

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

משרד

לשכת רווחה

יוסף אבני

אברהם

7/3/90 - 15/3/90

תיק מס'

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תיק מס'

מחלקה



שם תיק: היועץ המדיני לראש הממשלה - ארה"ב

מזהה פיוז: 4611/12-א


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תאריך הדפסה: 31/08/2020

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AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS



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March 13, 1990 - By Hand

The Honorable James A. Baker III
Secretary of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you well know, we have long supported your untiring efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the Middle East problem. Like you, we believe that the Israeli peace initiative of last May 14th provides a satisfactory framework for launching Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and deserves to be vigorously pursued.

It is in this context that we wish to express our concern along with that of the entire American Jewish community over what has been allowed to appear as a change in U.S. policy toward Jerusalem. Recent statements by the President and other senior officials allow the impression that unlike the carefully maintained distinction held by all Administrations since 1967 between the West Bank and Jerusalem, the President and the Administration now view East Jerusalem as part of the West Bank and oppose Jewish settlement there. We earnestly hope that this impression is mistaken.

Like virtually all other Jews in Israel and around the world, we regard Jerusalem - all of Jerusalem - as the eternal capital of Israel and of the Jewish people. Please be assured that whatever differences may exist among various Jewish groups and organizations on other aspects of the Middle East problem, there is a firm, enduring consensus among all of us on unified Jerusalem's permanent status as Israel's capital and on the absolute right of Jews to reside anywhere in Jerusalem - East or West - unhindered by any political considerations.

We understand the long-standing position of the United States is to support a united Jerusalem whose final status is to be determined by negotiations. But this position has never been construed as barring Jewish "settlement" in East Jerusalem. As affirmed by Margaret Tutwiler on March 8, "the United States' position, as was enunciated this week, is, of course, that Jews can live in East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem. There is no difference from that policy, and it's been stated, as you know."

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The Honorable James A. Baker
Page Two

March 13, 1990

We believe that a confirmation from you that this statement accurately reflects Administration policy would go a long way to defuse the current problem.

We are confident that you personally and the Administration in general understand and sympathize with our views. Indeed, we recall with gratification the 1988 Republican Party platform declaring that Jerusalem should never again be divided and should remain Israel's capital. To clarify the Administration's position on this crucial issue and to remove the deep concern aroused by the recent statements, we urge you to issue an unambiguous formal statement on Jerusalem to lay our concerns to rest.

Sincerely,

Robert K. Lifton
President

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטוןט ו פ ס מ ב ר קדף מתוך דפיםסוג בטחוני שמודחיות מידיתאריך/ז"חמס' מברק

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אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

פגישת דיניץ - שיפטר (15.3)

הנושאים שנדונו בשיחה (בהשתתפות סגנו של שיפטר והו"מ) היו: התבטאות הנשיא בנושא מזי ירושלים ויציאת יהודים מבריה"מ.

1. בהקשר לדברי הנשיא ניסה שיפטר להסביר הסיבות שהביאו להתבטאות, ציין בין היתר את המידע המטעה לגבי התיישבות יהודית מחוץ לשטח המונציפלי של ירושלים: כביכול.
 2. בסוגיית יציאת יהודים מבריה"מ ציין דיניץ הנקודות הבאות: א) הסיבות. הבירוקרטיה המעכבת יציאת יהודים, ב) הערכות לגבי היקף היציאה בתקופה הקרובה. ג) המו"מ המתנהל עם מדינות מזא"ר בנושא הצ'ארטרים וההשלכות על היקף היציאה (לכשהמו"מ יסתיים).
 3. דיניץ ביקש סיוע מחמ"ד בשני נושאים: 1) הגדלת המענק (בשנת התקציב הנוכחית) לקליטת עולים. 2) אישור הערבויות לדיור בסך 400 מליון.
 4. שיפטר בתגובה הצביע על האילוצים התקציבים וציין שיקשו על מתן תוספת לקליטת עולים מתוך כספי מחמ"ד.
- המליץ כי נרכז מאמצינו להשגת התוספת כמו גר' להגדלת המענק לשנה הבאה בקונגרס.

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דחילות: רגיל	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: שמו	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 1
תאריך וזמן מעור: 15.3.90	מצי"א	אל:
פס' פרוק:	דע:	
הפסד: 495	כאת: קישור לקונגרס	

מפגש עם ג'ודית דיוסטון ממשרדו של הסנטור סרביינס מוועדת החוץ

להלן מספר "בונבוניות" מפי היועצת:

1. ממליצה להתכונן - תקציבית - למוש ה- SEQUESTER. זו התרחשות כמעט בלתי נמנעת לאור המבוי הסתום התקציבי/פוליטי המאפיין את דיוני הקונגרס. אי ממוש ה- SEQUESTER יהיה בונוס...
2. הסנט טרוד במבול של נושאי פנים (במיוחד) וחוץ, ולא יתערב לחיוב ולשלילה בתהליך השלום.
3. איננה צופה קיצוץ בנתח הישראלי בסיוע החוץ השנה, אך החל מן השנה הבאה...
4. כבודו של בייקר במקומו מונח, אך הסנט חש כגוף ריבוני, לא יימחל על סמכויותיו, ולכן לא ישעה להפצרות בייקר (גם) בנושא הערבויות.

יורם

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תפוצה: 31-

סגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון טופס פרוק

דחיות: מידד

סוג: ש.מ.ר.ד

תאריך וזמן תעוד:

15.3.90

מצפ"א

כס' פרוק:

הפרד:

496

כאח: קישור לקונגרס

מפגש עם ברברה לרקין ממשרדו של הסנטור סנפורד מועדת החוץ

להלן מספר "צימוקים" מפי היועצת:

1. הסנטור תומך בהגדלות עוגות סיוע החוץ.

2. הסנטור מתנגד לקיצוץ הנתח הישראלי.

3. מציע להתכונן למאבק קשה על הנתח כבר השנה, ויותר מכך בשנים הבאות.

4. מצד אחד יקוצץ תקציב הבטחון באופן משמעותי, כנראה, החל משנת התקציב 1992 (פוטנציאלי

לעבוי סיוע החוץ), אך מאידך גוברת התחרות על העוגה המצומקת מכיוון המזא"ריות, אולי

אף הבלטיות, מרכז אמריקה, ואתגרי פנים דחופים. הנקודה הפעילה בהקשר הישראלי - ESF.

5. יש תמיכה בערבויות הדיור, אך המשוכה המשמעותית הקיימת היא המו"מ הצפוי על ה-A.I.D.FEES.

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תפוצה: - 36 -

A new, hard edge enters U.S. relationship with Israel

Second of three parts

By Martin Sieff
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Reagan honeymoon is over. These days, the Israeli-U.S. relationship is looking more like "The War of the Roses."

The Bush policy-makers do not share their predecessors' strong

emotional commitment to Israel. Thus, Israeli policies which would have rated disapproval but not action from the previous administration, have brought angry responses from this one.

• White House Chief of Staff John Sununu recently made an unusual sally into foreign affairs, warning that U.S. aid to Israel may be linked

to Israeli compliance with American demands and should not be used to create new settlements in the occupied West Bank.

• President Bush said in a March 3 press conference at Palm Springs, Calif., that there should be "no new settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem." Both major parties in Israel recognize a unified Jerusalem

as the capital of Israel.

• Secretary of State James A. Baker III told the House Foreign Affairs Committee Feb. 22 that he favored cuts in aid to both Israel and Egypt to provide more assistance to emerging democracies in Central

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MIDEAST

From page A1

America and Eastern Europe.

• Mr. Baker also told Congress the administration would support a \$400 million housing loan guarantee to Israel only if Israel could "provide some assurances that it would not be engaging in any new or additional settlement activity in the territories."

Sources close to State Department policy-makers saw Mr. Baker as pulling the strings behind both the president's and Mr. Sununu's remarks. His frustration with the Israelis has been building up for months, they said.

"Whenever we get these periods of intensive diplomatic interaction, a lot of tension is created," said former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis, now with the U.S. Institute of Peace.

U.S. pressure was a major factor in the collapse of Israel's National Unity Government earlier this week. The center-left Labor Party and the nationalist Likud bloc split amid bitter divisions over Mr. Baker's plan to negotiate peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

Sources close to the White House said Mr. Bush is known to share his secretary of state's impatience and that it was that knowledge that led Mr. Sununu to abandon his previously scrupulous avoidance of foreign policy issues.

"Bush has a real bugaboo about Israeli settlements on the West Bank," one administration source said. "Sununu is reflecting Bush's obsession. He knows it's a sure-win issue with the president."

The new confrontational signals mark a sharp change in direction for the Bush administration, which until recently had followed the Reagan team's policy of working closely with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his Likud party.

"The Bush administration has learned from previous administrations that an Israel secure in the support of the U.S. is more likely to take

the risky decisions involved in the peace process than an Israel held at arm's length," said Martin Indyk, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in describing earlier administration policy.

Dennis Ross, State Department director of policy planning, is credited with selling the pro-Likud approach to Mr. Baker.

"Ross is the driving intellectual force on policy. On the Middle East,

The new American toughness, both on settlements and the emotionally charged issue of Jerusalem, stems from growing impatience with Mr. Shamir's reluctance to move ahead quickly with that process.

he can write his own ticket," one State Department insider said.

"Both conceptually and at the hands-on level, Dennis has a huge amount of power, but if it blows up, if there's a catastrophe, he'll be there to take the fall," the source said.

Mr. Baker is determined to see results from the peace process and is pushing strongly for Israel and Egypt to agree on the composition of a Palestinian delegation for peace talks.

He has proposed to host a tripartite conference in Washington with foreign ministers Esmat Abdel-Maguid of Egypt and Moshe Arens of Israel to set the terms for direct Israeli-Palestinian talks that will then be held in Cairo, Egypt.

The new American toughness,

both on settlements and the emotionally charged issue of Jerusalem, stems from the administration's growing impatience with Mr. Shamir's reluctance to move ahead quickly with that process.

During the Reagan years, Israel benefited from a splintering of policy. Although then-Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead and the Bureau of Near East Affairs were widely perceived as seeking a tougher line toward Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories, then-Secretary of State George Shultz felt free to disregard them on a wide range of issues.

At the same time, the National Security Council went its own way under a rapid succession of leaders, pursuing independent policies in disregard of State Department positions. Influential NSC staff members were strongly pro-Israel and disposed to accept Israeli intelligence assessments above those coming from U.S. sources.

This was particularly true on Iranian policy. U.S. reliance on Israeli sources that turned out to be disastrously unreliable was a theme of the Iran-Contra affair.

Following Iran-Contra, new National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci rebuilt the NSC staff and directed the agency away from its pro-Israel sympathy.

Meanwhile, Mr. Shultz emerged from congressional hearings on the scandal as a hero, with his authority as secretary of state greatly enhanced. The result was that the State Department was back in the saddle on Middle East policy.

But the Bush administration remains caught in a dilemma, Middle East analysts say. If it sits back and lets Israeli settlement of the territories and repression of the intifada continue, it risks being blamed for any future major crisis in the area.

But if it ups the ante and strong-arms Israel into concessions that could endanger the Jewish state's existence, it risks a firestorm of protest from conservatives and evangelical Christians.

Next: Israel and Congress.

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נל: וושינגטון - קינגדאם

משימות, ירושלים

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1. ביחס לירושלים (שלכם סעיף 1), אנא עדכנו האם מדובר בפעילות המקומת שליחת מכתב לנשיא או בקידום SENSE OF CONGRESS, בנושא ?

א. שימוע ציונות - גזענות : לא לנו לצנן כוונות מויניהאן
בנושא במיוחד אם יעניקו לנושא תהודה מחודשת.

ב. ~~שימוע ירושלים~~ : מבחינתנו כמובן אין כל מניעה לקיום
שימוע בנושא, כי הר' קיים קונסנזוס לאומי בסוגייה זו.

ג. שימוע אש"פ : כזכור, בעת ביקורו כאן הבטיח מויניהאן לשה"ח קידם שימוע בנושא. כאן דווקא מומלץ לעודדו ביחוד לאור הגשת דו"ח מחמ"ד בשבוע הבא.

ה'תשנ"ח

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תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סי יבל, ר/מרכז, ממר,
רס, פ(אמ)

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סגירות ישראל / וושינגטון

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דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

דחיפות : מידי

סיווג : שמור

תאריך וזמן חעור : 08.05.90

למכירת מט' 460

אל : מצפ"א

דע :

מאת : ק. קונגרס, כלכלית

הנדון : מפגש עם סנטור אינוויה

להלן נקודות מרכזיות אשר הועלו ע"י הסנטור :

1. מוטד מעמדת הממשל, ובמיוחד הנשיא, כלפי ירושלים, ויעלה עמדתו בנדון בפני הנשיא. סבר שהתבטאות הנשיא היתה מעידת לשון, אך סבור כעת שזה היה שלא במקרה.
2. מוטד מעמדת ישראל בנושא דרא"פ, ומתקשה להבין איך בעלת ברית של ארה"ב מסייעת לפתח נשק בדרא"פ, ומאיץ בישראל להנמיך פרופיל בנושא ההתנחלויות (מתמקד ברמה ההצהרתית).
3. מודאג מן הקולות המפוצלים הבוקעים מירושלים, ומקשים על פעילות ידידי ישראל.
4. הצטרף ליוזמת ליי-קסטן בענין ערבויות הדיור, ולפי שעה נסוג מרעיון ה-Concessionary loans, אם כי עדין משוכנע שיש להקל על ישראל ע"י מענק. לדעתו, מענקים בשלב זה אינם ריאליסטים ועלולים להיות Counter productive.
5. מצפה למערכה קשה בנושא סיוע החוץ, אינו צופה קיצוץ, אך מהרהר

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על אפשרויות התמרון של 1.2 : 1.8 .

6. אינו נסחף בזרם האופוריה, וער לסכנות אי-הוודאות והחמוש מכיוון ברה"מ והעולם ה-3. הועדה שלו תצטרך לתת את הדעת לכמויות הנשק הקונבנציונלי העצומות שיתפנו עם דעיכת העמות הבינגושי ועלויות להגיע לאזורי עמות. ציין את התקדים של אספקת טנקים אמריקאים למצרים כתקדים לא חיובי.

7. לדעתו, אין הגורם הסובייטי בטבור השת"פ האסטרטגי.

8. נפגש עם תורמים יהודים גדולים שהביעו בפניו נכונות לתרום (Match) כמיליארד דולר כנגד מחויבות דומה של ישראל לשכון עולי ברה"מ.

March 15, 1990

The New York Times

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The Right Bush Push on Israel

What's the prognosis for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations? Very grim, with the collapse of the Likud-Labor coalition Government on Tuesday. What's the remedy? A new Israeli government, strong and united enough to pursue Israel's own plan for negotiating with the Palestinians.

What are the chances of that? Very grim. Israelis are deeply divided over whether to give these talks a chance. What's the remedy? For the Bush Administration to continue its sensitive, tough diplomatic pressure to bring the parties to the bargaining table. The U.S. doesn't have the right, reason or interest to ask Israel to jeopardize its security. But as Israel's closest ally, it has the obligation to press Israelis to test every possibility for peace.

It was over just that issue of peace talks that the Labor Party voted to bolt the unity Government with Likud, and Prime Minister Shamir decided to dismiss the Labor ministers from the Cabinet. This rupture undermined Bush Administration efforts for almost a year to position Mr. Shamir to say yes to his own proposal for holding elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It took months, and Egypt's help, to win apparent Palestinian agreement to Secretary of State Baker's guidelines for carrying out the Shamir plan. The focus of the talks was to be on the elections, as Israel desired, though the Palestinians could raise their ultimate objective of independence. The Palestine Liberation Organization would play no role, as Israel demanded, though all understood Yasir Arafat's behind-the-scenes power.

It even appeared that Mr. Baker had arranged agreement on two of the trickiest issues regarding the Palestinian delegation. One was that no member could be a deportee, who might then have visible links to the P.L.O. But an exile would be O.K. The

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second agreement was that one of the delegates could have dual residence, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The latter was a particularly difficult concession for Mr. Shamir, since it could be interpreted as acknowledging Palestinian claims in Jerusalem. Almost all Israelis regard Jerusalem as their undivided capital.

Two weeks ago, with these issues ironed out and talks imminent, Ariel Sharon and other right-wing Likud ministers walked out of the Cabinet. Then Mr. Shamir withdrew his acceptance of those two points. Then Labor leaders put the choice to Mr. Shamir: Either go ahead with the talks as previously agreed, or they would leave the Government.

President Bush made the maneuvering all the more complicated last week. He said, for the first time, that he opposed Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem as well as the occupied territories. It was a thoughtless, unnecessary jolt to Israelis on a matter that should not even be raised until the very end of a long and successful peace process. The remark seemed to hint a change in Administration thinking about what kind of Israeli government could best pursue negotiations.

Until now, the Administration has argued that a Likud-led coalition with Labor was the preferable way. Now the U.S. seems so frustrated with Mr. Shamir that it might prefer a Labor-led government.

The Bush Administration knows that any direct meddling in Israeli politics would be disastrous. It will surely be sensibly silent in the coming days about political preferences. But Mr. Bush and Mr. Baker need not be still in stressing that Israel, led by whichever government, belongs at the table, with appropriate Palestinians, as quickly as possible.

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Bush's Assault on Israel

By Thomas A. Dine

The mainstream of the pro-Israel community generally has supported the Bush Administration's Middle East diplomacy. But surprises in the past two weeks have undermined much of that confidence and raised fears that a new tilt is occurring on issues of fundamental importance. Shock waves hit Israel at the wrong time; dismaying the Likud and Labor parties and contributing to political upheaval.

The Bush Administration, elected on the most pro-Israel platform in the history of either party, has built on the peace initiative Israel launched last May. It has enhanced the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship, and faithfully supported Israel and opposed Palestine Liberation Organization maneuvers in the U.N. It has made a major contribution to opening the Soviet Union's gates so that record numbers of Jews could choose freedom.

But four recent developments have aroused considerable anxiety, while giving hope to those who would drive a wedge between the U.S. and its sole democratic ally in the region.

First was President Bush's unexpected statement opposing what he called "settlements in East Jerusalem." Jerusalem is not the West Bank, and no President has declared opposition to Jews residing in any part of the city.

Thomas A. Dine is executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a lobbying organization.

No serious body of opinion in the U.S. Jewish community and Israel accepts this new implication that Jews' return to the Old City's Jewish quarter, from which they were barred during Jordan's rule, constitutes "settlement activity" and that the Western Wall is "occupied territory."

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Moreover, Administration officials

Four actions that caused Jews alarm.

have transmitted to Israel some very minor statements from low officials in past Administrations to try to show that the U.S. has had a sustained policy of opposing settlements in Jerusalem; such a policy never existed.

Second, two week ago, for the first time Administration officials told Congress that the Palestine Liberation Organization was fully living up to its commitments to peace and the renunciation of terror.

While there have been some positive P.L.O. developments, there have also been many statements and actions inconsistent with Yasir Arafat's Geneva peace pledges in 1988. He has said openly he personally authorized the death squads that have killed hundreds of Palestinians who have strayed from the P.L.O. line. Abu

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Iyad, his top deputy, publicly praised the still continuing stepped-up cross-border raids against Israel.

Third, the U.S.'s reluctance to criticize the P.L.O. contrasts sharply with a recent flood of statements publicly expressing differences with Israel. There seems to be a policy of sugar-coating words to the Arab side while publicly criticizing Israel, all in the name of evenhandedness.

Little is said about Jordan's vote to throw Israel out of the U.N., Saudi Arabian steps to enforce the Arab boycott and Arab League pressures on the Soviet Union to close the gates to Jews seeking sanctuary in Israel.

But Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir is singled out for repeated pressure. And this at a time when he is under attack in his own party for moving toward concessions on peace talks with the Palestinians. This pressure has undercut his ability to move ahead at a key moment.

Fourth, the exodus of Soviet Jewry is the worldwide Jewish community's top priority. Unfortunately, the Administration has needlessly linked the housing of Soviet Jews with the issue of settlements in the territories. Israel has repeatedly given assurances that it will not use U.S. or Israeli resources to direct Soviet immigrants to the territories. Why should the Soviet Jews' place of residence be an issue? Only 1 percent of them choose to live in the West Bank.

It is not too late for the Administration to correct its course. In search for peace, Israel needs to, confidence in its most reliable ally and friend. This confidence is precisely what has been eroded by the Administration's actions.

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negotiations will produce an acceptable result.

That there's a wide divergence of opinion among Israelis about the future of the West Bank is plain: some urge that all or part of this area be handed over to Arab rule in the context of a peace settlement. Others, skeptical of the notion that a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian entity will satisfy Arab aspirations, believe Israel's current borders should be given a more permanent character.

There are even differences of opinion about whether Palestinians who reside in East Jerusalem should be permitted to join a Palestinian peace-talks delegation.

But, again, there is virtually no debate over whether Jews should be allowed to make their homes in East Jerusalem. The notion of a Jerusalem partitioned into ethnic zones has no adherents. If the President doesn't yet realize that this result is implicit in his remarks on Jewish "settlement" in East Jerusalem, he is the victim of exceedingly poor advice.

Every relevant peace proposal — from the earliest British and U.N. partition plans onward — has respected the integrity of Jerusalem as a whole, and has treated the city as a single entity not to be carved up.

That Bush's words have had a dramatic and chilling impact on the peace process as a whole is altogether unfortunate. We're not, to be candid, profoundly optimistic as to that process.

Palestinian and general Arab unwillingness to accept Israel's right to exist as a sovereign Jewish state remains the key barrier to peace, not the handful of Jewish settlements on the West Bank. But exploratory, step-by-step talks seem worth pursuing.

The President's comments on Jerusalem, however, beyond their specific implications, bespeak an utter absence of realism in the U.S. outlook. And realism — an appreciation of the existing realities and possibilities — is essential to America's success as a peace-broker.

New York Post
Mar. 14, 90

DEBORAH ORIN

INSIDE WASHINGTON



3/4

0482

COMING soon — Round 2 between Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan and his old pal (or perhaps ex-pal) President Bush, this time over the emotionally explosive issue of Jerusalem.

Moynihan (D-N.Y.), you'll recall, infuriated the White House last December by calling for cuts in Social Security payroll taxes. Since then, he hasn't heard one word from Bush, a friend for more than 20 years.

Moynihan ready to do battle with Bush

Now Moynihan, angered that Bush has raised questions about Israel's claims to East Jerusalem, is about to push forward to get Congress on record in opposition to the president.

The senator is still working out precisely what he'll do — possibilities include hearings, a sense-of-Congress resolution or a renewed push for legislation to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem.

"He's committed to making an essential point about the peace process," said Moynihan aide David Luchins.

"We're asking the Israelis to take a gamble for peace and the last thing we need to do is to suggest this path may end with the dismemberment of their historic capital. Jerusalem is Israel's single most emotional issue."

Moynihan — who first sponsored legislation for the U.S. to move its embassy to Jerusalem in 1983 — chairs the Senate's Near East subcommittee.

Adding to the intrigue, Senate Majority Leader Dick Gephardt — the Democrat who really seems to get under Bush's skin — could team up with Moynihan.

A key step in Moynihan's effort could come in New York Sunday when he addresses the Jewish Community Relations Council.

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As it happens, Gephardt will be there to get a JCRC award for service to the Jewish community — and since Gephardt is one of Bush's sharpest critics, it seems unlikely he'll pass up the chance to join the debate.

Last week, when Bushites came out swinging against Gephardt because he accused the president of reading polls instead of leading, Moynihan and Gov. Cuomo were among the first Democrats to rise to Gephardt's defense.

Bush touched off the Jerusalem flap March 3 by saying: "We do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem."

Ex-pals at odds in flap over Jerusalem

The U.S. has never recognized Israel's 1967 annexation of East Jerusalem, but Bush's suggestion that the area is occupied territory appears to be the first public statement by any president questioning the right of Jews to live there.

At a news conference yesterday, Bush hung tough, saying: "I don't regret it. I was reiterating U.S. policy."

Moynihan sees it very differently — last week on the Senate floor he said the president's remarks were "most unhelpful to the quest for peace in the Middle East" and created "anguish" across the political spectrum in Israel.

He added it was "a frightful irony" for Bush — after celebrating the Berlin Wall's collapse — to revive the image of a divided Jerusalem where Jews could be driven from the Old City and Western Wall at gunpoint.

Moynihan says he had the votes to pass his Jerusalem bill in 1984 but didn't push the issue because the Reagan administration had warned it could mean the torching of U.S. embassies around the Middle East — a warning he described as a "self-fulfilling prophecy."

Bush almost certainly would veto the same measure if it were passed now — which raises the alternate possibility of a sense-of-Congress resolution acknowledging Jerusalem as part of Israel.

Such a resolution would have no legal impact — but Bush couldn't veto it and it would put the Senate and House on record as disagreeing with Bush.

And, needless to say, it is unlikely that pro-Israel Republicans like Sens. Al D'Amato (R-N.Y.) and Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) would vote against it.

All of which could add up to political heartburn for Republicans at a time when the GOP is trying to reach out to Jewish voters.

Republican national spokesman Leslie Goodman yesterday acknowledged hearing "concerns, absolutely," about Bush's Jerusalem remarks, but insisted she is sure the president will "make the right decision for Israel."

Meanwhile, at a time when many Democrats fear to take on Bush and his 80 percent popularity, Moynihan is once again ready to lead the charge against his old pal.

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ביהנ"ב ; ירושלים

היום אחה"צ יתקיים דיון מיוחד במליאת ביהנ"ב (SPECIAL ORDER) בנושא ירושלים, ביוזמת הקונגרסמנים אדפיהן ודן בורטון.

רצ"ב המכתב, שהפצו הקונגרסמנים הנ"ל לעמיתיהם, המזמין ס להשתתף בדיון

נדווח פרטים לאחר הדיון.

יפארה וואסאן פקס
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

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House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

IMMEDIATE ATTENTION: SPECIAL ORDER TODAY

March 14, 1990

Dear Colleague:

On Wednesday, March 14 we will be reserving time for a special order on the status of Jerusalem and the Administration's handling of this issue. We urge you to participate.

We are engaging in this colloquy in order to express our dismay over the Administration's recent statements on the future of Jerusalem. On March 3, President Bush referred to his Administration's opposition to new settlements "in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem." Initially, it was thought that the President had misspoken, that he had meant to say "the West Bank and Gaza." It seemed highly unlikely that the President would have wanted to put Israel's capital city in the same category as the administered territories.

But, as Tom Friedman pointed out in the New York Times of March 9, that was his intention. "Officials say that Bush intentionally added East Jerusalem to make sure that the Israelis understood that it was still viewed as occupied territory by the United States...."


We do not share that view which is a departure from traditional U.S. policy. The U.S. has always made a distinction between Jerusalem and the territories. West Bank policy is governed by U.N. Resolution 242 and Camp David, both of which envision at least partial Israeli withdrawal in exchange for full peace and security. At the same time U.S. officials have indicated, over and over again, that Jerusalem cannot be returned to the pre-1967 status quo, that it must remain united.


Jerusalem is Israel's capital. The concept of "settlements" in Jerusalem is nonsensical. Israelis do not "settle" in their capital. They live there. It is not "occupied territory."

In the context of peace negotiations, innovative solutions for Jerusalem's future should be considered. However, to suggest that Jerusalem is just another piece of territory to be bargained over once the negotiations begin is a serious mistake. Surely it is not the view of Congress.

That is why we invite your participation on Wednesday. If you wish to participate, please contact Neil Levine (w/ Rep. Feighan: 5-5731) or Gil Kapen (w/ Rep. Burton: 5-2276).

Sincerely,


DAN BURTON
Member of Congress


EDWARD F. FEIGHAN
Member of Congress

The Right Bush Push on Israel

What's the prognosis for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations? Very grim, with the collapse of the Likud-Labor coalition Government on Tuesday. What's the remedy? A new Israeli government, strong and united enough to pursue Israel's own plan for negotiating with the Palestinians.

What are the chances of that? Very grim. Israelis are deeply divided over whether to give these talks a chance. What's the remedy? For the Bush Administration to continue its sensitive, tough diplomatic pressure to bring the parties to the bargaining table. The U.S. doesn't have the right, reason or interest to ask Israel to jeopardize its security. But as Israel's closest ally, it has the obligation to press Israelis to test every possibility for peace.

It was over just that issue of peace talks that the Labor Party voted to bolt the unity Government with Likud, and Prime Minister Shamir decided to dismiss the Labor ministers from the Cabinet. This rupture undermined Bush Administration efforts for almost a year to position Mr. Shamir to say yes to his own proposal for holding elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It took months, and Egypt's help, to win apparent Palestinian agreement to Secretary of State Baker's guidelines for carrying out the Shamir plan. The focus of the talks was to be on the elections, as Israel desired, though the Palestinians could raise their ultimate objective of independence. The Palestine Liberation Organization would play no role, as Israel demanded, though all understood Yasir Arafat's behind-the-scenes power.

It even appeared that Mr. Baker had arranged agreement on two of the trickiest issues regarding the Palestinian delegation. One was that no member could be a deportee, who might then have visible links to the P.L.O. But an exile would be O.K. The

second agreement was that one of the delegates could have dual residence, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The latter was a particularly difficult concession for Mr. Shamir, since it could be interpreted as acknowledging Palestinian claims in Jerusalem. Almost all Israelis regard Jerusalem as their undivided capital.

Two weeks ago, with these issues ironed out and talks imminent, Ariel Sharon and other right-wing Likud ministers walked out of the Cabinet. Then Mr. Shamir withdrew his acceptance of those two points. Then Labor leaders put the choice to Mr. Shamir: Either go ahead with the talks as previously agreed, or they would leave the Government.

President Bush made the maneuvering all the more complicated last week. He said, for the first time, that he opposed Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem as well as the occupied territories. It was a thoughtless, unnecessary jolt to Israelis on a matter that should not even be raised until the very end of a long and successful peace process. The remark seemed to hint a change in Administration thinking about what kind of Israeli government could best pursue negotiations.

Until now, the Administration has argued that a Likud-led coalition with Labor was the preferable way. Now the U.S. seems so frustrated with Mr. Shamir that it might prefer a Labor-led government.

The Bush Administration knows that any direct meddling in Israeli politics would be disastrous. It will surely be sensibly silent in the coming days about political preferences. But Mr. Bush and Mr. Baker need not be still in stressing that Israel, led by whichever government, belongs at the table, with appropriate Palestinians, as quickly as possible.



Bush's Assault on Israel

By Thomas A. Dine

The mainstream of the pro-Israel community generally has supported the Bush Administration's Middle East diplomacy. But surprises in the past two weeks have undermined much of that confidence and raised fears that a new tilt is occurring on issues of fundamental importance. Shock waves hit Israel at the wrong time, dismantling the Likud and Labor parties and contributing to political upheaval.

The Bush Administration, elected on the most pro-Israel platform in the history of either party, has built on the peace initiative Israel launched last May. It has enhanced the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship, and faithfully supported Israel and opposed Palestine Liberation Organization maneuvers in the U.N. It has made a major contribution to opening the Soviet Union's gates so that record numbers of Jews could choose freedom.

But four recent developments have aroused considerable anxiety, while giving hope to those who would drive a wedge between the U.S. and its sole democratic ally in the region.

First was President Bush's unexpected statement opposing what he called "settlements in East Jerusalem." Jerusalem is not the West Bank, and no President has declared opposition to Jews residing in any part of the city.

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No serious body of opinion in the U.S. Jewish community and Israel accepts this new implication that Jews' return to the Old City's Jewish quarter, from which they were barred during Jordan's rule, constitutes "settlement activity" and that the Western Wall is "occupied territory." We hoped President Bush's words were inadvertent, that there would be a clarification. But he has expressed no regret.

Moreover, Administration officials

Four actions that caused Jews alarm.

have transmitted to Israel some very minor statements from low officials in past Administrations in try to show that the U.S. has had a sustained policy of opposing settlements in Jerusalem, such a policy never existed.

Second, two week ago, for the first time Administration officials told Congress that the Palestine Liberation Organization was fully living up to its commitments to peace and the renunciation of terror.

While there have been some positive P.L.O. developments, there have also been many statements and actions inconsistent with Yasir Arafat's Geneva peace pledges in 1988. He has said openly he personally authorized the death squads that have killed hundreds of Palestinians who have strayed from the P.L.O. line. Abu

Iyad, his top deputy, publicly praised the still continuing stepped-up cross-border raids against Israel.

Third, the U.S.'s reluctance to criticize the P.L.O. contrasts sharply with a recent flood of statements publicly expressing differences with Israel. There seems to be a policy of sugar-coating words in the Arab side while publicly criticizing Israel, all in the name of evenhandedness.

Little is said about Jordan's vote to throw Israel out of the U.N. Saudi Arabian steps to enforce the Arab boycott and Arab League pressures on the Soviet Union to close the gates to Jews seeking sanctuary in Israel.

But Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir is singled out for repeated pressure. And this at a time when he is under attack in his own party for moving toward concessions on peace talks with the Palestinians. This pressure has undercut his ability to move ahead at a key moment.

Fourth, the exodus of Soviet Jewry is the worldwide Jewish community's top priority. Unfortunately, the Administration has needlessly linked the housing of Soviet Jews with the issue of settlements in the territories. Israel has repeatedly given assurances that it will not use U.S. or Israeli resources in direct Soviet immigration to the territories. Why should the Soviet Jews' place of residence be an issue? Only 1 percent of them choose to live in the West Bank.

It is not too late for the Administration to correct its course. In the search for peace, Israel needs to have confidence in its most reliable ally and friend. This confidence is precisely what has been eroded by the Administration's actions. □

506/59 :2/6

מקור בטרשטש

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1990

Dear Mr. Mayor:

Thank you for your thoughtful and gracious letter. I will always treasure the memory of my visit to Jerusalem, an experience made even more enjoyable because of your personal involvement. But I am simply one of many who are in debt to you. Thanks to your fair and farsighted leadership, and to Israel's exemplary respect for the holy places, Jerusalem remains an inspiration and a source of hope to Jews, Christians and Muslims alike.

I would like to thank you as well for sharing your insights with me. There is much that we hold in common. As you note, the basis of our position remains that Jerusalem must never again be a divided city. We did not approve of the status quo before 1967; in no way do we advocate a return to it now. This was and is the policy of the United States, and it is my policy. Our efforts in the peace process are in no way designed to promote the division of Jerusalem. We would oppose any such effort.

It is also our view that the final status of this most special of cities should be decided by negotiation, and that this negotiation would be facilitated if we were well along the path toward peace. There is thus no intention on our part to focus now on the final status of Jerusalem. It is also our view, just as it has been the view of the United States since 1967, that all sides should be taking steps to get to negotiations and avoiding steps that could prejudice the prospects for these negotiations. It is the pursuit of peace that ought to take priority, for only with peace can Jerusalem truly be open and whole.

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Thank you again for taking the time to write me.
Barbara joins me in sending our best wishes to
you and your family.

Sincerely,

C. Bush

The Honorable Teddy Kollek
Mayor
City of Jerusalem

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DRAFT -

506/59: $\frac{4}{6}$

March 16, 1990

מקור מטושטש

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing to express our deep concern with recent statements made by your Administration that appear to deviate from America's traditional policy regarding Jerusalem, the capital of our friend and ally Israel.

We applaud your efforts to build upon the peace initiative launched by the Government of Israel last May. By standing squarely behind Israel's four-point plan, the U.S. was sending a powerful message to Arab states -- that the U.S. and Israel were unshakable partners in the search for peace and security.

But your precedent setting declaration regarding Israeli "settlements" in Jerusalem sounded alarm bells across the Israeli political spectrum and may have eroded Israel's confidence in our reliability as a partner in the peace process. Indeed, the breakup of the National Unity Government may be indicative of this erosion.

Mr. President, for 2,000 years Jerusalem has been the spiritual soul of the political capital of the reborn Jewish state. But only since Jerusalem was unified in 1967 under Israeli control have the holy sites of Christianity, Islam and Judaism been protected and open to all.

We stand by you, Mr. President, in your efforts to bring peace to the Middle East. But now is not the time to sidetrack the peace process and change longstanding U.S. policy, unless it is to finally and formally recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

We hope you recognize what has been reality all along -- that Jerusalem, a city of neighborhoods not settlements, is the indivisible capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

506/59 : $\frac{5}{6}$

מקור מיושטש

March 14, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Jerusalem has a place in the hearts of the American people and of people throughout the world. Whether Christian, Jewish, or Moslem, they look to it as a symbol of peace and a source of spiritual inspiration.

Jerusalem is the spiritual center of the Jewish faith, and for Israelis, it is their capital. For over twenty-five hundred years, as Jewish people yearned to return to Zion, they recalled Jerusalem in their prayers. Thus, above all, Jerusalem has special meaning to the Jewish people. But their devotion to Jerusalem has not meant the exclusion of others. When Jerusalem was reunited in 1967, a tragic period in its history ended; now people of every faith enjoy free access to their holy places.

We agree with long-standing United States policy that Jerusalem should never again be divided and that its people should be free to live wherever they wish without regard to their faith. In our view, the status of Jerusalem need not be settled early in the current peace process, and it should not be linked to other issues.

We are deeply concerned, however, that recent statements on the subject of Jerusalem may raise doubts as to whether that policy has changed. In particular, these statements could raise doubts about our long-standing commitment to the right of Jews to live in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem is a city unique in the world, a mosaic of diverse ethnic and religious groups living together in peace. That peace reigns in Jerusalem, despite its diversity, gives us hope that peace may be achieved throughout the Middle East.

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
מקור מטושטש

506/59

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Mr. President, we support your determination to advance the peace process in the Middle East. We believe, however, that your clarification that our policy on Jerusalem has not changed is urgently needed now. Even though the constraints of time prevented us from asking more of our colleagues to join in this letter, we believe that most of them share our concerns.


Sincerely,



Benjamin A. Gilman, M.C.


Rudy Boschwitz

Pete Wilson


Joseph I. Lieberman

Alfonse M. D'Amato


John McCain

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שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק

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ביהניב : ירושלים

בהמשך לשלנו 418 סעיף ב' רצ"ב מכתב לנשיא בנדון, ביוזמת הקונגרסמנים

שומר, סיהן, וובר ובורטון.

הנייל הופץ לחתימת הקונגרסמנים.

אוראל - אנה' פסקו
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מחבר

תפוצה: 60

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

March 16, 1990

487 2/2

Dear Mr. President,

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We hope you recognize what has been reality all along -- that Jerusalem, a city of neighborhoods not settlements, is the indivisible capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

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United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 101st CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 136

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1990

No. 27

House of Representatives

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1990

486 2/15

JERUSALEM MUST NOT BE DIVIDED

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TAYLOR). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. FEIGHAN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I thank the Speaker, and at the outset of this special order I would like particularly to thank our colleague from Indiana, Congressman BURTON, who has joined me in organizing this special order this afternoon and spoke with many of our colleagues, many of whom had hoped to participate, thinking that the special order would have been conducted somewhat earlier in today's schedule. But because of the wide interest in a number of topics, we were not able to do so.

I would also like, Mr. Speaker, to just mention two of our colleagues who have been instrumental in organizing this special order and were very eager to participate but because of the lateness of the hour were unable to do so.

One is the gentleman from California (Mr. LEVINS), who has been a very active member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, particularly the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in dealing with the wide range of complex issues in the fashioning of American foreign policy in the Middle East. He is submitting an extension of his remarks at a later date.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my special order today.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I also would like to mention a colleague of ours who serves on the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. LEHMAN), who also wanted to participate today. I will be submitting his lengthy statement into the Record. He is someone who has been of enormous help and tremendously responsible in helping us to fashion an appropriate American policy.

Mr. Speaker, during the past 23 years—since 1967—there have been certain hallmarks in U.S. Middle East policy that have remained constant. One has been that any peace agreement involves mutual recognition and secure borders for Israel. Another has been that in exchange for full peace and recognition Israel might have to yield some of the territory that was won after the Arab States attacked in 1967. A third was that the city of Jerusalem must remain united and would not be returned to the divided status of the pre-1967 period.

However, on March 3, President Bush seemed to break with the consensus that had existed since 1967 when he stated that his administration opposed new Israeli settlements "in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem." Initially, it was thought that the President misspoke and that he had meant to say "the West Bank and Gaza." It seemed unlikely that the President would have intended to put Israel's capital city in the same category as the administered territories.

But, as Tom Friedman pointed out in the New York Times of March 9, that was his intention. "Officials say," Friedman wrote, "that Bush intentionally added East Jerusalem to make sure that the Israelis understood that it was still viewed as occupied territory by the United States." The President stated just yesterday that he stands by his March 9 statement.

The President has made a blunder, one that is already reverberating throughout the Middle East. The first mistake was in the timing of his remark on Jerusalem. At the time he made his statement, the administration was trying to convince the Israeli Government to enter into negotiations with the Palestinians—negotiations that would lead to elections in the West Bank.

The Shamir government was resisting, in part because of the administration's insistence that Arab residents of Jerusalem be allowed to participate both in the negotiations and in any future election. Israelis feared that allowing residents of Jerusalem to participate—as if Jerusalem was just another part of the West Bank—might lead to a situation where Israel was being pressured to relinquish sovereignty over its own capital.

This fear was only fueled by the President's statement which is a departure from traditional U.S. policy. The United States has always made a distinction between Jerusalem and the territories. American policy on the West Bank and Gaza is governed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and the Camp David accords, both of which envision at least partial Israeli withdrawal in exchange for full peace and security.

However, neither of those documents makes reference to Jerusalem and deliberately so. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations at the time 242 was drafted stated that "Resolution 242 in no way refers to Jerusalem." Jerusalem was a discrete matter, not linked to the West Bank. As for Camp David, the accords drafted there include separate letters stating the Egyptian, Israeli, and American positions on Jerusalem. These separate side letters were included simply because the three sides could not reach agreement on Jerusalem's future.

Subsequent United States administrations have made clear, over and over again, that the land for peace formula does not apply to Jerusalem. Israelis would not be asked to accept the redivision of Jerusalem.

Nor should they. Jerusalem is Israel's capital. The concept of settlements in Jerusalem is nonsensical. Israelis do not settle in their capital. They live there. Jerusalem is not occupied territory.

The Bush statement reveals a troubling aspect to United States policy toward Jerusalem. In his March 9 statement the President indicated that the administration considers East Jerusalem to be occupied territory, that is, territory that Israel would be asked to give up in the context of peace negotiations.

In a March 13 letter to Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem he stresses that Jerusalem must "never again be a divided city," but at the same time states that it is "our view that the final status of this most special of cities should be decided by negotiation."

The logic here is inescapable. The administration believes that Jerusalem must remain one city but that its final

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status is up for grabs. Israel will be asked to negotiate not only over the future of East Jerusalem—the part of the city that was gained in the 1967 war—but also over West Jerusalem, which has always been part of Israel.

Mr. Speaker, the administration's policy toward Jerusalem is precisely half right. Jerusalem must never again be divided. However, it is most certainly not up for grabs. Jerusalem, East and West, will remain Israel's capital. Now and forever.

This is not to say that there can be no negotiations over Jerusalem's final status. At the end of the day, when the other outstanding issues dividing Israelis and Palestinians are resolved, there should be discussions over the holy places and other sites of particular historic or religious interest.

However, raising the Jerusalem question at this time is counterproductive. It unnecessarily alarms the Israelis and raises the expectations among Palestinians and other Arabs that the United States will join in the effort to wrest Jerusalem from Israel. That is not going to happen. And it shouldn't happen. It's President Bush who should convey this message to Arabs and Israelis alike. Only then will this needless controversy be laid to rest.

□ 1850

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] who has joined me this afternoon in calling for and organizing this special order.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I am a very strong supporter of President Bush, and I think many of my colleagues are. However, we believe, I think many Members believe, that an unfortunate error was made by the President recently when he made the statement that "We do not believe that there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem."

Jerusalem, the ancient capital of Israel, represents the heart and soul of the Jewish people. It has been the focus of Jewish national and religious yearning for 3,000 years. Jews have always lived there. And, since the 19th century, a plurality of its residents have been Jewish.

Ever since King David established Jerusalem as the capital of the kingdom of Israel, Jerusalem has been close to the heart of the Jewish people.

Through all the years of exile, Jerusalem was the focus of Jewish prayers. At Passover, Jews have always prayed "next year in Jerusalem." One of Judaism's most fervent prayers reads like this:

If I forget thee O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget its cunning. Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I do not remember thee, if I do not raise Jerusalem above my highest joy.

We must remember Jerusalem was divided for 19 years because of war imposed by Arab neighbors, and Jews

were not allowed into East Jerusalem for that time, even to pray at the holy shrines. Jewish gravesites were desecrated, and some used for latrines, and some used for road construction. Israel pleaded with Jordan not to enter the 1967 war. Jordan, instead, chose to enter the war started by Syria and Egypt. As a consequence, Israel found itself in control of all of Jerusalem and the West Bank. In order words, these were areas seized in a war of self defense. The very fact that Israel is being asked to relinquish those territories is a reflection of the hypocrisy of the world community. What other country in the world is expected to give up land it won in a war? Especially a war of self defense. Can Members imagine the United States giving Texas back to Mexico? Can Members imagine Poland returning territory to Germany? I think not.

How could anyone who has been to Israel not be awed and impressed by what the Israelis have done in Jerusalem? It is a free city, where Jews, Arabs, and everybody else enjoys freedom. Mayor Teddy Kollek, a great statesman, has done a tremendous job in unifying that city. The Arabs who live there are entitled to full citizenship and have all benefited from a higher standard of living, better education, better health care, better job opportunities and so forth. Most Arabs in any other country in the Middle East do not enjoy anywhere near the same advantages. Anyone who has been to Israel who has seen the West Bank knows how vulnerable Israel is, how narrow the country is at the waist. A person can fire a rocket from the West Bank all the way across the country into the Mediterranean Sea. It is surrounded by hostility. We ought to have maximum understanding for Israel's situation.

However, Jerusalem is in a category by itself. Recently, unfortunate statements have been made about the Israeli settlements in Jerusalem, which I alluded to, by the President, a few moments ago. Let all Members make it clear that we do not understand that language, on both sides of the aisle. Jerusalem is the eternal, indivisible capital of Israel. As a matter of principle, we really should move our Embassy to Jerusalem. Israel is the only country in the world where the United States Embassy is located in a city other than its capital, and Israel is our strongest ally in the Middle East. But at the very least, let Members speak with one voice concerning our feelings about Jerusalem. Let no one, be it friend or foe, doubt our strong support for Israel, and our strong conviction about the centrality of Jerusalem as Israel's eternal, united, and free capital city.

I would just like to end by saying since 1967, successive administrations have been sensitive to the special status of the city. According to Arthur Goldberg, one of the drafters of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242,

that resolution "in no way refers to Jerusalem, and this omission was deliberate . . . Jerusalem was a discrete matter, not linked to the West Bank."

Mr. Speaker, I hope that the President, whom I support almost 100 percent of the time, will reevaluate his position on this issue so that this Congress can speak with one voice with the administration in helping preserve, protect, and defend Israel, our allies, work with them and work with their capital city, Jerusalem.

Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] for his forceful statement this afternoon, and again for his participation in organizing today's special order.

I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, who has been one of the most effective and responsible voices on American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Mr. GILMAN, Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] for arranging this special order so that we may be able to comment on the status of Jerusalem.

Mr. Speaker, for over 3,000 years, Jerusalem has been the center of religious, historic, and political identification for Jews throughout the world. The people of Israel and both major Israeli parties are united in their conviction that Jerusalem is and will remain the undivided capital of the State of Israel, just as it has been for more than four decades.

Jerusalem is the heart and soul of the Jewish people. For thousands of years it has been the focus of Jewish national and religious yearning. Jews have always lived in Jerusalem, and since the 19th century, a plurality of its residents have been Jewish.

On December 5, 1949, David Ben Gurion, first Prime Minister of Israel, declared in the Knesset that:

" . . . Jewish Jerusalem is an organic and inseparable part of the State of Israel, as it is an inseparable part of the history of Israel, of the faith of Israel, and of the very soul of the Jewish people. Jerusalem is the heart of hearts of the State of Israel . . . "

Those words, so articulately spoken by Ben Gurion, loudly proclaimed to the entire world that Jerusalem is the only religious and national center that Jews have ever had. If all of this is so obvious, and so critically important to Israel and her citizens, I question why our administration has not been more sensitive to this issue?

It is inconceivable for any Israeli Government to agree to the redivision of Jerusalem under any circumstances. In 1967, a Labor government was responsible for reunifying the city and a labor controlled Knesset legislated Israeli jurisdiction over all parts of the city. This commitment was reaffirmed when the Knesset enacted the basic law on Jerusalem in July 1980, which

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declared that "Jerusalem, united in its entirety is the capital of Israel."

Since 1967, successive administrations have been sensitive to the special status of Jerusalem. It is significant to note that according to Arthur Goldberg, one of the drafters of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, commented on the omission of Jerusalem in that resolution, stating: "that resolution in no way refers to Jerusalem, and this omission is deliberate * * *. Jerusalem is a discrete matter, not linked to the West Bank."

The 1980 Republican Party platform called for Jerusalem to "remain an undivided city with continued free and unimposed access to all holy places by people of all faiths."

President Reagan on a number of occasions voiced support for keeping Jerusalem "undivided under Israeli rule."

I believe that President Bush is clearly committed to the important strategic relationship with our one stable, resolve any in the Middle East: the State of Israel. In fact, President Bush's 1988 Republican Party platform was the most pro-Israeli political document ever produced by a major American party.

Lately, however, something appears to have been lost in the translation and most recently there has been a plethora of mixed signals with respect to United States policy toward Israeli Jews living in east Jerusalem.

Earlier this month, President Bush stated "we do not believe that there should be new settlement in the West Bank or in east Jerusalem."

By departing from a longstanding United States policy regarding the special status of Jerusalem, President Bush has raised doubts about our Nation's credibility at an extremely sensitive time in the peace process.

Jerusalem's mayor, Teddy Koller, observed that the administration's recent statements "have harmed the peace process and have caused a furor throughout Israel" and I might add throughout the American Jewish community.

Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I call upon our President to review and clarify the official United States position with regard to Jerusalem and particularly with regard to the Jewish population in east Jerusalem, as a further demonstration of our commitment to and support for Israel.

Mayor Teddy Koller noted there have been no Jewish settlements in Jerusalem.

A.M. Rosenthal, in his comments in the NY Times on March 8, 1990 stated:

The very use of the word "settlement" to describe Jews moving into Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem is insulting. Should Israelis declare a Jewish quota for the eastern part of their capital?

Mr. President, you have been a staunch supporter of peace in the Middle East. Do not allow your recent east Jerusalem comments to undermine all of your good works.

□ 1900

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his very thoughtful and scholarly presentation on this issue.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. BERMAN].

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank both the gentlemen from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] for taking this special order.

If President Bush's comments were not so serious, if his misstatement of U.S. policy were not so severe, one could almost find a humorous aspect to what he has done. With the Israeli body politic, which is so divided and so split up and so fractious and tumultuous right now, he has managed to unify Israelis from the left to the right and from Labor to Likud with his very, very unfortunate comments.

The sad part of this and the thing that takes the humor away is the serious repercussions and implications which will come from all of this. The President has misstated U.S. policy toward Jerusalem. Jerusalem has always, under Republican administrations and Democratic administrations, been considered a separate issue from the question of the West Bank and Gaza. Jerusalem has been accorded a special status by the U.S. Government, at least until last week. The United States has always until last week been very careful to refrain from taking a position on the final status of Jerusalem. But always the U.S. position has been that Jerusalem is to be a unified entity.

The separation between 1967 and post-1967 was not to apply to Jerusalem. The green line did not run through the middle of Jerusalem.

The irony of the President's statements implying that Jews should be restricted from living in certain areas of the Holy City, in addition to being deeply offensive to Israelis of all political persuasions, Jews of every nationality, and many other Americans, is that Jerusalem is one city where the residents, be they Muslim, Christian, or Jew, Arab Israeli or Jewish Israeli, could live anywhere. No one has ever suggested restrictions on the ability of Arab Israelis who lived in what was known as East Jerusalem before 1967 to move anywhere within Jerusalem or anywhere within Israel as it existed before 1967. This has never been a question for Muslims or for Christians.

Now President Bush all of a sudden suggests and raises the question that it should be an issue of where Jews can live in Jerusalem. Each year at Passover, Jews worldwide pray, and they pray next year in Jerusalem, remembering that particularly in recent years Soviet Jews were unable to conduct services for themselves. For 2,000 years the return to the Holy City has been the highest spiritual aspiration for Jews.

That is why the President's statements are especially distressing to

Soviet Jews. Having finally escaped decades of persecution in the Soviet Union, they discover now that our Government is seeking to discriminate against them on the basis of religion. As we applaud the collapse of the Berlin Wall, it might be intolerable for us to support the erection of a similar divisive edifice in Jerusalem.

I have been one who has been supportive of the administration's efforts in pursuing the peace process in the Middle East. The administration has played a very useful role in trying to implement the Shamir peace initiative, and in doing so, I think, has given hope to all of us that we may bring this spiraling escalation of hatred to an end, turn this around, and move forward in the peace process. But when they raise the kind of issue like the final status of Jerusalem in such a fashion as President Bush just did, it is the kind of ill-considered, hasty action that brings negotiations of such sensitivity to a standstill.

There are three theories for what the President has done. One is that it was a misstatement. If it was a misstatement, he had ample opportunity to correct it, but he chose instead to reiterate it. Another suggestion has been that he is trying to make a purposeful change in our position with respect to Jerusalem. If that is his intent, he should put it forth as such, defend it as such, and explain why what he is doing serves our national interest.

Finally, it is the view of some that this is the result of pique or irritation at some Israeli action in the peace process. That is not an appropriate response for the President of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, moving the peace process backward by this kind of comment is a very terrible responsibility for the administration to bear, and I hope they do everything they can as soon as they can to rectify the situation.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. BERMAN] for his remarks and for joining us this afternoon.

Mr. Speaker, I yield now to the gentleman from New York [Mr. PAXON].

Mr. PAXON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I would like to thank and commend my colleagues, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] who have taken the time this evening to ask us to come over and talk about an issue of very great importance and personal interest to me.

Last August I had the opportunity to visit Israel for the first time. While I was there, I spent several days touring the ancient city of Jerusalem, the center of Jewish history. Although the short time I was there was not nearly enough to fully experience life in Jerusalem, I was able to speak to many people, not just leaders of the government but ordinary citizens as well.

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I was told by these men and women of the days when Jerusalem was a divided city, when the city, held sacred by not only Jews but by Christians and Muslims as well, was divided by walls and barbed wire, machine guns, and mines. My friends in Israel, those old enough to remember, told me of the pain they felt knowing that they could not go to East Jerusalem to visit the many places holy to them and to their religion.

After the Jewish sector of the partitioned city came under attack in the Six Days War in 1967, the Israelis were able to reestablish control and order in all parts of that Holy City.

□ 1910

Mr. Speaker, when the Israelis reunited all parts of Jerusalem, they undertook measures to guarantee that in the future all holy places would be protected from desecration and that access to them would be free to all members of all faiths, and, my colleagues, that has been the case ever since, regardless of religious background.

On that afternoon of the reunification of Jerusalem in 1967, standing at the Western Wall, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said, "We have returned to our holiest places. We have returned, never to be parted again."

Mr. Speaker, when I was in Jerusalem, I went and prayed at that Western Wall myself. I joined with others in our group and from all over the world at that wall to pray that Jerusalem never again would be divided. I prayed for a just and lasting peace in Israel and the Middle East.

However, my colleagues, now I fear that these prayers and these concerns of myself and so many others might go unanswered. The United States policy toward the division of the city of Jerusalem and Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem as expressed in recent days by our administration is at very best unclear. We must explore every opportunity for achieving peace, and we must demonstrate our unwavering commitment to Israel with a unified Jerusalem as its capital.

I have been a strong supporter for the State of Israel for a very long time, for Israel is our only real democracy and our only real ally in the turbulent Middle East. But I have also been among the strongest supporters and friends of the Bush administration in this House. As a result, I today urge my friends in the administration to carefully reflect on the issue of Jerusalem and then join with us in standing up for a united, free, and strong Jerusalem and Israel.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. MANTON].

Mr. MANTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleagues Mr. FEIGHAN and Mr. BURTON for reserving this time to discuss President Bush's policy toward Jerusalem.

Mr. Speaker, I am here to voice my deep concern about President Bush's recent statement that the administration is opposed to new Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. The President's remarks are troubling to me and to friends of Israel everywhere because they signal a complete shift in United States policy toward Israel. No other United States president has ever challenged the rights of Jews to live in Jerusalem, the ancient capitol of Israel. The President's statement also represents a complete reversal of his own previously stated policy on this issue.

One reason I am concerned about the President's remarks is that they seem to represent a lack of understanding of Israel's history. I am troubled that the President linked the very different issues of the West Bank and Jerusalem. It is inappropriate to refer to the Israeli community in Jerusalem as a settlement because Jerusalem is part of Israel, and has been since 1967.

During his news conference yesterday, President Bush said he did not regret his remarks about Jerusalem. He added that the political situation in Israel was so sensitive and emotional he would not talk about it further. I think we need to urge the President to change his mind. These statements need to be talked about. We need to know what other departures from longstanding U.S. policy the President has in mind with regard to the Middle East.

Although the President's policy toward Jerusalem remains ill defined, the effect of his statements is painfully clear. In a single remark, the President has done a great deal to undermine confidence in his administration's intentions regarding the Middle East peace process and in political stability in Israel.

Mr. Speaker, the outlook for peace in the Middle East looked bright 2 weeks ago. Both the Likud and Labor Parties seemed poised to agree to begin peace talks with Palestinian representatives in Cairo. Unfortunately, things have changed a great deal in 2 weeks. Today, Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir fired his Vice Premier, Labor Party Leader Shimon Peres, thereby signaling the end of Israel's coalition government. Regrettably, President Bush's introduction of the Jerusalem issue into the peace talks debate precipitated this breakdown.

When asked a question about the Soviet Union at yesterday's news conference, the President said that he stayed out of the internal affairs and deliberations of the Soviet Union. Yet the administration has shown no such constraint in making pronouncements about Jewish neighborhoods in the Israeli city of Jerusalem. I only wish the President felt that his administration owed Israel the same courtesy he feels is due the Soviet Union.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. ROS-LEHTINEN].

Mr. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] for yielding, and I would like to commend my colleagues, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] for having the energy, and the foresight and everything, the dedication of putting this special order together, and it is a real privilege and an honor for me to be able to participate tonight in this very important discussion.

Mr. Speaker, today we are at a point where one could envision peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict as a result of this new world.

Congress continues to debate many issues of concern to Israel. Policy regarding Soviet refugees, terrorism, foreign aid, and the Middle East peace process justifiably demand our complete attention.

There is, however, a more pressing issue on our collective agenda, an imperative concern to the ongoing search for a lasting peace—it is Israel's capital, Jerusalem.

Jerusalem is the embodiment of Jewish history, the heart and soul of the Jewish people. For 3,000 years, Jerusalem has been the focus of their national and religious yearning. It is a city in which Jews have always lived. However, it is a city that Israel has granted freedom of access to all.

Jerusalem is worshiped as a holy city; a well of spiritual opportunity for Jews, Christians, Moslems, and other religious groups. The Israeli Government guarantees each religion the authority to oversee their own holy places. The history, culture, and tradition of this land are unparalleled and give one an understanding of why so much of man's past and present existence has been focused in this part of the world. Israel recognizes Jerusalem's special significance and has made great efforts to preserve this multiple identity. One can therefore not help but have an intense love for this land and her people.

In the year 1000 BCE [before the common era] King David established Jerusalem as the capital city of the Jewish state, serving as the symbol and most profound expression of the Jewish people's identity as a nation. The return to Israel has continued throughout the centuries, and 78 years of nation-building, beginning in 1870 culminated with the reestablishment of a Jewish state.

History has demonstrated the need to ensure Jewish security through a national homeland with a national capital—Jerusalem.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield now to our very distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the initiative of the gentleman

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from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] in taking out this special order. It is very important because our purpose here is not simply to reaffirm what I believe is the policy overwhelmingly supported by the Congress of the United States; that is, the recognition that Jerusalem united is the capital of Israel.

Actually, Mr. Speaker, I was somewhat puzzled when the President said at one point that he agreed that the Jewish people should be united, but they apparently only were not sure that it should be part of Israel. I do not know whether the implication is that Jerusalem is supposed to move entirely someplace else. I think that illustrates the lack of thought that went into the President's position.

So, Mr. Speaker, we are here to reaffirm our commitment to the legitimacy, indeed the essentiality, of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. We are here to once again praise Israel because only under Israeli rule have all of the holy places been fully opened to all. Prior to Israel taking over, in all of Jerusalem Jews were denied access. The Jewish people running Jerusalem have not denied access to anyone, as they should not have.

□ 1920

But it was a particular disaster for the President to have gratuitously injected the sensitive issue of Jerusalem into the political arena at this point.

American policy for some time has been trying to advance the peace process in the Middle East, and I have agreed with some aspects of that policy. I was one who believed that it was in the interests of peace and justice when Prime Minister Shamir came forward with an electoral proposal, which was quite a good proposal. I was sorry that it seemed to be bogging down. I was hoping that we could get an agreement with Israel and Egypt and the United States so that the talks could begin leading to an election so that there could be an elected autonomous body in the elected territories to see whether out of that could evolve a true peace. At that point, when this government was asking elected democratic leaders in Israel to take political risks and to take risks to some extent with the security of their state, for the President to have called into question Israel's right to Jerusalem was the biggest diplomatic gaff I can remember having been made since I have come to Congress.

What the President did was not simply to call into question something that should not be questioned, but he did it at a time when it was guaranteed to retard the very peace process that he was apparently trying to help, because what has he done? He has given those in Israel who are resistant to any degree of compromise the argument that if you give in to the Americans, you are going to be calling Jerusalem into question. I do not think that is accurate.

I think it is very important that we here show overwhelmingly that the United States Congress does not agree with that, that we are not asking Israel in any way, shape or form, to sacrifice their control over their sovereignty over all of Jerusalem; but the President of the United States has given some credibility to those who would argue that putting the peace process forward would somehow call Jerusalem into question. The President's objection to Jerusalem at this point undoubtedly contributed to the political crisis in Israel, and it is not just a political crisis, it is a political crisis which may lead to an election in which some will be portraying an American initiative as one which calls Jerusalem into question as the capital of Israel. It cannot be the interests of anyone who wants peace in the Middle East. It cannot be in our interests, so what the President said was not simply wrong, factually wrong, politically wrong and morally wrong in doubting Israel's right to have a united Jerusalem as its capital. It was as I guess Tallyrand said, even worse than a crime. It was a stupidity. It was an error of a very grave sort, compounded the other day when the President was asked if he wanted to take it back, he said, "I don't want to take it back because it is too sensitive to discuss it. It is too delicate."

Mr. President, if it was so sensitive and so delicate, why did you bring it up in the first place?

He was the one who injected this bomb into the process. Then he pleads the delicacy of the subject as a reason not to clarify what he said.

The President has got to understand, it is not simply that we believe as a matter of right that Israel can have Jerusalem as its capital. If the President continues to allow there to be doubts about America's recognition of Israel's right to a unified Jerusalem, he will be putting a serious obstacle in the way of the peace process that he says he wants.

The President at this point, as I say, has created an enormously difficult diplomatic situation. We are trying to minimize the damage. Only he can totally undo it, and I hope that he will, and I thank the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to our colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHEUER] whose recent visit to Israel and the region I think underscores his experience and perspective on this issue and the whole range of issues regarding the peace process.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio for yielding to me. I thank the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] for having had the leadership and thoughtfulness and sensitivity to arrange for this important special order, and I would like to thank the broad range of our colleagues who have spoken before me. They really said it

all. There is really not very much for me to say. I have enjoyed their remarks.

Mr. Speaker, I was asked this afternoon in various conversations with the press, did President Bush mean to upset the peace process? Did he mean to sabotage the negotiations? Did he mean to cut Prime Minister Shamir down to size with this monkey wrench or this bomb that he threw into the negotiations. Of course not. Nobody thinks that. Nobody questions President Bush's essential decency, his essential honor, his bona fides; but this was an awful gaff. This was an awful boomer.

To link Jerusalem with settlements is a non-starter in the first place. I just got back from Jerusalem 16 days ago. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] was there on a mission. We meet there. Anybody who has ever been in East Jerusalem would be appalled by the application of the word settlements to East Jerusalem.

Mr. Speaker, East Jerusalem is a very densely occupied urban place. Settlements are placed on rocky mountainsides. Settlements are placed in empty fields. Settlements are not placed in densely occupied urban areas, and this is an urban area that has been densely occupied by Jews and Arabs, living together amicably for most of the last 3,000 years.

There is a difference, though. Jews look upon Jerusalem and always have as the centrality of their ethos, of their morality, of their religion, of their body and soul. A united Jerusalem is totally central to the Israeli persona, both as individuals and the persona of the Israeli state. It has been the capital of Israel for the last 42 years, and for several thousand years Jews have been saying every year on the occasion of Passover, "L'Chaim." "Good health next year in Jerusalem."

And we say, "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand lose its cunning." And we have been saying that for 3,000 years.

It is totally central to the Jewish being.

Now, I guess Jerusalem is of significance to Arabs, to the Arab culture. It is never mentioned in the Koran, not once, while Jerusalem is mentioned in the Bible, in the Torah 700 times. There has never been an Arab state of which Jerusalem was its capital, and indeed over the years Mecca and Medina have been the two central cities that are most holy to the Arabs, with Jerusalem coming a poor third. Not so with the Jews. Jerusalem was the one and only holy place, the one and only capital, the one and only center of the heart and the mind of the Jewish people, extending back 3,000 years.

Now, I do not think President Bush, I do not believe President Bush meant to disrupt the peace process, but it was his thoughtless act—I credit him with bona fides, but this was a thoughtless,

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ill-considered act, and it was mischievous. It was destructive. It spread confusion and doubt and chagrin and dismay throughout the Middle East. It was very painful for the Jewish community and it was very confusing for the Arab community, because the Arabs are going through a very traumatic situation now. Their friends and mentors and suppliers and financiers of 40-odd years are disappearing into the morning mist. Russia, the East European states, the central European states, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, who have supplied arms to the Arabs, who have provided intelligence for the Arabs, who are giving training, have been giving training for the Arabs, they have totally departed the Arab camp.

□ 1930

Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, all in the last few weeks, have recognized the State of Israel. Incidentally, so have eight African states.

No longer can Syria look to Russia for the state-of-the-art armaments of all kinds, no longer can the PLO look to Russia and the Eastern European countries for assistance, financial underpinning, advice, counsel, training in terrorism and so forth. That is all a thing of the past.

It has been a very difficult period for the Arabs. The Arabs are reaching for straws, understandably. It is a painful period for them. So when the President threw this little bomb into the negotiation process and talked about no settlement in Jerusalem, the Arabs understandably grasped at that straw, understandably they felt that America was sending very mixed and confused signals about America's support for Israel and America's support for Jerusalem as the centrality of the Jewish existence. So it is going to take some time for a new equilibrium to be achieved.

Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that in the fullness of time this little contretemps, this little confusion will be viewed as a blip on the radar screen, but not it is not.

The very reasons that President Bush used not to apologize or the reason that he used as not having regrets over this was because it was a sensitive and an emotional subject. My colleagues, this is precisely and exactly the reason why President Bush never should have made the comment in the first place, why it was so wholly ill-advised. It was blurted out. I am sure that the President would not make that statement again, nor would the Secretary of State.

We will get negotiations back on an even keel when a new government in Israel is established. We all hope and pray that they will be open-minded, open-hearted, and magnanimous in dealing with their Arab brothers. They are all Semites under the skin. They are a bunch of scorpions in a bottle; they must learn how to live to-

gether, and we all pray that that process will be sooner rather than later.

Surely this ill-considered episode did not add anything to the process.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, in view of the short length of time remaining, I am going to ask the subsequent speakers if they could confine their remarks within a 2-minute timeframe.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER).

Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER. Mr. Speaker, on March 3, President Bush stated his opposition to new settlements "in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem." The administration has confirmed that the President's remarks were intended to make it clear to the people of Israel that administration policy still viewed East Jerusalem as occupied territory.

I want to take this opportunity to clearly state my disagreement with the President's statement. I think that it is unfortunate that the President has forsaken his strategy of sitting on the sidelines of world events just in time to disrupt the prospects for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In the past, the United States has stated that it supports a united Jerusalem whose final status would be determined by negotiations. The status of Jerusalem, the capital of the State of Israel, has always been considered a separate issue from the treatment of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—territory which came under the control of Israel after the Six-Day War in 1967.

The separation of Jerusalem into east and west portions was the result of the battle lines existing at the end of Israel's war for independence in 1949. Prior to this, the United Nations partition plan, accepted by the Zionists and rejected by the surrounding Arab States, had called for Jerusalem to become an international city under U.N. control. Instead, the Arab countries attacked the newborn State of Israel and at the end of the fighting, the Kingdom of Jordan controlled a portion of the city of Jerusalem.

Over the next 18 years, the city of Jerusalem grew up around the battle lines. New communities grew up on all sides of Jerusalem to house the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees and immigrants who came from all over the world. In 1967, after a number of belligerent acts by President Nasser of Egypt, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack against Egypt. Armies from Jordan and Syria joined Egypt in the fight against Israel. In the ensuing battles, Jordan lost control of its portion of Jerusalem.

The Six-Day War allowed the reunification of the city of Jerusalem. Since that time, the city has continued its growth in all directions. Today, it is impossible to clearly delineate what is east or west Jerusalem. It has grown

as a single city. It should not be considered as a part of the West Bank.

When I visited Israel in 1988, I had the opportunity to talk with an American citizen who was living in Jerusalem. This person had recently tried to register his newborn son as an American citizen at the United States consulate in Jerusalem. At the consulate, when filling out the appropriate forms, this person came to the question, "place of birth." He filled in the answer "Jerusalem, Israel." A consular official told him that that was not an acceptable answer—essentially, the consulate officials said there was no such place. This must have come as a great shock to this individual and to his friends who have been successfully sending letters to this address that the United States was claiming did not exist.

United States refusal to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel denies the reality of the situation and continues debate on an issue that never should have begun in the first place. President Bush, in equating Jerusalem with the West Bank and Gaza Strip has only served to break up the government of national unity which had been working toward negotiations with West Bank and Gaza Palestinians and strengthened the hand of groups such as the PLO which have no interest in a resolution of this conflict.

Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. This fact should be recognized by the administration. It is an odd fact that Israel, one of our most loyal international allies, is the only country in which the United States purposely does not locate its Embassy in that nation's capital. I think it is time to change that.

I hope that President Bush will reconsider his position and clearly state United States support for a unified Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. SCHUMER).

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank very much the gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from Indiana for taking out this special order and their leadership.

Much of what has to be said has already been said. This was a cosmic blunder. This united the American community and the community in Israel behind a very justifiable and worthy goal that I believe just about all Americans would support, and that is that Jerusalem be united, Jerusalem be Israel.

Many of us cannot forget the time between 1947 and 1967, or 1948 and 1967, when the Jordan Arab League pushed the Jews out of East Jerusalem. Was there an open city as there is today where Arabs and Christians and others can come and worship and even run their own shrines? No way. No Jew was allowed. Jews could not visit the Walling Wall, Jews could not visit the old temple, Jews could not visit

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vital parts of their history, and in fact in 1967 when the areas were finally liberated, what was found was that many of these holy places had been desecrated.

Jews and many others throughout the world said after discovery of this desecration, "Never again." We say to the President, "Perhaps you did not know the chord you were striking. Perhaps you did not understand how the centrality of Jerusalem is to Jews throughout the world as well as in Israel. Perhaps it was, indeed, a slip of the tongue. Unfortunately, the damage has been done. The clocks cannot be turned back. The peace process has been at the very least temporarily derailed and, Mr. President, the only thing that I can think of that you can do to change, to undo, this slip of the tongue that had such terrible consequences is once and for all do what the Republican platform says ought to be done, and that is that there ought to be one city, a unified city of Jerusalem under Israeli control with international guarantees of the holy places so that all religions can be there."

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Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for his participation this afternoon.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to recognize the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. DYSON].

(Mr. DYSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to join my colleagues in voicing our concern over alarming deficiencies in the Bush administration's position on Jerusalem. I wish to thank my distinguished colleagues from Ohio and Indiana for arranging time today for this purpose.

All of us are by now aware of the dismal chain of events which began on Saturday, March 3. Breaking with the policy of his predecessors, President Bush included East Jerusalem as an area in which he opposed "new settlements" of Jews.

In the days preceding that unfortunate remark, the prospects for peace in the Middle East looked brighter than they had for some time. The resignation of hard-line Cabinet Minister Ariel Sharon gave the Israeli Government room to maneuver. Prime Minister Shamir seemed ready to lead the moderates in his Likud Party to join with their coalition partners from the Labor Party and launch a viable peace process.

With his ill-considered remarks, President Bush destroyed this promising opportunity and seriously jeopardized the chances for a U.S. brokered solution in the region. Today, the Israeli Government stands on the verge of collapse.

What troubles me the most about the President's statement is his apparent failure to recognize its conse-

quences. President Bush denies having misspoken and has stood by his remarks. At the same time, his administration refuses to acknowledge the drastic shift in U.S. policy which they portend.

Ten years ago, when the Carter administration voted for a U.N. resolution opposing all settlements "including Jerusalem," they were severely criticized by a Vice Presidential candidate by the name of George Bush. President Carter had the courage to repudiate this vote, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance publicly apologized for "the breakdown in communications" which led to this lapse in judgment. I ask today how President Bush can justify a refusal to do the same.

Recent events only underline the need for a fundamental reassessment of U.S. policy toward Jerusalem. How much longer will we ignore the reality that Jerusalem, as the spiritual capital of the Jewish people, is and must remain an integral part of the sovereign State of Israel? The sooner the United States recognizes this reality by moving its embassy from Tel Aviv and ending the futile and counterproductive debate over the status of Jerusalem, the sooner we can address the real issues which span the Arab-Israeli divide.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. ENGEL].

(Mr. ENGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my strongest opposition to the stance Mr. Bush and the administration has taken on the issue of Jerusalem. Jerusalem is the heart and soul of Israel and, as previous administrations have maintained, should under no circumstances be divided. Mr. Bush's recent statements have cast serious doubt on this longstanding American policy and have come at a very delicate time in the peace process. At this juncture the Israeli Government needs assurances of solid and unambiguous American support, not unnecessary and destructive equivocations about the status of Israel's capital city.

Mr. Bush's statements have also cast doubt on the administration's commitment to freeing Jews still trapped in the Soviet Union. The Israeli Government has provided assurances that no American funds will be used for the settlement of Soviet Jews in the territories and that American funds will not be used to expand shekel-funded programs either. There is no reason to link further United States funding to Israeli settlement policies. With rising anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, the administration must do all it can to expedite resettling of these Jewish refugees and not hinder this effort.

The PLO is delighted at the current turn of events. Instead of the United States clearly supporting our ally

Israel, the PLO sees the administration applying heavy handed pressure. This is a time for solidarity with Israel, not a time for pandering to the interests of a terrorist organization that has for years and years committed itself to the complete annihilation of the State of Israel. The Israelis know best what is necessary for the security of their homeland and should not be coerced into accepting unreasonable negotiating positions by irresponsible American rhetoric.

Mr. Speaker I urge the President and my congressional colleagues to support Israel during this critical time as it moves toward the peace process. Further statements of the President or the administration to pull the rug out from under the Israelis regarding Jerusalem, will only make it more difficult for the Israelis to negotiate and take real risks for peace. The future of Israel cannot be jeopardized by a thoughtless and inconsistent shift in American foreign policy.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TAUBIN). The Chair is obligated to caution all Members that under the rules it is impermissible to direct comments directly to the President of the United States. All comments must be directed to the Chair.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. DOUGLAS].

(Mr. DOUGLAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to make clear tonight this is a bipartisan concern and that we clarify American policy with regard to the citizens of Jerusalem.

In 1947 it was the Arabs who rejected a plan to internationalize that city. A year later when Israel became independent, Jordan moved in troops and occupied what is known today as East Jerusalem. For 20 years thereafter, Jews were not free to travel to East Jerusalem.

In 1967 that ended when the war occurred after Jordan invaded Israel and Israeli forces drove out the Jordanians. Ever since that time Israel has granted to all religions equal access to their holy shrines in Jerusalem.

A year ago this month I had the privilege of being in Israel and going to Jerusalem. The only thing I can describe is a city not unlike Washington, DC, a city of industry, of hotels, of residences, an urban area where you cannot tell the difference between East or West Jerusalem any more than you can tell the difference between northeast and southeast Washington, DC.

East Jerusalem is not Arab. It is part of the united capital of Israel and is home to an equal number of both Jews and Arabs, and the Jews and Arabs are equal citizens in that city.

Our own government has always made a distinction between Jerusalem and the territories. For instance,

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West Bank policy is governed by United Nations Resolution 242 and Camp David, both of which envision some kind of Israeli withdrawal in exchange for peace and security down the road. But we have indicated over and over again that while there may be play in the joints and negotiation in what is called the West Bank, and I happen to disagree with that policy, but assuming there is some play in the joints there, it is very clear: Jerusalem is one city. It is Israel's capital.

Therefore, Jews who go to Jerusalem are not engaged in settlements, they are engaged in moving into neighborhoods. I think that is what we have to clarify. That is what I urge, that it be clarified as soon as possible. Anyone who has been to Jerusalem clearly knows that it is one city, indivisible, and Jews and Arabs equally should be free to move and live in that city, which is the capital of the nation of Israel.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. MACHTLEY].

(Mr. MACHTLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MACHTLEY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentlemen from Ohio and Indiana for bringing this important issue to our attention and giving Members the opportunity to address and focus on Jerusalem.

There are those who might use their time to dilute the importance of Jerusalem, to criticize or to discuss this on a partisan basis. But let it be clear that there is bipartisan support for not only the greater security of Israel, but for a united Jerusalem.

It is in that vein that I wish to use my time to persuasively and passionately argue that, first, we should have a renewed commitment for the greater security of Israel, and second, that we must recognize that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and that the Jewish people have inextricably committed themselves to that issue.

From King David, Jerusalem has in fact been the symbol of the Jewish people. It has been the profound expression of the essence of the Jewish people. It has been their identity.

During the time from King David there have been many foreign rulers who have ruled this city, but only the Israelis, the Jewish people have made Jerusalem their capital.

In August I visited Jerusalem, and in the early morning I ran through its streets, streets that knew no division, streets that were in a united city, streets that were filled with the history of the Jewish people. As my heart pounded running through the streets, I came to the conclusion that I no more could run through the streets without a heart than Israel could exist without its capital. In fact, Jerusalem is more than just a thriving city. Jerusalem is more than just the capital of Israel. Jerusalem is Israel, and let us

pledge that Jerusalem, as a united city shall remain the capital of Israel.

Mr. FEIC HAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. PALLONE].

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, last December, I made my first visit to Israel, which included several days in Jerusalem. Through my entire stay in Israel, I was struck repeatedly by how little room the Israelis have to maneuver in terms of their own security. This was made especially clear to me during my stay in Jerusalem, a densely populated area lacking any surrounding buffer zone to protect its inhabitants from hostile or unstable neighbors. If, as the President seemed to suggest, we were to begin negotiating away Israeli sovereignty and jurisdiction of any portion of the Jerusalem area, we would be guilty of bringing an extremely dangerous and rampant form of instability to this historic and glorious city.

The current status of Jerusalem has benefited its Arab inhabitants, as well as Jewish residents of the city. A unified Jerusalem allows for a more normal flow of commerce and people that has benefited all Jerusalemites. Under Israeli administration, religion shrines of all faiths have been protected and maintained, and access has been granted to all—which is much more than can be said of the years of Jordanian control, when Jews were prevented from going to the Western Wall, the holiest site in Judaism.

Last year, we all rejoiced when the wall separating East and West Berlin came down. We should not be in the position of rebuilding the wall that separated East and West Jerusalem during those dangerous years when a highly militarized "green line" cut through the heart of ancient neighborhoods. Furthermore, the administration should not be reversing years of American diplomatic practice, which has recognized East Jerusalem as distinct from the West Bank and Gaza. Israel continues to be one of our staunchest and most reliable allies. We owe it to the Israelis to speak up for their security concerns. And we owe it to them not to abruptly surprise them with sudden and unwise policy shifts.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mrs. LOWEY].

(Mrs. LOWEY of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. LOWEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise to join in this very important discussion of the Middle East peace process and the status of the city of Jerusalem.

It is the responsibility of the United States to do what we can to help achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East that preserves the security of our close friend and ally, Israel.

However, the statements and actions of the Bush administration in recent days have harmed, not helped, the peace process.

In the midst of delicate negotiations designed to get the peace process moving in the Middle East, the Bush administration made ill-timed, counterproductive statements about the status of the city of Jerusalem. Not only did these statements derail the peace process, but they also represented a dramatic departure from previous U.S. policy on this question. They have raised serious questions about the Bush administration's commitment to provide strong support for our closest ally in that region of the world.

Previous U.S. administrations have always considered Jerusalem's status a subject that will be raised after most other outstanding issues have been resolved. By raising this delicate issue before negotiations have even started, the Bush administration unnecessarily complicated the peace talks. The result has been the collapse of the Israeli coalition government, which will substantially delay any actual peace negotiations.

In addition, these statements—which President Bush has confirmed are an accurate portrayal of his administration's position—represent a dramatic departure from previous United States policy on the status of Jerusalem. No administration has ever questioned the right of Jews to live in Jerusalem, and no administration has ever equated the status of Jerusalem with the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In fact, every U.S. administration has repeatedly insisted that Jerusalem must remain united under any final peace agreement.

The Bush administration's position in this regard is unfortunate and ill-advised. Jerusalem is the holiest site and the spiritual capital of the Jewish people, and the right of Jews to live anywhere in Jerusalem should not be questioned by the United States.

That notwithstanding, this issue should not even be on the bargaining table. Nor should the Bush administration ever have suggested that the political capital of the State of Israel is simply another piece of territory to be bargained once such negotiations begin.

Rather, the United States should focus on the more immediate steps that can be taken to achieve real progress toward peace in the Middle East. And we should express our strong support for a united Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel.

Mr. Speaker, I regret that the Bush administration has taken this counterproductive stance toward the Middle East peace process. Those of us who are strong supporters of a secure Israel believe deeply that this path will not contribute to a solution of the Middle East conflict. Rather, I urge the administration in the strongest possible terms to reverse its position, express strong support for a united Jerusalem, and get on with the task of reinvigorating the Middle East peace process.

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Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of bringing this special order to a conclusion, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY].

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio and congratulate and compliment the gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] for making it possible for all of us to express our views on this very important issue. It has been restated here many times this evening that President Bush's statement, "We do not believe that there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem," is a mistake, plain and simple.

By raising questions about Israel's claim to East Jerusalem at this very sensitive point in the negotiations, the President may have helped torpedo early prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian meeting on elections for the West Bank and Gaza.

Such an outcome would be a tragedy. The administration has worked very hard over the last year to help move the Middle East peace process forward. All of us applaud Secretary of State James Baker's efforts to bring the Israelis, Egyptians, and Palestinians together to devise an elections plan that can produce a Palestinian leadership able to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict. Unfortunately, the President's statement on Jerusalem has served to undercut all of these efforts by raising sensitivities over one of the most difficult and sensitive issues to be resolved in future negotiations.

While United States policy has not officially recognized Israeli control over East Jerusalem, no other President has ever before challenged the right of Jews to live in the historic capital of Israel. Since the late 1980's, successive American Presidents have been sensitive to the special status of the city. It is for this reason that the United States has long emphasized that it favored an undivided Jerusalem, whose final status would be decided through negotiations. Jerusalem is not the same as the West Bank and Gaza, and a United States policy which equates Jewish settlements in the territories and Jewish housing in East Jerusalem is wrong-headed.

Mr. Speaker, in the last few months the world has watched in wonder as the wall which divided Berlin was finally torn down—signaling the end of the cold war and the division of Europe. The last thing we should be doing is raising fears about new walls and dividing other cities.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that a terrible mistake has been made, and the administration should reverse its position so that it can be clear that the historic position our country has taken on Israel remains intact.

I again congratulate the gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, that concludes our special order. I want to thank the Speaker personally for his patience and generosity in presiding over this special order tonight, as well as the patience of our professional staff.

Mr. LEHMAN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I was very dismayed by the gratuitous comments that President Bush made about East Jerusalem recently. I was hoping they were made in error, especially since most of us who know the history of East Jerusalem know that there are no settlements there. The unfortunate impression that is left by those untimely remarks is that United States policy is against Jews living in East Jerusalem.

I have never before heard a President suggest that Jews were not welcome in all parts of Jerusalem. In fact, the freedom of Jews to live anywhere in Jerusalem had not been an issue until Jordan annexed East Jerusalem in 1950. Until then, and prior to the creation of modern Israel, Palestinian Jews lived alongside Moslems and Christians in the eastern part of Jerusalem. During the war of 1948, many of these Palestinian Jews fled to the western part, leaving property they had owned for generations. It was only when East Jerusalem was liberated in a defensive war in 1967 that the former Jewish residents of the eastern part of the city could return to their homes.

East Jerusalem is an intrinsic part of Jerusalem and as Israel's first prime minister David Ben-Gurion said, an "inseparable part of Israel." After 19 years of annexation by Jordan, during which time the Jewish quarter of the Old City was destroyed, the sacred burial place, the Mount of Olives, was desecrated, and holy sites were inaccessible to Jews, Christians, and even Moslems. It was the Israeli Government that passed a resolution protecting all holy places. The right of all religions to worship at their respective holy sites was reinstated and is honored to this day.

While United States policy has been unclear as to the final legal status of Jerusalem, leaving its resolution to further negotiation as stipulated in a side letter to the Camp David accords, our Government has distinguished between the sui generis issue of Jerusalem and the administered territories of the West Bank and Gaza.

The one issue on which the major Israeli political parties and world Jewry agree is a Jerusalem undivided. I urge the Bush administration to take note of this fact and to take an approach that will facilitate the commencement of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians instead of making it more difficult.

Mr. OWENS of Utah. Mr. Speaker, President Bush made a serious political blunder last week when he condemned Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. Inadvertently, it seems, he enunciated a change in United States policy and precipitated a major political crisis in Israel. The fall of the National Unity Government was inevitable, it seemed to me as 3 weeks ago when I last visited Jerusalem. The real crisis which threatens the peace process, however, was caused by the President's miscalculation of how a simple, unfortunate misstatement could precipitate a sea change in Israeli public opinion.

By calling into question the right of Jews to settle in a unified Jerusalem, the President an-

gered not only Israelis, but supporters of Israel in this country and around the world. Prior to the President's statement, Israel's friends were secure in the knowledge that American policy was unequivocal in its support for an undivided Jerusalem whose ultimate status would be determined by negotiation.

Jerusalem issues are unquestionably the most difficult to resolve and the most explosive in a possible Middle East peace settlement. They must be dealt with only after all others are resolved. Secretary of State Baker's five point plan was gaining momentum in Israel because Israelis felt that this process would not call Jerusalem's status into question. After all, Baker's plan is simply the implementation of the Shamir proposal of last April.

Much to the credit of this administration, support for Baker's five points has been steadily growing in Knesset, most notably among religious party members who were strongly aligned with Likud. The Shas party, for example, was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the stalled peace process, and was preparing to join a narrow labor coalition. The prospects for repairing the rift in the unity government or for labor gaining a necessary majority to form a coalition may have been fatally jeopardized by Bush's misjudgment. This, in turn, could prove to be a major setback for the peace process.

It must be hoped by all who support peace in the Middle East that the Shamir proposal can go forward. Ironically, it is labor and non-aligned Knesset members who are prepared to carry through with Shamir's suggestion. The double irony is that Baker's plan may have been sabotaged by his well-meaning President.

There is still time, however, to avoid a political catastrophe in Israel if the President will clarify that his statement was not intended to alter long-standing American policy on the issue of Jerusalem. Rather, he should reiterate that he strongly supports the traditional position that Jerusalem must never again be divided. Moreover, he should reaffirm that American policy does not oppose Jewish residences in East Jerusalem, nor does it oppose establishment of homes by Moslems or Christians, or for that matter, Hindus or Buddhists.

It is in no one's interest to deal with this matter in an ambiguous way. It does not even serve the Palestinians' cause, because it threatens the progress toward peace which Baker's activities have achieved. The traditional American policy has not obstructed the peace process, so it should not be interposed as a roadblock at this time.

Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, in the midst of a crisis within the Israeli coalition government, President Bush has further aggravated the peace process and shocked the American-Jewish community with his remarkable ignorance and insensitivity. The city of Jerusalem is the historical and cultural capital of Israel—and it remains its strength and spirit. For the survival of Israel, Jerusalem can never be divided. With a few manipulative words of warning on March 3, President Bush seriously damaged United States relations with Israel, perhaps beyond repair. Mr. Speaker, on this matter, the administration can not and will not be allowed to prevail. As Mayor Teddy Kollek noted, "on Jerusalem, we are united."

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Israel is the recognized Jewish state and Jerusalem is the capital. When Jews move to their own homeland, they are not settlers, they are not visitors, and they are not subject to the capricious whims of President Bush. The administration responded to the mass emigration of Soviet Jews to the United States by capping the number in absurd disproportion to the amount of Jews being permitted to leave the Soviet Union. President Bush wisely suggested Soviet Jews go to Israel instead. So they did. The Soviet Jews sought their motherland and she welcomed them with open arms. Now President Bush has the gall to declare East Jerusalem off limits to Soviet Jews.

The Israeli coalition government has disintegrated and President Bush provoked the collapse. The Bush administration has departed sharply from traditional United States policy on Jerusalem in an effort to dictate the rules and completely control the peace process. By deliberately overlooking the special status of Jerusalem and by coupling Jerusalem with the West Bank, President Bush has effectively denied the legitimacy of the Israeli capital and linked it to occupied territories. Jerusalem can not be a bargaining chip in the peace talks. Yet this administration seems intent on distinguishing between East and West Jerusalem and on dividing the very heart and soul of Israel.

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Speaker, I sincerely appreciate the opportunity afforded Members of the House today to discuss the issue of the status of Jerusalem in the Middle East peace process.

No discussion of Jerusalem can be divorced from the facts of history.

Israel liberated Jerusalem in 1967, in a war that was not Israel's choosing. In response to an attack that was not of Israel's making. The kingdom of Jordan was warned not to enter hostilities with Israel in those fateful days, but King Hussein could not resist, and the eastern part of the city fell to Israel.

Those developments meant the reunification of Jerusalem—the restoration of its normal status. It has been divided since Israel's war of independence some two decades previously. The division of Jerusalem, and the exercise of control by Jordan over the eastern part of the city, should hardly serve as a source of pride or inspiration to Jordanians or Palestinians. Jews were denied access to holy places to worship—denied the ability to visit and pray at sites whose meaning date to biblical times. Holy places were also systematically desecrated. The Jewish cemetery on Mount of Olives still bears the marks of the wholesale destruction of headstones by the Jordanian authorities. Some headstones were used to construct latrines. Slums were permitted to be built abutting the Western Wall of the Temple Mount—the holiest site in Judaism. An alley, with a sewer in its middle, was next to the wall. These were the conditions found by Israeli soldiers on the day of the liberation of Jerusalem in 1967.

Since that time, several important things have happened. First, Jerusalem is a completely open city. Anyone can live there—be they Israeli or Palestinian. Second, anyone can worship there—without any restrictions. Third, all holy sites are open and protected in their sanctity with the full force of law from desecration. Israel has created an environment of respect for the full exercise by peo-

ples of all faiths of their ability to worship in Jerusalem at the places they deem holy.

Jerusalem is the capital of Israel—as it has been since the day of independence in 1948.

Most importantly, Israel has determined, with unanimity, that Jerusalem shall not be divided again. The previous division of Jerusalem meant its spiritual and material dismemberment. That cannot and will not be repeated. The city is now an organic whole, rich with the diversity of ethnicity, religion, and heritage of peoples from throughout the world. Its municipal structure, under the leadership of Mayor Teddy Kollek, is truly remarkable. The administration of the city under Teddy Kollek is dedicated to preserving the rights of all who live in Jerusalem.

In recent days, a controversy has erupted, promoted by remarks by the President and the Secretary of State, over the future of Jerusalem and the issue of Israeli settlements and development in the city. These remarks were inappropriate and harmful to the peace at a most sensitive moment. The entire point of the efforts to breathe life into Israel's proposal for elections to establish a Palestinian delegation for dialogue with the Israeli Government was to make the process of peace work—not to immediately grapple with the hard issues involved. By placing Jerusalem front and center, however, not only has the administration exposed the rawest of Israeli nerves, but done so gratuitously.

Again, Jerusalem is one city, and Israelis can and will live throughout that city. If there is a question over Palestinian representation in the governance of the city, or access to holy sites, or some other matter involving fundamental civil liberties and respect for their protection, these matters should certainly be on the table for discussion at the appropriate time.

But no one, including the President, should make a mistake in assuming, for a moment, that it is illegitimate for Israelis to settle in Jerusalem or that there is something unsatisfactory in Israel's governance of Jerusalem.

A small miracle, the reunification of Jerusalem, has been forged by the goodwill of Israelis and Palestinians alike. It is something to cherish—not question. None should doubt the resolve of us in the Congress to do everything in our power to affirm that it is the unequivocal policy of the United States that Jerusalem is and should remain united as Israel's capital.

Mr. BUSTAMANTE. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague from Ohio, Mr. FEIGAN, for calling this special order on Jerusalem. I am disturbed by the recent White House statements about Jerusalem, Israel's undeniable and indivisible capital. Jerusalem is no more occupied territory than Texas is. I think our failure to recognize Israel's right to designate its own capital is a shame; our Embassy should be there too, not in Tel Aviv.

I have been to Jerusalem. I have seen the beautiful things Mayor Teddy Kollek has accomplished throughout the entire city for Jews and Arabs, Muslims and Christians. The Israelis have treated that city like the precious jewel that it is to us all—guaranteeing the right of free access to all holy places.

How could President Bush, then, imply that Jews should be prevented from living anywhere in their capital? That was exactly the situation for 19 years during Jordan's occupation, when King Hussein set out to systematically eliminate all traces the city's Jewish her-

itage. Jews of all nationalities and Israeli of all religions were barred from their holy sites. The vibrant, growing Jewish neighborhood built since the city was reunited in 1967—when Jordan and the Arab confrontation states failed in their second full-scale attempt to destroy Israel—are a living symbol of the commitment to protect against the severing of Jerusalem from the Jewish people ever again.

The timing could not have been worse. Ten days ago the administration was saying the national unity government was close to accepting the Baker formula for a tripartite meeting in Cairo; now the Israeli Government is falling apart over this issue. And, the President's remark about Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem was just one more in a series of confidence-eroding statements made by the Bush administration that indicate a dangerous inclination to lean on our ally, Israel, but stroke the PLO. Its time for confidence-building measures from this administration—like holding the PLO's feet to the fire on its commitment to end terrorism and insisting that the Arabs end their boycott of Israel now.

Finally, I am alarmed by the linkage between the question of settlements and the urgent imperative to get Soviet Jews out of Russia. Where do we come off toying with their lives while we tinker with relatively minor differences between Washington and the Government of Israel? The administration should be moving full speed ahead on the Housing Loan Guarantee Program.

Mr. JOHNSON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the complex political and emotional situation in the Middle East lends itself to many interpretations. And it is not uncommon or inappropriate for Israelis, Americans, and friends of Israel throughout the world to express differing opinions on the proper course for peace negotiations and strategic planning for Israel's future.

But there is one thing upon which virtually all Israelis and their allies agree: Jerusalem is the soul of Israel. Jerusalem is a symbol for Jews throughout the world, and a spiritual center for people of many faiths. As the celebration of Passover approaches, Jews throughout the world will reaffirm the importance of this holy city by proclaiming "next year in Jerusalem."

That is why President Bush miscalculated so drastically when he equated East Jerusalem with the West Bank and said that there should be no new settlements of Jews in either area. That is why the Government of Israel is racked with dissension. That is why Americans who support Israel are in a state of shock.

President Bush, we are all united in our desire to see a lasting peace achieved in this vital portion of the world. And we are disheartened that your words over the last few days may have dealt a severe blow to the painstaking efforts toward peace in the Middle East.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Speaker, Israel's coalition government broke up yesterday because of differences over how to proceed with a United States plan to open Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The major parties are divided over this broad issue, but they are united on the issue of the need for a united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Since 1967, the U.S. administration has acknowledged the special status of Jerusalem, and the fundamental need to preserve the

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status quo. The willingness to move toward talks with the Palestinians rests on that foundation. President Bush has introduced a new, destabilizing factor into the negotiations for peace in the Middle East. Whether the ruling Israeli Government is "Labor, Likud or National Unity," any agreement that leaves open the status of a united Jerusalem is a nonstarter.

I hope the President will reassess or clarify his remarks, and continue to foster a dialog that will achieve peace without undermining the status of Jerusalem. But I wonder, as did the mayor of Jerusalem, "Why did the White House have to bring it up?"

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to join with my colleagues in the House of Representatives in expressing my deep concern about President Bush's recent remarks in which he stated his opposition to new settlements on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem.

The city of Jerusalem is not just a territory, but the President's comments alluding to reservations on the right of Jews to enter and live in the holiest of cities is an affront to most Members of Congress. It signals an unwelcome and totally unacceptable change in U.S. policy. In the text of United Nations resolutions and even the Camp David accords, Israel and the United States have always made a careful distinction between the city of Jerusalem and the occupied territories on the West Bank and Gaza.

Our Government, and especially the State Department, has had a long history of nonrecognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel. Our United States Embassy is in Tel Aviv, and Israel is the only country where our Embassy is not located in the capital city. For years, along with many of the Members in Congress, I have urged the United States to recognize formally the city of Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel, and relocate our embassy in the capital city. Yet the State Department still has not acted, and the latest statement by the President appears to be a step backward complicating the already delicate peace process.

It was the Arab States in 1947 which rejected a plan that would have made Jerusalem an international city, and after Israeli independence, it was Jordan which forcibly occupied East Jerusalem, throwing Jews out of their homes, and prohibiting Jews from entering this area. As a divided city under Jordanian occupation, what followed was a despicable history of desecration and destruction of Christian and Jewish holy sites by the Moslems. It was not until the Arabs decided to attack Israel during the Six-Day War in 1967 that Israel was able to regain control of the eastern part of Jerusalem, and Jews were able to reoccupy and rebuild neighborhoods in the Jewish quarter and Mount Scopus where they previously had lived.

Under the control of the State of Israel, Jerusalem is a united city, and the Israeli Government has shown the ultimate in respect for all holy sites. Jerusalem is truly an international city with Christian, Moslems and Jewish denominations having absolute control and authority over their own respective sites.

Mr. Speaker, the eastern portion of the city of Jerusalem is not an occupied territory, and cannot be linked and grouped with the West Bank and Gaza in any discussions or peace negotiations. By linking East Jerusalem to occupied territories the President has not only

departed from a longstanding United States policy, but also has impeded the already slow moving peace process.

I join with my colleagues in the House of Representatives in urging the President to clearly and unambiguously retract his statements, which ignore the history of Arab occupation and desecration of the city of Jerusalem, and are counterproductive to the peace process.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. Speaker, I am dismayed by the recent statements of President Bush regarding East Jerusalem. On March 3, the President stated, "We do not believe that there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem." Then yesterday, the President declared that he did not regret expressing this sentiment and questioning the right of Jews to settle in East Jerusalem. I am very concerned about the intent of the administration on this issue. First, I do not believe that settlement in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem is equivalent, and the two should not be linked. Second, I am very concerned about the impact of these ill-thought statements on the Government and the people of Israel as well as the negative impact on the Middle East peace process.

The view expressed by President Bush is a departure from traditional United States policy, which has always made a distinction between Jerusalem and the territories. Every administration since 1967 has been sensitive to the special status of Jerusalem and the need to address this issue with great thought and sensitivity as well as innovative proposals. Policy that may apply to the territories does not necessarily correlate to the policies we need to advocate for East Jerusalem. To make such a parallel is misguided and simplistic at best. West Bank policy is governed by U.N. Resolution 242 and Camp David, both of which envision at least partial Israeli withdrawal in exchange for full peace and security. At the same time United States officials have indicated, over and over again, that Jerusalem cannot be returned to the pre-1967 status quo, that it must remain united.

Likewise, United States efforts to initiate Israeli-Palestinian dialog, which is always an extremely sensitive issue, have been hampered by the President's statements. I am only hopeful that these peace efforts have not been irreversibly damaged. Instead of working to divide, we need to encourage the peace process. The divisions in the Israeli Government following the President's statement leave the peace negotiations in limbo for the present time. Certainly the Israeli people, who stand united in their support for Jerusalem, must also be distressed about the President's treatment of the ancient capital of Israel.

In closing, I want to again express my deep concern for the statements by President Bush on East Jerusalem. I am hopeful that the administration will carefully review this position and clarify its intent. I am also hopeful that the administration will come to the realization that President Bush's statement is both inconsistent with past policy and damaging to the peace process as well as detrimental to our close friendship with Israel. The status of Jerusalem should be an item of final negotiations in the peace process and should not be the subject of simple pronouncements at a news conference. I urge the administration to treat East Jerusalem with the respect and sensitivity that the issue deserves. Furthermore, I urge

the administration to think twice in the future about the ramifications of its statements on critical foreign policy issues such as this.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Speaker, I commend my colleagues, Representatives FEIGHAN and BURTON, for calling this special order today. Negotiators seeking peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must not forget the important history which surrounds the special status of Jerusalem.

Jerusalem is the Capital of Israel and Judaism's holiest city. When the United Nations recommended that Jerusalem be internationalized in 1947, the Jewish Agency accepted that proposal. It was the Arab States who rejected the United Nations decision, choosing instead to attack the Jewish state. From 1948 to 1967, Jerusalem was divided. Jews were denied visits to the Wall, Judaism's holiest shrine, and other holy sites such as the Mount of Olives Cemetery. Christians, too, were often denied access to their holy places. In 1967, after the Arab Legion again attacked Jerusalem, Israel came to control the Old City. Since 1967, the holy places of Jerusalem have been cared for by an Israeli administration which protects religious freedom for all—Jews, Moslems, and Christians alike.

The provisions of United Nations Resolution 181, including the internationalization of Jerusalem, were nullified by the aggression of the Arab States themselves. Only Pakistan and the United Kingdom recognized Jordan's 19-year claim to the sovereignty over Jerusalem.

The United States has always maintained a solid commitment to a united Jerusalem and, since 1967, successive administrations have been sensitive to the special status of the city. In recent weeks, however, President Bush has made disturbing statements regarding East Jerusalem which seriously undermine the integrity of the United States' commitment to a unified city. The President asserts that his recent statements on East Jerusalem are "reiterating United States policy." Surely he recalls that under President Reagan, that administration never viewed Israeli administration of Jerusalem to be in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention, and did not attempt to restrict Jewish settlement there.

In absence of a tenable legal argument, does the current administration really take the position that there are areas in which no Jew should be allowed to live? That would plainly be a violation of the 1968 Civil Rights Act in our own country. In a related issue, Secretary of State Baker's proposal that no housing loan guarantees under existing United States law be made available to Israel to house Soviet refugees unless Israel prevents any Jews—not just Soviet refugees—from settling in the administered territories is very offensive. How can Secretary Baker support that redlining in the administered territories?

The growth of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union makes it more urgent than ever that the United States not throw roadblocks in the way of emigration from the Soviet Union. Since the Bush administration has chosen to limit Soviet Jewish emigration of the United States, it is inexcusable that Secretary Baker should now throw intolerable obstacles in the way of emigration by Soviet Jews to Israel. Because I know Secretary Baker to be a decent, honorable, and unprejudiced human being, I hope that he is reconsidering his position on this issue.

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To further the cause of peace in the Middle East, the United States should not call into question Jerusalem's current status as a unified city open to people of all religions.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, the Jewish people have been inextricably bound to Jerusalem for 3,000 years. There has been a continuous Jewish presence in the city despite numerous conquests and persecutions.

Jerusalem is revered as a holy city by the world's three great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, but only since Israel gained control of the city in 1967, have worshippers of all faiths enjoyed free access to the holy sites.

Mr. Speaker, the United States should not presume to advise the Israelis what the capital of their country should be. Only the Israelis can make that determination.

Mr. LAUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, with the increasing peace and unification events occurring throughout the world, it is only sensible that we support the people of Israel in keeping Jerusalem the undivided Capital of the Jewish State.

Jerusalem is the ancient Capital of Israel and it represents more than 3,000 years of national and religious yearning of the people who lived there. The Jewish and Israeli people suffered heavy discrimination and witnessed the desecration of their burial sites. These people must not be denied their right to access their holy sites, which are the foundation of their civilization, nor should they be subjected to what they suffered during Jordan's 19-year occupation.

I ask that we recognize and support the established status of Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel; with free access of all holy sites to the people of all religious denominations who live there. I understand their views because we Americans would not tolerate people in other countries telling us where to locate the capital of our Nation.

Mr. LENT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to join those of my colleagues who have chosen today to speak out on the status of Jerusalem, the Capital of the State of Israel. It has been the longstanding policy of the United States to recognize the eastern portion of Jerusalem as separate from the West Bank territories and as a nonnegotiable item in peace talks. I strongly support this policy and believe that it should be a cornerstone of the administration's ongoing efforts to advance the Middle East peace process.

Jerusalem was the ancient Capital of Israel and has always been a central part of the national and religious aspirations of the Jewish people. In fact, next month when Jews around the world observe Passover, their ritual meal will be closed with the hope that it will take place "next year in Jerusalem."

Under the promise of the United Nation's 1948 partition plan, Jerusalem was to become an international city in which all faiths were free to worship. However, the plan was scuttled following the refusal of Palestinian Arabs to recognize Israel and the unprovoked attacks on the infant Jewish state by five Arab armies.

Jerusalem was occupied by Jordan for 19 years during which a vigorous campaign was undertaken to eliminate all vestiges of the city's historic ties to the Jewish people. Jewish cemeteries were desecrated and shrines important to the Jewish people were defaced. However, the suffering during this

period was not limited strictly to Jews; people of all faiths were discriminated against and denied access to their holy sites. In response, it is estimated that 20,000 Christians fled Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967.

Jerusalem became a united city in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War. Since the liberation, the rights of all faiths to worship freely have been scrupulously protected by the Israeli Government. Israel has ensured that every religion has access to and can oversee its own shrines.

It would be a grievous error to view Jerusalem simply as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations. To do so would be to jeopardize the hard-won freedoms which all faiths have enjoyed there for the last 23 years. As the Middle East peace process advances, it is imperative that the United States continue to fully support the special status of Jerusalem.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I salute Congressman FEIGHAN's leadership in arranging this special order so that we in the U.S. Congress may address a very important issue: the status of Jerusalem.

More than 40 years have passed since the Arab States and the Palestinian Arabs rejected the United States partition plan, which called for an internationalized Jerusalem. In 1948, five Arab armies invaded the Jewish State, including the Jewish section of Jerusalem. The Arab legion severed the city, separating the Western Wall and the Jewish quarter from the rest of Jerusalem. Those Jews who survived the attack were expelled from the city.

During Jordan's 19-year occupation, King Hussein sought to systematically eliminate all traces of the city's Jewish heritage. Jews of all nationalities and Israelis of all religions were denied access to their holy sites. Jewish cemeteries were desecrated; Jewish grave-stones were used to build roads and latrines.

Since the reunification of the city by Israeli forces in 1967, after the Arab States failed in their second full-scale attempt to destroy Israel, Jews have been living in the Jewish quarter, praying at the Western Wall, and attending school at the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus. And since 1967, Christians and Arabs have had the same access to their holy sites in Jerusalem as have had the Jews; in fact, Israel has welcomed religious pilgrimages from around the world.

I am puzzled as to why this issue has suddenly come under international scrutiny. As Israel was poised, some thought, to accept the Baker proposal to move the peace process forward, our own President jumped in with a statement probably designed to force Shamir's hand in accepting the Baker proposal. But what it has done instead is destabilize the Labor-Likud coalition government, and probably caused its collapse.

Since 1967, successive administrations have been sensitive to the special status of Jerusalem. In fact, Arthur Goldberg, one of the drafters of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, said that that resolution "in no way refers to Jerusalem, and this omission was deliberate . . . Jerusalem was . . . not linked to the West Bank."

Most countries around the world have, at one time or another, annexed land which they took during a war. The United States, in fact, annexed Texas in 1845, almost 10 years after Santa Anna was defeated at San Jacinto. Have I heard anyone ask the United States to

give Texas back to Mexico? Why does the rest of the world hold Israel to a standard that they themselves are unwilling to uphold?

Jerusalem is not up for negotiation. Just as the Moslem world would unify itself should the Israelis ever try to rebuild the Second Temple on the sight of the Dome of the Rock, the Moslems third holiest shrine, so will the Israelis, and their American supporters, react to the division of Jerusalem. On this issue all sides are in agreement; Jerusalem is not a territory and will not be divided.

Mr. BROWN of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, as the United States plays a central role in the Middle East peace process, it is imperative that we keep in mind the special status of the undivided Capital of Israel. It is important that the United States not sidetrack the peacetalks by interjecting divisive issues. Jerusalem is not an occupied territory. It is the united, political Capital of Israel as well as the spiritual home for Jews across the world.

Contrary to PLO chairman Yasir Arafat's declaration that East Jerusalem is Arab and will be the future PLO state, an equal number of Jews and Arabs live in East Jerusalem. Arab residents are entitled to Israeli citizenship, and are granted the right to vote in municipal elections even if they are not citizens. We must give the PLO the message that the United States Congress firmly recognizes Jerusalem as the unified capital of the Jewish state, and will not support any attempt to bargain it away. Jerusalem must remain the undivided Capital of Israel.

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, Jerusalem has always played a central role in Jewish religious and political life. For over 3,000 years, since the time when King David made it his capital, Jerusalem has been home to Jews. The Western Wall in Jerusalem, part of Herod's temple over 2,000 years ago has been the focus of Jewish prayer and veneration. The entire city is central to the Jewish people's religious faith, tradition, and to Israel's historic culture.

In 1947 the United Nations recommended that the city of Jerusalem be internationalized. The Jewish Agency was willing to accept this plan with the hope that the city would be spared from conflict. As we all know, the Arab States were adamantly opposed to the internationalization of the city just as they were to partition.

When Jordan controlled Jerusalem from the year 1948 to 1967, Jews were not granted access to Jewish holy places like the Western Wall or the Mount of Olives. The Jordanian-controlled parts of Jerusalem were not closed to Jews only. In fact, Christians from Israel were allowed to enter the Old City for Christmas and Easter, but Israeli Moslems were not permitted to enter.

Under Jordanian control the Jewish cemetery at Hebron was destroyed, the Jewish Quarter was sacked, and 34 Jerusalem synagogues, some of which were centuries old, were also destroyed. Two great institutions, Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University remained idle on top of Mount Scopus for 20 years.

On the second day of the Six-Day War, Jordanian King Hussein ignored Israeli appeals to stay out of the war by firing the opening shots on Jerusalem. They lost the Old City to Israel. Under Israel control all people of all religious

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faiths are permitted access to holy sites. Religious freedom has thrived since 1967.

A number of times during his Presidency, former President Ronald Reagan expressed his desire for Jerusalem to remain under Israeli authority. I do not often hope for a continuation of Reagan policy, but to President Bush I say, follow the policy of your predecessor.

Mr. Speaker, Jerusalem is the Capital of Israel. Anyone who has ever been there knows that it is the heart and soul of the Jewish state. Although official United States policy recognizes that there be a unified Jerusalem to be the subject of negotiations, to me the issue is as clear as a Jerusalem skyline when the sun sets on the whiteness of the Jerusalem stone and the true meaning of Jerusalem, city of gold, hits home—Jerusalem and Israel are inseparable.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, the President has recently stated that Jerusalem, the ancient capital of Israel, should be considered in the same light as the administered territories of the West Bank and Gaza. This apparent reversal of our Nation's longstanding policy toward Jerusalem ignores the history of that holy city and its importance to the State of Israel.

Since Biblical times, Jerusalem has been the single geographical focal point of Jewish prayer, theology and national aspirations. Until the President's recent statement, U.S. policy has consistently supported an undivided Jerusalem.

The President's recent statements ignore the history of the region and fail to take into account the present day realities of Israel. The belief that Jerusalem must always remain whole and under Jewish sovereignty is a belief that unites Israelis of all political and religious persuasions.

We must remember that turning over any portion of Jerusalem to Arab rule would not be a new experiment but the repetition of a serious mistake, the results of which are a matter of record. Many gross abuses of Jerusalem's holy sites occurred during the years of Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967. Jews not allowed during the Jordanian invasion were expelled from the city. Both Arab and Jew alike were barred from visiting their holy sites. Along with this, Jordan pursued a systematic attempt to eliminate all traces of the city's Jewish heritage.

Since the time of Israel's liberation of Jerusalem in 1967, Arabs and Jews have lived side by side. Arab residents have also been entitled to Israeli citizenship. All residents, regardless of their citizenship, have been granted the right to vote in municipal elections. Israel has granted each religion and denomination the authority to oversee its own shrines. It has also assured complete freedom of access to all people.

President Bush now speaks of Jerusalem and its Jewish residents as simply another West Bank style settlement. Israelis do not "settle" in their capital. They live there. Furthermore, no Government of Israel can consider the renewed division of Jerusalem and expect to survive.

I deeply regret that the President's statement on Jerusalem has endangered the very peace process that his administration, the Israeli Government, and Egypt have been working to promote. I ask the President to consider the danger of a policy that may leave our

Nation unable to promote policies that will advance the peace process rather than hinder it.

I was present at the signing of the Camp David Peace Accord. I look forward to the day when a new agreement is signed between the warring parties of the region and its people can live in peace. This peace that can only come if our administration accepts that the city of Jerusalem must remain unified and under Israeli democratic and beneficent rule.

Mr. GRANDY. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman taking the time this evening. I wish to submit the remarks of Mayor Teddy Kollek who recently wrote President Bush expressing his concerns over the question of Jerusalem's future. I was privileged to meet with Mayor Kollek earlier this year and see first hand the integrated Jerusalem he refers to in his letter. His comments reflect my own and I commend them to the membership.

MAYOR OF JERUSALEM,
March 8, 1990.

Mr. GEORGE H.W. BUSH,
The President of the United States of America,
The White House, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In these days when all Israelis are united in their deep concern over recent American statements on Jerusalem, I am encouraged to write you as I recall the privilege I had of taking Mrs. Bush and you through the city on your visit in Israel in 1986.

In June 1967, in spite of our messages to King Hussein through your ambassador and through the United Nations that Israel had no intention of initiating hostilities against Jordan, we were unprovokedly attacked from the Jordanian occupied part of Jerusalem, an occupation followed by an annexation that was not recognized by any country except Pakistan. After the war ended, the city was united as it had been for 4000 years and its municipal boundaries were somewhat enlarged, in the main incorporating uninhabited areas of rocky hills. In the past 22 years, the city has grown considerably. The number of Jews has increased from almost 200,000 to 340,000 and the Arab population has doubled from 75,000 to 180,000. This necessitated a massive effort to build housing for both Jews and Arabs. Homes for the Jewish population were built all over the city including in areas that had been under Jordanian occupation. Over 30,000 families now live in these areas. No Arabs were dispossessed in order to build these homes. Parts of this land had been Jewish owned before. In the northern extremity, within the new municipal borders, Jewish villages existed prior to 1948, when their inhabitants were forced to leave by the invading Jordanian army.

While the Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank did get considerable incentives, none were given to families who made their homes within the city's boundaries. They acquired their homes under the same conditions as those living in Tel Aviv, Haifa and other parts of the country. A certain number of Russian immigrants, as well as immigrants from other countries, including many from the United States, now live in these neighborhoods. It is a fact that these new neighborhoods have become an integral part of the undivided city and are quite distinct from the settlements in the West Bank, the nearest of which is miles away.

I am aware of the policy of the United States toward the City of Jerusalem, namely "that the city remain united but that its status be determined in the negotiations." In my opinion there is no conflict between this policy and the actual state of affairs. While there is a difference between Israel's thinking that united Jerusalem is and

shall remain the capital of Israel under Israel's sovereignty and American policy that leaves the city's ultimate status open, no conflict needs to arise from the existence of the new urban neighborhoods that have gone up in the last 22 years.

The Arab uprising over the last 2 years has also had its repercussions in Jerusalem, but to a much lesser extent than in the West Bank and Gaza. Work and life go on here, the schools are open and tourists and pilgrims are visiting the city. There is a certain amount of Arab strikes and some cars have been stoned or torched, but the level of violence, if at all, is small. To give just one figure, in 1989 there were altogether 11 homicides in Jerusalem, 6 of them of a criminal nature, while 4 Jews and 1 Arab were killed in terrorist acts. Indeed, the number is smaller than it was 10 or 15 years ago. I wrote to Mrs. Bush a year ago about the city's illiteracy program for Arab women. This and many other social and development activities in the city's Arab neighborhoods are going on as before.

There is one further point I would like to mention. Jerusalem is the center of Palestinian political activity. In 1967, before the city was reunited, not a single Arab newspaper was published here. Today there are 4 Arab dailies and a great number of weeklies and monthlies published which are free to attack the Israeli government and, at times, even challenge Israeli's right to exist. Palestinians, who in spirit, if not organizationally, represent the PLO, address freely meetings at the Hebrew University attended by Israeli and Arab students and the general public. Similar activities could not take place in Amman, Damascus or Bagdad, where no criticism of the authorities is tolerated.

Differences over Jerusalem's future status are bound to come to the fore at some stage of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. I do, however, firmly believe that this issue should be discussed as late as possible, and only after all other outstanding issues are settled. It would be particularly unfortunate if at this early but critical stage, when Israel must decide whether it will agree to a dialogue with a Palestinian delegation with one or two West Bank Palestinians who also have a Jerusalem address, other much more crucial questions concerning the future of Jerusalem should becloud the issue. In particular, no question mark should be permitted to hover over the new Jerusalem neighborhoods.

I would like to add, Mr. President, that we are grateful for the efforts of the United States government, and to you personally, to promote a peace settlement and to enable Russian Jewry to return to their homeland.

Please forgive me for taking up some of your valuable time, but I do this in the hope that I am contributing to the good relations between our two nations by expressing these thoughts to you.

With best personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

TEDDY KOLLEK.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Speaker, Jerusalem represents the historic center of the Jewish State. The people of Israel and both the Labor and Likud parties consider Jerusalem the undivided capital of Israel. Since 1967, Jews have returned to historically Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.

Recent discussions of the status of East Jerusalem may unfortunately complicate the peace process in Israel. At a particularly crucial point in the peace process, it would seem more advantageous to postpone discussion of

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this divisive issue until the larger issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are resolved.

Although U.S. policy has never officially recognized the 1967 reunification of Jerusalem, previous administrations have always supported a united Jerusalem.

It is my hope that the discussion of the status of East Jerusalem will not unnecessarily complicate the difficult peace process. Secretary Baker and the Bush administration have been stalwart in promoting a constructive solution to end the uprising. I am confident that once the larger issues have been addressed, the sensitive issue of East Jerusalem can be resolved.

Mr. SCHUETTE. Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank my colleagues, Mr. FEIGHAN and Mr. BURTON, for holding this special order.

Last weekend, President Bush expressed his opposition to new Jewish immigration to East Jerusalem. As much as I support the President's foreign policy views, I feel compelled to object to this statement. Maintaining a united Jerusalem transcends philosophical differences between the political parties within the Israeli Government and touches the very heart and soul of the Jewish people.

With the recent breakup of the Israeli governing coalition, it is important that statements from the United States not be used to heighten volatility in an already dangerous region. The United States should not stray from its longstanding policy that Jerusalem should never again be divided. Jerusalem should be a free and open city, where people are welcome to live wherever they choose without regard to their religious faith.

As the Israelis have contended, Jerusalem is the rightful capital of their nation. Currently, the United States Embassy to Israel is located in Tel Aviv. Mr. Speaker, I believe that Jerusalem, as the rightful capital of Israel, should be host to our Embassy.

Further, the issue of the division of Jerusalem should not be a factor in the negotiations of the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. The Israelis have sent a clear message that the division of Jerusalem will never be an acceptable concession—and, I, too, find this unacceptable.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TAUBIN). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DELAY] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. DELAY addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. STUMP (at the request of Mr. MICHEL) for today and the balance of the week on account of family medical emergency.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GILMAN) and to revise and

extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. LENT, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DELAY, for 60 minutes, today and 60 minutes on March 20.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana, for 60 minutes, on March 20, 21, and 22.

Mr. BILIRAKIS, for 60 minutes, on March 21.

Mr. ARMEY, for 60 minutes, on March 20.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. EVANS) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. MAZZOLI, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GLICKMAN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ENGEL, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. POSHARD, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CROCKETT, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. STARK, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. KASTENMEIER, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SKAGGS, for 5 minutes, on March 15.

Mr. SKELTON, for 30 minutes, March 15.

Mr. GAYDOS, for 60 minutes, March 15.

Mr. OWENS of New York, for 60 minutes, on March 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 60 minutes on April 2, 3, 4, and 5.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GILMAN) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. BROOMFIELD.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN.

Mr. DELAY in two instances.

Ms. SNOWE.

Mr. MACHTEY.

Mr. PURSELL.

Mr. GUNDERSON.

Mr. DOUGLAS.

Mr. WOLF.

Mr. CALLEGLEY in two instances.

Mr. IRELAND.

Mr. MILLER of Washington.

Mr. CONTE.

Ms. SCHNEIDER.

Mr. SCHUETTE.

Mr. GINGRICH.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. EVANS) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. MRAZEK.

Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland.

Mr. KLECZKA.

Mr. HAMILTON.

Mr. ECKART.

Mr. LIPINSKI.

Mr. SMITH of Florida.

Mr. RANGEL.

Mr. KASTENMEIER.

Mr. WYDEN.

Mr. DYMALLY.

Mr. DWYER of New Jersey.

Mr. PALLONE.

Mr. HAWKINS.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota.

Mr. TALLON.

Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts.

Mr. ACKERMAN.

Mr. RICHARDSON.

Mr. DOWNEY.

Mr. FRANK.

Mr. TRAFICANT in two instances.

Mr. MAZZOLI.

Mr. KANJORSKI.

Mr. STARK.

Mr. DELLUMS.

Mr. DIXON.

Mr. PENNY in two instances.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly, (at 8 o'clock p.m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, March 15, 1990, at 11 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2725. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting notice of the Department of the Air Force's proposed letter(s) of offer and acceptance (LOA) to Egypt for defense articles (Transmittal No. 90-28), pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 118; to the Committee on Armed Services.

2726. A letter from the Secretary, Department of Defense, transmitting the 1990 report on allied contributions to the common defense, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 1928 nt.; to the Committee on Armed Services.

2727. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 8-173, "Tax Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

2728. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 8-171, "Judiciary Square Detention Facility Construction Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia, March 14, 1990.

2729. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 8-172, "Abandoned Property Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

2730. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting notification that the Department provided the defense articles, services and training to Colombia under the authority of P.D. 89-24, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2218(b)(2); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 14, 1990.

2731. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency; transmitting notice of the Department of the Air Force's proposed letter(s) of offer and acceptance (LOA) to Egypt for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$120 million (Transmittal No. 90-28), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2776(b); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

2732. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting notice of the Department of the Navy's proposed letter(s) of offer and acceptance (LOA) to Korea for defense arti-

מיידי	דחילות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	ק: 1
גלוי	סוג:		קתין: 3
תאריך וזמן מעור:		אל: מצפ"א	דע:
15.3.90 - 13:00			
כס' פרוק:		כאח: ק. לקונגרס	דע:
הפסד:			
470		א/חוק	

ירושלים

בהמשך למברקנו 418 סעיף ו' ד'.

רצ"ב מכתבו של הסנטור בושביץ לנשיא בוש עליו חתומים: הסנטורים ליברמן, מקיין, פרסלר, וילסון, דמאטו, לויין, מק וחקונגרסמן גילמן.

ישראל ורנאי דונגר
יהודית ורנאי דונגר

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

WORKING COPY

March 14, 1990

470 $\frac{2}{3}$

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Jerusalem has a place in the hearts of the American people and of people throughout the world. Whether Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, they look to it as a symbol of peace and a source of spiritual inspiration.

Jerusalem is the spiritual center of the Jewish faith, and for Israelis, it is their capital. For over twenty-five hundred years, as Jewish people yearned to return to Zion, they recalled Jerusalem in their prayers. Thus, above all, Jerusalem has special meaning to the Jewish people. But their devotion to Jerusalem has not meant the exclusion of others. When Jerusalem was reunited in 1967, a tragic period in its history ended; now people of every faith enjoy free access to their holy places.

We agree with long-standing United States policy that Jerusalem should never again be divided and that its people should be free to live wherever they wish without regard to their faith. In our view, the status of Jerusalem need not be settled early in the current peace process, and it should not be linked to other issues.

We are deeply concerned, however, that recent statements on the subject of Jerusalem may raise doubts as to whether that policy has changed. In particular, these statements could raise doubts about our long-standing commitment to the right of Jews to live in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem is a city unique in the world, a mosaic of diverse ethnic and religious groups living together in peace. That peace reigns in Jerusalem, despite its diversity, gives us hope that peace may be achieved throughout the Middle East.

The President
March 14, 1990
Page 2

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Mr. President, we support your determination to advance the peace process in the Middle East. We believe, however, that your clarification that our policy on Jerusalem has not changed is urgently needed now. Even though the constraints of time prevented us from asking more of our colleagues to join in this letter, we believe that most of them share our concerns.

Sincerely,

Ben Gilman

Benjamin A. Gilman, M.C.

Rudy Boschwitz

Rudy Boschwitz

Pete Wilson

Pete Wilson

Joseph I. Lieberman

Joseph I. Lieberman

Alfonse M. D'Amato

Alfonse M. D'Amato

John McCain

John McCain

Carl Levin

Carl Levin

Larry Pressler

Larry Pressler

Connie Mack

Connie Mack

HADASSAH NEWS

The Heart of the Jewish Community

Ruth B. Hurwitz, Chairperson

NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Len Fink, Director

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEContact: Len Fink (212) 303-8153
(718) 273-8026475-52 $\frac{2}{5}$

HADASSAH SHOCKED BY PRESIDENT BUSH STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM

JERUSALEM, March 8 -- Hadassah National President, Carmela E. Kalmanson, expressed shock and outrage today over a statement by President Bush, that there should be no new Jewish settlements in Jerusalem.

She said, "I am shocked and deeply outraged by President Bush's statement that Jews should not be permitted to settle in Jerusalem. It is a stinging insult to every Jew in the world, and non-Jews, too, to try to prohibit Jews, or any other group, from settling in any part of the capital of Israel.

"Jerusalem is a free city and one city, and since reunification in 1967, Jews, Christians, Moslems and all other people have lived in any part of it," she declared.

Mrs. Kalmanson made her remarks at a ceremony at Hadassah's College of Technology in Jerusalem.

She continued, "We at Hadassah remember what it was like before 1967 when our hospital on Mt. Scopus, situated in the eastern sector of Jerusalem, was cut off. We remember the painful date of April 11, 1948, when 77 doctors and nurses were savagely attacked and murdered on their way to heal the sick and wounded in Hadassah Hospital on Mt. Scopus.

- more -

2/HADASSAH SHOCKED

475-52 $\frac{3}{5}$

"We remember when Jews could not live in all of Jerusalem or pray at the Western Wall. We could not visit our holy places, and Jewish property was destroyed.

"Today Jews, Christians and Arabs are provided full medical care at both Hadassah medical facilities in Jerusalem.

"Today all people may worship freely at the holy sites, and all property is protected," Mrs. Kalmanson said.

With 385,000 members in 1,500 chapters and groups in the United States, Hadassah is the largest Jewish organization in the world. It supports Jewish causes worldwide and promotes social justice throughout the world.

- 30 -

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AJ, AJP, M, N

14-90 WED 8:41

AJC-D.C.

FAX NO. 2024624864

P. 02

475-52 4/5

The American Jewish
Committee

Office of the President
1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Tel. (202) 462-4864 FAX (202) 462-4867

March 9, 1990

Honorable George Bush
President of the
United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As you well know, the question of the future of Jerusalem is a complicated and deeply emotional one. It is for this reason that Dr. Henry Kissinger wisely suggested that Jerusalem be left to the end of the diplomatic process, when a climate of mutual trust had been established between Israel and its Arab neighbors. President Jimmy Carter likewise found at Camp David that it was impossible to achieve agreement between President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin on the issue of Jerusalem. Therefore, the issue was deferred for later discussion.

It is thus not surprising that the dedicated efforts that you and Secretary of State James Baker are investing in bringing about Israeli-Palestinian talks to prepare for implementation of the Israeli election plan in the occupied territories may well founder on issues related to East Jerusalem.

While American Jews may be divided, as are the Jews of Israel as to the best approach to peace, they are virtually united on one issue. Jerusalem must continue to remain a physically united city with free access for all faiths to their respective holy places, and the acknowledged capital of the State of Israel. We believe that this is consistent with United States policy.

We are confident that once these unshakable principles are accepted, elections for a self-governing authority held, and final status talks later begun, it should not be impossible to devise a formula whereby the Palestinians will enjoy self-government under a borough system, permitting Palestinian institutions to flourish in the united city of Jerusalem. Then Jerusalem which for centuries was a center of strife, will genuinely live up to its Biblical name, 'Abode of Peace.'

Sincerely,

Sholom D. Comay
Sholom D. Comay
President

Sholom D. Comay
President

Fred H. Moses

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KENNETH JACOBSON

Leadership
Assistant to the National Director
MARVIN S. RAFFAPORT

Washington Representative
JESS M. HORDIS

General Counsel
ARNOLD FORSTER

March 12, 1990



The Honorable George Bush
The President of the United States
Washington, DC 20500

475-52 $\frac{S}{S}$

Dear Mr. President:

It is with great concern that we write to you now about the recently articulated U.S. government position on the status of Jerusalem.

We were pleased to learn about your clarification of a previous statement on the subject indicating an understanding of the right of Jews to live in Jerusalem. However, we are deeply troubled that the clarification made no mention of the issue at the heart of the controversy.

East Jerusalem is not the West Bank, nor can there be any comparison between the status of the two. Israel's administration of the West Bank may prove to be temporary, but the status of Jerusalem is a much more complicated matter.

Jerusalem has served as the symbol and most profound expression of Jewish national identity since King David declared it the capital of the Jewish state in 1000 BCE. The suburban neighborhoods of East Jerusalem were built in 1967 following the reunification of the nation's capital after almost 3,000 years. They are an integral part of the city and it is the deeply felt conviction of Israelis and American Jews that their status, like that of Jerusalem as the nation's capital, should remain unchanged.

It is our belief, Mr. President, that raising questions about Jerusalem at this sensitive time serves only to undermine the political process now underway. The suggestion that Jerusalem too is up for discussion, injects another obstacle at an extremely delicate stage in Israel's political debate. What is needed now as the government of Israel struggles to reconcile concerns over national security and the need to take risks for peace, is encouragement, not additional "red flags" from Washington.

Sincerely,

Burton S. Levinson
Burton S. Levinson
National Chairman

Abraham H. Foxman
Abraham H. Foxman
National Director

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

IMMEDIATE ATTENTION: SPECIAL ORDER TODAY

March 14, 1990

Dear Colleague:

On Wednesday, March 14 we will be reserving time for a special order on the status of Jerusalem and the Administration's handling of this issue. We urge you to participate.

We are engaging in this colloquy in order to express our dismay over the Administration's recent statements on the future of Jerusalem. On March 3, President Bush referred to his Administration's opposition to new settlements "in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem." Initially, it was thought that the President had misspoken, that he had meant to say "the West Bank and Gaza." It seemed highly unlikely that the President would have wanted to put Israel's capital city in the same category as the administered territories.

But, as Tom Friedman pointed out in the New York Times of March 9, that was his intention. "Officials say that Bush intentionally added East Jerusalem to make sure that the Israelis understood that it was still viewed as occupied territory by the United States...."


We do not share that view which is a departure from traditional U.S. policy. The U.S. has always made a distinction between Jerusalem and the territories. West Bank policy is governed by U.N. Resolution 242 and Camp David, both of which envision at least partial Israeli withdrawal in exchange for full peace and security. At the same time U.S. officials have indicated, over and over again, that Jerusalem cannot be returned to the pre-1967 status quo, that it must remain united.

Jerusalem is Israel's capital. The concept of "settlements" in Jerusalem is nonsensical. Israelis do not "settle" in their capital. They live there. It is not "occupied territory."

In the context of peace negotiations, innovative solutions for Jerusalem's future should be considered. However, to suggest that Jerusalem is just another piece of territory to be bargained over once the negotiations begin is a serious mistake. Surely it is not the view of Congress.

That is why we invite your participation on Wednesday. If you wish to participate, please contact Neil Levine (w/ Rep. Feighan: 5-5731) or Gil Kaper (w/ Rep. Burton: 5-2276).

Sincerely,



DAN BURTON
Member of Congress



EDWARD F. FEIGHAN
Member of Congress

דחיפות:	טופס מברק קשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1 מחור: 5
רגיל	מנהל מצפ"א, יועץ תפוצות	אל:
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הצהרת בוש - ירושלים

כהמשך למברקנו 424 מצ"ב:

1. מכתב פוקסמן/לוינגר א.ד.ל. לנשיא בוש
2. הודעת הדסה לתקשורת.
3. מכתב נשיא אמריקן ג'ואיש קומיטי לבוש.

מרדכי ידיד

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HADASSAH NEWS

"The Heart of the Jewish Community"

Ruth B. Hurwitz, Chairperson

NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Len Fink, Director

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: Len Fink (212) 303-8153

(718) 273-8026

475-52

 $\frac{2}{5}$

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- more -

2/HADASSAH SHOCKED

475-52 $\frac{3}{5}$

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AJ, AJP, M, N

R-14-90 WED 8:41

AJC-D.C.

FAX NO. 2024624864

P.02



The American Jewish
Committee

475-52 4/5
Office of the President
Tel. 202-462-4864
Fax 202-462-4864

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Max M. Fleher
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Advisory Council

Los Nevos

Advisory Council

Bertram H. Gold
John Altmann

March 9, 1990

Honorable George Bush
President of the
United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

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Sholom D. Comay
Sholom D. Comay
President

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National Director
ABRAHAM H. FOXMAN
Chairman, National
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Intergroup Relations
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Leadership
Assistant to the National Director
MARVIN S. RAFFAPORT
Washington Representative
JESS N. MORDES

General Counsel
ARNOLD FORSTER

March 12, 1990



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The President of the United States
Washington, DC 20500

475-52 S

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Sincerely,

Burton S. Levinson
Burton S. Levinson
National Chairman

Abraham H. Foxman
Abraham H. Foxman
National Director

דף: 1	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	דחיות: בהול לבוקר
כתוב: 2		סוג: שמור
אל: מנהל מצפ"א	תאריך וזמן מעור: 14.3.90 - 13:00	
דע: ארבע	כס' פבוק: הפסד:	
כא: ק. לקונגרס	418	

בהמשך לשיחתנו הטלפונית מ- 14/3, להלן עדכון על פעילות קונגרסיונאליה:

(1) ירושלים

א. על הדיון המיוחד שיתקיים היום במליאת ביהנ"ב, ראה בנפרד.
ב. במהלך פעולת הגיוס שערכנו עם ה"ידידים" לקראת ה- Special Order, התגבשה הדיעה (בשיחות שלי עם הקונגרסמן שומר והקונגרסמן לויין), לשלוח מכתב בלוויית חתימות רבות לנשיא בוש בנושא אחדות ירושלים. יעבדו על המכתב במהלך שבוע זה ותשובע הבא.

ג. מל לויין מתכוון להתקשר לאחר ה- Special Order לנשיא בוש בנושא.
ד. הסנטור בושביץ מארגן מכתב שקט לנשיא בוש בחתימת מספר סנטורים.

(2) שימועים - הסנטור מוינהן

א. ציונות גזענות - בהמשך למברקנו בנדון, מתכוונים לקיים השימועים כנראה ב- 30/3. ממתינים לקבל חוות דעתנו.

ב. ירושלים - אין עדיין החלטה האם לקיים השימועים. מוינהן מודאג מהמצב הפנימי בארץ וטרם החליט האם לקיים בכלל שימועים בנושא ואם כן, באיזה עיתוי.

ג. אש"פ - טרם קיבל החלטה האם לקיים השימועים ולכן גם לא נקבע מועד.

(3) תיקון מק - ליברמן

א. דו"ח הממשל יימסר ביום ב' הקרוב, אולם עדיין לא יהיה פומבי. שוקלים פרסומו אולי ביום ד' או ה' במהלך אותו שבוע.

ב. במימשל הובטח שהדו"ח לא יהיה White Wash, אולם יחד עם זאת, סביר מאד שהדו"ח לא ישמח כל כך את משרדו של מק.

ג. אש"פ אמנם לא יקבל תעודת יושר מליאה. עם זאת, יופיע בדו"ח, ככל כנראה,

Overall judgement שלא ישביע רצונם. הדו"ח לא יכלול את כל פעילות הטרור של אש"פ וכל הציטוטים של נציגיו, אלא רק חלקית.

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(4) עליה
 הקונגרסמן לנטוס עומד להפגש (כנראה בלוויית קבוצה של קונגרסמנים) עם השגריר
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יועץ תקשורת שהב"ט.

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

רצ"ב תמליל נאומו של מזכיר ההגנה צ'ייני בפני כנס ה-AUN.

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REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DICK CHENEY TO THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL
CONFERENCE AT THE WASHINGTON HILTON, WASHINGTON DC
TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 1990

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SEC. CHENEY: (Applause.) Well, thank you very much for that very warm and very fine introduction. I can assure you, thinking back, that frankly it hadn't occurred to me that I'd been on the job a year -- it seemed more like ten. (Laughter.) But I would much rather be here today than I would face the prospect of a week in front of the United States Senate trying to earn confirmation. So it is a pleasure to be here today.

Let me begin by saying, "Shalom." Charity has been important to Jewish life ever since the book of Leviticus said that farmers should not harvest the corners of their fields so the poor could find something to eat. Despite this, voluntary charitable associations have become important to the Jewish community only in modern times, and especially in this country. There is something essentially American about the way the United Jewish Appeal has flourished in the 51 years since it was founded. You have supported an impressive array of educational, social service and humanitarian organizations here and in Israel. And your volunteer activities have extended well beyond the mere writing of checks.

One hundred fifty years ago, Alexis De Tocqueville wrote about the crucial role of voluntary associations in his classic book, "Democracy in America." Tocqueville said that "in a country based on the primacy of individual rights, voluntary associations help potentially isolated individuals see the importance of caring for the welfare of the larger community." The United Jewish Appeal's role fits within a long tradition that goes to the core of this country's foundation as a liberal democracy.

I begin with this observation today because this has been a remarkable year in the history of democratic liberty. From Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe to Nicaragua, voluntary associations -- churches, labor unions and a host of others -- nurtured the seeds of freedom that have burst forth so gloriously these past several months. In country after country, the people, finally able to cast ballots, have rejected communism. Three weeks ago, it was Nicaragua. Two weeks ago, communist candidates were defeated in local elections in the three Slavic Soviet republics. Last Sunday, Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union. And next Sunday, it will be East Germany's turn to vote.

These momentous events have brought with them some major changes in the national security environment faced by the United States. The threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe clearly has receded. In other respects, the picture is more complicated, and I'll return to this point later. The net effect has been to

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Some of these questions have been posed by the press in a form that may be unsettling to the American Jewish community. A few months ago, a Washington Post headline said that partly because of the changes in US-Soviet relations, quote, "An anxious Israel fears that the world, and especially the US, is losing interest in it," end quote. And last week, a Washington Jewish Week headline asked whether, quote, "The end of the Cold War will mean that Israel will be less than a strategic asset?" 3/11

Before I go any further, let me assure you that this country's bedrock commitment to Israel's security is absolutely unshakeable. (Applause.) And I mean absolutely. We have had and always will have a very special relationship with Israel. I particularly want to say that in light of today's news about resignations from Israel's cabinet.

With that basic assurance stated up front, I want to get back to the underlying concern that a change in the Soviet threat may reduce the strategic importance of Israel to the United States. That suggestion reminds me of questions that appeared in the Korean and Japanese press during my visit to Asia last month. The concern really is about what it might mean for Israel, Japan, or other US allies if this nation were to rush willy-nilly to cash in on the so-called "peace dividend." Simply stated, the idea that there will be a massive dividend is based on the assumption that our enemies have disappeared. If the enemy has disappeared, the argument goes, so have the reasons for US alliances and for defense spending.

I want to address this issue on two levels today. First, on the narrow question of whether the US still cares about Israel, I want to say something about the cooperative defense relationship that exists and will continue to exist between the United States and Israel. And then I want to speak more generally about the US role in the world of the future.

In 1983, President Reagan and Prime Minister Shamir agreed to a formal relationship of strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel. Since then, the two countries' strategic ties have become closer than they ever were in the previous 35 years since Israeli independence. Perhaps the most important form of cooperation between the two nations involves shared information and planning. If you tell the average person that we have regular working groups, it may sound like bureaucratic gobbledegook. But these kinds of institutions tend to insulate long-term relationships from the disagreements that are bound to show up now and then among friends.

More concretely, Israel is slated to get 35 percent of the administration's fiscal 1991 budget request for security assistance. In addition, Israel is due to begin taking delivery on its third order of EF-16F aircraft in 1991, and we expect the Israeli Defense

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Forces to be getting their first Apache attack helicopters soon. At the same time, we also expect US procurements of Israeli defense product to increase in the 1990s. These procurements have skyrocketed from a level of \$51 million in 1984 to more than \$350 million in 1989. 431 4/11

Finally, the United States has a number of joint research and development projects underway with Israel, including several that are part of our EStrategic Defense InitiativeF, or SDI. It is hard to look at the EMiddle EastF today without worrying about the potential spread of EweaponsF of mass destruction. We have reason to be concerned that some states in the region may over time develop the EmissileF capability to deliver EchemicalF and EbiologicalF EweaponsF. Therefore, we've been talking with Israel about helping them strengthen their radar warning system, and we've funded initial research into the Arrow Eanti-ballistic missileF system as part of SDI.

I mention all of these specific programs because I want it to be understood that we do not consider our relationship with Israel to flow only in one direction. The United States provides aid and assistance, of course, but we also get national security benefits in return. And that brings us to the broader issue, how the US relationship with Israel and our other major allies fits into a broader conception of the US role in the world of the future.

There are some in the United States who seem to think that, because the world is changing, we can fundamentally alter the basic premises that have guided our military strategies. That is the posture that leads to loose talk about a peace dividend and produces concern among our allies that we are about to withdraw and to leave them all hanging. That is dangerous talk.

Our critics accuse us of not noticing that the world has changed. But the real argument between us is different. They believe that because the immediate threat has gone down, we should disarm immediately. We agree that the budget should come down, but we also insist that the whole process should be handled with an eye on the longer term.

With the world changing so quickly, we believe that we have to work harder than ever with a sense of predictability and consistency to maintain the strength of our relationships with our allies, and we have to do so with a steady sense of balance that will leave us ready for today's remaining uncertainties while we prepare for the role we want the United States to play in the decades ahead. Of course, planning for the future requires some clarity about what has just transpired. For the past 45 years, US and allied policy has fostered a climate of cooperation and stability that has helped keep the peace. That peace has permitted free economies to grow and free political ideals to spread and take root.

Throughout the postwar era, the biggest threat to peace has been the Soviet Union, its client states and client EterroristF organizations. The Soviets embarked on a massive military buildup

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that big, far beyond what would be needed strictly for EdefenseF, was useful for only two objectives: conquest or intimidation. 431

Soviet strategy failed because the democracies of the world deployed forces that were too strong to be conquered, and because their commitment to freedom and democracy could not be shaken. Look at the revolutionary developments in EEastern EuropeF: there is a very real possibility that much of Eastern Europe will soon be governed by democratically elected non-communist regimes, and that most if not all Soviet EtroopsF will be withdrawn back to the Soviet Union. 5/11

Change has even come inside the Soviet Union itself. We've been impressed with President Gorbachev's determination to bring about reforms in Soviet foreign and domestic policies: political reforms, pluralism in Soviet politics, and a better record on emigration and other human rights. His willingness to let events unfold contrasts favorably with the record of his predecessors.

However, as we survey all these changes, there are some key points to keep in mind. The threat of a sudden Soviet invasion of EWestern EuropeF has gone down, but a new set of uncertainties has sprung up, and old animosities could always resurface.

There is also great uncertainty about the future course of reform inside the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev faces massive problems at home. We very much want EperestroikaF to succeed, but its success is far from assured. No one can predict what fate has in store for the current Soviet leadership. Average citizens are questioning the basic assumptions of the governing Communist Party. The economy is a disaster. Old nationality problems are reasserting themselves, and virulent Eanti-SemitismF has begun to reappear.

In addition, we must never forget that, whatever other changes they may have made, the Sovieteted against the United States and our allies. It is hard for me to look at that capability, to consider the possibilities for upheaval within the Soviet Union, and to remain peacefully sanguine as if we no longer need to be concerned about our own defense. However much we may want Soviet reforms to take hold, it would irresponsible not to preserve all of our options for the future.

Moreover, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the Soviet Union, it would be a mistake to think that the United States can ever again be a "Fortress America." The United States is a global power with global interest and global responsibilities. It does not take a very vivid imagination to see what would happen if we were to let international power vacuums develop in regions where our strength now exerts a positive influence. Countries have claims or counterclaims against each other's territories and interest in just about every part of the world. As friends of Israel well know, these can endanger the peace if they get out of hand.

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If those kinds of situations threaten the important interest of the United States or our allies, we must be prepared to exert a restraining influence. Sometimes those interests unavoidably will require us to use American military power. One good example is EpanamaF. But another one in the Middle East was the 1987 decision to re-flag and escort EkuwaitiF EoilF tankers during the EIran-FIraq War. Our willingness to see that action through continues to pay dividends. Our active presence is welcomed by our friends in the region, and those friends have seen that they can, indeed, count on us. 431
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I said earlier that the US commitment to Israel is absolutely unshakable, and it is. However, the real-world value of our commitments to any ally depends ultimately upon our ability to project American power. Our commitments are only as good as our ability to back them up.

Some people who like to portray themselves as great friends of EIsraelF are in the forefront of those who want to cut the EdefenseF E budgetF drastically to cash in on the so-called peace dividend. You should listen to that kind of posturing with a great deal of skepticism. I believe those two positions are fundamentally incompatible with each other.

We can cut our budgets. We can reduce our force structure. President Bush's EbudgetF will get us down by 1995 to the lowest proportional rate of Edefense spendingF since before Pearl Harbor. But these cuts have to be managed with great care. We must handle any force reductions in a manner that keeps up the quality and the morale of our personnel. We must also invest in the technology we will need for the future. And we must continue to deter strategic threats from the ESoviet UnionF.

And finally, we will have to rely more heavily on mobile, highly ready, well equipped forces and solid power projection capabilities. This last point is particularly important in regard to the EMiddle EastF. Slash and burn budgeting would make it impossible for us to meet our EdefenseF priorities. It would be a direct threat to the commitments we all value dearly. And this, in turn, surely would not help the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

As we seek to promote a realistic peace process, Israel must know that it can count on the United States. Risk for peace can only be taken if Israel is confident about its security and the US commitment to it. Too often, we treat policy as if it can be made in isolated compartments. Our minds have a EMiddle EasternF compartment for diplomatic issues -- the peace process and so forth. Then there is the defense compartment. My message for you today is that those compartments are not distinct. The beaches of Haifa are washed by the rainfalls of Europe. Our long-term capabilities and influence in the Middle East are very much a part of the defense budget debates, even if it may not always look that way. I hope you all bear that in mind as you try to put this debate into a larger perspective.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

I understand there's a plan for a few questions to wrap up.

MODERATOR: Mr. Secretary, we're going to collect questions. There are cards on the table. There are some people walking around now. And then we'll filter the questions through me to you, if that's okay.

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SEC. CHENEY: I'd love to know who gets to filter the questions. (Moderator laughs.) All right. That sounds good to me. 7/11

MODERATOR: Okay, thank you. Let me -- they're already coming on. Okay.

It was reported recently, I think in the last week or so in the news, that the United States plans to sell the Patriot missile system to Israel. Could you describe what that is and what needs Israel has that we're selling such a sophisticated system?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, we have talked with the Israelis. I've had discussions in my meetings now with Defense Minister Rabin. I think I've met three times in the year that I've been Secretary, and I'm scheduled to go to Israel in May. (Applause.)

We've talked about a number of ways of dealing with the increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile threat, basically, and the threat to Israel in the Middle East. The efforts involve discussions of such things as early warning radars. The Patriot is a sophisticated air defense system that has significant capabilities that's used in Europe and NATO. We have not yet finalized arrangements in this area, but it is one of a number of measures that's under discussion that would enhance Israeli capabilities against possible future threats.

MODERATOR: Another couple questions on chemical weapons in the Middle East, specifically Iraq's capabilities and the press reports on Libya's plant now being operational. If you could comment on those developments.

SEC. CHENEY: Well, we have been watching the developments in Libya very carefully. Obviously, we have been involved -- our government has previously, both the Reagan and now the Bush administrations, in dealing with the efforts of the Libyans to acquire significant chemical capability. We've done that by diplomatic means. We continue to press those efforts.

The President feels very strongly about chemical weapons and their proliferation. When he was Vice President, he tabled the original administration proposal on -- for a chemical weapons ban internationally. We continue to pursue that.

The developments in the Middle East are worrisome because of the fact that we have sort of crossed through the threshold now, broken through the threshold, if you will, in the Iran-Iraq War where chemical weapons were actually used. And it is a subject of great concern, I think to all of us who watch developments not only here but in other places in the world. I think the policies we are pursuing, or discouraging the production of chemical weapons, and working with the Soviets to reduce our own stocks, and working on an international basis to get a complete ban on chemical weapons worldwide, is the proper course for us to follow. But we do, of

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course, follow very closely specific developments, especially any development that involves Libya.

MODERATOR: Thank you. A question on foreign aid, the military portion of foreign aid -- some 35 percent of the defense budget, as you have mentioned, is allocated to Israel, and isn't most of that in fact spent right here in the United States? Could you talk about the fact that foreign aid -- comment on the amount of foreign aid that is spent here in the US to purchase US weapons systems?

SEC. CHENEY: That's correct. The amount of military assistance that is slated for Israel both in 1990, the year we're now in and 1991 is \$1.8 billion. It is the largest portion of our military assistance budget. There are several reasons, obviously, for it in addition to our historic ties to Israel, but the United States does gain in the sense that a lot of those funds go to purchase US systems. I mentioned the third buy of the F-16, for example, but also even more importantly, because of the strategic relationship between the United States and Israel, we benefit enormously by having in the Middle East, a very important part of the world, a democracy, another nation that shares our historic values and our commitment to freedom and individual rights and to liberty, and that kind of strategic tie, I think and the capabilities that go with it in terms of our ability to contribute to our mutual security are enormously important, not only to Israel, but to the United States. One-point-eight billion dollars is not a gift in that sense at all, but it's something that we derive great benefit from in terms of our own national interests. (Applause.)

MODERATOR: Several of the questions coming in are on the military balance in Israel, maintaining its qualitative edge, and with our US arms sales to Arab countries, how can that -- how can Israel continue to maintain its qualitative edge? And, specifically, with reference to not an arms sale, but the US, as we withdraw from NATO and Europe, giving tanks to Egypt, and does that set a bad example for what the Soviets will be doing because they certainly have a lot more excess equipment than the United States does, and are we fueling and escalating an arms race in the Middle East by dropping off some of this there?

SEC. CHENEY: The United States has good relationships with a number of Arab nations in the Middle East. Those relationships are important to us. I think to the extent that the US has influence throughout the region, that's also important from the standpoint of Israel's security interest.

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A number of those nations also have legitimate requirements. That is to say they're faced with various and sundry threats to their security and survival. And the United States from time to time helps satisfy those requirements. There are obviously other options.

I think, as a general proposition, when we're looking at one of those nations in the Middle East, and they are able to satisfy their legitimate security requirements by dealing with the US instead of some other major foreign power or arms supplier, that's in our interests as well as in Israel's interest. We do not want to be in the business, and are not as a matter of policy in this administration, of doing anything to upset the qualitative advantage that Israel clearly enjoys.

The question on the Egyptian tank transaction is an important one, but the key here is what we're doing is we're taking 700 of the M60A1 tanks -- that's one of our older tanks, currently deployed in Europe -- and sending those to EEgyptF. Egypt will in turn destroy, on a one-for-one basis, old ESovietF tanks that they currently have in their inventory. That's good. That's a positive development.

It's also important to remember that Israel and Egypt after all do have diplomatic relations, that Egypt has been, in recent years, a friend of Israel's. There is a peace agreement there. And I think that's a classic case where, from the standpoint of both Egypt and Israel, that kind of capability for Egypt doesn't constitute a threat to Israel and does, in fact, add to stability in the region and I think it helps cement the relationship, as well, between the United States and Egypt.

So that transaction, I think, makes sense. It has not been objected to by the government of Israel. And it is a way for us to enhance the security and stability, if you will, of an important country in that part of the world, a country that does have good relationships with Israel.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Could you -- I may have missed the beginning, and if I'm repeating myself, please correct me, but what about the example -- we understand in the context of Egypt, but is it a bad example for the Soviet Union, as they have this excess equipment also? Is there any concern about what they'll do with it?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I haven't noted any special restraint on the part of the Soviets in supplying military hardware in the Middle East in the past. There's a lot of it there already, obviously, that has been provided by the Soviets to the ESyriansF and the ELibyansF and to others.

I'm not that concerned about that kind of a transaction. We haven't seen any evidence of it yet at this point. But in the final analysis, I come back to the proposition that it is in the interest of Israel and the United States for the US to have the kind of broad influence throughout the region that goes with our helping satisfy the legitimate security needs of several governments in that part of the world. And that's why we've pursued the particular policy we have.

MODERATOR: There are several questions -- we spent a good deal of the conference on the issue of ESoviet emigrationF. While the numbers are terrific and we're pleased with that, there is a sense

urgency about getting as many Soviet Jews out as possible, as quickly as possible. It's apparent that the direct flight agreement between El Al and Aeroflot is not going to be implemented any time in the near future. What is the chance -- the questioner is asking -- is the chance of involving US military aircraft in helping to lift Soviet Jews out of the Soviet Union? (Applause.)

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SEC. CHENEY: I -- that's one I hadn't thought of. (Laughter, applause.) It's conceivable you might have some difficulties getting the Soviets to allow us to fly a lot of -- (laughter) -- US Force flights into Moscow and other centers. I'll take it under advisement. (Laughter. Applause.)

MODERATOR: Mr. Secretary, we are very respectful of your position and the scope of your responsibilities, but I'm getting frustrated with the questions on a topic that you might imagine is very close to us and that we've spent a lot of energy on in the last couple of days, and that has to do with the question of Jerusalem.

You spoke very eloquently and deeply about this country's -- this nation's commitment to Israel's security and so maybe you could give us a comment on how you reconcile that commitment, which we trust and want to believe in, with the President's comments in denigrating out and calling -- leading us to believe that his thoughts are that East Jerusalem is occupied territory and the failure of the United States over years to recognize Israel's right to be in Jerusalem.

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I have learned as the Secretary of Defense (laughter) -- to be very cautious about interpreting the comments of any leader. (Laughter.)

The fact is that the position of the United States, the policy of the United States there is -- remains unchanged, it has not been changed. And that policy is -- because I checked it with Jim Baker before I came over here this afternoon -- (laughter, applause) -- that we believe that Jerusalem should not be divided -- (extended applause, cheers) -- and -- and that the status should be resolved as the final step in the negotiation process of achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. That has been our policy for a long time. It is a subject to be negotiated once we get the negotiations started, and that policy is unchanged.

MODERATOR: Do you have time for more? I thought there was a final --

SEC. CHENEY: I'd take one more question.

MODERATOR: One more? Okay. Could you talk about briefly the relationship of Haifa with the Sixth Fleet and how that is part of the strategic relationship?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, we do have a number of port calls by our ships; naval vessels visit Haifa. It's an excellent port and

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We will continue to -- obviously, to be very actively involved in the Mediterranean. That's one place where we have one of our aircraft carrier battle groups stationed 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 52 weeks a year. And that commitment isn't going to change, and I would expect that we will frequently and periodically continue to do joint exercises with Israeli forces, to pay port calls -- port visits in Haifa, continue to be an important location and place for us.

MODERATOR: Okay, and --

SEC. CHENEY: Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

MODERATOR: -- thank you.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מבריה'מ' לישראל וצריך למצוא דרכי ביניים אשר יענו על הצרכים. הוזכרו אפשרויות של קיום טיסות שכר מבריה'מ' לארצות מזרח אירופה ומשם לארץ.

בהתייחסותו לעניין התיישבותם של עולים ביו"ש, ציין איגלברגר שהנושא אמנם חרג מהמימדים האמיתיים שלו והביע הערכה על הנתונים שנמסרו לו ע"י דיניץ. בהקשר זה עלתה לדיון הצהרתו של הנשיא בוש לגבי מזרח ירושלים.

איגלברגר השיב, שככל ששני הצדדים ימהרו להוריד את הנושא מסדר היום הציבורי, כן ייטב לשתי המדינות. מדבריו היה ניתן להבין שאיזכור מזרח ירושלים היה ביטוי לתסכול וזעם של הנשיא בנושא ההתנחלויות בשטחים וזו היתה דרכו להביע תסכול זה. עם זאת, ברור שאין בכוונת הממשל לטפל בנושא מזרח ירושלים או להעלותו לסדר היום ולכן כל ויכוח פומבי רק מחריף, ללא צורך את מערכת היחסית בין שתי המדינות.

בנושא הערביות לשיכון ציין איגלברגר, שנצטרך לפעול במשותף כדי להגיע לנוסחה שתאפשר מחד תמיכת הממשל במתן הערביות, ומאידך, נוסחה שישראל תוכל לחיות עמה לפיה, הכספים האלה לא ינוצלו לבניה בשטחים. בנושא זה סוכם שאפגש עמו לדיון בשבוע הבא.

דיניץ העלה גם את נושא הסיוע שניתן ע"י הממשל באמצעות ה-U.I.A. בסך של 25 מיליון דולר אשר משמש לצרכי כיסוי הוצאות להטסת העולים ארצה. דיניץ אמר שהסוכנות היהודית ביקשה באמצעות ה-U.I.A. להכפיל סכום זה לנתיב הצרכים הגדולים, ולהקציב למטרה זו 100 מיליון דולר בשנה הבאה. איגלברגר השיב כי לא שמע אל בקשה זו אשר אמורה היתה להיות מוגשת ע"י ה-U.I.A. אין הוא רואה סיכוי להגדיל ההקצבה השנה מ-25 ל-50 מיליון דולר, ולגבי השנה הבאה, הממשל הגיש כבר את תקציבו וגם שם המצב עגום מאד מבחינה תקציבית.

כמו-כן, הבטיח לבדוק כיצד יוכל להיות לעזר בנושא.

ארד

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, ממנכל, ממנכל, מנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר, ר/מרכז, ממד, רס, פ(אמן), תפוצות, סייבל

02-5376967 פקס 02-5376967

המחלקה הכלכלית והמנהלית של הממשלה, תחת
ההנהגה של שר המדע והטכניקה, תהיה
המחלקה הכלכלית והמנהלית של הממשלה.

המחלקה הכלכלית והמנהלית של הממשלה, תחת
ההנהגה של שר המדע והטכניקה, תהיה
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המחלקה הכלכלית והמנהלית של הממשלה.

המחלקה הכלכלית והמנהלית של הממשלה, תחת

המחלקה

המחלקה

המחלקה הכלכלית והמנהלית של הממשלה, תחת
ההנהגה של שר המדע והטכניקה, תהיה
המחלקה הכלכלית והמנהלית של הממשלה.

2/3

401 2/3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1990

Dear Mr. Mayor:

Thank you for your thoughtful and gracious letter. I will always treasure the memory of my visit to Jerusalem, an experience made even more enjoyable because of your personal involvement. But I am simply one of many who are in debt to you. Thanks to your fair and farsighted leadership, and to Israel's exemplary respect for the holy places, Jerusalem remains an inspiration and a source of hope to Jews, Christians and Muslims alike.

I would like to thank you as well for sharing your insights with me. There is much that we hold in common. As you note, the basis of our position remains that Jerusalem must never again be a divided city. We did not approve of the status quo before 1967; in no way do we advocate a return to it now. This was and is the policy of the United States, and it is my policy. Our efforts in the peace process are in no way designed to promote the division of Jerusalem. We would oppose any such effort.

It is also our view that the final status of this most special of cities should be decided by negotiation, and that this negotiation would be facilitated if we were well along the path toward peace. There is thus no intention on our part to focus now on the final status of Jerusalem. It is also our view, just as it has been the view of the United States since 1967, that all sides should be taking steps to get to negotiations and avoiding steps that could prejudice the prospects for these negotiations. It is the pursuit of peace that ought to take priority, for only with peace can Jerusalem truly be open and whole.

3/3

401 $\frac{3}{3}$

2

Thank you again for taking the time to write me.
Barbara joins me in sending our best wishes to
you and your family.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Teddy Kollek
Mayor
City of Jerusalem



111 EAST WACKER DRIVE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601
PHONE (312) 585-3300

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
שיקאגו

פקסימיליה

DATE 11/3/54 תאריך

אל 22947 7/10/52 : 22947-1

FAX # 011-972-3-303362 .מס' פאקס.

ATT _____ לידני מוסקא 34

בהמשך לנר - 42 .

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THE JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIONS COUNCIL
OF THE JEWISH UNITED FUND OF METROPOLITAN CHICAGO

Ben Gurion Way • 1 South Franklin Street • Chicago, Illinois 60606-4694 • (312)346-6700 • FAX 444-2086

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**Director, Chicago Conference
On Soviet Jewry**
Richard D. Zelin

Program Coordinator
Jonathan Pearl

March 9, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We write on behalf of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Metropolitan Chicago to welcome reports of your recent reassurance to Seymour Reich, Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, that the United States is committed to a united Jerusalem.

Israel's liberation of parts of Jerusalem and the reunification of the entire city in June of 1967 reversed an aberration which had prevailed only since 1948. During that previous 20 years Jews were prevented from dwelling in areas and neighborhoods where they had lived for centuries. Synagogues had been destroyed and cemeteries desecrated. The reunification had enormous and profound significance for Jewish people everywhere as the Jewish people's ancient center and the capital of the State of Israel was made whole. Since then, Jews everywhere, both in Israel and in America, whatever their political leanings, have been united in a commitment that our geographic heart should never again be divided and that never again should any Jew be denied the freedom to live or worship in any part of Jerusalem that he or she desires.

We understand that U.S. policy is that the final status of Jerusalem is to be determined through a negotiated settlement. We welcome the reassurance, expressed by Vice President Dan Quayle at a recent meeting of the Conference of Presidents and conveyed by State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler, that the U.S. government is committed to recognizing the right of Jews to live anywhere in Jerusalem.

Sincerely yours,

Maynard I. Wishner
Chairman

Michael C. Kotzin
Director

Jewish Community Relations Council
of Metropolitan Chicago

MIW/MCK:abs

13

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים
סוג בטחוני: שמור
דחיפות: מיידי
תאריך וז"ח: 13/3/90
מס' מברק:

ארה"ב

המשרד

367

אל: מנהל מצפ"א. יועץ שה"ח לתפוצות

הועידה הדו-לשונית של המנהיגות הצעירה של המגבית.

הועידה בה השתתפו כ- 2500 משתתפים מרחבי ארה"ב היתה מרשימה מאוד והקרינה התלהבות, מסירות ועוצמה.

הנושא המרכזי שהעסיק את הועידה וליכד את משתתפיה היה נושא ירושלים, לאור התבטאות הנשיא בוש. הדברים ששמעו המשתתפים בנושא זה מהשגריר, סנטור קסטן, תום דיין, מנדל קפלן, שמחה דיניץ ואחרים גרמו להתלהבות רבה ולנחישות לפעולה מהירה בנושא בגבעה ובממשל (מצ"ב המנשר שנחתם ע"י משתתפי הועידה). היום יפגשו המשתתפים עם חברי קונגרס הן בנושא ירושלים והן בנושאים האחרים העומדים על הפרק כסיוע חוץ, יהודי בריה"מ ואש"פ.

בכוונתנו לפעול באמצעות הקונסוליות להידוק הקשרים בניהן לבין הסניפים המקומיים של המנהיגות הצעירה וכבר שוחחנו בנושא עם המנהיגות הלאומית של הארגון.

שם אספה ג' א"ש חפ"ח
אצ"ל ופא"ר ח"ב הסכ"מ
א.ס.מ. 2

367 $\frac{2}{2}$ PROCLAMATION

HAVING ASSEMBLED IN OUR NATION'S CAPITAL TO EDUCATE OURSELVES
AND REAFFIRM OUR DEEPLY HELD COMMITMENT TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL;
AND HAVING CONSIDERED THE RELIGIOUS, HISTORIC, AND POLITICAL
IDENTIFICATION OF ALL JEWS WITH JERUSALEM;
WE WISH TO RECORD THE VIEWS OF THE 2500 JEWISH LEADERS IN
ATTENDANCE AT THE 7TH NATIONAL YOUNG LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE.

1. JERUSALEM HAS BEEN THE CENTER OF THE JEWISH
PEOPLE AND THE OBJECT OF OUR YEARNING FOR
OVER 3,000 YEARS.
2. SINCE THE RECREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL IN
1948, JERUSALEM HAS BEEN THE CAPITAL OF THE
JEWISH HOMELAND.
3. SINCE 1967, JERUSALEM HAS BEEN A UNIFIED CITY,
FREE AND OPEN TO ALL PEOPLE AND ALL RELIGIONS.
4. THE CONTINUED UNITY OF JERUSALEM AND THE RIGHT
OF ALL PEOPLES TO LIVE AND WORSHIP WITHIN JERUSALEM
CAN NEVER BE COMPROMISED AND IS NOT NEGOTIABLE.
5. AS PROUD AMERICANS AND PROUD JEWS WE CALL UPON
ALL AMERICANS AND OUR GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ALL STEPS
NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED UNITY OF JERUSALEM
AS THE CAPITAL OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF ISRAEL.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11070

תאריך 14.03.90

נכנס **

שמור

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חוזם: 3,11070

אל: המשרד

יעדים: וושינגטון/194, מצב/1598, מנמת/675
מ-: נר, 424, תא: 130390, זח: 1730, דח: מ, סג: שמ
תח: @ גס: צפא
נד: @

ארה"ב

שמור/מיידי

אל: מנהל מצפ'א, יועץ תפוצות.

דע: השגריר וושינגטון
לשכת שה'ח.

מאת: לשכת הקונכ'ל.

~~בנושא הצהרת בוש על ירושלים-ממשיכים לתדרך ולכוון את
הארגונים היהודים לפעולה לעד הממשל והקונגרס.~~

כמה פעולות מיוחדות:

ה- JCRC פנה למויניהאן כדי לעודד אותו לכתוב OP-ED
בנושא ב- NYT .

הקונכ'ל פנה לאלי וויזל במגמה שיכתוב מאמר (או אף מכתב
לנשיא).

הקונכ'ל תדרך את מורט צוקרמן אשר יכתוב בשבוע הבא.

העברנו חומר רלוונטי לג'ק שטיין שביקש לשתף בו את ידידיו
בממשל.

הקומיטי וה- ZOA שיגרו מכתבים בנפרד לנשיא בוש.

נציגי ארגונים יהודיים ציינו כי מספר קונגרסמנים שהתבקשו

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דחיות: מיגד	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	קד: 1
סוג: שמור	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 1
תאריך וזמן העבר:	אל: מזא"ר ו, מצמ"א.	
13.3.90	דע: ממ"ד	
כס' פרוק:		
המסרד:		
391	פאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.	

ארה"ב בריה"מ: מפגש שרי חוץ

1. במסגרת ההכנות למסגרת בנושאי-גורבינו (שחקקים בארה"ב במחצית השניה של יוני) יפא ב"ק אטלנטיק ב-6.4-4 בנושאינגטון.
2. במסגרת השיחות יעמדו נושאי תפיקות על החימוש: הסכם START, נשק כימי ו-CFE.
3. בין הנושאים הצפויים להידון במסגרת הרגיונלית: אפגניסטן, אמריק"ז הבחירות בניקרגואה) אפריקה נקמבודית. נושא המזה"ת (כרגיל) יידון בנפרד.
4. עד למפגש בנושאינגטון צפוי מפגש בין שני שרי החוץ (נידור).

שטיינ

המפגש יתקיים ב-6.4-4 בנושאינגטון
במסגרת השיחות יעמדו נושאי תפיקות על החימוש: הסכם START, נשק כימי ו-CFE.
בין הנושאים הצפויים להידון במסגרת הרגיונלית: אפגניסטן, אמריק"ז הבחירות בניקרגואה) אפריקה נקמבודית. נושא המזה"ת (כרגיל) יידון בנפרד.

תפוצה: 36

1990-03-13

20:09

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דתיקות: אליה	שגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון	ק: 1
סוג: 15	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן העבר: 13.3.90		אל: מצבא, יולט שהה דהמולנה
כס' פרוק: 392	ארה"ב	דע:
הפסד:		כאח: ק. דקלונרס

ועדת המנהיגים הצעירים של ה- UJA

בערב הפתיחה ב- 11/3 נאמו שני הסנטורים ברדלי וקסטן (בנוסף לשגריר וחום דיין).
להלן עיקרי דבריהם:-

סנטור ברדלי

- יש לפעול בזריזות לגבי השעיית ג'קסון - וניס. (WE WILL GO SLOW ON REPLACING IT.)
- וביטול תיקוני סחר כלפי בריה"מ.
- יש להשתמש בכל הזדמנות כדי להוציא מבריה"מ כל מי שמעוניין לצאת.
- יש להמשיך לעמוד מאחורי הבטחת בטחונה של ישראל.
- על ה- אנט לעמוד מאחורי ישראל וכן מאחורי הנצרכים והנזקקים בארה"ב.
- סיים דבריו בסיפור לפיו בעת ביקורו בישראל לקח חזיל טרמפיסט אשר אמר לו TRUST ME כאשר נתן לו הנחיות להגיע לקיבוץ מסויים. ברדלי סיים דבריו ואמר I DO TRUST YOU.

סנטור קסטן

- אנו עדים לשנויים המתחוללים בכל העולם להוציא המזרחית. במזרחית אנו מוצאים נשק בימינו.
- טרור וישראל מאיימת. אלנו, כארה"ב, החובה לסייע לישראל דוקא בימים אלה. התייחס למתרחש עתה בישראל וציין כי חשוב שהצהרות ארה"ב תהיינה עקביות וחד משמעיות. עלינו - הקונגרס to be there and we will be there.

- היום אנחנו ואתם ניצבים בפני אתגר - עליית יהודי בריה"מ. מסכים לדברי ברדלי שיש לאפשר לכל יהודי הרוצה לצאת, לעשות כן. שלא תהיה סוג, דלת שנפתחת יכולה להסגר. אסור לחזור על הטרגדיה של שנות ה- 30. יש להמתין להעברת החוקים בבריה"מ ורק אח"כ להפסיד את ג'קסון וניס וחוקי סחר אחרים.
- קסטן מנה 4 תחומי פעילות המעסיקים אותו עתה:

תפוצה: - 36 -

שהם קטנים והם גורמים ל...
הוא קטן והוא גורם ל...

1990-03-13

20:10

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דחיפות:	סגירות ישראל/וויסינגטון	דף: 2
סוג:	טופס פבוק	כתוב: 2
תאריך ושפת העבודה:		אל:
פס' פבוק:		דף:
הפסיד:		פאת:
392		

1. 400 מיליון דולר ערבויות לדיוור - יש לפעול במהירות. בכוונתו להצמיד תיקון ל-Supplemental על סיוע לפנמה כדי שזה יעבור מהר. סיפר גם על תנאי החלואה הנוכחיים.
2. הצליח להביא להסכמת הממשל למימון נוסף של 70 מיליון ליישוב יהודים בארה"ב.
3. הסכם טיסות ישירות - אינו מבוצע נוכח לחץ ערבי. גם ממשלת ארה"ב יכולה להפעיל לחץ (נגדי). מספר סנטורים כבר עושים זאת. התחלנו במכתב (100 הסנטורים) ועתה מו תיקון להפסיק מו"מ הסחר עם בריה"מ במידה והטיסות לא יבוצעו (יזומת ספקטור).
4. יישוב העולים בשטחים - הערבים מתנגדים לכל נושא העלייה ואין להם הזכות להתנגד לעליית יהודים והתישבותם במולדתם. לכן היה מודאג מקישור עלייה (ע"י הממשל) לתהליך השלום. אין לדון בגיאוגרפיה לנתק שני הדברים.

- קיימים קשרים טובים בין 2 חמדינות. יש להמשיך הסיוע לישראל המסורתית של ארה"ב. אין זה להשתמש במילות קוד כמו הצורך ב"גמישות" או "גילוח שריזנים", לטובת דמוקרטיה חדשות ע"י מדינות הנמצאות בסכנה. ניתן לתת הלואות לדמוקרטיה החדשות ולהפוך ידיבדנדות השל ידיבדנדות החופש מבלי לקבל הסיוע לאיגוף הידידות המסורתית. ישראל היא בח בריחב ויש לטפל בעולים.

- יש להפסיק הNonsense לגבי ירושלים. ירושלים היא בירת ישראל מאוחדת ותשאר מאוחדת. הג (ומן שממארה"ב תבין שירושלים תשאר מאוחדת ולא חצויה).

קסטן זכה מ- 2500 משתתפי חוקידה, מספר פעמים Standing Ovation ומחאות כפיים סוערות.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגור

תפוצה:

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11030

13.03.90 תאריך

נכנס

בלמס

חוזם: 3,11030

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1589, מנמת/664

מ-: נוש, נר: 378, תא: 130390, זח: 1630, דח: ב, סג: בל

תח: & גס: צפא

נר: &

אלק'ק

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפא, מעת, הסברה.

דע: יועץ רוהם לתקשורת,

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון.

להלן דברי הנשיא בוש במסעת בביית הלבן.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, DO YOU REGRET THE OTHER DAY RAISING THE ISSUE OF SETTLEMENTS IN EAST JERUSALEM?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I DON'T REGRET IT. I THINK
-- I THINK ALL THE SPECULATION AND COMMENTARY OF THE LAST TEN DAYS HAVE BLOWN THINGS WAY OUT OF PROPORTION.

WHAT I WAS DOING WAS REITERATING UNITED STATES POLICY. BUT LET ME SAY THIS. RIGHT NOW IN ISRAEL, THERE'S INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE IN THE POLITICAL SCENE THERE, AND I DO NOT WANT TO LOOK IN ANY WAY LIKE WE'RE TRYING TO MINGLE INTO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL AS THEY ARE GOING THROUGH THIS DIFFICULT POLITICAL PROBLEM RIGHT NOW. RIGHT NOW. AND, SO, I WILL ANSWER NO MORE ON IT. YOU HAVE -- I'LL TRY TO CLARIFY IT BECAUSE YOU HAVE THE FOLLOW-UP. BUT IT'S SO

447.50.51

SENSITIVE AND IT IS SO EMOTIONAL THAT I JUST THINK
ANY FURTHER SPECULATION ON THIS QUESTION WOULD
BE -- CERTAINLY NOT BE USEFUL, GIVEN WHAT'S
HAPPENED JUST IN THE LAST FEW HOURS.

Q WELL, CAN I JUST ASK THEN --

PRESIDENT BUSH: YEAH, YOU CAN ASK.

Q (CHUCKLES.) I'M NOT REALLY CLEAR WHY YOU RAISED
THE ISSUE AT ALL. WAS THERE A PARTICULAR REASON?
IT'S LONG BEEN PART OF US POLICY --

PRESIDENT BUSH: YEAH.

Q -- BUT IT HASN'T BEEN TALKED ABOUT A LOT.

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I UNDERSTAND THAT. THAT'S
WHY I WILL SPECULATE NO FURTHER ON IT. I THINK
IT IS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL AND -- BUT I THINK ANY
SPECULATION AND ANY COMMENTARY AT THIS JUNCTURE
-- A LOT OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE I MADE THAT COMMENT
-- WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, (אמן),
ממ, בונצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה, לעמ

-שמו-

קאפ זינן

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

12 במרץ 1990

אמריק

אליא זמיר
א

ד"ר
אליא זמיר

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופרי"ן
דע: מנכ"ל ראה"מ
יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

ראו נא מכתב קונגרסמן מל לוינ למזכיר. לוינ ביקש שלא יינתן כל פרסום למכתב.

בברכה,
6514
עודד ערן

העתק: השגריר, כאן



MEL LEVINE
27TH DISTRICT CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS
ABUSE AND CONTROL

CO-CHAIR
HOUSE EXPORT TASK FORCE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

WASHINGTON OFFICE
132 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
TELEPHONE 202-225-6451

DISTRICT OFFICE
5250 WEST CENTURY BOULEVARD
SUITE 447
LOS ANGELES, CA 90045
TELEPHONE 213-410-9415
213-393-4135 (SANTA MONICA)

March 8, 1990

The Honorable James Baker
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for phoning me last Thursday to express your appreciation for my call to Prime Minister Shamir, urging him to agree to the formula advanced by you and Minister Arens.

After I spoke with the Prime Minister, I felt he wanted to say "yes" to that formula. I was even more encouraged after my very constructive discussion with Dennis Ross.

In light of how close you and the Prime Minister appeared to be, I hope you can understand how startled and upset I was to learn--within hours of our conversation--that you had made three separate statements whose inevitable consequence was to reawaken deep Israeli fears with regard to American policy.

Your statements supporting "shaving" aid to earmarked countries including Israel, questioning the proposed loan guarantee for housing for Soviet Jews, and giving Mr. Arafat a clean bill of health on terrorism--especially coming as they all did at such a delicate and significant time in our negotiations with Israel--could only serve to undermine Mr. Shamir's ability to move forward.

With regard to the PLO, surely you must have some doubts as to Mr. Arafat's involvement, encouragement, and acquiescence in terror. Indeed, PLO statements about their willingness to live in peace with Israel and refrain from terrorist attacks remain ambiguous at best, as the enclosed items underscore. No doubt you would agree that such statements impede--rather than advance--the peace process.

Furthermore, your Assistant Secretary, Mr. Kelly, last week before the House Foreign Affairs Middle East Subcommittee, conceded that Fatah operatives were likely involved in a terrorist attack in the Negev in December. This is an obvious repudiation of the PLO's December, 1988, commitment on this issue. Yet, Mr. Kelly's clear implication was that--as long as Arafat did not himself pull any trigger--it would have no bearing on U.S. policy toward the PLO.

I must ask, Mr. Secretary, who is responsible for attacks committed by Arafat's own troops if not Arafat himself? And what is the point of talking to him if he cannot control even those people loyal to him? Will this

Administration simply look the other way under any set of circumstances? How does such an attitude help us to influence PLO policy if we are prepared to overlook such counterproductive behavior? Indeed, today's Washington Post indicates that the PLO leadership views recent Administration statements and actions as a sign that the U.S. will "deliver talks," i.e., Israel. Unfortunately, it seems as if the PLO believes it no longer has any obligation--or incentive--to fulfill its stated commitments of December, 1988.

Finally, and perhaps most important, what will be the value of U.S. assurances to Israel further down the road to peace if Israel believes the U.S. has already abandoned its commitment to hold the PLO accountable on terrorism?

The statements on the PLO were then compounded by the President's regrettable reference to East Jerusalem this past weekend, again at the very moment we were presumably trying to reassure Israel on the issue of Jerusalem.

Under these circumstances, a way should be found to restore Israel's confidence that U.S. policy has not shifted and that a long-term understanding on fundamental issues continues to exist between the United States and Israel.

Thank you for your attention to these matters.

Sincerely,



Mel Levine
Member of Congress


cc: Dennis Ross

דמיפות: מידוי	שגרירות ישראל / ווסינגטון טופס פרוק	קד: 1
סוג: שמר		כתוב: 2
תאריך וזמן תעבור: 12.3.90		אל: לשכת רה"מ
כס' פרוק: הפסד:		דע: מצפ"א
334	אנ"כ	פאת: ק. לקונגרס.

ביהנ"ב: תחנת המסר בערבה (VOA)

לחלן מכתב המופנה לרה"מ מטעם יו"ר ועדת החוץ צנעת פאסל, ותקונגרסמנים פאסל וגילמן
המביע תמיכתם בחקמת תחנת המסר. הקונגרסמנים מביעים גם תקוותם ובטחונם שבעינת
הסביבה יזכו לעדיפות גבוהה בכל החלטות הנגזרות לחקמת התחנה.

יהודית רנאי דרנגר.



1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2
ס"א גפסל גפסל גפסל גפסל גפסל גפסל גפסל גפסל
36

תפוצה: 36

LAWRENCE J. SMITH
18TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA



COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CHAIRMAN, TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL

EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

CRIME

ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL LAW

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS
ABUSE AND CONTROL

DEPUTY MAJORITY WHIP

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

March 7, 1990

113 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20518
(202) 225-7931
DISTRICT OFFICE:
PRESIDENTIAL CIRCLE
4000 HOLLYWOOD BLVD.
SUITE 300N
HOLLYWOOD, FL 33021
(305) 987-6484 BROWARD
(305) 624-8111 DADE

334 2/2

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

We are writing to express our continued support for the agreement between the United States and Israel to establish a Voice of America/Board for International Broadcasting relay station in Israel. We believe that the long term interests of the United States and Israel are jointly served and strengthened by the prompt implementation of this agreement.


We are pleased that your government has been sensitive to the effects the relay station may have on Israel's environment. In light of recent concerns expressed by certain environmental groups, we are hopeful and confident that your government will continue to give environmental concerns a high priority in all decisions related to the construction of the relay station.

Now more than ever, it is clear that the communication of ideas is an essential part of the democratic changes reverberating throughout the world. For this reason, we firmly support and continue to believe that the installation of a BIB/VOA relay station in Israel will make a significant contribution towards delivering America's message of democracy and freedom into the 21st century.

Very truly yours,


Lawrence J. Smith, M.C.


Dante Fascell, M.C.


Ben Gilman, M.C.

3

שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק

דף מתוך דפים

סוג בטחוני שמור

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך/ז"ח 13.3.90 :30

מס' מברק

372

אוי

אל : ר. סיבל, היועמ"ש

מאת : השגריר, וושינגטון

בחירות בשטחים.

לשלך ווש/207

בפגישתי עם גינגריץ' לא התחייבתי למונח פיקוח.

בתשובה לשאלתו השבתי שאם ארה"ב וארה"ב בלבד תרצה לשלוח משקיפים לעקוב
אחר הבחירות אני מניח שלא תהינה בעיות.

לידיעתך שכאשר רה"מ נשאל בנושא זה באחת מפגישותיו עם חברי קונגרס - השיב
באותה רוח.

עם זאת הוספתי, כפי שמופיע במברקנו הנ"ל, שהקורד שלנו ונגישות התקשורת
לכל מקום, מהווים ההגנה הטובה ביותר והערובה היעילה ביותר לקיום בחירות
חופשיות.

חש
א/א


3.3.90 שטן קלני אלה אינני

למח 3 סלח 3 רהג 3 גרהג 3 להכ 3 אלה 3 גרהג 3
בוצב 3 אלה 3 סייב 3 סלח 3 כלהכ 3 גרהג 3 רה 3 אלה 3
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לשכת ראש הממשלה
11/3/90

official text



03/05/90

PRESIDENT BUSH COMMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST SUBJECT

Saturday, March 3, 1990

(Excerpts on peace process, aid to Israel, Soviet immigration)

Palm Springs -- Following are excerpts from President George Bush's March 3 press conference at Palm Springs, California.

Q* Mr. President, there are reports out of Israel that Yitzhak Shamir is prepared to accept the U.S. formula for Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Do you know anything about that, and if so, what shape will it take?

THE PRESIDENT* Well, as you know, we have been working on this for eight months. And I certainly -- Jim Baker and I were just talking about it, and I might say I commend him for staying in there, trying to be a catalyst to get this process going.

So we don't know any of the details of that; we just talked to our top officials here. But I hope it's true and I hope we can move forward. And if we do, I'll be glad to salute our Secretary of State and others, including Mr. Shamir, Mr. Mubarak, for hanging in there, trying to get something moving toward peace.

Q* Has there been any movement, sir? If you don't know about his final commitment, has there been any movement toward acceptance of the U.S. formula?

THE PRESIDENT* Well, there has over the months. But just like the real world, you take two steps forward and take one step back. I hope we're going to go forward now.

.....



United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63432 Tel. 654338
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

Q* Will you work to reduce some of the foreign aid to the largest recipients, like Egypt and Israel, so that the United States, can give more to Eastern Europe, Nicaragua and the countries --

THE PRESIDENT* Well, I am against earmarking. I am for more flexibility. We have had discussions with our congressmen, including the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Some of those discussions encourage the concept of a fund that gives the President the flexibility to determine a certain amount of foreign aid money. So I'm less interested in reducing somebody than I am getting the flexibility so that when you see a country come forward and try to solidify their democracy or work cooperatively with us in the Caribbean as, say, Mr. Manley in Jamaica is doing, we'd like to be able to help him more.

Q* Would it be a bad signal right now with Israel trying to move toward talks with the Palestinians?

THE PRESIDENT* Would what be a bad signal?

Q* Would the reduction of aid to Israel?

THE PRESIDENT* I don't know that moving towards peace need be totally equated with aid. I mean, we're talking about a quest for peace that comes not just in Israel, but in Egypt and everything else. So I'm not tying those two subjects. But Israel has some big economic problems, they've got some big problems facing them that require a very generous apportionment of aid money, and they are getting that.

Q* To follow on the question of aid to Israel, Secretary Baker has suggested that we might tie aid to resettle the Soviet Jews to the Israelis' willingness to not settle the West Bank and to withdraw some of its settlements from the West Bank and Gaza. Then the State Department seemed to equivocate on that. What's your position?

THE PRESIDENT* Well, I'm not sure there was equivocation. My position is that the foreign policy of the United States says we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem. And I will conduct that policy as if it's firm, which it is, and I will be shaped in whatever decisions we make to see whether people can comply with that policy. And that's our strongly-held view. We think it's constructive to peace -- the peace process -- if Israel will follow that view. And so there's divisions in Israel on this question, incidentally. Parties are divided on it. But this is the position of the United States and I'm not going to change that position.

Q* So will you link aid to resettle the Soviet Jews?

THE PRESIDENT* I will just simply reiterate that the policy right here -- that we are not going to look favorably upon new settlements.

OT1

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8201

תאריך : 09.03.90

דף 1 מתוך 3

יוצא

סודי ביותר

עותק 1 מתוך 12

חוזם: 3,8201

אל: ווש/288, נ/420, מצב/1100

מ-: המשרד, תא: 090390, זח: 2002, דח: ב, סג: סב

תח: @ גס: ארבל

נד: @

מ"מ
2

סודי ביותר/בהול להזעיק

אל: וושינגטון - השגריר

דע: נאום, ניו יורק - ביין

מועב'ט. ישוב עולים ביש'ע

למברק ניו יורק (34 לווינגטון)

1. מהמידע שהגיענו מניו יורק נראה לנו שהולך ומתקדם שתפ' בין האמריקאים, הסובייטים והמצרים בגיבוש נוסח הצעת החלטה לקראת דיון מועב'ט בשבוע הבא. מהלך אמריקאי זה, המתנהל מבלי שנשותף בו כלל, גורם לנו לאכזבה קשה. במשך כל השנה שעברה ניהלנו מערכה משותפת נגד כל ניסיון ערבי להשתמש בארגונים הבינ'ל כמכשיר לקבלת החלטות העלולות להשפיע על תוצאות המהלכים המדיניים שלנו. על סיועם הנמרץ והיעיל בכל הארגונים הבינ'ל הבענו גם את הערכתנו. המהלך האמריקאי הנוכחי עומד בסתירה לשת"פ המסורתי ההדוק הקיים בינינו במישור זה.

2. נבקשך להעלות את הנושא לדיון דחוף עם איגלברגר תוך ציון הנקודות הבאות:

א. אכזבתנו כאמור בסעיף 1 דלעיל.

ב. ברור מהמידים הצנועים של ישוב עולים בשטחים שיוזמי הדיון במועב'ט אינם מוטרדים מעצם הנושא אלא משתמשים בו כחלק ממאבקם המדיני בישראל.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 3
עותק 1 מתוך 12

ג. תמיכה אמריקאית בנוסח כזה או אחר במועב'ט עלולה להיות לה השפעה שלילית על דעת הקהל בארץ וזאת בעיתוי רגיש ועדין במיוחד של התהליך המדיני.

ד. הערבים בודאי יקנו לעמדה האמריקאית משמעות בהקשר לתהליך המדיני ולא יפרשו דוקא כנקיטת עמדה בנושא ההתנחלויות גרידא.

ה. לאור האמור לעיל אין לנו ענין ואיננו רואים תועלת בכך שהאמריקאים יכנסו לדיונים על 'שיפור וריכוך' נוסח הצעת ההחלטה.

לדעתנו, לאור המשמעות המדינית שיש לנושא כולו, מוטב היה לו הטילו וטו.

ו. השיקול המכריע בבואם לקבל החלטה על הצבעתם במועב'ט צריך להתייחס למידת הנזק או התועלת לגבי התהליך המדיני. גישתה של ארה'ב שפתרון הקבע לסכסוך יימצא בתהליך המדיני ובמומ', מחייבת אותה להימנע מצעדים העלולים להתפרש כנקיטת עמדה לפני שהתהליך החל בכלל. מה שעומד למבחן זו איננה השאלה אם טכסט כזה או אחר משקף את מדיניותם בנושא ההתנחלויות.

ז. באשר לירושלים, עמדתה הנחרצת של ישראל ברורה לחלוטין. גם אם יש בינינו הבדלי השקפות, הרי אין תבונה מדינית בחידודם בכלל ובעיתוי הנוכחי בפרט.

ח. לתשומת לבכם שגם אם תמכה ארה'ב ב-1980 בהצעת החלטה באותו נושא, הרי שב-1983 הטילה וטו.

ט. במקביל נבקשכם להתייעץ בדחיפות עם איפאק ועם ידידים בקונגרס במגמה לגייס מירב התמיכה בעמדתנו. דווחונא על הערכתכם לגבי הפעולות בשני המישורים.

י. עם תום כתיבת מברק זה אני למד שפיקרינג מסר לביין כי ארה'ב פועלת למען דחיית הדיון במועב'ט. על אף זאת נראה לי שיש מקום לפעולות המוצעות במברק זה.

ממנכ'ל.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 *
מתוך 3 *
עותק 1 *
מתוך 12 *

*תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, ארבל 27

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* 8409 תאריך 10.03.90 *
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5406 מספר וולף עשירי ב"מ טל. 03-5370067

11/9/90

* חוזם: 3,8409
 * אל: המשרד
 * יעדים: מצב/1172
 * מ-: ווש, נר: 289, תא: 090390, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סב
 * תח: 6 גס: צפא
 * נד: 6

* סודי ביותר - מיידי ח.ר.ב

* אל: סמנכל צפא ופרנ

* דע: יועץ מדיני לשהח

* מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

* ירושלים. שלך 144.

* 1. בדיון פנימי שקיימתי עם חברי הצוות התגבשה הצעה שגם אם
 * אפשר להעביר חקיקה אין צורך בשלב זה לאמץ האפיק החקיקתי,
 * אלא לבחור מסלול ביניים שיבהיר למימשל התמיכה הקיימת
 * בקונגרס בנושא זה ולא תתן פתחון פה למימשל העשוי להאשים את
 * ישראל בנסיון להכשלת התהליך המדיני. המסלול המוצע של
 * SPECIAL ORDER שיגובש ב - SENSE OF CONGRESS
 * יהווה גם 'מסר חנוכי' למימשל לא רק בהקשר של ירושלים.

* 2. נראה לי שהחלטה כזו צריכה לקרוא לשמירת אחדותה של העיר
 * כבירת ישראל מבלי להתייחס לאלמנטים אחרים כדי לאפשר למימשל
 * לחיות עם זה, ולהבטיח תמיכה מירבית.

* 3. מעבר לפעילות המוצעת במישור הקונגרסיאלי פעלנו במגזרים
 * נוספים: קהילה יהודית ותקשורת כדי להביא להתבטאויות בנושא
 * הן מצד ראשי הארגונים היהודיים והן מצד בעלי טורים. נראה לי
 * שרגישות הנושא גם מחייבת מאמץ הסברתי מיוחד וזאת נעשה.

* ארד.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* דף 2 *
* עותק 2 *
* מתוך 8 *

*תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

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* 0017 S 0017 S 0017 S 0017 S 0017 S

8341

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 10.03.90

נכנס **

שמו

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חוזם: 3,8341

אל: המשרד

יעדים: וושינגטון/149, מצב/1179

מ-: נני, נר: 345, תא: 090390, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: גס: ארבל

נד: ג

ארה"ב

שמו/מיד

תיק-215.16

אל: מנהל ארבל/2.

דע: המשנה למנכ"ל, מנהל מצפא, מנהל תפוצות,
השגריר/הציר שטיין-ווש

מאת: יוחנן ביין - נאו"מ.

JCRC - ג'והן בולטון.

מפי הנהגת הארגון-מייקל מילר והרייט מנדל.

ב-7 דנא היתה פגישה עם ג'והן בולטון בביתו של ג'ורג'
קליין-שהוא גם עמית רפובליקני וידיד. נכחו כ-35 איש.

1) עיקר הדיון היה בנושא ציונות-גזענות, בו תודרכו הנ"ל
מראש על ידי. היו שבחים רבים לפעילותו של בולטון והחלצותו
לנושא. הושם דגש על המשך מסע ציבורי לביטול החלטת האו"מ
באמצעות התבטאויות חוזרות של אישים רבים ככל האפשר, ופנייה
לראשי ממשלות ושרי חוץ להכליל הנושא בנאומיהם, כולל
בהופעותיהם בעצרת האו"מ הבאה.

2) הנושא הוזכר גם בפגישות שהיו ל-JCRC עם נשיא צ'כיה-
האול ועם אנדראוטי (שלו הובעה הערכה על התבטאות איטליה
בעצרת האחרונה).

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3) הדגש בשיחה היה כי יש להכין את דעת הקהל, הן כאן והן במדינות לקראת המועד שבו יוחלט - בעקבות HEAD COUNT שיראה תוצאה חיובית ברורה - על פעולה לביטול ההחלטה הרשמית. הוסכם כי לאור ההתפתחויות המדיניות המהפכניות השנה קשה לחזות מראש האם העצרת הקרובה תהיה כבר המועד המתאים, או שיהיה צורך להמתין להתפתחויות נוספות בעיקר בקרב המזארי'ות והבלמז'יות. בינתיים, כאמור, יש להמשיך בהכנת הקרקע ודעת הקהלה. אולין סומר מויצו עדכנה בנ"ל את סגן הנשיא-קוויל.

4) נכח בפגישה גם ED LUCK נשיא U.N.A. (אגודת הידידות ארה"ב-או"מ), שסיפר כי ארגונו עורך עתה מחקר שבדעתם לפרסם, על החרם הערבי נגד ישראל. JCRC ילחץ כי הארגון ייחלץ לפעולה גם בנושא הציונות, על אף רתיעתו עתה מכל פעולה העלולה לפגוע באו"מ. הזמנת LUCK היתה חשובה, לדעת המארגנים, שכן הוא התרשם ממשקלו של האירגון והשת'פ' עם בולטון - ועצם השתלבות JCRC בארגון הוולנטרי האמריקני למען האו"מ יגביר השפעתו לפעולות בכיוונים רצויים.

5) בולטון אמר שמעוניין להמשיך בקשר. סיפר, אגב, כי במגעיו עם הסובייטים בנושא הציונות ביקשוהו לספק להם חומר רקע, על אף שגם לו ברור שההחלטה בזמנו היתה ביוזמה סובייטית.

נאו"מ

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, ברנע, ארבל2, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות, פדודששון

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8179

תאריך : 10.03.90

שמו

נכנס

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חוזם: 3,8179

אל: המשרד

יעדים: וושינגטון/148, מצב/1178, מנמח/486

מ-: נ, נר: 315, תא: 090390, זח: 1200, זח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: & גס: ארב/

נד: &

א/הק

שמו/מיד

210.02 / עליה

אל: מנהל ארב 2

זע: ומשנה למנכ"ל, מנהל מצפא,
השגריר /הציר/שטיין ווש

מאת: יוחנן גיין -נאום

מועביט -עליה

למברקנו 291 (32-ווש).

שוחחתי (8/3) עם פיקרינג.

1. אמרתי שאני נבוכה הן כלפיו וכן כלפי הממשלה בירושלים על שמסתובבות טיוטות אמריקניות שאנו מקבלים מצד שלישי ולא מידידנו האמריקנים. אנו עדיין סבורים כי ראוי היה שלא להתדיין על נוסחים שלא יועילו ורק עלולים להביא נזק ליעד שיחזו אנו פועלים להשגתו: קידום יוזמת השלום, עם זאת, אם יוזמים טיוטות, ראוי שהשת"פ הקיים בינינו יימשך ושיעבירו לידעתנו.

2. פיקרינג אמר שהמסר נקלט ומובן, וידאג שלהבא נקבל טיוטות נכ"ל.

3. הוסיף, כי כפי שסיפר לי בשבוע שעבר, הוראותיו מווינגטון

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הן לנסות באמצעות המצרים להגיע לשפה ונוסח מוסכמים
''והכיוון ברור מתוך הנוסחים''. הוסיף כי ברור לו שהנוסחים
לא מקובלים עלינו.

4. ושאלה החשובה עתה, אמר, היא הזימון - יותר מן התוכן. המטרה
האמריקנית הרצויה היא שלא יהיה צורך להחליט עתה על נוסחים
- ''בזמן שנפלות החלטות בבית'' - ''אצלינו בארצ'' הוסיף
בעברית. ב-7 דנא היה פיקרינג בווישינגטון והוחלט לשגר שדר
לשה'ח מצרים, בו ממליצים שייעשו מאמצים על ידו לדחות כינוס
מועביט ככל האפשר שכן כינוסה עתה עלול לפגוע במאמצים לקידום
תהליך השלום הוסיף כי כמובן אם יגווע התהליך לכינוס מועביט
כולו - לא יצטערו, אם כי אינו מאמין שכך יהיה.

5. אשר לטיוטות ניירות העבודה- הם אמנם בשטח, אך המצרים
יודעים, לדברי פיקרינג, כי על כמה מן הנקודות אין לאמריקנים
עדיין הוואות (במשתמע: עמדתם תיקבע בהתאם להתקדמות
התהליך)...

6. איש כי בשלב זה מדובר על כינוס מועביט ביום ו' 14 דנא.
פיקרינג ייעדר בשבוע הבא ויחזור רק ביום ה' - אך לדבריו
הדבר אינו בהכרח מונע כינוס מועביט כמתוכנן.

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, והמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, 8(אמן),
ממד, ברנע, ארבל2, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר1, סולטן, מצרים

8369

תאריך: 10.03.90

נכנס **

סודי

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חוזם: 3,8369

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1187, מנמת/490

מ-: ווש, נר: 256, תא: 090390, זח: 1600, דח: סג, סו

תח: גס: ממד

נד: נד

ארה"ק

סודי/רגיל

אל: מנהל איסוף

מאת: עודד ערן

טוריה שלכם 183

בעקבות מברקכם נפגשתי לשיחה קצרה עם דג'רג'יאן.

א. נאום אסד - בידי שנינו היה רק הדיווח הקצר כפי שהופיע בעתונות האמריקאית - דג'רג'יאן אמר שבידי אסד עוד הזדמנויות רבות במהלך השבועות הקרובים להצביע על שינויים פנימיים בסוריה כמו בועידת הבעת'. להערכתו אסד לא יעשה זאת, יצביע הדבר על חולשה ופחד מאי יכולתו לשלוט על תהליך ואפילו איטי, של שינויים.

ב. לשאלת הגישה כלפי מו'מ עם ישראל. דג'רג'יאן הבהיר כי אנשי שיחו עם אנשי מימסד מדיניות חוץ (FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT) וגם אנשי צבא. לדבריו, הוא וזוטוב (הוא הזכיר מספר פעמים, בשתי השיחות, את יחסיו המעולים עם השגריר הסובייטי) הגיעו להערכה משותפת, שהמדובר אמנם בחשיבה מאד ראשונית, אבל שיש בה שינוי מסויים. השינוי מתבטא בעיקר בנכונות לחשוב במונחים של פרוז - אף כי פרוז הדדי שמטרתו ליצור אמון הדדי ונכונות למו'מ עם איזה שהיא חסות שזו הגמשה ביחס לרצון הסורי בועידה הבינלאומית. הסורים, כפי שהודגש במברק אמיתי 139, אינם חושבים על הסכם בילטרלי נפרד אלא על מו'מ במקביל לפתרון הסכסוך הישראלי -

פלשתינאי. בשיחות שונות עם אסד וגורמים אחרים, הסורים טוענים, שבעידן המודרני פחתה חשיבות מרכיב הטריטוריה ולכן אין לישראל צורך ברמת הגולן מבחינה בטחונית. שאלתי, אם הם העלו בשיחותיהם את ענין הטק'ק ודג'רג'יאן אישר ואמר, שבשיחות על אלו ועל הנשק הכימי אמרו הסורים שהם מוכנים לפרוץ האזור מכל הנשק הכימי הבקטריוולוגי והגרעיני והוא מודה, שלסורים קל להגיד בידעם שדבר לא יצא מכך.

ג. דג'רג'יאן ענה לשאלתי, כיצד דבריו עם ישראל מתישבים עם קריאתו של אסד שנמשכה גם בנאום האחרון לאיזון אסטרטגי, באומרו כי אסד לא יוותר כלפי חוץ על דרישה זו, אך שהוא מבין שזו מטרה קשה מאד ובוודאי על רקע השינויים במזא'ר, להגיע אליה. בהקשר זה אמר, כי להערכתם, עבד הפיקוד הצבאי בשנים האחרונות בעיקר על שיפור יכולת ההרתעה תוך פיתוח גמישות שתאפשר לצבא, אם התנאים יאפשרו זאת, לעבור ממגננה ובלימה לניצול אפשרויות התקפיות ואפילו מוגבלות.

ד. על היחסים עם ארה'ב הוסיף דג'רג'יאן רק שבשלב זה הסורים מרוצים מעצם הדיאלוג, אף כי ברור להם שלא יהיו לכך תוצאות מידיות.

ה. בשיחה עם מילר מתכנן מדיני, אחרי שיחתי עם דג'רג'יאן, הוא הוא טען שאין לצפות לשינוי בגישה כלפי ישראל אך הוא ציפה לשינויים פנימיים לאור ההתעוררות בסוריה על רקע המו'מ הכלכלי והשינויים במזא'ר.

ערן

לב

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, @ (אמן), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, סולטן

דחיפות: מיידית -	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	ק: 1 כתוב: 2
סוג: שמור		
תאריך וזמן חצור: 9 במרץ 1990 9:30		אל: מצפיה
כס' כבירק: הפסד:	א/כ/כ/כ	דע:
233		כאת: יורם אטינגר, וושינגטון

הנדון: סיוע החוץ ותקציב הבטחון.

להלן מספר נקודות מפיו של צירלי פליקנר, עוזרו של הסנטור דומניצ'י הנחשב לאחד ממקורבי הבית הלבן בסנט:

1. קים קשר אמיץ בין היקף סיוע החוץ לבין תקציב הבטחון.
2. כדי להגדיל את סיוע החוץ - כפי ששואפים הממשל (בראש ובראשונה ליעדים טכנים, ארמי וכו'), ולא להגדלת סיוע החוץ הקלסי (והדמוקרטים - חובה על הקונגרס לפתח יכולת החלטה על יעדי התקציב הכללי והיקפו. המצב הנוכחי מבטא שיתוק בנדון.
3. תהליך ההקצבות יתחיל, כנראה, למרות שתהליך ההרשאות לא יושלם, וזאת על בסיס הצעת התקציב שהגיש הממשל. ההחלטות הסופיות תידחנה, כנראה עד הסתיו, ואולי אף תושלכנה עיי LAME DUCK CONGRESS.
4. כדי להגדיל את סיוע החוץ יהיה צורך, כנראה, לאתר את הסכום הנדרש בתקציב הבטחון. סקרי דעיק של חברי הקונגרס וגופים אחרים מאשרים כי חצבור אינו תומך בקיצוץ מפליג בתקציב הבטחון.
5. סקרי דעיק מוכיחים כי התנגדות הצבור לסיוע החוץ גוברת ככל שמחברים דוחי התקשורת על הכוונה להעניק סיוע חוץ למזאיר, למרכז אמריקה, ולאחרונה אף (הצעתו של גפארדט, המוגדרת כ"משולה למחיה" עיי צירלי) לברה"מ.
6. שנת הבחירות, ושקולים אזוריים מחודשים ההתנגדות - גם בקרב דמוקרטים ואף דמוקרטים ליברלים - לקיצוץ מתבקש בתחומי בניית מתקנים, רכש ומו"פ. ככל שההתייחסות פוליטית יותר, קטן הסכום לקיצוץ משמעותי.
7. הדיונים הרציניים בקיצוץ משמעותי ידחו עד לתום הסיבוב הבא של שיחות להגבלת מרוץ החמוש וקיצוץ הכוחות הבינוגושיים. למעשה, הצפיות משיחות אלו כלולות כבר בהצעת הממשל, ולכן הסכומי לקיצוץ משמעותי קטן ביותר.
8. פופולריות הנשיא והנטיה להעניק לו אשראי בנושאי חו"ב מחזקים ההנחה הנ"ל. צירלי אף מציע לישראל להיות ערה לכך בהקשר תהליך השלום, אם כי טבור שכל מגמה שלילית ביחסי שתי המדינות תוליד תוצאות (קיצוץ ?) מגבלות, אם בכלל.

תפוצה: -36- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

MAR- 9-90 FRI 10:01 NJCRAC

P.02

National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council

443 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016-7322

(212) 684-6950

Fax (212) 686-1353

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 Gertrude White, Women's American ORT

0318

2/3

March 8, 1990

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council welcomed the assurances that you gave Seymour Reich, chairman of the Conference of Presidents, in your telephone conversation last Monday that the United States is committed to a united Jerusalem. (The NJCRAC is comprised of 13 national agencies and 117 community agencies listed on the reverse side of this letterhead.)

The American Jewish community, with all its diversity, is united in support of Jerusalem as the undivided eternal capital of the state of Israel. As we know you appreciate, Jerusalem maintains a special place in the hearts and minds of the Jewish people. It is uniquely significant to us in religious, historic and cultural terms. The fundamental right of Jews to live in this city must be respected.

Jews have lived in this ancient city without interruption since the days of the Bible. For much of Jerusalem's history, including well over the last 100 years, Jews have comprised the majority of the population of the city. Only from 1948 to 1967, under Jordanian rule, were Jews for the first time prohibited from living in parts of Jerusalem. Fortunately, this prohibition ended in 1967 when Israel successfully defended itself against Jordanian aggression.

We understand that U.S. policy now is that the final status of Jerusalem is to be determined by a negotiated settlement. We also believe that U.S. policy recognizes the right of Jews to live in any part of Jerusalem, a judgment expressed by Vice President Dan Quayle on Tuesday to the Conference of Presidents.

MAR- 9-90 FRI 10:02 NJCRAC

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
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This was reinforced in the statement today by Margaret Tutwiler in which she declared "the United States' position, as was enunciated later this week, is, of course, Jews can live in East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem. There is no difference from that policy, and it's been stated, as you know."

We trust that this correctly states U.S. policy in regard to the right of Jews to live in Jerusalem.

Respectfully yours,



Arden E. Shenker
Chair

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END

מברק יוצא

אאאא

אל: המשרד,

מ-: ווש, נר: 267, תא: 090390, חז: 1820, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס / מידי

אלהק

אל: מצפ"א, ממ"ד

דע: מע"ת, הסברה,

יועץ תקשורת רזה"מ, יועץ תקשורת שהב"ט (ימ העבירו נא)

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

נאום אסאד - דוברת מחמ"ד.

בעקבות שאלה שהופנתה לדוברת מחמ"ד (אחרי התדרוך הפומבי)
בנושא נאום אסאד אתמול הגיבה הדוברת כלהלן:-

(רצ"ב תגובתה)

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
March 9, 1990

Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

26 + 2

STATEMENT BY MARGARET TUTWILER/SPOKESMAN

PRESIDENT ASSAD'S CRITICISM IS OUT OF STEP WITH THE ENORMOUSLY PROMISING CHANGES UNFOLDING AROUND THE WORLD, AS WELL AS WITH THE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO MOVE TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

WHAT THE PEOPLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST -- INCLUDING SYRIA -- NEED IS NOT MORE BELLICOSE RHETORIC, BUT REAL STATESMANSHIP AND COMMITMENT TO THE PRACTICAL STEPS NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT A PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI DIALOGUE LEADING TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT.

MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE WILL SERVE SYRIA'S INTERESTS.

PRESIDENT ASSAD OUGHT TO BE COMMITTING HIMSELF TO PEACE, NOT WAR.

דחיות: רגיל	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	ק: 1
סוג: שמור		כתוב: 1
תאריך וזמן חצור: 9 במרץ 1990 9:45		אל: מצפ"א
כס' פבוק: הפסד:	ארה"ב	דע:
234		פאת: יורם אטינגר, וושינגטון

הנדון : מפגש עם הסנטור לאוטנברג.

1. הממשל בוקטבשיטה/ של מחווה אחת כלפי ישראל ומיד אח"כ מפעיל לחץ כפול.
2. חושש במודאג מעמדת הממשל כלפי ירושלים בפרט, וסה"כ הנושאים שעל שלחן ההליך השלום בכלל.
3. סבור כי לאוירה השוררת בין השותפות בממשלה תפקיד חשוב בעמידה מול הלחץ האמריקאי, עדודו, או הרתעתו.

הבכירות

ש"פ

1. חשש במודאג מעמדת הממשל כלפי ירושלים בפרט, וסה"כ הנושאים שעל שלחן ההליך השלום בכלל.

2. חשש במודאג מעמדת הממשל כלפי ירושלים בפרט, וסה"כ הנושאים שעל שלחן ההליך השלום בכלל.

3. סבור כי לאוירה השוררת בין השותפות בממשלה תפקיד חשוב בעמידה מול הלחץ האמריקאי, עדודו, או הרתעתו.

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דף: 1 מקור: 3	טופס מברק קשר ניו-יורק	דחפיות: מידי
אל:	יועץ תפוצות, מצפ"א, הסברה	סיוג: שמור
דע:	ארה"ב	תזח: 09/5-
מאת:	הקונכ"ל - ניו יורק	מל מדיק: 0329

מצ"ב מכתב ה-JCRC לנשיא כוש.

אורי סביר

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שם השולח: ...
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MAY 11 '87 09:51

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
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Under Mayor Teddy Kollek, Jerusalem has come to be recognized as a place where Jew and Arab can live together, under municipal leadership which respects the communities equally and which establishes a model for mutual accommodation, if not harmony.

Statements by Secretary Baker threaten to hold the proposed housing guarantee program hostage to U.S. hostility to the right, guaranteed in the Camp David Treaty, of Jews to settle where they like even in settlements to the extent contemplated in that Treaty. The large Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel presents an historic opportunity which the Jewish community will not let fail whether or not support is forthcoming from the United States Government. That support is important to help an ally and to vindicate humanitarian efforts. Further, whether such assistance is forthcoming or not, efforts to create a region of the occupied territories which will be Judenrein cannot be acceptable even to those members of the Jewish community who do not favor additional settlement of the West Bank, but who do believe in freedom of choice.

Mr. President, we have worked together with you for many years and have not previously felt it necessary to seek clarification of your purposes and policies but we feel we must do so now and will be grateful for your advice on these important matters.

Sincerely,



Kenneth J. Bialkin

קד: 1 כתוב: 1	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דחיות: סוג: שמור
אל: מזא"ר נתיב - פרנקל		תאריך וזמן העבר: 9.3.90 - 16:00
דע: מצפ"א		פס' פרוק: הפסיד:
פאת: ק. לקונגרס		282

ביה"ב - פגישה עם ה- TASK FORCE למען יהודי ברה"מ

1. אחמול (7/3), נפגשו, שירן והח"מ עם קונגרסמנים חברי ה- TASK FORCE נכחו בפגישה: גילמן, ברני פרנק, ברמן, ג'ון מילר ועוזריהם. וכן עוזרי הקונגרסמנים לויין, גייזנסון, קרדין ונוטפים.

2. שירן מסר דו"ח מצב ברה"מ, תיאור בפירוט תהליכי היציאה והסביר שאין כרגע בעיה של transportation (התייחס לבעיית המכס).

3. להלן שאלות והערות מרכזיות של הקונגרסמנים (בעקבות התדרוך של שירן):
 ברני פרנק - א) ג'קסון וניק וטיסות ישירות. (קיבל עמדתנו). טעות תהיה להוסיף תנאים נוספים לתיקון ג'קסון וניק ומעמד HFN לברה"מ. ב) יש להרגיע הקהילה היהודית לגבי מצב היהודים ברה"מ (פוגרומים) וקשיי יציאתם. (הקונגרסמנים בקליפורניה מקבלים טלפונים המביעים דאגה ממצב קשה ופחד). ביקש שנמצא לו מזכר, כך שיוכלו, חס הקונגרסמנים, להפיצו לכל היהודים הפונים אליהם. הוסיף, כי הם מהווים transmitter עצום להרגעת היהודים. הפחד ברה"מ הוא אמיתי, עם זאת, המציאות בשטח שונה מזו המתוארת ע"י אירגונים יהודים ויהודים בודדים.

ג'ון מילר - הגדלת מכסות ההגירה לארה"ב - מה תהיה עמדת ממשל או הקונגרס היו מציעים להעלות המכסות מ- 50 אלף ל- 100 אלף. שירן פירט באריכות עמדתנו. מילר קיבל בהבנה הדברים.

4. הישיבה ארכה למעלה משעה ולדברי הנוכחים היתה מאד מועילה.

וואלאטא' פנח'ל
 יהודית ורנאי דרנג

ג'ון מילר
 ג'קסון
 ברני פרנק
 ג'ון מילר
 ג'קסון
 ברני פרנק

תפוצה: 36 עותקים
 חתום: ג'ון מילר
 חתום: ג'קסון
 חתום: ברני פרנק

דחיות:	סגירות ישראל / ווסינגטון	דף: 1
סוג: שמור	טופס פרוק	כתוב: 6
תאריך וזמן מעור:	מקסימי משהביט	אל:
9.3.90 - 09:00	מחלק	דע:
כס' פרוק:	לשכת מנכ"ל מהביט; יועץ משפטי משהיח; רמט"ן ניו-יורק	
הפסד: 264, 153, 18		כאח: עודד ערו

הצבה מראש

להלן הטייטה האמריקאית כפי שהוגשה לי הבוקר. דיק קלרק הוסיף בע"פ בשיחה אתמול כי יש התנגדות בפנטגון לתשלום דמי הובלה, אך אם אנו נתעקש קשות, ייתכן ותמצא דרך לטפל בענין, אולי גם על ידי חלוקת הנטל.

ער 17

$\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$

תפוצה: שגריר, ציר, נספח, שטיין

CONFIDENTIAL

March 7, 1990

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AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

RELATING TO A WAR RESERVE STOCKPILE
PROGRAM IN ISRAEL

1. To enhance the security of Israel, the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel (the Parties) agree that, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, the Government of the United States will establish and stock a War Reserve Stockpile in Israel (WRS-Israel) designed to enhance the capabilities of Israel to sustain combat and defend Israel in the event of a significant military emergency threatening the security of Israel. Subject to agreement by the parties on the contents of the material to be stored, WRS-Israel will consist of United States Government-titled munitions, such as armor, artillery, and automatic weapons ammunition, and other munitions taking into account the 1988 Crisis Resupply Master List, of a total value of \$100 million to be stocked as soon as possible and not later than three years from the date this Agreement enters into force. Except as the parties may otherwise agree, munitions will not be placed in WRS-Israel which have been determined to be excess defense articles under Section 516 of the United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.

2. The detailed contents of WRS-Israel will be determined by the Government of the United States in agreement with the Government of Israel. Except as otherwise agreed by the Parties, WRS-Israel will be located at bunkers already under construction for the United States at Nahal Sorek.

3. Articles 3-7, 9, 10, and 12 of the January 13, 1985 Agreement on Host Nation Support and Prepositioning (HNSAP Agreement), to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, are incorporated into this Agreement and shall apply equally to WRS-Israel. In particular, the United

CONFIDENTIAL

States retains the right to withdraw stocks from WRS-Israel in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of that Agreement. It is the intention of the United States, in cases in which it exercises its right to withdraw stocks, to replace as soon as possible such stocks so that the stockpile is maintained at a value of \$100 million. In such cases, notwithstanding the first sentence of Article 11 of this Agreement, the United States will initially provide at its expense transportation to Israel for the replacement of such stocks. Should title to such stocks subsequently be transferred to Israel under this Agreement, the Government of Israel will reimburse the United States for the cost of such transportation.

4. Munitions in WRS-Israel will be available for delivery to Israel under the terms of this Agreement if the President of the United States and the Government of Israel each determine that a significant military emergency threatening the security of Israel exists requiring the immediate transfer of munitions to Israel by the United States. The Government of Israel agrees that WRS-Israel munitions will not be removed from their storage locations without the prior approval of the Government of the United States. Specific procedures to implement this process will be developed by the Parties.

5. All transfers of WRS-Israel munitions to the Government of Israel pursuant to this Agreement will be accomplished as a present sale on a reimbursable basis, and will be subject to the provisions of the United States Arms Export Control Act and other applicable United States Government laws and policies. The provisions of Annex A, United States Department of Defense Form 1513, General Conditions, are applicable to this Agreement. A copy of this Annex is attached to this Agreement and is an integral part of this Agreement. The terms of sale will be payment on delivery/commencement of performance (that is, "Type of Assistance Code 6," as set forth in Department of Defense Manual 5105.38-M) at acquisition cost, plus any other expenditures incurred in providing the munitions for emplacement in WRS-Israel. Billings will reflect the dates of title transfers, and shall be due and payable by the Government of Israel upon receipt. No interest on the net amount due and payable will be charged within 60 days after the date of such billing. During the 60-day period following title transfer, and after consultations with the Government of Israel, the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States will determine the extent to which it will seek special emergency legislation to finance these purchases and/or forgive, in whole or in part, the Government of Israel's obligation to pay for them, taking into consideration Israel's economic circumstances prevailing at that time.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. When the United States withdraws WRS-Israel munitions from Israel, Israel will upon request provide transportation from the storage facility to the port of embarkation in Israel, and will provide stevedoring and port operations services. Any such withdrawal shall be undertaken consistent with Article 3 of the HNSAP Agreement, to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement. The United States will reimburse Israel for any transportation-related services provided in Israel in support of the withdrawal of these munitions. The amount of reimbursement will be agreed upon by the Parties on a case-by-case basis, and will represent a fair estimate of the costs of such services rendered, exclusive of taxes, fees, duties or other similar charges. Such charges will be no greater than those that would be charged to the Israel Defense Forces for the same service.

7. The United States European Command, in conjunction with its components and in consultation with the Joint Staff, will administer the sale of WRS-Israel munitions to Israel. Implementing arrangements with respect to safety, security, emplacement, and maintenance of WRS-Israel will be prepared by the United States European Command and the Israeli Defense Forces through the Combined Logistics Committee.

8. The obligations of the Parties under this Agreement are subject to the availability of funds appropriated by their respective legislatures, provided that this provision does not apply to Israel's obligations under Article 5 or Annex A of the Agreement. In addition, the obligations of the United States are subject to provisions of United States law restricting additions to stockpiles in foreign countries.

9. Stock record accountability will remain the responsibility of the Government of the United States.

10. To supervise and to oversee the execution of this Agreement, and to ensure proper coordination and liaison with appropriate Israeli officials, the United States may assign up to ten additional personnel to its Embassy in Israel.

11. It is understood that the United States has assumed the costs of (1) initial procurement of the items to be stocked in

CONFIDENTIAL

WRS-Israel and (2) construction of storage bunkers at Nahal Sorek. The United States will also provide at its own expense transportation for replacement of withdrawn stocks in accordance with Article III of this Agreement.

12. The Government of Israel agrees to provide at its expense: (1) storage, warehousing, rewarehousing, maintenance, security, fire protection, explosive ordnance disposal support, surveillance and transportation to Israel and within Israel of WRS-Israel munitions; (2) maintenance and fire protection for WRS-Israel storage facilities and any United States Government property present in Israel in support of WRS-Israel; and (3) on-site administrative support for any U.S. Government and U.S. contractor personnel required for support of WRS-Israel, including office space, communications facilities, utilities and transportation. The Government of Israel will waive any taxes, fees, customs duties, or other similar charges that would otherwise apply to the import or export of munitions emplaced in WRS-Israel. The Government of Israel agrees to reimburse the Government of the United States for the acquisition cost of any item in WRS-Israel which may disappear or become unserviceable due to the activities of the Government of Israel or its personnel or its contractors.

13. Israel agrees to receive, store, warehouse, rewarehouse, and transport all WRS-Israel munitions in its custody in compliance with standards of the Government of the United States pertaining to serviceability and explosive safety.

14. This Agreement will enter into force after signature, upon confirmation by each Party to the other Party through an exchange of diplomatic notes that it has completed all steps necessary to bring this Agreement into force. It will continue in force for an initial term of twenty-five years and shall be extended automatically for periods of one year thereafter, provided that either Party may at any time terminate the Agreement by providing one year's written notice to the other party of its intention to do so.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Agreement.

Done at _____ on _____, in duplicate, in the English language.

For the Government of the
United States of America:

For the Government of
Israel:

264-153-18 $\frac{6}{6}$

CONFIDENTIAL

** נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 3,8395

אל: המשרד

יעדים: בטחון/477, מצב/1188, מנמט/491

מ-: ווש, נר: 284, תא: 090390, זח: 1830, דח: ר, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

1/27/90

סודי / רגיל

אל: מצפ'א

דע: מקש'ח / משהב'ט

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

פגישת השגריר עם הקונגרסמן סולרז.

אתמול (8.3) נפגש השגריר עם סולרז. מצידו נכחו שני עוזרים ומצידנו הח'מ.

להלן עיקרי השיחה:

1. תהליך השלום והתנחלויות.

א. סולרז ביקש לשמוע מהשגריר על עמדות הממשלה לגבי הצעת בייקר. השגריר התייחס ללחצים המופעלים על רה"מ ולעובדה שיש כאלה הדואגים כל העת לציין ולהבליט תפקיד אש"פ בתהליך. כן התייחס להתבטאויות הנשיא בנושא ירושלים ובייקר בנושא הערבויות לדיוור כהתבטאויות UNFORTANATE שאינן במקומן, ולא בעיתן.

ב. לשאלת סולרז האם הממשל התנה את הערבויות בהפסקת ההתנחלויות השיב השגריר כי סוננו התבטא בנושא כבר ב - 4/1. כעשרה ימים לפני התבטאות רה"מ בנושא ההתנחלויות. התייחס לדברי בייקר בנושא. כרגע המצב הוא שהממשל מעוניין לקבל תוספת

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

להתחייבות השנתית שישראל מעבירה לממשל בעת הגשת הבקשה לסיוע אזרחי, ועל תוספת זו הם מוכנים לשאת ולתת.

2. עלית יהודי ברה"מ.

א. בנוגע לטיסות ישירות, הסביר השגריר כי הסובייטים נסוגו מהתחייבותם עוד לפני התבטאות רוה"מ.

ב. השגריר הסביר תהליך היציאה בעקבות שאלות סולרז על דרכי היציאה ומדוע אי אפשר לעזוב ברכבת גם למשל מלניניגרד.

ג. לשאלות סולרז האם ישנה בעית יציאה בגלל היעדר טיסות ישירות והאם יש בעיות רכבות, השיב השגריר בשלילה בנושא הרכבות, והסביר כי היעדר טיסות ישירות מקשה אולם אינו מהווה בעיה בלתי ניתנת לפתרון.

ד. השגריר סיפר על הפגישה אצל הסנטור ספקטור. סולרז אמר כי סבוב שיש לקשור ה - MFN ליציאה לאור העובדה שהיהודים יכולים לצאת. לשאלות סולרז האם ישראל מציעה דחיית הענקת מעמד MFN לברה"מ השיב השגריר שזו החלטה אמריקנית אולם היינו רוצים לראות ביישום ההסכם. אין זו יוזמה שממשישראל אימצה או עודדה.

3. יהודי אתיופיה:

א. סולרז שאל אם הדיווחים בעיתונות על סיוע צבאי ישראלי לאתיופיה נכונים. מבין שישראל הכחישה אספקת פצצות מצור. השגריר השיב כי הכחשנו זאת וכן עובדת שהותם של מאות קציני צה"ל שם. ישראל לכל היותר יעצה לגבי מבנה הצבא אולם אין סיוע צבאי משמעותי.

ב. סולרז שאל האם ישראל מקבלת תמורה כלשהי מבחינת היהודים. השגריר השיב בחיוב והסביר כי יוצאים עתה כ - 100 לחודש אך - 3000 נרשמו כבר בשגרירות. סה"כ נותרו באתיופיה בין - 12 - 15 אלף יהודים.

ג. לדברי סולרז, מנגיסטו הוא רוצח וטיפוס שלילי ביותר ולמערכת השרינו עמו יצאו יותר בעיות מאשר יפתחו שכן הממשלה הבאה, לאחר נפילתו של מנגיסטו, לא תרצה בכל הנזאה לשת"פ עם ישראל. השגריר הגיב כי נראה שישראל תמיד נתונה לביקורת. בתחילה עלתה הטענה שישראל לא עשתה דבר למען היהודים ועתה כאשר יש שגרירות באתיופיה, ג"כ ישנה ביקורת.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DO hereby certify that the following is a true and correct copy of the original as the same appears on the records of the Department of the Interior.

Witness my hand and seal of office at Washington, D.C., this 1st day of January, 1901.

JOHN W. FOSTER, Secretary of the Interior.

Approved: _____

4. דרא'פ.

לקראת הפגישה שהתקיימה שעה לאחר מכן עם הקוקוס השחור אמר סולרז כי שמע שישראל מוכרת לדרא'פ 50-70 מטוסי כפיד. השגריר הגיב כי שומע על כך בפעם הראשונה. סולרז המשיך ואמר כי אם הדבר נכון, ולא ניתן יהיה לשמור זאת בסוד, הנושא יופיע בעמוד הראשון בעתון ויהיו לכך השפעות הרסניות. יש לו שאלות לגבי עיתוי חתימת הסכמים והמחיר הפוליטי יהיה גבוה. מבקש YOU TO ALERT לשאלת השגריר, האם לפי השמועה שקלט סולרז מדובר בדבר חדש, השיב סולרז שחתימת החוזים איננה חדשה אלא שרוב המטוסים טרם סופקו ויסופקו בעתיד הקרוב. חזר ואמר כי אם הדבר יתבצע, ההשלכות הפוליטיות תהיינה הרסניות שכן זהו פרופיל גבוה מאד לקשרים הצבאיים. השגריר הבטיח להעביר דבריו.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, פ(אמן), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, הדס, מאפ, רביב, גוברין, מזאר

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך: 09.03.90

יוצא **

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חוזם: 3,7801

אל: וושינגטון/140, מצב/1062

מ-: המשרד, תא: 090390, זח: 1141, דח: ב, סג: שמ

תח: פ גס: צפא

נד: פ

אורה

שמו-בהול לבוקר.

ווש-השגריר.

שגארה'ב הודיעתנו הבוקר על בואו של ג'ורג' מקגוורן לביקור
בישראל 14-16/3.

ביקש פגישות עם רה'מ, ממרה'מ, שה'ח, שהב'ט, השר וייצמן, אבא
אבן וטדי קולק.

כפי שהגדירה זאת השגרירות, יהיו גם מספר פגישות
פלשתינאיות'. ימשיך מכאן לירדן.

מצפ'א

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מאור

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** נכנס

סודי

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חוזם: 3,8410

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1173

מ-: ווש, נר: 290, תא: 090390, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: 10

תח: & גס: צפא

נד: &

10/6/90

סודי מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטוןהזמנת הנשיא הרצוג לסיור בארה'ב.

למכתבו של אורי ברנר מ - 5 מרס.

אני מחייב ביקור הנשיא הרצוג בארה'ב לסיבוב הרצאות והופעות
במאמץ להסביר ולהחדיר לדאשי היהדות האמריקנית המסר בדבר
המאמץ האדיר שישראל משקיעה ותשקיע בקליטת יהודי ברה'מ.
בכפוף להסכמת הנשיא, ניתן לתאם המועדים עם הארגונים
היהודיים כמו המגבית, מפעל מלווה העצמאות ומועדון הנשיאים.

ארד.

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות

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5114 • J. Neurosci., September 24, 2008 • 28(39):5109–5118

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8408

תאריך: 10.03.90

דף 1 מתוך 1

נכנס

סודי ביותר

עותק 1 מתוך 12

חוזם: 3,8408*

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/1171

מ-: ווש, נר: 288, תא: 090390, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סב

תח: @ גס: צפא

נד: @

סודי ביותר/מיידי

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א

דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

מנכ"ל משרד רוה"מ

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

מדיניות ארה"ב - ירושלים.

*בשיחה עם סימור רייך, ובשיחה נפרדת עמי אמר ריצ'ארד האס
*שבכוונת המימשל להרגיע (TO COOL OFF) את האויזה והמתח
*שנוצרו בעקבות הצהרת הנשיא בענין מזרח - ירושלים. הבטיח
*שבשבוע הבא ישיב הנשיא למכתבו של סימור רייך. הוספתי שלנשיא
*תהיה הזדמנות מצוינת להרגיע גם בתשובה מתאימה למכתבו של טרי
*קולק.

ארד.

לב

אתפ: רהמ, שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

דחיפות: בהול לבוקר	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	די: 1
סוג: שמור	טופס פבוק	כתוב: 9
תאריך וזמן העור: 16:45 9.3.90	אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א	
כס' פברק: 285	דע: יועץ מדיני לשח"ח מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ	
הפסד: 1/9	כא: השגריר, וושינגטון	

עמדת ארה"ב בענין ירושלים.

בהמשך לפגישתי עם גנרל סקורופט ב-6 דנא, קיבלתי היום ממכתב הרצ"ב לצירופיו.
לתשומת לבכם.

ארד

שִׁיחַ 2 / שִׁיחַ 1 רִיבָה 3 / מִמְרֵהָ 1 שִׁדְדָה 1 / מִנְהָלָה 1 מִנְהָלָה 1 / מִנְהָלָה 1
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תפילה:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508


March 6, 1990

Dear Moshe:

As we said in our meeting today, the U.S. positions on a united Jerusalem, final status subject to negotiations, and on East Jerusalem as occupied territory are longstanding U.S. positions. For examples of the continuity, I enclose copies of statements by then Ambassador to the United Nations George Bush and by then Undersecretary of State Larry Eagleburger.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Richard N. Haass
Special Assistant to the
President and Senior
Director for Near East and
South Asian Affairs

Enclosures a/s

His Excellency Moshe Arad
Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive
Washington, D.C. 20008

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Statement by Undersecretary of State Eagleburger, before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 23, 1984

Document Number 1

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Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with the Committee the Administration's position on S. 2031. As you know, this bill provides for the United States Embassy and Ambassador's residence in Israel to be moved to the city of Jerusalem.

This Committee has already received Secretary Shultz's letter expressing the strong opposition of the Administration to this bill. Before I outline the reasons for our opposition, let me take a few moments to provide the context in which this proposal arises.

The United States has been and remains Israel's staunchest supporter. In 1948 when Israel proclaimed its independence, the United States was the first country to extend it recognition. We quickly established diplomatic relations and established our embassy at Israel's seat of government, Tel Aviv. There our embassy has remained, during the Administrations of eight Presidents. Dating from well before the establishment of the state of Israel, we have maintained a Consulate General in Jerusalem which reports directly to the Department. This is in accord with arrangements in special circumstances elsewhere, such as Hong Kong.

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Why has it been consistent U.S. policy, during Democratic and Republican administrations, to retain our embassy in Tel Aviv? In short, because the location of our embassy is intimately related to the efforts of the United States to secure a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this regard, US efforts have stressed peace through negotiations. Our willingness to resist attempts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict through force or through unilateral actions has preserved our ability to play a constructive role in settling the conflict. Moving our embassy to Jerusalem would inevitably convey a message that the United States accepted the position of one party to the issue, when in fact, a resolution of that issue -- that is, a resolution of the issue that can stand the test of time -- can only be found in the framework of a final settlement reached through negotiations.

The status of Jerusalem is an integral part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While we fully understand the depth of attachment of Israelis to the city of Jerusalem, we have a responsibility to bear in mind the special significance which the city holds as well for Jews, Muslims and Christians throughout the world. That is a compelling fact that cannot be lightly put aside. We would not, Mr. Chairman, have achieved the Camp David Accords if the US had adopted the position of either party on the question of Jerusalem. This explains President Carter's separate letter attached to the Camp David Accords which reaffirmed the US position that the status of Jerusalem must be resolved through negotiations. That position continues to be U.S. policy today.

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Our policy on this issue has been resolute for more than three decades. In 1947, when the Israelis began moving their government to Jerusalem, we informed them that we could not accept a unilateral claim to the city. Again, in 1960 we informed Jordan of our opposition to its intention to make the eastern part of the city Jordan's second capital. And, in 1967, when Israel occupied the eastern sector, we opposed Israeli actions to place all of Jerusalem under Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration. Most recently, President Reagan stated in his September 1, 1982, Middle East Peace Initiative that "... we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations."

Mr. Chairman, a change in the U.S. position on the status of Jerusalem would seriously undermine our ability to play an effective role in the Middle East peace process. Indeed, moving our embassy to Jerusalem would widely be perceived as an effort by the United States to preempt negotiations altogether by prejudging a crucial issue. In short, to move our embassy to Jerusalem now would almost certainly gravely damage the prospects for a negotiated settlement; at a minimum, it would seriously compromise the ability of the United States to continue to play a constructive role in bringing the parties to the negotiating table..

In addition, Mr. Chairman, the proposed legislation would be a direct interference in the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs. As stated in Secretary Shultz's letter, we are concerned that, regardless of its merits, the bill raises serious constitutional questions of a separation of powers nature. The President historically has been responsible for conducting diplomatic relations on behalf of the United States, including the determination of where and through what means to conduct such relations. Legislation

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directing him to relocate an embassy would be in direct conflict with this principle. By further seeking to compel him to recognize all of Jerusalem as part of Israel, it would impair his ability to determine the recognition policy of the United States. In seeking to force the President's hand, the proposed legislation, in our view, would exceed the proper scope of legislative action.

I am told, although I find it hard to credit, that some have argued that in retaining our embassy in Tel Aviv we raise doubts concerning American recognition of Israel as a sovereign state. That argues in the face of too many years of history to be taken seriously. The United States and Israel have, since 1948, shared a special friendship, special closeness -- a special relationship, if you will -- that is known as such throughout the world. There cannot be any doubt about our commitment to Israel.

Some proponents of this legislation apparently also argue that United States policy is not in accord with reality -- that Jerusalem is Israel's capital, and that by failing to locate our embassy there we are denying Israel a sovereign prerogative. But this begs the fundamental question, at least from the perspective of the United States. It is the essence of the Jerusalem issue -- or at least America's decades old position thereon -- that it should not be resolved by the unilateral actions of any party.

It has also been suggested that conducting diplomatic relations through our embassy in Tel Aviv imposes practical impediments, since many Israeli government offices are now located in Jerusalem. That is, no doubt, true. But we have

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been able to manage, and will continue to be able to do so. In any event, I doubt that even the strongest of S.2031's proponents would argue that their principal purpose for putting the legislation forward is to improve the efficiency of our diplomatic establishment in Israel.

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Mr. Chairman, I have spoken here on behalf of the Administration of which I am a part. But were I speaking simply on my own behalf I would take no different a line. It is because I care about my country's relationship with Israel, and my country's ability to continue to play a crucial role in the search for that which the people of Israel so richly deserve -- peace -- that I oppose this legislation.

I cannot deny the frustration many Americans and most Israelis must feel because of our position. Nor do I, or this Administration, take this frustration lightly. We regret it.

But, in the last analysis, it is a just and lasting peace for Israel that will bring with it a solution to this vexing problem of the status of Jerusalem. It is the calling, and the commitment, of the United States to help bring about that just and lasting peace. Indeed, I believe we are indispensable to the achievement of such a result. And therefore, Mr. Chairman, I must oppose passage of S.2031.

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U.S. Reiterates Position on Jerusalem

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council on September 25 by U.S. Representative George Bush, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BUSH

USUN press release 147 dated September 25

Once again we have met to consider Jerusalem, an issue of long standing in this body and other organs of the United Nations. In our view, the ultimate status of Jerusalem should be determined through negotiation and agreement between the Governments of Israel and Jordan in the context of an overall peace settlement, taking into account the interests of its inhabitants, of the international religious communities who hold it sacred, and of other countries in the area.

In December 1969, Secretary Rogers stated: "We have made clear repeatedly in the past 2 1/2 years that we cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city."¹ The Secretary then delineated a number of principles which in our view would provide an equitable framework for a final Jerusalem settlement:

1. Jerusalem should be a unified city;
2. There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities;
3. Administrative arrangements for the unified city should take into account the interest of all its inhabitants and of the Christian, Jewish, and Moslem communities; and
4. There should be roles for both Israel and

¹ For Secretary Rogers' address at Washington on Dec. 9, 1969, see BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1970, p. 7.

Jordan in the civic, economic, and religious life of the city.

Earlier in 1969 in this hall, my distinguished predecessor Charles Yost addressed himself more specifically to the kinds of matters which are responsible for our presence here today.² He said, and let me just review it briefly: "The expropriation or confiscation of land, the construction of housing on such land, the demolition or confiscation of buildings, including those having historic or religious significance, and the application of Israeli law to occupied portions of the city are detrimental to our common interests in the city." He noted as well that the United States considers that part of Jerusalem which came under Israeli control, like other areas occupied by Israel in the June 1967 war, as occupied territory and thereby subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power.

We regret Israel's failure to acknowledge its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as its actions which are contrary to the letter and spirit of this convention. We are distressed that the actions of Israel in the occupied portion of Jerusalem give rise to understandable concern that the eventual disposition of the occupied section of Jerusalem may be prejudiced. The Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, 1970-71, reflects the concern of many governments over changes in the face of this city. We have on a number of occasions discussed this matter with the Government of Israel, stressing the need to take more fully into account the sensitivities and concerns of others. Unfortunately, the response of the Government of Israel has been disappointing.

All of us understand, as I indicated earlier in these remarks, that Jerusalem has a very special place in the Judaic tradition, one which has great meaning for Jews throughout the world. At the same time Jerusalem holds a special place in the hearts of many millions of Christians and Moslems throughout the world. In this regard,

² For a statement by Ambassador Yost made in the Security Council on July 1, 1969, see BULLETIN of July 28, 1969, p. 77.

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I want to state clearly that we believe Israel's respect for the holy places has indeed been exemplary. But an Israeli occupation policy made up of unilaterally determined practices cannot help promote a just and lasting peace any more than that cause was served by the status quo in Jerusalem prior to June 1967, which, I want to make clear, we did not like and we do not advocate reestablishing.

In conclusion, I would note that the resolution before us today, as in the past, calls for a report on the situation in Jerusalem. We have supported this resolution not because we agree fully with every provision in it; some elements in it in fact, as I mentioned to our distinguished colleague from Somalia, gave us difficulty. But we have supported this resolution out of the belief that it was time to reiterate our concern that nothing be done in Jerusalem that can prejudice an ultimate and peaceful solution.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION*

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of July 1967 concerning measures and actions by Israel designed to change the status of the Israeli-occupied section of Jerusalem,

Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem (S/10313) and the reports of the Secretary-General (S/8062, S/8146, S/8149 and Add.1, S/8537 and S/10124 and Add.1 and 2), and having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

Reaffirming the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

Noting with concern the non-compliance by Israel with the above-mentioned resolutions,

Noting with concern further that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures designed to change the status and character of the occupied section of Jerusalem,

1. Reaffirms Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);

2. Deplores the failure of Israel to respect the previous resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the status of the city of Jerusalem;

3. Confirms in the clearest possible terms that all

legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section are totally invalid and cannot change that status;

4. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace;

5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within 60 days on the implementation of this resolution.

* U.N. doc S/RES/298 (1971); adopted by the Council on Sept. 25 by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention.

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ס"ק

ד"ר : מחנך : $\frac{1}{4}$	טובס מברק קשר ניו-יורק	דחיפות: בחול לבוקר
אל: מנהל ארבי"ל 2.	בהול	סייג: שמור
דע: ממנכ"ל; ס/ממנכ"ל מצפ"א ופר"ן; מנהל מצפ"א; וושינגטון.	תזח: 081600	חש מצדיק:
מאת: אחרון יעקב, נאו"ם.	0291 34-011	

מיק: 210.02

מועבי"ט - עליה.

1. מקור מסר לידי את שתי הטיוטות המצורפות, שהוגדרו על ידו כ"ניירות עבודה אמריקאים".
2. נפגשתי עם פרנק אורבנצ'יק (ארה"ב) ואמרתי לו כי אנו מופתעים ומאוכזבים מן העובדה שטיטות הצעה הנוגעות לנו, ושהוכנו למיטב ידיעתנו על ידי מגיעות אלינו באמצעות צד שלישי, היינו מצפים מהם, כידידים, שיעבירו לנו את החומר ביוזמתם, ושכלל יחזיקו אותנו בתמונת המו"מ שהם מנהלים בענין הנוגע לנו במישורין.
3. אורבנצ'יק טען כי המדובר בניירות עבודה פנימיים של משלחתו, שהוכנו על בסיס גייר העבודה הסובייטי שהועבר אלינו בשעתו (מברקו 633 מ-16/2 - מברק 51 לווינגטון). הניירות הללו הובאו לידיעת המשלחת המצרית, וזו העבירה אותם אל ככון גט למשלחות אחרות. טען כי אינו יכול לומר שהניירות הללו משקפים את עמדת הממשל. הוסיף כי כידוע קיבלת ארה"ב מלכתחילה את זימון מועבי"ט באי רצון, אולם מכיוון שהזימון הוא בגדר עובדה, מעדיפה משלחתו שהמועצה תאמץ בקונצנזוס הודעה נשיאותית, או הצעת החלטה. טען שוב כי משלחתו לא ניהלה מו"מ על הניירות המצורפים, אלא הביאה אותם לידיעת המצרים בלבד.
4. השבתי כי לדעתנו הדיון במועבי"ט הוא מיותר ומזיק. הואיל וזוהי, כפי שעולה מדבריו, גם עמדת ארה"ב, עליהם להטיל וסו על הצעת התחלטה שתוגש, ולא לנהל מו"מ על נוסח זה או אחר.
5. שב וטען כי אין המדובר במו"מ, אלא בניירות עבודה פנימיים, שאינם משקפים בהכרח את עמדת הממשל. רמז כי עמדתם בדיון למועבי"ט תהיה חלויה גם בהתפתחויות סביב התהליך המדיני.

למה סשה רחל ואריאל להפיל זאת ולמה גרם הרע סשה 2
סייג גרם הרע הרעל אלהן גרם תחלול

ד"ר: $\frac{2}{4}$ מתוך: 4	טופס מברק קשר ניו-יורק	דחיות:
אל:		סיוג:
		תזח:
דע:		מס מברק:
מאת:		291/34

6. לחלן הערות אחדות לניירות המצורפים:

- א. המדובר בשתי גירסאות, שהמאוחרת יותר כיניהן (המסומנת במספר 3, כלומר השלישית במספר לאחר הנייר הסובייטי והגירסה הראשונה) הוכנה אל נכון בעקבות ההערות שנתקבלו מהמצרים לגירסה הראשונה.
 - ב. מהנייר הסובייטי בושט המונח ILLEGAL PRACTICES כן הושמטה הבקשה שועדת השטחים תחדש את עבודתה, ובמקום זה מרזמן המזכ"ל לעקוב אחר ביצוע החלטתו ולדווח למועבי"ס. המילה DEPLORES (סעיף אופרטיבי 2 בגייר הסובייטי) הומרה תמילה REGRETS. בניירות האמריקאים נוסף סעיף אופרטיבי חדש (סעיף 1) המאשר את זכות התגירה.
 - ג. בהשוואה לגירסה המוקדמת, נוספו לגירסה המאוחרת האלמנטים הבאים:
 - איזכור החלטת 465 ממרץ 1980 במבוא.
 - איזכור סעיף 13 בהצהרת האונברסלית על זכויות האדם במבוא.
 - בסעיף אופרטיבי 3 נוספו המילים: WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT.
 - הסעיפים האופרטיביים 4 ו-6 בגירסה המאוחרת הם חדשים.
7. בין עומד לשוחח על הנושא בנפרד עם פיקרינג.

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SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

--HAVING CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE SETTLEMENTS BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM,

--RECALLING RESOLUTIONS 446 (1979) OF 22 MARCH 1979, 452 (1979) OF 20 JULY 1979, AND 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980,

--DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH THE SETTLEMENT POLICY IS BOUND TO HAVE ON ANY ATTEMPT TO REACH A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

--1. REAFFIRMS THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND EMIGRATION AS STATED IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

--2. REAFFIRMS THE APPLICABILITY TO THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, OCCUPIED SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949, AND PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 49, WHICH PROHIBITS THE OCCUPYING POWER TO DEPORT OR TRANSFER PARTS OF ITS OWN CIVILIAN POPULATION INTO THE TERRITORY IT OCCUPIES,

--3. REGRETS THE SAID PRACTICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO SETTLE IMMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,

--4. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOT TO ACT TO ALTER THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

--5. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, UNDER REVIEW.

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THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

--HAVING CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE SETTLEMENTS BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM,

--RECALLING RESOLUTIONS 446 (1979) OF 22 MARCH 1979, 452 (1979) OF 20 JULY 1979, 463 (1980) OF 1 MARCH 1980, AND 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980,

--DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH THE SETTLEMENT POLICY IS BOUND TO HAVE ON ANY ATTEMPT TO REACH A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

--1. REAFFIRMS THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND EMIGRATION AS STATED IN ARTICLE 13 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

--2. REAFFIRMS THE APPLICABILITY TO THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, OCCUPIED SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949, AND PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 49, WHICH PROHIBITS THE OCCUPYING POWER TO DEPORT OR TRANSFER PARTS OF ITS OWN CIVILIAN POPULATION INTO THE TERRITORY IT OCCUPIES,

--3. REGRETS THE SAID PRACTICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO SETTLE IMMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT,

--4. CONSIDERS SUCH PRACTICES TO CONSTITUTE AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

--5. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOT TO ACT TO ALTER THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,

--6. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BEFORE 1990,

--7. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, UNDER REVIEW.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

March 7, 1990

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The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Baker:

I was surprised to learn of the recent statements from the State Department asserting that Yasser Arafat and the PLO have not committed or condoned terrorism in the last 14 months.


When the dialogue with the PLO opened, U.S. policy was clear and unequivocal, requiring that the PLO, in the words of President Reagan, "demonstrate that its renunciation of terrorism is pervasive and permanent." Over the last 14 months there have been a number of incursions over Israel's borders, and in last November and December alone, Israeli sources allege that 36 terrorist cells, belonging to Arafat's Fatah faction, were discovered.

I am concerned that the U.S. is turning a blind eye toward continued PLO terrorism.

Mr. Secretary, I am still very skeptical about the PLO. The State Department will soon be reporting, in connection with the PLO Commitments Compliance Act, on the numerous allegations of continued terrorism by Arafat and his PLO. I hope this report will contain not only an explanation of why the U.S. does not view these incidents as terrorism, but also a clear definition of what the State Department views as terrorism as well as the point at which these continued incursions and civilian assaults, against both Jews and Arabs, will be clearly labelled as terrorism.

I appreciate your attention to these matters.

Yours respectfully,



PHIL GRAMM
United States Senator

דחיות: מיד	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	דף: 1
סוג: בלמ"ס		כתוב: 3
תאריך וזמן העבר:	מנהל מצפ"א	אל:
כס' פרוק:	מזא"ר 1, אלון-הסתדרות (פקס 269-906 - 3)	דע:
הפסד:		
207	עבודה - וושינגטון	כא: 207

הנדון: עליה מברח"א - אגודים מקצועיים.

התקפה על הנדון, הינה גם בחזית האגודים המקצועיים בארה"ב.
מצ"ב מכתב, שהוצא ע"י אגוד מקצועי בענף חקשורת במצרים,
והופץ בקרב האגודים המקצועיים בעולם. וכך הגיע גם לארה"ב.

ממקורות בקרב האגודים נמסר, שיש מכתבים נוספים בדרך,
מתוך מגמה להעלות נושא שבנדון, בכל אחד מהכנסים הבינלאומיים
של האגודים.

פרטים בדי"פ

אלי כהן - קג

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GENERAL TRADE UNION
OF
COMMUNICATION WORKERS
EGYPT



النقابة العامة
للمواصلين
بالاتصالات

1 - 2 - 1990

Statement

on

the immigration of Russian
Jews to Israel

The General trade union of communication workers in Egypt expresses deep concern over jews immigration from the Soviet union and Eastern Europe to Settle in palestine at the expense of the Arab and palestinian people .

In this respect, the union wishes to verify that :

we are not against immigration , as it is a basic human right , but we are against settlement on the lands of another people .

we confirm that the immigration of the jews to Israel changes demographic status in the occupied Arab territories and is against U . N and security council resolutions, and 1948 Geneva convention .

That situation jeopardize the future of palestinian people and threaten peace process .

General Trade Union of Communication workers in the Arab Republic of Egypt appeals to international community and peace - loving forces , headed by international organisations, to condemn this immigration in order to realise just and lasting peace in the area, recognise the legitimate rights of the palestinians in having their independent state

1990-03-08

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GENERAL TRADE UNION
OF
COMMUNICATION WORKERS
EGYPT



النقابة العامة
للعاملين
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and right of countries in the area, including Israel, to live in peace within secured territories .

G . T . U . C . W looks forward to PTTI , as a free international trade union federation to take a position in support of the palestinian people and peace process in the Middle East .

The current israeli Policy and the influx of jews immigration to palestine will have fatal consequences on the area . Therefore concerted efforts must be exerted to maintain peace and justice .

President

Khairy Hashem

Khairy Hashem



CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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Seymour D. Reich
Chairman

Malcolm I. Hoenlein
Executive Director

March 7, 1990

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President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciated the opportunity to talk to you over the telephone on March 5 and to express my concerns about the statement that you had made in Palm Springs on March 3. In response to a question at a news conference, you stated: "My position is that the foreign policy of the United States says we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem".

During the call I sought to explain that East Jerusalem is not the West Bank nor can it be compared to it. I shared with you my understanding that you supported a united Jerusalem and you so confirmed during our conversation and in the statement subsequently issued by the White House Press Secretary. A united Jerusalem has won broad acceptance among the American people, the Congress and both major political parties. For all Jews everywhere, Jerusalem retains a special place as the spiritual capital of the Jewish people and the eternal capital of the Jewish state. What happens in Jerusalem affects us deeply. The policy our country adopts toward Jerusalem concerns us greatly.

To introduce at this juncture the startling thought that the Western Wall and the historic Jewish quarter of the Old City are no different from the West Bank departs from long standing American policy and American-Israeli understandings. No previous administration has opposed the construction of housing in places like French Hill, Ramat Eshkol, Ramot and Gilo. These communities are part and parcel of Jerusalem.

The statement issued by the White House on March 5 was not as clear or reassuring as our telephone conversation. For instance, the second paragraph stated:

"The President also reiterated that U.S. policy toward Jerusalem is unchanged. The United States supports a united Jerusalem whose final status is determined by negotiations. The President also made clear U.S. support for Jews as well as others to live there in the context of a negotiated settlement. The President also reiterated long-standing U.S. policy that all parties avoid unilateral actions, including settlement activity."

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President George Bush
March 7, 1990
Page two

I have repeatedly been questioned as to whether the third sentence means that the U.S. does not support the right of Jews and others to live in all of Jerusalem in the absence of a negotiated settlement? Other questions have arisen regarding the last sentence, which seems to imply that your reference to settlement activity, included Jerusalem. The release does not make clear your statement to me that Jews have a right to live in Jerusalem.

Mr. President, the last sentence of the third paragraph reads as follows:

"The President expressed his Administration's support for proposed housing investment guarantees provided the United States and Israel can work out assurances that satisfy the United States on settlement activity."

I read this statement to mean that if Israel gives the United States assurances that housing investment guarantees will not be used for settlements on the West Bank that is sufficient to satisfy the United States. Others find the statement ambiguous.

I hope that there is no longer an issue of linking housing investment guarantees with the cessation of settlement activity. The Administration's position on settlement activity on the West Bank and Gaza is known and clear. This issue should not be linked to your Administration's goal of assisting the miraculous exodus and resettlement of Soviet Jews in Israel.

Finally, I hope the issue of "fungibility" as it relates to aid to Israel has been put to rest.

Mr. President, the Vice President spoke to the Conference of Presidents yesterday and helped clarify some of these issues. His eloquent presentation was well received. In my introduction of the Vice President I noted my appreciation for the conversation we had on Monday and the positions you articulated directly to me.

In the spirit of the Vice President's remarks and to clear the record it would be helpful if you could clarify the questions raised by the release issued by the White House following our talk on March 5.

Mr. President, we appreciate your role in promoting the Israeli peace initiative and your efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry as we do your leadership in so many other areas. We look forward to working with you to achieve these goals.

Respectfully,

Seymour D. Reich

SDR:jgh

יוצא **

שומר

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חוזם: 3,6806

אל: וושינגטון/120, מצב/918

מ-: המשרד, תא: 080390, חז: 1428, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: פ גס: משרדים

נד: פ

שומר/מיידי

אל שטיין

דע השגריר, הציר

אנטישמיות.

א. התקשר השגריר בראון (שהעברתי אליו את דו"ח האנטישמיות האחרון שלנו באנגלית).

ב. מסר קונפידנציאלית, בנושא משאלתנו כי הדיווח על האנטישמיות ייכלל בשאלוני זכויות האדם של מחמ"ד לנציגויות ארה"ב, שהוא לומד מפי שיפטר, כי לקראת הכנתו של דו"ח זכויות האדם 1989 לא הוגש להם ע"י ADL חומר מועיל, ולכן לא נכלל נושא האנטישמיות השנה (כשלעצמנו לא היינו מרוצים כאן די הצורך הן מתגובת מחמ"ד בשעתו והן מקצב ההתייחסות של ADL, הגם שהיתה הסכמה עקרונית).

ג. ואולם, לפי בראון, בימים האחרונים התקיימה פגישה נוספת של אגף זכויות האדם במחמ"ד עם ADL לקראת הכנת דוח 1990, ו-ADL מסרו כי הם פועלים במרץ לעניין זה. אני מתרשם בעקבות השיחה עם בראון (ואולי גם נוכח האזכור לנושא האנטישמיות שבנאום הנשיא בוש על מצב האומה) כי יש סיכוי שהשנה אכן יוכנס הנושא לשאלונים הנשלחים לנציגויות ארה"ב ע"י אגף זכויות האדם.

ד. הרי וול נציג ADL, עמו שוחחתי, מודע לאי שביעות רצוננו עד כה. ינסה לתת דחיפה.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ד. אגב, ביל בראון ציין בהתלהבות את נאום איברס בנושא 'ציונות-גזענות' בג'נבה.

רובינשטיין

צש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, מזכיר הממשלה



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מברק יוצא

מממ

אל: המשרד,

מ-: ווש, נר: 212, תא: 080390, זח: 1530, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמס/מיידי

אל : מצפ"א, ממ"ד-ביו"ל 1.

דע : הסברה.

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

רצ"ב דברים שאמר ראש צוות הבית הלבן, ג'ון סונינו,
 במרכז ויזנטאל במסגרת ועידת המנהיגות הלאומית ביום
 6.3.90

עתונות

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MARKS OF WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF JOHN SUNUNU, TO THE SIMON
ESENTHAL CENTER, NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, THE WESTIN HOTEL
WASHINGTON, DC, TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1990

GOV. SUNUNU: Thank you very much. Thank you. I do appreciate the chance to come and spend a little time with you. One of the last things I did before I left was touch base with General Scowcroft. He kind of smiled when I told him I was coming out. I didn't know whether that meant "better you than I" or -- (laughter) -- (with a laugh) -- in the nicest sense of that. But I am pleased to be here.

First of all, let me talk about a few items in general. I have asked Richard Haass to join me from NSC just to make sure that as we get to the issues in which both the subtleties and the nuances are critical I want to make sure that I've got somebody here who is an expert that might be able to deal with those kinds of details rather than just tell you we'll get back to you; I thought it would be just easier to get you the answers as directly as I could.

The issues that are critical in these very interesting times are still ones in which the fundamental commitment of this country remains consistent -- it is fundamentally committed to the security of the State of Israel. I think that that has been reiterated as often as is appropriate and is possible, because it is a very important part of what the President, Secretary Baker, General Scowcroft use as the starting point.

But beyond that, as these exciting times, these changes that have been talked about in Europe and the Soviet Union take place, there are other fundamentals that have to be addressed. As you remember, when the President made his State of the Union Address he pointed out that he had a concern for a lot of issues. But one of the ones he underscored was the concern about what he felt was a rising level of anti-Semitism both in this country and around the world.

That concern was raised not only the State of the Union Address, but one of the issues that the President brought forth in the discussions in Malta. He emphasized to Mr. Gorbachev that the reports that we had been getting in that respect were very disturbing to the President and the President wanted to make two points there; number one, our continued support for the principles and the reality of emigration, but the fact also that the conditions within the Soviet Union should be made such that they would recognize that there is a resource base of talented people, of intellectuals, of people who are very much the heart and soul of the strength of the Soviet Union itself, and that Mr. Gorbachev ought not to have policies that encourage anti-Semitic activities or even condone anti-Semitic activities, because that in itself was wrong in itself, but also wrong for the capacity of the Soviet Union to retain its intelligence base. Whether that made a difference or not I cannot tell you, but I can also point out to you that it was re-emphasized by Jim Baker when he met with Mr.

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Schevardnadze and Mr. Gorbachev in his trips to Moscow. And in fact, the -- an associated issue, the issue that -- going back to the emigration question, the pressure was made -- it was made very clear to Mr. Gorbachev that Secretary Baker and the President are very much concerned about allowing direct flights from the Soviet Union to Israel.

We were very disappointed that that was not supported, that was not responded to in a constructive way. And I assure you that that will also be an item that the Secretary continues to press in the discussions that follow. It is a major concern -- (applause) -- it is a major concern, and it is the kind of issue that is disappointing not to get a constructive response, because frankly it is not that difficult to accommodate, and it is one of those responses that one always wonders as to whether or not that it might be indicative of further problems. But the fact is is that it is an issue of primary concern, high priority, and will continue to be pressed.

Finally, if -- you don't have to read very far into the press over the last few days to discover that there are issues of concern out there. I think the President's statement yesterday, following his telephone conversation with Seymour Reich, who is the President of the Conference of Presidents of the American Jewish Organizations, was an effort to make clear the continued commitment to the President on not only the fundamental questions, but that he -- that US policy towards Jerusalem is unchanged and that the United States supports a United Jerusalem whose final status is determined by negotiations.

That has been the policy; it continues to be the policy. And whatever the nuances of discussions that might have been raised, perhaps unfortunately, in the statements that were made on a variety of other issues, do not in any way at all impact that. And I hope that as the concerns that the administration and the President have towards moving the peace process forward continue, that it is kept in mind that the plan that we are encouraging, that the efforts that we are supporting, followed from the meeting that took place almost a year ago here in Washington, as Mr. Shamir came and made his presentation to the President and asked the President and Secretary Baker to support that approach, which was based on elections. That has been the thrust of what the President and the Secretary have been doing. And we are hopeful that that formula presented by Mr. Shamir can continue to be the basic foundation that moves these issues towards a peaceful reconciliation.

Having said that, let me open this up to questions and try and address the issues that are of most concern to you. I do apologize that I am operating on a schedule that unfortunately is a typical schedule around here, one that is tight. But we'll try and deal with as many of the issues as we can in the period of time we have.

MR. HAAS(?): Marcie (sp??)?

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GOV. SUNUNU: Oh, I'm sorry.

Q Thank you. Marcie Goldberg (sp?) from Chicago. Governor Sununu, in light of your comments to the National Association of Arab-Americans calling for, quote, "a foreign policy that is more even-handed," end of quote, I presume in regard to the Middle East, do you feel in any way that might be responsible for some of the President's comments on East Jerusalem?

GOV. SUNUNU: No, not at all. In fact, my comments were one that were also accompanied by admonitions and have continuously been accompanied by admonitions to Arab-Americans and frankly, to all supporters of -- all representatives of Arab governments that come into the White House to talk, that they must be dealing with these issues in a context of moving towards peace, and that that peace requires constructive participation in discussions and a constructive commitment to the reality that the United States policy supports Israel and supports the security of Israel. And the fact that I ask that as that whole process takes place that the climate be one of full participation, I think, is a supportive effort in trying to reach a peaceful conclusion to what is a complex and difficult issue.

Q Governor Sununu, there are reports in the media that the administration is edging towards a two-state solution. Do you foresee, and do you support a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza?

GOV. SUNUNU: No. The policy of this administration is opposed to an independent Palestinian state. It's part of the Republican platform, it's part of the President's position -- (applause) -- and I don't know of one iota of change that has taken place since he established that as the firm position of his -- of -- his firm

Q What is your position on settlement -- on settlements in the West Bank and Gaza?

GOV. SUNUNU: The President has made it very clear that the policy of the United States continues to be opposed to new settlements and the expansion of settlements. And he has made no bones about making that as a clear statement to Mr. Shamir; and he continues to have that commitment, and he recognizes it may be a point of disagreement between himself and the Prime Minister and the government of Israel, but he has not changed that position.

used in the Soviet Union, especially in Azerbaijan, and that word is extremely frightening to the Soviet Jews. This is a fear of history repeating itself.

GOV. SUNUNU: Sure. Well, let me -- let me emphasize again that it is because we have been hearing the same kind reports that the President addressed that issue rather directly in his discussions at Malta, among others, that it has been one of the major items that Secretary of State Baker has carried as the message from the President, and in the discussions that he has had with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and, in fact, continues to be one of the main issues of contention, differences that we will continue to stress in all the discussions.

There has been a tremendous streamlining in what we can control in terms of the processes associated with allowing for immigration at the embassy and in the offices in Europe that had built up a logjam over the -- in recent times. That effort to streamline continues. But the key issue is the issue of transportation. And I wish I had an answer for you as to how to have a magnificent substitute for the concerns that -- of -- the transportation concerns that have been raised. We will continue to press for the direct flights, but I don't have a better answer for you than that.

Q Thank you.

Q William Friedman (sp?) from Los Angeles. Governor, it's an issue which is not very well known, but there are about 3 [thousand] to 4,000 Jews left in Syria. And they are there for 30, 40 years. They are stuck; they don't get out. And I wonder now that the US and the Syrians have a better relationship in recent months, is there anything -- any plans to help those people to get out?

GOV. SUNUNU: I don't know of any specific efforts in that behalf. Richard, do you?

MR. HAASS: There's two issues. One is to improve the lot of those Jews who are staying in Syria; and that's something that we constantly talk about with the Syrian government. And then we try to make a special effort; for example, there's a fairly sizable number of young Jewish women who live in Syria who can't find husbands. And we try to make a special effort to see if we can't somehow facilitate the free movement of these people, who really face a terribly difficult problem. And that's something that quite regularly we speak about with the government of Syria.

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Q Governor, at the risk of being monotonous, the issue of Soviet Jews one more time.

GOV. SUNUNU: Sure.

Q It's not just an issue of direct flights and convenience -- if I want to stop in Boston on my way to Hawaii on a

vacation. You know, we're talking about a million people who currently want to leave. At the rate of 500 persons a day, it's going to take years to get them out. Gorbachev could be gone by then; pogroms could have happened by then. I think the Arabs have done a very successful job in lobbying Moscow not to have direct flights, not to let them out quickly. Obviously, it's against their interest.

I think we have to call upon the American government to use its pressure, not just for direct flights, but for massive emigration at a much greater pace than 500 a day. I think the American government could offer planes -- could offer transport planes, to do it themselves, to get out thousands a day, rather than getting out 500 a day, number one. Number two, the issue of aid for those who are arriving in Israel.

GOV. SUNUNU: Let me take the first one first. Again, it is because of the concern of the problem of transportation that the pressure has been made for the flights. But beyond that the President, even in his conversation yesterday with Seymour Reich, again reiterated the fact that we have been pressing governments not to oppose -- the Arab governments not to oppose the issues that are associated with emigration. So that has been part of what the President and [Secretary] Baker have been trying to do all along.

I'm sorry -- the last?

Q The issue of making the aid conditional on --

GOV. SUNUNU: Oh, the aid linkage is not a linkage. And there's a language that I would again ask Richard to be more specific on.

MR. HAAS: We've made it clear that we're prepared to facilitate the -- not only the movement of these people, but their resettlement in Israel. Quite honestly, we want to do so in a way that's also consistent with our other major concern, which is the peace process. And what we said yesterday, and are prepared to do, is to talk with the Israeli government about whether we can come up with a mutually acceptable approach to how we can, you know, make available these housing investment guarantees in a way that the Israeli government can live with, and quite honestly, we can live with.

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No one is making conditional the leaving of these people from the Soviet Union. One should not draw that kind of a connection. This administration and previous administrations have done everything possible to get these numbers as high as possible. And we're going to continue doing that. What we want to see is that when these people arrive in Israel that we not only accomplish that goal, but we don't at the same time set back the other important goal of promoting peace in the Middle East, which is also, I would say, just as much in Israel's interest.

GOV. SUNUNU: I'd add to it also that I think the success that the administration had in raising the emigration quotas, not just minimally but rather significantly, is also part of this overall

effort of understanding how critical the problem is and trying to do what can be done to fulfill our responsibilities. Let me take two more and then I apologize for having to leave.

Q Governor Sununu, J.J. Kaplan (sp?) from Los Angeles. Putting on your hat for a moment as a psychic -- (laughter) -- do you think Premier Gorbachev will be in power a year from now? I think that's something that's on the minds of a lot of people who are keeping an eye on developments in that part of the world.

GOV. SUNUNU: I don't know if I can give you an answer. We certainly hope -- the President really does feel that what Mr. Gorbachev has been able to move forward in terms of perestroika [and] glasnost has been constructive, not only for the Soviet Union but for the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and tranquility in the world. And the progress that is being made almost on a daily basis continues to move in that direction, with the very notable and very critical exception of the issue of anti-Semitism that seems to be itself thriving, unfortunately, in this climate of openness and perestroika. It is that conflict of seeing benefits, but also the same kind of openness creating this kind of terrible situation. I do think, though, that in the absence of a worldwide calamitous kind of situation where the Western European nations and the United States are not able to continue to respond constructively to the changes in Eastern Europe -- in the absence of something that we cannot foresee clearly taking place within the Soviet Union, I think at least on the terms of one year, I would say it's probably a better bet that he will be there than that he won't. And I think that's good.

Q Roger Gracen (sp?) from Baltimore. Mr. Governor, at the risk of appearing a little bit diplomatically impolite, it strikes me that at a certain level our government does tend to speak at times out of both sides of its mouth vis-a-vis standing up for a strong Israel. Our embassy is still in Tel Aviv, the \$400 million loan guarantee has -- we have not had a really forthcoming response from the administration. Foreign aid earmarks are coming under increasing pressure from the administration. And my question of substance regarding Israel is, just what does the administration really think is going to happen to the territories once the Palestinian platform really gains momentum?

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GOV. SUNUNU: The important point is that it is not the administration's policy to try and predetermine what is going to happen, and that that process ought to be one in which a constructive dialogue takes place, and that one of the important things that we feel would come out of the plan, as presented by Prime Minister Shamir when he came to the President almost a year ago, was to create a climate, a process, and a discussion mode in which a solution to that issue could be developed with Israel being the principal partner in the discussions. And it is more appropriate for it to take place that way than for somehow the United States to try and predetermine or predispose where that would go.

Q: Governor Sununu, inasmuch as you did say --

GOV. SUNUNU: Yes.

Q: -- that you would accept two more --

GOV. SUNUNU: Well, since there's a man at the microphone, let me take one more as a courtesy and then vanish. (Laughs.)

Q: Thank you very much, Governor Sununu. My name is Simon Fresch (sp?) from Detroit, Michigan. I'd like to ask why the United States, in its talks with Helmut Kohl, doesn't make formal commitments to the -- to Holocaust awareness part and parcel of the reunification process, perhaps even to the extent of including representatives of survivors' groups in the negotiations over German reunification?

GOV. SUNUNU: I must tell you that the process of determining how to deal with what is happening so rapidly in Europe is one that is under constant review. The administration's position is that it is clearly a question, first of all, for the two Germanys to somehow come to an accommodation between themselves as to what they would like to do internally and in terms of structure, and then that that is an issue that ought to be resolved within -- amongst -- with the appropriate participation of the allies within NATO.

Now, in each and every case of the allies within NATO, it is certainly felt that the groups that you are talking about have some indirect voice. Now, whether it ought to be extended beyond that framework I suspect will be continually reviewed. But at this point, it has been decided that that mechanism is the one that is most appropriate to the situation as it exists right now. And I'm afraid that the rapidity of change that is taking place there is one in which any deviation from an existing structure would have the process bypass it and end up with a result without having had a voice in it at all.

Thank you very much.

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דף: $\frac{1}{4}$ מחוך:	טובס מזרק קשר ניו-יורק	דחיפות: בהול לבוקר
אל: מנהל ארבי"ל 2.	בהול	סייג: שמור
דע: ממנכ"ל; ס/ממנכ"ל מצפ"א ופר"ו; מנהל מצפ"א; רושינגטון.		תזח: 081600
מאת: אהרן יעקב, נאוי"ם.	איה'	חש מזיקי: 0291 34-11

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מִרְעָבִי"ט - עֲלִיָּה.

1. מקור מסר לידי את שתי הטיטות המצורפות, שהוגדרו על ידו כ"ניירות עבודה אמריקאים".
2. נפגשתי עם פרנק אורבנצ'יק (ארה"ב) ואמרתי לו כי אנו מופתעים ומאוכזבים מן העובדה שטיטות הצעה הנוגעות לנו, ושהוכנו למיטב ידיעתנו על ידם, מגיעות אלינו באמצעות צד שלישי. היינו מצפים מהם, כידידים, שיעבירו לנו את החומר ביוזמתם, ושכלל יחזיקו אותנו בתמונת המו"מ שהם מנהלים בענין הנוגע לנו במישרין.
3. אורבנצ'יק טען כי המדובר בניירות עבודה פנימיים של משלחתו, שהוכנו על בסיס נייר העבודה הסובייטי שהועבר אלינו בשעתו (מברקו 633 מ- 16/2 - מברק 51 לווינגטון). הניירות הללו הובאו לידיעת המשלחת המצרית, וזו העבירה אותם אל נכון גט למשלחות אחרות. טען כי אינו יכול לומר שהניירות הללו משקפים את עמדת הממשל. הוסיף כי כידוע קיבלה ארה"ב מלכתחילה את זימון מועבי"ט באי רצון, אולם מכיוון שהזימון הוא בגדר עובדה, מעדיפה משלחתו שהמועצה תאמץ בקונצנזוס הודעה נשיאותית, או הצעת החלטה. טען שוב כי משלחתו לא ניהלה מו"מ על הניירות המצורפים, אלא הביאה אותם לידיעת המצרים בלבד.
4. השבתי כי לדעתנו הדיון במועבי"ט הוא מיותר ומזיק. הואיל וזוהי, כפי שעולה מדבריו, גם עמדת ארה"ב, עליהם להטיל וטו על הצעת ההחלטה שתוגש, ולא לנהל מו"מ על נוסח זה או אחר.
5. שב וטען כי אין המדובר במו"מ, אלא בניירות עבודה פנימיים, שאינם משקפים בהכרח את עמדת הממשל. רמז כי עמדתם בדיון במועבי"ט תהיה תלויה גם בהתפתחויות סביב התהליך המדיני.

[illegible]

1. 7. 1954

שם ר' יצחק

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אל:	סיוג:	תזח:
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מאת:	291/34	

6. להלן הערות אחדות לניירות המצורפים:

א. המדובר בשתי גירסאות, שהמאוחרת יותר ביניהן (המסומנת במספר 3, כלומר השלישית במספר לאחר הנייר הסובייטי והגירסה הראשונה) הוכנה אל נכון בעקבות ההערות שנתקבלו מהמצרים לגירסה הראשונה.

ב. מהנייר הסובייטי בושט המונח ILLEGAL PRACTICES. כן הושמטה הבקשה שועדת השטחים תחדש את עבודתה, ובמקום זה מוזמן המזכ"ל לעקוב אחר ביצוע החלטתה ולדווח למועבי"ט. המילה DEPLORES (סעיף אופרטיבי 2 בנייר הסובייטי) הומרה המילה REGRETS. בניירות האמריקאים נוסף סעיף אופרטיבי חדש (סעיף 1) המאשר את זכות ההגירה.

ג. בחשוואה לגירסה המוקדמת, נוספו לגירסה המאוחרת האלמנטים הבאים:

- איזכור החלטה 465 ממרץ 1980 במבוא.
- איזכור סעיף 13 בהצהרה האונברסלית על זכויות האדם במבוא.
- בסעיף אופרטיבי 3 נוספו המילים:

WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT.

- הסעיפים האופרטיביים 4 ו-6 בגירסה המאוחרת הם חדשים.

7. ביון עומד לשוחח על הנושא בנפרד עם פיקרינג.

נאו"ם.

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SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

--HAVING CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE SETTLEMENTS BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM,

--RECALLING RESOLUTIONS 446 (1979) OF 22 MARCH 1979, 452 (1979) OF 20 JULY 1979, AND 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980,

--DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH THE SETTLEMENT POLICY IS BOUND TO HAVE ON ANY ATTEMPT TO REACH A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

--1. REAFFIRMS THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND EMIGRATION AS STATED IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

--2. REAFFIRMS THE APPLICABILITY TO THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, OCCUPIED SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949, AND PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 49, WHICH PROHIBITS THE OCCUPYING POWER TO DEPORT OR TRANSFER PARTS OF ITS OWN CIVILIAN POPULATION INTO THE TERRITORY IT OCCUPIES,

--3. REGRETS THE SAID PRACTICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO SETTLE IMMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,

--4. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOT TO ACT TO ALTER THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

--5. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, UNDER REVIEW.

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THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

--HAVING CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF THE SETTLEMENTS BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM,

--RECALLING RESOLUTIONS 446 (1979) OF 22 MARCH 1979, 452 (1979) OF 20 JULY 1979, 465 (1980) OF 1 MARCH 1980, AND 476 (1980) OF 30 JUNE 1980,

--DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH THE SETTLEMENT POLICY IS BOUND TO HAVE ON ANY ATTEMPT TO REACH A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

--1. REAFFIRMS THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND EMIGRATION AS STATED IN ARTICLE 13 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

--2. REAFFIRMS THE APPLICABILITY TO THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, OCCUPIED SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949, AND PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 49, WHICH PROHIBITS THE OCCUPYING POWER TO DEPORT OR TRANSFER PARTS OF ITS OWN CIVILIAN POPULATION INTO THE TERRITORY IT OCCUPIES,

--3. REGRETS THE SAID PRACTICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO SETTLE IMMIGRANTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT,

--4. CONSIDERS SUCH PRACTICES TO CONSTITUTE AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

--5. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOT TO ACT TO ALTER THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,

--6. INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BEFORE 1990,

--7. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL SINCE 1967, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, UNDER REVIEW.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תאריך : 09.03.90

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שמור

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חוזם: 3,7552

אל: המשרד

יעדים: וושינגטון/136, בוסטון/68, שיקגו/59, מצב/1034

מ-: נר, 278, תא: 080390, זח: 1400, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: גס: צפא

נד: 6

ארת?

שמור/מיד

אל סמנכל צפא, יועץ תפוצות, מנהל מזאר, מנהל מצפא

דע שגריר וושינגטון

לשכת שהח

קונכל בוסטון

קונכל שיקגו

ציר הסברה - וושינגטון

מאת קונכל נ

השגריר והחמ נפגשו אמש עם מנכל ה C J F מרטי קראר.

השגריר עדכן את קראר בענין הקמת ועדת קונכלים שהוקמה

בכנס קונכלים בווינגטון.

השגריר תאר בפני קראר את מטרות הועדה בעיקר בתחום גיוס

השקעות ואימוץ ערים עי הקהילות. קראר הגיב על כך בחיוב רב.

הוא מציע כי יעשה ראשית כל נסיון במספר מוגבל של קהילות

ולאו דוקא הגדולות ביותר. כן הוא מצדד בעידוד הזמנת ראשי

ערים או מושלים ולצידם אנשי עסקים ארצה. סוכס כי לכשהועדה

תתכנס בקרוב לישיבתה הראשונה היא תפגש גם עם מרטי קראר.

סוכס גם שפניה דומה תעשה לראשי המגבית.

בשיחה עלה גם נושא פתיחת משרדי הייאס ומשרד ה UNION OF

COUNCILS SOVIET JEWS

קראר הביע הסתייגותו מהמקמת משרדים אלה הנוגדים במהותם את

המדיניות הנוכחית של הממסד היהודי ועלולים להוביל ללחץ

לפתיחת השערים לארהב. עוד הכחיש קראר שמועה שהגיע לאזני

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

השגריר על כי ה CJF הביע בקורת על אזלת ידה של ישראל בקליטת העליה ובמאבק על טיסות ישירות.

אורי סביר

יג

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר, תפוצות

דחיות: בהול לבוקר סוג: שמור	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פבוק	ק: 1 כתוב: 9
תאריך וזמן חשור: 16:45 9.3.90	אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א	
פס' פבוק: המסרד:	דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ א/מ	
1/9 285	כאת: השגריר, וושינגטון	

עמדת ארה"ב בענין ירושלים.

בהמשך לפגישתי עם גנרל סקורופט ב-6 דנא, קיבלתי היום המכתב הרצ"ב לצירופיו.
 לחשומת לבכם.

ארד

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Statement by Undersecretary of State Eagleburger, before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 23, 1984

Document Number 1

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Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with the Committee the Administration's position on S. 2031. As you know, this bill provides for the United States Embassy and Ambassador's residence in Israel to be moved to the city of Jerusalem.

This Committee has already received Secretary Shultz's letter expressing the strong opposition of the Administration to this bill. Before I outline the reasons for our opposition, let me take a few moments to provide the context in which this proposal arises.

The United States has been and remains Israel's staunchest supporter. In 1948 when Israel proclaimed its independence, the United States was the first country to extend it recognition. We quickly established diplomatic relations and established our embassy at Israel's seat of government, Tel Aviv. There our embassy has remained, during the Administrations of eight Presidents. Dating from well before the establishment of the state of Israel, we have maintained a Consulate General in Jerusalem which reports directly to the Department. This is in accord with arrangements in special circumstances elsewhere, such as Hong Kong.

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Why has it been consistent U.S. policy, during Democratic and Republican administrations, to retain our embassy in Tel Aviv? In short, because the location of our embassy is intimately related to the efforts of the United States to secure a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this regard, US efforts have stressed peace through negotiations. Our willingness to resist attempts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict through force or through unilateral actions has preserved our ability to play a constructive role in settling the conflict. Moving our embassy to Jerusalem would inevitably convey a message that the United States accepted the position of one party to the issue, when in fact, a resolution of that issue -- that is, a resolution of the issue that can stand the test of time -- can only be found in the framework of a final settlement reached through negotiations.

The status of Jerusalem is an integral part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While we fully understand the depth of attachment of Israelis to the city of Jerusalem, we have a responsibility to bear in mind the special significance which the city holds as well for Jews, Muslims and Christians throughout the world. That is a compelling fact that cannot be lightly put aside. We would not, Mr. Chairman, have achieved the Camp David Accords if the US had adopted the position of either party on the question of Jerusalem. This explains President Carter's separate letter attached to the Camp David Accords which reaffirmed the US position that the status of Jerusalem must be resolved through negotiations. That position continues to be U.S. policy today.

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Our policy on this issue has been resolute for more than three decades. In 1949, when the Israelis began moving their government to Jerusalem, we informed them that we could not accept a unilateral claim to the city. Again, in 1960 we informed Jordan of our opposition to its intention to make the eastern part of the city Jordan's second capital. And, in 1967, when Israel occupied the eastern sector, we opposed Israeli actions to place all of Jerusalem under Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration. Most recently, President Reagan stated in his September 1, 1982, Middle East Peace initiative that "... we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations."

Mr. Chairman, a change in the U.S. position on the status of Jerusalem would seriously undermine our ability to play an effective role in the Middle East peace process. Indeed, moving our embassy to Jerusalem would widely be perceived as an effort by the United States to preempt negotiations altogether by prejudging a crucial issue. In short, to move our embassy to Jerusalem now would almost certainly gravely damage the prospects for a negotiated settlement; at a minimum, it would seriously compromise the ability of the United States to continue to play a constructive role in bringing the parties to the negotiating table..

In addition, Mr. Chairman, the proposed legislation would be a direct interference in the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs. As stated in Secretary Shultz's letter, we are concerned that, regardless of its merits, the bill raises serious constitutional questions of a separation of powers nature. The President historically has been responsible for conducting diplomatic relations on behalf of the United States, including the determination of where and through what means to conduct such relations. Legislation

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directing him to relocate an embassy would be in direct conflict with this principle. By further seeking to compel him to recognize all of Jerusalem as part of Israel, it would impair his ability to determine the recognition policy of the United States. In seeking to force the President's hand, the proposed legislation, in our view, would exceed the proper scope of legislative action.

I am told, although I find it hard to credit, that some have argued that in retaining our embassy in Tel Aviv we raise doubts concerning American recognition of Israel as a sovereign state. That argues in the face of too many years of history to be taken seriously. The United States and Israel have, since 1948, shared a special friendship, special closeness -- a special relationship, if you will -- that is known as such throughout the world. There cannot be any doubt about our commitment to Israel.

Some proponents of this legislation apparently also argue that United States policy is not in accord with reality -- that Jerusalem is Israel's capital, and that by failing to locate our embassy there we are denying Israel a sovereign prerogative. But this begs the fundamental question, at least from the perspective of the United States. It is the essence of the Jerusalem issue -- or at least America's decades old position thereon -- that it should not be resolved by the unilateral actions of any party.

It has also been suggested that conducting diplomatic relations through our embassy in Tel Aviv imposes practical impediments, since many Israeli government offices are now located in Jerusalem. That is, no doubt, true. But we have

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been able to manage, and will continue to be able to do so. In any event, I doubt that even the strongest of S.2031's proponents would argue that their principal purpose for putting the legislation forward is to improve the efficiency of our diplomatic establishment in Israel.

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Mr. Chairman, I have spoken here on behalf of the Administration of which I am a part. But were I speaking simply on my own behalf I would take no different a line. It is because I care about my country's relationship with Israel, and my country's ability to continue to play a crucial role in the search for that which the people of Israel so richly deserve -- peace -- that I oppose this legislation.

I cannot deny the frustration many Americans and most Israelis must feel because of our position. Nor do I, or this Administration, take this frustration lightly. We regret it.

But, in the last analysis, it is a just and lasting peace for Israel that will bring with it a solution to this vexing problem of the status of Jerusalem. It is the calling, and the commitment, of the United States to help bring about that just and lasting peace. Indeed, I believe we are indispensable to the achievement of such a result. And therefore, Mr. Chairman, I must oppose passage of S.2031.

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U.S. Reiterates Position on Jerusalem

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council on September 25 by U.S. Representative George Bush, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BUSH

USUN press release 147 dated September 25

Once again we have met to consider Jerusalem, an issue of long standing in this body and other organs of the United Nations. In our view, the ultimate status of Jerusalem should be determined through negotiation and agreement between the Governments of Israel and Jordan in the context of an overall peace settlement, taking into account the interests of its inhabitants, of the international religious communities who hold it sacred, and of other countries in the area.

In December 1969, Secretary Rogers stated: "We have made clear repeatedly in the past 2 1/2 years that we cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city."¹ The Secretary then delineated a number of principles which in our view would provide an equitable framework for a final Jerusalem settlement:

1. Jerusalem should be a unified city;
2. There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities;
3. Administrative arrangements for the unified city should take into account the interest of all its inhabitants and of the Christian, Jewish, and Moslem communities; and
4. There should be roles for both Israel and

¹ For Secretary Rogers' address at Washington on Dec. 9, 1969, see BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1970, p. 7.

Jordan in the civic, economic, and religious life of the city.

Earlier in 1969 in this hall, my distinguished predecessor Charles Yost addressed himself more specifically to the kinds of matters which are responsible for our presence here today.² He said, and let me just review it briefly: "The expropriation or confiscation of land, the construction of housing on such land, the demolition or confiscation of buildings, including those having historic or religious significance, and the application of Israeli law to occupied portions of the city are detrimental to our common interests in the city." He noted as well that the United States considers that part of Jerusalem which came under Israeli control, like other areas occupied by Israel in the June 1967 war, as occupied territory and thereby subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power.

We regret Israel's failure to acknowledge its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as its actions which are contrary to the letter and spirit of this convention. We are distressed that the actions of Israel in the occupied portion of Jerusalem give rise to understandable concern that the eventual disposition of the occupied section of Jerusalem may be prejudiced. The Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, 1970-71, reflects the concern of many governments over changes in the face of this city. We have on a number of occasions discussed this matter with the Government of Israel, stressing the need to take more fully into account the sensitivities and concerns of others. Unfortunately, the response of the Government of Israel has been disappointing.

All of us understand, as I indicated earlier in these remarks, that Jerusalem has a very special place in the Judaic tradition, one which has great meaning for Jews throughout the world. At the same time Jerusalem holds a special place in the hearts of many millions of Christians and Moslems throughout the world. In this regard,

² For a statement by Ambassador Yost made in the Security Council on July 1, 1969, see BULLETIN of July 28, 1969, p. 77.

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I want to state clearly that we believe Israel's respect for the holy places has indeed been exemplary. But an Israeli occupation policy made up of unilaterally determined practices cannot help promote a just and lasting peace any more than that cause was served by the status quo in Jerusalem prior to June 1967, which, I want to make clear, we did not like and we do not advocate reestablishing.

In conclusion, I would note that the resolution before us today, as in the past, calls for a report on the situation in Jerusalem. We have supported this resolution not because we agree fully with every provision in it; some elements in it in fact, as I mentioned to our distinguished colleague from Somalia, gave us difficulty. But we have supported this resolution out of the belief that it was time to reiterate our concern that nothing be done in Jerusalem that can prejudice an ultimate and peaceful solution.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION^a

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of July 1967 concerning measures and actions by Israel designed to change the status of the Israeli-occupied section of Jerusalem,

Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem (S/10313) and the reports of the Secretary-General (S/8052, S/8146, S/9149 and Add.1, S/9537 and S/10124 and Add.1 and 2), and having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

Reaffirming the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

Noting with concern the non-compliance by Israel with the above-mentioned resolutions,

Noting with concern further that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures designed to change the status and character of the occupied section of Jerusalem,

1. Reaffirms Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);

2. Deplores the failure of Israel to respect the previous resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the status of the city of Jerusalem;

3. Confirms in the clearest possible terms that all

legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section are totally invalid and cannot change that status;

4. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City, or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace;

5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Security Council as appropriate and in any event within 60 days on the implementation of this resolution.

^a U.N. doc S/RES/298 (1971); adopted by the Council on Sept. 25 by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention.

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ארה"ב

בלמס/מידי

אל : מצפ"א, ממ"ד-בין"ל 1.

דע : הסברה.

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון.

רצ"ב דברים שאמר ראש צוות הבית הלבן, ג'ון סוננוו.
במרכז ויזנטאל במסגרת ועידת המנהיגות הלאומית ביום
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עתונות

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REMARKS OF WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF JOHN SUNUNU, TO THE SIMON
RESENTHAL CENTER, NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, THE WESTIN HOTEL
WASHINGTON, DC, TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1990

GOV. SUNUNU: Thank you very much. Thank you. I do appreciate the chance to come and spend a little time with you. One of the last things I did before I left was touch base with General Scowcroft. He kind of smiled when I told him I was coming out. I didn't know whether that meant "better you than I" or -- (laughter) -- (with a laugh) -- in the nicest sense of that. But I am pleased to be here.

First of all, let me talk about a few items in general. I have asked Richard Haass to join me from NSC just to make sure that as we get to the issues in which both the subtleties and the nuances are critical I want to make sure that I've got somebody here who is an expert that might be able to deal with those kinds of details rather than just tell you we'll get back to you; I thought it would be just easier to get you the answers as directly as I could.

The issues that are critical in these very interesting times are still ones in which the fundamental commitment of this country remains consistent -- it is fundamentally committed to the security of the State of Israel. I think that that has been reiterated as often as is appropriate and is possible, because it is a very important part of what the President, Secretary Baker, General Scowcroft use as the starting point.

But beyond that, as these exciting times, these changes that have been talked about in Europe and the Soviet Union take place, there are other fundamentals that have to be addressed. As you remember, when the President made his State of the Union Address he pointed out that he had a concern for a lot of issues. But one of the ones he underscored was the concern about what he felt was a rising level of anti-Semitism both in this country and around the world.

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That concern was raised not only the State of the Union Address, but one of the issues that the President brought forth in the discussions in Malta. He emphasized to Mr. Gorbachev that the reports that we had been getting in that respect were very disturbing to the President and the President wanted to make two points there; number one, our continued support for the principles and the reality of emigration, but the fact also that the conditions within the Soviet Union should be made such that they would recognize that there is a resource base of talented people, of intellectuals, of people who are very much the heart and soul of the strength of the Soviet Union itself, and that Mr. Gorbachev ought not to have policies that encourage anti-Semitic activities or even condone anti-Semitic activities, because that in itself was wrong in itself, but also wrong for the capacity of the Soviet Union to retain its intelligence base. Whether that made a difference or not I cannot tell you, but I can also point out to you that it was re-emphasized by Jim Baker when he met with Mr.

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Schavardnadze and Mr. Gorbachev in his trips to Moscow. And in fact, the -- an associated issue, the issue that -- going back to the emigration question, the pressure was made -- it was made very clear to Mr. Gorbachev that Secretary Baker and the President are very much concerned about allowing direct flights from the Soviet Union to Israel.

We were very disappointed that that was not supported, that was not responded to in a constructive way. And I assure you that that will also be an item that the Secretary continues to press in the discussions that follow. It is a major concern -- (applause) -- it is a major concern, and it is the kind of issue that is disappointing not to get a constructive response, because frankly it is not that difficult to accommodate, and it is one of those responses that one always wonders as to whether or not that it might be indicative of further problems. But the fact is that it is an issue of primary concern, high priority, and will continue to be pressed.

Finally, if -- you don't have to read very far into the press over the last few days to discover that there are issues of concern out there. I think the President's statement yesterday, following his telephone conversation with Seymour Reich, who is the President of the Conference of Presidents of the American Jewish Organizations, was an effort to make clear the continued commitment to the President on not only the fundamental questions, but that he -- that US policy towards Jerusalem is unchanged and that the United States supports a United Jerusalem whose final status is determined by negotiations.

That has been the policy; it continues to be the policy. And whatever the nuances of discussions that might have been raised, perhaps unfortunately, in the statements that were made on a variety of other issues, do not in any way at all impact that. And I hope that as the concerns that the administration and the President have towards moving the peace process forward continue, that it is kept in mind that the plan that we are encouraging, that the efforts that we are supporting, followed from the meeting that took place almost a year ago here in Washington, as Mr. Shamir came and made his presentation to the President and asked the President and Secretary Baker to support that approach, which was based on elections. That has been the thrust of what the President and the Secretary have been doing. And we are hopeful that that formula presented by Mr. Shamir can continue to be the basic foundation that moves these issues towards a peaceful reconciliation.

Having said that, let me open this up to questions and try and address the issues that are of most concern to you. I do apologize that I am operating on a schedule that unfortunately is a typical schedule around here, one that is tight. But we'll try and deal with as many of the issues as we can in the period of time we have.

MR. HAAS(?): Marcie (sp???)

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GOV. SUNUNU: Oh, I'm sorry.

Q Thank you. Marcie Goldberg (sp?) from Chicago. Governor Sununu, in light of your comments to the National Association of Arab-Americans calling for, quote, "a foreign policy that is more even-handed," end of quote, I presume in regard to the Middle East, do you feel in any way that might be responsible for some of the President's comments on East Jerusalem?

GOV. SUNUNU: No, not at all. In fact, my comments were one that were also accompanied by admonitions and have continuously been accompanied by admonitions to Arab-Americans and frankly, to all supporters of -- all representatives of Arab governments that come into the White House to talk, that they must be dealing with these issues in a context of moving towards peace, and that that peace requires constructive participation in discussions and a constructive commitment to the reality that the United States policy supports Israel and supports the security of Israel. And the fact that I ask that as that whole process takes place that the climate be one of full participation, I think, is a supportive effort in trying to reach a peaceful conclusion to what is a complex and difficult issue.

Q Governor Sununu, there are reports in the media that the administration is edging towards a two-state solution. Do you foresee, and do you support a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza?

GOV. SUNUNU: No. The policy of this administration is opposed to an independent Palestinian state. It's part of the Republican platform, it's part of the President's position -- (applause) -- and I don't know of one iota of change that has taken place since he established that as the firm position of his -- of -- his firm

Q What is your position on settlement -- on settlements in the West Bank and Gaza?

GOV. SUNUNU: The President has made it very clear that the policy of the United States continues to be opposed to new settlements and the expansion of settlements. And he has made no bones about making that as a clear statement to Mr. Shamir; and he continues to have that commitment, and he recognizes it may be a point of disagreement between himself and the Prime Minister and the government of Israel, but he has not changed that position.

Used in the Soviet Union, especially in Azerbaijan, and that word is extremely frightening to the Soviet Jews. This is a fear of history repeating itself.

GOV. SUNUNU: Sure. Well, let me -- let me emphasize again that it is because we have been hearing the same kind reports that the President addressed that issue rather directly in his discussions at Malta, among others, that it has been one of the major items that Secretary of State Baker has carried as the message from the President, and in the discussions that he has had with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and, in fact, continues to be one of the main issues of contention, differences that we will continue to stress in all the discussions.

There has been a tremendous streamlining in what we can control in terms of the processes associated with allowing for immigration at the embassy and in the offices in Europe that had built up a logjam over the -- in recent times. That effort to streamline continues. But the key issue is the issue of transportation. And I wish I had an answer for you as to how to have a magnificent substitute for the concerns that -- of -- the transportation concerns that have been raised. We will continue to press for the direct flights, but I don't have a better answer for you than that.

Q Thank you.

Q William Friedman (sp?) from Los Angeles. Governor, it's an issue which is not very well known, but there are about 3 [thousand] to 4,000 Jews left in Syria. And they are there for 30, 40 years. They are stuck; they don't get out. And I wonder now that the US and the Syrians have a better relationship in recent months, is there anything -- any plans to help those people to get out?

GOV. SUNUNU: I don't know of any specific efforts in that behalf. Richard, do you?

MR. HAASS: There's two issues. One is to improve the lot of those Jews who are staying in Syria; and that's something that we constantly talk about with the Syrian government. And then we try to make a special effort; for example, there's a fairly sizable number of young Jewish women who live in Syria who can't find husbands. And we try to make a special effort to see if we can't somehow facilitate the free movement of these people, who really face a terribly difficult problem. And that's something that quite regularly we speak about with the government of Syria.

Q Governor, at the risk of being monotonous, the issue of Soviet Jews one more time.

GOV. SUNUNU: Sure.

Q It's not just an issue of direct flights and convenience -- if I want to stop in Boston on my way to Hawaii on a

vacation. You know, we're talking about a million people who currently want to leave. At the rate of 500 persons a day, it's going to take years to get them out. Gorbachev could be gone by then; pogroms could have happened by then. I think the Arabs have done a very successful job in lobbying Moscow not to have direct flights, not to let them out quickly. Obviously, it's against their interest.

I think we have to call upon the American government to use its pressure, not just for direct flights, but for massive emigration at a much greater pace than 500 a day. I think the American government could offer planes -- could offer transport planes, to do it themselves, to get out thousands a day, rather than getting out 500 a day, number one. Number two, the issue of aid for those who are arriving in Israel.

GOV. SUNUNU: Let me take the first one first. Again, it is because of the concern of the problem of transportation that the pressure has been made for the flights. But beyond that the President, even in his conversation yesterday with Seymour Reich, again reiterated the fact that we have been pressing governments not to oppose -- the Arab governments not to oppose the issues that are associated with emigration. So that has been part of what the President and [Secretary] Baker have been trying to do all along.

I'm sorry -- the last?

Q The issue of making the aid conditional on --

GOV. SUNUNU: Oh, the aid linkage is not a linkage. And there's a language that I would again ask Richard to be more specific on.

MR. HAAS: We've made it clear that we're prepared to facilitate the -- not only the movement of these people, but their resettlement in Israel. Quite honestly, we want to do so in a way that's also consistent with our other major concern, which is the peace process. And what we said yesterday, and are prepared to do, is to talk with the Israeli government about whether we can come up with a mutually acceptable approach to how we can, you know, make available these housing investment guarantees in a way that the Israeli government can live with, and quite honestly, we can live with.

(6)

No one is making conditional the leaving of these people from the Soviet Union. One should not draw that kind of a connection. This administration and previous administrations have done everything possible to get these numbers as high as possible. And we're going to continue doing that. What we want to see is that when these people arrive in Israel that we not only accomplish that goal, but we don't at the same time set back the other important goal of promoting peace in the Middle East, which is also, I would say, just as much in Israel's interest.

GOV. SUNUNU: I'd add to it also that I think the success that the administration had in raising the emigration quotas, not just minimally but rather significantly, is also part of this overall

effort of understanding how critical the problem is and trying to do what can be done to fulfill our responsibilities. Let me take two more and then I apologize for having to leave.

Q Governor Sununu, J.J. Kaplan (sp?) from Los Angeles. Putting on your hat for a moment as a psychic --- (laughter) -- do you think Premier Gorbachev will be in power a year from now? I think that's something that's on the minds of a lot of people who are keeping an eye on developments in that part of the world.

GOV. SUNUNU: I don't know if I can give you an answer. We certainly hope -- the President really does feel that what Mr. Gorbachev has been able to move forward in terms of perestroika [and] glasnost has been constructive, not only for the Soviet Union but for the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and tranquility in the world. And the progress that is being made almost on a daily basis continues to move in that direction, with the very notable and very critical exception of the issue of anti-Semitism that seems to be itself thriving, unfortunately, in this climate of openness and perestroika. It is that conflict of seeing benefits, but also the same kind of openness creating this kind of terrible situation. I do think, though, that in the absence of a worldwide calamitous kind of situation where the Western European nations and the United States are not able to continue to respond constructively to the changes in Eastern Europe -- in the absence of something that we cannot foresee clearly taking place within the Soviet Union, I think at least on the terms of one year, I would say it's probably a better bet that he will be there than that he won't. And I think that's good.

Q Roger Gracen (sp?) from Baltimore. Mr. Governor, at the risk of appearing a little bit diplomatically impolite, it strikes me that at a certain level our government does tend to speak at times out of both sides of its mouth vis-a-vis standing up for a strong Israel. Our embassy is still in Tel Aviv, the \$400 million loan guarantee has -- we have not had a really forthcoming response from the administration. Foreign aid earmarks are coming under increasing pressure from the administration. And my question of substance regarding Israel is, just what does the administration really think is going to happen to the territories once the Palestinian platform really gains momentum?

GOV. SUNUNU: The important point is that it is not the administration's policy to try and predetermine what is going to happen, and that that process ought to be one in which a constructive dialogue takes place, and that one of the important things that we feel would come out of the plan, as presented by Prime Minister Shamir when he came to the President almost a year ago, was to create a climate, a process, and a discussion mode in which a solution to that issue could be developed with Israel being the principal partner in the discussions. And it is more appropriate for it to take place that way than for somehow the United States to try and predetermine or predispose where that would go.

Q: Governor Sununu, inasmuch as you did say --

GOV. SUNUNU: Yes.

Q: -- that you would accept two more --

GOV. SUNUNU: Well, since there's a man at the microphone, let me take one more as a courtesy and then vanish. (Laughs.)

Q: Thank you very much, Governor Sununu. My name is Simon Fresch (sp?) from Detroit, Michigan. I'd like to ask why the United States, in its talks with Helmut Kohl, doesn't make formal commitments to the -- to Holocaust awareness part and parcel of the reunification process, perhaps even to the extent of including representatives of survivors' groups in the negotiations over German reunification?

GOV. SUNUNU: I must tell you that the process of determining how to deal with what is happening so rapidly in Europe is one that is under constant review. The administration's position is that it is clearly a question, first of all, for the two Germanys to somehow come to an accommodation between themselves as to what they would like to do internally and in terms of structure, and then that that is an issue that ought to be resolved within -- amongst -- with the appropriate participation of the allies within ENATOF.

Now, in each and every case of the allies within NATO, it is certainly felt that the groups that you are talking about have some indirect voice. Now, whether it ought to be extended beyond that framework I suspect will be continually reviewed. But at this point, it has been decided that that mechanism is the one that is most appropriate to the situation as it exists right now. And I'm afraid that the rapidity of change that is taking place there is one in which any deviation from an existing structure would have the process bypass it and end up with a result without having had a voice in it at all.

Thank you very much.

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8/8

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6077

תאריך: 07.03.90

נכנס **

שמו

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חוזם: 3,6077

אל: המשרד

יעדים: וושנינגטון / 107, ני / 331, מצב / 845, מנמת / 350
מ: - בטחון, נו: 167, תא: 070390, זח: 1710, דח: מ, סג: שמ

תח: נתיב, פרנקל גס: משרדים

נד: a

ל/ה

מידדי/שמו

אל: שירן, ק. לקונגרס - וושנינגטון, שנהר-ניו יורק

דע: תפוצות

מאת: נתיב - פרנקל

154 צא 62

בהתיחסות למברק נר 147: פגישת השגריר עם הקונגרסמנים. כמה הערות:

1. כיום 20 אחוז מהעולים באים ברכבות, בעתיד הקרוב לא יהיה צורך להשתמש באפיק זה שכן יהיו מספיק מקומות בטיסות.

2. יש מספיק טיסות (מעבר לטיסות הרגילות) אך הנושא איננו לפרסום. כיום כל יהודי שאין לו סידור טיסה יכול באמצעות המשלחת לקבל סידור.

3. עד עכשיו כל ההסכמים שנחתמו על ידי חברות ספנות עם חברות סובייטיות לא קבלו אישור מדיני. כמו אל על. הנושא בבדיקה מתמדת.

4. נכון להיום: אין שום עיכוב מבחינת TRANSPORTATION מבריה"מ-אם יש עיכובים זה בגלל התור במכס לאנשים שרוצים לשלוח מטען.

5. אין צורך בינתים בפתחת תחנות מעבר נוספות, שכן אין כל

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ע יכוב בתחנות המעבר הקיימות והזרימה שוטפת.

פא

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, גוברין, מזאר, תפוצות,
ר/מרכז, ממד, רם, (פאמן), בנצור, מצפא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6401

08.03.90 תאריך

נכנס **

סודי

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חוזם: 3,6401

אל: המשרד

יעדים: בטחון/338, ווש/214, מצב/878, מנמת/368

מ-: נר, 257, תא: 070390, זח: 1800, רח: מ, טג: סו

תח: נתיב, שנהר גס: משרדים

נר: 8

א/הכ

סודי/מידי.

אל: נתיב-ברטוב, פרנקל, יועץ לענייני תפוצות - משה'ח.

דע: השגריר, שירן - וושינגטון.

לשכת שה'ח.

מאת שנהר - ניו יורק

.1145

~~אורי סביר הוזמן לפגישה עם סטיב סולנדר, מנכ"ל הפדרציה של ניו יורק, בעניין הקמת משרד היאס במוסקבה. בברור שנעשה הבוקר היה נדמה כי זו פגישה עם הועדה שהקים C J F לבדיקת הנושא, אך אחכ' התברר כי זו פגישה לא פורמלית עם חלק מן היועצים של הועדה לקראת פגישה של הועדה עצמה שהתקיימה היום. כאשר הגענו לפגישה עם יועצי הועדה סטיב סולנדר וג'פ סלומון מהפדרציה של ניו יורק הוכנסו אליה גם סטיב הופמן, מנכ"ל פדרצית קליבלנד ונכז הועדה לבדיקת שאלת הקמת משרד היאס במוסקבה וכן שפירא, יו"ר הועדה (עד כאן הסבר לדוד ברטוב).~~

סולנדר פתח באומרו, כי סטיב הופמן וג'פ סלומון הכינו דוח לועדה וכי היו רוצים לשמוע את עמדתנו כלפיו, בפגישה בלתי רשמית זו, לפני שהוא מוצג בפני הועדה.

הדברים יצרו אצלנו תחושת אי נוחות שכן זה נראה כהודעה חד צדדית וכ- FAIT ACCOMPLI.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סלומון הציג את הדוח. אמר כי נכתב לאחר סיור באירופה (וינה ואיטליה) - ופגישות עם נציגי הקונסוליות האמריקאיות, אנשי ה-I.N.S. והיאס.

ומסקנה של הדוח היא, כי יש לפתוח משרד היאס במוסקבה. זו גם בקשה של הממשל. הנמוקים הם ברמה המקצועית-טיפולית:

1. צריך לטפל ביעילות בהגירה של לפחות 40,000 יהודים מבריהמ' לארה"ב.

2. משרד היאס ישפר את היחס למהגרים היהודים לנוכח ההתנהגות הבעיתית של אנשי ה-I.N.S.

3. המשרד ידאג להעברת אינפורמציה כללית ורפואית על מהגרים לקהילות הקולטות בארה"ב.

4. היאס יצטרך לטפל גם בהסדרי טיסות בהיקף רחב. יחד עם זאת נאמר, כי עדיין לא נפתרה שאלת התקציב וכי השלטון הסובייטי עדיין מתנגד לכך.

בקשו את תגובתנו. אמרתי שאנו מתנגדים, באופן קטגורי להקמת המשרד, מן הנמוקים הפנימיים:

1) הקמת המשרד תהווה איתות ברור ליהודי בריהמ' כי הקהילה היהודית המאורגנת בארה"ב פועלת למען עידוד הגירת יהודי לארה"ב. כך יבינו זאת יהודי בריהמ'. זה עלול להביא לעיכוב ולעצירת היציאה לישראל, שכן יהודים יעדיפו להמתין בבריהמ' בשל הסכוי להגר לארה"ב ונשיג מטרה הפוכה מזו של הוצאה מהירה של היהודים.

2) יהודים רבים יפנו למשרד היאס בפניות אישיות ויבקשו טפול מיוחד למען הגירה לארה"ב. המשרד יוצף באלפי מכתבים של יהודים המבקשים להגר לארה"ב. ולבסוף יחל המשרד לפעול למען הגירתם של המקרים המיוחדים וזה יגמר בהפעלת לחץ להגדלת מכסות ההגירה.

3) הנמוקים של הדוח הם מקצועיים. צריך לבדוק אם לא קיימות דרכים אלטרנטיביות להעברת האינפורמציה על המגרים למשל באמצעות מחשב ה-I.N.S., שהיאס קיבל אישור להתחבר אליו, ומקובל כי רוב האינפורמציה שמועברת היום נמצא בשאלון של ה-INS שאותו ממלא המהגר במוסקבה.

4) חלק מן האינפורמציה הרפואית על המהגרים וגם מידע אחר

1. The first of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

2. The second of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

3. The third of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

4. The fourth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

5. The fifth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

6. The sixth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

7. The seventh of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

8. The eighth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

9. The ninth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

10. The tenth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

11. The eleventh of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

12. The twelfth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

13. The thirteenth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

14. The fourteenth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

15. The fifteenth of the following items is a copy of a letter from the
author to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association
dated 10/10/1918.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ניתן יהיה להשיג מקרובי המהגרים היושבים בארה"ב שכן רק אנשים שיש להם קרובי משפחה בארה"ב יוכלו להגר וכי הקרובים האלה יהיו בקשר עם היאס והפדרציות המקומיות.

5) אפילו אם יסתבר כי הנמוקים של הדוח נותנים תשובה מקצועית טובה יותר מן האלטרנטיבות, צריך יהיה לקחת בחשבון גם את המחיר הפוליטי והענייני: האיתות ליהודי בריה"מ, חשש לעיכוב תהליך היציאה ועימות עם ישראל.

נשאלו מספר שאלות ובסופן סיכם אורי סביר:

דברנו בלשון המעטה, ההתנגדות בארץ להקמת המשרד במוסקבה היא חזקה ביותר.

זהו נושא רגיש לכולנו. הגענו לקונצנזוס מסוים בשאלת תהליך היציאה והמכסות.

רק עתה הצלחנו ליצור שינוי בכיוון היציאה לכיוון ישראל ואסור לנו לפגוע במצב זה.

נראה כי הנמוקים שלנו בענין הצורך לבדוק אלטרנטיבות (שלא היה במנדט של כותבי הדוח), בענין המחיר הכללי של ישום מסקנות הדוח ובענין הפגיעה בקונצנזוס, נתפסו על ידם, סטיב הופמן שאל מה תהיה עמדתנו אם יציעו להמתין מספר חודשים, אחרי ה-1 באוקטובר 90, כדי לראות איך פועלת ההגירה, ללא משרד היאס במוסקבה, ואח"כ יחליטו. על כך ענה אורי שזה נשמע יותר טוב, בתנאי שלא יודיעו כבר עכשיו שלאחר הבדיקה הזו ימליצו על הקמת משרד היאס. בסוף בקשו הופמן ודן שפירא להמנע מהתבטאויות קשות נגד היאס ('סרטן שצריך לעקרו') שכן אין זה ארגון עצמאי אלא ארגון של הקהילה היהודית המאורגנת.

רש

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות, גוברין, מזאר, ר/מרכז, ממד, רם, (אמן)

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work during the year.

2. The second part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

3. The third part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

5. The fifth part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

6. The sixth part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

7. The seventh part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

8. The eighth part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

9. The ninth part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

10. The tenth part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

11. The eleventh part of the report deals with the results of the work during the year and the progress of the work during the year.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5613

תאריך 07.03.90

יוצא **

סודי

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חוזם: 3,5613

אל: וווש/207, מצב/841, מנמח/349

מ-: המשרד, תא: 070390, זח: 1450, דח: ר, סג: סו

תח: & גס: משפט

נד: &

לה/כה
2

סודי/רגיל

אל: וושינגטון שגריר

בחירות בשטחים

סעיף 2(ב) בשיחת השגריר עם קונגרסמן ג'נגריץ (שלכם 539 מיום 5.3.90).

אם בעתיד תשאלו לגבי אפשרות פיקוח בינ"ל על הבחירות מוצע להשיב כי הבחירות תהיינה פתוחות לכל העולם כולל אמצעי התקשורת ללא הגבלות.

לא מוצע להתחייב למונח 'פיקוח'.

סיב/

אק

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, &(אמן),
בנצור, מצפא, סיב/ל, סולטן, ממד

6406

מס' יסודי חלקי שווייץ בע"מ סל. 035376867

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SUMMARY OF MEETING
VICE PRESIDENT DAN QUAYLE
CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
MARCH 6, 1990
PLAZA HOTEL

Seymour Reich opened the meeting with remarks to Vice President Quayle commending him for being a strong ally of Israel, from his days on the Armed Services Committee until the present, noting that he has always championed the cause of Soviet Jewry as well. Reich particularly noted Quayle's recent speech at Yeshiva University calling for repeal of the Anti-Zionism resolution in the United Nations and said that his speech at the ADL conference in Palm Beach was excellent and that the media took the remark about the status quo being unacceptable out of context.

Reich also briefly expressed concern about the President's remarks in Palm Springs this past Saturday regarding the settling of Soviet Jewish olim in the suburbs of East Jerusalem. He said that Jerusalem is not the West Bank and Gaza, that Jerusalem is one and united and that that concept is accepted by all parties here in the United States. The President's statement flies in the face of acceptance of this principle by all previous administrations. Reich repeated that Giloh and all the other suburbs are part and parcel of Jerusalem and Israel.

Reich said that the subsequent phone conversation he had with the President was reassuring and pleasing but that the statement issued later by the White House was disturbing and that the Conference is looking to the Vice President for clarification.

Vice President Quayle began by stating that he wished to reassure us that both he and the President understand the special, strategic relationship between the U.S. and Israel and that he wished to address four issues:

- 1) The Soviet Jewish immigrants
- 2) The Peace Process
- 3) Foreign Aid
- 4) Repeal of the Anti-Zionism Resolution

1) Soviet Jewish immigrants

Both the President and the Secretary of State have spoken very directly to both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to the effect that Soviet Jewish emigration must continue, that it is supported by the United States, including the issue of direct flights. The USSR agreed to this in fact but is now yielding to pressure from Arab states. Quayle expressed alarm by rising anti-semitism in the USSR and said that it needs attention and that they have let the Soviets know that the US is disturbed by it. Quayle conveyed that Gorbachev has promised to quell anti-semitism at every possible opportunity.

2) Peace Process

Quayle began by emphasizing that the peace process in discussion is Shamir's peace process, the very same proposal for elections the Prime Minister brought last May, that it should be received with open arms and that the movement is in that direction. Achieving peace in the Middle East is in the interest of Israel and the United States. Quayle referred to a piece in today's (March 6th) Washington Post by George Schultz that proposes a kind of Jordan-Egypt-Israel

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(2)

and Palestinian umbrella or loose confederation that would work together for peace. Quayle said that he spoke to President Bush yesterday about the statement on Jerusalem, that there was no ambiguity and no change of U.S. policy with relation to Jerusalem - it is a united city whose status will be ultimately determined by negotiations.

There was, however, ambiguity about the \$400 million loan guarantees for housing for immigrants since the topic wasn't clearly addressed. Quayle said that it was apparent from his talks with Israelis that Israeli would not use those funds for West Bank and Gaza settlements. The issue of fungibility should not be used here since it is an argument that could be used in regard to foreign aid.

3) Foreign Aid

The United States will not change its policy of foreign aid to Israel nor is it their wish to reduce the amount. The \$3 billion has many strong supporters in Congress but it is ultimately Congress who decides how much foreign aid will be allocated. The Jewish community has to help Congress retain this. Quayle pointed to Congressman Ray McGrath who accompanied him to the meeting as an example of a staunch supporter of Israel in Congress with regard to aid and reiterated that the United States will not change its policy with regard to financial aid to Israel since it is a democracy surrounded by enemies that needs US help.

4) The Anti-Zionism Resolution

Quayle said that he spoke to UN Secretary General de Cueilhar who told him that he (the secretary) would be comfortable with a replacement resolution. Quayle, although he'd like to see an actual repeal, feels we could pass a substitute which would do the same thing, in effect. Quayle also spoke to Saudi Ambassador Bandar asking his help on this and received an "OK, we'll see" reply. Most of the responsibility for this resolution lies with the Soviets and work has to be done on them. If Israel wants enhanced legitimacy and credibility, this type of substitute resolution would help a great deal. It would also help further the peace process. The anti-Zionism resolution is left over from the past and should be done away with and there is strong support for this in Congress too. Change is taking place all over the world, democratic elections are being called in many new regions - democracy is coming to Central America but it has always been present in Israel.

Questions and Answers

Q - Wouldn't it help if the United States would recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and the issue could be put to rest?

A - I myself co-sponsored that legislation with Senator Moynihan in the Senate, but that is not the position of the Administration. Their policy is that the capital is Tel Aviv.

Q - Jim Baker has testified that the PLO has fulfilled the conditions that it declared when it renounced terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist - how do you see that in light of all the terrorist activities that have taken place in the past year?

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(3)

A - No one is oblivious to the fact that the PLO is still involved in terrorism but the political arena renders this ambiguous. Terrorist attacks do still occur but the discussion turns to what faction committed the act or did or did not Arafat's group participate. From my view point, terror is still being perpetrated against Israel.

Q - The policy hasn't changed but the administration sends out inconsistent signals. What is consistent policy in the public forum, e.g. what is the administration's position on Senator Dole's statement? Policy may be consistent but the public perception is that it is not, and is that what we want to signal to Israel and to the Arab states?

A - Consistency connotes a resolve that people understand, unfortunately, individual incidents, such as the Sheikh Obeid event or the Dole remark or the latest flap about East Jerusalem are used by those who would like to break up that special US-Israel relationship.

There are misunderstandings - in talks between the President and Shamir, each has come away with a different perception of what would happen, say, in the West Bank. This happens when things aren't addressed directly, so problems arise. For example, I was astonished when some went so far as to blame Israel for the murder of the American hostage during the Sheikh Obeid incident - not everyone in the administration agrees with me or the President on this so there was a complicated misunderstanding which had to be straightened out.

Labor and Likud differences also complicate things. I understand what you are saying - there have been some difficult times.

Q - I wish that the President would be as forthright as you are here today - can you convey to the President our concerns? The perception is that the Bush administration is not the Reagan administration, there is not the same feeling that there is a friend in the White House.

A - The administrations are on equal footing, there is not a dime's worth of difference in policy or approach. Reagan and Bush have different leadership styles. Reagan left many details to Schultz and Bush gets more involved himself in the details, is very much his own secretary of state. He will call Shamir himself on something he doesn't like - this way of behaviour can make some staffs nervous. There is no change in principle or commitment - we'll take a different road but we'll end up in the same place.

Q - The "fungibility" statement by the President is disturbing. The New York Times noted that he included not only new settlements but expansion of existing settlements - can you explain what he meant?

A - The policy is that the President opposes new settlements on the West Bank and Gaza. I am very aware of the fungibility statement but I am not aware of what is meant by expansion of existing settlements.

Q - Regarding the replacement resolution for the anti-Zionism resolution - the President should officially request that at the beginning of the next UN General Debate and should try to persuade other heads of state to do likewise. Is that feasible?

A - It is feasible and supportive of our position. De Ceullar will not encourage that but he will not resist. We have to soften up the Soviets on this to be able to make real headway.

End

07.03.90 : תאריך *
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*יעד ים:מצב/705

10:10, 1:17, 2100:17, 060390:17, 144:17, 111:17

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@:71*

*בהול לבוקר / סודי ביותר

*7א: סמנכ 7' צפ' א', מנכ 7' דה' א',

*דע: יועץ מדיני לשה"ח

* 24: השגה יד, ויש יגלגל

*שיחה עם היועץ לבטחון לאומי סקוקרופט.

*1. נפגשתי (6/3) לבקשתי עם סקוקרופט כדי להביע בפניו החומרה

*שבה אנו רואים את דברי הנשיא, הכורכים נושא ההתנחלויות

• 077177 077177 *

*בדבריי ציינת כי כמה מהשגותיי נגד:-

*א. איננו יודעים מה היו כוונותיו של הנשיא במתן ההצהרה

*במועד זה, אך ברור שדברים אלה בשלב כה עדין של המו'מ'

*המדינה רק מגבירים החשד לגבי מדיניות ארה"ב בנושא התהליך

*מומזן חרש ירושלים.

*ב. יש בתגובה בארץ, מקיר לקיר כדי להבהיר שדברי הנשיא פגעו

*בעצב רגיש ביותר, בנושא לגביו קיימת אחדות לאומית. כדוגמה,

*הבאתי החלטת מועצת ירושלים מהיום ודברי קולק. דברי הנשיא,

*הוספתי, הם שינוי במדיניות ארה"ב שהדגישה תמיד שהעיר צריכה

*להשאיר מאות.

*ג. הודעת הבית הלבן מאתמול שפורסמה להבהיר הנושא אין בה כדי

10:10, 10:10

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* 18.05.80

18.05.80

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* 29.05.80

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* 01.06.80

* 02.06.80

* 03.06.80

* 04.06.80

* 05.06.80

* 06.06.80

* 07.06.80

* 08.06.80

* 09.06.80

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 3
עותק 2 מתוך 12

* להרגיע. בהקשר זה ציטטתי מדברי הנשיא בוש בראיון לג'רוזלם
* פוסט, יולי 89, בהיותו ס/נשיא עת אמר:

* IF I AM SAYING THAT THERE SHOULD BE A NEGOTIATED
* SETTLEMENT WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, HOW CAN WE SET
* PRECONDITIONS ? WHY SHOULD WE SET A PRECONDITION
* ? I MEAN, THE CREDIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS DEPENDS
* ON NO PRECONDITIONS.

* הוספתי, שמדבריו אלו של הנשיא ברור שאין להצמיד תנאים
* מוקדמים למשא ומתן אשר יערך בעתיד בעוד בדבריו בשבת יש
* להטיל תנאים מוקדמים על ישראל.

* 2. סקורופט השיב, שאין שינוי במדיניות ארה"ב וכי עיתוי
* דבריו של הנשיא נגדם כתוצאה מהדברים ה"בלתי כנים"
* (DISINGENUOUS) שממשלת ישראל מפרסמת, לפיהם רק 1 אחוז
* מהעולים מתגוררים בשטחים. ארה"ב ראתה תמיד במז' ירושלים
* שטח כבוש אף כי שמרו על "שתיקה ידידותית" בנושא.
* ציין שלפי הנתונים שבידם 10 אחוז מהעולים הופנו למז'
* ירושלים. בהתייחסות לנקודה זו ציינתי שאין להם כל אפשרות
* להצביע באיזה אזור בירושלים מתגוררים העולים תוך שחזרתי על
* החומרה בה אנו רואים עמדת ארה"ב.
* סקורופט שב ואמר שאין שינוי בעמדתם כי ירושלים צריכה להשאר
* מאוחדת, אך אינם מרוצים ממאמציו ליצור מציאות חדשה בשטח
* ובכך לסגור אופציות מסוימות בעתיד. הם סבורים שצריך להשאיר
* אופציות שיאפשרו הסדר בעתיד.

* 3. בתשובה לשאלה אם הם מפקפקים בנכונות הנתונים שמסרנו השיב
* שאין להם בעיה אם אכן רק 1 אחוז מהעולים או אף פחות מזה
* עוברים להתגורר בשטחים, אך עלינו לדעת כי אף פעם לא קבלו
* החלטתנו להחיל הריבונות הישראלית על מזרח ירושלים. סקורופט
* המשיך בדבריו תוך רמז ששיקול נוסף לעיתוי הנוכחי להצהרת
* הנשיא הוא התעלמותנו המוחלטת מעמדת הנשיא בנושא
* ההתנחלויות:

* "YOU ABSOLUTELY IGNORED OUR POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS
* THE PRIME MINISTER STUCK IT IN THE PRESIDENT EYE".

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 3
עותק 2 מתוך 12

* עניתי שדרושה מידה רבה של חוסר רגישות פוליטית, עת רזה'מ
* נאבק למען קידום יוזמת השלום, להכריז הכרזות בנושא ירושלים
* המקוממת את כולנו. הוספתי שאם נושא ירושלים הופך מוקד חלוקי
* הדעות פומביים ביננו לבין ארה'ב עוד טרם החל התהליך אזי
* אין ספק שיהיה בחילוקי דעות אלה להשפיע קשות על תהליך
* השלום. עדיף לברר ולנסות לגשר על חילוקי דעות אלה בצנעה.

* 4. בהמשך הדברים הוספתי, שאני מקווה שהם מקבלים את הצהרת
* רזה'מ שאיננו מכוונים עולים לשטחים.
* סקורופט השיב שהם אכן מקבלים דברים אלה, אך בכל זאת עלינו
* להגיע להדברות כיצד לפעול בנושא הערבויות לדיוור. בהקשר זה
* הערתי שבסוף השבוע שעבר שמענו מיום חמישי עד שבת הצהרות
* שונות מידי יום מטעם דוברי הממשל וכי אני יודע עתה מהי
* עמדת הממשל.

* השיב שאינם רוצים להיות מופתעים ושהכספים לא יסייעו בהקמת
* התנחלויות. רוצים להיות במצב שיוכלו לעזור לנו, אך לשם כך
* על ארה'ב וישראל לגבש נוסחה שמבחינת המחויבות בה תהיה
* יותר מהנוסח הקבוע ומוסכם בעת קבלת הסיוע. הוסיף שמבינים
* שאנו לא ניתן הצהרה על הפסקת כל פעילות התנחלות, אך רוצים
* למצוא אתנו נוסחה משותפת שתקדם הנושא.

* 5. לסיכום אמר שאל לנו לראות הצהרת הנשיא בקשר לתהליך
* השלום, אין זו בעייה שנוגעת עתה לתהליך. דברי הנשיא היו
* בגדר 'MINOR PLIP' על המסך. התהליך חיוני וחשוב ואין
* להשוות חיוניותו לענין ההתנחלויות. חשוב להגדיר שוב כיצד
* ניתן להגיע לנוסחה מקובלת על שני הצדדים, שתאפשר למימשל
* לתמוך בבקשה לערבויות.

* ארד.

* לב

* תפ: רהמ, ששה, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור

5406

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר - דף 3 מתוך 3

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4041

תאריך : 06.03.90

נכנס **

סודי

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חוזם: 3,4041

אל: המשרד

יעדים: מצב/537, מנמט/229

מ-: ווש, נר: 97, תא: 050390, זח: 2000, דח: ב, סג: סו

תח: @ גס: צפא

נר: @

ל
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סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

דע: מנכ'ל רוה'מ, יועץ מדיני שה'ח

מאת: שג' וושינגטון.

הצהרת בוש.

1. בעקבות דברי הנשיא בוש, הכורכים נושא ההתנחלויות בירושלים, שוחחתי עם סימור רייך, שדיבר היום אחה'צ עם הנשיא.

בתשובה לדברי הביקורת של רייך, ציין בוש, שלא חל כל שינוי במדיניות ארה'ב וכי שאלת המעמד הסופי של ירושלים יוכרע במו'מ.

הוסיף, שתומך בזכותם של יהודים לחיות בירושלים וכי אין לו כוונה למנוע מאנשים מלגור בירושלים. מודה שדבריו הם UNFORTUNATE ומצטער שקישר את ירושלים בגדמ'ע במשפט אחד. ציין, שיש לנו אמנם חילוקי דעות עם ישראל בנושא ההתנחלויות, אך אין לקשרם דווקא עם ירושלים. על כל הצדדים להמנע מלנקוט צעדים חד צדדים ויש להשאיר המרחב הדרוש למו'מ פוליטי. עם זאת, רוצה לציין, שפעילות של התנחלויות חו צדדיות מסבכות את העניין. אל לנו להתיר ולהרשות שחילוקי הדעות ביננו יאטו את תהליך השלום. הוא יבדוק כיצד ניתן TO DOWNPLAY את הקשר בין ירושלים לגדמ'ע. אין כל כוונה מצידו להביא לשינוי

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מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מדיניות ארה"ב בנושא. בתגובה לדברי רייך, שהקהילה היהודית מאוחרת בהתנגדותה לשינוי לרעה במדיניות ארה"ב בנושא ירושלים השיב הנשיא, שהוא מקווה שניתן למנוע עימות ויעמוד בקשר עם בייקר על מנת להוציא הודעה מתאימה עוד היום. רייך חזר וציין באזני בוש שאין כל הבדליט או חילוקי דעות בקרב הקהילה היהודית האמריקאית לגבי הצורך להבטיח אחדותה של ירושלים וזכותם של היהודים להתישב בה. כן ציין כי העיתוי ההצהרה היה מאד בלתי מועיל.

2. ועידת הנשיאים תפרסם הודעה בנושא. נעביר בנפרד.

3. במשך היום מקיים שיחות עם מספר סנטורים וחברי קונגרס הידועים כמקורבים לבית הלבן כדי להעמידם על חומרת ההצהרה.

4. למחר נקבעה לי פגישה (14.25) עם היועץ לבטחון לאומי.

ארד

ל'ב

תפ: שהח, סשהח, רהמ, ממרהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רם, @ (אמן),
בנצור, מצפא, סייל

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