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מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד

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 תת חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה
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מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה



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הבחירות), ת"ד קוקראן (מיטיסיפי; יו"ר ה"קוקוס"), דון ניקלס (אוקלהומה; יו"ר הועדה המדינית הרפובליקנית) וציר ביה"נ ניוט גינגריץ' (ג'ורג'יה; "מצליף") הומחשה הדילמה של הרפובליקנים התומכים בישראל ובתחיקה, ערים למציאות שמאחורי רעיון הדחייה, אך חשים מחוייבות אישית, מפלגתית ולאומית למוסד הנשיאות. שלושתם מחוייבים לממש את תחיקת הערבויות ללא זיקה, ומחפשים מוצא מן הסבך אליו נקלע התהליך. שלושתם אף מבטאים את התפישה הטוענת כי גורם הדחייה אינו קריטי עבור ישראל, כל עוד ממוסמרות ההתחייבויות התחיקתיות הקשורות לערבויות. הם אף מעניקים חשיבות רבה להערכה כי ישראל, בתי הנבחרים והנשיא יעבדו בצוותא עד שנת 1996, ומכאן שיש להימנע מהצלחה במליאה אשר תותיר אחריה נתיב עמוס במוצחים ואפילו לא מנצח אחד לרפואה. המנהיגים הרפובליקנים הנ"ל חזרו על נחישותם שלא לאלץ את ישראל לשלם עבור הערבויות במטבע של ויתורים (דוגמאת ההתנחלויות) בתהליך השלום.

ז. במפגש שקיימו מנהיגי "בני ברית", ה"קונגרס", ה"ועד היהודי האמריקאי" ו"נקראק" עם הסנטור פט ליהי (דמוקרט - וורמונט; יו"ר תת-הועדה לסיוע חוץ העשויה להיות אחראית על הטיפול בתחיקת הערבויות) טען הסנטור כי סנטורים המתבטאים בפומבי נגד הדחייה פונים אליו הרחק מעיני הזרקורים בבקשה כי ידחה את הדיון בערבויות עד ינואר 1992, "כדי למנוע מאבק אשר יותיר אחריו חוטמים ובי זם בכל הצדדים". ליהי אף מעריך שהנשיא מוכן כבר להסלמה הבאה של המערכה, ואף שוקל לפנות במסר ישיר לאומה, במסגרתו יציג - באופן בוטה ביותר - את היקף הסיוע האמריקאי לישראל מאז 1948. מסר זה, לדברי הסנטור, יהיה תפור לפי מידות הצרכים הדוחקים מבית באוה"ב.

2. ההקשר התחיקתי - פוליטי - פנימי

א. רק התרחשויות מרעישות יכולות למנוע מהנשיא בוש להיבחר שוב ב-11/92, אך מערכת הבחירות העומדת בראש מעייניהם של הסנטורים ושל צירי בית הנבחרים איננה הנשיאותית אלא זו הקריטית יותר - המערכה האישית שלהם להיבחר מחדש.

ב. במרכז מערכות הבחירות האישיות עומרים הנושאים המקומיים, אשר אינם נמנים על רשימת ההישגים של הנשיא.

ג. סדר היום התחיקתי מתמקד בנושאי פנים, כאשר חוט השני המחבר את התחיקות למיניהן, ועמד במרכז הדיונים הוא: POLITICS IS LOCAL - העימות הבינמפלגתי עובר בהדרגה לסוגים גבוהים יותר, אשר אולי יהפכו אף לצורמים יותר ככל שנתקרב ל-11/92.

ד. סדר היום התחיקתי אינו מתמקד בערבויות להלוואות, וודאי שלא בתהליך השלום, ואף לא בכל נושא בינלאומי אחר. הוא מתמקד בשימועים אשר יש להם פוטנציאל קריטי לגבי גורלם הפוליטי של הנשיא ושל המחוקקים (אישור המינוי של השופט קלארנס תומאס, רוברט גייטס ואפשרות לשימועים בנושא "הפתעת אוקטובר", רוברט קלארק "המפקח על המטבע") ובתחיקות בנושאי הפלות, אבטלה, מלחמה בפשע, המערכת הבנקאית, היטל בנזין, מדיניות האנרגיה, טלויזיה בכבלים, זכויות האזרח, בריאות, מיסים, הרפורמה בממון הבחירות, וכו'.



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ה. חלק מן התחיקות צפוי לוטו נשיאותי, והדמוקרטים נחושים בהחלטתם להוכיח כי - בניגוד לעבר - הם אכן יכולים לגייס הקולות לביטולן של וטו נשיאותי.

ו. המליאה צפויה להיות ארוכה ותוססת ולהיגרר (כפועל יוצא של האוירה הפוליטית) אולי אפילו עד חג המולד!

ז. חלק מן הסנטורים הרפובליקנים רוטן ורוגז על שהממשל כופה עליהם מחלוקת בנושא כה מקובל ואהוד כמו קליטת יהודי בריה"מ (אשר ראוי היה, לדבריהם, להיות מאושר ללא מאבק צורם), כאשר הם מוצפים במחלוקות אין ספור, בעיתוי המתקרב במהירות ליום הבחירות (11/92), ומעמידם בפני מצב בלתי נסבל העלול אף לפגוע בסיכוייהם להיבחר מחדש.

ח. על רקע זה אפשר, אולי, להבין את העובדה שבארוחת הצהריים השבועית של הסנטורים הרפובליקנים לא נשמע קולם של תומכי הממשל, אם כי מוקדם עדיין לקבוע כי קולם לא ישמע בהמשך המערכה !!!

ט. על רקע זה אפשר להבין את ההנחה שפופולריות הנשיא בעיני הציבור איננה, בהכרח, מבטיחה לו את תמיכת המחוקקים.

י. על רקע זה אפשר אף לבחון את הניר המצ"ל אשר מופץ ע"י ציר ביה"נ הרפובליקני ביל מקקולום מפלורידה, שהוא סגן יו"ר ה"קוקוס" הרפובליקני (מס' 4 בין צירי ביה"נ הרפובליקנים). מקקולום אינו חושש לקרוא תגר על הנשיא, בנושא תהליך השלום, ואינו סבור שהניר הבקורתי (המופץ לכל צירי ביה"נ הרפובליקנים) יפגע במעמדו.

יא. בעוד שהממשל רואה במאבק נגד התחיקה אתגר מרכזי, הרי שה"גבעה" טרודה בנושאים אחרים. מכאן, כנראה, שאין להסיק מתקדים ה-AWACS, לגבי עמדת הממשל או ה"גבעה" בהמשך המערכה. בניגוד למחלוקת ה-AWACS, אין מדובר בנסיון לשלול מערכות נשק ממדינות ערב, או למנוע רווחי מליארדים מתעשיות אמריקאיות (על ההשלכות התעסוקתיות הכרוכות בכך). הפעם מדובר בנושא הומניטרי, למרות שיש לו ספיחים תקציביים מינימאליים ומשמעות פוליטית ודיפלומטית.

יב. ב- 10/9/91 נכשל הסנטור תום הארקין (דמוק' - איובה) בנסיונו להעביר משאבים בסך 3.1 מליארד מתקציב ההגנה לממון פעילות רווחה. הנסיון נכשל מכיוון שהוא מנוגד לחוק התקציב מ- 1990 המפריד באופן קשיח בין 3 חלקי התקציב (פנים, בסחון וחוץ) ואוסר על העברת כספים מן האחד למשנהו. למרות הכשלון הכריזו הסנטורים ומוקרטים בכירים (מיצ'ל, סאסר וכו') כי מן הראוי להעריך מחדש את ההפרדה השרירותית, ולתת הדעת לשינויים הדרמאטיים החלים - והצרכים הנלווים אליהם - מחוץ ובעיקר מבית.

יג. אם אכן יש סיכוי להערכה מחודשת של מבנה התקציב (והסיכוי סביר), הרי שהדבר עלול להשפיע גם על גורל תחיקת הערבויות, אם אכן תתקבל הצעת הדחייה מבלי שיוסכם עתה על תוכן התחיקה. דחיית הדיון על התחיקה עלול לגרום לכך שהדיון יקלע לתקופה בה תוסרנה המחיצות בין חלקי התקציב, ואז אכן יהיה אולי בסיס למקטרגים הטוענים (ולפי שעה



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ללא הצדקה) כי במקום לתקצב פעילות חוץ לשיפור תנאי חיים של אזרחי מדינות זרות, מן הראוי לטפל בנדכאי וחלכאי ארה"ב. דחיית העתוי, ללא מחוייבות תחיקתית מוצקה, עלול אף להעביר את המאבק על הערבניות לזירה אשר תושפע ע"י סדרי עדיפויות כלכליים שיגרעו מן התמיכה בערביות (החרפת המצב הכלכלי, גידול בגרעון התקציבי, זחיפות בסיוע לברה"מ ולבלטיות, לחץ על הנבחר להעניק הטבות לבוחר לפני 11/92, וכו'..).

3. כללי

א. כשם שאין להמעיט בחומרת המצב, בעקבות מסיבת העוונאים של הנשיא, אין גם להתעלם מבסיס התמיכה הרחב בישראל. אין גם להמעיט בחיוניות העמדה הנחושה מצד הגורם היהודי כמקור השראה להמשך התמיכה ב"גבעה".

ב. המצב (החמור) החדש אף מלמד על היקף המשאבים שמשקיע הממשל במערכה, ועל היקף הנוכחות הישראלית (כלכלית ומדינית) הרצויה לניהול המערכה. מן הראוי לשקול תגבור הנוכחות הן במישור הכלכלי (כדי לטפח את ההיבט הכלכלי של הערביות) והן במישור המדיני (כדי להציג את עקרון הבומרנג - כלפי תהליך השלום - השמון ביוזמת הדחיה של הממשל. עומס המשימה מנתק את היחידה מפעילות חיונית נוספת החייבת להתבצע בשבועות הקרובים.

ג. עוצמת המערכה הנשיאותית אף מעניקה סימוכין להנחה כי אין מדובר בפרק בודד אלא, אולי, בפרק ראשון (הן בהקשר הערביות, והן בהקשר המדיני הרחב יותר) של התיחסות הממשל כלפי ישראל.

ד. נתוח הארוע אף מלמד על הצורך בהערכה מחודשת לגבי היערכותנו בארה"ב (כפי שמועבר בנפרד).

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ISRAEL AND THE PARADOX OF THE AMERICAN
PEACE INITIATIVE

July 29, 1991

In the wake of the Gulf Crisis, the US has geared its efforts to promoting a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict by initiating an international peace conference with subsequent bilateral negotiations. Ironically, this plan, far from stabilizing the Middle East situation, runs the risk of upsetting the current balance of power, and in so doing may make war more, rather than less likely. In this connection, it is America's ally Israel that is being uniquely threatened by the American effort to bring peace.

Paradoxically, it was Saddam Hussein who originally introduced the "linkage" between the Palestinian problem and his occupation of Kuwait. Although the US rejected such linkage during the war, there has since been an on-going US emphasis on a "historic window of opportunity" created by the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. Thus, the Bush Administration's current emphasis on the peace process has had the unintended effect of confirming to the Arabs the correctness of Saddam Hussein's original approach, and has therefore suggested to them the existence of an at least residual Iraqi victory on an issue symbolically important to all Arabs.

In this context, it is important to remember that Arab leaders examine the peace process within the context of their overall situation. All involved agreed to participate in the conference proposed by the US not because they suddenly decided to recognize Israel's right to exist, but because of overwhelming considerations concerning their bilateral relations with the US, primarily the need for economic assistance. For it is the ultimate priority of all Arab rulers to consolidate their power position in view of the emerging new power distribution and to cope with the challenges of Islam. At present, they need a combination of stability (no war with Israel), and an existing external threat to unify their publics (Israel as a threat in being and Palestine as a declared objective) to justify and facilitate their power maneuvers. Genuine long term peace with

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Israel contradicts these imperatives.

Moreover, the primary challenge to the viability of the peace process is the mood in the Arab world itself. That mood is not promising. The latest surveys in the Arab world show that (1) a vast majority of the population, estimated at 85-90%, support Saddam Hussein's initiative (though not Saddam himself) that a new Salah ad-Din, that is a pan-Arab/Islamic leader, is needed to unify the Arab world, and are convinced that the Arabs are obliged to completely destroy Israel before there can be salvation, tranquility, prosperity, honor and glory in the Middle East; and (2) a majority (of the total population), about 60-70%, believe that the return to "true" Islamic Government (at various degrees of "fundamentalism" and different approaches to ecumenical issues within Islam) is the only viable method to attain the above goals, and that a Jihad should start immediately irrespective of their governments' positions.

Similarly, even the proposed maximalist solution for the Palestinian problem -- a total Israeli withdrawal from all the territories captured in the Six Days War and the establishment there of an independent Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem -- is totally meaningless when examined in the context of the prevailing trends among the "Palestinians:"

1. Over two-thirds of the Arab population in the territories support the Islamists, mainly the HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad, who launched, and who still are, the driving force behind the Intifadah. These Islamists are all explicitly dedicated to the complete destruction of Israel. Furthermore, their religious leaders have repeatedly decreed that they will not consider the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the territories to be the end of their struggle.

2. The vast majority of the PLO supporters in exile all over the Arab world, including Arafat himself and most of the Palestinian leadership, started their struggle for, and are determined to return to, the old Arab places in the Israel of 1949. (The PLO was established in 1964 as an organization committed to the destruction of "smaller" Israel and recognizing the Jordanian and Egyptian control over the territories.) Therefore, a Palestinian state in the territories will not solve their problem. These PLO-supporting exiles are the Palestinian refugees who have been the source of the Palestinian problem all over the Middle East, and whose presence in exile has contributed to radicalism and instability in their host countries.

Therefore, the US-sponsored "peace process," as it is emerging

now, irrespective of what Israel does or does not do, will have the following effect: (1) It will de-legitimize moderate Arab governments by introducing major causes for popular Islamist revolts; (2) endanger Arab governments that the US is committed to supporting (such as the Gulf states) because it does not remove the radical destabilizing Palestinian communities from their midst; and (3) it forces rulers, especially secular revolutionaries like Assad, Mubarak, and Saddam, to tighten their grip over their populations (most likely leading to armed suppression as happened in Algeria), thereby forcing them to reassert their commitment to their ideological credentials -- all of which are pan-Arab and militant -- and thus consequently trade away "peace" with Israel for stability at home. (Indeed, based on the media and government communiques, it is already possible to see this trend taking place in Egypt, despite its peace treaty with Israel.)

Thus, as discussed above, the main challenge to stability in the Middle East is the fundamental and profound gap between the Arab public and its leaders. However, the simple act of recognizing, and making a peace treaty with Israel, forces Arab leaders to contradict the Call of Islam, thus exposing themselves to the wrath of their publics. In point of fact, the echoes of Sadat's assassination a decade ago still reverberate throughout the Middle East as demonstrated by the fact that the writings of the Islamic Jihad ideologues who were instrumental in arranging the Egyptian President's murder are becoming ever more popular all over the Arab world.

In this environment, in return for formal peace, Israel is being asked to take some significant military risks. Even today, its reputation for military proficiency notwithstanding, Israel's strategic posture is precarious at best. The new political climate in the Middle East already challenges the fundamental doctrine of Israel since its establishment, namely, that belligerent Arab states should be actively prevented from having and/or not allowed to have the capacity to launch a surprise attack on the Israeli civilian rear with weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, Syria has already acquired large quantities of such missiles and warheads, but because of the legacy of the Gulf Crisis, an Israeli preemptive strike is inconceivable. Moreover, for the Arabs, the lesson of Israel's restraint during Operation Desert Storm is that it is possible to manipulate Washington to pressure Israel to do what was previously unthinkable.

Indeed, even when in a state of formal war with its neighbors, Israel was repeatedly pressured, mainly by Washington, not to react militarily to gross violations of "Red Lines" set in agreements. In 1970, Israel was restrained from attacking Egyptian SAM batteries moved into position after the US-negotiated ceasefire in the War of Attrition, thus creating

the military context for the Yom Kippur War. Similarly, Israel was convinced not to react to the Syrian introduction of SAMs into Lebanon (1981) and to its use of combat aircraft in Beirut (1990), and was warned not to respond to Iraqi military deployments to Jordan in 1989-1990. With peace treaties at stake, it is fair to assume that the pressure on Israel to restrain from reacting to force movements of this kind and to other infringements would be overwhelming.

Therefore, the real problem for Israel would lie in the gray area of Arab military moves while Arab governments insist on the viability of the peace agreements. What should Israel do in case of terrorist attacks from the territories should it evacuate those territories? At present, Israel does not pursue terrorists into the Sinai. Consequently, there has been an increase in the number of terrorist attacks across that frontier because the Egyptians hardly react and if the perpetrators are not killed in action, they are virtually assured a safe to return to their bases. Indeed, the Islamists have already vowed to launch an all out terrorist campaign against the Israeli civilian rear in case of "peace." The old 'Green Line' cannot be blocked.

Thus, certain questions needs to be asked: Will Israel have to endure Islamist terrorism in the name of peace? Will the safety of Israel's population be left in the hands of, say, Jordanian-Palestinian security authorities, and if they fail, will each time the Israeli government considers a retaliatory or preventative action, will it have to consider the potential for a collapse of the peace?

Similarly, what should Israel do in case of unauthorized movements of armed forces to agreed upon demilitarized areas? Militarily, a smaller "pre-1967" Israel will be indefensible against major armed forces on the attack. Therefore, after a sizable withdrawal from the territories, the danger exists that Israel would not be able to endure and survive a Yom Kippur-type attack. In such circumstances, Israel would be obliged to preempt and strike any threatening force concentration simply in order to survive. However, with peace agreements in place, there would always be the question: "Do these violations really justify going to war and destroying the peace?" Further, what guarantees would there be that there would not be an intelligence error leading to an accidental war in which the peace agreements would leave Israel vulnerable?

The key point to these questions are that they all point to the fact that almost all of the peace treaties Israel might be asked to sign are with minority dictatorial governments whose legitimacy is challenged by their populations. Moreover, as indicated above, the vast majority of the Arab population is not only opposed to peace, but is calling for the destruction of Israel. In all these Arab countries there are very popular

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Islamist leaders who claim their right as leaders and vow to implement the Jihad. What if one of these Islamist leaders overthrows the current government, as they have repeatedly declared that it is their intention to do, and decrees the peace agreement null and void? Israel would be forced into a position where she would either be forced to attack and re-occupy the territories, or remain condemned to being surrounded by hostile regimes without peace or any other guarantees.

Thus, under current circumstances, any peace treaty between Israel and its neighbors would leave Israel a hostage to the well being of a few Arab rulers and their ability to control and restrain their populations. With Islamist pressures growing, Arab regimes will be increasingly radicalized and Israel will be expected to understand and comply. This is a "hair trigger" environment that admits of enormous consequences should there be a miscalculation.

The fact of the matter is that the Arab world is not ready to accept Israel, let alone live in peace with it. Such a tense situation, even if it were formally called peace, is a recipe for a future war. Stability, normalization, peaceful co-existence, and even formal peace in the very long term, will be possible in the Middle East only when the Arab publics realize that they have a vested interest in such a development.

Therefore, the truly urgent challenge facing the US, Israel and the West in the Middle East is to create a situation where the Arab population has a genuine interest in the socio-political situation (standard of living, basic freedoms, etc.), and in the overall political processes of their own countries (such as representation, impact on local or area politics, etc.) so that there is genuine democracy and a vested interest in stability and tranquility. Only then will it be possible to expect the Arab population to accept compromises, recognize the existence of Israel (not simply its legitimacy or right to exist), and even reach levels of co-existence and cooperation with it. In short, the Arabs must first make peace with themselves, before they can make peace with Israel.

- by Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest

(This paper may not necessarily reflect the views of all of the Members of the Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. It is intended to provoke discussion and debate.)

אאא, חוזם: 11815

אל: רהמש/582

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 174, תא: 130991, זח: 1630, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/בהול

אל: מצפ"א

דע: שר האוצר, מנכ"ל אוצר, יועץ רוח"מ לענייני כלכלה

מאת: ציר קונגרס, ציר כלכלה

הנדון: עקרי הפגישה ביום ג' 11.9.91 עם הסנטורים: ד. אינויה, ר. קאסטן, ועוזריהם: ג'. בונד ור. קולינס, עם השגריר, ציר קונגרס וציר כלכלי.

(א) ד. אינויה-

קאסטן הוא איש המפתח בתהליך החקיקה. מה שהוא עשה עד כה זה מעל ומעבר למה שמצופה ממנו. כתוצאה מכך הוא מהווה מטרה לחיצי הממשל וחלק מהמנהיגות הרפובליקאית.

הגרוע ביותר עבור קאסטן - זה להפסיד עכשיו. יחד עם זאת אם יש דרך למנוע את העימות - זה חיוני ביותר.

(ב) אינויה וקאסטן -

הבוקר התקיימה פגישה עם הנשיא (השתתפו ד. אינויה, ר. קאסטן, ופ. ליהי) - הפגישה היתה קשה. הנשיא אמר שהוא לא התחייב לסכום מסוים, "ומי שחושב כך טועה".

יש לגייס מספר רב ככל האפשר של שושבינים להצעת החקיקה, ואם נשיג 70 חתימות זה יהיה הישג. הבעיה אינה הדחיה, בכל מקרה בשבועיים הקרובים לא יהיה דיון בתת הועדה.

בעתיד, אין לחזור כל שנה על הקרב הזה.

מן הראוי לתת משמעות מחייבת להסכמה עם הממשל.

הגשת הצעת התחיקה נועדה להבהיר לממשל כי המסגרת לדיון אינה מעוצבת ע"י 6 הנקודות של הממשל, אלא ע"י נוסח התחיקה (בשיחותיהם עם הממשל התברר כי אין בטחון לגבי מחויבות הממשל לנקודה השניה, בדבר אי-זיקה לתהליך השלום).

כפי שהדברים נראים כרגע ההחלטה הסופית תהיה בידי הנשיא, בייקר, סקורופט ואיגלברגר.

במפגש הסנאטורים הדמוקרטים תמכו רק שנים בבקשת הנשיא, בעוד שסנאטורים אשר לא תמכו בעבר בישראל, תומכים עתה במתן הערבויות.

מנהיג הרוב מיטצ'ל מחכה עדיין לראות לאן נושבת הרוח.

אם הנשיא ישתכנע שכולם עשויים להפגע והוא יפסיד, ייתכן והוא יסכים לפשרה. צריך לתת לנשיא סולם לרדת מן העץ עליו הוא טיפס, כדי שתהיה לו תחושה מסויימת של הישג (TO SAVE FACE). לדוגמא, ללכת על ערבויות בסך 8 מילארד דולר ל-4 שנים והיתרה תבחן בעתיד (רעיון אינויה; קסטן לא הגיב; בונד הסתייג)

(ג) שגריר-

- יש להיזהר ממלכודת פוטנציאלית הטמונה בהפצת השמועות על הפשרה.

- יש לשמור על נחישות תוך המנעות מתקיפת הנשיא.

- יש לוודא שהממשל מחוייב לפי עקרונות התחיקה אשר הוגשה ע"י אינויה קסטן, ולא לפי רק 6 הנקודות אשר אין מחוייבות משמעותית בצידן.

יורם אטינגר אמנון נויבך

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב', אוצר

סססס

(14)

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1315 -

שטור/מיד

13 - 11

1076

אל:מנהל מצפא

דע: וושינגטון - ציר, שטיין

מאת: ס' קונכיל ניי

הנדון: שיחה עם ארון מילר JERC-A יוחנה
רצ'ב דיווחה של הריאט מנדל עם ארון מילר ערב צאתו לישראל.

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להח 10/10 להח 2
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אצטו 2
בן אבו 1
תפוזו 1

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2/2

September 13, 1991

Harriet Mandel telephone conversation with Aaron David Miller.

Miller's views on President's press conference and current status of loan guarantees:

There was a set of expectations and conceptions on both sides before September.

1) There were wrong expectations on the part of the government of Israel to think that the U.S. would go along with the loan guarantee request.

2) On the U.S. side, settlement activity has been a major issue. The government of Israel has not been honest in conveying information on settlement activity. The letter, which Levy sent to the Secretary of State during the request for the \$400 million dollar housing guarantee request, has not been adhered to. The Israeli government has not been honest in conveying information on settlement activity. In fact, since that commitment, there has been 10% activity in the Jerusalem area, Golan and the West Bank. The President and the Secretary feel very strongly about this.

3) The Secretary has been humiliated by the building of settlements each time he visits Israel.

We are grappling with a no win situation. Meaning that the U.S. has a right to obtain certain assurances for the vast sum of money that Israel is requesting. Taking the past into account, meaning that Israel, according to the Levy letter, did not keep to its word with regard to settlement activity, complicates matters.

Israel cannot make a compelling case for why it is not willing to accept the 120 day delay. The U.S. logic is that engaging in this subject now raises problems. The President is angered that he has put forth a reasonable solution and that the government of Israel and the Jewish community here is trying to end run him. The President and the Secretary are further angered that a case is being presented that the delay is part of an anti-Israel bias, an appeasement of the Arabs, and an insensitivity to Israel's needs. This is wrong.

Moreover, there is a view that Israel thinks that this is their money, that Israel has an entitlement to these funds and that the U.S. owes this to Israel. In addition, there is anger that the issue has been politicized, particularly by Sharon. There is a need to temper this whole matter. Aaron is leaving to Israel tomorrow night for a week, in advance and after Baker's visit. We will continue discussions upon his return.

אאא, חוזם: 11943

אל: רהמש/579

מ-: ווש, נר: 2043, תא: 130991, זח: 1830, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א, סמנכ'ל הסברה, מנהל תפוצות

דע: סופר/ ניו יורק

מאת: הסברה וושינגטון

ערביות - דברי הנשיא

1. אמש והבוקר שוחחתי עם אישים יהודיים רבים והבוקר נפגשתי עם הנציגים הושינגטוניים של הארגונים היהודיים.

2. בקהילות זעם וזעזוע מדברי הנשיא, ותחושה שבדבריו הראה הנשיא את פניו האמיתיות ויחסו לישראל וליהודים. היו שציינו שרבים מהטיעונים בהם השתמש הנשיא (הצגת התומכים בערביות כמחבלים בשלום ובאינטרס הבטחוני האמריקאי, ההשוואה בין המתנגדים לעמדתו במלחמת המפרץ לעמדתו בנושא הערביות וההתייחסות למלחמת המפרץ כמלחמה להגנה על ישראל, ההתייחסות לסיוע האמריקאי לישראל-1000 דולר לנפש וההתייחסות ללובי הישראלי) דומים לטיעונים השגורים בפי הלובי האנטי-ישראלי ועלולים להביא לביטויים אנטישמיים ברחבי ארה"ב.

3. תגובות נבחרים ידידותיים למשלחות הקהילות היהודיות היו במקרים רבים, שישראל נמצאת ב- NO WIN SITUATION כאשר גם אם הצעת הנשיא ל- DELAY תדחה, תצא ישראל נפסדת מבחינת ההשלכות השליליות על יחסי ישראל-ארה"ב. הנבחרים ציינו הסכנות מעימות עם הנשיא והחשיבות במציאת פתרון של פשרה.

4. רבים מציינים שברור שהעימות הנוכחי הוא כיסוי למאבק בנושא ההתנחלויות. יתנו המתנגדת להקפאת ההתנחלויות ברורה, אך יש שאמרו לנו שחשוב שבתקופה הקרובה לא נספק לממשל, ע"י פעולות או הצהרות מצידנו, תחמושת בנושא זה והוסיפו ששמעו מנבחרים הסתייגות מדברים שנאמרו ע"י רה"מ בראיונות ערב רה"ש ומעיתויים.

5. הארגונים היהודיים ממשיכים בפעילותם ההסברתית לפירוט דרכי הקליטה של ישראל, ללא עימות עם הממשל, ומצפים בדריכות לפגישת רה"מ עם המזכיר המדינה ביום שני.

דוד פלג

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, בן אבו, תפוצות, רביב, מעת, הסברה

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון
טופס מברק

21

1049

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בלמ"ס/בהול

תאריך: 12 ספטמבר 1991

אל: מצפ"א, קונכ"לים - (הולנד)

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: הודעת שה"ח וסגן רוה"מ, דוד לוי, בענין הערביות

מצ"ב לידיעתכם, הודעתו של שה"ח וסגן רוה"מ, דוד לוי, כפי שנמסרה לנו היום
(12/9) בענין הערביות.

עתונות

להם ס/טח רחל גלילי - (צו צו' רחל'ה
הסברה
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1049 2/2 September 12, 1991

STATEMENT BY ISRAEL'S DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DAVID LEVY

Israel initiated the peace process and has worked to advance it without any connection to the issue of loan guarantees. The U.S. Secretary of State during his last visit to Israel defined Israel's position as extremely positive.

Since submitting our request there has been no linkage between it and the peace process. We also responded positively to the administration's approach earlier this year to defer submitting the request for guarantees from March to September through a desire to cooperate with the United States.

The absorption of immigrants is a supreme humanitarian issue and the guarantees are essential for the successful integration of hundreds of thousands of immigrants.

Israel is not disposed to a confrontation with the United States, its ally, just as our request for guarantees was not a provocation to any party and not an impediment to the progress of the peace process.

We look forward to the visit of the Secretary of State next Monday in order to continue to discuss with him subjects on the agenda in the spirit of understanding and friendship which characterizes Israel-U.S. relations.

1000 - 8 (י"ח אבירוסני)
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שמור/מייד

אל: מצפ"א - העבירות ב"פ אפ"ל יח
 דע: שר האוצר, מנכ"ל האוצר, יועץ רה"מ לכלכלה, ציר לכלכלה.
 ציר לכלכלה, קונכ"ל נ.י, המנכ"ל פילדלפיה
 מאת: ר' יחידת קונגרס

הנדון: המערכה על הערבויות להלוואות

1. מספר השושבנים של תחיקת הערבויות עומד עתה, לפני כניסת השבת, על 48 סנטורים. קסטן ואינווייה נחשבים להמשיך במשימה לגיוס ה-VETO OVERRIDE (67).

2. מצ"ל מכותבו של הסנטור פרנק לאוטנברג לנשיא האמור לשאת תמימות 15 (מתוך 29) חברי וע' ההקצבות. לפי שעה הצטרפו 11 "קרדינלים".

יום אטינגר

להת' ס'להח ורה"מ מנ"ל בנ"ל מ"ל כה"ן
 בס"ת' אודר
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September 12, 1991

The Honorable
George Bush
President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

X We are writing to express our deep concern over the Administration's request that Congress delay consideration of refugee guarantees for Soviet Jewish absorption in Israel.

Over the last two decades, the United States has led the world in appealing for the freedom of Soviet Jewry. A number of former refuseniks have stated it was U.S. actions which kept alive their hope of religious freedom and respect for human rights. Not only did the U.S. support Soviet Jewish emigration, but by limiting refugee entry into the U.S., our policy actually encouraged them to emigrate to Israel.

One million Soviet Jews are expected to emigrate to Israel over the next five years, which will result in an increase of approximately 20% of Israel's population. As their dreams come to fruition, the United States is presented with an historic opportunity to help with their absorption and make good on our commitment to them. We strongly support the proposed refugee guarantees as a cost-effective, humanitarian and urgent means of assisting with Soviet resettlement.

8 Developments in the Soviet Union, as encouraging as they are, portend a period of political and economic instability and cast a troublesome shadow on the future and safety of Jews in the region. Ethnic nationalism is on the rise in each of the Republics, and the onset of winter and potential famine could fuel ethnic tensions. Historically, the combination of these factors spell uncertainty for Jews in the former Soviet Union.

X U.S. loan guarantees to help with the absorption of Soviet Jewry have been discussed for over one year, with the understanding, arrived at between the Israeli government and your Administration last spring, that the Congress would consider their approval this month. As you know, given the Congressional calendar, the additional delay you have now suggested will be far longer than four months, and could stretch well into 1992.

The Honorable George Bush
September 12, 1991
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8

Soviet Jews have been arriving in Israel at the rate of about 20,000 a month. These refugees, seeking a new life outside of the Soviet Union, need jobs, housing and the chance for an independent life. Further delay in U.S. action will have enormous human costs.

We believe the U.S. government should act now, without further delay. Approval of the refugee guarantees is a humanitarian issue, which is separate and apart from the peace process. The fate of these refugees should not be held hostage to political differences, over which the refugees have no control, between Israel and the Arab nations. We support approval of the guarantees promptly, in the most cost effective way possible.

It is our hope that you will work with us and other members of the Senate Appropriations Committee to permit the resettlement of Soviet Jews to go forward with a minimum of disruption.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Frank R. Lautenberg

אאא, חוזם: 9921

אל: רהמש/476

מ-: המשרד, תא: 120991, זח: 1608, דח: ר, סג: סב,

בכבב

סודי ביותר/רגיל

אל פמלית ראש הממשלה

יוסי בן אהרון

להלן לידיעה :

אל: ווש, לונדון, פריז, רומא, קהיר, בריסל, האג הנדון: הבעות דאגה במחנה הפלס' מאפשרות דחית ועידת השלום

במחנה הפלסטיני - אש'פ ושטחים - מובעת בימים האחרונים דאגה וחשש מאפשרות דחית ועידת השלום:

א. חבר הועד הפועל מחמד מלחם הצהיר, שכל דחיה בעריכת ועידת השלום תחבל חמורות במאמצים להשגת שלום באזור, מדינות ערב יהיו המפסידות העיקריות מדחיה כזאת, שתפגע באמינות ווש' ותביא את האזור למצב הדומה לזה שלאחר יוני 1967. ישראל תהיה הנהנית העיקרית מהדחיה שתאפשר לה להגביר ההתנחלויות בשטחים (ראיון לר. תוניס, 1.9)

ב. פרשן ר' אש'פ (אלג'יר, 7), שהצהרות הנשיא בוש (המרמזות על אפשרות דחית הועידה) מעוררות שאלה לגבי מידת המחויבות של ווש' ומוסקבה לכינוס ועידת השלום במועדה... איננו מתעלמים מגודל הקשיים העומדים עדיין בפני כינוס הועידה ומהשפעת הארועים בברה'מ, אולם דחית הועידה תוכיח שוב שפתרון הסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי והענין הפלס' איננו כלול בסדר היום של הסדר העולמי החדש... זימון הועידה במועדה מהווה מבחן אמיתי למידת רצינותם של הצדדים השונים לגבי תהליך השלום.

ג. למחרת הצהרת הנשיא בוש על אפשרות דחית מועד פתיחת הועידה (4.9) התייחסו לסוגיה יומוני מז'-ירושלים (אלקדס, אלפג'ר, אלנהאר), בהבעת חשש ובהייה ממשמעות דברי הנשיא. 'אלקדס' הגדיר כינוס הועידה במועד כ'מבחן אמיתי למידת רצינותם של הצדדים השונים כלפי תהליך השלום'. הכותבים מודעים למצב הקשה של הצד הפלסטיני במקבילית - הכוחות במז'ת, אך למרות זאת מביעים הדעה, שעל הפלס' להשתתף במערכה המדינית ולא לאפשר לגורמים אחרים (קרי ישראל - ערב 2) לברוח מהתהליך. יצויין שהכותבים אינם מביאים נימוקים קונקרטיים מדוע על הפלס' להשתתף בועידה, למרות מצבם הקשה. ח'אפז אלברגותי ('אלשעב') מזהיר מפני מתן תשובה שלילית 'וזה מפתה, שכן רבים מאויבנו ו'חברינו' מייחלים לרגע זה בו נניף את שלט השלילה לתהליך'.

2. הרצון המובע בהתבטאויות הנ'ל לקיום הועידה במועדה עומד, לכאורה, בסתירה להתבטאויות פומביות אחרות של דוברים פלס', בכירי אש'פ ואישים בשטחים, על הקשיים העומדים עדיין בפני השתתפות הפלס' בועידה ועל סרוב אש'פ לתת הסכמתו ליצוג פלס' בועידה ללא הענות, אמריקנית בעיקר, לתביעותיו (ערבויות). עם זאת נראה שדווקא הקריאה לכינוס הועידה במועדה מעידה, שבמחנה הפלס' יש הכרה והודאה בכך שהפלס' יצאו ניזוקים מאי השתתפותם בועידה (ואולי אף ימצאו נשכרים מהשתתפות) ונוכחותם בה היא אינטרס פלס' ראשון במעלה, למרות תנאי הפתיחה הגרועים והאווירה הבינ'ל שאינה נוחה לאש'פ ולפלס'. יתרה מזאת, לא מן הנמנע שבאש'פ כבר נפלה החלטה

עקרונית על השתתפות בועידה, אך פירסומה של זו מעוכב הן כדי לנסות ולקבל גושפנקא לכך מהמל"פ והן כדי לשפר ככל הניתן תנאי הכניסה של הפלס' לתהליך, כשאש'פ ישתמש בקלף הוטו על השתתפות פלס' בועידה עד לרגע האפשרי.

ערב 2 / ממ"ד

להלן מהמשרד מ-110991

אל: תפוצת דו"ח אירועים יומי

1. התהליך המדיני

א. אש'פ

הועה'פ של אש'פ מכונס מזה מספר ימים בתוניס, בהערכות לקראת כינוס המל"פ ודן במאמצים להביא להשתתפות החמאס וחזית ההצלה בכינוס. צפוי שבתום ישיבת הועה'פ יפורסם מועד כינוס המל"פ באלג'יר. מקורות פלס' מסרו, שבין הנושאים שידונו במל"פ הקרוב יהיו בחירת ועה'פ חדש, יחסי אש'פ עם מדינות ערב והשתתפות הפלס' בועידת השלום. (סי'צ, 8; סי'א, 10). בענין זה צופה יורג' חבש, מזכ"ל החז'ע, שהמל"פ יצביע בעד השתתפות אש'פ בועידת השלום. לדבריו 'לאור המצב הכללי של הפלס' והערבים וארה'ב המציגה עצמה כאדון העולם, צפוי שיתבצע מהלך שיתמוך בתכנית האמר', כאלטרנטיבה היחידה' (רויטר, 10 ראיון ליומון האלג'ירי הורייזן). לעומת זאת הצהיר (9) אבו מאזן, חבר הועה'פ של אש'פ, שועידת השלום לא תתכנס אם הפלס' לא יורשו לבחור משלחת עפ"י תנאיהם. בראיון ל'אל-ביאן' התוניסאי (11) הביע אבו מאזן אכזבה מכך שרוב המנהיגים הערביים אינם שותפים לתביעת אש'פ ליצוג 'הולם' בועידה לערביי מזרח ירושלים (אי.פי. 8). בווש' שוהה זכריא אל-אע'א החבר במשלחת השטחים לשיחות עם המזכיר בייקר. לדבריו הבטיח בייקר, שמפגשו הבא עם המשלחת הפלס' יהיה במזרח י-ם. המשלחת תגיש לבייקר מזכר הבנה, בו תדרוש 'הבטחות אמר' לגבי י-ם, מעמדם של הפלס' כעם ולא כתושבים וזכותם לבחור את נציגיהם' (ר' אל-שרק, 9).

ב. מפגש הועדה הירדנית פלס':

במשה'ח הירדני התקימה (10) פגישה בין מומחים ירדנים בראשות מנהל המחלקה המדינית במשה'ח, קאסם ע'זאוי, לבין מומחים פלס' בראשות נביל שעת', מרכירי הפת'ח, וזאת במסגרת ועדה משותפת לירדן ולאש'פ שהוקמה בעקבות קור ערפאת בעמאן. לדברי שעת', מטרת המפגשים להגיע לשות'פ מירבי בין ירדן לאש'פ לגבי תהליך השלום (ר' מונטה קרלו, 10).

ג. ירדן

בראיון חוסין לרשת אן.בי.סי (9) אמר בתשובה לשאלה, אם ירדן תשתתף בועידה גם אם הפלס' יסרכו לקחת בה חלק, כי ירדן תיצג עצמה ואנטרסיה ותפעל במשור אזורי. הדגיש שאין בהירות לגבי הרכב המשלחת, אך אם יהיה תהליך שלום שיחתור להסדר כולל 'ודאי שאנו נשתתף'. חזר וטען שיש לישים החלטות 242 ו-338 להגשמת זכויות הפלס' ולבטחון לישראל. לגבי דרישת ירדן לערבויות מארה'ב ציין שירדן לא חתרה לערבויות מראש, הגם שהיא רוצה לדעת העמדה האמר' ביחס לנקודות מסוימות. הביע תקווה שהתהליך עצמו יתן התשובות. בהתיחסו להחלטת ארה'ב לדחית הערובות הכספיות לישראל אמר, כי עמדה זו מבטאת רצון ארה'ב למלא תפקיד קונסטרוקטיבי בהשגת הסדר לסכסוך (סי'ר, 9). הנסיך חסן אמר בראיון לר' אלשרק (8) שצוותי עבודה ירדניים פועלים עתה לגבוש העמדה הירדנית בשיחות השלום. הוסיף שירדן לא תלך להסדר נפרד עם ישראל ולא תאפשר לבודד אותה נוכח חשיבותה ומיקומה. הדגיש עצמאות וחופש ההחלטה הפלס' וציין שתשובה פלס' מהירה תסייע לבניית אמון ויציבות. עוד

ציין הצורך בפתרון אזורי לבעיות כמו מים, אקולוגיה, אנרגיה, מרוץ החימוש, חובות ובעיות דמוגרפיות. בראיון אחר (לאי.פי 8) הטיל ספק באמינות ועידת שלום ללא השתתפות הפלס' והביע הערכתו שועידת השלום תידחה נוכח אי-פתרון של היצוג הפלס'. הגדיר את בקשת בוש לדחית הדיון בערבויות למלואם לישראל כחיובית.

ד. מצרים

סגן רה"מ ושר המדינה לענייני חוץ והגירה, ע'אלי אמר בראיון לטלביזיה הבריטית (9) כי הוא מאמין שהועידה תתכנס באוק'. במהלכה יתגברו על הקשיים כאשר הבעיות המסובכות ביותר ובכללן ירושלים יידונו בסופה. ע'אלי הסכים כי כל הסכם על הבעיה הפלס' יחייב השתתפות אש'פ אבל הוסיף כי הארגון יכול להרכיב משלחת של פלסטינים שאינם משתייכים לאש'פ. במקביל הכחיש בתוקף שה'ח עמרו מוסא (10) כי מתקיימות התייעצויות ביחס לאפשרות מפגש מחומש של הגורמים הערביים הנוגעים לסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי (מצרים, סוריה, ירדן, לבנון ואש'פ) והוסיף כי עד עתה לא נעשו שום סדורים לעריכת כנוס כזה (סימז'ת 10).

ה. סוריה

ה'ח פארוק אלשרע אמר בקהיר בחשובה לשאלות כתבים כי אין תאום טורי-פלסטיני כהכנה לוועידת השלום וישנם מכשולים המפריעים לכינוס מפגש מחומש כדוגמת המתיחות השוררת בין מצרים לירדן (סי'צ מקהיר, 10).

ו. איראן

ס/שה'ח בשארתי, שתוכניות השלום לא תישאנה פרות כל עוד מתעלמים מהנוכחות הפלס'. יצא גם נגד 'הסדר העולמי החדש האמריקאי, מסווה להגמוניה אמריקאית, שגם הוא יכשל' (אירנה, 8). המשלחת האיראנית בוועידת הבלמ'ז בגאנה הצהירה שלא תכיר לעולם בישראל, ודרשה נסיגתה מכל השטחים הכבושים (ר' טהראן, 8).

2. מאמצים ירדנים להפיג המתיחות עם מצרים בשולי כנוס שה'ח של הלע'ר בקהיר נפגש שה'ח המצרי עמר מוסא עם עמיתו הירדני אלנסור (ר' אלשרק 10). לפני צאתו לקהיר הגיב אלנסור על צעדיה האחרונים של מצרים כנגד ירדן (הגבלות על מעבר ירדנים בתחומה), באומרו שירדן לא תנקוט בצעדי תגמול ולכן לא תכפה אשורות כניסה על מצרים המגיעים לירדן. טען שלצעדי מצרים אין הצדקה ותאר המזכר המצרי שהוגש ללע'ר בתגובה על הספר הלבן כחריף ואת דבת כלי התקשורת המצריים כ'התקפה מרושעת' נגד ירדן. הוסיף שירדן הופתעה מפרסום המזכר המצרי (אלראי, סי'צ, 8) (יצויין שזוהי תגובה רשמית ראשונה של ירדן על המזכר המצרי).

3. שליח גורבצ'וב מבקר במז'ת

שליח הנשיא גורבצ'וב, יבגני פרימקוב, יצא ב-10.9 למז'ת, לביקור במצרים, סעודיה, מאע'מ, כוית, איראן ותורכיה כדי לדון עם מנהיגיהן בשת'פ כלכלי ובהסדר במז'ת (טאס'ס, 10). במצרים ידון פרימקוב עם הנשיא מובארכ בנושאים המעכבים כינוס ועידת השלום, בהם סוגית הייצוג הפלסטי והתפקיד שיכולה למלא בריה"מ כדי להתגבר על בעיה זו (ר' מונטה קרלו, 10). לעומת זאת מציין דובר משה'ח הסוב', כי סיורו של פרימקוב איננו קשור לכינוס הועידה (רויטר, 10). במקביל מבקר במוסקבה חבר הוועה'פ של אש'פ אבו מאזן, שנפגש עם ס/שה'ח בלוגונוב והיה צפוי גם לפגוש את פרימקוב, טרם צאתו למז'ת (ר' מונטה קרלו, 9).

4. מגעי אש'פ עם חזית ההצלה

לאחר מפגש ערפאת בח'רטום עם נציגי החמא'ס, שכנראה לא עלה יפה, ממשיך

אש'פ במגעיו עם חזית ההצלה הפלס' הפרו-סורית במאמץ לצרפה לכינוס המל'פ. יו'ר החזית ח'אלד אל-פאהום אמר (10) שהחזית נענית להצעת ערפאת להתחיל בדיאלוג עם אש'פ בטריפולי. החזית ביקשה מערפאת שלא יקבע מועד כינוס המל'פ, לפני שיערכו השיחות עמם. נאיף חואתמה, מזכ'ל החז'ד, מסר, שבמכתב ששלח לו אל-פאהום ציין שבמפגש בטריפולי ינכחו רק חז'ע-מפכ'ל (ג'בריל), אל-צאעקה והאישים ח'אלד אל-פאהום ועבד אל-מחסן אבו מיזר (לאמר, יעדרו ארגונו של אבו מוסא והמפלגה הקומוניסטית המהפכנית) (סי'צ, 10).

5. עיראק - כורדים

דובר משרד ההסברה העיראקי (10) שדברי שליח האו'מ על קרבות קשים בין צבא עיראק והכורדים הם טענות שוא 'מנופחות' במסגרת הנסיונות לכפות על עיראק את יישום החלטה 706 (יצוא מבוקר של נפט). ממ'עיראק שואפת ליציבות באזור הצפון ובהמשך הדיאלוג עם החזית הכורדית כדי להגיע להסכם שיתבסס על העמקת הנסיון לאוטונומיה (סי'ע, 10).

6. מגעים סוריים - איראניים

מנהל המח' לעניינים ערביים וענייני צפון אמריקה במשה'ח האיראני, מחמד כז'ם הגיע לדמשק (8) ונועד עם ס/הנשיא ח'דאם. הוא הביא אגרת מהנשיא סג'אני. השניים דנו בהתפתחויות באיזור ובמיוחד בלבנון, בסוגיה הפלס' וביחסים הביטורליים. במהלך הפגישה הדגיש ח'דאם כי יש לעמוד לפני 'מדיניות התוקפנות של הישות הציונית' ולהמשיך בהתנגדות בלבנון ובמקומות אחרים (סי'ק, ר' קול העם, ר' טהראן, 9). לעומת זאת דחה שה'ח וילאיתי ידיעות בתקשורת המצרית על כוונת איראן לשפר יחסיה עם מצרים. ס/שה'ח בשארתי אמר שהיחסים עם קהיר ישארו ברמה הנוכחית (משרד אינטרסים) (אירנה, 8).

המרכז

להלן מבריסל נר 85 מ-110991

א ל: אירופה 1

ד ע: מזתים תפוצת מאיה רפרנט לפאר

מאת: יועץ לענייני הפאר המשלחת בריסל

הנדון: נאום המלך חסיין בפני מליאת הפאר 11/9/91

ני כשעה סיים המלך חסיין, המתארח היום בפאר בסטרסבורג, את נאומו בפני המליאה. המלך הגיע לאולם מלווה עי הנשיא ברוך-קוספו כש-280 הפרלמנטרים שנכחו במקום, קמים לכבודו ומקבלים אותו במחאות כפיים. נציין שזו היתה הפעם השניה שהמלך ההאשמי מופיע בפורום זה, לאחר הופעתו הראשונה ב-1983.

את דבריו פתח וסיים בדברי שבח לאל בערבית. להלן עיקריהם:

א. ירדן מהווה אי של יציבות במזהה. ב. ירדן סבלה תמיד מהצרות שהתרגשו על העולם הערבי והמקונפלקט הישראלי-ערבי/פלסטיני.

ג. ירדן היא זו שקלטה את הפליטים הפלסטינים בשלהי שנות הארבעים והיא זו שקלטה אותם ואחרים, בעת שגורשו מכווית וממדינות המפרץ בעטיו של המשבר האחרון.

ד. החוב הלאומי של ירדן גדל, כיוון שמדינות ערב לא עמדו בהתחייבויותיהן הפיננסיות כלפיה, למעט ערב הסעודית. התיחסות זו הביאה על ירדן ב-1989 כמעט שואה כלכלית.

ה. המלך חסיין הוא שהנהיג את הפלורליזם בירדן, הפכה לדמקורטיה הפתוחה לכל המפלגות והפלגים, והבטיח את תפקודו של פרלמנט יצוגי. המשטר מתבסס על בסיס

האמנה הלאומית מ 9/6/91.

ו. ירדן פעלה לפתרון משכר המפרץ בדרכי שלום, דבר שהתבקש מחברותה בליגה הערבית ורצונה לשמור על אחדות העולם הערבי. בשל נסיון אציל זה, לדבריו, משלמת ירדן את המחיר עד היום. אלה המציגים את ירדן כפרו עיראקית מעוותים את ההיסטוריה, שכן זו נהגה למעשה באומץ לב וביושר. ז. פירט נזקי המלחמה הישירים והעקיפים: עצירת אניות בדרכן לירדן, החרמת התוצרת הירדנית בשווקי העולם, קשיים בקבלת זכויות תיפעול ונחיתה לחב' התעופה הלאומית (מה שמונע את הפרטתה) וכו'.

ח. תהליך השלום-

1. מעודד מההתפתחויות באיזור. הירדנים משתתפים במאמץ לפתרון הקונפליקט הישראלי-ערבי/פלסטיני. להערכתו התהליך המדיני יעלה בקרוב על פסים מעשיים שיובילו לפתרון המקווה.

2. ציטט את הנשיא בוש שאמר לדבריו, שהשלום צריך להיות כולל, מבוסס על החלטות 242 ו-338, עקרון: 'שטחים תמורת שלום'. הכרה בזכות ישראל להתקיים בשלום ובבטחון והכרה בזכויות הלגיטימיות של הפלסטינים.

3. בועידת השלום ישתתפו שתי ה'ספונסריות הותיקות' (ציטוט) בריהם וארהב, וכן הקהילה האירופית והאום, שיעניק את הגושפנקא הבינל'. בתנאים אלה מסכימה ירדן להשתתף.

4. בהרמת קול הדגיש כי 'רק הפלסטינים ייצגו את עצמם' (ציטוט). ירדן הציעה 'מטריה' לפלסטינים לייצוג משותף, ברם רק הם שיחליטו אם הם רוצים בכך ומי ידבר בשמם.

5. ברך על הסכמתן של מדינות ערב רבות נוספות להשתתף בועידה.

6. הביע אמונתו שקיים צורך בשלום כולל ובהתפיסות איזורית, כדי ש'בניו של אברהם וישמעאל יחיו יחדיו', כדי שיוכל לשוב והלתפלל בירושלים הנשלטת כיום 'בצורה בלתי מאוזנת' (ציטוט).

7. הצורך בשלום היא 'חובתנו למען הדורות הבאים'. הביע תקווה שהעתיד הקרוב ינביח שכל הנוגעים לענין, למדו להתגבר על חשדנות הדדית, שנאה ודעות קדומות.

8. עוד אמר שהוא מקוה שיזכה לראות את הפלסטינים אל 'אדמותיהם האהובות' (ציטוט) נהנים מכל זכויות האדם שם ו'בכל מקום אחר' הדגיש, כשהוא רומז למפרציות, וכי 'יהודים וערבים יחיו יחד, בשלום והרמוניה לעולם ועד'.

9. המלך חסיין סיים נאומו במעין וידוי אישי כשאמר, שהוא מיישם חובתו החוקתית כבר 29 שנה, כאשר בכל השנים האלה פחד רק מאלוהים. חלומו הגדול והיחיד הוא, לזכות לראות עוד בחייו פרלמנט כלל-ערבי, דוגמת הפאר, שיסמל את אחדות העולם הערבים, המבוססת על חירות ודמוקרטיה (קימה של חברי הפאר ומחיאות כפיים ממושכות).

סיכום והערכה:

1. הנושא הישראלי תפס רק חלק קטן ומינורי בנאום, בהתייחסות לישראל נעדר כל סממן תוקפני, לא כללי ולא אישי, בניגוד בולט להתבטאות המשתתפים הערביים בדיאלוג האירו-ערבי, שנערך כאן ביוני האחרון. בנוסף יש לציין שבמהלך כל הנאום לא הוזכר אשף וכן לא עלתה הדרישה למדינה פלסטינית בשטחים.

2. בלטה הביקורתיות והמרירות של המלך, כלפי שליטי כוויט והמפרציות על יחסם אליו, לנתיניו ולפלסטינים. מסיבה זו העלה על נס את ההבדלים בין ירדן ל'משטרים אוטוקרטים מסויימים' (ציטוט) במזהת בהם נרמסות בפומבי זכויות האדם.

3. בנאום ניכר נסיון של המלך לתרץ ולהסביר עמדתו האמביוולנטית בעת משבר המפרץ.

4. בהנחה שהסבריו יתקבלו, היתה בנאום קריאה עקיפה לסיוע כלכלי של הקהילה האירופית לארצו, המגינה על האינטרסים של המערב בעולם הערבי ובמזהת, קרי יציבות, דמוקרטיה, פלורליזם וזכויות האדם.

הנוסח המלא בדיף.
גמר חתימה טובה.
גלילי.

להלן מווש נר 2032 מ-110991

מכתב מכתב מכתב

אל : לשכת רה"מ', לשכת שהח, סמנכל צפא

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

בשיחה עם מקור בבית הלבן, הנשיא מעוניין להימנע מעימות חריף, אם אפשר למונעו.

המקור איננו סבור שנשמע על הצעות פשרה ו/או שינוי הנקודה השניה מתוך שש הנקודות שהועלו במברק 2028 עד ביקור המזכיר בארץ, ולו בגלל הסיבה שכל החלטה בנדון חייבת להתקבל בפגישה משותפת של כל הנפשות הפועלות העיקריות, דהיינו, הנשיא, המזכיר, היועץ לבטחון לאומי וכו'.

אגב, הן בן-שיחי והן אנשים אחרים בממשל, כולל מחמד, שותפים לדאגה פן המצב החדש כברייהם עלול להביא להגברת האנטישמיות והם אינם חולקים בדרך כלל על הסברה שרצון היהודים לעלות לישראל יגבר ולא יחלש.

שובל

להלן מווש נר 2029 מ-110991

אל : סמנכל צפא

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ערבויות

הפעילות עודנה אינטנסיבית.

(1) קבוצת קונגרסמן יהודים נפגשת היום עם פולי.

(2) הבוקר ישבה המנהיגות הדמוקרטית אל המדוכה (ללא תוצאות לכאן או

לכאנ).

(3) קסטן ואינווה אוספים שותפים לחקיקתם (אין עדיין מספרים).

(4) היתה פגישת מנהיגים רפובליקנים עם הנשיא (שבה עבר מיקי אדוארדס לשורותיו).

על כל אלה תקבלו בודאי דיווחים מפורטים יותר מהקישור לקונגרס. בתום הפגישה האחרונה ענה בוש לשאלות עיתונאים. הדברים תקיפים ובלתי מתפשרים תקבלו את הנוסח מרות ירון.

שילה

להלן מושינגטון נר 129 מ-110991

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת שר האוצר, לשכת מנכ"ל האוצר ציר כלכלי כאן (הועבר)

מאת: ק' לקונגרס - וושינגטון

הנדון: ערבויות - מנהיגות דמוקרטית של בית הנבחרים

1. היום, 11/9, נפגשה קבוצת קונגרסמנים עם מנהיגות בית הנבחרים, כדי לדון בנושא הערבויות ובקשת הנשיא לדחות הדיון והחקיקה. השתתפו בפגישה בין השאר פולי (יו"ר בית הנבחרים), גפהרדט (מנהיג הרוב), בוניור (המצליף), הוייר (ראש הקוקוס הדמוקרטי), סמית, שומר, וקסמן, אקרמן, פרנק, פיהן, סולרז, אואנס ואחרים. בסה"כ השתתפו כ- 25 קונגרסמנים.

2. להלן דיווח על הפגישה מקונגרסמנים שנטלו בה חלק: הישיבה היתה ממושכת מאוד ודי טובה. (זאת במיוחד, כדברי המשתתפים, בהתחשב באופיו הפשרני של פולי). בכל מקרה, היה קונסנסוס בין המשתתפים "לעשות משהו" ורווחה תחושה חזקה שעל ישראל לקבל הערבויות. פולי פתח ואמר כי הוא תומך בערבויות לישראל (אגב, למעשה היום לראשונה, במסיבת העתונאים היומית שלו ובישיבה זו אימץ פולי את הנושא והביע בו תמיכה - י.ד.). ואיננו מרגיש מחויבות לפי DEADLINE מלאכותי שנקבע ע"י אנשים. (קרי: בקשת הנשיא לקבל תשובה מהקונגרס עוד לפני יציאת בייקר לביקורו במזה"ת). פולי עמד בדבריו על המציאות הפוליטית ועל האינטרסים של כל הצדדים וחזר על כך מספר פעמים שאיננו מעוניין בעימות ובמאבק (עם הממשל). חלק מהמשתתפים אשר קראו לפעולה חקיקתית עתה והדגישו הנושא ההומניטרי, הגיבו באומרם כי אין צורך בעימות וכי ניתן לפעול בשקט מתוך עמדת כוח ועצמה ולחפש COMMON GROUND.

פולי בתגובה אמר כי לדעתו הנשיא מעוניין בעימות פוליטי נגד הדמוקרטים, לדבריו, הנשיא מסוגל לנצל הנושא לצורך עימות פוליטי נגד הדמוקרטים, לטעון שהדמוקרטים מתמקדים כל העת ומנגחים הממשל בנושאי פנים, והנה הם הם אלה המוכנים לתת 10 בליון דולר לישראל. פולי הדגיש כי איננו סבור שיהיה זה באינטרס של ישראל או הקונגרס לקיים דיון פומבי בנושא הערבויות ולהעלותו על האג'נדה הלאומית. כל המשתתפים הסכימו. פולי הוסיף כי יש להגיע לפשרה. אפשר אמנם יהיה להעביר לדבריו חקיקת הערבויות בשני הבתים אולם אינו בטוח שיוכלו להתגבר על וטו נשיאותי.

3. לשאלת אחד המשתתפים על פגישתם הבוקר של פולי והסנטור מיטצ'ל השיב פולי כי הפגישה היתה טובה וכי הגיעו להבנה (מקורותי לא פירטו) אולם

העדיפו להמתין ולא קיבלו החלטות ספציפיות.

4. גם בפגישת הקונגרסמנים עם המנהיגות לא התקבלה כל החלטה. הובן שפולי ימשיך להתייעץ עם עמיתיו (כולל בסנאט) וכי אינו ממהר להשיב לבקשת הנשיא לדחות הנושא. פולי חזר על כך כי אינו מעוניין במאבק קשה נגד הממשל ("ולהפוך זאת למאבק כמו האייזוקס") והדבר הטוב ביותר יהיה להשיג פשרה. תוכן הפשרה טרם נדון.

5. בשיחה אישית עם אחד המשתתפים אמר גייפהרדט לאחר הישיבה כי יש לעבוד על פשרה וכי הוא סבור שבייקר מעוניין לסייע לישראל (לעומת הבית הלבן).

6. בשיחה עם לארי סמית אמר לי כי הוא יעמוד בקשר עם הסנטור קסטן אשר כבר התקשר עמו. ינסו לעבוד על פשרה/ACCOMODATION בצורה שקטה שתהיה על דעת ישראל ושלא תכלול כל התניות ולינקאג'. ינצרו בשלב זה האש ויגייסו התומכים. ביקש בכל לשון של בקשה שלא תמסרנה הצהרות והתבטאויות ישראליות פומביות בנושא בימים הקרובים.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

להלן מווש נר 2030 מ-110991

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

דע: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

הנדון: בקשת הערבויות

1. כאמור, בסקירה מהבוקר, הנושא שוב חוזר וזוכה בעיסוק תקשורתי מוגבר. דבריו של הנשיא הבוקר (נשלח בנפרד) עוד הגבירו העניין וקבלנו עשרות רבות של טלפונים (קרוב למאה טלפונים רק בנושא הזה) מעתונאים.

2. משיחה (בנפרד) עם שלושה בעלי-טורים חשובים וידידותיים, להלן מספר ידועות בעלות עניין:-

א. מסביבתו הקרובה של הנשיא ומיועציו עולה כי הנשיא נחוש בדעתו שלא לסגת מבקשתו לדחות הדיון בערבויות ב-120 יום. הנשיא רואה בכך מאבק THAT HE CANNOT EFFORD TO LOSE. מדובר על יוקרתו ומעמדו של הנשיא כמחליט העליון של האינטרס האמריקני. עמדתה של ישראל, ובעיקר לאור העמדות שהושמעו אתמול מצד ידידי ישראל בקונגרס, מתקבלות על-ידו כנסיון לערער מנהיגותו: יש כאן מעין מאבק-כוח בין ישראל לנשיא, והנשיא חייב לנצח. מיועציו שומעים כי הנשיא IS FURIOUS.

אחד העתונאים העיר בציניות שמקריאת דברי הנשיא הבוקר, נראה שהנשיא מרגיש כי הוא בזירת אגרוף: '... אני נחוש בדעתי להלחם... אני יכול לספוג - I CAN TAKE QUITE A FEW PUNCHES' וכו'.

לדבריו, אמירות אלה מבטאות נכונה הלך-רוחו של הנשיא וגישתו לעניין ו'כשהנשיא מרגיש שהוא בזירת ספורט, הוא לא אוהב להפסיד'.

ב. מסקרי דעת-קהל שנעשו בסוף השבוע האחרון (ושיפורסמו בימים הקרובים) ושתוצאותיהן ידועות לבית הלבן, עולה כי אחוז גדול בציבור תומך בעמדת

הנשיא שיש לדחות הדיון בערוביות. כמו-כן, עפ"י אותם סקרים יש עליה בפרספציה הציבורית שישראל 'מנצלת' יחסיה 'המיוחדים' עם ארה"ב ומבקשת עוד ועוד סיוע. על בסיס ממצאים אלה ודווחים שוטפים שמקבל הנשיא (FROM OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY) - הממשל בטוח שאם הנשיא 'יביא' העניין לציבור האמריקני - דעת הקהל תתמוך בו. לפיכך, הנשיא אינו מהסס לומר זאת פומבית (במסע'ת ביום שישי) ולחזור על כך היום בנימה הנשמעת כאיום.

ג. הטיעון המוסרי כנגד הלינקאג' של ענין הומניטארי בחילוקי דיעות פוליטיים - עובר על הנשיא. מאותם מקורות, כי הנשיא נפגע מאוד מההאשמה המורלית שהוטחה בו בטור של ספייר ('הנשיא לוקח בני ערובה'), אולם פגיעה זו רק מחזקת את נחישותו להמשיך ולהלחם על עמדתו, כפי שאמר היום במסע'ת.

עד כאן.

רות ירון

להלן מושינגטון נר 124 מ-110991

אל: לשכת רוה"מ, מצפ"א
מאת: וושינגטון - לשכת השגריר

השגריר הודיע לקלי לפי בקשת י. בן אהרון, כי הפגישה של מזכיר המדינה עם רוה"מ תתחיל ב- 15:30 ולא ב- 15:00.

לשכת השגריר

להלן מקינגסטון נר 32 מ-110991
אל: מנהל אמלט/1 והקריביים.

מאת: שגרירות קינגסטון.

הנדון: ועידת I.D.U.

א. לאור השתתפות רוהם שמיר בפריס בוועידה זו להזכירכם כי כנשיא הסניף האריבי של הארגון נבחר לאחרונה רוהם מיטשל מסט. וינסנט במקומו של רוהם לשעבר סייאגה מג'מייקה.

2. מציע שרוהם שמיר יברכו על בחירתו במידה ויפגש עמו.

שגריר

להלן מושינגטון נר 109 מ-110991

אל: מזא"ר 1 מצפ"א.

דע: לש' רוה"מ.

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

החלטת ליטא לטהר פושעים נאצים - להלן הנוסח המתוקן לנר 97.1 בפגישתו עם מזכיר המדינה (ביום שישי החולף), ניצל השגריר התייחסותו של המזכיר

לביקורו המתוכנן בבלטיות, כדי להביע תמהוננו מהחלטת ממ' ליטא לטהר פושעים נאצים. המזכיר היה מודע להתפתחות זו.

2. השגריר העלה הנושא גם בשיחה מקדימה שקיים עם רוס. ביקשו שהמזכיר יעלה הנושא בשיחותיו בליטא.

שטיין.

להלן מושינגטון נר 112 מ-110991
מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש על הערכויות

PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH DURING MEETING WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, CABINET ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1991

Q MR. PRESIDENT, ARE YOU GOING TO LOSE ON THE LOAN
GUARANTEES TO ISRAEL IN CONGRESS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU MEAN BY LOSE ON
IT. WHAT I AM FOR IS THE PEACE PROCESS TO BE SUCCESSFUL AND WE HAVE
WORKED DILIGENTLY FOR THAT, AND SO THE PROGRAM I AM RECOMMENDING, IN
MY VIEW, IS THE BEST TO ENHANCE PEACE IN THE AREA, A VITAL INTEREST
TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, PEOPLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND INDEED AROUND
THE WORLD. IF I HAVE EVER SEEN ONE INITIATIVE THAT HAS SUPPORT
WORLDWIDE, IT IS THIS CONCEPT OF AT LAST GETTING PEOPLE IN THE AREA
TO TALK TO EACH OTHER ABOUT PEACE.

AND SO, WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IN A SIMPLE DELAY HERE, IN MY VIEW
AND IN THE VIEW OF ALL OF US IN THE ADMINISTRATION IS THE BEST WAY
TO SET THE PROPER TONE FOR THESE TALKS TO START, AND I FEEL VERY
STRONGLY ABOUT IT, BUT IT'S NOT A QUESTION OF WINNING OR LOSING IN
MY VIEW. STRONG WILLED PEOPLE LOOK AT THESE MATTERS DIFFERENTLY.
MY VIEW IS THAT A DELAY IS IN THE INTEREST AND I AM GOING TO FIGHT
FOR IT, AND I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL BACK ME ON IT WHEN I
TAKE THE CASE TO THE PEOPLE.

BUT WHAT WE ARE REALLY TRYING TO DO IS WORK IT OUT WITHOUT
GETTING INTO A LOT OF CONFRONTATION, AND THAT'S -- I THINK THAT IS
THE APPROACH TO TAKE AT THIS POINT.

Q CAN YOU AVOID CONFRONTATION WHEN THEY ARE BRINGING THE
FIGHT TO YOU, WHEN THEY ARE GOING AROUND YOU, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
ISRAEL HAS --

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I CAN TAKE QUITE A FEW PUNCHES, BUT THAT
IS NOT WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WORKING
HARMONIOUSLY TOGETHER IN A SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND I HAVE SEEN
COMMENTS FROM ABROAD THAT I DIDN'T PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE, BUT

THAT'S -- WE'RE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND WE HAVE A LEADERSHIP ROLE AROUND THE WORLD THAT HAS TO BE FULFILLED, AND I AM CALLING THE SHOTS IN THIS QUESTION IN THE WAY I THINK IS BEST, AND I HAVE GOT SOME SELLING TO DO WITH CERTAIN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THAT'S UNDERSTANDABLE TO ME.

SO WE'LL SEE HOW IT COMES OUT, BUT I AM NOT APPROACHING THIS IN THE SPIRIT OF CONFRONTATION, IF THAT'S THE QUESTION. YOU HAVEN'T SEEN ANY REAL CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF HERE UP UNTIL NOW.

Q YOU ARE NOT COMMITTED TO THE GUARANTEES AFTER THE 120 BILLION (DOLLARS), SIR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I AM COMMITTED TO SEEING THAT THEY GET CONSIDERED AND WE HAVE GENERALLY BEEN QUITE SUPPORTIVE OF THE IDEA OF ABSORPTION. WE HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD AROUND THE WORLD IN FACILITATING THE QUESTION OF SOVIET JEWS COMING TO ISRAEL AND THE ETHIOPIAN JEWS AS WELL. THE POSITION OF THIS ADMINISTRATION IS NOT ONLY WELL KNOWN, BUT I THINK HIGHLY RESPECTED IN ISRAEL AND AROUND THE WORLD FOR THIS. SO WE ARE NOT BACKING OFF FROM THAT AND THE PRINCIPLE, THIS CONCEPT OF HELPING, WE WANT TO DO IT, BUT I AM NOT COMMITTED TO ANY NUMBERS AND NEVER HAVE BEEN.

THERE WAS A VERY MISLEADING STATEMENT IN THE PAPERS TODAY, OUT OF ISRAEL THAT I'D LIKE TO CLEAR UP, BECAUSE IT SAID, THIS -- THAT WE WERE COMMITTED AND THEY WONDERED WHAT WE COMMITTED TO. AND I'M SORRY TO TELL YOU THAT SIMPLY IS NOT CORRECT. AND IF WE'RE GOING TO DEAL ON THIS QUESTION, WE OUGHT TO BE DEALING FROM THE FACTS. AND THAT -- SO THAT ONE WAS NOT A FACT, JUST SOME SPOKESMAN, I DON'T KNOW WHO HE WAS OR WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO. BUT IT GIVES ME A GOOD CHANCE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THAT ISN'T CORRECT.

Q DO YOU TAKE THREATS FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY MAY (STAY AWAY ?) FROM THE PEACE CONFERENCE --

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, THEY'RE NOT -- I'VE SEEN NO THREATS FROM THEM. I'VE SEEN NO THREATS FROM THEM. WE HAVE A SPECIAL AND A GOOD, STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH ISREAL. AND THAT'S GOING TO CONTINUE. BUT I'VE SEEN NO THREATS. AND WE DON'T DEAL IN THREATS OVER HERE AND WE DON'T TRY TO THREATEN OTHER PEOPLE. THAT'S NOT THE WAY YOU ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Q ARE YOU CONCERNED, THOUGH, THAT THEY MIGHT NOT COME TO THE PEACE TABLE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I THINK THEY'RE COMMITTED AND I THINK IT'S A GOOD THING THEY ARE, AND I THINK OTHERS ARE COMMITTED. AND WE WANT THE CLIMATE TO BE RIGHT TO FACILITATE THE COMING TO THE TABLE. EVERYBODY WANTS THESE PARTIES TO COME TO THE TABLE ALL AROUND THE WORLD. AND WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE IS A SIMPLE DELAY OF 120 DAYS BEFORE THIS MATTER IS DEBATED, BECAUSE OUT OF THE DEBATE IS

GOING TO COME A LOT OF POSTURING AND POSITIONING THAT, IN MY VIEW, WILL NOT HELP THE PEACE PROCESS. SO, THAT'S WHAT IT BOILS DOWN TO, AND THAT'S WHY THIS VERY REASONABLE REQUEST IS BEING MADE.

Q THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

עד כאן

עתונות

להלן מקהיר נר 149מ-110991

א ל: מצרים

ד ע: מצפ'א ע-1

ת: קהיר

הנדון: פגישה עם עובד בשג' ארה'ב.

להלן משיחה עם ארתור ברנסטיין משג' ארהב האחראי על פרוייקט פיתוח האוכלוסיה מטעם US AID:

א. תקף בחריפות את הודעתו של בוש בענין הערבויות לישראל ואמר כי היא משגה חמור. אישית הוא מתנגד לכל לינקג'. אך אם הממשל בכל זאת מעוניין בלינקג' היה עדיף לכוון עניין הערבויות בהפסקת ההתנחלויות ולא בנושא הועידה. בוש היה אז מקבל תמיכה רחבה, היה מנטרל את הלחת של יהדות ארהב ואפילו היה מקבל תמיכה מהזרמים השונים במפה הפוליטית בישראל המתנגדים להתנחלויות, בייקר הטעה אותו, ההחלטה מהווה משגה טקטי.

2. לדבריו, הערבים הודיעו למחלקת המדינה שהם יחרימו את הועידה אם ארהב תחליט על מתן ערבויות לישראל במיוחד ערב כינוסה של הועידה. הערבים טענו כי הדבר יצטייר כמתן פרס לישראל הבהסכמתה להשתתף בועידה (לא פירט איזה מדינות ערביות).

3. סבור שהנשיא בוש הכניס את עצמו למבוי סתום: מצד אחד ההחלטה עלולה לפגוע בתהליך, ומאידך אם בוש ינסה לסגת מההחלטה, או להעלות חליפיות עלול הדבר לפגוע באמינותה של הארץ בעיני הערבים. עד כאן מהשיחה.

4. אודה על חסיון המקור והמידע.

כהן

להלן מאנקרה נר 42 מ-110991

אל: מזת 1 ממד

מאת: הממונה אנקרה

פעולה תורכית נגד בסיסים בבקאע .

1. ב - 11/9 בשעה 1615 טלפנה אלי ניקול POPE כתבת לה מונד מאסטנבול ושאלה אם שלטונות תורכיה פנו לישראל בקשר לאפשרות שיתקפו

בסיסים של PKK בבקאע . השבתי כי לא ידוע לי על דבר כזה .

המשיכה ושאלה מה תהיה תגובת ישראל במקרה שהתורכים יתקפו בסיסי PKK בבקאע כפי שפעלו בעיראק . השבתי כי אינני יכול להשיב לה על שאלות היפוטטיות כאלה .

2. אינני יודע מה מלמדות שאלות אלה אולם הריני מביא אותן לידיעתכם .

אורי גורדון .

להלן מושינגטון נר 95 מ-110991

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: ערבויות - תקשורת 11.9

1. בעקבות הדיונים אתמול בקונגרס, ובעקבות התייעצויות הממשל עם אנשי המפתח בסנט, זוכה שוב הנושא לדיווחים ומאמרים רבים בעתונים היום. רבייתם, הדגשה על "אי-התלהבות" הקונגרס לתמוך בבקשת הממשל לדחות הדיון בבקשת ישראל לערבויות. כמו כן, פרטים על מכתב הנשיא בוש למנהיגי הקונגרס והצעתו בת "שש הנקודות". להלן המאמרים העיקריים:

2. WP - דווח ג'ון גושקו על הדיונים אתמול בקאוקוס הרפובליקני שם, לדברי מקורות, אף סנטור לא דיבר בזכות בקשת הדחיה של הנשיא בוש, על פגישת הנשיא אתמול עם הסנטורים קסטן, אינווה ולייהי, והערכות "תומכי ישראל" (קרי - הלובי) כי בין 65-80 סנטורים מוכנים לדחות בקשת הממשל, קרי לצדד בבקשת ישראל לדיון עכשיו בערבויות. עוד אצל גושקו - פרטים על הצעת הנשיא ("שש הנקודות") לדחות הדיון, ובתמורה יבטיח הממשל: מחויבותו לסייע בקליטת העליה, לא תהיה דחיה נוספת, מעבר ל- 120 יום, יסייע במציאת "מכשיר חקיקתי" מתאים לבקשת הערבויות, יפנה למדינות אחרות שתסייענה אף הן בקליטת העליה, תמצא נוסחה מתאימה לאחוז SCORING מינימלי. עפ"י הדווח, נוסחה זו אינה קבילה על ישראל ועל ידידיה ותומכיה.

3. NYT - דווח דומה של אדם קליימר, המוסיף מדבריו של סנטור קסטן לפיהם הניע (קסטן) לנשיא לשקול דחיה של 14 יום בלבד בדיון, אולם הדגיש כי זונתו להציג לשון החקיקה לבקשת הערבויות כבר עתה (כפי שאכן נעשה אמש. ר. י.). כמו כן בדווח, פרטים מהודעת אובי לעתונות - התומך בבקשת הנשיא, ודברי סנטור דול כי ייתמוך אף הוא בנשיא.

4. WP - טור של אבנס ונובאק: "מלחמת בוש בישראל". בוש יודע כי אסור לו להפסיד המלחמה עם ישראל בקונגרס, לא רק בגלל סכויי ועידת השלום, אלא גם בגלל המשמעות למעמדו בקונגרס, ויותר מכך למעמדה ויכולתה של ישראל להשפיע בקונגרס על כמה סיוע מכספי המיסים האמריקניים יינתן לה. עוד בטור על הרגשות האנטי-ישראליים הגואים בממשל עד כדי "סיכון אמיתי" ליחסים המיוחדים בין ישראל לארה"ב, כדברי פקיד בבית הלבן שנחשב אוהד ישראל. לדברי הצמד, בוש מבקש להציג את שמיר בפני מעין "ניצחון פירוס" - גם אם תנצח בקרב על הערבויות, תפסיד המערכה בצבוריות האמריקנית. לדברי פקידים בממשל, יועצי הנשיא כועסים על התבטאויות רוח"מ בסוף השבוע אודות המשך ההתנחלויות, והסכנה לאפשרות קיום ועידת השלום. הנימה העויינת של אבנס ונובאק שוב באה לידי בטוי באזכורים על תוכנית ההתיישבות של שר השיכון - הממומנת בחלקה ע"י משלם המיסים האמריקני (שלושה בליון בשנה), על ידידי ישראל בקונגרס ש"דאגו" שישראל תקבל סיוע חרום - בדמות כסף ומצבורי דלק

לשעת חרום - בזמן מלחמת המפרץ ועוד. לסיום, חובה על בוש לנצח במלחמה זו בקונגרס כדי לשמור על מעמדו כמי שמכתיב מדיניות החוץ האמריקנית.

5. עוד ב-WP מודעה גדולה (רבע עמוד) של הליגה הערבית נגד השמצה הקוראת לצבור האמריקני להתקשר לנבחריהם ולהביע עמדתם נגד "עוד עשרה בליון דולר סיוע לישראל" ובעד שימוש בכסף לצרכים פנימיים אמריקניים.

6. בשאר העתונים (BS, WT וכו') - דווחים כבסעיפים 2-3. המאמרים נשלחים אליכם בנפרד.

רות ירון

עד כאן.

קשר ים

תפוצה: @ (רהמ)

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 10968

אל: רהמש/534

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 156, תא: 120991, זח: 2129, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבבב

9,244448

שמור/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

בייקר - תהליך וערכויות

להלן משיחות עם מספר כתבים מדיניים הנלווים למזכיר בייקר בנסיעתו ושהתקשרו ממוסקבה (הערה: כל השיחות היו לפני חוזר לפני מסהע"ת של של הנשיא):

א. המסר המועבר לכתבים - מפמליית המזכיר הוא כי דעתם אינה נוחה כלל מה"משבר" שנוצר בימים האחרונים סביב עניין הערכויות. אישית, המזכיר מרגיש שה"עסק מתפוצץ לו בפנים" ומאחר והוא זה הנושא והנותן עם ישראל והצדדים - הוא עלול להיות הנפגע הראשי.

ב. גם לגופו של עניין, בפמליית המזכיר סוברים שאין זה נכון טקטית ל"פוצץ" העניין על נושא הערכויות. בייקר, כפרגמטיסט, היה מעדיף להשתמש ב-POLITICAL CAPITAL של הממשל רק כשישבו הצדדים לשולחן המו"מ ורק בהקשר לתהליך השלום. שימוש בכוחו הפוליטי של הממשל בהקשר הערכויות מתקבל כ"בזבוז הון פוליטי".

ג. בשיחת רקע עם הכתבים אמש (11.9) אמר המזכיר כי טרם דיבר עם הסובייטים על נוסח ההזמנה לועידת השלום, אך בדעתו עוד לשוחח בעניין עם פונקין ואולי גם עם גורבצ'וב. סיפר שלצורך כך קבע למחר (13.9) בבוקר פגישה (שלא הייתה מתוכננת במקור) עם שה"ח פונקין, ואולי ייפגש גם עם גורבצ'וב בנדון.

ד. המזכיר היה עסוק לאורך כל הנסיעה במטוס ובתחנות הביניים (כולל עכוב הטיסה בשאנון בגלל זה) בשיחות טלפון בעניין הישראלי, עם הנשיא בעיקר. למרות העיסוק הגדול שלו בנושא - סירב המזכיר לדבר עם הכתבים על העניין הישראלי. עד כדי כך שבמהלך הטיסה סירב בהתחלה המזכיר לצאת ולתדרך הכתבים מחשש שישאלו אותו על ה"עניין הישראלי". רק לאחר שהופעל מצד הכתבים לחץ על טטוילר ורק לאחר שזו סיכמה עמם כי לא תשאל אף שאלה בעניין הישראלי, ניאות המזכיר לתדרכם בנושא הסובייטי.

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין,
מזאר1, רביב, מעת, הסברה, מקצב2, @ (לעמ)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10828

אל: רהמש/ 517

מ-: המשרד, תא: 120991, זח: 2205, דח: ב, סג: בל,

בבב

9,244448

117663

בלמ'ס/בהול

א ל: ושינגטון וכל הקונסוליות בארה"ב - בהול

ד ע: כל הנציגויות - מידי

הנדון: הודעת סגן רה"מ ושה"ח

ישראל יזמה ופעלה לקידום תהליך השלום ללא כל קשר לנושא הערבויות ומזכיר המדינה האמריקאי בביקורו האחרון בארץ הגדיר את עמדת ישראל כ'חיובית ביותר'.

מאז הוגשה בקשתנו לא היתה כל זיקה בינה לבין תהליך השלום. אף נענינו לבקשת הממשל בזמנו לדחיית הגשת הבקשה מחודש מרץ לספטמבר מתוך אותו רצון לשתוף פעולה.

קליטת העליה היא נושא הומניטרי נעלה והערבויות חיוניות לקליטה מוצלחת של מאות אלפי עולים. פניה של ישראל אינן לעימות עם ארה"ב, בת בריחה, כשם שבקשתנו לערבויות אינה התגרות בגורם כלשהו ולא בלם בקידום תהליך השלום.

אנו צופים לביקורו של מזכיר המדינה ביום שני הקרוב כדי להמשיך ולדון עמו בסוגיות שעומדות על הפרק ברוח ההבנה והידידות המאפיינת את יחסי ישראל
ארה"ב.

מצפ"א

12 בספטמבר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצרים,

מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, מזאר, ארבל²,

ארבל¹, הדרכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר¹, איר²,

@ (לעמ), מקצב², אומן, פרנ, מחע, משקוף, חליפה, בטמח, כספים, משפט

אאא, חוזם: 10828

אל: רהמש/517

מ-: המשרד, תא: 120991, זח: 2205, דח: ב, סג: בל,

בבב

9,244448

117663

בלמ'ס/בהול

א ל: ושינגטון וכל הקונסוליות בארה'ב - בהול

ד ע: כל הנציגויות - מידי

הנדון: הודעת סגן רה'מ ושה'ח

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מצפ'א

12 בספטמבר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצרים,

מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, מזאר, ארבל2,

ארבל1, הדרכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר1, איר2,

@ (לעמ), מקצב2, אומן, פרנ, מחע, משקוף, חליפה, בטמח, כספים, משפט

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11017

אל: רהמש/538

מ-: ווש, נר: 2040, תא: 120991, זח: 2230, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מיד

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

דע: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ, יועצת תקשורת שה'ח, יועץ תקשורת רוה'מ

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

ערביות

להלן מכתב שהשתתף בשיחה שנחן היועץ סקורופט באחד ממכוני המחקר ביום שישי בערב (10.9). השיחה כולה היתה OFF RECORD ונכחו בה אנשי ממשל לשעבר, אנשי אקדמיה ורק שני עתונאים:

א. סקורופט שנשאל בענין הערביות אמר כי רוה'מ שמיר הפך הנושא לעמות אישי בינו ובין הנשיא, ולכן גם אנחנו נהפוך זאת לאישי.

ב. אמר לגבי הערביות שהדיון בנושא בקשת ישראל לא ייתקדם עד שתושג מחויבות ישראלית להפסקה (כליל) של ההתנחלויות ונכונות לדון בנסיגה מהשטחים. כל דיון על הערביות WILL BOOMERANG על תהליך השלום.

ג. הדגיש כי הנשיא נחוש בדעתו לדחות הדיון בנושא עד ינואר AND THERE WILL BE NO COMPROMISE ON THAT

ד. בהתייחסו לאש'פ אמר סקורופט כי עראפת עשה כל הטעויות האפשריות התייצב כל הזמן בצד הלא-נכון (סאדם, ייאנאייב) ובכך גרם נזק רב לענין הפלסטיני.

הערה: מאוד מבקשת לא להוציא המידע החוצה. מאחר ונכחו בתדרוך רק שני כתבים, ושניהם ידידים, העקבות תהיינה ברורות, ,,,,אנא.

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11017

אל: רהמש/538

מ-: ווש, נר: 2040, תא: 120991, זח: 2230, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"נ, יועצת תקשורת שה"ח, יועץ תקשורת רוה"מ

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

ערבויות

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השיחה כולה היתה OFF RECORD ונכחו בה אנשי ממשל לשעבר, אנשי אקדמיה ורק שני עתונאים:

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כל דיון על הערבויות WILL BOOMERANG על תהליך השלום.

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רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 10969

אל: רהמש/535

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 157, תא: 120991, זח: 2129, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבבב

שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: מצפ"א; תפוצות; הסברה;

ערביות

ה- FLY-IN לווינגטון של הקהילות היהודיות בארה"ב שנערך היום הוכתר בהצלחה רבה. השתתפו כ- 1200 מקהילות ב- 40 מדינות ברחבי ארה"ב. המשתתפים תרמו ע"י השגריר ומנכ"ל איפא"ק ואח"כ יצאו לפגישות בגבעה. משיחות עם רבים מהמשתתפים התרשמנו שפעילותם המתואמת של הארגונים היהודיים, במשך חודשים, חיזקו את אמונתם בכוחה של הקהילה היהודית וראייתם את המערכה הנוכחית כהמשך המערכה לזכות היציאה החופשית מבריה"מ. מאידך, אין הקהילות מעוניינות בעימות עם הנשיא. מתגובות ראשונות לאחר הפגישות התרשמנו שאורגנו כהלכה, והנוכחות מהקהילות הרשימה (גם את הנשיא שהתייחס לכך במסיבת העתונאים שלו). בפגישות עם שני הסנטורים מורג'יניה, למשל, השתתפו כ- 180 איש.

שאלה שחזרה ונשאלה ע"י חברי הקונגרס היתה לסיבת ההתנגדות לדחיה ומה הנזק שיגרם לישראל מדחיה של ארבעה חודשים. נבריק השלמות מחר.

פלג

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, בן אבו, תפוצות, רביב, הסברה

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10816

אל: רהמש/516

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 141, תא: 120991, זח: 1530, דח: ב, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/בהול - להזעיק

א ל: לשכת שה"ח - בהול להזעיק

ד ע: לשכת רוה"מ, תפוצת תקשורת, קונכ"לים-בהול

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: דברי הנשיא בוש במסיבת עתונאים בנושא הערכויות

NEWS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON, DC, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, SINCE THE END OF THE GULF WAR, WE'VE WORKED EXTREMELY HARD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF WHAT WE BELIEVE ARE NEW AND EXCITING POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER HAS TRAVELED TO THE REGION ABOUT A HALF A DOZEN TIMES, AND WILL GO AGAIN IN A FEW DAYS. AS A RESULT OF THESE EFFORTS, WE'RE ON THE BRINK OF AN HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH. WE'VE COME A LONG, LONG WAY. AND WE'RE CLOSE TO BEING ABLE TO CONVENE A PEACE CONFERENCE THAT, IN TURN, WOULD LAUNCH DIRECT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES, SOMETHING THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAS SOUGHT SINCE ITS INCEPTION.

A FEW DAYS AGO, I ASKED CONGRESS TO DEFER CONSIDERATION FOR 120 DAYS OF ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR DOLLAR 10 BILLION IN ADDITIONAL US LO GUARANTEES MEANT TO HELP ISRAEL ABSORB ITS MANY NEW IMMIGRANTS. I DID SO IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE. I DID SO BECAUSE WE MUST AVOID A CONTENTIOUS DEBATE THAT WOULD RAISE A HOST OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, ISSUES SO SENSITIVE THAT A DEBATE NOW COULD WELL DESTROY OUR ABILITY TO BRING ONE OR MORE OF THE PARTIES TO THE PEACE TABLE.

A GOOD DEAL OF CONFUSION SURROUNDS THIS REQUEST FOR DEFERRAL, CONFUSION THAT I'D LIKE TO TRY TO CLEAR UP. LET ME BEGIN BY MAKING CLEAR WHAT MY REQUEST FOR DELAY IS NOT ABOUT.

IT'S NOT ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF MY OR THIS COUNTRY'S SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL. BOTH AS VICE-PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT, I'VE TRIED MY HARDEST TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO LIBERATE JEWS LIVING IN ETHIOPIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT THEY COULD IMMIGRATE TO ISRAEL.

TODAY IN NO SMALL PART DUE TO AMERICAN EFFORTS, HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE ARE NOW LIVING IN ISRAEL, ABLE AT LAST TO LIVE FREE OF FEAR, FREE TO PRACTICE THEIR FAITH; NOR SHOULD OUR REQUEST FOR DELAY BE VIEWED AS AN INDICATION THAT THERE EXISTS ANY QUESTION IN MY MIND ABOUT THE NEED FOR A STRONG AND SECURE ISRAEL. FOR MORE THAN 40 YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ISRAEL'S CLOSEST FRIEND IN THE WORLD. AND THIS REMAINS THE CASE AND WILL AS LONG AS I AM PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS A FRIENDSHIP BACKED UP WITH REAL SUPPORT.

JUST MONTHS AGO, AMERICAN MEN AND WOMEN IN UNIFORM RISKED THEIR LIVES TO DEFEND ISRAELIS IN THE FACE OF IRAQI SCUD MISSILES, AND INDEED, DESERT STORM, WHILE WINNING A WAR AGAINST AGGRESSION, ALSO ACHIEVED THE DEFEAT OF ISRAEL'S MOST DANGEROUS ADVERSARY. AND DURING THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR ALONE, AND DESPITE OUR OWN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE UNITED STATES PROVIDED ISRAEL WITH MORE THAN DOLLAR 4 BILLION IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID, NEARLY DOLLAR 1,000 FOR EVERY ISRAELI MAN, WOMAN, AND CHILD, AS WELL AS WITH DOLLAR 400 MILLION IN LOAN GUARANTEES TO FACILITATE IMMIGRANT ABSORPTION.

MY REQUEST THAT CONGRESS DELAY CONSIDERATION OF THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR DOLLAR 10 BILLION IN NEW LOAN GUARANTEES TO SUPPORT IMMIGRANT ABSORPTION IS ABOUT PEACE. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THE VISION OF ISRAELIS SITTING WITH THEIR ARAB NEIGHBORS TO TALK PEACE IS A REAL PROSPECT. NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE THAT MIGHT INTERFERE WITH THIS PROSPECT. AND IF NECESSARY, I WILL USE MY VETO POWER TO PREVENT THAT FROM HAPPENING. PEACE IS WHAT THESE NEW IMMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL AND, INDEED, ALL ISRAELIS LONG FOR. THEIR CHANCE FOR A DECENT JOB, A DECENT LIFE DEPENDS ON IT. IT IS OUR GOAL TO SUPPORT THE WELFARE OF THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND TO HAVE PEACE, NOT TO CHOOSE ONE HUMANITARIAN GOAL AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER.

LET ME END WITH JUST ONE FINAL POINT. THE CONSTITUTION CHARGES THE PRESIDENT WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY. AND DURING DESERT SHIELD AND THEN DESERT STORM, I CAME BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AS PRESIDENT, ASKING FOR THE LATITUDE TO DO WHAT WAS RIGHT AND NECESSARY. A GOOD MANY SINCERE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, OF BOTH PARTIES, DISAGREED AT THE TIME. AND NOW AGAIN THERE IS AN ATTEMPT BY SOME IN THE CONGRESS TO PREVENT THE PRESIDENT FROM TAKING STEPS CENTRAL TO THE NATION'S SECURITY. BUT TOO MUCH IS AT STAKE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICS TO TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER PEACE. THIS I KNOW IS SOMETHING THE BULK OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE UNDERSTAND.

AND I'M ASKING THE CONGRESS TO POSTPONE THIS QUESTION FOR 120 DAYS. THIS POSTPONEMENT IS NOT MEANT TO PREJUDICE IN ANY WAY WHAT WE WOULD DO COME JANUARY. AND I'M ASKING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SUPPORT ME IN THIS REQUEST. QUITE SIMPLY, A 120-DAY DELAY IS NOT TOO MUCH FOR A PRESIDENT TO ASK FOR WITH SO MUCH IN THE BALANCE. WE MUST GIVE PEACE A CHANCE, WE MUST GIVE PEACE EVERY CHANCE.

AND NOW I'D BE GLAD TO TAKE A FEW QUESTIONS.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT DO YOU SAY TO PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE THAT IF THERE IS AID MONEY AVAILABLE, THAT IT BEST BE SPENT ON THE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS WHO ARE WITHOUT JOBS AND ARE DISADVANTAGED?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, THAT IS A QUESTION THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SEEM TO BE RAISING MORE AND MORE ABOUT FOREIGN AID. BUT MY VIEW IS, WE MUST DO WHAT WE CAN TO FACILITATE THIS PEACE PROCESS. IN THE LONG RUN, THAT IS NOT ONLY IN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST BUT I THINK IT WOULD PROVE TO BE IN THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL. SO, I DON'T THINK THAT THESE TWO NEED TO BE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

Q WELL, DO YOU THINK YOU ARE GOING TO DO MORE AND MORE FOR THE AMERICANS WHO ARE WITHOUT JOBS NOW AND WHO ARE REALLY POVERTY STRICKEN?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE THIS ECONOMY MOVE, AND I THINK THAT, OF COURSE, IS BY FAR THE BEST ANSWER TO JOBS. JOBS CREATED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DON'T LAST; JOBS CREATED BY A REINVIGORATED PRIVATE SECTOR DO, AND THAT'S WHY I WOULD HOPE THAT OUR GROWTH PACKAGE THAT WE HAVE THERE CAN BE MOVED ON.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, ISRAEL YESTERDAY RELEASED 51 ARAB PRISONERS, AND THE SHIITE MOSLEM KIDNAPPERS SAY THAT THEY SUPPORT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE HOSTAGE ORDEAL. WHAT'S YOUR READING OF THIS SITUATION? AND IS THERE ANYTHING THAT THE STATES CAN DO TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NOT DIRECTLY. I WAS VERY PLEASED, THOUGH, AT THE RELEASE OF THOSE PRISONERS. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WITH MR. PICCO OF HIS OFFICE, ALSO, WHO IS DOING A VERY GOOD JOB. AND AGAIN, WE'RE BACK WHERE WE WERE A MONTH AGO: "HOW OPTIMISTIC IS THE PRESIDENT, HOW OPTIMISTIC IS THE CONGRESS ABOUT THE RELEASE OF THESE PRISONERS?" AND ONCE AGAIN I'M GOING TO RESIST QUANTIFYING MY OPTIMISM, BUT I THINK THIS RECENT DEVELOPMENT IS BOUND TO BE VIEWED, PROPERLY, AS VERY, VERY FAVORABLE.

Q DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE RELEASE OF A HOSTAGE IS IMMINENT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I CAN'T -- I DON'T WANT TO PUT TERMS ON IT. I MEAN, I KNOW THAT THERE WAS A FEELING A MONTH AGO -- I REMEMBER IT VERY WELL -- THAT HOSTAGE RELEASE IS IMMINENT, AND SURE ENOUGH, THANK HEAVENS, A RELEASE DID TAKE PLACE. BUT I JUST AM GOING TO RESIST, TERRY, IF YOU'LL PERMIT ME NOT TO GO INTO HOW OPTIMISTIC OR MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC OR WHATEVER THAT I AM.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, TO CHANGE THE SUBJECT YET AGAIN, JUDGE THOMAS HAS TOLD THE SENATE COMMITTEE THAT HE HAS NEVER EXPRESSED AN OPINION ABOUT ROE V. WADE, THAT HE HAS NO OPINION -- (INAUDIBLE) -- ON ONE OF THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL

LEGAL ISSUES IN THE COUNTRY. FIRST OF ALL, DO YOU FIND THAT CREDIBLE AND, SECONDLY, DO YOU FIND THAT SOMETHING THAT COMMENDS HIM FURTHER TO BE A JUSTICE ON THE SUPREME COURT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK IT'S A QUESTION FOR THE SENATE TO DECIDE AND I THINK HE IS HANDLING HIMSELF VERY, VERY WELL. AND IF YOU LOOK BACK TO OTHER PEOPLE THAT HAVE APPEARED BEFORE THE COURT (SIC), THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME SIMILARITY IN WANTING TO STAY AWAY FROM PREJUDGING CASES. SO HE HAS MY FULL SUPPORT. I THINK HE'S DOING A BEAUTIFUL JOB UP THERE AND I -- AGAIN, I DON'T QUANTIFY EVERYTHING -- BUT I FEEL MORE CONFIDENT THAN EVER THAT HE WILL BE CONFIRMED, AND I THINK THAT'S BECAUSE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SEE THAT HE SHOULD BE.

Q ARE YOU SURPRISED THAT HE SAYS HE HAS ABSOLUTELY NO OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I THINK HE'S HANDLING HIMSELF VERY, VERY WELL.

Q BACK ON THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI LOAN GUARANTEES, EVEN MANY OF YOUR REPUBLICAN SUPPORTERS ON THE HILL SAY THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE HAD THIS MONEY A LONG TIME AGO AND THEY DON'T SUPPORT THE 120-DAY DELAY THAT YOU'RE ASKING FOR. IS THERE ANY KIND OF COMPROMISE, IS THERE ANY KIND OF MIDDLE GROUND? YOU SOUND VERY TOUGH TODAY ON WANTING TO HOLD TO THAT 120 DAYS.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I JUST SOUND PRINCIPLED. I'M CONVINCED THAT THIS DEBATE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO PEACE AND I OWE IT TO THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO SAY IT AS FORCEFULLY AS I CAN. I'VE WORN OUT THE TELEPHONE IN THERE AND ONE EAR AND I'M GOING TO MOVE OVER TO THE OTHER EAR AND KEEP ON IT, BECAUSE THIS IS -- PEACE IS VITAL HERE AND WE'VE WORKED TOO HARD TO HAVE THAT REQUEST OF MY MINE DENIED. AND I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT ME. THEY KNOW WE SUPPORT ISRAEL. I'VE JUST DETAILED SOME OF WHAT WE'VE DONE. SO THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. I AM GIVING THE CONGRESS -- AND DID IT WITH THE LEADERS TODAY, HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY HERE, THANK YOU, TO DO IT HERE TO GIVE MY BEST JUDGMENT. AND I'M UP AGAINST SOME POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCES, BUT I OWE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO TELL THEM HOW STRONGLY I FEEL ABOUT DEFERRAL.

Q ARE THOSE POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCES UNGRATEFUL FOR WHAT YOU'VE DONE SO FAR IN A PEACE PROCESS AND WHY DOESN'T THE PEACE ARGUMENT SELL WITH THEM?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK IT WILL SELL, BUT IT'S TAKING A LITTLE TIME. AND WE'RE UP AGAINST VERY STRONG AND EFFECTIVE, SOMETIMES, GROUPS THAT GO UP TO THE HILL. I HEARD TODAY THERE WERE SOMETHING LIKE A THOUSAND LOBBYISTS ON THE HILL WORKING THE OTHER SIDE OF THE QUESTION. WE'VE GOT ONE LONELY LITTLE GUY DOWN HERE DOING IT. (LAUGHTER.) SO, HOWEVER, I LIKE THIS FORUM BETTER, TOO.

Q (INAUDIBLE) -- GRATEFUL FOR WHAT YOU'RE TRYING TO DO?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER -- I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT GRATITUDE. I'M TALKING ABOUT WORLD PEACE. AND WE'VE GOT TO GET IT INTO A FAR BROADER PERSPECTIVE, AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT. AND I THINK PEOPLE WILL UNDERSTAND THAT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU SAID THAT A CONTENTIOUS DEBATE NOW COULD ACTUALLY KEEP SOME PARTIES AWAY FROM THE PEACE TABLE, YET THE ISRAELIS CLAIM THAT THOSE ARABS WHO HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PEACE PROCESS HAVE NOT MADE THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE A PRECONDITION. THEY SAY THAT'S YOUR PRECONDITION. AS ONE COLUMNIST SAID THIS WEEK, IT'S YOUR OBSESSION. IS THAT FAIR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I WOULD SIMPLY SAY THAT I READ SOME CHARGES COMING OUT OF A SOURCE IN ISRAEL THAT WE'D MADE A DEAL WITH THE ARABS THAT WE WOULD FIGHT THIS. THAT'S NOT TRUE. THAT IS FACTUALLY INCORRECT, SIMPLY NOT TRUE. NO, IT IS MY JUDGMENT, AND JIM'S, AND EVERYBODY ELSE'S WORKING THIS PROBLEM, AND HAS BEEN FOR MONTHS, THAT THIS IS THE APPROACH WE OUGHT TO TAKE. BECAUSE WE DON'T WANT A CONTENTIOUS DEBATE ON SETTLEMENTS OR ANYTHING ELSE OVER THERE AT THIS JUNCTURE. WE WANT TO GET THESE PARTIES TO THE TABLE. AND I DON'T THINK IT'S ASKING TOO MUCH TO HAVE A 120-DAY DELAY. I THINK CONGRESS SHOULD LISTEN CAREFULLY TO WHAT I'M ASKING FOR, AND I HOPE THAT THEY WILL GO ALONG WITH THIS.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU TALKED ABOUT POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCES AT WORK. IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU'RE FEELING THE HEAT FROM THE ISRAELI LOBBY. DO YOU THINK THAT THERE'S UNFAIR FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE US POLITICAL PROCESS HERE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO. I DON'T THINK -- I THINK EVERYBODY OUGHT TO FIGHT FOR WHAT THEY BELIEVE IN. THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT I'M BEGINNING TO DO RIGHT HERE. WE'VE LAID BACK DOWN. WE'VE BEEN LYING IN THE WEEDS, SAYING LET'S NOT GET ALL THIS DEBATE -- THESE DEBATE SUBJECTS GOING. THE BEST THING FOR PEACE IS TO MOVE -- TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD IS TO JUST HAVE THIS DEFERRAL. BUT I'M GOING TO FIGHT FOR WHAT I BELIEVE, AND IT MAY BE POPULAR POLITICALLY BUT PROBABLY IT'S NOT. BUT THAT'S NOT THE QUESTION HERE, THAT'S NOT THE QUESTION, IS WHETHER IT'S GOOD 1992 POLITICS. WHAT'S IMPORTANT HERE IS THAT WE GIVE THIS PROCESS A CHANCE. AND I DON'T CARE IF I GET ONE VOTE, I'M GOING TO STAND FOR WHAT I BELIEVE HERE, AND I BELIEVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL BE WITH ME, IF WE PUT IT ON THIS QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE. AND NOBODY HAS BETTER -- BEEN A BETTER FRIEND TO ISRAEL THAN THE UNITED STATES, AND NO ONE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A BETTER FRIEND THAN THE UNITED STATES. BUT HERE, WE ARE SIMPLY ASKING FOR A 120-DAY DEFERRAL AND THAT'S WHAT MOTIVATES ME, IT ISN'T ANYTHING TO DO WITH LOBBIES OR POLITICS OR ANYTHING ELSE.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, JUST HOW MUCH DAMAGE IS BEING CAUSED BY THIS SHOWDOWN?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY DAMAGE. LAWSIE, WE'LL BE DEBATING SOMETHING ELSE TOMORROW. BUT I THINK THIS ONE'S VERY IMPORTANT, AND THAT'S WHY I WANT TO BE SURE THAT OUR POSITION IS OUT THERE. I'M NOT ONLY HALF IN JEST ABOUT WHAT'S HAPPENING UP THERE ON THE HILL. LISTEN, THERE'S A TREMENDOUS EFFORT GOING ON, AND WE HAVE HAD A LOW PROFILE ON THIS. AND I WAKE UP NOW AND SEE THAT WE BETTER GET OUT MESSAGE OUT, LOUD AND CLEAR.

Q BUT DOES THIS STRAIN ITSELF THREATEN THE PEACE PROCESS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PEACE PROCESS, IN MY VIEW. I MEAN, IF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN -- THE RESULT WAS WHAT WOULD STRAIN IT, NOT THE --

Q ISN'T THERE A LOSS OF TRUST, THERE? I MEAN, DO THE ISRAELIS TRUST YOU AS MUCH AS THEY DID?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, YOU'D HAVE TO ASK THE ISRAELIS THAT. I CAN'T TELL YOU ABOUT THAT. ALL I'M DOING IS EXPRESSING THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. AND WE'RE GOING TO SAY WHAT WE THINK IS BEST; IF THEY AGREE, FINE. THEY'VE GOT TO WORRY ABOUT THEIR PRIORITIES. BUT I THINK MANY PEOPLE THERE WANT TO SEE THIS PEACE PROCESS GO FORWARD. THE POLLING NUMBERS IN ISRAEL ARE OVERWHELMING IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE PROCESS. AND SO, WHAT I'M TRYING TO SAY IS LISTEN, TO THE DEGREE AMERICA'S JUDGMENT AND LEADERSHIP MATTERS, LISTEN TO WHAT WE SAY, HOW STRONGLY WE FEEL ABOUT THIS. AND I THINK THE PEOPLE THERE WILL RESPOND. I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL RESPOND.

Q -- TO THE ISRAELIS AND TO THE CONGRESS THAT IN THE EVENT THE DELAY IS ACCEDED TO, THAT YOU WILL SUPPORT THE LOAN GUARANTEE UNEQUIVOCALLY AND WITH NO FURTHER CONDITION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WHAT WAS THAT?

Q HAVE YOU MADE A COMMITMENT TO THE ISRAELIS AND TO THEIR SUPPORTERS IN THE CONGRESS THAT IF THEY AGREE TO THE DELAY THAT THEY WILL -- THAT YOU WILL THEN SUPPORT THE LOAN --

PRESIDENT BUSH: ABSOLUTELY NOT. THAT WOULD UNDERMINE EVERYTHING. I HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE QUESTION BE CONSIDERED IN 120 DAYS WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION ON OUR PART AND THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE CONCEPT OF ABSORPTION AID, A PRINCIPLE THAT WE BACKED UP BY DOLLAR 400 MILLION THIS YEAR, WILL STILL BE A VALID PRINCIPLE. BUT TO AGREE TO SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE WOULD BE JUST THE SAME, IF I FEEL IT IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS AS PRESENTED NOW, THAT KIND OF AGREEMENT WOULD BE EQUALLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

I REALLY AM GOING TO HAVE TO RUN. YEAH, CHARLES, AND THEN I AM GOING TO PHILADELPHIA HERE IN A MINUTE AND THEN I'VE GOT SOMETHING ELSE I'VE GOT TO DO BEFORE I GO THERE.

Q WHAT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: DOMESTIC AGENDA.

Q ISRAEL WANTS THIS PEACE CONFERENCE AS MUCH AS YOU DO AND YET IT'S ISRAEL THAT SUBMITTED THIS REQUEST TO YOU. HAVE THEY PUT YOU IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND DOES THIS SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THEIR LESS THAN GENUINE INTEREST?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL YOU CAN'T JUDGE BY STATEMENTS FROM ONE OR ANOTHER IN THE CABINET IN ISRAEL. YOU HAVE GOT TO LOOK AT THE WHOLE PICTURE. AND THERE HAVE BEEN SOME DISQUIETING STATEMENTS BY ONE RATHER FLAMBOYANT MINISTER THAT I AM SORRY I DIDN'T GET ASKED ABOUT BECAUSE I HAVE JUST BEEN ACHING TO ANSWER THE QUESTION. BUT WE ARE NOT -- I AM NOT GOING TO ANSWER ANYMORE -- BUT I AM JUST SIMPLY SAYING WE ARE NOT JUDGING IT ON A STATEMENT HERE OR THERE. I TAKE THE PRIME MINISTER AT HIS WORD WHEN HE SAYS THAT THEY FEEL IT'S IN THEIR INTEREST TO HAVE A PEACE CONFERENCE AND IT HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY DECISION FOR HIM, BUT HE HAS TAKEN THAT DECISION AND TO HIS CREDIT HE REAFFIRMED THEIR INTEREST IN THE PEACE PROCESS JUST LESS THAN 48 HOURS AGO.

SO THOSE ARE THE STATEMENTS THAT WE OUGHT TO LOOK AT AND IN THAT ONE, WHY I WAS QUITE REASSURED. BUT AGAIN, CHARLES, WE ARE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE HAVE GOT OUR POLICY. WE SHOULD SAY CLEARLY WHAT OUR POLICY IS AND I WANT THIS PEACE PROCESS TO HAPPEN. I WANT THE ISRAELIS TO DO THAT WHICH THEY WANTED ALL ALONG, HAVE A CHANCE TO SIT DOWN ONE-ON-ONE WITH HISTORIC ADVERSARIES AND I WANT THE ARABS TO HAVE A CHANCE TO GET THIS QUESTION SETTLED ONCE AND FOR ALL, AND I REALLY BELIEVE THE WHOLE WORLD WANTS THAT, AND IT IS MY BEST JUDGMENT THAT AN RANCOROUS DEBATE NOW IS LITERALLY MINISCULE IN IMPORTANCE COMPARED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF PEACE AND THAT'S -- WE OUGHT TO SET IT BACK 120 DAYS ONLY, WHO IS GOING TO GET HURT? WHAT POSSIBLY COULD WORK AGAINST -- AGAINST THAT REASONABLE REQUEST FROM AN ADMINISTRATION THAT'S BROUGHT THIS THING FROM SQUARE ONE RIGHT UP TO A PEAK THAT NOBODY REALLY BELIEVED WE COULD ACHIEVE; GETTING THESE COUNTRIES TOGETHER, AND THE WORK THAT'S GONE INTO IT. I JUST DON'T WANT TO RISK IT BY US TAKING SOME STAND IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AGAINST A REQUEST BY THE PRESIDENT IN ORDER TO SATISFY SOME OTHER INTEREST.

WE'VE GOT TO KEEP OUR SIGHTS ON THE BROAD PICTURE OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND I WOULD SAY THAT INCLUDES WORLD PEACE. THEY'RE SO CLOSELY INTERLOCKED WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HOW THEY SPILL OVER INTO EUROPE AND TO ASIA, INTO THE SOVIET UNION STILL. SO WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A MAJOR CHANCE NOW FOR ONE MORE TREMENDOUS STEP TOWARDS PEACE. WE'VE SEEN THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION, WE'VE SEEN THE DEFEAT OF AGGRESSION OVER THERE IN IRAQ, WE'VE SEEN DEMOCRACY ON THE MOVE IN OUR HEMISPHERE. AND HERE IS A LAST PLACE THAT REALLY NEEDS THIS PEACE PROCESS TO GO FORWARD.

Q SIR, JUST A QUICK FOLLOW-UP WAS, IF THIS GOES THROUGH, WHICH ARABS COULD YOU NO LONGER COUNT ON?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT GOING TO DEFINE THAT AT ALL. IT'S JUST OUR JUDGMENT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS. I CAN'T HELP YOU WITH THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY.

Q MR. PRESIDENT -- MR. PRESIDENT, NEXT WEEK YOU HAVE ANOTHER SOMEWHAT CONTROVERSIAL NOMINEE GOING TO HEARING -- THE ROBERT GATES CIA NOMINATION. DO YOU -- ARE YOU STILL CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL BE CONFIRMED? IS THERE ANY CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO WITHDRAWAL?

PRESIDENT BUSH: ABSOLUTELY NO CONSIDERATION TO WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE THERE'S NO REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL. I DON'T SEE -- I'M NOT SURE HOW CONTROVERSIAL THIS NOMINATION WILL BE. WHEN THE FACTS ARE OUT THERE -- AND THE COMMITTEE ARE GOING TO DEAL WITH IT, IN MY VIEW, IN EXTRAORDINARILY GOOD FAITH. I'VE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO THE CHAIRMAN, THE RANKING MEMBER, OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. AND I THINK THAT A LOT OF THESE KIND OF FEATHERY CHARGES THAT ARE FLOATING OUT THERE ARE NONSENSE. AND I THINK THE PROCESS WILL BE FAIR ENOUGH THAT I WOULDN'T CONCEDE THAT THIS NOMINATION IS IN ANY TROUBLE AT ALL.

AND I BELIEVE BOB GATES IS THE BEST MAN TO HEAD THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. I HAVE TOTAL CONFIDENCE IN HIS HONOR, HIS INTEGRITY, IF YOU WILL, HIS WORD OF HONOR. AND I THINK HE WILL BE CONFIRMED. SO I HAVE NO -- NO QUESTION IN MY MIND ABOUT THIS BEING THE PROPER CHOICE.

Q YOU DON'T THINK THE CLAIR GEORGE INDICTMENT HURTS HIM?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T THINK SO. I THINK PEOPLE ARE FAIR. I MEAN, THEY -- IF CLAIR GEORGE CAME OUT AND MADE SOME CHARGE AGAINST BOB GATES THAT MIGHT HAVE SOME INFLUENCE, BUT I DON'T THINK THAT WILL HAPPEN. I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AT ALL.

(SEVERAL REPORTERS ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS QUESTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT.)

PRESIDENT BUSH: HEY, LISTEN, I'M NOT MAKING AN EXCUSE, I REALLY DO HAVE TO GET TO THE CABINET --

Q JUST A FOLLOW-UP ON JERUSALEM, SIR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: HUH?

Q JUST A QUICKIE ON JERUSALEM.

PRESIDENT BUSH: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

END

עד כאן

עיונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, בן אבו, תפוצות, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10832

אל: רהמש/518

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 145, תא: 120991, זח: 1604, דח: ב, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/בהול להזעיק

א ל: רוה"מ - פריס

שה"ח

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

(קשר העבירו נא בהול לפקס מס' 42662991-1-33) - (הועבר)

בקשת הערביות - הנשיא בוש

להלן עקרי דברי הנשיא בוש במסע"ת שנסתיימה כרגע (13.25).
הנשיא בוש מסע"ת לא מתוכננת, שהנשיא אירגן ברגע האחרון כדי לדבר על נושא הערביות.

להלן עקרי הדברים:

1. מאז תום מלחמת המפרץ - עבדנו קשה למען השלום. בייקר נוסע הלך ושוב בשליחות השלום. השגנו רבות עד כה - אנו ניצבים בפני הזדמנות הסטורית: מדינות ערב מוכנות לבוא למו"מ ישיר עם ישראל, דבר שישראל חיפשה מאז ומתמיד.

2. ביקשתי מהקונגרס לדחות הדיון בבקשה לטובת השלום, כדי למנוע דיון בנושאים בעייתיים. דיון עכשיו עלול לסכל תוכניתנו לשלום.

3. יש הרבה בלבול בנושא הצעתי לדחות הערביות ואני רוצה להבהיר:

א. בקשתי לדחות הדיון אינה מערערת המחויבות שלי, של הממשל ושל העם הריקני לסייע בקליטת העולים. עוד בהיותי סגן-נשיא ומאז שאני נשיא אני מחויב לסייע בשחרור יהודי אתיופיה ובריה"מ, ורבים חיים היום בישראל בזכות עמדתנו זו.

ב. בקשתי לדחיה אינה מציבה ספקות לגבי מחויבותנו לישראל חזקה ובטוחה. ישראל IS OUR STRONGEST ALLY IN THE WORLD - כך היה וכך יהיה.

4. לפני כמה חודשים חיילים אמריקנים נלחמו במפרץ כדי להגן על ישראל מפני הסקאדים. חיילים אמריקנים סלקו האיום הגדול ביותר על ישראל והשמידו את עיראק.

5. במהלך השנה, למרות בעיות התקציב שלנו והבעיות הכלכליות - נתנו לישראל למעלה מארבעה (4) בליון דולר סיוע, שהם 1000 דולר לכל איש אשה וילד בישראל. בנוסף נתנו ערביות להלוואות בסך 400 מליון דולר.

6. בקשתי מהקונגרס לדחות הדיון למען השלום. אם יהיה צורך אשתמש בזכות הווטו שלי.

7. העולים זקוקים לשלום בישראל כדי שיוכלו להקלט כהלכה. איננו רוצים להחליט בין שלום לקליטת עולים. אנחנו רוצים לקדם שתי המטרות.

8. עפ"י החוקה האמריקנית, הנשיא הוא המחליט העליון בנושא מדיניות חוץ. בזמן מלחמת המפרץ הצגתי לעם ולקונגרס את עמדתי, ולמרות שהיו קונגרסמנים שחשבו אחרת, הקונגרס והעם בסופו של דבר תמכו בי. הפעם אנחנו שוב עומדים בפני החלטה כזו.

TODAY THERE IS AN ATTEMPT BY SOME IN CONGRESS TO PRESENT THE PRESIDENT TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST.

9. אני מבקש מהקונגרס לדחות הדיון ב-120 יום. אני מבקש מהעם לתמוך בי. לא בקשה גדולה מצד נשיא שמעוניין לקדם השלום.

10. אמשיך להלחם. אני מאמין בזה. השלום מספיק חשוב כדי לכבד את בקשתי ולדחות הדיון. כל אחד זכאי להלחם על מה שהוא מאמין בו וזה מה שאני עושה. I AM GOING TO STAND FOR WHAT I BELIEVE.

11. בקטע השו"ת התייחס הנשיא ל... 1000 ^{יהודים} שנמצאים היום בקונגרס ומנסים לשכנע הנבחרים... אני כאן רק איש אחד לבד בבית הלבן... עד כאן.

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), @ (שהבט), בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה, בן אבו, תפוצות, כהן, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רם), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10816

אל: רהמש/ 516

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 141, תא: 120991, זח: 1530, דח: ב, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/בהול - להזעיק

א ל: לשכת שה"ח - בהול להזעיק

ד ע: לשכת רוה"מ, תפוצת תקשורת, קונכ"לים-בהול

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: דברי הנשיא בוש במסיבת עתונאים בנושא הערכויות

NEWS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON, DC, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, SINCE THE END OF THE GULF WAR, WE'VE WORKED EXTREMELY HARD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF WHAT WE BELIEVE ARE NEW AND EXCITING POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER HAS TRAVELED TO THE REGION ABOUT A HALF A DOZEN TIMES, AND WILL GO AGAIN IN A FEW DAYS. AS A RESULT OF THESE EFFORTS, WE'RE ON THE BRINK OF AN HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH. WE'VE COME A LONG, LONG WAY. AND WE'RE CLOSE TO BEING ABLE TO CONVENE A PEACE CONFERENCE THAT, IN TURN, WOULD LAUNCH DIRECT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES, SOMETHING THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAS SOUGHT SINCE ITS INCEPTION.

A FEW DAYS AGO, I ASKED CONGRESS TO DEFER CONSIDERATION FOR 120 DAYS OF ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR DOLLAR 10 BILLION IN ADDITIONAL US LOAN GUARANTEES MEANT TO HELP ISRAEL ABSORB ITS MANY NEW IMMIGRANTS. I DID SO IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE. I DID SO BECAUSE WE MUST AVOID A CONTENTIOUS DEBATE THAT WOULD RAISE A HOST OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES, ISSUES SO SENSITIVE THAT A DEBATE NOW COULD WELL DESTROY OUR ABILITY TO BRING ONE OR MORE OF THE PARTIES TO THE PEACE TABLE.

A GOOD DEAL OF CONFUSION SURROUNDS THIS REQUEST FOR DEFERRAL, CONFUSION THAT I'D LIKE TO TRY TO CLEAR UP. LET ME BEGIN BY MAKING CLEAR WHAT MY REQUEST FOR DELAY IS NOT ABOUT.

IT'S NOT ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF MY OR THIS COUNTRY'S SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL. BOTH AS VICE-PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT, I'VE TRIED MY HARDEST TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO LIBERATE JEWS LIVING IN ETHIOPIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT

THEY COULD IMMIGRATE TO ISRAEL.

TODAY IN NO SMALL PART DUE TO AMERICAN EFFORTS, HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE ARE NOW LIVING IN ISRAEL, ABLE AT LAST TO LIVE FREE OF FEAR, FREE TO PRACTICE THEIR FAITH; NOR SHOULD OUR REQUEST FOR DELAY BE VIEWED AS AN INDICATION THAT THERE EXISTS ANY QUESTION IN MY MIND ABOUT THE NEED FOR A STRONG AND SECURE ISRAEL. FOR MORE THAN 40 YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ISRAEL'S CLOSEST FRIEND IN THE WORLD. AND THIS REMAINS THE CASE AND WILL AS LONG AS I AM PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS A FRIENDSHIP BACKED UP WITH REAL SUPPORT.

JUST MONTHS AGO, AMERICAN MEN AND WOMEN IN UNIFORM RISKED THEIR LIVES TO DEFEND ISRAELIS IN THE FACE OF IRAQI SCUD MISSILES, AND INDEED, DESERT STORM, WHILE WINNING A WAR AGAINST AGGRESSION, ALSO ACHIEVED THE DEFEAT OF ISRAEL'S MOST DANGEROUS ADVERSARY. AND DURING THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR ALONE, AND DESPITE OUR OWN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE UNITED STATES PROVIDED ISRAEL WITH MORE THAN DOLLAR 4 BILLION IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID. NEARLY DOLLAR 1,000 FOR EVERY ISRAELI MAN, WOMAN, AND CHILD, AS WELL AS WITH DOLLAR 400 MILLION IN LOAN GUARANTEES TO FACILITATE IMMIGRANT ABSORPTION.

MY REQUEST THAT CONGRESS DELAY CONSIDERATION OF THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR DOLLAR 10 BILLION IN NEW LOAN GUARANTEES TO SUPPORT IMMIGRANT ABSORPTION IS ABOUT PEACE. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THE VISION OF ISRAELIS SITTING WITH THEIR ARAB NEIGHBORS TO TALK PEACE IS A REAL PROSPECT. NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE THAT MIGHT INTERFERE WITH THIS PROSPECT. AND IF NECESSARY, I WILL USE MY VETO POWER TO PREVENT THAT FROM HAPPENING. PEACE IS WHAT THESE NEW IMMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL AND, INDEED, ALL ISRAELIS LONG FOR. THEIR CHANCE FOR A DECENT JOB, A DECENT LIFE DEPENDS ON IT. IT IS OUR GOAL TO SUPPORT THE WELFARE OF THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND TO HAVE PEACE, NOT TO CHOOSE ONE HUMANITARIAN GOAL AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER.

LET ME END WITH JUST ONE FINAL POINT. THE CONSTITUTION CHARGES THE PRESIDENT WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY. AND DURING DESERT SHIELD AND THEN DESERT STORM, I CAME BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AS PRESIDENT, ASKING FOR THE LATITUDE TO DO WHAT WAS RIGHT AND NECESSARY. A GOOD MANY SINCERE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, OF BOTH PARTIES, DISAGREED AT THE TIME. AND NOW AGAIN THERE IS AN ATTEMPT BY SOME IN THE CONGRESS TO PREVENT THE PRESIDENT FROM TAKING STEPS CENTRAL TO THE NATION'S SECURITY. BUT TOO MUCH IS AT STAKE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICS TO TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER PEACE. THIS I KNOW IS SOMETHING THE BULK OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE UNDERSTAND.

AND I'M ASKING THE CONGRESS TO POSTPONE THIS QUESTION FOR 120 DAYS. THIS POSTPONEMENT IS NOT MEANT TO PREJUDICE IN ANY WAY WHAT WE WOULD DO COME JANUARY. AND I'M ASKING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SUPPORT ME IN THIS REQUEST. QUITE SIMPLY, A 120-DAY DELAY IS NOT TOO MUCH FOR A PRESIDENT TO ASK FOR WITH SO MUCH IN THE BALANCE. WE

MUST GIVE PEACE A CHANCE, WE MUST GIVE PEACE EVERY CHANCE.

AND NOW I'D BE GLAD TO TAKE A FEW QUESTIONS.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT DO YOU SAY TO PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE THAT IF THERE IS AID MONEY AVAILABLE, THAT IT BEST BE SPENT ON THE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS WHO ARE WITHOUT JOBS AND ARE DISADVANTAGED?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, THAT IS A QUESTION THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SEEM TO BE RAISING MORE AND MORE ABOUT FOREIGN AID. BUT MY VIEW IS, WE MUST DO WHAT WE CAN TO FACILITATE THIS PEACE PROCESS. IN THE LONG RUN, THAT IS NOT ONLY IN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST BUT I THINK IT WOULD PROVE TO BE IN THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL. SO, I DON'T THINK THAT THESE TWO NEED TO BE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

Q WELL, DO YOU THINK YOU ARE GOING TO DO MORE AND MORE FOR THE AMERICANS WHO ARE WITHOUT JOBS NOW AND WHO ARE REALLY POVERTY STRICKEN?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE THIS ECONOMY MOVE, AND I THINK THAT, OF COURSE, IS BY FAR THE BEST ANSWER TO JOBS. JOBS CREATED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DON'T LAST; JOBS CREATED BY A REINVIGORATED PRIVATE SECTOR DO, AND THAT'S WHY I WOULD HOPE THAT OUR GROWTH PACKAGE THAT WE HAVE THERE CAN BE MOVED ON.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, ISRAEL YESTERDAY RELEASED 51 ARAB PRISONERS, AND THE SHIITE MOSLEM KIDNAPPERS SAY THAT THEY SUPPORT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE HOSTAGE ORDEAL. WHAT'S YOUR READING OF THIS SITUATION? AND IS THERE ANYTHING THAT THE STATES CAN DO TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NOT DIRECTLY. I WAS VERY PLEASED, THOUGH, AT THE RELEASE OF THOSE PRISONERS. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WITH MR. PICCO OF HIS OFFICE, ALSO, WHO IS DOING A VERY GOOD JOB. AND AGAIN, WE'RE BACK WHERE WE WERE A MONTH AGO: "HOW OPTIMISTIC IS THE PRESIDENT, HOW OPTIMISTIC IS THE CONGRESS ABOUT THE RELEASE OF THESE PRISONERS?" AND ONCE AGAIN I'M GOING TO RESIST QUANTIFYING MY OPTIMISM, BUT I THINK THIS RECENT DEVELOPMENT IS BOUND TO BE VIEWED, PROPERLY, AS VERY, VERY FAVORABLE.

Q DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE RELEASE OF A HOSTAGE IS IMMINENT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I CAN'T -- I DON'T WANT TO PUT TERMS ON IT. I MEAN, I KNOW THAT THERE WAS A FEELING A MONTH AGO -- I REMEMBER IT VERY WELL -- THAT HOSTAGE RELEASE IS IMMINENT, AND SURE ENOUGH, THANK HEAVENS, A RELEASE DID TAKE PLACE. BUT I JUST AM GOING TO RESIST, TERRY, IF YOU'LL PERMIT ME NOT TO GO INTO HOW OPTIMISTIC OR MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC OR WHATEVER THAT I AM.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, TO CHANGE THE SUBJECT YET AGAIN, JUDGE THOMAS HAS TOLD THE SENATE COMMITTEE THAT HE HAS NEVER EXPRESSED AN

OPINION ABOUT ROE V. WADE, THAT HE HAS NO OPINION -- (INAUDIBLE) -- ON ONE OF THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL LEGAL ISSUES IN THE COUNTRY. FIRST OF ALL, DO YOU FIND THAT CREDIBLE AND, SECONDLY, DO YOU FIND THAT SOMETHING THAT COMMENDS HIM FURTHER TO BE A JUSTICE ON THE SUPREME COURT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK IT'S A QUESTION FOR THE SENATE TO DECIDE AND I THINK HE IS HANDLING HIMSELF VERY, VERY WELL. AND IF YOU LOOK BACK TO OTHER PEOPLE THAT HAVE APPEARED BEFORE THE COURT (SIC), THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME SIMILARITY IN WANTING TO STAY AWAY FROM PREJUDGING CASES. SO HE HAS MY FULL SUPPORT. I THINK HE'S DOING A BEAUTIFUL JOB UP THERE AND I -- AGAIN, I DON'T QUANTIFY EVERYTHING -- BUT I FEEL MORE CONFIDENT THAN EVER THAT HE WILL BE CONFIRMED, AND I THINK THAT'S BECAUSE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SEE THAT HE SHOULD BE.

Q ARE YOU SURPRISED THAT HE SAYS HE HAS ABSOLUTELY NO OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I THINK HE'S HANDLING HIMSELF VERY, VERY WELL.

Q BACK ON THE QUESTION OF THE ISRAELI LOAN GUARANTEES, EVEN MANY OF YOUR REPUBLICAN SUPPORTERS ON THE HILL SAY THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE HAD THIS MONEY A LONG TIME AGO AND THEY DON'T SUPPORT THE 120-DAY DELAY THAT YOU'RE ASKING FOR. IS THERE ANY KIND OF COMPROMISE, IS THERE ANY KIND OF MIDDLE GROUND? YOU SOUND VERY TOUGH TODAY ON WANTING TO HOLD TO THAT 120 DAYS.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I JUST SOUND PRINCIPLED. I'M CONVINCED THAT THIS DEBATE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO PEACE AND I OWE IT TO THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO SAY IT AS FORCEFULLY AS I CAN. I'VE WORN OUT THE TELEPHONE IN THERE AND ONE EAR AND I'M GOING TO MOVE OVER TO THE OTHER EAR AND KEEP ON IT, BECAUSE THIS IS -- PEACE IS VITAL HERE AND WE'VE WORKED TOO HARD TO HAVE THAT REQUEST OF MY MINE DENIED. AND I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT ME. THEY KNOW WE SUPPORT ISRAEL. I'VE JUST DETAILED SOME OF WHAT WE'VE DONE. SO THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. I AM GIVING THE CONGRESS -- AND I DID IT WITH THE LEADERS TODAY, HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY HERE, THANK YOU, TO DO IT HERE TO GIVE MY BEST JUDGMENT. AND I'M UP AGAINST SOME POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCES, BUT I OWE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO TELL THEM HOW STRONGLY I FEEL ABOUT DEFERRAL.

Q ARE THOSE POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCES UNGRATEFUL FOR WHAT YOU'VE DONE SO FAR IN A PEACE PROCESS AND WHY DOESN'T THE PEACE ARGUMENT SELL WITH THEM?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK IT WILL SELL, BUT IT'S TAKING A LITTLE TIME. AND WE'RE UP AGAINST VERY STRONG AND EFFECTIVE, SOMETIMES, GROUPS THAT GO UP TO THE HILL. I HEARD TODAY THERE WERE SOMETHING LIKE A THOUSAND LOBBYISTS ON THE HILL WORKING THE OTHER SIDE OF THE QUESTION. WE'VE GOT ONE LONELY LITTLE GUY DOWN HERE DOING IT.

(LAUGHTER.) SO, HOWEVER, I LIKE THIS FORUM BETTER, TOO.

Q (INAUDIBLE) -- GRATEFUL FOR WHAT YOU'RE TRYING TO DO?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER -- I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT GRATITUDE. I'M TALKING ABOUT WORLD PEACE. AND WE'VE GOT TO GET IT INTO A FAR BROADER PERSPECTIVE, AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT. AND I THINK PEOPLE WILL UNDERSTAND THAT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU SAID THAT A CONTENTIOUS DEBATE NOW COULD ACTUALLY KEEP SOME PARTIES AWAY FROM THE PEACE TABLE, YET THE ISRAELIS CLAIM THAT THOSE ARABS WHO HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PEACE PROCESS HAVE NOT MADE THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE A PRECONDITION. THEY SAY THAT'S YOUR PRECONDITION. AS ONE COLUMNIST SAID THIS WEEK, IT'S YOUR OBSESSION. IS THAT FAIR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I WOULD SIMPLY SAY THAT I READ SOME CHARGES COMING OUT OF A SOURCE IN ISRAEL THAT WE'D MADE A DEAL WITH THE ARABS THAT WE WOULD FIGHT THIS. THAT'S NOT TRUE. THAT IS FACTUALLY INCORRECT, SIMPLY NOT TRUE. NO, IT IS MY JUDGMENT, AND JIM'S, AND EVERYBODY ELSE'S WORKING THIS PROBLEM, AND HAS BEEN FOR MONTHS, THAT THIS IS THE APPROACH WE OUGHT TO TAKE. BECAUSE WE DON'T WANT A CONTENTIOUS DEBATE ON SETTLEMENTS OR ANYTHING ELSE OVER THERE AT THIS JUNCTURE. WE WANT TO GET THESE PARTIES TO THE TABLE. AND I DON'T THINK IT'S ASKING TOO MUCH TO HAVE A 120-DAY DELAY. I THINK CONGRESS SHOULD LISTEN CAREFULLY TO WHAT I'M ASKING FOR, AND I HOPE THAT THEY WILL GO ALONG WITH THIS.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU TALKED ABOUT POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCES AT WORK. IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU'RE FEELING THE HEAT FROM THE ISRAELI LOBBY. DO YOU THINK THAT THERE'S UNFAIR FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE US POLITICAL PROCESS HERE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO. I DON'T THINK -- I THINK EVERYBODY OUGHT TO FIGHT FOR WHAT THEY BELIEVE IN. THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT I'M BEGINNING TO DO RIGHT HERE. WE'VE LAID BACK DOWN. WE'VE BEEN LYING IN THE WEEDS, SAYING LET'S NOT GET ALL THIS DEBATE -- THESE DEBATE SUBJECTS GOING. THE BEST THING FOR PEACE IS TO MOVE -- TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD IS TO JUST HAVE THIS DEFERRAL. BUT I'M GOING TO FIGHT FOR WHAT I BELIEVE, AND IT MAY BE POPULAR POLITICALLY BUT PROBABLY IT'S NOT. BUT THAT'S NOT THE QUESTION HERE, THAT'S NOT THE QUESTION, IS WHETHER IT'S GOOD 1992 POLITICS. WHAT'S IMPORTANT HERE IS THAT WE GIVE THIS PROCESS A CHANCE. AND I DON'T CARE IF I GET ONE VOTE, I'M GOING TO STAND FOR WHAT I BELIEVE HERE, AND I BELIEVE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL BE WITH ME, IF WE PUT IT ON THIS QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE. AND NOBODY HAS BETTER -- BEEN A BETTER FRIEND TO ISRAEL THAN THE UNITED STATES, AND NO ONE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A BETTER FRIEND THAN THE UNITED STATES. BUT HERE, WE ARE SIMPLY ASKING FOR A 120-DAY DEFERRAL AND THAT'S WHAT MOTIVATES ME, IT ISN'T ANYTHING TO DO WITH LOBBIES OR POLITICS OR ANYTHING ELSE.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, JUST HOW MUCH DAMAGE IS BEING CAUSED BY THIS SHOWDOWN?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY DAMAGE. LAWSIE, WE'LL BE DEBATING SOMETHING ELSE TOMORROW. BUT I THINK THIS ONE'S VERY IMPORTANT, AND THAT'S WHY I WANT TO BE SURE THAT OUR POSITION IS OUT THERE. I'M NOT ONLY HALF IN JEST ABOUT WHAT'S HAPPENING UP THERE ON THE HILL. LISTEN, THERE'S A TREMENDOUS EFFORT GOING ON, AND WE HAVE HAD A LOW PROFILE ON THIS. AND I WAKE UP NOW AND SEE THAT WE BETTER GET OUT MESSAGE OUT, LOUD AND CLEAR.

Q BUT DOES THIS STRAIN ITSELF THREATEN THE PEACE PROCESS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PEACE PROCESS, IN MY VIEW. I MEAN, IF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN -- THE RESULT WAS WHAT WOULD STRAIN IT, NOT THE --

Q ISN'T THERE A LOSS OF TRUST, THERE? I MEAN, DO THE ISRAELIS TRUST YOU AS MUCH AS THEY DID?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, YOU'D HAVE TO ASK THE ISRAELIS THAT. I CAN'T TELL YOU ABOUT THAT. ALL I'M DOING IS EXPRESSING THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. AND WE'RE GOING TO SAY WHAT WE THINK IS BEST; IF THEY AGREE, FINE. THEY'VE GOT TO WORRY ABOUT THEIR PRIORITIES. BUT I THINK MANY PEOPLE THERE WANT TO SEE THIS PEACE PROCESS GO FORWARD. THE POLLING NUMBERS IN ISRAEL ARE OVERWHELMING IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE PROCESS. AND SO, WHAT I'M TRYING TO SAY IS LISTEN, TO THE DEGREE AMERICA'S JUDGMENT AND LEADERSHIP MATTERS, LISTEN TO WHAT WE SAY, HOW STRONGLY WE FEEL ABOUT THIS. AND I THINK THE PEOPLE THERE WILL RESPOND. I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL RESPOND.

Q -- TO THE ISRAELIS AND TO THE CONGRESS THAT IN THE EVENT THE DELAY IS ACCEDED TO, THAT YOU WILL SUPPORT THE LOAN GUARANTEE UNEQUIVOCALLY AND WITH NO FURTHER CONDITION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WHAT WAS THAT?

Q HAVE YOU MADE A COMMITMENT TO THE ISRAELIS AND TO THEIR SUPPORTERS IN THE CONGRESS THAT IF THEY AGREE TO THE DELAY THAT THEY WILL -- THAT YOU WILL THEN SUPPORT THE LOAN --

PRESIDENT BUSH: ABSOLUTELY NOT. THAT WOULD UNDERMINE EVERYTHING. I HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE QUESTION BE CONSIDERED IN 120 DAYS WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION ON OUR PART AND THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE CONCEPT OF ABSORPTION AID, A PRINCIPLE THAT WE BACKED UP BY DOLLAR 400 MILLION THIS YEAR, WILL STILL BE A VALID PRINCIPLE. BUT TO AGREE TO SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE WOULD BE JUST THE SAME, IF I FEEL IT IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS AS PRESENTED NOW, THAT KIND OF AGREEMENT WOULD BE EQUALLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

I REALLY AM GOING TO HAVE TO RUN. YEAH, CHARLES, AND THEN I AM

GOING TO PHILADELPHIA HERE IN A MINUTE AND THEN I'VE GOT SOMETHING ELSE I'VE GOT TO DO BEFORE I GO THERE.

Q WHAT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: DOMESTIC AGENDA.

Q ISRAEL WANTS THIS PEACE CONFERENCE AS MUCH AS YOU DO AND YET IT'S ISRAEL THAT SUBMITTED THIS REQUEST TO YOU. HAVE THEY PUT YOU IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND DOES THIS SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THEIR LESS THAN GENUINE INTEREST?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL YOU CAN'T JUDGE BY STATEMENTS FROM ONE OR ANOTHER IN THE CABINET IN ISRAEL. YOU HAVE GOT TO LOOK AT THE WHOLE PICTURE. AND THERE HAVE BEEN SOME DISQUIETING STATEMENTS BY ONE RATHER FLAMBOYANT MINISTER THAT I AM SORRY I DIDN'T GET ASKED ABOUT BECAUSE I HAVE JUST BEEN ACHING TO ANSWER THE QUESTION. BUT WE ARE NOT -- I AM NOT GOING TO ANSWER ANYMORE -- BUT I AM JUST SIMPLY SAYING WE ARE NOT JUDGING IT ON A STATEMENT HERE OR THERE. I TAKE THE PRIME MINISTER AT HIS WORD WHEN HE SAYS THAT THEY FEEL IT'S IN THEIR INTEREST TO HAVE A PEACE CONFERENCE AND IT HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY DECISION FOR HIM, BUT HE HAS TAKEN THAT DECISION AND TO HIS CREDIT HE REAFFIRMED THEIR INTEREST IN THE PEACE PROCESS JUST LESS THAN 48 HOURS AGO.

SO THOSE ARE THE STATEMENTS THAT WE OUGHT TO LOOK AT AND IN THAT ONE, WHY I WAS QUITE REASSURED. BUT AGAIN, CHARLES, WE ARE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE HAVE GOT OUR POLICY. WE SHOULD SAY CLEARLY WHAT OUR POLICY IS AND I WANT THIS PEACE PROCESS TO HAPPEN. I WANT THE ISRAELIS TO DO THAT WHICH THEY WANTED ALL ALONG, HAVE A CHANCE TO SIT DOWN ONE-ON-ONE WITH HISTORIC ADVERSARIES AND I WANT THE ARABS TO HAVE A CHANCE TO GET THIS QUESTION SETTLED ONCE AND FOR ALL, AND I REALLY BELIEVE THE WHOLE WORLD WANTS THAT, AND IT IS MY BEST JUDGMENT THAT AN RANCOROUS DEBATE NOW IS LITERALLY MINISCULE IN IMPORTANCE COMPARED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF PEACE AND THAT'S -- WE OUGHT TO SET IT BACK 120 DAYS ONLY, WHO IS GOING TO GET HURT? WHAT POSSIBLY COULD WORK AGAINST -- AGAINST THAT REASONABLE REQUEST FROM AN ADMINISTRATION THAT'S BROUGHT THIS THING FROM SQUARE ONE RIGHT UP TO A PEAK THAT NOBODY REALLY BELIEVED WE COULD ACHIEVE; GETTING THESE COUNTRIES TOGETHER, AND THE WORK THAT'S GONE INTO IT. I JUST DON'T WANT TO RISK IT BY US TAKING SOME STAND IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AGAINST A REQUEST BY THE PRESIDENT IN ORDER TO SATISFY SOME OTHER INTEREST.

WE'VE GOT TO KEEP OUR SIGHTS ON THE BROAD PICTURE OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND I WOULD SAY THAT INCLUDES WORLD PEACE. THEY'RE SO CLOSELY INTERLOCKED WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HOW THEY SPILL OVER INTO EUROPE AND TO ASIA, INTO THE SOVIET UNION STILL. SO WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A MAJOR CHANCE NOW FOR ONE MORE TREMENDOUS STEP TOWARDS PEACE. WE'VE SEEN THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION, WE'VE SEEN THE DEFEAT OF AGGRESSION OVER THERE IN IRAQ, WE'VE SEEN DEMOCRACY ON THE MOVE IN OUR

HEMISPHERE. AND HERE IS A LAST PLACE THAT REALLY NEEDS THIS PEACE PROCESS TO GO FORWARD.

Q SIR, JUST A QUICK FOLLOW-UP WAS, IF THIS GOES THROUGH, WHICH ARABS COULD YOU NO LONGER COUNT ON?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT GOING TO DEFINE THAT AT ALL. IT'S JUST OUR JUDGMENT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS. I CAN'T HELP YOU WITH THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY.

Q MR. PRESIDENT -- MR. PRESIDENT, NEXT WEEK YOU HAVE ANOTHER SOMEWHAT CONTROVERSIAL NOMINEE GOING TO HEARING -- THE ROBERT GATES CIA NOMINATION. DO YOU -- ARE YOU STILL CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL BE CONFIRMED? IS THERE ANY CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO WITHDRAWAL?

PRESIDENT BUSH: ABSOLUTELY NO CONSIDERATION TO WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE THERE'S NO REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL. I DON'T SEE -- I'M NOT SURE HOW CONTROVERSIAL THIS NOMINATION WILL BE. WHEN THE FACTS ARE OUT THERE -- AND THE COMMITTEE ARE GOING TO DEAL WITH IT, IN MY VIEW, IN EXTRAORDINARILY GOOD FAITH. I'VE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO THE CHAIRMAN, THE RANKING MEMBER, OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. AND I THINK THAT A LOT OF THESE KIND OF FEATHERY CHARGES THAT ARE FLOATING OUT THERE ARE NONSENSE. AND I THINK THE PROCESS WILL BE FAIR ENOUGH THAT I WOULDN'T CONCEDE THAT THIS NOMINATION IS IN ANY TROUBLE AT ALL.

AND I BELIEVE BOB GATES IS THE BEST MAN TO HEAD THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. I HAVE TOTAL CONFIDENCE IN HIS HONOR, HIS INTEGRITY, IF YOU WILL, HIS WORD OF HONOR. AND I THINK HE WILL BE CONFIRMED. SO I HAVE NO -- NO QUESTION IN MY MIND ABOUT THIS BEING THE PROPER CHOICE.

Q YOU DON'T THINK THE CLAIR GEORGE INDICTMENT HURTS HIM?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T THINK SO. I THINK PEOPLE ARE FAIR. I MEAN, THEY -- IF CLAIR GEORGE CAME OUT AND MADE SOME CHARGE AGAINST BOB GATES THAT MIGHT HAVE SOME INFLUENCE, BUT I DON'T THINK THAT WILL HAPPEN. I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AT ALL.

(SEVERAL REPORTERS ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS QUESTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT.)

PRESIDENT BUSH: HEY, LISTEN, I'M NOT MAKING AN EXCUSE, I REALLY DO HAVE TO GET TO THE CABINET --

Q JUST A FOLLOW-UP ON JERUSALEM, SIR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: HUH?

Q JUST A QUICKIE ON JERUSALEM.

PRESIDENT BUSH: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

END

עד כאן

עיונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, בן אבו, תפוצות, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

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6 כולל
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אאא, חוזם: 9327

אל: רהמש/445

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 118, תא: 110991, זח: 1534, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: תדרוך הבית הלבן ליום 11/9/91

הנסף לנושאים הרלוונטים לעניננו (המצ"ב), עלו היום בתדרוך הבית הלבן, ונושאים הבאים:-

- סדר יומו של הנשיא בוש.

- שיחת הטלפון בין רו"מ יפן והנשיא בוש ב- 19 לאוגוסט, בענין ההפיכה בבריה"מ.

- תוכן הפגישה בין הנשיא בוש והסנטורים דול וגרהם.

- פגישת הנשיא בוש עם מספר סנטורים בענין גייטס.

- להלן הקטעים הרלוונטים לעניננו:-

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC, REGULAR BRIEFING, BRIEFER:
MARLIN FITZWATER, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1991

MR. FITZWATER: LEBANESE BUSINESS: THERE IS A WIRE STORY WE JUST SAW ON THE RELEASE OF LEBANESE PRISONERS BY ISRAEL. WE DON'T REALLY HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THAT IN TERMS OF SPECIFICS OF THE RELEASE. THERE'S SOME VARIANCES IN REPORTING. OBVIOUSLY, WE WILL BE RECEIVING THAT INFORMATION FROM ISRAEL AND OTHERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT WE DO THINK THAT THIS IS A POSITIVE STEP AND WE'RE HOPEFUL THAT IT DOES FACILITATE THE GROWTH OF CONFIDENCE AMONG ALL THE PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE HAVE ALWAYS CALLED FOR THE RELEASE OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED OUTSIDE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, SO WE'VE VERY HOPEFUL THAT THIS HAS RAMIFICATIONS THAT ARE HELPFUL TO THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION AT ALL ON HOW THIS MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT RELATE TO MR. PICCO'S, QUOTE, "SECRET MISSION"?

MR. FITZWATER: NO, WE DON'T AT THE MOMENT.

Q DO YOU KNOW IF IT'S RELATED?

MR. FITZWATER: NO, I DON'T KNOW.

Q DO YOU KNOW IT TO BE TRUE?

MR. FITZWATER: WE DON'T EVEN KNOW THAT. AT THE MOMENT, WE'RE RESPONDING PRIMARILY TO PRESS REPORTS, BUT YOU MAY BE --

Q (OFF MIKE) -- BETTER NOT DO THAT.

MR. FITZWATER: YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT -- YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT WE'RE CHECKING -- IN CONTACT WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS RIGHT NOW.

Q WHY CAN'T YOU ASK THE ISRAELIS?

MR. FITZWATER: THAT'S WHAT WE'RE DOING.

Q HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WHEN IT'S DONE, WE'LL TELL YOU.

Q MARLIN, DO YOU HAVE THE NAMES OF WHICH ISRAELIS ARE (ALIVE AND DEAD ?) YET?

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER INFORMATION.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING HOSTAGE RELATED THAT YOU CAN IMPART TO US?

MR. FITZWATER: WE DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER -- THERE ISN'T ANY OTHER INFORMATION THAT WE HAVE ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION. THERE'S NO NEW REPORTS OF HOSTAGE RELEASE. YOU KNOW ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE'RE ALWAYS HOPEFUL BUT WE DON'T HAVE ANY REPORTS FROM THAT MISSION EITHER THAT WOULD INDICATE SPECIFIC RELEASES.

Q WHILE WE'RE ON THE SUBJECT OF ISRAEL, WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT MEAN TODAY WHEN HE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE COMMITMENT FOR AID TO ISRAEL AND THAT THEY DIDN'T HAVE A COMMITMENT FROM HIM? WAS HE JUST TALKING ABOUT A SPECIFIC FIGURE?

MR. FITZWATER: YEAH, THE 10 BILLION (DOLLARS). IN OTHER WORDS, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE PROCESS AND TO GOING AHEAD WITH A REQUEST FOR LOAN GUARANTEES WAS MADE YESTERDAY IN THE POINTS THAT HE GAVE TO MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS WHO WERE INTERESTED AND OTHERS, BUT THERE WAS A QUESTION ABOUT THE AMOUNT, AND THAT'S WHAT HE WAS ADDRESSING IN THE CABINET ROOM. THEY ASKED FOR 10 BILLION (DOLLARS), BUT WE HAVE NOT MADE A COMMITMENT TO ANY NUMBER.

Q CAN YOU GIVE US THOSE FIVE POINTS -- EXCUSE ME, SIX POINTS?

MR. FITZWATER: THE PRESIDENT SENT A LETTER YESTERDAY TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CONGRESS AND OTHER INTERESTED MEMBERS. I THINK NOW IT'S BEEN MORE WIDELY DISTRIBUTED. ALSO, IT WAS PUBLISHED IN WHOLE OR IN PART IN SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS. I KNOW I SAW IT IN THE WASHINGTON TIMES AND OTHER PAPERS. ESSENTIALLY -- AND ALSO IN CONVERSATIONS THAT HE HAS HAD PRIVATELY WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HE HAS REITERATED THESE SIX POINTS WHICH COMPRISE OUR COMMITMENT ON THIS ISSUE. ALL OF THEM ARE IN THE LETTERS, JUST IN A DIFFERENT FASHION, BUT I'LL JUST BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE THOSE FOR YOU.

FIRST, THAT WE WILL GUARANTEE A VEHICLE FOR ACTION ON LOAN GUARANTEES AT THE END OF THE 120-DAY DEFERRAL PERIOD. IN OTHER WORDS, SOME KIND OF LEGISLATIVE VEHICLE FOR GETTING ACTION.

SECONDLY, THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER DELAY AT THE END OF THE 120 DAYS, NO MATTER WHAT THE STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS IS. THIS COMMITMENT, AS YOU KNOW, IS IN VIEW OF OUR REQUEST THAT CONSIDERATION OF THE LOAN GUARANTEES BE DELAYED 120 DAYS SO AS NOT TO OBSTRUCT THE PEACE PROCESS IN ANY FASHION.

THIRDLY, THAT WE RESTATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF ABSORPTION AID TO ISRAEL. AS YOU KNOW, I WENT THROUGH MUCH OF THIS YESTERDAY OR THE DAY BEFORE IN TERMS OF OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL AND HELPING OUT WITH THE IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

FOURTHLY, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD COMMIT TO HANDLE SCORING BY OMB IN THE MOST REASONABLE POSSIBLE WAY CONSISTENT WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. OMB SCORING IS A METHOD OF CALCULATIONS THAT HAS TO DO WITH HOW LOAN GUARANTEES ARE CONSIDERED UNDER THE BUDGET AGREEMENT. AND FRANKLY, I DON'T UNDERSTAND IT -- (LAUGHTER) -- BUT IT'S A TECHNICAL ISSUE MORE THAN A POLICY ONE, AT LEAST IN TERMS OF THE OVERALL QUESTION OF THE GUARANTEES THEMSELVES.

Q WHAT'S THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT COMMITMENT? I DON'T UNDERSTAND.

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, I'VE BEEN ASKING THAT ALL MORNING, FRANKLY, AND I DON'T HAVE A GOOD ANSWER, BUT IT HAS TO DO WITH HOW IT'S TREATED UNDER THE BUDGET. IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO THE CONGRESS IN TERMS OF BUDGETARY MATTERS. THERE'S NO DIRECT OUTLAYS, YOU SEE, ON LOAN GUARANTEES. HOWEVER, IF THE LOAN GUARANTEES AREN'T REPAYED AND THAT SHOULD BE REQUIRED, THEN YOU HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF HOW IS THAT MONEY TREATED UNDER THE BUDGET AGREEMENT. AND THIS COMMITS US TO AN OMB SCORING IN THE SENSE THAT WE SAY WE'LL DEAL WITH IT, BUT EXACTLY HOW, FRANKLY, I DON'T UNDERSTAND.

FIFTH, THAT WE WILL UNDERTAKE AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AFTER JANUARY TO GET SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES FOR ABSORPTION

AID. WE HAVE OFTEN TALKED ABOUT THAT IN THE PAST.

AND SIXTH, THAT IF THERE IS ANY COST TO ISRAEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEFERRAL, MEANING THE 120-DAY WAIT, THAT WE WOULD AGREE THAT THAT COST SHOULD BE OFFSET IN THE ULTIMATE AID PACKAGE.

SO THOSE SIX POINTS WERE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY IN A NUMBER OF FORUMS, BOTH IN LETTER AND IN HIS ORAL CONVERSATION AND LEADS US TO WHERE WE ARE.

Q WHEN THEY WERE ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET DECISION TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM CUBA TODAY, SENATOR GRAMM AND CONGRESSMAN GINGRICH SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT VOTE FOR ANY US AID TO THE SOVIET UNION UNTIL THEY COMPLETELY CUT OFF CUBA ECONOMICALLY. IS THAT ALSO THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE HAVE NOT LINKED ANY QUID PRO QUO ITEMS WITH AID, BUT WE HAVE SAID TIME AND TIME AGAIN THAT MILITARY REDUCTIONS OF EXPENDITURES IS THE QUICKEST WAY FOR THEM TO GET MORE MONEY FOR THEIR AILING ECONOMY, AND THAT INDEED WE WOULD EXPECT THEM TO BE LOOKING AT DEFENSE CUTS AS A WAY OF PICKING UP MONEY. WE ALSO HAVE SAID -- INDEED, THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID, I THINK AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GORBACHEV SITTING NEXT TO HIM, THE QUICKEST WAY TO GET 5 BILLION (DOLLARS) A YEAR WOULD BE FROM CUBA.

SO, THAT POSITION IS CLEARLY STATED BY THE UNITED STATES TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES. AND I SUSPECT THAT IT'S NOT ENTIRELY COINCIDENTAL THAT BOTH YELTSIN AND GORBACHEV MADE THAT POINT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE ABC TOWN MEETING, AND WE HAVE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TODAY. SO, IT CLEARLY LOOKS LIKE THEY'RE TRYING TO RECOUP SOME FUNDS FROM THAT PURPOSE.

Q DOES THE PRESIDENT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MERELY HAS TO COMMIT TO ECONOMIC REFORMS BEFORE DIRECT AID IS PROVIDED?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THERE'S BEEN A LITTLE MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT OUR POSITION ALL ALONG, BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT WE WANT TO SEE SERIOUS AND SIGNIFICANT REFORMS BEFORE WE'RE WILLING TO COMMIT AID, THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE BEING THAT WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT IT'S USABLE AND THAT IT DOESN'T GO DOWN A BLACK HOLE, AS WE'VE SAID IN THE PAST, AND THAT IT INDEED FURTHERS THE PROCESS.

CERTAINLY THE EVENTS OF THE LAST TWO WEEKS HAVE INDICATED THEY ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE REFORM PROCESS, BUT WE HAVE NEVER SAID THAT -- TRIED TO BE SPECIFIC IN SAYING ALL REFORMS HAVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED OR THEY HAVE TO DO THIS, THAT AND THE OTHER THING. WHAT WE HAVE SAID IS BASICALLY THAT'S A JUDGMENTAL MATTER.

SO WE DON'T CONSIDER THERE BEING ANY POLICY SWITCH IN THE COMMENTS THE SECRETARY MADE, WHICH I HAVE HERE AND WOULD BE GLAD TO READ FOR THOSE WHO HAVEN'T READ IT IN TOTAL. BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE REFORM. WE WOULD WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT A

REFORM IS INDEED REAL AND MEANINGFUL AND CAN USE UNITED STATES AID BEFORE IT'S GIVEN.

Q DOES THAT MEAN THERE WILL BE AID?

Q WHAT KIND OF DIRECT AID ARE YOU THINKING ABOUT?

MR. FITZWATER: IT MEANS THAT IT'S STILL AN OPEN QUESTION. WE CERTAINLY HAVE -- WE CERTAINLY HAVE COMMITTED TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY THIS WINTER. PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRIME MINISTER MAJOR HAD TALKED ABOUT THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE A TEAM HEADED BY UNDER SECRETARY CROWDER WHO IS MAKING AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR NEEDS RIGHT NOW, AND WE WILL INDEED BE WORKING ON A VERY FAST TRACK TO PROVIDE ANY WINTER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE THAT WE FIND IS NECESSARY. ON THE LONGER QUESTION, THE DECISIONS OF THE G-7 ARE STILL THE OPERATIVE ONES IN TERMS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TOWARDS AID. YOU KNOW FROM THE VISIT BY THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THERE IS TALK OF MOVING THAT TIMETABLE UP, OF PERHAPS BEING ABLE TO GET THEM INVOLVED WITH THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK ON A FASTER TRACK. BUT QUESTIONS OF DIRECT AID ARE STILL ONES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED AND AT THIS POINT, WE DON'T HAVE A DECISION.

Q GIVEN THE STATUS OF THE POLITICAL UNITS OF -- THE POLITICAL UNITS OF THE SOVIET UNION, ARE WE WILLING TO CONSIDER DIRECT AID TO INDIVIDUAL REPUBLICS?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THAT'S MY POINT IS THAT THERE STILL A LOT OF CHANGE GOING ON. THE REFORM PROCESS OBVIOUSLY IS MOVING FASTER. COUNTRIES ARE DECLARING THEIR INDEPENDENCE. NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ARE BEING SET UP. SO WE'LL HAVE TO ANALYZE ALL THIS AS WE GO. BUT WE DON'T HAVE CONCLUSIONS AT THIS POINT.

Q ARE WE TREATING THE HUMANITARIAN AID WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH NOW AS AID TO A SINGLE ENTITY OR ARE WE GOING TO BE WORKING MORE CLOSELY WITH INDIVIDUAL REPUBLICS?

MR. FITZWATER: WE'LL WORK WITH EVERYBODY. WE'RE TALKING AID TO PEOPLE, WHEREVER THEY ARE, WHOEVER NEEDS IT.

Q CONGRESSMAN GINGRICH AND SENATOR GRAMM SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO AID TO THE SOVIET UNION --

MR. FITZWATER: RIGHT.

Q -- UNTIL THEY CUT OFF ECONOMIC AS WELL AS MILITARY AID TO CUBA. IS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION, THAT THEY MUST CUT OFF THE ECONOMIC AID AS WELL?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THE OUR POSITION IS THE ONE I JUST STATED WITH CUBA, THAT WE THINK THAT'S THE PLACE WHERE THE SOVIET UNION CAN PICK UP MONEY AND THEY SHOULD ACT IN THAT REGARD. BUT WE HAVEN'T

TRIED TO LAY DOWN THREATS OR SPECIFIC GUIDELINES. FRANK?

Q TO FOLLOW UP ON THAT, HOW THEN DID THE PRESIDENT RESPOND TO THE STATEMENT AND WOULD HE PROPOSE SUCH A RESTRICTION IN THE SPENDING BILL?

MR. FITZWATER: RESPOND TO WHAT STATEMENT?

Q THE GRAMM-GINGRICH POSITION THAT THEY SHOULD CUT IT OFF, HOW DOES HE RESPOND TO THAT?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, IT DIDN'T COME UP IN THE MEETING, BUT HOW HE RESPONDS TO IT GENERALLY IS THE SAME WAY I DO, THAT WE FEEL THE SAME WAY, THAT A GOOD PLACE FOR THEM TO GET MONEY IS IN AID TO CUBA AND IT LOOKS LIKE THAT'S THE DIRECTION THEY'RE MOVING IN.

Q WELL, YOU SAY HE FEELS THAT WAY, BUT THAT'S NOT THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT YET TO DO THAT.

MR. FITZWATER: WE HAVEN'T STATED ANY DIRECTIVES ON SPECIFIC CUTS THEY HAVE TO MAKE OR WHERE, AND SO FORTH. BUT AGAIN, THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES ON CUBAN ASSISTANCE IS PROBABLY THE CLEAREST AND MOST OFTEN STATED POLICY IN THE US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS.

Q WHAT IS THE POLICY?

MR. FITZWATER: IT'S OUR POLICY THAT THE QUICKEST AND BEST WAY TO GET MONEY IS TO TAKE SOME OF THAT CUBAN AID AND APPLY IT TO THEIR OWN ECONOMY.

Q IS THAT ALL AID OR IS THAT JUST MILITARY?

MR. FITZWATER: WE HAVE NEVER SAID THEY HAVE TO DO ANY SPECIFIC THING TO GET AID. WE'RE NOT LAYING DOWN QUID PRO QUOS. WE HAVE SAID WE WANT TO SEE ECONOMIC REFORM AND WE THINK THEY OUGHT TO USE MILITARY REDUCTIONS AS AN IMMEDIATE SOURCE OF MONEY.

Q HISTORICALLY, OUR CONCERN WITH CUBA HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE MILITARY THREAT.

MR. FITZWATER: RIGHT.

Q NOW, I MEAN, SOMETHING'S HAPPENED HERE TODAY AND IS THAT ENOUGH?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE'VE SAID IT'S A VERY HELPFUL STEP AND ONE THAT GOES IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND WE THINK THAT INDEED THEY SHOULD BE WITHDRAWING SUPPORT FOR CUBA. PRESIDENT BUSH HAS BEEN VERY CLEAR ABOUT THAT TIME AND TIME AGAIN.

Q BUT A GOOD PART OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC AID OR TIE WITH

CUBA IS APPARENTLY A BARTER ARRANGEMENT WHERE THEY SHIP CUBA OIL AND GET SUGAR BACK. AND SUGAR IS IN SHORT SUPPLY AND ONE OF THE AREAS WHERE SOVIET CONSUMERS ARE COMPLAINING ABOUT IS NOT HAVING SUGAR. ARE WE IN FAVOR OF THEM STOPPING OIL SHIPMENTS? HOW DOES THIS HELP?

MR. FITZWATER: THAT'S WHY I SAID WE DON'T GO INTO THOSE KINDS OF DICTATES ABOUT THOSE KINDS OF SPECIFICS. WHAT WE SAY IS THAT THEY'RE PROVIDING DOLLAR 5 BILLION A YEAR IN AID TO CUBA AND THEY OUGHT TO TAKE A LOOK AT IT AS A SOURCE OF MONEY TO HELP THEIR OWN ECONOMY. BUT WE ARE NOT GOING TO DICTATE SPECIFICS. STEVE?

Q WHAT'S YOUR ASSESSMENT -- BACK ON ISRAEL, WHAT'S YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SUPPORT IN CONGRESS ON THIS 120-DAY DELAY? AND ALSO, SENATOR GRAMM SAID THAT HE COULD SEE THE SHAPE OF A COMPROMISE FORMING IN WHICH THEY WOULD GO ALONG IF THERE WOULD BE A COMMITMENT TO ACT AND APPROVE A HOUSING SUBSIDY AT THE END. IS THE PRESIDENT WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THAT?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, AT THE MOMENT, THE SIX POINTS THAT I GAVE YOU CONSTITUTE OUR POSITION. AS I SAID, THE VARIOUS MEMBERS HAVE DIFFERENT IDEAS ABOUT SOME WAYS TO BE ABLE TO PROCEED. BUT I THINK WHAT YOU SEE IN THAT COMMENT IS A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT, LIKE ISRAEL, LIKE THE UNITED STATES, THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WANT BOTH THINGS: THEY WANT THE PEACE PROCESS TO GO FORWARD; THEY WANT TO CONSIDER THE LOAN GUARANTEES. THEY WANT TO WORK THIS THING -- THIS TIMING PROBLEM OUT IN A WAY THAT'S AMENABLE TO EVERYBODY. SO THERE'S A LOT OF DISCUSSIONS GOING ON. BUT WE -- OUR FEELING IS THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROCEED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS, GET SOME DELAY IN THIS -- IN THE LOAN GUARANTEE QUESTION, AND THEN PROCEED ON THAT AS FAST AS WE CAN.

Q WHEN YOU SAY "SOME DELAY" ARE YOU -- YOU'RE NOT CONFIDENT THEN OF GETTING 120 DAYS?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE THINK THE 120 DAYS IS IMPORTANT, AND DON'T SEE ANY REASON WHY WE SHOULDN'T GET THAT MUCH DELAY.

Q HAS THE WHITE HOUSE BEEN TOLD BY ANYBODY IN CONGRESS THAT IT HAS TWO WEEKS TO COME UP WITH A COMPROMISE OR THEY'RE GOING TO GO AHEAD WITH CONSIDERATION ON LOAN GUARANTEES?

MR. FITZWATER: NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE. I THINK I DID SEE THAT IN A NEWS STORY, BUT I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT HAS ANY STANDING HERE. I'VE NOT HEARD IT DISCUSSED ANY PLACE.

Q AND DO YOU KNOW, WHAT IS THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE HERE? IF CONGRESS DECIDES TO GO AHEAD AND, LET'S SAY, THEY APPROVE IT, WOULD THE PRESIDENT HAVE A VETO POWER OVER THAT? I JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND THAT.

MR. FITZWATER: I THINK IT'S A STANDARD LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, YES. THEY PASS A BILL AND HE HAS STANDARD SIGNING/VETO RIGHTS.

Q THE PRESIDENT APPEARED TO EXPRESS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FRUSTRATION THERE THIS MORNING THE PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WHEN HE SAID, "I'M CALLING THE SHOTS." I MEAN, WHO IS HE AIMING THAT SHOT AT? CONGRESS, OR THE ISRAELI LOBBY, OR --

MR. FITZWATER: (LAUGHS) -- I DON'T KNOW, MICK, I DIDN'T HEAR THE QUESTION. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE ANTECEDENT WAS. I DON'T KNOW.

Q THE REFERENCE WAS TO HOW THIS THING WAS BEING DIRECTED -- IN WHAT DIRECTION --

Q MARLIN, WHY DOES THE PRESIDENT -- IF THIS IS A STANDARD LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, WHY DOES THE PRESIDENT NOT SIMPLY SAY THAT IF IT'S CONSIDERED NOW INSTEAD OF WHEN HE WANTS IT CONSIDERED, HE'LL VETO IT?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, BECAUSE WE WANT TO WORK THIS OUT IN A COLLEGIAL FASHION. MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS DO HAVE STRONG VIEWS ON IT, AND SO DO WE. AND WE -- LIKE THEM, WE WANT BOTH.

Q IF THEY WANT IT, THEN WHY WOULD THEY -- WHY WOULD IT NOT BE SENSIBLE FOR THEM TO WAIT UNTIL IT ISN'T GOING TO GET VETOED?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, BUT THE MAIN THING IS IF YOU FOSTER A PROCESS LIKE THAT, YOU DO --

Q FOSTER A BAD ATMOSPHERE, YOU MEAN?

MR. FITZWATER: YES, EXACTLY WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO AVOID, WHICH IS A RANCOROUS, BAD ATMOSPHERE. SO WE WANT TO TRY TO BE AS AMENABLE AS POSSIBLE IN WORKING THIS OUT.

Q MARLIN, HOW QUICKLY DOES THE PRESIDENT EXPECT TO NAME AMBASSADORS TO THE THREE BALTIC STATES? DOES THAT -- IS THAT IMMINENT?

MR. FITZWATER: WE'D LIKE TO DO IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT I CAN'T TELL YOU IN TERMS OF DAYS.

Q ARE WE TALKING DAYS, OR WEEKS?

MR. FITZWATER: THAT I DON'T KNOW. THE NORMAL -- I WOULD SAY -- I WOULD APPLY THE NORMAL AMBASSADORIAL SELECTION PROCESS, WHICH IS USUALLY -- USUALLY -- YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT IS?

Q NO.

Q FIRST YOU HAVE A CAMPAIGN AND CONTRIBUTIONS --

MR. FITZWATER: THE PRESIDENT DELIVERS HIS REMARKS AT THE DAY TOMORROW NIGHT AT 8:30.

Q CAN I FOLLOW ON THAT? WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO MR. GAMSAKHURDIA'S ASSERTION THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE CONSPIRING NOT TO GIVE GEORGIA RECOGNITION?

MR. FITZWATER: NO, IT'S NOT TRUE.

Q ARE YOU PREPARING NOW TO DEAL WITH THE OTHER REPUBLICS? ARE YOU MOVING ON THE OTHER REPUBLICS, SUCH AS GEORGIA AND MOLDAVIA?

MR. FITZWATER: ALL THOSE ISSUES ARE UNDER REVIEW. JOHN?

Q BACK TO ISRAEL FOR A SECOND. GINGRICH SAID OUT THERE THAT HE THOUGHT DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS -- SOME DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS WERE TRYING TO FORCE A CONFRONTATION OVER THE DELAY QUESTION THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROCESS FOR PARTISAN POLITICAL REASONS. IS THAT -- DOES THE PRESIDENT BELIEVE THAT ALSO?

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE HAVE ANY REAL INDICATION OF THAT. THERE'S -- YOU CAN ALWAYS FIND SOME DEMOCRAT WHO WANTS TO STIR UP A LITTLE POLITICAL TROUBLE, BUT -- (LAUGHTER) -- BUT WE'RE HOPEFUL THEY'LL SQUASH THAT IMPULSE WHEREVER THEY FIND IT.

Q MARLIN, I WANT TO GO BACK TO GATES. LIKE THOMAS, GATES FACES A BUZZSAW OF CONTROVERSY WHEN HE GOES BEFORE THE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, BUT HE DOESN'T SEEM TO HAVE ANY SPECIAL GROUPS SET UP TO HELP SHEPHERD HIS NOMINATION. WHAT'S BEING DONE FOR HIM, AND WHY ISN'T HE GETTING SPECIAL ATTENTION?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, HE IS. THERE'S A VERY CONCENTRATED EFFORT ON HIS BEHALF. IT'S TOTALLY DIFFERENT THAN THE THOMAS NOMINATION BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCES, WELL, THAT CHAFEE AND MURKOWSKI WENT INTO IN THE DRIVEWAY. I THOUGHT THEY GAVE A VERY DESCRIPTION. BUT WE ARE WORKING QUITE AGGRESSIVELY WITH VARIOUS PEOPLE TO SUPPORT THE GATES NOMINATION. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE A LOT OF SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS HERE WHICH CALL FOR A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT RESPONSE. THIS IS NOT A NOMINATION THAT'S PROBABLY GOING TO BE DEALT WITH BY THE KINDS OF SPECIAL INTEREST CONSTITUENCY GROUPS THAT WE SEE IN THE THOMAS NOMINATION.

SO WE ARE MEETING INTERNALLY EVERY DAY TO DECIDE VARIOUS ISSUES ABOUT THE NOMINATION, MOST OF THEM RELATED TO COMMUNICATIONS. AND THERE'S A VERY AGGRESSIVE EFFORT AND A LOT OF PEOPLE WORKING ON IT. AND OF COURSE, MY PR ANSWER TO THAT IS, THE PR THAT'S NOT SEEN IS THE BEST KIND. SO, IT'S GOING VERY WELL.

THANK YOU.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, סולטן, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט), @ (לוברני)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9327

אל: רהמש/445

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 118, תא: 110991, זח: 1534, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/מיידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: תדרוך הבית הלבן ליום 11/9/91

● וסף לנושאים הרלוונטים לעניננו (המצ"ב), עלו היום בתדרוך הבית הלבן, הנושאים הבאים:-

- סדר יומו של הנשיא בוש.

- שיחת הטלפון בין רו"מ יפן והנשיא בוש ב- 19 לאוגוסט, בענין ההפיכה בכריה"מ.

- תוכן הפגישה בין הנשיא בוש והסנטורים דול וגרהם.

- פגישת הנשיא בוש עם מספר סנטורים בענין גייטס.

להלן הקטעים הרלוונטים לעניננו:-

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC, REGULAR BRIEFING, BRIEFER:
MARLIN FITZWATER, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1991

MR. FITZWATER: LEBANESE BUSINESS: THERE IS A WIRE STORY WE JUST SAW ON THE RELEASE OF LEBANESE PRISONERS BY ISRAEL. WE DON'T REALLY HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THAT IN TERMS OF SPECIFICS OF THE RELEASE. THERE'S SOME VARIANCES IN REPORTING. OBVIOUSLY, WE WILL BE RECEIVING THAT INFORMATION FROM ISRAEL AND OTHERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT WE DO THINK THAT THIS IS A POSITIVE STEP AND WE'RE HOPEFUL THAT IT DOES FACILITATE THE GROWTH OF CONFIDENCE AMONG ALL THE PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE HAVE ALWAYS CALLED FOR THE RELEASE OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED OUTSIDE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, SO WE'VE VERY HOPEFUL THAT THIS HAS RAMIFICATIONS THAT ARE HELPFUL TO THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION AT ALL ON HOW THIS MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT RELATE TO MR. PICCO'S, QUOTE, "SECRET MISSION"?

MR. FITZWATER: NO, WE DON'T AT THE MOMENT.

Q DO YOU KNOW IF IT'S RELATED?

MR. FITZWATER: NO, I DON'T KNOW.

Q DO YOU KNOW IT TO BE TRUE?

MR. FITZWATER: WE DON'T EVEN KNOW THAT. AT THE MOMENT, WE'RE RESPONDING PRIMARILY TO PRESS REPORTS, BUT YOU MAY BE --

Q (OFF MIKE) -- BETTER NOT DO THAT.

MR. FITZWATER: YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT -- YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT WE'RE CHECKING -- IN CONTACT WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS RIGHT NOW.

Q WHY CAN'T YOU ASK THE ISRAELIS?

MR. FITZWATER: THAT'S WHAT WE'RE DOING.

Q HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WHEN IT'S DONE, WE'LL TELL YOU.

Q MARLIN, DO YOU HAVE THE NAMES OF WHICH ISRAELIS ARE (ALIVE AND DEAD ?) YET?

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER INFORMATION.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING HOSTAGE RELATED THAT YOU CAN IMPART TO US?

MR. FITZWATER: WE DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER -- THERE ISN'T ANY OTHER INFORMATION THAT WE HAVE ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION. THERE'S NO NEW REPORTS OF HOSTAGE RELEASE. YOU KNOW ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE'RE ALWAYS HOPEFUL BUT WE DON'T HAVE ANY REPORTS FROM THAT MISSION EITHER THAT WOULD INDICATE SPECIFIC RELEASES.

Q WHILE WE'RE ON THE SUBJECT OF ISRAEL, WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT MEAN TODAY WHEN HE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE COMMITMENT FOR AID TO ISRAEL AND THAT THEY DIDN'T HAVE A COMMITMENT FROM HIM? WAS HE JUST TALKING ABOUT A SPECIFIC FIGURE?

MR. FITZWATER: YEAH, THE 10 BILLION (DOLLARS). IN OTHER WORDS, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE PROCESS AND TO GOING AHEAD WITH A REQUEST FOR LOAN GUARANTEES WAS MADE YESTERDAY IN THE POINTS THAT HE GAVE TO MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS WHO WERE INTERESTED AND OTHERS, BUT THERE WAS A QUESTION ABOUT THE AMOUNT, AND THAT'S WHAT HE WAS ADDRESSING IN THE CABINET ROOM. THEY ASKED FOR 10 BILLION (DOLLARS), BUT WE HAVE NOT MADE A COMMITMENT TO ANY NUMBER.

Q CAN YOU GIVE US THOSE FIVE POINTS -- EXCUSE ME, SIX POINTS?

MR. FITZWATER: THE PRESIDENT SENT A LETTER YESTERDAY TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CONGRESS AND OTHER INTERESTED MEMBERS. I THINK NOW IT'S BEEN MORE WIDELY DISTRIBUTED. ALSO, IT WAS PUBLISHED IN WHOLE OR IN PART IN SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS. I KNOW I SAW IT IN THE WASHINGTON TIMES AND OTHER PAPERS. ESSENTIALLY -- AND ALSO IN CONVERSATIONS THAT HE HAS HAD PRIVATELY WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HE HAS REITERATED THESE SIX POINTS WHICH COMPRISE OUR COMMITMENT ON THIS ISSUE. ALL OF THEM ARE IN THE LETTERS, JUST IN A DIFFERENT FASHION, BUT I'LL JUST BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE THOSE FOR YOU.

FIRST, THAT WE WILL GUARANTEE A VEHICLE FOR ACTION ON LOAN GUARANTEES AT THE END OF THE 120-DAY DEFERRAL PERIOD. IN OTHER WORDS, SOME KIND OF LEGISLATIVE VEHICLE FOR GETTING ACTION.

SECONDLY, THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER DELAY AT THE END OF THE 120 DAYS, NO MATTER WHAT THE STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS IS. THIS COMMITMENT, AS YOU KNOW, IS IN VIEW OF OUR REQUEST THAT CONSIDERATION OF THE LOAN GUARANTEES BE DELAYED 120 DAYS SO AS NOT TO OBSTRUCT THE PEACE PROCESS IN ANY FASHION.

THIRDLY, THAT WE RESTATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF ABSORPTION AID TO ISRAEL. AS YOU KNOW, I WENT THROUGH MUCH OF THIS YESTERDAY OR THE DAY BEFORE IN TERMS OF OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL AND HELPING OUT WITH THE IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

FOURTHLY, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD COMMIT TO HANDLE SCORING BY OMB IN THE MOST REASONABLE POSSIBLE WAY CONSISTENT WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. OMB SCORING IS A METHOD OF CALCULATIONS THAT HAS TO DO WITH HOW LOAN GUARANTEES ARE CONSIDERED UNDER THE BUDGET AGREEMENT. AND FRANKLY, I DON'T UNDERSTAND IT -- (LAUGHTER) -- BUT IT'S A TECHNICAL ISSUE MORE THAN A POLICY ONE, AT LEAST IN TERMS OF THE OVERALL QUESTION OF THE GUARANTEES THEMSELVES.

Q WHAT'S THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT COMMITMENT? I DON'T UNDERSTAND.

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, I'VE BEEN ASKING THAT ALL MORNING, FRANKLY, AND I DON'T HAVE A GOOD ANSWER, BUT IT HAS TO DO WITH HOW IT'S TREATED UNDER THE BUDGET. IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO THE CONGRESS IN TERMS OF BUDGETARY MATTERS. THERE'S NO DIRECT OUTLAYS, YOU SEE, ON LOAN GUARANTEES. HOWEVER, IF THE LOAN GUARANTEES AREN'T REPAID AND THAT SHOULD BE REQUIRED, THEN YOU HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF HOW IS THAT MONEY TREATED UNDER THE BUDGET AGREEMENT. AND THIS COMMITS US TO AN OMB SCORING IN THE SENSE THAT WE SAY WE'LL DEAL WITH IT, BUT EXACTLY HOW, FRANKLY, I DON'T UNDERSTAND.

FIFTH, THAT WE WILL UNDERTAKE AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AFTER JANUARY TO GET SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES FOR ABSORPTION

AID. WE HAVE OFTEN TALKED ABOUT THAT IN THE PAST.

AND SIXTH, THAT IF THERE IS ANY COST TO ISRAEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEFERRAL, MEANING THE 120-DAY WAIT, THAT WE WOULD AGREE THAT THAT COST SHOULD BE OFFSET IN THE ULTIMATE AID PACKAGE.

SO THOSE SIX POINTS WERE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY IN A NUMBER OF FORUMS, BOTH IN LETTER AND IN HIS ORAL CONVERSATION AND LEADS US TO WHERE WE ARE.

Q WHEN THEY WERE ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET DECISION TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM CUBA TODAY, SENATOR GRAMM AND CONGRESSMAN GINGRICH SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT VOTE FOR ANY US AID TO THE SOVIET UNION UNTIL THEY COMPLETELY CUT OFF CUBA ECONOMICALLY. IS THAT ALSO THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE HAVE NOT LINKED ANY QUID PRO QUO ITEMS WITH AID, BUT WE HAVE SAID TIME AND TIME AGAIN THAT MILITARY REDUCTIONS OF EXPENDITURES IS THE QUICKEST WAY FOR THEM TO GET MORE MONEY FOR THEIR AILING ECONOMY, AND THAT INDEED WE WOULD EXPECT THEM TO BE LOOKING AT DEFENSE CUTS AS A WAY OF PICKING UP MONEY. WE ALSO HAVE SAID -- INDEED, THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID, I THINK AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GORBACHEV SITTING NEXT TO HIM, THE QUICKEST WAY TO GET 5 BILLION (DOLLARS) A YEAR WOULD BE FROM CUBA.

SO, THAT POSITION IS CLEARLY STATED BY THE UNITED STATES TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES. AND I SUSPECT THAT IT'S NOT ENTIRELY COINCIDENTAL THAT BOTH YELTSIN AND GORBACHEV MADE THAT POINT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE ABC TOWN MEETING, AND WE HAVE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TODAY. SO, IT CLEARLY LOOKS LIKE THEY'RE TRYING TO RECOUP SOME FUNDS FROM THAT PURPOSE.

Q DOES THE PRESIDENT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MERELY HAS TO COMMIT TO ECONOMIC REFORMS BEFORE DIRECT AID IS PROVIDED?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THERE'S BEEN A LITTLE MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT OUR POSITION ALL ALONG, BUT WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT WE WANT TO SEE SERIOUS AND SIGNIFICANT REFORMS BEFORE WE'RE WILLING TO COMMIT AID, THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE BEING THAT WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT IT'S USABLE AND THAT IT DOESN'T GO DOWN A BLACK HOLE, AS WE'VE SAID IN THE PAST, AND THAT IT INDEED FURTHERS THE PROCESS.

CERTAINLY THE EVENTS OF THE LAST TWO WEEKS HAVE INDICATED THEY ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE REFORM PROCESS, BUT WE HAVE NEVER SAID THAT -- TRIED TO BE SPECIFIC IN SAYING ALL REFORMS HAVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED OR THEY HAVE TO DO THIS, THAT AND THE OTHER THING. WHAT WE HAVE SAID IS BASICALLY THAT'S A JUDGMENTAL MATTER.

SO WE DON'T CONSIDER THERE BEING ANY POLICY SWITCH IN THE COMMENTS THE SECRETARY MADE, WHICH I HAVE HERE AND WOULD BE GLAD TO READ FOR THOSE WHO HAVEN'T READ IT IN TOTAL. BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE REFORM. WE WOULD WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT A

REFORM IS INDEED REAL AND MEANINGFUL AND CAN USE UNITED STATES AID BEFORE IT'S GIVEN.

Q DOES THAT MEAN THERE WILL BE AID?

Q WHAT KIND OF DIRECT AID ARE YOU THINKING ABOUT?

MR. FITZWATER: IT MEANS THAT IT'S STILL AN OPEN QUESTION. WE CERTAINLY HAVE -- WE CERTAINLY HAVE COMMITTED TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY THIS WINTER. PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRIME MINISTER MAJOR HAD TALKED ABOUT THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE A TEAM HEADED BY UNDER SECRETARY CROWDER WHO IS MAKING AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR NEEDS RIGHT NOW, AND WE WILL INDEED BE WORKING ON A VERY FAST TRACK TO PROVIDE ANY WINTER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE THAT WE FIND IS NECESSARY. ON THE LONGER QUESTION, THE DECISIONS OF THE G-7 ARE STILL THE OPERATIVE ONES IN TERMS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TOWARDS AID. YOU KNOW FROM THE VISIT BY THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THERE IS TALK OF MOVING THAT TIMETABLE UP, OF PERHAPS BEING ABLE TO GET THEM INVOLVED WITH THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK ON A FASTER TRACK. BUT QUESTIONS OF DIRECT AID ARE STILL ONES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED AND AT THIS POINT, WE DON'T HAVE A DECISION.

Q GIVEN THE STATUS OF THE POLITICAL UNITS OF -- THE POLITICAL UNITS OF THE SOVIET UNION, ARE WE WILLING TO CONSIDER DIRECT AID TO INDIVIDUAL REPUBLICS?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THAT'S MY POINT IS THAT THERE STILL A LOT OF CHANGE GOING ON. THE REFORM PROCESS OBVIOUSLY IS MOVING FASTER. COUNTRIES ARE DECLARING THEIR INDEPENDENCE. NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ARE BEING SET UP. SO WE'LL HAVE TO ANALYZE ALL THIS AS WE GO. BUT WE DON'T HAVE CONCLUSIONS AT THIS POINT.

Q ARE WE TREATING THE HUMANITARIAN AID WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH NOW AS AID TO A SINGLE ENTITY OR ARE WE GOING TO BE WORKING MORE CLOSELY WITH INDIVIDUAL REPUBLICS?

MR. FITZWATER: WE'LL WORK WITH EVERYBODY. WE'RE TALKING AID TO PEOPLE, WHEREVER THEY ARE, WHOEVER NEEDS IT.

Q CONGRESSMAN GINGRICH AND SENATOR GRAMM SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO AID TO THE SOVIET UNION --

MR. FITZWATER: RIGHT.

Q -- UNTIL THEY CUT OFF ECONOMIC AS WELL AS MILITARY AID TO CUBA. IS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION, THAT THEY MUST CUT OFF THE ECONOMIC AID AS WELL?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THE OUR POSITION IS THE ONE I JUST STATED WITH CUBA, THAT WE THINK THAT'S THE PLACE WHERE THE SOVIET UNION CAN PICK UP MONEY AND THEY SHOULD ACT IN THAT REGARD. BUT WE HAVEN'T

TRIED TO LAY DOWN THREATS OR SPECIFIC GUIDELINES. FRANK?

Q TO FOLLOW UP ON THAT, HOW THEN DID THE PRESIDENT RESPOND TO THE STATEMENT AND WOULD HE PROPOSE SUCH A RESTRICTION IN THE SPENDING BILL?

MR. FITZWATER: RESPOND TO WHAT STATEMENT?

Q THE GRAMM-GINGRICH POSITION THAT THEY SHOULD CUT IT OFF, HOW DOES HE RESPOND TO THAT?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, IT DIDN'T COME UP IN THE MEETING, BUT HOW HE RESPONDS TO IT GENERALLY IS THE SAME WAY I DO, THAT WE FEEL THE SAME WAY, THAT A GOOD PLACE FOR THEM TO GET MONEY IS IN AID TO CUBA AND IT LOOKS LIKE THAT'S THE DIRECTION THEY'RE MOVING IN.

Q WELL, YOU SAY HE FEELS THAT WAY, BUT THAT'S NOT THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT YET TO DO THAT.

MR. FITZWATER: WE HAVEN'T STATED ANY DIRECTIVES ON SPECIFIC CUTS THEY HAVE TO MAKE OR WHERE, AND SO FORTH. BUT AGAIN, THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES ON CUBAN ASSISTANCE IS PROBABLY THE clearest AND MOST OFTEN STATED POLICY IN THE US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS.

Q WHAT IS THE POLICY?

MR. FITZWATER: IT'S OUR POLICY THAT THE QUICKEST AND BEST WAY TO GET MONEY IS TO TAKE SOME OF THAT CUBAN AID AND APPLY IT TO THEIR OWN ECONOMY.

Q IS THAT ALL AID OR IS THAT JUST MILITARY?

MR. FITZWATER: WE HAVE NEVER SAID THEY HAVE TO DO ANY SPECIFIC THING TO GET AID. WE'RE NOT LAYING DOWN QUID PRO QUOS. WE HAVE SAID WE WANT TO SEE ECONOMIC REFORM AND WE THINK THEY OUGHT TO USE MILITARY REDUCTIONS AS AN IMMEDIATE SOURCE OF MONEY.

Q HISTORICALLY, OUR CONCERN WITH CUBA HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE MILITARY THREAT.

MR. FITZWATER: RIGHT.

Q NOW, I MEAN, SOMETHING'S HAPPENED HERE TODAY AND IS THAT ENOUGH?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE'VE SAID IT'S A VERY HELPFUL STEP AND ONE THAT GOES IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND WE THINK THAT INDEED THEY SHOULD BE WITHDRAWING SUPPORT FOR CUBA. PRESIDENT BUSH HAS BEEN VERY CLEAR ABOUT THAT TIME AND TIME AGAIN.

Q BUT A GOOD PART OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC AID OR TIE WITH

CUBA IS APPARENTLY A BARTER ARRANGEMENT WHERE THEY SHIP CUBA OIL AND GET SUGAR BACK. AND SUGAR IS IN SHORT SUPPLY AND ONE OF THE AREAS WHERE SOVIET CONSUMERS ARE COMPLAINING ABOUT IS NOT HAVING SUGAR. ARE WE IN FAVOR OF THEM STOPPING OIL SHIPMENTS? HOW DOES THIS HELP?

MR. FITZWATER: THAT'S WHY I SAID WE DON'T GO INTO THOSE KINDS OF DICTATES ABOUT THOSE KINDS OF SPECIFICS. WHAT WE SAY IS THAT THEY'RE PROVIDING DOLLAR 5 BILLION A YEAR IN AID TO CUBA AND THEY OUGHT TO TAKE A LOOK AT IT AS A SOURCE OF MONEY TO HELP THEIR OWN ECONOMY. BUT WE ARE NOT GOING TO DICTATE SPECIFICS. STEVE?

Q WHAT'S YOUR ASSESSMENT -- BACK ON ISRAEL, WHAT'S YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SUPPORT IN CONGRESS ON THIS 120-DAY DELAY? AND ALSO, SENATOR GRAMM SAID THAT HE COULD SEE THE SHAPE OF A COMPROMISE FORMING IN WHICH THEY WOULD GO ALONG IF THERE WOULD BE A COMMITMENT TO ACT AND APPROVE A HOUSING SUBSIDY AT THE END. IS THE PRESIDENT WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THAT?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, AT THE MOMENT, THE SIX POINTS THAT I GAVE YOU CONSTITUTE OUR POSITION. AS I SAID, THE VARIOUS MEMBERS HAVE DIFFERENT IDEAS ABOUT SOME WAYS TO BE ABLE TO PROCEED. BUT I THINK WHAT YOU SEE IN THAT COMMENT IS A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT, LIKE ISRAEL, LIKE THE UNITED STATES, THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WANT BOTH THINGS: THEY WANT THE PEACE PROCESS TO GO FORWARD; THEY WANT TO CONSIDER THE LOAN GUARANTEES. THEY WANT TO WORK THIS THING -- THIS TIMING PROBLEM OUT IN A WAY THAT'S AMENABLE TO EVERYBODY. SO THERE'S A LOT OF DISCUSSIONS GOING ON. BUT WE -- OUR FEELING IS THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS WE WILL BE ABLE TO PROCEED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS, GET SOME DELAY IN THIS -- IN THE LOAN GUARANTEE QUESTION, AND THEN PROCEED ON THAT AS FAST AS WE CAN.

Q WHEN YOU SAY "SOME DELAY" ARE YOU -- YOU'RE NOT CONFIDENT THEN OF GETTING 120 DAYS?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE THINK THE 120 DAYS IS IMPORTANT, AND DON'T SEE ANY REASON WHY WE SHOULDN'T GET THAT MUCH DELAY.

Q HAS THE WHITE HOUSE BEEN TOLD BY ANYBODY IN CONGRESS THAT IT HAS TWO WEEKS TO COME UP WITH A COMPROMISE OR THEY'RE GOING TO GO AHEAD WITH CONSIDERATION ON LOAN GUARANTEES?

MR. FITZWATER: NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE. I THINK I DID SEE THAT IN A NEWS STORY, BUT I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT HAS ANY STANDING HERE. I'VE NOT HEARD IT DISCUSSED ANY PLACE.

Q AND DO YOU KNOW, WHAT IS THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE HERE? IF CONGRESS DECIDES TO GO AHEAD AND, LET'S SAY, THEY APPROVE IT, WOULD THE PRESIDENT HAVE A VETO POWER OVER THAT? I JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND THAT.

MR. FITZWATER: I THINK IT'S A STANDARD LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, YES. THEY PASS A BILL AND HE HAS STANDARD SIGNING/VETO RIGHTS.

Q THE PRESIDENT APPEARED TO EXPRESS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FRUSTRATION THERE THIS MORNING THE PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WHEN HE SAID, "I'M CALLING THE SHOTS." I MEAN, WHO IS HE AIMING THAT SHOT AT? CONGRESS, OR THE ISRAELI LOBBY, OR --

MR. FITZWATER: (LAUGHS) -- I DON'T KNOW, MICK, I DIDN'T HEAR THE QUESTION. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE ANTECEDENT WAS. I DON'T KNOW.

Q THE REFERENCE WAS TO HOW THIS THING WAS BEING DIRECTED -- IN WHAT DIRECTION --

Q MARLIN, WHY DOES THE PRESIDENT -- IF THIS IS A STANDARD LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, WHY DOES THE PRESIDENT NOT SIMPLY SAY THAT IF IT'S CONSIDERED NOW INSTEAD OF WHEN HE WANTS IT CONSIDERED, HE'LL VETO IT?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, BECAUSE WE WANT TO WORK THIS OUT IN A COLLEGIAL FASHION. MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS DO HAVE STRONG VIEWS ON IT, AND SO DO WE. AND WE -- LIKE THEM, WE WANT BOTH.

Q IF THEY WANT IT, THEN WHY WOULD THEY -- WHY WOULD IT NOT BE SENSIBLE FOR THEM TO WAIT UNTIL IT ISN'T GOING TO GET VETOED?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, BUT THE MAIN THING IS IF YOU FOSTER A PROCESS LIKE THAT, YOU DO --

Q FOSTER A BAD ATMOSPHERE, YOU MEAN?

MR. FITZWATER: YES, EXACTLY WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO AVOID, WHICH IS A RANCOROUS, BAD ATMOSPHERE. SO WE WANT TO TRY TO BE AS AMENABLE AS POSSIBLE IN WORKING THIS OUT.

Q MARLIN, HOW QUICKLY DOES THE PRESIDENT EXPECT TO NAME AMBASSADORS TO THE THREE BALTIC STATES? DOES THAT -- IS THAT IMMINENT?

MR. FITZWATER: WE'D LIKE TO DO IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT I CAN'T TELL YOU IN TERMS OF DAYS.

Q ARE WE TALKING DAYS, OR WEEKS?

MR. FITZWATER: THAT I DON'T KNOW. THE NORMAL -- I WOULD SAY -- I WOULD APPLY THE NORMAL AMBASSADORIAL SELECTION PROCESS, WHICH IS USUALLY -- USUALLY -- YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT IS?

Q NO.

Q FIRST YOU HAVE A CAMPAIGN AND CONTRIBUTIONS --

MR. FITZWATER: THE PRESIDENT DELIVERS HIS REMARKS AT THE DAY TOMORROW NIGHT AT 8:30.

Q CAN I FOLLOW ON THAT? WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO MR. GAMSAKHURDIA'S ASSERTION THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE CONSPIRING NOT TO GIVE GEORGIA RECOGNITION?

MR. FITZWATER: NO, IT'S NOT TRUE.

Q ARE YOU PREPARING NOW TO DEAL WITH THE OTHER REPUBLICS? ARE YOU MOVING ON THE OTHER REPUBLICS, SUCH AS GEORGIA AND MOLDAVIA?

MR. FITZWATER: ALL THOSE ISSUES ARE UNDER REVIEW. JOHN?

Q BACK TO ISRAEL FOR A SECOND. GINGRICH SAID OUT THERE THAT HE THOUGHT DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS -- SOME DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS WERE TRYING TO FORCE A CONFRONTATION OVER THE DELAY QUESTION THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROCESS FOR PARTISAN POLITICAL REASONS. IS THAT -- DOES THE PRESIDENT BELIEVE THAT ALSO?

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER WE HAVE ANY REAL INDICATION OF THAT. THERE'S -- YOU CAN ALWAYS FIND SOME DEMOCRAT WHO WANTS TO STIR UP A LITTLE POLITICAL TROUBLE, BUT -- (LAUGHTER) -- BUT WE'RE HOPEFUL THEY'LL SQUASH THAT IMPULSE WHEREVER THEY FIND IT.

Q MARLIN, I WANT TO GO BACK TO GATES. LIKE THOMAS, GATES FACES A BUZZSAW OF CONTROVERSY WHEN HE GOES BEFORE THE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS, BUT HE DOESN'T SEEM TO HAVE ANY SPECIAL GROUPS SET UP TO HELP SHEPHERD HIS NOMINATION. WHAT'S BEING DONE FOR HIM, AND WHY ISN'T HE GETTING SPECIAL ATTENTION?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, HE IS. THERE'S A VERY CONCENTRATED EFFORT ON HIS BEHALF. IT'S TOTALLY DIFFERENT THAN THE THOMAS NOMINATION BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCES, WELL, THAT CHAFEE AND MURKOWSKI WENT INTO IN THE DRIVEWAY. I THOUGHT THEY GAVE A VERY DESCRIPTION. BUT WE ARE WORKING QUITE AGGRESSIVELY WITH VARIOUS PEOPLE TO SUPPORT THE GATES NOMINATION. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE A LOT OF SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS HERE WHICH CALL FOR A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT RESPONSE. THIS IS NOT A NOMINATION THAT'S PROBABLY GOING TO BE DEALT WITH BY THE KINDS OF SPECIAL INTEREST CONSTITUENCY GROUPS THAT WE SEE IN THE THOMAS NOMINATION.

SO WE ARE MEETING INTERNALLY EVERY DAY TO DECIDE VARIOUS ISSUES ABOUT THE NOMINATION, MOST OF THEM RELATED TO COMMUNICATIONS. AND THERE'S A VERY AGGRESSIVE EFFORT AND A LOT OF PEOPLE WORKING ON IT. AND OF COURSE, MY PR ANSWER TO THAT IS, THE PR THAT'S NOT SEEN IS THE BEST KIND. SO, IT'S GOING VERY WELL.

THANK YOU.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, סולטן, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט), @ (לוברני)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9463

אל: רהמש/467

מ-: ווש, נר: 2029, תא: 110991, זח: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/מיידי

אל : סמנכל צפא

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ערביות

הפעילות עודנה אינטנסיבית.

קבוצת קונגרסמן יהודים נפגשת היום עם פולי.

(2) הבוקר ישבה המנהיגות הדמוקרטית אל המדוכה (ללא תוצאות לכאן או לכאן).

(3) קסטן ואינווה אוספים שותפים לחקיקתם (אין עדיין מספרים).

(4) היתה פגישת מנהיגים רפובליקנים עם הנשיא (שבה עבר מיקי אדוארדס לשורותיו).

על כל אלה תקבלו בודאי דיווחים מפורטים יותר מהקישור לקונגרס. בתום הפגישה האחרונה ענה בוש לשאלות עיתונאים. הדברים תקיפים ובלתי מתפשרים תקבלו את הנוסח מרות ירון.

שילה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9443

אל: רהמש/461

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 124, תא: 110991, זח: 1940, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: לשכת רוה"מ, מצפ"א

מאת: וושינגטון - לשכת השגריר

השגריר הודיע לקלי לפי בקשת י. בן אהרון, כי הפגישה של מזכיר המדינה עם
רוה"מ תתחיל ב- 15:30 ולא ב- 15:00.

לשכת השגריר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

מכ"ל

1045 $\frac{1}{2}$

שמו/חיידי

מל גזקזח נא

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת שר האוצר, לשכת מנכ"ל האוצר, ציר כלכלי כאן (ג/א/א)

מאת: ק' לקונגרס - וושינגטון

הנדון: הקונגרסמן ביל גרין: ערבויות

היום, 11/9, הפיץ הקונגרסמן ביל גרין המכתב הרצי"ב לנשיא בוש, בין עמיתיו
בועדת החקצבות, מתוך כוונה לשגרו ביום ו' ח קרוב (13/9). משרדו של גרין
עונק עתה באיסוף התימות.

יו"ר - וקא' צינציר

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

2 להח ס'להי מד' אפס 1 בוצ'ה 2 דב'א 1 רמ'י 1 אלת 2 הס'מ
כהן 1 כס'ט'ת' 1 א'צ'ה 3

BILL GREEN
18TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE
RANKING MEMBER
VA-HUD-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
"FOREIGN OPERATIONS"

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2201 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2436

NEW YORK OFFICE
LINCOLN BUILDING
80 EAST 42ND STREET, ROOM 2208
NEW YORK, NY 10188-0018
(212) 681-4488

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

September 13, 1991

President George Bush
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

As Members of the House Appropriations Committee, we would like to bring the following points to your attention regarding the timing of Congressional consideration of Israel's request for \$10 billion in loan guarantees for refugee assistance.

When last Spring's supplemental appropriation bill was before the Appropriation's Committee, many of us wanted to offer an amendment to that bill to provide \$10 billion in loan guarantees for housing Soviet and Ethiopian Jewish refugees. From an appropriations point of view, it would have been highly desirable to have enacted the loan guarantee program then since, under the 1990 Budget Reform Act, the loan guarantee would not be a charge against funds otherwise available for appropriation if enacted for FY 91, whereas it will be such a charge when enacted for FY 92.

Nonetheless, when your Administration pledged that, if we did not pass the loan guarantee in the Supplemental Appropriation bill, it would be taken up in September, we agreed, and did not offer a loan guarantee amendment.

So last Spring, Mr. President, you told us, "Wait until September," and we did. Now September is here, but your Administration is refusing to honor its commitment. Now we are told, "Wait until January."

Surely you can see our dilemma at this juncture-- given the history of this issue, there is no reason for us to trust assurances that the Administration will endorse the loan guarantee program come January, and in the meantime, tens of thousands of Jewish refugees suffer throughout Israel for want of adequate shelter and other basic amenities.

We cannot sanction the 120-day postponement the Administration is requesting, and we respectfully request that you return to your original timing regarding this program. The rescue of an oppressed and endangered people from the Soviet Union, which the United States has demanded and orchestrated for two decades, cannot be delayed, and should clearly not be linked to the political vagaries of the Middle East.

We urge you to endorse the immediate consideration of Israel's request for the loan guarantee program.

1045 $\frac{2}{2}$

למכתב

1/3 למה
1044

ב'מ"ס/מיידי

אל: מצפ"א

ואת המכתב - (א)

דע: לשכת שר האוצר, לשכת מנכ"ל האוצר, ציר כלכלי כאן (הוצר)

מאת: ק' לקונגרס - וושינגטון

הנדון: הקונגרסמן לארי סמית: ערבויות

היום בבוקר, 11/9, בעקבות ההתפתחויות האחרונות, הפיץ הקונגרסמן סמית מכתב dear colleague (מצ"ב) לכל עמיתיו בבית הנבחרים (מעין T.P.) שנועד להחזיר מדוע אין לדחות, כבקשת חנשיא, את הדיון והחקיקה בנושא הערבויות. חדש של סמית הוא על תהליך השלום והתנהגות מדינות ערב והצורך בקליטה מחירה.

י (ב) (א) - ונגא' צינאלי
יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

למה סלמה רחל גולד מנצח גליל
רח"ב גליל הסמיה בין צפ"א א/ב
1 1 2 1 3

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING
AND RELATED PROGRAMS

LEGISLATIVE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS
ABUSE AND CONTROL

DEPUTY MAJORITY WHIP

VICE-CHAIR, DEMOCRATIC STUDY GROUP



1044
2/3
Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515
September 11, 1991

113 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0511
(202) 225-1821

DISTRICT OFFICE
PRESIDENTIAL CIRCLE
4000 HOLLYWOOD BLVD
SUITE 300 N
HOLLYWOOD, FL 33021-6970
(305) 987-4484 BROWARD
(305) 824-8111 DADE

Dear Colleague,

The President's request to delay consideration of loan guarantees for Israel raises troubling questions about U.S. policy. This will be a visceral issue for constituents and advocates of a strong U.S.-Israel relationship. I'd like to share some thoughts about the loan guarantees and the peace process:

* The administration has staked out an extreme position. Neither Syria nor Jordan ever asked that the loan guarantees be delayed, nor was this ever a precondition for their participation in the peace talks.

* The Arab states also agreed to attend the peace conference without any guarantee of a settlement freeze. By demanding a halt to settlement activities, the administration is prejudging the ultimate disposition of the territories and predetermining the outcome of the peace talks.

Without any incentive to compromise, the Arab states will not engage in meaningful negotiations. The President's decision thus threatens to doom the peace process.

* The President's request for a delay raises a question of fairness. Israel already delayed its request for loan guarantees: despite pressing needs, it agreed in March to postpone its request until September. The administration used the promise of loan guarantees to encourage Israel to attend the peace conference. Israel responded positively.

A new delay calls into question the President's willingness to abide by his commitments. As the mediator of the peace conference, and potential guarantor of a peace treaty, the United States needs all the credibility it can muster.

* The request for a delay reinforces the most uncompromising elements in the Arab world. Islamic extremists and the Palestine Liberation Organization do not simply want a delay in the loan guarantees; they want a total cessation of Jewish immigration to Israel. Palestinian leaders supported the abortive Soviet coup with the hope that the junta would stop Jewish immigration. A delay will only encourage this affinity for dictators and extremist solutions. It will reward the Arafats and the Qaddafis.

* The President's request links humanitarian assistance to transient political considerations. The central issue is immigrant absorption; assisting Israel with this task is the culmination of longstanding American policy.

3/1044

Within the next five years, more than one million new Israelis may arrive from Russia and the Ukraine alone. America's commitment to freedom of emigration was never made without an awareness of the consequences. It was understood that by supporting the right to emigrate, the United States was committing itself to help Israel provide homes, jobs, and infrastructure. The need is immediate. Assistance delayed is assistance denied.

* By delaying the loan guarantees, by impairing Israel's absorption capacity, the President in effect is impeding Soviet Jewish emigration. All of us hope that democracy will take root in the former USSR. But anti-Semitism is an abiding concern, and with the prospect of famine and social disorder, hundreds of thousands of Jews are seeking to leave now. One hundred and twenty days from now, in the depths of the Russian winter, may be too late.

* The President has unilaterally compromised Israel's negotiating position and strengthened its adversaries. Simple equity and common sense are at issue: the administration has addressed the loan guarantees, but not the \$4 billion worth of arms sales to the Arab states that have been initiated since the end of the Gulf War. These sales, and weapons deliveries already in the pipeline, pose a genuine risk to peace.


Are tools of construction a greater threat to peace than instruments of destruction?

* Scant pressure is being applied to the Arab states. When Syria refused last month to attend a Middle East water conference if Israel was invited, Turkey chose not to invite Israel, and the administration said nothing about how this action was a detriment to the peace process. The imbalance is illogical, and unwise.

* Finally, it is important to remember that Israel is only seeking loan guarantees, not credits, not grant aid, not cash.

I urge you to keep an open mind on this subject. Please do not agree precipitately to a delay that would damage the process of absorption and the prospects for peace.

Very truly yours,


LAWRENCE J. SMITH
Member of Congress

LJS:adr

אאא, חוזם: 9096
אל: רהמש/433
מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 103, תא: 110991, זח: 1210, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: תדרוכי הבית הלבן ומחמ"ד בראש השנה

להלן הקטעים המתיחסים לנושא הערבויות ותהליך השלום, כפי שהופיעו
בתדרוכי הבית הלבן ביום שני (9/9), מחמ"ד ביום שני, (9/9), הבית הלבן
ביום שלישי (10/9) ומחמ"ד ביום שלישי (10/9) -:

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC, REGULAR BRIEFING
BRIEFER: MARLIN FITZWATER, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1991

Q MR. SHAMIR HAS SHOWED DISPLEASURE AT THE PRESIDENT'S
REACTION ON THE DOLLAR 10 BILLION. IS THERE ANY EFFORT TO FIND SOME
KIND OF MIDDLE GROUND, OR ARE -- AND IS THERE ANY CONCERN THAT THIS
IS GOING TO INTERFERE WITH THE PEACE CONFERENCE?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, FIRST OF ALL, THE BASIS FOR OUR REQUEST
TO DELAY CONSIDERATION OF THE DOLLAR 10 BILLION IS THAT CONSIDERATION
NOW COULD WELL INDEED HAVE A BAD IMPACT ON THE PEACE CONFERENCE. WE
HAVE ASKED THAT ANOTHER 120 DAYS BE GIVEN TO CONDUCT THE PEACE
CONFERENCE OR TO GET THAT ON TRACK AS BEST WE CAN BEFORE WE TAKE UP
THIS MATTER.

OUR POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS IS WELL KNOWN. WE DO BELIEVE THEY
ARE AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE. THAT POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED AND WILL
NOT CHANGE. BUT WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A MATTER FOR CONTINUAL
DISCUSSION. SECRETARY BAKER IS GOING THERE FOR A MEETING ON
SEPTEMBER 16 WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS. HE'S GOING TO VISIT THREE OR
FOUR OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WHILE HE'S HERE, SO WE'LL HAVE
FACE-TO-FACE TALKS VERY SOON ON ALL OF THESE MATTERS.

BUT IF THERE'S -- YOU ASKED ABOUT A MIDDLE GROUND. I GUESS THE
MIDDLE GROUND THAT WE WOULD LOOK TO WOULD BE THE MIDDLE GROUND THAT
SAYS LET'S HOLD OFF ON THE 10 BILLION (DOLLARS). LET'S GET STARTED
ON THE PEACE PROCESS, AND THEN TAKE UP THIS MATTER LATER. IN OTHER

WORDS, THERE'S TIME AND THERE'S A SEQUENCE TO DO THESE THINGS AND WE THINK THAT WE JUST NEED TO FIND THE ONE THAT MEETS THE MOST NEEDS FOR US AND FOR THEM.

Q MARLIN, HAS THE ADMINISTRATION NOT SUGGESTED TO ISRAELI OFFICIALS A BRIDGE LOAN, SORT OF TO SPEAK, SOME AMOUNT OF MONEY TO CARRY THEM FROM NOW UNTIL THE 120 DAYS THAT WOULD -- NOT NECESSARILY FALL INTO THE HOUSING --

MR. FITZWATER: YEAH.

Q -- LOAN GUARANTEE CATEGORY?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WHEN I HEAR A QUESTION LIKE THAT I'M ALWAYS RELUCTANT TO ANSWER BECAUSE IT MEANS YOU'VE PROBABLY GOT SOMEBODY OVER IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO SAYS THEY'RE WORKING ON A BRIDGE LOAN. BUT I HAVE NOT HEAR OF ONE. (LAUGHTER.)

DO YOU KNOW OF ANYTHING, ROMAN? SO --

Q I READ IT IN TWO NEWSPAPERS THIS MORNING, MARLIN, AND COMING OUT OF ISRAEL.

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, I'M NOT AWARE OF IT, IN ANY CASE.

Q DOES THE ADMINISTRATION THINK IT HAS A MORAL OBLIGATION FOR THIS DOLLAR 10 BILLION LOAN CREDIT PROGRAM?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THE UNITED STATES HAS MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL THAT WE HAVE ARTICULATED AND FOLLOWED FOR YEARS AND YEARS AND WILL CONTINUE TO. AND OUR FRIENDSHIP AND LOYALTY TO ISRAEL IS BEYOND QUESTION AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SO. AND THAT IS THE OVERALL DRIVING FORCE THAT MAKES US WANT TO HELP THEM.

WE WANT TO HELP, OBVIOUSLY, THE REFUGEES THAT ARE COMING IN -- THE IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. WE, AS YOU KNOW, HAVE URGED ISRAEL TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THESE PEOPLE. WE HAVE WORKED LONG AND HARD WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO GET THEM TO BE ALLOWED TO IMMIGRATE TO ISRAEL.

SO WE DO HAVE RECOGNIZED RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THAT'S ONE OF THE REASONS WHY WE WENT AHEAD WITH THE 400 MILLION (DOLLAR) LOAN GUARANTEE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. BUT NEVERTHELESS, THAT RELATIONSHIP IS STABLE AND IS UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH PARTIES AND DOES NOT DIMINISH THE FACT THAT WE STILL WANT -- WE ALSO WANT TO GET THE PEACE PROCESS GOING.

Q DO THE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION MEAN THAT THERE WILL BE MORE SOVIET JEWS EMIGRATING, LESS, THE SAME? DO WE HAVE ANY --

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T KNOW THAT WE HAVE ANYTHING TOO

DEFINITIVE, ALTHOUGH THE LIKELIHOOD PROBABLY IS MORE. AS THE BARRIERS COME DOWN, THE EXPERIENCE -- HISTORIC EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT MORE HAVE GONE.

Q YOU SAY OUR POSITION HAS NOT AND WILL NOT CHANGE, BUT YET THERE'S A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. IS THAT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THEIR POSITION WILL CHANGE ON SETTLEMENTS SOON?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE CONTINUE TO MAKE OUR VIEWS KNOWN AND DISCUSS THIS ISSUE, BUT -- WHETHER OR NOT THEY WILL CHANGE THAT POSITION OR NOT.

Q WHAT, THEN, IS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION?

MR. FITZWATER: THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE TIMING OF THE LOAN CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS.

Q WHY DOES THE ADMINISTRATION THINK THAT THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE WOULD HAVE PREVENTED PEOPLE FROM COMING TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE? THE ISRAELIS MAKE THE POINT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO OBJECTION FROM ARABS WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE.

MR. FITZWATER: OUR CONCERN IS THAT THIS IS A CONTROVERSIAL MATTER THAT MEMBERS OF OUR LEGISLATURE FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT, THAT ARAB COUNTRIES FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT, AND THAT WE HAVE A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS HERE, THAT WE HAVE A TIME FRAME THAT'S RELATIVELY SHORT -- WE'RE TALKING IN THE NEXT MONTH OR TWO, OR THREE MONTHS -- AND THAT THE DELAY SIMPLY MAKES SENSE IN TERMS OF NOT WANTING TO INFLAME PASSIONS AT A TIME WHEN WE WANT TO BRING PEOPLE TOGETHER FACE TO FACE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY.

Q BUT WHOSE PASSIONS?

MR. FITZWATER: MEMBERS OF OUR CONGRESS, MEMBERS OF OUR --

Q BUT (THEY ARE ?) PERENNIALY INFLAMED.

MR. FITZWATER: MEMBERS OF OUR PUBLIC --

Q THEY (EXIST INFLAMED ?). (LAUGHTER.) IS THAT REALLY GOING TO UPSET SOME PEACE CONFERENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

MR. FITZWATER: -- LEADERS OF ARAB COUNTRIES, ALL OF THE PARTICIPANTS.

Q WELL, ONE COLUMNIST SUGGESTS THIS MORNING THAT --

MR. FITZWATER: .WE'RE TALKING TIMING HERE, AND THE QUESTION IS WHY RUSH IF YOU'VE GOT A CHANCE TO HELP MAINTAIN A CALMER ATMOSPHERE FOR THE PEACE TALKS?

Q BUT ONE COLUMNIST THIS MORNING SUGGESTED THAT THIS IS

PRESIDENT BUSH'S OBSESSION ALONE, THAT HE'S THE ONLY ONE WHO IS RAISING THIS SETTLEMENT ISSUE.

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THAT'S NOT TRUE. THAT'S NOT TRUE. YOU CAN SURVEY OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND HALF OF OUR OWN LEGISLATURE.

Q BUT I MEAN IN TERMS OF GETTING TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE. I UNDERSTAND THAT IT'S A LONGSTANDING ISSUE THAT WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED AT SOME POINT.

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T SEE HOW YOU CAN LOOK AT THE YEARS AND YEARS AND MONTHS AND MONTHS OF EFFORTS ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE PROGRESS THAT'S BEEN MADE AND SAY THAT THERE'S NO DANGER OF HAVING PEOPLE'S PASSIONS THROW THIS OFF COURSE. I MEAN, THIS IS THE MOST DELICATE FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE THAT ANY ADMINISTRATION HAS UNDERTAKEN AS LONG AS I CAN REMEMBER. I CAN REMEMBER SHULTZ SHUTTLE BACK AND FORTH, AND KISSINGER SHUTTLE BACK AND FORTH, AND BAKER SHUTTLE BACK AND FORTH. THE US GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN WORKING THIS FOR DECADES, AND IT JUST SIMPLY MAKES NO SENSE NOT TO TRY TO GIVE YOURSELF EVERY BREAK YOU CAN, ESPECIALLY WHEN WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A QUESTION OF TIMING.

Q MARLIN, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL IS GOING TO MOUNT A FULL-SCALE LOBBYING CAMPAIGN TO GET THE LOAN GUARANTEES IMMEDIATELY. WHAT'S THE WHITE HOUSE GOING TO DO IN RESPONSE? WHAT KIND OF --

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, I'M NOT SURE IT IS CLEAR. SECRETARY BAKER WILL DISCUSS IT WITH HIM NEXT WEEK. I'M NOT SURE THAT'S CLEAR AT ALL.

Q HAVE YOU BEEN GIVEN --

MR. FITZWATER: WE THINK ISRAEL WANTS THE PEACE PROCESS, AND WE THINK PRESIDENT SHAMIR IS SINCERE WHEN HE HAS TOLD US THAT MANY TIMES.

Q YOUR COMMENTS ARE PRETTY RESTRAINED TODAY, AND YET SHAMIR IGNORED TWO -- DEFIED TWO PERSONAL APPEALS FROM BUSH TO DELAY THIS MATTER, AND APPARENTLY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HASN'T RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO BAKER'S APPEALS ON FRIDAY. ISN'T THE PRESIDENT DISAPPOINTED OR ANGRY ABOUT THIS?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, RESTRAINT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A VIRTUE IN MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, AND AS I SAID, WE WORKED LONG AND HARD TO GET THIS FAR, AND WE'RE GOING TO TRY TO KEEP NUDGING THE PROCESS FORWARD WITH AS LITTLE ACRIMONY AS POSSIBLE.

Q GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE FLOOD OF EMIGRES IS SUCH A BURDEN ON ISRAEL, IS THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERING ALLOWING MORE SOVIET JEWS TO ENTER THE US AS AN ALTERNATIVE DESTINATION?

MR. FITZWATER: I'LL HAVE TO REVIEW THAT, MARY. I DON'T KNOW WHERE THAT POLICY STANDS. I KNOW WE'VE GONE THROUGH THIS SIX OR EIGHT MONTHS AGO, BUT I'M NOT UP TO DATE ON IT.

Q MARLIN, DID THE PRESIDENT MAKE ANY CALLS ON THIS ISSUE OVER THE WEEKEND TO DEMOCRATIC SENATORS?

MR. FITZWATER: HE HAS CALLED THE LEADERSHIP. I DON'T KNOW THE TIMING. AND MANY OTHER MEMBERS HAVE BEEN CALLED BY SECRETARY BAKER, UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER -- OR DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, AND GENERAL SCOWCROFT. THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED THE FOUR LEADERS, BUT I DON'T -- (TO MR. POPADIUK) DO YOU KNOW WHETHER IT WAS OVER THE WEEKEND OR NOT, ROMAN? I DON'T KNOW THE --

MR. POPADIUK: THREE OF THEM ON FRIDAY AND THEN ONE ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY.

MR. FITZWATER: YEAH, ROMAN SAYS THREE WERE CALLED ON FRIDAY AND ONE OVER THE WEEKEND.

WE HAVE STARTED A PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONGRESS WHERE THE -- THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN CONDUCTING WITH THE OTHER ADMINISTRATION LEADERS AND THERE WILL BE MORE CALLS.

Q WHAT -- IS YOUR ANTICIPATION THAT SOME MOVE WILL OCCUR IN CONGRESS THIS WEEK, SOON? I MEAN, WHAT IS YOUR SENSE OF TIMING ON THIS NOW?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, I THINK OUR SENSE OF IT AT THE MOMENT IS THAT PEOPLE ARE KIND OF -- ARE CONSIDERING IT, REALLY, THAT NO ONE HAS MADE A MOVE TO GO FOWARD OR TO PULL BACK. I THINK WE'RE KIND OF IN THAT PHASE WHERE WE WANT TO DISCUSS IT, CONGRESS IS WILLING TO LISTEN TO WHAT WE HAVE TO SAY. BAKER'S TRIP OF COURSE INCLUDES SYRIA, JORDAN AND THE FOURTH COUNTRY, EGYPT, AND THAT IS NEXT WEEK. SO, WE HAVE A PERIOD RIGHT NOW I THINK WHERE WE'RE NOT SEEING PEOPLE PUSH FOR EXTREME POSITIONS BUT RATHER TO KIND OF SEE HOW THIS SORTS OUT. THAT'S MY -- OUR JUDGMENT.

Q YOU DON'T HAVE A JUDGMENT THAT THE END OF THIS WEEK OR NEXT WEEK OR IN SOME -- EITHER HOUSE, I MEAN LEGISLATIVELY, WHAT DO YOU THINK IS GOING TO HAPPEN?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, I THINK IT'S JUST TOO SOON TO SAY. WHAT WE HOPE WILL HAPPEN WILL BE THAT EVERYONE WILL AGREE WITH OUR GENERAL THESIS THAT WE NEED TO PURSUE THE PEACE PROCESS FIRST AND THEN TAKE UP THIS OTHER MATTER.

Q WHEN DO YOU ACTUALLY EXPECT TO SEND OUT THE INVITATIONS FOR THIS PEACE CONFERENCE? HOW CLOSE ARE YOU TO THAT --

MR. FITZWATER: I DON'T KNOW, ON A SPECIFIC BASIS. OBVIOUSLY 120 DAYS IS THE TIMETABLE WE'VE PUT FORTH FOR GENERAL EXPECTATIONS

OF GETTING A CONFERENCE GOING, BUT I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS. THAT MAY --

Q DO YOU STILL EXPECT IT IN OCTOBER?

MR. FITZWATER: THAT'S WHAT WE'RE PUSHING FOR.

Q DO YOU HAVE SIGNS FROM ISRAEL THAT THEY MAY NOT LOBBY HARD TO GET THE LOAN GUARANTEES IMMEDIATELY? YOU SAID IT'S NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHAT THEY'RE GOING TO DO.

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, I MEAN, I THINK YOU HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND THAT THEY WANT THE LOAN GUARANTEES, THAT THEY WANT THE PEACE PROCESS, BOTH ARE IN THEIR INTERESTS. AND THERE'S DISCUSSION THAT'S GOING TO TAKE PLACE, SO I THINK THERE'S STILL A GOOD CHANCE WE CAN WORK THIS OUT.

STATE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEFING, BRIEFER: RICHARD BOUCHER
12:15 P.M., EDT, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1991

MR. BOUCHER: GOOD AFTERNOON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. I THOUGHT I'D START OUT BY UPDATING YOU ON SOME CHANGES IN THE SCHEDULE TO THE SECRETARY'S FORTHCOMING TRIP. WE ALWAYS GIVE YOU THESE THINGS WITH THE PROVISIO THAT THINGS MAY CHANGE. THIS IS EVIDENCE THAT THEY DO CHANGE, AND I WILL END THIS ALL AS WELL BY SAYING THINGS ALWAYS CAN CHANGE FURTHER BASED ON THE SCHEDULES.

THE MEXICO AND THEN MOSCOW SECTIONS OF THE SCHEDULE REMAIN AS THEY WERE. THE OVERNIGHTS START CHANGING AS OF SATURDAY. SO FRIDAY NIGHT AND SATURDAY NIGHT HE WILL BE IN LENINGRAD. ON SUNDAY THEY WILL GO TO ALMA-ATA -- ARRIVE THERE IN THE EVENING. ON MONDAY, THEY WILL GO FROM ALMA-ATA TO ISRAEL, STAY OVERNIGHT IN ISRAEL MONDAY NIGHT. TUESDAY IS ISRAEL, CAIRO, AND THEN ON TO AMMAN FOR THE NIGHT. WEDNESDAY -- TRAVEL FROM AMMAN TO DAMASCUS -- TO SYRIA. AND THEN THURSDAY, NOW, THEY CAN LEAVE SYRIA AND COME HOME TO ANDREWS, SO THEY'LL BE GETTING BACK ONE DAY EARLIER THAN PLANNED.

THAT'S THE SCHEDULE AS IT NOW STANDS WITH SOME RECENT CHANGES THAT WERE MADE TO IT FOR SCHEDULING REASONS. I'LL GIVE YOU THAT AGAIN WITH THE PROVISIO THAT THINGS CAN ALWAYS CHANGE AS FURTHER DETAILS GET WORKED OUT.

Q DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY ABOUT THE LATEST ISRAELI COMMENTS ON THE NEW SETTLEMENTS?

MR. BOUCHER:
OUR POLICY REGARDING SETTLEMENTS, I THINK IS VERY CLEAR. IT HAS

BEEN CLEAR FOR MANY YEARS, IT HAS NOT CHANGED AND OUR POLICY REMAINS WHERE IT WAS. ONE REASON FOR ASKING FOR A DELAY IS TO GIVE PEACE A CHANCE. WE WANT TO AVOID CONFLICT, WE WANT TO AVOID DIVISIVE DEBATES. THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE WHICH WE MUST NOT LOSE. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS, WE BELIEVE, COMMITTED TO PEACE AND IS INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING THROUGH AND PICKING UP ON THE OFFER OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, SOMETHING THAT ISRAEL HAS WANTED FOR OVER 40 YEARS. WE REMAIN FULLY COMMITTED TO HELPING ISRAEL SUCCESSFULLY ABSORB SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS.

LET ME REMIND YOU AS WELL THAT SECRETARY BAKER SAID LAST FRIDAY THAT HE LOOKS FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE IN DETAIL WITH PRIME MINSTER SHAMIR ON HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO ISRAEL.

Q SINCE THAT FRIDAY MEETING THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS COMING OUT OF ISRAEL THAT BAKER, IN LIEU OF IMMEDIATE ACTION ON THE LOAN GUARANTEE, OFFERED FINANCIAL HELP OF A DIFFERENT KIND, REPORTED TO BE TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN NEW FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. WAS THERE SUCH AN OFFER MADE?

MR. BOUCHER: I HADN'T SEEN THOSE REPORTS, JIM, SO I DIDN'T GET A CHANCE TO CHECK, SO I'LL HAVE TO CHECK FOR YOU AND SEE.

Q WELL, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THOSE REPORTS, DID THE SECRETARY MAKE ANY NEW KIND OF FINANCIAL COMMITMENT DURING THE COURSE OF THAT MEETING WITH MR. SHOVAL?

MR. BOUCHER: I THINK HE AND AMBASSADOR SHOVAL GAVE YOU QUITE AN EXTENSIVE RUNDOWN OF THE MEETING AND THEIR DISCUSSIONS ON FRIDAY. I AM NOT AWARE THAT THEY MENTIONED ANYTHING LIKE THAT, BUT AGAIN I SAY THAT I DIDN'T HAVE A CHANCE TO CHECK ON THIS SUBJECT, SO I'LL HAVE TO CHECK ON IT.

Q THEY DON'T IN THE TRANSCRIPT YOU PUT OUT, NO.

Q A FOLLOW UP ON JIM'S QUESTION. I HEARD THAT IT WASN'T NECESSARILY BETWEEN SHOVAL AND SECRETARY BAKER, BUT THERE HAS BEEN A MEETING BETWEEN SENIOR ISRAELI DIPLOMATS HERE, SENIOR PEOPLE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WAS DISCUSSED WAS THE SO CALLED COMPROMISE WHERE THE UNITED STATES WOULD GIVE SOME OTHER KIND OF AID IMMEDIATELY.

MR. BOUCHER: OKAY, I AM SORRY, I AM AT A LOSS HERE, I HADN'T SEEN THESE REPORTS SO I HADN'T CHECKED ON ANY IDEAS LIKE THIS, AND IT'S SOMETHING I'LL JUST HAVE TO CHECK ON FOR YOU.

Q IN THIS REGARD, RICHARD, COULD YOU PLEASE INFORM US IF THE UNITED STATES AT ANY TIME WILL BE SOON SIGNING THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OVER THE WHOLE PROCESS OF TALKS AND MEETINGS BETWEEN MR. BAKER AND MR. SHAMIR? BECAUSE THERE WAS AN AMERICAN TEAM, AN ISRAELI TEAM DISCUSSING THE

DETAILS OF THE MOU, AND I UNDERSTAND TWO WEEKS AGO, THREE WEEKS AGO, THAT THIS HAS BEEN PUT ON HOLD. CAN YOU ELABORATE ON THIS?

MR. BOUCHER: I CAN'T ELABORATE BEYOND WHAT THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED LAST WEDNESDAY WHEN HE DESCRIBED HIS TRIP. HE SAID HE WOULD BE WORKING FURTHER ON THE QUESTION OF ASSURANCES, AND THAT'S SOMETHING THAT HE'LL BE DOING AS HE TRAVELS OFF TO THE MIDDLE EAST NEXT WEEK. I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER UPDATE FOR YOU AT THIS POINT.

Q KING HUSSEIN WAS ON NBC THIS MORNING, AND I THINK THE JORDANIAN MONARCH HAS ASKED THE UNITED STATES FOR EXPLANATIONS OR RESTATING THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, OR POSSIBLY 338. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE REQUEST BY JORDAN TO GET SOME ASSURANCES ABOUT YOUR POSITION REGARDING 242?

MR. BOUCHER: AS I SAID, THE SECRETARY WILL BE DEALING WITH THESE QUESTIONS WHEN HE GOES OUT TO THE REGION. HE'S SPOKEN BEFORE ABOUT WORKING ON THE QUESTION OF ASSURANCES, AND HE'LL BE WORKING ON THAT AS HE GOES OUT THERE. I THINK HE'S ALSO MADE QUITE CLEAR OUR POSITIONS ON 242 AND 338.

Q WELL, LAST ONE ON THESE ASSURANCES. THE PALESTINIANS WHO WILL MEET WITH MR. BAKER, AND THE PURPOSE IS TO GET SOME ASSURANCES FOR THE PALESTINIANS HERE IN WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM AND THE EAST BANK AND THE WEST BANK OF JERUSALEM, DID YOU WORK ON THIS, OR ARE YOU STILL WORKING ON ASSURANCES FOR THE PALESTINIANS IF THEY WILL COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE?

MR. BOUCHER: AGAIN, LAST WEDNESDAY THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WAS A QUESTION THAT WAS STILL BEING WORKED. AT THIS POINT, WE STILL HAVE TO CONCLUDE THE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION, AND HE WILL BE WORKING ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES WHEN HE RETURNS TO THE MIDDLE EAST NEXT WEEK.

Q RICHARD, PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR SAID TODAY THAT UNLESS ISRAEL IS SATISFIED WITH THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION IT WILL NOT ATTEND THE PEACE CONFERENCE. DOES ANY OF THAT COME AS A SURPRISE TO YOU?

MR. BOUCHER: AGAIN, THERE HAVE BEEN A VARIETY OF STATEMENTS ON THIS. I THINK THE BEST COURSE FOR ME AT THIS POINT IS TO SAY THAT, AS THE SECRETARY HAS SAID BEFORE, HE WILL BE DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND ASSURANCES AND THINGS LIKE THAT TO DIFFERENT PARTIES AS HE GOES OUT THERE. HE'S MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WOULDN'T BE ASSURANCES THAT WERE NOT SHARED WITH ALL THE PARTIES. AND HE WILL BE WORKING ON THESE ISSUES AS HE GOES BACK TO THE REGION NEXT WEEK.

Q RICHARD, DID ANYBODY DECIDE DEFINITELY WHEN THIS 120-DAY MORATORIUM WAS DUE TO STOP? I ASKED MARGARET ON FRIDAY AND SHE SAID SHE DIDN'T KNOW, AND WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS DUE TO KICK IN

ONCE SHOVAL HAD PRESENTED THE OFFICIAL REQUEST; I.E., SO THE 120-DAYS BEGAN ON FRIDAY, OR IS IT STILL OUT THERE?

MR. BOUCHER: I DON'T THINK I HAVE A DEFINITIVE READING FOR YOU ON THE EXACT DATE. I THINK SHE SAID ON FRIDAY THAT IT WOULD BRING US TO THE END OF THE YEAR, AND THAT'S MY UNDERSTANDING AS WELL.

Q THE LAST TIME THE LOAN GUARANTEE TOPIC CAME UP -- I THINK THE AMOUNT WAS 400 MILLION (DOLLARS) -- IT WAS DELAYED FOR SOME TIME UNTIL ISRAEL PROVIDED CERTAIN ASSURANCES ABOUT HOW THE MONEY WOULD BE SPENT. I'M WONDERING WHETHER THOSE ASSURANCE CARRY OVER TO ANY FUTURE LOAN GUARANTEES, I.E., THE MATTER -- THAT MATTER HAS BEEN RESOLVED TO THE UNITED STATES' SATISFACTION, OR WHETHER ASSURANCES OF THE SAME KIND WOULD NEED TO BE PROVIDED FOR FUTURE LOAN GUARANTEES.

MR. BOUCHER: I DON'T HAVE A DEFINITIVE READING FOR YOU ON THAT AT THIS POINT, CHRIS. I THINK THAT'S SOMETHING THAT'S, YOU KNOW, AMONG MANY ISSUES THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO EXPLORE.

Q A MEMBER OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ACCUSED THE US OF CREATING LINKAGE BETWEEN THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE LOAN GUARANTEES WHERE THERE WAS NONE BEFORE. IS THERE ANY CONCERN AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THIS MAY HAVE RAISED NEW PROBLEMS RATHER THAN AVOIDING THEM?

MR. BOUCHER: AGAIN, I THINK I HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE WAY THE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENT, AND MARGARET ALL ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE ON FRIDAY. SHE SAID -- MARGARET, IN PARTICULAR, SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE AN EFFECT THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO WEIGH, BUT THAT WE WERE NOT CREATING ANY SPECIFIC LINKAGE. THAT'S THE WAY THE SECRETARY ADDRESSED IT LAST WEDNESDAY. AND CLEARLY, THE REQUEST RAISES ISSUES THAT WE HAVE TO EXPLORE, AND FOR THAT REASON WE'VE ASKED FOR A DELAY TO GIVE PEACE A CHANCE.

Q DO YOU -- DOES THE US GOVERNMENT NOT DETECT A NEW TONE COMING FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ON THE PEACE CONFERENCE SINCE THIS ALL BEGAN LAST WEEK?

MR. BOUCHER: I DON'T HAVE ANY ANALYSIS FOR YOU ON THINGS LIKE THAT. I'M SORRY.

Q RICHARD, GOING BACK TO THE SETTLEMENTS FOR A MOMENT, YOU SAID THAT THE US POLICY REMAINS THE SAME. BUT IN SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO MR. SHAMIR'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE SETTLEMENTS WOULD BE ACCELERATED, AT THIS POINT DO YOU FIND SUCH A STATEMENT TO BE HELPFUL, UNHELPFUL, OR WHAT?

MR. BOUCHER: I'M NOT IN A POSITION TO START CHARACTERIZING SPECIFIC STATEMENTS, JIM. I THINK OUR POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS HAS BEEN VERY CLEAR; IT CERTAINLY CONTINUES TO APPLY AT THIS POINT AND IT HAS NOT BEEN CHANGED.

Q ARE THEY CONSIDERED ILLEGAL, OR THEY ARE AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE? YOU STILL HOLD THEY ARE AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE, NOT ILLEGAL?

MR. BOUCHER: OUR POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED ON THAT POINT.

Q WELL, IS IT ILLEGAL OR OBSTACLE TO PEACE?

MR. BOUCHER: I'LL GET YOU REPEATED BRIEFINGS WHERE YOU AND OTHERS HAVE RAISED THIS QUESTION, AND I'LL REFER YOU BACK TO THOSE AND TELL YOU THAT NOTHING'S CHANGED.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON, DC REGULAR BRIEFING BRIEFER: MARLIN FITZWATER TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1991

Q I JUST WONDER IF THERE'S ANYTHING NEW ON THE ISRAELI AID DISCUSSIONS.

MR. FITZWATER: NO, YOUR -- YOU SAW OF COURSE SECRETARY BAKER'S COMMENTS. HE'S ON HIS WAY TO THE REGION, WILL BE MEETING WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS, BUT THERE'S NOTHING NEW PREPARATORY TO THAT.

STATE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEFING, BRIEFER: RICHARD BOUCHER 12:45 P.M., EDT, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1991

Q RICHARD, WHAT'S THE OUTLOOK FOR A MIDEAST PEACE CONFERENCE NOW WITH THE INTRANSIGENT POSITION OF SHAMIR AND THE PROBLEMS EVOLVING FROM THAT DIRECTION?

MR. BOUCHER: THE OUTLOOK FROM MY POINT OF VIEW IS THAT THE SECRETARY IS GOING TO THE REGION AND I'M SURE HE'LL EXPRESS THE OUTLOOK AS HE CONDUCTS HIS MEETINGS OUT THERE.

Q IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARING SOME KIND OF STOP GAP EMERGENCY AID FOR ISRAEL WHILE THE DOLLAR 10 BILLION IS IN ABEYANCE?

MR. BOUCHER: ALAN, THE SECRETARY WAS ASKED THAT QUESTION YESTERDAY IN MEXICO AND I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO WHAT HE SAID.

Q WHAT DID HE SAY?

MR. BOUCHER: I'LL TRY TO GET YOU A TRANSCRIPT.

ONE OF THE THINGS HE SAID WAS, "THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO SAY ON THE SUBJECT," SO I AM TAKING THAT AS MY GUIDANCE.

END

עד כאן

עיונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, סולטן, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

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בלמ"ס/מיידי

אל: מצק"א (צ"א)
דע: קונק"ל פילדלפיה
מאת: ר' יחידת קונגרס (המזכר)

הנדון: הסנטור ספקטר' ערבויות להלוואות

מצ"ל מכתביו של הסנטור לנשיא ולסנטור ליידי.

יורם אטיגר

שהח² סלשה¹ רהמ² מ¹ נ¹ ט

אנציה¹ מ² צפא² אונצ³ ר

ARLEN SPECTER
PENNSYLVANIA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3802

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1061
COMMITTEE
AGING
JUDICIARY
APPROPRIATIONS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

September 6, 1991

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Chairman
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Pat:

I urge you to convene a meeting of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee promptly to deliberate the timing on our consideration of the issue of loan guarantees for Israel.

It seems to me that this is a matter which ought to be considered by the Subcommittee, and then the Congress generally, as opposed to being decided informally by Congressional leaders, as noted in today's New York Times story.

I hope you had a pleasant summer and look forward to seeing you when we reconvene next Tuesday.

My best.

Sincerely,



Arlen Specter

AS/kr

ARLEN SPECTER
PENNSYLVANIA

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3802

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COMMITTEES
AGING
JUDICIARY
APPROPRIATIONS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
1061

September 6, 1991

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

I urge your Administration not to delay Congressional consideration on the issue of loan guarantees to Israel.

In my judgment, the issue of the loan guarantees should not be linked to West Bank settlements. I had thought that was the position of the Administration as well.

It also seems unwise to me to link the loan guarantees issue to a Mideast peace conference, because that linkage is likely to create more problems than it will solve.

I hope you had a somewhat restful summer. I have seen you frequently on the news and you are "looking good" notwithstanding the numerous problems you have had to deal with during your August vacation time in Kennebunkport.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Secretary of State Baker.

My best.

Sincerely,


Arlen Specter

AS/kr

BY TELEFAX

אאא, חוזם: 7112

אל: רהמש/ 333

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 70, תא: 060991, זח: 1316, דח: ב, סג: בל,

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ד ע: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הגדרה: התבטאויותיו של הנשיא בוש לגבי בקשת ישראל לערביות לקליטה

REMARKS OF PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH DURING MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER WASHINGTON, DC FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: LET ME JUST MAKE A COUPLE OF COMMENTS AND THEN I'LL TAKE A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS. BUT WE'RE HAVING A DISCUSSION HERE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE OTHERS THAT YOU SEE HERE. AND I HAVE ASKED THE SECRETARY TO UNDERTAKE A VERY IMPORTANT MISSION, YET ANOTHER ONE. THIS ONE WILL TAKE HIM TO THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING STOPS IN THE BALTICS, AMONG OTHERS.

AND THEN A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF THIS IS HIS TRIP TO -- BACK TO THE MIDDLE EAST. AND IT IS VERY, VERY IMPORTANT, MATTERS HAVING COME THIS FAR, THAT WE DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO GIVE PEACE A CHANCE.

AND WITH THAT IN MIND, I AM GOING TO ASK EVERY SINGLE MEMBER OF CONGRESS TO DEFER JUST FOR 120 DAYS CONSIDERATION OF THIS ABSORPTION AID PACKAGE. WE'RE INTERESTED IN ABSORPTION AID. WE TAKE PRIDE IN THE FACT WE'VE TAKEN THE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN REFUGEES COMING, PEOPLE COMING TO THE SOVIET UNION.

BUT IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND OF PEACE ITSELF THAT CONSIDERATION OF THIS ABSORPTION AID QUESTION FOR ISRAEL BE DEFERRED FOR SIMPLY 120 DAYS. AND I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL STRONGLY SUPPORT ME IN THIS. AND I AM GOING TO MAKE THE POSITION AS CLEAR AS I CAN TO EVERY SINGLE MEMBER OF THE CONGRESS AND TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BECAUSE WE WORKED VERY DILLIGENTLY, AND MANY COUNTRIES HAVE, AND ISRAEL HAS, AS WELL AS SOME OF THESE ARAB STATES, TO COME TOGETHER AT A PEACE CONFERENCE.

AND THIS DEBATE WILL TAKE PLACE LATER ON. IT SHOULD TAKE

PLACE, BUT THIS IS NOT THE TIME FOR A DEBATE WHICH CAN BE MISUNDERSTOOD, A DEBATE THAT CAN DIVIDE. AND SO MY PITCH TO -- THAT THE SECRETARY HAS ALREADY MADE IN TWO VERY FRIENDLY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR IS LET'S DEFER IT. THE DEBATE IS GOING TO BE LIVELY. DEBATE WILL BE UPCOMING, BUT LET'S WAIT 120 DAYS SO WE WILL TAKE NO CHANCE OF UNRAVELING A PEACE PROCESS THAT IS -- OFFERS US THE BEST HOPE FOR PEACE IN DECADES, LITERALLY DECADES. AND I FEEL VERY, VERY STRONGLY ABOUT IT, AND I SUPPORT THOSE SENATORS AND OTHERS IN THE CONGRESS THAT HAVE ALREADY TAKEN A POSITION ON DEFERMENT. I THINK OF SENATOR LEAHY, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO HAS A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN ALL OF THIS. AND HIS CONSTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP I THINK WILL BE REMEMBERED BY ALL ON ALL SIDES OF THIS QUESTION THAT WANT PEACE. AND THERE ARE OTHERS. THE SECRETARY HAS TALKED TO A LOT OF THE LEADERSHIP, AND I'LL BE FOLLOWING UP NOW WITH MANY CALLS BECAUSE WE WANT TO GIVE PEACE A CHANCE.

Q WHAT DOES SHAMIR SAY ABOUT THIS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, THE SECRETARY'S HAD TWO GOOD TALKS. AT THIS JUNCTURE I GATHER HE WANTS TO GO FORWARD. BUT AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, I'M TAKING THE STRONG RECOMMENDATION AND STRONGLY APPROVE OF IT, INCIDENTIALLY, BUT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THIS BE DEFERRED. AND I THINK FARSIGHTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHY IT SHOULD BE DEFERRED. WE DON'T NEED AN ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE JUST AS WE'RE ABOUT TO GET THIS PEACE CONFERENCE CONVENED.

Q MR. BUSH, WOULD YOU -- (INAUDIBLE) -- IF ISRAEL HAD CHANGED ITS HOUSING AND SETTLEMENT POLICY? IF THEY -- (INAUDIBLE) -- HOUSING AND SETTLEMENTS WOULD YOU -- (INAUDIBLE)?

PRESIDENT BUSH: LOOK, OUR SETTLEMENT POLICY IS WELL KNOWN. WHAT I'M NOT -- I DON'T WANT TO HAVE ANY DEBATE ON THIS QUESTION NOW. EVERYBODY KNOWS THE UNITED STATES POLICY ABOUT SETTLEMENTS, AND THAT POLICY IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE. AND I MUST DO A BETTER JOB CONVINCING YOU PEOPLE AND HERE AND IN ISRAEL THAT WE'RE CORRECT ON THIS AND WITH OUR UNDERLYING DESIRE FOR PEACE.

BUT IT ISN'T A QUESTION OF THAT. MY POINT HERE IS, DEFER DISCUSSION ON ALL THESE MATTERS NOW AND LET'S GO TO THIS CONFERENCE THAT'S JUST ABOUT PUT TOGETHER. AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THE DEBATE WE'RE TALKING ABOUT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO PEACE. AND WE'VE WORKED VERY, VERY HARD. AND EVERYONE KNOWS OF OUR SPECIAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, AND I FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT THAT IN MY HEART. BUT I KNOW IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE THAT THIS BE DEFERRED.

Q HOW ARE YOU GOING ABOUT WITH SOVIET PARTICIPATION AS YOU PLAN THE CONFERENCE? ARE YOU GOING TO JUST GO IT ALONE, OR --

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, THE SECRETARY WILL BE IN MOSCOW. THAT WILL BE DISCUSSED. BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE PLAYED A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE

ROLE IN ALL OF THIS, AND I SEE NO REASON THAT ANY OF THESE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION WILL CHANGE THAT. I THINK THEY WANT TO SEE IT GO FORWARD.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, ON THE LOAN GUARANTEES, ARE YOU CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL BE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THE PEACE CONFERENCE IF THIS IS PUT ON HOLD?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I'M CONVINCED THAT THEY'VE ALREADY INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO GO FORWARD WITHOUT A CONDITION OF THAT NATURE, AND I SEE NO REASON THAT THEY WOULD CHANGE THAT RIGHT NOW. IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. I MEAN, LOOK, WE ALL KNOW THE PASSIONS ON BOTH SIDES, AND THIS IS NO TIME TO INFLAME THE PASSIONS ON BOTH SIDES. ISRAEL STATED ITS POSITION, BUT THERE WAS NEVER ANY LINKAGE ON THEIR PART, AND WE'RE TRYING TO AVOID LINKAGE ON OUR PART.

Q YOU SEEM CERTAIN THERE WILL BE A CONFERENCE.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M VERY HOPEFUL IT WILL, BUT PART OF THE SECRETARY'S MISSION IS TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ENSURE THERE WILL BE A CONFERENCE. LOOK, THIS IS ONE THE WHOLE WORLD WANTS TO SEE HAPPEN. THIS ISN'T JUST AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. EVERYBODY WANTS THIS TO TAKE PLACE. AND I WOULD AGAIN SALUTE SECRETARY BAKER AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER AND EVERYBODY THAT'S WORKED ON THIS, HERE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, ALSO.

BUT WE'VE COME A LONG, LONG WAY. AND I REMEMBER WHEN THE WHOLE PROSPECTS FOR THIS CONFERENCE WERE BEING WRITTEN OFF A FEW MONTHS AGO, AND NOW PEOPLE ARE SAYING, "WE'VE GOT A CHANCE." AND LET'S NOT BLOW IT BY HAVING AN ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE THAT'S GOING TO BE READ NOT JUST IN THE STATES BUT AROUND THE WORLD AS -- ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. WE DON'T NEED IT. WE DON'T NEED THAT INGREDIENT CLOUDING THE WATERS JUST AT A TIME THE WATERS ARE BEGINNING TO CLEAR.

Q AND YOU THINK CONGRESS WILL RESPECT YOUR REQUEST FOR A DELAY?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M GOING TO FIGHT FOR IT BECAUSE I THINK THIS IS WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT, AND I'M GOING TO DO ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING I CAN TO BACK THOSE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS WHO ARE FORWARD LOOKING IN THEIR DESIRE TO SEE PEACE.

Q DO YOU HAVE ASSURANCES THAT -- (INAUDIBLE) -- GO AHEAD, OR WHAT DO YOU --

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WE'RE GOING TO WORK HARD ON IT, AND WE'LL SEE, BUT I THINK THEY SHOULD. I THINK THAT'S WHAT'S IN THE -- AGAIN, I KEEP SAYING IT -- IN THE BEST INTEREST OF PEACE.

SEC. BAKER: GIVE PEACE --

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK ALL OF THEM WANT TO --

SEC. BAKER: -- A CHANCE.

PRESIDENT BUSH: -- GIVE PEACE A CHANCE.

SEC. BAKER: GIVE PEACE A CHANCE.

SEC. BAKER: ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY DAYS, THAT'S ALL THE PRESIDENT IS ASKING FOR, 120 DAYS.

Q IS IT STILL REALISTIC TO SHOOT FOR AN OCTOBER CONFERENCE OR DO YOU THINK YOU MAY HAVE TO --

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WE'LL SEE. WE'RE -- I'D LIKE TO -- YOU KNOW, THE US POSITION IS WE'D LIKE TO HAVE HAD IT LONG BEFORE NOW, BUT JIM WILL GO OVER THERE TO THE MIDDLE EAST, HE'LL BE DISCUSSING THAT, WE'LL HAVE MORE TO SAY ABOUT THAT LATER ON.

STAFF: OKAY, THANK YOU ALL.

PRESIDENT BUSH: THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH.

Q DO YOU HAVE A DATE IN MIND FOR THE -- ARE YOU SHOOTING FOR ANY --

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I'LL LET THE SECRETARY TAKE THOSE QUESTIONS LATER, PROBABLY AFTER HE HAS BEEN THERE WOULD BE A BETTER TIME TO ANSWER THAT.

STAFF: OKAY, THANK YOU ALL.

PRESIDENT BUSH: THANK YOU ALL.

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תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
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COMMENTS AT A PHOTO OPPORTUNITY BY: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, ZALMAN SHOVAL AND U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, JAMES BAKER
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991

SEC. JAMES BAKER: GOOD AFTERNOON. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, LET ME SAY IT'S BEEN A PLEASURE TO HAVE RECEIVED AMBASSADOR SHOVAL THIS AFTERNOON. AND WE HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF ABSORPTION AID WITH ISRAEL.

THE AMBASSADOR HAS PRESENTED ME WITH A LETTER REQUEST FROM PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR POINTING OUT THE NEED OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL FOR ASSISTANCE IN ABSORBING SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRES REQUESTING, IN EFFECT, GUARANTEES FROM THE UNITED STATES IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF TEN BILLION DOLLARS -- TWO BILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR OVER FIVE YEARS.

I POINTED OUT TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PROVISIONS OF ABSORPTION ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, THAT WE HAD WORKED VERY LONG AND HARD OVER THE PAST TWO AND A HALF YEARS, OR SO, TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRATION, (EVEN ?) IN THE DAYS OF THE OLD SOVIET UNION. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THIS.

WE ARE, HOWEVER, CONCERNED WITH RESPECT TO THE EXACT TIMING AND NEED A LITTLE TIME TO CONSIDER A REQUEST OF THIS MAGNITUDE AND TO LOOK AT THE DETAILS AND THE SPECIFICS. WE HAVE AGREED THAT WE WILL STAY IN TOUCH. I WILL HAVE, OF COURSE, THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS -- HOPEFULLY -- IN SOME DETAIL WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR WHEN I VISIT -- (INAUDIBLE) -- DURING THE COURSE OF MY NEXT VISIT.

AMB. ZALMAN SHOVAL: (INAUDIBLE) -- OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL FOR THE LOAN GUARANTEES. I HAVE ADDED THAT AT PRESENT WE ARE

GRATEFUL, THANKFUL TO THE UNITED STATES AND I THINK -- (INAUDIBLE) -- EVERYONE CONCERNED FOR THE HELP WHICH HAD BEEN EXTENDED TO US OVER THE YEARS IN GETTING THE JEWISH PEOPLE OUT OF THE SOVIET UNION. AND WE HAVE NO -- (INAUDIBLE) -- BUT A LOT OF APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS, ONLY THIS WEEK, ABOUT THE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO HELPING US ABSORB THE NEW IMMIGRANTS. AND I HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT OUR REQUEST -- ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF PERHAPS, THE RENEWED URGENCY, (THE NEW ?) DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION -- WILL BE MET FAVORABLY BY THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS.

Q: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE FOUR MONTH DELAY?

AMB. SHOVAL: WELL, WE HAVE SUBMITTED OUR REQUEST, AS YOU KNOW. AND WE HOPE THAT THIS WILL BE DEALT WITH IN THE RIGHT SPIRIT AND IN THE RIGHT WAY. WE CERTAINLY HAVE THE SAME AIMS IN MIND AS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS WITH REGARD TO THE --

Q: IS THE DELAY A PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL?

AMB. SHOVAL: WE HAVE ALWAYS STATED WE ARE AGAINST LINKAGE AND WE ARE NOT GOING TO TAKE -- (INAUDIBLE) -- ANYTHING OF ANY IMPORTANCE. (INAUDIBLE.)

SEC. BAKER: LET ME SAY THE SAME THING FOR THE UNITED STATES. AND WHEN WE SAY WE WANT SOME TIME TO LOOK AT THIS, AND WHEN WE REQUEST THE CONGRESS TO CONSIDER A DELAY OF NO MORE THAN 120 DAYS TO GIVE PEACE A CHANCE, WE'RE NOT LINKING THIS.

WHAT WE'RE SAYING -- WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO DO IS TO AVOID A CONTROVERSY, TO AVOID A CONFLICT, TO AVOID A DEBATE THAT WE WOULD WORRY MIGHT BE VERY DIVISIVE AT A TIME -- AS THE AMBASSADOR SAID -- WHEN WE SHARE THE SAME OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO THE CREATION OF A VIABLE PEACE PLAN.

SO, WE HAVE HAD A VERY, VERY GOOD MEETING. I ANTICIPATE YOU WILL PROBABLY SEE SUCH BEGINNING (BEFORE?) I GET TO ISRAEL. OUR -- (INAUDIBLE) -- AGAIN TO SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND TO ABSORPTION AID FOR ISRAEL IS FIRM.

THE QUESTION OF TIMING IS ONE THAT I'M QUITE CERTAIN WE WILL BE ABLE TO AMICABLY WORK OUT AND I LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IT WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR WHEN I GET TO JERUSALEM. AND I'M DELIGHTED -- (INAUDIBLE).

Q: MR. SECRETARY, CONGRESSMAN SCHUMER SAID TODAY THAT YOUR HOLDING A CLUB OVER ISRAEL'S HEAD. WOULD YOU RESPOND TO THAT?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I SIMPLY DO NOT AGREE WITH THAT. WE'RE NOT DOING ANYTHING OF THE KIND. I'VE JUST TOLD YOU THAT I'VE HAD -- THAT I HAD TWO VERY, VERY GOOD CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR JUST AS MY VACATION ENDED. I'M LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING HIM

NEXT WEEK.

WE'RE NOT HOLDING ANY CLUB AT ALL. WE ARE SIMPLY SAYING THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE TIME TO CONSIDER THIS RATHER SIGNIFICANT REQUEST, TO CONSIDER THE ISSUES THAT SURROUND AND TO AGREE ON THE EXACT TIMING. WE HAVE NOT, AND WILL NOT, MOUNT AN EFFORT OR A CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF ABSORPTION AID TO SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRANTS.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, SENATOR MACK SAYS THAT ISRAEL'S HUMANITARIAN NEEDS SHOULD NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO ARAB DEMANDS. THIS IS THE FIRST FULL EXCHANGE WE'VE GOTTEN -- (INAUDIBLE). IS YOUR DESIRE FOR DELAYING BASED ON CONCERNS THAT THE ARABS DON'T WANT TO SEE ISRAEL HOUSING PEOPLE, AND YOU'D RATHER NOT HAVE TO DEAL WITH THAT UNTIL YOU'VE GOT THE PEACE CONFERENCE NAILED DOWN?

SEC. BAKER: NO, IT'S NOT THAT, BARRY. IT'S BECAUSE I DON'T PRESUME TO SPEAK FOR ALL OF THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WITH RESPECT TO WHAT THEIR VIEWS ARE, OR ARE NOT, CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC ISSUES.

IT'S JUST THAT IF THIS PACKAGE IS TO MOVE AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME I THINK THAT IT WOULD CREATE CONFLICT RATHER THAN AVOID CONFLICT. BOTH OF US WANT TO AVOID CONFLICT.

I KNOW WHAT YOUR JOB IS, AND I RESPECT IT. IT'S TO DRIVE WEDGES OCCASIONALLY AND TO CREATE GOOD STORIES AND TO GET SOME GOOD QUOTES. AND I MUST SAY THAT I HAVE BEEN VERY, VERY HEARTENED TO SEE THE STATEMENTS, FRANKLY, THAT HAVE COME FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL BECAUSE THEY MUST HAVE DISAPPOINTED YOU BADLY.

Q: WELL, THEIR -- (INAUDIBLE) -- CAN'T GET A FAIR FIGHT--

SEC. BAKER: NO, NO, NO, NO, NO.

Q: NO, WHEN YOU SAY --

SEC. BAKER: THE STATEMENT -- HOPEFULLY THE STATEMENTS THAT HAVE COME FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ARE DISAPPOINTING TO YOU AS WELL. (LAUGHS)

Q: WE'RE NOT -- (INAUDIBLE) -- CONFLICT. WE'RE TRYING TO UNDERSTAND HOW THIS WOULD UNDERCUT YOUR EFFORT. AND, SO FAR, THE SUGGESTION I GET IS THAT THERE WOULD BE TURMOIL. THERE WOULD BE -- YOU KNOW -- A DISTRACTION. BUT WE'RE WONDERING IF IT'S LINKED TO ARAB AID IN ANY WAY.

SEC. BAKER: WHAT WE DON'T WANT TO HAVE HAPPEN IS TO -- FOR ANY REASON -- LOSE WHAT MIGHT BE THE BEST OPPORTUNITY WE'VE HAD FOR PEACE IN A LONG, LONG TIME. AND WHAT WE'VE SAID IS: "LET'S GIVE PEACE A CHANCE," EVEN IF IT'S ONLY FOR 120 DAYS.

NOW, WE'VE HAD SOME GOOD DISCUSSIONS HERE TODAY WITH RESPECT

TO THESE ISSUES OF OUR BUDGET -- WHERE DOES THIS COME FROM, HOW MUCH DOES IT ACTUALLY MEAN IN TERMS OF (HITS?) TO THE UNITED STATES BUDGET, TIMING AND A WHOLE HOST OF OTHER THINGS. I HOPE WE'RE GOING TO CONTINUE TO HAVE THESE DISCUSSIONS IN THE FUTURE, AND I THINK WE WILL -- SO THAT WE CAN WORK THIS OUT IN A WAY THAT MEETS THE NEEDS AND THE COMMON OBJECTIVES OF ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES.

Q: AMBASSADOR SHOVEL, DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT HOLDING A CLUB OVER THE HEAD OF ISRAEL?

AMB. SHOVAL: I WOULD JUST CERTAINLY LIKE TO ASDD THAT WE WOULD DEFINATELY NOT LIKE THE ARABS TO GET THE WRONG SIGNAL FROM -- (INAUDIBLE). BUT I BELIEVE THAT -- (INAUDIBLE) -- WE'RE REQUESTING MAKES IT VERY CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN ARAB DEMANDS -- IF THERE ARE ANY ARAB DEMANDS -- AND AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO THE ABSORPTION OF THE IMMIGRANTS -- IMMIGRANTS INTO ISRAEL. AND THIS, I BELIEVE, IS THE SECRETARY'S AND OUR COMMON AIM.

SEC. BAKER: THAT'S RIGHT.

THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH

AMB. SHOVAL: THANK YOU.

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תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
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COMMENTS AT A PHOTO OPPORTUNITY
BY:

ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES,
ZALMAN SHOVAL AND
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, JAMES BAKER

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1991

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SEC. JAMES BAKER: Good afternoon. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me say it's been a pleasure to have received Ambassador Shoval this afternoon. And we have had the opportunity to discuss the question of absorption aid with Israel.

The Ambassador has presented me with a letter request from Prime Minister Shamir pointing out the need of the State of Israel for assistance in absorbing Soviet Jewish Emigres requesting, in effect, guarantees from the United States in the aggregate amount of ten billion dollars -- two billion dollars per year over five years.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that we strongly support the provisions of absorption assistance to Israel, that we had worked very long and hard over the past two and a half years, or so, to encourage Soviet Jewish immigration, (even ?) in the days of the old Soviet Union. We are committed to this.

We are, however, concerned with respect to the exact timing and need a little time to consider a request of this magnitude and to look at the details and the specifics. We have agreed that we will stay in touch. I will have, of course, the opportunity to discuss this -- hopefully -- in some detail with Prime Minister Shamir when I visit -- (inaudible) -- during the course of my next visit.

AMB. ZALMAN SHOVAL: (Inaudible) -- of the government of Israel for the loan guarantees. I have added that at present we are grateful, thankful to the United States and I think -- (inaudible) -- everyone concerned for the help which had been extended to us over the years in getting the Jewish people out of the Soviet Union. And we have no -- (inaudible) -- but a lot of appreciation for the Secretary's comments, only this week, about the continued commitment of the United States to helping us absorb the new immigrants. And I have absolutely no doubt that our request -- especially in view of perhaps, the renewed urgency, (the new ?) developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union -- will be met favorably by the United States Congress.

Q: How do you feel about the four month delay?

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AMB. SHOVAL: Well, we have submitted our request, as you know. And we hope that this will be dealt with in the right spirit.
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SHOVAL/BAKER-09/06
PHOTO OP COMMENTS
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and in the right way. We certainly have the same aims in mind as the United States government has with regard to the --

Q: Is the delay a problem for Israel?

AMB. SHOVAL: Well, of course delay is a problem because the immigrants are coming in. We have very severe economic problems and it's no secret that we need this money quite urgently. It is a problem.

Q: Will it affect Israeli participation in the peace conference?

AMB. SHOVAL: We have always stated we are against linkage and we are not going to take -- (inaudible) -- anything of any importance. (Inaudible.)

SEC. BAKER: Let me say the same thing for the United States. And when we say we want some time to look at this, and when we request the Congress to consider a delay of no more than 120 days to give peace a chance, we're not linking this.

What we're saying -- what we're trying to do is to avoid a controversy, to avoid a conflict, to avoid a debate that we would worry might be very divisive at a time -- as the Ambassador said -- when we share the same objectives with respect to the creation of a viable peace plan.

So, we have had a very, very good meeting. I anticipate you will probably see such beginning (before ?) I get to Israel. Our -- (inaudible) -- again to Soviet Jewish immigration and to absorption aid for Israel is firm.

The question of timing is one that I'm quite certain we will be able to amicably work out and I look forward to having the opportunity to discuss it with Prime Minister Shamir when I get to Jerusalem. And I'm delighted -- (inaudible).

Q: Mr. Secretary, Congressman Schumer said today that your holding a club over Israel's head. Would you respond to that?

SEC. BAKER: Well, I simply do not agree with that. We're not doing anything of the kind. I've just told you that I've had -- that I had two very, very good conversations with Prime Minister Shamir just as my vacation ended, I'm looking forward to seeing him

next week.

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We're not holding any club at all. We are simply saying that we would like to have time to consider this rather significant request, to consider the issues that surround and to agree on the exact timing. We have not, and will not, mount an effort or a campaign against the principle of absorption aid to Soviet Jewish immigrants.

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SHOVAL/BAKER-09/06
PHOTO OP COMMENTS

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Q: Mr. Secretary, Senator Mack says that Israel's humanitarian needs should not be held hostage to Arab demands. This is the first full exchange we've gotten -- (inaudible). Is your desire for delaying based on concerns that the Arabs don't want to see Israel housing people, and you'd rather not have to deal with

that until you've got the peace conference nailed down?

SEC. BAKER: No, it's not that, Barry. It's because I don't presume to speak for all of the Arab governments with respect to what their views are, or are not, concerning the specific issues.

It's just that if this package is to move at this particular time I think that it would create conflict rather than avoid conflict. Both of us want to avoid conflict.

I know what your job is, and I respect it. It's to drive wedges occasionally and to create good stories and to get some good quotes. And I must say that I have been very, very heartened to see the statements, frankly, that have come from the government of Israel because they must have disappointed you badly.

Q: Well, their -- (inaudible) -- can't get a fair fight

SEC. BAKER: No, no, no, no, no.

Q: No, when you say --

SEC. BAKER: The statement -- hopefully the statements that have come from the United States government are disappointing to you as well. (Laughs)

Q: We're not -- (inaudible) -- conflict. We're trying to understand how this would undercut your effort. And, so far, the suggestion I get is that there would be turmoil. There would be -- you know -- a distraction. But we're wondering if it's linked to Arab aid in any way.

SEC. BAKER: What we don't want to have happen is to -- for

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any reason -- lose what might be the best opportunity we've had for peace in a long, long time. And what we've said is: "Let's give peace a chance," even if it's only for 120 days.

Now, we've had some good discussions here today with respect to these issues of our budget -- where does this come from, how much does it actually mean in terms of (hits ?) to the United States budget, timing and a whole host of other things. I hope we're going to continue to have these discussions in the future, and I think we will -- so that we can work this out in a way that meets the needs and the common objectives of Israel and the United States.

Q: Ambassador Shoval, do you agree with that statement that the United States is not holding a club over the head of Israel?

AMB. SHOVAL: I would just certainly like to add that we would definitely not like the Arabs to get the wrong signal from -- (inaudible). But I believe that -- (inaudible) -- we're requesting makes it very clear that there will be no linkage between Arab demands -- if there are any Arab demands -- and America's commitment to the absorption of the immigrants -- immigrants into Israel. And this, I believe, is the Secretary's and our common aim.

SEC. BAKER: That's right.

Thank you all very much.

AMB. SHOVAL: Thank you.

END

.ETX

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1991

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since the end of the Gulf war, we have worked hard to take advantage of the potentially historic opportunity to move the Arab/Israeli peace process forward. Over the past six months, we have achieved a great deal -- fashioning a process that for the first time would launch direct negotiations between Israel, Palestinians from the Territories, and all of Israel's neighbors. Next week, Jim Baker will be returning to the region for what I hope will be a final effort to nail down the modalities for a peace conference and the direct negotiations that will follow.

This effort on our part does not take place in a vacuum. Over the past two years, Israel has opened its doors to more than 300,000 Soviet and Ethiopian immigrants. The steady influx of men, women, and children from around the world over past decades has been central to Israel's success. The United States has long supported immigration to Israel. I have been pleased to play a role in this enterprise. It is no exaggeration to state that many of the Soviet and Ethiopian Jews now in Israel would not be free and safe were it not for years of sustained U.S. effort -- an effort supported by both Republicans and Democrats and by Congress and the Executive alike.

Earlier this spring, the Administration came to agreement with Congress and the Government of Israel on the provision of emergency supplemental economic assistance to Israel. In turn, Israel and its supporters agreed to defer a request for additional absorption assistance

until September. Now we find ourselves on the verge of historic direct negotiations, possibly as early as October.

On both sides of the conflict, absorption assistance is a very important and very complex issue. I am deeply concerned that if we address Israeli absorption guarantees now -- on the eve of the conference -- we could divert attention and momentum from our efforts to get the parties together for these historic negotiations.

At the moment, we are involved in extremely sensitive negotiations to pin down the final details related to convening the conference. What we must avoid is anything that would distract the parties from the hard choices and decisions they have yet to make to get to the negotiating table.

It is our judgment that if we address absorption assistance now we risk losing everything we have been working on for the past six months. An issue of this sensitivity could be seized upon by rejectionists intent on thwarting negotiations. If Congress chooses to press forward now, we stand a very real chance of losing the participation of either our Arab or Israeli negotiating partners. The best chance to promote Arab/Israeli peace since the Camp David Accords will be lost, with uncertain and potentially dangerous consequences in the region.

Postponement will afford us an opportunity to study Israel's needs in greater detail and to craft a program which has the greatest likelihood of promoting successful absorption at minimal taxpayer cost while contributing to prospects for peace. We will ensure that an appropriate legislative vehicle is made available to address the absorption assistance issue in January.

Next week Secretary Baker will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir and a number of Arab leaders. He will assure all these leaders of

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
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unequivocal U.S. support for Soviet Jewish immigration and absorption in Israel. But I want him also to be in a position to report to them that, in the interests of advancing the cause of peace in the Middle East, the Administration and the Congress -- with the support of the bipartisan leadership of both Houses -- have agreed to defer (consideration of) Israeli absorption assistance until January.

Armed with such a commitment, he will have the flexibility he needs to try and nail down remaining modalities for the peace talks. Absent such a deferral, the attention of all the parties could well be diverted from the key choices they have yet to make in getting to the negotiating table. The result could well be the loss of the peace process.

Providing a pause is the single most important step Congress could take to get these historic peace negotiations launched. We have an excellent record of cooperation on Arab/Israeli issues. Won't you please support me now in a 120-day pause for peace?

Sincerely,



The Honorable Jamie L. Whitten
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

אאא, חוזם: 7951

אל: רהמש/ 387

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 94, תא: 100991, זח: 1920, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / בהול לבוקר

אל: מצפ"א

דע: ציר כלכלי (הועבר), מנכ"ל אוצר, יועץ רה"מ לכלכלה

מאת: ר' יחידת הקונגרס

הנדון: תמונת מצב מן ה"גבעה" - ערבויות להלוואות

(המשך לדוחי מ-6/9/91)

1. הסנטור דניאל אינוייה (דמוק'-הוואי) וכוב קסטן (רפוב'-וויסקונסין) הציגו הערב, במליאת הסנט, את תחיקת הערבויות להלוואות.
2. מחר יתחיל המרוץ לגיוס שושבינים, ואח"כ התהליך התחוקתי העשוי להימשך ימים, שבועות, או... לדברי קסטן נועד המהלך להעניק שהות לשיקול דעת תוך כדי הדיון על הבקשה לדחייה. המהלך נועד להבהיר כי הדיון על הדחייה לא מונע הדיון על התחיקה.
3. המהלך אמור, כנראה, להוות הצהרת כוונות, להסיר ספיקות מלב תומכים לגבי נחישותם של השניים ולדרבן התומכים לפעילות נמרצת בנדון. המהלך נועד אף להוות איתות ברור לממשל במסגרת מגעיהם של השניים עם נציגיו.
4. את ההחלטה להציג התחיקה עוד הערב קיבלו השניים בעקבות הערכת הלך הרוח זי ארוחות הצהריים הסיעתיות שהתקיימו היום:
 - בארוחה הדמוקרטית הוצגו 6 הנקודות אשר העביר הבוקר הנשיא לאינוייה, ליידי וקסטן (הבטחה לספק מכשיר תחיקתי נאות לאחר הדחייה; הבטחה להימנע מדחייה נוספת, יהיה גורל תהליך השלום אשר יהיה; הבעת תמיכה בעקרון הסיוע לישראל; קביעת SCORING סביר; פעולה לגיוס סיוע בינ"ל נוסף; העברת פצוי לישראל על מחיר הדחייה). יו"ר וע' ההקצבות, בירד (במיוחד), פאל או יו"ר תת הועדה לסיוע חוץ, ליידי, תמכו בדחייה, בנוסף למספר סנטורים דרומיים. מרבית הנוכחים תמכו בתחיקה ללא דחוי. ההנהגה, בראשות מיטצ'ל, שותפה לתחושת הרוב, אך המליצה להמתין עד שיתברר מצב הפשרות עליהן מדבר הממשל, ואולי (לדבריהם) ישראל ואייפ"ק. התגובות לנאומו המרגש של אינוייה היו סוחפות. נמסר כי תמיכת ליידי בדחייה-נוסח-ממשל הצטננה, לאחר השיחה הקשה שהתנהלה עם הנשיא (אשר חלק על עצם רמת הסיוע הנדרש).

- בארוחה הרפובליקנית הביעו מספר סנטורים הסתייגות מעמדת הנשיא (לדוגמא, גראם, פאקווד, מק, סימור וספקטר). קסטן הציג עמדות הצדדים ודול נמנע מנקיטת עמדה (למרות שתומך בדחייה). משיחות עם סנטורים ועוזריהם: יש נטייה להימנע מהתנגדות פומבית לדחייה "כדי שלא למשוך אש מכוון ממשל

אגריסיבי"; שורר רוגז כלפי הממשל על שדחק את הסנטורים ל-AWKWARD SITUATION.

5. להערכתי, אנו נמצאים בתקופת המתנה. מרבית הסנטורים משהים התחייבותם לתמיכה או להתנגדות (למרות שלדברי ידידינו - ולאור שיחות שהתנהלו בימים האחרונים - יש 68 תומכים בסנאט ורק 16 מתנגדים). הדיבורים על פשרה אפשרית מרסנים את רמת התמיכה, מכיוון שהסנטורים אינם ששים לעימות עם הנשיא, למרות שנוטים לתמוך בתחיקה.

6. הממשל עדיין לא הזעיק את ה"ארטילריה הכבדה" (פנייה ישירה לאומה והפעלת לחץ על המתנגדים והמתנגדים לדחייה). הוא אף נוכח לדעת שגם שיחות טלפון ומפגשים אינטנסיביים (בוש, בייקר וסונונו) עם המחוקקים, לא הביאו לכרסום משמעותי בקואליציה הרחבה התומכת בהענקת הערבויות להלוואות.

7. ספירת קולות בשלב זה היא מוקדמת מדי.

8. הצגת התחיקה הערב משקפת ההערכה כי ככל ש-6 הבטחות הממשל מפתות, הרי לא לשון חקיקה מחייבת ומוסכמת, צפויות ההבטחות לריקון אפשרי מתוכנן ע"י פרשנויות שונות ומשונות.

9. הנסיון להאיץ הדיון בתחיקה הספציפית אשר הוצגה (לדברי קסטן: אפשרי אולי להמתין 14 יום) מבטא הסברה כי אופציית הדחייה (ללא הסכמה מראש על נוסח התחיקה) נחותה מהאופציה הנוכחית: בחירות '92 יתקרבו ויקשו על פרופיל גבוה של הסנטורים המובילים; סדר העדיפויות הכלכלי (הפנימי והבינלאומי) עלול להשתנות לרעת הערבויות; הגרעון התקציבי התופח והצרכים הגואים עלולים לגרום לשינויים בחוק התקציב אשר יקשו על התחיקה; התפתחויות תהליך השלום עלולות לתרום לקשיים; כל דחייה עלולה להחריף התשתית התומכים.

יורם אטינגר.

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, אוצר

סססס

אאאא, חוזמ: 8106

אל: פריס/323

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 94, תא: 100991, זח: 1920, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבבב

שמור / בהול

פריס - העבירונא לבנ אהרון

אל: מצפא

דע: ציר כלכלי (הועבר), מנכל אוצר, יועצ רחמ לכלכלה

מאת: רי יחידת הקונגרס

נדון: תמונת מצב מנ הגבעה - ערבויות להלוואות

(המשכ לדוחי מ-6/9/91)

1. הסנטור דניאל אינוייה (דמוקי-הוואי) ובוב קסטנ (רפובי-וויסקונסין) הציגו הערב, במליאת הסנט, את תחיקת הערבויות להלוואות.
2. מחר יתחיל המרוצ לגיוס שושבינימ, ואחכ התהליכ התחוקתי העשוי להימשכ ימימ, שבועות, או... לדברי קסטנ נועד המהלכ להעניק שהות לשיקול דעת תוכ כדי הדיונ על הבקשה לדחייה. המהלכ נועד להבחיר כי הדיונ על הדחייה לא מונע הדיונ על התחיקה.
3. המהלכ אמור, כנראה, להוות הצהרת כוונות, להסיר ספיקות מלב תומכים לגבי נחישותם של השניימ ולדרבנ התומכים לפעילות נמרצת בנדון. המהלכ נועד אפ להוות איתות ברור לממשל במסגרת מגעיהם של השניימ עם נציגיו.
4. את ההחלטה להציג התחיקה עוד הערב קיבלו השניימ בעקבות הערכת הלכ הרוח בשתי ארוחות הצהריימ הסיעתיות שהתקיימו היום:

- בארוחה הדמוקרטית הוצגו 6 הנקודות אשר העביר הבוקר הנשיא לאינוייה, ליייה וקסטנ (הבטחה לספק מכשיר תחיקתי גאות לאחר הדחייה; הבטחה להימנע מדחייה נוספת, יהייה גורל תהליכ השלום אשר יהיה; הבעת תמיכה בעקרון הסיוע לישראל; קביעת

SCORING

xxx שסחרנג xxx סביר, פעולה לגיוס סיוע בינל נוספ; העברת פצוי לישראל על מחיר הדחייה). יור ועי ההקצבות, בירד (במיוחד), פאל או יור תת הועדה לסיוע חוצ, ליייה, תמכו בדחייה, בנוספ למספר סנטורים דרומיימ. מרבית הנוכחים תמכו בתחיקה ללא דחוי. ההנהגה, בראשות מיטציל, שותפה לתחושת הרוב, אכ המליצה להמתינ עד שיתברר מצב הפשרות עליה מדבר הממשל, ואולי (לדבריהם) ישראל ואייפק. התגובות לנאומי המרגש של אינוייה היו סוחפות. נמסר כי תמיכת ליייה בדחייה-נוסח-ממשל הצטננה, לאחר השיחה הקשה שהתנהלה עם הנשיא (אשר חלק על עצמ רמת הסיוע הנדרש).

- בארוחה הרפובליקנית הביעו מספר סנטורים הסתייגות מעמדת הנשיא (לדוגמא, גראמ, פאקווד, מק, סימור וספקטר). קסטנ הציג עמדות הצדדים ודול נמנע מנקיטת עמדה (למרות שתומכ בדחייה). משיחות עם סנטורים ועוזריהם: יש נטייה להימנע מהתנגדות פומבית לדחייה כדי שלא למשוכ אש מכוונ ממשל אגריסיבי. שורר רוגז כלפי הממשל על שדוחק את הסנטורים ל-

AWKWARD SITUATION

xxx-5

5. להערכת, אנו נמצאים בתקופת המתנה. מרבית הסנטורים משהימ התחיבותם תמיכה או להתנגדות (למרות שלדברי ידידינו - ולאור שיחות שהתנהלו בימימ האחרונימ - יש 68 תומכים בסנאט ורק 16 מתנגדימ). הדיבורים על פשרה אפשרית מרסנימ את רמת התמיכה, מכיוונ שהסנטורים אינמ ששימ לעימות עם הנשיא, למרות שנוטים לתמוכ בתחיקה.

6. הממשל עדיינ לא הזעיק את הארטילריה הכבדה (פנייה ישירה לאומה והפעלת לחצ על המתנגדימ והמתנגדימ לדחייה). הוא אפ נוכח לדעת שגמ שיחות טלפון ומפגשימ אינטנסיבימ (בוש, בייקר וסונונו) עם המחוקקים, לא הביאו לכרסומ משמעותי בקואליציה הרחבה התומכת בהענקת הערבויות להלוואות.

7. ספירת קולות בשלב זה היא מוקדמת מדי.

8. הצגת התחיקה הערב משקפת ההערכה כי ככל ש-6 הבטחות הממשל מפתות, הרי שללא לשונ חקיקה מחייבת ומוסכמת, צפויות ההבטחות לריקונ אפשרי מתוכננ עי פרשנויות שונות ומשונות.

9. הנסיונ להאיצ הדיונ בתחיקה הספציפית אשר הוצגה (לדברי קסטנ: אפשרי אולי להמתינ 14 יומ) מבטא הסברה כי אופציית הדחייה (ללא הסכמה מראש על נוסח התחיקה) נחותה מהאופציה הנוכחית: בחירות 92 יתקרבו ויקשו על פרופיל גבוה של הסנטורים המובילימ סדר העדיפויות הכלכלי (הפנימי והבינלאומי) עלול להשתנות לרעת הערבויות. הגרעונ התקציבי התופח והצרכים הגואים עלולים לגרום לשינויימ בחוק התקציב אשר יקשו על התחיקה. התפתחויות תהליכ השלום עלולות לתרום לקשיימ כל דחייה עלולה להחריפ התשת התומכים.

יורמ אטינגר.

מסמך, מס' 10:0018
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מס': 0010\838
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אאא, חוזם: 7413

אל: רהמש/362

מ-: ווש, נר: 2027, תא: 070991, זח: 1915, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר - מכתב מוברק - למכותבים בלבד - בהול - לבוקר

מכתב מוברק - למכותבים בלבד

אל: סמנכ'ל בנצור

לשכת רהמ'

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ערבויות. סכום קצר למוצ'ש 7/9.

(1) כמה סנטורים מכינים מכתב קולקטיבי אל יור' הועדה לייחי שבו יבקשוהו לחזור בו מהסכמתו לדחות את החקיקה.

(2) המזכיר בשיחתו עם איפא'ק חזר על הצעתו כדלקמן:-

(א) הטפול בקונגרס יידחה ב-120 יום. (ב) הממשל יחזור בפומבי על תמיכתו בערבויות. (ג) הממשל מתחייב שלא לתבוע דחיה נוספת אחרי ינואר. (ד) הממשל יסייע במציאת VEHICLE לחקיקה בינואר. (ה) הממשל ינמיך את הסקורינג 'ככל שמרשה החוק'. (ו) המזכיר יסייע בגיוס כספים לקליטה גם ממקורות אחרים (גרמניה ויפן - כנראה). (ז) אם יגרמו לישראל נזקים כספיים כתוצאה מהדחיה תימצא דרך לפצותה (כספית) על כך.

(העיר בשוליים אך לא כחלק מ'התפריט' שארהב' גם תפעל לבטול ההחלטה ציונות-גזענות).

(3) אין חשובה ברורה לשאלה מה יקרה אם בעוד 120 יום עדיין יעמוד הנשיא להתנגדותו העזה להתנחלויות. חשובה אחת אומרת שיהיה זה אחרי התחלת התהליך והנושא יטופל אז בזירה הישראלית-ערבית ולא בזירה הישראלית-אמריקאית וזה יאפשר לנשיא לצנן את להט מעורבותו בעניין. איש אינו מוכן להתחייב היום בשם הנשיא כי ההתניה הזאת לא תהיה קיימת בינואר. הסנטורים אינווה וקסטן יראו את הנשיא ביום ג' או ד' ויבדקו אם אפשר לקבל מהממשל IRONCLAD COMMITMENT שיבטיח העברת העניין בינואר. אם לאו ידחפו בכל כוחם לחקיקה מידית.

(4) סימן שאלה גדול מרחף עדין מעל למנהיגות הדמוקרטית. נראה כאילו גפהארד מצדד בקיום החקיקה עכשיו. אולי הוא רואה כאן הזדמנות להכביד על נשיא רפובליקני. הבעיה היא שג'ורג' מיטשל טרם אמר דבר ברור ומאמצים רבים מושקעים בשכנועו.

(5) אישים בממשל מביעים חשש מכניסה לעיסקה סודית עם ישראל לגבי ינואר משום חששם שאי אפשר יהיה לבלום פרסום ואז רק יתגבר חשדם של הערבים ויקרה בדיוק מה שהם מבקשים למנוע: הערבים לא יבואו לוועידה.

(6) הידידים, היהודים, הארגונים, המנהיגים איתנים ורוצים להמשיך. לא היו

שום פרישות ושום בקיעים.

שילה.

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 7413

אל: רהמש/362

מ-: ווש, נר: 2027, תא: 070991, זח: 1915, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר - מכתב מוברק - למכותבים בלבד - בהול - לבוקר

מכתב מוברק - למכותבים בלבד

אל: סמנכ'ל בנצור

לשכת רהמ'

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ערבויות. סכום קצר למוצ'ש 7/9.

(1) כמה סנטורים מכינים מכתב קולקטיבי אל יור' הועדה ליייה שבו יבקשוהו לחזור בו מהסכמתו לדחות את החקיקה.

(2) המזכיר בשיחתו עם איפא'ק חזר על הצעתו כדלקמן:-

(א) הטפול בקונגרס יידחה ב-120 יום. (ב) הממשל יחזור בפומבי על תמיכתו בערבויות. (ג) הממשל מתחייב שלא לתבוע דחיה נוספת אחרי ינואר. (ד) הממשל יסייע במציאת VEHICLE לחקיקה בינואר. (ה) הממשל ינמיך את הסקורינג 'ככל שמרשה החוק'. (ו) המזכיר יסייע בגיוס כספים לקליטה גם ממקורות אחרים (גרמניה ויפן - כנראה). (ז) אם יגרמו לישראל נזקים כספיים כתוצאה מהדחיה תימצא דרך לפצותה (כספית) על כך.

(העיר בשוליים אך לא כחלק מ'התפריט' שארהב' גם תפעל לבטול ההחלטה ציונות-גזענות).

(3) אין תשובה ברורה לשאלה מה יקרה אם בעוד 120 יום עדיין יעמוד הנשיא בהתנגדותו העזה להתנחלויות. תשובה אחת אומרת שיהיה זה אחרי התחלת התהליך והנושא יטופל אז בזירה הישראלית-ערבית ולא בזירה הישראלית-אמריקאית וזה יאפשר לנשיא לצנן את להט מעורבותו בעניין. איש אינו מוכן להתחייב היום בשם הנשיא כי ההתניה הזאת לא תהיה קיימת בינואר. הסנטורים אינוה וקסטן יראו את הנשיא ביום ג' או ד' ויבדקו אם אפשר לקבל מהממשל IRONCLAD COMMITMENT שיבטיח העברת העניין בינואר. אם לאו ידחפו בכל כוחם לחקיקה מידית.

(4) סימן שאלה גדול מרחף עדין מעל למנהיגות הדמוקרטית. נראה כאילו גפהארד מצדד בקיום החקיקה עכשיו. אולי הוא רואה כאן הזדמנות להכביד על נשיא רפובליקני. הבעיה היא שג'ורג' מיטשל טרם אמר דבר ברור ומאמצים רבים מושקעים בשכנועו.

(5) אישים בממשל מביעים חשש מכניסה לעיסקה סודית עם ישראל לגבי ינואר משום חששם שאי אפשר יהיה לבלום פרסום ואז רק יתגבר חשדם של הערבים ויקרה בדיוק מה שהם מבקשים למנוע: הערבים לא יבואו לוועידה.

(6) הידידים, היהודים, הארגונים, המנהיגים איתנים ורוצים להמשיך. לא היו שום פרישות ושום בקיעים.

שילה.

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

סססס

מ/כע

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
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אל: מנהל מצפ"א
דע: וושינגטון - קונגרס, פלג
מאת: סגן הקונכ"ל, ניו יורק

הנדון: דברי מוינייהן

מציב הצהרה חדשה של מוינייהן בעניין הערבויות שפורסמה היום
(6.9).



סופר
6 בספטמבר 1991

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לה סשה רהל אבא מנצ'ל יאזל
בן אבא תכאצות רביא אבא
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FROM THE OFFICE OF

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

New York

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, September 6, 1991 $\frac{2}{3}$ 1044CONTACT: David Luchins
212/661-5150
Brian Connolly
202/224-4451

STATEMENT OF SEN. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN (D.-N.Y.)
On Israeli housing loan guarantees

Earlier this year Israeli officials indicated their interest in securing loan guarantees from the United States government that would allow them to borrow ten billion dollars over five years at competitive rates from commercial banks. This money was, and is, needed to help provide housing and jobs for the hundreds of thousands of immigrants who wish to leave the Soviet Union and settle in Israel. The Administration asked the Israeli Government to postpone this request until September and it did so even though the dramatic rescue of Ethiopian Jews added to its already enormous immigrant absorption costs.

Now the Administration has asked the Israeli government to again postpone requesting -- and Congress has been asked to postpone considering -- these loan guarantees until after the Mid-East peace conference currently planned for October. We are told that this further postponement would "avoid a clash" with Israel over the Administration's demand that Israel stop building "settlements in the occupied territories" as a condition for securing loan guarantees.

The future of the territories that Israel occupied in 1967 will, no doubt, be one of the major issues discussed at the long-awaited peace conference. It seems to me most unhelpful, therefore, to demand that Israel make a major -- and absolutely unilateral -- concession immediately prior to the conference. What comparable concession does the Administration demand of the other conference participants, the nations who have repeatedly waged war against Israel?

As a sponsor of the talks, the United States should not set preconditions which appear to take a position on the future of the disputed territories. Imagine if the United States had demanded that Israel raze Israeli settlements in the Sinai prior to the convening of the Camp David peace conference! The members of the

-more-

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Senate will recall that Prime Minister Sadat came to Jerusalem without preconditions and was subsequently rewarded with the return of every square centimeter of Egyptian territory that Israel had occupied in 1967. Israel has not demanded that Jordan and Syria accept the loss of territory as a precondition to direct negotiations; the United States should not implicitly place such a precondition on Israel.

Freedom for Soviet and Ethiopian Jewry has long been a foreign policy objective of the United States. Helping Israel provide these people with homes and jobs is a logical extension of this policy. How ironic it would be for the freedoms we have helped to achieve to wither on the vine due to a lack of funds. I know that Scoop Jackson -- long my closest friend in the Senate -- would support Israel's request for loan guarantees in order to secure in reality the freedom which we have helped to bring about in theory and I most certainly do. And I believe that the request should be granted without preconditions which are more appropriately hammered out between Israel and its neighbors at the negotiating table.

The size of the request may at first appear large, but it is important to remember that loan guarantees do not require the expenditure of a single American tax dollar. Moreover, these guarantees will amount to less than one percent of all government backed loans issued during this period. It should also be noted that Israel has never defaulted on a loan or note. In short, I believe that our "guarantee" is a appropriate and humanitarian step and that it should be granted without further delay.

#

אאא, חוזם: 6449

אל: רהמש/302

מ-: ווש, נר: 2017, תא: 050991, זח: 1900, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל : סמנכל צפא

דע : לשכת רה'מ' - למכותבים בלבד X למכותבים בלבד

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

ערבויות לקליטה ותהליך השלום

להלן נקודות מתוך שיחה שקיימו (4/9) הציר והח'מ' עם מקור ממשלי העוסק בשני הנושאים לעיל:

א. ערבויות:

(1) בתשובה לשאלה האם הפלסטינים ומדינות ערב איימו שלא יופיעו לוועידה במידה וישראל תקבל הערבויות, טען איש שיחנו כי למיטב ידיעתו לא היו איומים ספציפים. יחד עם זאת, הבהר לממשל כי מתן ערבויות יסכן את התהליך.

(2) סכום הרעשים שקלטו הוביל את הממשל להערכה שמתן הערבויות יסכן התהליך.

(3) את ההחלטה שקיבלו בדבר דחיית הטיפול, תאר כפתרון ביניים שנועד להתגבר על דאגה כפולה: האחת שבתמיכתם בערבויות ללא כריכתן לנושא ההתנחלויות הם עלולים לאבד את הערכים. והשניה היא שבכריכתם את נושא הערבויות להתנחלויות הם עלולים לאבד את ישראל.

(4) תשובת איש שיחנו לשאלה מדוע דחיית הטיפול בערבויות עד אחרי פתיחת הוועידה, תקל על יכולתם לטפל בבקשה היתה שהערכתם/הרגשתם שפתיחת הוועידה תביא לשינוי. לא כל שכן, במידה והוועידה לא תתכנס בגלל סירוב הפלסטינים להשתתף.

(5) א-פרופו דיון בנושא הדחיה והקשיים שהדחיה מעוררת, טען איש שיחנו, כי יוכלו להתגבר על הבעיה הטכנית שהדחיה תיצור לגבי תהליך החקיקה. התייחס לאפשרות של ספלמנטל לתקציב 1992. מעבר לכך ציין כי לא ניתן יהיה להבטיח תמיכת הממשל במתן ערבויות. גם עכשיו וגם בינואר יתקיים דיון בנושא ההתנחלויות. להערכתו הנשיא מוכן כעת להלחם בנושא הערבויות.

ב. תהליך שלום: לקראת ביקור המזכיר

(1) בתשובה לשאלה האם חלה התקדמות בנושא הייצוג הפלסטיני, סיפר על הערכות אותם קלטו בירדן, לפיהן, דחיקתו של פייצל חוסייני על ידינו פעלה לטובת ערפאת. חולשתו של ערפאת היתה שפלסטיני מהשטחים (קרי חוסייני) הפך

למנהיג. כשהפלסטינים ו'אחרים' (?) הבינו שחסייני לא יוכל ליצגם, פעל הדבר לטובת ערפאת שחזר לזירה. להערכת ירדן, השפעתו של חסייני פחתה. ירדן (וארהב ש.ש.) מנסה להכניס את אשף חזרה לקופסא. מנסים לשכנע פלסטינים לשוחח עם המלך.

(2) אשר ליתר הבעיות שטרם נפתרו, ציין:

- מכתב בטחונות: מעריך שהמזכיר יביא עימו טיוטת המכתב. לא הוציא מכלל אפשרות שטיוטא תועבר לפני בואו. לגופו של ענין, סבור שהמזכיר נוטה למכתב ולא לחתימת מזכר הבנה. המכתב שינסחו לצדדים המעורבים לא יהיה זהה.

- מכתב הזימון לוועידה: להערכתו המזכיר WILL PREVIEW את המכתב. אינו מתכוון לנהל מו'מ' לגבי התוכן.

(3) בתשובה לשאלה לגבי מעורבות בריהם, העריך כי הם ON BOARD אך בעמדה חלשה יותר משהיו לפני תחילת הארועים.

שנה טובה,

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 6459

אל: רהמש/303

מ-: ווש, נר: 2018, תא: 050991, זח: 2015, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/ מיד- למכותב בלבד

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: לש' רוה'מ

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

ערביות, תהליך השלום

1. להלן נקודות משיחה (5.9) עם מקור ממשלי העוסק בנושאנו:

א. ערביות:

1. כוונת הממשל לעשות כל מאמץ כדי למנוע עמות פומבי עמנו. ירצו לשמור את הנושא בפרופיל נמוך ככל האפשר.

2. במסגרת מאמצי הממשל להמתיק עד כמה שאפשר את גלולת הדחיה העריך איש שיחי כי יהיו מוכנים להתחייב:

- למצוא כלי חקיקתי (כדי שלא נאבד את תקציב 92).

- למועד מוסכם TO REENGAGE עמנו בנושא.

3. אינו סבור שיוכלו להתחייב לתמוך בבקשתנו.

4. בשיחה נימקתי הסתייגותנו מרעיון הדחייה והשלכותיה השליליות.

ב. תהליך השלום: ההיבט הסובייטי

1. על רקע ביקורו הקרוב של המזכיר במוסקווה סיפר כי מכל מה ששמעו עד כה בטוחים שהסיכומים/הבנות שהושגו עם בסמרטניק בנושא התהליך יכובדו.

2. אינו בטוח שבדיה'מ תוכל לסייע בפתרון בעיית הייצוג הפלסטיני במיוחד לנוכח הקולות שנשמעו מטונים בהקשר ל-COUP.

3. בין אם מעמדה של בדיה'מ נתלש עוד יותר ובין אם לאו החשוב מבחינתם היא לשמור על הדימוי של שת'פ בינממצמתי הדוק כך שמדינות ערב לא תוכלנה לכסות ולנצל חילוקי דעות אפשריים.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 6460

אל: רהמש/289

מ-: ווש, נר: 2019, תא: 050991, זח: 2100, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/ בהול לבוקר

מכתב מוברק מכתב מוברק

אל : לשכת רה'מ'

לשכת שהח , בנצור

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ערכויות

נראה כרגע (יום ה' 0800 בערב) שלייהי החליט לדחות את הגשת החוק (FOREIGN AID APROPRIATION BILL) הכולל את נושא הערכויות עד לחודש ינואר.

לייהי סיפר זאת הערב ללארי וינברג. אמר שהדבר נעשה עפ'י בקשת הנשיא שאמר שחקיקה עכשיו תזיק לתהליך השלום.
לדברי לייהי אמר לו הנשיא שבינואר יתמוך בחקיקה. לארי שאל אם התמיכה בינואר תהיה ללא לינקג' ולייהי השיב שהוא מאמין שתהיה ללא לינקג'. הוסיף שבינואר יהיה סקורינג נמוך ואילו עכשיו הסקורינג יהיה גבוה. לארי שאל אם הנשיא יסכים לחזור על התחייבותו באזני קבוצה שתכלול את קסטן אינווה ואובי ולייהי השיב בחיוב.

לייהי שמע את בקשת הנשיא אמש בישיבה שבה השתתפו בייקר, סונונו סוקרופט ואיגלברג.

בינתיים דיבר בייקר גם עם ג'ורג מיטשל ובקשו לתמוך בדחיה ומיטשל השיב ידון במשאלתו של המזכיר עם חבריו הדמוקרטים.

אם ה-Foreign Aid Bill נדחה יש צורך ב-CR (כלומר בחקיקת ביניים שתאפשר לממשל להוציא כספים). הידידים אומרים שאפשר להדביק את הנושא שלנו ל-CR ויש לכך אפילו יתרונות מסויימים כי חקיקה כזו היא במידה רבה חסינת-וטו ויש להשלימה עד ל-1 באוקטובר.

קסטן ואינווה כועסים כנראה על כך שלייהי עשה צעד חד-צדדי מבלי להיוועץ בהם ויתכן שיחשבו על פתרונות חליפיים כגון ה-CR.

עד כאן המצב לשעה זו.

שילה

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), שהח, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 6002
אל: רהמש/252
מ-: המשרד, תא: 050991, זח: 1726, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בכב
80459
סודי/מידי

א ל: וושינגטון - הציר

הנדון: ביקור מזכיר המדינה בייקר

מרק פריס משגרירות ארה"ב מסר שמזכיר המדינה מבקש להגיע לישראל ב-16/9
ולעזוב ב-17/9.

דיעתכם .

ס/מנהל מצפ"א
5 בספטמבר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 6448

אל: רהמש/301

מ-: ווש, נר: 2016, תא: 050991, זח: 1900, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל : סמנכל צפא ופרן

דע : לשכת רה'מ' - למכותבים בלבד

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

ערכויות לקליטת עליה

1. להלן סיכום שיחה (4/9) בנושא לעיל שקיימו הציר והח'מ' עם מקור ממשלי המקורב:

א. חזר על רצון הממשל למצוא דרך לסייע לנו בקליטת עליה בד בבד עם רצונם להבטיח שהכסף לא יוצא באופן ישיר או עקיף למטרות שלהם מתנגד הממשל.

ב. מנה שלושה אלמנטים הנלקחים בחשבון בהקשר לטיפולם בבקשתנו:

(1) מכתב שהח למזכיר באוקטובר אשתקד והנסיון הלא טוב שהיה להם כמה שנוגע לקבלת מידע. הבטחות שניתנו על-ידינו לא מולאו. המכתב, טען איש שיחנו, צריך היה להיות מפתח שיבנה TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. לצערו, המכתב לא היה המפתח לפתיחת הדלת.

(2) ההתנחלויות:

חנהגותנו בנושא זה גרמה לריאקציה שלילית בדרגים העליונים של הממשל. גם אם ההתנחלויות להערכתו אינן המכשול היחיד לשלום, הרי, שמידי הבעיה החריפו מאז אפריל. לדבריו, קיימת פרספציה, לפיה יש אלמנטים בקרב ממשל ישראל שמנסים TO HUMILIATE את המזכיר (התייחס לידיעות בנושא ההתנחלויות שהתפרסמו עקב ביקוריו האחרונים של המזכיר) וזאת מבלי שנעשה מאמץ עי גורמים אחראים להבהיר שהפעילות אינה חלק ממדיניות רשמית של ישראל.

(3) שני האלמנטים לעיל משתלבים ליצירת בעיה שלישית שאינה חדשה והיא היעדר אמון (TRUST AND CONFIDENCE).

ג. להערכת איש שיחנו, עלינו לקחת בחשבון שלושה אלמנטים אלה לכשנגיש בקשתנו ל-10 ביליון.

ד. תאר המצב שבו נמצא הממשל כ-NO WIN SITUATION. אינו בטוח שניתן למצוא דרך שתספק אותנו ולא תפגע בתהליך. בתשובה לשאלה טען שאינו יכול לומר בוודאות שהפלסטינים לא יבואו לוועידה במידה וישראל תקבל את הערכויות. מעריך שהפלסטינים יבואו. הדרך היחידה לעצור ההתנחלויות היא לבוא לוועידה.

ה. מבלי שיכול היה לנמק, טען שלממשל יהיה קל יותר לטפל בערבויות לאחר תחילת הועידה. להערכתו, פתיחת הועידה תביא לשינוי במצב, ולחילופין, אי כינוס הועידה בגלל אי באום של הפלסטינים תסייע לנו בקבלת הערבויות.

ו. חזר מספר פעמים על כך שה-OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE שלהם היא הועידה (ר'ל כל מה שנתפס כמכשול יש לנטרלו).

ז. אינו סבור שעיקוב הדיון בבקשתנו עשוי להיות תמריץ שלילי מבחינת ישראל במה שנוגע להשתתפות בועידה. הועידה, קבע איש שיחנו, תקום או תיפול על נושא/נושאים שיש לפתורם, קרי בעית הייצוג הפלסטיני. 'ארהב, הוסיף, לא תשלם לנו כדי שנבוא לועידה'.

ח. איש שיחנו התייחס לשלושה מטיעוננו בעד הגשת הבקשה לערבויות: אם לא נקבל הערבויות כעת, נכנס לועידה בעמדת חולשה, התנגדות הממשל לתמוך בבקשתנו לערבויות תגביר חשדותינו לגבי אמינות הממשל וכוונותיו בעתיד, וכן שעיקוב הגשת הבקשה נאבד כלי חקיקתי. בהקשר לטיעון האחרון ציין כי יש אולי דרך 'TO REASSURE US'.

בסיום, ציין כי הנשיא והמזכיר החליטו שהתנהגות ישראל (בנושא ההתנחלויות) מהווה בעיה. על רקע בקשת ישראל לערבויות בסדר גודל משמעותי, חשוב לראות את יחס הגומלין בין רצונם להתקדם בתהליך מחד-גיסא, לבין רצונם לפקח על כך שהוצאת הכסף תועלה בקנה אחד עם מדיניותם.

שנה טובה,

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 6445
אל: רהמש/290
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 65, תא: 050991, זח: 1943, דח: ב, סג: שמ,
בבב
שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: יועצת תקשורת שה"ח, יועץ תקשורת רה"מ

בקשת הערבויות

מכתב בכיר ובעל מקורות טובים:

א. בבית הלבן מרגישים CONFIDENT שהקונגרס ייתמוך בבקשת הממשל לדחות הטיפול בבקשת הערבויות לזמן-מה (כנראה לאחר ועידת השלום). תחושה זו של הממשל מבוססת על שיחות בימים האחרונים עם סנטורים רפובליקנים שהסכימו להיענות לבקשת הדחייה של הממשל, מחשש שייפגע תהליך השלום, אך אמרו (הסנטורים) שהם תומכים בבקשה הישראלית.

ב. משיחות הכתב עם סנטורים - קיבל אישור למידע הנ"ל. הסנטור לייחי אף היה מוכן לומר הדברים בפומבי.

ג. לגברי הכתב, קו-הטיעון שהציג המזכיר אתמול (דחיה כדי למנוע הפרעת ההכנות לוועידת השלום) עובד במשותף ע"י המזכיר ומספר סנטורים בכירים עמם נועץ המזכיר (טלפונית) עוד בשבוע שעבר, ממקום חופשתו.

ת ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 6085

אל: רהמש/275

מ-: המשרד, תא: 050991, זח: 1822, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

80369

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל : וושינגטון - השגריר

הנדון : ערבויות

בהגישך למזכיר בקשת ישראל לערבויות מבקשך שה'ח להטעים הנקודות הבאות :

1. ישראל מביעה הערכה למזכיר על המשך ' מחויבותה של ארה'ב' לעזור לישראל לקלוט בהצלחה עולים מברה'מ (כפי שאמר בתידרוך מחמ'ד ב-4/9). אכן ארה'ב היתה זו הנושאת דגל עקרונות הדמוקרטיה וערך חופש ההגירה אשר פעלה ללא לאות לפתיחת שערי העליה מברה'מ ועזרתה היתה, אולי, המכרעת ביצירת החיזיון לו אנו עדים של הגעת יהודי ברה'מ בהמוניהם.

2. ישראל מבקשת לפעול בנושא הערבויות, כמו בנושאים אחרים, בשת'פ הדוק עם הממשל והקונגרס.

3. קליטת העליה הינה נושא הומניטרי ועזרתה של ארה'ב חיונית לישראל, בלעדיה ספק אם תוכל ישראל לקלוט העולים שהגיעו עד כה ארצה ואת אלה העתידים עוד להגיע ללא זעזוע כלכלי חמור. הערבויות ישמשו לקליטת העולים בתחום הדיור, התעסוקה ויצירת התשתית.

4. אנו חוששים כי אי קבלת הערבויות עלולה לפגוע בגל העליה ולהביא להאטתו וכך לחבל בהצלחה הגדולה של ארה'ב להביא להגירה חופשית.

5. ציין נא שכל דחיה במתן הערבויות תביא לכך שכל מאמצינו המשותפים לעיצוב כלכלי-חברתי יעלו בתוהו ויגרמו לזעזוע שתדרשנה שנים ארוכות לשיקומו.

6. לפיכך אנו מבקשים שהממשל יניע הליכי אישור הערבויות בהקדם המירבי כדי שתנופת העליה מברה'מ ומאמצי קליטתה בישראל לא יעצרו. ממשלת ישראל והעם בישראל יעריכו פעולה ויוזמת הממשל לאישור הערבויות.

7. החתירה לשלום הינה בראש מעיינינו. יזמנו התהליך המדיני והממשל סייע סיוע רב לקידומו. יחד עשינו כברת דרך ארוכה וישראל קבלה על עצמה החלטות כבדות ביותר. לישראל עניין לעבוד עם המזכיר למען הצלחת התהליך. נחתור לחיזוק ההבנה והידידות בינינו לארה'ב ואנו תקווה שפעולת הממשל בסוגית הערבויות תהיה ברוח זו.

(ב)

עם קבלת הדיווח על שיחתך עם המזכיר והמלצותיך לגבי המשך הפעולה, בהתחשב בדברי המזכיר ותדרכו מאתמול והפעולות הננקטות ע"י הממשל והקונגרס בסוגיה זו נגבש הנחיות פעולה לשגרירות לגבי המשך הפעילות.

בנצור
5 בספטמבר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

10/2/20

 $\frac{1}{6}$

102 g

שמור/מידי

אל : מצפ'א

19/91

דע : ציר כלכלי, מנכ"ל אוצר, יועץ רה"מ לכלכלה

מאת : ר' יחידת קונגרס

הנדון : תמונת מצב מן ה"גבעה" - המערכה על הערבויות.

1. כצפוי, נכנס הממשל למערכה ומנסה לבלום את תחיקת הערבויות להלוואות, ליצור זיקה בין הערבויות לבין תהליך השלום, לנטרל את לקחי 400 מליון הדולרים מן הגירסה הנוכחית של התחיקה ולהפוך את הערבויות למרכיב ב"תן וקח" של תהליך השלום. הנשיא, לדברי מקורות רפובליקנים, נחרץ בדעתו, אינו פתוח לטעונוי נגד, משולהב ע"י לחץ מע' אירופאי וערבי-מתון ושוקל פניה ישירה לאומה.
2. יש הטוענים כי הממשל נכון לעמות בזירת "גבעה" למרות שמודע ליחסי הכוחות שאינם נוסים (ברגע זה) לטובתו, מכיוון שרואה בעצם המהלך מכשיר לקידום אמינותו בעיני הערכים, שהיא חיונית בעיניו להמשך תהליך השלום. לפי גישה זו, תהליך השלום, ולא הערבויות, הן מוקד ענינו של הממשל.
3. מאז יום חמישי פועל הממשל (ובמיוחד מזכיר המדינה) לגיוס תמיכת מנהיגי המתקצבים וההנהגות בבתי המחוקקים ביוזמת הדחייה.
4. הממשל אף שוקל לגייס את ה- OMB באופן דרסטי, ע"י העלאת אומדן ה- SCORING עד ל- 10%.
5. הממשל קיבל הסכמת יו"ר וע' ההקצבות של ביה"נ, ג'יימי וויטן, יו"ר תת הועדה לסיוע חוץ, דויד אובי ו"המצליף" בוניור, כמו גם את הסכמתם של יו"ר וע' ההקצבות בסנאט רוברט בירד (כנראה) ושל יו"ר תת וע' הועדה לסיוע חוץ, פטריק ליייה. מטרת הממשל היא לכודד את הסנטורים אינוייה וקסטן המובילים את מהלך התחיקה.
6. ביום ג' הקרוב צפוי מפגש הנשיא ומזכיר המדינה עם הסנטורים הרפובליקנים לגיוס תמיכה מפלגתית.
7. סנטור ליייה:
 - מצ"ל הודעה לעתונות שמסר הסנטור לאחר שיחות הבהרה בעקבות מפגשו עם הנשיא (מצ"ל הודעה נפרדת).
 - בשיחה שהתנהלה הובהרו הנקודות כדלקמן:
 - ליייה אינו מתכוון -בהכרח- להשהות הדיון בערבויות להלוואות עד ינואר או פברואר;
 - ליייה מתכוון להמחיש תמיכתו בערבויות ע"י פעילות בנדון שתתחיל כבר ביום ב' הקרוב, מתוך כוונה לגבש נוסחאה אשר תימנע "חוקמים זבי דם, ומאבק שיותר את הזירה עם מפסידים ללא מנצח";

$\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{3}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{5}$ $\frac{1}{6}$ $\frac{1}{7}$ $\frac{1}{8}$ $\frac{1}{9}$ $\frac{1}{10}$

ליידי חש פגוע (ונבוך) מן הפרוש אשר ניתן להודעתו הראשונה לעתונות, כאילו הוא משתף פעולה עם הממשל מתוך מגמה לפגוע בהשגת הערכויות;

1029

2/6

ליידי אכן מאמין (ונראה לי שתחושתו היא אכן כך!) שהנשיא והמזכיר תומכים אף הם בערכויות;

הסנטור נקרע (תחושתו האישית שלי ולא התבטאותו) בין יחסיו הטובים מנהיגים ישראלים מחד ועם כוש (ובמיוחד) בייקר מאידך, ובין תמיכתו העקרונית-ריגשית-אישית בקליטת העולים ובערכויות מחד והתנגדותו למדיניות ההתנחלויות מאידך;

ליידי רואה עצמו כבעל הבית של "פונקציה 150" (חק סיוע החוץ) המיועדת לכלול "חבילת סיוע" לברה"מ ולמדינות הכלטיות. הוא אינו סבור שיהיה זה אחראי מצידו לגבש תחיקה כתאריך המיועד (17.9) לפני שהממשל והקונגרס החליטו על היקף "החבילה הסוביסטית". מלבד "הזיקה הסוביסטית" (אשר עליה עמד גם צ'רלי פליקנר ממשרדו של פייט דומיניצ'י, הרפובליקני הבכיר בוע' התקציב) קימת כמובן אצל ליידי הזיקה לתהליך השלום, האמור-לדעתו-להשפיע על עיצובה הסופי של תחיקת סיוע החוץ. (לדברי פליקנר תוהה דומיניצ'י "האם אין לסייע לאלו הנשארים בברה"מ-ע"י ערכויות - כפי שמסייעים לאלו העוזבים אותה?") פליקנר מסכים כי ה-SCORING של ערכויות לברה"מ גבוה לאין שעור מזה של ישראל).

ליידי נחוש בדעתו לנסות ולגבש תחיקה עד סוף אוקטובר, אם אמנם תעוצבנה עד אז המגמות המרכזיות "בחבילה הסוביסטית" ובתהליך השלום (האם יש תזוזה?, האם המדובר בהרהורי לב? האם יש צדדים אשמים יותר ואשמים פחות? וכו');)

ליידי עומד על כך שהוא לא singled out את ישראל בהתייחסותו לדחיה, אלא רואה לנגד עיניו את המרכיבים השונים והתמיכה הכוללת של "פונקציה 150" המחייבים דחייה;

איזכור 120 היום, כטרוח הדחייה, נועד לספק לממשל (במיוחד) ולקונגרס מירב הזמן לשיקול דעת ולבחירת המצב בנושאים השונים, אך היעד הוא תחיקה במליאה הנוכחית!

8. סנטורים רפובליקנים שונים (כמו גם אינווייה וקסטן) שלחו היום מכתב לליידי בו הם קוראים לו TO RESTORE את ה-MARK-UP לתאריך המיועד, לנתק את הדיון בערכויות מתהליך השלום ולראות בערכויות בטוי למטרה אנושית ואינטרס ארה"ב.

9. סנטורים רפובליקנים (ביקשו למנוע ציון שמם) מסרו כי, כאשר הוזמנו למפגש עם הנשיא ומזכיר המדינה ביום שלישי הקרוב, ציינו שבכוונתם להביע הסתייגות ממגמת הממשל לדחיתו (הווה אומר זיקה) של הדיון בערכויות. חלקם מסרו כי אין מדובר הפעם בתחיקה מן המניין אשר אפשר לגייס נגדה נבחרים רפובליקנים ע"י קריאה לדגל מן הבית הלבן.

10. הממשל מנסה לשכנע את הנהגת הדמוקרטים (מיטצ'ל, פולי וגפהארדט) לחמוך בעמדתו. הסנטור ג'ו ביידן (דמוק' - דלאאויר; סגן יו"ר וע' החוץ) עומד להתקשר למיטצ'ל כדי להביע התנגדותו העזה למהלך הדחייה ("פגיעה בתהליך השלום"; "בטוי לנכונות מסורתית לעשות עיסקה עם השטן כדי להשיג יעד, אך למעשה להישאר עם ידיים ריקות"; "בומרנג לשלום"; "בטוי לפשטנות וקריאה לא נכונה של המציאות המורכבת"; "מכה להזדמנות חד פעמית של ישראל וארה"ב").

11. הממשל מציע להנהגות ולתומכי התחיקה פתוי בדמות LOW SCORING. קיימת

הנחה כי מועד הדחייה של מאה עשרים הימים, כמו גם המערכה האגרסיבית (האמורה להתעצם) משמשים ל"פ ואמצעי מיקוח לגיבוש תחיקה נוחה יותר לממשל.

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12. ההנהגות הן גורם קריטי בכל הקשור לעתוי הדיון בתחיקה. אמנם וויטן, אובי, בירד (ולפי שעה) ליידי תומכים בדחייה, ובסמכותם לקבוע את העתוי הנראה להם, אך גם להנהגה הדמוקרטית (הרוב השולט בועדות) יש משקל כבד בנידון.

13. יו"ר ועדות ותת-ועדות ההקצבות הנ"ל וההנהגות משחקים תפקיד מרכזי גם בכל הקשור לאפשרות של דחייה משמעותית למליאת ינואר, אשר תביא לתחיקת ביניים/המשך (CONTINUING RESOLUTION). הממשל נחוש בדעתו - ונתמך ע"י חלק מן ההנהגות והיוזרים הנ"ל - כי ה-CR יהיה נקי מתיקונים (AMENDMENTS), וע"י כך למנוע מתומכי הערבויות לנצל את ה-CR כמכשיר תחיקתי לעקיפת מהלך הדחייה. האפשרות להעמיס על ה-CR (אשר יכול כנראה תחיקות נוספות שלא תגענה לכלל סיכום, עקב האקלים הפוליטי החם השורר ב"גבעה" היא מצומצמת. תיקון הערבויות, אם יוצג, ילווה בתוספת תקציבית (scoring) אשר לא כלולה בהצגת החוק עצמו, ומהווה עילה לבלימת התיקון ע"י הצבעת סנטור בודד. מכאן שהסיכוי כי ה-CR מהווה מכשיר מתאים לתחיקת הערבויות הוא אמנם קיים, אך קלוש ביותר.

14. משמעות הדחייה לגבי ההיערכות ב"גבעה":
- ל"פ לכירסום בתמיכה, מתוך הכרה למאזן הכוחות הנוכחי שאיננו שפיר מבחינת הממשל;
- בחירת עיתוי נוח יותר לממשל כדי לממש יעדים דומים לאלו המנחים אותו עתה;
- ניהול המערכה ע"י הסנטורים המובילים, כאשר יום הבחירות שלהם ב- 11/92 מתקרב ומקשה על פרופיל גבוה בנושא הערבויות שאיננו חביב על הבוחרים;
- נסיון להביא לגיבוש תחיקה אשר תאפשר לממשל שליטה נוסח תקדים ה- 400 מליון \$.

15. בסבב טלפונים במיוחד בין הרפובליקנים המקורבים לממשל, חזר הפזמון: "גא לוודא, למען התחיקה, כי החזית היהודית נשארת מלוכדת. כל בקע בחזית זו יהווה פתח לעריקים ב"גבעה".

16. מסרים:

- לדעת סנטורים ועוזריהם יש להמשיך ולהשריש המסרים האנושיים והכלכליים, ולא להיגרר אך ורק לכיוון המדיני;
- קיימת נטיה לקבל התיאום כי הממשל אמנם מתכוון לקדם התהליך אך למעשה הוא משתמש במכשיר דמוי בומרנג: סחיטת ויתור מ"ישראל באמצעות הממשל פוגעת בתמריץ למו"מ ישיר עם ישראל, ומהווה תקדים מסוכן העלול לחזור בהקשרי הגולן (תמורת סיוע צבאי ?), יו"ש (תמורת סיוע כלכלי ?), וכו'; קיימת התאמה בין רמת הבטחון שחשה ישראל כלפי תמיכת ארה"ב לבין רמת הסיכונים שישראל נכונה לקבל על עצמה בתהליך השלום; הזיקה בין קליטת עולים לבין תהליך השלום הופכת העולים לבני ערובה בידי גורמים רדיקלים המשפיעים על תהליך השלום יותר מן ההתנחלויות; המערכה למען "שלח את עמי" לא הותנתה אף פעם בויתורים ישראלים בהקשר המדיני.

יורם אטינגר

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STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY, 4:45 PM THURSDAY, SEPT 5, 1991

--At the President's request, I went to Washington yesterday to discuss foreign aid matters, including what to do about aid to the Soviet republics, and the Middle East peace process.

--We discussed the Israeli loan guarantees matter. He said he was considering asking Congress to postpone action on the guarantees request.

--He also said the Administration needed time to make recommendations about the Soviet Union because of the rapid changes over the last few weeks.

--The President also told me he was optimistic that there would be a Middle East peace conference soon, and that there could be an "historic" breakthrough.

--He asked for my help in a temporary delay of action on the Israeli loan guarantee request.

--I told the President that his request sounds reasonable, but that the Administration and he would need to consult with other members of Congress about the idea.

--I strongly support providing the loan guarantees to Israel. This is a great humanitarian endeavor to provide a refuge for one million Soviet Jews. US policy for over 20 years has been to pressure the Soviet Union to allow Jews to leave, and now that they can, the US needs to help.

--At the same time, if the President of the United States asks for a delay in the guarantees to help the chances for peace in the Middle East, I believe I should support him.

September 6, 1991
2:00 p.m.
Burlington, Vermont

STATEMENT BY SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY

CHAIRMAN, SENATE FOREIGN OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

At the request of President Bush, and after consultations with Congressional leaders, I have agreed to support a temporary postponement of the foreign aid bill. The President told me he needs additional time to conduct sensitive diplomacy to convene a Middle East Peace Conference in October, and to develop Administration proposals to respond to the massive changes in the Soviet Union, including the possibility of U.S. economic assistance.

I strongly support helping Israel to receive an expected one million Soviet and Ethiopian immigrants over the next four or five years. I will join with others in developing a program to provide \$10 billion in loan guarantees to help absorb these refugees. The loan guarantees are not direct cash assistance; they will be in the form of backing by the United States Government for loans Israel will contract from private financial institutions.

What the President requested, and what I have agreed to support, is a temporary delay in moving the foreign aid appropriation. I expect my subcommittee to take action on the foreign aid bill as soon as the Administration has developed its proposals for dealing with the new situation in the Soviet republics and as soon as the situation clarifies concerning the Middle East Peace Conference. If this happens before Congress adjourns in October or November, I would be willing to send the foreign aid bill and the loan guarantees program forward. If action prior to adjournment is not possible, the foreign aid bill and a proposal for \$10 billion in loan guarantees for Israel will be my top priority for action as soon as Congress reconvenes next January.

When I return to Washington, I will seek a meeting with the President and his advisers, and other members of Congress, to work on a plan for loan guarantees that can move forward rapidly once my subcommittee is in a position to act. The President and Secretary Baker told me that they, too, support providing Israel loan guarantees, and they assured me of Administration cooperation in developing this program.

The President told me that this brief delay is essential for his efforts to build a peace process in the Middle East, which I have long believed is vital to the long term security and

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wellbeing of Israel. This is a view I have stated many times directly to Prime Minister Shamir, Defense Minister Arens, Foreign Minister Levy and other Israeli leaders.

The situation in the Soviet republics is extraordinarily complex and fluid, and I have urged the Administration not to respond to it piecemeal. I welcome the President's desire to come forward with comprehensive proposals in this regard.

אאא, חוזם: 4912

אל: רהמש/215

מ-: ווש, נר: 2013, תא: 040991, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / מכתב מוברק / מידי

אל: מנכ'ל רהמ'

סמנכ'ל בנצור

(למכותבים בלבד)

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ערביות

אחרי שנכשלו נסיונות הממשל לגרור אותנו להסכמה לדחית המהלך, החליט המזכיר להזמין את השגריר ולקבל מידי את האגרת ולפנות עם זאת מיד לתשעה המחוקקים הרלוונטיים ביותר לנושא, ולבקשם שלא לפעול ולא לעשות מאומה לגבי פניתה של ישראל עד שתהיה הזדמנות למזכיר לשוחח בירושלים עם רהמ'. הנחתם היא שלבקשה 'פשוטה' כזאת, לא יוכלו המחוקקים לסרב. התשעה הם: מיטשל, דול, ליידי, קסטן ואינווה, מייקל, פולי, גפהרד ואובי.

שילה.

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

חכסס

אאא, חוזם: 4913

אל: רהמש/213

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 44, תא: 040991, זח: 2015, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / בהול לבוקר

אל: מצפ"א, מע"ת.

דע: יועצת תקשורת שה"ח, יועץ תקשורת רוח"מ.

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

בקשת הערבויות - תגובות לתקשורת

1. לפניות התקשורתיות הרבות בנושא הגבנו כדלקמן, עפ"י הנחיות השגריר:

א. השגריר שובל יפגש עם מזכיר המדינה ביום שישי הקרוב כדי להגיש בקשתה של ישראל לקבלת ערבויות להלוואות בסך 10 בליון דולר, על פני חמש שנים (2 בליון דולר לשנה).

ב. בקשת הערבויות להלוואות מבוססת על צרכים הומניטריים אמיתיים לקליטת מאות אלפי יהודים המגיעים לארץ, ואנו מניחים שההתייחסות לבקשה תהיה על בסיס זה.

ג. סירבנו להוסיף - להגיב על השאלה הישירה האם התבקשנו ע"י הממשל לעכב הגשת הבקשה.

ד. לרקע הבענו שביעות-רצון מדברי המזכיר על מחוייבות הממשל לסייע לממשלת ישראל בקליטת העולים. סירבנו להתייחס ישירות לדברי המזכיר על הקשר בין ערבויות לתהליך המדיני, אך חזרנו והבענו עמדתנו שנושא הערבויות הינו הומניטרי ביסודו וההתייחסות אליו צריכה להיות בהתאם, וללא קשר לתהליכים אחרים.

שנה טובה,

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, @ (נוה/משהבט)

אאא, חוזם: 4672

אל: רהמש/186

מ-: ווש, נר: 2007, תא: 040991, זח: 1315, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / בהול לבוקר

אל: המקש'ח

המנכ'ל

היוע'מש (משהב'ט)

- בטחון העבירונא -

מר ש. שטיין/היועץ המדיני/וושנגטון (הועבר)
לשכת רמש'נ - ניו יורק (בטחון העבירו נא)

זאת: הרמש'נ, וושנגטון

הנדון: MTCR

סימוכין: רמש'נ/4113

1. נפגשתי היום עם דיק קלרק אשר מסר לי את הטיוטה המצוייה כבר בידיכם.
דיק ביקש להסב תשומת ליבי לכך שתגובות ההתיעצות המוטלות בטיטה על ישראל
- אין משמען חובה לקבל העמדה האמריקנית.
לאחר שקראנו בצוותא את הטיוטה, בקש ממני דיק להביע התרשמותי, באופן בלתי
פורמלי.

2. הגבתי כי תגובתי הינה אישית לי בלבד ואינה מחייבת אותי עצמי (אין
צורך לומר שאין היא מחייבת את מערכת הבטחון).

3. להלן תמצית הערות ותגובות שמסרתי, כאמור, לקלרק:

א. הטיוטה יכולה לשמש בסיס לדיונים, אך לדעתי חסרים בה מספר אלמנטים.
כמו כן יש לערוך בה שינויים טכסטואליים.

ב. הטיוטה נראית ככפיית משטר ה-MTCR על ישראל. חסרה בה, איפוא, פיסקה
המביעה את העובדה שישאל וארה'ב שתיהן מבקשות למנוע הפצת טילים
וטכנולוגיה של טילים.
עוד חסרה פיסקה המביעה את האיום המיוחד הנשקף לישראל מטילים, לרבות
מטילים שאינם מכוסים במשטר MTCR.

ג. חסרה קביעה מפורשת כי ישראל תהנה מכל הזכויות והחובות המוקנות על פי
הדין למדינה החברה במשטר ה-MTCR.

ד. חסרה פיסקה הקובעת כי כל המכשולים שעמדו בפני התעשיות הישראליות
להתחרות בשוק האמריקני בהקשר ל-MTCR - יוסרו.
במיוחד, ומבלי לגרוע בכלליות האמור לעיל, כוונתנו לאיסורים המוטלים בקשר
למשגרים לחלל.

ה. בסעיף 2 - הערתי כי החובה לקיים התייעצות לגבי כל פריט ופריט נראות בעיני מסורבלות מדי. יש לבנות מנגנון שיפשט את התהליך.

ו. בסעיף 4 לטיוטה האמריקנית הרי הסייפא של הסעיף מייתרת את הרישא שלו. לפיכך יש להביע בצורה יותר קטגורית את זכות התחרות של ישראל בשוק האמריקני.

ז. בסעיף 5 לטיוטה הבהרתי כי הממשלה אינה מחוקקת חוקים, וכל שאנו יכולים להבטיח לפעול להגשת חוקים לכנסת.

ח. בסעיף 6 בטיטה הבהרתי כי הנוסח נראה גורף יתר על המידה בהזכירו המונח 'עסקות' TRANSACTIONS.

4. להלן הערות נוספות לאחר שיחה עם שמעון שטיין:-

א. לענין חובות ההתייעצות שמוטלות עלינו - יש לקבוע כי אלה תעשינה בהתאם למתכונת השוררת בין חברות ה - MTCR.

ב. גם לענין חובות 'העשה' שמוטלות עלינו בטיטה - יש לקבוע כי תבוצענה במתכונת חברות ה - MTCR.

ג. לשיקולכם אם לקבוע בטיטה חובה אמריקנית לפעול לצרופינו למשטר ה - MTCR במתכונת המולטילטרלית.

5. אנסה לקבל ממל רישי טיוטה מתקונת אשר תשקף את הערותינו.

בברכת שנה טובה,

משה קוחנובסקי.

אי =

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, פרנ, מצפא, סייבל

סססס

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman

For Immediate Release

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PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III

Department of State
September 4, 1991

SECRETARY BAKER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let me begin with a brief statement, and then I'll be pleased to respond to your questions.

In the last 2 weeks, we've seen another revolution blowing with full force across the Soviet Union. Of course, it's obvious that we want to see this revolution remain democratic, and we want to see it remain peaceful. Building democracy and free markets across the Soviet Union is not going to be an easy task after decades of totalitarianism and central planning.

The work of freedom will be hard, and the transition will be painful. The Soviet peoples have to know that they have just embarked on what will be a very difficult road. But they must know, too, that there can be no turning away from democratic principles and tolerance if they truly hope to follow that road to its end and to join the democratic commonwealth of nations.

We will help them move along that path of political and economic freedom.

As a first step, the President has asked me to go to Moscow next week to attend the CSCE human rights meeting and to have discussions with a number of leaders.

I go to the Soviet Union with a four-part agenda.

First, I will convey to Soviet leaders and to the Soviet peoples the five principles that will guide this Administration's approach to political change in the Soviet Union.

However, on this overall question, let me be very clear: The Baltic states have always been and they remain a special and, indeed, separate case for the United States. We never recognized their incorporation into the Soviet Union. To us, they have never been Soviet republics but instead separate states for whom we helped keep alive the promise and diplomatic symbols of independence.

And, of course, on Monday the President took an important step to turn that promise and those symbols into working realities,

beginning the process of establishing formal diplomatic relations with the Governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

To emphasize America's continuing commitment to the Baltics' enduring freedom, I would like very much to visit these states on this trip.

As to the changes that are taking place in center-republic relations, our policy -- that is, the policy of this Administration -- toward the Soviet future will be guided by the following five principles.

- First, the future of the Soviet Union is for the Soviet peoples to determine themselves, peacefully and consistent with democratic values and practices and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. We call upon all Soviet leaders at all levels of government, including those of the republics, to show their support for these internationally accepted principles. In this process, there can be no legitimate place for threats, intimidation, coercion, or violence.
- Second, we urge all to respect existing borders, both internal and external. Any change of borders should occur only legitimately by peaceful and consensual means consistent with CSCE principles.
- Third, we support democracy and the rule of law, and we support peaceful change only through orderly, democratic processes, especially the processes of elections.
- Four, we call for the safeguarding of human rights, based on full respect for the individual and including equal treatment of minorities.
- Five, we urge respect for international law and obligations, especially adherence to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.

Clearly, one of the first and most important steps the Soviet leaders and peoples need to take is to clarify the precise interrelationships both among the various republics and between the republics and the center. We will recommend that these relationships be clarified in ways that are supportive of the five principles that I've just outlined.

The second item on my agenda on this trip will be our support for fundamental economic reform and immediate humanitarian needs. The Soviet political revolution must now be matched by an economic revolution.

In Moscow, I will seek to meet with Prime Minister Silayev and the members of the Economic Commission to urge rapid development of a new, comprehensive economic adjustment and reform plan in close consultation with the IMF, the World Bank, and the other

international economic institutions. This, we think, is the critical next step.

I will also be discussing with Soviet leaders at all levels humanitarian needs for the winter. This work will complement the efforts being undertaken by the presidential mission.

And, finally, I plan to examine how our technical assistance can be accelerated to both help meet humanitarian needs and to prepare the foundations for long-term restructuring.

The third item on my agenda will be Soviet foreign policy. In particular, I will be continuing to work on efforts to convene a peace conference to launch direct negotiations and thereby to facilitate a viable peacemaking process in the Middle East. After consulting with our Japanese partners, I also would hope to be able to accelerate action on the Northern Territories, stressing the need to close out the last significant vestige of World War II.

And the fourth item on my agenda -- fourth and finally -- I hope to have some talks about Soviet security policy generally, so that we can ensure proper follow-through on treaty commitments and understandings on nuclear safety and pave the way for a genuine and extensive defense conversion effort.

Now I'll be glad to respond to your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you spoke carefully of the relationship between the republics and the central authority. I'd like to ask you if for the management of foreign affairs -- indeed, for the sake of a new world order the Administration is in favor of -- need there be or do you think there should be a strong or a reasonably strong central authority in the Soviet Union? And, if so, what functions should that central authority retain?

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me refer you, Barry, back to Principle No. 1 which points out very clearly, I think, that the future of the Soviet Union and the future of the republics thereof and the respective rights, obligations, and responsibilities is a matter for the Soviet peoples to determine.

They are now at this very moment in the process of making those determinations, and those determinations might well take a considerably longer period of time than just the period of time that will be covered by my visit. In fact, I think they will take a considerably longer period of time.

So it's not up to us to dictate or determine what those relationships should be, except to say that we hope that they are accomplished, carried out, and established in accordance with the five principles that I've outlined.

QUESTION: All right. I was trying to put some emphasis also on

your function -- I mean, the United States. You have to deal in this world, and you have to deal with the Soviet Union.

Do you have a practical preference, so far as managing U.S. foreign relations?

SECRETARY BAKER: If the developments in the Soviet Union proceed in accordance with the five principles that I have outlined, we will continue to work toward cooperation with the Soviet Union and with the republics thereof.

I would expect, for instance, to be meeting once again with the Foreign Minister of the Russian Republic -- the fifth time I will have met with him -- in addition to having a meeting with the new Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

So we're not in a position to dictate or determine exactly what those relationships should be, but I have outlined here for you today the principles that we subscribe to as being those principles that should guide the development of these relationships.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you've said that you were going to urge a comprehensive reform plan on the Soviets. Is there a plan that you specifically have in mind? Are there items that you are going to suggest to them specifically? Are you supporting an existing plan of theirs?

SECRETARY BAKER: We do not have a specific plan in mind, but I said, as a matter of fact -- I believe during the course of the Sunday program that I was on a week or so ago -- that we were heartened by the establishment of the Economic Commission that has been appointed.

We see on that commission some proponents and advocates of free-market economic reform. I also said, I believe, that the results of the London summit might have been different had the central government opted for the more liberal of the two economic plans that were before the central government before the economic summit.

So what we want to see are economic plans that commit the Soviet Union and/or the republics of the Soviet Union to free-market economic reforms. Now, what are those? They're convertibility of currencies. It's price systems. It's privatization. It's private property ownership. It's incentive. It's competition. It's everything that makes free-market economic systems the best systems in the world.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you going to the Middle East? What is the status of the Israeli loan guarantees, and is it tied firmly to the freeze on settlements?

SECRETARY BAKER: The answer with respect to the Middle East is, it has always been my view that following the August break,

there should be at least one more trip to the Middle East in order to try and tie up some outstanding issues with respect to the assurances process.

We are engaged in dialogue with Israel, with Palestinians, with Jordanians, and will be engaged, I'm sure, in dialogue with Syrians, with respect to certain assurances.

We've made a lot of progress since I was last in the Middle East -- the team that we sent out here. We still have some issues that are open. It would be my hope in going to the Middle East that maybe we could close those gaps even a little bit more; because I think -- as you heard me say before, I really think there is an opportunity here to create an active peace process; perhaps the best opportunity we've had in a long time.

With respect to the question of the loan guarantees, let me first say that the Administration remains fully committed, as we have since we came to office, to helping Israel successfully absorb Soviet immigrants. And we have been instrumental in helping improve and increase the flow of those immigrants to Israel.

I fully expect that I will receive a request during the course of this week, before I leave for Mexico on Sunday, from the Government of Israel for substantial assistance from the United States in the form of guarantees. Once we receive this request, we will study it very carefully. I will have an opportunity to discuss it in detail, I hope, with Prime Minister Shamir. I've already had a telephone discussion with him concerning it -- two, as a matter of fact. And I will also have the opportunity -- or we will have the opportunity as the Administration and I will as well -- to consult closely with the Congress.

We hope and expect and believe that the Congress will give us the time we need to study and further explore this request and deal with it in the manner that it deserves. It is a very substantial request -- the \$10 billion principal amount -- and we have ongoing now some very sensitive diplomatic efforts, as I've just mentioned, that present us with a rather historic opportunity, I think, to achieve something. And we want to deal with this and all other issues that come before us between now and the time that Arabs and Israelis might have an opportunity to sit down together in direct negotiations. We want to deal with those issues in a way that does not undercut that opportunity.

Let me say one more time what I said at the beginning: We are firmly committed to helping Israel successfully absorb Soviet Jewish immigrants.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there's been some discussion that all of the nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union should end up inside one republic -- Russia. Do you think that's going to happen, and is that a good idea?

SECRETARY BAKER: I can't tell you that that's what is going to happen. Again, let me say that the principles that we think should govern all of these changes, including that one, are the five principles that I've just laid out.

I will be discussing the nuclear issue in Moscow. We do not want to see the transformation that's taking place in the Soviet Union either create or add to the problems of nuclear weapons proliferation, and I think that it would be probably on balance best if -- not necessarily that they ended up all in one republic but that they ended up under one central command authority. I do believe that that would be advisable.

QUESTION: Would that conceivably be the Republic of Russia, though, for example?

SECRETARY BAKER: I said maybe not even under -- who knows whether it will be one republic or more than one republic, because you don't really know whether that function might remain a function of a more loosely structured center. So those are all still very hypothetical as these changes take place. But one central command would be, I think, helpful and advisable.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, under fairly new credit reform practices as a result of the budget agreements of last year, the government is required to set aside a certain amount of the loan guarantees, as you know. And there's some controversy as to whether that could be so large an amount as to become an obstacle to the passage of those loan guarantees, or to those loan guarantees.

Could you tell us what the position is of the Administration on that -- whether it's up to OMB or whether the State Department has a view on it?

QUESTION: It's my understanding the law vests that responsibility in OMB, but it's not a responsibility that is to be or has to be exercised until approximately the time of passage of the legislation. These are the kinds of questions, I think, that have to be looked at and examined. That one, for instance, would answer some questions that exist with respect to exactly what is the budget impact of this, and where do the funds come from. But those are the kinds of things we need a little time to look at.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, given the uncertainties about how the republics will sort themselves out in their relations with the center, and the uncertainties you've just mentioned about our command authority for weapons, can the Administration urge the Senate to ratify the CFE and START agreements in the near future, or do you think some kind of pause is called for while the sorting-out process is unfolding in the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY BAKER: I happen to think that these treaties continue

to be in the national security interest and national interest of the United States. We would not have negotiated them; we would not have worked as hard as we had to conclude them if we hadn't felt that way. Nothing has changed on that.

I would direct your attention, David, to the fifth principle that I outlined for you, which is the principle that calls for respect for international obligations and say that the changes that take place, we would hope would take place in an atmosphere of respect for international law and international obligations.

There are a lot of questions that will remain unanswered that don't relate, by the way, to arms control treaties but good questions such as, for instance, what happens to the debts of the Soviet Union? To what extent will republics that are leaving the Soviet Union disclaim any responsibility? To what extent would some accept some responsibility? What does that do to the credit rating of the center should there remain a center anything like the one that we have been used to dealing with or that is there now -- let me put it that way -- as they go through these changes? And what does that do to the ability of those of us in the West whose laws call for certain credit requirements? What does that do to our ability, for instance, to help on CCC credits? There are many, many questions that its going to take quite a bit of time before we're going to have answers to them.

QUESTION: If I could follow up, though, Mr. Secretary. How can you ask the Senate this September and October to ratify an agreement that would limit weapons in eight republics, the future of which you don't -- to cover eight republics that you don't even know the status of?

SECRETARY BAKER: We're not sure that we won't know the status. All I'm really saying is, the treaties are still in our interest. We're going to call upon the successor entities, whatever they are -- whether they're republics or some loose confederation of sovereign states or whether there's a center. Without assuming any of that, we are asking that they agree to abide by and respect their international obligations.

If we're not satisfied come time to ratify, obviously, I think we would probably say, "Let's wait until we're satisfied." But don't interpret that as a statement today that says we're not going to do --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, to follow up on the question of the loan guarantees, you said you spoke to Mr. Shamir twice. Did you, in either of those conversations, or has any other senior Administration official, asked the Israelis to delay their application for this \$10 billion?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not going to get into the nitty-gritty details, Mary, of diplomatic communications.

Let me simply say that there are a number of questions here that we need to examine, that we need to deal with; Saul has just asked one of them. I think I said in response to the original question, that we are at a very sensitive stage in what might really prove to be a historic breakthrough in terms of opportunity to create a peace process.

Let me say that I am absolutely, totally convinced that Prime Minister Shamir remains as committed to this process as he did when I was last in Jerusalem, just before the August break.

SECRETARY BAKER: But, Mr. Secretary, if I could just follow up. What is the linkage you're drawing here between the \$10 billion and the peace process?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not drawing any linkage.

QUESTION: Why do you seem to be saying that it impinges on the peace process somehow? You're saying that we're in a very sensitive stage here.

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm making a statement of fact. We're in a very sensitive stage. We want a little bit of time to review this request, to look at such questions as the one that's just been raised here and what the impact might or might not be vis-a-vis the peace process. We will want to do that. That's not drawing a linkage.

I'm not suggesting that there's not some relationship. There will be an impact.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in the five principles you outlined today, there was some similar language that you used in Yugoslavia earlier this summer urging the republics to negotiate peacefully and so forth.

Two questions. One: Mr. Genscher today hinted that Germany might soon recognize Croatia and Serbia -- Slovenia, I'm sorry. What is the U.S. position on that? And, secondly, are you as sanguine about the results in the Soviet Union as in Yugoslavia?

SECRETARY BAKER: I believe in the Soviet Union that the events of the last 2-1/2 weeks or so do present us with some significant opportunities. I think, on balance, that these events are very favorable to those of us who believe in democracy and in freedom and, indeed, in free markets.

But there are also some risks. I don't think we ought to be shy about acknowledging that. That's one of the reasons that I suggest that we approach these changes with these five principles in mind; one reason that I suggest that these five principles should guide our approach to these changes.

You're quite right. We made similar suggestions with respect to the situation in Yugoslavia. The five principles,

unfortunately, did not guide the approach there, and look what's happened.

With respect to the first part of your question, we have not changed our position on that question of recognition. We continue to support the European Communities' call for a peace conference. There is going to be one held now, as you know, September 7th in The Hague. We continue to deplore the continued violence there, and we continue to think that if these five principles had guided the development of the situation there, we might not have the tragic situation we have today.

QUESTION: But do you think that the outcome in Yugoslavia can be avoided in the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think if the developments in the Soviet Union proceed in accordance with these five principles, I certainly think that they can be, yes. That's one of the reasons we make the suggestion.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you've made comments on central command and control of military weapons in the Soviet Union. You've suggested that economic commitments by the Soviet Union would also be easier for the West to handle if there were a place to go to get commitments. Aren't you, in effect, saying that the U.S. would prefer to see some kind of fairly strong central authority maintain the ability to make political commitments, military commitments? And on the Middle East, diplomatic commitments as well?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, Ralph, I really am not, with the single exception of suggesting that I think, at least, it would be preferable if there were one central command responsibility for the nukes.

My comments with respect to the economic reform program do not in any way suggest that republics -- it may well be, indeed, that some republics will be the first to come forward with credible economic reform programs. If they do, I think our reaction to that ought to be the same as it would be if the center came forward with credible --

QUESTION: You talked about debts and you talked about meeting the Russian Foreign Minister.

SECRETARY BAKER: Debts, but all I suggest there is that if there is going to be a devolution of rights and responsibilities, that it's both, not just rights but responsibilities as well. I'm not arguing that there has to be -- I'm not picking and choosing between 15 separate republics, a loose confederation of sovereign states, a firm, strong central union. It's not up to us to make these determinations. And I'm not picking either between individuals in terms of who we might or might not prefer to deal with. We're going to deal with reformers in the Soviet Union wherever we find them.

We are suggesting that the developments that take place there should be guided and governed by these five principles, because we think that's very important.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you didn't mention Cuba in your list of foreign policy issues.

SECRETARY BAKER: There are two other issues that need to be resolved. Let me say, there's one vestige of World War II -- that's the Northern Territories. That's why I mentioned it.

There are a couple of vestiges of "old thinking." Afghanistan is one, and Cuba is another. We talk to the Soviet Union about these issues every time we get together. I intend to do that again. I also intend to talk to the Foreign Minister of the Russian Republic about it. But the Northern Territories is the last vestige of World War II, and that's the reason I mention it.

QUESTION: A quick follow-up, if I could; sort of a two-sided question. Do you intend to, or do you hope to get something a little more solid from the Soviets on Cuba? And are there any policy initiatives the U.S. is considering to sort of tighten the screws on Castro? I'm thinking specifically of immigration.

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me decline to get into the last part of your question. But to say, with respect to the first part, we raise this issue every time we sit down with the Soviets. You perhaps saw what I had to say when I testified before the International Subcommittee of the Supreme Soviet as far back as a year and half or more ago.

When people ask us for help, we always raise the question, "How can you ask us -- how can we ask the American taxpayer, for instance -- to come forward with support at a time when some of that is going in a subsidized way?"

Let me say this: There has been a marked and dramatic reduction in the extent and amount of the Soviet subsidy to Cuba just in the last year. I would anticipate, judging from the comments we've seen in the last 2 weeks, there is going to be a continuation of that. We will certainly be encouraging a continuation of that.

QUESTION: You have been urging the Soviets to solve the Northern Territories issue in the past years. Are you urging the Japanese counterpart to solve this issue with a degree of the same reciprocity? In other words, are you urging the Japanese Government to find a way to solve the issue of the Northern Territories with the Soviets? And, if so, have you done something with the government in Tokyo so far?

SECRETARY BAKER: We support the position of the Japanese Government. We have for a long time.

QUESTION: Will you call upon the government in Tokyo to do something about it -- to find a new approach to solve the issue?

SECRETARY BAKER: No. We support their approach, and we continue to support it and will continue.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how concerned are you about tactical nuclear weapons which, as you know, are under somewhat lesser controls than strategic nuclear weapons? Is that what is driving your decision to talk with the Soviets about security policy?

SECRETARY BAKER: No. I think that we need to have a discussion with them for some of the reasons that have been raised in the questions here today. How do we proceed with arms control agreements that have been negotiated that we think are in our best interests? Who's going to implement those, in terms of the obligations on the Soviet side? So there are any number of reasons why we ought to, at least, begin a security dialogue with them that is quite a bit broader than the question of tactical nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the effects of the Soviet changes are obviously enormous. They'll play out for generations.

SECRETARY BAKER: They will.

QUESTION: Could you share with us some of your preliminary thinking on how U.S. foreign policy is likely to begin changing in the short term?

SECRETARY BAKER: It's already changing. I think we are recognizing -- if you go back and review carefully what I said when I first walked in here -- the scope and extent of these changes and the magnitude of them and the fact that they, indeed, will change things for a long, long time in the future and that it's going to take quite a while before it all finally plays out and before we know exactly what the inter-relationships are going to be between center and republics.

We are already changing. We started this maybe a year go though. We started changing in our approach to the people we deal with and that we talk foreign policy issues with over there.

QUESTION: I'm sorry. I wasn't clear. I meant actually outside the Soviet Union. How it's likely to change now that we -- we don't have a First, Second, and Third World. How is it likely to change vis-a-vis the Third World, vis-a-vis Asia --

SECRETARY BAKER: I think there could be some significant changes, Chris, but that's not something I really want to speculate or hypothesize about today.

We've got a lot to do right now dealing with these changes as they occur in the Soviet Union.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you had tied economic reform with humanitarian aid in your second principle. How tied is that? In other words, is there a chance the U.S. might give them some humanitarian aid if they don't move quick enough on economic reform or the five principles?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes. The President, I think, has made it clear that we would not like to see people starve. We put humanitarian aid in a different category. We put technical assistance in a different category.

Humanitarian aid, indeed, there may be greater requirements now for that than there were even in the aftermath of the London summit. But we talked about that kind of assistance at the London summit, and we talked about technical assistance.

We, the United States, have been talking about technical/economic assistance for the Soviet Union for a long time -- I think over 2 years -- because we think that's the answer. They must find a way to convert that system to one that is productive.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, when you spoke of asking Congress for time to let you deal with the loan guarantees -- the Israeli loan guarantees -- would you prefer that they postpone final action until after a Middle East peace conference takes place?

SECRETARY BAKER: That's sort of open-ended, Mark. I think if I made that request, they might say, "Well, you can't give us any assurance that one ever will take place." I don't mean to be suggesting that one is just about to happen. So if I were going to make a request, I might be a lot more specific and discreet than that in terms of a timeframe.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you have anything on the Cyprus issue? And more specifically, for the Greek-Turkish summit which had been announced by President Bush?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, I'm sorry I don't. I don't have anything new on that for you today.

QUESTION: Why haven't you involved Lebanon in your talks at all? Why haven't you gone to Lebanon, I guess is really what I want to ask?

SECRETARY BAKER: We have had people go to Lebanon, and I have met with the Foreign Minister of Lebanon three times.

QUESTION: Are you going to go?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't have plans, as things now stand, on

this trip to go. It's not unlikely that John Kelly will be going.

QUESTION: Why don't you spell out for us where you will go since you never did that?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not going to spell it out because we haven't actually locked-in with some of the governments, and I hate to stand up here and say, "I'm going to Country X" until we've at least asked the country if they want to see us.

QUESTION: What's the point of going without an answer from the Palestinians?

SECRETARY BAKER: Maybe we'll get one.

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בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

ד"ר

הנדון: השאלות והתשובות בנושא הערביות לדיור, כפי שעלו בתדרוך מחמ"ד
היום

SPECIAL STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER
STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, DC WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1991

Q MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST? WHAT IS
THE STATUS OF THE ISRAELI LOAN GUARANTEES, AND IS IT TIED FIRMLY TO
THE FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS?

SEC. BAKER: THE ANSWER WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST IS, IT
HAS ALWAYS BEEN MY VIEW THAT FOLLOWING THE AUGUST BREAK THERE SHOULD
BE AT LEAST ONE MORE TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN ORDER TO TRY AND TIE
UP SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE ASSURANCES PROCESS.
WE ARE ENGAGED IN DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL, WITH PALESTINIANS, WITH
JORDANIANS, AND WILL BE ENGAGED, I'M SURE, IN DIALOGUE WITH SYRIANS
WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ASSURANCES. WE'VE MADE A LOT OF PROGRESS
SINCE I WAS LAST IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- THE TEAM THAT WE SENT OUT
HERE, WE STILL HAVE SOME ISSUES THAT ARE OPEN. IT WOULD BE MY HOPE
IN GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST THAT MAYBE WE COULD CLOSE THOSE GAPS
EVEN A LITTLE BIT MORE BECAUSE I THINK -- AS YOU HEARD ME SAY
BEFORE, I REALLY THINK THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY HERE TO CREATE AN
ACTIVE PEACE PROCESS, PERHAPS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY WE'VE HAD IN A
LONG TIME.

WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF THE LOAN GUARANTEES, LET ME --
LET ME FIRST SAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED, AS
WE HAVE SINCE WE CAME TO OFFICE, TO HELPING ISRAEL SUCCESSFULLY
ABSORB SOVIET IMMIGRANTS. AND WE HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN HELPING
IMPROVE AND INCREASE THE FLOW OF THOSE IMMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL.

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LET ME SAY THAT I AM ABSOLUTELY TOTALLY CONVINCED THAT PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR REMAINS AS COMMITTED TO THIS PROCESS AS HE DID WHEN I WAS LAST IN JERUSALEM, JUST BEFORE THE AUGUST BREAK.

Q BUT, MR. SECRETARY, IF I COULD JUST FOLLOW UP, WHAT IS THE LINKAGE YOU'RE DRAWING HERE --

SEC. BAKER: I'M NOT DRAWING ANY LINKAGE.

Q -- BETWEEN THE 10 BILLION (DOLLARS) AND THE PEACE PROCESS.

SEC. BAKER: I'M NOT DRAWING ANY LINKAGE.

Q WHY DO YOU SEEM TO BE SAYING THAT IT --

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Q -- IT IMPINGES ON THE PEACE PROCESS SOMEHOW? YOU'RE SAYING THAT WE'RE IN A VERY SENSITIVE STAGE HERE.

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SEC. BAKER: WELL, THAT'S SORT OF OPEN-ENDED, MARK. I MEAN, I'M NOT SURE THAT WE'RE -- I THINK IF I MADE THAT REQUEST, THEY MIGHT SAY, "WELL, YOU CAN'T GIVE US ANY ASSURANCE THAT ONE EVER WILL TAKE PLACE," AND I DON'T MEAN TO BE SUGGESTING THAT ONE IS JUST ABOUT TO HAPPEN. SO I WOULD BE, I THINK -- IF I WERE GOING TO MAKE A REQUEST, I MIGHT BE A LOT MORE SPECIFIC AND DISCRETE THAN THAT IN TERMS OF A TIME FRAME.

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SEC. BAKER: I DON'T HAVE PLANS AS THINGS NOW STAND ON THIS TRIP TO GO, BUT IT'S NOT UNLIKELY THAT JOHN KELLY WILL BE GOING.

Q WHY DON'T YOU SPELL OUT FOR US WHERE YOU WILL GO, SINCE YOU NEVER DID THAT?

SEC. BAKER: IT'S NOT -- WELL, I'M NOT GOING TO SPELL IT OUT BECAUSE WE HAVEN'T ACTUALLY LOCKED IN WITH SOME OF THE GOVERNMENTS, AND I HATE TO STAND UP HERE AND SAY I'M GOING TO GOVERNMENT -- I MEAN, TO COUNTRY X UNTIL WE'VE AT LEAST ASKED THE COUNTRY IF THEY WANT TO SEE US.

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SEC. BAKER: MAYBE WE'LL GET ONE.

עתונות

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אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעח,
הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 4894
אל: רהמש/210
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 42, תא: 040991, זח: 1814, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: השאלות והתשובות בנושא הערביות לדיור, כפי שעלו בתדרוך מחמ"ד
היום

SPECIAL STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER
STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, DC WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1991

Q MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST? WHAT IS
THE STATUS OF THE ISRAELI LOAN GUARANTEES, AND IS IT TIED FIRMLY TO
THE FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS?

SEC. BAKER: THE ANSWER WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST IS, IT
HAS ALWAYS BEEN MY VIEW THAT FOLLOWING THE AUGUST BREAK THERE SHOULD
BE AT LEAST ONE MORE TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN ORDER TO TRY AND TIE
UP SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE ASSURANCES PROCESS.
WE ARE ENGAGED IN DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL, WITH PALESTINIANS, WITH
JORDANIANS, AND WILL BE ENGAGED, I'M SURE, IN DIALOGUE WITH SYRIANS
WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ASSURANCES. WE'VE MADE A LOT OF PROGRESS
SINCE I WAS LAST IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- THE TEAM THAT WE SENT OUT
HERE. WE STILL HAVE SOME ISSUES THAT ARE OPEN. IT WOULD BE MY HOPE
IN GOING TO THE MIDDLE EAST THAT MAYBE WE COULD CLOSE THOSE GAPS
EVEN A LITTLE BIT MORE BECAUSE I THINK -- AS YOU HEARD ME SAY
BEFORE, I REALLY THINK THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY HERE TO CREATE AN
ACTIVE PEACE PROCESS, PERHAPS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY WE'VE HAD IN A
LONG TIME.

WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF THE LOAN GUARANTEES, LET ME --
LET ME FIRST SAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED, AS
WE HAVE SINCE WE CAME TO OFFICE, TO HELPING ISRAEL SUCCESSFULLY
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אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעח,
הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9461

אל: רהמש/468

מ-: ווש, נר: 2032, תא: 110991, זח: 2100, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבבב

סודי/מיידי

מכתב מכתב מכתב

אל : לשכת רה'מ', לשכת שהח, סמנכל צפא

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

בשיחה עם מקור בבית הלבן, הנשיא מעוניין להימנע מעימות חריף, אם אפשר למונעו.

המקור איננו סבור שנשמע על הצעות פשרה ו/או שינוי הנקודה השניה מתוך שש קודות שהועלו במברק 2028 עד ביקור המזכיר בארץ, ולו בגלל הסיבה שכל החלטה בנדון חייבת להתקבל בפגישה משותפת של כל הנפשות הפועלות העיקריות, דהיינו, הנשיא, המזכיר, היועץ לבטחון לאומי וכו'.

אגב, הן בן-שיחי והן אנשים אחרים בממשל, כולל מחמד, שותפים לדאגה פן המצב החדש בכריהם עלול להביא להגברת האנטישמיות והם אינם חולקים בדרך כלל על הסברה שרצון היהודים לעלות לישראל יגבר ולא יחלש.

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9261
אל: רהמש/431
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 112, תא: 110991, זח: 1413, דח: ב, סג: בל,
בכב
9,244448
בלמ"ס/בהול

אל: חדר מצב

דע: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי הנשיא בוש על הערביות

PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH DURING MEETING WITH
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1991

Q MR. PRESIDENT, ARE YOU GOING TO LOSE ON THE LOAN
GUARANTEES TO ISRAEL IN CONGRESS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU MEAN BY LOSE ON
IT. WHAT I AM FOR IS THE PEACE PROCESS TO BE SUCCESSFUL AND WE HAVE
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AND SO, WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IN A SIMPLE DELAY HERE, IN MY VIEW
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THE APPROACH TO TAKE AT THIS POINT.

Q CAN YOU AVOID CONFRONTATION WHEN THEY ARE BRINGING THE FIGHT TO YOU, WHEN THEY ARE GOING AROUND YOU, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS --

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I CAN TAKE QUITE A FEW PUNCHES, BUT THAT IS NOT WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT HERE. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WORKING HARMONIOUSLY TOGETHER IN A SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND I HAVE SEEN COMMENTS FROM ABROAD THAT I DIDN'T PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE, BUT THAT'S -- WE'RE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND WE HAVE A LEADERSHIP ROLE AROUND THE WORLD THAT HAS TO BE FULFILLED, AND I AM CALLING THE SHOTS IN THIS QUESTION IN THE WAY I THINK IS BEST, AND I HAVE GOT SOME SELLING TO DO WITH CERTAIN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THAT'S UNDERSTANDABLE TO ME.

SO WE'LL SEE HOW IT COMES OUT, BUT I AM NOT APPROACHING THIS IN THE SPIRIT OF CONFRONTATION, IF THAT'S THE QUESTION. YOU HAVEN'T SEEN ANY REAL CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF HERE UP UNTIL NOW.

Q YOU ARE NOT COMMITTED TO THE GUARANTEES AFTER THE 120 BILLION (DOLLARS), SIR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I AM COMMITTED TO SEEING THAT THEY GET CONSIDERED AND WE HAVE GENERALLY BEEN QUITE SUPPORTIVE OF THE IDEA OF ABSORPTION. WE HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD AROUND THE WORLD IN FACILITATING THE QUESTION OF SOVIET JEWS COMING TO ISRAEL AND THE ETHIOPIAN JEWS AS WELL. THE POSITION OF THIS ADMINISTRATION IS NOT ONLY WELL KNOWN, BUT I THINK HIGHLY RESPECTED IN ISRAEL AND AROUND THE WORLD FOR THIS. SO WE ARE NOT BACKING OFF FROM THAT AND THE PRINCIPLE, THIS CONCEPT OF HELPING, WE WANT TO DO IT, BUT I AM NOT COMMITTED TO ANY NUMBERS AND NEVER HAVE BEEN.

THERE WAS A VERY MISLEADING STATEMENT IN THE PAPERS TODAY, OUT OF ISRAEL THAT I'D LIKE TO CLEAR UP, BECAUSE IT SAID, THIS -- THAT WE WERE COMMITTED AND THEY WONDERED WHAT WE COMMITTED TO. AND I'M SORRY TO TELL YOU THAT SIMPLY IS NOT CORRECT. AND IF WE'RE GOING TO DEAL ON THIS QUESTION, WE OUGHT TO BE DEALING FROM THE FACTS. AND THAT -- SO THAT ONE WAS NOT A FACT, JUST SOME SPOKESMAN, I DON'T KNOW WHO HE WAS OR WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO. BUT IT GIVES ME A GOOD CHANCE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THAT ISN'T CORRECT.

Q DO YOU TAKE THREATS FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY MAY (STAY AWAY ?) FROM THE PEACE CONFERENCE --

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, THEY'RE NOT -- I'VE SEEN NO THREATS FROM THEM. I'VE SEEN NO THREATS FROM THEM. WE HAVE A SPECIAL AND A GOOD, STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH ISREAL. AND THAT'S GOING TO CONTINUE. BUT I'VE SEEN NO THREATS. AND WE DON'T DEAL IN THREATS OVER HERE AND WE DON'T TRY TO THREATEN OTHER PEOPLE. THAT'S NOT THE WAY YOU ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Q ARE YOU CONCERNED, THOUGH, THAT THEY MIGHT NOT COME TO

THE PEACE TABLE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I THINK THEY'RE COMMITTED AND I THINK IT'S A GOOD THING THEY ARE, AND I THINK OTHERS ARE COMMITTED. AND WE WANT THE CLIMATE TO BE RIGHT TO FACILITATE THE COMING TO THE TABLE. EVERYBODY WANTS THESE PARTIES TO COME TO THE TABLE ALL AROUND THE WORLD. AND WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE IS A SIMPLE DELAY OF 120 DAYS BEFORE THIS MATTER IS DEBATED, BECAUSE OUT OF THE DEBATE IS GOING TO COME A LOT OF POSTURING AND POSITIONING THAT, IN MY VIEW, WILL NOT HELP THE PEACE PROCESS. SO, THAT'S WHAT IT BOILS DOWN TO, AND THAT'S WHY THIS VERY REASONABLE REQUEST IS BEING MADE.

Q THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

END

עכאן

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעח,
הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט), @ (לעמ), מקצב2

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9261
אל: רהמש/431
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 112, תא: 110991, זח: 1413, דח: ב, סג: בל,
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SO WE'LL SEE HOW IT COMES OUT, BUT I AM NOT APPROACHING THIS IN THE SPIRIT OF CONFRONTATION, IF THAT'S THE QUESTION. YOU HAVEN'T SEEN ANY REAL CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF HERE UP UNTIL NOW.

Q YOU ARE NOT COMMITTED TO THE GUARANTEES AFTER THE 120 BILLION (DOLLARS), SIR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I AM COMMITTED TO SEEING THAT THEY GET CONSIDERED AND WE HAVE GENERALLY BEEN QUITE SUPPORTIVE OF THE IDEA OF ABSORPTION. WE HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD AROUND THE WORLD IN FACILITATING THE QUESTION OF SOVIET JEWS COMING TO ISRAEL AND THE ETHIOPIAN JEWS AS WELL. THE POSITION OF THIS ADMINISTRATION IS NOT ONLY WELL KNOWN, BUT I THINK HIGHLY RESPECTED IN ISRAEL AND AROUND THE WORLD FOR THIS. SO WE ARE NOT BACKING OFF FROM THAT AND THE PRINCIPLE, THIS CONCEPT OF HELPING, WE WANT TO DO IT, BUT I AM NOT COMMITTED TO ANY NUMBERS AND NEVER HAVE BEEN.

THERE WAS A VERY MISLEADING STATEMENT IN THE PAPERS TODAY, OUT OF ISRAEL THAT I'D LIKE TO CLEAR UP, BECAUSE IT SAID, THIS -- THAT WE WERE COMMITTED AND THEY WONDERED WHAT WE COMMITTED TO. AND I'M SORRY TO TELL YOU THAT SIMPLY IS NOT CORRECT. AND IF WE'RE GOING TO DEAL ON THIS QUESTION, WE OUGHT TO BE DEALING FROM THE FACTS. AND THAT -- SO THAT ONE WAS NOT A FACT, JUST SOME SPOKESMAN, I DON'T KNOW WHO HE WAS OR WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO. BUT IT GIVES ME A GOOD CHANCE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THAT ISN'T CORRECT.

Q DO YOU TAKE THREATS FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY MAY (STAY AWAY ?) FROM THE PEACE CONFERENCE --

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, THEY'RE NOT -- I'VE SEEN NO THREATS FROM THEM. I'VE SEEN NO THREATS FROM THEM. WE HAVE A SPECIAL AND A GOOD, STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH ISREAL. AND THAT'S GOING TO CONTINUE. BUT I'VE SEEN NO THREATS. AND WE DON'T DEAL IN THREATS OVER HERE AND WE DON'T TRY TO THREATEN OTHER PEOPLE. THAT'S NOT THE WAY YOU ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Q ARE YOU CONCERNED, THOUGH, THAT THEY MIGHT NOT COME TO THE PEACE TABLE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I THINK THEY'RE COMMITTED AND I THINK IT'S A GOOD THING THEY ARE, AND I THINK OTHERS ARE COMMITTED. AND WE WANT THE CLIMATE TO BE RIGHT TO FACILITATE THE COMING TO THE TABLE. EVERYBODY WANTS THESE PARTIES TO COME TO THE TABLE ALL AROUND THE WORLD. AND WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE IS A SIMPLE DELAY OF 120 DAYS BEFORE THIS MATTER IS DEBATED, BECAUSE OUT OF THE DEBATE IS GOING TO COME A LOT OF POSTURING AND POSITIONING THAT, IN MY VIEW, WILL NOT HELP THE PEACE PROCESS. SO, THAT'S WHAT IT BOILS DOWN TO, AND THAT'S WHY THIS VERY REASONABLE REQUEST IS BEING MADE.

Q THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

END

עד כאן

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט), @ (לעמ), מקצב2

סססס

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תכנה

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בלח"ס/בהול

אל: מצפ"א
דע: שר האוצר; מנכ"ל האוצר; יועץ רוה"מ לכלכלה; קונכ"לים; (הולנד)
מאת: ציר קונגרס; ציר כלכלה;

הנדון: הצעת התחיקה - ערבויות לחלוואות

1. מצ"ל הצעת התחיקה אשר הוגשה ב- 12.9.91 (באופן בלתי רשמי) למליאת הסואט ע"י הסנטורים אינווייח וקסטן.
2. להצעה מצורפים הבקשה הרשמית של ממ' ישראל אשר חוגשה לממשל, מסמך "תאחים סלומון" ומסמך על אופן תיקצוב הערבויות (Scoring).
3. לפי ההצעה לא יהיה נטל תקציבי כתוצאה מאשור הערבויות. ישראל תשלם 100 מליון \$ ל- A.I.D. וערך ה-Scoring יהיה 1%. לפי חוק התקציב יש לנכות התשלום ל- A.I.D. מסך ה-Scoring.
4. לפי ההצעה חוזרת ישראל על מחויבותה השנתית לגבי סיוע החוץ ושטחי 1967.

יורם אטינגר
אמנון נויבך

7 (13) - 1031 113 777
1 3 2 1

ABSORPTION GUARANTEES HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR SOVIET AND ETHIOPIAN REFUGEES RESETTLING IN ISRAEL

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I, first of all, ask unanimous consent that an amendment that I intend to propose on behalf of myself and the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye] be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

On page 28, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:

Title III of chapter 2 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 226. LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM FOR RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN ISRAEL.—(a) During the period beginning on October 1, 1991, and ending on September 30, 1996, the President shall issue guarantees against losses incurred in connection with loans to Israel for the purpose of providing economic assistance to Israel and the economy of Israel in connection with the extraordinary costs occasioned by Israel's humanitarian undertaking to resettle and absorb Soviet and Ethiopian refugees. The authority of this subsection is in addition to any other authority to issue guarantees for any such purpose.

"(2) The total principal amount of guarantees which may be issued under this subsection in any fiscal year shall not exceed \$2,000,000,000, except that, in the event that less than \$2,000,000,000 of guarantees is issued in any fiscal year, the authority to issue the balance of such guarantees shall be available in any subsequent fiscal year ending on or before September 30, 1996. Each guarantee issued under this section shall guarantee 100 percent of the principal and interest payable on such loans. Loan guarantees shall be made in such increments as the government of Israel may request. The guarantee for each such increment shall be obligated and committed within 30 days of the request therefor, and the issuance of this guarantee for each such increment shall occur within 60 days of such request, unless a later date is selected by the government of Israel.

"(b) The standard terms of any loan or increment guaranteed under this section shall be 30 years, with semiannual payments of interest only over the first 10 years, and with semiannual payments of principal and interest, on a level-payment basis, over the last 20 years thereof, except that the guaranteed loan or any increments issued in a single transaction may include obligations having different maturities, interest rates, and payment terms if the aggregate scheduled debt service for all obligations issued in a single transaction equals the debt service for a single loan or increment of like amount having the standard terms described in this sentence. The guarantor shall not have the right to accelerate any guaranteed loan or increment or to pay any amounts in respect of the guarantees issued other than in accordance with the original payment terms of the loan. For purposes of determining the maximum principal amount of any loan or increment to be guaranteed under this section, the principal amount of each such loan or increment shall be—

"(1) in the case of any loan issued on a discount basis, the original issue price (excluding any transaction costs) thereof; or

"(2) in the case of any loan issued on an interest-bearing basis, the stated principal amount thereof.

"(c)(1) Before the issuance of the first guarantee under this section, the Government of Israel shall provide the President with written assurances that such loans will be used only for projects or activities in geographic areas which were subject to the administration of the Government of Israel before June 8, 1967, to be stated in the same manner as was provided in the grant agreement with Israel for fiscal year 1991 under chapter 4 of part II of this Act.

"(2) Section 223 shall apply to guarantees issued under subsection (a) in the same manner as such section applies to guarantees issued under section 223, except that subsections (A), (B)(1), (B), and (C) of section 223 shall not apply to such guarantees and except that, to the extent section 223 is inconsistent with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, that Act shall apply. Loans shall be guaranteed under this section without regard to sections 221, 222, and 228(c). Notwithstanding section 223(f), the interest rate for loans guaranteed under this section may include a reasonable fee to cover the costs and fees incurred by the borrower in connection with financing under this section in the event the borrower elects not to finance such costs or fees out of loan principal.

"(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees charged for the loan guarantee program under this section shall be an aggregate origination fee of \$100,000,000, payable on a pro rata basis at each guarantee for each loan or increment is issued."

The loan guarantees authorized pursuant to section 226 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by this Act) for fiscal year 1992 and for each of the four succeeding fiscal years shall be made available without need for further appropriations of subsidy cost as the fees required to be paid by the borrower under section 226(c)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 reduce the subsidy cost to zero.

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Hawaii and I will propose an amendment which provides \$2 billion in absorption guarantees for fiscal year 1992 and for a like amount in each of the following 4 fiscal years, to help Israel finance absorption costs associated with the resettlement of Soviet and Ethiopian refugees.

The administration has asked that Congress delay consideration of this bill, and Senator Inouye and I, and other, will continue our dialogue with the administration on that request. In the meantime, we believe it is important that this amendment be put forward so that whatever the timing of its enactment, we can more closely examine the substance of this proposal.

The massive wave of immigration into Israel which began in 1988 continues. Since then, nearly 350,000 have immigrated to Israel, and it is estimated that the total will reach 1 million by the end of 1995.

This tremendous immigration is the fruition of United States policy on Soviet Jewry begun by our late esteemed colleague, Senator Frank Jackson. Through successive administrations going back 20 years, we made the free immigration of Soviet Jews a cornerstone of United States foreign policy. The scope of this current immi-

gration is unlike anything Israel has seen since after World War II and the creation of the State. It represents nearly a 25-percent increase in her total population.

This legislation answers many concerns expressed by our colleagues and others, including the administration, in a manner we believe will result in support from all parties involved. I would like to explain some of its provisions.

As requested by the Government of Israel, this bill provides loan guarantees to Israel to help defray the extraordinary costs of resettling and absorbing Ethiopian and Soviet refugees. The program is similar to the \$400 million housing guarantee we provided last year.

The loan guarantees under the legislation shall be obligated and committed within 30 days of the request, and issued within 60 days of the request.

On the matter of subsidy costs, the legislation provides for an aggregate origination fee of \$100 million, payable to the U.S. Government on a pro rata basis at each guarantee for each loan is issued. In other words, Israel will pay for the subsidy cost. The credit reform law requiring subsidy appropriation states that any such subsidy is net of any fees paid to the U.S. Government.

Under this legislation, we estimate that subsidy costs for Israel are 1 percent. Over 11 years, this is a total of \$100 million. We have crafted the legislation so that American taxpayers are not asked to provide any additional funding for these guarantees. Instead, the legislation requires that Israel directly pay this subsidy cost, obviating the need for an appropriation.

Another provision I would like to highlight is one which requires that the Government of Israel, before the issuance of the first guarantee, provide the President with written assurances that such loans will be used only for activities in geographic areas subject to the administration of Israel prior to June 8, 1967. This has been U.S. policy since that time, but insofar as we know, this is the first time it has been written into the law.

Before I yield to Senator Inouye, I would like to emphasize that our purpose today is to present the legislation so that substantive discussion may begin on the absorption of these refugees. We continue to deal with the administration on the matter of delaying this legislation. It is our hope that when time comes for its enactment, it will receive enthusiastic support from all quarters of our Government.

I ask unanimous consent that the formal request from the Government of Israel be printed in the Record along with a study by the sovereign assessment group of Salomon Brothers on the creditworthiness of Israel and a memorandum on the application of the Credit Reform Act.

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There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REQUEST FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT CREDIT GUARANTEES IN THE AMOUNT OF \$2 BILLION PER ANNUM FY 1992-FY 1996

The people of Israel have approached the people and the Government of the United States of America to assist in the humanitarian challenge of rescuing and resettling one million Soviet Jewish refugees in Israel, as well as additional immigrants from Ethiopia and Eastern Europe.

The lessons of World War II serve as a permanent reminder that economic constraints should not block the provision of a safe haven for Jewish refugees in need of protection and resettlement. Ongoing instability in the republics of the former Soviet Union and the tradition of hostility towards Jews in these regions, in particular in times of economic duress, are causes of great concern. Temporary short term financing difficulties must not hinder the exit of Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, to safety and freedom. In this era in which there have been increasing manifestations of anti-Semitism in various parts of the world, Israel is committed to provide a haven for Jews seeking a secure home.

To this end, the Government of Israel have requested that the United States Government extend guarantees for credits to be raised on the U.S. capital market in the amount of US\$ two billion a year for the fiscal years 1992-1996. These credits are essential for the successful absorption of the refugees immigrating to Israel.

I. IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL

Since mid-1989, 350 thousand people have immigrated to Israel. It is forecasted that by 1994-95, a total of one million people will have arrived. This forecast depends upon the economic and political developments in the Soviet Union, and on Israel's success in absorbing the immigrants. These immigrants are highly educated, with predominant representation of the natural sciences and technological professions. Approximately 75 percent of the immigrants are of working age, and their labor force participation is relatively high at 80 percent. Among the Soviet immigrants, approximately 25 percent are engineers and architects, 15 percent are technicians and 5 percent are physicians. Israel is sparing no effort or resources in vocational training and adaptation of the immigrants, and in the structural readjustment of the economy, to facilitate the absorption of the immigrants. We recognize that this influx of people is both a challenge and an opportunity for the Israeli economy and society.

II. ISRAEL'S MACROECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

Between the years 1990 and 1995, Israel's population and its civilian labor force are expected to increase by one third. It is projected that the new labor force, combined with complementary capital investment, will rise to a growth rate of about 8 percent per annum in Israel's private-enterprise business sector. Initially, this growth will be led by a substantial expansion of domestic demand stemming from increased domestic investment. An accelerated expansion of exports will follow, at an annual rate of 8-10 percent per annum (in constant US\$).

Increased investment, in particular in infrastructure, is essential to establish the business environment and climate of opportunity necessary to attract the private business initiatives that are required to create new jobs on the requisite scale. Total nonresidential investment in the years 1992-96 is projected to be approximately US\$ 70 billion. Residential investment in Israel is un-

dergoing dramatic changes, with the level of new housing starts having quadrupled between the years 1989 and 1991.

Israel's economic stabilization program launched in 1985 was far reaching and comprehensive and extremely successful. Price stability was achieved, with the rate of inflation reduced dramatically. Exports of goods and services grew from US\$ 11.2 billion in 1985 to US\$ 19 billion in 1990, entailing an average rate of approximately 11 percent per year. The ratio of foreign debt to GDP was reduced from 80 percent in 1985 to 30 percent in 1990.

A principal achievement of the structural reform program, initiated in 1985, has been the reduction of the budget deficit from 11 percent of the GDP in the first half of the 1980's to a balanced budget in the second half of the 1980's. This reflects the government's strict budgetary discipline and its strong commitment to responsible economic management. Legislation has been adopted that prohibits the printing of money as a means of financing budget deficits.

The economy of Israel is very open. The pivotal role of international trade is demonstrated by the ratio of foreign trade to the value of output of the business sector, which is approximately 90 percent. The investment necessary to cope with the immigration will require large-scale imports. These imports include investment goods, such as machinery and equipment, as well as raw materials. The necessary increase in investment in the coming years is exceptionally high, and domestic savings cannot meet all of the requisite needs. It is estimated that, as a consequence, approximately US\$ 20-25 billion of additional capital will need to be raised abroad in the years 1992-1996 in order to finance the increased volume of imports. Credit guarantees are being requested for US\$ 10 billion out of this sum of US\$ 20-25 billion. However, even with the sizable investments forecasted, unemployment will rise above its present level of about 10-11 percent.

The forecast is that the GDP will grow (in constant US\$) from \$1 billion in 1990 to approximately US\$ 75-80 billion in 1995-1996. The percentage rates of change of some economic indicators are estimated as follows:

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
GDP	11	12	13	14	15
Exports	12	13	14	15	16
Imports	13	14	15	16	17

The economic measures designed to attain these growth rates include a governmental decision to translate the reduction deficit in accordance with the multi-year budget; accelerating the privatization process; further deregulation of the capital and labor markets; and gradual implementation of comprehensive foreign trade liberalization.

The adoption and implementation of these measures will increase the international competitiveness of the Israeli economy and enhance the prospects for continuing export-led growth. The share of the public sector in the economy will be reduced, and the flexibility of the labor market increased, while at the same time, the quest for macroeconomic stability will be maintained.

III. STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE ISRAELI ECONOMY

The economy of Israel has in recent years been undergoing substantial adjustment that places increased emphasis on the role of free-market allocation mechanisms. To enhance the capability of the private business sector to grow at the rate necessary for absorption of the immigrants, the govern-

ment of Israel is committed to continue the full implementation of the reforms undertaken since 1985.

In particular, the Government is fully committed to accelerate and intensify the privatization process. To this end, the Government instituted in July 1991 a three-member committee of Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, that is to approve the sale of Government corporations without granting veto power to the Minister under whose auspices an enterprise falls. Major government-owned corporations for privatization procedures have been initiated or are pending include Israel Chemicals, Bezeq Telecommunications Company, Industrial Buildings Company, Shikem-Military Canteen Services. Controlling interests in the commercial banks, along with their non-banking subsidiaries, are also in the process of sale to private owners.

Comprehensive reforms in Foreign Exchange regulations on the capital movements are in the process of formulation. The changes in the foreign exchange regulations will permit domestic resident to undertake financial investments and domestic corporations will have increased flexibility in foreign direct investment. Foreign investors will have non-restricted access to the Israeli financial and capital markets. In the area of trade liberalization, the Government is committed to exposure of the economy to foreign competition. This is facilitated by the adherence to the Free Trade Agreements that have been entered into with the United States and the European Economic Community. The Government also initiated on September 1, 1991, a program of elimination of non tariff barriers on imports from Third World Countries that are not encompassed by these free trade Agreements.

With respect to the domestic capital market, the Government has in recent years consistently retreated from prior status privileged market access and has borrowed in the local capital market under competitive conditions. There has also been a substantial reduction in reliance on government intermediation in capital market access, and a corresponding increase in free market financial activity.

IV. THE BUDGET

A three year budget framework has been prepared for the years 1992-1994. This new budget mechanism was drafted with a view toward enabling long-term planning of the Government's various objectives and sending a signal to the business sector in Israel and abroad regarding macroeconomic trends to be expected in Israel over the next few years. The budget deficit will be reduced gradually to 2 percent by the end of 1994. However, in 1992, a deficit of 6.2 percent of GDP is inevitable primarily due to the necessity of financing the aforementioned absorption expenditures, since outlays precede the increase in GDP and tax income. The allocation of Government expenditures and budget deficit over the next three years is projected as follows (in percentages):

	1991	1992	1993	1994
Total Budget	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Absorption	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
Defense	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
Health and Social	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
Infrastructure	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
Other	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
Deficit/GDP (%)	6.2	2.0	2.0	2.0

In 1992, Government expenditure for immigrant absorption will amount to approximately 10.5 percent of GDP. In the follow-

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Value-Added Tax was raised by 2 percent, from 15 to 17 percent, to provide employment to the immigrants.

Taxes have been raised in order to provide the additional need created by the immigrants, such as health care, nursing of the elderly and handicapped population, and education, including temporary Hebrew language courses. Value-Added Tax was raised by 2 percent, from 15 to 17 percent, to provide employment to the immigrants.

Taxes have been raised in order to provide the additional need created by the immigrants, such as health care, nursing of the elderly and handicapped population, and education, including temporary Hebrew language courses. Value-Added Tax was raised by 2 percent, from 15 to 17 percent in 1991, and a supplementary Absorption Levy of 8 percent was imposed on income tax payments.

V. THE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

Based on the above, the Government of Israel, therefore, respectfully requests that the Government of the United States assist it in raising the necessary capital over the next five years by providing guarantees for credits to be raised in the U.S. capital market in the amount of US\$ 3 billion a year during the fiscal years 1992-1996. Due to the long-term nature of the task faced by Israel, an assured multi-year availability of credit is vital.

VI. UTILIZATION OF THE FUNDS

The funds will be utilized in the three main spheres as follows: (1) Investment in infrastructure, such as highways, roads, sewage, water installation, industrial parks and residential infrastructure; (2) Source funds for the commercial banks to finance investment in capital goods, machinery and equipment; (3) The balance will be utilized for mortgage financing.

1. Investment in Infrastructure

Government investment in infrastructure during the years 1992-1994 will amount to some US\$ 1.7 billion, of which US\$ 1.1 billion is for highways, roads and related construction; US\$ 400 million is for water installations and sewage; and US\$ 200 million is for industrial parks and residential infrastructure.

In addition, it is estimated that over the next five years, non-budgetary investments in infrastructure of nearly US\$ 7 billion will be carried out as follows: approximately US\$ 3.5 billion will be for electricity generation, US\$ 2.5 billion will be for expansion of telecommunications facilities and a further US\$ 100 million will be invested in a peripheral railway system for the Gush Dan-Tel Aviv Metropolitan area.

2. Promoting Investment by the Business Sector (Creation of New Jobs)

The Government has allocated ample amounts to create the necessary business environment to encourage private enterprise and to establish new businesses and to expand existing plants. To this end, the government has budgeted, annually, approximately US\$ 400 million in grant capital and US\$ 250 million for research and development enterprises under the Encouragement of Capital Investment Law. The above measure will undoubtedly have the effect of creating new employment opportunities.

3. Provision of Mortgages and Housing for Immigrants

The Government has budgeted 8.5 billion US\$ for the years 1991-1994 for long-term mortgages to be funded via the commercial and mortgage-banking system. These mortgages are funded at current market rates of interest.

VII. ISRAEL'S EXEMPLARY RECORD AS A BORROWER AND ABILITY TO REPAY

Since its establishment, Israel has honored its foreign and domestic commitments,

economic growth. The foreign debt, as a proportion of GDP, fluctuated between 65 and 80 percent in the mid-1980's.

Since then, it has declined steadily, reaching 31 percent of GDP in 1990. We view the decline as a favorable starting point for raising capital in the future, which will lead to increased investment and accelerated economic growth.

The foreign debt, as a proportion of GDP, fluctuated between 65 and 80 percent in the mid-1980's. Since then, it has declined steadily, reaching 31 percent of GDP in 1990. We view the decline as a favorable starting point for raising capital in the future, which will lead to increased investment and accelerated economic growth.

Even based upon highly conservative assumptions that the additional capital required will be financed solely from foreign credits and that there will be no significant increase in unilateral transfers and direct investments, it is estimated that by 1996 the ratio of net foreign debt to GDP will be below 47 percent.

In 1988-1990 the debt service/exports ratio was between 18-22 percent. Assuming that exports increase as estimated and that foreign debts rise to US\$ 35 billion, the debt service/exports ratio should remain at a level of 20-23 percent, another indicator which clearly demonstrates that Israel can continue to service its foreign debt in a timely manner. Applying the more positive assumptions that direct foreign investments and unilateral transfers will significantly increase, the debt ratio will be much lower.

The rapid growth of the Israeli economy will generate the funds required to finance the repayment of these credits. It is imperative, however, that the loan include a grace period with respect to the payment of principal which would allow ample time for such economic growth to materialize. We are certain of the Israeli Economy's ability to repay principal and interest so that no cost accrues to the American taxpayer.

VIII. THE POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING

As stated, our policy and understanding with the United States Government is that the utilization of funds shall be restricted to the geographic areas which were subject to the Government of Israel's administration prior to June 4, 1967. Furthermore, the Government of Israel's administration will not direct the Soviet Jewish immigrants to those territories, in accordance with its declared policy.

IX. U.S.-ISRAEL TRADE RELATIONS

During the next five years, aggregate imports are expected to increase to approximately US\$ 173 billion in current prices. On the basis of past precedent, the source of at least US\$ 30 billion of these imports will be from the United States, consisting primarily of capital goods and raw materials.

As a result of the need to provide housing for the increased immigration, approximately US\$ 65 million worth of homes and caravans mobile homes have been imported from the United States, totaling 68 percent of such imports. Imports from the U.S. are consistently increasing, from US\$ 2.4 billion in 1989 prior to the immigration, to US\$ 2.8 billion at the end of 1991.

We are deeply grateful to the people of the United States of America for their long and committed friendship to the people and the Government of Israel. The value of continued American assistance is immeasurable. It extends well beyond financial magnitudes, and continually strengthens the bond between our two countries based upon the democratic values which we share.

ANNEX

The following outlines some of the economic reforms which have been introduced in Israel during the last few years.

A. Capital Market Reform: Until the mid-1980's, the capital market was dominated by

total and comprehensive liberalization, 1984 long-term interest rates have declined substantially to levels prevalent on international markets, from 12-13 percent in 1983 to 4-5 percent in 1990.

B. Foreign Exchange Controls: Reform in this area has been implemented since 1987, leading, in the near future, to an almost total and comprehensive liberalization, 1984 long-term interest rates have declined substantially to levels prevalent on international markets, from 12-13 percent in 1983 to 4-5 percent in 1990.

C. Subsidies: As a part of the measures to balance the budget and to rely on market prices as an efficient mechanism of allocation, virtually all consumer subsidies have been eliminated. The only remaining staple subsidy is on public transportation.

D. Privatization: Privatization is being undertaken in two stages with a view to preparing the various corporations and government authorities for successful privatization:

1. Corporations which were wholly owned by the government and partially sold either to private investors or on the Stock Exchange, are being further diluted or entirely sold. Examples are Bezeq Telecommunications, Tel Aviv Industrial Buildings Ltd.

2. Corporations fully owned by the Government are being privatized initially, via the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Israel Chemicals, being one example.

E. Taxation: To encourage investments, corporate tax rates were reduced to be lower than the prevailing rates in other industrialized countries, while the Value-Added Tax was simultaneously increased. In 1990, various tax exemptions, including those for medical expenses, meals and gifts to employers were canceled.

F. Labor Market: Israel recognizes the increasing importance rendering the labor market more flexible. An important step in this direction was the abolishment of the government monopoly of the official labor exchanges and the granting of a general permit for private sector firms to engage in labor mediation. The linkage between the wage scales in the public service and the public sector business corporations has also been reduced.

G. Other Deregulation Measures: Land is no longer sold by the Israel Land Administration on a "minimum price basis," but on the open market. Immigration facilities are no longer directly under government auspices, the market provides rental housing, and mortgages are financed at market prices primarily by the commercial bank, with the State budget now supporting only the weaker sectors. The Government is withdrawing from foreign trade activities such as certain imports; the fuel industry has undergone its first stages of liberalization and Citrus Production and Marketing Board have been abolished.

ISRAEL: A MISUNDERSTOOD CREDIT

(By John F.H. Purcell, Jeffrey A. Kaufman, Joyce Chang, Dirk W. Damrau)

INTRODUCTION

We believe that the state of Israel is considerably higher in credit quality than generally is understood. The country often is placed in a developing country credit category while, in our opinion, it should be compared with the industrialized democracies. Israel is similar to the OECD countries in many substantive ways. Appendices A and B provide some comparisons between Israel and other countries on a number of macro-economic and debt indicators. Its population

of 4.8 million is productive and prosperous as witnessed by 1990's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of \$10,700; this level is slightly below those of the United Kingdom and Australia, on a par with that of New Zealand and above those of Spain, Portugal and Ireland (see Figure 1). GDP of \$10 billion makes Israel equivalent to New Zealand, Portugal and Ireland.

(Figure 1 not reproducible in the Record.) Israel's economy is industrialized and diversified. As in other developed countries, services make up the largest portion of GDP (53%), while manufacturing and construction account for another 40%. Agriculture, the mainstay of most developing economies, contributes only the remaining 7%. The composition of Israel's trade also indicates an advanced economy; exports primarily are made up of manufactured goods, while imports are mostly comprised of raw materials.

Social indicators further illustrate the developed nature of Israel. Life expectancy in 1987 of 75.4 years essentially was the same as in the United States (75.4 years), the United Kingdom (75.2 years) and Australia (76.1 years). In addition, Israelis are well educated. Secondary school enrollment of 83% in 1988 was equivalent to that of the United Kingdom, and 8% of all Israelis have a university degree.

Israel's sovereign credit quality has improved significantly over the past six years. The government has not only shown the political will to implement tough macroeconomic policies when faced with economic challenges, but it also has demonstrated a commitment to structural reforms that should boost the economy's performance significantly. Threats to Israel's security, although still a very important consideration, have diminished considerably. Finally, the most important quantitative measures of creditworthiness point to an improvement in Israel's creditworthiness and, indeed, indicate that the country is comparable to medium-investment-grade-rated sovereign issuers.

We believe that Israel is currently underrated by Standard and Poor's, the only major rating agency that has rated Israel's sovereign debt. The agency affirmed its implied BBB-rating in June 1989. The report stated that geopolitical risks were the primary reasons for the low investment-grade rating. However, since these geopolitical risks have moderated considerably (as we will show later in the report) and may diminish even more significantly if the peace process goes forward, we expect S&P's next review to be more favorable. In our opinion, an upgrade to the single-A category would be appropriate, although we do not necessarily expect such a large jump all at once.

We take into account the substantial challenges faced by the Israeli economy. The following issues have been raised by several analysts and are discussed throughout this report:

(1) Because Israel suffered large budget deficits and a brief experience with hyperinflation during the mid-1980s, some observers view the country as a potentially volatile and unreliable credit in the mold of Latin American countries during the 1970s and early 1980s.

(2) Government involvement in the Israeli economy historically has been fairly high. Furthermore, "structural rigidities" in the labor market often are cited as restricting the growth and adaptability of the private sector and the economy as a whole.

(3) The large-scale immigration of Russian Jews to Israel will pressure the country's balance of payments and force the external debt well above existing levels.

(4) Related to the third issue is the concern that the immigrants will not be ab-

sorbed smoothly into the Israeli economy. Unemployment, already high, may rise to extremely high levels, resulting in stagnation and emigration.

(5) The most often cited geopolitical risks facing Israel include arms races, or possibly war with neighboring states or a break in friendly relations with the United States, which would lead to a cut-off or severe reduction of the large amounts of U.S. aid and loans to Israel.

These issues continue to be of serious concern. However, many analysts have focused only on the risks and have ignored the positive aspects toward improved credit quality. Indeed, some analysts have developed projections based on assumptions that are the opposite of recent trends. While these issues remain relevant, we do not believe that Israel's debt warrants a rating below the single-A category.

MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

The government's management of the economic crisis of the mid-1980s confirmed Israel's ability and willingness to make necessary adjustments and sacrifices. Faced with an unmanageable budget deficit and high inflation, the government implemented policies that eliminated both problems while maintaining real growth in exports and in the economy as a whole. Figure 2 shows that Israel's inflation rate has been relatively moderate during the latter part of the 1980s. We believe that the late 1980s should be viewed as a period that highlighted Israel's fundamental creditworthiness, rather than as a period typical of a volatile economy. This is based on our strong contention that sovereign creditworthiness is best judged by the will of the political system to make adjustments following a crisis or shock, whether internally or externally generated.

(Figure 2 not reproducible in the Record.) Israel's economic history typically is divided into two broad periods: 1918-72 and 1973-85. The first 25 years of nationhood were characterized by intense concern with national security and heavy immigration. Out of necessity, the government played a very large role in coordinating responses to these national imperatives. However, government involvement in organizing the economy and allocating capital did not significantly impede growth: Real growth in GNP averaged 6%, while per capita GDP grew at a 5% average rate between 1948-72.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War was a turning point in the nation's economic development. The increased emphasis on defense expenditures, steadily higher private and government consumption spending and the oil shocks limited the economy's previous dynamism. Real GNP growth between 1973-82 nevertheless averaged 3.2 percent per annum, although per capita GNP growth slowed to 0.8% per annum. While this period usually is considered "stagnant" in Israel's economy, the real GDP growth rate exceeded the 2.56% figure for the OECD countries. Inflation rates, however, rose steadily in the late 1970s and early 1980s, culminating in hyperinflation in 1984 and the first half of 1985.

The 1985 Economic Stabilization Plan demonstrated the determination and cohesiveness of the Israeli political system when faced with a crisis. Despite significant political differences, the Likud and Labour parties were able to come together into a National Unity government that implemented a complete and consistent economic plan.

The government deficit (12% of GNP in 1984) was cut by \$2.25 billion in 1985 through a \$750-million reduction in subsidies, \$750-million emergency aid package from the United States. The budget actually

showed a slight surplus in 1986, helped by another \$710 million in U.S. aid.

Real wages were cut by limiting cost of living adjustments and tying future growth to levels below the exchange rate devaluations. These wage concessions originally were ordered by decree but subsequently were agreed to by the federation of labor unions (Hikladut).

Controls were effectively imposed, limiting certain price increases to 17%.

The shekel was devalued 18.8%, then allowed to fluctuate within 2% of US\$-131.5/10.

The 1985 Stabilization Plan, aided by a drop in the price of oil imports, permitted the economy to regain its equilibrium. Inflation has remained in the 16%-21% range since 1986. Real GDP growth surged to over 6% in 1988-89, but slowed as a result of the Intifada in 1988-89 and has rebounded to 4.6% in 1990 despite the Gulf Crisis.

FIGURE 3.—THE ISRAELI ECONOMY—MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1985-90

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Real GDP growth (in cont.)	2.8	2.7	5.5	2.1	3.3	4.6
Inflation (annual average)	23.8	19.7	14.1	16.4	20.7	11.1
Public sector deficit (pct. of GDP)	-1.1	-1.4	-0.9	-1.8	1.1	2.4
Current account (US\$ bilions)	-1.1	-1.4	-0.9	-1.8	1.1	2.4

NA—Not available

The 1985 Stabilization Plan created the impetus for the Israeli government to undertake a number of positive structural reforms. These reforms demonstrate a commitment to deregulation and promotion of the private sector and contradict some observers' view that the Israeli economy is naturally socialist, hopelessly mired in structural rigidities and unlikely to change.

STRUCTURAL REFORMS

Some critics of the Israeli government's economic policies both inside and outside Israel have pointed to various rigidities in the economy, including a high level of government ownership of productive enterprises, a dense structure of subsidies and regulations that stifle entrepreneurship and retard economic growth, and severe labor market rigidities resulting from the dominant role of Hikladut (the federation of labor unions) in Israeli politics.

We believe that from a sovereign credit perspective, while many of these criticisms may be accurate they do not justify a rating in the low investment-grade category, but rather in the mid-range of investment-grade ratings. While an analysis of these rigidities does indeed suggest that the Israeli economy would be more efficient and grow faster without them, it does not follow that the current situation significantly compromises Israel's ability or willingness to pay its foreign currency-denominated debt.

In addition, much of the criticism ignores the fact that a gradual change toward freer markets, less regulation and orthodox macroeconomic policies is underway in Israel as it is in many countries around the world. A number of recent events reinforce this trend. A number of recent events reinforce this trend. Among the more important events are the following:

Income Taxation—Israel has lowered its corporate income tax rate from 61% in 1985 to 40% scheduled to take effect in 1992—a lower level than West Germany, Japan, Canada, or Italy. Individual income taxation also has been lowered from an average rate of 34% in 1984 to 30.4% currently. Lost income tax revenues were replaced with higher consumption taxes.

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Industrial Subsidies and Regulation—As mentioned previously, subsidies were cut drastically during the Stabilization Plan, bringing industrial and consumer subsidies down from 11.3% to GDP in 1980 to only 4.9% in 1989. In addition, the government relinquished its responsibility for marketing, importing and pricing grain, wheat, soy, oil, and eggs; private firms now dominate these activities. The monopoly in citrus exports and a cartel of fuel distributors also were recently eliminated.

Exchange Rate Regulation—In January 1980, Israel replaced its fixed exchange rate system with one similar to the European Monetary System (EMS). The new shekel (NIS) is permitted to fluctuate against a basket of currencies within 5% of a midpoint rate that has been readjusted every six to eight months. Effectively, the change diminishes the central bank's involvement in the foreign currency market and lets market forces determine rates within a band. The rationale is to limit the speculative cycles that caused sharp capital movements under the fixed exchange rate regime.

The country's export industries will benefit from a more predictable and competitive environment under the new exchange rate mechanism. Previously, the shekel's periodic overvaluation hurt exports by decreasing Israel's international competitiveness. Furthermore, uncertainty regarding the timing and size of devaluations probably deterred foreign buyers of Israeli exports. The new system should result in significantly higher exports.

One final benefit of the new policy concerns the Israeli government's previous policy of compensating exporters for lost sales resulting from currency overvaluation. These subsidies are being eliminated, thereby helping to narrow the government's budget deficit.

Capital Markets—Relaxation of regulations has helped make the capital markets more efficient and receptive to private issuers. For example, currently 70% of government borrowings are tradable in the secondary market, compared with only 5% in 1985, and compulsory investments in government bonds by institutional investors have been reduced. Along with a credible low-inflation policy, these capital market reforms have lowered real short-term private rates from 19.7% in 1987 to 4.9% in 1989.

Privatization—Despite widespread frustration at the slow pace of the commercial banks privatization, signs of an acceleration in the rate of privatization are appearing in other sectors. For example, several government departments are in the process of becoming companies and, therefore, saleable. They include Israel Rail, the Postal Authority, Bezek (Israeli Telecom), and the Military-Industrial Complex.

In July 1991, the government formed a privatization committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice. The committee has the power to privatize state-owned companies without the consent of the minister responsible for the company. This step is significant since ministerial opposition to losing control of state-owned enterprises historically has stopped or slowed the privatization process.

Trade Liberalization—Israel has signed free trade agreements with both the United States (1985) and the European Economic Community (1978). Trade liberalization, therefore, primarily concerns the Far East. The Government has already announced its plan to replace all non-tariff barriers with tariffs beginning in September 1991 and subsequently decrease all tariff rates linearly to zero over the next six to seven years.

We believe that these efforts, combined, represent a genuine advance which could continue toward increasing the relative role of the private sector in the economy and deregulating economic activities.

Misconceptions about the extent of government involvement and the role of Histadrut in the Israeli economy are mentioned occasionally in the press. These misconceptions need to be addressed directly.

(1) Government involvement in the economy is diminishing substantially and is not as extensive as it may appear. Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP fell from 62% in 1984 to 50% in 1989. Compared with some countries, Israel's expenditures seem large because of the particular emphasis on defense spending required by Israel's geopolitical situation. However, Israel's nonmilitary government expenditures as a percent of GDP are similar to those of many industrialized countries with high credit ratings.

FIGURE 4. THE ECONOMY - RELATIVE GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1989

[in percent]

Rating	Gov't % GDP	Unempl. % GDP	Defence % GDP	Nonmilitary % GDP
Israel (1989)	50.0	11.3	11.3	28.4
Australia (1987/88)	34.0	1.0	1.0	17.0
Denmark (1987/88)	34.0	1.0	1.0	17.0
New Zealand (1987/88)	42.0	1.0	1.0	17.0
Norway (1987/88)	42.0	1.0	1.0	17.0
Sweden (1987/88)	42.0	1.0	1.0	17.0
Switzerland (1987/88)	42.0	1.0	1.0	17.0

1 Fiscal year 1987 figures, NR not stated.
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 1990.

(2) Contrary to the views of some analysts, government intervention in the 1983 commercial bank crisis and the 1989 restructuring of the Kibbutzim debt cannot be viewed as a demonstration of the uniquely high level of government intervention in Israel's economy. Rather, these interventions should be viewed as normal responses by an industrialized country in a domestic economic crisis. They were aimed at ensuring the integrity of the financial system and the agricultural sector, much the same way as the U.S. government felt Chrysler, Continental Bank, Lockheed, and the Savings & Loan industry were too important to fail.

(3) Histadrut, the federation of labor unions that owns many Israeli companies, has been weakened significantly by the events of the past few years and is likely to play a diminishing role in the economy. Some analysts view Histadrut as a quasi-governmental entity that can ensure real wage increases. In reality, Histadrut members bore the brunt of the 1985 Stabilization Plan's measures, as real wages were cut by 9.4% in 1985 before the unions conceded the cuts. During 1985-89, real wages averaged growth of only 1.1%, while labor productivity grew at a 2.7% average rate, suggesting flexibility and concessions on the part of the federation.

Furthermore, the inflow of a million Russian immigrants—and the concomitant upward pressure on unemployment—will make it politically untenable for Histadrut to demand large real wage increases and bar competing workers. It is highly likely that wage concessions will continue to be made until the immigrants are effectively absorbed into the economy.

Finally, Histadrut is increasingly having to run its companies as private enterprises and cannot count on government support if they fail to meet the test of the market. This distancing of the government from the federation of labor was demonstrated by the

lack of ready support accorded Histadrut-owned Koor Industries in 1988 when it defaulted on its debt obligations.

Certainly, Israel's private sector could benefit from additional reforms. However, some analysts have held the country to a standard of perfectly free markets that even the U.S. could not meet; Israel is not the last holdout in a world that has forsaken subsidies, state-owned postal services, company bailouts, and minimum wages. To focus on Israel's remaining structural rigidities is to miss the unambiguous trend toward deregulation and increasing the private sector's role in the economy.

THE EXTERNAL DEBT BURDEN

The state of Israel compares favorably with other investment-grade sovereign issuers based on quantitative measures of debt as they pertain to credit quality. Appendices A and B consist of a statistical comparison between Israel and several OECD and developing countries. If the analysis were based solely on these statistics, we believe that Israel would deserve a high single-A rating.

Israel's high per capita GDP compares favorably with other industrialized, double-A rated countries with long democratic traditions, such as Spain, Ireland and New Zealand, all of which have well-diversified economies with well-educated and skilled populations. Of the single-A and triple-B rated countries, only Iceland has a higher per capita GDP than Israel.

The level of Israel's net external debt appears small relative to some higher-rated sovereign borrowers. As figure 5 shows, Israel's net external debt as 37% of GDP in 1989 was below the comparable figures for Ireland (57%), New Zealand (49%) and Iceland (42%). Furthermore, Israel's net external debt and interest payments as a percent of exports were similar to, or below, these three countries (See Figures 6 and 7).

[Figures 5, 6 and 7 not reproducible in the Record.]

Several factors peculiar to Israel suggest that its sovereign credit quality is considerably higher than the ratios alone imply:

(1) Israel's net debt of approximately \$16 billion is entirely intermediate and long term. Israel is a short-term creditor, making it less vulnerable to sudden external shocks. The country's history of timely payment and no defaults has established it as a long-term borrower in international credit markets, further reducing dependence on short-term credit.

(2) Related to this, the Israeli banking system is in a net surplus position with respect to the international commercial banking system. That is, the country's banks have more deposits in foreign banks than do foreign banks in those of Israel. Israel therefore is not vulnerable to the sudden withdrawals that precipitated the "debt crises" in Latin America or South Africa, for example.

(3) A greater proportion of Israel's gross debt is owed to governments (32%) than is common for other countries. A large portion of this borrowing (approximately \$10 billion) is for defense purposes and is linked to joint U.S.-Israeli strategic interests in the Middle East. Of the debt owed to the U.S. government, \$8.8 billion was refinanced at lower interest rates in 1985 and 1989, yielding \$150 million in interest savings in 1989 alone.

(4) Another large portion of Israel's net external debt (roughly \$9.4 billion) consists of deposits by foreign individuals in Israeli banks. The basis of this debt is largely political support for Israel by individuals living outside the country. Therefore, during the past decade's military conflicts and economic

ic crisis, the level of these deposits has remained stable. Indeed, in the last quarter of 1990 when the threat of the Gulf war seemed imminent, deposits from foreign residents actually rose by \$200 million.

Of course, trends in the ratios also give an important indication of the credit worthiness of a sovereign borrower. The government's sound fiscal and monetary management of the economy since 1986 has resulted in dramatic improvements in Israel's debt statistics (see Figure 8).

FIGURE 8.—THE ISRAELI ECONOMY—EXTERNAL DEBT MEASURES, 1986-90*

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Gross Debt (US \$ billions)	20.6	21.8	21.3	21.1	22.6
Net Debt (US \$ billions)	12.2	12.8	12.8	12.8	13.1
Percentage of GDP	41.8	42.1	44.9	37.0	31.1
Percentage of exports	105	127	111	96	82
Debt service (US \$ billions)	3.158	3.512	4.250	4.097	NA
Exports (US \$ billions)	32,176	34,728	35,741	37,151	NA
Debt service ratio (percent)	32	32	37	37	NA
Interest payments/exports	29	16	16	13	NA

* Net debt excludes of gross liabilities from commercial bank assets and reserves. NA Not available.

Source: Bank of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics.

Net debt figures (rather than gross debt) were used for calculating ratios since they better reflect the nature of Israel's exposure to currency movements. Bank of Israel policy has required that foreigners' deposits be used to fund foreign credits; this policy, instituted to limit domestic money creation, effectively eliminates any foreign exchange risk for the liabilities, since foreign assets are funded from foreign liabilities. Unlike some developing countries, Israel's commercial bank foreign assets and reserves are not of dubious quantity or quality.

Most analysts are not concerned with Israel's ability to service its existing debt; current debt levels clearly are manageable. Worries arise, however, over the expected increase in debt associated with the anticipated mass immigration of Russian Jews through 1995. The following section deals with the credit implications of the immigration issue.

EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION

The major challenge facing the Israeli economy in the next five years will be the absorption of approximately one million Russian Jews. The comparable test for the U.S. economy would be assimilating a country the size of France. There most definitely will be a rise in Israel's external debt, but the country will also be gaining some valuable assets, as well. We feel that the net effect of the immigration on the economy will be positive, leading to higher productivity and per capita income. Even in a worst case scenario, Israel should remain an investment-grade borrower, since there are several factors that would limit or mitigate serious deterioration in credit quality.

The government's stated role in the absorption is to leave as much as possible to the private sector. The government gives an absorption grant to each immigrant, and public services (education and health) also must be provided. However, the provision of housing and jobs is being relegated to private companies, not to the public sector. The main thrust of policy, therefore, is toward boosting business profitability—through lower real wages and payroll taxes—to create more jobs.

Nearly 200,000 immigrants arrived in 1990, providing a hint of the composition of the newcomers. In general, the immigrants are better-educated than Israeli residents: 41% have university degrees compared with 8% for existing residents. The occupations of these immigrants suggest the sizeable

import of human capital that accompanies their arrival (see Figure 9).

FIGURE 9.—ISRAELI OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, 1989

	(in percent)	1986	1989
Professional		8.3	40.8
Technical and manual		29.8	21.4
Other		19.8	24.4
Total		100	100

To the extent that the immigrants can find jobs suited for their existing skills, the Israeli economy will benefit from sharp increases in per capita GDP. Furthermore, the heavy concentration of engineers and technicians likely will boost the competitiveness of Israel's export industries.

In the short term, the absorption will cause a fairly significant current account deficit (perhaps 11% of GDP). There is a timing mismatch between the immigrants' immediate needs for housing, food and public services and their medium-term productivity. Essentially, Israel's government is investing in the immigrants, which will pay off once these highly educated and skilled people find or create their own jobs. The government has shown, by its adoption of a three-year budget, that it understands the timing of the cash flows involved.

Some analyses of Israel's credit, however, do not factor in the benefits of the immigration and have focused solely on the costs. They understandably have assumed an increase in the external debt of Israel but have made no offsetting increases in GDP growth or exports. The process of large-scale absorption does require foreign borrowings but will result in markedly higher GDP and exports. For example, between 1968-72, Israel's population grew by 16%, real GDP climbed by 80% (11% annual average) and real exports jumped by 207% (16% annual average). Considering the skilled nature of the new immigrants, it is not unreasonable to anticipate similar explosive growth during the coming period of immigration.

Our base case scenario for the Israeli economy, however, conservatively assumes economic results below those of the dynamic 1968-72 period. Real GDP growth is expected to average 5.6% over the next five years, while exports are projected to grow by an average of 8.6% annually.

FIGURE 10.—THE ISRAELI ECONOMY—BASE CASE PROJECTIONS, 1990-2000

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	2000
GDP (\$ billions)	50	55.9	62.8	69.9	77.9	84	124.4
Net Debt (\$ billions)	13.4	18.5	22.8	28.9	36.9	43.9	49.9
Debt/GDP (percent)	27	33	37	41	47	52	40
Debt/exports (percent)	31	35	39	43	47	51	44

A conservative base case scenario for Israel's balance of payments shows that the country should be able to service its external debt comfortably over the next decade. Net external debt is projected to peak in 1993 at \$40 billion, approximately \$23 billion above current levels. Debt as a percentage of GDP should reach 43% in 1995; however, this level is still below the 1990 figures for double-A-rated New Zealand (48%) and Ireland (67%). Debt as a percentage of exports is projected to rise to 139% in 1995, also below 1989 levels for New Zealand (175%), Australia (139%) and Turkey (145%).

The absorption process most likely will be completed within the next five years, while the return on Israel's investment in its immigrants is expected to occur from 1995 through 2000. In that period, no additional external financing will be required, since domestic savings will be sufficient to finance required investment. In real terms and relative to GDP and exports, Israel's external debt burden should decrease. By 2000, debt as a percentage of GDP is projected to fall to 41% and debt as a percentage of exports is anticipated to decrease to 86%.

In three years, the Israeli economy will be at an important juncture. The inflow of immigrants will be dwindling, and most of the government expenditures on absorption will have been made. The economy will have to shift from explosive growth in the construction and basic necessities industries toward export industries that can help pay down the debt accumulated for absorption. The structural reforms should permit the private sector to adjust to the shifting demand, and the government likely will end its housing guarantee programs, further signaling the need to shift resources away from construction.

A worst case scenario, as suggested by some of the more pessimistic analyses of Israel, takes the following form: Israel in 1993 has incurred a great deal of external debt in meeting the immediate needs of the immigrants. The labor market, however, has remained totally inflexible, driving unemployment up near 20%. Immigrant frustration at the lack of any employment—let alone suitable employment—leads to large-scale emigration to other countries. Thus, all the costs and none of the benefits of absorption are accrued to Israel; the increased debt burden essentially rests on the pre-existing population.

There are significant factors that preclude this situation from being a reasonable worst case scenario:

(1) If the economic growth does not accelerate with the infusion of immigrants, fewer Russians probably will decide to move to Israel or they will arrive over a longer period of time. High unemployment could mean well below one million immigrants in the next five years, less government expenditures on their absorption and, accordingly, less foreign debt. Indeed, Israeli officials have reduced their estimates for 1991 immigration from the Soviet Union to 235,000 from 300,000. The reduction most likely is the result of the high unemployment rate and a new Soviet law requiring emigrants to obtain passports prior to emigration.

(2) There is a link between the accumulation of foreign debt and productive investment in the economy; in many cases, the debt will only accumulate if the business sector is investing. That is, private external debt will increase only if the economy is performing well and providing the immigrants with jobs. After the 1982 debt crisis, commercial banks, export credit agencies and suppliers became more conscious of the use of their credits and wary of financing consumption rather than investment.

(3) The response of the Israeli political system and the population at large has always been determined and cohesive when faced with a crisis, whether military or economic, which permits the Israelis to make sacrifices, yet maintain productivity; during the Economic Stabilization Plan of 1985 and 1986, for example, the economy actually sustained real growth rates of 2.8 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively. All historical evidence suggests that Israel can be expected to react effectively—through decreased government spending and real wage cuts—as circumstances dictate.

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(4) Support from Jews not in Israel also would cushion adverse developments in the absorption program. The United Jewish Appeal already has committed to pay the costs of transporting Russian Jews to Israel and is considering whether to give loan guarantees to banks making loans to immigrants. Any absorption costs taken on by foreigners, of course, decrease the debt burden on Israel.

Figure 11 contains projections for a reasonable worst case scenario, incorporating the above factors. Real GDP growth is assumed to average 4 percent over the next five years, while exports are projected to grow by 6.5 percent. Net debt is assumed to rise exactly as in the base case through 1993, but then level off at \$38 billion rather than \$40 billion.

FIGURE 11.—THE ISRAELI ECONOMY—WORST CASE PROJECTIONS, 1990-2000

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	2000
GDP (10 ⁹ \$)	22.1	23.3	24.5	25.7	27.7	29.8	33.9
Net GDP (10 ⁹ \$)	15.4	16.9	18.3	19.7	21.5	23.3	26.5
Net GDP (percent)	69	73	75	77	77	78	78
Net exports	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.1	3.3

Although there is some deterioration in the debt ratios compared with the base case, Israel's economy in a worst case scenario could still comfortably manage its external debt. Debt as a percentage of GDP and exports peaks in 1994 and remains below the comparable figures for double-A-rated New Zealand in 1989. As in the base case, debt ratios in the worst case scenario improve between 1993-2000, but to a lesser extent.

THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION

The external and internal security threats facing Israel have diminished substantially over the past few years. Not only has the probability of armed conflict decreased, but also its associated economic burden on the economy can be expected to fall gradually (mainly as a result of the collapse of Soviet communism and the defeat of Iraq). Furthermore, the economic and diplomatic isolation of Israel from several potential trading partners appears to be ending. The geopolitical risks cited by Standard and Poor's in 1989 as the primary basis for Israel's low investment-grade rating need to be reconsidered, as do their adverse effects on the Israeli economy. Some analysts remain focused on the continuing geopolitical risks, arguing that they have not been eliminated. Such views, however, fail to account for the remarkable developments in the Middle East, the Soviet Union and elsewhere:

(1) The Gulf war clearly improved Israel's security and strengthened the U.S.-Israeli

strategic alliance. Not only was the Iraqi military eliminated as a viable threat to Israel, but also Israel faced the same enemy as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states, laying the foundation for regional peace negotiations. If the peace process moves forward, it is highly likely that arms limitation agreements will be negotiated, reducing Israel's defense in the medium term.

If the peace process breaks down and the Middle East remains unstable, Israel's role as a U.S. ally will be enhanced. Israeli expertise in intelligence gathering in the region, as well as in research and development of weapons, will ensure continued strategic cooperation. In addition, Israel's "friendly ports" for U.S. ships are becoming increasingly important, as bans in the Far East and the Mediterranean Sea are less welcoming to a U.S. presence. Thus, in the event that the region remains unstable, U.S. cooperation with, and aid to, Israel even more likely will continue.

(2) The U.S.S.R.'s preoccupation with its own internal affairs and its retreat from military relationships with countries such as Syria and Iraq have dramatically improved Israel's situation. Previously, the Soviets were active in arms transfers to these states, leading to arms races with Israel; providing training and safe havens for terrorists; isolating Israel diplomatically and pressuring the U.S. over its support for Israel; and closing East European markets to Israeli exports. The curtailment of these activities will help bring a measure of stability to the region.

The renewed peace process can be linked to diminished Soviet influence. Syria, no longer able to depend on its major patron for arms supplies, poses much less of a threat to Israel. Indeed, we believe that Syria's willingness to participate in negotiations directly results from its realization that it must comply with the wishes of the United States, the only superpower still deeply involved in the region. It is realistic to expect, though it is not assumed, that Syria will be increasingly drawn into negotiations with Israel through relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

(3) The Intifada remains a threat to the internal security of Israel; however, that threat is significantly less than had been anticipated. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) lost some legitimacy and bargaining power when it supported Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, and this has dampened Palestinian diplomatic and political weight in the upcoming negotiations. Progress in the peace talks will hinge on an acceptable solution to the Palestinian issue. Now that those talks appear imminent, the Intifada could subside (at least

temporarily), as Palestinian leaders focus on diplomatic channels.

(4) Improved diplomatic relations between Israel and many foreign countries are expected to result in increased integration of the Israeli economy into world markets. For example, improved relations with the European Community recently resulted in the negotiation of EFTA-equivalent trade status for Israel. In addition, relations between Israel and Eastern Europe have improved quickly; the many East European immigrants to Israel provides a natural link between their previous and new countries. To the extent that new markets are opened to Israel, the country's economy will benefit from higher growth, exports and direct foreign investment.

A reasonable outgrowth of the peace process would be an end to the Arab boycott of the Israeli economy and non-Israeli companies doing business with Israel. Although the direct benefits to the Israeli economy of trade with the Arab countries probably would be minimal, the end of the boycott would have significant secondary effects. Companies from the United States, Western Europe and Japan could then invest in Israel without fear of being "black-listed". This is particularly applicable to Japan companies, which reportedly have been resistant to breaking the boycott.

Stability is by no means assured in the Middle East. However, the Gulf war and the curtailment of Soviet activities have resulted in genuine peace prospects, which if realized, would substantially reduce the adverse economic effects of Israel's geopolitical risks. If peace negotiations falter and the region remains polarized, then the U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance will remain important to both parties. In such a case, we believe that Israel can depend on the continued military and economic support of the United States.

CONCLUSION

To summarize our opinion concerning Israel's level of sovereign credit safety, its debt should be regarded as equivalent to that of the highest medium-grade sovereigns in terms of credit worthiness. In other words, we believe that an appropriate long-term bond rating for Israel would be a mid-to-low single A, placing Israel in the company of Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong and just below Korea, Portugal and Iceland. In many ways, Israel's economy is more developed than these other sovereigns. However, we have selected the lower rating as appropriate to take account of both remaining geopolitical risk and existing rigidities in the economy. Therefore, we also regard the trend of an appropriate rating for Israel debt to be positive.

APPENDIX A.—MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1989

Country	Rating	Moody's	Moody's	Moody's	Moody's	Moody's
		Moody's	Moody's	Moody's	Moody's	Moody's
Spain	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
France	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Italy	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Germany	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Japan	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
U.S.	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
U.K.	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Canada	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Sweden	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Norway	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Denmark	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Netherlands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Belgium	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Luxembourg	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Portugal	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Greece	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Ireland	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Finland	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
South Africa	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
China	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
India	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
South Korea	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Malaysia	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Thailand	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Hong Kong	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Taiwan	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Singapore	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Philippines	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Indonesia	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Brunei	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Mexico	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Brazil	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Argentina	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Chile	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Colombia	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Venezuela	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Ecuador	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Peru	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Guatemala	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
El Salvador	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Honduras	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Nicaragua	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Costa Rica	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Panama	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Dominican Republic	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Jamaica	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Trinidad and Tobago	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Barbados	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Grenada	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Dominica	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
St. Kitts and Nevis	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Antigua and Barbuda	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
St. Lucia	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Guyana	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Suriname	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
French Polynesia	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
New Caledonia	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Wallis and Futuna	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
French Southern Territories	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
British Antarctic Territory	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
British Indian Ocean Territory	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
British Virgin Islands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Cayman Islands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Faroe Islands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Falkland Islands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Guernsey	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Jersey	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Manx	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Norfolk Island	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Pitcairn Islands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
St. Helena	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Torres Strait Islands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
U.S. Virgin Islands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
British Virgin Islands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Cayman Islands	A1/AA	3375.20	59.601	5.73	8.00	17
Faroe Islands	A1/AA	3375.20				

APPENDIX A—MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1989—Continued

9/11

Country	Rating: Moody's/S&P	Normal GDP (US\$bn) 1989	Per Capita GDP (US\$) 1989	Real GDP growth (percent)	Inflation ^a (percent)	Current account balance as percent of GDP ^b
Poland ^c	NR/NR	87.09	2,754	9.18	159.05	-1.79
Poland ^d	NR/NR	40.35	1,377	9.37	7.09	-2.15
Romania	NR/NR	39.45	1,223	4.73	26.97	-4.18
Russia	NR/NR	45.19	1,500	8.63	11.13	-4.51
Slovakia	NR/NR	22.87	942	3.37	3.24	-1.12

^a Figures are an average of 1987-89.^b Imputed rating.^c 1989 figures are an estimate of Institute of International Finance.^d Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland's figures are an average of 1988 and 1989.

NR Not rated.

Note: Inflation figures are Consumer Prices percent change and period.

Source: Institute of International Finance, S&P, Moody's Investors Service, and Salomon Brothers Inc.

APPENDIX B. EXTERNAL DEBT MEASURES, 1989^a

Country	Rating: Moody's/S&P	Net External Debt ^b (US\$ million)	Net External Debt/GDP (percent)	Exports ^c (US\$ M Bn)	Net External Debt/ Exports (percent)	Interest/Exports (percent)
South Africa	A1/AA	NA	1.00	NA	0.00	5.08
Spain	A1/AA	NA	87.00	NA	87.00	5.36
Spain (World)	A1/AA	NA	49.00	NA	49.00	20.20
Spain	A1/AA	NA	42.00	NA	42.00	13.50
Spain ^d	A1/A	58.701	8.81	672.297	13.19	2.69
Spain ^e	A1/A	8.708	1.49	11.885	74.17	11.79
Spain ^f	A1/A	10.352	1.67	10.915	94.77	11.77
Spain ^g	A1/A	23.782	3.64	10.958	216.83	18.51
Spain ^h	A1/A	18.101	2.81	9.156	197.73	18.51
Spain ⁱ	A1/A	18.678	2.87	17.151	167.23	18.51
Spain ^j	A1/A	25.128	3.86	8.587	222.69	18.51
Spain ^k	A1/A	25.128	3.86	14.008	179.37	18.51
Spain ^l	A1/A	25.128	3.86	5.972	420.68	18.51
Spain ^m	A1/A	25.128	3.86	16.571	151.58	18.51
Spain ⁿ	A1/A	25.128	3.86	27.612	90.97	18.51
Spain ^o	A1/A	25.128	3.86	5.750	434.73	18.51
Spain ^p	A1/A	25.128	3.86	0.070	358.58	18.51
Spain ^q	A1/A	25.128	3.86	1.144	219.58	18.51
Spain ^r	A1/A	25.128	3.86	7.284	344.73	18.51
Spain ^s	A1/A	25.128	3.86	2.227	112.85	18.51
Spain ^t	A1/A	25.128	3.86	8.356	300.62	18.51
Spain ^u	A1/A	25.128	3.86	1.019	247.23	18.51
Spain ^v	A1/A	25.128	3.86	1.076	233.28	18.51
Spain ^w	A1/A	25.128	3.86	1.076	233.28	18.51
Spain ^x	A1/A	25.128	3.86	1.076	233.28	18.51

^a Figures are an average of 1987-89.^b Total external debt on all international reserves including gold and financial assets held abroad by resident deposit money banks.^c Exports of goods, services and primary net transfers.^d Spain's interest payments/Exports figure is for 1988.^e General rating.^f Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland's figures are an average of 1988 and 1989.^g 1989 figures are an estimate of Institute of International Finance.

NR Not rated.

Source: Institute of International Finance, S&P, Moody's Investors Service, and Salomon Brothers Inc.

MEMORANDUM—THE FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990/SUBSIDY COST

The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 was enacted in order to measure more accurately the costs of federal loan guarantee (as well as direct loan) programs. The legislative history of this act, as well as its literal terms, make clear that the so-called "subsidy cost" of credit programs must be determined in accordance with a "cost-to-government" approach, rather than a "market-valuation" method which calculates the economic benefit borrowers receive from U.S. loan guarantees. To this end, the act and interpretative authority promulgated pursuant to it recognize that the historical performance of the borrower is the most reliable and therefore appropriate gauge by which to predict the long-term cost of a loan guarantee to the U.S. government.

By way of background, in years prior to enactment of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, the Administration had advocated a credit reform proposal which measured the financial assistance to the borrower of federal credit. The "subsidy cost" of a guarantee under this proposal was "based on the premise that the value of any asset is the amount that people would pay for it in the market." Thus, "the subsidy cost of a loan guarantee would be its market value

less the present value of fees received." Market value may be determined by the estimated net cost to the government to reinsure the guarantee or "the present value, based on a comparable market discount rate, of the difference between the interest paid by the borrower and the interest that would be charged by a private lender for such loan."

The legislative history reflects that the Administration, through OMB, advocated market-based subsidy estimates because, in its view, "they include the cost of bearing the risk that default losses will be more than expected" and there may be "a difference of unknown direction and size if the market expects changes in future loss rates compared with past experience."

Congress, however, never approved the President's proposal, largely because there was disagreement over the use of the market-based method of determining subsidy costs versus the "cost-to-government" approach.¹ The GAO and the Budget Committee

¹ Federal Credit Reform: Hearing Before the Task Force on Urgent Fiscal Issues of the House Committee on the Budget, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force Hearings] (OMB submission).

² Message from the President: Proposed Legislation—"Federal Credit Reform Act of 1987," H.R. Doc. No. 80, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1987).

³ Task Force Hearings (OMB submission), at 28.

⁴ See id. at 7.

fees expressed preference for the cost-to-government approach because (i) it is "more consistent with current budgeting practices, and with the cost valuation practices followed for most other federal programs" and (ii) it would be difficult to accurately calculate a market valuation for loans without "a real credit market or set of applicable interest rates. Such persons come to the government because they cannot get commercial financing."

As described in the legislative history, the cost-to-government approach calculates "the net present value of a loan guarantee . . . by estimating the expected future default claims based on historical experience, along with any direct interest subsidies, and then discounting these future cash flows by the yield on Treasury securities of similar maturity. The difference between this net present value and the present value of fees received for the loan guarantee would be the subsidy."² In other words, this method measures the net present value of the difference between the costs to the government of making the guarantee and the expected receipts flowing back to the government.³

¹ Id. (statement of Comptroller General Charles A. Bowsher) at 47-48.

² Id. (OMB submission) at 28 (emphasis added).

³ Id. (statement of Bowsher) at 48.

THE CREDIT REFORM ACT EMBODIES THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COST-TO-GOVERNMENT APPROACH.

The literal terms of the 1990 credit reform act as well as the conference report accompanying it clearly and unequivocally reflect the cost-to-government approach. Indeed, the law includes the same "cost-to-government" terminology described above. Specifically, the credit reform act provides that the budget costs of credit programs will be the estimated long-term costs (i.e., the "subsidy cost") to the government, calculated on a net present value basis, excluding administrative costs. (2 U.S.C. § 601a(5)(A).) More specifically, the subsidy cost is the portion of the expected payments by the government that the government does not expect to be offset by collections. In present value terms, (OMB Budget Procedures Memorandum No. 770, Dec. 31, 1990, at 3.) Payments by the government include defaults, delinquencies and interest subsidies and payments to the government cover origination and other fees, penalties and revenues. (2 U.S.C. § 601a(5)(C).)

THE HISTORICAL LOAN EXPERIENCE OF THE BORROWER IS THE APPROPRIATE GAUGE FOR MEASURING THE COST OF A LOAN GUARANTEE.

The key word in estimating a loan guarantee's potential cost to the government is "expected"—that is, what is the government's realistic expectation of cash outflows and inflows with respect to the loan guarantee? (See President's Budget for FY 1992, Part Two-224.) An accurate assessment of the loan's expected performance can only be made on the basis of the borrower's historical experience. This principle is clearly embodied in the terms of the credit reform law. In Section 503, the OMB and CBO Directors are instructed to "coordinate the development of more accurate data on historical performance of direct loan and loan guarantee programs." And, the OMB Director is required to review "historical data and develop the best possible estimates of adjustments that would convert aggregate budget data to credit reform accounting." (2 U.S.C. § 601b(d), (e) (emphasis added).) Neither the law nor the legislative history allow for any approach to subsidy cost other than the expected cost to the U.S. Government as projected based upon this data.

The President's Budget for FY 1992 similarly recognizes the cost-to-government approach of credit reform and the importance of the borrower's historical loan experience. The Budget states that the 1992 estimates were based on "available historical experience." Specifically, these estimates "take into account characteristics of the loan or the borrower that make default more likely, and the degree to which policies or economic conditions influence that probability." The Budget further states that "[t]he actual experience—the delinquencies, repayments, and modifications—of the loans . . . must be tracked." (Part Two-224 to 225.)

Finally, OMB guidance reflects the cost-to-government approach and the central role that the borrower's historical experience plays in estimating the long-term cost of credit programs to the government in its formula for calculating subsidy costs. According to OMB, the "expected performance by borrowers" is to be based on "analysis of past statistical data; performance on equivalent loans in the private market, and/or other information." (OMB Budget Procedures Memorandum No. 770, at 3.) OMB documents make clear that agencies must present statistical evidence to justify their risk analyses and that such evidence must be based on "historical analysis of program data or comparable credit data, as to likely costs—whether, defaults, other deviations from contract, or other costs—that are ex-

pected to be associated with loans in that category." (OMB Circular No. A-11, revised July 12, 1991, § 33.5, at 101.)

... the subsidy cost of credit programs—yet, the agency has merged the two methodologies in its guidance—an act which flies in the face of the purposes of the 1990 act.

In conclusion, the Administration and OMB have lost the debate over whether credit reform should be based on a cost-to-government approach or a market-based method. Credit reform, as enacted, does not sanction speculative estimates of a loan guarantee's expected cost to the government, which are not based on the borrower's historical loan experience. The government's expectation must be based on available hard evidence: statistical data and accurate information on the borrower's historical loan performance. Otherwise, the act's fundamental purpose—to measure more accurately the costs to the government of credit programs—would be thwarted. Thus, OMB should carry out its role—that is, to implement the law that Congress enacted—rather than attempt to advance a legislative agenda that was expressly rejected by our nation's lawmakers.

Mr. KASTEN. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise today, along with my colleague, Senator ROBERT KASTEN, to offer an amendment which provides for \$2 billion in absorption guarantees to Israel for each of 5 years. These guarantees will enable Israel to raise the capital needed to finance the resettlement costs of over 1 million new immigrants now arriving from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia.

Mr. President, my colleague and I met with the President of the United States this morning and were asked to delay the parliamentary consideration of this amendment. We appreciate the position taken by the President in this matter, and we are, accordingly, prepared to fully discuss this matter with the President and his staff before its parliamentary consideration, we have, therefore, decided to go forward with the introduction of this proposal so that it might serve as a basis for discussion in the weeks ahead. We feel it is important that all Members of this body, as well as the administration, have the opportunity to fully review all the issues connected with the loan guarantee legislation.

In addition, my colleague and I believe it is important to move forward with this initiative because of the dire financial situation faced by the State of Israel this time.

The humanitarian plight now facing Israel is too important, the legislative calendar too short, and the events now unfolding in the Soviet Union too uncertain for us to delay this important initiative any longer. Indulgence to any other issue is unacceptable and merely serves as a diversion from the urgent humanitarian problem now before us. Mr. President, there are extraordinary times—times which call for extraordinary compassion and extraordinary gestures of friendship and goodwill. Today, Senator KASTEN and I intend

* Id. (OMB submission) at 28.

to make good on our Nation's longstanding pledge to some of the most aggrieved victims of Soviet tyranny.

Six American administrations, both Democrat and Republican, have pledged their support for this cause, declaring that normal relations with the Soviet Union would be impossible without free immigration. From the streets of Moscow to the wastelands of Siberia, the rallying cry: "Let my people go" has resonated in the minds of countless refuseniks for over a generation and sustained their hope that next year they would find peace in Jerusalem.

While it is clear that momentous changes have taken place in the Soviet Union, these past few months, it should be clear to everyone that they are by no means irrevocable. The euphoria of the summer can turn quickly into the discontent of winter, as cold, hunger, and uncertainty grip this impoverished land.

No one knows the reversals and misfortunes of history better than the Jewish people. Even as Muscovites were celebrating their new freedom in Red Square, the Government of Azerbaijan suspended the issuance of exit visas for many of the Republic's 80,000 Jewish inhabitants.

We would all like to believe that the future for Jews remaining in the Soviet Union will be bright. But the resurgence of Russian nationalism, and its virulent strain of Anti-Semitism, is cause enough for concern. Feelings of anti-Semitism run deep in the heart and history of Mother Russia and her neighboring republics. We must not foreclose the chance that many hundreds of thousands of Jews may still choose to leave for Israel despite the potential flowering of freedom.

Mr. President, it is still conceivable that the ominous cloud of totalitarianism could still descend upon the Soviet landscape, dashing our fondest hopes for change, and plunging the citizens of this great land, along with its Jewish inhabitants, into an even darker abyss. We must all guard against the day when the intoxication of revolution turns bittersweet, and chaos replaces dancing in the streets of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev.

Mr. President, the world which we knew just 12 months ago has undergone a profound transformation. The Iron Curtain has rusted away. The statues of Lenin and Marx are being toppled from their pedestals in cities from Riga to Vladivostok. A tired and decrepit Soviet empire has collapsed of its own ponderous weight.

What was once a closed and frightened society has emerged into the light of day, shedding their cobwebs of communism and embracing the ideals of democracy. With this transformation has come a flood of refugees, most of them Jewish refugees, who long for freedom in their national homeland, Israel.

Mr. President, what began as a struggle for the liberation of the Jewish people in the Soviet Union, now has become a struggle for their integration into Israeli society. Already, since mid-1989, 345,000 refugees have resettled in Israel with over 200,000 arriving during the last year alone. Joining this unprecedented ingathering of the Jewish people have been 25,000 Ethiopian Jews, a community which owes its survival to your personal intervention in 1985 and 1981.

Within 3 years, well over 1 million new immigrants will arrive on Israel's shores, beckoned by an ancient call and modern necessity. To put this number in its proper perspective, it is the equivalent of the entire population of France—some 55 million people—choosing to resettle in the United States by 1994.

Clearly, the major burden for absorption will have to rest upon the shoulders of Israelis. To this end, they are prepared to accept ever more severe austerity measures, including a drop in their standard of living, as the price for being able to welcome home this last great exodus of Jews from captivity.

Every Israeli knows that the increasing social cost of this immigration will demand ever greater national sacrifice. I have no doubt they are prepared to meet this economic challenge with the same grit and tenacity that they have faced challenges to their national security.

Already, Israelis have curbed their consumption, downsized their Government bureaucracy, and endured severe

cutbacks to their social services. By 1992, Government expenditures for immigrant absorption are expected to reach 18.8 percent of total Government spending as compared to less than 1 percent in 1989. This is equivalent to 10.5 percent of Israel's total GNP.

The United States, for its part, should be prepared to lend what assistance it can by providing the \$10 billion in absorption guarantees which the Government of Israel requires—guarantees, which I must stress, will be used by Israel solely to borrow its own funds on the world's capital markets. The United States will not be adding to its budget deficit if these loans are made available, nor will other foreign aid programs suffer as a result.

In addition, the legislation which Senator Kasten and I are proposing is crafted so that the fees on the loan guarantees are equal to the subsidy cost—a fact that will obviate any need for a budget outlay.

The American public should labor under no misconceptions. This is not grant aid to Israel. There is no free lunch. Israel is not asking for a hand-out, but for an outstretched hand, a hand of friendship, reassurance and confidence. Nothing could be more firmly imbedded in the American tradition of neighbor helping neighbor. No gesture could better exemplify the humanitarian impulse which guides American foreign policy than assistance in this great process of absorption.

What is being proposed today is merely a Government vote of confi-

dence in a dear friend and a trusted ally—a friend which has never defaulted on any U.S. loan, and a friend which will use a large portion of these resources to purchase goods and services from the United States. Though Israel will benefit from our help, numerous jobs also will be created in the United States—improving our trade balance and assisting in our economic recovery. Of this I am sure.

A strong, self-confident, prosperous Israel poses little risk of default. It is a solid investment. Israel is a country which has remained true to its fiduciary responsibilities despite hardships unimaginable to most Americans. Americans have no reason to doubt that Israel will honor its debts. Israel has never defaulted on any loan extended by the United States—a perfect record of repayment matched only by Norway.

As one who has served the American people in Congress for over 30 years, I know that the frontier spirit of neighbor helping neighbor is alive and well. Americans never forsake a fellow in need and they will not do so today.

Mr. President, colleagues, it is my hope that you will give this proposal your strongest endorsement.

RECESS UNTIL 9 A.M. TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands in recess until 9 a.m., September 11.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 7:06 p.m., recessed until Wednesday, September 11, 1991, at 9 a.m.

אאא, חוזם: 25592

אל: רהמש/1529

מ-: המשרד, תא: 270891, זח: 0929, דח: ר, סג: בל,

בבב

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בלמ'ס/רגיל

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א ל: לוס אנג'לס - צורי רפאל

הנדון: משלחת הוואי - דו'ח ביניים

הקבוצה בראשות סגן המושל הגיעה בשלום (22/8) ומקיימת את ביקורה כמתוכנן. הספיקו לסייר בירושלים, יד ושם, מצדה, איזור ים המלח וחזרה לתל-אביב שם התארחו לא'צ אצל ראש העיר. עד כה סגן המושל וחברי המשלחת מרוצים מאד מהתכנית וביצועה.

2. גולת הכותרת אתמול (25/8) הייתה כשהתקבלו אצל רוה'מ לפגישה שכללה סקירה מדינית מפי רוה'מ, שאלות ותשובות, חילופי ברכות ומסירת מתנות ע'י סגן המושל בשם הקבוצה והעם בהוואי. בדבריו ציין סגן המושל כי הוא עצמו והעם בהוואי תומכים בישראל וכי מטרת בואם לארץ בין היתר הינה לחיזוק התמיכה והקשרים בין שתי המדינות. רוה'מ ציין את הקשרים הטובים עם הוואי והעלה על נס את אישיותו ופועלו בתמיכת ישראל של הסנטור מהוואי - אינווה. חברי הקבוצה ובעיקר סגן המושל הודו בחום על המפגש ועל פעילותנו לאירגונו.

3. למיטב ידיעתנו, מייקל פרנקל מקיים קשר רצוף עם שולחיו. עם זאת מניחים שתראו לנכון לדווח ישירות גם אתם.

4. דו'ח סופי על הביקור כולו יוברק בסיומו.

מצפ'א

26 באוגוסט 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מאור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 23437

אל: רהמש/1404

מ-: ווש, נר: 2122, תא: 230891, זח: 1630, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מידי

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: וושינגטון

משיחה עם ג'וק קובי סגנו של קלי במחמ'ד

1. אינם סבורים שההתרחשות בבריה'מ תביא לעיכוב כלשהו בתהליך. בכל הנוגע להמשך המהלכים במז'ת הם נוהגים כאילו לא ארע דבר בזירה הבינ'ל.

2. הם מניחים שהסובייטים עצמם ירצו להוכיח שהם נאמנים לכל התחייבויותיהם הבינ'ל ויעשו ככל שיוכלו להראות מעורבות בתהליך.

3. חידוש היחסים של בריה'מ עם ישראל הוא ענין מובן מאליו והם מניחים שהסובייטים יעשו את הצעדים הנדרשים כדי לפתור ענין זה בעוד מועד.

4. הוא ראה בעיתונים ישראלים כאילו ביקור המזכיר נקבע ל-16 בספטמבר ואמר שלפי ידיעתו הכוונה היא לקיים את הביקור מוקדם יותר, אולי בשבוע הראשון של ספטמבר.

5. בקשר לוועידת המים באיסטנבול, אמר שמדיניותם ברורה לחלוטין לא תהיה השתתפות אמריקנית ללא השתתפות ישראלית מלאה. לפי דעתו בלי ארה'ב ובלי ישראל מאבדת הועידה את כל ערכה וטעמה ולא תתקיים.

לה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, גוברין

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 24162
אל: רהמש/1446
מ-: המשרד, תא: 250891, זח: 1613, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
69063
שמור/מידי
10602

אל: יצחק אורן , לש' רה'מ

דע: מרגלית גבאי , מאו'ר

הנדון: חבר הקונגרס ברני פרנק

ברני פרנק , דמוקרט ממסצ'וסטס (יהודי) , ישהה בארץ מה-29/8 עד ל-3/9 .
הנ'ל חבר בוועדת הבנקים, פיננסים ונושאים אורכניים וכן בוועדת פעולות
הממשלה הקשורות לתעסוקה ודיוור .

מבקשים פגישה עם רה'מ .

מתאמת הפגישות : מרגלית גבאי במאו'ר , טל' 02-303641 .

ליאורה הרצל - מצפ'א
25 באוגוסט 1991

פוצה: @ (רהמ), מצפא, מאור

סססס

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CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN LOS ANGELES

הקונסוליה הכללית של
ישראל בלוס-אנג'לס

1103 י.י)

תשנ"א ד' אב
1991 15 ביולי
אחב 000.00
6581

4838 66 : ס' פ' 1

יזמן אלן - איגוד כלכלי : אל
מיוע/מזכיר : מאת

הנדון : משלחת בראשונה ונן מושל חוואי
ג'ימס קמפמן, אלוהי וינס'היט האק'ים מילואי בולד

1. סגן מושל חוואי BENJAMIN CAYETANO יעמוד בראש משלחת
של אנשי ציבור בכירים מהוואי שתצא לארץ זר
לוס-אנג'לס ב - 21.8 ותחזור מישראל ב - 30.8 שם
המשלחת 91 SHALOM/ALOHA.

2. במשלחת מאושרת השתתפותם של :

- LT.GOVERNOR AND MRS. BENJAMIN J. CAYETANO
- STATE SENATOR AND MRS. ANDY LEVIN
- DIRECTOR OF THE STATE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MR. MUFU HANNEMANN
- STATE COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH AND MRS. JOHN LEWIN
- UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PRESIDENT AND MRS. ALBERT SIMONE
- UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII VICE PRESIDENT FOR ACADEMIC AFFAIRS MS. MADELINE GOODMAN (פעילה גם בקהילה היהודית של הונוולולו)
- UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII REGENT AND BUSINESSWOMAN MS. MOMI CAZIMERO.

ייתכן מאוד שישתתפו גם :

- EDITOR OF HONOLULU DAILY ADVERTISER MR. PETER ROSICK
- REPORTER AT KGMB TV (LOCAL CBS AFFILIATE) MS. SHERI GEVURTZ
- RABBI STEVEN BARAK OF TEMPLE EMMANUEL וא
JEWISH FEDERATION PRESIDENT MR. MEYER WASHOFKY

טרם שמענו גם מעוד 3-4 אנשים נוספים.

SHALOM/ALOHA '91: A Leadership Mission of
Friendship and Understanding

Sponsored by:
American Friends of Hebrew Univ.
Jewish Community Relations Council
Jewish Federation of Hawaii

Hawaiians and Israelis have much in common: Deep and abiding attachments to beautiful, and historically and culturally-rich lands; a shared history of welcoming and successfully absorbing large immigrant populations of diverse backgrounds and cultures; traditions of pride in their historical heritage, and dynamic economies spearheaded by thriving tourist industries and rich natural resources.

Most important, Israelis and Hawaiians share a spirit of freedom, peace, tolerance and respect for law, tradition and brotherhood. In Hawaii, this is called the spirit of Aloha; in Israel, the spirit of Shalom.

The purpose of the "Shalom/Aloha '91" leadership mission is to build on those spirits, common values and interests, to promote deeper understandings, ties and shared experiences among these unique peoples, through a visit to the land of the People of the Bible.

The attached outline describes the mission.

אאא, חוזם: 22671

אל: דהמש/1338

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 318, תא: 220891, זח: 1712, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: תמליל מסיבת עתונאים עם הנשיא בוש ומזכיר המדינה בייקר

לתשומת לבכם השאלות המתיחסות לתהליך השלום במזה"ת (ראו סימון) 5-4 26

PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH AND
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER, III
WALKER'S POINT, KENNEBUNKPORT, MAINE
THURSDAY, AUGUST 22, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I JUST FINISHED -- WE'RE IN THE MIDDLE OF OUR DOMESTIC BRIEFING WHICH WILL CONTINUE. WE INTERRUPTED THAT TO GET BRIEFED BY SECRETARY BAKER WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM THE MINISTERIAL ABROAD -- NATO MINISTERIAL -- THAT WENT VERY, VERY WELL. HE FILLED ME IN ON HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF AND OF THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC. HE MET WITH HIM, I BELIEVE, AND OF COURSE, WE ARE VERY PLEASED THAT CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN RESTORED THERE.

ON THE DOMESTIC SIDE, AS I SAY, WE'RE HALFWAY THROUGH IT. THIS IS A FOLLOW-ON TO THE REGULARIZED DOMESTIC BRIEFINGS THAT WE HOLD IN THE WHITE HOUSE WITH DIRECTOR DARMAN AND MR. ROGER PORTER AND OUR CHIEF OF STAFF; ANDY CARD, OUR DEPUTY. WE HAVE THOSE REGULARLY. BUT THIS WAS AN UPDATE AND WE TALKED ABOUT OUR EDUCATION PROGRAM. WE'RE REALLY LOOKING FORWARD TO THE FALL. WITH CONGRESS OUT NOW, WE'RE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW BEST TO GET CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON SOME OF OUR PROGRAMS -- ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION, EDUCATION, THE CRIME BILL, MANY OTHER AGENDA ITEMS THAT WILL BE COMING UP IN THE FALL.

SO IT'S A MIX TODAY OF BOTH THE DOMESTIC AGENDA AND THE FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA, WHICH HAS, OF COURSE, BEEN DOMINATED BY EVENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. AND I HAVE NOT TALKED TO ANY OF THE LEADERS TODAY. I DID TALK LAST NIGHT, AS I THINK MARLIN MAY HAVE RELEASED, TO PRIME MINISTER KAIFU OF JAPAN AND, OF COURSE, JAPAN HAS VERY SPECIAL INTEREST IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE SOVIET UNION. AND HE SHARED THE EMOTION THAT WE ALL FELT AS TO DEVELOPMENTS OVER THERE.

SO THAT'S AN UPDATE FOR RIGHT NOW.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, HOW DO YOU JUDGE GORBACHEV'S OPENING MOVES BACK IN MOSCOW? HE'S PUT MOISEYEV, A FAIRLY HARDLINE PERSON, IN CHARGE OF MILITARY.

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, HE TOLD ME WHEN HE WAS IN THE CRIMEA THAT HE HAD ORDERED MOISEYEV TO REMOVE THE FORCES, SEE THAT THE FORCES MOVE BACK. AND I GATHER THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE. SO, AND IT WAS MOISEYEV WHO -- WITH WHOM WE FINALIZED -- ON THE MILITARY SIDE FOR THE SOVIET UNION -- HELPED FINALIZE THE START AGREEMENT.

BUT WHO'S ON FIRST OVER THERE IS UP TO THEM. THAT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN SAY ANYTHING -- ANY MORE ABOUT.

Q TO WHAT EXTENT HAS GORBACHEV HIMSELF BEEN PART OF THE PROBLEM? NOT IN THE COUP NECESSARILY, BUT AFTER ALL, HE DID HAND-PICK THESE EIGHT LEADERS. AND TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DRAG ON REFORMS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I HEARD PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SAY THAT HE BORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PEOPLE THAT HE PUT IN, AND FELT BETRAYED BY SOME OF THEM. AND THAT'S A MATTER -- I THINK THAT SAID IT ALL PRETTY WELL, JIM.

IN TERMS OF REFORMS, LET'S KEEP EVERYTHING IN PERSPECTIVE AND LET'S RECOGNIZE THAT NOT ONLY IS EASTERN EUROPE FREE, GERMANY REUNITED, TROOPS COMING -- MOVING BACK AND ALL OF THAT, BUT THAT HE LAUNCHED A VERY AMBITIOUS PROGRAM ON PERESTROIKA AND ON GLASNOST. YOU NEVER WOULD HAVE SEEN A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE INITIATIVES THAT HE TOOK EARLY ON.

NOW, WITH SOME OF THE HARDER LINERS ON THE SIDELINES CLEARLY, IT PERHAPS FREES UP PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO SEE THAT THESE REFORMS CONTINUE.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, OF COURSE, ARE TO SEE A MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND ALSO TO SEE A DEMOCRATICALLY -- CERTAINLY A DEMOCRATIC -- DEMOCRATICALLY HELD ELECTIONS AND A DEMOCRATIC ORIENTED REGIME THERE. SO, I VIEW THE RECENT HAPPENINGS AS VERY POSITIVE IN THAT REGARD.

TO FURTHER THE ECONOMIC REFORMS I CAN TELL YOU THAT I MADE A DECISION TODAY TO LIFT THE HOLD THAT WE HAVE HAD ON THE VARIOUS

ECONOMIC PROGRAMS THAT I THINK WILL CLEARLY BENEFIT THE SOVIET UNION. THAT'S AS OF NOW TAKEN CARE OF.

Q WELL, NOW THAT THE HARDLINERS -- SOME OF THE HARDLINERS HAVE BEEN BRUSHED ASIDE, DO YOU LOOK FOR GORBACHEV TO QUICKEN THE PACE OF REFORMS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I HAVEN'T HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THAT WITH HIM. I HAVEN'T HAD AN OPPORTUNITY YET TO DISCUSS IT WITH ANY OF THE PRESIDENTS IN THE REPUBLICS. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT ALL ELEMENTS IN MOSCOW AND IN THE VARIOUS PARLIAMENTS WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE BEST WAY TO GET ECONOMIC SUPPORT FROM THE WEST IS TO ADOPT A GENUINE AND A FAR-REACHING ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM, AND THAT HAS BEEN ON HOLD FOR SOME REASONS WHICH INCLUDE A LACK OF A UNION TREATY. SO THAT'S UP TO THEM. IT'S UP TO THE REPUBLICS IN THE CENTER.

BUT THEY'VE GOT TO GET ON WITH A TREATY SO THAT AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS KNOW WHO THEY'RE DEALING WITH. YOU CAN'T MAKE A DEAL AND THEN WONDER WHETHER YOU HAVE TO MAKE IT WITH TWO OTHER ENTITIES. AND THAT WOULD BE -- THAT WOULD BE ELIMINATED, THAT KIND OF PROBLEM WOULD BE ELIMINATED IF A GOOD, SOLID, UNION TREATY WERE AGREED BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS AND THE CENTER. YEAH?

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT DO YOU HOPE GORBACHEV DOES NOW IN TERMS OF INDEPENDENCE FOR THE BALTIC REPUBLICS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, YOU KNOW, WHAT MY POSITION HAS BEEN. IN THE FIRST PLACE, WE STILL DON'T RECOGNIZE THE INCORPORATION, AND THE BALTIC FLAGS DO FLY THERE IN WASHINGTON, AS YOU KNOW. BUT I'VE LONG FELT THAT THE QUICKER INDEPENDENCE CAN BE GRANTED TO THE BALTICS THE BETTER. AND LET'S HOPE THAT OUT OF THIS NOW WE WILL SEE GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE BALTIC STATES AND THE CENTER TO ACCOMPLISH THIS END. AND I'VE TALKED TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ABOUT THIS BEFORE. I TALKED TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN ABOUT IT, AS A MATTER OF FACT. AND SO PERHAPS RECENT EVENTS WILL SPEED THE DAY WHEN YOU HAVE AN AGREED PATH SET OUT FOR INDEPENDENCE OF THESE STATES. IN MY VIEW, THAT WOULD DO MORE TO ENHANCE GOODWILL IN THE UNITED STATES THAN ALMOST ANY OTHER SINGLE THING THAT COULD BE DONE.

Q DO YOU THINK THAT THIS IS A SITUATION WHERE GORBACHEV IS GOING TO FEEL MORE PERSONALLY INCLINED TO SPEED UP THE PACE OF REFORM OR MAYBE JUST PRESSURED BY THIS NEW KIND OF LOOSE ALLIANCE THAT HE'S GOING TO HAVE TO FORGE WITH YELTSIN?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I'VE ALWAYS FELT THAT GORBACHEV WAS COMMITTED TO PERESTROIKA, AND I'VE ALWAYS FELT HE'S COMMITTED TO OPENNESS, AND SO WHAT PACE IT TAKES NOW WITH THE REMOVAL OF SOME OF THE HARDEST LINERS, TO WHOM GORBACHEV HAD TO PAY SOME ATTENTION, I CAN'T SAY. BUT I SEE NOTHING IN HERE BUT GOOD NEWS IN TERMS OF SPEEDING UP THE PACE.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD TIME FOR MR. GORBACHEV TO REIN IN THE ARMY AND THE KGB?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK HE'S ALREADY -- YOU'VE ALREADY SEEN THAT JUST TAKEN PLACE ON A FACTUAL BASIS. THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOVING THE FORCE -- THE FORCES -- DEFENSE MINISTER YAZOV APPARENTLY IS DEFINITELY OUT OF THE PICTURE. MR. GORBACHEV APPEARS TO HAVE PUT SOME -- SOME TRUST IN GENERAL MOISEYEV AND HE IS -- (CORRECTING HIS PRONOUNCIATION) -- "MOISEYEV" I GUESS IS THE PRONOUNCIATION. AND HE IS A MAN THAT WE'VE WORKED WITH. BUT THAT'S A MATTER FOR GORBACHEV TO SORT OUT -- THE CENTER -- AS, INDEED, YELTSIN POINTED OUT YESTERDAY, I BELIEVE.

BUT WE OBVIOUSLY WILL BE LOOKING FOR -- FOR A REGIME THAT WILL MOVE FORWARD WITH THESE POLICIES OF DIVERSIFICATION OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES. WE'VE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY IN THE PAST TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN ABOUT LEVELS OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE SOVIET UNION. AND, CLEARLY, I'D LIKE TO SEE OUR FINALIZATION NOW OF THE START AGREEMENT, WHICH HAS ONLY SOME DETAILS LEFT, BUT THAT WAS RESISTED UP TILL CLOSE TO THE FINAL BREAKTHROUGH BY -- BY SOME IN -- SOME OF THE HARDEST LINERS IN SOVIET DEFENSE.

SO IN THE WHOLE DEFENSE AREA WE'VE GOT TO WAIT. IT'S UP TO THEM WHO THE HEAD OF THEIR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS AND WHO WILL BE THE NEXT CHIEF OF STAFF. BUT WE WILL HOLD BACK A LITTLE ON MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS UNTIL WE SEE THIS SORT OUT, AND MOVE BRISKLY FORWARD ON THE AGREEMENTS THAT WE'VE ALREADY REACHED.

AND, AS I SAY, ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT WE WILL GO FORWARD WITH THE PROGRAM THAT WE OUTLINED, A PROGRAM THAT BOTH GORBACHEV AND YELTSIN SEEM TO FEEL WOULD BE VERY BENEFICIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION.

Q BUT NOTHING NEW ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T SEE ANYTHING NEW RIGHT NOW ON THAT. WE'RE TALKING -- WE'LL BE TALKING TO OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS ABOUT THIS. BUT WE AGREED AT LONDON ON A CERTAIN PATH, AND IF THERE'S SOMETHING THAT WE COULD DO THAT MIGHT FURTHER ENHANCE ECONOMIC RECOVERY WE'LL ALWAYS BE GLAD TO TAKE A LOOK.

Q SIR, WHERE DO YOU GO NOW FROM -- FROM NOW ON THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE? ARE YOU IN CONTACT WITH MR. BESSMERTNYKH? IS IT COMPLETELY OUT? WHAT DO YOU EXPECT NEXT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS TALKED TO MR. BESSMERTNYKH. AND LET ME JUST ASK HIM TO COMMENT IN A LITTLE MORE DETAIL HERE ON HOW HE SEES THAT DEVELOPING.

BUT I CAN TELL YOU WE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO SEE THIS PEACE CONFERENCE GO FORWARD. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE ENTIRE

עצמאות ופוליטיקה
~~entities~~

WORLD. AND THROUGH HARD WORK BY OUR SECRETARY OF STATE, AND WITH COOPERATION OF A LOT OF OTHER ENTITIES -- COUNTRIES AND ENTITIES -- THINGS HAVE MOVED FAR BEYOND WHERE MANY OF THE SEVEREST CYNICS THOUGHT IT WOULD BE. AND NOW WITH THIS TURMOIL IN THE SOVIET UNION HOPEFULLY BEHIND US AND WITH THE SOVIET UNION BEING IMPORTANT IN ALL OF THIS, I SEE NOTHING BUT AN IMPROVED CHANCE. BUT, JIM, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO COMMENT ON THE NEXT DETAILS, IF YOU WOULD.

SEC. BAKER: I DID HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK BY TELEPHONE WITH MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH WHEN I WAS IN BRUSSELS AND I BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE EVERY BIT AS COMMITTED TOWARD TRYING TO CREATE JOINTLY WITH US AND OTHERS AN ACTIVE AND VIABLE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS THEY WERE BEFORE. SOME OF YOU MAY HAVE SEEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE COUP WHERE CERTAIN SOURCES -- A VERY LIMITED NUMBER, AS THE PRESIDENT HAS POINTED OUT -- PRAISED THE FACT OF THE COUP. THOSE SOURCES HAVE SHOWN AN UNCANNY ABILITY IN THE PAST TO BACK LOSERS. AND THIS IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THAT. WE THINK, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE'S AN OPPORTUNITY HERE FOR A POSSIBILITY FOR PEACE. IT'S AN OPPORTUNITY THAT MAY NOT COME BY AGAIN FOR A LONG TIME. AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND THE SOURCES AND ENTITIES WOULD SUBSCRIBE TO THAT AND WOULD JOIN WITH US IN SEEKING TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q I HAVE A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER BESSMERTNYKH IS IN OR OUT RIGHT NOW. THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME DOUBT ABOUT WHAT HIS ROLE WAS, WHERE HE WAS DURING THE COURSE OF THE COUP ATTEMPT.

SEC. BAKER: WELL, HE WAS THE -- WHEN I SPOKE TO HIM YESTERDAY ON THE TELEPHONE, HE WAS THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE SOVIET UNION. AND PICKING UP ON WHAT THE PRESIDENT JUST SAID, THE DESIGNATION OF THEIR CABINET OFFICIALS IS REALLY A MATTER FOR THEM TO DETERMINE. HAVING SAID THAT, I THINK IT'S OUR VIEW THAT WHAT HAS HAPPENED MIGHT WELL PROVIDE US WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO PURSUE AN EXPANDED AGENDA WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- AN EXPANDED AGENDA CENTERED ON REFORM.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, ISN'T THERE SOME CONCERN -- I MEAN, THERE IS SOME CONFUSION OR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT BESSMERTNYKH'S ROLE WAS, FOR EXAMPLE. HE DISAPPEARED AND IT WAS SAID HE WAS GOING TO BE SICK FOR TWO DAYS.

PRESIDENT BUSH: THERE'S A LOT LESS CONFUSION THAN THERE WAS TWO DAYS AGO, ISN'T THERE?

Q BUT IT WAS ANNOUNCED HE WAS GOING TO BE SICK FOR TWO DAYS AND THEN HE SHOWED UP A DAY LATER ONCE THE COUP WAS OVER.

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, LET THEM SORT THAT OUT. DOES THAT COME UNDER THE DIRECT HEADING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA? HERE'S A MAN THAT WAS CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE PEACE PROCESS. HERE'S A MAN THAT WORKED SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO GET SOMETHING DONE. NOW LET THEM FIGURE OUT IF THAT'S WHO THEY WANT TO CONTINUE

THERE. BUT WE WILL DEAL WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE SOVIET UNION. AND IT'S NOT FOR US TO SECOND-GUESS WHAT HAPPENED IN A COMPLEX SITUATION. ALL I'M SAYING IS THINGS ARE AN AWFUL LOT BETTER TODAY THAN WHEN WE WERE STANDING HERE, WHAT WAS IT, 48 HOURS AGO.

Q DON'T YOU HAVE TO APPROACH THE SOVIET UNION, THOUGH, FOR AT LEAST A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME WITH A LITTLE MORE CAUTION? DON'T YOU HAVE TO FIGURE OUT WHO IT IS YOU'RE DEALING WITH AND TALKING TO?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I SAID THAT, I THINK, YES, JIM. BUT I DON'T THINK THAT MEANS THAT -- WHAT I WANT TO DO IS GIVE INSTANT SUPPORT FOR THE CHANGE THAT'S TAKEN PLACE AND ONE WAY TO DO IT IS TO LIFT THE ECONOMIC HOLD THAT WE'VE HAD ON A PROGRAM THAT I THINK WOULD BENEFIT THEIR RECOVERY. THAT, I'M PERFECTLY PREPARED, AND I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT TO GO FORWARD. BUT ABSOLUTELY. WE DON'T KNOW EXACTLY

HOW ALL THIS IS GOING TO SORT OUT AND WHO IS GOING TO BE ON FIRST OR WHO IS GOING TO BE ON SECOND WHEN IT COMES TO STAFFING THE BUREAUCRACY INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. BUT AGAIN, THAT DOESN'T EXACTLY COME UNDER THE HEADING OF OUR BUSINESS.

I WOULD BE A LITTLE RESENTFUL IF SOMEBODY TOLD ME WHO I OUGHT TO HAVE IN MY CABINET FROM MOSCOW, AND I THINK THEY'LL SORT THAT OUT. THERE'S GREAT PRESSURES NOW BETWEEN THE CENTER AND BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS AND THERE IS ALSO GREAT ACCOMODATION BETWEEN THE CENTER AND THE REPUBLICS, AND SO LET'S JUST SEE HOW IT WORKS OUT AND NOT TRY TO PUT THIS ON A PERSONAL BASIS AS TO WHO OUGHT TO BE WHERE. THAT'S THEIR BUSINESS.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, HASN'T GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL STATURE BEEN PERMANENTLY WEAKENED BY THIS AND CAN HE RULE NOW WITHOUT THE FEAR OF ANOTHER COUP FROM SOME DIRECTION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DON'T SEE THAT HIS STATURE HAS BEEN WEAKENED BY IT. HERE IS A MAN WHO STOOD BY HIS DESIRE FOR REFORM AND DEMOCRACY, AND HE WAS SEIZED AND PUT UNDER HOUSE ARREST AND TO SAY THAT THAT IS A WEAKENING PERFORMANCE, I DON'T KNOW. NOW IF YOU ASK ME HAS BORIS YELTSIN'S STATURE HAS BEEN ENHANCED, THE ANSWER IS CLEARLY YES. BUT THIS JUMPING ON GORBACHEV, WHO WAS TAKEN AND HELD UNDER HOUSE ARREST WITH HIS WIFE AND GRANDCHILD, I AM SIMPLY NOT GOING TO BE A PART OF THAT NOR A PART OF SECOND GUESSING ALL OF THAT.

THEY'VE GOT PROCEDURES THERE THAT THEY HAVE NOW PUT INTO EFFECT IN TERMS OF INVESTIGATING ALL OF THIS AND WHAT BUSINESS, WHAT POSSIBLE GOOD COULD COME FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRYING TO SORT ALL THAT OUT? LET THE SYSTEM SORT IT OUT. ALL I KNOW IS THAT HE WAS COMMITTED TO REFORM, HE HAD THE SUPPORT OF YELTSIN AND HE HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND EVERY OTHER LEADER AROUND THE WORLD EXCEPT IRAQ, CUBA AND LIBYA, AND THAT'S GOOD ENOUGH FOR ME. WE'RE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THAT ONE.

Q HE'LL STILL HAVE TO RULE WITH THE THREAT OF A COUP OVER HIS HEAD, ANOTHER COUP, POSSIBLY.

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL YOU MUST KNOW MORE ABOUT THIS THAN I DO. I JUST DON'T SEE THE THREAT OF ANOTHER COUP BUT THERE MIGHT BE ONE, I DON'T KNOW. BUT I'D LOVE TO KNOW WHAT ANY OBSERVER WOULD BASE THAT COMMENT ON RIGHT TODAY.

Q HOW CAN YOU GO FORWARD IN YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT CHOOSING BETWEEN MR. YELTSIN AND GORBACHEV?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE'VE DONE IT PRETTY WELL SO FAR, HAVEN'T WE?

Q WOULD IT BE NOBLE TO HAVE ANOTHER MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS ACCELERATING THE PACE OF REFORM?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WE'LL PROBABLY BE DISCUSSING MATTERS OF THE UNION -- SOVIET UNION MATTERS WITH HIM, NO QUESTION ABOUT IT, BUT WHETHER -- IS YOUR QUESTION A HEAD-ON-HEAD MEETING?

WELL, I DON'T KNOW.

THERE'S NO PLANS FOR SUCH A MEETING, AND I THINK THEY'VE GOT SOME MATTERS IN THE WAKE OF THIS, WHICH WE'VE BEEN FENCING AROUND ABOUT HERE, TO SORT OUT THEMSELVES. SO -- BUT I'M AVAILABLE. I -- LOOK, THIS RELATIONSHIP IS VERY, VERY IMPORTANT, AND ALL I CAN SAY IS, ISN'T THE WORLD AN AWFUL LOT BETTER OFF TODAY THAN IT WAS 48 HOURS AGO? AND THE ANSWER TO THAT ONE IS ABSOLUTELY YES.

NOW, I CAN UNDERSTAND YOU ALL WANTING TO GET OUT AHEAD OF THE POWER CURVE AND TRY TO HAVE ME COMMITTED AS TO WHO SHOULD BE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR OR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OVER THERE OR MINISTER OF WHATEVER IT IS, AND I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO THAT BUSINESS. WHAT I AM GOING TO DO IS SAY BOTH YELTSIN AND GORBACHEV ARE COMMITTED TO REFORM, TO DEMOCRACY, AND TO OPENNESS, AND THIS IS VERY GOOD. AND THERE'S SOME TENSIONS, THERE'S SOME DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE CENTER, BUT THEY'LL SORT THAT OUT. AND I THINK IT WILL BE SORTED OUT WITHOUT THE THREAT NOW OF ANOTHER RIGHT-WING TAKEOVER, BECAUSE -- AND THE REASON I SAY THAT, SOME SUGGESTING ANOTHER COUP HERE -- THE REASON I SAY THAT IS THE MESSAGE OF DEMOCRACY WAS SO CLEAR, THE STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE WAS SO CLEAR AND VISIBLE IN THIS ONE, THAT I THINK ANYBODY ATTEMPTING ANOTHER COUP FROM THE RIGHT WOULD HAVE TO BE OUT OF THEIR MINDS TO TAKE ON HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE WHO CLEARLY, IN SPITE OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, WANT TO SEE DEMOCRACY PREVAIL.

AND THAT'S WHAT IT WAS ABOUT, THAT'S WHAT THE MESSAGE WAS ABOUT, THAT'S WHAT THE SURVIVAL OF GORBACHEV WAS ABOUT, THAT'S WHAT THE STRENGTH OF YELTSIN WAS ABOUT IN DEMANDING THE RETURN OF GORBACHEV. AND I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THIS PROBABLY A LOT MORE CLEARLY THAN ANY PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD.

I'M GOING TO TAKE THIS LAST QUESTION AND THEN I'M SHUTTING THIS THING DOWN. I'M UP HERE ON A VACATION NOW, AND YOU'RE GOING TO SEE ME VACATING A LOT MORE. YOU'VE HAD ME IN HERE TOO MUCH LATELY, AND I APOLOGIZE FOR ABUSING YOUR HOSPITALITY.

Q YOU'VE OFTEN SAID THAT THE STABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION IS IN THE BEST NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILED COUP ATTEMPT, WON'T SOME OF THE REPUBLICS AND THE BALTICS STATES BE EMBOLDENED TO PERHAPS RISE UP AGAINST THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT? WON'T THAT CREATE STILL FURTHER INSTABILITY?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, AGAIN, I DON'T KNOW TO SAY "STILL FURTHER." IF YOU MEAN STILL FURTHER THAN A COUP WHERE YOU HAD TANKS ROLLING DOWN TOWARD THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT BUILDING, NO, I DON'T THINK SO. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT I SEE IS AN OPPORTUNITY, AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACCELERATE THE TALKS THAT WOULD LEAD TO INDEPENDENCE. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES IS CLEAR ON ALL OF THIS, AND THERE HAVE BEEN SOME REASONS, SOME OF WHICH HAVE NOW BEEN GOTTEN OUT OF THE WAY, THAT THIS PROCESS HAS GONE MUCH SLOWER THAN I WANT, I THINK SLOWER

THAN GORBACHEV MIGHT WANT, BUT CLEARLY SLOWER THAN YELTSIN WANTS. AND SO -- BUT I DON'T -- I HOPE WE'RE NOT LOOKING AT SOME, YOU KNOW, CONFRONTATION ON THIS. WHAT I HOPE WE'RE LOOKING AT IS MORE RAPID NEGOTIATIONS THAT LEAD TO THE FULL INDEPENDENCE THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE FOR THE BALTIC STATES.

Q SO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S SEEN THE LIGHT AS A RESULT OF THIS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK SOME OF THE PEOPLE THAT SAW THE DARKNESS ARE NO LONGER AROUND. AND I THINK THAT'S -- I WOULD HOPE THAT THAT'S THE CASE. BUT, AGAIN, I CAN'T ASSURE YOU OF THAT. I JUST -- WE JUST DON'T HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION ON THAT AT THIS POINT.

BUT CLEARLY SOME OF THEM -- THE HARDEST LINE OBSTRUCTIONIST ARE NO LONGER IN THE PICTURE. AND SO I'D SAY TO THE DEGREE ANY OF THAT UNDERBRUSH HAS BEEN REMOVED IT MAKES IT BETTER AND MAKES IT CLEARER THAT THE PEOPLE'S DRIVE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION CAN'T REALLY BE STOPPED.

SO, LET'S USE THE -- I HOPE THEY WILL USE NOW THE PROCESS OF ACCELERATED NEGOTIATION TO GET ON WITH THIS. THIS IS THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND IT'S NOT GOING TO CHANGE.

THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH. THANKS, WENDEL, THANKS.

END

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מזתים,
רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט), תפוצה

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 22665

אל: רהמש/1337

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 315, תא: 220891, זח: 1711, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: תדרוך לכתבים ע"י פקיד בכיר ממחלקת המדינה

תשומת לבכם להתייחסויות לגבי המזה"ת והפלסטינים. 3-2

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE/OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY/SPOKESMAN
BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
EN ROUTE BRUSSELS, BELGIUM TO ANDREWS AFB
AUGUST 21, 1991

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: THIS IS ON BACKGROUND, IF THAT'S ALL
RIGHT, AS AN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. I'LL JUST START BY ASKING FOR
QUESTIONS ON WHATEVER YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT.

Q WITH THE APPARENT FAILURE OF THE KGB, THE PARTY AND THE
MILITARY TO CARRY OUT THIS COUP, DO YOU SEE GORBACHEV AS BEING --
PRESUMING THAT HE IS FIRMLY BACK IN POWER -- DO YOU SEE HIM BEING
MORE FREE TO PURSUE REFORMS OR NOW? WOULD YOU ANALYZE THAT
SITUATION?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: AGAIN, YOU ARE GETTING INTO THE AREA OF A
HYPOTHETICAL. BUT, ACCEPTING THAT, LET ME SAY I WOULD THINK THERE
WOULD BE MORE LATITUDE FOR A MORE AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF THE REFORM
COURSE ON THE PART OF ALL OF THOSE IN THE SOVIET UNION WHO ARE
INTERESTED IN REFORM.

AND LET ME ALSO SAY ONE THING TO CLEAR UP SOMETHING I SAID AT
THE PRESS CONFERENCE. I THINK SAUL ASKED ME, "HOW HAVE YOU HELPED,
WHAT HAVE YOU DONE TO ASSIST THE PROCESS?" AND I SAID THAT AT ONE
POINT WE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN
ATTEMPT WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS

AND WAS, IN FACT, CONDUCTED THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL -- THROUGH THE PROCESSES OF THE SUPREME SOVIET. WE RECEIVED THAT INFORMATION FROM REFORM SOURCES IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND WE NOTIFIED THOSE WITHIN THE CENTER THAT WE THOUGHT WERE INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING A REFORM COURSE, AND YOU CAN SPECULATE ABOUT WHO THOSE PEOPLE WERE THAT WE NOTIFIED. AND SO THAT'S THE KIND OF THING I WAS TALKING ABOUT THAT I DID NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE SAYING THERE, AND I DON'T FEEL COMFORTABLE GOING ANY FURTHER WITH IT HERE EXCEPT TO LET YOU KNOW THAT ON BACKGROUND.

Q IS THAT EXCLUSIVE OF THE -- (INAUDIBLE) -- THAT WE ALREADY KNOW ABOUT? IS THIS AN ADDITIONAL ONE? THERE WAS ONE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTEMPT THAT THEY REFERRED TO.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: THIS IS THE ONE THAT -- I'M REFERRING TO THE ONE OF ROUGHLY JUNE 18 OR SOMETIME IN THAT TIMEFRAME. INFORMATION WAS BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTION BY PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION INTERESTED IN REFORM, AND WE WERE IN A POSITION TO NOTIFY THOSE IN THE CENTER WHO WERE MORE REFORM-MINDED THAN SOME OF THE OTHERS, MANY OF WHOM ENDED UP ON THIS COMMITTEE OF THE EMERGENCY.

Q I WOULD LIKE TO ASK ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST PROCESS, THE REACTION OF THE PALESTINIANS TO THIS. THEY SEEM TO HAVE BET ON THE WRONG HORSE AGAIN. ALSO, THE JORDANIANS. I THINK THE JORDANIAN INFORMATION MINISTER KIND OF WELCOMED THIS PUSCH. JUST TELL US HOW YOU THINK THE PLAYERS WILL BE AFFECTED, WHAT THIS IS GOING TO DO TO THE PALESTINIAN POSITION?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, LET ME SAY, LET ME REPEAT WHAT I SAID EARLIER, AND THAT IS THAT NOTWITHSTANDING WHAT THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE BEEN OR PERHAPS EVEN MIGHT BE, BECAUSE WE DON'T KNOW YET EXACTLY HOW THAT'S GOING TO SORT OUT, ALTHOUGH I THINK THEY WILL BE EVERY BIT AS COMMITTED TO MOVING FORWARD AS THEY WERE BEFORE -- WE WOULD HAVE REMAINED AS FIRMLY COMMITTEED, AND I THINK THAT THE DECISIONS TO -- HAD BEEN TAKEN TO DATE BY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WERE TAKEN IN THEIR INTERESTS. I MEAN, THEY TOOK THOSE DECISIONS BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT IT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST -- NOT BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION WAS NECESSARILY INVOLVED IN THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE POSSIBLE CONFERENCE.

I SAW THE PLO REACTION, AND THEY HAVE DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES ONCE AGAIN BY JOINING THE CLASSY COMPANY OF IRAQ AND LIBYA AS THE ONLY SOURCES THAT WELCOMED WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SOVIET UNION. NOW, THAT CAME FROM ONE PARTICULAR SOURCE IN THE PLO, AS BEST I CAN DETERMINE, AND THAT WAS KADDOUMI, FAROUK KADDOUMI, WHO IS THE FOREIGN MINISTER -- THE SO-CALLED FOREIGN MINISTER -- OF THE PLO WHO IS QUITE A HARDLINER, AND YOU MIGHT EXPECT, I THINK, THIS KIND OF REACTION FROM HIM. BUT THAT'S THE ONLY THING -- I MEAN WHEN I ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, THAT'S THE ONLY REACTION THAT I'M AWARE OF MYSELF.

THE JORDANIAN REACTION, I DON'T THINK THERE WAS A REACTION BY

THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN. IT WAS A REACTION -- A QUICK REACTION -- BY THE INFORMATION MINISTER AT A TIME WHEN THE KING AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN WERE OUT OF THE COUNTRY. SO I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU CAN SAY WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN. I'M NOT SURE HE WAS.

Q WHERE DO YOU THINK THE PALESTINIANS ARE NOW? ARE THEY GOING TO BE UNDER MORE PRESSURE? I KNOW YOU WON'T LIKE THAT WORD, BUT WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THEM IN TERMS OF GOING TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND TRYING TO HOLD OUT FOR CONDITIONS AND SO FORTH?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, IF THEY'RE -- IF THINGS SORT THEMSELVES OUT IN A VERY POSITIVE WAY IN THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEXT DAYS AND WEEKS, I THINK YOU WOULD MAKE IT -- IT SHOULD MAKE IT -- IT SHOULD IMPROVE THE CHANCES THAT PALESTINIANS -- AND NOW I'M NOT SPEAKING ABOUT THE PLO -- THAT PALESTINIANS MIGHT FIND A WAY TO PROVE ABA EBAN WRONG -- AND YOU KNOW WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT WHEN I SAY THAT.

Q DOES IT SET BACK AT ALL THE OCTOBER TIME SCHEDULE IN YOUR MIND?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I DON'T KNOW, BOB, BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW AGAIN WHEN WE'RE GOING TO SEE A FINAL SORTING OUT IN MOSCOW AND WHEN WE CAN RESUME OUR EFFORTS. NOW I HAD HOPED, AS YOU KNOW, THAT WE COULD RESUME THOSE EFFORTS AFTER THE BREAK. WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO THAT, WE MAY NOT. HAVING TALKED NOW TO BESSMERTNYKH, IF YOU MAKE SOME ASSUMPTIONS HERE THAT HE IS GOING TO CONTINUE TO BE THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THAT THE CENTER AND THE REPUBLICS EVERYTHING IS SORTED OUT AND IS COPACETIC BETWEEN THEM AND THE UNION IS STILL INTERESTED IN PURSUING THIS PROCESS WITH US, THEN MAYBE WE CAN STICK TO THAT SCHEDULE. BUT WE DON'T KNOW YET.

Q I NOTICED AT THE NEWS CONFERENCE, AFTER YOU SPOKE OF THE CHALLENGE TO GORBACHEV, WHICH YOU JUST REFERRED TO AGAIN, YOU SPOKE IN THE PLURAL OF PRIOR ATTEMPTS, AND YOU SAID YOU DIDN'T WANT TO DISCUSS IT AT THE NEWS CONFERENCE. YOU LEFT ME WITH THE IMPRESSION THERE WAS MORE THAN THAT ONE SOMEWHAT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE. DID I MISUNDERSTAND THAT?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I DON'T WANT TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WAS AN EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE, BUT I THINK THERE WERE OTHER CHALLENGES THAT WOULD PROBABLY BE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS CONSTITUTIONAL GOING BACK TO DECEMBER, FOR INSTANCE.

Q AND YOU DON'T WANT TO DISCUSS THEM NOW HERE? THEN LET ME ASK YOU SOMETHING ELSE, SAVING MY QUESTION. NOW THE NAME GORBACHEV DOESN'T COME UP. YOU HAD TO REFER, AS THE PRESIDENT DID, TO GORBACHEV, AFTER ALL, HE WAS THE AUTHORITY TO BE RESTORED. NOW THAT THE COUP IS GONE, ARE YOU ABOUT TO BROADEN YOUR NET AND THINK MORE IN TERMS OF OTHER PEOPLE LIKE YELTSIN? WILL WE BEGIN TO SEE FEWER REFERENCES TO GORBACHEV AS NECESSARILY THE HORSE YOU'D LIKE TO BET

ON?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I DON'T THINK IT'S A CASE OF BETTING ON ONE HORSE TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHERS. AGAIN, IN ANSWER TO SAUL'S QUESTION, I MADE THE POINT THAT I THINK IS A VERY VALID POINT, THAT ONE WAY WE HAVE SUPPORTED REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST SIX MONTHS IS TO BROADEN OUR CONTACTS, AND THIS WAS THE FOURTH MEETING, FOR INSTANCE, FOURTH, THAT I HAVE HAD WITH THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC'S FOREIGN MINISTER. SO I DON'T THINK IT'S AN EITHER/OR. I NEVER HAVE FELT IT WAS AN EITHER/OR SITUATION. I DON'T THINK IT IS NOW, AND I THINK THAT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WILL REMAIN THAT WE WILL SUPPORT REFORMERS IN THE SOVIET UNION WHEREVER WE FIND THEM -- AT THE CENTER, AT THE REPUBLIC, AND AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.

Q DID BESSMERTNYKH GIVE YOU ANY PARTICULAR INSIGHT INTO HOW THE COUP OCCURRED, AND HOW IT WAS ABLE TO COME ABOUT AND WHY IT FAILED?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I DIDN'T REALLY ASK HIM. I DIDN'T GET INTO THAT WITH HIM.

Q DID HE TELL YOU ANYTHING ABOUT GORBACHEV'S HEALTH?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: HE'S FINE. LET ME SAY THIS. I SAY IT'S FINE. I THINK WE ASSUME IT'S FINE BASED ON HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. AND IT DOESN'T COME FROM WHAT BESSMERTNYKH MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT HAVE SAID.

Q FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, IN HIS REMARKS WHILE STANDING NEXT TO YOU WARNED AGAINST EUPHORIA, AND SAID THERE WAS EVEN THE RISK OF THE REACTIONARIES MAKING ANOTHER ATTEMPT TONIGHT. COULD YOU ELABORATE ON THAT? DID HE TELL YOU ANY MORE ABOUT THAT, AND WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ON IT?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I WOULD REFER YOU TO WHAT I SAID IN MY OPENING REMARKS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE, WHERE I SAID SUPPORTERS OF DEMOCRACY -- ONE LESSON IN THIS IS -- SUPPORTERS OF DEMOCRACY SHOULD REMAIN EVER VIGILANT. I THINK THAT'S TRUE, AND I THINK THAT WAS A CAUTION THAT HE WAS EXPRESSING.

Q IS THERE A DANGER THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT DELEGITIMIZE GORBACHEV BY BACKING HIM TO THE HILT, AND THEREFORE HE WOULD LOOK LIKE HE DEPENDS ON THE UNITED STATES?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WE HOPE THAT WE CAN BE HELPFUL AND INFLUENTIAL IN SUPPORTING REFORMERS. SO THE REAL ISSUE IS, DO YOU THINK, IF YOU WANT TO PUT IT THAT WAY, DO YOU THINK HE'S A REFORMER OR NOT? I AGAIN WOULD POINT OUT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, WHAT'S HAPPENED WITH THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY, WHAT'S HAPPENED IN TERMS OF POLITICAL PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN TH

SOVIET UNION, WHAT'S HAPPENED IN THE GULF. AND WE DO NOT SUPPORT THIS REFORMER TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER REFORMERS. SOMEONE ASKED EARLIER, AND I THINK IT WAS A VERY GOOD QUESTION, MIGHT HE AND OTHER REFORMERS NOW HAVE MORE LATITUDE. HOPEFULLY, THAT WILL BE THE CASE. HOPEFULLY. WE DON'T KNOW THAT. AND I THINK WE MUST CONTINUE TO BE VIGILANT BECAUSE THE FORCES OF DARKNESS MAY TRY THIS AGAIN. WHO KNOWS? AND IF THEY GOT CONTROL OF SOME OF THE INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT, THEY MIGHT BE MUCH MORE RUTHLESS IN THEIR APPROACH THAN WAS THE CASE THIS TIME.

Q CONCERNING AID TO EASTERN EUROPE, A COUPLE OF THINGS. CAN YOU PROVIDE ANY MORE DETAIL ON THAT PIPELINE? HOW FAR ALONG IS IT, FOR EXAMPLE, AND ARE THERE ANY OTHER SIMILAR BIG PROJECTS LIKE THAT THAT ARE BEING CONTEMPLATED THAT WOULD LESSEN THE DEPENDENCE OF THOSE COUNTRIES ON THE SOVIET UNION?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, WE'VE DONE WHAT I THINK IS A VERY, VERY GOOD JOB OF -- AND I DON'T MEAN JUST THE UNITED STATES -- I'M TALKING ABOUT THE FREE WORLD, THE WEST -- HAS DONE A GOOD JOB OF GENERATING SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND POLAND. I THINK THE NUMBER IS SOMEWHERE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF DOLLAR 15 BILLION THROUGH THE G-24 PROCESS.

THIS ISSUE REALLY CAME UP IN MY MEETING WITH DIENSTBIER YESTERDAY WHEN HE SAID, "LOOK, NOW THAT THIS HAS HAPPENED IN THE SOVIET UNION, PERHAPS WE CAN LOOK AT THIS PARTICULAR PROJECT AS SOMETHING MORE THAN JUST ANOTHER ECONOMIC PROJECT FOR THE G-24 TO SUPPORT." IT IS A STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL ISSUE BECAUSE WITH ONE FELL SWOOP THEY CAN CUT US OFF, AND WE THOUGHT -- SO I THOUGHT IT WAS AT LEAST WORTH MENTIONING IN TERMS OF TRYING TO GENERATE SOME INTEREST IN THAT ON THE PART OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THEN OVER INTO THE G-24.

Q JUST TO FOLLOW-UP DO YOU ENVISION OTHER BIG PUBLIC WORKS TYPE PROJECTS LIKE THAT?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I DON'T KNOW. WE'VE SAID MANY TIMES HOW IMPORTANT WE THINK IT IS THAT THE REFORMING DEMOCRACIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE SUCCEED. WE'VE PUT A MAJOR EFFORT INTO THE G-24 PROCESS, AND I THINK WE WOULD WANT TO SUPPORT, TO THE EXTENT OF OUR ABILITY TO DO SO, OTHER PROJECTS LIKE THAT.

NOW SO FAR THERE HASN'T BEEN A DIME COMMITTED TO THIS, AND WITH THE END OF THE COUP, I DON'T KNOW, MAYBE PEOPLE WILL SAY, 'WELL, IT'S JUST GOT TO GET IN LINE BEHIND ALL THE OTHER G-24 ECONOMIC PROJECTS.'

Q EVEN THOUGH THE COUP HAS FAILED, ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT YOU ARE GOING TO BE DEALING NOW WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT IS EVEN MORE INWARD LOOKING THAN IT HAS BEEN OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF YEARS, AND LESS ABLE TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH YOU ON ISSUES

LIKE CAMBODIA, AFGHANISTAN, EVEN THE MIDDLE EAST?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WARREN, IT SHOULD WORK -- LET'S ASSUME -- YOU SAID THE COUP HAS FAILED, I HAVEN'T SAID THAT YET, AND I QUOTED THE PRESIDENT WHO SAID IT HAS BEEN A GOOD DAY FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY AND HE SAID IT'S NOT OUR PLACE TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE COUP HAS FAILED, AND IT ISN'T -- BUT IT SHOULD WORK THE OTHER WAY. IT REALLY SHOULD GIVE MORE LATITUDE FOR COOPERATION, CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION, ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION ASSUMING THAT THEY SORT OUT PROPERLY AND PROMPTLY THE DIFFERENCES WITH RESPECT TO EXACTLY WHERE POWER LIES BETWEEN CENTER, REPUBLIC AND LOCAL.

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY CONTINUE THAT PROCESS THAT THEY HAVE STARTED BECAUSE JUST LOOKING AT IS FROM AN ECONOMIC STANDPOINT, FOR INSTANCE, NOBODY CAN KNOW WHERE TO INVEST AND HOW TO INVEST AND WHETHER TO INVEST UNTIL THEY KNOW WHERE ECONOMIC POWER LIES. AND THE SAME THING IS TRUE, I THINK, IN TERMS OF MAKING SURE THEY SORT OUT THE QUESTION MARKS WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

END

עד כאן

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, גוברין, מזאר, סולטן, @ (נוה/משהבט), @ (דוצ)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 17964

אל: רהמש/992

מ-: המשרד, תא: 190891, זח: 1405, דח: ר, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ'ס/רגיל

10602

אל: ר' יחידת קישור לקונגרס, וושינגטון

דע: קונכ'ל יוסטון

הנדון: ביקור סנטור ג'ונסטון 12-18 דנא

1. הסנטור ג'ונסטון בלווית רעייתו, בנו, שני עוזרים ושני פעילים יהודים - מרשל ברכמן וברוס פיינגרץ סיים ביקור שני בארץ מאז 1974.

2. הפגישות עם ס'שה'ח ורה'מ התנהלו בצילן של ההתפתחויות בנושא שחרור בני הערובה בלבנון ולפיכך תפסו חלק מרכזי בשיחות. ס'שה'ח תיאר בהרחבה את הרקע לחטיפת בני הערובה, מבצעי החטיפה ונותני החסות להם. ס'שה'ח הדגיש את חוסר ההבנה הבסיסי של כלי התקשורת המערביים בדיווחים על ההתפתחויות הנוכחיות.

רה'מ התמקד בדבריו על התהליך המדיני תוך שהוא מדגיש הצורך ומחויבות ישראל למו'מ. בשתי הפגישות הללו איזכר הסנטור יוזמת חקיקה שלו שנועדה לצמצם את תלותה של ארה'ב ביבוא דלק שעל מתנגדיה נמנים כמה מידידים מובהקים של ישראל בסנאט. עוד נזכרו בשיחות קליטת יהודי ברה'מ והערבויות הנחוצות לכך. בהקשר זה אמר הסנטור כי יתמוך במתן הערבויות המבוקשות בסך 10 ביליון דולר כשם שעשה זאת בעבר לגבי ה-400 מיליון דולר. בשיחה עמי הדגיש הסנטור שלהערכתו הקונגרס יאשר הערבויות בלי כל התניות והגבלות אלא אם הממשל ביוזמתו ('אם בייקר יתעקש על כך') יזום הטלת הגבלות כאלו. במקרה כזה הבהיר הסנטור הוא יתנגד לכך משום שלדעתו מהלך כזה יפלה את אחד הצדדים למו'מ שבוא ארה'ב אמורה לשמש מתווך הוגן. עוזרי הסנטור ובנו ביקרו במרכז קליטה והתרשמו מהמאמץ הרב המושקע בקליטת יהודי ברה'מ ואתיופיה. בשיחות עם רה'מ, ס'שה'ח ובמיוחד בתדרוך אמ'ן נסקרו בהרחבה ההתפתחויות האזוריות שלאחר מלחמת המפרץ.

3. האורח התוודע לבעיות הבטחון של ישראל וצרכי הרכש והפיתוח במהלך סיור בבסיס ח'א, סיור אווירי בשמי הארץ, סיור בגולן, פגישות עם מפקד ח'א, מתאם הפעולה בשטחים, ראש המינהל האזרחי ביהודה ובשומרון, ראש מפא'ת וסיור של עוזריו במספנות ישראל ושיט על השלדג. פירוט הפגישות עם ח'כ פרס ושהב'ט בנפרד.

אאא, חוזם: 28303
אל: רהמש/1684
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 386, תא: 280891, זח: 1626, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמס/מידי

אל: סולטן.

דע: מצפ'א, בן אהרון.

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון.

ראו הטקסט להלן:

ISRAEL: PARTICIPATION IN WATER CONFERENCE

Q: WILL THE UNITED STATE PARTICIPATE IN THE WATER CONFERENCE HOSTED
BY TURKY IF ISRAEL IS NOT INVITED?

A: WE BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SOULD BE INVITED AS A FULL
PARTICIPANT IN THIS CONFERENCE, AND THIS ISSUE WILL BE A FACTOR IN
OUR OWN PARTICIPATION.

שילה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), סולטן, מזתים, סייבל,
משפט, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה, ר/מרכז,
ממד, @ (רם), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 17575

אל: רהמש/966

מ-: המשרד, תא: 190891, זח: 0941, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבבב

שמור/מיד

אל: יצחק אורן / לשכת רוה'מ

הנדון: פגישת רוה'מ עם מנהיגי מיעוטים מטעם J.C.R.C.

1. מאשרת בתודה פגישת רוה'מ עם המשלחת ביום א' 25/8 בשעה 17:15 .

2. להלן מספר מילות רקע לבקשתך על המשלחת :-

מדובר על משלחת מנהיגי מיעוטים מניו-יורק המאורגנת ע"י J.C.R.C. ניו-יורק. המשלחת כוללת בין היתר את CONGRESSWOMAN MOLINARI שהיא איטלקיה, וכן מנהיגי מיעוטים סינים, קוריאנים, שחורים, אירים, פורטוריקנים וכמובן איטלקים. אלו אנשים שלא היו מעודם בארץ, בעלי השפעה רבה בפוליטיקה הפנימית באיזוריהם והגיעו לעמדות מפתח בעיקר באמצעי התקשורת ובעיריה.

מקווה שהמידע הנ"ל מסייע .

בברכה .

יעל רובינשטיין - מצפ"א

19 באוגוסט 1991

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), מצפא, מאור

סססס

25.8

ק/ה

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JERUSALEM



מחלקת
העניינים
הביטחוניים

(5)

משרד החוץ
ירושלים

מצפ"א
3244 טר'

חשן"א י"ז באב
1991 28 ביולי
10602

81967

אל : לשכת רוה"מ לירי יצחק אורן
מס' פקס : 385491

מאת : מצפ"א

הנדון : ביקור JCRC - "י"

בתאריכים 19-25 באוגוסט, חגיע לארץ משלחת של מנהיגים בכירים
ובולטים של קבוצות מיעוטים מארה"ב מטעם ה-JCRC.
המשלחת מונה כ-23 איש.

המשלחת מעוניינת במהלך ביקורה, להפגש עם שרים, ח"כים ואנשי מפתח
בנושאי בטחון, עליה וקליטה וחברה.

מעוניינים לקיים פגישה עם רוה"מ ביום ה' 22/8 בשעה 09:30.

לצורך תיאום, המטפלות בביקור מטעם משה"ח / מצפ"א :

- יעל רובינשטיין - 02-303664

- אלונה קם - 02-303564

רצ"ב רשימה של חברי הקבוצה, תפקידם ומעמדם.

בברכה,

אלונה קם
אלונה קם

לשכת מנכ"ל

TO: LAMDAN, RUBENSTEIN
FROM: B. EHRENBURG

2 2 2035
9 3 1104

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PARTICIPANTS ON THE JCRC MISSION TO ISRAEL FOR AUGUST 18TH. AS DISCUSSED, THEY WILL ARRIVE ON AUGUST 19TH, EL AL #002, AT 8:35 AM. THEY ARE BOOKED TO LEAVE BEN GURION ON AUGUST 25 AT 9:00 AM BUT ARE WAIT-LISTED FOR THE #001 OF THE 16TH. SINCE THIS EXTRA SUNDAY MAKES A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFERENCE IN THE AMOUNT OF MEETINGS OR SIGHTS TO BE COVERED, I HAD ALREADY MENTIONED TO RUTH HALPERN TO TRY TO MOVE THE GROUP TO THE #001. KINDLY FOLLOW THIS UP WITH RUTH SO YOU CAN SCHEDULE FOR SUNDAY AS WELL. THANK YOU.

- 1) FRED CERULLO - REPUBLICAN MINORITY LEADER ON THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL. THIS POSITION WAS HELD BY SUSAN MOLINARI BEFORE SHE BECAME CONGRESSWOMAN. AN IMPORTANT POST, VERY VISIBLE. HE IS ALSO YOUNG AND ALSO A MEDIA PERSONALITY (TELEVISION) AND HAS RECENTLY ATTRACTED A LOT OF ATTENTION. HE OUGHT TO BE CULTIVATED AS HE IS POPULAR.
- 2) PHILLIP CHANG - PRESIDENT, SINOVISION, AN INFLUENTIAL CHINESE TELEVISION STATION.
- 3) MARY NAN HIGGINS - WIFE OF PHILLIP CHANG
- 4) CHARLES J. HYNES - DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BROOKLYN. HE WILL RUN FOR MAYOR OF NYC. WELL-RESPECTED, HE HAS BEEN PARTICIPATING IN JEWISH EVENTS SUCH AS YOM HASHOA, THE ISRAEL DAY PARADE, BEING VISIBLE IN THE COMMUNITY. THOUGHTFUL AND INFLUENTIAL.
- 5) PATRICIA HYNES - WIFE OF CHARLES HYNES
- 6) ROBERT JOHNSON - BRONX DISTRICT ATTORNEY. BLACK, IMPORTANT IN BRONX POLITICS.
- 7) DIANE RENWICK - WIFE OF ROBERT JOHNSON
- 8) BILL LYNCH - DEPUTY MAYOR OF NEW YORK. INFLUENTIAL, SHARP POLITICIAN, RAN MANDELA EVENTS IN NEW YORK, WILL BE KEY IN DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION TO BE HELD IN NEW YORK BEFORE '92 ELECTIONS. SAID YES BUT MAY NOT COME IF CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN SEPTEMBER-AWAITING CONFIRMATION.
- 9) SUSAN MOLINARI - CONGRESSWOMAN, STATEN ISLAND. DAUGHTER OF FORMER CONGRESSMAN WHO IS NOW STATEN ISLAND BORO PRESIDENT. REPUBLICAN, PRO-CHOICE. VERY OUTSPOKEN IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL, VERY POPULAR. WILL HAVE A LONG LIFE IN POLITICS.
- 10) ROBERTO RAMIREZ - STATE ASSEMBLYMAN - UPCOMING RISING STAR. REPRESENTS DISTRICT IN BRONX (THAT OF IZZY MILLER)- VERY BRIGHT.
- 11) REV. PATRICIA REEBERG - BLACK, BAPTIST MINISTER, VERY BRIGHT. HEADS UP IMPORTANT PROTESTANT CHURCH COUNCIL. SHE IS INCLINED POSITIVELY TOWARDS US AND NEEDS TO INFLUENCE OTHERS IN HER GROUP WHO ARE LESS SO.
- 12) ANTONIO RIVERA - DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, CITY COUNCIL. VERY POSITIVE, HAS WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH US. -VERY SUPPORTIVE LEADER, ORGANIZER FOR HISPANIC LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY CLERGY WHO ARE KEY AND INFLUENTIAL IN THEIR COMMUNITY.
- 13) ANGELA RIVERA - WIFE OF ANTONIO RIVERA
- 14) STEVEN VILLANO - DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR GOVERNOR CUOMO.
- 15) SANG CHAN NAM - PUBLISHER, KOREA CENTRAL DAILY WHICH IS OWNED BY SAMSUNG. WIDELY READ PUBLICATION.
- 16) PII-SOOK NAM - WIFE OF SANG CHAN NAM

2/

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43
3 2035 1104

- ** 17) DENNIS RIVERA - STILL UNCONFIRMED. PRESIDENT OF UNION LOCAL 1199 - MOSTLY BLACK HOSPITAL WORKERS - NOT POSITIVE BUT INFLUENTIAL. WAITING TO HEAR.
- 18) HARVEY NEWMAN - EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC POLICY FOR UJA-FEDERATION, N.Y.
- 19) MICHAEL MILLER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, JCRC
- 20) PHYLLIS MILLER, WIFE OF MICHAEL
- 21) YONATAN MILLER, SON
- 22) DAVID POLLACK, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, JCRC
- 23) SHARRY POLLACK, WIFE OF DAVID POLLACK

NOTE- MICHAEL MILLER AND FAMILY WILL BE ARRIVING ON AUGUST 11TH OR 12TH

KOL TUV. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN TOUCH.

אאא, חוזם: 17575

אל: רהמש/966

מ-: המשרד, תא: 190891, זח: 0941, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מיד

אל: יצחק אורן / לשכת רוה'מ

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מקווה שהמידע הנ"ל מסייע .

זרכה .

יעל רובינשטיין - מצפ"א

19 באוגוסט 1991

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), מצפא, מאור

סססס