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# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

משיב ראה

יועץ מדיני

אורח

4/1/89 - 10/1/89

תיק מס'

5

מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פנימי: א-5/4608

מזהה פריט R00035r00

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-8

תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020



GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN  
GOVERNOR

344-7  
5/2/89

State of California  
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE  
SACRAMENTO 95814

January 10, 1989

His Excellency  
Yitshak Shamir  
Prime Minister of Israel  
Office of the Prime Minister  
Hakirya  
Jeruselum, Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to express my sincere and personal appreciation to you and the people of Israel for the immediate assistance you provided the victims of the devastating earthquake which struck Soviet Armenia on December 7, 1988. Countless lives were saved due to the swift reaction of the world community to this natural disaster. The spirit of caring and compassion, which your assistance indicates, will long be remembered by the victims, their families and Armenians throughout the world.

As you know, the Armenian people have endured many tragedies during their long history. This natural disaster tests not only the character of Armenians but causes all citizens of the world to reflect on the fragile nature of life.

The task ahead will be very difficult and will require a long-term commitment by all of us. Entire cities will need to be rebuilt. Displaced families will need new homes. Orphaned children will need to be cared for. And, victims who lost limbs will need constant medical attention and rehabilitation. Your continued moral and material support will provide valuable reassurance as the victims deal with the uncertainties of the future.

Please accept my heartfelt thanks and best wishes for success in during 1989.

Most cordially

*George Deukmejian*

George Deukmejian



# משרד החוץ

## מחלקת ההסברה

ירושלים, כ"ח בשבט תשמ"ט  
3 בפברואר 1989

אל הנציגות

מאמר OP - ED של השגריר ארד בווינגטון

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מאמר OP - ED של השגריר משה ארד, על תהליך השלום,

התפרסם בווינגטון פוסט ב-12 בינואר השנה (מצ"ב).

ראו בהקשר זה גם חוזר מנהל הסברה מספר 521 מה-1.2.1989

בנדון.

115/3.2.1989/4.06.01



Moshe Arad

# Israel Wants Peace Too

*But it can't be expected to believe Arafat.*

Recent events concerning the Middle East have been unfolding at an almost dizzying pace: the Palestine National Council met in Algiers; the State Department denied Yasser Arafat a U.S. entry visa to address the United Nations; Arafat held talks in Stockholm with five American Jews. Then, after a period of intense speculation surrounding Arafat's speech at the U.N. session in Geneva, followed by the speech itself, Arafat held a press conference, to which the United States responded by initiating direct contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Meanwhile, a broad-based coalition Israeli government was formed after weeks of negotiations.

An avalanche of editorials, columns and other views have accompanied and interpreted these events. In the supposedly new climate that has emerged, some have even suggested that Israel is not the seeker of peace, but the "obstacle to peace." Others have suggested that Israel, by carefully examining the PLO's rhetoric rather than simply accepting statements at face value, is "nitpicking."

But if Israel has not gone along with the international enthusiasm for a new-found friend, it is because to this very day the lessons of our history with the PLO, both bitter and painful, have persuaded us that while the public veneer may have changed for Western consumption, the essence of the organization has not. The PLO, the standard bearer and pacesetter of international terrorism for more than two decades, still retains as its goal the destruction of the Jewish state, a goal explicitly stated in the PLO Charter, which until now remains unamended.

When the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat made his historic speech in Israel's Knesset, he said, "Never have I spoken, nor will I ever speak, with two tongues; never have I adopted, nor will I ever adopt, two policies. I never deal with anyone except in one tongue, one policy and with one face."

Unfortunately, the opposite can be said about Arafat. In fact, Arafat and his followers lend new meaning to the art of obfuscation, ambiguity and deception. Those who follow the PLO's pronouncements, both in Arabic and in English, in the Middle East and elsewhere, know well his and his cohorts' capacity for double talk.

Example: while Arafat purportedly adopts a new face for a largely Western audience in Stockholm and Geneva, his principal deputy, Abu Iyyad, is quoted in a Kuwaiti newspaper (Dec. 13) as saying, "To our people we will say: this is our state and this is a state for future generations, a small state at its outset, and God willing, it will be large and expand to the east, to the west. . . . About three months ago, I was calling for the one-shot liberation in Palestine. I was a fool. I am interested in the liberation of Palestine, but how? Step by step. . . ."

Example: On Dec. 21, Aba Al-Kamid Sayah, the chairman of the Palestine National Council, declared to another Kuwaiti paper: "the liberation of all of Palestine must be the aim of all of us. We must take, and ask for more, without concession. We are acting to acquire what is possible in this stage, and will demand more afterwards."

Example: Arafat now supposedly speaks of Israel's right to exist, yet in an interview in Time magazine on Nov. 7, he stated, "We are opposed to a Zionist state; Zionism is a racist movement, according to a U.N. resolution." To this day, the PLO leader invokes all "relevant" U.N. resolutions on the Middle East, thereby including the infamous "Zionism is racism" canard and its attempted undermining of Israel's legitimacy.

Why quibble over semantics and details? Israel is asked. Why not just talk with the PLO? Our answer is quite simple: so-called semantics and details go to the very heart of the issue.

Israel is not being asked to attend an open-ended negotiating session

with a good-faith partner who has demonstrated a willingness to seek a workable solution. Rather, it is being sold a package of goods, take it or leave it: withdrawal of Israeli forces and the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state with Jerusalem as its capital as prior conditions to the convening of an authoritative, international peace conference under U.N. auspices.

Does that constitute acceptance of U.N. resolutions 242 and 338? Neither resolution speaks of a Palestinian Arab state nor of such an international conference. What about the PLO's dangerous insistence on the applicability of other "relevant" U.N. resolutions, which could include the original partition plan's call for indefensible borders; the right of return of Palestinian Arabs to Israel; the labeling of Zionism, the Jewish people's national liberation movement, as racism; and the calls for economic and political boycotts against Israel?

And what about Arafat's most recent announcement that a Palestinian state would be demilitarized only if Israel itself were to demilitarize and that a corridor, which necessarily would bifurcate Israel, must link the West Bank and Gaza?

What we have here is new packaging designed to appeal to an American, not an Israeli, audience. Inside, the same old product remains: a more stylized attempt to ensure, by stages, Israel's disappearance. This deception will not deter Israel from continuing to search for a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian issue and to the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. But it prevents us from pursuing the path of false peace with disingenuous partners.

Let's be very clear. No nation on earth yearns for peace and tranquility as much as my own. Perhaps it is because we have never known a single day of true peace since our birth 40 years ago. Still, we cannot, we shall not, join in the temptation



to appease the PLO because of weariness over the conflict. The lessons of Europe's failed attempt to appease Hitler ought to remain instructive.

And no nation, I believe, has risked more to achieve peace than Israel: we accepted the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan, even though it reduced the land size of the original League of Nations-mandated Jewish homeland to only a small part of its original area; we extended an outstretched hand of friendship to our neighbors at the time of our birth; we signed a peace treaty with Egypt whereby we relinquished the invaluable strategic depth of the Sinai, together with airfields and oil fields, estimated to have cost our country a staggering \$20 billion; in the Camp David Accords, we recognized "the legitimate rights of the Palestinians" and endorsed a plan for Palestinian

autonomy, transitional arrangements and final-status talks.

Israel and Egypt already have demonstrated that peace can be a viable alternative to war. We remain eager to sit down and talk peace with our other Arab neighbors and with representatives of the Palestinian people. We insist that the violence end. For our part, the government of Israel is now considering elections in the West Bank and Gaza in order to permit a representative leadership of the indigenous population to emerge. We are prepared to discuss autonomy proposals that would transfer significant responsibility to these elected leaders. We are prepared to sit down in direct, face-to-face negotiations on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 with those parties to the conflict who renounce terror and violence and truly recognize our right to exist.

But we are not prepared to commit national suicide. After all, if the world misreads Arafat, we will have to pay the price. Our survival is at stake. There is nothing in the PLO's recent behavior—neither its words nor its deeds—that persuades us that it has changed its terrorist character and is no longer bent on Israel's destruction, nor has there been any discernible modification in the unrelenting hostility of those Arab states that join with the PLO in seeking our disappearance.

Ours is a tough region of the world. Yet we remain ever vigilant to true signals of peace and acceptance to which we shall never hesitate to respond, fully and generously.

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*The writer is Israel's  
ambassador to the United  
States.*

ד"ר: $\frac{1}{2}$ מחיר: 2	טופס מברק קשר ניו-יורק	דחיות:
אל:	מע"ח, מצפ"א, הסברה	סיוג:
דע:	יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשהב"ט, לע"מ, דו"צ קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה, וושינגטון	תזוח: 1600 ט
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# NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 10, 1989

## EDITORIALS

WSJ-"The old world"-Cynical look at European's lassitude on Libyan plant while making fuss over hormone-fed beef; advocates Israel-style destruction of plant. (cabled)

## COLUMNS

NYT:Rosenthal-"The conquest of terrorism"-We know who is responsible for terrorism (Assad,Khomeini,Qadaffi) and should take economic and political action against them. (cabled)

## PRESS REPORTS

### Chemical weapons conference

Setback to conference caused by Arab nuclear-chemical linkage discussed in several articles, including (NYT,Markham-p.1) on moral ambiguity and finger-pointing of conference dimming chance of progress; (NYT,Gordon) on stormy day including Libyan assertion of right to make chem arms and Israeli appeal for new export controls; (ND:Friedman) on Third World defense of chemical arms as deterrent to nuclear attack.

Also articles on Iraqi role in Libyan plant (NYT,Engelberg), Sudanese rebels charge Libyan forces used chem weapons against them (NYT,Pear), Qaddafi threatens U.S. if plant attacked (NYT), Soviets find U.S. proof insufficient (DN), Libyan Info. Ministry officials criticize Rabta press trip as p.r. disaster (ND) and U.N. resolution on Libyan jet downings is softened (NYT,Blair).

### Israel - uprising

Palestinian casualties reported (NYT,DN,WSJ)

### Israel - general

ND:Katz:Decision on erection of Jerusalem sports stadium, a symbol of power struggle between Orthodox and secular Jews.

DN:Israeli hotel loses kosher license due to New Year's sex stunt.

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Lebanon - Moslem fighting rages. (NYT-Hijazi, ND,WSJ,DN)

State Dept. - Anxiety mounts as career officers and political appointees compete for Baker appointments; selection of Eagleburger fueled speculation #3 job may go to political appointee. (NYT,Sciolino)

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דמיפות: כידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קרי: 1
סוג: בלפים	טופס פבוק	כתוב: 4
תאריך וזמן חגורה:		אל: מצטיא, מעיית, ממיד
פס פבוק:	יועץ רוחיים לחקשורת, יועץ שחבייט לחקשורת, לעיית	דע:
הפסיד: בטחון נו יורק	אמין/קשיית, דובר צחיל, ניו-יורק	
38 183 208	פאת: עתוכות וושינגטון	

תדרוך דובר כחפיד ליום JANUARY 10, 1989

Q The Soviet Foreign Minister apparently did not accept as conclusive the evidence the United States presented to the Soviets on Sunday in Paris. Any comment?

MR. REDMAN: Well, that was certainly no surprise to us, and the Secretary said that at the press conference afterwards. He said that the purpose of the amount of information we were able to present was not to be a detailed or conclusive exposition. Those were his words. What was important was that the Soviet Minister understand why it was a serious concern, and that is what the Secretary then made reference to, in saying that he was gratified at the response, and that the Foreign Minister had said they do take these questions of chemical weapons proliferation seriously. They've looked into them and they will continue to look into them. Those are two separate questions.

Q Chuck, this question is on the chemical warfare again. Did that German team arrive here yet?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know whether they've arrived, but those discussions will take place a little later this week.

Q Chuck -- do you know whether the Libyans are still receiving any hardware or materiel for the plant to become fully functional?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any new update on that.

Q Chuck, also on chemical weapons. The Soviets apparently offered today, or Shevardnadze offered, to mediate with the United States in the Libyan matter. What's the US response to that?

MR. REDMAN: I haven't seen that. So until I'd see the details, I really don't have any comment.

תפוצה:

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Q To go back on chemicals again. Apparently there was a report out of Bonn quoting German government sources saying that Shultz had raised the issue of three other firms involved in that Libyan chemical plant with the West German officials. It was an Iraqi --

MR. REDMAN: First -- first, I'm not quite sure that I saw the same reports, if you have paraphrased correctly; but in any case, I will leave it to the West German authorities to decide how they choose to treat this problem.

Q There has been an interview with Qadhafi by an American reporter, and in that interview, Qadhafi said if we can just get through the remaining days of the Reagan administration, things will certainly improve and that perhaps we can open up a dialogue with the new administration. Thus far, the Reagan administration has refused all attempts at secret or public or whatever communication with the Libyans, a dialogue. Is that correct?

MR. REDMAN: I haven't said that we refused anything. I've said there hasn't been anything. There is a channel for communication through our protecting powers. We have used it, as you know, recently to inform them of what happened in the incident between our aircraft. But that is not to say that we turn down

messages coming through that channel.

Q No, not "turn down messages," but basically your public utterance on it is, "communication's not the problem, it's behavior." So, when Qadhafi makes an initiative, as he apparently did a week or two ago through the Italians, the US response to that is basically, you know, "we don't want to talk to you." Is that correct?

MR. REDMAN: Our response is that there are ways of communicating, there are channels, they can be used. But fundamentally, there is still a problem with actions and behavior.

Q But, you have no interest, none whatsoever, to talk with them directly without any intermediaries?

MR. REDMAN: That has never changed. We have a channel, and as I say, there's no problem with using the system that exists.

Q Now that you are letting the Soviet Union to track by themselves if the plant is for chemical weapons, isn't this another way to let the Soviet Union convince Libya to just put off the project of producing chemical weapons?

MR. REDMAN: Our effort throughout has been to convince anyone who has any influence or any way to influence what Libya is doing with that chemical weapons plant --

Q You are putting confidence now in the Soviet Union that they will just solve this problem this way? They are going to tell the truth about the plant?



MR. REDMAN: We are continuing to do what we have always done, which is to ask everyone to use influence. We will, of course, judge for ourselves whether anything happens in the end.

Q Well, along those same lines, do you think the dog fight with the jet fighters has hindered US support around the world to dismantle the chemical weapons plant as you see it?

MR. REDMAN: I don't see any relationship. We said earlier that those two things are totally separate and I don't really see any interplay.

Q Chuck, (you have seen ?) a concern of the Arab world, as seen or as expressed in Paris, about nuclear proliferation and what do you have to offer on this issue?

MR. REDMAN: The first thing I have to offer is the Secretary's speech because the Secretary addressed that issue and I don't know what else I could do. I could give you a brief summary version.

The Secretary said that we're concerned with the proliferation of both chemical and nuclear weapons. We're a signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of CW and we're signatories of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. We urge all other states to adhere to both international agreements. We have also introduced a draft treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that would ban production and use of chemical weapons. So that our position on both of those issues is clear. The ongoing conference in Paris, however, was convened for the purpose of dealing with the erosion, in recent years, of the norms against the use of chemical weapons. We believe that introducing the nuclear issue into this forum can only serve to divert attention from the stated objective of the

conference and could limit its potential effectiveness without advancing the cause of nuclear non-proliferation.

Q There is a concern in the Arab world, as you probably know, and it was voiced in Paris, about Israel's nuclear capability and you have not addressed Israel's nuclear ability in a clear manner to say if you have some apprehension or some fears or concerns about Israel's ability to have the bomb, and this is what concerns the Arab world.

MR. REDMAN: I think I have addressed the question of nuclear non-proliferation many times, how we feel about universal adherence to the NPT and, as a consequence, I think we have been very clear on that, but the relationship between nuclear and chemical in the context of this conference is as I have described it.

Q I just wanted to ask if the United States had any plans to present the Soviets with any more information about the Libyan plant, in an effort to try to persuade them to --

MR. REDMAN: No, I think the meeting in Paris did exactly what we hoped.



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Q But you said the meeting was only, what, ten minutes, and provided only a short amount of time to lay out the case. I just wondered if --

MR. REDMAN: But that was certainly sufficient, because the Soviets said they are concerned about proliferation and they will be looking into it and asking questions.

Q Have there been any new contacts with the PLO? There were some reports floating around this morning that there might have been secret meetings in Tunis.

MR. REDMAN: No.

Q Chuck, can I go back to the issue of the nuclear capability of Israel? You have been timid in addressing the issue of Israel's nuclear capability throughout many, many times -- the danger which it's posing to the Arabs in the Middle East. Do you have anything --

MR. REDMAN: I disagree with your presumption, and as a consequence, I really --

Q No. Do you have anything to allay the fears of the people in the Middle East about nuclear capability of Israel?

MR. REDMAN: I have no further answer.

Q My question is, do you characterize Arab apprehensions about nuclear arms in Israel as legitimate? Valid?

Q This is not the same question.

Q Can you confirm a report by the New York Times this morning quoting rebels from Sudan, saying that the Sudanese government or Libya have used chemical weapons against the rebels?

MR. REDMAN: The -- on this question of chemical weapons, the Sudanese government is well aware of the negative consequences of using CW, and has assured us that it is firmly opposed to chemical weapons use. There is no evidence to indicate otherwise. The SPLA has alleged for months that CW is being stored, but, as far as we are aware, authorized SPLA representatives have never claimed CW has been used.

Q To followup, is there any followup to the CW question in Angola, other than what you had the other day?

MR. REDMAN: No.

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END

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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תאריך : 10.01.89

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תח: פ גס: כנסיות

נד: תפ/נתונה

שמו/מיידי

אומן.

דע ידיד.

ארגונים נוצרים.

א.משיחתי עם התאולוג הלותרני RICHARD NEUHAUS במשרדו  
ב CENTER OF RELIGION AND SOCIETY בניו יורק לפני שובי  
ארצה מעצרת האום.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EVANGELICALS (N.A.E.)  
ארגון גג של הזרם המרכזי והסולידרי בתנועה האוונגליטית.

האיש החשוב בארגון זה הוא BILLY MELVIN שהוא

ה-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. מושבו ליד שיקאגו. כתובת הארגון

P.O.BOX 28. WHEATON, ILL. 60189

בוושינגטון יושב האיש השני בחשיבותו והוא

ROBERT P.DUGAN JR.DIRECTOR.NAE.OFFICE OF PUBLIC

.AFFAIRS

המטפל באופן שוטף בעניינים מדיניים. דוגן כפוף למלווין  
הנל.

כזכור גם ידידנו ג'ורג' וויגל נשיא JAMES MADISON  
FOUNDATION בוושינגטון המליץ מאוד על הקמת קשר עם ארגון

זה. וויגל שהוא קתולי היה בין הקומץ האנשים שהכין את

ה-GUIDELINES של NAE. קבלתי בשעתו ממנו את המצע ואני

מעביר אליך צילום בדיפ. כפי שתראה מהחוברת הארגון ניגש

לעבודה אידאולוגית חינוכית רחבת היקף ובעמודים 37-38

מפורטים המנצחים על המלאכה בארהב. מאחר והן הרושם שלנו



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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EVANGELISTS (N.A.E.)  
DURING JULY 1971

[illegible]

## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

והן עדויות מקרובים מאוד לנושא-וויגל וניוהאוס הינם כי קיימת פתיחות ואף תמיכה בנו בקרב הגופים המאוגדים בארגון, דומה שעלינו לחפש דרך להכניס תשומה שלנו לעבודה ההסברית-חינוכית שמפעיל ארגון זה.

בנוסף לשני ראשי הארגון מלווין ודוגן הנל הריני ממליץ למצוא קשר במשך הזמן באמצעותך או באמצעות הקונכלים הרלבנטיים עם חברי הועד הפועל שבעמוד 8 והפעילים שבעמודים 37-38, כמובן לאחר מאמץ להשגת מידע אלמנטרי עליהם.

ב. ניוהאוס גם הפנה תשומת ליבי לחשיבותו של NATIONAL BAPTIST CONVENTION שמשרדיו העיקריים בשיקאגו.

גוף זה מאגד כ-5 מיליון שחורים. המליץ כי אם אין לנו קשר אתם הרי שראוי מאוד להקים קשר כזה. גוף זה יותר ימני ויותר שמרני ורציני מהכומר השחור ג'סי ג'קסון וניתן למצוא אצלם הבנה כלפינו. הוסיף אף כי הארגון אמנם אינו מתרכז בענייני חוץ אך טפוח קשרים אתו עשוי להועיל לנו. זאת ועוד, נראה לניוהאוס שנוכח היחסים הגרועים בין השחורים והיהודים בארהב חשוב שיהיה לנו קשר טוב עם ארגון כנסייתי של שחורים. גם לבנים רבים בארהב יראו בעין יפה קשר כזה.

ובכן אם אין לנו קשר עם ארגון זה ואם אתה עומד לבקר בשיקאגו בקרוב מוצע כי תיזום ביקור אצל ראשי הארגון. אם ביקור קרוב שלך בשיקאגו אינו צפוי מוצע כי הקונכל בשיקאגו יקיים פגישת היכרות עם ראשי הארגון.

ג. אנא תאם עם הקונכל בשיקאגו בעניין הפגישות עם NAE ועם NATIONAL BAPTIST CONVENTION והברקנא הסיכום.

ד. על חשיבותו של ג'רי פולוול סיפר לי ניוהאוס כי בעוד שפאט רוברטסון התחרה בסגן הנשיא בוש בשלבים המוקדמים של המירוץ לתפקיד המועמד הרפובליקאי לנשיאות הרי פולוול תמך בבוש תמיכה רבת ערך מהרגע הראשון ולכן יש ביכולתו לפנות ישירות לבוש אם רצונו בכך. כדי למנוע ספק אוסיף כי כידוע לך פולוול אינו משתייך ל-NAE (אלא ל-SOUTHERN BAPTIST-CONVENTION).

אורי גורדון



THE BAPTIST CONVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 HAS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTIONS:  
 RESOLUTION NO. 1. WHEREAS the Convention of the United States of America  
 has been organized for the purpose of promoting the Christian  
 faith and the Kingdom of God on earth; and

WHEREAS the Convention of the United States of America  
 has been organized for the purpose of promoting the Christian  
 faith and the Kingdom of God on earth; and

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 has been organized for the purpose of promoting the Christian  
 faith and the Kingdom of God on earth; and

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח,רהמ,ממרהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,רביב,הסברה,כנסיות,  
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דמיפות: בחול לבוקר	שגרירות ישראל/וויטינגטון טופס פרוק	זק: 1
סוג: שמור		פתיק: 20
תאריך וזמן חבול: 9 בינואר 1989 15:50		אל: מצפייא מקשיח-משהבטי מנכ"ל אוצר
פס' פרוק: מפסרד:		דע: ציר כלכלי נספח צבאי-כאן
קטחון 158 164		כאת: ק.לקונגרס

## קונגרס: התקציב הפדרלי

הבוקר 9/1 חגיש ממשל רייגן לקונגרס את בקשת התקציב לשתיא 1990.

רציב החלק הבוגע לסיוע חוץ (פונקציה 150) ולתקציב ההגנה (פונקציה 050).

כפי שהחבטאו מרבית המחקקים שהופיעו לאחרונה בתקשורת, ובמיוחד בתכניות יום אי האחרון, בקשה זו של ממשל רייגן "פחות רלבנטית" מאחר וכולם ממתינים לבקשת ממשל בוש. מכל מקום, בקשה זו (הרציב) תשמש תבסיס לשינויים שיוכנסו עיי הממשל החדש.

הערות בנפרד.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

שהי רהד/גן 1 ג/גן 1 ב/גן 2 ג/גן 1 א/גן 3

תפוצה: 36 + 36

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EAR 1990

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Federal Government bears the primary responsibility for protecting and advancing the interests of the United States and its people in international affairs. The funds for international affairs proposed in this budget are necessary to carry out that responsibility.

For all international affairs programs in 1990, \$18.9 billion in budget authority is requested and outlays of \$17.3 billion are estimated. These amounts represent increases over 1989 levels of \$2.7 billion and \$6.6 billion for budget authority and outlays, respectively. For 1990, new direct loan obligations for international affairs are proposed to be \$0.8 billion, and new guaranteed loan commitments are proposed to be \$10.7 billion.

**Foreign Aid.**—Two budget subfunctions—international security assistance and international development and humanitarian assistance—comprise foreign aid.

**International Security Assistance.**—Security assistance programs are vital to the exercise of national security and foreign policy and serve to strengthen allied and friendly governments where the United States has special security concerns. These programs make it possible for other governments to strengthen their economies and to acquire and use the U.S. military equipment necessary for their defense. Security assistance also helps ensure U.S. access to military bases and facilities overseas. For 1990, budget authority of \$9.1 billion is proposed. Outlays for 1990 are estimated to be \$8.4 billion, an increase of \$5.6 billion over 1989. The substantial increase is because the large reduction in 1989 outlays resulting from prepayments of past military loans will not recur in 1990.

**Foreign Military Sales Financing.**—This renamed program provides grant financing for foreign governments to purchase U.S. military equipment, training, and design and construction services for their security needs. In previous years, this activity was carried in two separate accounts. For 1990, budget authority of \$5.0 billion is requested and net outlays of \$3.8 billion are estimated. Much of this assistance will be aimed at promoting peace in the Middle East as well as maintaining democracy in Central America and the Philippines.

**Economic Support Fund.**—This program provides grants to over 40 countries. The largest portion goes to countries where there are major U.S. political and security concerns. The grants help accomplish two goals: (1) they provide general budget and balance of payments support to friendly governments, and (2) they help finance individual development projects that also serve national security objectives. The proposed budget authority for 1990 is \$3.3

or all defense-related programs, \$318 million in 1990 and

ENSE

	Estimate		
	1990	1991	1992
38	-48	-48	-48
21	1,672	1,624	1,576
18	-48	-48	-48
11	1,672	1,624	1,576

high level of readiness in case of a national emergency include national defense of automated regiments and training of Reserve units necessary to set up a post-mobilization of health care units. For 1991 are \$26 and \$27

security in all of Central America and the Caribbean for 1989 and 1990 are \$26 and \$27

also provided military equipment excluded from taxable income. Estimated at \$2.3 billion



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## THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990

billion. Outlays for 1990 are estimated to be \$3.5 billion. Middle Eastern and Central American countries will also be major recipients under the program.

In the past the budget has contained funds to advance democracy in Nicaragua and promote security throughout Central America. It is intended that additional assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance will subsequently be requested for 1989, as well as for 1990 in the context of future plans for peace and democratic reform in the region.

*International Development and Humanitarian Assistance.*—An important complement to security assistance are international development and humanitarian assistance programs. These programs are designed to encourage the expansion of a market-oriented international economic system through budgetary support, capital projects, and technical assistance. They also provide funds for the relief of major disasters and for on-going humanitarian purposes such as refugee care. Budget authority requested for 1990 is \$5.4 billion. Outlays for 1990 are estimated at \$4.8 billion.

*Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).*—The United States purchases equity in the World Bank group of institutions and regional banks for Latin America, Asia, and Africa. These institutions provided more than \$25.4 billion in long-term loans and technical assistance in calendar year 1987 and promoted sound economic policies in recipient countries. Lending programs are funded through the direct contributions of members and through borrowing in world capital markets, backed by guaranteed repayment of that borrowing by member governments. Both are provided in accord with multiyear international agreements to replenish the resources of each bank.

To carry out U.S. pledges to the MDBs, budget authority of \$1.6 billion is requested for 1990. More than half of this budget authority will be used to support the International Development Association, a World Bank affiliate that lends to the poorest countries on concessional terms. Of the remaining funds, \$314 million will be used to make up for arrearages on past commitments and the balance will be used to make authorized annual payments to the other multilateral banks.

*International Organizations.*—Contributions of \$209 million in budget authority are recommended for 1990 for several developmental, humanitarian, and scientific programs carried out by the United Nations and other international organizations—\$17 million less than the 1989 level. The administration believes that, useful as some of these programs may be, a higher priority must be afforded other foreign assistance activities accomplishing the same objectives.



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EAR 1990

be \$3.5 billion. Middle will also be major recipi-

ds to advance democracy out Central America. It is Nicaraguan democrati- d for 1989, as well as for e and democratic reform

Italian Assistance.—An ice are international de- ograms. These programs n of a market-oriented dgetary support, capital so provide funds for the humanitarian purposes requested for 1990 is \$5.4 4.8 billion.

3s).—The United States oup of institutions and nd Africa. These institu- ong-term loans and tech- promoted sound econom- g programs are funded ers and through borrow- uaranteed repayment of . Both are provided in ements to replenish the

budget authority of \$1.6 if of this budget author- al Development Associa- the poorest countries on ds. \$314 million will be it commitments and the annual payments to the

ions of \$209 million in 990 for several develop- rams carried out by the ganizations—\$17 million n believes that, useful as priority must be afforded plishing the same objec-

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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## NATIONAL NEED: CONDUCTING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(Functional costs 110 - 4 million of dollars)

Major missions and programs	Actual 1988	Estimate			
		1989	1990	1991	1992
<b>BUDGET AUTHORITY</b>					
<b>Foreign aid:</b>					
International security assistance:					
Foreign military sales (FMS) financing	4,049	4,273	5,027	5,110	5,181
FMS prepayments	532	+ 850			
Guarantee reserve fund	701	534	720	523	489
Military assistance	3,269	467	40	41	42
Economic support fund	117	3,258	3,349	3,404	3,452
Other	-70	125	98	100	101
Offsetting receipts		-127	-150	-203	-396
Subtotal, international security assistance	8,598	7,741	9,084	8,975	8,869
International development and humanitarian assistance:					
Multilateral development banks	1,208	1,315	1,637	1,483	1,408
International organizations	245	228	209	212	215
Agency for International Development	2,339	2,338	2,383	2,409	2,441
Existing law			200	200	200
Proposed legislation			22	27	29
Proposed credit reform					
P.L. 480 food aid:	1,060	1,098	931	1,056	1,077
Existing law			-208	-217	-222
Proposed credit reform	362	412	380	355	343
Refugee assistance					
Other:	293	308	334	341	347
Existing law			28	31	32
Proposed credit reform	-483	-480	-505	-520	-545
Offsetting receipts					
Subtotal, international development and humanitarian assistance	5,022	5,216	5,411	5,376	5,325
Subtotal, Foreign aid	13,620	12,957	14,495	14,351	14,194
Conduct of foreign affairs:					
Administration of foreign affairs:					
Existing law	2,038	2,061	2,280	2,329	2,376
Proposed credit reform					
International organizations and conferences	515	521	832	831	861
Other	78	82	91	89	90
Subtotal, Conduct of foreign affairs	2,631	2,665	3,204	3,249	3,326
Foreign information and exchange activities	1,066	1,127	1,386	1,184	1,159
International financial programs:					
Export-Import Bank:					
Existing law	8	110	100		328
Proposed credit reform			136	163	159
Foreign military sales trust fund (net)	-835	-582	-500	-650	-420
International monetary programs:					
Existing law	796		150		
Proposed legislation			-94	-96	-98
Offsetting receipts	-90	-92			
Subtotal, international financial programs	-123	-564	-208	-593	-31
Total, budget authority	17,184	16,186	18,877	18,191	18,647

\$100,000 in 1991

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## THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990

## NATIONAL NEED: CONDUCTING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(Functional Code 250 in millions of dollars)

Major missions and programs	ACTUAL 1988	ESTIMATE			
		1989	1990	1991	1992
OUTLAYS					
Foreign aid:					
International security assistance:					
Foreign military sales (FMS) financing	3,078	3,227	3,791	3,901	4,528
FMS prepayments	-3,152	-5,000			
Guarantee reserve fund	659	599	720	523	489
Military assistance	607	599	499	172	71
Economic support fund	3,269	3,361	3,467	3,502	3,551
Other	109	162	101	100	100
Offsetting receipts	-70	-127	-150	-203	-396
Subtotal, international security assistance	4,500	2,823	8,428	7,995	8,343
International development and humanitarian assistance:					
Multilateral development banks	1,235	1,302	1,326	1,391	1,373
International organizations	263	247	236	231	226
Agency for International Development:					
Existing law	2,082	2,136	2,254	2,303	2,348
Proposed legislation			150	180	200
Proposed credit reform			5	14	21
P.L. 480 food aid:					
Existing law	1,060	1,098	931	1,056	1,077
Proposed credit reform			-208	-217	-222
Refugee assistance	378	410	404	367	347
Other:					
Existing law	170	195	212	217	241
Proposed credit reform			1	8	13
Offsetting receipts	-483	-480	-505	-520	-545
Subtotal, international development and humanitarian assistance	4,703	4,997	4,805	5,030	5,079
Subtotal, Foreign aid	9,203	7,820	13,233	13,025	13,422
Conduct of foreign affairs:					
Administration of foreign affairs:					
Existing law	2,092	2,186	2,209	2,231	2,276
Proposed credit reform					
International organizations and conferences	547	538	809	816	860
Other	90	98	99	89	90
Subtotal, Conduct of foreign affairs	2,729	2,822	3,117	3,136	3,225
Foreign information and exchange activities	1,051	1,154	1,263	1,289	1,218
International financial programs:					
Export-Import Bank:					
Existing law	-894	-862	-218	-421	-530
Proposed credit reform			61	101	130
Foreign military sales trust fund (net)	93	125	120	108	135
International monetary programs:					
Existing law	-136				
Proposed legislation			3	5	8
Special defense acquisition fund	13	-28	-57	-60	-8
Exchange stabilization fund	-1,498	-100	-107	-107	-107
Offsetting receipts	-90	-92	-94	-96	-98
Subtotal, international financial programs	-2,513	-957	-291	-470	-470
Total, outlays	10,471	10,748	17,322	18,980	17,394

\* \$100,000 in thousands



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## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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*Agency for International Development (AID).*—This agency carries out bilateral development assistance programs in more than 60 countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia as well as being the primary implementing agency for Economic Support Fund programs and P.L. 480 food aid. The agency also supports the overseas humanitarian relief and development programs of U.S. private and voluntary organizations and assists development-related research activities in U.S. universities. Proposed budget authority for AID programs for 1990 is \$2.6 billion.

AID funds include \$586 million for the Development Fund for Africa with funding increases targeted for the economic policy reform program. Principal objectives of bilateral development programs include meeting the basic human needs of aid recipients, supporting sound economic policies in recipient countries, using the private sector as a vehicle for economic growth, improving the capability of indigenous institutions in developing countries, and increasing the use of science and technology in development.

In 1990, the budget assumes the creation of a new account for Special Assistance Initiatives (SAI). The SAI would provide funds for joint efforts with bilateral and multilateral donors to meet extraordinary economic assistance needs. The SAI would be inaugurated in 1990 with \$200 million for the Philippines. These resources would be used to help nurture economic growth, thereby fostering the consolidation of Philippine democracy.

*Public Law 480 Food Aid.*—This program provides U.S. agricultural commodities to foreign governments under either long term (up to 40 years) low interest rate (2 to 3 percent) loans or through grants. Food aid commodities are limited to those declared by the Secretary of Agriculture to be available in excess of normal domestic and commercial export needs.

The U.S. agricultural sector benefits when these available commodities are exported in a manner that does not displace commercial exports. The food aid program serves U.S. objectives in promoting international security, agricultural export market development, and economic development. Recipients of these loans benefit by saving their scarce foreign exchange to import non-food goods and services beneficial to economic development.

Under the Title II grant program, food aid is targeted by foreign governments and private and voluntary organizations, as well as international organizations, mainly to needy children, pregnant women, and refugees. Title II also constitutes the U.S. Government's primary response mechanism to emergency food needs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Excluding the financing effects of credit reform, the budget includes a total P.L. 480 program level of \$1.5 billion, with a request of \$931 million in 1990 budget authority and outlays. The budget



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## THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990

authority and outlay amounts are nearly \$167 million below 1989 because of technical financing changes. Program levels remain the same as 1989.

**Refugee Assistance.**—Budget authority of \$380 million is proposed in 1990 for assistance to refugees abroad, primarily in Africa, the Near East, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia; for the admission of up to 81,000 refugees and Asian-American immigrants to the United States; and for refugee emergencies. Together with the continuing needs of existing refugee populations, this admissions level will cover the major inflow of Armenians and Soviet Jews into the United States. This budget request continues United States leadership in international humanitarian programs to assist refugees. Additional funding for refugee assistance in the United States is discussed under the domestic income security function of the budget.

**Conduct of Foreign Affairs.**—Funds for this group of programs primarily cover the operating costs of the Department of State in carrying out diplomatic and consular activities with foreign governments. Contributions to international organizations of which the United States is a member are also included here. For 1990, \$3.2 billion of budget authority is requested, and \$3.1 billion in outlays are estimated. These figures represent an increase over 1989 of \$602 million and \$381 million for budget authority and outlays, respectively.

**Administration of Foreign Affairs.**—To promote U.S. interests abroad, diplomatic and consular relations are maintained with foreign governments at 262 posts throughout the world. The overall request for 1990 budget authority is \$2.3 billion, \$0.2 billion above 1989, with estimated outlays of \$2.2 billion. The request for regular State Department operations will increase funding for a more efficient Department of State telecommunications network and for improved word and data processing capabilities. In addition, second year funding is requested for a new Foreign Service Institute facility in Arlington, Virginia.

The 1990 request also provides for the diplomatic security program, which protects U.S. officials and facilities abroad against terrorist or other attacks, as well as counteracting foreign intelligence gathering activities. Requested funding for diplomatic security operating expenses will enhance the surveillance of the construction of U.S. embassies. It will also permit the continuation of high priority perimeter security, office equipment protection against electronic spying, and replacement of certain foreign national employees in communist countries. In addition, the administration is requesting funds for three new high priority construction projects in Thailand, West Germany, and Papua New Guinea, while continuing work on 57 ongoing projects.



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## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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**International Organizations and Conferences.**—The United States remains committed to effective participation in international organizations in pursuit of important U.S. interests. In recent years, the United States has successfully pressed for implementation of the administrative and program budget reforms required to rebuild confidence in the operational effectiveness and policy relevance of these organizations. Budget authority of \$832 million in 1990 is proposed for assessed contributions to international organizations and international peacekeeping activities and to begin the payment of arrearages owed to international organizations. The request recognizes progress made thus far by the United Nations and other international organizations in the area of budget reform by including funds for the full U.S. assessed contribution to these organizations. The request also provides for increased international peacekeeping needs in the Persian Gulf and southern Africa. In addition, the budget requests \$46 million to pay part of the arrearages that have accumulated on past year's assessments. These funds would be directed toward special activities that are mutually agreed upon by the United States and the respective international organizations, and their payment would be conditional upon such agreements.

## CREDIT PROGRAMS—INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

(in millions of dollars)

	Actual 1988	Estimate			
		1989	1990	1991	1992
<b>Direct loans:</b>					
Foreign military sales credit:					
New obligations	4,049	410			
Change in outstandings	-2,901	-4,899	466	322	-461
Outstandings	22,034	17,135	17,601	17,923	17,462
Economic support fund:					
New obligations	98				
Change in outstandings	58	9	9	6	-37
Outstandings	6,368	6,377	6,385	6,391	6,354
Development credit:					
New obligations	49				
Change in outstandings	-136	-199	-214	-227	-246
Outstandings	12,774	12,576	12,361	12,134	11,888
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (credit reform):					
New obligations			17	17	17
Change in outstandings			1	7	11
Outstandings			1	8	19
Overseas Private Investment Corporation:					
New obligations	23	23			
Change in outstandings	2	5	4	*	-7
Outstandings	51	57	61	61	53
AID private sector loans (credit reform):					
New obligations			4		
Change in outstandings				1	1
Outstandings				1	2
AID private sector revolving fund:					
New obligations	9	5			
Change in outstandings	5	5	*	-5	-8
Outstandings	23	28	28	24	16



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## THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990

## CREDIT PROGRAMS—INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS—Continued

(In millions of dollars)

	Actual 1988	Summary			
		1989	1990	1991	1992
AID housing & other guarantee programs:					
Change in outstandings	26	26	34	21	19
Outstandings	119	145	179	199	218
Public Law 480 food aid (credit reform):					
New obligations			747	759	770
Change in outstandings			740	731	758
Outstandings			740	1,471	2,229
Public Law 480 food aid:					
New obligations	837	791			
Change in outstandings	413	582	-191	-176	-197
Outstandings	11,632	12,214	12,024	11,847	11,651
Export-Import Bank:					
New obligations	693	695			
Change in outstandings	-1,308	-1,376	-658	-738	-775
Outstandings	9,905	8,530	7,871	7,133	6,358
Other:					
New obligations	1	1	1	1	1
Change in outstandings	634	593	720	523	489
Outstandings	1,966	2,560	3,279	3,803	4,292
Total, direct loans:					
New obligations	5,759	1,924	768	777	788
Change in outstandings	-3,206	-5,253	911	465	-457
Outstandings	64,873	59,620	60,531	60,996	60,544
Guaranteed loans:					
Foreign military sales credit:					
New commitments	2,480	5,000			
Change in outstandings	2,460	4,980	-223	-229	-237
Outstandings	2,600	7,580	7,357	7,128	6,892
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (credit reform):					
New commitments			175	178	180
Change in outstandings			12	69	114
Outstandings			12	81	195
Overseas Private Investment Corporation:					
New commitments	200	175			
Change in outstandings	58	72	92	64	-70
Outstandings	366	437	529	594	523
AID private sector loans (credit reform):					
New commitments			50	75	100
Change in outstandings			*	6	27
Outstandings			*	7	29
AID private sector revolving fund:					
New commitments		50			
Change in outstandings		25			
Outstandings		25	25	25	25
AID housing guarantee programs (credit reform):					
New commitments			100	100	100
Change in outstandings			20	50	90
Outstandings			20	80	170
AID housing & other guarantee programs:					
New commitments	125	125			
Change in outstandings	81	109	98	67	30
Outstandings	1,409	1,518	1,616	1,683	1,713
Export-Import Bank:					
New commitments	5,739	10,200			
Change in outstandings	624	960	-958	-801	-650
Outstandings	5,703	6,664	5,695	4,895	4,245
Export-Import Bank (credit reform)					
New commitments			10,384	10,555	10,703



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## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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## CREDIT PROGRAMS—INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS—Continued

(in millions of dollars)

	Actual 1988	Firmly			
		1989	1990	1991	1992
Change in outstandings.....			1,779	1,356	1,296
Outstandings.....			1,779	3,135	4,431
Total, guaranteed loans:					
New commitments.....	8,544	15,550	10,709	10,908	11,083
Change in outstandings.....	3,224	6,145	810	594	595
Outstandings.....	10,079	16,224	17,034	17,628	18,223
Total, new obligations and new commitments.....	14,304	17,474	10,730	10,926	11,101

\* \$500,000 = M\$1

**Foreign Information and Exchange Activities.**—An important objective of this administration is to increase international understanding of American society and U.S. foreign policy. The United States Information Agency (USIA) seeks to do so through personal contacts, academic and leadership exchanges, satellite television broadcasting, Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasting, distribution of books and periodicals, English language teaching, and the operation of libraries and cultural centers in 127 countries. For 1990, the administration proposes \$951 million in budget authority for USIA. The budget reaffirms the administration's commitment to a streamlined radio modernization program that focuses on completion of USIA's top two priority radio transmitter projects. To accomplish this, the 1990 request provides \$89 million in budget authority for radio construction, primarily for new relay facilities in Morocco and Thailand. In recognition of the congressional initiative to develop a television broadcast service for Cuba, the Administration is conducting tests in the Florida area in order to assess the feasibility and technical requirements of such a system. Congress has indicated that it will not consider final action until the tests are completed and results evaluated.

The Board for International Broadcasting provides grants to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc. (RFE/RL), which broadcasts in 22 languages to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For 1990, \$425 million of budget authority is requested for the Board. This includes \$207 million for construction of a high priority shortwave radio relay station in Israel, to be used by both RFE/RL and the VOA. Funds totalling \$28 million are proposed to complete the refurbishment of a relay station in Portugal, another high priority project that will improve the audibility of RFE/RL's broadcast.

**International Financial Programs.**—To assist in the steady growth of the international economy, the United States conducts



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## THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990

programs to improve the international financial system and to facilitate U.S. participation in world trade, including arms sales. For 1990, offsetting collections are expected to exceed outlays by \$291 million, primarily because Export-Import Bank loan repayments are expected to exceed new loan commitments.

*Export-Import Bank.*—The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) administers direct loan, guarantee, and insurance programs to promote U.S. export sales. The Reagan administration has had notable success in international negotiations to reduce subsidies on direct loans by about 90 percent since 1980. As a result, the administration proposes that Eximbank's direct loan program be terminated in 1990. The Bank's broad range of loan guarantee and insurance programs (89 percent of Eximbank's 1988 activity) can provide comprehensive financial support for U.S. exporters, including small businesses. A \$100 million "war chest" grant program is retained to ensure implementation of the international Tied-Aid Credit Agreement and encourage improvement in the existing arrangement. Collections for 1990 are estimated to exceed outlays by \$216 million.

*International Monetary Fund.*—The 1990 budget recommends a U.S. contribution of \$150 million to the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of the International Monetary Fund. The ESAF was created at the end of 1987 to provide balance of payments assistance on concessional terms to low-income developing countries, particularly in Africa, that face serious economic problems. The U.S. contribution will be used to subsidize the interest payments on ESAF loans. Total ESAF resources in 1990 are expected to be \$9.6 billion (at current exchange rates), many times the amount to be provided by the United States to this facility.

*Tax Expenditures.*—In an effort to encourage exports, a portion of the profits from the export sales of foreign sales corporations (FSCs) is not taxed. Also, Americans working abroad are permitted to exclude substantial amounts of earned income and housing allowances from taxation. Tax expenditures resulting from FSCs and the foreign earned-income exclusion are an estimated \$0.7 billion and \$1.9 billion, respectively, for 1990. Additional estimated tax expenditures of \$4.7 billion, \$100 million, and \$105 million result from the source rules exception for inventory property sales, the interest allocation rules exception for certain nonfinancial institutions, and the deferral of income tax on the undistributed earnings of foreign corporations controlled by U.S. shareholders. Total tax expenditures for international affairs are estimated to be \$7.5 billion in 1990.







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loan guarantees, regulations, or other tax law provisions.

Tax expenditures are discussed in the functional presentation that follows so that they may be compared with outlays and loan guarantees that serve similar purposes. To aid in this comparison all tax expenditures estimates in Part 5 are shown as outlay equivalents—that is, the amount of outlays that would be required to provide the same level of after-tax benefits if direct spending programs were substituted for the tax expenditure. The definition and measurement of tax expenditures are discussed in Part 7 of this volume and in Special Analysis G, "Tax Expenditures."

**Relationship to Other Budget Tables.**—The following tables appear in other parts of this volume and supplement the tables shown in Part 5:

- Outlays by function and subfunction for 1980 through 1990, in Table 16 of Part 10.
- Budget authority and outlays by function for 1988 through 1994, in Tables 6 and 3, respectively, of Part 10.
- Budget authority and outlays for 1988 through 1990 for each agency and account, in Part 9. Each account has a 3-digit code indicating the function and subfunction in which it is classified.

Data for earlier years are published in *Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1990*.

The objectives of the national defense program are to protect the United States and its allies from foreign aggression and to maintain sufficient military strength to deter both nuclear and conventional war. Should armed conflict nonetheless occur, we must be prepared to defend ourselves successfully, while limiting the scope and intensity of the conflict.

Carrying out these objectives requires a full range of defense capabilities. These include survivable and flexible capabilities for nuclear deterrence; strong maritime, air, and ground forces forward deployed in Europe and other critical areas; and the means to deploy reinforcements rapidly from the United States and to sustain our military forces anywhere in the world.

Budget authority for national defense declined in real terms for the fourth straight year with funding of \$238.8 billion provided in 1989. This decline in real defense funding levels has resulted in smaller annual procurements of equipment, ammunition, and war reserve stocks than previously planned, slower development of new weapons, and delays in equipment maintenance. To reverse this adverse trend, the budget proposes sustained, moderate real growth of about 2 percent per year in 1990 and after. In comparison to last year's estimates, total 1989-1993 funding for national defense is lower by \$19.1 billion.

As required by the Defense Authorization Act of 1986, a two-year budget for 1990 and 1991 is submitted for national defense. The budget proposes \$315.2 billion in budget authority and estimates \$303.0 billion in outlays for the national defense function in 1990 and \$330.8 billion in budget authority and \$314.4 billion in outlays for 1991. These levels are below those projected in last year's budget request, (\$316.4 billion and \$333.7 billion, respectively, for budget authority).

The accompanying table shows budget authority and outlays for the three national defense subfunctions: military functions of the Department of Defense, atomic energy defense activities, and defense-related activities of other agencies.

**Department of Defense—Military.**—Budget authority of \$305.6 billion in 1990 and \$320.9 billion in 1991 is requested for the military functions of the Department of Defense (DOD). The budget provides for continuing efforts to:

- modernize all components of U.S. strategic forces to ensure that they deter nuclear attack by virtue of their ability to survive and retaliate should an attack occur;
- develop and procure conventional equipment for essential modernization of U.S. conventional forces;

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# NATIONAL DEFENSE

Fiscal year 1991, in billions of dollars

Major activities and programs	Actual 1988	Estimate			
		1989	1990	1991	1992
<b>BUDGET AUTHORITY</b>					
Department of Defense—Military:					
Military personnel	76,584	78,566	79,845	82,060	84,283
Operation and maintenance	81,629	85,939	91,725	95,518	97,245
Procurement	84,853	79,232	84,115	90,894	99,759
Research, development, test and evaluation	54,521	37,542	41,024	40,252	42,372
Military construction	5,349	5,701	5,200	5,937	7,104
Family housing	3,795	3,266	3,280	3,671	3,958
Resolving funds and other	1,274	749	852	968	1,224
Offsetting receipts	-855	-811	-786	-749	-759
Allowances: Other legislation (proposed)			305	358	524
Subtotal, Department of Defense—Military	283,755	290,186	306,645	320,909	335,710
Atomic energy defense activities	7,749	8,140	9,027	9,389	9,862
Defense-related activities	504	519	521	525	531
Total, budget authority	292,008	298,885	315,193	330,823	345,103
<b>OUTLAYS</b>					
Department of Defense—Military:					
Military personnel	76,337	78,229	79,377	81,625	83,833
Operation and maintenance	84,475	85,394	88,671	92,685	95,558
Procurement	87,166	80,651	78,711	82,112	85,840
Research, development, test and evaluation	54,792	37,023	38,700	40,118	41,672
Military construction	5,874	5,751	5,361	5,313	5,747
Family housing	3,082	3,215	3,353	3,521	3,735
Resolving funds and other	1,065	344	330	870	870
Offsetting receipts	-855	-811	-786	-749	-759
Allowances: Other legislation (proposed)			107	226	354
Subtotal, Department of Defense—Military	281,935	289,609	293,620	304,721	316,250
Atomic energy defense activities	7,913	7,945	8,647	9,177	9,653
Defense-related activities	512	519	524	528	535
Total, outlays	290,361	298,055	302,981	313,426	326,439

- maintain the readiness and improve the combat sustainability of conventional forces;
- develop sufficient sealift and airlift capacity to ensure that U.S. forces can be rapidly deployed overseas in order to protect our critical interests, support our allies, and allow continued access to essential resources; and
- strengthen alliances and coalitions to protect U.S. interests worldwide and, in particular, to achieve NATO objectives.

Budget authority estimates for the Department of Defense—Military are displayed by mission category in the following table.

**Strategic Forces**—The budget continues the President's strategic modernization program, which is essential for strengthening deterrence and achieving meaningful arms control agreements. Main-

taining a modern triad of strategic forces remains the highest defense priority. Nevertheless, some adjustments to individual strategic programs have been made as part of the administration's efforts to fit within reduced defense budget levels.

U.S. bomber forces are being modernized by acquiring the B-2 bomber, a modernized short-range attack missile (SRAM II), and the advanced cruise missile. B-1B bomber production was completed in 1988 with the delivery of the one-hundredth aircraft. Continued procurement of the Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is proposed, to provide for operational and reliability testing and for deployment in rail garrisons. To continue the modernization of U.S. submarine-based forces, the budget provides for procurement of one new Trident ballistic missile submarine each year, as well as procurement of the new Trident II missile. Finally, the budget also supports continued improvements to strategic command and control systems, as well as to early warning and strategic defense capabilities. These programs for strategic forces are essential to ensure that the U.S. deterrent remains strong in the near term and through the 1990's.

## MISSION CATEGORIES: DEFENSE, MILITARY \*

(Fiscal year 1991, in billions of dollars)

Major activities and programs	1988 Actual	Estimate		
		1989	1990	1991
Strategic forces *	19.8	21.2	23.4	27.6
General purpose forces	114.9	112.8	117.8	122.8
Intelligence and communications	28.3	29.6	31.7	32.8
Air and sealift	4.4	5.4	6.3	7.3
Guard and reserve	16.9	17.2	17.7	17.8
Research and development *	28.4	29.1	32.1	32.6
Central supply and maintenance	24.3	25.3	27.0	28.1
Training, medical, and other general personnel activities	37.3	38.5	40.0	42.1
Administration and associated activities	6.7	6.3	5.9	6.3
Support of other nations	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.1
Special operations forces	2.0	3.2	3.1	2.6
Total, budget authority	283.8	290.2	305.6	320.9

\* Preliminary data, subject to revision.

\* Excludes strategic systems development included in the research and development category.

\* Excludes research and development in other program areas, as systems approach for production.

**General Purpose Forces**—U.S. conventional forces must be able to respond effectively to all levels of potential conflict—up to and including a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact—while retaining the flexibility to meet other threats. The budget provides support for 18 active-duty Army divisions, 3 Marine divisions, 3 Marine and 13 Navy active-duty tactical airwings, the equivalent of nearly 24 active-duty wings of Air Force tactical aircraft, a 574-ship Navy in 1990 and a 571-ship Navy (including strategic missile submarines and support ships) in 1991.



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The Defense Appropriations Act for 1989 requires the submission of information on the costs of overseas military units and dependents accompanying military personnel abroad. This information will be provided separately by the Department of Defense.

Army General Purpose Forces.—The budget provides for new weapons to improve the firepower, mobility, and survivability of Army forces, and supports the maintenance and training of these

Under the 1990-91 budget request, the Army would procure 448 M-1 Abrams tanks in 1990 and 261 in 1991. Also, the budget proposes procurement of 600 Bradley fighting vehicles a year in 1990 and 1991. The budget would continue procurement of Apache helicopters at a rate of 12 per year and includes funds for buying 83 Blackhawk utility and Special Operations Forces helicopters a year in 1990 and 1991.

The budget continues procurement of air defense missile systems such as the short-range Stinger and Chaparral missiles and the long-range Patriot area defense system. Procurement of a new Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) system to provide short-range air defense for mechanized infantry and armored divisions will continue.

The 1990-91 budget would support the Army's 18 active and 10 reserve divisions. About 800 older utility helicopters would be eliminated from the Army force structure.

Navy General Purpose Forces.—Naval forces are essential for protecting our national interests in many parts of the world. In peacetime, these forces demonstrate our capability to honor national commitments, as shown by our recent successful naval operations in the Persian Gulf. In wartime, they would engage in offensive operations and protect the movement at sea of U.S. military forces and vital supplies.

The Navy's deployable battle force ships will increase from 568 ships in 1989 to 574 ships in 1990. As a result of retaining a large number of older ships, however, the number will decrease to 571 ships in 1991. The 1990-91 shipbuilding plan provides for the construction of 32 conventional force ships, including 4 nuclear attack submarines, 10 guided missile destroyers, 2 amphibious ships, and 16 other ships.

The budget continues modernization of the 13 Navy and 3 Marine Corps active tactical airwings and 24 active land-based patrol air squadrons. Procurement of the F-14, F-18, and AV-8B aircraft for tactical airwings as well as the SH-60B Lamplighters ship-based and the SH-60F carrier-based anti-submarine helicopters is proposed. The budget also funds development and initial procurement of the Advanced Tactical Aircraft, the A-12, which will replace the medium range A-6 attack aircraft.

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To sustain the substantial increase in naval readiness that has occurred since 1980, the budget will fund the same levels of flying hours per flight crew and steaming days per ship that have been achieved in recent years. However, some maintenance of equipment and facilities will be deferred.

Air Force General Purpose Forces.—The Air Force's tactical forces include fighter, attack, and support aircraft that are employed to gain air superiority and to conduct attacks against enemy ground forces and interdiction targets. Active fighter and attack and attack units of the active Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve together provide the equivalent of 35 fully-equipped wings in 1990, a reduction of 3 wing equivalents from the 1988 force level. In addition to these forces, units equipped with the F-117A stealth fighter are now operational. The Air Force plans to procure 36 F-15E aircraft a year in 1990 and 1991, as well as 150 F-16 multi-mission fighters each year. Improvements in readiness and combat sustainability will continue. Monthly aircrew flying hours will be maintained near the 1989 level. To enhance air-to-air combat capability and sustainability, the budget provides for procurement of 1,450 advanced medium range air-to-air missiles for the Air Force in 1990 and 2,200 in 1991. These are sizeable increases over the 1989 procurement level of 874 missiles.

Intelligence and Communications.—To employ our weapon systems and forces effectively, we must be able to direct them in accordance with national policy and military strategy. Information on friendly, hostile, and potentially hostile forces must be gathered and evaluated to aid decision makers. Decisions and operational orders, in turn, must be communicated to the appropriate forces. The budget seeks improvements in intelligence and communications by providing for development and modernization of command centers, sensors, computers, satellites, and other data-gathering and communication links. These improvements will be made in five broad mission areas: strategic and non-strategic nuclear force management; theater and tactical force management; world-wide information and communication systems; electronic warfare; and intelligence.

The budget requests funds to support an initiative in last year's budget to modernize and upgrade our verification capabilities. These capabilities will help the U.S. verify future arms control agreements, ensure compliance with these agreements, and keep pace with changes in technologies in other nations. *Aviation and Sealift Forces*—The ability to deploy military forces to crisis areas and to sustain them once deployed depends on airlift and sealift forces.



The budget proposes increasing funded airlift capability to 38.2 million ton miles per day by 1991, compared to 28.5 million ton miles per day in 1980. As previously planned, the procurement of C-17 cargo aircraft increases from 6 in 1990 to 10 in 1991 as production increases toward an economical production rate.

Government-controlled sealift capability will have increased under this administration from 550,000 short tons in 1980 to 895,000 short tons in 1991 in this budget. Part of this sealift fleet, the Ready Reserve Fleet maintained by the Maritime Administration, will be funded by the Transportation Department and in the transportation function (subfunction 403) beginning in 1990.

Stockpiling equipment and materials near potential trouble spots greatly aids the deployment of forces to distant areas. The Army has stockpiled in Europe heavy equipment for four divisions and supporting units, but the acquisition of equipment for two more divisions has been slowed. Equipment to support the rapid deployment of tactical fighter squadrons is also being stockpiled in Europe.

*National Guard and Reserves.*—Guard and Reserve forces are essential partners of the active forces in supporting national defense. Total Selected Reserve strength of 1,170,744 in 1989 will increase to 1,178,300 in 1990 and 1,181,700 in 1991. Full-time support personnel, who provide training and administer Reserve programs, will increase from 71,814 in 1989 to 73,709 in 1990 and 74,772 in 1991. In addition, upgrading of Guard and Reserve equipment continues.

*Research and Development.*—This category includes funds for all research and development (R&D) except improvements to systems that are already operational. Weapon systems are developed, tested, and evaluated to meet new military requirements. At the same time, a strong research and technology base allows continued investigation into promising new technologies and guards against technological surprise by potential adversaries.

Major strategic force development programs include rail garrison basing for the Peacekeeper ICBM, the Trident II submarine-launched missile, the B-2 bomber, and the advanced cruise missile. The budget requests \$5.6 billion for R&D and military construction for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1990. Additional SDI funding of \$0.3 billion is requested in the Department of Energy budget. Overall, SDI funding for 1990 is \$1.3 billion above the level provided in 1989.

Development programs for general purpose forces that are approaching completion and transition to production include the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, the C-17 transport aircraft, and the A-12 attack aircraft. Full-scale development of the advanced tactical fighter aircraft would begin in 1991. Major anti-submarine warfare

efforts are also funded including development of the SSN-21 attack submarine and a new long-range maritime patrol aircraft. In addition, the Army continues development of its new light helicopter, advanced anti-tank weapon systems, precision artillery munitions, as well as systems for air defense.

*Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities.*—This category includes recruiting, training, and providing medical care to active duty personnel, dependents, and retirees. The budget proposes an increase in resources for recruiting because of the low U.S. unemployment rate, which tends to make recruiting more difficult. Recent innovations to provide more rigorous and realistic training are continued or expanded.

The budget proposes a two-year pilot program to introduce copayments in the provision of health care to non-active duty beneficiaries. The program will be conducted in several geographical areas. Copayments will be consistent with those required in other Federal programs including Department of Veterans Affairs programs. Families of junior enlisted personnel would be exempt. The purpose of the program is to explore how copayments can reduce costs and improve the quality of health care in military medical facilities. The budget also proposes the establishment of an advisory panel whose members will be selected by the Secretary of Defense and will include medical experts from outside the Government. The panel will make recommendations on the design of the pilot program and report these recommendations to the Secretary by June 1, 1989. The Secretary will forward his own recommendations to Congress soon thereafter. The panel will also review the conduct of the program, evaluate its results, and make recommendations for follow-on actions.

*Special Operations Forces.*—Special operations units include Army Special Forces and Rangers, Navy SEALs, and Air Force special units. Although special operations forces are mainly used for low-intensity conflict situations, they can be employed across the entire spectrum of military operations—from peacetime operations to conventional and nuclear war. Modernization of these forces would continue with procurement and delivery of new and specially modified helicopters, transport aircraft, and high-speed boats.

*Military Personnel and Compensation.*—The budget proposes military compensation levels that will continue to attract and retain quality personnel. The budget provides for military pay raises of 3.6 percent in 1990 and 3.2 percent in 1991 effective in January of each year. Overall active forces manpower levels will change little, declining from 2,138,200 in 1988 to 2,134,600 in 1991. These strength levels will allow full manning of U.S. ships, aircraft and front line forces, including new equipment and weapon sys-



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units entering service. Some personnel reductions have been made in support areas to meet budget constraints.

## SUMMARY OF ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FORCES

(The end of September 30)

	1988 Actual	Estimate		
		1989	1990	1991
<b>Military personnel (in thousands):</b>				
End strength:				
Army	772	772	772	772
Navy	593	593	598	598
Marine Corps	197	197	197	197
Air Force	576	571	571	567
<b>Total, Department of Defense</b>	<b>2,138</b>	<b>2,133</b>	<b>2,138</b>	<b>2,135</b>
<b>Average strength:</b>				
Army	769	769	772	772
Navy	582	589	599	596
Marine Corps	198	197	197	197
Air Force	593	578	574	571
<b>Total, Department of Defense</b>	<b>2,142</b>	<b>2,133</b>	<b>2,137</b>	<b>2,137</b>
<b>Strategic forces:</b>				
Intercontinental ballistic missiles:				
Pershing	38	50	50	50
Minuteman	950	950	950	950
Poseidon Trident	624	656	632	656
Strategic bomber squadrons:	25	24	21	21
<b>General purpose forces:</b>				
Land forces:				
Army divisions	18	18	18	18
Marine Corps divisions	3	3	3	3
Tactical air forces:				
Air Force wing equivalents	25.5	24.4	23.7	23.7
Navy attack wings	13	13	13	13
Marine Corps wings	3	3	3	3
Naval Forces:				
Attack and multipurpose carriers	14	14	15	15
Battleships	3	4	4	4
Nuclear attack submarines	97	97	95	95
Other warships	200	193	189	180
Amphibious assault ships	61	64	63	62
<b>Airlift and sealift forces:</b>				
C-5 airlift squadrons	4	4	4	4
Other airlift squadrons	15	15	15	15
Sealift fleet	70	70	70	70

Consistent with proposals for Federal civil service retirees, the budget proposes eliminating the cost-of-living adjustment planned for January 1990 and changing future cost-of-living adjustments. Under current law, military retirees who joined the armed services before August 1986 receive cost-of-living adjustments equal to the annual percent change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Those who joined after 1986 will receive annual adjustments equal to the percent change in the CPI, minus one percentage point. Beginning

in 1991, it is proposed that all military retirees, current and future, receive annual cost-of-living adjustments equal to the percent change in the CPI, minus one percentage point.

**Drug Interdiction Support.**—In the 1989 Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed that the Department of Defense serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. The Authorization Act also charged the Department of Defense with developing a plan for the integration into an effective communications network of all command, control, communication, and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs. In 1989, Congress allocated \$300 million for transfer to other appropriations once the Department determined the best method for carrying out its new responsibilities.

The Department of Defense will shortly determine how best to carry-out Congress' drug interdiction and law enforcement assignment and will report its plans to Congress.

**Management Initiatives.**—Over the past eight years the Department of Defense (DOD) has made major improvements in the way it does business. Continued improvements have become increasingly important in light of recent budget reductions. For 1990-91, major goals of the Department's management improvement program include simplifying and improving the acquisition process, strengthening the financial management system by consolidating financial management data within each military department and the defense agencies, and accelerating the Department's efforts to improve productivity.

For 1990, 32 additional programs will be proposed for multi-year procurement to lessen the instability inherent in the traditional, one-year-at-a-time approach to weapons procurement. Savings from these multi-year procurement proposals are estimated to be \$8.6 billion over the next eight years. Emphasis has also been placed on avoiding procurement stretchouts and on maintaining production rates at or above minimum economic levels. In addition, six low-priority weapons programs and five ammunition lines have been terminated with 1990-91 savings of more than \$1 billion.

Competition will be encouraged in order to keep costs down, quality up, and the industrial base strong. Commercially available products will be used instead of custom-made items wherever possible. The administration proposes to streamline commercial products acquisition procedures, as well as to simplify the basic procurement statutes. A policy on contractors' rights to technical data developed under Government contracts is going into force. DOD plans to continue improving its cash management programs.



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The bipartisan Commission on Base Realignment and Closure has submitted to both the Secretary of Defense and Congress its report on bases recommended for closure and realignment. The Secretary must decide on these recommendations by January 16, 1989, at which time planning for the implementation would begin. The budget assumes approval of a significant closure and realignment package. The 1990-91 defense budget proposes appropriations of \$500 million each year for the initial costs of consolidation. Savings are expected to be realized by 1992 and to increase to about \$2 billion a year by 1994.

As required by Executive Order 12615, the Department will accelerate its program of opening to competition some of its Government-operated commercially available activities. The Order requires studies covering over 29,000 full-time-equivalent positions (FTE) in 1989. For 1990 and beyond, DOD will conduct studies covering no less than 3 percent of its civilian employment annually until all identified potential commercial activities have been studied. In 1988 this program covered 12,000 FTE, achieving cost reductions through increased productivity of \$110 million.

The Department will initiate a pilot project to demonstrate innovative ways to organize, staff, reward, and compensate the workforce. Innovations to be explored include pay-for-knowledge experiments, the use of multi-skilled employees without job classifications, gainsharing, and other performance-based pay schemes.

**Atomic Energy Defense Activities.**—These activities, conducted by the Department of Energy, include research, development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons; production of special nuclear materials; storage and clean-up of nuclear wastes from defense programs; and design of reactors for nuclear-powered Navy vessels.

The accompanying table shows the funding levels for these programs. In total, budget authority of \$9.0 billion is requested for 1990 compared to \$8.1 billion for 1989. Outlays are estimated to increase from \$7.9 billion in 1989 to \$8.6 billion in 1990. Budget authority of \$9.4 billion is requested for 1991 with outlays estimated to be \$9.2 billion.

The nuclear weapons program involves the design, testing, and production of nuclear warheads for the nuclear weapons stockpile, including quality control and periodic inspection of the finished devices. Budget authority proposed for 1990 and 1991 would provide for continuing warhead production for current and new weapon systems, and for production of special nuclear materials for use in these warheads.

The budget provides for conceptual design of two new production reactors to replace the aging reactors at the Savannah River Plant. Spending levels in 1990 and 1991 would maintain the same pace of development for the heavy water reactor and high temperature gas

# ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

(in millions of dollars)

Major mission and program	1988 Actual	Estimate			
		1989	1990	1991	1992
<b>BUDGET AUTHORITY</b>					
Weapons research, development, test and production	4,170	4,234	4,475	4,714	4,853
Weapons materials production and waste management	2,704	2,960	3,618	3,708	4,007
Naval reactor development	607	638	652	671	692
Other research programs	268	276	278	296	308
Total, budget authority	7,749	8,108	9,023	9,389	9,860
<b>OUTLAYS</b>					
Weapons research, development, test and production	4,225	4,212	4,381	4,605	4,783
Weapons materials production and waste management	2,803	2,826	3,341	3,621	3,886
Naval reactor development	593	619	641	666	686
Other research programs	292	283	284	285	292
Total, outlays	7,913	7,940	8,647	9,177	9,653

reactor designs. Additional activities in support of new production reactor capacity include compliance with National Environmental Policy Act requirements, development of the safety review process, initiation of long lead procurement, and tritium target development.

The budget supports a significant increase in activities to bring existing facilities into compliance with all Federal and State environmental, safety, and health requirements and to clean up contamination from prior activities. It also provides for modernization of facilities throughout the nuclear weapons production complex.

The defense nuclear waste management program provides interim storage for all defense nuclear wastes. The program also supports research and development activities for the isolation and permanent storage of these wastes.

The naval reactor development program includes the research and development, design, procurement, and testing of prototype reactors for current and future nuclear-powered naval vessels.

Other atomic energy defense and research and development programs involve security at defense nuclear facilities, security investigations, and arms control and verification technology development.

**Defense-Related Activities.**—Activities of departments and agencies that support national defense include emergency preparedness programs and the Selective Service System.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency conducts civil defense and other preparedness programs. Budget authority of \$152 million is proposed for 1990 and \$154 million in 1991 for civil defense programs in order to improve State and local preparedness











דח'יות:	טובים מברק קשר ניו-יורק	דד: 1 מחנך: 2
סיוג:	מעי"ת, מצפ"א, הסברה	אל:
תזמ:		
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31-01	יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשחכ"ט, לע"מ, דו"צ	דע:
28-10	קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה, וושינגטון	
190	עתונות, ניו יורק	מאת:

9-JAN-1989

## NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 7-8, 1989

TV COVERAGE

All networks extensive coverage of Chemical Weapons Conference and continuing focus on Libyan plant; subject dominated Sunday morning talk shows. All newcasts on Sun. eve noted Iraq's challenge of Israel at Conference and Ambassador Eliav's attempt to reply.

EDITORIALS

ND-8-"Backward steps in quest for Mideast peace"-Criticizes Mubarak, Shamir and particularly Arafat for not taking advantage of openings, noting "terrorist threat" against Freij.

DN-7-"Human rights and Soviet wrongs"-Against Moscow conference; we must keep heat on Soviets.

NYP-7-Elegy to Yuli Daniel wary of abrupt nature of glasnost changes.

COLUMNS

NYT-Raker(7)-"Inscrutable Occidental Mentality"-Criticizes talk of strike against Libya wondering why Qaddafi not Iraq?

NYP-Buchanan(7)-"With such allies, who needs enemies?"-U.S. should go it alone and not be so deferential to European opinion.

PRESS REPORTSLibya - chemical weapons plant

Weekend papers all reported on U.N. defense of jet downing to U.N. and Paris conference (NYT-10, ND-5, DN-2, NYP-1).

NYT - Plant dispute overshadowing conference (Markham, 8-p.1) and obscuring isolation of rejectionist states in Arab world (Markham-wk in review). Possession of chemical arms is growing trend in Mideast and Asia (Engelberg, 7) and proliferation complicates diplomacy on issue (Pear-wk in review). Other articles on conference note Soviets challenge U.S. claims (Gordon, 7-p.1), Bonn-U.S. dialogue (Schmehmann, 7) and U.S. rejected Saudi offer to mediate with Libya (Scioline, 7).

Also, Khadafy manipulation of journalists retrijs to plant and call for talks with U.S. (Delaney-7, 8, ND, DN)

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תאריך:

JAN 9 1989

JAN 9 1989

1031



Israel - economy

NYT:Kifner(8,wk-in-review):relapse of economic woes, notes detrimental effect of politics influencing economic decisions.

Israel - uprising

Arab radicals form anti-PLO alliance (ND,NYP-7); Palestinian casualties. (ND, NYT-8)

PLO - gains 3 more embassies (NYT,ND,DN-8) and Arafat aide denies Freij threat. (NYT-8)

U.S. Jews - liberalism thrives

NYT:Steinfeld(8,wk-in-review):but faces problems of Jackson and preoccupation with Israel diverting energy from other issues.

PAN AM

NYT:Suro,p.1: notes shifting Mideast politics may have changed face of terrorism and investigators examining possibility of terrorist coalition.

Lebanon - Pro-Iranian terror groups targeting Saudi envoys.  
(NYT,Hijazi-8)

CARTOONS

DN:Ramirez(8):picture of "Assad's terror emporium." (cabled-hasbara)

NYT:Ze'ev(Ha'aretz):Arafat discarding terrorist gear but its imprinted on body.

GENINE STAUBER  
ITONUT-NY

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MR. REDMAN: As to when, I really don't know how that's going to develop. The Security Council is continuing discussion of the matter today. It's not certain when or whether a resolution will be formally tabled. Our understanding is that the Libyans are seeking a resolution condemning the US, but as I said, we don't know, in fact, whether that will occur. Obviously, we could not support a resolution that did not reflect the fact the US in the face of unprovoked hostile acts by Libyan forces exercised its inherent right of self defense under international law in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Q Do you find it unusual that no country has stood up and spoken on behalf of the United States yet? All of the speeches have been condemning US action.

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't have any particular reflection on that. I think that our people at the United Nations did a very good job of putting forward all of the detailed information that was made available.

Q Chuck, in light of the repeated Libyan assertions that they have no intention of producing chemical weapons at this plant, has the United States suggested outside the Paris conference any -- either at the conference or outside the conference -- any specific monitoring arrangements that might be implemented to ascertain that that does not happen?

MR. REDMAN: No, there's been no new developments on that particular subject.

Q What -- what -- is there any -- why shouldn't the United States propose such a thing, since the Libyans have asserted several times they don't intend to convert the plant to produce weapons -- chemical weapons?

MR. REDMAN: I haven't seen an assertion about conversion. I'm not sure what you're referring to there.

Q Well, they claim that they have no intention of using the plant to produce chemical weapons.

MR. REDMAN: But that's nothing new. We've been dealing with that particular state of affairs for any number of weeks now or longer. Our views haven't changed at all on this and how it needs to be handled.

Q Marlin Fitzwater has stated this morning, categorically, that the US position is that the plant must be destroyed. Is that what the US position is, that it must be destroyed?

MR. REDMAN: That would certainly solve our concerns.

Q I know. But is that our demand, that it must be destroyed or are there other measures that could be taken which would satisfy US concerns about the presence of that facility?



MR. REDMAN: Well, we certainly haven't seen any other measures that would satisfy those, and, as I say, dismantlement would certainly satisfy us.

Q But, Mr. Shultz used the word "inoperable." And inoperable -- a plant could be made inoperable without destroying it.

MR. REDMAN: I really don't have any way to take this particular little debate further. I think you're aware of the state of play, and that's really all there is at this stage.

Q It's not a little debate. It's sort of reminiscent of Krasnoyarsk -- whether the United States is interested in some sort of a compromise short of totally uprooting the facility.

MR. REDMAN: And, again, I think the Secretary addressed that in detail on the way to Paris on Thursday, so --

Q All right. Well, can you tell us if the Libyans have backed up Qadhafi's public statements of last week with some sort of communication through other parties, or directly, even, to the United States?

MR. REDMAN: We haven't had any direct communications.

Q No, I know you don't have. But, I mean, you -- as you've often said and as the Secretary said, you have no trouble communicating indirectly. There's a basis for communication. I wondered if he --

MR. REDMAN: He's got that line down well.

Q Yeah. Well, I wondered if he had -- if Libya had said anything in those channels to the US, apart from what you were able to read in the newspapers.

MR. REDMAN: No new developments.

Q No comment on Qadhafi's alleged communication through Andreotti asking for a compromise solution?

MR. REDMAN: No.

Q Chuck, you said "developments" twice now. And "developments" means, to me, that a situation has progressed.

MR. REDMAN: You want to substitute an alternative word?

Q No, no. It's your word --

MR. REDMAN: I can probably be pretty easily satisfied on that

Q No, no, no. I'm not quarreling with you. But, I know you choose your words very carefully, which is why I'm pursuing it

X

X

X



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with you. Because a "development" suggests some improvement, some progress, some change. We're asking, basically, if even the current situation is being threshed out directly or indirectly with Libya through intermediaries or not? Are you communicating through the Italians or through anybody else with Libya about some way to settle this dispute? And we also think there's a way to settle it, it seems, from what the Secretary has said, short of destroying it.

MR. REDMAN: If your question -- if it helps you to say "progress" or "change," the answer is still no.

Q No. I know you're telling us there's no progress --  
MR. REDMAN: There's nothing new --

Q I'm asking you if we're conversing with them to any great effect or not. Are we talking to these fellows?

MR. REDMAN: The point to be made is the same one that was made last week here at this podium by the Secretary on the trip, that there's no problem with the communication, there's a problem with policies.

MR. REDMAN: And, on that score, there's been no change and there's been nothing new.

Q Chuck, I have a feeling we're missing each other and I'm not sure it's unintentional. I know there is -- I accept there's no change in your ability to communicate. We're asking if you are, indeed, communicating?

MR. REDMAN: What I have to try to do is answer your questions fairly and squarely, which I invite you to take my answer as that kind of an answer -- without going into the principle that I have to be involved, or be seen to be involved, in the kinds of details in terms of mechanisms and procedures. And so I remain neutral on those kind of questions, but I want to give you the bottom line, and so I do that.

MR. REDMAN: No change, nothing new.

MR. REDMAN: No new developments. All of the above.

Q No. But the White House is saying "destroyed," you're saying "made inoperable." That leaves --

MR. REDMAN: But the Secretary used exactly those same words on the way over. I don't want to quarrel over particular words. But the fact of the matter is if the facility disappears, we have no problem.

Q Chuck, did the Secretary have any bilateral meetings with East European ministers while he was in Paris? And can you comment?

MR. REDMAN: No, he had none.

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✗



דחיות:	<div> <div>דף: 1</div> <div>מחנך: 2</div> </div> <div> <div>טובס מברק</div> <div>קשר ניו-יורק</div> </div>
<div>סיוג: 091830</div> <div>תזוח:</div>	<div>אל:</div> <div>מע"ח, מצפ"א, הסברה</div>
<div>מס מדק:</div> <div>0 0200</div> <div>34 - 011</div> <div>29 - 029</div>	<div>דע:</div> <div>יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשחב"ס, לע"מ, דו"צ קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה, וושינגטון</div> <div>מאת:</div> <div>עתונות, ניו יורק</div>

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## NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 9, 1989

### STATEMENTS BY ISRAELIS

FM ARENS: On upgrading of Israeli consular delegation to USSR. (NYT)

### COLUMNS

NYT: Reston - "The Mideast, Bush's first test" - urges stronger U.S. commitment to Israel's security. (cabled)

NYP: Kirkpatrick - "Arafat's violent peace offensive" - Arafat pushing peace on his terms because he expects Bush to pressure Israel.

NYT: Safire - "On being heard" - criticizes Eban's denunciation of pre-emptive attack on Libyan plant and Bonn response.

### PRESS REPORTS

#### Israel - economy - Peres

NYT: Kifner: Storm over Peres perks in austerity budget could undermine his credibility. (cabled)

TIME(16): world notes: Finance Ministry as much trouble for Peres as Foreign Ministry but he is determined to make austerity stick.

#### Chemical arms conference

All papers (NYT, p.1) on Soviet pledge to destroy stock and examine U.S. assertions. WSJ(Fialka) on U.S. inability to verify chemical weapons nature of plant even if opened to inspection and WSJ(Greenberger) notes Libya issue underscores difficulty in banning chemical weapons but lukewarm response may be result of U.S. not confronting Iraq. Also, TIME(16) and NEWSWEEK(16) extensive coverage of conference and U.S. downing of Libyan jets.

NYT: Markham: entire article on Arab linkage of chem arms ban to Israel's nuclear arm, seen as stratagem to water down conference's final declaration. (cabled - כול)

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Libya - Qaddafi

NYT:Deianey:notes Qaddafi has mellowed; diplomats point out he is unusually quiet regarding ELO moves And WSJ(Brooklyn) finds citizens have mixed views of mad leader.  
(DN:most foreign journalists expelled from Libya).

Who is a Jew

NYT:Goldman:remains a volatile issue in U.S., renewing efforts to standardize conversions and solve issue. (cabled)

Israel - foreign affairs

NYT:USSR to upgrade Israeli consular mission.  
NYT:Abdel-Meguid met Arens ending years of Egyptian resistance to dealing with Likud Govt.

Israel - uprising

Israeli-appointed Palestinian stabbed. (NYT,ND,WSJ)

PAN AM

DN:Arafat says bombing effort to sabotage Mideast peace efforts. (ND)  
and TIME(16) article on continuing investigation.

Lebanon - moderates gaining power in Iran bodes well for hostages.  
(NEWSWEEK) and Shiites captured villages from rivals. (WSJ)

GEMINE STAUBER  
ITONUT - NY



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חוזם: 1,4967

אל: רוש/248, בוקרשט/66, מנמת/138

מ-: המשור, תא: 080189, זח: 1239, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: ג: אירופה

נד: ג

שמור/רגיל

סטיון

זע: בוקרשט

ובש"א - תמונת מצב. לשלן 112.

1. עפ"י אמצעי התקשורת יצא נשיא רומניה צ'אושסקו בהצהרות לפיהן קבלת המסמן המסכם בעניין חופש המלחן כמוה בחזרה 500 שנה אחורנית ובעקבות כך רמז לעבוב המסמן.

2. נסה נא לבדוק אצל בני שיחן כיצד הם מעריכים עמדתה של רומניה ובאיזו מידה עלולה זו לסכן אימוצו של המסמן המסכם.

אירופה 3

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אק

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרנז, רס, אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצמא, איר1, איר2, איר3







January 8, 1989  
Special Issue 14

## PLO RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM?

According to the Kuwaiti News Agency (December 20, 1988), Khalid al-Hassan, intimate confidant of Arafat and a prominent member of Fatah's Central Committee, said that Abu Nidal officially requested to be re-admitted into the PLO (which he left in 1974). Rumors suggest, continues KNA, that a rapprochement was explored between the two during the November PNC in Algiers.

The following excerpts from pages 12-36 of Red Horizons, the memoirs of Ion Mihai Pacepa, a former Director of the DIE -- Romania's intelligence service -- who defected to the West (published by Regnery Gateway, N.Y., 1987), provide a possible background to the aforementioned report:

"...We have another operation using Abu Nidal," [Hani el-] Hassan added.

"Who would ever suspect that Nidal, my fiercest enemy, the very fellow who is killing-off my men, could actually be doing things for me?" Arafat boasted.

"Congratulations," said Ceausescu. "How about pretending to break with terrorism? The West would love it."

"Just pretending, like with your independence?"

"Exactly. But pretending over and over. Political influence, like dialectical materialism, is built on the same basic tenet that quantitative accumulation generates qualitative transformation." ...

"Dialectical materialism works like cocaine, let's say. If you sniff it once or twice, it may not change your life. If you use it day after day, though, it will make you into an addict, a different man. That's the qualitative transformation."

"A snort of a pacifist Arafat day after day...?"

"Exactly, Brother Yasser. The West may even become addicted to you and your PLO."

"Both of us want to influence America in our favor. Our methods are different, though. You, Brother Arafat, use arms. I use words..."

"You, Brother Yasser, were here in 1972, and you are here now. You can see for yourself that nothing has changed in Romania in that time. We are still the same Communist country, where private property is not only prohibited -- it is a disgrace. But the West now loves me..."

Over the last few months Ceausescu and Arafat had been most concerned with getting the PLO recognized in Western Europe by creating a moderate image for Arafat...

Conspiracy was so deeply imbedded in Hassan's blood that even here the Chivas Regal had to be in disguise.

"Do you remember the 'Shuqairy' plan..." Hassan started

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out...."

"The 'Shugairy' operation is the Chairman's favorite," Hassan went on. "It's designed to make him look like a moderate. He personally recruited its first agent of influence, 'Solomon.' You do remember him, don't you...?"

"The doctor who organized the attack on the El Al bus at the Munich airport in 1970? The one who was secretly instructed by the Chairman to pretend reconciliation and approach the Israelis -- but was then publicly denounced by him?... [This reference is to Issam Sartawi, who was in charge of the attack on the El-Al passenger bus at the Munich airport, but still enjoyed the reputation of a peacemaker.]

"Well, then I have news for all of you. The Chairman dispatched [agent] 'Solomon' to Vienna, where, with [agent] 'Helmut's' help, he made contact with some leftist Israeli politicians and started to float the 'reconciliation plan' past them... 'Solomon' and his Israeli partners will receive the Kreisky Prize, the one given for peace and human rights..."

"I instructed our people among the PLO hardliners to urge that 'Solomon' be reprimanded and told to renounce the prize or else resign from the Palestinian National Congress. Then Brother Kaddoumi and the Chairman will publicly defend him and praise Kreisky... That ought to make it clear in Austria that the Chairman is a moderate, willing to negotiate."

"I'm working on another operation..." Hassan continued. "It's a long-range one, but it looks very promising. Do you remember Sabry al-Bana?"

"...His non de guerre is Abu Nidal. He's the one who always wanted us to blast off at Israel every day of the week. There was no way we could do that, so in 1974 he decided to go it alone. He went to Pucharest with the Chairman once."

"After he left us, Abu Nidal approached Baghdad. He got more than ten million dollars from the Iraqis and used it to create the Fatah Revolutionary Committee, which some Baghdad circles immediately began calling 'the real Fatah.' A few months ago, Abu Nidal formed his own terrorist group, which he calls 'Black June'... Last January they killed our representative at his Green Street office in London and announced that they were prepared to assassinate other PLO representatives."

"That wasn't Nidal's operation. It was ours."

"You killed your own representative in London?" Olcescu asked.

"In a revolution some people always die," said Hassan... "Nidal himself is now spending more time in East German and Iraqi hospitals than he is standing on his own two feet. But we've taken over control of his 'Black June' through the agents I had there. All the top jobs under Nidal are held by my men. We're the ones who are really running 'Black June' now, not Nidal. We, not Nidal, now have the last word in setting its terrorist priorities."

"We, not Nidal, provide the intelligence support and the passports needed for its operations..."



"We, not Nidal, decide where to kill, where to act," Hassan continued, "and to top it all off, Iraq or Libya will foot the bill, as the Chairman says. They finance Nidal's Black June. The Chairman gave me the names of some of our people abroad that we could live without, and I've passed them to my men in the 'Black June.'"

"Why kill your own people?" Olcescu persisted stubbornly.

"We want to mount some spectacular operations against the PLO, making it look as if they had been organized by Palestinian extremist groups that accuse the Chairman of becoming too conciliatory and moderate."

"The Chairman asked the PLO Executive Committee to sentence Nidal to death as a traitor."

"I need your help, Brothers. I need some passports for 'Black June.' That's why the Chairman asked Brother Ceausescu for blank passports."

"Thank you in advance, Brothers. The Chairman is now really hooked on influence. It won't be long before I'll be able to create a positive image for him in the West."

"[Hani] el-Hassan [Khalid's brother] is my most devoted personal friend and my closest collaborator, although he is known only as one of my advisors," Arafat said. "Few people, however, know that he manages a whole foreign intelligence network. And even fewer know his real, deeply secret role in the Palestinian revolution. Fewer people than the fingers on this hand," Arafat emphasized, holding up his right hand with the fingers spread wide. "El-Hassan plays one of the most important roles in our struggle. More important than you or you," he went on, pointing to Doicaru and me, "because we are in a constant state of war. He is the one who, just a few months ago, prepared our answer to the Olympic Committee's decision not to allow a team of Palestinian athletes to participate in the Munich games. He is the brain who put our organization's name on the front page of every single newspaper." Arafat was referring to the September 5, 1972 massacre of 11 Israeli athletes by a team of PLO terrorists at the Munich Olympic Games.

Arafat detected a look of skepticism in his audience. "Don't be deceived by his elegant appearance," he cried. "Brother el-Hassan is not a gunman. He is a mind. He is a brain. He is our brain," Arafat concluded emphatically. I looked at Hassan, and I could no longer see the distinguished doctor or lawyer in him. His face was as impassive as stone. When I met his eyes, they were evil, piercing.

After that October 1972 meeting, an extensive liaison exchange started up between the PLO and the DIE. Hassan sent the DIE secret reports on Israel and Jordan that were by far the best information the Soviet bloc had ever obtained on those areas.

"In January 1975, Arafat and Hassan came to Bucharest in order to persuade Ceausescu to lend his personal support to a major PLO intelligence operation designed to overthrow and assassinate King Hussein of Jordan, making Jordan the home of a future Palestinian nation headed by the PLO. The most embittered against Hussein was Hassan. "More than half of Jordan's population is Palestinian," he said, "and according to the Palestinian National Covenant the PLO is responsible



for them. Palestine has become Jordan, however, and the king is swallowing up the Palestinians." Hassan's conclusion: "Hussein must die. He is no less dangerous than Israel to the Palestinian cause."

In 1976, Ceausescu proposed to Arafat that they exchange intelligence advisors. The addition of a few PLO officers brought about a dramatic improvement in the terrorist component of the DIE, called "Service Z" -- Z as the last letter of the alphabet representing the "final solution." To this service Arafat and Hassan assigned two teams of PLO professional terrorists, who had been especially trained for Romanian operations and were later used for kidnapping and assassination assignments in the West... A DIE general, Constantin Munteanu, was transferred to Beirut as the head of a group of advisors who were to teach the PLO how to run deception and influence operations, in order to get recognized by the West.

By the end of 1976, Hani Hassan was formally recruited as a Romanian agent, based on the advisors' reports revealing his weakness for Western money. At Ceausescu's personal direction he got a feminine code name, "Annette"... "Annette" also provided significant information about the secret training bases and camps organized for PLO terrorists in Bulgaria. His reports about the PLO training centers in the Yugoslav mountains were hugely enjoyed by Ceausescu and kept as evidence of Tito's duplicity. The most important contribution from "Annette," however, was the enormous quantity of Western arms samples, ranging from automatic weapons to tanks, he supplied to the DIE... some were acquired through capitalizing on the PLO's collaboration with the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigades, the West German Baader-Meinhof gang, and other similar groups.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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תאריך : 07.01.89

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אל: המשרד

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אל: פרנ

מאת: יוסי גל, וושינגטון

מכתב של ABC אנו למדים כי הרשת מתעתדת לצאת בשבוע הבא עם סיפור על מתקן לפיתוח נשק ביולוגי בעיראק באתר הנקרא כנראה FALMAN PAK.

לדברי הכתב קבלו הסיפור ממקור טוב והשיגו לו אמותים ממקורות כורדיים באזורים הסמוכים לו. המתקן שימש עד כה ככל הנראה כמתקן לייצור כימיקלים. הם (ABC) מאמינים כי זהו הנשק עליו דבר סאדאם חוסיין בזמנו כאשר התייחס ל-SUPERWEAPON שעיראק מפתחת.

לפי המידע שלהם עובדים העירקים על התאמת הנשק לטיל סק ד-בי משופרים שטווחם מגיעים ל-400-500 מייל.

עד כאן.

יוסי גל

רש

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, פרנ, מצפא, ר/מרכז, ממד, רם, אמן



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מאת: עתונות, לונדון

אימון מתנגדי משטר קדאפי.

א. בגארדיין (6) ידיעת AP על כתבה בבטאון AFRICA  
CONFIDENTIAL שישראל וארהב מאמנות כוח מתנגדי משטר  
לוביים להפלת משטר קדאפי. פעולות כבר החלו בשטח  
ומאזור דארפור בסודן. הכוחות אומנו בצאד, קמרון  
גאבון, רמא' וארהב.

ב. ידיעת AP מגדירה הבטאון כדו-שבועון מכובד למנויים  
בלבד הנקרא על ידי דיפלומטים, עתונאים ואנשי עסקים  
העוקבים אחרי הנעשה באפריקה.

מנור=

רש

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, רס, אמנ, איר, 1,  
איר, 2, מאפ, מעת, הסברה







January 6, 1988  
Issue 82

PLO-ARAB POLITICS

JORDAN-PLO

Jordan has closed down the Amman offices of Abu al-Zaim, the former chief of PLO intelligence, who had rebelled against Arafat. (United Arab Emirates News Agency, December 25)

ARAB SUPPORT

Abu Iyyad, Arafat's deputy:

"...A major cause hampering the full implementation of the uprising has been the less-than-minimal fulfillment of Arab commitments... It is the lack of Arab support that is responsible for the slow-pace of the uprising..." (al-Anba'a, Kuwait, December 3)

THE PLO -- A TURNING POINT?

ON THE "INCREMENTAL PROGRAM"

Sheikh Abd al-Hamid al-Sayekh, Chairman of the PNC:

"...We disagree with the tactics of Hamas [the Islamic Resistance Movement], but we agree with its strategy [the August 1988 charter of Hamas is discussed in Midmo Special Issue 12 and Contemporary Mideast Backgrounder 251]... The aim of Hamas is the whole of Palestine... We, too, aspire to that aim, but we act within the existing constraints..." (al-Itikhad, U.A.E., December 21)

al Sayekh:

"...The leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt says that even if the PLO succeeds in establishing a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it would not prevent the continuation of the struggle until the liberation of all of Palestine. I say that this is what must be the goal for all of us... We are working to achieve what is possible in the present phase, and afterwards we will demand more..." (al-Siyassa, Kuwait, December 21)

al-Sayekh:

"...Everything we do now is intended to achieve a provisional solution. We shall accept anything possible without conceding a thing... If asked to define the boundaries of Palestine, I would have to respond candidly that the whole of Palestine is ours..." (al-Maakiff al-Arabi, a Lebanese weekly published in Nicosia, December 12)

Nabil Sha'ath, Arafat's advisor on international relations:

"...The PNC resolutions have not expressed a surrender. They do stand for a flexible and moderate line... The current political program of the PLO is that which was introduced in 1974 [i.e., the 10-point 'Incremental Program' adopted during

.../2

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the 12th PNC in June 1974]..." (al-Usbu'a al-Arabi, a Lebanese weekly, Beirut, December 12)

#### REGIONAL POLITICS

##### SAUDI ARABIA-SOUTH YEMEN-NORTH YEMEN

Six military confrontations between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen [the 'Democratic Popular Republic of Yemen,' or DPRO], and two between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen [the 'Yemen Arab Republic,' or YAR] took place in 1988. These confrontations -- one of which continued for a few days -- resulted from unresolved border disputes. In March 1988, the Saudis took over certain areas in the YAR, which accused Saudi Arabia of attempting to seduce Yemenis into assuming Saudi citizenship. The conflict has been reinforced by the discovery of oil in YAR territory claimed by Riyadh. (al-Mukharir, a Lebanese weekly published in Paris, December 17)

##### SYRIA

Three Muslim Brotherhood activists were killed by security forces in Damascus. (al-Mukharir, December 17)

##### IRAQ-GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)

The six members of the GCC have been concerned about the possibility that Iraq may join the Council. They are apprehensive that Baghdad would dominate its agenda. (The Economist Foreign Report, London, December 14)

##### SUDAN

An attempted coup d'etat, which was backed by a foreign government and some military officers who support the return of deposed President Jaafar Nimeri, was foiled in its early stages. (al-Majallah, a Saudi weekly, December 27)

##### EGYPT

Results of student elections on major Egyptian campuses:  
The University of Cairo -- 16 seats to Islamic organizations, 5 to secular elements;  
Asyut University -- 2 and 15;  
The University of Alexandria -- 9 and 2;  
Ein Shams University -- 9 and 2;  
al-Azhar University -- 8 and 3;  
al-Mansura University -- 10 and 10;  
al-Maniya University -- 5 and 2.  
(al-Sha'ab, Cairo, December 6)

#### ARAB ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL

##### THE WORLD ISLAMIC ORGANIZATION

Dr. Kamal al-Dakas, Secretary-General, stated that his organization "does not object to the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state on any part of Palestine that is liberated as long as not a single inch is relinquished and the legitimacy of the occupation is not recognized. The jihad process will be continued until all the soil is liberated and a state is established in all of Palestine, from the [Mediterranean] Sea to the [Jordan] River, with Jerusalem as its capital." (al-Siyassa, Kuwait, December 25)

Haj Saad al-Din al-Alami, the Mufti of Jerusalem:

"The uprising has one goal, and that is to expel the Jews from the land. I oppose the existence of Israel in any form." (al-Qabas, Kuwait, December 22)



נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 1,3029

אל: המשרד

מ-: ווש, נר: 61, תא: 040189, זח: 1630, דח: ב, סג: סו

תח: פ גס: מצפא

נד: פ

סודי / בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: מנכ'ל

מנכ'ל רוה'מ

מאת: שגרירות, וושינגטון

שיחת השגריר עם מזכיר המדינה.

1. כללי :

א. הנושאים שנדונו בפגישה היו : החלטת הממשל לפתוח בדיאלוג עם עם אש'פ והשפעתו על התליך השלום ואיתור קרקעות למבני שג' ארה'ב בת'א וירושלים .

ב. השתתפו בפגישה מצידם : קמפלמן, מרפי, היל והירש מצדנו הציר והח'מ .

2. מהלך השיחה :

א. פתיחת הדיאלוג האמריקאי-אש'פי והשלכותיה על תהליך השלום.

1) בפתח השיחה הביע השגריר צערנו על אסון המטוס . בהמשך הביע הערכה לנשיא ולמזכיר על תרומתם להידוק היחסים. הדגיש את תרומת המזכיר למאמצים לקידום תהליך



השלום.

(2) על רקע זה תאר השגריר את אכזבתנו מעצם החלטתו לפתוח בדיאלוג עם אש"פ ומכך שלא אפשרו לנוע להביע עמדתנו מבעוד מועד.

(3) להערכתנו הוסיף השגריר אין בהתבטאויותיו של ערפאת כדי לשקף שינוי אמיתי במטרותיו ארוכות הטווח. דברי ערפאת בנאומו בז'נווה והתבטאויות מנהיגי אש"פ לאחר מכן מחזקות את הנחתנו שהמדובר בצעד טקטי. ברור לנו הוסיף שהתכנית אותה הציג ערפאת בז'נווה אשר בבסיסה הקמת מדינה פלסטינית אינה משקפת את עמדת ארה"ב. אף הפרספציה שנוצרה בעקבות החלטת המזכיר עלולה ליצור בקרב הפלסטינים ואחרים המחשבה שהקו שננקט ע"י אש"פ סופו לשאת פירות.

(4) בתגובתו חזר המזכיר והבהיר כי הוא מבטא את עמדת הנשיא לפיה לא חל שינוי בעמדת ארה"ב אשר ב-13 השנים האחרונות חזרה והבהירה את חנאיה לדיאלוג סובסטימי עם אש"פ. אש"פ הוסיף המזכיר הוא שהשתנה. השאלה היא האם תהיה למילים משמעות. לדברי המזכיר ניתן לראות שינוי אם כי ברור לו שתהליך השינוי יהיה איטי. אם אכן אש"פ השתנה מקווה שגם מדינות ערב תלכנה בעקבותיו ותכרנה בזכות קיומה של ישראל.

(5) ארה"ב, הוסיף, תפעל לקידום התהליך ותקבע עמדתה בבהירות. המזכיר הזכיר את מכתבו של רוג'מ'מ אליו לפני כשנה ביחס לחשיבות תהליך השלום. "מאז קרו דברים הוסיף. בנאומו בספט' אשתקד (ב- WYE) ציין כי זמן ההכרעה מגיע למז'ת וכי יש אירועים שמביאים לשינוי. המסר של ההתקוממות בשטחים הוא שתושבי השטחים HAVE ASSERTED THEMSELVES".

אש"פ, הוסיף, מגיב כיום לשינוי. על ארה"ב לראות האם ניתן לנצל זאת לצורך השגת המטרות שבהם היא מאמינה.

(6) המזכיר חזר למהלכים שקדמו להחלטתם ואשר בהם היו מעורבים שה'ח שבדיה וקבוצת מנהיגים יהודים וציין כי באותו שלב שבו חשבו שהמדובר בהתפתחות רצינית דווחו לנו על כך. לאחר שערפאת במסיבת העיתונאים עמד בתנאים הרגישו שחייבים לפעול. ארה"ב הדגישה באותה הזדמנות פעם נוספת שעמדתם לא השתנתה. אשר למנהיגי אש"פ

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1947-1948

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation in the country during the year 1947-1948. It is a summary of the work done by the various departments and the results of the various projects.

2. The second part of the report deals with the work done by the various departments during the year 1947-1948. It is a summary of the work done by the various departments and the results of the various projects.

3. The third part of the report deals with the work done by the various departments during the year 1947-1948. It is a summary of the work done by the various departments and the results of the various projects.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the work done by the various departments during the year 1947-1948. It is a summary of the work done by the various departments and the results of the various projects.

5. The fifth part of the report deals with the work done by the various departments during the year 1947-1948. It is a summary of the work done by the various departments and the results of the various projects.

6. The sixth part of the report deals with the work done by the various departments during the year 1947-1948. It is a summary of the work done by the various departments and the results of the various projects.



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שממשיכים להטיף להשמדת ישראל ציין המזכיר כי בין אם ערפאת שינה את עמדותיו ובין אם לאו ברור לו שבקרב אש"ף ימשיכו להיות אנשים שירצו בחיסול ישראל. התשובה לכך היא עצמחה של ישראל ויכולתה להתמודד עם כל איום. לדברי המזכיר אין כיום אופציה צבאית לפתרון הסכסוך יחד עם זאת, מחוייבות ארה"ב לעמוד לצידה של ישראל הינה אלמנט חיוני בתהליך השלום.

7) בהתיחסו לדיאלוג עם אש"ף הדגיש החלטתו שהדיאלוג יעשה רק באמצעות צינור אחד דבר שיאפשר לו לפקח על התהליך.

8) בסכום ציין המזכיר כי ימשיכו במדיניותם, ימשיכו להתנגד להקמת מדינה פלסטינית עצמאית וכי לא ישנו תמיכתם בישראל. בעקבות ההחלטה שיקבלו מתכוונים להמשיך ולעבוד כדי לקדם את תהליך השלום.

9) לשאלת השגריר באשר למחשבותיו ביחס להמשך תהליך השלום, ציין המזכיר כי ארה"ב ניסתה כל הזמן לעבוד עמנו במשותף. היזמה אותה העלה בשנה שעברה היתה תוצאה של דיונים עמנו וכן עם מצרים וירדן. לדברי המזכיר חשוב שנמשיך לחשוב על קידום התהליך. ציין כי ידוע לו שרה"מ עובד על הנושא (הזכיר בהקשר זה את שיחתו האחרונה עם דוה"מ).

10) חושב כי טוב נעשה אם נחליף דעות עם הממשל הנכנס לפני שזה יגיע לגיבוש עמדותיו. חשוב שלישראל ולארה"ב תהיה תכנית שאותה ינסו לקדם.

11) הוסיף כי הממשל הנוכחי מנסה להשאיר מבנה מוצק של יחסים שיאפשר התקדמות על התהליך. הוסיף כי משוכנע ברצונה של ישראל בשלום. הגדיר את הטענות שמושמעות על כך שישראל אינה מעוניינת בשלום כמגוחכות. למרות חילוקי הדעות משוכנע המזכיר נוכל להתגבר עליהן ע"י רצון טוב.

ב. איתור קרקעות למבני שג' ארה"ב בת"א וירושלים.

1) המזכיר חזר והביע שאיפתו לשיפור תנאי העבודה והבטחון של מתקניהם בת"א וירושלים. חשב לתומו כי הקרקעות להקמת המבנים בשתי הערים אותרו. הוסיף כי קיווה שיוכל להעביר ליורשו הסיכוי למימוש תכניתו. מבין



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שהסיכויים קטנו .

2) השגריר דיווח על שיחתו עם רובינשטיין שציין כי עשינו מאמץ כן לאתר חלקות קרקע בשתי הערים מתוך המבנה שיוקם בירושלים ישרת לא רק את הקונסוליה, אלא גם שלוחות של השגרירות בת'א . אשר לת'א ציין השגריר המאמץ שאנו עושים לאיתור חלקת קרקע וזאת לאחר שהתעוררו בעיות משפטיות לגבי החלקה שנבחרה . השגריר הביע תקווה ששה'ח ארנס יוכל בפגישתו הקרובה עם המזכיר לבשר לו על מציאת קרקע חילופית .

ג. בצאתו מהפגישה התייחס המזכיר קצרות לתקרית שבה הופלו שני מטוסים לובים . המזכיר ציין כי כוונת ארה'ב היתה להבהיר ללוב 'שלא יוכלו לשחק אתנו משחקים ושבדעתנו להשתמש בכל האמצעים כדי להבטיח מטוסינו וספינותינו ' .

ד. בהתייחסו לנושא הגירושים ציין המזכיר שעמדותיהם מוכרות לנו ועל כך ירחיב מרפי בפגישה מאוחרת יותר עם השגריר .

שטיין

לש

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ר/מרכז, ממד



100-100000

1. The first part of the report is a summary of the work done during the year. It includes a list of the projects completed, a description of the work done on each project, and a summary of the results of the work. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the work done on each project. It includes a list of the tasks completed, a description of the work done on each task, and a summary of the results of the work. The third part of the report is a summary of the work done during the year. It includes a list of the projects completed, a description of the work done on each project, and a summary of the results of the work.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the work done on each project. It includes a list of the tasks completed, a description of the work done on each task, and a summary of the results of the work. The third part of the report is a summary of the work done during the year. It includes a list of the projects completed, a description of the work done on each project, and a summary of the results of the work.

3. The third part of the report is a summary of the work done during the year. It includes a list of the projects completed, a description of the work done on each project, and a summary of the results of the work.

4. The fourth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the year. It includes a list of the projects completed, a description of the work done on each project, and a summary of the results of the work.

5. The fifth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the year. It includes a list of the projects completed, a description of the work done on each project, and a summary of the results of the work.

6. The sixth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the year. It includes a list of the projects completed, a description of the work done on each project, and a summary of the results of the work.



# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* תאריך : 06.01.89 \*

\* 4041 \*

\* דף 1 מתוך 2 \*

\* עותק 3 מתוך 36 \*

\* \*\* נכנס סודי ביותר \*

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\* חוזם: 1,4041 \*

\* אל: המשרד \*

\* מ-: ווש, נר: 82, תא: 050189, זח: 1700, דח: ב. ס. ג. ס. ב.

\* תח: ג. ס. מצפא \*

\* נד: \*

\* סודי ביותר/בהול \*

\* אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א, יועץ מדיני לשה'ח \*

\* מאת: ציר-עודד ערן \*

\* להלן משיחה עם דניס רוס. \*

\* א. אש'פ-ארה'ב. \*

\* 1. מסכים שערפאת השתמש בתמלילן כדי להעביר מילים מצד אחד \*

\* של המשפט לצידו השני, אך מוסיף שבכל זאת אמר דברים שעבר \*

\* לא אמרם. רוס מציין שזה כוחן של מילים וגם לישראל כדאי \*

\* להשתמש בניסוחים גמישים. \*

\* 2. מחמ'ד לא נועצו בצוות המעבר על הפגישה השניה בין \*

\* אש'פ ופלטרו ורוס גילה מורת רוח באמרו שאין כל טעם בדו \*

\* שיח עם אש'פ על נושא הטרור. \*

\* 3. תהליך השלום. \*

\* 1. אמרתי לרוס שיש נכונות בישראל לחדש התהליך אך מתוך \*

\* שיחותי בארץ חשתי בדאגה שכל רעיון שישראל תעלה יהפך לנושא \*

\* למומ' בין ארה'ב לאש'פ ובוודאי לנושא למומ' בין ארה'ב \*

\* מצרים ואולי גם בריהמ'. לכך ענה רוס שרעיונות שיגובשו יחד \*

\* בדיאלוג ישראלי-אמריקאי יקבלו גיבוי אמריקאי מלא. הערתי \*

\* לכך שגם בדיאלוג כזה יש סכנה שכך אנו עלולים למצוא עצמנו \*

\* במצב שארה'ב לוחצת עלינו ולכך ענה רוס שהרי הפרמטרים של \*

\* המדיניות האמריקאית ידועים. רוס המליץ בהמשך לסעיף א. 1 \*







## מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

\* דף 2 מתוך 2 \*  
\* עותק 3 מתוך 36 \*

\* שוננקוט בשורה של צעדים חד-צדדים כגון הקלות בעוצר,  
\* הקלות כלכליות ושנכריז כי אלה צעדים שמטרתם ליצור אוירה  
\* חיובית למומ' על תהליך שיביא לשלטון עצמי ( RULE-  
\* SELF ). הוא בדעה שצריך להתרחק מהטרמינולוגיה כמו "צעדים  
\* לבנית אמונ'" (שהוא מונח מצרי) או "אוטונומיה".

\* 2. שאלתי את רוס מה מידת המחויבות של הממשל הנכנס  
\* לתוכנית שולץ. לדבריו התפיסה הכלכלית מקובלת אך יש גמישות  
\* בשני מרכיבים. האחד הוא לו'ז הבנוי בתוך התוכנית והשני  
\* הוא הועידה הבינלאומית. לגבי השני הוא מוסיף שכל רעיון  
\* הועידה בא כדי לתת גיבוי למלך חוסיין ומאחר וירדן ניתקה  
\* עצמה בשלב זה מפעילות בנושא פוחתת גם חשיבותה של הועידה.

\* לגבי ירדן העיר כי ימליץ למזכיר החדש שלא "לחזר" אחרי  
\* ירדן והנחתו היא שאם יהיו התפתחויות משמעותיות בתהליך  
\* השלום ימצא כבר המלך דרכו לוושנינגטון.

\* עודד ערן

\* חו

\* תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, בנצור,  
\* מצפא, סייבל



דף: 1 מחיר: 1		טובס מכרז קשר ניו-יורק		דחיות: מידוי	
אל:		חמשרד - מנהל ארכל 2		סוג: שמור	
דע:		מז"חים		תזח: 061500	
מאת:		נאו"ם - יששכרופ		מס מכירי	
				0 0139	

לכנון - יוניפי"ל

למען הסדר הטוב; בעת פגישתו של שג' לכנון פחורי עם המזכ"ל  
אתמול, ביקש כשם ממשלתו חידוש המנדט של יוניפי"ל בסוף  
חודש זה.

נאו"ם

שמה 3 רהב 3 גרהב 1 סארה 1 גא 1 ג'א 1  
אילא 1 ג'א 1 חא 1 אהא 1 אהא 1  
סי"א 1 ג'א 1  
ג'א 1  
ג'א 1  
ג'א 1

אישור:

שם השולח: ג' יששכרופ

6.1.89

תאריך:



1 : תד  
2 : מחיר

דד: $\frac{1}{2}$	מחיר: 2	טופס מברק קשר ניו-יורק סותק איס	דחיות:
אל:	מנהל ארבי"ל 2.	סיוג:	שמור
דע:	סמנכ"ל ארבי"ל. אורי לובראני-לשכת שחב"ט/ת"א.	תזח:	061300
מאת: יוחנן כהן		מס מברק:	0 0126
			בטחון - 23

לבנון - פניית המזכ"ל

ז'אן קלוד איימה בא לראותני במועבי"ט (בעת הדיון על תלונת לוב נגד ארה"ב). אמר כי שגריר לבנון, פחורי, פנה למזכ"ל - "ולמען הסדר" ביקש המזכ"ל שישוחח איתנו.

1. גירושים :

פחורי הדגיש שפנייתו היא לעצם הנושא אך בעיקר משום שמגורשים ללכנון, ועל כך אין ממ'ל לבנון יכולה לעבור בשתיקה. פחורי התייחס גם לעובדה שבאוגוסט הודיע שחב"ט רבין שהוצאו צווי גירוש ל-25. מתוכם גורשו עתה 13, שאל את המזכ"ל האם ידוע לו מה קורה עם ייתרת הצווים.

הובן בינינו שאינני חייב לחזור על משנתנו שהגירוש הוא אמצעי חוקי בהתאם לחוק המקומי וכו' - והמזכ"ל אינו מצפה לתגובה או תשובה. (עם זאת השאלה לגבי גיטימית - ובזדה על כל מידע לידיעתנו לגבי 12 צווי הגירוש שנותרו, כביכול, ללא ביצוע).

2. גורל המתקשת בגנרל לאחד:

השגריר פחורי ביקש מהמזכ"ל להעביר אלינו כדלהלן :

שמעו שהמתנקשת סנשיה בשרה נמצאת בישראל וכי הכוונה היא למסרה לידי צד"ל. הנ"ל ביצעה פשע על אדמה לבנונית, ולכן מבקשים כי ישראל תסגיר אותה, באמצעות הצלב האדום לשלטונות לבנון.

עוד בטרם הספקתי להגיב, הוסיף איזמח כי הוא מעביר הבקשה אך יודע שאין לה כל יסוד. הוא אישית בדק ויודע שסושיה בשרה נמצאת באלחיאם בידי כוחות צו"ל; ובנוסף לכך, הוסיף, הצלב האדום עזב את לבנון....

גם על פניה זו - אין המזכ"ל מבקש תשובה. ופנייתו אלי הוא רק  
 "To go through the motion"  
 יוזמות :

3. יוזמות :

אמרתי כי עתה רוצה אני לשאול : הגיעונו כמה ידיעות (לידיעתכם : לג'רמי יששכרופ מעמית בשג'הולנד) כי בדעת המזכ"ל לצאת בקרוב "ביוזמה" בנושא המזה"ת במסגרת חמש הקבועות במועבי"ט.

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1907

שם השולח:

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מחיר: 2		קשר ניו-יורק	
אל:		דחיפות:	
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ת"ח:		ת"ח:	
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		23	
		הטחון	


- 2 -

אוימה הגיב מיד שאין לכך כל יסוד. אין כל יוזמה ואין הוא, המזכ"ל, מאמין ביוזמות מסוג זה. מקור הדיעות כנראה בחבטאות במסגרת התייעצויות מועבי"ט שבהם הוזכר מספר פעמים הצורך להביא להתקדמות גם במזה"ת - וכי חובתו של המזכ"ל לקיים התייעצויות בנושא.

אמרתי כי אנו מאמינים שגדולתו של המזכ"ל בכך שידע שלא לנקוט ביוזמות עצמאיות - אלא מעמיד את עצמו ואת האו"ם לרשות הצדדים הניצים כאשר הם נזקקים ומבקשים סיועו כדי להגיע לשולחן המו"מ הישיר.

הוספתי כי שה"ח נמצא עתה בפריס - ואוימה סבר שאין צורך לקבוע עתה מכאן מפגש בפריס. זה מוקדם מדי, סבר. עדיף להניח לתכניות השלוט שלנו להתגבש, ולהסדיר מפגש המזכ"ל עם רוה"מ שמיר כשיבקר בארה"ב.

נאו"ם



אישור:

יוחנן ביון

שם השולח:

6.1.89

תאריך:



נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 1.4030

אל: המשרד

מ:- וו.ש. נר: 98, תא: 050189, זח: 1815, דח: ר.ס.ג:סו

תח: & גס:מצפא

נד: &

סודי/רגיל

אל:מצפ'א

מאת:ה.לקונגרס

פגישה עם קונגרסמן מל לויין.

נפגשתי אתמול (4.1) עם לויין לקראת פתיחת מושב הקונגרס.

להלן הנושאים העיקריים שעלו בשיחה:

1. בפתח השיחה הביע דאגה מההדים השליליים כלפי ישראל שקולט בלוס-אנג'לס. לדבריו רוב האנשים עמם שוחח, מצדדים בדיאלוג עם אש'פ' מחד וקובלים על התדמית הנוקשה והבלתי גמישה שמציגה ישראל כלפי העולם מאידך. לדבריו מצב זה שונה לחלוטין מזה שהיה לפני ששה חודשים. בתגובה לטיעוני השיב כי זו פרספציה שקשה לסתור אותה כל עוד לא תבוא יוזמה מדינית מצד ישראל.

על ישראל להיראות פתוחה יותר לתהליך השלום ולצערן איננה נתפסת ככזו. הוא אמנם ניצב כדבריו בקו החזית ותמיכתו בישראל איננה מותנית במצב זה או אחר וימשיך להגן עליה ולהיאבק למענה אולם קיימת שחיקה מתמדת כולל בקרב ידידיה של ישראל בקונגרס. התפיסה את ישראל התהפכה והפלסטינים ואש'פ' נתפסים בימים אלה כפתוחים יותר לעומת ישראל ומובנים יותר לציבור האמריקאי.

2. לגבי התקציב והקיצוצים הצפויים אמר לויין כי להערכתו



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הנשיא בוש יגיש בקשת תקציב שלא תכלול העלאת מיסים ובעקבות זאת יחל מומ' שיסתיים ככל הנראה בשילוב של הגדלת הכנסות REVENUES (ממיסים עקיפים) וקיצוץ בהוצאות. להערכתו התוצאה הנלווית תהיה פגיעה רצינית בסיוע חוץ. מכל מקום הכדור נמצא בידי הנשיא בוש והתמונה תתבהר עד סוף החודש. בהקשר זה הוסיף כי בגלל האינתיפאדה יש המעוניינים בקונגרס להעמיד את ישראל במקומה ( TO SLAP ISRAEL'S WRIST ) ויוכלו לנצל ההזדמנות של קיצוצים כדי לפגוע בסיוע לישראל.

3. בנושא הדיאלוג עם אש"פ סיפר לויין כי המזכיר שולץ ביקש ממנו לקבל INPUT בנושא. לויין ניסח מכתב בנדון תוך שימוש בחלקים ממכתב הטיוטה של שומר שהעברנו במברקנו 562 מה-23/12 ושקל לשולחו לשולץ בחתימתם של מספר קונגרסמנים נוספים. אולם בינתיים החליט להמתין עד כניסתו של המזכיר החדש בייקר ולשלווחיאליו מכתב בנושא. סיפר כי כאשר שקל שיגור המכתב פנה למספר רפובליקנים בבקשה שיחתמו על המכתב אולם הללו סירבו בטענה שהם מעוניינים לאפשר לבוש ולבייקר מקסימום גמישות. הדגיש שזהו טון חדש הנשמע בימים אלה. הזכיר בהקשר זה כוונתו לעגן בחקיקה הגבלות על הממשל בדיאלוג שלו עם אש"פ תוך הדגשת נושא הטרור. לשאלתי האין בכוונתו להתייחס גם לנושאים כמו אי הכרה במדינה פלסטינית והיבטים מדיניים אחרים השיב שלא נתן עדיין הדעת במלואה ובי ישמח לקבל INPUT מאיתנו. לדבריו הוא חושש שנסיון "הקודיפיקציה" שלו בחקיקה לא יזכה לתמיכה רחבה כבעבר. להערכתו עליו לפעול במהירות ולהתחיל ברמת ועדת המשנה לאירופה והמזה"ת עוד בטרם יערמו נושאים אחרים על סדה'י.

4. לקראת סוף השיחה הביע דאגתו מעסקות הנשק הגדולות הצפויות עם מדינות ערב. ציין בין השאר מכירת F-16 לירדן. והטענות צפויה מצד הנשיא בוש.

אף הוא, כקונגרסמן ברמן, ימתין לרשימת יעבץ (למרות הידיעה שלא תהיה עליה) שתוגש בסוף ינואר כדי לראות בבירור באלו מדינות ומערכות מדובר. כן ימתינו השניים לשמוע עמדתנו בנדון.

יהודית ורנאי דרגנר







4617

תאריך: 06.01.89 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי

נכנס

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חוזם: 1,4617

אל: המשרד

מ-: ני, נר: 123, תא: 060189, זח: 1050, דח: ב, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: מאפ

נד: @

סודי/בהול

אל סמנכל אפאסוק.

דע בן אהרון-מנכל ממרוה'מ', מנהל מא'פ.

מאת יוחנן ביינ - נאו'מ.

זמביה.

בעקבות הודעתו הטלפונית של מנכל ממרוה'מ', מסרתי  
לשג.זמביה כי דייב קמחי יגיע ללוסקה ביום ד' 11  
בינואר שעה 16:40 טיסת KA-420.

השגריר שוחח אתמול עם מנכ'ל ממרוה'מ' שאישר  
כי נעשו סידורים לקבלתו בשדה - כולל אשרה, והובן  
שהפגישה עם קאונדה סודרה.

ברכות,

נאו'מ

פא

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, הדס, מאפ











# Bush Faces Big Decisions in Mideast And Central America, Shultz Says

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz says the Bush administration will face major decisions in the Middle East and Central America and that the United States must eventually deal with the gradual erosion of the nuclear deterrence that has kept the peace among the great powers since World War II.

Shultz summed up his views in a wide-ranging and sometimes philosophical interview Wednesday with Washington Post editors and reporters. When he and his wife leave Washington for California and their permanent home on the Stanford University campus late in the afternoon of Jan. 20, Shultz will have served 6½ years as secretary of state, longer than anyone else in the post-World War II era except for Dean Rusk.

The Middle East peace process, Shultz said, is "one of those things that consumes you as you get into it. It takes up all the time you've got." Therefore his designated successor at Foggy Bottom, James A. Baker III, "will have to think carefully how to involve himself in it."

Shultz, who came to office in mid-1982 just after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, was deeply and personally engaged in Mideast negotiations in his first two years at State. But after the collapse of his painstakingly negotiated Israeli-Lebanese agreement, the terror bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and the pullout of U.S. forces from Lebanon, Shultz stayed away from the Mideast from mid-1985 until starting a final burst of diplomatic activity in October 1987.

"We worked very hard on the problem" even in the years of apparent disengagement, said Shultz in defense of his record. "There were a number of occasions when we got it up to a... promising

point. [But] there was always the view that I held and that most of the people I was working with held, that if I was going to go out and engage, I should have at least a 0.1 probability of accomplishing something."

He added, "I know there is that criticism [that he was detached for a long time] and maybe if I had gone and traveled around more, it may have made some difference, but I kind of doubt it. I think perhaps it can be counterproductive if you aren't careful when you're traveling and nothing takes place."

In current circumstances, Shultz said, the Palestinian issues of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza are central to the diplomatic agenda—and "those are the hardest problems that there are."

Shultz seemed to rule out any role for himself as a future special U.S. negotiator in the Middle East, a possibility that has figured in Washington speculation. "That's out of the question," he said flatly when asked about accepting such a role.

The situation in Central America, where it is widely perceived that Reagan administration policies are at a dead end, was described as "very unsatisfactory" by Shultz. He added, "It's also very important to us, I think, that it be in much better shape than it is."

Shultz blamed Congress for the seeming stalemate. It "basically pulled the rug out from the most promising period of development" by refusing last February to continue U.S. lethal aid to the Nicaraguan contra rebels, he said.

Nevertheless, Shultz maintained, "the contras are in a lot better shape than most people seem to think. There is a significant hard core of contras who are very, very dissatisfied with what's going on in their country and are willing to fight to change things around."

Members of Congress who have had recent conversations with Baker have reported he is unlikely to take on a major battle on Capitol Hill by attempting to renew the highly controversial military aid to the rebels.

Shultz said he does not know what can or will be done by President-elect George Bush and Baker but declared, "At least, the next administration will inherit a contra group in existence."

Shultz said the U.S. diplomatic agenda also includes a host of bilateral problems and relationships in every part of the world.

In a metaphor he has often employed to describe his concept of American diplomacy, Shultz said, "looking after stuff all over the world, which I call 'gardening,' is almost more important than specific negotiations."

"You've got to go and find the weeds and get them out, and water the flowers and keep that going," he said, referring to undramatic but time-consuming attention to diplomatic detail. "Things are going very well for us, by and large, but that won't happen unless you keep gardening and keep working at it. The problems are changing."

At the opposite pole from the quiet, steady diplomacy of "gardening" was the sudden big-stakes dealing between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in a weekend at Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986.

Shultz defended Reagan's bargaining, which included an offer to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles and discussion of ridding the world of all nuclear weapons.

"I personally think that the idea of nuclear deterrence, as we have thought about it, as something that's just going to last in perpetuity, that's not likely," said Shultz.

cont...



"Among the changes that are taking place is the emergence of other kinds of weapons that are threatening"—at another point in the interview he referred to the growing peril of chemical and biological weapons—"and a growing sense of unease about nuclear weapons."

Shultz conceded it may be possible to continue with nuclear deterrence, based on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance of terror that has been an underlying feature of the bipolar relationship of the postwar era. But he added, "My instinct is that 20 years from now there will be something in its place."

"I personally would think there is a continuing role for a level of nuclear deterrence. But the kind of program we have now I wouldn't think it has a capacity to be there 25 years from now." Shultz did not describe the power relationship or relationships he expects to succeed deterrence.

Asked about Gorbachev's immediate future and his chances for success in his *perestroika* effort to reform policy and institutions in the Soviet Union, Shultz recounted an exchange at the mini-summit luncheon on Governors Island, N.Y., a month ago.

As Shultz recalled it, Bush asked Gorbachev to assess his own prospects of success, much as a potential investor might ask about the probable returns from factory improvements.

"Even Jesus Christ couldn't answer that question," replied Gorbachev, according to Shultz's account. The outgoing secretary of state said he has been impressed by Gorbachev's analyses and efforts but added, "It's a very hard problem that he has."

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דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פבוק	זר:
סוג: שמור		כתוב:
תאריך וזמן חבירה: 89 1200 6 בינו' 89		אלאגף אירופה, מצפ"א
כס' פבוק: הפסד:		דצ: ממ"ד
112		כאח: שג' רושינגטון

רבש"א - המונח מצב

שיחה (6.1) עם ס/מנחל המח' לנושאים פוליטיים-צבאיים באגף אירופה.

1. בעקבות החלטת הנשיא על הסכמת ארה"ב לכינוס ועידת מוסקבה לז"א ב-1991 (החלטה שהתקבלה בתאום עם בוש ובייקר) הוסר מכשול בדרך לסיום ועידת המעקב בוינה.
2. במגמה לעמוד בל"ז (17.1 מועד לסיום הדיונים) מתקיימות התיעוציות אינטנסיביות בנסיון "לנקות את השולחן".
3. הניטרליות הפיצו טינות מסמך מסכם אותו הגדיר כמסמך טוב. לפי שעה לא ברור אם ברה"מ והמזאקרינות יאמצוהו.
4. ארה"ב ממשיכה במאמציה לשפר את הטקסט. מעוניינים שתהיה התייחסות מפורטת ומוגדרת בטקסט: להגבלה בת שנה של יציאת אנשים מסיבות בטחוניות ולמעקב של קבוצות חלסינקיא נושאים אליהם התייחס גורבצ'וב בנאומו האחרון בעצרת.
5. לסיום מעריך את הסיכוי לסיים העבודה עד למועד שנקבע כגבוהים (90%) במידה ולא ישיגו את השיפורים בטקסט ינסו להשיגם בהזדמנות אחרת.

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תפוצה: 36 -



דחיפות: כידי	שגרירות ישראל/ווישינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: בלפ"ס	טופס פברק	כתוב: 4
תאריך וזמן מעבר:	אל: כצפ"א, כע"ת, המברה	
כס' פברק:	דע: ירה"פ לתקשורת, י. שהב"ט לתקשורת,	
הפסד: בטחון ניו יורק	רמ"ח/קס"ח, ניו יורק	
22 130 119	כאח: עתונות/ווישינגטון	

## סכום עתונות יומי

NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 6, 1988

### EDITORIALS:

**A NEW ARAFAT VETO BY VIOLENCE?** NYT: Editors criticize Arafat's recent threats against those Palestinians advocating moderation - Mayor Elias Freij. Arafat must stop terrorizing those of his own people who know how to make peace if he really wants to convince Israelis and Americans of his peaceful intentions.

**CENSORSHIP ISN'T THE ANSWER:** CT: 1-5: Editors support the Concise Oxford Dictionary inclusion of the anti-Semitic and pejorative definitions of "Jew." "When hatred disappears, so will those offensive usages."

**MOSCOW RIGHTS:** BS: The decision to approve of a human rights conference in the Soviet Union in 1991 is neither a favor to Gorbachev nor a clean bill of health for Soviet practices. It is rather, a freedom of action for Bush and Baker.

**TATTERED TABOO:** BS: Today the taboo against CW is tattered. The Paris conference will be instructive but hardly conclusive because of all the verification problems.

**POISON GAS:** PI: The plane incident may serve to put pressure on our European allies and Japan into doing what they should have done years ago: rein in the private chemical and pharmaceutical companies that have been selling third world dictators raw materials for making poison gas.

**BLOWING CHANCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:** WT: Editors strongly advocate blowing up the Libyan chemical plant.

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COLUMNS:

ARAB DUPLICITY ON GADHAFI: WP: Jim Hoagland: Margaret Thatcher's appeal for the US to exercise restraint and not attack Libya and its chemical plant appears to have been heard in Washington. This is a striking contrast to the refusal of Arab leaders to urge restraint on Gadhafi. The Arab govts' collective willingness not just to endure evil within their community but to come repeatedly to its defense in the name of solidarity is the single most important cause of their weakness abroad and division at home. 2/4 19 30 22

HOW TO MAKE THE DISAVOWAL STICK: WT: Bruce Fein: Guidelines of what the US should expect from Arafat in terms of his recent statement renouncing terrorism. Arafat has not yet truthfully disavowed terrorism and the US is censurable for fostering confusion, misunderstanding and mischief in int'l affairs by treating Arafat's unsubstantiated renunciation as the genuine article.

THE ARAFAT MURDER THREAT: NYT: A.M. Rosenthal: The Arafat murder threat against Freij shows that the PLO still relies on terrorism and is totally in line with a policy the PLO began in 1964: to use terror to ensure that no other organization or movement has a chance to build support among Palestinians opposed to Israeli occupation, but who might favor a solution not based on the PLO and its covenant. The threat also shows why so many Israeli officials pay more attention to what the PLO says to Palestinians and other Arabs than what it says to American diplomats and American Jews in Stockholm.

ARE THE CUBANS USING POISON GAS IN ANGOLA? WP: Evans and Novak.

PRESS REPORTS:

BUSH FACES BIG DECISIONS IN MIDEAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA, SHULTZ SAYS: WP: Oberdorfer: Re: Shultz speaking at WP on the ME: Shultz said that in current circumstances the Palestinian issues of the WB and Gaza are central to the diplomatic agenda - and "those are the hardest problems that there are." He ruled out any role for himself as a future special US negotiator in the ME.

A LONELY PROTEST OF OCCUPATION: PI: Lisa Karoly: The silent vigil of the "Women in Black" in Jerusalem's French Square who are protesting Israel's behavior and the occupation. They gather each Friday night much to the outrage of many Israeli citizens and have been threatened spat on and cursed at by many passing Israelis.

ISRAELI CABINET APPROVES BUDGET: WP: Cabinet accepted an economic plan with \$550 million in budget cuts designed to curb inflation and stimulate growth. This economic package seeks to reverse the worst economic slowdown since 1982.

\$550 MILLION PARED FROM ISRAELI BUDGET: WT: Reuters.

BETHLEHEM MAYOR DENIES HE'S HIDING: USA TODAY: ...also... Israeli soldiers forced Bethlehem residents to paint over graffiti threatening the life of Mayor Elias Freij.

THREAT ATTRIBUTED TO ARAFAT DRAWS US CRITICISM: BS: Reuters: Shultz said that a threat attributed to the PLO (Arafat to Freij) did not square well with the organization's renunciation of terrorism. Shultz said, "Threats against people who try to move in a calmer and more peaceful direction are acts of intimidation and fall much more into the terrorist category."



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GRAFFITI THREATENS MAYOR WHO CALLED TRUCE: WT: Re: Freij.  
WEST BANK MAYOR WHO SOUGHT TRUCE LIES LOW: CT: 1-5: Freij, after a  
warning from Arafat, withdrew his truce proposal...

MEDIATION IDEA WINS EGYPT'S TENTATIVE OK: CT:1-5: Egypt's envoy to  
Israel said Wednesday Cairo would agree to superpower mediation  
rather than an int'l ME peace conference if this was acceptable to  
the PLO.

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LIBRARY'S NAME BRINGS TALK OF ANTI-SEMITISM: NYT: Furor in  
Wisconsin over the naming of a library, the USS Liberty Memorial  
Library.

WT: SMALL ARTICLES IN WORLD SECTION:  
MORE JEWS LEAVE, FEWER PICK ISRAEL: Re: Soviet Jewish emigres.  
FRANCE UPGRADES PLO OFFICE IN PARIS: Paris PLO office will be  
upgraded to "general delegation"  
AIR FORCE FLIGHTS MAY GO TO MOROCCO: USAF is considering moving  
training missions to Morocco.  
ZAIRE SAYS IDI AMIN MAY BE EXPELLED.

ARABS DENOUNCE DOWNING; ISRAELIS CHEER: BES:AP: 1-5: Shock waves  
of US downing of Libyan plane: Arab nations were unanimous in  
their denunciation. ...the few kind words came mostly from Israel.

FINNS CONVINCED CALL ABOUT PAN AM BOMBING WAS GRISLY HOAX: WF:  
Re: investigation of calls made to the US Embassy in Finland which  
were originally dismissed. First calls of a bomb threat were made  
to the Israeli Embassy in Finland last July.

KEEPING THE GENIE BOTTLED: CSM: Gary Thatcher: Re: chemical  
weapons are once again at the center of arms-control efforts.  
Libyan threat to Israel.

US VIEW OF CHEMICAL ARMS MEETING: CSM: EA Wayne: US officials at  
the Paris conference are working hard and hoping that "dramatic  
and public" global condemnation of chemical weapons in Paris will  
build momentum for further steps to stop the proliferation of them  
and to create a system with a degree of automaticity for  
investigating charges of CW use.

ALL PAPERS COVERED THE LIBYAN ISSUES: THE DOWNING OF THE TWO MIGS  
AND THE CHEMICAL PLANT IN RABTA.

US RELEASES PHOTOS OF LIBYAN JETS: WP p.1.  
BONN SAYS PROBE FAILS TO BACK US CHARGES ON LIBYAN PLANT: WP p.1:  
Kohl said there was no evidence to back up US charges that at  
least one German firm played a leading role in constructing the facility.  
ANXIOUS LIBYANS SEEK HELP TO DETER POSSIBLE US ATTACK: WP: The  
Libyan govt., nervously awaiting the next US move, has asked  
European help to defuse tensions and steer the US away from  
another possible attack.

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SOVIETS CHARGE US WITH 'STATE TERRORISM' AND 'ADVENTURISM': WP;  
SOME ALLIES FEAR US REACTION ABOVE LIBYAN TERROR: WT  
US ASKS SOVIET AID IN PRESSING LIBYA ON CHEMICAL ARMS: NYT: p.1.  
US SAYS TAPES PROVE LIBYA JETS CARRIED MISSILES: NYT: p.1.  
US FAULTS BONN AG CLOW MOVING ON CHEMICAL COMPANY ASSERTIONS: NYT.  
RUSSIAN AT UN SAYS MOSCOW HAD URGED RESTRAINT BY THE US: NYT.  
INCIDENT OFF LIBYA TROUBLES EUROPE: NYT.  
BONN CLEARS COMPANY OF LIBYAN ROLE: NYT.  
AT THE UN, LIBYA, US TRADE BARBS: PI:AP.  
ALLIES ARE URGING US RESTRAINT ON LIBYA: WSJ.  
BONN DOUBTS FIRM WAS INVOLVED: LAT:PI.  
LIBYAN ROLE IN TERRORISM KEY TO FEUD: CT: p.1 1-5.

WALSH SEEKS TO DROP 2 OF NORTH'S COUNTS: WP: p.1  
\*\*Articles on this decision appear in all newspapers (extensive  
coverage) p.1: WP, WT, NYT, WSJ, PI, BS, ETC.

FOREIGN SERVICE AWAITS BAKER'S CHOICES: WP: Goshko: Critical posts  
include those dealing with Europe and the Middle East.

Beth Silverman  
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תדריך דובר כחפ"ד ליום  
JANUARY 6, 1989

I also have an announcement, or a statement, on the Libyan CW plant:

We have discussed with a number of governments, including, but not limited to, the Federal Republic of Germany, the serious danger posed by Libya's chemical warfare program. We and other governments are seeking to deny Libya the foreign assistance we believe is

essential for full development of this capability.

With regard to West Germany, we are confident that it is taking the information we have provided very seriously and is investigating fully. It has in the past year vigorously pursued and prosecuted such cases. Stemming from an investigation that began in November, 1987, the West Germany government and public prosecutors currently are looking into the activities of companies believed to have helped in the construction of chemical warfare facilities in Iraq. Like the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany is a member of the Australian Group, which seeks to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons.

With regard to the Libyan CW program, we understand that the appropriate Germany authorities are still conducting their investigations. As with other countries with which we have talked regarding this problem, this is an ongoing matter. West Germany has also announced that it is reviewing its export control laws. We understand an interim report on this subject will be presented to the cabinet soon.

For our part, the US has provided interested countries information available to us. We

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believe this information is conclusive with regard to the activities of various foreign firms in the Libyan CW program. Of course, whether such activities are illegal and the role of our information in any legal proceedings depends on the existing national laws affecting such activities. Our dialogue with the West German and other governments on this matter is continuing.

Q First of all, can we have a copy of that statement? 125 133  
MS. OAKLEY: Yes. 26

Q You made, obviously, repeated references to West Germany, but you also made repeated references to other countries. Could you please specify in the same way that you did West Germany which other countries those references refer to?

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not going to be able to go into the other countries that we have approached and discussed the Libyan problem with. These discussions involve sensitive diplomatic communications and I cannot go any further in identifying other countries. The key issue is to ensure effective international cooperation.

Q What's the distinction you're making between West Germany and the other countries, please?

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not making a distinction between the other countries. On the basis of the information that we've shared, certainly we have shared the same information, but there are certain things that we're in a position to talk about and other things we're not. But let me point out again that our discussion with all these countries are continuing.

Q Would it be accurate for us to conclude from the comments you've just made that the West German government, disappointed in what they perceive as Germany bashing by United States media, have asked the State Department to make this statement in effect to clear West Germany's name?

MS. OAKLEY: That would not be accurate at all. I don't think we're in any position of bashing any country. We're working closely with the West German government, other interested governments on this issue. We'll continue to bring to their attention relevant information that assists in their on-going investigations. But I'm not going to go any further on our diplomatic exchanges.

Q Phyllis, why is it that there seems to be a gap or a discrepancy in the public statements that are made from this podium here

MS. OAKLEY: I can't explain for you what might appear to be these discrepancies. What I'm giving you here is our position, that we value the close work and cooperation that we've had with the West German government. The point that we're trying to make is that our discussions with them are continuing. It's our understanding that the West German investigation is not yet complete, that they're continuing to investigate, and we remain in touch with them on the matter.



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Q In that case, it's also your understanding that the announcement made there yesterday that they're single investigation has concluded is erroneous.

MS. OAKLEY: I think that we had addressed this yesterday, that we were aware that there had been this report. I think the point that I made was we're not sure that that was the complete investigation. And I will repeat again that we understand that the total West German government investigation is not yet complete, and we'll look forward to continuing to work with them on it.

Q What about the West German comments that the United States has not provided them with enough conclusive, hard evidence to help them along in their investigation. Are we attempting to provide them with additional details?

MS. OAKLEY: I think that was covered in the statement that I read, and also pointing out that we are continuing to work closely with them. We'll continue to bring information to their attention as it is available to us, and that we expect this process to continue.

Q The statements from West Germany have focused on the thing that they have not found any violations of West German law. Now, that is not necessarily the same thing --

MS. OAKLEY: Yes.

Q -- as whether or not West German firms are involved in helping to construct what we claim is a chemical weapons plant in the thing.

MS. OAKLEY: Well, I think our statement --

Q Is this a semantical thing --

MS. OAKLEY: No, no, but I think --

MS. OAKLEY: No, I don't think so. I think our statement covered that as well, when we noted that whether such activities are illegal and the role of our information in a legal proceeding depends on the existing national laws affecting such activities.

Q Is there any chance that Secretary Shultz and Minister Genscher might address this matter jointly, since they're both together in Paris?

MS. OAKLEY: Well, we all are aware that they are together. I don't have the Secretary's schedule, and certainly any meetings or announcements will be made from Paris. Clearly, the Libyan CW potential is an item of concern. The Secretary addressed this in his press conference travelling to Paris. But I think for further details of meetings there, we'll have to go to Paris.



Q Is it the government's -- the United States government's position that the Libyans are right now in a position to begin the manufacture of chemical weapons, or do the Libyans need additional aid or contributions from other countries such as West Germany?

MS. OAKLEY: I don't have anything new beyond what we'd said before on this question when we talked about the Libyans being on the verge of this. I think the Secretary also addressed it in his press conference that he gave on the airplane going to Paris, that our estimate is -- he was asked the question whether we felt that there is no production yet, and the Secretary said that that is our estimate. We think that they have had some difficulties, and that they are quite -- not quite there yet.

Q My point is -- and if it's not understood, I'll clarify it -- my point is, if the Libyans are already in a position with what they have in hand now to go forward with it, then I'm wondering what the point of all the diplomatic pressure on the West Germans is, except for recriminations; or, if some contribution from the West Germans, technical or otherwise, is vital for this -- for them to pass the verge --

MS. OAKLEY: -- Because it talked about -- and I don't really want to paraphrase, but I think the thrust of what he said was that we feel that without foreign assistance, that they cannot go to full production. But I would suggest that you check the transcript of Wednesday on that.

Q Would this foreign assistance include assistance from the West Germans?

MS. OAKLEY: We have not talked about what foreign assistance is required. What we're concerned about is assistance that could be coming from firms from many countries, or other countries. What we're seeking is to deny them the assistance that would enable them to go to production of their capability.

Q In the middle of this statement about the investigation, which I understand to be an investigation of German -- any -- a possible German role in the construction of the Libyan plant, you brought up the fact that the West Germans have also conducted an investigation since November of '87 into the construction of the Iraqi facility.

MS. OAKLEY: Yes.

Q What's the point of that at this point? Is that investigation -- are you saying that that investigation is also still continuing, or is it --

MS. OAKLEY: What we're noting here is that Germany, in the past, has vigorously pursued and prosecuted certain cases involving -- (pauses) --

Q So it's sort of a -- (inaudible) -- situation?

MS. OAKLEY: Yeah, that they take this very seriously. This is the point that we're making. And that -- again, let me repeat that we intend to stay in close touch with them and to cooperate with them.



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Q (Off mike) -- anything on the request to the Soviets not to provide foreign assistance to the Libyans?

MS. OAKLEY: We have raised our concerns about the Libyan CW program previously with the Soviets. Secretary Shultz said yesterday, while en route to Paris, that he intends to discuss the issue of the Libyan chemical weapons plant with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and to seek Soviet cooperation in addressing the problem of the Rabta facility.

Q (Off mike) -- what does it mean to address the problem?

MS. OAKLEY: That he intends to discuss -- seek Soviet cooperation in addressing the problem -- in confronting it, in figuring out how to deal with it.

Q But not solving it?

MS. OAKLEY: Well, we hope it leads to a solution, that's the purpose of what we're doing.

Q What would you like the Libyans -- to see them do as far as the plant itself is concerned?

OAKLEY: That was discussed by the Secretary on his way to Paris yesterday, and he had noted there, obviously if the facility were destroyed, that would take care of the problem. That's our posture. Whether there is something else that can be done, we will see. There is a negotiation going on in Geneva, so I don't think it's appropriate for us to propose some ad hoc solution here, absent really working it through carefully in the broader negotiations.

Q Has there been any communication from the Libyans through authorized channels since the incident out in the Mediterranean, that you're aware of?

MS. OAKLEY: Not that I'm aware of. I think that many of you are aware that we did send a message to Libya, the same message through the two countries that represent our interest.

Q Can you elaborate any further on what you said, or what he meant by "destroying it"? Does it mean or imply destroying it with the equipment in it?

MS. OAKLEY: No. I can't elaborate on that. I think he was talking about the question of destroying or dismantling it, but I really have no further details beyond that.



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Q Soviet human rights activists aren't very happy with the decision to agree to hold a conference there on human rights in 1991. Can you elaborate a little bit on it, or have you any comment on that?

MS. OAKLEY: We have agreed to the Moscow human rights meeting on the basis of actions already taken by the Soviets and with the expectation and indication that current progress will continue, including the institutionalization of reforms, such as the abolition or amendment of key articles of the criminal code and passage of effective legislation on emigration. That expectation of continued progress was a key factor in our decision. We think the prospect of holding a Moscow meeting will lead the Soviets to continue improving performance. The lack of future progress would cause us to reconsider attendance at the Moscow meeting. We also expect that Soviet human rights dissidents, such as those who have been quoted, will be able to participate in the Moscow conference, based on the assurances of access and openness we have received from Soviet officials. We will continue to press both bilaterally and through the CSCE for the resolution of individual cases and for institutional change as we monitor Soviet implementation of its CSCE and other international human rights commitments.

Q The Soviet ambassador to the United Nations this morning suggested that perhaps both the Soviet Union and the United States should withdraw their naval forces from the Mediterranean on a fairly permanent basis. Do you have any comment --

MS. OAKLEY: I don't have any comment. I've not seen those remarks. I think we have clearly covered the rationale for our naval forces in the Mediterranean, and that policy has not changed.

Q -- human rights conference. If Soviet human rights activists are not allowed to participate in the conference, would the United States not support the holding of such a conference?

MS. OAKLEY: That is a hypothetical question about what would happen. I think that was covered in the answer that I've given before when we noted that lack of future progress would cause us to reconsider attendance, but I'm not going to set up a checklist of what might happen or what we might do. I think our broad outlines are clear enough.

Q Phyllis, an Israeli newspaper quoting Western sources is claiming that the IRA and the PFLPGC (?) pulled off the bombing of Pan Am 103 with Libyan help. Do you have -- do we have any evidence that that was or wasn't the case?

MS. OAKLEY: I can only say that our investigations are continuing; that, as we've noted before, some of the tips or theories appear off the wall.



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but we certainly are pursuing them, and that we intend to get to the bottom of this. But on a specific claim or hint like that, I just don't have any comment.

Q Do you consider this an off-the-wall theory?

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not considering it or passing evaluation. I'm setting out for you what we're doing with all the information and the leads that we get.

Q -- if you were a diplomat in a foreign country that spoke another language, how would you interpret the phrase "off the wall"?

MS. OAKLEY: I can only translate in other slang, perhaps -- "far out"? Not very credible.

Q Phyllis, are there any plans for any further meetings in the near future with representatives of the PLO in Tunis?

MS. OAKLEY: Again, we have said that we talked about the meetings that have been held. I have no further information on any further meetings.

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Oh, this is an update, that they did meet this morning in informal consultations. And we understand that a formal meeting will be held at 3:30 this afternoon, of the Security Council.

Q You filed the notification with the UN, that in response to an armed attack by Libyan aircraft. Yesterday, the US government was saying that the planes approached the American fleet with hostile intent. Was there a "Libyan attack" against American forces?

MS. OAKLEY: Well, I think if you read the -- or go back over the entire phrase, I think it's clear. We said that "In response to hostile actions constituting an armed attack by Libyan aircraft...", and I think that's consistent with what we've said.

MS. OAKLEY: I expect that Ambassador Okun, our acting permanent representative, will represent the United States.

Q Has the US government considered taking the matter of the Libyan chemical facility to the United Nations?

MS. OAKLEY: I don't have a definite answer on that. I think, as you well know, our efforts have focused on the problem of chemical weapons worldwide. That's why the Secretary left this morning, to go to Paris. We've stated clearly our purposes at the meeting. I think we're going to focus our efforts in Paris on this conference, and I'm not going to speculate in any way on any other actions. What we're doing now is focusing on the Paris conference on chemical weapons.

Q On this subject, was General Burns speaking for the US government when he yesterday, at this briefing, at a briefing he held, termed the Libyan chemical facility "a threat to peace" under the terms of the UN charter?

MS. OAKLEY: He was talking about, I think, how he viewed it. Our serious concerns have been reiterated again and again about that facility. Again, clearly, this is one of the reasons why we feel what's happening in Paris over the weekend is important.

Q Is that the US government position that the facility is a threat to peace?

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not going to paraphrase his words. What I would stress again for you today is that we are very concerned about that facility. It's very clear we're concerned about it. And, right now, our energies are going to be focused in Paris.

Q Maybe we got sidetracked on General Burns' words. Does the United States government consider this plant a threat to peace?

MS. OAKLEY: What we are saying, I think, has been clear. We



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have talked about our concerns about this plant. I'm not going to be drawn into these semantic definitions of "threat" -- is it a severe threat, how much a threat? What we're saying, and I think it's the point that we've all emphasized, is that we're concerned about it. And we've spelled out those concerns, why we're concerned. And we have said that we view it as part of a problem of world-wide proliferation. We're trying to do something about it. The first step is what's going to take place in Paris this weekend.

Q Secretary Shultz was quoted in the Post this morning saying that the US is -- wants to make Mu'ammarr Qadhafi feel uncomfortable. I wonder if you could elaborate on that a little bit, what he meant by that.

MS. OAKLEY: Well, (with a laugh) I hardly feel I need to elaborate on the Secretary's remarks. I think when you put that with what our policy has been toward Libya, we have stressed this for a long time, that we have talked about our concerns; that we feel that it is Libya's behavior -- their support of terrorism -- that is the cause of the problems between us. We have certainly stressed

that we want them to change their behavior, to give up their support for terrorism, that that is the basis for the problems that exist between us.

Q Have there been private approaches to the US government over the last several weeks from emissaries saying they represent Libya?

MS. OAKLEY: There have been several efforts by Libya over the past year to send messages to the US government through various intermediaries. But, let me get back to the points that I made in response to the last question. The problem is not one of communication. The problem is the policy and the conduct of the government of Libya; their policy, particularly, in support of terrorism. So that informal, back-channel messages will not take care of this basic problem. There are official channels through governments if messages must be passed, but the point that we're stressing -- it's not lack of communication, it's the conduct of the government of Libya that remains the problem.

Q But, I thought it was against policy of the US government to have an American government official talk to a Libyan government official. Is that not against US policy? Have we not gotten several of our ambassadors in trouble for doing so?

MS. OAKLEY: Yeah, for talking -- there have been cases, and

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I'm not prepared to go into the exact wording of those regulations that govern the conduct. But, I think what we -- the point that I'm trying to make, and I will be happy to make it again, it's not the lack of communication that is the problem between the United States and the government of Libya. It is the problem of the conduct of the government.

Q But apparently there were contacts just days prior to yesterday's incident, where Libya was at least saying that it "wanted to improve relations with the United States; could we lower the temperature?"

MS. OAKLEY: What we have said in response to this -- first of all, I said that there have been several efforts by intermediaries to send messages back and forth. We have acknowledged that. But what we're saying is that the problem is not the communications. The problem is the conduct of the government of Libya. And if they want to improve relations, then they have to change their conduct.

MS. OAKLEY: No, I'm not going to get into the specifics.

Q It doesn't reflect any change in the position of the Qadhafi regime towards terrorism like --

MS. OAKLEY: You'd have to ask them.

Q With the PLO, it was a matter of communication more than anything else. It's the same, if they are willing to say that they renounce terrorism. So why do you differentiate between an Arab government and an Arab organization?

MS. OAKLEY: You're trying to get into analogies of one situation with another on this. What I am addressing is the facts in the situation, what our reaction has been, what our policy has been. We have gone over the PLO issue. We have talked about the criteria that were met. That issue stands by itself. What we're talking about now is our reaction to the government of Libya. I have spelled it out as clearly as I can.

Q How does the United States feel about the statements issued by a number of Arab countries today, and by the lack of statements issued by a number of Western allies today over the incident in the Gulf yesterday?

MS. OAKLEY: I don't have any reaction to these reports of certain statements by various groups of countries. I think it's still very early. What we do is base our actions on what we think is right. This has been covered by the Pentagon. I don't have anything further to say on that, that we felt that our people behaved in the appropriate manner. We're not, if you will, guided in our policies by votes among everyone. We did what we felt was right in the situation and we have explained our reasons for doing it.



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Q What about the Soviet Union? They also had a very strong statement today, apparently using words like "terrorism," et cetera. Do you have anything to say about that?

MS. OAKLEY: No.

Q I wanted to ask, you said that there had been several efforts over the past year to send messages. Was there any type of response or reaction on the part of the United States, to say, "We are not interested," or to respond in any way?

MS. OAKLEY: I am not going to get into the specifics. I think our position on this has been perfectly clear, what we have said. We've explained what the problems are. We've gone over this time and again, certainly as the sanctions were renewed. This is very clearly spelled out. The government of Libya knows that there are certain channels that exist through the powers that represent us when there are official messages to be passed.

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MS. OAKLEY: What? No. I'm not saying that those channels have not been used. We -- as you know, Belgium represents US interests in Tripoli, and the UAE represents Libyan interests here. And I'm not getting into the discussion of messages that go that way. But those are the official channels, when and if messages need to be passed.

Q To go back to Samira's (ph?) question, it seems quite logical the issue for the PLO and for Qadhafi have both been terrorism, but we seem to hold them to different standards. Why is that?

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not getting into comparisons of standards. Our positions have been gone over and over on this. I would refer you most recently to the renewal of sanctions against Libya and in those statements that were issued. That clearly goes over how we view the policies of the government. That's an issue that stands by itself.

Q Do you have any reaction to the West German denial that Imhausen was involved in the Libyan plant, or the accusation of five companies being involved in the Iraqi chemical weapons production?

MS. OAKLEY: We have seen a wire report -- I'm not sure that that was the definitive statement of the West German government. If I remember correctly, that was a statement of some group. But we have, as we've gone over before, provided the West German government with the evidence that we've gathered. We've been assured that it is taking all the evidence very seriously and is investigating fully. I'm not aware that we have had a definitive answer or response back from the government.

Q Is the US government comfortable -- rather, uncomfortable with the reaction, the international reaction, to what happened yesterday?

MS. OAKLEY: We are not in a position where we're going to ever describe whether we're comfortable or uncomfortable with reactions. We've explained what happened in the incident. We've explained why we took the actions that we did. As everyone has said, we consider this incident to be closed. I have nothing further.



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Q Phyllis, the British government issued a statement saying it had accumulated some of its own independent evidence of the nature of the chemical plant in Libya and had concluded that that evidence indicates it would be capable of producing chemical weapons. Has the United States shared that -- Has Britain shared that information with the United States? Is it different from the evidence the United States has presented to its allies?

MS. OAKLEY: This gets into questions of intelligence that we simply can't discuss. We certainly feel gratified that the British have talked about evidence that supports the allegations that we have made on this question. We certainly are in a process of cooperating and sharing conclusions with a number of governments, but I'm certainly not going to be in the position to be able to say whether this is exactly the same or how it varies from our other information.

Q The Secretary was quoted in today's paper as -- speaking about Arafat's statements -- that would sort of suggest that it was unhealthy for certain West Bank officials to back a truce, or a cessation of the demonstrations. Is that a suggestion that we're rethinking our policy towards the PLO?

MS. OAKLEY: I don't have any specific response to your question, and I don't think we're going to get into the business of responding to every statement that people make in this situation. I think it's been clear that the objective of the United States, and of everyone sincerely interested in moving the Middle East process forward, should be to find ways to encourage Israelis and Arabs to pull back from violent confrontation and help to create an atmosphere conducive to coexistence and peace. Explicit or implicit threats against those who call for a dialogue between Arabs and Israelis do not help the process of a search for peaceful solutions to the conflict.

Q Is the US government looking seriously to accusations raised here and there that maybe the Mossad is behind the Pan American crash?

MS. OAKLEY: I don't have anything new to offer on the status of the investigation into the cause of the Panamanian (sic) flight 103. We talked about the investigation continuing in the hands of the competent authorities, both in the United Kingdom and with the cooperation of the United States and many other governments. We have talked about excellent cooperation. But I am certainly not going to get into any theorizing or speculating on what groups might be responsible. All those things are just theories -- some of them seem clearly "off the wall," others perhaps are being pursued. But we're just not going to get in the habit of commenting on those respective theories.







Q Do you mean to say that nothing is excluded?

MS. OAKLEY: Well, I don't see how you can exclude anything when you're beginning an investigation as important and as serious as this. We are looking clearly at every possibility, but let me point out that some of these ideas are clearly "off the wall." And

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not going to comment. We've talked about a number of groups who've telephoned and things like that. We're pursuing all avenues and we are determined to find out who was behind the crash of Pan American 103.

Q Do you have anything on any new US-PLO contacts?

MS. OAKLEY: No.

Q Following that, there are reports that officials have been -- US officials are now being allowed to talk to PLO representatives in a social setting. Do you have anything on that?

MS. OAKLEY: There have been instructions that have allowed people in social settings to respond socially to introductions. Let me repeat that the one channel for communication with the PLO, officially, remains our ambassador in Tunis.

Q But, is this now leading to more than just, say, "hello, how are you" and whatever? I mean, can they actually -- could they go socially for dinner? I mean, on those kind of levels?

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not going to get into the specific diplomatic, perhaps, niceties of the tea cups and the handshakes in this situation. What I'm trying to say, our policy remains as we have stated it. The official contact remains through our ambassador in Tunis. People may respond socially in a setting; if you're introduced, there may be the exchange of courtesies. And these are not to be construed as official contacts. That channel remains as we have stated and nothing has changed.

Q Does a social setting mean a public -- or in a group, rather than private?

MS. OAKLEY: Yes. In a group. If, at a large party, if people meet or are introduced, that's what that means.

Q On the terrorism poster, the reward poster, has that been distributed yet?

MS. OAKLEY: I assume that it has been distributed because it has been some time since we announced that reward program that we had broadened. But, I can't tell you how many posters have been distributed and whether the distribution has been completed.

Q Phyllis, in connection with the PLO, you said a little while ago that there had been good cooperation among all of the agencies and nations involved in the investigation on Pan Am 103. Has there -- Can we extend that to assume that there has also been good cooperation since the US requested the assistance of the PLO in this case?

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not getting into the specifics at all of various organizations or countries. What we have said, in general, that we're working closely with a number of people, we're working



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closely with authorities in various countries. And I'll just leave it at that. I'm not going to get into specific ratings or evaluations of cooperation on this.

Q That seems to me that -- since my question was about the contact with the PLO, that leaves clearly open the -- and your response dealt strictly with working closely with -- that leaves me with the impression that the United States is continuing to work closely with the PLO on this investigation.

MS. OAKLEY: No, that is not correct. What I have said, and we've said here from the podium, we are working closely with many governments, with organizations that are involved, such as Interpol, groups that have been set up, various committees -- that we welcome cooperation or information from every source. Nothing on that has changed.

Q But -- so the question, then, goes back to the original one, which is: since the United States requested the assistance of the PLO in this case, have there been any further discussions on that subject, or has there been any cooperation on that subject with the PLO?

MS. OAKLEY: And I'm saying that I'm not going to get into the specific answers of what we're doing with any country or with any government or any organization. That in a question like this, we are following leads, we're pursuing information as it is given to us, but we're not going to get into specifics of what we're discussing with whom at any time. Yes?

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שגרירות ישראל בווינגטון  
טופס מברק

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

דע: יועץ רוח"מ לתקשורת  
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת  
מנהל לע"מ, ניו-יורק  
מאת: עתונות

דף 1. מתוך 2  
דחיפותו מידי  
סוג: גלוי

תאריך, זמן: 5.1.89  
מספר המברק:

המשרד:

122 132 24

דו"ח תקשורת - 5.1.89

נסיבות התרסקותו של מטוס פאן-אם והדיון שהביאו עמן בבעיות בטיחות בתעופה הבינ"ל (בו זכתה ישראל וחברת "אל-על" לציונים לשבח), התארגנות הממשל החדש, נשק כימי בלוב ואפשרות התקפה אמריקאית על המפעל המייצר אותו, הפלת שני המיגים הלובים ע"י מטוסי קרב אמריקאים בים התיכון ומזג האוויר החורפי שפקד את היבשת, הוו את הנושאים העיקריים בתקשורת האמריקאית בשבוע שחלף.

התרסקות מטוס פאן-אם נקשרה גם בשמו של מנהיג אש"פ שהצעתו לעזור במציאת האשמים עוררה עניין בממשל וזכתה לכותרות בתקשורת. במאמרים תואר עראפת כמי שזמנו דוחק לקידום השיחות עם ארה"ב. גם שתוף הפעולה עם ישראל וזהות ההערכות בין ישראל וארה"ב לגבי המבצעים האפשריים זרזו לאזכורים רבים. ברור היה עם זאת שהיה כאן נסיון ון מצד אש"פ והן מצד דורשי סובתו כאן לנסות ולנצל תקשורתית את האסון.

דווחים רבים עסקו בממשלה החדשה בישראל, בתכנית השיקום הכלכלית של שר האוצר ובביקורת שהופנתה כלפיה בתוך ומחוץ למפלגת העבודה. אך לתשומת לב מיוחדת זכתה מסיבת העיתונאים שערך שר החוץ ארנס בה האשים את אש"פ בהמשך פעילותו הסרוריסטית בעקבות האיום שהשמיע עראפת נוכח דברי ראש עיריית בית לחם בנוגע להפסקת פעולות האיבה בשטחים. ביקורת על אש"פ השמיע גם מזכיר המדינה שמען כי האיום אינו עולה בקנה אחד עם ההבטחה להפסקת הסרור שבעקבותיה נאותה ארה"ב להתחיל בדו-שיח עם הארגון. מסיבת העיתונאים ודבריו של המזכיר סייעו רבות בהסבת תשומת הלב אל כפל הלשון של אש"פ ואנו חנסיים לנצל התפתחות זאת. בינתיים נכתבים כמו מאמרים טובים (זה של אייב רוזנטל הופיע כבר היום כמו גם מאמר המערכת של ה-N.Y.T.)

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הצלחה מועטה יחסית היתה לנו בנסיון לקשור את אש"פ - לפחות מבחינת האחריות המוסרית - לגל הטרור שהביא בסופו גם את הפגוע האכזר במסוס פאן-אם. הראשונות של אש"פ בטרור נגד מטוסים אמנם שמשה השראה למספר כותבים אבל ניכר קושי בהחדרת המסר הבסיסי לאור התדמית החדשה שקנה לו אש"פ ומנהיגו כאן.

לקראת הועידה בפאריס בשבוע הבא מהווה הנשק הכימי את הנושא המרכזי בכותרות הראשיות בעיתונים ובכתבות מרכזיות בתקשורת האלקטרונית ובעיקר המתקן בלוב, מעורבות ונגזות אירופאיות ובמיוחד מעורבות גרמניה המערבית שזכתה, על אף הכחשותיה, לביקורת רבה בתקשורת המקומית. מאמרי פרשנות ומערכת בצירוף כתבות רבות בטלביזיה עסקו בנושא תוך איזכור אפשרות התקפה אמריקאית על המפעל אם יסתבר כי אכן לא במפעל תרופות מדובר. דעה מקובלת היא שעם מדינות כמו לוב ושליטים כמו קדאפי יש משמעות לעמדה תקיפה, אפילו תקפנית, ובאווירה זו התקבלה גם הידיעה בדבר הפלת שני מיגים לובים ע"י טייסים אמריקאים. בהקשר הודגשה הביקורת בעולם הערבי ודברי עראפת כי הפעולה מעכבת את השלום במז"ח לטווח דורי הרכה שבאו מן הארץ, בנושא עסקו מאמרי מערכת ואופ-אד רבים.

אנו מקבלים מספר גדל והולך של פניות לסייע בחשיפת הספור הכימי במדינות ערב, במידת מעורבותם של חברות אירופאיות ובהערכות שלנו בעקבות זאת.

101

יוסי גל



דחיפות: כ"ד	שגרירות ישראל/וויינגטון	ק"ר: 1
סוג: בלכ"ס	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 4
תאריך ושם העמוד:		אל: כצפ"א, כע"ת, הסברה
כס' פרוק:	דע: ירה"פ לתקשורת, י. שהב"ט לתקשורת,	
תפסירי: בטחון ניו יורק	רמ"ח/קס"ח, ניו יורק	
94 108 20	כאת: עתונות/וויינגטון	

## סכום עתונות יומי

NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 5, 1988

### COLUMNS:

**ISRAELI POLICY ON PALESTINIANS: A DEAD END:** CSM: Pat Holt: Holt see the current Israeli government actions pointing to annexation of the territories and thus further isolating Israel and making Israel's adversaries more rather than less intransigent. He states that the 1947 UN partition plan was rejected by Arabs and Jews alike and blames the Israeli seizure of Arab land for creating the refugee problem.

**IT'S AMERICA'S TURN TO SHIFT THINKING:** LAT: Rashid Khalidi 1-4: Israel's campaign to demonize the PLO failed but will repeatedly be attempted by Shamir, Arens, and Netanyahu. A new Likud peace plan will avoid substantive negotiations. The US must cooperate with the Soviet Union and listen with an open mind to the PLO, and take a fair but firm attitude toward Israel. Israel's old days of indulging its every whim should be over.

**WT: CAL THOMAS (cabled):** the Pan Am incident shows that the terrorists have opened a second battle front to reclaim not just the WB and Gaza, but all of Israel. Thomas applauds the voice of B. Netanyahu and recounts the press conference of Dec. 29 and Netanyahu's stand against terrorists and terrorism. He also notes the fact that the PLO has pioneered terror in the skies and on the ground.

**WT: BOOK REVIEW:** On Samuel Segov's "The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in the Iran-Contra Affair."

### PRESS REPORTS:

**ARAFAT THREAT AGAINST TRUCE ADVOCATES HIT:** WP: Goshko: cabled: Shultz at meeting with WP editors said that Arafat's threat to kill advocates of a truce between Israel and the Palestinians fits "very badly" with Arafat's assertion that the PLO has renounced terrorism.

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ARAFAT'S WARNING SENDS A WEST BANK MAYOR INTO HIDING: WT: AP: Freij appeared to be in hiding yesterday after a warning from Arafat and death threats painted on the town walls. REPORTED ARAFAT THREAT IS GRIST FOR ISRAELI DEBATE: NYT: Kifner: Right-wing Israeli politicians said that death threats by Arafat against other Palestinians showed that the PLO was still a "terrorist organization." Arens expressed this view as leftist politicians prepared to meet with representatives of the PLO in defiance of Israeli law. ...AP reported threats in Bethlehem against mayor Freij. His proposal received little support among Palestinians but had been reported by Israeli newspapers and some new agencies.

PALESTINIANS, LEFTIST ISRAELIS TO HOLD MEETING: PI: Reuters. ARAFAT REMAINS A TERRORIST, ISRAELI OFFICIAL SAYS: LAT: 1-4: Williams: Re: Moshe Arens at news conference. ISRAEL'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER ADOPTING TOUGHER LINE ON PEACE: BG: Wilkie 1-4: Arens is taking a far tougher and less compromising approach to the ME peace process than his predecessor, Peres.

MIDEAST ACTORS TACKLE NEW ROLES: CSM: Moffett: Analysis of US-PLO dialogue and the future for Israeli-PLO talks and peace initiatives. Remarks by Shlomo Avenari, David Krivine of the JPost, Clinton Bailey, and other diplomatic sources in Israel.

BS: small article reported that Nablus has been out of gas and heating oil for a week.

JEWISH GROUPS FUME OVER PLANS FOR RIGHTS SUMMIT IN MOSCOW: WT: American Jewish orgs. reacted with anger to the Reagan admin. announcement that it will support an int'l human rights conference in Moscow in 1991.

US EXPLAINS MOVE ON RIGHTS PARLEY: NYT: US support for human rights conference in the Soviet Union in 1991. US CONDITIONS ROLE IN 1991 MOSCOW CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ADVANCES: WP: ...but US warned that the action would be reconsidered if the Soviets do not continue to make human rights progress in the interim. ...Shultz said the US approval is "not a reward for behavior. It is part of a process."

KHOMEINI AIDES MEET WITH GORBACHEV: WP: Representatives of Khomeini met with Gorbachev in Moscow, an event that underscored the rapidly improving relations between Moscow and Tehran.

FUND DENIAL FOR HOLOCAUST COURSE IS UPHELD: NYT. US Sec of Education does not intend to reverse a decision denying money for an education program about the Holocaust, despite Congressional pleas.

ARMS-SCHEME CHARGES DROPPED: WP: US DROPS CHARGES IN IRAN ARMS CASE: NYT: 1986 charges dropped on London lawyer and retired Israeli general and nine other men with plotting to sell more than \$2 billion in American-made weapons to Iran. Some on the names: Avraham Bar-Am, Gurriel Eisenberg, Rafael Israel Eisenberg, Isaac Hebroni, etc.

IRAQI USE OF GAS SPURRED US ACTION ON ISSUE: LAT: p.1 1-5: US intelligence agencies underestimated the impact of chemical weapons used in the Iran-Iraq war. This realization led to the Reagan administration's recent galvanized action against Libya.



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WILL LEBANON SPLIT APART IN '89? CSM: Jim Muir: analysis on crisis in Lebanon.

FINANCE AND ISLAM MIX, IGNITING A MIGHTY SCANDAL: NYT: Huge Islamic investment scandal in Cairo. "The scandal also has such serious political overtones that for the last month the Govt. has prohibited newspapers from reporting further details of its investigation of Al Rayan's affairs, an inquiry that may reach into the higher echelons of Egyptian officialdom.

BAKER SAID TO PICK A KISSINGER MAN: NYT: Sciolino: Baker has offered Lawrence Eagleburger the job of Deputy Secretary.

ARTICLES ON US DOWNING OF TWO LIBYAN PLANES:

\*\*\*All major newspapers extensively covered the downing. (p.1 coverage everywhere accompanied with more than one article on the downing, the Libyan chemical plant, and world reaction). Story was first on all nightly news programs last night and Peres appeared on some, condoning the US decision. Also, political cartoons depicting Qaddafi as a mad scientist with holding poison gas appeared in some papers. major editorials against the proliferation and development of chemical weapons - and against Qaddafi.

Articles paralleled closely the downing with the US's recent condemnation of the Libyan plant and US attempts to rouse int'l opinion against Libya; even though US officials deny any connections with the two. Articles also on Gadhafi reaction and his vow to confront "Yankee imperialism" and his urging an emergency session of the UN Sec Council.

EDITORIALS:

KADAFI'S BLOODY-MINDEDNESS: BS

THE WAR AGAINST CHEMICAL WARFARE: NYT.

LIBYA, STILL THE ROGUE: WP.

SCRATCH TWO MORE MIGS: WSJ.

AMERICA AS VIGILANTE: LAT.

USE TALKS, NOT FORCE TO BAN POISON GAS: USA TODAY.

COLUMNS:

KADAFI'S ACTIONS MAKE LIBYA AN EASY BUT NECESSARY TARGET: LAT: Barry Rubin 1-4.

PRESS REPORTS:

WP: US NAVY JETS SHOOT DOWN 2 LIBYAN FIGHTERS CONDEMNATION, ACCEPTANCE FROM ABROAD: WP: Int'l reaction to the incident ranged from sharp criticism in the Arab world to a mixture of concern and unenthusiastic acceptance and support among America's European allies. Peres congratulated the American Navy. The Syrian foreign minister strongly condemned the US downing. Arafat called the incident "very serious" and predicted that "it will affect negatively the ME peace process."

ISRAEL, BRITIAN SUPPORT, ARAB BLOC CONDEMNS US: WT.

INCIDENT WILL SLOW PEACE IN MIDEAST, WORLD CRITICS SAY: PI: UPI: world-wide reaction to the downing...

GADHAFI'S MOVES ARE ENIGMATIC: PI: Tamayo.

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US AIMS TO PRESSURE GADHAFI ON PLANT: WP: Shultz said that the US is deliberately seeking to make Gadhafi "feel uncomfortable" about construction of the chemical weapons producing plant. Shultz insisted that the US concern about the plant had nothing whatever to do with the US destruction of two Libyan fighter aircrafts. BONN EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER ARMS CHARGES: WP: W. German govt. is "very concerned" over US allegations that five WGerman companies helped Libya build a chemical weapons plant and authorities will respond to charges this week. SENIOR US OFFICIAL SAYS LIBYANS SHOULD DESTROY CHEMICAL FACTORY: NYT: p.1: William Burns said that Libya should tear down the chemical plant. He expressed US special concern with Libya (as compared with Iraq and its use of chemical weapons vs. Iran) because Qaddafi had aided terrorists and was unpredictable.

Beth Silverman  
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ד"ר : מחנך :	טובים מברק קשר ניו-יורק	דחיות:
אל:	מע"ת, מצפ"א, חסברה	סיוג:
דע:	יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשחכ"ט, לע"מ, דו"צ קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה, וושינגטון	תזח:
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5-JAN-1989

# NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 5, 1989

## TV COVERAGE

All networks extensive coverage of U.S. attack of Libyan jets and chemical weapons plant story; Nightline devoted show to subject and all showed cli of FM Peres supporting U.S. action.

## STATEMENTS BY ISRAELIS

FM ARENS : On Arafat death threats. (NYT, Kifner).  
FM PERES : Supporting U.S. action. (ND).  
AVI PAZNER : supporting U.S. action. (ND)

## EDITORIALS

NYP-"Arafat quickly reverts to type"-Arafat's death threat to Freij shows he has not renounced terrorism.

NYT-"The war against chemical warfare"-Commends U.S. use of diplomacy and force.

WSJ-"Scratch two more MiGs"-Supports immediate military action, noting U.S. doesn't have to prove its case.

ND-"Libyan threat, new chem warfare center?"- plant poses great danger to which U.S. and allies must respond.

DN-"Double trouble in Libya"-Supports unilateral U.S. military action.

## COLUMNS

NYT-Safire:"Baker's first blunder"-Criticizes U.S. support of Moscow human rights conference which loses us leverage.

ND-Steele:"Breaking our bond of shame"-Black-Jewish conflict a result of struggle against enforced kinship of "outsiders".

212 אישור:

שם השולח:

Pinge Plan

5/1/89

תאריך:

10034



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117/19/22

**PRESS REPORTS**

NYT:Kifner:While Arens says Arafat's reported death threats show PLO a terrorist organization, leftist Israeli MPs prepare to meet PLO representatives, reflecting political divisions in Israel. (cabled)  
(DN:brief on Israelis to meet PLO)

**Libya - U.S. downs fighter jets/chem plant**

Extensive coverage in all papers; NYT 3 column headline, 5 articles. WSJ 1 story. All locals full cover story and several pages.

NYT (Apple, p.1) notes its not isolated incident but latest chapter in conflict that has preoccupied Reagan for years. It will charge atmosphere and inject unpredictable element into upcoming chemical arms meeting (Pear, p.1). Other articles on U.S. insistence it be torn down (Gordon) and Bonn attempting to show interest in U.S. charges, but finding no evidence of German collaboration. (Schmemmann).

WSJ (Fialka) notes incident gives drive to U.S. campaign to close chem. plant and increases pressure on Libya.

ND notes cautious European response and sharp Israeli and Arab responses, for and against.

**Egypt - national investment scandal** (NYT, Covell).

**Lebanon** - ND:pix of debris and suffering from inter Shiite fighting.

**PAN AM** - memorial in Lockerbie and tighter U.S. airport security.

**USSR - human rights conference** - NYT:U.S. support for Moscow conference linked to talks on European security. (DN)

GENINE STAUBER  
ITONUT - NY

END



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3030

תאריך : 05.01.89

נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 1,3030

אל: המשרד

מ-: וו, נר: 62, תא: 040189, חז: 1830, דח: ב, סג: 10

תח: א גס: מצפא

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בהול לבוקר / סודי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

דע: מנכ"ל

מנכ"ל רוה"מ

לשכת שהב"ט ( F ר בטחון נר 75 )

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

פגישת השגריר - מרפי

1. הפגישה ( שהתקיימה לבקשת מרפי ) יוחדה להשמעת עמדת ארה"ב בעקבות ההחלטה על הגירושים .

2. להלן סכום השיחה :

א. מרפי פתח בהבעת התנגדותם למדיניות הגירושים .  
הוסיף כי מבקשים ( URGE ) שלא נוציא לפועל את כוונתנו לבצע הגירושים המתוכננים . חוזרים על עמדתם המחייבת העמדתם לדין של החשודים בביצוע עבירות ומיצוי הדין עם אלה שימצאו אשמים .

ב. סבורים שהתשובה שאנו נותנים לגבי הקושיים שבחשיפת מקורות הינה תשובה קלה מדי .

ג. ארה"ב מתייחסת ברצינות להודעות ממ' ישראל בדבר







## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

כוונתה להביא לרגיעה ויציבות באיזור . סבורים שהגירושים הינם צעד בכיוון ההפוך .

ד. בפניתה למספר מדינות ולאש"פ נ כפגישת הראשונה עם ) עמדה ממ' ארה"ב על הצורך בהשגת תקופת רגיעה בשטחים במיוחד בתקופה של הקמת ממשלה חדשה בישראל ותקופת מעבר בארה"ב . הגירושים הדגיש מרפי אינם מסייעים במימוש מטרתם כשם שידווי האבנים אין בו כדי להביא לרגיעה .

ה. בפניתם אלינו בעבר בנושא הגירושים הביעו חששם ביחס לאימפקט של הגירושים על היחסים . מתוך התגובות ששמעו חושבים שהמסר לא הובן כראוי . לא התכוונו לאימפקט על היחסים בין שתי הממשלות אלא לאימפקט שיש לגירושים על הציבור האמריקאי . הרגשתם שצעדים אלו עלולים להביא לסתף בתמיכת הציבור בישראל . מרפי חזר פעם נוספת וביקש שלא ונצע הגירושים המתוכננים .

ו. מרפי הוסיף כי מצפים לפגישת שה"ח ארנס עם המזכיר. מקווים שיוכלו ללמוד על מחשבותיו של רוה"מ לגבי תהליך השלום . מעוניינים לאחר נושאים שבהם ניתן לשתף פעולה. הסביר שבנושא הגירושים "דרכינו נפרדות" .

ז. בתגובתו ציין השגריר שיש לראות את סוגית הגירושים בהקשר לדרך שבה אנו תופסים את אחריותנו לשמירת החוק והסדר . עמד על הדילמות בפניהן אנו ניצבים בהתמודדותנו עם אנשים שכל מטרתם היא לפגוע בעצם נוכחותנו בשטח .

ח. השגריר פירט את הרקורד של חלק מהמגורשים כדי להבהיר שההחלטה לגירוש התקבלה לאחר שכל יתר האמצעים שננקטו מוצו . בהקשר זה התייחס השגריר לאיום שאותו השמיע ערפאת כלפי ראש עיריית בית לחם בעקבות הצעת פרייז' לשביתת נשק בשטחים כדוגמא לעידוד אלימות . גם אם אין במהלכים אלה כדי לקדם אותנו להשגת שלום הדגיש השגריר כי זו אחריותנו לשמור על חוק וסדר .

ט. מרפי חזר וציין שהגירושים אינם תורמים להרגעת המצב . מתקשים להבין הוסיף מדוע איננו יכולים להעמיד המגורשים למשפט .

י. מעניין לעניין ובאותו עניין התייחס מרפי לפלסטינים המוחזקים במעצר מינהלי . ביקש לדעת האם נעשו נסיונות



1. The first step in the process of the investigation is to identify the problem and to determine the scope of the investigation.

2. The second step is to collect data. This can be done in a number of ways, including interviews, observations, and the use of instruments.

3. The third step is to analyze the data. This involves identifying patterns and relationships between the data and the problem being investigated.

4. The fourth step is to draw conclusions. This involves interpreting the results of the analysis and making a decision about the problem.

5. The fifth step is to implement the solution. This involves putting the conclusions into action and monitoring the results.

6. The sixth step is to evaluate the results. This involves comparing the results of the investigation with the original problem and determining whether the solution was effective.

7. The seventh step is to report the results. This involves writing a report that summarizes the findings of the investigation and provides recommendations for future action.

8. The eighth step is to follow up. This involves checking back on the results of the investigation to see if the problem has been resolved and if the solution is still effective.



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

להגיע להדברות עם המנהיגי מחנות המעצר . מרפי הוסיף  
כי הם תחת הרושם שבשנה האחרונה לא עשתה ישראל נסיון  
ליצור הדברות עם המנהיגות הצעירה . חושב שהדיאלוג  
שאנו מקיימים עם המנהיגות המסורתית " לא יקדם אותנו "  
וכי נצטרך למצוא דרך להדבר עם המנהיגות החדשה.

יא. השגריר ציין בתגובה כי בשנה האחרונה התקיימו מספר  
מפגשים בין שהב"ט למנהיגי השטחים . פגישות נוספות  
שתוכננו נאלצו להתבטל בעקבות מסע הפחדות ואיומים  
שהפעלנו על המנהיגים שבקשו להדבר עמנו .

שטיין

לש

תפ: שהו, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ליאור, מזתים, סייבל,  
משפט, ר/מרכז, ממד



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תאריך : 05.01.89

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138/W11:7N

מ-:המשלד,תא:050189,זח:1429,ב,סג:ס  
תח: @ גס:מצפא  
נד: @

סודי/בהול

.77N

השגריר בראון והציר היוז באו אמש לפגישה עם ש"ח  
ס/שה"ח. נכחו בנצור, שילה ומרדור.

השגיר פתח בדברי ברכה לנתניהו על מינויו. ספר שהוא  
בא משהב'ט שם מסר מחאה על הגרושים שאותה הוא מוסר גם  
נו (הנוסח הוברק בנפרד). הוא יודע שנוסח המחאה חמור  
אך הוא מבטא את החומרה בה רואה הממשל עניין זה והם  
מבקשים לעכב את הגרושים שטרם בוצעו. ספר שהמזכיר  
זימן אותך לאותו בוקר והוא מניח שבאותו ענין. מכאן  
עבר לדבר על נושא בנית שתי השגירות. שה'ח התנצל  
על נסיגתנו בענין המגרש בחל-אביב והסביר את האילוצים  
הבטחוניים. עם זאת ספר שאיתרנו חמש חלקות חליפיות  
בדרום ובמזרח העיר. השר חזר על הקושי שיש לנו בקשר  
לייעוד הבנין בירושלים אך הוסיף שלא חשב שהענין  
יעורר התרגזויות והתרגשות כזו. על כל פנים אנחנו  
מעונינים להגיע לסיכום פוזיטיבי ואולי הכי טוב  
שנחליף מכתבים בענין.

ה'יוז' אמר שקמפלמן עבד על ענין זה זמן רב ולשון הפשרה עם הקונגרס מאד עדינה ואסור לשרשר את האיזון העדין







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ורשיב גטרן .

השגריר.

השגריר בראון מסר אמש לשה"ח את נוסח המחאה הבא על הגרופים:

-- I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REITERATE OUR TOTAL  
OPPOSITION TO THE POLICY OF EXPULSIONS AND TO URGE YOU NOT  
TO PROCEED WITH THE DEPORTATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS WHOSE  
ORDERS ARE STILL PENDING.

27 -- YOU RECALL THAT WE MADE OUR OPPOSITION CLEAR AFTER THE  
DEPORTATION ORDERS WERE ANNOUNCED LAST SUMMER.

-- DEPORTATION IS AN UNDULY HARSH PUNISHMENT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. IF YOU BELIEVE PALESTINIANS HAVE VIOLATED SECURITY LAWS AND REGULATIONS, THEY SHOULD BE ACCORDED A FAIR AND OPEN TRIAL, AND IF CONVICTED, PUNISHED BY AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE.

-- ACCORDINGLY, WE URGE YOU NOT TO CARRY OUT THE REMAINING EXPULSIONS ORDERS.

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מנהל מצפ"א

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# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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תאריך : 05.01.89

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שמו

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חוזם: 1,3241

אל: 137/וש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 050189, זח: 1248, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: מצפא

נד: @

שמו/מיידי

השגריר, הציר

איתור קרקע למיבנה שגרירות ארה"ב בת"א וירושלים.

התקשר יוז משג' ארה"ב למסור שבעקבות שיחתך עם המזכיר  
קיבלו הנחיה להציענו שההסכם על הנ"ל ייחתם ע"י שה'ח  
והמזכיר בפגישתם בפאריס ביום א'. הוסיף שאם עד סוף השבוע  
לא יקבלו אחת מחמש ההצעות שהגשנו להם אתמול, יוסיפו  
להסכם נספח לפיו תתחייב ישראל להציעם אתרי בניה חלופיים  
בהקדם.

בנצור

נש

אק

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל



3007

תאריך : 05.01.89

נכנס \*\*

שמו

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חוזם: 1,3007

אל: המשרד

מ-: 040189, תא: 040189, זח: 1430, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: מצפא

נד: @

שמו/מידי טפל

אל: השגריר ווש'

סמנכל צפא ופר' נ

מנהל מצפא

סמנכל אמיתק

דע: הסברה ווש'

מנהל הסברה

מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית לוס אנגלס

כנס הזדהות של יהדות העולם עם ישראל

1. נפגשנו היום עם ראשי מכון ויזנטאל הרבנים הייר וקופר ביוזמתם שבקשו לספר לנו כי בעת ביקורם האחרון בארץ (דצמבר 88), נפגשו עם רה'מ' והציעו לו לקיים בישראל כנס עולמי של נציגי ומנהיגי הקהילות היהודיות שמטרתו לאחד את העם היהודי מאחורי מדינת ישראל ואל מול המתקפה התקשורתית של אש'פ' והצלחותיו הדיפלומטיות באחרונה.

2. הרבנים הציעו לרה'מ' שהכנס יתקיים לפני ביקורו הראשון בווש' ושיהווה גם איתות לממשל החדש על החזית האחידה.

3. לדבריהם, תגובת רה'מ' היתה חיובית ולפי בקשתו הגישו לו תזכיר שהעתקו הועבר לווש' ובו פירוט קווי המפגש הנ'ל.







## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4. לדבריהם, מינה רוה"מ השרים גור ואולמרט כאחראים לארוע שנקבע טנטטיבית ל 6 במרץ 1989.

5. חשוב להדגיש שאם אכן יצא הנושא לפועל, ואין עוררין על חשיבות קיומו של מפגש מעין זה, אנחנו פועלים במסגרת זמן לחוצה ביותר ויש להתחיל בהכנת הכנס ללא דיחוי.

אנא העבירו הנחיותיכם בהתאם.

משה רם

לש

תפ: שהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, הסברה







דחיפות: כ"ד	שגרירות ישראל/וואשינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: בל"ס	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 4
תאריך וזמן מעבר:	אל: כצ"פ"א, כע"ת, הסברה	
פס' פרוק:	דע: ירה"פ לתקשורת, י. שהב"ט לתקשורת,	
הפסד: בטחון ניו יורק	רמ"ח/קס"ח, ניו יורק	
11 76 66 1/4	פאת: עתונות/וואשינגטון	

## סכום עתונות יומי

NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 4, 1988

### EDITORIALS:

**WP: JOINING THE WAR ON TERRORISM:** cabled. The PLO should be put on the spot to go further than repudiating its sponsorship of terrorism and start taking on the more demanding and politically convulsive task of helping to bring to account those of its own people, and others, who continue to be involved in this activity. Editors make note that the PLO invented modern terrorism and was responsible for the first hijacking, first destruction of a plane in flight, first gun-and-grenade attack on airline passengers, etc.

**WT: TERROR WITH A HUMAN FACE:** Strong and vehement condemnation of Abu Nidal and Qaddafi. Editors recommend striking Libya by force and note that if Abu Nidal happens to be in the way when we struck, than that would be an additional and unanticipated benefit. Editors also criticize France for its having hailed Abu Nidal's decision to release two French girls and go further as to say that the French govt. has a reputation for licking the boots that kick it.

**BS: BOTTLING UP KADAFI:** Libya must be stopped in its tracks if there is conclusive evidence that it seeks to be a chemical weapons power - and proliferator. It would be a double bonus if the Soviet Union would condone, or at least not condemn US efforts to keep the Kadafi genie capped securely within its bottle.

**WSJ: ASIDES: THE NEW ARAFAT?** the irony behind two PLO statements of yesterday: As an Arafat aide told Reuters that Arafat began investigating the bombing of Flight 103 days before Washington told the PLO it welcomed its information, Bethlehem's Mayor Freid withdrew his proposal for a 1-year truce of the uprising because of an Arafat threat against such a proposal.

תפוצה:

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## COLUMNS:

THE FLAWED STRATEGIES OF ISRAEL AND THE PLO: WP: Steven Spiegel: Both new strategies by the Palestinians and Israel are likely to fail. Arafat will either alienate the rejectionists or the moderates. And Israeli policies, reflecting the Camp David Accords and Labor's more flexible arrangement of limited Palestinian control are strategies more appropriate for the 1970s than today. And an int'l conference is not viable. Peace only if one or both sides alters its strategy or if the US can produce a new framework acceptable to both.

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BONN'S PROLIFERATION POLICY: NYT: Mihollin: Germany as the source of materials for third world nuclear weapons programs: lax export laws and perhaps the fact that West German exporters are being protected by powerful political allies may explain the US's failed attempts to stop German companies from selling heavy water, etc. Mihollin believes Germany should talk to govts. of the importing countries about returning items that were obtained illegally. West Germany must quit pretending that nothing is wrong. Mentioned also is the fact that heavy water from W. Germany went to Israel which increased the output at Dimona.

QADDAFI'S POISON POTENTIAL: WT: Adelman:

## PRESS REPORTS:

US DECRIES EXPULSION OF PALESTINIANS: WP: Goshko: The US condemned as "counterproductive" Israel's expulsion of 15 Palestinians and warned that such measures will only exacerbate the uprising. ... Some US officials speculated that the deportations at this time might have been prompted by an Israeli desire to underscore its refusal to deal with the PLO despite recent US recognition of the exile org.

WEST BANK MAYOR DROPS TRUCE CALL: WP: Frankel p.1 (cabled): Freij withdrew his call for a one-yr truce between Israel and Palestinians after Arafat warned that anyone proposing an end to the uprising there "exposes himself to the bullets of his own people." Arafat's warning and the quick response suggested that despite recent professions of moderation and renunciation of terrorism, the threat of assassination remains an important weapon in the PLO's arsenal for controlling local Arab leaders. Moshe Arens said that the statement demonstrated Israel's contention that Arafat is a terrorist and that the recent US decision to open a dialogue was a mistake.

HARD-LINE VETERAN TO PROMOTE ISRAELI FOREIGN AFFAIRS: BS: Ruby: Re: Moshe Arens as Foreign Minister... bio on his politics and career... "he is virtually made-to-order for promoting Israel's view to its most important audience, the US." Emphasis on the hard-line rightist policies of Arens and the fact that there is little evidence that his approach has softened over the years.

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ISRAEL IS PREPARING TO SUFFER ISOLATION FOR ITS OWN SECURITY: WT: AP: Arens complaint that European nations were making ME peace moves without consulting Israel and he said his nation was willing to suffer isolation in the world for its own security. At the same time, Sir Geoffrey Howe urged Israel to give "a matching response" to Arafat's peace overtures and said that British officials hoped to meet leaders of the PLO next week.  
\*\* Same article appears in BS.

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ISRAELI AUSTERITY PLAN IS FACING SHARP OPPOSITION: NYT: Kifner: Peres' economic austerity plan is running into sharp opposition.

PALESTINIANS PIT PRIMITIVE ARMS AGAINST HIGH-TECH ISRAELI ARMY: BG: Wilkie 1-3: re: The David vs. Goliath scenario where "it is a war between a sophisticated army and an angry population wielding little more than sticks and stones.

PLO OFFERS FULL COOPERATION IN PROBE OF PAN AM BOMBING: WP: The PLO pledged its cooperation with the US in investigation the Pan Am bombing and indicated its own search for suspects began soon after the crash. Paris PLO representative Souss's remarks gave credence to the suggestions that the bombing was the work of radical Palestinian forces hoping to derail Arafat's initiative.

ON WEST BANK, THE CRUCIAL FACTOR IS HATE: WSJ: Brooks: Re: the violent past of fighting between the Jews and Arabs of Beit Omar and Kibbutz Kfar Etzion. Jews, who recaptured Kfar Etzion in the 1967 war, remember the Arab massacre of 1948. Arabs in Beit Omar insist that their village won't be tranquil until Palestinians win their independence.

SOVIET JEWS TO JOIN WORLD CONGRESS: NYT: Clearing for Soviet Jews to formally be represented in the World Jewish Congress.

IN FREE SPEECH ERA, POLES AT LAST CONFRONT GHOSTS OF THE GHETTO: WSJ: p.1: The burst of free-speech in the 1980s and the Soviet Union's gentler view of Israel have brought Poland's Jewish problem to the surface. Re: dealing with the Jewish ghosts that haunt the Poles' conscience and the emerging numbers and consciousness of Polish Jews.

THE NAZI TIME: YOUNGER JEWS TRY TO COMPREHEND: NYT: The First Holocaust Conference for the Children of Holocaust survivors.

ARAB PRISONER MAY HOLD JET CLUE: CT: 1-3: Palestinian terrorist M. Rashid, who is held by Greece and wanted by the US for the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am plane, may hold clues to a group that is among the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flt 103.

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ARTICLES ON POISON GAS, LIBYA CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLANT, THE PARIS CONFERENCE:

US TO SUPPORT PUNISHING NATIONS THAT USE POISON GAS: WP: "US officials are concerned that a group of Arab countries, led by Syria and Libya, may attempt to derail a conference declaration opposing the use of chemical weapons by demanding a simultaneous condemnation of all weapons capable of mass destruction, a euphemism for undeclared nuclear arms stockpile by Israel."

LIBYA CHEMICAL PLANT SPILL REPORTED: WP: Ottaway: Toxic chemicals leaked accidentally at what US intelligence agencies say is a huge chemical weapons facility in the Libyan desert during an operational test by Libyan technicians last summer. Article accounts Redman's statements on the Libyan Plant at yesterday's briefing.

US SAYS LIBYA MOVES CHEMICALS FOR POISON GAS AWAY FROM PLANT: NYT p.1.

CHEMICAL ARMS PRODUCTION TESTED IN LIBYA, US SAYS: BS: AP.

US BLOCK LIBYA ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS: USA TODAY.

ARTICLES ON REAGAN ENDORSEMENT OF MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE:

'91 MOSCOW CONFERENCE ENDORSED: WP: p.1.

US-SOVIET TALKS ON RIGHTS LIKELY: NYT: p.1

REAGAN APPROVES '91 PARLEY IN MOSCOW ON HUMAN RIGHTS: WT: p.1.

Beth Silverman  
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נכנס \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 1,3029

אל: המשרד

מ-: ווש, נר: 61, תא: 040189, זח: 1630, דח: ב, סג: 10

תח: א גס: מצפא

נד: א

סודי / בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: מנכ'ל

מנכ'ל רוה'מ

מאת: שגרירות, וושינגטון

שיחת השגריר עם מזכיר המדינה.

1. כללי :

א. הנושאים שנדונו בפגישה היו : החלטת הממשל לפתוח בדיאלוג עם עם אש'פ והשפעתו על התליך השלום ואיתור קרקעות למבני שג' ארה'ב בת'א וירושלים.

ב. השתתפו בפגישה מצידם : קמפלמן, מרפי, היל והירש מצדנו הציר והח'מ.

2. מהלך השיחה :

א. פתיחת הדיאלוג האמריקאי-אש'פי והשלכותיה על תהליך השלום.

1) בפתח השיחה הביע השגריר צערנו על אסון המטוס. בהמשך הביע הערכה לנשיא ולמזכיר על תרומתם להידוק היחסים. הדגיש את תרומת המזכיר למאמצים לקידום תהליך



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השלום.

(2) על רקע זה תאר השגריר את אכזבתנו מעצם החלטתו לפתוח בדיאלוג עם אש'פ' ומכך שלא אפשרו לנוע להביע עמדתנו מבעוד מועד.

(3) להערכתנו הוסיף השגריר אין בהתבטאויותיו של ערפאת כדי לשקף שינוי אמיתי במטרותיו ארוכות הטווח. דברי ערפאת בנאומו בז'נווה והתבטאויות מנהיגי אש'פ' לאחר מכן מחזקות את הנחתנו שהמדובר בצעד טקטי. ברור לנו הוסיף שהתכנית אותה הציג ערפאת בז'נווה אשר בבסיסה הקמת מדינה פלסטינית אינה משקפת את עמדת ארה'ב. אף הפרספציה שנוצרה בעקבות החלטת המזכיר עלולה ליצור בקרב הפלסטינים ואחרים המחשבה שהקו שננקט ע'י אש'פ' סופו לשאת פירות.

(4) בתגובתו חזר המזכיר והבהיר כי הוא מבטא את עמדת הנשיא לפיה לא חל שינוי בעמדת ארה'ב אשר ב-13 השנים האחרונות חזרה והבהירה את תנאיה לדיאלוג סובסטנטיבי עם אש'פ'. אש'פ' הוסיף המזכיר הוא שהשתנה. השאלה היא האם תהיה למילים משמעות. לדברי המזכיר ניתן לראות שינוי אם כי ברור לו שתהליך השינוי יהיה איטי. אם אכן אש'פ' השתנה מקווה שגם מדינות ערב תלכנה בעקבותיו ותכרנה בזכות קיומה של ישראל.

(5) ארה'ב, הוסיף, תפעל לקידום התהליך ותקבע עמדתה בבהירות. המזכיר הזכיר את מכתבו של רוה'מ' אליו לפני כשנה ביחס לחשיבות תהליך השלום. "מאז קרו דברים הוסיף. בנאומו בספט' אשתקד (ב- WYE) ציין כי זמן ההכרעה מגיע למז'ת וכי יש אירועים שמביאים לשינוי. המסר של ההתקוממות בשטחחים הוא שתושבי השטחים HAVE ASSERTED THEMSELVES".

אש'פ', הוסיף, מגיב כיום לשינוי. על ארה'ב לראות האם ניתן לנצל זאת לצורך השגת המטרות שבהם היא מאמינה.

(6) המזכיר חזר למהלכים שקדמו להחלטתם ואשר בהם היו מעורבים שה'ח שבדיה וקבוצת מנהיגים יהודים וציין כי באותו שלב שבו חשבו שהמדובר בהתפתחות רצינית דווחו לנו על כך. לאחר שערפאת במסיבת העיתונאים עמד בתנאים הרגישו שחייבים לפעול. ארה'ב הדגישה באותה הזדמנות פעם נוספת שעמדתם לא השתנתה. אשר למנהיגי אש'פ'



SECRET

1. The following information was obtained from a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past.

2. The source has advised that the following information was obtained from a confidential source who has provided reliable information in the past.

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מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שממשיכים להטיף להשמדת ישראל ציין המזכיר כי בין אם ערפאת שינה את עמדותיו ובין אם לאו ברור לו שבקרב אש"ף ימשיכו להיות אנשים שירצו בחיסול ישראל. התשובה לכך היא עצמתה של ישראל ויכולתה להתמודד עם כל איום. לדברי המזכיר אין כיום אופציה צבאית לפתרון הסכסוך יחד עם זאת, מחוייבות ארה"ב לעמוד לצידה של ישראל הינה אלמנט חיוני בתהליך השלום.

7) בהתייחסו לדיאלוג עם אש"ף הדגיש החלטתו שהדיאלוג יעשה רק באמצעות צינור אחד דבר שיאפשר לו לפקח על התהליך.

8) בסכום ציין המזכיר כי ימשיכו במדיניותם, ימשיכו להתנגד להקמת מדינה פלסטינית עצמאית וכי לא ישנו תמיכתם בישראל. בעקבות ההחלטה שיקבלו מתכוונים להמשיך ולעבוד כדי לקדם את תהליך השלום.

9) לשאלת השגריר באשר למחשבותיו ביחס להמשך תהליך השלום, ציין המזכיר כי ארה"ב ניסתה כל הזמן לעבוד עמנו במשותף. היזמה אותה העלה בשנה שעברה היתה תוצאה של דיונים עמנו וכן עם מצרים וירדן. לדברי המזכיר חשוב שנמשיך לחשוב על קידום התהליך. ציין כי ידוע לו שרה"מ עובד על הנושא (הזכיר בהקשר זה את שיחתו האחרונה עם רה"מ).

10) חושב כי טוב נעשה אם נחליף דעות עם הממשל הנכנס לפני שזה יגיע לגיבוש עמדותיו. חשוב שלשראל ולאר"ב תהיה תכנית שאותה ינסו לקדם.

11) הוסיף כי הממשל הנוכחי מנסה להשאיר מבנה מוצק של יחסים שיאפשר התקדמות של התהליך. הוסיף כי משוכנע בדיונה של ישראל בשלום. הגדיר את הטענות שמושמעות על כך שישראל אינה מעוניינת בשלום כמגוחכות. למרות חילוקי הדעות משוכנע המזכיר נוכל להתגבר עליהן ע"י רצון טוב.

ב. איתור קרקעות למבני שג' ארה"ב בת"א וירושלים.

(1) המזכיר חזר והביע שאיפתו לשיפור תנאי העבודה והבטחון של מתקניהם בת"א וירושלים. חשב לתומו כי הקרקעות להקמת המבנים בשתי הערים אותרו. הוסיף כי קיווה שיוכל להעביר ליורשו הסיכוי למימוש תכניתו. מבין



THE FIRST OF THESE IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RICH ONE IN NATURAL RESOURCES  
AND THAT THE PEOPLE ARE CAPABLE OF  
EXPLOITING THEM TO THE ADVANTAGE OF  
THE NATION. THE SECOND IS THE FACT  
THAT THE PEOPLE ARE CAPABLE OF  
ORGANIZING THEMSELVES INTO A  
NATION.

THE THIRD IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RICH ONE IN NATURAL RESOURCES  
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THE NINTH IS THE FACT THAT THE  
COUNTRY IS A RICH ONE IN NATURAL RESOURCES  
AND THAT THE PEOPLE ARE CAPABLE OF  
EXPLOITING THEM TO THE ADVANTAGE OF  
THE NATION.







1941. 10. 10.

1. The first part of the report is devoted to a description of the work done during the year. It is divided into two main sections: a general survey of the work and a detailed account of the results. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section.

2. The second part of the report is devoted to a description of the work done during the year. It is divided into two main sections: a general survey of the work and a detailed account of the results. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section.

3. The third part of the report is devoted to a description of the work done during the year. It is divided into two main sections: a general survey of the work and a detailed account of the results. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section.

4. The fourth part of the report is devoted to a description of the work done during the year. It is divided into two main sections: a general survey of the work and a detailed account of the results. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section.

5. The fifth part of the report is devoted to a description of the work done during the year. It is divided into two main sections: a general survey of the work and a detailed account of the results. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section.

6. The sixth part of the report is devoted to a description of the work done during the year. It is divided into two main sections: a general survey of the work and a detailed account of the results. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section. The general survey is given in the first section, and the detailed account is given in the second section.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אל: המשרד

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תח: 8 גס: מצפא

נד: 8

בהול לבוקר / סודי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

דע: מנכ"ל

מנכ"ל רוה"מ

לשכת שהג"ט ( פר בטחון נר 75 )

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

פגישת השגריר - מרפי

1. הפגישה ( שהתקיימה לבקשת מרפי ) יוחדה להשמעת עמדת ארה"ב בעקבות ההחלטה על הגירושים .

2. להלן סכום השיחה :

א. מרפי פתח בהבעת התנגדותם למדיניות הגירושים . הוסיף כי מבקשים ( URGE ) שלא נוציא לפועל את כוונתנו לבצע הגירושים המתוכננים . חוזרים על עמדתם המחייבת העמדתם לדין של החשודים בביצוע עבירות ומיצוי הדין עם אלה שימצאו אשמים .

ב. סבורים שהתשובה שאנו נותנים לגבי הקושיים שבחשיפת מקורות הינה תשובה קלה מדי .

ג. ארה"ב מתייחסת ברצינות להודעות ממ' ישראל בדבר



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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

כוונתה להביא לרגיעה ויציבות באיזור . סבורים שהגירושים הינם צעד בכיוון ההפוך .

ד. בפניתה למספר מדינות ולאש'פ ( בפגישה הראשונה עמם ) עמדה ממ' ארה'ב על הצורך בהשגת תקופת רגיעה בשטחים במיוחד בתקופה של הקמת ממשלה חדשה בישראל ותקופת מעבר בארה'ב . הגירושים הדגיש מרפי אינם מסייעים במימוש מטרתם כשם שידוויי האבנים אין בו כדי להביא לרגיעה .

ה. בפניתם אלינו בעבר בנושא הגירושים הביעו חששם ביחס לאימפאקט של הגירושים על היחסים . מתוך התגובות ששמעו חושבים שהמסר לא הובן כראוי . לא התכוונו לאימפאקט על היחסים בין שתי הממשלות אלא לאימפאקט שיש לגירושים על הציבור האמריקאי . הרגשתם שצעדים אלו עלולים להביא לסחף בתמיכת הציבור בישראל . מרפי חזר פעם נוספת וביקש שלא נבצע הגירושים המתוכננים .

ו. מרפי הוסיף כי מצפים לפגישת שה'ח ארנס עם המזכיר . מקווים שיוכלו ללמוד על מחשבותיו של רוה'מ לגבי תהליך השלום . מעוניינים לאתר נושאים שבהם ניתן לשחף פעולה . הסביר שבנושא הגירושים 'דרכינו נפרדות' .

ז. בתגובתו ציין השגריר שיש לראות את סוגית הגירושים בהקשר לדרך שבה אנו תופסים את אחריותנו לשמירת החוק והסדר . עמד על הדילמות בפניהן אנו ניצבים בהתמודדותנו עם אנשים שכל מטרתם היא לפגוע בעצם נוכחותנו בשטח .

ח. השגריר פירט את הרקורד של חלק מהמגורשים כדי להבהיר שההחלטה לגירוש התקבלה לאחר שכל יתר האמצעים שננקטו מוצו . בהקשר זה התייחס השגריר לאיום שאותו השמיע ערפאת כלפי ראש עיריית בית לחם בעקבות הצעת פרייז' לשביית נשק בשטחים כדוגמא לעידוד אלימות . גם אם אין במהלכים אלה כדי לקדם אותנו להשגת שלום הדגיש השגריר כי זו אחריותנו לשמור על חוק וסדר .

ט. מרפי חזר וציין שהגירושים אינם תורמים להרגעת המצב . מתקשים להבין הוסיף מדוע איננו יכולים להעמיד המגורשים למשפט .

י. מעניין לעניין ובאותו עניין התייחס מרפי לפלסטינים המוחזקים במעצר מינהלי . ביקש לדעת האם נעשו נסיונות



1. The first step in the process of identifying and classifying information is to determine the sensitivity of the information. This is done by comparing the information to the criteria established in the classification guide.

2. The second step is to determine the appropriate classification level. This is done by comparing the information to the criteria established in the classification guide. The classification level is then assigned to the information.

3. The third step is to mark the information with the appropriate classification level. This is done by placing the classification level in the top right corner of the document. The classification level is then assigned to the information.

4. The fourth step is to review the information to ensure that it has been correctly classified. This is done by comparing the information to the criteria established in the classification guide. The classification level is then assigned to the information.

5. The fifth step is to ensure that the information is properly stored and protected. This is done by placing the information in a secure location and ensuring that it is protected from unauthorized access.

6. The sixth step is to ensure that the information is properly disposed of when it is no longer needed. This is done by destroying the information in a secure manner and ensuring that it is not accessible to unauthorized personnel.

7. The seventh step is to ensure that the information is properly maintained. This is done by keeping the information up-to-date and ensuring that it is accessible to authorized personnel.

8. The eighth step is to ensure that the information is properly controlled. This is done by ensuring that the information is only accessed by authorized personnel and that it is not disclosed to unauthorized personnel.



## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

להגיע להדברות עם מנהיגי מחנות המעצר . מרפי הוסיף  
כי הם תחת הרושם שבשנה האחרונה לא עשתה ישראל נסיון  
ליצור הדברות עם המנהיגות הצעירה . חושב שהדיאלוג  
שאנו מקיימים עם המנהיגות המסורתית ' לא יקדם אותנו ' ו  
וכי נצטרך למצוא דרך להדבר עם המנהיגות החדשה .

יא. השגריר ציין בתגובה כי בשנה האחרונה התקיימו מספר  
מפגשים בין שהב'ט למנהיגי השטחים . פגישות נוספות  
שתוכננו נאלצו להתבטל בעקבות מסע הפחדות ואיומים  
שהפעלנו על המנהיגים שבקשו להדבר עמנו .

שניין

לש

תפ: שהוו, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ליאור, מזתים, סייבל,  
משפט, ר/מרכז, ממד



THESE ARE THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT  
EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON THE  
EFFECT OF THE VIBRATION OF THE  
EARTH ON THE STABILITY OF THE  
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THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT  
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STRUCTURES.



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3007

תאריך : 05.01.89

נכנס \*\*

שמו

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חוזם: 1,3007

אל: המשרד

מ-: לוטאנגלס, נר: 8, תא: 040189, זח: 1430, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: מצפא

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שמו/מיד טפל

אל: השגריר ווש'

סמנכל צפא ופר' נ

מנהל מצפא

סמנכל אמיתק

דע: הסברה ווש'

מנהל הסברה

מאת: הקונסוליה הכללית לוס אנגלס

כנס הזדהות של יהדות העולם עם ישראל

1. נפגשנו היום עם ראשי מכון ויזנטאל הרבנים הייר וקופר ביוזמתם שבקשו לספר לנו כי בעת ביקורם האחרון בארץ (דצמבר 88), נפגשו עם רה'מ והציעו לו לקיים בישראל כנס עולמי של נציגי ומנהיגי הקהילות היהודיות שמטרתו לאחד את העם היהודי מאחורי מדינת ישראל ואל מול המתקפה התקשורתית של אש'פ והצלחותיו הדיפלומטיות באחרונה.

2. הרבנים הציעו לרה'מ שהכנס יתקיים לפני ביקורו הראשון בווש' ושיהווה גם איתות לממשל החדש על החזית האחידה.

3. לדבריהם, תגובת רה'מ היתה חיובית ולפי בקשתו הגישו לו תזכיר שהעתקו הועבר לווש' ובו פירטו קווי המפגש הנ'ל.



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DATE: 10/10/2010

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ה'תשנ"ב  
לשנת ה'תשנ"ב











# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3241

תאריך : 05.01.89

\*\*\* יצא

שזור

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חוזם: 1,3241

אל: 137/וש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 050189, חז: 1248, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: מצפא

נד: @

שזור/מיידי

השגריר, הציר

איתור קרקע למיבנה שגרירות ארה"ב בת"א וירושלים.

התקשר יוז משג' ארה"ב למסור שבעקבות שיחתך עם המזכיר  
קיבלו הנחיה להציענו שההסכם על הנ"ל ייחתם ע"י שה'ח  
והמזכיר בפגישתם בפאריס ביום א'. הוסיף שאם עד סוף השבוע  
לא יקבלו אחת מחמש ההצעות שהגשנו להם אתמול, יוסיפו  
להסכם נספח לפיו תתחייב ישראל להציעם אתרי בניה חלופיים  
בהקדם.

בנצור

נש

אק

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל



# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3330

תאריך : 05.01.89

יוצא \*\*

סודי

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חוזם: 1,3330

אל: וווש/138

מ:-המשרד, תא: 050189, חז: 1429, דח: ב, סג: סו

תח: @ גס:מצפא

נד: @

סודי/בהול

ארד.

השגריר בראון והציר היוז באו אמש לפגישה עם שה'ח  
וס/שה'ח. נוכחו בנצור, שילה ומרדור.

השגריר פתח בדברי ברכה לנתניהו על מינויו. ספר שהוא  
משהב'ט שם מסר מחאה על הגרושים שאותה הוא מוסר גם  
לנו (הנוסח הוברק בנפרד). הוא יודע שנוסח המחאה חמור  
אך הוא מבטא את החומרה בה רואה הממשל ענין זה והם  
מבקשים לעכב את הגרושים שטרם בוצעו. ספר שהמזכיר  
זימן אותך לאותו בוקר והוא מניח שבאותו ענין. מכאן  
עבר לדבר על נושא בנית שתי השגרירויות. שה'ח התנצל  
על נסיגתנו בענין המגרש בתל-אביב והסביר את האילוצים  
הבטחוניים. עם זאת ספר שאיתרנו חמש חלקות חליפיות  
בדרום ובמזרח העיר. השר חזר על הקושי שיש לנו בקשר  
לייעוד הבנין בירושלים אך הוסיף שלא חשב שהענין  
יעורר התרגזויות והתרגשות כזו. על כל פנים אנחנו  
מעונינים להגיע לסיכום פוזיטיבי ואולי הכי טוב  
שנחליף מכתבים בענין.

היוז אמר שקמפלמן עבד על ענין זה זמן רב ולשון הפשרה  
עם הקונגרס מאד עדינה ואסור לערער את האיזון העדין



מפורשים אך צריך לדעת לקרוא בין השורות.  
שה'ח אמר שברור שכל **משה החזן-מחלקת הקשר** שגגירות  
בירושלים ו... שאם יקום בנין נהדר שישימש כקונסוליה  
כללית שאינה כפופה לשגגירות ואינה מואמנת לישראל

יְהִיָּה בְּזֶה עֵינֹת גָּמֹר שֶׁל כּוֹנֵן הַמַּחֲקֶק. הַשְּׁגִיר הַשֵּׁב שֶׁהוּא מִקְבֵּל אֶת הָרַעֲיוֹן שֶׁל חִלּוּפֵי מַכְתָּבִים.

אח"כ שאל השגריר מה יבקש הש"ר לומר לשולץ בפגישתם. שה"ח השיב שיביע את תודתו למזכיר על כל מה שעשה ועל איכות היחסים הביטורליים. אח"כ ידון בעניני האזור וכלל מצרים ויביע דאגתנו נוכח החלטת ההידברות עם אש"ף ויאמר שזה עלול להזיק הן לבטחוננו והן לתהליך. הוסיף שיזכיר פרמטרים אפשריים לייזמה ישראלית.

לבסוף חזרו לענין מצריים והשר אמר שאגב נושא הועידה בפריז המצרים מסייעים לעירקים בייצור נשק כימי. אח"כ הוסיף שהוא אופטימי שענין טאבה יגיע לסיום טוב אך שבכמה ענינים אחרים כגון פיצוץ נפגעי ראס-בורקה מתנהגים המצרים רע מאד ובענינים אלה ארה"ב יכולה לסייע.

עד כאן.

מנהל מצפ"א

NE

שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנוכל, ממנוכל, שהבט, סי' יבל, בנצור, מצפא, ר/מרכז, ממד



יוצא \*\*

שמור

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חוזם: 1,3352

אל: ני/151, בטחון/181, מנמת/79

מ-: המשרד, תא: 050189, זח: 1504, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: גס: ארבל

נד: @

שמור/רגיל

אל: ניו יורק - נאו'ם.

דע: בטחון - מתאם הפעולה בלבנון

יששכרוף לשלך 43.

לבנון.

לידיעתכם ששבעת התושבים שנעצרו על פי התלויה הלבנונית  
מ-30/12 לא חוזר לא נעצרו על ידנו אלא ע"י צד'ל ומוחזקים  
על ידי ללא כל קשר אלינו. אם חוזר אם תישאלו תוכלו  
למסור לפונים כי ככל הידוע לנו הנ'ל כנראה נעצרו ע"י  
צד'ל בחשד למעורבות בפח'ע אך לבירור פרטים יש לפנות  
ישירות לנוגעים בדבר.

ארב'ל 2

ל.כ.

אק

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, ליאור,  
מזתים, ברנע, ארבל2, סייבל, משפט, ממד, לוברני



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ע.ב.ש.

ורשיב גטרן.

השגריר.

השגריר בראון מסר אמש לשה"ח את נוסח המחאה הבא על הגרושים:

-- I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REITERATE OUR TOTAL  
OPPOSITION TO THE POLICY OF EXPULSIONS AND TO URGE YOU NOT  
TO PROCEED WITH THE DEPORTATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS WHOSE  
ORDERS ARE STILL PENDING.

27 -- YOU RECALL THAT WE MADE OUR OPPOSITION CLEAR AFTER THE  
DEPORTATION ORDERS WERE ANNOUNCED LAST SUMMER.

-- DEPORTATION IS AN UNDULY HARSH PUNISHMENT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. IF YOU BELIEVE PALESTINIANS HAVE VIOLATED SECURITY LAWS AND REGULATIONS, THEY SHOULD BE ACCORDED A FAIR AND OPEN TRIAL, AND IF CONVICTED, PUNISHED BY AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE.

-- ACCORDINGLY, WE URGE YOU NOT TO CARRY OUT THE  
REMAINING EXPULSIONS ORDERS.

*Handwritten signature*

מנהל מצפ"א

5 בינואר 1989

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Q Chuck, on the plant itself, what could you tell us about whether the Libyans have moved some of the important chemicals away from the plant? And anything you can provide on the situation there.

Has it eased at all or is it still the dangerous situation it was?

MR. REDMAN: Nothing really has changed -- that I am in a position to talk about here, in any case. We've had a long discussion yesterday and several discussions last week. I can't go into the types of specific information you ask for. I could only say in response to the more general question of being able to move things, that that is a point I made yesterday about why one-time inspection preannounced, for example, is not an adequate solution to this problem.

Q What does this do to the atmosphere of Shultz going into the conference this weekend in Paris? Do you feel this will make it easier or more difficult for the United States to convince the Western European allies? Certainly -- although the two may not be directly connected, you certainly don't deny this is going to have some impact on that conference, do you?

MR. REDMAN: To the extent that everything that happens in the world has an impact on the international situation -- it's a fact of life. But I think the other point is that this conference has been called and has been organized for reasons totally unrelated to this incident that happened today. That goes back to the first point that I made. The principal goal of the United States at the Paris conference is to focus world-wide attention on the problems of CW use and CW proliferation, and to help put a stop to the use of these weapons in violation of international law.

We want participants to reaffirm their commitment, to comply with existing international norms on the use of chemical weapons, and to consider specific measures to restore respect for those constraints. We also hope the conference will spur those nations which have thus far not done so to become parties to the 1925 Geneva protocol.

The purpose of the conference is not to negotiate an international treaty. However, we are prepared to discuss the strongest possible measures that might be taken in the event of future use of chemical weapons in violation of international norms. These measures could include all measures available under the UN charter, including sanctions. To be effective, of course,



any such sanctions would require wide international support.

Those are the kind of things that we are going to be discussing in Paris. Those are the objectives that were set down when the President first proposed this idea back in the fall. This other incident has occurred today, but as I said, it really does not involve in any way the Libyan CW facility. And I would only repeat what I said yesterday, that the existence of that facility and the efforts to build those kind of facilities are the kind of things that pinpoint the dangers that exist in the international community, and show the kind of reasons that the international community should be interested in this kind of a conference.

Q Given that Libya will be in attendance, how hard will the Secretary personally work to draw attention, while he's there in Paris, to the Libyan facility?

MR. REDMAN: I think what I would say again is to draw your attention to what I've said here. We're talking about a conference here that will work at these kind of elements that I put forward, the problems of future use and proliferation. This is not a conference called to deal with a specific problem, such as the Libyan facility. That's never been the purpose of this conference. At the same time, there's no doubt, as the international community is aware, of these kind of developments; that it heightens, however, the seriousness with which this CW issue needs to be treated.

Q Chuck, you said the strong -- excuse me, but I just want to get back to the strongest possible measures, you said, we're prepared to discuss -- the US is prepared to discuss. Do you mean only economic measures? Or is the US prepared to discuss military measures?

MR. REDMAN: Again, I'm not going to go further at this stage. We're going to have a discussion in Paris. There are going to be a lot of countries there. I'm sure there are going to be a lot of ideas thrown on the table. So I think the end objective would be to do as much as possible in the context of a four-day meeting, of course, to try to raise the barriers, to try to address some of these concerns that I specified earlier.

Q You say that there is no relationship between the incident today and the chemical weapons plant issue, but you can't

X

X

X



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say that for sure from the Libyan point of view, especially since Qadhafi has made a number of statements in recent days saying that there is an effort to kill him that's underlying the US policy vis-a-vis this plant, and also the remarks that the wires are carrying of Qadhafi's response to this action, which he characterizes as an act of US terrorism, and indicates that he intends to retaliate. What's your response to the perception on the part of Libya that, in fact, there was a relationship between the act today and --

MR. REDMAN: My response would simply be to say, take a look at the briefing that was given at the Pentagon. It's very detailed in terms of the locations

of our fleet in areas where they normally exercise well into international waters and international airspace with no threatening intent toward anyone, let alone Libya, in a part of the country totally removed from the CW plant, for example, or from Tripoli, if those are the kinds of concerns. So, I think all of those facts stand on their own and are a very clear explanation as to the circumstances. I can't speak for someone else's motivations. As Secretary Carlucci said, you'll have to ask them.

Q You can't rule out paranoia on Qadhafi's part that this is a preemptive act to prevent the United States from carrying out a military operation.

MR. REDMAN: Well, there's certainly no preemptive act on the part of the United States, since our aircraft, well into international airspace, made numerous efforts to evade and to avoid this kind of clash.

Q Chuck, in the message that the State Department is sending out to the embassies, are you saying that there was a radar lock-on, target radar lock-on, from the Libyan planes?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not going to try to address those kind of technical issues. You'll have to stay in touch with the Pentagon.

Q Chuck, has the United States briefed our allies about this chemical plant, what is there, the evidence that we have that it is about to begin production? And what has been their reaction? Have they agreed to pull back some of the efforts by private firms and those companies to help Qadhafi?

MR. REDMAN: I'll have to let each individual country speak for itself as it chooses to do so on these kinds of questions. A number of countries have described the kinds of things that they are doing. But, in a more general sense, you know already, as we have said, that we have been in touch with a number of governments on this particular issue. We have provided as much information as we can and you certainly know, in some cases, that those governments are actively pursuing that information to see what they can turn up on



their own.

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Q But, I mean, did they -- when you came to them and showed them this evidence, did they throw up their hands and say, "My God, I didn't know any of this, and we'll certainly do something about it"? Or --

MR. REDMAN: I don't know that there's any way I could characterize, in a general sense, reactions. All I would say is that I think it is fair to say that this problem is being taken seriously and people are pursuing it.

Q Do you have any reaction to reports saying that Qadhafi requested a kind of Soviet military presence in the area in order to prevent a full-scale clash between the United States and Libya?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know anything about those reports. I only saw a wire report, which I suppose is what you saw. But there clearly is no danger of any large-scale clash, since it's very evident from the Pentagon briefing that the Kennedy was conducting routine training operations near the island of Crete in fact, in areas where they have frequently exercised.

Q: A number of complained to Switzerland about the activities of two Swiss firms in building Libya's chemical plant?

MR. REDMAN: With regard to what I said in response to an earlier question, I'll leave it to each country to address this as they desire to publicly. I did see reports that the Swiss had indicated that they were looking in, or had looked into a couple of things that we had brought to their attention.

-- Q So we are -- I mean, we brought it to their attention?

MR. REDMAN: Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the German company which

rejected what you accused, that they have helped in the building of this factory?

MR. REDMAN: No. Nothing beyond what I said yesterday. I think we covered that.

Q They said this morning that -- they said this morning that they had no part in building that factory, that -- you mentioned the name of that -- their company.

MR. REDMAN: But I'm not going to comment on those particular kinds of statements. I would just refer to what the German government has said, that they are investigating. They're making a full investigation. And I think that's what's called for.

*[Handwritten marks: a circle with a cross, a squiggle, and a checkmark]*



Q Does the United States government, the State Department, think that building a chemical factory like that, or -- Libya can -- is not entitled -- or cannot build such a factory, and building such a factory will be in violation of international laws and regulations? (7/1)

MR. REDMAN: The question is not one, as I said yesterday, of international law. The question is one of proliferation of a weapons system that is a very dangerous one; whose use, of course, is prescribed -- proscribed by international norms. That is the issue. There is an additional factor when countries such as Libya, who have a proven track record of supporting terrorism, of various kinds of support for groups around the world, that makes it particularly concerning in the hands of a country like Libya.

But our concern in terms of CW proliferation is wider. We've spoken about other countries in the world where we have these concerns. And the Paris Conference, as I said, is not focused on one plant or one country. It is focused on a phenomenon that is more widespread. We have seen a breakdown in the barriers to the use of these weapons, particularly in the Iran-Iraq war. And so that is what is at the root of this effort. The Libyan plant, to repeat again what I've said twice, simply highlights in a graphic way what the problem is and why the international community needs to start to address it.

I also said yesterday, of course, that the long-term solution, and the one we have been working on at Geneva, is to find an effective, verifiable worldwide ban on chemical weapons, and we will continue to pursue that in Geneva.

Q I'm curious about the US government's quick decision to announce that this case, this matter of the incident with the Libyans, is closed. It isn't every day that the United States army -- armed forces are attacked by those of another country, as you allege Libya has done in this case. Why so quick to say, "Well, it's all over and that's it."? Has there been some kind of communication of some sort with the Libyans to indicate that this is the end of it, from their point of view?

MR. REDMAN: No, no communications of the kind you seem to be referring to. But, it's just a judgment based on the facts. There was no provocation. Our airplanes acted in self-defense. As I said, I can't speculate on the motivation in the Libyan case. There haven't been any further actions. So that, there just is no basis to think that there's anything further to this. These kind of incidents are always regrettable. No doubt about that. But, at the same time, we have the right of self-defense in international waters and international airspace; and, under these circumstances, we will exercise it.

Q Wait, excuse me! Can I follow that, please. To take that a step further, it almost sounds, if you take what you just said about the incident being "regrettable" and the fact that you've declared the incident closed quickly and Carlucci's statement that there were no -- that he is not aware of any warnings, and the US will be talking with the pilots to determine whether there were any warnings given, it almost sounds as though a review might be in order of the way the US pilots handled the incident. Is that the case?

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MR. REDMAN: I'm not the person to ask about that. I think Secretary Carlucci gave you the details as he knew them, and also indicated that they would be further debriefing the pilots. So I really have no way to comment on those kind of questions.

Q -- that you have and that Secretary Carlucci has that the case is closed, you'd have to assume that it was an accidental attack on the part of the Libyans, that it wasn't premeditated. If it in fact was premeditated, then how can you assume that there aren't further premeditated attacks being planned right now?

MR. REDMAN: One never presumes anything. That's why we fly combat air patrol, for example, when the carrier group is exercising. People are always on alert. But, as I say, this incident happened. It's over, as far as we're concerned. And as a consequence, as Secretary Carlucci said, the case is closed.

Q On that point, Chuck, are the US embassies around the world being alerted for any possible terrorist action?

MR. REDMAN:

Well, what we normally do in a case like this is what I described earlier. We inform the embassies of what has happened, so that they're fully informed, and then each embassy is arranged and has procedures to evaluate its own situation and do whatever is appropriate.

Q On the chemical plant, have you included the Soviet Union and East European countries in the request not to supply technology and materials?

MR. REDMAN: I'm, again, not going to go into all of the countries that have been approached. But as I said yesterday, this is a worldwide problem. Whether it is this facility or any other facility, we would encourage all countries who have the capability to supply equipment, expertise, materials, not to do so.

Q Chuck, to address the point on the United States objectives that you didn't address directly yesterday, you said that the US aim is to deny Libya the additional expertise necessary to put the plant into full-scale production. Does that imply that the physical existence of the plant is acceptable; in other words, that the United States objectives could be served as long as production is not achieved, but the plant remains in place?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not

going to try to address whatever hypothetical scenario you might choose to put forward. All I would say is that our concern with this facility is as I have described it. Our efforts at the present time have been to inform people about what's happening, to let them know about the importance of foreign assistance and foreign equipment, and to see if something can't be done to keep this plant from moving into production.

*[Handwritten marks: a checkmark, a circle with a dot, and a stylized 'D']*



Q Well, let me state it not in a hypothetical way. You are saying that the existence of the plant is not hypothetical, that the plant is

-- MR. REDMAN: That's right. --  
MR. REDMAN: That's right.

Q Are you saying that the very existence of the plant, without being in production, at its present state, is unacceptable?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not even going to address the question. It is not the issue before us. The issue before us is a CW production facility. It's there. The question is, are there ways that the international community can move to prevent that production facility from producing. That's what's before us; that's what we're trying to achieve.

Q Chuck, can you be any more specific, though, about what -- Q Is it the US view that that plant -- may I ask this follow-up question? Is it the US view that this plant is devoted solely to chemical weapons, or might it have other purposes?

MR. REDMAN: I'll just stick with what I have described it as. The Director of the CIA has spoken publicly to it. To show you the kinds of information that is available -- and I don't want to claim this as my own -- but I know that one of the networks represented

here had an interview last evening with a gentleman who worked at that facility for a year. So there are people there who have seen it and who know about it, and as a consequence, I would just leave it at that.

Q Chuck, has West Germany or any other country come to the conclusion that it is a chemical warfare facility?

MR. REDMAN: I think that's been addressed in various ways. I think all I would say again is leave it to each country to say publicly what they want to say, but to say in a general sense that we have found a willingness across-the-board to investigate and to see what can be done about it. And I think that speaks something.

Q Could I -- can I just ask you on a broader question? The United States has been trying now for eight years to issue alarms about Qadhafi, and yet our allies continue -- companies in the allied nations continue to trade with Qadhafi on a relatively free basis without any hindrance from their governments. Why are we so unsuccessful at this?

MR. REDMAN: First of all, it's your judgment of what is success and what is a lack of success. There have been lots of things done over the years which have been quite, quite successful. Some we have done unilaterally, but some have had a lot of support from other governments around the world. And so I think this is not -- this is not a "black and white" issue, it's not an "all or none" issue; it's an issue of continuing to do what you can to



convince people of the seriousness of the problem. Each country, as does the United States, looks at these problems in the context of its own interest and environment. And I think the bottom line has been that the international community has taken a lot of steps over the last eight years.

Q Why is it that you will not name the other countries that we have notified? Some West German officials have been quoted, like in Le Figaro yesterday, saying that the US is letting the Soviets off the hook with this, because they've been proliferating chemical weapons for 45 years. Why mention West Germany and none of the other countries that we know have been involved in participating, both in the construction --

MR. REDMAN: I am only mentioning countries that themselves have chosen to address the issue publicly. The major objective is to be effective, and to do that, we continue to work this actively through diplomatic channels, and that's what we'll continue to do. But you shouldn't be misled. We're talking here about a particular facility and some particular information, but in other CW areas of concern, we certainly have had talks with the Soviet Union and many, many other countries.

Q Chuck, on that point, you mentioned the possibility of some United Nations action. Is the United States thinking of something like the resolution it tried to get against Iran, 598, or the enforcement resolution that followed that -- or didn't follow that?

MR. REDMAN: That's hard to define at this particular stage. But what I'm saying is, as we try to create barriers and create a situation where a country that might consider use in the future would come face to face with a number of elements in the international environment that might be a deterrent, that this is an area that we think we ought to look at. You recall in the situation 598, for example, that we did believe in that situation, that the application of international sanctions could have been an effective means of getting to the problem. What we're saying in the case of CW is that's another area where we think we might explore that possibility.

Q Chuck, this is sounding more and more like a conference about Libya, and I know you occasionally make some side references to the problem of proliferation. But apart from some reference to North Korea last week, why -- well, I could ask why the US is so shy about naming other countries whose plants pose problems, or could you just tell us whether Iraq is a problem, whether some other countries are a problem?

MR. REDMAN: I have named a number of countries in the future -- in the past -- including Iraq and a number of others. You'd have to check their record, but --

Q Well, as we get into the conference, can you -- do you mind, if you can, off the top of your head, tick off some of the countries that --

Q -- whose production bothers the US?



MR. REDMAN: First, you can check the record, because it's there. But secondly, I want to reiterate what I said earlier, that this conference isn't called to address a specific case or a specific issue, but rather the broader phenomenon and the question of stopping it where it is now and preventing future use, and trying to restore norms.

Q Can we go back to the incident today one more time? The United States has been operating a carrier task force group in the central Mediterranean since before Christmas, doing flight ops off the coast of Libya over international waters. Considering the leadership in Libya, does the US not regard this as a provocative effort, especially considering the climate now and the kind of accusations the UC is making?

MR. REDMAN: No, not at all. And I think you only have to look at the map to see where the exercises are being conducted, there near the island of Crete.

Q: Re: Shultz's schedule at the Paris conference:

MR. REDMAN: But he will have a number of bilateral meetings; certainly with the French government, and then with other foreign ministers who are in town. But as of now, I don't have that schedule put forward. Perhaps tomorrow on the way to Paris we'll be able to do that.

Q How about Mideast ballistic missile proliferation? Is this an opportunity to get the Egyptians and the Israelis together?

MR. REDMAN: Are you talking about a joint meeting? A trilateral meeting?

Q No -- or take them one -- well, they do have a peace treaty, but I suppose he could still talk to them separately if that's still the preferred approach.

MR. REDMAN: I'm not going to go into a particular agenda for any specific bilateral meeting. They're all somewhat different, so there are lots of items that could turn up on the agenda. I'm just not in a position to tell you what they are right now.

Q Chuck, can we go back to US diplomatic efforts regarding the Libyan plant? What's accurate to say about what exactly the United States wants the supplying allies, or foes for that matter, to do? Do you want them to investigate? Do you want them to punish? Do you want them to break off the private contracts that their private businesses have going with Libya?

MR. REDMAN: The exact specifics will vary from country to country, and they have to operate within their laws and all the rest. But the more general objective, which I described yesterday, is that this is a question of equipment, materials, and expertise. And if those kind of things can be cut off, then it is going to be very difficult, if not impossible, for this plant to produce.



Q (Off mike) that type of contents as regarding material, expertise, et cetera, how is it going to be done? Is it going to be vis-a-vis an international observer mission or something, since you all have dismissed Libya's offer of inspecting it?

MR. REDMAN: The kind of things that we have just been talking about don't require any sort of observation at all. They require simply stopping the flow of certain kinds of things. And that will be obvious without any kind of inspection on-site, for sure.

Q The -- when the Secretary is in Paris, is he going to be bringing a proposal for upgrading the investigative powers of the United Nations on chemical weapon matters?

MR. REDMAN: That's another of the ideas that we think should be discussed, which would be ways of reinforcing the powers that the UN Secretary General already has in this kind of investigative process.

MR. REDMAN: I don't want to go into further specifics, other than to say to reinforce that kind of capability.

MR. REDMAN: At this stage, I don't have any further specifics as to what kind of ideas might develop. Clearly, we're not the only country that's going to have ideas. And in the course of four days, I'm sure there will be a lot of things put on the table, some of which may be reflected immediately in the work of the conference, but lots of things, which may be the subject of continuing discussion because this is not an issue that we can solve in one four-day conference. But at the same time, we think that these

objectives here of focusing attention, restoring the norms, helping to put a stop to use, getting people to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which exists already, are very important goals.

Q Chuck, has the US government made a decision yet on whether to agree to attend a human rights conference in Moscow in 1991?

MR. REDMAN: That particular question I really can't help you any further than I did yesterday. I might just give you a rundown of where things stand in Vienna. There has been a proposal, as you've seen reported, made at the Vienna meeting to schedule a closing ceremony on January 17. However, we're not prepared to discuss a closing date until the final agreements are made and the substantive work of the conference is finished. There are still a number of important issues remaining, both in the final text and in the conventional stability talks mandate. Resolving these issues requires the cooperative effort of all the delegations in Vienna. We, the United States, are working hard on these efforts and look forward to a ..... good result.

✱                      ✱                      ✱



Now, to look at the kind of things that remain before us: The Neutral Non-Aligned group, the NNA, have just presented a comprehensive text which goes some distance toward meeting our concerns, although we have not completed our analysis. In recent weeks, we have been most concerned about several issues which we will examine carefully and which may require further negotiation, and these are basically four. In the military security area, we must preserve the autonomy necessary for the success of the CST negotiations. On human rights, we still need to limit the use of secrecy as a bar to emigration, recognize the rights of human rights monitors, and move clearly toward making the end of jamming permanent. We still need to settle on a limited list of follow-up meetings. There are currently eleven proposals on the table; the one you mentioned falls in that category. And with regard to the CST mandate, we have to resolve differences resolving -- excuse me -- regarding the zone of application in Turkey.

So that -- that basically is where we are today.

Q -- emigration, you mean security?

MR. REDMAN: No, secrecy as a bar to emigration. Meaning people, say, if you've had security clearances, therefore, you can't emigrate.

Q Chuck, how do you respond to complaints that the US shouldn't agree to this follow-up human rights meeting until the

Soviet Union comes across with, let's say, all the political prisoners and all the unresolved refusenik cases?

MR. REDMAN: At this point, all I could say would be to refer you to Friday's briefing, where we gave a considerable run-down of the kinds of things that have been done already. Those are the kind of things that have to be evaluated in making that decision.

Q On human rights, the Moscow Rabbi sent word to the United States yesterday that the so-called "anti-Zionist committee" in the Soviet Union has been abolished. Have you been informed of that?

MR. REDMAN: I haven't heard that particular report. But someone may have been informed.

Q Has that been an issue in US-Soviet relations?

MR. REDMAN: That particular aspect, I'm just not familiar with. Clearly, there have been a number of issues relating to the freedom to practice religion and those kind of things that we have addressed routinely in our bilateral dialogue. I just don't happen to recall that particular one.

Q Chuck, is two weeks enough time to accomplish resolution of all these goals? On the one hand, they sound like they're pretty -- some of them particularly are pretty sticky issues. On the other hand, it sounds as though you must have made decisions, or you believe decisions are on the verge of happening on all of these cases. I guess I'm trying to sort out what the signal is you're trying to send. Is it -- are you trying to say, "Look, it's not just a human rights conference. There's all this other stuff that we have to settle, and it's a long way off?" Or are you --



MR. REDMAN: What I'm trying to say is that the fact that I can enumerate a checklist of four items after all of these months is a sign of a lot of progress. That's the first point: the fact that we are now at the point where I can tell you in a few phrases the kinds of things remaining is indicative of what has happened. The NNA document, as an overall document, I think is believed to be a very good, strong document. It still needs work in some of these areas, and we have people there actively now working on those areas. So I don't think one would say it's not possible by the 17th. But there's work to be done.

Q Chuck, what is the State Department attitude now on US investments in Libya? Do you think the US firms should pull out and close down all their investments there?

MR. REDMAN: We still have a number of measures in place. I don't have all those before me, but those still exist in a number of cases. And, in fact, the Treasury Department might be the best place to give you the details. But we have some information, perhaps, as well.

Q Back to Vienna, if I may. What kind of guarantees do the Soviets -- given to you about freedom of access? You mentioned those guarantees --

MR. REDMAN: In order for the United States, and I'm sure this applies to most other countries as well, to consider such a conference, there would have to be the same kind of openness that would apply in other human rights conferences.

That is the general principle, so we would have to have those assurances.

MR. REDMAN: I don't know at this stage that one could put those kind of specifics on it. But obviously it has to do with access to the conference, openness of the meetings. And there the model, of course, would be Paris and Copenhagen, which come in '89 and '90.

Q Has the US government accepted an invitation from the Libyan government to send representatives to the inauguration of the plant? Serious question.

MR. REDMAN: Well, I'm afraid I can't think of a serious answer.

Q Do you have any comment on Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens' news conference where he attacked the opening of the PLO-US dialogue and he called it -- "This is increasing terrorism and demonstrations"?

MR. REDMAN: No.  
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# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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תאריך : 04.01.89

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חוזם: 1,1802

אל: המשרד

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שמו/מיידי

אל: מצפא דרנגר-ורנאו, ווש

ביקור המורשה ג'ו קנדי.

לשלי 24.

א. הביקור כפי שכבר ודאי ידוע לכם מתקיים במועדים שנקבעו ושהברקתי בשלי הנל. לפי מיטב המסורת הנקוטה בידי הארגונים היהודים, מתקש האי. די. אל לטפל בביקור באמצעות משרדו בירושלים. לפיכך מצוי כל המידע על המשלחת בידי הרי וול והוא גם שמתאם את הפגישות והסיוורים.

בינתיים היה משרדו של קנדי בקשר עם יהודית דרנגר ונמסרו להם קורות חייהם של ראשי המדינה.

ב. מבקש להזכיר שעל אף הליברליות המופלגת שלו, גילו הצעיר וחוסר נסיונו הפוליטי מוכן קנדי להתגייס תמיד לטובת הקהילה היהודית וישראל. לאחרונה הצטרף בצורה פעילה למאמץ להכשיל את, שאלה 5 שנכללה ברפרנדום הבחירות עי קבוצות פרו פלסטינאיות.

קנדי משאיר לעתים רושם לא רציני ושחצני ואף נוטה להעליב אנשים (ומיד להתנצל על כך). הוא רגיש לזכויותיהם של מי שהוא מחשיב כמדוכאים, עניים ומוכי גורל, ולכן הארועים בשטחים, כפי שהוצגו כאן בתקשורת השאירו עליו רושם לא קל. פרסומו במקומות אלו יצא לו לא רק בזכות היחוס המשפחתי שלו, אלא גם בזכות פעילותו הסוציאלית הענפה. הוא ייסד חברה מסחרית שכל



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## משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

רווחיה מופנים לרכישת נפט לחימום בתי העניים בחורף, למשל.

אני מבקש ומציע שבמידת האפשר יתקבל עי צמרת המדינה, כמבוקש עי האי.די.אל.

ג.ראש האי.די.אל כאן ציין כמעט בדרך אגב שבמשלחת ישתתף גם המורשה גורדון מטנסי.

אבנון/דרנגר-ורנאי

חו

תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מאור







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תאריך : 04.01.89

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אל: המשרד

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בהול להזעיק / סודי

אל:בן אהרון, מנכל מ' רוה'מ  
דע:סמנכל אפסוק,מנהל מאף

מאת: יוחנן בייץ, נאום ניו יורק

זמביה, למברקנו 26 ושיחתנו הטלפונית מהיום (4.1)

שג' זמביה התקשר: שמחים על בואו של דיוו קימחי למסירת איגרת רוה'מ. יתקבל ע'י הנשיא. מבקשים לקבל מועד וטיסת הגיעו. הבריקונא.

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תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, הדס, מאפ

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2783

תאריך : 04.01.89

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חוזם: 1,2783

אל: המשרד

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תח: א גס: מאפ

נד: א

בהול להזעיק / סודי

אל: בן אהרון, מנכל מ' רוה' מ

דע: סמנכל אפסוק, מנהל מאף

מאת: יוחנן ביין, נאום ניו יורק

זמביה, למברקנו 26 ושיחתנו הטלפונית מהיום (4.1)

שג' זמביה התקשר: שמחים על בואו של דיוו קימחי למסירת

איגרת רוה' מ. יתקבל ע'י הנשיא. מבקשים לקבל מועד

וטיסת הגיעו. הבריקונא.

נאום

רש

תפ: שהו, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, הדס, מאפ



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דחילות: כידי	שגרירות ישראל/וויסינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: בלכ"ס	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 12
תאריך וזמן חבור:	אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד	
כס' פרוק:	דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהביט לתקשורת, לע"מ	
המסרד: בטחון ניו יורק	אמ"ן/קש"ח, דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק	
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תדריך עובר בתכיד ליום		

Q That's it? We didn't get a chance to ask over the weekend, but do you have any views on the deportation of 15 Palestinians? And have you made those views known to the Israeli government?

MR. REDMAN: Well, let me say what we've said before. We have repeatedly voiced our opposition to the expulsion of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories. As a strong friend of Israel, we are gravely concerned about these most recent expulsions. Deportations are an unacceptable practice under the fourth Geneva Convention. Moreover, they are counterproductive, and we do not believe they are an appropriate form of punishment. Instead of enhancing Israel's security, deportations increase Palestinian resentment and add to tensions. If individuals are accused of having committed criminal acts, they should be afforded full and public judicial process to defend themselves against any charges. If found guilty, they should be punished appropriately.

Concerning how we addressed this issue with the Israeli government, let me just stress again that we remain deeply concerned over this most recent use of deportations and we will continue to press our position, as we have in the past.

Q Chuck, do you have further information about the meeting held in Tunisia between Ambassador Pelletreau and the Palestinian -- PLO representatives, with regard to the Pan American crash?

MR. REDMAN: No, there is no additional information to be had on that particular score. As you know from what was said over the weekend, in the course of that informal meeting with the local PLO representative, Ambassador Pelletreau did note that this Pan Am bombing was a high priority for the United States and that we would welcome any information that the PLO was able to develop concerning that incident.

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Q Since yesterday, have you heard from Mr. Arafat or anyone at the PLO on the request?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any further information, but in any case, I'm not going to be in the position of going into what might actually occur in these exchanges between the PLO or any other government organization. That's something that the law enforcement agencies and the people investigating this will have to work with on a confidential basis and decide as to what could be made available at whatever point.

Q Was there another meeting today?

MR. REDMAN: No, there was not.

Q Could you explain how you characterize the PLO as a government agent?

MR. REDMAN: Pardon.

MR. REDMAN: I said with organizations or countries.

Q All right, well you misspoke, but that's what you meant.

Well then, can you let us in on whether, in this conversation with the PLO, any US official made any mention of the attempt at daily, almost daily infiltrations of Israel and whether any request perhaps was made deferentially of the PLO to do something about this?

MR. REDMAN: No, I'm not going to offer any other details of this particular meeting. I would just emphasize that in this case, it was a very informal meeting, asked for by the head of the local PLO office, and as a consequence, it lasted about 45 minutes. It did not have the kind of agenda that we have had, that we had in the one real meeting, if you will.

Q -- put the right, just so you can put the right spin you want on it, we had told there would not be, there was no meeting, second meeting, planned. So is this something that comes out of the Pan Am investigation? In other words, when the PLO approached the US, did they say, let's talk about the Pan Am disaster, or was this a suddenly developing second meeting, even though it didn't have a formal agenda?

MR. REDMAN: This arose for the reason I said. This person who came to the embassy was the head of the local PLO office, thus at a lower level than the people we have met with previously and he asked to come and introduce himself to the ambassador. The ambassador took the occasion of that meeting to raise the Pan Am incident.

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MR. REDMAN: No, I don't. On those kind of questions, I will have to leave that to the appropriate authorities; in the first place, UK authorities because they are in charge of the investigation, and secondly, to US law enforcement authorities because they are the ones who are actually intimately involved with it. So, I'm not going to try to get involved in status reports.



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Q While the PLO was offering to help, did the US ask if, perchance, the PLO caused the blow-up of the plane?

MR. REDMAN: I believe that the PLO has already spoken to that publicly. I don't know that anything came up at this particular meeting.

Q Sort of a variation on that: Given the fact that some of the people -- some of the organizations that are named as suspect are part of the PLO umbrella, does the United States feel that perhaps a PLO investigation would bear more fruit than maybe some other investigations?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not making any judgments on the investigation. I'll stick with what I said earlier as to how to handle that. I'll let the appropriate authorities deal with it.

Q Chuck, back on the deportation -- back on the deportation for a second. What's the US doing with the Israelis as far as making its concern and its opposition felt in Israel as far as deportation that you oppose so much?

MR. REDMAN: I think I answered earlier in saying that we'll continue to press our position on this issue.

Q Well, but that's only verbal, and we witnessed it for the past year or two and nothing has been changed actually. It's still being consistent and persistent with that policy.

MR. REDMAN: That doesn't mean it's not important or useful to press it.

Q Chuck, do you have anything on the various reports that the US is pursuing a military option against Libya?

MR. REDMAN: I never talk about those kind of questions with response to any country.

Q (Off-mike) -- about the West German claims that it's not

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a poison gas or chemical warfare facility?

MR. REDMAN: Let me review just a little bit of information on that story.

We have discussed with a number of governments, as you're aware, including the FRG, the serious danger posed by Libya's CW program, and we are seeking their help in denying Libya the foreign assistance we believe is essential for full development of this capability. We are confident that the West German government is taking the information we have provided very seriously, and is investigating fully.

We have called on all countries to end any assistance that they or their firms may be providing to the Libyan CW-capability. Without getting into details, Libya is still dependent on foreign assistance for this plant. If the assistance stopped immediately, Libya would find it difficult to begin full production, and would not be able to sustain limited CW production. Our aim is to deny Libya the additional technology, materials, and expertise necessary for fullscale production.

Q What kind of help do they need?

MR. REDMAN: Again, I won't go into the details, other than to say it would be additional technology, materials, and expertise.

Q So is that plant producing anything, to the best of your knowledge?

MR. REDMAN: We've talked about that before, and nothing has changed in terms of our appreciation of where it stands at this time.

Q You're always talk "on the verge of fullscale," however, there are many reports that it is in fact producing small quantities of mustard gas.

MR. REDMAN: I'll just leave it with what's been said. I don't have anything new.

Q Chuck, that is a really odd phrase -- "verge of full production." I mean, it sort of says they're not producing fully, but it doesn't answer whether they're producing anything partially. Can you have another go at that?

MR. REDMAN: No, I just don't know that I can -- I agree there's a difference between full and partial, or full and limited, but in any case, I think in trying to be accurate, I'll just stay with where I am.

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MR. REDMAN: I don't know that I can -- that I can take it any further. But let me just emphasize, however, that regardless of the answer to that specific question, the fundamental point remains that we have a major CW production facility that is on the verge of fullscale production, i.e., which is complete, sitting there, and which is a very worrisome development. And that's why we have been raising this issue. I just think that's --

Q Okay, one other thing. Last week, North Korea was mentioned as having technological -- reached the point, perhaps, of being ready to break out. Apparently there's some 20 countries that either have, or are believed to be capable of, producing chemical weapons. Before we go to Paris, is it possible the State Department will make public the countries that it feels -- in that state -- in that stage -- at that stage?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know how much of that can be made public, but there is a briefing, as you know, scheduled for tomorrow afternoon by the director of ACDA on the question of the Paris Conference. So if it's possible, he'll be aware of that question; if he can answer it, I'm sure he'd be happy to.

Q Chuck, there have been a number of contradictory statements that have come out of Bonn on how the Germans see their role in the chemical weapons plant. There have been some official pronouncements where they talk -- they are doing investigation, and they seem to acknowledge the role of a company there, Imhausen-Chemie, in providing assistance and design work for the plant.

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There have been other statements that say they've been -- the Germans have found no wrongdoing and aren't even convinced that the facility is indeed a chemical weapons plant. Do you -- does the United States propose some sort of renewed effort to persuade the Germans of the seriousness of our concerns? You said you're --

MR. REDMAN: I don't think that's really necessary, and that's why I would return to the phrase that you were about to repeat yourself, which is that we are confident that the West German government is taking the information we have provided very seriously and is investigating fully.

Q Does that mean that they have acknowledged to the United States that German firms have indeed participated in the development of this plant?

MR. REDMAN: I'm just not going to go further, but I'll just leave it with what I said.

Q I take it from you, you don't want to address the contention that this West German firm was involved. Is that right?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not going to address specifics.

Q Okay. Let me ask you a general question then. Is the United States government satisfied with its Western allies' compliance with the multilateral export controls that cover this technology?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have a ready-made answer to that. That's something I have talked about any number of times here. We've set up this regime among a number of Western countries. We have tried to work on it. It's difficult, as we have said, because the kind of precursor chemicals that are being dealt with are routinely produced and widely used in fertilizer and pharmaceutical concerns,

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as well as having a CW potential, so everyone has recognized from the beginning that it's difficult. But we do believe that there has certainly been progress made, and this multilateral regime has been one of the major efforts that we have gotten underway.

Q Chuck, several statements out of this podium gave the impression that the plant is short -- one step short of producing chemical weapons. Could it be that this last leg that differentiates between what the US claims as chemical weapons, and the Libyans claim that it's just a pharmaceutical plant?

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't believe that's really the issue here. I think what we're talking about here is whether or not one can begin production of any kind, whether one can sustain small production, whether one can begin larger scale production. Those are the kind of questions that people have been addressing. What I have tried to say is that the crucial point remains, regardless of where we might be on that scale of production, is that even if limited production were to begin, for example, it could not be sustained without further Western assistance. So that, even at the lower end of that scale, we can still have an impact if we can get at this issue. And certainly, we could get at the question of full-scale production through the same means.

Q So you're saying -- a follow-up, please. So you are saying nowwhy there are a lot of experts who take a lot of information from a lot of sources. They put it all together. And, as a consequence, they come to conclusions. And I don't think, among experts, that there's any debate.

Q Well, but the German -- I ask because the Germans are debating it. They -- statements from their Foreign Ministry say that you haven't proved the case. And, yet, you've expressed full confidence in the Germans today.

MR. REDMAN: And I'll stick withhave them and I can't do it. So I think I would stick with my earlier answer in the sense that Western assistance, in terms of technology, expertise, materials, is still required if this plant is going to sustain limited production, certainly if it's going to be able to produce on a full scale basis.

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MR. REDMAN: I think our position has been made clear any number of times. We have been working against the use and proliferation of Libyan CW capability. The existence of this plant points out again the dangers of proliferation, so that's why we have been raising the issue. We do not believe it is a good thing to see, around the world, countries developing CW capability, and particularly countries with the track record of Libya in international terrorism and other kinds of irresponsible behavior. But this is not the first case in which we have raised our concerns about CW production, but it is a particularly relevant one now, because it is a large facility, it's new, and there is still time to do something about it. But it's not the only one we're concerned about, and we'll continue to work on others too.

Q To pursue that, if I could, if the time is not used wisely to the satisfaction of the United States government, is the existence of this functional plant acceptable to the United States?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not putting any deadlines on this subject, but of course, in this job I've learned that that's not a wise thing to do on any issue. So --

Q A time limit in which --

MR. REDMAN: -- but there is a -- but there is a time element in what I have said previously by virtue of the fact that given what we can still do by cutting off Western technology and assistance, it is still possible to influence the production of this particular facility. So that is a goal that we believe people should continue to work for; could have an impact.

Q Chuck, is the United States prepared to give up its own chemical weapons?

MR. REDMAN: That's a subject that's being discussed in Geneva. There are long ongoing negotiations now on chemical weapons. The United States has put forward a draft treaty. We have worked at that hard and will continue to do so. And so that is a separate issue, but one which is under active negotiation at Geneva, and with, as always, the objective of finding verifiable ways to eliminate this capability.

Q But at present, we continue to produce chemical weapons. Do we continue to produce chemical weapons?

MR. REDMAN: You're aware of our binary program, which results in a lessening of US stocks, deterrent stocks, as they replace older, and therefore, less safe weapons.

Q Chuck, in reply to the Libyan offer that came through Italy, the State Department said that one-time inspection is not enough. So how come that one-time inspection is not enough to judge if this is a chemical weapons facility while no inspection at all is enough to say that it's absolutely a chemical weapons facility?

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MR. REDMAN: The information that one puts together in evaluating a facility like this comes from a lot of sources. It comes over a long period of time. That's how these judgments are made by the intelligence community, and that's how this judgment has been made. And as you're aware, the Director of the CIA himself has spoken publicly to this particular complex. The problem with a one-time inspection is the fact that, with advance notice, you can do some things which would make it possible to claim, on the day or

the hour of the visit, that nobody observed anything that could be called CW-related because of the close interrelationship between these kind of facilities with pharmaceutical and fertilizer complexes. So, it would be possible to, if you will, sanitize such a facility. So it wouldn't prove anything.

Q Chuck, is -- are -- several times you've said it couldn't go forward without additional Western input. Was that word "Western" chosen deliberately? Could it not, for example, come from the Soviet Union? Could it -- Czechoslovakia, North Korea?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not saying it couldn't come from anyplace. And as I say, it would be advanced technology, in some cases, expertise. And so, we certainly encourage anybody who might have had a hand in this, who would think of having a hand in it, to take these concerns into account. Certainly.

Q The word "Western" did not refer to some specific technical knowledge or material that the West has as opposed to something that might exist in the Soviet Union or --

MR. REDMAN: No. In fact, my original statement was more general, by saying we had discussed with a number of countries, of governments, including the FRG.

Q Chuck, earlier today you did not disclaim the possibility of a military option. Is the inference here that the military option is a possibility, an ultimate possibility?

MR. REDMAN: The inference is the standard one, which is you should not infer that I'm ready to answer that kind of a question about this subject or any other subject. It's just not something I address.

Q You're not asserting anything like that though, are you?

MR. REDMAN: That's not the problem. The problem is that we see a proliferation of CW capability, and particularly, a growing tendency to actually use it, to break down the traditional psychological barriers against the use of this weapon. We saw that particularly in the Iran-Iraq war. But, we think it is a worthy goal simply to stop the proliferation of this kind of weapon.

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In that sense, it's akin to the nuclear proliferation issue. But, of course, the technology --

MR. REDMAN: But it's still -- no, there is not such a treaty, but that's not the issue. What I'm saying is that on nuclear issues, we have gotten together a regime, we've worked at it for a number of years, we have worked to get countries to adhere. To join up to that treaty is still a voluntary effort on the part of those who would so adhere. And what we are trying to do is establish the same thing with regard to chemical weapons. And particularly in Paris, for example, our primary objective is to reinforce the 1925 Geneva protocol which has to do with the use of chemical weapons.

Q Can I go back to Pan Am just briefly and ask if any of the countries that the State Department has accused of sponsoring terrorism have come forward and made the same offer that the PLO has -- Libya, Syria?

MR. REDMAN: I'm just not prepared to go into all of the various efforts that are underway on a country by country basis or in terms of specifics. We're dealing with a wide range of countries and governments. People are working on this. Local police are working on it, civil aviation officials in many countries. And so, there is a broad effort bringing together as wide a range of investigative intelligence, materials, and resources as can possibly be done.

Q And could you tell us if the PLO -- if it's the State Department's judgment that the PLO can be useful in this, knows enough about the situation to be of assistance?

MR. REDMAN: I can't make those kind of judgments about any specific countries or organizations or otherwise. I just have to say that we want to bring to bear as full a range of resources as is possible.

Q Chuck, do you have anything about -- the Soviet foreign ministry said today that they would be willing to help with whatever they could do. Do you welcome their help in this?

MR. REDMAN: Well, sure. We welcome everybody's help. But I think it should be up to each country to say what they want to say publicly on this. I'm not going to try to enumerate all of this.

Q And lastly, do you have something on the SAS scare now? The Swedes apparently are under pressure because of their assistance.

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't have anything specific, and I would refer to the answer that was posted on Friday, I believe, concerning the nature of these threats and how we handle them.

Q: What is the status or the consideration on sharing information of specific threats against specific air carriers, or specific threats in specific regions of the world, against American air carriers going back to where we all started in this crash?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything new on that. It's been



Q More on chemicals. First of all, if you could try to get a clarification for us. There is some talk that if the Libyans reconfigured their plant, it would be acceptable. What is acceptable to the US -- the complete destruction of the plant? Or perhaps if you could look into that.

MR. REDMAN: No, I'm not going to try to set those kind of standards. All I'm going to say is what I've said. What we're working here toward is trying to engage the international community as widely as possible on this particular issue, but also to raise sensitivities and to get everyone working more generally.

Q One more chemical -- on this report that Angola is reported to have stockpiled Cuban chemical agents. Do you have anything on that?

MR. REDMAN: No.

MR. REDMAN: I've not tried to put that sort of a timetable on it myself, but I'd just stick with what I said.

Q Chuck, is this the only chemical plant of its kind you know about anywhere in the world, or it's just a kind of Libyan special treatment?

MR. REDMAN: It's certainly not special treatment.

Q No, I mean Americans --

MR. REDMAN: How many times have we talked here about --

Q -- American special treatment of Libya?

MR. REDMAN: -- various other countries and their use of CW, or production of CW. This one is important for the reasons that we have specified. It's new, it's large, and it does happen to be in the hands of a particularly irresponsible government.

Q Have there been any recent significant overtures that you can talk about that would move the United States and Iran closer to talking?

MR. REDMAN: Nothing has changed. The Secretary has put forward our policy. That's where we are. I guess you might say the ball's in their court, but nothing's changed.

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# NEWS SUMMARY DECEMBER 31-JANUARY 2, 1988

## TV COVERAGE

All networks continued coverage of PAN AM bombing and aftermath, including focus on Palestinian groups, tightening airport security, and Arafat's offer to help in investigation (this topic discusses on Sunday morning talk shows).

## STATEMENTS BY ISRAELIS

FM PERES: On devaluation of shekel. (NYT, Kifner-1)

## COLUMNS

NYT: Eban(2) - "Israel, hardly the Monaco of the Middle East" - Supports U.S. dialogue with PLO emphasizing it does not pose threat to Israel; myth of Israeli weakness has gained currency and does no good. (cabled)

NYT: A. Lewis(1) - "Not a zero-sum game" - Approves of elections in occupied territories, noting Hussein's support and expresses optimism on chance of movement on Palestinian situation with new Israeli govt.

NYP: Evans, Novak(2) - "U.S. wary on Arafat as ally in war on terrorism" - PLO pledged Pelletreau cooperation on terrorism; if Arafat delivers, would give U.S. reason to change from Israel's attorney to honest broker and provide propaganda in U.S. for Palestinian statehood.

NYT: Safire(2) - "The German problem" - Blasts German indifference to news of W. German participation in construction of Libyan chemical weapons plant. (cabled)

## PRESS REPORTS

Mubarak - Israel - peace talks

NYT: 31: Mubarak, in interview, called Shamir stubborn, criticizing his opposition to U.N. conference.

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Israel - uprising

31:NYT, DN:briefs on 3 Palestinian deaths.  
1:DN:brief on 2 more Palestinian deaths

NYT:Kifner(1):Article on strong Palestinian resistance and Israeli countermeasures in Nablus; Intifada leaders approve of Arafat moves but say uprising will continue.

ND:Phelps(2):Long article detailing charges of abuse at Dahariya detention camp.

ND:Phelps(2):Israeli lawyer Goldman discusses horrors witnessed on visit to Dahariya.

NYT and ND:2:Full articles on Israel deporting 13 Palestinians.

Israel - economy - Shekel devaluation

NYT:Two front page articles on Peres' effort to revive Israel's troubled economy.

NYT:Kifner(31):halt in trading of foreign currency to head off panic over shekel devaluation; notes criticism of Peres' actions.

NYT:Kifner(1):Details Peres' austerity plan noting opposition it faces. (ND)

Libya - chemical weapons plant

NYT:Gordon(31,p.1):U.S. rejects Libyan offer to inspect plant; article notes Libya making efforts to deflect int'l criticism of plant.

NYT:Engelberg, Gordon(1,p.1):Expose of U.S. charges that W. German firms involved in constructing Libya chemical plant. (cabled)

ND:2:Bonn investigating U.S. allegations. (NYP)

PAN AM - bombing

31:All papers continued coverage of investigation, noting it is now focusing on Frankfurt and PFLP-GC.

1:NYT:articles on unusual cooperation of various intelligence agencies and tighter airport security worldwide.

2:NYT:Rule:Thatcher comments opposing revenge for bombing seem intended to distance her from U.S. pledges of punishment.

Arafat - PAN AM bombing

2:All papers on FBI welcoming Arafat's aid in investigation.

PLO - Saudi Arabia

NYT:2:picture of PLO raising flag at embassy in Riyadh.

U.S. - Mideast diplomacy

NYT:Pear(1,wk-in-review):Extraordinary ferment in Mideast diplomacy in transition period illustrates continuity between Reagan and Bush Administrations.

U.N. - successful peacekeeper

NYT:Levis(1,wk-in-review):U.N. faces challenge of maintaining momentum of peace efforts.

Iran - economic difficulties

NYT:Sciolino(2,p.1):Iran struggling to rebuild economy and recast goal of victory into an ideology suited for peace.



Lebanon - fighting  
NYT:2:Shiite rivals battle.

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Sudan - unrest  
NYT:31:More protests as political chaos breaks out. (ND)

U.S.S.R. - human rights  
NYT:31:American-born Jew granted permission to emigrate. (ND)

NYT:1:Yuli Daniel, Soviet dissident, dies.

LETTERS

ND:2:Siotis(Press Officer, Greek Consulate):Defends Greek decision to free Palestinian terrorist.

NYP:Gouras(31):Israel has already yielded much for peace.

NYP:Sandler(2):Defends Israel against charges of arrogance, noting its eagerness to help other nations in trouble.

DN:Tobin(31,Americans for Safe Israel):Deplores Shultz decision to talk to PLO.

NYP:2:Several letters on PAN AM crash noting anger at U.S. not issuing warning and desire for strong action against terrorism.

NYT:Nirenberg:Doors still closed to many dissidents for possession of state secrets.

NYT:Ehr(1):U.S. should ratify U.N. Bill of Human Rights.

CARTOONS

NYT:Morin(1):Arafat asks PLO radicals at meeting if they are discussing Israel's right to exist? They Answer: No...yours.

DN:Morin(1):Shultz at U.N. surrounded by representatives of unsavory states: "I can't allow Arafat into the U.S. to speak here...he condones terrorist acts!"

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## סכום עתונות יומי

NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 3, 1989

### EDITORIALS:

FAMINE IN SUDAN: WP: responsibility for a policy of starvation rests squarely on PM Sadiq Mahdi and the US should be pushing very hard to get him to consummate his accord. Saudi Arabia needs to be more helpful.

### PRESS REPORTS:

JEWISH SETTLERS BECOME FOCUS OF VIOLENCE IN WEST BANK: WP: Frankel p.1 with photo of a funeral for a Jewish settler killed in clash; lengthy account of how Jewish settlers have become the target of Palestinian stones and the uprising. Although the settlers are a more diverse group than their hard-line image suggests, the uprising has brought the majority of them farther to the rights and interviews with three rabbis depicts all three as taking hard-lines against Palestinians who throw molotov cocktails and stones. Also explained are the settlers complaints against the govt. and the military who, to many, are not doing enough to combat the uprising.

ISRAEL SENDS TROOPS INTO LEBANON, BLAMES RETALIATION ON ARAFAT FOES: WT: AFP: 200 Israeli troops launched a massive search operation in southern Lebanon yesterday as an Israeli official blamed Palestinian opponents of Arafat for the raids. ...lawyers in the WB said they would boycott military courts for one month to protest what they called a complete lack of due process for Palestinian detainees.

LAWYERS FOR PALESTINIANS TO BOYCOTT MILITARY COURTS: BS: Ruby: p.1.

ISRAEL'S EXPULSION CRITICIZED: USA TODAY: Egypt charged Israel's expulsion of 13 violates human rights and hinders peace. Israel enters the new year facing old problems: the uprising, deportations, Palestinian lawyers' charges, and economy...

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US ASKS PLO AID ON DOWNED PLANE: WP: The US has asked the PLO to provide any information it has about the downing of Pan Am Flight 103, White House official Roman Popadiuk said. US Ambassador to Tunisia Robert Pelletreau made the request to PLO representative Hakam Balaoui. Popadiuk emphasized that the request for information was the same one they are making to organizations and countries in the Middle East that might have information on the plane.

US ENVOY, PLO DISCUSS PAN AM CRASH: WT: Dorsey p.1: A US official said the discussion between Pelletreau and Balaoui did not amount to a request by the US for PLO assistance, but was in line with the administration's position that it will welcome information from any source... Palestinian sources said that the Fatah Revolutionary Council (headed by Abu Nidal) had expressed its condolences to the families of the victims in the crash. They said that the statement indicated that neither Abu Nidal nor Libya was linked to the crash.

JET IS TOPIC OF TALKS: PI:p.1 wires: Re: weekend meeting between Pelletreau and Balaoui. Popadiuk said that the meeting was informal and centered on Middle East issues. He also said that since the meeting was called by Balaoui, the ambassador (Pelletreau) was principally in a listening mode.

US ASKS PLO FOR INFORMATION ON JET BOMBING: BS: LAT: p.1:

PLO BOOSTS DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE: LAT:p.1: The PLO and moderate Arab nations are beginning the new year with an intensive and closely coordinated diplomatic campaign to maintain the momentum they see as finally running in their favor in the Middle East peace process.

BRUTALITY ALLEGED AT WEST BANK PRISON CAMP: LAT: from Timothy Phelps - Newsday: Israeli brutality and policies of beating Palestinians held at the Dahariya detention camp. Specifically, the claim by Palestinian, Farouk Najajra, of his being repeatedly beaten at Dahariya.

BONN REBUFFS US ON LIBYAN FACTORY: WP: W. German govt. spokesman, Norman Shaefer said that Kohl treated the US assertions very seriously but that W Germany had no evidence so far that German firms or persons have been involved in building the Libyan plant. This strongly worded statement signaled that Washington faces difficulty in persuading Bonn to help head off what the US contends is a serious danger that Libyan leader Gadhafi is about to obtain the capacity to produce chemical weapons on a large scale.

BONN SEES NO PROOF YET OF COMPANY'S ROLE IN CHEMICAL-ARMS PLANT: NYT:

US WILL PROPOSE WIDE UN POWERS ON CHEMICAL ARMS: NYT: Fear p.1: Shultz is expected to propose that the UN Secretary General be given additional powers to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world. Officials say this need was dramatized in Sept., when the US charged that Iraq had used poison gas against the Kurds. ....W. Seth Carus from the Washington Institute said that Syria, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Libya have manufacture chemical weapons. ...also..The Kohl Govt. said that preliminary investigations had uncovered no proof that a West German company had helped to build the chemical plant in Libya.

W. GERMAN RESPONSE MIXED ON LIBYA PLANT: WT: AFP: Contradictory statements issued by West German officials in response to US charges...

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SHIITES BATTLE ON 2 FRONTS IN LEBANON: PI: AP: latest battle between rival Shiite Muslim militias: 20 killed and 47 injured since fighting began last Saturday.

2 SHIITE BANDS STEP UP THEIR FIGHT IN LEBANON: NYT: FIGHTING IN LEBANON: WP: World-section.

NEW YEAR POSERS CHALLENGES FOR SUPERPOWERS: CSM: EA Wayne p.1: Article deals with the centrality of US-Soviet relations for the new Bush administration and past alliances and future expectations. Also noted is the fact that the new Bush administration must deal with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the Middle East and has flagged out the issue of chemical weapons and ballistic missile proliferation as a major one.

THE AGENDA OF THE 101ST CONGRESS: WP: On the Foreign Policy agenda remains the Middle East, Central America, trade disputes with Europe, and US-Soviet relations which may raise new disputes. On defense issues, Congress is considered unlikely to allow for anything more than a squeeze on manpower and weaponry and battles are expected to continue over Reagan's "Star Wars" system; although Bush advisers may slow the program to ease tensions with Congress.

CLIPPINGS FROM JANUARY 2, 1989:

ISRAEL ENACTS MEASURES TO MEET ECONOMIC CRISIS: WP: Frankel: Re: new austerity program designed to stave off a looming economic crisis.

ISRAEL UNDERCUTS WORKERS' PAY IN AUSTERITY MOVE: LAT and PI p.1: Williams.

ISRAEL PUTS FORTH AN AUSTERITY PLAN TO REVIVE ECONOMY: NYT: p.1. ISRAEL UNVEILS AUSTERITY MEASURES DESIGNED TO EASE ECONOMIC WOES: LAT P.1 and BS.

ISRAEL EXPELS 15 PALESTINIANS: WP: Frankel p.1....The move also demonstrated Israel's continued willingness to use measures condemned by the US and the int'l community as human rights violations.

ISRAELIS DEPORT 13 TO LEBANON: PI: AP: Roni Rabin

ISRAEL EXPELS 13 PALESTINIANS ACCUSED OF AIDING UPRISING: NYT: AP.

ISRAELIS DEPORT 13 PALESTINIANS INTO LEBANON: BS: AP.

ISRAEL DEPORTS 13 PALESTINIANS TO SOUTH LEBANON: WT.

ISRAEL BANISHES 15 ARABS IN BID TO CURB UPRISING: LAT: p.1

LAT: p.1 Williams: Article on the demonic bitterness that surrounds the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Re: a heart transplant that never took place because the heart would have come from a Palestinian and the recipient would have been a Jew.

FBI WILL ACCEPT ARAFAT'S OFFER TO AID CRASH PROBE: WT: p.1

WP: Article on UN advances and breakthroughs toward peace in the past year.

Beth Silverman  
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ד"ר:	טובס מכרז
מחיר:	קשר ניו-יורק
אל:	מע"ת, מצפ"א, הסברה
דע:	יועץ חקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ חקשורת לשחכ"ס, לע"מ, דו"צ קש"ח, מזכיר הממשלה, רוסינגטון
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## NEWS SUMMARY JANUARY 4, 1989

TV COVERAGE

All networks reported on Libyan chemical weapons plant.

EDITORIALS

WSJ-Editorial Aside-"The new Arafat?"-Cynical of Arafat's eagerness to find PAN AM terrorists when he just threatened with death anyone proposing to end intifada. (cabled)

NYP-"Khadafy's chemical factory"-supports U.S. desire to widen U.N. investigatory powers; criticizes European indifference.

DN-"Help wanted? Maybe"-skeptical of Arafat the terrorist's intentions, but if he helps FBI he deserves credit.

DN-"The evil bouquet"-supports stricter measures on chemical weapons, including widening U.N. powers.

COLUMNS

NYT-Milhollin:"Bonn's proliferation policy"-Illegal exports make Germany major source of materials for third world nuclear weapons programs due to Bonn indifference. (cabled Paran and K'K1)

NYT-Schlesinger(former Sec. Defense, Energy):"Meet OPEC's new friend: Us"-Rising U.S. demand for oil will lead to revival of OPEC.

TIME(9):Talbott-"Virtuoso transformations"-Commends Arafat changes; better than Israel's growing rejectionism.

NEWSWEEK(9):Rosensaft:"Why I met with the PLO"-since believes Israel must talk to enemy did so himself on chance might advance process.

PRESS REPORTSIsrael - peace process

ND, DN, WSJ:brief on Arens complaining of European peace moves without consulting Israel. WSJ also noted 4 MPs said they would meet PLO.

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שם השולח

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PAGE 1

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US NEWS WK(V):WORLDGRAM:Midwest players offering initiatives but no sign of compromise; U.S. needed to mediate.

Arafat - PR gains

US NEWS WR(9):Washington whispers:With U.S. talking to PLO, PR firms considering PLO interest in finding representation.

ND-"Inside N.Y."(gossip)-Arafat had picture taken for Vanity Fair for story in upcoming issue.

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Israel - uprising

WSJ:Brooks:Visit to Beit Omar and Kibbutz Kfar Etzion shows implacability of hatred between Israelis and Arabs. (cabled)

Israel - economy

NYT:Kifner:Peres austerity plan encountering sharp opposition.

Libya - chemical weapons

NYT:Engelberg(p.1):U.S. says Libya moved poison chemicals from plant as part of campaign to refute U.S. claims and improve Libya's image. (NYP,WSJ,ND-also notes deployment of U.S. warships to Mediterranean)

US NEWS WR(9):Lief:U.S. battle against Libyan plant waged for more than year but with no cooperation from allies.

PAN AM bombing

All national magazines had stories; TIME, NEWSWEEK listed Palestinian suspects, NEWSWEEK noting Hawari link could implicate Arafat.

DN:Soviets offer to help find bombers; article notes Arafat adviser said not to expect too much help from PLO.

NYT:Bomb threats caused delays in European airports.

Lebanon

NYT,ND:briefs on continued fighting between Shiite militias.

S. Yemen - moderation

TIME(9):S. Yemen improving relations with neighbors and stopping support of terrorism.

Turkey - human rights violations

NYT:Turkey accused of routinely torturing political detainees. (ND)

U.S.S.R. - human rights improvements

NYT:Gordon:Shultz recommended Reagan agree to human rights conference in Moscow due to recent Soviet improvements.

NYT:Goldman:Soviet Jews soon to join World Jewish Congress.

Poland - Jewish relations

WSJ:Newman(p.1):Era of free speech and improved Soviet-Israel relations have Poles confronting anti-Semitic past.

GENINE STAUBER  
ITONUT-NY



מיידי	דחיות:	טופס מכרז	דף: 1
בלמ"ס	סיוג:	קשר ניו-יורק	מחיר: 3
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מס מכרז:		השגריר וושינגטון	דע:
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להלן הודעה שסימור רייך, ימסור מחר לעתונות בנושא מגעי הממשל עם אש"פ.

<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup> <sup>1</sup> <sup>1</sup> <sup>1</sup> <sup>3</sup> <sup>3</sup>  
 יב"ה גלפא בנדרו גלב ג'נא ג'נא רהב טהח  
 פזני גלג וליכא אילור וליכא בס-גיה  
<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup> <sup>1</sup> <sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup> <sup>1</sup>

אישור

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P.L.O. SPOKESMAN WHO MET WITH PELLETREAU  
LINKED TO MURDER OF U.S. AMBASSADOR IN 1973

A member of the P.L.O. delegation that met with U.S. Ambassador Richard H. Pelletreau Jr. last month served as station chief for the P.L.O. in Khartoum in 1973 when Fatah terrorists killed the American ambassador to the Sudan, it was disclosed today (Thursday, Jan. 5.)

Seymour D. Reich, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, said that the P.L.O. official -- WAITING FOR HIS NAME, a longtime associate of Yasir Arafat -- was part of the P.L.O. group that met with Ambassador Pelletreau at the first meeting in Tunis following the announcement by Secretary of State George Shultz that the U.S. would begin talks with the P.L.O.

HIS NAME dropped from sight shortly after the U.S. envoy, Cleo Noel, was shot to death on March 1, 1973, when eight members of the Arafat-controlled Fatah wing of the P.L.O. seized the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum, according to the Presidents Conference chairman.

Ambassador Noel and the Belgian ambassador to the Sudan, who also was killed, were attending a diplomatic reception in the Saudi embassy when the attack occurred.

Mr. Reich stated:

"According to a White House spokesman, a second U.S. meeting with the P.L.O. was held last Saturday in Tunis for the purpose of seeking information from the P.L.O. about the terrorist bombing of the Pan Am plane that crashed in Scotland.

"It is particularly troubling that our government should have stooped to seek information from the P.L.O. about that tragedy.

"In view of the P.L.O.'s long history of terrorism and cooperation with other terrorist gangs, it is not surprising that the P.L.O. representative gave no information to our Ambassador. Did our State Department really expect one fox to reveal how another fox got into the chicken coop?

"Not only did the P.L.O. pioneer and perfect airline hijacking and placing bombs aboard civilian airliners, it also inspired, taught and carried out joint operations with other terrorist groups, including the Red Brigades in Italy, the Japanese Red Army and the Baader-Meinhoff gang in West Germany.

"That bloody record should have been enough to make clear that no information would be forthcoming from the P.L.O. about their partners in crime."



Mr. Reich, who heads an umbrella group composed of 47 national Jewish religious and secular organizations, continued:

"The latest demonstration that the P.L.O. remains committed to terrorism -- and to the threat of assassination to control local Arab leaders -- came on Monday when Yasir Arafat warned that anyone proposing an end to the intifada 'exposes himself to the bullets of his own people.'

"Arafat, in a statement broadcast on Radio Monte Carlo calling for an intensification of the Arab uprising in the territories, was quite obviously referring to a statement by the Mayor of Bethlehem, Elias Freij, who had called earlier for a one-year truce between Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

"Immediately upon learning of Arafat's threat against his life, Mayor Freij withdrew his call for a truce. He understands that despite its professions of moderation and its statements renouncing terrorism, the P.L.O. remains a terrorist gang whose power comes from the barrel of a gun. Indeed, the P.L.O. has killed more Palestinians over the years than it has Israelis.

"The P.L.O.'s newly-established 'credibility' is based on a handful of words grudgingly uttered spoken by Yasir Arafat under powerful pressure from Sweden and the United States, and after two earlier failed attempts to satisfy our Government. That is clearly not sufficient to establish the kind of confidence needed if there is to be progress in our Government's talks with the P.L.O.

"Here are three demands that Ambassador Pelletreau should make in his next meeting with the P.L.O. :

"1) NAME TO COME should be ordered to appear before American counter-terrorism officers for questioning about his role in the murder of Ambassador Noel.

"2) The P.L.O. terrorist Abu Abbas -- treated as an honored guest during the recent meeting of the Palestine National Council in Algiers -- should be be surrendered to American authorities for the murder of Leon Klinghoffer aboard the Achille Lauro.

"3) The P.L.O. must stop pressuring the Greek government to reject a U.S. request for the extradition of another P.L.O. terrorist, Mohammed Rashid, whom our country seeks to prosecute for planting a bomb on a Pan Am jet in 1982 -- and whose legal defense is being paid for by the P.L.O.

"These would be indications that the P.L.O. has indeed renounced terrorism. But I do not suggest anyone hold his breath until that occurs."

Concluding, the Presidents Conference chairman said:

"Because the record of the P.L.O. is so filled with horror, Yasir Arafat cannot expect to utter a couple of sentences and expect absolution. Secretary Shultz has properly stated that more than words are expected from the P.L.O.

"This means an end to violence against Israel -- including a halt to the intifada.

"It means amending the Palestinian National Covenant, the P.L.O.'s charter, which vows the destruction of Israel.

"And It means turning over to the United States those P.L.O. terrorists linked to attacks against American citizens."

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אלו מצפיא	סיוג: שטר	
דעו מזאיר	תזח: 941800	
מאת: ס/קונכ"ל - ק. עתונות	מס מדקי:	
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UJA-FEDERATION פג'ישה עם צמרת

1. הקונכ"ל והח"מ נועדו אתמול לפגישת עבודה עם מנהיגי UJA-FEDERATION בניו יורק, סטיב סולנדר וארני מישל (בלוויית שניים מעוזריהם).

2. הנושא המרכזי לו חוקרשה השיחה היה הערכות הקהילות היהודיות בארה"ב לקליטת יהודי ברה"מ. השניים צפו שהשנה יצאו מברה"מ כ-30,000 יהודים, ולפי הערכה כי 90%-95% מהיוצאים יגיעו לארה"ב, הרי מדובר בהגירה של כ-26,000 איש. ההוצאות הדרושות לקליטתם כאן נעות סביב \$5,000 לאיש - ובסה"כ מדובר, איפוא בהוצאה של כ-130 מיליון דולאר. חלק מסכום זה כבר מתוקצב אך אין ספק שהקהילות תדרשנה לעמוד למבחן כספי קשה. במישור המקומי וזוהי יוזמה יוצאת שיש בין 10 מיליון דולאר רחוחות הארציים של הארגונים היהודיים שודרת ואגוז וווייפה מהתפתחות זו. מעריכים שבכמה קהילות מקומיות פשוט ישתמשו בחלק מהכספים לצורך קליטת יהודי ברה"מ במקומותיהם ולא יעבירו הכל לניו יורק. צעד כזה אולי יקל לחצים מקומיים אך ירדלד את הקופה הארצית. עד כה נתקיימו רק דיונים פרלימינאריים ברמת המטה המקצועי ונשבעו חסרובים יועלה הנושא בפני המנהיגות הנבחרת של הארגוניה. מהור הקושי הוא כפול - שלא כבשנות ה-70, שאז כמחצית מן היוצאים פנו לישראל, כעת, כאמור, מגיעים הרוב הנה (וגם מספרי היוצאים הולכים ועולים במוחלט). יתירה מזו, המימון הממשלתי האמריקני הולך ופוחת. הפחרון ההכרחי הוא מגבית חרום לקליטת יהודי ברה"מ בארה"ב. בשיחות ראשוניות בהן נדון הרעיון עורר התנגדות נמרצת מצד הסוכנות היהודית בשל התקדים השלילי, שכן זו תהא הפעם הראשונה בה מתקיימת מגבית וזוהי שלא לצרכי ישראל. ביכשוו התיחסונו ישראל לרעיון זה.

3. הצביעו על הצורך הדחוף לשפר את מערך הקליטה החובבני בארץ והעלו מחשבות על אפשרות שרה"מ יעניק חסותו למפעל יהודי בינלאומי לקליטת יהודי ברה"מ בארץ. לדעתם עשוי להיות משקל רב ליזמה פומבית לפתוח במבצע כלל יהודי הדומה למפעל "שיקום השכונות" בשעתו.

4. עוד העלו את ספיחי "מיהו יהודי" וציינו שהם מניחים שיצטרכו לחיות עם האיום לשינוי החוק מפעם לפעם. הרגישו כי על אף שהאיום בשינוי החוק הוסר לפי שעה הרי "נגרם נזק" כבר כעת. עמדו על השינוי החברתי - דמוגרפי שעברה ישראל ואשר לדבריהם הוא מקור שוויון הנפש בה קיבל רוב הציבור בארץ את סערת הרגש שעוררה ההצעה לשינוי החוק בעולם היהודי.

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שם השולח:


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5. סוכס על ריווח והתעדכנות הדריס באורח שוטף ועל שיחוף פעולה מוגבר  
בתחום ההסברה - ביחוד בתחום החדרת כתבות "רכות" על ישראל.
6. נודה על חתיחסוונט לסעיפים 2-3 לעיל.



בינה - ידיר

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..... תאריך: 4.1.89  
..... השולח: ברוך בינה  
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