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מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

משכר רלוף

יולי מדני

ארה"ב

24/2/89 - 19/2/89

תיק מס'

12

מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פיו: 4608/12-A

מזהה פריט: R00036p4

כתובת: 2-111-2-4-8

תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

דמיפות: דגיל	שגרירות ישראל/וויסינגטון	זק: _____
סוג: גלרי	טופס פבוק	מתוך: _____
תאריך וזמן מעור: 241600 פברואר 1989		אל: _____
פס' פבוק:	מנכ"ל חוצר	דע: _____
הפסרד:	דברת/אוצר	
1/22 619		כאת: ק. לקונגרס

סיכום חוץ

רצ"ב חדר"ח השנתי על מצב הכלכלה בישראל שהוגש ע"י AID לקונגרס (כפי שמתבקש עפ"י חוק) לקראת השימועים על סידע לישראל לשנת"א 1990.

השימועים יפתחו ביום ד' הקרוב.

להשומת לבכם ל- Executive Summary בע"מ 1.

ואלף/אלף פכנלר
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תפוצה:

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20521

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
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The Honorable James Wright
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to Section 1205(b) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, as amended, please find enclosed the Israel Economic Report. The report discusses economic conditions prevailing in Israel that may affect its ability to (a) meet international debt obligations and (b) stabilize its economy.

Sincerely,



Kelly C. Kammerer
Director
Office of Legislative Affairs

Enclosure a/s

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REPORT ON THE ECONOMY OF ISRAEL

January 1989

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Executive Summary

Israel's comprehensive economic stabilization program, launched in 1985, initially lowered inflation and stabilized prices, while reducing the trade deficit. Underlying economic factors and external forces, however, combined to slow both the ambitious adjustment and economic growth in 1988. These problems include (a) an inflation rate that remains higher than Israel's trading partners' (b) wage rates that are outstripping productivity; (c) private consumption expenditures that are rising faster than GNP; (d) a fixed nominal exchange rate and relatively high interest rates in 1988 that tended to enlarge the current account deficit and slow investment; and (e) stagnant growth in productivity in the business sector. The uprising in the occupied territories is also having a negative impact on the economy. Not surprisingly, it appears that real GDP growth will drop to 1% in 1988.

Recent budgets had succeeded in reducing the budgetary deficit, excluding foreign grants, to 10% of GDP by 1986/87. Lower economic growth and the uprising in the occupied territories have, however, widened the deficit again. Despite diligent efforts to restrain spending, current expenditures rose an estimated 15% in 1988. Subsidy cuts on transport, education, health, fuels, milk, poultry and bread and a few cuts in Ministry budgets were therefore announced in November 1988 and January 1989 in an attempt to reverse direction on the budget deficit.

Exchange rate policy and high domestic interest rates continued to attract overseas capital, possibly contributing to money supply growth in the latter half of 1988. The fixed exchange rate policy, however, made it impossible to reduce inflation further from its current 17% level to the world rate of about 4%, also reducing the profitability of exports and import substitutes. Recognizing the unsustainability of such a policy, the GOI devalued the shekel 13.4% during the week ending January 1.

Israel's trade deficit widened in 1988, as a result of an overvalued exchange rate and earlier wage hikes. The GOI, however, was able to sustain its \$4 billion deficit through net unilateral transfer payments, primarily to the public sector. U.S. aid, which amounts to US \$1.8 billion in military assistance and another US \$1.2 billion in cash grants annually, is the primary source of the transfers. Despite the transfers, Israel is continuing to run a current account deficit of \$1 billion annually.

6/19 A. Recent Economic Trends

6/22 The year 1985 was a turning point for the Israeli economy. Following more than ten years of rapid inflation and balance of payments deficits, the government in July 1985 launched a comprehensive program for economic stabilization. The program achieved significant improvements in two critical areas --inflation and the budget, and, temporarily, also in the balance of payments.

Inflation dropped from an annual level exceeding 400% in 1984 to 20% in 1986, 16% in 1987 and about 17% in 1988. The current account of the balance of payments changed from a US \$1.5 billion deficit in 1984 to a US \$1.1 billion surplus in 1985. A US \$1.5 billion surplus in the current account was recorded in 1986, but 1987 showed a US \$997 million deficit. The deficit was expected to stay at roughly the same level in 1988. The budget deficit, exclusive of foreign aid, has declined from 26% of GNP in 1984/85 to 10% in 1986/87. This ratio may, however, have retrogressed to 14% during 1987/88.

Economic activity surged in the second half of 1986 and the first half of 1987. Productivity increased in the business sector from 2.9% in 1986 to 3.2% in 1987. Unemployment dropped from 7.1% in 1986 to 6.1% in 1987. The expansion was fueled by rapid growth of private consumption and investment. Private consumption rose 14% in 1986 and 8.1% in 1987. Fixed investment (excluding housing) rose 1.1% in 1986 and 16.8% in 1987. Public consumption, excluding defense imports, declined 4% in 1985, remained stable in 1986, and rose only 1.8% in 1987.

These achievements, however did not address the underlying structural problems that led to the development of

- a. Higher inflation in 1988 (roughly 12% above inflation rates among Israel's major trading partners).
- b. Wage gains in excess of productivity: real wages rose 8% annually in 1986 and 1987 and gained another 6% in 1988.
- c. Private consumption in excess of GNP growth: private consumption jumped 14% in 1986; 8% in 1987; and an estimated 3% in 1988. GNP growth was 3.3% in 1986, 3% in 1987, and only 1% in 1988. Consequently, private savings did not increase sufficiently to finance investments and narrow the balance of payments deficit.

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- d. The stabilization plan and the end of the high inflation had long been characterized by a fixed nominal exchange rate (despite domestic inflation significantly higher than world inflation) and by relatively high interest rates. Together with the rapid rise in wages and in consumption, these factors tend to accelerate the current account deficit and to slow the rate of increase in investment.
- e. Factor productivity has not grown significantly either this year. The exceptional increase in productivity growth during the years 1985-1987 may have been due to the following factors: the sharp decline in the rate of inflation, which diverted efforts from financial to productive activities; the decline in energy prices which increased the value added of domestic production; and the pullout from Lebanon, which decreased the number of reserve duty days and the resulting work disruptions. The impact of these factors on productivity growth was of a one-time nature and has probably faded; the rate of inflation is relatively stable, and energy prices are not expected to decline further.

These underlying problems contributed to a general economic slowdown in mid-1987, which was exacerbated by the start of the uprising in the occupied territories in December 1987. Investment and exports stagnated as well as business output, especially in manufacturing.

The uprising is having a number of specific negative impacts on the economy. The construction sector, in which 45,000 of the 110,000 workers employed in the sector live in the Territories, was estimated to have declined by 10% in 1988 (about 400 million NIS). The tourism sector is being hurt even more: by as much as 20% in terms of the number of tourists (about 250,000 tourists) and a decline in tourist revenues of approximately \$250 million. Moreover, an increase of about 2% in domestic military expenditures is anticipated. The business sector productivity is also affected by the erratic supply of workers from the Territories and the extension of reserve duties so that productivity growth in 1988 fell to about 1%.

B. Fiscal Policy and Government Budget

The budget for fiscal 1988 attempted to reverse the recent deterioration in the fiscal deficit, but economic stagnation, and the uprising have combined to stymie efforts at renewed austerity. There was a diligent effort to limit the increase in the budget deficit just six weeks before the November 1988

6/9 election through subsidy cuts for transport, milk, poultry, and bread and by small across-the-board cuts for most Ministries. Further subsidy cuts were announced on January 1, especially on gasoline, kerosene and heavy fuel.

8/22 Government expenditures on wages have been rising more slowly in recent years than the rate of inflation. This trend is expected to continue in 1989. Despite numerous labor disputes during the election year, the government has not made any major concessions to labor unions. Negotiations are continuing on a new cost of living formula and a delinking of the minimum wage to average wage levels. Defense spending was expected to grow more than purchases for civilian purposes in 1988.. Altogether, ordinary spending was expected to grow 15%.

Tax revenues have scarcely risen at all in 1988 due to the slack economy and the 1987 tax cuts. In January 1989, tariffs on imports are being lowered as a result of trade agreements with the U.S. and the European Community. Under these agreements, tariffs and purchase taxes on imports will be reduced 20%, thus reducing government income from tariffs by some 500 million NIS. Some increase in imported goods might reasonably be expected so that sales and value-added taxes may partially compensate for the lost revenue. The 1989 budget contains a number of new revenue measures, including higher educational and health charges and higher purchase taxes on cars, which will also help to offset this lost revenue.

The estimated deficit for 1987/88 before foreign grants rose to 14% of GDP from 10% in 1986/87. The new measures introduced during the last three months will hopefully achieve greater budgetary austerity. Failure to continue the earlier progress towards reducing the budget deficit will make it impossible to reduce the import surplus and the current 17% inflation rate.

C. Business Sector Output and Employment

The general trend in manufacturing over the past twenty years has been towards high-tech industries which have had an increasing share of output and exports relative to the traditional industries. In 1987, manufacturing output grew at an annual rate of 6%. As noted, this was a result of the consumption boom and the export expansion. Output of chemicals and food rose at above average rates; in the metal and electronic industries, there was a slight rise and in textiles, output was stable. Commerce and services revenue rose 8.5% in 1987. Manufacturing output probably declined 2% during 1988.

The prevailing high rates of interest prevent significant increases in the level of investment and expansion of the economy's productive capacity. This factor combined with the

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low level of business confidence has probably caused fixed investment to fall 3% in 1988. All in all, both GDP and business sector output probably increased by only about 1% in 1988. Given a population growth rate of about 1.6 - 1.7%, it follows that GDP per capita is virtually stagnant, putting an end to the short episode of economic growth in 1986-1987.

Employment rose 3% in 1987 and, as a result, unemployment declined to 6.1%. The downward trend continued in the first quarter of 1988 and unemployment reached a low level of 5.4%, in spite of the slowdown in the economy. This drop is due to the temporary absence of workers from the Territories and their temporary replacement by Israeli workers. With continuing stagnation throughout the rest of 1988, the unemployment rate has been rising. In the third quarter of 1988, unemployment reached 6.9% and rose above 7% in the fourth quarter. Noteworthy has been the rise of public sector employment (over 20,000 employees) which moderated somewhat the losses in private employment opportunities.

D. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

Monetary policy over the periods 1986-1987 was characterized by a fixed exchange rate. However, money supply continued to rise at a rapid pace. The overvalued exchange rate was associated with high domestic interest rates, exceeding foreign interest rates significantly. This interest rate differential generated sizeable capital inflows (borrowing at low interest abroad in order to earn high rates in Israel). High interest rates are also fostered by a highly segmented capital market in which limited unsubsidized capital is bid up to high interest rate levels. This sizeable inflow of capital may explain the large increases in domestic money supply. As a matter of fact, a leading monetary aggregate rose 27% in 1986 and 29% in 1987. These increases are, at least, much less than the annual triple digit increases during 1983-85.

The rapid growth in the domestic money supply has been a major determinant in continued high increases in domestic prices and wages. Thus, for example, nominal wages in manufacturing rose 43% between the second half of 1985 and the second half of 1986 and rose another 32% by the second half of 1987. In the services industries, nominal wages rose 27% and 55%, respectively during the same periods. The manufacturing price index rose 19% and 18%, respectively, and the services price index rose 54% and 42%, respectively.

Real wages in manufacturing rose 20% in the second half of 1986 over the second half of 1985 and continued to rise by an additional 10% through the second half of 1987; while over the same periods, real wages in the services industries rose only 1% and then fell 11%.

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Continuation of this monetary policy, and in particular, the lags in the adjustment of the exchange rate caused a widening gap between the prices of services and the prices of traded goods and an increase in the trade deficit. Today, it is clear to all policy-makers, and the public at large that the price of an unrealistic exchange rate is the deterioration of profitability in export and import-competing industries.

The shekel was devalued by 13.4%, vis a vis the dollar in two stages at the beginning of 1989. This devaluation was accompanied by subsidy and budget cuts. The devaluation and budget cuts will improve the productivity and competitiveness of Israeli goods and services only if the labor unions forgo a cost of living adjustment that would otherwise have been triggered.

In addition to these problems, 1988 has been a difficult year for management of the internal national debt. Most of a record high government debt of 16 billion shekels (up from 8.2 billion shekels in 1987) has been recycled. This recycling had notably included 55% out of US \$3.7 billion in bank shares in October 1988; the rest was redeemed. Investors used most of the proceeds of the redeemed bonds for additional savings instruments so little has been left for expanded consumption. Recent expectations for an approaching devaluation of the shekel had pushed up nominal interest rates on government bonds. In 1988 Israel did refinance \$4.75 billion of its FMS debt. This will save Israel over \$100 million annually in debt service payments.

E. Other Economic Reforms

1. Privatization

It is commonly acknowledged that government intervention in the Israeli economy is above the optimal level, especially with regard to its direct ownership of economic entities. However, some progress was made on this issue during 1988 with completion of the sale of 74% of Paz Oil Company and with inter-ministerial approval given for the sale of 74% of Israel Chemicals. There has been a drastic reduction in government financial aid being provided to distressed companies, with Alliance Tire Factory, for example, being allowed to close. Planning has been underway to allow private takeover of grain imports. Future steps toward privatization will probably be based on the recommendations of the report submitted by the First Boston Corporation to the Ministry of Finance. A weakness in the report is that it focused on the steps that should be taken towards privatization in several government enterprises. It did not sufficiently stress that a privatization plan should be accompanied by government

6/9 deregulation to foster a climate in which private interests will wish to purchase and operate government assets. The Ministry of Finance has stated that the proceeds of asset sales will be used to retire debt.

11/22 During 1987 controls on numerous prices had been lifted so that by early 1988, only 26% of consumer items were still covered by price controls compared to 89% in January 1986.

2. Tax Reforms

In early 1988, a committee of experts prepared a report on reform of the individual income tax system. Several recommendations made by the committee are likely to be adopted next year (but would not affect tax receipts before 1990). These recommendations include the reduction of the tax burden on low and medium-income individuals, without changing the tax rates on high-income individuals. This is proposed to be done by means of a reduction in the tax rates, an increase in the number of tax credits and a widening of the tax brackets.

3. Capital Market Reform

Government intervention in the capital market has been extensive. In previous years, this involvement was implemented through numerous mechanisms dealing with investments and forms of savings. These included: tax breaks on various types of savings; the need for Treasury and Knesset approval for all stock and bond issuances by commercial firms in the stock exchange; the regulation requiring banks, pension funds and retirement funds to invest the major part of the savers' deposits in government bonds; the granting of subsidized credit for specific investments or for short-term financing of exports (by means of reduced interest or directed credit); and restrictions on the international movements of capital. Most of these features promoted the directing of financial savings towards the government. Since 1985, the government began to allow greater private sector discretion in the transfers of savings funds. In 1987-88 several changes were implemented: the Ministry of Finance gave a general approval on issues by the business sector (limiting only firms owned by commercial banks), and the Bank of Israel eliminated the preferential tax treatment of government bonds over corporate bonds.

A new series of capital market reforms was announced on January 1, 1989. These involved principally measures for reducing interest rates on local credits, promoting easier access to the Israeli capital markets for corporate borrowers and permitting greater access to foreign credit and foreign currency in Israeli banks abroad and to foreign security markets.

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The proposed tax reform also includes recommendations which would have a positive impact on the capital market. These include imposing a 25% to 35% tax on income from capital, including real capital gains on securities traded on the stock exchange and interest on savings plans. Also included among the recommendations are the preservation of tax benefits to long-term savings (and, especially, retirement benefits), while taxing principal and interest at the time of withdrawal. These proposals will be reviewed further by the new government.

4. Wage Reform in the Public Sector

Another committee of experts is expected to publish its recommendations in the beginning of 1989 concerning a reform of the wage structure in the public sector. This report is expected to suggest a new wage scale for the public sector which would reduce the number of wage levels and give equal treatment to all wage components. In particular, all wage components would be included for pension payments. All these recommendations, if adopted by the government, may increase government spending on wages in the next fiscal year.

F. Balance of Payments and External Debt

1. Trade Balance

With civilian imports rising more rapidly than exports during 1988, the civilian current account deficit rose to an estimated \$3.9 billion, compared to \$3.4 billion in 1987. Military imports declined by some \$700 million so that the overall trade deficit improved. Exports of most manufacturing industries began to decrease in the third quarter of 1988 as a result of the exchange rate freeze and the wage hikes. Agricultural exports were particularly depressed due to decreased demand in Europe and the extreme weather conditions in the spring.

The effect on Israel's exports of the fixed exchange rate and the weakening of the dollar relative to the European currencies was delayed into 1988 through the attempt to keep various export contracts between Israeli producers and their American counterparts.

The demand for imported goods, both for consumption and for investment, was weak during 1988 owing to the slump in the economy. Demand might have been still weaker if there had not been attractive import prices due to the overvalued exchange rate. In January 1989, trade agreements with the U.S. and the European Community are coming into force, reducing tariffs on a large number of imported goods by 20%. These agreements may act as an additional stimulus to imports.

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2. Unilateral Transfers and Overall Current Account Transactions

The size of the net unilateral transfer payments explains how Israel can survive a civilian current account deficit of some US \$4 billion annually. As seen in Table 5, these transfers rose steadily through 1984, jumped during 1985 and 1986 and then dropped in 1987 by US \$550 million. Transfer payments to the public sector dropped by US \$935 million and transfers to individuals increased by US \$390 million. The primary source of transfer payments to the public sector is U.S. aid, which has included over the past years US \$1.8 billion in military aid and US \$1.2 billion in civilian grants. A bulge occurred during 1985 and 1986, as a result of US \$750 million in supplemental assistance received from the U.S. during each of those years.

Following ten years in which the U.S. military aid was given as a long term loan, 1985 and onwards saw military aid given as grants. A further source of unilateral transfer payments to the public sector comes from Jewish organizations mainly within the framework of the United Jewish Appeal. These transfers have fluctuated over the past few years and have ranged between US \$314 million and US \$410 million.

The private sector's capital movements of foreign currency is subject to widespread controls. The control of foreign currency is designed to reduce capital export during years of crisis in the balance of payments and to avoid importation of short-term speculative capital when interest rates in Israel are higher than those abroad. However, it is difficult for the control authorities to avoid speculative capital movements with the tools available to them. As a result, the high rate of interest on local currency deposits has encouraged foreign investors to expand their transfers into NIS during 1987 and 1988.

The dramatic improvement in the current account (from US \$1.4 billion deficit in 1984 to US \$1.2 billion surplus in 1985) was halted in 1987, with the end of the emergency aid of US \$750 million by the U.S. government. However, this trend was partly offset by the increase of more than US \$300 million per year in private unilateral transfers during 1986-87. Overall trends in Israel's balance of payments are presented in Table 6.

3. External Debt

After several years in which the external debt was increasing by large amounts (between 1973 and 1984 the debt increased, on the average, by 16% annually), the trend changed in 1985. In the latter year, the external debt stopped growing

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14/22 for the first time, and since then has more or less stabilized at the level of approximately US \$20 billion. Moreover, the burden of the external debt, which is denominated mostly in US dollars, decreased as a result of the weakening of the dollar relative to the European currencies and the Japanese yen.

Consequently, the ratio of net debt to GNP has improved significantly during the last three years; it has been reduced from 80% of GNP in 1984 to 57% in 1987. This reduction consists of 2% decrease in net debt (in current dollars), 8% increase in real GNP and 23% increase in nominal GNP, measured in current dollars. The debt to export ratio also improved from 188% in 1984 to 140% in 1987.

No significant differences occurred over the past year regarding the various features of the debt; the public sector's portion is still high - some 55%. Israel has a surplus of assets invested in the world banking system and has a net surplus of liquid assets relative to current liabilities.

Most of the gross external debt is long-term. Although the ratio of debt outstanding to GNP is high relative to most countries, the maturity structure of Israel's debt does not expose Israel to any liquidity crisis in the foreseeable future. The debt service burden has also declined during the last two years as the ratio of debt service to GNP decreased from 13% in 1985 to 10% in 1987.

4. Debt to the U.S. Government

Prior to 1985, the U.S. military aid was given to Israel in the form of long-term loans. Israel has accumulated a military debt to the United States Government of some US \$5.45 billion, with interest rates ranging from 10-14%. Total debt incurred from the United States government totals about US \$10 billion, with annual debt servicing running about US \$1.1 billion. Thus, the debt payments to the American Government amount to most of the civilian aid granted.

In 1988, the Israeli Government converted US \$4.75 billion dollars of its debt to the U.S. Government by selling bonds in the U.S. capital market. These bonds are 90% guaranteed by the U.S. Government. By converting the debt via the sale of bonds, Israel saves over \$100 million dollars a year on interest payments.

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Table 1: Main Indicators of the Economy of Israel
Rates of change

	1985	1986	1987
National Accounts (Annual Rates)			
Gross Domestic Product	3.7	3.3	5.2
Government Consumption	-1.0	-3.5	1.8
Private Consumption	0.5	14.2	8.1
Investment in Fixed Assets	-7.8	-1.6	13.7
Exports	8.5	5.6	10.8
Imports	-3.8	15.2	11.2
Supply Side Components (Annual Rates)			
Business Sector			
Production	5.0	5.3	6.9
From this: Industry	7.1	6.4	5.8
Construction	-2.4	-4.7	7.8
Commerce and Services	5.5	8.7	8.3
Public Services	-0.4	-2.9	0.7

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Table 2: Main Budget Aggregates
(In Percent of GDP)

	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88
Current expenditure of which:	59	61	61	59	55
Defense domestic purchases	12	11	12	11	10
Defense purchases abroad	9	10	10	9	7
Civilian goods and services	19	19	20	19	15
Wages and salaries	8	9	8	8	8
Subsidies and transfers	19	18	17	18	18
Interest payments	12	14	16	13	12
Capital expenditure	6	3	3	2	2
Total revenue	46	38	47	51	46
Deficit before foreign grants	20	26	17	10	14

Source: IMF adapted data from GOI Ministry of Finance.

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Table 3: Trade Account
(millions of dollars)

	1985	1986	1987	1988*
Merchandise Exports	6,084.4	6,932.9	8,222.4	7,721.9
Merchandise Imports	8,020.9	9,285.0	11,451.0	10,245.4
Trade Deficit	1,936.5	2,352.1	3,228.6	2,523.5

*Ten Months

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Table 4: Composition of Exports
(in millions of dollars)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988*
Agriculture	529	468	560	613	467
Industry	5222	5748	6551	7806	7394
Ores & Minerals	245	255	249	252	217
Food	372	383	333	436	435
Textiles	373	379	466	592	516
Chemicals	750	835	792	1039	936
Metals, Machinery and Electronics	1760	1928	2204	2430	2199
Diamonds (net)	1035	1263	1664	2059	2194
Total	5622	6084	6933	8222	7721

*Ten Months

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Table 5: Unilateral Transfers 1978-1987
(in millions of dollars)

	78-82 Average	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Total transfers	2,710	2,865	3,366	5,075	5,374	4,827
Net private sector transfers	1,106	993	823	809	1,159	1,547
a. Reparations from Germany	437	374	323	328	424	531
b. Individuals' transfers in cash	544	553	425	367	593	788
c. Individuals' transfers in goods	25	21	20	16	21	24
d. Not-for-profit organizations	198	196	190	170	186	290
e. Transfers of individuals abroad	-95	-152	-136	-73	-65	-86
Net public sector	1,604	1,873	2,542	4,266	4,215	3,280
a. National institutions	321	319	327	397	411	314
b. Intergovernmental transfers*	1,283	1,545	2,215	3,869	3,804	2,966

*Including U.S. Government Aid.

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Table 6: Major Developments in The Balance of Payment
(millions of current dollars)

	1985	1986	1987	1988*	1989**
Civilian Import of Goods & Services	13,014	14,441	17,160	18,488	19,593
Exports of Goods & Services	10,891	11,706	13,774	14,606	15,660
Civilian Goods & 'Services Deficit	-2,123	-2,735	-3,386	-3,882	-4,033
Military Imports	1,792	1,169	2,438	1,750	1,820
Net Unilateral Transfers	5,075	5,374	4,827	4,580	4,791
Current Account Surplus	1,159	1,470	-997	-1,052	-1,062

* Partly projected, based on ten months data.

**Projected.

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Table 7: U.S. Government Aid 1984-1987
(in millions of dollars)

	1984	1985	1986	1987
1. Grants	2,981	3,817	3,885	2,271
of these: Defense	1,781	1,867	1,935	1,071
Civilian*	1,200	1,950	1,950	1,200
2. Long and Medium Term Loans	270	405	0	950
3. Long and Medium Term Loan Repayments	1,129	1,081	1,055	1,047
4. Gross Total Aid (1+2)	3,251	4,222	3,885	3,221
5. Net Total Aid (4-3)	2,122	3,141	2,830	2,174

*Including Emergency Aid of \$750 million in 1985 and 1986.

דתיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 1
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	ציר הסברה, וושינגטון	כאת:

"ת י ק ו ן"

ראונא החומר המצי"ב על כוונת "תיקון" לפרסם ערב בואו של רה"מ לארה"ב מודעות
ביקורתיות בעתונות הישראלית וחאמריקאית.

1. א.ש. רובינשטיין

2. אביה חקל

3. יוס. אמוניאז

4. א.ש. פרוק

5. דני הודק

6. א.ש. נובל / שאול סגל

7. יוס. חקל

8. חיים אר

1. א.ש. רובינשטיין
2. א.ש. פרוק
3. יוס. אמוניאז
4. א.ש. נובל / שאול סגל
5. דני הודק
6. א.ש. חקל
7. יוס. חקל
8. חיים אר

תפוצה: -12-

TIKKUN

A BIMONTHLY JEWISH CRITIQUE OF POLITICS, CULTURE, & SOCIETY

Editor: Michael Lerner
Publisher: Nan Fink

February 7, 1989

5100 Leona Street
Oakland, CA 94619
(415) 482-0805

Dear

Nan and I want to express our deep appreciation for your contribution to the success of the TIKKUN conference. While the speakers and ideas were certainly extremely important, the respect and appreciation with which you treated speakers, organizers, and fellow participants helped to create a sense of safety that made it all work. While there were inevitable, and sometimes justified, criticisms of some problems at the conference (e.g., lack of childcare), the feedback from most of the 2,000 people there was overwhelmingly positive and enthusiastic--at times even ecstatic. Many of the conference talks will be printed in the next two issues of TIKKUN.

The conference generated favorable articles in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Detroit News, the Nation, In These Times, and in many Jewish newspapers. All of these articles acknowledged that the conservatives in the Jewish world do not speak for all Jews.

You and I and the other participants at this conference represent a potential alternative leadership of the Jewish world. Unlike the leadership of "the organized Jewish community," we are leaders not because we are good fundraisers or because we toe the line of the bureaucrats, but because of our ideas and our commitment to the best ideals of the Jewish people. The conference confirmed what TIKKUN's remarkably large readership already suggested--that there is a large constituency of Jews hungry for what we have to say, yearning for a different way to be Jewish.

We think the next step is to create a network of small groups of Jews who are meeting together to talk about the kinds of issues raised at the conference and raised in TIKKUN. Imagine the following: in every city in America several such small groups gathering once every two weeks or once a month, discussing articles in TIKKUN, or books on Jewish subjects, or studying some texts, or discussing current events in Israel and the U.S., or exploring amongst themselves the meaning of their own Jewishness.

I'm writing to you because I want you to consider spearheading such a group. I'd like to ask you to go through your own personal rolodex and invite a group of 8-10 of your friends or acquaintances to get together to participate in such a group. My guess is that groups composed of people who know each other would be most productive and comfortable for many of you. (However, if you'd prefer, send us your

Editorial Board: Martha Arkesberg, Rachel Adler, Leslie Alexander, Gai Alperovitz, Michael Bader, Michael Berenbaum, David Blase, Rachel Blase, Norman Birnbaum, Heather Booth, E. M. Broner, Rusellen Brown, Abraham Brumberg, Jay Canine, David Cohen, Gerald Cromer, Dorothy Dinnerstein, Elliot Dorff, Peter Edelman, Leslie Epstein, Sidra Easch, Gordon Fellman, John Felstiner, Gordon Freeman, Maurice Friedman, Peter Gabel, Laura Geller, Todd Gitlin, Herbert Gold, David Gordis, Arthur Green, Collin Greer, Morton Halperin, David Hartman, Richard Healey, Robert Heilbroner, Marvin Hoffman, Burr Jacobson, Marc Kaminsky, Michael Kasin, Wolfe Kelman, Reuven Kimelman, Daniel Landes, Christopher Lasch, Hillel Levine, Phillip Lopate, Daniel Matt, Milton Menkoff, Ruth Messinger, Marshall Meyer, Jo Milgrom, Raquel Newman, Martin Peretz, Yoram Peri, Marga Piercy, Robert Pinaky, Judith Plaskow, Larry Corbin Pogrebin, Francine Press, Avi Ravitsky, Lilian Rubin, John Rusky, David Saperstein, Zalman Schachter-Shalimi, Howard Schwartz, Chaim Seidler-Feller, Gerald Serotta, T. Dvorah Setel, Gershon Shaked, Stanley Sheinbaum, Carol Ruth Silver, Ira Silverman, Uri Simon, Daniel Thorsz, David Thersky, Milton Viorst, Al Viorst, Arthur Waskow, Steven Wasserman, Trude Weiss-Rusmarin, Arnold Wolf, Seth Wolitz, A.B. Yehoshua, Eli Zaretsky, Idith Zaretsky, Steve Zipperstein.

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
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name/address/telephone number, and we'll help you get connected with other people in your area--we already have many successful discussion groups organized in this way.)

Of course I know the problems: first, you are overextended, and, second, you doubt if many of your friends would be interested in this kind of discussion. You may yourself wonder whether at this stage of your life you'd want to get involved in something that you might imagine better suited for younger people. Yet, I'm convinced that the experience is likely to produce some powerful results--both for you and even for those friends who might have to be dragged into a first discussion. What we saw at the conference is that many, many respected intellectuals have a lot of unresolved issues around their Jewishness, and though they might need some legitimating pretext to get them into the discussion, once there they have a lot to say and a lot to work through. And a lot to contribute--I imagine some very important ideas would surface in any group that you were involved in, and we might then try to get those ideas known to the rest of our TIKKUN constituency.

The Committee for Judaism and Social Justice--the educational arm of TIKKUN magazine--will provide you with assistance in figuring out how to organize such a group, what discussion materials to use, group dynamics, etc. If you do make it happen, I'd like you to write me with a detailed account of how it is going.

Sincerely yours,


Michael Lerner

P.S. Shamir will be arriving in the U.S. in March, and we'd like to take out some ads in the New York Times in the U.S., and Yediot Achranot and Maariv in Israel, making it clear that he doesn't have the support of all Jews. Enclosed you will find the draft we are circulating--we expect that it will be signed by some of America's most respected intellectual and cultural figures. We'd like to invite you to join this distinguished group. Unfortunately, because of the hefty cost of buying this kind of ad, we can only list signators who will send us \$100. The appearance of these ads will be an important event, so even if you can't afford the money to have your name listed, we encourage you to make some contribution to get this message out. You may specify if you prefer to restrict the use of your name or contribution to the purchase of an ad in the Israeli newspapers.

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NO. MR. SHAMIRDON'T ASSUME THAT AMERICAN JEWS SUPPORT YOUR POLICIES
TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS

Israel's occupation of the West Bank is a political and moral disaster. The killing of Palestinian civilians, including children, the closing of Palestinian schools, the demolition of homes of the parents of children who throw rocks, the expulsions and 6-month "administrative detentions" without trials, the indiscriminate use of plastic bullets against children--these are all policies which are morally repugnant, a violation of Jewish ethics, and they weaken Israel's credibility in the U.S. We urge you to stop the bloodshed immediately.

To achieve that end, we call upon the State of Israel to take two decisive steps:

1. Israel must begin negotiations now with the PLO. Not only has the U.S. begun to talk with the PLO--recent polls indicate that a majority of Israelis (54%) would support direct negotiations with PLO leaders. If you are serious about seeking peace, you must be prepared to talk directly with your enemies, and you cannot expect to pick their representatives for them.
2. Israel must not rule out the possibility that the outcome of the negotiations might be the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state. To insist, as you have done, that the only focus of talks would be an "autonomy," which Palestinians have already rejected as an unsuitable alternative to a state, is to ensure that even if talks do begin little progress will be made. While Israel has every right to guarantee its security, it cannot deny to the Palestinians the same right to national self-determination that it claims for itself.

During your visit to the U.S. you will undoubtedly once again find support from the "Conference of Presidents," AIPAC, and other elements of "the organized Jewish community." Although these same "leaders" endorsed your policies during your last visit in March, 1988, polls at that time indicated that most American Jews did not agree. There are literally millions of American Jews for whom these "leaders" do not speak--and who now find your policies immoral, contrary to what is best in our Jewish tradition, and destructive to the best interests of Israel and of American Jewry.

We, the undersigned American Jewish writers, teachers, artists, intellectuals, and community leaders, urge you to tell our sisters and brothers in Israel the following: Many American Jews, loyal supporters of Israel, do not support the brutal suppression of the Palestinian people and the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. You do not have a blank check from American Jewry to continue these policies.

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To pay the amount necessary to print this ad in major American and Israeli newspapers, we must ask that those who wish to have their names on the ad contribute a minimum of \$100. If you wish to have your academic or organizational affiliation listed (with a disclaimer indicating that they are listed for purposes of identification only), please indicate. Please circulate this to your colleagues, but return your checks (or credit card information) to TIKKUN by March 15th, 1989.

This ad is sponsored by TIKKUN Magazine's education arm, the Committee for Judaism and Social Justice (CJSJ).

* * * * *

FILL OUT THE FORM BELOW AND RETURN WITH CHECK (MADE OUT TO CJSJ) OR CREDIT INFORMATION TO: TIKKUN, 5100 LEONA ST., OAKLAND, CA 94619.

Your Name _____

Institutional or organization affiliation, or other way you wish to be identified (Note: We cannot guarantee that there will be space in the ad for everyone's affiliation) _____

Your Address _____

(City)

(State)

(Zip)

Your Telephone _____

Although our first goal is to buy an ad in the New York Times, some people may prefer to have their money and name used only in ads we hope to buy in Israeli newspapers (Yediot Achranot and, if money permits, Maariv). If you specifically wish to restrict the use of your name and donation to purchasing an ad in Israel, please indicate here. _____

- () Please list my name. Enclosed is () \$1,000 () \$500
() \$300 () \$200 () \$100.
- () I cannot contribute the minimum of \$100 to have my name included, but enclosed is _____ to help defray expenses.
- () Check enclosed. () Please charge my credit card as follows:
() Visa () Mastercard
Card I.D. number _____
Expiration date _____
Your signature _____

619
22/22
Table 8: Changes in Debt Obligation

	(end of year in \$ billion)			
Source of Debt	1984	1985	1986	1987
U.S. Government	9,997	9,888	10,159	10,265
Other Governmental or International	964	1,180	1,505	1,804
State of Israel Bonds	3,293	3,506	3,749	3,912
Israeli Banks	1,683	1,282	929	775
" Foreign Banks	825	916	1,008	1,156
Supplier Credits	955	1,035	1,240	1,553
Other	<u>1,373</u>	<u>1,481</u>	<u>1,561</u>	<u>1,711</u>
Total	19,090	19,288	20,151	21,176

דחיפות: הייחודי	שגרירות ישראל/וויינגטון טופס פרוק	קד: 1
סוג: למ/ר		סתנ: 2
תאריך וזמן מעור:		אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		
1/2 588		פאת: ק/ק לקונגרס

שיחת השגריר - מנחם הרב בסנט (22.2)

א. השגריר קיים אתמול שיחה שוטפת עם מנחם הרב, הסנטור ג'ורג' מיצ'ל. נכחו עוזרו לענייני חוץ ורח"מ.

השגריר עידכן אותו על הנעשה באיזור וחשיבה אצלנו לגבי קידום תהליך השלום. כרגיל, מיטצ'ל התגלה כשומע טוב, וכאיש נבון וחושב. להלן משאלותיו ומתעוררותיו:

(1) כאיש שאינו מומחה אך עוקב אחר המצב בעניין באמצעות כלי התקשורת, לא נראה לו שייבחרו פלסטינאים שהם עצמאים בדעותיהם ובלתי תלויים באש"פ, אם תתקדמונה בחירות בשטחים. השגריר השיב שאין לנו **אשליה**, אך עם זאת תקוותנו היא שחיה ותיערכנה בחירות, אלה שייבחרו יונחו בקדש ובראשונה ע"י אינטרסים מקומיים ולא ע"י שיקולים מבחוץ. ארד ציין שאש"פ מוסיף לדבר על "זכות השיבה" שאינה אלא נוסחה להשמדת ישראל מבפנים, ולעומתו הפלסטינאים המקומיים מחפשים דרך לשנות את גורלם ואינם מחפשים מלחמה נוספת.

(2) לאחר שמיטצ'ל התעניין במסמרי הפלסטינאים בשטחים, בירדן ובמקומות אחרים, העיר שלמיטב חבנתו החליט חמלך חוסיין לשים טרחק"בינו לבין הגדה המערבית במגמה לחזק את מעמדו מבית קצן לחקטין את מספר הפלסטינאים תחת שלטונו. השגריר הסכים ורחיב על מניעי חוסיין, בחוסיפו שבכל זאת באיתותיו ובמטרייו לעברנו עולה בכירור **חוסיין** לא ויתר על רצונו לשחק תפקיד בעתיד השטחים, מה גם שהוא חייב להיות חלק של תהליך השלום לנוכח חגבול המשותף הארוך בין ירדן וישראל.

(3) בתגובה לדברי השגריר, ביקש מיטצ'ל לדעת מדוע מדינה פלסטינית בשטחים תחווה סכנה לירדת הסנטור גילה חכנה לחסברי השגריר. לדעת מיטצ'ל עולה מחיסטורית הפלסטינאים כי ככל שעובר הזמן, האופציות העומדות בפניהם חולכות ונעשות גרועות יותר. סירובם העיקבי לקבל הצעות שונות גרם להחרפת הרטוריקה שלחם ולחדרדרות עניינם.

תפוצה: 36 -

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

דחיפות:	סגירות ישראל / ווסינגטון טופס פבוק	דף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן העבור:		אל:
כס' פבוק:		דע:
הפסיד:		פאת:
2/2 588		

הוא מסכים עם דברי חפתיחה של השגריר לפיהם לא מצאנו דרך טובה יותר לטפל באלימות בשטחים והוא משוכנע שלו חיתה דרך טובה יותר היינו מאתרים אותה, אין ספק שבעבר היו שעות כושר לפריצות דרך לקידום השלום ובעוד שעלינו להתייחס לקורות הסיכסוך מבחינתנו אנו, זיתכן שכיום קיימת חזמנות לנקיטת יוזמה נועזת. השעה חייבת להיות "אטרקטיבית" לישראל כי הרי הצד שכנגד מונחה ע"י תחושת "Fatalism" ותחושה שאין לו מה להפסיד. תחרשת אלה, שאינן קיימות אצל הישראלים, מקנות יתרון לצד השני. לכן מן הרצוי שישראל תיזרם ולא תמתין.

4 תוך כדי פיתוח תיזה זו חצביע מיטע'ל על האיטיות שמגלה הממשל בגיבוש מדיניות חוץ והביע חשש שתוחמץ כתוצאה מחוסר תשומת הלב מצד הממשל. שאל איפוא אם נראה תועלת במנוי "מתורג" מיוחד" בעל קרמה מטעם חנשיא. השגריר טען נגד רעיון זה באומרו שבטרם יתמנה שליח מיוחד, יש לקבוע מדיניות, בהגובה, מיטע'ל חביע דעתו שלפעמים אירועים חיצוניים מביאים לקביעת מדיניות וחוא חרחר על רעיון חמנוי כמאיץ לעשיית מדיניות. השגריר עמד על הסכנות שבקור מחשבת זה: באין מדיניות, חשליח יוכל לעסוק אך ורק ב-fact finding, מה גם עעם חמנוי יש בו כדי להוריד נושא הסכסוך מסדר חיום של חנשיא ולגרום לדחייה נוספת. מיטע'ל חסכים בהעירו שיש לארד "A Good Point".

ב- כסיכום השיחה ניתן לציין דברים שאמר מיטע'ל במהלכו: חתמיכה לישראל בקונגרס נשאר חזקה. עם זאת קיים "Compelling Desire" לעשות מה שניתן לעזור לפתרון חסיכסוך. הקונגרס רואה את תפקידו פנידוד גיכוש חמסגרה לפתרון חבעייה.

ג- השיחה התנהל באורח ידידותית ונינוחה. מיטע'ל חודה לשגריר על כואו, אמר שמצא תועלת רבה בשיחה וביקש שהשגריר ימשיך לתדרכו מדי פעם לפעם.

ו. א. א. פ.
למדן.

תפוצה:

דחיפות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	קד: _____
סוג:		מתוך: _____
תאריך ושמן חבור: 23.2.89 - 15:00		אל: _____ מ צ פ " א
פס' פרוק:		דע: _____
הפסיד: 565 15		כאת: _____ ציר הסברה, וושינגטון

" ת י ק ו נ "

ראונא החומר המצי"ב על כוונת תיקון " לפרסם ערב בואו של רות"ם לארה"ב מודעות
ביקורתיות בעתונות הישראלית והאמריקאית.

פ ל ג

1 2 3 1 1 1 1
לגה ס/טגה רהב גלוהג ג'א ג'אג'א ג'אג'א
ג'אג'א רהב הסג'ה
2 1 2

תפוצה: -12-

דחיפות: מדידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
סוג: שמור		פתוך: _____
תאריך וזמן חבור: 24.2.89 15:30		אל: סמנכ"ל י. ליאור
כס' פרוק: הפסד:		דע: _____
614		פאת: ציר - עודד ערן

הרפר שבעא

התקשר ג'ון הירש וביקש למסור כי אל-חוס פנה לשגרירות בבקשה לסייע בחקלת המצור על הרפר שבעא. קיים גם מחסור חמור בדלק וקמח וחוא מבקש מהאמריקאים לפנות אלינו במגמה לחקל על המצור. הוא מתכוון לפנות גם לצל"א. הירש מבקש שנתחשב בבקשה ונמצא "דרך שקטה" לטפל בה.

614
ערן

מה טניסר מה גמאג שחבט
הרפ גמאג שחבט גמאג

תפוצה: 36

דף: 1	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דחיפות: מדידי
כתוב: 2		סוג: שמור
אל: מצפ"א	תאריך וזמן מעור: 23.2.89 15:45	
דע: לשכת שר האוצר	כס' פבוק: הפשרה: 568 1/2	
פאת: קצין קישור לקונגרס		

שיחת שגריר - הסנטור מק-קונל (22.2)

א. השגריר קיים אתמול שיחת הכרות אצל הסנטור מיץ מק-קונל (הסנטור הזוטר מקנטאקי, רפובליקאי, חבר ב"ועדת החוץ, ידידותי). נכחו עוזרתו לענייני חו"ר וחח"מ.

ב. רוב השיחה הוקדשה לסקירה שוושגרייר העביר על המעב באזור, תחליף חשלוס וחאופעיות הדיפלומטיות וחפוליטיות העומדות בפני הממשלה החדשה בארץ. לחלן שלוש נקודות שטק-קונל העלה:

1. סקר דעת קהל המשותף לעתון הרוש. פוסט ול-ABC לפיו 52% רואים את ישראל בצורה בלתי חיובית (מברק הדובר 496 מה-21 דנא). לדברי מיטצל, ונוצאו ווטיק הן מדכאות ("DEPRESSING") אך לא מפתיעות עקב הכיסוי הטלוויזיוני של מאורעות בשטחים בשנה האחרונה. ארד חסכים שרשתות הטלוויזיה עשו ועושות לנו DISSERVICE חמור, אך הוא מקורו שחאליטה חפוליטית ומעצבי המדיניות בארה"ב מבינים טוב יותר. בתגובה העיר מק-קונל שיתכן אך, כמובן לנו, במשטר דמוקרטי הנציגים הנבחרים נענים במוקדם או במאוחר לדעת הקהל.

2. מוסדות דת "אמריקאים" בישראל

(ראו נא מברקנו 408 מה-16.2)

מק-קונל מסר שלפני כשבועיים קיים שיחת טלפון בנדון עם שר האוצר. הביע תקווה שנתייחס ברצינות לנושא.

3. נשק כימי במזרח

מק-קונל שותף לדעת השגריר שהשימוש בנשק כימי במזרח' מחורח כיום אחד מהאיומים הרציניים ביותר לישראל. הוסיף שלחברתו הנשיא אמר מה שניתן לומר בנושא ויש להניח שבענין זה הסובייטים בדעה אחת עם ארה"ב. השאלה היא מה לעשות ע"מ לבלום הפצה של נשק כימי. לפי נסיונו בקנטאקי (בה קיומים מחסנים גדולים של כל"ח) סילוק הכימיכלים המתישנים גורס לבעיות קשות מאד, לדעתו, יש מקום לטעון בפני מדינות הרוצות בנשק

תפוצה: 3 - 10/10/89 10/10/89 10/10/89 10/10/89 10/10/89 10/10/89 10/10/89 10/10/89 10/10/89 10/10/89

1 3 4 10/10/89 4 1 1

דחילות:	שגרירות ישראל/וושינגטון טופס פברק	דף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן חנייה:		אל:
כס' פברק:		דע:
הפסד:		כא:
4/2 568		

כימי נאגרות כמיות של כימיכלים, שבמו ידיון הן מיערות לעצמן בעיה גוראית הקשורה
לענין ה- DISPOSAL במרצת חזמן.

ו.א.מ.
למדן

תפוצה:

END

דחיות:	סגירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס כסוף	1: דף
סוג: שמור		2: כתיב
תאריך וזמן מעור:	אל: מצפ"א	דע: לש"י רוחמי ס/שר העבודה
23 בפבר' 1989 09:30		
כס' פרוק:	כאח' שג' וושינגטון	כאח' שג' וושינגטון
המסרד: 576 1/2		

פגישות ס/שר העבודה - ריצ'ארד האס (NSC) (22.2)

1. ס/השר התייחס בפגישת השיחה לנושאים אותם העלה בשיחתו עם ממי' עוזר המזכיר ל-NEA האר (שלילת זכותם ההסטרית של הפלסטינים על הארץ, שלש האפשרויות להתמודד עם האירועים בשטחים, הקושי בהקמת מנהיגות פלסטינית בישיע בשל הטרור האשפ"י והצורך בסיוע ארה"ב במציאת פתרון קביל מבחינת ישראל).

2. האס בחגובתו עמד על המשותף לארה"ב וישראל. הדגיש חסונצנזוס האמריקאי ביחס להמשך היחסים ההדוקים עם ישראל. הבטיח כי מערכת היחסים ההדוקה תמשיך אחת ממשל בוש. הדגיש כי אין בכונתם לכפות פתרונות על ישראל. הוסיף כי - בכונתם להעלות בפנינו מס' רעיונות. ובממשך אם ישראל תצטרך ליטול על עצמה סיכונים תחפש ארה"ב דברים להקטין הסיכוי. חזר כל כך שאין בכונת הממשל ללחוץ או לכפות על ישראל פתרון שיפגע בבטחונה.

3. בהתייחס לסוגית הסדרי השלום ציין האס כי הממשל התחיל ללמוד הנושא. מקווים לקבל במהלך ביקורי שה"ח ורוחמי' וביקורי שכנינו רעיונות לקידום התהליך. מקווה שבעקבות השיחות עמנו ניתן יהיה להגיע להסכמה. האס ציין כי אין בכונתם כעת לדון בבעית המזחת'. עיקר המאמץ צריך להיות מופנה להניע התהליך ובכך להביא להורדת המחיר שאנו ושכנינו משלמים בגלל המשך הסטטוס קוו. לדברי האס קיים היום התמריץ להוריד מחיר הסטטוס קוו. ירצו לעבוד בתאום עמנו על יצירת תנאים/סביבה פוליטית שתתרום להבשלת התהליכים.

4. האס הדגיש כי האינטיפאדה אינה הבעיה היחידה במזחת'. ציין בעיות נוספות כגון: נשק כימי, טילים היוצרות חחוש דחיות מבחינת טיפול.

תפוצה: 36-48
שם ס/השר רוחמי' וושינגטון
לש"י רוחמי' וושינגטון
לש"י רוחמי' וושינגטון
לש"י רוחמי' וושינגטון
לש"י רוחמי' וושינגטון

דתיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	2	קף:
סוג:		2	פתוך:
תאריך וזמן מעור:			אל:
כס' פרוק:			דע:
הפסד:			פאת:
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5. ס/השר התייחס לפגיעה בדימוי של ישראל תוצאה מדווחי התקשורת בהקשר זה עמד על השיפור ברמת החיים של האוכלוסיה הפלסטינית (זיור ותעסוקה).
6. האס בתגובתו ציין כי ישראל (בשל מדיניותה), החמיצה הזדמנות להקמת מנהיגות פלסטינית בשטחים צבר אשר גרם לכך שלא בוצרה בשטח אלטרנטיבה לאש"פ. "כעת קוצרת ישראל את פירות מדיניותה קצרת הרואי".
7. בהתייחסו לדימוי של ישראל הביע האס דאגתו ביחס לאימפאקט שיש לדווחים על ישראל על הדור הצעיר, סבור כי מציאת פתרון פוליטי תוכל להביא לשינוי במצבנו. הדגיש הצורך להתמודד עם שורשי הבעיה תהליך שיצור דינמיקה שתביא לרגיעה בשטחים. "הורדת הטמפרטורה הינה המשימה הדחופה ביותר כעת".
8. בסיום העלה ס/השר את מצוקת יהודי תימן. ביקש סיוע ארח"ב להקלת המצב. האס שלא היה מודע לנושא הבטיח ללמוד הנושא.
- השתתפו בשיחה: עוזרתו של האס, עוזרי ס/השר, הציר, כהן-כגן והח"מ.

שטיין ll

תפוצה:

TIKKUN

A BIMONTHLY JEWISH CRITIQUE OF POLITICS, CULTURE, & SOCIETY

Editor: Michael Lerner
Publisher: Nan Fink

February 7, 1989

5100 Leuna Street
Oakland, CA 94619
(415) 482-0805

Dear

Nan and I want to express our deep appreciation for your contribution to the success of the TIKKUN conference. While the speakers and ideas were certainly extremely important, the respect and appreciation with which you treated speakers, organizers, and fellow participants helped to create a sense of safety that made it all work. While there were inevitable, and sometimes justified, criticisms of some problems at the conference (e.g., lack of childcare), the feedback from most of the 2,000 people there was overwhelmingly positive and enthusiastic--at times even ecstatic. Many of the conference talks will be printed in the next two issues of TIKKUN.

The conference generated favorable articles in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Detroit News, the Nation, In These Times, and in many Jewish newspapers. All of these articles acknowledged that the conservatives in the Jewish world do not speak for all Jews.

You and I and the other participants at this conference represent a potential alternative leadership of the Jewish world. Unlike the leadership of "the organized Jewish community," we are leaders not because we are good fundraisers or because we toe the line of the bureaucrats, but because of our ideas and our commitment to the best ideals of the Jewish people. The conference confirmed what TIKKUN's remarkably large readership already suggested--that there is a large constituency of Jews hungry for what we have to say, yearning for a different way to be Jewish.

We think the next step is to create a network of small groups of Jews who are meeting together to talk about the kinds of issues raised at the conference and raised in TIKKUN. Imagine the following: in every city in America several such small groups gathering once every two weeks or once a month, discussing articles in TIKKUN, or books on Jewish subjects, or studying some texts, or discussing current events in Israel and the U.S., or exploring amongst themselves the meaning of their own Jewishness.

I'm writing to you because I want you to consider spearheading such a group. I'd like to ask you to go through your own personal rolodex and invite a group of 8-10 of your friends or acquaintances to get together to participate in such a group. My guess is that groups composed of people who know each other would be most productive and comfortable for many of you. (However, if you'd prefer, send us your

Editorial Board: Martha Ackelsberg, Rachel Adler, Leslie Alexander, Gai Alperovitz, Michael Bader, Michael Berenbaum, David Blale, Rachel Blale, Norman Birnbaum, Heather Booth, E. M. Broner, Rusellen Brown, Abraham Brumberg, Jay Cantor, David Cohen, Gerald Cromer, Dorothy Dinnerstein, Elliot Dorff, Peter Edelman, Leslie Epstein, Sidra Barachi, Gordon Fellman, John Felstiner, Gordon Freeman, Maurice Friedman, Peter Gabel, Laura Geller, Todd Gitlin, Herbert Gold, David Gordis, Arthur Green, Colin Greer, Morton Halperin, David Harrisman, Richard Healey, Robert Hellbroner, Marvin Hoffman, Nurt Jacobson, Marc Kaminsky, Michael Kasin, Wolfe Kelman, Reuven Kimelman, Daniel Landes, Christopher Lasch, Hillel Levine, Phillip Lopate, Daniel Matt, Milton Mankoff, Ruth Messinger, Marshall Meyer, Jo Milgrom, Raquel Newman, Martin Peretz, Yoram Peri, Marge Piercy, Robert Pinsky, Judith Plaskow, Lotty Cottin Pogrebin, Francine Prime, Avi Ravitsky, Lillian Rubin, John Rusky, David Saperstein, Zalman Schachter-Shalomi, Howard Schwarz, Chaim Seidler-Feller, Gerald Serotta, T. Dvorah Seret, Gershon Shaked, Stanley Sheinbaum, Carol Ruth Silver, Ira Silverman, Uri Simon, Daniel Thuss, David Twerzky, Milton Viorst, Al Vurspan, Arthur Waskow, Steven Wasserman, Trude Weiss-Rusmarin, Arnold Wolf, Seth Wolitz, A.B. Yehoshua, Eli Zaretsky, Idith Zertal, Steve Zipperstein.

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name/address/telephone number, and we'll help you get connected with other people in your area--we already have many successful discussion groups organized in this way.)

Of course I know the problems: first, you are overextended, and, second, you doubt if many of your friends would be interested in this kind of discussion. You may yourself wonder whether at this stage of your life you'd want to get involved in something that you might imagine better suited for younger people. Yet, I'm convinced that the experience is likely to produce some powerful results--both for you and even for those friends who might have to be dragged into a first discussion. What we saw at the conference is that many, many respected intellectuals have a lot of unresolved issues around their Jewishness, and though they might need some legitimating pretext to get them into the discussion, once there they have a lot to say and a lot to work through. And a lot to contribute--I imagine some very important ideas would surface in any group that you were involved in, and we might then try to get those ideas known to the rest of our TIKKUN constituency.

The Committee for Judaism and Social Justice--the educational arm of TIKKUN magazine--will provide you with assistance in figuring out how to organize such a group, what discussion materials to use, group dynamics, etc. If you do make it happen, I'd like you to write me with a detailed account of how it is going.

Sincerely yours,


Michael Lerner

P.S. Shamir will be arriving in the U.S. in March, and we'd like to take out some ads in the New York Times in the U.S., and Yediot Achranot and Maariv in Israel, making it clear that he doesn't have the support of all Jews. Enclosed you will find the draft we are circulating--we expect that it will be signed by some of America's most respected intellectual and cultural figures. We'd like to invite you to join this distinguished group. Unfortunately, because of the hefty cost of buying this kind of ad, we can only list signators who will send us \$100. The appearance of these ads will be an important event, so even if you can't afford the money to have your name listed, we encourage you to make some contribution to get this message out. You may specify if you prefer to restrict the use of your name or contribution to the purchase of an ad in the Israeli newspapers.

③

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NO. MR. SHAMIR

DON'T ASSUME THAT AMERICAN JEWS SUPPORT YOUR POLICIES
TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS

Israel's occupation of the West Bank is a political and moral disaster. The killing of Palestinian civilians, including children, the closing of Palestinian schools, the demolition of homes of the parents of children who throw rocks, the expulsions and 6-month "administrative detentions" without trials, the indiscriminate use of plastic bullets against children--these are all policies which are morally repugnant, a violation of Jewish ethics, and they weaken Israel's credibility in the U.S. We urge you to stop the bloodshed immediately.

To achieve that end, we call upon the State of Israel to take two decisive steps:

1. Israel must begin negotiations now with the PLO. Not only has the U.S. begun to talk with the PLO--recent polls indicate that a majority of Israelis (54%) would support direct negotiations with PLO leaders. If you are serious about seeking peace, you must be prepared to talk directly with your enemies, and you cannot expect to pick their representatives for them.

2. Israel must not rule out the possibility that the outcome of the negotiations might be the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state. To insist, as you have done, that the only focus of talks would be an "autonomy," which Palestinians have already rejected as an unsuitable alternative to a state, is to ensure that even if talks do begin little progress will be made. While Israel has every right to guarantee its security, it cannot deny to the Palestinians the same right to national self-determination that it claims for itself.

During your visit to the U.S. you will undoubtedly once again find support from the "Conference of Presidents," AIPAC, and other elements of "the organized Jewish community." Although these same "leaders" endorsed your policies during your last visit in March, 1988, polls at that time indicated that most American Jews did not agree. There are literally millions of American Jews for whom these "leaders" do not speak--and who now find your policies immoral, contrary to what is best in our Jewish tradition, and destructive to the best interests of Israel and of American Jewry.

We, the undersigned American Jewish writers, teachers, artists, intellectuals, and community leaders, urge you to tell our sisters and brothers in Israel the following: Many American Jews, loyal supporters of Israel, do not support the brutal suppression of the Palestinian people and the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. You do not have a blank check from American Jewry to continue these policies.

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To pay the amount necessary to print this ad in major American and Israeli newspapers, we must ask that those who wish to have their names on the ad contribute a minimum of \$100. If you wish to have your academic or organizational affiliation listed (with a disclaimer indicating that they are listed for purposes of identification only), please indicate. Please circulate this to your colleagues, but return your checks (or credit card information) to TIKKUN by March 15th, 1989.

This ad is sponsored by TIKKUN Magazine's education arm, the Committee for Judaism and Social Justice (CJSJ).

* * * * *

FILL OUT THE FORM BELOW AND RETURN WITH CHECK (MADE OUT TO CJSJ) OR CREDIT INFORMATION TO: TIKKUN, 5100 LEONA ST., OAKLAND, CA 94619.

Your Name _____

Institutional or organization affiliation, or other way you wish to be identified (Note: We cannot guarantee that there will be space in the ad for everyone's affiliation) _____

Your Address _____

(City) (State) (Zip)

Your Telephone _____

Although our first goal is to buy an ad in the New York Times, some people may prefer to have their money and name used only in ads we hope to buy in Israeli newspapers (Yediot Achranot and, if money permits, Maariv). If you specifically wish to restrict the use of your name and donation to purchasing an ad in Israel, please indicate here. _____

() Please list my name. Enclosed is () \$1,000 () \$500
() \$300 () \$200 () \$100.

() I cannot contribute the minimum of \$100 to have my name included, but enclosed is _____ to help defray expenses.

() Check enclosed. () Please charge my credit card as follows:
() Visa () Mastercard
Card I.D. number _____
Expiration date _____
Your signature _____

סודי

נכנס

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חוזם: 2,17973

אל: המשרד

מ-: נר: 697, תא: 230289, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

סודי/מיידי.

אל מנהל מצפ'א, מנהל מצרים, לשכת השר.

דע השגריר וושינגטון (נר 181), סמנכ'ל צפ'א, סמנכ'ל מז'ת.

מאת קונסול ההסברה - ניו יורק.

מפגש מנהיגות ה- COMMITTEE - מובארק.

IRA SILVERMAN בא לקונכ'ל לדווחו אודות מפגשיהם עם צמרת השלטון במצרים נכח החמ'.

נפגשו בנפרד עם מובארק, אבד-אל-מגיד, ראלי, אל-באז יוסוף וואלי, תחסין באשיר ועטף א-בייד. חשו בכל הפגישות באחידות הקו ובכך שכולם מדברים על פי קווי המדיניות המשותפים על ידי מובארק ואשר באו לידי ביטוי בפגישתם עמו כדלהלן:

הפגישה עם מובארק (יום שני 13.2.89) בה נכחו אל-באז ראלי ותשעת אנשי הקומיטי (ונשותיהם) ארכה כ-75 דקות והתנהלה באנגלית. הנשיא מאד הרשימם בהופעתו.

תהליך השלום.

קמפ' דיוויד - מובארק אמר כי בעוד שהחלק הראשון יושם וענין טאבה נפתר והולך, לא יכלו להמשיך בישום החלק

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

השני של הסכם המסגרת כי מחד גיסא לא יכלו לכפות החלטה ומאידך גיסא בעולם הערבי כולם התקיפו מצרים.

ציין כי תכניות רייגן ושולץ לא הביאו שום התקדמות בחובן.

באשר ל-181 אמר כי אמנם ההחלטה נדחתה תמיד על ידי הערבים (אמר זאת בטון של הכאה על חטא), אולם כעת המצב שונה מכיוון 'שאנו הובלנו ערפאת וקבוצתו לבוא עם עמדות חדשות - קיבלו 242+338, גינו טרור, הכרחנו אותם להוסיף הפיסקה על קונפדרציה אפשרית עם ירדן וכי הגבולות של המדינה הפלשתינאית העצמאית לא יהיו יותר מאשר הקו הירוק'.

דיאלוג ארה"ב-אשפ' - מובארק: 'אני המלצתי לשולץ שיפתח בדיאלוג עם אשפ', יש המנסים להפסיקו. ערפאת הינו המנהיג המתון ביותר הקיים אך הוא אינו יכול לשלוט על כל הטרוריסט. אם ערפאת יפול יהיה הרבה יותר גרוע'.

באשר למדינה הפלשתינאית, אותה הוא רואה, אמר כי באופן מעשי רוב הפלשתינאים היושבים כיום מחוץ לשטחים לא יבואו שמה, אך רואים וימשיכו לראות בערפאת סמל ללאומיותם.

ועידה בינלאומית - ציין שפרס כראה'מ' קיבל הרעיון נשהוא אינו מבין התנגדות להמ' שמיר, שהרי לא תהא כופה אלא רק 'מטריה' שתתחיל עם חסות אמריקנית, סובייטית ומצרית ואח'כ' הוסיף ואולי גם בריטית וצרפתית.

מובארק המשיך בציינו כי הוב'ל הינה בבחינת STARTER ואח'כ' יהיו דיונים בילטרליים: 'ישראל-סוריה, ישראל-ירדן, ישראל-לבנון, ישראל-פלשתינאים'.

אמר כי הפלשתינאים והירדנים אינם סומכים זה על זה אך כי המצרים מנסים להביאם יחד אולי למשלחת ערבית משותפת אשר מצרים תשמש כמובילתה.

חזר ואמר כי אין לרהמ' סיבה לחשוש.

סוריה. מובארק גורס כי אסאד שינה טעמו ועתה הסורים יהיו מוכנים להשתתף בוב'ל, אולם אם הסורים יסרבו

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ציין, כי אפשר לקיים הוב'ל בלעדיהם.

בתשובה לשאלה אמר כי יתחילו במשלחת ערבית משותפת אשר לא יהיה בה לאף אחד זכות וטו ואח'כ' יפנו לשיחות בילטרליות. אם יגיעו להסכמה מה טוב אך בכל מקרה איש לא יוכל להפריע.

ארה'ב-מצרים - מובארק ציין כי אין בעיות.
אחרים עימם נפגשו ציינו כי במצרים מצפים להקלה במצבת החובות המעיקה.

ישראל - מצרים. - באשר לטאבה ציין כי הישראלים אינם מקיימים התחייבויותיהם (יש לזכור תאריך הפגישה 13.2)
ציין כי יחסי ישראל מצרים טובים, הזכיר השת'פ' החקלאי ופיתוח האיזורים הצחיחים.
סיכם באמרו כי אם יקודם תהליך השלום ובכללו וב'ל כמובן שהיחסים הבילטרליים ישופרו.

אינתיפאדה - בתשובה לשאלה האם ערפאת יכול להפסיק השיב הנשיא בשלילה היות שהיא לא אורגנה על ידי אשפ' ולא תופסק על ידו. אולם, אמר, כי גם אם אשפ' אינו יכול להפסיקה הרי שישראל אינה יכולה להתעלם מ-NON WEST BANG PLO.
אמר כי מומ' עם פלשתינאים מקומיים לא יצלח.

לקראת הסיום חזר מובארק לנושא המשלחת המשותפת בהציעו כי ניתן שהקבוצה הפלשתינאית תכלול שנים מהשטחים ושנים מבחוץ.

בסיום כשנשאל אם לא הגיע עתה הזמן לצעד דרמטי מצידו - ביקור בישראל, השיב כי הוא הציע זאת בעבר ועתה תורה של ישראל להציג הצעד הדרמטי.

אורי פלטי.

ח

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמנ, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, ליאור, מצרים, סייבל

שמו

נכנס

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חוזם: 2,18028

אל: המשרד

מ-: אוטבה, נר: 89, תא: 230289, זח: 1500, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

שמו/רגיל

אל: מצפ' א'

1. קיימנו הבוקר שיחה ארוכה עם מנכ"ל ה-CIC. הם כפי שדיווחתי בקשו לפני למעלה משבועיים פגישה עם שה"ח קלארק ועד כה טרם נקבע תאריך.

2. בנפרד תוכן הודעה שפרסמו בנושא הצבעת קנדה במועבי"ט.

3. הצעתי כי יפנו למספר פרופסורים יהודים מהימנים ויבקשו כתיבת מאמרים אשר יסבירו מצבה של ישראל אשר חייבת להגן על עצמה בפני הקיצונים הפאנאטיים מבית מדרשו של חומייני כמו אנשי ח'זביאלה ואחרים תוך ניצול הזעם בתקשורת ובדעת הקהל הקנדי בעקבות פרשת סולימאן רושדי. הכעס של הקנדים בנושא יקבל ממדים יותר חריפים כאשר קואליציה של סופרים מולי"מ ובעלי חנויות לממכר ספרים האשימו פומבית את ממשלת קנדה על העדר מנהיגות נוכח "מעשה תוקפנות ללא תקדימ".

התגובה באה לאחר שהצעד הראשון של קנדה היה לאסור יבוא הספר כדי לבחון אם הוא אמנם ספר תעמולה אשר יכול להחשב "כספרות שנאה". מזה יומיים החלו אנשי הבטחון לשמור שמירה קפדנית על השר ג'לינק אשר חזר בו מהחלטתו הראשונה והתיר יבוא ספרו של רושדי מארה"ב לקנדה ובגלל זאת איימו על חייו קצוניים מוסלמים תושבי קנדה.

במאמרי הפרופסורים תהיה פניה לדעת הקהל אשר אולי עכשו כאשר הוא חש מקרוב תוצאות הקצוניות והפאנאטיסם האיסלמי

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

יגלו הבנה למצבה של ישראל .

כמובן שבקשתי ועמדתי על כך שבשום צורה לא יובילו הדברים
למקור כלשהו בשגרירות .

גור-אריה

חו

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, הסברה

תע: שחח, שחחח, חחח, חחחח, חחחח, חחחח, חחחח, חחחח, חחחח, חחחח

יוצא **

שמור

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חוזם: 2,18715

אל: ני/981, לונדון/532

מ-: המשרד, תא: 240289, זח: 2232, דח: ב, סג: שמ

תח: גס: ארבל

נד: ג

בהול להזעיק/שמור

אל: ניו יורק - ביין

לונדון - קשדן

יוניפיל - הריגת החייל האירי - בהמשך להודעותינו מהיום.

מיחידת קישור לכוחות זרים הודיעו לנו ש:

מפקד יוניפיל שיגר מכתב אל אלוף פצ'נ ובו הוא מביע את מחאתו על פיגוע בחייל האירי הבוקר על ידי צד'ל.

במכתבו מציין מפקד יוניפיל בין השאר כי הוא רואה את צה'ל כאחראי לאירוע ומבקש להפגש עם האלוף בהקדם האפשרי.

עד כאן.

מנהל ארבל 2

צש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, ברנע, ארבל, סייבל, משפט, איר, ליאור, מזתים, לוברני, כוחות זרים

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

18671

תאריך : 24.02.89

נכנס

שומר

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חוזם: 2,18671

אל: המשרד

מ-: נ', נר: 708, תא: 240289, זח: 1230, דח: ב, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: ארבל

נד: @

שומר/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל ארבל 2.

דע: לוונדון - קשדן ,

לוברני - לשכת שהב'ט -בטחון העבירונא

מאת: נאו'מ - יששכרוף.

החייל האירי.

1. שג' ביין הוזמן לגולדינג בעניין הריגת החייל האירי.

2. גולדינג ביקש בשם המזכ'ל לחות בתוקף (VIGOROUSLY
(PROTEST לגבי הריגת החייל. לדבריו, הגזרה

היתה שקטה לחלוטין והחיל עמד במחסום ונורה.

זו הפעם השביעית שירו על

עמדה זו לאחרונה ותקרית הירי ה-34 שצד'ל יורה לעבר
יוניפי'ל בכלל. הזכיר שהעלה את הסוגיה עם רבין ובדו'ח

המזכ'ל האחרון על יוניפי'ל, האו'מ הודה לישראל על

התערבותה כדי למנוע תקריות מסוג זה. גולדינג ציין

שאילו היה מדובר ב-CROSSFIRE זה דבר אחר, אך הפעם

היה ירי מכוון בזמן שקט, ולכן המחאה החריפה.

3. ביין השיב שהמקרה נמצא בבדיקה, וכי חיילי צה'ל

לא נוכחים באיזור הזה ולא היו נוכחים בעת התקרית,

ונשלח קצין בדיקה מיד לשם עם היוודע דבר התקרית. ביין

הביע צער על מות האירי ומסר המידע הראשוני שהיה ברשותנו

תוך הדגשה שהמידע הוא לא רשמי. הדגיש שצדל אינו תחת

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שליטתנו ופיקודנו הצמוד, וכי יש לזכור שאנשיו הם לבנונים
הפועלים כלבנונים.

4. גולדינג שוב חזר על בקשתו בשם המזכ"ל, ששהב"ט רבין
יעשה כל מאמץ להגביר את המשמעת בצדל כדי לנוע תקריות
מסוג זה בעתיד. גולדינג ציין בתום השיחה שאילו היה
מתקיים פינוי של 4 עמדות צדל ליד בית יהון ואל קולאי
היה ניתן למנוע תקריות כאלה וגם להגביר את הרגיעה
בגיזרה כדוגמת הרגיעה עקב הנסיגה באל חוקבן.

5. הבטחנו להעביר ארצה ולהודיע על מידע שנקבל במשך
סוף השבוע.

נאו"מ.

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, איר, שהבט, ברנע, ארבל, 2,
סייבל, משפט, ליאור, מזתים, כוחותזרים

18027

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 24.02.89

** נכנס

שמו

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חוזם: 2,18027

אל: המשרד

מ-: אוטובה, נר: 88, תא: 230289, זח: 1300, דח: ר, סג: שמ

תח: 8 גס: צפא

נד: 8

שמו/רגיל

אל: מצפ'א

1.להלן תוכן ההודעה שפרסם ה- CIC בעתון היהודי
.CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS

CIC STATEMENT ON CANADIAN VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

THE CANADA-ISRAEL COMMITTEE STRONGLY DISAGREES WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SUPPORT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S UNBALANCED CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL ON FEBRUARY 17. THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION FAILED TO ADDRESS THE REAL CAUSES OF THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARE THE ENDLESS, VIOLENT RIOTING BY PALESTINIANS IN THE TERRITORIES, AND THE CONTINUING INCITEMENT OF THE RIOTERS BY PALESTINIAN LEADERS. IT CONTRADICTED THE CANADIAN CALL, AFTER THE VOTE, FOR "RESTRAINT ON ALL SIDES" AND "A RECOGNITION OF THE CONTEXT" IN WHICH RECENT EVENTS HAVE OCCURRED. NEITHER THE RESOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE. IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD SUPPORT A RESOLUTION WHICH DISTORTS EVENTS IN THE TERRITORIES AND CONTRIBUTES NOTHING POSITIVE TO THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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 . CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2. ידוע לי בודאות כי העתון היהודי נקרא בעיון ע"י אנשי משה'ח הקנדי וע"י אנשי לשכת רוה'מ.

גור-אריה

חו

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, הסברה

י"ב ז' אייר תש"ח
א. יוסף קאסאן ז"ל י"ב ז' אייר תש"ח

ה'תש"ח-ה'תש"ח

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ה'תש"ח: ה'תש"ח, ה'תש"ח, ה'תש"ח, ה'תש"ח, ה'תש"ח, ה'תש"ח, ה'תש"ח, ה'תש"ח, ה'תש"ח, ה'תש"ח

דמיפות: מיד	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: גלוי		כתוב: 4
תאריך וזמן מעור: 221800 פרואר 1989		אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק:		דע:
מספר:		
548		פאת: ק. לקו גרס

ביהנב"ח : ועדת החוץ וסיוע חוץ
בחדשן לשלנו 514 מ-21.2

רצ"ב הודעתו של יו"ר ועדת החוץ פאסל, מהבוקר התומכת בבקשת התקציב (המתקנת)
של הממשל ובניגוד להודעתו של אובי מאתמול.

הועדה תעביר הערוכה ותמיכתה זו לוועדת התקציב.

ישראל ונא דרגר
יהודית ורנאי דרגר

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תפוצה:

548 2/4
Opening Statement of the Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Full Committee -- Wednesday, February 22, 1989

*** **

THE COMMITTEE WILL BE IN ORDER.

THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IS CONSIDERATION OF THE COMMITTEE'S VIEWS AND ESTIMATES REPORT TO THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HOUSE BUDGET RESOLUTION TIME TABLE, THESE REPORTS ARE DUE ON FEBRUARY 25. FOLLOWING OUR CONSIDERATION OF THIS REPORT, WE WILL CONTINUE OUR HEARINGS ON THE PRESIDENT'S PENDING FISCAL YEAR 1990 AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WITH OUR NEXT WITNESS, THE HONORABLE ALAN WOODS, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

BEFORE EACH MEMBER IS A BUDGET TABLE SHOWING PRESIDENT BUSH'S REVISED REQUEST FOR THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (150) FUNCTION FOR FY 1990 COMPARED WITH FY 1989 APPROPRIATIONS ON A LINE ITEM BASIS. ALSO, PRESENT IN THE AUDIENCE ARE THE COMPTROLLERS AND BUDGET ANALYSTS FROM THE VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE WHO ARE AVAILABLE TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THAT MAY ARISE.

HAVING REVIEWED THESE NUMBERS CAREFULLY AND HAVING HEARD SECRETARY BAKER'S PRESENTATION YESTERDAY, THE CHAIR IS PREPARED TO RECOMMEND THAT THE BUDGET COMMITTEE APPROVE THE OVERALL EXECUTIVE BRANCH REQUEST FOR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY AND OUTLAYS FOR THIS BUDGET FUNCTION.

THE 9.9% INCREASE IN BUDGET AUTHORITY REQUESTED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE DISCRETIONARY PART OF THIS FUNCTION DOES NOT REPRESENT REAL GROWTH OR NEW INITIATIVES; RATHER, THE 5.8% INCREASE OVER AND ABOVE THE 4.1% ALLOWANCE FOR INFLATION RESULTS FROM A COMBINATION OF FACTORS WHICH CAUSED THE UNITED STATES TO FALL BEHIND IN CERTAIN COMMITMENTS AND DEFER IMPORTANT

548 3/4

INITIATIVES. THESE COMMITMENTS INCLUDE:

- ASSESSMENTS FOR NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES;
- X-- DEFERRED CONSTRUCTION OF A VOA-RFE/RL RADIO TRANSMITTER FACILITY IN ISRAEL;
- FUNDING FOR PAST SHORTAGES FOR BASE RIGHTS COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY TURKEY, PORTUGAL, AND THE PHILIPPINES;
- PAST DUE PAYMENTS TO THE UNITED NATIONS AS WELL AS RESTORATION OF OUR REGULAR ASSESSED PAYMENT;
- MAINTENANCE OF UPGRADED RESIDENTIAL SECURITY IN HIGH THREAT COUNTRIES;
- FUNDING FOR INCREASED NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS OVERSEAS; AND
- DEFERRED REPLENISHMENTS FOR CERTAIN MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS BUDGET DOES NOT ADDRESS THE EXPENSIVE PROPOSITION OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE NEW EMBASSY OFFICE BUILDING IN MOSCOW OR, AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED IN HIS TESTIMONY YESTERDAY, THE INSUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF FUNDS TO ADDRESS THE GROWING PROBLEM OF REFUGEES AROUND THE WORLD. OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR OPERATING EXPENSES AND BILATERAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMS ARE AT OR BELOW A CURRENT SERVICES BUDGET.

FINALLY AS THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT, THIS BUDGET IS IN REAL TERMS, LESS THAN THE ADMINISTRATION RECEIVED IN FISCAL YEARS 1985, 1986, AND 1987.

AT THIS POINT, I RECOGNIZE THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, MR. BROOMFIELD, FOR HIS COMMENTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET.

IS THERE ANY FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE CHAIR'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE? IF NOT, THE CHAIR WILL

548 4/4

ENTERTAIN A MOTION TO DIRECTS THE STAFF TO PREPARE THE REPORT TO THE BUDGET COMMITTEE RECOMMENDING THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY REQUEST AND OUTLAY ESTIMATES BE APPROVED AS THE LEVEL FOR THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FUNCTION IN THE FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990.

*** ** ***

WE WILL NOW HEAR FROM THE HON. ALAN WOODS.

MR. WOODS IT IS A PLEASURE TO WELCOME YOU TO THE COMMITTEE. AS YOU WELL KNOW THE COMMITTEE IS ABOUT TO START THE PROCESS OF WRITING A TWO YEAR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BILL. THE HAMILTON/GILMAN TASK FORCE HAS REPORTED ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE AND WE WILL ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP CONSENSUS ON AS MANY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AS POSSIBLE. A.I.D. AND THE ADMINISTRATION ARE OBVIOUSLY CRITICAL TO DEVELOPING THAT CONSENSUS AND WE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN CRAFTING A NEW BILL.

MR. WOODS YOU MAY PROCEED.



American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee

4201 Connecticut Ave., NW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20008
(202) 244-2990
Telex: 866419 (ADC WSHDC)
Telefax: (202) 244-3196

Alex Odeh
(1944-1985)

James Abounekk, National Chairman

Abdeen Jabara, President

ADC National Advisory Committee
(Partial List)

Rep. John Conyers (D-MI)
Rep. George Creakett (D-MI)
Rep. Walter Fauntroy (D-DC)
Rep. Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH)
Rep. Nick J. Rahall (D-WV)

Mohammad Ali
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Hon. George Bashara
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Imam A.M. Khatib
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Samir Merhi

Hon. Herb Mool
Joseph Najjar
Jack O'Dell

Talat Othman
Paul Rask
Dr. Bata Rifka

Don Rik
Joseph Robbie
Michael Baba

Edward Said
Marion Said
Archbishop Philip Saliba

Harold Samhat
Henry Schwarzschild
Razouk Semaan

Richard Shadyac
Archbishop Michael Shaheen
Hisham Sharabi

Qhada Taham
Archbishop Joseph Tawil
Abdula Warrayat

Joe Yulif

February 17, 1989

Senator Charles E. Grassley
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Grassley:

As you know, the State Department issued its annual country report on human rights last week. Considerable attention was paid to the report on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip by our national media.

Such scrutiny is not surprising given the fact that Israel is the single largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid and in light of the enormous number of human rights abuses documented in the report. Over 370 Palestinians were killed, 5,000 imprisoned and 20,000 injured in the past year alone.

To understand the magnitude of these figures for the 1.7 million Palestinian people in the occupied territories, one need only calculate what this would mean to Americans were such incidents to occur in the United States. On a proportionate basis, this would amount to 53,499 Americans killed, 722,961 imprisoned and 2,891,84 injured.

I am enclosing a copy of the country report on Israel and the occupied territories and hope you will find time to read it. Also enclosed are an editorial from the Wichita Eagle-Bee and a Sacramento Bee cartoon on the same subject.

There is no doubt that Israel is in violation of many provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other generally recognized standards of international law -- the evidence is decisive and overwhelming.

While Israel has been a valued ally of the United States, it should not be allowed to continue its military occupation and the brutal practices which are documented in the country report.

Palestinian casualties are mounting daily. I urge you to contact the Israeli embassy about its government's human rights violations.

If you have the opportunity to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Foreign Minister Moshe Arens during their visit to Washington next month, I hope you will raise this issue with them directly.

Sincerely,

Abdeen Jabara
Abdeen Jabara
President

2
4

581

Israel's shame

Cruelties will haunt soldiers forever

ISRAEL'S repressive policies and massive violations of human rights in the occupied territories are exacting a terrible vengeance. This is seen nowhere more clearly, perhaps, than in the young Israeli soldiers and reservists who are being scarred forever by the bestial conduct they are charged with carrying out.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir came face to face with the horror he has inflicted on a whole generation of Israeli youth when he toured the West Bank city of Nablus on Tuesday. There, while the Israeli media's television cameras rolled, he encountered reservists in their late 20s and early 30s. They told him that when they beat innocent people to instill fear in the populace, as they do routinely, they are ashamed of themselves and hardly can face their friends and family at home.

Yotam (the only name he used), a laborer from Tiberias who currently is serving as a reservist, had this to say to the unrepentant Mr. Shamir:

"In order to enforce order in the marketplace, we must be brutally violent to innocent people.... When I get up in the morning, I say to myself, 'Now I have to go out and chase somebody'.... and when I catch him I look at his hands and see he is a working man, just like me."

"I have to slap him or beat him [with] murderous blows to get him to fear me. It wears me down as a person. It breaks me. These are not the values I grew up on."

They are not the values most Jewish young men and women grew up on. Yet many are forced in the Israeli armed forces to renounce those values and inflict terror, in the name of their government, on unarmed protesters — including little children.

At the same time young Yotam was baring his soul, new army tactics were being instituted that will intensify the suffering among the Palestinian civilian population a hundredfold. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin said whatever loose rules of conduct had governed army treatment of Palestinian protesters previously would be loosened still more.

Before, only officers trained in the use of plastic bullets were authorized to shoot demonstrators judged to be threatening the lives of soldiers. (Even this rule was abused horribly, and repeatedly.) Now, noncommissioned officers will be allowed to use the plastic bullets and a new, more deadly "rubber" bullet (actually a steel sphere with a thin covering of rubber). Worse, troops will be allowed to fire upon stone-throwers even when they are fleeing.

This means the human toll on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip is certain to rise far above the current 362 deaths and many thousands of critical injuries — 492 in the past month alone. Back in October — three months ago — at least 7,600 and possibly as many as 15,000 Palestinians were estimated to have been permanently disabled in the course of the uprising, or intifada, that began on Dec. 8, 1987.

At least 10 new deaths have occurred in just the past week, as Israeli troops increasingly have opened fire on Palestinian young people. The fletion of the new "rubber" bullets — responsible for four of these deaths — being somehow less lethal is exposed not only by the sudden rise in fatalities but by the horrid injuries they have inflicted. A 17-year-old Gaza Strip boy is in an intensive care unit right now with half his brain blown away by a "rubber" bullet.

And to what end? It is a question the people of Israel must put to their government, as surely as the troubled young soldiers did to their nominal commander in chief on Tuesday.

AD

AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE

3/4 581

4801 CONNECTICUT AVE., NW, SUITE 600 □ WASHINGTON, DC 20008 □ Phone: (202) 244-2990
TELEX: 866419 (ADC WSHDC) □ TELEFAX: (202) 244-3196



AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE

SACRAMENTO BEE
February 12, 1989



"How can I be violating *human rights* when I don't consider these people *human*?"

4201 CONNECTICUT AVE., N.W., SUITE 500 □ WASHINGTON, DC, 20008 □ Phone: (202) 244-2990
TELEX: 856419 (ADC WSHDC) □ TELEFAX: (202) 244-3196

דמי פיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: שמר	טופס פרוק	מתי: 3
תאריך וזמן מעבר: 1430 23.2.89		אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק:		דע: לשי רוח"מ
הפסד:		ס/שר העבודה
1/3 577		פאת: שג' רוש ינגטון

שיחת ס/שר העבודה - ממ' עוזר המכיר ל - הא (22.2)

1. בחלקה הראשון של השיחה השיב ס/השר לשאלותיו של האר לגבי תוצאות הבחירות הכלליות, והגידול בכוחן של המפלגות הדתיות והערכותיו לתוצאות הבחירות העירוניות.
2. בחלקה השני של השיחה, התייחס ס/השר לאירועים בישי"ע, אופיו ומטרותיו של אש"פ.
3. כנציגה של מפלגת דתית חדגיש החשיבות העליונה בהשגת שלום כאמצעי לפיקוח פפש, ציין החשיבות (לאור החסטרוריה של העם היהודי) שבהבטחת זכותה של ישראל להתקיים בשלום ובטחון.
4. ס/השר שלל הטיעון הפלסטיני לזכותם החסטרורית על הארץ בשל היותם צאצאי הפלישתים. הדגיש זכותיבו על הארץ כצאצאיו של המלך דוד. בהתייחסו לאירועים בישי"ע מנה ס/השר שלוש אפשרויות לחשליט רגיעה : א. דרך לא פופולרית דוגמת זו הנהוגה במקרים רבים ע"י סוריה וירדן חודו ואחרות. ב. הדרך שבה אנו נוהגים כיום. זוהי דרך קשה וארוכה שבמהלכה נתונים חיילי צה"ל לא אחת לפרובוקציות מצד האוכלוסיה. להוציא חריגים. הדגיש ס/השר מתבטאים חיילי צה"ל בצורה אנושית. "במקום לזכות בהערכה על התנהגותנו אנו זוכים ליחס הפוך". ג. נסיגה בישי"ע תחווה שלבאראשון בהגשמת תכנית פאז.
- ס/השר שלל אפשרות זו.
5. אלמלא החשש מפני טירור אש"פי הדגיש ס/השר היתה קמה מנהיגות מקומית בישי"ע שהיתה מוכנה להכנס למומי. ס/השר הביע אכזבה והכרת ארה"ב באש"פ מהלך אשר סייע לאש"פ לשפר את דימויו ובמקביל מקשה על הקמת מנהיגות פלסטינית בישי"ע.

תפוח: 36 -

דק: 2	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דחיות:
כתוב: 3		סוג:
אל:		תאריך וזמן תכנון:
דע:		כס' פרוק: הפסד:
כאח:		2/3 577

- 2 -

6. ס/השר ציין כי ממי ישראל עובדת על הכנת חכמיכ אותה יציג רוחי"מ בביקורו, בהקשר זה הביע ס/השר תקווה שארחי"ב תסייע לישראל בין היתר ע"י כך שלא תלחץ עלינו לקבל פתרונות שאותם נאלץ לדחות, יש לחפש פתרון חוסיף שיחיה קביל על הציבור בישראל.
7. האר בתגובתו לדברי ס/השר ציין כי מודעים לפגיעותה של ישראל ולמצבה הבטחוני הקשה, כמו כן ציין כי ^{הוא} חבנת לתנאים הקשים שבהם נאלצים חיילי צה"ל להפעיל בשטחים כדי להחזיר החוק והסדר.
8. ס/השר התייחס למאמצי משרדו לשפר רמת החיים של תושבי ישי"ע בתחום השיכון והתעסוקה.
9. ביחס לפתיחת הדיאלוג עם אש"פ, חזר האר על התנאים אותם העגינה ארה"ב ואשר בהם אש"פ עמד. הבחיר כי יחסי ארה"ב - אש"פ יקבעו עפ"י מעשי הארגון. הדגיש כי סוגית הטירור עומדת בראש רשימת נושאי הדיאלוג.
10. ס/השר הביע סקפיות ביחס לאפשרות שיחול שינוי באופיו של אש"פ.
11. בהקשר למציאת פתרון הבחיר האר כי אין לארה"ב כונה לכפות פתרון על ישראל וכי כוונת הממשל להעלות רעיונות ולשמוע הצעותינו לקידום תהליך השלום במהלך ביקורי שה"ח ורוח"מ.
12. האר העלה את נושא הכושים העבריים בדימונה. הביע דאגתם למצב הקהילה אשר עפ"י הדיווחים סובלת מתעדר מזון בכמות מספקת. לדבריו חלק מהבעיה קשור למעמדם בישראל, האר הביע תקווה שמשרד העבודה יהיה מעורב במתן ארוחות לילדי הכושים העבריים ובשיפור שירות הבריאות לקהילה. ס/השר הבטיח ללמוד הנושא במטרה למצוא פתרון.

תפוצה:

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל/ווישינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 3
סוג:		כתוב: 3
תאריך וזמן חבירה:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
הפסד:		פאת:
3/3 577		

- 3 -

13. ס/השר סיפר על דווח שקיבל מפי תייר שחזר מעיור בתימן על מצבה הקשה של הקהילה היהודית. ביקש סיוע ארה"ב להקלת מצבם של היהודים.
14. האר בתגובתו ציין כי מודעים למצבם הקשה של יהודי תימן, חבטיח כי ינסו לסייע.
- השחקר ושיחה חזרה מנהל מח' ישראל, מצידנו עוזרי ס/השר, רהן-קגן, הציר והח"מ.

שטיין

תפוצה:

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 23.02.89

17570

יוצא **

שומר

**

**

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חוזם: 2,17570

אל: ווש/886, בטחון/926

מ-: המשרד, תא: 230289, זח: 1742, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

שומר/מיידי

וושנינגטון - קונגרס.

דע: מקש'ח/בטחון.

ביקור סנטור אינוייה.

1. שג'ארה'ב הודיעתנו על בואו בראש CODEL שימנה כ- 25 איש (6-7 סנטורים, רעיות וחבר עוזרים).
מועדים - 28-31/3/89. טרם ידוע אילו סנטורים יצטרפו.

2. להלן בקשותיהם (שהועברו מריצ'רד קולינס דרך מחמ'ד):

28/3 - מגיעים ממצרים ב- 20:30 בטיסה צבאית.

29/3 - יד ושם, מוזיאון ישראל, אתרים בירושלים, א'צ מטעם ועדת חו'ב
אחה'צ - פגישות עם רה'מ, מ'מ רה'מ ושר האוצר, שר החוץ.

30/3 - הסנטורים ומספר עוזרים בלבד - ביקור בבסיסי חיל-אוויר בדרום ומצדה.
אחה'צ: פגישות מקצועיות במשה'ט כולל פגישה עם שהב'ט.
הנשים ישארו בירושלים או יוסעו לסיור בתל-אביב.
א'ע עם הקונכ'ל וילקוקס.

31/3 - ממריאים ב- 08:00 לארה'ב.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3. מצדינו נטפל בהתאם; אנא הערות והמלצות בחוזר.

מצפ'א

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מאור

** יוצא

סודי

**

**

**

חוזם: 2,17585

אל: אוטבה/300

מ-: המשרד, תא: 230289, זח: 1750, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: פ גס: צפא

נד: 8

סודי/מיידי

השגריר.

בשיחת המנכ"ל והח"מ עם ס/שה'ח קנדה קרטין וברטלמן (22.2)
 ביקשנו שקנדה תימנע מכל צעד שיש בו כדי להעלות דרג מגעיה
 עם אש"ף. קרטין אמר שזכורה להם פנייתו של שה"ח לשה"ח
 קלארק להמתין עד אשר ישראל תגבש רעיונותיה ויזמתה
 המדינית. קרטין אמר שידבר ברוח זו עם קלארק וברטלמן ציין
 שהמלצתם לקלארק תהא להימנע מנקיטת יזמה קנדית שתתפרש
 כהעלאת רמת היחסים עם אש"ף.

המנכ"ל העלה ענין שיתוף הפעולה המש"בי במדינות שלישיות.
 סוכם שנקדם פרויקט קמרון ולאחריו נבחן אפשרויות נוספות
 אחרי שנעזכן הקנדים בהתאם.

קרטין הזמין המנכ"ל לביקור בקנדה והודה לו על קבלת הפנים
 החמה לה זוכה בביקורו בארץ.

בנצור

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ר/מרכז, ממד

דחיפות: מיידית	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק 12	דף: 1 3
סוג: גלוי		כתוב: 3
תאריך וזמן העבר: 21 בפבר' 1989 20:00		אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק: המשרד: 515		דע:
		פאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביהנביח: עדות המזכיר בייקר בועדת החוץ

1. בנפרד עדותו הכתובה של המזכיר.

2. בקורות המעניינות מבחינתנו:-

- בקשת התקציב לשתיא 1990 לפונקציה 150 תשאר פחות או יותר ברמה שהוגשה (היינו 19.3 בליון \$). הוצאות פונקציה 150 מהוות פחות מ-2% מסה"כ התקציב הפדרלי.

- פירוט תכנית הסיוע (שגודלה 14.6 בליון \$):-

- 5.3 בליון \$ = 36% - סיוע לישראל ומצרים (היינו שמירת הסיוע ברמתו הנוכחית)

- 1.8 בליון \$ = 12% - 4 מדינות בעלות בסיסים

- 1.1 בליון \$ = 7% - למדינות מזה"ת, אפריקה ואסיה (סה"כ 8)

- 900 מיליון \$ - 6% - קידום שלום ומוקד סיוע ופיתוח באמריק"ז

- 150 מיליון \$ - למדינות האנדיניות (4 סה"כ)

- 800 מיליון \$ - למדינות סהרה.

- 900 מיליון \$ = 6% - תכניות בילטרליות בקרוביים, דר' מז' אסיה ובשאר העולם.

- שאר הסיוע 3.6 בליון \$ לבנקין לפיתוח, או"ם, פליטים וסמים.

- חוק סיוע החוץ השנה, יציע שינויים משמעותיים לרבות מספר יוזמות שיאפשרו לסיוע

הצבאי המצטמק להחרחר חערר למה שמאפשרת החקיקה הנוכחית (בייקר הביא כדוגמה במהלך

השאלות והתשובות את נושא ה- FAIR PRICING).

- הסכמת בייקר לגישת ה-TASK FORCE לסיוע חוץ (דו"ח המילטון) הממליצה על שינויים

בחקיקה שיאפשרו ניהול יעיל של המקורות המוגבלים, ע"י הממשל.

3. בחלק השאלות והתשובות לא עלה נושא המזמ"ח להוציא שתי שאלות שנשאלו ע"י קונגרסמן מל

לויין:-

תפוצה: 2 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 2 2

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
סוג:		כתוב: 3
תאריך וזמן חשור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
המסרד:		
515		פאת:

- ש. הדיאלוג עם אש"פ: מוטריד מחמסרים תשונים שמוסר ערפת במערב לעומת אלה שמוסר במזה"ת. גם מחמ"ד גינתה איומי ערפת על פרייג'.
- בסיון החדירה מדורס לבנון, שנראה כנסיון לביצוע פעולת טרור בישראל, שאושר ונתמך ע"י ערפת עומד בסתירה מוחלטת להודעותיו על התנערותו משמוש בטרור. הודעותיו של אבו אייד, סגנו של ערפת, חדגישו לאחר הצהרת ערפת בגנ'בה, שמאקצי ערפת הם טקטיים בלבד ולמעשה הם חלק מתהליך לטווח ארוך לשחרר את כל פלסטין לרבות חיפה ות"א. ברור שמדקורד לו אנו עדים מבחינת פעולות והצטרות, שונה לחלוטין מהרטוריקה שנשמעה מפי ערפת בגנ'בה. לאור דאגתו מבקש לשמוע הערכת המזכיר לגבי פעולות אלה והשפעתן על הדיאלוג בין אש"פ לארה"ב. כמו כן מבקש לדעת האם במחמ"ד לא סבזרים שזה הזמן לדחוק במדינות ערביות מתונות, בבחינת Confidence Building Measure לעשות יותר מאשר עשו עדכה כדי לחזק לישראל וארה"ב שחן אכן מעונינות לחיות בשלום בטווח הארוך עם ישראל באיזור.
- ת. בקשר לשאלה על מדיניות ערב, התשובה היא וויזיונית. בנוגע לאש"פ, הבהרנו באמצעות סלטרו כי נסיון החדירה ב-5/2/89 גרם לנו קשיים וכי לא נוכל לתמוך בפעולות טרור במיוחד נגד מטרות אזרחיות. עמדתנו היא כי בעוד שאנשי הקבוצה היו חברים באש"פ הקבוצה שהיתה אחראית לחעשה החנגדה להחלונות אש"פ מנובמבר ויתכן שביצעה המעשה כדי להפיץ את ערפת ולפגוע בדיאלוג. הבהרנו כי הדיאלוג עם אש"פ אינו מטרה בפני עצמה ועל מנת שיהיה לו ערך, עליו לתרום בדרכים מעשיות לשלום.
4. לשאלת קונגרסמן ברומפילד לדרך הטיפול בסיוע הצבאי הקטן השיב בייקר כי אחת הדרכים להתמודד עם הבעיית היא Fair Pricing שבאמצעותו ניתן להגדיל הסיוע למקבלות FMS.

תפוצה:

דחיפות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 2
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5. נושא תיקון אקסון וביק הועלה ע"י הקונגרסמן אד פיהן. בייקר התבקש להגיב על אפשרות Waiver לשנתיים עד חמש שנים לאור ההתפתחויות בברה"מ (שינוי במדיניות ז"א, הגירה וכו'). לדברי בייקר יש אמנם לבדוק חנושא אולם אין להסיע מסקנות רק ע"ס מדיניות, יש לראות זאת בקונטקסט של שינויים אחרים שחייבים להעשות במדיניות ז"א בברה"מ ומדינות מזא"ר ג"כ. את שאלת הסחר עם ברה"מ יש לראות בקונטקסט הרחב של יחסי ארה"ב - ברה"מ. ברה"מ עדיין מעצמת על מחומשת מאד בעלת אינטרסים המנוגדים לאלה של ארה"ב. יש להיות זהירים וריאליסטים בבחינת הנושא שחועלה.

6. נושאים בולטים שנדונו: סלמן רשדי וספרו נגד האיסלם והתגובה המתבקשת מארה"ב, יחסי ארה"ב ונאט"ו (בעקבות ביקור המזכיר באירופה), יחסי ברה"מ - ארה"ב, יחסי ברה"מ אירופה והשפעתן על נאט"ו, אמרכ"ז ניקרגואה וסנמה.

ישראל ונאט"ו
יחודית ורנאי דרנגר.

תפוצה:

דמיפות: מידי	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דף: 1
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ביהנביח : ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות וסיוע חוץ

רצ"ב הודעה מטעם קונגרס אובי, יו"ד ועדת המשנה, המחייסת לבקשת התקציב של הממשל לשנת 1990. ההודעה נשלחה לוועדת התקציב, כפי שתוכלו לראות, מצינת ההודעה כי לוועדת מעט ציפיות שביהנביח יהיה מעוניין במתן סיוע חוץ ברמה, אפילו קרובה, לזו שהתבקשה על ידי הממשל בהתחשב בקיצוצים העמוקים בתכניות פנים והעדר הכנסות חדשות. בסיפא, מצינת ההודעה כי לא ניתן לאפשר העלאה ברמת המימון לפרוייקטים מסויימים (כפי שהוצעו) ויהיה למעשה צורך בקיצוצים. משמעותיים כדי לעמוד בדרישות ג"ר.

בד"כ ועדת התרשאות חן אלה המגישות דוחות לוועדת התקציב ערב הדיונים בוועדת התקציב וע"כ הודעה זו התקבלה חיוס כחריגה.

עוד נדווח.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר
יהודה / ונא' דרנגר

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Foreign Assistance, Export Financing, and Related Programs

Committee Views: FY 1990 Request Summary

In considering the Administration's FY 1990 budget request, Congress is faced with a proposal to increase net funding 2.5 percent, \$368 million. This request includes substantial funding increases and decreases in individual programs. Congress will need to consider these proposals closely in light of the need to cut total funding in order to achieve Gramm Rudman Hollings deficit targets without new revenues. The Committee has little expectation that the House will be interested in providing foreign assistance at levels even close to those requested given the deep cuts in domestic programs and the lack of new revenues.

The most significant Administration proposals include (1) cutting all funding for the Export-Import Bank direct loan program but retaining \$100 million for a "war chest" compared to a FY 1989 total of \$695 million for the direct loan program, including \$110 million for the "war chest", (2) requesting \$150 million for a United States contribution to a new International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility. This facility is being utilized to cut interest rates to the poorest countries which are acting to improve their economic performance, (3) requesting an initial \$200 million for the new "Special Assistance Initiative" account for a United States contribution to the "Multilateral Assistance Initiative" (MAI) for the Philippines on top of a substantial increase in the request for the Philippines in the regular funding accounts due to recent base rights negotiations.

In addition to these major proposals, the Congress will have to carefully consider several areas where the Administration request may be unrealistic. The Administration has again failed to request sufficient funds to cover arrearages to the International Financial Institutions, a shortfall of \$100 million. Funding requested for the Migration and Refugee Assistance program is insufficient for expected needs by approximately \$30 million. The United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) is requested at \$33 million compared to funding of \$60 million in FY 1989.

While the Administration budget request totals \$14.658 billion for FY 1990, a 2.5 percent increase over FY 1989 levels, the large cut in the Export-Import Bank direct loan program masks increases for other foreign assistance programs totaling 7 percent, \$963 million. The Administration is requesting a 36 percent, \$473 million, increase for the International Financial Institutions of which \$315 million is for arrearages, primarily

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for the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank, and \$150 million is for the previously mentioned Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility of the IMF. New funding is also requested for a United Nations Afghan Emergency Trust Fund at a level of \$16 million.

In bilateral economic assistance a 6 percent, \$391 million, increase has been requested. This amount includes a 10 percent increase, \$300 million, for development assistance and State Department accounts, and a 3 percent, \$91 million increase in the Economic Support Funds (ESF). Proposed increases in this area include: \$200 million for the Special Assistance Initiative for the Philippines, \$34 million for the Agency for International Development Operating Expenses, \$10 million for Peace Corps, \$15 million for Sub-Saharan Africa, and \$14 million for International Narcotics Prevention.

In bilateral military assistance a total increase of 2 percent, \$116.5 million, has been requested. Within this total, funding requested for the Guarantee Reserve Fund has been cut by \$220 million. Funding for military procurement programs, the Military Assistance Program and the Foreign Military Credit Sales Program, has been increased 7 percent, \$128 million. The Administration has also requested that all military funds be provided on a grant basis in FY 1990. Concessional loans totalling \$410 million had been provided in FY 1989.

Clearly proposed increases cannot be provided and significant cuts in fact may be necessary to meet the requirements of Gramm-Rudman.

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February 22, 1989
Issue 88

EGYPT-ISRAEL

Cairo has joined Baghdad and the PLO in an attempt to forestall the establishment of an Israeli consulate in New Delhi (al-Itikhad, United Arab Emirates, January 31).

MIDDLE EAST CONFLICTS

IRAQ-KUWAIT

The pending border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait clouds their bilateral relations. It is not as simple a problem as presented by the Kuwaiti papers. The boundary between the two states has never been properly delineated. It was initially drawn -- but not agreed upon -- in 1903. The Iraqi parliament rejected a proposal to ratify this line in 1933. The current border was set in 1963, but has never been accepted by the Iraqi government (al-Thawra, Iraq, February 8; for further information, please see Dr. Robert Litwak's "Security in the Persian Gulf: Sources of Inter-State Conflict," 1981, and J.B. Kelly's "Arabia, the Gulf and the West," 1980).

IRAQ-INTERNAL

"Iraqi President Saddam Hussein recently survived an attempted coup, for which a number of senior army officers have been executed... The coup attempt occurred around the beginning of January and involved officers from military units stationed in northern Iraq... Some reports circulating in both diplomatic and intelligence circles have indicated that officers from the elite Republican Guards, which is charged with protecting the president, were also involved in the attempted coup... Army Day, which is celebrated every January 6, was cancelled this year without explanation..." (Michael Ross, writing in the Los Angeles Times, February 8).

LIBYA-INTERNAL

Some 900 students from Benghazi University were arrested following anti-Qaddhafi riots (al-Dostour, a Lebanese weekly published in London, February 7).

LEBANON-WARS BY PROXY

Syria has supplied Amal with 200 T-55 tanks, cannons, mortars and missiles, bolstering the latter's position vis-a-vis the Iranian-backed Hizballah. The Iranian embassy in Beirut has become a major storehouse of weaponry used by Hizballah (al-Jumhuriya, Iraq, January 24). Egyptian authorities have confiscated a shipment of weapons that were intended to be sent, through an Egyptian port, by Iraq to the Christian Lebanese Forces (al-Rai, Lebanon, January 1).

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PLO-ARAB POLITICS

Abu Iyyad, Arafat's deputy, has expressed disappointment with the extent of the Arab commitment to the uprising. He hopes that Arab support will amount to 10 percent of that accorded to the Afghan rebels (Middle East News Agency, Egypt, February 9). Arafat stated that he will be forced "to contemplate aloud other means of convincing them [i.e., Arab leaders] to fulfill their obligations, even though they would not be in keeping with the character of the diplomatic phase or its perfect course..." (al-Qabas, Kuwait, January 29).

THE PLO -- A TURNING POINT?

ON THE "RETURN"

Sheikh Abd al-Hamid Sayekh, Chairman of the PNC:
"...The PLO has embarked on the road that will lead to the realization of the right of return... Hamas [the Islamic Resistance Movement] has an important role to play and a distinct direction. Its aim is to retrieve all the Palestinian land, which is a natural right..." (Uqaz, Saudi Arabia, February 14).

ON ISRAEL

Abd al-Rahim Ahmed, a member of the PLO's Executive Council and leader of the Arab Liberation Front:

"...Israel was founded on the basis of a religious legend. A state or a project established in such a manner may either fully succeed or fail altogether. There isn't a quarter or a half a success to the religious legend responsible for the establishment of Israel..." (al-Iqra'a, the weekly supplement to al-Bilad, Saudi Arabia, January 26).

The PLO's "Unified Command":

"...The unity of the uprising will lead to the establishment of the independent Palestinian state and to the liberation of the whole of the Palestinian land from the [Jordan] River to the Mediterranean... Our children will never forget Lydda, Ramle, Haifa and Jaffa... He who contemplates ceasing the uprising, in the guise of a timeout for negotiations, is a criminal, a coward and an agent..." (from a leaflet distributed in Jelazoun, quoted by the AFP, January 17).

ARAB ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL

SYRIA

"...The village of Dabouriye and other towns and villages in the Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev, have proven to Israel that it is impossible to Judaize the Palestinian Arab land..." (al-Talia, Syria, February 7).

EGYPT

"...Europe is aware of the Zionists' cruelty and their potential for damage... They behaved accordingly in Germany, or else why was Hitler so furious with them?... If one accords Jews freedom of operation, they consume other people... Europeans rejoiced over the establishment of Israel, thinking that it would rid them of their Jews..." (October magazine, Egypt, February 5).

February 21, 1989
Special Issue 15

[The following are excerpts from an article entitled "Self-Determination, Arab Style," by David Pryce-Jones, which appeared in the January 1989 edition of Commentary magazine. David Pryce-Jones is a British political analyst and novelist whose books include "Paris in the Third Reich." His latest book, "The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs," will be released in March by Burlingame Books/Harper & Row.]

"The Arab-Israeli conflict, according to a senior Egyptian diplomat in 1985, 'has been the most important single factor in the shaping of history in the Middle East during the past four decades. Had it not been for that conflict, we would have been able to see in that area a much more stable order, the orientation of which would have been liberal and rational.' This sentiment is repeated so often that it seems a truism, but it is superficial: plenty of other wars have broken out to defy liberalism and rationality, and they owe nothing to the presence of Israel in the Middle East.

"Morocco and Algeria have fought, and for years Algeria has financed a proxy, the Polisario movement, to continue its feuding against Morocco. Libya has raided across the Egyptian and Tunisian borders and interfered militarily in Sudan. Syria has twice invaded neighboring Lebanon, and once neighboring Jordan, and it has mobilized against neighboring Iraq. Iraq has threatened neighboring Kuwait and Syria and has twice sent forces into Jordan, and under Saddam Hussein fought one of the longest wars of the century against neighboring Iran. Jordan, Yemen North and South, and Oman have experienced civil wars. In South Yemen, Ali Nasser Muhammed and Abdul Fattah Ismail, both nominally Marxists, fought in 1986 to decide which of them should rule; perhaps 13,000 people died, and fifty years of development in the port of Aden and along the shore were shelled to ruins.

"For over a decade now, moreover, the world has watched in impotence and horror the death agony of Lebanon, as its component communities, Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Shia, Palestinian, have been each in turn victim and victimizer in the accelerating cycle of massacre and counter-massacre. Lebanese villages, city quarters, refugee camps, refineries and hospitals have been destroyed indiscriminately. Beirut, once one of the most agreeable of Mediterranean cities, has become a mass of rubble and no-go areas. Over the years, Beirutis have been obliged to endure nights of random bombardment, to emerge pale and shaking in the dawn. Truces are no sooner

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In Tripoli on December 18, Syrian soldiers arrested a leader of the fundamentalist Islamic Unification Movement, also known as the Tawheed. All its members are Sunni Muslims. In response Tawheed killed 15 Syrians. That night members of the pro-Syrian Arab Democratic, Lebanese Communist, Baath, and National Syrian Socialist parties cordoned off the suburbs of Tabbaneh. Syrian intelligence officers then named more than 200 people for summary execution. All were shot in the head. The massacre is taken to be a warning to other groups that Syria rules in Lebanon.

"The second newspaper item is a report from Iraq:

Fifty-seven boxes were recently returned to the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya in Zeil trucks -- large Russian military vehicles -- by the Iraqi government authorities. Each box contained a dead child, eyes gouged out and ashen white, apparently drained of blood. The families were not given their children, were forced to accept a communal grave, and then had to pay 150 dinars for the burial.

The fifty-seven children were among several hundred taken hostage by their own government in order to bring the rebellious Kurdish minority into line by means of this atrocity.

"Public executions are frequent in Syria and Iraq, and criminals also suffer amputation in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Sudan, and Iran. Between 1983 and 1985, according to a newspaper report, religious courts in Sudan approved over a hundred amputations, sometimes for petty theft, and thousands of floggings, even an unconfirmed crucifixion. A doctor, Kamal Zaki Mustapha, apparently British-trained, is quoted as saying that he was preparing executioners for this task, teaching them how to dislocate the wrist from the forearm. 'There was never any cutting of the bone. I attended the first seven or eight cases and when I was satisfied with the standard of chopping, I didn't go back.'

"In Saudi Arabia, offenders are decapitated or have a limb amputated in public on a Friday, the day of prayer. Now and again, a shocked Westerner describes in the press how during his stay in Saudi Arabia he has stumbled upon such a sight, witnessed by a large crowd. [...]

"In Libya, the execution of offenders has been lengthily shown on television. In one instance, Muammar Qaddafi, who is responsible, offered the explanation that those hanged were "terrorist groups," although none of them had perpetrated any attack, and none of them had been before a court of law. Whether a country declares itself secular or religious has less bearing on the level of cruelty than on the methods of its implementation.

[...]

"Instead of construction, destruction; instead of creativity, wastefulness; instead of a body politic, atrocities. The Moroccan intellectual, Abdallah Laroui, has summed up what ought to have been the new and positive era of independence as 'the long winter of the

made than broken. Rooftop snipers fire at any person visible in the streets below, women and children included. Churches and mosques are the object of sacrilege, and the living, and even the corpses of the dead, are regularly defiled. In a country of about 3.5 million, a tenth have become refugees, perhaps 150,000 have been killed, and countless more maimed and wounded.

"Mercilessness to external enemies is matched by mercilessness to the internal population under rule. In 1982 President Hafez Assad of Syria directed his artillery upon people in his own town of Hama who threatened his absolutist hold on power, and in the ensuing carnage killed several tens of thousands. A million and a half foreign workers live in Saudi Arabia, and in 1982 some of them demanded better living conditions. Six hundred police surrounded one particular camp. The security forces selected three Koreans at random, put them on a truck, drove them away and executed them without any due process of justice, as Said Aburish, a Palestinian by origin, describes it in his book. Raising the matter with a Saudi prince, Aburish was told that guilt or innocence was immaterial. The example was enough. Neither Korean nor any other workers would now dare contemplating disturbing the authorities. An assassination attempt in November 1986 on the head of state in Kuwait led to the deportation of 26,898 people. Some 32,000 Tunisians were expelled from Libya and had their assets seized, for no other reason than that a proposed merger between the two countries had come to nothing.

"The Palestine Liberation Organization has killed some tens of thousands of people by now, only a relatively small number of whom are Israeli or Jewish, though these include many schoolchildren and a sixty-nine-year-old cripple thrown in his wheelchair off a liner at sea. Hijackings and hostage-takings, involving politicians, academics, businessmen, tourists, clergymen, journalists, who happen to provide available targets, have become commonplace. The world has grown accustomed to pictures on television and in the newspapers of Arabs strewing corpses in their wake, throwing bodies out of aircraft on runways, driving cars loaded with high explosives to kill anyone who might happen to be within reach, placing bombs in markets and shops.

"Nothing appears too inhumane. Nizar Hindawi, a Jordanian in London but in fact a Syrian agent, over a long period deceived an Irish girl into thinking he loved her, made her pregnant, bought her a ticket to Tel Aviv, and placed in her luggage a bomb to blow up in midflight, which would have killed her and his own unborn child as well as all the passengers. Having put the plan into effect, as he thought (wrongly, thanks to security measures), he returned to the Syrian embassy in London, where the ambassador masterminding this operation 'greeted him warmly,' according to the evidence later given in the British court which sentenced Hindawi to life imprisonment.

"Two typical newspaper items speak for themselves. The first is on the conduct of Syrian soldiers in Lebanon:

Arabs.' This self-critical tone is now occasionally to be heard, at least among intellectuals. The Algerian writer Malek Bennabi entitled a section of his book on contemporary events, 'The Chaos of the Modern Muslim World.' The prominent Palestinian novelist, Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, writes:

From the Arab Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean I heard a cry, I heard weeping and the sound of sticks and plastic hoses. Capitals and casbahs, the secret police was everywhere, on mountaintops and in the valleys below; men in neat civilian suits walking to and fro like a thousand shuttles on a thousand looms, hauling off to the centers of darkness people by the tens and hundreds.

In 'The Arab Predicament,' a sustained attempt at a truthful reckoning of these Middle East realities, Fouad Ajami, originally a Lebanese Shia and now living in the United States, calls the material of his book 'a chronicle of illusions and despair, of politics repeatedly degenerating into bloodletting.'

[...]

"For me, it was soon evident that words like 'socialism,' 'democracy,' and 'revolution' had no meaningful application to Arab societies but were serving a purpose as metaphors for an absolute rule that could not be declared openly as such. Merely mystifying, these metaphors were for export only. It was abroad, in Western conferences and congresses, in learned journals and fashionable reportage by no means always or necessarily Marxist, that Arab socialism and revolution thrived. But the realization that 'imperialism' was another such metaphor, in this case for the failure or evanescence of Arab nationalism, came more slowly. [...]

"The passage of the years and the unfolding of the wars among the newly independent states has revealed how misleading it was to suppose that the violences of the Arab world were momentary maladjustments, as it were the teething troubles of nationalism. To me as to many, the Middle East for a while seemed in anarchy; here was the war of every man against the other, in which the frightening phrase of Thomas Hobbes had come true, and life was 'poor, nasty, brutish, and short.' Life for the Arabs is certainly that, but it is also displaying a pattern, much more fundamental, recurrent, rooted in the past.

"For all the indisputable diversity, the remarkable thing is the extent to which Muslim societies resemble each other,' Ernest Gellner has observed. 'One has the feeling that the same and limited pack of cards has been dealt.' Here again, slogans of 'imperialism' widened the discrepancy between what was done in the Arab world and what was said about it, creating artificial distinctions where actually none existed. Like Algeria, Egypt since Nasser, Iraq since 1958, Syria, Sudan, North Yemen and South Yemen are nominally republics, nominally 'progressive.' Jordan and Morocco, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have dynastic ruling families and are nominally 'conservative.' All have had varied historical

experiences. And yet now common to all is the rule of a single power-holder around whose ambitions the state has been arranged.

'Set up by Muslims for Muslims, every Arab state is explicitly Islamic in confession. Religious and ethnic minorities have been persecuted everywhere. Nowhere is there participation in the political process corresponding to any conception of representative democracy. No parliament or assembly except by appointment of the power-holder, no freedom of expression throughout rigidly state-controlled media, no opinion polls, nothing except a riot to determine what public opinion might be. Nowhere in the Arab world is there security guaranteed under the law for persons and property. The same is true for non-Arab and Shia Iran, where the difference between the rule of the late Shah and his successor Ayatollah Khomeini may be posed as a question of who is persecuting whom and according to what principle. Lebanon, which until 1975 had maintained participatory institutions, has also become a truly Hobbesian example of social and political disintegration.

'Westerners, unsuitably and even laughably projecting their own political and moral attitudes where these cannot apply, habitually and ignorantly misconceive the responses they are likely to encounter from the Arabs. In Lebanon in 1983, a terrorist sponsored by Syria or Iran drove a truck packed with explosives into a barracks, killing 241 American Marines. To abandon Lebanon as a result was a response comprehensible as pragmatic to an electorate, but which in the Islamocentric perspective looks quite different, a shaming of the entire West and an honor to the anonymous terrorist whose bomb, however freakishly, proved to be strong enough for supreme arbitration. As a Western democracy unable by reason of geography to extricate itself from the Arab collectivity, Israel is in a similar predicament, routinely obliged to arbitrate by force while fruitlessly pleading for democratic procedures of compromise and civility to resolve a conflict that would be redundant, indeed would never have assumed its historic form, if such procedures had been available in the first place.

Far from creating approximations to Western social and political norms, the Arab order in its post-1945 independence has been reverting to custom, to basic tribal and kinship structures, with their supportive group values, as they were in pre-colonial days -- with hindsight, perhaps it was only natural that this should have been so, a defiant assertion of that special and persistent sociopolitical system which in the last resort makes them Arab. Where Arabs are actually asserting their identity as Arabs, in the Eurocentric view they are backward; where they are adjusting relationships among themselves in the customary manner, they seem violent; where they are justifying themselves and their values, they seem irrational. [...] To describe that custom as 'progress' is truly to patronize the Arab masses, who still have no say in deciding their fate.

נכוס

בלמס

חוזם: 2,15013

אל: המשרד

מ-: אומבה, נר: 76, תא: 200289, זח: 1500, דח: מ, סג: בל

תח: פ גס: מצפא

נד: בשנית נר 60

בלמס/מיד

להלן שנית נר 60 מ-17 דנא

אל : מנהל מצפא

דע : השגריר ביינ - נאום

שלך 202

להלן הכתבה מהשבועון מקליין.

HESITATION IN OTTAWA

OFFICIALLY, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER JOE CLARK IS RELUCTANT TO UPGRADE CONTACTS WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION - A STEP THAT WOULD BRING CANADA IN LINE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. BUT MACLEAN'S HAS LEARNED THAT CLARK FAVOURS ESTABLISHING AMBASSADOR - LEVEL RELATIONS WITH THE PLO - AND FORMALLY RECOMMENDED THAT POLICY TO PRIME MINISTER BRIAN MULRONEY EARLY LAST MONTH.

ACCORDING TO SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, MULRONEY IS HESITANT TO ENDORSE CLARK'S PROPOSAL BECAUSE OF AN EXPECTED BACKLASH FROM CANADIAN JEWS WHO ARGUE THAT PLO LEADER YASSER ARAFAT HAS NOT REALLY ABANDONED TERRORISM. DECLARED ONE SENIOR OFFICIAL IN OTTAWA:

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

'IF WE HAD CHANGED OUR POLICY WHEN THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZED THE PLO IN DECEMBER , IT MIGHT NOT HAVE ATTRACTED SO MUCH ATTENTION. IT PUTS OUR DIPLOMATS IN AN EXTREMELY AWKWARD POSITION , HAVING TO EXPLAIN TO THE ARAB WORLD WHY CANADA IS THE ONLY MAJOR WESTERN NATION THAT HASN'T OPENED CONTACTS WITH THE PLO.' CLEARLY, THE PRIME MINISTER NEEDS A SIMILAR EXPLANATION FOR CLARK.

גור-אריה

מס

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, ממד,
בנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל, רביב, מעת, הסברה

יוצא **

שמור

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חוזם: 2,15375

אל: ני/796, אוסלו/194, מנמת/380

מ-: המשרד, תא: 210289, זח: 1408, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: ט גס: ארבל

נד: ט

שמור/מיידי

ניו יורק/ביין, אוסלו/יטיב

יוניפיל - גזרה נורווגית.

א. לפני כשבועיים ביקש פצ'נ מיוניפיל להפסיק פריצתו של ציר תנועה חדש בואדי שבין הכפרים שובא לשבעא שבגזרה הנורווגית.

ב. יוניפיל הודיע לפצ'נ היום (21) שהם ימשיכו בפריצת הדרך ואף ישתמשו בפיצוצים היכן שיידרש.

ג. לידיעתכם בלבד: צה'ל אישר בזמנו ליוניפיל לפרוץ הציר אך ביקש כאמור לפני כשבועיים להפסיק העבודות.

ד. נעקוב אחר תגובת פצ'נ להודעת יוניפיל על המשך העבודות ונחזיקם בתמונה.

מנהל ארבל 2

יל

אק

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, אמן, איר, ברנע, ארבל, ליאור, מזתים, סייבל, לוברני, כוחותזרים

** נכוס

שמו

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חוזם: 2,15042

אל: המשרד

מ: - נ', נר: 518, תא: 200289, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: 8 גס: ארבל

נד: 8

שמו/מיד

אל: מנהל ארבל 2

דע: סנכל ארבל, יטיב-אוסלו,

לוברני - משהב'ט ת'א

מאת: יוחנן ביי-נאום

יוניפיל, פציעת נורבגים.

היום (20.2), שהוא יום חג כאן (יום וושינגטון) - התקשר

מרק גולדינג לביתי, מסר על התקרית.

אמר כי לפי דיווחיהם היו שלושה נורבגים ושוודי אחד

בסיוור השיגרת היום בשבת בין השעות 2200 ל- 2300

ליד העיירה BLAT

לא ברורה להם הסיבה מדוע ירה טנק ממרחק 4 ק"מ 4 פגזי

FLACHET אליהם.

נפצעו שניים - ולמזלם לא אנושות.

מסרתי כבמברקיס והודעותיכם הטלפוניות, הוספתי כי

ברור בודאי גם לו, שהפגיעה היא תוצאה של טעות מכנית

או אנושית וכי אנו עדיין מבררים פרטים. לנו נודע

לראשונה על הפגיעה כשיוניפיל הודיע לנו על המראת

מסוקיו עם הפצועים. הוספתי כי ברור גם לו בודאי

שאלו זו מדיניותנו לפגוע באנשי יוניפיל - חוזר על

צערנו על התקרית ואודיעו כשהיו בידי פרטים מלאים.

הודה על גילוי הלב והצער.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

יוחנן ביין
נאום

מס

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, איר, ברנע, ארבל, 2,
ליאור, מזתים, סייבל, משפט, כוחותזרים



Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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136 EAST 67TH STREET • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

Press Release

No. 29
February 20, 1989

625

2/17

MEETING IN DAMASCUS EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE AND HAFIZ ASSAD CONVERSE

DAMASCUS. February 18, TASS. Eduard Shevardnadze, Member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and USSR Foreign Minister, now staying here on an official visit had a meeting with Hafiz Assad, General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic. Shevardnadze handed over to Hafiz Assad a message from Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

On behalf of the Soviet leadership and people, Shevardnadze expressed deep gratitude to the Syrian leadership and people for compassion and relief aid in connection with the devastating quake that hit Soviet Armenia.

Major problems of world politics, specifically questions of the Middle East settlement were discussed during the conversation that had a comradely and trusting nature. The sides confirmed the striving for a further deepening of Soviet-Syrian relations built on a durable basis of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Basing on the provisions contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's addressed to the United Nations, Shevardnadze substantiated the conclusion that the philosophy of a nuclear weapons free and non-violent world, transition from confrontation to a dialogue meet the vital interests of all the countries without exception. In this context the emphasised the importance of asserting in the international communication as a universal principle the freedom

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of choice, equal right of all states to security and participation in the solution of problems common to humanity.

Hafiz Assad spoke highly of a complex of peace initiatives advanced by Gorbachev. He went along with the idea that it is now important to pool the efforts of all countries to make positive tendencies in the world irreversible.

A substantive exchange of opinions on the Middle East situation was held. Shevardnadze set out the Soviet leadership's view on it. The overall process of the improvement of international relations, the easing of tension and the lessening of the threat of war creates favourable conditions for a breakthrough in the Middle East settlement. There is a broad awareness that this can be achieved by collective efforts at an international conference on the Middle East. In this connection it is necessary to step up actions to prepare such a conference using the possibilities of the UN Security Council, other forms of dialogue and contacts among the parties concerned.

Hafiz Assad confirmed Syria's stand in favour of a comprehensive and fair Middle East settlement that would lead to the establishment to durable peace in the region. He declared in principle for the intensification of international efforts to achieve a real advance to this.

The participations in the conversation noted that the consolidation of Arab interaction is an important factor of ensuring an equitable Middle East settlement. Hafiz Assad spoke about the steps taken by Syria to overcome differences among Arabs. The Soviet side emphasised the importance of restoring cooperation between Syria and the PLO and improving Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-Egyptian relations.

When the crisis situation in Lebanon was discussed, the sides expressed the conviction about the need to preserve unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon through a dialogue and national reconciliation.

Questions of Soviet-Syrian bilateral cooperation in various areas were extensively discussed. The sides emphasised the interest and wish to ensure its further development and upgrading through broad use of contemporary forms and methods of the organization of commercial, economic, scientific and technological ties.

Hafiz Assad confirmed the invitation to Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, for an official friendly visit to Syria.

"I am leaving Jordan deeply satisfied with my talks and their results", Shevardnadze said in conclusion.



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Press Release

No. 30
February 20, 1989

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EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE TALKS "FRUITFUL" AMMAN NEWS CONFERENCE TOLD

AMMAN. February 20, TASS. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze described as "fruitful, interesting and profound" his talks with King Hussein of Jordan, Prime Minister Zeid Al-Rifai and Foreign Minister Marwan Al-Kasim, held during his visit to Jordan. The talks covered a wide range of issues, including the situation in the world, regional conflicts and recent trends in international relations.

"I can say that we have expanded the sphere of agreement on many global contemporary problems. Today's talks continued the dialogue started in Moscow by Mikhail Gorbachev and King Hussein", Shevardnadze told a news conference at Amman airport late on Sunday night.

"Of course, we focused on the Middle East problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviet and Jordanian leadership have identical views on all the fundamental issues, such as the preparation and convocation of an international conference and other matters."

The Soviet Foreign Minister said that practical preparation for an international Middle East peace conference had become of primary importance now that certain favourable trends have appeared for settling the Middle East crisis. The task calls for more vigorous actions by the United Nations Security Council, including its permanent members, the U.N. Secretary-General, the European Economic Community and all parties interested in a settlement.

"Opportunities of settlement are not bad now. We and the Jordanian leadership agreed to make the best of these opportunities and to exchange the necessary information in the interests of stepping up this settlement."

"I am leaving Jordan deeply satisfied with my talks and their results", Shevardnadze said in conclusion.

* * *



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Press Release

625 5/4

No. 31
February 21, 1989

EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE MEETS HOSNI MUBARAK

CAIRO. February 20, TASS. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, paying an official visit here, on Monday met Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and handed over to him a message from Mikhail Gorbachev.

During the talk, which passed in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and mutual respect, the sides made an extensive review of overriding problems of our time and Soviet-Egyptian relations.

Mubarak highly appraised a fundamentally new concept of international relations, which was elaborated by the Soviet leadership, noting that the Soviet Union's dynamic and resourceful policy that largely determined favourable changes in the world climate draws a live and interested response in Egypt and generates hopes for further positive shifts on the international scene.

The Soviet side positively evaluated Egypt's role in the non-aligned movement, noted its constructive and well-considered approach to tackling pressing international problems, and expressed gratitude for Egypt's support of Soviet peace initiatives.

In considering the state of matters in the Middle East, Shevardnadze drew his interlocutor's attention to the fact that the ongoing arms race in the region, generated by persisting tension there, threatens to destabilise the situation still more and, moreover, impede the disarmament processes gaining strength in other parts of the world.

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Mubarak agreed with this assessment and said he would support any considerations that would help resolve this problem.

The discussion revealed the common view about the need to mobilise all efforts for the speediest settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict given due account for the interests of all parties. To this end, it is important to put to a maximum use the United Nations' peacemaking potential to conduct multilateral and bilateral consultations and contacts which would be leading, without unjustified procrastination, to a convocation of an international conference on the Middle East.

During the talk the sides comprehensively analyzed the state and dynamics of Soviet-Egyptian relations and stated with deep satisfaction that there are all grounds to consider them to be fully normalized. Certainly, there are problems in relations between the two countries but there are no those which would be insoluble.

The leaders of the Soviet Union and Egypt attach priority importance to a further extension and development of the relations of friendship and cooperation in diverse areas between the two countries, and intend to act consistently and purposefully in this direction. They expressed confidence that Soviet-Egyptian relations, which are built on the principles of full respect for the distinctiveness of the sides and the nature of their relations with other countries, will, at a new stage, become a factor of promoting peace and mutual understanding among nations.

Mubarak accepted with gratitude Gorbachev's invitation to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union. The terms of the visit will be agreed upon under mutual arrangement.

On the same day talks began between Shevardnadze and Ismat Abdel Magid, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

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February 22, 1989

Compiled by APN

REVIEW OF SOVIET PRESS

THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER'S TOUR OF MIDEAST COUNTRIES

The Soviet mass media give extensive coverage to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's trip on the Syria-Jordan-Egypt-Iraq-Iran route. Explaining why the Soviet Minister has set out on a visit precisely to these countries, Andrei Ostalsky writes the following in IZVESTIA:

"Preference has been given to the direct participants in the two main conflicts tearing the region apart: the Arab-Israeli and the Iran-Iraq conflicts. That is why the choice of the route reflects the priorities of Soviet policy with regard to Middle East -- the launching of the peace process in the region as early as possible. Incidentally, the Israeli leaders also said that they would like Eduard Shevardnadze to visit their country these days. Though this is hardly possible since diplomatic relations between our countries have not been restored, during the Soviet Minister's stay in Cairo a meeting with M. Arens, the head of Israel's Foreign Policy Department has also been provided for. The Soviet Minister will also meet Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, during his stay there."

"The importance of the Middle East has never been put to doubt in our country," notes Ostalsky. "Nevertheless, this is the first official visit to the region at such a high level over the past fifteen years, while for some of these countries it is the first ever. Why is it so? Perhaps other problems took up the time and occupied the minds of our leaders? Perhaps they did. But probably the thing is that in the 60's, 70's and the early 80's few, if any, believed in the feasibility of our correct tasks and slogans. For example, isn't the need for a just settlement of the Palestinian problem or the ensurance of the security of all countries of the region, including Israel, obvious? How could anyone count in all earnest on all this in conditions of the complete irreconcilability of stands? And in an international situation when both the United States and the USSR divided the Middle East, above all, into their own and the other side's allies, looking at it mainly through the prism of the struggle against each other?"

"Only in the new, altered world of the past few years," writes the IZVESTIA political commentator in conclusion, "has it become possible for the main Palestinian organization to recognize Israel, for the state of Palestine to proclaim its independence, for a direct dialogue to be started between the PLO and the USA, and for the ceasefire on the Iran-Iraq front to become possible. And these events have, in their turn, made real compromises possible. True, not all the opposing parties have managed to see them by now..."

דף: _____	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דחפיות: מידד
כתוב: _____		טופס: שמור
אל: ממ"ד	כס' פרוק: חשש: 1/2 647	תאריך וזמן חבור: 241300 פברואר 1989
דצ:		
כאח: אלי אבידן, רושינגטון		

משיחה עם טד האטור באג, מזח"ת / מחמ"ד

לבנון

1. האמריקאים הרפתעו מפריצת מעשי אלימות בין חצבא וחמ"ל. הם אמנם ציפו שמחלך כזה יארע אך לא במהירות כזו. זהו מאבק כח טיפוסי בו לאבקים ג'ע'ע ועון על השליטה בעדה הנוצרית שהיה צריך לחכות לו, אך כך או כך חופתער ממנו. הם אינם רואים זאת בחומרה יתרה ומאמינים שהגל הנוכחי חלף, אך הוא מעיד על משבר מנהיגות עמוק בעדה הנוצרית בהעדר מנהיגות מקובלת על הכל והניזון גט מחוסר אמון וחשדנות הדדית. עון מרגיש בטחון רב מאז שובר מתרניס, לחמחשת הדבר מובא הסצנריו שבשעה שאלח"ס בילה את רוב זמנו שם ליד מכשיר הטלפון לקבלת חוראות מדמשק, הרי עון מרגיש עצמו חפשי לחלרטיין לחצחור חצחרות מבלי שאיש יחסום אתו.

2. ארח"ב ריאליסטית מספיק לדעת מהן גבולות יכולתה בלבנט. הסוגיה אינה נמצאת בסולם עדיפות גבוה וכלל לא הגיעה לדיון בגורות החדש במחמ"ד. הוא ממשיכה לתמוך בשני סוגי הליכים מקבילים (א) פעילות חלע"ר, אף כי איש לא מצפה שתוכל להרים את המשא. (ב) שליחותו של הפטריארך, באשר רשימת חומעמדים המעודכנת שחגיש בזמנו תקפה מבחינת ארה"ב גט עתה.

ירדן

3. תשומת הלב מוסבת לתחום הכלכלי, איסור פעולת חלפני המטבע, העלתה אמנם את ערך הדינר הירדני ב-5 אחוז, אך ישנה דאגה מיכלתה של ירדן להתמודד לבדה עם בעיותיה הכלכליות. אין זה סוד שארה"ב זנחה אותה בתחום זה. ישנה חרטה מסוימת על כך שלא הושקעה מחשבה כיצד ניתן לסייע לה ואפשר לנושא זה יעלה לדיון מחדש, עם השלמת איש המשרות באגף. גורם שלילי נוסף הוא שבמקביל ירדן אינה בראש דאגותיהם של מנהיגי ערב ע"מ שיחושו לעזרתה, אפשר והסוגיה תטפסל בארגון הכלכלי החדש שתוקם

תפוצה:

דחפנות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: _____
סוג:		כתוב: _____
תאריך וזמן חבור:		אל:
כס' פרוק:		דע:
תעודת:		כאח:
4/2 627		

לא מכבר, אף כי קאטרף נשמע מטופק באס חבריר דקימר μ -ET כלכלי חדש שיוכל לסייע לה. הוא (כ/מ/ר) רואה את חמשת"ע כבעל צבע מדינת חזק יותר מאשר זה הכלכלי.

אש"פ

4. באש"פ ישנה תחושה של מועקה דאכזבה מהצורה בה חדיאלרג עם ארצ"ב התפתח עד עתה. החולקים בארגון על עצם המהלך התחזקר בעמדתם שזתר מהלך סרק. באשר לארצ"ב, אש"פ נתבע למעשים דבראש דבראש גילודי מנחירות מצד ערפאת, ישנה בעינין סקפטיות מרובה באשר לעתידות בעידה ולא יחול שינוי בעמדת אש"פ. אם ערפאת חושב שחמטרה היא ארצ"ב ושהדיאלוג הוא לשמר הרי שהוא בחזקת טרעה ומטעה. היעד האמריקאי הוא לחביא לדיאלוג ישראל-פלס, אך לפני כן על ערפאת להרכיח לישראל במעשים שהוא רציני ושאכן חל בו שינוי.

אלז | אכידן

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תפוצה:

MR. UTLEY: Mr. Secretary, let's turn to the Middle East right now. The Reagan administration opened the door to contacts, talks, between the United States, Yasser Arafat and the PLO. In your time in office, do you think that the PLO has been living up to its side of the agreement? Are they showing good faith in your eyes?

.ETX

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SEC. BAKER: Well, so far we have had one incident which, some were inclined to argue, constituted a -- an endorsement, if you will -- or a return to terrorism by the PLO.

MR. UTLEY: Well, Israel made that claim.

SEC. BAKER: An incident in southern Lebanon -- yes -- and suggested that somehow we should break off the dialog. That was not our conclusion. We did, however, go to the PLO through our ambassador in Tunis and say, "Look here, now, these kinds of things cannot be -- cannot continue -- if you want to continue this dialog with the United States."

MR. UTLEY: So you put them on warning.

SEC. BAKER: Well, we put them on warning before we even began the dialog with them because we made it clear to them that we were not going to have a dialog unless they renounced terrorism by actions and by words.

MR. HOUSE: Now that you have a dialog with the PLO and your Soviet counterpart is getting his own dialog with everyone in the Middle East now on a trip, is the Middle East an area that needs to incubate further before you actually go in and try to solve the problem, or is it one that if it incubates further it blows up?

.ETX

SEC. BAKER: I don't think it's one that if it incubates further, it blows up. I hope not, because I think that if you had to balance risks here, the risk would be greater in taking precipitous action than it would in waiting a while, analyzing the situation, working on the ground carefully, tilling the ground, and making sure that when you do go in there you have some reasonable prospect of success. And this is the message, if I may say so, that we have given our alliance partners.

We have said, in effect, "Look, we understand the importance of the United States involvement if we're ever to achieve peace in the Middle East. We understand that, but, we're not sure that the process is best served by a big, high-level, high-visibility international conference begun too early. We think that there ought to be some quiet consultation done before that ever -- before we ever get close to that."

MR. UTLEY: John?

MR. DANCY: Mr. Secretary, is Yasser Arafat conducting indirect talks with the Israelis through Palestinians, through European diplomats?

SEC. BAKER: I have no knowledge of that, John.

*

BUSH P.C. -02/21/89
 .STX

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(SP/2)

and maybe others -- but Brent, are we in? -- I'm not sure exactly of the bilaterals we're having, but it will be a matter.

Helen, and then we'll start moving around trying to get to the back of the room.

Q Basically, in a way, a question about your trip. There is a widespread perception that you don't have a foreign policy, that you have permitted the Russians to move into the vacuum in the Middle East, you were surprised on Central America, that your "go slow" attitude really has let the Russians grab the ball.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I've never heard such an outrageous hypothesis. (Scattered laughter.) The fact that the Soviets -- you failed to point out that the Soviets moved out of Afghanistan. Some good things happening. I don't worry about a trip by Mr. Shevardnadze to the Middle East. I have no worry about that --

Q (Off-mike.)

PRESIDENT BUSH: No, it happened just this week. And they're out of there. I don't worry about that. And we have a foreign policy. We are reviewing appropriately East-West relations, the way we look at South America. But this doesn't trouble me one bit. We've established and are following on with certain principles that are out there. And I think that Jim Baker when he came back made very clear that the NATO alliance still looks to the United States. I'll have an opportunity to discuss a lot of things as we go on this particular trip. So I simply don't agree with that. I really hadn't ever heard such a negative approach to foreign policy.

Q (Off-mike.)

PRESIDENT BUSH: Middle East policy? It's to encourage discussions between King Hussein and the Israelis. And to build on the progress that has been made already. And I think it was -- I've already said that I think it was very useful, the changes that the PLO advocated. Now, we want to see that there's some follow-on there. So the policy is set. I campaigned on what the policy is. And I think it's quite clear. The question is, what specific steps we take next, and I don't want to be rushing out because Mr. Shevardnadze went to the Middle East. I'd like to have for the first step we take of that nature to be a prudent step. So the principles are there, and I think we're -- you know, we've got to now flesh that out and figure out what we do specifically.

Yes?

Q Mr. President, the FBI's final, or presumably final report on Senator Tower is now in. You are reported to have read some of it. The

.ETX

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4-1

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.STX

3/4

that would make me, if I were a senator, vote against Senator Tower. Now, Senator Nunn, he's got to reach his own conclusions, and I think he's been fair. And I think he is approaching it in a very professional manner. But I hope he reaches the same conclusion that I have reached.

493

Yeah, in the back?

Q Mr. President, Washington DC and other big cities have been besieged with violence lately. Do you see any role at all that the federal government can play to help in that area?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I hope so. But certainly in Washington we have a responsibility, it's a federal city, and a lot of the funds come -- obviously come from the federal government. But, there isn't any easy answer to that, and yet I, you know, campaigned strongly on enforcing existing law, on being tough on criminals, on more prison space. And I think that those things all will be caught up in our new anti-drug effort that I'm looking to Bill Bennett to lead. And so it's a complicated problem where everybody in the country has a stake in it. Everybody should be trying to do something about it. And yes, I think the federal government has a role in that.

11

Q If I may follow. Is there any federal money for it? Is this something that you really do not have the resources to attack?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes, there will be federal money and I wish we had more.

Yeah, Charles.

Q (Way in the back?), Mr. President!

Q Mr. President --

PRESIDENT BUSH: How far do we go to be democratic, here? No that's too far -- here. (Laughter).

ME

Q Mr. President, you said in answer to Helen's question that you wanted your first step in the Middle East to be "prudent." What do you mean by a "prudent" step? What do you have in mind?

PRESIDENT BUSH: What I have in mind is I don't want to just send somebody charging off on a mission to counter Mr. Shevardnadze's trip to see Mubarak and others. Let's do something that's going to hopefully have results. And I'm not saying we have to know that a trip by the Secretary, or a trip by -- instructions to an ambassador are going to result in a settled policy -- everything's settled in the Middle East. But, I don't want to be stampeded by the fact that the Soviet Foreign Minister takes a trip to the Middle East. So it's -- in my view, that's a good thing.

.ETX

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BUSH P.C.-02/21/89

6-2

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Q What role do you think Mr. Shevardnadze and the Soviets could and should be playing? 4/4

PRESIDENT BUSH: I think it should be a limited role, and I think that's what it's going to be. 493

Q Mr. President --

PRESIDENT BUSH: And that's exactly the way it should be and I think the people in the Middle East feel that way. But the fact that he goes there really shouldn't be bad.

Yes?

Q Mr. President, if the West Germans --

PRESIDENT BUSH: Viewed with alarm.

Q -- if the West Germans refuse to modernize short-range weapons, will that hurt the Alliance in the long-run and perhaps result in the de-nuclearization of Europe --

PRESIDENT BUSH: Too hypothetical a question, Jerry, for me to answer.

Q Mr. President, I'll ask you a Japan question --

PRESIDENT BUSH: Shoot. (Scattered laughter.)

Q -- with the summit starting tomorrow. How do you reassure those

.ETX

CONTINUED ON PAGE 7-1

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דחיות: מ י ד י	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קד: 1
סוג:	טופס פרוק 12	כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן מעור: 21.2.89 - 10:00		אל: מצפ"א
פס' פרוק:		דצ:
הפסיד:		
484		פאת: ציר הטברה, וושינגטון

ועידת נקרא"ק - היום השני

1. היום החל הדיון בהצעות החלטה והנושא הראשון על סדר היום היה תהליך השלום, כאשר מועלות הצעות לתיקונים שמגמתם מיתון, סמנטי ומהותי, בהצעות ההחלטה.
2. מצב ה- Strategic Goals כפי שהוצעו ע"י הנהלת נקרא"ק המהוות פשרה בין עמדות הארגונים השונים.
3. לגבי הסעיף השני, א/שרו מספר שינויים סמנטיים שמטרתם להעמיד הנושא בצורה יותר חיובית, אך נדחתה הצעה לקרוא לממשל להמשיך הדיאלוג עם אש"ף. בין המתנגדים לשינוי זה בלטו ADL (הזכיר שישראל קראה לממשל לשים קץ לדיאלוג) והדסה.
4. בסעיף השלישי החליפו המלה Expose ב- Monitor and Publicize.
5. בסעיף האחרון נדחתה הצעה לחשמיט החתיחות לקהילה היהודית.
6. טד מאן הציע להוסיף סעיף המביע מסירות לבטחון ישראל, אך מביע גם דאגה עמוקה מההשלכות העמוקות של המשך הסטטוס קוו בשטחים, ההצעה עוררה ויכוח סוער ובסופו של דבר נפלה ברוב של 157 נגד 151.

פ ל ג


 3/10/89 3/10/89 3/10/89 3/10/89 3/10/89 3/10/89 3/10/89 3/10/89 3/10/89 3/10/89

תפוצה: 36-

484

2/2

36
37 Strategic Goals: The Jewish community relations field should:

38
39 -- encourage the Administration to continue vigorous efforts to
40 bring about direct, face-to-face, bilateral negotiations between
41 Israel and Arab parties;

42
43 -- encourage the new Administration to use its dialogue with
44 the PLO to press it to abrogate those sections of the Covenant
45 that call for Israel's destruction, to contribute to the ending
46 of the uprising in the territories, and to take other steps that
47 could contribute positively to a peaceful resolution of the
48 conflict;

49
50 -- expose those actions and statements of the PLO that
51 contradict the PLO's professed renunciation of terrorism and
52 recognition of Israel's right to exist; and, call upon the

1 Administration to engage in a continuing examination of the
2 efficacy of that dialogue in light of those actions and
3 statements;

4
5 -- interpret to the new Administration, the 101st Congress,
6 decision-makers, and opinion-molders at all levels, and the
7 American public as a whole, Israel's continuing commitment to
8 seek a political settlement of its conflict with the Arabs,
9 including the Palestinian issue, through direct negotiations
10 based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and the
11 Camp David Accords.

12
13 -- urge the Administration to place a high priority on
14 promoting more constructive Soviet policies in the Middle East,
15 particularly to resume full diplomatic relations between Israel
16 and the USSR;

17
18 -- continue to interpret to the general community the complex
19 challenges faced by Israel in its ongoing efforts to restore
20 order in the West Bank and Gaza Strip;

21
22 -- continue to monitor the impact of the extended violence in
23 the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the Jewish community and American
24 public opinion and seek appropriate ways of communicating these
25 findings to Israeli leaders.

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✱

דחילות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קד: 2
סוג:	טופס פדוק	כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן תעבור:		אל:
פס' פברק:		דצ:
הפסרד:		כאת:
473		

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אחד השואלים, דר רוברט פרידמן מבוולטימור, סיפר על פגישתו בתונוס לפני מספר ימים עם ערפאת ועל מסקנתו שיש צורך ודואלוג רדד להסדר ועמדותיו לאש"ף ולהפריך הכזב בטענותיו (מפליא שלמדות שדיבר באדיקות לא היו כל קריאות בניגוד).

- 3, בערב כאמו סנטור פקורד והמורשה המילטון על מדיניות ארה"ב ביחס למזה"ת, פקורד - חשיבות המו"מ הישר בין הצדדים, ישראל גלתה בעבר ^{למזה"ת} לתת אדמה תמורת שלום, אך השאלה היא האם הערבים מוכנים לתת שלום ^{למזה"ת} יקבלו אדמה. בדעת הקהל מצטירות ישראל בנוקשה עובדה שגלולה להיות לה השפעה בנושא סיוע חוץ, ישראל ורק ישראל צריכה להחליט האם היא מוכנה לשאת ולתת עם הפלסטינים, אם תחליט שלא, פקורד יתמוך בהחלטה, אך עליה לקחת בחשבון את השלכות החלטתה אצל דעת הקהל אם לא תצליח לשכנע בצדקת החלטתה, דברי פקורד השאירו משקע רב אצל המאזינים.
- המילטון - יש כיום תנאים לקידום תהליך השלום (ממשל חדש בארה"ב, ממשלה חדשה בישראל, מדיניות סובייטית חדשה). הזכיר מספר נשאים שעליהם על הממשל להתמקד:
- א. רחירות וחוזות וזורודו דמת המתח ושיבואו לפתיחת תהליך מדינתי שיפוש מספר שנים שיכלול הוצאת כוחות צה"ל ממרכז האוכלוסיה.
- ב. לנצל הדו-שלי עם אש"ף על מנת ללחוץ עליו לנקוט בצעדים להפסקת הטרור, להשלטת מרותו על הפלגים, לשיפור תדמיתו בארה"ב ולהעברת הדגש מטרור לשיפור איכות החיים בשטחים.
- ג. להגיע להסכמה על סוגי הנשק שארה"ב תספק לירדן וסעודיה, ממשיך להתנגד לאספקת נשק מתקדם אך יש צורך באספקת סוגי נשק מסוגימים כדי למנוע פניית מדינות אלו למקורות נשק אלטרנטיביים.
- ד. פעולה לבלית פיתוח נשק כימי וכיולוגי במזה"ת ולכלימת הסכנה כשימוש בטילי קרקע-קרקע בתשובה לשאלה אמר המילטון שהלובי הערבי בקונגרס המתקדם בשנים האחרונות אך עדיין אין לו השפעה רבה. בתשובה לשאלה אחרת אמר שאט יתכרר שאש"ף אחראי לפיצוץ מטוס "פאן-אם" ימליץ להפסיק הדואלוג עם אש"ף. פלב

תפוצה:

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 20.02.89

14497

שמו

יוצא

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חוזם: 2,14497

אל: וווש/763, ניו/741, לוסאנגלס/225

מ-: המשרד, תא: 200289, זח: 1417, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: גס: הסברה

נד: ג

106.03

שמו/מידי

וושנגטון, ניו-יורק, לוס אנג'לס

ביקור משלחת חברי כנסת

9 א. התנועה ליהדות מתקדמת בישראל מארגנת משלחת בת חברי כנסת מסיעות ליכוד, מערך, שינוי, רץ, מפ'ם ותחיה.

רשימה לא סופית ולא מלאה, של חברי המשלחת כוללת את חברי הכנסת: אלי בן מנחם, עימנואל זיסמן, אריאל ווינשטיין, מיכאל איתן, אמנון רובינשטיין, יוסי שריד וחיים אורון.

ב. מטרת המשלחת לערוך מסע היכרות עם יהדות ארה"ב והיא תבקר בין התאריכים 11/4-1/4 בניו-יורק, לוס אנג'לס ו-וושנגטון. עדיין אין תכנית מפורטת לביקור.

ג. לבקשתנו יפנו המארגנים בארץ לעמיתיהם בארה"ב לעמוד בקשר ולתדע את נציגותינו.

ד. עוד נבריקכם פרטים נוספים ומעודכנים כשנקבלם.

הסברה/מרחבי - מצפ'א

פא

תפ: בנצור, מצפא, רביב, הסברה, יורכנסת

דתיסות: מידי	שגרירות ישראל וושינגטון		ק"י: 1
סוג: שמור	טופס פניה		פתוק: 1
תאריך וזמן חבול:			אל: מצפ"א - הסברה מרחבי
כס' פברוק:	לשכת רה"מ: ניו-יורק, לוס אנג'לס		דע:
תפסרד:			
503	פאת: לשכת השגריר, וושינגטון		

ביקור משלחת חברי כנסת, שלכם 763

1. לתשומת לבכם, מועד בקור חברי המשלחת ומקומות בקורם עשוי לתפוף מועדי ומקומות בקור רח"מ.

2. השגריר ממליץ שכדי למנוע חסימה אפשרית ידחה ביקור המשלחת למנוע מאוחר יותר.



לשכת השגריר

רה"מ 3
מנהל 1
לשכה 2
יו"כ 1

תפוצה: 12

יוצא

שמו

חוזם: 2,14506

אל: ני/744, אוסלו/181

מ-: המשרד, תא: 200289, זח: 1428, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: א גס: ארבל

נד: א

שמו/מידי

ביין/ני, יטיב/אוסלו

יוניפיל - פציעת שני הנורווגים.

לחוזמינו 13712 ו-13806 מה-19.

מסתבר, מהתלונה שהוגשה ע'י יוניפיל, שהטנק שלנו ירה שלושה פגזים. אחד מהם פגע במרחק 15 מטר מ-2 החיילים והשני במרחק של 50 מטר.

מנהל ארבל 2

מא

מס

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, איר, ברנע, ארבל, 2, ליאור, מזתים, סייבל, משפט, לוברני, כוחותזרים

** יוצא

סודי

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חוזם: 2,14624

אל: פרנציסקו/135

מ-: המשרד, תא: 200289, זח: 1604, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: מצפא

נד: @

סודי מידי

קניטל.

בריה'מ-ישראל. מברק 24 למזא'ר וממ'ד.

נשאלנו אותה שאלה על ידי אנשינו בווינגטון ושובתנו
בתאום עם נתיב ומזא'ר היתה כדלקמן :

א. איננו מצדדים בבטול התקון אך לא נביע התנגדות
להפעלת WAIVER על ידי הנשיא על פי שיקולו.

ב. אסור שאנחנו נהיה אומרי ההן או אומרי הלאו.

ג. הדיון בנושא וההתבטאויות צריכים להיות בידי
ה NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOVIET JEWERY

מנהל מצפא

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, איר3, בנצור, מצפא, ר/מרכז,
ממד

10:03:02

10:03:02

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10:03:02 : 28.02.02

** יוצא

סודי

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חוזם: 2,13884

אל: וווש/727, מקמר/88

מ-: המשרד, תא: 190289, זח: 1434, דח:ר, סג:סו

תח: 3 גס:משרדים

נד: 2

סודי/רגיל

השגריר, הציר-וווש

דע:פצ'ר-מקמר העבירונא

דו"ח זכויות האדם של מחמ'ד

א.בשיחה עם מנכל משרד ראש הממשלה והח'מ אמר בראון כי במגמה צופה פני עתיד רצונו למסד דיאלוג עם המערכת הישראלית שיאפשר תשומה נאותה הן לרקע הנושאים לדוחות הבאים והן לעניינים ספציפיים. הוסיף כי אמנם הנחיות מחמד ברורות ואוסרות 'השוואה' עם מדינות אחרות, אך אין זה מונע נסיון. הסברנו עד כמה לקינו בעבר וגם הפעם מן האובססיה המתמדת בתקשורת בכל נושא ישראלי, לטוב ולרע, ולכך (בנוסף להדלפות מראש שהיו הפעם) יש לתת את הדעת בתפיסת הרקע.

ב.באשר לנושאים הספציפיים, בראון הבטיח עירנות להבחנה שבין חומר אותנטי לבין מעשיות שניתן להלעיט בהן את המערכת האמריקנית ע"י גורמים עוינים.

ג.אמר כי שיפטר, מתוך רגישות לנושאינו, עבר אישית על כל מלה בדו"ח על ישראל.

ד.בנפרד נתבקש בראון ע"י הח'מ, בהמשך להבטחת שיפטר בשיחה באוקטובר האחרון בוושנינגטון, לבדוק אפשרות כי בשאלון השנתי שמפיצה מחמד לנציגויות ארה"ב בקשר לזכויות האדם ייכלל ברשימת פריטי הדיווח גם נושא האנטישמיות, כך

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שתופעות אנטישמיות יהיו במעקב וידווחו ע"י נציגויות
ארה"ב. הבטיח לבדוק. נודה אם גם השגרירות תפנה בהתאם.

רובינשטיין

מא

לח

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ברנע, ארבל1,
ארבל2, סייל, משפט, ליאור, מזתים

U. S. Aid to Israel: Needs, Commitments, and Benefits

The United States' "Rise to Globalism," as the post-1945 shift of international power centers is frequently called, entailed dramatic transformations in the structure, dynamics and patterns of international politics. This transformation was underscored by an active U.S. foreign policy, highlighted by an extensive foreign aid program. These programs constituted a cornerstone of a new foreign policy posture, intended to enable accessibility to countries and regions previously impervious to American influence, such as the Middle East.

Within this "bi-polar" structure and context, the United States' prime objective was the explicit containment of Communism. That goal was to be achieved, through an elaborate policy of creating regional allies and alliances, based on common political interests, the strategic and geopolitical significance of the specific country, and the mutual benefits resulting thereof. Thus, throughout the late 1940's, the 1950's and 1960's, the United States supported politically, militarily and economically, countries as diverse as Great Britain, France, Germany (under the Marshall Plan), Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Panama, Turkey, Greece, the Philippines, to name a few.

Israel, however, presents a different case, based on a different rationale for support, albeit consistent and congruent with U.S. policies, U.S. interests and American ideas and values. American support of Israel stems from and is predicated on a moral rationale. The plight of European Jewry during the Second World War, the holocaust and the dramatic establishment of an immigrant Jewish state, based on Western values, in the Judeo-Christian tradition resembled the principles on which the American Republic was built.

From its inception, Israel constituted a democratic island in a sea of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, hostile to Israel, and alien to the American concept of freedom, liberty, and democracy. That same Israel emerged as a stable democracy, thereby transcending the confines of a moral ally, and becoming an ever increasing strategic ally whose interest concurred with the United States' geo-political strategy.

This tacit and later formal alliance, consists of several components - Israel's democratic character and political stability, Israel's battle-proven military, (a fact which contributes immeasurably to U.S. defense, insofar as weapons systems are concerned, both U.S. and more importantly Soviet systems), and Israel's position as a major party of any peace agreement in a contentious region, marred by frequent wars and violence.

Israel's predicament, however, is a result of exogenous and endogenous factors which can only be mitigated by means of self-reliance and alliance cooperation. A strong Israel, a deterring Israel, is also an Israel capable of concessions. It is an Israel capable of sustaining an existing defense burden, while at the same time investing and allocating resources to the strengthening of democracy and the building of a new society.

U.S. support therefore, is a combination of mutually cultivating moral, idealistic, strategic, political and economic factors. Israel is not merely indebted to the U.S. for this continuing invaluable support, but also adamantly believes that it is in the interest and cultural tradition of the U.S. to maintain this mutually beneficial and unique relationship.

Although in recent years, most aid to Israel has been given in the form of grants, until 1985 Israel paid for most of its military purchases in the U.S. with loans borrowed from the U.S. Government, totalling \$13 billion. Since 1985, Israel has received a total of \$3 billion per year, of which \$1.8 billion is military aid (FMS, most of it to be spent in the U.S.) and \$1.2 in economic assistance, (to be spent for certain eligible expenditures).

In 1988, Israel refinanced its high interest FMS debt to the U.S. government. These loans were primarily the result of the Camp David Peace Accords with Egypt, in which Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, to return its only oil fields, and to relocate its military bases. To date, Israel is repaying to the U.S. (government and private institutes), more than it gets in economic aid. Until 1995 Israel's debt service to the U.S. will be approximately \$1.3 billion annually. Then it is scheduled to gradually decline, (provided that no new loans will be taken).

Why Israel needs U.S. Aid


Forty years of Israeli struggle for survival has taken its toll. The young country increased its population from approximately 850,000 in 1948 to over 4.5 million today, mainly through the absorption of massive numbers of Jewish immigrants. At the same time, Israel fought five major wars and numerous terror and guerilla attacks. A major portion of the country's resources was and continues to be spent on defense. The following figures illustrate the magnitude of the problem:

- * In 1988 defense expenditures as a percentage of the Government Ordinary Budget were 29%.
- * In 1988 the defense budget as a percentage of GNP was 16.3%.
- * Active military duty manpower is 4% of the total population, (4 times more than the U.S.). There is three year compulsory military service for men, two years for women.
- * 45 - 60 days per year reserve service for men up to the age of 50 years old.
- * Indirect cost for defense (excluding direct defense budget) is 7% of GDP.
- * In 1988 Defense spending per capita was \$1200.

These figures do not however, convey the socio-political burden of everyday life and its cultural and psychological effects.


The following tables provide a basis for country comparison:

DEFENSE SPENDING PER CAPITA (1987) *



* Source: The Military Balance 1988-1989
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1987.

DEFENSE SPENDING AS % OF GDP (1986) *




* Source: The Military Balance 1988-1989
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1987.

The heavy defense burden, coupled with the need to absorb massive numbers of immigrants, resulted in another unwelcome phenomenon -- an enormous internal and external debt. The government debt to its own citizens amounts now to 3 times the country's annual GDP. In 1988, the government's internal debt service was 40% of the total budget.

An additional unfortunate consequence of the heavy defense burden is the enormous external debt burden of \$26 billion. Almost 50% of the government budget is spent on its debt service, most of which goes to the U.S. Again, we are unfortunately among the world leaders in our debt burden.


EXTERNAL DEBT AS % OF GDP (1987) *




* Source: The Military Balance 1988-1989
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1987.

In light of this situation, U.S. aid to Israel is critical. In 1988, U.S. aid to Israel comprised 10% of the total Israeli budget and 7.2% of its GDP. US defense assistance was 33% of the total Israeli defense budget. Israel is facing an increasing threat from at least four extremely well equipped Arab armies. Soviet military and economic aid to these Arab countries is massive, as is demonstrated by the following Table.

Military and Economic Assistance, Incl'd Sales From the U.S.S.R, U.S and W.Europe to Select M. East Countries (1981-1988)



ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY
(ANNUAL AVERAGE,
1981-1988)



Source: Annual Report to the Congress,
Frank G. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense,
Y 1990.

See: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants,
U.S. Agency for International Development,
ent. 1988

Recent reports reveal that Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq have long range tactical missiles capable of launching a countervalue attack, and inflicting hundreds of thousands civilian casualties. Libya, Syria and Iraq have the capability to and experience in dealing with and using chemical and biological warfare. With the termination of the war in the Persian Gulf, and the ensuing availability of fifty-five (55) Iraqi divisions (more than the U.S. and NATO combined) there is a considerable and sophisticated arms arsenal potentially aimed at Israel. Furthermore, the U.S. government announced recently its intention to sell billions of dollars worth of weapons and arms to some Arab countries.



Israel has to face these increasing threats. Weapons and arms are becoming more sophisticated and costly. Without U.S. assistance, Israel's ability to insure its security would be extremely difficult.

There are several feasible geopolitical scenarios which could result in war. The reconstruction of a united Eastern front consisting of Iraq, Syria and Jordan, or a Syrian adventure supported by either Soviet policy or massively sustained by Saudi and Libyan weapons. The plausibility or imminence of such a scenario is irrelevant. What is, is the potential concomitance of hostile countries, failed diplomacy and a set of pretexts. As has been the case previously, that would suffice to ignite a new round of violence detrimental to the region's stability.

These potential tendencies and inclinations must be deterred by a strong and determined Israel.



The following charts illustrate the magnitude of the potential threat facing Israel.

Military Arsenal, select Middle East Countries (1987-1988)*
(Syria, Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel)



Artillery

COMBAT AIRCRAFTS



MANPOWER

TANKS

For how long will Israel need U.S. aid?

Naturally, Israel wishes to become independent of any foreign support. Funds raised through Israel Bonds and private donations are merely a fraction of Israel's ever increasing needs. Thus, U.S. aid remains the most important foreign support for Israel's security and well being. As a result of inflation and the rising cost of weaponry systems, the current volume of U.S. Aid to Israel is decreasing in real terms. Several factors are expected to affect significantly Israel's need for foreign aid:

I. External Debt

Israel's current debt to the U.S. is not expected to be reduced substantially before the year 2016. Israel's total debt to the U.S. is \$22 billion (future value). Until 1995 our debt services to the U.S. is expected to remain greater than the \$1.2 billion of Economic Assistance (ESF). Less debt burden means less need for foreign aid.

II. Geopolitical Situation

Although any kind of peace settlement in the Middle East is expected to create more expenses in the short run (as occurred after the Camp David Accord), it will ultimately result in reducing the burden on our security budget. In the long run, peace agreements will enable us to require less foreign assistance. However, in the face of currently growing Arab military capability, we expect security needs to increase.

III. Economic Situation

Economic independence implies less need for foreign support. The Israeli people and government are striving to achieve this goal. With the encouragement, support and guidance of the U.S. government, Israel has undertaken major economic measures which have put the country's economy on the road to economic recovery and growth. Being a small country with scarce natural resources and no adjacent markets, Israel has to rely primarily on two factors: the quality of it's human resources and it's ability to export. In spite of major obstacles, such as the Arab boycott, 40% of Israel's GNP is export. Increasing utilization of our high level human resources and a drive to expand our exports will bring us closer to realizing our economic goals and eventually to reducing our dependence on American foreign aid.


Why U.S. Support Of Israel Is A Good Investment

Over the last 40 years, the United States has assisted Israel in many ways. The military and economic aid, whether in loan or grant form, was primarily intended to enable Israel to strengthen its democratic society, and establish a deterring posture vis-a-vis the Arab military threat. Notwithstanding the political reasons, this assistance has been cost-effective on many levels for both countries.

The annual \$3 billion assistance constitutes but a small fraction of the total U.S. budget, (1/4% budget). The accumulated aid over the past 40 years equals U.S. expenditures in the Persian Gulf alone.

As is illustrated in the Table below, U.S. aid is negligible compared to the allotment of funds and aid to NATO or Japan. What's more, Israel has never asked, nor does it intend to ask the U.S. to deploy its troops in Israel.

Aid to Israel Compared to Major International Costs
(Figures based on FY 1987 expenditures)



- (a) Direct and indirect costs of NATO defense commitment calculated on the basis of 56% of defense budget (this percentage based on figures in "Reduction in U.S. Costs to Station Forces in FRG and UK Are Unlikely," General Accounting Office, July 31, 1984).
- (b) Direct and indirect costs of Far East commitments based on number of troops stationed in Asia (114,000) compared to number of troops stationed in NATO countries (230,000).
- (c) John Lehman, "Carter Doctrine is No Longer Adequate in Gulf," The Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1987, page 22.

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The nature of U.S. - Israel relations, in essence, is one of deep friendship, shared values, strategic cooperation and moral commitment and support. These cannot be measured quantitatively at all times. Some factors are intangible, however significant or crucial they may be perceived to be.

We believe that the return to the U.S. on every dollar it has loaned or granted to Israel has multiplied its value:

* Israel's battle-proven weapons systems serve the U.S. military, as well as the American defense industry, by providing critical evaluations of real time usage, thus exposing flaws, emphasizing strengths, and substantially cutting research and development processes. In 1987, 54% of the U.S. Foreign Weapon Evaluation fund was spent on evaluation of Israeli weapons systems for possible U.S. military use.

* It is estimated that for every \$1 billion Israel receives in military aid, 60,000 jobs are created in the U.S. economy.

* Israel is cooperating with the U.S. in battling international terrorism, most of which originates in the Middle East.

* Cooperation in intelligence information has provided the U.S. intelligence agencies with invaluable information on Soviet weapons systems, Soviet military doctrines, and analysis of the stability of various pro-Western regimes in the region. (Israeli intelligence was the first to alert the U.S. of the deteriorating situation in Iran in 1979.)

* The strength and viability of Israel's Democratic society and systems serve as a model to young and developing countries in the world and help to promote democracy as a whole. Joint economic and military projects complement and supplement the advancement of democracy, stabilization of the region, and the extension of political cooperation, thus rendering Israel a strategic asset to the U.S. from both a military and political perspective.

From an Israeli perspective, there is still yet another point to emphasize. The U.S. not only is Israel's most important ally, its moral, material and political supporter, and its friend over a considerable time span, it is Israel's only ally in these respects. Unlike other countries, Israel cannot resort to other would-be allies. It is noteworthy to point out that Israel has never experienced anti-American activity, nor does it harbor sentiments of that sort. This can only be attributed to the deep and broad interests and values shared by both countries.