

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

משכד ראה

יוף אפיני

אנה

12/2/90-20/2/90

תיק מס'

9

מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

4611/9-N

מזהה פנימי

מזהה פריט R00036g

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-9

תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

משרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 14.02.9

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שומר

נכנס **

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חוזם: 2,11325

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1106, רהמש/203

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אברהם

שומר/מיידי

אל: יועץ תפוצות

דע: מצפ'א, שגריר-פלאג, ווש

מאת: קונכ'ל/ניו-יורק

נפגשתי הבוקר עם מרטין קראר מנכ"ל ה-CJF לשיחה בנושא יהודי ברה"מ. שתי נקודות הראויות לציון -

קראר מודאג ביותר מהפרסומים בנושא בדיקת יהדותם של העולים. לדבריו זהו הנושא שעלול לחבל במסע גיוס הכספים. הוא ישהה שבוע הבא בארצ(במלון המלך דוד 17-25/2) ויתכן ויפגש עם שר הפנים.

פתיחת משרד היאס במוסקבה - על אף שהוא אישית מתנגד לפתיחתו הוא ממליץ לנו לנהל המערכה בנושא בפרופיל נמוך ובדיסקרטיות כדי לא לעורר נוגדנים בקהילה, אמרתי לו ששמואל שנהר יפגש עם הגורמים הרלוונטים ואין לנו כאן ענין להפוך את הנושא למחלוקת ציבורית.

אורי סביר.

יג

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, תפוצות, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר

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שגרירות ישראל בושינגטון
טופס מברק

1/3

דף 1 מתוך:
דחיפות: מיידית
סוג: בלמיס

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת,
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ,
אמ"ן/קש"ח, דובר צה"ל, נ"י.

תאריך, זמן:
מספר המברק:

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

המשרד: 55 384 565
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אורח

20/2/90

תדרוך דובר הבית הלבן ליום

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC, REGULAR BRIEFING
BRIEFER: MARLIN FITZWATER/ TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1990

Q Has the E Soviet Union F, as reported in the New York Times this morning, told the US that they are not now considering direct flights for E Jewish emigrants F out of the Soviet Union to E Israel F?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, they have indicated that they would not approve direct flights. I don't know about the process aspects of notification, but that's -- they clearly have made that view known. The United States feels, of course, that direct flights would be helpful in increasing the number of Soviet emigrants to Israel. The President is concerned about reports of growing anti-Semitism in that country. He heard from American Jewish leaders just a week or two ago who voiced great concern on that issue, and we believe that direct flights would be helpful in increasing the number of people that can get out.

So we are disappointed that they have not approved those, but we are hopeful that it may still happen.

המברק יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
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Q Well, what about the Israelis encouraging these immigrants to go settle in the Occupied Territories?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we think that's unfortunate. The United States position has been that we do not believe the new settlements in the Occupied Territories is helpful to the peace process, nor do we believe that encouraging Soviet immigrants to settle there is helpful to the peace process. And so there is -- but that does not mean that --

Q Do we want to see --

MR. FITZWATER: -- that does not mean we don't -- we don't want to increase the number of immigrants that are able to go to Israel.

Q But what do you plan to do with the Palestinians there? I mean, it's supposed to be illegal. Suddenly it becomes "unhelpful." It's either illegal and we are not encouraging it -- I mean, don't they have a just basis for being unhappy with this development?

MR. FITZWATER: I'm -- you lost me in the question. Who is unhappy with what?

Q What is -- who is going to protect the rights of the Palestinians who live under military occupation?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, one of our concerns about that's -- we're concerned about new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza because we want the peace process to move forward and we don't think it's helpful to increase our presence there. And that recognizes the Palestinian situation.

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Q But how does this relate to your response to the Soviet move? I mean, clearly they are doing this because of the Soviets being moved into the settlements. Why aren't we -- why are we encouraging it when the Israelis haven't --

MR. FITZWATER: Well, the reverse side of your question is, why don't you want to keep Jewish immigrants out of Israeli if they are going to the West Bank and Gaza. But we don't think that's -- that's fair. And we certainly want --

Q Well, what pressure are you putting on Israel?

None!

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we have -- have talked with them about this in a very -- in very strong terms. The President has made his views known directly to President Shamir and to the Israeli government on a number of occasions.

Q Well, what good has it done?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we're hopeful that it will --

Q Is that -- (inaudible) -- you're hopeful, but you'll also financially supply the Israeli government with the wherewithal to have these settlements?

MR. FITZWATER: Israel is a loyal and steadfast friend of the United States. We have supported their government and their country in the past and we will continue to do so.

Q Do we view these settlements as illegal?

MR. FITZWATER: We haven't -- we haven't addressed the legal problem. Our policy is that they should not be established in the West Bank and Gaza. But I don't have an answer for you on the legal aspects of it.

Q Didn't we at one time view them as illegal? I mean, and then --

Q Yes.

MR. FITZWATER: I don't know.

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Testimony by

Richard Schifter

Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

before

The Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee

"COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989"

February 21, 1990

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This is my fifth annual report to this Committee on the state of human rights worldwide. Our most recent volume of the Reports, which will again become an internationally-recognized standard reference work, is once more the result of the labors of hundreds of persons, both at the various diplomatic posts and in Washington.

This year some of the posts which had their reports all prepared had to start over again and write a new document, based on the profound changes in human rights conditions which took place in Eastern Europe during the last few months of 1989.

And that brings me to the discussion of the year 1989 in terms of its human rights developments. When I delivered my first report to you, I most certainly did not think that during my incumbency in this office I would be reporting to you on the spread of the democratic ideal throughout Eastern Europe. But that is precisely what I can do today.

To paraphrase Karl Marx, a specter has haunted not only Europe but the entire world during most of this century. It is the specter of totalitarianism, of a state taking total control of the life of individual citizens, extirpating all forms of dissent, killing or imprisoning those who stand in the way. Although dangers remain, and much work needs to be done to firmly establish democratic governments, this specter of totalitarianism is at long last disappearing from Europe. As of today, Albania is the only relic of the age of Hitler and Stalin left intact in Europe.

It has been suggested that future historians will take special note of 1989 as a watershed year, a year in which the ideas of democracy and respect for human rights won out in Europe. To some extent the spectacular events in the East European states overshadowed the developments in Moscow. But it was in Moscow that the most critically important steps were being taken. In a reversal of Lenin's precepts, power is now being transferred in the Soviet Union from the Communist Party to the State, and the country's citizens have begun to be given a genuine role in the election of their legislative representatives. The process of democratization has by no means been completed, but a good beginning has been made. As we compare 1989 with previous years, we can note that that process was sharply accelerated. And as we analyze the developments of the first six weeks of 1990 it is clear that further acceleration can be hoped for this year.

Particular attention should be paid to the Soviet Union's republic and local elections which in most areas will take

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place on March 4. These elections may create in many parts of the Soviet Union an effective counterweight to the local Communist Party apparatus. It is in this way that Soviet reformers may succeed in outflanking the local party officials, many of whom have fiercely resisted the reform effort.

What is clear today is that Soviet reformers have committed themselves publicly to establishing in the Soviet Union a state based on the rule of law, adhering to democratic principles, and respecting human rights. Whether they will succeed remains to be seen. The obstacles are formidable. Opponents of reform, consisting of Russian nationalist-extremists, party hacks fearful of losing their positions of authority and privilege, and demobilized army officers who find themselves in a similar situation, may form a significant political block. Beyond that, the sentiments of the non-Russian nationalities, severely repressed for decades, are now coming to the fore. Too often these nationalist sentiments have expressed themselves in serious inter-ethnic violence. The re-emergence of anti-Semitism as a serious problem is another facet of the current difficulties. Soviet anti-Semitism is no longer sponsored by the top level of Government, as was the case in years past; but Soviet leaders have yet to speak out strongly against it. It has, however, proven to be a popular agenda item for some in the anti-reform opposition, including some opponents of reform in the lower echelons of officialdom.

The sharp decline in the totalitarian threat to the human rights cause in Europe has also been reflected in developments on other continents. Political parties and movements committed to totalitarian solutions are in disarray. Yet, as we so well know, there are countries in which totalitarian thinking still holds sway.

While we witnessed progress on the human rights front in Eastern Europe in 1989, we noted regression in China. As our Report shows, the killings in Lhasa and Beijing were only the first step. The crackdown that followed put into reverse, in very short order, much of the significant movement toward a more open society which had taken place in China during the last ten years.

As has already been noted publicly, our Report on China tells it as it is. Regarding the inter-relationship between our findings on human rights violations in China, on one hand, and our general policy toward that country, on the other hand, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger testified fully before this Committee less than two weeks ago. The following points do, however, deserve reiteration:

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(1) Our human rights goals are not advanced by cutting all ties with a country which engages in human rights violations; our purpose is to effect improvements in human rights conditions, which are usually the result of continuing contacts.

(2) We have fully adhered to the human rights requirements of existing legislation.

(3) Those of us concerned with human rights issues must accept the fact that in the framing of foreign policy, factors other than human rights are given weight too.

Other countries in which totalitarian methods of government still survive are North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba. It is especially noteworthy that these three countries combine repression with abject economic failure. The economic progress of South Korea and the success of Vietnamese and Cuban refugees in the United States well illustrate the debilitating effect of totalitarianism and the fact that political freedom and economic progress go hand in hand. As to the status of Cuba, I want to add that it is indeed tragic that in a hemisphere which is now overwhelmingly democratic and free, an aging dictator continues to cling to office, refusing to recognize that he has in every respect failed to fulfill the promises of the revolution he led a generation ago.

Countries which engage in similarly severe repression include Iran, which does it in the name of religion, and Iraq and Syria, which do it in the name of a secular political ideology. In the case of Iran, religiously motivated repression continues to single out the Baha'i for the most serious victimization.

Turning to countries in which authoritarian rule prevailed, we can note, on the positive side of the ledger, the movement of Chile back into the democratic fold. For the first time in 20 years a democratically elected president will be taking office shortly. Democracy and respect for human rights are also taking hold in Paraguay. But conditions remain grim and repressive in many other authoritarian countries. Burma is one significant instance in which efforts to move to democracy have been effectively stifled. And our hopes for greater respect for human rights in Haiti have again been disappointed.

Note should be taken of developments in 1989 in South Africa. Only time will tell whether the apartheid system, this most notable and egregious form of racial discrimination, will now, at long last, be dismantled and whether equal rights will

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finally be accorded to the country's Black population. But we can say that there is now better reason for cautious hope than there has been heretofore.

As distinct from the traditional human rights issues, which relate to the relationship between government and the governed, our Reports also deal with the issues of lives lost and other suffering sustained as a result of inter-ethnic and political domestic strife. In the year 1989, the most serious incidents occurred in the context of ethnic strife in Mauritania and Senegal. Scores of persons lost their lives and at least 200,000 persons were displaced. Other areas of continuing inter-religious and inter-ethnic strife include Sri Lanka, India's Kashmir State and the Punjab, Yugoslavia's Kosovo Province, the Israeli-occupied territories, and long-suffering Lebanon.

Another human rights problem is posed by the inability of some governments to protect the security of individual citizens in the face of domestic strife, including excesses by the government's own military forces in their efforts to suppress a violent opposition. In countries which experience this problem, we usually also note an inability of the judicial system to carry out its functions. That is the nature of the difficulty in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru and Colombia.

To sum up, we have not yet reached the "end of history" as far as the human rights cause is concerned. Progress in some areas has been offset by regression in others. But there is no doubt that the totalitarian challenge to the human rights precepts set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a matter of the past in almost all of Europe, though it still prevails in some parts of the world. In our discussions of human rights questions with our Soviet counterparts, we now speak the same language. That is a significant step forward and it augurs well for the future of human rights developments worldwide.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 2 מחוד 6 דפים

סוזג במחוני

דחיסות

תאריך/ז"ח

570

מס' מברק

ביקש לקבל הסבר לסכידוסרניה של מדיניות החוץ האמריקאית.

כריס סמית -

התייחס לשינויים במזא"ר, ציילה, נמיביה, סין (חבצ בקורת עולמית וגינוי מתמיד של סין ע"י המדיה, הממשל, הקונגרס האוני"ם ואגודות לז"א), נפאל(חופש דת).

מל לוויין -

תמך בכל דברי לנטוס. עיתוי השימועים - במועד דרמטי על רקע נאום האבל (שאיש לא האמין כי יתקיים לפני 3 חודשים) והשינויים במזא"ר.

בירך שיפטר על גילויי הפרות ז"א בסין ובטיבט, והסכים כי גישת הממשל כלפי סין היא סכידוסרנית. ביקש להעלות 3 נושאים:

א. הבחרות לגבי אל סלבדור (ע"מ 572-5 בדו"ח).

ב. מאמרים בעתונות (W-P) מתייחסים לפוגרומים בבריה"מ נגד יהודים, המסיעים על החברה הסובייטית בכללותה ועלית האנטישמיות.

ג. המאמר ב- W-P על ירדן והמלך חוסיין הפועלים למניעת עליית לישראל. " זה מזכיר לי סגיית שערים בסוף שנות ה-30 בפני יהודי אירופה".

ביקש התייחסותו של שיפטר ל: (1) טיסות ישירות (2) עד כמה בעיית האנטישמיות והפוגרומי חמורה.

לארי סמית -

בטעה שאנו חוגגים הדמוקרטיזציה במזא"ר אנו קוראים על המשך הפרות ז"א והעדר תומכי במדינות רבות. התייחס לדברי לנטוס בנוגע לעירק, סעודיה אירן וסין. עלינו לתת הע' כיצד לצמצם עוביו של הדו"ח לחצי, ע"י שיפור ז"א, המדיניות איננה פועלת.

8. להלן חלק השאלות והתשובות.

גאס יטרון - שמוש בנשק כימי נגד הכורדים. אמנם הדו"ח השנה אינו מתייחס לעובדת שמוש בנשק כימי אולם ישנן הוכחות לדיכוי הכורדים ומדיניות ג'ינוסייד כלפיהם.

שיפטר -

יש להבדיל בין גישת עירק כלפי הכורדים התומכים בממשל לבין המתנגדים לו. אין פירושו של דבר שזה מטחית מעוצמת הפסע. בצפון עירק האוכלוסיה הכורדית בהנהגת ברזני וחלימני התנגדה לממי עירק. באיזורים אלה התנהגות מס' עירק הייתה ללא ספק ברוטלית ומצננת.

יטרון -

אם לעירק מדיניות ברוטלית מדוע ארה"ב איננה ממקדת מאמציה כלפי נושא זה באוי"ם. אשתדק נדון הנושא בזעדה לזכויות אדם והואבצ. תמכנו בהחלטה אולם לא היו מספיק קולו

שיפטר -

יבדוק מה קורה השנה בועדה לז"א. יודע שדובר משלחתם התבטא בנושא ברוח דברי יטרון, ון התנגדות למדיניותה של עירק.

יטרון -

התייחס למאמרו של ג'ייס הוגלנד ב-WP על המשך פעילותם של מנגנוני הבטחון במזרח אירן האם הללו מהווים עדיין איום.

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 3 מתוך 6 דפים

סיווג בטחוני

דחיסות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מבק 570

- שיפטר - להערכתו אם כל המשל במדינת מזא"רית יעבור לשיטה דמוקרטית חסכנה תפחת. מקווה שגופים אל יסורקו במחירות.
- בירויטר - התייחס לנושא ייזום ^(הגנה) מאו"ם בנושא ז"א ותגובת שיפטר כי בדיכ לא יוזמים מהלכים כני"ל א יודעים מראש שאין מספיק תמיכה.
- לדעת בירויטר יש בכ"ז להגיש החלטות גם "אם אין קולות".
- לגבי אירן-עירק, האם ישנן הוכחות להתמכנות אירן מאז מותו של חומייני.
- שיפטר - לא חלה התמכנות. התייחס לדיכוי תבאחיים על רקע דתי, ותוסיף שההוצאות להורג אמנם נפסקו. אולם בסת"כ כל נושא ז"א באירן **is very repressive**
- בירויטר - מהם התבדלים העיקריים בין עירק לאירן וש"פ שלהן עם גופים בינ"ל כמו חצ"א לגבי שבוי מלחמה.
- שיפטר - סיפר כי העירקים נפגשו עמו והביעו דאגה לגבי התנהגות אירן כלפי שבויי המלחמה העירקים.
- בירויטר - שטחים: האם חל שיפור בשנה האחרונה.
- שיפטר - הדו"ח מדבר בעד עצמו. מספר מקרי המוות שנגרם ע"י צה"ל ירד בחצי וזאת כתוצאה מחוראות ותקנות חמורות.
- בירויטר - שאל על המצב בבורמה והמיעוט התורכי בבולגריה.
- אואנס - סיפר על ביקורו בבריה"מ ובארמניה ועל דיונים שקיים בנושא יתודי בריה"מ. שאל, לאור ההתפתחויות האחרונות מה התקווה לגבי הארמנים.
- שיפטר - נושא הלאומים מהווה בעיה לממשל הסובייטי. פירט בנושא. הטוביטיים מנסים להתגבר על בעיה המיעוטים שחינה כללית באיזור.
- אואנס - ביקש לחזור בסיבוב הבא של השאלות לנושא שיחותיו עם יהודים והשמועות שקלט על פוגרומים.
- כריס סמית - שאל בנושא חופש דת בסין. **כן שאל האם לקב.**
- לנטוס - טיץ - ציטט משפט בדו"ח המדבר על ניתוק כל הקשרים עם מדינת המפירה ז"א, אנו לא ביקשנו ז חאם יש מחוקק כלשהו שביקש זאת. לא ידוע לי על כך.
- שיפטר - היו שביקשו להפחית הקטרים.
- לנטוס - יש הבדל ומבקש להעמיד דברים על דיוקם.
- סעודיה - התנהגות כלפי אזרחים אמריקנים - ביקש פרטים על האזרחים האמריקנים שבדונו להלו מה עשו המשל ושגארה"ב בריאד, בנדון.
- שיפטר - אינו יודע. יבדוק. יכול לתת חשבה ביורוקרטית שהנושא הינו קונסולרי.
- לנטוס - התרגז על התשובה ואמר כי ניתן היה לצפות שלשיפטר יהיו פרטים בנושא. לנטוס המשיך בנושא

שגרירות ישראל / נושין גטון

סוּמַס מְבַרַק

דף 4 מחוד 6 דפים

טוונג בסמוני

דחיסות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק 570

סאקיגה וטוואי אינ עספה פראנסיז אלמל פולמא

קטיעת איברים כאמצעי ענישה.

שפט - לשאלת לנטוס האם השגריר האמרי העלה בנושא בריאד השיב שיפטר בסליחה. לשאלה נוספת הליב

שיפטר כי נושא זי"א לא נדון עם סעודית שכן התחושה היא שזה לא יוליך לשום דבר.

לנטוס - האם פירושו של דבר שאנו שותקים.

שפט - לא. הדו"ח מהוזה היאוד עובדתי של המצב. שיפטר הסביר כי הם פגמים יום יום לתת תשובות

ולעשות ככל יכולתם. לא אנו (כותבי הדו"ח) נביא אונגרום לטינויים.

לנטוס - ביקש לקבל רשימת של כל האמריקאים שנפגעו ב-89.

ג'ין מיינס - שאלה בנושא הודו. **1986 - שאל באיכות והביליות רבה וקטפ H איכיה.**

אל אוי - שאל בנושא אלסלבדור (ההבדל בין **death squads** וקבוצות ויגיילנטים).

יהודי בריח"מ - בירך את שיפטר ותממשל לגבי המאמצים לקידום טיסות ישירות. מודאג מאד

מהידיעות בעתונות על פוגרומים צפויים נגד יהודים מחד גיסא "וועקת" (שטרא) הערבים

נגד העליה מאידך גיסא.

בקש שיפטר לחתימת לוא. מידת האנטישמיות בבריח"מ.

ב. אפשרויות התגירה מבריח"מ.

ג. טיסות ישירות

שפט - א. נושא האנטישמיות מעוגן שנים בבריח"מ. זוהי עובדת ומציאות החיים. מה ששונה עכשיו, לעומת

העבר (למשל לפני 5 שנים) הוא שנראה שהפרנמיסטים בממשלה אינם מעוניינים בתופעה ואף נב

ממנה ומעוניינים בהיעלמותו של כל קונפליקט אתני. נושא האנטישמיות מנוצל ע"י האופוזיציה

מתנגדת הרפורמות.

ב. בנוגע לעדיבת בריח"מ, מוצבים מעט מאד חכשולים ליציאה.

ג. טיסות ישירות - המזכיר בייקר ביקש מהסובייטים שיתקדמו בנושא לאחר חתימת ההסכם עם אל

הסובייטים מסרו שלא יעשו זאת עתה, אולם, כך שיפטר, נבדקות אפשרויות לעזוב בדרכים אחרות.

לנוי - אנחנו נמשיך לעסוק בנושא הטיסות הישירות. ביקש בשם הקונגרסמן גיי. ינסון לשאול על גורלו

של הרסיוזניק ולדימיר ראז.

שפט - חעלה זאת במוסקבה בביקורו האחרון בשבוע שעבר עם יו"ר ה- **MEMBERSHIP COMMISSION**

שקבטיה שועדתו תדון בנושא תוך חודש עד ששה שבועות. הנושא הועלה ע"י בוש בפגישתו עם

גורבצ'וב ובייקר עם שוורדנדזה. כ"א בצד הסובייטי יודע שאנו נחושים בדעתנו לגבי הנושא.

לארי סמית - מדועזע מתשובת שיפטר ללנטוס בנוגע למדיניות ארה"ב כלפי סעודיה. לתוודות שאין לארה"ב כל מ

על סעודיה לאחר שמכרנו להם כל כך הרבה נשק ב-30 שנה האחרונות? הם מעוניינים בנשק שלנו

שגרירות ישראל / נושיונגטון

ס ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 5 מחוד 6 דפים

סוג במחוני

דחיות

תאריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק 570

לגבי דרא"ס, סין, ליבריה, מוזכרות שנקציות זדגים כל העת בנושא. לגבי טעויות - לא ג'אשי דבר. יש לנו מדיניות סלקטיבית בנושא ז"א.

שיפטר -

האם איננו פוגעים בעצמנו בפירוט הרב של בלי שנעשה דבר. הדו"ח מצויין וחשוב אך מה משיגים ממנו. מה עושים עם הדו"ח לאחר השלמתו.

סמית -

א. המנדט להכנה הדו"ח ניתן ע"י הקונגרס. זה מסייע לנו להחמק בנושא ז"א ובמקרים מסויימים אף מביא לשינוי.

ב. כשאנו דניט במדינות, אנו מנסים לחצוא קריטריונים ונסיבות שיאפשרו שינוי.

אנו מנסים לערב גם גורמים ומדינות נוספות מחוץ לארה"ב שיעסקו בנושא ז"א. מציע שהקונ יפנה לפורלמנטים אחרים לצרכי שת"פ.

שיפטר -

המשיך בחילומי הדברים עם שיפטר לגבי העדר LEVERAGE וחרמת ידיים, ותכניות הדרכת של מחמ"ד לגבי טיפול בנושא ז"א במדינות השונות.

אואנס -

ביקש לקבל רשימת כל הדמרשים שנעשו ע"י מחמ"ד ב-89 כדי לראות האם הדו"ח משקף מדיניות תחז' האמריקניות.

יהיה מוכן לעשות זאת אולם רק בישיבה סגורה בהיות החומר מסווג.

שיפטר -

(החליף את יטרון שעזב כיו"ר) -

פוגרומים בבריה"מ - סיפר שנפגש עם רפיוזניקים במוסקבה בשבוע שעבר אשר ביקשוהו לסנו לכל עמיתיו ולבקשם לא לבטל את ג'קסון-וויק - גם לא לשנה, עד שלא תובטח ההגירה החופשית מהעמדת הממשל.

אואנס -

במאי '89 אמר הנשיא בוש כי יהיה מוכן להטעות את ג'קסון-וויק אם וכאשר ממבריה"מ תעב חקיקה בנושא ההגירה ואם נראה שהחוק ימומש כראוי. הנשיא לא תחס הזמן, גם לא בשנה. הצים עתה היא שהסובייט העליון יפעל במושב הקרוב להעביר החקיקה בנושא והובטח לו בשיחותיו שזהו הנושא הראשון על סדה"י. להערכתו הנושא ידון במהלך חודש מרס.

אואנס -

נושא הטיסות היטירות וההטכס שנחתם עם אל-על, אינו תואם דבריו.

שיפטר -

החקיקה תאפשר הגירה חופשית. לגבי טיסות אל על, הן אמורות להיות טיסות נוספות אולם אפ לעזוב את מוסקבה לבודפשט ורמס לקחה את מטוסי אל-על. זה מאט את תהליך היציאה.

אואנס -

יש המתנה כבר של שנה. האם מצב הטיסות היטירות ישתנה.

שיפטר -

אינו סבור שיהול שינוי אך יתכן שתתאפשרנה טיסות אחרות נוספות.

אואנס -

שטחים - מספר תהרוגים הפלסטינים ע"י צה"ל קטן, מאידך מספר הפלסטינים שנהרגו ע"י פלסטינים האם ב - '89 מצב ז"א החמיר בשטחים?

שגרירות ישראל / זרטינגטון

ט ו ס ס מ ב ר ק

דף 6 מתוך 6 דפים

סוג בטהוני

דחיפות

האריך/ז"ח

מס' מברק 570

- שיפטר - לא אמרתי זאת כר, וקשה לחגדיך זאת בצורה כזו. במצבים אחרים (במדינות ובאיזורים אחרים) בעיית ז"ח היא מרכז הבעייה. במקרה של השטחים, הבעיה העיקרית היא תהליך השלום. הבעיות בשטחים נובעות מהעדר שלום, לכן עימותים עם צה"ל, אירועים אלימים ואז אנו זנים באופי התגובה.
- אואנס - מח תגובתך על רצח פלסטינים עי"י פלסטינים.
 - שיפטר - השאלה היא האם הרצח מחוץ לשטחים או מתוך השטחים.
 - אואנס - אין לך דיעה האם זו תוצאה של תיאום מבחוץ?
 - שיפטר - איני יודע. יתכן שגם מבחוץ וגם מתוך השטחים.
 - אואנס - האם אתה משוכנע שצה"ל עושה כל שביכולתו?
 - שיפטר - אי אפשר לעשות הכל - יש מגמה להוריד מס' הנפגעים, מאידך צה"ל אינו נמצא בכל מקום.
 - אואנס - האם דואה קטר בין עליית האסלם הפונדמנטליסטי לרצח פלסטינים עי"י פלסטינים.
 - שיפטר - אינו יודע. יתכן שכן. מכל מקום לחמאס יש מעורבות רבה בנושא.
 - כריס סמית - המשיך לשאול בנושאי סין, רוסניה, נפאל בריה"מ. (חוסר זת, הסלז, ענישה על חמרת דת).
 - ג'יון מירט - המשיכה לשאול בנושא רדיפות דתיות בהודו.
 - אואנס - שאל על מחנות החינוך מחדש בוואטנ, וסיים השימועים.
9. כפי שחוכלו לראות נושא השטחים כמעט ולא נדון וכאשר הועלה, הועלה באופן חיובי ובענה בטון חיובי.
10. בדיפי-התמליל המלא של השימועים.
11. הילואים הנסג.

ורנאי ורנאי דרנגר

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / אוסינגטון טופס פרוק	ד: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 4
תאריך ושפת העבר:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דצ:
המסד:		פאת:
569		

ישנם איזורים מבטיחים יותר מישראל כמו למשל הודו ממנה ניתן להגיע גם לטין.
 החמקד בצורך של שידורים לטין.
 שוייר המליץ בסוף דבריו שהכספים שהוקצבו לפרוייקט תחנת הממטר בערבה יועמדו לטובת
 הקיצוצים שנעשו לאחרונה ב-1989, לקידום תכניות שתיים איזוריות בין ישראל ומדינות ערב,
 למימון הגירת יהודי בריטיים ולחקטנת הדפיציט האמריקני.
 שוייר הדגיש שעל אנשי איכות הסביבה חובת החוכחה שאכן קיימות בעיות.
 3. להלן סיכום המשך השימועים.

תפוצה:

1990-02-21 23:42

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Forbes also sent a letter to Rabin promising that should any other problems with the Air Force arise after the transmitter is operational that BIB/VOA will do whatever is necessary to alleviate the problems. He also noted that the Air Force had occasion to try to move the base into the nature preserve prior to the VOA project but didn't due to environmental complaints. 569

In response to a question from Snowe regarding the impact of the cancellation of the project, Forbes stated that it would send a message of bad faith to the Israelis and would send a signal to the world that the U.S. is becoming more isolationist.

The Subcommittee also heard from Israeli and American environmentalists. Although the environmentalists were very upset they did not offer hard proof of the environmental dangers caused by the transmitter. Members of the panel were very sympathetic to their concerns but explained how difficult it would be for Congress to override what at this point is an Israeli domestic issue.

Rep. Larry Smith (D-FL) stated that he had "a nagging feeling that this is not the forum for this discussion...and that it is difficult to make decisions based on conjecture."

Rep. Olympia Snowe (R-ME) astutely responded to Scheuer's argument regarding Soviet jamming, reminding the panel that "jamming was never the principle reason for this project." She stressed that \$20 million were saved when jamming "ceased to be an issue in 1983." She reiterated that the issue had always been to strengthen the VOA signal to Soviet-Central Asia.

Also testifying before the Subcommittee was Malcolm Forbes Jr., the Chairman of the Board of International Broadcasting. Forbes outlined the importance of the VOA transmitter for reaching the Soviet bloc, Asia and Africa and stressed that BIB/VOA has worked very closely with the Israeli government through each phase of the transmitter project. Forbes explained that all the problems now being discussed including the environmental concerns were brought up by the Israelis at the beginning of negotiations and since then all but two or three have been resolved. Forbes stated that BIB/VOA had contracted a \$2 million study that showed no significant negative effects of the environment as a result of the transmitter and noted that researchers from the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel had participated in the study.

Forbes emphasized that he had just returned from Israel where he met with Rabin. He stated that Rabin asked for American reassurances but did not express opposition for the project. Forbes continued that BIB/VOA does not support moving the Air Force base into a nature preserve and has been in close consultation with Air Force officials and "has now met all of the standards of the Israeli Air Force" to avoid relocating the base.

1990-02-21

23:44

דתיקות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קד: 4
סוג:		פתוק: 4
תאריך וזמן תכור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
תפסיד:		פאת:
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4. בשלב זה לא ברור האם ומתי יחיה המטען לפעילות בנושא זה.

ישראל ורנאי דרנגר.
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה:



1/27/10
2007/10

אמריקאים

official text

INTRODUCTION

1989 Human Rights Report

This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in compliance with Sections 116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.* The legislation requires human rights reports on all countries that receive aid from the United States and all countries that are members of the United Nations. In the belief that the information would be useful to the Congress and other readers, we have also included reports on the few countries which do not fall into either of these categories and which thus are not covered by the Congressional requirement.

Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act with the foregoing sections of law so as to be able to consult these reports when considering assistance programs for specific foreign countries. One of the very important consequences--perhaps unintended--of these legislative provisions is that they have made human rights concerns an integral part of the State Department's daily reporting and daily decisionmaking. A human rights officer in an Embassy overseas who wants to write a good annual human rights report on the country in which he or she works must carefully monitor and observe human rights developments throughout the year on a daily basis. As a consequence he or she will report on such developments whenever something of human rights significance happens in the country of assignment. In the past 12 years, the State Department has become decidedly better informed on and sensitized to human rights violations as they occur around the globe.

* Section 116(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as follows:

"The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by January 31 of each year, a full and complete report regarding...

(Footnote continued on page 2)



United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63432 Tel. 654338
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

USIS

The year 1989 may very well go down in history books as a watershed year regarding the worldwide cause of human rights. The revolutionary changes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and Romania left Albania as the only totalitarian regime left intact in Europe by year's end. In Poland's elections, Solidarity won nearly all contested seats and saw one of its members installed as Prime Minister. Constitutional reforms in Hungary should lead to the installation of a government by consent of the governed in 1990. Free elections are promised in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Romania.

(Footnote continued from page 1)

*(1) the status of internationally recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (a)...

(A) in countries that received assistance under this part, and

(B) in all other foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report under this Act."

Section 502(B)(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as follows:

"The Secretary of State shall transmit to Congress, as part of the presentation materials for security assistance programs proposed for each fiscal year, a full and complete report, prepared with the assistance of the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect to practices regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights in each country proposed as a recipient of security assistance."

What was striking about these dramatic changes in Eastern Europe was that, except for those in Romania, they occurred almost without bloodshed. The Soviet Union's acceptance of these changes was undoubtedly a significant factor in the peaceful character of the transition, as was the orderly and democratic spirit of the popular movements themselves.

The spectacular events in what were once known as the Soviet satellites tended to overshadow remarkable steps taken by the Soviet Union in the direction of an open society. Elections to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, though rigged in some areas, were genuine contests in others, and resulted in the election of numerous opponents of the old order. The Supreme Soviet, chosen from members of the Congress, became a legislative branch relatively independent of the executive. There was further progress regarding freedom of expression, of association, of assembly, and of religion. Many restrictions on emigration were relaxed.

Though reformers strengthened their hold on the top echelon of the Soviet Government, "new thinking" has failed to penetrate many parts of the Soviet bureaucracy. Incidents of the autocratic use of power continue to be reported. The absence of a legal tradition and of legal institutions empowered to protect the rights of individuals add to the leadership's difficulty in getting its reform policies fully enforced. The creation of an independent judiciary remains critically important for the enhancement of respect for human rights in the Soviet Union.

In the Western hemisphere, democratic processes and human rights gained considerable ground. The year 1989 marked the end of the Stroessner dictatorship in Paraguay, election of the leader of the democratic opposition as President of Chile, and peaceful elections in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, El Salvador, and Honduras. Elsewhere in the world, human rights progress was recorded in southern Africa, where U.N.-supervised elections took place in Namibia. The newly elected constituent assembly began drafting a new constitution, and we expect independence day to be in the early part of 1990. Newly elected President de Klerk of South Africa has taken some encouraging steps leading to dialogue with the black opposition.

Around the globe, the positive trends are unmistakable, making the setbacks all the more stark. After having moved in the direction of a freer society for more than a decade, China reversed course last June with its suppression of student protests, large-scale arrests, renewed prohibition of the expression of dissenting views, and a renewed commitment to totalitarian governance and indoctrination. Severe repression of all forms of political opposition continued in Burma, and North Korea remained one of the most repressive totalitarian regimes.

Going against the prevailing trend in the Western Hemisphere was Cuba, which once again sharpened repression, particularly of human rights activists, many of whom had cooperated with the 1988-89 U.N. Human Rights Commission investigation. The Government staged a show-trial and then executed a group of military officers who might have been a threat to Castro. Also of concern was the serious setback in Haiti in January 1990 involving the suspension of civil liberties and the arrest, beating, and/or deportation of prominent opposition politicians.

Ethnic violence in Senegal and Mauritania took scores of lives in both countries and resulted in the displacement of at least 200,000 people. In Liberia, unknown numbers of persons were killed, and thousands sought refuge in neighboring countries during fighting between dissidents and units of the army.

Ethnic strife and insurgency took at least 8,500 lives in Sri Lanka and more than 1,000 lives in Sudan. Repressive measures and clan warfare in Somalia caused the deaths of perhaps several thousand persons, and repression and civil war resulted in thousands of casualties in Ethiopia.

Other areas plagued by insurgency, civil unrest, terrorism, and countermeasures taken by governments include Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, the Israeli-occupied territories, Northern Ireland, Peru, and the Phillipines, as well as long-suffering Lebanon. Elsewhere armed conflicts continue to be waged in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Afghanistan.

As we look to 1990, the questions before us and before the world community are whether the human rights gains of 1989 in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world will be lasting achievements. Is there a danger of relapse? Will human rights problems stemming from domestic rather than international conflicts increasingly draw our attention?

For our part, the United States remains committed to the worldwide promotion and consolidation of human rights and democracy. We see these goals as principal foreign policy challenges. We actively champion them abroad because they reflect the best that is in ourselves. And we do so because we have found that in those countries where human rights and democratic values have taken hold, we find friends--not enemies. These are the world's most stable governments, the most dynamic societies, the bulwarks of freedom, respectful of the rights of their citizens and of their neighbors, and the most responsible contributors to the well-being of the world community.

This year, as last, there are 169 separate reports. The guidelines followed in preparing the reports are explained in detail in Appendix A. In Appendix B is a discussion of reporting on worker rights, as required by Section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by Title V of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984).*

Although the legislation requires reports on worker rights only in developing countries that have been beneficiaries

Under the Generalized System of Preferences, in the interest of uniformity, and to provide a ready basis for comparison, we have here applied the same reporting standards that we have applied to all countries on which we prepare reports. Appendix C contains a list of 12 international human rights covenants and agreements and indicates which countries have ratified them. Appendix D contains explanatory notes on the statistical table in Appendix E, which shows the amounts obligated for U.S. economic and military assistance for fiscal year 1989.

Definition of Human Rights

Human rights, as defined in Section 116(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, include freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; disappearance due to abduction or clandestine detention; and other flagrant denial of the rights to life, liberty, and the security of the person. Internationally recognized worker rights, as defined in Section 502(a) of the Trade Act, include (A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.

* Section 505 (c) of the Trade Act provides as follows:

"The President shall submit an annual report to the Congress on the status of internationally recognized worker rights within each beneficiary developing country."

In addition to discussing the topics specified in the legislation, our reports, as in previous years, cover other internationally recognized political and civil rights and describe the political system of each country.

In applying these internationally recognized standards, we seek to be objective. But the reports unashamedly reflect the U.S. view that the right of self-government is a basic political right, that government is legitimate only when grounded on the consent of the governed, and that government thus grounded should not be used to deny life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Individuals in a society have the inalienable right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person; to enjoy civil liberties such as freedom of expression, assembly, religion, and movement, without discrimination based on race, ancestry, or sex; and to change their government by peaceful means. The reports also take into account the fact that terrorists and guerrilla groups often kill, torture, or maim citizens or deprive them of their liberties; such violations are no less reprehensible if committed by violent opponents of the government than if committed by the government itself.

We have found that the concept of economic, social, and cultural rights is often confused, sometimes willfully, by repressive governments claiming that, in order to promote these "rights," they may deny their citizens the right to integrity of the person as well as political and civil rights. There exists a profound connection between human rights and economic development. Experience demonstrates that it is individual freedom that sets the stage for economic and social development; it is repression that stifles it.

Those who try to justify subordinating political and civil rights on the ground that they are concentrating on economic aspirations invariably deliver neither. That is why we consider it imperative to focus urgent attention on violations of basic political and civil rights. If these basic rights are not secured, experience has shown, the goals of economic development are not reached either. This is a point which the Soviet Union's reformers seem to have recognized.

United States Human Rights Policy

From this premise, that basic human rights may not be abridged or denied, it follows that our human rights policy is concerned with the limitations on the powers of government that are required to protect the integrity and dignity of the individual. Further, it is in our national interest to promote democratic processes in order to help build a world environment more favorable to respect for human rights and hence more conducive to stability and peace. We have developed, therefore, a dual policy, reactive in the sense that we continue to oppose specific human rights violations wherever they occur, but at the same time active in working over the long term to strengthen democracy.

In much of the world, the United States has a variety of means at its disposal to respond to human rights violations. We engage in traditional diplomacy, particularly with friendly governments, where frank diplomatic exchanges are possible and productive. Where we find limited opportunities for the United States to exert significant influence through bilateral relations, we resort to public statements of our concerns, calling attention to countries where respect for human rights is lacking. In a number of instances, we employ a mixture of traditional diplomacy and public affirmation of American interest in the issue.

The United States also employs a variety of means to encourage greater respect for human rights over the long term. Since 1983 the National Endowment for Democracy has been carrying out programs designed to promote democratic practices abroad, involving the two major United States political parties, labor unions, business groups, and many private institutions. Also, through Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, funds are disbursed by the Agency for International Development for programs designed to promote civil and political rights abroad.

We also seek greater international commitment to the protection of human rights and respect for democracy through our efforts in the United Nations and other international organizations, and in the process devised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Preparation of these annual reports constitutes an important element of our human rights policy. The process, since it involves continuous and well-publicized attention to human rights, has contributed to the strengthening of an international human rights agenda. Many countries that are strong supporters of human rights are taking steps of their own to engage in human rights reporting and have established offices specifically responsible for international human rights policy. Even among countries without strong human rights records, sensitivity to these reports increasingly takes the form of constructive response, or at least a willingness to engage in a discussion of human rights policy. In calling upon the Department of State to prepare these reports, Congress has created a useful instrument for advancing the cause of human rights.

Richard Schifter
Assistant Secretary of State
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES*

Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty political system and free elections. There is no constitution, but a series of basic laws defines the responsibilities of government institutions. The legislature (the Knesset) can limit the government and force its dissolution. Israel has an independent judiciary. Public debate on issues of concern to Israelis is open and lively. A vigorous free press scrutinizes all aspects of Israeli life and politics.

Since Israel's founding in 1948, it has been in a formal state of war with most of its Arab neighbors, except Egypt, with which it concluded a peace treaty in 1979. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel has occupied the territories of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the eastern sector of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.

Since its founding, Israel has experienced numerous terrorist incidents, within and outside its borders. In this atmosphere of hostility and threat, Israel has relied heavily on its military and related services for security and has retained many of the security-related emergency regulations from the preindependence British mandate period.

*Because the legal status of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem and the political and human rights conditions differ sharply from those in Israel, the situation there is dealt with in a separate report following the report for Israel.

Internal security is the responsibility of the general security service (Shin Bet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister's office. The police are under the authority of a separate minister. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)--which include a significant portion of the Israeli adult population in either active duty or reserve status--also plays a role in maintaining internal security. The IDF is under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee reviews the activities of the IDF and the Shin Bet.

Israel enjoys a relatively high standard of living. It has a predominantly market economy with substantial government regulation and subsidies for basic commodities. Economic policy has a strong social welfare orientation.

Israeli citizens have a range of civil and other rights generally comparable to those in advanced Western democracies. Israel's Arab citizens have nonetheless not shared fully in the rights granted to, and the duties levied on, Jewish citizens.

In 1989, as in 1988, Israel's most significant human rights problem has been its practices in confronting the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. (For detailed discussion, see the separate report on the occupied territories.)

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Political killings in Israel are neither practiced nor sanctioned by Israeli authorities. In 1989 nearly 20 Israeli civilians were killed within pre-1967 Israel by Palestinians in circumstances that appeared to be related to the ongoing political conflict in the occupied territories. Approximately five Palestinians from the territories were killed within Israel by Israeli private citizens in what may have been indirect retaliation for these incidents. Palestinians and Israelis apprehended for these acts were dealt with through the normal process of Israeli law.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of government-condoned disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Israeli laws and administrative regulations prohibit, and provide specific penalties for, such activities. However, where security concerns predominate, these strictures have been violated. (See the occupied territories report for a discussion of allegations of mistreatment of prisoners.)

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Israeli law and practice guarantee against arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. Writs of habeas corpus and other procedural and substantive safeguards are available. Defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty.

Administrative detention, with no formal charge or trial, has in the past been imposed on Israeli citizens for security reasons under emergency regulations. Two Israeli Arabs were administratively detained in 1989. The Minister of Defense may issue a detention order for a maximum of 6 months. Within 48 hours of issuance of such an order, a district judge must review the case and may confirm, shorten, or overturn the detention order. Failing review within the designated time period, the detainee must be released. The detainee may be represented by counsel and may appeal to the Supreme Court. The Government may withhold evidence from the detainee and counsel on security grounds.

In 1989 Israel continued to hold most administrative detainees from the occupied territories in detention centers inside Israel. (For a full discussion of administrative detention of Palestinians, see the separate report on the occupied territories.)

Israel does not exile its citizens.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The right to a hearing by an impartial tribunal with representation by counsel is guaranteed by law. The judiciary is independent and effectively insulated from political interference. All nonsecurity trials are open. According to the Ministry of Justice, security cases may be tried before a military court or a civil court and may be partly or wholly closed to the public. The burden of justifying nonpublic proceedings falls to the prosecution. Defense counsel is present, even during closed proceedings, but may be denied access to some evidence on security grounds. According to the Ministry of Justice, in security cases in which access to some evidence is denied, that evidence is not presented to the court.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Privacy of the individual and the home are protected by law within Israel. Emergency regulations permit mail to be stopped, opened, and even destroyed on security grounds. A 1979 law allows tapping of telephones for security reasons, with confirmation by the Prime Minister or Defense Minister. Interference with mail and the tapping of telephones are practiced infrequently.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

(See the separate report on the occupied territories.)

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Individuals, organizations, the press, and the electronic media freely debate a wide range of public issues and criticize government officials and policies, except where sensitive security-based considerations or other censorship provisions apply. Press articles dealing with security-related matters must be submitted to the military censor. Israel's Arabic-language press is censored more strictly than the Hebrew-language press. In 1989 a High Court of Justice ruling narrowed the range of material that could be censored on security grounds. Movies are occasionally censored if deemed pornographic, offensive to religion or social mores, or likely to disturb public order. Theater censorship was ended in 1989 for a 2-year test period. All newspapers are privately owned and managed. Most of the electronic media are run by the independent Israel Broadcast Authority, whose chief is appointed by the Government.

Security regulations make it illegal to possess or distribute literature of an outlawed organization for purposes of encouraging support for that organization or its cause or publicly to express support for such an organization. There was no indication that anyone was prosecuted under this law in 1989. Provisions against maintaining contact with, or accepting support from, an outlawed organization apply to the media as well as individuals. In 1989 the license of an Arabic-language newspaper was revoked on the grounds of links to an outlawed organization.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Israelis representing almost any point of view are free to assemble and associate. The law and court rulings protect these rights. However, security regulations prohibit membership in, or contact with, outlawed organizations, their subdivisions, or their individual members. In 1989 an Israeli peace activist was jailed for meeting with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, eight Israelis were charged with meeting PLO members, and the 1988 convictions of four others for a similar offense were under appeal. A Knesset member met publicly with Yasser Arafat, but his Knesset immunity protected him from prosecution.

c. Freedom of Religion

Israel is a democracy. There are strong guarantees of freedom for all religious faiths. Approximately 82 percent of its citizens are Jewish. Muslims, Christians, and Druze, and members of other minority religions make up the remaining 18 percent. Travel to visit religious sites or perform religious obligations in and outside Israel is widely permitted. In 1989 Israel facilitated the pilgrimage to Mecca of over 5,000 Israeli Muslims.

Each recognized religious community in Israel has legal authority over its members in matters of marriage, legitimacy, inheritance, and conversion. Orthodox religious authorities have exclusive control over these matters in all sectors of the Jewish community, whether or not they are Orthodox.

Missionaries are allowed to work in Israel. A 1977 antiproselytizing law, prohibiting the offering and receipt of material benefits as an inducement to conversion, has not been employed.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Israeli citizens can move freely within Israel except in military or security zones, or in cases where they may be confined to their neighborhood or village by administrative order under emergency regulations. In 1989 two Israeli Arabs were confined in this fashion, but were later released.

Israeli citizens are free to travel within the occupied territories, except in those sections temporarily declared closed military areas. (See the occupied territories report regarding the effect of Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians' freedom of travel.)

Israeli citizens are free to travel abroad and to emigrate, provided they have no outstanding military obligations or are not restricted by administrative order. In 1989 the Israeli Government renewed restrictions on the travel of one Israeli Arab political activist, without giving an official reason.

Israel welcomes Jewish immigrants, including Jewish refugees, to whom it gives automatic citizenship and residence rights. It accepts back Israeli citizens who have emigrated. Israel has allowed the return of some Palestinians on the principle of family reunification but has rejected the great majority of requests for return.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Israel is a parliamentary democracy, with a multitude of parties representing a wide range of political views. Relatively small parties regularly win seats in the Knesset. All adult Israeli citizens have the right to participate in the political process and to vote by secret ballot. Participation of eligible voters, including Israeli Arabs, in national elections is high by Western standards. In the 1988 national elections, Israeli Arabs won 6 of 120 Knesset seats. Israeli citizens, including Israeli Arabs, actively participated in the 1989 local (municipal) elections.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.

Israel is responsive to international and nongovernmental interest in its human rights situation. It hosts and works with a delegation of the International Committee for the Red Cross. It permits regular visits by a wide range of private and international organizations concerned about human rights such as Amnesty International (AI), the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and others. The Government routinely investigates and responds to human rights inquiries by such organizations as AI. The Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs have human rights offices.

The number of local human rights and political action groups, already very active, expanded in 1989, primarily in response to the continuing uprising in the territories.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status.

Women's rights in Israel are protected by the equal opportunity law, which forbids sex discrimination. For example, it requires employers to pay male and female workers equal wages for equal work. Other laws and regulations give protection to women employees regarding pregnancy, childbirth, and child care. The Government includes a senior adviser on the status of women, and the Civil Service Commission and several government ministries have officers responsible for women's rights. Nongovernmental women's organizations work actively in promoting women's rights and welfare. Women are drafted into the army but do not fill combat-related positions.

Domination of personal status law by religious courts means that women are subject to restrictive interpretations of their rights in such crucial areas as marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The courts in Israel deal firmly with persons convicted of violence, including violence against women. Human rights groups, especially women's groups, are increasingly active in dealing with the issue of domestic violence against women, and the Government provides some funding for intervention activities.

Israeli Arabs, who comprise approximately 18 percent of Israel's population, have made substantial educational and material progress since the founding of Israel. A few have risen to responsible positions in the civil service, generally in the Arab departments of government ministries. The year saw the appointment of the first Arab woman judge. The Arabic-speaking community has access to local and foreign Arabic newspapers and magazines, internal and external Arabic television programming, and Arabic-language radio services. However, Israeli Arabs have not attained the same quality of education, housing, or other services as Israeli Jews. Relative to their numbers, they are underrepresented in the student body of most universities, and in higher level professional, academic, and business ranks.

The Israeli Druze and Circassian communities, at their initiative, are subject to Israel's military draft, and some Bedouin Arabs serve voluntarily in special units. However, most Israeli Arabs are not subject to the draft, and few volunteer. Consequently, they have less access than do other Israelis to such social and economic benefits as housing and new-household subsidies, and government or security-related industrial employment, for which military service is either a prerequisite or an advantage.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

Israeli workers and employers have freely established organizations of their own choosing. Israel has a powerful free trade union movement, the General Federation of Labor in Israel (Histadrut), and a much smaller rival federation. About 80 percent of employed Israelis (including 70 percent of employed Israeli Arabs) are members of Histadrut trade unions or are covered by its collective bargaining agreements. Histadrut is a vast service organization which also runs industries, banks, cooperatives and the country's largest health and child care systems. Histadrut's position as the preeminent representative of Israeli labor predates the establishment of the State of Israel and is not imposed by law.

Histadrut's members democratically elect their national and local officers and those of its affiliated trade unions and women's organization, choosing between political party lists. Plant or enterprise committee members are elected individually.

The right to strike is exercised frequently. There is a legal obligation to give 15 days' notice prior to a strike or lockout, unless otherwise specified in the collective bargaining agreement. Strikes often erupt without prior notice or Histadrut authorization, although Histadrut tries to maintain discipline with a central strike fund. The Government occasionally appeals to labor courts for back-to-work orders to restore essential public services while negotiations continue, but these orders are temporary and not always granted. Labor courts include employer and employee representatives. Strike activity in 1989 was relatively low; among the more important strikes were those by employees of Histadrut's health care system and by employees of the Histadrut-owned KOOR Industries.

Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have the same rights of labor association. While a number of such residents are members of Histadrut, at least 14 Arab unions independent of Histadrut also operate.

Approximately 100,000 nonresident workers work in Israel. Most of them are Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. While the total number of Palestinians working in Israel appears not to have changed significantly from 1988, a number of factors--entry permits required of Gaza workers, general strikes in the territories, and Israeli-imposed curfews--have had serious short-term effects on daily workers and have probably depressed the weekly average of hours worked per worker.

Nonresident workers cannot be members of Histadrut. They are nonetheless entitled to union representation, and can join, vote for, and be elected to shop level workers' committees in establishments where they number at least 20 or comprise at least 10 percent of the work force.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The right of Israelis to organize and bargain collectively is enshrined in law and freely exercised. The majority union (generally Histadrut) is the exclusive bargaining agent. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have the same rights under Israeli law. The Arab unions operating in East Jerusalem conduct their own collective bargaining.

Nonresident workers (primarily Palestinians) may not organize and bargain collectively on their own in Israel, but those that work in the organized sector are entitled to the protection of collective bargaining agreements and representation by the bargaining agent. The majority of these workers, however, work outside the legal hiring mechanism and lack this protection.

There are no export processing zones in Israel.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Israeli citizens are not subject to forced or compulsory labor.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

By law, children under age 15 may not be employed. Those aged 15 may not be employed if subject to compulsory education, except during vacations, or in apprenticeships, or with a permit from the Labor Minister under special conditions. The Minister may also allow an artistic performance by a child under 15, with safeguards. Employment of children aged 16 to 18 is restricted to ensure time for rest and education. A Labor Inspection Service enforces these provisions, but enforcement may be lax in smaller, unorganized enterprises. Israeli labor exchanges in the West Bank and Gaza do not permit Palestinians under 17 to be employed in Israel.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

Wage income in Israel is generally sufficient to provide workers and their families a decent standard of living. Legislation in 1986 established a minimum wage at 45 percent of the average salary, calculated periodically. An October 1989 adjustment raised it to \$447 a month. Most wages and salaries are established in collective bargaining agreements. The Labor Minister frequently uses the 1957 collective agreements law to extend private-sector wage settlements to the public sector and sectoral wage settlements to other, uncovered enterprises. Along with union representation, the Labor Inspection Service effectively enforces labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace.

By law, maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47 hours per week, 8 per day, and 7 the day before the weekly rest, which must be at least 36 consecutive hours and should include the Sabbath. Exceptions may be approved by the Labor Ministry but may not exceed 10 hours per day, or an average of 47 hours per week. By national collective agreements, the public sector moved to a 5-day, 42.5-hour week in April 1989, while the private sector established a maximum 45-hour week in August 1988 and an April 1990 deadline for all firms to institute the 5-day week.

Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have the same rights under Israeli law and union contracts and are entitled to the same working conditions as Israelis.

About 33,000 of the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working in Israel enter the job market legally through Israeli employment service labor exchanges in the West Bank and Gaza. Employers pay wages and social contributions for these workers to the service, which deducts taxes, employee social contributions, and a 1-percent union fee, and pays the balance to the workers. The same percentage is deducted from the pay of Palestinians working legally in Israel as is deducted from the pay of Israeli workers for social contributions. However, they do not receive the same benefits from the National Insurance Institute (NII, similar to U.S. social security), because many NII benefits require residence in Israel.

The NII provides commuting workers with workers' compensation for occupational injury or illness and employer bankruptcy insurance. These workers are also entitled to maternity benefits, including free hospital care and 12 weeks' paid maternity leave, but only for births in hospitals in Israel. Nonresidents are ineligible for NII old-age, survivors', and disability pensions, unemployment compensation, or insurance for long-term care or injury in nonoccupational accidents. They are also ineligible for NII children's allowances, funded only by employer contributions, and for NII-administered welfare programs funded by Israeli taxpayers through the budget.

Because of these restrictions, only 1.2 percent of nonresident Palestinian workers' pay goes to the NII, compared to 5.35 percent for an Israeli. The other 4.15 percent is an equalization deduction which was established to keep labor costs equivalent. This amount goes to a special finance ministry fund to be earmarked for social and development expenditures in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians estimate that this amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars since 1970 and claim that the Government of Israel has not accounted for its use of the funds. Expenditures for the territories are reviewed by the Knesset Joint Committee for Defense and Finances, but are not made public.

A report issued in December by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) on the social and economic conditions of West Bank and Gaza workers recommends that the social security system be revamped so that those who work in Israel are able to receive full social benefits or else be reimbursed for the value of their contributions which are deducted from gross wages.

Nonresident Palestinian workers who are legally hired are covered by the minimum wage law and by the larger system of social benefits granted through collective bargaining agreements. They are entitled to receive a pension through the Labor Ministry at age 65 after at least 10 years' employment in Israel, based on earnings and years worked, which is equivalent to Histadrut pensions granted to Israelis. They are also entitled to sick leave, severance pay, and paid vacations of 14 to 28 days per year, by law as well as by Histadrut contract. Histadrut has sought to defend the rights of nonresident Palestinians who were dismissed for absences during the uprising, maintaining that military curfews and community-wide strikes are beyond their control. Histadrut has not been able to get large numbers reinstated but has worked to get many their severance pay. The labor federation has used plant-site visits, Arab-language broadcasts, fliers, and workplace posters to inform nonresident Palestinians of their legal rights and benefits. Histadrut began holding seminars on worker rights in 1988 for employees recruited through West Bank and Gaza labor exchanges.

The majority of the nonresident Palestinians who work in Israel bypass the employment service hiring system, thereby losing social benefits but also avoiding taxes and social contributions for themselves and their employers. Their wages and working conditions are often below Israeli legal standards, particularly in seasonal agriculture and small restaurants, garages, and construction sites where many work. Enforcement of minimum wage laws is not stringent. In 1989 the employment service carried out stricter enforcement of the requirement that they be hired through labor exchanges, but this has not halted the trend toward more Palestinians working in the informal sector. Employment service inspectors have begun fining employers \$250 per illegally hired worker as an alternative to long drawn-out criminal court complaints.

According to the regulations, nonresident Palestinian workers are not allowed to stay overnight in Israel without a permit. The pressures of strikes in the territories, the occasional closure of the territories, and Palestinian activist efforts in Gaza to resist Israeli imposition of entry permits for all Gaza workers have induced more Palestinian workers to stay overnight in Israel illegally, often in substandard conditions. In practice, relatively few of the estimated thousands who regularly stay overnight are detained by the police. However, police have recently stepped up efforts to enforce the law against those workers who lack overnight and entry permits.

The 1989 report of the ILO Director General reviewed the situation of nonresident Palestinian workers in Israel. It reiterated its recommendations for action to combat illegal employment and eliminate inequalities with respect to benefits, working conditions, and job security. It called for restructuring the system of benefits so that workers' contributions would be used strictly for social security programs and not for other purposes.

THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

This report differs from most other reports contained in this volume in one fundamental respect: whereas other reports describe the relationship between the government and the governed in countries over which the governments in question exercise sovereignty, this report deals with lands under foreign military occupation. The lands now known as the "occupied territories" were occupied by Israel in the 1967 War. Israel has not been recognized to have sovereign rights over any of the occupied territories: the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. Regarding East Jerusalem, Israel has asserted sovereignty and annexed it. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are governed under Jordanian and British law, as modified by military orders. Israeli law and civilian administration have been extended to the Golan Heights.

The United States considers Israel's occupation to be governed by the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Israel denies the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank and Gaza, but states that it observes the Convention's humanitarian provisions in those areas.

Since 1967, there have been episodic but sometimes intense outbreaks of violence within the occupied territories, reflecting Palestinian opposition to the occupation. In December 1987, there was a dramatic outburst of civilian unrest and violence. This has continued throughout 1989 and has been far more widespread and intensive than at any time heretofore. This has led to a severe crackdown by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

The human rights situation in the occupied territories remains a source of deep concern to the United States. Overall, there were more Palestinian deaths in 1989 than in 1988. A total of 432 Palestinians were killed in intifada-related violence in 1989, of whom 304 were killed by Israeli security forces and settlers and 128 by other Palestinians; 13 Israelis, soldiers and civilians, were killed by Palestinians during 1989.

This unrest and violence, known as the intifada, has as its minimum goal the end of Israeli occupation, a goal strongly supported by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The leadership of the uprising, known as the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), attempts to direct and coordinate intifada activities. As it developed, groups of young people which have formed in individual localities but are loosely associated with each other and coordinate their tactics have, throughout the occupied territories, enforced business shut-downs and strikes, and directed attacks at Israeli military patrols and Israeli travelers, particularly settlers, whose cars are routinely pelted with stones. Occasionally firebombs have been thrown. The security forces have responded with tear gas, rubber and plastic bullets, and metal bullets.

Israeli occupation authorities have sought to end the intifada through widescale arrests, detention, raids on homes in which suspects were thought to reside, and more severe forms of punishment, including deportation. The rules of engagement of the Israeli Defense Forces provide for the use of force in case of self-defense in life-threatening situations, in the arrest of a suspect to a crime if the suspect resists, and dispersing a violent riot which endangers public order or the safety of soldiers. The rules allow the use of live fire only as a last resort and under defined procedures in these circumstances. The guidelines for the use of force stipulate that once force is no longer needed, it should no longer be applied. The Government of Israel makes clear to all forces serving in the occupied territories the need to adhere to the rules of engagement. However, violations of these rules have resulted in death and injuries. Only a relatively small number of such incidents have resulted in prosecution, and the sentences meted out have tended to be light.

An important aspect of the situation in the occupied territories in 1989 has been the significant increase in violence by Palestinians directed at other Palestinians. This has taken a number of forms, including assassinations, other acts of violence, and threats of violence. This took place in an environment influenced by some statements by various Palestinian leaders and the Unified Command promoting violence (e.g., a call by one UNLU leaflet to use knives, hatchets, and Molotov cocktails), tough Israeli security measures, the breakdown in law enforcement against conventional crime, and factional differences among Palestinians. The Unified Command has not disassociated itself from the phenomenon of intra-Palestinian violence but has sought to curb that element not under its control.

The strength of the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas movement has contributed to this intra-Palestinian violence and atmosphere of intimidation. Hamas opposes any reconciliation with Israel, and it would appear that its appeal, albeit still limited to a minority of the Palestinian population, has also shaped intra-Palestinian tensions.

Israel's open, democratic society enables widespread access to data on and investigations of human rights in the territories, notwithstanding IDF restraints applied there. Israel has designated officials in the Ministry of Defense with whom U.S. officials discuss specific allegations of human rights violations.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

- a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Political killing is not condoned by Israel. However, in 1989 there were allegations that Palestinian activists were intentionally killed by Israeli security forces or Palestinians working for them. Israel categorically denied these charges.

Israeli settlers killed 11 Palestinians during marches, patrols, retaliatory raids, and other incidents. The IDF condemned such vigilantism and attempted to stop it. Charges were brought against one settler leader in 1989 for the 1988 slaying of a Palestinian, and he has been on trial. Suspects in other killings were released for lack of evidence after they failed to cooperate with police.

Palestinian attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians in 1989 resulted in 13 deaths and 196 injuries. The authorities investigated these cases and prosecuted suspects in some of them.

During 1989, 128 Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians. Many were also wounded. There has been intimidation against some of those who are employed by the Civil Administration, and, in some cases, against some of those who have expounded the need for political compromise. Among those killed this year were a number of Arab policemen or local Arab village officials. Israelis state that a number of the victims of intra-Palestinian violence have been killed for seeking to express moderate views. Many of the victims were working with the Israeli security authorities, and Palestinians claim that some of them were armed and provided information leading to arrests of uprising activists. Palestinians state that other victims were habitual criminals or people killed due to private disputes.

Some of these attacks and acts of intimidation were carried out by young Palestinian activists, often masked, who were members of the "strike forces" which enforce directives relating to the conduct of the uprising. However, some attackers were members of self-styled Palestinian gangs which operated autonomously. The emergence of gangs called the Red Eagles and Black Panthers in Nablus in the northern West Bank has been a new development of concern both to Israelis and to most of the Palestinian community; these gangs and other individuals have also engaged in acts of violence as vendettas or as settling scores not connected with the intifada.

(For further discussion of casualties, see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.)

b. Disappearance

Israel does not sponsor or condone disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Torture is forbidden by Israeli law, and Israeli authorities assert they do not condone its use in the occupied territories. IDF orders forbid the use of force after the detention of a suspect and the cessation of violent resistance. Nevertheless, reports continue of harsh and demeaning treatment of prisoners and detainees, as well as allegations of beatings of suspects and detainees, including beating during house searches, which is contrary to IDF rules. At least 10 deaths can be attributed to beatings. Palestinians and international human rights groups claim that other cruel practices--including enforced standing in one position for prolonged periods, hooding, sleep deprivation, and cold showers--have continued since being confirmed in the 1987 report of the Landau judicial commission referred to in the 1988 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Physical and psychological pressures are particularly severe in incommunicado detention during investigation and interrogation.

Most convictions in security cases are based on confessions. An attorney is normally not allowed to see a client until after interrogation is completed and a confession, if obtained, has been made. Individuals may be held up to 14 days after arrest before the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is permitted access, which is often delayed.

According to IDF figures, 9,138 Palestinians were being held in IDF prison facilities as of January 1, 1990. Two military detention centers were added to the nine existing facilities. The Ketziot detention facility was expanded and improved, but serious overcrowding continued. Conditions at military detention facilities varied. Several prison riots and hunger strikes protesting conditions occurred. In March a prisoner in Gaza died while under Shin Bet interrogation. An Israeli investigation concluded that the cause of death was natural (an ulcer), and there is no presumption of mistreatment. The investigation also held that lax supervision may have contributed to the death, and a medical orderly has been disciplined. Another prisoner in Gaza died December 19 under interrogation in Shin Bet custody. An official autopsy concluded that death was caused by internal stomach bleeding brought on by a blow. Israel initiated an investigation into this incident.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

No new deportation orders were issued in 1989, but 26 Palestinians (including 5 journalists and 5 labor leaders) were deported in 1989, many after a lengthy appeals process up to the Israeli High Court of Justice, under deportation orders issued in 1988. Two others avoided formal deportation by signing agreements to remain abroad and avoid political activities for 5 years. The deportation process is characterized by a lack of formal charges and the use of secret evidence not disclosed to the suspect or his attorney. The United States considers deportations to contravene Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Israeli High Court of Justice has not accepted this view.

Palestinians under deportation orders may appeal to the Israeli High Court. The Court has overturned no deportation orders.

Administrative detention for alleged security reasons without formal charges was widespread in 1989. Israel maintains that administrative detention is used only against persons engaged in activities threatening security; however, in a number of cases persons appear to have been detained for nonviolent political activities. While the number of administrative detainees at any one time varies, IDF figures indicate that the number was 1,271 as of January 1, 1990. Most were detained under a 6-month order, although many orders have been renewed for a second or third time. In August the maximum length of detention under orders was extended to 12 months.

District military commanders may order administrative detentions without formal charges. A detainee may appeal the order to a military judge. Only a small percentage of orders is overturned on appeal. Secret evidence, not made available to detainees or their attorneys, is often used to support administrative detention orders. Rulings by military judges can be appealed to the High Court, which may review secret evidence, but there have been no reversals. According to the IDF, approximately 30 percent of detention orders were shortened or canceled on appeal in 1989 after portions of the detention period were served.

The authorities continued to transfer detainees and prisoners convicted of security offenses from the occupied territories to facilities in Israel, particularly the Ketziot detention camp in the Negev Desert and Megiddo Prison near Afula in northern Israel. Such transfers, in the view of the United States, contravene Article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, the Israeli High Court dismissed a 1988 petition brought by Ketziot detainees and held that the Convention's provisions could not be enforced by an Israeli court since they had not been enacted into Israeli law.

Any soldier can arrest without warrant a person who has committed, or is suspected of having committed, a criminal or security offense. Persons arrested for common crimes in the occupied territories are usually provided the opportunity for bail, access to an attorney, and a statement of charges, although these rights are sometimes delayed. Individuals may be held in custody without a warrant for 96 hours, and may be held without formal charges for up to 18 days. The normal pretrial detention period is 60 days. A high court judge may approve unlimited 3-month extensions. Security detainees are usually denied bail and are routinely held without access to counsel for 18 days. Access may be denied indefinitely if officials believe granting it would impede the investigation. Many security suspects are arrested without warrants and may be so held for up to 96 hours. Denial of notification of arrest to immediate family members, attorneys, and consular officials is common and under law can be extended for up to 14 days. Incommunicado detention for a period of 8 days is permitted

with a court order. Detainees are often not told the reasons for their detention. In September Israel announced improved family notification procedures. However, the problem of delayed notification continued.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Palestinians accused of nonsecurity offenses are tried publicly in local courts by Palestinian judges, except where jurisdiction has been transferred by military order. Palestinians accused of security offenses, which are broadly defined and, as administered, cover Palestinian nationalist activity of a nonviolent character, are tried in Israeli military courts before panels composed of one or three judges. Charges are brought by military commanders. Suspects are entitled to counsel. In 1989 there were long delays before trial because military courts were overburdened by the large number of uprising-related security cases. An increased number of judges and prosecutors was inadequate to cover the workload.

Most military trials are public, though access is controlled and in some cases limited. Consular officers are allowed to attend military court proceedings involving foreign citizens, but there have been delays in gaining admission. Acquittals are very rare in security cases. Most convictions in military courts are based on confessions. The absence of bail, long pretrial delays, and physical and psychological pressures increase the likelihood of confessions. These are usually recorded in Hebrew, which many defendants are unable to read.

In April a military appeals court staffed by active duty and reserve military officers was established with branches in the West Bank and Gaza. Appeals from decisions by three-judge panels may be brought by the defendant or the prosecution. Cases heard by single-judge panels, which can impose prison sentences of up to 5 years, may be appealed only with the permission of the court. According to Israel's Judge Advocate General, the court heard 25 cases through mid-October in which it accepted 15 defense appeals and 7 prosecution appeals. Nonjudicial administrative orders of the military government may be appealed to area military commanders and to the High Court. The court almost never reverses Civil Administration or military orders based on security considerations.

Israeli settlers in the occupied territories accused of security and ordinary offenses are tried in the nearest Israeli district court under Israeli law. These courts are presided over by professional judges, and standards of due process and admissibility of evidence are stricter than in military courts.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Military authorities may enter private homes and institutions without a warrant in pursuit of security objectives. Forced entries, which are a regular part of IDF operations, have resulted in beatings, destruction of property, and arrests. Military orders also authorize the authorities to occupy buildings, or parts of buildings, as military observation points. Security officials frequently questioned Palestinians about their political views, and temporarily detained people. Demolition and sealing are nonjudicial administrative punishments ordered by the area military commander. Demolition and sealing of houses in the occupied territories are carried out pursuant to Article 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945. Under the regulations, military commanders may order the demolition or sealing of any house from which they suspect a firearm has been discharged or bomb thrown, or any house situated in an area, town, village, quarter, or street the inhabitants of which they are satisfied have committed offenses against the regulations. The Israeli High Court ruled in January that houses of stone-throwers could be demolished. In July the High Court ruled that houses rented by offenders could be demolished and that owners have 48 hours to appeal a demolition order to the area military commander, who can waive this right in cases of "operational military need." Final appeals can be made to the High Court. The High Court has delayed orders but has not overturned any of them. In 1989, 170 Arab houses were demolished or sealed for security reasons (88 demolished, 82 sealed).

Owners are not allowed to rebuild, making the punishment one of indefinite duration. House demolition as punishment is enforced only against Arab residents of the occupied territories. The United States believes demolition and sealing as punishment of families contravenes the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel, however, holds that the Convention permits demolition under imperative military considerations. The Israeli High Court has ruled that demolition is lawful in certain circumstances.

Mail and telephone conversations are sometimes monitored. Telephone service to specific areas is sometimes interrupted by the authorities.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

While the rules of engagement set forth the limits within which force may be used, there were nonetheless a number of instances in which these limits were exceeded. IDF regulations permit use of live fire only when soldiers' lives are in real and immediate danger, to halt fleeing suspects, or to disperse a violent riot. Only a specific attacker may be fired on; fire is to be directed at legs only; and fire may be directed at a fleeing suspect only if a serious felony is suspected, and as a last resort. Rules of fire were expanded in 1989 to allow firing at any fleeing masked individual. Soldiers may fire high-velocity ammunition only after exhausting other methods, including tear gas, rubber bullets, and warning shots.

IDF guidelines often were not followed, resulting in avoidable deaths and injuries. Most Palestinians were killed by high-velocity rounds shot by the IDF or border police in the course of incidents involving stones, firebombs, and fleeing suspects. Many deaths and wounds were from bullets in the head or upper body. Misuse of plastic and rubber bullets continued to result in death and serious injury. In January noncommissioned officers were authorized to fire them. Tear gas was occasionally used in houses and enclosed spaces in violation of instructions for its use, which can be potentially lethal.

Estimates vary of the number of casualties from violence in the occupied territories. Figures compiled from press, Palestinian, hospital, international organization, and Israeli government sources indicate that in the occupied territories a total of 432 Palestinians were killed in 1989 (including the casualties already described in Section 1.a.: 11 Palestinians killed by settlers, and 128 Palestinians killed by other Palestinians). Estimates of the number of Palestinians wounded varies from over 5,000 to up to 20,000. As also reported in Section 1.a., 13 Israelis were killed by Palestinians and 196 injured in the occupied territories during 1989.

According to the IDF, 435 cases of IDF conduct were investigated in 1989, of which 47 resulted in court-martial; some were dropped for lack of evidence, and others were sent to unit commanders for disciplinary action below the level of court martial. However, regulations often were not vigorously enforced, many cases of unjust killing did not result in disciplinary action, and punishments often were lenient. In May four members of an elite IDF unit were cleared of manslaughter charges and convicted on reduced charges of "causing grievous bodily harm" in the 1988 beating death of a Gazan. The court found their officers had issued "manifestly illegal orders" in authorizing the beatings, but there was no prosecution of the officers. The 9-month sentences of the soldiers were later commuted to 6 months. The High Court of Justice on December 24 ordered the court-martial of an IDF colonel, who had resigned after the IDF had severely reprimanded him for ordering the breaking of bones of detainees. The IDF Judge Advocate General's office announced December 25 that another IDF colonel would be court-martialed for having shot to death a Palestinian resident of the Bureij refugee camp in Gaza. The official investigation of an incident in Nahalin in April 1989, which had resulted in five Palestinian deaths, acknowledged serious errors. Several Israeli security personnel involved in Nahalin were transferred and disciplined.

There were several controversial incidents in 1989 involving the entry by Israeli security forces into Palestinian hospitals and clinics. Israel denies that it interferes with medical services and supplies as a matter of policy but acknowledges that at times its security forces enter hospitals to pursue and arrest fleeing rioters or those suspected of security offenses. It denies allegations of mistreating patients or staff and asserts that Palestinians use hospitals as refuges for uninjured rioters. Palestinians deny this and charge that

security forces in some cases used tear gas and beat patients and staff, in contravention of international law. Palestinians allege that security forces at IDF roadblocks deliberately held up ambulances transporting wounded. Israel charges that ambulances are used to transport uninjured security suspects.

Israel, in response to a tax boycott, imposed a siege on the West Bank town of Beit Sahour. All access to the town was blocked for over 40 days, during which Israeli authorities seized merchandise and vehicles to pay outstanding tax bills. Israel claims these actions were justified by the tax boycott. Palestinians claim that certain Israeli tax practices are inconsistent with international law, including the imposition of a value added tax (VAT) and other taxes which did not exist before 1967, the summary seizure of private property, and Israel's failure to address whether the tax revenues were being utilized for the benefit of the population of the occupied territories.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

East Jerusalem is an active center of Arabic publication, including newspapers. There is no press elsewhere in the occupied territories. The Israeli authorities imposed tight restrictions on the Arabic press, citing broadly defined security reasons. Publications in East Jerusalem must submit to the military for prior censorship all copy relating to the security, public order, and safety of Israel and the occupied territories. Some reports and editorials related to the uprising and Palestinian political goals were permitted, but articles and editorials were routinely expurgated. Arabic translations of uprising-related news stories which had previously appeared in the Hebrew language press were routinely censored from the Arabic press.

The display of Palestinian political symbols, such as flags, national colors, and graffiti, is punishable by fines, detention, or imprisonment. According to the IDF, very few persons were sentenced in 1989 solely for displaying nationalist symbols, although this charge may be levied along with other more serious charges for violent activity. Public expression of support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), its component factions, Muslim extremist groups (such as Hamas), and other banned organizations is prohibited.

No broadcast media originate from the occupied territories. The authorities have jammed inflammatory radio broadcasts from neighboring countries. In August the use of fax machines in the Gaza Strip was banned. A military order closing a prominent Palestinian press service was renewed, and two other Palestinian press services were closed.

For alleged security offenses, Israeli security authorities administratively detained at least 20 journalists, interrogated numerous others, and raided newspaper offices. A permit is required for publications imported into the occupied territories. Imported materials may be censored or banned for anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli content or support of Palestinian nationalism. In addition to temporary restrictions on individual publications, there were temporary bans on the distribution of all East Jerusalem Arab newspapers in the West Bank and Gaza on four occasions. Possession of banned materials, such as uprising leaflets, is punishable by fine and imprisonment. The IDF periodically declared all or parts of the West Bank and Gaza closed military areas, one primary effect of which was to exclude journalists except under military escort. Reports by foreign journalists are subject to censorship under a system of self-regulation.

Israel kept all Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza closed throughout 1989, allegedly because they were contributing to violence. The vocational, secondary, and elementary schools in the West Bank, closed in January, reopened in July and August but were closed again in mid-November. Schools in Gaza and East Jerusalem were open for most of the school year. Alternate, off-campus classrooms organized by parents and teachers were banned on security grounds, although some continued to operate.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.

Military orders ban public gatherings of 10 or more people without a permit. (No permits were requested in 1989.) Political parties and other groups, including some labor unions, viewed as political are banned. Private organizations must be registered, though some operate without licenses.

Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-help organizations were permitted to operate unless their activities were viewed as overtly political or supporting the uprising. Persons involved in such activities were arrested, interrogated, administratively detained, or denied permission to travel.

c. Freedom of Religion

Freedom of religion is respected in the occupied territories. No group or sect is banned on religious grounds. Muslim and Christian holy days are observed. Both faiths operate schools and institutions (although religious schools were subject to the same extended closure as other West Bank schools). Religious publications circulate subject to the laws for publications detailed in Section 2.a.

In the wake of a demonstration in the al-Aqsa mosque area in Jerusalem, which resulted in some worshipers at the Western Wall below being pelted with stones, the Israeli authorities restricted access to the Al-Aqsa mosque during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and the Id al-Adha holiday. Security forces raided mosques and confiscated mosque loudspeakers, claiming security reasons. There was no indication that such raids or arrests of Muslim clergy were directed at religious freedom but rather at political or security-related activities.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories,
Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Freedom of movement was restricted periodically in the West Bank and Gaza by IDF curfews, which were often prolonged to discourage protest activities. Hundreds of curfews, some lasting several weeks, were imposed. During curfews, people were usually allowed to leave their houses to obtain food and medical care for short, defined periods. These curfews caused severe hardship.

All residents of the West Bank and/or Gaza were sometimes prevented from traveling to East Jerusalem or Israel. Peace advocacy groups from Israel were sometimes forbidden to visit Palestinian villages, for alleged security reasons.

Thousands of Palestinians in the occupied territories travel abroad each year. Israel imposed travel restraints on some political activists and on family members of some deportees. There were cases in which young men were denied permission to travel unless they agreed to remain abroad for an extended time. Exit travel permits were delayed for some Palestinians returning abroad for work or study after visiting relatives in the occupied territories. According to figures from the Islamic Waqf, which supervises mosques and Islamic properties in the occupied territories, over 90 percent of the Muslims who applied were permitted to make the hajj. Palestinians claim that those denied permission were denied because of nationalist activity.

There are no obstacles to emigration. Israel sometimes refuses to renew laissez-passers of Palestinians from the occupied territories who live or work abroad on the grounds that they have abandoned their residence, even though they may not have acquired foreign citizenship. Palestinians who obtain foreign citizenship are ordinarily not allowed to resume residence in the occupied territories. They are permitted to return as tourists only and sometimes are denied entry entirely. Enforcement of the 3-month limit for tourist visas for stays by Palestinians is uneven.

Entry or residency permission is frequently denied spouses, relatives, and children following the emigration of the head of the household. According to press reports, at least 100 spouses were deported for lack of residence permits in 1989. Persons who marry Palestinians in the occupied territories generally are not allowed to take up residence there. Israel has also denied the return of former West Bank residents who were not present in the territories, for whatever reason, at the time of the 1967 census.

Requests for family reunification far exceed the numbers of those granted. Palestinians say thousands of family reunification requests are pending. According to the Government of Israel, in 1988 and 1989 a total of 3,266 family reunification applications were filed for the West Bank, of which 695 were approved. For Gaza, 278 applications were filed in 1988 and, through July 1989, 219 were filed. Figures on the number approved for Gaza are not available. Israeli officials acknowledge that family reunification is limited for demographic and political reasons and assert that the laws of occupation do not require Israel to permit immigration into the territories. Restrictions on residence, tourist visas, reentry, and family reunification do not apply to Jews resident in the occupied territories, whether or not they are Israeli citizens.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government.

The West Bank and Gaza are ruled under occupation by Israel's Ministry of Defense through a military governor and civil administration. Palestinians have no means to participate in significant policy decisions concerning land and resource use and planning, taxation, trade, and industry. Municipal elections were last held in 1976 in the West Bank, and most mayors elected then were later dismissed on security grounds. Palestinians appointed by Israel have filled most vacancies. Some appointed mayors have resigned or stopped working because of the uprising and, in some cases, threats from other Palestinians. One Israeli-appointed municipal secretary was killed by other Palestinians.

East Jerusalem is governed as part of Israel. Arab residents of East Jerusalem are permitted to vote in municipal elections but have largely boycotted them. In the 1989 Jerusalem elections, less than 5 percent of Jerusalem's Arab population voted.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.

Israel normally permits international human rights groups to visit the occupied territories. Israel cooperates with a number of such organizations, and officials are generally available for meetings on human rights issues. However, some of these organizations often complain that Israel's responses are inadequate, not all inquiries receive answers, and some groups' requests for meetings with officials or access to detention facilities are denied.

Many local groups--Israeli, Palestinian, and mixed--are concerned with human rights. Their publications and statements are generally allowed to circulate in the occupied territories. They are allowed to hold press conferences. Individuals working for a prominent Palestinian legal rights organization were detained, beaten, prevented from traveling freely, and harassed at military checkpoints.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status.

Israeli settlers in the occupied territories are subject to Israeli law, while Palestinians live under military occupation law. Under the dual system of governance applied to Palestinians--both Muslim and Christian--and Israelis, Palestinians are treated less favorably than Israeli settlers on a broad range of issues, including the right to due process, right of residency, freedom of movement, sale of crops and goods, land and water use, and access to health and social services. Israeli settlers involved in security violations have been treated far more leniently than Palestinians guilty of similar offenses. Offenses against Israelis are investigated and prosecuted more vigorously than offenses against Palestinians. Israelis have residency rights in the occupied territories under Israel's Law of Return, regardless whether they have foreign nationality.

Israel continued to place land under its control for military purposes, roads, settlements, and other purposes which restrict use by Palestinians and discriminate in favor of Israeli settlers against Palestinians. Palestinians do not participate in the Higher Planning Council, which plans land use in the occupied territories and exercises planning powers transferred from local, municipal, and village councils in 1971. Issuance of permits to Palestinians for house construction is tightly restricted.

The Israeli Civil Administration provides basic services. In 1989 such services were sharply reduced due to the economic disruption caused by the uprising and a Palestinian tax boycott. There was no public accounting of revenue and expenditure.

Palestinians and persons of Arab descent entering the West Bank via the Jordan River bridges, regardless of citizenship, are subject to extensive searches, and many complain of harsh or humiliating treatment. Israel limits the funds visitors or residents may bring into the occupied territories for Palestinian use to about \$300 per person per month unless Israeli authorities grant permission in advance. There are no limits on funds for Israeli settlers.

There is no legal discrimination against women. Violence against women is not legally condoned. The participation rate of women in the labor force is low, and exists primarily in traditional professions and occupations, although there are exceptions. Women's societies flourish and play an important social role.

Section 6 Worker Rights

The applicable sections for West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working in Jerusalem and Israel are contained in the country report for Israel. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have the same rights and are governed by the same law as workers in Israel.

a. The Right of Association

The labor law in force in the West Bank is Jordanian Law No. 21 of 1960, as amended by military orders. It permits workers to join unions without prior government authorization. It also permits the formation of unions by any group of 20 or more workers from the same trade or workplace, with prior government authorization. The International Labor Organization (ILO) Director General's report has noted that the Israeli authorities have approved no applications since 1979. No petitions were submitted in 1989. Out of approximately 90 unions functioning in the West Bank, 31 are licensed.

Israeli authorities, citing security concerns, actively discourage union activities in the West Bank. The authorities state that the West Bank umbrella federations and many individual unions are fronts for illegal political organizations rather than trade unions. Israel claims that no legitimate union activities are disrupted and that its actions are intended to prevent illicit political activity.

More than 100,000 West Bank Palestinians, representing a full range of blue-collar and white-collar professions, were members of approximately 90 trade unions in 1989. Unions belong to one of three organizations, all calling themselves the General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank (GFTU). The largest GFTU claims membership in the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU), although the Tunis-based Palestinian Trade Union Federation (PTUF) is ICATU's affiliate of record. Two GFTU's have applied for membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). There is no connection between any of the West Bank unions and the Government of Israel or the Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.

Military Order (M.O.) 825 of 1980 requires that Palestinian unions present lists of candidates for union office to the Civil Administration (CIVAD) for approval 30 days before elections. CIVAD has said that it will enforce M.O. 825 by disallowing the election of

candidates not approved in advance. The order authorizes the CIVAD to remove from the lists any candidates who have been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor. Because Palestinian trade unionists fear that the CIVAD will use the order to exclude those candidates who have served in administrative detention, they refuse to adhere to the order.

Like all organizations and individuals in the occupied territories, Palestinian labor organizations are subject to disciplinary measures for engaging in political activities. The premises of the GFTU in Nablus remained closed on the grounds they had been used for political rather than union activities. Union-related meetings of 10 or more persons must have the prior approval of the CIVAD.

There has been no dissolution of unions by administrative or legislative action. Under prevailing labor law, unions have the right to strike only after submitting a complaint to the CIVAD for mandatory arbitration. No strikes have been authorized under this procedure. However, authorities have not interfered with unauthorized strikes called over strictly labor issues. More than 20 such strikes took place in the West Bank in 1989.

Union leaders have been among those detained for alleged security offenses. GFTU leaders have been denied permission to travel to ILO conferences, but they and their representatives have been permitted to travel abroad at the invitation of labor organizations in other countries. Delegations from the ICFTU and foreign trade unions, in addition to the annual ILO mission, visited the West Bank in 1989 and met with the GFTU leaders.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Collective bargaining is protected. The CIVAD does not record collective agreements because some unions and/or their leaders are not legally recognized. However, most union-employer agreements are honored without interference from the authorities. The only legal forum for labor grievances in the West Bank is the CIVAD's military court system. Palestinians view the system as unsympathetic and prefer to use the traditional technique of mediation by community notables. There are no export processing zones in the occupied territories.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

There is no forced or compulsory labor in the occupied territories. Under existing law applicable to the occupied territories, there is no

statutory ban on forced labor. Forced labor is, however, banned (except under certain exceptional circumstances) by the Fourth Geneva Convention.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

A 1978 military order raised the minimum working age in the West Bank and Gaza to 14, and there are no known instances of child labor in industry or construction.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

In the West Bank, Jordanian law allows a maximum workweek of 48 hours, except for certain hotel, food service, and cinema employees, whose workweek is 54 hours. In Gaza, Israeli authorities amended this law to provide for a 45-hour workweek for day laborers and a 40-hour week for salaried employees. There is no effective enforcement of maximum workweek laws. There is no minimum wage provision in the West Bank or Gaza. The Ministry of Labor's inspection service is charged with enforcing health and safety standards in the West Bank and Gaza, but no inspections take place.

דתיפות: מילדי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: שמור		פתוך: 2
תאריך וזמן העבור: 21.2.90		אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א
כס' פרוק: הפסד:	סלרה 11	דצ: מנכ"ל משרד ראה"מ
566		כאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

פגישה סגן הנשיא קוויל - הטר אולמרט.

אולמרט פחה בהעברת ד"ש מראה"מ ותודתו על המנהיגות שמגלה סגן הנשיא במאבק נגד ההשוואה בין ציונות וגזענות. קוויל הודה ואמר שיש התקדמות בנושא זה. הוא שוחח עם מזכ"ל האו"ם שאמר שאין לו חתנגדות לביטול. מיד אחרי נאומו בנושא בא אליו שגריר סעודיה שהיה דאָקטֶר בשל כך. קוויל אמר שענה לו כי זו היא מדיניות ארה"ב.

קוויל שאל על המצב הפוליטי בישראל ואולמרט ענה שהאירועים האחרונים צריכים להוות הוכחה לכך שראה"מ דבק ביזמת השלום. יש כאלו שרואים בו מדינאי נוקשה אך אין זה משנה מחעובדה שראה"מ תקיף בדעתו להמשיך בתהליך. אולמרט ציין כי ישראל נחושה בדעתה גם שלא לנתל כל מו"מ עם אש"ף. הצענו בחירות ובחירות אינן מתישבות עם התופעה ששמה אש"ף. מאידך אנו ערים לכך שיש כאלו שחושבים כי אפשר יהיה להכניס את אש"ף בדלת האחורית ולכן צריך להיות ברור שישראל לא תנהל מו"מ עם אש"ף לא במישרין ולא בעקיפין.

קוויל שאל מה מביא שה"ח לפגישה עם המזכיר ואולמרט ענה שזו בעצם פגישה בלתי פורמלית ופרילמנרית לפני שיתקיים המפגש המשולש. קוויל שאל האם צפויה התקדמות בתהליך ואולמרט ענה שאם אפשר יהיה להוציא לחלוטין את אש"ף אין לו ספק שצפויה התקדמות. בבחירות יש הרבה תקווה והבטחה, ציין אולמרט. קוויל שאל האם מצרים מסייעת לתהליך כי לדעתם היא אכן עושה זאת.

אולמרט ענה שהבעיה היא שהיא אינה עצמאית לחלוטין והם נוטים לשמש לפחות בצורה חלקית כדוורים של אש"ף. קוויל שאל האם יש הבדלי דעות בין המערך לליכוד בנושא של אש"ף ואולמרט ענה שלחוציא אולי ניואנסים יש הסכמה רחבה בישראל לגבי נושא זה. השגריר ארד הוסיף שיש הסכמה רחבה בישראל על הצורך בהסדר בינים ומהותו וחלוקי הדעות קיימים בקשר להסדר הקבע. יש צורך וגם על כך אין חילוקי דעות להתחיל בתהליך. פתרון הקבע הוא במילא נושא לטוות ארוך והוא תלוי בגורמים רבים כמו למשל ירדן ומקומה בתהליך.

אולמרט אמר שעראק יצאה מתלחמה עם איראן עם צבא הקרוב בגדלו ל-50 דביזיות. לאחרונה הם שיפרו גם את היכולת הטילית שלהם ע"י שיפור הסקאד. קוויל שאל האם לעראק יכולת לוחמה כימית ואולמרט אישר והוסיף שישראל מתבקשת לעשות וותורים במסגרת תהליך השלום כאילו אינה מוקפת במדינות ערביות העוינות אותה.

תפוצה: 36

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דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן העבור:		אל:
כס' פבוק:		דף:
הפסיד:		
566		פאת:

קוויל שאל האם לעראק גם יכולת אטומית ואולמרט ענה שבעבר השמדנו הכור אך עראק חדשה נטיונותיה בתחום זה והיא מסחיעת בחברות גרמניות ואחרות. קוויל אמר שחשוב מאד שנעלה נושאים כאלו במסגרת השיחות הבילטרליות שיש לנו עם ארה"ב.

קוויל אמר שארה"ב עוקבת בדאגה אחרי התגברות האנטישמיות בארה"ב. המזכיר העלה את נושא הטיסות ביטירות אך קיבל תשובה שלילית. אולמרט אמר שהם דחו כל הצעה להקלת יציאתם של היהודים עבור ישראל זה נושא הטומן בחובו הרבה תקווה. קוויל שאל-אמר שישראל בודאי בדעה שהערבים מפעילים לחץ מופרז בנושא ואולמרט אישר והוסיף שהם רוצים בהפסקת העלייה או הפנייתה לארה"ב.

אולמרט הוסיף שהוא מבקש להפנות תשומת להצהרות שאין לנו כל כוונה להפנות עולים לישי"ע. כל עולה יכול להתישב היכן שירצה. השגריר ארד הביא בפני סגן הנשיא את חקיקת קסטן-ליהי בנוש הערביות להלוואות לשיכון ואמר שחשוב שהממשל יגלה תמיכה בחקיקה זו. קוויל הבטיח לעיין בנוש

318
ע.ר.

תפוצה:

אל: רהמש/553

מ-200, נר: 580, ת א: 220290, חז: 1530, דח: ט, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / מטידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

אורה

8

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

תהליך השלום

שיחה (21/2) עם ברנס סגנו של דוס.

1. בשיחתו עם שה'ח מתכוון בייקר להבהיר הצורך בהתקדמות מהירה של התהליך.

2. לדבריו בכונת בייקר לקיים המפגש המשולש בזמן הקרוב ביותר.

3. המזכיר מקווה שבמפגש ניתן יהיה לפתור את בעיית הרכב המשלחת ('במקום דיון בקטיגוריות יש להתרכז בנושא הפרסונלי') אותה רואה ברנס כבעיה העיקרית. כל יתר הנושאים אינם בעייתיים מבחינתה של ארה"ב.

4. ברנס סבור שלחוצאות המפגש המשולש תהיינה השלכות על המשך מיקוד תשומת הלב של ביוקר לדבריו בהיעדר התקדמות, יאבד עניין.

5. אשר לעמדת הממשל בסוגיית התנחלויות-עליה העריך ברנס שבתקופה הקרובה לא יחול שינוי בעמדת הממשל החושש מפני השלכות שיהיו לשינוי בעמדתו (במידה ויגיעו למסקנה שמחייב שינוי) על התהליך. עד כאן דברי ברנס.

6. הערה: רתיעתו של הממשל לעסוק בסוגיות חוקיות/אי חוקיות ההתנחלויות בעיתוי הנוכחי, המנעותם בז'נווה (ועדת ז'א) , הצבעותיהם בנושאינו באו'ס ובארנונים הבינ'ל. הפרופיל הנמוך שהממשל שמר בנושא דו'ח ז'א ולהבדיל בסוגיית דרא'ף הינם חלק ממאמץ מכוון של הממשל שלא להעמיד מכשולים שעלולים לפגוע בנכונות ישראל לקדם את התהליך. התמונה לעיל עלולה להשתנות במידה והממשל יגיע למסקנה שישראל נושאת באחריות לכך שלא ניתן לקדם התהליך.

שטיין.

ססס

דתיפות: מידי	שגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון טופס פרוק	דף:
סוג: שמור		כתוב:
תאריך וזמן תבונה: 21.2.90	mf	אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק: הפרד:		דע:
568		פאת: ק. לקונגרס.

מפגישה עם הקונגרסמן בירוויטר.

נפגשתי עם הנ"ל אתמול (20/2) במסגרת ההכנות לקראת השימועים על דו"ח ז"א. בירוויטר הוא בכיר המיעוט בוועדת המשנה לזכויות אדם. הנושאים שהועלו במהלך השיחה: שטחים, תהליך השלום, עליה.

א. החיק בנושא השטחים הועבר למשרדו כבר לפני שבוע והיה מודע לעמדתנו, לאחר דיון בנושא אמר שהשנה יהיה פחות מיקוד בישראל, לעומת אשתקד, "לא בגלל שיש פחות דאגה מהנושא אלא שישנם נושאים רבים אחרים". (בנפרד תוכלו לראות נאום הפתיחה של בירוזנסר שאכן אינו מחיחס לישראל) בירוויטר ביקש לבדוק האם נכון הדבר שחלים מיסים על הסיוע המועבר ליו"ש. הבוקר בדק דודו יתב את הנושא ומסרנו למשרדו של בירוויטר שכל הסיוע המועבר דרך אירגוני סיוע אמריקנים, פטור ממס.

ב. בנושא העליה, העלה בירוויטר הנושא של יישוב עולים בשטחים. הבהרתי מדיניותנו לגבי קליטה ישירה והחלטת כל עולה על מקום מגוריו, וכי במהלך '89 פחות מ-1% מהעולים בחר מרצונו לגור בשטחים. הדגשתי כי אין מדיניות ממשלתית המכוונת העולים לשטחים. הנושא נוסף מעבר לכל פרופורציה והוא מהווה חלק ממסע ערבי כנגד עצם עליה יהודית, במטווה של בעיה השטחים. בירוויטר הגיב שהוא שומע את כל הטענות אולם אינו יכול להסכים. לדעתו על ישראל לאסור באופן מפורט קליטת עולים בשטחים. בתגובה להערתו, כי

לא נוכל לאסור מגורי יהודים בכל איזור שהוא, לא בח"א ובגליל ולא

בשטחים, חזר בירוויטר על כך כי על ממי ישראל לאסור מפורשות מגורי עולים בשטחים

יגאל ונא' פנינו.
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

"וכך תוכלו לחסוך מעצמכם בעיות רבות"

תפוצה: 36

23

דתיפות: בהול לסומך	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	קי: 1
סוג: שמור		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן העבור: 21.2.90	מנהל מצפ"א, מנהל מע"ת מנהל הסברה.	אל:
כס' פבוקי הפסדי:	עתונות/נרו-זורק, לע"מ, דו"צ, יועץ תקשורת שחב"ט. יוזף תקלנר וג' (ימ הז'רלן)	דע:
531	פאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.	פאת:

דו"ח זכויות האדם - תקשורת

בחמשר לשלנו נר 522

נכרו לחבוקר 09:00, לחלן סיכום תדווחים על דו"ח מחמ"ד וחשתקפות חנושא בתקשורת-

1. א. במהדורות החדשות הבוקר ברשתות עודרו ידיעות על הדו"ח כולו. שלוש הגדולות ו- CNN שידרו ידיעה שהתמקדה בהפרת זכויות האדם בסין, עיראק ובבורמה. בנוסף, איזכור של ישראל מתוך הדו"ח לפיו "...מצב זכויות האדם בשטחים שבשלטון ישראל ממשיך להיות מקור לדאגה רבה במחמ"ד..."

ב. כרדיו - (CBS-Radio, NPR) ידיעה קצרה על הדו"ח התמקדה בהפרת זכויות האדם בסין, עיראק ובורמה ומציינת מתוך הפרק על השטחים המטפט דלעיל.

ג. ב"וושינגטון פוסט" כתבתו של ג'קסון דיל על חמשר הטרנד האשפ"י - דו"ח כרמון. (הכתבה מוברקת בנפרד).

ד. ב- NYT (הוברק ע"י רותם/נ"י) כתבתו של רוברט מיר חתמקדת בישראל (כאמור בשלי נר 522) אולם מאזכרת גם מדינות אחרות (עיראק, קובה, ברה"מ, אל-סלבדור, ניקרגואה ועוד). בכותרות המשנה בכתבה - חתמקדות לעלסטינאים חורגים פלסטינאים. (הידועה בע"מ 6 של העתון).

ה. ב "וושינגטון טיימס" כתבה קשה וחד-צודית הנותנת מקום נרחב לטיעונים הערכים (זוגבי, אבדין ג' ארה) הקוראים לקונגרס לחסטיק סינע חרוץ לישראל.

תפוצה: 36-

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including a signature and some illegible text.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 17757

* תאריך: 21.02.90 *

* ** נכנס

סודי ביותר

* דף 1 מתוך 1 *
* עותק 6 מתוך 14 *

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* חוזם: 2,17757 *

* אל: המשרד

* יעדים: מצב/1968, רהמש/449

* מ-: וווש, נר: 509, תא: 200290, זח: 1300, דח: ב, סג: סב

* תח: ג: אפסוק

* נד: 8

א/כהן

* סודי ביותר / בהול לבוקר

* אל: סמנכ"ל אפסוק

* מאת: עודד ערן

* אתיופיה

* 1. מסרתי אתמול לוורן קלרק, סגנו של כהן, והבוקר חזרתי בפני
* כהן על העברת הצ'יוד והאימון.

* 2. בשיחה עם כהן אמרתי שאנו מבקשים שיגיע לישראל. כהן אמר
* שיבדוק ויודיעני. אמר שעדיין לא ברור אם יסע לנמיביה וזה
* אתלוי באם המזכיר יסע.

* 3. בשיחה טלפונית עם קימט ב-17/2, שבה התייחסתי לדילמה
* המחריפה עבורנו, אמר קימט, שהם החליטו שכהן יפגש עם מי
* שיגיע הנה ובהתאם לנסיבות ולמסר האתיופי שיווא ימליץ כהן
* באם יש להעלות את השליח לקומה השביעית.

* 17*

* תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, רהמ, הרס, מאפ, בנצור

מסמך מס' 17757 תאריך: 21.02.90

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Congress of the United States**House of Representatives****Washington, DC 20515**

February 20, 1990

567 2/3

Letter to the Soviet Ambassador on the Necessity of Direct Flights between the USSR and Israel to Facilitate Jewish Emigration

Dear Colleague,

The Administration reported today that the Soviet government has rejected a plea from Secretary of State Baker to permit direct flights to Israel for Soviet Jews. Without such flights, thousands of Soviet Jews are trapped in the Soviet Union. Current emigration routes from the USSR to Israel do not have adequate capacity for those who have received permission and wish to leave. In view of rising Soviet anti-Semitism, it is particularly important that all available means be found to permit the emigration of those Jews who wish to leave the Soviet Union.

We are sending the letter on the back of this page to Soviet Ambassador Dubinin to let him know of our very serious concern that this matter be reconsidered and favorably resolved. Under terms of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, MFN benefits for Soviet Trade is conditioned on Jewish emigration. This latest Soviet action in denying direct flights to Israel raises very serious questions about the intentions of Soviet leaders.

We invite you to join us in signing this letter to Ambassador Dubinin. Please have your staff call LeAnn at 5-3531 to add your name. Since we would like to send this letter out on Monday February 26, we would appreciate your response by that date.

Sincerely,



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567 3/3

His Excellency Yuriy V. Dubinin
Ambassador of the Soviet Union
Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 - 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

We were appalled and dismayed to learn that the government of the Soviet Union has rejected an appeal from President Bush and Secretary of State Baker to permit direct flights for Soviet Jews from Moscow to Israel. At a time when relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are developing in very positive new directions, the decision by your government to deny the request for direct flights to Israel is a serious blow to our relationship.

The decision was reportedly made in response to heavy pressure from Arab countries. We are shocked and surprised that your government would yield to Arab pressure at a time when the Soviet Union is seeking to play a constructive and involved role in the Middle East peace process.

At a time when anti-Semitism is on the rise in the Soviet Union and Pamyat is threatening new pogroms against Soviet Jews, it is unconscionable that the Soviet government is not doing its utmost to facilitate the departure of those of its Jewish citizens who wish to emigrate. Because of the lack of direct air links between the Soviet Union and Israel, thousands of Jews are now unable to emigrate. This attitude is totally inconsistent with and contrary to Soviet responsibilities under the Helsinki agreements to permit free emigration.

We urge that your government reconsider its position, and we ask that you convey without delay to your government and to President Gorbachev personally our very serious concern for this unresponsive and incomprehensible attitude toward Jewish emigration.

Sincerely,

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ארכיון 2

שגרירות ישראל בושינגטון
מופס מברק

1/3

דף 1 מתוך:
דחיפות: מידי
סוג: בלמ"ס

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת,
יועץ שהב"ס לתקשורת, לע"מ,
אמ"ן/קש"ח, דובר צה"ל, נ"י.

תאריך, זמן:
מספר המברק:

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

המשרד: טלחין נ
55 384 565

20/2/90

תדרוך דובר הבית הלבן ליום

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC, REGULAR BRIEFING
BRIEFER: MARLIN FITZWATER/ TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1990

Q Has the ESoviet UnionF, as reported in the New York Times this morning, told the US that they are not now considering direct flights for EJewish emigrantsF out of the Soviet Union to EIsraelF?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, they have indicated that they would not approve direct flights. I don't know about the process aspects of notification, but that's -- they clearly have made that view known. The United States feels, of course, that direct flights would be helpful in increasing the number of Soviet emigrants to Israel. The President is concerned about reports of growing anti-Semitism in that country. He heard from American Jewish leaders just a week or two ago who voiced great concern on that issue, and we believe that direct flights would be helpful in increasing the number of people that can get out.

So we are disappointed that they have not approved those, but we are hopeful that it may still happen.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including a list of numbers: 1, 2, 1, 14, 320, 4, 1, 2, 1.

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Q -- Well, what about the Israelis encouraging these immigrants to go settle in the Occupied Territories?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we think that's unfortunate. The United States position has been that we do not believe the new settlements in the Occupied Territories is helpful to the peace process, nor do we believe that encouraging Soviet immigrants to settle there is helpful to the peace process. And so there is -- but that does not mean that --

Q Do we want to see --

MR. FITZWATER: -- that does not mean we don't -- we don't want to increase the number of immigrants that are able to go to Israel.

Q But what do you plan to do with the Palestinians there? I mean, it's supposed to be illegal. Suddenly it becomes "unhelpful." It's either illegal and we are not encouraging it -- I mean, don't they have a just basis for being unhappy with this development?

MR. FITZWATER: I'm -- you lost me in the question. Who is unhappy with what?

Q What is -- who is going to protect the rights of the Palestinians who live under military occupation?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, one of our concerns about -- that's -- we're concerned about new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza because we want the peace process to move forward and we don't think it's helpful to increase our presence there. And that recognizes the Palestinian situation.

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(3)

Q But how does this relate to your response to the Soviet move? I mean, clearly they are doing this because of the Soviets being moved into the settlements. Why aren't we -- why are we encouraging it when the Israelis haven't --

MR. FITZWATER: Well, the reverse side of your question is, why don't you want to keep Jewish immigrants out of Israeli if they are going to the West Bank and Gaza. But we don't think that's -- that's fair. And we certainly want --

Q Well, what pressure are you putting on Israel?

None!

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we have -- have talked with them about this in a very -- in very strong terms. The President has made his views known directly to President Shamir and to the Israeli government on a number of occasions.

Q Well, what good has it done?

MR. FITZWATER: Well, we're hopeful that it will --

Q Is that -- (inaudible) -- you're hopeful, but you'll also financially supply the Israeli government with the wherewithal to have these settlements?

MR. FITZWATER: Israel is a loyal and steadfast friend of the United States. We have supported their government and their country in the past and we will continue to do so.

Q Do we view these settlements as illegal?

MR. FITZWATER: We haven't -- we haven't addressed the legal problem. Our policy is that they should not be -- established in the West Bank and Gaza. But I don't have an answer for you on the legal aspects of it.

Q Didn't we at one time view them as illegal? I mean, and then --

Q Yes.

MR. FITZWATER: I don't know.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 17731

* תאריך : 21.02.90 *

* נכנס **

סודי ביותר

* דף 1 מתוך 3 *

* עותק 2 מתוך 8 *

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הג'ק

* חוזם: 2,17731 *

* אל: המשרד *

* יעדים: מצב/1974 *

* מ-: ווש, נר: 521, תא: 200290, זח: 2130, דח: מ, סג: 108 *

* תח: 0 גס צפא *

* נד: 0 *

✓

אכתב

* סודי ביותר / מידי *

* ח.ר.ב. ח.ר.ב. *

* אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א, ראש ממ"ד *

* מא: השגרירות, וושינגטון *

* ההתנגדות הערבית לעליה מבריה"מ. *

* משיחה [redacted] ב - 20.2 *

* 1. הלחץ הערבי על וושינגטון: מבראך שיגר איגרת לבוש. *

* הירדנים, כולל חוסיין, שבים ופונים, כמעט יום-יומית לשגריר *

* האמריקאי בעמאן. *

* 2. הערבים מערבים, בדר"כ, בין עמדתם בנושא העליה בכלל, *

* לבין התייחסות הספציפית לנושא יישוב העולים בשטחים, או *

* לפחות אינם טורחים להבחין בין השניים (ציין - למעט התבטאות *

* של גורמים בשטחים שמיקור התנגדותם בנושא היישוב בשטחים). *

* המצרים הבטיחו לארה"ב כי בפסגת המשפ"ע (תחל ב - 24.2) *

* יחתרו לכך שהמתכנסים יבחינו בין שתי הסוגיות. *

* 3. תמצית התביעות הערביות מארה"ב: פתיחת שערים בפני ההגירה *

* היהודית, הכרה ברורה ככורה על מדיניותה בנושא ההתנחלויות, *

* ציין שבעקבות דברי ראה"מ, כנס מרכז הליכוד, בשבוע שעבר, *

* בנושא ההתנחלויות, הגיע אליהם גל מחודש של טענות ערביות (לא *

* פוט, י.א.) שראו בדברים אלה אישור לכוונות שהשתקפו, לדעתם, *

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

חסוי



חסוי

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* דף 2 מתוך 3 *
* עותק 2 מתוך 8 *

* בדברי ראה'מ הקודמים בנושא הצורך בישראל גדולה וחזקה.

* 4. תמצית החביעות מהסובייטים: הפסקת ההגירה עד שיפתחו שערים
* נוספים ליוצאים, המנעות מטיסות ישירות לישראל.

* 5. חוסין משוכנע ב - 100 אחוז כי עלית יהודי בריה'מ תוביל
* בהכרח ללחץ על הפלס' בשטחים, ולמעשה - למנוספר. מבחינת
* חוסין - ישראל הופכת לגורם עוין לממלכתו. לדעת הרצ, הערכת
* המלך כשלעצמה מציבה בפני ישראל בעיה אסטרטגית.

* 6. הערה: לבקשתו המפורשת של בן שיחי אנא שימרו על חסיון
* המקור והמידע. תודה.

* בשיחת הציר עם הירש ורוס:

* 7. הירש חזר על כך שהמלך ואחרים בירדן לוחצים על השגריר
* האמריקאי שם. אשר לדיון במועבי'ט - ארה'ב הבהירה לברה'מ
* שלא תוכל לקבל הנוסח הנוכחי והנציג הסובייטי באו'מ הבטיח
* לפנות למוסקבה לקבל הנחיות חדשות.

* 8. מרוס שמע הציר:

* א. המלך מרגיש שטעה משניתה עצמו מהתהליך. כחוצאה מההתקדמות
* בתהליך ותוצאות הבחירות בירדן מרגיש המלך צורך להוכיח עצמו
* כמנהיג בזירה הערבית ובמיוחד בנושא הפלסטיני כדי שלא יראה
* כבלתי רלבנטי. (קרצר אמר לח'מ כי לדעתו חוסיון שגה קשות
* בהנתקו ב - 88 מהשטחים).

* ב. להערכת רוס, חוסיון טעה גם בהתקשרות הצבאית עם עיראק
* והוא מצוי עתה בלחץ סעודי שלא להרחיב מסגרת השת'פ.

* ג. בנושא ההתנחלויות ועמדת ארה'ב אמר כי למרות הלחצים בתוך
* מחמ'ד להצטרף לקונצנזוס בג'נבה הוחלט להמנע כדי לא ליצור
* ניגוד בין ההצבעה בג'נבה להצבעתם בניו יורק שכן לא יוכלו
* לתמוך בהחלטה המגדירה ההתנחלויות כבלתי חוקיות ובודאי לא
* בעתוי קריטי זה מבחינת התהליך.

* אמיתי.

1. 1950
2. 1951
3. 1952

4. 1953

5. 1954

6. 1955

7. 1956

8. 1957

9. 1958

10. 1959

11. 1960

12. 1961

13. 1962

14. 1963

15. 1964

* TP 2 UNIT 2
* UNIT 2 UNIT 2

* UNIT 2, UNIT 2, UNIT 2, UNIT 2, UNIT 2

אל: רהמש/252

מ-: נר: 524, תא: 140290, חז: 1430, דח: מ, סג: שס,

בבב

שמור/מידי

355.16

אל: יועץ תפוצות

דע: מצפא, מזאר 1

מאח: קונכל / כר

משיחה עם מלקום הונליין-

על ועידת הנשיאים מופעל לחץ כנד מצד גורמים יהודיים שונים
כדי לדרוש מהמימשל לאפשר כניסה של מס' גדול יותר של יהודי
ברהם על רקע האנטישמיות הגוברת בברהם.

גורמים אלה מביעים חרדה עמוקה לגורל היהודים ומשווים את
המצב לאדישות ארהב במלחמת העולם השניה.

הנליין מביע דאגה ממצב זה וטוען שהוא מתקשה לקבל תמונת מצב

א/רהג

מעודכנת על הנעשה בתוך ברהם.

לידיעתכם.

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ס י ר ס

אל: רהמש/255

מ:- רוש, נר: 412, תא: 140290, חז: 2000, דח: ב, סג: שם,

בבב

בהול לבוקר / שמור

א(ה)ק
2

אל: ממנכ"ל דובק, ניו יורק

ליאור, ג'נבה

מאת: עודד ערן

זועדה לזכויות אדם, מועבי"ט.

א. להלן מקרצר.

מוריס אברם התקשר היום לומר שהוא תושב שיוכל לשנות את סעיף
1 האופרטיבי ובמקום שיאמר שישוּב יהודים בשטחים הוא בלתי
חוקי יאמר שזה מכשול לשלום, עמדה שבה נקטה ארה"ב ב-8-9
השנים האחרונות. במקרה זה תצטרף ארה"ב לקונצנזוס, לדבריו
אין איש במחמ"ד שממליץ על הצבעה נגד הצעת ההחלטה כפי שהיא
עומדת היום והם מחפשים אלטרנטיבות שונות, כגון בקשה להצבעה
על כל סעיף בנפרד דבר שיאפשר להם להצביע נגד סעיף 1 ואח"ך
להמנע על כל ההחלטה. בהיעדר שינוי בסעיף, ישלח מחר מזכר
למזכיר והוא שיחליט בנושא (בהתחשב בעובדה שהמזכיר יוצא
לקולומביה ספק אם יספיק לקבל המזכר). כמו כן אמר קרצר

שנציג השגרירות הסובייטית ביקר אצל בולטון אחה'ץ וחזר בפניו על שלושת האלמנטים שברה'ס רוצה לראות בהחלטת מועי'ט. לא היו כל הפתעות או חידושים בדברי הסובייטי שגם חזר על מחויבות ארצו להמשך החרת העליה. תשובת ארה'ב הייתה בלתי מחויבת.

ב. מפיקרינג שמעתי הערב שאברם אמר לו שיש סיכוי של עשרה אחוז לשינוי בסעיף 1. פיקרינג מוסיף שהוא ובולטון לוחצים על

הצבעה נגד כדי שלא ליצור מצב שבו תמנע ארה'ב בג'נבה אך חטיל וטו בניו-יורק. פיקרינג אומר שהדבר כבר קרה לו פעמיים והוא לוחץ על קונסיסטנטיות. לדעתו אם לא ישתנה הנוסח וענין הליגליות יכלל בנוסח תצביע ארה'ב נגד.

עודד ערן

AA

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אל:רהמס/247

מ-:גנבה,כר:139,תא:140290,חז:1900,דח:ס.סג:שס,

בבב

א/נר

מיידוי/שמור

אל:ארבל 2

דע:רוש, נאום

ועדה לזכויות אדם: הצעת ההחלטה בנושא יישוב עולים בישראל.

פטרסון סיפרה שטרם קיבלו הוראות כיצד להצביע על הצעת ההחלטה
כפי שהיא כרגע. יחד עם זאת הנציגות בחקשה עי וושינגטון
TO NEGOTIATE SOMETHING ACCEPTABLE

וושינגטון עומדת על כך שהתייחסות לאי-חוקיות ההתנחלויות
תימחק, וגם רוצה שנוסח ההחלטה באופן כללי ירוכך.

הערה:

הואיל והצעת ההחלטה כבר הופצה, הסיכוי קלוש מאוד שהערבים
יסכימו להשמטת התייחסות לאי-חוקיות ההתנחלויות.
קשה גם לראות את האירופאים מסכימים לכך, הואיל וזה משקף את
מדיניותם המוצהרת.

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אל: רהמש/261

מ:- ורוש, נר: 413, תא: 140290, חז: 2000, דח: ס, סג: שם,

בבב

שמור / מירי

אל: משנה למנכ"ל

דע: נאו'ם

ג'בה

מאח: השגריר, רושינגטון

לקראת ההצבעה בוועידה לזכויות האדם בג'בה בנושא ההתנחלויות
, שוחחתי הבוקר עם בוב קימט ובקשתי ממנו שארה"ב תצביע נגד
הצעת ההחלטה המגדירה ההתנחלויות כבלתי חוקיות. ציינתי
ההשלכות השליליות והחמורות על תהליך השלום למקרה שארה"ב
תמנע מההצבעה. הבטיח להתייעץ עם המזכיר ולהודיעני הנחיותיהם
למשלחת בג'בה. הוספתי כי הדברים הנ"ל נכונים גם לגבי
יוזמת ברית"ם לקיים דיון במועבי"ט.

ארד

אורה ק

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

February 20, 1990

Letter to the Soviet Ambassador on the Necessity of Direct Flights between the USSR and Israel to Facilitate Jewish Emigration

Dear Colleague,

The Administration reported today that the Soviet government has rejected a plea from Secretary of State Baker to permit direct flights to Israel for Soviet Jews. Without such flights, thousands of Soviet Jews are trapped in the Soviet Union. Current emigration routes from the USSR to Israel do not have adequate capacity for those who have received permission and wish to leave. In view of rising Soviet anti-Semitism, it is particularly important that all available means be found to permit the emigration of those Jews who wish to leave the Soviet Union.

We are sending the letter on the back of this page to Soviet Ambassador Dubinin to let him know of our very serious concern that this matter be reconsidered and favorably resolved. Under terms of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, MFN benefits for Soviet Trade is conditioned on Jewish emigration. This latest Soviet action in denying direct flights to Israel raises very serious questions about the intentions of Soviet leaders.

We invite you to join us in signing this letter to Ambassador Dubinin. Please have your staff call LeAnn at 5-3531 to add your name. Since we would like to send this letter out on Monday February 26, we would appreciate your response by that date.

Sincerely,

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His Excellency Yuriy V. Dubinin
Ambassador of the Soviet Union
Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 - 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

We were appalled and dismayed to learn that the government of the Soviet Union has rejected an appeal from President Bush and Secretary of State Baker to permit direct flights for Soviet Jews from Moscow to Israel. At a time when relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are developing in very positive new directions, the decision by your government to deny the request for direct flights to Israel is a serious blow to our relationship.

The decision was reportedly made in response to heavy pressure from Arab countries. We are shocked and surprised that your government would yield to Arab pressure at a time when the Soviet Union is seeking to play a constructive and involved role in the Middle East peace process.

At a time when anti-Semitism is on the rise in the Soviet Union and Pamyat is threatening new pogroms against Soviet Jews, it is unconscionable that the Soviet government is not doing its utmost to facilitate the departure of those of its Jewish citizens who wish to emigrate. Because of the lack of direct air links between the Soviet Union and Israel, thousands of Jews are now unable to emigrate. This attitude is totally inconsistent with and contrary to Soviet responsibilities under the Helsinki agreements to permit free emigration.

We urge that your government reconsider its position, and we ask that you convey without delay to your government and to President Gorbachev personally our very serious concern for this unresponsive and incomprehensible attitude toward Jewish emigration.

Sincerely,

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Kennebunkport, Maine)

For Immediate Release

February 16, 1990

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have signed today H.R. 3792, the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991." This Act authorizes funding for the Department of State at a level sufficient to cover appropriations for this fiscal year. The levels authorized for Contributions to International Organizations and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities are those requested by the Administration. These authorizations provide for full funding of our assessed obligations in the international area.

This Act, which provides the Department's basic operational authorities, includes welcome new authorities for the Department, many of them included at the Administration's request. I am pleased that this Act does not contain a provision that compelled me to veto an earlier version of this legislation (Section 109 of H.R. 1487). Additionally, H.R. 3792 also waives a number of restrictive earmarks that would otherwise apply. I regret, however, that the Congress has included several provisions in the Act that raise constitutional difficulties.

The Constitution vests in the President the executive power of the United States. The executive power includes, among other things, the authority to receive and appoint ambassadors and to conduct negotiations on behalf of the United States with foreign governments. Thus, pursuant to the Constitution, the President is entrusted with control over the conduct of diplomacy. The content, timing, and duration of negotiations with foreign governments are also within the President's control. Unfortunately, many provisions of this Act could be read to violate these fundamental constitutional principles by using legislation to direct, in various ways, the conduct of negotiations with foreign nations.

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Section 102 of the Act would prohibit the use of certain appropriated funds for any U.S. delegation to any meeting within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe unless individuals representing the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a body controlled by the legislative branch, are included in the U.S. delegation. By purporting to deny certain funds for the negotiation of certain arms control agreements unless representatives of the Commission are included in the U.S. delegation to such negotiations, this section impermissibly intrudes upon my constitutional authority to conduct our foreign relations and to appoint our Nation's envoys. I therefore shall construe it to express the sense of the Congress but not to impose any binding legal obligation, and as severable from the ability to continue the critically important negotiations at issue.

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Section 108 would restrict the expenditure of appropriated funds for carrying on "the current dialogue on the Middle East peace process with any representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization if the President knows and advises the Congress that that representative directly participated in the planning or execution of a particular terrorist activity which resulted in the death or kidnapping of a United States citizen." I have frequently emphasized my determination to work to eliminate the scourge of terrorism, and I have no intent --

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negotiating with terrorists. This provision demonstrates that the Congress shares my concern. However, if this section were interpreted to prohibit negotiations with particular individuals under certain circumstances, it would impermissibly limit my constitutional authority to negotiate with foreign organizations. Accordingly, I shall construe this section to preserve my constitutional discretion for the conduct of foreign negotiations.

Section 407 of the Act is similarly subject to inappropriate interpretation. This section purports to require that no individual may be admitted to the United States as a representative to the United Nations if the individual "has been found to have been engaged in espionage activities directed against the United States or its allies and may pose a threat to United States national security interests." In effect, this provision could constrain the exercise of my exclusive constitutional authority to receive within the United States certain foreign ambassadors to the United Nations. While espionage directed against the United States and its allies is a problem of the utmost gravity, curtailing by statute my constitutional discretion to receive or reject ambassadors is neither a permissible nor a practical solution. I therefore shall construe section 407 to be advisory.

Section 134 is consistent with the Administration's planned course of action and improves on prior law. Nevertheless, it infringes upon my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and receive representatives of foreign governments by purporting to permit the Soviet Union to occupy a consulate facility in the United States only upon certification that the U.S. mission in Kiev is able to occupy an interim facility. I also shall treat this section as advisory.

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A number of other provisions might be construed to require the executive branch to contact foreign governments and espouse certain substantive positions regarding specific issues. See S.A.U., Sections 115, 210, 902(a)(7). My constitutional authority over foreign affairs necessarily entails discretion over the timing and subject matter of such contacts. Accordingly, I shall construe all these provisions to be merely precatory as well.

Similarly, several sections, in particular section 804, impose significant reporting requirements on the Secretary of State to inform the Congress of specified diplomatic contacts. Such blanket reporting requirements could be read to compel the disclosure of the contents of sensitive ongoing negotiations and may, therefore, compromise my constitutional authority over such negotiations. I am also concerned that such provisions tend to undermine the spirit of cooperation and trust between the executive and legislative branches that I have been laboring to foster. In reporting to the Congress, therefore, I shall construe these provisions in light of my constitutional duties.

Section 206 of the Act would establish a United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Several of its provisions would impermissibly interfere with the President's control over the deliberative processes of the executive branch. Section 206 clearly contemplates that the Commission shall report to the Congress about deliberations within the executive branch and, indeed, shall monitor the executive branch in its execution of the laws. I shall interpret these provisions consistent with my authority as head of the unitary executive branch to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3, to coordinate and supervise my subordinates, and to have the executive branch speak with one voice to the Congress.

Certain provisions of the Act could be construed to require impermissible racial preferences. In order to avoid legal challenge, these provisions will also be construed in accordance with the Constitution.

On a different matter, it is my understanding that section 128, removing the sunset provision on section 901 of the 1988-89 Authorization Act, which prohibits the exclusion of aliens on certain grounds, has no effect on the substance of section 901 or on the way the executive branch has applied it since its enactment.

Finally, with regard to Title IX, I want to reiterate that legislatively mandated sanctions represent an unwise constraint upon the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. I note, however, that the section provides flexibility, by permitting a Presidential waiver to lift suspensions, in whole or in part, when it is in the national interest of the United States.

GEORGE BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 16, 1990.

דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קד: 2
סוג:		פתור: 2
תאריך יוסף חבור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		פאת:
526		

3. סנטור דנסורתי: כחומר שורשי, פעמדותיו כלפי ישראל אינן ניתנות לשנוי, אני מודאג מן העובדה שאין פחרון באופק, ומן המבור הפנימי והחיצוני שבו נחונה ישראל. האם הזמן טועל לטובה ישראל? איך מטפיע המצב על החיל הישראלי?
4. הסנטור ווילסון: יוזמת דול (לקצוץ קיוע החוץ) מאכזבת, ואין ספק שאיננה תורמת לדול עצמו, ומבטאת עמדה מעוט. ישראל צודקת כאשר מסרבת לנהל מו"מ עם אש"ף, ומרבית הקונגרס תומך בכך. הממשל מסתיג, אך יצטרך להתמודד עם מציאות המצדיקה את ישראל, לישראל בעיני קשת החבור האמריקאי אינו מכיר את המימדים הגיאוגרפיים שלה, ולכן אינו מבין את בעיותיה הבטחוניות.
5. סנטור בונד: מלא שבחים על הבקור בישראל ובמיוחד על הכנייה היחצי. ארה"ב אינה רגישת דיה לקשיים העומדים בפני ישראל השוכנת בסביבה זרה למערב. מנסה לסייע לנהן שרגסקי באיחור מהרובות דיוור, ובשילוב השקיעי חוץ וטיסות אמהיקאיות לעדוד הסנטור הפרטי והבנקים בתחום הבניה. שוחח ע"כ עם פרטיו מרלטה מיוסטון, שהוא הנשיא הנכנס של ה-

Abraham Ben of Bilder
 בהקרה על השומת ה...
 יורט

תפוצה:

דחיפות: מיידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	ק: 1
סוג: בלמים		כתוב: 4
תאריך וזמן העבר: 21:00 20.2.90		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק: הפסד:	ארכ"ו	ד: 4
524	ק. לקונגרס	פאת:

חוק כספי מחמ"ד-הרשאות

בהמשך לשלנו מהיום.

רצ"ב הנוסח המלא של הודעת הנשיא שליוותה את חתימתו על החוק.
חשומת לבכם לקטעים המסומנים המתייחסים לתיקון הלמס ותיקון מק-ליברמן.

אנא - חתום
יהודית ורנאי-דרנגר

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 4 5 4 1 1

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תפוצה:

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Kennabunkport, Maine)

For Immediate Release

February 16, 1990

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have signed today H.R. 3792, the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991." This Act authorizes funding for the Department of State at a level sufficient to cover appropriations for this fiscal year. The levels authorized for Contributions to International Organizations and Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities are those requested by the Administration. These authorizations provide for full funding of our assessed obligations in the international area.

This Act, which provides the Department's basic operational authorities, includes welcome new authorities for the Department, many of them included at the Administration's request. I am pleased that this Act does not contain a provision that compelled me to veto an earlier version of this legislation (Section 109 of H.R. 1487). Additionally, H.R. 3792 also waives a number of restrictive earmarks that would otherwise apply. I regret, however, that the Congress has included several provisions in the Act that raise constitutional difficulties.

The Constitution vests in the President the executive power of the United States. The executive power includes, among other things, the authority to receive and appoint ambassadors and to conduct negotiations on behalf of the United States with foreign governments. Thus, pursuant to the Constitution, the President is entrusted with control over the conduct of diplomacy. The content, timing, and duration of negotiations with foreign governments are also within the President's control. Unfortunately, many provisions of this Act could be read to violate these fundamental constitutional principles by using legislation to direct, in various ways, the conduct of negotiations with foreign nations.

Section 102 of the Act would prohibit the use of certain appropriated funds for any U.S. delegation to any meeting within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe unless individuals representing the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a body controlled by the legislative branch, are included in the U.S. delegation. By purporting to deny certain funds for the negotiation of certain arms control agreements unless representatives of the Commission are included in the U.S. delegation to such negotiations, this section impermissibly intrudes upon my constitutional authority to conduct our foreign relations and to appoint our Nation's envoys. I therefore shall construe it to express the sense of the Congress but not to impose any binding legal obligation, and as severable from the ability to continue the critically important negotiations at issue.

Section 108 would restrict the expenditure of appropriated funds for carrying on "the current dialogue on the Middle East peace process with any representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization if the President knows and advises the Congress that that representative directly participated in the planning or execution of a particular terrorist activity which resulted in the death or kidnapping of a United States citizen." I have frequently emphasized my determination to work to eliminate the scourge of terrorism, and I have no intention --

2

negotiating with terrorists. This provision demonstrates that the Congress shares my concern. However, if this section were interpreted to prohibit negotiations with particular individuals under certain circumstances, it would impermissibly limit my constitutional authority to negotiate with foreign organizations. Accordingly, I shall construe this section to preserve my constitutional discretion for the conduct of foreign negotiations.

Section 407 of the Act is similarly subject to inappropriate interpretation. This section purports to require that no individual may be admitted to the United States as a representative to the United Nations if the individual "has been found to have been engaged in espionage activities directed against the United States or its allies and may pose a threat to United States national security interests." In effect, this provision could constrain the exercise of my exclusive constitutional authority to receive within the United States certain foreign ambassadors to the United Nations. While espionage directed against the United States and its allies is a problem of the utmost gravity, curtailing by statute my constitutional discretion to receive or reject ambassadors is neither a permissible nor a practical solution. I therefore shall construe section 407 to be advisory.

Section 134 is consistent with the Administration's planned course of action and improves on prior law. Nevertheless, it infringes upon my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and receive representatives of foreign governments by purporting to permit the Soviet Union to occupy a consulate facility in the United States only upon certification that the U.S. mission in Kiev is able to occupy an interim facility. I also shall treat this section as advisory.

A number of other provisions might be construed to require the executive branch to contact foreign governments and espouse certain substantive positions regarding specific issues. See, e.g., Sections 115, 210, 902(a)(7). My constitutional authority over foreign affairs necessarily entails discretion over the timing and subject matter of such contacts. Accordingly, I shall construe all these provisions to be merely precatory as well.

Handwritten: 1/11/90

Similarly, several sections, in particular section 804, impose significant reporting requirements on the Secretary of State to inform the Congress of specified diplomatic contacts. Such blanket reporting requirements could be read to compel the disclosure of the contents of sensitive ongoing negotiations and may, therefore, compromise my constitutional authority over such negotiations. I am also concerned that such provisions tend to undermine the spirit of cooperation and trust between the executive and legislative branches that I have been laboring to foster. In reporting to the Congress, therefore, I shall construe these provisions in light of my constitutional duties,

Section 206 of the Act would establish a United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Several of its provisions would impermissibly interfere with the President's control over the deliberative processes of the executive branch. Section 206 clearly contemplates that the Commission shall report to the Congress about deliberations within the executive branch and, indeed, shall monitor the executive branch in its execution of the laws. I shall interpret these provisions consistent with my authority as head of the unitary executive branch to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3, to coordinate and supervise my subordinates, and to have the executive branch speak with one voice to the Congress.

Certain provisions of the Act could be construed to require impermissible racial preferences. In order to avoid legal challenge, these provisions will also be construed in accordance with the Constitution.

On a different matter, it is my understanding that section 128, removing the sunset provision on section 901 of the 1988-89 Authorization Act, which prohibits the exclusion of aliens on certain grounds, has no effect on the substance of section 901 or on the way the executive branch has applied it since its enactment.

Finally, with regard to Title IX, I want to reiterate that legislatively mandated sanctions represent an unwise constraint upon the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. I note, however, that the section provides flexibility, by permitting a Presidential waiver to lift suspensions, in whole or in part, when it is in the national interest of the United States.

GEORGE BUSH

1990-02-20

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קד: 1 כתוב: 2	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דתיפות: <u>בהול לבוקר</u> סוג: שמור
אל: מנהל מצפ"א, מנהל הסברה,	אלה!	תאריך וזמן תבוע: 20.2.90
דע: לשבת שתיח יועץ שהביט לתקשורת, דובר-צה"ל שי, הפציר, משרד המשפטים חמר גולן, ניו יורק עתונות	פס' פבוק: 356 הפסרד: 523	פאת:
עתונות, וושינגטון		

דו"ח זי"א - מחמ"ד

בהמשך לשיחתנו.

1. רצ"ב נוסח תגובתנו לדו"ח זי"א של מחמ"ד.
 2. על-פי בירורים שנערכו עם מחמ"ד ועם הקונגרס - הדו"ח לדבריהם חולק לעתונאים כ"נצור" עד מחר ב-10:00 בבוקר (זמן שלנו). משיחותינו הרבות עם עתונאים חיום - מסתבר שלעתונאים רבים יש הדו"ח ורובם קיבלוהו ב"הדלפה" כן שלא חלה עליהם החובה לשומרו עד מחר. לסיכר, הפצנו היום תגובתנו לדו"ח ב"נצור" חוזר ב"נצור".
(EMBARGOED UNTIL THE REPORT IS RELEASED)
- (הערה: למרות נסיונות חוזרים, לא הצלחנו ליצור קשר טלפוני עם מנהל הסברה ומנהל מע"ת).
בנפרד - לגבי חתבות המהוככנות.

רוח יורה
 רוח יורה

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תפוצה: 36

356, 573 $\frac{2}{3}$ EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

A Statement by the Embassy of Israel
in Response to the State Department's Human Rights Report 1989

"...Israel's open, democratic society enables widespread access to data on and investigations of human rights in the territories notwithstanding IDF restraints applied there..." (State Department Human Rights Report, 1989)

Conscious of American concerns, Israel has consistently provided the United States with answers to queries pertaining to general and specific matters in the territories. Ongoing contacts are maintained with both the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Israel, and, for over a year, a channel of direct communications has been in operation between the U.S. Embassy and the Coordinator for Government Operations in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District, within the Ministry of Defense. All this is in keeping with Israel's close relationship with the United States and with the openness of Israel's society and political system.

The riots and violence in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza District are the most recent link in the ongoing chain of violence and hostility against Israel. As the report states: "This unrest and violence, known as the Intifada, has as its minimum goal the end of Israeli occupation..."

The disturbances have created enormous difficulties and dilemmas for Israel, committed as it is to democratic principles. Israel's measures have not differed from those applied by other democratic countries when facing violence in the form of riots, armed assaults, murder, and terror.

The violent nature of the Intifada leaves no alternative to a response entailing the use of force. At the same time, special efforts have been undertaken to make clear to Israeli soldiers that, however great the provocation, their behavior must conform to strict regulations and standards, and that restraint must be exercised.

The report acknowledged that and states: "...The Government of Israel makes clear to all forces serving in the occupied territories the need to adhere to the rules of engagement..."

Under the circumstances, the IDF record in adhering to high standards of behavior stands up well to scrutiny. The IDF Chief of Staff, Dan Shomron, wrote in a letter to all Israeli soldiers dated September 1989: "IDF soldiers must act decisively and, at the same time, exercise self-control and sensitivity appropriate to the high behavioral norms demanded of IDF soldiers and commanders." In the relatively few exceptions, when officers or

356,523 ²/₃EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

soldiers have violated these instructions, they were brought to justice. In the two years of the Intifada, 90 soldiers and officers were prosecuted and punished.

All measures are subject to judicial review. The Palestinian residents of the territories have access to the Israeli legal system, including the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice. Such access of non-citizens from a territory administered under belligerent conditions is unprecedented.

The State Department report draws attention to more than 120 Palestinians who were assassinated by other Palestinians in 1989 alone. This is but a part of the grim story of the reign of terror directed against Palestinian Arabs refusing to toe the PLO line -- and also reflecting Islamic fundamentalism, feuds and rivalry between various gangs.

In the last 22 years, since Israel began administering the territories following a war for its very survival, Israel has exerted efforts in numerous areas to improve the living standards of the local Palestinian inhabitants.

Israel has also sought a negotiated settlement that would bring genuine peace and a solution to existing problems. Its most recent effort was launched on May 14, 1989 when the Government of Israel presented a four-point Peace Initiative.

A complete cessation of violence and terror would provide an immediate answer to most of the human rights questions in the territories.

A bold and courageous step on the political road of the peace process will eventually bring a peaceful solution to our region.

1990-02-19

22:54

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02-19-90 06:34PM FROM OASIS BEDROOMS

P04

660/54
2/2

Motion: When the Israel Task Force convenes to consider language on this subject for the Joint Program Plan, it is the sense of this plenum that their report should ~~include~~ give serious consideration at least these 4 points:

1. Our top priorities in respect to the resettlement of Soviet Jewry today are to get them out of the Soviet Union and to raise the massive amounts of money necessary to resettle and house them.
2. We applaud recent Israeli government statements clarifying that the government will not "encourage" resettlement in the administered territories.
3. But under the conditions of housing shortage that will soon prevail, olim will settle wherever jobs and affordable housing are made available to them; and therefore the construction of new housing in the administered territories will have the direct effect of encouraging settlement there. This may detract from the aliyah potential and our fundraising.
4. The construction of new housing in the territories can only increase tensions between Israelis and Palestinians living there, possibly disrupting delicate negotiations.

דחיפות: מיידי	יד: 1 מתוך: 2 טופס מצדק קשר ניו-יורק
סיוג: סמור	אל:
תזוח: 192230	יועץ שה"ח להטובות, מנחם מצפ"א, יועץ רוה"מ לטובות.
מס מצדק: 54/660	ברטוב - מרגל (יה וועבירונא). דע: השגריר/ווסטינגהאוס (אויס האזגרי בנכ 54)
	מאת: פלג, יריד, טנור / פיניקס, אריזונה.

נקראק. יהודי בריה"מ - התייטבות בטשחית.

במסגרת הדיון בנושא שהוקצו לו 20 דקות התחולל זכות סוער כאשר רבים מהמשתתפים טוענים שחובת רוה"מ מה-19/2 לשנקר אינה מתייחסת לנושא.

הטעון המרכזי על טעמן ותומכי ההצעה היה שבניה בשטחים טשטשית ערוד עולי בריה"מ להחיישב שט.

טיימור רייך אמר שהוא Distressed מכחש רוה"מ והציע ששנקר יבקט ובהרות מרה"מ בנושא ברות והבהרות ערה"ט נתן לו (לקייסור רייך).

כן הציע להסיר הצעה והחלטה משוט שמרכבה נושא יוודי בריה"מ עם נושא הטשחית והחנתחלויות.

2. והצעה (המאורטט בזה) - עברה ברוב של 216 בעד לעומת 207 מתנגדים.

פלג-יריד-טנור.

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02-19-90 06:34PM FROM OASIS BEDROOMS

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Motion: When the Israel Task Force convenes to consider language on this subject for the Joint Program Plan, it is the sense of this plenum that their report should ~~include~~ include at least these 4 points:

give serious consideration

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2. We applaud recent Israeli government statements clarifying that the government will not "encourage" resettlement in the administered territories.
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4. The construction of new housing in the territories can only increase tensions between Israelis and Palestinians living there, possibly disrupting delicate negotiations.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 18.02.90

15190

טמור

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אברהם

חוזם: 2,15190
אל: וושינגטון/104, מצב/1606
מ-: המשרד, תא: 180290, חז: 1558, דח: מ, סג: שמ
חח: & גס: צפא
נד: &

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שמור/מידי

אהב 10301

אל: וושינגטון

קנוכ'ל ארה'ב בירושלים ויישוב עולי בריה'מ בשטחים

להלן מתוך שיחה עם 'M.J' רוזנברג ראש משרדו של הקונגרסמן אד פייהאן :

ערב ביקור הקונגרסמן בארץ (שהתקיים בשבוע שעבר) התקבל בוושינגטון מברק מהקנוכ'ל ווילקוקס בו הציע שפיהאן יראה את ה- 'SETTLEMENTS' הגדולים שהישראלים בונים בחלקה של ירושלים שבשטחים ע'מ ליישוב שם עולים יהודיים מבריה'מ. רוזנברג (בשם פייהאן) לא נענה לבקשה.

מיותר לציין חומרת הגישה.

מנהל מצפ'א

בא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 20145

* תאריך : 22.02.90

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* דף 1 מתוך 2

* ** יוצא

* סודי ביותר

* עותק 1 מתוך 6

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* חוזם: 2,20145

* מל: 530/ווש/975, רהמש/530

* מ-: המשרד, תא: 220290, זח: 1938, דח: ב, סג: סב

* תח: 8 גס: צפא

* נד: 8

מל
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* סודי ביותר/בהול

* השגריר

* רצ'ב מכתב שה'ח בייקר לרה'מ שמיר

* MESSAGE FORM SECRETARY BAKER TO PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR

* DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

* I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MY TRIP TO MOSCOW AND OTTAWA.

* I MUST TELL YOU THAT THERE ARE EXTRAORDINARY CHANGES

* UNDERWAY IN EUROPE AND IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THAT

* PRESENT GREAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR REDUCING TENSIONS

* GLOBALLY AND BRINGING ABOUT NEW RELATIONSHIPS AMONG

* STATES. BILL BROWN WILL BE BRIEFING YOU AND YOUR

* GOVERNMENT IN DETAIL ON MY DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW ON

* ISSUES OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO YOU.

* FIRST, I MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY MUST

* RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH YOU IF THEY WERE

* SERIOUS ABOUT DEMONSTRATING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THIS

* PROCESS AND THAT IT WAS UP TO THEM TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE

* DIRECTLY WITH YOU.

* SECOND, I RAISED THE ISSUE OF DIRECT FLIGHTS, ALTHOUGH

* I DID NOT MAKE MUCH HEADWAY. THE SOVIETS FEEL PRESSURE

* FROM THE ARABS ON THE JEWISH EMIGRATION ISSUE, AND ARE

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

14962

תאריך : 18.02.90

** יוצא

סודי

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חוזם: 2,14962
אל: 7:11וש/768, רהמש/355, מצב/1587
מ-: המשרד, תא: 180290, זח: 1416, דח: מ, סג: 10
חח: @ גס: צפא
@: 7J

אברהם

58495
סודי/מידי
אהב 10301

אל: זושיןגטון - שגריר

ד ע : אטינגר, פ.דרור

מיסות ישירות - סיוע ממשל
שלך 446

מקבלים המלצתך במלואה. הנ"ל גם על דעת האוצר.

מצפ"א - מזא"ר

יג

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, גוברין, מזאר, 1, בנצור, מצפא,
תפוצות

** נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 2,14655

אל: המשרד

יעדים: רהמש/340, מצב/1537, מנמת/527

מ-: ווש, נר: 478, תא: 160290, חז: 2200, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: גס: צפא

נד: 8

כ"ע/כ"ק

סודי / מידי

אל: סמוכ'ל צפ'א, ממ'ד

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

על התגובה הערבית לעליה מברה'מ.

משיחה עם דייוויד וולש, דסקאי מז'ת ב - N.S.C (15.2):

1. המבועתים ביותר הם הפלס'. אחריהם הירדנים ואח'כ שאר מדינות ערב. הירדנים טוענים כלפי האמריקאים בנושא ההתנחלויות: פעם קבעתם שאינן חוקיות, אח'כ שהן מכשול לשלום, מחר תאמרו שהן מראה דוחה (ENESORE), ומה תאמרו בעוד עשר שנים? תשובתם לדבריו: אל תשאלו מהי עמדתנו פן תקבלו תשובה שאינכם רוצים לשמוע.

2. בהמשך השיחה ציין וולש טיעוני הערבים בנושא יישוב העולים בשטחים ובירושלים המורחבת וטענות הירדנים בנושא הגירת הפלסטינים מהשטחים מזרחה. חזרתי על עמדותינו, וצינתי, בין השאר, עקרונות הקליטה הישירה וגישתנו לנושא איחוד המשפחות.

סוריה.

3. אסד אינו מתון טקטי אך קיצוני אסטרטגי. לסוריה אין אשליה בדבר יכולתה להגיע לאיזון אסטרטגי עם ישראל. לכל היותר חותרים הסורים להשיג 'איזון הגנתי' אסטרטגי'. קרי, יכולת להגן על עצמם במקרה של התקפה ישראלית. זהו, לדבריו,

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לקח סורי מרכזי מהמכה שספגו מישראל במלחמת לבנון. איננו מאבחן שינוי בעמדות סוריה כלפי התהליך.

אש'פ.

4. תוהה לגבי משמעות המגעים האחרונים בין אש'פ לסוריה לגבי גישת אש'פ לתהליך. חושד כי אש'פ מבקש להגדיל מרחב התמרון שלו מול מצרים וללחוץ עליה ועל ארה'ב תוך שהוא מצביע על אלטרנטיבה לתהליך הנוכחי.

5. הגדיר את אבו-איאד כאיש החזק ביותר באש'פ אחרי ערפאת: בשונה מקדומי או בסאם-אבו-שריף, לאבו-איאד יש 'ציבור בוחרים' (CONSTITUENCY) כמחמוד אלעלול וזהיר מנאצרה - אנשי ה'גזרה המערבית', שאותם הוא צריך לרצות. פרש בהקשר זה את התבטאויותיו הבוטות האחרונות של אבו איאד בנושא התהליך ('אש'פ צריך להרכיב ולהכריז על המשלחת').

6. ההיגיון שבגישת ארה'ב כלפי הפלס' בהקשר התהליך: לא ניתן לנתק הפלס' בשטחים מאש'פ או למצוא לו תחליף מקרב השטחים, אך יש לפעול לח' לחיזוק המרכיב של תושבי השטחים במסגרת התהליך.

ירדן.

7. שאלותיו לגבי הידיעה לפיה ירדן עלולה לחתום על ברית הגנה עם עיראק ב - 24.2 בעת מפגש המשפ'ע הקרוב (9.2, MIDEAST MIRROR). לא היה מודע לכך. אמר שיבדוק והדגיש הסתייגותו ממהלך כזה. עד כה ראה במשפ'ע גוף חיובי שבמסגרתו מצרים וירדן מהוות גורם מרסן כלפי עיראק.

לבנון.

8. הדגש העיקרי בדבריו: הראווי אינו עושה דבר והופך עצמו ללא רלבנטי. האמריקאים אמרו לו שהוא השליט הלגיטימי, אך מכאן מתחייבת גם אחריות. כן ציינו בפניו שאם יזמין הסורים להתערב - י.א. - הדבר יזיק למעמדו. וולש לא ידע לפרט למה בדיוק הם מצפים מהראווי. אמר כי איננו מתכוון בהכרח להתערבות צבאית, אלא לפעילויות כלשהן שבאמצעותן יבטא מנהיגות.

הערה על השקפות וולש:

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DOES HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
SIGNATURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IS

AS APPEARING IN THE
ORIGINAL INSTRUMENT
AND THAT THE SIGNATURE IS
THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

AND THAT THE INSTRUMENT IS
THE INSTRUMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THAT THE INSTRUMENT IS
THE INSTRUMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

AND THAT THE INSTRUMENT IS
THE INSTRUMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THAT THE INSTRUMENT IS
THE INSTRUMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN WITNESS WHEREOF

I, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
SIGNATURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
IS THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

AT WASHINGTON

THIS 15TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1950,
AT WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
DOES HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
SIGNATURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
IS THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9, במהלך השיחה השתמש וולש במילה מתווך (MEDIATOR) להגדרת מעמדה של ארה"ב בתהליך. נקודת מוצא זו השתקפה לטעמי, גם בשאר דבריו, הן בהצגת הטיעונים והן בין השיטין, לדוגמא - מחד גיסא - נימה ביקורתית בולטת באשר למדיניותה של ישראל בשטחים

תוך כדי הסברת הטיעונים הערביים כנגד עליית יהודי ברה"מ, וויכוח בנושא זכות השיבה מבחינת הפלס' (''לפחות לשטחים''). מאידך גיסא - אמירה כגון: 'אף אני איני מאמין לערפאת' (אך בהמשך הדגשה, כי מעשיו של אש"פ בתהליך חשובים יותר מהתבטאויותיו), והתבדחות כגון: מדוע בשפה הערבית נגזרות המילים 'שלום' ו'כניעה' (''סלאם'' ו''אסתסלאם'') מאותו השורש, ומדוע לא ניתן לתרגם את המילה 'פשרה' למילה יחידה בשפה הערבית (''פשרה'' מופיעה בערבית כצרוף של שתי מילים: 'חל וסט''). תרגומן בנפרד: פתרון, אמצע. י.א.)

אמיתי.

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, @ (אמן), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, סייבל

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20315
ATTENTION: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20315

1. The Adjutant General is the principal
officer in the Adjutant General's
Office (AGO) who is responsible for
the management and control of the
AGO. The AGO is the central
office for the Adjutant General's
Office (AGO) and is the principal
office for the Adjutant General's
Office (AGO). The AGO is the
principal office for the Adjutant
General's Office (AGO) and is the
principal office for the Adjutant
General's Office (AGO).

AG 100-10

11

AG 100-10, AG 100-11, AG 100-12, AG 100-13, AG 100-14, AG 100-15, AG 100-16, AG 100-17, AG 100-18, AG 100-19, AG 100-20, AG 100-21, AG 100-22, AG 100-23, AG 100-24, AG 100-25, AG 100-26, AG 100-27, AG 100-28, AG 100-29, AG 100-30, AG 100-31, AG 100-32, AG 100-33, AG 100-34, AG 100-35, AG 100-36, AG 100-37, AG 100-38, AG 100-39, AG 100-40, AG 100-41, AG 100-42, AG 100-43, AG 100-44, AG 100-45, AG 100-46, AG 100-47, AG 100-48, AG 100-49, AG 100-50, AG 100-51, AG 100-52, AG 100-53, AG 100-54, AG 100-55, AG 100-56, AG 100-57, AG 100-58, AG 100-59, AG 100-60, AG 100-61, AG 100-62, AG 100-63, AG 100-64, AG 100-65, AG 100-66, AG 100-67, AG 100-68, AG 100-69, AG 100-70, AG 100-71, AG 100-72, AG 100-73, AG 100-74, AG 100-75, AG 100-76, AG 100-77, AG 100-78, AG 100-79, AG 100-80, AG 100-81, AG 100-82, AG 100-83, AG 100-84, AG 100-85, AG 100-86, AG 100-87, AG 100-88, AG 100-89, AG 100-90, AG 100-91, AG 100-92, AG 100-93, AG 100-94, AG 100-95, AG 100-96, AG 100-97, AG 100-98, AG 100-99, AG 100-100.

נכנס

בלמס

כ/כק

חוזם: 2,14581

אל: המשרד

יעדים: נ' 879/ווש, 746/רהמש, 337/מצב, 1531/מ

מ-בוסטון, נר: 44, תא: 150290, זח: 1300, רח: זר, סג: בל

תח: גס: צפא

נד: ג

אל: נ' י, ווש

יועץ שה'ח לתפוצות, מצפ'א

דע: פלג, שנהר

מאת: הקונכ'ל בוסטון

עלית וקליטת יהודי בריה'מ - הקהילה, התקשורת ודעת הקהל.

1. מזה כשלושה חודשים שהנושא העיקרי על סדר היום היהודי - ובמידה רבה של דעת הקהל כאן-הינו ההתפתחויות במזא'ר התפתחות קשרי ישראל - מזא'ר ובעיקר עלית וקליטת יהודי בריה'מ.
2. בצד ההתלהבות ורצון היהודים לחלוק עמנו שעה יפה זאת ולהירתם לענין מתפתחות גם תחושות אחרות העשויות לנטרל במידה רבה את הרצון הטוב.
3. גילויי האנטישמיות בבריה'מ והדוות הנרחב עליהם (נ'י טיימס והבוסטון גלוב הקדישו כתבות נרחבות לנושא) מעוררים בצד האהדה גם תחושת חרדה בקרב רבים בקהילה כי יש לסייע ליהודים לצאת מיד.
4. הדווחים המגיעים לקהילה ישירות מיהודים מבריה'מ ובאמצעות הקהילה הרוסית כאן-מדאיגים. במקביל מתקשים הם לקבל המדיניות להעניק אשרת כניסה לישראל רק לבעלי כרטיס טיסה או רכבת. חלקם מפרשים מדיניות זו ככוונה ישראלית לצמצם מימדי היציאה ליכולת הקליטה בארץ ולמנוע בכך צאתם ליעדים אחרים.
5. על רקע זה כתב כזכור ה'בוסטון גלוב' במאמר מערכת כי יש

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לגנות האנטישמיות ולהגדיל מכסות הנכנסים לארה"ב.

6. הפדרציה קבלה לאחרונה שאלה מסנטור בכיר האם תתנגד לייזמת חקיקה להגדלת המכסות בכמה עשרות אלפים. בינתיים ניתנה תשובה שלילית אך יש חוגים בקהילה הנוטים לתשובה ברוח חיובית. ועדת ה-CRC ליהודי בריה"מ זימנה דיון פורמלי ל-27/2 כשעל סדר היום בחינת עמדת הקהילה בדבר הגדלת מכסת הנכנסים לארה"ב לאור השינויים המהירים בבריה"מ והתגברות האנטישמיות שם. הזמנתי ראשי הוועדה לשיחה מקדימה בקונסוליה ב-20/2.

7. רבים בקהילה מביעים אכזבתם על אי הערכות ראויה לקליטה בארץ. שואלים כל העת על חכניותינו בתחום הדיור והתעסוקה ביחוד על רקע מספר המובטלים כעת. אין בידינו מידע מוסמך בנושאים אלו והמידע הנשאב מאמצעי תקשורת ומבקורים מזדמנים יוצר אצלם ההרגשה שלא התעלינו כנדרש לשעת חירום זאת. לכך מתוספות מעט לעת הצהרות אחמי"מ ישראלים בנושאי הקליטה המחזקות תחושות אלה. הדבר מזריד את המוטיבציה אצלם ביחוד ערב פתיחת המגבית המיוחדת לקליטה. השבוע נדונה ואושרה הנכונות המקומית למגבית זו בישיבת הפדרציה בבוסטון.

8. מאידך המשלחת שבקרה החדש בשלוש ערים בארץ לצורך בדיקת אפשרויות אימוץ עיר עם עולים מבריה"מ חזרה נלהבת. אחדים מחבריה היו פעילים בעבר דווקא בקליטת מהגרים מבריה"מ כאן. המשלחת ממתנה לקבלת הצעות משלושת הערים בהן בקרו כדי להמליץ על כוון האימוץ ולקבוע שעור ההקצבה לאימוץ ישיר מתוך כלל המגבית המיוחדת. נוטים כרגע לאמץ את חיפה.

9. ראשי הקהילה הרוצים לראות עליה וקליטה מסיבית של יהודי בריה"מ בארץ מפצירים בנו להיות ערים לנקודות דלעיל ולתת ליהודי התפוצות תחושה אמיתית של גודל השעה אליה יירחמו כל הגורמים בארץ ושתוכל לגרוף גם את הספקנים והמתנגדים בגולה ולגייס המשאבים הדרושים לקליטה מוצלחת.

10. לידועתכם.

יעקב לוי

אק

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, גוברין, מזאר, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות, רביב, מעת, הסברה

1071

** כנס
**
**
**

חוזם: 2,14663

אל: המשרד

יעדים: ג'נבה/322, רהמש/339, מצב/1536, מנמת/526

מ-: ווש, נר: 476, תא: 160290, זח: 1700, דח: 10, סג: 10

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

אלהב

1071 / רגיל

אל: ממנכ"ל

דע: לאור, ג'נבה

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

הועדה לזכויות האדם - ישוב עולים בישראל. בהמשך לשלי 448.

בוב קימט צלצל הבוקר ב-7:00, כדי להודיעני החלטתם הידועה
לכם זה מכבר - המנעותם בהצבעה בג'נבה.

עם זאת, ביקש להבהיר שפעילותנו בנושא ההתנחלויות מקשה עליהם
יותר ויותר לשמור על עמדותיהם.

החלטה שהתקבלה בדרג הגבוה ביותר (המזכיר) התקבלה לאחר
דיון ארוך שבו חלק נכבד מהמשתתפים תמך בהצטרפות לקונצנזוס
האירופי למען תמיכה בהצעת ההחלטה. הוא רוצה להדגיש שוב,
שהמימשל יתקשה בעתיד לשמור על עמדתם הנוכחית, בהגדרתם
ההתנחלויות כמכשול לשלום ויש רבים וחשובים הסבורים, שכן
הראוי הוא לחזור לעמדה המגדירה ההתנחלויות כבלתי חוקיות,
השבת כמתבקש והודיתי לו על כך שלא נתנו תמיכתם להחלטה.

ארד

אא

17

נושד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפז שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, ברנע, ארבל2, בנצור,
מצפא, סי'י'בל, משפט, ר/מרכז, ממד, רם, פ(אמנ)

30

ש ג ר י ר ו ת י ש ר א ל

ט ו י פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף 1 מתוך 2

אל :מא"פ 1

דחיפות:מידי

סווג:בלמ"ס

דע :מצפ"א
סמנכ"ל מפאסו"ק

תאריך:16.2.90

זמן:17:30

מס. המברק: 496

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

ס'מ"ל

אתיופיה

בוודאי תמצאו ענין בהתבטאות הגנרל שוורצקוף, מפקד הפקוד המרכזי של צבא ארה"ב בפני הוועדה לשרותים מזויינים של הסנט.

א

עמרני

הגם 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
הגם 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf
 Commander - in - Chief CentCom.

Feb. 5, 1990
 Senate Armed Services Comm.

Because of our long-term friendship and its increasing internal difficulties, Kenya places great emphasis on its security assistance relationship with the U.S. The focus of our joint efforts has been to provide needed defensive capabilities and, through engineering assistance, to improve nation-building infrastructure. Our continuing security assistance will help Kenya to maintain the stability it needs to preserve its democratic institutions and overcome pressing economic difficulties.

ETHIOPIA

For over thirty years, Ethiopia has been involved in an internal war that has virtually destroyed the country's economic infrastructure. Despite billions of dollars in Soviet aid and support from thousands of Cubans, the Ethiopian government has been unable to defeat the insurgents. During the past year, Eritrean and Tigrean forces have won major victories in the northern provinces, exacting a large number of casualties and provoking numerous desertions from the government's forces.

These insurgent victories and Western pressure have led to recent shifts in Ethiopian practices and policies. The regime has agreed to open discussions with its adversaries, and in late summer 2,500 Cuban combatants left Ethiopia and returned home. In September, the Ethiopian government was most cooperative in assisting U.S. efforts during the search and rescue efforts for Congressman Leland and party. There are now indications that the government may be seeking ways to resolve its internal problems and improve relations with the U.S. Any Ethiopian initiative leading to a decrease in regional tensions should be welcomed by the U.S. and viewed as an initial step toward reestablishing a positive bilateral relationship.

496 $\frac{2}{2}$

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2
עותק 2 מתוך 4

* המגורשים ומזרח ירושלים.

* (ב) היכן ואיך תתפרסם הרשימה. הם, כמוכן, מעדיפים שההודעה
* תצא בקהיר בסמוך לסיום המשולשת ובהנחה שבין המשולשת והמפגש
* בקהיר יחלוף זמן קצר.

* סדר היום - מילר הזכיר

* 1. נאומי פתיחה.

* 2. בחירות.

* 3. NEGOTIATING PROCESS אמרתי שאיני מבין האלמנט השלישי,
* שהרי אין כל נושא אחר סובסטנטיבי מעבר לבחירות שישראל תסכים
* לדון בו. מילר אמר שזה מובן אך אני רוצה להשב תשומת לב
* לצורך בהבנת העמדה האמריקאית לאשורה בנושא סדר היום.

* ב. מילר אמר שהמצרים אמנם העלו עם ארה"ב הנוכחות
* הסובייטית, אך, לדעתו, אין זה נושא שעליו יפילו המצרים את
* התהליך ולהערכתם גם אש"פ לא ילחץ על כך. מילר מוסיף, שהם
* לא בטוחים היכן הסובייטים עצמם נמצאים עתה לגבי נושא זה
* מאחר וצריך להיות ברור להם המחיר שתדרוש ישראל. ולאור הלחץ
* הערבי הכבד עליהם גם ברור שיתקשו מאד להענות.

* אמרתי למילר כי אני מקווה שאין להם מחשבות על שינוי
* מדה האמריקאית בנושא ההתנחלויות. מילר אמר שהוא ואחרים
* מבינים זאת ואת הרגישות המיוחדת בימים אלו, אך רמז שיש
* לחצים מכוונים שונים. מילר, כאחרים במחמ"ד, מגלים ענין
* עצום בהתפתחויות הפנימיות בליכוד והשפעותיהן על התהליך.
* לדבריו הם ערים לצורך להמנע מלחץ עלינו בנקודת זמן זו.

* ד. הפץ כראות עיניך.

* ערן

* לב

* תפ: שהח

מושרד החוץ-נוחלת הקשר

* 13902 * 16.02.90 * תאריך *
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סודי ביותר

דף 1 *
עוֹתָק 4 *
מחוך 2 *
מתוך 26 *

* חוזם: 2,13902 *

* אל: המשרד *

* יעדים: הרהמש/311, מצב/1430, מנמת/483 *

* מ-: ווש, נר: 447, תא: 150290, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סב *

* תח: גס: אפסוק
* נד: *

ארה"ב

* סודי ביותר / מייד *

* אל: סמנכ'ל אפס'וק *

* דע: המנכ'ל *

* מאת: השגריר, ווש *

* יהודי אתיופיה / ארה"ב *

* ג'ק שטיין נפגש לשיחה בנושא עם היועץ לבטחון לאומי של
* הנשיא, ג'נרל סקוקרופט. הציג בפניו הנושא בהמשך לשיחותיו עם
* המנכ'ל והח'מ. בימים שקדמו לפגישתו ביקש ג'ק שטיין מידע
* נוסף ממני לאור הפירסומים בווישינגטון פוסט ובניו יורק
* טיימס.

* כמסוכס, הציג ג'ק שטיין בפניו ענינה ההומניטרי של ישראל
* ביציאת יהודי אתיופיה לארץ וענינה של הקהילה היהודית
* האמריקאית לסייע במאמץ ההומניטרי זה.

* ג'נרל סקוקרופט השיב. שארה"ב תומכת במאמציה של ישראל להוצאת
* יהודי אתיופיה, וכי ההוכחה הטובה ביותר מבחינתה של ארה"ב,
* שאכן מדיניותו של מנגיסטו השתנתה, היא ללאפשר יציאתם של
* יהודי אתיופיה בקצב הולך וגובר.

* מבחינת האינטרס האמריקאי ציין סקוקרופט אין לנו עניין בהמשך
* שלטונו של מנגיסטו והיינו רוצים לראות בנפילתו. סקוקרופט
* הבטיח עם זאת, שתבדק בקשתו של שטיין להפגין בעיני האתיופים
* נכונות להאזין לעמדותיהם, אך לא הבטיח הענות פוזיטיבית

משרד החוץ - משרד הביטחון וההגנה

מושרד החוץ-מוחלקת הקשר

* דף 2 * מתוך 2
* עותק 4 * מתוך 26 *

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* לבקשה זו.
* לנזכח תגובתו של סקוקרופט לא מצא לנכון שטיין להעלות הנושא
* בפני הנשיא בוש, איתו נפגש בחום פגישתו עם סקוקרופט. שטיין
* הוסיף שהוא הבין מסקוקרופט כי קיימת התנגדות חריפה בקונגרס
* לשיפור ביחסיה של ארה"ב עם אתיופיה- התנגדות משותפת הן לאגף
* הרפובליקני השמרני, והן לאגף הליברלי דמוקרטי השמרני, והן
* לאגף הליברלי דמוקרטי. הדיווחים בתקשורת על מניעת העברת
* אספקת המזון לאזורי הקרבות ע"י ממשלת אתיופיה רק משחקים
* לידי אלו המתנגדים לשיפור מערכת היחסים בין ארה"ב
* לאתיופיה.

* * * * *
* ארד *
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* לב *
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* תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, (אמן), הדט,
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* מאפ1, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות *
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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 13902

* תאריך : 16.02.90

* ** נכנס סודי ביותר

* דף 1 מתוך 2
* עותק 5 מתוך 26

ציון אכילי
ציון
ארה"ב

* חוזם: 2,13902
* אל: המשרד

* יעדים: רהמש/311, מצב/1430, מנמת/483
* מ-: ווט, נר: 447, תא: 150290, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סב
* תח: @ גס: אפסוק
* נד: @

1. מ. סניטין
2. מ. סניטין
3. מ. סניטין
4. מ. סניטין
האחראי על קולו
המיוזם
מ. סניטין

* סודי ביותר / מיידי

* אל: סמנכ"ל אפאס'וק

* דע: המנכ"ל

* מאת: השגריר, ווט'

* יהודי אתיופיה / ארה"ב

* ג'ק שטיין נפגש לשיחה בנושא עם היועץ לבטחון לאומי של
* הנשיא, ג'נרל סקוקרופט. הציג בפניו הנושא בהמשך לשיחותיו עם
* המנכ"ל והח'מ. בימים שקדמו לפגישתו ביקש ג'ק שטיין מידע
* בנוסף ממני לאור הפירסומים בווישינגטון פוסט ובניו יורק
* טיימס.

* כמסוכס, הציג ג'ק שטיין בפניו ענינה ההומניטרי של ישראל
* ביציאת יהודי אתיופיה לארץ וענינה של הקהילה היהודית
* האמריקאית לסייע במאמץ ההומניטרי זה.

* ג'נרל סקוקרופט השיב. שארה"ב תומכת במאמצי של ישראל להוצאת
* יהודי אתיופיה, וכי ההזכחה הטובה ביותר מבחינתה של ארה"ב,
* שאכן מדיניותו של מנגיסטו השתנתה, היא ללאפשר יציאתם של
* יהודי אתיופיה בקצב הולך וגובר.

* מבחינת האינטרס האמריקאי ציין סקוקרופט אין לנו עניין בהמשך
* לשלטונו של מנגיסטו והיינו רוצים לראות בנפילתו. סקוקרופט
* הבטיח עם זאת, שתבדק בקשתו של שטיין להפגין בעיני האתיופים
* נכונות להאזין לעמדותיהם, אך לא הבטיח הענות פוזיטיבית

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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* 2 דף * מחוך 2
* עותק 5 * מתוך 26
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* לבקשה זו.

* לנוכח תגובתו של סקוקרופט לא מצא לנכון שטיין להעלות הנושא
* בפני הנשיא בוש, איתו נפגש בתום פגישתו עם סקוקרופט. שטיין
* הוסיף שהוא הבין מסקוקרופט כי קיימת התנגדות חריפה בקונגרס
* לשיפור ביחסיה של ארה"ב עם אתיופיה- התנגדות משותפת הן לאגף
* הרפובליקני השמרני, והן לאגף הליברלי דמוקרטי השמרני, והן
* לאגף הליברלי דמוקרטי. הדיווחים בתקשורת על מניעת העברת
* אספקת המזון לאזורי הקרבות ע"י ממשלת אתיופיה רק משחקים
* לידי אלו המתנגדים לשיפור מערכת היחסים בין ארה"ב
* לאתיופיה.

* ארד

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* תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, (אמן), הדס,
* *מאפ1, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13903

תאריך: 16.02.90

נכנס **
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סודי

חוזם: 2,13903

אל: המשרד

יעדים: 306/מזב/1419

מ-: ווש, נר: 446, תא: 150290, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: & גס: צפא

נד: &

א/מ/כ

סודי / מיידי

אל: מצפ'א, מזא'ר

מאת: השגריר - ווש'

טיסות ישראל - סיוע הממשל.

למברקו בנדון של יורם אטינגר 302 מה-12 דנא. שלכם וו/684

נראה שעלינו להימנע מכל יוזמה בנדון, מאחר והצדקה לדרישה לפעולה כזו, יכולה להיות לה רק משמעות אחת: מצב חרום של יהודי בריה'מ המחייב פנוי חרום, ולא יציאת מסודרת למטרות הגירה שיעדה, ישראל,

פניה כזו או אפילו התענינות בנושא רק תחזק טעוניהם של אותם גורמים יהודיים בארה'ב התובעים הגדלת מכסת המהגרים, שיוכלו לבוא לארה'ב מבריה'מ על רקע האנטישמיות הגוברת שם. הבעות ענין בנושא מצידנו יתנו מנוף בידיהם של אלה הדורשים פתיחת שערי ארה'ב לאלה המעוניינים לבוא מבריה'מ ועלולה לפגוע בעלייה מבריה'מ לישראל.

אי לכך אני מציע להניח לכל הענין ללא דחוי.

ארד

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מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזארן,
תפוצות, כהן

משרד החוץ - מנהל המסמכים
4406



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

13920

תאריך: 16.02.90

נכנס **
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סודי

חוזם: 2,13920

אל:המשרד

יעדים:רהמש/308, מצב/1424, מנמת/480

מ:-ווש, נר:431, תא:150290, זח:2300, דח:ר, סג:10

תח:פ גס:ממד

נד:פ

אנה ב

סודי/רגיל

אל:ממד אסוף

מנהל מצפא

מאת:עודד ערן

מטוסים לערב הסעודית

שאלתי את ג'וק קובי על הכוונות בנושא המטוסים לערב הסעודית תוך התייחסות ל'רשימת יעבצ'. קובי ענה שהמדובר בשלוש שאלות נפרדות.

א. התחליפים למטוסים שיצאו מכלל שימוש מתוך 60 המטוסים מסוג F-15 שבידי ערב הסעודית. השאלה היא, האם מטוס שנמצא בשיפוצים ומחוץ למסגרת פעילה למשך תקופה ארוכה, חייב להיות מחוץ לטריטוריה הסעודית ע'מ שאפשר יהיה לתת לו תחליף. (כזכור אושרו לערב הסעודית 12 מטוסים בקטגוריה זו ב-87) קובי מוסיף, שהסעודים מרגישים יותר בטוחים בעצמם וביכולתם לעשות שיפוצים, לפחות חלקיים, במטוסים.

ב. הרצון הסעודי המעוגן בהנחות שלוו את העסקה הראשונית להגדיל את מספר ה-F-15 שבידיהם ל-80 או 100 הסעודים 'רושמי' מידי פעם את הנושא על מנת שלא ישכח ו שלא יואשמו שוויחרו עליהם.

בשלב זה אין כוונה להכנס לפעילות מעשית בנושא. הם ערים לכל השיקולים כנגד ניסיון 'להעביר' המכירה בקונגרס.

6406

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ג. החלפת מטוסי ה-F-5 הסעודים, הודיעו כזכור רק על כוונה
עקרונית אבל לא החליטו איזה מטוס יהיה המחליף.

ערן

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, (אמן),
מד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

54006
מחלקת הקשר - משרד החוץ - תל אביב



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 16.02.90

13901

שמו

נכנס **
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חוזם: 2,13901

אל: המשרד

יעדים: גנבה/316, רהמט/303, מצב/1412, מנמת/473

מ-: ווש, נר: 448, תא: 150290, זח: 2000, דח: ב, סג: שמ

תח: גס: ארבל

ג: ד

א/ארה"ב

שמו/בהול לבוקר

אל: ממנכ"ל

דע: ליאור ג'נבה

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

הועדה לזכויות האדם בז'נבה - ישוב עולים בשטחים בהמשך לשלי.

1. שוחחתי הערב עם בוב קימט אשר ציין שעד עתה; שעה 18:30 לא התקבלה החלטה ביחס להצעתה של ארה"ב מחר בג'נבה. המזכיר יחד עם הנשיא נמצאים היום בקולומביה, והוא מקווה שעד חצות הלילה המזכיר האמור לחזור הערב לווינגטון יקבל ההחלטה.

2. עם זאת ברצוננו להבטחני שנייר העמדה שהוגש למזכיר, מבהיר שלאופן הצעתה של ארה"ב בג'נבה משמעות הרבה יותר נרחבות מעבר לנושא הקונקרטי שעומד להצבעה.

קימט הוסיף שהנייר מתייחס בהרחבה לגורמים ולשיקולים האחרים שיש לקחתם בחשבון, קרי, ההשפעה שתהיה להצבעה של ארה"ב על תהליך השלום. כאמור, ההחלטה תתקבל רק מאוחר הלילה.

ארד

פא

מושרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, @ (אמן),
ממד, ברנע, ארבל2, סי יבל, משפט, בנצור, מצפא, גובר'ן, מזאר, תפוצות

משרד החוץ - מנהל המסמכים



3/4 168 read

WE ALSO CONCUR THAT THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION IS APPLICABLE TO THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. AS TO

SETTLEMENTS, THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS ARE WELL-KNOWN TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS BODY. AS WE HAVE SAID ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT SETTLEMENTS ARE AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE. WE BELIEVE THAT PUTTING MORE SETTLERS IN THESE AREAS, PARTICULARLY AT THIS TIME, WORKS AGAINST THE CAUSE OF PEACE. WE RENEW TODAY OUR CALL ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO REFRAIN FROM ESTABLISHING NEW SETTLEMENTS OR SETTLING NEW IMMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

HOWEVER, WE MUST NONETHELESS ABSTAIN ON THE RESOLUTION. WHILE THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS CLEAR OBJECTIONS TO SETTLEMENTS, WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED THAT IT IS PRODUCTIVE TO ADDRESS THE LEGAL ISSUE. WE THEREFORE CANNOT AGREE TO THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH.

SECONDLY, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE FIRST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH, WHILE UPHOLDING THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION, ALSO REFERS TO THE "RIGHT OF RETURN." THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN A STRONG SUPPORTER OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION FOR PALESTINIANS, AND WE URGE ISRAEL TO DO MORE IN THIS REGARD.

$\frac{4}{4}$ 168 025

FINALLY, WE ALSO OBJECT, AS WE ALWAYS HAVE DONE, TO THE USE OF THE PHRASE "PALESTINIAN AND ARAB TERRITORIES" IN THE SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH. WE CONSIDER THAT THIS PHRASE MERELY DESCRIBES THE TERRITORIES DEMOGRAPHICALLY AND IS LIMITED TO TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE IMPLIED PREJUDGMENT OF THEIR STATUS. THE FINAL STATUS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. AS FOR JERUSALEM, MENTIONED IN THE SAME PARAGRAPH, ITS STATUS CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THE CITY SHOULD REMAIN UNDIVIDED.

IN CONCLUSION, I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL, IS CONTINUING ITS SERIOUS AND INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO INITIATE AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. WE BELIEVE THAT OPENING SUCH A DIALOGUE CAN LEAD TO ELECTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE STRONGLY URGE THAT DELIBERATIONS IN THIS BODY CONTRIBUTE TO THIS EFFORT.

- 810 -

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מקבילה.

- (ב) בשיחה עם הובלר, סגנו של לויצקי שב וציין נכונותם לשלב ישראלים בפעולות ההדרכה שהם מקיימים.
- אשר לרעיון גרובבסקי ציין שיכינו מזכר ללויצקי בו יציגו הנושא הוסיף שעם כל ההסתייגות מריבוי קבוצות עבודה שיש עם מדינות שונות רואה הרעיון בחיוב וימליץ בהתאם.
- (ג) בשיחה עם ראש NIDA, שוסטר, סוכם על השתתפות NIDA, ויתכן שוסטר עצמו, בכנס שמארגנת הרשות בארץ. כן סוכם על חילופי מידע וכן שנציע להם הצעות למחקרים משותפים.
- (ד) בשיחה עם לון סוכם על הידוק הקשרים וצנורות המידע. לון יבדוק עם נציגו האזורי (בקפריסין) האפשרות להעמקת הקשרים עם הגורמים בארץ.
5. התרשמותנו בתום שיחות אלה היא שקיים רצון טוב מהצד האמריקאי ונכונות לפעולה משותפת.
- נראה שהדרך לבסס ולעגן נכונות זו היא ע"י הקמת ועדה משותפת שתייצג נציגי זרועות שונים בארץ, בכללם מערכת הבטחון, שתדון באספקטים השונים של הבעייה ודרכי ודרכי שתוף פעולה.
- גוף זה יכול לשמש אמצעי לחלופי מידע ודיעה, וכן לבחינת פרויקטים משותפים.
- מומלץ שעם שובו של ארד ארצה ישלח מכתב בחתימתך לבנט שיציג התרשמותו מהשיחות, וכן נכונותנו לאמץ רעיון קבוצות העבודה, שהעלה עוזרו, תוך ציון נושאים ובעלי תפקידים.
6. לשיקולך.


 עמרני

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February 15, 1990

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Oded,

Sorry for taking so long to fax this to you. The schedule is in the hands of our control officer at the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, Mr. John Chamberlain. He has been in direct contact with the Israel Foreign Ministry and Ms. Gal who is handling the schedule from the Foreign Ministry side. Please understand that this schedule is now almost two week hold and has been superceded by changes, changes which as of today I am not even aware. My best,

VISIT OF PRESIDENT AND MRS. CARTER TO
EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND ISRAEL

ISRAEL PORTION:

Sunday, March 18, 1990

8:00 am Motorcade departs Amman, Jordan en route Jerusalem
Israel
Drive-time: 2 1/2 hours

9:00 am Arrive Allenby Bridge, Jordan

9:20 am Depart Allenby Bridge, West Bank

10:30 am Arrive Baptist Church Jerusalem

11:30 am Proceed to American Consulate, Jerusalem

noon Lunch, American Consulate, Country briefing
(R. Brow has separate schedule in pm in
Jerusalem until dinner)

pm Ministerial meetings
Yitzhak Shamir
Ezer Weizman
Moshe Arens
David Levy

7:30 pm Dinner TBA,

RON Jerusalem, Israel

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Monday, March 19, 1990

- 7:00 am Breakfast meeting with Dan Meridor and Ehud Olmert
- 8:00 am Meetings in Jerusalem with Palestinian academics
on Palestinian society and economics
Selim Tamari, Bir Zeit University
Mahdi Abdul Hadi, PASSIA
others, no more than four more academics
- 1:00 pm Lunch TBA
- Personal Time
- 5:20 pm Motorcade departs Consul General's Residence
- 5:30 pm Arrive Consul General's home, Jerusalem
- 5:40 pm President Carter greets Palestinian notables
Con Gen
- 7:00 -
7:30 Proceed to Dinner, TBA, private dinner
- RON Jerusalem, Israel

Tuesday, March 20, 1990

- 7:15 am Breakfast meeting with members of Israel's
religious parties, Shas leaders, Rabbi Baruch Abu
Hatzera, Yehazkiel Landau, etc.
- 8:15 am Motorcade departs Jerusalem, Israel en route
Tel Aviv, Israel
- 9:00 am Arrive Israeli Defense Ministry
- Meet with Minister Rabin
- Meet with economic specialists from civil and
military administration on status of territories
- 10:30 am Depart Israeli Defense Ministry
- 10:45 am Arrive Tel Aviv University
- 10:50 am Meet with Israel Diaspora Institute personal
contact person: Dr. Arye Carmon
Dr. Eppi Yair, Israeli democracy
Dr. Avnir Yaniv, Democracy and security
Dr. Yoram Peri, Electoral reform

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- 11:45 am Meet with Israeli academic specialists on the economics of the peace process
contact person: Dr. Haim Ben Shazar, Tel Aviv
Dr. Gideon Fishelson, Tel Aviv University
Dr. Emmanuel Sivan, Hebrew University
plus no more than two (2) others
- 12:45 pm Lunch, Tel Aviv University, host Dayan Center
contact person: Dr. Asher Susser
- 2:00 pm Visit Museum, Tel Aviv University campus
Beit Hatafusot
- 2:45 pm Briefing on Middle Eastern political issues with the staff of the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies (off the record, closed to the press)
contact: Dr. Asher Susser
- 4:15 pm Motorcade departs en route to American ambassadors residence, via Russian immigrant absorption center
- 4:45 pm TBA, at desire of American ambassador
- 6:30 pm Motorcade to Ben-Gurion airport
- 7:00 pm Arrive airport, proceed to news conference,
- 7:25 pm Proceed to board El Al Flight LY443
- 7:30 pm Depart Tel Aviv, Israel en Cairo, Egypt

14

שגרירות ישראל / רושינגטון

אל: יועץ שה"ח לענייני חפוצות.
דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א
מנהל מצפ"א
מאת: השגריר, רושינגטון

ס ו ס ס מ ב ד ק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סוג מסמך: מסמך

דח"פ: מייד

תאריך: 16.2.90 2:45

מס' מברק: 482

Handwritten initials

ועידת NJCRAC

1. לקראת הועידה השנתית של הארגון הני"ל בסיניקס, בפגשתי השבוע עם טד מאן, על מנת לעמוד מקרוב על כוונותיהם של חבריו ושליו להביא לשינוי נוסח הצעות ההחלטה העומדות על סדר היום, במגמה להחריף הנוסחים שמהם תשתמע בקורת על מדיניות ישראל בנושא תהליך השלום. בשיחה ארוכה הבהרתי לו על המאמצים שננקטו ע"י מחסלת ישראל לקידום תהליך השלום ועל המשך מעורבות אש"פ בטרור. כן עמדתי על הבקורת שהושמעה במצרים על המנעות אש"פ מגיבוי חד משמעי של התקפת האוטובוס במצרים.
2. במסגרת אותו מאמץ, קיימתי פגישה עם אייב פוקסמן וחבר עוזריו, כדי לדון בנוסחי הצעות ההחלטה והחיקונים שהוגשו במגמה להבטיח אישורן של הצעות המביעות תמיכה בעמדותינו.

Handwritten signature and scribble

- 36 -

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page

דחיפות: רגיל

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון
טופס פרוק

ק: 1
כתוב: 4

סוג: בלמים

תאריך וזמן מעור:

אל: מצפ"א

16 במר 1990 13:30

כס' פרוק:

דע:

הפסד:

א/מ/ב

469

פאת: ק. לקונגרס

עדות הגנרל שוורצקופף
(1) מצ"ל תקציר הכוונות

(2) במהלך העדות חזר הגנרל על הסתייגותו מ-"Barmarking" ומתמיכתו בחספקת נשק מתוחכם למדינות ערב.

(3) בתשובה לסנטור נאן ציין הגנרל שברח"מ מעבירה כמויות גדולות של נשק ממזרח אירופה לעירק ואפגניסטאן.

(4) צילום של עדות הגנרל בדיס' הקרוב.

רע"י
יורם

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and various words and symbols.

תפוצה:

February 8, 1990

469 2/4

MEMORANDUM

TO: Staff

FROM: Leg/GH

RE: Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on developments in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), Southern Command, and Special Forces.

RELEVANT WITNESS: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander In Chief, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)

MEMBERS PRESENT: (for at least a portion of the hearing)

Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA) Ranking Member John Warner (R-VA)

James Exon (D-NE) Strom Thurmond (R-SC)

Edward Kennedy (D-MA) William Cohen (R-ME)

Trent Lott (R-MS)

SUMMARY

The Senate Armed Services Committee received testimony today from the Commanders of the U.S. Central Command, Southern Command, and Special Operations Forces on the threats facing U.S. military interests in their respective areas of jurisdiction. The written testimony of General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) - an area encompassing a majority of the Middle East (excluding Israel, Syria, and Lebanon) ardently advocated greater cooperation with and access to friendly states in the region. He criticized "declining and erratic security assistance funding and restrictive arms sale practices" which undermine U.S. credibility in the region.

He also confirmed that the new classified Defense Planning Guide, an analysis of U.S. global interests used to determine U.S. defense policy, calls for a shift away from sole concern for a Soviet thrust into Iran to a more general concern for preventing regional conflicts in the region. The Guide recommends a policy of defending friendly Arab states in the Gulf.

The main focus of the hearing, however, was an evaluation and report by the Southern Command and Special Operations Forces on the U.S. military operation in Panama. Members of the committee focused on this issue as reflected by their questions of the witnesses.

HIGHLIGHTS

Schwarzkopf's testimony criticized congressional earmarking of security assistance. "Program reductions in security assistance funding since 1985 for non-earmarked countries have damaged our credibility as a reliable security assistance partner, and threatened both our regional access and overall military-to-military relationships," he testified. "This situation is exacerbated by the earmarking of security assistance funds - causing some of our countries to bear a disproportionate share of the reductions."

Responding to Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA) on the importance of security assistance, Schwarzkopf stated that it is "the number one weapon that we have available in executing a peace time strategy in the Third World."

He also chided U.S. arms sale policy. "Our restrictive arms transfer policies also call into question U.S. reliability. The political battles in the U.S. Congress that invariably accompany proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have produced inconsistent and, for our Arab friends, frequently embarrassing results." He said that "consequently, these states are turning increasingly to other sources." He did however,

praise the recently passed fair-pricing legislation and the FY90 foreign aid funding level for Jordan.

U.S. joint military exercises with countries in the Central Command were commended, and specific reference was made to BRIGHT STAR, which was described as "USCENTCOM's keystone exercise." He testified that the BRIGHT STAR operation took place in four countries and involved 10,000 U.S. soldiers for a period of three months.

He stated that "BRIGHT STAR provides the most challenging opportunity to train and test a large U.S. joint service force alongside the armed forces of host countries" in the Central Command. "Key regional leaders were very enthusiastic about participation in this exercise and stressed the importance of continued U.S. support and presence." Schwarzkopf's testimony also referred to military construction related to the joint exercises. "We improved airfields, built storage facilities, constructed an assault airstrip and training ranges," he said.

His testimony also included information on the pre-positioning of U.S. defense articles in the region. "The viability of the pre-positioning program was recently validated during BRIGHT STAR 90. Use of these assets lowered costs by reducing our airlift and sealift requirements and simultaneously enabled the consumption of perishable stocks." He also revealed that last year, the U.S. placed an additional 3,000 tons of supplies and equipment in the Central Command region.

In response to questions from Chairman Nunn and Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC) regarding the Soviet's withdrawal of conventional weapons and troops from Eastern Europe and its impact upon the region, Schwarzkopf said that huge amounts of modern Soviet armaments, previously deployed in Eastern Europe, have been transferred to Iraq and Afghanistan. He also said that there has been an increase in the number of Soviet troops deployed in just north of the region.

Schwarzkopf also testified that the "economics of the U.S. and its European and Pacific allies are increasingly dependent on the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf oil." He explained that the region contains 77% of the Free World's proven oil reserves, and noted that one quarter of the oil imported by the U.S. comes from the Persian Gulf. He predicted that U.S. reliance on imported oil will increase, especially from the Gulf region, which still contains over 100 years of proven oil reserves - with many acres yet to be explored, due to declining U.S. production.

According to Schwarzkopf, the principle threat to U.S. interests in the Central Command are "regional conflicts" which have "the potential to spill over and directly involve U.S. military forces."

"Although Israel lies outside USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, the longstanding Arab-Israeli dispute exerts a dominate influence in our relations with states in the region," he added. "The U.S. and our friends have done much diplomatically to find a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, but a lasting peace remains a distant goal. A resolution of this prolonged confrontation would do more to guarantee peace and stability in the region than any other event or combination of events."

He also warned that although the Iran-Iraq ceasefire continues, hostilities between the two countries are likely to resume. "This no peace-no war situation is a matter of great concern to leaders in our region," Schwarzkopf said. "Universally, they believe that the cease-fire represents only a lull in the fighting; and that as soon as Iran has adequately rearmed, it will go back to war with Iraq."

He highlighted the fact that "ballistic missiles were used on undefended populations" during the Iran-Iraq war. "The war demonstrated growing acceptance by both sides of the use of chemical munitions as anti-personnel weapons," he said. "While

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not as widespread," he added, "several regional states are also conducting advanced biological warfare research and development."

In response to a question from Chairman Nunn regarding the type of missile proliferation in the region, Schwarzkopf said that the "majority of missiles are tactical in nature" and cited the existence of SCUD and FROG missiles. He said that "only one country has ballistic missiles" but added that the U.S. is not concerned about it and does not consider it a threat. (He did not elaborate.)

In his opening statement, Ranking Member John Warner (R-VA) expressed concern about the proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles, "particularly as it relates to Israel's security."

Regarding terrorism, Schwarzkopf said "whether to reduce U.S. influence or as a by product of regional conflict," terrorist acts "will continue to be employed by radical groups who lack military power or constructive channels for political expression." He singled out Iran, Libya and Syria for continuing to influence and support terrorist organizations, and cited the Abu Nidal Organization and the PFLP-GC as the "most deadly and capable groups that operate and train in this region."

Schwarzkopf's testimony contained an evaluation of the U.S. relationship with each of the countries which make up the Central Command. Following are excerpts indicative of his lengthy testimony:

Iraq:

"Even though it enjoys a significant post-war military advantage over Iran, Iraq continues to import arms. Of greater concern, however, is its domestic arms industry, the most advanced in the region. Iraq is now capable of producing chemical munitions and medium-range missiles."

Saudi Arabia:

"However, as a result of restrictive U.S. foreign military sales policies, the preeminent position we once enjoyed in the country no longer exists....As a result, the U.S. has already lost tens of billions of dollars in exports and domestic employment opportunities. The recent M1 tank sale to the Saudis represented a critical test of our credibility as a long-term defense partner. With the Congressional approval of the sale, Saudi confidence in our commitment to the region (and our ability to affect the types and quantities of weapons introduced into the region) has improved. To build on this success, we must maintain our support for Saudi Arabia's legitimate defense needs."

Bahrain:

"We must work closely with the Bahrainis to repair the damage to our relationship caused by the Stinger buy-back issue. They are still suspicious of the buy-back provision that has been extended until 1991 and cannot understand why the United States has singled out one of its best friends in the region for this type of treatment."

United Arab Emirates:

"...the UAE asked the U.S. for Stinger missile protection. This request was refused and the Soviet union promptly stepped in and provided its most modern SA-14 air defense missile."

Jordan:

"It [Jordan] has also been a key contributor to the search for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli confrontation and the Palestinian issue by helping to gain the PLO acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. It also helped to persuade the PLO to renounce the use of violence....The U.S. has long considered Jordan a dependable and cooperative friend. During recent exercises, Jordanian and U.S. troops conducted highly effective combined air and ground training."

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

1/3

16.2.90

21:30

סוף קריאה

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שומר / מידי

אל: מנחל מצפייא, יועצ רוחיים להפוצוח

כנס נקראק.

המכתב הרצייב מיוייר ומנכ"ל אי.די.אל יופמצ באמצעות נקראייק
לכל משתתפי הכנס בפניקס.

פלג.

מכתב הרצייב מיוייר ומנכ"ל אי.די.אל יופמצ באמצעות נקראייק
לכל משתתפי הכנס בפניקס.

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The answers, we believe, are obvious. We urge that participants think very carefully before continuing to move in the direction recommended by some. No one is saying that it is easy to find common ground, particularly with the sharp divisions that exist in Israel itself. But it can be done.

More specifically, let us focus on the fact that there is an Israeli peace proposal that is on the table, the beauty of which is that Israeli leadership on both sides agreed on its fundamental perspective: get a process of elections started and avoid at this stage fundamental issues that divide. If the Israelis themselves think it productive to put off divisive issues, why should the community inject such views now — for example, questions of land for peace and a Palestinian state? Shouldn't we use the fact that Israelis agree on this perspective as the basis for a more aggressive unified campaign by the American Jewish community?

It is no accident that Israelis have come together on the need to pursue elections first, leaving substance to later. It reflects the recognition that to date there have been no parties to negotiate with and the priority to determine a negotiating partner with whom there is the possibility of moving forward. It reflects the recognition that Israeli leadership is divided on the issues and that a resolution of these divisions is likely to take place only when the people of Israel see real partners who are ready to make compromises toward achieving peace and security. This perspective is one that we should respect.

The theme of common ground is particularly timely because the leaders and people of Israel are right now working together in the historic aliyah of Soviet Jews. The twin problems of the peace process and absorbing Soviet Jews are difficult enough without the people of Israel looking over their shoulders, wondering where their traditional supporters in America are heading. It is a historic period. American Jewry has the opportunity to address these twin challenges in a positive way, to strengthen Israel's position here in the U.S., to send the right messages to the Arab world that their hopes of diaspora-Israel divisions are illusions, and to reassure Israel as it begins this challenging but risky new decade.

Sincerely,

Burton S. Levinson
National Chairman

Abraham H. Foxman
National Director

BSL-AHF/nmh

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 15.02.90

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חוזם: 2,13676

אל: המשרד

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אורה

סודי/דחוף

אל: אירופה 2, המרכז

מאת: הציר - יועץ לונדון

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משיחה עם מיליקאן משגרירות ארהב .

1) להלן מפגישתו של גון קלי עם טארק עזיז ב-11.2

א. הגירת יהודי בריהמ'. לפי העיראקי הנושא מחבל בשלום פוגע בדמוגרפיה ובגאוגרפיה. משלחת הליגה בראשות שרים תצא בסוף פברואר לוושינגטון, דבלין ומוסקווה .

ב. אשפ'. במידה ולא תהיה תגובה ישראלית הולמת למתינות שהוכיח אשפ' תתחולל הקצנה.

ג. לבנון. הפסיקו אספקת נשק לנוצרים. (לפי מיליקאן ידוע שעיראק מספקת לשני הצדדים הלוחמים).

ד. איראן-עיראק. כל הרעיון של מפגש במוסקבה וקבוצות עבודה הינו מיותר וללא שום תועלת. הבעיה הינה שרפסאנגאני איננו שולט דיו על מנת להחליט להתחיל בתהליך אמיתי של שלום.

2) מפגישה עם גליצין היועץ הסובייטי כאן :

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

א. ממרה' שמעון פרס יגיע למוסקבה בסוף פברואר ויפגש עם גורבצוב.

ב. ניל קינוק שאמור היה לבקר בינואר יגיע גם הוא בסוף פברואר.

ג. המפגש האיראני-עיראקי במוסקבה כנראה לא יתקיים.

3) מפגישה עם איברהמי היועץ העיראקי :

א. צאדס חוסיין בביקורו בקהיר לא הביא עמו כסף, אולם נכון שהיתה העברה בנקאית בחלק מהסכום שהוגש על ידי המצרים

ב. בסמינר ב-19.2 על מי הפרת אינו ברור שכן העניין מצא כבר את פתרונו. עם זאת נכון שמגיע ס' שהח לסמינר אולם ' באופן פרטי'. יפגש גם עם אנשי הפוראוף.

ג. הביע תמיהה על המהומה שעושים הבריטים בנושא רושדי כאשר ברור שהאיש אשם ואין טעם לפגוע ביחסי מדינות בגלל אדם אחד (דעה דומה הובעה גם על ידי גברת ריפאי משגרירות ירדן. אחותו של רהמ' לשעבר).

יורם-שני==

יג

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, פ(אמן), ממד, איר, 1, איר, 2, סולטן, מזתים, בנצור, מצפא



CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

Seymour D. Reich
Chairman

2/3

Malcolm I. Hoenlein
Executive Director

February 9, 1990

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TO: PRESIDENTS AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
FROM: SEYMOUR D. REICH, CHAIRMAN
MALCOLM HOENLEIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Enclosed are a number of important items that require your immediate attention. As you know there have been many developments regarding Soviet Jewry, foreign aid and the peace process. Under separate cover we will be sending significant background materials including a report on the meeting of a Conference of Presidents delegation with President Bush on Monday, Feb 5th.

The results of the meeting were apparent in public comments by President Bush (February 6) and Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov (February 6). Responding to a question President George Bush said, "...And I think there are certain things that the Soviet Union could do that would facilitate their role as a catalyst for peace in the Middle East. One of them would be to assist more through transportation, direct flights for Soviet Jews wishing to leave the Soviet Union to go to Israel. I think that would send a sign that their presence, their interest in the Middle East is not just on the side of what heretofore has been the side of the more radical states in the area. So, they can do something like that. I would like to see them normalize diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. I think that would be helpful."

In a statement released by TASS, Mr. Gerasimov said, "The Soviet Union condemns any national discrimination, including Anti-Semitism." The TASS statement noted that "Mr. Gerasimov was commenting on a report that leaders of US Jewish organizations called on President George Bush Monday to ask President Mikhail Gorbachev to denounce anti-Semitism in the USSR."

FOREIGN AID

The issue of foreign aid has been in the forefront since Senator Dole's New York Times Op-Ed piece on the subject. In its budget submission, the Administration included the full \$3 billion for Israel, and 73 Senators signed the Levin-Wilson letter to the President urging support for full aid to Israel. In addition many Senators and Congressmen have written or spoken out positively on the subject. Most recently, there were two negative developments with Senator Byrd calling for a 10-20% cut, and 10 members of the Black Caucus distributing a "Dear Colleague" letter. (Copies of each letter are enclosed.) Letters to Senators and members of Congress on the subject are very much in order at this time.

515 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 • (212) 752-1616 • FAX # (212) 644-4135

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SOVIET JEWRY

On the Soviet Jewry front there has been a great deal of concern regarding growing anti-Semitism within the Soviet Union, the continued refusal of the Soviets to allow direct flights and limitations on the size of the Israeli consular delegation processing applications. Several recent speakers have addressed these subjects as well as the absorption of Soviet Jews in Israel and the "Operation Exodus" campaign.

There has also been controversy regarding the resettlement of Soviet Jews in the territories. Enclosed is a release reflecting assurances given to the Conference chairman by Prime Minister Shamir in this regard. The Arab League and individual Arab governments as well as the PLO have sought to capitalize on this in an effort to stem the flow of Soviet Jews to Israel. The enclosed fact sheet describing Arab efforts over the years to halt immigration of Jews to Israel helps put their current actions in perspective. Continued efforts to provide ample transportation to the tens of thousands of Soviet Jews waiting to leave for Israel is a top priority, as is providing Israel with the wherewithal to properly absorb them.

CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS NOTES

The issues above will be examined in depth during the upcoming Presidents Conference Seminar in Israel, February 25-28. A challenging and informative itinerary has been prepared and includes top Israeli political, military and academic leaders. The leaders of more than 30 member organizations along with six past chairmen will be participating.

Within the past several weeks representatives of the Presidents Conference have conferred with numerous foreign leaders, Israeli officials and Jewish communal figures. A 24 member delegation met with President George Bush in Washington on February 5. Delegations met recently with Secretary of State James Baker, the new French Ambassador to the US Jacques Andreani, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi (see enclosed JTA report), and with members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Among the Israeli officials were Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, Minister without Portfolio Mordechai Gur and Labor Party Secretary General Micha Harish. Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs John Bolton discussed various United Nations issues relating to Israel. The Conference also paid tribute to former Mayor Ed Koch in January.

On the issue of Soviet Jewry, the Conference heard Minister of Immigration and Absorption Yitzhak Peretz, Jewish Agency Board of Governors Chairman Mendel Kaplan and Senator Daniel Inouye. Mikhail Chlenov and Shmuel Zilberg, co-chairmen of the Va'ad of Jewish Organizations and Communities of the Soviet Union also addressed the Conference.

SDR
MH

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דחפנות: מידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קף: 1
סוג: שמור		פתיק: 6
תאריך וזמן העבור: 14.2.90		אל: מזא"ר ו, מצפ"א.
פס' פרוק: הפסרד: 403		דצ: ממ"ד, פר"ן
		פאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

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אמ"ק

ארה"ב-בריה"מ: שיחות בייקר במוסקבה.

שיחה (19.2) עם וולף דסקאי במו"ב בריה"מ שהשתתף בשיחות המשלוח

1. שיחת בייקר שווארדנצה:

א. בשיחה (בארבע עיניים שהתקיימה ערב פתיחת השיחות) דרוח שווארדנצה על ביינוס, מושב הועד המרכזי. ציין כי הפרסטרניקה הגיע לנקודה המחייבת התקדמות. הדגיש כי יש לראות בכינוס נקודת מוצא לרדיקליזציה של התהליך. למרות הקשיים הרבים בפניהם ניצב בתחום הכלכלי, אחני והנמיות הספרטיסטיות, כחוש גורבצ'וב בדעתו להכניס "דינמיזם חדש" לתהליך הפרסטרניקה.

2. תוכן השיחות:

להלן פירוט נושאי השיחות (הערה: דיווח על השיחות שוגר לשגרירותם בת"א).

א. AC

(1) טילי שינט המוצבים על צוללות:

הנושא היחיד שנותר שנוי במחלוקת נוגע לסוגיית ה-range threshold.

(2) טילי שינט יבשתיים:

העבירו לסובייטים טיוטת ההצעה בה ידרש כל צד להצהיר תכניותיו בשנים הקרובות הסובייטים העבירו לעיונם הצעה נגדית. - למעט בסוגיית ה-range threshold הושגה הסכמה בכל הנושאים שהיו שנויים במחלוקת.

(3) התקדמות הושגה בשני חומים נוספים: אי הצבה של טיליח data denial.

(4) START

א) הושגה הסכמה לגבי החילת דיון בסיבוב השיחות השני.

ב) ארה"ב הציגה רעיונות (בנוסגרת סיבוב השיחות הנוכחי) בסוגיית הטילים הבינבישתיים, אימות וכו'.

תפוצה:

1. שגרירות וושינגטון
2. שגרירות ישראל
3. שגרירות מוסקבה
4. שגרירות ברלין
5. שגרירות פריז
6. שגרירות לונדון
7. שגרירות רומה
8. שגרירות טורין
9. שגרירות וינה
10. שגרירות ז'נבה
11. שגרירות אמסטרדם
12. שגרירות ברסל
13. שגרירות פראג
14. שגרירות ורשה
15. שגרירות בודאפשט
16. שגרירות בוקרשט
17. שגרירות סופיה
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61. שגרירות אמסטרדם
62. שגרירות ברסל
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68. שגרירות בלגרד
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81. שגרירות אמסטרדם
82. שגרירות ברסל
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88. שגרירות בלגרד
89. שגרירות בודאפשט
90. שגרירות ז'נבה
91. שגרירות אמסטרדם
92. שגרירות ברסל
93. שגרירות פראג
94. שגרירות ורשה
95. שגרירות בודאפשט
96. שגרירות בוקרשט
97. שגרירות סופיה
98. שגרירות בלגרד
99. שגרירות בודאפשט
100. שגרירות ז'נבה

דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	ק: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 6
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל:
כס' פבוק:		דע:
הפסד:		כאת:
2103		

ג) וולף ציין כי הושגה התקדמות בפיתוח הבעיות השנויות במחלוקת. למרות התקדמות לא ברורה האם ההסכם יהיה מוכן לחתימה עד למפגש הפיטגה.

SDI (5)

- מסרו לסובייטים על כוונתם להעלות הצעה חדשה בנושא *predictability measures*
- הסובייטים חזרו על עמדתם לפיה הפרת הסכם ABM תהווה עילה לטרוש מהסכם START
- בייקר חזר על עמדתם המפרידה בין שתי הסוגיות.
- וולף מעריך שאין בכוונת בריה"מ להחזיק הסכם START בן ערובה לנושא ה-SDI.

ב. נשק כימי:

- 1) ארה"ב העלתה הצעה מקיפה להתקדמות בתחום הביולטרלי ובמקלטיל טרלי ברוח יוזמת הנשיא.
- 2) בריה"מ הסכימה לגבי המסגרת הכללית. סרבו לנקוב בהיקף הקיצוץ בכל אחד מהשלביות. הסכימו לקצץ או להשמיד חלק הארי של הארטנל הכימי במסגרת הביולטרלית וכמות קטנה יותר בחלופה ש שנים לחתימה על ההסכם הגלובלי.
- 3) הדיון על הסכם להשמדת הנשק הכימי ימשיך במסגרת קבוצת המומחים בז'נבה.
- 4) להערכת וולף השיכויים לחתימה על הסכם הם: 50:50. בריה"מ צריכה לקבל החלטות בנושא השמדת הנשק הכימי. בהקשר לעיל ציין כי לברי"מ יש בעיות בתחום איכות הסביבה והיעדר טכנולוגיה מתאימה. מבין שתי הבעיות מעריך שהיעדר טכנולוגיה הינה בעיה אקוטית יותר. ארה"כ מוכנה לסייע לברי"מ בנושא.

ג. CFE

- 1) בייקר פירט הצעות נאט"ו בשני החומים השנויים במחלוקת: מטוסים וכ"א. (הערה: בינתיים נתנה בריה"מ הסכמתה להצעת הנשיא בוש בנושא כ"א).
- 2) בסוגיית המטוסים לא הושגה התקדמות, הפער בין שני הצדדים ממשיך להיות משמעותי.

תפוצה:

דחיפות: סוג: תאריך וזמן תעבור: 14.2.90	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	ק: 3 פתוך: 6
		אל: מצפ"א, מזא"ר 4.
פס' פרוק: המסרד: 403		דע: ממ"ד.
		פאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

ד. "שמים פתוחים":

(1) נערך דיון בהצעה הוונגרית לחתום על ההסכם באביב 91. ארה"ב הביעה הסכמתה בתנאי שטיוטא תובא לעיונם בסתיו.

ה. Non Proliferation

- (1) תחם כי עד לפטגא תוכן הצעה להודעה בנושא סיקוח על הסוצה נשק כימי וגרעיני.
- (2) לגבי תסוצה טילום הסובייטים הודיעו על כוונתם to adhere לעקרונות של MTCR.
- (3) עד לכינוס הפטגא סוכם על פגישת מומחים לגבש הודעה מוסכמת. לדברי וולף הפער בעמדות אינו גדול.

ו. סכסוכים רגיונליים:

הנושאים שנידונו היו: אפגניסטן, מז"ת, אמרכ"ז, טריטוריות צפוניות (הכונה ליחסי יפן - בריה"מ) קוריאה, קמבודיה ואטריקה. בייקר הבהיר בפתח הדיון החשיבות בהתקדמות across the board ובגמישות סובייטית.

(1) אפגניסטן:

- הסובייטים שהעלו (כצפול) את הנושא חזרו על עמדתם המסורתית ללא כל חידושים.
- בייקר פירט את תכנית שלש השלביה.
- הסובייטים שלא התלהבו מהתכנית (כך איש שיחי) הבהירו שעזיבת נג'יבילה (במהלך ישום השלב השני) חדזה ע"י קבול.
- הציעו כי ארה"ב תסוחח עם הממשלה (מתוך מגמה להעניק לגיטימציה לנג'יבילה) וחס ישוחחו עם הגרילה.
- בהיעזר הסכמת סוכם על המשך הדיון בדרג מומחים.
- לדברי וולף לו בריה"מ חיפטה נוסחת שתאפשר לה נסיגה מכובדת היחה מגיבת אחרת להצעת בייקר. מתגובת הסובייטים למד שבריח"מ מעריכה שיש ביכולתו של נג'יבילה to outlast the war ולכן ממשיכה לחמוך בו פוליטית וצבאית.

תפוצה:

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק

דחיפות:

דף: 4

סוג:

פתוך: 6

תאריך ושפת מעור:

אל:

כס' פרוק:

דצ:

הפסד:

403

כאת:

(2) מז"ת

ראה דיווח נפרד.

(3) אמרכ"ז:

- בייקר העלה נושא ניקרגואה. ביקש חמיכת הסובייטים בקיום בחירות הוגנות וחופשיות. ביקש כי במקרה של הפסד אורטגה בבחירות תכטיח בריה"מ העברה מסודרת של השלטון.

- בייקר העלה נושא אספקת מיג 29 לקובה. שוורדנצהניסה להמעיט בערך הנושא. בייקר בתגובה הדגיש המשמעות הפוליטית שיש לאספקת המטוס.

- בייקר העלה נושא אל סלבדור. עמד על החשיבות שמייחסת ארה"ב להפסקת אספקת נשק למחתרת.

- שווארדנצה העלה נושא פנמה. מתח ביקורת על פלישת ארה"ב. בייקר פירט שיקולי ארה"ב. ציין כי בכונת ארה"ב להוציא כוחותיה עד סוף החודש.

(4) טריטוריות צפוניות:

- בייקר שהעלה הנושא (לבקשת היחנים ש.ש.) הבהיר שיש לראות הבעיה בקונטקסט מז'מע' ולא רק בקונטרסט היטני-סובייטי. הבהיר החשיבות בהעברת החפצרה הבינגושיית לאסיה.

- תגובת בריה"מ לא היתה אוהדת. שאלו מדוע יסן מטרידה את ארה"ב בנושא. שווארדנצה הבהיר התנגדות בריה"מ להחזרת השטח. ציין לסיכום ידווח לשח"ח יסן שארה"ב העלתה הנושא.

(5) קוריאנה:

- בייקר ביקש שבריה"מ תלחץ על צפון קוריאנה לחתום על הסכם הבטחונות במסגרת שבא"א. בריה"מ טענה שבכונת הצפון קוריאנים לחתום בקרוב (2) על החסכם.

(6) קמבודיה:

- ארה"ב ביקשה מהסובייטים ללחוץ על הון - סאו ליצור neutral political environment - כדי לאפשר.

תפוצה:

דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	ק: 5
סוג:	טופס פרוק	פתוח: 6
תאריך וזמן העבר:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דצ:
הפסד:		פאת:
2103		

עריכת בחירות בפיקוח בינ"ל.

- בריה"מ הציעה כי ארה"ב תסגש עם חזו סאן והם יפגשו עם סיהנוק.
- ארה"ב הבהירה כי יצטרכו לדון על ההצעה עם חברות אסיאן וסיהנוק.
- לדברי וולף לארה"ב אין כוונה להפגש עם הון סאן. לכל היותר יפגשו עם נציג מטעמו.

(7) אפריקה

- ציין בקצרה שהנושאים שנידונו (אנגולת, דרא"פ, וקרו אפסונה) טוכמו בהצעה המשוחטת שהתפרסמה בסיום המפגש.

(8) קפריסין

- ארה"ב דחתה ההצעה לדיון בנושא. הבהירו תמיכתם בפעילות - מזכ"ל האו"ם.

(י) נבט"א

- (1) ארה"ב חזרה על עמדתה באשר למסגרת. פירטו החבאים להסכמתם לכינוס פסגא עוד השנה: מועד לחתימה על CFE 'הכנה לקראת פסגה 1992 בחלסינקי ומתן אישור לרעיון הבחירות החופשיות.
- (2) בריה"מ לא הגיבה לתנאי בדבר אישור העקרון של בחירות חופשיות.

(ח) גרמניה

- (1) וולף ציין כי חלקו הארי של הדיון שהתקיים איבד מחשיבותו על רקע האירועים מאז שיחות בייקר במוסקבה.
- (2) בייקר הבהיר תמיכתם ברעיון איחוד גרמניה במסגרת נאטו.
- (3) בייקר הדגיש שארה"ב מוכנה לבהבטיח שנאט"ו לא יפרוש פעילותו (לאחר האיחוד) לשטח של גרמ"ז.
- (4) באשר לתהליך האיחוד הבהיר בייקר כי את הדיון בהיבטים הפנימיים יש להשאיר למגעי שתי הגרמניות. לעומת זאת את הדיון בהיבטים החצוניים (קרי נושא הבטחון) יש לקיים במסגרת שתקח בחשבון את אינטרסי שכנותיה של רפ"ג.
- (5) שווארדנצה האזין לטיעונים ולא הגיב.

תפוצה:

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון
טופס פרוק

קד: 6
פתוך: 6

דתיפות:

סוג:

תאריך וזמן תעבור:

אל:

כס' פרוק:

דע:

מספר:

403

פאת:

ט. נושאים טרנס לאומיים:

1. ארה"ב העלתה שורת הצעות לגבי מאבק בטידור. סוכם על עריכת מפגש מומחים במרץ.

2. החקיים דיון לגבי שח"פ במאבק בסמים ואיכות הסביבה.

י. נושאים בילטרליים:

1. בין יתר הנושאים שעלו הן: סוגיית העצירים פוליטים, רפיוסניקים ונושא האנטישמיות.

שטי. ll

תפוצה:

דחיסות: מיידי	טג' דות יסדאל / וויס: טג' טון	ק' / פתוק
שמו	טופס פרוק	
מאריך יוספן העבור: 14 בסבר 1990 16:30		אל: מצמ"א
כפ' פרוק:	אנר	דע:
מסדד: 205		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביהיב : תחנת הממטר בערמה (מס)

1. ביוס ג' ח-2/2 יקיים הקונגרסון דיימלי, יו"ר ועדת המשנה לענייני מחמ"ד, שימועים בנושא תחנת הממטר.

2. יעידו מטעם הממשל אנשי חזב סורבס ופורטר.

הוזמנו לחעיד: נציגי תחברת לחגנת הטבע, אגודה אמריקנית לאיכות חסביבה "FRIENDS OF THE EARTH". חקונגרסון שוייר.

3. מתחילוח לחתעודר שאלוח לגבי חצורר והחיוניות בחמשר הפרוייקט על רקע שאלוח איכות חסביבה ועל רקע נסיבות סוליטיות משחנות בברתיים ומזא"ר. ביומיים האחרונים קיבלנו פניות ממסר משרדי קונגרסמנים לגבי עמדתנו. לפונים אנו עונים שישראל ממשיכה להיות מחויבת להסכט. הטרוייקט מתבצע עפ"י בקשת ארחיב לה בענתה ישראל.

4. נודה על קבלוח דיווח על סגישות סורבס ופורטר בארץ.

יהודים ורנאי זרנגר.
אנאל' זרנגר

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סייב 1 אלה 1 אלה 1 אלה 1 אלה 1 אלה 1 אלה
תאן קיבלה / אלה

תפוסה: 36

סודי - ביוגר

14 בפברואר 1990
58178

ארה"ב

אל : שה"ח
דע : דאה"מ
מאת: סלי

שיחת טלפון סלי - רוט 13.2.90 , 17:00

יהודי ברה"מ - טיסות ישירות והגדלת מספר שליחים ישראלים במוסקבה

סיפר כי בייקר העלה הנושא וכי מסר לשברנדזה מכתב 100 הסנטורים.
דוסיס הגיבו בציון הכעיות החמורות ביותר שיש להם עם הערכים וכיקשו
סיוע ארה"ב בנושא.

הסובייטים התחייבו לא לעכב ההגירה, אך לא יעשו דבר שיסייע להאצתה,
כולל טיסות ישירות והגדלת מספר הישראלים.

רוט מעריך שגמדתם נחושה. הרוח בקול שאולי הבורה מצד דאה"מ שמיר
תעזור, אך ציין כי אין כל ודאות שכך יהיה.

האמריקאים פנו גם בנושא האנטישמיות ובעניין זה היו הסובייטים יותר
נכונים לשמוע ולפעול.

סלי

H-Senate Report for the 101st Congress Tue, February 13, 1990 5:01pm (EST)

Report for S.2119 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1990, Amendment
As introduced in the Senate
Complete Text of this version

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3

389

II

101st CONGRESS
1st Session

S. 2119

Amend the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1990, to increase the total amount of commitments
which may be made to finance projects for housing and infrastructure in
Israel for Soviet refugees, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 8 (legislative day, January 23), 1990

Kasten (for himself and Mr. Leahy) introduced the following bill; which
was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

Amend the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1990, to increase the total amount of commitments
which may be made to finance projects for housing and infrastructure in
Israel for Soviet refugees, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) title II of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990
(Public Law 101-167) is amended in the undesignated paragraph under the
heading "housing and other credit guaranty programs"--

(1) by striking out "\$100,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof
"\$500,000,000";

(2) by inserting after "principal" in the last proviso under such
heading the following: ", of which amount \$400,000,000 in commitments
shall be available during fiscal year 1990 or subsequent fiscal years
only for the purpose of providing housing and infrastructure in Israel
for Soviet refugees: Provided further, That with respect only to the
\$400,000,000 in commitments to be made for housing and infrastructure in
Israel referred to in the preceding proviso--

"(1) the guarantees shall be made available for loans made during or

of "\$2,558,000,000".

3/3

After fiscal year 1990, notwithstanding the limitation contained in the third sentence of section 222(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

"(2) the guarantees shall be made available for loans in increments of at least \$150,000,000 or the amount requested by the borrower, whichever is lesser, and that the Agency for International Development shall review the borrower's actual or planned expenditures solely to ascertain that such amounts have or will be expended in accordance with the preceding proviso;

"(3) section 223(j) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 1877d) shall not apply to such commitments; and

(4) no guarantee fees provided for in section 223(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or under any other law or regulation shall be charged with respect to such commitments".

(b) Section 222(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.) is amended by striking out "\$2,158,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$2,558,000,000".

Please enter NAME of desired report (or 'MENU').....

389

Please enter NAME of desired report (or 'MENU').....

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קד:
סוג: שמור		כתוב:
תאריך וזמן תעבור: 14 בפבר 1990 9:00	ארה"ב	אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק:		דצ:
הפסד:		
366		פאת: ק. לקונגרס, נספחות צבאית

שתיים אסטרטגי - שיחה עם וורן נלסון.

להלן מספר נקודות שהועלו ע"י עוזרו הבכיר של יו"ר ועדת הכוחות המזויינים בביה"נ, לט אספין:

1. אנטרס ארה"ב במז"ת אינו מבוסס על נוכחות או מעורבות ברה"מ.
גם אם תוריד ברה"מ את הפרופיל הצבאי באזור, הרי שרבות הסכנות לאנטרסים האמריקאים, ויש לטפח הסדרים אסטרטגים שיגנו עליהם.
2. ירידת הדגש הבטחוני האמריקאי במזא"ר כבר הביא לתגבור תשומת הלב המופנית כלפי העולם השלישי בכלל, והמז"ת בפרט.
3. בנגוד למדינות מסוימות בעולם ה-3 (כגון אנגולה) אשר מיקדו תשומת לב ארה"ב רק כדי לבלום את ברה"מ, הרי שהמז"ת מרתק משאבים אמריקאים עקב אינטרסים חשובים ללא קשר לברה"מ.
4. למרות הרגיעה הבינגושית, גוברים הסכסוכים האזוריים בעולם ה-3, והדבר מדגיש את חשיבות הקשר עם ישראל.
5. פנוי מרצון ומכוח של בסיסים ב"נ, למשל, מחיב הימצאותן של אופציות נוספות. ישראל מציגה אופציה יעילה, המקילה גם על המו"מ של ארה"ב עם תורכיה אשר תמהר להעלות את המחיר הפיננסי והפוליטי של בסיסים אמריקאים בתחומה.
6. ווארן מעודד להעלות בפניו רעיונות לטפור השתיים האסטרטגיות, תוך דגש על רעיונות אשר יחסכו בהוצאות ויטפרו את הניידות. הוא מודע לחיוניות הקשר עם הפנטגון ובכורת הפנטגון בכל הקשור ל"גלגול" הרעיונות.
7. הדגיש את חשיבותה של ישראל חזקה להצלחת התהליך המדיני, אך ציין את הקושי שיש לארה"ב בהסכמה עם מדיניות ישראל בנדון.

יורם אטינגר - אברהם בן-שושן

תפוצה: 26

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the number 20 and some illegible text.

דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קד: 1
סוג: שמור		פתוך: 1
תאריך וזמן תעבור: 13 בפבר' 1990 15:00		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק: הפרד: 352	אור"ק	דע: לשכת רה"מ
		פאת: יורם אטינגר, וושינגטון

הנדון: הסנטור אינוייה והצעתו למענק מיוחד לקליטת עליה.


1. נר 1040 הביא לתשומת לבי את דיווח עקיבא אלדל מ-11.2, לפיו הקפיא הסנטור מאמציו בנדון עקב דברי רה"מ על "ישראל הגדולה".
2. לפי אלדר אמר זאת הסנטור לקציני הקשור בקונגרס.
3. לאור השתתפותי בשיחות שהתקיימו עם הסנטור אני קובע כי אין שחר גם לדווח זה של אלדר.
4. הנסיבות אשר הביאו להחלטה הסנטור, מעוגנות במגבלות התקציביות והשלכותיהן הפוליטיות.

יורם אטינגר.

שהח³ סלשה³ רה"מ³ אמרה¹ אן¹ אמנכ¹ מצב¹ קצור¹
 2² 1¹ ס"ב¹

תפוצה:

דחילות: סייד	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: גלוי		כתוב: 2
תאריך נוסח העור: 13.2.90		אל: טפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה.
כס' פרוק: הפשרד: 27 45	אמ"ק	דע: ניד-דורק, עתונות.
346		כאת: עתונות, רושינגטון.



רע"ב כתבתו של דולף בליצר ל-"רושינגטון ג'ואיש וויק"-:

הנשיא בוש חתם על חוק שהועבר לאחרונה לפיו מחמ"ד יספק להונגרים
דוחו"ת - 3 פעמים בשנה - בנושא; אש"ס - כיצד עומד בהתחייבויותיו לחיות
 בשלום עם ישראל ללחדול מפעילות טרור.

עתונות

לוח 3 סלעהח מנל ומנל ארבה ארבה ארבה
 רבוי 1 מלח הסברה 2 פסוק 1 זעמ 2
 סיב 1 גשפ 1 חז/געה אלן 2
 1 1 4

תפוצה: -12-

Bush signs PLO reporting law

By Wolf Blitzer
Special to the WJW

2/2
346,45

WASHINGTON — President George Bush has signed into law recently-passed legislation requiring the State Department to provide Congress with detailed reports three times a year on the PLO's stated readiness to live in peace with Israel and to renounce terrorism. The first such report will be due in early March.

The U.S. Ambassador in Tunis, Robert Pelletreau, also asks the PLO specifically whether it was responsible for nine violent incidents aimed against Israel between December 26, 1988, until March 15, 1989.

Those included attempted infiltrations into Israel from Lebanon and Gaza as well as other attacks.

After the first report, the State Department, every 120 days, will have to inform Congress in an unclassified document "to the maximum extent practicable" whether the PLO or any of its constituent groups has fully complied with the PLO's declared commitment in Geneva in December 1988 to accept Israel's right to exist and to renounce terrorism.

The commitment, made by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, resulted in the opening of a U.S.-PLO dialogue in Tunis.

The legislation, co-sponsored by Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and Republican Connie Mack of Florida, is designed to pressure the PLO into maintaining that commitment.

The required State Department reports will monitor whether PLO spokesmen are continuing to declare that their proposed Palestinian state should encompass all of Israel and whether the PLO has taken any steps "to evict or otherwise discipline individuals or groups taking actions inconsistent with the [1988] Geneva commitments."

The reports will also require statements whether the PLO has repealed provisions of its National Covenant

calling for Israel's destruction and its so-called "strategy of stages" declarations leading to the total elimination of Israel.

In addition, the reports will have to state whether the PLO has called on any Arab state to recognize Israel and enter direct negotiations with Israel "or to end its economic boycott of Israel."

Other statements required in the State Department reports include:

- "Whether 'Force 17' and the 'Hawari Group' units directed by Arafat that have carried out terrorist attacks, have been disbanded and not reconstituted under different names."

- Whether various PLO constituent groups, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Fatah, the Arab Liberation Front, and the Palestine Liberation Front, "conduct or participate in terrorist or other violent activities."

Regarding the intifada, the report will have to describe the PLO's position on the unrest in the territories "and whether the PLO threatens, through violence or other intimidation measures, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who advocate a cessation" of the uprising or might be "receptive to taking part in elections."

The State Department will have to answer whether the PLO will prosecute and extradite "known terrorists such as Abu Abbas," who directed the Achille Lauro hijacking and whether the PLO will provide compensation to American victims of "PLO terrorism."

The new law also stipulates that the State Department will have to report within 30 days about the policies of Arab states toward the peace process, including progress toward "public recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, ending the Arab economic boycott of Israel, and ending efforts to expel Israel from international organizations or denying participation in the activities of such organizations." ■

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מילדי	דחמות	שגרירות ישראל / דושינגטון	דף: 1
גלדי	סוג	טופס מברק	מתור: 4
תאריך וזמן חיבור 13.2.90		מפע"א, מע"ת, הסברה א/רה"ב	אל
מס' מברק		דועץ רה"מ לתקשורת - קשר ד-ם העבירו נא.	דע
חמסרד 345		מאונכת, דושינגטון	מאת

רע"ב כתבתו של לארז קולר מה-אנשי:

ג'ון סובנו, ראש עוזת הבית הלבן, במטרה להגביל התנחלויות בשטחים
דוחף להתנות מתן הטיוע לקלוטת העליה מברח"ט בהתחייבות מעידה של ישראל
להגביל התנחלויות.

עמנואל

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Special Report

Sununu seeks to link Soviet Jewry aid to Israeli settlement limits

By Larry Cohler
WJW Staff Writer

White House Chief of Staff John Sununu has been pushing linking aid to Israel to settle Soviet Jews to commitments from Israel to limit its settlement activity on the West Bank and Gaza, informed sources reported this week.

White House officials are engaged in a vigorous debate about whether and how to make such a linkage, one of these sources reported.

In conversations with Jewish leaders, Sununu has been adamant in insisting that Israel's promise not to use U.S. funds to settle immigrants in the West Bank and Gaza was insufficient. Israel's ability, thanks to U.S. support, to shift other funds to West Bank settlement must also be addressed, he has said.

After a meeting with President Bush last Monday, Jewish leaders were hopeful that they had stilled administration concerns about the impact Soviet immigrants to Israel will have on West Bank settlement and the peace process. But at a luncheon at the Israeli embassy the same day, Sununu once more raised the issue of fungibility, or Israel's ability to divert other funds to West Bank settlement. He added that he was confident this could be addressed but did not say how.

"The issue is a live issue," said one source in the Jewish community who is close to Sununu and Bush. "The question of how the administration is going to address financial aid in support of [Israel's] absorption of the Soviet Jews in a manner consistent with its concern about the peace process is a legitimate issue. Where the

administration will go on it, I believe, should be clear in the next couple of weeks."

Any linkage making U.S. aid contingent on Israeli commitments regarding West Bank settlement activities would be unprecedented. U.S. attempts to forge such a linkage during the Nixon and Carter administrations failed in the face of congressional resistance.

But the current explosion in the numbers of Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel has set off alarms in many quarters, including the White House.

Soviet immigration has been surging for weeks amidst widespread fears among Soviet Jews of growing anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and a U.S. decision to restrict the number coming here.

But it was only on Jan. 14 that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir provoked alarm worldwide that the immigration might have implications for settlement activities on the West Bank and, consequently, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

"For a big immigration, we need a big and strong state," Shamir said then.

Asked if the government would settle Soviet Jews in the West Bank and Gaza, site of a 25-month-old Palestinian uprising, he replied, "We will need a lot of room to absorb everyone and every immigrant will go where he wants."

He added, "Everything is about to change here. With all the waves of immigration that will come . . . the state will be different, will look different."

Protests soon mounted in the Arab world to Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States. In the face of these protests, the Soviet Union last week announced it was delaying implementation of an agreement to start direct flights between Moscow and Tel Aviv to facilitate the emigration.

Currently, Soviet emigres must first travel to Bucharest or Budapest to catch flights to Israel by El Al, Israel's

national airline. But these flights are backed up for months due to the swelling numbers.

In the United States, administration officials sharply scored Shamir's comments as harmful to the peace process, which is currently at a delicate stage.

For its part, Israel rushed out statistics indicating that, at most, 1 to 2 percent of the Soviet immigrants who have come to Israel thus far have settled over the so-called Green Line that separates Israel's pre-1967 borders from the territories it won in the Six Day War that year.

Shamir later explained his reference to the need for a "big" state to handle the immigration wave as meaning "a great Israel, not a big Israel."

But even on Jan. 4 — ten days before Shamir's remarks — Sununu told a delegation of officials from the American Jewish Committee that Israel would have to address the settlement issue to win U.S. support for a \$400 million housing loan guarantee request it has submitted.

"He said he would not look favorably upon giving housing loan guarantees to Israel until settlement activity was stopped," said Ira Silverman, executive vice president of the committee, who attended the meeting.

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"Someone asked, 'What if the U.S. funds were limited to areas within the Green Line,' Silverman recalled. 'He (Sununu) said that would not matter because the money is fungible. . . . He made it clear that the White House would not be favorably disposed to respond to the loan guarantee request if there were settlement activity.'

Those attending the meeting said that Sununu was ambiguous about whether he

was referring only to the settling of Soviet immigrants on the West Bank or the overall issue of settlements.

"He was ambiguous, I assume, deliberately," said one person present at the meeting who spoke on the condition he not be identified. "I assume it was a broader concern, because statistically, the Russian settlement activity on the West Bank is insignificant."

"Clearly, the question of loan guarantees triggered a very impassioned response which went beyond the loan guarantee issue to the question of settlements," said David Harris, the AJC's Washington representative, who was also at the meeting. "I've not heard it quite so vehemently from others, though I have heard this concern from the White House before."

At a later meeting with members of the National Jewish Coalition, a group of leading Republican Jews, an aide to Sununu reportedly voiced similar concerns.

Last Monday, during a luncheon at the Israeli embassy with leading contributors to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the pro-Israel Washington lobby, Sununu again raised the fungibility issue. "But in the same breath, he said he thought it could be solved," related Newton Becker, who attended the meeting.

Sununu did not say how this could be done, Becker added.

X

It remains unclear whether the concerns and proposed remedies Sununu has advanced remain his alone or are more widely shared within the administration. Repeated calls to Sununu's office were not returned.

"I can say that the president is very hung up on the issue of settlements," said Jacob Stein, a former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations who has a longtime personal relationship with Bush.

"Anything that appears to strengthen the settlements, he bristles at, very personally. He sees them as harmful to the United States' interest in maintaining a dialogue with the Arabs," Stein added.

In a piece published last Monday, the syndicated columnist Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported that the administration was considering reclassifying its view of the settlements as "illegal" under international law and an "obstacle to peace."

That view, which was maintained by successive administrations until 1982, was changed by then-Secretary of State George Shultz, who pushed through an official shift in the U.S. position. Since then, the settlements have been officially considered as merely "unhelpful" to the peace process.

Despite such reports and the position carved out by Sununu, Seymour Reich, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, said that in a meeting with Bush on Monday, "I did not sense any points of disagreement at all."

In their meeting with the president, the Presidents Conference leaders emphasized Israel's point that only 1 to 2 percent of the Soviet immigrants have settled in the territories. Reich related a phone conversation he had with Shamir last week in which, he said, Shamir affirmed that Israel was not encouraging Soviet Jews to settle in the West Bank and Gaza.

X

"The new immigrants are free to go wherever they wish," he said Shamir told him. "It is not the policy of the government to intentionally settle Soviet Jews in those areas."

Reich said he also told the president that Israel "could not make a law prohibiting Soviet Jews from settling beyond the Green Line."

"I think the president understands that," said Reich.

Bush did not raise the issue of fungibility of funds, he reported.

Reich said he and the other Presidents Conference mem-

bers stressed to Bush "the real danger" Jews currently face in Soviet Union amidst spiraling ethnic strife there and explained that "the administration might be helpful" in settling Soviet Jews in Israel.

The discussion did not get into specifics, such as the proposal for a \$400 million U.S. loan guarantee, Reich said.

Nor was there mention of a reported effort by Sen. Dan Inouye (D-Hawaii) to construct a \$500 million one-shot aid package to Israel for Soviet Jewish resettlement.

But Reich did raise with Bush the importance of direct flights from Moscow to Tel Aviv in order to alleviate the current logjam. He suggested the administration might be able to encourage the Soviet Union to proceed with this plan.

Reich gave no indication of any commitment from the president on any of the issues raised. But another Jewish official present, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that Bush at one point said, "We'll try," in response to the Jewish officials' appeal for help.

This official said that during preparations for the meeting, the unity of those attending was striking, given the Jewish community's usual fractiousness. Like many other Jewish leaders who are filled with a growing awareness of the implications of the swelling wave of Soviet emigres, Reich himself stressed the magnitude of the challenge facing the American Jewish community.

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"Israel is there, unlike the 1930s," he said, referring to the period during which European Jews trying to escape the Nazis could find no place willing to take them. "It's ready to absorb the immigrants, to provide housing and jobs."

Also present at the meeting were Gen. Brent Scowcroft, head of the National Security Council, and Richard Haass, who is in charge of Middle East affairs for the National Security Council. Sununu was not present. ■

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דתיקות: בחול לבוקר
סוג: סמור

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון
טופס פבוק

ק: 1
פתיק: 2
22

תאריך ייסן העבור: 19:30 1990

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

כס' סבדק:
הפסדד:

דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופרי"ג
יועץ תקשורת שה"ח

350

פאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

אש"פ - טרוור
בהמשך לשלכו נר 306

1. הכתב שפנה הבוקר טלפונית למשרדו של באוצ'ר כדי לקבל מענה, קיבל טלפונית מהמזכירה תשובה שעקריה הם :-
- ארה"ב מביעה ספוק מכל גנוי על ההתקפה האכזרית והברברית. יכול להיות שלסוף הגנוי של אש"פ אינה חריפה מספיק, אולם אין ספק מתוך ההודעה שאש"פ מביע צער (deplones) על עצם ההתקפה.

2. כשפנה שוב, לבקשתי, כדי לקבל הטקסט המדוייק הופנה לדובר ה- NEA שהעביר אלינו תגובה שונה, לא כהודעה רשמית של דובר מחמ"ד, ולא רק לייחוס ל"פקיד בכיר" וזו לשונה
We cannot say that we are totally satisfied with the P.L.O.
reaction following the terrorist attack on the Israeli tourists' bus in Egypt.

There were many expressions following that attack, and we do not know for sure which of them really represents the official stand of the P.L.O. Some of these responses tried to make an association between the attack and events in the occupied territories. The U.S. has rejected any associations of this kind.

It should be noted, that the U.S. is insistent that the P.L.O should fulfil its commitment to unconditionally and clearly renounce terror in all its manifestations. We are not fully satisfied that this commitment was fulfilled in this case.

Having noted that, one should nevertheless bear in mind, that the P.L.O. responses - or at least a great part thereof - had expressed sorrow for the loss of innocent lives, and called for a peaceful solution.

התשובה של האג"פ, בלשון גורמת סיבוכים רבים והיא לא מביעה צער אמיתי על ההתקפה.

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	ק': 2
סוג:		סתיו: 2
תאריך ודפן חצור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
350		כאת:

3. תשומת ליבכם בהודעה לפסקה השלישית לפיה ארה"ב חוזרת ומדגישה שעל אש"פ למלא החייבות להתנער מהטרור בכל צורותיו בצורה ברורה ובלתי-מותנית. ההודעה כוללת כמובן את מכלול התגובות וברור כי הפסקה הרביעית נועדה "לאזן" את קודמתה. חשוב ומעניין לציין התעקשותו של הפקיד כי ההודעה לא תיחס למחמי"ד אלא רק ל"פקיד בכיר". מניחים כי התגובה הנ"ל תפורסם ואז ניתן יהיה לעשות בה שמוש פומבית, ואולי אף לחזור עליה בתדרוך מסמ'ד כדי לקבלת "ON RECORD" בזמן התדרוך.

באקוין זילב
רות ירון.

תפוצה:

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 4 דפים
סוג בטחוני: גלוי
דחיפות: רגיל
תאריך רו"ח: 13/2/90
מס' מברק: 342

אל: המשרד

✓ ארמיה

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
דע: סמנכ"ל ארבל

ציונות - גזענות

מצ"ב הצעת החלטה שתוגש לוועידת נקרא"ק לאישורה.

3/13 סג

- 12 -

להת 3 סנעיה מנ"ל / ח.י.ס. / ארבל / הנ"ל / ארבל / ס"ק
אשרי הונע ארבל 2 / רבוב / דוד טסון / פולא

2/4

342

1 PROPOSITION: REPEALING UN ANTI-ZIONISM RESOLUTION 3379

2 **CHANGING CONDITIONS** The Administration has publicly declared
3 its intention to intensify its efforts to overturn UN Resolution
4 3379, the infamous resolution which equates Zionism with racism.
5 New opportunities for repealing this resolution are opening up in
6 the wake of the dramatic political transformation taking place in
7 Eastern Europe leading to the resumption of diplomatic relations
8 with Israel and an improvement in relations between Israel and a
9 number of African and Latin American countries.

10 **BACKGROUND** While the U.S. has always taken a firm position in
11 opposing the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution equating Zionism
12 with racism, the Bush administration has indicated it will be
13 intensifying its efforts to have the resolution repealed. In a
14 major speech to Yeshiva University on December 10, 1989, Vice
15 President Dan Quayle issued a call on behalf of the U.S.
16 government to the nations of the world to join in co-sponsoring a
17 resolution in the UN General Assembly declaring "Zionism is
18 racism" null and void.

19 Joint Resolutions were introduced in the Senate and the House of
20 Representatives urging the immediate repeal of UN General
21 Assembly Resolution 3379 and commending the President for his
22 commitment to achieving this goal.

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NEW PROPOSITION: REPEALING UN RESOLUTION 3379

page 2

1 Intensified U.S. efforts on this issue come against the backdrop
2 of dramatic changes sweeping Eastern Europe. The formation of
3 independent democratic governments in that region of the world
4 is leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel
5 and to a reassessment of the votes cast in favor of UN General
6 Resolution 3379 in 1975.

7 The Soviet Union, which supported expulsion of Israel from the
8 General Assembly in 1988, abstained from the resolution to oust
9 Israel in 1989. The Administration will be actively seeking a
10 reversal of the current Soviet position in support of UN General
11 Assembly Resolution 3379. Nevertheless, one Soviet official
12 expressed continuing support for General Assembly Resolution 3379
13 following Vice President Quayle's speech at Yeshiva University.

14 In addition to advances in Eastern Europe, Israel in the past
15 several years has reestablished diplomatic relations with
16 Ethiopia, Kenya, Togo, Zaire, and Cameroon. These countries are
17 likely now to vote in favor of overturning UN General Assembly
18 Resolution 3379. In January, 1990, Brazilian President-elect
19 Fernando Colla de Mello stated that his country's vote in 1975
20 supporting "Zionism is racism" was a "mistake" and that it now
21 would be carefully reviewed.

22 With regard to some of those countries which had diplomatic
23 relations with Israel in 1975 and yet voted in favor of it

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NEW PROPOSITION: REPEALING UN RESOLUTION 3379

1 "Zionism is racism" resolution or abstained, internal political
2 changes since that time offer hope that they may now be persuaded
3 to vote in favor of overturning the resolution.

4 **STRATEGIC GOALS** The Jewish community relations field should:
5 -- utilize ties through multifaceted approaches to encourage
6 those countries that voted against the original resolution to
7 adopt through their national legislative bodies resolutions
8 calling for the repeal of resolution 3379,

9 -- encourage those countries that voted in favor of, or
10 abstained on UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, to publicly
11 reverse their positions and support its repeal.

12 -- enlist the support of key religious and civic organizations in
13 the general community in calling for the repeal of resolution
14 3379.

15 -- develop programs and materials for the Jewish and general
16 communities explaining the history and meaning of Zionism.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 5 דפים
סוג בטחוני: שמור
דחיפות: מידי
תאריך וז"ח: 13/2/90
מס' מברק: 340

✓
אמ"ק

אל: המשרד

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

הקהילה היהודית

מצ"ב דווחו של הקונכ"ל בסן-פרנציסקו על פגישתו עם מנכ"ל הפדרציה
בסן-פרנציסקו בנושא כנס ה"דיסידנטים" בג'ורג'יה. לתשומת לבכם
האפשרות שחולתה למינוי נציג קבוע בארץ.

1 תפוז
2 מצפ"א
3 פלג
מנכ"ל
1 אמ"ק
1 אמ"ק
3 שהח
-12-

4. MEETING WITH BRIAN LURIE (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SAN FRANCISCO FEDERATION) FEBRUARY 2, 1990

Brian Lurie, who has recently visited Israel, is particularly excited by the historical opportunity to absorb the massive aliyah from the USSR. Lurie sent an upbeat message from Jerusalem to all the Federation leaders and agencies. (See Appendix 2) Specifically, San Francisco intends to raise 18-20 million dollars in the next few years. Lurie will recommend to the Federation that they continue the 'twinning arrangement' with Neshet Tel-Hanan (the original project renewal community sponsored by San Francisco) to help in absorbing 10,000 Soviet Jews.

On his way back from Israel, Brian Lurie took part in the Georgia weekend retreat, joining other concerned Jewish leaders. The purpose of the meeting was twofold:

- 1 - To discuss the challenge of absorbing large numbers of Soviet Jews. Everybody understands the need to mobilize all possible resources to facilitate this monumental task.
- 2 - To assess the prospects for a successful peace process in the Middle East. The participants believe it is imperative to lobby both the US administration to stay involved (not to pull out of the current efforts because of its frustration with the slow progress) and the Knesset to treat the Israeli government peace initiative seriously. The participants raised the possibility of establishing a permanent presence in Jerusalem (a Jewish PAC) to enhance the urgency of acting resolutely to advance toward peace.

Apparently, Lurie was very active at the Georgia meeting. However, he acts, at this stage, on his own, without formal support from the Federation Board. Lurie believes that this gathering is significant because it involves people with 'proven credentials' as dedicated friends of Israel. They are not trying to pressure the Israeli government or undermine its position in Washington. The sole purpose

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page 3

to expedite the peace process by dropping unrealistic demands, such as determining who is going to negotiate on behalf of the enemy. As the movement gathers momentum, Lurie expects increasing institutional support. Following the meeting, Rabbi Schindler sent the enclosed appeal to all the rabbis and presidents of all reform congregations in the USA and Canada (see appendix 3)

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THE DREAM, AGAIN

In all of Jewish history, there have been no more than ten or so dates that will be remembered as long as there are Jews to remember things. Most generations of Jews have lived and have died without ever witnessing the decisive turns of Jewish history except through the clouds of memory. Yet, within the lifetime of our own generation, those clouds have parted not once, but twice, and we have seen the turning with our own eyes.

First was the Kingdom of Night, then was the rebirth of the Republic of Hope.

And now there is the Reunion, the great homecoming of hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union, yesterday's trickle becomes today's flow, tomorrow's flood.

Through the tumultuous years of modern Israel's brief history, there have been moments of pure vindication, moments when all complexity has disappeared and the elemental reason for a Jewish state has stood in stark and pure relief. The mass immigration in the late 1940s and early 1950s, from the displaced persons' camps of Europe and from North Africa; years later, Operation Moses, the rescue of Ethiopian Jews; now, Operation Exodus, perhaps as many as a million and a half Soviet Jews ingathered, welcomed.

For the Soviet Jews themselves, the new freedom means, at last, the chance to build a life far from the quickening curse of anti-Semitism.

For the Jews of Israel, the new freedom means the renewal of a dream that some had supposed was obsolete, the chance to refresh the authentic purposes of a Jewish national home.

And for us, for the Jews of North America, there is an essential role to play in the fulfillment of this new chapter of our people's dream. Two years ago, a quarter of a million of us gathered in Washington to speak for the freedom of our people. That freedom is now ours to enable.

That freedom is not free. To bring masses of Soviet Jews to Israel means to provide housing, schools, jobs, lest the invitation to a new life prove a cruel and bitter hoax, lest the reunion sour. Here are Jews, eager to come; here is a nation eager to receive them. But they cannot come and they will not if there is nowhere for them to live, to learn, to work.

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mainly, it is our task to provide the resources that will translate the dream of freedom into the reality of reunion. As mainly, we want and mean to be more than passive financiers as that translation is written into our people's history. We want and mean to be partners with the Soviet Jews and partners with the Israelis, going beyond the raising of dollars and the signing of checks to helping ensure that every dollar that is spent is spent responsibly, efficiently, effectively.

It is unthinkable that the Jewish people will allow this glorious opportunity to shrivel, that we will allow ourselves to be remembered as the generation that had history in its grasp --- and to go of it.

It is our shared opportunity limited to the wonders of reunion. The restoration of the early vision of Israel's purpose is inherently a restoration of a vision of peace, as well. The people of Israel know that chronic violence and war not only inhibit migration, but also exhaust the energies and the treasure of the nation, the energies and the treasure that must now be turned to the sacred task of absorption.

We call attention to the danger of seeking to use this new opportunity for political purposes. The homecoming of our people transcends politics -- but politics can poison it. Soviet Jews are "settlement-fodder," nor ought Operation Exodus be a cover for the pursuit of ideological goals. The absorption of Soviet Jews must not become a pawn in the debate over a Greater Israel; if those who enter the partnership with enthusiasm are led to conclude that their efforts are being exploited by partisans of one view or another, their enthusiasm will surely wane.

Therefore, we call on each and every American Jew, in all our congregations throughout the land, working through our local organizations, to join in this partnership in reunion, to lend hand and pocketbook so that we may together enter history. That is what is here at stake. Together, it has been given us the right to write a new chapter, to make possible a new beginning, to bring new life to our people and to our dream --- the dream of freedom, peace, of home.

In this book of life, it is we who must inscribe ---

1988-02-13

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Special Report

Sununu seeks to link Soviet Jewry aid to Israeli settlement limits

By Larry Cohler
WJW Staff Writer

White House Chief of Staff John Sununu has been pushing linking aid to Israel to settle Soviet Jews to commitments from Israel to limit its settlement activity on the West Bank and Gaza, informed sources reported this week.

White House officials are engaged in a vigorous debate about whether and how to make such a linkage, one of these sources reported.

In conversations with Jewish leaders, Sununu has been adamant in insisting that Israel's promise not to use U.S. funds to settle immigrants in the West Bank and Gaza was insufficient. Israel's ability, thanks to U.S. support, to shift other funds to West Bank settlement must also be addressed, he has said.

After a meeting with President Bush last Monday, Jewish leaders were hopeful that they had stilled administration concerns about the impact Soviet immigrants to Israel will have on West Bank settlement and the peace process. But at a luncheon at the Israeli embassy the same day, Sununu once more raised the issue of fungibility, or Israel's ability to divert other funds to West Bank settlement. He added that he was confident this could be addressed but did not say how.

"The issue is a live issue," said one source in the Jewish community who is close to Sununu and Bush. "The question of how the administration is going to address financial aid in support of [Israel's] absorption of the Soviet Jews in a manner consistent with its concern about the peace process is a legitimate issue. Where the

administration will go on it, I believe, should be clear in the next couple of weeks."

Any linkage making U.S. aid contingent on Israeli commitments regarding West Bank settlement activities would be unprecedented. U.S. attempts to forge such a linkage during the Nixon and Carter administrations failed in the face of congressional resistance.

But the current explosion in the numbers of Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel has set off alarms in many quarters, including the White House.

Soviet immigration has been surging for weeks amidst widespread fears among Soviet Jews of growing anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and a U.S. decision to restrict the number coming here.

But it was only on Jan. 14 that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir provoked alarm worldwide that the immigration might have implications for settlement activities on the West Bank and, consequently, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

"For a big immigration, we need a big and strong state," Shamir said then.

Asked if the government would settle Soviet Jews in the West Bank and Gaza, site of a 25-month-old Palestinian uprising, he replied, "We will need a lot of room to absorb everyone and every immigrant will go where he wants."

He added, "Everything is about to change here. With all the waves of immigration that will come . . . the state will be different, will look different."

Protests soon mounted in the Arab world to Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States. In the face of these protests, the Soviet Union last week announced it was delaying implementation of an agreement to start direct flights between Moscow and Tel Aviv to facilitate the emigration.

Currently, Soviet emigres must first travel to Bucharest or Budapest to catch flights to Israel by El Al, Israel's

national airline. But these flights are backed up for months due to the swelling numbers.

In the United States, administration officials sharply scored Shamir's comments as harmful to the peace process, which is currently at a delicate stage.

For its part, Israel rushed out statistics indicating that, at most, 1 to 2 percent of the Soviet immigrants who have come to Israel thus far have settled over the so-called Green Line that separates Israel's pre-1967 borders from the territories it won in the Six Day War that year.

Shamir later explained his reference to the need for a "big" state to handle the immigration wave as meaning "a great Israel, not a big Israel."

But even on Jan. 4 — ten days before Shamir's remarks — Sununu told a delegation of officials from the American Jewish Committee that Israel would have to address the settlement issue to win U.S. support for a \$400 million housing loan guarantee request it has submitted.

"He said he would not look favorably upon giving housing loan guarantees to Israel until settlement activity was stopped," said Ira Silverman, executive vice president of the committee, who attended the meeting.

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"Someone asked, 'What if the U.S. funds were limited to areas within the Green Line,' Silverman recalled. 'He (Sununu) said that would not matter because the money is fungible. . . . He made it clear that the White House would not be favorably disposed to respond to the loan guarantee request if there were settlement activity.'

Those attending the meeting said that Sununu was ambiguous about whether he

was referring only to the settling of Soviet immigrants on the West Bank or the overall issue of settlements.

"He was ambiguous, I assume, deliberately," said one person present at the meeting who spoke on the condition he not be identified. "I assume it was a broader concern, because statistically, the Russian settlement activity on the West Bank is insignificant."

"Clearly, the question of loan guarantees triggered a very impassioned response which went beyond the loan guarantee issue to the question of settlements," said David Harris, the AJC's Washington representative, who was also at the meeting. "I've not heard it quite so vehemently from others, though I have heard this concern from the White House before."

At a later meeting with members of the National Jewish Coalition, a group of leading Republican Jews, an aide to Sununu reportedly voiced similar concerns.

Last Monday, during a luncheon at the Israeli embassy with leading contributors to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the pro-Israel Washington lobby, Sununu again raised the fungibility issue. "But in the same breath, he said he thought it could be solved," related Newton Becker, who attended the meeting.

Sununu did not say how this could be done, Becker added.

It remains unclear whether the concerns and proposed remedies Sununu has advanced remain his alone or are more widely shared within the administration. Repeated calls to Sununu's office were not returned.

"I can say that the president is very hung up on the issue of settlements," said Jacob Stein, a former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations who has a longtime personal relationship with Bush.

"Anything that appears to strengthen the settlements, he bristles at, very personally. He sees them as harmful to the United States' interest in maintaining a dialogue with the Arabs," Stein added.

In a piece published last Monday, the syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported that the administration was considering reclassifying its view of the settlements as "illegal" under international law and an "obstacle to peace."

That view, which was maintained by successive administrations until 1982, was changed by then-Secretary of State George Shultz, who pushed through an official shift in the U.S. position. Since then, the settlements have been officially considered as merely "unhelpful" to the peace process.

Despite such reports and the position carved out by Sununu, Seymour Reich, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, said that in a meeting with Bush on Monday, "I did not sense any points of disagreement at all."

In their meeting with the president, the Presidents Conference leaders emphasized Israel's point that only 1 to 2 percent of the Soviet immigrants have settled in the territories. Reich related a phone conversation he had with Shamir last week in which, he said, Shamir affirmed that Israel was not encouraging Soviet Jews to settle in the West Bank and Gaza.

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Reich said he also told the president that Israel "could not make a law prohibiting Soviet Jews from settling beyond the Green Line."

"I think the president understands that," said Reich.

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bers stressed to Bush "the real danger" Jews currently face in Soviet Union amidst spiraling ethnic strife there and explained that "the administration might be helpful" in settling Soviet Jews in Israel.

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Nor was there mention of a reported effort by Sen. Dan Inouye (D-Hawaii) to construct a \$500 million one-shot aid package to Israel for Soviet Jewish resettlement.

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This official said that during preparations for the meeting, the unity of those attending was striking, given the Jewish community's usual fractiousness. Like many other Jewish leaders who are filled with a growing awareness of the implications of the swelling wave of Soviet emigres, Reich himself stressed the magnitude of the challenge facing the American Jewish community.

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"Israel is there, unlike the 1930s," he said, referring to the period during which European Jews trying to escape the Nazis could find no place willing to take them. "It's ready to absorb the immigrants, to provide housing and jobs."

Also present at the meeting were Gen. Brent Scowcroft, head of the National Security Council, and Richard Haass, who is in charge of Middle East affairs for the National Security Council. Sununu was not present. ■

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 12, 1990

Dear Ellie:

I enclose a transcript of the President's February 12 news conference in which he discusses German unity, the future of NATO and the U.S. role in Europe at some length.

Sincerely,

Bob

Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill
Special Assistant to the President
for European and Soviet Affairs

Enclosure

Mr. Elyakim Rubenstein
Secretary to the Government
of Israel
Jerusalem
Israel



THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

February 12, 1990

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

2:01 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. Well, this has been an extraordinary and positive week in East-West relations. In the Soviet Union, progress was made at the Central Committee plenum on moving the Soviet political system toward pluralism and genuine respect for the views of the Soviet electorate.

I commend this development, which demonstrates once again why our administration has supported Chairman Gorbachev's efforts to extend glasnost and perestroika through the Soviet Union.

Secretary Baker's visit to Moscow made solid progress in pushing the U.S.-Soviet agenda forward in preparation for the June summit here. We made important headway on conventional arms control, START, nuclear testing and chemical weapons, and continue to explore ways to reduce our differences on regional issues -- especially concerning Central America and Afghanistan.

All in all, Secretary Baker's talks in Moscow accomplished much of what Chairman Gorbachev and I intended when we set the goals for this meeting during our discussions at Malta. I am confident that if we continue this kind of momentum in our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union, the June summit will be a major success.

And finally, I want to congratulate Chancellor Kohl for his successful visit to Moscow. His visit reflects the accelerating pace of German self-determination, and the statements on German unity, on the Soviet side, by the Soviet side, were most welcome. And we support Chancellor Kohl's position that a unified Germany should remain a member of NATO.

Let me also express my appreciation of Chairman Gorbachev's statesmanlike view that decisions regarding German unity should be left to the people of Germany.

I made a statement this morning on the wonderful news of the release of Mr. Mandela, so I will leave that to the question period. But, Terry, I understand you have the first question today.

Q Yes, Mr. President. What is your reaction to Mr. Gorbachev's counterproposal for troop cuts in Europe? And in the wake of Secretary Baker's visit to Moscow, what do you think the likelihood is that there will be three treaties to be signed this year -- chemical, strategic, and conventional?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me take the last one first. I'm not sure that there will be three treaties to be signed by the time we have this summit, but I think there's going to be progress towards all three, and it's still our goal to get that CFE agreement signed. On the troop -- where Gorbachev wanted to have either 195,000 or 225,000 -- we're going to stay with our proposal, because we don't see this linkage to that degree.

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We're talking about the forward deployment there in Europe -- the 195,000 -- and that's what we're challenging him to reduce. And we've got a big ocean between us and Western Europe. And so the argument that we should always have a linked reduction is one that I want to get away from now. I think we've made some real progress on this and I was very pleased with his reaction to our proposal, but I don't think we need to have exact linkage from this point on.

Q Well, if you're rejecting his counterproposal, is there an impasse now?

THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't call it an impasse. This is the way it works when you're discussing these arms control things. No, I don't think we've got an impasse.

Q With the breakup of the Soviet empire and you want Germany to remain in NATO; who's the enemy? (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: What was that?

Q Who's the enemy? Who are they supposed to be fighting against?

THE PRESIDENT: Who?

Q The NATO troops? U.S. troops in Germany?

THE PRESIDENT: The U.S. troops are there as a stabilizing factor. Nobody can predict, Helen, with total certainty, what tomorrow's going to look like. I've been wrong. You've been wrong. He's been wrong. She's been wrong -- on how it's going to go. And we don't know in our --

Q Do you expect the Soviet --

THE PRESIDENT: May I finish, please.

Q Okay.

THE PRESIDENT: Our European allies want us there. I have a feeling that some of the Eastern Europeans want us there, because they know that the United States is there as a stabilizing factor. And we will be there for a long time to come. Hopefully, at significantly reduced numbers.

Q May I just add, Mr. President, that there's a wide perception that your whole military budget is out of sync, that you're tone-deaf into what's been happening and that there is a possibility of this money going for distressing domestic needs.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that perception is widespread with the American people. I think the American people want a cautious approach to this. I don't think any of us think we can see with clairvoyance what's going to happen the day after tomorrow. And we are reducing our defense expenditures. We made -- sent a budget proposal up there that makes good sense. You're right, some of the Democrats are jumping all over us, but that's all right. That just goes with the system. The main thing is the Europeans, our staunchest allies, want us there, because they see the U.S. as a stabilizing presence. And so we are going to remain there. Now, as I say, I hope our negotiations go so well that we can have substantially-reduced numbers over the years.

Q Mr. President, does the release of Nelson Mandela and the other steps announced by President de Klerk in South Africa, alter in any way your views towards the United States economic sanctions which, of course, the Reagan administration and you as a part of it, were never very enthusiastic about?

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean? In the sense of -- alter my views as to what we ought to do in the future?

Q Well, as to whether they work or not?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't know that one can attribute all the change in South Africa to sanctions. Now, we've got some sanctions on there and, by law, they remain on until the South Africans have taken certain steps. And I think that -- somebody asked me about this yesterday and I said, well, I can't judge. Frankly, I think some are counterproductive. I happen to think American jobs there make good sense. And I don't think they perpetuate the status quo.

But I think what's really changed is the mind-set of the South African leadership. And I think that we ought to give Mr. de Klerk certain credit for being able to look much more realistically about political change and, hopefully, more favorably about a society that eventually eliminates this racism that is equated with apartheid.

Q Well, would you be willing to push for the lifting of any of the sanctions before all of the conditions set forth in the law have been met?

THE PRESIDENT: We can't do that. I'm bound by the law. And what I do want to do is discuss these with -- these provisions with Mr. Mandela and with Mr. de Klerk. And I've invited both of them to come here and I also want to see them continue to talk with each other. And then out of that I think we'll have a much more realistic picture of what the United States might do in the future.

Q Nelson Mandela continues to call for armed struggle to overturn apartheid. When he comes to the White House, would you urge him to adopt the nonviolent tactics of Martin Luther King?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I would. But what I -- and I hope I didn't misread it -- I read his statement to be more on the defensive side when I looked at it this morning. But I -- yes, we've always advocated nonviolence, and I think the United States ought not to move away from that.

Q Could I just follow up on the question about the sanctions? Are there things that you can do for the South African government apart from lifting sanctions? We realize that by law you can't lift the sanctions unilaterally. Are there other things you can do other than just asking de Klerk to come to Washington?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would say out of the meeting with Mr. de Klerk I would have a clearer perception of what other things might be. I think having him here is a major step; I think it's a very important step. And so I would simply have to defer on that question until I have a chance to talk to him.

Q Mr. President, there are those who say -- keeping on with sanctions -- that now is more of a time than ever to keep all the pressure on and, if not keeping the pressure on, even go one step further. I wonder if you intended your invitation to Mr. de Klerk as a reward for what he's done, given that no South African president has ever been here before? And secondly, do you think it time, regardless of what you think of sanctions, to reward them in some other way?

THE PRESIDENT: Reward --

Q Reward South Africa?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't know about rewards. I think his coming here evidences the fact that we see in him a new brand of leadership, a man who is making dramatic changes in South Africa. The freeing of Mandela clearly is a very positive sign. So I think there's more to be done, but there are things that he has done that I think deserve our support and, I'd say, appreciation. Because I think these steps he's taking moves South Africa down the

road towards racial equity.

Q Mr. President, on Germany, would you be willing to consider a situation where a United Germany was not necessarily a full member of NATO?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I think that Chancellor Kohl is absolutely correct, and we ought to support him -- NATO membership. And I think it's stabilizing. I think it's good --

Q But full --

THE PRESIDENT: There might be some flexibility, obviously, on the deployment of NATO forces, but in terms of membership, I think that is the most reassuring and stabilizing concept. I happen to believe that it is the most reassuring and stabilizing in terms of how the Eastern Europeans will eventually look at it. Maybe not today.

Q But you mean the same kind of membership that West Germany now has?

THE PRESIDENT: Sure. But as I've -- there's some flexibility on deployment of NATO forces into Eastern Europe. Nobody wants to threaten the Soviet Union. As I was trying to say to Helen, the U.S. presence is a stabilizing presence.

Q Mr. President, on the de Klerk visit that now seems to be almost a fait accompli, are there any conditions on that? Does he have to lift the state of emergency? And in your conversation with him, did he tell you when he would do that?

THE PRESIDENT: There's no conditions on my invitation, if that's the question -- absolutely not.

Q Well, would he come if the state of emergency has not been lifted? He hasn't done that.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I don't know whether he would or not.

Q You didn't discuss that element with him --

THE PRESIDENT: I didn't discuss any conditions. I said, I want him to come. You have freed Nelson Mandela, you have taken certain steps that are positive, and we want to see more. We want to see you go further, but you're welcome. And that's the way --

Q Mr. President, do you have any second thoughts about --

THE PRESIDENT: I was trying to identify the lady next to you, but go ahead.

Q It happens all the time.

Q Do you have any second thoughts about the trip last week? I'm especially thinking of the war games with the Soviet tanks -- particularly when your views on the defense budget are well-known and the Central Committee was meeting at the same time?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I think it was a good trip. And I've read some tick-tock inside here, but it doesn't bother me a bit. I think that those people that were there understood that training. As applications elsewhere -- we've seen recent areas where military force was used because it was well-trained. So I stand by that as a very good trip. You see, I support our defense budget. I think it makes sense. And the fact that we've got some critics up there that don't like it, that's too bad. I think the American people want to see us stay strong.

Q What signal does that send to Mr. Gorbachev,

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however, who you just praised a few minutes ago?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it sent a pretty good one, I guess, because we came out of that meeting with some forward motion. And I salute him. I can't say the trip to the State of California's desert had a heck of a lot to do with it, but if you'd listen to some of the critique from Capitol Hill, you'd have thought it had been a disaster. And yet, I've told you we've just completed one of the most successful ministerial summits that we've had with the Soviets. So you can't -- the critics up there on the Hill can't have it both ways.

Q I just wanted to follow up on the Germany question. You said you thought that the Eastern Europeans would ultimately come to see this alliance with NATO as a positive thing, too. Are you suggesting, sir, that there's something less threatening about a Germany that is in alliance -- any alliance, rather than a neutral Germany?

THE PRESIDENT: I think so. Because I think a Germany inside the NATO Alliance -- they're good NATO partners now and they'll be good NATO partners then. And they are very closely linked to the United States, and I think that's a very good thing.

Q If I could just turn that around. Do you think that a neutral Germany does pose a threat potentially to its neighbors?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I know that's the concern of many Europeans, but it's not the concern -- it's a concern that would be allayed by having West Germany -- having Germany, a unified Germany inside of NATO.

Q Mr. President, you indicated you don't think the conventional talks are at impasse. Would you be willing to consider an arrangement, an agreement in which the U.S. was able to keep extra troops in Europe, but at a number somewhat less than the 30,000?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we've made our proposal. Our allies -- I don't make these proposals without consulting the allies -- and there's agreement that these are the proper levels. It's a level that has been scrubbed by our military, and I think there's a happiness within our own military about this. For this time in history, I think it's the right level. And so we're not out there trying to trade that away.

Q Mr. President, you said -- you talk often about the importance of free markets to democracy. But Nelson Mandela supports the ANC view about nationalizing South African industries, including banks and mines. How do you feel about that? And does that pose a problem for real democracy in South Africa?

THE PRESIDENT: We are not for nationalizing, we're for privatization across the -- for free markets. And so if we have a difference there, that's fine; we'll discuss it with him. But I am not about to embrace the idea that what we want to do is go down to more socialism when socialism is folding -- folding its hand and going over to the other side all across the world. I mean, you see this. So this is a difference that we -- if that's his view, why, certainly we're not going to embrace that.

Q Is that a severe obstacle, though, to having a successful democracy there?

THE PRESIDENT: Nationalization of all the -- I don't necessarily associate nationalization -- socialization of industry, the goods and services produced belonging to the state -- I don't see that as particularly helpful towards democracy, if that's what you mean. But what I do agree with Mandela is, is to try to get a society that is not a racist society, doesn't support a concept of apartheid.

Q On South Africa, the question is, how willing are

you to become personally involved -- your administration become personally involved in facilitating negotiations between Mr. Mandela and President de Klerk? Are you ready to play a role like President Carter did in the Camp David Accords in the Middle East?

THE PRESIDENT: If such a role would be productive, I certainly would. But I have the feeling from the talks with both men -- just the short phone conversations with both Mr. de Klerk and Mr. Mandela -- that they feel they can talk to each other without the U.S. catalytic role. But, sure, if we could be helpful in a way of that nature, we certainly would.

Q Mr. President, there are some people who are questioning the need for a conventional forces treaty at all at this point -- the argument being that we're at a situation in which the East European countries are going to invite all the Soviet troops to go home anyway, and all that we'd be doing is codifying a Soviet presence that isn't even wanted in Eastern Europe. What's your response to that argument?

THE PRESIDENT: Say it's very interesting, and it may well be that the pressure on the Soviets will have them withdraw to lower levels. I don't think there's great sentiment in the Warsaw Pact countries for continued Soviet presence. I'm not sure that it would negate the need to have an agreement. I think the Soviets would like to get our commitment, too. But, you see, those troops are not wanted in Eastern Europe anymore. Our troops are wanted by the Free World. And I suspect -- can't prove it -- that some countries in the Warsaw Pact countries today would see us not as a threatening presence, but as a stabilizing presence.

Q But is it possible the Soviets might use a treaty as an excuse to keep troops where they're not even wanted?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think they can do that. I think they've got a problem of a CFE treaty with us and others, but they also have the problem of opinion inside these countries, and they have enormous budgetary problems that make things very difficult.

Q Mr. President, what was your reaction to the rather effusive embrace of the South African communist party and the presence of the communist party flag on the balcony when Mr. Mandela made his speech yesterday?

THE PRESIDENT: I didn't notice that. But, you see, I think these communist parties, for the most part, are sliding downhill. And I think what's coming uphill, and triumphantly so, is democracy and freedom. And I would hope that the steps that Mr. de Klerk is taking and is suggesting be taken would enhance the view that democracy and freedom are on the move.

Q A follow-up, sir. If Mr. Mandela persists in allying himself with the communist party, would that change your view of his --

THE PRESIDENT: Too hypothetical. I mean, what's good is that he's out there, been in jail a long time. And it's an interesting question back here, but I'm not embracing every position of the ANC or some of the positions that are represented here today as Mr. Mandela's positions. What I am doing is embracing the concept that it's good that he's out of jail and that it's good that the South Africans seem to be moving towards a more equitable society.

Q Do you think it's time for a conference of the four powers on Germany?

THE PRESIDENT: No, not at this juncture. I know that idea has some credibility right now. But I think it's moving along pretty well. And we have always favored self-determination, and that the Germans have to sort this out. At some point, clearly, the four powers will have to have some say. There's no question about that. Whether it's two plus four, or what the formulation is, we're not

locked on that at all.

Q If Gorbachev continues to insist on German neutrality, Mr. President, do you think that could create a dangerous impasse that would spawn a neutrality movement in West Germany?

THE PRESIDENT: Not necessarily. But I think that we've seen the Soviet Union's position change on the whole concept, or the whole acceptability of German reunification. It wasn't so long ago that Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet system were positioned very skeptically about any reunification. And that's what was so symbolic about the Kohl-Gorbachev meeting -- so important about it. And I might say that it was a very emotional day for people in Germany -- GDR and FRG -- highly emotional. Brother separated from brother, cousin from cousin and all of this -- now with a chance to have peaceful reunification.

And so I don't want to buy into any real hypothesis on what might happen, but I think we ought to applaud the fact that the Soviets demonstrated a real flexibility on this question that we didn't think they had a few months ago.

Q Can I just follow? Do you now think, then, that German unification is instoppable, and that Gorbachev will back off his demands?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think again I'd just refer it to the will of the people there. And it seems to be moving very fast in that direction.

Q Sir, what is your visceral reaction to the resignation of Ariel Sharon and its effect on the peace process? And is this part of the pattern of the hard-liners losing out around the world?

THE PRESIDENT: You know, I just heard about this, and I have to understand more about what went on there. But Mr. Shamir was the proponent of these talks, and if this clears the way for the talks to go forward, that would be in keeping with U.S. policy.

Q When you talked with Mr. de Klerk and Mr. Mandela, did you talk about -- when you talked about democracy and freedom, did you make the point that in our understanding of democracy, the majority rules? I'm really wondering about de Klerk. Or will you talk with him about that when he comes?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm sure he will -- and with Mr. Mandela. But that did not come up in these conversations. None of the detail here on the various sanctions or anything of that nature came up.

Q Is that what you would tell him? De Klerk, I'm speaking --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let's wait and see what happens when he gets here.

Yes, Sarah. You haven't had one for a long time.

Q Thank you so much. Sir, we have a big problem in this country with the bases that we have to close and the tens of thousands of personnel we have to let go out of the military and out of civilian roles, too. I wonder if you would be for taking these military bases and turning them into prisons rather than building new prisons and if you'd be for using the extra housing for the homeless?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Sarah, let me say this, that when military bases close, various communities historically seem to prosper. And I think the one in Waco, Texas, where a base was closed -- it was years ago -- all kinds of speculation that this would be the end of the world, and then gradually found out that it doesn't work that way. And so I think there will be socially redeeming uses for these benefits that municipalities and county governments and

others -- these bases -- that these entities may want to use them for.

And so I would say it's a good question, because we can say to others this is not the end of the world. But let me say on base closings, these suggested closings were made without political favor and I would hope that we could get the Congress convinced that the age-old adage, "cut here, cut there, but don't cut in my district" could be laid aside now. And I hope that that's what will prevail.

I said out there in San Francisco that instant doves become feathery instant hawks on base closings -- (laughter) -- only if it's in their district. And I want to see that changed, and I've got to convince these folks we're not doing this in some vindictive political way. We're doing it to try to accommodate to what will be a new kind of defense force in this country.

Q Mr. President, I wonder if you could clarify your position on your hopes for the June summit. Is it your view that it may be possible, if not necessarily to sign formal treaties but to substantially complete the CFE and the START, and even maybe the chemical?

THE PRESIDENT: Chemical. I'd hope we'd be substantially completed -- that's a good way to phrase it.

Q Your assistant secretary for Africa seemed to suggest that some sort of gestures were now needed towards South Africa. Has there been any discussion of that or have you pretty much ruled it out, any concrete move, until the state of emergency is lifted?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have certain provisions in the law that have to be met, but I would hope people would see the invitation to Mr. de Klerk as a -- certainly, as a gesture, but one that will have, after the discussions with him, I think considerable more substance to it.

Q Can you support a situation -- back to Germany -- where there is membership, let's say, political membership in NATO, but not a military relationship that exists now with the possibility of no foreign troops on German soil and a reunified Germany?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we're contemplating a neutralized Germany, and I have stated my position in terms of the Alliance. And that's the way we view it, and I'm sure that's the way our allies look at it.

Q Can I ask how, since you had mentioned that unification is a matter to be left to the German people, if there were some referendum where they wanted a configuration without foreign troops on German soil, how would you deal with it?

THE PRESIDENT: I would cross that bridge when I came to it. But I would point out that Helmut Kohl, to his credit, is not considering that.

Q Mr. President -- in a different hemisphere -- over the past couple of months when asked why you're going to Cartagena this week, you've said you want to show support for the government down there. Now that you're just a couple days away, do you expect to do anything more than that -- than show the flag? Do you expect anything concrete to come out of it, perhaps increased use of military down there?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do think that we want to support Mr. Barco, a courageous leader, and I think going there will certainly indicate how strongly I feel about that. But I think there'll be more than that come out of it. I hope we can get agreement in terms of support for the antinarcotics efforts in these three countries, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.

What was the last part?

Q Anything in particular, like the increased use of the military -- the plan that seemed to have been scuttled earlier -- to use U.S. warships off the coast of Colombia?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what happened on that plan was some mischevious stories that suggested blockade. So one of the things I'll try to do -- because there's never any intention of a blockade. Absolutely absurd. And yet, that threw a panic amongst many of the Colombians, who said we don't want a blockade off our coast. And that wasn't what ever had been intended. But in terms of interdiction, what I'd like to convince them is we can be extraordinarily helpful, particularly, to Colombia in their courageous fight against narco traffickers by a sophisticated interdiction effort.

Q Mr. President, on the same subject. Some observers and some headlines recently have taked about we're winning the war on drugs. And I believe your last statement, you said, we're just starting on the war on drugs.

THE PRESIDENT: Starting to win.

Q Starting to win.

THE PRESIDENT: Combined the two statements. (Laughter.) We'll meld them.

Q As you head for the drug summit, what will you tell the other leaders about the status on the war on drugs in this country?

THE PRESIDENT: I'll tell it -- one of the points I'll emphasize at the beginning is, look, I know you three leaders think that this is all the fault -- not entirely, but a lot of the fault because of the demand in the United States. And let me assure you, we're not just talking about interdiction, we're not just talking about anticrime aspects of this the United States, we're talking about major efforts on the demand side. A major initiative.

And it's a lot of it -- most of it is out in the private sector, or in the schools, to educate people against the use of narcotics. Because they think that it's all -- that the United States is causing all this problem. It's changed a little bit, because some of them are beginning to see user problems inside their own countries, or neighboring countries, or countries that have across the ocean even. So, I think we've got convince them that we are going out on all fronts, and I think I can do that.

Q As a follow-up, they're -- from what we've heard -- going to ask you for more money for crop substitution, to substitute other goods for the coca crop down there. Will the U.S. put its money where its mouth is on that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we'll listen to what they have to say on it, but they should -- ought not to be condoning the growth of crops that are illegal in some areas and certainly crops that are clearly used in the cocaine trade. And so that's a moral question. I'd try to put it on that kind of emphasis and then see what we can do over here in terms of trying to help financially.

Q Yes. You've said that the Eastern European countries want the Soviet troops to leave. And you've also pointed to the progress in talks about conventional force reductions. But the fact of the matter is, virtually all those Soviet troops are still there now in Eastern Europe. Can you point to any real progress on the ground, in terms of any changes in Soviet troop deployments in Eastern Europe? And to what extent to you see the continued threat for reversals, politically, inside the East bloc that could cause those troops continue to be deployed?

THE PRESIDENT: To be wanted? I can't see a political change inside the Eastern European countries that would have an invitation go out to please remain. I don't see any politics or any political changes that would make me think that that is a likely scenario right now. And I do think that you put your finger on something -- they have not -- I don't know, I was looking at Brent to see if any have been pulled back at all.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, they have.

THE PRESIDENT: He says some have, so we'll have to get you the information on exactly what withdrawals have taken place.

Q Mr. President do you have a date for the summit with Mr. Gorbachev yet?

THE PRESIDENT: Do what?

Q Do you have a date?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we've set the exact date.

Q Mr. President when you won the China veto vote you said there were signs things were easing up in Beijing. Now they say they want -- that before students can leave the country to study abroad they'll spend five years at work. Isn't this back sliding, or is there some evidence that you have that things are easing up in China?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm disturbed by that statement. I don't like that statement, because I feel that student exchanges are very good things to have between our countries. I know that some visas have recently been given to students, so I'd want to check the statement against the reality. I know that some students over there have been issued visas to come to the United States. But I saw the statement, and if you just want me to comment on the statement, I thought that was counter productive; very much so.

Q Mr. President has the current oil spill out in southern California in any way changed your thinking about the wisdom of further development of offshore oil lease sale? And what is your time table for when you're going to make the decision on those lease sales?

THE PRESIDENT: I saw -- a freighter or tanker has a whole punched in it, and I see a whole bunch of guys jumping up and down saying this proves you can't have any offshore drilling. I'm saying to myself I'm not sure I understand the connection between tankers. Do they want to cut off all tankers, or do we just want to do our level best to make tankering safer?

I have said that we're not going to have drilling in highly-environmentally-sensitive places. But I'll be darned if I think we ought to shut down all offshore drilling everywhere. And I don't see that a spill from a tanker really has much to do with whether you can drill an offshore well safely, because it's going on all the time. And this country depends on it. We depend on offshore oil in -- domestically for our own energy requirements. But I tell you what it does do -- it reinforces my view that we've got to be very careful about leasing in sensitive areas, even though there's no connection between a tanker spill and a drilling of a well.

Q But when do you plan to make your decision on those lease sales?

THE PRESIDENT: Fairly soon. I read the recommendations and the report. It should be fairly soon.

Q Mr. President, did Mr. Mandela and Mr. de Klerk accept your invitations? And if so, when are they coming?

THE PRESIDENT: I felt -- I have to go back and look at my notes, but I felt they accepted in principle, both of them. I think Mr. Mandela said he wanted to talk -- I thought he said to his executive council or something. But anyway -- I thought he said to his executive counsel or something. But anyway, he wanted to talk to some others that came right out the first few hours. I must say he seemed very pleased at that, and I think Mr. de Klerk the same way. But there wasn't any time set on either of those invitations.

Q Mr. President, is this the time to reexamine the flexible response doctrine of NATO, and particularly the wisdom of continuing work on the Lance missile?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that decision will not be taken until 1992. That was an agreement between all the NATO partners. And I see nothing to change that at this point.

Q But could I just follow up? How can you, under current circumstances, justify possible deployment of the Lance, which would hit with nuclear warheads East Germany, perhaps Poland and Czechoslovakia?

THE PRESIDENT: If you have these dramatic changes get affected, then you take a new look at all these considerations. That's what I would say.

Q Yes. You talked a lot about troop cuts, but nobody is explaining how these soldiers would physically -- how tens of thousands of soldiers would physically be removed from the Armed Services? What are your suggestions --

THE PRESIDENT: Well see, I was talking to Marlin when I should have been listening. Excuse me. What was your question? The first part of it?

Q A lot of people are talking about troop cuts, but you have not proposed a way to get several thousand -- many thousands of soldiers out of the Armed Services. How do you propose getting people out of uniform? Should we turn them all into DEA agents or force a lot of early retirement? Do you want a lot of the people to go into the Reserves?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'll tell you, in our defense budget, we did propose reductions. They'll come up over the years. Not necessarily all at once. Eighty-one thousand troops, two active Army divisions, and then two battleships, 14 B-52s, all of which have personnel with them; M-1 tanks, Maverick missiles, sea-launch system, Apache helicopter -- several different systems that will eventually result in lower personnel. Maybe I'm missing the question.

Q So you're only talking about reducing forces by attrition?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh. I would hope a lot of it could be done by attrition because of the highly trained, dedicated men and women in the Armed Forces. I would hope a lot could. You have relatively high attrition rates in spite of pretty good retention. But there's still attrition. And I would like to think that a kid that went in to make a career out of this would not be unceremoniously dumped from the Armed Services. No, that's a good point. And I would hope that attrition can take care of the cuts that inevitably would be coming.

I'm told by Marlin this has got to be the last one.

Q Mr. President, what role did antiapartheid demonstrations in this country play in the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know, because you had antiapartheid demonstrations in many countries. So I think if people get the feeling in South Africa that apartheid itself is abhorrent to

the United States -- through whatever way they get that feeling, whether it's a statement by the President, whether it's some legislative action or whether it's some demonstration, that's helpful. But I can't help you on how you would quantify that.

Thank you all. Really, I've got a 2:30 p.m. meeting. But thank you very, very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

2:39 P.M. EST

דחיפות: בהול לבוקר	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	ק: 1
סוג: גלוי		פתוק: 1
תאריך: 12.2.90	1070	אל: מצפ"א
כס' פבוק:	דצ: יועץ תקשורת שה"ח	
הפסד:	יועץ תקשורת רוה"מ	
41	320	פאת: עתונות וושינגטון

מרכז הליכוד - תקשורת

1. במהדורות החדשות ברדיו דווחים שוטפים במשך כל היום על הדיון במרכז הליכוד. הקו המשותף לפרשנות, מעבר לדווח העובדתי, היה של מבוכח בהבנת תוצאות ההצבעה.
2. ב - CMM במשך היום דווחים שוטפים מהדיון - נאום רוה"מ, הודעת ההתפטרות של השר שרון וכו'. הפרשנות המסכמת הייתה ש- "גם שלושת אלפים הנוכחים בוועידה התוצאה לא הייתה ברורה... יש חרדה לגורל המפלגה וחרדה לגורל תהליך השלום..."
3. ב-MBC כתבה קצרה מאוד המראה תמונות מהוועידה ומתקדח בעמות רוה"מ - השר שרון, ובאי הבהירות שבתוצאות ההצבעה.
4. תגובות פומביות אמריקניות:
 - א. חשובת הנשיא בוש לשאלת כתבים (הוברק בנפרד).
 - ב. דובר מח"ד שנשאל בנדון סרב להתייחס לארועים בהיותם "עניינים פנימיים".
5. במשך היום קבלנו פניות רבות מהתקשורת כאן בבקשה הבהרות וחסברים למהלך הארועים (תהליך התפטרות שר, נוהל ההצבעה וכו').

רות ירון

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תפוצה: 120

31

דתיפות: רגיל	שגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: גלוי		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן העבור: 12.2.90	ארק	אל: מצפ"א
כס' פרוק: הפסד:		דע:
313		פאת: יורם אטינגר

הנדון: הערכות-המאבק על התקציב והסיוע לישראל

להלן מס' נקודות שהועלו בשיחה עם צ'רלי פלינקר, העוזר הרטובליקני הבכיר בוועדת התקציב של הסנט, ויועצו הקרוב של הסנטור דומניצ'י:

1. הרושם כי גורבציב מתעשת, וכי הממשל אינו מדביק את התפרצות הדמוקרטיה באירופה והחלשותה של בריה"מ, מחליטים את עמדתו של הנשיא בוש.

2. התקופה הקריטית תהייה אפריל ומאי (בחירות במזא"ר) ויוני (הסכמים לצמצום מרוץ החמוש, ושנויים בדרא"פ). אחרי תקופה זאת יקשה על הממשל לשמור על רמתו הגבוהה של תקציב הבטחון תקציב הבטחון יהיה גדול יחסית ב- 1991, אך הצמצום בפרוייקטים חדשים והחחזקות צפויה של מגמת הרגיעה הבינגושית יביאו לצמצום משמעותי אח"כ.

3. צופה כי יגדל הקפו של סיוע החוץ ע"ח תקציב הבטחון.

4. תגבר הקריאה לחוץ על אימוץ שיטות כלכליות מתקדמות, ולחעניש מדינות (כגון ישראל לדעת הדבקות בשיטות כלכליות שאבד עליהן הכלח.

5. לדעתו, City ציב לקצץ בסיוע לישראלו יחד עם זאת מתכנן לצפות כי כספי הסיוע המגיעים לישראל אינם מנוצלים באופן כלכלי מושכל.

6. מעריך שישראל תקבל את הערבויות להלוואות בסך 400 מליון דולר, למרות הסתייגותו העקרונית על רקע השיטה הכלכלית בישראל.

יורם

מס' (ט"ה) 36 תפוצה: 36

מס' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

מס' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

דתי: 1	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דחפיות: כהנל לבוקר
סתיו: 1		סוג: בל"ס
אל: מע"א	אמ"ק	תאריך וזמן תעבור: 12.2.90
דע: יועץ מקטורת ט"ח, יועץ מקטורת דה"מ (קטר ז-ס, תעבור נא כחול לבוקר).		פס' פרוק: המסרד: 307
פאת: עתונות, רוטוננטוק.		

במסגרת סקירת הדגם הנפלא ברום בבית הלכן נשלל לתדובר על התערות
הער סרוך וההשפעה על החליך הטלוס.

דע"ב התליל הסרויית:

Q So what is your visceral reaction to the resignation of Ariel Sharon and its effect on the peace process? And is this part of a pattern of the hardliners losing out around the world?

PRESIDENT BUSH: You know, I just heard about this, and I have to understand more about what went on there. But Mr. Shamir was a proponent of these talks, and if this clears the way for the talks to go forward, that would in keeping with US policy.

רות ירון

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and some illegible text.

תפוצה: 12

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9574

תאריך : 12.02.90

סודי

יוצא **

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חוזם: 2,9574

אל: וווש/556, נ' 611, מנמת/282

מ-: המשד, תא: 120290, חז: 1458, דח: מ, סג: סו

חח: גס: צפא

נד: @

ארה"ב

סודי/מיידי

וושנינגטון השגריר, שטיין

דע: ביי, נ"י

בשיחה עם השגריר בראון העליתי יזמם הסובייטים להעלות נושא העליה במגזרי וביקשתי פעולת ארה"ב להניא הסובייטים מהיזמה. בראון אמר שהכוונה הסובייטית להיזקק למוסדות בינלאומיים הזכרה ע"י וורנוצוב בשיחה עם שגרירם במוסקבה עוד בסוף ביקור בייקר. וורנוצוב אמר שבניה"מ נתונה נלחץ כבד של מדינות ערב בסוגיה זו, תקף ארה"ב בהקשר זה, והעיר שאם לא יניחו זעתה של בריה"מ היא תיאלץ לנתב הבעיה לאפיקים בינלאומיים. הוסיף ששגרירם במוסקבה מחה לא מכבר במשה"ח הסובייטי על מאמר סלפני ב'טאס' המאשים ארה"ב בהערמת קשיים על כניסת מהגרים לארה"ב וכו'.

בנצור

לש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמ, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר 1

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10237

תאריך : 13.02.90

נכנס **
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1071

חוזם: 2,10237

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1013, רהמש/183

מ-: ווש, נר: 302, תא: 120290, זח: 1700, רח:ר, סג:10

תח: גס: צפא

נד: 8

ארה"ב

סודי / רגיל

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

הנדון: סיוע אפשרי ע"י הממשל לטיסה ישירה של עולים מברה"מ לישראל.

1. הציר הכלכלי והח"מ קבלו מידע בנדון מאנשי קשר ב"גבעה". שום פעולה לא ננקטה בנידון. ההצעה היא כי הבקשה לפעולה- אם תהיה המלצה ברוח זאת- תופנה לסנטור דניאל אינווייה, יו"ר תת ועדת ההקצבות לתקציב הבטחון המופקר על הנושא.

2. מצורף לזה המזכר אשר הוכן ע"י המח' הכלכלית.

3. הנושא - ברוח המזכר - הועבר היום, אישית ע"י הציר הכלכלי פנחס דרור, למ"ע רה"מ ושר האוצר.

4. דחיפות הדיון ומימוש אפשרי של היוזמה נובעים הן מן המצב האובייקטיבי בברה"מ, הן מן הסכנה שמגמות החותרות לשינוי מדיניות ההגירה של ארה"ב תתחזקנה והן מן ההערכה כי התחיקה הנ"ל עשויה להשתלב כתקון ל- REFUGEE SUPPLEMENTAL BILL שידון במרץ - אפריל.

5. להלן נקודות הבהרה נוספות, מעבר למזכר הכלכלית על מהות והיקף ה- DEPT. OF DEFENSE HUMANITARIAN .AID

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הנקודות בתאום עם הציר הכלכלי (עבודת מחקר בנושא בדיפ' הקרוב) :

א. במידה והזהות האמריקאית של המטוסים מהווה בעיה אפשר אולי לגייסם כמטוסי או'מ'.

ב. על המטוסים, כנראה, להטיס מטען הומניטרי בדרכם לברה'מ' (חקלאות, רפואה, וכו') .

ג. את הטסת היהודים אפשר להציג כ- QUO PRO QUO למטען ההומניטרי.

ד. אם הנחיתה בנמ'ת בברה'מ' תהווה מכשול, אפשר לשקול הסעת היהודים לרומניה (למשל) והטסתם מבוקרשט.

ה. יעדי הנחיתה חייבים להיות סלקטיביים, לפי רמת המכשולים על דרך היהודים לצאת מברה'מ'.

ו. הקונגרס אישר 4 תחיקות המרחיבות את מעורבות הפנטגון בסיוע אזרחי ואנושי מעבר לים. הסיוע מתיחס, במיוחד לאפגניסטן ומרכז אמריקה, אך אפשר להרחיב היקפו. המנגנון למימוש היוזמה קיים, והוא אף ניתן להרחבה.

ז. סמכויות הפנטגון הורחבו, ע'י כך, לשטחים הנמצאים בדי'כ באחריות מחמ'ד ו- A.I.D.

ח. ב-1986 יזם ציר ביה'נ ביל מקקולם את ה- PROVISION OF EXCESS PROPERTY.

ט. ב-1986 יזם מקקולם, כחקון ל-1986 D.O.D. AUTHORIZATION ACT את ה- FUNDED TRANSPORTATION FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF עבור פליטי אפגניסטן הזקוקים לטיפול רפואי (118 ב-1986). התיקון הורחב ב-1987, כספית וגיאוגרפית (כל העולם).

י. הוצאות הכרוכות במבצעים המאושרים הן נמוכות-יחסית (R.A.T.E.) .

כ. למחמ'ד ול- A.I.D. הכח לאשר את זהות המטען. תאום הטיסות, עם ח'מ'א האמריקאי או נתיבי אויר מסחריים נעשה ע'י ה- DIR OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PENTAGON. הסמכות, כפי שמצויין במזכר הכלכלית, נובעת מ- ECONOMY ACT .

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

WYOMING
NORTH PLATTE

SECTION 10, T14N, R10E, S10E, WYOMING

ACRES 10.00

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7. ב-1985 יזם הסנטור דנטון את ה- SPACE AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATION כחקון ל- D.O.S. AUTHORIZATION ACT המוגבל למרכז אמריקה.
ב-1986 הורחב היקף התחיקה לרחבי העולם. ב-1987 בוצעו 28 טיסות.

מ. ב-1985 יזם נסטור סטיבנס את ה- USE OF OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE FUNDS כמכשיר סיוע אזרחי והומניטרי לרחבי העולם.

ורם אטינגר

הנדון: סיוע ממשלת ארה"ב להטסה ישירה של עולי ברה"מ לארץ.

במהלך השנים האחרונות חקק הקונגרס מספר חוקים שהרחיבו את מעורבות משרד ההגנה האמריקאי בסיוע הומניטרי מחוץ לארה"ב. חקיקה זו עשויה לסייע בהטסת יהודי ברה"מ באופן ישיר לישראל.

המשרד לסיוע לאזורים מוכי אסון (OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE) נוסד ב-1963 כחלק מחוק סיוע החוץ במטרה לסייע בהספקת מזון ולאחר מכן ב-1975 הורחבו פעולותיו למטרות סיוע לאזורים מוכי אסונות.

משרד זה מטפל בכ-50 מקרים בשנה. למשרד, שהינו חלק מ- AID , סמכות לבקש מטוסים ממשרד ההגנה למטרותיו. החוק המאפשר סיוע כזה נקרא THE ECONOMIC ACT והוא קובע :

(A) THE HEAD OF AN AGENCY OR MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT WITHIN AN AGENCY MAY PLACE AN ORDER WITH A MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT WITHIN THE SAME AGENCY OR ANOTHER AGENCY FOR GOODS OR SERVICES IF-1. AMOUNTS ARE AVAILABLE. 2. THE HEAD OF THE ORDERING AGENCY OR UNIT DECIDES THE ORDER AS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. 3. THE AGENCY OR UNIT TO FILL THE ORDER IS ABLE TO PROVIDE THE ORDERED GOODS OR SERVICES AND 4. THE HEAD OF THE AGENCY DECIDES ORDERED GOODS OR SERVICES CANNOT BE PROVIDED AS CONVENIENTLY OR CHEAPLY BY A COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE.

SPACE AVAILABLE FOR THE YEAR 1952-53
AUTHORITY ACT - 1952-53
IN THE YEAR 1952-53
1952-53

USE OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR 1952-53
1952-53

SECTION 1

1. THE YEAR 1952-53

2. THE YEAR 1952-53

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אנשי קשר שלנו בקונגרס יצרו קשר דיסקרטי עם משרד ה OFDA במטרה לבדוק באופן ראשוני היתכנות הובלה של אנשים בהיקפים גדולים, וקיבלו תשובה שאכן הדבר אפשרי בכפוף לתקציב וזמינות מטוסים, וכן אשור לבצוע המבצע ע"י ממשלת ארה"ב. עלות המבצע יכולה לבוא ממקורות פנימיים של OFDA שהינם מצומצמים. כיום יש למשרד זה כ-25 מליון דולר כתקציב שנתי וכן סמכות ללוות כספים בסך 50 מליון דולר. במידה וידרש ניתן להקצות כך משאבים ספציפיים. עלות ההובלה מוערכת בכ-2000 דולר לשעת מטוס. העלות לישראל להובלה במטוסי אל-על מוערכת בכ-65 מליון דולר לכ-100,000 עולים (ללא עלות אלטרנטיבית של רווחים בקווים הרגילים).

הפיצוי הישראלי לעלויות האמריקאיות יכול לבוא בצורה של תיקוני מטוסים אמריקאיים בתעשייה האווירית בארץ. כמו כן יכולים המטוסים האמריקאים להוביל סחורה חקלאית ואחרת מישראל לברה"מ.

פעילות ה- OFDA מתקמת בסיוע הומניטרי אולם במקרים בודדים בעבר הובילו מטוסי משרד ההגנה גם נוסעים כמו פצועים מאפגניסטן וארמניה. הטסת יהודי אתיופיה נעשתה כחלק מתכנית אחרת וסודית של הבית.

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר, כהן

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9573

תאריך : 12.02.90

שמו

יוצא

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**
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חוזם: 2,9573

אל: 1101/555, רהמש/159, מנמת/281

מ-: המשרד, תא: 120290, חז: 1457, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: 8 גס: צפא

נד: 8

ארת

שמו/מידי

צ.א. 729

שגריר, ציר

בשיחה עם בראון אמר שהידיעה על שיגור פקירי מחמ'ד לקהיר להכנת המיפגש המשולש איננה נכונה. מדובר במיפגש שנקבע כבר לפני חודשים ואיננו קשור בתהליך המדיני.

בנצור

פא

תפ: שהיו, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמנ, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מצרים

Date

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31323334353637383940
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21222324252627282930 31323334353637383940
41424344454647484950

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10239

תאריך: 13.02.9

נכנס **
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1071

✓

א. כ. מ. 2

חוזם: 2,10239

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1014

מ-: ווש, נר: 304, תא: 120290, זח: 1700, דח: ר, סג: 10

תח: 6 גס: צפא

נד: 6

סודי / רגיל

אל: מצפ' א'

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

דו"ח זכויות אדם.

בהמשך למברקי נר 21 מ-1/2.

במסגרת ההכנות לקראת פירסום הדו"ח וקיום השימועים ב-21/2 המשכתי בסידרת הפגישות עם חברי ועדת המשנה לזכויות אדם וחברי מליאת ועדת החוץ שיש לנו עניין בנוכחותם בשימועים.

א. ביום ד' ה-7/2 קיימנו ישיבת תדרוך אצל הקונגרסמן לארי סמית. תדרך יואל זינגר. השתתפו בנוסף לסמית גם, לויין, מילר, אנגל, פיהן ואוזריהם. וכן עוזריהם של גילמן ואקרמן. (ברמן הגיע למספר דקות אולם לא יכול היה להשאר). בתדרוך התמקד זינגר ב-3 נושאים עקריים: - גירושים, הריסת בתים ונוהלי פתיחה באש. חלק מהקונגרסמנים אמרו בביקורת מסויימת כי הם מכירים הנושאים ודקדוק בעמדתנו לא יסייע.

אנו ממלא נגנו על ישראל ולצורך כך אנו זקוקים ל"כותרות". אחרים, למרות עמיתיהם, המשיכו לשאול שאלות. בסיומו של דבר חשיבות התדרוך היתה בעצם גיבוש הקבוצה והתכנסותה. נעביר לבקשת הקונגרסמנים שנכחו בפגישה חומר נוסף המצוי בשגרירות. בסוף הפגישה הושגה הבנה עם חלק מהקונגרסמנים שנוותרו שינסו להרחיק הדיון מישראל ולהתמקד בסין ניקרגואה מדינות ערב ואחרות. אם יחזור תקדים אשתקד היינו התמקדות בישראל, ינסו ידידינו הקונגרסמנים להתמקד

6400 יוקר עליו שומר ברית נר. לשימועים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ברצח פלסטינים ע"י פלסטינים, ליבוי האינתיפדה ע"י אש"פ-
תונים וז"א במדינות ערב.

ב. בנוסף, נפגשתי עם הקונגרסמנים, לנטוס, אקרמן, ויין
אואנס, ג'ון מילר ועוזריהם. לכולם נמסר מבעוד מועד תיק
הסברה עם החומר שלנו וכולם הבטיחו הירחמותם כאשתקד.

ג. החומר נמסר גם לעוזריהם של כריס סמית, טד וייס ג'יינ
מירס וביירוטר.

ד. ביום ג' הבא (עוד לפני השימועים) אפגש עם ביירוטר
(שהיה חולה השבוע).

ה. אם אכן הדו"ח לא יודלף או יפורסם לפני המועד עליו סוכם
- היינו ב-21/2 בבוקר (השימועים נקבעו ל-21/2 בשעה 14:00)
ולכך אין לנו כל ערבות ובטחון ניתן יהיה לנסות, לפחות,
להעביר ההתמקדות מישראל למדינות אחרות.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סי יבל, סולטן, רביב, הסברה

1948

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אל: רהמס/183

מ-: רוש, כר: 302, תא: 120290, זח: 1700, דח: ר, סג: סו,

בנבב

סודי / רגיל

11
א/רהק?

אל: מצפ'א

מאח: ק. לקונגרס

הנדון: סיוע אפשרי ע"י הממשל לטיסה ישירה של עולים מברה"ם לישראל.

1. הציר הכלכלי והח"ם קבלו מידע בנדון מאנשי קשר ב'גבעה'. שום פעולה לא ננקטה בנידון. ההצעה היא כי הבקשה לפעולה- אם תהיה המלצה ברוח זאת- תופנה לסנטור דניאל אינווייה, יו"ר חת ועדת ההקצבות לתקציב הבטחון המופקד על הנושא.

2. מצורף לזה המזכר אשר הוכן ע"י המח' הכלכלית.

3. הנושא - ברוח המזכר - הועבר היום, אישית ע"י הציר הכלכלי פנחס דרור, למ"ם רה"ם ושר האוצר.

4. דחיפות הדיון ומימוש אפשרי של היוזמה נובעים הן מן המצב האובייקטיבי בברה"ם, הן מן הסכנה שמגמות החותרות לשינוי מדיניות ההגירה של ארה"ב תחזקנה והן מן ההערכה כי התחיקה הנ"ל עשויה להשחלב כחקון ל- REFUGEE SUPPLEMENTAL BILL שידון במרץ - אפריל.

5. להלן נקודות הבהרה נוספות, מעבר למזכר הכלכלית על מהות והיקף ה- DEPT. OF DEFENSE HUMANITARIAN AID הנקודות בתאום עם הציר הכלכלי (עבודת מחקר בנושא בדיפ' הקרוב):

א. במידה והזהות האמריקאית של המטוסים מהווה בעיה אפשר אולי לגייסם כמטוסי או"ם.

ב. על המטוסים, כנראה, להטיס מטען הומניטרי בדרכם לברה"ם (חקלאות, רפואה, וכו').

ג. את הטסת היהודים אפשר להציג כ- QUID PRO QUO למטען ההומניטרי.

ד. אם הנחיתה בנמ"ת בברה"ם תהווה מכשול, אפשר לשקול הסעת היהודים לרומניה (למשל) והטסתם מבוקרשט.

ה. יעדי הנחיתה חייבים להיות סלקטיבים, לפי רמת המכשולים על

דרך היהודים לצאת מברה"ם.

ו. הקונגרס אישר 4 תחיקות המרחיבות את מעורבות הפנטגון בסיוע אזרחי ואנושי מעבר לים. הסיוע מתיחס, במיוחד לאפגניסטן ומרכז אמריקה, אך אפשר להרחיב היקפו. המנגנון למימוש היוזמה קיים, והוא אף ניתן להרחבה.

ז. סמכויות הפנטגון הורחבו, ע"י כך, לשטחים הנמצאים בד"ך באחריות מחמ"ד ו- .
. A.I.D.

ח. ב-1986 יזם ציר ביה"ן ביל מקקולט את ה- PROVISION
.OF EXCESS PROPERTY

ט. ב-1986 יזם מקקולט, כחקון ל- 1986 D.O.D. AUTHORIZATION ACT את ה- FUNDED TRANSPORTATION FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF עבור פליטי אפגניסטן הזקוקים לטיפול רפואי (118 ב-1986). התיקון הורחב ב- 1987, כספית וגיאוגרפית (כל העולט).

י. ההוצאות הכרוכות במבצעים המאושרים הן כמרכות-יחסית
. (D.O.D.) RATE

ך. למחמ"ד ול- A.I.D הכח לאשר את זהות המטען. תאום הסיסות, עם ח"א האמריקאי או נתיבי אוויר מסחריים נעשה ע"י

ה-

הסמכות, כפי DIR OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PENTAGON

שמצויין במזכר הכלכלית, נובעת מ-

ECONOMY ACT

SPACE AVAILABLE -ה ל. ב-1985 יזם הסנטור דנטון את ה-

TRANSPORTATION כחוקן ל- D.O.D. AUTHORIZATION ACT המוגבל

למרכז אמריקה.

ב-1986 הורחב היקף התחיקה לרחבי העולם. ב-1987 בוצעו 28

טיסות.

מ. ב-1985 יזם נפטור סטיבנס את ה-

USE OF OPERATIONS

MAINTENANCE FUNDS כמכשיר סיוע אזרחי והומניטרי לרחבי

העולם.

יורם אטינגר

הנדון: סיוע ממשלת ארה"ב להטסת ישראל של עולי ברה"ם

לארץ.

במהלך השנים האחרונות חקק הקונגרס מספר חוקים שהרחיבו את

מעורבות משרד ההגנה האמריקאי בסיוע הומניטרי מחוץ לארה"ב.

חיקה זו עשויה לסייע בהטסת יהודי ברה"ם באופן ישיר

לישראל.

המשרד לסיוע לאזורים מוכי אסון) OFFICE OF FOREIGN
(DISASTER ASSISTANCE) נוסד ב-1963 כחלק מחוק סיוע החוץ
במטרה לסייע בהספקת מזון ולאחר מכן ב-1975 הורחבו פעולותיו
למטרות סיוע לאזורים מוכי אסונות.

משרד זה מטפל בכ-50 מקרים בשנה. למשרד, שהיננו חלק מ- AID ,
סמכות לבקש מטוסים ממשרד ההגנה למטרותיו.
החוק המאפשר סיוע כה נקרא THE ECONOMIC ACCT והוא קובע :

(A) THE HEAD OF AN AGENCY OR MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL
UNIT WITHIN AN AGENCY MAY PLACE AN ORDER WITH A
MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT WITHIN THE SAME AGENCY
OR ANOTHER AGENCY FOR GOODS OR SERVICES IF-1.
AMOUNTS ARE AVAILABLE. 2. THE HEAD OF THE ORDERING
AGENCY OR UNIT DECIDES THE ORDER AS IN THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. 3. THE
AGENCY OR UNIT TO FILL THE ORDER IS ABLE TO PROVIDE
THE ORDERED GOODS OR SERVICES AND 4. THE HEAD OF
THE AGENCY DECIDES ORDERED GOODS OR SERVICES CANNOT

BE PROVIDED AS CONVENIENTLY OR CHEAPLY BY A COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISE.

אנשי קשר שלנו בקונגרס יצרו קשר דיסקרטי עם משרד ה

OFDA

במטרה לבדוק באופן ראשוני היחכנות הובלה של אנשים בהיקפים גדולים, וקיבלו תשובה שאכן הדבר אפשרי בכפוף לתקציב וזמינות מסוּסִים, וכן אשור לבצוע המבצע ע"י ממשלת ארה"ב. עלות המבצע יכולה לבוא ממקורות פנימיים של OFDA שהינם מצומצמים. כיום יש למשרד זה כ-25 מליון דולר כתקציב שנתי וכן סמכות ללוות כספים בסך 50 מליון דולר. במידה ויודש ניתן להקצות לכך משאבים ספציפיים. עלות ההובלה מוערכת בכ-2000 דולר לשעת מטוס. העלות לישראל להובלה במטוסי אל-על מוערכת בכ-65 מליון דולר לכ-100,000 עולים (ללא עלות אלטרנטיבית של רווחים בקווים הרגילים).

הפיצוי הישראלי לעלויות האמריקאיות יכול לבוא בצורה של תיקוני מסוּסִים אמריקאיים בתעשייה האווירית בארץ. כמו כן יכולים המטוּסִים האמריקאים להוביל סחורה חקלאית ואחרת מישראל לברת'ים.

פעילות ה-

OFDA מחקמת בסיוע הומניטרי אולם במקרים בודדים
בעבר הובילו מטוסי משרד ההגנה גם נוסעים כמו פצועים
מאפגניסטן וארמניה.
הטסת יהודי אתיופיה נעשתה כחלק מתכנית אחרת וסודית של
הבית.

000

ס י ו ס

אל: דהמש/183

מ- נוש, כר: 302, תא: 120290, חז: 1700, דח: ר, סג: סו,

בבב

מג'ו אה'ה
אנ'ס 11

סודי / רגיל

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

הנדון: סיוע אפשרי ע"י הממשל לטיסה ישירה של עולים מברה"ם
לישראל.

1. הציר הכלכלי והח"ם קבלו מידע בנדון מאנשי קשר ב'גבעה'. שום פעולה לא ננקטה בנידון. ההצעה היא כי הבקשה לפעולה- אם תהיה המלצה ברוח זאת- תופנה לסנטור דניאל אינורייה, יו"ר תת ועדת ההקצבות לתקציב הבטחון המופקד על הנושא.

2. מצורף לזה המזכר אשר הוכן ע"י המח' הכלכלית.

3. הנושא - ברוח המזכר - הועבר היום, אישית ע"י הציר הכלכלי פנחס דרור, למ"ם רה"ם ושר האוצר.

OPDA מתקמת בסיוע הומניטרי אולם במקרים בודדים
בעבר הובילו מטוסי משרד ההגנה גם כוסעים כמו פצועים
מאפניסטן וארמניה.
הטסת יהודי אתיופיה נעשתה כחלק מתכנית אחרת וסודית של
הבית.

ססס

ס י ר ס

BE PROVIDED AS CONVENIENTLY OR CHEAPLY BY A COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISE.

אנשי קשר שלנו בקונגרס יצרו קשר דיסקרטי עם משרד ה

OFDA

במטרה לבדוק באופן ראשוני היחכנות הובלה של אנשים בהיקפים גדולים, וקיבלו תשובה שאכן הדבר אפשרי בכפוף לתקציב וזמינות מסוּסִים, וכן אשר לבצוע המבצע ע"י ממשלת ארה"ב. עלות המבצע יכולה לבוא ממקורות פנימיים של OFDA שהינם מצומצמים. כיום יש למשרד זה כ-25 מליון דולר כחקציב שנתי וכן סמכות ללוות כספים בסך 50 מליון דולר. במידה ויודש ניתן להקצות לכך משאבים ספציפיים. עלות ההובלה מוערכת בכ-2000 דולר לשעת מטוס. העלות לישראל להובלה במטוסי אל-על מוערכת בכ-65 מליון דולר לכ-100,000 עולים (ללא עלות אלטרנטיבית של רווחים בקווים הרגילים).

הפיצוי הישראלי לעלויות האמריקאיות יכול לבוא בצורה של חיקוני מסוּסִים אמריקאיים בתעשייה האווירית בארץ. כמו כן יכולים המסוּסִים האמריקאים להוביל סחורה חקלאית ואחרת מישראל לברה"ם.

פעילות ה-

לישראל.

המשרד לסיוע לאזורים מוכי אסון) OFFICE OF FOREIGN
(DISASTER ASSISTANCE) נוסד ב-1963 כחלק מחוק סיוע החוץ
במטרה לסייע בהספקת מזון ולאחר מכן ב-1975 הורחבו פעולותיו
למטרות סיוע לאזורים מוכי אסונות.

משרד זה מטפל בכ-50 מקרים בשנה. למשרד, שהיבנו חלק מ- AID ,
סמכות לבקש מטוסים ממשרד ההגנה למטרותיו.
החוק המאפשר סיוע כה נקרא THE ECONOMIC ACCT והוא קובע :

(A) THE HEAD OF AN AGENCY OR MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL
UNIT WITHIN AN AGENCY MAY PLACE AN ORDER WITH A
MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT WITHIN THE SAME AGENCY
OR ANOTHER AGENCY FOR GOODS OR SERVICES IF-1.
AMOUNTS ARE AVAILABLE. 2. THE HEAD OF THE ORDERING
AGENCY OR UNIT DECIDES THE ORDER AS IN THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. 3. THE
AGENCY OR UNIT TO FILL THE ORDER IS ABLE TO PROVIDE
THE ORDERED GOODS OR SERVICES AND 4. THE HEAD OF
THE AGENCY DECIDES ORDERED GOODS OR SERVICES CANNOT

ה-

הסמכות, כפי DIR OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PENTAGON

שמצויין במזכר הכלכלית, נובעת מ-

ECONOMY ACT

SPACE AVAILABLE ל. ב-1985 יזם הסנטור דנטון את ה-

TRANSPORTATION כחוקן ל- D.O.D. AUTHORIZATION ACT המוגבל

למרכז אמריקה.

ב-1986 הורחב היקף החחיקה לרחבי העולם. ב-1987 בוצעו 28

טיסות.

מ. ב-1985 יזם נסטור סטיבנס את ה-

USE OF OPERATIONS

MAINTENANCE FUNDS כמכשיר סיוע אזרחי והומניטרי לרחבי

העולם.

יורם אטינגר

הנדון: סיוע ממשלת ארה"ב להטסת ישירה של עולי ברה"מ

לארץ.

במהלך השנים האחרונות חקק הקונגרס מספר חוקים שהרחיבו את

מעורבות משרד ההגנה האמריקאי בסיוע הומניטרי מחוץ לארה"ב.

חקיקה זו עשויה לסיוע בהטסת יהודי ברה"מ באופן ישיר

דרך היהודים לצאת מברח'ם.

ו. הקונגרס אישר 4 תחיקות המרחיבות את מעורבות הפנטגון בסיוע אזרחי ואנושי מעבר לים. הסיוע מתיחס, במיוחד לאפגניסטן ומרכז אמריקה, אך אפשר להרחיב היקפו. המנגנון למימוש היוזמה קיים, והוא אף ניתן להרחבה.

ז. סמכויות הפנטגון הורחבו, ע"י כך, לשטחים הנמצאים בד"ך באחריות מחמ"ד ו- .
A.I.D .

ח. ב-1986 יזם ציר ביה"ן ביל מקקולם את ה- PROVISION
.OF EXCESS PROPERTY

ט. ב-1986 יזם מקקולם, כחקון ל- 1986 D.O.D. AUTHORIZATION ACT את ה- FUNDED TRANSPORTATION FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF עבור פליטי אפגניסטן הזקוקים לטיפול רפואי (118 ב-1986). התיקון הורחב ב- 1987, כספית וגיאוגרפית (כל העולם).

י. ההוצאות הכרוכות במבצעים המאושרים הן נמוכות-יחסית
(D.O.D.) RATE .

ך. למחמ"ד ול- A.I.D הכח לאשר את זהות המטען. תאום הסיסות, עם ח"א האמריקאי או נתיבי אוויר מסחריים נעשה ע"י

4. דחיפות הדיון ומימוש אפשרי של היוזמה נובעים הן מן המצב האובייקטיבי בברה"ם, הן מן הסכנה שמגמות החותרות לשינוי מדיניות ההגירה של ארה"ב תחזקנה והן מן ההערכה כי התחיקה הנ"ל עשויה להשתלב כחוקן ל- REFUGEE SUPPLEMENTAL BILL שידון במרץ - אפריל.

5. להלן נקודות הבהרה נוספות, מעבר למזכר הכלכלית על מהות והיקף ה- DEPT. OF DEFENSE HUMANITARIAN AID הנקודות בתאום עם הציר הכלכלי (עבודת מחקר בנושא בדיפ' הקרוב):

א. במידה והזהות האמריקאית של המטוסים מהווה בעיה אפשר אולי לגייסם כמטוסי או"ם.

ב. על המטוסים, כנראה, להטיס מטען הומניטרי בדרכם לברה"ם (חקלאות, רפואה, וכו').

ג. את הטסת היהודים אפשר להציג כ- QUID PRO QUO למטען ההומניטרי.

ד. אם הנחיתה בנמ"ת בברה"ם תהווה מכשול, אפשר לשקול הסעת היהודים לרומניה (למשל) והטסתם מבוקרשט.

ה. יעדי הנחיתה חייבים להיות סלקטיביים, לפי רמת המכשולים על