הנושא מאחורינו כדי למנוע בעיות, שאינן רצויות לכולנו. זהו המסר העיקרי; ומכאן הרצון שנקבל את המשלחת, כי אם לא נעשה כן, תהיה שוב החלטה של מועב"ט. קיווה כי תשובתנו לא תמהר להימסר באו"ם, (הערה: השיחה היתה בערך במקביל למסירת התשובה) ושנסקול לאפשר למשלחת לבוא גם אם איש לא יקבל אותה.

ב. תיארתי במפורט את עמדתנו בנושא, ואמרתי כי רה"מ מכין איגרת לנשיא בוש. חזרתי על האלמנטים שגרמו להחלטת הממשלה ועל הפגיעה הקשה וחוסר ההגינות שראינו בהחלטת מועב"ט, לרבות עמדת ארה"ב, וכן על האבסורד והעלבון שבבוא משלחת בניגוד לדעת מי משלתנו. כל הענין הוא תשלום במטבע ישראלית בעד קיום הקואליציה האמריקנית במפרץ, אך מבחינתנו ויתורים בעניני ירושלים הם משל היה אדם מסכים לפגיעה באמו. חזר שוב על משאלתם.

א. רובינשטיין



קונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בניו יורק
CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
(212) 351-5200

אב"ד

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אלו מצפ"א, תפוצות, הסכרת
דעו פלג וושינגטון
מאת: סגן הקונסול ניו יורק

הנדון: אירועי הר הבית ותחלפת מועדני'ט.
לשלנו 1147

1. מרבית הארגונים היהודים האמריקאים תומכים בעמדת ישראל ובכלל זה 'אמריקן ג'ואיש קונגרס' הידוע בעמדתו היונית. מצ"ב חודעתם.
2. כל אימת שוחסי ישראל ארה"ב מתחדדים יש גם קולות בקרב הקהילה היהודית התומכים בעמדת הממשל וזו היא הפעם עמדת התנועה הרפורמית כפי שכאח לידו ביטוי בהודעתו של רבי אלכסנדר שינדלר.

סגן הקונסול ניו יורק
מרדכי יריד

16 באוקטובר 1990

הנה מכתב זה אשר נשלח אליהם
רוב גמול
2



UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1511

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
CHIEF OF STAFF
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

1. [Illegible]

[Several lines of illegible text, possibly a list or table]

2. [Illegible]

3. [Illegible]

1990-10-16

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NEW-YORK/MASHAN

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AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS NYC

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DEPT. (TX): 0035

AJ Congress

American Jewish Congress
Stephen Wise Congress House
19 East 64th Street
New York, NY 10021
212 879 4930 • Fax 212 247 3673

117)

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37 News

Contact: Andrea Binder
Associate Director of Communications
212-360-1841

For Immediate Release
October 18, 1990

**JEWISH LEADERS COMMENT ON ISRAEL'S REFUSAL
TO COOPERATE WITH UN COMMISSION**

In a statement released today by Robert K. Lifton, president and Henry Siegman, executive director of the AJCongress, the Jewish leaders "welcomed the establishment by Israel of a commission of inquiry to investigate the tragic events in Jerusalem last Monday."

In their comments, Mr. Lifton and Mr. Siegman noted that it is understandable that Israel is reluctant to cooperate with the UN given the UN's record of one-sided pronouncements on virtually all questions pertaining to the Arab-Israel conflict. They also noted that "it is unreasonable to expect the government of Israel to accept a UN resolution that directly challenges Jerusalem's status as the capital of Israel."

The full text of the statement follows:

We welcome the establishment by Israel of a commission of inquiry that will investigate the tragic events in Jerusalem last Monday.

Given the record of past Israeli commissions, which conducted their investigations with uncompromising integrity, we are confident that this newly appointed commission will investigate the conduct of all parties, including the Israeli security forces, fairly and impartially. We look forward to the findings and recommendations of the commission.

The reluctance of the Israeli government to cooperate with the United Nations representatives is surely understandable given the U.N.'s record of one-sided pronouncements on virtually all questions pertaining to the Arab-Israel conflict. Furthermore, the UN representatives will be acting pursuant to a Security Council resolution that anticipated the results of their inquiry and already judged Israel guilty even before the representatives left on their mission.

Finally, it is unreasonable to expect the government of Israel to accept a UN resolution that directly challenges Jerusalem's status as the capital of Israel. It should come as no surprise to anyone that no Israeli government could acquiesce in that proposition.

The loss of life and injuries which occurred as a result of the violence in Jerusalem is tragic, and we extend our condolences to the families of the Palestinian and Jewish victims. It is our hope these tragic losses do not divert attention from efforts to counter Saddam Hussein, the real source of mortal danger in the Middle East.

-END-

UNRES.015



NEW-YORK/MASHAN 1409180 02
U.A.H.C. 4001
Union of American Hebrew Congregations

PATRON OF YERUSHALAYIM COLLEGE - JEWISH INSTITUTE OF RELIGION
630 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NY 10021 (212) 448-9100 SABLES UNIONVAARD

RABBI SCHINDLER

NEWS RELEASE

117/37 3/3

CONTACT: Richard Gelson (212) 786-6308 For Immediate Release

**RABBI SCHINDLER URGES ISRAEL TO COOPERATE WITH UN INQUIRY;
HE CALLS THE UN RESOLUTION 'ONE-SIDED' BUT SAYS REFUSAL
TO COOPERATE WOULD DIVERT ATTENTION FROM RAPE OF KUWAIT**

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, today (Monday, Oct. 15) called on the government of Israel to make its case to the world community by cooperating with the proposed United Nations inquiry into what he called "the tragic and bloody events in Jerusalem."

Rabbi Schindler, whose organization is composed of 340 Reform synagogues in the United States and Canada, called the UN resolution "one-sided" but said that refusing to cooperate would "protract the crisis at the UN, divert attention from Iraq's rape of Kuwait and aggravate U.S.-Israel relations."

It will also "give rise to the unnecessary suspicion that Israel has something to hide," he said.

The full text of Rabbi Schindler's statement follows:

The tragic and bloody events in Jerusalem during the Jewish holiday of Succoth have proved to be a bonanza for Saddam Hussein. The condemnation of Israel by the UN Security Council -- before its own investigation has even begun -- is a one-sided judgment ignoring the attack on peaceful Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall on one of the holiest days of the Jewish calendar.

Clearly, the resolution is a political vehicle, designed to preserve the anti-Iraq coalition. Despite its tendentious nature, however, Israel would be best served by making its case to the world community. To refuse to cooperate with the UN investigators on any level will not help Israel's long-term interests. Rather, it will protract the crisis at the UN, divert attention from Iraq's rape of Kuwait, and aggravate U. S.-Israel relations. And it will give rise to the unnecessary suspicion that Israel has something to hide.

"In the absence of a peace process, such events as took place in Jerusalem last Monday are inevitable. Nothing demonstrates with more terrifying urgency the need for a renewed peace initiative that will offer hope for a better and more civilized relationship between two peoples who will either learn to live together or will surely continue to die together."

10/15/90 X X X

10/16/90 to Israel's Consulate - VIA FAX
ATTENTION: MORDECAI YEDID

10 כה 7

אאא, חוזם: 12734

אל: רהמש/925

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 246, תא: 171090, זח: 2211, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/ מיידי

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ציר לקונגרס

הנדון: האוירה הכללית ב"גבעה" כרקע לשלהי הדיון הקונגרסיונלי ב"תחוקות ישראל"

1. דיון מליאת הסנאט בחק תקציב סיוע החוץ יתחדש, אולי, הערב, וכנראה מאוחר יותר. המשוכות שבדרך - אינן לפי שעה - "ישראליות", אלא קשורות לסלבדור, הפלות וכו'. ה- CONFERENCE בנושא חוק תקציב הבטחון (הקצבות) זכנס, אולי, היום.

2. שני אירועים "ישראלים" אלו מתרחשים בצילו של משבר תחיקתי-ממסדי המורכב מן הגורמים כדלקמן:

א. חרב הבחירות מתנופפת מעל לראשי הנבחרים בעוצמה חסרת תקדים.

ב. משבר מוסד ה- INCUMBENCY ממותן אמנם ע"י החשיפה התקשורתית שמקבלים הנבחרים, אך תדמיתם בשפל על רקע פרשיות האתירה, המבוך התקציבי וההערכה כי ה"גבעה" אינה מבטאת רחשי לב הצבור ואינה יכולה להגיע להכרעות בנושאים קריטיים.

ג. המשבר הכלכלי (גרעון צפוי לשנה הבאה בסך 300 מיליארד דולר ואולי אף יותר) נראה כמחריף. המצב מחייב החלטות קשות אך מכאיבות לצבור הבוחרים, מכאן - בין היתר - חוסר הרצון והיכולת של ה"גבעה" (במקביל לכורח) לפעול.

ד. סדר היום התחיקתי ב"גבעה" יוצר צוואר בקבוק חסר תקדים. עשרות תחיקות המעצבות את הנוף הכלכלי, חברתי, צבאי של ארה"ב, והמסתכמות במאות מליוני דולר, עומדות על הפרק, ובפני מרביתן מכשולים גדולים לפני סיום תהליך התחיקה. חשוב מכל (?) גורל התחוקות יכריע אף את גורלם הפוליטי של רבים מהניבחרים.

ה. משבר אשליית ה- PEACE DIVIDEND אשר לא היתה ולא ניבראה. התנפצה האשלייה כי אפשר יהיה - עקב הפשרת המלחמה הקרה - לקצץ באופן דרמטי בתקציב הבטחון, להפנות משאבים לתקציבים אזרחיים, ואולי אף כמו שצפוי עם סיום מלחמות ארה"ב מעבר לים - להוריד מסים. ניפוץ האשלייה הותיר משקעים מרירים של האשמות בינמפלגתיות ופנים מפלגתיות על החמצה, כביכול, של הזדמנויות הסטוריות ועל הדרך הרעיונית הנכונה.

ו. משבר ההנהגות ב"גבעה" מוצא בטויו בשורה ארוכה של המתמודדים על תפקידי הנהגה שונים בשתי המפלגות, בהמרת פי המפלגות בוויה דולורוזה של גבוש התקציב, בערעור היחסים האישיים בין השחקנים הראשיים בתהליכים הנ"ל, בהערמת קשיים ע"י הצגת תילי תיקונים לתחוקות, על דרך התחוקה.

ז. משבר המשמעת המפלגתית מקבל תאוצה על רקע הבחירות הקרובות, הניגוד הקיים לעתים בין הקו המפלגתי וצורך ההישרדות הפוליטי של הנבחר, ועל רקע ירידת קרנן של ההנהגות.

ח. משבר הפיחות במעמד הנשיא הסובל מירידה משמעותית במעמדו בדע'ק (יוקרתו מוגדרת כ-SOFT, בניגוד לזו של רייגן), עד כדי השוואתו לעתים לג'ימי קארטר (וזו אינה מחמאה בקרב מומחים פוליטיים!). משבר זה מחדד ההתגברות הנ"ל, והתגברות עליו תורמת למיתונם. הביטוי למשבר ניתן

בעת הדיון על התקציב ואף בעת השימועים בנושא עסקת הנשק הסעודית (בד"כ מעניקה ה"גבעה" אשראי רב לממשל בכל הקשור למדיניות חוב, ובמיוחד לעסקות נשק).

ט. משבר המפרץ משחק לפי שעה כבלם זעזועים. המגמה האיתנה לפי שעה עלולה לקבל תפנית חדה (במיוחד עקב המשברים הנ"ל) אם תחול התפתחות אשר תעלה ספיקות ביחס לכדאיות המהלך הנוכחי (בין אם המדובר באבידות אמריקאיות או באיגופים ותימרונים מפתיעים של צדאם).

3. אחת המסקנות מן התאור הנ"ל (בתוספת ההנחה כי ה"גבעה" נוטה לראייה פשטנית את נושאי האיום על ישראל, הקואליציה, ערב-ארה"ב, תהליך השלום וכו') עשויה להיות כי פרופיל נמוך של ישראל בתחום החדרת מסרינו ל"גבעה" הטרודה בסדר יומה המורכב, להבדיל מפרופיל נמוך בתחום העמידה מול עיראק עלול לכרסם - ואולי כבר מכרסם - במעמדנו. גורמים שונים ב"גבעה" טוענים שבעוד שישראל משחקת ב- SOFT BALL (בטוי לפרופיל הנמוך?) הרי שהממשל משחק ב-HARD BALL ואולי אף ב-ROUGH BALL תוך הסבת נזקים לתדמית והישגי ישראל ב"גבעה": מדוע איננו שומעים מן היהודים!?

ר.ס.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, סי יבל

סססס

ארה"ב

12411: חוזם, אאא
אל: רהמש/900
מ-: המשרד, תא: 171090, זח: 1925, דח: ב, סג: שמ,
בבב
שמור/בהול
אל : ווש'
השגריר

להלן נוסח בלתי מוסמך של מכתב השר למזכיר המדינה מהיום (17.10.90).
נוסח זה כבר הועבר לידי שג' ארה"ב כאן, ולכן אין צורך להעבירו לנמען.
המקור החתום יועבר דיפ'.

JERUSALEM, OCTOBER 17, 1990
86726

DEAR JIM,

IN THE WAKE OF VARIOUS PUBLICATIONS, SOME OF
THEM WITH DIFFERING AND PERPLEXING INTERPRETATIONS OF
MY LETTER TO YOU OF OCTOBER 2, 1990 WITH REGARD TO
THE HOUSING INVESTMENT GUARANTEES, I WISH TO DEFINE
OUR POSITION:

YOU ARE WELL AWARE THAT IN THAT LETTER THERE IS
NO UNDERTAKING, EITHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT, TO REFRAIN
FROM CONSTRUCTION IN JERUSALEM -- OR TO LIMIT
CONSTRUCTION WITHIN JERUSALEM -- OR ANYWHERE ELSE,
INCLUDING JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA.

THIS POSITION FINDS ITS FULL EXPRESSION,
CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY, BOTH IN THE CONVERSATIONS
WE HELD TOGETHER AND IN YOUR LETTER TO ME OF
SEPTEMBER 21.

PERMIT ME TO QUOTE MY WORDS FROM THE RECORD OF
OUR CONVERSATIONS WHICH WE HELD IN WASHINGTON ON
SEPTEMBER 5, 1990, AS FOLLOWS: 'MY GOVERNMENT HAS AN
IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION. IF YOU THINK THAT WE WILL
CHANGE OUR CREDO ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE GOVERNMENT
WAS ELECTED BECAUSE OF THESE INVESTMENT GUARANTEES,
YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN.' ELSEWHERE
IN THE RECORD, I REPEATED AND EMPHASIZED: 'IF YOU
EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT TO DECLARE THAT IT WILL HALT
THE SETTLEMENT ENDEAVOR AND THAT NO ONE WILL SETTLE
IN THE TERRITORIES -- THAT WILL NOT BE.' INDEED, YOUR
REACTION WAS: 'YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO TAKE ANY STEP
WHICH CONTRADICTS YOUR PLATFORM AND YOUR POSITION.'

MOREOVER: IN YOUR LETTER TO ME OF SEPTEMBER 21,

1990, YOU WRITE INTER ALIA: 'I LISTENED VERY CAREFULLY TO WHAT YOU TOLD ME IN WASHINGTON.... YOU PLACED PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON NOT BEING PUT IN A POSITION ... TO GIVE UP THE PRINCIPLE OF SETTLEMENTS.' YOU CONCLUDED YOUR LETTER BY REEMPHASIZING THAT YOU HAD MY COMMENTS TO YOU VERY MUCH IN MIND. IN THE COURSE OF THE LETTER YOU SAID THAT YOU HAD ISRAEL'S 'CONCERNS VERY MUCH IN MIND' ... 'AND NOTWITHSTANDING OUR STRONG OPPOSITION TO SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY, I HAVE MADE AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID PUTTING YOU IN A POSITION WHERE A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT IS BEING OVERTLY CHALLENGED.'

IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, JIM, WE AGREED THAT THE FUNDS DERIVING FROM THE LOAN, WHICH IS GUARANTEED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT, WILL BE USED IN KEEPING WITH THAT COMMITMENT GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, YEAR BY YEAR, UPON RECEIPT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND GRANTS FROM THE UNITED STATES. THIS COMMITMENT STATES THAT '... USES OF THE GRANT SHALL BE RESTRICTED TO THE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO JUNE 5, 1967.'

THIS COMMITMENT HAS NOT -- AND HAS NOT HAD IN THE PAST -- ANY BEARING WHATSOEVER ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER JERUSALEM.

THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM WAS DETERMINED IN THE JERUSALEM LAW WHICH STATES THAT JERUSALEM, WHOLE AND UNDIVIDED, IS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL.

JERUSALEM IS NOT DIVIDED EITHER BY A WALL OR BY ANY SEPARATING LINE.

MY DEAR JIM, THE TWO OF US AGREED AT THE OUTSET OF OUR TALKS THAT THE BASIS OF OUR WORK WILL BE POSITED ON TRUST AND CREDIBILITY. HENCE I THINK IT CORRECT TO HAVE TAKEN THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SET THE RECORD ABSOLUTELY STRAIGHT, BOTH IN LETTER AND IN SPIRIT.

LET US NOT PERMIT EXTRANEIOUS INTERPRETATIONS TO UNDERMINE THIS BASIS, WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND BETWEEN US PERSONALLY.

SINCERELY YOURS,

DAVID LEVY

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

טטטט

אברהם

אאא, תוזם: 11355

אל: רהמש/841

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 218, תא: 161090, זח: 1629, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / מידי

אל : מצפ"א

דע : הסברה, תפוצות

הנדון : בניה חדשה בירושלים

דיון היום ישבתי ליד סטויארט איזנשטאט שהעביר לי את המסר הבא:

"תהיה זו טעות אמיתית אם נתחיל בבניית התנחלויות (SETTLEMENTS) בירושלים. במיוחד לנוכח הרקע של מכתב ההתחייבויות, בחתימת שה"ח, בקשר להלוואות". הוסיף כי התוצאות השליליות תהיינה כלפי הממשל, הקונגרס והקהילה היהודית.

לגבי המינוח - "התנחלות" - אמר שזו לא דעתו האישית, יש לו קרובי משפחה הגרים בשכונות החדשות של ירושלים.

עודד בן - חיים

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, רביב, מעת, הסברה,
בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות

ססס

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33-ע 11

ממל 11
2/2

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1/3

17091
שמו"ר/מידי
355.20

001147 | 33

אל: מצפ"א, תפוצות

דע: פלג וושינגטון

מאת: סגן חסונכיל ניו יורק

הנדון: החלטת מועבי"ם

1. עומדים בקשר עם הארגונים היחודיים במגמה לרתום אותם לתמיכה בלתי מסוייגת כתגובת ישראל להחלטת מועבי"ם.
2. מציב חודעת יו"ר נאקראא בצירוף מכתב מדמין רפאל לפדרציות היחודיות.
3. בנתיים הוחלט על עצרת סולידריות בישראל ב-21 באוקטובר בקווינס בארגונו של רבי שויינפלד שהודיע לנו כי קונגרסמנים אקרמן ושויימר ישתתפו בעצרת.

סגן חסונכיל ניו יורק
מודכי ידיך

15 באוקטובר 1990

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ד

END

NATIONAL JEWISH



COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL
443 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016-7322
(212) 684-6950
Fax: (212) 686-1353

Memo

001147/33

3/3

Sent by Fax

October 15, 1990

TO: NJCRAC Member Agencies
FROM: Martin J. Raffel, Israel Task Force Director
RE: Recent Developments in Regard to the Riots in Jerusalem

The attached statement about last Friday's U.N. Security Council resolution and yesterday's Israeli Cabinet action was issued today by Arden E. Shenker, NJCRAC Chair. Please note that in contrast to the letter sent last Wednesday to President George Bush, this statement does not refer to the Palestinian Arab attack on Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall as premeditated. This is not to suggest that we believe the Arab riots necessarily were spontaneous but it is felt that this issue would better be left to the Israeli investigation to determine.

The hope is that this issue will recede as quickly as possible from the news headlines. Obviously, we do not want to do anything that will prolong attention to it, such as engaging in a public campaign on this issue. However, we encourage you to utilize the points made in Arden's statement to respond to inquiries from the media and to selectively stimulate editorial comment along these lines. It would also be a good idea, I believe, to share the statement with leadership in the Jewish and general communities, including members of Congress.

Please send us copies of any local newspaper editorials or statements by community leadership on this issue. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to consult with NJCRAC.

MJR:rs1

2/3

001147 | 33

Statement by Arden E. Shenker, NJCRAC Chair, in Response to Recent Developments Regarding the Riots in Jerusalem

The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council supports the Israeli decision to investigate immediately the tragic events of last week in Jerusalem and urges that this independent investigation be conducted as thoroughly and as expeditiously as possible. We are confident that Israeli authorities will take appropriate action on the basis of the investigation's findings. We urge all fair-minded people to give Israel, an open and democratic society, the opportunity to complete this process before arriving at any final judgments in regard to these events.

We understand Israel's reluctance to subject itself to the scrutiny of a United Nations commission of inquiry. While the U.N. has been an effective vehicle for dealing with the Persian Gulf situation, which is based on an inter-Arab conflict, the U.N. has had an abysmal record with regard to Israel. The U.N.'s traditional one-sidedness is reflected in the resolution adopted last Friday, which totally disregards the Palestinian Arab attack on Jewish worshippers praying on a Holy Day at the Western Wall, Judaism's most sacred site. Clearly Israel cannot expect to receive a fair hearing from a world body which in 1975 adopted a resolution challenging the legitimacy of Zionism, the modern national liberation movement of the Jewish people that led to the creation of Israel.

We also understand the concern expressed by Israel with regard to the possible impact of this U.N. action on the status of Jerusalem. The American Jewish community is unified in support of Jerusalem as Israel's undivided eternal capital. We note that the U.S. Congress, in manifesting the will of the American people, has expressed support for Jerusalem as Israel's undivided capital on a number of occasions. Thus, we understand why Israel would reject an undertaking by the U.N. or any other body that would directly or indirectly call into question Jerusalem's status.

Finally, the approach taken by the U.N. on this issue only serves to reward Saddam Hussein and his supporters, particularly the PLO, who want to deflect attention away from Iraq's aggression in the Persian Gulf by focusing attention on the Palestinian issue. In this context, we welcome the U.S. position that there is no linkage between the Persian Gulf crisis and the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.



מזכירות הממשלה

ירושלים, כ"ז בתשרי התשנ"א
16 באוקטובר 1990

סודי ביותר
אמ"ק

תרשומות - ארה"ב-מועב"ט

(1) שיחה עם השגריר בראון (כ"ה בתשרי התשנ"א - 14.10.90):

א. השגריר בראון התקשר ושאל על הרקע להחלטת הממשלה מהיום.

ב. אמרתי כי ההחלטה מדברת בעדה, וסיבותיה כתובות בה - ההתעלמות מההתקפה על המתפללים היהודיים; הצגת ירושלים בירתנו כ"שטח כבוש"; והתעלמות מכך שאנו שומרים על המקומות הקדושים באורח חסר תקדים. איננו רוצים לשלם מחיר ולהיות שעיר לעזאזל בגלל "צרכים קואליציוניים" של מישהו, כשהמדובר בהחלטה לא צודקת.

ג. בראון אמר שהוא מודאג מנטיה שיש לאנשים מסויימים לתבוע החלטות נוספות של מועב"ט. אמרתי כי אילו היו ערבים הורגים ערבים לא היה קורה דבר, כפי שאירע פעמים הרבה בעבר; כשהמדובר ביהודים שונה הדבר.

(2) שיחה עם מרטין אינדיק, מנהל "מכון בושינגטון" -
כ"ו בתשרי התשנ"א (15.10.90) - (17:00)

אינדיק התקשר. ביקש, בעקבות שיחה שלו עם דניס רוס, להנחיל את התחושה כי ארה"ב רוצה לשמור את הנושא הישראלי מחוץ למועצת הבטחון, כדי לא לסייע לצדאם חוסין. רואים את אש"פ כקשור לצדאם. ארה"ב ניסתה לצמצם את הנזק שבהחלטת מועב"ט. קולו של דניס רוס מבודד בתמיכה בגישתנו. לפיכך המבוקש הוא שלא לחסום את בוא המשלחת, אף כי ניתן לסרב לראותה, לאפשר למזכ"ל לקבל את הדו"ח של ועדת הבירור. אפשר להשיג מארה"ב הבנה לעניינינו בגלל הצורך שהם נתונים בו, כדי שלא להגיע שוב למועב"ט. אמרתי כי לא נקבל את המשלחת; זוהי פגיעה בלבנו, בירושלים, והסתובבות שלהם כאן בניגוד להחלטת הממשלה היא עצמה עלבון מיותר. אין לנו כמובן כל ענין להתנגח עם ארה"ב אלא להיפרך, אך נעבר קו אדום. ציין שרצוי היה שאשוחח עם רוס.

(3) שיחה עם השגריר בראון - (כ"ו בתשרי התשנ"א (15.10.90) - 18:30)

השגריר ביקר ביוזמתו. השתתף מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ.

אמר כי הסביר לדניס רוס את החלטת הממשלה כבאה משני טעמים עיקריים: פגיעה ואי-איזון בהחלטת מועב"ט, ועקרון ריבונות ירושלים. סיפר על שיחתו עם סרה"מ ושה"ח אמש. כמו-כן הזכיר שכעסנו על העדר אזכור להשלכת הסלעים על יהודים בכותל.

סיפר על שיחה שלו עם דניס רוס. ביטא כרעיון שלו אפשרות שתחילה תפרסם ועדת הבירור את הדו"ח ואחר-כך נקבל משלחת שתפגוש אישים "מוניציפליים וטכניים", ואולי תקיים "שיחות פרטיות עם אנשי ממשל" ותדווח למזכ"ל, תוך שמירת העקרון שלנו שאין הממשלה מקבלת אותם. נאמר לבראון כי המשלחת לא תתקבל ומוטב שלא תגיע.

(4) שיחה עם דניס רוס כ"ו בתשרי התשנ"א (15.10.90) בעקבות מסרים שביקשו לשוחח עמו, ועל דעת רה"מ:

א. רוס טען שגם אילולא המשבר העיראקי היו תומכים בהחלטה, כיוון שלדעתם היתה אלימות מופרזת ונהרגו אנשים (ציינתי כי מועב"ט אינה מתכנסת כשנהרגים מאות אנשים במקומות שונים בעולם). באשר למועב"ט הם מעוניינים לשים את הנושא מאחורינו כדי למנוע בעיות, שאינן רצויות לכולנו. זהו המסר העיקרי; ומכאן הרצון שנקבל את המשלחת, כי אם לא נעשה כן, תהיה שוב החלטה של מועב"ט. קיוה כי תשובתנו לא תמהר להימסר באו"ם, (הערה: השיחה היתה בערך במקביל למסירת התשובה) ושנשקול לאפשר למשלחת לבוא גם אם איש לא יקבל אותה.

ב. תיארתי במפורט את עמדתנו בנושא, ואמרתי כי רה"מ מכין איגרת לנשיא בוש. חזרתי על האלמנטים שגרמו להחלטת הממשלה ועל הפגיעה הקשה וחוסר ההגינות שראינו בהחלטת מועב"ט, לרבות עמדת ארה"ב, וכן על האבסורד והעלבון שבבוא משלחת בניגוד לדעת מי משלתנו. כל העניין הוא תשלום במטבע ישראלית בעד קיום הקואליציה האמריקנית במפרץ, אך מבחינתנו ויתורים בענייני ירושלים הם משל היה אדם מסכים לפגיעה באמו. חזר שוב על משאלתם.

א. רובינשטיין

אמה

אאא, חוזם: 11191

אל: רהמש/817

מ-: ווש, נר: 2120, תא: 161090, זח: 1300, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

1. בשיחה (16.10) עם ארון מילר תאר את תוכן השדר של רוה'מ לנשיא כ - "STRAIGHTFORWARD" לדבריו תוכן השדר מעביר 'הרבה אמוציות'.
 2. בהמשך לשדר ולחילופי הדברים של הימים האחרונים הבהיר כי יש למצוא דרך - TO COOL DOWN לכמה ימים. לאחר מכן ינסו לשכנע אותנו לאפשר בואו של שליח מטעם המזכ'ל. סיפר כי שמע על נכונות טדי קולק להפגש עם המשלחת. הערה: מדברי מילר ניתן להבין שביקור שליח חשוב יותר משאלת שתה'פ ממ' ישראל עם השליח).
 3. לדברי מילר חשוב לעשות מאמץ TO DIFFUSE את המצב שנוצר ביחסי ישראל - ארה'ב. המשך המתיחות עלול להביא לסחף במאמצי ארה'ב למקד תשומת הלב למפרץ, כמו גם לחזק את הלינקאז' בין שני האיזורים דבר שלא להם ולא לנו יש ענין.
 4. לסיום, בהמשך לפירסומים בדבר החלטת ועדת השרים בראשות השר שרון לעודד יישוב עולים ולהגדיל מספר יחידות הדיור שיבנו, ביקש לדעת האם מדובר בהחלטות חדשות או שמא המדובר במתן פרסום להחלטות שהתקבלו בעבר ?
- שטיין.

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), שהח, סשהח, בנצור

ססס

11315: חוזם, אאא

אל: רהמש/838

מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 213, תא: 161090, זח: 1518, דח: מ, סג: נל,

נכב

בלמס/מידי

אל : תפוצת תקשורת

מאת : עתונות, רושינגטון

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER ANNOUNCES INFORMATION CAMPAIGN FOR THE TERRORISM INFORMATION REWARDS PROGRAM/ BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ROOM DEPARTMENT OF STATE/ TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1990

THE FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE QUESTION AND ANSWER SECTION

Q MR. SECRETARY, LAST JUNE THE US CEASED ITS DISCOURSE WITH THE PLO, CONCLUDING THAT THE PLO HAD NOT FULFILLED ITS COMMITMENT RENOUNCING TERRORISM. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS FOUND OF PLO INVOLVEMENT IN THE DISORDERS ON THE WEST BANK AND IN JERUSALEM, ESPECIALLY THAT -- THE MELEE LAST MONDAY IN WHICH JEWISH WORSHIPPERS WERE INJURED AND 21 PALESTINIANS WERE KILLED?

SEC. BAKER: THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT I AM AWARE OF, BARRY, THAT WE NOW HAVE, ALTHOUGH AS YOU KNOW, THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS INCIDENT HAS JUST BEGUN BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ITSELF. THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, AS YOU ARE AWARE, HAS PASSED A RESOLUTION ASKING THAT A MISSION FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL GO TO THE REGION AND REPORT BACK, AND THERE IS, AGAIN, AS YOU KNOW, TO SAY THE LEAST, SOME QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THAT MISSION WILL TAKE PLACE.

Q HOW DO YOU FEEL, SIR -- MAY I FOLLOW UP QUICKLY -- ABOUT ISRAEL'S RELUCTANCE TO GIVE MORE THAN JUST TOURIST ATTENTION TO THE UN INVESTIGATOR?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, WE'RE -- WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TEAM TO COMPLETE ITS MISSION. I THINK OUR REACTION -- THE SPOKESMAN CHARACTERIZED IT FOR YOU, YESTERDAY, OUR REACTION TO THE INITIAL RESPONSE OF THE ISRAELI CABINET.

LET ME SIMPLY SAY THAT THIS RESOLUTION IS ONE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE VOTED FOR HAD THERE BEEN NO IRAQ ISSUE OR CRISIS, BECAUSE WE WERE AND REMAIN DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE KILLINGS THAT TOOK PLACE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WERE ALSO DISTURBED BY THE VIOLENCE AGAINST INNOCENT WORSHIPPERS AT THE WESTERN WALL. WE DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY EXCUSE FOR THAT EITHER. AND THE RESOLUTION DOES REFER TO THE ATTACKS ON INNOCENT WORSHIPPERS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU GIVE US AN ASSESSMENT AT THIS DATE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE BELIEVE SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS DEPLOYED TERRORISTS FOR POTENTIAL TERRORIST ACTS AS A RESULT OF THE CRISIS? ARE WE AS CONCERNED AS WE WERE A WHILE AGO? MORE CONCERNED? I MEAN --

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SEC. BAKER: I THINK WE ARE VERY -- I THINK WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT PARTICULARLY THE THREATS THAT HAVE COME FROM BAGHDAD TO UTILIZE TERRORIST ACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES TO FURTHER SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTERESTS. WE TAKE THOSE STATEMENTS VERY SERIOUSLY, AND WE ARE QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THEM. I CAN'T, OBVIOUSLY, GET INTO SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE OR EVIDENCE.

Q MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU BRING US UP TO DATE ON THE MOVES IN THE UN TO PASS A NEW RESOLUTION THAT MIGHT CALL FOR REPARATIONS FOR COUNTRIES DAMAGED BY IRAQ?

SEC. BAKER: I'LL BE GLAD TO. LET ME SAY THAT YOU HEARD ME SAY THE WEEK THAT WE WERE UP AT THE UN RECENTLY THAT I THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE ADDITIONAL NON-FORCEFUL RESOLUTIONS, OR RESOLUTIONS THAT WOULD NOT SPEAK TO THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, THAT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER. WE THINK THAT THE FOCUS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL REALLY SHOULD BE ON THE RAPE OF KUWAIT, WHICH IS CONTINUING, AS WELL AS ON THE PLIGHT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS THAT ARE STILL THERE AND ARE STILL HELD HOSTAGE IN IRAQ.

SO WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE PRIORITY GIVEN TO A HUMANITARIAN RESOLUTION ON THE RESUPPLY OF FOOD AND WATER AND BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE TO THOSE IN EMBASSIES IN KUWAIT, INCLUDING DIPLOMATS, AND WE'D LIKE TO SEE THAT RESOLUTION PASSED PROMPTLY. AND THAT RESOLUTION IS UNDER DISCUSSION AT THE UNITED NATIONS AS WE SPEAK HERE TODAY.

AT SOME POINT, AS WE HAVE INDICATED IN THE PAST, AND AS THE PRESIDENT I THINK MAY HAVE MENTIONED YESTERDAY, WE THINK IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER RESOLUTIONS THAT SPOKE TO THE QUESTION OF REPARATIONS FROM IRAQ FOR WHAT THEY'VE DONE TO KUWAIT, AND THAT SPOKE TO THE QUESTION GENERALLY OF WAR CRIMES RESPONSIBILITY.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE DIPLOMATIC SITUATION BETWEEN THE REST OF THE WORLD AND SADDAM HUSSEIN IS STAGNANT AT THIS TIME? OR DO YOU SEE ANY ACTIVITY ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PART THAT SUGGESTS HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO MAKE A MOVE THAT COULD BRING AN END TO THE CRISIS IN THE GULF?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, THERE'S BEEN A LOT OF SPECULATION ABOUT THAT, RALPH, AS YOU KNOW. LET ME SAY THAT OUR DIPLOMATIC AGENDA, I THINK, IS QUITE CLEAR. IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. WE SEEK FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS.

SO I HOPE NO ONE IS JUDGING THE PACE OF OUR ACTIVITY FROM THE STANDPOINT THAT WE ARE UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN A SEARCH FOR PARTIAL SOLUTIONS. WE ARE INDEED UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN A SEARCH FOR PARTIAL SOLUTIONS. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THIS CONTINUOUSLY. WE THINK THAT THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AND IMPLEMENTED FULLY.

THAT DOESN'T EQUATE, IN MY VIEW, TO AN ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. WE ARE ENGAGED EVERY DAY QUITE ACTIVELY, DIPLOMATICALLY IN WASHINGTON, IN NEW YORK AT THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IN FOREIGN CAPITALS IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL AND POLITICAL RESOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS AS OPPOSED TO A MILITARY OR FORCEFUL RESOLUTION, WHICH, OF COURSE, HAS TO BE AN OPTION WE MAINTAIN.

Q BUT MY QUESTION WAS ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE OF IT, WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. DO YOU SEE ANY RECIPROCAL ACTIVITY ON HIS PART?

SEC. BAKER: ALL WE'VE SEEN SO FAR HAS SUGGESTED THAT SOMEHOW THERE MAY BE SOME INTEREST IN A -- IN WHAT WE WOULD CHARACTERIZE, QUITE FRANKLY, AS A PARTIAL SOLUTION. THAT IS, SOME INTEREST IN A NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD ENABLE HIM TO CLAIM BENEFITS FROM HIS UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION AGAINST A SMALL NEIGHBOR. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND MOST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE STANDING FOR, AND STANDING UP FOR, AND STANDING -- STANDING AGAINST, OR DEFENDING IN PRINCIPLE.

SO IT'S A CASE, FROM OUR STANDPOINT, OF NOT WANTING TO SUCCUMB TO THE SIREN SONG OF A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS. WE THINK THERE SHOULD BE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IF, INDEED, WE ARE GOING TO MOVE TO A PRINCIPLED NEW ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, IF I COULD FOLLOW UP ON THAT QUESTION, WHEN YOU SAY THE SIREN SOUND, IS IT COMING FROM THE SOVIET UNION MISSION TO BAGHDAD? IS THAT WHERE YOU PICKED UP THESE SIGNS THAT HE'S INTERESTED IN SOME SORT OF PARTIAL SOLUTION?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, THE FIRST SIGNS CAME STRAIGHT OUT OF BAGHDAD WHEN HE MADE SOME PROPOSALS ABOUT WITHDRAWING IF CERTAIN OTHER THINGS HAPPENED. AND IT'S OUR POSITION -- AGAIN, LET ME RESTATE IT -- THAT HE SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY BE REWARDED FOR HIS AGGRESSION.

WE MADE THIS MISTAKE IN THE '30S. WE DID NOT STAND UP FOR PRINCIPLE. WE DID NOT STAND UP IN OPPOSITION TO UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION. AND WE REMEMBER WHAT HAPPENED IN ETHIOPIA AND WE REMEMBER WHAT HAPPENED IN EUROPE WHEN WE REFUSED TO TAKE A PRINCIPLED STAND.

AND NOW, HAPPILY, THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, FOR THE MOST PART, IS STANDING FIRM WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THIS STAND.

Q ON ISRAEL AGAIN, HOW FAR IS THE US WILLING TO PUSH ISRAEL TO FOLLOW THE UN RESOLUTION? THERE ARE SOME SUGGESTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT UNLESS YOU PUSH AS HARD AS YOU'RE PUSHING AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN, THERE'S A DOUBLE STANDARD HERE.

SEC. BAKER: WELL, YOU KNOW WE'VE MADE CLEAR I THINK, OUR VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE -- IT WOULD BE GOOD IF ISRAEL WOULD ADMIT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE. WE'VE SAID THAT IT IS ONLY IN THAT WAY, WE THINK, THAT ISRAEL WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE ITS CASE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION; AND NOT TO ADMIT THE MISSION, WE THINK, MOVES ISRAEL AND MOVES OUR EFFORT IN THE GULF IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. WE HAVE MADE THAT VERY CLEAR.

Q YES. IF ISRAEL DECIDES TO BUILD APARTMENTS IN EAST JERUSALEM, WOULD THAT BE IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OR LETTER OF THE AGREEMENT THAT WE HAVE REGARDING THE DOLLAR 400 MILLION IN LOAN GUARANTEES FOR HOUSING?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, IF THEY DECIDE TO BUILD APARTMENTS OR IF THEY DECIDE TO DO SOMETHING BEYOND JUST BUILDING APARTMENTS. LET ME -- LET ME SIMPLY SAY THAT YOU HAVE THE LETTER OF ASSURANCES THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL. WE HAVE RECEIVED THOSE ASSURANCES ON THE 2ND OF OCTOBER.

THE MINISTER'S LETTER RESPONDED TO THE CONCERNS THAT WE HAD EXPRESSED PRIOR TO RECEIVING THE LETTER. WE THINK THAT THE -- WE THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES IS AND SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RELY UPON ASSURANCES RECEIVED IN WRITING FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL.

AND WE ARE RELYING UPON THOSE ASSURANCES, AND YOU HAVE THE LETTER.

Q MR. SECRETARY, I HAVE THE LETTER AND I HAVE READ IT A NUMBER OF TIMES, AND I CAN'T TELL FROM READING THE LETTER WHETHER THE ASSURANCES AGAINST SETTLING SOVIET JEWS BEYOND THE GREEN LINE APPLIES TO EAST JERUSALEM OR NOT. CAN YOU CLEAR THAT UP?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, LET ME SAY THAT THE ASSURANCES THAT ARE GIVEN IN THAT LETTER, NORM, ARE THE SAME ASSURANCES IN SUBSTANCE THAT ISRAEL HAS GIVEN THE JEWISH AGENCY, WHICH IS AN AGENCY THAT HELPS SUBSIDIZE THE COST OF THE ABSORPTION OF SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS.

THE LETTER IS QUITE CLEAR, I THINK, IN SPEAKING ABOUT AREAS OUTSIDE OF THE GREEN LINE. IT SAYS, AND LET ME QUOTE IT TO YOU, "THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S POLICY IS NOT TO DIRECT OR SETTLE SOVIET JEWS BEYOND THE GREEN LINE." IT SAYS THE USE OF THE HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO JUNE 7, 1967.

SEC. BAKER: THE GREEN LINE RAN THROUGH JERUSALEM AND WE KNOW THAT EAST JERUSALEM WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL PRIOR TO JUNE 5, 1967. I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY YOU'RE HAVING TROUBLE WITH THAT.

Q IF I MAY, IT'S QUITE CLEAR THAT THE PART OF THE LETTER THAT SPEAKS OF THE ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO THE WAR, THAT THAT CERTAINLY INCLUDES EAST JERUSALEM. THAT'S THE PART ABOUT SPENDING THE 400 MILLION (DOLLARS). THE PART THAT YOU READ PREVIOUSLY THAT SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S POLICY IS NOT TO SETTLE SOVIET JEWS BEYOND THE GREEN LINE, I THINK THAT FULL SENTENCE CITED PREVIOUS STATEMENTS BY HOUSING MINISTER SHARON AND PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, WHICH I DO NOT BELIEVE WAS INTENDED TO INCLUDE EAST JERUSALEM. AND THAT'S WHAT I'M WONDERING, WHAT THE -- WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S DEFINITION OF THE --

SEC. BAKER: LOOK, I'M NOT GOING TO MAKE -- I'M NOT GOING TO INTERPRET IT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. I THINK THE LETTER SPEAKS FOR ITSELF, AND I WOULD INVITE YOU TO DRAW YOUR CONCLUSIONS FROM THE LETTER.

Q MR. SECRETARY, A CLARIFICATION AND A QUESTION. JUST APROPOS OF MARY'S QUESTION, THESE OVERTURES FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN REGARDING A PARTIAL SOLUTION, ARE YOU REFERRING TO HIS EARLIER CALL THAT SOMEHOW IF WE LINK THE TWO CRISES, THAT THAT WOULD PROVIDE -- THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT, A SETTLEMENT THERE, AND A SETTLEMENT IN THE GULF -- (HE/YOU ?) WOULD CONSIDER A SOLUTION, OR ARE YOU SPEAKING ABOUT SOMETHING MORE RECENT IN WHICH HE HAS SAID, "WELL, IF I COULD JUST KEEP THE ISLANDS OR IF I COULD JUST KEEP SOME OILFIELDS, THEN I'D BE READY TO DEAL"? THAT'S THE CLARIFICATION.

MY QUESTION IS, IT'S OBVIOUS FROM ALL THESE QUESTIONS AND EVEN A CURSORY READING OF THE NEWSPAPERS TODAY THAT THERE IS ENORMOUS TENSION IN THE US-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP. HOW DID WE GET THERE AND HOW ARE WE GOING TO GET OUT OF THERE?

SEC. BAKER: IS YOUR QUESTION ABOUT THE GULF, THE SIGNALS THAT ARE COMING OUT OF BAGHDAD, FIRST?

Q FIRST.

SEC. BAKER: WELL, YOU'RE QUITE RIGHT WHEN YOU POINT TO THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL SIGNAL WAS, "I'LL GET OUT IF OTHERS WILL GET OUT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES." THAT GOES BACK ALMOST TO THE BEGINNING OF THIS CRISIS. SINCE THAT TIME, WE HAVE SEEN SOME SUGGESTIONS THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT OTHER THINGS ARE NEGOTIABLE AS FAR AS BAGHDAD IS CONCERNED. I DON'T KNOW HOW FIRM THOSE SIGNALS ARE, BUT YOU MENTIONED SOME OF THEM IN YOUR QUESTION -- BUBIYAN ISLAND, ACCESS TO THE GULF AND THINGS LIKE THAT. THESE ARE THE KINDS OF THINGS THAT WE SAY, IF WE NEGOTIATED THAT -- IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT'S REALLY NOT UP TO US TO NEGOTIATE IT, BUT IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WERE WILLING TO GO FOR THAT -- WE'D BE PERMITTING AN AGGRESSOR TO PROFIT FROM HIS UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION.

AND THE SECOND QUESTION IS THAT, WOULD WE LIKE TO SEE THINGS A BIT SMOOTHER AT THIS TIME?

Q BUT HOW DID WE GET TO THIS POINT IN THE US-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP, FIRST OF ALL? AND COULD THESE TENSIONS AND THESE -- (INAUDIBLE) -- HAVE RESULTED --

SEC. BAKER: WELL, TOM, YOU'RE THE EXPERT. YOU WROTE THE BOOK ON THE REGION. I'M NOT -- I'M NOWHERE NEAR AS --

Q BUT MR. SECRETARY --

SEC. BAKER: -- AS WELL-EQUIPPED TO ANSWER -- WELL-EQUIPPED TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION AS YOU ARE. BUT LET ME GO BACK TO THE -- TO THE ANSWER I GAVE YOU A MINUTE AGO.

ON THIS QUESTION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, I SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE VOTED FOR THIS RESOLUTION IF THERE HAD BEEN NO GULF CRISIS. AND THE SUGGESTION THAT SOMEHOW WE ARE VOTING TO CONDEMN THE KILLINGS THAT TOOK PLACE -- THE KILLING OF 20 PEOPLE AND THE INJURING OF SOME 150 THROUGH LIVE FIRE, SIMPLY BECAUSE WE WANT TO MAINTAIN A COALITION ON THE GULF, IS NOT -- IT'S NOT ACCURATE TO SUGGEST THAT.

DO WE WANT TO MAINTAIN THE COALITION ON THE GULF? YES. DO WE THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT WORLD ATTENTION BE FOCUSED UPON THE RAPE OF KUWAIT? YES. DO WE THINK IT'S INAPPROPRIATE TO LINK THAT WITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM? YES. HAVE WE SAID, FOR THE FULL 20 MONTHS THAT WE'VE BEEN IN OFFICE, THAT WE THINK IT'S EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE A PEACE PROCESS? YES. WOULD WE LIKE TO SEE A PEACE PROCESS DEVELOP? YOU BET. DO WE THINK THAT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL? YES, WE DO. AND WE ARE -- WE STAND READY, WILLING, AND ABLE TO WORK ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PEACE PROCESS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, THE SUGGESTION FOR A PARTIAL SOLUTION WAS APPARENTLY MADE TO MR. PRIMAKOV WHEN HE WAS VISITING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. TWO QUESTIONS. HAS FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS A PARTIAL SOLUTION WOULD, IN FACT, BE A GOOD IDEA? THAT IS, IS HE BREAKING WITH THE SOLIDARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT? AND SECONDLY, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT WAS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTENTION WHEN HE MADE THE SUGGESTION TO PRIMAKOV?

SEC. BAKER: I'M NOT SURE THAT I CAN CONFIRM FOR YOU THAT THAT SUGGESTION WAS MADE TO PRIMAKOV. I'M NOT SURE WE HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT THAT WAS THE CASE, NUMBER ONE.

NUMBER TWO, FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAS REMAINED AS SOLID AS THE UNITED STATES ON THE ISSUE OF PARTIAL -- NO PARTIAL

SOLUTIONS; THAT IS, FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATION'S SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. AND I THINK THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL COMMITTED TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YESTERDAY YOU WERE QUOTED IN THE ISRAELI PRESS AS SAYING THAT IF ISRAEL DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE LATEST UN RESOLUTION AND ALLOW THIS UN TEAM IN, IT WOULD BE THAT SOME WOULD COMPARE THEM TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S NOT ABIDING BY UN RESOLUTIONS.

FIRST OF ALL, DO YOU STAND BY THOSE WORDS? AND SECOND OF ALL, ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT THE ISRAELIS, WHOM YOU HAD ASKED TO REMAIN SILENT WHEN THIS CRISIS FIRST BEGAN, MIGHT NOW FEEL THAT THE DEAL IS OFF AND BEGIN TO BE MORE PUBLIC?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, LET ME SAY -- I'VE SAID A NUMBER OF TIMES SINCE THE GULF CRISIS STARTED THAT WE ARE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THE APPROACH THAT WAS TAKEN BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT -- THAT IS, THE LOW-PROFILE APPROACH TO -- THAT THEY TOOK TO THIS ISSUE. AND -- AND I WOULD HOPE, AND WE WOULD HOPE, THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GET BACK TO THAT. AND THAT WAS ONE OF THE POINTS OF MY MESSAGE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT I SENT BEFORE THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD MET BECAUSE I WANTED TO -- I WANTED TO TELL THE FOREIGN MINISTER PERSONALLY THAT I THOUGHT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL -- THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MISSION -- BE ALLOWED TO COME TO ISRAEL, JUST AS A SIMILAR MISSION WAS ALLOWED TO COME IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR.

THE -- I DO NOT STAND BY THE QUOTE AS YOU HAVE EXPRESSED IT BECAUSE IT IS NOT ACCURATE. WHAT I SAID WAS, "I FEAR THAT SOME WILL TRY TO MAKE THAT COMPARISON," I SAID, "QUITE UNJUSTIFIABLY," OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT -- WORDS TO THAT EFFECT, THAT IT WOULD BE UNFAIR AND UNJUSTIFIED BUT THAT I WOULD WORRY THAT THAT ARGUMENT WOULD BE MADE IN NEW YORK IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL -- HIS MISSION IS NOT PERMITTED TO COME TO ISRAEL.

Q (OFF MIKE) -- ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN -- (INAUDIBLE) -- AMERICAN TELEVISION. ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT TERRORISM IN FACT HAS BEEN -- (INAUDIBLE)?

SEC. BAKER: WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT TERRORISM ALL AROUND THE WORLD. I HAVE MENTIONED, IN ANSWER TO AN EARLIER QUESTION, WE'RE QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THE THREATS THAT HAVE EMANATED FROM BAGHDAD SINCE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT AND SINCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO THAT. AND WE WILL BE -- WE WILL BE VERY ALERT, AND ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE COULD BE SOME EXPANSION OF TERRORISM WORLDWIDE.

WE HAVE NO -- I DON'T MEAN TO IMPLY BY THAT THAT WE HAVE ANY SPECIFIC CONCERNS AT THIS MOMENT ABOUT PARTICULAR ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE --

Q (OFF MIKE.)

SEC. BAKER: WE WANT TO RAISE THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF PEOPLE ALL AROUND THE WORLD TO THE THREAT THAT'S REPRESENTED BY TERRORISM.

Q MR. SECRETARY, THE UNITED STATES HAS OFTEN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH TERRORISM. ARE YOU AT ALL CONCERNED THAT SYRIA HAS NOW EXTENDED ITS HAND TOO FAR INTO LEBANON? DO YOU EXPECT SYRIA PERHAPS TO PROVIDE THE MILITARY FORCE FOR HRAWI TO SUCCEED IN FORMING A UNITY GOVERNMENT? AND HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO

PRESS REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES BASICALLY TOLD SYRIA IT WOULD NOT BLOCK EFFORTS TO COME TO HRAWI'S DEFENSE?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, IN THE FIRST PLACE, WE REGET THE VIOLENCE THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE, JUST AS WE HAVE REGRETTED VIOLENCE IN LEBANON FOR A LONG TIME. I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON DID REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM THE SYRIANS IN THIS INSTANCE, BUT I SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF GIVING GREEN LIGHT -- GREEN LIGHTS FOR VIOLENCE ANYWHERE, INCLUDING IN LEBANON.

FOR 15 YEARS, WE'VE ARGUED AGAINST VIOLENCE IN LEBANON; MOST RECENTLY, IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF LEBANON ON THE 29TH OF SEPTEMBER AT THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IN MY MEETING WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK AT THE SAME TIME.

Q BUT THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO THE LEBANESE OFFICIALS STATING THAT THEY BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND -- (INAUDIBLE) --

SEC. BAKER: THERE'S A HISTORY OF THAT, JOHN, AS YOU KNOW, HAVING COVERED THIS DEPARTMENT FOR AS LONG AS YOU HAVE. ANY TIME ANYTHING HAPPENS OVER THERE, SOMEHOW THERE'S A SUGGESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES GAVE A GREEN LIGHT. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS WE DIDN'T. BUT WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS NOT FOCUS ON THE PAST HERE. WE'D LIKE TO FOCUS ON THE FUTURE. WE'D LIKE TO FOCUS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

THANK YOU.

Q OUT OF CURIOSITY, IF THIS CAMPAIGN EXTENDS ALL OVER THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, WHY IS IT NOT IN HEBREW ALSO?

SEC. BAKER: IT IS -- IT IS GOING TO BE -- IT IS GOING TO BE RUN IN ISRAEL, AND I WILL LEAVE TO AMBASSADOR BUSBY THE ANSWER -- TO THE DUTY OF ANSWERING YOUR QUESTION ABOUT WHY IT'S NOT IN HEBREW. MAYBE IT'S THAT THERE'S A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO CAN BE REACHED AND WILL BE REACHED BY HAVING IT RUN IN ENGLISH.

עד כאן
עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, ששהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט), @ (יועץרהמ/טרור)

סססס

אברהם

אאא, חוזם: 11487

אל: רהמש/855

מ-: ווש, נר: 2129, תא: 161090, זח: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר - ח.ר.ב./מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: לש' שה'ח

הנדון: בעקבות החלטת מועבי'ט

1. בשיחה (16.10) עם קרצר נסקרו הנושאים הבאים : הבהרות לתגובות ישראל וארה'ב בעקבות החלטת מועבי'ט והמהלכים הצפויים.

2. להלן סכום השיחה :

תגובות ארה'ב וישראל

א. לאחר שפירטתי הסיבות לתגובת ממ' ישראל הבהיר קרצר כי הפרספציה לפיה מאמצי ארה'ב במועבי'ט לניסוח הצעת החלטה שתאפשר להמנע מהטלת וטו וכו' קשורים במשבר במפרץ מוטעית. לדבריו, בייקר במכתבו (והיום בתשובות לעתונאים) השגריר בראון (בשיחותיו) ודוברת מחמ'ד הבהירו שארה'ב היתה פועלת כפי שפעלה ללא כל קשר למשבר במפרץ. כל פרשנות אחרת אינה מבטאת את עמדת הנשיא והמזכיר. הוסיף כי הדבר המרכזי בגללו הגיבו כפי שהגיבו היא עובדת הריגתם של 21 איש. 'אל לה לישראל להניח שהיא נדרשת לשלם את המחיר של רצון ארה'ב לשמור על אחדות המחנה האנטי עיראקי. אם זו דרך חשיבתכם כי אז אני מבין את תגובתכם'. מקווה שלאחר שהבהירו לנו שעמדתם לא נקבעה בגין משבר המפרץ אנו נגיב אחרת.

ב. אשר לתוכן החלטת מועבי'ט, קרצר טען שהנוסח שהתקבל היה המירב שניתן היה להשיג בנסיבות הקיימות. 'האלטרנטיבות היו הרבה יותר גרועות'. כראיה לכך שהחלטה היתה סבירה ציין את העובדה שאש'פ רואה בה (בהחלטה) כשלון ומכאן כך קרצר 'שכשלונו אש'פ אינו יכול להיות גם כשלונכם'. באשר לסוגיית שיגור שליח וסוגיית הריבונות ניסה קרצר להסביר שאין לראות בקבלת שליח מטעם המזכ'ל משום ויתור על תביעתנו לריבונות על העיר. בתגובה הערותיו חזרתי (כמפורט בהנחיות שקיבלנו) על עמדתנו.

ג. מעניין לעניין סיפר על שיחת רונינשטיין עם רוס במהלכה הבהיר האחרון כי לשתי המדינות ('לא בהכרח מאותן סיבות ' כד קרצר) עניין שישראל לא תהפוך ל' FOCAL POINT באו'מ'.

מהלכים צפויים:

א. בתשובה לשאלתי לגבי הערכתנו את שעתיד להתרחש עשה הבחנה בין מה שהוא ' DOABLE ' קרי בר עשייה מבחינת הנשיא והמזכיר.

ב. אשר לקטיגוריה הראשונה סבור שהמזכ'ל לא יוכל לוותר בנושא שיגור שליח. באותה מידה כמו ששיגור שליח 'עם שיניימ' לא יצא לפועל בגלל התנגדותכם. להערכתו, קיים מרווח שמאפשר למצוא מוצא שישיב רצון הצדדים.

ג. בהקשר לעיל הוסיף כי אינו משוכנע שמזכ'ל האו'מ עומד על כך שהשליח יפגש עם נציגי ממ' ישראל. למזכ'ל חשוב שהשליח לכשיבוא יוכל לנוע בחופשיות ('לא כתייר ') ולהפגש עם כל גורם שירצה לפגשו. סבור כי המזכ'ל ירצה לעיין בדו'ח הועדה שהוקמה. אינו מוציא מכלל אפשרות שהמזכ'ל עשוי להסכים לדחות ('בהנחה שמדובר בדחייה סבירה ') ביקור

השליח. לסכום שיחה זו ציין כי המזכ"ל אינו מעוניין להקשות עלינו.

ד. אשר לבוש ובייקר, קרצר ציין כי השניים מייחסים חשיבות לשיגור השליח (הערה: הערכת קרצר עולה בקנה אחד עם התבטאויותיהם של החד משמעיות של הנשיא והמזכיר ביומיים האחרונים).

ה. בהתייחסו למכתב רוה"מ לנשיא סיפר כי דרגי העבודה החלו לנסח טיוטת תשובה של הנשיא לתוכן המכתב שלהערכתו יחייב את הנשיא להתייחס לתוכן אשר אינו מותר שום ספק ושום מרחב תמרון. קרצר הביע תקווה שבמידה והנשיא יחליט להשיב הוא לא יסתפק בתגובה לתוכן המכתב אלא יסכים להוסיף פסקא או שתיים שבהן יבקש מרוה"מ לעשות מאמץ לפתור נושא השליח כדי שאפשר יהיה לסגור הנושא. עד כאן תוכן שיחתנו.

ו. הערה: בהנחה וקצר סכס בדבריו את הלך הרוח בממשל בנושאים לעיל כי אז ניתן לקבוע כדלקמן :

1) עיקר 'זעממ' של הנשיא והמזכיר יצא על הריגתם של כ-21 ערבים ופציעתם של כ-150. פציעה בלבד או אישפוז בגין גאז מדמיע לא היה גורר תגובה דומה.

2) למרות המאמץ להבהיר כי למשבר במפרץ לא היתה השפעה על עמדתם אין ספק שהחשש מפני ההשלכות שעלולות להיות לנושא על המאמץ האמריקאי לשמור על החזית האנטי-עיראקית היתה השפעה על המאמץ האינטנסיבי אותו השקיעה ארה"ב (ונכונותה לספוג ביקורת מאתנו) להשגת קונצנזוס על הצעת החלטה שהתקבלה.

3) שיגורו של שליח מטעם המזכ"ל (גם אם ממשלת ישראל תסרב לקבלו) הינו מינימום הכרחי מבחינתם של הנשיא והמזכיר. מעבר לכך יהיה הממשל פתוח להצעות להקל על ממ' ישראל להשאר נאמנה להחלטתה.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11442

אל: רהמש/853

מ-: ווש, נר: 2128, תא: 161090, זח: 1740, חמ: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר - מידי -- ח.ר.ב

אל: מנכ'ל ראה'מ

מנכ'ל משה'ח

דע: השגריר, שובל - הועבר

סמנכ'ל צפ'א

יועץ מדיני לשהב'ט -

מאת: עודד ערן

יחה עם סגן הנשיא

הבוקר קיימתי שיחת פרידה בת 40 דקות עם סגן הנשיא קוויל. השיחה נערכה בארבע עיניים. בפתיחה ביקש קוויל בכל לשון של בקשה שנאפשר למשלחת האו'מ להיכנס לישראל.

'הדבר חיוני כדי לנסות ולהסיר את המתיחות בין שתי המדינות', אמר קוויל. 'מוטב שתניחו להם להיכנס גם אם לא תקיימו עמם כל מגע'. קוויל ביקש להעביר מסר זה במיוחד לראה'מ והבטחתיו שאעשה זאת (בתום הפגישה התקשרתי עם מזכיר הממשלה ע'מ לעשות זאת - ע.ע).

במהלך השיחה אמרתי, שקשה לנהל כך יחסים בין שתי מדינות. אנו עומדים ביחד ובנפרד בפני איום אדיר וגם מול אפשרויות שעשויות להיפתח עם פתרון של המשבר ואי אפשר לטפל לא במשבר ולא בהזדמנויות שפתרוננו עשוי ליצור, ללא הידברות רצינית בין שתי המדינות וההנהגות הפוליטיות שלהן. קוויל אמר שהוא מסכים עם דברי והוסיף, שהדברים האישיים שהוא שומע בישיבות הקבינט האמריקאי והפרסומים בעתונות האמריקאית והישראלית, גורמים לו דאגה רבה. הוא שאל לדעתי, מי בשני הצדדים יוכל לנסות ולהפסיק את הסחף הזה ועניתי שאיני רוצה להיכנס לכך אבל עליהם ליטול היזמה בנדון.

בהמשך השיחה הצגתי לו בפרוט את הדאגות הבטחוניות שלנו לטווח המידי לטווח הקצר ובמיוחד את הסחף שנוצר בכל מה שקשור ליתרוןנו האיכותי. קוויל ידע במעומעם על ה-DRAWDOWN והסברתי לו, שעל אף שזו עשויה להיות תרומה חשובה, צריך לחשוב על דרכים אחרות כמו ההצבה מראש, אבל במיוחד הסיוע לישראל לפתח וליצר את הפיתוחים העצמאיים שהם אשר מהווים למעשה את הפער בין ישראל לשכנותיה.

קוויל התעניין בנושא העראקי ובמחשבותינו על ההשלכות של כשלוננו האישי של צדאם חוסיין. אמרתי לו שלדעתי, הבעיה אינה מתמקדת באיש עצמו, אלא בעצמה שהוא בנה ומבקש לבנות ושעמה יאלץ האיזור להתמודד בין אם בעיראק צדאם חוסיין או שליט אחר. בסוף השיחה חזר קוויל וביקש שנאפשר למשלחת המזכ'ל להיכנס. הוא התעניין גם בשגריר החדש ועדכנתיו בנושא.

ערן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור

אלהה

אאא, תוזם: 11488

אל: רהמש/854

מ-: ווש, נר: 2130, תא: 161090, זח: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מידי

ארהק

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

הנדון: ערבויות לדיור.

1. נשיחה עם קרצר התייחס לפרסומים בדבר החלטות ועדת השרים בראשות השר שרון.

2. מהמידע שבידו עולה שהועדה החליטה על מתן תמריצים נוספים לעולים שיתיישבו מעבר לקו הירוק. החלטה כזו (במידה והתקבלה) אינה עולה קנה אחד עם המשפט במכתבו של שה'ח לוי שבו נאמר :

' I ALSO WANT TO RECONFIRM WHAT I TOLD YOU IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION THAT NO SPECIAL INCENTIVES EXIST TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO SETTLE BEYOND THE GREEN LINE NOR ARE WE PLANNING TO PROVIDE SUCH INCENTIVES IN THE FUTURE '.

3. ציין כי בכוננתו להמליץ בפני המזכיר לבקש הבהרות משה'ח. (הערה: להשכלתנו נודה על קבלת עדכון לגבי ההחלטה שהתקבלה) .

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

1/17/72

אאא, חוזם: 12384

אל: רהמש/892

מ-: ווש, נר: 2131, תא: 171090, זח: 1000, דח: מ, סג: סו ,

בבב

סודי/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

הקונגרסמן מל לויין ואירועי הר הבית.

1. אתמול שוחחתי עם הקונגרסמן בנוגע ליוזמתו ויוזמת הקונגרסמן שומר בנושא הדה-לינג'ז. ברור ללויין שיש להניע במהירות את יוזמתם (ראו מברקנו ... מ-12/10) - כך שתהיה תגובה קונגרסיונאלית למדיניות הממשל כלפי ישראל ובמיוחד למכתב הבוטה של המזכיר בייקר לשה'ח לוי. לויין סיפר כי שוחח כבר עם יו'ר ועדת החוץ, פאסל, אשר הסכים לקיים MARK-2 עתה נותר לו לשוחח עם הקונגרסמן המילטון, יו'ר ועדת המשנה לאירופה והמזה'ת ולהשיג הסכמתו.

2. לויין, בנקודה זו עבר למונולוג כאוב על מצבה של ישראל בדעה'ק בעקבות ארועי הר הבית. לדבריו, ימשיך לפעול כדרכו, יתבטא בכל הזדמנות ויזיז את הצעת ההחלטה. עם זאת עליו לומר הדברים הבאים: - הטיפול בצד הישראלי בכל פרשת הר הבית - החלטת מועב'ט והחלטת הממשלה בעקבותיה, הינו גרוע ביותר. לא משתקפת בתקשורת ובדעה'ק כל תחושה של REMORSE מצד ישראל על אבדן חיי אדם. (קטעתי אותו בדבריו והסבתי את תשומת לבו להתבטאויות השונות של רה'מ ושרים אחרים) סיפר כי חזר אתמול מלוס אנג'לס שם נפגש עם תורמים 'כבדים' של ה-JSA ותומכיה המובהקים של ישראל. לדבריו זכה לדברי ביקורת קשים על תמיכתו בישראל. ישראל מאבדת תמיכה והפידבק מתומכי ישראל הוא ממש קריטי. אינו זוכר 'כזה אבלנג' של טלפונים אנטי ישראלים כמו לאחר מותם של הפלסטינים בהר הבית'.

' ' WHY CAN'T YOU EVEN APPEAR CARING. IT'S REALY SERIOUS IN TERMS OF THE PUBLIC ' ' .

לויין המשיך דבריו באומרו: ' I'M SCARED TO DEATH ' ' יש לכם ממשל עויין שמוכן למכור אתכם, ואם לא תוכלו לקבל תמיכה קונגרסיונאלית ת המבוססת על דעה'ק, אתם במצב חמור ביותר. I'M FRIGHTENED WITH REGARD TO THE BASIC AMERICAN SUPPORT

3. לויין מבין הטיעונים שלנו סביב נושא ירושלים וועדת החקירה אולם טענתו העיקרית היא כי אנו מופיעים בדעה'ק IN DEFIENCE לכל דבר.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא

1190



Handwritten symbol resembling a stylized letter 'T' with a horizontal bar and a vertical line below it.

14

קונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בניו יורק
CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10017
(212) 351-8200

ארה"ב 171500

41-011

17124
בלמ'ס/מיד
106.01

אלו סמנכ"ל צמ"א, יועץ תמוצות, לשכת חשר - אורן
מנחל מצפ"א

דעו: חשגררר מלג וושינגטון

מאתו קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

הנדון: ביקורת כפוחל
בחמשן למברקי 2041

בעקבות הדיונים אמש החליטה ה-UJA לפרסם החודעה חמצ"כ.

אורי סביר

קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק
אורי סביר
17 באוקטובר 1990

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the word 'מספר' (number) and other illegible text.

1990-10-17 15:05
UNITED JEWISH APPEAL N Y TEL: 212-818-9509

Oct 17, 90 11:45 No.026 P.02



NEWS

41-011

1190

212

For further information, contact:
Gerald S. Nagel,
Director of Public Relations
(212) 818-9100

STATEMENT TO NEWS MEDIA

Oct. 16, 1990

The national United Jewish Appeal is aware of some speculation in the news media about the forthcoming United Jewish Appeal missions to Israel and is therefore issuing the following clarification.

The UJA has had two missions planned to leave in the next few days for Israel. Neither mission has been cancelled and both are scheduled to arrive in Israel, with hundreds of participants, in the next few days.

The UJA plans to include a visit to the Western Wall as is the custom on UJA missions.

1990-10-15

21:18

KESHER-WASHINGTON

1480126

08

10-15-90 10:26 AM FROM SEN. ARLEN SPECTER

P02

2/6 1154

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1990

Dear Arlen:

Thank you for your recent letter expressing concern about the military balance between Israel and the Arab states. The Administration's commitment to Israel's security is ironclad. It is my intent to see that Israel receives the assistance necessary to maintain its qualitative military superiority. Toward this end, I decided on September 29 to provide the Patriot Air Defense system to Israel under the emergency authority available to me.

A fundamental part of our Middle East policy is providing all our friends with appropriate military assistance so that they can defend themselves. At this critical time, Saudi Arabia has a distinct need for additional military assistance. A long term benefit of meeting Saudi Arabia's legitimate defense needs will be to provide the Saudis with the means to defend themselves and thereby reduce the need to deploy U.S. military forces for that purpose.

I hope I can continue to count on your support for our Gulf policy and these related issues.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

131012.459

S.L.C.

2

1 (c) may be proposed for transfer, as provided for in the Arms
2 Control Export Act, to a country in the Persian Gulf region
3 if the President certifies to Congress that--

4 (1) such defense articles are needed by the recipient
5 country to counter an immediate threat or to contribute
6 to the protection of United States personnel, facilities,
7 or operations;

8 (2) no other appropriate system is available from the
9 United States;

10 (3) the recipient agrees to safeguards, as required
11 in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance by the United
12 States Government, to protect against diversions; and

13 (4) the recipient country has agreed to a United
14 States buyback, at a time to be determined by the United
15 States Government, of all the remaining defense articles
16 and components which have not been destroyed or fired in
17 order to return them to the possession and control of the
18 United States.

19 (c) Defense Articles Covered.--The defense articles
20 referred to in subsection (a) are Apache helicopters, Patriot
21 anti-aircraft missiles, TOW II A anti-tank missiles, and
22 electronic security equipment.

3
1150

101st CONGRESS
2d Session

S. _____

416 1159

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Cranston introduced the following bill; which was read twice
and referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To prohibit the transfer of certain defense articles to Persian
Gulf region countries during fiscal year 1991.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF CERTAIN DEFENSE
4 ARTICLES TO PERSIAN GULF REGION COUNTRIES.

5 (a) Prohibition.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
6 no defense articles specified in subsection (c) may be
7 provided, directly or indirectly, by sale, lease, grant or
8 otherwise, during fiscal year 1991, to any country in the
9 Persian Gulf region.

10 (b) Exception.--Notwithstanding the prohibition in
11 subsection (a), any defense article specified in subsection

101st CONGRESS
2d Session

5/6

1153

S. J. RES. _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Cranston introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

JOINT RESOLUTION

Prohibiting the proposed sales to Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles and defense services, pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
 2 the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
 3 proposed sales to Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles
 4 and defense services (including the TOW II missile launchers,
 5 the M1A2 tanks, the AH-64 APACHE attack helicopters, and the
 6 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS)) described in the
 7 following certifications transmitted to the Congress pursuant
 8 to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act on
 9 September 27, 1990, are prohibited:

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S.L.C.

1 transmittal numbers 98-77, 98-78, 98-80, and 98-82.

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COPIES
H 9381
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he poems
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memory

They
Ancient
In October of an
He disappeared.
The plane was swallowed up
So Agassiz said.
The gaunt land gulped him down
And nothing has been found.
(For a long time I used to wonder which one
I would have to learn to hate—mountains
of the sea—he loved them both.)

I no longer laugh
In simple-minded sophistication
At burial customs.
The laying-out, the viewing,
The elaborate preparations
Are all signposts of a Reality
New, shocking, irrefutable.
(We had a catafalque for his funeral. It was
so clumsy; he was so big.)

For a burial
A body is essential.
He left, work-wearry, to give a gift,
A practiced gift, an easy gift for him.
We can never know a gift's true price.
Nor post-effect out our gratefulness.
He stumpy did what he had said that he
would do.
He always tried to do that.
It was at the heart of what was best in him.
Life-giver, how did your life end?
Now you are a mountain in Alaska,
And a new dream river
To mingle with the old horror;
(Written on the day of the dedication of
Mt. Boggs in Anchorage, Alaska October 9,
1977.)

MARKING TIME

For Christmas
I gave two calendars each
To the three young men
Who claim to be my children.
They must make their own time now,
So I gave them easy access to their days and
weeks and months.
One calendar for their pockets,
Another for their walls.
Once, of course, their time and mine were
one,
And they needed no numbers and little
squares
To tumble through their days.
But they have entered the realm of Expec-
tations,
And expectations exact their due
Of planning and deadlines and dates.
They must create their own worlds
Out of those endless numbered empty
squares
Of hopes and fears and years.
Bluffing myself
Not to look longingly backwards,
(But by what alchemy do three little boys in
blue keep flickering beside my eye?)
I gave my sons two calendars this year.
(On the highway between Washington
and Princeton December 29, 1987.)

BURMA'S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues an enlightening article by Thant Myint-U, a leading advocate with respect to human and civil rights

in Burma. The article highlights the Government of Burma's systematic refusal to honor the human and civil rights of Burmese citizens advocating a return to democracy.

Open signs of unrest by the Burmese people began 2 years ago when millions of citizens marched in Rangoon, Mandalay, and other Burmese cities demanding an end to the 36-year military dictatorship of General Ne Win. The Government responded by massacring 10,000 unarmed citizens. Since the crackdown, tens of thousands of additional people have been arrested, executed, or disappeared.

Last May, in response to domestic and international pressure, the military arrested opposition leaders and then held free and fair elections. The military lost, winning only 10 of 492 legislative seats. Since that time, the Government has invalidated the elections and stepped up its repression of advocates of democracy.

Mr. Thant is the grandson of Thant U. Secretary General of the United Nations from 1962 to 1971. Mr. Thant has dedicated his life to the struggle for democracy in Burma and is currently Secretary of the Burma fund and a senior fellow at the International Center for Development Policy.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Thant's article may be placed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FROM THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 9, 1990
THANT MYINT-U—BURMA'S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

Nothing else in the world is the human rights situation as bad as in Burma. Nowhere else have people fought so hard for their freedom and yet still suffer under the threat of terror and repression. And nowhere else will the rest of the world care less, unless it becomes too late.

On the same day that President Bush delivered his address to Congress on the new international order, a crowd of Burmese students demonstrated in Mandalay for democracy and human rights. Eleven people were killed. Hundreds have been arrested in the past two weeks alone, including the leadership of the National League for Democracy, the country's largest political party. More demonstrations are expected these next few weeks, and every day Burma moves closer and closer to civil war.

The unrest began two years ago when millions of people marched in Rangoon, Mandalay and other Burmese cities demanding an end to the 36-year military dictatorship of Gen. Ne Win, which has impoverished what was once the richest nation in Southeast Asia. Gen. Ne Win responded by gunning down as many as 10,000 unarmed civilians, many secondary school students as young as 12 or 13.

Since the crackdown in September 1988, tens of thousands of people have been arrested, executed or have disappeared. Military tribunals have replaced civil courts, gatherings of more than four people are forbidden, and schools and universities have remained closed. Young men live in constant fear of being taken away for porter service in the remote jungles, where they are used as human mineweepers and made to carry army supplies until they die. Torture is both

severe and widespread, and imprisoned students are subject to beatings, and electric shocks and kept in solitary confinement.

And yet the people of Burma carry to their fight for democracy and believe that the world—especially the United States—is on their side. Last May, the military, thinking that it had jailed and intimidated enough opposition activists, held "free and fair elections." The military lost, winning only 10 of 492 seats. Since May, the military has moved step by step to invalidate those elections, and the resulting anger has brought Burma back to the point of another violent explosion.

Though Burma's government has followed an isolationist foreign policy, Burma is not isolated, and the international community and the United Nations can do a lot to prevent further bloodshed. First, multinational companies, including many American companies, can stop funding the regime through their investments in the military's projects. Many of these foreign companies are engaged in timber and mineral extraction, and the resulting environmental damage (Burma could lose all its rain forests in five years) threatens the whole region.

Second, the United States can take a harder line on the military's suspected involvement in the heroin trade, involvement which may be providing Gen. Ne Win with much-needed cash. Certainly the United States should end all talk of resuming anti-narcotics assistance to the military regime, as suggested by the DEA and others in Washington.

Third, the United Nations as a whole can speak out on human rights, and bilateral and multilateral assistance and perhaps move toward comprehensive sanctions. The military has shown time and again how sensitive it is to foreign criticism, and pulling away outside support for the regime could make all the difference in ensuring peaceful democratic change.

In early August, China began providing Burma with more than \$1 billion worth of arms. Burma is fighting ethnic insurgencies that have already spilled into Thailand and India. A bloody and sustained confrontation between the military and the people could eventually have serious international repercussions. Better to act before the situation reaches crisis proportions. The United States and the rest of the world can do more to help.

TERRY ANDERSON

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise to inform my colleagues that today marks the 2,035th day that Terry Anderson had been held captive in Beirut.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FEIN). Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of morning business for not to exceed 1 hour under the control of the senior Senator from California [Mr. CRANSTON] or his designee.

ARMS SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, last month the administration posted a report that it would propose a gigantic \$21 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia. When this was greeted by widespread cries of congressional concern,

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an administration backed off and substituted a smaller, so-called compromise package of \$7.5 billion.

Or so they said. But at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing last week, the truth came out. The alleged smaller package turned out to be a fake. The proposed 7.5 billion sale is not to be a substitute for the big package. It is only a teaser, a forerunner of what would be the largest arms transfer in U.S. history.

The administration still intends to go ahead--if it can--with the rest of the \$21 billion deal next January.

I have major problems with this deal. In fact I have major problems even with that \$7.5 billion first installment.

It includes some of America's latest, highly sophisticated weapons systems.

The idea of this weapons sale is to end the Saudis what they need and just have right now to defend themselves and to deter further Iraqi aggression.

And we must, of course, send them what they need and must have right now to be an effective force to fight side by side with our troops should active combat break out.

But why in the world, I ask, does the administration include in this "rush" order 100 M1A2 tanks, which have not even been built--and will not be delivered until 1987? Or 200 Bradley fighting vehicles, which would not arrive in Saudi Arabia for another 7 years?

And there is another question concerning us.

The proliferation of U.S. arms in the Gulf raises concerns about the possibility of arms falling into hostile hands using some future crisis and being used against our own fighting forces or our allies. My concern is not hypothetical, Mr. President.

Considerable weaponry was in the hands of Saddam Hussein, ready to be used against our American interests in oil fields and pipelines and others, as made in the United States. We sold it to the Shah of Iran. The Ayatollah Khomeini acquired it and Islam Hussein captured it during the Iran-Iraq war. It included armored vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, and armored personnel carriers, along with all the front-line equipment that accompanied these items.

When he invaded Kuwait, Saddam Hussein captured still more U.S. weapons, including howitzers and Hawk anti-aircraft missiles.

The recently dismissed Air Force Chief of Staff, Michael J. Dugan, may have committed still another indiscretion when he recently said of those Iranian-made Hawks now in Iraqi hands: "We typically do not have any detection against Hawk missiles."

Imagine. We sold these weapons to a country that lost them to Iraq and now our American forces face an Iraqi force equipped with American-made missiles for which we have no real defense.

I am very concerned about our spewing out weapons all around the world, never knowing in whose hands they might eventually land, and firing more than once that they back in the hands of those who are prepared to use them against us, against American military personnel.

There is another question. What are we selling the Saudis themselves more of these weapons--and the rest of the \$21 billion package--after the Iraq deal is over?

Saddam Hussein is the black boy on the black right for the moment, so far as they are concerned.

But what happens after he is gone? What will the Saudis ultimately do with all the Patriot missiles we send them? Or our multiple launch rocket systems? Or U.S. Apache helicopters and Hellfire missiles?

We may, as momentary brothers-in-arms, forget who the Saudis consider to be their real, longtime, irreconcilable enemies--who they and fellow Arab nations are ever by destiny.

But the Saudis have not forgotten.

Less than a month ago, on September 29, one of the royal family's top leaders--Prince Sultan--declared before the Tabuk headquarters of the Saudi northwestern command: "We must return our Jerusalem to our hands, from the hands of Israel the usurper."

The day before, Prince Sultan declared that Iraq and Saudi Arabia "should be conserving our forces for a different purpose, for a more honorable conflict... the foremost problem of the Arab and Islamic world, which is the problem of Palestine."

Just 10 days ago, on October 2, the Saudi Foreign Minister--Prince Saud Al-Faisal--told the United Nations General Assembly:

We say to them [the Palestinians], "Support legitimacy, for it is the basis of your cause, the cause of all Arabs, and the basis that guarantees your legitimate rights in liberating the land and establishing the state."

And less than 2 months ago Crown Prince Abdullah--who is next in line to be King of Saudi Arabia--told his troops:

On my way to you, I wished the purpose of my visit was... to see you--along with your brothers and comrades in arms in the United Arab Army and in all the Arab Armies--proceeding to restore the usurped and legitimate rights in Palestine.

Regrettably, he pointed out, Saudi Arabia's current fight is against Iraq, not Israel.

"However," he added, "Iraq continues, and it will not die in our souls, God willing."

There you have it. There you have the true, self-revealed picture of the Saudi Arab--unfathomable animosity toward Israel. And the Saudis, we are told, are the moderates among the Arabs.

Mr. President, we dare not close our eyes to reality in the Middle East.

We dare not continue to pour billions and billions of dollars worth of

advanced weapons into the area irresponsibly, without a thought to the future.

We must stop Saddam Hussein. We must proceed now to supply arms to our temporary Arab allies that can help protect the lives of American fighting men and women in Saudi Arabia; we must do that.

But we must proceed cautiously, prudently, with our eyes open. That means we must change this arms sale package in two ways: One, we must send only what is absolutely essential to meet the current Iraqi threat, and no more; and two, we must attach whatever strings and safeguards are feasible.

Mr. President, we have a buy-back arrangement with arms we have sold to Bahrain. We had lend-lease in World War II. I understand that we are exploring a lend-lease or buy-back arrangement with Israel now in connection with an arms sale. Why not a similar buy-back arrangement with Saudi Arabia so we can reclaim our weapons once the Iraqi invasion ends? That would make more sense than losing all control over the weapons with an outright sale.

We are told that the Saudis, or any nation that receives these weapons, will not be resupplied with U.S. spare parts. But what consolation that would be to the thousands of Israelis who could be killed in a first strike. You need spare parts to follow up an attack, not to launch it.

Mr. President, we must not leave American weapons at the easy disposal of uncertain future Arab rulers. We must not become the unwitting arms supplier for a new Arab war of annihilation against Israel.

Mr. President, I see my friend and colleague from Oregon on the floor. I would be delighted to yield to him, if he wishes.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Will my good friend yield me 5 minutes?

Mr. CRANSTON. Of course.

The SPEAKING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, America is a wonderful, humane, optimistic country. But here, on occasion, is very short view of history. We are a very nation, by any kind of measure--with 200 years of history as a nation and barely 400 years of settlement. And when you look at the Middle East, with a millennium of a millennium of history, you realize how countries in that area can look at things over a longer period than we do.

We have a wonderful desire to finish things by Thanksgiving, or by the Fourth of July. We wonder why the rest of the world cannot operate on our timetable? We are inclined to look at things as an engineer does--I do not mean that critically--and assume that the rest of the world is willing to march to our tune. But they are not.

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We are now involved in the Middle East, and I support the President in the Middle East. He made a wise decision. I think, in going into the Middle East. However, all of a sudden, we want to pour arms into Saudi Arabia way beyond anything that the Saudis can conceivably use for their own military; weapons that we can never be sure will remain in Saudi hands. And I am not here saying anything derogatory of the present Saudi Government, but the Middle East is obviously an unstable area.

We provided weapons to the Shah, and they ended up in Khomeini's hands. Europeans provided weapons to Iraq, and they now face us. In some cases, weapons that Iraq has captured from Iran are our weapons, now facing us. So before we rush pell-mell into approving an immense transfer of arms to Saudi Arabia, I wish we could step back, reflect, view history, and look at our long-range interests in the Middle East. We should stop for the moment and not go forward with this arms sale.

While I am talking on the subject of the Middle East, let me also say that I wish the United States would be more cautious in proposing, in the United Nations, an effort to censure Israel for what happened at the Walling Wall on Monday of this week. We do not know the facts. And no harm will come, if we wait 2 days or 2 weeks, to find out exactly what happened.

I remember in 1981 when the United Nations very rapidly condemned Israel for the bombing raid they carried out to destroy the reactor Iraq was building. And they were going to use that plant to build atomic bombs. This was not a plant to generate electricity, or an academic research reactor. This was an atomic bomb plant.

There was immediate denunciation on the day after the raid, in a resolution passed in the United Nations. I would say that today there is not a country in the world that at least is not silently saying thanks to Israel for having taken out that atomic bomb plant. And, therefore, I hope we will pause and reflect, think, and gather the facts, not only before we rush pell-mell to condemn Israel in the United Nations, but before we go forward with an arms sale or transfer, whatever it may be, that I think, in the long-range, will not be in the interests of the United States.

I thank the Chair, and I thank my friend from California.

Mr. CRANSTON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California controls the time.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank my friend for his comments and for the leadership he has displayed over the years on the issues we are now debating.

I will yield 4 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, Senator SIMON.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

(Mr. SIMON.) I thank my colleague for his leadership on this.

Mr. President, I just want to join in expressing some words of caution in this whole field. First of all, in the arms race, generally, wherever it is in the world, we ought to be using greater restraint. The pressure is on because of the profit by those who make arms; they want to push for more arms sales. There ought to be a restraining force, and that restraining force, too often, is not here. As you provide more weapons to Saudi Arabia, you make Israel less secure and, clearly, we have to help Israel, and we escalate the arms race in the Middle East. I do not think that is in anyone's best interests.

Second of all, very candidly, I think we would be much better off simply saying to the countries of the Middle East, unless you join in the peace process, you are not going to get weapons, period. We would enjoy a much better relationship, I think, with all the nations, because we would not be going through these embarrassing negotiations that get turned down by the Senate or the House as we go through this whole process.

Our interests ought to be, No. 1, the security of Israel; No. 2, the security of the Arab nations; No. 3, and all three are tied in, we want some stability in that area of the world.

I am pleased when we meet informally with leaders of some of the Middle Eastern Arab countries now who say: When this immediate crisis is over, then let us sit down and let us get an overall settlement worked out in the Middle East. I think that is possible. Frankly, I am optimistic, if we can get this thing worked out, that that will happen.

The immediate goal, obviously, is to get the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait and take away from Iraq the ability to manufacture chemical weapons and nuclear weapons.

But in the meantime, I think it is imperative that our Government use restraint.

I hope the Defense Department, the State Department, and the White House will look very, very carefully at this huge package, what portions of this package are not essential for the immediate operation that is going on in the Middle East. Those parts of this package that are not essential should be eliminated. I recognize political reality that if this came up for a vote right now, it would be approved. Frankly, it would be approved without my vote.

But I think it is important that restraint be used. Then the signal ought to be very clear to the Arab countries, "We are willing to work with you, economically, in terms of your defense and anything else if you join in the peace process." That is not an unreasonable requirement on our part. I

hope that is the direction in which we move and move more decisively.

I yield back the remainder of my time to the Senator from California.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, are we under controlled time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California controls the time.

Mr. CRANSTON. What time does the Senator need?

Mr. METZENBAUM. Ten minutes.

Mr. CRANSTON. I am delighted to yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Ohio.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from California.

I rise to address myself to an aspect of the Saudi matter that is a little bit different than those addressed by my colleagues. I share the concern of some who have already spoken about the influx of arms to Saudi Arabia. I share their concern that the United States is fueling a Mideast arms race. But I also recognize the need for Saudi Arabia to have certain arms to defend itself. I find no fault with that, so long as Saudi purchases are reasonable.

The proposed package is not reasonable. I am concerned about this overwhelming Saudi desire for more and more and more, a \$21.3 billion package which has now been cut back into two separate packages. The Saudis want the shiniest, newest military toys they can get. I think that the need of Saudi Arabia to have defensive weapons does make sense.

Mr. President, I might point out that I am concerned about some statements that have been made by the Saudi leadership within recent days indicating that they intend only to defend Saudi Arabia and that they are not prepared to share any additional burden. I have to just point out to those in Saudi Arabia who provide the leadership that it is very difficult to fight a solely defensive war. There is an enormous international force currently in Saudi Arabia. But the Saudi Government says it will not permit this force to do anything other than defensive activity. This is wonderful for Saudi Arabia. But it isn't so wonderful for the people of Kuwait, and the Western nations committed to Kuwait's freedom. The Saudis must become better team players. There is an international team now in the Persian Gulf area, and the Saudis should take their role on this team more seriously. After all, the team is the only thing separating the Saudis from Saddam's guns.

Mr. President, my concern today is not primarily about the size of the Saudi Arabian arms sale, but rather to discuss another aspect of our relationship with Saudi Arabia. I heard my colleague from California address himself

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to some comments that have already been made by leaders of Saudi Arabia concerning their desire, their wish, that they would be standing with their Iraqi brothers against the common enemy, Israel, rather than on the battlefield against Iraq. Total absurdity and unbelievable was my initial reaction, after all it is these leaders we are defending. And yet the statements have been confirmed over and over again.

What concerns me most as I stand here this morning is that the Saudis revel in their magnanimity, providing \$6 billion in order to help the United States defray the cost of Operation Desert Shield. The Saudis trumpet their generosity, yet it is the Saudis who are actually becoming unbelievably enriched by the crisis at the expense of the world economy and particularly the American economy.

Here is a story from USA Today, October 5, 1980: "Saudi Leap Off Windfall From Crisis," I quote:

Since Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, Saudi Arabia's monthly oil revenues has jumped 183 percent to \$1.6 billion, from \$5.2 billion.

It goes on to report:

The Kingdom is clearly the world's biggest financial beneficiary of rising prices, which are up about 70 percent.

And we have in this country who were paying something like \$18 or \$20 a barrel before the Kuwaiti invasion by Saddam Hussein, we are the ones, the American people, who are suffering the burden of this Saudi windfall. Saudi Arabia is living high off the hog at the expense of the American people and the world economy even as they make pretenses at funding Desert Shield.

That impact upon the American economy is equally dangerous as the threat which Saddam Hussein poses. I am not equating the current Saudi Government with the current Iraqi Government. There is a big difference. The fact is that the Saudis are in a position to do something about the harm they are causing the United States. Iraq, obviously is in no such position. When oil prices have gone as high as they have, when the Saudis are pumping 7.8 million barrels of oil a day—and I understand the extra oil is being pumped to make up for the loss of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti supply—the fact is it provides an incredible windfall to the Saudis—an extra \$4.2 billion per month. A \$4.2 billion monthly oil windfall certainly puts the \$5 billion Saudi contribution to Desert Shield in perspective.

Saudi Arabia, as the world's largest producer of oil, is in a position to make a greater effort. If Saudi Arabia provided the leadership, the Saudis could moderate world oil prices. And I saw here on the floor today that before the end of this week a majority of Members of the U.S. Senate will have joined me in sending a letter to the President of the United States asking him to call upon King Fahd to

bring down the oil prices, to bring them down to the point where they were when this entire matter devalued. If Saudi Arabia provided that leadership, if they said they were going to unilaterally drop prices there is just no question that it would have a tremendous impact in stabilizing and lowering oil prices.

I believe the Saudis owe this to the American people. I believe we are paying with our people in the desert now, with our young men and women there protecting them, and I believe that the Saudis have an obligation to be concerned about what impact all of this has had upon the American economy.

But, instead, what do we get? We get statements from the Saudis saying they are more concerned about the whole question of legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The fact is—and I now come back to a different aspect of this question—the fact is that Saddam Hussein knows that Israel's military position in the Middle East does indeed bolster and improve Saudi Arabia's security. But all that the Saudis Arabians talk about, in full sympathy against Israel, (a) their cooperation regarding what they consider to be Palestinian rights, and (b) we talk at all about joining together to find a peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East. The Saudis are not playing the role they should be on the Desert Shield team.

Let me read you what the Saudi Ambassador to Indonesia was quoted as saying on September 24, "Saddam Hussein is an Israeli agent," said he, "who was planted in the Iraqi Embassy in Riyadh in order to stab the Arab world in the back."

Such an unbelievable statement it is hard for me to believe, yet it has been published worldwide. Are these the words of friends? Is this what the United States receives in return for exchange for the privilege of picking 200,000 men and women in the defense of Saudi Arabia? I believe the United States is entitled to more sensitivity from the Saudis. We should not have to watch our economy go bust from high oil prices, while defending Riyadh's oil windfall and listening to diatribes against our closest Middle East ally.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I appreciate the presence of the Senator from Florida. I would like to ask how much time he needs.

Mr. GRAHAM. Five minutes. Mr. CRANSTON. I am glad to yield 5 minutes to him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I wish to commend my colleague from California for his leadership in organizing this opportunity for several of us concerned about events in the Middle

East, concerned about the decisions that we are going to be called upon to make, to submit some comments.

Mr. President, we are now going to be asked to vote on significant changes in United States policy relative to the Middle East, the sale of over \$20 billion of armaments to Saudi Arabia. This is not only a staggering increase of new armaments, but it also, in many ways, represents a change in US policy. Our previous policy, Mr. President, has been essentially a defensive policy; that is that we would assist the States who we felt to be in danger in the region to defend their territory. Now we are about to provide weapons which by any definition would be available for offensive use and, of course, all of this is happening in a time of great tension in the Gulf area.

Mr. President, I believe that as we prepare for the specific debate on the prospect of arm sales to Saudi Arabia, we need to ask the administration and ask our colleagues to engage in a debate on what is our strategic vision in this region of the world; what is it that the United States in this last decade of the 20th century seeks to accomplish by our combination of diplomatic, military, economic, political and other initiatives.

Clearly, this is a region of the world that is in great turmoil. It is not just the massing of hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides of the Kuwaiti border that demonstrates that turmoil. It is also underscored by such factors as the retreat of the Soviet Union as a significant force in this part of the world.

As the Soviet Union begins to reform its attention more on domestic issues—a development that we all believe has been long delayed and will contribute to a new and more peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union—it has had the collateral effect of reducing whatever discipline the Soviet Union was able to exercise over some of its client States in this region. There also has been an escalation of armaments in this region, armaments which have poured in from all over the world.

I believe what we need to have as part of our strategic vision, Mr. President, includes the concept that as going to require an international, not just a national, approach to the stability of the Middle East; that the goal of that international effort should be peace in the fundamental way, which is based upon dignity and respect for neighborhood and national leaders; and the protection of human rights; that in order to achieve this, what the President has described as the new era in international geopolitics, we are going to have to work out some thorny problems.

It is not going to be achievable over the long period, Mr. President, for the United States to be seen as the new hegemon of the world, as the people who will send their troops in to defend

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other peoples' borders. We are going to have to have, Mr. President, as we did with NATO, a previously arrived at agreement that determines what is the responsibility of the various nations who would be participating in those efforts to assure peace in this volatile region of the world and what contributions they would make, both in terms of personnel and financing. Those, Mr. President, I believe are some of the ingredients to a strategic U.S. policy in this region of the world.

At that contact, I am very concerned that the proposal for the \$21 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia runs in the opposite direction; that it tends to increase the potential for violence in the region; that it could be very destabilizing; that it represents a direct threat to the stability with common shared values in this region, the State of Israel; and that it moves away from a recognition of a long-term international, as distinct from regional, obligation for the stability of this part of the world which is so important in so many regards to the well-being of the rest of the world.

Mr. President, again, I commend the Senator from California for giving us this opportunity to elevate the discussion into the broader question of long-term U.S. interests in this critical region. I look forward to joining with the Senator from California and our other colleagues when we reach the point of debating the specifics of the proposal that the administration will soon be submitting to us relative to arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Florida. I would like to ask him one question while he is on the floor, which I will address to others as they appear.

I have discussed with Senator Packwood the introduction of a resolution of disapproval, not of the whole package but of those items that do not need to go now, that cannot go until later, giving us more time to consider the wisdom of sending them. I have also discussed with him the advisability of introducing a separate piece of legislation suggesting that instead of an outright sale of certain of the weapons, that we would just as soon not have floating around endlessly in the Middle East, that instead of selling, we provide for either a leasing arrangement or buy-back arrangement, so that we can control the weapons and get them back if need be when the crisis is over, so they will not be there possibly to fall into the hands of somebody else and be used or aimed against us, as our weapons are now that we sold originally to the Shah of Iran and to Kuwait.

Another approach could be a buy-back provision. There are precedents for all of this. We had lend-lease in World War II. We sold some Stingers to Bahrain under a buy-back arrangement, and we sold or are discussing now providing some weaponry to Israel with a buy back or leasing ar-

range ment, so they may not stay there forever.

I simply would like to ask the Senator if he would be interested in considering joining in both of those efforts? We will seek to introduce the resolution of disapproval today, and the bill regarding leasing or buy back as soon as possible.

Mr. GRAHAM, I say to the Senator, the answer is yes. I believe that the principles that he has just outlined are the types of issues that ought to be seriously considered; specifically, the proposal of shifting from sale to some form of lend-lease, that carries with it the implicit recognition that our interest in this region is a long-term one; that we are not just in for a short-term crisis and that we are going to leave and depend upon the states within the region to maintain a peaceful countervailing series of forces.

Whether this Congress and this administration will be prepared to face that strategic reality, I think will be one of the tests of our vision and will, as we conclude this century.

If I could share with the Senator a historical event that occurred in this Chamber almost exactly 50 years ago. The man who held the seat that I am now privileged to hold, Senator Claude Pepper, in 1940, introduced the first proposal for the United States to enter into a lend-lease agreement with Great Britain. He did that at a time when England was under the severest siege of the Battle of Britain. That first proposal, when considered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was defeated by a vote of approximately 19 to 1, a statement of the unwillingness of this body and of the American people to accept a long-term position in the world in 1940. We clearly paid a very serious price for our timidity at that point.

I believe that, undergirding the recommendations that you made, we not be so timid in terms of recognizing the necessity of a sustained American commitment to this region of the world, not alone, but but as a leader of other nations who share our values and, particularly, in defense of the one nation in the region which is our strongest ally, and which is the rock upon which values of democracy and human rights are based, the State of Israel.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I would like to add a footnote to the one point the Senator from Florida made. When Claude Pepper, his predecessor, was standing in the Senate making impassioned speeches for lend-lease to aid the allies in the early days of World War II, I was seated up there in the gallery listening to him. Then I moved over there, so I could see him because he was standing a little bit behind where the Senator from Florida is now standing. I think in the back row. He made eloquent and impassioned statements of the urgency of that program.

I am delighted now to be down on the Senate floor, out of the gallery, working with the Senator from Florida. I will be talking with him momentarily about the terms of the resolution that we will be, I hope, introducing very soon.

Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the Senator. Mr. CRANSTON. I now yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. ADAMS).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, I appreciate very much the Senator from California yielding to me. I particularly appreciate the manner in which the discussion was conducted between the Senator from Florida and the Senator from California, regarding alternatives to a buildup of weapons in the Middle East.

It seems to me that before we commit ourselves to yet another massive sale of sophisticated military equipment into the most dangerously unstable region of the world, the Congress needs to be assured that the administration has carefully thought through the consequences of such an action.

Previous sales, intended to contribute to stability and balance in the region, have frequently done just the opposite. With the fall of the Shah of Iran, a massive arsenal of American-made weapons fell into the hands of political and religious fanatics who continue to look upon our country as the "Great Satan."

Our support for Saddam Hussein in his 10-year war against Iran, when measured against the current crisis, proves the danger of seeking out and assisting governments that frequently display a national agenda that sometimes appear to parallel our own interests, yet prove capable of careening wildly off course after receiving our assistance.

How useful were our past sales of military assistance to the Government of Kuwait, a nation that frequently voted against us when issues were raised in the United Nations before being invaded by Iraq? Now that Kuwait has been invaded, and is under the control of Saddam Hussein, some of those very weapons are pointed at the more than 150,000 American troops positioned in the Saudi Arabian desert. Who could have predicted that bitterly ironic turn of events when those sales were being contemplated. Let us keep those sales in mind as we consider this sale proposal.

Mr. President, I hope the current crisis in the Persian Gulf ends peacefully, and our troops return home without being fired upon with American made weapons. But considering the lessons of recent history, I believe we should be cautious and prudent in deciding how many additional weapons we intend to leave behind after Operation Desert Shield is completed.

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Countries with a demonstrated inability to defend their own sovereignty, pose significant risks to our own national interests when left with advanced American military technology. The mere presence of these weapons increases the possibility of an across-the-board arming of countries throughout the Middle East. I firmly believe that the peace that has proven so elusive in this region, will not be found through continued massive buildups of our most sophisticated weaponry. We must proceed with caution.

I yield to the Senator from California.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Specter is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. SPECTER. I support armed sales to the Saudis which will aid current United States efforts in the Persian Gulf to help relieve United States fighting men and women from the responsibility to stay in the region to defend Saudi Arabia. I oppose arms sales to Saudi Arabia which are projected for future use.

I believe the Senator from California has drawn the valid distinction in articulating a difference between selling arms to the Saudis which are for current purposes to relieve the United States burden there, contrasted with sales for the future. There have been consultations between Members of the Senate, including this Senator, and the administration on this proposed arms sale.

I have advised ranking Department of Defense and National Security Council officials of my opposition to any sales which are directed to the future because I believe we need a new policy, if, so, and when, we solve the problem of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and solve the problem of the threat of Iraq in the region.

We have to adopt a policy which will stop the influx of arms into the Middle East. This is the position that this Senator has contended repeatedly on this floor, back to 1981 on the AWACS sales, the heated debate on this floor about Maverick missiles to Kuwait, which was finally approved by the Congress. The only thing which saves us from having those weapons of potential force, the Maverick missiles, from now being in the hands of Iraq, is that we had not gotten around to delivering them to Kuwait. We had already committed to the sale.

It seems to me what we need to do is to change our policy and stop the reiteration that if the United States does not sell the weapons then the British or the French will, or somebody else will. The United States ought to take the leadership role, with the bitter experience of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and see to it next time "the next Iraq"

is not supported with weapons from the French or somewhere else, and that Iraq does not get its chemicals from Western Europe; and that the United Nations, with the help of the Soviets which have already proposed an international registry of arms, take the leadership to stop the proliferation of weapons into the Mideast.

The time to stop them is now, if it relates to the future and anything other than the immediate needs to help relieve the United States from the responsibilities which we have undertaken there.

There is a real problem in putting more weapons in the hands of the Saudis just like there was a problem in putting weapons in the hands of Kuwait, because of the inability of the Saudis, like Kuwait, to defend themselves and to keep the weapons out of the hands of others like the Iraqis.

There is also a real problem—and we have to face this bluntly—as to where the Saudis are going to be a few years from now. Their top officials have repeatedly articulated the proposition that the Saudis will line up with the other Arab nations against Israel. Their top officials make no bones about that.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks, the specifics on the Saudi's statements.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SPECTER. But the Saudis may use these weapons in future counter to the interests of the United States and counter to our interests in the region. At the moment, according to the front page of the New York Times, Saudi Arabia with other Arab countries, "seem to support the FLO-backed resolution in the United Nations." Contrary to the resolution which the United States is urging.

It is a matter of amazement to this Senator, Mr. President, that the lead on the international dateline of the report on what is happening in the United Nations starts with, "The Palestine Liberation Organization and its supporters were seeking tonight to get the U.N. Security Council approval of an anti-Israel resolution that is harsher than the one proposed on Tuesday by the United States."

What standing does the FLO have in the United Nations to take this kind of a leadership role? It is not even a member of the United Nations. It is only an observer.

The FLO are coconspirators and accessories after the fact with Iraq. Yet, in the councils of the United Nations they appear to be taking a leadership role, counter to what the United States is proposing.

With respect to the resolution proposed by the United States—and this all ties together when we are considering United States action on the proposed arm sales to Saudi Arabia—that resolution proposed by the United

States should not be enacted on this state of the record.

It is a very strange situation where the United States is asking the United Nations to send an investigative team to Israel to find out what are the facts and, at the same time, the United States is asking for a conclusion on a matter where the facts have not even yet been determined.

Mr. President, this Senator has had some considerable experience on investigating the issue of police violence and the issue of excessive force in response to what may have happened by way of mob violence. It is a complex picture as to what happens in a given situation as to what is the provocation, what is the justification for a response, and what is a reasonable response under all of the circumstances.

Mr. President, I have information from those at the scene of this incident in Jerusalem showing that the problem started with stones being thrown on the heads of the thousands of people who were gathered at the Western Wall for holiday Jewish prayers. The normal police contingent of 40 or so policemen was in no way equipped to deal with the thousands in the mob. There had been fear on the Arab side about a march from a fringe group called the Temple Faithful who wanted to oust the Arabs from their holy place. That small band in the past had tried to demonstrate and had threatened to march on the Mount again this year. But a court order had prevented that group from approaching the site.

When the stones started falling down, that group, the Temple Faithful, were not even in the city. I am informed that anyone who understands Arabic could hear clearly the incitements of the Muslim who were urging Arabs to come to the Temple Mount and kill the Jews. And these calls were broadcast on the Arab radio. Those are the facts as represented to me.

What the actual facts are requires an investigation and a determination because, in a situation like that, it is hard to read reports, hard to hear hearsay evidence, and come to a conclusion without an official investigation.

When the U.S. Government has called for an investigation which today's news reports tell us about, I think the U.S. Government is on the right track.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the report which I have just recited shows justification for the kinds of resistance on the use of force which the Israeli authorities acted on under this circumstance. But I am not in a position to stand here and take an oath as to what the actual facts were. That remains to be determined by a thorough investigation.

When we have called upon the United Nations to conduct an investigation, that is the right course. But it is the wrong course to draw a conclu-

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sion to rush to judgment and blame the Israeli authorities for excessive force before that investigation has been completed and before the facts are known.

Today's Washington Post recites that the "United States insists on a resolution that is balanced in apportioning blame."

Mr. President, that is not the way we proceed with an investigation and that is not the way we proceed with a determination as to what happened and a conclusion as to what ought to be the result.

What happened at the ruins is not a matter for a political judgment, and for something that apportion blame. What is called for is a determination of what the facts are and who is to blame.

From what I have seen in investigations in the city of Philadelphia, which have been very problematic and resulting in deaths, it requires a very detailed inquiry to find out what happened, what the provocation was, what the response of force was, and then a determination as to whether there was proportionate and reasonable force.

It is also worth noting that there has been a probe established, again as reported in today's Post, by Prime Minister Shamir, and we know from the incident in 1982 in Sabra and Shatila that the Israeli Government conducted a thorough investigation and was very tough and very harsh in its evaluation of Israel's own acts there.

Mr. President, in essence, we are facing a very complex situation in the Mideast today. We have a resolution which is now pending on the floor of the United Nations which ought to await decision until the facts are in. We have the Saudis siding with the FLO and the PLO siding with the Israelis. The United States has put 175,000 fighting men and women into the Persian Gulf with material, tanks, planes and ships to protect the Saudis, and get the Saudis side with the FLO, the conspirators and accessories after the fact with the Iraqis.

In this context and in this state of the record, Mr. President, I think it is most unwise for the United States to put any additional arms in the hands of the Saudis except what is directly related at this time to current United States interests. Beyond that, we ought to fashion a policy which will diffuse the situation in the Mideast and not make more arms available to counter United States interests and to fall into the hands of those likely Iraqis.

I thank my friend from California.

THOMAS I.

SAUDI SUPPORTERS ADVISE ISRAEL

"It is for Palestine that Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait and adhere to international testimony so that we can establish international legitimacy in dealing with the people of Palestine who will be crushed by the people of Kuwait. We say to them (the

Palestinian Support testimony, for it is the basis of your cause, the cause of all Arabs, and the base that guarantees your legitimate rights in liberating the land and establishing the state."—Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, address to the U.S. General Assembly, 10/8/90.

"There is a danger to our two nations and two separate interests in the Iraqi-Saudi conflict. We both should be cooperating our forces for a different purpose, and for a more honorable conflict. . . . Saddam Hussein has dealt a holocaust blow to the foremost problem of the Arab and Islamic world, which is the problem of Palestine."—Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan, according to the Radio Riyadh, 8/18/90. The Prince was speaking at the King Khalid Center in Riyadh.

"We must return our Jerusalem to our hands from the hands of Israeli occupation."—Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan, at the Tabuk headquarters of the Saudi Revolutionary Command, 8/20/90, according to the Saudi News Agency.

"I had hoped, on my way here, that my visit with you and your brothers would be a favored visit, hoping to see you, together with your brothers and comrades, soldiers with your fearless Iraqi army, and all the Arab nations, preparing to restore the legitimate rights in Palestine, but unfortunately this is God's will, the hour exists and will continue to live in our hearts."—Saudi Crown Prince speaking before Saudi soldiers, shown on Saudi TV, 8/22/90.

"The Saudi ambassador to Indonesia stated in an Indonesian newspaper interview that 'Saddam Hussein is an Israeli agent who was planted in the (Iraqi) Arab Party in order to stab the Arab world in the back.' The Saudi diplomat also said that 'Saddam's actions divert attention from the Palestinian problem and allow Israel the opportunity to settle Soviet immigrants in the territories.'"—Israel Radio News, 8/24/90.

The PRESIDENTIAL OFFICER, Under the previous order, the Senator from New Jersey is now recognized.

MR. LAUTENBERG. I thank the Clerk.

MR. PRESIDENT, I thank our distinguished colleague and friend, Senator CRAMER, for his leadership in this decision to try to express concerns about the proposed sale of 5.7 billion dollars' worth of arms to Saudi Arabia and the additional arms sales planned for January.

MR. PRESIDENT, the administration has justified this package on the grounds that the Saudis urgently need these weapons for their own defense. If that is so, then as others have noted, why does the package include weapons that will not be delivered for years. How will those weapons help in the current crisis?

For instance, the package contains 180 M-1A2 tanks, the most advanced in the U.S. arsenal, which the manufacturer says will not be available until mid-1992. It contains 200 Bradley fighting vehicles that will not be delivered until 1992. It includes a new naval command control and communications system that will not be completed before 1992.

Further, Mr. President, it is not clear that more weapons can really provide the Saudis with true security. Developing a true Saudi defense capability will take decades and perhaps a

generation. The Saudi Arabians must expand their current ground force of roughly 50,000 and train a credible army.

The fact is, despite the considerable arsenal now in Saudi possession, they were not able to deter Iraqi aggression. They needed to rely on American troops.

And I think it is important, Mr. President, that we remind the American public, especially those with sons and brothers and fathers and sisters over there, that our mission is not solely to defend Saudi Arabia. We have much larger interests at stake. Those interests are to remain leaders of the free world, to guarantee the energy supply that permits this world as we know it to function, to help us grow the food and transport it and market it, and to prevent Saddam Hussein from gaining a stranglehold over the energy required to fuel the world.

So, Mr. President, I believe that the administration is inappropriately pushing the sale of many weapons that have no military use in the current crisis but that the Saudis simply want to buy in the misguided hopes of strengthening their defense capabilities.

MR. PRESIDENT, although American soldiers are prepared to fight shoulder to shoulder with Saudi Arabians, I am alarmed at some of the comments we hear from the Saudi Arabian Government. We heard high Saudi officials proclaim that they wished that their arms were pointed at Israel. They referred to the Iraqi soldiers as brothers, and said that they wished the Saudi troops were going to join their Arab brothers in recovering their plundered rights in Palestine.

We cannot ignore these comments directed at a steadfast ally of America. We dare not turn our backs, not even turn our cheek, as we seem to be ready to do right now. We certainly should not sell weapons that may one day be used against Israel as these Saudi statements suggest.

Providing weapons to be delivered a few years cannot help the Saudis in the current crisis. There is no need to rush them through a Congress that, at the end of a session, cannot truly give this sale the close scrutiny it deserves. If you believe, as I do, that many of these weapons will not help them defend themselves in the future without the development of a larger, well-trained Saudi army, I am at a loss to know why they are being provided.

In the administration's zeal to give the Saudis whatever they want, Congress cannot overlook the possibility that arms provided to the Saudis today could fall into the hands of our enemies tomorrow to be used against us, for the death and destruction or the injury of our own troops, or those of our allies. It has happened before in the Mideast East and could easily happen again.

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There are many examples in the current crisis. Even as we discuss this issue, weapons that we provided to the Shah of Iran, believing that we would be helping a friend—armored vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, armored personnel carriers—are now in the hands of the Iraqi soldiers that we may face in combat. They captured these weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. They captured more United States weapons when they invaded Kuwait, weapons like the Hawk missiles against which, according to the former chief of staff for the Air Force, Gen. Michael E. Dugan, we have no defense.

French soldiers and sailors now face the possibility that their ships may be fired upon by the very Exocet missiles they blithely sold to the Iraqis. The Saudis themselves face Iraqi jets and tanks they helped Iraq to buy for use against Iran.

So it is clear, Mr. President, that we must exercise care in selling weapons into an unstable part of the world where alliances shift just as easily as the desert sands.

Just remember the Kuwaitis spent \$80 billion of their own money to bankroll the very soldiers who now occupy and destroy their country. In the Middle East, today's friends can easily become tomorrow's enemies. And although the United States and Saudi interests currently intersect, let us not forget that tomorrow this could change. The administration should not use the Gulf crisis as an excuse—yes, even a pretext—for sending to the Saudi Arabians whatever weapons are on their wish list.

I yield the floor, Mr. President.

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to join with my colleagues in expressing my concern about the prospect of selling several billion dollars of advanced military equipment to Saudi Arabia.

I approach this issue with a great deal of skepticism. In general, I am simply not convinced that the best way to defend our national interests is to provide nations with more arms to fight more wars. The balance in our foreign aid program between economic development and military aid is totally tilted toward weapons and war. And that just doesn't make a lot of sense to me.

I do recognize, however, that some special circumstances are operating in Saudi Arabia. They obviously face a hostile and dangerous neighbor in the form of Iraq. They have obviously taken some real risks in responding as they have to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. And they do deserve some additional assistance. I am not, however, convinced that they deserve or need or can use the massive level of assistance proposed by the administration.

To begin with, what has happened to the billions we have already given the Saudis? We had a major struggle over the sale of AWACS to them in the early 1980's. We finally sold them those planes—yet we had to send our

Secretary of Defense, armed with our satellite photos, to convince them that Iraqi forces were massing on their borders. They could not figure it for themselves? We have sold them tanks and planes and guns—and then we had to send them 800,000 American men and women to defend against a possible Iraqi attack. With all the equipment they have, why did we need to send so many people? And now that our people are there, we are beginning to discover that the equipment we have—and that the Saudis want—may not be all that well-adapted to desert conditions. So why sell more?

And it is not just a question of the amount we are selling to the Saudis. They are—and I want to emphasize this point—a nation which needs and deserves help. But we sold Kuwait arms; and they were not used to slow the Iraqi advance. In fact the planes we had sent over there were used to help the rich and the powerful escape rather than to attack Iraqi tanks and armies.

Weapons are not going to deter a nation like Iraq. They have demonstrated time and time again that they are willing to fight no matter what kind of weapons their opponents have. Deterrence works when nations behave rationally—and the Middle East is not noted for rationality when it comes to territorial disputes. All the weapons do is make those disputes more bloody, more destructive, and more capable of expanding into the kind of regional conflict that can engulf the entire world.

Beyond that, Mr. President, I am afraid that the decision to make such a massive sale of arms is symbolic of the way we make decisions about Middle Eastern policy. The sale is clearly a response to the new threat created by Iraq. But I see no evidence of it being consistent with our overall policy in the region. Obviously we may sell the arms to help the Saudis defend our mutual enemies; but they can be used by the Saudis to attack our allies.

Those of us who believe that a strong and secure Israel is an asset to America have some clear concerns about this sale. I am not in a position to make a judgment about what really happened at the Temple Mount, but I am in a position to make some judgments about the reaction to it. The PLO and Iraq are trying to manipulate that tragedy to advance their own desire to destroy Israel. They are trying to use that incident as a wedge, to put pressure on other Arab States to forget about the aggression in Kuwait and start some aggression against Israel. We ought not, in any way, advance that plan. Refusing to sell arms the Saudis might help the PLO by allowing them to claim that we will never help any Arab State; selling too many arms to the Saudis might help the PLO by giving them a stronger ally in the war they still hope

to wage. We need some balance—and this proposal is not balanced.

We do face a crisis in the Gulf and we do need to take some actions to deal with it. But we need not move so quickly that we make some basic mistakes. A sale of the size originally proposed by the administration would be a basic mistake. The Congress needs to exercise its obligations to review and revise the proposal. I hope that this series of speeches will help achieve that goal.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise today to share my concerns over the proposed \$7 billion arms package to Saudi Arabia. Because we face a very real crisis in the Middle East, we may be tempted to approve the sale too quickly. I want to urge my colleagues to reflect on the long-term consequences of pumping such an infusion of arms into a volatile region.

The Saudis certainly need to know we are with them as they confront an aggressive Iraq, but purely our deployment of over 100,000 troops and tons of material is eloquent testimony to our commitment to defend Saudi Arabia. We have responded fully and quickly to the immediate security crisis facing the Saudis. We have put the lives of our own people on the line in the desert and have organized our allies to respond as well. There can be no question of where the United States stands.

I certainly appreciate the need to provide some hardware to meet the immediate security needs of the Saudis, but a \$7 billion package that contains some of our most lethal and sophisticated weapons, with an even larger multibillion-dollar package to come, is a very different matter. What is the sense in agreeing now to the sale of weapons which will not even be off the production line for several years?

Before we approve a package that would allow the Saudis to make first-time purchases of our Patriot missiles, Apache helicopters, and MLRS systems, we ought to give serious thought to the facts of life in the Middle East.

Alliances shift quickly and dramatically in that region, often to the real detriment of the United States. We poured arms into Iran to prop up the Shah, only to see that regime collapse and all our military hardware fall into the hands of a hostile government. Iran and Iraq fought a devastating, bloody war for almost a decade, but now we see the beginnings of rapprochement between these old enemies. The Kuwaitis stood by Iraq, indeed provided significant financial support to that country during its war with Iran, and how were they thanked? The Iraqis have shown their appreciation by toppling the Kuwaiti Government, killing its people and destroying that beautiful country. Any weapons we've sold the Kuwaitis over the years are now in Iraqi hands and could be used against our own people.

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In a region where today's friend is tomorrow's foe, is it really prudent to send billions of dollars' worth of sophisticated hardware to a Saudi monarchy that many experts feel is under strain from within and without? Our experience in Iran should tell us that the answer to a regime's internal problems is not United States arms sales. We need to reflect too on who would control all those weapons should the monarchy fall. How would they be used?

And what about external pressures on the Saudi monarchy? Who knows what impact the rise of Islamic fundamentalism will have on the region? What kind of pressures will the more radical states in the region continue to exert on the Saudis? Will the Saudis have to make pacts with more radical states just to buy some breathing room?

No one has a crystal ball, but these are the questions we must think through before we approve an arms package that could dramatically alter the military balance in the Middle East. It would be a real tragedy if, in a rush to respond to the current crisis, we only created a much greater problem for ourselves down the road. Who wants to come to the Senate floor a few years from now, when the Arab map may have changed once again and say, "If we only knew in 1990 what we know now?"

In the coming months, we will have to develop a longer term strategy for meeting the security needs of our friends in the gulf. And it is in that context of an overall strategy that we should address the serious questions of large arms sales to the Middle East.

Mr. BRYAN, Mr. President, I rise today to express my concern with the administration's proposed sale of sophisticated weapons systems to Saudi Arabia.

The need to bolster Saudi Arabia's defenses is undeniable. Recognizing our strong interests there, this body has supported the President's deployment of American forces in the Persian Gulf, particularly in Saudi Arabia. However, we must exercise care. While we plan in the short term to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression, it would be unwise to ignore the long term implications of this sale.

American policy must, over the long term, strive to create stability in the Middle East. The history of American arms sales to the Middle East is not a good one. Our weapons have often fallen into the hands of those who oppose stability in the region, and America's interests around the world. The fall of the Shah of Iran resulted in large numbers of sophisticated American weapons falling into the hands of Islamic radicals, and fueled the long and devastating Iran-Iraq war. Ironically, our soldiers in Saudi Arabia are facing American weapons, captured by the Iraqis from the American-supplied Kuwaiti Armed Forces.

The administration has approved this sale in order to enable the Saudis to better defend themselves against Saddam Hussein. This is a reasonable goal. We should use this goal to define the size and scope of arms sales to the Saudis. I question the administration's inclusion of weapon systems which would not become available until long after this crisis is likely to have passed. Some would enhance Saudi Arabia's offensive military capabilities long after Saddam Hussein is no longer a threat.

It is important to remember as we consider this sale, that the alliances in the Middle East can shift as easily as the desert sands. During the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars to support the same Iraqi army which now occupies the Emir's palace and threatens Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, while our ally against Iraqi aggression, remains a declared enemy of another important American ally, Israel. The experience of the last 40 years show Israeli concerns about the ultimate use of these weapons to be well founded. This sale would not make it possible for Saudi Arabia to defend itself alone against Iraqi aggression. However, it could allow the Saudis to share sophisticated American weapons with other Arab nations intent on Israel's destruction.

For these reasons, I believe that we must be cautious in considering the administration's request. We must look to the long-term stability of the Middle East, and approve no weapon transfer which does not serve long term American interests in the region. I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KERRY). The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. SYMMS. Might I inquire of the parliamentary situation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California controls the time until 11:10.

Mr. CRANSTON. I yield back all time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Regular order would be to go to the appropriations bill.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might proceed as though in morning business for not to exceed 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMMS. I thank the Chair.

NO NEW TAXES

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I take the floor this morning to reemphasize what I think is becoming very apparent to the American people but somehow it is not becoming very apparent to the tax and spenders in both parties in Washington, DC. There still seems to be some sort of a mad rush here in Washington to raise taxes so we had more money to spend for all the favored Government programs, and an unwillingness on the part of Congress to take it an end attack this trend

with a no new tax start, with no new taxes as the pledge.

Mr. President, when I was elected to the House back in the 1970's and in the Senate at the turn of the 1980's, I was running on a platform of no new taxes.

Let us allow people the opportunity to be free and to run their own business without an excessive Government. What is happening is the Government is growing, it is getting bigger. But the American people have the message, Mr. President. All one has to do is go to Idaho or go to New Hampshire or go to New York City where in New York City the distinguished Presiding Officer just pointed out to me that the liberal Democratic mayor of New York City is cutting city employees because they are short of revenues. I do not see any suggestions of that around here.

One thing we could do here in this Congress—and I offered an amendment earlier this year—is reduce the staff in the legislative appropriations bill to set an example for the rest of the country and then go about our legislation.

The American people elected George Bush, Mr. President, on a platform of no new taxes. He said, "No new taxes; read my lips."

I personally believe that this President still does not want new taxes. He is a diplomat. He has been able to negotiate with everyone in the world; from the Soviet Union to everybody else in the world the President has demonstrated his abilities to negotiate. There are only two groups of people he has not been able to negotiate with. One is Saddam Hussein and his henchmen, and the other group is the tax and spenders in the Congress of the United States.

I think it is high time, and it is not too late, for the President to turn this around, I appeal to him as an American to go back on the warpath and go out on the campaign trail and tell the American people. Let us pass a continuing resolution similar to the one we now have in effect that will get some savings for the Government, a modified sequester, extend it through to the first of next year, to the middle of February or some such time, and then tell the American people, send me a Congress. If the issue is do we want new taxes, then I will sign their tax bill. If you elect them to come in here and raise your taxes, I will sign the bill next year and you can have more taxes. If you elect them to reduce the spending of the Federal Government, I will work with them to do it and work out a fair budget proposal.

Mr. President, the President of the United States then goes on TV and says to those of us in the Republican Party, "Blame me, blame me. Do not blame them; blame me."

I do not blame the President. I do not blame George Bush for the mess

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There being no objection, the poems were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

MOUNT MOOSE: ELEGY FOR AN UNBORN FATHER

They made my father
Into a mountain in Alaska.
With appropriate law and ceremony
They changed his substance:
Ancient rite in modern form.
In October of another year,
He disappeared.
His plane was swallowed up
So *Newspaper* said.
The gaunt land gulped him down
And nothing had been found.
(For a long time I used to wonder which one
I would have dreamed to hate—mountain
skins or the skin he loved them both.)
[no longer laugh]
In simple-minded sanctification
At burial customs.
The laying-out, the sewing,
The elaborate preparations
Are all symptoms of reality
Now, shocking, irreparable.
(We had a catafalque for his funeral. It was
so skimpy, he was so big.)
For a burial
A body is essential.
He left work-wear to give a gift.
A practical gift, a way gift for him.
We can never know a gift's true price.
Nor post effect on our grandchildren.
He simply did what he had said that he
would do.
He always tried to do that.
It was at the head of what was best in him,
Interior, how did our life end?
Now you are a mountain in Alaska
And a new dreamer
To mingle with the old horror.
Written on the day of the dedication of
Mt. Moose in Anchorage, Alaska, October 9,
1977.

MORNING TIME

For Christmas
I gave two calendars
To the three young men
Who claim to be my children.
They must make their own time now.
So I gave them each access to their gaves and
weeks and months.
One calendar for their pockets,
Another for their walls.
Once, of course, their time and mine were
one.
And they needed no numbers and little
squares
To tumble through their days.
But they have entered the realm of Expec-
tations.
And expectations exact their due
Of planning and deadlines and dates.
They must create their own worlds
Out of those endless numbered empty
squares
Of hopes and fears and years
Stiffening myself
Not to look longingly backwards,
(But by what alchemy do three little boys in
blue keep flickering beside my eyes?)
I gave my sons two calendars this year.
(On the highway between Washington
and Princeton December 28, 1987.)

BURMA'S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues an insightful article by Thant Myint-U, a leading advocate with respect to human and civil rights

in Burma. The article highlights the Government of Burma's systematic refusal to honor the human and civil rights of Burmese citizens advocating a return to democracy.

Open signs of unrest by the Burmese people began several years ago when millions of citizens marched in Rangoon, Mandalay, and other Burmese cities demanding an end to the 26-year military dictatorship of General Ne Win. The Government responded by massacring 10,000 unarmed citizens. Since the crackdown, tens of thousands of additional people have been arrested, executed, or disappeared.

Last May, in response to domestic and international pressure, the military arrested opposition leaders and then held free and fair elections. The military lost, winning only 10 of 492 legislative seats. Since that time, the Government has invalidated the elections and stopped all its repression of advocates of democracy.

Mr. Thant is the grandson of Thant U, Secretary General of the United Nations from 1952 to 1971. Mr. Thant has dedicated his life to the struggle for democracy in Burma and is currently Secretary of the Burma Fund and a senior advisor at the International Center for Development Policy.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Thant's article may be placed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

(From the Washington Post, October 10, 1990)
THANT MYINT-U—Burma's Grandson

Nowhere else in the world is the human rights situation as bad as in Burma. Nowhere else have people fought so hard for their freedom and yet still suffer under the threat of terror and repression. And nowhere else will the rest of the world look, unless it becomes too late.

On the same day that President Bush delivered his address to Congress on the new international order, a crowd of Burmese demonstrated peacefully for democracy and human rights. Ethnic people were killed. Hundreds had been jailed in the past two weeks alone. In the leadership of the National League for Democracy, the country's largest ethnic party. More demonstrations are expected these next few weeks. And every day Burma moves closer and closer to civil war.

The unrest began two years ago when millions of people marched in Itanbon, Mandalay and other Burmese cities demanding an end to the 26-year military dictatorship of Gen. Ne Win, which has impoverished what was once the richest nation in Southeast Asia. Gen. Ne Win responded by gunning down as many as 10,000 unarmed civilians, many secondary school students as young as 12 or 13.

Since the crackdown in September 1988, tens of thousands of people have been arrested, executed or have disappeared. Military tribunals have replaced civil courts, gatherings of more than four people are forbidden, and schools and universities have remained closed. Young men live in constant fear of being taken away for porter service in the remote jungles, where they are used as human mine sweepers and made to carry army supplies until they die. Torture is both

severe and widespread, and imprisoned students are subject to beatings, and electric shocks and kept in solitary confinement.

And yet the people of Burma carry in their fight for democracy and believe that the world—especially the United States—is on their side. Last May, the military, thinking that it had jailed and intimidated enough opposition activists, held "free and fair elections." The military lost, winning only 10 of 492 seats. Since then, the military has moved step by step to invalidate those elections, and the result is that the people have brought Burma back to the point of another violent explosion.

Though Burma's government has followed an isolationist foreign policy, Burma is not isolated, and the international community and the United Nations can do a lot to prevent further bloodshed. Foreign multinational companies, including many American companies, can stop funding the regime through their investments in the military's projects. Many of these foreign companies are engaged in timber and mineral extraction, and the resulting environmental damage (Burma could lose all its rain forests in five years) threatens the whole region.

Second, the United States can take a harder line on the military's suspected involvement in the heroin trade, investment which may be providing Gen. Ne Win with much-needed cash. Certainly the United States should cut all aid of economic, technical assistance to the military, as suggested by the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington.

Third, the United Nations and the whole can take out on human rights and bilateral multilateral assistance and perhaps more hard comprehensive sanctions. The military has shown time and again how sensitive it is to foreign criticism, and pulling away outside support for the regime could make all the difference in ensuring peaceful democratic change.

In early August, China began providing Burma with more than \$1 billion worth of arms. Burma is selling ethnic insurgents that have been spilled into Thailand and leading a prolonged and sustained confrontation between the military and the people could eventually have serious international repercussions. Better to act before the situation becomes a crisis. The United States and the rest of the world can do more to help.

TERRY ANDERSON

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise to inform my colleagues that today marks the 2,035th day that Terry Anderson had been held captive in Beirut.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. REID). Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of morning business for not to exceed 1 hour under the control of the senior Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) or his designee.

ARMS SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, last month the administration floated a report that it would propose a gigantic \$21 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia. When this was greeted by widespread cries of congressional concern,

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ARMY COLONY

Cranston Packwood Metzgerbaum Gilman, Graham, Adams, Packer, Lautenberg, Kohl, Conrad, Brown

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We are now involved in the Middle East, and I support the President in the Middle East. He made a wise decision, I think, in going into the Middle East. However, all of a sudden, we want to pour arms into Saudi Arabia way beyond anything that the Saudis can conceivably use for their own military; weapons that we can never be sure will remain in Saudi hands. And I am not here saying anything derogatory of the present Saudi Government, but the Middle East is obviously an unstable area.

We provided weapons to the Shah, and they ended up in Khomeini's hands. Europeans provided weapons to Iraq, and they now face us. In some cases, weapons that Iraq has captured from Iran are our weapons, now facing us. So before we rush pell-mell into approving an immense transfer of arms to Saudi Arabia, I wish we could step back, reflect, view history, and look at our long-range interests in the Middle East. We should stop for the moment and not go forward with this arms sale.

While I am talking on the subject of the Middle East, let me also say that I wish the United States would be more cautious in proposing, in the United Nations, an effort to censure Israel for what happened at the Walling Wall on Monday of this week. We do not know the facts. And no harm will come, if we wait 2 days or 3 weeks, to find out exactly what happened.

I remember in 1981 when the United Nations very rapidly condemned Israel for the bombing raid they carried out to destroy the reactor Iraq was building. And they were going to use that plant to build atomic bombs. This was not a plant to generate electricity, or an academic research reactor. This was an atomic bomb plant.

There was immediate denunciation on the day after the raid, in a resolution passed in the United Nations. I would say that today there is not a country in the world that at least is not silently saying thanks to Israel for having taken out that atomic bomb plant. And, therefore, I hope we will pause and reflect, think, and gather the facts, not only before we rush pell-mell to condemn Israel in the United Nations, but before we go forward with an arms sale or transfer, whatever it may be, that I think, in the long-range, will not be in the interests of the United States.

I thank the Chair, and I thank my friend from California.

Mr. CRANSTON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California controls the time.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank my friend for his comments and for the leadership he has displayed over the years on the issues we are now debating.

I will yield 4 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Illinois. Senator SIMON.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

Mr. SIMON. I thank my colleague for his leadership on this.

Mr. President, I just want to join in expressing some words of caution in this whole field. First of all, in the arms race, generally, wherever it is in the world, we ought to be using greater restraint. The pressure is on because of the profit by those who make arms; they want to push for more arms sales. There ought to be a restraining force, and that restraining force too often, is not here. As you provide more weapons to Saudi Arabia, you make Israel less secure and, clearly, we have to help Israel, and we escalate the arms race in the Middle East. I do not think that is in anyone's best interests.

Second of all, very candidly, I think we would be much better off simply saying to the countries of the Middle East, unless you join in the peace process, you are not going to get weapons, period. We would enjoy a much better relationship, I think, with all the nations, because we would not be going through these embarrassing negotiations that get turned down by the Senate or the House as we go through this whole process.

Our interests ought to be, No. 1, the security of Israel; No. 2, the security of the Arab nations; No. 3, and all three are tied in, we want some stability in that area of the world.

I am pleased when we meet informally with leaders of some of the Middle Eastern Arab countries now who say: When this immediate crisis is over, then let us sit down and let us get an overall settlement worked out in the Middle East. I think that is possible. Frankly I am optimistic, if we can get this thing worked out, that that will happen.

The immediate goal, obviously, is to get the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait and take away from Iraq the ability to manufacture chemical weapons and nuclear weapons.

But in the meantime, I think it is imperative that our Government use restraint.

I hope the Defense Department, the State Department and the White House will look very, very carefully at this huge package, what portions of this package are not essential for the immediate operation that is going on in the Middle East. Those parts of this package that are not essential should be eliminated. I recognize political reality that if this came up for a vote right now, it would be approved. Frankly, it would be approved without my vote.

But I think it is important that restraint be used. Then the signal ought to be very clear to the Arab countries. "We are willing to work with you, economically, in terms of your defense and anything else if you join in the peace process." That is not an unreasonable requirement on our part. I

hope that is the direction in which we move and move more decisively.

I yield back the remainder of my time to the Senator from California.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. President, are we under controlled time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California controls the time.

Mr. CRANSTON. What time does the Senator need?

Mr. METZENBAUM. Ten minutes.

Mr. CRANSTON. I am delighted to yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Ohio.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. President, I thank my colleague from California.

I rise to address myself to an aspect of the Saudi matter that is a little bit different than those addressed by my colleagues. I share the concern of some who have already spoken about the influx of arms to Saudi Arabia. I share their concern that the United States is fueling a Mideast arms race. But I also recognize the need for Saudi Arabia to have certain arms to defend itself. I find no fault with that, so long as Saudi purchases are reasonable.

The proposed package is not reasonable. I am concerned about this overwhelming Saudi desire for more and more and more, a \$21.3 billion package which has now been cut back into two separate packages. The Saudis want the shiniest, newest military toys they can get. I think that the need of Saudi Arabia to have defensive weapons does make sense.

Mr. President, I might point out that I am concerned about some statements that have been made by the Saudi leadership within recent days indicating that they intend only to defend Saudi Arabia and that they are not prepared to share any additional burden. I have to just point out those in Saudi Arabia who provide the leadership that it is very difficult to fight a solely defensive war. There is an enormous international force currently in Saudi Arabia. But the Saudi Government says it will not permit this force to do anything other than defensive activity. This is wonderful for Saudi Arabia. But it isn't so wonderful for the people of Kuwait, and the Western nations committed to Kuwait's freedom. The Saudis must become better team players. There is an international team now in the Persian Gulf area, and the Saudis should take their role on this team more seriously. After all, the team is the only thing separating the Saudis from Saddam's guns.

Mr. President, my concern today is not primarily about the size of the Saudi Arabian arms sale, but rather to discuss another aspect of our relation with Saudi Arabia. I heard my colleague from California address himself

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other peoples' borders. We are going to have to have, Mr. President, as we did with NATO, a previously arrived at agreement that determines what is the responsibility of the various nations who would be participating in those efforts to assure peace in this volatile region of the world and what contributions they would make, both in terms of personnel and financing. Those, Mr. President, I believe are some of the ingredients to a strategic U.S. policy in this region of the world.

In that context, I am very concerned that the proposal for the \$21 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia runs in the opposite direction; that it tends to increase the potential for violence in the region; that it could be very destabilizing; that it represents a direct threat to the stable ally with common shared values in this region, the State of Israel; and that it moves away from a recognition of a long-term international, as distinct from regional, obligation for the stability of this part of the world which is so important in so many regards to the well-being of the rest of the world.

Mr. President, again, I commend the Senator from California for giving us this opportunity to elevate the discussion into the broader question of long-term U.S. interests in this critical region. I look forward to joining with the Senator from California and our other colleagues when we reach the point of debating the specifics of the proposal that the Administration will soon be submitting to us relative to arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Florida. I would like to ask him one question while he is on the floor, which I will address to others as they appear.

I have discussed with Senator Packwood the introduction of a resolution of disapproval, not of the whole package but of those items that do not need to go now, that cannot go until later, giving us more time to consider the wisdom of sending them. I have also discussed with him the advisability of introducing a separate piece of legislation suggesting that instead of an outright sale of certain of the weapons, that we would just as soon not have floating around endlessly in the Middle East, that instead of selling, we provide for either a leasing arrangement or buy-back arrangement, so that we can control the weapons and get them back if need be when the crisis is over, so they will not be there possibly to fall into the hands of somebody else and be used or aimed against us, as our weapons are now that we sold originally to the Shah of Iran and to Kuwait.

Another approach could be a buy-back provision. There are precedents for all of this. We had lend-lease in World War II. We sold some Stingers to Bahrain under a buy-back arrangement, and we sold or are discussing now providing some weaponry to Israel with a buy back or leasing ar-

range ment, so they may not stay there forever.

I simply would like to ask the Senator if he would be interested in considering joining in both of those efforts? We will seek to introduce the resolution of disapproval today, and the bill regarding leasing or buy back as soon as possible.

Mr. GRAHAM. I say to the Senator, the answer is yes. I believe that the principles that he has just outlined are the types of issues that ought to be seriously considered; specifically, the proposal of shifting from sale to some form of lend-lease, that carries with it the implicit recognition that our interest in this region is a long-term one; that we are not just in for a short-term crisis and that we are going to leave and depend upon the states within the region to maintain a peaceful countervailing series of forces.

Whether this Congress and this administration will be prepared to face that strategic reality, I think will be one of the tests of our vision and will, as we conclude this century.

If I could share with the Senator a historical event that occurred in this Chamber almost exactly 50 years ago. The man who held the seat that I am now privileged to hold, Senator Claude Pepper, in 1940, introduced the first proposal for the United States to enter into a lend-lease agreement with Great Britain. He did that at a time when England was under the severest siege of the Battle of Britain. That first proposal, when considered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was defeated by a vote of approximately 19 to 1, a statement of the unwillingness of this body and of the American people to accept a long-term position in the world in 1940. We clearly paid a very serious price for our timidity at that point.

I believe that, regarding the recommendations that you made, we not be so timid in terms of recognizing the necessity of a sustained American commitment to this region of the world, not alone, but but as a leader of other nations who share our values and, particularly, in defense of the one nation in the region which is our strongest ally, and which is the rock upon which values of democracy and human rights are based, the State of Israel.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I would like to add a footnote to the one point the Senator from Florida made. When Claude Pepper, his predecessor, was standing in the Senate making impassioned speeches for lend-lease to aid the allies in the early days of World War II, I was seated up there in the gallery listening to him. Then I moved over there, so I could see him because he was standing a little bit behind where the Senator from Florida is now standing. I think in the back row. He made eloquent and impassioned statements of the urgency of that program.

I am delighted now to be down on the Senate floor, out of the gallery, working with the Senator from Florida. I will be talking with him momentarily about the terms of the resolution that we will be, I hope, introducing very soon.

Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the Senator. Mr. CRANSTON. I now yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. ADAMS).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, I appreciate very much the Senator from California yielding to me. I particularly appreciate the manner in which the discussion was conducted between the Senator from Florida and the Senator from California, regarding alternatives to a buildup of weapons in the Middle East.

It seems to me that before we commit ourselves to yet another massive sale of sophisticated military equipment into the most dangerously unstable region of the world, the Congress needs to be assured that the administration has carefully thought through the consequences of such an action.

Previous sales, intended to contribute to stability and balance in the region, have frequently done just the opposite. With the fall of the Shah of Iran, a massive arsenal of American-made weapons fell into the hands of political and religious fanatics who continue to look upon our country as the "Great Satan."

Our support for Saddam Hussein in his 10-year war against Iran, when measured against the current crisis, proves the danger of socking out and assisting governments that frequently display a national agenda that sometimes appear to parallel our own interests, yet prove capable of careening wildly off course after receiving our assistance.

How useful were our past sales of military assistance to the Government of Kuwait, a nation that frequently voted against us when issues were raised in the United Nations before being invaded by Iraq? Now that Kuwait has been invaded, and is under the control of Saddam Hussein, some of those very weapons are pointed at the more than 150,000 American troops positioned in the Saudi Arabian desert. Who could have predicted that bitterly ironic turn of events when those sales were being contemplated. Let us keep those sales in mind as we consider this sale proposal.

Mr. President, I hope the current crisis in the Persian Gulf ends peacefully, and our troops return home without being fired upon with American-made weapons. But considering the lessons of recent history, I believe we should be cautious and prudent in deciding how many additional weapons we intend to leave behind after Operation Desert Shield is completed.

ation to rush to judgment and blame the Israeli authorities for excessive force before that investigation has been completed and before the facts are known.

Today's Washington Post recites that the "United States insists on a resolution that is balanced in apportioning blame."

Mr. President, that is not the way we proceed with an investigation and that is not the way we proceed with a determination as to what happened and a conclusion as to what ought to be the result.

What happened at the scene is not a matter for a political judgment, and for something that apportions blame. What is called for is a determination of what the facts are and who is to blame.

From what I have seen in investigations in the city of Philadelphia, which have been very problemsome and resulting in deaths, it requires a very detailed inquiry to find out what happened, what the provocation was, what the response of force was, and then a determination as to whether there was proportionate and reasonable force.

It is also worth noting that there has been a probe established, again as reported in today's Post, by Prime Minister Shamir, and we know from the incidents in 1982 in Sabra and Shatila that the Israeli Government conducted a thorough investigation and was very tough and very harsh in its evaluation of Israel's own actions there.

Mr. President, in essence, we are facing a very complex situation in the Mideast today. We have a resolution which is now pending on the floor of the United Nations which ought to await decision until the facts are in. We have the Saudis siding with the PLO and the PLO is siding with the Iraqis. The United States has put 175,000 fighting men and women into the Persian Gulf with materiel, tanks, planes and ships to protect the Saudis, and yet the Saudis side with the PLO, the coconspirators and accessories after the fact with the Iraqis.

In this context and in this state of the record, Mr. President, I think it is most unwise for the United States to put any additional arms in the hands of the Saudis except what is directly related at this time to current United States interests. Beyond that, we ought to fashion a policy which will diffuse the situation in the Mideast and not make more arms available to counter United States interests and to fall into the hands of those likely Iraqis.

I thank my friend from California.

EXHIBIT 1

SAUDI STATEMENTS AGAINST ISRAEL

"It is for Palestine that Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait and adhere to international legitimacy so that we can mobilize international legitimacy to realize for the people of Palestine what will be realized for the people of Kuwait. We say to them this

Palestinians), Support legitimacy, for it is the basis of your cause, the cause of all Arabs, and the base that guarantees your legitimate rights in liberating the land and establishing the state."—Saudi Foreign Minister Prince SAUD AL-FAYEAL, address to the U.N. General Assembly, 10/2/90.

"There is a danger to our two nations and two armies inherent in the Iraqi-Saudi conflict. We both should be conserving our forces for a different purpose, and for a more honorable conflict. . . . Saddam Hussein has dealt a holocaust blow to the foremost problem of the Arab and Islamic world, which is the problem of Palestine."—Saudi Defense Minister Prince SULEIMAN, according to the Radio Riyadh, 9/16/90. The Prince was speaking at the King Khalid Center in Riyadh.

"We must return our Jerusalem to our hands from the hands of Israel the usurper."—Saudi Defense Minister Prince SULEIMAN, at the Tabuk headquarters of the Saudi Northwestern Command, 9/20/90, according to the Saudi News Agency.

"I had hoped, on my way here, that my visit with you and your brothers would be a farewell visit, hoping to see you, together with your brothers and comrades, soldiers of the fearless Iraqi army, and all the Arab armies, preparing to restore the legitimate rights in Palestine, but unfortunately this is God's will, the hope exists and will continue to live in our hearts."—Saudi Crown Prince speaking before Saudi soldiers, shown on Saudi TV, 8/22/90.

"The Saudi ambassador to Indonesia stated in an Indonesian newspaper interview that 'Saddam Hussein is an Israeli agent who was planted in the (Iraqi) Ba'ath Party in order to stab the Arab world in the back.' The Saudi diplomat also said that 'Saddam's actions divert attention from the Palestinian problem and allow Israel the opportunity to settle Soviet immigrants in the territories.'"—Israeli Radio News, 9/24/90.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from New Jersey is now recognized.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I thank our distinguished colleague and friend, Senator CRANSTON, for his leadership in this decision to try to express concerns about the proposed sale of \$7 billion dollars' worth of arms to Saudi Arabia and the additional arms sales planned for January.

Mr. President, the administration has justified this package on the grounds that the Saudis urgently need these weapons for their own defense. If that is so, then as others have noted, why does the package include weapons that will not be delivered for years. How will those weapons help in the current crisis?

For instance, the package contains 160 M-1A2 tanks, the most advanced in the U.S. arsenal, which the manufacturer says will not be available until mid-1993. It contains 200 Bradley fighting vehicles that will not be delivered until 1994. It includes a new naval command control and communications system that will not be completed before 1995.

Further, Mr. President, it is not clear that mere weapons can really provide the Saudis with true security. Developing a true Saudi defense capability will take decades and perhaps a

generation. The Saudi Arabians must expand their current ground force of roughly 50,000 and train a credible army.

The fact is, despite the considerable arsenal now in Saudi possession, they were not able to deter Iraqi aggression. They needed to rely on American troops.

And I think it is important, Mr. President, that we remind the American public, especially those with sons and brothers and fathers and sisters over there, that our mission is not solely to defend Saudi Arabia. We have much larger interests at stake. Those interests are to remain leaders of the free world, to guarantee the energy supply that permits this world as we know it to function, to help us grow the food and transport it and market it, and to prevent Saddam Hussein from gaining a stranglehold over the energy required to fuel the world.

So, Mr. President, I believe that the administration is inappropriately pushing the sale of many weapons that have no military use in the current crisis but that the Saudis simply want to buy in the misguided hope of strengthening their defense capabilities.

Mr. President, although American soldiers are prepared to fight shoulder to shoulder with Saudi Arabians, I am alarmed at some of the comments we hear from the Saudi Arabian Government. We heard high Saudi officials proclaim that they wished that their arms were pointed at Israel. They referred to the Iraqi soldiers as brothers, and said that they wished the Saudi troops were going to join their Arab brothers in recovering their plundered rights in Palestine.

We cannot ignore those comments directed at a steadfast ally of America. We dare not turn our backs, not even turn our check, as we seem to be ready to do right now. We certainly should not sell weapons that may one day be used against Israel as these statements suggest.

Providing weapons to be delivered a few years cannot help the Saudis in the current crisis. There is no need to rush them through a Congress that, at the end of a session, cannot truly give this sale the close scrutiny it deserves. If you believe, as I do, that many of these weapons will not help them defend themselves in the future without the development of a larger, well-trained Saudi army, I am at a loss to know why they are being provided.

In the administration's zeal to give the Saudis whatever they want, Congress cannot overlook the possibility that arms provided to the Saudis today could fall into the hands of our enemies tomorrow to be used against us, for the death and destruction of the injury of our own troops, or those of our allies. It has happened before in the Middle East and could easily happen again.

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In a region where today's friend is tomorrow's foe, is it really prudent to send billions of dollars' worth of sophisticated hardware to a Saudi monarchy that many experts feel is under strain from within and without? Our experience in Iran should tell us that the answer to a regime's internal problems is not United States arms sales. We need to reflect too on who would control all those weapons should the monarchy fall. How would they be used?

And what about external pressures on the Saudi monarchy? Who knows what impact the rise of Islamic fundamentalism will have on the region? What kind of pressures will the more radical states in the region continue to exert on the Saudis? Will the Saudis have to make pacts with more radical states just to buy some breathing room?

No one has a crystal ball, but these are the questions we must think through before we approve an arms package that could dramatically alter the military balance in the Middle East. It would be a real tragedy if in a rush to respond to the current crisis, we only created a much greater problem for ourselves down the road. Who wants to come to the Senate floor a few years from now, when the Arab map may have changed once again and say, "If we only knew in 1990 what we know now?"

In the coming months, we will have to develop a longer term strategy for meeting the security needs of our friends in the gulf. And it is in that context of an overall strategy that we should address the serious questions of large arms sales to the Middle East.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my concern with the administration's proposed sale of sophisticated weapons systems to Saudi Arabia.

The need to bolster Saudi Arabia's defenses is undatable. Reemphasizing our strong interests there, this body has supported the President's deployment of American forces in the Persian Gulf, particularly in Saudi Arabia. However, we must exercise care. While we plan in the short term to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression, it would be unwise to ignore the long term implications of this sale.

American policy must, over the long term, strive to create stability in the Middle East. The history of American arms sales to the Middle East is not a good one. Our weapons have often fallen into the hand of those who oppose stability in the region, and America's interests around the world. The fall of the Shah of Iran resulted in large numbers of sophisticated American weapons falling into the hands of Islamic radicals and fueled the long and devastating Iran-Iraq war. Ironically, our soldiers in Saudi Arabia are facing American weapons, captured by the Iraqis from the American-supplied Kuwaiti Armed Forces.

The administration has approved this sale in order to enable the Saudis to better defend themselves against Saddam Hussein. This is a reasonable goal. We should use the goal to define the size and scope of arms sales to the Saudis. I question the administration's inclusion of weapon systems which would not become available until long after this crisis is likely to have passed. Some would enhance Saudi Arabia's offensive military capabilities long after Saddam Hussein is no longer a threat.

It is important to remember as we consider this sale, that the alliances in the Middle East can shift as easily as the desert sands. During the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars to support the same Iraqi army which now occupies the Emir's palace and threatens Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with our ally against Iraqi aggression, remains a declared enemy of another important American ally, Israel. The experience of the last 40 years show Israeli concerns about the ultimate use of these weapons to be well founded. This sale would not make it possible for Saudi Arabia to defend itself alone against Iraqi aggression. However, it could allow the Saudis to share sophisticated American weapons with other Arab nations intent on Israel's destruction.

For these reasons, I believe that we must be cautious in considering the administration's request. We must look to the long-term stability of the Middle East, and approve no weapon transfer which does not serve long term American interests in the region. I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY). The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. SYMMS. Might I inquire of the parliamentary situation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California controls the time until 11:10.

Mr. CRANSTON. I yield back all time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Regular order would be to go to the appropriations bill.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might proceed as though in morning business for not to exceed 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMMS. I thank the Chair.

NO NEW TAXES

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I take the floor this morning to reemphasize what I think is becoming very apparent to the American people but somewhat less so to the tax and spenders in both parties in Washington. There still seems to be some sort of mad rush here in Washington to raise taxes so we have more money to spend for all the favored Government programs, and an unwillingness on part of Congress to take it on and attack this budget

with a no new tax start, with no new taxes as the pledge.

Mr. President, when I was elected to the House back in the 1970's and in the Senate at the turn of the 1980's, I was running on a platform of no new taxes.

Let us allow the opportunity to be free and run their own business without excessive Government. What is happening is the Government is taxing. It is getting bigger. But the American people have the message. President. All one has to do is go to Idaho or go to New Hampshire or go to New York City where in New York City the distinguished President Officer just pointed out to me that the liberal Democratic mayor of New York City is cutting city employees because they are short of revenue. I do not see any suggestions of that around here.

One thing I could do here in this Congress—what I offered an amendment earlier this year—is reduce the staff in the legislative appropriations bill to set an example for the rest of the country. Then go about our legislation.

The American people elected George Bush, Mr. President, on a platform of no new taxes. He said, "No new taxes, read my lips."

I personally believe that this President still does not want new taxes. He is a diplomat. He has been able to negotiate with everyone in the world, from the Soviet Union to everybody else in the world. The President has demonstrated his abilities to negotiate. There are only two groups of people he has not been able to negotiate with. One is Saddam Hussein and his henchmen, and the other group is the tax and spenders in the Congress of the United States.

I think it is high time, and it is not too late, for the President to turn this back to him as an American to go back on the warpath and go out on the campaign trail and tell the American people. Let us pass a continuing resolution similar to the one we now have in effect that will get some savings for the Government, a modified savings program, extend it through the first of next year, to the middle of February or some such time, and then tell the American people, send me a Congress. If the issue is do we want new taxes, then I will sign that tax bill. If you elect them to come here and raise your taxes, I will sign the bill next year and you can have more taxes. If you elect them to reduce the spending of the Federal Government, I will work with them to do it and work out a fair budget proposal.

Mr. President, the President of the United States then goes on TV and says to those of us in the Republican Party, "Blame me, blame me. Do not blame them; blame me."

I do not blame the President. I do not blame George Bush for the ma-

1119 6/6

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ישינגטון

1118 - 1/2
סלוק

גרוי - מיירי
אל: מצפ"א
מאת: ק. לקונגדס

ביהנ"ב: האירוע בהר הבית

רצ"ב מכתב ששוגר לנשיא בוש ב- 10/11 בסמיכת 7 קונגרסמנים הקורא לנשיא לא להתעלם מהסיבות המקוריות לאירוע ולהציגן בצורה לא נכונה.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

7
שנת 3/סלוק צה"ל א"ס א"ס א"ס א"ס א"ס
רבית א"ס א"ס א"ס א"ס א"ס א"ס
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א"ס א"ס

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

October 11, 1990

ALL BULGARIA

1118 2/2

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We write to express our hope that any U.S. statements about the tragedy in Jerusalem would acknowledge that the tragedy was set in motion by a potentially deadly assault by Palestinians on Jews whose only offense was to be praying at one of Judaism's holiest sites, the Western (Wailing) Wall. Such an assault on those engaged in religious observance is deeply offensive and obviously highly inflammatory.

To ignore the origin of the tragedy is a serious misrepresentation of what occurred, and we respectfully request that any future U.S. statements reflect the full circumstances of the tragedy.

Sincerely,

Bill Green
Bill Green, M.C.

John Porter
John Porter, M.C.

Norman Lent
Norman Lent, M.C.

Hamilton Fish
Hamilton Fish, M.C.

Royce McCreary
Royce McCreary, M.C.

Lynn Martin
Lynn Martin, M.C.

Vin Weber
Vin Weber, M.C.

SCHUMER100

1116 ²/₃

BLC

101st CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. CON. RES. _____

~~ALL INFORMATION~~

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. SCHUMER (for himself and Mr. [Name of California]) submitted the following concurrent resolution which was referred to the Committee on _____

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the crisis created by Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait must be addressed and resolved on its own terms separately from other conflicts in the region.

1116 $\frac{3}{3}$

Whereas there is no parallel between Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait and Israel's act of self-defense in the war against it by all the surrounding Arab nations in 1967;

Whereas Israel acted in response to an outside invasion to protect its "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats and acts of force" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 242), and Iraq defied all norms of international law and deprived an entire nation of these fundamental rights; and

Whereas the President and the Secretary of State have repeatedly stated that the policy of the United States is to keep the resolution of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis separate from any other conflict in the region; Now therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
2 concurring), that it is the sense of the Congress that--

3 (1) the crisis created by Iraq's invasion and
4 occupation of Kuwait must be addressed and resolved on
5 its own terms separately from other conflicts in the
6 region; and

7 (2) the President should continue to thwart any
8 effort to link the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis with the Arab-
9 Israeli conflict.

ALL CLEAR

20

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D C



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

1117 - אג"ד
215 - ג"מ
1/3
א"ת

גלוי / מייד
אלו מצפ"א
דע: מקשה / משהב"ט
מאח: ק. לקונגרס

עסקת הנשק - פעודיה

כבשחכם רצ"ב מכתב 14 הסנטורים מ-26.9 .
השומת לבכם כי מכתב זה כרוז כנגד העסקה המקורית הגדולה של ה-21
ביליון \$.

ק. לקונגרס

א"ת - אג"ד - א"ת
א"ת - א"ת - א"ת
א"ת - א"ת - א"ת

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

1117
215 $\frac{2}{3}$

September 26, 1990

President George Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We applaud the strong steps you have taken to confront Saddam Hussein's illegal aggression in Kuwait and to assist in the defense of Saudi Arabia, and we welcome your efforts to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council concerning this serious crisis.

We understand that the Administration is considering a massive sale of advanced weaponry and equipment to Saudi Arabia. Because most of the weapons involved would not be in Saudi hands for several years it seems clear that the sale has not too much to do with the current crisis.

We believe that the sale of weapons which would not be delivered in the near future should be postponed until its effects on this unstable region have been thoroughly studied by both the Administration and the Congress. This seems especially important given the fact that so much has changed in the world in recent months. For the first time there may be a realistic possibility of limiting the flow of sophisticated weapons to this region. It may be that regional stability and the security of states in the region would be better secured by a reduction rather than a sharp escalation of the volume and sophistication of weapons in the area. Major arms supplying nations -- the Soviet Union, France and others -- may be willing to exercise restraint and cooperate with the United States in limiting sales to this region in a manner which would have been inconceivable even two months ago. It is only prudent to make every effort to explore this possibility before plunging into another round of massive arms sales.

1115 3/3
211

For decades nations outside of the Middle East have stoked the fires of conflict in the region by selling weapons there with little restraint. The results have been ambiguous at best. Massive weapons sales to the Shah of Iran did not preserve his regime; French troops will soon be within range of weapons France sold to Saddam Hussein; weapons we provided to Kuwait are now in Iraqi hands; Saddam Hussein was able to acquire chemical weapons and missiles. We believe that, in light of this history, careful study and thought should precede a proposal to conclude the largest arms sale in history.

We understand the desire to improve Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities in the context of the current crisis and would be willing to consider now the sale of those arms that are both available for delivery in the near future and needed on an urgent basis, as well as items of purely defensive equipment such as systems to deal with the current and future threat of tactical missiles in the region. However, we urge you to refrain from making any proposal including large amounts of offensive weapons which will not be delivered in the near future for at least six months to allow adequate time for both the Administration and the Congress to weigh its potential consequences.

Sincerely,

D. Moynihan
Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Charlton
Charlton Bell

Terry Sanford
Terry Sanford

Paul Simon
Paul Simon

Bob Packwood
Bob Packwood

Paul Sarbanes
Paul S. Sarbanes

Larry Pressler
Larry Pressler

John E. Kerry
John E. Kerry

Daniel K. Akaka
Daniel K. Akaka

Brock Adams
Brock Adams

Frank R. Lautenberg
Frank R. Lautenberg

Timothy E. Wirth
Timothy E. Wirth

Arlen Specter
Arlen Specter

Edward M. Kennedy
Edward M. Kennedy

א/כ/כ/כ/כ

אאא, חוזם: 8312
אל: רהמש/648
מ-: המשרד, תא: 141090, זח: 1518, דח: מ, סג: סב,
בבב
86292
סודי ביותר / מידי

אל: וושינגטון
מ.שילה, שטיין

בפגישת שה'ח - השגריר בראון הבוקר על החלטת מועבי'ט (דיווח בנפרד) אמור
היה בראון לקרוא מה-T.P המועבר בזה. מפאת קוצר הזמן הדבר לא עלה בידו.

I LOOK FORWARD TO TALKING TO YOU SOON.

I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING SOME OF YOUR CREATIVE
IDEAS ON THE PEACE PROCESS.

DENNIS HAS TOLD ME OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH EITAN BENTSUR,
AND I WAS ENCOURAGED BY WHAT I HEARD.

LET'S TRY TO FOLLOW UP SOON.

אמרתי לבראון שכפי שהבהרתי לדניס רוס בניו-יורק שה'ח דבק ביוזמתה
המדינית של ממשלת ישראל והוא נותן דעתו ללא לאות לגיבוש רעיונות לקידום
התהליך המדיני לכשיווצרו התנאים לכך.

בנצור

פוצה: שהח, סשה, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

סודי

8304:חוזם,אאא
אל:רהמש/647
מ:-המשרד,תא:141090,זח:1514,דח:ב,סג:סב,
בבב
86284

ח.ר.ב
סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר
103.05

אל: וושינגטון - הממונה

הנדון: החלטת מועב'ט
למברק ערן נר 2109 מה-13.10

1. להלן המסר מאת בייקר, שנראון מסר לידי השר הבוקר עוד לפני ישיבת הממשלה.

DAVID,

I HAVE ASKED BILL BROWN TO SEE YOU ON MY BEHALF. I FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, TO CONVEY TO YOU SOME OF MY PERSONAL THOUGHTS.

WHILE I'M SURE YOU WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WE HELD THE LINE, INCLUDING THREATENING VETOS, AGAINST A MUCH TOUGHER ONE. WE SUPPORTED THIS RESOLUTION BECAUSE, FRANKLY, WE FELT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND ABLE TO HANDLE VIOLENCE BY AND THE RIOT WITHOUT KILLING TWENTY PEOPLE AND WOUNDING 150. NOT BEING PREPARED, ISRAEL PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF SADDAM HUSSAYN.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH UNSC ACTION THAT WOULD HAVE, OR COULD HAVE HAD THAT VERY SAME EFFECT. SADDAM HUSSAYN'S AGGRESSION IS THE ESSENTIAL ISSUE THAT MUST CONCERN THE WORLD. WE WANT TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON THAT AND SO SHOULD YOU. IF YOU ACCEPT THE MISSION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE, I BELIEVE WE CAN GET THE FOCUS BACK WHERE IT BELONGS: ON SADDAM'S AGGRESSION. YOU RECEIVED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE BEFORE, AND THUS THIS MISSION WOULD NOT BE PRECEDENTAL.

I'M CONCERNED THAT IF YOUR REJECT SUCH A MISSION NOW YOU WILL KEEP ISRAEL, NOT IRAQ, IN THE FOREFRONT OF WORLD ATTENTION. IF YOU REJECT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, SOME WILL UNFAIRLY COMPARE YOU TO SADDAM AND HIS REJECTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. YOU DON'T NEED THAT AND WE DON'T EITHER. LET'S GET THIS ISSUE BEHIND US. WE WANT TO GO BACK THIS WEEK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH A NEW RESOLUTION ON IRAQI AGGRESSION. LET'S NOT LET SADDAM OFF THE HOOK.

JIM BAKER

2. מבלי להתייחס לעצם הבקשה שבמסר זה העיר השר שהחלטת מועב'ט, שבגיבושה הובילה ארה"ב והכוללת מרכיבים חמורים מבחינתנו (הגינוי החד-צדדי, אי-איזכור ההתקפה על המתפללים היהודים, ציון הר הבית בשמו הערבי ואלמנטים נוספים שיש בהם משום תקדים) גרמה לזעזוע ומורת רוח בישראל בכלל ובמשלה בפרט.

3. השר הוסיף כי נכון שצריכים להחזיר את צאדאם ל'שולחן הניתוחים' אך לצערנו הניתוח שבוצע בשבוע שעבר במועב'ט נערך על ישראל ואנו שלמנו המחיר. עוד אמר שיבדוק את הנושא (בקשת בייקר) עם עמיתו בממשלה והציע שיפגש עוד היום (בשנית) עם בראון.

4. בראון מסר שיש לו מספר נקודות להעביר בע'פ אך בשל קוצר הזמן (לפני ישיבת הממשלה) סוכם שיעבירן לסמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן (דיווח בנפרד).

5. ציין גם שהוא ער לתגובת ישראל להחלטת מועב'ט מהתקשורת. כמו כן שמע מהתקשורת שועדת החקירה שלנו תתחיל את עבודתה היום, ובאופן אישי הביע תקווה שתסיים את עבודתה 'בקרוב'. (בצאתנו מהפגישה, נתקלנו במר חיים קוברסקי ובראון חזר על תקותו האישית הנ"ל. כששאל קוברסקי לפרש המילה 'קרוב', חייך בראון ולא פרט).

6. גם במעמד זה חזר בראון לנושא החלטת מועב'ט, והביע תקווה שרשמנו לפנינו את דברי ההסבר של פיקרינג אחרי ההצבעה, שלדעתו מהווים מעין מקשה אחת יחד עם לשון ההחלטה. שם נאמר כי ארה"ב מגנה מעשי אלימות 'פרובוקטיביים ורה-אקטיביים' כאחת, ושארה"ב מצפה שהמשלחת מטעם המזכ"ל תבדוק נסיבות האירועים ב-8.10 ותו לא.

מנהל מצפ"א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

6. שמיטת החובות למצרים לא אושרה בועדת המשנה ידון כנראה במליאה.

7. חוק תקציב הפנטגון - הקצבות (Defense Appropriations)

להלן פרוט נושאים שנדונו בועדת המשנה לתקציב הפנטגון (Defense Appropriations) של סנטור אינווה:

א. עבודות באירופה: זכות לתעשיות ישראליות להתמודד. ישראל מוגדרת כחלק הישראלי מה- European Theater ומשוכרת מכל הגבלות בהתחרות. על מזכיר ההגנה לדווח על היקף הפוטנציאל.

ב. תיקון שניידר: יגביל סמכויות קציני הרכשה להטיל הגבלות על השתתפות חברות זרות במכרזים. יחייב שיקול דעת בכיר בטרם הטלת הגבלה.

ג. הגדלת שיתוף הפעולה בנושאי טכנולוגיה: מחייב את הפנטגון לבצע Studies ולדווח אפשרויות להגביר שת"פ עם ישראל בנושאי טכנולוגיה אוירונאוטית כגון (LH, ATF), התאמת HAVE NAP ל B1/B2, טכנולוגיות חלל, טכנולוגיות ומו"פ לוחמה בטרור ולוחמה בסמים).

ד. הצבה מראש של שימוש משותף דלק ותזקימים בישראל, בהיקף של 4.5 מיליון חביות.

ה. פיתוח נמל חיפה עבור הצי ה 6 לא פחות מ 15 מיליון דולר.

ו. "חץ" ב" הקצבת 42 מיליון דולר לשת"א 91 אין כנראה פרוט החלוקה.

ז. בנוסף אושרו בעבר סעיפים לתקציב שמשונים (TALD) של חע"ש עבור צי, CLNAS.

8. בנוסף על כן החליט הסנטור אינווה להעלות למליאת הסנט את נושא אספקה של צינור ממלאים הימים (Draw Down) בערך של \$700M הדיון במליאה עלול להציר בעיות עקרוניות של סיוע לישראל. לדיון פימבי.

9. תשומת לבכם כי חרב הקיצוצים עדיין מרחפת, לרבות על תקציב סיוע החוץ, תאריך היעד להגעה לסיכומים בין הגבעה לממשל הוא 20 אוקטובר. אין לכו בטחון עדיין שכל הנושאים הללו יאושרו. להערכת השגרירות בושינגטון הסיכויים גבוהים.

10. עד כאן.

ב ב ר כ ה,

ד"ר חנו אלון
הממונה על השרי החוץ

תפוצה

הרמש"נ
נטעו צה"ל וושינגטון
קישור לקונגרס וושינגטון

הרמטכ"ל
סגור הרמטכ"ל
ראש אג"ת

המנכ"ל
המשנה למנכ"ל
סמנכ"ל למקס"מ
ראש מנה"ר
ראש אח"ק
ראש אכ"ס
היוע"כ"ל
מזכ"ר צבאי לשהב"ט
יועץ לשהב"ט
(01)

אאא, חוזם: 8658

אל: רהמש/676

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 179, תא: 141090, ח: 1522, ח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מקש"ח / משהב"ט

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

פגישה עם הקונגרסמן אובי

1. ביום ו' ה- 12/10 נפגשנו הציר והח"מ, לבקשתנו, עם הקונגרסמן אובי לקראת הקונפרנס, הצפוי בשבוע הבא, על חוק סיוע החוץ.

2. בפתח דבריו, אמר אובי כי בכוונתו לשגר ביום ב' (15/10) מכתב ליו"ר ועדת החוץ, פאסל, המביע התנגדותו לעסקת הנשק עם סעודיה ולהשיג חתימות עמיתיו על המכתב. (מניחים שמדובר ב- RES. OF DISAPPROVAL).

3. ערן העלה הנושאים החדשים בחוק סיוע חוץ שאושרו בסנאט וביקש תמיכתו של אובי.

הנושאים שצויינו: - חלוקה מוקדמת של FMS, הגדלת PRE-PO ב- 200 מ' דולר, אפשרות שמוש ב- 200 מ' דולר מכספי ESF לרכישת ציוד בטחוני ומשיכת ציוד ממלאים בסך 700 מ' דולר (DRAWDOWN FROM STOCKS).

4. תגובת אובי היתה כי לא היה לו מספיק זמן להתעניין בהצעת החוק ובנושאים החדשים בהיותו עסוק בענייני התקציב. יבדוק הנושאים שהעלינו עמו. עדיין לא בדק מהן ההשלכות התקציביות של נושאים אלה.

לגבי החלוקה המוקדמת - יש לכך השלכות תקציביות. להערת ערן כי ההשלכות לא תשפיענה על פונקציה 150 השיב אובי
BUT IT IS SCORED AGAINST THE BUDGET

לגבי ה- DRAWDOWN FROM STOCKS - מוסדית תמיד התנגד לחקיקות DRAWDOWN שכן זה מקנה לממשל סמכות יתר לספק סיוע בטחוני ללא מעורבות קונגרסיונלית. "זוהי פעולה קלה. אינה עולה לממשל כסף ואיננה מצריכה ומשאירה הקונגרס מחוץ לתמונה". אינו אוהב הסמכות הרחבה הניתנת לממשל.

למרות האמור לעיל הבטיח אובי (אשר לא התנגד בהקשר הישראלי), לבדוק הנושא.

ערן הסביר כי זהו המקור היחיד שנותר לישראל לשמור על רמתו האמיתית של ה-FMS בגובה 1.8 ב' שנשחק ב- 5 שנים האחרונות, ולאפשר לה להתמודד עם מירוף החימוש. זאת על רקע מודעותנו להעדר האפשרות של הגדלת ה-FMS.

5. התרשמותנו היא כי אובי היה פתוח לנושאינו, לא התנגד בשלב זה לאף אחד מהם (שלא כדרכו) והבטיח לבדוק אחד לאחד.

6. הקונפרנס צפוי בשבוע הבא מייד לאחר העברת חוק סיוע החוץ במליאת הסנאט.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

ארה"ב

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל,
@ (מקשח/משהבט), ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רס), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 7938

אל: רהמש/640

מ-: יוש, נר: 2109, תא: 131090, זח: 1600, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/בהול להזעיק חרב חרב חרב

אל : מנהל מצפא - לעיניו בלבד

מאת: ערן, וושינגטון

מועביט.

ארכיון

רוס מסר לי (1515) שהמזכיר החליט לא להתקשר טלפונית אלא להעביר מסר דרך בראון. במסר כותב בייקר כי מצא לנכון לפנות אל שהח בעקבות החלטת מועביט שכן הוא מניח שישראל היתה מעדיפה שלא תהיה החלטה כזו.

● דהב תמכה בהחלטה שכן לדעתה על ישראל היה להיות מוכנה לאירוע מסוג זה ולא להיות במצב שבו נאלצה להרג 19 פלשתינאים. מאידך מוסיף המזכיר, לא תהיה ארהב מוכנה לתת ידה לפעילות של מועביט שתשחק לידי צדאם חוסיין. הוא חייב להיות מוקד הפעילות והדבר נכון הן מנקודת ראותה של ארהב והן מבחינתה של ישראל. אם תקבל ישראל את המשלחת יעזור הדבר להחזיר את הפוקוס אל עבר צדאם חוסיין. ישראל קיבלה משלחת דומה בעבר ומבחינה זו הדבר לא יהווה תקדים. אחרת, מציין המזכיר, ישראל תשאר במוקד ההתעניינות והיא תושווה לצדאם חוסיין וכמובן שזה לא נחוץ לא לארהב ולא לישראל.

|| ארה'ב רוצה לחזור למועביט עוד השבוע ולקבל החלטה נוספת כנגד עיראק והוא מקווה שהדבר יתאפשר.

|| המזכיר מוסיף כי הוא מקווה לשמוע משהח בנושא תהליך השלום בעקבות הרעיונות המעודדים שהעביר בנצור.

אנא העבר לגורמים הנוגעים לדבר.

ערן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, e(רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

ר
א/רהק

אאא, חוזם: 7926

אל: רהמש/635

מ-: ווש, נר: 2108, תא: 131090, זח: 1400, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/בהול חרב חרב

אל : מנהל מצפא

מאת: ערן, וושינגטון

(א) החלטת מועביט.

קראתי בפני רוס (1330) את הודעת דובר משהח. הוספתי שאיני יודע איך ננהג כלפי המשלחת אך שאנו רואים בחומרה שרובם של כמה עקרונות בפעם הראשונה לתוך החלטות מועביט ואת התקדים המסוכן שנוצר על ידי כך. רוס אמר שיתכן ניציע לבייקר להתקשר לשהח על מנת לנסות ולשכנעו לנקוט במתינות מתוך מגמה זיים פרשה זו במהירות ולמנוע אזכורה של ישראל בנשימה אחת עם עיראק כמסרבות לבצע החלטות מועביט. רוס אמר שיודיעני תוך השעות הקרובות על החלטת המזכיר.

(ב) לבנון.

קראתי בפני רוס ובנפרד סגנו ביל ברנס את הודעת לוברני. רוס וברנס אמרו כי ההודעה טובה וברוח זו יתבטאו גם הם. עון נמצא למיטב ידיעתם בשגרירות הצרפתית ויתכן שיבקש מקלט פוליטי בצרפת. בשעה זו נמשך הירי בין תומכי עון והכוחות שנכנסו למובלעת. לשאלתי אמר רוס כי עוד לפני חדש קיבלו איתות מהסורים שזה מה שיקרה. אמרו לסורים כי אין זה מענינה של ארהב לתת אור ירוק וכי הסכנה שתשומת הלב תופנה מהמשבר העקרי. (הערה: מטון דברי רוס ניתן היה להבין שהסורים לא קיבלו מסר חד-משמעי בדבר התנגדות ארהב ע.ע.).

ערן

נפוצה: שהח, ששהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן,
ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן

סססס

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אוריאל
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אל: המשרד,
מ: רוש, נר: 1111, דח: מ, תא: 121090, חז: 1800, סג: שמ,
בובב

שמור/מידי

אל: מנחל מצפייא

מקשייח משהבייט

מכירות נשק

א. ערב הסעודית.
בןגרט מתגברת הפעילות כנגד עסקת הנשק גם בהיקפה המצומצם. בשלב זה ידוע שקרנסטון הגיש הצעה לאי-אישור (ואליו הצטרפו ספקטר, סימון פקורד) ההצעה מתיחסת לטיילי ה- TOYX למסוקי האפאציי, MLRS ווטנקים. בשיחה נפרדת אחייצ היום אמר לנו אובי (ראה מברק דנגר בנפרד) כי הוא עומד להגיש ביום שני הקרוב הצעה דומה בבית הנבחרים. היוזמות האלו ננקטו בלא שיידידי ישראל יי עמדו מאחוריהן. למעשה החליטו אלו לנהל את המערכה כנגד החלק השני של העסקה הסעודית היינו המטוסים והטנקים מסוג M-1. להערכתי הסיכוי להכשלת מרכיבים מרכזית רעסקה הוא שקול. ספק אם יש רב חוסם לווטו.

ב. בודינ ומעאיים
בנוסף לטנקים שעליהם הודיע הממשל (ראה בנפרד) החל הממשל בתהליך ההזיעצויות בקונגרס לגבי מכירות 20 מסוקי אפאציי למעאיים ו-8 לבחריינ. תגובות המחוקקים היתה נזעמת והמתדכים מטעם הממשל אמרו שיקצו בכמויות או יבטלו את המכירה לחלוטינ.

שני
שנהו סטרהו רהאו, סההו, מנהלו מנהלו, ראוככו, רהו, אמן
מנה, בלניה מצפאויסחין
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

September 27, 1990

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MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FROM: John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Notification Pursuant to Section 36(b) of Arms Export Control Act

Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, the Committee on Foreign Affairs has received notification that the United States proposes to sell defense articles to BAHRAIN.

Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the President to notify the Congress that he intends to issue a letter of offer to sell to a foreign country or international organization defense articles or services valued at \$50 million or more, or any major defense equipment for \$14 million or more, 30 calendar days before the letter of offer can be issued, and 15 calendar days in the case of letters of offer to Australia, New Zealand, Japan and NATO countries. The notifications are now accompanied by policy justifications, which are available for your review in the Full Committee office, Room 2170 Rayburn.

The text of the transmittal follows:

Transmittal No. 90-72
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act

(i)	Prospective Purchaser: Bahrain
(ii)	Total Estimated Value: Major Defense Equipment* \$27 million
	Other \$10 million
(iii)	TOTAL \$37 million

Description of Articles or Services Offered:
Twenty-seven M160A3 tanks with Tank Thermal Sights (TTS), machine guns, and repair parts, tools, test sets, publications, support and calibration equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.
Military Department: Army (UEN)
Sales Commission, Fee, etc. paid, offered or agreed to be Paid: None

(iv) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex in Room 2170RHOB.
(v) Section 28 report: Case not included in Section 28 report.
(vi) As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7742

תאריך : 13.10.90

נכנס

בלמס

חוזם: 10,7742

אל: המשרד

יעדים: רהמש/608, מצב/649, בטחון/941

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 176, תא: 121090, זח: 1054, דח: ב, סג: בל

חח: @ גס: צפא

@: נד

א/נהג

בלמס/בהול להזעיק

אל: מנהל מצפ"א (בהול להזעיק)

דע: מקש"ח - משהב"ט / מייד

מאת: ק. קונגרס

חקיקה : סיכום הנושאים הנוגעים למערכת הבטחון

א. נושאים חדשים .

1. בחוק סיוע חוצ/ הקצבות.

-חלוקה מוקדמת (מופיע בנוסח הסנאט. יידון בקונפרנס)

-הגדלת PRE-PO ב-100 מליון דולר (מופיע בנוסח הסנאט. יידון בקונפרנס)

-OSP בגובה של 475 מליון דולר (מופיע בשני הבתים)

-אפשרות שימוש ב-200 מליון דולר מכספי ESF לרכישת ציוד בטחוני (מופיע בנוסח הסנאט. יידון בקונפרנס)

-שחרור מהיר של ציוד צבאי עבור ישראל ותורכיה (מופיע בנוסח הסנאט. יידון בקונפרנס)

-משיכת ציוד ממלאים בסכ 700 מליון דולר (בכוונת הסנטור אינווייה להגיש התיקון במליאת הסנאט בעת הדיון ואישור חוק סיוע חוצ/הקצבות).

2. בחוק תקציב הפנטגון

א. הרשאות

-עבודה באירופה - תע"א - (מופיע בנוסח ביהנ"ב. מצוי עתה בקונפרנס בין

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שני הבתי (.

-תיקון ביל שניידר אומבודסמן - (מופיע בדו"ח ביהנ"ב כמלווה את החוק-
מצוי עתה בקונפרנס בין שני הבתי)

ב. הקצבות

-עבודה באירופה- תע"א- (מופיע ככל הנראה בנוסח הסנאט. יידון בקונפרנס)

- אינו בידנו עדיין נוסח הצעת החוק של חוק תקציב הפנטגון/הקצבות (הסנטור
אינוייה) לפיכך איננו יודעים אלו נושאים נוספים הוכללו בחוק.

ב. נושאים ' ישנים ' המופיעים בחוקי תקציב הפנטגון/הרשאות והקצבות.

' חצ '

' פופי '

TALD

C-L-NAS

FWE

מו"פ משותף לנאטו

הערה: את המספרים הסופיים נעביר רק לאחר העברה סופית של החוקים .

ג. לו"ז

א. חוק כספי הפנטגון/הרשאות- מצוי זה השבוע השני בקונפרנס בין שני הבתי

ב. חוק תקציב הפנטגון/הקצבות-

ביהנ"ב- החוק יובא לדיון במליאת ביהנ"ב ככל הנראה היום יום ו' (12.10)

סנאט- אתמול (11.10) נדון החוק במליאת וועדת ההקצבות.

ד. כל האמור לעיל במברקנו זה הוא בנוסף לחקיקות הנוספות בחוק סיוע חוצ
שכבר הוברקו אליכם.

יהודית וורנאי דרנגר

דא

רש

10-10-1954

Dear Mr. [Name] - I am writing to you regarding the [Topic] which you mentioned in your letter of [Date].

I am sorry that

we cannot do more for you at this time, but we will be glad to consider your request in the future.

Very truly yours,
[Name]

[Address]

cc - [Name]

[Name]

10-10-54

10-10-54

10-10-54

Very truly yours,

[Name]

[Name]

[Address]

[Name]

[Name]

[Name]

[Name]

[Name]

[Name]

[Name]

מ כ ר ק י ו צ א מ ס ר ו ג

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אאאא

אל:המשרד,

מ-:וושנינגטון, נר-:111090, תא:1711, דח:מ, סג:בל,

בבבב

1/1
2/2

בלמס/מידי

אל : מצמא

מקשה (ימ העבירוונא לבטחון)

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

חוק סיוע חוץ/חקצבות

1. אחמול (11/10) קיימה מליאת ועדת החקצבות בסיוט mark up יור הועדה, הסנטור בירד הודיע על ה- 302 של פונקציה 150 כדלקמן: 20.1 ביליון ב-BA ו-18.6 OUTLAYS (יש לזכור שנתונים אלה כוללים בתוכם גם את מימון מחמד וגם את PL-480, מכל מקום נתוני הסנאט טובים בהרבה לאחר המסגה החקציבית) בהצבעה שהתקיימה לאישור ה- 302 B הצביעו נגד הסנטורים הולינגס, סטר, גארן, קוקרן וברדיק.

2. הוגשו שני תיקונים: האחד הנוגע ישירות לישראל והשני שהוא מענייננו:

א. קסטן - אינווייה - 'זירוז שחרור ציוד צבאי עבור ישראל וחורכיה' (נוסח התיקון הועבר אליכם כבר לאחר ה-MARK-UP של ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות אולם לא הוגש באותה עת).
כאשר הציג קסטן את התיקון הוסיף גם את שמו של הסנטור בירד כמגיש התיקון. בירד התערב ואמר כי אמנם ראה התיקון ווסכים לו, אולם לא ביקש להיות שושבין לתיקון. לפיכך חוטר שמו. התיקון התקבל.

ב. הקונסיני - 'ביטול איסור מכירת או העברת ציוד צבאי לקטאר'.
זאת בעקבות שתתם של קטאר עם ארצות כנגד עיראק. (רצ'ב נוסח החוק ורוח החסבר).

3. הסנטור אינווייה לא הגיש התיקון בדבר משיבת ציוד ממלאים כגובה של 700 מיליון דולר והחליט להגישו במליאת הסנאט בעת הדיון וההצבעה על החוק.

4. התקיים דיון בנושא שמיטת החובות של מצרים:

הנושא הועלה על הסנטור ריד. לדבריו הוא חש בכבוד רב כלפי מצרים ומנהיגיה אולם נשאלת השאלה האם אין דרכים או אופציות אחרות לסייע למצרים אולי למשל על ידי פריסת חובות על פני מספר רב של שנים.
הסנטור ליהוי השיבו כי הנושא שנוי במחלוקת ושוחח על כך עם הנשיא בוש והמזכיר בייקר. מודע לעובדה שלסנטורים רבים יש בעיה עם

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הנושא. אולם כולם הסכימו לא להגיש תיקונים בשלב הועדה ולדחותם למליאה שם לדבריו יתקיים דיון בנושא.
הסנטור ריד השיב כי אין בכוונתו להגיש תיקון אלא להציע לחשוב על דרכים אחרות או שינוי במיכניזם מאשר מחיקת החוב.
קסטן התערב ואמר כי איש אינו מוסל הצורך בסיוע למוברק והשאלה מתמקדת במיכניזם עליו עובדים עדיין. חשוב לדעתו למחוק החוק ואכן השאלה היא כיצד לעשות זאת. הסנטור הארקין התייחס באדיבות וכביקורתיות לנושא.
לדבריו, במקום מחיקת חובות חד צדדית יש צורך במחיקה מולטיילטרלית שתכלול גם את גרמניה יפאן ובנות ברית אחרות.

1. מחיקת 6.7 בליון דולר של חוב לארחב היא רק חלק קטן מסך החוב המצרי בן 50 ביליון דולר. ולא תפתור את בעיית מצרים. יתרה מזו החוב הצבאי המצרי לצרפת הוא 3 ביליון דולר, ליפאן 2,5 ביליון דולר ולגרמניה 2,5 ביליון דולר.

2. ארחב איננה יכולה להרשות לעצמה למחוק חובות ובכך להפסיד הכנסות מתשלום חובות (במיוחד אם תהיינה מדינות נוספות להן ימחק החוב).

3. מדוע על משלם המיסים האמריקני לספוג אבדן ההכנסות. הסעודים יכולים לשלם. הם מרוויחים 50 ביליון דולר בעקבות עליית מחירי חנפט.

למוברק מגיעות ברכות והערכה רבה.

כסום הדיון הוצבעה הצעת החוק ללא התנגדות.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

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AMENDMENT

REPEAL OF BAN ON SALE OF
U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO QATAR

Section 568 of the Committee Print (beginning on page 137, line 20) is amended by --

(1) inserting "(a)" after the section number, and

(2) adding the following new subsection:

"(b) Section 566(d) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1989, is hereby repealed."

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REPORT LANGUAGE

REPEAL OF BAN ON SALE OR TRANSFER OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO QATAR

The Committee recognizes that the Government of Qatar has been very cooperative with international and United States defense efforts opposing Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. It has opened its airfields to US transport planes and personnel under Operation Desert Shield and has strongly supported the economic embargo against Iraq. It has also joined with a majority of its fellow Arab League members in condemning Iraq's actions. These are positive developments and ones which the Committee supports and encourages. Therefore, the Committee suggests that Qatar should be brought into a closer relationship with the United States and our allies. For this reason, the Committee has included bill language repealing Section 566(d) of the fiscal year 1989 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill.

The Committee remains very concerned, however, about the Stinger missiles which were illegally obtained by Qatar. The Committee expects these Stingers to be returned to the United States and expects the State and Defense Departments to continue their discussions with the Government of Qatar about the return of these Stingers, and report to the Committee on progress in those discussions no later than April 1, 1991.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the word 'אשר' (asher) and other illegible characters.

יורדי

נכנס **

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אורה

חוזם: 10,7841

אל: המשרד

יעדים: וווש/2121, רהמש/622, מצב/667

מ-ני: נר: 2234, תא: 121090, זח: 2000, דח: ב, סג: 10

תח: גס: מצפא

נד: @

סודי/בהול

אל: ממנכל, סמנכל צפא, מנהל מצפא, יועץ תפוצות

דע: לישכת שהח, לשכת ס.שהח, הממונה-פלג זושנינגטון, יוחנן ביין (כאנ)

מאת: אורי סביר - קונכל ניו יורק

הנדון: ארועי הר הבית - תגובות הארגונים היהודים

ממשיכים לתדרך הארגונים השונים. מתנהלת מערכה אגרסיבית אם כי לא קולנית בלשב זה של הארגונים ובראשם ועידת הנשיאים כנגד העמדה האמריקאית במועביט. ארגונים שונים מפרסמים הודעות (בנפרד), מופיעים בתקשורת, מנהלים מגעים בקונגרס ובממשל. הארגונים מייחסת למערכה זו חשיבות מעל ומעבר למה שמתרחש עתה באוס.

סימור רייך שוחח היום עם האס, רוס ובונטון, מהם שמע ביקורת על ניהולה של ישראל את הר הבית (בדומה לדברי בייקר) ויחד עם זאת נחישות לדחות הניסוחים הערביים.

אחד מבני שיחו ציין כי ארהב בעצם כבר הבהירה את עמדתה הן כלפי ישראל והן כלפי הקואליציה הערבית וההמשך במועביט פחות חשוב לה.

יחד עם זאת עושה ארהב מאמצים בניצוחו של המזכיר להגיע לפשרה שכללו שיחה קשה בין המזכיר לשגריר צרפת, מאמץ לנתק האפריקאיות מיתר הבלמזיות והפעלת לחץ כבד על תימן.

בהתאם להפתחויות עשויה המערכה היהודית לגבור תאוצה בתחילת השבוע הבא (אחרי החגים) כאשר בבסיסה החשש שישאל משלמת המחיר עבור קיום קואליציה ערבית וזהו רק תחילתו של תהליך מסוכן.

תשמעו על כך בהרחבה מרייך והונליין המגיעים ביום א'.

אורי סביר

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אוריאל

מאת: חמשד,
מ-: רוש, נר: 1113, דח: ר, תא: 121090, זח: 2000, סג: שמ,
בכב

שמור/מידע

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אל: מצפייא

דע: רמשיין מקשייח

מאת: קונגרס

הנדון: זק תקציב הפנטגון (הקצבות) סנאט - נושאים ישראלים.

1. מצייל הקטעים הרלבנטיים (מעיון חטופ ראשוני) מה- BILL ומנ
ה- REPORT LANGUAGE

2. חחוק יגיע למליאת הסנאט הערב או מחר. אינ צופים יימארבימיי, אמ כי
קשה לחיות החלטי בנושא.

3. הקטעים המצייל (לפי סדר העמודים):

א. לא פחות מ-16 מליון דולר להרחבת שרותי נמל חיפה (למעשה מדובר
בהשקעה המהווה מכפלה של הכנסות) .

ב. 42 מליון דולר להמשכ כפתוח הייחציי.

ג. Allied Cooperation Enhancement Studies המוטלים על הפנטגון כדי לדווח
על האפשרויות להגברת חשתיים בנושאי טכנולוגיה אוירונאטית (ATF ,
CAS , NATF , LH) , מוייפ בטחונ י בתחומים שונים, כולל התאמת
ה- HAVE NAP ל-1 ו-2-B , טכנולוגיות החלל (משגרים וכוי) ,
טכנולוגיות ומוייפ לוחמה בטרור, לוחמה בסמיים. לסעיפ זה פוטנציאל רב
אשר אפשר יחיה להעריכו בעקבות הגשת הדוחויית לוועדות עיי הפנטגון לא
יאורד מ-9.91.

סיה, ססיה, רהוי, מנכיו, מנכיו, מנכיו, מנכיו, מנכיו
8 1 2 1 1 1 2

ד. OVERSEAS WORKLOAD PROGRAM: הגדרת ישראל כחלק מן ה-EUROPEAN THEATER, ומשוחררת מכל הגבלות בתחרות על חוז'ים. על מזכיר ההגנה לדווח לתת-הוועדה על היקף הפוטנציאל הישראלי.

ה. EXCESS EQUIPMENT: ישראל נכללת בקבוצה המועדפת (תורכיה וישראל). קריאה לממשל לזרז אסקפת הציוד למדינות הנייל.

ו. ENERGY ALLIANCE FUEL RESERVE: מאגרי נפט מזוקק לטובת ארה"ב וישראל יוקמו בישראל ותחולתם 4.5 מליון חביות.

שבת שלום
יורם

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1 vessels and aircraft, funds shall be available to acquire the
2 alteration, overhaul and repair by competition between public
3 and private shipyards, Naval Aviation Depots and private
4 companies. The Navy shall certify that successful bids in-
5 clude comparable estimates of all direct and indirect costs for
6 both public and private shipyards, Naval Aviation Depots,
7 and private companies. Competitions shall not be subject to
8 section 2461 or 2464 of title 10, United States Code, or to
9 Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. Naval
10 Aviation Depots may perform manufacturing in order to com-
11 pete for production contracts: *Provided further*, That the
12 Navy may provide notice in this fiscal year to exercise op-
13 tions under the LEASAT program for the next fiscal year, in
14 accordance with the terms of the Aide Memoire, dated Janu-
15 ary 5, 1981, as amended by the Aide Memoire dated April
16 30, 1986, and as implemented in the LEASAT contract:
17 *Provided further*, That not less than \$15,000,000 shall be
18 made available only for the upgrade of port facilities in Israel
19 in support of United States Navy operation and maintenance
20 activities.

21 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS

22 For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for
23 the operation and maintenance of the Marine Corps, as au-
24 thorized by law; \$1,880,100,000.

requested an increase of services. These services are provided by the Defense Logistics Agency [DCA] for fiscal year 1991 DCA user sensitive, intending services. The Committee will report the fiscal year 1990 level on the fact reduce costs as in-

For 1991, costs for initial transfer to the first destination appropriations. Previous appropriations and maintenance" maintenance budget, however, action costs in the fiscal year 1991. The Committee recommends transportation to reflect the change from the revised

continues to support the hunters in Astoria, OR. That the Navy has not yet for these vessels. The Navy and governments to resolve so that the site will be cleanup is required. The Comvelop South Tongue Point in conjunction with the Navy. Consider working with the facilities at South Tongue Point. The Navy to provide a report to the Navy no later than Janu-

Navy currently has several Puget Sound, WA, from been removed. The Navy's (May 1984) indicated that disposal by the year 2000. major powers would be retired from active service at nuclear submarine tenders

industrial capacity to disassemble hulls, and can arrange for the technical support to full advantage of all potential directed to develop a joint plan to prepare a detailed plan and disposal of the submarine and reactor compartments redistribution of material, salt, and any hazardous waste. The schedule should include the committee to assess the Navy's

progress in meeting reasonable hull disposal numbers annually. This study should be completed and provided to the Committee no later than May 1991.

UNC naval products.—For 30 years, UNC Naval Products Division in Uncasville, CT, has been a manufacturer of high-quality defense components for the Department of Energy. Specifically, this facility has produced approximately 160 propulsion units exclusively for the U.S. Government. In light of the recent procurement projections for the *Seawolf* class submarines, UNC's provision of propulsion components is being phased out.

While the decision to rely on a sole source strategy for naval nuclear components may have been the correct one under the circumstances, the wasting of the unique resources and industrial base offered by UNC is a question that demands consideration beyond the merits of the sole source decision.

The investment in UNC's physical infrastructure and human capital resources can and should be put to other uses in assisting the Nation in meeting both military and civilian project objectives. UNC has 1,000 highly trained, DOE cleared employees; it is a DOE/DOD secure facility with a NRC license. UNC's 500,000-square-foot facility can provide state-of-the-art engineering, manufacturing, and inspection facilities in full compliance with DOE, DOT, NRC, and EPA applicable requirements.

UNC has a rare capability to assist DOE in the management of the military nuclear programs and complexes as well as to assist in the provision of design and manufacturing services in controlled environments.

The Committee is concerned about the retaining of an adequate naval nuclear industrial base. Therefore, it urges DOE to evaluate additional work which can be placed with UNC naval products to maintain that facility, its NRC license and DOE cleared personnel within the Nation's nuclear industrial base.

Environmental remedial investigation at Adak Naval Air Station.—The Committee understands that the Navy has identified seven sites at the Adak Naval Air Station that pose a potential hazard to human health and the environment. The first step to restore these sites will be the completion of a remediation plan, approved by the Navy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the State of Alaska.

The Committee understands that \$3,900,000 has been requested for the completion of the remedial investigation of these seven sites at the Adak Naval Air Station. The Navy should expedite completion of these investigations. The Secretary of the Navy shall report the findings of these remedial investigations and the proposed restoration plan, not later than August 1, 1991.

Navy facilities upgrade.—The Committee recommends bill language to provide not less than \$15,000,000 out of funds provided under this act for "Operation and maintenance, Navy", to support the upgrade of port facilities in Israel for United States Navy operations and maintenance activities. Activities supported by this appropriation shall include, but not be limited to, maintenance dredging, pier improvements, enhanced power generation, increased water desalination capability, POL storage improvements, improved drydocks, cranes, and specialized maintenance equipment.

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The Committee strongly supports the use of port facilities in Haifa for the support, maintenance and repair of U.S. Navy ships and the rest and relaxation of Navy personnel. As such, the Committee expects the Navy to increase its use of the facilities at the port of Haifa to the greatest extent possible and consistent with U.S. Navy readiness requirements and cost effectiveness.

Furthermore, the Committee directs the Navy to examine the feasibility of using the port of Ashdod, Israel, for maintenance, repair, reprovisioning, rest and relaxation activities. The Navy is to report, no later than May 15, 1991, on its findings, to include: a plan and timetable for using Ashdod, the cost of upgrading or expanding existing facilities to accommodate Navy ships and personnel, and the contribution that access to Ashdod could make to the increased readiness and sustainability of U.S. military forces in the region.

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS

Appropriations, 1990.....	\$1,657,719,000
Budget estimate, 1991.....	1,948,100,000
Committee recommendation.....	1,880,100,000

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$1,880,100,000. This is \$68,000,000 below the budget estimate.

SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ADJUSTMENTS

Committee adjustments to the budget estimate are summarized in the following table:

Program	[In thousands of dollars]	Committee adjustments
Fiscal year 1991 budget estimate.....		1,948,100
Civilian personnel freezes.....		-20,200
O&M general support to military personnel.....		-11,100
Base operations.....		-10,000
Training and education.....		-3,500
Recruiting, advertising, and examining.....		-8,000
Inventory management.....		-15,200
Total.....		1,880,100

OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE

Appropriations, 1990.....	\$21,808,213,000
Budget estimate, 1991.....	22,048,900,000
Committee recommendation.....	20,064,092,000

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$20,064,092,000. This is \$1,984,808,000 below the budget estimate.

SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ADJUSTMENTS

Committee adjustments to the budget estimate are summarized in the following table:

Program	[In thousands of dollars]	Committee adjustments
Fiscal year 1991 budget estimate.....		22,048,900
Strategic forces:		
EC-130 Looking Glass.....		-11,900
Minuteman II.....		-17,000

Program

General purpose forces:

- USAF operational test and evaluation
- Defense department communications
- CINC initiatives.....
- Flying hour costs.....
- Morale, welfare, and recreation
- Dormitory furnishings.....
- Chemical/Biological Defense
- Intelligence and communications
- Command, control, and communications
- Milstar.....

Airlift:

- Dormitory furnishings.....
- Purchased communications

Central supply and maintenance:

- Aircraft service extension
- Automated data processing
- ment.....
- Exchangeable components
- Deferred requirements.....
- C-17A interim contracts
- Printing and reproduction
- Audiovisual.....
- Military airlift command
- Commissary operations.....
- Supplies and equipment.....
- Training, medical, and other
- Training and education.....
- Recruiting, advertising, and examining
- Administration and associated
- Contractor support.....
- Departmental supplies and
- Service-wide data processing
- Banking.....
- Fiscal year 1990 civilian personnel
- O&M general support to military
- Foreign national civilians.....
- Retiree pay systems.....
- Increased use reserves.....
- Real property maintenance.....
- Base operations.....
- Inventory management.....
- Stock fund operations cost.....
- Corporate information management
- Currency fluctuation.....
- Classified programs.....

Total.....

Telecommunications Committee recommends a reduction in operation and maintenance. This recommendation is significant for the Air Command to scale back in response to reduced threat from the Soviet Union.

Minuteman II.—The Committee recommends a reduction of \$17,000,000 in the administration and maintenance. [NSIAD-90-196BR] anti-savings through the elimination of...

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1 Weapons Project under the Advanced Strategic Missile Sys-
2 tems Program.

3 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION,
4 DEFENSE AGENCIES
5 (TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

6 For expenses of activities and agencies of the Depart-
7 ment of Defense (other than the military departments), neces-
8 sary for basic and applied scientific research, development,
9 test and evaluation; advanced research projects as may be
10 designated and determined by the Secretary of Defense, pur-
11 suant to law; maintenance, rehabilitation, lease, and oper-
12 ation of facilities and equipment, as authorized by law;
13 \$8,563,407,000, to remain available for obligation until Sep-
14 tember 30, 1992: *Provided*, That of the funds appropriated
15 for fiscal year 1990 under the heading "Research, Develop-
16 ment, Test and Evaluation, Defense Agencies," \$18,000,000
17 shall be obligated within 90 days after enactment of this Act
18 for a facility to enable collaborative research and training for
19 Department of Defense military medical personnel in trauma
20 care, head, neck, and spinal injury, paralysis, and neuro-de-
21 generative diseases: *Provided further*, That of the funds made
22 available under this heading for the Strategic Defense Initia-
23 tive program, \$137,000,000 shall be transferred upon enact-
24 ment of this Act to the Air Force to continue advanced devel-
25 opment of the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System and

211 1113 $\frac{7}{27}$

1 for the Defense Support Program Follow-on Competition:
 2 *Provided further*, That of the funds appropriated under this
 3 heading for the Strategic Defense Initiative, not less than
 4 \$42,000,000 shall be made available only for the joint re-
 5 search and development of the advanced development pro-
 6 gram for the Arrow antitactical ballistic missile program.

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7 DEVELOPMENTAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEFENSE

8 For expenses, not otherwise provided for, of independ-
 9 ent activities of the Deputy Director of Defense Research
 10 and Engineering (Test and Evaluation) in the direction and
 11 supervision of developmental test and evaluation, including
 12 performance and joint developmental testing and evaluation;
 13 and administrative expenses in connection therewith;
 14 \$226,679,000, to remain available for obligation until Sep-
 15 tember 30, 1992.

16 OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEFENSE

17 For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for
 18 the independent activities of the Director, Operational Test
 19 and Evaluation in the direction and supervision of operational
 20 test and evaluation, including initial operational test and
 21 evaluation which is conducted prior to, and in support of,
 22 production decisions; joint operational testing and evaluation;
 23 and administrative expenses in connection therewith;
 24 \$15,000,000, to remain available for obligation until Septem-
 25 ber 30, 1992.

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1 (2) There has been tremendous instability in the 1
2 Phase I architecture of the strategic defense system. 2

3 (3) A decision to deploy the phase I architecture 3
4 of that system would have grave implications for offen- 4
5 sive arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union 5
6 and for continued United States compliance with the 6
7 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 7

8 (4) Changes in the international political environ- 8
9 ment over the past year permit the United States to 9
10 pursue the SDI program at a more measured pace, 10
11 with increased emphasis on theater and anti-tactical 11
12 ballistic missile contingencies. 12

13 (5) A broad-based research program on the feasi- 13
14 bility of highly effective missile defenses remains in the 14
15 national interest. 15

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 16
17 that ~~_____~~ 17

18 (1) the Strategic Defense Initiative should not be 18
19 focused on the projected 1993 Presidential decision on 19
20 deployment of a space-based kinetic energy weapon 20
21 system; 21

22 (2) the Strategic Defense Initiative should contin- 22 pri
23 ue a balanced, robust program of research on those 23 gie
24 technologies that offer the prospect of highly effective 24
25 anti-ballistic missile defenses; 25

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(3) priority under the Strategic Defense Initiative should be given, in the near term, to research on a defense system that (A) would protect against an accidental missile launch against the United States or a limited ballistic missile attack against the United States by a third-world country, and (B) if deployed, would not be in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

(4) the Strategic Defense Initiative should include a vigorous pursuit of a variety of theater and anti-tactical ballistic missile defenses which would be of value to allies of the United States and to the military forces of the United States temporarily or permanently deployed within range of tactical ballistic missiles of a potential enemy; and

(5) the Strategic Defense Initiative should continue support, as it has over the past six years, for those critical technology efforts that have both civil and military applications in areas other than ballistic missile defense systems.

(c) LIMITATIONS ON SPENDING.—Of the funds appropriated under title IV pursuant to section 201 for the Strategic Defense Initiative—

(1) not more than \$345,000,000 may be obligated for the ground-based radar, space-based surveillance

211 1113 10/27

- 1 and tracking system program, and ground-based sur-
- 2 veillance and tracking system program;
- 3 (2) not more than \$142,000,000 may be obligated
- 4 for the ground-based interceptor program;
- 5 (3) not more than \$129,000,000 may be obligated
- 6 for the brilliant pebbles program;
- 7 (4) not more than \$894,300,000 may be obligated
- 8 for other phase I programs;
- 9 (5) not more than \$944,400,000 may be obligated
- 10 for follow-on technologies programs;
- 11 (6) not more than \$320,000,000 may be obligated
- 12 for key technologies activities;
- 13 (7) not more than \$227,800,000 may be obligated
- 14 for operational support and management activities;
- 15 (8) not more than \$180,000,000 may be obligated
- 16 for test and evaluation activities;
- 17 (9) not more than \$180,000,000 may be obligated
- 18 for theater defense activities, of which not more than
- 19 \$42,000,000 may be expended for an advanced devel-
- 20 opment program for an anti-tactical ballistic missile
- 21 system with the Government of Israel;
- 22 (10) not more than \$116,800,000 may be obligat-
- 23 ed for the innovative science and technology and small
- 24 business innovative research programs; and

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budget request and high-definition display of: (a) \$9,500,000 program element; (b) plane array program this program ele-

mends \$115,249,000 6,000 for the infra-

defense agency re-nuclear weapons re-tee recommends budget request. The excessive rate of real cal year 1990 level the expected con-

Committee recom-0 in excess, stand-ckpile transaction PA and eligible en-w program at the ave prompted the he Committee be-quate, under con-h a new effort.

by this program cal to the national endation does not year 1991 act be-stockpile transac-

f Defense critical one of 22 technol-e recognizes that iative would en-omoting optoelec-PA to build on its tation of the pre-

trial manufactur-e of our Nation's Defense to give ction of a labora-umber of compa-ng ability in ad-r DARPA cooper-ference report, Act also apply to

program element iformed Services

University of the Health Sciences. The Committee recommends \$2,467,000, an increase of \$125,000 to the budget request. The increase provides funds for the second year of a research effort to investigate the health and technical performance of pilots of high-performance military aircraft. The Committee has received a laudatory independent assessment of the first year of the study and directs that the Defense Department budget for continuation of the work in fiscal year 1992, and beyond, if results in the second year support further extension.

Strategic defense initiative [SDI].—This program to develop defenses against strategic and tactical ballistic missiles remains the Defense Department's largest RDT&E program. The Committee recommends \$8,573,000,000, a reduction of \$887,000,000 as approved by the full Senate, and an amount equal to the fiscal year 1990 funding level for SDI. As further approved by the Senate, the recommendation denies the \$265,000,000 sought to begin full-scale development of the boost surveillance and tracking system [BSTS] as part of the phase I strategic defense system.

In addition, bill language is recommended which transfers \$137,000,000 included in the SDI budget for advanced development of BSTS to the Air Force. As approved by the full Senate, the transferred funds support continuation of these BSTS activities and are to be combined with \$15,000,000 added to the Air Force budget for conduct of a competition for a follow-on capability to the Defense Support Program early warning system.

As already approved by the full Senate, the Committee adopted bill language in a general provision (section 8098) which specifies certain allocations and limitations on the use of funds for the SDI program.

The Committee also understands that the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization [SDIO] proposed using fiscal year 1990 funds to plan, design, and undertake the construction of a liquid fuel missile launch complex at Wake Island in the Pacific Ocean. This proposal is based on the schedule anticipated by SDIO for development and flight tests of the brilliant pebbles space-based interceptor and for conduct of the liquid plume experiments [LPX] using the *Starlab* space shuttle flight. The Committee notes that the current schedules for brilliant pebbles development and space shuttle flights are uncertain. Accordingly, the Committee directs that no funds may be obligated or expended to plan or implement the proposed liquid fuel missile launch complex construction on Wake Island until 30 days after Congress receives: (a) an updated budget and schedule for brilliant pebbles development and LPX flights, based on the final outcome of the fiscal year 1991 appropriations process and including the most current space shuttle *Starlab* flight schedule; and (b) final versions of all the new and updated environmental-related documentation required for the construction and flight tests.

The Committee also is concerned about the increased threat posed by surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, some with chemical warheads, in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions. The SDI joint program between the United States and Israel to develop the Arrow theater ballistic missile defense system can contribute to advancing the technologies to defeat this threat. The first phase of the Arrow program is finishing and the Defense Department and

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NATIONAL JEWISH



COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL
443 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016-7322
(212) 684-6950
Fax: (212) 686-1353

Memo

- 611

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

001118

October 10, 1990

TO: CRC Directors and NJCRAC Member Agencies
FROM: Martin Raffel, Director, Israel Task Force
RE: Immediate Action Required on UN Resolution on Israel and
Imminent Foreign Aid Vote

Based on a conference call conducted this morning with representatives of national and community agencies the attached letter was drafted and sent today to President Bush.

We are urging that you communicate through telephone calls and telegrams to the President this afternoon, the points outlined in this letter. Also, we recommend that organizational leadership follow-up this communication with letters by mail.

Please note the White House telephone number, (202) 456-7639. For telegrams, call Western Union, 1-(800) 325-6000, and indicate that you are sending a Public Opinion-Gram to the President. The cost is \$9.95 for a twenty word message with additional charges for a longer message.

You may also use the points raised in the letter to respond and make statements to the media regarding the Jewish community's serious concerns over the direction of the United States position on the U.N. resolution condemning Israel.

Foreign Aid Vote

The United States Senate is scheduled to vote on the foreign aid package this Friday, October 12. Therefore, telephone calls and telegrams should be transmitted, before the holiday, to your senators urging support of the foreign aid bill, including \$3 billion dollars in aid to Israel, and opposing any cutting amendments.

We will keep you informed of developments on these issues next week.

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מל מצדקי	ממתי: ארצט ופוז/ ס. קנכא ניו-יורק	001117

תפוז: ארצט פוז - אמפא

בהמשך למברקו אהיום נר - 258

אצב פרסום תקופות אנהיום

והפייס בניו-יורק סמאס היום

ארצט ופוז

שה סמאס הנה אצב אהיום
הסברה אהיום

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001117

U.S. Move in U.N. to Condemn Israel Angers Jewish Groups

By CHRIS HEDGES

Leaders of American Jewish groups expressed anger yesterday at the decision of the Bush Administration to sponsor a United Nations resolution that would censure Israel for the shooting deaths of at least 21 Palestinians on Monday in disturbances in Jerusalem.

"This hypocrisy of the U.N. is not unusual," said Rabbi Marc D. Angel, the president of the Rabbinical Council of America. "American complicity in this hypocrisy, though, is something alarming. The U.S. has betrayed Israel, it has betrayed its own honor and dignity as well. Will oil and terrorism become the arbiters of justice in the world? The U.S. is now seeming to accept this frightening scenario."

Kenneth J. Bialkin, the president of the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York, said: "We are deeply dismayed by the Administration's reported decision to support a vicious and unjust U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel for violence and excessive use of force. We regret the shortsightedness of our country in casting a vote which will encourage instead of contain violence."

'The U.S. has betrayed Israel, it has betrayed its own honor.'

The Bush Administration said on Tuesday that it would sponsor a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Israel for its "excessive response" in putting down disturbances in the Old City of Jerusalem, at AlAksa Mosque.

The American draft, however, was criticized as too timid by some Arab leaders. Other Security Council members have put forward a stiffer resolution that is currently under debate.

The United States has not backed a United Nations resolution condemning Israel since 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon.

The Bush Administration, which has pulled many Arab states behind it to oppose the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, is

struggling not to alienate its Arab allies who have universally condemned Israel for the incident, yet maintain the close working relationship the United States has with the Israeli Government.

A Call by Orthodox Rabbis

But the American Jewish group spokesmen said they had no intention of allowing the United States to condemn Israel in the United Nations without a fight.

The Rabbinical Council of America, and other Orthodox groups, have designated Oct. 20 as "a Sabbath of protest."

The Orthodox groups have called on rabbis across the country "to raise their voices against the unjust and immoral denunciation of Israel by the U.N. and sharp dismay at the behavior of the American Administration during this crisis."

The groups have also organized a letter-writing campaign to Federal and Congressional officials.

U.S. Action Regretted

Seven New York rabbis, who attacked the American decision, have called for nationwide protests. The rab-

bis, in a prayer vigil outside the United States Mission to the United Nations, lashed out at President Bush for using Israel as a scapegoat to hold together the coalition arrayed against Iraq.

"We regret that the United States, Israel's closest friend, has chosen to act so unfairly against its most reliable ally in the Middle East for short term objectives," Mr. Bialkin said. "It appears that support for this resolution emerged in order to curry favor and appease a volatile Arab bloc and sustain a coalition against the belligerent actions of Iraq."

Even liberal Jewish groups, like Americans for Peace Now, which have long opposed Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip, are uncomfortable with the American decision.

"We would have liked the United States to wait to see what the facts really were before acting," said Jonathan D. Jacoby, the president of Americans for Peace Now.

"It looks like the United States is simply using Israel as a pawn in a much larger Middle Eastern game. This resolution is being used by the United States to address the Persian Gulf crisis, not the Arab-Israeli conflict."

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Israeli Ministry of Defense are discussing prospects for a follow-on effort. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to proceed without delay to negotiate, on an equitable basis, a memorandum of agreement to continue, as necessary, the Arrow program.

To support this continuation, the Committee directs that \$42,000,000 of the funds for SDI's theater missile defense project may only be used for additional joint efforts to develop the Arrow system. Bill language is recommended to accomplish this direction.

Joint DOD-DOE munitions technology development.—The Committee recommends \$20,000,000, an increase of \$11,478,000 to the budget request for this joint program between the Departments of Defense and Energy to develop advanced munitions. The added funds maintain the fiscal year 1990 level of effort. This program capitalizes on the nuclear weapons design expertise of the three Energy Department national weapons laboratories. Such techniques are applied to design more effective conventional munitions and weapons technologies.

Experimental evaluation of major innovative technologies [EEMIT].—The Committee recommends \$158,357,000, a reduction of \$21,040,000 to the budget request for this program element which funds several major projects at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The Committee reduction eliminates \$14,000,000 available due to the cancellation of the hypersonic weapons technology project, and \$7,040,000 for two new start subprojects in the guidance technology project.

The two new starts—the differential global positioning system and terminal sensors subprojects—are unjustified in view of other advanced guidance and precision targeting efforts underway in the Defense Department. The Committee directs that the \$4,000,000 in remaining hypersonic weapons technology funds be used to finish certain tests and data collection to bring that project to a productive end.

Prototyping of advanced technology and innovative concepts.—This DARPA program element funds several projects attempting to mature advanced technologies and bring them together in prototype developmental systems to demonstrate their military utility. The Committee recommends \$57,742,000, a reduction of \$6,500,000 to the budget request.

The recommendation eliminates: (a) \$5,000,000 for the now-canceled remote surveillance system in the unmanned undersea vehicle project; (b) \$1,000,000 in the pilot's associate project for a premature study on applying these still-evolving technologies to Special Operations Forces aircraft; and (c) \$500,000 for expected contract savings on one of the phase II contracts for the baseline pilot's associate effort.

Balanced technology initiative [BTI].—The Committee recommends \$162,687,000, a reduction of \$46,500,000 to the budget request for this program to develop technologies to enhance U.S. conventional war-fighting capabilities. BTI concentrates on advanced technologies, such as new warhead and gun technologies, targeting sensors, and precision-guided weapons.

This program has suffered from, among other problems, a lack of firm priorities. The result was a financially overextended program with too many unaffordable projects, several of which were of in-

sufficient priority to merit the Secretary of Defense's improving program management. The Committee has tried to embody in its recommendations

The Committee recommends the project discussed in the budget, where it is in the particular program, it also is not fully program, is of question requirement and operational

Also deferred is \$7,000 contract awards for the year 1991. The deferral of military utility also prevents a premature integration endeavor expected

The Committee denies the strike system. This appears to duplicate the Force and Army.

The Committee is concerned a continuation of area of affordability. The more focused, still is expected next 4 years. The available the future defense budget

Air defense initiative advanced air defense defend the continental and bomber threat. Retain, and its outyear program the likely budget environment

In view of these recommendations \$148,000,000, a request. The recommendation year 1990 level. With respect that \$35,000,000 in search and demonstration

Nonacoustic antisubmarine recommends an increase program element to fund OSD to explore critical participants include the department national laboratories certain NATO allies. In Navy efforts in this area, committee's recommendations program at its current

OSD's report to Congress program indicates that a

211 1113 $\frac{13}{27}$

1 rights violation: *Provided further*, That the Air Force must
2 provide concentrated instruction in democratic government
3 and human rights protections to each attendee of IAAFA:
4 *Provided further*, That the Air Force will provide the Com-
5 mittees on Appropriations of the House and Senate, no later
6 than March 1, 1991, with a report on the operation of
7 IAAFA and its curriculum, as well as a statistical and bio-
8 graphical profile of its students.

9 WC-130 HURRICANE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

10 SEC. 8084. Of the funds made available to the Air
11 Force under this Act not less than \$14,100,000 shall be
12 available only for the operation, maintenance and manning of
13 all existing WC-130 hurricane reconnaissance aircraft: *Pro-*
14 *vided*, That none of the funds made available to the Depart-
15 ment of Defense may be used for the deactivation or disestab-
16 lishment of the WC-130 reconnaissance aircraft: *Provided*
17 *further*, That none of the funds made available to the Depart-
18 ment of Defense may be used to transfer the hurricane recon-
19 naissance mission to another agency or entity other than the
20 United States Air Force and Air Force Reserve: *Provided*
21 *further*, That no less than one full squadron of WC-130 hur-
22 ricane reconnaissance aircraft will continue to be fully oper-
23 ational under the Air Force Reserve.

24 ALLIED COOPERATION ENHANCEMENT STUDIES

25 SEC. 8085. (a) Funds shall be made available to the
26 Secretary of Defense for the study of:

אאא, חוזם: 7475

אל: רהמש/592

מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 258, תא: 111090, זח: 1245, זח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/בהול

ארה"ב

אל: מצפ'א, תפוצות, בנצור סמנכל דע: שילה, פלג וושינגטון, ביין נאומ
מאת: מרדכי ידיד ס. קונכל ניו יורק

הנדון: ארועי הר הבית - מועביט

1. בהמשך למכתב ארדן שנקר יו"ר נאקראק לנשיא בוש (הברקתיכס אתמול),
הוציא נאקראק הנחיות לקהילות היהודיות ברחבי ארה"ב המאיץ בהם להביע
בטלפונים ובמכתבים לבית הלבן ולמחמד אי שביעות רצון מתמיכת ארה"ב בגינוי
ישראל במועביט. בעיקר להביע מבוכה על כך שארהב ממהרת לגנות ישראל בגלל
סיבות שאינן קשורות באירועי הר הבית, ומבלי לאפשר סיומה של החקירה שהחלה
ארץ. מרטין רפאל שעמו שוחחתי לפני דקות ספורות אמר כי הם נערכים יותר
ויותר לתקוף את הקונספציה האמריקאית של מתן פרס לקואליציה הערבית הפועלת
נגד סאדם חוסיין.

2. מרטין ציין כי כבר אתמול פעלו ראשי הקהילות היהודיות בהתאם להנחיות
והגיבו בחריפות בפני הבית הלבן ובפני מחמד.

3. ניתן לאמר כי קיים קונצנסוס בקהילה היהודית האמריקאית נגד תמיכת
ארה"ב בגינוי ישראל במועביט. בנפרד הפרסום הבוקר (11.10) בניו יורק
טיימס על תגובות מנהיגים יהודים (נר 1117) והנחיות נאקרק לפדרציות
היהודיות (נר 1118).

מרדכי ידיד

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות,
רביב, מעת, הסברה, ארבל, 2, סולטן, מזתים

ססס

National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council

443 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016-7322

(212) 684-8980
Fax (212) 686-1353

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- Arden S. Shetler, Portland, OR
- Frederick M. Frank, Pittsburgh
- Shirley T. Joseph, Buffalo
- Donald E. Lefsch, Miami
- Michael M. Newman, St. Louis
- Steven Schwarz, Wilkes-Barre
- M. William Shurtz, New Haven
- Arnold Sweet, Dallas
- Barry Ungar, Philadelphia
- Marcia Volpert, Los Angeles
- Maynard Wisner, Chicago
- David Leberbaum, Detroit
- Albert E. Arant, Washington, DC
- Jordan C. Sand, Cleveland
- Lewis D. Cole, Louisville
- Aaron Goldman, Washington DC
- Irving Kane, Cleveland
- Jacqueline K. Levine, Mizovist NJ
- Theodore R. Mann, Philadelphia
- Michael A. Pelavia, Flint
- Bernard M. Treger, Bridgeport
- Lewis M. Weinstein, Boston
- Bennett Yanowitz, Cleveland
- Lawrence Rubin
- Albert D. Chermis

October 10, 1990
The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are deeply dismayed by the U.S. action at the U.N. Security Council in supporting passage of a resolution condemning the Israeli response to the recent riots in Jerusalem. The scope and nature of what appears to have been both a premeditated attack by Arab rioters on worshippers at Judaism's holiest site on a Jewish holy day when thousands had gathered at the Western Wall, and an assault on law enforcement authorities, including the use of knives and incendiary devices, suggest that the Israeli response may indeed have been reasonable under the circumstances. We believe it was a serious error to rush to judgment in condemning our sister democracy before an appropriate independent body, the formation of which was announced earlier today by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, was given an opportunity to investigate these tragic events. We join with Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek and others in Israel who have expressed their profound regret over the loss of life to the rioters and the injuries of many more, Jews and Arabs alike.

We have strongly supported the Administration's policies in response to Iraq's actions in the Persian Gulf. We also share your view that there is no linkage or parallel between Iraq's brutal crushing of a member state of the U.N. and the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Efforts by Saddam Hussein to raise the intensity of debate on the Palestinian issue are a transparent and cynical attempt to deflect attention away from his naked aggression. We fear that in joining with those forces at the U.N. which routinely use that forum to isolate Israel diplomatically, including Arab states cooperating with the U.S. in the Persian Gulf, the Administration may be contributing to the very phenomenon that you seek to avoid, namely diversion of central attention away from Iraq's aggression.

We believe that instead of voicing a precipitous condemnation of Israel, U.S. policy would be better served by making it clear to the Arab states and their supporters that the use of the U.N. as a vehicle for continually heaping opprobrium on Israel must be ended, once and for all. It is high time for the Arab states and the Palestinians to end their 42 year state of war with Israel and to begin negotiations toward a political settlement that will resolve the issues dividing them.

Very respectfully yours,
cooperation in the common cause of Jewish community relations

- AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
J. Kent Friedman • James G. Grushelmer
- AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
Theodore R. Mann • Julian Salzer
- ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
Melvin Silber • Seymour Reich
- BA'AL BRITH
- BERNARDSONS
Carmela K. Kalmanson • Thelma G. Wolf
- JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE
Herbert Magleson • Emanuel Muryshnik
- JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE U.S.A.
Herbert D. Greif • Murray L. Rosen
- NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN
Jean Brons • Lynn Lyss
- UNION OF AMERICAN
HEBREW CONGREGATIONS
Harris J. Dubert • Albert Vorspan
- UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH
CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA
Sidney Kweitel • David Luchins
- UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF AMERICA
WOMEN'S LEAGUE
FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM
Evelyn Auerbach • Scott M. Kaplan
- WOMEN'S AMERICAN ORT
Reesa Feldman • Ruth Yafel
- Marie Abrams, Louisville
- Roger Auerbach, Portland, OR
- Irving Blank, Richmond
- Jack B. Blumenthal, Wilmington
- Paul P. Bolman, Detroit
- Marvin Carter, Hartford
- Barry Cohen, Atlantic County NJ
- Albert Damp, Cleveland
- Rabbi Azriel Feiner, Westwood NJ
- Stephen N. Gall, Washington, DC
- Roberta Gluck, Flint
- Lawrence Gold, Atlanta
- Ronald Goldsmith, Kansas City
- Alan Goldstein, Central NJ
- James Gordon, Springfield, MA
- Ruthellen Harris, San Francisco
- Grace Hudson, New Orleans
- Joan Knoll, Dayton
- Bonnie K. Milenthal, Columbus
- Paul Minkoff, Philadelphia
- Norman Orendaner, Rhode Island
- Nedda Pollack, Nashville
- Joel M. Reeb, Boston
- Alan Respler, Southfield NJ
- Gary S. Rubin, Des Moines
- Howard Schoenfeld, Milwaukee
- Stephen P. Stone, Springfield, IL
- Richard Wexler, Chicago
- Dolores Wilkowitz, Houston
- Paul Berger, Washington, DC
- Shoshana Cardin, NCSJ
- Sheldon Cohen, Washington, DC
- Leonard A. Cole, Northern NJ
- Milton Carwin, Phoenix
- Norman B. Davis, San Antonio
- Raymond Epstein, Chicago
- Rabbi Harvey Fields, Los Angeles
- David Goldman, Des Moines
- Marcia Goldstone, CRC Directors Assn.
- Melissa Gartin, AJCRW
- Allan Goroff, Boston
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- Helen Hoffman, Palm Beach
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- Harvey Kaplan, Kansas City
- Aileen Kessen, Cleveland
- Stanley M. Lowell, New York
- Rabbi Israel Miller, New York
- Burton Portman, Cincinnati
- Rum Pappin, Massesah
- Nan Rich, Miami
- Theodore R. Selon, San Francisco
- Daniel S. Shapiro, New York
- Sheldon U. Tenenbaum, Saratoga
- Norman D. Tilles, Rhode Island
- Jerry Wagner, Hartford
- Herbert Wandler, Chicago
- Matthew S. Weinberg, San Francisco
- Bernard S. White, Washington DC
- Jerry Yanowitz, Oakland

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 11.10.90

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אל: וושינגטון
הממונה

הנדון: ערבויות דיור

למברק ירון נר 145

אתמול (9.10) תידע שגארה'ב את המנכ'ל ואת ס/מנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'ן לגבי האפשרות של פירסום מכתב השר למזכיר בייקר מה- 2.10.

(במקביל ועוד לפני- כן התקשר הסגן בשגרירות עם הח'מ בנדון). הובהר להם כי לדעתנו יש לתאם עמנו כל מהלך בקשר למכתב (כי מדובר במכתב משר לשר) ואין לפעול בצורה נמהרת וחד- צדדית.

בקשנו איפוא שיתיעצו עמנו מראש. קבלו על עצמם להעביר את המסרים לווינגטון.

מנהל מצפ'א

פא

תפ: שהח(2), סשהח(1), רהמ(0), מנכל(1), ממנכל(1), בנצור(1), מצפא(4)

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מקור: מלך שעות, כליס נח, 5376967 03

משרד החוץ-מח' ה'ת הקשר

IT IS A VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY THAT WE BOTH SHARE, AND I
LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU CLOSELY ON THIS.

IN THIS RESPECT, OUR DISCUSSION ON THE ISSUE OF HOUSING
INVESTMENT GUARANTEES PRODUCED RESULTS. AS I SAID IN OUR MEETINGS,
I CAN CONFIRM THAT THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL
WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSORPTION OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION
IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IN HIS
JUNE 27, 1990 LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH, AND THE STATEMENT BY
MINISTER OF HOUSING SHARON ON JUNE 25, 1990, NAMELY, THAT THE
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S POLICY IS NOT TO DIRECT OR SETTLE SOVIET JEWS
BEYOND THE GREEN LINE.

CONSISTENT WITH THE TRADITIONAL ASSURANCES WHICH THE GOVERNMENT
OF ISRAEL PROVIDES IN OUR ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS, AS WELL AS THOSE IN
THE "IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, SEPTEMBER 1980, BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ACTING THROUGH THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT", USES OF THE HOUSING LOAN GUARANTEES WILL BE RESTRICTED
TO THE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF
ISRAEL'S ADMINISTRATION PRIOR TO JUNE 5, 1967. I ALSO WANT TO
RECONFIRM WHAT I TOLD YOU IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION THAT NO
SPECIAL INCENTIVES EXIST TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO
SETTLE BEYOND THE GREEN LINE, NOR ARE WE PLANNING TO PROVIDE SUCH
INCENTIVES IN THE FUTURE.

AS I KNOW YOU WILL BE REPORTING TO CONGRESS ON THIS LOAN
PROGRAM, LET ME SAY FURTHER, I AM PREPARED TO AGREE THAT WE WILL
PROVIDE YOU PERIODICALLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S BUILDING PLANS FOR
HOUSING FOR IMMIGRANTS INCLUDING SPECIAL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES. I
WILL ALSO USE MY BEST EFFORTS TO PROVIDE ANNUALLY AS COMPLETE
INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY, AND PERIODICALLY AS WELL TO INFORM
YOU OF ANY GOVERNMENT SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY.

I BELIEVE THAT THESE POINTS, THESE UNDERSTANDINGS, WILL HELP US
FURTHER THE GREAT CHALLENGE OF ABSORPTION OF SOVIET JEWS IN ISRAEL.

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK
PRESIDENT BUSH AND YOU PERSONALLY FOR THE EXTENSION OF THIS HOUSING
LOAN GUARANTEES PROGRAM.

SINCERELY, DAVID LEVY. (SIGNED "DAVID".)

END

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח (2), סשהח (1), רהמ (0), מנכל (1), ממנכל (1), בנצור (1), מצפא (4)



730 8306

מספר תעודת זהות: 7308306

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יוצא **

שמור

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חוזם: 10,6673

אל: וושינגטון/335, ניו יורק/384, רהמש/484, בטחון/770, אביב/557, מנמת/453

מ-: המשרד, תא: 101090, זח: 1348, דח: ב, סג: שמ

תח: א: גס: שהח

נד: א:

1/2
2/2

בהול לבוקר/שמור

אל: שגרירות וושינגטון

ניו יורק

יוחנן ביין

דע: ערן

מועב'ט, לשלך 1091

1. בשיחה הבוקר (11:30) מסר ס/שה'ח ב. נתניהו לשגריר בראון כי אם יעבור הנוסח (כבשלכם הנ'ל) ישראל תצטרך להתנגד לו וזה יגרום לחכוך בינינו שישרת את מטרותיו של סדאם.

2. הבהיר בקשתנו להוריד בכלל הסעיף אופרטיבי 4 המדבר על שגור שליח. בנוסף לכך מעונינים לצמצם את החכוך הפוליטי בינינו, ע"י תיקונים נוספים, גם אם סעיף השליח לא ירד. בכל מקרה הדגיש חוזר הדגיש שאין פרוש הדבר הסכמה שלנו לקבלת שליח, וכוונתנו בתיקונים היא רק לצמצם החכוך וחלוקי הדיעות בינינו.

3. השינויים האפשריים שהוזכרו:

א) בסעיף אופרטיבי 4: להשמיט הצורך ב-REPORT.

ב) בסעיף אופרטיבי 3: להשמיט ההתייחסות לאמנת ג'נבה ה-4.

ג) לשנות את ה-CONDEMNNS במונח שאין בו גינוי.

ד) להשמיט את ה-POLITICAL RIGHTS.

4. מבקשים שתפעלו גם בושינגטון וגם בניו-יורק בהתאם כשהכוונה היא לנסות למנוע את קבלת הצעת ההחלטה או לפחות לרככה.

730 5408
***** יוקף ולף עשית בל"ט סל 0376997

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לשכת ס/שה'ח

אג

תפ: שהח(2), סשהח(1), רהמ(0), שהבט(0), מנכל(1), ממנכל(1), ר/מרכז(1), רם(0),
אמן(1), ממד(10), ברנע(1), ארבול2(2), בנצור(1), מצפא(4), סי יבל(1), משפט(1),
סולטן(1), מזתים(1)

XX
XX

730 8408
סימני זיהוי: 07567658

