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# מדינת ישראל

משרדיה הממשליה

5/5/4605/10

נאכז ר/הנ'

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הנ' ר/הנ' נאכז

5/5/89 - 9/5/89

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שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ביקור ראש  
 הממשלה בארה"ב

מספר פיקוח:

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כתובת:



- סודי -

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

דו"ח שיחת רה"מ עם מזכיר המדינה ביקר 5.4.89

ביקורת

- יחש הברית עם ישראל חשובים לנו ביותר, לא נפגע בהם, ולא נלחץ עליהם.
- קיימת הדדנות להתקדם להסדר, ואסור שיראה לנו לא מוכנים לבדוק רעיונות ולהתקדם ובשארים דבקים בעמדות קודמות.
- מובך קיבל הצעתו שלא לדוחה הצעה לקיום הבחירות בשוחים.
- לפניה שלב המומץ צריך לנוקוט צעדים שיפרו האוירה על הקרקע.
- על התחלויות - חזר על מה אמר לשיח.
- חשוב שתהיה קומובייקציה אמינה וטובה בינוינו. לא רוצים הפתעות בשני הכוונים.
- אין לנו עניין בועידה בינייל, אך אם יש סיכוי להתקדם, צריך לפעול ביחד.
- ערבות לבוחן ישראל הם דבר מרכזי בחשיבה שלו.

רהיימ

- אם נעבד ביחס נצלח להתקדם ולהגיע להישגים. בנויגוד למה שנאמר עלי, אינני *intransigent* וכאשר יש סיכוי להתקדמות, אני פרגמטי.
- אני נחנה היום מתחמכת הרוב המכרי של הצבא בישראל ושל המפלגות.
- אבל נאכד הדיאלוג עם אשיפ, זה קו אדום בשביבנו כי שמעותו מדינה פלטינית, נלחם באופציה זאת בכל כוחנו. דו-שיח עם אשיפ שמעותו קבלת דרישת המינימלית שהיא מדינה פלטינית, אחרת אין הגיון במגע עמם.

ביקר - זו איננה צריכה להיות מסקנה אוטומטית. אפשר לדבר עם אשיפ על קונפדרציה, אפשר לדון על כמה מרכיבים של עצמאות שתיישבים עם קמפ-דיוויד ולא מהווים מדינה עצמאית, אך לא נשחף בשום מhalt שיגביל למדינה פלטינית.

רְהִיִּם - עַצְם קְבָלַת הַעֲקָרוֹן שֶׁל מִדִּינָה פָּלָسְטִינִית סָוֹתֵר אֶת קִיּוֹמָה שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל וּבַנִּילָחֵם  
בָּזָה בְּכָל כּוֹחֵנוּ.

בַּיּוֹקָר - צָרִיךְ לְמַצּוֹא נוֹסֶחֶת המגשרת בין הבטחת בעתו יִשְׂרָאֵל לְבֵין העבקה זָכוּיות  
מִדִּינִיּוֹת לִפְלָسְטִינִים.

רְהִיִּם - אַיִלְלָנוּ מַבְקָשִׁים שָׁוֹם עֲרָבוֹת לְבַטְחָוֹנוּנוּ. אַנוּ דּוֹאֲגִים לְבַטְחָוֹנוּנוּ.  
בָּהָזְדָעָה עַם מַוְרָךְ הַשְׁתָמָשׁו בְּבִיטּוֹי סִיּוֹם הַכְּבָשׁ - דָבָר שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂיתָם מִאַז 67'.

בַּיּוֹקָר - לֹא כָּךְ פִּירּוֹשׁ הַדְּבָרִים וְאַיִן ذָוּ מִדִּינִיּוֹת אַרְהַיִּבְן. בַּיּוֹקָר לְהַבָּהֵר ذָאת בַּתְּקָשָׁוֹתָה.

רְהִיִּם - לֹא נִכְלַל עֲבֵין הנְסִיגָה לְקוּי 67'. הַגְּבוּלֹות - בּוֹשָׁא לִמְוֹיִם וְהַסְכָם. אַיִלְלָנוּ תּוֹמֶךְ  
בַּהֲבָצָת הַסְּטָטוֹס-קָוָו וּמִאַז כְּמָהִים אַנוּ לְשָׁלוּם, וְלֹא מִתּוֹךְ חָוָשָׁה.

- כַּאֲשֶׁר מְדָבָרִים עַל הַסְּדָר, פְשָׁתָה הַיּוֹם הַאוֹפֶנה שֶׁכֹּל הַסְּכָוָר הָוָא רָק הַבְּעֵיה הַפָּלָסְטִינִית.  
אָרְזָוּ רָק חָלֵק מַהְבָּעֵיה. אַנוּ עֲדִיָּין בָּמַצֵּבָה מִלְחָמָה עַם רֹבֶּן מִדִּינִוֹת עָרָב וְהַסְכָּנָה כְּלָפִינוּ  
נוֹבְעָתָה מִדִּינִוֹת עָרָב וְלֹא מִהַּפָּלָסְטִינִים. סְוּרִיה קִיצוֹנִית כַּפִּי שָׁהִתָּה וְאוֹלֵל תְּזַדְּקָק  
לְאוֹפְצָיה הַצְּבָאִית בְּאַחֲד מִן הַיּוֹמִים וְהַרְוִסִּים, מְסֻפְקִים לָהֶם נַשָּׁק. עִירָק בָּמַצֵּבָה דּוֹמָה.  
סְעוּדִיה אָוּמָרָת לְכָם שָׁאַיְלָנוּ תּוֹמֶךְ בַּמִּלְחָמָה, אָרְזָוּ ذָה בַּהֲרָחָה נְכֹוּן.  
- לְכָן צָרִיכָה לְצַאת קָרִיאָה לְמִדִּינִוֹת עָרָב לְתָבוּעָה מִן סִיּוֹם מִצְבָּה הַמִּלְחָמָה. צָעֵד בָּזָה יִשְׁנָה  
הַמִּצְבָּה בָּאַזְוֹר וַיַּעֲוֹד אָוֹתָנוּ מִאַז. בִּינְתִּים הַעוֹוִיִּנּוֹת כְּלָפִינוּ בְּעוֹלָם הָעָרָבִי לֹא  
הַשְׁתַּבְתָּה.

- אַנוּ חֹוָגָגִים עַשְׂרֵה לְקָמָפְ-דָּוד. צָרִיךְ לְחִזּוֹר אֲלֵיכֶם, לְבַחֲנוּ אֶתְכֶם, לְרֹאֹת כִּיצְדָּקָה  
אֶת הַפּוֹטְנִצְיָאֵל שְׁבָהֶם, לְהַעֲמִיקָם וְלַהֲרָחִיב הַיּוֹרִיעָה כִּדִּי שְׁתְּקִיף מִדִּינִוֹת נְוֹסְפּוֹת. הַמָּם  
הַוּכָחָו כְּהַסְכָמִים טּוֹבִים, מְזֻקִים וְהַגִּוְונִים עַל אָפְיַה בְּקֹוֹרֶת שְׁנָמְתָחָה עֲלֵיכֶם. אַיִלְלָנוּ  
מִקְבָּלִים הַדְּבָרִים עַל כָּךְ שָׁעַר עַלְיכֶם הַכְּלָח. וְאִם נָאָמָר שָׁעַר הַכְּלָח עַל 242, מָה יִגְיָדוּ?  
חִיִּבְים לְשָׁמֹר עַל קְדוּשַׁת הַסְכָמִים וְהַמְחֹווּיִבּוֹת לָהֶם.

בַּיּוֹקָר - הַתִּיחִשּׂוֹתִי לְהַסְכִּמִי ק.ד. נוֹבְעָתָה רָק מַהְצֹוֹרָךְ לְמַבּוּעַ הַרְוּשָׁם שָׁאַיְלָנוּ מִתְחִפְרִים בָּאוֹתָה  
עַמְּדָה וְלֹא מִתְקָדְמִים. הַפְּסָדָנוּ הַזְּדִמְנוֹיוֹת בַּעֲבָר וְצָרִיךְ, עַל-כָּן, שָׁלָא לְהַפְּסִיד עַד  
הַזְּדִמְנוֹת שְׁבָהָא אַלְיָנוּ. אַנוּ צָרִיכִים לְכֹבַשׁ מִחְדָשׁ אֶת הַעֲמָדָה הַעֲדִיפָה  
לְקָדָם אֶת הַסְּדָר וְלַהֲגִיעַ לִמְוֹיִם עַם הַפָּלָסְטִינִים וְאֵי לְקַפּוֹז לְסִיּוֹם הַלְוָחָמָה מִן  
הַנּוֹכְחִי.

רְהִיִּם - הַדְּבָרִים קָשָׁוֹרִים ذָה בָּזָה. אַנוּ רֹצִים לְפָטוֹר בָּעֵית הַפָּלָסְטִינִים וְקַבְלָנוּ עַל עַצְמָנוּ  
בַּהֲסָכָמִי קָמָפְ-דָּוד לְעַשְׂוֹת ذָאת. אַנוּ מְחוֹווּיִבּוֹת לִמְוֹיִם עַל מַעַם הַקָּבָע וְלֹכֶן לֹא  
בָּעֵלָבָן חֲדַ-עֲדַדִּית עַל אָפְיַה לְחַצִּים, לְהַחֵל רִיבּוֹנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵלִית עַל  
הַשְּׁתָחִים.

- המומים על אזרורי ישיע צרייך להעשות בשני שלבים:

(א) בתקופת ביןניים והסדרי-ביןניים transitional period; בפרק זה יקבלו הפליטיניגים ממשל עצמי שיקיף כל השטחים, פרט לחוץ ובתחוץ. זו תקופה מבחן חשובה.

(ב) החל בשנה השלישית יתנהל מרים לקביעת מעמד הקבע של השטחים. אנו מחווייבים לדון במעמד הקבע. מרים ישתתפו מצרים וירדן, שרוב אוכלוסייתם פליטיניגים. תור כדי כר נדונ עם ירדן על שלום וגבולות הקבע. הפליטיניגים ישתתפו בקביעת גורלם.

אסור לשכוח ששורש הסכorder עם הערבים הוא הסכorder על כל ארץ-ישראל, או פליטיניג. כיצד פותרים סכorder כזה? עיי מרים. לא ניתן לקבוע עתה את עמדתנו במרים. אם נציג עמדה משלהנו, היא תיפסל, ויחול פיצוץ.

ביקור - האם תוכל לומר עכשו שאותה רואה כמה אפשרויות במורים להסדר הקבע, כגון קונפדרציה, ריבונות זו או אחרת - וכך?

רהיימ - אינני יכול. יש בישראל דעות שונות בעניין זה ואני חייב להיות דבק בקונסנסוס האומר - יהיה מרים ללא תנאים מוקדמים. על הערבים להבין שאנו מחווייבים במורים על מעמד הקבע.

ביקור - לא תוכל לומר שהסדר הסופי יכול להקיף מספר אפשרויות?

רהיימ - אם ישאלו אותי, אומר שיש תביעה ישראלית לריבונות והערבים יתבעו שלם. ולכן לא יהיה מנוס מביהול מרים.

ביקור - איך מגיעים למורים?

רהיימ - יש אפשרות שמצרים וירדן ירכיבו, משלחת שתהיה מקובלת על הפליטיניגים. אפשרות יותר ריאלית - לומר לפליטיניגים לבחור נציגיהם בבחירה. אך על הנבחרים יהיה לדעת מהם נבחרו לנשל מרים על הסדרי ביןניים.

ביקור - מדוע שלא יהיו הם בני השיח גם להסדר הביניים וגם לאחר-מכן להסדר הקבע.

רהיימ - זו שאלה משפטית. אך לא יוכל לובא ולומר מיד שהם רוצחים מדינה פלسطינית. ייבחרו רק להסדר ביניים ולאחר תקופת מבחן, נראה. נוסף לזה, לא יתכן שהבחירה יתנהלו במצב של אלימות וטרור. חייב להפסיק.

בינייקר - אך איך אתה תובע הפסקת האלימות... אנו בדעה שצורך לשנות המצב בשטח. אני מ庫ווה שלא תציג תנאי שרק לאחר הפסקת האינתיפאדה יהיה בחירות. נניח, למשל, שההיה הסכם על disengagement, ישראל תוציא חילילים ואז יפסיקו צעדים נגד האוכלוסייה,

רהיימ - לבו אין עניין בנסיבות חילילים בערים ובכפרים וביתר הצעדים. אם לא תהיה אלימות, לא יהיה צעדים משלבו.

בינייקר - אך הדבר ניתן להשות רק אם תהיה הבנה בין שני הצדדים.

רהיימ - אם יהיה הסכם על בחירות, הדבר ישפיع מאד לטובה. האוכלוסייה סובלת מאד מז'

בינייקר - אך איך יהיה הסכם לפני אמצע האינתיפאדה.

רומ - אם תאמר שצורך להיות הפסקת האלימות לפני המלחמת התחילה זה יהיה תנאי שקשה לעמוד בו. אולי אפשר שתהייה הבנה מקבילה. (?)

רהיימ - לפני שימוש הסכם, צריך להיות שקט.

בינייקר - אם מתנים תנאים פורמליים, לא תהיה תזוזה. מה בוגר לפקוח ביטול על הבחירה ?

רהיימ - אין זה נכון. יש לבו מסורת דמוקרטית. הערבים בישראל משתתפים בחירות וזה ידוע לכל.

בינייקר - מה בוגר לפלסטינים שמחוץ לשטחים ? ומדובר בירושלים ?

רהיימ - אלה נושאים לדין. יש עוד עניין - צריך לחסל מחנות הפליטים. הפליטים חיים בתנאים תת-אנושיים. צריך לעשות מאמץ בינלאומי לספק להם שכון קבוע. אנו עשינו זאת במידת צנעה והצלחנו. אם נגיע כמיליارد דולר נוכל לישב 350,000 פליטים בעשור הקרוב. זה יקל ויסייע לפתרון הבעיה המדינית.

ביה"ר - מה יקרה אם הנבחרים בבחירה ייהיו אנשי אשיפ?

ריה"מ - נצער לטעל בבעיה. צריך למצוא דרכי כדי למנוע הפתעות.

ביה"ר - אם יתברר שאנו מדברים רק על קמפ-דוד ויוזר רושם כזה - הדבר יהיה קשה.

ריה"מ - אבו נוטלים סכון על עצמנו בכל מקרה. האוכלוסייה עזינית. קיום בחירות באוירה כזאת אייננו דבר קל והוא בודאי סכון.

(החלק המצוומצם מהשתתפות  
סקוקרופט והח"מ)

הנשיה : אני שמח לבוארך. ראייתי ספקולציה רבודה באשר לביקור. היתי רוצה לשם דברים מפיך. ארצתה להזמיןך לביקור עמי במודיאון החלל ולרעריתך ואתת חקדים העבר בדקות אחדות. יהי לנו לנו הזרמנויות לשיחתך.

רח"ט : אני שמח לחזדמנויות לדון במושאים וסביר כי השיחות עם מזכיר המדינה היו מעודדות, התקדםנו ואני מאמין שאנו בדרך הנכונה.

אחד, אדוננו הנשיה, ממקדמי שיחות הפעולה האסטרטגי, המתקדם יפה לשביות רצוננו. אני מוקה כי יתקדם עוד וככל הניחן יכולת חוממים רחבים יותר.

הנשיה : מחויבתנו ליחסים הידידותיים ולשיתות האסטרטגי אינה ניתנת לעדרעור. זהה המשך של מהו חשוב לשתי המדיניות ואני מיחסם לכך חשיבות רבה.

רח"ט : אני בא חלק חבל שיש בו בעיות רבות. השפעת ארה"ב בזאת"ח הרבה יותר - הרבה משליחתך. מסיבות שוניות רואים העربים באיזור את בריה"מ כנכחשת, ואין היא בתחרות לארה"ב, הנחנית מירקה בכלל שמירת התחביבותיה. הצלחתם במפרץ הוסיפה יוקרה לארה"ב, והכל יודעים כי הרוצה בתפקידו דיפלומטי יש לו בעל ברית אחד-והו ארה"ב. ארה"ב היא המעכמת היחידה לה יחסים מצוינאים בעת ובוונח אחת עם ישראל ועם מרבית הערבים.

בוש : אכן, אך דבר זה עלול להחטט, אם ארה"ב נראית כבלתי מסוגלת לזרז ~~—~~ כמובן היא ~~לעוזר~~ מישראל, למעשה, להמעה אין לאלה"ב השפעה על לוב, סוריה, עיראק, איראן - אך עם חידוש האמינוות במפלץ אני מסכימים להערכה שעדת ארה"ב חזקה, אך בದרכם נקודות מ- 10-1 את סבור אולי שעדתנו היא בנקודה 8, ואני סבור כי היא בנקודה 7, בכלל האבדה שלא הצלחנו להציג עוד את תהליך השלום, ואולם, אני מסכימים לכך ~~ולחצנו~~ <sup>לעוזר</sup> אם ימנו חננו, עם זאת יש אי נחט אצלם הערבים שאנו קוראים "מתוונים" אף כי הם מצוינים שגנית במצב מלחמה עם ישראל.

רח"ט : הסיבה לבבז שהערבים רוחשים לארה"ב היא ידידותה לישראל. עליהם, לשיטתם, לשכנע את ארה"ב - שכן ישראל סומכת עליה, ומכאן העליה לרגל לארה"ב. אם רוצאים להציג שינויים מסוימים עם ישראל-יודעים הם שרק עם ארה"ב יכולם הם לדון. בכך החולות באלה"ב בהקשר זה, שהוא גורם מייצב.

מלה על לבנון - הטרגדיה והיגון שם כו庵ים סובלים, יש הרג רב, אלפיים בורחות מבירחות לבבון הגבול עמנו, רבים עוזבים את לבנון. אנו איננו יכולים לעשות דבר. טרגדיה אונסית שאי אפשר לעשות דבר ~~על~~, וגם התקשרות שוחקת. הנשיה : גם לנו אין מה להציג בנושא. אני מעריך דבריך, היתי לבנון ואמרתי לדני חומאס ~~ו~~ שביקר אצלך כי לבן האמריקנים רבים כו庵 מאוד. אין הדבר בתודעתם כמו ישראל, אך יש תחושת הסכול. אולי ניחן בדרך כלשהי לפועל יחד בעניין זה. זכורה לי בירחות מלפני שלושים שנה. ~~על~~

רח"ט : אכן בירחות היתה עיר יפה. אנו סובלים ידוע לי כי אתה והאמריקנים מושפעים ממה שראוים בטליזיה. כו庵 לי אישית לראות אדם בהרג, אש, ילד. הינו מזוא דרך להפסיק זאת - לנו חשבים על בר יום וליליה ומשכיעים אנרגיה כדי למצוא דרך לצאת מז העניין. איננו יכולים לחיות עם הדבר, לנו מושכענים שעליינו לשנות ונשנה בעדרתכם - לנו יודעים שאתה חזק. יש לכם השפעה ואמון. יחד נוכל למצוא פתרון.

את רציתך להוסיף דברים אחדים אישית. עניין הדיאלוג של ארה"ב עם אש"ף מכאייב ~~נו~~ מאוד, ואני נרוצים דיברים ביקורת פומבית, שכן אני סבור ~~נו~~ כי ~~ו~~ ייזיא ~~נו~~ בפומבי. במקרה צריכים לאבקר. בפומבי. אש"ף מבחןנו הוא האויב הקיצוני ביחסו שהיא לבן האמונה, המעשים, הפילוסופיה. אנו סוברים שבלי מושוחה עט נאלץ לחשוב על האפשרות לקבל את דרישת המינימום שלהם שהיא מדינה פלסטינאית, דבר שהוא בסוד קיומו של הארגון וואיפוחו. לא היתי חי בשלום עם מצפוני לולא אמרתי לך, נשיא ארה"ב ~~לידידנו~~, לנו מושכענים כי ישראל לא יכול לחיות עם מדינה פלסטינאית.

**הניסי** : לא שיבנichi דעתי על המדרינה הפלסטינאית. אמשיך ללחוץ בעניין האמנה, אך הצהרת אש"ף קיבלה את חנאי ריביגן בעניין הדיאלוג, <sup>ושבסבורים</sup> שהדייאלוג יכול להיוולד ביחס (על <sup>היחס</sup> ) לשולם. איני סבור שבעת פגישות החרובנה היבינו שבניו מאמינים כי עראפה יאמר מה שאמר. הוא אמרם אמר גם, "עשרה כדורים בחזה" וזה מרגיז אוחנו. אל חראה בנפרד את עניין זכות ישראל לחוקים ו-242 מן הדיאלוג הזה. אני מעריך דבריך בעניין אי מתייחסה של ביקורת פומבית. לא נלחץ למדינה פלסטינאית. דעחנו בעניין מדינה פלסטינאית לא השתנהה. אני סבור שהדייאלוג יהיה מועיל, ויש לי כל כוונה להמשיך ואני מקווה שבנקודה מסוימת נוכל לומר על כך דבר טוב. אם <sup>על</sup> דבר רע – אמרו לנו. יש להבין שהדבר קרה. ואני מ舡ים שהוא טוב.

**ರה"מ** : החומר במדינה פלסטינאייה מדובר על סופה של מדינה ישראל.

ראה"ם : מדיננה פלסטינאית איננה מקובלת עליינו. אבל רוצחים לעבוד על הצעות שaczענו, ויש לנו יוזמה של 4 נקודות. הפעולה צריכה להיות בשני ביוונגים - יט ערביים, ביוון שבסכום אין עם הפלסטינים בלבד. הדבר אינו יכול להימשך, ויש צורך לדבר עם מדיננו ערבי שישנו את המצב, אם רוצחים שלום באזרנו. שנייה, על חותמי קמף דיוויד להיפגש ולבדוק מה הושג ומה יש לעתות לשם הרחבות החקיר השלום. כמו כן יש לפתח על ידי מאץ בינלאומי את בעית הפליטים ביו"ש ועזה (שלוש מאות חמישים אלף איש המצוויים בחנאים קשים), יש להעניק להם, שיכון וחנאי חיים אגושים. דבר זה יכול להעשות במאץ בינלאומי על-לספר את המצב, שambilי להזות תחليف לפרטן פוליטי. לנו יש חכמיות - אך לא אמצעים. הדבר דורש בליזן דולר תוך שור שנים, והמדינה העשירות יותר יוכלו לחתום לבך.

הנשיה : השאלה איך ניחן לעשות זאת בלי הצד הפוליטי.

**רבה מ** : שוחחת על בך עם אנשים במנוחה. אמרו שוכנים לך מחר. הם מתחזקם לבר. המדיניות הערבית החליטה **זיהו** <sup>זיהו</sup> תנאים כאלה. זה פוליטי.

שנית, מי ישתחף במו". אם ניתן להביה את מקרים וירדן, <sup>לגבי רצון פלסטינים</sup> מה טוב, אך ידוע לי כי הדבר קשה עם ירדן <sup>או</sup> יודעים על החגיגות החזקה של ירדן למדינה פלסטינאית כלשהי. יש לנו מומ"מ עם האוכלוסייה של העברים הפלסטינאים, והחלנו בצד לעשות זאת, על ידי בחירה נציגים על ידי האוכלוסייה לנו מומ"מ ולמצוא דרכם לפתרון הגירוני. אנו סבורים שהדבר אפשרי והרוב קיבל דעתן בזה בחלבות, הם סובלים ורוצים לראות פתרון לஸלם, ואנו סבורים שיש הצדקה לכך - יש לנו סכטך עםם, והם חלק מהascoor העברי-ישראל. אני מאמין שארץ זו שייכת לנו, העברים מאמינים כי היא שייכת להם, ויש שתי דרכם - עימות או מומ"מ. ראיינו די עימות. נלק למומ"מ וננסה להשיב פתרון מקובל, זו הדרך הדראליסטייה היחידה. ברור שצעריך לחיות יחד בארץ קסנה זו.

ארה"ב חוכל לנסוח לסייע, וזיהו הרעיון שעליו משכנו, והתחלנו לדון בכך עם המזכיר.

הנשיא : ישנן 6 נקודות בנוסח הבהיר, ובחן הפיקוח, פחרון הקבע, פלסטינאים מבחו"ז, וצריך למצוא <sup>הנורא מושג עליון ודרישת</sup> מושג עליון ודרישת ארנס דיבר על כך שאחוּת עם תוכנות בחירות כפי שיחיו, והדבר מעלה את השאלה מה אם ייבחר א"פ, ואלא אם חשבנוונו אחרת, אנו סבורים שמי שיבחר צרייך לנחלה את המומ"מ. אני.ARצה לשוחח עמו על כל הנושאים לפנוי עזיבתך.

רה"מ : הבתתי למציר כי אם אראה שהרעיון מתקבלים עלייכם, אדרון בפרטם הנוראים בבייח ואננו מוכנים לעבוד. ייחד עמכם על תכנית קונקרטית לפחרון כל הבעיות, גם מעבר לנקודות הלו. יהא עלייכם לשכנע פלסטינאים. פוליטית - עליינו לפעול במסגרת הקואליציה. שלנו.

הנשיא : אני מבין שהמצב השתף לעומת הממשלה הרוטציונית הקודמת, אך עודו קשה, גם לי יש קונגרס. high ground איבדנו את ה-

הה"מ : אנטישמי בחירות אינן בדילוק דבר קלاسي במדה"ת, זה כמו המצאת הגלגל במדיה רובה.

הנשיא : אנטישמי השפעת ישראל כטול הדמוקרטיה מורגשת באיזור, אנטישמי איש לא סבר לפנוי זמן שילצין ייבחר במוסקבה. בנוסח הסובייטי, כולנו מכירים אותו ואיבדנו מודאגים מהו.

לآخر מבחן קויימה שיחת קטרה באربע עיניים.)

2/11/89

PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR OF ISRAEL  
ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE  
MAYFLOWER HOTEL, WASHINGTON, DC  
THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1989

Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate this opportunity to address an audience whose interest in world affairs is guided by historical perspective. We have always believed that the better informed the audience, the easier it is to present our case.

Yesterday and today, we held talks with President Bush, Secretary Baker, and other members of the new administration. The talks were held in a friendly atmosphere as befits relations between allies. We are agreed that to produce positive results, the United States and Israel must work in close coordination. There is little chance of any progress toward peace negotiations and toward the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict unless there is an understanding between Israel and the United States. Since the Arab side continues to reject direct talks with Israel, the United States, which enjoys the trust and confidence of most Arab states, can play a useful role in paving the way for negotiations.

We made absolutely clear that we oppose any kind of talks with the PLO. We explained in detail the reasons for our stance on this issue, and I shall expand on them further on. Our two governments are agreed that the status quo is not desirable and not satisfactory. None of us wants to see it continued. Peace is our common objective. If the sides to the conflict make a determined and sincere effort to bring it about, it will be achieved. It is not Israel, and never was Israel, that needed to be convinced on the vital necessity and blessings of peace.

The violence, riots and terror attacks must end if a setting conducive to negotiations, accommodation and peace is to be established. We stressed that if the leaders and inciters of the violence believe they can gain politically, their chances for an agreement will disappear. We propose free, democratic elections among the Palestinian Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Their purpose is to produce a delegation to negotiate an interim period of a self-governing administration.

The shape, modalities and participation in the elections will have to be discussed. The interim phase will provide a vital test of coexistence and cooperation. It will be followed by negotiations for a permanent agreement. The participants in the negotiations could be Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Arabs and Israel. All proposed options will be examined during these negotiations. Since the administration is in the process of consultation with all the governments connected with this issue, our two governments have decided to maintain close contact with a view to reaching joint operative plans as soon as the present stage of preparation is concluded.

On United States-Israel bilateral issues, we discussed the status of our strategic cooperation which both sides consider satisfactory, the economic situation in Israel and the United States aid, the question of Soviet emigration, the alarming escalation of missiles and chemical weapons, and the situation of Jewish communities in distress, especially in Syria.

I would now like to give our assessment of the present situation in our area. Most of these points were raised by us during our talks in Washington. I believe it is necessary to present them because of the barrage of the daily news in recent months has obscured many of them.

One: Since the establishment of the State in '48, we have lived with the reality of conflict and war between us and the Arab states. No one is more sick and tired of this conflict than we are.

Two: With the exception of Egypt, the entire Arab world continues to wage political, economic, and propaganda warfare against us and supports terrorist organizations that attack us. In recent years, the conflict has been portrayed as a conflict between us and the Palestinian Arabs. This perception is reinforced daily by pictures of confrontations between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian rioters. But no serious student of the region can believe that if the Palestinians gain a state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the hostility of Syria, Libya, Iraq, Iran and their respective terrorist proxies will cease, nor that they would then promptly disarm and stop threatening Israel. The simple truth is that the Palestinian problem is not the cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the result of it.

Three: Both the kingdom of Jordan and Israel are parts of what used to be the British mandate of Palestine. A third Palestinian state would reduce Israel to strategic vulnerability. Israel's entire territory covers just less than one-fifth of one percent of the combined territory of the Arab states. The area of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza is 2,200 square miles -- the size of a county in the US. It cannot be, nor is it intended to be a normal state. It can only be a convenient launching pad for terrorist attacks against the center of our country. Without Judea and Samaria, Israel, at its most densely populated center is as wide as the distance between the White House and Chevy Chase.

Four: There is no one I would refuse to negotiate with if I thought it would bring peace. But I believe negotiating with the PLO will reward international terrorism, increase violence in the world, bring about a PLO state on the outskirts of Tel Aviv and the center of Jerusalem, and pose a mortal danger to Israel.

Five: The Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza don't want us in their areas. We cannot risk the life of our country by leaving -- by leaving. The slogan, "territories for peace," is deceptive. The choice is not between Israel keeping the territories or risking war. The opposite is true. If we leave, there will almost certainly be war, but we do not want to run the lives of the inhabitants. We want them to have self-rule. We want them to be able to express their national aspirations for the Palestinian state on the East Bank of the Jordan.

And above all, we want to end the hostility and bloodshed by negotiating with the leadership they elect to represent themselves, not with a terrorist organization based in Tunisia.

Six: Our image has been tarnished. Our enemies are delighted and our friends suffer at the sight of our soldiers subduing civilians with force. We know that the TV pictures don't convey the full truth. They don't show the rocks that kill, the petrol-bombs that burn, and the iron pipes that maim. They do not tell of 950 attacks on Arabs by Arabs for the crime of not participating in the riots. They do not count the 26 Arabs murdered for advocating moderation, nor do they tell about the reign of terror which prevents the end of violence. But even though we know all that, we also suffer when we see what our soldiers have to do. No one is more eager to see an end to this confrontation than Israel. Many say we made serious mistakes in handling riots. I have no doubt that like all nations, we too have made mistakes. But the reason Israel is alive today is that we never made the cardinal mistake of forgetting where we live. To the West, our conduct seems tough, but one of the reasons the riots continue is that in our neighborhood we are considered soft. The rioters know the limits imposed by our democratic values. Similar riots were subdued practically overnight by our neighbors using measures we would not and could not consider using. Recently, even a democratic country put down riots with the kind of ruthlessness we have never used. We hope we can convince the Palestinian Arabs that they can achieve much through negotiations, and nothing through violence. But we are not going to risk our existence for the sake of good press.

Seven: PLO terrorism has not abated. We have absolute proof that terrorist groups under Arafat's control, and others, continue engaging in terror attacks. Their incursions are intended to take hostages and kill civilians. Fortunately, most of them have been caught by the Israeli army. The PLO leaders have made no secret of their intention to use any territory they might acquire to launch terrorist attacks against Israel, and to trigger an all-out Arab-Israeli war, nor have they renounced their charter which calls for Israel's destruction. Clearly, they are not fit partners for negotiation.

Eight: The arms race in the Middle East is continuing. The Arab countries are acquiring vast quantities of sophisticated arms. The Soviet Union has concluded another large arms deal with Syria. Libya's air force is now capable of reaching Israel. Most of the Arab countries around us possess medium-range ground-to-ground missiles and chemical warfare capabilities. The Arabs buy from the Soviet Union, Europe and the United States. The fact that they can buy arms that are identical to those used by the Israeli army threatens to reduce our qualitative advantage. The arms and weapons arrayed against Israel today are more threatening than ever.

Nine: Syria's ambition to dominate the region and its dreams of "Greater Syria" have not abated. The media have not found the fighting in Beirut important news, but what is going on there is mass slaughter.

Finally, let me stress that no one is more interested than we are in achieving peace in the Middle East. Ten years ago, on signing the

Peace Treaty with us, President Sadat spoke of turning swords into ploughshares. He was quoting the Hebrew prophet Isaiah who first said those words in Jerusalem 2,500 years ago. We have been expressing this hope in our prayers ever since. We know there are no quick fixes for the Middle East conflict. We believe our plan is reasonable and fair. It rejects the PLO terrorist-inspired solution. It advocates a democratic solution. It is based on the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed 10 years ago almost to the day. We believe in honoring a contract. We believe the other signatories should honor it too. And if this contract is declared dead 10 years after its birth and after we made enormous sacrifices for it, there is no use asking us to put our faith in other contracts.

But we believe we can expand on this treaty in its spirit. We propose that for the first time in their history, the Palestinians of Judea, Samaria and Gaza hold elections to choose their representatives for negotiations with us on interim arrangements. By doing so, they will be the only Arabs in the Middle East except Israeli Arab citizens who will participate in a true democratic election. But to have free elections, people must be free to express their opinions without fear of terror and assassination. Over the past year, the PLO has murdered dozens of Palestinian Arabs who expressed independent views. Clearly, a first requirement for free elections is an atmosphere free of violence and terror.

The free nations of the world have a clear choice. They can promote a PLO campaign for a PLO-dominated state and ensure deterioration to tyranny and war. Let us remind all those who worry about human rights that the PLO once ruled a mini-state in Lebanon where no human rights existed at all. For this reason, and to secure our very existence, Israel will resist this course.

But the free nations have another option. They can support a realistic and positive proposal to achieve co-existence between Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinian Arabs. We share with the free nations a fervent desire to change the status quo. But we hope that they realize that, as in the case of Iran, a reckless rush to change can bring disaster. Our proposals for a settlement will be futile unless the Arab states around us also embark on the road to peace. They must renounce belligerency and advocate a peaceful solution. They must stop objecting to the resettling of the Arab refugees. They must stop the arms race.

The international community can help by supporting the resettlement of the refugees. Their situation is intolerable, but to shed tears over their fate while vetoing Israeli projects of resettlement neither improves their lot nor contributes to the relaxation of tensions.

Our proposal will safeguard Israel's security and give maximum self-rule to the Palestinian Arabs. They will give, following the Camp David formula, equal opportunity to both sides to put forward and negotiate their positions. Some may reject our plan out of hand, but I believe joint effort by the United States and Israel, based on these proposals, can bring about their acceptance and bring a just and lasting peace to our region. Thank you.

## שагן ווות ישראל בורושינגטונ טופס נבו נ

## 2. מtower. דף 1.

אל : מצפ"א, מט"ת, הסברה

תאריך, זמן: 11.4.89  
חסר המברך:

דנ : לשכת רה"ם

### מאת: עתונאות

### המשרד:

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תשומת לבכם למאמרו הרצ"ב של ריצ'רד כהן בעקבות בקורי שה"ח וריה"מ. המאמר הופיע היום ב "רוזנברגטון פוסט".

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Richard Cohen

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## The Right Signals on Israel?

Each time he talks about the Middle East, President Bush is sure to say the right things: Israel is an American ally, a strategic partner and, of course, a fellow democracy. Having said that, however, the president—much like someone spoiling a photograph by holding up two fingers—manages to spoil the picture.

Two examples: Just before Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir arrived for a state visit, the president used the occasion of a similar visit by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to call for an end to Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Shamir must have been stunned. After all, the Israeli leader was supposedly coming to Washington with some plans of his own.

Earlier, when Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens came to Washington, Secretary of State James Baker said publicly what he did not say privately to Arens—that the United States might want Israel to deal directly with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Arens read about the American position in the newspaper.

Word for word, I cannot fault either Bush or Baker. What they said makes sense. The way they said it, however, is another matter entirely. By publicly pressuring Israel, by showing a degree of

impatience not exhibited elsewhere (Soviet relations, for instance), Bush and Baker are making the American-Jewish community (and, to a lesser degree, Israel) a bit nervous.

Why? One reason is that Bush is not Ronald Reagan. The former president was unambiguously pro-Israel. Not so Bush. The Jewish community remembers him as the vice president who seemed to blame Israel for the Iran-contra affair, whose presidential campaign had to rid itself of anti-Semites and who chose John Sununu as White House chief of staff. As governor of New Hampshire, Sununu refused to condemn the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism.

If either Bush or Baker is aware of what a prominent Jewish leader called the community's "queasiness," they sure haven't shown it. Indeed, even as Bush was saying goodbye to Shamir, he repeated a formulation that startled some Jewish leaders: Israel must relinquish "sovereignty over . . . the West Bank and Gaza." As a general principle, that corresponds to the position of many Israelis. But even the Israeli left is not willing to give up *all* the occupied territories—not what was once East Jerusalem and probably not certain

militarily strategic areas. Bush's statement lacked nuance.

Nuance is important. What disturbs Jewish leaders who have no substantive quarrel with the Bush administration's emerging Middle East policies is the suspicion that the White House has adopted a pro-Arab tilt. (One of them even noted that the state dinner for Mubarak "included some well-known 'Arabists'—former or current State Department officials considered hostile to Israel.) That perception could diminish the Bush administration's chances of being an "honest broker" in the Middle East. It might cause Shamir and his Likud bloc to dig in—to sense antipathy rather than concern.

At home, Bush's conduct toward Israel could rob him of the support he needs in the American Jewish community. By no means as unified as it once was on Israel, the community is likely to rally around Shamir if it thinks he's being pushed around—especially if those doing the pushing are suspected of being unfriendly toward Israel. The administration's public declarations of policy have already caused at least one influential congressman to protest to the State Department. His message was blunt: don't spoil what we have been working years to achieve.

Israel's current policies are both untenable and wrong. Its steadfast refusal to deal with the PLO is counterproductive, and it must, as Bush insists, substantially withdraw from the occupied territories. But these objectives will be harder, maybe impossible, to achieve if the American-Jewish community thinks Shamir is being bullied. In that event, members of Congress who have been working behind the scenes to have Jerusalem change its policies will fear the wrath of an unforgiving Jewish community. That community is already on the alert.

Israeli sources and others say it is still too early to assess the Bush administration—and that, anyway, the signals are mixed. But the most radical changes in U.S.-Israel policy—opening talks with the PLO, for instance—occurred during the Reagan administration. This was possible because the American-Jewish community and Israel itself never doubted Reagan's goodwill. If the Bush administration wants to accomplish as much or more, now is not too early to ponder the signals it has been sending. The "confidence building" steps it proposes for the Middle East might, in the short run, be better applied at home.

## שגרירות ישראלי בוושינגטון טופס מבוק

## אל : מצפ"א, משי"ת, הסברה

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תאריך, זמן: 10.4.89  
מספר המברך:

### מזה: שערכות

## המשרד:

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## משאכ דעתך קהיל - ווושי פאגטונו קומס

תשומת לבכם לממצאינו מושא דעת הקהל שהופיע ב"ירושינגןטון פוסט" במלבד ביקור רוחם כאן. גם אם, כאמור, הכותרות מתרכזות בנסיבות המומ"מ בין ישראל לאש"פ כדי לשים לב ליתר ממצא הדו"ח. ביניהם:  
 1. רמת התמיכה בישראל שבאה לידיים שהו לפני תחילת האינתיפאדה.  
 2. כ-8 מתור 50 גשאטיים רושם שלילי על אש"פ.  
 3. רוב הנשאלים הבינו שביעות רצון מיחסו ישראל-ארה"ב ורוב ברור התנגד לכל צמוך בסיוו' הכלכלי והכלכלי לישראל.  
 4. 41% מהנשאלים הטילו האחריות לאלימות בשטחים על הפלסטינים, 28% עשו כך לגבי ישראל.

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## Terrorist Attack in U.S. Seen Somewhat Likely

Most Americans say a major terrorist attack is at least somewhat likely in the United States in the near future, according to the latest Washington Post-ABC News poll.

The survey also found that nine out of 10 persons interviewed suspect that their government frequently withholds information about terrorist attacks on civilians, and four in 10 say that withholding such information is unjustified under any circumstance.

Half the respondents said the government can do only a fair amount or not much at all to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States—and eight out of 10 believe that little or nothing

can be done to stop such attacks against Americans abroad.

Eight out of 10 said a terrorist attack within the United States is at least somewhat likely in the near future, and a quarter said such an attack is very likely to occur. Nearly eight out of 10 said the United States should take military action against any Middle Eastern nation found aiding terrorist actions against Americans, and two-thirds said we should take such measures even if it leads to war.

Iran was named by a third of those interviewed as responsible for most of the terrorism directed against the United States and its allies, followed by Libya, which was mentioned by 16 percent.

ior in the violence that has swept across the occupied territories. Fifty-one percent of those interviewed blamed the Palestinians for the recent turmoil, while 28 percent faulted Israel. One out of 10 said both sides were equally responsible.

But half also said that Israel is wrong to destroy the houses of Palestinians accused of anti-Israeli violence or their relatives. That policy has been widely publicized and frequently criticized in the United States and elsewhere.

Most Americans expressed general satisfaction with the overall relationship between Israel and the United States and a clear majority opposed any reductions in U.S. economic and military aid to Israel, which receives more U.S. foreign aid than any other country.

But the survey also found that support for cutting aid increases significantly when respondents were first informed about the amount of assistance that Israel

now receives, suggesting that some who favor present aid levels might change their minds if they knew how much aid Israel actually receives compared to other countries.

Half of those sampled were asked whether the amount of U.S. military and economic aid to Israel should be increased, decreased or kept about the same. Two-thirds favored keeping aid at current levels, while a quarter wanted to cut aid and 6 percent favored an increase.

The basic question asked of the other half of the sample was preceded by an introduction noting that Israel receives more aid than any other country, and brief summaries of the major reasons why some favor current aid levels and others favor cuts.

In that context, the percentage who favored cutting aid to Israel increased to 43 percent and those who said aid should remain at current levels dropped to 51 percent. Four percent favored increasing assistance.



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## Americans Polled Urge Israeli-PLO Talks

By Richard Morin  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Most Americans believe Israel should negotiate directly with the Palestine Liberation Organization and an even larger majority say peace in the Middle East is impossible without direct talks between PLO and Israeli leaders, according to a Washington Post-ABC News poll.

The survey found support for Israel among Americans has rebounded in recent weeks, and is now about as high as it was before the Palestinian uprising began 18 months ago in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Yet about half of all Americans remain critical of some aspects of Israel's response to the *intifada*, and eight out of 10 say Israeli countermeasures to control the violence, criticized by some as overly harsh, will weaken support for Israel in the United States.

The Washington Post-ABC News Poll of 1,525 randomly selected adults nationwide also disclosed that many Americans question whether Arab and Israeli leaders sincerely want to find peaceful solutions to their differences. Six out of 10 respondents said they doubt that peace in the Middle East will be achieved in the next 10 years.

And half of those interviewed said they support the establishment of a homeland for the Palestinians in territory occupied by Israel, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli government.

The survey was conducted March 30 to April 3. Margin of sampling error for the overall results is plus or minus 3 percentage points.

According to the poll:

- Seven out of 10 Americans said Israel should negotiate directly with the PLO, and eight out of 10 said peace in the Middle East is not possible without direct talks between the PLO and Israel.

### WASHINGTON POST-ABC NEWS POLL

**Q** Do you generally have a favorable or unfavorable view of the following countries?

COUNTRY	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE
England	94%	4%
West Germany	81	15
China	80	17
Mexico	71	26
Egypt	68	27
Israel	59	37
Soviet Union	54	44
Iran	4	94

**Q** (Asked of half sample) Do you think that the United States should increase or decrease the amount of military and economic aid it gives to Israel, or do you think it should remain about the same?

Increase	6%
Decrease	26
Should remain about the same	66

**Q** (Asked of half sample) The United States gives more economic and military aid to Israel than to any other country in the world, amounting to about \$3 billion last year. Some say this level of assistance is justified because Israel is a strong ally of the United States and is threatened by its hostile Arab neighbors. Others say the United States gives too much aid to Israel, compared to the countries in need. Do you think that the United States should increase or decrease the amount of military and economic aid it gives to Israel, or do you think it should remain about the same?

Increase	4%
Decrease	43
Should remain about the same	51

NOTE: Figures for this Washington Post-ABC News Poll are based on telephone interviews with a national sample of 1,525 randomly selected adults conducted March 30-April 3. Margin of sampling error for the overall results is plus or minus 3 percentage points. Sampling error is only one of many potential sources of error in this or any other public opinion poll. Interviewing was conducted by Chilton Research of Radnor, Pa.

THE WASHINGTON POST

■ About six out of 10 Americans now have a favorable view of Israel, compared to slightly more than four of 10 in a poll conducted two months ago following extensive media coverage of the Palestinian uprising. Half of those in the most recent survey characterized Israel as a reliable ally, up slightly from February's poll.

■ More than six in 10 respondents said they did not believe Arab leaders wanted peace, and half said Israel was not sincere in its desire to find peaceful solutions to the differences with its Arab neighbors.

The survey also documented the continued strong sympathy of the American people for Israel. Large majorities of Americans said they were more sympathetic with Israel than with the Arab nations or the Palestinians. Although the public is critical of the Israeli response to

the Palestinian uprising, sympathy for Israel is higher now than it has been at any time since the Post and ABC began measuring it in 1982.

Despite recent public pronouncements by Yasser Arafat that the PLO has renounced terrorism against Israel and its allies, eight out of 10 Americans say they have an unfavorable impression of the PLO.

The survey found many Americans troubled by both Palestinian and, to a lesser extent, Israeli behav-



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SPEECH TO U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE  
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

My Friends,

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We have had two days of talks with President Bush and Secretary Baker and other members of the new administration. I am happy to say that the President and Secretary Baker responded positively to our ideas on how to break out of the status quo and advance the peace process. ~

There are points on which we do not agree, but both our governments realize that only a coordinated effort of our two countries can bring peace to the Middle East. For this we need your support, your help and your understanding.

Y

I believe our proposal is reasonable, practical and implementable. Above all, it represents a democratic solution. We want to negotiate with representatives of the Palestinian inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Their future and our future are at stake. There is only one way to know that their representatives really represent them: if they hold free, democratic elections. To be valid these elections must be held without PLO intimidation, threats, terror and assassination. They must be free, they must be honest. They must truly reflect the will of the people.

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Strangely, people who are usually devoted to the democratic process tell us that only the PLO in Tunisia represents these people. Many say, "the PLO is what the Palestinian Arabs want. It is not your business to decide who should represent them". But let me give you some information from

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ur intelligence services. Of the 2880 violent incidents since the beginning of the riots, 960 have been attacks on Arabs. In the months of January and February 1989, these attacks rose to almost fifty percent of the total.

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What this means is that those who do not toe the line of the PLO, or even of a particular faction in the PLO, are silenced. It means we do not know and we cannot know who truly represents the Palestinian Arabs. We shall truly know that only when free elections are held.

The representatives will be elected for the purpose of negotiating with us an interim transition period of five years. The negotiations can be held with Jordanian and Egyptian delegations, as stipulated in the Camp David accords. Some people refer to these accords as if they were dead. We made great sacrifices to reach

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the agreements embodied in the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty with Egypt. We believe they should be kept. To tell us after ten years that they are dead is to tell us that we can never trust any agreement.

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The interim period will serve as a gradual transition to a self-government, and as a test of coexistence and cooperation. Talks on the permanent status of the areas will start when the interim stage has proved itself. In these talks all options will be examined. The Palestinian claims and our claims will be put forward and we shall seek agreement. Neither side will come out with all it wants, but we shall find a solution we can live with.

But it would be a big mistake to believe that negotiations with Palestinians and the resolution of the Judea, Samaria and Gaza problem will end

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the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian problem is not the cause of the conflict. The cause is the unremitting hostility of the Arab nations. It is the result of it. It is they, not the Palestinians, who have attacked us in all our major wars. Obviously, Syria, Libya, Iraq and Iran and their terrorist proxies do not intend to abandon their holy war on Israel, no matter what happens in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

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Again let me recall to you a few pieces of information. The size of Israel is less than one fifth of one percent of the Arab countries. On the western front alone we are faced with over a million soldiers. Over 10,000 tanks and 1500 fighter planes. Libyan bombers can now reach Israel. Saudi Arabia is spending 30 billion dollars on arms. Iraq is rebuilding its nuclear reactor. Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran all have medium range missiles and all have chemical

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warfare capabilities. The Syrian army is committing mass slaughter in Lebanon. We live in a region where violence is endemic, terrorism is rampant and breaking agreements is a way of life.

Against the background of this reality, talking with the PLO and permitting the establishment of a PLO-controlled state on the outskirts of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem would be sheer madness.

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My friends, the only way to make progress toward peace in the Middle East is to stop the arms race, stop terrorism, stop the political, economic and propaganda warfare against Israel and bring our Arab neighbors to the negotiating table.

They must replace holy war with coexistence, economic boycott with mutual developments, anti-semitic propaganda with recognition. Until then we cannot, we must not allow anything to deflect us from the real problem.

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The nations of the world have a clear choice. They can support the present Arab campaign for a PLO-dominated state and ensure deterioration, tyranny and war. Or they can promote a realistic and positive proposal to achieve co-existence between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. They can spend their energies trying to whitewash the PLO and pressure Israel, or they can try to defuse the powder keg in the Middle East by addressing the threat posed by Arab military might. The weight of your decision, the influence of this house will have a lot to do with the course the nations of the world will take.

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## שדרירות ישראל בושינאמון טופס מברק

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דף 1. מtower.  
דחיפות: מירוץ.  
סורה: אלבי

תאריך, זמן: 10.4.89  
מספר המברך:

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה.

דע : לשכת רה"מ

### מאות: עתורנות

**המשרד:**

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### בקור רה"מ - תגשנות

להלן התמוניות המלאות של ראיונות רה"מ לרשות CNN ו PBS במהלך ביקורו כאן.

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MACNEIL/LEHRER NEWSOUR  
INTERVIEW WITH:

YITZHAK SHAMIR, PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL

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.STX FRIDAY, APRIL 7, 1989

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JUDY WOODRUFF: Before the Bush news conference I talked with Prime Minister Shamir about his government's new proposal to sponsor elections among Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Thank you for joining us, Mr. Prime Minister.

You have brought some suggestions to Washington, but some people are saying that these are not really new suggestions, that they're just warmed over material from the Camp David accords.

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, not everything -- quite everything is based on the Camp David accords, but there are some enlargements, some changes, some additions, but I must say that the Camp David accords have been an excellent agreement, an excellent accord --

MS. WOODRUFF: Let's --

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: -- and it could still serve the cause of peace.

MS. WOODRUFF: Let's talk about the specifics of what you're proposing -- elections.

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Yes.

MS. WOODRUFF: Who would be eligible to vote in the West Bank and the Gaza?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, the general idea is that the Palestinian Arabs living in these areas, the inhabitants of these areas.

MS. WOODRUFF: And who would be eligible to be elected?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: The same. The same.

MS. WOODRUFF: Could they be members of the PLO?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: I don't think they will be members of the PLO because, according to my proposal, the elected people will have to know and accept the principles of the agreement about the elections. They will have to know that they are elected in order

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SHAMIR  
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to conduct negotiations about an interim period of arrangements of self-rule for a specific time, for a few years, and then afterwards, there will be started a process of negotiation about the permanent status of the territories -- the territories of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza (?) -- with the clear purpose that the target of their negotiations, the purpose is to be to get a solution acceptable to both of us.

MS. WOODRUFF: So you --

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: I don't think it is in the line of the PLO.

MS. WOODRUFF: What do you mean it's not in the line of the PLO? What do you mean?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: I think that the PLO are opposed to such elections and to this way of solving a problem. They are asking for a Palestinian state immediately.

MS. WOODRUFF: But if they were willing to participate, would Israel have a problem with their being elected as these interim representatives?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, maybe through the problem, but all these details -- and many other details have to be discussed by the parties -- what we have now proposed to the United States is the principles, the principles of such a proposal, of such a way to solve the conflict. Many details -- many details have to be discussed, and they will be discussed in the coming weeks.

MS. WOODRUFF: You say PLO participation may be a problem. What do you mean by that?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: You know there will be people, there will be elected people, who will oppose the principles of the agreement. It will give -- to the parties, it will give a problem because we are looking for a solution. But anyhow, I don't think we have to speculate now about the various problems that could arise during the negotiations about all what concerns the elections.

MS. WOODRUFF: As you know, the Americans and others had urged you to arrange for some outside observers to be there during these elections. Will Israel accept the situation?

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SHAMIR

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PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: We have not faced formally this question. There are some talks about it, and I don't think we need foreign observers. I don't think it's a need because Israel is well-known for its honest way of conducting a democratic election -- democratic elections. Here in our country, the Israeli-Arabs participate in the elections to the Knesset, and I don't remember any case of some claims against the Israeli government that for distortion of the results of the ways of elections.

MS. WOODRUFF: That's true, but the United States has a reputation, for example, of being observers at elections in other countries, and if that observer situation becomes an obstacle to these elections taking place, would Israel be willing to bend on that point?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Let us not look for obstacles. We have to discuss all the details, as I said before, all the modalities. And if there will arise some questions, we'll have to give answers, argue about it, negotiate, and I hope that if there will be difficulties, we will overcome them.

MS. WOODRUFF: The reason I'm asking this is, as you well know, in 1976 there were mayoral elections in the territories, and right afterwards, Israel threw out the people who'd been elected, and said, "we're not going to have any more elections." So, some people wonder if Israel might do this again.

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, you know, these '76 elections are additional proof that the elections organized by Israel are honest and decent elections, and the fact is that Israel was compelled afterwards to do something against the results of these elections. But, this is not the case. It's not the same case as these elections we are talking now about. It's a different case. We don't speak now about useful elections or elections of this kind. What we are looking to establish by the elections is a representative delegation that will be able to negotiate on behalf of the inhabitants of these areas. It's a different story.

MS. WOODRUFF: And I understand you to say that Israel is willing to consider the notion of outside observers, foreign observers?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: I wouldn't say so now because what I am entitled to do now is to bring before the United States government proposals accepted and

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and agreed by our government. Then we will go to the other phase of handling this problem. We will have to consult in our government and establish our positions about the various problems that will arise.

MS. WOODRUFF: Do I understand you to say that Israel is committed that this interim arrangement will lead to some sort of final solution one way or another?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: I would say so. People pose negotiations in two stages about a solution of the problem of the conflict between us and the Palestinian Arabs. One stage -- negotiations about establishing an interim period of self-rule, that there has to be a period of test. We have to test them to examine if some co-existence is possible. And then after a few years, we will have to start a second phase of negotiations about the permanent status of these territories.

MS. WOODRUFF: Is Israel willing to accept the possibility down the road that that final solution might be an arrangement whereby Israel would give up control of those territories?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, I have explained precisely that there will be a negotiation without any preconditions. It means that every party will be entitled to bring all these proposals and all these ideas to the table of negotiations. But the parties will have to accept and to agree on a solution that could be accepted, that will be accepted by both parties. I am ready to explain more. I can imagine -- I don't know if I will participate in such negotiations. It will be in the future, in a few years, and nobody knows what it will be there. But, I can imagine that the Israelis, the Israel representatives, will propose Israeli sovereignty, and the Arabs will propose Arab sovereignty, or let us say Palestinian sovereignty, it's the same. And then, what we'll have, they will have to continue to negotiate until they find an acceptable solution. Acceptable means acceptable to both parties. It's not easy, but I believe it's possible.

MS. WOODRUFF: So, you're -- it sounds to me as if you're saying, the possibility is there that a final arrangement could be a situation where Israel relinquishes sovereignty.

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: You know, it's very difficult to arrive at such a conclusion. I think it's very difficult, but

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the parties will have to agree.

MS. WOODRUFF: What was your reaction this week when you heard that President Bush had said Israel must end its occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, I think if there will be an agreement between the parties, nobody will be able to speak about occupation. The agreement will be a result of the acceptance by both parties of the status of these territories. There will not be any occupation.

MS. WOODRUFF: Is that a change in policy on the part of the United States to say that?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: I don't think it's a change in the American policy, and I don't think it's a change in our policy. We are committed to it since a long time. We are committed to this principle that the future status of these territories will be established as a result of negotiations between the parties. And this is the principle.

MS. WOODRUFF: Well, if these principle has long been accepted by Israel and by the United States, why did Mr. Bush bother to make that point this week?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, I don't think I have to comment the position -- to explain the position of the President of the United States. It's up to him.

MS. WOODRUFF: All right. Mr. Prime Minister, one other thing about these elections. What has to happen before they take place in terms of the violence in the territories? You've said that that has to end. Do you mean it has to come to a complete end, or what are you suggesting?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: I think the parties have, first of all, to agree on this process. And if they agree on this process, then they will work together to organize and to launch elections. It's clear that there will not be any room for riots and disturbances. Everybody understands that in a climate and environment of violence it is impossible to have -- to hold elections.

MS. WOODRUFF: One other point on what President Bush said this week. Some people interpreted that as a hardening of the US position toward Israel. Do you see it that way?

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PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: I don't think it's a hardening. You know sometimes there are some differences of views between the United States and Israel, and it is quite normal -- we have some differences even among your best friends. But in this case, I don't see any real deep difference.

MS. WOODRUFF: One last point. This is the first time you've met with an American leader, a US leader, since the United States began to have discussions with the PLO. Did you raise this in your talks with President Bush or Secretary Baker?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Of course, of course. I've explained very clearly my position. I don't use -- it's not my way to criticize friends and allies in public. But, when we talk together, I feel it's my duty to explain very sincerely my position, and I've explained it.

MS. WOODRUFF: And it was?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, I'm against it.

MS. WOODRUFF: And what was their reaction?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, they have their decision. They have stated a decision, and they keep it.

MS. WOODRUFF: Since those talks are taking place, if you could direct what the United States was saying to the PLO, what would you say to them?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, that -- we are not to speculate about it. It's up to the United States. You know, my position -- my position is a position of principle. I don't think that the United States has talked with the PLO, and if they are talking with them, I don't -- I am not ready to take any position about the contents of these talks.

MS. WOODRUFF: There's no message that you think the PLO should have from the United States?

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: My message they know, and the United States will know what has to be their message.

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MS. WOODRUFF: What do you mean, "your message they know?"

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: Well, the PLO know what my attitude toward them. They know that I don't trust them. I think that they ought not to exist. I think they have to dissolve themselves. I think that the PLO is against this. I think that the PLO is an obstacle to peace in the Middle East.

MS. WOODRUFF: Mr. Prime Minister, thank you very much for joining us.

PRIME MIN. SHAMIR: I thank you.

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MR. SHAW: What do you do if the Palestinians elect people who are sympathetic to the PLO?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I think it could happen, but if these people that had some sympathies will agree and will accept the principle, the principles of the agreement about the elections, it means they will accept the process of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel, negotiations in two stages. The first, about an interim period of self rule for the Palestinians as a period of test, to test if there is possible a coexistence, a peaceful coexistence between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. And then after a few years, there will begin another stage of negotiations about the permanent status of the territories. And in this case, the solution has to be -- the solutions the parties will get -- will have to get -- will have to be a solution acceptable to both parties. If they agree to it and they will work with it, it could go.

MR. SHAW: That overall two-stage process, how much time would that take?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Minimum, at least five years. It means the third year of this overall period, of the interim period, negotiations about a permanent status will begin. We can imagine that in two years, the parties will get an agreement. If it will take more time, well, it will not be a catastrophe.

MR. SHAW: Why will you never sit down and talk with the Yassir Arafat?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: First of all, we know that Arafat with his organizations are our most extreme enemies. Their main aspiration, their main goal is to exterminate the Israeli people and to destroy the State of Israel. This is their goal, and they have not changed it.

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And then, as a result of it, what they demand and what they are asking now politically is to get a Palestinian state inside the country. And therefore, I think it's useless to speak with people whose minimum demand is not acceptable at all by us. We see the PLO not a factor of peace. On the contrary, for us the PLO is an obstacle to peace.

MR. SHAW: So notwithstanding what he said recently, as recent as December, you would never trust him under any circumstances?

PRIME MINISTER: No. We cannot trust him, because we know what he thinks, we know what they are talking among them, he with his friends. They have not changed their philosophy, they have not changed their ideology. For tactical reasons, they've decided to say a few words that do not reflect their real thinking and their real ideas.

MR. SHAW: When the Bush administration decided to talk to the PLO, was it a stake in the heart?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, let us say that I am strongly opposed to these talks.

MR. SHAW: But when you first learned that these talks would begin, how did you feel personally?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, it was a feeling of pain.

MR. SHAW: Mr. Prime Minister, by secretly selling to Libya superbombers and giving Moammar Qadhafi the ability to refuel these bombers, projecting them 800 miles potentially, theoretically to hit targets within your country and beyond, by Moscow's doing that, has that set back the cause of improved diplomatic relations between your two countries?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: I think it is a part of this process, what we all would like to see, not only in the Middle East. Everybody would like to know if there is a real change in the Soviet policy, all over the world and in the Middle East. And unfortunately, until now we see that the Soviet Union is still

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selling very dangerous weapons to radical Arab countries, to Syria, and to Libya. And they know very well which country could be the target of these weapons, and we are worried about it.

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MR. SHAW: Is this another reason why you would not like to see the Soviets as part of an international conference?

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PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: First of all, we don't see how an international conference could serve the cause of peace. We don't need it. I think, we think that the most -- the most realistic and efficient way to get peace is by direct negotiations between the parties, between us and the Arabs. We don't need many countries coming together, each one with its own interests, to discuss and to argue about matters concerning only us and the Arab countries.

MR. SHAW: What do you say to people who say, "Yitzhak Shamir is a man who only cares about the status quo"?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, it's the opposite of the truth, I must say. I am not for the status quo. Of course I wouldn't like to have a situation worse than the situation now, but I am against the status quo because it lacks the element of peace, and I want peace for me, as for all our people in Israel. The main goal is to get peace, and I hope and I pray we will get it.

MR. SHAW: In a development related to that interview, PLD leader Yasir Arafat today rejected, rejected a proposal by Shamir that would allow elections among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to negotiate temporary self-rule. Arafat described Shamir's plan, outlined yesterday here in Washington, as quote, "inappropriate, as usual."

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שערי רוח ישראל בדורות נאחים  
טומס מברק

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברת	ד.פ. 1. מתוך 2. דוחיפות: מיזיידי סגולות: גלווי
דע : יונע רוחה"ם לתקשורות	
מאתנו: עתרכות	תאריך, זמן: 10.4.89 מספר המברך:

161 המשרד:

## בקור רוחanim - תקשורת

עם סיום הקטן הוושינגטוני של ביקור רוח"ם להלן הסכום הראשוני של תMOVNET התקשורות: **במהלך ביקורו התראיין רוח"ם לשלווש תכניות טלוויזיה חשובות: השבורע עם דוויד ברינקלוי" של רשת ABC, "דו"ח מקניל-לרד" של רשת PBS ו"שעת החדשות הבינלאומיות" של CNN. רוח"ם הופיע בפני פורום מוחחב של AEI שכלל נציגים רבים של העתונות, פגש קבוצה נבחרת ומגוונת של בעלי טורים (אייב רוזנטל - AP, לסל סטאל - CBS, ארנו דה-בורגרייב - WP, בוב קיווזר - WP, צ'רלס קרואטה אמר נחביבם) - במג"ב נפגש רוח"ם לתרoor עם העתונות הישראלית.**

ניתנו לסקם את האלמנט התקשורתי בביטחון כהצלהה הן בנסיבות שלו או פגישותיו עם מזכיר המדינה ועם הנשיא, הן בראינונות ובמידה מסוימת גם במאמריהם שלו את הביקור (מאמריהם של קרואוטה אמר וספינר בולטים, אבל גם האחרים שווים עיוון) ומאמרי המשיכת שבאו בעקבותיו.

דוחי העתונות הכתובה עסקו בעיקר בתגובה המשל להצעות רוחה". לאחר שבימים שקדמו לביקור צפו רבים מהם עימות בין רוחה"מ למושל מחשש להצעות בלתי מספקות, אם בכלל, הרוי היתה תחושת 'הקלה' מסויימת להווכח כי הנשיה ומצביר המדינה ראו הצעות ישראל ב'מעודדות' (קמ"א - אושקו, דיאן - פרידמן) וככעלוות פוטנציאלית לקידום הדברים בשטחים ולשבירת המבו' הסתום במצ"ת. לעומת זאת, מאמרי המערכת היו ספקניים יותר והדגישו את היות הבחירה רק שלב ויאשובי בדרר להידברות, שלב שעדיין אינו מקובל על הצר הפלסטיני ולא ניתן להתחילו ללא ויתורים נוספים משני הצדדים (קמ"ב, דיאן). התקשורת האלקטרונית הייתה פחות נלהבת ונזקקה לתמונות מההתרעויות על הר הבית, אם כי גם ממנה לא נעלמה הרוח החיהית שנשבה מൻ המשל במלר הביקור ולמחרתו.

ההרגשה החיובית הכללית בעקבות הביקור נובעת להערכתנו משלוש סיבות מרכזיות:

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כיווזמה ישראלית הטענת בחובה סכוי מה ופוטנציאל לקידום תהליכי השלום, לפחות בשלב הראשון, למרות שעדיין רב הנשתר על הנגלה ותగובות מדיניות עתב ואש"פ אינן משודדות.

2. תגבורת הממשל לרעיון רוחה"מ הכתיבו את התייחסות הכללית ובעיקר דבריו של המזכיר בעקבות שיחתו הראשונה עם רוחה"מ כי מצא את רעיוןנו **ENCOURAGING**. אם דברי הנשיה תאמו קוו זה.

3. הניסוחים זהיריהם, החובביים המתונאים בהם נקט רוחה"מ בכל הפעולות הפורמליות ובמיוחד בראיונוטיו בטלביזיות צוינו ע"י רבים כאן כסגןנו חדש.

נדמה כי בעקבות הנ"ל אנו נמצאים ביום בנקודת התחלת חודה במאבק על דעת הקהל. אם השגיא הביקור וגם ממצאי סקר דעת הקהל של ה"ירושינגטון פוסט" (הובדק בנפרד) מעמידים אותנו לראשונה לאחר זמן רב במצב שבו הcador מונח בצד השני והמשל ממשיע זמירות חיוביות בעניינו.

ירומי אל

## שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון טופס מברך

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10.4.89 זמן תאריך מס' המברך:

דעת : לשכת רה"מ

## המשרד:

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מזהב: עתודנות

## בכור בה"מ – תקשורת

להלן התמילך המלא של הופעות רה"מ ומצביר המדינה של אריה"ב בתכנית  
השבוע עם דויד ברינקלוי"

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ABC "THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY"  
WITH HOST, DAVID BRINKLEY  
JOINED BY SAM DONALDSON AND GEORGE WILL

INTERVIEW WITH:  
ISRAEL'S PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR  
SUNDAY, APRIL 9, 1989

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MR. BRINKLEY: Prime Minister, thank you for coming.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Thank you for inviting me.

MR. BRINKLEY: Pleased to have you with us. Here in the studio with us, as I'm sure you know, are George Will and Sam Donaldson, both of ABC News.

Now, you have proposed elections in Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinians don't like it. Can you go ahead even with their opposition? Can you go ahead with it? Will you go ahead with it?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Let me first explain a bit about all our initiative, because our initiative now, the new initiative about bringing peace to our area, doesn't concern only the question of the Palestinians living in -- under our rule in our country. It's a question how to bring peace by combined efforts. And it means that we have to invite and to call upon the Arab nations to interrupt this state of war which they have with Israel. Until this day, I think all the Arab countries are in this situation except Egypt. And then, the countries who are partners to the Camp David process, who were partners to the Camp David process, like Egypt and the United States, have to participate in this initiative. They have to propose also to solve, once and for all, the problem of the refugees, of camps in Gaza and the other parts of the country, in which hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees live in impossible conditions.

MR. BRINKLEY: How -- let me interrupt you, sir -- how would you solve that? Bring them all in? And where?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: They are in the camps, the refugees, these places, but to live in human conditions. It's only a financial problem. We have tried to do it ten years ago, and we did it with about 10,000 families. It was a great success, but we need the financial means to do it, and I see -- I think it could be done

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by the international community in a decade or so. It will not replace the political solutions, but it will improve the climate and then, we propose also a process of negotiations with the Palestinian Arabs how to solve our conflict with them.

MR. WILL: But what the Palestinians say they want is not housing, but a homeland. They say they want a state. In your answer to David's first question you said that the proposals you put forward are for the Palestinians living in your country of Israel. That still seems to be the unchanged, irreconcilable conflict, is it not, that Israel, which, before the '67 War, was nine miles wide at one point, is never again going back to those borders, is it?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: I don't think it can go again -- go back to these borders, but let us, let me explain, we propose now negotiations in two stages with the Palestinians. The first stage -- about an interim arrangement of self-rule for the Palestinians living in these territories for a few years. This will be a transitional period, a test period, in which we will see if we can live together, walk together, cooperate, and then after this period, on the third year we will start a process of negotiations about the permanent status of these territories. And in these negotiations, we will have to get a solution that will be acceptable to both parties. This is our proposal.

MR. WILL: That still sounds like squaring the circle, to a good many people, for the following reason: There are obviously a lot of fuzzy and muddy ways you can have semi-sovereignty and shared sovereignty and all the rest in a place like the West Bank, but is there not still, in your mind, an outer limit to the amount of sovereignty Israel will yield? That is, Israel will never fully leave and fully concede to any other entity, sovereignty over the West Bank, will it?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, we are committed, as you know, to the Camp David agreements. We have signed once these agreements and Israel has a tradition to keep commitments. We are committed, but --

MR. WILL: But it does not -- it does not commit you, does it

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: No, no, no. It does commit us and the commitment is that the fate of these territories, the future status of these territories has to be determined by negotiations. By negotiations between the powers --

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and we will go now to these negotiations according to these principles. I can imagine Israeli -- the Israeli representatives -- I don't know who will they be. I don't think -- I don't imagine that I will be among them -- it will be in four or five years -- and the Israeli representatives will, for instance, propose Israeli sovereignty. The Arab representatives will propose Arab sovereignty. Then the parties will be left to continue their negotiations until they find a solution acceptable to both parties.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, do you have any problems, then, --

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: I personally believe it's possible.

MR. DONALDSON: -- with President Bush? Do you have any problem with President Bush when he says the United States does not support continued Israeli sovereignty or occupation in the West Bank in Gaza?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: I know that President Bush said it. Maybe --

MR. DONALDSON: Do you have any problem with it?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Maybe that in this phase of negotiations which I mentioned before just now, this will be the position of President Bush, of the United States, but the parties will have to negotiate, and to come to an agreement.

MR. DONALDSON: Prime Minister, must the intifada stop before you have elections in the West Bank in Gaza?

PRIME MINISTER: I cannot imagine that elections will be possible under the pressure of violence. You cannot have at the same time violent manifestations and free democratic elections.

MR. DONALDSON: So the answer is from you, yes, the intifada must stop.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I don't think we will have to -- that anybody will propose to hold negotiations, to hold elections at the same time as the intifada.

MR. DONALDSON: Prime Minister, your old adversary, Shimon Peres, said this morning, as you know, that in fact, you are negotiating with the PLO, at least indirectly, by letting the United States be the honest broker here.

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PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I don't know what Shimon Peres said.

MR. BRINKLEY: That's what he said on the radio this morning.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Yes, of course, but I didn't hear it personally, and I will refrain from any comments on his words. I have to be cautious.

MR. DONALDSON: You talk about the intifada must stop. Prime Minister, over 400 Palestinians have been killed -- most of them shot to death, some of them 11-year-old boys. How can you sustain that policy?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, they've explained many times: It's very painful for us to kill people --

MR. DONALDSON: Then why do you keep doing it?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: -- Israelis or Arabs. But in this case, what are they doing against us?

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Many Arabs, among them, very young boys and women, are throwing stones, are throwing Molotov cocktails on our soldiers, on our citizens and we have to defend ourselves.

MR. BRINKLEY: There's no --

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: And by --

MR. BRINKLEY: There's no --

MR. DONALDSON: At least we're saying --

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I mean there's no -- at least keep to the facts. And of course, they could -- it was possible for our Army to quell all this riots in a few days, if they decide, as they use is in the Middle East countries, to kill some thousands of people and (inaudible) to it. We cannot do it --

MR. DONALDSON: Have you been --

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: -- and kill these people.

MR. DONALDSON: Let me just ask about Iraq. If Iraq, as now many intelligence reports suggest, is once again perfecting atomic weapons, let alone poison gas, will you allow them to do that, or will you bomb them again?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Permit me not to answer you.

MR. DONALDSON: In other words, that's an open question --

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, you know, every country has to defend itself.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, you are leaving Washington today and travelling about the United States for a few days before you go home. I assume you will see a number of Jewish groups and organizations while you're here. I am sure you know that a number of Jewish -- members of the Jewish community in this country are opposing your policies, running ads in the newspaper with a half a page of names and so on. What's your reaction to that?

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PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I know that the great majority of the Jewish people, not only in the United States, but all over the world, supports our policy. And now, after this last proposal I brought to the United States, they are enthusiastic about it. And there are some exceptions. You know, our society is a very democratic society. We have different views also in Israel and it is normal that there are different views among the Jewish communities abroad, but all of them know the decision has to be taken by the Israeli government, by the Israeli parliament.

MR. WILL: What is your current view of the PLO? It is said to have -- the PLO is said to have changed its nature fundamentally in the last four months. Does the PLO still aim to destroy Israel and is its current policy, as many Israeli spokesmen describe it, a phased plan for affecting the traditional goal of the destruction of Israel?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: I have no doubt about this. For me it's clear. I know the PLO since the establishment of this organization. For me it's clear they have not changed their aims. They have not changed their philosophy.

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MR. WILL: What do you say to those who say there's another way to destroy the Jewish state, and it is demographically? Today, one half of the children in greater Israel, under six years old, are Arab children. How can there be a Jewish state 20 years from now with the demographic factors?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, you know that is an internal Israeli problem. We know it and we are exposed to all these statistics these many years. And it seems that the reality is reality. It is not influenced by all these statistics. What we know now is that the relation -- the proportions between Israelis and Arabs since '67 remain the same, until this date. And then, what we hope for -- we hope -- and by our proposals to live in peace, to live in peace with the Arab Palestinians in the territories; to live in peace with the Arabs living in Israel as Israeli citizens, and to have a peaceful country. And people --

MR. DONALDSON: Prime Minister, Pollard, the man which --

MR. BRINKLEY: I'm sorry, Sam, but our time's up.

MR. DONALDSON: Okay.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thank you very much for being with us today. It's a pleasure to have you. Enjoy your trip in the US.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: I thank you.

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ABC "THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY"  
WITH HOST, DAVID BRINKLEY  
JOINED BY SAM DONALDSON AND GEORGE WILL

INTERVIEW WITH: 143

JAMES BAKER, SECRETARY OF STATE 9/14

SUNDAY, APRIL 9, 1989

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MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Secretary, thanks for coming in.

SEC. BAKER: Thank you, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: Glad to have you with us.

SEC. BAKER: Glad to be here.

MR. BRINKLEY: You know everybody here. No introductions are necessary.

SEC. BAKER: I do, indeed.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, you heard Prime Minister Shamir. Do you hear anything new?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I think it was interesting that the Prime Minister said that we were in the process, really, of a political -- starting a political negotiation. He said that that political negotiation ultimately would consider matters of permanent status and he said, in effect, that all options would be considered during that negotiation, particularly the one involving permanent status.

I think this is new. I believe it's different, really, than Camp David. It's not just warmed over Camp David. And I think it is a very useful first step that will enable us, hopefully, to engage Arabs and Israelis in a negotiation that might lead to peace. Is it a small step? Yes, it's a small step but, as someone indicated a couple of days ago, this is the most intractable foreign policy problem that many United States administrations have faced, and we ought not to be dissatisfied with small steps.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, even though a small step, the Palestinians have already rejected it or opposed it.

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SEC. BAKER: That's correct. We think it has potential and we hope that anyone who's interested in peace would give it a chance. There are positions that have been taken on the other side as well that some would characterize as perhaps too rigid, and we hope that those -- we would hope that there's a potential for some of those to moderate as we go through this process.

MR. WILL: I'd like to go back to the sort of very basic question raised by the President's statement about Israel leaving the Occupied Territories, and that is, what is the United States position as to whom those territories belong? Is it still the United States position that the West Bank is part of the unallocated portion of the Palestine Mandate, belonging neither to Jordan or Israel or anyone else until negotiation between the two parties directly?

SEC. BAKER: It's the United States position that the permanent status of those territories will not be determined except through direct negotiations between the parties. And whatever those direct negotiations bring about that lead to peace will be supported by the United States.

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MR. BRINKLEY: The parties being?

SEC. BAKER: Being Israelis and Palestinians.

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MR. BRINKLEY: Jordanians?

MR. DONALDSON: Well, what happened --

SEC. BAKER: Palestinians.

MR. DONALDSON: -- 242 and 338?

SEC. BAKER: 242 and 338 we support.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, then is --

SEC. BAKER: And we support --

MR. DONALDSON: I didn't realize that 242 said that through negotiations those territories may in fact become Israeli land?

SEC. BAKER: But we also support the idea of direct negotiations. We do support, as you know, and we differ here from the position of Israel -- we support territory for peace. We support direct negotiations, though, Sam, that could, that will provide for Israeli security and for Palestinian political rights.

MR. DONALDSON: The Prime Minister just indicated that the intifada, the uprising, which is now in its 17th month on the West Bank and Gaza, must stop before he can proceed with elections toward this autonomy plan. Do you think that's a reasonable position?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I think that what the Prime Minister said, if I could interpret his remarks, is that it's pretty tough to conduct fair and democratic elections in an atmosphere of violence. I do not read him to be saying that as a requirement for negotiations with Palestinians about how the elections will be handled, what the details will be, what the modalities will be, that there somehow has to be an end to the intifada in advance. I don't think that would work, and I don't think that that is something that the Palestinians would --

MR. DONALDSON: Well, we didn't ask him that, so far as negotiating toward reaching a process to hold elections to find people to negotiate -- didn't ask him that question.

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SEC. BAKER: Well, but you have to do that. It is a step by step process. And you do have to, as we have been saying for some time, I think, you've got -- we've got to find ways to improve the climate on the ground -- to improve the atmosphere if we are ever going to find the parties in --

MR. DONALDSON: Should direct negotiations

MR. BRINKLEY: -- be allowed to vote?

SEC. BAKER: That could lead to peace.

MR. DONALDSON: Should Palestinians be --

SEC. BAKER: That's a good example of the kinds of details and questions that will have to be answered --

MR. DONALDSON: What do say the answer is?

SEC. BAKER: Not just East -- not just Palestinians in East Jerusalem, but what about Palestinians outside of the territories?

MR. BRINKLEY: What about the territories, Mr. Secretary?

MR. DONALDSON: Let me ask you whether you think they should be allowed to --

SEC. BAKER: Let me say that the only way we're going to make progress here, Sam, is not to take hard, fast, pre -- set hard and fast pre-conditions before we get this process of negotiations started. That's one of the things, frankly, that Palestinians and Israelis are going to have to decide with respect to these elections -- who's eligible to vote

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after these people are elected? What is going to be their responsibility? What is it that they're going to do? How will that fit in with the negotiations on permanent status? All these things have to be determined.

MR. BRINKLEY: A few moments ago, in Jerusalem, Shimon Peres, the Finance Minister in the Israeli government said they are now negotiating with the PLO, with the United States as mediator, and they have abandoned their refusal to talk to the PLO so long as the US is doing the talking for them. We asked, as you heard, we asked the Prime Minister about that, and he didn't want to discuss it. They are, of course, political rivals. You might say, enemies. What is your view of it? Is that actually what's going on?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I don't think I should characterize it and judge it. If the Prime Minister of Israel is unwilling to do so, it's not up to me, I don't think, to make a judgment about whether they feel they are negotiating with the PLO. I'm quite sure they do not feel that way, and they are very adamant in their determination not to. And, anyway, I don't know exactly what the Peres statement said. I have only heard what I just heard here on the program.

MR. WILL: Do you believe that a Palestinian state on the West Bank would be economically or politically viable?

SEC. BAKER: It's the position of the United States now, George, that we do not support an independent Palestinian state, nor do we support though the extension of Israel's sovereignty over the occupied territories or their occupation thereof.

MR. WILL: I don't think many people believe, looking at the outer limits of possible negotiations, that Israel ever again will be nine miles wide at the Latrun salient, and nor do they believe that Jerusalem will be, ever again, divided. Jerusalem, is that the capital of Israel?

SEC. BAKER: Well, we think Jerusalem should remain undivided and we think that its status as such should be subject to --

MR. WILL: Is it the capital of Israel?

SEC. BAKER: -- subject to negotiations.

MR. WILL: The Israelis say it's the capital of Israel.

SEC. BAKER: It should be subject to negotiation, and determined by a negotiation. As you know, we continue to maintain our embassy in Tel Aviv --.

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MR. WILL: Why is Israel the only nation with which the United States has diplomatic relations it doesn't get to, in the eyes of the American government, say what its capital is?

SEC. BAKER: Well, it's a question that we really feel can only be resolved through negotiations, as I just said. That's our position, and we're sticking to it.

MR. DONALDSON: You just heard the Prime Minister -- real quickly, when you just heard the Prime Minister duck the question as to whether they would bomb Iraq again if Iraq was about to develop nuclear potential, what would be our view of such an Israeli raid once more?

SEC. BAKER: Well, you will see me duck equally quickly a question like that. But, if I had to --

MR. BRINKLEY: Sam, I've got to interrupt.

SEC. BAKER: It's highly speculative, and I really shouldn't answer.

MR. BRINKLEY: We're not going to get an answer to that question.

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למייפות: ש. מ. ו. ר.	טופס פלוק	שגרירות ישראל/ושינגטון
סוווג: מ. י. ד. י.		
תאריך יציאה: 8.4.89 - 14:30		אל: מזרח אסיה מצפיה
פס. כבוק: אפסילן:		דעת: יאנוש (וְאַנְשָׁה - פְּרָן).
129		פאות: ק. לקונגרס

#### רואהים ומחוקקים חיתודים (7.4)

א) רוחם הזמן את כל החוקקים היהודיים לא"ז בבלגיה הארץ ביום שלישי, ה-7 דנא. מתוך ה-39 (8 סטורים ו-31 מורים) באו 25, מופיע גבוה ומרשים במיוחד לאור העובדה שהאירו עתקיים ביום ו' אחיה', שעה שבדרך כלל החוקקים אינם בעיר.

השתתפו כל הסנטוריים היהודים, לחוציא ווורן רדמן (שבעקרונות איננו משתף באירועים כאלה וdag לטפלן מראש להסביר את העדרותו), ואילו מבית הנחברים המורשים יייטס, ביילינסון, ברמן, קרדין, פרנק, פרוטט, גליקמן, לויין, מל לויין, סנדר לויין, מילר, סמית, סולארץ, וקמן, וויס. שיפ, אAngel וגב'י אנט לבוט (шибיצגה את בעלה המאושפץ בבית חולים).

ב) לאחר הארוחה השיב רחيم לשאלות המשתתפים. לרוב, השאלה היו עכיניות והתמקדו בקשרו הצעה בחירות בישיע. נשאלו גם שאלות הנוגעות לעתדי המושל, מובהרכ', תדמית ישראל ופולאוד. להלן מחרך הש�ג (לפי בושאים, ולא לפי הסדר) :

### ו) בחירה בטעין

בגד' לוין: "השבוע הבא יהיה חשוב ליעיכול" הצעותיכם ע"י העם האמריקאי. יש לצפות שאלות מסווג אלה שהועלו ע"י הקונגרסמן מט מק-היין ואחרים ממהלך פגישתך עם וועדת החוץ בבית הנבחרים ביום תי (דיוקן בンפרד), כגון: מה תהיה תגובת ישראל אם רוב המנצחים בבחירות יהיו תומכי אש"פ, ובמקרה שכך יהיה והיה וישראל תנחל עמו מומ"ט, מודיעו שלא תחילה בשיחות עם אש"פ כבר עכשו?

**חשיבות רה"מ :** מדיניות חייבות לטול טיכוגנים למען השלום. היו טיכוגנים בהסכם ק"ד ובכבודו כ-10 ימים לאחר חתימתו אבא אבן גרש שיש בהתאם כדי להקמת מדינה פלסטינאית. וחרי, עשר שנים לאחר מכן, יש שלום ואין מדינה פלסטינאית.

תפוצה: - 36 -

31 We're ready for 1.

דוחות: ש. מ. ו. ר	ס. ג. ר. י. ש. ר. א. / 113. נ. ג. ג. ו. ו.	זג: 2
ס. ו. ו: מ. י. ד. י	ט. ו. פ. פ. ל. ו. ק	כ. ת. ו: 6
ת. א. ל. י. ו. פ. נ. ח. נ. ו.:		א. ל:
כ. פ. ב. ר. ק:		ד. ע:
ה. פ. ש. ר. ד:		
169		פ. א. ת:

לגופו של דבר, הערכתו היא שמניהagi אשיפ האמיטיים לא יטלו חלק בבחירה, כי הרי תנאי להשתתפות יהיה חובה להסכים מראש למורים על שלטון-עצמם לכמה שנים ואז למורים על פתרון קבוע שיחית מקובל על שני הצדדים. התפישה והתהיליך נוגדים את גישת אשיפ ולכון לא השתתפו. אחרים צריכים לבוא ולהודיע על נוכנותם לנחל מורים, כי אחרת לא נתקדם.

- מצנכאות : אבי מודאג מהשחף במתכונת האיתנה בישראל בקונגרס, המשקף להערכתי את הכירוסום במעמד ישראל בדעת הקהל. חשוב לנוין מראיה אותה כי הצבעה על אלמנט שיכל להיות "פצחה" בקרב הציבור האמריקאי, לדברייך, המשתתפים בחירות צריכים לחתם התchingibilit מראש לאבי המורים הדו-שלביים שיפתחו בעקבות הבחירה. זה כאילו אתה "מטיל פצחה", היהת ואם עם אמריקאי יבין שישראל מטילה תנאים על אלה שרשאים לחתוך בחירות ושהמתמודדים חיברים לחתם COMMITTEE לאבי מה שיבוא לאחר בחירות, ישראל יצא נפסדת.

- תשובה רה"מ : יש כאן אי-הבנה. לא אמרתי שהם חיברים להטכים עם תוכנות המורים ועם כל מה שנצעע, מאיידן חייב להיות ברור מהם הולכים לקלפי בכוננה תחילת לקיים עמנו מורים על פי המתוכנת המוצעת.

- מילר : איש, האחד (WITH JESSE MILLER) את אשיפ, יתמודד בחירות וייבחר: האם חפגו עמו?

- תשובה רה"מ : זה אחד מהנושאים שעליינו לדון בהם וזה אחד הסיכוןים. בוא נגיד שפליטינאים ניגשים לבחירות ולאחר מכן יאמרו שאיןם רוצחים במורים על שלטון-עצמם, אלא על מדינה פלטינאית, אזי נצער לומר שאין לנו פרטנרים למורים כזה.

תכליזה:

תמייניות: שמונה	שגרירות ישראל/ושינגטון	ז: 3
סוווג: מידי	טופס מלוק	כתרון: 6
תאיין ודף תגבור:		אל:
קס' פבריק:		דע:
הפרשן:		
129		פאות:

2) עמדת הממשלה

- סקטרו, היום נשאל הנשיא בשוש עיי' כתוב האם הודיעתו בתחילת השבוע בקשר לשטחים ("יקץ לכיבוש") מהוות גישה חדשה. לדעתו שובת הנשיא הייתה מעין **"SLIPPERY NO CHANGE AT ALL"**

- תשובה רה"מ : אין זה מענייני להתפלט עם הממשלה. ניתן לדעתו לחת פירוש ולומרו: היה וכל צדדים קיבלו את הפטرون המוצע, התוצאה תחתה שלא יהיה כיבוש, מדובר בנושא קונטראברסיאלי ועבינן שחייבים לפטור אותו במורים. זו הכוונה של הסכמי קיד ואלה ייבח סכימה לכל מלה בתוכם לאח. בכל זאת, הנושא קונטראברסיאלי ואני סבור שייפש עיי' הצעותינו.

- סתיית - בשובעים האחרונים נדמה שמדובר המדינה החלטת חלוטות שובות לאבי רצון של ארה"ב לנחל מורים עם אשיפ וכנ, כך נראה, לאבי רצון שוגם ישראל חיפש עם אשיפ ו אף חתן ותוא עמו. העניין החיל עם הופעת בייקר בסנט ואך החזק בעת הופעה בבית הנבחרים. לנוכח האור החיוובי בו מציאו הממשלה את הביקור, האם בייקר מתבטה בצורת בפורומים סגורים או האם הוא באמת סיכן את הדיאלוג שלכם עם ערבים הפלשינאים.

- תשובה רה"מ : אנו לא התווכחנו עם הממשלה בדבר הדיאלוג עם אשיפ. השתפכנו בהבהת חתגוזתנו לדיאלוג כזה. בנות-ברית מעבירות דברי ביקורת בדלותם סגורות. אלה כללי המשחק. הממשלה מכיר חיטב את עמדתנו בנדון. הנשיא ומדובר המדינה אמרו שלא ינסו לשכנע אותנו לדבר עם אשיפ. מצד המשפקו כחבר מניעתם לקיום דוח-השיכון שלחם.

- סתיית : חזר ושאל אבי אימרתי של בייקר לפי ייחון שבאחד מהימים לצריך ישראל

לחירות: ט מ ו ר	שרירות ישראל/וושינגטון	ל: 4
סוג: מ י ז	טופס פלור	מ: 6
תאריך ו开会 חיבור:		אל:
פס' כבוק:		דע:
הפרץ:		
129		פאות:

מג'כג'ן

לדבר עם אש"פ ובחוותה אמר רה"ם כי זו ספקולציה "יבייקר חושב כר; אין אלו  
חוותים כר".

ב) מובארבי

- גיטס: מה עמדתו של מובארבי לגבי הצעותיכם?

- תשובה רה"ם: מובארבי ממתין לעצמו של אש"פ. תמיד הוא מתייעץ עמו, לפיכך עדין  
אין חגובה.

- לאוטנברג: שאלתי את מובארבי על עניין הפגישה המשותפת عمر בוושינגטון. הוא  
חשיב שתיקת מוכן לחפש אחר ואך מוכן לבקר בישראל, אך אותה קבעת שלושה תנאים וهم  
מכעו את הביקור. באם כן או לא, עלייך לדעת שМОבארבי אמר מה שאמור בפני קבוצה  
גדולה של סנטורים והעביר רשות שתגבירו היז בלחתי אפשריות, בעוד שהוא גמיש יותר.

- תשובה רה"ם: חכל יודעים שניי הזמנתי את מובארבי מספר פעמים וחכתי את רצוני  
להפגש עמו. ציינתי לא סעם הצורך למגע אישי בין מנהיגי האיזור. לא עליה על דעתי  
להטיל תנאים על פגישה עם מובארבי. תשובהו הרגילה לכתבים היא בנווח: "למה שאפאג  
עם שמי - זהה מתקנד לאש"פ, לוועידה בינלאומית וכיו"ב; אם אכן מראש ששמיר שינה  
את טמו, אשקל פגישה". המשיך רה"ם ואמר תשובה זו גראית לעם המצרי ולצייבור  
הערבי בכלל, אך בשלהמו רתיהם לא אמר מלה בקשר לתנאים.

יאני נזכר לכל פגישה עם מנהיגי ערבי, לרבות אסד, חרף חרדייליזם שלו. לא חתבטתי

בטענה מובארבי.

כטביך, פאיי, סקפייה לך לאן אגאכ' נאנו, חוץ עליי מז'ה גדיי.  
4) תדרmitt ישראל

- פרנק: אתם, ישראל, היד שיכם על התחרותה פאשר אתם מתחרדים עם העربים. אתם

תפוזה:

לחירות: מ. י. ד. י	שגרירות ישראל/וואשינגטון	ד"ה: 5
סוג: ש. מ. ו. ר	טופס פלוק	פתחן: 6
תאריך יופן חכון:		אל:
קס' פבריק:		ד"ע:
הפרשן:		
129		פאת:

דמוקרטיה והם אינם. אנו מכירים בכך ובמונחים את הבשורה, אך בכל זאת علينا להגן על ישראל באיזורי חחירה שלנו וגס בקונגרס (בעניני הסיווע, מכירות נשק וכדומה) ולכך יעדור לנו רשות אם חוכלו לחתנה בישכלי (כ ר) ולהתחשב בבוחרים שלנו. קיימים כרפסות בתמיכת ישראל. הציבור מוכן להאמין במידעך ובנסיבות אפילו אם איבן נוכנות. תשובה לשאלת סנדר לוין (דלויל) טובת, אך מדוע לא תוסיפ שבמידה שאשייפ ישנה את עמדתו, ~~טספ... ..~~

- תשובה רחיהם : אמי מסכימים שאנו חייבים לעודור האחד לשני ואני מסכימים שאנו צריכים להתחשב בציורים שונים. אבל בכל זאת קיים הבדל. אנו אחרים למה שאנו אומרים. מלחנו היא חחיבות. אך בהגנו בעבר והעולם יודע את זאת. חברי הכנסת וכן חברי הקונגרס יכולים לומר דברים רבים ורבים עימם להשיג יתרון בוויכוח. ברם אנו לטפל ולפעמים מטעוררים חילוקי דעת ומרחיקים בינינו לבין דעת הקהל. שומה علينا לטפל במצבים כאלה בצוות זו או אחרת, ולדעתם תמיד קיימות תשובות ואני יכולם לספק תשובות אלה. רצוני לחזיע שתעמדו בקשר קבוע עם השגרירות, וכן למסור לה את משאלותיכם ושאלות ידידינו, מכיוון שאנו בנסת תמיד להתחשב בקשייכם ובקשיי ידידינו. אבל אם יש לכם הראות כדי לנו מטעלים מכם ולא מתחשבים בהם, אין זה נכון.

- וויש : כשאמריקאים מגבשים דעה, הם לוקחים בחשבון דברים רבים, וביניהם עניין בכוחות האדם. בקונגרס איננו מחסיטים להבייע דאגותינו לאבי התחגותן של מדיניות שוניות בכל רחבי תבל. משך 39 שנה לא היו בעיות בתחום זה לאבי ישראל, אך במשך השנה וחצי אחרוניים יש מקום לדאגה דאנו משוכנע שלא秣לא מדובר בישראל, הקונגרס היה מtbody. אנו מבינים שכחוצאה מהאיינטיפאדה קרו וקוראים חריגים אך בכל זאת קיימים הנושא של אזרחים פוליטיים. לדוגמא, מה אני אומר לאחד מבוחרי המתלוונן על עתונאי פלטיני שגען שלוש פעמים, תחקיר ולא הוגש נגדו כתוב אישום. אין אתה מסביר זאת.

תפוצה:

למיות: מ. י. ד. ו.	ארצ'ירוט ישראל/וושינגטן	ל. 6
סוג: ש. מ. ו. ר	טופס פלוק	מטען: 6
תאריך וזמן תגבור:		אל:
פס' כבirkן: הפליך:		דע:
621		פאות:

הס' י. ר. ב

- כל המערכת שלנו מושחת על זכויות האדם וכיובוזן. באינטיפאדה נתעוררנו בעיותן כל המשרדים הממלכתיים ~~בנרכמים~~ נסיגות למצוות חוקיות לביעות אלה העונשות גם על צרכיו הבתוחניים. אך, לידיהם, דבר לא קורה בישראל בלי הליכים מתאימים בהתאם לחוק.

- וועיס : ביקש לדעת מה עוצרים פוליטיים ישנים בישראל, ויהי חזר והטעים שהכל בעקרים על פי החוק. "עתונאי לא נוצר בגלל היותו עתונאי". לזאת העיר וועיס יאט' הציבים טעננים כראוי, ויהי השיב לו שניתן להיות עתונאי וטרוריסט בעת ובונגה אחת. וועיס לא הרפה ושאל בשנית מדויק לא מගשים כחבי אישום. ויהי הסביר מדויק הדבר לא תמיד ניתן ותdag'ש בחום שאיש לא נוצר בלי סיבה ובניגוד לחוק והמשפט.

## 5) פולארד

--פולארד : לפי תקשורת, פולארד עדיין מקבל 5000 דולר לחודש בישראל. האמנם? ויהי חופט ו חשייב | כי תוא בטוח שזה שקר. איננו יודע מה המקור אך הדבר איננו מתקבל על הדעת ולדעתו אין לו יסוד ויהי טעוי.

ס. 1/13

ל. מ. ד. 1

תפוצה:

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## שרידות ישראל בושיבת הארץ טופס מברך

דף 1. מtower.

### דחיפות: מיידי

סורה: אלוהי

10.4.89: זמן, תאריך:

### המשרד:

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה.

דע : לשכת החיים

### מאת: עתוכות

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בכור רה"מ

להלן חלופי הברכות בין רה"מ והנשיה בוש בתום ארוחת הערב בבית הלבן.

יומן לא 10/1

יוסי אל

• 2.9

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TOASTS BY  
PRESIDENT BUSH AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR  
AT A STATE DINNER GIVEN IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S HONOR

WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON, DC

142 26  
THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 1989

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PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, Mr. Prime Minister, it has been my pleasure -- our pleasure -- to welcome you to Washington and to renew a friendship that I cherish, that we all cherish, and to reaffirm, more importantly even, the friendship between our two nations. And the value of these visits goes beyond the meetings of state to the experience we gain from the time spent among the people of Israel and America.

I recall the trips that I made to your country first I think -- Barbara and I -- in 1979 and then in the summer of 1986. And I recall the deep longing for peace that I found on the part of the people there in Israel. And I am grateful for your visit now in the first days of our brand new administration and also because you see Washington in springtime, which some say is its most beautiful season, and because you had a chance to go to the Air and Space Museum today where we saw many American tourists.

And for those of you who weren't with us, it was a wonderful thing, because you heard people saying to the Prime -- "Shalom!" You know, I thought they were all tourists from Texas, but, no -- (laughter) -- they knew that much. And I think they expressed the affection that we all feel for Israel and for you, sir.

But the friendship, the alliance, between the United States and Israel is strong and solid, built upon a foundation of shared democratic values, of shared history and heritage, that sustain the moral life of our two countries. The emotional bond of our peoples goes -- it transcends politics. Our strategic cooperation -- and I renew today our determination that that go forward -- is a source of mutual security. And the United States' commitment to the security of Israel remains unshakeable. We may differ over some policies from time to time, individual policies, but never over this principle.

Mr. Prime Minister, the great unsolved challenge that concerns us both is peace in the Middle East. And we know peace is possible. Last month, we marked the 10th anniversary of the treaty between Israel and Egypt, and that treaty was the product of the remarkable courage and leadership of two men and also -- I want to say right

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BUSH, SHAMIR TOASTS-04/06/89  
WHITE HOUSE DINNER  
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here in this White House -- and also will give credit to the strong, principled mediating efforts of President Carter, too. Those qualities -- courage and leadership -- are no less necessary today in the effort to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East. We also know there's much more to do.

Mr. Prime Minister, the discussions that we have had, and then those I had earlier this week with President Mubarak, give me reason to hope that in the Middle East today there is leadership, courage, and vision capable of transcending the historic animosities that have long stood as obstacles on the path towards peace. The United States is proud of the role it has played in the search for peace. We know a partnership with Israel in peace can work, and we stand ready today to take another step for the cause of peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Shamir, I raise my glass to the abiding friendship between our two nations and lasting peace among the peoples of the Middle East and to life. L'haim.

AUDIENCE: L'haim.

PRESIDENT BUSH: To your health, sir.

(The toast is drunk and there is applause.)

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PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Mr. President, Mrs. Bush, distinguished Secretaries, members of the Senate, the House of Representatives, Charges, Ambassadors, ladies and gentlemen. It is almost exactly a year ago since you, Mr. President, graciously entertained my wife and me and my colleagues at dinner in your previous capacity as Vice President. At that time, we were both facing elections -- (chuckles) -- you were already very much on the campaign trail, and I was preparing to set out on mine. It was a demanding but interesting experience, and here we both are. (Laughter, applause.)

Permit me, Mr. President, to extend the heartfelt congratulations of all the people of Israel on your election to the most important office in your country, and I venture to suggest, in the world. The people of Israel know you and Mrs. Bush. They respect and admire you. They are grateful for your longstanding friendship, support, and efforts for our people, especially those who have been struggling for the right to leave the Soviet Union and return to their homeland.

And, Mr. President, your name is permanently linked with the saga of the rescue of many thousands of East European Jews who five years ago started out on an exodus and returned to their ancient homeland after a very long separation. But several thousand East European Jews remain behind, and we must solve their problem, and especially the human tragedies of family separation. I hope that we will soon find an answer.

Mr. President, an awesome responsibility rests upon you

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as you set out on the new road that lies before you. As leader of the United States of America, you are the leader of the free world who has to find a way to prevent global conflict. We acknowledge and applaud your efforts to ensure that the great advances in technology are not abused and exploited for evil designs that could cause devastation to millions of people.

In your presidency, it will be necessary, I am sure, to reach further agreements on the elimination of the new and growing threat of gas, chemical and biological weapons which are being developed at an alarming pace, especially in our part of the world.

My responsibility is more limited but equally awesome. I must find a way to achieve comprehensive and lasting peace for my nation and country. That is my overriding role and ambition. We are not content with the status quo because we firmly believe that this is achievable.

Mr. President, 10 days ago we completed a decade of peace between Israel and the leading Arab country, Egypt. That peace was the first and so far still the only breakthrough in the otherwise ongoing hostility of Arab states against Israel. Ten years ago, not many believed that we would be standing here today and looking back on a decade of peace. With all its shortcomings and deficiencies, our relationship with Egypt is not yet regular and normal. It must be deepened, it must be enriched.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is now almost 50 years since the start of World War II, in which we were the principal victims and paid relatively the highest price. And it is now 40 years since we renewed our national life in our ancient homeland. In that period, six wars were forced upon us, and we have faced permanent terrorism against our civilian population.

Few nations in the annals of humanity had to endure such peril and to pay such a price. It is therefore only natural that we never stop searching for the road to peace. The yearning for peace is ingrained in the national tradition and character of our people. We pray for peace three times every day. We despise violence and war. We refuse to believe that a military confrontation is a valid way to solving disputes, but we cannot permit our abhorrence of war to be used against us by terrorists and dictators to force us to submit to their demands.

We want to devote and utilize

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the talents and skills of our people for creativity, for scholarship, for science, for medicine, not for developing more and more sophisticated instruments of war. But until today, they've had no choice. Therefore, in the absence of peace, we must be strong as you are.

In one of our prayers, we use the words -- (Kippotem in Hebrew) -- the Lord will give his people strength, the Lord will bless his people with peace. First strength, then peace.

We are grateful to the United States for its great contribution to enable our small nation to develop a deterrent capacity in the face of a bloc of wealthy Arab countries with a population of 120 million people and a landmass twice the size of the United States. In our view, the United States can play a useful role in advancing the search for peace because it enjoys the confidence of the parties in the Middle East. We are ready at all times to explore new ideas and study new proposals together with you, and to reach understanding on how to proceed.

Mr. President, today we celebrate the beginning of the month of Nissam. Nissam is the month of miracles, the month of deliverance, because it was established in the Jewish calendar some 3,500 years ago on the eve of the great exodus of the 12 tribes of Israel from bondage in Egypt. Since then, our people have carried an eternal message to humanity. The message is that all human beings are equal and were created in the image of God, that no man should be enslaved by his fellowman, that human life is sacred, and that peace on earth is the loftiest of goals. Our people have lived by these principles through triumph and exile, from Babylon to Auschwitz. We were ravaged but never destroyed, because our message and our spirit are eternal and indestructible. And now, in our renewed homeland, we aspire to nothing more than the total achievement of these same principles. Our two democracies, our two peoples share these values, cherish these ideals, long for similar objectives.

Mr. President, I wish you a successful term of office. May the United States prosper under your leadership; may it enjoy peace and avoid conflict. May it continue to stimulate and lead the free world, and stem the tide of evil. We pray, Mr. President, that under your leadership, the relationship between our two countries will continue to be solid, strong, deep and enduring.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in this toast to the President of the United States and Mrs. Bush, and the people of this great country. L'haim.

GUESTS: L'haim. (All clink glasses.)

PRESIDENT BUSH: Thank you, sir.

.ETX

  
END

סוכנות + פגישת רהיטים עם מטבחים הרוב מיטץ' וסטוררים זידיזותים

ב-ה. ג אירוח מנהיג הוווב מילאךיל ביזמתו את רהיימ. נכחו בפגישת הנטורייס: דול, איננויה, לירוי, מצבאות, א'ינט', כושביז, חפלין, ד'מאטו, ניקלט, רדמן, וילסן, לאוטנברג, גראט, ברו, פאולר, צ'אשל, קומט, קול, ליברטן וברנסט.

ונפְּנֵי שָׁמֶן אֶרְכָּתָה כְּשָׁעָה בְּאוֹרִיתָה יְדִידּוֹתִיתָה.

1. מייציל פתח המפה ובירך את רה'ם, "אתה מצוג בקרב חכמ'ת ואנו מעריצים אותך ואות מדינחך". תהיijk לך שבדין מורה שמי מדיניות וצין עובדת ביקוריהם של רוב הסנטורים בישואל וחכירותם את ננה'יגיה.

2. דול - בדברי ברכת לרהי"ם :  
 ישראל חיכת בת הברית הקדובה והחזקת ביטחון של אריהיב במדינת, במידות וחלום שינועית  
 במדינת זה אולר level with them לפעמים...;  
 והיחס לעידן זה ותיקורי התפרעויות, זריקות אכניות בשטחים. כתופר חזק של ישראל  
 הביע תקווה שנייה יהיה לנחל עם רוחם דיוון כנה ופתח. הוטיף כי מועלות שאלות, עיי  
 איבור בזוריון - שלמי מטיסים האמריקניים, לאבי נידוח והטמיכת בישראל (על רקע סיורי  
 והקשרו של חיינתייפוד) וודגש כי אין המדובר בפרשנים אלא בבודור האמריקני.

ג. ר. ח. י. מ. גוזה למברכינו. תזಗיש החשיבות של ישראל מיחסתו לטנאם ופעילותו והכיע עכין לחלק עם הנטוררים דאגותיהם וריעוננותיהם של ישראל.

1	1	1	3	3
for	for	base	from	from
for	for	base	from	from

טלפון: 5-5-5	שם מלא: ישראל/וושינגטן	שם פרטי: מ. י. ד. י.
טלפון: 5-5-5	שם פרטי: מ. י. ד. י.	שם מלא: ישראל/וושינגטן
שם פרטי: מ. י. ד. י.	שם מלא: ישראל/וושינגטן	טלפון: 5-5-5
שם מלא: ישראל/וושינגטן	שם פרטי: מ. י. ד. י.	טלפון: 5-5-5
שם פרטי: מ. י. ד. י.	שם מלא: ישראל/וושינגטן	טלפון: 5-5-5

למיין עיקרי ובראשו  
הכוונה העיקרית בשיחותינו עם הממשל - הדריכים לשלוח מכתב באיזורנו וחשגון פתרון בגין  
ישראל לעולות הערבי לרבות הערבית הפלטינית. בכךנו עם טיש העצות ורעדיניות המהוויות  
זוזמת חדשה למשגש שלום. באיזור.

הדריכ שחוקונקליקט חישראלי-ערבי רחב יותר מההיבט הפלטיני אוthon נוטים להדגיש  
ולפיכך אנו נאזעטם לכל מדיניות ערבית לצערף למו"מ  
אנו מזיעים פתרון כעיהת-מחנות-פליקים באמצעות פיעוע מהקהילה הבינלאומית. אמנם זה לא  
יפתור הבעייה המלחנית אולם יסייע ללא ספק את האקלים המדיני. (התייחס לאינזיבים  
החוורדים של קוריאט את פעלומת של ישראל בתחום זה בעזה).

העלנו הצעה לפתרון בעית הפלטינית הערבית - המווי"מ (בו ישחפנו ישראל הפלטינית  
ערביים ואט מרגנץ להצערף גם ירדן ומצרים) יתנהל בשני שלבים: (א) להשתתת תקופת  
ביניים של ממשל עצמי מלא לפלטיניט (להוציא חוץ ובתמונה) למשך 5 שנים. (ב) בשנה  
שלישית למשעל זה, יפתח המווי"מ עם חתובים לגבי מעמד הקבע.

על המווי"מ להמגנץ ללא חנאות מוקדמים. כל צד יוכל להביא כל הצעה לשולחן הדיאלוגים  
כאשר חטרכה מי משגת פתרון שיווכת על שני הצדדים.

לשאלה מי ישא ויתן עם ישראל בשם ערביים אנו מזיעים קיום הבחירה-בבחירה כדי שנוכל  
לנהל מווי"מ עם נקציגים הבחירה (لتיקותם ביןדים ומעמד קבע). לא דנו עדרין בפרט.

עם שובבו של רה"מ לישראל יחולו לעגד הרעינו ולמהפכו ל- CORNER STONE

של התהילהן.

אין דבר קל לביאו אולם פלטינית רביס מודכנית להונחיל במלחין כדי להיחלץ  
משמעות וסבלותיהם. הם מועוניים בפתרון וחוואות חוץ פווים בידעת שילא ניתן לשכנע

תפואת:

תמיון: צ מ ו ר	אזור. לוט. ישראל/וושינגטן	3
סוויג: פ. ג. ד. ג	טופס פלוק	5
תאין יוכן חניכו:		15
怯, כביך:		14
הקסיל:		13
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את ישראל בדרכי אלימות.

אם יהיה מאמץ משותף ישראלי-אמריקני לשכגו הפליטינית וערביים, יהיה סביר ובעתית התחניע החתליר.

הממשל קיבל ( ACCEPTED ) עידונות אלה ועתה כוחר לעבר זה  
של קונסנס זה, ישראל מוכנה להתחיל בזאת מיידית.

#### ה. להלן חלק השאלות ותשובות

בראשיה דבריו, בירר רהיהם וקידם בברכה עיחותינו במשול.

אייבוגיות - בקרב אמריקנית ובאים רוחות השאלת - אם לא רהיב שבירר המשנה מושם עם אשיפ,  
הופיעו נפשם עם ערפתה; האוים כיבד את ערפתה בראש מדינה ומוריניות רבות בעולם קיבלו  
את ערפתה כחדיכא, בירר, מזוע ישראל מתחגדת למושם עם אשיפ?

#### ג. רהיהם

1) איננו סבורים שערפתה ואריפות מעונייניות בשלום עם ישראל. הם מתנגדים לכך. הארגון  
הוקם ב-1964. עם מטרות מזחרות להרשות את ישראל. מшибות טקטיות (ב-1974) החליט  
לאנחות את הuko שלו באמצעות תיאוריה של שלבים. (רה'ם פירט). 50 שנים עבדו על גישה זו  
לא הצלחה. ערפתה טאג'נה הchlית על עד בוסף - כביכול ביטול השלב השני והסתפקות  
בשלב הראשון של תקנת מדינית פלטינית בייש וועזה. אולם אם מזעניט ועוקבים אחריו  
הצהרות ראיוי חארגון. ניתן להבין שבעצם לא זנחו גם את השלב השני.

2) לא זנחו פעולות מטרור. יומם יום הם מנסים לבצע פעילות טרור וחדירות ורק הוזדמת  
לכחות הבטחון שלנו לא האליהם. גם בתחום זה לא שנו מזעניהם.

תפוצה:

שם פרטי: דניאל	שם משפחה: שטרן	טלפון: 03-555-1111
שם פרטי: דניאל	שם משפחה: שטרן	טלפון: 03-555-1111
שם פרטי: דניאל	שם משפחה: שטרן	טלפון: 03-555-1111
שם פרטי: דניאל	שם משפחה: שטרן	טלפון: 03-555-1111
שם פרטי: דניאל	שם משפחה: שטרן	טלפון: 03-555-1111

3) הוביעה המינימלית חמירות של אשיפת היא הקמת מדיניות פלטינית עצמאית. ישראל לא תוכל להתקיים אם חוקם מדינה כזו. מיניהם פלטינית כזו באבולות מזומם לא תוכל  
הקיים ולמלא חרבוניה וחתה באוירה של חסבול וחוקיפות מתמידים כגד יושאל. אנו  
מצידן נצטרך לנוקט באמצעי בעחון רבים ומדיברות ערבית מצידן (כמו לוב וسورיה) עלילות  
להקים בסיסי חוקהות. כדי ישראל במדינה פלטינית כזו.

4) בישראל חיות חיים 500 אלף ערבים ישראליות המנס. לא-חיות נאמנים לישראל, אך אם לידם על הגדול חתמה מリンגו רדיקליות פלסטינית עצמית, מהית לבו אינטיפדה לא כמו היום - בשטחים, אלא בתוך ישראל. אשיפ כבר החל בזאת חיים בישראל באמצעות שיחוד ערבים ישראלים ופעילותם ומעורבותם בחיה הפנים הערביים-ישראלים כמו מתן הוראות לקראות הבחרות המונצ'יפליות:

אם מוקם מדיינה פלטיניבית עצמאית, עלולות להלחש יחד עמה כגד ישראלסיפורה השותחים הערביים היישראליים למדינה חמלטינית.

מי שתווך במדינה קלטיניות עצמאית חומר במאזינים להרוויח ממדינת ישראל, הגזותינו  
הו, בוגדרו למגוע נחלה כזה מחר, ולאפשר זו קיומן ישראלי-פלסטיני מאידך.

צ'וֹזְבִּי - הַצְּרָף לְמִבְּרָקִים.

**מיצג אמצעי** אם לא נביע בפניך הדאגה הרווחת באורה"ב מהתהרכש בשתייס (חיזיון ספציפית ל-4-ו ישראליים הרוגים מול למללה מ-003-פליטיינית). אם לא היה מדובר בישראל אלא במדינה אחרת מזמנם היו מעצים לה בסיוועי.

צווימי חתן בהצעת רתימת קיימות הבחירה ושאל כיצד היה מוציא לפועל למכי הבחירה כדי להבטיח קיומן.

רְגִיּוֹם - ובכ"ע צער רב על אבדן חייט. אינכ"ו מעוניניות להרוג איש אלא לחייו עם הפלשטיינים.

תלו צה:

רשות: מ.ד.	ארציות ישראל/ושיגון	ס. ג.
ס. ג. ש. מ. ז.	טופס פלוק	
אזור ווצן חיכוי:		
כט. פבלק:		
תקציר:		
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או רואים עתידנו בדו קיום שלום עם כל האוכלוסייה, אמן ניתן לשים קץ. לתקוממות  
בauthis תוך מספר ימ"ט בלבד ואז לא ייראו בטליזיה כל התרעויות. היו לנו כבר כבר  
חדימות במלחמות השכנות ואנו מספיק חזקים לעשות זאת, אולם לא נעתה זאת שבן זה  
מגادر לעקרונות חטיפות של ישראל. לא נחרוג 5000 איש כפי שגעה הדבר בונצואלה.  
מעכיננו לשכני האוכלוסייה שאין זו אינטראשלת לחתוך באלים.

בעיה אישית לצוותי אחר רהיט כי עליו להבין שהפובלות נאלות נגד אזרחים ישראלים  
אייננו מוגבלת לשחיתם בלבד ואשיפת מושך לשלוות הוראות הפעלה. אפילו הפשגה האחורה  
נקהיר בין מובראק חסינו וערמת הטמיינה בקריאת עראת לאוכלוסייה השתחית להגביר  
האליות.

רהייט סיפר על מחות שחרור מאות עזירים לקראת המזאן. וגם כדי להוכיח שאנו מועוניים  
לעשות מהו לנצח. חושיך כי אייננו מבקש שഫלקטיניבים יוויתו על שאייפותיהם. אלא  
шибועו לשולחן המרי. הצעותינו הוגנות ונכונות הולכות בחובן האינטראשלים והשאייפות  
של האוכלוסייה.

מאנבאות - ביקש לשמע מרטים נופדים על רעיון קיום הבדירות - מתי יתקיימו, באילו  
נסיבות ומה יקרה אם יבחרו נציג אשיפ.

רהייט - נחilih לעבד תרעים ולדרכם בפרטם וב- צעדיות מיטסן עם הממשל. בעת הביקור  
נימת לבדוק האם העקרונות מקובל על הממשל. הפרטים יובדו בזמן הקרוב.

בזרם המגיון תוחלפו מתחות בין מיטזיל לרהייט.

ו. פ. ג. א. א. ע. ז.  
הרהייט ורנאי דרנגור

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## שערי רוח ישראל בדורשין גטון טופס מברך

דפ. 1. מtower. דוחיפות: מיזיידי סולג: אלווי

תאדייר, זמן: 10.4.89  
מספר המברך:

### המשרד:

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אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה,  
דע : לשכת ס/שה"ח.  
דע : לשכת רה"מ

ס/השר נתניהו הופיע הבוקר בתכנית הבוקר של רשת CBS.

לහלו תמליל הו甫טהו.

יוסי אל

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CBS "THIS MORNING"  
INTERVIEW WITH:

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BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, ISRAELI DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

MONDAY, APRIL 10, 1989

.STX

KATHLEEN SULLIVAN: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has told the Bush administration he favors elections for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Secretary of State James Baker calls this proposal a very useful first step.

Joining us now is Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. He is the former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, and he accompanies Prime Minister Shamir on this US visit.

Good morning.

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MINISTER NETANYAHU: Good morning.

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MS. SULLIVAN: Is that the reaction you thought the US would have?

MINISTER NETANYAHU: Well, we were very pleased with it. We thought that it was important to get a positive move forward. The Prime Minister suggested elections so we can have genuine interlocutors for genuine peace, and we're glad to see that the United States is supporting it.

MS. SULLIVAN: Could you give me any more details, like possibly a timetable?

MINISTER NETANYAHU: I think we both, the United States and Israel, want to move this quickly as we can. We are going to go back -- the Prime Minister is going back to Israel in a few days. We're going to discuss the details with the relevant people in the cabinet and elsewhere. As far as Israel's concerned, Israel is moving forward for peace, and what we need to see now is what is the reaction in the Arab world, what are the Arab countries going to say? The United States has said, "Support this." And I hope that we'll see such support, but it's up to the Arabs now to come forward.

MS. SULLIVAN: You already have demonstrations on the West Bank and rock-throwing once again. Do you think that's just to get some attention away from the Shamir proposal?

MINISTER NETANYAHU: I think that's the kind of action that the PLO is backing to try to obstruct the kind of positive steps that we're talking about. The PLO is not interested in a real resolution of the problem. What it wants is the dissolution of Israel. If they have to push kids, young children, in front of the cameras, throwing rocks, Molotov cocktails, they don't care if the people are killed. They want people to be killed. And that's not going to produce a solution. I think that what we have to do is to say, "Let's stop this violence; let's take on this concrete suggestion, this concrete plan, to get negotiations going between Palestinian Arabs and Israelis and, hopefully -- I hope -- between Arabs states and Israel as well."

MS. SULLIVAN: Mr. Netanyahu, a former mayor of the West Bank said about this proposal, "As one who was elected back in 1976, I'd remind Mr. Shamir that those who were elected were either expelled by the Israelis or are dead or were dismissed."

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MINISTER NETANYAHU: Well, of course, what he neglected to say is that these particular mayors were involved in terrorist actions and in inciting terrorism. That, he doesn't say.

MS. SULLIVAN: Well, how can you --

MINISTER NETANYAHU: But the important --

MS. SULLIVAN: -- guarantee that these people who would be elected in a free election wouldn't be?

MINISTER NETANYAHU: Well, I think any election -- elected official, in this country and certainly in our country -- anyone can get elected, but once you're elected, you have to obey the law; you have to abide by the rules. You can't incite terrorism. As far as we're concerned, what we're looking for is the genuinely representative of the Palestinian Arabs. Whoever they elect obviously will have to maintain the proper standards of conduct in an open society, but as far as we're concerned, whoever they elect are the people that we can talk to.

MS. SULLIVAN: Well, it comes right down to the fact that you don't want to deal with Yassir Arafat. Are you worried that, now that the US has opened a dialogue with Yassir Arafat, that he's the chosen one for the Palestinian people?

MINISTER NETANYAHU: Well, I don't think that's an issue that we can put forward right now. Everybody is saying that. He's never been elected. You're putting the cart before the horse. We'd like to see genuine representation. Now, you know, one of the people -- problems we have is not whether PLO sympathizers will get elected; it's whether any but PLO people would even dare to run, because the PLO is holding a gun, cocked at the head of the -- any Palestinian Arab who says, "I'm not PLO; I want to have a genuine choice." And that's what we'd like to give them: a genuine choice.

MS. SULLIVAN: Are you willing to protect these Palestinians on the West Bank?

MINISTER NETANYAHU: I think it's part of our job. I think it's also the job, frankly, of the international community and the United States to say: "Look, we really have a choice. We can go down the route of embracing the PLO and pushing towards a PLO state when the PLO" -- in Arabic, not on the CBB morning news -- "is saying at every possible forum, 'We are just going to use this state to destroy the Jewish state.'" That's a prescription for war. Or we can go the other route that Israel is now suggesting: Leave the PLO in Tunis with their wild dreams, talk to the Palestinian Arabs in the territories, try to make a genuine peace that protects Israel's security and at the same time gives the Palestinian Arabs genuine representation. That's our choice.

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140 5/5

MS. SULLIVAN: But do you want the United States to stop talking with Yassir Arafat, because they can now?

MINISTER NETANYAHU: Well, they're talking, and we can't -- I don't think the PLO needs the United States to know what's going on and what our suggestions are. But as far as we're concerned, we're looking for interlocutors in the territories, not outside the territories. We're looking for those who want peace.

MS. SULLIVAN: Benjamin Netanyahu, thank you for joining us this morning.

MINISTER NETANYAHU: Thank you.

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למייפות: מ. י. ד. י.	שדר. רוחן, ישראל/וושינגטון טוויס פלאט	אל: לשכת שחיה מצפיה
סודג: ש. מ. ו. ר.		
תאריך יצון חנוך: 8.4.89 - 16:45		
שם כביך: <u>הפטלץ</u>		דעת: לשכת רה'ים - CAN
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סנאט: פגירת רה"מ עם נעדת החוץ

ב-4-7. גפיש רבעי עם חבר, נאדת החיז וספכוריים בוסטיפ שבודםבו עי' ג'ז' ב' הצעדה.

המארח היה יוציא חוצהה הסבטור פל.

נכחו הסטודנטים: איוון קרי, מיצי מקונל, קובי מק, מוגנשאן, חלמס, קרנסטון, סרביינס, קנדיז וגלן (חברי ועדת השירותים המזרחיינית), בושביז, סיימון, לאוטנברג (חבר וועדת הקצטוף). ברברה מילולסקי, ארשלוי, קריס דוד וצ'יק רוב.

הבטור טד סטיבנס מלסקה (חבר ועדת הקצבה) הטרוד עתה בעביני האסון האקולוגי  
במדינתו בא חמוץ לפניו הסגירה לברך את רה"ם ועוזב מיד לאחר מכן.

מצידנו נכחו: השגריר, נתניהו, דובינשטיין, בן אהרן, ערן, מקל, אחימאיר, הורוביץ, למדן והחימם.

המגישה ארכה כשבה באוירה ידידותית ונינוחה.

פל, קידם בברכה את רה"י בשם הוועדה. הביע שביעות רצון מפניות רה"י במשפט והיכולות לנوع קידימה בתחילת. כדיידן ישראל ביקש לחלק עם רה"י מספר דאגות: (1) היו דיווחים על מות פלסטינים רבים (אם הוא צייני חתיכח לפחות מ-20 הרוגים ישראלים מול למעלה מ-300 הרוגים פלסטינים) (2) תדמיתה של ישראל נפגעה. (3) יש צורך במענה על שאיפות הפלסטינים מחד ובוחן ישראל מאידך.

ועמידה על דיווחתו. תקף התקשרות המציאת רק את חטמולת אשיפ' ומתחעלמת מהטרור האשפ'י.

"לנו כפנטורים יש היכרנו של נגשנות לחומר בלחן מקווג שאיננו מושך דרכו לעתונות"

תג' ינואר 1936 - 36

דוחות: מ. י. ד. י	שגרירות ישראל/ושינגטון	דוח: 2
סוד: ש. מ. ו. ר	טופס פלוק	נתון: 7
תאריך וזמן חיבור:		אל:
קס' פברך:		דעת:
הפרשך:		
131		פאת:

לפיכך החליט להגשים הצעת החלטה: הקוראת לממשל ללחוץ על אש"פ להפחית הטרוורו הדורשת שבשיבוב השיחות הבא בתוניס ינחנו דיווח והסבירים עיי' אש"פ לשורה של מעשי טרור שבוצעו לאחררונה; שמציר המדינה ידוע לקונגרס על דיווחים אלה של אש"פ.

להחלטה 22 שושביניים משתי המפלגות (בנפרד מעביריהם הצעת החלטה).

3. רהיימ - סיפר על פגישתו עם בוש וביקר שהגיעו בחיוב לרעיזותינו. יש נקודות של אי הסכמה אולם קיימת הבנה שרק מאמצים מתואמים יובילו לשלוום. חזר על עיקרי הצעותינו לממשל ועמדותינו כפי שמספר בפגישה הקודמת עם מיטזיל.

#### 4. להלן חלק תשובות ותשובות:

פל - ביקש לשפטו פרטיים נוספים על רעיזון הבחירה.

רהיימ - הצעותינו לא כוללות עתה את כל הפרטים. העקרון התקבל. החלטנו לא להכנס לפתרים לפני קבלת הסכמה אรหיב. עתה משיש לנו התקבלה נחילה לעבוד על פרטיים.

תלטס - אם היו בחירות, כיצד ניתן להבטיח שלא יהיו אינומים על מתחנים.

רהיימ - זהה אחת הביעות עתה ניאלץ להתמודד. נצטרך להבטיח שקט מלא בזמן הבחירות. האוכלוסייה תצטרך להסכים לכל התכנית ומטרתה. היינו: הסדרי ביןיהם לממשל עצמי והחלה מושם למועד קבע לאחר שלוש שנים. אם לא יסכימו לכך לא יוכל להשתתף בחירות.

תלטס - ביקש חגורות רהיימ למכירת מפעלים ארוכי טווח מבריהים ללבוב.

תפוצה:

דוחות: מ.ד.י	שם: ש.מ.ו.ר	תאריך ומקום חיבור:	שם: טופס פלור	דף: 3
			שם: שגרירות ישראל/ושינגטון	דף: 6
			שם: אלן	
שם: פ.ס. פבריק	שם: דע:			
שם: המסדרן:				
שם: 13	פאות:			
<p><u>רהיימ</u> - בוודאי אין זה מטיען לבו בלשונו המעתה.</p> <p><u>סרביאנס</u> - בקש חברות, מי צריך להסכים לתוכנית.</p> <p><u>רהיימ</u> - מישראל, אריה"ב והפלסטינים הערביים, וכן ירדן ומצרים אם תסכמתה להutrף לתחלין.</p> <p><u>סרביאנס</u> - כיצד תושג ההסכמה לתוכנית מצד הפלסטינים הערביים לבחירות ולמכונית.</p> <p><u>רהיימ</u> - מקווה שבудרhom אריה"ב יוכל לעשות זאת.</p> <p><u>bosbizi</u> - בפגישתם עם מובruk (יומיים קודם לכן) האם לאור העובדה שקיים ציפייה מישראל למבחן עמדותיה כלפי אש"פ, והចורך לפיכך ב-confidence Building האם יאות לשוחח עם ערפאת ולשכנעו למתן האיניביטיפדה. תשובה מובruk היתה שלאSHIP אין השפעה על האיניביטיפדה וגם לא על נסיבות החדרה לישראל. שאלתו היא האם יש אמת בכך.</p> <p><u>רהיימ</u> - יאני מודה לך שאתה מוסר לי עדות מובruk וחייב שאני יכול לדבר עמו ישירות". אש"פ מסוגל לפעול להפחחת האלימות. הוא שולח יומם הוראות לתוכבי השתחים להגביר האלימות במיוחד בתקופת המגעים הדיפלומטיים באלה"ב של מובruk, שלו ושל חוסיין במגמה לחזק דרישותיו. יש לך בוחלט השפעה על המצב. אם אש"פ לא ישלח הוראות לבנייל תפחית האלימות.</p> <p><u>bosbizi</u> - כיצד מאמין שאוכלוסייה תבוא לבחירות אם מאיימים עליה מצד אש"פ ?</p> <p><u>רהיימ</u> - רוב הפליטים מערביים בקידום החמליין ולראות סוף לנצח הנוכחי הכרוך עבורה בסבל רב. קשה על אש"פ לעמוד מול נטייה זו של רוב האוכלוסייה, במיוחד אם תהיה לנו תמיכת אריה"ב.</p>				
תפוצה:				

למיות: מ. י. ד. י.	שרירות ישראל/וושינגטן	דב:
סוג: ש. מ. ו. ר.	טופס פלוק	נתן: *
תאריך ושם מנכ"ל:		אל:
פס' מביק:		דע:
הפטולד:		
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כרייך דוד - בתרש"ף לשאלת בשבייך על השחפות בבחירה, האם רה"ם יהיה מוכן לדבר  
עם ערפאת?

רה"ם - זה חסר ערך לפגוש את ערפאת מאחר והוא מתנגד לכל מורים עם ישראל על בסיס 2  
שלבים: חקופת ביןיהם ומעמד קבוע. ערפאת מעוניין להגביר לחץ האלימות שכן הוא  
מעוניין להשיג מיד מדינה פלסטינית עצמאית (רה"ם חזר על הטענות להתנגדותו למורים  
עם אשיפת ברוח דבוריו בפגישת אצל מיטצ'יל).

נתניהו - כאן באהר"ב את שומעים שערפאת אומר שהוא מעוניין בשלום. אולם עוזריו  
וסגנונו מתבונאים אחרם בעולם הערבי (הביא מספר דוגמאות והתיחס למסורת של הפלגים). הם  
מבקשים מהתנו own destruction . To capitulate our own destruction

מרקונל - מודאג מהשחיקת הטעינה בישראל. האם גם רה"ם?

רה"ם - אכן מודאגים מכל דבר שיכול להפחתה הטעינה בישראל. הטעינה זו הייתה באינטנס של  
אהר"ב וקיים שטייף נרחב בתחוםים רבים בין שתי המדינות.

ישנם אירופאים חמשפיעים על דעה"ק אך מקווה שהשכונות אלה תהיינה זמניות. בראע שנכובו  
למורים ונשיג פתרון לא תהיינה יותר סיבות לאפשר השליליות של הציבור האמריקני. אכן  
נchosים בדעתנו להשיג פתרון לביעיה. יש לנו المسؤول והנסיון שאמ כולנו מאוחדים  
ונchosים להשיג דבר חנוגע לקיומנו - נשיגו.

מרקונל - היושבים נאולם זה כולם תומכי ישראל. אולם אפילו בקהילה היהודית יש קרע.  
מבקש To leave with you a sense of urgency שישראל מצטיריה כרגע. ב-  
Reluctant Partner

רה"ם - איןנו סבור שחקיילה היהודית מפוזרת. בועידת הטולידריות בירושלים הביעו

תפוצה:

עמילות: מ י ד	שרירות ישראל/וושינגטן	ז' צפוי:
סוג: ש. מ. ו. ר	טופס פלוק	פתון: ז
תאריך וזמן חכירות:		אל:
מספר:		דעת:
131		פאת:

תמייבותם בישראל. יתבצעו דעות שווכות או לשם אין שפק לאבי תמייבותם בקיומה של ישראל.

קורני מק - הצעות רח'ם יגסיסו תמייחת בקהילה היהודית ובארה'ב בכלל.

גם הוא חמיה'ץ לשאלת הבחירה, הפרטורים הנחוצים כמו השתפות וכו' .

רהי'ם - חזר על עמדתו והוסיף כי לא ניתן להכנס לפרטרים טרם החלו דיוון וחתמי'עצוויות בקבינט בישראל.

קורני מק - חשוב לפעול בשכונות הקרובים כדי להמשיך הדימוי החיווי.

קרנטון - בקש לקבל עדכון על התפתחויות חדשות בנושא יהודית אתיופיה, נושא בו הוא מאוד פעיל.

רהי'ם - הודה לקרנטון על פעילותו בנושא. זהה טראדייה נמשכת של איחוד משפחות. כיוון מזוינים 11 אלף יהודים באתיופיה. אלו מצליחים להוציא מספר קטן מאוד של יהודים. העליתה הנושא במבחן'ד וביקשתי שיסכימו לנו באמצעות קשריהם עם ממתיאופיה. הם מנסים לפעול אך עדין ממתינים לתוכאהו ממשיות.

קרנטון - מה הסיכויים להאטרפות ירדן לתהיליך .

רהי'ם - אבו מערביים. בהאטרפותה אך המלך כזכור החליט לפני כשנה על התנקותתו מיריש. המלך מჩגד מכך לחתמה של מדינה פלסטינית שכן תחווה סיכון למשטרו.

סימון - (א) יש אמנים סיכון שיש ליטול, או לשם מעל הכל, הם יספרו תדמיתה של ישראל. יש שיחיקה במעמדה של ישראל וישנם לא מעטם, ולא מקרוב אויביה של ישראל, השואלים האם יש לחמשך בסיכון. (ב) תגירת יהודית בריה'ם : כפער בנושא בקש תגבורת רה'ם לאפשרות שהוועלה להעניק מעמד של פליט ליווצאים מבריה'ם אפילו אם יהיו 6 חודשים בישראל.

לחיפות: מ. י. ד. י.	טריטוריות ישראל/וושינגטונ	על: *
סוווג: ש. מ. ו. ר.	טופס פלוק	פתחון: *
תאריך וזמן חיבור:		אל:
קס' פברוק:		דעת:
המשלץ:		
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רהיימ - הודה על פעילותו של סימונן למען היהודי בבריח'ם. איננו יכולים להתנגד לחופש הבחירה אם יהודים מעוניינים לנסוע לאրת'יב. אולם אם הם מעוניינים לצאת לאראה'יב עליהם לקבל ויזות אמריקניות. אם מעוניינים עלולות לישראל שימושו בויזות/israelites. אין זה הגון להשתמש בויזות ישראלית כדי לצאת למדיינות אחרות. בעבר, כשבקשו היהודים אשירות לצאת לישראל, הפסידו מוקומות עירודתם וסבירו בגלל עצם בקשתם. היום, אין המצע בר. הם בקשים לצאת, יכולים להמשיך ולבוד ולחתמו בבריח'ם ללא כל בעיה עד שיקבלו הויזות האמריקניות ואין זה מוצדק שישבו בלධיספולי שבאיטליה וימתינו לאשרות אמריקניות לאחר שעבדו את בריח'ם על ויזות ישראליות.

סימונן - הבעייה היתה עד כת שאמ לא נתקבל ויזה לישראל, לא ניתן היה לצאת. יתכן שהמצב משתנה.

רהיימ - אישר שמדובר משתנה.

א'ן רוב - מתי תדרוך חטובה וחויבית ביותר להביא את ירדן לתחלה.

רהיימ - איננו יכול לדבר בשם חסינן, אולם היינו רוצים לראות בו חלק מהתהלהך. אין לנו בעיות מיוחדות עם ירדן ותగובל הארוך ביותר שלנו - שהוא עם ירדן, שקט.

לאוטנברג - פתח דבריו בהתייחסתו לפעילותו העניפה ורבות השנים בקהילה היהודית. תקאן עבר להציג בנקודות, ובעיקר כלפי הנטטוריט הנוכחים:

(א) מודעגבעתון של מספר יהודים אמריקנים (התיחס למודעת אנשי הרוח) המבקרת את ישראל היא חסרת חשיבות (meaningless). "אני רוצה להבהיר זאת לכל הנוכחים בעולם".

(ב) הודה בוש על סוף הכיבוש והתנגדות ג'ריבונות ישראלית בירוש (בעת ביקור מוגבר) איננה ממשית.

תפוצה:

למייפות: מ. י. ד. י.	שגרירות ישראל/ושינגטון	זע: 7
סוג: סודי	טופס פלוק	פתחן: 7
תאריך וזמן חניל:		אל:
קס. כברך:		דע:
הפלציג:		
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(ג) יד הטרור גוברת וכאן בארה"ב מתחילה לחשוב זאת רק עתה. עליכם לעמוד על דעתכם ואנחנו לא נאמר לכם מה לעשות. (חוותם ליבכם לשינוי בדבריו של לאוטנברג לעומת התבאותיו בפניכם ובפנוי קבוצות יהודיות בזמן אחרונו).

רתים - הוודת לאוטנברג על דבריו.

מיינהן - הסנטור היחיד שלא תתייחס לתחילה שלום ולכון דבריו מובאים בסוף הדיווח.

מיינהן ביקש ליחס חוות הלב לפרשת הקונגרס. לאור משפטו של אוליבר נורת' המתקיים בימים אלה, הגיע חמשל מסמכים - בית המשפט. בדוח שביבו (מסרו לשגריר) בולטת העובדה שהמשל ניסה לסייע לקונגרס באמצעות מדיניות שלישית, מקובלות סיוע אמריקני, תוך מתן הבטחות לפצצת מדיניות אלה. מהדיווח שביבו, לא היה נעים לו לראות שישראל מופיעה החל מהעומד הראשון. איןו מאישים אותנו וברור לו שיישראלי נזulta (taken advantage) אולם עליינו להבין שאסור לנו להיות חלק מתרגיל של המשל שנועד לעקוף את הקונגרס. בעת כתיבת חוק הטיעו חדש שנושא זה יהיה מקור לדאגה.

רתים - איןנו יודע על הפרטים אליהם תתייחס הסנטור. ישראל שיתפה פעולה באופן מלא והעבירה החומר לו עדות החקירה של הקונגרס.

מיינהן - מטכחים עם רהים לגבי שתהיפ אולם השאלה העומדת היא איסור הטיעו לקונגרס שעוגן בחיקיקת תקונוגם.

י. ק. א. ג. ל. א. פ. ע.  
יהודית ורנאי דרנברג

תפוצה:

## שגרירות ישראל בושינגטון טופס מברך

דפ. 1. מtower. 12  
דחיפות: מתי ידי  
סובלאן אלוני

6.4.89 תאריך, זמן: מספ"ר המברך: המשרבן:

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

### דנו. לשכת השר

בבבון זבוב

### המזהב:

gs

## ביקור רוח"ם בנו שין גטו

להלן התדריך שנכתב nomine, ע"י פקיד בכיר בבית הלבן בתום פגישת רוח"מ עם חנשיה בוש. הפקיד הבכיר היה פול הייד.

שְׁתַּוְתַּח

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WHITE HOUSE BACKGROUND READOUT  
ON THE US VISIT OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR  
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

BY A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1989

.STX

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Let me just say, with respect to the meeting itself, that the President and the Prime Minister met alone with aides -- with one aide each, for about 45 minutes. And that was then followed by a larger group meeting in the Cabinet Room for 20 minutes.

The President and Prime Minister will meet again at 2:00. Marlin [Fitzwater] will have further information about the details of that, but for security reasons, all I can say is that they will be meeting again at 2:00 today, and they will be -- of course, the President will be hosting a dinner this evening in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Shamir.

Q Why are they meeting again?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It was something that was arranged and the President wanted to have

.ETX

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SHAMIR VISIT

.STX

3/2

(SP)

a further opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister. I think all of you have heard the President's statement, which he made a few minutes ago.

In terms of the actual discussions, I would emphasize that both the President as well as the Prime Minister emphasized that the relationships between the United States and Israel are strong and are in very good shape. Overall, I would characterize this as a good visit. I would emphasize also that we're engaged in a step-by-step process. This is the beginning of a process. The Prime Minister came with some new ideas, which he referred to in his statement to the press.

With respect to those ideas and proposals, I would make the point that they are in fact principles for moving forward. Everybody recognizes that more needs to be done in order to develop those principles and put more meat on the bones. And as we indicated in -- or as the President indicated in his statement -- we are prepared to discuss these issues further with Israel and other parties in the region in the weeks and months ahead.

And I think that's basically where I would leave it in terms of my opening remarks. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q If this wasn't the final meeting, why did they do their departure statements? Is this two o'clock a substantive meeting, or more ceremonial?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I won't get into -- I won't characterize it. It will be -- but they'll have a chance to talk together further, but also it will have another dimension to it.

Q Do you characterize the meeting, there were more differences -- there were more differences than agreements, or what, in the meeting?

.ETX

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END

WHITE HOUSE READOUT-04/06/89  
SHAMIR VISIT  
WHITE HOUSE READOUT-04/06/89  
SHAMIR VISIT

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(RJB/mg)

STX further opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister. I think all of you have heard the President's statement, which he made a few days ago. SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think that there is a shared conviction on the part of the President and the Prime Minister. It came through very clearly in the discussions that there is a need to move ahead, that -- on the peace process; that the present situation is a -- is a painful one; and that the Prime Minister was bringing some of his ideas about how to move things ahead. And we find that encouraging; we want to pursue it further. As we said -- as the President said in his statement with respect to the question of elections, that we believe that elections in the Territories can be designed to contribute to a political process of dialogue and negotiation.

Q Any judgment about the terms of those elections, whether they will be supervised, and if so, by whom?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I would say that -- well, I believe in the Prime Minister's statement, he said a lot more needs to be discussed in terms of the modalities for conducting the elections. And -- but certainly, in the course of the conversations which we've had with the Prime Minister and his team here, the whole question of the elections and how they would be conducted have been discussed, but this is in a very preliminary sense.

(Cross-talk.)

Q Is that a "yes" or a "no"?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: What's that?

Q As far as today's sessions, was that a "yes" or a "no"?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I wouldn't go into that. I wouldn't go -- I wouldn't give any precision in terms of their one-on-one meeting.

Q There are reports that the US wants Israel to give up the Jericho II missile. Was that discussed at all?

Q What?

Q What?

Q The Jericho II missile.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I can't confirm it.

Q What was the question?

.ETX

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WHITE HOUSE READOUT-04/06/89

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SHAMIR VISIT

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Q Was there any discussion about --

Q -- discussion about?

Q -- continued US support for funding the SDI research in  
Israel?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Again, with respect to our strategic cooperation with Israel, that was discussed. I would say that both sides expressed satisfaction that the -- that the nature of the strategic cooperation relationships are going very well, but

.ETX

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WHITE HOUSE-04/06/89  
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(AT)

there was not really any detailed discussion about that. But I can't say if Secretary Cheney, for example, talked about these issues more specifically with him.

Q In these discussions you had -- in these discussions that you had on these elections, what was -- what kind of flexibility, if any, did the Prime Minister transmit regarding links to the PLO might be permissible for those who are participating? Just how free does he intend these elections to be?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, he certainly has indicated -- in his statement, he indicated that he was looking for free elections --

Q Would he permit a member of the PLO (to run?) ?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think that for those -- those are sorts of issues which I prefer for you to talk to the Israeli side.

Q President Mubarak has already rejected the idea of elections. Is there any reason that you have, or that the Israeli side may have cited, that they believe that the idea of elections will be accepted by the Palestinians?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm not aware that President Mubarak has rejected the idea of elections. On the contrary, in his departing statements, at least at the State Department, he indicated otherwise, that he was prepared to look at any proposals which could advance the peace process. That's the way I read his position.

Yes, Barry?

Q Are you able to elaborate in any way on the President's statement that the United States would be willing to assist, presumably, in these elections? Is that just a general statement of support, or is there some mechanical way that the US would participate, or oversee, or guide --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, no, no, no. I -- no, at this point, I think all of -- it's --

Q Well, what --

Q Was the US -- was the US involvement with the PLO and their discussions with them discussed at all during these meetings?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Our -- our -- our dialogue with the PLO?

Q The US dialogue with the PLO, was that discussed at all?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think you can say that our dialogue with the PLO certainly came up at various points in the discussions.

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SHAMIR VISIT

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Q What was said?

Q And what was the -- what was the discussion about that?

Q How -- (off mike) --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Hmm? I'm sorry?

Q Would you respond to that? What was discussed, and what was the outcome of their discussions?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think there's any secret that the Israelis are concerned about our dialogue with the PLO, but I wouldn't characterize their position any further.

Yeah?

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Q Did the Prime Minister talk at all about the timing of the elections and the relationship between holding the elections and continuance of the intifada?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The timing?

Q In other words, how soon would he anticipate them taking place, and is the -- an end to the intifada a precondition for holding them at all?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I would say that, with respect to timing and so on, again, we're talking here -- and I think the Prime Minister himself made it very clear that he was talking about concepts or principles which needed to be worked on. So therefore, I don't want to get into those sort of specifics because we're really not at that stage. With respect to actually having elections, hopefully, if they can take place, I think both sides recognize that they'd have to be carried out in an atmosphere of calm.

Q Will the United States have its own proposals for the way the elections could be structured -- who would supervise and who would be allowed to run?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We're talking about an Israeli proposal.

Q (Are you?) satisfied that Minister Shamir has brought the kind of new ideas that the Secretary had asked for?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I think, as we've indicated -- Secretary Baker indicated yesterday, as well -- that we find encouragement here that this could provide a basis for moving forward.

Q Was there discussion -- was there discussion of other gestures? Baker has focused upon the need for Israel to do certain things to create an atmosphere of goodwill, as he has with the PLO. Were gestures on the part of Israel discussed, and was any commitment made on the part of Shamir?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: You're talking about --

Q Lowering of tension.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: -- lowering of tension and -- lowering the tensions and what steps could be taken to lower the tension? I think there was a general review of our position, at least, that this would be desirable

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in order to provide an environment which was more conducive to dialogue, and eventually to negotiations. I believe also that, with respect to the Israeli side, I think you should really ask them on their views. But certainly I would again point out that the Prime Minister does want to do something in order to move things ahead. I think that's a very important point.

Q When Baker says that he is encouraged, does that mean that he is encouraged by the substance of the election part of the proposal, or is he encouraged by some other aspect of the message that was brought by Shamir? What part of it is he encouraged by?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I wouldn't be too specific on that. (Laughter.) I mean, not -- I mean, no, in the sense of -- I mean, I think, you know, you're talking about a totality here, clearly; I mean, a totality of commitment to try to do something. I think that's what's important.

Q Following the meeting with President Mubarak, President Bush said that both countries had gained (?) for certain things, and for an end to the occupation. Following his meeting with Prime Minister Shamir today, does the President believe that this conversation would bring to that end -- to end the occupation?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We're talking about what all of us believe should happen, which is a comprehensive settlement. And our positions on that certainly have not changed, and there is no change from what the President said upon Mubarak's departure on that point.

Q Specifically, what was the President's response to the Prime Minister's refusal to accept any international supervision of elections in the Territories?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm not even aware -- why are you so categoric? In any event, I can't --

Q We've been briefed.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (Chuckles) -- You've been very well briefed -- no. No, I can't -- I'm not even aware of that, so I wouldn't --

Q Was anybody here aware of it?

Q Were you encouraged by the degree of linkage that the Prime Minister seemed to express between the interim arrangement and the final status?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: In the -- if you look at the President's statement, he said he also -- he found encouragement by the Prime Minister's assurance that all options are open for negotiation.

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I think also the fact that it's clear that what we're talking about is an interim or second stage or first stage, then leading on to a final stage, is also something that fits -- has fitted in with our approach for a long time, and is to be welcomed, yes.

Q Mr. Shamir is going --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I already took yours.

Q Is it your understanding that the elections will be used to elect representatives to negotiate on an interim solution, or that these people who would be elected would also assume some of the jobs

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of autonomy that have been talked about, an interim solution being an autonomous government? In other words, would the elections be two-fold? Would they actually perform some sort of local functions, municipal functions? Or would they strictly be representatives to engage in negotiations for an interim settlement?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Again, I think you're talking about specifics and modalities, and at this point, we're dealing with principles. And I can't intelligently answer that question.

Q Elections -- elections for what, I guess, is what I'm saying.

Q Would you say that the --

THE PRESS: (Request an answer to the previous question.)

Q Elections for what? That really is my question.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I would say, in a general sense, elections, as I understand it, is elections, however they are structured, but elections which would permit Palestinian interlocutors to emerge who could carry out discussions and negotiations about interim arrangements. I think that's basically -- if I have to frame it -- that's basically the way I'd understand it.

Q Did you hear anything new from Shamir today with regard to Israeli contact with Palestinians? I mean, his language seemed a little bit different outside, but I'm wondering whether you saw --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Different about -- ?

Q Who he would talk to -- "anybody, anytime, anywhere" -- and then he added a couple of conditions. He said "no preconditions" and then he added a precondition. What is your understanding of -- (inaudible) --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: My understanding, as it was -- as I heard the Prime Minister, is that he really wants to move. But I can't really comment on that particular part of his statement.

Q On that point, why do we say that all the options are open if the Prime Minister has said he won't talk to the PLO, and he doesn't want to a Palestinian state? He's made that extremely clear in the last two days. What do you mean "all options are open"?

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm just saying what the -- basically, our understanding of what the Prime Minister's position is -- that all options can be examined in the negotiations.

Q Well, what about talking to the PLO and a PLO state. He just said "no PLO state" out there. So all options are not open.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That -- our -- our view has been that we do not support an independent Palestinian state, either.

Q So all options are not open?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That -- that doesn't -- what I -- I think what it says, it doesn't preclude parties from bringing their ideas to the table.

(Cross-talk.)

STAFF: -- the last question. All the way in the back. The gentleman in the back sitting over there.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes, okay.

Q In his statement today, the President said not only that the United States was against continued occupation, he said he -- eventually the United States was against Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank AND a Palestinian state. Does this mean the President is saying that at the end of the road, Israel -- as far as the United States' view is -- Israel should not be sovereign -- that's one ultimate outcome that the United States does not favor?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That Israel should not -- ?

Q Have sovereignty over the West Bank --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: What the President said specifically was that "We do not support an independent Palestinian state, nor Israeli sovereignty over or permanent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza."

Q Would you say --

Q Wait a minute --

Q Thank you!

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That's what he said.

Q -- closer together today than they were last week?

Q -- closer together today than they were last week?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I've been told it's finished.

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## שאנדרות ישראל בושינגן טופס מברק

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### הספרה, מאפ"א- מא"ת.

## דנו לשכת השר

### מאות עתרכות

## ביגור רוחם בושי גאנטו

להלן הצהרותיהם של רוח"ם ונשיה אריה"ב בתום פגישתם היום, 6.4.89, בבית הלהבו.

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2/5DEPARTURE STATEMENTS  
PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR OF ISRAEL

THE WHITE HOUSE

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1989

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PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, the Prime Minister Shamir and I have had a very productive meeting. My message to him, and through him, to the government and to the people of Israel was clear: We are friends, strategic partners and allies. And the mutual interests that bind together the people of the United States and Israel are broad and deep. The Prime Minister and I dedicated ourselves to maintaining and, where possible, improving the relationship between our two countries. Both of us are committed to this goal.

Throughout the world, old enemies are finding ways to talk to one another and to end conflicts in a manner that preserves the basic interests of all concerned. This can and must happen in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved. Peace, security and political rights can be attained through direct negotiations. The status quo serves the interest of no one. In this spirit, I reiterated to Prime Minister Shamir the resolve of the United States to assist the parties of the Middle East in their pursuit of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Our responsibility as friends and as partners in the search for peace is to help develop approaches that enhance peace prospects. Problems do not resolve themselves. Leaders, acting with courage and vision, solve problems. Menachim Begin and Anwar Sadat demonstrated this truth a decade ago at Camp David. Today's leaders can afford to do no less.

I reassured the Prime Minister that the fundamental basis of our approach to a Middle East settlement has not changed. The United States

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BUSH, SHAMIR-04/06/89  
DEPARTURE STATEMENTS  
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is committed to a comprehensive peace achieved through direct negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This remains the building block for a viable negotiation for a durable settlement. This is our goal.

With regard to final status issues, I reaffirmed to the Prime Minister that we do not support an independent Palestinian state, nor Israeli sovereignty over or permanent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. To move the peace process forward, I discussed with the Prime Minister, as I had earlier this week with President Mubarak, an ambitious but realistic approach. Progress will require meaningful steps to reduce tensions, political dialogue between Israel and Palestinians, and clear indications that all concerned are prepared to think creatively about key substantive issues.

Israel has an obligation to contribute to this process, but it cannot be expected to assume the entire burden. The Palestinians, the Arab states and other interested parties must demonstrate that they too, are willing to make peace a reality. I stress that no peace process can succeed in a political vacuum. I believe it is in Israel's interest to engage in a serious dialogue with Palestinians that address their legitimate political rights. The United States believes that elections in the territories can be designed to contribute to a political process of dialogue and negotiation. We urge Israel and the Palestinians to arrive at a mutually acceptable formula for election. And, we plan in the days and weeks ahead, to work toward that end.

In negotiations, Israel understands that Palestinians will be free to bring their own positions and preferences to the bargaining table. The Prime Minister assured me that Israel is committed to negotiating an agreement on final status that is satisfactory to all sides, and he made it clear that interim arrangements on Palestinian self-rule are not the end of the road, but are directly linked to a broader political process that includes negotiating and concluding an agreement on final status.

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I'm encouraged by the Prime Minister's assurance that all options are open for negotiation. The Prime Minister and I agreed that our governments would remain in close touch to ensure that everything possible is being done to promote the prospects for peace in the Middle East. And speaking for myself and for the American people, I want to assure everyone that the United States is committed to promoting this goal.

Mr. Prime Minister, we're delighted you're here. The floor is yours, sir.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Thank you, Mr. President. I am honored to be here today. Let me first, on behalf of the people of Israel and on behalf of my wife and myself, express our warm wishes on your assuming the mantle of leadership of the United States and the free world. We have cherished your personal friendship and warm humanitarian concern for many years. We shall never forget the help you have extended our brothers and sisters in distress, just as we shall always remember the role the United States has played in our history.

Our reliance is based on common values and shared interests. Our agreements on strategic cooperation and the free trade area benefit both countries. They help us continue as a vanguard of democracy in the Middle East. I am confident that under your administration, our bonds of friendship and cooperation will grow even stronger.

Our two nations share the values and ideals of the free world and the ideals of democracy and freedom. What we do not share is a neighborhood. For us, the carnage in Beirut, the use of poison gas against civilians and acts of terrorism and fanaticism, are not news from afar. For us, they are events happening around the corner. They are our daily reality. If there is one mistake Israel cannot afford to make, it is the mistake of forgetting where we live.

I would like to reiterate here what I said to you in private: We shall make the greatest possible efforts to achieve peace short of endangering the security of our state. We consider the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River, which is an objective of the PLO, a mortal threat to our security. I have assured you that we would sit with anyone, anytime, anywhere, without preconditions, if we thought it would advance the cause of peace.

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BUSH, SHAMIR-04/06/89  
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But we cannot lend ourselves to any steps that will result in a Palestinian state, which is a prescription, not for peace, but for war. I can assure you that we will be forthcoming. We believe the Camp David Accords, based on Resolutions 242 and 338, are the cornerstone of peace in our region. We faithfully abide by our agreements, and we expect others to do so, as well.

Mr. President, to advance the cause of peace, we have put forward a four-point peace initiative: First, we propose an effort to make the existing peace between Israel and Egypt, based on the Camp David Accords, a cornerstone for expanding peace in the region. We call upon the three signatories of the Camp David Accords, at this 10th anniversary of the treaty of peace, to reaffirm indeed their dedication to the Accords.

Second, we call upon the United States and Egypt to make it clear to the Arab governments that they must abandon their hostility and belligerency towards Israel. They must replace political warfare and economic boycotts with negotiations and cooperation.

Third, we call for a multinational effort, under the leadership of the US and with substantial Israeli participation, to finally solve the Arab refugee problem, perpetuated by Arab governments, while Israel absorbs hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab countries. All these refugees should have decent housing and live in dignity. This process does not have to await a political solution or to substitute for it.

Fourth, in order to launch a political negotiating process, we propose free democratic elections, free from an atmosphere of PLO violence, terror and intimidation, among the Palestinian Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Their purpose is to produce a delegation to negotiate an interim period of self-governing administration. The shape [of] modalities and participation in the elections will have to be discussed. The interim phase to provide a vital test of coexistence and cooperation. It will be followed by negotiations for a permanent agreement. All proposed options will be examined during these negotiations.

This is an outline of our comprehensive plan for peace. It is based on democratic principles. It addresses the real issues. Together, I believe we can achieve these goals. May God lead us to the right decision.

Thank you, Mr. President.

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## שאנדרות ירושלים בונשינגרס טופס פברק

דפ. 1. מתרן. דוחיפות מינית, סולונגן; 128.

### אל: מאנ"א, מע"ת, הספרה

### דעת: לשותת המשר

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טננברג, חנה-

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## ביקור רוח"ח בנושי גאטונג

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AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTETHURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1989, 10:00

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I appreciate this opportunity to address an audience, whose interest in world affairs is guided by historical perspective. We have always believed that the better informed the audience, the easier it is to present our case.

Yesterday and today we held talks with President Bush, Secretary Baker and other members of the new administration. The talks were held in a friendly atmosphere, as befits relations between allies.

We are agreed that to produce positive results the United States and Israel must work in close coordination. There is little chance of any progress toward peace negotiations and toward the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict unless there is an understanding between Israel and the United States. Since the Arab side continues to reject direct talks with Israel, the United States -- which enjoys the trust and confidence of most Arab States -- can play a useful role in paving the way for negotiations.

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We made absolutely clear that we oppose any kind of talks with the PLO. We explained in detail the reasons for our stance on this issue, and I shall expand on them further on.

Our two governments are agreed that

-- the status quo is not desirable and not satisfactory. None of us wants to see it continued.

-- peace is our common objective. If the sides to the conflict make a determined and sincere effort to bring it about it will be achieved. It is not Israel -- and never was Israel -- that needed to be convinced of the vital necessity and blessings of peace.

-- the violence, riots and terror attacks must end if a setting conducive to negotiations, accommodation and peace is to be established. We stressed that if the leaders and inciters of the violence believe they can gain politically, the chances for an agreement will disappear.

-- negotiations must be held as soon as possible. The participants could be Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Arabs and Israel.

-- the Palestinian representatives to the talks could either be appointed by agreement or chosen through a process of elections. Israel has an open mind on this issue and is willing to consider and apply any workable formula.

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-- progress toward a solution can be achieved by a two-stage approach. The general objective is to enable the Palestinian Arabs in the areas to gradually run their affairs. Israel's position is that the interim stage is a vital requirement and a testing period before the subsequent phase of negotiations on the permanent status of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

Since the Administration is in the process of consultation with all the governments connected with this issue, our two governments have decided to maintain close contact with a view to reaching joint operative conclusions as soon as the present stage of preparation is concluded.

-- On United States-Israel bilateral issues, we discussed the status of our strategic cooperation which both sides consider satisfactory. The economic situation in Israel and the United States aid; the question of Soviet emigration; the alarming escalation of missiles and chemical weapons; and the situation of Jewish communities in distress, especially in Syria.

I would now like to give you our assessment of the present situation in our area. Most of these points were raised by us during our talks in Washington. I believe it is necessary to present them because the barrage of daily news in recent months has obscured many of them.

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One. Since the establishment of the State in 1948 we have lived with the reality of conflict and war between us and the Arab states. No one is more sick and tired of this conflict than we are.

Two. With the exception of Egypt, the entire Arab world continues to wage political, economic and propaganda warfare against us and supports terrorist organizations that attack us. In recent years the conflict has been portrayed as a conflict between us and the Palestinian Arabs. This perception is reinforced daily by pictures of confrontations between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian rioters. But no serious student of the region can believe that if the Palestinians gain a state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the hostility of Syria, Libya, Iraq, Iran and their respective terrorist proxies will cease. Nor that they would then promptly disarm and stop threatening Israel. The simple truth is that the Palestinian problem is not the cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict but a result of it.

Three. Both the Kingdom of Jordan and Israel are parts of what used to be the British mandate of Palestine. A third Palestinian state would reduce Israel to strategic vulnerability. Israel's entire territory covers just less than one fifth of one percent of the combined territory of the Arab states. The area of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is 2200 square miles, the size of a county in the U.S. It cannot be, nor is it intended to be, a normal state. It can only be a convenient launching pad for terrorist attacks against the centre of our country. Without



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Judea and Samaria, Israel at its most densely populated center is as wide as the distance between the White House and National Airport.

Four. There is no one I would refuse to negotiate with if I thought it would bring peace. But I believe negotiating with the PLO will reward international terrorism, increase violence in the world, bring about a PLO state on the outskirts of Tel Aviv and the center of Jerusalem, and pose a mortal danger to Israel.

Five. The Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza don't want us in the areas. We cannot risk the life of our country by leaving. The slogan "territories for peace" is a hoax. The choice is not between Israel keeping the territories or risking war. The opposite is true. If we leave, there will almost certainly be war. But we do not want to ruin the lives of the inhabitants. We want them to have self-rule. We want them to be able to express their national aspirations through the Palestinian state on the east bank of the Jordan. And above all, we want to end the hostility and bloodshed by negotiating with a leadership they elect to represent themselves, not with a terrorist organization based in Tunisia.

Six. Our image has been tarnished. Our enemies are delighted, and our friends suffer, at the sight of our soldiers subduing civilians with force. We know that the TV pictures don't convey the whole truth. They don't show the rocks that kill, the petrol bombs that burn and the iron pipes that maim.

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They do not tell of 950 attacks on Arabs by Arabs for the crime of not participating in the riots. They do not count the 22 Arabs murdered for advocating moderation, nor do they tell about the reign of terror which prevents the end of violence. But even though we know all that, we also suffer when we see what our soldiers have to do. No one is more eager to see an end to this confrontation than Israel.

Many say we made serious mistakes in handling riots. I have no doubt that like all nations we, too, have made mistakes. But the reason Israel is alive today is that we never made the cardinal mistake of forgetting where we live. To the West, our conduct seems tough. But one of the reasons the riots continue is that in our neighborhood we are considered soft. The rioters know the limits imposed by our democratic values. Similar riots were subdued practically overnight by our neighbors, using measures we would not and could not consider using. Recently even a democratic country put down riots with the kind of ruthlessness we have never used. We hope we can convince the Palestinian Arabs that they can achieve much through negotiations and nothing through violence. But we are not going to risk our existence for the sake of good press.

Seven. PLO terrorism has not abated. We have absolute proof that terrorist groups, under Arafat's control and others, continue engaging in terror attacks. Their incursions are intended to take hostages and kill civilians. Fortunately, most of them have been caught by the Israeli army. The PLO leaders

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have made no secret of their intention to use any territory they might acquire to launch terrorist attacks against Israel and to trigger an all-out Arab Israeli war. They renounced their charter which calls for Israel's destruction. Clearly they are not fit partners for negotiations.

Eight. The arms race in the Middle East is continuing. The Arab countries are acquiring vast quantities of sophisticated arms. The Soviet Union has concluded another large arms deal with Syria. Libya's air force is now capable of reaching Israel. Most of the Arab countries around us possess medium range ground to ground missiles and chemical warfare capabilities. The Arabs buy from the Soviet Union, Europe and the United States. The fact that they can buy arms that are identical to those used by the Israeli army threatens to reduce our qualitative advantage. The armies and weapons arrayed against Israel today are more threatening than ever.

Nine. Syria's ambition to dominate the region and its dreams of "Greater Syria" have not abated. The media have not found the fighting in Beirut important news, but what is going on there is mass slaughter.

Finally, let me stress that no one is more interested than we are in achieving peace in the Middle East. Ten years ago, on signing the Peace Treaty with us, President Sadat spoke of turning swords into ploughshares. He was quoting the Hebrew

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Prophet Isaiah, who first said those words in Jerusalem 2500 years ago. We have been expressing this hope in our prayers ever since.

We know there are no quick fixes for the Middle East conflict. We believe our plan is reasonable and fair. It rejects the PLO-terrorist inspired solution. It advocates a democratic solution. It is based on the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed ten years ago almost to the day. We believe in honoring a contract. We believe the other signatories should honor it too. If this contract is declared dead ten years after its birth, and after we made enormous sacrifices for it, there is no use asking us to put our faith in other contracts.

But we believe we can expand on this Treaty, in its spirit. We propose that for the first time in their history the Palestinians of Judea, Samaria and Gaza hold elections to choose their representatives for negotiations with us on interim arrangements. By doing so they will be the only Arabs in the Middle East, except Israeli Arab citizens, who will participate in a true democratic election.

But to have free elections, people must be free to express their opinions without fear of terror and assassination. Over the past year, the PLO has murdered dozens of Palestinian Arabs who expressed independent views. Clearly a first requirement for free elections is an atmosphere free of violence and terror.

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The free nations of the world have a clear choice. They can promote the PLO campaign for a PLO-dominated state, and ensure deterioration to tyranny and war.

Let me remind all those who worry about human rights that the PLO once ruled a mini-state in Lebanon where no human rights existed at all. For this reason, and to secure our very existence, Israel will resist this course. But the free nations have another option. They can support a realistic and positive proposal to achieve co-existence between Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinian Arabs.

We share with the free nations a fervent desire to change the status quo. But we hope they realize that as in the case of Iran, a reckless rush to change can bring disaster.

Our proposals for a settlement will be futile unless the Arab states around us also embark on the road to peace. They must renounce belligerency and advocate a peaceful solution. They must stop objecting to the resettling of the Arab refugees. They must stop the arms race.

The international community can help by supporting the resettlement of the refugees. Their situation is intolerable. But to shed tears over their fate while vetoing Israeli projects of resettlement neither improves their lot nor contributes to the relaxation of tensions.

*He*

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Our proposals will safeguard Israel's security and give maximum self-rule to the Palestinian Arabs. They will give, following the Camp David formula, equal opportunity to both sides to put forward and negotiate their positions. Some may reject our plan out of hand. But I believe a joint effort by the United States and Israel, based on these proposals, can bring about their acceptance and bring a just and lasting peace to our region.

OK

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### הסנטור מצנberos וביקורי נשיין מצרים ורהיין ישראל

רצ"ב דברים שהשミニיע הטנטור חוות מוגבאים במליאת הסנת היום (4.4) :

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תפוצה:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR METZENBAUM  
APRIL 4, 1989

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Mr. President, the President of Egypt is in Washington today and the Prime Minister of Israel will arrive here tomorrow. Both leaders will be conducting important talks with President Bush, Administration officials and congressional leaders that will focus on the peace process and regional economic issues. What an opportunity this would have presented for face-to-face meetings between these two heads of state.

Regrettably, President Mubarak has refused to meet with his Israeli counterpart. I would hope that even at this late date he would change his mind, and I encourage him to reconsider his decision.

It is tragic that, at a time when the Mideast peace process could gain immeasurably from an injection of goodwill, another golden opportunity for a substantive, direct Arab-Israeli dialogue will be wasted.

It is puzzling, Mr. President, that as Egypt, Israel and the United States celebrate a triumphal decade of peace, Mr. Mubarak will not meet with Mr. Shamir. This is not a positive opening to the second decade of an historic peace treaty. Mr. Mubarak's actions send the wrong signal to other Arab governments, especially at a time when the Administration is urging them to recognize Israel.

Just over two weeks ago this body unanimously approved a resolution commending Egypt and Israel on the tenth anniversary of the signing of their peace treaty. It took leadership, courage and sacrifice to overcome decades of war and move forward to a peaceful settlement.

Israel has sacrificed time and again to make the peace with Egypt work. Israel returned the vast Sinai Desert, stretching from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, from the Suez Canal to the Negev Desert. Israel agreed to submit the Taba question to international arbitration and abided by the final decision, returning Taba to Egypt.

Israel gave up near self-sufficiency in energy. The oil wells of Sinai were producing the most valuable natural resource known to man.. They were pumping away for years -- and they were in the hands of Israel. But in order to effect a true peace, Israel gave back those wells, and again became a nation totally unable to provide for its own energy needs. In the interest of peace, Israel again made itself an oil-dependent nation. The energy crises of the 1970's clearly illustrate what a great sacrifice this was.

Israel also left extensive military facilities in the Sinai, and lost forever the strategic "buffer" provided by this vast desert.

Statement of Sen. Metzenbaum (cont.)

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Can any of us forget that momentous occasion when President Anwar Sadat of Egypt got on a plane in Cairo, flew to Israel, and sat down to negotiate peace with Prime Minister Begin? Can any of us forget the time when those two heads of state came to the United States under the auspices of President Carter to draft their treaty? We all celebrated this momentous event, and the ramifications it held for peace in the Middle East.

And now the opportunity is available to Mr. Mubarak -- not an easy opportunity, not one that anybody suggests is going to suddenly bring about a peaceful resolution of contentious issues -- but an opportunity for Mr. Mubarak and Mr. Shamir to get to know each other. By coincidence -- or maybe it isn't such a coincidence -- they will both be in the United States at the same time. Why not use this opportunity now to advance the peace process? Why not sit down and get to know each other?

I am troubled that Mr. Mubarak has declined to use this latest opportunity to further the peace process. We need to work for peace and to nurture it -- not ignore it. It won't come about easily.

I would hope that even at this point Mr. Mubarak might see fit to change his mind and make a step in the right direction for peace, while that opportunity is still available. I would hope that Mr. Shamir and Mr. Mubarak can both find the time to meet with each other. I think the world yearns for it, I think the world hopes for it, and I think that all of us who want to see peace in the Middle East would hope that even at this late hour there would be a change in Mr. Mubarak's position. We hope that Mr. Shamir and Mr. Mubarak can discuss their differences frankly, and in a head-to-head meeting.

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## BACKGROUND BRIEFING

## SUBJECT:

THE VISIT OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR

ATTRIBUTION: SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 1989

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Let me start with a few notes on Prime Minister Shamir's schedule. He arrived in New York today, earlier this morning, and will travel to Washington, April 5, for an official working visit. This will be the Prime Minister's first visit to Washington during the new administration. He was last here in March, 1988. Secretary Baker will meet with the Prime Minister tomorrow at the State Department. The meeting will be followed by a working lunch.

That afternoon, Defense Secretary Cheney, Commerce Secretary Mosbacher and HUD Secretary Kemp will call on the Prime Minister at Blair House. The Prime Minister will meet with the President on Thursday, April 6, at 11:00 a.m. Afterward, Vice President Quayle and Mrs. Quayle

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SHAMIR VISIT-04/04/89

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will host a lunch for the Prime Minister and Mrs. Shamir at his residence. The Vice President will also meet separately with the Prime Minister. The President will host a dinner for the Prime Minister and Mrs. Shamir at the White House the evening of April 6.

While here, Prime Minister Shamir will have other meetings, including with members of Congress, deliver a speech at the American Enterprise Institute the afternoon of April 6, and make several media appearances. The official part of his visit will conclude on Friday afternoon, April 7. Prime Minister Shamir leaves Washington April 9 for Chicago.

By way of background and themes, I would note that Prime Minister Shamir comes to Washington at a time when the US-Israeli bilateral relationship is strong and vital. The US commitment to Israel's security and wellbeing is unwavering. There should be no question about that.

As is the case in all of our meetings with Prime Minister Shamir and his colleagues, I know that the discussions will be marked by the type of candid give-and-take that comes with long and close friendship and partnership. Both sides are

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always open to practical ways to strengthen the relationship further and make it more meaningful whether we are talking about security, economic, or other bilateral issues. And I'm sure that these subjects will be an important part of our discussions with the Prime Minister.

We will also be having wide-ranging discussions on regional issues, with the main focus of the President's and Secretary's meetings being on the Middle East peace process. We want to work closely with Israel to advance the prospects for peace. Our objective remains a comprehensive peace achieved through negotiations based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Such a settlement should incorporate the principles of territory for peace, Israeli security, and Palestinian political rights.

We also need to foster an environment more conducive to dialogue and negotiations. And we'll be especially interested in the Prime Minister's thoughts on these matters.

In conclusion, Israel is a close friend, reliable partner, and staunch ally. We look forward to talking with Prime Minister Shamir and his party on how we can best proceed together to advance the prospects for peace in the region.

With those few preliminary remarks, I'll be happy to take your questions.

Yes?

Q The administration has said that it hopes that Prime Minister Shamir will come to Washington with some new proposals. And apparently Mr. Shamir is coming with the proposal that there be limited autonomy; that elections be held. Is this enough? Or does the Bush administration want to see more?

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BR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I've read some of the same press stories that you have. As I said in my opening remarks, we're going to want to listen to what Prime Minister Shamir has to say about how the peace process can be moved forward, but I'm not going to prejudge what he in fact is going to tell the President at this point.

Q Are you giving any credence to the interview printed in the "New York Times" on Friday?

BR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We've seen the press reports but we, of course naturally enough, the President wants to hear directly from the Prime Minister about his specific thoughts and suggestions.

Yeah, Barry?

Q \*\*\*\*\*, during President Mubarak's visit, there's been some talk by him and a little by you yesterday about the violence on the West Bank. And today, after he saw Mr. Baker, he said that nobody could stop the violence, much as he'd like to see it stopped. I'd be interested in the US view of the rebellion, or whatever you want to call it, and whether you think it's spontaneous, PLO managed, inspired, controlled, and whether indeed it could be stopped, and whether you want to see it stopped?

BR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Barry, our position, as you know, has been that the environment has to be improved. It has to be changed, that the present situation that prevails is not a tenable one. And that's why we have been talking about looking at ways in which reciprocal steps could be taken in order to improve the climate and atmosphere for dialogue and eventually negotiations.

Q Well, I understand you. That has long been the position. Of course, you want a better environment but, mechanically speaking, was this a spontaneous uprising? Was it a PLO managed and controlled \*\*\* could the PLO bring down the tensions? You say you'd like to see a better situation. Presumably there are other ways to get a better situation than, you know, for Israel and the Palestinians. Do you think there are external forces that could be brought into play?

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into examination of the causes of the intifada and who is in control. I listened to what President Mubarak had to say after his meetings with the President -- I mean, with the Secretary and -- but I don't know what -- how helpful it would be for me to try to précis or give my personal evaluation of the mainsprings behind the intifada.

Q Well, you guys are talking to the PLO -- you began doing that in December and you've had about a half a dozen meetings. And there is some thinking in some quarters that the PLO maybe has, you know, a slight, if not a significant role to play. Have you ever asked the PLO to maybe bring down the tensions?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We -- you did mention that we've had five or six meetings with the PLO. As you know, it was really only until the last meeting where we entered into a more substantive dialogue with the PLO. The previous meetings had to do with our concerns about specific activities in the main, particularly with respect to attempted incursions into Israel. But certainly, in terms of the necessity to try to change the climate and the environment, I mean, this would be certainly one of the things that we would be talking to the PLO about.

Yeah?

Q On these environment talk and atmosphere, is it all concentrating on putting off the intifada or what? I mean, we don't understand about the atmosphere.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No. I think our goal is very clearly to try to get to dialogue and to negotiations, and at the end of the day to arrive at the comprehensive settlement, which will allow all of the states in the region to exist in peace and security.

Q But what role do you envisage for Egypt? I mean, is it playing any role in doing this --

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we believe, as we stated that -- I think a number of times in the course of President Mubarak's visit -- that Egypt is in a unique position to contribute to forward movement in the peace process. It enjoys a relationship with Israel as well as with the Arab world.

Yeah, Lars?

Q You said in response to an earlier question that you wanted to hear from the Prime Minister ways of moving the peace process forward. Will you be content if he confines himself to the process and procedure and avoids giving an outline for a comprehensive settlement -- his idea what the final settlement ought to be?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I know what you're trying to do to me, Lars, but I think I'm going to stay very firmly on my present wicket, which is that we want to hear what Prime Minister Shamir has to say and --

Q (Inaudible.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: But I'm not going to try to prejudge that or comment in advance.

Yeah, David?

Q Are you going to -- will the US government raise the issue of settlement? And what is our position on that?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I -- without getting into the fine tuning these discussions, but I would expect that the full gamut of issues relating to the peace process would be addressed at one point or the other. But --

Q Would that include the Camp David Accords, or --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm saying the whole gamut without -- I mean, I can be asked endlessly if this, that, and the other thing is going to be discussed, but I expect a full discussion.

Q Well, does the United States, does this administration consider that the Camp David Accords are as valid as they were 10 years ago as they are today?

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We certainly continue to support the principles of the Camp David Accords.

Yeah?

Q What's --

Q As a -- as a matter --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Please?

Q Thank you. As a matter of principle, does the United States take the position that the violence on the West Bank and Gaza has to stop before anything else happens? Or -- (first ?), that something else happening might stop the violence.

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I think that we believe that there is an urgent, immediate need to try to turn the situation around in the Territories, which will permit dialogue and discussions to take place.

Q But as a matter of principle, this has come up before when the United States gets involved elsewhere, that violence has to stop before something else takes place; or that something takes place, and then, perhaps the violence stops. As a matter of principle, do we feel that the violence must stop before anything else takes place?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm -- I think what I would say -- I think I know what you're driving at, and I don't want to get absolutely fine-tuned because then you can be talking about all different levels and gradations. But, I think that we certainly believe that the present unrest and violence that exists in the Territories needs to be improved upon in order for dialogue to begin. Yes?

Q What is the US position now on the question of elections on the West Bank? Are you in favor, and if so, are you in favor of it being held under the occupation, under UN auspices, since this is considered one of the confidence-building measures that should precede direct negotiations?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm going to go back to what I said before, frustrating as it may be for you, but we want to hear directly from Prime Minister Shamir what his ideas are.

Q Well, I'm asking what's the US position.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I -- I'm -- I'm going to stay right where I left it. Thank you.

Q What do you expect to get accomplished in this meeting that could not be accomplished in a telephone call? (Laughter.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: A telephone call is a very difficult way to conduct diplomacy. I mean, sometimes telephones come in useful, very useful. But, for the sort of detailed and extensive discussion of issues and

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beyond just the peace process issues, as well as to establish the direct personal relations between leaders, are very important facets of --

Q If I can press you on this --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: -- of the conduct of relations.

Q If I can press you on this, you're now talking about a discussion of issues, whereas a minute ago we were only talking about the President "hearing" from Prime Minister Shamir.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I said we wanted to hear what Prime Minister Shamir's ideas were. That doesn't preclude ourselves from saying something in the course of the discussion, I wouldn't think.

Q So, I'll ask you again, in concrete terms, what would you expect to see come out of this meeting?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm not going to prejudge the outcome in concrete terms. I'm very sorry.

Yeah?

Q Yes, you just said that the unrest and violence in the Territories needs to be improved upon. My understanding was that the US government does not consider the intifada as something that should be stopped prior to what my colleague here asked. Do you want to leave us with that impression or do you want to add something? Do you want to change that impression? Do you -- does the administration think that the intifada should be stopped cold as violence in order to carry on? Or does the administration stick by the view that the intifada is not a form of violence that should be stopped before other things take effect?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, the intifada takes different forms. I'd make that point. And it has its more violent aspects. But I think, in terms of your specific question, we've never said -- told anybody, to my knowledge, that, you know, we expect the intifada to come to a complete halt before anything else can happen.

Q \*\*\*\*\*

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q In your opening remarks you talked about a "territorial compromise" as being one of the things you think should be a peace -- a comprehensive peace. Yesterday, the President used the term "end of the occupation." Can you qualify the difference between those two terms?

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not going to improve upon the President's language. I would simply --

Q You choose use it there?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Hmm?

Q You choose to use it there?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I mean it's right there. I can repeat it for you, if you would wish. But I would point out that -- I mean, first of all, I mean, what the President said yesterday in his statement, I think you have to read it in full. It does not represent a change of policy. And secondly, when one speaks of the issue of ending the occupation in the territories, it's said in the context, if you read the statement, of a negotiated settlement.

Q In the whole spectrum of the Middle East, what is the US doing about the shelling of Beirut and the Syrian-Lebanese clash?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I would --

Q Question?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: -- the question was about Lebanon and what are we doing with respect to the --

Q (Off-mike) -- anything being done privately or --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I don't -- don't normally like to speak about subjects outside of the pre-brief. But I will say on Lebanon that we are deeply concerned. We're in very active contact with all of the parties. That includes Damascus, Beirut, as well as the Arab League. I believe there is an Arab League mission that has arrived in Damascus today. We fully support the Arab League efforts to try which is being inflicted on Beirut, and to move on to the necessary political steps that have to be taken, such as the election of a president, and then getting on with reforms.

Q Well, this delegation is an American delegation?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, this is an Arab League delegation.

Q Is the Soviet Union involved in these consultations?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: On Lebanon?

Q Yes.

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Not -- I mean, I'm talking about our  
bilateral discussions. I don't know -- I can't say.

Q -- Moscow, too?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: In terms of discussions with the Soviets,  
I think we've had some -- might have had some discussions with the  
Soviets up at New York in the Security Council, but don't hold me to  
it.

Q Thank you.

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### ביקור רוח"מ בנו יורק

באוולם מלא מפה לפה, נציגי אירגונים יהודים ועמרא. אונסן (4.4) הופיע רוחים בעצרת כ- 115000 ומשוד.

2. מצ"ב התבטאותו של ליטר פולאך נשיא - JCRC סיגימור רייך נשיא ועידת הנשיאים ונאים רוחה"מ.

3. להודיע רוחה"מ היה כיסוי תקשורת רחבי.

מרדייד ירכז

לְמִשְׁׁרֶת

## שם השולחן:

מרדי ירדן

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- TOWN HALL  
Tues. April 4, 1989

OCCASIONS SUCH AS THESE, WITH SUCH EXCEPTIONAL PARTICIPATION, REAFFIRMS OUR COMMITMENT AND ADDS TO THE COMMON BOND BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AMERICAN JEWRY. SINCE ISRAEL'S ESTABLISHMENT ALMOST FORTY ONE YEARS AGO, AND SINCE THE BIRTH OF THE ZIONIST DREAM, WE HAVE NURTURED THIS RELATIONSHIP BY SUPPORTING ISRAEL'S GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, DREAMS AND ASPIRATIONS. NEW YORK JEWS AND AMERICAN JEWS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ZIONIST DREAM.

DESPITE SOME UNFULFILLED ASPIRATIONS, ISRAEL IS THE REALIZATION OF OUR DREAMS - A HAVEN AND HOMELAND FOR THE JEWISH PEOPLE.

ISRAEL IS A DEMOCRACY WHICH HAS STOOD FOR OVER 40 YEARS, AND CONTINUES TO PURSUE WITH VIGOR THE CHERISHED VALUES OF PEACE AND JUSTICE!

OVER THE PAST FOUR DECADES MORE THAN ONE MILLION IMMIGRANTS HAVE BEEN ABSORBED; FIVE WARS HAVE BEEN WAGED; A LAND LONG BARREN THROUGH NEGLECT, IGNORANCE AND DECAY HAS BEEN RESTORED; AN ANCIENT LANGUAGE HAS BEEN RESURRECTED ... ALL OF THIS, AND MUCH MORE MERITS UNDERSCORING, AND IS CERTAINLY WORTH REMEMBERING AND CELEBRATING.

THE TERM PEACE HAS RECEIVED MUCH ATTENTION OF LATE. IT IS A NEW TERM IN THE LEXICON OF SOME, BUT FOR ISRAEL IT IS ROOTED IN THE HISTORY, HERITAGE AND ETHOS OF OUR PEOPLE. SINCE THE

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FOUNDATION OF THE STATE, AND WELL BEFORE THAT, ISRAEL HAS  
RELENTLESSLY TRIED TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE VOLATILE MIDEAST.  
THAT EFFORT CONTINUES. ISRAEL HAS NOT, NOR EVER WILL GIVE UP  
ITS EFFORTS TO BRING ARAB PARTNERS - WHO TRULY WANT A JUST  
RESOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT - TO THE PEACE TABLE.  
ISRAEL AND THE JEWISH PEOPLE STAND UNITED IN ITS SEARCH FOR  
PEACE AND IN ITS DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH RESPONSIBLE  
NEIGHBORS, NEIGHBORS THAT WILL RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF THE  
STATE OF ISRAEL AND PERMANENTLY COVENANT TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY.  
AT THIS TIME IN PARTICULAR, WHEN ISRAEL IS FACING INNUMERABLE  
PRESSURES, WE REAFFIRM OUR UNWAVERING SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.

MR. PRIME MINISTER, WE WELCOME YOU HERE AS YOU CONTINUE YOUR  
MISSION AND WISH YOU SUCCESS AS YOU PURSUE PEACE, THE  
CHERISHED GOAL OF SHALOM.

MR. PRIME MINISTER, WE ARE WITH YOU.

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REMARKS  
BY  
SEYMOUR D. REICH  
CHAIRMAN OF CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS  
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS  
ON  
APRIL 4, 1989 AT TOWN HALL, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Mr. Prime Minister: Welcome to the United States of America, the land of the free and the home of the brave. We are a people that fought a civil war for the right of all men to be equal, and fought foreign wars to defend our nation's freedoms. We are proud of our democratic traditions, proud of our election process, proud of the way our nation's decisions are made.

This is the American way -- elections by a people expressing themselves freely and choosing the men and women who will represent them. Here no one can claim to speak for anyone else. Here free elections determine those who debate the bills and enact the laws and execute the policies of a free democracy.

Some of us have just returned from Israel, where we took part in a great conference on Jewish solidarity with Israel. That Conference was a powerful demonstration of unity among the Jews of the world in support of the Jewish state, eminently fair to all points of view, all-inclusive in its representation, a heartening indication that American Jews and the Jews of the world stand with Israel in her pursuit of a true peace and justice.

In Jerusalem we made clear our views. There were skeptics. There were those who said we would not be heard. We were heard. We saw a unity government. A government that speaks for Israel with one voice. Let there be no misunderstanding of that.

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Our country, the United States, has also expressed itself clearly. President Bush has stated that the parties must negotiate directly, Israel and the Palestinians, that peace cannot be imposed by third parties, and that Jordan must be brought into the process.

The President has made clear that there can be no independent Palestinian state, because such a state would destabilize the region, including Jordan itself.

The President has made clear that there can be no return to the 1967 borders, because those borders are an invitation to war.

The President has made clear that Jerusalem will never again be a divided city. The President of the United States understands and appreciates that Americans regard their commitments to their allies -- of which Israel is one -- as solemn undertakings. We respect our friends and our allies, even if we may differ with them from time to time. I have spoken with the President. I know he cherishes the nature of our country's relationship with Israel. That relationship is deep and strong, and will endure.

Another guest of our country today is Hosni Mubarak, the President of Egypt. Egypt is the only country that after 30 years of war and siege against Israel, of economic boycott and political attack, entered into peace negotiations with Israel and signed a peace treaty whose 10th anniversary we celebrated last week. We salute Egypt and its president for adhering to that treaty of peace, although we wish that it were not so cold a peace as it has turned out to be thus far.

But we cannot fail to express our disappointment at Mr. Mubarak's refusal to meet with Prime Minister Shamir while both leaders are in Washington. The anniversary of the treaty signed by Egypt, Israel and the United States would have been an appropriate

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time to review that achievement and look ahead to further steps in the peace process. President Mubarak's rejection of such talks does not advance the cause of peace and does not build confidence in the possibilities of an early resolution of Arab-Israeli differences.

A word might be said about Israel's "occupation" of Arab lands. The President knows and understands what many newspaper readers and TV viewers may have forgotten: that his "occupation" was the result of a war of aggression against Israel launched by Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1967; that Israel begged King Hussein to stay out of the war, not to join in the attack; that King Hussein nevertheless joined in the fighting and that Israel captured Judea, Samaria and Gaza while defending itself against attack.

Israel does not hold a single acre of land gained by conquest. The President of the United States understands this full well. And so does the President of Egypt. They also understand that it was Israel -- not Jordan -- that opened half a dozen universities in the West Bank for Arab students. And that if the present generation of Palestinians are the most educated young men and women in the Arab world, it is because of the education that Israel provided -- no one else.

Finally, they know that the only free elections held in the Middle East in the last 4,000 years have been the elections held in Israel.

These are some of the reasons why American Jews love Israel, its land and its people; why we are committed to Israel's security; why we are determined that Israel shall be economically sound and militarily strong; why we have faith in the justice of Israel's cause.

We know the destiny of the Jewish people is linked to the fate of Israel. And so, in welcoming the Prime Minister, we renew our pledge of solidarity with Israel, the nation so close and so dear to us.

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Mr. Prime Minister, you leave for Washington tomorrow on a mission of peace. There are no easy answers - no quick fixes. This will be a long process. The government of Israel must determine its own destiny. It is not for the Jewish community in the United States or elsewhere to speak for Israel. We are united in our commitment to the security of the State of Israel and to your quest for peace.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir.

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ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, MR. YITZHAK SHAMIR  
AT THE TOWN HALL, NEW YORK, ON TUESDAY 4 APRIL 1989 AT 7.00 P.M.

Mr. Chairman, Rabbis and Teachers, Leaders of the Jewish Community,  
Dear Friends, Shalom to you all!

I am delighted to have the opportunity to be with you this evening. I see our meeting here as a continuation of the Solidarity Conference in Yerushalayim two weeks ago. It was a memorable demonstration of our unity, and your presence here is another such demonstration. It shows me that you know how important it is for us to be united, to speak as one people. We all know that the only thing that can defeat us at this moment is disunity. United, we can face anything and anyone.

I am pleased that so many of you are here. Still, I would have preferred to see you in Israel and to address you in Hebrew, in our homeland. We all appreciate what the Jews of America have done for Israel. Your contribution is invaluable. But only Aliyah, only life in Israel, can fulfil us as Jews and as a people. If enough of you came to join us many of our present problems would disappear overnight. We need both quantity and quality, and you can give us both. And remember, living in Israel in these times, despite all the difficulties, means taking part in the most exciting adventure in Jewish history since the Exodus from Egypt.

We left Yerushalayim only this morning. In days like these it is good to remember that Jerusalem has been the capital of the Jewish people; the object of our prayers; the center of our thoughts and the symbol of our yearnings for 3,000 years. It was occupied by others during many of these years, but it never served as another nation's capital. Many tend to forget now that for the first 19 years of the State of Israel the city was divided. We could not worship at the Western Wall, and many a time we could not cross the street in our part of the city without risking a sniper's bullet from the Wall of the Old City. We shall never allow this to happen again. The city will stay united. It will stay open. It will stay under Israeli sovereignty, and it will continue to be the capital of Israel forever.

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These are difficult times for our people, and I know you are worried and concerned. But let us remember that our history is not exactly a story of easy times. We faced far greater difficulties in the past. We overcame them all. We shall do so again.

I do not want to underestimate the damage to our image. We should do whatever possible to improve it. But let us not fall into the trap of sacrificing substance for the sake of public relations. Above all, we must remember that we cannot, we will not, risk our survival in order to get good press.

It would not be difficult to make the world love us overnight. All we have to do is declare we are willing to negotiate with the PLO, withdraw from Samaria, Judea and Gaza, and allow a PLO state to be formed there. It will make us very popular for a short while. But it would also endanger our existence.

I would sit with anyone in the world if I thought it would bring peace. I would do it now, today, this minute. But sitting with the PLO will not bring peace. It will guarantee disaster. The PLO is not only a terrorist organization. It is the parent, the trainer, the supporter and the inspirer of international terrorism. It is the originator of air hijackings, of wanton attacks on school buses, of taking pride in atrocities. It has committed some of the most terrible crimes since World War II. The PLO is not a liberation organization seeking to free occupied territories. It was formed before these territories were occupied, for the express purpose of destroying Israel. Its Charter, which the PLO leaders have repeatedly and adamantly refused to change, specifically calls for the destruction of Israel. The claims that the PLO has changed are mocked every day by their deeds. Despite all their public pronouncements, they are continuing, even now, to send terrorists to kill civilians and take hostages.

The majority of the people of Israel understand that by rewarding terrorism and surrendering to violence we would invite continued terrorism and violence. They know that recognizing the PLO can only lead to a second Palestinian state, and they know that a PLO state is a prescription for war. We are not going to let this happen.

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Sometimes I wonder if the people who criticize us remember where we live. In Israel we do not need to be reminded of our surroundings by the bombing of the Pan American flight over Scotland, or by the Rushdie affair and the killing of the Moslem Mullahs in Belgium, or by the daily reports of carnage in Lebanon. We know, first hand, the fanatic terrorism which originates in our region. The Western countries believed that if they appeased the terror organizations, if they made deals with them, terrorism would not touch them. They were wrong. As the history of the twentieth century has taught us, terrorists and fanatics cannot be appeased. Giving in to their demands only whets their appetites. Handing a victory to the PLO now will assure continued terrorism, with greater ferocity, with greater violence, with greater ruthlessness, all over the world. We must not let this happen.

Lebanon, our neighbour to the north is witnessing yet another bloodbath. Hundreds are killed by wanton shooting and shelling. Thousands have fled southward to that area that the media likes to call "Israeli occupied". We are outraged by the cynical selectivity of the media that does not consider the thousands of Arabs killed in Beirut as newsworthy but treat virtually every single Arab casualty in Israel as front-page news. Are the Arabs of Lebanon lesser human beings than the Palestinian Arab? Were they not too created in the image of God?

We are often criticized for not agreeing to the formula "territory for peace". Strangely, no Arab ruler has ever been asked to give territory for peace. We did give up more than 90% of the territory we acquired in the defensive war of 1967. But the Sinai desert is not Judea-Samaria and Gaza. Withdrawing from these populated areas means bringing the horrors of Beirut to the vicinity of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It means giving Arab armies access to the hills of Judea and Samaria which dominate our country. It means putting Israel in greater jeopardy than that of June 1967, for this time the Arab armies are many times stronger and their weapons far more dangerous. Above all, these areas, unlike the Sinai, are part of Eretz Yisrael. We have a 3000 year claim on them. The Arabs say they have a claim on them too. It is their right to put their claim against ours. That is what negotiations are for. We shall present our claim and they will present theirs and we shall reach a settlement. It will not completely satisfy either side, but we shall be able to live with it.

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There are no quick fixes for the situation in our country. We must not expect miracles. The central fact of our life is that Arabs and Jews are inhabiting a very small piece of land, and they must learn to live in it, together, in peace. Tomorrow we will begin talks with leaders of the US Government, including President Bush, Secretary of State Baker and Members of Congress. We look forward to a friendly exchange of views and a common search for ways of improving the situation in the Middle East and moving toward peace. We have never wavered in our dedication to peace and shall not rest until we achieve it.

I shall bring some ideas to the President and the Secretary of State on how to achieve this goal. Let me say here only that we believe the Palestinian Arabs should have self-rule, the maximum that is compatible with our security. I hope that one day we can reach the kind of cooperation and understanding with our Arab neighbors which will make borders irrelevant. Just as they are becoming irrelevant in Europe.

As we approach Pessach, the celebration of our deliverance from Egypt over 3000 years ago, let us try to put today's problems into proper perspective. My generation has seen the greatest tragedy in the history of the Jewish people, and also some of the greatest miracles: The establishment of the State, the ingathering of exiles, the successful defense of the State against great odds, the emigration of over a quarter of a million Soviet Jews, the rescue of thousands of Ethiopians, whose flight represents the first time in history that black people were transported from Africa not for slavery but to freedom, and thousands of other miracles, big and small.

But, our work is not finished. As Americans, you know that nation-building cannot be accomplished in forty years. To continue with our historic calling we must have courage and unity, faith and vision. If we want the State of Israel to thrive, if we want the Jewish people to survive, we must cling to the Zionist vision, and have the strength and courage to give it life.

Let us never forget our people, who have risen from the ashes of the Holocaust to build a nation ...

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Let us never forget the soldiers of Israel who defend our land every day and give their lives for it ...

Let us never forget the countless heroes who refused to bow before their oppressors ...

Let us never forget all our brethren still suffering from oppression simply because they are Jews: In Syria, in Ethiopia, in Yemen and in Iran...

And let us pledge, here and now, that we shall never rest until they, like our forefathers in Egypt, whose deliverance we celebrate soon, will be free to come to the Promised Land.

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שגדו ירושלים נגטו  
טופס מברך

סולג: אגלו;  
דחיפות: מידי  
דף 1. מtower. 2

5.4.89 תאריך, זמן: מס' המברך:

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אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

### דרכן: לשכת השר

INTRODUCTION

ליחלון ה策הרו ואזהט של רוח"מ ומזכיר המדינה ביריק בתום פגישתם היום, 5.4.89, במחמת"ד.

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SHAMIR AND BAKER  
STAKEOUT AT STATE DEPARTMENT  
APRIL 5, 1989

SHAMIR:....and discuss with him the most important elements of our relationship, our relationship between the United States and Israel. We discussed many problems in the spirit of the very friendly..the relationship existing between our two countries, including cooperation in many fields. And I would say the most important problem we would like to work together is the problem of peace in our area. And we have discussed together about some ways to solve the problems related to the conflict between Israel and the Arab world including Arab countries and the Palestinian Arabs living in this country. I have proposed some ideas out of ???? and we've started a very serious discussion about it and we would like to continue this discussion until we will find an appropriate and positive solution. I must add that our conversation was very friendly and I'm very grateful to the Secretary of State.

BAKER: Let me simply say that I would like to echo what he has just said about what I think was a very productive useful and very friendly discussion we spent about an hour and 15 minutes text of a one-on-one discussion and then we retired to a working lunch where we were joined by others. The Prime Minister has made some suggestions we are going to continue our discussions with the objective of moving the peace process forward if it's possible to do so.

SHIFFER: How did you find the Israeli proposal?

BAKER: Well I'm not in a position to characterize that yet. The PM is going to meet with the President He will advance the same proposals to the President. But let me say that I think they were very encouraging...they....hopefully will form the basis under which we can move the peace process forward. As the Prime Minister indicated we still have some talking to do because frankly we just ran out of time. We got into quite a bit of depth we expect to continue the talk.

Q: Can you tell us a little bit about what you proposed?

SHAMIR: Well I cannot go now into all the details of my proposals because we have to continue our discussions about it and I'm going tomorrow to present it to the President and I think after we will be at end of our discussions in Washington I will have the opportunity to explain more details about our proposals.

\*\*

END

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למייפות: מידי זי	שגרירויות ישראל/וושינגטון	ל: 1
סוד: שמור	טופס פלט	סתיו: 6
תאריך וזמן חיבור:		אל: מצפיה
7 באפריל 1989 09:30		
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הפרשך:		
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### בית הנבחרים: רוחים נחברים ובעודם החוץ

ב) דברי הפתיחה של רהיט מוצריים בפרט.

ג) להלן מתר קשיאות ותשנויות (לפי גושאים). ולא לפני הדר) :-

### (1) בחרות בישיע

- המילטון (יוזיר וועדה המשפחת לאירועות ולמציאות): שמענו "

על האUTHORICUM בדבָר קיומ בחרוות-מכל' התקשורה.

וחדיותיהם היו כלליים או פיזיים. האם תוכל לפרט לאבי ה-*MODALITIES*?

**חשיבות רחיה:** הציגנו הצעותינו בפני מארחינו בפה בראשונה היום, ועם ההצעות היו את מחלעותינו האחרוניות (שהתקבלו בטרם בואו של רה'ם לבאן). לפיכך עליינו לעבוד עוד על ההצעות ולבוד את ה-*modalities*. רצינו לדעת אם הממשל יחייב את האישה ואם יהיה מוכן לעבוד עמו עיתם. לדוגמא אם חרעין ...

חשיבותם חיובית: המושל וזכה מzd (EAGER IS) לעבוד עמו בעניין זה. ככלצמננו הגענו למקונה שזו הדר הרצויה ומאהר ואין לנו מוכנים לנהל מורים עם אשיפת יש לבחרו

## תפוצה:

שם פרטי:	שרירות ישראל/וושינגטון	מספר:	2
שם משפחה:	טופס פלוק	מספר:	5
שם אב:	גארין יספן חנוך	שם אב:	אלן
שם אב:	פס' פברק	שם אב:	דע
מספר מסמך:	2/6 115	מספר מסמך:	פאות:

במציאות לאטימטיים של האוכלוסייה הפלסטינאית.

- מק-היי (בכירות בזועמת המשנה לפעולות דרום):

הכל מסכימים שטוב יהיה לעורר בחירות. לאור התנגדותם. לביהול מורים עם אשיפ. רצוני לשאול:

- סביר להניח שבין המועמדים יהיו כאלה שיבינו חמיכה באשייפ. האם תרשו להם להתמודד?

- היה ויודיעו אחרי הבחירה שהם שייכים לאשייפ, האם חמכינו לשאת ולחת עטם?

- תשובה רח'ם: זו שאלת טוב ויש לה שייכות למציאות. המשתתפים בבחירה יצטרכו להסביר מראש לתוכיר דו-שלבי: קודם ניהול מורים לפתרון הביניים ואחרי-כך לפתרון הכללי.

אשייפ רואת בחקמת מדינה מייד ולכון אין להניח שאנשיו ישתתפו בבחירה. היה וייהו כאלה המביעים חמיכה באשייפ לאחר בחירות, אני משער שדבריהם יחו מஸול.

- סולרז': הצעותיכם בדבר הבחירה ייצורית מאד. הכל תקווה שיש בהן בסיס אפקטיבי לקידום תחיליך השלום. שאלותי:

- האם פלטינאים תושבי מזרח ירושלים יהיו רשאים לטלול חלק בבחירה?

- לאחר הבחירה, יתחילו המורים על האוטונומיה. המורים האחראונים בנושא הופסקן בתחילת שנות השמונים. האם ישראל הרירה מזע על הנושא והאם היא תהיה מוכנה להיות

יותר FORTHCOMING לABI סמכויות השלטון העצמי.

- תשובה רח'ם:

- לABI השתתפות ערבי מזרח ירושלים, שאלת זו כבר התעוררה בשיחות בתחילת השמונים. בישראל רוחות דומות שונות בנדון. עלינו להמתין ולראות כיצד תישוב השאלה.

- באשר למורים הקודמים על האוטונומיה, אין לא הופסקו בשל הקשיים אלא בשל העובדה שלאחר פטירתו של סאדאת, ממייצרים לא היתה מוכנה להמשיך בלי השתתפות הפלסטינים והראייה לכך: דברי מובהרכי לעתון ערבי בזמן האחרון, לפיהן השיחות הופסקו בשל לחץ יאחיבם ערביים.

תפוצה:

דוחות:	שרירות ישראל/וושינגטון	ז' :
פונט:	טופס נבדוק	ט' :
תאריך יופן חעוץ:		אל:
פס' כביך:		דע' :
תפליך:	115/6/2	פאות:

אנוואנס:

- האם אתה חוזה הוצאה חילילם ישראליים מאייזוריים מוכפלים לפני קיומם הבחירה ?
- האם תהיינו מוכנים לפיקוח אוימי או בינלאומי אחר על הבחירה ?
- האם תחליף אדמות (LAND TRANSFER) תהייה אפשרית ?
- חשיבות רה"מ:

- לפי הסכם האוטונומיה, על צהיל לצתת מאייזוריים מוכפלים ולהעניק מחדש מאייזוריים מוגדרים. מובן מاليו שלאחר השגת הסכם בנייניים, לא יהיה צורך בהצבת כוחות באיזוריים מוכפלים. מאייזר אין לנו רואים צורך להוציא כוחותינו מאייזוריים אלה לפני קיומם הבחירה.
- באשר למשקיפים בינלאומיים לבחירות, אין סבורים שאין צורך בהם אך ניתן לדון בדבר. לדעתנו אין וחלופת נאים מוגבלים לארגן את הבחירה לבדנו (כאן הזכיר רה"מ השתפות ערביי ישראל בבחירה עצמנו) - אך כאמור אין מוכנים לדון ברעיון.
- אין צורך לדון בשאלת הטריטוריאלית כתה. הצדדים יצטרכו להגיא לפתרון שהוא מתקבל על-ככל אחד מהתמודד הקבוע של השטחים, כולל כמובן השאלה הטריטוריאלית.

(2) ירדן ותחבירו שלום

- פסקל. למיטב הבנתי, אם מוכנים לקיומם הבחירה בישיע, לניהול מויים ללא תנאים על פתרון בנייניים, ולהתדייגות בפתרונו לקראת הטווח הארוך יותר. בנוסף אם רוצחים שירדן תועל חלק ביהליר. שאלתי: באיזה שלב הם רוצחים. בהשתפות ירדן - בהתחלה, באמצעות או בסוף ? ואיזה תמריץ קיים כדי להביא את ירדן לשולחן הדיבוניים ?
- חשיבות רה"מ. אין מעוניינים מוד בנסיבות ירדן למויים, כי הרי נמצא עצמה אוכלוסייה פלסטינית גדולה, מה עוד שיש לה גבול ארוך עם ישראל. אחד מיעדי המויים הינו חוזה שלום עם ירדן, וכך חתמה תועלת רבה בהשתפות ירדן למויים. אבל הכל תלוי בירדן עצמה. אם חוטין ישנה את עמדתו (מיולי אשתקד), נשמה מוד.

**תפוצה:**

תתייפות:	שרירות ישראל/וושינגטן	ד"ק:	4
סוד:	טופס פלוק	סתור:	5
גאיין יספן חנוך:		אל:	
קס. פברוק:		דע:	
הפסנץ:		פאות:	
4/6	11/1		

- פסקל (שאלת נומסתה): כבר לפני 20 שנה הצעיר חוספין קונפדרצייה. עכשיו הוא הרוצח את עצמו מהמעgal, והוא יכול לטעון שבעשך 20 שנה דחף רעיון הקונפדרצייה והוא לא הצליח. רצוי לדעת אם להערכתך השחתפותו בחלילך חיובית?

- רהיימן: השיב: חיוב.

#### (3) ישראל - מצרים

- לוינין: שאלתי את מובארקי מדוע לא הסכים להפגש אחר פה בוושינגטן. לדבריו, עליה מתחכבות פרטית שאין ממשות בעמדותיך ולכון הוא לא ראה טעם בפגישת צדו. האם זה נכון שהוא חנאים מוקדמים לפגישה וחותם תוכל להעירך את מערכת היחסים בין לבני מובארקי ומארים בכלל?

- תשובה רהיימן: אין זה נעים להתווכח בפומבי עם מובארקי על העובדות. אולם אכן מעוניינים מאד בפגע אישי עם כל מנהיגי ערבי, ובמיוחד עם מנהיג המדינה שהיא במצב של שלום אהנו. תגבורתו של מובארקי לכל האUTHORI בהקשר זה תמיד הייתה שלילית. כਮובן הוא ער/לדיעות ולבמדותי, אך אין זו סיבה לא להפגש עמי <sup>אם</sup> ~~אם~~ לקיים שיחות עמי <sup>אם</sup> ~~אם~~ קח לדוגמא <sup>טבילה</sup> ~~טבילה~~ חמורות לפני זמן מה כאשר היה מוכן לבוא לישראל - מיד החכונו לביקורו, והוא חזר בו.

#### (4) ברה"ם, ישראל ותימוש מדיניות ערבי.

- גillum (בכircular תמיינוט בוועדת המשנה לאירועה ולמחיה): ביקש עידכו לABI יחת ישראל-ברה"ם.

- תשובה השר: "אין חדשות מיוחדות. להם עדיין משלחת קונסולרית בישראל ולנו משלחת במוסקבה. ברם במישור המיניסטריאלי לא קורת דבר רציני. שורר נדזה לא השמייע התבאות חיובית, ולABI <sup>שידנו</sup> חדש היחסים הדיפלומטיים (שהם דבר בסיסי ביחסים בין מדינות) לא צריך להיות מותנה על החלטות ישראליות ושינויים במדיניותנו, כדרישת הסובייטים.

תפוצה:

דוחות:	שרירות ישראל/וושינגטון	דוח: 5
סוד:	טופס פלוק	סוד: 6
תאריך ייצון מסע:		אל:
מספר כבirk:		דעת:
מספר:	5/6 115	פאת:

- גילמן (שאלת נספחת): האם הפסיכיאטרים ממשיכים להזרים נשק ללוב ולמזהית בכלל?
- תשובה רחيم: לרוב הצער, כן. ייתכן שלוב וסורייה איבן מקבלות את כל זה. אך אין זה משנה הועודשה שהפסיכיאטרים ממשיכים לחשוף אותן בכך.

#### (5) האיום החיצוני לבטחון ישראל

- ברומפילד (בכיר חמיוט בזועמת החוץ): התיחס להפצת טקי"ק ונשק כימי במזהית, וכן למפעל לייצור נשק כימי בלוב ואספקת מפציצים סובייטיים למדינה זו. ביקש לדעת את ההשלכות לבטחון ישראל.
- תשובה רחيم: סכנת הנשק הכימי אכן נשקת עליינו ואנו מודאגים מכך. אין לנו הפעם הראשונה שאנו עדים להכנת נשק כימי לאיזורנו. לאחרונה ראיינו את השימוש בו בעיראק ועתה נשק כזה מצוי גם בידי סוריה ולוב. עליינו לדאוג להגנתנו. אנו עובדים על פתרון לבביה זו, יחד עם אריהיב ומיכיון שקשה להשיב לאיים מהבחינה הכתומתית, גישתנו מכוונת לשמרת עליונותנו האיקותית. אנו מקווים שאריהיב תוסיף להמור במאץ זה.
- דורבן: רק אריהיב ובריהם מומחים בכך שיש לנו גז מרעל, אך לפי המודיעין האמריקאי, לפחות תשע מדינות נוספות, יש לנו נשק כימי כזה. ערבים אינם מוכנים לוותר על נשק זה עד אשר ישראל תותר על האופציה הגרעינית שלו. במagenta לפרק את הערבים מנשך הכימי, האם ישראל תהיה מוכנה לפתח מתקפה הגרעינית שלא לפיקוח בינלאומי?
- תשובה רחيم: ישראל بعد איזור חופשי מńsk גרעיני מזרחה התיכון. ערבים אינם מוכנים לכך.

#### (6) רפורמות אלקטו-ריאליות בישראל

- שויגיאר: תדמית ישראל ניזוקה לאחר הבחירות שלכם ו עקב חיליך הרכב הממשלה החדשה. האם רפורמות אלקטו-ריאליות אפשריות?
- תשובה רחימן: אנו דנים בנושא כיום, וביתן לפתרו את הבעיה בעקבות הקמת ממשלה

תפוצה:

יתיפות:	שרירות ישראל/וושינגטן	מ"ל:
סוג:	טופס פלוק	מספר:
תאריך ו开会 חתום:	אל:	
שם כביר:	דעת:	
מספר:	פאת:	
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האחדות. חוקמה וועדה מיוחדת עם אישור המלצותיה, הממשלה תדון בהן. אובי מקווה שהכנסת חתמור בשינויים ואם תושג רפורמה במערכת, תהיה ذات אחד מהתוצאות החשובות ביותר של משלתי. (לבקשת שוינייר, הצבע רהימ על מספר השינויים האפשריים הנשקלים ביזמת).

ו.ס גאנט  
לمدن.

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תפוצה:

שם פרטי:	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון	טלפון:
שם משפחה:	וילס פלורק	כתובת:
תאריך:	תל אביב 4 במרץ 1900	טלפון:
שם:	מיכאל ראהים CAN	שם:
מספר:	63	שם:
שם:	הציגן: חזיר, וושינגטון	שם:

### ביקורי ראותם ומוכרך.

לרי זינגרג וברוב אשר ביקשו להפגש דחויפת עם דניש רוס ע"מ לחייב בפניו המשל את דאגתו העומקת מתוך עברי הנשיה בוש בתחום השיכחה עם מוגראק.

בדברי תשובה זו אמר רום שאכן אפשר היה לנשח את ההודעה בצורה טובה יותר (בשיטה נפרדת עמי אמר רום שחתיקטן פיעז'ה ממחמ'יד לא כלל את הפטקה חז'ו ולהערכתו ריצ'רד האס הוסיפה אח'יך) כמו כן חוסיף שהכתבה של פרידמן הילסבי'ג'ו יורך ט'ימט' איננה משקפת את טון השיחות עם מוגראק ולעומת זו של אוטורי ב'וושינגטונ פוטט' יותר משקפת. רום הצבע עפני אני שיחו על דברי מוגראקacha'צ' ביחס פגיתו עם ביבקר בעניין הבהירות וגם בעניין הועידה הבינלאומית עית להוכיח שארה'יב הצליחה לרכז את מדותינו הראשוניות.

המחל הוסיף רום - לא רואה בكونספראצייה עם ישראל. מאיידן הם רוצחים לקבל אישור מראהיהם על נוכחות להכנת למו"ם על הסדר הקבע וכמוון היו רוצחים גם לפרט את האופציות השוכנות להסדר זה. בהקשר להסדר קבוע אמר רום שכדי להטבל על קמפני דוד שבית כי יש שם תמיHOSTOT לנסיגה מקרע וכן אוטונומיה שהיא לעריתוריה. רום ציין שארה"ב תבקש לא רק מישראל אלא גם מדינות ערב לסייע בआידם המיזועדים לשופור האוירה.

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