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מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

מסר רותם

יוסף מדיני

ארה"ב

15/2/88 - 19/2/88

תיק מס

2

מחלקה

שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פיוז: 4608/2-N

מזהה פרויקט: R00035q

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-8

תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020



** נכנס
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הודם: 12,14384
אל: המשרד
מ-: ורש, נר: 439, תא: 191288, זח: 1600, זח: ר, טג: 80
תח: 6 גט: מצמא
נד: 8

סודי/רגיל

אל: סמנב"ל צפ"א ופרי"נ

דע: מקש"ח/משהב"ט, (הועבר) / סויבל/משה"ח

מאת: שג רושינגטון

ישראל-ארה"ב: בשת"פ בטחוני

1. בשיחה (14.12) עם בוב טיילור (פנטגון) התייחס בין היתר למס' נושאים שיעמדו על סדה"י הכילטרלי בתחום הבטחוני בתקופה הקרובה.

2. טיילור הקדים וציין כי להערכתו ההמשכיות היא שתאמין את היחסים הבילטרליים בתחילת ממשל בוש.

3. להלן פירוט הבעיות שעמן נצטרך להתמודד בתקופה הקרובה:

א. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION:

(1) בהעדר דרישות מהצבא האמריקאי איננו רואה הקצאת כספים נוספים לבניית תשתית בישראל.

(2) ציין כי הידיעות על סגירת עובות לא תקל על ישראל במאמציה להגדיל התקציב להקמת מתקנים בישראל.

(3) אלמנט נוסף אשר לא יסייע לתומכים בהרחבת תבנית הבינוי הוא סגירתם הצפויה של בסיסים אמריקאים בתוצאה

1. The purpose of this document is to provide a comprehensive overview of the current status of the project and to identify the key challenges that must be addressed in order to ensure its successful completion.

2. Objectives

The primary objective of this project is to develop a robust and scalable system that can handle the increasing volume of data generated by our operations. This system will be designed to meet the following requirements:

3. Key Challenges

4. Recommendations

It is recommended that the project team focus on addressing the data integration and security challenges first, as these are the most critical to the success of the project. Once these issues are resolved, the team can then move on to addressing the performance and scalability challenges.

The project team should also consider the need for ongoing monitoring and maintenance of the system, as well as the potential for future upgrades and enhancements.

Finally, it is important to ensure that the project is well-communicated to all stakeholders, and that they are kept informed of the progress and any changes to the plan.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, the project is a complex and challenging one, but it is also an opportunity to improve our operations and enhance our competitive advantage. By following the recommendations outlined in this document, the project team can ensure that the project is completed on time and to the highest quality.

The project team should also consider the need for ongoing monitoring and maintenance of the system, as well as the potential for future upgrades and enhancements.

Finally, it is important to ensure that the project is well-communicated to all stakeholders, and that they are kept informed of the progress and any changes to the plan.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מהמצוקה התקציבית.

4) בהקשר לטעילות הישראלית העיר כי טעילות אויב"ק בנושא המתבססת על מידע שקיבלה מהודו הנרת הסנס בילטרלי בדבר שמירת סודיות. טוען כי המידע שהעביר לאויב"ק מסווג ביותר.

ב. SOFA :

1) הביטחון הקרוה שסיבוב השיחות בינואר יהיה האחרון.

2) בהקשר לבעיית המעצר אשר טרם נפתרה הדגיש כי מייחסים למתרונה חשיבות. איננו רואה אפשרות לזיכרון מצד ארה"ב.

3) להערכתו קרוב הרגע שבו תצטרך ממישראל לקבל החלטה פוליטית. סבור שאי תחימה על ההסכם מסב נזק גדול יותר לישראל מאשר לארה"ב (ירידה משמעותית במס' החיילים שיגיעו).

ג. OFFSHORE - OFFSET

1) צומח להקטנת הסכומים בשני הסעיפים.

ד. מכירות נשק:

1) לקראת הגשת הבקשות לקונגרס בכוונת הממשל להיערך למאבק במעורר מועד. מתכוונים להעביר לחברי הקונגרס נתונים על אופן צמיח של מקומות עבודה כתוצאה מזיכרון על עסקות נשק. טיילור מעריך שנושא מקומות העבודה יקבל בשנה הקרובה משנה חשיבות לנוכח מצבה הכלכלי של ארה"ב.

2) לדבריו טוב תעשה ישראל אם תשקול מחזש עמדתה השוללת קטיגוריות עסקות נשק אמריקאיות למדינות שרובן חזר על הטיעון שלפיו מאחר ונשק יגיע למדינות שרובן מוטב שארה"ב תספק הנשק ובכך תקנה לעצמה שליטה ופיקוח על איכות הצירוף.

3) בהקשר לעיל לא הסך טיילור את ביקורתו מאויב"ק שלדבריו בדרך פעולתו מזיק לישראל.

מקוה כי בעקבות פגישת מנהיגים יהודיים עם קרלוזי בנוב'

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

1. The proposed project is a study of the effects of the proposed changes on the operations of the various departments of the Agency.

2. OBJECTIVE

The objective of this study is to determine the extent to which the proposed changes will affect the operations of the various departments of the Agency.

The study will be conducted in three phases: (1) a preliminary study to determine the scope of the study; (2) a detailed study of the operations of the various departments; and (3) a final report on the results of the study.

3. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study will cover the operations of the following departments:

4. METHODOLOGY

The study will be conducted using a combination of interviews, questionnaires, and direct observation. The results of the study will be presented in a final report to the Director.

The study will be completed by the end of the fiscal year. The results of the study will be used to guide the implementation of the proposed changes.

The study will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

The study will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Privacy Act.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

כ) במהלכה הבהיר מוריס אברם כי ועדות הנשיאים תהיה הגוף האחראי על קביעת עמות הקהילה היהודית בטורגיה מכירות נשק) תהיה עמות הקהילה היהודית הגיונית לפחות נתונה להכרעת 'חבורה' שאינה משקפת לא את עמות ישראל ולא את עמות הקהילה היהודית.

כדי להוכיח את צדק דבריו בהקשר לאויכא"ק הזכיר את המשבר שהתגלע בתוך הקהילה בעקבות פרסום המכתב אותו שגר הארגונים לאויכא"ק שבו מתחו ביקורת על דרך עבודתו (הערה: יש להניח שהגורמים הרואים באויכא"ק מכשול למימוש מדיניות ארה"ב שאנו עיוור מהתמיכה שקיבלו גורמים יהודים).

ה. JPMG :

1) טיילור הצטרף לתומכים בקיצוץ תכנשי המליאה מפעמיים בשנה לפעם אחת.
אינו טורר שהדבר ימנע בשתהפ' האסטרטגי. מניח שהנושא יעלה במגש הבא.

שטיין

צש

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מככל,ממככל,כנצור,טייבל

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terrorist basis on the other side?

MS. OAKLEY: This again is in the realm of speculation. I think that we will stick with these words. They've covered the situation as we see it. I really have nothing further to add in this area today.

Q Doesn't this put the United States, and State Department particularly, in a very, very poor light, as being childish about what's happening in the Middle East and how the PLO operates?

MS. OAKLEY: I reject your characterizations of the position of the State Department. I think we have explained very clearly the reasons why we made this decision and what we're looking for now.

Q Well, when you decide on a case-by-case basis, the question has been raised: How are you going to determine who did what?

MS. OAKLEY: I think, once again, I would refer you to the testimony and the statements by Assistant Secretary Murphy. He covered this.

Q This wasn't testimony, this was a statement on a network. A testimony takes place before a congressional committee.

MS. OAKLEY: But he -- excuse me, I misspoke. But what I'm saying is, what he said represents the views of the administration. I think it covered this whole area clearly. I have nothing further to add to it.

Q Well, do you have anything to respond to former Ambassador Netanyahu, the Israeli member of Parliament, who says

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that the action by the Secretary of State, or by the US government, undercuts the mutual trust between Israel and the United States, that peace can only proceed with some basis of trust? Has the US done something to undercut the trust that Israel has in the America's -- America's word?

MS. OAKLEY: I think that those words that were uttered by the former Ambassador were clearly answered by Assistant Secretary Murphy in his part of the response to that. I have nothing further to add to that.

Q Does the State Department have an opinion on the apparent formation of a government in Israel?

MS. OAKLEY: No. We have seen these various reports. We stick by the position that we've always had, that we'll be happy to work with whatever government emerges from the will of the Israeli people.

Q Do you have any comments on Shimon Peres' statements yesterday on national television?

MS. OAKLEY: No.

Q Well, can you please comment on the --

Q -- on the continued shooting on the West Bank of three more Palestinians yesterday?

MS. OAKLEY: We are deeply concerned over the upsurge in violent confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis which resulted in increased injuries and deaths. We especially regret the loss of life. Both sides bear responsibility to avoid violent incidents. There is an urgent need for Palestinians and Israelis alike to pull back from confrontation and reflect seriously on what each side can do to promote calm and create an atmosphere conducive to dialogue, understanding, and negotiations. And once again, this was clearly stated yesterday by administrative spokesmen.

Q How do you believe -- how do you say the word, "confrontation," for both sides to pull back from confrontation, when the attacks are being made by these people on the West Bank attacking troops who are trying to enforce a peace and bring about a settlement of some kind, so that negotiations can proceed? What -- how are the Palestinians and the Israeli troops both culpable of confrontation? How do you explain that?

MS. OAKLEY: It's not my position here to get into the causes or the reasons or the history. What we're talking about now is moving forward in the search for the comprehensive peace that I

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think we all desire. What we are calling on people to do is to pull back from confrontation, to seriously reflect, if I may repeat this -- these words, to reflect on what each side can do to promote calm and create an atmosphere conducive to the search for peace.

Q Well, aren't you putting the victim and the victimizer in the same position? This is an old way of handling the situation.

MS. OAKLEY: No, I'm not. And I really can't help you any further with that question.

Q Does the State Department see any relationship between the "upsurge," as you call it, in violence, and the US decision? Is there any -- do you think it's coincidental? Or do you think there's some relationship? And secondly, as of Saturday, no decision had been made whether this administration will hold a second meeting; it was up in the air. Has that -- is that still up in the air?

MS. OAKLEY: There is no way in which I can make an evaluation about the correlation of decisions and violence. The intifada has been going on for over a year in various waves. There is just no way that I can help you with that. I think that our Ambassador in Tunis covered the meeting that he held. We have no further meetings planned at this point.

Q Will Arafat get a visa now?

MS. OAKLEY: I don't think he's applied. Yes?

Q Phyllis, about the killing again. Since the beginning of the intifada, or the uprising, this government has called on Israel to refrain from using live ammunition, which ends up usually with killing young Palestinians. Does that policy still stand? And the fact that Israel has not really responded, and it's still using live ammunition -- does it tell you anything? Is there anything else to be done?

MS. OAKLEY: Of course our policy of urging restraint and calm still stands. We are in continuous dialogue on this question. I think our views are very well known. We simply don't need to repeat them all the time. Again, let me repeat that what we're urging now is calm, refrain -- restraint from violence, so that constructive measures toward the comprehensive peace can go forward.

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Q Since the decision, I seem to be hearing -- I admit some of it is at cocktail parties and weekend talk --

Q -- but I seem to be hearing more and more references to what the Israelis are doing as "state terrorism" on the West Bank. Does the US consider what Israel is doing -- its forcible actions -- a form of state terrorism?

MS. OAKLEY: We're not putting that kind of label on it. We have talked about the need to avoid the excessive use of force. All that still stands. We've talked about restraint. We've talked about calling on both sides to work together to come up with something that will provide the peace that all the people in the area need and deserve.

Q Phyllis, what other measures can the United States government take besides the statements you are making here, and all of that dialogue, which didn't bear any fruit with regard to decreasing the pressure and the tension, and decreasing the slaughter and the killing of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza? What other measures the United States government intends to take?

MS OAKLEY: Well, let me repeat, we have been in a dialogue with the government of Israel on this situation. They know our views. We never get into the explicit details of our conversations of this kind, but you may be sure that they're aware of our views on this subject, and I think they're aware of our calls, repeated very strongly yesterday, for the sides to step back, to decrease the violence, and to move forward.

Q Relevant to this issue: You already posted an answer to a question made by my colleague last Friday about Mr. Abdeen Jabara, the President of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. I understand that he's back in Washington. But did the State Department receive from the Israeli government any reasoning for denying him, as a US citizen, an entry to Israel.

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MS. DAKLEY: I think that you will note in the statement that we posted about his situation that we had raised Mr. Jabara's case in Israel and in Washington before he attempted to Israel. We had been told that he would be denied entry. We attempted to pass this information on to Mr. Jabara, but we were unable to contact him. The Israeli government is well aware of our position that all Americans seeking entry to Israel should be treated equally.

Q The reasoning? Was the reasoning of the Israelis acceptable to United States government? Was there a reason given to you that they refused to let him inside?

MS. DAKLEY: They had discussed their reasoning with us. We certainly accept their right to determine who shall enter their country. This is the right of every sovereign nation. Let me repeat what we have been concerned about and wanted to stress again to them was our position that ALL (speaker's emphasis) Americans seeking entry should be treated equally.

Q But that's not a protest. That's not -- the US's intercession with Israel doesn't rise to the level of a protest, does it?

MS. DAKLEY: I'm not putting labels on it, whether it was a protest, whatever you want to call it. What we did was make our views known to him -- to the government of Israel about his case.

Q Without going into the exchange, of the sensitive exchange between you and Israel about this issue, was the ground that he was barred from entering Israel security ground or security reasons? What were the reasons?

MS. DAKLEY: I think you'd have to go to the government of Israel for that. They're going to give their reasons for actions like that.

Q Phyllis, as the points of last week's events fade into history, there's a very good account in the Washington Post, and there have been other accounts, of what went on. From all these accounts and this is my question, from all these accounts it seems the first word Israel got of what Mr. Shultz planned to do was the call Tuesday night, which turned out, of course, to be one day premature, because Arafat didn't say the "magic words" that night. He said it the next night. He said them the next day, I mean. Is it true? Is that a proper inference, that all this negotiating through the Swedes and the Saudis and the Egyptians and Rita Hauser, and whoever else, was going on without Israel being aware of the evolving US position?

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MS. OAKLEY: I'm not going to go into the background, as you can well imagine, of all the diplomatic exchanges that led up to this process. Various people have speculated about them in various articles in various publications. I think that what we have said, what the Secretary has explained, others have talked about on the record, covers that. But certainly, we were in touch when we felt it was appropriate to be in touch with the government of Israel as well as other countries who had a great interest in this situation.

Q Do the words of Yasir Arafat now supercede the statement in the covenant of the PLO about the dissolution of the state of Israel?

MS. OAKLEY: Again, I would refer you to the transcript of Undersecretary Armacost yesterday. He covered that question.

Q Well, yes, I'm asking that --

MS. OAKLEY: Yes, and we stand by what he said.

Q You stand by it. So, you were taking Armacost's words as a spokesman for Arafat as to what that means. Is that right?

MS. OAKLEY: No, what we're doing is taking Mr. Armacost's words as a statement for the US government. Yes?

Q Does the US government now consider that the statement in the covenant on the dissolution of Israel is now passe?

MS. OAKLEY: Again, I would -- that's not the word that he used, but I would refer you to the transcript.

Q Well, he said "supercession." Isn't that the same thing?

MS. OAKLEY: Yes, yes. That's the word he used.

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Q Well, is that the same thing.

MS. OAKLEY: As what?

Q That it means that it's no longer applicable.

MS. OAKLEY: (Laughs.) Again, I'd refer you to the dictionary -- (laughter) -- but I would just stand by what Mr. Armacost said.

Q -- let's ask this. Does the State Department accept the word of Arafat on the 242 and the rest of it as meaning that the covenant section dealing with the dissolution of Israel is now null and void and passe and dead?

MS. OAKLEY: Again --

Q Yes or no, please.

MS. OAKLEY: -- I will refer you to the testimony] -- not the testimony, excuse me, but the statement of Mr. Armacost yesterday when he covered this question. I have nothing further to add. We stand by what he said. Yes?

Q Can we get a statement to that effect from Mr. Shultz?

MS. OAKLEY: You have a statement for the US government from Undersecretary Armacost.

Q Did Pellatreau press for an end to violence in the territories when he met with PLO officials over the weekend?

Q Did the US Ambassador press for an end to terrorism in

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the territories when he met with PLO officials.

MS. OAKLEY: We have certainly pointed out that the first subject on the agenda was the whole question of terrorism. I think in the brief readout that was given about that meeting that it was clear that this was the major item on the agenda for us. I'm not going to go into the details of our diplomatic exchanges even in a situation like that, except to repeat that terrorism was the main point on the agenda.

Yes?

Q Does the United States have evidence or supposition that Libya is considering taking the products of its chemical warfare plant and distributing them to terrorist organizations or other nations? Do you have any evidence that one ounce of chemical warfare material has left Libya as an export?

MS. OAKLEY: Just in general on this whole question of chemical warfare and weapons in the Middle East, we have stated before, the US is very concerned about the spread of chemical weapons and the capability of spreading chemical weapons in the Middle East, and we're also concerned about missile proliferation in that region.

We have previously expressed our concern that Libya has acquired a CW capability. We have had indications, including reports in the international media, that bolster these concerns. The US believes that Libya has established a CW production capability and is on the verge of full-scale production of these weapons. Libyan production of CW would be particularly troubling in view of public reports that Libya has used CW in combat, and, because of the Qadafi regime support for terrorism and indications that Libyan-backed or supplied terrorist groups have been involved in recent terrorist attacks.

Q Does the Sofaer Doctrine still apply, that action taken to counter terrorism in such instances -- it wasn't exactly that instance -- but countering terrorism is a permissible, legal action?

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not commenting at all on the Sofaer Doctrine one way or the other. But I think, clearly, what all of this highlights is the problem that exists, and that the ultimate solution for which we are working very hard is to achieve a comprehensible, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons. Negotiations toward this end will resume in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament, the CD, in February. Meanwhile, we are urging all nations to reaffirm the ban against the illegal use of chemical weapons as codified in the 1925 Geneva

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Protocol. At the suggestion of President Reagan, the nations of the world are meeting in Paris on January 7th to discuss ways to reverse the erosion of norms against the illegal use of chemical weapons.

Q But we have not seen any export of the material from this plant out of Libya, I gather from your statement?

MS. OAKLEY: I just have really nothing further on the details of that facility.

Q And you say the facility is on the verge of production. Some people say it is producing. You stand by "verge of production" --

MS. OAKLEY: Yes.

Q -- that it is not yet producing, as far as you're concerned?

MS. OAKLEY: Yes. That's what we have said, that we feel it's on the verge.

Q Is the US pursuing any third party diplomacy, trying to get Qadhafi to take it apart?

MS. OAKLEY: Well, we have continued various diplomatic efforts in regard to chemical weapons. As you know, the United States and other Western countries control the export of certain chemical weapons, precursors, to deny their availability to Iran, Iraq and Syria. The US also denies the export of these chemicals to Libya as part of our embargo on Libya. And we continue to call upon all nations to halt any contributions they might be making to the Libyan chemical weapons capability, and to take vigorous actions to curb the illicit use of chemical weapons and their further proliferation.

Q Who are these nations that are helping the Libyans?

MS. OAKLEY: We have discussed some of these problems. I really don't have any further update or details on what various countries might be doing.

Q Well, the Japanese are one of the countries that have been named, and the United States has made a number of statements publicly and apparently diplomatic de marches to the Japanese. Has there been any response, or any positive action on the part of that government?

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MS. OAKLEY: We had covered the question of the Japanese connection with the Libyan chemical warfare plant in October. At that time, we had said that the government of Japan had confirmed to us that there are no Japanese nationals now working at the industrial site. We have also been informed that Japanese firms intend no further involvement in the industrial plant project. So that --

Q Has that been borne out since then? Is that --

MS. OAKLEY: Yes. So we've accepted --

Q So they built it and left it for the Libyans --

MS. OAKLEY: Yes.

Q -- to go ahead and manufacture whatever they want to manufacture? Is that correct?

MS. OAKLEY: I'm not commenting on your phraseology. I'm simply repeating what we had said earlier at the end of October about the Japanese connection. We certainly have no reason to change that.

Q Because that was in October and now you are saying that this plant is on the verge of production, does this mean that your diplomatic efforts to this part have failed and you need to do something different?

MS. OAKLEY: No, it doesn't mean that at all, because it's very difficult to know at certain stages what -- how far along they had been, what they were able to do for themselves. It doesn't mean that at all. And I think clearly that our diplomatic efforts are beginning to pay off. I think the world is much more aware of the dangers, the problems with chemical weapons. We certainly look forward

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to the progress that can be made in Paris at the conference in early January, and feel that this really is an important contribution to the global effort against chemical weapons.

Q But wait. You said your diplomatic efforts are paying off, and earlier you said they're on the verge of full-scale production.

MS. OAKLEY: I'm talking about, not this specific case just of Libya, what I'm talking about is the world-wide problem where, I think, that our efforts are paying off, that we have increased public awareness and that we are looking to this conference to create further conditions to prevent the erosion of the ban on the use.

Q Could you tell us what "on the verge of production" means?

MS. OAKLEY: No, I'm not going to go into any further details on that.

Q -- similar region, different weapon. Do you have anything on the anti-tactical ballistic missile that the Iraqis are supposed to have successfully launched?

MS. OAKLEY: I am simply not in a position to be able to confirm whether Iraq has tested an ATBM. Certainly this brings to mind again the other part of this problem, that the proliferation of missile systems and chemical weapons threaten regional stability, particularly in a crisis. We have made known our desire to work with all countries in the region, with other concerned parties to reduce the threat of missile proliferation.

Q Are we concerned about anti-missile proliferation as well? I thought those were fairly harmless?

MS. OAKLEY: (Laughs.) Well, I think that what I'm talking about is the whole general situation of missile proliferation.

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Q Phyllis, among Mr. Murphy's remarks yesterday was he spoke about an international conference to get to a comprehensive settlement.

Just what is our position now dealing with an international conference?

MS. OAKLEY: That hasn't changed. The Secretary of State has gone over that. And you may be assured that our position on that remains the same.

Q Remains the same. That means what?

MS. OAKLEY: Just what it was. That's right. That we -- I would refer you again to the famous speech of September 16th.

Q That's the Wye Plantation?

MS. OAKLEY: That's it.

Q That still stands?

MS. OAKLEY: Still stands.

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דחיקות: מידי

קשר ניו-יורק

מחיר: 14

סוג: כלום

אל: המשרד

תזו: 19 11 19

הס מדי

דע:

0 0514

מאת: נאו"ם

אל: ארב"ל 2

מאת: מיכל צוייגרייך

תגובת המזכ"ל לאירועים בשטחים

להלן תגובת המזכ"ל לאירועים האחרונים בשטחים.

Comments by the Spokeswoman for the Secretary-General in answer to queries at the noon briefing of Monday 19 December:

The Secretary-General is naturally following the situation in the occupied territories very closely. He is deeply concerned by press reports of casualties sustained during the past few days, in particular deaths resulting from the use of live ammunition. The Secretary-General again calls on the Israeli authorities to apply in full the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

מיכאל

מיכל צוייגרייך

שם השולח

19.12.88

תאריך:

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including names like 'מיכאל' and 'מיכל צוייגרייך', and numbers like '1', '2', '3'.

228

דף : 1	מחלקת המשך כ"ו-יורה	ודחיסות : מידי לבוקר
מתוך : 5	טופס מברק	סוג : שמור
אל : המשרד		מס' וזמן חבורה : 191800
דע :		מס' מברק יק : 538-
מאת : השגריר-נאו"ם		המשרד ושייטת - 139

אל : יועץ מדיני לשה"ח.
 דע : מנכ"ל ממרוה"מ, המשנה למנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל ארב"ל, מנהל ארב"ל 2. מנהל מצפ"א, השגריר/הציר-ווינגטון, השגריר-ג'נבה (מפיר)

מאת: יוחנו ביי-נאו"ם.

עצרת ג'נבה : תצפית, צפי והערות

א. עובדות

1. העצרת בג'נבה ודיון פלסטין היוו כעין ביסוס למו"מ המתמשך בין אה"ב לאש"ף בתיווך שוודיה-שהתנהל מבלי שהיינו מודעים לפרטיו ומבלי שארה"ב הכניסתנו לתמונה (כנראה מתוך חשש שונסה לשבש את המהלכים באמצעות לחצי יהודים וסנט)-בשתשומת לב הכל מוסטת לדיון ולהצהרות הפומביות תוך התעלמות מן המגעים שמאחורי הקלעים. נראה ביום שגם אי הענקת האשרה לערפאת הייתה אולי חלק ממהלך המו"מ - אם כי ייתכן גם, שאנו מייחסים בכך למדיניות ארה"ב סופיסטיקציה רבה מן המגיע לה.

2. עיתוי ההודעה האמריקנית הגביר את הרושם, הן בדעת הקהל והן במשרדי החוץ, כי יש ממש ב"יוזמת השלום" של אש"ף - וכי ישראל חייבת לו תגובה עתה.

3. העיתוי הביא גם לסחף בעמדות המערב לגבי הצעות החלטה-והצבעה בעד החלטות שיש בהן הבעה מראש מה יהיו תוצאות המו"מ, הצבעה בעד פיקוח או"ם על השטחים וקביעה כי ישראל חייבת לסגת מכל השטחים כולל ירושלים-כשכל זה עומד בניגוד לאות ורוח 242.

4. קיים חשש שאש"ף והערבים "ינצלו דוח זו וינסו להגביר הרושם של קבע ביחסי ישראל-אה"ב, עלולים לקורא לשם כך כמועבי"ש מצד אחד (אם כי וטו אמריקני עשוי לעבוד נגדם)-וירבו בנאמצים לקירוב נוסף ומופגו של ההחלטה האירופית לאש"ף.

4 3 4 8 2 2 1 1 3 2
 4 3 4 8 2 2 1 1 3 2
 4 3 4 8 2 2 1 1 3 2
 4 3 4 8 2 2 1 1 3 2

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ב. מסקנות והצעות לדיון

1. בד בבד עם הבעת אי שביעות רצוננו מהתנהגות אה"ב כלפינו ואי הסכמתנו עם מסקנתם שהצעד יהדס כביכול את תהליך השלום - חייב מאמצנו העיקרי להיות, בתיאום עם אה"ב, להפגין השת"פ והידידות, וכי למרות אי ההסכמה יחסי הידידות ההדוקים נמשכים כרגיל, ואמנם האיתותים הראשונים של שולץ ועמיתו מכוונים לכך.

2. כלפי האירופים, לעומת זאת, נראה שעלינו להפגין מורת רוח בולטת. בהצבעתם החד צדדית ובהחלטות הפאר הם קובעים מראש תוצאות המו"מ. הדרך של ניהול מדיניות באמצעות הצהרות חד צדדיות וניהול מו"מ מעל לראשינו בנושאים שהם בנפשינו, אינם מקובלים עלינו. כנקטם בדרך זו הם מוציאים עצמם מכלל אלה המקובלים עלינו כ-HONEST BROKERS היכולים לסייע בהידום תהליך השלום.

3. ברור בודאי לכל, שעל אף שאש"ף רק הצהיר הצהרות דו משמעיות, הרושם שנתקבל מחייב אותנו לצאת בהדסם לפחות בהצהרות על יוזמת שלום שלנו. הברירה בפנינו עתה היא לצאת ביוזמות משלנו או להתגונן נגד יוזמות של אחרים.

ג. הערות שוליים

1. במסדרונות האו"ם הרושם הוא כי ישראל/תהיה מבודדת עתה לחלוטין אלא אם תנקוט ב"יוזמת שלום" נגדית.

2. גם הודעות המזכ"ל ונשיא העצרת מגבירות החושם שאש"ף אמנם עשה צעד ומלמשה עתה תגובת ישראל.

3. על אף רוח זו ראויות לציון מספר מדינות כגון קמרון צ'ילי, קוסטריקה, אל סלבדור, גואטמלה, והונדורס, ששיזמו הצבעתו בנושאים חשובים לנו - או נעדרו מן ההצבעה לפי בקשתנו. המדובר בעיקר בהצבעות על שתי ההצעות החדשות L53 (ועידה בי"ל פלוס) ו L54 (מעמד אש"ף).

4. לוחות ההצבעות בידיכם. לופה השואה להצבעות אשתקד.

נאו"ם

החנן כ"י

19.12.88



ממשלת ישראל
של ישראל לאומות המאוחדות
PERMANENT MISSION OF ISRAEL
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

538/139 $\frac{3}{5}$

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
(212) 351-5200

43RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEBATE ON QUESTION OF PALESTINE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND
13 - 15 DECEMBER, 1988

RESOLUTIONS:

- A/43/L.50 : VOTE ON WORK OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
A/43/L.51 : VOTE ON WORK OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS DIVISION
A/43/L.52 : VOTE ON WORK OF DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (D.P.I.)
A/43/L.53 : VOTE ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE*
A/43/L.54 : VOTE ON STATE OF PALESTINE : PLO UN OBSERVER (NEW)

43RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY

42ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

RES.	Y	N	A	-	RES.	Y	N	A	-
L.50	123	2	20	13	42/66 A	131	2	22	3
L.51	123	2	20	13	42/66 B	133	3	20	2
L.52	127	2	17	12	42/66 C	133	3	18	4
L.53	138	2	2	16	42/66 D	129	2	24	3
L.54	104	2	36	16					

* NOTE : IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT DRAFT RESOLUTION A/43/L.53 IS DIS-SIMILIAR IN SUBSTANCE WHEN COMPARED WITH RESOLUTION 42/66 D OF THE 42ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THEREFORE NO DIRECT COMPARISON OF VOTING PATTERNS CAN BE MADE IN THIS CASE;



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 $\frac{4}{5}$ CHANGES IN VOTES

<u>RESOLUTION</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>43RD GA</u>	<u>42ND GA</u>
A/43/L.50	BELIZE	-	Y
	CAMEROON	-	Y
	CONGO	-	Y
	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	-	Y
	EL SALVADOR	-	A
	FIJI	-	Y
	GRENADA	-	Y
	HONDURAS	-	A
	JAMAICA	-	Y
	MALDIVES	Y	-
	PANAMA	-	Y
	SOLOMON ISLANDS	-	Y
	ST KITTS & NEVIS	-	Y
SURINAME	Y	-	
A/43/L.51	BELIZE	-	Y
	CAMEROON	-	Y
	CONGO	-	Y
	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	-	Y
	EL SALVADOR	-	Y
	FIJI	-	Y
	GRENADA	-	Y
	HONDURAS	-	Y
	JAMAICA	-	Y
	MALDIVES	Y	-
	PANAMA	-	Y
	SOLOMON ISLANDS	-	Y
	ST KITTS & NEVIS	-	Y
SURINAME	Y	-	
A/43/L.52	BELIZE	-	Y
	CAMEROON	-	Y
	CANADA	A	N
	CONGO	-	Y
	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	-	Y
	EL SALVADOR	-	A
	FIJI	-	Y
	GRENADA	-	Y
	HONDURAS	-	A
	JAMAICA	-	Y
	MALDIVES	Y	-
	SOLOMON ISLANDS	-	Y
	SURINAME	Y	-

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- 3 -

<u>RESOLUTION</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>43RD GA</u>	<u>42ND DA</u>
A/43/L.53	AUSTRALIA	Y	A
	BELGIUM	Y	A
	CAMEROON	-	Y
	CHILE	-	Y
	CONGO	-	Y
	COSTA RICA	A	Y
	DENMARK	Y	A
	EL SALVADOR	-	A
	FRANCE	Y	A
	GRENADA	-	A
	GUATEMALA	-	Y
	HAITI	Y	A
	HONDURAS	-	A
	ICELAND	Y	A
	IRELAND	Y	A
	ITALY	Y	A
	JAMAICA	-	Y
	LUXEMBOURG	Y	A
	MALDIVES	Y	-
	NETHERLANDS	Y	A
	NEW ZEALAND	Y	A
	NORWAY	Y	A
	PARAGUAY	-	Y
	PORTUGAL	Y	A
	SAMOA	Y	A
	SOLOMON ISLANDS	-	Y
	ST KITTS & NEVIS	-	A
	ST LUCIA	Y	A
	ST VINCENT	Y	A
	SURINAME	Y	-
	UNITED KINGDOM	Y	A
	WEST GERMANY	Y	A

END

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 16.12.88
חוזם: 12,12396
אל: ניו/698, לונדון/319, מנמת/445
מ-: המשרד, תא: 161288, זח: 1413, דח: ר, טג: שמ
תח: גט: ארבל
נד: ג

שמור/רגיל

נאום

דע: קשורן

יוניפיל-אמל

א. מיחידת הקשור לכוחות זרים נמסר כי ממקד יוניפיל התקשר (15) למפקד היחידה לזרחה כי כח משולב של צה"ל וצד"ל לקח 4 תושבים מקומיים כבני ערובה באזור הגיזרה האירית וכי נציגי אמ"ל פנו אליו לבקש החזרת הארבעה. ממקד יוניפיל הביע חששו מאי השקט הגובר. מאוחר יותר זיווח יוניפיל כי קצין ושלושה חיילים נחטפו ע"י אמ"ל ליד עמדת או"ם אירית ושחררו לאחר מכן. עד כאן.

ב. על פי זיווחי התקשורת (16) ממקורות לבנוניים נלקחו ארבעה שיעים מקומיים בידי אנשי שבי"ב ישראלים ואילו ארבעת חיילי יוניפיל נחטפו בהגובה ע"מ להפעיל לחץ לשחרור המקומיים.

3. לידיעתכם.

ארבל 2

רש

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רט, אמן, ממד, אירו, איר, 2, ברנע, ארבל, 2, ליאור, מזתים

ATTORNEY GENERAL
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20530
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
LITIGATION

MEMORANDUM

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT :

1. [Illegible text]

2. [Illegible text]

3. [Illegible text]

4. [Illegible text]

5. [Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

SECRET
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

TOP SECRET

SECRET TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

TOP SECRET



י' טבת תשמ"ח
18 בדצמבר 1988

4033

אל : תפוצת דף מצפ"א

מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

הנדון: דיאלוג ארה"ב-אש"פ

התבטאויות בארה"ב ובקנדה

1. ריגון ובוש -

במסגרת "מסע-הרגעה" התבטאו השניים פומבית תוך הדגשת מחויבות ארה"ב לבטחון ישראל ובשבח הידידות העמוקה בין שתי המדינות. הוסיפו אזהרה לאש"פ שמעשיהם צריכים לשקף את הצהרותיהם.

2. שולץ -

יש לארה"ב מחויבות גמורה לבטחונה של ישראל. לא יורעו יחסי שתי המדינות. ההחלטה שלי כמעט ולא היתה בבחינת החלטה כי ההודעה של ארה"ב היתה קימת כל השנים אך היתה תלויה בשלשה תנאים ואלה לדעתנו - נתמלאו. השיחות אינן מטרה בפני עצמה. המטרה היא להגיע למו"מ ישיר בין הצדדים.

3. סנט - בית הנבחרים -

הקו המסתמן מהודעות המחוקקים (הנמצאים בפגרא) הוא של תמיכה בצעדו של המזכיר עם זאת דגש חזק על כך שזהו צעד פתיחה ויש לבחון את אש"פ במעשים ולא רק במילים. סנטור ג'ורג מיטשל, מנהיג הרוב, פעל על פי בקשות שולץ לפרסום הודעת תמיכה במהלך ראש ועדת ההקצבות של הבית, אובי, יצא בהודעת תמיכה, חבר הקונגרס שומר הודיע כי הבית ישגיח היטב על ביצועי אש"פ ולא רק על דיבוריו. סנטור בירד: הגיע הזמן להכיר בשינוי שחל באש"פ. סנטור צ'ייפי: לא יהיה שלום ללא תפקיד לפלשתינאים. סנטור הלמס: מכין מכתב למזכיר ובו יביע צער והתנגדות להחלטה לקיום מגע עם אש"פ.

4. צ'רלי היל ומכס קמפלמן (לשגריר ארד): "מקווים שישראל תחזור למגרש המשא-ומתן אותו נטשה לפני שנה וחצי".



- 2 -

5. ראש העיר אד קונץ' -

אש"פ הוא ארגון טרוריסטי שלא השתנה אבל אני מעריץ גדול של שולץ ואני מקבל את שיפוטו. אני מעודד מדברי שולץ על התנגדותו למדינה פלשתינית. על ידידי ישראל לעמוד עכשיו לימינה כדי שתדע שלא ננטשה.

6. @קייסינג'ר (בנייטליין) :-

אם אש"פ יתבער מאחורי החלטת או"מ 181 אני צופה מעט מאד התקדמות. בינתיים אינני רואה אף ערבי שיהיה מוכן לקבל את גבולות '67 ואין אף ממשלה ישראלית שתסכים לחזור לגבולות אלה. אש"פ מדבר על גבולות '47 כך שהפערים כל כך גדולים שאינני רואה כל טעם למהר ולהכנס לוועידה בינלאומית.

7. יהודים -

רוב הארגונים והמנהיגים התישרו לפי הקו המגלה הבנה לעמדת הממשל ומטיל את חובת ההוכחה על אש"פ בהימנעות מטרוור ובביטול האמנה.

איפ"ק : - מבינים שהממשל צריך היה לפעול כך אבל קוראים לזהירות מירבית במגעים.

הקומיטי : - ההוכחה הנדרשת :

1. הפסקת התקפות על אזרחים ישראלים
2. הפסקת האינתיפדה
3. ביטול האמנה.

א.ד.ל. : - מבינים שהממשל צריך היה לפעול כפי שפעל. שמחים על תביעת הממשל למו"מ ישיר והתנגדותו למדינה פלשתינאית. דרושים צעדים נוספים כמו הפסקת האינתיפדה וביטול האמנה.

אברם : - אין להסתפק במילים, רושלים בירת ישראל. עמדות ערפאת נוגדות את 242. יחסי ארה"ב-ישראל לא יפגעו אלא יתחזקו.

ההודעות של הארגונים האחרים דומות פחות או יותר.

8. קנדה -

שר החוץ קלארק ציין שפתיחת הדו-שיח בין ארה"ב לאש"פ הוא צעד חשוב הנחוץ לפתרון מוצלח של הסכסוך. קנדה מקבלת התפתחות זו בברכה ותנסה, יחד עם מדינות אחרות, לתרום להתקדמות נוספות. (השגריר באוטבה מעיר שנוסח זהיר זה מקובל גם על האופוזיציה).

ב.ב. כ.ה.

מיכאל שילה

שמור

ירצא **

**
**
**
**

חוזם: 12,13210
אל: נוי/740, לונדון/344, מנמת/481
מ-: המשרד, תא: 181288, זח: 1523, דח: ר, טג: שט
תח: ג: ארבל
נד: ג

שמור/רגיל

כאו"ם, קסון/לונדון.

יוניפיל-אמל. לשלנו ח/12507. להודעת דובר צה"ל ח/12946.

א. להלן פרטים נוספים על השתלשלות הפרשה:

1. לאחר חגיגת שלושת החיילים האירים בפעם השניה (כזכור נחטפו ושחררו קודם לכן 4 אירים (ח-12396) פנה קצין הקישור של יוניפיל (אירי) לעמיתו הישראלי בבקשה שנשחרר לפחות חלק מהשיעים שנעצרו על ידנו בדרום לבנון. לאחר מכן שוחח ממקד יוניפיל עם אלון מקוד צפון ומקביל פנה ממטכ"ל אירלנד אל נספה צה"ל בלונדון.

2. לאחר מכן שוחררו שלושת האירים החטופים ורק מאוחר יותר שיחרר צה"ל שניים מתוך ארבעת העצורים לאחר תום הקירטם, כאמור בהודעת דובר צה"ל.

ב. חשוב להדגיש במגעים בנדון כי לא הוזר לא היה כל קשר סיבתי בין החזרת האירים החטופים לבין שחרור העצורים ע"י צה"ל לאחר הוכחת חפותם, ולא היתה כל 'עיסקה' או 'היענות' לפניוח אלינו. זאת ע"מ להבהיר שאין כל סיכוי להציס שיופעלו עלינו בנסיבות דומות בעתיד. יתר על כן חייב להיות כרוך לנוגעים בדבר שאם יתקבל ברבים רושם מוטעה כזה הוא יפגע בראש וראשונה בכוחות האו"ם, שיהפכו לבני ערובה של המחבלים והמיליציות השונות.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ארביל 2

אא

מס

תפז: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רט, אמן, ממז, איר, 2, ברנע,
ארבל, 2, ליאור, מזתים, מור/נוחותזרים

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1923

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILL.

** יוצא

טרדי

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חוזם: 12,13206
 אל: וווש/685, לונדון/346, קהיר/245, רומא/254, מנמת/482
 מ-: המשרד, תא: 181288, זח: 1520, דח: ר, ט: ג: טו
 תח: ג: ט: ממד
 ג: ד:

טרדי רגיל

עיראק-אש"ף

1. מקור מערבי מהימן מוסר שבמגעים זמלומטיים השמיעו העיראקים לאחרונה ועתה מתכננת ביחס לסכסוך, ואף הצהירו על תמיכתם בנסיון ההתמנות של טרפאת. בעבר, מסר המקור, היו רגילים העיראקים להשמיע דעות קיצוניות וחוצבות להבות בהקשר לסכסוך.

2. אנא הערכתכם לגבי גישת עיראק לאירועי ג'נבה והתגובה של ארה"ב.

מנהל ערב 3/ממ"ד

אא

מט

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרנז, רס, אמן, ממד, ליאור, מצרום,
 בנצור, מצמא, אירד, אירד 2

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF NEW YORK
ALBANY

STATE OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

1. THE STATE OF NEW YORK HAS A DEBT OF SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS WHICH IS BEING PAID BY THE STATE OF NEW YORK THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE.

2. THE STATE OF NEW YORK HAS A DEBT OF SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS WHICH IS BEING PAID BY THE STATE OF NEW YORK THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE.

STATE OF NEW YORK

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THE STATE OF NEW YORK HAS A DEBT OF SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS WHICH IS BEING PAID BY THE STATE OF NEW YORK THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE.

** נכנס

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הודם: 12,12984

אל: המשרד

מ-: רוש, נר: 417, תא: 171288, חז: 1300, דח: מ, ט: 10

תח: ט: מצמא

נד: 8

טרוי/מיווי לנוקר

אל: סמנכ"ל צמ"א ומר"נ

דע: סמנכ"ל רה"מ

סמנכ"ל משה"ח

מאת: השגריר, רושינגטון

המכש בטוניס.

1. מרפי התקשר אמש לצטור דיווח על פגישה פלטרן עם אנשי אש"כ בטוניס. הפגישה התקיימה בבית ארוח לשמי של אמטוניס וארכה כשעה ורבע.

2. לדברי מרפי לא היו בעמדות שהובטו ע"י נציגי אש"כ חידושים כלשהם. לאחר הבעת הערכה על עצם קיום הדיאלוג נתחו דוברי אש"כ בתאור עמדותיהם המדיניות שתאמו עיקרי נאום ערפאת בג'נבה:-

א. ועדה מכינה לוועידה הבינ"ל.

ב. פקוח בינ"ל על נסיגת ישראל מהשטחים. סיום הטרור בשטחים.

ג. ועידה בינ"ל על יסוד 242 ו-338.

מחצית זמן הפגישה הוקדש לדיון בנושא הטרור. דוברי

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אש"פ חזרו וטענו שאין להם מקוח על כל הקבוצות הפעילות ובמיוחד אלו, המתנגדות לדיאלוג בין אש"פ-ארה"ב. אינם מוציאים מכלל אפשרות ביצוע פיגועים נגד אמריקאים ופלסטינאים, המעורבים בדיאלוג ונגד מטרות אמריקאיות אחרות.

3. פלטרו השיב שארה"ב תעקוב בקפידה רבה אחר פעולות אש"פ בתחום זה וכי מצפה שהנהגת אש"פ תנקוט צעדים משמעותיים נגד המעורבים בפעולות טרור. בהקשר זה הוזכרו במיוחד פעולות כוח 17 והיחידות הכנוניות לקולונל חווארי. לדברי מרמי הנושא לעיל שב ועלה בהדגשה רבה ע"י פלטרו.

4. חוראני, חבר משלחת אש"פ ציין שהם מגנים טרור בכל מקום שהוא ומצפים לטיוס הטרור בשטחים נאשר התייחסותם זו מנוונת גם לפעילות צה"ל בשטחים.

5. לטיוס, הביעו ענין בהמשך הדיאלוג עם ארה"ב, אך לא נקבע מועד לשיחה נוספת. התרשמות האמריקאים שאינם ילוחצים על כך אתה.

6. בתשובה לשאלתי השיב מרמי שמצפים שמגישה נוספת תקיים בתחום הנא וכי דיאלוג של ממש יתחיל רק עם כניסת הממשל החדש.

7. הערכתי, כי הדיווח המיזי של מרמי-מחצית השעה לאחר קבלת הדיווח מפלטרו - נועד להפגין בפנינו רצונם להחזיק אותנו בתמונה בצורה שוטפת.

יש לראות בפעולה זו חלק ממאמצי ההרגעה שהמימשל נקט בהם בימים האחרונים, לאחר קבלת ההחלטה לפתוח בדיאלוג עם אש"פ.

ארד.

אק

1. The first part of the report is a summary of the work done during the period covered by the report. It is intended to give a general impression of the progress made and the results obtained.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed account of the work done during the period covered by the report. It is intended to give a full and complete account of the work done and the results obtained.

3. The third part of the report is a summary of the work done during the period covered by the report. It is intended to give a general impression of the progress made and the results obtained.

4. The fourth part of the report is a detailed account of the work done during the period covered by the report. It is intended to give a full and complete account of the work done and the results obtained.

5. The fifth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the period covered by the report. It is intended to give a general impression of the progress made and the results obtained.

6. The sixth part of the report is a detailed account of the work done during the period covered by the report. It is intended to give a full and complete account of the work done and the results obtained.

7. The seventh part of the report is a summary of the work done during the period covered by the report. It is intended to give a general impression of the progress made and the results obtained.

8. The eighth part of the report is a detailed account of the work done during the period covered by the report. It is intended to give a full and complete account of the work done and the results obtained.

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terrorist raids

הם נוסדו לראשונה
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הם נוסדו לראשונה
 עם שחרור - 1948 - 1949 - 1950 - 1951 - 1952 - 1953 - 1954 - 1955 - 1956 - 1957 - 1958 - 1959 - 1960 - 1961 - 1962 - 1963 - 1964 - 1965 - 1966 - 1967 - 1968 - 1969 - 1970 - 1971 - 1972 - 1973 - 1974 - 1975 - 1976 - 1977 - 1978 - 1979 - 1980 - 1981 - 1982 - 1983 - 1984 - 1985 - 1986 - 1987 - 1988 - 1989 - 1990 - 1991 - 1992 - 1993 - 1994 - 1995 - 1996 - 1997 - 1998 - 1999 - 2000 - 2001 - 2002 - 2003 - 2004 - 2005 - 2006 - 2007 - 2008 - 2009 - 2010 - 2011 - 2012 - 2013 - 2014 - 2015 - 2016 - 2017 - 2018 - 2019 - 2020 - 2021 - 2022 - 2023 - 2024 - 2025 - 2026 - 2027 - 2028 - 2029 - 2030 - 2031 - 2032 - 2033 - 2034 - 2035 - 2036 - 2037 - 2038 - 2039 - 2040 - 2041 - 2042 - 2043 - 2044 - 2045 - 2046 - 2047 - 2048 - 2049 - 2050 - 2051 - 2052 - 2053 - 2054 - 2055 - 2056 - 2057 - 2058 - 2059 - 2060 - 2061 - 2062 - 2063 - 2064 - 2065 - 2066 - 2067 - 2068 - 2069 - 2070 - 2071 - 2072 - 2073 - 2074 - 2075 - 2076 - 2077 - 2078 - 2079 - 2080 - 2081 - 2082 - 2083 - 2084 - 2085 - 2086 - 2087 - 2088 - 2089 - 2090 - 2091 - 2092 - 2093 - 2094 - 2095 - 2096 - 2097 - 2098 - 2099 - 2100

collective punishments
 הם נוסדו לראשונה
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דחיפות: שטר	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: מדי		פתוך:
תאריך וזמן חבור: 16.12.88 - 18:00		אל: מ/מנכ"ל, מ/מנכ"ל עפ"א דפר"ן ט ע פ א
כס' פרוק: הפסוד: 416 1/8		דע: לשכת רח"ם
		פאת: ק/ק לקונגרס

קונגרס: בעקבות החלטת ארה"ב לפתוח בדיאלוג עם אש"פ

לשנר 374

1. גם היום סנטורים וקונגרסמנים התבטאו בנדון על פי רוב לפי הקווים הכלליים שצוינו במברקנו הנ"ל.

2. לעיונכם, רצ"ב מכתב הסנטור הלמס למזכיר המדינה כפי שהועבר היום. לזכרי עוזרו, סנטורים רפובליקאים הנחשבים תומכי ישראל ומתחרי ביקורת על הלמס בשל שיגורו מכתב זה.

3. רצ"ב גם העעת מכתב לשולץ שהקונגרסטן הרפובליקאי, ויז רובר, מפיץ בקרב עמיתיו. יש להניח שיועבר בתחילת השבוע הבא.

4. לא רק הקונגרסטן מל לויזן שוקל קביעת יעדים ומגבלות לדיאלוג (מברק הוציר 372) אלא נודע לנו מחקונסוליה בשיקגו שהוצע לסנטורים ג'ון דנפורת' (רפ' טמיסורדי) וסאט נאן (דמ' מג'ורג'יה) שינסו לעבד עמדה בי-פרטיסנית לגבי המגעים עם אש"פ. כידוע דנפורת' עומד לערוך ביקור פרטי בארץ מייד לאחר חג המולד. נעקוב ועוד נדווח.

5. בינתיים בלוט לקט התייחסויות מתיום:

- הודעה לעתונות מטעם הקונגרסטן ביל גרין .

- סיכום דבריהם של:

* הסנטור ריצ'רד לוגר (מבכירי הרפובליקאים בוועדת החוץ).

* הקונגרסטן דנטה פאסל (יו"ר וועדת החוץ).

* סנטור ג'ון סק-קייז (העומד לבקר בארץ בתחילת דנואר).

וילהלם
לטר

תפוצה: -36-
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CLAIBORNE PELL, RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN
 JOSEPH P. BAKER, JR., DELAWARE
 PAUL S. SARBANES, MARYLAND
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 LARRY PRESSLER, SOUTH DAKOTA
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OSWALD S. CHRISTIANSEN, STAFF DIRECTOR
 JAMES P. LUCKE, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8225

December 15, 1988

416
2/8

The Honorable George P. Shultz
 Secretary
 Department of State
 Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Needless to say, I deeply regret the Administration's decision to initiate diplomatic contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization. This hurried decision risks reversing gains made by this Administration in the war against terrorism and threatens the cause of peace in the Middle East.

As President Reagan himself has stated on numerous occasions, the Palestine Liberation Organization is one of the world's most notorious terrorist operations. In addition to Arafat, the organization includes such terrorists as Abu Abbas, master-mind of the Achille Lauro hijacking, and Khaled Nasser, currently on trial in absentia in Egypt for his involvement in terrorist activities.

Scores of innocent men, women and children -- including Americans -- have lost their lives as a result of terrorism conducted or orchestrated by the PLO. The PLO has repeatedly and specifically targeted American citizens.

Three weeks ago, you accurately stated that there is "convincing evidence" that Yasser Arafat "knows of, condones, and lends support to terror against Americans."

For the United States now to initiate diplomatic contacts with this organization solely on the basis of statements made by Arafat -- a terrorist with a track record of issuing contradictory statements -- sends a clear signal to other terrorists, and potential terrorists, that political objectives can be achieved through sustained campaigns of violence against innocent men, women and children.

The United States simply cannot combat international terrorism by negotiating with terrorists.

The Hon. George P. Shultz
November 15, 1988
Page Two

3/8 4/6

The bottom line, Mr. Secretary, may very well be the question of who will control the Middle East and its vital oil supplies. There has heretofore been no doubt about the goal of the Soviet Union in this regard.

Moreover, the cause of peace in the Middle East very much depends upon the ability of the nations in that region to rely upon the word and the commitments of the United States.

For more than 13 years, other countries have relied upon our government's commitments regarding contacts with the PLO. These commitments have been widely understood to require that before diplomatic contacts may take place, that, at a minimum the PLO must expressly and explicitly recognize Israel's right to exist, renounce terrorism in theory and practice, and unequivocally accept Resolutions 242 and 338 to the exclusion of contradictory U.N. Resolutions relating to the Middle East.


I am aware of Mr. Arafat's rhetoric. But the point, Mr. Secretary, is that this requirement can be satisfied only with evidence that the PLO has in fact ceased all forms of terror in practice and that Arafat's remarks constitute the policy of the PLO and all its factions.

The fact that our government has abruptly retreated from this commitment sends a signal to all nations of the Middle East -- not just Israel -- regarding the reliability of our commitments. Faith in the value of the commitments of our government is imperative if the United States is to play a constructive role in the peace process.

History is instructive that the price of leadership may occasionally require that the United States must stand alone, when necessary. What is important is that our principles and commitments not be surrendered in an atmosphere of intimidation. To the extent we compromise principles, America's self-respect and her standing in the eyes of the world are diminished.

Winston Churchill once assessed an event involving his country and France. Mr. Churchill observed, "Britain and France had to choose between dishonor and war. They chose dishonor. They will have war."

Sincerely,



JESSE HELMS:dn

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December 16, 1988

George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Shultz:

The Administration's decision to begin a "substantive dialogue" with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a significant change in U.S. participation in the Middle East peace process. We believe it is necessary, at this time, to reaffirm the commitments the U.S. has made to our best ally in the region, Israel.

First, it must be emphasized that this decision does not involve the U.S. in direct negotiations with the PLO, nor does it mean we have accepted its peace plan. It is simply a step to initiate a dialogue with the PLO based on your interpretation that they have met the technical requirements for U.S. contact. Direct negotiations can only be sought with the participation of Israel, whose right to live within secure borders must be unconditionally recognized if peace talks are to be successful.

Second, our decision to talk with the PLO is not irreversible. The U.S. must hold the PLO accountable to Yassir Arafat's statement renouncing terrorism. Several weeks ago, Arafat was denied a U.S. visa because of "convincing evidence" that the PLO leader "knows of, condones, and lends support to" terrorist actions against Americans, Israelis, and others. It is the responsibility of the PLO to prove with concrete action that terrorism is no longer its policy.

The burden is also on Arafat to clarify his demands as the alleged leader of the Palestinian people. Many of his statements in the December 13 speech before the U.N. General Assembly and his subsequent press comments remain troubling. For example, the PLO's final position regarding Israel's right to exist remains unclear. A clarifying and substantive step he could take would be to convene a special session of the Palestinian National Council and renounce Articles 15 and 19 under its National Charter. These Articles, respectively, call for "the elimination of Zionism in Palestine" and brands the "state of Israel" as "illegal."

Finally, as we move forward in this process, we must remember that the three wars Israel has fought have been against the entire Arab world. Recent reports about Syria's acquisition of Soviet missiles and Libya's alleged capability to produce chemical weapons are signs that the threat to Israel remains serious. Arab nations must recognize Israel and its right

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AIPAC

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PAGE.02

to exist within secure borders. The burden is on Arafat to convince his Arab supporters to follow his lead.

We firmly believe the primary commitment of the U.S. must not change. Israel remains our best ally in the region. A change of semantics cannot replace the shared interests and beliefs between the U.S. and Israel. We remain unwavering in our support for this friendship.

Sincerely,

4/6

5/8

XXX



15th Congressional District
Member: Appropriations Committee

CONGRESSMAN BILL GREEN

WASHINGTON OFFICE
1110 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2436

6/8 4/6

NEW YORK OFFICE
Grand Central Post Office Building
110 East 45th Street
New York, N.Y. 10017
(212) 826-4466

TERRORISM SHOULD STOP TALKS

Yasser Arafat should be warned that any act of terrorism by Palestinians will terminate talks between the United States and the PLO, Congressman Bill Green (R-NY) said today.

"Explicit in the Administration's decision to open discussions with the PLO is its reliance on Arafat's commitment of December 14 that 'we totally and resolutely renounce all forms of terrorism including individual, group and state terrorism,'" Rep. Green said.

"Implicit in the Administration's decision is its assumption that the PLO can and will deliver on that commitment," he said.

"Thus, the Administration must make it clear that all talks with the PLO will terminate with the first act of Palestinian terrorism. Otherwise we shall simply have been duped by the PLO," Green said.

"If Arafat can't deliver on controlling Palestinian actions, then what is the sense of talking to him?" Green added.

###

Release: Immediate, December 15, 1988
Contact: Hank Roden (202) 225-2436

דתיקות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: _____
סוג:		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן תגובות:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דף: _____
הפסיד: 4/6 7/8		פאת:
- 15 237		

✓ Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), was "delightfully surprised" at the chain of events which took place and said Arafat has "proved that he is at least willing to pay the price to get a seat at the bargaining table."

"Now we shall see if this opening can produce peace and progress," Lugar stated. "I hope Israel will at least be willing to informally acknowledge this process as a worthy attempt."

It may be a blind alley, but an alley worth treading with our eyes open. This dialogue in no way mitigates our steadfast support of Israel." Lugar also called the Soviet proposal for an international conference a "bad idea."

10 20/3

A more skeptical reaction was elicited from Rep. Dante Fascell (D-FL), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He said it would take "definitive and verifiable actions to convince me and the Foreign Affairs Committee" that talks with the PLO were worthwhile.

✓ Fascell also pledged that the United States would not "attempt to impose a settlement on Israel." He added that "U.S. economic and military support to Israel must continue" to assure Israel of America's support and show the PLO that the U.S. "is committed firmly to the independence of Israel within secure borders."

תפוסה:

26

דחיות: מ ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: ^{שאלה} 16.12.88 - 17:45	טופס פרוק	כתוב:
תאריך וזמן העבודה:		אל: סמנכ"ל צע"א
כס' פרוק:		דע: סמנכ"ל ראה"מ
הפסד: 412		כא: הציר, וושינגטון

אש"ף-ארה"ב

מפול היר על המפגש הראשון ע"פ דרוח טלפוני של פלטרו, השתתפו 4 נציגים פלשתינאים שדרשו שיושמו דגלי אש"ף וארה"ב ופלטרו סרב.

פלטרו מסר להם תוכן ההנחיות שקיבל. נציגי אש"ף מעידים חזרו על הקודם העיקריים של נאום ערפאת בעצרת האו"ם בג'נבה והדגישו ועידה מכינה, ועידה בינלאומית ופיקוח האו"ם על חשטח, בענין הטרור הפלשתינאים לא התווכחו עם פלטרו אך טענו שיש בעיות עם קיצונים משני צידי המתרס והביעו דאגה טעני נסיונות לטרשד את הדואלוג. הם בקשו שארה"ב תפעיל השפעה על ישראל על-מנת ש"זו תפסוק את הטרור שלה". פלטרו העלה בפניהם את הצורך להפסיק פעילות הווארי וכח 17.

פלטרו מסר שבסה"כ היה עוז השיחה חיובי. לא נקבעה פגישה נוספת בשלב זה.

יוני
ערך

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דתיקות: מדי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס סגור	
סוג: שמר		
תאריך וזמן העבור: 15.12.88 - 19:00		סטנכ"ל עמ"א
כס' סגור: המשרד:		
373		העור, רושינגטון

אש"ף-ארה"ב

שאלתי את הייר באילו הנחיות צויד פלטרו. השיב שחן תואמות למדי את הדברים הסומכיים שנאמרו על ידי המזכיר.

א. טרור - נזחו הסעיף המרכזי בהנחיות, פלטרו הונחה לומר שארה"ב תבחן בקפדנות את העמידה בהתחייבות מצד אש"ף. לצורך זה הם רואים את עדשות כאחראי לכל הארגונים שיוצגו במל"ס. כמו כן ירצו לראות גם הענשת האחראים לביצוע פעולות טרור.

ב. פלטרו התבקש להבהיר לאנשי שדחו שהדיאלוג עם ארה"ב אינו תחליף לדיאלוג בין פלשתינאים וישראל וכי אש"ף צריך לתרום לכנון יחסים בין תושבי השטחים וישראל.

ג. ההנחיה המרכזית השלישית היתה לומר שארה"ב לא תיתן לדו-שיח עם אש"ף לסגוע ביחסיה ההדוקים עם ישראל ולתקוע טריז ביניהן.

כאשר לטכניקה חידר מעידן שעל אף דברי המזכיר אין בהכרח הגבלת הטבעים לשגריר האמריקאי בטונס. לשאלתי מה יקרה אם אנשי אש"ף יבקשו לקיים פגישה בווישינגטון, אמר שיעטרכו לשקול זאת בסובד ראש. פלטרו לא הוגבל לדרג מסויים.

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דתיקות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	ק: _____
סוג: ש מ ד ר		פתוק: _____
תאריך וזמן מעור: 15.12.88 - 19:00		אל: סטנכ"ל צפ"א
כס' פרוק: _____ המשרד: _____		דע: _____
373		כאת: הציר, רושינגטון

אש"ף-ארה"ב

שאלתי את הייר באילו הנחיות צויד פלטרו. השיב שחן תואמות למדי את הדברים הסומכיים שנאמרו על ידי המזכיר.

א. טרור - וזהו הסעיף המרכזי בהנחיות, פלטרו חונחה לומר שארה"ב תבחן בקפדנות את העמידה בהתחייבות מצד אש"ף. לצורך זה הם רואים את ערשאת כאחראי לכל הארגונים שיועגו בטל"ס. כמו כן ירצו לראות גם הענשת האחראים לביצוע פעולות טרור.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף: 1 מחוך: 1 דפים
סוג בטחוני: שמור
דחיפות: מידי
תאריך/ז"ח: 15/12/88-16:00

אל: המשרד
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354

אל: מצפ"א, הסברה
דע: ידיד/נ"י

הארגונים היהודיים ופתיחת דו-שיח בין ארה"ב לאש"פ

רוב הארגונים התיישרו על הקו המגלה "הבנה" לעמדת הממשל ומטיל את "נטל ההוכחה" על אש"פ במעשים וביטול האמנה. ההודעות מוקדשות ברובן לפירוט הדברים המצופים מאש"פ למימוש התחייבויותיו שבע"פ. בהבדל מימים אחרים רוב שיחות הטלפון לנציגויותינו הם מתומכים המבקשים לעודדנו בתקופה קשה זו.

פלג

- 10 -

ס'ה ר'הנ 3
ג'נא ג'אנוס ג'לכ בק'נא ג'לסא ר'כיא
הסכנה 2

דתימות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: <u>2</u>
סוג: ט פ ר		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן העור: 15.12.88 - 19:30		אל: מנהל מעמ"א
פס' פרוק: הפסד:		דע: "
372		כאת: העיר, וושינגטון

אש"ף - ארה"ב

קונגרסטן מל לויין שחכנס את תנאי 1975 לחוק שוקל עתה קביעת יעדים ומגבלות
לדיאלוג בין אש"ף וארה"ב.

אש"ף
עיר

מיה רהג 3
מיה 2
מיה 1
מיה 1
מיה 2

תפוצה: שגריר, ציר, קונגרס, שטיין איכ

NEWS FROM THE Committee



The American Jewish
Committee

Institute of Human Relations
165 East 86 Street
New York, New York 10022
212 751-4000
Morton Yarmon
Director of Public Relations

The AJC protects Jewish interests the world over; combats bigotry and promotes human rights for all; defends pluralism, enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people, and contributes to the formulation of American public policy from a sensitive Jewish and American perspective. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the U.S.

8/4

352 - P1

80 - Y

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

New York, December 15...The following statement was issued today by Theodore Ellenoff, President of the American Jewish Committee:

"We hope and expect that in its dialogue with the PLO, the United States will call on the PLO to match words with actions. Specifically, they must 1) end attacks on Israeli civilians, 2) urge the Palestinians in the territories to call off the uprising in order to give the peace process a chance, and 3) formally revoke the PLO charter's provisions calling for the dissolution of Israel.

"It is also crucial that the US pursue high-level talks with Israel to coordinate their strategy in dealing with the next steps in resuming the peace process.

"The record of the close relationship between the US and Israel as well as the specific commitments the US has made to Israel require the US to be sensitive to the security concerns of Israel. We are confident that this will continue to be so under the Bush Administration as it has been under the Reagan Administration.

"Finally, we believe that events have confirmed the correctness of Secretary of State George Shultz's denial of a visa to Yassir Arafat. By standing firm, Mr. Shultz helped Arafat withstand the pressures from his own hardliners and successfully prodded him to meet more fully the long standing US conditions for starting a dialogue."

B'nai B'rith

TEL No.

202 857 1099 Dec 15, 88 13:37 P.02



B'NAI B'RITH INTERNATIONAL

1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 857-6544
TWX 710-822-0086/Cable BNAIBRITH WASHDC

NEWS

3/4

P1-352

K-80

Date: December 15, 1988

No. 88-202

Release: Immediate

Contact: George L. Spectre

B'NAI B'RITH CHALLENGES PLO TO HONOR ARAFAT'S WORD

WASHINGTON, DC -- Mr. Warren Eisenberg, Director of the International Council of B'nai B'rith, today issued the following statement:

"With his press conference yesterday in Geneva, Yasir Arafat has now met the technical requirements for a dialogue with the United States.

"Far from certain is who Arafat was speaking for, since he has clearly gone beyond last month's PNC declaration in Algiers. Even less certain is whether the PLO leader will be willing or able to honor yesterday's commitments. The PLO chief's history of artful zig and zag on the issues of peace, together with his organization's blood-drenched record of disdain for human life and peaceful accommodation with Israel, leave us exceedingly skeptical.

"The onus for more than two decades of bitter and bloody Israeli-Palestinian conflict is on the shoulders of the PLO, and with yesterday's statement, the PLO must now accept the burden of proof for ending that conflict.

"The PLO has to show through deeds that it has finally come to terms with Israel's existence, and intends to pursue the path of peace and eschew violence. He must convince not the American government, not the American

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(more)

B'nai B'rith

TEL No.

202 857 1099 Dec 15.88 13:37 P.03

B'nai B'rith Press Release/2

P: - 359
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Jewish community, but the people and leaders of Israel, for whom a bad gamble for peace could cost their country its life.

"Yes, Mr. Arafat, you have uttered the 'magic' words the U.S. has been waiting for since 1975. It is now up to you and your PLO to transmute that magic into hardheaded and heartfelt faithfulness to the promises your words hold out. We ask Arafat to now repeat those words in Arabic, in Arab capitals.

"We -- and the world -- will be watching and listening, Mr. Arafat, to see if you can now deliver."

///

16

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

טופס מברק
דף: 1 מתוך: 3
סוג בשחונני: גלוי
דחיפות: מיידי
תאריך/ז"ח: 15/12/88-16:00

1/3

5

82

אל: המשרד

355

אל: מצפ"א
דע: ידיד/נ"י

ארה"ב - אש"פ

מצ"ב הודעת ~~אישור~~ ומועצת קהילת ורשינגטון.

פליג

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1 גוס ביה 1 סנוי 1

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822
13**JEWISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL**

1522 K STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 • (202) 347-4628

OF GREATER WASHINGTON

December 15, 1988

TO: Community Leadership

FROM: Stephen N. Gell,
President

Secretary of State Shultz' announcement that the U.S. will for the first time enter into direct dialogue (not recognition) with the PLO brings with it new responsibilities for the United States, for American Jewry and for Israel.

Friends and supporters of Israel, including AIPAC, NJCRAC and others, understand that the Administration acted because Arafat's semantic change was believed to have met the conditions that were laid out in the 1975 American commitment not to talk to the PLO until they recognize Israel's right to exist, renounce terrorism and accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338.

Secretary Shultz made clear that the U.S. decision does not mean an acceptance of a Palestinian State, and reaffirmed American policy opposing unilateral determination of the final status of negotiations. The secretary also reaffirmed American opposition to imposed solutions or preconditions for negotiations and American support of the principle of direct negotiations between the parties.

Enemies of the U.S.-Israel relationship will seek to exploit this new situation to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Israel. We have faith in the pledge of President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz that this will not happen.

We recognize that the U.S. felt compelled to act because its semantic conditions were met, but we believe that extreme caution by the U.S. is warranted because of Arafat's record of deceit and duplicity.

By moving in this new direction, the U.S. has accepted an obligation to press the PLO to have its words matched by its deeds. Similarly, the American Jewish community must energetically press for real change in PLO performance.

Only three weeks ago, Secretary Shultz denied Arafat a visa because, he said, there is "convincing evidence" that the PLO leader "knows of, condones and lends support to" terror against Americans, Europeans, Israelis and others, including incidents right up to the present enumerated in various State Department releases.

The central representative body of over 215 affiliated Jewish organizations in the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia, devoted to community relations, information and action.

MEMBER AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL
BENEFICIARY OF THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL FEDERATION OF GREATER WASHINGTON



82/355

3 We must now watch to see whether "words match words." Will PLO statements in Arabic continue to reflect Arafat's professions of peace in English?

And will "words match deeds:"

- o Will Arafat support repeal of the Zionism-is-racism resolution?
- o Will he end the campaign to have Israel expelled from the UN?
- o Will he support Saudi Arabian and Jordanian recognition of Israel?
- o Will he support an end to the Arab boycott of Israel?
- o Will there be an end to terrorist acts by Col. Hawari's group, Force 17, and other Fatah arms?
- o Will Arafat move to change the anti-Semitic and anti-Israel aspects of the Palestine National Covenant?

We must raise these and similar questions with Secretary of State Shultz, with President Reagan and President-elect Bush and, most importantly, with members of Congress.

We must demand that the U.S. press the PLO to demonstrate in clear, tangible actions that its rhetoric is true. We must demand that the PLO be held fully accountable for any future infringements of its commitments to Secretary Shultz.

We must demand that the PLO cease directing itself to third parties, and direct itself to the principals in the region, most especially to Israel.

We must also call on elected officials and opinion leaders to follow Secretary of State Shultz' lead in publically affirming that the "U.S. commitment to the security of Israel remains unflinching."

The Council will keep community leadership informed on an ongoing basis, and will disseminate written material beyond that which appears in the media for continuing efforts to interpret and to stimulate coordinated response. The Council is already in the process of reaching out to the media and to the broader community to make these views known.

As always, we will endeavor to keep you informed, and we welcome your responses and suggestions.

✱

ארה"ב

שיחת פיקרינג - יוסי בן-אדרן
16.12.88

השתתפו: פיליפ בקר, איתן בנצור, נדב ענר ובחלק מן השיחה אריה מקל.

פיקרינג אמר כי קיבל מן המזכיר הנחיה לתדרך את בן-אדרן בנוגע להנחיות שניתנו לשגריר פלטרוב בטוניס בנוגע למפגש עם אש"ף:
ההנחיה הראשונה היא לארגן המפגש בהתאם לנוחיות אש"ף, אפשר החל מהיום. כן ציין מאוחר יותר כי פלטרוב כבר התקשר עם אש"ף והם הבטיחו להתקשר חזרה.
פיקרינג המשיך בקריאת ההנחיות המהותיות לפלטרוב המנוסחות כ- TALKING POINTS. (נוסחן באנגלית כפי שהוכתב ע"י בקר לענר לאחר השיחה מצ"ב).

בהמשך השיחה קרא פיקרינג את ההנחיות לדוברים (PRESS GUIDANCE) שניתנו ע"י המזכיר, ההנחיות מנוסחות בצורת שאלות ותשובות. להלן עיקרי התשובות:

1. בנושא הטרור : ערפאת התנער מן הטרור וארה"ב מכירה בכך, הוא אמר כי אין לו שליטה על האינתיפדה וארה"ב מכירה גם בכך, אמנם אין ארה"ב מגדירה את האינתיפדה כטרור אך היא תבדוק כל מקרה לגופו ואם יוכח כי לערפאת שליטה על כך הוא יצטרך לשאת באחריות. ארה"ב אינה דורשת רק התנערות ממעשי הטרור אלא גם נקיטת צעדים נגד מבצעיו וסילוקם מאש"ף, כן דורשת ארה"ב גינוי כל פעולת טרור שתבוצע ע"י ארגון מחוץ לאש"ף.
לשאלת בנצור האם תבקש ארה"ב מערפאת לפנות למנהיגי האינתיפדה להפסיקה, ענה פיקרינג כי הפנו שאלה זו לווינגטון לקבל מענה.
לגבי תגובת ארה"ב במקרה של המשך הטרור מבהירות ההנחיות לדוברים כי ארה"ב מבססת הדיאלוג על התנערות אש"ף מן הטרור כנאמר לעיל.

2. בנושא המדינה הפלסטינית : ארה"ב אינה מכירה במדינה הפלסטינית ואינה תומכת בהקמתה אולם כל צד יכול לבוא לשולחן המו"מ עם עמדותיו - כולל הקמת מדינה פלסטינית. לדעת ארה"ב אין לקבוע את עתיד השטחים באופן חד צדדי אלא הוא חייב להיות תוצאה של משא ומתן.

3. בנושא הוועידה הבינ"ל : ארה"ב תומכת בשיחות ישירות אולם תומכת גם בכל דרך שיכולה להביא לשלום, שיתוף אש"ף בוועידה תלוי בהחלטת הצדדים.

4. בנושא החלטות המל"פ ודברי ערפאת : דברי ערפאת נשענים על החלטות המל"פ באלג'יר אולם אלה היו מעורפלות ואילו הצהרות ערפאת בנוגע להכרה בישראל, לקבלת 242 ולהתנערות מן הטרור גם אם נשענו על החלטות המל"פ היו ברורות יותר. ארה"ב לא עשתה שום עיסקה בתמורה להצהרות ערפאת.

5. בנוגע לבואו של ערפאת לאו"ם : אין קשר בין האיסור על כניסת ערפאת לניו-יורק לבין המעשים כיום. אם יגיש ערפאת בקשה לאשרה היא תידון מחדש בזמנה.

6. בנוגע לבואו של אבו שריף לארה"ב : הדיונים עם אש"ף יתנהלו באלג'יר והנציגים של אש"ף יקבעו על ידו.

לשאלת יוסי בן-אהרן האם מדובר בדיאלוג או במו"מ השיב פיקרינג כי מדובר ב"דיאלוג רציני שיוביל למשא ומתן שיענה על דרישות כל הצדדים". פיקרינג ציין כי לא הגדירו את ה-TALKING POINTS מכוונים למו"מ או לדיאלוג.

בתשובה ציין יוסי בן-אהרן את הנקודות הבאות:

1. מגעי ארה"ב עלולים להפוך לדו-שיח בלתי ישיר בין אש"ף לישראל באמצעות הדיווח של ארה"ב אלינו. אנו לא נהיה מעורבים בכך ויתכן אף שנגיע למצב בו לא נרצה אפילו לשמוע דיווח.

2. מה הטעם בדיאלוג של ארה"ב עם אש"ף אם נשללת מראש המטרה של הקמת מדינה פלסטינית?

3. יש לציין שערפאת התנה את כל התנאים שקיבל:
- את קבלת 242 התנה בוועידה בינלאומית.
- את ההכרה בישראל התנה בהכרה במדינה פלסטינית.
- את ההתנערות מן הסרור כך בהמשך האינתיפדה.

להערכתנו הלכה ארה"ב לקראת אש"ף כברת דרך רבה בהענות להצטרות ערפאת בעוד ערפאת לא הלך את כברת הדרך הדרושה כדי להענות לתביעות האמריקניות.

בתשובתו ציין פיקרינג:

1. ארה"ב מאמינה שיש בדברי ערפאת מענה לתנאים של ארה"ב לדוגמא הוא הכליל את החלטה 181 בקונטקסט של 242 ו-338.

2. ההחלטה בנוגע לקבלת דיווח על השיחות היא בידי ישראל ואתם תצטרכו לקבל את החלטותיכם בעצמכם. אנו כידידיכם מוכנים לדווח לכם ככל שנדרש. זכותכם אף לזעוק חמס.

3. באשר לעמדות ארה"ב, אלו הובעו בצורה ברורה והדיאלוג עם אש"ף מתקיים במנותק מהכרזת המדינה הפלסטינית:

- תכנית ריגן מ-1982 בעינה עומדת ועמדתה ברורה בנוגע לשלילת המדינה הפלסטינית, שלילת הסיפוח ושליילת המשך הכיבוש.

- אין לארה"ב שליטה על ההצעות שיובאו לשולחן המשא ומתן כל עוד יהיו מבוססות

על 242. התוצאה הסופית חייבת להיות תולדה של המשא ומתן.

4. אין לפרש את צעדי ארה"ב כשינוי בעמדה האמריקנית. אם תהיה מסקנה מניתוח צעדינו כי ארה"ב הולכת לקראת הכרה במדינה הפלסטינית יש לראות בה מסקנה ניתוחית גרידא שאינה מעוגנת במציאות.

רשם: נדב ענר

SECRET

TALKING POINTS

Through its recent statement which accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism in all its forms, the PLO has demonstrated a commitment to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict through negotiations with Israel.

We are prepared for a serious dialogue leading to negotiations conducted in a manner that meets the basic needs of all parties.

It is important that this dialogue will be launched and sustained on a practical basis.

First, there can be no return to terrorism by the PLO. This is not an additional condition to the dialogue to continue, it is simply a fact that no American Administration can sustain the dialogue if terrorism continues by the PLO or any of its factions.

You must not only end terrorism inside or outside Israel, you must also be prepared to publicly disassociate yourselves from terrorism by any Palestinian group operating anywhere. In the event of

a terrorist action by any element of the PLO or one or more of its members, we expect that you not only condemn this action publicly, but also discipline those responsible for it, at least by expelling them from the PLO.

This will also contribute to a regional environment conducive to building confidence in the process.

Secondly, there shall be a single authoritative channel of communication between us. Our dialogue must be carefully structured and coordinated. Neither side is served by having contradictory signals flowing back and forth.

We have designated our Embassy in Tunis as the sole authoritative channel. Only communication through that channel should be considered official.

If at some time we should meet elsewhere, we shall inform you through our Embassy in Tunis.

You are aware that we are between Administrations. I am authorized to assure you that the President-elect is in agreement with this dialogue. The timing has its effect. However, we may wish to have

another meeting before January 20, but any far-reaching substantive dialogue will be left to the new Administration.

BASIC PRINCIPLES:

Certain principles are so basic to our approach that you may be sure they will remain valid under the new Administration:

Our objective is comprehensive peace. That means that our dialogue is not an end in itself but a means to the goal of starting negotiations to achieve such a peace. Peace can only be achieved through face-to-face negotiations. Each party must do what it can to contribute to developing momentum.

The PLO can help by:

- Encouraging meetings between Palestinians in the territories and Israelis, to foster practical steps on the ground that help improve Palestinian conditions and start the process of accomodation.

- Making statements that will reach the Israel public.

Any party can bring to the negotiating table any position it wishes, consistent with the basis of the negotiations. This is true even though the U.S. may not be able to support certain positions put forward by one party or another. A settlement will emerge from the dynamic give-and-take between the parties directly involved.

An international conference properly structured may be necessary to facilitate negotiations. But we are convinced that nothing of lasting value can be accomplished without direct negotiations. No Israel government will turn to the international community, or any combination of outside powers in matters so central to its destiny. No U.S. Administration will ever ask Israel to do so.

THE U.S. ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP

No one should be under any illusions regarding the meaning of this dialogue for U.S.-Israeli relations. A key reason the U.S. has entered this dialogue is to help Israel achieve the security it deserves. The U.S. commitment to Israel is unshakeable and it will be counter-productive to any party to attempt to drive a wedge between us. Surely Israel must make adjustments in its policies for negotiations to succeed, but U.S. efforts to help Israel formulate these adjustments should not be construed as a weakening of our commitment to Israel's wellbeing.

U.S. AND PALESTINIANS

We have an intense interest in the Palestinian people and in their quest to realize their legitimate rights. I refer you to the Secretary's speech of September 16th. and his statement of February 26th.



- 1 7 1 0 -

ח' טבת תשמ"ח
16 בדצמבר 1988

4020

אל : המנכ"ל
מ"מ מנכ"ל
לשכת השר
חברי הנהלה
ראשי נציגויות צפ"א

מאת : מנהל מצפ"א

דף מצפ"א מס' 32

דו שיח ארה"ב-אש"פ

ב- 14 בדצמבר 1988 הודיעה ארה"ב על פתיחה רשמית ומידית של דו-שיח עם אש"פ, אשר לדבריה ענה על הדרישות והתנאים כמפורט בהחייבות קיסינג'ר מ-1975. זאת בעקבות הבהרות שנתן ערפאת במסע"ת בג'נבה למחרת נאומו בעצרת, ועל דעת הנשיא היוצא והנשיא הנבחר כאחד.

עשרים יום קודם פסל ג'ורג' שולץ מתן אשרת כניסה לארה"ב לערפאת וזכה לקיתונות זעם על החלטתו מחברות אחרות באו"ם ומגזרים רבים בארה"ב, להוציא הקונגרס.

רק יום קודם להחלטה, ב- 13, בעקבות הנאום בג'נבה, הודיעה ארה"ב שאש"פ לא עמד במבחן, ושאינן די בדבריו כדי לפתוח במו"מ. אחרי הנאום היה ויכוח באגף מז"ת במחמ"ד אך לאחר שגברה יד הסבורים שאש"פ לא עמד במבחן הוחלט לא לפתוח בדו-שיח ומשלחת ממחמ"ד אשר לפי הדווחים היתה מוכנה לצאת לטוניס לא יצאה.

בימים שקדמו להודעה גברו הסימנים שהיא צפויה (אחד הדווחים מושינגטון חאר הגישה האמריקנית לאפשרות פתיחת הדו שיח כ"להיטות"). בתגובה להצהרת שטוקהולם אמר מזכיר המדינה עוד לפני שבוע "שאם אש"פ יענה על הדרישות הללו, אנחנו מוכנים לדו-שיח טובסנטיבי". גם הנשיא רייגן אמר במסיבת העתונאים האחרונה שלו (8.12) שארה"ב מוכנה לפגוש את ערפאת ולשוחח איתו, והוא בטוח שגם ישראל כך, כאשר יהיה ברור מעל לכל ספק שהוא מוכן להכיר בזכות ישראל להיות אומה ומוכן לנהל מו"מ בשם העם הפלשתינאי למולדת.



- 2 -

מרפי אמר, בנאום ב- 8.12 באחד ממכוני המחקר בווישינגטון לציון שנה לאינתיפאדה, שיש סימנים לשינוי בתוך אש"פ, ענין רב יותר להשתתף בתהליך ושבשטוקהולם ערפאת קידם את התהליך. התבטאויות דומות היו בשבוע שקדם להחלטה בכל הדרגים.

בהקשר זה חשוב לציין שמהדרגים הבכירים ביותר במחמ"ד הובהר לנו שסמור מאד למועד השמעת המילים הרצויות תודיע ארה"ב את החלטתה, ולמעשה להוציא זמן תגובה פורמלי של מספר שעות לא היתה מצד ארה"ב נכונות לקיים התייעצות עם ממשלת ישראל ונציגיה לגבי התגובה למהלכי אש"פ.

עפ"י דיווחים שונים קדמה למפגש שטוקהולם סדרת מגעים בת מספר חודשים בין שבדיה לארה"ב, לרבות קשרים תכופים בדרג שרי החוץ של שתי המדינות במהלך מפגש שטוקהולם ולפניו. לפי אחת הגרסאות צרף אנדרסון למכתב לשולץ גם מכתב מערפאת שכלל התחייבויות אש"פ. גם היהודים המעורבים במפגש שטוקהולם תדעו את בכירי הממשל האמריקני באופן שוטף, ונראה שזכו לברכת מרפי ושולץ במהלך המפגש ובצעדים שקדמו לו. מענין שרוב ארה"ב להתיר כניסת ערפאת לארה"ב התרחש בעוד המגעים העקיפים הללו בעיצומם.

באגרת לראש הממשלה שמיר ולשר החוץ פרס שתאריכה 15.12 מפרט שולץ את הלבטים שקדמו להחלטת ארה"ב ואומר שזו לא נתקבלה בקלות. הוא מוסיף כי הדיאלוג שיפתח אינו מטרה בפני עצמה וכי ארה"ב תעקוב בקפידה אחרי הביצועים של אש"פ כתוצאה מהתחייבותו להימנע מטרוור. ארה"ב, אומר שולץ, תבחר לאש"פ כי אין דבר שיוכל לשנות לרעה את יחסה של ארה"ב לישראל. הוא מבטיח לבסוף לדווח על כל התפתחות חדשה במהלך המגעים בין ארה"ב לאש"פ.

בינתיים נאם נציג ארה"ב לאו"ם להסבר הצבעתה של ארה"ב ב"שאלת פלשתיין" והתייחס שם להחלטת שולץ והקפיד להבדיל ולהבחין בין החלטת ארה"ב לקיום דיאלוג מחד לבין הצעות ההחלטה הבלתי קבילות של העצרת.

מהודעות ראשונות של יהודים וממגעים שקיימו נציגי הארגונים היהודים עולה כי אין מגמתם להיכנס לעימות עם הממשל. מספר ארגונים הביעו הבנה לעמדת שולץ אך הוסיפו כי יש לשים את הצהרת אש"פ במבחן המעשה.

לחשומת לב ווישינגטון והנציגויות:-

העמדה המוסמכת בנושא יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב לאחר הודעת שולץ מצויה בהודעת שר החוץ שהוברקה במברק הסברה מספר 601 לווישינגטון. יש להעביר את הנוסח הזה לידיעת כל נציגויותינו בארה"ב.

ב ב ה כ ה.

מיכאל שילה



דחילות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן הגור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפטרד:		
381		פאת:

4. להערכתך דברי טרפי ולא השובה הנשיא טבעאים את תשובתו הצמודה של הממשל בעקבות טעמי טירור מצד אש"ס.

5. החלטת הממשל לפתוח במגעים עם אש"ס הינה בלתי נוסכח ר"ל אינה תלויה בטעמי הטירור שיתבצעו ע"י קבוצות בתוך אש"ס. פעולות טירור יקשו על ניהול הדואלוג אך לא יביאו לסידמד.

Handwritten signature

תפוצה:

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

טופס מברק

דף: 1 מתוך: 2 דפים
סוג בטיחות: שמור
דחיפות: מידי
תאריך/ז"ח: 15/12/88-11:25

4
85

אל: המשרד
396

אל: מצפ"א, הסברה, ממ"ד
דע: ידיד/נ"י

הגדרת הטרור

בפגישתי הבוקר עם נציגי הארגונים היהודיים בושינגטון עלתה השאלה כיצד תגדיר ארה"ב מה הוא מעשה טרור המנוגד להתחייבות ערפאת? האם זריקת בקבוק תבערה בשטחים תהווה הפרת ההתחייבות, ומה לגבי חדירה מלבנון, האם יש הבדל בין פיגוע המכוון כלפי אזרחים וחיילים ומה לגבי טענת ערפאת שאין לו שליטה על המתרחש בשטחים, כשבמחמד נשאלה השאלה ע"י אנשינו קיבלנו חשובה מגומגמת ובקשתי מנציג ה"קומיטי" לשאול השאלות בדרג מתאים. הבהרתי לנציגי הארגונים שאנו רואים בכל הפעולות האלימות של אש"ף כמעשי טרור. הארגונים מתכוננים לנצל ההתפתחות להעלאת דרישה שאש"ף יתכחש להשוואת הציונות לגזענות ושמיניות ערביות ובמיוחד "מתונות" ילכו בעקבות אש"ף ויכירו פומבית בזכות ישראל להתקיים.

פג

Handwritten notes and signatures in Hebrew, including a large signature and several lines of text.

דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
סוג: שמר		כתוב: _____
תאריך יזמן העבור: 1045 16 בדצמ' 88		אל: טעם"א
פס' פרוק: הפס"ד:		דע:
378		פאת: שג' רושינגטון

החלטת שולץ בנושא הדיאלוג עם אש"פ

1. בכתבת הרושינגטון פוסט (15.12) על שיחות שולץ - רה"ט טורקיה שצטט הכתב טקורות טורקיים לפיהן בתגובה לדברי אוזל בדבר הצורך בעידוד הסתונגים באש"פ ובישראל השיב שולץ:
"I'm about to be history. But before this happens, I'd like to make a hit history by opening a dialogue with the PLO",
2. אולי היה בתחושתו זו של המזכיר על כך שהוא עלול להיעלם מדפי החסטוריה אם לא יעשה צעד דרמטי כדי לזרז התהליך אותו בלם עד לאחרונה.

שולץ

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American Gathering/Federation of Jewish Holocaust Survivors

קאנפדראציע פון דער שארית הפליטה
122 WEST 30TH STREET . SUITE 205 . NEW YORK, N.Y. 10001

BENJAMIN MEEB
President

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE AMERICAN GATHERING/
FEDERATION OF JEWISH HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS
DECEMBER 9, 1988

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Holocaust Survivors everywhere, together with the Jewish People, were very disturbed by the news that a Delegation of Jews decided to meet with Yasir Arafat. Holocaust survivors, and their children, as well as the Jewish community at large, emotionally can not accept or understand the rationale of such a meeting.

On behalf of the American Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, we endorse the statement issued on December 6, by Morris Abram, Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, of which we are members. (A copy is enclosed).

The Executive Committee of the American Gathering met today and also endorsed the statement of Rosita Kenigsberg, President of The International Network of Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors. (Copy enclosed).

We deeply regret that the name and the memory of the victims of the Holocaust came into play in association with this unpleasant event. We are sure that the public will realize that the delegation that went to Stockholm was not representing any Holocaust Survivor Organization or any major Jewish Organization, and acted as a private group.

FROM THE DESK OF...

EXPRESS PRINTING

ATT: Counsel General

Please Rush!

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ג. של לויזן

ד. צ'אק שומר .

ה. גם הסנטורים כירד וע'ייפי התנטאו בנדון. לדברי בירד הגיע זמן לחכיר בשינוי שחל בעמדת של אש"פ, "מהוייכותנו לישראל איתנה אולם יש לחכיר בכך שלעיתים אנו חייבים לנקוט בצעדים זהירים הראשוניים."

לדעתו של צ'יפי לא יחיה שלום אמיתי במזח"ת ללא תפקיד לפלסטינים בין אם זה מועא חן בעיננו בין אם לאו. דובר הפלסטינים הוא אש"פ. ברור שלפני ג'ינו דרך ארוכה אך זו תחילת הדרך. האיום האמיתי לישראל הוא אי השקט המתמשך בשטחים.

ו. הסנטורים וילסון וחלמס שוקלים אף ^ההתבטאויות בכתב אך טרם עשו זאת. (רצ"ב טיוטה שכתב חלמס) .

ז. קונגרסמן ג'ייט שוידר התקשר ומסר שבשיחותיו עם התקשורת ישים הדגש על הצורך מעד אש"פ במעשים ולא במילים ובו זמנית יביע התנגדות לקיום ועידה בינ"ל .

כטובן שמדובר בלקט ראשוני של תגובות. נמשך לעקוב ולדווח.

י. לטדן - י. דרנגר

תפוצה:

①

GEORGE J. MITCHELL
NAME

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United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

3/9

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, December 15, 1988CONTACT: Diane Dewhirst
202/224-5344**STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE J. MITCHELL REGARDING
PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON DIALOGUE BETWEEN U.S. AND THE PLO**

President Reagan has determined and Secretary of State Shultz has announced that the Palestine Liberation Organization has met the conditions set by the U.S. for a direct dialogue between the U.S. and the PLO, and the President has authorized that dialogue to begin.

I support the President's decision. It is consistent with what has been bipartisan American policy for over a decade. Under that policy, the U.S. seeks to encourage direct negotiations between the parties, without preconditions, intended to achieve a stable and lasting peace. The U.S.-PLO dialogue is not intended to be a substitute for direct negotiations between the parties; rather it is intended to encourage and facilitate such negotiations.

This is a first step, but it is a significant step toward advancing the peace process. The acceptance of Israel's right to exist and the acceptance of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations are important statements. So, too, is the total renunciation of terrorism. In light of the PLO's record, however, it must be viewed with caution, and these words must of course be matched by deeds.

I emphasize, as did Secretary of State Shultz, that this action in no way represents or implies U.S. recognition of an independent Palestinian State. And I reaffirm strong and unwavering American support for Israel's security and the continuation of a close U.S.-Israel friendship.

news from congressman dave obey

Wisconsin — 7th District Washington, D.C. 20515 (202) 295-3365

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Wednesday, December 14, 1988

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WASHINGTON, DC -- Wisconsin Congressman Dave Obey, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Trade today released the following statement:

The State Department has informed me its analysis of Yasser Arafat's press conference today indicates that Mr. Arafat has clearly accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and provided an explicit renunciation of terrorism and a clear recognition of Israel's right to exist. Under those circumstances, the Administration will be announcing that it is going to begin a dialogue with the PLO about the Middle East.

I have not yet personally analyzed Mr. Arafat's statement, but if the facts are as the State Department has described them, I congratulate Secretary Shultz and the State Department for eliciting that kind of public position from Mr. Arafat.

The proof will still lie in deeds not words; but if the characterization of Mr. Arafat's press conference is correct, he will have apparently met the conditions for a US-PLO dialogue which the United States laid down and has further defined since 1975.

In the interests of peace and security for Israel and all parties in the region, the United States has no sensible choice but to begin a dialogue to test whether today's words can in fact lead to a new and reliable reality in the Middle East.

This dialogue commits America to nothing. It only opens up an avenue to explore whether there has been real movement necessary to achieve the long-term peace and security everyone is looking for.

Rep. Mel Levine (D-CA), a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Middle East Subcommittee and the author of the 1985 amendment codifying the 1975 Kissinger conditions on U.S. dealings with the PLO, today issued a statement on the Reagan Administration decision to open a diplomatic dialogue with the PLO. The statement follows:

As the author of the legislation which codified the three conditions the PLO was required to meet before it could engage in dialogue with the U.S., I have been asked to respond to yesterday's decision by Secretary Shultz.

I do not wish to second-guess the Secretary's action. Secretary Shultz and the United States government are obviously deeply committed to obtaining peace in the Middle East.

The three conditions first codified in 1983, expanding the commitments made by Secretary Kissinger in 1975, have served an exceedingly useful purpose. By requiring that these basic standards be met, we have obtained from the PLO a set of important promises.

The test will now be whether the PLO's acts are consistent with those promises.

In the coming months, the following five points must be remembered.

First, as Secretary Shultz emphasized, the U.S. remains "unflinching" in its commitment to the security and survival of Israel. This decision will not drive a wedge between our two nations or in any way diminish the depth of American support for Israel.

Second, it should be clear to the PLO that merely meeting the U.S. conditions for dialogue is only the beginning of a process. In fact, it is not the Americans whom the PLO must convince that they seek peace; rather, it is the Israelis. Israel deeply desires peace with its neighbors--and the PLO must convince Israel that it seeks ~~peace~~ with her.

-MORE-

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DEC 15 '88 17:50 FROM CONGRESSMAN LEVINE

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Third, if the PLO is serious about recognizing Israel's right to exist, it is now time for other Arab states--especially Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq--to end their state of war against Israel and lend public support to the peace process. Israel needs to have the confidence that its neighbors are finally willing to recognize Israel in the community of nations.

Fourth, the U.S. does not and should not recognize Arafat's declaration of an independent Palestinian state. Such a state--should it ever come into existence--must be the end of the negotiating process and not a precondition to negotiations. Furthermore, a two-state solution is not the way to peace when previous PLO statements and documents have indicated that this is merely the first step toward the "liberation of Palestine," which means the destruction of Israel. This strategy, enunciated even after Algiers by one of Arafat's top deputies, must be repudiated publicly and unambiguously.

Fifth, for 24 years the PLO has conducted a terror campaign against Israel and the West; Israel has every right to remain skeptical about the PLO's ultimate intentions. Secretary Shultz appropriately said yesterday that terrorism will be the first item on the agenda. If the PLO is serious about renouncing terrorism, it should take the following tangible steps: Disband "Force 17," Arafat's elite terrorist unit; repudiate the provision of the PLO Covenant which calls for Israel's destruction; halt all infiltration attempts into Israel; and move to end the violence in the West Bank and Gaza.

Secretary Shultz yesterday took a gamble. It is a gamble that will in no way diminish our commitment to Israel's security. Whether it pays off will depend on the willingness of the PLO and the leaders of Arab nations to turn the Geneva statements from mere rhetoric to reality. The ball is now in their court.

NEWS

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CHARLES E. SCHUMER

10th Congressional District, N.Y.



FOR RELEASE:

CONTACT:

Immediate
December 15, 1988

Miles Ehrlich
Wayne Dillehay
202 225-6616

Statement of
The Honorable Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.)
U.S. Discussions With Palestine

ONE MUST BE SKEPTICAL OF SHULTZ'S DECISION UNTIL THE ACTIONS OF THE P.L.O. MATCH THEIR RECENT WORDS. IF THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN, WE WILL BE LEFT WITH ONLY DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATIONS.

WE IN CONGRESS WILL BE WATCHING VERY CLOSELY TO SEE THAT THE P.L.O. NOT ONLY SAYS THE RIGHT THING, BUT THAT IT DOES THE RIGHT THING.

O WILL THE P.L.O. NOW REMOVE FROM ITS CHARTER ARTICLE 19, THE CLAUSE WHICH CALLS EXPLICITLY FOR ISRAEL'S EXTINCTION?

O WILL THE P.L.O. REMOVE FROM ITS ORGANIZATION ANY RADICAL FACTION WHICH CONTINUES TO WAGE TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAEL?

O WILL THE P.L.O. CALL UPON THE OTHER ARAB REGIMES TO FINALLY RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHTFUL PLACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

O WILL THOSE MODERATE PALESTINIANS WHO ARE INTERESTED IN PEACE NOW BE ALLOWED TO SPEAK OPENLY WITH THE ISRAELIS, AND NOT BE MAIMED, MURDERED, AND TERRORIZED AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST?

O AND WILL THE PALESTINIAN RIOTERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA NOW LAY DOWN THEIR STONES AND MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AND COME FORWARD WITH REASONABLE PROPOSALS FOR COEXISTENCE?

ONLY WHEN THESE ACTIONS ARE TAKEN WILL MANY OF US BELIEVE THAT THE P.L.O. MEANT WHAT IT SAID YESTERDAY.

THE SUPPORTERS OF ISRAEL IN CONGRESS WILL BE DOUBLY VIGILANT TO MAKE SURE THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT BECOME ISOLATED FROM THE U.S., OR PUT INTO AN UNTENABLE POSITION.

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BLADENHILL HALL, WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN

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Draft
United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6228



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December 15, 1988

8/9

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We deeply regret the Administration's decision to initiate diplomatic contacts with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. This hurried decision threatens the cause of peace in the Middle East, and risks reversing gains made by your Administration in the war against terrorism.

The cause of peace in the Middle East is very much dependent on the ability of the nations in that region to rely on the words and commitments of the government of the United States.

For more than 13 years, Israel has relied upon our government's commitments regarding contacts with the P.L.O. These commitments have been widely understood to require that before diplomatic contacts may take place, that, at a minimum the PLO must expressly and explicitly recognize Israel's right to exist, renounce terrorism in theory and practice, and unequivocally accept Resolutions 242 and 338 to the exclusion of other U.N. Resolutions relating to the Middle East.

intent of this requirement?

This requirement was not met by the statement made yesterday in Geneva, and indeed, can not be met until there is evidence that the PLO has ceased to practice terror and that the Arafat remarks reflect the policy of the organization and its constituent groups.

reinst

The fact that our government has abruptly retreated from this commitment sends a clear signal to all nations of the Middle East -- not just Israel -- that our commitments cannot be relied upon. This is unfortunate, for faith in the value of the commitments of our government is necessary for the United States to serve as an effective broker in the peace process.

Furthermore, we fear this rushed decision to initiate diplomatic contacts with the PLO risks reversing the strides made by your Administration in the war against terrorism.

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The Palestinian Liberation Organization is one of the world's most notorious terrorist operations -- in addition to Arafat, the organization includes such terrorists as Abu Abbas, master-mind of the Achille Lauro hijacking, and Khaled Nasser, currently on trial in absentia in Egypt for his involvement in terrorist activities. (7)

Scores of innocent men, women and children have lost their lives as a result of terrorism conducted or orchestrated by the PLO. The PLO has repeatedly and specifically targeted American citizens. 9/9

For the United States to initiate diplomatic contacts with this organization solely on the basis of statements made by its leader -- who has a history of issuing contradictory statements -- sends a clear signal to other terrorists and would-be terrorists that political objectives can be achieved through sustained campaigns of violence against innocent men, women and children. It sends the unfortunate signal that the best way to get the attention of State Department is to target Americans.

Mr. Secretary, sometimes the price of leadership is that the United States must stand alone in the world community behind its principles and commitments. To the extent we violate our principles and cause our friends to question the value of our commitments, it diminishes our Nation's standing and sets back the cause of freedom.

Sincerely,

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

טופס מברק
דף: 1 מתוך: דפים
סוג בטחוני: גלוי
דחיפות: מייד
תאריך/ז"ח: 15/12/88-16:15

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אל: המשרד

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אל: מצפ"א, מעת, הסברה
דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת

מזכיר המדינה נפגש היום (15-12-88) עם קבוצת הכתבים הישראליים
בוושינגטון. להלן הנוסח המלא של מסיבת העיתונאים.


יוסי גל

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Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the number '10' and various illegible scribbles.

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INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
BY
ISRAELI JOURNALISTS
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1988

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, after your decision, what message do you have for the people of Israel?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the first message is that our sense of commitment to Israel and Israel's security is strong, unshakeable, as it has always been.

QUESTION: Do you expect any tension, or a split in future relations with Israel?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I'm sure that -- we have all sorts of problems that occasionally create tension. But, basically, we have a very strong relationship with Israel. We've worked through many difficult issues during my time in office and that will continue, because we have parallel interests. We have a great sense of community. We are democracies and so we will work through these problems together.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, after your decision, if Mr. Arafat will apply for a visa now, is he going to get a visa to come to the United States? And if the answer is yes, my question is why? Why now and [not] two weeks [ago]?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We never comment on questions like that until we have an operative request for some particular reason.

The law says that members of the PLO are not eligible for visas to come to the United States. They only get visas through a process in which the Secretary of State makes a recommendation to the Attorney General and the Attorney General then makes a decision. That's the process through which the people who serve the PLO Observer Office in New York come and that is because of the United Nations decision. So that process is in place. What happens at some future time remains to be seen.

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QUESTION: Would it will be fair to say that after your decision the PLO will have a major role and they will participate in the peace process now? 3/8

SECRETARY SHULTZ: What happened was that the United States has had some conditions that govern whether or not we would talk -- have a substantive dialogue with the PLO. Those conditions have been in place since 1975. We have not changed.

As a matter of fact, we added a condition beyond the 1975 conditions, namely, renunciation of terrorism. So our position has been a constant. It is exactly as it has been.

The PLO -- Mr. Arafat speaking for them -- yesterday finally made what we consider to be a clear statement meeting our conditions, and, therefore, we did what we have said all these years we would do, namely, have a substantive dialogue with them, and so we'll proceed with that.

Now, what is the object of this from our standpoint? The dialogue itself is not an end. Our object is to do whatever we can, in talking with whomever we talk to, to help move things toward peace in the Middle East.

I know that there is complete support in Israel -- everybody I've ever talked to -- that if we can find our way to a peace in the Middle East that has justice in it and has the prospect of security for Israel, then people want that. So that's what we'll keep working at.

But as far as the decision made yesterday, it was, in a sense, almost not a decision in the sense that we've had this proposition out there all these years and when it was met, we then carried through on what we had said, and the result of it will be a dialogue. What comes out of that dialogue, I don't know. But I hope that it may be a contribution to finding our way to a peaceful situation.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, we wonder how -- or what can you discuss (inaudible). The PLO wants an independent state as much as you know the Israelis don't want [it]; as much as we know the U.S. also says it's not in the interest of the United States and not in the interest of peace to have an independent state. So what can a substantive dialogue go on? What is the basis of a dialogue?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The first point we'll make in that dialogue is to emphasize our total rejection of terrorism anywhere -- outside Israel, inside Israel. Terrorism is something we abhor and we want to make it very plain, and we'll take the occasion to do that.

As far as any negotiation is concerned, with whoever comes to a negotiation, it's always been our view that in order to get some place toward peace, you have to have direct negotiations

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between Israel, on side of the table, and on the other side of the table, a state or somebody who is representing those whose interests have to be negotiated about.

You don't expect, when people come to the negotiating table, that they all agree. If they all agreed, you wouldn't have to have a negotiation. So as far as we're concerned, we've always said, the thing is to get to direct negotiations. And when that happens, the different parties to it will take different positions. They'll represent what they want.

The issue isn't what do they come to the table with; the issue is what results from the process of bargaining. We have made plain the positions that we would take, if we are a part of that process. Those are all on the record, but that doesn't mean other people won't take different positions. We know they will, and then there's going to be a long process.

Personally, I think that the ideas that we talked about last year, that are amalgams of various notions that are around, are the way to go. Namely, to have a interlocked process in which you start with transition arrangements of the sort that have been discussed a great deal in the past and get them into place. And then, as that is happening, you begin talks on final status.

We believe that the theory that success in a transition period will help people be comfortable with what might come out of final status negotiations is a very profound and correct way of looking at it.

We also believe that since people are interested in final status, primarily, the fact that there are substantive, concrete and thoughtful talks taking place about final status will help the transition arrangement work. So somehow or other, you've got to get to direct talks. And when you get to direct talks on final status, no doubt there are going to be lots of different views.

But the way to go is, let's start with some transition arrangements and then we'll see where we go from there. But I think you have to have an interlock in the way that we proposed.

QUESTION: Do you expect the responses from the European countries and others to be more supportive now to help with the process, or maybe will go on like now with the visa refusal? How do you expect it to influence?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, our decision about the visa and our insistence before we would have any dialogue with the PLO that they meet these conditions clearly, that represents the position of the United States. Some people didn't like it. They complained. I got a lot of criticism for my visa decision, but I was very comfortable with it. I felt it was the right decision -- and I might say the the President of the United States. People said I was isolated; I said, I don't

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feel very isolated. The President of the United States agrees with me. An overwhelming number of members of the Senate agree with me. I'm inundated with calls from the House of Representatives that agree, so I feel very comfortable with that.

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So people have their differences of opinion. We have felt that before we should have a dialogue with the PLO, they must recognize 242 and 338, as a basis for negotiations with Israel; recognize the right of Israel to exist in peace and security; and, renounce terrorism. We just wouldn't move until they did that.

Other people have different views. They're entitled to their views. We are just speaking for ourselves. But, I know there is a great sense of gratification in many circles that there is this dialogue taking place. Others are somewhat reluctant about it. But all we are doing is implementing a policy that we have long had. We have not changed a thing.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you have any talk with Prime Minister Shamir or Foreign Minister Peres before reaching your decision?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We've had a lot of communication back and forth through our Ambassador in Israel and Israel's Ambassador in the United States, and I've gotten messages back and forth through them about this --

QUESTION: But not on Wednesday --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Pardon me?

QUESTION: But not on Wednesday. Is that correct?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's practically a continuous process. However, our view is that this was a decision that we had to make. We were happy to have the views of our friends in Israel -- the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and others -- but this was basically a decision for the United States to take, and we took it.

QUESTION: Still on Wednesday, saying you did have contact with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and President Mubarak. Is that correct?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: President Mubarak called me. The night before the Foreign Minister of Egypt called me. The Ambassador from Egypt called me. The Ambassador from Israel had lots of phone calls back and forth to my assistant and one to me. I had calls from the Swedish Ambassador, and through him from the Swedish Foreign Minister, and I was inundated with communications from my NATO Foreign Minister friends when I was in Brussels last week. There is a -- no dearth of people

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 wanting to tell me what they think, and I'm glad to know what other people think. (Laughter) 6/8

But in the end, this is the United States' policy, and what counts is what does the President of the United States think. He has expressed himself, and on his behalf I expressed this decision.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there will be people in Israel and also in the Jewish community here that would say that mere verbal acceptance of U.S. conditions is probably not enough, and even three days ago we found it difficult to get a clear answer from your Spokesman here whether a verbal commitment, as Arafat did yesterday, would be enough. In fact, you used to call PLO leaders ambiguous, and even used to point out that they would say things here and say things there. Will there be any other conditions? Will they have to stand a test of fulfilling those conditions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, statements that they have made in the past, including, in our opinion, the statements made as they appeared at the end of the PNC meeting, or that were made in Stockholm, or that were made in Mr. Arafat's speech before the United Nations in Geneva, seemed to us not to be clear-cut answers to our questions. People kept asking us, and we kept saying, no, we don't consider that to be a clear-cut answer, and we won't go ahead and have a dialogue until we get a clear statement.

And we felt that yesterday -- and I think by and large people agree -- yesterday in the statements that were made in his press conference, he did give a clear answer that wasn't hedged, wasn't conditioned and wasn't obscured. So we have proceeded.

Now, obviously, we are interested in what they do, and that's why I said that when it comes to our dialogue, one of the first things we're going to set out is our views about terrorism. And as your question suggests, it's not enough to say you're against terrorism; you've got to be against terrorism. So you've got to try to -- you shouldn't engage in it, you shouldn't support it, and if it occurs anywhere, you should separate yourself from it, and so on.

So we do this in all occasions. I was shocked, and said so publicly in Brussels, at the decision of the Minister of Interior in Greece to release that terrorist, who threw grenades into a synagogue, and we just raised hell about that and should. So those are things you have to look at. 3/12/87

QUESTION: But, Mr. Secretary, I think one could make a case that even the statement that Arafat made yesterday was not necessarily all that clear-cut. I mean, he once again hedged the existence -- the right of Israel to exist, to the creation

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of a Palestinian state, which the United States has opposed in the past. It wasn't a flat statement: "We accept Israel's right to exist."

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't agree with you. I think it was a flat statement, and he accepts a lot of other things right to exist, but it wasn't conditioned.

QUESTION: If you would have wanted to say that that was still ambiguous, I think you would have still been on strong grounds to say that statement yesterday was as ambiguous as his other statements were.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think so. I think it was a much better statement.

QUESTION: The point is, though, wasn't there a decision on your part that this is about as far as the United States can expect Arafat to go, and let's cut the deal and give a gift to George Bush?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, that wasn't the way we looked at it at all. Lots of people called on earlier occasions and said, "You know, this is as far as they can go, and they have all sorts of internal problems, and you have to understand that, and you should just go along." And we said, "No. We can't make that kind of a judgment. We only can look at what is said, and it meets our criteria or it doesn't."

Actually, I think the process of struggling to bring this out of their strive was important for us to encourage, because it isn't just the words, it's the fact that in this context of all of their internal debates, they finally managed to say these things. That's what we wanted to have them do.

But we didn't have any real discussion, although many put it to us, that this is as far as they can go, and so on. We felt that we couldn't make a judgment on that basis. We had to make a judgment on the basis of the statements and look at them in their own terms.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, considering the amount of credibility and friendship that you enjoy among the Israeli leaders, is there any role that you are going to play in the peace process in the next Administration? And, second, could you confirm that Secretary Kissinger is going to the Middle East, is going to be a special envoy of President-elect Bush in the future?

QUESTION: I haven't any information at all on President-elect Bush's plans as far as special envoys are concerned, and I hadn't heard about any rumor of former Secretary Kissinger in that role. So I don't have any information to contribute on that. I would be surprised.

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As far as I'm concerned, I leave on January 20, and, you know, in the political system, when you're out, you're out. (laughter) And I'll be out. And other people will be managing things, and I'll, of course, be very interested. But, nevertheless, I won't have any role. I will have lost my job, and another person will be in it, and I will go on to other things. 8/8

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you inform the U.S. Congress in advance before your decision about the PLO?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We've had a lot of conversations back and forth, but the President -- I got word that the President had signed off on this -- I don't know -- about 5:15 or 5:30 yesterday afternoon, something like that, and we had arranged for making calls. And it was shortly thereafter that my assistant called the Israeli Ambassador to inform him. I called members of the Senate, former Presidents. I called Henry Kissinger, since he was part of this original process, and various other friends, the Jewish community, and tried to get as many as I could. But we were scheduled to make this statement at 6:30, so I only had so much time to make these calls and chase people around. But I got quite a few of them.

MR. REDMAN: We're absolutely out of time.

* * * *

בכנס

טרדי

חוזם: 12/12030

אל: המשרד

מ-: 101, 368, תא: 151288, חז: 2000, זח: מ, טג: 10

תח: 8 גט: מצמא

8 נד:

מיוזי/טרדי

אל : ממנכל צמא

זע: ממנכל רהט, ממנכל משהח

מאת: השגריר, דושינגטון

במסגרת 'מסע הרגעה' שהממשל יזם היום התבטא הנשיא רייגן וסגן הנשיא בוש כומגיה תוך הדגשת מחויבותם של ארהב לבטחון ישראל ובשבת היודיות העמוקה בין שתי המדינות. כמו גם אזהרה לאשף שמעשים צריכים לשקף את הצהרותיהם. נוסח הדברים בגלוי ובכבוד. כמו כן הזמין אליו המזכיר את כתבי העתונות הישראלית ותדרן אותם באותה רוח.

דברים דומים נאמרו לי היום בשיחת טלפונית עם צ'רלי היל ומקס קמפלמן. צ'רלי ציין כי הצבעתם היום באום נגד הענקת מעמד של מדינה - משקיף לאשף ונגד זימון ועידה ביכל משקים את עמדותיהם הסטודנטיות והעקרוניות שאין בהן שינוי. יחד עם זאת, הביע גשם המזכיר התקווה שישראל תחזור למדמ' דימלומטי. 'עזבתם את המגרש הזה לפני כשנה וחצי ולכן החלל במגרש זה נתמלא עי אחרים. הגיע הזמן שתחזרו לגרש'. דברים דומים נאמרו גם עי קמפלמן.

לשאלתי כיצד הם רואים את מעשיהם עם אשף ציונו כי מלבד התנגש הקרוב של השגיר מלטרז עם נציגי אשף בתונים (לגביו אין להם עדיון מועד) ומפגש נוסף, אולי,

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בינואר אין הם צרכים התפתחות מגעים אינטנסיבית.
הצעד הבא יהיה תלוי כממשל החדש שיכנס לבית הלבן בינואר.
שניהם ציינו כי הם מעריכים את העבודה שבאיונות הטלביזיה
והרדיו שהענקתי ביממה האחרונה ניכר היה שאיננו ששים
להשלמת העימות המזמני תוך הדגשת היוודות העמוקה השוררת
בין שתי המדינות.

א ר ד

לב

תפ: שהח, דהח, שהבט, מנכ"ל, מאנכ"ל, ר/מלכז, רט, אאן, ממד, תצטא

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY
5708 SOUTH WOODLAND AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637

RECEIVED

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* תאריך : **מעשה: החוק-מחלקת הקשר**

* דף 1 מתוך 1

** יוצא

* עותק 3 מתוך 14 טודי ביותר

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* חרזם: 12,11188

* אל: דוש/580

* מ-: המשד, תא: 151288, זח: 1257, דח: ב, טג: סב

* תח: 8 גט: מצפא

* נד: 8

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* טודי ביותר/כהול לבוקר

* הציר

* שיחתך עם היל

* שלך נר 289


* 1. אנו שולחים מברק לבל הנציגויות לבקשן להימנע מלאמין
* הרועה ארה"ב לגבי מעשיה עם אש"ף במשך חמור ביחסים
* יונקשכם לנהוג בהתאם.

* 2. נבריק מידית כל תגובה מטעם רזה"מ או שה"ח בנושא זה.

* בנצור

* ירד

* תמ: שהח, רהמ, מכנבל, ממנבל, בנצור, מצפא



Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith ח'ליג'ה נגד השמועה של בני ברית

30 KING DAVID ST., JERUSALEM 94101 ירושלים 30 דוד בן דוד
FAX. 02-344046 סוקסימיליה TEL. 1021224844, 221171.30

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FAX TRANSMISSION MEMORANDUM

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT IS FOR FAX # 664065

NAME/S: מר מרוביץ 1

CC: ~~מר מרוביץ 2~~

מר מרוביץ 3

מר מרוביץ 4

FROM: מר מרוביץ

Total number of pages to be transmitted: 2

This transmission memorandum plus: 1 pages under serial: A1-2

Transmission date: 15.12.88

למס' 838-1000
מס' 838-1000
מס' 838-1000

מס' 838-1000

Yes, Mr. Shultz, Keep Those Killers Out

NYHT 2-3/12

By Lisa and Ilsa Klinghoffer

NEW YORK — The rollercoaster of emotions that we have experienced ever since that day in 1985 when our father, Leon Klinghoffer, was murdered on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro has continued.

When the Palestine National Council met in Algiers, the picture of our father's killer, Abu Abbas, in attendance in a front row seat, brought back all the bad memories. Then we read an interview with Abbas in which he snickered about our father's death. He compared the hijacking to "driving a car" and the killing to "an accident on the way." And, after all, he added, "Accidents happen." And, he said, "Who is Klinghoffer?" To think that this man was running around free, being treated as a man of respectability, made the pain too much to bear.

Then Saturday there was light again. Secretary of State George Shultz announced that the State Department had denied a visa to Yasser Arafat, the Palestine Liberation Organization chairman, who sought to enter the United States to make a speech at the United Nations. Mr. Shultz cited the presence of Abbas in Algiers as a sign of Arafat's continuing support and tolerance of those who murder American civilians. How wonderful, we thought, that a man making policy at the highest level was able to see through the rhetoric to understand what we understood directly and profoundly from tragic experience.

Arafat and the PLO could not possibly have repudiated their commitment to terrorism when they gave a place of honor to the man who murdered Leon Klinghoffer. Terrorism, the killing of innocents, is an unmitigated evil. Abbas's participation at Algiers highlighted for us the absurdity of some media coverage describing a new PLO attitude toward terrorism. We did not need to wait for the analysis of the Palestine National Council meeting to know that there was no such commitment in Algiers.

After all, it was only months after the Achille Lauro tragedy that Arafat declared that the PLO would cease terrorism in Israel and the occupied territories. In fact,

terrorism has continued unabated not only in Israel but outside as well. At no time has Arafat said what has to be said: that terrorism is an unmitigated evil.

Far more impressive than ambiguous PLO rhetoric would have been a PLO decision to bar Abbas from Algiers, to oust him from the PLO Executive Council and, indeed, to turn him over to Italian authorities who have an arrest warrant out for him. An Italian court had tried him in absentia and given him a life sentence.

For us, and we think for a lot of other Americans, George Shultz is a hero for his consistent stand against terrorism. After all, if he had had his way, the selling of arms to Iran would never have happened. And it has been Mr. Shultz who, year after year, has spoken to the American people and the world, trying to rouse support for an intelligent and courageous stand against terrorism.

While some diplomats may not approve of Mr. Shultz's decision, we think the average person understands it very well. It is not a question of the peace process and Arafat's potential role in it. It is a question of whether the United States can be taken seriously as the leader of the struggle against terrorism if it speaks out of both sides of its mouth. Mr. Shultz says no — that we must stand up against terrorists, that we must not sell arms to Iran and that we must not give Arafat a forum until he demonstrably rejects his terrorist past.

Yes, we have heard all the arguments being made about the United Nations Headquarters Agreement and about the impact all of this will have on America's relations with the Arafat world. Our reaction is: Right on Mr. Shultz! Stick to your principles! As Americans, we are best off when we do so, and, in the end, despite criticism from abroad, the world is best off when America takes the lead in fighting this evil.

Lisa and Ilsa Klinghoffer, who live in New York City, contributed this comment to The New York Times.



ח'ל'ג'ח נגד השמצה של בני ברית
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
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FAX, 02 244846 טקסטומיליטון TEL. (02) 224844, 221171 טל.

FAX TRANSMISSION MEMORANDUM

כוכב

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT IS FOR FAX # 664065

NAME/S: מר מרוביץ ①

CC: אריה אהרן ②

יוסי בן אהרן ③

אבי בן צור ④

FROM: מר אהרן

Total number of pages to be transmitted: 2

This transmission memorandum plus: 1 pages under serial: A1-2

Transmission date: 15.12.88

ליו אהרן - 838 - 1010
מכתב המסומן
8 אהרן בן יוסף



MISSION PERMANENTE D'ISRAEL
AUPRES DE L'OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES
ET DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES A GENEVE

נציגות ישראל
ליד משרד האומות המאוחדות
והארגונים הבינלאומיים בג'נבה

מאתנו / כ"ו / 202

חמש
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פקסימיילית גנבה 984950

15.2.88

מידע: אורכסא... ארבעה-2
הערה: ארבעה... ארבעה

מספר התעודות כולל העליון: 4

בעד שבת טובה
אשר שגית
נ"ו יתקן (טובה) - ה"ע ביטול
אשרגון - ה"ע ביטול

ארכיוב

כ"ב"ה קולמוס (וויזבארה של ארנה)
היכולת וה"חיסול והחלטת ארנה

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**Office of Public Affairs
United States Mission**

Route de Pregny, 11
1292 Chambesy (Geneva)
Switzerland

(22) 99 03 59



/// EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY ///

2/4 for

~~43rd U.N. General Assembly Explanation of Vote~~

By

United States Ambassador JOSEPH C. PETRONE

on Resolutions Submitted under the item entitled

" The Question of PALESTINE "

Geneva, December 15, 1988

/// CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY ///

207 3/4

Mr. President,

Over the last 24 hours we have seen important developments in the search for Middle East peace and resolution of the Palestinian problem. The PLO has explicitly announced its acceptance of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, recognition of Israel's right to exist, and renunciation of terrorism. We view this as another step forward toward the direct negotiations between the parties concerned that are essential to achieving a comprehensive settlement. We are encouraged by this positive movement. On this basis, Secretary Shultz announced yesterday that the U.S. is prepared to engage in a substantive dialogue with the PLO.

The draft resolutions before this assembly today are unhelpful and inconsistent with the search for peace. In his remarks before this body yesterday, Ambassador Walters gave a clear exposition of U.S. policy on the fundamental issues involved and our vision of a realistic framework for reaching a negotiated settlement. We have also listened carefully to the views expressed by other participants. Much has been said here about fresh new opportunities for advancing peace in the Middle East. It is unfortunate that the draft resolutions being considered today fail to address the issues in a constructive manner and thus do nothing to advance the prospects for achieving a settlement. Rather, these texts, like so many others adopted by this Assembly over the years, will only make it more difficult to bring the concerned parties together at the negotiating table. We cannot support such measures.

In an improvement over earlier years, the draft resolution on convening an international peace conference on the Middle East does not cite UNGA Resolution 38/58C, which prescribed an extremely one-sided formula for a predetermined settlement. Yet this draft still fails to address the centrality of direct negotiations between the parties. Instead, it purports to resolve in advance issues which must be resolved in negotiations such as withdrawal from the occupied territories, dismantlement of settlements, and creation of an independent Palestinian state. This approach is inconsistent with the PLO's own statement acknowledging the need for negotiations with Israel.

The United States does not rule out any means of reaching the direct negotiations that we believe are essential to concluding a just and lasting peace. In this regard, we have said we could support a properly structured international conference--one designed to facilitate negotiations between the parties concerned, not a conference with the authority to impose a prescribed solution or overturn agreements reached between the parties. The latter would only be a formula for more conflict.

207/4/4

In addition, this draft resolution endorses the concept of placing the occupied territories under the temporary supervision of the United Nations. We cannot support such a concept. In our view any proposal to extend UN authority over the occupied territories is impractical and unrealistic.

Mr. President, my Government objects strongly to a second draft resolution, which ~~welcomes~~^{acknowledges} the proclamation of the state of Palestine and seeks to change the PLO's present UN observer status to that of "Palestine". The latter formulation is vague and could be susceptible to various interpretations. Yet however one interprets it, we believe it is unhelpful. We cannot support attempts to lend even a degree of purported legitimacy to the self-proclaimed Palestinian state. The United States, like the large majority of members of the General Assembly, does not recognize this state. As Secretary Shultz reaffirmed yesterday, our decision to engage in a substantive dialogue with the PLO should not be taken to imply acceptance or recognition by the United States of an independent Palestinian state.

As a policy matter, we firmly believe that the Arab-Israeli problem must be resolved through negotiations, in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, and not by unilateral actions of any party.

Moreover, we see no legal basis to justify recognition of a Palestinian state. This self-declared entity does not satisfy the generally accepted criteria under international law for statehood.

The remaining three draft resolutions are not new. As in years past, these texts endorse the activities of various UN organs that, regrettably, are dedicated to expounding only a very one-sided perspective of the Palestinian issue. We have said that legitimate Palestinian rights must be addressed in the context of negotiations. In perpetuating such a distorted, unbalanced picture of the problem, however, the UN bodies referred to in the Resolutions do little to further the real interests of the Palestinian People.

We call again on all concerned parties to dispense with unproductive polemics and instead focus on positive, practical steps to move the peace process forward.

מיידית: דחיפות:	טופס מכרז קשר ניו-יורק דד: 1 מחיר: 4
סיוג: שמור	אל:
תזוח: 151730	מעפ"א, לש' השר
מס מכרזי: 0 0470	דע: השגריר - וושינגטון
@ 11 122	מאת: הקונכ"ל

מצ"ב הודעה שהעכיר אלינו קוץ'. הבנת מסויימת להחלסת
 הממשל, קריאת תגר לאש"ם ואהדה לישראל.

אורי סכיר

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אורי סכיר

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THE CITY OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE MAYOR EDWARD I. KOCH

Tel. 566-5090

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For Release:
Thursday, December 15, 1988

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STATEMENT BY MAYOR EDWARD I. KOCH

Secretary of State Shultz's decision to authorize diplomatic contacts between the United States and the PLO marks a historic departure in American foreign policy. I stand by my long-held belief that the PLO is a terrorist organization. We can never forgive or forget the murders undertaken in its name.

As its leader, Yasir Arafat is responsible for this bloody record of killing and terrorism. In my view, the comments he has made do not reflect a change of heart. Arafat is engaging in duplicitous rhetoric that, unfortunately, has opened the door for direct contacts with the United States.

In 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger laid down two conditions for U.S. dealings with the PLO: the PLO's unequivocal acceptance of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and a clear recognition of Israel's right to exist as an independent state in the Middle East.

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Subsequently, the State Department added a third requirement: a total renunciation by the PLO of all terrorism committed either in Israel or abroad, by individuals or groups. In the years since, the PLO has claimed repeatedly to have taken these steps. But it never had and the United States refused to accept the PLO as a legitimate negotiating partner.

As a result of statements made yesterday by Yasir Arafat at a press conference, Secretary Shultz decided that the PLO had finally met those conditions.

I have frequently expressed my great confidence in George Shultz. Therefore, I am willing -- with great reluctance in this instance -- to accept his judgment. President Reagan and Secretary Shultz have led the most sympathetic American administration that Israel has ever dealt with. United States policy has always been based on the best interests of America -- that is why the tie with Israel is so strong. But this also

(more)

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means that there will be occasions -- sometimes painful -- when Israeli and American policies diverge.

Israel does not share the American view of the PLO for its own understandable and valid security reasons. Israel has a right to its own view and all supporters of Israel must defend that right. The United States must not in any way pressure Israel to bend by threatening to cut off either economic or military aid.

If, at any time, the PLO or any of its constituent groups violates any of the conditions of its recognition, the United States government must withdraw this recognition and end all contacts with the PLO.

The Shultz decision is just the first step in what could be a long and difficult road to negotiations and, perhaps, to peace. I was encouraged that even as he authorized contacts with the PLO, the Secretary reaffirmed American opposition to an independent Palestinian state.

Now is the time for all of Israel's friends to stand fast and make sure that Israel knows it has not been abandoned. As these diplomatic contacts proceed, the obligation of Israel's friends will be to assure that the United States upholds its commitments to the absolute security of Israel. No matter what the ultimate resolution of this particular matter, I believe the U.S.-Israeli alliance will continue because it is in the highest national interest of both countries.

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מחן: 7

אופיס מברק קשר ניו-יורק

דחפיות: מ"ד

סויג: שמור

אל: מנהל מצפ"א, לש' שה"ח, לש' ראה"מ

תזח: 151790

דע: חשגריד - וושינגטון, פלג-וושינגטון
כיון - נאו"ם

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מאת: סגן חקונסול הכללי

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ארה"ב - אש"ם. בהמשך למברקי 447.

1. מצ"ב הודעת חקונגרה החומכת בהחלטת האדמיניסטרציה, הודעת ארגון הגג הניו-יורקי של CRJ, והודעת 20A.

2. במסיבת עיתונאים היום (16.12) מורים אכרם קרא את הודעתו (הועברה אליכם בשלכו 447). הרגיש כי אין לחסותם במילים ויש לראות המעשים, ירושלים כירח ישראל, עיפאת עומד על נסיגת ישראל מכל השטחים והובר כוגד 242 אותה כביכול קיבל. יחסי ישראל - ארה"ב לא יפגעו אלא יחוזקו נוכח החלטת הממשל. כשנשאל מה הוא מייצע לישראל, הגיב שאין הוא רוצה לייצע בנושאים הקשורים לבטחון ישראל.

מרדכי יריד

אישור:

שם השולח:

15.12.88

מרדכי יריד	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
מרדכי יריד	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31

Jewish Community Relations Council Of New York, Inc.

NEWS RELEASE



Jack D. Weller Center For Intergroup Relations 711 Third Avenue, 12th Floor, New York, NY 10017 Tel. 212-983-4800

2/7
contact:

Harriet Mandel
(212) 983-4800

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

0 0471/123

STATEMENT BY LESTER POLLACK
PRESIDENT - JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS COUNCIL OF NEW YORK
ON U.S. DECISION TO OPEN DISCUSSION WITH THE PLO

AT YESTERDAY'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN GENEVA, YASIR ARAFAT SPOKE WORDS WHICH LED TO A U.S. GOVERNMENT DECISION TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO. HOWEVER, A CHANGE IN WORDS DOES NOT BY ITSELF CONSTITUTE A CHANGE IN PLO ATTITUDES. THE PLO WILL ONLY PROVE ITSELF AS A VIABLE NEGOTIATING PARTNER WHEN ITS ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL CHANGE. THESE ATTITUDES ARE CODIFIED IN THE PLO COVENANT WHICH CALLS FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. TO DATE, THIS COVENANT REMAINS IN EFFECT AND UNRENOUNCED.

THE U.S. HAS FRAMED ITS POLICY ACCORDING TO LANGUAGE. ISRAEL FRAMES ITS POLICY ACCORDING TO EXPERIENCE. ISRAEL'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE ARAB WORLD IS BASED UPON 40 YEARS OF HATE, WAR AND TERROR. IN ORDER TO COUNTER THESE EXPERIENCES THE PLO WILL HAVE TO DO MORE THAN UTTER MAGIC FORMULAS GRANTING IT ACCEPTANCE BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WHICH, AFTER ALL, IS NOT A DIRECT PARTY TO THE DISPUTE.

THE U.S. AND ISRAEL CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN A STRONG AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY DIFFERENCES WHICH MIGHT ARISE REGARDING THIS MATTER WILL IN NO WAY IMPINGE UPON THIS RELATIONSHIP.

THE U.S. HAS CONCEIVABLY PROVIDED THE PLO WITH AN OPPORTUNITY. THE PLO WILL NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD BY ITS DEEDS AND PERFORMANCE, RATHER THAN BY ITS WORDS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS, WHETHER IT GENUINELY EMBRACES PEACE.

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The Jewish Community Relations Council is the central coordinating and resource body for 60 major Jewish organizations in the Metropolitan New York area.

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AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS NYC

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(3) To press for negotiations that are based solely on Resolutions 242 and 338, and not on a prior acceptance of their unilaterally proclaimed Palestinian state or any other U.N. resolutions that contradict 242 and 338.

As an organization that has invested deeply in the cause of peace between Arab and Jew, the American Jewish Congress hopes that Mr. Arafat is communicating a genuine change in attitude on the part of the PLO. We trust that in the days ahead, the PLO will be able to send the kind of clear and direct messages to Israel that are necessary to allay well-founded Israeli fears and suspicion bred by forty years of PLO terrorism and violence. We are confident that such efforts will elicit appropriate Israeli responses."

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news

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
STEPHEN WISE CONGRESS HOUSE 15 EAST 84TH STREET • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10028 • 879-4920

Martin Gallanter
Director of Communications
212-879-4500
12/15/1988

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS REACTS
TO U.S. DECISION TO TALK TO PLO

(New York) The following statement was issued today by Robert K. Lifton, President and Henry Siegman, Executive Director of the American Jewish Congress. The statement was made at AJCongress headquarters at 15 E. 84th Street in New York City.

"Having stated for thirteen years that the United States will establish contact with the PLO if it recognizes Israel's right to exist, accepts U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 and renounces terrorism, the United States acted correctly by responding positively to Arafat's statements in Geneva on December 14th.

President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz have made it clear, however, that establishing contact with the PLO is one matter and satisfying continuing U.S. skepticism, not to speak of Israeli skepticism, about the genuineness of the PLO's conversion is an entirely different matter. We commend them for their declared intention to carefully monitor PLO activities on the ground to make absolutely certain that PLO action conforms to their rhetoric.

Indeed, by changing our long-standing policy vis-a-vis the PLO, our country has assumed certain new and important responsibilities:



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- (1) To assure that PLO terrorism has in fact been ended.
- (2) To assure that Arafat's statement to the Western press recognizing Israel's right to exist not be negated by contradictory statements to his own constituents in the Arab world, a practice widely engaged in by the PLO in the past. In this connection, the United States must see to it that there is no resumption of inflammatory PLO rhetoric labeling Israel a racist state.

(continues)



Zionist
Organization
of
America

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News Release

JACOB and LIBBY GOODMAN ZOA HOUSE 4 EAST 34TH STREET, N.Y., N.Y. 10016
FOR INFORMATION CONTACT: PAUL FLACKS - 481-1500
481

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA.

The decision by the United States to begin a substantive dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization is very troublesome. Having made its decision, the United States should proceed with optimism, but with equal caution. The intentions of the PLO must be immediately tested if there is to be credence to its verbal declarations. Arafat's statements require the following corresponding actions: guarantees that all factions of the PLO will adhere to his repudiation by the PLO of violence and terrorism; the revocation of the PLO Covenant, consistent with the public statement made by President Reagan on September 7, 1988, wherein he made it clear that the PLO had to change its Covenant; a statement that Zionism is not racism; acceptance of the decisions reached at Camp David.

We can only hope that the judgment of President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz will be vindicated. Beyond the political issues involved, there is a sobering reality that the United States has joined the rest of the world community in accepting an organization and its leader, Yassir Arafat, in spite of its established record of violence and terrorism and the murderous baggage which Arafat brings to the world. We trust that the potential forces for moderation in the Middle East will not now be overwhelmed by the decision to meet with the PLO.

We regret that the Palestinian people have not come forward with a more moderate element than the PLO. We agree with Secretary of State Shultz that Israel has the independent right to arrive at its own decision regarding any future relationship with the PLO. We concur with the decision that the United States not recognize a Palestinian State. We trust that America's decision to begin dealing directly with the PLO will not cause the terrorist organization to believe that Israel can be pressured to make concessions, which are not in its self-interest. The recognition of Israel by other Arab States in response to Arafat's actions and America's acceptance of them, should be immediately forthcoming.

We are proud that the Jewish State has the moral integrity to maintain a principled position. Its refusal to submit to the pressures of a world community, which has capitulated to the forces of violence and terrorism, deserves the highest expression of appreciation and respect, which we of the ZOA strongly reaffirm.

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Anti-Defamation League **ADL** of B'nai B'rith
 823 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 212-490-2525 Telex 649278

LYNNE IANNIELLO
 Director, Communications

NEWS

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The following statement was released tonight by Abraham H. Foxman, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

"We understand that the United States, having set standards for talking with the PLO, and the PLO having met those minimal standards, is living up to its commitment. It is a first step. Now we must watch to see whether the PLO will match words with deeds.

We welcome and appreciate Secretary of State Shultz's comments that this dialogue with the PLO in no way changes America's commitment to the need for direct negotiations as the only way to peace, opposition to any imposed solution and to an independent Palestinian state, and continued support for Israel's security.

We also understand Israel's distrust. The intifada continues, the PLO has not renounced the National Covenant, and Arafat talks about an independent Palestinian state as a precondition for negotiations. This is not the way to reach true peace. It does not reassure an Israel that has had too many years of experience with PLO terrorism. More significant steps are needed."

שגרירות ישראל בווינגטון
סופס מברק

דף 1. מתוך 6.
דחיפות: רגיל
סוג: גלוי

אלו מצפ"א, מע"ח, הסברה
דעו יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת

תאריך, זמן: 15.12.88
מספר המברק:

מאת: עתונות

המש"ב:
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מ ר ה - ב - א ש " ב

להלן נוסח הצהרתו של מזכיר המדינה ותשובותיו לשאלות
במסיבת העיתונאים המש"ב במחמ"ד.

יוסי גל
יוסי גל

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the number '2' and various illegible scribbles and markings.

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SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AT PRESS CONFERENCE
6:33 P.M. (EST)
THE STATE DEPARTMENT

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1988

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Palestinian Liberation Organization today issued a statement in which it accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; recognized Israel's right to exist in peace and security; and renounced terrorism. As a result, the United States is prepared for a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives. I am designating our Ambassador to Tunisia as the only authorized channel for that dialogue.

The objective of the United States remains as always, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. In that light, I view this development as one more step toward the beginning of direct negotiations between the parties, which alone can lead to such a peace.

Nothing here may be taken to apply an acceptance or recognition by the United States of an independent Palestinian state. The position of the US is that the status of the West Bank and Gaza cannot be determined by unilateral acts of either side, but only through a process of negotiations. The United States does not recognize the declaration of an independent Palestinian state.

It is also important to emphasize that the United States' commitment to the security of Israel remains unflinching.

Q Mr. Secretary, what was it today that changed your mind?

SEC. SHULTZ: I didn't change my mind, they changed their -- they made their statement clear so that it doesn't have the ambiguities in it that earlier statements had, which tended to allow various people to give different interpretations of what was meant.

Q Well, what was different, what was different about it today?

SEC. SHULTZ: It was clear. It was not encumbered.

Q Mr. Secretary, what about the PLO's record, which only two weeks ago you described as a terrorism record. You called Arafat an accomplice or an accessory to terrorism. You denied him a visa. Are you expunging the PLO record and saying "let bygones be bygones"?

SEC. SHULTZ: No. When we have our dialogue, you can be sure that the first item of business on our agenda in that dialogue will

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be the subject of terrorism, and we'll make it clear that our position about the importance of the renunciation of terrorism is central.

Q But what can a dialogue do about people who are already dead? And what does your statement have -- how does your statement bear on the promise Kissinger made the Israelis?

SEC. SHULTZ: The promise that Kissinger made the Israelis, which had to do with 242 and 338, and with the recognition of Israel's right to exist. Since that time, we have added our insistence on a renunciation of terrorism. Those conditions have been US conditions for a dialogue with the PLO going back to 1975. Our position has not changed. We have stayed with that position consistently. And now, today, we have an acceptance of those conditions in a clear-cut way.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you told the State of Israel of your intentions? And can you tell us what their response was?

SEC. SHULTZ: Everybody has been put on notice repeatedly for -- since 1975, in effect, that if the PLO meets our conditions, then we're prepared for a substantive dialogue. That is well-known. Of course, we have had communications with Israel as we have with other states and we have been engaged in the last hour or so of trying to call people to tell them explicitly what we are prepared to do, now that there is this statement, but I don't want to try to speak for others. I'm only speaking for the United States?

Q Do you have any reason to believe that the Israelis would be willing to sit down with the PLO?

SEC. SHULTZ: No, I don't have any reason to believe that. But all I'm telling you is what the US policies are and this policy has been in place for -- since 1975, and it has been consistently adhered to and now that we see a change in the posture of the PLO,

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all we're doing is following through on that policy. Our policy remains unchanged.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you see this as a single meeting or as the beginning of a process in which there will be a series of meetings and aimed at what result? If it is going to be a series of meetings, where do you want it to go?

SEC. SHULTZ: The meetings are not an end in themselves. Our object is a comprehensive peace and so our object in any dialogue that we have with the PLO will emphasize our desire for that and our views of what it takes to get there. I made a speech last September on behalf of the United States and set our views as a supplement to the views contained in the initiative that we worked on earlier this year. So our object is not a dialogue. Our object is peace and we will be talking to the PLO as to others in an effort to move things along toward that objective.

Q Mr. Secretary, Kissinger was at the White House this morning. Was that he was there? To --

SEC. SHULTZ: No, it wasn't.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SEC. SHULTZ: However, I did talk to Secretary Kissinger since we got word of this development.

Q Mr. Secretary, your statement at the American Colony was addressed specifically to Palestinian residents in the West Bank and Gaza and not -- specifically not to the PLO. Does this dialogue with the PLO now mean that the United States is prepared to address that sort of statement to the PLO leadership as well as to other Palestinians?

SEC. SHULTZ: That was a statement to Palestinians that I made in Jerusalem last Spring, as I remember. Do you have the date of it in mind? I forget. It's been a while ago. Anyway, I sought a meeting with Palestinians and I went to their turf, so to speak and they would not meet and, of course, the word we got was that they were afraid to meet because they were afraid to meet because they were afraid they would be killed if they did. So I went and I made a statement that you referred to, saying, "Here is what I would have told you if you had come," and we issued that statement as a statement of our efforts toward peace and of our recognition, which has been consistent and it's obviously so, that if you're going to get to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, you have to include Palestinians in the process from the beginning and at the end. That is clear enough, and that was basically what I said.

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Q As a result of this, Mr. Secretary, are you going to be willing to talk with Mr. Arafat, before you leave office?

SEC. SHULTZ: What I am doing is authorizing our Ambassador in Tunisia to make himself available for a direct dialogue, and we are making it clear that this is the only authorized channel of communication. So anybody else who is representing themselves as a channel is not a channel. This is the authoritative channel representing the United States Government.

Now, what may evolve from this remains to be seen, but I think that when it comes to any genuine, substantive discussion, we are in a transition phase and it is basically for the next administration to decide what they do.

Q When will the first meeting be held?

SEC. SHULTZ: I don't -- we have seen this PLO statement; I'm making this response on behalf of the President. I might say, the President, the Vice President agree with this. And I'm authorizing now the Ambassador in Tunis to undertake this dialogue, but when there will be a meeting, I don't know.

Q (Off mike) -- the United States has recognized the PLO as the legitimate partner for negotiations, do you feel that there's any reason for Israel not to negotiate with the PLO?

SEC. SHULTZ: What we are doing as a result of the PLO's meeting our conditions, is establishing a substantive dialogue with them. We hope that that dialogue may help bring about direct negotiations that will lead to peace. How those negotiations are structured, who is there to speak on behalf of the Palestinians is a subject that's a difficult one. We've worked on it a long time. And I imagine it'll continue to be difficult. But, at any rate, we'll have a dialogue with the PLO, and that dialogue will be designed to find the answers to those questions.

Q Now that the PLO has recognized Israel's right to exist and the UN Resolutions, and renounced terrorism, do you feel there's any reason that Israel should not now talk to the PLO?

SEC. SHULTZ: I -- Israel has its own views and own policies, and Israel has always made it clear that these conditions that are US conditions are not necessarily theirs. So, I am not in any way

speaking for Israel. It's totally for Israel to make its own decisions about what it wants to do and there's nothing to be inferred judgmentally about what they should do. I'm only saying that for the period since 1975, the US has had a position, in

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effect, that if the PLD meets these conditions, we will have a substantive dialogue and since they have met the conditions, we are carrying through on our policy and that's the sum and substance of it.

Q Have you conferred with the incoming administration, since you have insisted that you are in a transitional state, and would you be able to tell us what's their stand on it?

SEC. SHULTZ: The President and the Vice President both have followed these developments very closely and they have reviewed each of them -- this most recent development and they both agree that under these circumstances, the conditions for a substantive dialogue which we have had in place since 1975 have been met and so we should state that we are ready to undertake that dialogue. Now as far as what will be the efforts of the administration of President-elect, that is for them to determine and that remains to be seen.

Q Thank you.

Q Sir, is this a condition of the PLD --

SEC. SHULTZ: I have been dismissed.

MR. REDMAN: Thank you, all.

END

END

WESTERN SAMOA

EMBASSY (SEE FIJI)

RANK AND ASSIGNMENT

NAME

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Zohar RAZ
(see Fiji)

**Office of Public Affairs
United States Mission**

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1292 Chambesy (Geneva)
Switzerland

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/// EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY ///

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~~43rd UN General Assembly Explanation of Vote~~

By

United States Ambassador JOSEPH C. PETRONE

on Resolutions submitted under the item entitled

" The Question of PALESTINE "

Geneva, December 15, 1988

/// CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY ///

WESTERN SAMOA

EMBASSY (SEE FIJI)

RANK AND ASSIGNMENT

NAME

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Zohar RAZ
(see Fiji)

207 3/4

Mr. President,

Over the last 24 hours we have seen important developments in the search for Middle East peace and resolution of the Palestinian problem. The PLO has explicitly announced its acceptance of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, recognition of Israel's right to exist, and renunciation of terrorism. We view this as another step forward toward the direct negotiations between the parties concerned that are essential to achieving a comprehensive settlement. We are encouraged by this positive movement. On this basis, Secretary Shultz announced yesterday that the U.S. is prepared to engage in a substantive dialogue with the PLO.

The draft resolutions before this assembly today are unhelpful and inconsistent with the search for peace. In his remarks before this body yesterday, Ambassador Walters gave a clear exposition of U.S. policy on the fundamental issues involved and our vision of a realistic framework for reaching a negotiated settlement. We have also listened carefully to the views expressed by other participants. Much has been said here about fresh new opportunities for advancing peace in the Middle East. It is unfortunate that the draft resolutions being considered today fail to address the issues in a constructive manner and thus do nothing to advance the prospects for achieving a settlement. Rather, these texts, like so many others adopted by this Assembly over the years, will only make it more difficult to bring the concerned parties together at the negotiating table. We cannot support such measures.

In an improvement over earlier years, the draft resolution on convening an international peace conference on the Middle East does not cite UNGA Resolution 38/58C, which prescribed an extremely one-sided formula for a predetermined settlement. Yet this draft still fails to address the centrality of direct negotiations between the parties. Instead, it purports to resolve in advance issues which must be resolved in negotiations such as withdrawal from the occupied territories, dismantlement of settlements, and creation of an independent Palestinian state. This approach is inconsistent with the PLO's own statement acknowledging the need for negotiations with Israel.

The United States does not rule out any means of reaching the direct negotiations that we believe are essential to concluding a just and lasting peace. In this regard, we have said we could support a properly structured international conference--one designed to facilitate negotiations between the parties concerned, not a conference with the authority to impose a prescribed solution or overturn agreements reached between the parties. The latter would only be a formula for more conflict.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (cont.)

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RANK AND ASSIGNMENT

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Consul-General

(Area of Jurisdiction: The States of Arizona,
South California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada,
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Consul

Moshe RAM 213-275-2947

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Ilan MOR

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Consul (Tourism Affairs)

Arie ZOMER

Consul Head of Consular Section

Moshe PEER

Consul (Administration)

Moshe ELAZAR

653-6416



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In addition, this draft resolution endorses the concept of placing the occupied territories under the temporary supervision of the United Nations. We cannot support such a concept. In our view any proposal to extend UN authority over the occupied territories is impractical and unrealistic.

Mr. President, my Government objects strongly to a second draft resolution, which ~~welcomes~~ the proclamation of the state of Palestine and seeks to change the PLO's present UN observer status to that of "Palestine". The latter formulation is vague and could be susceptible to various interpretations. Yet however one interprets it, we believe it is unhelpful. We cannot support attempts to lend even a degree of purported legitimacy to the self-proclaimed Palestinian state. The United States, like the large majority of members of the General Assembly, does not recognize this state. As Secretary Shultz reaffirmed yesterday, our decision to engage in a substantive dialogue with the PLO should not be taken to imply acceptance or recognition by the United States of an independent Palestinian state,

As a policy matter, we firmly believe that the Arab-Israeli problem must be resolved through negotiations, in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, and not by unilateral actions of any party.

Moreover, we see no legal basis to justify recognition of a Palestinian state. This self-declared entity does not satisfy the generally accepted criteria under international law for statehood.

The remaining three draft resolutions are not new. As in years past, these texts endorse the activities of various UN organs that, regrettably, are dedicated to expounding only a very one-sided perspective of the Palestinian issue. We have said that legitimate Palestinian rights must be addressed in the context of negotiations. In perpetuating such a distorted, unbalanced picture of the problem, however, the UN bodies referred to in the Resolutions do little to further the real interests of the Palestinian People.

We call again on all concerned parties to dispense with unproductive polemics and instead focus on positive, practical steps to move the peace process forward.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (cont.)

CONSULATE-GENERAL
NEW YORK (cont.)

RANK AND ASSIGNMENTS

NAME

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Anti-Defamation League  of B'nai B'rith

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NEWS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: Harry Wall
Tel: 02:242868, 224844

Jerusalem, Israel, December 15th 1988

The following statement was released last night by Abraham H. Foxman, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

"We understand that the United States, having set standards for talking with the PLO, and the PLO having met those minimal standards, is living up to its commitment. It is a first step. Now we must watch to see whether the PLO will match words with deeds.

We welcome and appreciate Secretary of State Shultz's comments that this dialogue with the PLO in no way changes America's commitment to the need for direct negotiations as the only way to peace, opposition to any imposed solution and to an independent Palestinian state, and continued support for Israel's security.

We also understand Israel's distrust. The intifada continues, the PLO has not renounced the National Covenant, and Arafat talks about an independent Palestinian state as a precondition for negotiations. This is not the way to reach true peace. It does not reassure an Israel that has had too many years of experience with PLO terrorism. More significant steps are needed."

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דחיסות כהול	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק בהול	ת"ד: 5
סוג בטחוני שמור	עופס מברק	
תז"ח 151200	מנהל מצפ"א, לש' שה"ח, לש' ראה"מ	
כ"ר : 0 0447 אויסנסיין - 117	השגריר וושינגטון, פלג - וושינגטון, דע: - בניין כ"ז - יורק	
	סגן הקונסול הכללי	

ארה"כ - אש"ף.

1. הניו-יורק טיימס מביא הווקר תגובות ראשוניות של מספר נציגי ארגונים יהודיים ארציים (ראו סקירת העתונות היומית).
2. ממגעים אתמול והווקר עם נציגי ארגונים יהודיים ומניתוח הודעותיהם עולה כי אין מגמתם להיכנס לעימות עם האדמינסטרציה האמריקאית. מעבר לכך, מספר ארגונים הביעו הכנה לעמדת שולץ. אמרו כי עתה יש לשים את הצהרת אשף במבחן והכיעו סקפטיזם לגבי יכולת המימוש.
3. מצ"ב הודעת מוריס אברס. היום יקיים מסיבת עיתונאים. כן מצ"ב הודעת נאקראק לאחר התיעצות שקויימה בין נציגי איפא"ק, קונגרס קומיטי, א.ד.ל וועידת הנשיאים.
4. ההסכרה שלנו הפיצה הודעת השגריר מאתמול, דברי פרס במסיבת עיתונאים היום ותגובת רבין לדברי עראפאת בג'נבה.

מרדכי יודד

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איטור

מרדכי יודד

שם הטלון: 251288

15.12.88

אריז

Contact: Richard Cohen
(212) 758-6969.

For Immediate Release

447 / 117 2 / 5

**Statement by Morris B. Abram, Chairman
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations***

"The first piece of business in the talks between the American ambassador and the PLO representatives in Tunisia should be a threshold demand by our country that the PLO repudiate its charter, the Palestine National Covenant. There can be no progress toward peace in the Middle East if the PLO insists on adhering to that Covenant -- its basic political document -- which calls on Palestinian Arabs 'to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland' and demands 'the elimination of Zionism in Palestine.' (Article 15)

"Arafat's words in Geneva must now be translated into deeds -- and the essential deed must be to repeal the Covenant and its call to destroy Israel, whose establishment is described as 'entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time' (Article 19) and which states that 'the Arab Palestinian people...reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine' (Article 21).

"Yasir Arafat does not have authority to change the PLO charter, no matter what he says in speeches to the UN or press conferences in Geneva. The Covenant itself (in Article 33) spells out how it is to be amended -- 'by vote of a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Council of the PLO, taken at a

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special session convened for that purpose.' When that meeting is called and that vote taken, when the PLO forswears statements like 'armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine' (Article 9), negotiations toward peace can begin -- but not a moment before.

"Secretary Shultz is a man we admire and trust as a statesman of integrity, honor and decency. He understands full well the importance of the U.S.-Israel alliance, which he helped to strengthen. He recognizes the commonality of values, of friendship and of strategic interest that link our two countries. He will keep those ties strong and thriving."

*The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations is composed of the 46 largest national Jewish organizations.

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NATIONAL JEWISH

COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL

400 PARK AVENUE SOUTH NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10014-6285

Memo

מקור מטושטש

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December 15, 1988

SENT VIA FAX

TO: NJCRAC MEMBER AGENCIES
 FROM: ALBERT D. CHERNIN, EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN
 MARTIN RAFFEL, DIRECTOR, ISRAEL TASK FORCE
 RE: U.S. DECISION TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO

The following statement represents judgments reached through consultations we undertook last night in a conference call with Tom Dine, of AIPAC, Henry Siegman and Phil Baum of the American Jewish Congress, and George Gruen of the American Jewish Committee. Additional consultations were held this morning with the Anti-Defamation League and the Presidents' Conference.

TEXT OF STATEMENT

We understand why Secretary of State George Shultz arrived at the decision to open up a dialogue with the PLO in light of the statements made by Yassir Arafat at his press conference yesterday in Geneva. We believe it was the firmness of the American position that in the end led Arafat to make these long overdue statements. We understand that the decision to enter into a dialogue does not represent U.S. recognition of the PLO, and we welcome the Secretary's emphatic assertion that this action should in no way be taken as "acceptance or recognition by the U.S. of an independent Palestinian state."

We remain skeptical about the PLO's overnight conversion. We would have found Arafat's statements more credible had they been asserted in the text of the formal policy position adopted by the Palestine National Council in Algiers, and reiterated in his address to the United National General Assembly.

In the dialogue the U.S. must press the PLO to match its rhetoric with deeds. The U.S. must seek a repeal of those provisions of the PLO Covenant which call for the destruction of the State of Israel. The U.S. also must make it clear that it will hold Arafat and the PLO responsible for any act of terrorism linked to this conflict.

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מקור ממושמע

We are confident that the Secretary appreciates and respects Israel's profound concerns and fears about the PLO. He understands the history of the PLO's unrelenting campaign of terror and delegitimization against Israel. We also are confident that the U.S., particularly Secretary Shultz, recognizes that Israel, as a sovereign state, must act according to its perception of its own security.

The U.S. and Israel, we believe, will not allow differences regarding the American decision to meet with the PLO to undermine the deep relationship between them as allies. No one wants peace with security more than the Government and people of Israel. It is our hope and prayer that this step by the U.S. will move the process toward that goal.

ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that these judgments be conveyed in communications to Secretary of State George Shultz, President Ronald Reagan, President-elect George Bush, and members of Congress, and in public statements to the media and the Jewish community.

These judgments should be the basis for discussions with coalition partners and other communal leaders.

These judgments should be shared with area rabbis for use in their sermons this Shabbat.

Please send us editorials, op-eds and other reactions that appear in your local newspapers immediately by FAX, so that we can share them with the field.

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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM



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השגריר, הציר.

להלן אגרת שולץ לפרס שנמסרה על-ידי פיקרינג ב- 15/12
בצהרים.

מנהל מצפ"א

15 בדצמבר 1988

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO FOREIGN MINISTER PERES

December 15, 1988

Dear Shimon:

Today, in a press conference in Geneva, Yasser Arafat made a statement in which he unconditionally accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, clearly recognized Israel's right to exist, and renounced terrorism. I have studied the text of Arafat's remarks carefully, and have concluded that this satisfies longstanding American conditions for opening a substantive dialogue. We therefore plan to act as we have often said we would, most recently in the President's statement of December 8, by entering into a substantive dialogue with the PLO. I will be issuing a public statement to this effect, shortly after finalizing this letter. The initial U.S. contact with the PLO will be carried out by the American Ambassador in Tunis.

I know how sensitive an issue this is for you and the people of Israel. Our decision was not taken lightly. For thirteen years, every American Administration has remained committed to the agreement we made with the Israeli Government concerning contacts with the PLO. During this period, we insisted upon a change in the PLO's position, as represented in a clear and unambiguous statement on the critical issues of Israel's right to exist, on 242/338, and on terrorism. In the past few weeks, we maintained a firm stand on these conditions, refusing to be drawn into accepting less than what we have insisted upon since 1975. Today, such a statement was issued by Mr. Arafat.

The dialogue about to be launched is not an end in itself. It must focus on the core issue of negotiations to end the Arab-Israel conflict. We will also be watching closely the PLO's performance of the obligations it has undertaken as a result of its renunciation of terrorism.

We also intend to make clear to the PLO that nothing can upset or adversely affect our relationship with Israel. What motivates us to play an active role in the peace process is the desire to see a safe and strong Israel, living in peace with its neighbors. Nothing will shake the foundation of our relationship.

We will, of course, remain in closest contact, and will keep you fully informed of what transpires in our talk with the PLO. We enter this dialogue with our eyes open and our guard up. With regard to:

Sincerely,

George P. Shultz

Handwritten notes in Hebrew and Arabic script, including numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.