

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד ראש הממשלה

המשק ביתי מט' ז

משרד

לשכת ראש הממשלה - אר"ז

5/1985

המשק ביתי מט' ז



שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס - אר

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מחלקה

מס' תיק מקורי

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אל: הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לשי רוח"מ, דובר צה"ל. דע: ניו-יורק. רמ"ח, קשי"ח

NEWS SUMMARY - THURSDAY - MAY 30, 1985

COLUMNS

***WASH. POST-Joseph Kraft-"Mideast Stalemate" The absence of Israel from the scene provides the master clue to the latest outbreak of violence in Lebanon. The fighting pits a group of Arabs who want to come to terms with Israel against several groups of Arabs, including Syria, who don't. It is literally a war against peace. The continuing struggle shows that despite the favorable elements stressed by Hussein at the White House, the political climate in the Middle East remains unripe for an Arab-Israeli accord. The Syrians turned their proxy forces against the Shiites to block any coming to terms along the Lebanese-Israeli border. For the Shiites seek accommodation with the Israelis along the frontier. The stalemate puts the next step up to Arafat. He can bow to the pressures and go for 242 and 338. Until Arafat says so publicly, the US is well advised in maintaining the present resistance to dealing with senior PLO officials.

***CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Robert Kupperman-"David's Retreat" Terrorists around the globe won a stunning victory when Israel exchanged prisoners. The principle that Israel always held inviolate was its refusal to negotiate with terrorists. It now seems inconceivable, after so much has been lost in the fight against terrorism, that Israel has simply abandoned the struggle. The sad fact is that in saving the lives of 3 Israeli soldiers, many more lives are now at risk. No matter what individuals believe about the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are all worse off by this exchange. No nation can capitulate to terrorist demands with impunity. Terrorism is political extortion. By giving into terrorists, governments participate unwittingly in their own downfall. Where has David gone? Has he given up being the West's role model, having once stood firm at terrorism's battlefield? When Israel falters so badly, can the rest of us be far behind? The human price of standing firm is high. But if we choose not to stem the tide we will have sent out a signal of defeat.

THE SUN-Arye Naor-"Dangerous Bargain" The prisoner exchange reflects another price Israel has paid for Sharon's bad war in Lebanon. The exchange suggests 2 possible dangers: The first is the risk that Arab states will underestimate the strength of Israeli society or overestimate the price Israel may be willing to pay in any future prisoner exchanges. Although, Peres and his govt. had to make the exchange. Every govt. has assured the conscript Army that Israel will do everything in its power to secure the release of all Israeli soldiers held captive. Moreover, the notion that such action is important lies deep in the teachings and values of Judaism. All this was impulse enough for a prisoner exchange, no matter what the price.

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THE PRESS REPORTS

Hussein Says PLO Is Prepared To Talk

WASH. POST-Goshko-Hussein told Reagan yesterday that the PLO is prepared to negotiate with Israel on terms that recognize its right to exist. Administration officials indicated that the US might end its objections to his call for new peace talks under the "umbrella" of an international conference including the Soviet Union. Hussein said he had the approval of the PLO for his announcement, including an endorsement from the PLO's Central Council yesterday in Tunis. (This article was cabled in full today.)

Israeli Units Left In Lebanon Await Last Stage Of Pullout

WASH. POST-Walsh-Israeli withdrawal is expected to come by this weekend, and perhaps as early as Thursday night, and will be noted by a simple announcement from the govt. in Jerusalem. When the last units cross the border into Israel, it will mark the start of a new era in Israel's relations with Lebanon. At the outset at least, it will be an era much like the four years that preceded the invasion, when the Israelis relied on surrogate Lebanese militia forces backed by Israeli supplies, financing and advisers to control the strip of land along the border that now falls within an enlarged security zone.

Israel Frees 249 Shiites

WASH. POST-(Reuters)-Israel freed 249 Shiite Moslem guerrillas today and allowed them to return to their homes in southern Lebanon. The detainees were bused into Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon before heading for their villages. The release coincided with Peres' statement that Israeli troops would complete their withdrawal from Lebanon next week.

War Games Foretold Israeli Failure

***WASH. TIMES-(Wires)-The Israeli army held war games three months before it invaded Lebanon and concluded that it could not crush the PLO. But Aryeh Naor said the predictions were not brought to the government's attention before the invasion was launched. Mr. Naor said the military exercise in March 1982 indicated that even if the army reached its destination in Lebanon within 96 hours, "the aims of the war would still not be achieved. According to his study there was no point in the military process as it was undertaken."

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Hussein Says PLO Is Prepared to Talk

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

King Hussein of Jordan, using language that U.S. officials said could open the way for the United States to talk to the Palestine Liberation Organization, told President Reagan yesterday that the PLO is prepared to negotiate with Israel on terms that recognize its right to exist.

In an important concession to Hussein, administration officials indicated that the United States might end its objections to his call for new peace talks under the "umbrella" of an international conference including the Soviet Union. Until now, the U.S. position has been that Soviet participation would not be helpful.

Hussein said he had the approval of the PLO for his announcement, including an endorsement from the PLO's Central Council yesterday in Tunis.

He called for peace negotiations between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which assure Israel's right to exist within secure boundaries. The PLO has previously balked at accepting the resolutions or making an explicit acceptance of Israel's right to exist.

It was not immediately clear whether Hussein's commitment on behalf of the PLO would lead to a breakthrough in the long-stymied effort to launch Arab-Israeli talks. The United States refuses to deal

with the PLO until it accepts the U.N. resolutions, acknowledges Israel's right to exist and renounces the use of terrorism.

Reagan publicly reserved judgment on Hussein's proposal, which the king made as the two held an impromptu news conference on the White House south lawn.

"We have made it very plain that nothing has changed those conditions under which we would meet with the PLO," Reagan said. And a senior U.S. official, who spoke with reporters later, stressed that the PLO would have to affirm explicitly the commitment made by Hussein on its behalf.

But U.S. officials regarded Hussein's comments as a potentially significant development. The senior official told reporters, "I think you have heard a significant statement which was fully coordinated by the PLO leadership." Another U.S. official added, "What the king said moves the PLO pretty far along toward the conditions long set by the United States."

The officials cited as particularly encouraging the fact that Hussein had discussed the situation with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat before coming here. Those discussions had led to the meeting of the PLO Central Council, which endorsed a joint peace effort with Jordan calling for the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip to become a Palestinian state in confederation with Jordan.

However, the first fragmentary reports from Tunis indicated that the council might have attached some potentially troublesome qualifications, including a demand that the confederation be preceded by creation of an independent Palestinian state—a concept unacceptable to Israel and opposed by the United States. In addition, the PLO has a long history of making statements that seem to imply a recognition of Israel and then backing away from them.

The 71-member Central Council oversees policies of the PLO between the infrequent meetings of the Palestine National Council, which serves as the organization's parliament.

After the three-day meeting, which was boycotted by Syrian-backed PLO rebels, PLO spokesman Ahmed Abdul Rahman said the Central Council insisted that any Palestinians who meet with the United States in a joint delegation with Jordan "should be PLO representatives." He did not elaborate.

Until yesterday, U.S. soundings—including a trip to the Middle East by Secretary of State George P. Shultz earlier this month—had indicated that many obstacles remained in the way of naming a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation able to meet the American conditions and make possible later direct talks with Israel.

On Tuesday, the same senior official who yesterday characterized Hussein's remarks as "a significant statement," had cautioned report-

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ers "not to look for dramatic occurrences in the next 48 hours."

U.S. officials, speaking on condition they not be identified, said that assessment began to change when Shultz talked with Hussein at length Tuesday night and was informed of the king's recent talks with Arafat. They added that Hussein's elaboration in the White House meetings yesterday, including his stress on the PLO council action in Tunisia, had fueled optimism about a possible breakthrough.

In fact, the seemingly impromptu news conference following the Reagan-Hussein meeting was orchestrated by White House officials. They told reporters that the two leaders would be willing to answer questions after making their formal farewell remarks, and the subsequent questioning allowed Hussein to say that he and the PLO were ready to negotiate on the basis of "all pertinent U.N. resolutions including 242 and 338."

In addition to that point, U.S. officials also cited as encouraging several of his other remarks to reporters. According to the officials, these included:

■ The king's endorsement of Reagan's statement that he hopes direct negotiations with Israel can begin "by the end of this year."

■ Hussein's statement that he and the PLO have a "genuine desire for negotiations proceeding in a non-belligerent manner." The Jordanian delegation later issued a clarification changing the word "manner" to "environment." But, they and U.S. officials affirmed that the intent was to imply a willingness to accept Israel's existence in line with the Resolution 242 formula commonly known as "exchanging land for peace."

■ Hussein's reaffirmation that land returned to the Arabs would become part of a Jordanian-Palestinian

confederation rather than an independent Palestinian state.

■ His use of the term "umbrella" in describing the international conference proposed by Jordan and his reference to the multination 1973 Geneva conference on Middle East peace as a model. The Geneva conference led indirectly to the successful Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt, and U.S. officials interpreted Hussein's reference to Geneva as an indication that he sees an international conference as a starting point that ultimately would turn into bilateral Arab-Israeli talks.

In response to questions about Hussein's call for an international conference that would include the five permanent members of the Security Council, Reagan said: "We have not resolved some of the differences. We are still discussing the whole matter."

"We're going to continue discussions about that question," the senior official said in his briefing. "We are looking for a process that has to be structured so that it contributes to the peace process—one that doesn't detract from it, doesn't derail it."

That was an apparent reference to past U.S. and Israeli concerns that if the Soviet Union becomes a participant, it will seek to enhance its influence among hard-line Arab states by obstructing progress toward peace.

However, another U.S. official acknowledged that "the United States obviously has changed its position about an international conference out of appreciation for Hussein's efforts and recognition of his need for some sort of international blessing for his taking on the politically risky task of direct negotiations with Israel."

HUSSEIN SAYS P.L.O. AGREES ON PARLEY WITH THE ISRAELIS

International Talks Proposed as an 'Umbrella,' Based on Key U.N. Resolutions

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 29 -- King Hussein said today that Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization were now in agreement on holding negotiations for peace with Israel under the "umbrella" of an international conference.

After a meeting with President Reagan, the Jordanian leader also said that the P.L.O., after years of refusing to do so, had agreed with Jordan that those talks should be held on the basis of "the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338," which sought to establish a framework for Middle East peace.

Key American Condition

For the last 10 years, acceptance by the P.L.O. of those two resolutions — which are regarded as laying the groundwork for negotiations — has been stated by the United States as a prime condition for any American dealings with the P.L.O. Jordan has always accepted the two resolutions, but the P.L.O. has balked at doing so.

A senior American official termed the King's statement "significant" but said the United States would need an "unequivocal" statement from the P.L.O. itself before acting on it.

Chance for Progress Seen

In an unusual question-and-answer period on the White House lawn, King Hussein was asked by a reporter if the P.L.O. accepted what he had said, and he replied that "every word I have made in my statement is a result of agreement between us and the P.L.O." Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. leader, was in Amman, Jordan, today, presumably to be able to receive direct word on the talks here.

Both King Hussein and President Reagan said the new developments had

produced a good opportunity for progress this year, and Mr. Reagan said specifically that he hoped direct negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation could begin before the end of the year. "I believe this is the last chance for peace," King Hussein said.

A senior Administration official, in a briefing for reporters later, said of the acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 that "I think you have heard a significant statement" from King Hussein. He said that in private talks Tuesday night and this morning between King Hussein and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, the Jordanian leader divulged what he would say publicly and "we were told it was fully coordinated with the P.L.O. leadership."

But when asked if the Jordanian leader's remarks had now met the American conditions for talking to the P.L.O., the official was cautious, saying that "we have not heard this directly from the P.L.O."

He said that it would have to come in an "affirmative, unequivocal way from the P.L.O." for the United States to act upon it.

Nevertheless, American officials who only Tuesday morning were saying they expected nothing significant to emerge from the Hussein-Reagan talks were now saying the Jordanian leader had produced statements that were more forthcoming than they had expected.

In addition to the statement about acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338, King Hussein also seemed to go a considerable way toward meeting the American insistence that there be direct talks between Israel and the joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation.

February Agreement Cited

King Hussein said Jordan and the P.L.O., on the basis of their published agreement of last Feb. 11, had agreed on an international conference as the framework for negotiations on recovering the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which have been occupied by Israel since the 1967 war, in return for peace. Privately, Jordanian officials have said such a conference was needed to avoid ostracism of Jordan in the Arab world. They have said such a conference could produce direct talks with Israel, but King Hussein went further publicly than he had done before.

When asked why Jordan wanted such a conference, which would include the permanent members of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union, King Hussein said:

N.Y. Times

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"It is our hope that an international conference would enable the parties to the conflict to negotiate the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. We need the international umbrella to offer us the opportunity to negotiate, and when I speak of negotiations I obviously mean negotiations amongst the parties to the conflict, in other words, negotiations between the Arab side, in this case a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, with Israel on the other side."

This was the closest the Jordanians have come to saying that the international conference would just serve as a vehicle to direct talks.

American officials said a basic disagreement with Jordan over the international conference idea remains, although Mr. Reagan, when asked his view of the proposal, said, "This is under discussion and we have not resolved some differences that we have."

Understanding of King's Position

The United States believes that such a conference would lead to unnecessary polemics, a senior Administration official said. But he added, "We understand the King's desire for international support for whatever agreement might emerge from a negotiating process."

"The process by which such support is gained has to be structured so that it contributes to the peace process, doesn't detract from it, doesn't derail it," he said.

The question of P.L.O. acceptance of the Security Council resolutions is important because it would align the main Palestinian organization with negotiations, even though Israel is opposed to any direct dealings with the P.L.O., which it regards strictly as a terrorist group. As a first step to negotiations, Jordan has been proposing that the United States meet with a joint Jordan-Palestinian delegation.

Washington has said it was willing to do so provided either that the P.L.O. met the American conditions or that, in the absence of doing so, no declared P.L.O. members were members of the delegation.

The full American conditions for dealing with the P.L.O. were first stated in 1975 in an agreement between the United States and Israel. The United States said it would not recognize or negotiate with the P.L.O. until it recognized Israel's right to exist and accepted Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 242 of November 1967 was a compromise document, passed in the aftermath of the June 1967 war, that called on Israel to return the lands it had occupied in that war in return for secure and recognized borders. Resolution 338, passed at the conclusion of the October 1973 war, called for negotiations to implement 242.

Most countries have interpreted Resolution 338 as meaning that Israel should negotiate the complete withdrawal of the occupied lands in return for peace. But the wording of the resolution does not state that "all" lands had to be given up, and Israeli political leaders have since stated that they would not return all of the West Bank and would never give up what had been East Jerusalem.

King Hussein's statement today did not encompass all the American conditions, but a senior American official said that he might have meant to "subsume" the part about recognizing Israel in the agreement to negotiate on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.



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Soviet Mideast plan

By Mark N. Katz

FOR a long time Washington has tried to persuade Arab governments that relying on the Soviet Union is not to their benefit. The US argues that Moscow is not truly interested in working for a peace settlement, because if there ever were an overall Middle East peace settlement, those Arabs who now rely on the USSR would no longer need the same level of support, and Soviet influence in the region would decline. Knowing this, the Soviets prefer to perpetuate the state of constant tension in the Middle East which in turn perpetuates their role in the area.

The Arab states have countered this American argument by pointing out that Moscow has a comprehensive Middle East peace proposal while Washington has only offered a partial one, which does not provide for a Palestinian state. America's continually vetoing the Soviet Middle East peace initiative allows the Soviets to argue that the US is the one that is not interested in an overall Middle East settlement. Even moderate Saudi Arabia asks the US to at least try the Soviet plan.

What is the Soviet peace plan, and why does it appeal so much to the Arabs? Basically, it calls for a conference chaired by both superpowers. It would be open to all parties to the dispute, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the PLO. This conference would agree to both the establishment of an independent Palestinian state to coexist with Israel (though what their respective boundaries would be has not been made clear) and peace among all states of the area. Indeed, it is because the Soviets call for an independent Palestinian state that even the conservative Arab states favor the Soviet plan over the American one.

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The US has always rejected this Soviet proposal not only because of its commitment to establish an independent Palestinian state, but also because successive administrations have sought to bring about a Middle East peace that would exclude Moscow from the region. Unfortunately, the US has been unable to do the latter; the Soviets seem to have a permanent role in aiding the most radical state (now Syria) to reject all US peace proposals.

But if Washington did accept the idea of a Middle East peace conference sponsored by the two superpowers, one of two things could happen, either of which would benefit the US: The conference would either succeed or fail.

Let us begin with the more likely outcome, failure. If the US agreed to participate in this conference, there would still be several obstacles to its success. The first is that Israel might refuse to attend. But even if it did, the second is that the various Palestinian groups would not be able to decide among themselves whether they should attend or what their position should be if they did.

The third and greatest obstacle is that even if the Palestinians could agree to the more moderate demand of a state just on the West Bank and Gaza, Syria might not agree to this. The government of Hafez al-Assad largely stakes its claim to legitimacy on opposition to a common enemy, Israel. Peace with Israel would end this excuse.

It would be useful to American foreign policy if the Soviet Middle East peace plan were shown to be a failure. The Arabs would see Moscow's plan for what it is. But even if the plan actually succeeded in establishing peace, this would not be bad for the US either. After a settlement, the Arab states might well decide that a Soviet presence in their region is no longer desirable.

It is possible, of course, that even if the US and Israel accepted the Soviet-proposed Middle East peace conference, the USSR would not seriously try to work for a peace settlement and would be unwilling to pressure Syria into entering the peace negotiations. In this case, it would be clear not only to the US and Israel, but also to the moderate Arab states that the Soviet commitment to achieving peace ranks lower than keeping its foreign policy gains in the region. Thus, by not blocking the Soviet Middle East peace initiative, Washington may succeed in demonstrating that what it has argued all along is true: the Soviets really are not interested in bringing peace to the Middle East.

Mark N. Katz is a research scholar at the Smithsonian Institution's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and a visiting scholar at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.



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שמור/מידע

בלוח

לשלכם 593. אל על

THANK YOU FOR : קודקלוד :
 YOUR CABLE OF MAY 23 . I TRUST THAT YOU HAVE BEEN
 INFORMED THAT BOTH MR AMRAM BLUM AND MR AMOS ERAN WILL
 LEAVE FOR NEW YORK IN ORDER HOPEFULLY, TO REACH A
 DEFINITE AND CRUCIAL CONCLUSION WITH THE UNION ON THE
 BASIS OF PRINCIPLES WHICH I HOPE YOU WILL FIND, AS I DID
 , CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL.

I AM FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE HISTORICAL AND CLOSE TIES
 BETWEEN THE AMERICAN LABOUR MOVEMENT AND ISRAEL, TIES
 WHICH ALL OF US HAVE CHERISHED FOR MANY LONG YEARS. IT IS
 PRECISELY BECAUSE I VALUE THOSE TIES THAT I WOULD HOPE
 THAT YOU WILL SEE YOUR WAY TO SUPPORTING THE PRESENT
 EFFORT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE
 SINCERELY

V. SHAMIR VICE PREMIER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

לשכת בראון

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ת 91 : שהח, דהמ, מנכ, ממנכ, ארהמחבורה

סגירות ישראל - ווטינגטון

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דחיסות, בהול לבוקר

1985 מאי 23 1600...מאריך ודפים

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לשכת מיים רוהיים ושר החוץ

דע: לשכת ראש הממשלה

אל - על

ליין קיר קלנד ביקשנו להעביר את המברק הבא למיים רוהיים ושר החוץ:

May 23, 1985

The Honorable Yitzhak Shamir
Vice Premier and Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem, Israel

The AFL-CIO urges you to accept and support the recommendations of Amos Eran for the settlement of the dispute between El Al and the International Association of Machinists.

Approval of these recommendations is important to the maintenance of the American labor movement's long standing friendship with the State of Israel. This friendship historically has been based on non-political, bipartisan respect.

The AFL-CIO would hope that efforts to settle this dispute do not become a political matter where one Israeli party is perceived as determined to weaken American labor, which I am sure is not the case.

Lane Kirkland
AFL-CIO President

דני בלוג

עברת את המברק הזה לשר החוץ

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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**סודי ביותר/מיד

**ממנכל,מצפא

**ביקור חוסיין

**מתוך שיחה עם אסתר קופרסמית: היא השתתפה בארוחת ערב שערך
המזכיר לכבוד המלך. היא ישבה בשולחן הסמוך לשולחן הראשי ליד
קנת דאס, דון גרג מעורי סגן הנשיא ושר החצר היורדני. לדבריה
האווירה בארוחה ובנאומי שולץ וחוסיין היתה אופטימית.
היא שאלה את דאס מדוע חוסיין רוצה בוועידה בינל' בהשתתפות
הסובייטים. תשובתו של דאס היתה כי חוסיין הסביר לנשיא ולמזכיר
כי אינו רוצה בגורלו של סודאם, ואינו רוצה להיות מבודד או
בסכנת התנקשות בחייו. על כן הוא וקוק למטריה רחבה לדעת
חוסיין, אין כל סיכון בהסכמה לוועידה שכן בלחץ הסורים ופלגי
האשפי שלהם לא יבואו הסובייטים. הוא הפציר באמריקאים שלא לשלול
מיידיית את רעיון הוועידה אלא להגיב מגובה בלתי מחייבת. הוא גם
היה רוצה שישראל, ובמיוחד פרס, לא תגיב בשלילה טוטלית
ומיידיית.

**דאס וגרג הוסיפו כי גם הם אישית מקוים שישראל לא תגיב בשלילה
טוטלית, אלא בהבעת אופטימיות מעצם הנכונות של חוסיין לפעול
לקידום שלום, ולהמתין ולראות כיצד יתפתחו הדברים.
לדבריהם היורדנים שבחו את המפגש שקיימה בין שר החוץ לאישים
יהודיים. שר החוץ אמר לה כי המפגש נתן למלך תחושת תקווה
שיש סיכוי להתקדמות לשלום. כמה מבני שיחה בארוחה הציעו שבשלב
הבא תקיים בביתה מפגש בין אישים יהודיים לפלסטינאים החיים
בארהב.

**בתשובה לשאלתי אמרה כי לא נתבקשה לארגן מפגש של יהודים עם
המלך, אלא המלך יסתפק בשיחה עם אלה שיבואו למפגש במלון

**מדיוסון מטעם מכון 'אנטרפרייו'.

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משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

במשרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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ממנכל,מצפא

ביקור חוסיין

מתוך שיחה עם אסתר קופרסמית: היא השתתפה בארוחת ערב שערך המוכיר לכבוד המלך. היא ישבה בשולחן הסמוך לשולחן הראשי ליד קנת דאס, דון גרג מעוורי סגן הנשיא ושר החצר הירדני. לדבריה האוירה בארוחה ובנאומי שולץ וחוסייין הייתה אופטימית. היא שאלה את דאס מדוע חוסייין רוצה בוועידה בינלי בהשתתפות הסובייטים. תשובתו של דאס הייתה כי חוסייין הסביר לנשיא ולמוכיר כי אינו רוצה בגורלו של סאדאת, ואינו רוצה להיות מבודד או בסכנת התנקשות בחייו. על כן הוא וקוק למטריה רחבה. לדעת חוסייין, אין כל סיכון בהסכמה לוועידה שכן בלחץ הסורים ופלגי האשפי שלהם לא יבואו הסובייטים. הוא הפציר באמריקאים שלא לשלול מיידיית את רעיון הוועידה אלא להגיב מגובה בלתי מחייבת. הוא גם היה רוצה שישראל, ובמיוחד פרס, לא תגיב בשלילה טוטלית ומיידיית.

דאס וגרג הוסיפו כי גם הם אישית מקוים שישראל לא תגיב בשלילה טוטלית, אלא בהנעת אופטימיות מעצם הנכונות של חוסייין לפעול לקידום שלום, ולהמתין ולראות כיצד יתפתחו הדברים. לדבריהם הירדנים שבחו את המפגש שקיימה בין שר החוץ לאישים היהודיים. שר החוץ אמר לה כי המפגש נתן למלך תחושת תקווה שיש סיכוי להתקדמות לשלום. כמה מבני שיחה בארוחה הציעו שבשלב הבא תכיים נביתה מפגש בין אישים יהודיים לפלשתינאים החיים בארזה.

במשובה לשאלתי אמרה כי לא נתבקשה לארגן מפגש של יהודים עם המלך, אלא המלך יסתפק בשיחה עם אלה שיבואו למפגש במלון מדיסון ממעם מכון 'אנטרפרייז'.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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נספח

מחוק 2
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מחוק 4

(3)

מאל: המשרד, נד: 212, ט: וזש
דח: ב, סג: ט, מא: 290585, זח: 1930

סודי ביותר/בהול לנוקר

מאל: המנכ"ל, מצפ"א

חוס"י

א. שוחתי בקצרה עם מרפי לאחר הפגישות בניהם הלבן וחדרונים
הפוסטיים לעתונות וכן מדרך הרקט שלו

ב. מרפי אמר בחשונה לשוחתי כי העתונאים סגזימים ב"תגובה"
וכי הוא מנסה לעטון שהחליך ארוך

ג. שאלתי מה החידוש שמצא בדברי חוס"י, אמר כי חוס"י עומד
בתוקף על כך שיש התפכחות בתשיבתו של אש"ף וכי אש"ף ור
קדימה והשתנה, אף כי ספק למרפי שאנו איננו סאטינים לכך.
מצידי הערתי כי ספק אם חוס"י יהיה מוכן לרכוש מכונית טוומסת
מעדפאת, ועל אחת כמה וכמה שאין להניח כי הוא סאטין שחל בו
שנינו

ד. טיקר שיחגנו נסבה על ההתייחסות האמריקאית, שבעינינו כמובן
אינה מקובלת, לנושא הועידה הבינלאומית. רדום היה לנו עד כה
כדי האמריקאים דוחים זאת כמובן, אך הנשיא אמר בדבריו שהנושא
בדיון ובכל הכבוד יש כאן שינוי (כבוד היה בדברי פלמרו אלי
אמש בענין זה טידפוח ש"בישרי" זאת). מרפי טען שיש לראות זאת
בפרספקטיבה ולא "בצערקה". הירדנים פועלים בחוס בקשר לכך,
מרפי אמר כי בשיחותיו עם מ"מ דוה"מ ושה"ח בירושלים אמר
עמד עמיד כי חוס"י מנסה לעקוף את המו"מ הישיר, ומרפי השיב
כי הוא מחפש "מטריה" למו"מ הישיר. האמריקאים סבורים כי
אם יפגע ענין הועידה בקידום התהליך אין דבר מתאים הם
מבינים עם זאת את חששותיו ורצונו של חוס"י, ולא לכל השאלות
יש תשובות.
הדיונים יימשכו, ואת התהליך יש לבנות בצורה מחיימת. כשהודתי

600

חולקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס חברת גלוי

מחור 4 1

אל: הסכנה, כע"ח, לש' סמנכ"ל, יועץ רוח"ס להקשרות, מפ"א,

לש' יגד.

סיווג בטחוני:

ד"ר: וושינגטון

רשימות:

מח: פחונות

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לש' יגד

מס. סג"ס:

28/400
65/0760

News Summary May 29, 1985

Press Reports

Israel's Economy

WSJ-Seib-The Israeli economy has gone from bad to worse despite intensive care. Peres must devote large amounts of his time on the problem and that is sure to sap his ability to take political risks in joining a new Mideast peace process that Arab moderates are trying to organize. Despite packages of "reforms" every key economic indicator has gone wrong in the past five months. Most agree that the reasons for this is that the national unity gov't doesn't have the political will to make the deep cuts necessary to slow the economy. These problems make Israel more dependent than ever on US economic aid.

Hussein Visits US

NYT-Gwertzman-Senior US officials do not believe any major breakthrough will be achieved despite Hussein's talks with Reagan. The administration is trying to maintain at least the impression of further movement toward a Mideast settlement. Washington has been urging Hussein to find acceptable Palestinians or a commitment to direct talks. But the King has been unable to do so.

US Pressed To Act on Arms Sales to Mideast

WSJ-Greenberger-Pressure is building on the administration to act on Mideast arms sales that were suspended this year. Weinberger, for example, is arguing that Hussein and other Arab moderates should get US arms soon in order to encourage them to further participate in the peace process. The administration is likely to move with extreme caution. Arms sales to Jordan would increase pressure to act sooner than it would like on sales to Saudi Arabia. With the wounds from Bitburg still healing, the administration is trying to avoid action that would offend Israel or American Jews. Congress remains lukewarm to Arab arms sales. Shultz and McFarlane overruled Weinberger. They asserted that they weren't about to risk spilling blood on Capital Hill for Saudi Arabia, which has maintained characteristic caution on the peace process. They also argued that early sales to Jordan might dampen Hussein's incentive to pursue peace with Israel. The US is wary of any action that might destabilize Israel's fragile Gov't. Lurking in the background, should Peres fall, is Sharon. But Reagan's biggest problem is on Capital Hill, where he doesn't need a new defeat.

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טופס מברק גלוי

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

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165/0760 תאריך היציאה: 07.07.73

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Egyptian Minister Visits Israel

ND-combined-The first Egyptian minister to visit Israel in three years met with Peres in talks that an Israeli spokesman said were positive and productive.

Palestinians Start Counterattack But Are Driven Back

NYT-p.1-Hijazi (photo of Palestinians firing at Shiites from Shatila) Palestinian forces mounted a counterattack on Shiites, killing 20 but vanished as soon as they appeared from tunnels in the camp. About 400 have been killed and 1000 wounded in the latest battles in Beirut. Amal said the Palestinians slaughtered the Shiites but the Palestinians denied the accusations. Each side has accused the other of committing atrocities. Journalists have been barred from the battle areas and it has been difficult to get independent confirmation. Terri has said that the Shiites attacked the camps so the Palestinians could not set up bases again, a move that would bring attacks from Israel. But Western diplomats believe the fighting is an attempt by Syria to lessen the influence of Arafat.

Another American Seized

NYT-special-The American director of a hospital in Beirut was abducted by gunmen, bringing the number to six of US citizens missing in Lebanon. The State Dept. believes that there are 300 US citizens in Beirut and about 4000 with dual nationalities throughout the country. The US has urged Americans to leave. Holv War issued a statement warning against the circulation of information purporting anti-Palestinian atrocities. (see DN-AP; ND-LA Times; NYP-wire)

BBC Reporters Leave

NYT-Reuters-The BBC has withdrawn its correspondents from Lebanon after threats against the staff.

Iran-Iraq

NYT-Reuters-The capitals of Iran and Iraq came under attack as both countries continued intensive air and missile strikes against civilian areas. There was no sign of response from either side as Cuellar called for a halt in the attacks. British Airways has suspended its flights to Baghdad because of the fighting.

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15/0760 תאריך חידוש: מס. מברק:

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Kurds in Iraq Announce Kidnappings

NYT-UPI-Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq have kidnapped 26 foreigners in an attempt to discourage foreign support for the Iraqi Gov't. The 26 technicians are being held hostage at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's headquarters. The guerrillas are supported by Iran and Syria.

OPEC

WSJ-staff-OPEC faces a virtually uninterrupted period of depressed demand for its oil over the next 18 months or more, according to a survey of major oil company executives. Prices will remain weak or continue to slide in the absence of corrective action by OPEC.

Black Hebrews in NYC

NYT-no biline-(photo of Rabbi Yehonatan in synagogue in Harlem) When Rabbi Haim White preaches his weekly sermon at the Ethiopian Synagogue, the congregation explodes with religious fervor. The Ethiopian Hebrews have a community that numbers 500 families and 10 congregations in the NY area. Most are American blacks but they call themselves Ethiopians in the belief that they, like the Ethiopians recently airlifted to Israel, are descendants of ancient Israelites. They call themselves Hebrews and are not recognized by mainstream Jewish authorities because most are not recently descended from Jews and have not agreed to convert. The Ethiopian Hebrews observe Orthodox strictures. Yet they consider themselves autonomous from white Jewry.

Koch Returns From Rome-Still a Jew

DN-Michelini-Koch returned from Rome and said "I'm still Jewish... and very proud." (see ND-Arneberg)

Report Says US Must Allow Press in War Zones

NYT-Jones-A 13 member task force consisting of former military and Gov't officials, scholars and journalists, issued a report stating that the presence of journalists in a war zone is essential. They believe that the President, not the military should make the decisions on access.

Friedman Gets Award

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NYT-special-The Marine Corps Historical Foundation presented its annual award for historical writing to Thomas Friedman, the NYT Jerusalem correspondent for his April 1984 NYT Magazine article "America's Failure in Lebanon."

Reviews-"Gaza Ghetto"

NYT-Maslin-In attempting to generate sympathy for the Palestinians, the filmmakers overstate their case to the point of counterproductivity. The Israelis censors who banned the film greatly overestimated its power. The film relies on cheap shots.

VV-Edelstein-Gaza Ghetto is not objective. The film is bad propoganda and leaves the viewer filled with questions about the filmmakers' omissions. The Israeli treatment of the Palestinians have been shameful; but if you watch this stupid movie, you'll be no closer to understanding why.

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רצ"ב תדרון מרפי אחרי פגישת רייגן-חוסיין.

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MR. SIMS: This briefing will be on background, attributable to a senior administration official. For your information only, he is the -----(title)----, -----(name)----. The President has remarks at his event at 2:30, so if we're not through by then the President starts, that will be the end of this briefing.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I offered to start the briefing at 2:27 just to make sure that you got the full insights.

Now, I scribbled some notes on your Qs and As and I have a copy of the two statements, the President's statement and the King's departure statement. I think looking at those two texts as an opener, we can see that there seems to be an agreement that the conditions are good for progress towards extension of the peace process, a good opportunity to get to negotiations, that is; that he objective would be negotiations between the parties, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The President said that we hope these could lead to direct negotiations by the end of this year. When the King was asked, according to my notes, he said he hoped that would prove possible, but we'll all have the transcript of exactly what he said in a few minutes.

I think rather than interpreting my scribbling, let me take your questions.

SAM DONALDSON (ABC): Can you clear up for us exactly what the US position is toward a conference that would include the Soviet? Was the President trying to hint that we might accept that, or it might be something we'd consider?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, I don't think the President was trying to hint at anything. He said that this is a matter that considers under discussions, between us and Jordan. There isn't any easy answer. It's a question that we do need further work on. And as he said, we're going to continue our discussions. We'll be meeting with the Jordanians, with the King and his advisors, over the next couple of days, the days remaining of their stay in Washington.

We understand the King's desire for international support, which I think was the phrase he used, for whatever agreement might emerge from the negotiating process. We believe it's a key question. The process by which such support is gained has to be structured, so that it contributes to the peace process, doesn't detract from it, doesn't derail it. It's something we're looking at in all of its respects, including who must be involved.

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Q Let's go through the 242/338 scenario.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Right.

Q It seems that he and the Palestinians had agreed to negotiate in an international conference, on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions, including 242 and 338. In the Q&A he said the Palestinians, that is the PLO, subscribe to every word he said. How close does that come, or does it come, to the US condition for dealing with the PLO?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We've said we would not recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it had accepted 242, 338, and Israel's right to exist. And the phrase, as well, "renounce the use of terrorism", has been used often in our statements of policy. But I think the first I gave you is the basic one. Perhaps considering that Israel's right to exist means you don't engage in terrorism against it. But, you're right, that's been spelled out further, over the years.

Q How do you read what he said? Does that meet -- I mean, the King also said that he would agree to direct talks with Israel in the context of this international conference. Does this meet the American conditions for dealing with the PLO or, if it falls short, in what way does it fall short? Because a lot of people here felt this came a long way.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I certainly think there has been progress. Whether this means that it has met American terms for recognizing and negotiating with the PLO is another question. We have not heard this directly from the PLO, and the two phrases that I mentioned, Israel's right to exist, the condition of renunciation of terrorism, I didn't hear. That may well have been subsumed in the phrases of the King's departure statement, when he speaks of agreement having been reached, and he used the term "our agreement" -- sorry, let me just find the text. "We are willing to negotiate within the context of an international conference a peaceful settlement on the basis of the pertinent resolutions, including 242 and 338." The "we" refers to the King and the PLO.

But we have not heard this --

Q In other words, you need an affirmative confirmation from the PLO?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I would think we certainly would, yes.

Q How could that be done? A statement by Arafat?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to speculate just how it would be done, but I think it would have to come directly in an affirmative, unequivocal, way from the PLO.

Q In your private discussions with the King last night and

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previously, had he told you he had this agreement with the PLO, or was this worked out -- usually there's not a Q&A after statements at the White House. Was this worked out so that question could be gotten on the record and an answer could be given?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Given the confusion in my notes, I can understand why there is not normally Q&As after the White House talks. I look forward to receiving the tape on exactly what was said.

But, I think you have heard a significant statement, which we are told was fully coordinated with the PLO leadership.

Q So, were you surprised by him making the statement here? Had he informed you that this was his understanding?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I heard somewhat before the statement was issued that it would be made.

Q In that statement the President talked about the US commitment to Jordan's security. Does that include resuming the push on Capitol Hill for the Jordanian arms package?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I said yesterday that our review of strategic and foreign policy interests in the Middle East hasn't been completed yet, and recommendations have not gone up to the President for his review.

No decisions made. I think you had a general statement by the President there, meaning that we recognize Jordan has legitimate security concerns and requirements, and that there is a relationship between feeling secure at home and conducting an active and assertive peace policy. Security cooperation with Jordan, economic assistance programs with Jordan, are very longstanding, and we would expect such programs to continue.

ANDREA MITCHELL (NBC): If we have the affirmative confirmation from the PLO, what do you envision is the next step? Find the appropriate Palestinian delegation? And secondly, what is the situation regarding Soviet participation? What is our view?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I think you've mixed two questions when you say talking of finding an appropriation Palestinian delegation. As you know, there's been discussion for several weeks now about the possibility of a US-Jordanian-Palestinian -- US team meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian team. And as I mentioned yesterday, names, at an earlier point, had been suggested on a for-instance basis, repeated. We didn't have any definitive list.

The other question, really, is at such point as the PLO were to explicitly, directly, announce it had met our terms on those conditions, then there would be a meeting between the United States and the PLO. That's been policy for a good many years.

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MS. MITCHELL: And after the international conference? What are our objections?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We just haven't -- we haven't -- we haven't discussed that whole issue, out to the point that we feel we have the answers as to whether a conference is going to contribute or, on balance, is it going to be a plus or a minus for the peace process. That is under study.

Q On the conference, State Department people have been saying that it would not contribute to the peace process and the United States doesn't support it -- for some time. You seem to be considerably softening that. Can you tell us what's happened or why there's been the change?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, nothing is static. You've got --

MR. DONALDSON: Life goes on.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: You've got movement. You've got a fluid situation. We are not dropping our position that a conference -- concerns that a conference would be a setback for the process. As we've spoken of it in the past, it would be an exercise in political theater and rhetoric.

But I return to what I said earlier. We understand the King's desire for international support for whatever agreement might emerge from a negotiating process. And we want that process to be structured in a way that's going to contribute to the overall peace process. We have not reached any further decisions.

Q You said yesterday that you didn't expect any good news in the next 48 hours. This situation, as everybody here knows, has a lot of subtleties to it. Have we witnessed a breakthrough here?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (Pause.) I think there's a lot that has been positive in the outcome of these meetings, and we've got something to build on. The King's statement was a flat-out reaffirmation that he desires to seek a negotiated settlement, based on 242/338. For him, that is nothing new. But he made this affirmation in the light of his recent discussions with the PLO. This is progress.

CHRIS WALLACE (NBC): Do you read him as saying that he now has PLO support for continuing with this process that he and you say will -- is likely to lead to direct negotiations by the end of the year?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Does he have continuing PLO support for that?

MR. WALLACE: Does he have Arafat's backing now to continue with this process that could lead to negotiations by the end of the year?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I would see that in the words that he just read out in his formal statement. I was told just before coming over

to the White House that there had been something in from the area quoting -- and this is, please, to be checked, I didn't see the text myself -- quoting the Central Council, Palestine Central Council, as committing itself to support of the King's mission and his peace efforts. But check the wording. If so, that was the third --

Q It was a February 11 agreement, I think, that they --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Didn't they refer to his present trip, though?

Q They reaffirmed, at least in a wire account, that the confederation based on a prior Palestinian state was, in a sense, cleared up some of the ambiguity you were concerned with yesterday.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The confederation would be based on a prior Palestinian state, yes. No opposition on the independent Palestinian state. (Laughter.)

Q So there's some good news and some bad news. (Laughter.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: But that, in any case, if the statement did include the statement of support for the King's efforts, and in the context of February 11, that's the third such, as I recall, you had the statement by the Fatah Executive Committee, by the Executive -- by the Revolutionary Council, and now by the Central Council.

MR. DONALDSON: Is there any reason to believe Israel would go to an international conference, particularly if the Soviets were involved?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That is a question you're going to put to Israel.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, their well-known position has been against that type of move.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Then you don't need to put the question. He really did start asking a question, about 10 minutes ago.

MR. WALLACE: Was the King at all more specific with the administration about an international conference, in terms of who the participants would be, and how it would work?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: He spoke of, as he did in answer to that question, he spoke of one form being the five permanent representatives of the Security Council, being involved.

MR. WALLACE: Plus whom? Plus this joint delegation and Israel?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, his basic presentation was that he thought if we are talking peace process, no one should be excluded.

MR. WALLACE: Well, would other Arab states be involved too?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Again, I think this is something you're going to have to probe with the King, but my understanding is that the other states involved in making peace.

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MAGDA ABU-FADL: Did he also refer to the 1973 agreement that fell through soon after it was not even convened? Do you think he was referring to that?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: He was asked a question, "Do you support direct negotiations?" Was that the way it came out?

MS. MITCHELL: He said it was the first time.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: He said there were such negotiations in 1973, and I assume -- that were direct negotiations.

MS. ABU-FADL: Yes, but it resulted in a bilateral disengagement. They fell through.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It resulted, as I recall, the following year or so, in the first and second Sinai disengagements, the Syrian-Israeli disengagement. And it depends how much you want to attach to that particular conference. But it did lead to an activation in the peace process.

Q Has Israel been consulted? And if not, why not?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Has who been consulted?

Q Israel.

MR. DONALDSON: Israel.

Q I mean, after all, they are the ones who are one of the principal participants.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, has Israel been consulted on what point, though?

Q On this whole procedure.

MR. DONALDSON: Everything. (Laughter.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we maintain very, very close consultations with Israel, and we'll be remaining in the closest of touch with them for discussion of all ideas bearing on the peace process.

Q Does that mean that the embassy will be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem? (Laughter.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: It has no bearing whatsoever on that question.

Q You always say that the 11th of February is an ambiguous agreement. Has the King cleared all ambiguities, disagreements? Such as, what is to prevent the formation of the joint delegation, now?

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I don't think the King set out to clear up the February 11th agreement. He didn't approach his whole presentation in that context. He considers the February 11th agreement one of great importance, that took considerable effort, in negotiating on his part, and of course, on the part of the PLO. And he is very proud of that agreement. We still have some questions about the exact meaning of the agreement. What was the second part?

Q The second part is what is to prevent, now, the formation of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: For meetings with the United States?

Q Yes.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we'll be discussing that with the Jordanians in the next couple of days.

Q What is the element which is hampering this?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We're looking for satisfactory arrangements. How much more specific do you want me to get?

Q As a followup on that, on the upshot of the King's decision not to continue the visit, is there anything substantive to that, not to go to California?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I honestly don't know. I know that the program here goes through the --

Q From your point of view, you were not informed of that in any --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That was a -- I mean, the California visit, to the best of my knowledge, was a purely private visit, and I don't know the circumstances. So I can't say much.

Q Let me just try to walk you through this. The US is interested, and said it would be interested, in talking to a Palestinian-Jordanian group if it would lead on to further direct talks with Israel.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Right. Part of a process that would lead through.

Q The US has also said it would deal with the PLO if it met certain conditions.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Right.

Q But if I catch you right, you're saying that even if the PLO met the conditions, it doesn't follow from that that we would want to have PLO members on the joint group, because Israel probably wouldn't deal with such a group?

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SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, two things. I'm not sure that that group was ever intended, from the Arab side, to be the group that would go through to the table with Israel. I had two main points. I have now forgotten my second main point.

Q In other words, if the PLO then met the conditions --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Oh, the second main point. May I? It was just that the PLO has to meet our conditions before we meet with them. Just to restate it.

Q You are willing, if they met the conditions, you'd be willing to have PLO members, then, on that joint group?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I wouldn't -- I think, Bernie, we're just getting too far out into the deep blue yonder.

JIM ANDERSON (UPI): You leave me with the impression that the composition of that delegation, or pre-delegation, whatever you're going to call it now, is not a terribly important block in the way of these peace negotiations, it is not any more the significant issue that we thought it was two weeks ago, down in Aqaba.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think it has a significance in terms of -- it's a group that would be put together, has not been put together, to the best of our knowledge, to discuss the peace process. But it's a group put together in the light of the February 11 agreement. So, it has that significance. It's somehow seen, from the Jordanian and Palestinian side, as contributing to a broadened understanding of that that peace process will involve. It's not seen as a negotiating group. I have learned that much more about it in the talks, our recent discussions, about the purpose of such a group. It's to discuss the basic issues concerned in the peace process, but not a negotiating group.

Q Is this something to put pressure on the Palestinians in Lebanon, having any effect on US thinking? Is it slowing you down?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: If anything, it's speeding us up. You're watching another terribly brutal chapter of the Palestinian peoples' existence, in what's going on in Lebanon. But it does not have a direct bearing on what we've been discussing with the King in the last days. We're very, very aware that these talks are going on against a backdrop of incredible brutality and violence in Lebanon.

MS. MITCHELL: Let me seek a clarification to your answer. You were asked whether the King explained or clarified the February 11th declaration. Is it your understanding that when he talked about 242 and 338, and the PLO's commitment, that that is something that he received during his recent travels, that goes beyond what he got on February 11th? Or is this his interpretation, again, of the February 11th PLO commitment?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: My understanding is it's recent. It's

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certainly post February 11th.

Q Was there any discussion of other bilateral issues, Iran-Iraq, or anything?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes. I would have given you a nice rundown if you hadn't confused me so quickly with your questions about -- no -- (laughs) -- Iran-Iraq was discussed and, again, against the background of what can be done to help bring that conflict to an end. The questions of international terrorism were discussed and how the community of nations can better cooperate to bring that under control.

Q What about Syria?

Q The King said that he hoped that the United States, with th courageous leadership of President Reagan, will seize this opportunity. What do you think he expects the United States to do to seize it? What, specifically?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think that that statement comes from the King's conviction that time is running out very fast, and that soon there will be nothing to negotiate that will be even minimally acceptable, as a basis for negotiation. And the vigorousness and the words "to seize the..." how is it, "to seize the opportunity and respond positively to our peace efforts". He would like the United States committed as a full partner in helping develop the framework for negotiations, and while we're not a negotiating partner, we've always said we would be a full partner in that effort.

The King's comments you have heard in one form or another, from President Mubarak, from King Fahd, over recent months. They would like the US more deeply, more actively, engaged.

Q Does he mean to put the burden on Israel? Is that what he means, something specifically?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: He means to get thing going, and I think

Q How?

Q You're talking about West Bank settlements, aren't you?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, I wasn't. Oh, oh, in terms of closing the door for the negotiations, if land for peace is, indeed, the basis for negotiations represented in 242.

Q -- of Syria acting as spoiler?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we hope that no one is going to be acting as a spoiler. We hope that everyone is going to see the -- that the opportunity will be there to become engaged in the process, that no one is excluded.

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MS. ABU-FADL: Did he express specific concern that it may?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into details on that.

Q Would you say that, over the last several months, and including today, the US role in this Mideast process has changed as a result of Egyptian and Jordanian pressure, persuasion, if you like?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Persuasion of whom?

Q It strikes me that the United States once said, "We wash our hands of this matter and until the Arabs can find a way to talk directly with Israel we're staying out of it," basically, although, you know, "We would like to be constuctive, if we can". Has this whole picture changed into a more familiar, Carter administration, or Ford, or Nixon administration situation?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Where we plunge in regardless of the possibilities and the consequences, you mean? (Laughter.) Just how leading a question do you want me to answer here?

MR. SIMS: Last question, please.

Q -- to negotiate, they say, "Yes, if, yes, but, and don't forget, the United States has to be more active." And it looks as if you're accepting that role. Is that correct?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'll stand securely and safely on the Secretary's view that we can't want peace more than those in the region want it, and we can't be more directly engaged in the search for it. So, let me hold it at that.

MR. SIMS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The President's going to make a statement?

MR. SIMS: He'll be coming on the speaker.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Okay. Thank you.

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ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מרכז, רמ"ח קשי"ח

בקור חוסיין

להלן דברי הנשיא וחוסיין היום אחה"צ בבית הלבן וכן תשובותיהם לשאלות חכתיים.

תגובת רייגן בעניין ועידה בי"ל עוררה כאן התרגשות מסויימת.

אנו מבהירים עמדתנו בנוון.

הראל

PRESIDENT REAGAN: I have just concluded a very useful meeting and lunch with King Hussein. We all recognize that the positive atmosphere which has developed in the Middle East recently can be credited in great measure to His Majesty, King Hussein. Steps he's taken over the last year gave new momentum to the search for peace.

Our discussions today have provided further evidence of Jordan's commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflicts, which should prompt a sense of gratitude from men of goodwill everywhere.

The United States has long played a central role in the Middle East peace process. We're proud of what we've helped accomplish, and we look forward to continuing to make meaningful contributions. But we hope that His Majesty's courageous steps forward can lead to direct negotiations between the parties, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, by the end of this year, and we'll do our part to help bring this about.

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Our goal remains a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace, which will satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and provide for the security of all states in the region, including Israel. We recognize Jordan's economic and security needs. And in the spirit of working together, I have told the King that we will be able to count on the United States for assistance in addressing problems which Jordan may face in those areas.

We are pleased and proud to have had His Majesty here with us today.

KING HUSSEIN: Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. President, for the kind words. Ladies and gentlemen, I have had a full, friendly, and useful discussion with the President on all issues of mutual concern. Regarding the prospects of peace in our area, I have told the President that a just, comprehensive, and durable peace in the Middle East should secure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right of self determination, within the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.

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I have also assured the President that on the basis of the Jordan-PLD accord of 11 February, and as a result of my recent talks with the PLD, and in view of our genuine desire for peace, we are willing to negotiate within the context of an international conference a peaceful settlement on the basis of

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the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

We are offering a unique opportunity for peace, which might not be with us for long. I hope the United States, under the courageous and dedicated leadership of President Reagan, will find a way to seize this opportunity and respond positively to our peace efforts. The active and balanced role of the United States is an essential element for the success of the peace process.

I should like to thank the President for his hospitality, and kind words, and wish him continued good health, and every success.

Q Your Majesty, a question, please, if you can hear me, sir. Can you explain why Jordan needs an international conference in order to negotiate with Israel? Couldn't it do it directly? Could you elaborate a little on what your thinking is?

KING HUSSEIN: In that regard, it is our hope that an international conference would enable the parties to the conflict to negotiate the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. We need the international umbrella to offer us the opportunity to negotiate, and when I speak of negotiations I obviously mean negotiations amongst the parties to the conflict, in other words negotiations between the Arab side, in this case a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, with Israel on the other side.

Q Mr. President, would the United States participate?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: Would we what?

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KING HUSSEIN: Well, we certainly are approaching the whole issue not in a belligerent fashion. I am almost sure of that.

CHRIS WALLACE (NBC): Your Majesty, has the PLO agreed to this framework, sir?

KING HUSSEIN: What I have said in my statement is the result of my discussions with the PLO, yes.

Q Are you committed to going forward with this this year?

KING HUSSEIN: I am certainly hoping very, very much, indeed, that we will see some progress this year, yes.

ANDREA MITCHELL (NBC): Is a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation acceptable to you?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: This is all being worked on right now, with us, or together. This is what we are discussing.

Q (Inaudible.)

PRESIDENT REAGAN: Who is he asking? Which one of us? (Laughter.)

Q (Inaudible.) -- in view of the situation in Lebanon, is there not something the United States can do to speed the process and, if so -- (inaudible) --

PRESIDENT REAGAN: We think that the situation in Lebanon with regard to the peace process will be resolved completely when Israel has made its complete withdrawal from Lebanon.

Q Do you think there's a need to send out a new envoy to the area to continue the talks?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: Well, no, the people we have working there are going to continue. Yes.

Q Do you want to involve the Soviets at this point, at this preliminary point, in this quest for a peace agreement? Do

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FEDERAL TRANSCRIPTS 202-347-1400

REAGAN/HUSSEIN 5/29 -4-

you think that would help or hinder the process?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: Well, I'm not going to respond to that question because, as I say, we're still discussing this whole matter, and I'm not going to get into any great details on things of that kind.

MS. MITCHELL: Is that one of the problems, Mr. President, Soviet support?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: As I say, just generally, we are discussing and hopeful of arriving at a solution.

MR. WALLACE: Your Majesty, does your proposal include Soviet participation?

KING HUSSEIN: I have spoken of an international conference and of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

MR. WALLACE: So the Soviets would be included?

KING HUSSEIN: Well, that's what we're working on, as the President has said.

MR. DONALDSON: Are the Palestinians agreed on that?

KING HUSSEIN: Yes, sir. I am saying that.

MR. DONALDSON: Have the Palestinians agreed that 242 and 338 are the governing --

KING HUSSEIN: Every word I have made in my statement is a result of agreement between us and the PLO.

MR. DONALDSON: Arafat? The PLO?

KING HUSSEIN: PLO, yes.

Q -- 242 and 338?

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אל: הסברה, מעייה, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לשי רוה"מ, דובר צה"ל. דע: ניו-יורק. רמ"ח, קשי"ח

NEWS SUMMARY - WEDNESDAY - MAY 29, 1985

COLUMNS

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Mark Katz-"Soviet Mideast Plan" For a long time, Washington has tried to persuade Arab govts. that relying on the Soviet Union is not to their benefit. The US argues that Moscow is not interested in working for a peace settlement, because if there was one, those Arabs would no longer need the same level of support. Hence, the Soviets prefer to perpetuate the state of constant tension in the Middle East which in turn perpetuates their role in the area. The Arabs have countered this US argument by pointing out that Moscow has a comprehensive Middle East proposal while Wash. has a partial one. Because the Soviets call for an independent Palestinian state, the even the conservative Arab states favor the Soviet plan over the US one. By not blocking the Soviet Middle East peace initiative, Wash. may succeed in demonstrating that what it has argued all along is true: the Soviets really are not interested in bringing peace to the Middle East.

THE PRESS REPORTS

Hussein, Reagan Meet Today

WASH. POST-Goshko-Hussein will confer with Reagan today about the chances for new Arab-Israeli peace talks, but US officials cautioned against expecting dramatic breakthroughs in the search for a Palestinian-Jordanian negotiating team acceptable to all sides. "This visit is part of a process that we hope in the end will lead to extension of the peace process and to direct negotiations," said a senior US official. Hussein may cut his visit short and the reasons were not clear. Some non-Jordanian Arab sources said it was their understanding that Hussein was miffed by the senior official's cautions against expecting dramatic results and also wanted to avoid reporters' questions about his meetings with Reagan. (This article was cabled in full this morning.)

Israeli Officials Forsee 'Minimum Presence' In Lebanon

PHIL. INQUIRER-(Wires)-Israel will formally end its three-year occupation of Lebanon next week, but officials said yesterday that Israeli soldiers would maintain a "minimum presence" in southern Lebanon. The pullout will be completed by the beginning of June.

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US Envoy To Israel Using Impending Retirement To Stir Up Controversies

THE SUN-Jefferson Price III-Samuel Lewis, has been getting into arguments with senior officials of his host country, employing a flair for candor that is the result of the fact that he is not only leaving Israel but leaving the Foreign Service. In a lengthy conversation with US correspondents, he said he reluctantly concurred with the assessment of Hussein that "time is running out" on the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian problem. He also expressed uncertainty as to whether Israel's minimum objective to secure its border with Lebanon against enemy infiltration - would be achieved. Lewis' comments in the past week have stirred up some fury in Israel.

As Attacks On Beirut Camps Continue, Israelis Ask: 'Where Is World Outcry?'

***CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Curtius-As in Sept. 1982, there are once again reports of mass slayings in the camps. Relief workers have been prevented from entering the camps, where some of the wounded had reportedly bled to death. "Where are the headlines now?" one Israeli official asked a reporter sarcastically. "Where is the international outcry?" Israeli govt. analysts said they see the struggle for the camps as another step by the Syrian-backed Amal toward achieving hegemony over mostly Muslim west Beirut, where Amal has ruled jointly with the Druze since Feb. 1983. Israeli analysts also said they believe the Shiites primary concern is to consolidate their position as the most powerful military force in Lebanon.

Shuttle Trip Seen Aiding Arab Ties

WASH. POST-O'Toole-The first Arab scheduled to go into space said yesterday that his flight next month aboard the space shuttle Challenger is bound to improve diplomatic relations between the US and the Islamic world. "You will have 800 million Moslems and 155 million Arabs glued to their TV sets watching an American spaceship carry an Arab into space," Saudi Arabian Prince Sultan Salman Abdel Aziz Saud said. (He is the nephew of King Fahd.)

Airlift Of Ethiopian Jews To Israel May Sour US-Sudan Relations

***CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Willis- A stumbling block to good relations between the Reagan administration and the new govt. of the Sudan is the controversial issue of the Ethiopian Jews secretly airlifted to Israel. To many Muslim Sudanese, who consider themselves part of the Arab world, the use of their airports to help Jews go to Israel, with whom Sudan has no diplomatic relations, was an outrage. Gen. Abdul Rahman Swaraddahab, has begun an investigation. If he found those responsible, he said, he would put them on trial. "Many Sudanese believe that large amounts of dollars were given to Nimeiry to persuade him to agree to the airlift," said a Westerner in Khartoum. The clear implication of the US position is that Sudan is risking some of the massive US economic aid as well as famine relief aid if it goes ahead with a long public inquiry or trial.

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ANALYSIS

***Bloody Twists In Lebanese History Aren't News

THE SUN-Jefferson Price III- The week-long slaughter between Palestinians and Shiite Muslims at three Palestinian enclaves in Beirut represents the latest shift in Lebanon's tortuous modern history. A truth that must be felt most painfully in Israel, is that hardly any Lebanese, or outside observers, are surprised, or seem to care very much, that the death toll seems likely to exceed the casualties of the 1982 Christian massacres of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatilla that provoked a storm of international outrage. The fact that the desire to prevent a PLO return to the south appears to be shared for the moment by Syria and Israel, is an ironic twist in the political kaleidoscope of this land. Amal is now fulfilling both Israeli and Syrian objectives, and it enhances the view that Israel would have been wiser to cultivate the Shiites in Lebanon than to throw in its lot as it did with the Phalangists. The latest battle of Beirut will end when the Palestinians in Beirut have been disarmed and once again pose no threat to regroup in the capital or in south Lebanon. Then, the sordid truth of people murdered and mutilated will assault the international conscience, a little less this time, perhaps, because the images have become so commonplace.

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official text

May 30th, 1985

REAGAN SAYS CONDITIONS RIGHT TO PURSUE MIDEAST PEACE (1730)
(Transcript* Reagan, Hussein departure remarks and Q and A)

Washington -- President Reagan says that "conditions have never been more right than they are now" to pursue peace in the Middle East.

The president made the remark **May 29** at the White House in response to questions from reporters following his meeting with King Hussein of Jordan.

The king, in his departure remarks, said he had assured Reagan that "on the basis of the Jordan-PLO accord of 11th February, and as a result of my recent talks with the PLO...we are willing to negotiate within the context of an international conference, a peaceful settlement on the basis of the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 and 338."

Reagan told questioners that the idea of such an international conference "is under discussion."

"We have not resolved some differences that we have in views on this. But we're going to certainly continue in these discussions," he said.

Following is the transcript of remarks by Reagan and Hussein upon the king's departure from the White House*

(begin transcript)

PRESIDENT REAGAN* I have just concluded a very useful meeting and lunch with King Hussein. We all recognize that the positive atmosphere which has developed in the Middle East recently can be credited in great measure to His Majesty, King Hussein. Steps he's taken over the last year gave new momentum to the search for peace.

Our discussions today have provided further evidence of Jordan's commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflicts, which should prompt a sense of gratitude from men of goodwill everywhere.

The United States has long played a central role in the Middle East peace process. We're proud of what we've helped accomplish. And we look forward to continuing to make meaningful contributions. But we hope that His Majesty's courageous steps forward can lead to direct negotiations between the parties, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 by the end of this year. And we'll do our part to help bring this about.

Our goal remains a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace which will satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and provide for the security of all states in the region, including Israel.

We recognize Jordan's economic and security needs. And in the spirit of working together, I have told the king that he will be able to count on the United States for assistance in addressing problems which Jordan may face in those areas.

We are pleased and proud to have had His Majesty here with us today.

KING HUSSEIN* Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. President, for your kind words.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have had a full, friendly, and useful discussion with the president on all issues of mutual concern.

Regarding the prospects of peace in our area, I have told the



president that a just, comprehensive, and durable peace in the Middle East should secure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right of self determination, within the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.

I have also assured the president that on the basis of the Jordan-PLO accord of 11 February, and as a result of my recent talks with the PLO, and in view of our genuine desire for peace, we are willing to negotiate within the context of an international conference, a peaceful settlement on the basis of the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

We are offering a unique opportunity for peace which might not be with us for long. I hope the United States, under the courageous and dedicated leadership of President Reagan, will find a way to seize this opportunity and respond positively to our peace efforts. The active and balanced role of the United States is an essential element for the success of the peace process.

I should like to thank the president for his hospitality and kind words, and wish him continued good health and every success.

Q* Your Majesty, question, please.

PRESIDENT REAGAN* Go ahead.

Q* If you can hear me, sir, can you explain, please, why Jordan needs an international conference in order to negotiate with Israel? Couldn't it do it directly? Could you elaborate a little on what your thinking is?

KING HUSSEIN* In that regard, it is our hope that an international conference would enable the parties to the conflict to negotiate the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

We need the international umbrella to offer us the opportunity to negotiate. And when I speak of negotiations, I obviously mean negotiations amongst the parties to the conflict, in other words, negotiations between the Arab side, in this case, a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, with Israel on the other side.

Q* Mr. President, what is your view of such an international conference?

PRESIDENT REAGAN* This is under discussion, and we have not resolved some differences that we have in views on this. But we're going to, certainly, continue in these discussions.

Q* What are the problems that remain, the definition of Palestinian --

-- Palestinian representation in the delegation. Have you agreed on the Palestinian representation in the delegation -- especially Jordan said PLO should be represented?

PRESIDENT REAGAN* We have made it very plain, heretofore, and nothing has changed, with regard to those conditions under which we would meet with the PLO.

Q* Well, your Majesty, if I may ask, whether it's an umbrella of an international conference or not, you would be negotiating directly with Israel for the first time, would you not?

KING HUSSEIN* Well, I can cite an example of the international conference of 1973. We met and negotiations were carried out between the Arab side and Israel.

Q* So, you are saying this is not new? This is not a different form of direct negotiation?

KING HUSSEIN* This is, I believe, a last chance for peace. We are approaching it, as I explained, determined to do all we could for the establishment of a just and durable peace in our area. And, obviously, when we speak of negotiations, we speak of them within the context of an international conference, but negotiations amongst the parties to the conflict.

Q* On a non-belligerent basis?

KING HUSSEIN* Well, we certainly are approaching the whole issue not in a belligerent fashion. I am almost sure of that.

Q* Your Majesty, has the PLO agreed to this framework, sir?

KING HUSSEIN* What I have said in my statement is the result of my discussions with the PLO, yes.

Q* Your Majesty, are you committed to going forward -- talks can take place this year?



backgrounder

May 30th, 1985

U.S. TO EXPLORE HUSSEIN'S CALL FOR MIDEAST CONFERENCE (Article on Reagan-Hussein meeting, briefing)

by Alexander M. Sullivan
USIA White House Correspondent

Washington -- The United States wants to further explore King Hussein's call for an international conference on the Middle East, President Reagan said May 29.

Jordan's king, in remarks to reporters after meeting Reagan, announced that the Palestine Liberation Organization had agreed to direct negotiations with Israel in the context of such an international conference in order to reach a peace agreement based on United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. He said his announcement was based on agreement with the PLO leadership, which has previously shunned explicit endorsement of the two resolutions.

Hussein, who reached agreement last February with PLO leader Yasser Arafat on a joint Palestinian-Jordanian peace delegation, said he had assured Reagan that on the basis of that accord and more recent conversations with the PLO leadership, "we are willing to negotiate, within the context of an international conference, a peaceful settlement on the basis of the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 and 338."

The king told a questioner that the Palestinians and Jordanians "need an international umbrella" to engage in direct negotiations with Israel. "We are offering," the monarch said, "a unique opportunity for peace which might not be with us for long."

Asked his view of the proposed conference, Reagan replied: "This is under discussion. We have not resolved some differences that we have in views on this. We're going to certainly continue in these discussions."

A senior administration official told a questioner the president was not hinting that the United States might withdraw previous objections to an international conference, which might include participation by the Soviet Union as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.

Asked directly if Washington is ready to accept Soviet participation, the official said that the question has no easy answer. "We understand," he said, "the king's desire for international support for whatever agreement might emerge from a negotiating process. We believe it is a key question."

But the official said "the process by which such support is gained has to be structured so that it contributes to the peace process (and) doesn't detract from it, doesn't derail it."

He said U.S. diplomats have not "dropped our concerns that a conference would be a setback for the peace process, as we've said in the past, that it would be an exercise in political theater, rhetoric."

The official said discussion of the conference had not reached a point where "we feel we have the answers" on whether it would contribute to progress toward peace, whether "on balance, a conference is going to be a plus or a minus in the peace process." Told that there seemed to be a considerable "softening" of the previous U.S. stance on such a conference, and asked why there had been a change in

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position, the official replied, "Nothing is static. You've got movement. You've got a fluid situation." But he noted concerns about the conference remain, and will be discussed with the king and his advisers during the remainder of the monarch's stay in Washington. The king has cancelled a private visit to California, but will remain in Washington through May 30 as scheduled.

Turning to the implications for U.S. recognition of the PLO contained in the king's remarks, the official noted Washington has not heard directly from the organization, and would require a positive affirmation from the group. The president, in chatting with reporters, noted there has been no change in the U.S. position -- it will not recognize nor negotiate with the PLO until that group recognizes Israel's right to exist as a nation, accepts U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for a settlement, and renounces the use of terrorism.

Asked if the king's announcement that the joint delegation would negotiate a settlement on the basis of the resolutions met U.S. conditions, the official acknowledged there has been progress. Noting that the statements did not come directly from the PLO, he added, "I did not hear the two phrases (Israel's right to exist and renunciation of terrorism), but that may well be subsumed in the phrases of the king's departure statement when he speaks of agreement having been reached ... (on 242 and 338)... But we have not heard this" from the PLO. Asked if Washington would require an affirmative statement from that organization, he replied, "I would think we certainly would, yes.... It would have to come directly in an affirmative, unequivocal way from the PLO."

The official told reporters "you have heard a significant statement" from Hussein, "which we are told was fully coordinated with the PLO leadership." While shunning acceptance of the word "breakthrough," the official said "there has been a lot that is positive" in the meetings in Washington. "We've got something to build on." He pointed out the king's willingness to negotiate is not a new position for Jordan, but went on to say that "he made this affirmation in light of his recent discussions with the PLO, and this is progress."

The official said the possibility of a meeting between a U.S. team and a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation continues as an option. Discussing the difficulty of getting Palestinian representation acceptable to Israel, the official pointed out the group that meets with Washington would not necessarily be the negotiating team for the peace talks. "I'm not sure that that group was ever intended from the Arab side to be the group that would go through to the table with Israel," he said.

He said the group that would meet with a U.S. team would be significant since it will be composed in light of the Hussein-Arafat accord of February 11 and would be "seen from the Palestinian and Jordanian side as contributing to a broadened understanding of what the peace process would involve. It is not seen as a negotiating group. I learned that much more about it in the talks" in Washington. He said the delegation would "discuss the basic issues concerning the peace process, but not in a negotiation."

Referring to Hussein's wish that the United States "seize" the opportunity to advance the process, the official said he believes the king's remark "comes from his conviction that time is running out very fast and that soon there will be nothing to negotiate that would be even minimally acceptable as a basis for negotiation... He would like the United States committed as a full partner in helping develop the framework for negotiations... We've always said that we would be a full partner in that effort... to get things going."

Both the president and the king expressed hope that progress in the peace process could be made this year.

KING HUSSEIN* I am certainly hoping very, very much, indeed, that we will see some progress this year, yes.

Q* Mr. President, have they come up with a Palestinian delegation acceptable to you?

PRESIDENT REAGAN* This is all being worked on right now with us -- or together. This is what we are discussing.

Q* Mr. President, the king has said that this opportunity will only be with us for a short time. In view of the situation in Lebanon, is there not something the United States can do immediately to speed this process?

PRESIDENT REAGAN* We think that the situation in Lebanon with regard to the peace process will be resolved completely when Israel has made its complete withdrawal from Lebanon.

Q* Mr. President, do you feel the need to send out a new envoy to the area to be able to continue all these negotiations between the different parties?

PRESIDENT REAGAN* Well, no. The people we have working there are going to continue.

Q* Mr. President, do you want to involve the Soviets at this point, at this preliminary point, in this quest for a peace agreement? Do you think that would help or hinder the process?

PRESIDENT REAGAN* Well, I'm not going to respond to that question because, as I say, we're still discussing this whole matter and I'm not going to get into any great details -- things of that kind.

Q* Is that one of the problems, Mr. President? Is that one of the problems -- Soviet participation?

PRESIDENT REAGAN* As I say, just generally, we are discussing and hopeful at arriving at a solution.

Q* Your Majesty, does your proposal include Soviet participation?

KING HUSSEIN* I have spoken of an international conference and of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Q* So the Soviets would be included?

KING HUSSEIN* Well, that's what we're all working on, as the president has said.

Q* Well, your Majesty, when you talk about 242 as being a governing principle, are the Palestinians agreed on that? Are you telling us --

KING HUSSEIN* Yes, sir. I am saying that.

Q* That the Palestinians agreed that 242 and 338 are the governing resolutions?

KING HUSSEIN* Every word I have made in my statement is a result of agreement between us and the PLO.

Q* Arafat? The PLO?

KING HUSSEIN* PLO, yes.

Q* Mr. President would you recognize the PLO if they accepted 242 and 338?

PRESIDENT REAGAN* His Majesty has said that they've discussed this and, yes, that this --

Q* I am asking if you would recognize -- the United States would recognize the PLO if they accept 242 and 338 explicitly?

PRESIDENT REAGAN* Well, as I have said, our terms have been made very plain for quite some time as to what is necessary for us to negotiate with the PLO, and they remain unchanged.

Q* Your Majesty, did you discuss the sale of Hawk missiles by the U.S. to Jordan?

Q* Why did you say it was the last time --

KING HUSSEIN* I think we have said enough, sir.

Q* Why did you say it was the last chance --

PRESIDENT REAGAN* I will answer then, this word that this was the last chance, and then this is the last we're going to take. The last chance -- I think that the conditions have never been more right than they are now to pursue this peace. And who knows whether those conditions will ever come as close together again as they have now. So that's why I think the term "last chance." And I think we ought to keep that in mind, that perhaps it is the last chance.

(end transcript)

טגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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אל: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א

ביקור חוסיין
מפלטרו הבוקר (0930)

- א. במשך הלילה קיים מפיי שיחות ארוכות עם ריפאעי, כשהאמריקנים מדברים על מו"מ ישיר והירדנים על ועידה בינלאומית.
- ב. פלטרו לא היה בטוח אם ניתן יהיה להשיג אוחן הצהרות חיוביות שהאמריקנים קיוו להם, אם כי יהיו אלמנטים חיוביים. ככל הנראה לא תמיה חצהרה ירדנית על תמיכה במו"מ ישיר. לשאלתי אמר כי האלמנטים החיוביים שייחכנו הם התיחסות ל- 242/ 338 כאילו על דעת עראפאת. אמרתי כי מתר נשמע הכחשות מעראפאת.
- ג. חוסין כנראה יחזור על הקריאה לוועידה בינ"ל.
- ד. חלק מהבעיה הוא אם המלך ירצה להטיב פומבית על שאלות או לתת הצהרה בלבד. למחמ"ד לא ידוע על אפשרות קיצור הביקור שדובר עליו היום ב"ווש"נגטון פוסט".


רובינשטיין

שהג ההגשה
מאמץ רב מאין
מנסה מ/אנס מרמז מנסה מ/אנס

אל: ווש, נד: 864, מ: המשרד
 דח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 290585, לח: 1600
 נד: מתגים

שמודר/רגיל

דובינשיין - הראל - לשלכם 602 ולשלנו 600.
 מתגים - כל שבקשנו הוא לשקול הכנת נייר הנחיה לקונסוליות,
 שיתואם עמנו טרם ישלח כדי שיוכל לשמשם בשעת הצורך. אין זה
 בלתי סביר להניח שעם הפתח המשפט יקבל הנושא בסוי בולט. הראל
 במברקו 602 מציין בעצמו 'שרוב הפרשנים מייחסים לישראל שאינה
 בוחלת באמצעים בשמדובר בכושרה הגרעיני' וכי עד כה לא קבל
 הנושא בסוי רחב גם בשל העדרם של מרבית הכתבים המדיניים
 העוסקים בענייננו בשל שהייתם בוינה עם שולץ.

נודה על התייחסותכם להצעתנו. שהיא באמוד דעת הממונכיל.
 מצפא

תפ: שהח, דהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, פרנ, משפט, יגר, הסברה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אל: המשרד, נר: 100, ט: לוסאנגלס
רח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 280585, רח: 1530

טיידי/שמו

אל: לשכת רוהמי, ימי

תא: לשכת הקונבלי, לאי

מהוואי

הודון: ברכות לסנטור DANIEL INOUCHE
1. נא ספולכם בשלנו מה-7 במאי, נר 37

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכלי, ממנכר, מצפא, טקס

אל: נושא, נר: 823, מ: המשדר
 דח: ר, סג: ס, תא: 280585, יח: 1300

סודי/מיד

תדרוך - תגובתי - מדיניות בריהים בטוהית
 1. למבדקכם 516 מ-21.5.85.

א. חלק מדברי המקור תמוה וחלק אחד סותר מידע קיים:
 1. הקביעה כי הפעם האחרונה בה קויימו בצמרת הסובייטית
 דיונים שלא בנושא מריית שוטפים היתה בשנתיים לפני מות
 ברז'נייב - תמוהה. ראשית נשאלת השאלה האם משתמע מקביעה
 זו כי למקור מידע קשה בכל פעם בה מתקיים דיון עקרוני
 בהנהגה בנושאי מריית שנית אפשר להבין את סוגיית ה-5-5
 כצעד תגובתי סובייטי נכפי שמוען המקור) כשם שאפשר
 לראות בתכנית ההסדר הסובייטית מילוי '84 צעד טקטי (נאף
 כי נכללו בה מספר חידושים מעניינים). עם זאת קשה לקבל טענה
 כי צעדים אלה ואחרים ננקטו ללא כל הערכת מצב כוללת
 בהנהגה, זאת לאור התפוכות באזור בשנתיים: שלוש
 האחדונות.

2. לא ברורה קביעת המקור כי טוריה קיבלה במרוצת השנים סיוע
 כלכלי מן הגדולים שניתן עיי בריהים למדינה זרה. עפיי
 הנתונים שבפרסומי ה- CIA לא זו בלבד שאין הדבר כך
 אלא שאף בין מדינות המזרחית מפגרת טוריה בהיקף האשראי
 הסובייטי שקיבלה אחרי תורכיה, מצרים, איראן (נאף עיראק,
 מבחינת ניצול האשראי שהועמד לרשותה). פאם לא בלבד כאן
 המקור בין סיוע צבאי לכלכלי?

2. למבדקכם 491 מ-20 מאי 85: -

א. לא ברור מתי המליץ ברוטנמס על התרחקות מסודיה וחיוור
 אחרים המתונים בעולם הערבי, כמו חוסיין. (נאמר, שיחה או
 מידע חסוי שבידי המקור).

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1. האם יש להם מידע 'טרי' בדבר יחסו השליילי של הממסד הצבאי לחידוש יחסים עם ישראל או שמדובר בהשערות בלבד.
3. כדאי היה לבקש מן השניים להסביר דבריהם ולו גם כדי שלהבא יונהר בדיוח מתי הוא מבוסס על מידע ומתי על השערות.

המרכז/א"סוף

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, רם, אמן, מצפא,
מראד

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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540 EAST 57TH STREET
CHICAGO, ILL. 60637

1968

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5576

** יוצא
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סודי

אל: מקמר, ווש, נר: חורים 2028, מ: המשרד
דח: ד, סג: ס, תא: 280585, רח: 1300

סודלי/רגיל

אג'ת/מטבלי

V.O.A

ענה מסתבר שאחד הגורמים המרכזיים מבקש לעיין בכל הנושא ואף
ביצוי
שיתן תשובתו ב-1/6 קשה לסמוך על כך. לאור זאת לא נוכל
להתחייב
לתאריך מסוים בשלב זה ואנו מבקשים שמטלחת הסקר תמתין עד אשר
תפול
החלטה סופית על האתר שיוצע על ידינו

אנא הבהר שאנו עושים כל מאמץ לודו תהליך ההחלטה

מצפא

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפ : שיהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, מצפא, משפט, ר/מרכו, ממד, רם,
אמן

דף 1. מסודר 3. דפים

שוגר בטחוני בלמס

דמי פוסט

מסרף ודפים - 28/4

מסרף 681

(7)

אלו המשרד

133/

חודון: הסנטור איגלטון מבצע שליג.

1. לאור חידיעות בכלי התקשורת לאחרונה, מבקש הסנטור הנ"ל קיום - Hearings בדבר המצב בין ארצ"ב לישראל בחדשים שקדמו למבצע שליג, דעו האכ"ע ודנה הכלי.
2. רצ"ב מכתבו של איגלטון ליו"ר ועדת החוץ ולבכיר המיעוט בוועדה, יחד עם הודעה לעתונות בנדון (שניהם מה- 24.5)

למדי

אולי 313

מח	מח	מח	מח	מח	מח	מח	מח	מח
2	1+1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2

THOMAS F. EAGLETON
MEMPHIS

2/3

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

681

May 24, 1985

Senator Richard G. Lugar
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee
Senator Claiborne Pell
Ranking Minority Member
Foreign Relations Committee
440 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Dick and Claiborne:

Please note the attached article from the Washington Post of May 24, 1985 entitled "Envoy says Sharon outlined invasion plan to U.S. in 1981."

I think it is imperative that the Foreign Relations Committee hold hearings and clarify precisely what was the situation between the United States and Israel in the months preceding the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, at the time of the invasion itself, and during the operation of the invasion.


What did we know and when did we know it? Who knew it? Did then Secretary of State Alexander Haig give a green, orange, or red light? Did we "impede" in any way General Sharon's desire to capture an Arab capital? Did Ambassador Lewis, Ambassador Habib, Ambassador Draper "lie," as General Sharon charges? Begin and Sharon were "hell bent" to invade Lebanon. Did we encourage, benignly condone it, oppose it, criticize it, try to constrict it, try to contain it, try to limit it?

We all know Lebanon became a disaster resulting in the loss of close to 300 American lives, around 650 Israeli lives, and untold thousands of Lebanese lives.

Lebanon was a mini-mess before the Israeli invasion; it is a maxi-mess after same.

The Congress and the American people ought to know, by benefit of a public record, what happened, when, why, how, and who.

Best personal regards,


Thomas F. Eagleton
United States Senator

TFE:bw

News from 681 3/3 Senator Tom Eagleton

U.S. Senate, Washington 20510 - 202/224-5721

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
FRIDAY, MAY 24, 1985

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
JON AUSTIN 202/224-5721

EAGLETON CALLS FOR HEARINGS ON U.S. ROLE IN LEBANON INVASION

Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, today called on the committee leadership to hold hearings to "clarify precisely what was the situation between the United States and Israel in the months preceding the invasion of Lebanon, at the time of the invasion itself, and during the operation of the invasion."

In a letter to Committee Chairman Richard Lugar and Ranking Minority Member Claiborne Pell, Eagleton spelled out the essential questions that such a hearing must answer:

"What did we know and when did we know it? Who knew it? Did then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig give a green, orange, or red light? Did we 'impede' in any way General Sharon's desire to capture an Arab capital? Did Ambassador Lewis, Ambassador Habib, Ambassador Draper 'lie,' as General Sharon charges? Begin and Sharon were 'hell bent' to invade Lebanon. Did we encourage, benignly condone it, oppose it, criticize it, try to constrict it, try to contain it, try to limit it?"

Eagleton closed his letter by saying, "Lebanon was a mini-mess before the Israeli invasion; it is a maxi-mess after same. The Congress and the American people ought to know, by benefit of a public record, what happened, when, why, how and who." KJ 32

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(5)

פגירות ישראל - וושינגטון
ד.ל.ל. מחזור... 24.12.85
סוג בשחוני... סנדל...
מילדי
דחיסות...
תאריך וזיהוי... 28 מאי 1985
85
677

אל - : ממ"ד
דע - : מצפ"א

ביקור חוסין ותהליך השלום - הערות

1. עם בוא חוסין לוונשינגטון מצטיירת התמונה בקווים כלליים על טמך שיחות והתרשמויות כדלקמן.
2. הסיכויים לפרסום הודעה ירדנית "דרמטית" בד בבד עם ביקור חוסין או במהלכו נראים מועטים בלשון זהירה למרות מאמצי ארה"ב עד לרגע האחרון, לרבנת שיגור מרפי לרוז איילנד ובוא רפאעי לכאן.
3. טביר שהקושי המרכזי נערץ בכך שארה"ב בדעה שהודעה שתעיד על התקדמות ושתיצור אוירה ותנאים ל"ביקור טוב" (נשק) חייבת לכלול סעיפים אופרטיביים, להבדיל מהצהרת כוונות בלבד. מרכיבים אופרטיביים כנ"ל יכולים לבוא משני תחומים - מו"מ ישיר ויתר קונקרטיזציה ביחס למועד המו"מ בין ישראל וירדן.
4. דא עקא מרכיבים אלה עומדים ביסוד התפיסה המנוגדת בין ארה"ב (וישראל) מחד לבין ירדן (והפלסטי) מאידך :
(א) ירדן מתנגדת למו"מ ישיר בשלב הנראה לעין ושלא באמצעות ועדה בינ"ל או מערכת אחרת שבה ניתן "למהגול" את הנרשא, גם אם מקבלים את ההנחה שחוסין בסתר לבו (בשיחות עם האמריקאים) מסכים לכך אך מצבו הגיאוגרפי-אסטרטגי מהווה אילוץ שלא ניתן להתגבר עליו. מחלך מעין זה, עד כמה שזכור, לא נדון או אושר בפורום ערבי כלשהו לרבות לא במשתמע. קשה להניח שחוסין יטול על מהלך העלול, בלשון המעטה, לסכן את יחסו עם סביבתו הפוליטית ועודיה, מפרציות ועיראק. גם הפוליטיקאים במחמ"ד, שלא לדבר על אנשי המחקר שם מודים שהעזה כזו היא למעשה למעלה מכוחותיו. הדבר הובחר בנובמבר 84 כאשר מובארכ נאלץ לשנות יוזמתו משיחות ישירות בין משלחת משותפת לבין ישראל לשיחות עם ארה"ב.
(ב) איזכור אלמנט של זמן לגבי הצטרפות ירדן לשיחות עם ישראל (כגון השמועות שפורחות כאן על סוף השנה) כמוהו כהודעת בריש גלי שירדן מוכנה להצטרף גם ללא אש"פ, היה וזה יכזיב במועד זה. מרכיבי ההליכה המשותפת, ההתחייבויות שירדן לא תדבר בשם אש"פ ושהארגון הדובר והנציג של הפלסטינאים הם מן האלמנטים המודגשים ביותר ע"י ירדן.

עם התחלת הביקור ירדן תצטרף לשיחות עם ישראל (כגון השמועות שפורחות כאן על סוף השנה) כמוהו כהודעת בריש גלי שירדן מוכנה להצטרף גם ללא אש"פ, היה וזה יכזיב במועד זה. מרכיבי ההליכה המשותפת, ההתחייבויות שירדן לא תדבר בשם אש"פ ושהארגון הדובר והנציג של הפלסטינאים הם מן האלמנטים המודגשים ביותר ע"י ירדן.

ש ו י ס

דף... 2... מתוך... 3... דפים

סוג בטהוני

דחיות

תאריך וזמן

מס' מברק 677

אל:

(ג) התייחסות לאש"פ. קשה לראות כיצד חוסין יוכל להתחמק, כך או אחרת, מאי קשירה כלשהי בין אש"פ לבין התהליך.

5. דרך אפשרית לפתרון נשוא ההודעה והופעותיו הפומביות כאן, היא הביניים - יותר "סולידית" אך פחות חדשנית. מצפים פה שחוסין יעשה קומפליציה בין כל מרכיבי התבטאויותיו עד כה בנושא השלום עם ישראל. זו עשויה להכיל נכונות לשלום על בסיס החלטות 242 ו-338 כולל אלמנט אופרטיבי בזמנות טיוס מצב המלחמה. עם כל החידוש בכך צריך לזכור שזכות היוצרים לכך שמורה בידי אסד שהודיע בהודמנויות שונות שמהות השלום הסורי עם ישראל היא יצירת מצב של טיוס המלחמה.

6. בין אם תפורסם הודעה ובין אם לאו כדאי לשים לב שארה"ב פיתחה 2 ערוצי תקשורת בו זמנית בנושא המשלחת ותהליך השלום, האחד עם ישראל והשני עם ירדן ותפלסטינאים, כאשר החלק הנוגע לפלסטינאים נמצא "בשטח אפור" הגובל עם אש"פ. יתר על כן בשעה שעם ישראל הודו שיח מתנהל במישור העקרוני כגון האם חברי המלי"פ הם "לא אש"פ" הרי בערוץ השני ישנה למעשה הבנה בין שלושת המרכיבים הנ"ל שהחלק הפלסטינאי במשלחת הנ"ל יכול להכיל חברי המלי"פ. בברורינו כאן ניתן אישור לכך שאמנם לא קיימות "רשימות" כלשהן אך לא הוכחש שבשיחות השונות הועלו ונדונו שמות של בודדים. במכלול זה האמריקאים שואפים לצמצם את היקף האישים הבאים בחשבון כגון העדפת אלה שקשריהם עם המלי"פ רופפים ואילו הצד השני עומד על הכללת חברי מלי"פ המזוהים ישירות עם אש"פ. הערכה הנשמעת כאן מפי גורמים שונים היא שהמו"מ על כך הוא עוד לפנינו ושאש"פ, קרי ערפאת, מוכן לגלות גמישות כלשהי.

7. ערפאת עצמו, עפ"י... ההערכות כאן, רוצה להטאיר את מצב העניינים בערפל מסויים לגבי המשלחת:

- (א) נוח לו לשיטתו המדינית.
- (ב) חשובה לו התדמית, שגם חוסין עושה לה נפשות, שיש לעשות הבחנה בין "אש"פ המתון" לבין האחרים.

(ג) ערפאת חותר, גם כאן בעזרת חוסין, להשגת הכרה בנושא "ההגדרה העצמית". שמעתי כבר מחוגים שונים (אמנם במסגרת) הצדקה מסויימת לכך בהבחנה שעושים בין זה לבין יישות עצמאית דביינו, לא כל הגדרה עצמית חייבת בהכרח למדינה עצמאית.

8. הביקור עצמו נראה בעיני רבים כאן כ"תיקון הקלקוליס" בין ירדן וארה"ב שליוו את היחסים בעקבותיה במשך תקופה מסויימת. לאחרונה גורמים במחמ"ד:

- (א) מברכים את חסין על יזמתו בענין תהליך השלום. הסכם עמאן מ-11.2.11 נראה כאן כציון דרך לכך, דהיינו ניתן לו יתר משקל ירדני מאשר אש"פ.

ס ו נ ס

ד...נ...מ...ד...ים

סווג בסחובי

דחיות

מאריך וז"ח

677

אלו

(ב) משמשים לו מליצי יושר בכך שמקבלים את קו הטעון המרכזי שלו שלא יוכל להתקדם ללא אש"ם. נדיר לשחזר תחזית ריקורה על חוסיו על שקשר גורלז עם ערפאת. דהיינו שבניתוח אובייקטיבי ניתן לצפות שחוסין ישיג את כל מה שחוא מקווה להשיג באמצעות הדיאלוג/הסכם עם אש"ם.

9. במצב זה נראה שביקור חוסין בתיבטו הירדני נועד להשגת כמה יעדים נוספים שהם בתחום "מוצרי לוואי" של תמליך השלום:

(א) ממשל - יש לזכור שחוסין מגיע הנה עם תדמית של מי שהכזיב את הציפיות האמריקאיות לגבי תכנית רייגן מטפטי 82. מהרבה בחינות הביקור מטיים פרשה זו. חוסין אף מגיע עם תדמית של מי שיוזם ופועל לקידום תהליך השלום הסכם עמאן, יחסיו עם מצרים וכד'. אגב, במקביל, כך טוענים שזפרו יחסיו עם המזכיר שלא נודעו בחמימות יתרה.

(ב) דעת קהל - סביר שחוסין יקרין שהוא המנהיג הערבי העושה ככל יכולתו לקידום השלום ושחוא (ביחד עם הפלסטינאים) מיצה את עצמו בנתונים הקיימים אם יתר הגורמים ארה"ב וישראל לא ישקיעו מהונם.

(ג) מכירות נשק. טפק אם הממשל יוכל לצייד את חוסין כבר בביקורו במשהו מוגדר. מאידך, אין טפק שהממשל ירצה לנצל האירוע כמנוף להסרת מכשולים מדרכו ליעד זה. מגמה זו מקבלת ביטוי מפורש יותר (ארמקוסט).

10. קשה שלא להתרשם מפרופיל הנמוך עד כה של ביקור חוסין בעתונות ובהצגתו ע"י גורמי מחמ"ד. הדבר בולט בהשוואה לביקורי מנחיגים בינ"ל ערבים ואחרים אפילו בהשוואה לבורגיבה הישיש (וושינגטון פוסט) העומד להגיע בעקבות גנדי. אין לנו הסבר לגבי העתונות אך מצד מחמ"ד הדבר משתלב בזהירות המופלגת שנוקטים כאשר כל אישה תרשם כהישג.

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המשרד

(47)

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מרכז

בקור חוסיין

תדרוך פלטריו היום לקראת הבקור מחר.

הראל


MR. PELLETREAU: Then we can go right to questions. I'm sure you all heard Ambassador Murphy a few minutes ago, at the White House, go over the schedule and go over a little of the backdrop and what's been leading up to this visit. I would say that there were a number of questions thrown at him about recent developments, that are not directly related to King Hussein's visit, and this background briefing is on King Hussein's visit, not the other developments. So, I'd like to steer away from them.

Let me just say a couple of things in addition. First, that King Hussein comes as a traditional friend of the United States, with longstanding close ties, in a personal as well as official sense. He has just seen his son graduate from Brown University. It was only natural that the President invite him to Washington, in connection with that private visit, to review current developments and also our relations, both in the bilateral and the regional sense.

We are not -- I would steer you away, I would say, from expecting momentous news or breakthroughs, as we say, but the visit does take place in the context of a number of developments in the Middle East, that point in the direction of possible broader peace negotiations with Israel. And the United States would like to see the momentum in that direction maintained, and we will be looking forward to discussing how that can be done, including how the United States can be actively involved in helping maintain that momentum.

So, we do have the expectation that we will have in-depth discussions over the next couple of days, on the peace process. The visit does take place against a backdrop of a new round of tragic fighting in Beirut which points up, as Ambassador Murphy said, just how important it is to be working energetically for a resolution of Palestinian issues, through negotiations.

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Bilaterally, US-Jordanian relations have always been close and cooperative. The US has programs of economic and security cooperation with the Kingdom of Jordan which go back many years, which in the current year total \$20 million in economic assistance, and \$90 million in security assistance.

For the coming year, FY '86, we have proposals before the Congress for \$20 million in economic assistance and \$95 million in security assistance.

We recognize that Jordan has legitimate security concerns and requirements, and that there's a relationship between feeling secure at home and following an assertive policy in promotion of peace. And, of course, the question of possible arms sales, which people

have on their minds, falls within this context. But the Middle East Arms Transfer Study, which we have been engaged in for several months, has not yet been wrapped up and completed, although it is nearing completion -- (laughter) -- and no decisions have been taken with respect to arms questions or possible arms packages.

MR. JACOBS: We'll go to questions. I would remind you, please identify yourself and please speak into these microphones.

Q Raphael Khalis, Kuwait News Agency. Mr. Pelletreau, do you think in the light of the recent fighting in Lebanon that PLO leader Yasser Arafat can deliver, or is it your evaluation that, in fact, the Syrians have maneuvered it in such a way that he will be pushed to become more hardline, and therefore be unable to take part in the peace process, or even approve non-PLD members to participate in the talks? What will that mean to the Hussein visit and the initiative as a whole?

MR. PELLETREAU: Well, I don't know how the fighting in Lebanon is going to impact on the PLO as an organization, or on Mr. Arafat's position. About all I'd want to say is that the fighting in Lebanon is a new, tragic, turn, both in the Lebanon context and in the context of the position of the Palestinian people, who are suffering, again, another tragic development. And it seems, it would seem to me, if I would just extrapolating logically from that, that it does give new strength to the argument that we've got to begin addressing Palestinian issues in negotiations.

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The other courses are not productive courses. And we see what's happened in the past, what's happening in the present, what might continue to happen in the future, as long as there are not negotiated solutions to these issues.

Q But if he cannot deliver, where will this lead you? What will be the next phase? What will be the next stage? What will be King Hussein's position?

MR. PELLETREAU: Well, look, we recognize that out of the February 11 agreement, the framework agreement, and before it and after it, there is a great deal of political debate going on in the Palestinian community over these issues, and, obviously, it is the Palestinian community itself that must determine its position. We think there is a great deal of support within the Palestinian community for the course that Arafat and Hussein are launched on.

Q Oded Manot (?), Ma'Ariv Daily. I understand the expectations are modest, Secretary Murphy said. Although, do you expect a kind of statement by King Hussein on the Middle East peace process that might show that he is more pragmatic and forthcoming and that might justify an arms sale to Jordan?

MR. PELLETREAU: I don't think that that is in accord with a modest expectation, a statement of that sort. But it's traditional that there are statements after the meetings between head of state

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and President, and I would expect there'd be some sort of a statement. But, again, I would not really be hanging on the edge of my chair about something along the lines you've said.

Q Kamal al-Barazy, Watt-al-Araby magazine, Paris. Sir, can you clarify for once, and for all, about the list? They have been talking more than a couple of months about this. Do you have the list? Does the list contain PNC members or American Palestinian professors, or what? Can you clarify, please?

MR. PELLETREAU: I can make a couple of statements but I doubt if I can clarify it to your satisfaction. There is no list, as such. There have been some names floated and talked about. But there hasn't been a formal list that has been forwarded to us or, as far as I know, agreed on.

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Obviously, at some point, in the process, as it moves forward, one would expect to get into the question of who makes up the delegation. But that isn't a question that we are in the front line of. And I am just not sure that people are at that point yet. Obviously, names are very important, when that time comes.

Q John Roberts, Middle East Economic Digest. You spoke of the necessity of the US considering moves as far as actually being involved in the peace process. Is the US giving active consideration to the possibility of an exchange, or perhaps recognizing Palestinian rights to self determination, should Arafat accept, specifically, 242?

MR. PELLETREAU: I don't think that I am going to get into the substance of elements that might make up part of this conversation. But -- or these discussions that the King is having. But I should say, in that regard, that there has been no change at all in the US position with respect to dealing with the PLO. And that's been stated a lot of times.

Q Magda Abu-Fadi, Middle East Affairs News Service. Getting back to this list, you say there is no list, per se. However, according to the Washington Times today, the agreement on the list versus who could represent the Palestinians apparently came while Secretary of State George Shultz was in the Middle East earlier this month, according to an administration source, and that this list was brought up with the King, with King Hussein, in a closed meeting that did not include aides. Would you confirm that or deny it?

MR. PELLETREAU: There has not been a formal list, as such, presented. There has been, I would say, some preliminary types of discussions about people. But there's not a list.

Q So would you say that this was somewhat misleading, then, this report?

MR. JACOBS: It was wrong.

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MR. PELLETREAU: I guess I'd have to call it ambitious journalism.

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Q Kandi Fouad, Al Ahram newspaper, Cairo. If I understand clearly what has been said so far, has the United States put any kind of precondition on the talks, that the talks should be bilateral, I mean direct talks, between the Israelis and the Arab side? If this condition is met and accepted by the Arabs then the United States can discuss a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, who is going to sit at the table, who is going to be on this list, if this is correct?

The second question, as we understood from the briefing by Mr. Murphy, the Americans are going to put some ideas to King Hussein?

MR. PELLETREAU: Let's see. On the first question, of -- we think that talks should be, ultimately, direct, face to face talks, following the precedent of Egypt, and we think that that is the only sure way to arrive at agreements that will stick, is to have the people that are going to be involved in carrying out those agreements and living under those agreements, directly involved in reaching those agreements. That's a position that the United States has held for quite some time.

I don't say there is only one specific way of getting there. There may be lots of ways of getting there. That's part of the challenge of diplomacy. But that's where we would expect things to wind up.

Now, I think any talk about closing doors or ultimatums is not accurate. The King comes as a friend and he comes as somebody who has taken a number of very positive and helpful initiatives, in the Middle East, over the past months. And we'll be discussing these things with him in that regard.

Q Concerning the second part, that you're going to put steps and proposals, or ideas to the King?

MR. PELLETREAU: I would just say that we're looking forward to having productive, in-depth, discussions, and wouldn't want to get into the specifics of what we'll be discussing on that.

Q Seaan Seaan, BBC. On the names, are you expecting all the names to be presented by King Hussein?

MR. PELLETREAU: I don't, no. Honestly, I don't know. I don't know whether that point has been reached yet.

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Q From an Israeli point of view, to what extent do you feel that a warm-up of the relationship between Israel and Egypt, appointing the Ambassador and so on, is a preliminary condition to any kind of new proceeding?

MR. PELLETREAU: Well, I certainly think that a warmup, as you

put it, in the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, would contribute to a positive atmosphere.

Q Is it a precondition set by the Israelis?

MR. PELLETREAU: I'm not sure that anybody's speaking in terms of preconditions. In fact, I think that I'm right that Prime Minister Peres has called on King Hussein, has invited King Hussein, to discussion without preconditions, if I am correct. I think he has. I think that was in his acceptance speech before the Knesset.

Q Samir Kharan, Al Khafar news weekly of Lebanon. Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Murphy has just emphasized the fact that the Palestinian participation is not the only critical problem. Would you, kindly, say what are the other critical problems facing the peace process?

MR. PELLETREAU: No, I want to address that because I thought that some of the questions got a little off base on that question. I think all that he was trying to do was to say that formation of a delegation and US meetings with a Jordanian-Palestinian group of some sort should not be the only focus of everyone, and it's probably wrong to be looking at this visit in terms of whether that happens or not. I think all he was trying to do was to say that there are lots of things to discuss with respect to making progress toward peace in the Middle East, and formation of such a delegation is one. Creating the positive environment in the area is one, going back to a previous question.

Each of the potential parties operates within a given political context and improving the political context of each party is obviously one. So, there isn't just one specific thing. Your job is not that easy, in other words, that's all.

Q I have a followup to this. You, yourself, said that, you have frequently said, that there will be in-depth discussions this time.

MR. PELLETREAU: Yes, yes. Absolutely.

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Q Is this unique to this visit or has there always been in-depth discussion during the visit of the Secretary, during the visits of Mr. Murphy to the area?

MR. PELLETREAU: Well, I think it's just that this is the first time King Hussein will have been in Washington since some of these positive actions, these developments that he has taken. It is the first time that he and the President will have had a chance to sit down together, to discuss these things, and there is enough time during the visit, between his arrival today and when he departs, to be able to have productive sessions.

So, I wasn't meaning to say anything more than that, except that we're looking forward to it and we've got enough time on the schedule

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(to get into it.

Q Ouen (?), Davar, Israel. Ambassador Murphy said that we don't really know how to get from May 28th to December 31st, although many parties in the region believe that this is the year of opportunity. But if you already have only modest expectations for this visit, do you have any general outline, any general idea, of what the next steps are going to be? Are you waiting for this PLD-PNC committee to come up with another report on the King's address to the PNC on 242? And is there any possible change on American positions, vis-a-vis the Soviet and Jordanian call for an international conference, which is dependent, this possible change, on conditions in the Middle East changing?

MR. PELLETREAU: Yeah, I would say we don't have one, clear, idea of a specific scenario between now and the end of the year. That depends on the political context in which each of the potential parties to a negotiation operates. And I think it's a fair statement to say that we, and others, have seen 1985 as a potentially productive timeframe. It doesn't necessarily have to be 1985. But in the context of the political situation of the different parties, you do have, right now, King Hussein, President Mubarak, the Prime Minister of Israel, each of whom is interested in broader peace negotiations, but each of whom operates within his own particular political environment.

But those are assets that should be used. When you have three of the key leaders in the Middle East all interested in trying to move ahead in this time frame, I think the United States is interested in trying to move with them and in trying to help find a way into a constructive negotiating structure.

Q An international conference on the PNC committee?

MR. PELLETREAU: An international conference has not seemed to us to be a productive way to proceed. It has seemed to us to be more of a forum for stating maximum positions rather than a forum for serious, practical, negotiations. So there hasn't been any real change in the way we view it.

Q Mr. Murphy chose to point out -- (inaudible) -- self determination, he said, is the context of confederation and, therefore, he said, the Palestinians would make it appear that they were going to forego an independent state. Is this one of the contentious issues or is this a point that is being discussed among the critical issues, besides the list and other things?

MR. PELLETREAU: Yes.

Q And -- it is?

MR. PELLETREAU: Okay. Yes, I think -- if I recall correctly -- Ambassador Murphy used the word "apparently", in describing what we understood the accord to mean. But this is one of the ambiguous

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points of that accord. It is not that crystal clear specific. And we've seen different Palestinian spokesmen since, interpret that language in different ways. So, I would say that if our reading is a correct reading of it, then that's a positive step, to us.

But I's not positive that it's been definitively defined.

Q So the question is are you asking for a clearcut explanation of this proposal, or are you willing to discuss the self determination concept? Is there a give and take on both sides or only are you trying to get a declaration of the other side?

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MR. PELLETREAU: I don't think that we are specifically asking for something, in that respect. I do think that's one of the questions that has to be in our minds and in the minds of others who would come to negotiations, to try to understand just what the various ambiguous and uncertain points of the Hussein-Arafat framework accord really mean. Yeah.

Q Semaan Semaan. Can I follow up on this, please? Why do you stay so ambiguous when you have had ample time to verify everything on the Jordanians and Palestinians?

MR. PELLETREAU: I don't think the accord was specifically pointed at the United States. It was specifically pointed at defining Jordanian-Palestinian relationships and providing a basis on which both Jordan and the PLO leadership would be developing political support for a common position. So, I'm not sure it's up to us, at this point, to seek specific clarifications on it, and I am not going into everything that we've discussed with the Jordanians.

Q Joseph Polakoff, Canadian Jewish newspapers. I wonder if you could tell us what your feeling is as to whether progress can really be made towards a negotiation for some kind of talks leading to negotiations until the situation in Lebanon is settled in some way where there's some order, and Syria then could be approached?

MR. PELLETREAU: I don't think that the situation in Lebanon is either a necessary impediment or a necessary precondition or situation to be resolved before you approach the subject of broader peace talks. Obviously, Syria has to be a concerned and involved party. We have always said ourselves that Security Council Resolution 242 applies on all fronts, and that includes the Golan Heights. And we would hope that issues between Israel and Syria would be resolved, through negotiations between those two countries, and we, certainly from our part, do not suggest that Syria ought to be excluded in some way from any talks or negotiations.

Now, having said that, Syria is an independent country and makes its own decisions based on its own views of its national interest. And Syria will continue to do that.

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Q Wolf Blitzer of the Jerusalem Post. Has the fighting, most recent fighting in Beirut, between the Palestinians and Shia, hurt prospects of getting some sort of development between Hussein and Reagan, as far as the peace process is concerned, off the ground? You're saying it hasn't necessarily helped, it hasn't necessarily hurt, but it seems to me that there has been a direct impact of what's happening over there vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli peace process. But I can't get a sense from you whether it's been a negative development, or has it been a spur to creating unity in Israel?

MR. PELLETREAU: I am not sure. It is still going on. Obviously, it has to be a great focus of concern on the part of Palestinian leaders, as they see what is happening there. I tried to suggest that I would think that the way many Palestinians would look at that fighting is that here you have another community in the Arab world which is engaged in a direct confrontation with Palestinians, and this just points, again, to the urgency of addressing the Palestinian issues in a political context, rather than military confrontation.

I would think that this latest round of fighting would just re-emphasize that point. I realize you could make an opposing argument, and I think it's too recent for any of us, really, to know exactly how it's going to cut.

Q What about the prisoner exchange that Israel had with the Palestinians. Has that hurt the prospects of promoting the Middle East peace process, as has it helped?

MR. PELLETREAU: I would not think that would have that such direct relationship to the peace process.

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אל: הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לשי רוח"ם, דובר צה"ל. דע: ניו-יורק.
רמ"ח, קשי"ח

NEWS SUMMARY - TUESDAY - MAY 28, 1985

THE PRESS REPORTS

Peres Is Said To Ask Advice In Jews Trial

WASH. POST-(AP)- Peres has asked the attorney general to say whether it is possible to stop a trial of Jewish militants charged with terror attacks on Palestinians. Pressure has grown for the release of a Jewish group charged with attacking and killing Palestinians on the West Bank between 1980 and 1984.

Palestinians Told To Leave

WASH. TIMES(Wires)-Jewish settlers put up more than 1,000 notices yesterday around Nablus in the West Bank warning Palestinians who returned to the area after a prisoner exchange to leave. Rabin defended the release of 1,150 Palestinians in exchange for 3 soldiers. Critics heckled Mr. Rabin during his 40-minute speech with shouts of "The price was too high!" and "Killers are roaming free in our land!"

Hussein To Initiate Arab Representation

***WASH. TIMES-Neff-Hussein is reported to have reached a consensus with US officials on the composition of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to represent the Arab side. Hussein is hopeful that a series of meetings with top administration officials, including Reagan, will produce progress on the talks involving the fate of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Egyptian Visit Starts Talks Anew

WASH. TIMES-(Wires)-Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Energy Minister Abdul-Hali Kandil became his nation's first Cabinet member in three years to visit Israel as he met with Peres yesterday. Mr. Kandil, who arrived Monday for a three-day visit disclosed no details of his mission or the contents of a message from Mubarak he gave Peres. Officials on Mr. Peres' staff described the visit as a "gesture" from Mr. Mubarak.

Fighting Halts Rescues At Beirut Camp

WASH. POST-Boustany-A Red Cross ambulance convoy entered one of the embattled refugee camps here today and evacuated 14 wounded Palestinians before renewed hostilities halted the rescue mission only 35 minutes after it began. There were unconfirmed reports of atrocities against the Palestinians by the Shiites.

אל: ראה"מ

מאת: נמרוד

הנדון: מסר אישי מסם לואיס

דן קרצר העביר המסר הבא:

לאחר שיחתכם אתמול בצהריים לואיס ביקש לתרום להקטנת הלחצים הפוליטיים אשר נבעו מדבריו האחרונים (בעיקר בהקשר ועדת החקירה). בהנחה כי העניין יסייע לך ולשמיר, החליט להפגש עם שמיר בנושא זה. בפגישתם הביע סם צער באם דבר מדבריו גרם לשמיר או לממשלה נזק כלשהו אך בדבריו ביטא את המינימום האפשרי בתנאי הראיון. סם ושמיר הסכימו כי שמיר יתן פומבי לקיום הפגישה. ברם סם מבקש להדגיש כי לא היתה בכך התנצלות אלא מאמץ להקטין הבעיות לשמיר או לממשלה. השניים גם הסכימו כי יאמר משהו על כך שלסם אין כוונה להתערב במדיניות הפנימית בישראל. סם מבקש למסור כי מתוך כוונה שלא לסכך את העניינים בימים שנותרו לכהונתו הוא יימנע מכל קשר עם התקשורת בימים אלה. כך, למשל, דחה ראיון עם מעריב עד לאחר תום כהונתו (בשבוע הבא). מאידך גיסא, מבקש למסור כי בשבוע שעבר נתן ראיון למערכת הג'רוסלם פוסט וראיון זה יופיע ביום ו' השבוע.

העביר המסר בצורה אישית מתוך שלא רצה לעשות זאת בטלפון.

נמרוד נוביק

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee. The names are listed in alphabetical order and include the following: [illegible names]

2. The second part of the document is a list of the names and addresses of the members of the committee who have been elected to the office of [illegible title]. The names are listed in alphabetical order and include the following: [illegible names]

3. The third part of the document is a list of the names and addresses of the members of the committee who have been elected to the office of [illegible title]. The names are listed in alphabetical order and include the following: [illegible names]

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
6. The sixth part of the document is a list of the names and addresses of the members of the committee who have been elected to the office of [illegible title]. The names are listed in alphabetical order and include the following: [illegible names]

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9. The ninth part of the document is a list of the names and addresses of the members of the committee who have been elected to the office of [illegible title]. The names are listed in alphabetical order and include the following: [illegible names]

כז' בניסן תשמ"ח
18 באפריל 1985



שמור

אל : לשכת המנכ"ל

מאת : מצפ"א

הנדון: ביקור המורשים סקלטון ו-וויט

המורשים IKE SKELTON (ד' מיסורי) ו-RLEN WHEAT (ד' מיסורי) עוברים לבקר בארץ בין 25-31 מאי 85. אליהם יחלוץ 3 מחברי הקהילה היהודית של קנזס-סיטי, המארגנת את הביקור, דוד גולדשטיין סג"ל ה-CRC, הרווי קפלן שהוא ידידו של סקלטון ו-פול רוזנברג - סגן יו"ר ה-UJA.

המורשה סקלטון נבחר לקונגרס ב-1977, במקצועו עו"ד ומשמש כחבר בוועדת הכוחות המזוינים, בוועדה למסחר זעיר ובוועדה לספול בקטישים.

המורשה וויט נבחר לקונגרס ב-1982, שחור, כלכלן במקצועו ומשרת בוועדת החוקים ובוועדה לעניני ילדים נוער ומשפחה.

שני המורשים תומכים בעניננו לאורך כל הדרך ומצטרפים לכל מכתב הודן בעניני האזור, רקורד החצבעות שלהם הוא ללא דופי.

אבקש לאשר פגישה בינם ובין משרה"מ ועמ"ח. נושאים לשיחה :

א. הסיוע לישראל

ב. תהליך השלום


ג. שת"פ אסטרטגי ישראל-ארצ"ב

אם וכאשר תאושר הפגישה ניתן לתאם הפרטים עם הגב' חנה דביר ממאו"ר שהיא עורכת התכנית.

ב ב ר כ ה,

דוד בן-גוריון

העתק: לשכת השר
מאו"ר ✓



IKE SKELTON

Rep. Ike Skelton (D) Elected 1976; b. Dec. 20, 1931, Lexington; home, Lexington; Wentworth Mil. Acad., U. of Mo., B.A. 1953, LL.B. 1956, U. of Edinburgh, Scotland, 1956.



Career Lafayette Co. Prosecuting Atty., 1957-60; Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen. of Mo., 1961-63; Practicing atty., 1964-71; Mo. Senate, 1971-76.

Offices 1404 LHOB, 202-225-2876. Also 219 Fed. Bldg., 301 W. Lexington, Independence 64050, 816-252-2560.

Committees *Armed Services* (20th). Subcommittees: Military Personnel and Compensation; Readiness.

Small Business (11th). Subcommittee: Export Opportunities and Special Small Business Problems.

- + REP. IKE SKELTON (D MO-4)
- Committee on Armed Services
 - Subcommittee on Military Personnel & Compensation
 - Subcommittee on Procurement & Military Nuclear Systems
- Committee on Small Business
 - Subcommittee on Energy, Environment & Safety Issues Affecting Small Business
- Select Committee on Aging
 - Subcommittee on Health & Long-Term Care

+ REP. IKE SKELTON (D MO-4) of Lexington. Washington office, 2453 RHOB, dial 225-2876. House service, January 3, 1977 to present. Born Dec. 20, 1931 in Lexington. University of Missouri, A.B., 1953; LL.B., 1956. Student, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, 1953. Phi Beta Kappa. Admitted to Missouri Bar, 1957. Practicing attorney, 1957-71. Prosecuting attorney, Lafayette County, 1957-60. Special Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, 1961-63. Missouri State Senator, 1970-76. Married. Disciples of Christ. **DISTRICT OFFICES**— Blue Springs 64015: 1700 W. 40 Highway, dial 816-228-4242. Jefferson City 65101: 314 Jackson Street, dial 314-635-3499. Sedalia 65301: Federal Office Bldg., 319 South Lamine, dial 816-828-2675.

ALAN WHEAT

- + REP. ALAN WHEAT (D MO-5)
- Committee on Rules
 - Subcommittee on the Legislative Process
- Select Committee on Children, Youth & Families

+ REP. ALAN WHEAT (D MO-5) of Kansas City. Washington office, 1609 LHOB, dial 225-4535. House service, January 3, 1983 to present. Born Oct. 16, 1951 in San Antonio, Texas. Grinnell College, B.A. Former aide to Jackson County Executive; economist, Missouri Dept. of Housing & Urban Development. Missouri House of Rep., 1976-82. Church of Christ. **DISTRICT OFFICES**— Independence 64050: Room 221, 301 W. Lexington, dial 816-833-4545. Kansas City 64106: Room 935, U.S. Courthouse, 811 Grand Ave., dial 816-842-4545.

חבר קונגרס מאור. נאמי באילנה שאין בה
 זה מאור. אמין רמה טים בתל האורה.

תלמוד

תנה דקייב מוסרה

שלא יהיב שרונה

איני אקבל חבתי קונטרס

יפה הוצאה

אויב סקולסון - אפונה אפונים
אלו ויט

אונט

(ראה סרה)

אנחה - אואר שטיוה!
רוצה הניח!

התאריך 6/5/85	אל: א.י.ס.
תיק מס'	מאת: אמנון
הנושא:	

דברי הנואם הר"ם.

בצדק אב אב -

אין כל הצדקה אנגלה!

א.י.ס.

הוצגו ארבע בתי ספר

1 סמור 2

אל: הסכנה, מע"ח, לש' סמנכ"ל, יועץ רוח"ם לחקירות, מצפ"א,

לש' יגד.

97: רושינגטון

חמח: עמנוחה

28/5/85
0718
61

News Summary May 27-28, 1985

Editorials

NYT-"The Heartbreak Called Lebanon" 5/28-Lebanon's conflicts seem not only beyond cure but even beyond understanding. Lebanon has ceased, by any plausible definition, to be a nation. Lebanon is more a memory than a society.

Columns

WSJ-Ibrahim 5/28 "Egypt Contains Islam's Fires" Egypt is trying to cope with fundamentalism four years after Sadat's assassination. This is being done partly by letting it show its cards and partly by yielding so some demands. Egypt seems to be doing a pretty good job of containing what could be a searing fire. Opposition publication are readily available. The fundamentalists are waging a war of attrition, where little victories may one day add up to a takeover. The fundamentalists have not won support for their view that peace with Israel should be abrogated. Most Egyptians will tell you that Israel has betrayed hopes of a broader peace with the Arab world but a return to a military confrontation is the furthest thing from anyone's mind. In countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Iraq and Syria, where there is a depth of culture and history, Islamic fundamentalist trend, if they appear, will be aberrations soon to be replaced by the quest for more democracy. This should be the case with Iran as well. The sinister projections about fundamentalism taking over the Mideast will not come to pass.

NY-Podhoretz 5/28 "The Many Ironies of Lebanon" It is ironic that Sabra and Shatilla should again be in the news, under attack this time by fellow Moslems. The death toll will probably be as high. In 1982 the world rose in outrage, this time the righteous can barely suppress a yawn. But the most dizzying irony is that now that the Israelis are gone, and everyone is saying that it was a failure, the unfinished business is being completed. It is the Syrians and their allies who are doing the job. It is they who are now trying to get the PLO out of Lebanon. From the Israeli point of view, a Lebanon in which the PLO is on a Syrian leash is the next best thing to a Lebanon in which there is no PLO at all.

DN-Buckley 5/27 "If Jesse Were A WASP, There'd Be No Sting" If Jackson were a WASP, he would be treated with contempt. But Jackson is a black leader. Jackson is known to allow anti-Semitism in his ranks.

תאריך: השליח: אגודת פנהל החלפת:

7 + 11
סכך מלכום
מסחום אמאם שסחום
מסחום

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מאריך ת"ת: 0718
מס. סניף: 61

ממ:

He said, in Europe, that the victims of South Africa's apartheid are as much victims as the Jews were in Nazi Germany. Where was the world protesting? They weren't because he is a black preacher saying dumb things. He is at center stage because he is black, and he has a lot of followers for the same reason. There is true condescension in American for the black. The media elite patronizes him. They figure he's just a bit uppity, and what do you expect?

Press Reports

Israel-PLO Talks-Analysis

WSJ-5/28-Ignatius-In making bets on the Mideast, pessimism pays. But a number of US officials remain strangely optimistic over Hussien's visit here. The Administration believes that Arafat may accept 242. The Americans and the Jordanians bargained hard this weekend on one basic issue: whether Arafat should be given a reward, in the form of US statement endorsing a limited form of Palestinian "self-determination," in return for supporting the peace process. Hussein insists this is necessary for Arafat to recognize Israel. The US doesn't wish to alienate the Israelis. Both sides agree its now or never. Arafat has brought misery and ruin wherever he tried to operate. It's time for him to admit that he failed and either to embrace a new strategy or get out of the way. An agreement with Israeli-backed Palestinians wouldn't be worth the paper its printed on.

Lewis Apologizes to Shamir

NYP-5/28-Dan-US Ambassador Lewis apologized to Shamir for any "misunderstandings" that he tried to interfere in Israeli politics.

NYP-5/27-Dan-Israel's unity gov't faces the most serious test yet of its ability to survive. Peres will decide whether to instruct his Labor Party colleagues to oppose an official investigation into the war. Shamir warned that his Likud Party would leave the Gov't if the Knesset adopted the investigation.

Rescuers Sent to Aid Palestinians Stopped

NYT-5.1-Hijazi-A Red Cross effort to evacuate wounded Palestinians from a refugee camp was only slightly successful. The operation was forced to halt after 30 minutes because of new fighting. 250 people are said to need medical treatment and the water supply is said to be low. (see ND-Wash Post: NYP)

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תאריך חידוש: 0718
מס. מברק: 61

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:מאח

Iran-Iraq

NYT-5/28-Reuters-Iran fired surface to air missiles at Baghdad after an Iraqi strike on Teheran, the official Iranian press reported. (see DN-JPI)

Kuwait Identifies Attacker

NYT-5/28-Reuters-The suicide bomber who tried to assassinate the Kuwaiti leader has been identified as an Iraqi with a Pakistani passport. The driver was said to belong to the banned Islamic Call party, which is fighting for an Iranian-styled fundamentalist Gov't in Iraq.

US Aide to Meet Sudan's New Chiefs

NYT-5/28-Gwertzman-The US has sent a high level delegation to the Sudan for the first time since the coup. The policies of the new regime has raised questions in Washington. US officials hoped to keep the visit quiet but an Egyptian newspaper reported it.

Mengele Hunt

NYT-5/28-Werner-The US Marshal Service is now involved in the hunt for Mengele. They will help supply foreign countries with information, not go to these countries themselves.

Drama Warns Vienna About Anti-Semitism

NYT-5/28-Kamm-Joshua Sobol's "Ghetto" is now playing in Vienna. The play is Israeli and it's about the destruction of the Vilna ghetto. The play has recieved positive reviews. The Holocaust is not discussed in detail in Austrian schools. The play is intended as a warning against persistant anti-Semitism in Austria.


Arabic-English Guide for NY

NYT-5/28-A new Arabic-English guide to New York will be published here called Metroscope.

Letters

ND-5/27-All victims of the Holocaust must be remembered in musuemns and research centers.

ITONUT



משרד החוץ

סוג ירושלים,
 אל : פֶּה (מסוב נאליק, יוסף) תאריך: 24/5
 מאת : לשכת השר
 הכתוב : בניה של ר' שמואל זל לביאני

כ"ב אב תר"ל
 אלה יבס ובעה, בנאם ה"ל -
 אפר פסא א.א.ז. כס בנאם

בברכה.

י.ה.ב.ל.מ.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel Aviv

May 27, 1985

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Minister:

I have been asked to convey to you the
enclosed message from Secretary Shultz.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'S. Lewis', written over the word 'Sincerely,'.

Samuel W. Lewis
Ambassador

May 24, 1985

Dear Mr. Minister:

During our meeting last week in Vienna, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and I had a brief discussion of the Middle East, as part of a broader review of regional issues. I am writing today, because I wanted you to know firsthand of the contents of our conversation.

Gromyko's comments on the Middle East, as with most of the other regional issues we discussed, were predictable. He recited the familiar litany of Soviet "positions of principle" on the Middle East, denouncing what he called "Israeli aggression" and expressing support for withdrawal from occupied territories and an independent Palestinian State. He also asked for clarification of Israel's plans for withdrawal from Lebanon.

I told him you expected to be out of Lebanon by the end of May and that you intended to pursue a policy of "live and let live" along the Lebanese border. If Israel was not attacked from Lebanon, it would not attack across the border. I told Gromyko that I thought Syria might be able to do something in this regard and that perhaps the Soviet Union might want to tell Syria something on this score.

With regard to my recent trip to the Middle East, I told Gromyko that I had sensed a slight increase in optimism. Given the turbulent history of the region, however, any realist would have to be extremely cautious. I said we continued to view direct negotiations as the best means for resolving outstanding problems. We hoped for movement in the right direction. I told Gromyko that I thought the Soviet Union's position in the region would be helped by establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, putting an end to their anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist propaganda, and increasing Jewish emigration. Gromyko replied on the question of renewed diplomatic relations by saying that Soviet relations with Israel were an open book, and he stated that Israel was currently probing the possibility of reestablishing diplomatic relations. Beyond that he merely reiterated Soviet readiness to renew such relations if there was a change in Israeli policy.

I also emphasized the importance of increased Jewish emigration in my presentation on human rights, noting that a number of Moscow Jews had recently been allowed to emigrate but that the overall level was very low. I said we were watching this situation carefully. I told Gromyko that the arrest and conviction of Hebrew teachers must be stopped. I also raised again the cases of the Sakharovs, Ida Nudel and Anatolly Shcharanskiy, noting that Mrs. Shcharanskiy and Ida Nudel's sister had made a very moving appeal to me during my visit to Israel. Gromyko as usual responded with the usual line about human rights being an internal Soviet affair. He noted my concern about the level of emigration, and said that things cannot stay the same or grow, that things should fall down if they follow the law of mathematics.

Gromyko and I also had a brief exchange on the Iran-Iraq War. Gromyko described the conflict as senseless, and questioned whether the United States was doing enough to stop the conflict. In the Soviet view, Iraq was definitely interested in beginning negotiations to end the war, but Iran was not interested. In his view the Iranian leadership was not very far-sighted. I agreed with Gromyko that the Iran-Iraq War should be stopped, but said this was one war I didn't think even the Soviets could blame on us. I expressed support for the UN efforts and urged the Soviets to use their influence to halt arms supplies to Iran from its Warsaw Pact allies, Libya, Syria and North Korea. In connection with our efforts to control the proliferation of chemical weapons, I suggested to Gromyko that experts from our two countries meet in coming weeks to examine ways in which our two countries might jointly express our concern to both Tehran and Iraq on the use of these weapons.

The Vienna meeting thus provided an opportunity to review our respective positions on the Middle East. There was no evidence of any give in the Soviet position, particularly on the question of renewed diplomatic relations. I hope in the coming months that we can remain in touch, continuing to coordinate closely our respective positions vis-a-vis the Soviets.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

George Shultz

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

אל: ממישראל וושינגטון

טופס מברק צפון-1

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סיווג בטחוני: סודי

דחיפות: מייד

תאריך וזמן רישום: 2808

מס. מברק: 802

לשימוש
מח'
הקשר

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) 18.40 27.5.85

לידיעת: רוזן.

להלן איגרת שקיבל היום ממרה"מ משולץ:-

(קשר-גא העבירו הרצי"ב)

לשכת בר-און

אישור לשכת המנכ"ל:

אישור מנהל המחלקה:

השולח:

(לציון תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)

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802

May 24, 1985

2/3

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With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

George Shultz

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5297

** יוצא **

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אל: 1111, נד: 267, ט: המשדד
דח: ד, טג: ט, תא: 270585, וח: 1530

סודי/רגיל

השגריר למדן
קפטן לינץ הנלווה לסנטורים לוגאר וואלף סיפר לי אמש בא"ע
שערך דוה"ס לסנטורים שהצי האמריקאי תומך בייצור משותף
ישראלי-אמריקאי של צוללות וכלי שי"ם כיוון שהצי רואה בישראל
בת ברית אמינה, ומאחד ולצי האמריקאי עניין בהמשך תיפעול
מיספנות ישראל.
לינצי הוסיף כי כלליה שבחינת הצי האמריקאי מוסט משקל הכבוד
מנאפולי לחיפה.

מצפ"א

תפ: שהח, דהמ, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, שהוב

14764 תוצא טל. 33902

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5296

** יוצא

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אל: ונש, נר: 266, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 270585, רח: 1530
נד: נשק לערב

סודי/מיד

רוון - רובינשטיין

מכירות נשק לארצות ערב.
באחיש לכבוד לוגד דובר גם על מכירות נשק אמריקאי לארצות
ערב דהים הבהיר בארוחה שלא עצם העובדת הנשק היא אשר קובעת
עבודנו אלא המדיניות שבה נוקטות ארצות כגון סעודיה וירדן
כלפינו הוא ציין שירדן אפילו לא הייתה מוכנה עד כה להתחייב
לגבי אי לוחמה כבר לא לדבר על שלום, ומכאן נובעת הנטייה
עבודנו.

בר און

תפ: שהח, דהס, שהבט, מנכל, מטנכל, ר/טרכו, רס, אמנ, ממד, מצפא

12764 339042 70

ארוחת-ערב לכבוד סנטור לוגאר, יו"ר ועדת-החוץ האמריקנית
וסנטור וולופ - ביום ראשון - 26.5.85 בשעה 20.00 במלון
פלאזה ירושלים (בסניטה שבקומה 22 -) עם נשים

- ראש-הממשלה ורעייתו
- סנטור לוגאר ורעייתו
- עוזר
- סנטור וולופ ורעייתו
- עוזר
- כוב פלאטן ורעייתו
- השר גד יעקבי ורעייתו
- השר אברהם שריר ורעייתו
- חה"כ שמחה דיניץ ורעייתו
- מר דוד קמחי (לבד)
- מר חנן בראון ורעייתו
- מר נמרוד נוביק ורעייתו
- מר אורי סביר ורעייתו

תן צור
סניטה

ארוחת-ערב לכבוד סנטור לוגר, יור ועדת החוץ - וסנטור וולופ
ביום ראשון - 26.5 בשעה 20.00 בפלאזה ירושלים (בסויטה -
קומה 22) = עם נשים

סנטור לוגאר + ~~עוזר~~ + אשה

סנטור וולופ + ~~עוזר~~ + אשה
פלאטן ורעיתו

ק/ק

אבא אבן ורעיתו

גד יעקבי ורעיתו

דייב קמחי - לבד

נמרוד נוביק ורעיתו

חנן בראון ורעיתו

~~עוזר~~ אברהם ארז

אורי סביר
שנתה צינין

קאה"ה

32

~~בא אל שרה אל ימים~~

קלרוי - פקצ

דיאון

סקיה

לקיך

~~הנה אל בינת אל בית~~

סנארי לושא הרצח
 סנארי וואס ורעהו
 קרב פאטן הרצח
 2 150. סנאריי.

} פאנים
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הנהגות
הנהגות
— למנהג ציניק —

— ע. ט. ט. —

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למנהג ציניק

למנהג
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מדינת ישראל

תאריך

אל:

מאת: לשכת ראש-הממשלה.

אור

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אל:

מאת: לשכת ראש-הממשלה.

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אל: ראה

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הולבו

אשר יב אצבג החוף של

הסנטס וביה האולף ה- 5-2825

אבקס פראונג. לראות

היום אצבג

אז האוצר
או אצבג ויאלא
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UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RICHARD G. LUGAR
INDIANA

June 7, 1985

Mr. Shimon Peres
The Prime Minister
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On behalf of Senator Wallop and myself, I would like to thank you for your thoughtful hospitality during our delegation's recent visit to Israel. We very much appreciated the dinner which you hosted for us.

I was impressed by your very open approach to the peace process. You will be pleased to know that both President Mubarak and the Crown Prince of Jordan spoke highly of you.

I look forward to further opportunities to get together in the future.

Sincerely,

Richard G. Lugar
Chairman
Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations

You and Mrs. Peres were most gracious and we admire your leadership and creativity.



UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

MALCOLM WALLOP
WYOMING

June 27, 1985


Mr. Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of Interior
and of Religious Affairs
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you so much for the lovely dinner that you hosted for us when we were recently in Israel. It was a gracious celebration, and Mrs. Wallop and I were especially pleased with the champagne for our anniversary.

I personally appreciated your candid conversation, and I look forward to more opportunities to discuss our mutual concerns.

Sincerely,


Malcolm Wallop
United States Senator

MW:vc

טופס מברק גלוי

חלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

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מחוד 97

אל: הסברה, כע"ח, לש' מסנכ"ל, יועץ דוח"ס לחקורות, סגפ"א,

לש' יבר.

קיוון בטחוני:

דפ: רוסינגטון

דחיות: 28/6

מאת: עוזנו

תאריך חיד: 0719

מס. מברק: 0719

News Summary May 25-26, 1985

Editorials

DN "Dealing with Terrorists" Israel always refused to deal with terrorists. They lectured the rest of the world on the need for firmness and bitterly criticized European countries when they compromised with terrorists and put their own citizens first. Now Israel has done the same thing. The exchange threatens the stability of the Gov't. Whatever the future brings, Israel has clearly changed its policy. What should the US do with its hostage problem? Diplomacy hasn't worked. Threats to retaliate against Iran aren't persuasive. The CIA gave up when its proteges went off on their own and failed. If the US hostage aren't freed in the next few months, the US should ask Kuwait to arrange an exchange. It will be a surrender. But as Israel found, there are times when democracies have to put saving life first. 5/25

Columns

NYT-Anthony Lewis 5/26 "To the Extremes" The prisoner exchange was an act resulting from the deepest instincts of the state--but in its results, menacing to the state. Israel has exercised its responsibility of Zionism with out question since its birth. Jews from all over the world are protected. But this exchange fostered a deep anguish among many Israelis. One political reason for concern, says Yehoshaf Harkabi, was that the bitterness would feed the forces that want to annex the occupied territories and even expel their Arab inhabitants. Meir Kahane is believed to have more support than at the time of his election. Harkabi's fear is that the exchange will help extremists on both sides. Jabril will be seen as a man who gets things done. Israel's long-term security can lie only in accomodation with the Palestinians, who are mostly moderate people of bourgeois instincts. They too, in their diaspora want the protection of a state, no matter how small and tied to others.

NYT-Siemon Baker (syndicated columnist and radio commentator) 5/25 "Some Nazis Got Off Easy" No rewards for lo ing many Nazi war criminals are necessary. There names are in the US phone books. The prospects for punishment for their deeds are not good. The longstanding flexible and lienent attitude toward f. ner Nazis and their active collaborators underscores the shortsightedness of a great democracy.

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162/0719

Press Reports

Israel Prisoner Exchange-Lebanon

NYT-Week-in-Review-Freidman 5/26-After all is said and done, the reason Israel released the prisoners, military sources concede, was that the country's leadership wanted to tie up loose ends of the invasion before the final withdrawal. A crisis in the coalition seems to be looming. The debate over the Jewish terrorists is indicative of how deeply the cycle of violence has scarred many people, who in some cases see nothing wrong with taking the law into their own hands so long as it is against Arabs. Shamir called these Jewish terrorists "boys who erred, but are basically excellent boys who've done much for the nation." In Lebanon, Nabih Berri has miscalculated on two fronts. He misjudged the Palestinian resolve and he has misread the Syrians. The Syrians know that West Bank Palestinians are on Arafat's side. To block any Hussein-Arafat initiative, the Syrians want to be sure that the Palestinians in Lebanon fall behind the anti-Arafat supporters of Abu Musa. The Syrians also want to see the pro-Syrian Palestinians in charge of the refugee camps in Lebanon, in keeping with the policy of maintaining all parties in Lebanon equally weak. Syria does not want to see Amal become a dominant force. The results are an illegal street battle that may determine who controls south Lebanon. If Amal wins, Berri can't afford to keep the south too quiet, for fear of appearing to cooperate with the Israelis. But as long as things aren't completely quiet, the Israelis won't leave Lebanon alone.

Beirut: Syria's Role-News Analysis

NYT-5/25-Diplomats and Lebanese sources say the latest bloodshed appears to be part of an effort by Syria to impose its will on Lebanon by proxy. The continuing struggle for the refugee camps are regarded as evidence that "Syria rules" are in effect. It is ironic that many factions who are battling against each other have Syrian support. Also ironic is the fact that the refugee camps were the scenes of massacres by Christians. Perhaps the biggest irony is that the divisions in Lebanon, and in the Arab world, are so large that even Syria, as ruthless as it is, has difficulty imposing its will.

NYT-5/26-p.1-Hijazi-Fighting spread to eastern Lebanon. The Arab League secretary, was due for talks about the situation of the Palestinians in the settlements. (see NYT-p.1 5/25; JD-D'Antonio 5/26)

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Jews Press Arabs to Leave West Bank

NYT-special-Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank have stepped up a campaign to oust convicted Arab terrorists who were released in the prisoner exchange. Arab sources said militant Jews besieged the homes of Talib Geit and Abu Kishik, pounding on doors and windows with rocks and iron bars. Earlier Jewish militants drove through Hebron firing shots in the air. Maj. Gen. Shishak described the mood of the Israeli settlers as "explosive" and the outlook as "unpredictable."

Sharon Outlined Invasion

NYT-5/26-Friedman-Davar has printed what it says is the American diplomatic summary of a meeting between Sharon and Habib on Dec. 4, 1981, during which Sharon is said to have outlined plans for the invasion of Lebanon. Ambassador Lewis disclosed the basic contents of the meeting on Israeli TV and set off a political storm. Sharon termed Lewis' remarks as a "gross lie." If the Davar story is true, it proves Sharon planned the invasion while the PLO was abiding by a cease-fire. It also suggests that a main target of the invasion was the Palestinian population of the West Bank, which was to have been subdued as an indirect result of the destruction of the PLO. (see NYP-Dan)

NYT-5/25-special-The State Dept has insisted that Lewis' version was accurate and that the US tried to dissuade Israel from invading. But, they also state that "beyond what was generally and publically known, the US Gov't had no prior knowledge of the invasion."

Car Bomb Fails to Kill Kuwaiti Leader

NYT-p.1-AP 5/26-A suicide driver rammed a bomb-laden car into the motorcade of the Kuwaiti leader, killing himself and two bodyguards in an unsuccessful assassination attempt. Holy War claimed responsibility. The group has issued a cascade of threats in recent weeks against US diplomats. Holy War wants Kuwait to release 17 prisoners in exchange for four Americans and two Frenchmen. Political analysts in Kuwait do not believe that the shiekdom would give into terrorist demands. (see ND-7N-AP)

Demonstration in Paraguay-Mengele

NYT-Riding 5/25-Beate and Setge Klarsfeld led a small demonstration

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to demand the arrest and extradition of Mengelo, who she says is being protected by Paraguay's rightist regime.

Young Jewish Playwright

NYT-Fein-Richard Greenberg's play "Life Under Water" is about Jews and preppies in the Hamptons. His play has gotten good reviews.

Magazine-McFarlanes Growing Power

*** NYT Magazine-5/26 Cover Story-Galb-"Taking Charge" Within the last few months, McFarlane has emerged as a powerhouse in the administration's formulation of domestic and foreign policy, sometimes rivaling and overruling Shultz and Weinberger. Evidence of his clout is everywhere and he has only begun to come public. It was McFarlane who knocked heads with Shultz and Weinberger when they wanted to sell massive arms to Saudi Arabia. Instead he proposed a review of arms sales to the area. McFarlane took Weinberger's line on Lebanon but felt closer to Shultz's and believes he made a mistake. It is Shultz who remains the most powerful foreign policy advisor to the President. It is said that McFarlane agrees with Shultz 80% of the time but it can no longer be assumed that if they disagree, Shultz will win out. Weinberger's power is said to have waned. The diplomatic picture is bleak in terms of the Mideast. The administration's plan will be to encourage others to raise the level of diplomatic activity while Washington stays in the background, waiting for conditions to ripen.

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המשרד בטחון ניו-יורק
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אל: הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לשי רזה"ם, דובר צה"ל. דע: ניו-יורק.
רמ"ח, קש"ח

NEWS SUMMARY - SATURDAY - MAY 25, 1985

PRESS RELEASES

U.S. ENVOY SAYS LEBANON WAR IMPEDED WIDER PEACE EFFORTS

Wash. Post, Walsh: The war in Lebanon was "not just a misadventure, but a tragedy" for Israel and Lebanon that set back the Middle East peace process and turned into "a damaging episode for the United States," U.S. Ambassador Samuel W. Lewish said today.

He said the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon "was a failure largely because of basic misconceptions from the start, and that failure was assured by a lot of mistakes along the way by all of the parties, including ourselves."

He added: "The Lebanon war, the preoccupation with the Lebanon era, was a great diversion and made it impossible for Israel, the United State or Jordan to seek a way to continue the peace process. I think we would have been able to renew the peace process in 1981 or 1982 had Lebanon not diverted diplomatic and psychological energies." . . . Lew said that relationship is now "in the best shape as perhaps it has ever been," and added: "We are really irrevocably bound to each other and entagled in a whole variety of ways, and it is in the nature almost of a family relationship."

PALESTINIANS REJECT TRUCE PLAN AS SHIITES VOW TO PRESS FIGHT

Wash. Post, Boustany: A Syrian-sponsored plan to halt a five-day battle for control of three Palestinian refugee camps between Shiite militiamen and Palestinian guerrillas faltered today as the guerrillas dismissed it and Lebanese gunmen besieging them vowed to fight to the finish.

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AMBASSADOR WAS ACCURATE IN REPORT ON SHARON'S PLANS, STATE DEPT. SAYS/ U.S. MISGIVINGS ABOUT ISRAELI OFFICIAL BROUGHT OUT INTO OPEN

Wash. Post, Goshko:The State Dept. said yesterday the U.S. ambassador to Israel spoke with "complete accuracy" when he charged that former Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon had outlined his plans to invade Lebanon six months before Israeli troops began their march to Beirut.

The department pointedly disputed Sharon's denial of Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis' account of a December 1981 conversation with Sharon and Pres. Reagan's special Mideast envoy, Philip C. Habib.

The State Department initially refused comment on the dispute. Spokesman Edward Djerejian said today, "We can confirm that Ambassador Lewis has described the U.S. position in this matter with complete accuracy. We strongly object to any suggestions to the contrary."

SHARON CALLS U.S. ENVOY "A LIAR"

Phil. Inq., Merzer:Former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon has called the U.S. ambassador here "a liar" for saying Sharon discussed plans for the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon with U.S. officials six months before it took place.

The claim made by Amb. Lewis in an interview broadcast on Israeli television Thursday night, cause a furor in Israel, where some politicians have called for an investigation of whether Sharon was determined to invade Lebanon on an pretext.

ISRAELIS HOLD 30 IN WEST BANK

Phil. Inq., Wire Services:The Israeli army, saying it had uncovered a radical guerrilla group, rounded up 30 suspects in the West Bank yesterday and demolished five houses whose owners it said were Palestinian guerrillas.

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PALESTINIANS ARE REPORTED SUMMARILY EXECUTED IN BEIRUT

Phil. Inq., Masland: Shiite Amal militiamen in West Beirut have begun randomly arresting and executing Palestinians, according to Palestinian groups based here.

They say that Amal, which has besieged three Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut since Sunday, has been picking up Palestinians at its checkpoints around the Lebanese city. Lebanese Palestinians carry papers identifying them as such.

"Any Palestinian found on the street is killed immediately," said Jamil Hilal, spokesman for the Damascus-based Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

SHAMIR DEFENDS 25 ACCUSED TERRORISTS

Chic. Tribune, (AP): Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir said Friday that 25 Jews accused of terror attacks on Palestinians were "basically excellent boys who have done much for the nation."

Shamir, who has called on the government to pardon the group, told Israel Army Radio: "We're not dealing here with people who set out to commit some ordinary crime or murder out of irrational urges."

"We're dealing here with a more or less organized group which had reached an ideological conclusion that, for the sake of the state of the people, such deeds must be done."

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אל: הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לשי רוה"מ, דובר צה"ל. דע: ניו-יורק.
רמ"ח, קט"ח

NEWS SUMMARY - SUNDAY - MAY 26, 1985

PRESS RELEASES

SHIITES NEAR TAKING PALESTINIAN CAMPS/REFUGEES REPORT EXECUTIONS

Wash. Post, Boustany: Shiite Moslems were close to taking control of the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila today, as they and Palestinians battled on the edges of the city for the sixth straight day today with no truce in sight.

At the Burj al Barajinah camp just north of the Beirut airport, guerrillas fending off Shiite fighters and soldiers from the Lebanese Army fought with machine guns, antitank shells and rocket-propelled grenades.

Reports of a Shiite-Palestinian confrontation spreading to the Waveli refugee camp in the Bekaa Valley in central Lebanon reached Beirut.

EDITORIAL

DOING BUSINESS WITH "TERRORISTS"

Wash. Post, Geyelin: In their meeting here this week, Pres. Reagan and Jordan's King Hussein will be grappling with the same close questions raised by last week's swap of Israeli POWs for imprisoned Palestinians: Under what circumstances, and for what purposes, is it sound practice to do business with "terrorists?"

Let it quickly be said that the Israelis officially reject the connection. Arranging by whatever means for the speediest possible return of captured Israeli soldiers is a thing apart. It is an article of faith, a government

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commitment Israeli fighting men carry into battle. Bringing the Palestine Liberation Organization however indirectly into the Middle East "peace process," which is what Hussein and Reagan will be talking about, involves an altogether different Israeli article of faith.

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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שמור/בהול

השגריר דונן, הציר הלפרין, היועץ בלוך.
מאת: יועץ מדיני לראש הממשלה.

1. בזום דיון בלשכת ראהמי, ביום 24 במאי 85, סיכס שר
התחבולה בלהלן:

עמד בלום ועמוס ערן יצאו לניו יודק לשם דיון מסכס עם
הארגון במטרה להגיע להסכם המושתת על העקרונות דלהלן:
א. כל העובדים ששבתו יוחזרו לעבודה.
ב. האגוד יודיע על סיום השביתה.

ג. קיימת העובדים החוזרים לעבודה והוצאת העובדים החדשים
עפ"י כולת התפעול של החברה תוך פרק זמן סביר.
ד. ייבט בווד עיי דשות התיווך הפדרלית עפ"י הכללים הנוהגים
בה.

ה. הרשות תיקבע את משך הבודרות.

ו. שר הבודרות יחתם עיי שני הצדדים. הנושאים שיועברו
להכרעת הבודר יהיו:

1. חמישה הנושאים המפורטים במברקו של עמוס ערן.
2. חמישה נושאים נוספים אשר יסוכמו עיי אל על.
3. כל נושא אחר אשר לגביו לא תושג הסכמת הצדדים.
4. קפו של ההסכם מותנה באישור בית המשפט המפקח על פעולות
החברה.

שר בא

מחלקת הקשר - חשבון דואר 70-339042-14764

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2 טווס טרן הביע ספקות לגבי קבילות הסעיפים אשר נוספו להמלצתו המקודמת.

3 דיהמי נתבקש להודיע לליין קירקלנד כי הוא תומך בסיכום זה ומבקש לעשות מאמץ לקבלתו ע"י האיגוד.
4 לזר מודק קירקלנד אל ממי דאהמי ושהיה תבדק נבונותו להשיב ברוח זו גבי.

5 נו"עכס את החלטה דאהמי ושהיה בנדון.
חג שמח.

נמרוד גוביק.

תפ: דהם, שהה, מנכל, ממנכל, שרהתחבורה, מצפא, דרודר, כלכליתני, מנכלמספטים, מנכלתחבורה, שרהאוצר, שוהמי/תחבורה

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר/מיד

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נספח צהל-כאן

SDI

א. לאחר ביכור במשלחת קיבלנו לבקשתנו מדרך מד' נווה. אנו

מבינים כי שירות המשלחת התרכזו בנושא הטכנולוגי, שהוא

מבחינתנו נוודאי מרכזי. אני משער גם כי ההחלטה אם להשיג בחיוב

מתקבל על יסוד השיקולים הטכנולוגיים בראש וראשונה, קרי התועלת

הטכנולוגית לישראל והתועלת הפיננסית.

ב. הגם שקו זה הוא בודאי סביר, ראוי להביא בחשבון בצורת

התייחסותנו את ההיבטים הפוליטיים הקשורים בנושא, דהיינו

המחלוקת הקיימת בין ארהב לבעלות בריתה האירופיות והדיונים

הפנימיים הוא פשוטים בארהב גופא. יש עוד לזכור, כי שטענו גם

התייחסויות בממשל עצמו לכך שהפניה אלינו באה בין היתר כדי

לגייס באמצעותה תמיכה ציבורית בחוגים התומכים בנו בארהב-אם

כי ניתן להניח שההיבט הטכנולוגי המכובד שלנו אינו מבוטל.

ג. נדמה לי, והנושא כמובן מעיון מעמיק, כי אין לנו סיבה להוסיף

''נדוניה'' של התייחסות פוליטית משלנו, במישור הבינ-ממשלתי

ובמישור הויכוחים הפנימיים בנאטו וכו'. לתשובתנו שתהיה ביסודה

טכנולוגית.

ד. אם גישה זו נכונה, נדמה לי שתשובתנו לארהב צריכה לעסוק בצד

הטכני, כאשר למקרה שניטל בצורות שונות נכין תשובה שיסודה

דף 2 מתוך 2
עומק 4 מתוך 14

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר
10 ד"ר ב' ותר

בערך כן: בטור שאנו חומכים במאמץ של ארהב והעולם החופשי
להגנתו, איננו כשלעצמנו מביעים דעה בויכוחים פנימיים בתוך
נאטו ובארהב גופה. התבקשנו להציע הצעות במישור הטכנולוגי ואנו
עושים כן. התייחסות רחבה יותר למישור השיקולים הפוליטיים
חורגת מעבר לתחומנו הישיר.

רוברט טייין

תפז: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא

4727

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י"א

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אל: וו"ט, נד: 226, מ: המשרד
דח: ב, סג: ס, תא: 240585, זח: 1600

סודי/בהול

רוון, רובינשטיין.

נשק לירדן. למברקיבם השונים.

עמדתנו נשארת כפי שהיתה דהיינו שאנו לא יכולים אלא להתנגד
להספקת נשק המהווה סיכון חמור לישראל למדינות אשר מכריות
שהם במצב לוחמה עם ישראל ואשר תומכות בארגונים שממשיכים
לדגול בפתרון הצבאי.

נר און.

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, ממד, מצפא

מסמך 14764

les

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס חבוק גל

4 מתוך 1

אל: הסכרה, טע"ח, לש' ממנכ"ל, יועץ רוח"ם לתקשורת, מאג"א, לש' יגר.

סיווג בטחוני:

דחייבות:

97: וושינגטון

מאג"א ח"ד:

מאת: קהרנזה

153/0673 מס. סגור:

News Summary May 24, 1985

Editorials

WSJ "Asides" "Cut in Cairo" Egypt's Interiro Minister just banned unexpurgated copies of "1,001 Nights," calling it a threat to the country's moral fiber. We await his verdict of "Aida" that hot piece about promiscuity among the pyramids.

Columns

NYT-Edward Said "Who Would Speak For Palestinians" The US has made it clear that no Palestinians in the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation be members of the PLO or affiliate with it. Never mind that for some 15 years, virtually all Palestinians have said they consider the PLO their sole legitimate representatives. Never mind that it is recognized as such by over 100 countries. No one has suggested that any Israeli, Jordanian or American that participates in the talks shouldn't have any affiliation with their government. The US says the PLO is a terrorist organization, whose sole business is to wipe out Israel. These are grave charges especially when the PLO is compared to Israel, whose military forces just happen to be in occupation of all of what was Palestine, the Syrian Golan Heights, and for a time, South Lebanon. Israel is responsible for destroying Palestinian society, the expulsion of hundreds of thousands and the deaths of thousands more. But all resistance is considered terrorism because the US and Israel says so. Any Palestinian negotiator must endorse 242. Never mind that it never mentions the word "Palestinians". Also, Israel's right to exist must be recognized. None of us are stupid enough to believe Israel doesn't exist. But what we dispute is that that existence depends on the negation of ours. Israeli and Palestinians must speak with each others legitimate representatives. The rest is a waste of time.

NYT-Flora Lewis "Macabre Mideast Dance" The continued infighting among Arabs and Israel's unexpected indulgence for convicted terrorists has spoiled the climate for peace talks all around. The Israeli decision to release 79 prisoners directly responsible for murder and to let hundreds go to the West Bank, has aggravated the problem. This was a change in Israel's policy of refusing to pay terrorist blackmail. The mood in Israel has made most people even more adamant against negotiating with any Palestinian. The exchange has enforced Jabril's argument that only extremism pays off. So now Hussein is pressured. Syria is trying,

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Handwritten signature: ד"ר אריאל שרון

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153/0673 : מס. מברק : מאריך חיי' : תאריך

to take control of the PLO and to force Hussein to accept leadership from Damascus. Syria is helping both sides fight in Lebanon to make sure no one wins. Arab and Israeli attitudes are linked in a macabre dance of abstract politics and real corpses. There appears no way to break it.

NYP-Rabinowitz "Media's Double Standard on Terror" Sabra and Shatilla are in the news again. When Israel occupied those parts of Lebanon the occupants of the camps were "helpless refugees." Now we receive neutral reporting on the fighting over the camps... "factional strife or warring Moslem factions" is what we hear, as reporters try to explain that Shiites are trying to kill the inhabitants of the camps. Can anyone recall such restraint, such resort to social history, such accommodation to the peculiar facts of war in this region, in the outpouring over Sabra and Shatila in 1982? Had the Christians or Israelis raided hospitals as did the Shiites, what would we have heard? It seems as though journalists find nothing strange about atrocities committed by Moslems. Will Time and Newsweek do cover stories, in color, of the bodies?

NYT-Anthony Lewis 5/23 "Cat and Mouse" Anatoly Shcharansky is now in his ninth year as a Soviet prisoner: the price of speaking out for the right for Jews to emigrate. Through these years, his wife Avital, has kept his name and fate before us. The Soviets are playing with Anatoly and his family. Promises aren't kept, treatment is horrible and he is innocent. Avital says that before meeting Gorbachev, Reagan should insist that the USSR make a commitment to let 400,000 Soviet Jews who want to leave do so. The Soviets do not give in to absolute conditions. But Avital is right, there can be no summit without substantial Soviet action on Jewish emigration and human rights.

Rabin Defends Release

NYT-Friedman-Rabin indicated that Israel really had no choice but to agree to the exchange of prisoners. He said that Israel did not have a military option for rescuing the three soldiers because they were being held in Damascus. At the same time, there was no reason to believe that if Israel held out longer that a better deal could have been struck, in fact, he says the price could have gone up. Rabin said it was contrary to the traditions of the IDF and the Gov't to let the men languish in captivity. Friedman interviewed Rabin in his office.

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מחור 97

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153/0673

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Era Rappaport Sought by Israel Is In New York

NYT-Margolick-A man sought for questioning by Israel in connection with a terrorist bombing that maimed two West Bank mayors five years ago is living in NY, where he is directing a city-financed social welfare agency. Allegations against him have not been documented and the Israeli Gov't has not filed formal extradition charges against him. His whereabouts were uncertain until last week when Yoav Karney located him. Rappaport's lawyer says that if Israel wanted him, they could have gotten him.

Iranians Expell Reuters Reporter

NYT-AP-Iran expelled a Reuters correspondent, accusing him of sending biased and false reports. Trevor Wood had been in Teheran for 1 year. Reuters said they were not aware of biased or false reports and would try to send another reporter there.

Shiite-Palestinian Warfare Continues to Rage

NYT-Hijazi-(Photo p.1 and inside) Fierce fighting continued around three Palestinian refugee camps, the object of a drive by Shiite Moslem militiamen. Amal said they took Sabra & Shatilla but were relieving heavy fighting from Burj al Rajneh. A Palestinian spokesman said "It's a horrific tragedy... Dozens of bodies are lying in the streets. They won't let the Red Cross in." Leaders of Amal are trying to prevent a return of PLO bases in Lebanon which they say would invite Israeli retaliation. 1000 guerrillas are said to be living in the camps. (see ND-UPI)

Cairo Bomb Plot Said to be Foiled

NYT-Miller-Egypt's Interior Ministry said it foiled a plot by a Libyan and Syrian backed terrorist group to detonate a truck bomb at the US embassy. (see ND-AP)

Hussein in US

DN-AP-Hussein arrived for a 12 day visit to the US during which he will attend his son's graduation from Brown University and meet with Reagan.

Amos Kollek's Movie

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NYT-Maslin-"Goodbye, New York" is faring better in NY than at home. Amos Kollek believes that Israeli audiences don't like Israeli movies and that the film was intended for foreign audiences.

Book Release

The Nation-5/25-The Institute For Palestine Studies published and advertised it's new book "Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1976-1948. Walid Khalidi writes an introduction and comments.

ITONUT

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו

המשרד

ש.ד.ס. 97

דפים... 9 מתוך... דפים

... 1340 בשחוני... 24?

דחיות... 24?

מאריך וז"ח 1340 24 מאי 85

... 56... משרד

(60)

אל :- מח' מצרים, ממ"ד

דע :- מצפ"א, שגרירות קהיר

משיחה עם דיוויד זנפורד (מנהל מצרים NEA) ב-24.5

1. חזר לא מכבר מביקור עבודה בן שבוע בקהיר ובאלכסנדריה. נפגש עם גנזורי ועם שרים כלכליים וכן עם השר לעניני קבינט. קיים פגישות במשה"א אך לא ראה, לשאלתי, את אוסמה אלבאז מאז ביקור מובארכ כאן. העיר שהאמריקאים "איבדו את עקבותיו".

2. הנושא המרכזי בביקורו היה המצב תנחוני של האמריקאים בקהיר ובעיקר אנשי השגרירות. עתה מסתבר שתביקור בעקבות הכשלת פיצוץ מכונית תופת ליד השגרירות, שנחשף אמנם עתה אך התגלה לא מכבר (הבינותי במשתמע שהיה ש"פ בין השירותים של שתי המדינות) אגב, עיתוי החשיפה קשור במאמץ המצרי המרוכז כיום רובו ככולו נגד לוב (רי להלן).

3. מסתבר שארוע זה וכן מקרים אחרים של נסיונות לפגוע ולאיים על השגרירות ועובדיה הכניס את הסגל שם ללחץ ונעשים עתה מאמצים להרגיעם ולהנמיך את האפקט הפסיכולוגי של האירועים. נושא העברת השגרירות האמריקאית, עלינו מדובר, למקום פחות סואן ויותר מוגן מקבל תנופה. השטח למעשה כבר אותר אך התהליך נתקל בקשיים בשל טרבוולי בירוקרטיה שבהם התברפה מצרים. לא חזר עם הפתעות מיוחדות. טדה"י הלאומי הוא כדלקמן :

(א) לוב (מתקשר גם עם נושא הבטחון הפנימי).

(ב) מצב הכלכלה.

(ג) הנושא הבילטרלי (ישראל).

(ד) סוגיית המזחיית - תהליך השלום.

4. הנושא הלובי - מטריד מנוחת הנעלם עולה על הידוע בכל הקשור לנסיונותיו ומחלפיו של קדאפי, אם כי לא קשה לשער מה טיפוס השליט הלובי מצידו ממשיך להעביר מטרים למצרים (לא פרט) ש"ימוכן לדבר" אך גילויי החתרנות (מאז באקוס) הנמיכו את המוטיבציה המצרית. מאידך, קונפרונטציה עם לוב זהו הדבר האחרון שמצרים מייחלת לו כרגע. לנושא הלובי משתלבת במקביל חשדנות גוברת בסעודים. המצרים, כך התבטא, לא מאמינים שקדאפי פשוט נחת בריאדי וגם אם זוהי עובדה הם טוענים שהסעודים "תגליס" "יחוס רך" ובלתי מוכן כלפיו.

ובכלל הדגיש היחסים עם סעודיה שתמיד לוו בחשדנות מצרית איגם משופרים במיוחד גם בשל מה שהמצרים יצייג סוסר המיכה מספקת בחוסיין וערפאת. אמנם השתית הקשרים

ש 8 7 6
ד... 2... ממנו... דפים
... שווג בסחונני
... דחיסות
... תאריך וזייה
... 56
... מסי מברק

נשמרת אך "התעבורה" בה לא צפונה מידי. (אגב, על החשדנות המצרית בסעודיה בנושא הלובי שמעתי גם מגורמים אחרים). נושא אחר המדאיגם במכלול זה הוא שחשעודים לא יוצאים מגדרם בכל הקשר לדרבון המשטר החדש בטודאן שלא להוריד פרופיל ביחסים עם קהיר. המצרים עפ"י דנפורד סבורים שסעודיה יכולה להפעיל המנוף הכלכלי שלה על חרטום בצורה יעילה יותר ממה שעושה. מה גם שמתאשר ^{מסי} האחרון של פדאללה במפרץ לא הניב פירות. מאידך, נהיר למצרים שריאד' הנה הגורם הערבי המתון אולי היחיד, שיש לו דריסת רגל שם. באשר ליחסי קהיר - ח'רטום מסתבר שעיקר או חלק גדול ממערכת הקשרים ^ש ששכבה שמתחת ^{מסי} במיירי התבסס, על מערכת הבטחון הסודנית ומשהללו הושמו במאטר עם נפילתו נגדעה זרוע מרכזית של היחסים.

5. המצב הכלכלי. מצא שחמצרים פחות מודאגים מהאמריקאים עצמם באשר לנעשה בתחום זה. גילה שם-4 מרכיבי ההכנסות של מצרים - נפט, תיירות, הכנסות הפועלים וסואץ. המרכיב הטרי ביותר שנפגע הוא ירידה דרסטית בהכנסות הפועלים ממדינות הנפט במפרץ. ביטוי - קיימים סימנים מוחשיים של חזרה פועלים למצרים כתוצאה מהאטה הכלכלית שם. בתחום הנפט נמשכת הירידה בהפקתו ומצרים גם נאלצת להתמודד עם מערכת המחירים שמתחת לשולחן". מאידך, האמריקאים מעודדים - מהמגמות לקצץ בהוצאות הממשליות, מדובר על קיצוץ של 37% (העלאת מחירי הדלק והאנרגיה ותקטנת הסובסידיות). הבעיה המעיקה המיידית, הבטחת עמידת מצרים בתשלום חובותיה החיצוניים. דנפורד שהיה הציר הכלכלי בשגרירות בקהיר עד 1982 אמר שמאז התחזית הקודרת שלו שמצרים לא תעמוד בקשיים הכלכליים נתבדתה הוא הפטיק להתנבא (מטר לי דו"ח כלכלי שהכינה השגרירות ואעבירו בדיס'). לשאלתי, אמר שלא ניתן לחוש את חומרת המצב עפ"י הלך רוחו או התבטאויותיו של האיש ברחוב. אגב, סיפר שמצא כמה שיפורים בחיי היום יום - כגון בדרך מנמחה"ת העירה נסתמו המהמורות בכביש.

6. תהליך השלום. הסכים במקצת להתרשמות שמצרים מסקיעה פחות מרץ בנושא אש"פ-ירדן. מאידך טען שאין להפריז בכך ושתמיכתה בהליכה ירדנית - פלשתי נשארת מוצקה כשהיתה אולי בפחות רעש, בעיקר בשל סדרי עדיפויות כנ"ל.
7. יחסים בילטרליים. מצא את המצרים איתם נפגש נינוחים יותר בנושא ויותר פתוחים לצעדים קטנים בתחומים בהם מדובר להוציא טאבה. ישנם אילוצים אובייקטיביים בעיקר בתחום הכלכלי שעל מצרים להתמודד עמם כגון צמצום היבוא וכו'. הסכים שנושא "החינוך לשלום" עומד בפני עצמו גם אם תפתר בעיית טאבה ויוחזר השגריר.

אלי אבידן
f.c

מרת רות ספיר מן מלחמה ארצות הברית
רס אלן (רבי מלחמה)

ש ו ר כ פ

דף...1...מסוף...3...דפים

טווג בטחוני מוגד...

דחיסות...מיידגי...

מאריך וזמנה 24. מאי 85

מס' פרוטוקול

108

מס' 654

אל:

המסרד

אל: ממנכ"ל, מנהל מזא"ר, מנהל מצפ"א, בר/תיא

שיחת פרט והח"מ עם מארק פלמר ס/עוזר המזכיר לענייני בריה"מ.

א. פלמר העלה נושא הזוג לזר ורובינה שיצאו מבריח"מ באשרות ישראליות אך עברו לרומא בדרך לארה"ב. שגרירות ארה"ב במוסקבה הודיעה כי סירובניקים רבים משוכנעים שבני הזוג עובדים למען הקג"ב ולארה"ב כל המידע בענין זה (יימסר לפרט). המלצת פלמר ושירות ההגירה היא שלא תאושר כניסתם לארה"ב (הגם שיש להם קרובים בה), אם כי יתכן שלחץ פוליטי ישנה החלטה זו. פלמר מניח שישראל תקבל אותם בכל מקרה.

ב. ביקור בלדריג' - מזכיר המסחר האמריקני במוסקבה.

1. מפגש ראשון היה עם פליציב, והחל בצורה קטנה ביותר. בולדריג' אמר כי בלי התקדמות בנושא זכויות האדם לא יזוז הסחר, ואין לצפות ל- AFN בלי הגירה יהודית גבוהה. סטוליצ'ב טען שהדבר אינו קביל על בריה"מ, ואם זו גישת ארה"ב מדוע בעצם בא בלדריג', הרי יכול היה לשלוח נייר. בלדריג' השיב כאן: "אם כן אולי נפסיק את הפגישה, ואולי לא תיה מקום שאבוא". כנקודה זו נרגע פטוליצ'ב, והשיחה נמשכה - אך לא הייתה כל גמישות בענייני זכויות האדם. הנ"ל כמובן לא לציטוט. 2. במפגש בלדריג' עם גורבצ'וב אמנם לא היה הטוביטי כה קטוח ביחס הכללי, אך כשבלדריג' העלה את זכויות האדם השיב גורבצ'וב שהנושא אינו קביל. הוא לא נתן כל סימן לנכונות לפעולה בנושא זה. בלדריג' אינו אופטימי במיוחד.

3. לא עלה נושא חידוש הטיטות בין בריה"מ לארה"ב. בנפרד התקיים באותם ימים במוסקבה מו"מ על בטיחות האויר בצפון האוקיאנוס השקט (בעקבות פרשת המטוס הקוריאני), נושא שהוא תנאי לחידוש הטיטות. נושא זה מתקדם כנראה.

4. בטיטות ביקור בלדריג' פורסמו *agreed minutes* בדבר הצורך בשיפור יחסים בין ארה"ב לבריה"מ, אך היתה אי הסכמה בפסקה אחת, בה אמרה בריה"מ כי היא טבורה ששחר צריך להידון בנפרד ואילו ארה"ב כרכה כל היבטי היחסים. שני הצדדים הביעו רצון להטבת יחסי המסחר (ישנו רצון אמריקני לרכש עורות וכדומה).

108 54

ש.נ.ש. 2.2.2

ד...2...ממוך...3...דפים

שוג בשחוני

דחיות

תאריך וזית

מכרז

ג. מפגש שולץ - גרומיקו בוינה - 1. במפגש זה הסתתף פלמר (מצד ארה"ב היו מקפולן, ניצה, השגריר הרטמן, מטלוק מ-ASC, בארט ופאלמר וכן מתרגם). כזכור דיווחה השגרירות בהרחבה על רשמיי ארה"ב, אך רצינו דווח גם מפי פלמר שהוא טוביטולוג הראשי במחמ"ד.

2. לדברי פלמר, הרושם העיקרי הוא כי גרומיקו אינו מוכן לתזוזה רצינית בענייני פירוק הנשק (גי'נבה). לעומת זאת היה מוכן יותר מן הרגיל לדיאלוג בנושאים אזוריים. אמנם העיסוק במזה"ת היה מועט, עסקו יותר בקמבודיה ובאפגניסטאן. גרומיקו לא ביקש חידוש מפגש המומחים על המזה"ת במתכונת שיחות מרפי בוינה. כמו כן לא התייחס לועידה הבינלאומית, ובכלל לדעת אדלמן איש המזה"ת בנושא הסובייטי במחמ"ד (כפי שציטט פארקר) הסובייטים פחות דוחקים בנושא המזה"ת בכיסוי התקשורת שלהם.

3. גרומיקו היה כרגיל, ללא שינוי בעידן גורבצ'וב, אך שמו לב להתייחסות חיובית מצדו לגורבצ'וב, יותר מאשר לצ'רניינקו בעבר (דיבר עליו בשמו הפרטי מיכאיל סרגייביץ מספר פעמים, וכנראה מרגיש בנות עם גורבצ'וב).

4. גרומיקו היה רע בנושא זכויות האדם. באשר למספרי העליה ^{האנשים} שבירידה אמר: "אינכם יכולים לצפות אחרת, לפי חוקי המתימטיקה ברור שהם יורדים". פלמר הוסיף: "כמובן המדובר בחוק הכובד ולא בחוקי המתמטיקה, מכל מקום הגישה היתה מאוד לא מעודדת". שולץ לא העלה נושא המעבר ברומניה (פלמר לא היה מודע לפרטי תגובת המזכיר למשאלתנו בארץ), אגב, אנו מבינים שישנו בדרך ארצה מכתב משולץ המסכם את המפגש.

5. גרומיקו מעוניין מאוד בדיאלוג בילטרלי עם ארה"ב, ונקבעה פגישה בעשור להלטינקי סוף יולי ולאחר מכן כנראה בעצרת. אשר לפסגה, דעת פלמר היא כי בניגוד לכל הדיבורים מעוניינים הסובייטים בהחלט בפסגה, אך יש צורך לבדוק זמן ומקום. לא רצה להרחיב מעבר לכך

ד. אין לאמריקנים אינדיקציות על מחשבות סובייטיות בכיוון של חידוש היחסים אתנו.

ה. הזכרנו פגישה השגריר עם דוברינין, וצינו כי לא היה בדברי דוברינין חידוש יתר התרשמות השגריר היתה כי ^{הוא} רואה זיקה ברורה בין יחסי מעצמות העל לבין העליה היהודית. פלמר העיר כי זה הקו המוכר של דוברינין. כן הוספנו כי דוברינין לא העלה נושא אסטרטגי פלמר אמר, בתשובה לשאלה, כי גרומיקו לא העלה את נושא השיתוף האסטוטגי או נושאים "גרעיניים" ישראלים ^{הוא} עם ארץ.

ס ו ט ס

ד 3.9... מתוך... דפים

סוג כסחוני

דחיות

מאריך וז"ח

מס' סדר

108

אלו
854

ו. התייחסנו לפרסום ב"דבר" היום (אורז) בענין הגישה המיוחסת למקורות מזרח אירופיים של "חבילה" כביכול (חידוש יחסים מול מעורבות בתהליך השלום) ואמרנו כי אין לנו אינדיקציות מסוג זה, גישתנו הכללית היא כיו בניתוק היחסים ניתקו הטוביטים עצמם ^{לני} ממגע רציני עמנו, וזאת בנפרד מהתנגדותנו העקרונית לוועידה בינלאומית.

ז. פרט עידכן באשר לביקור "משלחת השלום" הסוביטית בישראל ודברי פטרנקו כי הסוביטים מרוצים מצעדי ממישראל (אולי הכוונה ליציאה מלבנון). אחד מחברי המשלחת הוא, אגב, מאנשי בית ההוצאה האנטישמי "פרוגרס". כן עידכן פרט באשר למספרי העליה במאי (40 עד היום, ו-5 כנראה היום) והחלוקה הגיאוגרפית. פלמר התעניין בהשואה למאי אשקד (יש הציגה). לשאלת פלמר לסיבות הירידה במספרים (שמאכזבת נוכח ציפיות מסוימות שחיו) הסביר פרט כי זהו ברומטר סובייטי ליחסי מעצמות העל. עם זאת ציין ירידת מה בטון האנטישמי בפרסומים.

ח. לשאלתנו אמר פלמר כי לא ידוע אם דוברינין עוזב (שנים רבות מדובר על כך, ובעבר היה מפיץ שיהיה שח"ח, אך לא עתה). אולי יש אחיזה לכך, גם במצב משפחתי מיוחד: לדוברינין נכדה המאומצת כבת והיא קשורה לרעייתו ולו מאוד, ועליה לשוב ללמודים בבריה"מ.

ט. גרומיקו חוזר על דברי תמיכתם הכללית בקיום ישראל (תוך אזכור התמיכה בהקמתה).

י. סיכום פלמר כרגע ליחסי ארה"ב - בריה"מ הוא שבצד ^{המדינות} יש דיאלוג והוא יימשך, אך במישור המהותי אין הדברים נראים היטב.

חג - שמח.

רובינסטיין

לדבר ראה את ה/אני עליו ואת ר/אני

(2)

2 7 2 0 0 8 1 0
 94... 6... 6... 94...
 סוג כספוני...
 דמי...
 מאריך וז"ח... 17.00 24.5
 653

1/5

מל: האסכ

הקונגרס (18-24 במאי)

א. כללי

(1) השבוע לא עניני ישראל אלא נושאים אמריקאים כבדים עמדו במרכז ההתענינות במליאת הסנט, חוק ההרשאה (Authorization) לכספי משרד ההגנה, ואילו בבית הנבחרים חוק ההרשאה לתקציב (הכללי). כמפורט בהמשך, הממשל נתקל בקשיים רציניים במאמציו להבטיח העברת שני החוקים האלה בצורה רצויה לו, ולכן מוצע לעיון המאמר הרצי"ב שהתפרסם אתמול (23) בעתון ה"וושינגטון פוסט", מאת דוד הופמן שמנתח הסיבות לקשיים אלה בשנה הראשונה לקדנציה השניה של הנשיא רייגן לעומת הצלחותיו בשנה הראשונה לקדנציה הראשונה.

(2) הידיעות על שיעור האינפלציה הגבוה אפריל בישראל והחלטת הממשלה מיום א' שעבר נודעו לאחר קבלת חוק סיוע החוץ בסנאט בשבוע שעבר (ולכן לא השפיעו על הדיון ועל חוצאות ההצבעה). עם זאת, קלטנו השבוע תגובות של אכזבה עמוקה ואף של ביקורת קשה על המצב הכלכלי בארץ ועל החלטות הממשלה. היו בקרב אנשי הקונגרס שהעירו בשיחות פרטיות כי תמכו במתן תוספת הירום לישראל (1.5 בליון דולר) בהנחה שמגמת האינפלציה הדוחרת רוטנה ושכנוונת הממשלה לנקוט (לאחר הבחירות להסתדרות) בצעדים שיש בהם כדי לחולל שינויים מיבניים במשק הישראלי (ושלא יסתפקו בהלאה מסיים, כפי שהדברים הוצגו בכלי התקשורת כאן). כתוצאה מכך אנשי הקונגרס שמתמצאים בעינינו יעקבו בשקדנות אחר התקדמות קשיחות הכלכליות בארץ (JEDC), העשויות להשפיע על הויכוח סיקויים בתחילת יוני גם בסנאט וגם בבית הנבחרים אודות ההקצבה (Appropriation) של תוספת החירום.

ב. סנאט

(1) גם בחוק ההרשאה לכספי משרד ההגנה נאלץ הנשיא לעשות וויתורים לא מעטים, ואולי המשמעותיים עד כה קשור לפריסת טילי ה-MX, הממשל ביקש הצבת 100 מחטילים האלה, בעוד שהסנטור נאן (הדמוקרט הבכיר בוועדת השירותים המזויינים) היה מוכן להסכים ל-40 בלבד כל עוד שמציבים אותם בסוללות הפגיעות יחסית של טילי ה-Minuteman. לאחר שלושה ימים של מו"מ קשה עם הבית הלבן, הוסכם על פשרה של 50 טילים, אך הדיון במליאת הסנאט לא הושלם השבוע כמתוכנן, ויחודש לאחר תפגרה. יש לציין שבחוק זה ישנו סעיף שנוגע לבניית צוללות, ואין זה מעיינינו שיוכנס תיקון שיאסור על בניית צוללות דיזל בכספי משרד ההגנה מחוץ לארה"ב (בדומה לתיקון בנושא זה שכבר מופיע בהצעת החוק המקביל

שחוגש לבית הנבחרים). בתיאום עם קציני הקיסור של הצי בגבעה, אנו פועלים - בדיסקרטיות - למנוע זאת.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו

2

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו

ס ד ט 6 7 8

ד... 6... מחור... דמים

טווג בטחוני

דחיסות

ס ד ט 6 7 8

ד... 6... מחור... דמים

טווג בטחוני

דחיסות

מאריך וז"ח

מאי 1983

מאי 1983

5. בנושאי ישראל אושרה תוספת סיוע החרום לישראל ומצרים בועדת ההקצבות ללא דיון. מנהל OMB סטוקמן שיגר ערב הדיון מכתב ליו"ר ועדת ההקצבות, וויטן, בו דרש שהועדה תשמיט הפסקה בהצעת החוק שקובעת שטכומי הסיוע ינתנו עד 30.9.86. לדעת סטוקמן לפסקה זו מגבילה יכולתו של הנשיא לנהל מו"מ בדבר יזרפורמה כלכלית בישראל. סטוקמן דרש שהנשיא יחליט מתי ינתנו הסכומים, ובכך רמז לאפשרות של מתן הכספים מעבר ל-30.9.86. מכתבו של סטוקמן לא מקובל על חברי הקונגרס (הצעת חוק).

6. לקראת ביקור חוסיין יזם סולרוז מכתב של חברי ועדת החוץ אל סולץ, הדורש מורוטוריום של 30 יום על החלטת הממשל למכור נשק מתקדם לארצות מזה"ת. הדבר נחוץ בכרי לאפשר התייעצות בין הקונגרס לבין הממשל לקראת גבוש מטקנות רויח HEAT. עד כה חתמו 15 חברי הועדה על המכתב ומאמץ איסוף החתימות ימשך עד שרץ חברי הועדה יצטרפו ליוזמה. בנוסף לכך, שיגרו 28 מורשים חדשים מכתב לדיגאן ובו התנגדות למכירת נשק לסעודיה או מדינה אחרת שאינה מצטרפת לתהליך המדיני (ירדן). הממשל מוסיף להתנגד בתוקף לחיקון סמית שמתנה מכירת נשק מתקדם לירדן בכניסתה למו"מ ישיר עם ישראל, אולם סמית נחוש בהחלטתו שלא לשנות עמדתו לפי שעה.

7. רבים מהעוזרים בבית הנבחרים הוזמנו לארוחת הצהריים מטעם ה- AEI ב-30.5 לכבוד המלך חוסיין.

8. בית הנבחרים חוזר מהפגרה ב- 3.6 וסביר שיעשה מאמץ לחביא את חוק סיוע מחוץ (הרשאה) לדיון אחרי שיושלם הדיון בתקציב הבטחון. סיוע לקונטרס וטנקציות נגד דרא"פ.

הקניא מל' אג'י
1.1 - 2.1

3 7 2 8 4 1 0
 0101...5...1001...4...97
 1101 בסחונני
 דחיסוח
 מאריך 1101
 653... 101

Reagan's New Term Opens With Surprising Setbacks

Hill Agenda Less Focused Than in '81

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan, who chose his legislative targets carefully in launching his first term, has begun his year with a string of surprisingly difficult fights with Congress that have eroded his political capital in the eve of his campaign for tax simplification.

Despite his 49-state reelection victory and continuing high approval ratings from the public, Reagan is struggling to avoid further setbacks in a Congress of the kind that have troubled the White House since he promised a "Second American Rev-

olution" in his Inaugural Address in January.

The farm-credit crisis, struggles over the MX missile and aid to Nicaraguan rebels, controversy over the Bitburg cemetery visit and an ambitious budget proposal that target middle-class programs while continuing the defense buildup have sapped Reagan's strength on Capitol Hill, according to lawmakers, White House officials and other political analysts.

Even as he prepares to launch a tax-simplification initiative that may become a centerpiece of his second term, Reagan has been beset this week by problems. The administra-

WHITE HOUSE, From A1

tion is fighting in the Republican-controlled Senate against capping the MX missile force and is facing certain reversal of its budget priorities in the Democratic-controlled House.

Earlier, in a compromise with the Senate, Reagan was forced to accept significant changes in his budget priorities.

Four years ago, it was much different. Then Reagan was successful because he was able to focus the congressional agenda almost entirely on his economic program, thereby avoiding the kind of distractions that have cropped up repeatedly this year.

"This is year five, and not year one," said Craig L. Fuller, Vice President Bush's chief of staff and a

key White House official in the first term. "In the fifth year of what is an eight-year presidency, you have to start with the agenda you're given. You don't have the luxury of beginning with a blank piece of paper."

For all his troubles, Reagan still holds power on Capitol Hill. He will try to improve the prospects for tax revision with a series of speeches starting Tuesday. He is expected to win approval of aid to the Nicaraguan rebels and may put a dent in the deficit before this session of Congress is over.

But the White House effort this year has not been as carefully plotted as it was in 1981, when Reagan was given a study by several top political strategists, including pollster Richard B. Wirthlin, dubbed the "Initial Actions Plan"—a blueprint for his early congressional victories.

The plan, delivered to Reagan on Jan. 29, 1981, warned the new president that when Jimmy Carter had assumed the presidency, he tried to move on too many fronts at once—energy, welfare revision and taxes, among others—leaving Congress uncertain of his priorities.

The study advised Reagan to focus on his economic program in the first half of 1981, saying the public would approve of an aggressive effort if it stressed the then-critical inflation problem.

The White House deftly controlled the agenda, in part by deferring action on conservative social issues such as abortion and by postponing difficult foreign policy decisions. The major unexpected event, the March 30, 1981, attempt on Reagan's life, paid political dividends. It helped Reagan focus on his economic program during his recovery, and it built sympathy for him in Congress.

No comparable plan was presented to the president for the second term, White House officials said. When Donald T. Regan took over as White House chief of staff from James A. Baker III on Feb. 4,

28

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

ס 1 8 8 8 8

דף... מסמך... דפים

סוג בשחוני. אמר...

דחיות... מזיד...

מאריך וז"ח 1500. 24 מאי 85

מס' מברק... 645

אל: המשרד

אל :- ממנכ"ל, מנהל מצפ"א, מנהל תפוצות

לאחר ביטבורג - למברק הציר 583

1. חרשו לי להזדהות עם דברי הציר במברקו הנייל ולהתייחס לשאלתו לגבי המשמעות הופרטיבית המיידית של פרשת ביטבורג, 'לא גהירט האין אב'.
2. נכון שהפרשה גרמה עוגמת נפש שעדיין לא ניתנת לשעור בקרב הציבור היהודי (ומחוצה לו) ואף הביאה רבים מהם להרהר מחדש בתופעת האנטישמיות בארה"ב וכן להתבטא כפי שהציר מדווח מהחושמויותיו באוהיו ובמקומות אחרים. יחד עם זאת, אין לדעתי להתעלם מהצד החיובי, שבאופן פרדוקסלי, צמח מהפרשה. עצם הפרשה, הוויכוח הרבתי סביבו, הכיסוי הטלביזיוני האדיר, שטף הכתבות והמאמרים ככל כלי התקשורת לפני הביקור בבית הקברות ובעקבותיו (במשך פרק זמן של 6 שבועות לפחות), ההתעסקות הפוליטית ב"ניפולת" מהפרשה, כל אלה התחברו והגבירו את המודעות והתודעה לנושא השואה על השלכותיה השונות לא רק בקרב היהודים אלא בקרב כל הציבור בארה"ב, ובוודאי בקרב חוגים שמעולם לא היו ערים לנושא השואה, מה גם שלא ניתן היה להגיע אליהם ולצפות מהם להתעניין בשואה ובמשמעותה.
3. בעבר היו אומרים שמצבה של ישראל יחמיר לכשילך "דור השואה" לעולמו (הכוונה היתה למנהיגים ואף לאיש ברחוב שהשתתף במלחמת העולם השנייה), ולכשיקום דור חדש שלא ידע מלחמה זו - ולכן לא חש על בשרו ובנפשו את הצורך הקיומי והחובה המוטרת לחקים מדינה יהודית. כמו כן היו אומרים שמטבע העניינים ילך וידער זכר השואה במרוצת השנים ולא ניתן יהיה לחנך כראוי הדורות הבאים - 25 שנה, ועל כמה וכמה 40 שנה, אחרי תום המלחמה.
4. יתכן ופרשת ביטבורג איפשרה השגת יעד זה. המועצה להנצחת זכר השואה כבר נותנה את הדעת לשאלה כיצד לבנות על המומנט שנוצר על ידי פרשת ביטבורג, לשם תכניותיה החינוכיות והאחרות (לרבות בניה מוזיאון השואה). לעניות דעתי מתבקש מאמץ גדול גם מצד ישראל לנצל לטובה את ההזדמנות הזו למען החייאת מסר ולקח השואה - קודם כל בקרב יהודי ארה"ב ואירופה (ובכל מקום שהוא), ואף בקרב חוגים לא יהודים נרחבים. יתכן שכצעד ראשון יש מקום לשקול קיום סמינאר בינ"ל בירושלים בהשתתפות אמריקאית מירבית וברמה הרצינית ביותר.

ל מ ד ו

ד"ר שרה מנס / מ'אנס / אהרן אהרן / אהרן / אהרן / אהרן

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

ש.נ.ר.ק
דפ.../...ממוק.../...דפים
שווג בשמוני...סקנה...
דחיסות...רגיל...
מאי 85 241800
מאריך וזיה...
644

אל: המנכ"ל.
מצפ"א.

קונגרס : תוספת החירום לישראל

בעקבות אישור התוספת בתחילת הוועדה של אוביי השבוע, צפוי ספול מהיר בשלבים הבאים של תהליך החקיקה, מיד לאחר הפגרה, גם בבית הנבחרים וגם הסנט.
א. בית הנבחרים - כעת מעריכים שבשבוע המתחיל ב-3 ביוני תידון התוספת במליאת הבית, במסגרת פתי'סנג (Amicus) לשנה התקציבית השוטפת (FY 1985).
ב. סנט - הכוונה היא לדלג על שלב תחילת הוועדה, ולהגיש את ההצעה בסני מלנא וועדת ההקצבות לקראת סוף השבוע (אולי ב-6 יוני). לאחר הוצאת הדו"ח בנדון, יועבר הנושא לטיפול מליאת הסנט עד לאמצע השבוע שלאחר מכן- תוך תקווה לסיים את הדיון עם עד ה-14 ביוני.
המטרה הכללית היא להשיג התימתו של הנשיא על חוק התוספת סרם יציאת הקונגרס לפגרת הארבעה ביוני.

שרה רחל שיהר מנכ"ל מ/אמ"ל מרפ"ו משה י/א"צ מאג רק מ/אמ"ל
שרה אלבי

למדן

י.א.ר. י.א.ר.

2.92... 3... דפים
 סוג מסומני
 דחיסות
 מאריך וזיהוי
 542...

מהמז"ת אך שום דבר לא יצא מכך. כולם ממתינים לראות מה ייצא מביקור חוסין.

5. הציר - העלה נושא ש"פ בנושאים פרקטיים עם ירדן תוך שסיפר מנסיונו בנושא מי הירמור.

הדגיש שאם היה קיים בצד השני רצון פוליטי למרות שאינו מתעלם מהקשיים, ניתן היה להתקדם יותר לעבר ש"פ כגון בנושאי הימים וכן באיזור המפרץ ולא לחכות עד לסיום תהליך השלום. אנו גם חוהים בעניין הגישה הירדנית לנושא פתיחת הבנק ומינוי ראשי העיריות. שגם ביו"ש ועזה עדין זוכה לביקורת. שאל מה שמעו מהירדנים. ארמקוסט - אנו מדברים עם שני הצדדים (לא זכר מה בדיוק נאמר להם לאחרונה) היה טבור שנושא הבנק היה עד לפני זמן מה "במגרש הישראלי" אך ער לכך שלא כן עתה.

6. הציר - הודה על הסיוע בנושא ספרד ויחדות ברה"מ. העלה נושא יגוסלביה והודו. במיוחד

היינו רוצים שנושא הודו יעלה בעת ביקור גנדי כאן (בשלב זה נקרא ארמקוסט למזכר לשיחה דחופה). פנדלטון אמר: אנו מודעים לעניין שלכם בביקור גנדי כאן, ארמקו ישירות והארי בארנס (השגריר בדלהי) העלו זאת בפני החודים כולל ענין הויזה. אנו עושים ככל שבידנו אך עלינו להיות גלויי לב שגם לנו יש בעיות עם ההודים (הזכיר ביקור גנדי בברה"מ) שאנו מנסים לקדם. עם זאת הבטיח כי הנושא יועלה ע"י אקמקוסט שיהיה פעיל מאוד בביקור.

7. הציר - העלה נושא שכבר הועלה ע"י השגריר רוזן - פיתוח נשק כימי בסוריה. פנדלטון - הנושא מטופל בדרגים הגבוהים.

8. ביקור המנכ"ל - הואיל וארמקוסט נקרא כאמור למזכיר, סוכט עם פנדלטון עוזרו הראשי סדיה' לפי מברק הציר למנכ"ל. פנדלטון הוסיף כי את הפגישה עם נציגה חציע ארמקוסט, וכי מבינים שעם קרוקר תהיה פגישה באירופה. האמריקאים ביקשו כי אם יש נושאים מיוחדים שמבקש המנכ"ל להעלותם ספציפית, כדאי שיקבלו על כך הודעה מראש מוקדם ככל האפשר על מ

טגירות ישראל - ווטינגטון

ש.ר.פ. ש.ר.פ.
 דף.....מסוף.....דפים
 שווג בשחוני..קנד?
 דחיות.....
 מאריך וזים..1600.2 מאי
 639.....מבר...

אלו: המשרד

ממנכ"ל. מצפ"א

מועדון הנשיאים. כלכלה.

וילקוקס יחד עם עוד ארבעה אנשי מחמ"ד (מרטין ביילי, האנזר, קטרין קים, רוברט לוקה) נפגשו היום לשלוש שעות עם מועדון הנשיאים כדי לבדוק דרכים בהן ניתן לבוא לעזרתה של ישראל בנושא הכלכלי. דעת אנשי מחמ"ד ובעיקר דעתו של ביילי היא שישראל הולכת לקראת משבר כלכלי חמור ביותר מאחר ולא נקטה בצעדים הדרושים להבראת כלכלתה. הדו-שיח התנהל באוירה מצויינת כשאנשי מחמ"ד יצרו רושם שברצונם לסייע ככל שיוכלו.

רוזן

מה שרה אנט מ/אנט מרסא אפואה ו/אייב אא 9

דפוס... ס. מחור... 1.97
 177
 דחיסות... רגיל
 מאריך וזיית
 פסי-מברק

1/6

אלו

המשרד / נסחון
 634 / 508

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קטי"ח.

חדרון דובר מחמ"ד ליום - Friday - May 24

An announcement on King Hussein's visit. King Hussein of Jordan will be here for a working visit, May 29. There will be a pre-brief for the press, at 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, May 28th, in the White House briefing room. For your information only and not for publication, the briefer will be _____ (name) _____ (title)

Q Do you have anything to explain or to add to what Ambassador Lewis has said in an Israeli television interview

about the US foreknowledge of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon?

MR. DJEREJIAN: (Refers to guidance book.) Well, Jim, I have something very brief to say, but I think definitive. As we said yesterday, without going into the details of diplomatic exchanges, we can confirm that Ambassador Lewis has described the United States' position on this matter with complete accuracy. We strongly object to any suggestions to the contrary.

Q Is that last sentence a reference to Minister Sharon?

MR. DJEREJIAN: You can draw your conclusions from that, Jim. I repeat, that we strongly object to any suggestions to the contrary.

Q If that's the case, and the Ambassador's account is accurate completely, that suggests that the US government, in Washington, was fully aware of the Israeli plans to invade Lebanon, and go all the way to Beirut, six months before the invasion began, and perhaps before the Israeli Cabinet was aware of the Defense Minister's plans. Did the US take any steps to alert the Israeli government to a US view on that plan? What steps were taken? What did the US do? Did the US give the long spoken of green light, or caution light, or any kind of a nod to that plan, after hearing about it six months before it took place?

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including the word "file" and various numbers and names.

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508 / 634

SEMAAN SEMAAN (BBC): What about Alexander Haig? What -

MR. DJEREJIAN: Now, the government of Israel is what I am turning your attention to.

Q All right. So that's more than the man that you said represented the government of Israel, a moment ago?

MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, I was making a point to your first question, that I think we tend to forget that at that time Mr. Sharon was the Israeli Minister of Defense.

Q What were the rest of them? What were those names?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I'm not going to be drawn into the specifics of contacts.

Q You aren't saying that we objected to the plan?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I'm not going to get drawn into that.

Q At the time, administration spokesmen were saying that we repeatedly warned the Israelis against, A, an invasion of Lebanon and, B, going as far as Beirut. I mean, there were repeated statements to that effect from the White House and from that podium. Do you know at what levels those, beyond Habib, and Sam Lewis, whether the President himself or the Secretary of State, at the time, ever made such a warning, issued such a warning?

MR. DJEREJIAN: John, on that I have nothing for you.

Q Can you take that question?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I can look into it and see.

Q Because there's a lot of confusion -

MR. DJEREJIAN: I can see if I can get something for you.

Q -- revolving around Haig's role at the time.

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Q What you have said, that Ambassador Lewis' account is completely accurate, would then appear to fly in the face of the version of the events given by Secretary of State Haig, who said, one, we had no real inkling of an invasion until May, 1982, during the Sharon visit, and two, that even after the invasion started it was the understanding of this government that it would end at a 25-mile mark.

MR. DJEREJIAN: I can't be drawn into commenting on these conclusions that you're drawing, Jim. I simply have to stay with the remarks I made.

Q Those aren't conclusions. The record is obviously clear as to what this Department said at the time, both after the invasion -- I mean, after the invasion especially, about its knowledge, its foreknowledge, and its understanding of what the Israeli government plans were. We're free, then, to contrast the statements made at the time, and the statements being made today, that you were aware six months before the events, of the plan to go all the way to Beirut.

MR. DJEREJIAN: I can only confirm that our ambassador to Tel Aviv has described the US position on this matter with complete accuracy. You have to draw your own inferences.

Q There's a report today that President Reagan -- a report in Israel -- that President Reagan sent a message to Prime Minister Begin immediately following that December '81 meeting that we're all talking about. Can you comment on that report at all?

MR. DJEREJIAN: No, Ralph, I have nothing for you on that.

Q Do you have anything on this supposed Russian diplomat who has been kicked out as a result of the whole Navy spy case?

MR. DJEREJIAN: No, I have nothing for you on that.

Q You can't confirm it?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I can't make any comment on that, no.

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Q Is there any comment you'd like to venture on what's happening in Beirut today, I mean the continuation of the fighting between Amal and the Palestinian camps?

MR. DJEREJIAN: (Reading from guidance book.) The United States deplors the violence in Lebanon that has resulted in death and injury of innocent people of all communities. We would welcome a lasting cease-fire that would bring an end to this tragic violence. As we said on Wednesday, we believe that an end to the suffering of the Lebanese people can only come about when they unite behind a common government and are committed to resolving their differences by political means. The central responsibility for ending the Lebanese tragedy rests with Lebanon's leaders. We have continually urged all parties to support the central Lebanese government as the only means of restoring lasting peace, tranquility, and stability to this troubled country.

The United States continues to back the efforts of the central government to restore sovereignty over all Lebanese territory.

MR. SEMAAN: Does your call apply to the Palestinians as well, to support the government of Lebanon?

MR. DJEREJIAN: This is a call for all the parties --

MR. SEMAAN: They are one of the parties, are they not?

MR. DJEREJIAN: This is a call to all parties.

MR. SEMAAN: I see.

Q Does that mean that you support the Lebanese Army, that they should protect the Palestinian camps?

MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, I won't be drawn into specifics of who is to protect whom, but certainly when we stress our support for the central government it also, obviously, involves the important role of the Lebanese armed forces.

MAGDA ABU-FADL: Is there any update on the almost attack on the US Embassy in Cairo, and whether or not there's any consideration of cutting back personnel in Cairo, American diplomatic personnel?

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Q Besides issuing these statements, Wednesday's, last Wednesday's statement, and your reiteration of it today, does the US feel, as a superpower, it lost its -- whatever leverage it did have, in Lebanon, to bring an end to the suffering, the cycle of violence which you call it?

MR. DJEREJIAN: Well, I don't think I'll be drawn into commenting on that but certainly the American role in Lebanon, in the person of our Ambassador and Embassy, remains an active one. So, I won't go beyond that, in terms of your reference to alleged loss of leverage.

MS. ABU-FADL: Ed, on the Embassy in Cairo and the aborted attack, or -- any update, any consideration to cut back on personnel, and is there any concern about Colonel Khadafy globetrotting, or certainly around the Middle East these days, different capitals, and the last one being, I think, Baghdad?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I have nothing on Khadafy. On the Embassy, the foiled bomb plot in Cairo, really nothing more to offer you. We continually review the security situation and have taken all appropriate measures in terms of our American -- the American Embassy there. But beyond that, I have nothing to say.

MS. ABU-FADL: So there's no consideration of cutting back on our diplomatic personnel in Cairo?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I have nothing on that, no.

Q About Sudan, do you have anything on the former Sudanese Vice President, that he will be tried for treason for his involvement in the airlift of the Falasha and cooperation with the Americans, since he was your ex-ally?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I have nothing on that.

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טגרינות ישראל - ורטינגטון

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85. May 24 1985

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ניו-יורק

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המשרד

633

אל: הסברה, מע"ח, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לשי רזה"מ, דובר צה"ל. דע: ניו-יורק. רמ"ח, קטי"ח

NEWS SUMMARY - FRIDAY - MAY 24, 1985

EDITORIALS

***BOSTON GLOBE-24/5-"Israel's Anguish" Israel's overblown reputation as a nation that refuses to negotiate with terrorists has been permanently deflated by its decision to release 1,150 Arab prisoners. The world is a little less safe as a result, and so is Israel. Terrorists have been sent a message that no matter how heinous their crimes, they can still hope for early release provided their organizations hold hostages for bargaining purposes. What makes this trade so difficult is its wrenching imbalance.

COLUMNS

***WASH. POST-Stephen Rosenfeld-"Israel: Time To Act" Israelis need to be reminded that the problem - is only in the second instance terror. In the first instance it is politics. What can still be done to turn Palestinian energy from rage to conciliation? The prisoner exchange marked the failure of one Israeli answer. The previous Israeli govt. invaded Lebanon to solve the Palestinian question by destroying the PLO presence and by opening the way to absorb the West Bank fully into Israel. Only the first of these two goals was achieved. In Washington, Israel enjoys its best relations with the administration. Israelis hope - here is the most difficult current problem area - that American arms sales to friendly Arabs can at least be contained. Everyone is tired of alarms of doom and crisis ahead in the Middle East. Let it be stated that Israel's policy is tragically shortsighted. The Israelis have spent 18 years "creating facts," making it harder for Hussein and then protesting that he does not deliver. They have a dozen ideas they could pull out of the drawer to get something started without undermining their security or bargaining position. Peres knows what to do. Destiny beckons.

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Jim Muir-"Syria Set To Step Into Lebanese Crisis" Lebanon is in dire need of salvation - and Syria is standing in the wings, apparently ready to step in once Israeli troops pull out from the south. Parties are increasingly turning to Syria in their search for relief whenever a crisis erupts. There is now almost universal recognition in Lebanon - even among those who bitterly resisted Syrian influence in the past - that Syria is the only power capable of even trying to end the Lebanese conflict. As Lebanon's ambassador in Paris said: "The Lebanese are opposed to a new Syrian intervention, but they are fed up with the war, and ready to accept anybody if peace can be restored."

התאחדות העברית לתיאטרון ומוזיקה

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אל

182/507/633

THE PRESS REPORTS

'Jewish Underground' Defendant Pleads Guilty

WASH. POST-(Reuter)-Menachem Neuberger, was convicted today after pleading guilty to plotting to blow up the Al Aqsa mosque, Islam's holiest shrine in Jerusalem, and to wound Arab mayors. Charges of criminal attack and membership in a terrorist organization were dropped in plea bargaining.

Envoy Says Sharon Outlined Invasion Plan To US in 1981

***WASH. POST-Walsh-Lewis has reignited the national debate in Israel Sharon's role in planning the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the decision to send the Israeli Army as far north as Beirut. Lewis, said that in December 1981, Sharon outlined his ambitious plans to Habib. Sharon was quoted today as calling Lewis' description of the meeting with Habib "a gross lie."

Kahane Supporters Strike At Democracy In Israel

L.A. TIMES-Kretzmer-Kahane is in Los Angeles, seeking support for his racist and violent policies. He has managed to attract support here in the world's greatest democracy. He has successfully won to his cause small segments of the Jewish community in several US cities, including L.A. Potential followers should acknowledge Kahane for what he is: a racist, plain and simple. They must recognize that, in supporting him, they strike at the very underpinnings of democracy, which is the mainstay of both Israel's inner strength and its external support.

Hussein Arrives In US For Talks

WASH. POST-(Wires)-Hussein held talks with the British foreign secretary yesterday, then left for Wash. to confer with US officials in the quest for peace in the Middle East. The king has said that the present time may represent the "last chance" for peace in the region.

Egypt Says It Foiled Attack On Embassy

WASH. TIMES-(Wires)-Egypt said yesterday that it had thwarted a plot by a Libyan-recruited agent trained in Syria to set off a truck bomb outside an embassy in Cairo Wednesday.

Sudan Says It Will Not Honor Pacts With Egypt

**BOSTON GLOBE-(AP)-Sudan will nullify all agreements its recently deposed gov. signed with Egypt because they do "not reflect the will of the people," Sudan's prime minister was quoted as saying yesterday. Agreements are null and void.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו
המשרד

ס ר ט ס

דפוס... משרד... דפים

סוג בשחוני... גלזי

דחיסות... רגיל

מאי 85 24 0845

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אל :- מצפ"א, בינאופאי
דע :- נספחות - כאן

SDI

1. הוזמנו להשתתף בשידור חלופי של גנרל אברהמסון ראש תכנית SDI עם כתבים מישראל וממדינות מערב אירופה, שהתקיים באולפני CSJS ב-23.5.
2. עקרי דבריו ובתשובה לשאלות נסובו על כך שהתכנית היא הגנתית צרופה 'Defensive Deterrence' שתשען על Ground base laser וקרני Adams שאינם לייזר אבל בעלי מהירות כפולה מזו של קרני האור. התכנית מיועדת לסגור את הפער עם ברה"מ שכן אין בידי ארה"ב אמצעים קונבנציונליים אחרים למנוע נחיתותה בתחום האסטרטגי התגנתי והחזקטי, בין השאר בגלל סיבות פנים - אמריקאיות. לברה"מ יש מערכת חגבה ABM שאמנם טרם הושלמה אך שתתן בידיה שליטה אסטרטגית באמצעות Central command.
3. המדובר בשלב המחקר שימשך עד 1990. ההזמנה שהופנתה למדינות חשונות ובתוכם ישראל מדברת על השתתפות בשלב המחקר שכן (א) עדיין לא חושבים במונחים קונקרטיים מעבר לכך. (ב) כניסת התכנית לשלב מתקדם יותר תלויה בתוצאות השלב הראשון. בין היתרונות לישראל שמנה - תעש (טילים) ותעשיה אווירית.
4. בחלק האירופאי שהיה פרובלמטי ביותר נשאל, בין היתר, "אלימותו של דיצ'ארד פרל (עוזר מזכיר החגנה) כלפי ברה"מ מול האימפילקציות הפוליטיות והצבאיות על אירופה. השיב ש-(א) ספק אם ארה"ב תעבור לשלב המתקדם לבדה או באם יתברר שהאירופאיות לא הצטרפנה. (ב) התכנית לפחות בחלקה המחקרי אינה מהווה הפרח של ה-ABM. (ג) אין מדובר רק בתחום האסטרטגי - גרעיני אלא ואולי בעיקר במחפכה טכנולוגית שעשויה להשתוות למחפכה התעשייתית באירופה, ארה"ב מוכנה להביא את התכנית לדיון עם ברה"מ. זו לדעתו, אמנם מגלה עתה עמדה בלתי מתפשרת לחלוטין כלפי ה-SDI אך אין זו מילתה האחרונה.
5. בחום השידור נפגש גנרל אברהמסון עם אלה שנוכחו באולפן הדגיש בסיפוק ביקור המשלח כאן וכן סיורו בארץ.

אלי אבידן
lc/c

למח' רה"מ שהבאנו את המחקר לגבי ארה"ב
למח' רה"מ ארה"ב רוב אלן ארנסט

4270

** יציא **

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מל: נוש, נד: 699, מ: המשדד
דח: ר, טא: ט, תא: 230585, רח: 1730

1011/ארגיל

השגריר, הציר

בפגישת הכרות עם הממונל נבחרו קורצר והחיימז סיפר דוג'ר
הריסון, מחליפו של הי"ד, תוך שהוא קורא מדווח מברקי כי
מקור ששוחח עם האני אל חסן נודע להם כי בישיבת האקדמיה
של אשיף ב-20 לח'ר נתקבלו שתי החלטות: 1. הסכמה לייצוג
פלשתינאי שאיננו אשיף בסבוב הראשון בתנאי שאשיף יצטרף לאחד
סבן.

2. נכונות אשיף לקבל החלטה 242 בתנאי שאדה'ב תכיר בעקרון של
הגדרה עצמית בפנפי שהוא בא לידי בסוי בהסכם חוקיין-ערפאת
ספנדואר דהיינו במסגרת קונפדרציה ולאן דוקא מדינה עצמאית.
לשכת בראון

פ: שהח, רהמ, שהבס, סנכל, סמנכל, סמד, רס, אסן, מצפא

מזכ"ל משרד החוץ, ת"א 14764, 330042

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

10 ד'י

אלו המשרד, נר: 585, מ: 1100
 דח: מ, סג: ט, תא: 230585, וח: 1100
 נד: נשק לירדן

10 ד'י/מיד

ממנכל,מצפא

נשק לירדן.

מתוך שיחת הציר והחמ' עם המודשה סמית.
 1. לארי סמית ניתח בשיחה אתנו את יחסי הכוחות בתוך הממשל
 בסוגיית מכירת ציוד מתקדם לירדן. לדבריו, יש לחתור להימנע
 מעמות עם מוכיר המדינה בסוגיה זו עקב יחסו הידידותי כלפי
 ישראל.

2. סמית דואה קואליציה המורכבת מווינברג, ארמיטאו'
 (פנסגונ), מרפי וארמקוס ממחמ' ומק-פרלן מהמועצה לבטחון לאומי
 אשר מחוייבת למכור הנשק לירדן ופועלת במרץ בנדון. סמית ציין
 כי אין זו הערכה בלבד אלא יש סימנים ברורים לכך נלא
 פירמ). אין זה סביר שסולץ יתייצב לבדו מול קואליציה זו כאשר
 הדבר יגיע להכרעה נשיאותית וסביר שיגלה משמעת שעה שתבקש
 החלפת הנשיא בנדון.
 קני טל

תפ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, ממנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, ממד, מצפא

** 3293

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** ** נכנס

** דף 1 מחוך 1

** **

סודי ביותר

מחוך 10

עומק 7

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**אל: המשרד, נד: 595, ט: 111
**דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 230585, זח: 1900
**נד: אלטל

**סודי ביותר - /בהול לבוקר - לנטענים בלבד
**אל: יוסי ביילין - מוכיר המטלה, אמנון נויבך- לשכת ראש
**הממשלה
**אל-על.

**טמוס ערן ידווח לכם לקראת הישיבה בבוקר. חיוני ביותר לקבל
**ההחלטה חד-משמעית היום כדי לסיים את הפרשה. אני מבין שנוכח
**חנות דעתו של זמיר בעניין טס הנסיעות יש לאל-על דרישות
**הממשלה. אפשר לנצל זאת כדי לכפות עליהם לקבל את עמדת ראש
**הממשלה בנושא ניו יורק. חשוב שתנתן להם הוראה ברורה שעליהם
**לקבלה ולמטעה מיד בלי הסתייגויות והתחבטויות.

**דני בלונך==

**חפ: שהח, דהם, מנבל, טמנבל

14764 339943 14764

3293

נסנס

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מחוך 1	דף 1
מחוך 10	עמק 4
סודי ביותר	

מל: המשרד, נד: 595, ט: ווש
 דח: ב, סג: א, מא: 230585, זח: 1900
 נד: אלעל

סודי ביותר - לנהול לבוקר - לנסענים בלבד
 מל: יוסי ביילין - מזכיר הממשלה, אסנון נויבט- לשכת ראש
 הממשלה.
 מל-טל.

טמוס טרן ידווח לכם לקראת הישיבה בבוקר. חיוני ביותר לקבל
 החלטה חד-משמעית היום כדי לסיים את הפרשה. אני מבין שנוכח
 חוות דעו של רמיר בטנין מס הנסיעות יש לאל-על דרישות
 מהממשלה. אפשר לנצל זאת כדי לכפות עליהם לקבל את עמדת ראש
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 לקבלה ולמטה סיד בלי הסתייגויות והתחבטויות.

דני בלונג==

פ: שהה, רהמ, טנבל, ממנכל