

5

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד ראש הממשלה

משרד

המשק בתיק מס 4

משרד ראש הממשלה -

א/רה"ב

6/19/06

המשק בתיק מס 6



שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס - אר

א - 5 / 4383

מזהה פנימי: 43.4/3 - 222
מס פריט: 1739790
מזהה לוגי: 02-111-01-07-10
כתובת: 25/08/2010

מחלקה

מס' תיק מקורי

למט, מס



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 43.4
מיכל מס': 4383 / 10
תאריך התעודה: 6/6/1986
שם הנמען: 5
שם מחבר התעודה: _____

סוג התעודות (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

- מכתב ☐
מברק או הודעת טלקס ☒
תזכיר או מזכר ☐
דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון ☐
פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה ☐

הנמקה**:

תאריך 25/8/2020

שם הכורך: אליהו רובין

חתימה: _____

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק היורק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה;
העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

**נא לרשום את ההנמקה רק בעותק הלבן.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9681

1101

בלמים

אל: המשרד, נר: 110, מ: 111
דח: מ, סג: ב, תא: 040686, רח: 1630

שמור/מיד
אל:מצפא. דע:לשכת רה"ם.

ביקור איירונשטאט

הנל מוקש להפגש עם ומרוד נוביק

עפ"י לוח"ר מציע את ה-10/6 ב-0900 או 1000 או בשעות בקר
ה-11/6. אנא בחזר

תודה

לוא"ר שימרון

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,מצפא

14764 33002 70 14764

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי ביותר

נכנס **

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הוצט: 6/19

אל: המשרד

מ-: רוש/נר: 93/תא: 040686/חז: 1300/ח: מ/מ: טג: טו

נד: @


סודי ביותר/מיד

אל: מנכ"ל/ממנכ"ל/ מנד/לשכת שהבט (נר 74 לבטחונ)
סוריה-טרור. משיחה עם השגריר אוקלי הממונה על המאבק
בטרור.

לשאלתי כיצד רואה הוא את מאזן המאבק בטרור מזינתי
בשעה זו השיב:

1. לרב. א. קדאפי הופתע בעצמו מעצמת הבידוד שאליו נקלע
וזאת בתחומים אחדים: הן בשבירת מיתוס האיש הבלתי ניתן
לפגיעה (אוקלי מעיד על כך משיחה עם דיפלומט צרפתי
אמריקאי בכיר בעצם הימים הללו), הן בתגובות המושרות
בעולם הערבי והן במכרות הניחתות עליו באירופה, שממנה
לא ציפה לכן. מספר האיטלקים העובדים בלוב ירד מלאים
למחות מ-2500, והלהץ לרבישת מניות לוב ב'מיאט' הוא
ראיה נוספת (קרסטי, לדבריו, נהג כחונמה וגרם לפיצול
הדמו-נוצריים). מחמת קשרים כלכליים מצמצמת לוב את נציגויותיה
בחול', אמילר במדינה כמו ירוך שבה אין מכוניות עליה.
ב. שיתוף הפעולה של האירופיות בנושא לוב (וכן בענין
סוריה-ראח להלן) נובע במידה רבה מכך שלמדו עתה בעליל
כי זה יכול לקרות גם להם'.

2. סוריה. א. הסורים עצבניים מאוד בגלל הקורה את לוב
הטיפול בהם עצמם. למד על גישתם גם משיחות עם בכירים
מתורכיה וממצרים. ארהב פועלת ל'עידוד' עצבנות זו בעסקי
המעורבות בטרור, וגישתה בענין זה היא להץ מכיוונים
שונים, שחלק חשוב ממנו הוא הפעלת האירופיות באורח
אינדיבידואלי, כל מדינה בפניה משלה, ועל רקע אירועים
שלה, אל הסורים, הלכה, בעיקר מהקטע הלובי, הוא כי האמקטיביות
גדולה הרבה יותר אם הלהץ בא מכיוונים שונים ולא בביכול
ניוזמה אמריקנית, ומבחינה זו האירופים מועילים. הוסיף
בגילוי לב, ואמר כי טרם הטלה דברים אלה באוזניו כי
ארהב עושה זאת (כפי שהתרשמתי) בצורה שלא תיראה כהזדהות



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אר הצטלמות עם ישראל, מטעמים טקטיים של היעילות כפי
שרואים אותה כאן.
רובינשטיין

תפ: שהה, דהמ, מבכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, רס, אמן, מצפא, טייבל

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי ביותר

נכנס **

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חוזם: 6/19

אל: המשרד

מ-: רוש, נר: 93, תא: 040686, חז: 1300, דח: מ, טג: טב

נד: 8

סודי ביותר/מידוי

ל: ממנכל, ממנכל, ממו, לשכת שהבט (נר 74 לבטחונ)

סוריה-טרור. משיחה עם השגריר אוקלי הממונה על המאבק

בטרור.

לשאלתי כיצד דואה הוא את מאזן המאבק בטרור מדינתי

בשעה זו השיב:

1. לרב. א. קדאפי הופתע בעצמו מעצמת הבידוד שאליו נקלע

וזאת בתחומים אחדים: הן בשבירת מיתוס האיש הבלתי ניתן

לפגיעה (אוקלי מעיד על כך משיחה עם דיפלומט צפון

אפריקאי בכיר בעצם הימים הללו), הן בתגובות המושרות

בעולט הערבי והן במכרות הניחתות עליו באירופה, שממנה

לא ציפה לכן. מספר האיטלקים העובדים בלוב ירד מלאים

למחות מ-2500, והלהץ לרכישת מניות לוב ב'פיאט' הוא

ראיה נוספת (קרסי, לדבריו, נהג בחונמה וגרם לפיצול

הדמו-נוצרים). מחמת קשיום כלכליים מצמצמת לוב את נציגויותי

בחול', אמילו במדינה כמו יורן שבה אין מנבירים עליה.

ב. שינוף המעולה של האירופיות בנושא לוב (וכן בענין

סוריה-ראה להלן) נובע במידה רבה מכך שלמדו עתה בעליל

כי 'זה יכול לקרות גם להנ'.

2. סוריה. א. הסורים עצבניים מאוד בגלל הקורה את לוב

הטימול בהם עצמם. למדו על גישתם גם משיחות עם בכירים

מורניה וממצרים. ארהב מועלת ל'עידוד' עצבנות זו בעסקי

המעורבות בטרור, וגישתה בענין זה היא להץ מכיוונים

שונים, שחלק חשוב ממנו הוא הפעלת האירופיות באורח

אינדיבידואלי, כל מדינה בפניה משלה, ועל רקע אירועים


שלה, אל הסורים, הלכה, בעיקר מהקטע הלובי, הוא כי האמקטיביות

גדולה הרבה יותר אם הלהץ בא מכיוונים שונים ולא בביכול

ניוזמה אמריקנית, ומבחינה זו האירופים מועילים. הוסיף

בגילוי לב, ואמר כי טרם העלה דברים אלה באוזניו כי

ארהב עושה זאת (כפי שהתרשמתי) בצורה שלא תיראה בהזדהות



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

או הצטלמות עם ישראל, מטעמים טקטיים של היעילות במי
שרואים אותה כאן.
רובינשטיין

תמ: שהח, דהמ, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, ר/מרבז, רס, אמן, מצמא, סייבל

מחלקת חוץ 14764 339002

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9230

נכנס

בלמים

אל: המשרד, נר: 138, מ: נוש
דח: ב, סג: ב, תא: 050686, רח: 1415

בלמים / בהול

אל: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א

מאת: למדן / נושיונגטון

סנפ: - נשק לסעודיה

בהצבעה חוזרת שהתקיימה היום בשעה 14:00 נשעון נושיונגטון (הווסו
הנשיאותי החזיק מעמד (WAS SUSTAINED) ב-34 קולות מול 66
נגד הווסו. לשון אחרת, מכירת הטילים לסעודיה אושרה.

למדן

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, ממנכ"ל, מרכי, דס, אמן, מצפ"א, ממד,
סייבל

סגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

291

סניף
דפוס.....מחור.....דפוס
שמו
סוג בסחוני
רגיל
דחפות
תאריך וזיהוי
1300 11
מס' פבר

(Handwritten signature)

אל: מצפ"א

ח"כ מיכה חריש - פגישות בבית הנבחרים

1. ב-10 נפגש חריש בלוויית הח"מ עם המורשים מורת'ה ומקרדי ופגישות אקראי עם גייג'נסון וטוריסלי.

2. ג'ון מורת'ה, דמוקרט, חבר ועדת המשנה להגנה בועדת ההקצבות, בעל הספעה רבה בבית, שב זה עתה מביקור בזק בצי הששי בים התיכון. הביע פליאתו על העדר שת"פ ביניהם לבין ורועות המודיעין הישראליות. כן תמה על הסימפטיה הערביסטית בצבאות ארה"ב. העלה הקושי הצפוי בשמירת רמות הסיוע בעתיד. בהקשרים הנ"ל ציינו הכוונות ליישם תיקוני נאן-קווייל כלפי ישראל. התייחס בחיוב רב. התעניין בנעשה בגבול הסורי ודאגתו מהתלקחות אפשרית. ח"כ חריש תאר בהרחבה המתיחות במאי. בקשר למעורבות סובייטית אפשרית במקרה של התלקחות בעתיד העריך, ע"ס ביקור בבריה"מ לפני כשנה, ששם קיים פחד מרתיע מתגובות אפשריות של ריגאן. בשיחה נדונה פעולת ארה"ב נגד לוב והוסכם שהיא השיגה את מטרותיה.

3. דייב מקרדי, דמוקרט מבטיח, צעיר, פעיל מאד בנושאי אמרכ"ז, חבר ועדת השירותים המזויינים, התעניין בנושאי פנים: השיפורים בכלכלה, רוטציה וכו'. שאלת הסיוע נדונה בהרחבה. לדעתו, חלוקת הכספים כפי שמתגבשת בועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בועדת ההקצבות אינה עונה לצרכים חיוניים של ארה"ב באמרכ"ז, פיליפינים והאיטי. באמרכ"ז יש כעת לראשונה ארבעה ממשלים שנבחרו באורח דמוקרטי אולם בשל קשיים כלכליים, אין ודאות שיחזיקו מעמד. הוא עצמו יוזם עתה תיקון שיעלה את הסיוע הכלכלי לאמרכ"ז מ-800 מליון דולר ל-1.25 בליון, כבעבר, ומנהל מו"מ עם אובי לשם כך. לדבריו, יהיה על ישראל להיות "גמישה" בבקשות הסיוע שלה בעתיד. הופתע לשמוע שטחור 1.2 בליון סיוע כלכלי, מחזירה ישראל לארה"ב קרן וריבית בסך 1.1. גם הוא התייחס בחיוב ליישום תיקוני נאן-קווייל כלפי ישראל.

4. פולארד: בפגישת אקראי עם סם גייג'נסון (יהודי, חבר ועדת החוץ) העריך הלה שהנזק בקונגרס מהפרשת קטן משהיה מקום לחשוש. בוב טוריסלי (מועדת המשנה לאירופה ומז"ת) אמר לנו שהטיעון שהסמיעו ישראליט, לפיו ישראל השתמשה במידע ולא העבירה אותו הלאה (ומטוס כן הנזק אינו גדול) אינו ענייני ומוטב להמנע ממנו.

בן טובה הרצל
אירג של

סם גייג'נסון ג'ורג' רהב ר/ג' אגמ ר' אגמ

סגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

ס ר ס ס
 דפ...מחור...דפים
 סווג בטחוני גלוי
 דחיפות רגיל
 תאריך וז"ח 86111100
 מס' מברק

אל:

המשרד

279

1/3

אל: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

להלן ראיון חסיין ל"וושינגטון-פוסט" (11.6)

עיונות

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 אב אב אב אב אב אב אב
 אב אב אב אב אב אב אב
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279 $\frac{2}{3}$

Hussein Says Iraq, Syria Have Set Discussions Toward Reconciliation

By Jim Hoagland
Washington Post Foreign Service

King Hussein of Jordan disclosed yesterday that Iraq and Syria, bitter enemies for more than a decade, have agreed through his mediation to have their foreign ministers meet Friday to explore a broad reconciliation and a possible summit meeting between the leaders of the two Arab nations.

Portraying the proposed reconciliation as the cornerstone of promising new efforts to achieve Arab unity in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to help bring an end to the Iranian-Iraqi war closer, the Jordanian monarch said a political truce between Damascus and Baghdad "would enable the Arab world to move from the state of paralysis that has affected us for far too long towards greater cohesion."

Syria has been the only important Arab nation to support Iran in its 5½-year war against Iraq. A shift by Syria toward Iraq would produce a major realignment in Arab politics and possibly in the Persian Gulf war.

During a 40-minute interview here, Hussein also voiced a deeply pessimistic view of Jordanian-U.S. relations in the wake of the Reagan administration's decision to postpone indefinitely the sale of sophisticated U.S. weapons to Amman. He described that decision as bringing to an end "30 years of a very close association" in which the United States has been the major supplier of arms to Jordan.

"We don't know how long this will last, but certainly for the foreseeable future we are reorienting ourselves toward Europe and other



KING HUSSEIN
... middleman between Arab rivals

sources," he said, noting that Jordan is considering two models of European-manufactured jet fighters, and has recently received new supplies of military equipment from the Soviet Union under an existing contract. He did not provide details.

"We have received the signal loud and clear" from the United States, Hussein observed in tones that alternated between sorrow and bitterness. Speaking of reports that the Reagan administration has decided to supply Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Afghan and Angolan rebel movements after pulling similar missiles out of an arms package for Saudi Arabia, the Jordanian ruler softly added:

"When you take a weapon like the Stinger that is being supplied to

See HUSSEIN, A28, Col. 2

A presidential news conference will be televised live at 8 tonight.

ס ד ס
ד. מתוך... דסים
סווג בטחוני
דחיפות
תאריך וז"ח
מס' מברק

973 3/2

Hussein Says Iraq, Syria Agree to Hold Talks

HUSSEIN, From A1

many movements in this world which could be described as freedom fighters by some, as terrorists by others, and when you come to governments that have been reliable, that have been your friends and allies for many years, and suggest that you do not wish these weapons to be in their hands, ... this is very hard to swallow."

The Jordanian ruler, who traveled to the United States to attend the high school graduations of his twin daughters last week, met with President Reagan in the White House on Monday. While he urged the United States to increase its involvement in peace efforts in the Middle East, Hussein held out no hope during the interview of a new American initiative in the near future.

The meeting Friday between the Iraqi and Syrian foreign ministers, which is to take place at the border between the two nations, will be a major diplomatic triumph for Hussein if it occurs. He confirmed that the proposed meeting grows out of visits he made to Baghdad and Damascus and a trip his prime minister, Zaid Rifai, made to Athens to meet with Syrian President Hafez Assad earlier this month.

Assad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein lead rival factions of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and have accused one another, apparently with justification, of serious attempts to overthrow each other's regimes. Syria's support for Iran in the Persian Gulf war had brought the rivalry to the edge of belligerency in recent years.

But Syrian-Iranian ties have come under open strains in the past three months as Iran shut off ship-

ments of subsidized petroleum and Syria moved to tighten its grip on Shiite Moslem groups in Lebanon that are associated with Iran.

These tensions have surfaced as Jordan and Syria moved to end a decade of estrangement and at times open hostility. Hussein, who has strongly supported Iraq from the beginning of the war, apparently took the initiative in making peace with Assad.

Yesterday, in explaining the Syrian-Iraqi moves toward reconciliation, Hussein laid heavy stress on the effect that non-Arab Iran's occupation of Iraqi territory has had in Syria and the rest of the Arab world. Iranian troops have occupied the peninsula around the Iraqi oil-shipping port of Faw since seizing it in February.

"Syria's leadership and people believe as we do that Arab land is sacred, and must be safeguarded. That is part of the Arab interest and the Arab identity," said Hussein, who lost the West Bank of the Jordan River to Israel in the 1967 war.

Saying that "we have our fingers crossed," Hussein spoke at length of his hopes that the reconciliation of the two feuding Arab countries may "pave the way for a successful Arab summit" that would seek a unified approach toward dealing with Israel.

He left the impression, without saying so explicitly, that an Arab summit conference might be called on to endorse new leadership for the Palestine Liberation Organization, or failing that, to give recognition to new leadership outside the PLO that would cooperate with Hussein in renewed peace efforts.

When asked for his view of the present PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, Hussein insisted that he

would not comment on "internal Palestinian matters." But Hussein did not mask his conviction that Arafat's repeated failures to live up to agreements he had reached with the Jordanian leader to enter American-sponsored talks about peace with Israel had undermined the PLO's claim to legitimacy.

Citing the need for "a leadership that is able to live up to the hopes and aspirations of the people of Palestine," Hussein added later: "Maybe the Palestinians themselves will find it necessary to reorganize themselves in such a way as to enable this [leadership] to emerge."

Jordan, he said, was examining plans to step up its economic involvement in the West Bank and "to look at the needs of the occupied territories."

Syria and Jordan, he indicated, have almost identical views on the need for a United Nations-sponsored international peace conference to work out a Middle East peace settlement, and see eye-to-eye on the leadership problems the Palestinians face.

Syria has bitterly opposed Arafat's claim to lead the PLO and is supporting rival guerrilla movements. Hussein has not gone that far publicly, but his comments yesterday suggested that he is edging toward such a stance.

Asked about the American bombing raid against Libya in retaliation for Libyan support of terrorist acts targeted against Americans, Hussein gave a carefully balanced answer that stressed his opposition in principle to the raid and his opposition in practice to Libya's leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

"Any attack on any part of Arab land we view as an attack on us, and oppose," he said of the American air strike against Libya last April.

But he went on to note that Libya's leader "had sent missiles to Iran that were used to hit an Arab capital, a thing that was [also] shocking to us, that there would be support for an alien force threatening Arab land."

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

280

1/4

ס ר ש ס
דף... מתוך... דפים
סוג בטחוני...
דחיות...
תאריך וז"ח...
מס' מברק...

אל : ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, ממ"ד, מע"ח

פרשת פולארד

להלן מאמרי ה"וושינגטון פוסט" מהיום (11.6)

עיתונות

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סווג בטחוני

דחיות

חאריך וזית

מס' מברק

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Israelis May Lose Immunity

U.S. Weighs Revoking Pollard Case Accord If Deception Is Found

By Joe Pichirallo
Washington Post Staff Writer

Justice Department officials, concerned that Israeli officials implicated in the Jonathan Jay Pollard spy case may have misled them, are considering revoking the immunity from prosecution granted before the Israelis were interviewed last December, according to sources familiar with the investigation.

U.S. officials gave immunity to Rafael Eitan, the Israeli official who prosecutors have said directed the Pollard spy network, and to other Israelis in return for assurances that they would cooperate fully with the American inquiry.

If Justice Department officials now conclude that Eitan—a legendary Israeli intelligence figure and former counterterrorism adviser to two Israeli prime ministers—withheld crucial details about the case, his immunity could be nullified and he could be charged with espionage, informed sources said.

Any espionage charges, however, would more likely serve as a formal protest of what U.S. law enforcement officials regard as the failure of the government of Prime Minister Shimon Peres to cooperate fully with U.S. authorities in the Pollard investigation.

Under the U.S. extradition treaty with Israel, the U.S. government would not be able to extradite any Israelis charged with espionage, legal experts said yesterday. Israeli law also would block such an attempt, the experts added.

But criminal charges against Eitan or other Israelis would effectively bar them from entering the United States because if they did so they could be arrested, U.S. officials said.

"In effect, [a criminal charge] is an exclusion order," said one U.S. official familiar with the Pollard case. "That's the ultimate sanction."

The Justice Department is also examining whether charges should be filed against Aviem (Avi) Sella, an Israeli Air Force brigadier general identified by prosecutors as Pollard's initial contact in the spy operation, officials said.

None of the Israelis interviewed told U.S. investigators about Sella or of the arrangement to deposit \$300,000 in a Swiss bank for Pollard over a 10-year period—details that were learned only after Pollard began cooperating, sources said. U.S. officials said a key question is whether the Peres government

knew these details. If the government had the information, U.S. investigators want to know why it was withheld and why no disciplinary action was taken against Eitan and Sella.

"You just don't turn around and promote Rafi Eitan and Sella," said one official, who noted that Eitan was recently appointed chairman of the board of a state-owned chemical company and that Sella was promoted from colonel to brigadier general.

Justice officials' examination of possible immunity violations comes while there is a continuing debate within the U.S. government over the handling of the Pollard case by the Peres government, which is anxious to put the matter to rest.

The State Department on Monday praised Israeli cooperation and assurances that "no espionage activities are being carried out" against the United States, praise

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ד... 3... מחור 4... דפים

אל

סוג בטחוני

דחיות

תאריך וז"ח

מס' מברק

980 $\frac{3}{4}$

THE WASHINGTON POST

that reportedly pleased the Israeli government.

Other U.S. officials, however, said the question of whether there is additional Israeli spying is secondary to two more pressing questions about the Pollard case: Whether the operation was indeed a "renegade" activity that lacked official government authorization, and whether the Peres government has lived up to its promise to conduct a thorough internal investigation.

One knowledgeable U.S. official pointed to FBI Director William H. Webster's statement last week that Israel has given only "selective cooperation" in the Pollard case. "I think he is just telling it like it is," the official said.

"There were statements from the Peres government last November or December in which they said they would conduct an internal investigation and let the 'chips fall where they may.' I have seen no indication they have done that," the official said.

Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, told reporters yesterday that more information is needed before the United States can accept Israeli statements about the case.

"I don't know that it was a renegade operation and I don't know that it was a unique kind of operation... we need more information," said Durenberger, whose committee has been briefed twice by Justice Department officials. "In other words, we're not taking people's word for the fact there's nothing going on. The [Justice] investigation, which began last year, is continuing."

Besides Eitan, sources said, other Israelis interviewed by U.S. investigators were Joseph (Yossi) Yagur, a former Israeli science consul based in New York who is alleged to have been a handler of Pollard, and Irit Erb, a former secretary at the Israeli Embassy here who allegedly received classified U.S. documents from Pollard.

U.S. officials said that immunity was extended to the Israelis, who were represented by private attor-



SEN. DAVID F. DURENBERGER
... says more information is needed

neys, because otherwise they would not provide potentially incriminating information. The agreements were conditional, however, on the witnesses' complete and truthful cooperation.

Staff writers Patrick E. Tyler and John M. Gashko contributed to this report.

ס ו פ ס ס כ ר ק

דפוס 4... מחור 4... דפוס

סווג בטחוני

דחיות

תאריך ודחיות

מס' מברק

280 $\frac{4}{4}$ *Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

The Split Over the Pollard Case

The disturbing factor in the Reagan administration's split over the Pollard spy case is that it cannot be bridged by smooth-sounding statements.

State Department legal counsel Abraham Sofaer was said to be aghast last week at FBI Director William Webster's careful, on-the-record remark to *The New York Times* that Israel had been "selective" in its cooperation with U.S. efforts to get to the bottom of Israeli espionage. But, officials told us, Sofaer decided a phone call to Judge Webster might be misunderstood if it got out. On Monday, the smooth-sounding statement was put out by the State Department alleging administration harmony.

A call from ex-judge Sofaer would have changed nothing in the Justice Department or the FBI, illustrating the irreparable split between diplomats and prosecutors even over questioning Israeli Gen. Aviem Sella. As of today, Secretary of State George Shultz holds high cards because the administration wants no damage done to the intimacy of U.S.-Israeli rela-

tions. But Justice's success in extracting Jonathan Jay Pollard's confession has given prosecutors new muscle.

The question of whether Air Force Gen. Sella, allegedly Pollard's first case officer here, should or should not be questioned on his role in Pollard's espionage for Israel delineates the stark divergence in practice and psychology between State and Justice.

The State Department view is that Sella should be encouraged to answer questions but that Israel cannot be held accountable if he declines or tells nothing. That is because the Israeli government's claim to have been ignorant of the espionage has not been officially disproved and the diplomats at State want very much to believe it.

The law-enforcement establishment views the questioning of Sella as dubious; he would probably add nothing to the extensive file of information obtained from Pollard's plea-bargaining.

Justice Department officials have insisted ever since Pollard's June 4 guilty plea that Prime Minister Peres never has delivered on his pledge to

investigate his government's role in the case. If he had, Sella's alleged role as Pollard's first case officer would have been uncovered by Israel and not, as it was, by Justice Department investigators.

The State Department claimed that Attorney General Edwin Meese personally collaborated on the department's statement last Monday, drafted with the help of White House aides, but Justice officials denied that. He did agree with its finding that "successful prosecution" of Pollard was made possible by Israel's cooperation. But he also has agreed privately that Judge Webster correctly defined Israel's cooperation as "selective."

The suspicion of Israel's overall conduct by counter-intelligence officials, as contrasted to the diplomats' desire not to find evidence of Israeli government complicity, was fed by one vagrant document. Found in the telltale suitcase that Pollard's wife was unable to get rid of, this document was described in the indictment as a letter to Pollard's alleged second handler, Yossi Yagur. It

dealt with "missile systems designed or manufactured by various non-communist countries, which might be available for sale to Iran."

U.S. investigators recently uncovered an alleged multimillion-dollar "private" sale of U.S. arms to Iran and arrested as one of the dealers an Israeli identified by the U.S. Customs Service as a retired army general. The Israeli government, as it has done in the Pollard spy case, insisted it had no knowledge of or connection with the sale.

The reason Pollard's letter particularly caught the eye of investigators is that the United States has obtained pledges from Israel not to sell arms to Iran. Despite this administration appeal suspicions have lingered that Israel was trafficking—or aware of trafficking—in arms to Tehran. The Pollard letter to Yagur appeared to U.S. investigators as evidence backing these suspicions. Yet, diplomats at the State Department have publicly and repeatedly exonerated the Israeli government from all charges of con-

spiring to sell any arms to the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Hence the unbridgeable split through the middle of the Reagan administration. Pollard himself will have a lot to say about narrowing—or widening—the split. It depends more on what he may still have to say than it does on competing Reagan administration officials.

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June 11, 1986.

His Excellency Prime Minister Shimon Peres
Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem, Israel.

Dear Prime Minister,

If I may come straight to the point, I think our Foundation can be useful to you in promoting your ideas and those of President Reagan on a Middle East "Marshall Plan". We have already held an Economic Consultation on May 9 in Washington with representatives of U.S. and international agencies concerned with planning and implementing regional economic cooperation in the Middle East. We plan to host a meeting of economists and officials in London on the same themes in the Fall, and are ready to take on the task of encouraging the allies to move in the direction of the Marshall Plan as a matter of urgency. The Armand Hammer Fund in Tel Aviv (Dr. Ben-Shahar & Dr. Zeev Hirsch) has agreed to help us in this endeavor.

Today in the West there are two competing factions which dominate government policy planning in regard to economic assistance for the Middle East. The first argues that the United States and its allies are doing all they can, given their budget constraints. The second and more pragmatic faction (strongly supported and promoted by the Sadat Peace Foundation, its associates and friends within and outside allied governments) insists that the economic crisis in the region must be considered in the context of its strategic importance to the West. Indeed, the second group forewarn of the high price the allies would have to pay if the Middle East economic crisis were allowed to deteriorate further.

I am happy to report that at my recent meetings with our Board (including Ambassador Philip Habib and Mr. Winthrop Rockefeller) and with senior U.S. government policy planners, the Sadat Peace Foundation's program was approved. We are therefore committed to hosting additional economic consultations in Europe and the U.S. to increase our lobbying constituency among allied economic officials in support of major economic programs for the Middle East.

Since the fall of 1985, the Sadat Peace Foundation has gathered momentum, utilizing Anwar Sadat's respected legacy in the West. We have convincingly presented to western economists the benefits their governments would reap from developing trading partners and securing peace in that region, providing each of the allies does its share in developing a multi-billion dollar fund or "Marshall Plan" for the Middle East.

In a few weeks the U.S. Congress will recess for the summer. In September and October Congress will give priority to domestic legislation. So time is of the essence in moving forward on the Marshall Plan. In 1986-87, the Sadat Peace Foundation proposes specifically :

1. To promote and encourage major economic development in the Middle East, in consultations with allied economic officials.

2. To conduct extensive research to determine the maximum benefits that can be expected from economic cooperation between Israel, Egypt and the United States, in the public and private sectors.

3. To encourage major U.S. corporations to invest or increase their investments in Israel and Egypt, and to implement five major cooperative projects in the two countries funded by international organizations and the U.S.

4. To help establish an independent trinational (Israel, Egypt, USA) program to fund industrial development in Israel and Egypt, modelled on the U.S./Israel BIRD Foundation program.

As Canadian Ambassador to Iran in the late seventies, I was among a handful of officials to forewarn our leaders of the high price our countries would pay if we did not help the Shah. In the light of all that has happened since in Iran, my advice on the Middle East has lately been given more attentive consideration. I had already made good contacts in Western capitals while serving as Minister to NATO and later to France.

If the Sadat Peace Foundation is to lobby effectively for a Middle East Marshall Plan, it is particularly important for us to have your support, Mr. Prime Minister, as the initiator of this grand design.

With my respectful best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

James George
President

אל:



דף: 1 מתוך 8 דפים
 סיווג בטחוני: סודי
 דחיפות: גבוה
 תאריך וזמן רישום: 251830
 מס. מברק: 785

לשימוש
 מח'
 הקשר

אל: השגריר / וושינגטון

מאת: נמרוד נוביק / לשכת ראה"מ

לבקשת המכותב, מאד אודה לך אם תוכל לדאוג להעברת הרצ"ב לתעודתו
 עוד היום.
 המקור נשלח בדיפ' בנפרד.

בתודה ובברכה,

נמרוד נוביק

חשולח: _____ אישור מנהל המחלקה: _____ אישור לשכת המנכ"ל: _____
 (לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) _____

לשימוש מח' הקשר בלבד

התפוצה:

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הנושא:

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ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem

June 25, 1986.


Ambassador James George
Staff President
The Sadat Peace Foundation, Inc.
1100 15th Street Suite 800
WASHINGTON DC 20005

Dear Ambassador George,

I was delighted to learn of the Sadat Peace Foundation's support for, and active promotion of the idea of a Middle East Economic Development Program. The various economic consultations undertaken by the Foundation can facilitate a better understanding of the urgent need for this program.

Indeed, it is only through such coordinated efforts by those who wish to make a meaningful contribution to peace in this region that the prerequisite for a revitalized peace process -- e.g. the economic basis of political stability -- can be assured..

Hence, you have my full support for the Foundation's activities on behalf of our common objectives: better understanding, greater cooperation and peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely,


Shimon Peres

ס ו ד י

דף	1	מתוך	3	דפים
עוֹתֵק	1	מתוך	3	עוֹתֵקִים
5-ימ-050-1				

11 ביוני 1986

אל: ✓ראה"ח

מאת: נמרוד

הנדון: עסקת ה - AWACS

1. עיקרים:

א. בטרם יגוררו אותנו הארגונים היהודיים למאבק שלא נשקל מראש מציע לגבש עם שהב"ט ושה"ח מדיניות שעיקריה:

- (1) חזרה על המדיניות העקרונית של התנגדות למכירת אמל"ח מתקדם למדינות הנמצאות עמנו במצב מלחמה.
- (2) קביעה כי עמדתנו בענין זה הובהרה היטב לקראת קבלת החלטת הממשל בשנת 1981.
- (3) תמיכה במימוש התנאים למכירה כפי שנקבעו ע"י הנשיא רייגן בשנת 1981.

ב. במגעים עם הממשל מציע לכרוך ויתור על מאבק בתמורה בתמורה בהקשרי עתיד ה"לביא".

ג. העלות הכלכלית לארה"ב של ביטול העסקה היא אסטרונומית (למעלה מ- 10 מיליארד דולר). ברורה גם העלות הפוליטית של מאבק כזה בתקופת גראהם-רודמן מחד גיסא ופולארד מאידך.

2. רקע:

א. הארגונים היהודיים (בראש ובראשונה ועידת הנשיאים, איפא"ק ו- ADL) מגבשים קו למאבק כנגד ביצוע העסקה. הם לוחצים להנחיה מירושלים.

ב. לטענתם, הלחצים מתוך הארגונים הם למאבק חריף.

ס ו ד י

דף 2 מתוך 3 דפים
עותק 1 מתוך 3 עותקים
5-ימ-050-1

3. נתונים:

א. עלויות:

- (1) העסקה אמורה להכניס לארה"ב כ- \$ 8.3 מיליארד.
- (2) החלטה על ביטול העסקה תחייב את הקונגרס להקצות \$ 2.7 מיליארד כהחזר על תשלומים אשר כבר בוצעו ע"י הסעודים.
- (3) הקונגרס יצטרך להקצות סכום נוסף (כנראה \$ 1.3 מיליארד) כפיצוי ליצרנים על ביטול העסקה.
- (4) היצרנים יתבעו מח"א האמריקאי סכום נוסף עבור המטוסים שנרכשו עבורו ואשר עלותם חושבה בהנחה שקו הייצור יכלול את הסדרה הסעודית.

ב. בשנת 1981 הנשיא התחייב בפני הקונגרס כי העסקה תתבצע רק באם הסעודים יעמדו ב- 6 התנאים הבאים:

- (1) אבטחת הטכנולוגיות:
 - (א) זכות ארה"ב לבחון סידרי אבטחה בשטח.
 - (ב) זכות ארה"ב לוטו על היתר לאזרחי מדינות שלישיות לתחזק ו/או להכניס שינויים במערכות המטוסים.
- (2) גישה למידע:

התחייבות סעודית לשתף את ארה"ב בכל מידע שיאסף ע"י המטוסים.
- (3) השתתפות צדדים שלישיים:

זכות ארה"ב לוטו על שיתוף צדדים שלישיים במידע שנאסף ע"י המטוסים.
- (4) תפעול באזיר:

המטוסים יופעלו בשטחה של סעודיה בלבד; ורק למטרות הגנה ויציבות אזרית.
- (5) שלום ובטחון אזורים:

הפעלת המטוסים נועדה לקדם השלום והבטחון באזור בכלל ושלום ערבי-ישראלי בפרט.

4. הערכה

א. השעה אינה נוחה למאבק בוטה בממשל.

דף 3 מתוך 3 דפים
 עותק 1 מתוך 3 עותקים
 5-ימ-050-1

- ב. התגבשות השילוש הבלתי מקודש (ממשל - לובי סעודי - לובי יצרניות המטוסים) מבטיח שמאבק יהיה החריף שידענו אי-פעם. בפעם האחרונה שהתגבש שילוש זה (1981) נכשלנו בבלימת העסקה למרות המאמץ הניכר.
- ג. עלות ביטול העסקה -- פוליטית וכלכלית -- היא אסטרנומית. לניפנוף בסכומים אלה כנגדנו בעידן גראהם-רודמן תהיה השלכה על המאבק לשימור סיוע חוץ.
- ד. מאידך גיסא - לא ניתן לצפות מהארגונים היהודיים שימנעו לחלוטין ממאבק.
- ה. ויתור על מאבק יעניק יתרונות בשלשה תחומים:
- (1) הממשל יהיה מוכן לשלם תמורתו.
 - (2) ימנע בזבוז "הון פוליטי" על נושא המוגדר פחות מעיקרי.
 - (3) בקונגרס - יאפשר לחפצים בכך להוביל מהלך התנגדות עצמאי.

5. המלצה:

- א. מוצע לגבש בצוות המוביל (ראה"מ, שהב"ט, שה"ח) עמדה כלהלן:
- (1) אי סטיה מעמדתה העקרונית והמוצהרת של ישראל באשר למכירות אמל"ח למדינות הנמצאות עמנו במצב מלחמה.
 - (2) תביעה לעמידה סעודית בשישה התנאים. העמידה בחמישה הראשונים חייבת להיות בפועל, בעוד העמידה בשישי (תרומה לשלום) בהצהרת כוונות.
 - מבחנה של עמידה בתנאים יהיה הצהרה של הממשל (לא של סעודיה) לקונגרס.
 - (3) קביעה כי הנושא נדון ביסודיות בשנת 1981 ולכן ישראל אינה רואה זאת כ- ISSUE לדיון מחודש.
- ב. במגעים עם הממשל ל"מכור" נכונות זו בתמורה הכורכת את הגברת האיום הנובעת מאספקת המטוסים עם מענה על צרכי ההגנה האוירית של ישראל - קרי, מטוס שנות ה-90 (זאת, בין אם החלופה המועדפת היא המשך תמיכה בלביא כמות שהוא; המעבר לייצורו כפרוייקט משותף עם יצרן אמריקאי, כשהממשל אחראי להשיג שותף זה; מעבר לפלטפורמה אמריקאית או כל חלופה אחרת).

נמרו, נוביק

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

425

דף 1 מתוך 4
עותק 1 מתוך 4

סודי ביותר

אל: המשרד, נר: 256, מ: נ
דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 100686, נח: 1100

בהול להעתיק/סודי ביותר
אל: מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל

דע: ווש-השגריר מאיר רוזן (נר 76)
מאת: קונבל ניו יורק

לעיניהם בלבד

=====

פרשת פולרד.

טלפן מלקולם הונליין ומסר שפגש אתמול, יחד עם קבוצת יהודים
את סנטור פאריק. ליהי מורמונט, הנחשב כידיד שלנו. הסנטור
סיפר שוועדת הסנאט למודיעין דאתה מסמכים מדאיגים מאוד בעניין
פולרד המוכיחים שישראל לא שיתפה מספיק פעולה עם ארה"ב. הוא
סירב לספר איזה מסמכים דאה, אך אמר שהעניין חמור וייעץ
שממשלת ישראל תעשה מיד ובמהירות כל הדרוש לסיום הפרשה.
באותה פגישה אמר הסנטור שאינו בטוח אם דוהמי קיבל באמת את
כל המידע. עד כאן.

יג"ר =

תפ: שהח, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל

207

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2374

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יוצא

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מל: ווש, נר: 347, מ: המשרד
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טמור/מיידי

דע: לשכת דוה'ם - היכל.

השגריר, הציר.

ביקור סגן הנשיא בוש.

בפגישה שנערכה ב- 10 ביוני במשרד דוה'ם גובש שכל תכנית
לביקורו של סגן הנשיא בוש.

להלן תאור התכנית:

יום א' - 27 יולי:

אחה"ץ - נחיתה בנתביג - מבקשים לוודא כי יגיעו מספיק מוקדם
כדי לאפשר קיום הטקס באור יום.

טקס בגן הוורדים.

פגישה בבית דוה'ם.

ארוחת ערב.

יום ב' - 28 יולי

0800 - פגישה עם מם דוה'ם ושה'ם במכון
0915 - ביקור ביד ושם.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1015 - פגישה במשרד רוה'ם.

1300 - ארוחת צהרים עם נשיא המדינה.

1500 - חנוכת יער צ'לנג'ר.

נא בידקו נכונותם לבקר במרכז קליטה במבשרת ציון, בדרך חזרה מחנוכת היער, ופגישה עם עולים חדשים, כולל אתיופיים.

1730 - כנסת - פגישה עם היו"ר, צפיה בדיונים, פגישה עם ועדת חו"ב.

2030 - ארוחת ערב.

יום ג' - 29 יולי

0730 - ארוחת בוקר עם מדי קולק - משכנות שאננים.
יתרת היום מוקדש לנושאי ביטחון ותחזוקת ע"י שר הביטחון.

2030 - ארוחת ערב.

יום ד' 30 יולי

0730 - ארוחת בוקר בבית רוה'ם.

מסיבת עיתונאים.

מקס בגן הוורדים.

נסיעה לנתביג - המראה.

לצורך המשך תאום התכנית נודה אם תבדקו ותודיעונו הפרטים הבאים:

א. מי משתתף בפמליה, האם אשת סגן הנשיא מצטרפת, כמה עיתונאים נלווים, כמה אנשי ביטחון נלווים.

ב. שעת הגעה ועזיבה מדויקת - נודה אם תוודאו הגעה מוקדמת באמור לעיל.

ג. חלוקת ארוחות הערב כולל ארוחת גומלין, מותנית בשעת הגעת האורח ולכן לא שיצנום בשלב זה. עם קבלת ההחלטה על שעת ההגעה נודיעכם ע"י ניתנות הארוחות השונות.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ד. ביום ד' - 30 יולי - נודה אם תבדקו עם המבקרים אם יש להם
ענין להוסיף נושאים נוספים אותם נוכל לשבץ לפי בקשותיהם.
ה. נודה לקבלת אישור עקרוני על הפרטים וחלוקת תוכנית זו.
ו. נא הודעונו פרטים על הרבב המשלחת. המקדימה מועדי הגעתה
ונושאים לשיבוץ בתכניה.

מצפא / מאו'ר.

1/א

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, שמודק, אורחים
תח: היכל ממרהמ'

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אל:
המשרד בטחון, נ.י.
56/180/278

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח, קש"ח, ניו יורק

מדרוך דובר מחמד ליום 10.6.86

MR. SCHWEID: Bernie, on Syria, sometimes the administration points a very sharp, accusing finger at Syria for terrorism. At other times it implores Syria to assist in the rescue of American and other nationals held hostage someplace in Lebanon. The New York Times today has a story that suggests the administration has reached some tentative conclusions, at least, about whether Syria is as culpable as Libya, for instance, in terrorism. Can you, with or without reference to the Times story, give us some sort of an idea of how the administration now looks at Syria, which, I understand, now the administration hopes will help in a Mideast peace process. So it's all very confusing. What is the judgment? Is Syria a terrorist-supporting country? Isn't it? What do you know?

MR. KALB: Barry, what I would do by way of a reply is to recall the profile of Syria as set forth, I think it was a couple of weeks ago, right from here. I'd be happy to get that for you in the press room at the conclusion of the briefing, but insofar as the story itself setting forth a definitive outline of Syria, vis-a-vis terrorism, I don't know that that's the case. The way I read it, there were some assessments made on the run, and it was put together in a package. For the more definitive profile, would be the one that I refer you to, and we could get it for you afterwards.

MR. SCHWEID: And the point would be that whatever is in there

MR. KALB: The point would be --

MR. SCHWEID: -- that nothing has changed since?

MR. KALB: That is correct. The point would be, among other things, that Syria remains on the U.S. terrorism list, and that our policy apply to the perpetrators of terrorism and to whatever state sponsors terrorism. And I think that you will find the rest of it there, and we'll make it available.

MR. SCHWEID: I think there are five countries on the list. Does the State Department sort of have a notion of whether some classify as five-star terrorists and others only as maybe three-star, because one of the points of the story is that Syria -- whatever Syria may or may not have done, it's not on the same plateau with Libya. Is that a fair judgment?

MR. KALB: I'm not going to enter a rating situation. I pass on that one.

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including a large asterisk and various scribbles.

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Q What is the current state of the relationship between the U.S. and the government of Israel on the Levi fighter?

MR. KALB: Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Nothing on that? Well while we're on current relationships between Israel and the United States, where stands the apparent agreement or lack of it between this building and the Department of Justice on the Pollard case and the existence or nonexistence of an Israeli spy ring?

MR. KALB: I've said everything I'm going to say on this subject, is what I said yesterday.

Q Do you stand on your comment that you spoke for the entire administration?

MR. KALB: I had just said that what I said yesterday is what I'm referring you to, and I have nothing to add to what I said yesterday. In other words, the full range of comment from me on variations of the same question is that I've nothing to add to what I said yesterday.

Q Has Mr. Shultz spoken to Mr. Meese today about the apparent discrepancy?

MR. KALB: Don't know.

Q Will you take that --

MR. KALB: I think that if the Secretary gets engaged in private conversations, they undoubtedly will remain private unless I am instructed to share any particular details.

Q What you said yesterday then is a government, is still an administration --

MR. KALB: Could very well be.

Q Are the two cabinet officers talking about what the attitude of the U.S. government toward Israel is, and to club chatter I think it's gossip over the fence. It's a public matter, isn't it?

X

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MR. KALB: No, I must say I disagree with you.

Q You think they just chat it up, huh?

MR. KALB: No, I just think that there is such a thing as a private conversation.

Q There are such things that you don't want to make public for your own parochial reasons, but don't mislabel them. It's government business that's being conducted here, not private chit-chat between two cabinet officers.

MR. KALB: There's an assumption, I think there's an assumption in what you say that a private conversation should be attached with some sort of an electronic loudspeaker. Do you concede there being the right of a private conversation --

Q ----- What are you having for dinner, Ed, tonight? I'm having baked beans. What are you having, George? That's a private conversation.

MR. KALB: I see.

Q U.S. attitude toward the state of Israel and what is a clear conflict between two departments of the government is a public matter.

MR. KALB: I said that, I've said what I'm going to say on the subject is what I said yesterday, and I suppose we will wind up in disagreement as to the parameters of what constitutes a private conversation. Ralph?

Q I'm just going to ask whether your statement that you said what you had to say yesterday means that you do not believe there is a conflict, or that you simply do not wish to engage any further in exacerbating what we believe to be a conflict.

MR. KALB: I said that I've said all I'm going to say on the subject, and I said that yesterday, and --

Q But the question wasn't raised yesterday.

MR. KALB: And you might consider rereading what I said.

Q I have reread it.

MR. KALB: I have said, that what I've said, I've said yesterday.

(Laughter)

X

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מס' מברק

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Q That question didn't exist yesterday, Bernie. The question is one that arose since --

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4-5

MR. KALB: Yes, and what I am saying today is in full light of the various points that are being pointed out to me.

Q Bernie, have you talked to Pat Cordon, the Justice spokesman?

MR. KALB: That's a private conversation.

(Laughter)

Q (Off mike)

MR. KALB: There have been discussions. Whether I did or somebody else, it's beside the point. But I really -- I've nothing to add to the whole point.

Q Don't you think you owe it to us? Since you're the one who originated the statement that you were speaking for the entire administration, then late in the afternoon the Justice Department spokesman says in fact, you are not speaking for Justice.

MR. KALB: I stand by what I said yesterday, and I have nothing to add to what I said yesterday. The invitation to grid what I said yesterday into various departments, I think you could take a look at what I said and there it is and there I stand.

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Q Did the Syrians respond to our chemical exports ban? We had anything from them --

MR. KALB: I don't know, I'm unaware of it. I simply don't know. I'll take a look and see if an answer is possible.

Q Bernie, is the Secretary of State planning to travel to any distant places in the next several weeks?

MR. KALB: Under that general heading, I'd have to answer, in all candidness, yes.

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Q Is the Mideast one of them?

MR. KALB: I'd have to answer in all candidness that I don't have anything on that.

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מספר:		רושינגטון
מספר:		עמנואל, ניו יורק

26 - מחן

News Summary June 10, 1986

Editorials

NYT "Dutiful in Austria" Like Waldheim during Hitler's war, a majority of Austrian voters have done what they took to be their patriotic duty. They elected Waldheim as if to exonerate all Austria of complicity in Nazi atrocities. At no point in his charmed career has Waldheim attained moral heights. He remains what he was in the Balkans, an adapting subaltern. That should not affect his eligibility to visit the US, whose doors ought to remain open to all political figures. But it will certainly affect his welcome.

DN "Heil Waldheim...A Moral Lesson" The butchery of Jews, and the Nazis' other crimes, happened while peoples and governments worldwide were failing to speak out. Now Waldheim insists, "I was criticized by private people, not by governments." That makes it doubly obligatory that the US gov't, without delay, declare Waldheim unfit to enter the US. To stand silent is to condone.

Columns

NYT-Bronfman "Shame on Austria" In the wake of the election, the world cannot remain silent. It must severely condemn some Austrians' deliberate exploitation of the Waldheim affair, during the campaign to exploit anti-Jewish sentiment. This is not the end of the affair.

ND-Charles Sydnor (Pres. Emory and Henry College, Specialist in modern German history). "Over Waldheim's Triumph Looms Nazi Legacy" To the residents of the town where Hitler was born, what Waldheim did as an army officer in the Balkans to Jews, Italians, Yugoslavs and Greeks was moot. If there was any truth to the charges, he would not have been elected Sec. Gen. of the UN, they argue. The people of Austria have decided not to come to terms with their past.

NYP-Podhoretz "New Guises for Old Anti-Semitism" Anti-Semites often hide behind criticism of Israel. The most blatantly anti-Semitic utterances

עמנואל, ניו יורק

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to have appeared in any respectable periodical in decades-- comes from the Left. It is by now the notorious article by Gore Vidal. Vidal, and others like him, believe that writing anti-Semitic articles is brave and fair, but describing these articles as anti-Semitic is cowardly and repressive. The new anti-Semitism is no longer restricted to Israel alone. It is now beginning to brazenly address itself to American Jews in general.

NYT-Mark Heller (Dep. Dir. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) "In Fighting Terrorism, Why Not Use Force?" The threat of state-sponsored terrorism has not yet been eliminated and similar US actions against Libya, Syria, Iran or other states may well be waged in the future. It is therefore important to affirm the legitimacy and utility of military responses to terrorism. Common sense argues that political leaders, including those in Arab states, operate according to a fairly rational calculus of cost and benefit. Raising the cost of actions abhorrent to others will either induce Arab leaders like Khadafy to refrain from such actions in the future or lead to the replacement of such leaders. There is no question that a political settlement acceptable to a representative body of Palestinians would reduce the popular base of terrorism. But this truism is immaterial to the type of state-supported terrorism being waged today in the name of the Palestinian cause. These actions have been directed against those Palestinians willing to explore the idea of peaceful coexistence. As long as Israel continues to exist, enough outraged Palestinians and other Arabs will remain to practice terrorism on a large scale. Some states are promoting their interests by using their agents or proxies to take violent action against the citizens and property of other states. This is war.

Press Reports

Justice and State Depts. At Odds Over Israeli Spying

NYT-Gwertzman p.1 Officials of the State Dept. and Justice Dept. made conflicting statements about the extent of Israeli spying in the US. The statements brought additional confusion to an issue already straining the US-Israeli relationship. Apparently trying to mollify the Israeli Gov't, the State Dept. said the US had "no evidence of any espionage ring involving Israeli officials, other than those already named as unindicted co-conspirators of Pollard. The dept. said Messe had approved the statement. But later in the day the Justice Dept. denied Messe had given his formal approval. Justice Dept. officials said privately that there was indeed evidence of wider Israeli spying in the US, and that the State Dept. had misstated the facts. (cabled)

Reagan and Hussein Meet

NYT-special-Reagan and Hussein met and expressed regret that they had been unable to revive the stalled Arab-Israeli peace talks, a senior Administration official said. During the deliberately low-keyed

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meeting at the White House that lasted an hour, both leaders affirmed the importance of doing something to end the stalemate, but officials said there was no likelihood of immediate moves in that direction. "The climate for progress is just not good," a State Dept. official said. Hussein repeated his view that the US would have to play a more active role in the diplomacy. He outlined a long-term approach under which Syria and Iraq would reconcile their differences and join in an Arab summit meeting that would authorize Jordan to negotiate with Israel for recovery of the West Bank without the participation of the PLO groups that recognize Arafat's leadership. A visit by Shultz to the region is not expected. Peres has proposed a Marshall Plan for economic growth in the Mideast. An Administration official said there would be discussions with the king's party on the idea of economic cooperation before the Jordanians leave Washington.

DN-Rehm-Hussein warned Reagan that the deadlock in the search for peace can force nations of the region to "drift towards war." (see NYP-Lathem)

Evidence of Syrian Terror Link Still Murky

NYT-Weinraub p.1-Administration officials have concluded that although Syria's involvement in terrorism may be "much more professional, much more deadly" than Libya's, the evidence remains murky about Syria's direct links to recent acts of violence. The US and the Western allies have failed to gather the same "incontrovertible evidence" against Syria as they say they have against Libya for recent attacks. As a result the US is not seriously weighing a retaliatory raid. US officials say Syrian terror has focused less on random attacks on Americans than on seeking to crush prospects for Mideast peace through assassinations of moderate Palestinians and those friendly with Jordan.

US-Israeli Response to Waldheim Election

NYT-Shanon-Reagan joined a variety of foreign leaders in congratulating Waldheim. But Israel recalled its Ambassador from Vienna for an indefinite period of "consultations" to protest the Waldheim victory. In the US, Jewish groups and lawmakers continued their criticism of Austrian voters. (see photo of Amb. Elitzur)

NYT-AP-In London, senior Gov't officials said it was unlikely that Waldheim would be invited for an official visit. French PM Chirac said he had not seen "decisive proof" against Waldheim and would not interfere in the affairs of a friendly nation. UN Sec. Gen. Cuellar sent a private congratulatory message to Waldheim, according to the UN spokesman.

Waldheim on Mideast

NYT-special (Beirut) Waldheim has been quoted in Al Osbou Al Arabic saying that Israel's criticism of him is motivated by the Mideast policy he followed when he was Sec. Gen. of the UN. "I stood on the side of Arab rights, and this annoyed the Israelis. I supported the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and to an independent state of their own. I backed Syria's rights in the Golan Heights and sympathized with Third World causes."

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Waldheim Accused of Beating Greek Jew

NYT-AP-A Greek Jew now living in Israel was quoted as saying that he saw Waldheim beat his brother at a time when Waldheim was supervising deportation of Greek Jews to concentration camps. Moshe Mayuni's testimony is the first public first-hand testimony in support of accusations that Waldheim committed war crimes.

Austrian Quits as Chancellor

NYT-Markham p.1 The Chancellor of Austria, a Socialist, resigned, a day after Waldheim won the election. The Socialist Foreign Minister is also expected to resign because he is unwilling to travel with Waldheim or defend him abroad.

Opponents of Khoemini Said to Leave France for Iran-Iraq Border

NYT-Bernstein-More than 1000 members of the largest group opposing the Iranian Gov't have left their headquarters near Paris for an area on the Iran-Iraq border, presumably to join anti-Gov't guerrilla forces that the group says it maintains there.

Iraq Cuts Iranian Phone Links

NYT-Reuters-Iranian telecommunications with the rest of the world were cut after an Iraqi air raid on a satellite ground station.

Oil Companies in Libya Pressed

NYT-AP-The House of Representatives voted to order 5 American oil companies to leave Libya by June 30. Reagan set a similar deadline and said he would enforce it by executive order.

Koch at Jewish Humor Conference

DN-Bell-Koch welcomed experts on humor last night saying he rarely tells jokes but has a "reasonable" sense of humor. He also said that Reagan is one of the greatest American Presidents, a line that drew some laughs, but he said he was serious. Koch said he found uncomic to tell jokes about New York City but he did tell one joke; "You know what Waldheimer's disease is, don't you? It's a Nazi who's forgotten his past." The joke drew applause.

Cartoons

ND-Lord-A Youth for Waldheim worker says to the new President, "I wouldn't worry about the criticism, sir. Look at all these congratulatory telegrams Arafat's says "How could I forget that Zionism is Racism vote at the UN? Looking forward to working with you in the future." Klaus Barbie's says, "Good job! How about a contribution to my defense fund? Rudolf Hess says, "Nice Work! Will you testify for my parole board?" and Khadafy's message reads, "Way to go, Kurt!"

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מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	1-1
טופס מברק	2-1
תז"ח: 101030	ממנכ"ל, מנהל מע"ת, מצפ"א, ואמית"ק.
252	יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, דו"צ.
25	עמנואל, ניו יורק

בהור

כתבה בניו יורק סינימס 10.6 עמוד 1

Justice and State Depts. at Odds In Assessments on Israeli Spying

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 9 — Officials of the State Department and the Justice Department made conflicting statements today about the extent of Israeli spying in the United States. The statements brought additional confusion to an issue that has already strained American-Israeli relations.

Apparently trying to mollify the Israeli Government, the State Department said that the United States had "no evidence of any espionage ring involving Israeli officials" other than those already named as unindicted co-conspirators of Jonathan Jay Pollard, who has pleaded guilty to spying for Israel. The department said Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d had approved the statement.

Evidence of Spying Cited

But late in the day, the Justice Department formally denied that Mr. Meese had given his approval.

"Mr. Meese did not approve the statement," said Patrick Korten, a Justice Department spokesman. "It contains a reference to an ongoing investigation, about which we would never comment." Mr. Korten would

not discuss details of the case.

Department officials said privately that there was indeed evidence of wider Israeli spying in the United States, and that the State Department had misstated the facts.

Senior Administration officials had said Thursday that Mr. Pollard was giving the Justice Department information about a number of espionage operations involving Israelis and other foreigners.

Shultz and Meese Met

The confusion today, one Administration source said, resulted from a misunderstanding by middle-level officials at the State Department who believed that their counterparts at the Justice Department had approved the statement. There was a meeting this morning between Mr. Meese and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, but details of what went on at the meeting could not be obtained.

The Government has also issued conflicting statements as to whether the Israeli Government has been cooperating fully in the case. William H. Webster, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other Justice and White House officials have recently faulted Israel for "selective cooperation," in Mr. Webster's words.

Bill Baker, an F.B.I. spokesman,

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שם השולח:

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דחיות:	מחלקת הקשר	2
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Continued From Page A1

said today that Mr. Webster stood by his remarks. "We will stand by the comments," he said.

But today Bernard Kalb, the State Department spokesman, said, "Quotes from unidentified sources are entitled to no weight and these and other uninformed statements do not represent the Administration's views."

Asserting that he was speaking for the entire United States Government, Mr. Kalb praised the Israeli Government, saying that "the indictment and successful prosecution was made possible through the cooperation of the Government of Israel."

An official in the White House press office said Mr. Kalb's statement had been "coordinated" with the White House in an effort to secure a statement the entire Administration agreed to.

The State Department statement was carefully worded to say that there was no evidence of any further Israeli "officials" being involved in spying. But the White House official left open the possibility that Israelis who are not Government officials might still be implicated.

Within hours of Mr. Kalb's claim to be speaking for the entire Administration, some Justice Department officials were expressing surprise and anger.

No Evidence, Strong Reasons

"I don't know what they think they're doing over there," one Federal law-enforcement official said of the State Department. "They're going to look silly." Another official said that while it was literally true that there was no hard evidence to implicate other Israeli officials in espionage in this country, there were strong reasons to suspect the existence of other spy activity.

When told of the Justice Department

reservations about the statement, a senior State Department official said: "The statement was signed off on by Ed Meese. And that is good enough for us."

After being told of Mr. Meese's denial, the State Department official had no further comment.

The State Department statement was issued in response to criticism leveled Sunday by Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel. He expressed concern that there were some in the United States who were seeking "to foul the atmosphere" between the two countries.

He also repeated his government's contention that Israel had cooperated in the Pollard investigation, and that the espionage ring was unauthorized and contrary to Israeli policy. He said also that Israel would continue to cooperate with the American investigation.

One Surprising Indictment

Last week, in connection with the guilty pleas of Mr. Pollard and his wife, Anne Henderson Pollard, to different charges in connection with spying activities, the Justice Department listed four Israelis as co-conspirators, but did not indict them.

Three of the four were known to have been involved last November when the Pollards were arrested. They are Rafael Eitan, a veteran intelligence agent; Joseph Yagur, the science attaché at the Israeli Consulate in New York, and Irit Erb, a secretary in the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

But the fourth, Air Force Brig. Gen. Aviam Sella, was a surprise. He was identified as Mr. Pollard's first "handler," and his involvement only became known when Mr. Pollard provided evidence as part of his plea bargaining. All four are now in Israel.

Several Administration officials have expressed skepticism that someone of General Sella's stature could have been involved in an unauthorized intelligence operation without the ap-

proval of senior officials in the Government while he was studying as a graduate student in New York.

State Department Statement

A State Department official said today's statement was drafted by Abraham D. Sofaer, the department's legal adviser, who led a joint team from the State and Justice Departments to Israel in December to question Mr. Eitan and others then known to have been involved in the espionage case.

"The United States is deeply concerned about the Pollard case, as we are about any acts of espionage," Mr. Kalb said, reading the statement. "We have made our concern known to the Government of Israel and it is aware of this. The Government of Israel issued a statement yesterday stating that no espionage activities are being carried out against the U.S. on Israel's behalf, and committing itself to continued cooperation."

"The United States welcomes and accepts this statement and Israel's renewed pledge of cooperation with the investigation of the remaining issues in the Pollard case," he said. "We expect such cooperation in view of the close relations between our two countries and we look forward to receiving this until the case is closed."

"The U.S. has no evidence of any espionage ring involving Israeli officials other than the ones described in the indictment of the Pollards," Mr. Kalb said. "We also wish to note that the indictment and successful prosecution was made possible through the cooperation of the Government of Israel."

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97.....712.....97

סווא בשחוני סודי

דחיסום רגיל

מספר 1430 10 710

1938

269

להלן מתוך שיחה עם לין טקס (קצינת הקיסור לקונגרס מטעם ה- NSC).

2. אם כי טום דיין DELIVER HIM FROM, פְּעִיזִים שְׁתַּחֲוֶה בְּכֹד (HONORABLY) וְלֹא
בְּדוֹ-טְרָצוּפוֹת. הַצִּלָּתוֹ שֶׁל דֵּיין מִתְבַּטֶּחַ בְּכֹךְ שְׂכִימֹם אֶפִּילוֹ אִם אִיפֹאִיךְ בּוֹוֹשִׁינְגְטוֹן מַחְלִיעַ לֹא
לְתַאֲבֵק בְּאוֹפֶן פְּעִיל בְּגִבְעָה, אֲנִשְׁיוֹ בִּשְׂדֵה, לְאַחֵר שָׁנִים שֶׁל הַדְּרָכָה וְאִימּוֹן. יוֹדְעִים מֵה לַעֲשׂוֹת-וְעֹשִׂים
אֲצֵל נְצִיגִים בְּשָׁנֵי הַבָּחִים.

ב- NSC קולטים עייפות מנושאים קונטרברסיאליים הקשורים לסעודיה, ומספר משרדים בגבעה
היו עליהם והציעו שיקול נושא האוואקס יידחה עד חסותיו. נדמה שמשרד אלו אינם מודעים
לקנסות שעל ארה"ב לשלם אם מסירת המטוסים תתקבל, וכן לא למחיר אחסון המטוסים בארה"ב
שמתכמת בכ-2.5 מליון דולר למטוס לחדש. אי לכך, להערכתה, יגיש הנשיא את הסרטיפיקציה לקונגרס
SOONER מאשר LATER. אין ^{לדעת} חוליה מסירת האוואקס הראשון ב-28 (או ב-30) ביוני,
אך זה המועד שכולם מזכירים.

ו. המספרים האפשריים חמורים, אפילו אם נציגי בית הנבחרים בוועידת ההתייעצות בדבר חוק התקציב (המתנהלה כיום) יסמכו את ידם על מספרי הסנט (14.2 להוצאות בפועל), ואפילו אם ישוחררו כספים מסוימים שמיועדים כעת לצרכי אבטחת הנציגויות בחו"ל ("תכנית אינמן"). בשבוע שעבר שלח הנשיא מכתב ליושבי הראש של שתי וועדות התקציב (הסנטור פיט דומניצ'י והמורסה ביל גריי) והפציר בהם לא לקצץ את תכנית סיוע חוץ כפי שמחכננים, אך לא נראה שפנייה זו הועילה.

2. להערכתה, ועידת ההתייעצות לא תסתיים בהצלחה בגלל הפער הגדול בין שני הצדדים בחציב הבטחון וכן בגלל דרישת ביה"ג להגדיל ההכנסות הפדרליות, כך שבסופו של דבר ייחנן שלא יהיה חוץ מקציב.

 ~~$\frac{y}{\sqrt{1+y^2}} = \frac{1+1+3}{2+2} = \frac{5}{4}$~~

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ס ז י ס

דף.....מחור.....דפים

.....סוג בטחוני

.....דחיות

.....מאריך וזמן

.....שם מי שברך

3. מעבר לזה מסתמנים סימנים מובהקים שהנשיא יטיל ווטו על חוקי ההקצבות, ובתוצאה מכך המורשה ג'ימי וויטן, כיו"ר וועדת ההקצבות, כבר מתכוון לקראת האפשרות של החלטת המשך (CR).

(ד) חוק הרשאה לכספי הפנטגון

ה- NSC מטופלת בנושא זה "בגדול" (להבטיח שהקיצוצים בתקציב הבטחון לא יהיו גדולים מדי). מטרה לה על התעניינותנו בחוק זה (תיקוני נאן וקווייל וכו'), ובחגובה העירה שבעיצומו של משבר פולארד, אין זו שעת כושר לקדם את עניינינו כבן-ברית אסטרטגי.

י.א.ר. זמב
למדן

257

ס ו ק ס
ד.....מחור. שמור. דמיס
סווג בסחונני
דחיפות.....לונני סו 1400
מאריך וזיח
.....מס' מברק

אל: מצפ"א

ביקור המלך חוסיין

לשלנו 211

(1) חזר וון-דוזן ואישר סופית שהמלך לא יבקר בגבעת הקפיטול. המורשה לי המילטון (יו"ר וועדת המשנה ל'איוועה ולמניית) נאד רצה שחוסיין ייפגש עם חברי הוועדה, אך וון-דוזן לא הצליח לשכנעו לבוא - לא רק בגלל שחוסיין נמצא כאן בביקור בלתי רשמי, אלא בגלל שאין לו מה לבקש מהקונגרס כעת, מה גם שהוא עדיין חש נפגע מיחס הקונגרס אליו בשנה האחרונה, והטיפול בבקשתו לבשק.

(2) במקום זאת, היום (10) אחה"צ מוזמנת קבוצה קטנה של מומחים לענייני מזה"ת - לרבות עוזרים מהוועדות בשני בתי הקונגרס - להפגש עם המלך, ומחר (11) הוא יאכל ארוחת בוקר עם כעשרה סנטורים ומורשים - כאמור, לא בגבעה.

למדן

שלה 2
הג 3
שלה 1
ג' 5
ג' 1
ג' 2
ג' 1
ג' 4
ג' 4

பிங்கு பூர்வ பிங்கு மீதம் ஸ்ரீ கமலா : 1 2

251/24/73

2/3

protocol. An official in Jerusalem described Waldheim's victory as "a nightmare for every Jew and every Israeli." Key Gov't officials said they hoped to confine the diplomatic chill to the office of the Presidency and to continue full diplomatic relations with Austria.

DN-UPI-Jewish leaders in Austria decried the election saying the nation had not learned the lesson of the Holocaust.

NYT-Schmemmann-The Soviet Union harshly denounced Washington and "Zionist circles" for waging "a campaign of personal hostile attacks" against Waldheim. The statement in Tass was the first mention in the Soviet press of the allegations that Waldheim concealed his wartime activities. The statement, which also gave a positive summary of Waldheim's records as Sec. Gen. of the UN, placed Moscow unambivalently behind the new President.

MD-Culline-Mayor KOCH said at the Israeli Day Parade that Waldheim's election will to be "Austria's eternal shame." Koch then declared to the cheers of 50,000 paraders that "I am a Zionist." (see photo of paraders NYT, NYP)

Britain in Talks to Sell Jordan 40 Fighter Jets

WSJ-Gumbel-Britain has been quietly negotiating with Jordan for some time over the sale of as many 40 Tornado fighter jets valued at about \$1 billion. In the absence of any progress on the Mideast peace process, it is highly unlikely that Congress will approve any major arms sales to Jordan this year. Hussein is visiting with Reagan in Washington. Administration officials do not expect any diplomatic breakthroughs in the Mideast soon.

Arabs Battle Over PLO

ND-Randal (Wash Post) Arafat's weakened forces are now fighting for their physical and political lives--this time against fellow Arabs. In Jordan, with apparent official complaisance, Attalah Attalah, a PLO military chief, claims to have ousted Arafat as PLO chief. Arab analysts suggest that Jordan and Syria may be acting in concert to bring Arafat to heel. Their aim is described as part of a larger plan to foster reconciliation between Syria and Iraq. Such joint action would be calculated to please the US and Britain, whose PM recently endorsed Jordanian and Israeli arguments for ditching the PLO for more pliant Palestinian leadership in any future peace negotiations. So far, Saddam Hussein has shown no disposition to stop providing Arafat with facilities in Baghdad.

OPEC'S Hard Times Cause Dislocations

WSJ-Seib-(Egypt) Disappointment is being felt all over the Arab world as the oil-price crash reverses one of the largest human migrations of recent times. The return of workers from oil-rich states to countries like Egypt causes wide-reaching social and economic problems.

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Leading Khomeini Foe Leaves France for Iraq

WSJ-staff-Massoud Rajavi, the leading opponent to Khomeini's regime, left France under strong pressure from the French gov't and has sought refuge in Iraq. French gov't officials stress that Rajavi left voluntarily and was not expelled. The tough French attitude appears to be linked to efforts to secure the release of 9 French hostages in Lebanon.

Fighting in Beirut

NYT-Reuters-Heavy fighting erupted between Amal militiamen and Palestinians defending the Shatila refugee district, and a child was killed, Palestinian witnesses reported.

Chadian Leader Says Khadafy Bars Peace

NYT-Reuters-Pres. Habre said that he abandoned all hope of a negotiated end to his country's civil war. "The arrogance of Khadafy, who does not understand the language of reason, leaves only one solution--the military solution."

The War Against Terrorism

DN-Part 2 of excerpts from Cayle River's book. Rivers demonstrates why security measures at airports are largely insufficient. He also gives nine recommendations on how to behave during a skyjacking.

Terrorism as Viewed by Youths

NYT-Friendly-The Foreign Policy Association, invited NYC high school students to compete for awards by writing essays on international topics. More than one-third of the papers submitted dealt with terrorism. Excerpts of some essays are given.

Letters

DN-6/8-German soldiers during WW II were only too willing to comply with orders. Unfortunately, the German mentality never changes.

Cartoons

DN-Rigby

Austrians dressed as Nazis drop their ballots into boxes with a Nazi salute.

Paid Ads

NYT-Full page ad placed by the American Friends of Lubavitch. Letters from Reagan and a proclamation from Congress are reprinted in honor of Rabbi Schneerson's birthday.

NYT-Small ad placed by the Lubavitch Youth Organization urging parents to bring their children to shul on Shavuot.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי

92

נסס

נסס

נסס

נסס

אל: המשרד, נד: 233, מ: 111
דח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 090686, רח: 0900

סודי / מיד

אל: - מצפ"א, מע"ת

מאת: השגריר / וויטינגטון

פולארד

נפגשתי בארוחת-צהרים אצל ידיד משותף עם ג'יימס רסטון. לדעתו
- כדי לתקן את התדמית שלנו בדעת הקהל רצוי מאד שנתדרך עתונאי
באשר לסיוע הישראלי למודיעין האמריקני. הבהרתי לו שהעניין
איננו בה פשוט כפי שנראה כיוון שכל התייחסות ספציפית מדי
עשויה לפגוע במקורות מודיעין שלנו. הגיב - שניתן למסור פרטים
באופן כללי ביותר - אך לדעתו הפגיעה בתדמיתנו כאן היא כרו -
שאנו חייבים לעשות משהו כדי לתקנה.
מ. רוזן

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, מצפא, שמודק, מעת, רם

Continued From Page A1

Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense.

Four Israelis were named as co-conspirators in the Pollard case — General Sella; Rafael Eitan, a veteran intelligence operative; Joseph Yagur, the science attaché at the Israeli Consulate General in New York, and Irit Erb, a secretary in the Israeli Embassy in Washington. All four are now working in Israel.

Mr. Pollard's wife, Anne Henderson Pollard, pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of unauthorized possession of classified documents.

The Prime Minister's statement was in keeping with a general attitude among Israeli officials that people within the Justice Department and the F.B.I. want to harm Israel's relations with the United States by exaggerating the breadth of the Pollard affair.

"Out to Get Israel"

The Israeli Defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, asserted in a speech Saturday that there were people in the Reagan Administration "who are out to get Israel."

"I don't know what is motivating and impelling certain echelons in the U.S. Administration to go after Israel," Mr. Rabin said, "but taken together the latest events in the United States form a picture which should cause us concern."

The Prime Minister's statement put

it less directly: "U.S.-Israel relations are marked by closeness, and it is inconceivable that attempts to foul the atmosphere between them should succeed."

"In recent weeks we have witnessed a wave of unfounded reports regarding ostensible espionage affairs and Israeli arms deals. The Government of Israel views these reports with concern, and hopes they will not continue."

Mr. Peres was apparently referring to a retired Israeli general who was recently charged by the United States with conspiring to sell \$2 billion in American-made weapons to Iran. Israeli officials have denied that the retired general, Abraham Bar-Am, had links to the Israeli Government.

"During the examination of the Pollard affair, the statement continued, "there was sincere cooperation on the part of the Israel Government. The Government of Israel is committed to the continuation of this cooperation, which is based on the relations of trust that prevail between the two countries."

Intelligence Unit Dismantled

The statement added that Israel had dismantled the intelligence apparatus run through the Scientific Liaison Bureau, "that exceeded its authority, as emerged in the wake of the Pollard affair."

In conclusion, the statement said: "Israel reiterates that no espionage activities are conducted against the

United States on its behalf. The Government of Israel is in close touch with the U.S. Administration in order to bring about the clarification of the various topics that have come up recently."

In Washington today, the State Department issued a response saying, "The United States welcomes and accepts the renewed pledge of the Government of Israel to continue cooperating with United States investigations of the Pollard case." But a spokesman had no comment on the allegation of efforts to harm relations between the two countries.

A spokesman for the Justice Department, John Russell, refused to comment on Mr. Peres's statement.

Concern With News Reports

A senior Israeli cabinet official, briefing reporters after the Cabinet meeting today, said the statement "could be seen as an Israeli appeal for an end to recent reports in the U.S. media concerning the affair, which had an anti-Israel tone."

The official's comment indicated that there still did not seem to be much awareness at the Cabinet level that Israel has a serious credibility problem in Washington, which is rooted not only in reports of the Pollard case but in its own seemingly less than straightforward explanations of the affair.

The belief in official circles in Jerusalem is that some Israeli officials made a mistake, but that Israel apologized and more or less cooperated with an American investigation, so the matter should be dropped. Those within the American Government or news media who seem not to believe certain aspects of the Israeli explanation are seen as being "anti-Israel."

In a long article in today's Haaretz newspaper, Israel's leading military writer, Ze'ev Schiff, argued that Israel's ministers have not come to grips with the implications of the spy scandal.

'Cry Out for an Answer'

"Does everyone in Israel's intelligence community do what it wants and on the political echelon nobody utters a peep from their mouths?" Mr. Schiff asked. "These are the questions that cry out for an answer and a serious internal investigation."

One way to behave, Mr. Schiff added, is to "blame the Americans, who have the nerve to complain that we spied inside their intelligence services and even dare to leak the details of the scandal to the press — while we here at home divert the public's attention with stories about the great bravery and natural honesty of those involved in this affair — as if that was the question we were dealing with."

"The other approach," he added, "is to investigate fundamentally the circumstances of the internal failure and not just issue statements saying that everything is O.K. Some people might try to argue that the Pollard affair is a media event and will soon be forgotten, but that is not the measure for the amount of damage it has done."

XXX

JUST LET ME REMIND YOU
THAT THE U.S. CANNOT
TURN ITS BACK ON
ISRAEL....



...EVEN FOR
A MINUTE...



New York Times

June 8, 1986



9 ביוני, 1986
ביסיון, תשמ"ו

אל: מצפ"א
מאת: קצין הקישור לקונגרס

סיוע חוץ

ידענו אף ידענו שבמוקדם או במאוחר יתחילו להבליט את מימדי הסיוע שמקבל ישראל מתוך הסכום הכולל, והמצטמצם, שעומד לרשות העולם כולו, וכן למתוח ביקורת על כך. לעיונכם, שתי דוגמאות, אחת פומבית והשנייה דיסקרטית יותר:

א. מאמר מערכת שהתפרסם בעיתון וושפוסט ב-31 במאי (ניסיונו - ללא הצלחה - להביא את העתון לתקן את אי-הדיוקים במאמר זה).

ב. מכתב מה-19 במאי לכל חברי וועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בביה"נ מאת קבוצה שמתקראת "פעולה בין הדתות למען צדק כלכלי", המציעה בין היתר כי הקיצוצים הצפויים בסיוע חוץ יחולו על מדינות מזה"ת (קרי ישראל ומצרים, בעיקר) ועל מדינות שיש בהן בסיסים אמריקאיים, ללא יוצאות מן הכלל (כ"חצי נחמה", ראו נא ההסתייגות של איגוד הקהילות העבריות בארה"ב (הרפורמיות) לגבי קיצוצים בסיוע לישראל).

בברכה
יוסף למדן

העחק: לשכת מ/מנכ"ל
לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר
לשכת מנכ"ל בטחון
לשכת רה"מ ✓

השגריר, הציר, ציר כלכלי, קונכ"ל, קצינת קישור לקונגרס - כאן



Interfaith Action for Economic Justice

May 19, 1986

The Honorable <first> <last>
House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
US House of Representatives
<address>
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative <last>:

Consideration of FY 1987 foreign aid appropriations takes place under circumstances entirely different from those at any other time in recent memory. No longer is there any question of aid increases, or even of a freeze. Rather, US government budget decisions make reductions inevitable. The questions are (1) whether reductions will be across-the-board or some programs will be exempted, and (2) how steep the reductions will be in any given program.

It is our understanding that the budget, as approved by the House Budget Committee and affirmed in floor action on May 15, makes likely across-the-board cuts of approximately 20 percent from FY 86 levels in programs under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee. If exceptions are made for high foreign policy priorities, as is anticipated, the percentage reductions in remaining programs could be much steeper, possibly as high as 50 percent.

Unfortunately, the most seriously threatened programs are bilateral and multilateral development and humanitarian assistance programs that serve the needs of the poor in developing countries. These programs have grown only marginally in recent years, while security assistance has doubled. We therefore urge that every effort be made to protect development assistance from reductions that could force crippling cutbacks in international human needs programs.

Specifically, we urge, at a minimum, the following actions:

--No exemptions should be made for countries in the Middle East or for base-related assistance programs. Those programs should take their fair share of an overall reduction.

Members of Interfaith Action for Economic Justice are the mission boards or program units of national religious agencies working together for just and effective US food and agriculture, health and human services, and development and economic policies.

American Baptist Churches, USA
American Lutheran Church
Baptist Joint Committee
on Public Affairs
Bread for the World
Center of Concern
Christian Church (Disciples
of Christ)
Christian Life Commission of
the Southern Baptist Convention
Church of the Brethren
Episcopal Church
Friends Committee on National
Legislation
Jesuit Social Ministries
Lutheran Church in America
Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers
Moravian Church in America
National Council of Churches
of Christ Church World Service
Network
Presbyterian Church (USA)
Progressive National Baptist
Convention
Reformed Church in America
Union of American Hebrew
Congregations
Unitarian Universalist Association
Unitarian Universalist Service
Committee
United Church of Christ
United Methodist Church
World Hunger Education Service

Interfaith Action for Economic Justice, continuing the work of the Interreligious Taskforce on US Food Policy, speaks for itself and not its member agencies.

10 Maryland Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002-5694
02/543-2800

00/424-7292 (legislative
updates)

--If any countries are nevertheless accorded special security assistance treatment, the further reductions that result should be made exclusively in other Economic Support Fund (ESF) and military assistance programs, and not in development assistance.

--Attempts should be made to protect specific development assistance programs that have a particularly good track record and/or a major role in providing development resources to the poorest countries and people, especially in Africa.

We believe the Child Survival Fund, the AID health account, UNICEF, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and its Special Africa Program, and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) have been particularly effective in small-scale efforts to help the very poor.

Similarly, we believe the International Development Association (IDA) and its Special Facility for Africa are crucial to progress in such areas as policy reform and infrastructure rehabilitation, without which small-scale efforts are unlikely to achieve maximum benefit in many countries, especially in Africa.

Thank you for considering our views.

Sincerely,

Arthur B. Keys, Jr.
Executive Director

The Union of American Hebrew Congregations does not concur in any proposal that would reduce levels of assistance to Israel.

31.5.86 Wash. Post

Don't Cut Humanitarian Aid

MANY ASPECTS of foreign aid are controversial, but few Americans, if they stopped to think about it, would cut back on the humanitarian programs that this country has supported for decades. Money for health care, food assistance, child nutrition, family planning, education and refugee assistance, for example, is desperately needed in the Third World and is widely viewed in this country as having a direct impact on individuals and families, rather than on governments. Similarly, the Peace Corps, UNICEF and other organizations dedicated to direct service are popular because they are seen to provide the personal care to the world's poor that Americans want to give, as taxpayers and as private donors too. Ironically, it is just this kind of aid that is threatened in the budget battle going on now.

The president has submitted an international affairs budget request—covering foreign aid and other State Department functions—of \$22.6 bil-

lion. Of this, \$15.4 billion is for foreign aid, but it is heavily weighted on the military and security assistance side. Countries with U.S. bases and those that need military assistance would get \$5.2 billion. Israel and Egypt alone are to receive \$5.3 billion. Every other bilateral aid program and all the humanitarian aid efforts then would divide \$4.9 billion. As things are now going, it appears that after the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings squeeze—a 20 percent cut is expected—most of the security requests will remain untouched and almost all the cuts will hit aid to poor countries and humanitarian assistance. Why should that be?

Security obligations to allies must be sustained. But in an era of unprecedented budget restraint, must they be increased, as the request for Israel and Egypt was? It is painful and unjust for cuts to fall disproportionately on programs that directly help individuals and families in need. There is no good justification for the cuts now contemplated in these services.

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המשרד

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משיחה עם אריק אדלמן (מחמ"ד/ברה"מ)

1. שיחות ח'דאם - ג'לוד במוסקבה. מדיווחי השגרירות האמריקאית במוסקבה ע"פ מקורות ערביים שם עולה; אכן התקיימה פגישה משולשת אחת סובייטית-סורית-לובית כשכל יתר הדיונים התנהלו בצורה בילטרלית. בשיחות הסובייטיות - לוביות היו דווקא "הפיקנטיות" יותר. כזכור היתה זו ברה"מ שהציעה בואו של ג'לוד בחשובה לבקשה לובית לשגר משלחת סובייטית צבאית לטריפולי, בעקבות תקיפת חייה"א האמריקאי. מסתבר עפ"י אותם מקורות שהסובייטים "נזפו" בלובים בנושא הטרור והשתמשו בביטוי ע"פ הדיווחים הנ"ל. Dent Foot Around, המעניין מוסיף אדלמן, שנושא הטרור עד כמה שידוע לא עלה בשיחות עם המשלחת הסורית. אך ייתכן, ממשיך, שהסובייטים בחרו בשיטה של העברת מסרים באמצעות הלובים לסורים, ומכל מקום יש להניח שהללו דיווחו על תוכן השיחה לאחרונים. לא ידוע מי השתתף מהצד הסובייטי בפגישה הנ"ל אך ידוע שנפגשו עם גורבצ'וב, רה"מ ריזקוב, שר ההגנה סוקולוב והרמטכ"ל אכרומייב. בחלק הצבאי שהיווה את עיקר הדיונים עם ג'לוד עלה נושא תפעול טילי הסאם-5 שבידי הלובים. מסתבר שהסובייטים אינם שבעי רצון מצורת תפעולם בעת התקיפה האמריקאית. הדברים נאמרו בהקשר לטענה הלובית על טיב הטילים. הבעיה המרכזית שהסובייטים מאתרים בנוגע להפעלתם בידי הלובים נוגעת לסינכרוניזציה בין מרכיבי מערכת הטילים - המכ"מ יחידת הבקרה ושיגור הטילים. הצוותים המפעילים אותם הם ברמה ירודה ואינם מצליחים להגיע לתאום בין היחידות כך שיפעלו כמערכת אחת שהיא סוד הבטחת יעילותה. המעניין הוא שהסובייטים הציעו שצוותים סורים הבקיאים יותר בהם ישוגרו ללוב להדרכת המקומיים, והם מעדיפים זאת על פני שיגור מומחים סובייטים. יתכן שהרעיון המסתתר מאחורי ההצעה נוגע לחסכון אך אין להוציא מכלל אפשרות שהסובייטים מעונינים להיות מה שפחות מעורבים למקרה של פעולה-נגד נוספת על הטילים בלוב. בשיחות עם הסורים, ח'דאם ושיהאבי עלה הנושא הצבאי גם הוא. אגב, אדלמן מציין התופעה שהסורים שיגרו שני הסינים הבכירים בהנהגה הסורית - ח'דאם ושיהאבי - יתכן ולדבר אין כל משמעות אך התופעה מענינה כשלעצמה. הגורמים האמריקאים לא מעריכים שסוגי הנשק שהוזכרו בתקשורת בהם טוריה מעונינת טילי ס.ס.-23 ומטוסי מיג-29 אכן ישוגרו לזמשק. טילי ס.ס.-23 עדיין אינם קווי יצור מסחרי בברה"מ עצמה וכמובן שטרם סופקו לאף מדינה מברית ורשה. ויקח עוד כ-5-6 שנים עד אשר ייוצרו בכמויות. באשר למיג-29 אין סימנים מידיים לכך אך אדלמן הדגיש שידוע שטייסים סורים נמצאים בהשתלמות בברה"מ. בחלק המדיני של השיחות לא הסתמנו תכנים חדשים פרט לחזרה על קווים משותפים

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בנושא התמיכה בסוריה, התהליך המדיני (ועידה בינ"ל) וכד'. אגב כך מציין שהידיעות שהופצו במפרץ (כווית) ושכביכול באו ממקורות סובייטיים על כך שברה"מ הזהירה את ארה"ב וישראל שברה"מ תגיב נגדן במידה ויפעלו נגד סוריה הם דיסאינפורמציה סובייטית ברורה כשנוח לה שהדבר יופץ כבעבר ע"י גורמים מפרציים. לארה"ב לא נמסרה "הזהרה" כזו ובמגעים הסובייטיים - אמריקאים סביב הנושא הסורי הדבר כלל לא עלה. המעניין, מציין אדלמן, שערפאת "הפס טרמפ" על הידיעות ומתגדר בהבטחה סובייטית לפעול. בסה"כ אדלמן עפ"י הדיווחים על הביקור במוסקבה שהיתה זו הפגנת תמיכה סובייטית בבני בריתה הנ"ל במזה"ת כשכולם מופיעים ב"תמונה חמשפחית" אך ללא ווכן חדש במיוחד, בודאי לא מויני ואולי "משהו" בתחום הצבאי.

2. בתחום מדיניות החוץ הסובייטית נמשכת ההערכות לאור השינויים לא מכבר בסגל החדש. ב-29/5 נערך כנס רב משתתפים במזה"ח הסובייטי בו נטלו חלק גורבצ'וב, שברנדזה, דוברינין ואנשי הועד המרכזי. אין פרטים על תוכן הדיונים אך מהידוע שגורבצ'וב חזר על תוכן נאומו בוועידת המפלגה כשהדגש הושם על מקומה של המפלגה ביישום המדיניות. אדלמן, מעריך שהדבר תואם את המגמה המסתמנת לא מכבר של הגדלת חלקם של חברי הועד המרכזי ובעיקר המח' הבינ"ל בכך. לא הועלו תכנים חדשים ונראה שהכנס נסב בעיקר סביב השינויים הפרטונלים שנערכו במערך החוץ הסובייטי. בהקשר זה סיפר שבפגישה שהיתה לו לא מכבר עם דינקובסקי היועץ בשגרירות הסובייטית. הלה סיפר שפוליאקוב יחמנה לסגן שה"ח (דיוקווחקי ירוע ככח חסותו) במסגרת הריאורגניזציה הנמשכת. הכוונה היא ליצור מח' ערבית נפרדת לצפון אפריקה במקום זו שהיתה עד עתה ושכללה את האיזור מהמפרץ להרי האטלס כאשר פוליאקוב יקבל גם ניהולה של המח' החדשה. במסגרת האינפלציה של הסגנים במשה"ח כשורובצ'וב הבכיר ביניהם, התמנו מספר אישים נוספים. פטרובסקי סגן שה"ח ואחראי לארגונים בינ"ל, אדמישין סגן שה"ח לעניני מערב אירופה, בוריס צ'פלין השגריר בהאנוי סגן שה"ח לעניני אסיה (לא ידוע כיצד זה משפיע על מעמדו של קפיציה האחראי עדין על איזור זה).

3. באשר לדיבורים על הקמת מסגרת של מועצה לבטחון לאומי, (תדרך ממ"ד בנדון) שתרכז את כל המוסדות המטפלים בנושא בטחון וחוץ, מועלה לתפקיד שמו של צירנייב עוזרו של גורבצ'וב שהחליף את אלכסנדר ארזנטוב. אדלמן מעריך שיהיה זה דוברינין שימש בתפקיד לכשיוחלט על ארגון המוסדות תחת חסות זו. מסתבר שדוברינין הופך יותר ויותר אישיות מרכזית בהיררכיה הסובייטית מעבר לתפקידו כמומחה לארה"ב. לא נפקד מכל מפגש או כינוס העוסק בהתוויית מדיניות החוץ הסובייטית כולל כלפי העולם השלישי. העוצמה שצובר בידיו חורגת כאמור ממכלול היחסים הבינמצמתיים.

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4. אדלמן נפגש עם חלק מחברי המשלחת הסובייטית שבקרה לאחרונה בארה"ב במסגרת חילופי משלחות (IREX) (רי דיווח קודם) בפגישה עם צויגלבסקיה האחראית על הנושא הישראלי (סנערכה בביתה של יהודית קיפר) הסתבר שהיא מצויה היטב בנעשה בישראל. היא אמנם חזרה על הקו הסובייטי הרשמי כלפי ישראל אך יחד עם זאת הודתה שישראל מנהלת מדיניות חוץ עצמאית משלה בניגוד להתייחסות הסובייטית הרשמית המאזכרת אותה וארה"ב בנסימה אחת. בפגישה עם גאומקין המומחה לרד"ת סיפר הלה שהגיע לשם כמה ימים אחרי המרד נגד עלי נאצר. סיפר שההרס כתוצאה מכך לא היה חמור במיוחד ונקב בסכום של כ-250 מ' דולר אך התרשם מאכזריותו ובעיקר מהאבדות הרבות, למעלה מעשרת אלפים הרוגים. הדגיש שלא יהיה ^{ס"ס} בין המשטר החדש ועלי נאצר, אולי עם תומכיו. לא צופה שינוי במדיניות החוץ של רד"ת מאחר והסכסוך אמנם אידיאולוגי אך נוגע לענייני פנים - איך ליישם את הסוציאליזם, וכן על רקע של יריבויות בין שבטיות. הסובייטים לא הופתעו מעצם המאבק הפנימי אלא משפיכות הדמים הרבה והאכזריות הבלתי רגילה בה התנהל המרד. פגישה אחרת עם גנקובסקי המזמחה לאפגניסטאן הוצדה ע"י אדלמן כ-GLOOMY. הסובייטי הדגיש שהפתרון הטוב ביותר לבעיה הוא שברה"מ תוציא כוחותיה ושארה"ב ופקיסטאן יניחו ידיהם מאפגניסטאן כך שהאפגאנים יפתרו את בעיתם בדרכם, אך הוא אינו מאמין שהדבר ריאלי. סיפר שלפני פרוץ המלחמה שם חשבו על פתרון לאפגניסטאן ע"פ המודל של פינלנד, אך הרעיון נגנז ועתה מדובר על פתרון נוסח מונגוליה - דהיינו הבטחת האינטרסים הסובייטים באמצעות נוכחות צבאית מוגברת (במונגוליה חונים למעלה ממאה אלף חיילים סובייטים) סיפר שהצבא האפגאני השתפר לאין ערוך ומונה כ-80-90 אלף חייל בניגוד למספרים שמקובלים במערב - כ-50 אלף אנשים. חזר והדגיש בנוסח "עליכם ללמוד אותנו, היטב והנכם טועים שנצא (מאפגניסטאן), ראו מה קרה לכם בבירות (נחתים) אצלנו הנפגעים לא משחקים תפקיד ובסובייט העליון (פרלמנט) לא שואלים שאלות ולא מחקיימים "הירינגס". לא נצא מאפגניסטאן". אדלמן התרשם שהמסר שבפיו שאין לבנוח במערב על כך שברה"מ נתונה במצוקה שם ושכביכול עומדת בפני מפלה שם שתאלץ אותה לקבל פתרון בלתי קביל עליה.

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אלי אבידן

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פרשת פולארד

להלן מבחר קטעי עתונות מהיום (9.6.86)

עתונות

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סגירות ישראל - וויינגטון

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THE WASHINGTON POST

WORLD NEWS

Israeli Spy Units Get Unwan Cabinet Denies Suggestions That Pollard Operation Was W

By William Claiborne
 Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, June 8—Israel today strongly denied as "unfounded" suggestions by U.S. officials that the Israeli-run Jonathan Jay Pollard espionage operation was much more extensive than Washington has been told by Israel.

The sharply worded Cabinet statement came after a turbulent two weeks of disclosures and allegations that have brought an unwanted glare of publicity to Israel's intelligence organizations, long-respected by many as among the world's most efficient, and acute embarrassment to the fractious "national unity" coalition government.

Today's statement was the strongest the government has issued since Pollard pleaded guilty last week. At that time, the names of alleged Israeli coconspirators were disclosed, along with details that suggested an Israeli espionage operation in the United States far more extensive than the unauthorized "renegade" operation that Israel said had operated without the knowledge of officials at the political level here.

The Cabinet of Prime Minister Shimon Peres said in a statement released after its regular weekly meeting today that the Israeli government had "provided full cooperation regarding the Pollard case and remains in close contact with Washington in order to clarify the issues which were raised lately."

The statement pledged "a continuation of the cooperation" but added that Israel "is concerned" about allegations by some U.S. officials "and hopes they will not continue."

The Cabinet was referring to suggestions by some U.S. Justice Department officials that Israel withheld information from a State Department and Justice Department team that came here last year to interview Israeli officials about the case against Pollard, a former U.S. Navy civilian intelligence analyst who last week pleaded guilty in a U.S. District Court to conspiring to pass U.S. military secrets to Israel.

"The relations between the United States and Israel are very close, and it is inconceivable that attempts to disrupt these relations will succeed," the Cabinet said, repeating its assertion that the spy unit that handled Pollard "exceeded its authority" and had been dismantled and that no espionage activities are now being conducted against the United States.

Since late last month, Israel's domestic and foreign intelligence wings have both been shaken by unaccustomed controversy. Abroad it was fresh disclosures about the extent of the spy network for which Pollard worked; at home it was allegations that Israel's highest-ranking domestic intelligence official participated in the fatal beating of two handcuffed Arab prisoners captured after a

1984 bus hijacking and then covered up the incident.

The principal Israeli figures involved in the two cases—Rafael (Rafi) Eitan, former chief of operations of the external intelligence service, the Mossad, and Avraham Shalom, chief of the domestic intelligence service, the Shin Bet—were both members of a team that in 1960 snatched Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann off a street in Buenos Aires and brought him secretly to Israel, where he was tried and hanged.

But in terms of the government's and society's reactions to the two current scandals, the similarity ends there.

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In the case of Shalom, the nation is still engaged in a wrenching, introspective national debate about the conflict between the fundamental principle of the rule of law and what Israel sees as its unique security problems.

In the case of Eitan, who headed the Washington spy ring that recruited Pollard, the reaction here has been a curious mixture of muted ambivalence and stiff-necked defensiveness.

While Shalom has been condemned by some politicians and the press for his alleged cover-up—and ordered by Israel's attorney general to endure a humiliating police investigation—Eitan has been handed a comfortable new posting as chairman of a huge state-owned chemical conglomerate.

His principal "handler" of Pollard, according to the U.S. indictment, then-Lt. Col. Aviam Sella, who ostensibly was doing graduate studies at New York University, was promoted to brigadier general in the Air Force upon his hurried return to Israel and given command of the country's biggest air base.

Informed Israeli sources said that the other unindicted coconspirators in the Pollard case—Science Attache Yosef Yagur and embassy secretary Irit Erb—have been given attractive new assignments in the Foreign Service.

Even though the Peres government continues to insist that Eitan was running a renegade spy operation unknown to his superiors in Jerusalem, the former Mossad agent has not been condemned publicly by the government or parliament—or much of the public—for establishing a spy network that stole top secret military documents from a close ally and patron nation.

The fact that Eitan has not been publicly chastised but rather has been rewarded with a prestigious executive position prompted the military affairs commentator for Haaretz newspaper, Zeev Schiff, to ask in a commentary published today whether the Pollard ring actually was "renegade."

One senior Israeli official said privately, "The only crime Eitan committed was getting caught."

Some Israeli officials, speaking on the condition that they not be identified, have bitterly condemned the U.S. Justice Department for what they term an anti-Israeli campaign of leaks of

embarrassing details of Eitan's espionage network. These complaints have generally been coupled with charges that the American press has been "blowing out of proportion" a case that these officials view as essentially closed.

One senior official, pressed on the question of whether the \$300,000 Pollard allegedly was promised over a 10-year period by his Israeli control agents did not suggest something wider than a small "renegade" spying operation, appeared annoyed when he retorted: "Thirty thousand a year is peanuts."

Acceptance of Eitan's espionage ring as almost inconsequential—except for the embarrassment it caused—is not confined to government.

Israel's normally free-wheeling press, including opposition papers that rarely fail to turn a scandal into a political cause, have limited their coverage of the new Pollard disclosures mostly to playbacks of what the American press has uncovered about the extent of the Eitan spy ring.

With one or two exceptions, none of the usually strident Hebrew newspapers has carried a locally written story that attempted to answer such questions as how extensive Israel's espionage activity in Washington was, or whether Peres and his Cabinet knew about it, or who was the unnamed Israeli diplomat in whose suburban Maryland house Pollard held clandestine meetings, or whether Sella's military superiors knew about his role in the spying operation.

When questioned about this unusual absence of aggressive reporting, several Israeli journalists at first cited censorship. Israeli military censorship requires that all locally written stories dealing even peripherally with national security matters be submitted for review by the censors, who routinely excise sensitive material.

But when reminded about the traditional censorship dodge of leaking restricted material to foreign journalists, waiting for its publication abroad and then reprinting it here on the basis that it has already been made public, the Israeli journalists conceded that the government's blackout on any substantive disclosures on the Eitan espionage ring has had an inhibiting effect on their treatment of the story.

Mirroring the government's ambivalence on the seriousness of the case, the journalists also characterized the new Pollard disclosures as an "internal affair" between the U.S. Justice and State departments.

There is also a widely held belief here that Pollard was mostly supplying Israel with documents concerning the activities of its Arab enemies. "We were getting information about our enemies that the Americans should have been giving to us anyway. Is that the same as stealing state secrets that could harm the United States' security?" one Israeli official asked.

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Assails Those Who 'Foul the Atmosphere' — Reiterates Promise of Assistance

JERUSALEM, June 8 — Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel today denounced attempts to "foul the atmosphere" between Israel and the United States with suggestions that Israeli spying in America was far more extensive than Israel has said it was.

Mr. Peres's statement was his first public comment on the espionage issues since Jonathan Jay Pollard, a former American Navy analyst, pleaded guilty on Wednesday to conspiring with Israeli agents to steal secret Government documents.

The Prime Minister reiterated his country's readiness to cooperate with the United States to investigate the affair. He did not say who was trying to foul the atmosphere with false reports but said "the Government of Israel views these reports with concern and hopes they will not continue."

Comments by F.B.I. Director

His remarks followed a comment in Washington last week by William M. Webster, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that Israel had given only "selective cooperation" in the investigation of Mr. Pollard, and reports by senior Administration officials that Mr. Pollard had begun providing information about a number of Israeli espionage operations in the United States.

Mr. Peres's statement, issued with the approval of the full Cabinet, provided no new evidence to back up assertions by the Israeli Government that spying by Mr. Pollard, on behalf of Israeli agents, was a "rogue" operation, undertaken by a small scientific intelligence-gathering unit without the knowledge of Israeli politicians.

No Details on Pollard General
Now it is explained how a senior Air Force commander, Brig. Gen. Avdon Sella, could have been intimately involved in the Pollard affair while on a "study leave" in the United States, without the knowledge of his superiors — the head of the Air Force, the

Continued on Page A15, Column 2
Continued From Page A1

Chief of Staff and the Minister of De-
fense

Four Israelis were named as co-conspirators in the Pollard case — General Sella; Rafael Eitan, a veteran intelligence operative; Joseph Yagur, the science attaché at the Israeli Consulate General in New York, and Irit Erb, a secretary in the Israeli Embassy in Washington. All four are now working in Israel.

Mr. Pollard's wife, Anne Henderson Pollard, pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of unauthorized possession of classified documents.

The Prime Minister's statement was in keeping with a general attitude among Israeli officials that elements within the Justice Department and F.B.I. want to harm Israel's relations with the United States by exaggerating the breadth of the Pollard affair.

Don't Get Jaded

The Israeli Defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, asserted in a speech Saturday that there were elements in the PLO Administration "who are out to destroy Israel."

"I don't know what is motivating and compelling certain echelons in the U.S. Administration to go after Israel," Mr. Rabin said, "but taken together the latest events in the United States form a picture which should cause us concern."

The Prime Minister's statement put it less directly: "U.S.-Israel relations are marked by closeness, and it is inconceivable that attempts to foul the atmosphere between them should succeed."

"In recent weeks we have witnessed a wave of unfounded reports regarding ostensible espionage affairs and Israeli arms deals. The Government of Israel views these reports with concern, and hopes they will not continue."

Mr. Perca was apparently referring to a retired Israeli general who was recently charged by the United States with conspiring to sell \$2 billion in American-made weapons to Iran. Israeli officials have decided that the retired general, Abraham Bar-Am, had any links with the Israeli Government.

"During the examination of the Pollard affair, the statement continued, 'there was sincere cooperation on the part of the Israel Government. The Government of Israel is committed to the continuation of this cooperation, which is based on the relations of trust that prevail between the two countries.'"

Intelligence Unit Dismantled

The statement added that Israel had dismantled the intelligence apparatus run through the Scientific Liaison Bureau, "that exceeded its authority, as emerged in the wake of the Pollard affair."

In conclusion, the statement said: "Israel reiterates that no espionage activities are conducted against the

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United States on its behalf. The Government of Israel is in close touch with the U.S. Administration in order to bring about the clarification of the various topics that have come up recently."

In Washington today, the State Department issued a response saying, "The United States welcomes and accepts the renewed pledge of the Government of Israel to continue cooperating with United States investigations of the Pollard case." But a spokesman had no comment on the allegation of efforts to harm relations between the two countries.

A spokesman for the Justice Department, John Russell, refused to comment on Mr. Peres's statement.

Concern With News Reports

A senior Israeli cabinet official, briefing reporters after the Cabinet meeting today, said the statement "could be seen as an Israeli appeal for an end to recent reports in the U.S. media concerning the affair, which had an anti-Israeli tone."

The official's comment indicated that there still did not seem to be much awareness at the Cabinet level that Israel has a serious credibility problem in Washington, which is rooted not only in reports of the Pollard case but in its own seemingly less than straightforward explanations of the spy affair.

The belief in official circles in Jerusalem is that some Israeli officials made a mistake, but that Israel apologized and more or less cooperated with an American investigation, so now the matter should be dropped. Those elements within the American Government or news media who seem not to believe certain aspects of the Israeli explanation are seen as being "anti-Israeli."

In a long article in today's Haaretz newspaper, Israel's leading military writer, Ze'ev Schiff, argued that Israel's ministers simply have not come to grips with the implications of the spy scandal.

'Cry Out for an Answer'

"Does everyone in Israel's intelligence community do what it wants and on the political echelon nobody utters a peep from their mouths?" Mr. Schiff asked. "These are the questions that cry out for an answer and a serious internal investigation."

One way to behave, Mr. Schiff added, is to "blame the Americans, who have the nerve to complain that we spied inside their intelligence services and even dare to leak the details of the scandal to the press — while we here at home divert the public's attention with stories about the great bravery and natural honesty of those involved in this affair — as if that was the question we were dealing with."

"The other approach," he added, "is to investigate fundamentally the circumstances of the internal failure and not just issue statements saying that everything is O.K. Some people might try to argue that the Pollard affair is a media event and will soon be forgotten, but that is not the measure for the amount of damage it has done."

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Peres angry at U.S. for Pollard case

Leader says officials tried to 'foul' air

From Wire Reports

JERUSALEM — Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel, speaking out yesterday for the first time on a former U.S. Navy analyst's admission that he spied for Israel, denounced those in Washington who, he said, were trying to "foul the atmosphere" between Israel and the United States by circulating stories suggesting that Israeli spying in America was far more extensive than Israel has said.

Mr. Peres also reiterated Israel's readiness to cooperate with the United States in continuing to investigate the affair.

The statement followed recent reports in the U.S. media that an Israeli spy ring involving Navy intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard was much larger than Israel had previously acknowledged, and that the ring was run by Brig. Gen. Aviem Sella, a member of the Israeli air force reserves.

Pollard pleaded guilty Wednesday in Washington to conspiring with Israeli agents to steal secret government documents. His wife, Anne Henderson Pollard, pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of unauthorized possession of classified documents.

Four Israelis were named as co-conspirators — General Sella; Rafael Eitan, a veteran intelligence operative; Joseph Yagur, the science attaché at the Israeli Consulate in New York; and Irit Erb, a secretary in the Israeli Embassy in Washington. All four are now working in Israel.

Israel has denied that Pollard was a spy but said that he was a small and unimportant figure in the Israeli spy ring. The United States, however, has cooperated with a full-scale investigation by the CIA, FBI, Justice Department and State Department that was completed last December.

Mr. Peres' statement, which was issued with the approval of the full Cabinet, provided no new evidence to back up assertions by the Israeli government that Pollard's spying on behalf of Israeli agents was a "major" operation, undertaken by a small scientific intelligence-gathering unit without the knowledge of Israeli politicians.

In particular, the statement failed to explain how General Sella could have been intimately involved in the Pollard affair while on a "study leave" in the United States, without the knowledge of his superiors — the head of the air force, the chief of staff and the minister of defense.

In Washington, the State Department issued a response saying, "The United States welcomes and accepts the renewed pledge of the government of Israel to continue cooperating with United States investigations of the Pollard case." But a spokesman had no comment on the allegation of efforts to harm relations between the two countries.

Mr. Peres' statement was in keeping with a general attitude among Israeli officials that elements within the Justice Department and FBI want to harm Israel's relations with the United States by exaggerating the breadth of the Pollard affair.

The Israeli defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, reacted in a speech Saturday that there were elements in the Reagan administration "who are out to get Israel."

"I don't know what is motivating and impelling certain echelons in the U.S. administration to go after Israel," Mr. Rabin said, "but taken together, the latest events in the United States form a picture which should cause us concern."

The prime minister's statement put it less directly: "U.S.-Israel relations are marked by closeness, and it is inconceivable that attempts to foul the atmosphere between them should succeed. In recent weeks we have witnessed a wave of unfounded reports regarding ostensible espionage affairs and Israeli arms deals. The government of Israel views these reports with concern, and hopes they will not continue."

Meanwhile, Vice President George Bush warned in an interview published yesterday in the Hebrew-language daily Yediot Ahronot that Israel's image in the United States might be damaged.

He was quoted as saying the Pollard affair had already had "certain negative consequences on the relations between the United States and Israel."

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WHITE HOUSE BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN

MONDAY, JUNE 9, 1986

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The President and the King just concluded an hour-long session. This was the first time they've been able to get together since the King was here September last year, after his address to the U.N. General Assembly.

As you know, the King and Queen Noor are here on an unofficial visit to attend the high school graduation -- one last Friday, one last Sunday -- of two of the King's daughters. The King has come as an old and a valued friend of the United States. We're delighted that he was able to take time from a very busy personal schedule to visit Washington. It's a pleasure to welcome him here.

The King and the Queen will be the guests of the Vice President and Mrs. Bush at lunch today. After that, there will be -- the King will be meeting with Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger and other senior officials.

In the nine months since he was here last, we've seen many changes in the Middle East. On the central concern to all of us, a just, a lasting peace for the region, our hopes of 1985 for progress through the Jordanian/PLD dialogue were not realized, that effort founded on the PLD leadership's inability to meet the King's challenges and how to move forward for the sake of peace, and the interests of the Palestinian people which they claim to represent. And while that particular road now seems closed, we in Jordan remain committed to the continuing search for peace in the region.

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Throughout these difficult months, our very longstanding ties and our concern for the security and the prosperity for Jordan have not waivered, nor will it. We remain as convinced as ever we were that Jordan is a trusted friend and the President has just reaffirmed to the King that trust and that friendship in their meeting.

I don't want to get too deeply into the specifics of the discussion, but to give you some sense of where things stand, as I've said, the President reaffirmed to the King the continued concern of the United States for the security and the prosperity of Jordan. He also confirmed to the King that his Middle East peace initiative of September 1st, 1982,

which was accepted by the government of Jordan, and the positions he set forth at that time remain the basis of our policy towards peace in the region. We expressed our appreciation for Jordan's principled stand against the menace of international terrorism. And anyone who has followed events in the region, in particular Jordan's own sacrifices at the hands of terrorism, knows the courage demanded by the King's stand. We have noted with interest Jordan's growing importance as a moderate Arab state, able to act effectively at the center of regional politics. In an area where many shrill voices urge extremism, the value of Jordan's calm and balanced views becomes even more significant.

Well, in terms of the way the actual discussions went, I might just say, before taking your questions, that the King opened with expression of strong appreciation for the President's efforts on behalf of peace in the region; emphasized that he felt the United States was the key to any peace, any progress towards peace; that the President's initiative of September first, and the subsequent decisions taken at the Arab Summit of Fez, 1982, had been the inspiration and the basis for his own moves. He is concerned at the lack of activity to date, in the recent months, and that the momentum of the peace process is not -- has not been maintained. But let me try to answer your questions now.

Q Is there any discussion of the Jordanian arms package which has been withdrawn?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, there was nothing specific discussed of a military nature.

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into specifics at this point in time. We've had a number of positions out there since '82. A number have developed in the course of the discussion of '85 to the impasse, the breakdown in February, and we're looking at what remains valid and possible to move ahead with.

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Q (Off-mike)--hearing his ideas, does the administration have any sense that there's life left in the peace process?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We agreed with the King that this quoting his own words that the Middle East is an area of vital interest to all of us, and where one must not give up however difficult the moment appears.

Q Could you tell us--does the King think that he can go alone with PLO representation or with out--and is the February accord (inaudible) completely now?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There was no--the King had never felt he could go alone. The question of Palestinian representation has always been fundamental to the King's--in the King's efforts to get to the peace table--how will the Palestinians be represented. You remember we wrestled throughout '85 with that issue along with the construct of an international conference. And these are questions which we're still pursuing.

Q How about the February accords? Did he say it is dead now?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, he did not say that. He did not--I'm not going to get into the details other than to tell you he didn't say that.

Q Can you tell us--

Q Does the President not hold out any hope at all for resubmitting the arms package to Congress?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I said nothing specific was discussed on arms, but our position on the package remains what it was, that we're committed to notifying Congress prior to proceeding further with any sale of the items which were included in that package.

Q You said no arms package discussion occurred.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I said no specifics--I think, if I can quote myself against myself--

Q (Off-mike)--in overall terms?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: In overall terms.

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, all of the countries that would be involved were touched on, but I'm not going beyond that. Yes?

Q The first question is did they meet alone, head on head, and for how much -

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: They were alone for between 15 to 20 minutes, just the two -- I'm sorry, with the Vice President.

Q Did the King carry any message from President Assad to President Reagan?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of any such message.

Q Is there any -- did the King broach the subject of his efforts to (inaudible) between Syria and Iraq?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That wasn't discussed in detail in this meeting. As you know, it's been said that next Friday -- Friday the 13th, one of the more auspicious dates in the calendar -- the foreign ministers of Syria and Iraq will meet. And that was presumed to be an opening for if things go well at that level -- for a summit meeting, whether at the summit, or an Iraqi/Syrian summit -- that wasn't clear.

Q Was there any feel that this is a positive step (inaudible) that Hussein felt (inaudible)?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well Jordan very much hopes so because of the Syrian relationship with Iran that Syria could play a positive role in containing -- helping contain the war in the Gulf and helping them bring it to an end, namely by obviously getting peace talks started, with Iran has rejected consistently these last six years.

Q Is the idea of the joint meeting -- Jordanian/Palestinian delegation -- be meeting with you in the future (inaudible) still viable?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into any of the specifics on this. We discussed the sweep of discussions of 1985 and both regretted that they didn't lead to the table by the end of '85 as we had hoped, and as was some possibility of their doing in the course of that year. But I don't want to get caught on any one aspect.

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Q -- any discussion of (inaudible) the PLD presented to King Hussein last week with the President today, or --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There was no discussion today of that, no.

Q I just wanted to ask if I understood you correctly -- did the King, in fact, present a new idea, new proposal, new things about peace? Is it different from the (inaudible) and can you tell us if he had discussed if the answer is yes -- if he had discussed those with any other heads of state or presidents?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: This was all-in-all, in the Cabinet Room, only about 45 minutes of discussion. The King did outline in general terms what he saw as the state of play in the area, in the region, and this was the first of several meetings, of course, that he'll be having with our government -- starting with the President. He'll be meeting again this afternoon with the Secretary -- Secretary Weinberger. He'll have further sessions. So we expect to have ample opportunity to really get a good grip on his overall thinking. But just on the basis of this preview, I would hesitate to go any further.

Q Did he bring up the issue of Peres' plan of -- the (inaudible) plan for the Middle East at all in this discussion?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The King spoke -- did speak on economic issues, in terms of the increasing distress that all of the countries in the area are finding themselves. As there was no specific discussion on arms, there was no specific discussion of economic assistance, but he was drawing attention to the point that declining oil revenues and the return of workers from the Gulf area was creating difficulties for all of the governments.

Q The exception in the Peres plan that cooperative economic development among the modern Arab states and Israel together is a pathway to peace as a conception -- is that something which --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It wasn't, but it's very much on our minds and I'm sure that will be a topic that we'll be pursuing with the party during their stay in Washington.

Q (Off-mike)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There was no such presentation.

Q Does the United States have any plan to break the impasse (inaudible)?

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think we share very much the King's appreciation that we've got a major role to play; that if there is a drift without an overall peace process, that drift is in the negative direction, it's in the direction of war. I don't think there's any misunderstandings.

Q Did he say that?

Q What is the answer to -- (inaudible)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We've been -- these last months, since the break-down of the talks in February, we've been keeping very close touch with the King, with Israeli leadership, Egyptian leadership, and collecting ideas from them, looking at what we think can be done. But we're not laying any plan on them at this moment in time, no. But as far as the President reconfirmed, the positions we will take into the negotiations, if we can ever get those negotiations going, are those which he outlined on September first.

Q I'm just a little bit confused. Did you not --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I find that very hard to believe.
(Laughter)

Q Did you not, just a few moments ago, say that there were a number of suggestions made by the King on getting the peace process moving again, and just -- (inaudible) -- simply saying what the specifics were?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That's right, yes. As I say, we've been spending the last several months talking with him and we were hearing some things today, recommendations how things might move forward, but they're specifics that I just can't get into at this point in time. But we've been talking with the King, with the Israelis, with the Egyptians, all the parties.

Q You don't have any specifics on suggestions to make in response to the King?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, we did not.

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Q (off-mike) -- King Hussein over the rapprochement -- the positive (inaudible) in the rapprochement between Syria and Iraq?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think it's appropriate for me to get into discussing his views of rapprochement between two other Arab countries. Obviously, he's been concerned, going himself to Damascus, sending his prime minister to meet with Iraqi and Syrian leaderships quite intensively over the past five, six weeks. He thinks that -- obviously, that that will be a contribution to the overall process. But the King remains, as I said -- to the extent that that relationship makes a contribution to dropping tensions in the area, we support it.

MODERATOR: Okay, this is the last question.

Q Was there any discussion about the fate of the future of the hostages who have been held in the region?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There was not in this meeting.

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תדורך דובר מחמ"ד ליום

Q What comment do you have on the election of Kurt Waldheim as president of Austria? Or related matters such as the inquiry on whether he should be on a watch list here and the resignation of the Chancellor of--

MR. KALB: It is my understanding is that that question was addressed at the White House. I have nothing to say beyond what the White House has said. On the specific question that you've asked about Waldheim and the lists are two that you referred to, as you know that matter is under investigation and it is still, to repeat, under investigation. Other than that I have nothing to say.

Q What about the resignation of the Chancellor?

MR. KALB: I don't have anything to say about that.

Q The Chancellor was coming here later this month. Is that--is that invitation switched to his successor?

MR. KALB: I saw a blip on that on the wires just prior to coming out here a little earlier this morning, but I have nothing by way of any comment or observation to make about that.

Q Bernie, is the United States at this state satisfied with the cooperation that it has so far gotten from Israel on the Pollard case?

MR. KALB: Let me--one second, please. The United States is deeply concerned about the Pollard case as we are about any acts of espionage. We have made our concern known to the governments--I beg your pardon--we have made our concern known to the government of Israel and it is aware of this. The government of Israel issued a statement on June 8th, that is to say yesterday, stating that no espionage activities are being carried out against the US on Israel's behalf, and committing itself to continued cooperation.

The United States welcomes and accepts this statement and Israel's renewed pledge of cooperation with the investigation of the remaining issues in the Pollard case. We expect such cooperation in view of the close relations between our two countries and we look forward to receiving this until the case is closed.

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The US has no evidence of any espionage ring involving Israeli officials other than the ones described in the indictment of the Pollards. We also wish to note that the indictment and successful prosecution was made possible through the cooperation of the government of Israel.

Q Copy?

MR. KALB: Copy? Yes.

Q What further cooperation is the United States planning to ask for?

MR. KALB: I'm not in a position to be specific about those things. I guess I would have to refer you, Don, to the Department of Justice.

Q Well, if you have no evidence of any further espionage ring, what is the point of asking for the further cooperation?

MR. KALB: Well, I think I'll have to repeat what I just said. Last week the prosecutor talked about the investigation continuing and for any specifics I suspect that the only thing I can do not obviously to engage in speculation, et cetera, is to refer you, indeed, to the prosecutor for any additional information.

Q You say you have no evidence. Obviously they're investigating something. What it is it that they're investigating if you don't--what's your definition of evidence?

MR. KALB: I'm going to have to stick with this, Don. And again, to offer you the address of the Department of Justice for whatever additional information may be forthcoming. I do not have it. Ralph.

Q Bernie, just a clarification on some of the language you used there, you said that there is no evidence of others other than those in the indictment. Are you referring to those who were not--

What do you make of those who were not indicted, but were mentioned as unindicted co-conspirators? Does that include -- are you including those in this description?

MR. KALB: I am saying here, and I'll read the statement that triggered a question or two by Don -- "The United States has no evidence of any espionage ring involving Israeli officials other than the ones described in the indictment of the Pollards."

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MR. KALB: That is exactly as it is put here, and I will not be in a position to amplify or speculate about what is said here. You're talking about the four unindicted co-conspirators.

Q That's right. Who were mentioned by the United States government at the time, but were not indicted and --

MR. KALB: "No evidence of any espionage ring involving Israeli officials other than the ones described in the indictment." It seems to me that's quite clear.

Q Bernie, you say that the United States accepts the Israeli explanation, or statement that they're not conducting espionage activities against the United States. But at the time of the Pollard operation, there was a similar statement in force, which the Israeli ~~government either violated or didn't know anything about. How can we~~ accept a statement when the evidence indicates that they either violate such statements or they don't know about the operations as they're going on?

MR. KALB: The Israeli government issued a statement yesterday, and what I am offering you today is the United States reaction to what Israel had said yesterday. The Israeli statement said, "No espionage activities are being carried out against the U.S. on Israel's behalf." It said that it was committing itself to continued cooperation. What the U.S. is saying today is that the United States welcomes and accepts this statement. The statement goes on to say, "and Israel's renewed pledge of cooperation with the investigation of the remaining issues in the Pollard case," et cetera, referring to what I had read earlier before.

Q Can you tell us what those remaining issues are, please?

MR. KALB: Nope, I can't. That takes you back to questions such as what is the ongoing investigation focusing on. And I'm not in a position to offer anything other than the address of the Department of Justice.

Q Can you answer the question of whether you're -- the Administration is satisfied with Israeli cooperation to date?

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MR. KALB: I'm talking about --

Q (off-mike)

MR. KALB: Well, I'm saying that we expect such cooperation.

Q But have you gotten it, though?

MR. KALB: What I will say on that is I think variations you've heard before. That the Israeli government has pledged to take appropriate action to ensure that such actions do not recur, and we expect it to stand by its undertaking. What we have said in the past is that we would expect the cooperation, and what I have set forth today is the U.S. position, in fact as of today.

Q So you're not -- you are declining to answer the question --

MR. KALB: No, I think --

Q -- are you satisfied with Israeli cooperation so far?

MR. KALB: I have also said we wish to note that the indictment and successful prosecution was made possible through the cooperation of the government of Israel.

Q In what way, Bernie? What did the government of Israel provide that the Justice Department didn't know before, that made the prosecution possible?

MR. KALB: You're inviting me to embark into an area that I cannot help you. But let me just emphasize this point, in a response to Matt's question and some others here: Israel has cooperated in accordance with the terms of its arrangement with the Department of Justice.

Q On that point, the director of the FBI, Judge Webster, says their cooperation has been rather limited. Do you have any indication that their cooperation is going to be less limited now that they've made this renewed pledge that you speak of?

MR. KALB: The U.S. position, as I have just set it forth, reflects the view of all elements of the administration. We have said we welcome and accept the government of Israel's renewed pledge of full cooperation. Quotes from unidentified sources are entitled to no weight, and these and other uninformed statements do not represent the administration's views.

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Q Are you talking about Judge Webster?

MR. KALB: I am talking -- I am not going to address this last quotation in any specific way. I will just have to let it stand as I have offered it here to you.

Q This statement was on the record, so --

MR. KALB: Well so is mine.

Q No, no, but you just referred to unidentified --

MR. KALB: I said "uninformed," and I talked about unidentified sources and uninformed statements. Now, if you'd like, I'd run through that sentence again.

Q So that could apply to --

Q We want to know whether you're saying that the FBI Director, on the record, is uninformed. That's what we want to know, if that's what you're saying.

MR. KALB: I understand your question.

Q We understand what you're saying about unidentified people and about sources and all of that that you usually do, but --

MR. KALB: The one failure of understanding here is that I have said what I'm going to say on this particular thing. I appreciate the thrust of your questions, but I'm going to stand with my reply, that I'm not going to speculate beyond what is set forth here.

Q Bernie, does the United States feel that it's appropriate for the people who have been, as you put it, identified in connection with the Pollard case as being those who were directing the espionage operation, have been rewarded by Israel in one way or another by promotion or by naming to -- being named to some more important post there following the disclosures?

MR. KALB: Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Has the U.S. talked to Israel about its concern on that score?

MR. KALB: I cannot be specific by way of replies. Obviously there is ongoing communications, as you know, but insofar as specifics, I'm not in a position to offer anything along those lines.

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Q Is there any progress in providing access to those who have not yet been interviewed by agents of the U.S. government?

MR. KALB: I don't have anything on that. You might try the Department of Justice.

Q Last time the State Department led the delegation. You're saying there will be no State Department participation in that?

MR. KALB: In what?

Q Judge Sofaer led the delegation last time.

MR. KALB: And therefore?

Q Well, if we are to get access to these people, would there not be another delegation from the United States?

MR. KALB: I can't answer that. I would be stepping outside of the range of information that I have. I just don't know the answer to that, John.

Q Does Sofaer plan to go back to pursue the Pollard case?

MR. KALB: Well, I thought that was an echo of that in John's question. I don't have anything on that. Let's take a visitor, if I may, from Egypt.

Q About the visit of King Hussein -- he has been received today by the President. Later on, he will be negotiating with Mr. Shultz and Mr. Murphy. Can you tell us anything about the talks he has, and whether the United States is going to offer military aid to Jordan, and if there is any kind of doubt that there is sabotage about the helicopter event?

MR. KALB: On the last point first, I have nothing beyond what was offered on Friday. On the first point second, it was my understanding that there was going to be a readout. Was it -- did the readout in fact take place at the White House? It did, or it should have by a senior official, whose name we shared with you the other day. And so that I am in a position of having nothing additionally to offer beyond the backgrounder that it was my understanding took place at the White House about an hour ago.

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MR. BEGLEITER: Have you announced a trip to the Middle East yet?

MR. KALB: Nope, we have not.

MR. BEGLEITER: Do you have anything to say about a Secretarial trip?

MR. KALB: I don't have anything beyond what I said about a week or 10 days ago in connection with the second question; that is to say, having to do with the Middle East trip. I simply have nothing to announce.

MR. BEGLEITER: Bernie, one more back on Waldheim, if I may, please. I'm not quite sure I understood what the White House said earlier, and maybe you could help with that or not. It's my impression that what was said was that even if the Justice Department wants to exclude Waldheim from a visit in the future, that the White House has announced today that it considers diplomatic immunity to be superior to, in a bureaucratic sense, any kind of lower-level exclusionary device. Is that the impression that was meant to be left?

MR. KALB: I did, at the outset, set forth that I have nothing to say beyond what the White House has said, and I indeed do have nothing to say, other than to reiterate what I did, that the investigation was and is still continuing.

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163		רושנינסון
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News Summary June 7-8, 1986

Columns

NYP-Evans & Novak 6/7 "Sofaer Slipping" The standing of Shultz's closest Mideast aide has slipped in the past few weeks. This is mainly because of Sofaer's inability to settle the bitter Taba dispute and because of the Pollard spy case. Sofaer had advised Shultz that Israeli officials had assured him there was no spy ring. But Pollard admitted that Israel was running a spy ring that extended far beyond himself.

NYP-Dorothy Rabinowitz 6/6 "Easy Explanations" NBC News President Larry Grossman has earnestly explained that this was not the first time a network agreed to secrecy to secure an interview. Journalists in the past had agreed in the past not to reveal the whereabouts of "Polish Solidarity leaders, Afghanistan freedom fighters, Soviet dissidents, contra rebels..." It never occurred to us to put a Solidarity leaders and the world's most wanted terrorist, Abu Abbas, who planned the Achille Lauro hijacking, in the same category.

NYP-Ray Kerrison 6/7 "Painful Memories of a Holocaust Survivor" The dates June 6th and 7th are forever ingrained in the souls of Abe Lederman and his wife Helen, from the Bronx. On June 6, the Allied troops landed in Normandy to launch the biggest military invasion in history. On June 7, many of Abe's friends were rounded up by the Gestapo, threatened, tortured and murdered--but none gave him away. Somehow, Abe survived the Lodz ghetto. The prospect of Waldheim winning the Austrian election horrifies Abe. "He's as guilty as any of them," says Abe bitterly.

Press Reports

US Urges Israel to Help in Inquiry

NYT-Gwertzman p.1 6/7 (photo of Modai) The US called on Israel to provide "full cooperation" in the investigation of the evidence turned over by Pollard. State Dept. officials conveyed to the Israelis that the Pollard case could create considerable tension in relations if Israel is seen as covering-up information. Senior Justice and White House officials have said the Israeli Gov't has not fully cooperated in the investigation. But Shultz is said by aides to be willing to give the Israelis the benefit of the doubt, barring solid evidence that the Israelis are withholding information. At a news conference in NY, Israeli Justice Minister Modai,

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characterized the Israeli spying as "most embarrassing to Israel" but essentially "a one-time violation of Israeli policy." Speaking at the Consulate, Modai said Israeli spying in the US was "illegal, definitely." Israeli press reports said Peres was angered at American statements and called the US Ambassador to discuss the matter. One State Dept. official, who regards US support for Israel as excessive, said he was "amazed" that there had not been more of an outcry in the US over the case. Besides, he said, "the military intelligence Israel has turned over" to the US is "worth more than all the military assistance the US had provided to Israel."

NYT-Friedman 6/7 Officials in Israel are withholding public comment on the Pollard case, apparently in the hope that the scandal will eventually blow over. Middle-ranking Israeli officials, who were told by their superiors that Israel had fully cooperated with the US say now that they are not so sure they know the full extent of the Pollard affair. The general mood in Israel has been dominated by the assumption that every nation spies on every other nation, and that Israel's error was to get caught. The Israeli public seems to have been left numb by a number of scandals that raise questions about the accountability of the country's leadership.

NYT-Friedman 6/8 In a sense, good diplomats are good spies, even when posted to friendly countries. If they are doing their jobs, they ferret out confidential information that would be of value back home. When the Justice Dept. named a former Israeli diplomat in NY and three other Israelis as members of a spy ring that had spent tens of thousands to buy American secrets, not everyone was surprised. Jeffrey Richelson, a Prof. at American U., who specializes in intelligence matters, said that while most of Washington's friends might not mount such extensive operations, spying "appears to go on by everybody against everybody." Israel is not immune to American surveillance. By the end of this past week, many Administration officials were saying privately that they hoped the case would be quickly forgotten. Unlike other nations that are US allies, Israel has legitimate fears about its survival. The Israeli intelligence agents were apparently trying to learn about naval fleets of moderate Arab nations; the US does not routinely provide some of those details to Israel.

Eitan Denies Plot to Steal Uranium

NYP-Latham & Dan 6/7 Alleged spymaster Rafi Eitan, in his first interview since being identified as the mastermind of an Israeli spy ring in the US, denied reports he smuggled American enriched uranium to Israel. According to the Washington Post, Eitan is believed by US officials to have arranged in 1968 for the smuggling of enriched uranium from a Pennsylvania plant. The US has long believed that the uranium was diverted to Israel for its atomic reactor.

Israel Suffering Big Loss of American Tourists

NYT-Friedman 6/8 Israeli officials say the American "hysteria" about traveling abroad has dealt a severe blow to their country's tourist industry and handed Khadafy a victory the likes of which he probably never dreamed. Since the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, Israeli tourism officials estimate that their country has lost at least \$300 million in tourist revenue. There was a decline of 40% in visitors from the US in the first four months of this year. The officials say, as many as one-third of the 23,000 hotel

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employees may have to be transferred. What makes the situation doubly annoying for the Israelis is the fact that through all the years in which Israel has been a target, the terrorists have never managed to alter Israelis' way of life. Israel is now opening a campaign to convince Americans that Israel is basically a safe place to visit.

Plan for Iraqi-Syrian Talks Reported

NYT-Hijazi 6/7 A high-ranking Iraqi official was quoted as saying that his Gov't and Syria would soon hold talks, a step that could end two decades of antagonism. Arab policy analysts said several considerations caused Syria's change. Damascus has felt threatened by the US and Israel and feels it needs strong Arab backing. Assad is dismayed by Iran's attitudes. Syria is also suffering from an acute economic crisis and shortage of foreign exchange.

Lebanon Leans on UN Unit

NYT-Hijazi 6/8 In Lebanon, where work carried out by the Gov't has come to a virtual standstill, more than two-thirds of the population has been relying on rehabilitation projects undertaken by the UN Children's Fund, with considerable part of the financing coming from the US. UNICEF has carried out hundreds of water, education and health projects throughout Lebanon in the past five years.

Bahrain Causeway-A Road Few Travel

NYT-special 6/8 A 16 mile long causeway that cost a billion dollars to build links Manama, a small island in the Persian Gulf to Saudi Arabia, but hardly anyone is allowed to drive across it. Most Bahrainians believe this is because Gov't officials want to ponder the implications of this new link with Saudi Arabia. Alcohol flows freely in hotels in Bahrain, there are clubs and discos. The Gov't is even planning an Arabian-style Disneyland to attract visitors. Bahrain seems the antithesis of puritanical Saudi Arabia. But Bahrainians do not like the prospect that Saudis may travel to Bahrain for a good time. This could force the Saudi Gov't to put pressure on Bahrain to adopt a stricter way of life.

Iranian Exile Leave France Under Pressure

NYT-special 6/8 A prominent Iranian opposition leader, Massoud Rajavi, left France under Gov't pressure in a move apparently intended to improve France's relations with Iran and speed the release of French hostages held in Lebanon. Rajavi and his family went to an undisclosed location. Bani-Sadr is not expected to be asked to leave. In recent weeks, officials have warned that France may step up its military support for Iraq if Iran does not agree to settle its differences with France and help gain the hostages release.

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Waldheim

NYT-Dan & Latham 6/7 Yitzhak Modai told a press conference that the Israeli Gov't has a witness who claims he saw Waldheim personally bludgeon a man to death. He also said that the Israeli Gov't had evidence that Waldheim took part in Nazi atrocities while serving with the German Army in Greece and Yugoslavia. Even without the witnesses, Modai said Israel has enough evidence to try Waldheim as an accessory to war crimes, but is investigating charges that he directly committed such crimes.

NYT-special 6/8 Opinion polls in Austria predict that Waldheim will win the election. (see DN)

NYT-AP 6/7 25 Israeli high school students ended a vigil outside the Austrian Embassy in Tel Aviv to protest Waldheim's candidacy. They held up signs reading "Dr. Waldheim and Mr. Hyde" and "Woe be a country whose No. 1 citizen is Waldheim."

NYT-Tagliabue 6/8 The disclosures about the WW II record of Waldheim are confronting the Yugoslav Gov't with an array of problems. So far they have refused to comment on the charges that Waldheim lied about his service. The charges against Waldheim focus largely on his activities under an Austrian General who was executed in 1947 for war crimes. Waldheim was named by a Yugoslav postwar tribunal as a possible war criminal. The Yugoslav Gov't is coming under increasing pressure to take a stand. "The whole thing is bringing up painful memories," said a Western diplomat.

NYT-Tagliabue 6/7 A former Yugoslav intelligence official said that Soviet intelligence officers in Vienna were told "in late 1947 or early 1948" that Waldheim was sought by Yugoslavia for involvement in war crimes. The disclosure is significant because of speculation that the Soviet Union might have subjected Waldheim to political pressure or blackmail while he was Foreign Minister of Austria or Sec. Gen. of the UN.

NYT-special 6/7 The Justice Dept. said that if Waldheim was elected President of Austria, it would be impossible for American officials to prevent him from entering the US by citing his activities in WW II. As President, he would automatically be granted diplomatic entry.

NYT-McQuiston 6/7 In a key paragraph in the German edition of Waldheim's memoirs, he writes that he returned to service in the German Army after recovering from a leg wound. The paragraph was omitted from the English language edition. A spokesman for the American publishing company said "We were not aware of any omissions."

Book Excerpt-Terrorism

DN-Gayle Rivers the first of five excerpts from the new book "The War Against Terrorism". Rivers believes we can win the war against terrorism and do it with currently available means. Rivers was a counterterrorist hunting down terrorists for 15 years. He worked for the US, Great Britain, Spain and some of the allies.

Yehuda Amichai-Israel's Master Poet

NYT Magazine 6/8-Robert Alter-An in-depth article on Israel's leading poet. A sample of his work is given.

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Jewish Humor Conference

DN-Bell 6/8-The Conference on Jewish Humor begins on Monday at the New School for Social Research in NY. The conference is a serious attempt to understand the roots and meanings of Jewish humor. About 500 students will attempt to understand meanings of Jewish humor. It's hard to define Jewish humor, although one consistent theme is giving tragedy a comic twist. For example: The Lord announces that a flood will engulf all life on earth in three days. A pastor, a priest and a rabbi go to their flocks with the bad news. "Repent for your sins," the pastor says, "and we will meet in the next world." "Pray," the priest says, "and we'll enter paradise together." "There's no time to lose," the rabbi says. We've only got three days to learn how to live under water."

Bob Dylan Worships With Hasidim

DN-Santangelo 6/8 Bob Dylan, the reclusive pop superstar, has spent part of the last 4 years living and worshipping with the ultra-orthodox Hasidic Jews of Brooklyn's Lubavitch community. Members of the community say Dylan has been taking instruction from Talmudic scholars. His latest visit took place during Passover and he is expected to return when he comes to New York in July for a series of concerts. Dylan declines to discuss his religious activity.

Cartoons

NYT-Carlson (Milwaukee Sentinel) 6/8-Uncle Sam says "Just let me remind you that the US cannot turn its back on Israel...even for a minute." As he says this a spy is taking out a top secret paper from his pocket.

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להלן ממכר במחמד.

1. מוכיר שחסינות דיפלומטית חלה רק כאשר דיפלומט בתפקיד, אינה תופסת עם סיומו לרבות לגבי מעשים שנעשו כשהיה בתפקיד. רא' מעצור אפשרי לא רק בביקור חוזר בארהב אלא בכל מדינה עימה יש הסכם הסגרה והמשמעות: על המעורבים בפרשיות השונות, ובאלו יש רבים, להזהר בנסיעותיהם לחולי בעתיד. לא הסכים לפרט.

2. רמז שידעויותיו על מימדי ריגול ישראלי גדולות בהרבה ממה שפורסם עד כה ולא הוציא מכלל אפשרות המשך פרסומים חדשים. רמז גם שאיסור פתיחת קונסוליה בדנבר קשור לידיעות הללו, שהיו קיימות כבר בעת האיסור.
3. הצביע על נזק לישראל בשני תחומים:

א. הנשיא, המחלק את העולם ליטובים ו'רעים'. נוכח ריבוי הידיעות עלולה ישראל לעבור מהקבוצה הראשונה-לשניה.
ב. קהילת המודיעין, שם האמון וההערכה לישראל היו גדולים במיוחד. שם סבורים שהמסמכים שפולארד התבקש להביא היו חשובים לא בשל תוכנם אלא באמצעי לפענח צפנים כלומר היעד של ישראל בפעולה היה קהילת המודיעין האמריקאית. זו מחלקת עם ישראל 90 אחוז מהידוע לו וחשה נבגדת על ישראל 'גנבה' את היתר. לבך
מת'יחסים בחומרה רבה יותר מאשר נניח רכישה בלתי חוקית של נשק
או מרכיביו, המתקבלת בהבנה.

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4** הוא כואב שיש בזה (המדיניות) מפרדים בין האומות
**המקובלות בין ידידות לבין מאמץ מסודר לגייס סובבים
**בתשלום, אשר אינו מקובל בין ידידות.

* * 5. חזר ושאל האם לאלו המעשיכים י'עם צה' נ'הוא בטוח שממשיכי צ'ח
* * ברור הנוק לעומת התועלת הדגיש שבוכת יהודים בממשל הנתפסים
* * בטיכון ולסיכום כנראה מחשש אזניים אמריקאיות בי קש שלא
* * אטסור הנל'
* * שובה הרצל

* * חפ : רהמ, שהח, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבטננר, רסננר (רד)
* * תח : ר/שבכ (ננר) (רד)

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סיגל, פרן

בישיבה השבועית של הממשלה: -

א. הממשלה אישרה היום את הודעת ראש הממשלה כאשר ליחסי ישראל-ארצות-הברית על רקע גל הפרסומים האחרון. להלן ההודעה: -

בין ארצות-הברית וישראל קיימת מערכת יחסים הדוקה ואין להעלות על הדעת שנסיכונות להעכיר את האווירה ביניהן יעלו יפה.

בשבועות האחרונים, אנו עדים לגל פרסומים, בלתי-מבוססים, על פרשות ריגול ועל עסקות נשק ישראליות כביכול.

ממשלת ישראל רואה כדאגה פרסומים אלה ומקווה כי לא יהיה להם המשך.

במהלך בדיקתה של פרשת פולארד התקיים שיתוף פעולה כן מצד ישראל. ממשלת ישראל מחוייבת להמשיך שיתוף פעולה זה המושתת על יחסי האמון השוררים בין שתי המדינות.

ישראל פרקה את היחידה אשר חרגה מסמכותה כפי שהסתבר בעקבות פרשת פולארד, והיא חוזרת ומדגישה כי אין מתקיימות מטעמה שום פעולות ריגול כנגד ארצות-הברית.

ממשלת ישראל עומדת במגע הדוק עם הממשל האמריקאי על-מנת להביא לכירורג הסוגיות השונות שהועלו לאחרונה, וזאת כרוח היחסים ההדוקים שבין שתי המדינות.

עד כאן לשון ההודעה.

ב. הממשלה קיבלה היום את התפטרותו של נגיד בנק ישראל, ד"ר משה מגלכאום, בעקבות מסקנות ועדת בייסקי. ראש הממשלה הודיע כי בתוך ימים אחדים יוצע לממשלה מועמד שיוסכם עליו, בין ראש הממשלה, ממלא-מקומו ישר האוצר.

ג. הממשלה אישרה היום את הצעת שר החקלאות לקצץ השנה 200 מליון מטרים מעוקבים מים. הממשלה החליטה לפנות אל הציבור ולבקשו לחסוך כרבע מצריכת המים שלו.

Continued From Page 1

raeli spying in the United States was "illegal, definitely."

He said it was embarrassing because "the United States has always been most helpful to Israel in the area of the exchange of information."

In Israel two weeks ago, the State Department's legal adviser, Abraham D. Sofaer, told the Israelis about the facts that were made public on Wednesday, naming four Israelis as unindicted co-conspirators. He also reportedly repeated the American insistence on cooperation, department officials said.

Mr. Sofaer refused to discuss the matter today. He said he had been denied authorization to speak about the case while it was under investigation.

The criticism of Israel has irked some senior State Department officials whose views usually reflect those of Mr. Shultz. The Secretary of State, who is regarded as one of Israel's strongest supporters, has not commented on the latest developments in the Pollard case. His aides have taken the position that there is no evidence that the Israeli Government failed to cooperate fully.

When asked to comment today on Mr. Webster's assertion that the Israel-

is were providing only "selective cooperation," Bernard Kalb, the State Department spokesman, said, "I'm not going to get involved with what Judge Webster said."

He added that as a "general response," the United States "would expect full cooperation from the Government of Israel until the case is closed."

Mr. Kalb declined to say whether the United States was receiving such cooperation.

Reports of Perea Anger

The Israeli press reported today that Prime Minister Shimon Peres was upset at statements American reporters attributed to Justice Department officials that were critical of Israel's performance in the Pollard case, and he called in Thomas R. Pickering, the United States Ambassador, to discuss the matter. The State Department would not discuss the meeting.

The main issues of contention reportedly concern differing perceptions of the visit to Israel last December, after the Pollards were arrested, of a joint State-Justice Department team led by Mr. Sofaer. During its visit, the group received documents and met with Israelis known at the time to have taken part in the spying case.

On Dec. 20, after the visit, the State

Department issued a statement saying it was satisfied that the American officials had received "full cooperation" from the Israeli Government.

But Administration officials said that during the talks in Israel, the Americans were not told about many details of the case that became known only when Mr. Pollard, as part of a plea-bargaining arrangement, provided more information.

Name of His 'Handler'

The most important new information was the name of Gen. Aviam Sella of the Israeli Air Force, who was Mr. Pollard's first spy "handler" in 1984. At the time, General Sella was a colonel and was taking graduate courses at New York University.

State Department officials said that, to those skeptical about Israeli Government cooperation, it was inconceivable that Israeli officials had not learned of General Sella's involvement from their own investigation and had not made this known to the American team.

But Mr. Shultz is said to believe that it is quite possible that the Israelis who were running the spy operation had been able to keep General Sella's involvement a secret both from the Israeli Government and the Americans.

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Israeli officials reported to the American team that the intelligence operation was a "rogue" operation run by Rafael Eitan, a veteran intelligence official who was a close associate of many leaders of the Likud bloc.

A State Department official said that the United States had asked to speak to General Sella about the case, but that he had not been made available.

Skepticism From Some

Nevertheless, even in the State Department, there are officials who express skepticism about the Israeli Government's actions in the case.

One official, who admits to not being privy to the confidential discussions between the two Governments, said he found it hard to understand how Mr. Eitan, if he had indeed carried out an intelligence mission contrary to Israeli policy, had been given the post of chairman of Israel Chemicals, one of the largest state-owned enterprises.

Mr. Modal said the Israeli espionage operations were designed to get information for Israel only. They did not, he insisted, "constitute any danger to the security of the United States."

One official, who regards American support for Israel in the Middle East as excessive, said he was "amazed" that there had not been more of an outcry in the United States over the case.

Besides, he said, "the military intelligence Israel has turned over" to the United States is "worth more than all the military assistance the U.S. had provided to Israel."

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Israelis Publicly Silent About Spy's Guilty Plea

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

209/19
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JERUSALEM, June 6 — Two days after an American caught spying for Israel pleaded guilty in Washington, officials here are withholding public comment on the case, apparently in the hope that the scandal will eventually blow over.

Neither Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir nor Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin have had any formal comment on the plea, which was entered by Jonathan Jay Pollard, a former United States Navy intelligence analyst.

The Israeli leadership has also declined to offer any comment on, or explanation of, the naming of four other Israelis as unindicted co-conspirators in the Pollard case. The four include one of the rising stars of the Israeli Air Force, Brig. Gen. Aviam Sella, the commander of the Ramon Air Force Base in southern Israel.

Confidence in Shaken

Middle-ranking Israeli officials, who were told by their superiors in December that Israel had fully cooperated with the United States and had made a full disclosure to the American investigative team led by the State Department's legal adviser, Abraham D. Sofaer, say now that they are no longer sure they know the full extent of the Pollard affair.

One possible explanation being discussed is that senior Israeli officials did not reveal all that they knew about the Pollard espionage ring during their discussions with American investigators. Another possibility is that Rafael Eitan, the Israeli official who led the Pollard espionage operation, continued to hide some aspects of the affair from his superiors even after he was dismissed and during his interrogation by American legal authorities.

In any event, with the officials at the very top refusing to comment, those below are clearly uncertain as to what is the truth. This is particularly so regarding the question of how one of the top figures in the Israeli Air Force could have been involved in what the Israeli Cabinet has termed a "rogue" espionage operation.

"At this stage we just hope the whole thing will blow over and that there will be no new surprises," a senior Government official said.

Until now, Israeli news organizations

have not been insistent that the political echelon account to the public for what happened in the Pollard affair. From the start of the scandal, there has been no real sense of outrage among Israel's journalists or the society's leaders.

The general mood has been dominated by the assumption that every nation spies on every other nation and that Israel's error was to get caught. It was against this backdrop that Mr. Eitan, far from being punished for his involvement in the affair, was given one of the most lucrative Government jobs, the chairmanship of the board of Israel Chemicals, a state-owned industrial organization.

Lately, however, some Israeli news organizations have started to ask questions with broad implications. The left-of-center newspaper Davar said today:

"All attempts to obtain an official response or information about the background of Aviam Sella, who is mentioned in Pollard's indictment, were met with stubborn silence. The questions on the agenda remain as follows: Did the Israel Defense Forces or Israeli Air Force senior command know about Sella's involvement in spying? Is the absence of knowledge and coordination a lesson requiring conclusions to be drawn and implemented?"

Other Recent Scandals

The Israeli public seems to have been left numb by the revelations in the Pollard case, which is the latest of a series of recent scandals that have raised questions about the accountability of the country's leadership.

In the last month, the heads of all of Israel's major banks have been forced to resign in connection with a huge stock market scandal. In addition, the head of Shin Beth, Israel's domestic intelligence service, has been the subject of reports that he tampered with evidence, altered testimony and influenced witnesses in order to cover up his purported involvement in the killing of two captured Palestinian bus hijackers in April 1984.

On Thursday, one of Israel's most important contractors, Abraham Gindi, who was being investigated in connection with a variety of large-scale land frauds on the West Bank and various building scandals, walked into his empty swimming pool, poured gasoline over his head and immolated himself.

ISRAELI SPYMASTER DENIES PLOT TO STEAL U.S. URANIUM

By URIDAN
in Jerusalem
and NILES LATHEM
in Washington

ALLEGED spymaster Rafi Eitan, in his first interview since being identified as the mastermind of an Israeli spy ring in the U.S., last night denied reports he smuggled American enriched uranium to Israel.

"It's a fake — it has nothing to do with reality," Eitan told *The Post*. "I had absolutely nothing to do with smuggling any uranium from the United States."

"I am absolutely amazed to read about this baseless story, which I have nothing to do with."

According to the *Washington Post*, Eitan — a former high-ranking officer in the Israeli Mossad — is believed by U.S. officials to have arranged in 1958 for the smuggling of enriched uranium from a Pennsylvania plant.

The U.S. long has suspected the uranium was diverted to Israel for its atomic reactor.

The paper quoted a declassified FBI document indicating that Eitan, 59, was part of a four-man team that visited the NUMEC uranium processing plant in Apollo, Pa. in 1958.

Sources in Jerusalem confirmed to *The Post* last night that Eitan, then a high-ranking Mossad officer, was part of the delegation.

But they insisted that the visit was "known to U.S. authorities" and denied that any uranium was smuggled to Israel.

According to the sources, the purpose of Eitan's visit was to buy technical equipment.

Eitan, who recently was named head of Israel's billion-dollar state-owned chemical company, refused to discuss the Jonathan Pollard spy affair.

He said only that he answered questions from a State Dept. investigating team, headed by legal counsel Abraham Sofaer, last December.

Pollard, a U.S. Navy analyst, admitted this week that he delivered classified documents relating to Arab military strength to Israel.

He said he was promised more than \$300,000 by the Israelis and named Eitan and three other Israelis as his "handlers."

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* "The procedures for all that have been changed radically," the Pentagon official said.

The official said that following Pollard's arrest last Nov. 21 outside the Israeli embassy here the department began an internal review of the Navy's handling of Pollard's top secret security clearances.

Another Defense Department source said last year that Pollard's security clearance was temporarily withdrawn in 1981 for "bizarre behavior." It was later restored, however, and Pollard also obtained access to "special compartmentalized information," which is higher than top secret.

The Pentagon official said yesterday he was unaware of the findings of the department's internal inquiry, which he believes is still under way.

specialist at the National Security Agency, was convicted of selling secrets to the Soviets in a case that a federal prosecutor said "may have caused the intelligence community more damage than any other turn-coat in recent memory."

Wash test
June 8, 1956

Pollard, as part of his duties, had a "courier card" that enabled him to leave his office without being searched for classified documents that he was not authorized to have, prosecutors said.

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Wash. Post, June 7, 1986

Israelis Criticize Spy Case Leaks By U.S. Officials

By William Claiborne
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, June 6—Israeli officials today began a counteroffensive in the Jonathan Pollard espionage case, charging that the U.S. Justice Department is waging what one official called a "malevolent" anti-Israel campaign to obfuscate its own counterintelligence inadequacies.

The government has restricted itself in official statements to reiterating that the Pollard case was an "aberration" and involved nothing more than a renegade spy ring operated without political sanction. Senior officials, however, have begun stepping up their anonymous criticism of what they called orchestrated Justice Department leaks intended to portray Israeli spying activities as far more extensive than Israeli officials insist they are.

One senior Foreign Ministry official, after talking with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, said he had recommended "going public" with a strong counteroffensive to rebut allegations that the Israeli government had lied about the extent of the espionage activities when a joint Justice-State Department team visited here last year.

"People are exploiting our silence. Our silence stems from the fact that we reached an agreement with the [U.S.] State Department that both sides had cooperated fully and that the matter was essentially over," said the senior official, speaking on condition that he not be identified.

He was referring to a Dec. 20, 1985, State Department communique saying that Israel had cooperated fully with U.S. law enforcement officials in disclosing its role in the Pollard affair.

The official said he had sought to convince Shamir that a more forceful response to the allegations of a

See ISRAEL, A11, Col. 1

■ Spy's neighbor turned in suit-case with documents. Page A11

ISRAEL, From A1

under Israeli conspiracy was needed.

However, the official, and sources in the office of Prime Minister Shimon Peres, said no consideration was being given to making public any allegations of espionage activities conducted in Israel by the United States.

The Hebrew daily newspaper Davar, which is affiliated with the national trade union federation Histadrut, today quoted a "high" government official as saying that if leaks in Washington over the Israeli spying operation continue, the Peres government will consider disclosing details of U.S. espionage activities uncovered in recent years by Israeli counterintelligence and then covered up by mutual agreement between Washington and Jerusalem. The newspaper provided no specifics.

"We aren't considering any such thing. It would be totally counterproductive," a senior Israeli government official said.

He said, however, that there was growing resentment in the Foreign Ministry, in the office of the prime

minister and in the intelligence community over what is perceived here as a calculated attempt by some U.S. Justice Department officials to exaggerate Israeli espionage activities in the United States.

One senior official singled out U.S. Attorney Joseph E. diGenova as a source of the leaks detailing the extent of the Israeli operation, saying, "diGenova wants to stick it to Israel. He opposed the [Pollard] plea bargaining from the very beginning because he wanted to cash in on the publicity that a sensational trial would bring him. Now he is trying to make the case bigger than it is. He's enjoying the limelight... Who knows? Maybe it will get him elected to the Senate."

[Efforts to reach diGenova Friday were unsuccessful.]

The Israeli official said that the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon have remained "very much against inflaming the situation because they are convinced that, essentially, everything that is going to come out has already come out."

The official characterized as "unimportant details" the disclosures that Aviram Sella, an Israeli Air

Wash Post

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Force colonel doing graduate study at New York University at the time, was Pollard's alleged contact in the United States in 1984 when the former U.S. Navy civilian intelligence analyst passed secret documents to Israel; that an Israeli secretary, identified as Irit Erb, was utilized in photocopying stolen documents, and that Pollard had been promised, according to the U.S. District Court summary of the case, \$300,000 over a 10-year period for his espionage activities.

Sella, since promoted to brigadier general, currently is the commander of the Rimon Air Force Base in the Negev Desert. Israeli officials today would not comment on Sella's alleged role in the Pollard case. Attempts to contact Sella were unsuccessful.

"Whether three people were involved, or four people were involved, or even five people were involved is without importance. The point is that the moment we admitted that the operation occurred, and said that we had dismantled the operation and that it was not sanctioned by official policy, these details are not important," a senior Israeli official said in an interview.

Wash Post (Jun 7 '84)

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F2 SUNDAY, JUNE 8, 1986

THE WASHINGTON POST

Israeli Security and the Rule of Law

What Did Its Leaders Know of Two Murders, and When Did They Know It?

By Lally Weymouth

TEL AVIV—Israeli Attorney General Yitzhak Zamir stood alone last week fighting both the prime minister and the Israeli Cabinet in the name of law, order and democratic values.

Zamir was attacked—and labeled everything from square-minded to unpatriotic—because he insisted on investigating the role of the super secret Israeli security service known as Shin Bet in the killing of two Palestinian terrorists who were taken prisoner in 1984. It would be hard to imagine a less popular cause in Israel.

—Zamir appeared to lose his battle and was fired last week. But conversations with Cabinet ministers, military officials and Israeli journalists make clear that the Shin Bet security scandal isn't over yet. Like the Lavon affair of the 1950s, it is likely to provoke a continuing political and moral crisis for Israel—one that could challenge the current Israeli government and determine the balance struck in Israel between security and the rule of law.

What Zamir has said is that the rule of law must predominate, no matter how serious Israel's terrorism problems may be.

The Israeli public appears to have little sympathy for Zamir and his insistence on proper legal procedures. According to one poll, at least 70 percent of the public stood squarely behind Prime Minister Shimon Peres and against Zamir. Facing a choice between security and the law, they chose

Lally Weymouth writes regularly about foreign affairs for The Los Angeles Times Syndicate.

security. They couldn't understand why an attorney general would want to investigate the head of the Shin Bet, Avraham Shalom, for his alleged role in the deaths of the two captured Arab hijackers and for the cover-up he allegedly arranged later to hide the truth from two commissions of inquiry.

Israelis feel an understandable loyalty and gratitude to the Shin Bet for allowing them to sleep safely at night, work by day, and travel without fear by air.

Zamir believed, however, that the public would come to understand that the Shin Bet case was more than a matter of killing two captured terrorists, but a question of whether the secret services could take the law into their own hands. As one of Israel's most famous intelligence officers put it: "If they are allowed to do this, tomorrow they'll take your son and do the same. You don't give these authorities excess power."

Moreover, if the charges were true and Shalom had ordered the killing of the captured hijackers, he had broken not only the law but also the Israeli Defense Forces' code against killing prisoners. If a new precedent were established that prisoners would be killed, future hijackers would resist to the bitter end rather than surrender.

Zamir believed that as the guardian of law and civil liberties in a country that lacked constitution, he had a duty to fulfill, no matter how unpopular it might be. Several years ago, against similar political and popular pressure, he had prosecuted Jewish settlers on the West Bank for plotting terrorist attacks against Palestinians.

The Shin Bet scandal landed in Zamir's lap last February, when several of his assistants told him they had received new evidence.

about the fate of the two Arabs who had hijacked a bus going from Tel Aviv to Ashdod in 1984 and had later died during interrogation. The evidence included testimony from three Shin Bet members who claimed that their boss had ordered the killings of the two Arabs and then arranged a cover-up.

Zamir had no idea when he began that the scandal might involve two prime ministers: Yitzhak Shamir, who held the post in 1984, when the two hijackers were killed; and Pines, who was prime minister during much of the alleged cover-up.

Soon after he began his investigation, Zamir learned that the three Shin Bet members had already presented their case to Prime Minister Peres. Peres had dismissed the three, convinced that they just wanted Shalom's job, and they were fired from the service.

But Zamir disagreed with Peres' assessment. He concluded that the three Shin Bet agents were men of good character and, after reviewing the facts, he decided it was his duty to go to the prime minister and inform him there was sufficient, reliable evidence to bring a case against Shakom. If the allegations were correct, he told Peres, then Shakom had broken the law.

Zamir ran into a stone wall. Peres told him that he had checked the story and decided not to reopen an investigation. He advised Zamir to close the file. To reopen the case would, he said, damage Israel's security.

The political dimension of the scandal—the possibility that it might involve some of the highest officials in Israel—gradually became clear to Zamir. He came to suspect that Shalom might have been acting on orders from the political level, since Shin Bet re-

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ports directly to the prime minister—who at that time was Shamir.

Ezer Weizman, a member of the Cabinet, explains the likelihood that there was political involvement: "No military action, whether an ordinary army type of operation or a covert action, is undertaken in Israel without the consent and approval of the civil authorities—the defense minister and the prime minister. Therefore, I assume if the allegations are true [that Shalom ordered the killing of the two Arab terrorists and the subsequent cover-up] the actions must have been approved by the authorities responsible. The man responsible was Mr. Shamir. So I point my finger at the then-prime minister, and I want him to say if he was responsible or not."

(Shamir's spokesman, Avi Pazner, responds: "As prime minister, Shamir gave his full backing to the head of the secret services. He knew what a prime minister should know and acted accordingly.")

The pressure on Zamir to drop the case became intense. According to Israeli sources, Pores formed a troika—consisting of himself, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and Vice Premier Shamir—to deal secretly with Zamir on the Shalom affair, without the knowledge of the rest of the Cabinet. The three men tried without success to get Zamir to abandon the case.

Zamir suggested a compromise. Recognizing the sensitivity of the investigation, he offered to drop the case if Shalom would resign. But Peres refused the offer.

When it became obvious that the long negotiations had reached a stalemate, Zamir decided to take the matter to the police for an investigation. He believed that Israel's long-term security lay in making sure that the Shin Bet was free from corruption and that it abided by the law.

Zamir's foes countered that it is impossible to fight terrorism effectively within the framework of the law. "When you fight ter-
ror, there are many situations that cannot fit

under the laws of democracy," says one veteran intelligence officer. "You must break the normal rules of democracy when you fight merciless terrorists who come to kill civilians."

Israel had never seen a confrontation quite like this, according to Uriel Reichman, dean of Tei Aviv Law School: "It's a constitutional drama. Never before was the attorney general isolated, fighting the government."

Zamir knew that in theory he could be dismissed by the Cabinet, and he had announced a few months earlier that he intended to resign. But he doubted that Peres would allow him to be fired. He was wrong. Last Sunday, at the weekly government meeting, he was informed that he was being replaced and that a successor, Yosef Harish, had been found.

But the firing of Zamir may be only a pyrrhic victory for Peres and the Cabinet. Reichman predicts that, should the new attorney general try to sweep the affair under the rug, he will spark off a government crisis that could trigger Cabinet resignations and incite a public outcry.

If an investigation occurs, Zamir will have won by forcing the government, however reluctantly, to live by the law. And if the investigation establishes the truth, however unpleasant, Israel also will be the winner—for it will have proved that, despite living in a near-constant state of siege, it has a viable democracy. Even now, with the issue far from settled, government efforts at censorship haven't stopped the Israeli press from reporting the story. And that, in itself, is a kind of triumph.

As for Prime Minister Peres, perhaps he should remember the lesson of his mentor, David Ben-Gurion, who insisted that every detail of the disastrous Lavon affair be brought to light, even at the expense of abandoning the party he created and going into the political desert with Shimon Peres to form the Rafi Party—when his party refused to go along with him.

Like Ben-Gurion, Zamir is correct in claiming that security cannot be based on lies.

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(Jun 8, '56)

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F6 SUNDAY, JUNE 8, 1986

Wash Post

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The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

The Pollard Cases

THE CASE of Jonathan Jay Pollard, the American intelligence analyst who has pleaded guilty to spying for Israel, was always two cases. The one in the courtroom is just about over, although Mr. Pollard and his wife—she pleaded to two lesser charges—are yet to be sentenced. The other case, involving the pattern of ties between Israel and the United States, will be working its way out for some time.

Mr. Pollard passed on secrets for more than a year and took money. He betrayed his trust. That he did so with a friendly country does not so much mitigate the act as move its major consequences from the military to the political sphere. He has diminished the mutual trust on which the friendship of the United States and Israel necessarily rests.

No single citizen is a principal custodian of this trust. The Israeli government is, and its conduct remains in the main troubling. Prime Minister Shimon Peres did apologize for this "unauthorized" operation, did cooperate in the investigation of it to the State Department's satisfaction and did reaffirm Israel's declared policy of no spying on its leading patron. Yet the root question remains of how Israelis could have launched an operation whose finest imaginable gains in intelligence could not have come near to matching the losses in trust attendant upon discovery. How plausible are official denials of responsibility for an operation whose handlers, when unmasked, were promoted? Was

this project connected to other shadowy international operations involving Israelis that have come to light in the last year? William Webster, head of the FBI, complains that Israeli cooperation in the Pollard case was "selective"; Justice Department sources say that Mr. Pollard, awaiting sentencing, is telling of other Israeli operations here.

More is going on than the predictable divergence between American diplomats, who seem prepared to join Israel in lancing the Pollard boil, and law enforcement officials. A usually hidden side of American-Israeli relations is in partial view. In strategic and intelligence matters, the two countries have deep common interests. Each, however, values first its freedom of movement. Israel's permanent condition as a nation at war with most of its neighbors, and as one that believes ultimately it can trust only itself, inclines it toward high-risk exertions to gain narrow additional increments of security. The United States, as a great power with a large and diverse presence in the Middle East, has permanent reason to ensure that it is not surprised by friend or foe.

In brief, Israel and the United States not only share and bargain information but also spy on each other. Most of the time the spying is done within certain bounds. In the Pollard case the bounds were broken, and it falls to Israel to find ways to show Americans that their confidence and generous patronage will not be further abused.

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Friendship Doesn't Always De

WASHINGTON

Jeffrey T. Richelson, a professor at American Uni-

Nor is Israel immune to American surveillance. An American ship equipped with sensitive listening devices was sent to the Gulf of Sinai during Israel's six-day war with Egypt in 1967; it was bombed by Israel, which de-

ter Espionage

The amount of spying by friendly governments often depends on the intimacy of their intelligence services, and the insecurity of the nation doing the spying. Unlike most leading American allies, Israel has legitimate fears about its survival. "The Israelis always have their backs to the wall, and they do what they have to do," said George Carver, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency who is now associated with Georgetown

Last week, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Strom Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina, asked for an investigation of charges that Asian governments had obtained through unauthorized channels information about the the American position on textile negotiations. "I am personally angered and deeply disturbed by what I consider to be at the very least a breach of trust and perhaps a violation of law," he said. The Justice Department is considering his request.

New
York
Times

June 4th

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1. The first part of the report discusses the general situation of the country and the progress of the work. It also mentions the results of the survey and the conclusions drawn from it.

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וקוקים בדחיפות לפרטים על המועד המדויק של הביקור. האם נתקבלו תגובות לרעיונות ששלחנו לפני שבועיים. הבריקונא בהולות או התקשרו אל שמעון לשם - שטיין 819340 - 02

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1071

אל: המשרד, נד: 208, מ: 111
דח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 060686, יח: 1630

סורי/מיד

אל: ממנכל, מצפא, ממד -
אצי עם רניס רוס הממונה החוש על המזהה במזעצה לבטחון לאומי.
א. ביקור חוסיין.

1. תהליך השלום: מתוך ההנחה כי חוסין לא ילך עתה לשולחן המומי ינסו לבדוק עמו גישה לשווה ארוך, דהיינו עד כמה שקל מורכבות גדולה יותר שלו ביוש' ועיה זאת לאחר שהופרכו הנחות חוסין לגבי מירא אחיצתו באוכלוסיה בהקשר זה ינסו לבדוק עמו גם את האפשרות של בניית מנהיגות חלופית לפלסטינאים.

2. מהלך חוסיין כין עיראק לסוריה: גם אם יעלה משהו בכף, אין להביא על כך במונחים של שווה ארוך, ככל צעד שבין עיראק לסוריה, הרווח מבחינת חוסין הוא בהצגת יתנועה בין-ערבית ובהנחת דעתם של הסעודים.
ב. סוריה

1. ימורשת אסד: רבים בממשל כולל איש שיחי, תוהים בשאלה כיצד יצוונו לדאוג את מורשתו, אין תשובות חותכות. ההנחה היא כי הוא כונה את צבאו כצורה שתוכל לענות להתמודדות צבאית עתידית עם ישראל, אך אינו בטוח שייכל למלחמה, הוא רחוק מעשיית מאיוון כזה.

2. הסובייטים ואסד: תחושת איש שיחי היא כי הסובייטים, שחיממו תחילה את אסד לאחר הפצצת ארהב בלוב כדרך אופיינית להם גם כמכרז חשבו מחשבה שניה. הוא מצטט נאום של פרימקוב מן הימן האחרון, שבו אמר כי על הסורים להסתייע באחיהם הערבים במאבקם. רוס רואה זאת כמסר סובייטי לסורים שמבדיהם אל יצפו לגדולות ונצורות. תדרכתיו בנושא ישראל-בריהמ' להערכתו ניתן לצפות לפניית סובייטית אלינו, דבר התואם לדעתו את תפיסתה של

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY
FROM THE CHIEF, BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY

RE: [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]

4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. [illegible]
8. [illegible]
9. [illegible]
10. [illegible]

משדר החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ההנהגה החדשה.

א. אל על לונדון. ישנן ספקולציות רבות בממשל להסבר הפרשה. אפשר היה לחשוב על פרזוכציה עיראקית, אך טביעות האצבעות הסוריות ברורות מדי. אפשר היה לחשוב על מעשה בלי ידיעת אסד, אך עובדה היא שאיש לא נתלה. יש איפוא אפשרויות שונות, אך נראה בסביר שהסורים פשוט הניחו כי הפעולה תצליח, ואז לא יהיו טביעות אצבעות והכל יתפשו בביונים של ארגון מחבלים כמו אבו ניואל-להוואת ולמזלנו נבשלנו, ומכאן החנחונים כלפי המערב עתה.

ב. עיראק-איראן. החשש מנצחון איראני הוא בהשלכות על העולם החדבי, פן תינתן רחיפה רבתי לפונדמנטליסטים שיחדשו אמונתם בבשורת חומייני.
ד. מצרים.

1. מאכה. תחושתו שהמצרים חוששים מהבוררות אם לא יהיה השטר מנוסח כמבטיח 100 אחוז הצלחה. אולם גם נדחע מובארך פן המהיר שיהא בלינו לשלם כער השטר נשגדיד וכו' גבוה מדי בלי שהתמודה היא מעבר למאכה, וגם בה רק כהליך ועדיין לא הנצחון עצמו.
2. מצרים-פנים. ראית קו של סיכון במזווח של שנים אחדות נלמשל חמש שנים: קלארק סלמנהל אאו ריבר על לאחר שנתיים למשטר, אם לא יהיו שינויים לטובה, וקשה להכניס שינויים כגם בגלל העדר החלטיות של מובארק. איש שיחי חושב במאנחי חקלאות מצרים, שיש בה פוטנציאל גדול שטרם נוצל ושיכולה לאפשר חלוקה צודקת של המשאבים.

ה. לבנון. כשלוך רוורף בשלוך, של כל המנסה לפתור משהו בישראל וארה"ב וההסכט, סוריה וההסכט שלה. שמא בכלל אין פתרון.
דובינשטיין

נפ: שהח, רהמ, שהכט, מנכל, ממנכל, רזמרבו, רס, אמן, ממד, מצפא,
קידר, סייבל, מצרים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9431

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נכנס

101

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אל: המשרד, נר: 200, מ: נ
 רח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 060686, רח: 1800

סודי/מיידי

אל: ממנכ"ל, מנהל מע"ת, מצפ"א, אמית"ק ממדי
 רח: יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ, יועץ תקשורת לשה"ט נטבור בטחון נר
 16, לעמ"י, דוצ"י, וושינגטון (נר 55)
 מאת: עתונות נ"י

רוח'י תקשורת 6.6.86

איך לסכם את השבוע האחרון בתקשורת כאן ?
 אולי כבך שהימים הללו מהוים כנראה נקודת ציון בתהליך שהחל עם
 תחילת פרשת פולארד, לפני כחצי שנה. אמנם שיתוף הפעולה
 היומיומי שלנו עם חברים ברשתות ובמערכות נמשך כסדרו, ובשינוי
 מייפולארד אי"י גם אין לוחצים עלינו לתגובות
 ON CAMERA ויימכנימי מדוע איננו יכולים להתבטא מעבר להתבטאויות
 הרשמיות, ואולי גם זה משקף במידת מה את השינוי.

יש לסייג ולציין כי אמנם דוב בני שיחנו מתמקדים בתאאור הנזק
 ומתייחסים למצב כאל
 DOWNHILL PROCESS
 אולם מיעוט מכובד סבור שהנזק לתדמיתנו אינו כה גדול ואינו
 ארוך טווח.

קשה להעריך את מידת הנזק שגרמה לנו פרשת פולארד. ראשית, כי
 אנו עדיין כעיצומה של ההתעניינות התקשורתית. אך כבר עתה ניתן
 לומר שאנו נראים כיום ררך משקפיים חדשות. סקירה מהירה של
 אירועי התקשורת כעניינינו תעלה, ברצף מתמשך וכמעט בלתי מופרע
 את נקודות הציון הבאות: פולארד, נאפקו, ברמודה, רייס, השבב'
 ושוב פולארד. בשולי רצף זה על מישור ההתייחסות המדינית -
 אסטרטגית נמשך נתקופה זו הדיון באספקת הנשק לסעודיה, בעתידה
 הכלכלי של ישראל ובמדור המזרח-תיכוני, כאשר יותר ויותר
 ROOT CAUSES מואשר במעשי המדור
 עוסקים ב-
 EFFECTS במישור 'ינמוכ' יותר מרצף
 עצמם וב-

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אדוועיס זה גם פרשות מקומיות שאינן מסייעות לתדמיתנו : פרשת המלפונים, פרשת הכושים העבריים, בשבוע זה היטיב לבטא נקודת המבט החדשה ג'ון צ'ינסלור בפרשנות שנתן אמש (5) בחדשות הערב של ABC. לכבוד יום ירושלים פתח צ'ינסלור ואמר שגיונתן פולארד היה בן 12 כאשר שוחררה ירושלים. צ'ינסלור תיאר כיצד נכתב כשטח התרגש יחד עם החיילים ליד הכותל ב-67 והוסיף ששני האדוועיס ייאומרים לנו דבר מה על 19 השנים האחרונות, כמה אהבנו אז בולנו את ישראל, ארץ קטנה ואמיצה... יי וגוי. השינוי בישראל היה בלתי נמנע ומובן.

ישראל שונה, אומר צ'ינסלור, היא זו שעשתה את ה-MESS כלבנון, וישראל שונה היא זו שהביאה את פולארד. היחסים הם מוכים ומוקים ויימשכו, מסיים צ'ינסלור, אך יום ירושלים יימוכיר עד כמה היו היחסים שונים פעם ועד כמה טובים נראו, השבוע לפני 19 שנה.

הארכתי כתיאור דברי צ'ינסלור משום שהם עלולים לבשר את האקלים הצפוי לנו. פרט לניתוח זה עסקו בנו הרשתות השבוע ללא הרף. יום המשפט (4) הניב בצפוי בתבות ב-3 הרשתות. ABC פתחה את מהדורת הערב בפולארד והכתבה, כמו גם דברי הקישור של תום ברקו, התמקדה כמה שער צפוי בחשיפות של ריגול ישראלי. CBS ו-ABC אוכדו את המשפט בפרט חמישי או שישי, אך ככתבות נרחבות אם כי נטו יותר להדגיש שהיחסים לא יפגעו בטווח רחוק.

ABC ייתקנה יי אמש בכתבה של ג'ון מקוואתי על הריגול הישראלי בארה"ב. מקניל-להרד קיימו ריון ארוך בן כ-8 דקות אמש, זו התבטא פקיד לשטבר של ה-CIA על פעולות הריגול העניות של ישראל בארה"ב מאז ומתמיד.

הכיסוי בעתונות הכתובה אינטנסיבי ומעבר לדיווח העובדתי בימים הראשונים של השבוע החלו כבר מאמרי OP-ED ר' מאמרו של ספאיר (ב-5 הוורק) ושל לארס אדיק נלסון ב-DAILY NEWS והיום (הוורק). ה-NY POST הידוע בתמיכתו המתמדת בישראל התייחס גם הוא בחריפות במאמר מערכת ב-4 (הוורק).

בו נוסף נמשכות השאלות בנושא השבבי והיועץ המשפטי. נר' מאמר מערכת ב-NEWSDAY (ב-4). יש הכורכים זאת ר' פולארד בן מאמרו של ספאיר, בן הניתוח של תום פרידמן ב-NYT (היום הוורק). שניהם, אגב, מעלים את השאלה כיצד ייתכן שרפי איתן מונה לתפקיד ממסלתי בביד לאחר פרשת פולארד. היום ראינו גם קטירה של פרשת פולארד אפילו עם פרשיות ברעם ורייס נאמרו של פיאליקה ב-WSJ (היום). ובשולי כל הטיפול היה גם כתבה ב-CBS אמש על דוח' וולד לפיה כוחו של צה"ל אינו למעשה אלא מקסם שווא.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

לסיכום ביניים של פרשת פולארד, על סמך שיחות ומעקב אחר
הביסוי נאמר:

א. הרושם בתקשורת הוא שישראל לא שיתפה פעולה באופן מלא עם
הממשל וכי העלימה מידע בפרשת פולארד.

ב. מחלקת המשפטים יימחפשת את ישראל - לא רק בפחשת פולארד
אלא גם כפרשות ברמודה, נאפקו וכו'.
ג. המסגרת זו ר"ל ראיון ראש ה-FBI ב-DEA דהיום.
ד. האיפול בנושאים ישראלים שונים, לאו דווקא נעימים לנו,
יימשך. שמרה סקפטית כלפינו היא בעת לגיטימית ואופנתית.
בינה. ===

תפ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ממד, רם, אמן, קלוור,י,
מנח, הטברה, לעמ, סניד, דוצ-יס, רוצ, מצפא, פרנ, תפוצות, שטחים,
מתאסשטחים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9688

1101

שמו

אל: המשרד, דר: 199, ט: 1101
דח: ד, סג: ש, תא: 060686, דח: 1700

שמו/רגיל

אל: מצפא, אירופה 1

ואן דר ברוק

מילקוקס:

בשיחת שולץ עם ואן-דר-ברוק לא עלה ספציפית נושא הפגישה עם
עדפאת אלא המזכיר הדגיש את הצורך לחזק מעמדו של חוסיין בשיחה
הועלה כמובן תהליך השלום כללי. וילקוקס העיר שהמפגש לא יזכה
לתהודה ושעמדת האירופאים שונה טתה מאד מאשר בעבר, בזה שהתפקחו
עניינם כלפי אשפי

הדברים הנל הקריא וילקוקס מנייר שקיבל לדבריו מאחד הנוכחים
בשיחה
מתני

תפ: שהח, דהט, שהוט, מוכל, מוכל, ד/מרכו, דס, אמן, ממד, מצפא,
ענוג, אירא, אירד

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9702

0111

ברלין

ל: המשרד, נר: 197, מ: 111
דח: ר, סג: 1, תא: 060686, נח: 1600

בלטס/רגיל

אל: הסברה מעת מצפא ממנכל סמנכל הסברה לשי דנהם לעס דובד
שהל, למח קשה (במחון נר 135- הועבר בנפרד),
דע: ניו יורק (נר 36- הועבר בנפרד)
סקירת העתונות היום לא כללה תמצית המאמרים בנושאי רגול
ופולארד
קטעים אלה הונקו במלואם. (מברקנו 172 ים, ובמחון 119)
עתונות

9: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, שמורק, מעת, הסברה, לעס, סביר

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9696

0131

1101

אל: המשרד, נר: 184, מ: 111
דח: מ: סג: ס, תא: 060686, רח: 1200

סודי/מיד

אל: ממנכ"ל, פרנ'י, מצפא, ממד

סוריה-נשק בימי וכו'

א. כפי שראיתם (נר 159) בשטחי ימי ו לאחר הריון ממושך נולדה הצהרת הממשל על הצבת הגבולות של ייצוא כימיקלים לסוריה. בנוסף לעיראק וליראן מעניינת ההנמקה כפי שנוסחה: מודחק החשש מפעילות סורית ישירה, ומובטחת שאלת האספקה ליראן מס שפתיים וולם לנייטרליות ארה"ב, כביכול, במלחמה-אך ברור מזה זמן לאן נוטה הכף האמריקנית, וההודעה הנוכחית רק מבליטה זאת.

ב. ממד ממשיכה להיות בדשונה בקשר לסורים, על פי הקו הנקוט ביד' NEA, גורם בכיר אחר בממד אישר כי בימים אלה את הידוע לנו, כי אנשי NEA יסידנו להשתבנע' בדבר שאין בו ספק כלל, דהיינו המערובות הסורית בפרשת אל על בלונדון ובטרור בגרמניה. זאת, כיוון שהדבר סתר, נעצם, את הקונצפציה שלהם, אם בדבר דרכי פעולתו של אסד כלא הגיוני שיעשה זאת! ואם בשאלה אם אסד ידע.

מרפי, בשיחה לא מכבר, התייחס להערה קודמת בענין אי דצון NEA להכיר בכך שסוריה עשויה להתנהג לא יפה, באמרו שאם הסורים עשויים לנקוט פעולה מעין זו של אל על בלונדון, המסמעות היא כי כל שינוי בכל המערכת, ובכך, לכאורה, תמונה מסוימת של קונצפציה מול מציאות. דובינשטיין

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהנט, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, ר/מרבו, רס, אמנ, ממד, פרנ'.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מסמך, סיו' 117

מסמך, סיו' 117

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

9670

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0101

שמו

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אל: המשרד, נד: 177, מ: 1100
דח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 060686, רח: 1100

שמו/מייד

אל: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א

סנ: נשק לסעודיה - תוספות לשלנו 156.

1) בהערכת תוצאות המערכה ייתכן שהפרספקטיבה הנכונה מבחינתנו היא השוואת החבילה שאושרה אתמול לרשימת הקניות הנ WISH LIST המקורית של הסעודים. בעת ביקור המלך פהד בוואשינגטון בפברואר 1985 דובר בעיסקה בשווי כולל של כ-4 ביליון דולר, שהיתה אמורה להיות מורכבת ממסוסים מדגם אפי' 16 או 20' יקטימי' לשיכלול מסוסים שבבר בידי הסעודים, טנקים מסוקים וטילים רבים מסוג סטינגר, סיידווינדד והרפון. שווי החבילה ירד לחצי בסתיו אשתקד בעקבות עיסקת המודנאדו נ אם כי יש לציין שככל הנראה הסעודים היו מוכנים בשנה שעברה לקנות גם מסוסי יירוט אמריקאים בנוסף לבריטיים, ויש יסוד להאמין שבין הסיבות להוצאת המסוסים האמריקאים מהחבילה היו ההתנגדות הנמרצת למכירת המסוסים בקונגרס מזה, והחמדת המצב הכלכלי של סעודיה בעקבות הירידה במחירי הנפט מזה). בכל מקרה, שווי החבילה ירד עוד יותר בראשית שנה זו כלביליון אחד) משהחליט הממשל לבקש חבילה לשם שמירת המצב (MAINTENANCE PACKAGE) ותו לא. בשל ההסתייגויות הבלתי פוסקות בקונגרס, עוד הוחלט לפרוט חבילה זו למנות קטנות, כך שבאפריל הוגשה בקשה למכירה מוקטנת למדי, בשווי של 354 מיליון דולר בלבד נדהיינו פחות מעשירית בערכה לעולת ה- WISH LIST המקורית). כידוע, גם מחבילה זו נאלץ הממשל להוציא את הסטינגרים, כך שבסופו של דבר המכירה שאושרה מוסבלת סיידווינדדים ולהרפונים בשווי של 265 מיליון דולר. אנו רק צריכים לתאר לעצמנו כמה היה עולה לנו, צבאית וכספית, אילו מומשה רשימת הקניות המקורית של הסעודים.

2) מעבר לצימצום הדרסטי של תוכן החבילה נמסרו מספר סיגנלים

THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY

WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MAY 1, 2014

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced that it has approved a new round of funding for the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Pilot Program. The program is designed to encourage small businesses to commercialize technology developed by federal agencies. The new round of funding will provide up to \$100,000 in grants to small businesses that have developed a technology that is based on research funded by a federal agency. The program is part of the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Pilot Program, which was established in 2011. The program is designed to encourage small businesses to commercialize technology developed by federal agencies. The new round of funding will provide up to \$100,000 in grants to small businesses that have developed a technology that is based on research funded by a federal agency. The program is part of the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Pilot Program, which was established in 2011. The program is designed to encourage small businesses to commercialize technology developed by federal agencies. The new round of funding will provide up to \$100,000 in grants to small businesses that have developed a technology that is based on research funded by a federal agency.

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AT (202) 950-7000.

ברורים לממשל ולסעודים:-

- לעת עתה לא יאשר הקונגרס נשק נוסף לסעודיה.
- הקונגרס אינו מרוצה מהיחס הסבלני של הממשל כלפי הסעודים.
- הקונגרס אינו מרוצה מהתנהגות הסעודים כלפי ארה"ב בתחומים שונים נקידום אינטרסים אמריקאים, תהליך השלום, מרוד, נפט).

3) אם כי הממשל מציגהיום את תוצאות ההצבעה בסנא אתמול כנצחון, אין איש בר-דעת שסבור כך. ידוע לכל שבסיבוב הראשון סבל הממשל מכה קשה מאד, ובסיבוב השני זכה הנשיא בחודו של קול אחד בלבד - וזאת רק לאחר עמל רב ואי-וודאות עד הרגע האחרון. זאת ועוד: בסופו של דבר, יישם המשחקי לא היה מכירת נשק לסעודיה, אלא יוקרת הנשיא, אמינותו ויכולתו לנהל מדיניות החוץ של ארה"ב.

4) יש מקום לדאגה מהצורה שהוצגה השפעת היהודים לא רק במערכה זו אלא בכל המערכה הפוליטית בארה"ב כיום. כמו כן דיעותיו גבלתי מוסתרות של יו"ר ועדת החוץ, הסנאטור ריצ'ארד לוגר, אינן מדיניות. הוא זה שדיבר בזמנו על מסע "הפחדה" נגד סנאטורים מצד היהודים. הוא זה שגם הציע לנשיא ריגאן שיש לגייס היהודים לתמוך במכירה, ועל ידי כך הפך הנשיא בשלב מסוים לעניין יהודי במקום עניין סעודי, או אמריקאי-סעודי. גם אחרי ההצבעה אתמול הוא נשאר בשלו, במיעונו בפני כתבים שתוצאות ההצבעה החוררת היתה כפי שהיתה רק בגלל תחושת סנאטורים רבים בשנת בחירות שהצבעה בעד העיסקה "תתפרש על ידי אזרחים יהודיים במדינותיהם בהצבעה שלילית, ככה זה פשוט".

5) לדברי אד וולש בעתון וושפוסט היום "יניתוח ההצבעה נותן תימוכין, לכאורה, לשענת לוגרי": רק 4 מתוך 27 הסנאטורים שמתמודדים בבחירות השנה תמכו במכירה נ דול, סנאטור, גרן וקווייל), ולעומתם 5 מתוך 7 הסנאטורים שפורשים השנה תמכו במכירה. נראה שהסנאטור רודי בושביץ לא הועיל בהפגישו את מיכאל גולנד נ מי שתרם לתבוסת הסנאטור פרסי) לסנאטורים שונים - "WITH ALL THE SUBTLETY OF A KNEE TO THE GROIN". בדברי מרק שילדס בעתון וושפוסט אתמול במאמר אופ-אד תחת הכותרת "BIG MONEY AND THE SAUDI VOTE" נ' שלנו 132).

6) רצ"ב חלוקת ההצבעה לפי מפלגות. תמליל הדיון בדפי למד=

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

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עומק 2

אל: המשרד, נר: 193, מ: 110
לח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 060986, רח: 1800

סודי ביותר/מיד

אל: ממנכל-למכרות ולנד.

פולדד

1. משימה עם צירלי היל: אנשי משרד המשפטים, הצועמים על כך שלא קיבלו את כל המידע, כמובטח, נוהגים ביותב מחוזי שיש לו קייס והחומר לליו. מאור מצטרף שיש התבטאויות קשות, אך זהו מצב שקשה לשנותו.

2. משימה עם דניס דוס הממונה על נושאי מזחי ב- NSC: אנשי משרד המשפטים חשים מדומים בעקבות סיפור סלע. נכון-כפי שטענותי-שהדבר אינו מרחיב את ידיעת כל הפרשה, כמו שנדמו עיי המדליפים למיניהם: אך תחושת אלה המאמינים שההסכם הופר היא ההיווצרת את הקושי, וזאת צריך לתקן. אלה המעוניינים לסייע, בבית הללן ובמחטור, נתקלים בקושי זה. הוא מיצר על כך אישית בגלל המשמעות הרגילה כלפי השיתוף האסטרטגי בו תמך כל השנים.

3. יריד טוב יהורי במערכת הבטחון כאן ציין באזני בצער, כי הקרבות האמיתיים של המצב שנוצר, הנראה לו כמשגה אוילי ביותר מצונו, הם היהורים ירירי ישראל במערכת. עם זאת הוסיף, כי מבחינה מהותית אינו צופה פגיעה בשיתוף האסטרטגי, וזאת בין השאר מחמת תחולת הערבים, והחלשת החששות פן יבולע ליחסים עמם. ירידת ערך היחסים עמם מורירה את מחיר השתוף עמנו, שממילא נראה גם לפני כן כרצוי כשלעצמו. משקע פולדד לטווח ארוך יותר הוא שהצטרפות לאותם הנושאים שוב מנפנפים מתגדינו.

דובינסטיין

החל

9: שהח, ממנכל, ממנכל

Page 1 of 1
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202	לש'מנכ"ל; כע"ח; כמנכ"ל אס"ח; המברק; כע"א; כע"ר;	
17	יועץ רוה"מ לחקשורת; יועץ שר"מ לחקשורת; לע"מ; רו"צ.	
57		נושיונל
		תאריך: 07/12/80

News Summary June 6, 1986

Editorials

DN "The Waldheim Disgrace" Waldheim is the heavy favorite to win Austria's election on Sunday. What a disgrace! Even Waldheim's most ardent backers must know by now that he'll never be able to represent Austria honorably in world forums. In fact, several nations may bar him from entry. The one indisputable fact is that Waldheim has been dishonest with Austria, and the world. Austrians should ask themselves if a brazen liar is fit to be their president.

NYP "For History's Sake--A 'Watch' on Waldheim" The Justice Dept. faces a quandary on the Waldheim affair. Messer doesn't want to be seen as influencing an election in a foreign country. But waiting causes a problem because if he wins--as it seems likely--it may be impossible to place him on the "watch list." Foreign heads of state enjoy immunity from domestic laws. Waldheim made fools of the UN and many of its member countries. He will never be brought to trial or justice. Messer should order Waldheim placed on the watch list, its the only lasting judgement that can be rendered.

Columns

NYT-Safire "Rogues Rewarded" Rafi Eitan and Avi Sella are heroes but they appear to have been engaged in activity that is bringing shame and dishonor to their country: hiring a couple of Americans to steal secrets from a nation Israel must depend on for its survival. The Pollards and their spymasters have done more damage to their respective countries than any terrorist could dream of doing. In Washington, Israel's detractors are almost besides themselves with glee. Jewish Americans are furious and justifiably so. The question now is who in Israel know? The line put out was that this whole operation was a "rouge." If true, the rouges were well financed. The rouges provided stacks of material; did nobody in Peres's Gov't ask how all this stuff was obtained? If the Pollards' confession is true, four Israelis are guilty of violating US Criminal Code sections 641 (theft) and 794 (espionage). They should be prosecuted, they belong in jail. Instead, Eitan was given a plush job in industry; the airforce officer was promoted to general. Is there nobody in power in Israel who will say, "Is this right?"

DN-Nelson "Roots of Pollard Case Run Deep in Israel" A few years ago, an

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Israeli general named Yekutiel Adom met an American Jewish college professor at a restaurant in Washington. "He wanted me to compile lists of Jewish graduate students studying electronics--real super-duper ones," the professor recalled yesterday. "He told me to find Orthodox Jews; he said they were the most reliable." The intent was both clumsy and clear: Israel needs an ongoing source of intelligence in the sophisticated US electronics industry, and it was hoping to recruit young American Jews, it is hard to imagine anything more politically reckless than trying to use American Jews to betray their citizenship and spy for Israel. For all the friendship between our two countries, Israel is a sovereign state, not our pet. Its gov't is duty bound to protect its national security. If Israel suspects the US is making secret deals with its Arab enemies or selling them sophisticated weapons, it must do its best by fair means or foul, to find out. That is a matter of national survival. But when caught, pretenses must stop. Pollard was no lone spy. To believe that Peres and Arens didn't know about a major, expensive, full scale military espionage operation against their closest ally and biggest benefactor is an insult to their intelligence.

NYT-Gerhard Waldheim "Why the Critics are Unfair" "Since even my father's critics have had to admit that he was not personally involved in war crimes, two issues remain: that he was less than forthcoming about his wartime record, and the guilt-by-association charges--what did he know and what he could have done about it." Waldheim's book, "In the Eye of the Storm" made reference to his return to military service after 1942, in the German edition. There was, most definitely, a reluctance to talk much about those darkest years of history, a reluctance typical of those--as he--who had to cope with a war whose cause they did not support. But there was clearly no cover-up. Waldheim was not a Nazi. This has been documented in a 1979 US report and by the President of Austria this year, and by Wiesenthal. In the Balkans, Waldheim has no powers of command. "I and many young people in Austria are sad that bad feelings have been aroused against a man who showed active support for the Jewish people as Foreign Minister by having Austria act as a transit haven and first asylum for the emigration of Soviet Jews." The vast majority of Austrians feel compassion with the sufferings of Holocaust victims.

NYT-Menachem Rosensaft "He Can't Be Exonerated Of His Guilt" Waldheim may not in fact have been a war criminal. But that hardly exonerates him of guilt for his participation in the absolute evil of the Hitler era. From 1939 to 1945, he was a willing and apparently enthusiastic servant of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. At the very least, he closed his eyes to the deportations of Greek Jews to Auschwitz that were taking place beneath his nose. He failed to protest even a single atrocity, he endorsed all the reprehensible policies of the Hitler regime. In matters of historical responsibility, no one is only a little bit guilty.

Press Reports

Pollard Tells of Other Israeli Spy Operations

NYT-p.l-Shanon-Pollard has begun providing the Justice Dept. with information about a number of Israeli espionage operations in the US, senior Reagan Administration officials said. The evidence he will give is part of his plea bargain agreement. One highly placed Administration source said

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the amount of Israeli spying in the US would "surprise many people as evidence turns up." Pollard has not implicated other Americans. The inquiry focuses on Israelis and other foreigners but no other details were provided. Despite promises of full cooperation from the Israelis, the Dir. of the FBI, William Webster, said Israeli assistance has been limited. He described the lack of cooperation as "disappointing but, considering the nature of intelligence gathering, it's not really surprising." Justice Dept. officials vowed to conduct a widespread investigation of all allegations that the operation involving Pollard was much larger than originally reported. A senior dept. official strongly indicated that information from Pollard might lead to criminal charges against Israeli officials. But another Administration official said the case would not have long-lasting effects on US-Israeli relations. Law-enforcement agents were puzzled over the decision to use Pollard and said it didn't fit the usual Israeli pattern.

Israel-Iran Arms Connection

WSJ-Fialka-Federal investigators are turning up new evidence of an "Israel connection" between arms merchants and clandestine shipments of weapons to Iran. Court papers show that Pollard had been asked by the Israelis to search US intelligence files for US analysis of foreign missile systems used by other non-Communist countries that might fit the military needs of Iran. US officials say mounting evidence suggests Israeli-connected weapons are a vital source of US military parts, ammunition and equipment for Iran. US investigators have turned up three other cases of attempted Iranian weapons deals in which the middlemen had either direct or indirect connections to the Israeli military or Israel's defense industries, in this past year alone.

Who Controls Israel's Spies?

NYT-Friedman-The Pollard case, coupled with the latest domestic intelligence scandal, has raised questions among Israeli officials and politicians about who is in control of Israel's intelligence services. It is hard to decide which is worse, that Israeli political officials did not know about the spying, or to believe that the politicians have not been candid. A senior Israeli official said Israel believed that elements of the Justice Dept. are "trying to blow the whole business out of proportion," adding, "We cooperated fully with the American investigators in this matter and have nothing more to say." American and Israeli officials say it is not inconceivable that Eitan, who had a substantial budget and a reputation for independence, could have engaged in an unauthorized operation. However, evidence produced suggests otherwise. An air force colonel was involved and the Israeli Air Force is probably the most tightly controlled bureaucracy in Israel. Furthermore, Sella was promoted to brigadier general. The idea that the Air Force would hand over such responsibility to a man who was involved for more than a year in an unauthorized espionage operation strains believability, Israeli analysts say. Eitan was given the job of chairman of the board of Israel Chemicals, the nation's largest owned state industry. How could Israel reward a spy who had, in the Government's own words, violated the basic rules of Israeli intelligence gathering? Like the Pollard affair, the Shin Beth case raises questions about the politicians' judgement and control. "Shamir is in this mess up to his neck, the Koteret Rasheet editor said.

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"Peres is only into it up to his knees." According to political sources, the top 9 out of 10 officials in the Shin Beth said they would resign if Peres goes ahead with an investigation. This would leave Peres open to charges of having stripped Israel of its main security shield against terrorism. One reason that Israel is having problems controlling its intelligence service is because of the weakness of the government.

US To Grill Israeli Mastermind

NYP-Latham & Dan-Israel has agreed reluctantly to let American investigators interrogate Avi Sella, the key figure in the Pollard Case. Sella's role is a crucial point because Peres never mentioned Sella in his "official apology" to the US. Peres pledged his government's full cooperation with the investigation but Sella's role was never disclosed. This infuriated the US and led swiftly to the suspicion that the spy ring was more widespread than first believed.

Israelis Accused in the Case

NYT-Biographical data on Eitan, Erb, Yagur and Sella.

Israel's Search for Economic Growth

NYT-Silk-The sharp cuts in its budget deficits have given Israel the opportunity to restructure its economy from one overwhelmingly dominated by the Gov't to one in which private investment can provide the thrust for vigorous growth. Some economists fear that the Government's appetite for control has been curbed only temporarily. The great issue for Israel--and for the Arab states around it--is whether economics can be made to serve the interests of peace, not war.

US Includes Syria in Chemical Ban

NYT-Gwertzman-The US announced that it was banning the sale to Syria of 8 chemicals that might be used to help Iran develop mustard gas and nerve gases for use in its war against Iraq. The announcement followed the receipt of intelligence information that Syria has begun to produce its own chemical weapons and has been discussing cooperation in this field with Iran.

Senate Opposes Arms for Saudis

NYT-p.l-Roberts-Reagan won a narrow victory in the Senate as his supporters mustered enough votes to allow the sale of advanced missiles to Saudi Arabia. The margin was a single vote. 8 Senators who switched their votes cited the reasons the Administration's removal of Stingers. (see NYT-Tolchin; NYP-AP)

Waldheim

NYT-special-The French Gov't said that a junior French official in West Berlin inspected the WW II military records of Waldheim while he was still UN Sec. Gen. Chirac's spokesman said the Gov't was still trying to find out why the inspection was made and whether it was ordered by the Gov't then in office. He added that he did not think the officer wrote a

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report based on the Berlin records. Austrian and West German officials also inspected the military records. If substantiated, these reports mean that all three governments were at least in a position to know that Waldheim had given a falsified account of his war record while he was still Sec. Gen.

DN-Volz-Meese is expected to order that Waldheim be put on a "watch list" that would bar him from the US. But a gov't source said Waldheim probably would be allowed to visit the US with diplomatic immunity.

ND-Mulvaney-In Vienna, even Waldheim's opponents give him the benefit of doubt. He is not believed to be a criminal, just a link in a chain. He is viewed as an average Austrian.

Battles in Beirut Resume

NYT-Reuters-Heavy artillery and rocket fire engulfed Beirut's refugee districts as Syrian-backed Shiites carried their offensive against Palestinians into a third week. The death toll exceeded 100.

Weinberger Warns Terrorist Diplomats

ND-combined-Weinberger said that the US and other countries should consider ending criminal immunity for diplomats who plan to take part in terrorist incidents.

US Assets Left in Iran

NYT-special-When the Shah fell from power, most Americans quickly packed up and left, but the superintendent of the American School in Teheran stayed behind to sell off the school's assets and to pay off faculty members and others to whom it had debts. The school gave the US Embassy several automobiles to auction off for them. The embassy did and kept the \$13,333 in its sale. But the embassy was the last place to keep anything safe in Iran. The school has not gotten all of its money back and plans to sue the Iranian gov't for lost assets.

Money Raised to Help Israel Improve PR

NYT-Anderson & Dunlop-The American Jewish Congress raised \$200,000 at a dinner Wed. night, to be used to teach PR skills to Israeli Gov't spokesmen. The Hasbara Project, an internship program established 2 years ago, trains foreign-service officers communications by placing them with American companies.

Book Review

NYT-Gross reviews "Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry Into Conflict and Prejudice" by Bernard Lewis. Lewis takes guarded comfort in the fact that Moslems, even when they are anti-Semitic, seldom show the kind of deep visceral loathing that was typical of the classic anti-Semite in Europe. It is less pathological and will probably diminish if there is an easing of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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DISTINGUISHED FELLOW MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, IT IS A PLEASURE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS NOTEWORTHY CONFERENCE. I OFFER YOU MY CONGRATULATIONS FOR ORGANIZING SUCH AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA ON WHAT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, ONE OF THE MOST VEXING PROBLEMS FACING AMERICA AND OTHER CIVILIZED PEOPLES.

FROM 1975 THROUGH 1985, MORE THAN 6,200 TERRORIST INCIDENTS WERE RECORDED WORLDWIDE. THE TRAIL OF CARNAGE INCLUDES SOME 4,700 DEAD AND MORE THAN 9,000 INJURED. IN 1985, THERE WERE MORE THAN 800 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS, A 60 PERCENT INCREASE OVER THE RATE OF THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS. IN ALL LAST YEAR, THERE WERE 2,223 CASUALTIES ATTRIBUTABLE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACK. BUT WE HAVE NO WAY TO MEASURE THE TOLL IN TERMS OF HUMAN MISERY, FRAGMENTED SOCIETIES, AND SHATTERED FAMILIES.

THE U.S. PRESENCE ABROAD HAS BECOME A PRIME TARGET FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS --A TARGET BECAUSE WE ARE THE SYMBOL OF THE SUCCESS OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, BECAUSE WE STAND FOR FULFILLMENT OF HUMAN ASPIRATIONS BY NON VIOLENT MEANS, AND BECAUSE, BY RENOUNCING VIOLENCE EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE, WE BECOME MORE VULNERABLE TO THEM. SINCE 1969, TERRORISTS HAVE KILLED OR MAIMED MORE THAN 1,000 AMERICANS. DURING THE PAST DECADE, TERRORIST ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND INSTALLATIONS ABROAD HAVE AVERAGED ONE EVERY 17 DAYS. IN FACT, SINCE 1969, ALMOST 50 PERCENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS. THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, U.S. BUSINESSMEN, PUBLIC SERVANTS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, EDUCATORS AND CHURCHMEN ARE TARGETS OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM NOT ONLY ENDANGERS AMERICAN LIVES, IT ALSO THREATENS TO CORRODE OUR IDEALS, OUR SOCIAL ORDER, AND THE FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF OUR CIVILIZATION.

OUR RESPONSE TO TERRORISM WILL BE THE MEASURE OF OUR CHARACTER AS A SOCIETY. THE FEAR ENGENDERED BY THE RANDOM AND BLOODY CHARACTER OF TERRORISM MAY TEMPT SOME TO GRASP FOR EXTREME SOLUTIONS. ON THE ONE HAND, A TOTAL CRACKDOWN MAY ENDANGER THE POLITICAL LIBERTIES SUCH ACTION SEEKS TO PROTECT--THE CURE CAN OFTEN BE MORE DEADLY THAN THE DISEASE. ON THE OTHER HAND, DESPAIR AT EVER DEFEATING THE TERRORISTS CAN SET IN, PARALYZING POLICY WHILE IT PERMITS VIOLENCE TO SPREAD. WE MUST STEER CLEAR OF BOTH OF THESE PATHS TOWARD SOCIAL DECAY. WE MUST MEET THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM WITHOUT BEING OVERWHELMED BY IT. TERRORISM IS A PROBLEM THAT CANNOT BE SOLVED SIMPLY BY CHANGES IN POLICY. INNOVATION IS NEEDED, BUT IT MUST BE WEDDED TO PERSEVERANCE, TO PRUDENCE AND TO AN APPRECIATION OF THE MANY SIDES OF MODERN TERRORISM.

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THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS CONSTANTLY CHANGING AS IT INCREASES IN SCALE. THERE ARE SEVERAL DISCERNABLE AND ALARMING TRENDS. THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST GROUPS HAS MULTIPLIED. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN THE ADVENT, OR AT LEAST THE RESURGENCE, OF SUICIDAL TERRORISTS AND OF FANATICAL, PSEUDO-RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES THAT EXTOLL TERRORISM. TERRORISTS HAVE DEVELOPED COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS. THEY HAVE GAINED BETTER ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL ARMS MARKETS, AND HAVE ACQUIRED MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES. THEY HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY ADEPT AT MANUFACTURING THEIR OWN BOMBS AND ROCKETS. SOME TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE BECOME ADEPT AT FOILING INTERNAL SECURITY, USING STRICT COMPARTMENTATION, FORGED IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS, DISGUISES, AND CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS.

TERRORISTS HAVE REFINED THEIR PLANNING, INTELLIGENCE AND TARGETTING METHODS, OFTEN SURVEILLING THEIR VICTIMS FOR MONTHS, PREPARING DETAILED MAPS, AND ASSEMBLING EXTENSIVE PHOTOGRAPHIC HISTORIES OF THE FACILITIES THEY INTEND TO ATTACK. AS THE UNITED STATES HAS ENHANCED THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF ITS OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS OVERSEAS, AND HAS TRAINED ITS PERSONNEL TO DETECT AND COUNTER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, THE TERRORISTS HAVE SHIFTED THEIR ATTACKS TO "SOFT" TARGETS--TO BUSINESSMEN AND TOURISTS, OFFICE BUILDINGS AND NIGHTCLUBS.

TERRORISTS HAVE DISCOVERED NEW SOURCES OF FUNDING THROUGH CRIME. IN ADDITION TO THEIR TRADITIONAL BANK ROBBERIES, THEY HAVE ENTERED THE LUCRATIVE NARCOTICS TRADE. TERRORISTS HAVE BECOME SKILLED MANAGERS OF THEIR FINANCIAL ASSETS, USING SECRET BANKING CHANNELS, AND INVESTING LARGE SUMS IN LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES IN THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE. FINALLY, WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE SPREAD OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM. TERRORISTS HAVE FORMED PARTNERSHIPS WITH RADICAL REGIMES THAT OFFER FUNDS, WEAPONS, PARAMILITARY TRAINING, SANCTUARY, AND A MOUTHPIECE FOR PROPAGANDA AND CLAIMS TO LEGITIMACY.

THERE IS SURELY A NEED FOR NEW APPROACHES THAT COMBINE PRAGMATISM AND MORAL VISION. THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM DOES NOT FIT NEATLY INTO OUR PRESENT SYSTEM OF LAWS. IT IS NOT A TRADITIONAL LEGAL SUBJECT. WE WILL FAIL TO ADDRESS THE REALITY OF TERRORISM AND TO DEAL WITH IT EFFECTIVELY, IF, AS LAWYERS, WE CONFINE OUR THINKING TO FAMILIAR CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL PROCESS OR CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE CHALLENGE IS SQUARELY BEFORE OUR COMMUNITY OF ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL SCHOLARS TO DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK, IN HARMONY WITH OUR LIBERAL VALUES, FOR DECISIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST TERRORISTS. THE ENEMIES OF OUR CIVILIZATION, INDEED THE TERRORISTS THEMSELVES, WILL EXPLOIT ANY DEFINITION WE CHOOSE IN ORDER TO FOG OUR VISION AND TO PROMOTE THEIR PERVERTED DOGMA. MR. ORTEGA OF NICARAGUA AND MR. QADAFI OF LIBYA, AMONG OTHERS, HAVE ALREADY, IN CHORUS, ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES OF "STATE TERRORISM." THEY APPARENTLY HAVE LEARNED A LESSON FROM MOSCOW THAT MORAL TRUTH CAN BE OBSCURED BY A BARRAGE OF MISNOMERS, BY THE INVERSION OF LANGUAGE, AND BY LIES REPEATED LOUDLY AND OFTEN.

MORE OUTRAGEOUS AND INSIDIOUS IS THE CRY, REPEATED EVEN IN OUR COUNTRY, THAT "ONE MAN'S TERRORIST IS ANOTHER MAN'S FREEDOM-FIGHTER." CONSIDER THE GROUPS PRESIDENT REAGAN CALLS FREEDOM-FIGHTERS, SUCH AS THE MUJAHEDIN STRUGGLING TO OUST A SOVIET-AFGHAN PUPPET REGIME, WHICH, JOINED WITH THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES, HAS MASSACRED AND ENSLAVED THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. ARE THE MUJAHEDIN NO DIFFERENT FROM ABU ABBAS, WHOSE THUGS MAKE THEIR POLITICAL STATEMENT BY SHOOTING LEON KLINGHOFFER IN HIS WHEELCHAIR AND TOSSING HIM INTO THE SEA? IF WE FAIL TO MAKE A DISTINCTION HERE, WE ARE ALREADY PHILOSOPHICALLY AND MORALLY DEAD. WE CAN WRING OUR HANDS AND REPEAT SOVIET CLAPTRAP THAT ASSERTS MORAL EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR. BUT IF WE DO, THEN THE TERRORISTS WILL HAVE WON.

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I HAVE SPOKEN IN THE PAST ABOUT THE NEED TO MAINTAIN OUR BEARINGS IN THIS WILDERNESS OF LANGUAGE AND EMPTY THINKING. FOR OUR RESISTANCE TO TERRORISM, THIS NEED IS ACUTE. THE LEGAL PROFESSION BEARS A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY TO GUIDE THE DISCOURSE ON TERRORISM, SO THAT ABSTRACT FORMULAE DO NOT PREVAIL OVER MORAL VERITIES, SO THAT WE INTELLECTUALLY CAPTURE, AND AGGRESSIVELY ACT AGAINST, THE ONSLAUGHT OF TERRORISM, AND SO THAT WE DO NOT SUCCUMB TO THE SOPHISTRY OF QADAFI AND HIS FRIENDS. THE THINKING OF OUR LEGAL COMMUNITY WILL REFLECT OUR POLITICAL AND MORAL VALUES, AND WILL ALSO INFLUENCE THEM, BECAUSE LEGAL DOCTRINES SEEP INTO, AND BECOME PART OF OUR CULTURE. IF WE SOW CONFUSION BY LANGUAGE CUT LOOSE FROM VALUES, WE WILL REAP CONFUSION, AND TERROR.

TERRORISTS HAVE BECOME ADEPT AT USING THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO CLAIM EQUAL STANDING WITH SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS, AND TO POSTURE AS LEGITIMATE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. THEY IN EFFECT PURSUE A TWO-TRACK POLICY: 1) THEY DEMAND A SEAT AT THE FORUM OF NATIONS, WHILE PURSUING A CAMPAIGN OF MURDER AND DESTRUCTION; AND, 2) THEY SEEK RECOGNITION BOTH THROUGH DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, AND THROUGH FEAR COUPLED WITH EXTORTION. SADLY, MANY GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAVE CAPITULATED TO THIS TACTIC IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. IN PARTICULAR, AN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC GATHERING THAT CONVENED IN 1974 TO IMPROVE UPON THE 1948 GENEVA CONVENTIONS ON HUMANITARIAN RULES OF WAR, INVITED THE PLO AND OTHER SO-CALLED "NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" TO PARTICIPATE. AT THE URGING OF THE PLO AND ITS KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS, THE CONFERENCE ADOPTED A PROTOCOL THAT WOULD CLASSIFY SO-CALLED "STRUGGLES OF PEOPLES AGAINST COLONIAL...AND ALIEN...AND...RACIST REGIMES" AS "INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS" UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS. THE PROTOCOL PROVIDES THAT COMBATANTS NEED NOT DISTINGUISH THEMSELVES FROM CIVILIANS UNTIL THE ACTUAL POINT OF ARMED ENGAGEMENT.

THE NET RESULT WOULD BE TO GIVE TERRORISTS, DRESSED AS CIVILIANS, WHO KILL INDISCRIMINATELY WITH CONCEALED WEAPONS, THE SAME STATUS AS UNIFORMED SOLDIERS OPENLY ENGAGED AGAINST OPPOSING MILITARY FORCES. THE NEW PROTOCOL WOULD LEGITIMATE THE TERRORISTS' PRACTICE OF CONCEALING THEMSELVES AMONG CIVILIAN POPULATIONS. BY REMOVING THE VISIBLE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN NON-COMBATANTS AND SOLDIERS, THE PROTOCOLS WOULD MAKE EVERY CITIZEN SUSPECT AND SUBJECT TO REPRISALS. THE PROTECTED STATUS OF CIVILIANS, AT THE HEART OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, WAS TRAGICALLY WEAKENED.

IN A GRAVE LAPSE OF JUDGMENT, THE UNITED STATES SIGNED BOTH OF THE NEW PROTOCOLS IN 1977. SECRETARY SHULTZ, ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE, AND I RECOMMENDED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT HE NOT SUBMIT THE NEW PROTOCOL TO THE SENATE FOR RATIFICATION. IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO OPPOSE THE DEGRADATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, TO RESIST OTHER MANEUVERS BY TERRORIST GROUPS FOR LEGAL STATUS AND PRIVILEGES, AND TO PREVENT SUCH MANEUVERS FROM SUBVERTING THE LEGAL PROCESS. WE MUST PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS. THE SPECTACLE IS ALL TOO FAMILIAR: TERRORISTS USING LEGAL FORUMS AS A THEATER TO PUBLICIZE THEIR HATRED AND TO DISPLAY THEIR CONTEMPT FOR THE VALUES THAT ARE THE ESSENCE OF LAW.

THERE ARE OTHER IMPERATIVE LEGAL ISSUES. WE MUST STEADFASTLY PRESERVE THE PRESIDENT'S FREEDOM OF ACTION TO PROTECT U.S. CITIZENS FROM TERRORIST ACTS. THE PRESIDENT MUST HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO CHOOSE THE MOST JUDICIOUS AND EFFECTIVE COURSE OF ACTION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE, AND TO ACT QUICKLY, SECRETLY, AND DECISIVELY. THE PRESIDENT HAS THIS AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND IT MUST BE PRESERVED.

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WE MUST ASSERT THE RIGHT TO PROSECUTE TERRORISTS FOR THE CRIMES THEY COMMIT. IN 1984, CONGRESS ENACTED NEW LAWS EXTENDING U.S. JURISDICTION IN INSTANCES OF HOSTAGE TAKING. LEGISLATION IS NOW PENDING THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY EXPAND FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO PROSECUTE TERRORISTS WHO ATTACK U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD A CRIME. THIS AND OTHER MEANS OF PROSECUTION SHOULD BE PURSUED INTENSIVELY.

WE SHOULD ALSO STRENGTHEN AND EXTEND OUR EXTRADITION TREATIES TO REACH TERRORISTS IN ALL NATIONS THAT WILL COOPERATE WITH US. THIS INCLUDES, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE TERRORISTS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. POLITICAL VIOLENCE HAS NO PLACE IN A DEMOCRACY. WE, THEREFORE, HOPE THAT THE SENATE SOON WILL RATIFY THE SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH THE ABA HAS ENDORSED. AT THE VERY LEAST, TERRORISTS SHOULD BE FORCED TO HIDE IN THE EMBRACE OF THE WRETCHED REGIMES THAT COLLUDE WITH THEM.

WE CANNOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT, BY ANY REALISTIC APPRAISAL, AND IN THE TERRORISTS' OWN TERMS, THEY ARE AT WAR WITH OUR SOCIETY. INDEED, IN ONE SENSE, IT IS THE MOST EXTREME AND IMMORAL FORM OF WARFARE; CITIZENS WHO HAVE NO AFFILIATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OR THE MILITARY ARE INDISCRIMINATELY KILLED TO DEMORALIZE THE ADVERSARY. OUR PRESIDENT MUST BE PERMITTED TO MEET THIS ENEMY UNDER THE RULES THAT ALLOW NATIONS TO USE FORCE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES.

OUR GOVERNMENT RESERVES THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, AS A LAST RESORT, AGAINST A STATE OR FOREIGN ORGANIZATION THAT WILLFULLY ORDERS THE MURDER OF U.S. CITIZENS OR THE DESTRUCTION OF U.S. INSTALLATIONS. WE RECENTLY EXERCISED THAT RIGHT IN LIBYA. THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS, WHICH WE EXERCISED IN LIBYA, IS A MATTER OF NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER.

OF COURSE WE MUST NEVER REFLEXIVELY RESORT TO A MILITARY OPTION. IN FACT, THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS DEVELOPED A BROAD RANGE OF INITIATIVES TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THESE INCLUDE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE, ECONOMIC LEVERAGE, POLITICAL ACTION, IMPROVED SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND A VARIETY OF OTHER MEASURES. OUR RESPONSE TO TERRORISM IS CAREFULLY CRAFTED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES, AND EMPLOYS ALL OF THESE MEASURES TO MAKE THEM COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE NON-MILITARY APPROACHES IS ALWAYS INCREASED, HOWEVER, IF THOSE WHO USE AND EXPORT TERRORISM UNDERSTAND THAT, BEHIND THESE MEASURES STANDS THE MIGHT OF OUR ARMED FORCES THAT CAN ADMINISTER A RESPONSE CAPABLE OF DETERRING FUTURE ACTS. THE TERRORISTS MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS A HEAVY COST TO THEIR ACTS OF TERRORISM, AND THAT THAT COST WILL BE BROUGHT HOME TO THE LEADERS AND EXECUTIONERS OF TERRORISM.

THERE IS ALSO IMPORTANT LEGAL WORK TO BE DONE ON THE ISSUE OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM. THE GOVERNMENTS OF LIBYA, SYRIA, IRAN, CUBA, AND NICARAGUA, NOT TO MENTION THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE FROM TIME TO TIME ALLIED THEMSELVES WITH TERRORIST FANATICS AS A MEANS OF SPREADING THEIR INFLUENCE, OR TO DESTABILIZE WESTERN SOCIETY. THESE GOVERNMENTS PROVIDE EVERYTHING FROM FUNDS, WEAPONS, AND TERRORIST TRAINING TO OPEN POLITICAL SUPPORT AND SANCTUARY. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HAS REACHED NEW LEVELS OF DESTRUCTIVENESS THROUGH THIS SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP OF TERRORISTS WITH ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. EMBASSIES ARE USED AS TERRORIST ARSENALS AND PLANNING CENTERS, AND SO-CALLED "DIPLOMATS" ACTUALLY PLAN AND ORCHESTRATE MURDERS AND BOMBINGS IN THE NATIONS HOSTING THEM.

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YET UNDER THE PREVAILING LAW OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, THE EMBASSY IS A SANCTUARY; THERE IS NO RECOURSE AGAINST THE SO-CALLED "DIPLOMAT" EXCEPT EXPULSION. I THINK WE SHOULD EXAMINE, VERY CAREFULLY, THE WHOLE IDEA OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGE EXTENDING TO SUPPORT OF TERRORISM. SURELY, WE CAN PRESERVE THE GOOD PURPOSES OF THE DOCTRINES OF SOVEREIGN AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WITHOUT CLOAKING TERRORISTS IN THOSE PRIVILEGES. WE SHOULD REMEMBER THE 1984 INCIDENT WHEN LIBYA DISPATCHED ITS EMISSARIES TO LONDON TO EXECUTE LIBYAN EXILES THERE. THE MURDERERS BARRICADED THEMSELVES IN THE LIBYAN EMBASSY, AND, FROM INSIDE THE EMBASSY, THEY MACHINE-GUNNED ANTI-QADAFI PROTESTERS, WOUNDING TEN. THEY ALSO KILLED A BRITISH POLICEWOMAN. THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES SURROUNDED THE EMBASSY WHILE THEY CONSIDERED WHAT ACTIONS TO TAKE, THEN QADAFI'S THUGS SURROUNDED THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI. THUS QADAFI NOT ONLY USED HIS DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES IN SERVICE OF TERRORISM BUT ALSO ENFORCED THOSE PRIVILEGES BY TERRORISM. THE LIBYAN MURDERERS WERE ACCORDED SANCTUARY FROM ARREST WHILE INSIDE THE LONDON EMBASSY, AND ULTIMATELY WERE GIVEN FREE PASSAGE TO TRIPOLI. THE BRITISH HAD EARLIER, WITH GREAT SKILL AND DARING, STORMED THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN LONDON, KILLING A GANG OF TERRORISTS WHO THREATENED TO REND THE FABRIC OF LAW AT WILL.

UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, I SUBMIT THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE DOCTRINE OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. THE TASK REMAINS FOR OUR DIPLOMATS WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION TO DEFINE THOSE LIMITS. DIPLOMATIC TITLE MUST NOT CONFER A LICENSE TO MURDER.

FINALLY, I HOPE OUR INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS CAN FORGE A WORLD ALLIANCE AGAINST TERRORISM. OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE EXPELLED LIBYAN DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND HAVE BEGUN TO SEVER ECONOMIC TIES WITH LIBYA. BRITAIN, GERMANY, FRANCE, ITALY, DENMARK, LUXEMBOURG, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND SPAIN HAVE ALL TAKEN POSITIVE ACTIONS. WE HOPE THAT WE ARE SEEING THE EMERGENCE OF A CONSENSUS THAT WILL EVOLVE INTO TREATIES OR INTO INTERNATIONAL LAW. A GREAT DEAL NEEDS TO BE DONE TO REMOVE THE MANY RECENTLY CRAFTED DOCTRINES THAT HAVE TOO FREQUENTLY PLACED INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE SERVICE OF THOSE WHO USE POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

CERTAINLY WE HAVE ENOUGH REASON TO FEAR TERRORISM, BUT EQUALLY, HAVE WE NOT REASON ENOUGH TO AVOID BEING GOVERNED BY OUR FEARS? THE LEGAL COMMUNITY MUST BRING TO BEAR ON THIS ISSUE A RARE MEASURE OF ITS TALENT, PRUDENCE AND DEDICATION TO LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. WE WOULD ALL WELCOME YOUR BOLD INNOVATIVE SPIRIT IN THIS EFFORT TO PRESERVE AND PROTECT THE VALUES THAT DEFINE FREEDOM AND SELF-GOVERNMENT.

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*****FOLLOWING IS ON BACKGROUND*****

*****RESUME ON-THE-RECORD*****

Q Is this a private meeting?

Q As long as you're on that, do you have any details of the helicopter crash this morning?

MR. KALB: Well, what I have on that was just very quickly put together in the last few minutes prior to my coming out here. But I've been told that King Hussein is fine. And having said that by way of the headline, let me just add that the details that are available at this point here are somewhat sketchy. And if I could share with you our appreciation of the situation as of now, it's something like this:

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Three helicopters had been offered to the King Hussein party by the Sikorski (?) Corporation. But there was bad weather in the Boston area, and in fact it was so bad that a decision was made by the Hussein party not to use the helicopters, but rather to proceed to their destinations using automobiles. The three helicopters were reportedly returning to their home base when one of them crashed. We understand that all on board -- two pilots and two mechanics -- were killed. There is no indication that anything besides bad weather was involved.

Q Well, Bernie, on that point, is there any effort going to be made to follow up on it to see if there might conceivably have been something else involved?

MR. KALB: Well, I'm sure that there will be all the necessary follow-ups that take place in situations such as these. But as I say, this was just put together very, very quickly in the last few minutes prior to my arrival here. And I was seeking to find out about the King in some details, and that's about all I have at this point.

Q Bernie, on the visit itself, what can you tell us about where we are in the peace process and what you anticipate will be discussed with the King?

MR. KALB: Well, as I noted earlier, the King is coming here to attend the graduation of his children,

and that the President has invited the King to meet with him, Monday at the White House. And we have some idea of the time, I think it's somewhere elevenish but I can't be exact on that. The King, as you know, is a long-standing and valued friend of the United States. It is only natural that the President would wish to see the King while the King was visiting the United States. In the course of his stay here, the King will be meeting with other U.S. officials. That is to say, in addition to the President, he will be meeting with Vice President Bush as well. He will also be meeting with Secretary Shultz and other senior officials during the course of the King's stay here in Washington.

Q But I mean have the basic subjects for discussion -- like the Saudi sale, for example --

MR. KALB: I wouldn't be in a position where I would rule various things in or out. I think it's an agenda that we're all quite familiar with, without my needing to be specific.

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Q Has the Secretary decided against going to the Middle East?

MR. KALB: I have nothing to take that story, about the possibility or non-possibility of a Secretarial trip to the Middle East, beyond where it was left several days ago.

Q How long is the King's visit here?

MR. KALB: I don't have a time on that. I think the White House, having made the announcement, would have all the details. I can get that for you very quickly later.

Q Bernie, do you think -- visit now -- he's stronger or weaker than his last visit? His position --

MR. KALB: I'm not going to get involved in speculation along the line of your question.

Q (inaudible)

MR. KALB: That will be my reply. I congratulate you on the question, and I hope you can accept my response in the same spirit.

Q There have been a lot of reports, and most of them not from the State Department, on the state of Israel-American relations in the aftermath of the plea-bargaining by Mr. Pollard and his wife. Much of it is criticism of Israel for not being more forthcoming in the discussions. There's a suggestion that the State Department was misled last December. Do you have anything at all on this?

MR. KALB: Nope, I do not.

Q Does the Secretary have any views on Israel?

MR. KALB: Nope, I don't have anything to share with you on that.

Q Well do you have anything on what recommends that Israel is not cooperating fully with --

MR. KALB: I'm not going to get involved with what Judge Webster said. I will simply reiterate what you've heard on more than one occasion in a general response to a question along those lines. That, as has been said from the very outset of this case, we said we would expect full cooperation from the government of Israel until the case is closed. That is still our position.

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Q The question is are you getting that?

MR. KALB: I have been asked that a number of times, and I have referred you back to the very sentence I have just said.

Q Bernie, your announcement of the December 20th, that the King --

MR. KALB: My what?

Q The announcement of the State Department of December 20th, that the case was closed last year, could you consider that it was premature to make the announcement that the case was closed?

MR. KALB: I think that was the assessment at that particular point. Beyond that, I have nothing to add.

Q Is Prime Minister Peres coming --

MR. KALB: I don't have anything on that.

Q Well let me ask a couple of other questions. Two of the people named, Mr. Ikon(?) and the Air Force general, were both promoted, in a sense, in the wake of the spy revelations. Do you have any comment on that -- the way it was treated by the Israelis, almost praise for their work, in effect.

MR. KALB: I think I've said, and Chuck has said, that neither of us will be drawn into any speculation or comments while the case is still under investigation, as it still is. Max?

Q Bernie, there were some reports from Israel this morning that some people in the government there ascribe the victory for the President on the Saudi arms sale to the aftermath of this case. Do you see any connection between the two?

MR. KALB: I don't have anything to say on that. I think the case--the case of the Saudi case that the President and the administration had set forth was the basis for the voting that did in fact take place. And the White House issued a statement in the aftermath of the vote, and I refer you to that statement.

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Q Does the return of PLO fighters to Lebanon violate any agreement reached with the US and Lebanon in '82?

MR. KALB: Don't have anything on that.

Q Can you take it?

MR. KALB: Let me see whether I can, without any guarantees by way of a response. Let me just try--

Q What is the status of the Department's inquiry into the Waldheim matter?

MR. KALB: My understanding is that it's still being looked into. I don't have anything beyond that. Pat?

Q More on the chemical export controls to Syria --

MR. KALB: Well, you did get an anthology of TQs yesterday in the afternoon. There is some additional material that I could make available to you, as well. All those who are interested, raise your right hand. Okay, so -- you got the chemicals?

Q Yes.

MR. KALB: You got them. The question is, can I pronounce --

Q -- read them, Bernie.

MR. KALB: No, but the question is, can I pronounce them. And I'll pass on that. (INAUDIBLY READS A FEW CHEMICAL NMAES) Let me just add one or two in a general way -- on amplification,

perhaps on some of the -- we've all seen the TQs, I take it. They've made the rounds. Well, have they? Have you seen the TQs on Syria, chemical weapons and so forth?

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MR. KALB: TQ. Let me just say, to get back on a somewhat more serious tone, in spite of the export controls the United States and other Western industrialized countries have imposed on certain chemical weapons precursors, it is apparent that Iran, Iraq and Syria continue to find sources of supply. These sources, however, are becoming more difficult to find and more expensive. The United States is working on a confidential basis with the countries concerned to further restrict the availability of these chemicals. Having said that, I cannot comment further on just what those sources might be.

MR. KALB: No, I cannot comment. I'm saying that the US is working confidentially to see what can be done about restricting the outflow of those particular chemicals known as precursors for chemical weapons. Max?

MR. KALB: Max, I'm going to have to decline the invitation to speculate about the King's role.

MR. KALB: I don't have that specifically. I would think so, but let me take that and get an answer for you on that.

MR. KALB: I don't have anything for you on that. Thank you.

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המשרד, בטחון, ניו-יורק

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NEWS SUMMARY
FRI., JUNE 6, 1986

דע: ניו-יורק.

PRESS RELEASES

PRESIDENT PREVAILS ON ARMS SALE/SAUDI MISSILE DEAL NARROWLY SURVIVES
IN SENATE SHOWDOWN

Wash. Post, Walsh: The Republican-controlled Senate salvaged Pres. Reagan's proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia yesterday as the required minimum of 34 senators voted to approve the politically controversial transaction. With Vice Pres. Bush presiding as a symbol of the importance attached by the administration to the showdown, Sen. William L. Armstrong (R.-Colo.) cast the decisive 34th vote that deprived the sale's foes of the necessary two-thirds majority and sustained Reagan's veto of a congressional resolution disapproving the sale. Armstrong joined seven other senators who switched after opposing the sale last month. They did so after a barrage of administration lobbying that portrayed the vote as a test of the president's leadership and credibility. Along with the backing of four senators absent May 5 when the Senate voted to disapprove the sale, 73 to 22, the margin was just enough to allow the sale. After the 66-to-34 vote, both sides claimed at least partial victory in the hard-fought battle. Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), who led opponents, said Congress "has sent a strong, clear message to Saudi Arabia that friendship is a two-way street and that we expect much more of you." He said continuing, strong congressional opposition to the sale reduced the arms package to less than 10 percent of the Saudis' original "wish list" of weapons. However, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) said, "I'd call it a victory" for the administration. "The president has again established his ability to prevail in these close issues of foreign policy," he said. But Lugar warned that the administration "will really have to do much better the he Middle East" to sustain support for moderate Arab countries.

SYRIA INCLUDED IN EXPORT BAN OF CHEMICAL ARMS INGREDIENTS/

Wash. Post, Ottawa: The Reagan Administration yesterday extended to Syria its export controls on eight compounds used to manufacture chemical weapons, saying it was concerned that the Syrians now have the capability to produce such weapons and are helping Iran do the same. The US has already banned export of the same eight compounds to Iran and Iraq. State Dept. spokesman Bernard Kalb said, "Iran has not used chemical weapons but their continued use by Iraq and the potential for Iranian "use is a cause of concern."

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Other US and Israeli sources said Syria is producing chemical weapons, possibly at a plant in the Damascus area. The sources were uncertain whether Syria has passed on its technology or chemical weapons to Iran. Syria and Libya have long provided Iran with military supplies for its war against Iraq in return for low-cost Iranian oil. These two countries are the only Arab nations aiding Iran, which is a Moslem but not an Arab Middle Eastern country.

FORMER U.N. FRIEND URGES WALDHEIM TO QUIT CAMPAIGN

Wash. Post, AP:Former Supreme Court justice Arthur Goldberg said today that he spoke with former U.N. secretary general Kurt Waldheim and urged him to abandon his campaign for the presidency of Austria. Goldberg, who served with Waldheim in the U.N. in the mid-1960's, said he also told Waldheim that his denials of war crime allegations were "asinine." Austrian voters choose a new president Sunday. Goldberg chaired an ad hoc group of prominent Americans who sent a telegram today to Attorney General Edwin Meese III urging him to bar Waldheim from the US. Others in the group included former attorney general Benjamin Civiletti, Brooklyn District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman, retired major general Walter D. Reed and Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz. Goldberg said in a telephone interview that Waldheim telephoned him at his Washington home Wednesday night and the two spoke for nearly an hour. The two men served together in the U.N. from 1965 to 1968 as ambassadors of their countries. They later lived in the same building in Washington. "I'm not happy that I served for three years with a Nazi," Goldberg said. "I told him that." When they discussed the alleged atrocities, Goldberg said, "He said he didn't know what was going on (during the war). I said 'Don't be asinine.' "I finally said to him, "Look...if you were a patriotic Austrian...you would do the honorable thing in the interests of your country, and the honorable thing would be to say, "I was wrong, I did a grievous thing," and renounce his candidacy," Goldberg said. He said Waldheim told him he would not do that.

WEINBERGER URGES NEW RULES TO TEAR SHIELD OF DIPLOMACY FROM TERRORISTS

Wash. Times, AP:Defense Sec. Caspar Weinberger yesterday called for new international standards to thwart the use of embassies to shelter or support terrorists, saying, "Diplomatic title must not confer a license to murder. "There is...important legal work to be done on the issue of state-sponsored terrorism," Mr. Weinberger said in remarks prepared for an American Bar Association meeting last night. "Embassies are used as terrorist arsenals and planning center, and so-called 'diplomats' actually plan and orchestrate murders and bombings in the nations hosting them. "Yet, under the prevailing law of diplomatic immunity," said Mr. Weinberger, "the embassy is a sanctuary; there is no recourse against the so-called diplomat except expulsion."

ITONUT



UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

JOHN KERRY
MASSACHUSETTS

June 5, 1986

The Honorable Shimon Peres
Prime Minister
Israeli Knesset
Jerusalem, Israel 91999

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:


Thank you very much for taking the time to meet with me and members of the Anti-Defamation League mission. I know how busy your schedule is--particularly at the moment we were there--so I'm particularly grateful for the visit.

I enjoyed my visit to the Israeli Ministry and came away with a significant increase in my understanding of the problems you face. I hope it will be the first of many such visits and look forward to meeting with you in the future.

Accompanying this letter is a small token of our appreciation from the Senate.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


John F. Kerry
United States Senate

Attachment
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Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

הליגה נגד השמצה של בני ברית

June 19th, 1986

The Honorable Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of Israel,
Office of the Prime Minister,
Kiryat Ben Gurion,
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

On behalf of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, we thank you for your participation in our National Commission Meetings in Jerusalem last week.

There is no doubt that the evening with you at the Knesset, and your outstanding address, was the highlight of the visit for our National Commissioners.

Thank you for giving us of your valuable time.

Sincerely,

Roberta Fahn
Associate Director

National Chairman
KENNETH J. BIALKIN

Chairman,
National Executive Committee
BURTON LEVINSON

National Director
NATHAN PERLMUTTER

Associate National Director
ABRAHAM H. FOXMAN

Israel — ישראל
מנהל, הרר וואל
Director, HARRY WALL

רח' המלך דוד 30, ירושלים 94101
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TELEX 26323 טלקס

HEADQUARTERS: 823 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017 (212) 490-2525/Cable: ANTIDEFAME/Telex: 649278

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News Summary June 5, 1986

Columns

NYT-David Shaham (exec. dir., International Center for Peace in the Mideast) "Where the Six Day War Has Led: Paralyzing Hostility" The 19 years since Israel took possession of the West Bank and Gaza, during the Six-Day war, have brought to light a disturbing symmetry between Israelis and Palestinians. Each people believes that justice is totally on its side. Each denies the legitimacy of each other, its history and its very identity. Both sides claim that they have been willing for some time to take part in some sort of conciliatory process--if only the other side would meet certain conditions. The trouble is that virtually all hints and intimations were communicated indirectly, through third parties, and none contained a commitment to negotiate. Nor did they imply a recognition of the rights or even the existence of the other side. Both Palestinians and Israelis are generous with their threats and frugal with their promises. Both Peres and Arafat head coalitions with sizable opposition from within. There is very little chance that change in the Mideast will come from the Israelis and Palestinians. This imposes grave responsibilities on the world powers, particularly the US.

NYT-Gad Yaacobi "Time for Autonomy" There are now no prospectes for peace negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. It is therefore crucial that Israel announce without delay that unless such talks begin by the end of 1986, it will singlehandedly implement an autonomy plan in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Otherwise, Israel will become a binational state in which the Jewish majority will gradually diminish and might even disappear, or a state that denies basic political rights to some inhabitants and thus ceases to be democratic. Either outcome is unacceptable. Autonomy would be an interim arrangement until a permanent peace settlement was achieved. The comfort provided by the status quo is a dangerous illusion.

ND-Anderson "Temper Flares at the State Dept." If one thinks the government's supersecret intelligence analysis is conducted in an atmosphere of cool, calm efficiency, let's go behind the scenes at the State Dept. during the time Israel intercepted a Libyan jet. Eyewitness accounts make the Intelligence and Research Office sound like an officers' mess. "On Feb. 4, 1986...the current intelligence watch was handling the Israeli interception of a Libyan plane. Gerald Sutton, chief of the State's terrorist intelligence branch, and his analysts were apprised of the

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incoming traffic, which was mainly press items." (There's a jolt: State Dept. spooks, with all their resources, knew only what they got from the press.) 20 minutes after the first incoming "traffic" the first intelligence cable arrived--with bad information. The cable said nothing new except for an erroneous note that the aircraft was a 727. In the midst of this fairly tense situation, Sutton "stormed the watch area" and demanded "vociferously" to know why he had not been informed of recent developments. The reason was that there was none but when an analyst tried to explain Sutton shouted "Shut-up, damn it!" The intelligence analysts sat bewildered at his outburst and he was reported. Sutton refused to be interviewed. Sutton will soon be leaving the Foreign Service.

Press Reports

Pollard and Wife Plead Guilty to Spying for Israel

NYT-p.1-Shenon-Jonathan Pollard pleaded guilty to spying for Israel and the Justice Dept. named four Israelis as unindicted conspirators in his espionage activities. Federal prosecutors said that Israeli officials had asked Pollard to gather classified satellite photographs and other intelligence materials related to Israel's defense after he made initial contact with the Israelis. Prosecutors would not rule out later charges against the Israelis named in the indictment. They are: Rafael Eitan, Avi Sella, an Israeli air force colonel, Yossi Yagur, former science attaché at the Israeli consulate in NY and Irit Erb, a secretary in the embassy. Joseph diGenova, US Attorney in Washington said the investigation was continuing. Israeli officials in Washington and Israel refused to comment in any detail. Ehud Gol said the gov't would not discuss the case because "a sentence is awaited," adding, "We would like to stress that the Gov't of Israel continues to cooperate fully with the US Gov't. A White House spokesman, Pete Roussel said, "No matter which way the question comes out, we are pursuing the investigation on the Pollard case and we'll do so until it is resolved." He would not comment further, except to say that the Administration had been in touch with the Israeli gov't, which promised "full cooperation." When asked if this meant the Israelis were actually cooperating, Roussel said "The statement speaks for itself." (see NYP-Lath DN-Volz; ND-Ciolli)

NYT-Text of a statement, entitled Factual Proffer, presented by the Federal Gov't in Federal District Court summarizing the facts it was prepared to prove against Pollard. The full page statement, submitted by diGenova details Pollard's contacts with the named Israelis, his reimbursement of cash, trips and an expensive diamond ring. Pollard was to spy for 10 years, after which he would become "Danny Cohen" and live in Israel. Pollard was given the account number for a foreign bank account and was told by Yagur that \$30,000 a year would be put in it for the next 10 years. This was besides the cash payments Pollard received.

Israel to Widen Probe of Spying By Israel

WSJ-Fialka-Federal prosecutors said they are engaged in a broadening investigation of alleged Israeli espionage aimed at the US. The investigation which could damage relations between the US and Israel, involves several current or former Israeli officials and an unidentified US "associate" of Pollard's whose name has been disclosed to a grand jury in Washington. The guilty plea by Pollard is believed to be the first time the US

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has pressed an Israeli espionage case to a successful prosecution. The FBI has a long history of investigating Israeli intelligence activities; however, most investigations have ended privately and inconclusively amid rumors that the Israelis involved were quietly sent back to Israel. diGenova, said Meese "has asked us to pursue this case wherever it leads."

The Darker Side of US-Israeli Relations Revealed

NYT-Weinraub-Relations between the US and Israeli intelligence agencies are normally marked by intimate cooperation but when the interests of the two nations diverge, they spy on each other. By all indications, the US has been inclined to forgive the Israelis for the Pollard case, and officials at the White House and elsewhere in the Administration were plainly seeking to treat it as an isolated incident in a remarkably close military and intelligence relationship of more than 3 decades. But the Israelis have been frustrated by the refusal of the US to provide certain information on troop deployments by moderate Arab countries. John Davitt, former chief of the Justice Department's internal security section, said: "The Israeli intelligence service, when I was in the Justice Dept., was the second most active in the US after the Soviets." But despite the strains, the intelligence ties remain intense and US officials have praised the skill with which the Israelis have gathered data. (NYP-Dan)

Few Facts Known About Israelis Involved in Case

NYT-Little is known in the US about the four Israeli officials named as co-conspirators.

Israeli Occupation of West Bank

WSJ-Seib-Israel has controlled the West Bank as long as Jordan did before the war. An entire generation of Palestinians on the West Bank has grown up without spending one day under Hussein's rule. This fact raises serious doubts about the soundness of the peace process as envisioned by US diplomats and left-wing officials in Jerusalem. Conversations with West Bank residents suggest that many wouldn't be any more happy living under the control of Jordan, an increasingly unfamiliar state, than they are living under Israeli control. Young Palestinians are interested in their national identity, they don't relate to Jordan. These attitudes are important because such a large portion of the West Bank's population is so young. 46% of the West Bank's population is under age 14. 23% are aged 20-34. To the extent that they political loyalty to anyone, young Palestinians support the PLO and Arafat. But increasingly, young Palestinians see Arafat as a symbol of Arab leadership that has failed so they are turning towards Islamic fundamentalism. This does not bode well for Jordan, the PLO or Israel. Israelis are being forced to come to terms with the fact that they are long-term custodians of the territories and masters of a mushrooming population without citizenship or equal laws.

Modai Lacks Proof on Waldheim

NYT-Friedman-The Israeli Justice Minister said that the Gov't had been unable to turn up any firm evidence that Waldheim personally took part in atrocities while he was an officer in the German Army. The remarks

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by Modai were the first official confirmation that Israel, in its own research, had not been able to produce any evidence linking Waldheim personally to specific war crimes. His statement was made in an interview on Israel radio and appeared not to have been coordinated with the Cabinet. Israeli officials expressed surprise and said "it could harm Israel's case against the election of Waldheim only four days before the Austrian Presidential election," the radio reported.

NYT-Lewis-Austrian, West German and French officials inspected the WW II military records of Waldheim in the 1970's when he was in his first term as UN Sec. Gen., according to sources familiar with the documents. The sources say military records show that despite Waldheim's statements, he continued to serve in the German Army past 1941 but the records do not cast any light on Waldheim's personal activities in the Army or on accusations that he might have been personally involved in war crimes.

NYT-AP-Attorney General Messe will not decide whether to ban Waldheim from the US until after the election on Sunday, a Justice Dept. spokesman said. The spokesman denied allegations that the election was a factor or had any bearing on the decision.

Fighting Eases in Beirut

NYT-Hijazi-Heavy fighting eased, allowing residents of the Moslem sector of the capital to emerge and buy food and bury their dead. The relative calm, the first in nearly two weeks, came after Shiite militiamen succeeded in routing gunmen of a Sunni group called the Feb. 6 Movement, which is aligned with Sunni Palestinians.

Hostage's Brother in Plea

NYT-AP-The cancer-stricken brother of journalist Terry Anderson has recorded a videotape plea to be broadcast in Beirut in hope that the last plea of a dying man will touch the hearts of the kidnappers.

Ramadan in Cairo

NYT-p.2-Kifner-According to a recent Gov't survey, just breathing in Cairo is equivalent to smoking 2 packs of cigarettes a day. Throughout the Moslem world, life has slowed during this monthlong fast. But nights become a festival. This year's Ramadan reflects Egypt's economic crisis. Flour and sugar are in short supply. The word on the street is that chickens and eggs will soon be in short supply because of lack of imported feed. In the Arab world, only life in Lebanon went on as usual...the fighting did not stop.

Paid Ad

NYT-A clothing company, Banana Republic, advertises it's "Authentic Israeli Paratrooper Briefcase." The bag, the ad says is "made with Israeli ingenuity...for paratroopers who take along their paperwork when called away on business (to Entebbe, for example)." The bag is made in Israel.

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עגירות ישראל - וועינגטון

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ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח. ניו יורק

תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום 5.6.86

I have a statement here on controls of chemical exports to Syria. The United States today is extending existing controls on certain chemical exports useful in chemical weapons production. Previously, these controls applied only to Iran and Iraq. Now they will apply also to Syria. This decision is in accordance with U.S. foreign policy which opposes the prohibited use of chemical weapons. We have known for several years that both Iran and Iraq have had active, on-going programs to develop chemical weapons. Our imposition of chemical export controls two years ago was designed to impede the supply of chemical weapons precursors to these two countries.

The United States is concerned that that Syria may have a chemical weapons capability and has assisted Iran and the Iranian war effort. Iran has not used chemical weapons but their continued use by Iraq and the potential for Iranian use is a cause of concern. The United States maintains its neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war and actively seeks a mediated end to that war. As part of that effort and U.S. concern about the continuing illegal use of chemical weapons, the U.S. export policy is designed to impede the use of chemical weapons by either belligerent. Now that is the end of the formal statement and the answer is yes, I will make it available at the conclusion of the briefing.

Yes, go ahead.

Q Can you give us the details of what chemicals are banned?

MR. KALB: No, I don't have those specifics. Let me see if I can get those.

Q Is it similar to the previous bans?

MR. KALB: Let me not speculate about that, but let me make an effort to get you the particulars that you are inquiring about and see whether they can be made available.

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Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including names and dates.

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Q Since Syria's main supplier and use in the military field is the Soviet Union, has there been any effort to have a joint measure taken with other countries, particularly the Soviets, towards Syria?

MR. KALB: I don't have anything on that, Vern.

Q Beyond that, Bernie, could you say what leads you to believe that Syria may have chemical weapons capability now? I mean, is there some sort of evidence that chemical weapons have indeed been delivered from Damascus to one of the belligerents?

MR. KALB: No, I can't help you on that, other than to make the assertion that a policy decision was reached which is being announced today. The U.S. is concerned that Syria may have a chemical weapons capability.

Q Is there --

MR. KALB: Go ahead. I'm sorry.

Q Is there any evidence that American companies sell Syria chemicals?

MR. KALB: Don't have the specific on that. Let me take that.

Q Do you think that Syria's considered a supporter of international terrorism, and does that have anything to do with it? Is there a fear that these weapons might get into the hands of--

MR. KALB: No. I think you know where Syria stands on the terrorist list, and I think that probably is a reply to your question.

Q (Off-mike)

MR. KALB: The US believes that Syria supplies military equipment to Iran. I alluded to that by saying that in fact Syria has assisted Iran in the Iranian war effort, in the ongoing Iran-Iraq war. But insofar as adding any particulars, I do not have those.

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אל

סווג בסחונני
דחיות
תאריך וז"ח
מסל מברק

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Q Could I just ask a broader question, and perhaps you can take it? Since the US has accused Iraq and says it has evidence that Iraq has used chemicals, why would the US oppose Iran's having the capability for chemical weapons, which would seem to be one of the better deterrents against having Iraq use it? After all, the only reason the US says it has chemical weapons in Europe is it's a deterrent against possible use by the other side. I don't see any point in depriving Iran of chemical weapons if Iraq's already using it.

MR. KALB: Well, I don't know whether you intend or the thrust of your question is to advocate a kind of proliferation of chemical weapons.

Q No, I mean--that's the US policy.

MR. KALB: But, let me accept your invitation to let others take a look at that point, about why not try in effect to establish a sort of chemical weapons equation, is what you're asking--

Q Well, a deterrent--

MR. KALB: --a deterrent. Let me--

Q Can I ask you a more narrow question then?

MR. KALB: Ya.

Q You started by talking about chemical exports and extending existing controls, right?

MR. KALB: Yes.

Q What are the existing controls? And what are the specific chemical exports you're talking about?

MR. KALB: That came up, Marvin, in an earlier question--at least half of that--that is what are the particulars, the identification of the precursors--which are chemicals, as I understand it, not being a scientist, that are critical in creating a combustion that produces the fallout of chemical weapons. Your question about the specifics on what elements go into the controls is again a question I'll have to put together on that anthology in the pursuit, in the pursuit of additional information.

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Q Can you also find out--

MR. KALB: Just--just one second, Matt. George.

Q Among your taking questions, could you come up with a dollar amount on any trade from the US to Syria of the offending chemicals?

MR. KALB: Dollar amount requested. Matt.

Q That was my question.

MR. KALB: How did I know that?

Q Different question you can take, if you can't answer now. Do we know whether the Soviets train, since they are the main Syrian supplier, train the Syrian army to fight on chemically or biologically contaminated battlefields -- train or equip them?

MR. KALB: Well, since you are making all sorts of contributions to the anthology, are there any others that fall under this heading?

Q Do you have a situation report on the fighting?

Q Do you have any evidence that the Syrians had given any technology, chemical technology, to the Iranians?

MR. KALB: I have what I have set forth, and I indicated earlier that in view of the fact that Syria has assisted Iran in the war effort, there is a concern that Syria may have a chemical weapons capability and things under that heading may be possible. Hence, the imposition of the ruling that I set forth today. Juan?

Q You mentioned three controls as being on this control list, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Are there any others who are on this chemical --

MR. KALB: I'll put that on the question. I don't have the answer. Barbara?

Q One final point, Bernie. I'm still not clear, when you announced this, does the United States at this time or American companies provide this kind of chemicals to Syria?

MR. KALB: Let me add that too. Obviously, if there is today the imposition of extending controls that already exist to embrace still another country, it is put on here in the United States, so obviously it has to originate to some degree here.

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Q And you have no idea the scope of this?

MR. KALB: No, but I have no idea the scope and I have no idea, which has been made apparently clear to a number of the questions and I'll take them and see what we can get.

Q Bernie, to follow that, can you give us definition, is this a requirement --

MR. KALB: Can you give us what?

Q Definition.

MR. KALB: Definition?

Q Is this a precautionary move? Or is there some evidence existing which you cannot talk about that Syria is indeed producing these weapons?

MR. KALB: That Syria is producing these weapons?

Q I beg your pardon, that Syria is producing the supplies for Iran?

MR. KALB: I'll have to stand on this statement as it stands here and I can't go beyond that.

Q Without going crazy on this particular issue, might it be worth having someone come down who can talk to us on the exports and the technical --

MR. KALB: Let me take note of that. I don't know whether that will be possible, but I'll raise it in view of a request. Matt or George?

Q Is there evidence that chemicals from the United States contributed to Syria's capability? Has that been asked?

MR. KALB: In various forms that's come up, and we'll put that in the questions taken.

A new subject.

XXX

ס ג ר ט ס ג ר ט
דף... 6... מתוך... 9... דפים

:אל

סווג בטחוני.....
דחיות.....
תאריך וז"ח.....
מס' מברק.....

6/9 י' 31 65 115 159

Q Is the United States still satisfied with the level of cooperation it's getting from Israel on the Pelton case? Does the US believe that--

Q Pollard--

Q I beg your pardon. Pollard case.

MR. KALB: Essentially, what I will have to do is echo what Chuck has done here in discussing that case for the past few days; that I will not be in a position to comment on reports or discuss the case further since it is still under investigation. I think that it could be noted that the nature of the case is set forth in the indictment, if that's the proper legal word. I understand the proper legal word is the factual proffer. But I'm not in a position to give you a precise legal interpretation of that. The nature of the case set forth in that what I am calling an indictment or the summarization of the facts as known, and that in a general way what you've heard here is that any espionage against the United States major or limited is extremely serious. For that reason we have pursued our investigation of the Pollard case with great vigor and will continue to do so until it is resolved.

Q Well, wait--

MR. KALB: Beyond that--

Q Previously you have been willing to say that you have been satisfied with the level of cooperation. Is that still true? Or suddenly we've--

MR. KALB: No. What has been said here before on that still stands. I think what Chuck said the other day, and that was on Monday I believe, is that we said at the outset of this case--which goes back I guess to last winter, is that we would expect full cooperation from the government of Israel until the case is closed. That is still the US position. And we continue to be in touch with the Israelis, who have promised full cooperation.

Q Wait a minute, Bernie. But that sort of brings a question. I mean, Mr. Pollard has pleaded guilty to this. He has named at least four other co-conspirators, and the Justice Department suggests there may be yet more people indicted in this. When Judge Sofaer came back the Department issued a statement saying that they were sort of satisfied that this was settled; that it was by now an internal Israeli matter. And it raises the question, if there had been an extensive network of spying by the Israelis against the United States in this country, what effect that's going to have on US relations?

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אל:

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מס' מברק

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How much did we know about? When did we know about it? I mean, it's

MR. KALB: No, I hear you. I hear you. But the point that I am making is that in view of the fact that the investigation is still underway, I'm not going to be in a position to address questions that you are setting forth or to speculate on themes and so forth.

Q The guy has pleaded guilty.

MR. KALB: The investigation is still underway, as I say.

Q The court case is over.

MR. KALB: I stand with what I have just shared with you.

Q But are you amending at all the assessment that you relayed to us with Judge Sophaer —

MR. KALB: No, I'm not.

Q What about the study then? Can you tell us how many cases the Israelis had --

MR. KALB: Nope, I don't have anything for you.

Q Have you seen the reports in the Washington Post today?

MR. KALB: Yes.

Q Do you have any comment on that?

MR. KALB: No, I don't.

Q What role, if any, did the State Department play in the plea bargaining?

MR. KALB: In the what?

Q In the plea bargaining.

MR. KALB: I've made it clear that I cannot be specific or walk you through any particular details and I just am bound by that position.

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ד.פ. 8...מחור...9...דפוס

אל:

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דחיות

תאריך וז"ח

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Q When is the case over?

MR. KALB: Don't have any --

Q I mean, the man has pleaded guilty.

MR. KALB: I'm going to have to let it stand as is.

Q Bernie, yesterday Joseph diGenova said when he was asked

did the Israeli government authorize this operation, he said, "The question remains open. I have not resolved the question." Does that reflect the State Department's view of that?

MR. KALB: Nope, I don't have anything to add on what he said.

Q How about something diGenova did not address was the Israeli willingness to extradite Israeli citizens if they are indicted.

MR. KALB: I started this round of dialogue off on these questions with telling you where I stood on this. It is fair enough for you to ask these questions, but I'm not in a position to be of much help on that.

Q How will you describe the Israeli government position thus far?

MR. KALB: I stand with what I have just said. In the back? Excuse me, Barbara.

Q Do you have anything on the situation in Beirut?

MR. KALB: The United States strongly condemns the violence in Beirut and elsewhere in Lebanon. The continued loss of innocent civilian lives is particularly intolerable. The

United States calls on all combatants to end the fighting now. There must be a cease-fire in Beirut and progress on national reconciliation and political reform. In the South violence must stop.

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The United States reaffirms its support for Lebanon's independence, unity and sovereignty, and for the restoration of central government authority throughout the country. The United States will support efforts to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, to seek agreed on security arrangements that could assure stability in South Lebanon and security along the Lebanese-Israeli border, and to promote restoration of security throughout Lebanon.

Q Could I have a copy, please?

MR. KALB: Yes, you can.

Q (Off-mike)--(laughter)

MR. KALB: You'll have to reach your own judgement. But I think--I think--I think that although your question may prompt some amusement here, I don't think anybody, even the one who put the question, is amused by the bloodletting that is taking place in Lebanon. And I'm not sure that--

Q Does the US government (inaudible) -- even try to implement that?

MR. KALB: What I can say on that, is the United States remains in touch with various and concerned parties, both inside and outside of Lebanon. Anticipating your next question, as to specifics, I don't have anything to offer you.

Q (Off-mike)--are you still supporting or (inaudible) the Syrian peace treaty or peace solution to (inaudible)--

MR. KALB: With respect to the agreement or arrangements, et cetera, that were sponsored by the Syrians, just let me say this: that the United States has no position on that document or any other under discussion by Lebanese parties. It has long been US policy in Lebanon to urge an immediate end to the fighting, to support efforts to re-establish dialogue among the Lebanese and open the way to political reform. Lebanon's political problems cannot be solved by force. Any successful agreement would require broad support in all Lebanese communities. That is the answer to your particular question.

Q Copy of that?

MR. KALB: A copy of that--let me try to help you on that.

1/24

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דף.....מחור.....דפים

סודי

מדידת

דחיות

1700/5 יוני

מאריך וזיה

מס' מברק

אליאב. ארכ"ל 2. מצפ"א.

יוניפי"ל

הרושם העולה מקריאת שיחות השרים ואנשי המשרד עם גולדינג הוא כי חלה לכאורה "התמתנות" בעמדת הממשלה כלפי יוניפי"ל. דהיינו, דומה שהניחה הקודמת הוחלפה קמעא בניהם חיובית יותר, לפחות בטון אך גם בנכונות למו"מ, שמשמעה "חבל" טבלני יותר כלפי מזכירות או"מ. כלשעצמי, הופתעתי במקצת, גם לנוכח ההנחה שהסיכוי לתכניות מסוג זה שבהן מעוניין האו"מ הוא מועט. עם זאת שיערתי כי יש רגיעה מסויימת בשטח והדברים משקפים זאת. כך גם אמרנו לאמריקנים בממשל שדרכנו. נודה אם תשכילונו.

רובינשטיין

ש"ה 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

אל: מצרים. ממ"ד.

משיחה עם הציר המצרי גונאיים:

א. בסיסים לארה"ב. אמר כי אין שחר לידיעות ("דיפנס ופורין אפירס ויקלי") בנושאים אלה. חבינותי שהמצרים פנו לשבועון והתלוננו. הדבר מנוגד, לדברי בן שיחי, לתפיסתם הבסיסית באשר לריבונותם. בסיסים הם עניין שאבד עליו הכלח, ואדמתם אינה למכירה. אילו רצו באמצעים כאלה להשיג כסף היו משיגים הרבה יותר ומזמן (לכזכור, אגב, בעבר, לפני 1982, עלו רעיונות באשר לבסיסי סיני והמצרים דחום מאותה סיבה).

ב. ביקור אבו גזאלה מתקיים. יערוך בין השאר פגישות רבות בגבעה. לשאלתי על יחסו מבחינתנו (מזה שנים לא נפגש עם אנשינו למיטב ידיעתי) אמר שהוא "חיובי ופרגמטי", אך ישנם שיקולים פנימיים המוכרים לנו.

ג. פונדמנטליזם במצרים. שאלתי אם מודאגים. אמר שמודאגים, אך ללא פניקה. שכן יודעים מהו הגבול שאליו הפונדמנטליזם עשוי להגיע.

ד. פיצויים למשפחות ראס-בורקה. אמרתי כי הגיע השמן שישלמו, כצעד הומניטרי. שאל אם העלינו עם המצרים והשבתי בחיוב. הזכרתי שיש משפחה אחת בעלת אזרחות ארה"ב (מוכרת לו), וחבל שהנושא יהיה בעין הציבורית כאן כשאין בכך צורך.

ה. שגמורים בבסקוק. שלכם 116. אמרתי דעתנו על ראיון השגריר: אמר (כגורם אחר, בממשל) שאין לשגריר הרבה מה לעשות ומכאן אולי הדברים. יעביר לקתיר.

ו. העיסקה הסעודית. לדבריו חס, אמנם בלי אתדה מיוחדת, שחרור ממועקה עם התוצאות. וזאת בגללהשלכות על מעמד ארה"ב בעולם הערבי, שבגללו "גם אתם וגם אנו צריכים לעשות קונסיווח". שמחת עניים.

אני נרגש בויסקי.

רובינסטיין

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אל: ממנכ"ל. מצפ"א.

סנט: נשק לסעודיה - 146

להלן מספר מחשבות ראשוניות (ואישיות) בעקבות ההצבעה החוזרת היום (5) בסנט ולאחר שלמעשה אושרה העיסקה (ב-34 קולות נגד ביטול הוועד הנשיאותי, מול 66 קולות בעד ביטול ווטו זה).

(א) מבחינתנו, ייתכן שבנסיבות הקיימות התוצאה היתה אופטימלית. לאחר תהליך ממושך (בעיקר מאחורי הקלעים) תוכן העיסקה דולל עד המינימום (סיידווינדרים והרפונים בלבד).

- הנשיא והממשל לא נחלו כשלון מחפיר, התסכול בעקבותיו היה גם בעוכרינו.
- ממשלת ישראל (והסגרירות כאן) לא פעלו ולא התערבה במאבק סביב המכירה, כך שאין להאשימנו בקשיים הרבים שנערמו בפני הממשל.

(ב) לאמיתו של דבר, הממשל והסעודים אכן הפסידו במידת רבה:

- חרף התנגדותנו הסבילה והסתלקות איפא"ק מהמערכה, הסתמן רוב מסיבי נגד המכירה המקורית בשני בתי הקונגרס, ואף בסנט בהצבעה החוזרת, למרות הוצאת הסטינגרים מה"חבילה".
- הממשל ניהל מאבק כושל בעד המכירה, ובלעדי מאמצי הנשיא עצמו לא היו מצליחים את הוועד היום.

- עם זאת ישלם הנשיא מחיר לבצחון מעורב זה, כי פעולתו בסופו של דבר סותרת עתה את עמדתם של שני שלישי חברי הסנט (ואחוז כפול מזה בביה"נ) ולדבר עשוי מבחינתו להיות אימפקט שלילי על יחסיו עם הקונגרס, בייחוד בתחום מכירות הנשק.

- אם בסופו של דבר הוצג העניין כמבחן ליוקרת הנשיא מחד גיסא, הפך ל"משאל עם" ול"הצבעת אימון" מפוקפקת בסעודים מאידך גיסא וההוצאות מדברות בעדן.

- בלשון המעטה, לא הצליחו הסעודים לשכנע את הקונגרס (ואת הציבוריות האמריקאית) שהם ידידי אמת, שהם תרמו לתהליך השלום, ושהם תומכים באינטרסים אמריקאים, כגון המלחמה בטרור.

(ג) הקונגרס נוטה לקשור מכירות נשק למדינות מזה"ת עם תהליך השלום, בעוד הממשל מנסה להמנע מזיקה זו (או לשבור אותה), אף כי חלק מדובריו ממשיכים להתבטא בחיוב על כך.

(ד) קשה להעלות על הדעת שהממשל יגיש השנה עוד בקשה למכירות נשק לסעודיה. (בעוד)

(ה) ספק אם תוצאה ההצבעה תשפיע על הויכוח הבא עלינו בקרוב בנושא האוואקס תוצאה הפוכה-הווה אומר, ביטול הוועד והמכירה - עלולה היתה להקל על הממשל ועל מסירת מטוסים אלה,

למה יגיד שישב ג'נרל ג'אן ג'אן. ה'איינז ג'אן ג'אן

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סווג בטחוני

דחיסות

מאריך וז"ח

מס' פבר

כיוון שהיו טוענים כי אי אפשר לפגוע יתר על המידה בנשיא

- (ו) במידה מסוימת המפתח להצבעה ולתוצאה היה בידי שני סנטורים יהודים - צ'יק הנט (רפובליקאי מנבדה) ששינה עמדתו (ובעיני הציבור היהודי עלול לזכות בתואר הגנאי "SEPSER" ע"ש הסנטור מאיובה שב-1981 עשה כך וב-1984 הובס), ואד דוריןסקי (דמוקרט מנברסקה) שתמיד טוען שבשעת הדחק יצביע לטובת ישראל, ועל אף שאלותיו הנוקבות בנושא זה לשהביט (סעיף 8(ז') למברקנו 214 מה-9.5) לא השתכנע כנראה מהסיבות שמביאות אותנו להתנגד למכירה.
- (ז) מן הסתם פרשת פולארד, וחזרתה לכותרות השבוע, לא השפיעו על המדות הסנטורים - וגם זו לטובה.

למדן

31

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

ס' נ' ר' 4... 1... 4... 4... 4... 4...

דפים 4... 4... 4... 4... 4... 4...

סוג בשחוני : סודי

דחיות : 4... 4... 4... 4... 4... 4...

מאריך וז'ח' 05.1300 86

מס' מבר :

אל : המשרד

1/4

CG 113

153

Handwritten signatures and notes in blue ink.

אל : ממנכ"ל, מע"ח, מצפ"א, הסברה

דע : יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שה"בט לתקשורת
מנהל לע"מ
ניו יורק

דו"ח תקשורת (5.6.86)

לכשנזכה אי-פעם לחקופת רגיעה ארוכה יחסית משטף פרשיות הסנסציה ששמנו נכרך בהן חדשות לבקרים נוכל אולי להעריך נאמנה מה בדיוק קונה כאן. רצף פרשיות הרגול המסחורי, הברחות הנשק, גניבת הטכנולוגיה וכיוצא באלה ספורים, הכובשים את דמיונה של התקשורת. הם אלה הבונים נדבך על גבי נדבך את ההתייחסות העתידית לישראל בעיני האמריקאי הממוצע. לא עוד תהליך שלום שאינו קיים ונסיונות נואשים להפיח בו דוח חיים, לא עוד ישראל היפה של קדמה וטכנולוגיה מתקדמת כי אם התעסקות אובססיבית במדינה חסרת אחריות.

נדמה שאט-אט הדברים נשמטים כאן מן הידיים, תמונה של השבוע החולף מסמלת אולי יותר מכל את רכוז המגמות העובר על ארה"ב: גראם-רדמן שהפך לחוק המדובר ביותר הפנה הזרקורים גם לסיוע החוץ, גם אוהד ישראל המושבע, ביותר לא רווה נחת מהטבלאות המפורטות של מדינות נהנות הסיוע שהופיעו בעחונים ושבחן מובילה ישראל בבדידות מזהירה (לצד מצרים שאינה סובלת כאן מבעיות הסברה והדמית) לעומת כל היתר.

מטוס הלבאי אם ימריא, עושה רושם, לא יצטרך לעמוד מול מספר רב כל כך של התקפות כמו שהוא זוכה על הקרקע במערכת מתוזמנת של כל חוגי הממשל.

פרשת פולארד שעלתה כצפוי אל פני השטח הוכיחה פעם נוספת שיונתן לא היה כל כך קטן וכי בדרך אל הגן גור עמו הרבה מנקודות הזכות שצברה לעצמה ישראל כאן במשך השנים. הוסף לביליל הנ"ל את האכזבה מחוסר פתרון בעית טאבה העומד על מלה אחת, את השתקפותה המאסיבית של פרשת הפקיד הבכיר, את המשך העסוק בעסקת הנשק לסעודיה, את פרשיות ברעס אייזנברג ורייס והדיון המשפטי בעניינם, והרי לך שבוע בחייו של מי שקווה להפיץ בגויים את דברה של ישראל היפה.

יגיד מי שיגיד שלמרות הכל יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב טובים כפי שמעולם לא היו. מ'דה מוגבלת של צדק תהא בוודאי עמו אך עלינו לעשות האבחנה בין היחסים בין הממשלים וההדמית הישראלית בעיני הצבור הרחב, הנזון זה חודשים ארוכים ורבים מספורי שערוריות או כמו שאמרה המשוררת "אף רגע דל, כל יום טקדלי". כל הנ"ל מביא להתעוררות סימני שאלה רבים לגבי התדמית שמקבל האמריקאי הממוצע הרחוק ממעגלי השלטון בווינגטון.

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סוג בסחובי
דחיות
מאריך וזיה
סוגי פבר

פרשת השבוע היא פרשת פולארד. שחזור ארועי השבוע האחרון נהשיחות אין ספור עם העתונאים שכסו אותה מביאים אותנו לכמה מחשבות:

- ההנחה המקובלת בחקשורת על מאבק בין משרדי החוץ והמשפטים נראית לנו סבירה. כתב הל.א. טיימס וויינס ציין באזנינו כי מקורותיו לספור הראשוני שהופיע על מעורבות קצין חיל אויר היו במשרד המשפטים. ג'ון גושקו מה"פוסט" ספר לנו לאחר עסקת הטעון כי מקורותיו במחמ"ד אינם מאשימים את ישראל בכך שלא מסרה כל המידע על אלי"ם סלע וכי הם עושים את האבחנה בין מדינת ישראל המחויבת לש"פ ובין הפרטים כנראה שקרו בנושא. משיחות רבות אחרות קבלנו חזק לתיאוריה הנ"ל.
- יהיה לא נכון לחשוב שבזה נסתימה הפרשה. העתונות בודקת למה התכוון די ג'נובה באמרו כי החקירה נמשכת, מה בדיוק נאמר לסופר בארץ בשהותו האחרונה ומה מידת המעורבות שלנו בפרשיות מן העבר. גם ספור ה"וושינגטון פוסט" ביום שלאחרי מאזכר פרשות ידועות וידועות פחות על מעורבות מודיעינית ויש להניח שידינו תהיינה מלאות גם בימים הקרובים.
- מקריאת העתונים היום מסתבר שקימת הבחנה אדה בין הכסוי ברשתות שהתרכז בהמשך החקירה ובין העתונות הכתובה המתרכזת לפחות היום בדו"ח העובדתי שככל שהוא לא-נעים הוא בסך הכל היה צפוי.

אך הנה טכום כמה מהשיחות שקבלנו היום המצביעות על מה יהיה מחר בעתונים. רוב הכתבים מתקשרים רק כדי לחלק עמנו חברית את מה שהם שומעים ואינם מצפים מאתנו להתייחסויות:

Phil Shenon (N.Y. Times) - מנהל ה-FBI התראיין לעתון והביע אכזבתו מרמת שתוף הפעולה עם ישראל (בפרשת פולארד) שמסרה אינפורמציה סלקטיבית. מקור בכיר בממשל אמר לניי טיימס כי פולארד החל מזהה לחוקריו רשתות רגול ישראליות נוספות וישראלים נוספים שהיו קשורים ברשת שלו.

Joe Pichirallo (Wash. Post) - מקורות בממשל אומרים כי קשה לקחת ברצינות טענות ישראל שלא ידעה על המבצע. כיצד ניתן היה להוציא סכומי כסף כאלה, דרכונים ומחנות בלי אישורים.

ס.י.ס. 0 2 2 3

דף... 3... מתוך... 4... דפים

סוג בשחוני

דחיפות

מאריך וזמן

שם מל

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מל:

Lars Erik Nelson
(N.Y. Daily News)
- מקור מסר לן שהאלוף יקותיאל אדם ז"ל שעמד להיות ראש המוסד
היה בשליחות בארה"ב על מנת לאתר ולגייס סטודנטיים אמריקאיים
ממוצא יהודי שהסתלמו בנושאי הנדסה
וכך הלאה

שלוש תגובות הוצאנו במהלך הימים האחרונים מאז פרץ הספור:
התודעה הראשונה (איננו יודעים דבר. מפנים תשומת הלב להודעה מחמ"ד מ- 20 דצמבר 85)
נתקלה בספקנות כאשר השאלה המרכזית היתה כי מדובר במידע חדש שלא נמסר למשלחת סופר,
אך הסיפא של הודעתנו - זאת האומרת כי יהיה זה בלתי-נאות להגיב בעצמו של תהליך משפטי -
היא זאת שקבלה פרסום.
ביום שבת קבלנו והצאנו מייד הודעה מפורטת שזכתה כאן לפרסום רב אך לורחה מיד בשאלה -
מה נשתנה מאז הודעתנו 24 שעות לפני כן ומדוע אנו כן מגיבים בעצמו של התהליך. השאלה
מצאה ביטוי גם בכתובתם של כמה ובמיוחד של הניר יורק טיימס. לא נעלם מכל הקוראים כי
ה- baseless שבהודעתנו מתייחס ל widespread espionage activity.

לכשנפתח הפסטיבל ותוגש כתב האשום תחלטנו להגיב ב"אין תגובה" על כתב האישום ומה שקרה
בביהמ"ש. רבים שאלו אותנו אם הצהרתנו מיום שבת עומדת בעינה ואנו אסרנו בחיוב.

הכיסוי בטלביזיות היה לא נעים. אמנם רק ABC פתחה בידיעה את מהדורתה אך
כולם דברו על המשך החקירה ועל בדיקות פרשיות מן העבר בהן היתה ישראל מעורבת ברגול
בארה"ב. כצפוי תופשת הפרשה כותרות שמנות בעתונות הכתובה, פותחת את מהדורות החדשות
ברדיו ומטופלת באנטנסיביות על ידי כל ה- WIRES.

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לפרשת "הפקיד הבכיר" לקח קצת זמן להקלט בתקשורת כאן והיא מהווה שהקפות לכל גלי הטעונים שנשמעו בארץ מעל דפי העיתונות. הטלביזיות דברו על cover-up of a cover up (סם דונלדסון ABC). והעיתונות המרכזית דשה בנושא כמה ימים ברציפות. סופה של פרשה זאת בתקשורת גם הוא לא נראה לעיין ומינוי היועץ המשפטי החדש רק תביא להתחדשות השאלות החשדניות על מינוי מטעם (ביל ספייר שנשיכתו בזמן פולארד א' כאבה מאד לא שכח לחבר הפעם את פולארד ב' לפקיד הבכיר).

מבין האירועים האחרים רצוי להזכיר בקצרה נושאים אחרים שהעסיקו אותנו:

1. ביקור זקתיים בארץ שבא במקביל להמשך המערכה הגלויה שמנהל כאן הממשל נגד הלבאי. פקידים אנונימיים ישראלים תורמים למדורה בהוסיפם שמן למדורת טעוני הממשל נגד המטוס. בהתייחסותנו נתלינו בתצהרות של רה"מ ושהב"ט כפי שדווחו בתקשורת.
2. עסקת הנשק לסעודיה ומאמצי הממשל בתשורה היו בולטים ביותר כחלק ממה שהיה כנראה מערכת שכנוע מאסיבית להשגת השליש החוטם.
3. אנו ממשיכים לשמוע על ספקולציות על נסיעה אפשרית של המזכיר אם כי אחמד עולאד סאין להן בטיס של ממש מעבר לרצונו הכללי של המזכיר לחרום אם רק יווכח שהדבר ניתן לביצוע.

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יוסי גל

עד כאן

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במטלות של מלחמת התשה אפקטיבית באיראן, אלא בעיקרה פוליטית. הסתגרותו של צדאם חוסיין במסגרת הצרה של החשש מתגובה איראנית מאסיבית וחסרת מעצורים, היה ויתמיד בעיקר בהפצצות חיה"א שתביא את המלחמה לסף ביתם של האזרחים. ברליי מנית גם שאימוץ מדיניות נועזת יותר זוכה בזואי לזמינה ללא סייג של מפקדת חצבא חמוטאט עיי נציגיהם ב-R.C.I. כאמור השאלה היא מה תהיה מידת התמדתו של צאדם חוסיין במעבר מהתגוננות מתמדת ובליתם מהלכי איראן לעבר נטילת היוזמה.

4. החחום הכלכלי כפי שזה נראה מהצד העיראקי שופע פחות אופטימיות. העיראקים אמנם שומרים על רמה של יצוא נפט אך ירידת מחירי הנפט, המונחגת על ידי סעודיה כתרומתה להחלשת איראן גורמת לקשיים לעיראק בתחום המט"ח עליהם ניתן להתגבר רק עיי הגברה מתמדת בתחום שיווק ומכירת נפט. מסתבר שהעיראקים נתקלים בקשיים בתחום ייצור הנפט מאשר בשיווקו. כתוצאה מכך מסתברת לעיראק חשיבותו של הפוטנציאל של הקו לעקבה שהוקפא וכן הצינור הסורי המשותק (כזכור בהיקף של 5000 ט.י.) (ר' להלן). בעיקר לנוכח המצאותם מחוץ ליכולת הפגיעה האיראנית וקרבתם לנקודות השיווק. השפעת המצב הנ"ל ניכרת בתחום תמאמץ העיראקי בכיוון דחית מועד פרעון החובות החיצוניים ובמקביל השגת קווי אשראי נוספים במערב בעיקר באירופה ויפן שאינן נלהבות לכך, כאשר האמריקאים הודיעו שמטיבות כלכליות אין ביכולתם להוסיע את עיראק. תשובה ברורה התקבלה מבריה"מ אשר הסכימה במכלול הפגישות האחרונות במוסקבה לערוך מחדש את נושא החובות, להעניק סיוע כלכלי, שפרשו המעשי סיוע להצטיידות הצבאית העיראקית.

5. איראן לעומת זאת מוצאת עצמה נתונה דווקא בלחצים מיידים בחתום הצבאי והכלכלי. היוזמה העיראקית בחזית עצמה, אם כי בהיקף קטן שבודאי לא משנה המצב הכללי וההפצצות מטרות כלכליות באיראן גופה, הכניסו את טהראן למתח מסויים. (א) כיצד להגיב על היוזמה העיראקית החדשה. בתחום זה האיראנים כבר נתקבלו בבעיה בדמות התגובה הסעודית על הפצצת מיכליות הנפט לא מכבר. הסעודים, באמצעות הסורים, הלובים וכן עיי הממונה בטהראן הודיעו שהמסך הפצצת המיכליות הסעודיות בדרום המפרץ בידי הליקופטרים איראנים תגורר תגובה סעודית צבאית. (ב) שמירה על רמת שיווק נוכחית (2 מליון תביות בהשוואה ל-7 מליון אשתקד) בתחום מדיניות הנפט ניכרת הסתגלות למצב מחירי השוק עיי לעמוד בשיווק כמויות נפט. הדבר לא בא אלא בעקבות ויכוח ארוך דנדקב בתחום זה במשרד האנרגיה-בין. הדבר התוליסט שחבע, המסר המדיניות של שמירת רמת מחירים גבוהה יחסית לבין הדרג המקצועי שניבא חזות קודרת באם איראן לא תתאמץ עצמה למצב. בהקשר זה ברליי העיר שכמויות די גדולות של נפט איראני מוצאות דרכן לארה"ב מ"השוק החופשי" ברוטרדם. האיראנים, במאמץ להקל המצוקה במיידית, פנו לשני גורמים, בנוסף לגורמים המסורתיים באירופה ויפן - צרפת ובריה"מ. בתחום היחסים עם פאריס מסתמנת אפשרה. מהדיווח הצרפתי לאמריקאים עולה שהדיאלוג המתקיים לסירוגין בשתי תבירות (שליח צרפתי רם דרג שוהת

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כעת בטהראן) נסוג על הפשרת הנכסים האיראנים הכספים המוקפאים בצרפת בטכום של כ-4.1 בליון דולר ובהגבלת פעילות "המוג'אהידון אלחלק" תמורת שחרור בני הערובה הצרפתים בלבנון. האיראנים ניסו לשכנע הצרפתים להגביל מכירת נשק לעיראק אך ניתקלו בסירוב גמור. בינתיים שתי המדינות מגלות עצבנות, האחת מפעילות זולתה. העיראקים מהשיחות בין טהראן ופריס, והאיראנים מהמאמץ הירדני לגשר בין בגדאד ודמשק (ר' לחלן) שהתבטא בשחרור כמויות הנפט לסוריה.

6. ברליי ציין שבנושא המאמץ הירדני לעבר בגדאד ודמשק, האמריקאים מדווחים "במקצת" ע"י הירדנים בעוד שהעיראקים שומרים על שתיקה. העיראקים, עפ"י הירדנים, עומדים על דעתם שיש לנוע בשלבים ע"מ לעמוד על הכוונות הסוריות האמיתיות ולקיים מפגש ביניים בדרג רם טרם פסגה בין השליטים. חששם, המוצדק עפ"י ברליי הוא שפני אסד אינם לפיוס אמיתי אלא למהלך טקטי בו ימצא בעמדה בו ימצא בעמדה שתאפשר לו "להנות משני העולמות", ובעיקר מסיוע סעודי ומתדמית משופרת בזירה הבינ"ל, ובמקביל להחזיק את איראן במצב של בת ערובה בתחום הנפט. העיראקים ימצאו עצמם במצב טפשי של מסייעים למדיניות הסורית. דמשק לעומת זאת עומדת על דעתה שיש ללכת "על הקופה" בבחינת "הכל או לא כלום" ולקיים פסגה בין אסד וצאדס חוסיין. הירדנים ממשיכים להתרוצץ בין הצדדים כאשר לו"ז מבחינתם הוא כנס חליגה של שתי הערביים, יתכן עוד קודם לתאריך שנקבע לכך (23/6). עפ"י הירדנים הסורים נוטים להסכים (טרם הושג סיכום עמם) להכללת נושא המלחמה במפרץ בסד"ה, אך עדיין עומדים על דעתם שיש לדון בנושא ההפצצה האמריקאית על לוב. ברליי, כגורמים אחרים במחמ"ד (INR) בדעה שגם אם יתרחש מהלך כלשהו בין הצדדים מה שעדיין בסימן שאלה אם כי אפשרי, הוא יהיה ברמה הטקטית שכן שתי המדיניות, וביחוד האיבה האישית בין השליטים, חלוקות בכל קשת הנושאים שעל סד"ה ביניהם ושום צד, וביחוד העיראקי, לא ירצה להיות במצב של נפילה במלכודת שהצד השני יטמון לו ואח"כ להיות מואשם כמי שסכל "הפיוס".

7. ברקע הקשיים האיראנים מתנהל ויכוח בין הקבוצות השונות בהנהגת בטהראן. אמנם לא חדש במהותו אך נראה שהתחדד במקצת לאחרונה. ברליי מאתר בכך שוני בולט, קצת מפתיע בין שני משטרים שונים אך טוטליטריים האמונים על השתקת הבעת דעות. הויכוחים בטהראן מוצאים הן בפרלמנט ועושים דרכם לדפי העתונות היומיומית בשעה שבעיראק אין לכך שום ביטוי חיצוני והם סגורים בצורה הרמטית אם אכן מתקיימים. ההסבר של ברליי הוא ש"הויכוח הציבורי" בטהראן מבוקר לחלוטין ע"י ח'ומייני והוא מתנהל בעיקר ברובד השני של שכבת המנהיגות הדתית בטווח בטחון רחב יחסית שבין ויכוח אסור ברמה קונספטואלית-אידיאולוגית שיהווה קריאת תיגר על מדיניות ח'ומייני כגון בנושא המלחמה בעיראק המהווה טאבו, לבין ויכוח נסבל על דרכי יישום הקונספציה בתחומים השונים בעיקר במה שנוגע למדיניות פנים. ברליי מבחין באופן גס ב-3

ס 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

דף... 4... מתוך... 4... דפים

סוג בטחוני

דחיות

תאריך וזמן

מס' פנימי

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קבוצות. מזכיר לדוגמה עמדת האיטולה (ללא היחוס של "גרנד") HADHAVI KANI, העומד בראש הקבוצה הקוראת לעצמה "הקבוצה המיליטנטית תאיסלאמית של כוהני הדת" הדוגל באיטולה דתית שונה בין מדיניות פנים שמרנית בתחום הסוציאלי, בגד מיעוטים וכד', ובין אימוץ קו מחוץ במדיניות החוץ כגון איסור שימוש בטרור, אי אחזקת בני ערובה ועוד. מסתבר שיש לו תומכים ב-Council of Guardian המפקח על המגילים. קבוצה שניה המתנגדת להפרדה מונתגת ע"י הנשיא תיאמני, שייך אלאטאלם, החבר במועצה ליחסי החוץ והמופקד על נושא מחנות אימונים לטרור. לקבוצה מצטרף מפעם לפעם רפסנג'אני המשנה דעותיו בהתאם לעמדה שמביע ח'ומייני. קבוצה שלישית נוגעת לשכבת של סכנוקרטים הנגשים לויכוח מהזווית הכלכלית שלו. ביניהם אגדאבילי סגן שר הנפט (לשעבר ס/שה"ח) המופקד על הקשרים הכלכליים עם המערב (צרפת) וכן לארגני ממשלה.

8. באשר ליחסי ארה"ב-עיראק בעיקר בתחום הכלכלי, ברליי ציין בתשובה שהאמריקאים הבהירו לעיראקים שאינם יכולים לסייע בתחום האשראי פרט לתחום החקלאות שהוא הענף המרכזי הנמצא בדיון בין שתי המדינות. בתחום זה ארה"ב העניקה אשראי של 500 מ' דולר לרכישת גרעיני חיטה, כשהעיראקים ניצלו עד עתה רק כמחצית הסכום. פיטר הדגיש שהחוסר במזומנים מאפיל על ש"פ הכלכלי ופוטרו את האמריקאים מעיסוק בקבלת החלטות בתחום הפוליטי הקשורות לאספקט של ש"פ כלכלי, לרווחתם (או למגינת ליבם) של הגורמים במחמ"ד. לשאלה נוספת השיב שאין פעילות של אנשי AIO בעיראק. חחום של ש"פ כלכלי נוסף הוא עסקות תהליקופטרים. המדובר ב-3 סוגי עסקות, מסוג "בל" עד עתה רכשה עיראק 12 מסוקים עפ"י הרשיון שהוציא משרד המסחר מחוץ סה"כ של 36 מסוקים שאושרו. עיסקה שנייה נוגעת למסוקי "היוז", כ-13 מתוך ה-30 לגביהם ניתן רשיון. העיסקה האחרונה שהיא החדשה מכולן נוגעת לרשיון ל-12 "מסוקי אמבולנס" שמייצרת חברת M.B.B שטרם יצאה כלל לפועל מחוסר עיראקי במזומנים. סוגיית ההליקופטרים קשורה לנושא העצום טכנולוגיית ע"י ארה"ב, שיש לה חשיבות רבה במסגרת הפיקוח הצמוד שמקיים להבטחת הכללים הקשורים בכך. למעקב שהאמריקאים מקיימים מאשר שהעיראקים עומדים בתנאי הרשיון ושלא נעשה בהם שימוש צבאי החורג ממסגרת הרשיון.

אלי אבידן

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דף.....מחור.....דפים

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מסרין וזיה...050930 1701 86

אל:

המסרד

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.....מסרין

מצפ"א

עוד על ביקור חרסיין

בהמשך למברק הציר 95

מווילקוקס:-

א. עד כמה שידוע לו אין באמתחת חרסיין בעת ביקורו, ב-9 ו-10 בווינגטון, נעיונות חדשים לגבי תהליך השלום ולכן עוסק בתווך בין מוריה ועיראק. לדעת ווילקוקס, פיוס בינערבי יכול לסייע לחרסיין כאשר יבוא זה לשקם מעמדו ביס"ע כדי שיוכל להמשיך בתהליך השלום יחד עם הפלסטינים.

הגבתי כללית באשרי המאמין. כן הערתי, שלפי הגיון זה, אי-הצלחה במאמצי החוץ עשויה גם לגרום גם ההפך.

ב. גם לארה"ב אין, לעת עתה, מה להציע לחרסיין: לא סיוע, לא נשק ולא כל דבר אחר, The bag of gimmicks is empty.

ג. כהערה מסכמת אמר, שאין לצפות להפתעות כלשהן.

ד. לשאלתי אמר, שעוד ימסור לי אם בשיחת שולץ ואן-דר-ברוק עלה ענין הפגישה עם ערפאת. כמו כן ידע על פגישה בין ערפאת לג'ומייל אך לא ידע מה תוצאותיה. על ערפאת אמר עוד, שאף אם יתקיים דיון במועבי"ט, דבר שלא נראה, ערפאת בודאי לא יגיע.

מתני
ב/א

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תחילת השנה ניו-יורק	תאריך: 4
סופס צוברק	מחזור: 3
041300 0097 28-011 7-JINGP	לש'מנכ"ל; סע"ח; סמנכ"ל אמ"ח"ק; המכרה; נספ"א; סמ"ר; יועץ דו"ה"ם לחקשורת; יועץ שדב"ס לחקשורת; לע"מ; דו"צ. ר ע : וושינגטון סמ : עזרנות, ניו יורק

News Summary June 4, 1986

Editorials

ND "Probing the Evidence of an Israeli Cover-Up" Israel's leaders should know that invoking national security to cover up official misdeeds is a dangerous tactic in a robust democracy. Shin Beth quite properly conducts its war against terrorism in the most extraordinary secrecy. But it doesn't mean the agency can be excused when they operate outside the law. Nor should government ministers of a law-abiding country be in the position of obstructing justice themselves. Firing the Israeli attorney general who had been demanding a police investigation is a disgrace. Although the current uproar in Israel over this case testifies to the vitality of that society and the vigor of its press, expressions of outrage should continue until a new investigation fixes responsibility and satisfies the demands of law and justice. (cabled)

NYP "Israel Should Stop Stonewalling and Help in the Pollard Spy Case" What Israel did in the Pollard affair was wrong, a wrong in no way mitigated by the notion that "everyone does it." PM Peres assured the US that the affair was an isolated incident. He insisted that Israel does not--in general--engage in espionage against the US. Now the Justice Dept. probe has widened. Pollard appears to be singing his head off--in hopes of avoiding a life sentence--and he's evidently implicated other persons, Israeli and Americans, in espionage. The navy analyst appears to have been part of a larger Israeli espionage effort. Espionage of this sort turns Americans into traitors. Stonewalling in this affair must be replaced by full and genuine cooperation. The friendship between Israel and the US is special--and part of what makes it special is trust. (cabled)

Columns

DN -Buckley "Striking Terror From the Evil Empire" The Israeli Ambassador to the UN is, as most Israelis on the vital questions, strictly no-nonsense. The movement to condemn terrorism in a comprehensive way failed. It continues to fail today. The measure of the failure isn't the UN's paralysis. It is the apparent paralysis of the free world. Netanyahu believes it is a challenge of focus. His point is that it is self-evident that there is no excuse for terrorism. He says there should be no concessions, no appeasement of countries that tolerate terrorists, common policies among allies, economic sanctions against terrorist sanctuaries,

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and education of the media. Buckley wonders what we are going to do about the Soviet Union. It is conceded by all the authors of "Terrorism: How the West Can Win" that the Soviet Union is the principle engine behind international terrorism. The challenge of the era is how to deal with the evil empire.

Press Reports

US Expects Guilty Pleas in Israel Spy Case

NYT-Shenon-Pollard and his wife are expected to plead guilty to Federal charges in connection with an Israeli espionage operation. At a hearing to be held today, new details of the espionage operation might be disclosed. A decision by the Pollards to cooperate fully in the investigation could lead to additional strains between the American and Israeli governments. (Cabled)

Military Costs in Israel

NYT-Silk-Peres stressed in an interview the most positive aspect of his administration: the sharp drop in Israeli inflation. But there are many Israeli economists and business executives who think the PM's optimism is excessive. Aron Dovrat, chief exec. officer of Cral Ltd. says the PM has not really faced up to the task of cutting the national budget and reforming Israel's tax system. A dispute between the US and Israel has arisen over the Lavi. Peres said: "Our relations with the US are so open and confident that I am sure we will have a good resolution of the difficulties over the Lavi." Nevertheless, there is much anxiety over the possible damage to Israeli-US relations as a result of the Pollard affair. The betting in Israel is that the Lavi will survive because to kill it outright would be too damaging to Israeli-US relations.

Reagan Asks Vote For Saudi Missiles

NYT-Weinraub-Reagan told Republican Congressional leaders that a Senate vote this week on the sale of missiles to Saudi Arabia would "have a profound effect" on US relations with Arab states. The vote is expected to be very close. (see ND-Page; DN-Drake)

Fighting in Beirut

NYT-Hijazi-The fiercest fighting in a year engulfed West Beirut as Shiites clashed in separate battles with Palestinians and a pro-Palestinian Sunni Moslem faction. 53 people were reported slain in the past day and night of fighting. 242 were wounded. Amal has said it is determined not to allow the Palestinians to re-establish a military presence in Beirut, fearing that a resurgence of Palestinian power could cut into the Shiites' own influence. (Photo page 1 of fighting in West Beirut)

Waldheim

NYT-Lewis-The French Gov't is investigating charges that French officials knew as early as 1979 that Waldheim had given a false account of his WW II service, a spokesman for Chirac said. The investigation began after Rabbi Marvin Heir gave the Prime Minister's staff copies of what appeared to be a report on Waldheim's wartime career prepared by the French Military Gov't archivist in Berlin and dated March 21, 1979. The French never made the report public.

NYP-Dan-Israel has decided not to send another ambassador to Vienna if Waldheim is elected President of Austria. A highly placed source said: "If Waldheim wins the election on Sunday, then (ambassador designee) Avi Pazner stays home."

DN-Rainie & Drake-There is no chance that Messe will make his decision on Waldheim before the election on Sunday. Stephen Solarz says the delay means that if Waldheim is elected it would be much harder to put him on the watch list because he will be the leader of an allied gov't.

NYT-special-Lawyer for Waldheim hope to meet this week with Justice Dept. prosecutors who are debating whether to ban Waldheim from entering the US.

Fiat Turned Down in Bid to Buy Shares From Libya

WSJ-staff-Fiat's chairman said the Italian automaker has tried to buy Libya's stake in the company but has been turned down. Fiat is reportedly embarrassed by Libya's holding and fears it could jeopardize its chances of winning US defense contracts.

Netanyahu Urges Help for Israel

NYT-Ambassador Netanyahu urged more than 1500 graduates at Yeshiva University to help guarantee the survival of Israel. Netanyahu recieved a honorary Doctor of Humane Letters degree for being "dignified and firm in the face of hostility, and unyielding in your quest for peace and justice."

Paid Ad

NYT-Author Pong Yu says that America should not do the dirty work in dealing with Libya. It is America's pro-Israel policies that make Arab extremists hate America and choose Americans as their targets. So, the Israelis should help America as America has always helped them. The Jews are brave people and Israel's air force is one of the best in the world, maybe better than the American's. If it is necessary for a military action action, Yu suggests that Israel should take the responsibility to rid us all of the terrorist activities of Libya.

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אל: המשרד

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דע: לשכת מנכ"ל אוצר, לשכת מנכ"ל בטחון.

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פגירות ישראל - ונסינגטון

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תאריך:

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5. כרגיל חבטות הקשות ביותר קשורות לתקציב הבטחון. החלטת הנשיא לצאת מהגבלות

“סאלט שנייט” בערוד חדשים מספח אם הסובייטים לא יכבדו הסכם זה, מקשה על מלאכת הוועידה

כי הדטוקרטיס רואים בהחלטה זו שלוחת חרסן ע"י הנשיא במגמה להתחיל מחדש את החימוש

הגרעיני. סנטורים ומורשים רבים, ולא רק דמוקרטים, מותחום ביקורת על החלטת הנשיא

ונראה שגברו תלחצים לחגביל את תקציב הבטחון ככל האפשר - דבר שאינו מקובל, כמובן,

על הסממל בכלל ועל הבית הלבן בפרט.

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ס ו פ ס
דף.....מחור.....דפים
שמו
טווג בטחוני
מלידי
דחיפות
מאריך וז"ח יוני 4 1230
סגור

אל: המשרד

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אל: מצפ"א

נסק לסעודיה

1) כיום (וניחן לומר, סוף סוף) אנו עדים למסע מחוזמר מצד הממשל, הסעודים והתעשייה שמכוון בעיקר לסנטורים שעומדים לקיים מחר (5) במליאת הסנט אח התצנעה בחזרת בנושא - או ליתר הדיוק, בווסו הנשיאותי. בסוף השבוע שעבר ניסח הממשל לקשור את מכירת הטילים לביקור אפשרי של שולץ בסעודיה (שלנו 868 מה-30 במאי); במהלך סוף השבוע התפרסם בעתון וושפוסט מאמר ארוך תחת הכותרת "קשר ארה"ב עם סעודיה מתמוטט" מאת מזרח חמיד (שתואר כמומחה סעודי לעניינים מדיניים ובטחוניים), וכ"כ חברת הנפט, מופיל, פירסמה מודעה תחת הכותרת "מכירת טילים לסעודים משרתת את האינטרסים הטובים של ארה"ב" (שלנו 42). בנוסף, הנשיא ריגאן נפגש אתמול (3) עם סנטורים רפובליקאים מרכזיים והציג את עניין המכירה כמבחן למדיניות החוץ של ארה"ב וליכולתו הוא, כנשיא, לנהל מדיניות זו.

2) נכון לאתמול טענו אנשי הממשל וחבית חלבן (וויל באל - קצין הקישור הראשי) שמספר הקולות בסנט בעד העיסקה עדיין "מרחף" בגובה של 33 (דהיינו אחד פחות משליש חוסט). כמעט ואין איש שאינו מאמין שעד מחר הקול האחרון לא יימצא, ויש האומרים שקול זה כבר מצוי אך הממשל ממשיך לעסוק בלוחמה פסיכולוגית במגמה להגביר את הלחצים על סנטורים שעדיין מתלבטים. בקיצור, ההערכה היא שהווסו יחזיק מעמד (WILL BE SUSTAINED) ושהמכירה תאושר.

3) כידוע, התחילו השבוע לשר את דיוני הסנט בטלביזיה והויכוח בנושא הטילים לסעודיה, לא זו בלבד שיהיה "סרט המתח" הראשון שיוקרן מאולם הסנט, אלא ייפתח בשעה 10:00 ויסתיים ב-14:00 כלומר "PRIME TIME" לקראת תכניות החדשות בערב.

למדן

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מחור 1

Weekly Update: Bases in Sinai to Offset FMS Debt?; Syria/Iran

Exclusive: Are US Bases in Egypt an Idea Whose Time Has Come?

Recent visitors to Egypt were surprised to find that at very senior levels of the Egyptian Government (both civilian and military) concern about Egypt's pressing need for economic relief and about the US' dwindling influence in the Arab world after the Jordanian and Saudi arms sale affairs and the aftermath of the US raid on Libya had led to a new receptivity, or at least a willingness to listen, to the possibility of providing bases in Egypt for the US, something which has been officially out of the question in recent years. While public denials must be expected, there is now a willingness to discuss the idea in private. Among the options, offer the US the two unused bases left behind by Israel in Sinai (Eytam and Etzion), using the base rental fees to offset Egypt's heavy Foreign Military Sale debts to the US (running from \$700-million to \$900-million a year). The bases, now used only in a limited way to support the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, are in good condition and, having been built by Israel, the specifications might not require much work to come up to US levels. Sources tell the *Weekly* that one scenario would involve:

- Leasing the two Sinai bases to the US, plus Ra's Banas and another base. Efforts to provide Rapid Deployment Force (now US Central Command) facilities at Ra's Banas fell through before, but there is now much less resistance to the idea in high Egyptian circles than in 1979. Ra's Banas and one other base would presumably be shared with Egypt, while the Sinai bases could have, at best, an Egyptian flag, since Egypt is prohibited by the Egyptian-Israeli treaty from using them. Egypt would prefer that the fourth base be in the Western Desert, near Libya.

- In return, the FMS debt is wholly or partially offset by the base rental, and US aid increased. At the moment, the FMS burden is actually greater than post-Grumman Rudman Economic Support Fund Assistance, money Egypt needs to make up for the loss of oil, Suez Canal, and tourism revenues and expatriate remittances. US military aid should increase to equal that received by Israel (up to \$1.8-billion from \$1.3-billion), rental fees might be set along the levels of those paid to Spain or the Philippines, or higher if all four bases are involved. The argument is that this provides the US with strategically needed prepositioning in return for giving Egypt the means to pay its debts, as opposed to merely having them forgiven.

- Amend the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty to permit training in Sinai of local forces recruited there. This is a logistical concern of the Egyptians; it would save much effort to train the forces recruited in Sinai there, something now banned by the Treaty. The added security of US bases in Sinai might make Israel willing to concede this, in any event, the Treaty would have to be amended to allow the US in, and Israel would be likely to favor the increased US presence.

At this stage the idea may merely be a talking point, but it would solve two major problems: CENTCOM's need for Middle Eastern bases (exacerbated by weakening Saudi Arabian confidence in US firmness) and Egypt's pressing cash needs. And the airfields are unused; Egypt certainly cannot use them under the Treaty. Nor would Israel presumably object. There would be a political storm likely in Egypt, but some in the leadership may now feel that necessity is the mother of this rather clever trade-off, and that the infringement on Egyptian sovereignty caused by bases would be less than the potential problems caused by the collapse of the economy. And the damage done in the Arab world, disunited as it is, might be minimal.

COMPROMISING STINGERS? The US Administration's decision to withdraw the *Stinger* portion of the Saudi missile sale to try to avoid losing the sale altogether comes at a curious time: many Senators opposed to the sale warned that the *Stingers* might fall into the hands of terrorists, and thus should not be sold. But the Saudis already have *Stingers*, and what's more, the recent US decision to provide the shoulder-launched SAMs to the Afghan *mujahidin* and the UNITA forces in Angola suggests that compromising or losing the system is not a great concern. (In fact, the *Stingers* in all three cases are not state-of-the-art, and the Soviet SA-14 is equivalent technology, according to sources.) Via the Afghan *mujahidin*, some *Stingers* seem certain to wind up in Iran, which maintains ties with several Afghan movements. And no Saudi *Stinger* has ever been compromised, Administration sources say.

סגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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בית הנבחרים: פולארד

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 על כל פרשיות חריגול שנתגלו לאחרונה בארה"ב. פרטים על חמועד כנפרד (לכשנקבלם).

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מאריך דדים: 09.06.86

מס' חברה...

אל : ממכ"ל, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממ"ד

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יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

פרשת פולארד

להלן מה"ווינגטון פוסט" (4.6.86).

תוכנות

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Pollard Expected to Plead Guilty

Agreement Is Reached in Israeli Intelligence Case, Sources Say

By Joe Pichirallo
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. officials have worked out a tentative agreement in which accused spy Jonathan Jay Pollard would plead guilty today in connection with his arrest last year for allegedly selling classified U.S. government documents to the Israelis, sources familiar with the case said yesterday.

A court hearing in the Pollard case has been tentatively scheduled for today before U.S. District Court Judge Aubrey Robinson. A spokesman for the U.S. attorney's office declined to explain the hearing's purpose or make any further comment.

Sources said the plea agreement in the politically sensitive case was nearly resolved. All that remained, they said, was working out last-minute details that were not expected to derail months of extensive negotiations between federal prosecutors and attorneys for Pollard and his wife, Anne Henderson-Pollard, who is also charged in the case.

Under the agreement, Pollard, 31, a former civilian Navy counter-intelligence analyst, would plead guilty to what was described as a "lesser" espionage charge, and his wife would be allowed to plead to a

lesser charge, said the sources. They declined to specify the charges.

Sources said the federal investigation has uncovered new information that implicates an Israeli air force official in the alleged espionage operation, as well as others whose identities were not disclosed. The sources said others are likely to be charged in the case.

Pollard was arrested outside the Israeli Embassy Nov. 21 during an unsuccessful attempt to seek political asylum and was charged with selling U.S. military secrets, an offense that carries a maximum penalty of life in prison. Henderson-Pollard, 26, has been charged with unauthorized possession of classified documents, for which she could receive a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison and a \$10,000 fine.

A negotiated plea would avoid a trial that might further strain relations between the United States and Israel, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East.

The Israeli Embassy here released a statement during the weekend labeling as "baseless" recent news reports that the embassy said suggested a "widespread espionage operation by Israel in the United States."

One U.S. official said yesterday that the Israeli air force official is

expected to be cited in the Pollard court proceedings along with others implicated. The official described the Israeli official as Pollard's "case officer."

U.S. diplomats, who recently have provided the Israeli government with new details uncovered by the investigation, are eager to learn Israel's account of the air force official's actions, the source said.

The Israeli Embassy statement said that "the government of Israel reiterates that in accordance with the agreement reached in December 1985 between Israel and the United States, full cooperation regarding the Pollard affair has been and is continuing . . ."

Sources said that the new information emerged largely after Pollard began cooperating with federal authorities as part of his effort to negotiate a plea.

Under such plea agreements, prosecutors generally outline the case to the judge. Just how much information should be made public in the Pollard case has been the subject of sensitive negotiations between Justice Department officials and State Department officials concerned about the case's diplomatic impact, sources said.

Staff writer Dan Chodackoff contributed to this report.



official text

DATE: 06/04/86

U.S. MUST PURSUE SDI, FORMER SOVIET SCIENTISTS SAY (1260)

(Text: open letter to the U.S. Congress)

Washington -- The United States must vigorously pursue its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program and not slow its development because of Soviet pressure, a group of former Soviet scientists said June 4. The scientists presented their views in an open letter to the U.S. Congress and the American people at a press conference in Washington June 4.

Concessions "could endanger America's security and the long run prospects for continued world peace," physicist Nadia Lifshitz said. She read the text of the letter, signed by 30 former Soviet scientists, physicists and engineers. Most of the signers received their doctorates in the Soviet Union and subsequently emigrated or defected to the West, where they now work professionally.

"We believe that America's quest for strategic defenses combined with mutual reductions in offensive nuclear weapons offers all the peoples of the world the greatest hope for a stable and enduring peace in our lifetime," she said.

The scientists noted that the Soviet Union has been working on "Star Wars" research since the late 1960's and devotes "much more of its efforts and resources" on the program than does the United States.

They warned that development and deployment of a "Star Wars" system is part of the Soviet Union's global strategy against the non-communist world.

The United States must be wary of arms control treaties with the Soviet Union and must insist on verifiability because "the idea of abiding by a treaty does not exist" for the Soviets, said Dr. Igor Abramovich. "They are concerned with image, not morality, and discuss among themselves how to present a treaty, not how to follow it."

Dr. Edward Lozansky, who informally led the press conference, reminded his audience that, "Moscow does not believe in tears -- Moscow believes in force." The Soviet Union will not respond to tearful appeals for peace, he explained, but it will respond to power.

Following is the text of the letter signed by the former Soviet scientists:

(begin text)

"AN OPEN LETTER TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS FROM FORMER SOVIET SCIENTISTS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE"

We are concerned about the growing pressures on the United States from the Soviet Union and others to make vital concessions on the Strategic Defense Initiative -- concessions that could endanger America's security and the long run prospects for continued world peace -- simply to achieve an agreement providing the short-lived illusion of peace.

We believe that America's quest for strategic defenses combined with mutual reductions in offensive nuclear weapons offers all the peoples of the world the greatest hope for a stable and enduring world peace in our lifetime.

When we were scientists in the Soviet Union, we belonged to a privileged part of Soviet society. We had the opportunity to observe the Soviet ruling elite, its way of looking at the world and its view



United States Information Service
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of Soviet-American rivalry in particular, and to learn of many of its programs and intentions.

We can say unequivocally that the Soviet party elite honestly believes no genuine coexistence between socialism and capitalism is possible. Despite all its talk about peaceful coexistence and detente, the Soviet ruling elite is convinced that one of the two superpowers is destined to dominate the other and makes every effort to ensure that it will be the Soviet Union.

Consequently, the structure of Soviet society is designed to best contribute to the ultimate world-wide victory of the Soviet communist totalitarian system. We know that the Soviet leadership spends enormous resources, in fact, all it can, to surpass the United States in the military field because it believes overwhelming military superiority will be a decisive factor in the victory of communism.

We have witnessed that not only the best scientific research and technology is channeled into the military spheres, but in fact, all the finest achievements of Soviet economics, culture, and even sports are automatically requisitioned for the "defense of the Motherland" -- a euphemism for the promotion of the final victory of communist totalitarianism.

Only then, the ruling elite thinks, will its power be finally secured.

In relation to the Strategic Defense Initiative we must tell you, from our experience and understanding, and even though Gorbachev may deny it, we are convinced that:

1. The Soviet scientific community and government leaders believe that effective strategic defenses are technically possible and doable.

2. The Soviet Union has been intensely working on its own version of the Strategic Defense Initiative since the late 1960s, and puts much more of its efforts and resources into its "Star Wars" and strategic defense programs than does the U.S.

3. Development and deployment of Soviet "Star Wars" systems is part of the Soviet Union's global strategy against the non-communist world which seeks by coercion to usher in the "final historical era" of world-wide Communism and "peace" maintained by Soviet military power.

4. The Soviet Communist leaders can be expected to continue working on their "Star Wars" system, either overtly or covertly and with high priority, no matter what they say or what they sign, or what the U.S. does.

5. Soviet Communist morality and the history of Soviet behavior teaches us that the Soviet leaders do not consider it immoral to cheat or deceive their "mortal enemies" -- and, unfortunately, they consider the U.S. their Number One Enemy. Therefore, they will break any international agreement the moment it serves their interest to do so, as they have done many times before. As a result, everything in agreements must be strictly verifiable.

As former citizens of the Soviet Union, we love the country of our birth as much as we love the country of our choice. We want for all the millions of our former countrymen, a future of peace and, eventually, freedom. The Strategic Defense Shield will, we believe, help achieve these goals by discouraging the Soviet leaders from using nuclear blackmail to gain their ends, and instead encourage them to turn inward and begin addressing the needs of the Russian and other people subjugated by them.

Andrei Sakharov has wisely pointed out that, "genuine security is possible only when based on a stabilization of international relations, a repudiation of expansionist policies, the strengthening of international trust, openness and pluralization of socialist countries, and the observance of human rights throughout the world..."

As scientists, we strongly advocate true coexistence and understanding among nations as the only ultimate guarantee of a secure future for humankind. But, for that to be possible, the Soviet leadership will first have to establish a genuine coexistence with Soviet intellectuals and scientists, renounce its mission of spreading communism throughout the world and open Soviet society to non-communist ideas and influences. Only such steps can produce confidence that the Soviet elite's supposedly peaceful intentions are authentic.

Finally, the president and his negotiators can contribute substantially to preserving world peace when dealing with the Soviet leaders if they:

1. Do not hurry to reach an agreement for agreement's sake.
 2. Do not yield on development of the Strategic Defense Peace Shield.
 3. Do not give the Kremlin leadership a veto on the Peace Shield's deployment.
 4. Constantly remain aware of the expansionist character of the true nature, aims and motivations of the Soviet leaders with whom they will be negotiating, and
 5. Do hold fast to America's commitment to liberating the world from being held hostage to the threat of nuclear holocaust.
- (end text)



official text

DATE: 06/04/86

SDI, ARMS CONTROL POLICIES, ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY
(Text: Nitze speech to Time Magazine conference) (3280)

Washington -- Ambassador Paul Nitze says the Strategic Defense Initiative and U.S. arms control policies, as currently defined, provide a cohesive and firm basis for enhancing strategic stability in the future and ultimately for reducing the risk of war.

But Nitze, special advisor to the president and secretary of state on arms control matters, told a Time Magazine conference on SDI June 3 that the Soviet Union is trying to limit U.S. defense programs, "especially SDI."

"This focus on SDI," he said, "reflects Soviet concern over the fact that they are no longer alone in their exploration of the defensive potential of advanced technologies and over the prospect of having to divert resources from proven ballistic missile programs to high-technology programs in fields where we are likely to have a competitive advantage."

Following is the text of Nitze's speech, as delivered:
(begin text)

The primary security objective of the United States is to reduce the risk of war while preserving our liberty and democratic political system. Over the past 25 years, the United States has pursued this objective through two related means. We have sought to deter war by maintaining a force structure adequate to convince potential adversaries that the risks and costs of aggression would far outweigh any possible gains. Simultaneously, we have sought to limit the nature and extent of the threat to the United States and to stabilize the strategic relationship with our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, through arms control agreements.

The United States is now engaged in research to find out if new technologies could provide a more stable basis to deter war in the future by a shift to a greater reliance on strategic defenses. Arms control could also play an important role in designing a more stable strategic regime in the future. Tonight, I propose to examine the relationship among SDI, arms control and stability. I hope to show that our SDI research and arms control policies, as currently defined, provide a cohesive and firm basis for enhancing strategic stability in the future and ultimately for reducing the risk of war.

Arms Control and Stability

Two important corollaries to the objective of reducing the risk of war are the objectives of assuring overall functional equality between the capabilities of the two sides, and of assuring crisis stability. Crisis stability implies a situation in which no nation has an incentive to execute a first strike in a serious crisis or, in peacetime, to provoke a crisis that might lead to a military confrontation. This situation obtains if no significant advantage can be achieved by initiating conflict. Equivalently, crisis stability also implies that a potential aggressor perceives that he could end up in no better a military position after expending a major portion of his forces in executing the attack and then absorbing a retaliation than would the defender after absorbing the attack and retaliating. These two goals -- assuring overall functional equality and crisis



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stability -- are closely interrelated. The United States cannot tolerate either significant inequality or substantial crisis instability.

Trends in the strategic balance over the past 15 years lend new meaning and importance to these classical goals. The growth of Soviet capability to destroy hardened targets such as ICBM silos in an initial strike, with their large, land-based, MIRVed ballistic missiles, has created a serious force structure asymmetry and a growing danger of instability in a crisis. Soviet strategic defense activities, coupled with a military doctrine that stresses the importance of offensive and defensive force interactions to achieve Soviet aims in any conflict, have likewise been threatening.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that it is the balance between the offense-defense mixes of both sides that determines the strategic nuclear relationship. The Soviet Union must realize that a successful "creepout" or "breakout" in its strategic defense capabilities, or conversely, unilateral restraint by the United States in this area, would further shift the strategic nuclear balance in its favor and potentially undermine the value to the United States and its allies of U.S. deterrent forces. Through its on-going overt and covert defense activities and its arms control policies, the Soviet Union has been attempting to foster such a shift. Currently, in the arms control arena, the Soviet Union seeks to protect the gains that it has achieved in the strategic nuclear balance by limiting and delaying U.S. defense programs, especially SDI. This focus on SDI reflects Soviet concern over the fact that they are no longer alone in their exploration of the defensive potential of advanced technologies and over the prospect of having to divert resources from proven ballistic missile programs to high-technology programs in fields where we are likely to have a competitive advantage.

U.S. arms control efforts are oriented toward achieving strategically significant and stabilizing reductions. For example, we seek to lower the ratio of accurate warheads to strategic aimpoints and reduce a potential attacker's confidence in his ability to eliminate effective retaliation. I should note that, while the role of arms control in enhancing U.S. security and in bringing about a more stable strategic relationship is important, it is secondary to what we are able and willing to do for ourselves. U.S. strategic modernization programs provide the necessary foundation on which our deterrence and arms control policies must rest. SDI should be understood in the context of the goals of our modernization and arms control policies and the dangers inherent in the future possibility of having deterrent forces inadequate to respond to, and thus deter, the threat.

We should make no mistake about the fact that Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities pose real threats to the security of the West. Our work in SDI is in part a reaction to the unabated growth of this threat, especially during the last 15 years. Through SDI, we seek both new capabilities and a new approach to rectify the deteriorating strategic balance.

The ABM Treaty and the Origins of SDI

The president's March 1983 speech expressed his strongly held belief that we should reexamine the basis of our deterrent posture to see if we could deter aggression through a greater reliance on defense rather than relying so heavily on the threat of devastating nuclear retaliation. This belief reflects both our disappointment in the

deterioration of the strategic balance since the signing of the SALT One agreements, and our hope that new defensive technologies can mitigate adverse developments in the area of strategic offensive weaponry.

The United States in the early 1970s had proceeded from the assumption that the strict limitation of defenses in the ABM Treaty would provide the basis for significant reductions in offensive weaponry. The theory was simple: if both sides had survivable retaliatory nuclear forces at about the same level of capability and both sides were otherwise effectively defenseless against the nuclear capability of the other, then neither side would have an incentive to strike first, regardless of the circumstances. Therefore, significant reductions to equal levels of capability, tailored so as to enhance security, would improve the security of both sides.

However, the Soviets showed little readiness during the SALT negotiations to agree to measures which would result in meaningful limits or cuts in offensive nuclear forces. Within the framework of the SALT One interim agreement and SALT Two, the Soviets deployed large numbers of MIRVed ballistic missiles of sufficient throwweight and accuracy to pose an evident threat to the survivability of the entire land-based portion of U.S. retaliatory forces. This violated a basic premise of the SALT process. The growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities in general, and in the asymmetry in counterforce capabilities in particular, are fundamentally inimical to the security of the United States and its allies.

Despite erosion of the value of the ABM Treaty through Soviet noncompliance and through the absence of comparable Soviet restraints on offensive systems, the United States is and will continue to remain in full compliance with its ABM Treaty obligations. A principal factor leading to that accord was the conclusion reached in the United States during the ABM debate of the late 1960s that defenses, at the then-existing level of technology, could be overwhelmed at less cost by additional offensive systems than would be required to add balancing defenses. Therefore, we were concerned that the deployment of a relatively ineffective territorial ABM system on either side could prompt a proliferation of offensive nuclear forces and cheap but effective countermeasures. An ABM system based on then-current technology would not have been militarily effective, survivable or cost-effective at the margin.

By contrast, our interest in SDI research is premised on the judgment that new technologies may now be available that could reverse our judgments of the late 1960s about the military ineffectiveness, vulnerability and cost-ineffectiveness of strategic defenses. It is important to keep in mind that these three requirements are as relevant today as they were 16 years ago; it is the capabilities of the technologies that may have changed.

The SDI Decision Criteria: A Path to Stability

The President's Strategic Defense Initiative, published in January 1985 as the most authoritative description of the president's vision, discussed these requirements for an effective defense. These criteria are posited as necessary for maintaining stability.

To achieve the benefits which advanced technologies may be able to offer, defenses must be militarily effective. Defenses must be able at a minimum to destroy a sufficient portion of an aggressor's attacking forces to deny him confidence in the attack's outcome, in general, and in particular to deny him the ability to destroy a

significant portion of the military target sets he would need to destroy.

The exact level of defense system capability required to achieve these ends cannot be determined at this time, since it depends on the size, composition, effectiveness and inherent survivability of U.S. forces relative to those of the Soviet Union at the time that defenses are introduced. However, in addition to the requirement of military effectiveness, two other necessary characteristics of an effective defense have been identified and constitute current presidential policy as put forth in a recent National Security Decision Directive. They are survivability and cost-effectiveness at the margin.

Survivability is defined not in terms of system invulnerability, but the ability of a system "to maintain a sufficient degree of effectiveness to fulfill its mission, even in the face of determined attacks against it." The president's analysis characterizes survivability as "essential not only to maintain the effectiveness of a defense system, but to maintain stability." Vulnerable defenses could, in a crisis, provide the offense with incentives to initiate defense suppression attacks to gain a favorable shift in the offense-defense balance as a prelude to a first strike.

Similarly, in the interest of discouraging the proliferation of ballistic missile forces, the defensive system must be able to maintain its effectiveness against the offense at less cost than it would take to develop offensive countermeasures and proliferate the ballistic missiles necessary to overcome it. This is the concept of cost-effectiveness at the margin. It describes the stability of the competitive relationship between one side's defensive forces and the other side's offensive forces, that is whether one side has major incentives to add additional offensive forces in an effort to overcome the other side's defenses.

The term cost-effectiveness is expressed in economic terms. While this concept has valid application not only for strategic defenses but for other military systems as well, the United States understands the criterion of cost-effectiveness at the margin to be more than an economic concept.

In particular, we need to be concerned, in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, with the degree to which certain types of defensive systems encourage or discourage an adversary to attempt to overwhelm them with additional offensive systems and countermeasures. We seek defensive options which provide clear disincentives to attempts to counter them with additional offensive forces.

Our continued adherence to these criteria indicates the deep interest that the United States has in maintaining and enhancing stability. The United States is demonstrating this interest in other ways as well. In particular, our goals related to a possible transition to greater reliance on defenses, together with our view of SDI as a means of enhancing deterrence and stabilizing the U.S.-Soviet balance, and not as a means of achieving superiority, underscore our concern for stability.

Assuring Confidence in Our SDI Research

President Reagan personally assured General Secretary Gorbachev at last November's summit that the United States seeks to enhance peace and that we are pursuing SDI as part of our effort to enhance deterrence and global stability. In this regard, as we have repeatedly made clear, the United States is conducting research only

on defensive systems, with primary emphasis on non-nuclear technologies. While it is difficult to be certain of capabilities of potential systems based on technologies not yet developed, defenses based on the new technologies we are investigating would not have the role of striking targets on the ground.

Despite Soviet unwillingness during the first four rounds of the Nuclear and Space talks to engage in meaningful dialogue in the defense and space negotiating group, the United States has consistently demonstrated in our statements and actions that we do not seek to gain a unilateral advantage from strategic defenses. This openness stands in marked contrast to the closed nature of Soviet strategic defensive activities, the intentions of which we must extrapolate from an operationally offensive Soviet military doctrine with heavy emphasis on strategic defense, and from the unabated growth in Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities.

Consistent with our traditional emphasis on verification, the United States does not expect the Soviet Union to accept our assurances on faith alone. On the contrary, in Geneva we have made concrete proposals which would enable the United States and the Soviet Union to assess the defensive nature of the research being conducted by each side.

If and when our research criteria are met, and following close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems. It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive technologies prove feasible, we -- in close and continuing consultation with our allies -- and the Soviets will jointly manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance. A jointly managed transition would be designed to maintain, at all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive systems thereby assuring both sides of the stability of the evolving strategic balance. An implicit goal of a jointly managed transition would be to identify in advance potential problems in, for example, the stability of the mix of offense and defense and to act to resolve such problems.

Of course, arms control would play an important role in such a transition. Properly structured cuts in offensive arms are not only worthwhile in their own right, they could also facilitate the shift to a more defense reliant posture. Unilateral modernization measures can enhance transition stability. Improving the survivability of our offensive forces, for example, would especially contribute to stability in an early transition phase.

Our interest in pursuing a cooperative transition with the Soviets should not be seen, however, as granting them veto power over U.S. decisionmaking. Any U.S. decision to develop and deploy defenses would still reflect the same goals of peace and enhanced deterrence through a stable transition, even if our good faith efforts to engage the Soviets in a cooperative transition were to fail. I am convinced, however, that a successful SDI research phase proving the feasibility of survivable and cost-effective defenses would provide compelling incentives for the Soviets to consider seriously the advantages of a jointly managed transition. In Geneva, we seek to provide a forum for such consideration.

Balancing Offense and Defense in Geneva

The Soviet approach in Geneva has been to advance the

self-serving and unacceptable concepts of "a ban on space-strike arms" and "a ban on purposeful research," both impossible to define in meaningful and verifiable terms. They would like to limit U.S. capabilities and stop U.S. research while avoiding constraints on their own weapon systems and research through definitional ploys.

The United States is committed to the SDI research program, which is being carried out in full compliance with all of our treaty obligations, including the ABM Treaty. Indeed, the United States seeks to reverse the erosion of existing agreements, including the ABM Treaty, caused by Soviet violations. In seeking to stop or delay SDI, the Soviet Union also talks about strengthening the ABM Treaty. However, their approach for doing so has so far been based on artificial distinctions such as that between "purposeful" and "fundamental" research.

The Soviets maintain that deep cuts are only possible, and that stability can only be preserved, if the United States agrees to halt substantive work on SDI. The United States cannot accept this thesis.

We propose instead a serious discussion on the offense-defense relationship and the outlines of the future offense-defense balance. Were the Soviets to work with us in a meaningful exploration of significant reductions in S.T.A.R.T. and INF, we could examine how the level of defense would logically be affected by the level and nature of offensive arms.

The ABM Treaty marked the beginning of an arms control process which, in retrospect, has been profoundly disappointing. The offensive reductions which were supposed to accompany it have not materialized and the Soviets are in fundamental violation of one or more of the treaty's key provisions. Consequently, we are working to halt the treaty's erosion by the Soviet Union and persuade them that full compliance with its terms by both sides is in our mutual interest.

The United States does not believe that there is reason now to change the ABM Treaty. Through our SDI research, we wish to determine whether or not there is a better way to ensure long-term stability than to rely on the ever more dangerous threat of devastating nuclear retaliation to deter war and assure peace. If we find there is and if, at some future time, the United States, in close consultation with its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for U.S./Soviet consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own expansive defensive systems research program, we will seek to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union. In this context, we must remember that the ABM Treaty is a living document. Articles XIII and XIV provide for consultation with the aim of appropriate amendment of the treaty to take account of future considerations, such as the possibility of a new -- and more stable -- strategic balance.

Toward A New Synthesis

Current U.S. SDI research activities and arms control policies are designed to provide a basis for securing stability in a future strategic regime. The goal of stability can be guaranteed only if we maintain our commitment to the standards and criteria consistent with it.

The United States is committed to achieving strategic stability and therefore to a predictable and stable arms control process to complement our strategic programs to assure our primary security

objective of reducing the risk of war.
(end text)

ס ו ד י

כ"ו באייר התשמ"ו
4 ביוני 1986

אל: ✓ראה"מ
שהב"ט

מאת: נמרוד

הנדון: לביא

ידיד משותף התקשר בשמו של נציג מחמ"ד (מהאגף הפוליטי-צבאי) במשלחת הפנטגון שבראשות דב זקהיים והעביר מסר כלהלן:

1. הממשל משוכנע שישראל טועה טעות חמורה בענין הלביא וכי ארה"ב תישא במירב עלויות הטעות הזו.
2. הממשל החליט לצאת למאבק לשינוי ההחלטה. (באופן פרטי לחלוטין הוא מוכן לספר כי שלבי המאבק כפי שנראים עתה הם:
 - א. הופעת פיקרינג ב"מוקד".
 - ב. מכתב שולץ.
 - ג. הדלפה צפויה משיחות רבין-זקהיים.
 - ד. פניית שולץ לקונגרס)
3. לפיכך, בצד הנכונות ללכת לקראתנו בתחום הימי, הם מוכנים לחבילה של "CO-PRODUCTION" וכן לסדרת צעדים חיוביים אשר במקום לפגוע בתעשיות הרלבנטיות יסייעו "להעלותן כתה", בראש ובראשונה באמצעות נכונות לשותפות ישראלית משמעותית בפרוייקט מטוס שנת ה-90 של ארה"ב (ה-ATF: ADVANCED TACTICAL FIGHTER).
4. הם מעדיפים לטפל בנושא בצינור שולץ ולא בצינור ווינברגר.
5. הבחור עזב הבוקר את הארץ, אך השאיר הנחיות אצל ידיד המשותף למקרה שנרצה להשתמש ב"צינור אחורי" זה.

נמרוד נוביק

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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שמו

אל: המשרד, נד: 116, מ: ווש
דח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 040686, רח: 1715

שמו/רגיל

אל:מצפא,אוקיאניה,השגריר פרטוריה ()
קונגרס: דראיפ, ישראל, ארה"ב

1. בתחילת השבוע הופץ למשרדים קונגרסיונליים ספרון ושמו
UNDERCUTTING SANCTIONS: ISRAEL, THE US AND SOUTH AFRICA
מדובר בפרסום בן כ-60 עמודים המתבסס על ידיעות בתקשורת
ובמקורות גלויים אחרים. הספרון סוקר התפתחות היחסים, היחסים
הצבאיים לרבות בתחום הגרעין, קשרי כלכלה, וההיבט האמריקאי של
היחסים.

2. הפרסום בהוצאת WASHINGTON MIDDLE EAST ASSOCIATES
שגיימס זוגבי הינו אחד משני עודכיו, והוא החתום על מכתב
הלוואי לחברי הקונגרס. זוגבי היה מנכ"ל הליגה הערבית נגד
השמצה וכיום פועל במסגרת ה- AMERICAN ARAB INSTITUTE
שמטרתו לעודד מועמדים ערבים לתפקידים פוליטיים ולאחר
מועמדים פרו-ישראלים להבסה. למול ולארגון כתובת ומספר
סלפון זהים.

3. עיתוני הפרסום אינו מקרי: השבוע, במסגרת ועדות משנה של ועדת
החוץ ובן במליאת הועדה רניס בהטלת סנקציות על דרום-אפריקה
שאלת דראיפ' זוכה לתשומת לב והנסיון לקשרה לישראל ברור.
4. הפרסום בדיפ.

טובה הרצל

רוביקה דגל

תפ: שהח, מנכ"ל, מנכ"ל, פרימור, אוקיאניה, רזמרכו, ממד

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אל: המשרד, נר: 114, ט: 111
ות: ר, סג: ס, תא: 040686, ות: 1500

סודי/רגיל

אל: ממיד, מצפא

אשיחה עם פלטרן, סגן עוזר מזכיר ההגנה/מז"ח
א.מפרץ, פלטרן חזר בימים אלה ממסע לבחריין ובה שירת כשגריר
לפני שנים 3. הוא התכוון לאזמירל הלווייני (יו"ר הועדה
גינסטרית למבאק בטרוור), אשר התבקש ע"י הנשיא, בעקבות פניה
מזכיר הכתר לבחריין, לבקר במקום ולייחזק את ידם של
המקומיים בקשר לסכסוכם הקרקעי עם קטר. היתה לו שליחות רצון
טוב ולא תיווך.

ב. כעודיה, ביקרו גם בסעודיה לתדון על השיחות לבחריין
כמובן שמעו תלונות בנושא עיסקת הנשק, אך הימים היו ימי
המאזן והקצב של הפעילות הואם לכך. הסעודים תומכים בצעד
הנסיין בעניין סודיה-עיראק לדעתו הסיכוי להורמת נפט עיראקי
בצינור הסורי קלוש. בי העיראקים בשלעצמם אינם זקוקים לכך
בעקבות התחליפים בתורכיה וסעודיה, אלא אם ירצו לפייס את
הסורים.

2. שאלתי אם הממשל הסעודי מודע לאימפקט השלילי של פרסומים
נבזיים כלפי ישראל בתקשורת (למשל שלכם ח/199), במיוחד כאשר
זה מובא ליריעת הצנור בארה"ב. אמר שההכוונה היחידה של הממשל
הסעודי לעתונות שם היא שלא לתקוף את משפחת המלוכה, וכל היתר
בשיקול דעת העתונאים העושים כבתוך שלהם: אינו צופה שינוי
בעניין זה.

ג. ירון, פגישת חיסין עם וינובדגר תהא בעיקרה פגישת נימוסין
אין סיכוי של ממש לדיבורים על עסקת נשק. הגם שוינובדגר יאמר
בוודאי שהוא מצדיק את המשאלה הירדנית לשאלתי על פרסומים בוויר
המרונים צבאיים עם ירון (שלכם 21) אמר שלא היו סאז אפריל
לועל כך מסרו לנו בשעתו.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

- ד. לבנון. 1. נפגש אתמול באיצי עם שגריר לבנון וגסאן תויני
נהיו גם שוררים מן הקונגרס. הלבנונים בטאו תחושה של כאב
ועצב על הנעשה בלבנון. הלבנונים עצמם, לדבריהם, לא יהיו
מסוגלים להביא לסוגי להוצאת סוריה ולהסדר בעית לבנון כולו
מתפנה מסוימת במהירה זו. אגב, תויני עצמו נע בין פאריס
לבנון ומצליח להמשיך בהוצאת עתוננו.
2. השגריר הלבנוני ותויני תמכו בהמשך מימון יוניפייל ע"י
ארה"ב כאגב, תדרכתי פלטרו על שיחות גולדינג בארץ. שוררו שר
באשויץ, גולדון, שנכח אמר, ראשית, כי עתה שהסובסידים הסכימו
יתרוס אין צורך בתקציב אמריקני גדול. ושנית אם הממשל רוצה כל
כך במימון יוניפייל מתוך אינטרס אמריקני, ימץ א נא כספים
מתקציבים המופנים לפעילויות אומיות אחרות.

רובינשטיין

תפ: שהת, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, ממד, מצפא

Jerusalem June 4, 1986

Ref.: 1-DSR-569-1

Congressman Jim Scheuer
House of Representatives
U.S. Congress
Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Scheuer,

We are very delighted and enthusiastic about the Scheuer Foundation's involvement in one of the most neglected aspects of the city of Eilat: its image. The beautification of the city has great potential, for we believe that the physical surroundings contribute to the well-being of both residents and tourists.

The government has decided to proceed with the moving of the airport to its new location, and the planning of the new air strip has begun. This is, of course, an important key to the overall development effort.

Let me express again my support of Mayor Rafi Hochman. Under his vigorous leadership the city has already undergone great changes, and with everyone's help will continue on this path.

Sincerely yours,

Shimon Peres

תחנות:	כתלעת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1
שם המעורר:	עופר פז	מספר: 4
כ"ה:	לש'סנכ"ל; מע"ח; כמנכ"ל אמית"ק; הסברה; צפ"א; סמ"ד; יועץ רוח"ם לחקשורה; יועץ שוב"ס לחקשורה; לע"מ; דו"צ.	
כ"ר:		ד ע : וושינגטון
מס':		מס' : מחנות, ניו יורק

News Summary June 3, 1986

Editorials

NYP "If Arafat Enters the US, Messe Shouldn't Let Him Leave" Arafat has been trying to wrangle an invitation to visit the UN later this month--in order to attend the GA debate on the Mideast peace process. The administration should state plainly that Arafat is unwelcome in the US. Granting entry to the leading symbol of international terrorism would undermine the credibility of America's all-out war against that very scourge. Attorney General Messe has indicated he wouldn't mind seeing Arafat indicted for murder in connection with a PLO operation in Khartoum in which two US diplomats were killed. That's a far better idea than giving him a visa.

Columns

NYT-Richard Yellin (Rabbi, Newton Mass.) "Miss Bonner Meets I.B. Singer" Bonner had expressed a desire to meet Singer and did in NYC. A sample of their dialogue is given.

Press Reports

US Cites Israeli Cooperation in Pollard Affair

NYT-AP-White House spokesman Edward Djerejian evaded questions about whether the US was satisfied with the Israeli Government's cooperation in the investigation of a former Navy employee accused of spying for Israel. "Any espionage against the US is extremely serious. For that reason, the Administration has pursued the investigation of the Pollard case with great vigor and will continue to do so until it is resolved. We continue to be in touch with the Israelis who have promised full cooperation." The LA Times reported that Justice Dept. investigators, despite objections from the State Dept., are seeking an indictment of a senior officer in the Israeli air force believed responsible for the espionage ring. However, a statement released by the embassy calls the allegations "baseless." (see NYP-Latham "US Steps Up Probe")

Israelis Seem Split on Inquiry into Cover-Up

NYT-Friedman Major differences appear to be developing between Peres and Shamir over how to deal with the growing scandal in Israel's domestic

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intelligence service, Gov't sources said. The differences have serious political ramifications. There are increasing indications that Shamir might have been part of the extensive cover-up in the slaying of two Palestinian terrorists. Whether Peres could make political capital out of such conclusions is not clear. The majority of the Israeli public opposes destroying the careers of Israeli officials whose only crimes may have been involvement in putting terrorists to death. Peres believes there is no way to avoid an investigation of some kind. Shamir is still adamantly opposed to any investigation, either by the police or a special secret commission. Shamir has yet to categorically deny or confirm assertions that he knew of such a cover-up. (see ND-UPI)

Syria and Iraq to Hold High-Level Meeting

WSJ-staff-Syria and Iraq have agreed to a meeting between high-level envoys that could mark the start of a rapprochement between the two rival nations, an Arab source said. It is expected that the foreign ministers of the two countries will meet after Ramadan ends. The purpose of the summit is to arrange a meeting between Assad and Hussein.

Hussein in France

NYT-Reuters-King Hussein of Jordan arrived in Paris for talks expected to center on his efforts to rally feuding Arab nations for a summit meeting to discuss Mideast peace and the Iran-Iraq war. The King will leave France on Wednesday for Washington, where he will meet with Reagan.

Justice Dept. Agrees to Meet Waldheim's Lawyers

NYT-Shenon-The Justice Dept. announced it had agreed to meet with lawyers for Waldheim as the dept. considers whether to ban Waldheim from entering the US because of what he did during WW II. Meese could make a decision on Waldheim as early as next week. Administration officials said it appeared that the head of the department's criminal division, Stephen Trott, would recommend to Meese that Waldheim be denied entry into the US. Their statements were later withdrawn, and the department said it would meet the request of Waldheim lawyers for a meeting.

NYP-The WJC accused the Justice Dept. of playing politics by not immediately barring Waldheim from the US. Edgar Bronfman called Waldheim "an amoral, unrepentant liar."

Fighting in Beirut-Syrian Efforts Fail

NYT-AP-Shiite and Sunni militias fought street battles in what police called a spillover from the war for control of the Palestinian neighborhoods. Syria has been trying to stop the 15-day-old battle. (see NYP-AP)

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Protesters Urge Release of Soviet Jews to Israel

DN 6/2-About 200 protestors, some in prison stripes, chanted outside the Soviet Mission to the UN, demanding that Ida Nudel and Vladimir Slepak be allowed to emigrate to Israel.

Ex-Yale Professor Hid Ties to Nazis

NYT-McFadden-A Federal judge in Connecticut ruled that a former Yale lecturer should be stripped of his US citizenship for having concealed his background as a wartime Nazi propagandist who called for the extermination of Jews. Vladimir Sokolov, 73, taught Russian and Soviet Literature at Yale for 17 years until his past was uncovered. He faces deportation unless the ruling is overturned on appeal.

Channel 13 Looks at Shiites

NYT-Corry-"Frontline" examines Islamic fundamentalism as an international problem in "Holy War, Holy Terror." It is an intelligent and frightening program. The program visits Iranian military training camps and the city of Qum, where it says, students from 45 countries study the principles of Islamic revolution. At an orphanage, small boys are raised to die as martyrs.

Israeli Women in Murder Trial

DN-Meisels-Two prominent Israeli women went on trial charged with murdering a New York woman in argument over money. The case has caused a sensation because of the defendants' social standing.

Saudi Oil

DN-AP-Oil prices will rise steadily and settle at \$20 a barrel, King Fadh was quoted yesterday as predicting. He said that other sources of energy, mainly nuclear energy, have proven "costly and dangerous...It's sufficient for all to note the Soviet nuclear disaster."

Magazine Articles

The New Republic 6/16 Peter Lubin "The Waldheim File" An indepth article on Waldheim's role during the war. "I swear I did not know about the deportation of the Jews, and I swear I never saw a single partisan," Waldheim says. The article thoroughly disputes this quote.

The Nation 6/7 Robert Sherrill "The Golden Years of an Ex-Nazi" While the saga of Austria's favorite Nazi continues, let's take time out to review our government's gentle treatment of a much bloodier war criminal, Arthus Rudolph. The murders that the UN War Crimes Commission charged Waldheim with, were, by Nazi standards, mere battlefield thuggery. Rudolph was a Nazi yuppie, a born manager. He is believed to have had something to do with the deaths of at least 5000 slave laborers in WW II. He became one of Nazi Germany's, and later one of the US military/space industry's most honored engineers, as a result of which he now lives in comfortable retirement on \$33,166 a year out of the US taxpayers pockets. There are alot of influential people, including Pat Buchanan, Reagan's

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communication's director, who don't think "helpful" war criminals should be punished. Any effort to strip Rudolph of his Federal pension would inevitably reopen investigations into the pro-Nazi activities of the US Army and NASA. You aren't going to get that sort of investigation from an administration whose President has said that German soldiers in WW II "were victims just as surely as the victims of concentration camps." A history of the Nazi follows.

The Nation-Stanley Diamond (Anthropologist; New School) "States of Terror" After the indiscriminate bombing of Tripoli, the question again rises: Who are the terrorists? A terrorist is not a guerrilla. Terrorism may be viewed as the fallout from forced modernization, thwarted leadership and failed revolutionary activity throughout the Third World. Terrorist acts are often desperate efforts to strike back at oppressors who are regarded as historically responsible for the destruction of the terrorists' traditional culture. But the industrialized nations refuse to understand that terrorism is a result of their aggression against all forms of society that deviate from their standards and values. It cannot be stopped by the eradication of a Khadafy or the bombing of a city. Although some Arabs may be terrorists they are overshadowed by the states of terror that control the planet.

Letters

The Nation-7 letters on the continuing debate over Gore Vidal's article defaming the Podhoretzes.

Israel's Bikini Ads

NYP-AP-Photo of bus stop ad of woman in a bikini. The shelters have been torched and spray painted by ultra-orthodox Jews.

ITONUT
NYC



3 ביוני, 1986
כ"ה באייר, תשמ"ו

אל: מ/מנכ"ל

הנדון: סיוע חוץ והמורשה אובי

למכתבינו מה-13 במאי וה-20 במאי

ה-MARK-UP של ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בועדת ההקצבות, שנקבע באופן בלתי פורמלי ליום ה' הקרוב, 5 דנא, נדחה בינתיים באופן בלתי פורמלי למועד בלתי ידוע. תקוות ידידי ישראל היא שהוא יתרחש רק לאחר ה-CONFERENCE בין שני הבתים בנושא התקציב ואז, אם אמנם יוסכם ביניהם על נתוני סיוע החוץ כבהצעת הסנט (17.9 בליון להרשאות ו-14.2 בליון להוצאות בפועל) שהם יותר גבוהים מהסכום המיועד לכך בבית (17 בליון להרשאות ו-13.8 בליון להוצאות בפועל), יהיה מצב ידידי ישראל בועדת המשנה יותר נוח.

נכון לעכשיו עדיין לא ברור באיזה קו ינקוט אובי: האם הוא שיציע לשמור על רמת הסיוע לישראל ולמצרים כברמות השנה, או שיציע קיצוץ אחד ACROSS THE BOARD אך לא יתנגד אם אחד המשתתפים האחרים יציע תיקון המחזיר את הסיוע למדינות קמפ-דיויד לרמתו הנוכחית. לידיעתכם.

בברכה

ב/ טובה הרצל

אירגן שלג

העתק: מנהל מצפ"א

מנכ"ל אוצר

מנכ"ל בטחון

לשכת רה"מ

השגריר, הציר, הציר הכלכלי, קצין הקישור לקונגרס - כאן

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

ס.נ.ר. ס.נ.ר.

דפוס.....מחור.....1.97

גלוי סווג בשחוני

רגיל דחפוח

8606031800 מאריך וזיח

מכר

אלו

המשרד, נ.י. בסחור
069 66 18

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח, רמ"ח קש"ח, ניו יורק

תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום 3.6.86

Q There are reports from Israel that the commander of the Israeli army northern command said that Syria is about ready to attack. Does the United States share this sense of urgency and foreboding, as it were?

MR. KALB: I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you feel that Syria is in any position to attack?

MR. KALB: I am not going to make any sort of military forecast about -- hold on just a minute -- about military forecasts, about what may or may not happen. Let's go over here, please.

Q It's been reported in the Middle East that the administration had asked Robert McFarlane to look into a new peace proposal for the Middle East, a new peace plan. Do you have anything on that?

MR. KALB: Nope. First I've heard of it. Sorry, let me go ahead with Debbie.

מאריך

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Prosecution Details Spy Suspect's Spending

By KATHERINE BISHOP

Special to The New York Times

SAN FRANCISCO, May 30 — Jerry A. Whitworth, on trial here on charges of espionage and tax fraud, lived extravagantly and spent thousands of dollars on gold coins, works of art, jewelry, lingerie and other items, according to records of banks and merchants introduced as evidence here.

Mr. Whitworth, who retired from the Navy in 1963 with the rank of chief petty officer, is accused of stealing sensitive Navy cryptographic data and selling it to a Soviet spy ring over a 10-year period in exchange for \$332,000. For the past two weeks prosecutors

have presented nearly four dozen witnesses from coin dealers to commodities traders to appliance salesmen to testify about his purchases and investments.

What has emerged is a portrait of a couple who spent large amounts of cash on paintings, luxurious silk lingerie or dinners for friends at fine restaurants.

Furniture and Motorcycles

Witnesses have detailed the financial transactions of Mr. Whitworth and his wife, Brenda L. Reis, beginning with thousand of dollars in purchases of household furnishings and two motorcycles in 1976, the year they were married.

At the time he retired from the Navy, Mr. Whitworth was earning about \$24,000 a year plus allotments. Miss Reis has been working toward a doctorate in nutrition since 1960. Defense attorneys have not yet presented any evidence of other sources of income for them.

Mr. Whitworth has been charged with eight counts of espionage and five counts of tax fraud. He has pleaded not guilty. The couple filed joint tax returns, but Miss Reis has not been charged.

Celia Vanderpool of San Clemente, who said she met the couple when she was dating one of Mr. Whitworth's

friends, testified that they lent her \$4,600 in 1981. When Mr. Whitworth visited, she said, he brought and expensive brandies and sherries.

"Jerry tended to prefer a decadent lifestyle," Miss Vanderpool said. She said that Mr. Whitworth told her in 1981 and 1982 that he had made money in the stock market. Previous witnesses testified that Mr. Whitworth and his wife reported on their income tax returns that they had lost \$16,000 in the stock market in those two years.

Whitworth Was 'Agitated'

Miss Vanderpool said that Mr. Whitworth called her the day after John A. Walker Jr. was arrested in May 1985. Mr. Walker has pleaded guilty to espionage and testified last month that Mr. Whitworth passed stolen Navy data to

him and received cash payments from him.

Mr. Whitworth was "agitated" and "very upset," Miss Vanderpool said, and told her that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had questioned him and searched his home and might come to her home next because she might "have things." When she replied that she did not know what he was talking about, she said, Mr. Whitworth told her to "Think, Celia, think." He said he would call her back, she added, but he never did and then he was arrested.

Prosecutors have presented a number of witnesses to testify on the couple's finances.

For example, a representative of the Bank of America testified that the couple purchased \$7,000 in cashiers checks in April, 1977 and deposited them in a

stock trading account opened at Merrill Lynch and Company. The indictment charges that Mr. Whitworth received \$12,000 in the first week of April as payment from Mr. Walker.

Prosecutors have detailed \$36,000 in purchases they say the couple made in 1980, when the Government says Mr. Whitworth received a payment of \$100,000. The purchases include camera and computer equipment, a video recorder and a van, as well as a \$7,000 deposit in a Merrill Lynch account.

Prosecutors expect to present the rest of their evidence on Mr. Whitworth's financial dealings Monday.

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U.S. Ready to Charge Israeli In Spy Operation, Aide Says

By PHILIP SHENON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 30 — An Israeli military officer is expected to be charged in the next several days with participating in an espionage operation in the United States, a Reagan Administration official said today.

According to the official, the Israeli had ties to Jonathan Jay Pollard, a civilian analyst for the United States Navy who has been accused of selling classified military information to Israel.

The Administration official, who spoke on the condition that he not be named, said prosecutors were close to a plea bargain with Mr. Pollard that would require him to cooperate in an investigation that has strained ties between the United States and Israel.

'Obviously a Big Case'

Neither the rank nor the whereabouts of the Israeli officer could be determined, and it was unclear if there would be other arrests in the case.

"It's obviously a big case," the Administration official said. "They've been trying to wrap this thing up for weeks."

Mr. Pollard's lawyer and spokesman for the Israeli Embassy did not return telephone calls today. Mr. Pollard is in custody.

The Administration had no comment today on a report in The Los Angeles Times that Mr. Pollard was part of an Israeli intelligence operation in the United States that was much larger than previously believed.

Mr. Pollard, a civilian counterterrorism analyst, was arrested in November along with his wife, Anne Henderson-Pollard, after they drove into the Israeli Embassy here, apparently seeking asylum.

The case created rifts between the American and Israeli Governments, and officials said the United States reduced the amount of intelligence information shared with Jerusalem for a time.

Apology From Peres

In December, Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel apologized to the United States and portrayed the spy operation as independent of Israel's main intelligence agencies. After long negotiations, American prosecutors were permitted to travel to Israel as part of their investigation.

In the past, Israeli Government officials have acknowledged that two Israeli diplomats working in the United States served as Mr. Pollard's contacts. The diplomats were recalled to Israel shortly after the arrest of the Pollards.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has said that Mr. Pollard admitted that he provided Israel with hundreds of pages of classified military documents, including one stack of mostly top-secret papers that was more than 15

inches high. After his arrest, law-enforcement officials said a search of Mr. Pollard's apartment had turned up about 80 secret documents in the master bedroom.

Pollard Reported Cooperating

The bureau said the documents included several involving the military capabilities of foreign governments.

News reports in March said that Mr. Pollard had begun cooperating with the authorities. His wife has been released on bond.

According to the bureau, Mr. Pollard has admitted that he received about \$2,500 a month from an Israeli contact in exchange for American documents, including some classified higher than top secret. He acknowledged espionage activities going back to 1984, the bureau said.

There have been frequent reports of tension between the Justice Department and the State Department over the case. According to officials, Federal prosecutors have actively sought to go forward with the case, while diplomats at the State Department feared that prosecution could harm the relationship between the United States and Israel.

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News Summary June 2, 1986

Columns

NYT-Safire "Israel Stonewalls" When does a democracy's need for security begin to undermine its principles? Israel faces a moral dilemma in two cases: one is a cause celebre, the other a time bomb. Recently, several gutsy Shin Beth officers went to the Prime Minister to protest the coverup of the illegal killings of two Palestinian terrorists. When Peres refused to confront the chief of the security agency, the whistle-blowers went to the Attorney General, who started to conduct an investigation--and has just been fired by the Cabinet. What becomes of a nation that condones execution before indictment? That issue now profoundly troubles Israelis. What does not yet trouble them, but should, is the second example of security uncontrolled: the shameful attempt to steal secrets from the US. Pollard, a Jew, was reportedly hired by Israeli intelligence, when he was caught, two Israeli diplomats scurried home. Peres disavowed the scheme, no Israeli was prosecuted; everyone hoped the affair would blow over. But some protested the coverup. Nothing could be more self-defeating than to use American aid money to finance the stealing of American secrets. Pollard has been talking to save his skin. At least one other American will be arrested and an Israeli officer has been accused. The Israelis say the charges are "baseless," but because the Peres-Shamir Gov't has just demonstrated how it chokes up in a security crisis, the charges are probably not baseless. (cabled)

DN-Richard Cohen "Missing the Point in the Middle East" Reagan has simplified Mideast politics, telescoping the center into the hard left--holding leaders accountable to American, not Arab, standards. The Senate too, lacks the patience to distinguish between moderates and radicals. As a result, it has refused to sell arms to Saudi Arabia. Eventually, the administration will probably get something of its Saudi arms package. But the damage has been done. During the course of the Reagan administration, the US has shifted from being only a protector of Israel's to a Mideast belligerent--which is no favor to Israel. It is hard to say anything good about the PLO. But in the Mideast the PLO is seen neither as a simple terrorist organization nor being particularly radical.

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ND-Roger Hilsman (former US assistant Sec. of State) "Fight State Sponsored Terror, But Effectively" It seems clear that the bombing of Libya will not reduce terrorism. The only effect of the raid is that it provides an excuse of small Arab splinter groups that operate independently. The unpleasant truth is that for dealing with this kind of terrorism, police intelligence work and increased security are the only measures that are likely to make even a small difference. Today, only three states appear to engage in terrorism: Syria, the most, with Iran second and Libya third. But there is not much that can be done.

Press Reports

Israeli Cabinet Replaces Attorney General Who Sought Inquiry

NYT-Brilliant p.1-The Israeli Cabinet replaced the Attorney General who went against its wishes in ordering a criminal investigation of the head of Shin Beth. The new Attorney General is Yosef Harish. He is to be inducted on Wednesday. (see ND-headline "Israeli Scandal: Attorney General Sacked; Hijack-Death Probe Cited; Report of Shamir Cover-Up" Reuters; NYP-Dan; DN-Meisels; WSJ-p.1 Briefs)

Assad to Crack Down on Nidal

NYP-Lathem-Assad, apparently bowing to US pressure, has told the White he will crack down on Palestinian terrorist leader Abu Nidal. Assad, in diplomatic contacts with US officials, continued to deny all responsibility for the recent terrorist attacks. He said he is prepared to "curtail" the activities of the Abu Nidal group--and possibly to expel members of Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council from Damascus. The US has warned that it is prepared to retaliate with diplomatic and military action--unless Assad expels Nidal and other terrorist leaders from Syria.

Orthodox Jews Protest Visiting Israeli Mayor

NYT-Boorstin (photo of some of the 6000 Orthodox Jews protesting Israeli Gov't policies) More than 6000 Orthodox Jews, protesting what they called the unfair policies of Mayor Teddy Kollek, rallied outside the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, where Kollek addressed a fund-raising dinner. The demonstration turned volatile at one point when several hundred protesters, seemingly on cue, rushed the entrance of the hotel. They threw eggs and chanted but were stopped from entering the building by police officers. Kollek said the protestors represented a small minority of religious Jewry. "I thought they should be busy studying Torah," said the Mayor. (see all NY papers)

Cameras at Auschwitz

NYT-Kaufman-For the first time, the Polish Gov't has permitted the twin death camps of Aushwitz and Birkenau to be used as a setting for a major commercial film. The filming is for a 30-hour ABC miniseries presentation of Herman Wouk's historical novel "War and Remembrance." The assistant director, Branko Lustig was brought to Auschwitz as a

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10 year old from his native Yugoslavia and he spent two years as a slave laborer. "I think that 75% of the unit does not believe it really happened. They are young, but they are learning," Lustig said.

Saudis Devalue Currency

WSJ-Reuters-Saudi Arabia devaluated its currency 2.7% against the US dollar in what bankers said was an effort to lessen the impact of lower oil prices.

Moslem Observances Alter the Pace at UN

NYT-special- The position of the moon wreaked havoc with talks between delegates, guest lists and menus during last week's special GA session.

Letters

NYT-Thomas Klestil, the Austrian Ambassador to the US writes that Amos Perlmutter draws a distorted picture of Austria's attitude toward anti-Semitism and Nazism. Although it is true--as in other countries--there were strong currents of anti-Semitism in Austria's past, it is equally true that Jews played a prominent, admired and highly acclaimed role in Austrian history. Austria is now a country of asylum. It's human rights record compares well with any other democratic country. Austrians understand that in order to overcome the legacy of the past, continuous efforts will be required in the future.

NYT-Ex-Austrian writes that there was a part of Austrian society that fought to remain free of German dominion.

NYT-Louis Halasz, an author who collaborated on Waldheim's recent book, says Waldheim did not reveal details of his military service. His reputation is now irreversibly damaged outside of Austria, making him unable to represent his country in international forums. If Waldheim wins the World Jewish Congress, instead of having put him in the dock for war crimes, can be accused of materially contributing to his electoral success.

DN-New Yorker wonders what Waldheim's past has to do with his ability to govern Austria today. Is there nothing to be said for what the man has done in the past 40 years?

NYP-Writer believes it is bad enough that NBC's viewers are subjected to Abu Abbas' threats, but it is worse to hear the President of NBC defend the staging of this terrorist propaganda event.

NYP-Highways in the US will be more jammed than ever this summer due to Americans eschewing Europe. To be sure, someone will come up with statistics comparing the increased number of fatalities on US roads resulting from accidents against the number of lives lost as a result of terrorist activities overseas.

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