

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

שרת ראש הממשלה

משרד

הגשק לתיק מט 2

לשכת ראש הממשלה -

ארכיוב

10 / 1985

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה



שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס - אר

א - 3 / 4381

מס פריט: 1734830	43.4/3 - 199	מזהה פנימי:
15/08/2010	02-111-01-07-10	מזהה לוגי:
		כתובת:

מגזרות ישראל - ווענינגטון

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דמיסות

85' OCT 31 1300

מגזרות

אל:

המסרד, נסחון, ניו-יורק

284 566 752

אל:הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לשי רוח"ם, לע"ם, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח
דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - WEDNESDAY (OCT.30) & THURSDAY (OCT 31)

THE PRESS REPORTS

WEDNESDAY - OCT. 30

Jordanian Jets Fly Over Israel, Syria

WASH. POST-Claiborne-Two Jordanian jet fighters flew over northern Israel today and then were fired on by a Syrian missile battery as they returned to Jordan by way of Syrian airspace. An Israeli Army command source said the Jordanian pilots apparently realized their mistake while over the Sea of Galilee, and turned back before Israeli fighters were scrambled to intercept them.

Jordan, PLO Appear To Be Reconciled

WASH. POST-Dickey-Jordan and the PLO, dropping expressions of bitterness over differences that have marked their relations in recent weeks, appear to have agreed to continue as partners in the Middle East peace process. But Jordanian officials remained silent about what price, if any, the PLO agreed to pay to maintain the alliance. The Jordanian govt., limited itself today to a statement that said its two days of talks with Arafat were "amicable and brotherly." Arafat and his aides, gave no sign of having shifted attitudes toward Israel. The apparent reconciliation of the PLO and Jordan could present serious obstacles on the road to the kind of settlement envisioned by the Reagan administration and Israeli Prime Minister Peres.

Peres To Name Palestinians To West Bank Posts

WASH. TIMES-Meisels-In a clear move to undercut Arafat's claim that his organization speaks for the Palestinian people, Israel plans to appoint Palestinians to leadership positions in the militarily occupied West Bank. West Bank Palestinians who are not members of the PLO would be named mayors of West Bank cities now run by Israeli military governors, Israeli govt. officials told the Wash. Times. The policy won approval of the Knesset this week after seven hours of often acrimonious debate.

Erosion Of Israeli Military Poses Major Threat To Peace

WASH. TIMES-Kritzberg-Israel's military edge against its Arab adversaries is

ישראל - המגזרות יבנה

33

דף: ---	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דחיסות:
מחור: ---		110 ג בטחונני: סמור

א ל : משרד רוה"מ	תז"ח:
	312200

ד ע :	נ ר :
	1160

מאת : נאו"מ ניו יורק

אל : סמיר/מסרה"מ - איסי
מאת: גביר

מכתבי חודה מרוה"מ למארחיו בניו יורק. לפיחה הטלפונייה עופרי-כחניהור.
אין לנו להרסיף שמוח מהמערכת האו"מיה לרשימת הסעות שקיבלה בינתיים מהקונב"ל.

נאו"מ

177
3

תאריך: 31.10.85	שם השולח: ר. גביר	אישור:

טגרירות ישראל - ווסינגטון

פ.י.ס. פ.י.ק.
 דף...ל...מחוק...דפיס
 טווג בטחוני...טמוכ
 דחיסות...מללכל
 תאריך וזייח 1700 31 אוקי 85
 פיקסי פברי

כג

אלו המסרד

575

761

אל :- ממכיל, מצפ"א
 דע :- לשכי רוה"מ, ממכיל אוצר, ממכיל בטחון

סנט : סיוע חוץ (תיקון אינוייה)

היום לפנות ערב, לאחר דיון קשה ועל אף התנגדותם הנמרצת של יו"ר ועדת ההקצבות, הסנטור מרק הטפילד, והסנטור לוטון צייילדס (שהוא גם חבר בוועדת התקציב) מליאת ועדת ההקצבות קיבלה את הצעת חוק ההקצבה לסיוע חוץ שהוכנה והוגשה ע"י תת ועדה לפעולות זרות. כמדונה, הצעת חוק זו כוללת כל הסיוע האזרחי וחצבאי לישראל וגם תיקון אינוייה, דו"ח מורחב בנסרד.

למדן קואלנה

עממ המג אלא אלא/א אלא אלא אלא אלא אלא אלא
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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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** ** נכנס

** ** סודי ביותר 5 מחוך 1 דף 4 עותק 30 מחוך

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אל: המשרד, נר: 268, ט: 1101
דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 311085, זח: 2000

סודי ביותר למייד

אל: מצפ"א, מ"י"ד.

סוריה, ירדן ותהליך השלום.

למברק מ"י"ד 859.

1. פשיחות שקיימת בשלושה אנפים - הגיאוגרפי (MESC) (תכנון (רוזמנט), והמחקר (IMR) מתברר: (א) אין שדיין מידע ברור על שיחת חסינ-ערפאת ומתן מסקנותיו האופרטיביות של חוסין.

(ב) חוסר בהירות לגבי העמדה הישראלית כלפי ירדן.
2. ירדן: - המוקד מבחינתה כפי שהגורמים הנ"ל מאתרים הוא בתחום המגורש הבינערבי והפלטסטינאי, בהנחה שישראל נ בהתאם לעמדות שהציג רוחאי פרס בהופעותיו הפומביות בארה"ב, הליכה בצורה מקסימלית לעבר ירדן, בסיסית חוסין וקוק לשלושה מרכיבים (לא חדשים) על מנת להתקדם בתהליך השלום:
אש"ף: המיוצג על ידי ערפאת. חוסין נ למרות ה- GRIEVANCES שיש לו כלפי ערפאת - ר' להלנז) דואה בהסכם עמאן נכס צאן ברזל... שלא ישמים מידיו בנקל מתוך הערכה שכלל לא בטוח באם ניתן היה להשיגו בנסיבות הנוכחיות.

(ג) תמיכה ערבית: - גורמים מסויימים (אגף רוזמנט) בדיעה שלחוסין לא מובטחת תמיכה ערבית גם אם ערפאת יצטרף אליו.
אדרבא, סעודיה והמפרציות שהן טיקר הששענת של חוסין מייטצות לו לנהוג בהירות ולהיסנע ממהלכים שיגבירו את הקיטוב הערבי (סוריה). חשטן הוא שהתקדמות ירדנית-אש"פית (ערפאת) עשויה לעודד גורמי חתרנות נגד המסערים הנ"ל. בהן קיים אלמנט פלטסטינאי לא מבוטל.

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עותק 4 מחוך 30

4. לשאלה 'מה הלאה', נראה שחוסין פועל בכמה מיטורים טקטיים:

א) הוא עדיין תובע מטרפאת את 'ינוסחת לונדון'. האחרון, כנראה, השיב בצורה מקובלת 'שידבר עם אנשיו' ורקוק לזמן בינתיים יעמדו על הגובות/עמדות הצדדים האחרים. צפויים עוד מפגשים וברורים. מסתבר לחוסין שבנסיבות הבינערביות הנוכחיות אין לו מנוף אפקטיבי של טרפאת כל עוד הוא כובל עצמו אליו. בהקשר זה אציין שאנשי ה- MEA שהלכו 'טופו' בעקבות פרשת הספינה האיטלקית, והאפיוזדה בלונדון, חירו לטיימכם בכך ששוב מעלים חשיבות השתתפות הגורם האישי' גם על פי מה שגוררים מדברי חוסין עצמו.

5. ארה"ב: האמריקאים מצביעים על כך שהנקודה היחידה המקשרת בין הצדדים נ בפרושים שונים) שאדם זו הקשורה לוטידה בינ"ל. זהו למעשה יהיה הקו האמריקאי בשבועות הבאים - מאמץ לגשר בין עמדות הצדדים. צומת חשובה לכך חיה הפסגה בג'ינבה. האמריקאים ינסו לעמוד מקרוב ומכלי ראשון על עמדת בריה"ם נ בהקשר זה שמעתי שבנושא הסורה'ית, בפייסגה וריגן יעמיד את תכניתו בטרכו דבריו לפתרון הסבסוכ).

6. באגף של רודמן מעדיכים שקיים תמריץ נסוך לבדיהם' להשתתף בנסיבות הנוכחיות בפורום כזה. מבססים זאת על שני דברים: - א) בריה"ם לא תתן חסות ל'ועידת שלום אמריקאית' בהנחה שרוב הקלפים אם לא כולם אכן בידי ארה"ב.

ב) היא תעשה כן רק אם יודידיה - אשי'ף וסודיה יוזמנו וישתתפו או אם יתברר שיש לה סיכוי להשיג עבורם הישג כלשהו. בכך בריה"ם צועדת על קרקע בטוחה 'הקונצנרוס הערבי' המדבר על הסדר כולל ובהשתתפות כל הצדדים. כל זאת גם אם יתברר שניתן להתגבר על המישור הישראלי- סובייטי.

7. סוריה: - המפגש הסורי-ירדני נ לגבי אין עדיין מידע) נראה כאן בטפגש טקטי אך המצביע על הקטיים שיש לחוסין בתחום האסטרטגי. מקובל ששתי נקודות טפגש ברורות קיימות ביניהן: א) היענות לסעודיה, הכח הדותף לכך. ב) שום כלפי טרפאת. אנשי ה- MEA נ גלספי בשיחה עם מתני (והח'ים) עמדה על כך שסוריה מונעת מבח השנאה כלפי טרפאת אותה מייצג חידאם בנאמנות. ידוע מהמפגש הקודם בין רוגה' ירדן וסוריה, שהאחרון הסכים להכיר באשי'ף בהרכבו הנוכחי, בתנאי א

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עומק 4 מחוך 30

בתנאי שערפאת יסולק או יודח. הסורים גם העלו תביעה שבי הסכמי
קהירי תוכנס הטילה ייחית ההצלה הלאומית י כל אימת שמוכר
השם של אש'יף. ירדן - באמצעות דפאטי מבקשת להגיש את דמסק אך
בעיקר לדעת מהו סף ההתנגדות הסורית ועד היכן ירדן יכולה
להתקדם מבלי ANTAGONIZE את סוריה. המרכיבים (השלייליים)
של ההודעה המשותפת - המיכה בפאס, השתתפות סוריה נ דהיינו
דיון בנושא רמה'יג) ועלילת הסדרים חלקים אינם מעידים בהכרח א
בהכרח על שינוי בעמדה ירדן. שהרי לגבי המרכיב הראשון
והשלישי עלולים להיות פרושים שונים נ ובטיקר בנושא פאס).
יותר ספקנים כאן נ IAR) לפשר שלילת הסדרים נפרדים/חלקיים,
אין בכך אמנם סטיה מהמטרה הירדנית להשיג הסכם כולל אך האם
משמעות הדבר שלילת ייחנות בינ'ימי' בדרך לכך ולא כמטרה בפני
עצמה. הערבה כאן שיש בכך משום ייצהרת כוונות' ירדנית ולא
סדיניות אופרטיבית.

סוריה:- השתתפותה במפגש בעצם הימים הללו מעידה נ עפ'י אנשי
IAR) על בטחון עצמי מופגן שאין ממשות מבחינתה במה שקרוי
התהליך המדיני. אדרבא, ניתן לצייר את הסוצריו בו פרט רזה'י
קאסס לעמיתו הירדני את תולעת העמדה הירדנית הנשענת על
ערפאת המוליך שולל את כולם, ארה'יב הביחתי אמינה נעסקת הנשק)
וחד צדדית לטובת ישראל. ישראל שלא תוותר במאומה. באותה רוח
ודאי דיבר על צדקת העמדה הסורית. הליכה ערבית מלוכדת, קיום
החלטות הפסקה הערבית, ועידה בינ'יל לביצוען, כאופציה יחידה א
יחידה להסדר.

8. בסיכום. קשר לאתר הסכמה על תוכן מדיני במפגש הסורי-ירדני
בג'דה. הפער הוא לא רק על תוכנו של ההסדר אלא נוגע גם
בפרוצדורה להשגתו. יש הטוענים נ IAR) שכלל לא נסוח אם אסד
ישתתף למשל בוועידה בינ'יל גם אם נושא רמה'יג יכלל בסדר היום
העימות הרב צודי עם ישראל הוא מבחינת נשמת אפו של משטר הבטת'
והסרתו תפגע, אם לא תשמיט מרכיבותה של סוריה במערכת האזורית
עם זאת, הגורם הסורי הוא סמל וביטוי לקשיים הניצבים בפני
ירדן בוירה הנינערבית בכל הנוגע לתהליך המדיני. סוריה היא
מפגש דרכים בנושא הפליסטינאי והתמיכה (קונצנזוס) הערבית.

מושרד החוץ-בוחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר 5 מתוך 5 דף
30 מתוך 4 עותק

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* 99 : שהח, להט, שהבט, טנכני, מסנכני, ר/טרבו, רס, אמן, מצפא, סייבל *

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מל: נוש , נ' , אוסלו , תלצ , נרו חוום 2335 , מ : המשרד
תח: מ , 30 : ס , תח: 301085 , זח: 0800

ידי/מיד

נוש. נ' . אוסלו . תלצ-ממאס לבנון , תא"ל ד. שיאון .
פגישת הריסון משנארהב עם סמנכל מו"מ (28.10) . השתתפו נב'
ל סידים מצפא.א. גולן (נסייבם) .
1. בשיחה העלה הריסון נושא מצרים ולבנון. להלן סיכום הנושא
הלבנוני ניוניפי' ל הריסון אמר שנתבקש להעלות דאגת ארהב
מהתקריות בין צדל ליוניפי' ביחוד עם היחידה
הנורבנית. מאמינים שנוכחות צהל בשטח והיעוץ לגנדאל לחד
משמעותם קביעת אחריותנו לצד'י' ולפטולותיו. כך נראים הדברים
לכפי חוץ. מודאגים המדיווחים מנורבגיה על הסדרות של צדל נגד
חייליהם. חוששים שההתנהגות הנוכחית עלולה להפוך לתופעת קבע
של דרך ההתנהגות. חוששים שאם תהיה פגיעה בנפש יו"ק הדבר לשמה
של ישראל וליציבות בדרום לבנון. על כן ארהב מבקשת שישראל
תנקוט בצעדים לריסון של צדל.

2. קידר עמו על חשיבותו של אזור הבמחון לישראל ועל מגבלות
השפעתנו על הגנדאל לחד, הנוהג של פי כלי המשתק הלבנוני וכאן
דווקא כפי שהיינו רוצים שינהג גנדאל לחד מעורה במציאות
הלבנונית גם נקנה המידה הרחב שלה ואינו מוכן לקבל שמעמדו
פחות מזה של מליציה אחת דוגמת אמל. כן ציינו הבעיות של
היחסים בין צדל ליוניפי' כמוצאה מכך. הוסיף כי גם אנו
מעוניינים כמובן בצד'י' ממושמע שלא יעורר בעיות ויתנגש עם
יוניפי'. הריסון הוסיף כי פגיעה ביוניפי' היא פגיעה במחון
נורוס לבנון. כולה שכן הבוח ממלא תפקיד מועיל בשמירת השקט
שם.

הסמנכל ענה כי בנושא תפקיד יוניפי' אנו חלוקים עליהם, לא
בקטנו נוכחות יוניפי' ואף לא נצטטר אם יעורר. על יוניפי'
להגיע לידי מורוס ויונדי עם צדל כפי שהגיע עם אמל ואו יש
להניח שהחיכוכים יפסקו.

פ: שרה, דהם, פהבס, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, דם, אמן, כידר, מוט'ים,
לונדן, מצפא, טנוג, מלי'אב

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

299

1951

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אלי: ווט, קהיר, נד: חודם 2334, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 301085, וחי: 0800
נד: הדיסון-קידד

10/די/מיד

פגישת הדיסון משגארהב עם סמנכל מו"מ (28/10). השתתפו גבי
ל. סידס המצפא, א. גולן (מסיכום).
בשיחה העה הדיסון נושאי מצרים ולנוון. להלן סיכום הנושא
המצרי.

הדיסון העלה שני נושאים: חידוש שיחות מאבה והרצח בראס
בורקה. בנושא הראשון הוכיר דברי דוהמי' לופפי (23.10) על
אפשרות חידוש שיחות מאבה ושאל אם המצרים השמיטו בפנינו משהו
בענין. קיור השיב שלא שמענו דבר לאחרונה שכן הדו שיח בינינו
מוטטה ולא ברור עדיין ממי יתחזק. מתקיימים אומנם מגעים עם
משהם ובנושא ראס בורקה התקשרו שהם ושר ההגנה עם השגריר, ואף
מרובר על פגישת השגריר עם שר ההגנה אלא, שבסך הכל הקשרים
מוגבלים ביותר ושגרירוננו בקהיר מבודדת. בנושא הרצח בראס
בורקה הסביר הסמנכל את הנשייתות סביב ענין סיום החקירה
והגשת דוח הממצאים. עדיין לא כיבלנו דוח והסימנים לגביו
אינם מעודדים. עוד ציין, שמלבד חומרת הענין לכשעצמו אנו
ניצנים בפני לחץ רב בתוך ישראל ומצד משפחות הנפגעים. הדיסון
אמר שיש להניח שממילא לא נבוא על סיפוקנו מהדוח ושאל אם
תהיינה לכך השלכות על מכלול היחסים הבינלאומיים וחידוש שיחות
מאבה. קיור ענה שאנו מקווים ואין לנו ענין בכך שנושא הרצח
יחדג מעבר להיותו תקדית מבודדת על אף שהיא החמורה מאו נחתם
הסכם השלום. גם על המצרים יהיה לחרום לכך ולדרך בה ינהגו
תהיה השפעה כלומר אם ימסד דוח רציני ואמיתי ויטפלו כראוי
בשאלות שעוד יתעוררו כגון האחריות ומתן הפיצויים התקרית
החמורה והכואבת תאותר. במום השיחה בנושא המצרי ציין הדיסון
שיחסי ארהב מצרים עומדים לחודד בהקום למצבם הנורמאלי. פגישת
וויטהד מונארן היפה טובה. קידד אמר שברצוננו לקוות שגם יחסי
ישראל מצרים יחודו כי קצת מאוחר יותר למצב בו שררו לפני
כחודש

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מח' מצרים

פא: שהח, דהמ, שהבוס, מנכל, ממנכל, ו/מרכו, דס, אמן, ממד, קידור,
מצרים, מצפא, סי'י'בכ

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

826

נכנס

מס

אל: המשרד, נר: 731, ט: 111
דח: ט, סג: ט, תא: 301085, ח: 1730


שמור/מידע

א: היושף המספטי, מצפא, אירופה דע: אגרוטא (ז)
א. נפגיה אקראיה במחמד עם לורנס ברטלה פרקליט במשרד החובט
המחוזי בוושינגטון העוסק בבקשת ההסגרה מאיטליה של ארבעת
הרוצחים מן האניה ואבו עבאס, מסד לי כי ההחלטה האיטלקית
'לשנות כיוון' ולהוציא צו מעצר נגד אבו עבאס באה עתה בעקבות
הקירט הארבעה אחד מהם במיוחד כנראה 'ג'מלי' בטנין אבו עבאס.

ב. בכל מקרה אין האיטלקים מסונינים בהסגרה לארהב אלא באפימה
באיטליה. האמריקנים חוששים נחשש שהועלה גם על ידינו בארניהם
כי האיטלקים ישקלו אחד כך שיסקת חליפין של שחרור הפושעים
לכבוד אמר לנו וייטהד שקרקסי שלל אפשרות של שחרור. כשלעצמי
אמרת כי יש צורך במעקב מתמיד אחר ההליך עם, לרבות שימוש בדעת
הקהל במקרה של חשש קונקרטי.
ג. על מקום המצאו של אבו עבאס עצמו עדיין סגית מידע סותר, בין
דרום תימן לבין היותו עדיין בכלגרו גופה.

רובינשטיין

פ: מהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, מסד, טנוג,
א'רא, מצפא, סייכל, משפט





official text

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DATE: 10/30/85

EAGAN ADMINISTRATION FAVORS BILATERAL ANTI-TERROR EFFORTS (600)

Excerpts: Oakley remarks to House Foreign Affairs panel)
Washington -- The Reagan administration has found that bilateral efforts are generally the best way to develop international protection against terrorism, says U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley.

The director of the State Department's Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning expressed this view October 29 in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Operations.

Oakley said that during the past 11 months, more than 90 planned terrorist attacks had been thwarted by good intelligence work and preventive measures carried out by the United States and its allies.

"It is both easier and more effective to develop these relationships on a one-on-one basis as they are not so likely to be complicated by the various foreign policy and other concerns which multilateral fora generate," Oakley said.

Some governments, he added, "are unwilling to share information in a multilateral forum that they might be willing to share on a bilateral basis or they are prepared to act with us, but not with other states on specific issues."

Following are excerpts of Oakley's statement, as prepared for delivery:

(begin excerpts)

The tactics and motives of terrorist groups around the world are numerous, just as the groups themselves are. As some groups, or their original members, fade or are put away, others emerge.

In dealing with these changing threats and groups, the U.S. government uses a number of weapons and avenues of approach. They can be roughly grouped into three categories: Unilateral, bilateral and multilateral.

We have put heavy emphasis on bilateral efforts because, in past experience, we have found that this is generally the most productive way to build meaningful international cooperation. We are working to get all countries to recognize first that terrorist actions against some states are in effect terrorist actions against us all, and second that the most effective means to deal with the problem is to face it together, sharing information, protecting better each other's diplomatic facilities and developing common plans of action.

Closer counter-terrorism cooperation has been on the agenda for meetings which the president and the secretary have had recently with world leaders in New York and Washington, including the Soviet foreign minister. I have travelled, as have other members of the inter-departmental group on terrorism and members of my staff, to discuss specific measures for closer cooperation with other governments. At the end of last month, I travelled to Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy to talk about threats from Middle Eastern and other terrorists in these countries. My deputy, Parker Borg, met recently with British and Canadian officials in Ottawa in another series of exchanges designed to coordinate our policies and improve understanding.

The real payoff, however, is not the special meetings and

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high-level discussions. It comes in important intelligence passed quickly through liaison channels, in the greater protection of our facilities, and personnel abroad, and the surveillance and arrest of terrorists by local governments, and in other governments consulting with us on how to bring pressure to bear upon those states which flout international conventions or directly support terrorist groups. During the past eleven months, more than 90 planned terrorist attacks were thwarted by good intelligence work and preventive measures by ourselves or our allies.

It is both easier and more effective to develop these relationships on a one-on-one basis as they are not so likely to be complicated by the various foreign policy and other concerns which multilateral fora generate. Some governments, for example, are willing to share information in a multilateral forum that they might be willing to share on a bilateral basis or they are prepared to act with us, but not with other states on specific issues. At the present time, agreements among smaller numbers of like-minded states generally are easier to achieve and provide greater opportunities for effective cooperation than international conventions.

One agreement we believe is important to help cooperation is the supplement to the U.K. Extradition Treaty. Senate ratification will help us maintain credibility in our efforts to bolster the use of the legal processes to combat terrorism when we are trying to extradite suspected terrorists for trial in the United States.

An important tool in our overall bilateral effort is the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program. About 1,500 officials from nations already have participated to date. The program, which has been operating for about a year and a half, is useful not only in providing assistance to developing countries, as you know, it also provides a format for policy-level exchanges and discussions with anti-terrorism specialists from the more developed nations.

We expect a team from the Netherlands shortly, for example, and already have had meetings with officials from Britain, Denmark, Israel and some Arab countries. When the Spaniards contacted us recently about the need for international counter-terrorism cooperation not long ago, we were able to use this program as a mechanism to begin discussions. These meetings underscore the importance of the ATA Program in securing closer international cooperation at the policy level, as well as its importance in training personnel of other governments to do a better job of countering terrorist threats to Americans as well as to themselves. We appreciate your Committee's strong support for the program and its action in increasing the authorized funding to 9.8 million dollars in the Foreign Assistance Act for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987.

We have put a heavy emphasis on such bilateral efforts because this generally has been a more productive area in which to achieve concrete actions than the purely multilateral arena. There also have been some valuable multilateral results however, such as the variety of international conventions.

During recent years the U.S. has looked to the Summit Seven industrial states for closer cooperative measures against terrorism. The results, unfortunately, have thus far been mixed, although we continue to press for progress here as elsewhere. Terrorism has been a topic of discussion among the Summit Seven leaders, the foreign ministers and the expert groups especially established to consider counter-terrorism initiatives. Following the Summit sessions there have frequently been communiqués condemning terrorism and providing direction for further areas of cooperation. Special attention has been given at the Summits to aircraft hijacking, specifically through the Bonn Declaration of 1978, which provides for concerted sanctions against states that fail to take appropriate legal actions against hijackers. The Bonn Declaration led to sanctions against Afghanistan in 1982. However, this was the only occasion in which action has been taken.

Attaining effective cooperative measures even among a small group of like-minded nations such as the Summit Seven is not easy. It has been difficult to obtain much progress beyond the aviation field. It takes only one country to slow down or block a consensus agreement on one issue or another. Each state faces a different sort of terrorist problem, has its own foreign policy or economic priorities, and thinks

in terms of its own interests in dealing with others. We were disappointed that the Summit Seven nations were not more supportive of our efforts to deal with the aftermath of the TWA B47 and Achille Lauro hijackings.

As you know, the current U.N. General Assembly is considering in its sixth committee a detailed and comprehensive resolution, sponsored by the United Kingdom, that would condemn international terrorism. We are hopeful the general assembly will pass a solid text that underscores the international community's condemnation of terrorism and calling for specific action. In working on this, in cooperation with a large number of other Western states, we are guided by the sentiments expressed by Congress during recent months, especially during consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act which took place after the TWA B47 hijacking.

On another matter related to terrorism, the State Department is exploring the feasibility of an urgent U.N. resolution calling for the unconditional release right away of all hostages in Lebanon. We are working toward a resolution that could be supported by all those countries whose nationals are now being held hostage, including the USSR.

We will be alert to other opportunities for anti-terrorism initiatives in the United Nations. We are trying to emphasize that recent events show that terrorism knows no international boundaries, respects no passports. As the Soviet Union recently discovered to its dismay in Lebanon, even it is not immune to the virus of terrorism which they have helped spread. The Achille Lauro demonstrated the international nature of the travel business. Citizens of more than 20 nations were on the original passenger manifest of the ill-fated cruise. Citizens of more than 75 countries have been the victims of terrorist attacks so far this year. Terrorist groups, in a world of imitation and acquiescence and with support from various governments, can spring up overnight almost anywhere.

We are trying in these efforts to raise the consciousness of the United Nations members to the terrorist problem. The U.N. itself traditionally has not been action-oriented, but we hope these various efforts by us and other concerned states will make the member nations more inclined to take actions themselves or in cooperation with other governments.

In summation, we are working on a number of multilateral approaches as well as unilateral and bilateral steps. Just as there is no single terrorist threat or tactic, there is no one way of countering the international terrorism threat. The multilateral approach is an important part of the effort and we will pursue it vigorously along with the others.

(end excerpts)



official text

DATE* 10/30/85

REAGAN FAVORS WORLDWIDE SHARING OF SPACE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
(Transcript: BBC interview with the president) (4610)

Washington -- President Reagan says he favors a "worldwide sharing" of space defense technology.

In his November meeting in Geneva with Soviet leader Gorbachev, the president said, he will be prepared to negotiate his Strategic Defense Initiative "in the sense of coming to an agreement, which we are bound by in the future for whenever that weapon happens -- bound to this matter of worldwide sharing."

In an interview carried by the British Broadcasting System, the president said that rather than being a sticking point, as it has been at the arms talks in Geneva, SDI "should be one of the most helpful things in easing some of that paranoia...or that hostility or suspicions between us."

If suspicion and hostility between the Soviet Union and the West were reduced, Reagan said, "the reduction of arms will easily follow, because we will have reduced the feeling that we need them."

Reagan assured the BBC that he would not relegate arms reduction issues to a lower place on his Geneva agenda than regional conflicts and human rights. "The effort is to arrive at an understanding about our ability to live in the world together and at peace," he said, adding that arms reduction "can follow." He said nations are not suspicious of one another because of their arms, but are armed "because they are suspicious."

The president had kind words for Gorbachev, saying the Soviet leader has shown more interest in ordinary Soviet citizens than was the case with his predecessors. "He has expressed great concern about the economic problems and the improvements that he feels should be made," Reagan said of Gorbachev.

Reagan defended the U.S. activities in capturing the Palestinian terrorists who took over the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and killed an American tourist. "We had no choice in the matter if we were going to prevent those terrorists" from escaping justice, he said.

But, he noted, "I'm pleased to say now that I think the flurry is over and that both Egypt and Italy want to continue the warm relationship that we've had."

Following is the transcript of the interview, which the White House made available October 30*

(begin transcript)

Question; Mr. President, you are meeting with Mr. Gorbachev -- it's only three weeks away now. Everyone regards it as crucial. What do you hope personally to get out of the summit with Mr. Gorbachev?

The president* I think that the most that we could get out is if we could eliminate some of the paranoia, if we could reduce the hostility, the suspicion that keeps our two countries particularly -- but basically should we say the Warsaw bloc and the West -- at odds with each other. And while I know everyone is looking toward and emphasizing a reduction in arms, this is vital and important, but I see reduction in arms as a result, not a cause. If we can reduce those suspicions between our two countries, the reduction of arms will easily follow because we will have reduced the feeling that we need them.

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Q: Mr. Shultz is off to Moscow on Saturday to do the groundwork for this summit fully aware, as he himself admits, that there are major differences between the United States and Russia. Apart from the paranoia which you talked about, what are those differences as you see them?

A: Oh, my heavens. The -- here are two systems so diametrically opposed that -- I'm no linguist but I have been told that in the Russian language there isn't even a word for freedom. And two nations everyone is referring to as the "superpowers" obviously are competitive and our philosophies and our ideas on the world -- and that probably cannot be corrected, but we can have a peaceful competition. We have to live in the world together. There is no sense in believing that we must go on with the threat of a nuclear war hanging over the world because of our disagreements.

We don't like their system. They don't like ours. But we're not out to change theirs. I do feel sometimes they are out to change ours. But if we could get along. They have a system of totalitarian government and rule of their people. We have one in which we believe the people rule the government. And there isn't any reason why we can't coexist in the world -- where there are legitimate areas of competition, compete. But do it in a manner that recognizes that neither one of us should be a threat to the other.

Q: When Mr. Shultz talks to Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shevardnadze, what will be the topics of discussion? Will it be trying to find some groundwork, for example, on arms control and reduction?

A: No, I would think that probably the main point in their meeting ahead of the meeting -- ahead of the major meeting is to establish an agenda. In other words, Secretary Shultz would tell them the things that we feel are important to be discussed. Minister Shevardnadze will probably have a list of things that are on their agenda so that we can plan and neither one of us be caught by surprise at the summit with hearing -- having a subject come up that hadn't even been considered. So I think that this is probably the main useful purpose that will be served by their getting together.

Q: Is there any chance at all that the discussions Mr. Shultz has in Moscow might be -- might enable you to produce an initiative before you go to Geneva?

A: Right now, we are in the position of studying what we call a counterproposal. In Geneva, where our arms control delegations are meeting and have been meeting for a long time, we have had a proposal for a reduction of nuclear weapons.

Now, for the first time, the Soviet Union has made a counterproposal. We have put that in the hands of our people in Geneva now for them to look at; we ourselves are studying it. There are some elements in there that are -- well, we've called them "seeds to nurture" -- the things that we look at and say, "yes, these could very easily be acceptable."

At the same time in their proposal, there are some things that we believe are so disadvantageous to us that they should be negotiated and some changes made. And with all of this going on, I'm not in a position to say now at what point will we make our reply to their counteroffer and state where we are or where we differ and so forth, and then that should be the area in which negotiations would take place.

Now, whether that doesn't happen prior to the summit meeting or whether our team in Geneva tables it before they adjourn for their recess that is coming up, that I can't answer; that still remains to be seen.

Q: But I must tell you, Mr. President, that Mrs. Thatcher has already told the leader of the opposition -- and she said this today in the House of Commons -- that you were going to come up with an initiative before Geneva. Have you been talking to her?

A: Well, we're -- I'm personally hopeful of that, also. So she's right, that that is what we're striving to do.

Q: Now, can we look at some of the things which obviously are going to affect Geneva, but particularly I'd like to talk to you about the Strategic Defense Initiative and how important that is going to be. Can anything be achieved in Geneva without some understanding from both sides in this area?

A: Probably not. But I think there can be an understanding when they hear what we have in mind. I believe that this is something that is probably one of the most momentive things in a century. We have a team that, within the terms of the ABM Treaty, is researching to see if there is a defensive weapon -- the possibility of a defensive weapon that could intercept missiles before they reach their target, instead of having a deterrent to war, as we have now, which is both sides with massive weapons of destruction -- nuclear missiles -- and the only thing deterring war is the threat we represent to each other of killing millions and millions of citizens on both sides.

Now, if we can come up with a defensive weapon, then we reach -- and we know that we have it, that it is there, that it is practical, that it will work -- then my idea is that we go to the world; we go to our allies; we go to the Soviet Union and we say, look, we are not going to just start deploying this at the same time we maintain a nuclear arsenal. We think this weapon -- this defensive weapon -- that we would like to make available and let's have the world have this for their own protection so that we can all eliminate our nuclear arsenals. And the only reason, then, for having the defensive weapon would be, because since everyone in the world knows how to make one -- a nuclear weapon -- we would all be protected in case some madman, some day down along the line, secretly sets out to produce some with the idea of blackmailing the world and the world wouldn't be blackmailed because we would be -- all be sitting here with that defense.

I've likened it to what happened when -- in 1925 after World War I, all the nations got together and outlawed poison gas, but everybody kept their gasmasks. So, we would have a world with some nuclear gasmasks and we could sleep at night without thinking that someone could bring this great menace of the nuclear threat against us.

Q: When you say, Mr. President, you'd go to the world once you had proved -- satisfactory to yourself that here was a weapon which would actually work. If you go to the world, would you include Russia in that?

A: Yes. I think that -- what could be safer than -- today, everything is offensive weapons. It's the only weapon I know of that's ever been developed in history that has not brought about a defense against it. But, what would be safer than if the two great superpowers -- the two that have the great arsenals -- both of us sat there with defensive weapons that insured our safety against the nuclear weapons and both of us eliminated our nuclear missiles.

Q: But the Russians, presumably, would have to make their own SDI. You wouldn't offer it to them, would you, off the shelf?

A: Why not? I think this is something to be discussed at the summit as to what kind of an agreement we could make about -- in the event. I would like to say to the Soviet Union, we know you've been researching for this same thing longer than we have. We wish you well. There couldn't be anything better than if both of us came up with it. But if only one of us does, then why don't we, instead of using it as an offensive means of having a first strike against anyone else in the world, why don't we use it to ensure that there won't be any nuclear strikes?

Q: Are you saying then, Mr. President, that the United States, if it were well down the road towards a proper SDI program, would be prepared to share its technology with Soviet Russia, provided, of course, there were arms reductions and so on on both sides?

A: That's right. There would have to be the reductions of offensive weapons. In other words, we would switch to defense instead of offense.

Q: That, of course, is quite a long way away --

A: Yes.

Q: -- this idealistic world of yours, if I may say so.

A: Yes. Although we're optimistic. We've had some good breakthroughs in our research so far.

Q: It's going well, is it?

A: Yes.

Q: And is the research going so well as to suggest to you that a defensive weapon of this kind is really practical now?

A: As a matter of fact, very leading scientists who are involved in this have said that -- that they can foresee us achieving this weapon.

Q: Will it take long?

A: Oh, I think we're talking a matter of years.

Q: Let us say, though, that -- this isn't going to come about, as you say, for a matter of years. And Mr. Gorbachev, as we all know, is very worried about SDI. Would you be prepared to negotiate on SDI at Geneva?

A: Well, negotiate in the sense of coming to an agreement, which we are bound by in the future for whenever that weapon happens -- bound to this matter of worldwide sharing.

Q: I wonder if you'd be kind enough to clear up one point on the SDI, and it's this. Mr. Gorbachev, I think, accepts the idea that you could do nothing about research because it's not really verifiable. Testing, on the other hand, worries him. Now, does testing, in your view, come within the ABM Treaty?

A: Yes, I believe it does. I think that we're well within it and within a strict adherence to the treaty, although you could have a more liberal interpretation of the treaty that I believe is justified.

But rather than have any debate or argument about that, we are staying within the strict limits of the treaty.

Q: Do you think the SDI is likely to be a stumbling block at Geneva, bearing in mind what Mr. Gorbachev thinks about it, these reservations?

A: I think it should be the other way around. I think it should be one of the most helpful things in erasing some of that paranoia I mentioned, or that hostility or suspicions between us.

Q: You have a horror of nuclear weapons, and that's why you say that SDI is a good thing. If we had SDI worldwide, would there still be nuclear weapons available?

A: I wouldn't see any need for them at all. I wouldn't know why a nation would strap itself to invest in them. But, as I say, there is always the possibility of a madman coming along, and, as I say, you can't eliminate the knowledge about building those weapons, who might seize upon them. We've had an experience in our lifetime of a madman in the world who caused great tragedy worldwide. And so I would think that this -- this would be our gas mask.

Q: Mr. President, can we turn now to some of the things you said in your U.N. speech? One of the central themes you brought up there concerned those areas of regional conflict, such as Afghanistan, in which the Soviets have a hand. Are you going to bring these up with Mr. Gorbachev? And, if so, do you expect him to respond positively?

A: I would think that this is very much a part of trying to rid the world of the suspicions. They claim that they fear that we of the Western world threaten them, that somehow we're lying here in wait for a day when we can eliminate their method of government and so forth. There is no evidence to sustain that. If you look back to the end of World War II, our country, for example, absolutely undamaged -- we hadn't had our industries destroyed through bombings and so forth -- and we were the only nation with the bomb, the nuclear weapon. We could have dictated to the world. We didn't. We set out to help even our erstwhile enemies recover. And today those erstwhile enemies are our staunchest allies with -- in the NATO Alliance.

They, on the other hand, have created -- Well, they've gone through the biggest military buildup in the history of man, and it is basically offensive. Now, we, therefore, claim we've got some right to believe that we are threatened. Not the other way around.

Now, to eliminate that suspicion or that fear, if they really want to live in a peaceful world and be friends and associate with the rest of the world, then, we need more than words. And the deeds could be the stopping of their attempt to -- either themselves or through proxies and through subversion -- to force their system on other countries throughout the world. And that could be one of the greatest proofs there is, that --

Q: Do you think you were being a bit optimistic in your U.N. speech? You proposed the idea that these areas of regional conflict should be discussed. But, of course, you took them much further than that. What you actually said, they should be discussed up to the

point when they're just eliminated. Now, do you think you're being optimistic when you recognize the fact that the fellow sitting opposite you is Mr. Gorbachev and he's tied up in these things.

A: Yes. But, on the other hand, he has some practical problems in his own country, some problems of how long can they sustain an economy that provides for their people under the terrific cost of building up and pursuing this expansionist policy and this great military buildup.

Q: His economic problems.

A: Yes. And if we can show him that he can resolve those economic problems with no danger to themselves, convince him that we represent no threat, then I could see us -- as I've said before, we don't like each other's systems, maybe we don't like each other. But we're the only two nations that can probably cause a world war. We're also the only two nations that can prevent one.

Q: Will you want to talk to him about human rights? You've probably heard that Mrs. Yelena Bonner has just been granted a visa --

A: Yes.

Q: -- to come to the West so she can get medical treatment, but she'll have to go back to Russia, of course. Do you see that as a propaganda move by the Russians? Or is it a step along the road?

A: I would like to feel it's a step along the road. And there needs to be more.

I don't think, however, that the human rights thing is -- should be a kind of a public discussion and accusing fingers being pointed at each other and their claim that this is an internal matter with them. But I think it should be explained and -- that some of these violations -- Well, first of all is the violation of the Helsinki Pact. This was one of the main reasons why we are signatories to that pact is this agreement about not separating families and so forth, allowing people freedom to choose.

What they have to understand is that in some of the major areas where we could seek agreement, we have a better chance in our type of society of getting the approval that we need from our Congress, from our people of some of these agreements if these issues, these human rights problems are not standing in the way. And maybe I can point that out.

Q: Mr. President, there have been fears expressed in Europe that arms control will be pushed right down the agenda at Geneva in favor of issues like regional conflict and human rights, which we've been discussing. Can you give an assurance that that is not the case?

A: I certainly can, as far as I'm concerned. That is -- but, as I've said, that follows another thing. The effort is to arrive at an understanding about our ability to live in the world together and at peace, and the other -- that can follow. Someone -- if I can only remember the quote correctly the other day said, "Nations aren't suspicious of each other because of their arms. They are armed because they are suspicious."

Q: There is a feeling, Mr. President, that Mr. Gorbachev has seized the initiative in Europe. European leaders have undoubtedly been impressed by his performance. Mrs. Thatcher, as you know, said that he is someone she can do business with. What do you think about it?

A: I don't know him as yet, but he seems to have shown more of an interest in the people -- the man in the street -- than other Soviet leaders have. He has expressed great concern about the economic problems and the improvements that he feels that should be made there. And he is younger and more energetic than some of the more recent leaders have been. And I just -- I'm optimistic by nature, but I have to be optimistic that he is looking at the entire picture.

On the other hand, I don't think we should believe that he is not dedicated to the principles of their system, to communism and so forth. If he wasn't, he wouldn't be where he is.

Q: Do you think he is, in terms of youth -- energy if you like -- intelligence, and obviously a powerful grasp of public relations -- do you think he is a pretty formidable Russian leader to deal with compared with his predecessors?

A: Well, I don't know. On the public relations thing, he did far better with some of our own press than he did with the French

press on his recent visit when he was there. I just -- I can't judge him on that. Sometimes public relations is made by -- or are made by those reporting, not by those doing.

Q: Can I take one or two other areas with you, Mr. President?

The first is terrorism. We know how you handled the Achille Lauro affair, but does that carry the risk of alienating friendly governments? Egypt, if you remember, wasn't too pleased.

A: I know, and yet we felt that there wasn't -- we had no choice in the matter if we were going to prevent those terrorists from suddenly, as so many in past had, disappearing into the rabbit warrens that bounded the Middle East -- Lebanon and so forth -- and therefore they would escape being brought to justice. They had murdered a man, a helpless individual. We felt we had to do it. But I'm pleased to say, now, that I think the flurry is over and that both Egypt and Italy want to continue the warm relationship that we've had. And, so, that has worked out all right.

Q: Mr. President, would you do it again, even if it meant, say, violating international law?

A: Well, it actually didn't violate international law. Well --

Q: But, say, could in the future?

A: It could, I suppose. This is hard to -- it's a hypothetical question.

Q: But terrorism is always with us.

A: Yes. And I think that you just have to say -- you'd have to judge each case on its own as to the need to bring terrorists to justice; the need to convince them that terrorism is not going to be successful, it is not going to make governments, like your own or our own, change their policies out of fear of terrorism. If that ever happens, then the world has gone back to anarchy.

So, you would have to judge that against how much you would be violating international law to achieve your goal.

Q: But if it was necessary, I take it you would.

A: Yes.

Q: And you would pursue terrorism as hard as you can, as often as you can?

A: Yes. It's been very frustrating for a number of the things that have happened and I've been taken to task by members of the press that I talked, but I didn't take action. But, just look at the nature of some of those terrorist acts. The terrorist blows himself up with all the innocent people that he also kills at the same time. So, there's no way you're going to punish him. You now seek to find, well, who does he belong to? What group brought this about? Well, there the difficulty is almost insurmountable. But also, even if you do get some intelligence that indicates it's a certain group, they're in some foreign city and you say, well, how do we punish them without blowing up a neighborhood and killing as many innocent people as they did? And this has been our problem up until this last time when we had a very clear-cut case.

Q: Mr. President, this may be a difficult question for you to answer, but what would you most like to be remembered for by history?

A: Well, five years ago when we came here, the United States had allowed its defenses to decline. The United States economy -- I remember attending my first economic summit in Ottawa, Canada and that was just in the spring of the year -- my first year here -- and I remember our friends and allies -- the heads of state of the other summit nations there -- beseeching me to stop exporting our inflation and our recession to their countries in this world of international trade and all -- that we were exporting bad economic situations to the rest of the world.

The Soviet Union -- again, as I say, through surrogates or on their own -- there was Afghanistan, there was Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, Nicaragua, and they had forced governments of their choosing into all of those countries.

Well, it's been five years now. We have the greatest recovery, economic recovery that we've ever had in our history. It is not we

who are exporting inflation anymore. Inflation is down from those double-digit figures, well, for the last five months it's only been two and one-half percent, and none of our trading partners can match that. Our interest rates are down. We have created almost nine million new jobs over these five years with our economic recovery.

And in the world abroad, the Soviet Union has not stepped in or created a government of its kind in any new country in these five years. It's not moved under one additional inch of territory, and I just like to feel that maybe some of the things we did here -- the American people, their spirit was down, they had heard talks prior to our arrival that maybe we should give up our high expectations that never again could we look toward the future as we had in the past, lower our expectations and so forth.

Today we have a volunteer military, we exceed our enlistment quota every year. We have the highest level of education in the military, in this volunteer military that we've ever had in our history, even in wartime drafts. The American people have rallied, and with a spirit of voluntarism, voluntarily stepping into problems that once they just let go by and thought somebody in the government would take care of them. And as I say, the economy -- last year some 600,000 new businesses were incorporated in our country.

I would like to be remembered not for doing all those things -- I didn't do them; the American people did them. All I did was help get government out of their way and restore our belief in the power of the people and that government must be limited in its powers and limited in its actions. And that part I helped in -- I'd like to be remembered for that.

Q: One final question, Mr. President, it's about your health. How do you feel, and what do the doctors say?

A: The doctor said that I've had a 100 percent recovery. I'm riding horses regularly now, as I've always done, and I'm doing my exercises in the gym every day at the end of the day.

I have a little gymnasium upstairs and some weights and so forth, and I'm doing all those things. And I've just never felt better.

Q: Well, it's a pleasure that -- you look remarkably fit. It's been a pleasure to talk to you. Thank you.

A: Well, my pleasure, and I thank you.

(end transcript)



official text

DATE* 10/30/85

(With NEA313: Reagan Won't Withdraw Jordan Arms Proposal)
TEXT; ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY ON ARMS SALES TO JORDAN
(Statement to House subcommittee) (2042)

WASHINGTON -- Following is the text of the statement delivered to the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East October 30 by Richard W. Murphy, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs' (begin text)

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, I appreciate the opportunity to join you today to discuss a subject which the president regards as one of his highest priorities -- the sale of a limited quantity of defensive arms to Jordan -- and to consider why the Administration regards this sale as so important.

YEAR OF OPPORTUNITY

Recent events in the Middle East, including the PLO attack on an Israeli yacht in which three Israelis were killed, the Israeli air raid on PLO sites in Tunis, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the brutal murder of an American citizen -- Leon Klinghoffer -- again illustrate the tragedy and futility of the most recent cycle of violence and terrorism -- attack and counterattack in that region. It has long been United States policy to seek an end to this kind of violence by encouraging men of good will to find peace. Our policy -- indeed our fervent hope -- is to see the parties to the Middle East conflict sit together at the negotiating table to resolve their differences.

Some would contend that the recent incidents in the Middle East sounded the death knell of the current peace process. We fundamentally disagree. Certainly these incidents have complicated the attainment of our goal -- direct negotiations. Yet, these incidents have had a paradoxical effect. By making very clear the consequences of failure in the peace process, they appear to have served to reinvigorate the determination of those dedicated to the success of that process.

I do not wish to mislead the Committee. The peace process is at a delicate stage, but a hopeful one. For the past year we have been hearing from many friends in the region that this is the year of opportunity and we have tried to take advantage of that opportunity. This Administration has been engaged in a dialogue with the parties about the kind of steps that need to be taken to move the process forward. In the past several months we have been able to come closer than ever before to agreement on the kinds of steps that will be required.

Under the determined and courageous leadership of King Hussein, Jordan has made a significant move toward peace. Arab governments in the past have been reluctant to enter negotiations with Israel without a guarantee of the final outcome. Now, King Hussein has stated his readiness to engage in a negotiating process, knowing that the outcome will depend on tough bargaining among the parties. Hussein has welcomed the prospect of entering negotiations with Israel, "promptly and directly" as he said at the White House on September 30, in an "environment free of belligerent and hostile acts." The King spoke to members of this house a few weeks ago about



his dedication to peace, a peace that he knows Israel must share.

Israel's Prime Minister Peres has responded in a most constructive way to King Hussein's courageous position. In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly recently, he reiterated Israel's desire to enter direct negotiations with Jordan and spoke eloquently of the need for peace to ensure the well-being of future generations.

Problems remain, however, in the process of getting to direct negotiations. They relate for the most part to two questions -- Palestinian representation and King Hussein's need for an international context to provide the broad support he needs to enter into negotiations with Israel.

Jordan must be able to share the burden and challenge of peacemaking with credible representatives of those directly concerned - the Palestinian people. This Administration's policy regarding recognition of and negotiation with the PLO has been clear and consistent: the PLO must first accept Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognize Israel's right to exist. We have long maintained, however, and the governments of Israel and Jordan support this position, that the Palestinian people must be fully involved in this process. We believe also that they should participate at every stage of the negotiating process. After all, it is their legitimate rights as a people as well as the security of all states in the region that these negotiations must address.

King Hussein has spoken of the need for an international umbrella. We understand Jordan's need for a supportive international context for direct negotiations and we continue our consultations with the parties in order to ascertain how such a context can best be provided.

Prime Minister Peres, recognizing the King's needs, indicated at the United Nations that Israel would also be willing to consider an international forum to support the initiation of direct negotiations. In stating his willingness to consider an international context that would facilitate direct negotiations, Prime Minister Peres has demonstrated that he too is steadfastly dedicated to peace.

The problems that remain are not insurmountable. Tactical and procedural questions are negotiable. They are the stuff of what we call the peace process. Violence and terror are not. As Jordan moves toward peace with Israel, rejectionist forces in the region, determined to block peace with Israel, have stepped up acts of terrorism and intimidation. King Hussein and Prime Minister Peres understand that the moment presents an historic opportunity for lasting peace. Just as they are willing to face increased risks for the prospects of peace, so must the United States be prepared to support our friends. Our nation has a clear moral commitment to those whom we have encouraged along the path of peace. By this I mean both Israel and Jordan.

JORDAN ARMS SALE

This Administration, together with the Congress, has worked to ensure that Israel will have the military capability to defend itself against any realistic combination of hostile forces. We have maintained that before Israel can go to the peace negotiating table, it must have the confidence that it can defend itself. This is no less valid for Jordan as well.

President Reagan, in notifying Congress of his intention to sell Jordan a limited quantity of defensive arms, clearly stated his

commitment to Jordan's security. This Administration stands behind that commitment. We base our position on four main considerations.

A. Jordan's Security

First, Jordan has legitimate defense needs that exist quite apart from the King's current peace initiatives. It is in our interest, and the interest of stability in the region, for the United States to aid Jordan in meeting those needs.

Perhaps the single most fundamental compact a government undertakes with its people is the assurance of their security. King Hussein must assure his people that Jordan's armed forces have the capability to defend Jordan from its adversaries. If the King cannot obtain these arms from the U.S., he will -- he must -- seek them elsewhere, possibly the Soviet Union.

The conventional threat to Jordan comes from the vastly more powerful Syria, which opposes King Hussein's efforts to move to negotiations with Israel. In 1970 Syria invaded Jordan. In 1980, Syria threatened Jordan by massing its troops along their common border. Syria holds major quantitative advantages over Jordan in personnel (5 to 1), tanks (4 to 1), armored personnel carriers (2.5 to 1), artillery (4 to 1) and combat aircraft (5 to 1).

Jordan's most serious military deficiency is its inability to provide adequate air defense against an external attack and thereby resist military intimidation by the adversaries of peace. Although the Royal Jordanian Air Force would resist aggression courageously, it could face overwhelmingly superior numbers of more advanced Soviet fighters, and Jordan's limited surface-to-air missile system would not now be able to defend the country against a determined air campaign. The package of arms that we propose to sell to Jordan, therefore, focuses on air defense -- it contains advanced fighter aircraft and improved air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, to upgrade Jordan's increasingly obsolete equipment. In part these aircraft will be replacements for obsolete F-5s that are to be phased out of Jordan's inventory. There will be little growth in the size of Jordan's arsenal as a result of this sale.

B. Contribution to the Peace Process

Secondly, the sale of defensive arms to Jordan makes it possible for King Hussein to undertake additional real risks for peace.

Since King Hussein announced his peace initiative last spring, Jordan has been subjected to an escalating campaign of terror.

A Jordanian diplomat in Turkey was assassinated and the Jordanian Embassy in Rome attacked by rocket fire; three Jordanian airliners have been either bombed or hijacked, and Jordanian airline offices in Athens and Madrid were attacked. Without any doubt, the enemies of peace are trying to intimidate King Hussein from pursuing efforts to broaden the peace process and reach a comprehensive settlement with Israel -- and they will intensify their attacks.

At this critical point in Middle East diplomacy, the United States must stand behind its friends. Our arms sale to Jordan represents a powerful political signal of American support for Jordan that will strengthen the King's ability to stand up to these attacks.

C. U.S. Policy Continuity

Thirdly, for the past thirty years, the United States has maintained a productive security assistance relationship with Jordan. To refuse to meet Jordan's needs at this juncture would represent an unprecedented break in continuity. The United States's close defense

relationship with Jordan has developed over 30 years and eight U.S. administrations. We have become Jordan's main arms supplier. To break this continuity in our policy now would be a signal that the United States does not fully support the King's peace efforts and would be seen as U.S. waffling in the face of terrorism and intimidation.

Indeed, never before in our long friendship have U.S. and Jordanian diplomatic objectives enjoyed greater harmony. We are both committed to achieving direct negotiations between the parties in order to bring about a lasting and just peace.

D. No Threat to Israel

Finally, the package of arms for Jordan that we have proposed does not threaten Israel's security. Quite the contrary, by contributing to Jordan's confidence in moving toward direct negotiations, the arms sale serves to enhance the prospects for long-term security and stability in the region.

As I said earlier, this Administration is unswervingly committed to helping ensure Israel's security, survival and well-being, and to maintaining Israel's decisive advantage over any combination of potential adversaries. According to U.S. intelligence community assessments, Israel's edge over potential Arab adversaries is substantial and will continue to widen for the remainder of the decade.

Israel's long-term security, however, can only come through peace with its neighbors, not military superiority. A strong and stable Jordan, able to defend itself against radical pressures, enhances the prospect for regional peace.

Jordan has proven, over the past 15 years, that it is determined to ensure that terrorists do not attack Israel from Jordanian territory. The border that it shares with Israel -- the longest Israel has with any of its neighbors -- has been peaceful for many years. Israel has been able to place confidence in Jordan to prevent infiltration along their common border. In fact, Prime Minister Peres noted several weeks ago that Jordan has worked actively to prevent terrorist acts from being launched from or through its territory.

In short, it takes courage, skill and self-assurance to move toward peace in a complicated and dangerous environment.

King Hussein has demonstrated such courage and, in so doing has increased the risk to his regime and to himself posed by rejectionist forces. He has boldly faced down intimidation and terrorism. He is a friend, of thirty years standing. He has called for peace in the region - a peace attained through negotiations with Israel. He has amply demonstrated his commitment to a process which, in the short-term, greatly increases the threat to his regime and his people.

He has turned to us for support. To refuse to sell him equipment to help defend his country only encourages those who are most adamantly opposed to what the U.S., Jordan, Israel desire -- lasting peace in the Middle East.

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Hijacking Case to Go to Genoa

NYT-Tangiabus-An Italian court is expected to give magistrates in Genoa jurisdiction to investigate the hijacking and murder of Klinghoffer. But it remains unclear whether the court would uphold the arrest warrant for Abbas. This could harm Carzi's chances of forming a new Gov't.

Bomb Scare on Achille Lauro

DN-A bomb threat forced the captain of the Archille Lauro to throw 21 boxes of casino equipment overboard. A bomb was not found.

Correction-On US Position on Resolutions

NYT-10/29-A dispatch on Friday about the UN anniversary misstated the US position on resolutions in the Mideast. The US opposes references not to a "just settlement" but to Palestinian "self-determination."

Letters

WSJ-Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution writes that trade, in regard to Italy, is not an adequate means of controlling foreign policy. By surrendering to its own fear of retaliation, Italy has gained nothing in the Arab world except contempt.

NYP-Arafat should capture Abbas and put him on trial if he wants to prove he is sincere.

NYP-Columnists Evans & Novak ignore the hundreds of cold-blooded murders by the PLO. They will probably have thechutzpah to nominate Hussein and Arafat for the Nobel Peace Prize.

NYP-The problem with the PLO is exacerbated by the US de facto acceptance of its existence, for example, the PLO headquarters in NYC. These offices have no legal right to exist.

NYP-Funny how Sen. D'Amato is so tough on terrorism. A few months ago he said he was afraid to ride the NYC subways.

אשרר

פיקוד

עם השלוח:

30.10.85

מאריך

עגירות ישראל - ווסינגטון

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לבנון.

אמ"ל הודיע למחמי"ד ששלושת החטופים הסובייטים שוחררו, אני מניח שהידיעה כבר ברשותכם אך אדווח עליה למען הסדר הטוב. הדבר, כך נאמר לי, מעמיד את האמריקאים במבוכה ועם מספר שאלות שאין עליהן תשובה. כגון: מה גרם לתפניה לאחר שהחוטפים הקטו הנאיהם לסובייטים, האם נעשתה עסקה ומה כוללת, ולחילופין שמה איימו הסובייטים בתגמול (לא מתקבל כאן ברצינות). הגורמים הנ"ל מתקטים גם לפרט זאת בהקשר לחטופים האמריקאים - מה פשר תיאפליה... וזאת הדבר שיכנן לקולא או לחומרה.

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חאריך וז"ח 30/10/30

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תקון אי"ר

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בית הנבחרים - נשק לירדן

מרפי הופיע היום בשמיעה פתוחה בפני תת הועדה לאירופה ומזיית בוועדת החוץ. גאסט הצטרף אליו.
 נכחו המורשים המילטון, גילמן, לנטוס, לארי סמית, קריס סמית, לויין, דורנו, זשאו.

מרפי מסר הודעה כתובה (בדיפ) ובפתח דבריו ציין את עיקריה: הממשל מודע שהקונגרס תומך במאמציו לקדם השלום, אנחנו קרובים מאי-פעם לצעדים שיקדמוהו. חשוב לאותת נכונה לאלו המוכנים להסתכן למען השלום, זוהי מטרת עסקת הנשק, ואין הפקידה להוות פרס או תמריץ. מרפי ציטט הופעת חוסיין בגבעה לפני כחודש, ציין שבדברי המלך עונים על דרישות החוק, וציין שמירתה הקפדנית של ירדן על הגבול עם ישראל. אם לא יהיה מסוגל להגן על עמו בעזרת נשק אמריקאי, יאלץ לפנות לבריה"מ.

עיקרי השאלות והתשובות:

המילטון מי יחליט בסופו של דבר האם ירדן עונה על תנאי לשון החלטת הסנאט האם היתה התקדמות בפגישה חוסיין-ערפאת? מה הצעד הבא?
הטובה - הנשיא יהיה הסמכות האחרונה. חוסיין-ערפאת: מחתינים לשמוע תוצאות הפגישה.
 הצעד הבא - זמן הוא נכס מתבזבז במזיית, אך במאמצים צייתן לראות החילה מוי"מ ישיר בקרוב. אינו יכול לתת מועד, אך מדובר בחסות מתאימה.

גילמן (ואחייכ לנטוס) שאלו על ההתקרבות הירבנית-טורית והשלכותיה לגבי טיעון הממשל שירדן זקוקה לנשק מול סוריה. צוטטו דברי המלך ועקידים בדבר ההתקרבות ונקודות ההסכמה. הטובה מרפי היתה שגם לחילוקי דעות יש משמעות במזיית, הזכיר הפלישה הסורית ב-70 והגיט ב-80. הידוק הקשרים הוא היענות להמלצות פסגת קזבלנקה, אך אינו מצמצם צרכי ירדן.

גילמן שאל על מימון אפשרי של העסקה ועלות. הטובה 3 מקורות אפשריים: ירדן, מדינות ערב, כספי סיוע, אך אין תמונה ברורה (בחוס הפגישה ביקש המילטון ממרפי תשובה לשאלה עד מחר (10.31). סך העלות תלויה במטוט שייבחר. לשאלה האם להשתתף אשיף מדברי רח"מ באוי"מ יש משמעות השיב מרפי שטמע בהם הד לדברי שולץ על הצורך לשתף פלסטינאים בכל השלבים. לגבי הצעד הבא בתהליך אמר מרפי שאין יודעים מה יהיה אך עומדים בקשר הדוק עם ירדן, ישראל ומצרים. מחתינים לדעת תוצאות פגישה ערפאת-חוסיין ולוקחים בחשבון רצון דמסק ועמאן לשת"פ.

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... דחיפות...
... תאריך וזיחה...
... מסי מברק...

732

זשאו אם הבית ינקוט בצעדי הטנט כלפי העסקה, האם יהווה איתות חיובי, שלילי, או נייטרלי למלך? מרפי - נייטרלי, במובן שהממשל מתכוון להתקדם עם העסקה. וכיצד ישפיע על התהליך? קשה להשיב בודאות. האספקה אינה מיידית וחשיבות האיטור בתחומת הודאות. זשאו שאל לדעת מרפי על החלטה בשני הבתים המשבחת את המלך או רה"מ על צעדיהם, כדי לפצות על האיתות השלילי? מרפי תומר, במיוחד אם יהיה רוב גדול. המלך התחיל ביוזמת השלום בלי קשר לנשק ומצפת שגם ארה"ב תראה אותן כנפרדות.

לארי סמית מבקש להודיע שדוחה את ה- *certification* של הנשיא, שאיכו מבוסס על מידע מדוייק - שום דבר מוחשי לא הוצג כעדות. ציטט דברי המלך 24.10 לתקטורה בדבר הסכם אי-לוחמה, חטות בינ"ל, מעורבות כל הצדדים. לציטוט מרפי מדברי הוסיין בעצרת השיב לארי שיש ציטוטים הפוכים. מרפי אמר שגם ארה"ב לא מתנגדת לחטות בינ"ל, ואף רה"מ התייחס לכך בכנסת. סמית הדגיש שנת הועדה פעלה ביוזמתה להגברת הסיוע לירדן ותהה מדוע אין הדבר מתפרש כאיתות אמריקאי המצריך תגובת ירדן.

קריס סמית התעניין בנוחלים כעת לגבי עסקת הנשק. מרפי הבטיח להמשיך לחדע את הקונגרס לגבי התפתחויות. הממשל ממתיך לראות מה יוכרע בין שני הבתים.

מל לויין מרוצה מדחיית העימות ותוהה מה יקרה אם תוך 120 יום לא יתחילו שיחות מיידיות. מרפי ענה שהמלך דוגל בשיחות ישירות ומיידיות אך הקצב תלוי לא רק בו. יש גם התבטאויות ירדניות לפיהן לא תסכים למו"מ ישיר שמשמעו הסכם חלקי. לכן ירדן לא תוכל להסכים, וגם טאדאח לא חשב שמדובר בשלזט נפרד, אלא בתהליך. מרפי ממשיך להיות מעודד: הצעדים קטנים אך הרצון קיים. השאלה היא האם ניתן להתקדם לכיוון של משלחת ולא אסיף, הנשאר גורם מפתח בפוליטיקה האזורית, ואם כן. כיצד לויין מציע לסקול את הצעה הנ"י טייחס מאתמול בדבר משאל דעת קהל בטטחים שיבדוק האם מעוניינים שהמלך ייצגם. מרפי המלך הבהיר שלא יוכל להתפטר בשם הפלשתינאים.

סולרו עם הקונגרס יהליט לא לקדם העיסקה, מה עדיף: דחיה או התניה. תשובה ו אף אחת מהללו. סולרו: הצטרפות המלך לתהליך מותנה בערפאת ולא בנשק, ולכן הקשר בין התהליך והנשק מצומצם. מרפי: דחיית העיסקה תפגע במעמד ארה"ב *כאמ"ל* ותחפרט כאילו ארה"ב אינה מעוניינת בתפקיד פעיל באיזור. עייט נתוני פגיעה במטוסים ישראלים ב-73, ביקש סולרו מגאטט הערכה על שיעור הפגיעה במלחמה אפשרית בעמיד בהשתתפות ירדן. גאטט אמר שצרכי ישראל נבחנו. דורנן ממליץ לפרק את העיסקה המוצעת לשתיים: אחת לציוז קרקע (כגון ברדלי) שלא תתקל בהתנגדות בגבעה והשניה: קרקע - אויר ואויר. מרפי וגאטט השיבו שהצורך הבטיסי של ירדן הוא בהגנה אוירית.

טובה הרצל

ס ז ס ס ז ר ק
ד...ל...מתוך...דפים
סוג בטחוני...סמור
דחיסות...מייד
תאריך וז"ח...אוק' 30 1600
מס' מברק

מ/מנכ"ל. מצפ"א.

סנט: מכירת נשק לירדן

בסנט עדיין נוקטים ביוזמות:

- א. אתמול (29) הפיצו הסנטורים דוד וקרנסטון מכתב חוזר בו הציעו לעמיתיהם לששן החלטה שתחיל נוהלי זירוז על הטיפול בהחלטה של אי-הסכמה עם עיסקת הנשק הני"ל (ראו נא דברי דוד בנדון בעת הדיון במליאת הסנט בשבוע שחלף - מברקנו 11, 10, 9).
- ב. היום שיגר קרנסטון מכתב דומה לעמיתיו ובו הצעת שהחלטות משותפות (joint resolutions) יהנו מאותן הזכויות הניתנות להחלטות מקבילות (concurrent resolutions) פירוש הדבר שנוהלי הזירוז יחולו עליהן.
- ג. כמו כן, היום שוקל הסנטור לאוטנברג להכניס מחר (31) בעת ה- mark-up של מליאת וועדה ההקצבות חיקון לחוק ההקצבה לסיוע חוץ, לפיו כספים לא יחוייבו ולא יוצאו בקשר למכירת הנשק לירדן בלא אישורו של הקונגרס (רצ"ב הצעת החיקון).

מס' 37
למדן

2 3 1 3 1 1 1 4
3 1 3 1 1 1 1 4
4 3 1 1 1 1 1 4

2/2

457

AMENDMENT

726

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED PROGRAMS
APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1986

H.R. 3228

Senator Frank R. Lautenberg

At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following section:

Sec. _____: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds made available in this or any other Act shall be obligated or expended to carry out a sale of advanced weapons systems of the type described in the notification submitted to Congress on October 21, 1985, pursuant to Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act unless the Congress has, by Joint Resolution^{on} enacted after the date of enactment of this Act, specifically approved such sale.

559 / 717

ס ו ס ס
 דף.....מתוך.....דפים
 טווג בסחונני
 דחיסות
 תאריך וז"ת
 טיפוס טיפוס

(מאתיים מליון דולר) יופחת למאה מליון דולר. כייכ הציע שבדו"ח הלוואי של תת הוועדה ייכלל סעיף המביע אי-שביעות רצון מהתנהגות מצרים. קסטן הצביע על הרגישות שבמערכת היחסים בין ארה"ב ומצרים ועל חשיבותם, והציע כפשרה שישובו לבקשת הממשל המקורית, לפיה יועברו למצרים 115 מליון דולר כ-CASH TRANSFER. (כזכור, הועלה טכום זה לפי הצעת הסנטור רודי בושביץ בוועדת החוץ בעת הטיפול בחוק ההרשאה) - וזאת, המשיך קסטן, מבלי לרסום הערות בדו"ח הלוואי. אינוייה תמך בהצעה זו בציינו שתמיד יש לחשוב על "היום למחרת", מה גם שהנסיון מלמד שבסופו של דבר, צעדי ענישה מהטוג שהוצעו ע"י ספקטר אינם אלא "COUNTER - PRODUCTIVE".
 ספקטר נענה להצעת קסטן.

הסיוע לתורכיה

(ג) הסנטור דיאמטו התריע נגד ה-" CHARADE " לדבריו, מצד התורכים שטוענים שמה שנים שהם רוצים לפתור בעיית קפריסין בחסות האו"ם. כולם יודעים שאינם רציניים, ושלא ניתן לפתור אף בעייה בינלאומית באמצעות האו"ם. שקל מחשבה לקצץ את הסיוע לתורכיה (מ-700 מליון דולר לערך ל-700 מליון) אך מוכן להסתפק בהערה בדו"ח הלוואי של תת-הוועדה שהצביע על החשיבות שארה"ב מייחסת להשגת פתרון בקפריסין באמצעות מו"מ ועל פעולות התורכים בצפון האי שפוגעות במאמצים להשיג פתרון. ספקטר ודה-קובסיני תמכו בהצעה, והיא התקבלה.

תוכנית ASHA

(ד) תוכנית ASHA (יבתי-ספר ובתי-חולים אמריקאים בחו"ל). להצעת דיאמטו, ההקצבה לתוכנית זו הועלתה מ-30 מליון דולר ל-35 מליון דולר.

3. מליאת וועדה ההקצבות תערוך ה- MARK-UP מחר (31).

למדו

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו המשרד

ס ו ס ס
 97.....מחור.....דפים
 סוג בסחובי...סמור
 לחיסות.....מידי
 תאריך זייה. אוקי 30 1200
 713
 סמור...מכרס


אל: מ/מנכ"ל. מצפ"א.

בית הנבחרים: מכירת נשק לירדן
לשלבו

1. בישיבה בדלתיים סגורות של תת-הוועדה לאירופה ולמזרח שליד ועדת החוץ בבית הנבחרים, הציגו נציגי ה-GAO את מסקבותיהם לאור החקירה שערכו לבקשת תת הוועדה באופייה של "חבילתי הנשק שהממשל מבקש למכור לירדן. המסקנה הכללית: שמדובר בחבילה דפנסיבית ולא אופנסיבית.
2. אנשי ה-GAO התקדו במידע טכני שנוגע בעיקר ליכולת הטפציפית של כל פריט בחבילה במצבים שונים. בחשובה לשאלה העריכו שכעת תוכל ירדן לעמוד נגד התקפה חזיתית מסוריה למטר חמישה ימים עד שהובט; אם תקבל את הנשק המוצע, יוארך כוסר העמידה שלה ביומיים לערך. אם כי הסבירו כיצד ההוקים הניידים יכולים להוות איום לישראל, ככלל ניטו להמעיט באיום לישראל, הטמון בעסקה.
3. לא החיחסו לשאלות הפוליטיות המרכזיות הקטורות לעיסקה (נחיצות המכירה בכדי להחזיק את חוסיין כעחקן בתהליך השלום, האימפקט של עצירת העסקה על ירדן ועל תהליך השלום וכו'). לכן חברי תת הוועדה לא מצאו חדש ועניין רב בעדות.

קישור לקונגרס

2 3 1 3 1 1 4 4
 4 3 1 1 1 3 1 4
 4 3 1 1 1 3 1 4



ט ו ס ק

ד. 2. מתוך 3. זשים

סדנ דיוני

.....

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.....

.....

אל:

ג. שאלתי לעמדה טוריה, נוכח הרצון הירדני כביכול להכניס למערכת המז"מ. אמר שתאמריקנים מדברים עם הטורים והללו לא סינו את הקו זה עשר שנים - הכל צריך להיעשות לפי החלטות אוי"מ ועידות הפסגה הערביות, לוועידה עם חמש חברות הקבועות של מועב"יט. הירדנים טענו באוזני הטורים כי לא הבינו (הטורים) את אופיו של הסכם ערפא - חוסיין נראה אותו כהסכם נפרד, ומידדנים הסבירו עתה כי לא כן הזכיר כי בשיחה עם רה"מ דובר על השאלה אם הטורים ירצו להשתתף, ענייני רמה"ג וכו', הזכרתי מכתב פורד מ-1.9.75. אמר שהמכתב מוכר לו.

ד. מרפי אמר שעמדה הסובייטים זהה לזו של הטורים, בהבדל אחד - שאין הם רוצים בחמש חברות מועב"יט בוועידה, אלא במשהו נוסף גיבנה. לשאלתי אם בדעתו להעלות, נושא המז"מ בפסגה, הזכיר כי בשיחה עם רה"מ דובר על עמדותינו בקשר לכך, מכל מקום, הנושא לא עלה בשיחה סולץ - שבנדזה שבוע החולף. מכתב גורבצ'וב לחוסיין (ראה שיחתנו עם אברמוביץ) לא פירט את נדשא הוועידה. עיקר המסר של גורבצ'וב היה כי מה שארה"ב והירדנים עושים לא יצלה בלי בריה"מ. מרפי אינו בטוח אם וכיצד יעלה הנושא בפסגה. בשלב זה הזכיר שהנושאים האזוריים שבנאום הנשיא לא כללו את המז"מ. עם זאת אמר, כי לירדנים, הדורשים ועידה "מלאה", אומרים התאמריקנים שאין בעתון בתפקיד שירצו הסובייטים למלא, וגורבצ'וב, שלפניו לך עשרות שנים, אולי ירצה בתפקיד פעיל (זאת להערתו כי החשש בוועידה הוא הלחץ הסובסטנטיבי האפשרי), אינו אינו מלא מינוי איננו קיבלנו עמו; יאללה-יאללה-יאללה! בניס קלויזלר מאלגו.

ה. הירדנים לא רנו גחת בעניין דחיית האישור לעיסקת הנסק, חוסיין אמר בהדגשה כי הוא מועל בתהליך השלום אך אינו יכול לקבל תנאים שיוצבו. מרפי נשמע בעצמו מאוכזב מן הדחיה למאסט, שכן אישור העיסקה (כשחנטיק מסופק בעוד שנים) יכול היה להוות אינצנטיבה, זריקה אמון ואיחות פוליטי (יש גם שמוע 4 גנאמא גאגת גו-).
ו, אמר כי מינוי קלווריוס בא מתוך ההכרה כי הוא עצמו אינו יכול להקדיש זמן כה רב כנדרש למסקות באיזור, בגלל האחריות המוטלת עליו.

ז, אם הבינתי אל נכון, אין עוסקים עדיין בחכיות הממשיות. כשעלה בשיחה נושא האוטונומיה אמר שלא ידוע לו על מסרים מפורטים האתנו בקשר לכך, כפי שדווח בתקשורת, כשהזכרתי מו"מ האוטונומיה בעבר, לרבות מכניה: דובר לזנו. וקמס דיויד, הכוללים המיחסויות במיסור הירדני, אמר שחלק מהאמננה גיחה לעשות זאת בצורה-שלא תקשור ישירות לסטים קודמים של מו"מ.

ט ד ס ח

ד.ה. 3... מתוך 3... דפים

סדרן דוחי: 10

אל:

המשרד

742

ח. אמרתי שהתנאים שמציב חוסיין (אשייפ, סוריה, בריהיים) מזכירים לי את שירו של איציק מנגער "על הדרך עץ עומד", ובו תיאור ילד יהודי בעיירה המטפס על עץ והופך עצמו לציפור כדי לטוס לארץ ישראל, אך אמו מבקשת כי בגלל הרוחות והסערות בדרך ילבש לבנים חמים, מעיל וכובי, וככלבש אותם ועשה כבד כל כך עד שאינו יכול לעוף. שאלתי אם זה מה שרוצה חוסיין, ופן האם לא הגיע הזמן שארה"ב תלחץ להיפטרות מערפאת כפי שהזמן מחייב ותנסה לגייס תמיכה של מדינות ערב לכך, ועיי' כך אולי ניתן יהיה לעודד ערבים פלסטינאים מיושש ועזה להצטרף.

ט. מרפי טען, כי חוסיין מאמין שהוא יכול להשתמש באשייפ כהלכה, הוא רואה עצמו *commander in chief* אך צריך "משהו נוסף", ולפי שעה אין תנהגה פלסטינאית אחרת. אולי יבוא הדבר, אך מן הסתם לא יהיה זה בחודשים הקרובים, לשאלתי על עמדת מצרים אמר כי מובארכ אמנס אומר שערפאת "בלתי אפשרי" אך... לא איבד תקוה לגביו.

י. סיכומי של דבר: אין מרפי רואה תזוזות דרמטיות בשבועות הקרובים. יהיה לוגיני צריך אסגה
... קולא גמ דיזנס וגו' אז איננו קיזאח הלא.
י"א. בעת שיחתנו טרם קיבל מעמאן דיווח על מפגש חוסיין - ערפאת,

דובינסטיין

WALTER F. MONDALE

2550 M STREET, N.W., SUITE 500
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037

October 29, 1985

Prime Minister Shimon Peres
Prime Minister's Office
3 Kaplan Street
Hakirya
Jerusalem, Israel 91919

Dear Shimon:

Thanks so much for giving me your time at that wonderful breakfast in New York the other day. Congratulations again on your superb leadership. We really loved breakfast.

Warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,


Walter F. Mondale

WFM:ps



הוא אהב את המעלה

בברכת
שגרירות ישראל
בושינגטון

אני
יוסף אהרן

GUS PATRON, PENNSYLVANIA
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, NEW YORK
DON BONKER, WASHINGTON
GERTY E. STUDDS, MASSACHUSETTS
DAN MICA, FLORIDA
MICHAEL D. BARNES, MARYLAND
HOWARD WOLPE, MICHIGAN
GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., MICHIGAN
SAM GLIDENSON, CONNECTICUT
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, CALIFORNIA
TOM LANTOS, CALIFORNIA
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, NEW JERSEY
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, FLORIDA
HOWARD L. BERMAN, CALIFORNIA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
MEL LEVINE, CALIFORNIA
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, OHIO
TED WEISS, NEW YORK
GARY L. ACKERMAN, NEW YORK
BUDDY MCKAY, FLORIDA
NORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA
ROBERT GARCIA, NEW YORK

WILLIAM J. DICKEY, NEW YORK
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, CALIFORNIA
JIM LEACH, IOWA
TOSY BOTH, WISCONSIN
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, MAINE
HENRY J. HYDE, ILLINOIS
GERALD B. H. SOLOMON, NEW YORK
DOUG BEREUTER, NEBRASKA
MARY D. ELLANDER, MICHIGAN
ED ZSCHAU, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT K. DORNAN, CALIFORNIA
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY
CONNIE MACK, FLORIDA
MICHAEL DEWINE, OHIO
DAN BURTON, INDIANA
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA

JOHN J. BRADY, JR.
Chief of Staff

Congress of the United States . . .
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

October 29, 1985

Mr. Asher Naim
Minister of Information
Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Naim:

Thank you for your letter enclosing a copy of Prime Minister Peres' October 21 speech before the U.N. General Assembly. I appreciate your thoughtfulness in providing me with a copy of the Prime Minister's remarks.

Mr. Peres makes a compelling case for the need to extend the peace process beyond Camp David. It is my hope that Jordan will respond to this appeal in a forthright and positive way.

Needless to say, I will be watching developments closely in the coming weeks and months. It is surely worth our best effort to see that the Prime Minister's vision of peace becomes a reality.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,
Dante B. Fascell
Dante B. Fascell
Chairman

DBF:cg

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News Summary October 29, 1985

Editorials

NYT "US Must Not Let Itself Be Used By Terrorists' 'Friends'" The US should not comply with the demands of the hostages' families in doing anything to gain their freedom. Reagan met yesterday with the newly formed American Hostage Committee. This committee--which consists of the families of the Lebanon Six--is organized and supported by Arab and PLO lobbyists. They are using it to poison US-Israel friendship, to promote sympathy for terrorist demands; and, above all, to oppose any retaliation for terrorist crimes.

Columns

NYT-Flora Lewis "Mideast Deadlines" Virtually all the players in the Mideast are in motion again. It remains to be seen whether there is a real chance for peace now. Peres is in a hurry for good reason. Engagement in talks serious enough to convince the Israeli public that there is a fair prospect for peace is probably the sole ground on which he could successfully break the deal with the Likud. The deadline is powerful for Jordan because Likud has made no secret of its wish to annex the occupied lands. Also, there is growing weakness in Mubarak's Egypt. If Mubarak should fall before peace, a new leader in Egypt may not hold firm. Syria is satisfied that Arafat has weakened himself so badly that his only choice is to support Hussein or fade away. Syria's warming relations with Jordan does not scare Peres. Assad may prefer a role in an international peace process without Arafat than trying to break it up and being left out. The Soviets are sending messages that they are prepared to move dramatically on Soviet Jewry and limited relations with Israel if the US-Soviet climate is favorable. Large scale emigration would be a brilliant success for Reagan. Moscow is taking Mideast talks seriously. Current Moscow judgement is that it was a mistake to break relations with Israel.

NYT-Saunders "No Arafat, No Peace" For all the deplorable violence in the last months, the fact is that the peace process will not succeed unless the PLO takes part. Peres's and Hussein's diplomatic movements guarantees nothing. The politicians must deplore the violence but focus on peace. PLO leaders need to endorse 242 and 338 and end violence. But only the PLO can represent the Palestinians. Peres needs to help

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תאריך:

הג' - מילא תבנית הנ"ל ושלח למערכת תודה

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סוג מסמך:	טופס מבוק	5
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Hussein and Arafat manage their coalition politics. The US needs to help get the PLO to the table.

NYT-Bailey "Let the Occupied Territories Decide" Jordan's equivocal and ambiguous answer to Peres's peace proposal indicates that the Mideast peace process is still deadlocked. Hussein feels he is not authorized to pursue peace on his own without the PLO. The only way to break the deadlock is to offer a referendum, under neutral auspices, among the Palestinians living in the West Bank. They should be asked whether they want Hussein to negotiate for them. This is the only way to refute the PLO claim that it and only it can represent the Palestinians. Without such a referendum, Hussein may never be able to negotiate with Israel. Recently, newspapers throughout the West Bank have prodded the PLO to grant Hussein negotiating rights. It has become more than clear that the PLO remains an unacceptable negotiating partner to Israel and the major Western nations. Yet Hussein needs Palestinian endorsement. Peres has already spoken. Those Palestinians interested in peace must be given a safe way to express their reply.

NYP & ND-Anderson "Dr. Mengele's Son Has A Story to Tell--But Only for Pay" Mengele's son has tried to put distance between himself and his father. Yet he has shielded his father from justice for more than 20 years, knowing his whereabouts and writing to him regularly. Rolf though is perfectly willing to make a buck from the notoriety. In fact he insists upon it. He turns down interviews if there is not money up front.

Press Reports

Peres Wins Vote of Confidence

NYT-AP photo p.1 of Peres shaking Bar-Lev's hand. Sharon sits glumly near Bar-Lev. Friedman-Peres won a vote of confidence from the Parliament for his peace overture to Jordan, but only after a bitter struggle with his right-wing partners. The vote was 68-10. After six hours of back-room debate, Peres said that he would not change one word of his proposal. In the end, the Likud had little choice but to join in the endorsement of Peres's plan. Shamir believes the plan will lead nowhere but he did not adopt a hard-line position. Sharon and Levy are trying to push Shamir into a corner, said a Likud

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member. They wish to break up the coalition because they want Shamir's job. (see DN-Meisels; NYP-Dan; ND-wire)

Hussein and Arafat Meet

NYT-p.i-Kifner-Hussein and Arafat met for 2½ hours to discuss strains in their already uneasy alliances. The meeting broke up without apparent resolution and more talks are scheduled. Hussein is determined to force concessions from Arafat on such issues as acceptance of key UN resolutions, a renunciation of violence and recognition of Israel. The commitments are all US or Israeli preconditions for negotiations. Jordanians say that the hijacking and other recent events are evidence of erratic behavior and irresponsible organization by Arafat. Public statements were upbeat. Off the record, Jordanian officials made tough statements about their attitude toward Arafat. "Nobody is indispensable," said one key Hussein advisor about Arafat. (see ND-LA Times)

Nazi Talks in Syria

NYT-Markham-A West German magazine said it interviewed and photographed Alois Brunner, a Nazi war criminal in Syria. Editors from Brunte said two of its reporters spoke at length with the ex-SS officer who is responsible for the deaths of 120,000 Jews. Brunner has lost an eye and some fingers due to letter bombs presumably sent by Israeli agents. Syrian bodyguards protect Brunner. Syria has adamantly maintained that Brunner did not live in Syria. Brunner is said to have been a close advisor to Rifaat Assad. He is still a fervent anti-Semite. (see DN-wire)

The Pope and Jews

NYT-Dionne-The Pope met with a group of Jews to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Second Vatican Council document that revolutionized Roman Catholic teaching on Judaism. The meeting came amid signs of difficulty in Catholic-Jewish relations. Some Jews are dissatisfied with the pace and content of discussions of Catholic-Jewish relations and feel that the Vatican is slowing down on purpose.

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Soviets Letting Sakharov's Wife Leave

NYT-special-The son-in-law of Sakharov said "it seems a likely possibility" that Yelena Bonner has received permission to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment abroad. State Dept. officials said that if she was allowed to leave, they would regard this as a gesture by Gorbachev. (see NYT; ND)

Reagan Talks to Hostage's Families

ND-Waldman-Relatives of four of the US hostages in Lebanon met with Reagan. McFarlane told them that the US ambassadors in Lebanon and Syria were waiting and available for anyone to come and talk to them about the hostages.

Mrs. Klinghoffer Tells Her Story/Jew Singled Out

*** NYT-Rimer-Telling her story publicly for the first time, Mrs. Klinghoffer described how the hijackers held a gun to her head when she pleaded not to be separated from her husband. The hijackers took an elderly couple and asked if they were Jews. The man said he was and was knocked down by a rifle butt blow to his chest. He was struck repeatedly while he was on the ground. (see DN-La Rosa; ND-Gordy)

Sicilians Won't Pursue Inquiry on US Troops

NYT-Tagliabue-A Sicilian prosecutor said there were no grounds for formal investigation of the behavior of US soldiers after the interception.

Druse Forces Clash with Lebanese Army-Israeli Boat Said to Open Fire

NYT-UPI-Druse militiamen and Lebanese Army troops fought with rockets and artillery in the Shuf mountains. The state-run Lebanese TV said an Israeli gunboat opened fire on Sidon. There was no comment from Israel.

Kahane-Magazine Article

*** The New Republic-11/11 Cover Story-Wisseltier "The Making of a Jewish Monster" Upon the Jewish world, Kahane has been a curse, with a return air ticket. He now sits in Parliament, alone for now. But his popularity

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is rising. His new support comes at the expense of the right-wing parties. It is hard to imagine a Likud leadership that would not invite the demagogue into a coalition if it required his membership to form a government. One of the consequences of Kahanism will be the further radicalization of the Israeli right, precisely during the period of the Israel's right's ascendance. Kahane is a boon to those who hate Israelis and those who hate Palestinians, to those who hate Jews and those who hate Arabs. Kahane is not a danger to Israel but he is a symptom of something deeper. He will not influence Israeli policy but he will influence political culture. Kahanism is really about rage.

Cartoons

DN-Evers-Hussein brings Arafat to a large sign pointing to Israel. Arafat is in front of sign and says "No, I still can't see it."

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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מס' מברק

אל: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א

דע: לשכת רוה"ט, מנכ"ל ארצו, מנכ"ל כטחון.

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סיוע חוץ ותיוקון איגודה

תת-הועדה לפעולות זרות שליד וועדת ההקצבות בסניט, אשרה היום
 הצעת חוק ההקצבה כפי שחוצאה ע"י דו"ר תת-הוועדה הסנטור בוב קסטן
 וע"י בכיר הסיעדט הסנטור דניאל איגודה,
 הצעה זו כוללת את מלוא הסיוע שאושר בחוק ההרשאה לסיוע החוץ
 (3 ביליון דולר בסיוע אזרחי וצבאי); כמו-כך, היא כוללת הצעת
 איגודה בדבר הפחתת שיעורי תרומות על חובותיה של ישראל - כפוף
 להסכמה מצד עליאת הוועדה (העומדת להתכנס מחרתיים-יום ה')
 ואף מצד וועדת התקציב,
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לסדן.

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אל:הסברה, מע"מ, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לט' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח
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NEWS SUMMARY - TUESDAY - OCTOBER 29, 1985

COLUMNS

***WASH. POST-Richard Cohan- "Talking With Killers" Israel bases its refusal on the PLO's being a terrorist organization that has never recognized Israel's right to exist. That's true. But as the joke suggests, who can you make peace with if not your enemies? To that question, Israel has a stock answer: Palestinian moderates. These are the tooth fairies of the Middle East. The Israelis have managed to eliminate whatever moderate Palestinian leadership existed on the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip. When it comes to making a bad situation worse, the Israelis have had help from the Arabs - in this case the PLO itself. When a Palestinian leader does assert himself he has a tendency to be killed. It would be instructive if Israel would look to South Africa for some perspective. There, the govt. refuses to negotiate with the outlawed African National Congress for the same reasons Israel will not talk with the PLO. When the US and others ask the PLO to renounce violence and recognize Israel, it in effect asks the PLO to cease being the PLO. There can be no peace in the Middle East without the acquiescence and participation of the Palestinians.

THE PRESS REPORTS

Peres Turns Back Challenge

WASH. POST-Claiborne-Peres turned back an attempt in parliament to scuttle his plan for peace talks with Jordan. At the same time, he urged that Jordan's Hussein not miss an opportunity for peace that Peres said has been created by a series of favorable events in the Middle East. After seven hours of debate, Peres handily won two votes in the 120 member parliament - a 68 to 10 acceptance of his report on the issue and an 86 to 6 rejection of a small opposition party's no-confidence measure.

Hussein, Arafat Hold Talks; Problems Appear Unresolved

WASH. POST-Dickey- Hussein met with Arafat for almost three hours in an effort to resolve the deep differences that have emerged between them through a month of crises. But there were no suggestions from Hussein's palace following the talks that any clear formula for cooperat

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had been reached. While the PLO called the atmosphere "positive" and "brotherly," Hussein's palace made no characterization at all.

Nazi Reported To Weigh Surrender

WASH. POST-(Wires)- A Nazi wanted as a war criminal, who has hidden in Syria for three decades, has indicated that he is willing to surrender and stand trial, provided that he is not turned over to the Israelis. The magazine Bunte, said that it had located former SS captain Alois Brunner, who has been sought by six govts. for sending more than 120,000 Jews to their deaths in Hitler's gas chambers.

US Military Thought Too Weak To Repel Soviet Thrust At Mideast

WASH. TIMES-Hritzberg-Despite a concerted effort to strengthen its military capability in the Middle East, the US is in no position to repel a Soviet invasion of the region. That's the conclusion of most military experts. "You could say that the old strategic balance no longer exists," Thomas McNaugher, author of Arms and Oil, says.

Militia End Talks On Lebanon War; 5 Civilians Killed

BOSTON GLOBE-(AP)- Rival militia officials meeting in the Syrian capital ended talks yesterday on a plan to end Lebanon's civil war and renewed sectarian fighting claimed five more lives in Beirut. In eastern Lebanon Israeli jets bombed two Palestinian guerrilla bases in the Bekaa Valley and Palestinian sources said some guerrillas were wounded in the attacks

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אל - ארבייל, מצפ"א

מצהרים עם ווילקוקס וקובנר לכבוד אליאב :

1. שבחו נאום רה"מ באו"ם בסופרלטיבים. באשר לטיכו"י. תהליך ווילקוקס ^{מלפני} חדגיש שירדן רוצה להכנס למר"מ לשלום.
2. התחלקו עמנו בשבח שלושת ההשגים באו"ם (כתב האמנה, אי קבלה ערפאת, מניעת הכרזת היובל שלא נוחה מבחינתנו).
3. הביעו שביעות רצון מפגישה רה"מ עם גנדי.
4. קיבלו המידע על פגישה רה"מ - נשיא סרי לנקה בפאריס בטיפוק רב.
5. מתרשמים שאכן ישנה התקדמות במז"ר. שאלו וקיבלו פרטים כלליים על שיחות שהי"ח.
6. ווילקוקס התיחס לנושא סט"ח ואמר שלאחר דיונים ארוכים באגף הגיעו למסקנה שעדיף סט"ח על פני כל גוף אחר שיבוא תחתיו ולכן משמרים הארגון.
7. אליאב ביקש גם משניהם (בנוסף לפנייה לקיס) לסייע בענין ECE.
8. להערכת קובנר, חרף ביקור שולץ במוסקבה אין רואים תכלית או הישג מוגדר בטסגה הקרובה.
9. ווילקוקס אמר להגיע ארצה לביקור עוד בדצמבר השנה.

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4. בריה"מ, לשאלת המקום שיתפוס המזה"ח בפסגת רייגן-גורבצ'ב הטיב שטרם למד הנושא אך חרבה תלוי במה שיתפתח בין ישראל וירדן בנושא הועידה הבינ"ל הזכיר (שמענו עליה לראשונה) האיגרת הסובייטית לחוסין בו נאמר לנו שלא יוכל לנוע בלעדי בריה"מ ושגם לא יוכל להשיג, ARAB CREDENTIALS לכך. אברמוביץ גם אינו משוכנע ע"פ הערכה אישית שגורבצ'ב יהיה מוכן "לשלם" במטבע של הגירת יהודים במספרים גדולים יותר. יש לו תחושה ובכך אין הוא עומד על קרקע בטוחה, שגורבצ'ב אכן ינצל בנקודה מסוימת את הנושא היהודי. מכל מקום הנושא יעלה בפסגה. טרם הוחלט כיצד, אך האמריקאים בודאי יעשו כן. הרבה תלוי גם במה שיתפתח בשבועות הבאים. מאמין שהנושאים האזוריים ולא רק 5- (שהנשיא הזכיר) לא יתפסו מקום בולט בשיחות. השאלה מה יש ראל העשה אם בריה"מ תסכים לחדש יחסים. היא לא תוכל לדחות הנושא. חשוב גם מה יכלל תחת הטס הנ"ל. הזכיר שרוה"מ פרס דיבר כאן על INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL, באשר לפסגה עצמה ישנו תהליך דינמי. נוכח לדעת שהסובייטים לא רוצים בכשלון ג'ינבה. הם פועלים בצורה מעניינת ונמצאים במצב שתובעים מארה"ב כל הזמן. לדעתו הם נכוכים מה שהיה עמדת ארה"ב. הציר הזכיר שהסובייטים מדברים בקול אחד ואילו מכאן נשמעים מספר קולות. אברמוביץ הסכים אך הדגיש שרוב הקלעים נמצאים בידי ארה"ב. הסובייטים להערכתו רוצים להכניס אלמנט של יציבות ביחסים. הסובייטים, 13 שנה לאחר סאלט לא רוצים ביחסים נעדרים CENTRAL AVENUES. רייגן חזיח ב-5 השנים האחרונות שחל שינוי בקונספציה ביחס לבובייטים.

אלי אבידן

לפני כניסת אבידן כנין 2021



official text

DATE: 10/28/85

U.S. REPORT POINTS TO SOVIET OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL CAPABILITY (3470)

Washington -- The size and scope of Soviet activities in chemical weapons demonstrate that the Soviet Union has a formidable capability to carry out offensive chemical warfare operations, according to a Pentagon report released October 28.

The report, "Soviet Chemical Weapons Threat," prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency, is an updated version of a document issued as a Department of Defense publication in October 1983.

"The Soviets recently have used chemical warfare agents and toxins in Afghanistan and have supplied them for use by client forces in Laos and Cambodia -- actions that demonstrate Soviet willingness to exploit the military utility of chemical and toxin weapons," the report said.

The Defense Department is urging the U.S. Congress to approve funds to stockpile new, safer and more effective chemical weapons in an effort to give the United States parity with the Soviet Union in this field.

At a news briefing October 28, Thomas Welch, deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for chemical matters, said that the present U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, much of which dates back to World War Two, is militarily almost useless, has begun leaking, and should be destroyed.

So far, he said, the leaks have been contained without doing any damage.

He urged a new generation of binary weapons, in which ingredients are separated until use, when they would be mixed and become toxic. The Soviets have not developed such weapons yet, he said, perhaps because they have less concern about safety than the United States has.

But the Soviet Union, which already has a large arsenal of chemical weapons along the North Atlantic Treaty Organization front, is going ahead with research and with building up its stockpile, Welch stressed.

The Department of Defense report also makes the following points:

-- Storage depots for chemical warfare agents within the Soviet Union have undergone a significant increase in storage capacity since the late 1960s.

-- A large force of military specialists and equipment give the Soviets an unmatched capability to survive and operate on a contaminated battlefield. All Soviet forces undergo extensive training in chemical protection.

-- Any military force fighting Soviet forces will run a substantial risk that the Soviets will use chemical weapons.

-- There are now 11 nations outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact that have chemical weapons in their arsenals and two more that are attempting to acquire them. More countries now have a chemical weapons capability than at any time in the past.

-- The forces of the United States and its allies must be alert to the fact of chemical weapons acquisition by nations outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact. Both military and security forces must also be alert to the possible use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups and clandestine forces.



Following is the text of the DOD document*
(begin text)

This is an updated version of a document issued as a Department of Defense publication in October 1983. It represents our continuing efforts to respond to requests from members of Congress, the press and the Armed Forces for unclassified information on the Soviet Union's chemical warfare capabilities. The illustrations in this document are derived from various U.S. sources; while not revealing of every detail, they are authentic.

There is no question that the Soviets have long held a policy and doctrine that acknowledge the military utility of chemical weapons in warfare. This view persists today. Indeed, the Soviets are exploiting state-of-the-art technology for new or improved chemical warfare agents, with the obvious intent of extending their advantage over the West.

With respect to world-wide developments related to chemical warfare, we note that over the past 20 years, nations outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact spheres have shown strong interest in acquiring chemical warfare capabilities. In view of this trend, we have included a brief discussion on chemical weapons use and proliferation.

JAMES A. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

KEY JUDGMENTS

-- Although the Soviets have claimed they are pursuing only a defense against chemical weapons, the size and scope of their activities demonstrate a formidable capability to carry out offensive chemical operations. Soviet policy and doctrine promote the need for these types of weapons and their value in warfare.

-- The Soviets recently have used chemical warfare agents and toxins in Afghanistan and have supplied them for use by client forces in Laos and Cambodia actions that demonstrate Soviet willingness to exploit the military utility of chemical and toxin weapons.

-- They have a wide range of chemical warfare agents and associated delivery/dissemination systems. The calculations for the offensive employment of chemical weapons have been established.

-- Research, development, and testing are continuing.

-- They can produce very large quantities of chemical warfare agents.

-- Storage depots within the USSR have undergone a significant increase in storage capacity since the late 1960's.

-- We believe chemical weapons are collocated with conventional weapons in forward areas facing NATO.

-- A large force of military specialists and equipment give the Soviets an unmatched capability to survive and operate on a contaminated battlefield. All Soviet forces (land, sea and air) receive extensive training in chemical protection.

-- Any military force fighting Soviet forces will run a substantial risk that the Soviets will use chemical weapons.

HISTORY

The Soviet Union's chemical weapons activities can be traced to World War I. Of all the belligerents fighting in that war, the Russians probably were the least prepared to conduct chemical warfare.

The Germans first used chemical weapons against the Russians in January 1915, three months before these weapons were first used on the Western Front. Russian industry lacked the capability to produce significant quantities of chemical agent, their delivery means were primitive, and the chemical protection training of the individual Russian soldier was poor. As a consequence, the Russians incurred more chemical warfare casualties and deaths than any other nation. Of the approximately one half million Russian chemical casualties, more than 50,000 were deaths.

Because of the high losses suffered during World War I, the Soviet leadership began to stress the importance of chemical warfare. During the 1920s and 1930s, their industry was modernized, chemical agent plants were constructed, and research and development was undertaken on chemical weapons. A chemical warfare organization and military chemical academies were established, and preparedness for chemical warfare was stressed throughout their forces.

By World War II, the Soviets had an extensive chemical organization and a significant stockpile of chemical weapons. At the end of the war, the Soviets captured and relocated to the Soviet Union two German nerve agent production plants and stocks of chemical agent.

During the 1950s, Soviet chemical institutes developed other nerve agents for use in chemical weapons. Since World War II the Soviet chemical warfare program has continued unabated.

Historical Aspects

- Russia suffered almost half a million chemical warfare casualties during World War I.
- First military chemical academies established in the 1920s.
- At the end of World War II the Soviets captured and relocated two nerve agent plants to the Soviet Union.

CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS

Soviet research and development activities, usually headed by military chemists, continue to explore new chemical agents and combinations including ways to render the protective masks, suits and filtration systems of potential enemies ineffective.

A number of chemical agents, toxins, and combinations have been used by the Soviets in Afghanistan and by their client forces in Southeast Asia (Laos and Cambodia). One group of agents has been positively identified in the laboratory* toxic substances (known as mycotoxins) produced by molds. Other agents remain unidentified.

Soviet Chemical Warfare Agents

Lethal Agents

- Nerve agents (including sarin, soman, and a V-series agent)
- Blister agents (including mustard, lewisite, and a mixture of the two)
- Blood agent (hydrogen cyanide)
- Choking agent (phosgene)

Incapacitants

Not specifically identified, but an agent which causes unconsciousness for an hour or more has been widely reported as being used in Afghanistan.

Toxins

Research and development of a variety of toxins is continuing.

Notes

1. Protection from all of the above agents requires protective clothing and/or masks as well as rapid treatment for any exposed individuals.
2. Both non-persistent and persistent agents are available. Non-persistent agents will clear the target relatively quickly, while persistent agents will stay on target for hours to days, depending on weather conditions, unless removed by decontamination.
3. We believe the Soviets are investigating binary systems for chemical agent delivery because of the significantly improved safe handling and storage characteristics in this type of system.
4. This list of agents gives the Soviets an all-season capability for using these agents against an enemy.
5. Production and possession of toxin weapons are banned by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Delivery and Dissemination Systems

Almost all Soviet conventional weapon systems from mortars to long-range tactical missiles have compatible chemical ammunition or warheads, and are available to their land, air, and naval forces. The Soviets have developed the firing data required to use chemical weapons in battle situations. This includes the types and numbers of weapons required to attack various targets under a variety of weather and combat conditions. They continue to explore and test systems with improved dissemination, larger payload, increased range, and better accuracy. This gives them greater target flexibility and deeper strike capability. They have developed two types of chemical weapons for their tactical missiles -- bulk agent and small bomblets which can be dispersed over the target.

SOVIET DELIVERY/DISSEMINATION SYSTEMS

- Missiles
- Artillery

- Mines
- Multiple rail and tube launched rockets
- Fighter-bombers and attack helicopters with aerial bombs, rockets, and spray tanks

THE TARGETS FOR SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Soviets have developed the doctrine and plans for the use of chemical weapons including the targets to be attacked, and Soviet tacticians have standardized the procedures required. If a Soviet Commander determines that a particular battle situation is suited to the employment of chemical weapons, he can conduct strikes against any or all of the targets shown (once the approval to use chemical weapons has been given by the highest Soviet authority). He can select persistent agents or non-persistent agents as well as a variety of delivery systems. He will know the level of contamination he can place on the target. Should his own forces have to cross the contaminated areas, he will have specially trained troop support available for advice, reconnaissance, and decontamination. The scope and versatility of the Soviet chemical weapons arsenal provide the Commander the means to attack and contaminate a full range of targets.

An example of the agent concentrations that can be placed on a target by a Soviet surface to surface missile is shown. At least 50 percent of exposed personnel will be affected. Also shown is the elliptical pattern superimposed on an airfield runway. Use of a persistent agent such as a V-agent would make it extremely difficult to fly operational missions from a contaminated airfield without proper decontamination. In addition to surface-to-surface missiles, fighter bombers play an important role in chemical bomb delivery. A FLOGGER aircraft operating from airfields in East Germany has a radius of operation that covers most of Western Europe.

The chemical strike capabilities of the Soviets in the immediate battle zones and against the rear areas are also shown.

TARGETS FOR SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- Nuclear delivery means
- Airfields
- Naval bases and seaports
- Command and control facilities
- Storage depots
- Supply routes
- Troop concentrations
- Artillery and armor
- Amphibious/heliborne landing forces

SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS TESTING, PRODUCTION, AND STORAGE ACTIVITIES

Since the late 1960s the Soviets have continued to test, produce and stockpile chemical weapons. What we have observed over the past 15 years is not what we would expect of a nation that was maintaining a status quo.

Soviet Chemical Weapons Testing

The Shikhany Chemical Warfare Proving Ground is one of the Soviets' primary chemical weapons test areas. It was established in the mid-1920s, and a number of chemical weapons tests were conducted in the late 1920s and 1930s. World War II reconnaissance photography confirmed that Shikhany was an active chemical weapons test facility. Since that time it has grown in size and sophistication and today continues to be a highly active chemical weapons testing facility.

Since the late 1970s, the Soviets have constructed several new chemical agent/weapon test facilities at Shikhany and construction is continuing. The sampling devices used to determine the efficiency of chemical weapons are arranged in grids which have a circular or rectangular pattern. These distinctive grids measure the agent concentration and how well it was dispersed. The shape of the grid and complexity of its pattern depend on the kind of weapon (bomb, artillery, rocket, etc.) and the type of agent being tested.

One of the new grids is a circular design. It is used to test the efficiency of a munition in dispersing effective concentrations of chemical agent.

The rectangular grid also shows an example of a chemical weapons test at Shikhany. The impact craters were caused by exploding chemical munitions. The sampling devices are positioned downwind to

measure concentration of the agent released. All testing of this kind is done under predetermined wind and temperature conditions. Tests similar to the one shown are continuing. Research, development and production facilities are also located at the Shikhany proving ground.

Chemical Warfare Agent Production

At the end of World War II, the Soviets captured from the Germans large stockpiles of chemical agents, as well as the technology and equipment to make the nerve agents tabun and sarin, and the German plans for production of soman. Two German nerve agent production plants were dismantled and removed to the Soviet Union where they were reassembled. The captured CW agent plant at Volgograd is depicted. The Soviets have continued to develop production capabilities based on this early design and have built agent manufacturing facilities in various locations around the Soviet Union.

Giving chemical warfare capabilities a high priority, the large modern Soviet chemical industry has the capability to produce toxic chemical warfare agents at manufacturing rates sufficient to meet military needs. The industry has had an agent production program since the late 1920s and today can supply a variety of chemical agents such as blister, choking, blood and nerve gases.

There are research institutes in the Soviet Union that are actively engaged in developing the theoretical foundations for producing chemical warfare agents of even greater lethality and designing the equipment necessary to make them.

Soviet Chemical Weapons Depots

Chemical agents produced over the past five decades are stored in a network of military depots located across the Soviet Union. These depots contain agents in bulk containers and agent-filled munitions, as well as gas masks, protective suits, decontamination solutions, and decontamination vehicles. These depots support operational forces and report to the Headquarters of the Soviet Chemical Troops, in the Ministry of Defense.

Major Soviet chemical warfare storage depots are highly secure military installations. Many depots have rail lines allowing for the rapid mobilization of chemical warfare materials.

Since the late 1960's, the amount of agents, weapons, and material in storage at these depots has increased significantly, and this build up continues. A graphic representation of the increase characteristic of most of these areas is shown.

THE SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANIZATION

The continuing chemical weapons activities include a large well-trained chemical warfare organization directed by the Headquarters Chemical Troops in the Ministry of Defense. This chemical warfare organization is headed by a three-star General and numbers more than 45,000 officers and enlisted men in the ground forces alone. When staffed during a war, the size will double. Their primary responsibilities include the following:

- Technical advisors to the front commanders for chemical weapons and results of their use
- Research and development programs for weapons and protection
- Production and storage of chemical weapons and protective materiel testing and evaluation
- Training of all forces for chemical employment and survival on a contaminated battlefield
- Decontamination and reconnaissance
- Operating the chemical academies (college equivalent)

This corps of specialists also has about 30,000 special vehicles for decontamination and reconnaissance and has developed more than 200 areas for teaching and training all forces on how to protect themselves and clean up following combat where chemical weapons have been used. This training includes the use of actual chemical agents. Also, the Soviets have installed protective filtration systems in many combat and combat support vehicles and ships.

Continuing activities include the development, testing and evaluation of new chemical agents and weapon systems, protective antidotes against chemical agent poisoning, new suits and gas masks, decontaminating solutions and new vehicles with filtration systems.

A significant characteristic of protective equipment, including Soviet models, is the physical burden associated with prolonged wear, especially in warm temperatures. The equipment is bulky and

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uncomfortable. When worn for an extended period of time in hot weather soldiers become fatigued rather quickly and combat efficiency is lowered. In some cases heat prostration may result. Accordingly, the Soviets have devised norms stipulating desired maximum lengths of time for various temperature ranges for wearing protective suits.

Temperature (Centigrade/Fahrenheit)		Time Spent in Protective Suit
30 degrees and above	86 degrees and above	15-20 minutes
25-29 degrees	77-84 degrees	Up to 30 minutes
20-24 degrees	68 -75 degrees	40-50 minutes
15-19 degrees	59-66 degrees	1.5-2 hours
BELOW 15 degrees	BELOW 59 degrees	More than 3 hours

Soviets use these norms as guidelines only because they realize that certain situations may require troops to wear protective suits beyond desired maximum times. The Soviets acknowledge that a 50 per cent decrease in the work place will occur after personnel have spent six continuous hours in full protective equipment, though this can be reduced by rests and spraying the protective suit with water to cool it. A Soviet example of the degrading effect on troop operations, when suits are worn for too long, describes a potentially disastrous mistake made by one of their artillery officers who had worn his protective suit for too long in temperatures above 30 degreesC/86 degreesF. Apparently unable to concentrate because of his impairment, he prepared firing data from the wrong firing tables. Recognizing this factor the Soviets basically call for more training in protective suits to improve physical and psychological conditioning.

The Soviet concept of maintaining the momentum of attack presupposes a capability to decontaminate armored fighting vehicles rapidly and return them to combat as fast as possible. A jet decontamination apparatus, the TMS-65, satisfies this requirement. It consists of an aircraft turbojet engine mounted on a URAL-375 truck chassis which sprays decontamination solution. An operator directs the jet engine's hot exhaust gases at contaminated vehicles. He may mix water or a decontamination solution intermittently into the exhaust. The TMS-65 normally is employed in pairs, positioned on both sides of a road. A contaminated vehicle passing between them can be decontaminated in less than a minute. Other equipment used to maintain the momentum of attack are the ARS-14 (equipment and terrain decontamination); AGV/DDA (personnel and clothing decontamination); and the DK for partial decontamination of combat crews.

THE SPREAD OF CAPABILITIES AND USE

The Soviet Union continues to represent the major chemical weapons threat to the U.S. However, chemical weapons are spreading to nations outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact. U.S. forces may face a chemical weapons threat in a significant number of other nations.

Chemical weapons have been used during the Egyptian-Yemeni war in the 1960s; in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing into the early 1980s. There have also been allegations of chemical weapons use in the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict and during the brief war between the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam. Most recently chemical weapons have been used in the Iraq-Iran war.

We have observed that as some nations have used these weapons, a number of others have developed a strong interest in acquiring them. Some are trying to find suppliers, others are making determined efforts to acquire the technology and equipment to produce chemical weapons independently in-country. None of these countries is capable of producing thousands of tons of chemical warfare agents at the present time. Over a period of time and as they improve their expertise and production capacities they will progress to production of larger tonnages of chemical warfare agents and will be developing delivery systems.

There are now 11 nations outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact that have chemical weapons in their arsenals and two more that are attempting to acquire them. More countries now have a chemical weapons capability than at any time in the past.

Our forces as well as those of our allies must be alert to the fact of chemical weapons acquisition by such nations. Both military and security forces must also be alert to the possible use of these weapons by terrorist groups and clandestine forces.

(end text)

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News Summary October 28, 1985

Columns

NYP-Lathem "Heat On Our Ambassador to Egypt" Nicholas Veliotis is likely to become the latest casualty of the Achille Lauro affair, according to State Dept. insiders. Veliotis became somewhat of a hero when he instructed his staff to "prosecute those sons of bitches." While his strong language expressed the views of the whole Gov't, the Egyptians were not pleased. As the administration moves to repair relations with Egypt, Veliotis will probably quietly be removed from his post.

Press Reports

Israeli Cabinet Debates Peres's Peace Proposal

NYT-Freidman Israel's fragile Gov't held a long and often acrimonious debate on Peres's peace overture to Jordan but the Gov't appeared to be in no danger of falling. A senior Cabinet official said that only if Hussein took Peres up on his offer would there be a real chance of the Gov't collapsing. Peres won endorsement of all the Labor ministers in the Cabinet but more importantly, he won the support of the three religious ministers. Sharon accused Peres of having secret meetings and Hussein denied he had met with Peres in Paris. He would not talk about reports that other senior Jordanians met with Israeli officials. Political sources in Jerusalem say that Peres met with Hussein in Paris before he left for the US. Hussein told Peres that he needed international cover and Peres told Hussein that the PLO could not be negotiated with.

NYT-Pace Peres declared to North Americans that "we shall have enough support to carry on" in reference to his peace proposal. Peres made the comments in a live TV relay by satellite from Jerusalem to Jewish groups in the US and Canada. He was asked questions from a studio in Manhattan and had an estimated 10,000 viewers. Peres was reflective but seemingly untired after presiding over a long Cabinet meeting. Peres stated that he thought the Parliament would support him although he admitted there was criticism. He stated that Hussein is strong enough to make peace for he needs it as bad as the Israelis do.

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PLO Asserts Hussein Won't Cut Arafat Ties

NYT-Kifner-(Amman) PLO officials said Hussein would face a host of political difficulties if he dropped Arafat from his peace initiative. A confrontation is expected between the two men when they meet today. The officials said that the initiative would lack authentic Palestinian representation if the PLO was excluded. They also said that such a move would set off a wave of violence. Hussein is threatening to drop Arafat unless Arafat makes a statement flatly renouncing violence and recognizing Israel. The Israelis are mounting a public campaign to exclude the PLO. Israel wants direct negotiations but Jordan issued a communique saying that it absolutely refuses any separate negotiations with Israel. The statement was issued by the Jordanian Minister of Information. Abu Jihad, the PLO military commander said that "We haven't any choice but to cooperate." He said he was certain that Arafat and Hussein would work things out. The PLO he said, is committed to the Feb. 11 accord. (see NYT-Latham; DN-wire)

Israel Hits Bases in Lebanon

NYT-p.1-Hijazi-Israeli Air Force jets attacked Palestinian guerrilla bases in the Beeka region. There were no immediate reports of casualties in the 13th raid against guerrilla bases in Lebanon this year. Earlier in the day, Israeli jets produced sonic booms over Beirut causing windows to shatter and the noise caused panic among people at the shore.

NYT-wire-The military command in Tel Aviv announced that punitive raids had been staged against Palestinian gunmen, with Israeli forces bombarding buildings in southern Lebanon and blowing up houses in the West Bank. Two houses were destroyed and the military command said that the homes belonged to members of terrorist gangs that had carried out a series of shooting incidents near Hebron.

US Increases Security in Jerusalem

NYT-Reuters photo of Arab workers building a steel-reinforced wall around the US consulate in Jerusalem.

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New York and Israel Share Job-Training Program

NYT-10/20-Sherman-A program sponsored by New York State and Israel is being developed to create educational and job opportunities for underprivileged youths in both countries. The New York State Dept. of Labor is sponsoring the program with the National Committee for Labor Israel, a fund-raising arm of Histadrut. An exchange program will be set up so that youths from both countries will be able to compare notes.

Anti-Semitism on Rise

NYT-Sherman-Jewish leaders warned that anti-Semitic acts and sentiments have increased recently in the US and abroad, even as several studies suggest that anti-Semitism is on the decline. The Jewish educators, religious leaders and others who gathered at NYU cited the rise of white supremacist groups in the Midwest, the attacks on Judaism by Farrakhan and the killing of Klinghoffer. Eli Weisel said that he has received hundreds of death threats since he opposed Reagan's visit to Bitburg.

Iran's New Cabinet

NYT-AP-The Prime Minister of Iran introduced his proposed new Cabinet and emphasized the religious and revolutionary credentials of its 24 members.

Italian Prosecutors Examine Airport Standoff

NYT-Dionne-Italian prosecutors let it be known that they were looking into the US interception. They are also looking into the standoff that occurred between Italian and US troops at the air base.

Israeli Male Prostitute Murdered

NYP-Haim Bechnor, 28 came to the US to work as a model and ended up as an "escort." He died at the hands of a psychiatrist who took him out on a date, but strangled him.

תאריך:	תחלקת: חשבון - 107	4-107
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Questions Without Answers

NYT-Often events capture headlines and then fade from view. This new column will periodically answer some questions. As to what happened to the Soviet diplomats that have been kidnapped, there are no answers.

Book Reviews

NYT-10/27-Fuchs reviews "Conversations with Isaac Bashevis Singer by Singer and Richard Burgin. Singer discusses his view of literature and Judaism.

NYT-10/27-Khojst reviews in brief "Klaus Barbie: The Untold Story" by Ladislav de Hoyos. This is a well researched book that is crammed with information about Barbie's escape, his time in Bolivia and how he was expelled and sent back to France.

NYT-10/27-Iohannan reviews "Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience" by Aliza Naff. The book deals with Arabs mainly from Syria and Lebanon who came to the US during 1870-1940 hoping to strike it rich and return home. Only about 1/4 did go home. On the whole they found tolerance.

ND-Christison reviews "My Father, His Daughter" by Yael Dyan and "My Father and I" by Carmelia Sadat. Dyan's book emphasizes her father's failings while Sadat's book focus on her father's strengths.

Paid Ad-Soviet Jewry

NYT-10/27-1/4 page ad sponsored by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. They wish to draw attention to the plight of Soviet Jewry before the summit. They believe that an opportunity exists to reverse the deteriorating state of affairs.

Letters: On Terrorism

NYT-In theory, the US refuses to negotiate with terrorists but in practice, we negotiate, not to accommodate the terrorists but to free the hijacked. The US should not stoop to the level of terrorists and our allies should be in a position to help us.

תאריך:	מחלקת קשר כללית - 117	5-197
סדר מסמכים:	מסמך 501	5-197
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NYT-The Achille Lauro affair reminds one of the Trent Affair during the Civil War.

HD-Israel raided Tunisia and the world cried out but nobody mentioned the obvious solution: No terrorism, no reprisal.

Jewish Repertory Theater

NYT-10/27-The Jewish Rep Theater offers promising Jewish playwrights help.

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אישור:

שם השולח: *עו"ת 27*

תאריך: *28.10.85*

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לפגשו בקהיר, לא עכשיו, אך הוא אופטימי. סודארתי הוסיף שמובארכ שולח מסר לרה"מ באמצעות הממונה המצרי כארץ, באשר לנושאים אחרים ציין ווייטהד את עניין טאבה וסודארתי אמר שלדברי מובארכ ניתן לעבוד בשתי דרכים מקבילות - טאבה ותהליך השלום. ווייטהד בחשבה לשאלת חציר האם יחיו המצרים מוכנים להסכים להרחקת ערפאת מהתהליך השיב שהתרשם שהמצרים עומדים על חזמת ערפאת אם כי לא היה בטוח אם עומדים על ערפאת אישית או על פלטינאים שונים. (לדעתו מובארכ מכוון להשתתפותו האישית של ערפאת בתהליך). כ"כ עלה בשיחות נושא הרצח בסיני, כאשר המצרים תרצו זאת בפעולה יחיד של "משוגע" ובאשר לטיפול בנפגעים טענו שעשו כמיטב יכולתם. חציר ציין שמדובר בפונדמנטליסט ושישראל מחכה לדו"ח החקירה המצרי (אנשים מתו בגלל אבדן דם ומהעדר טיפול) ושגיררנו בקהיר ממתין לפגישה עם שר ההגנה המצרי. דעת הקהל בארץ נסערה בעניין. אמנם שמרנו על פרופיל נמוך בהתייחסות בארה"ב אך קיימת מרידות בשל הפרשה, וזאת בצד הרצון לקדם אחי חסי השלום. ווייטהד הסכים שחש לקבל דו"ח מלא אך חזר על כך שמובארכ נתן להרגיש שיש לו יחס של חמימות כלפי ישראל ושמוכן לנוע ככל שהתנאים הפוליטיים (במצרים) יאפשרו לו. הוא זקוק למספר שבועות. המצרים זקוקים גם לזמן ביחסים עם ארה"ב ואי אפשר לעשות זאת בן לילה. תגובות הציבור היו קשות. המצרים משוכנעים בצדקה פעולתם בעניין המטוס והעלו מה היה קורה לו דובר במטוס אמריקאי. מובארכ אמר שלא שיקר בעניין יציאת המחבלים למקום מסויים (לא פרט) שם אמורים היו להמסר לנציג אש"פ שלא נכח (טעון זה על נסיון הוצאת המחבלים שמענו גם ממקורות אחרים כאן) בתום שיחותיו הוטכם על מסיבת עיתונאים קצרה ללא שו"ח (ההודעה תואמה). בענין ההודעה המצרית על דחיית הרגילים צבאיים משותפים, סודארתי ציין שאין מדובר בדחייה שכן טרם נקבע דבר אבל מפגש צבאי שאמור להתקיים בווישינגטון בנוב' יערך כפי שנקבע.

4. חציר העלה החבטאות ווייטהד בתוניס (ההשוואה בינינו לבין הטרור). ווייטהד הדגיש שסמח לשאלה בענין זה. הוא כלל לא התכוון להתייחס לפעולת ישראל כאל פעולת טרור וכתב

We deplore the raid as we deplore all terrorist actions

נוסח שגם הושמע בפי הנשיא. לא תאר לעצמו שהמשפט יתפרש כפי שהתפרש. הוא ניתן לעתונות התוניסאית וצוטט ע"י האחרים. ספר שקיבל פניות מארה"ב והשיב שיש לקרוא היטב את המשפט. הסכים שציפה לתגובה מישראל. חציר השיב שמשוכנע *that* אמנם לא התכוון לכך אך השימוש בסוגר יוצר לראשונה טרור וזכור גם הנשיא ואחרים הסבירו פעולתנו כהגנה עצמית. ווייטהד חזר על כך שלא התכוון בשאין לראות במשפט יותר ממה שיש בו כפי שהסביר, אמר שנאמר לו גם כאן שיש מקום לכך שזה *intended* אך כאמור לא התכוון לכך. סיפר שבתוניס ישנו גשנות נגד ישראל כפי שגם האמריקאים מדווחים מטם. חזר מספר פעמים על כך שישראל חייבת לעבוד

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אל:

על הנושא ע"מ להחזיר את תוניסיה למסגרת המדינות המתונות. את בורגיבה מצא מלא חיוניות והערצה ליחסים עם ארה"ב. אין בכוונתו, כפי שהצהיר, לשנותם. יועציו עמו שכן התוניסאים מאמינים שארה"ב ידעה על ההפצה ואף ש"פ עם ישראל שהרי לאמריקאים יש מתקני מודיעין והאזנה על אדמת תוניסיה. האמריקאים הבטיחו שאין כך. התוניסאים הדגישו שלא היתה ידועה להם שישנה פעילות טרוריסטית של פלסטינאים שאם כן הם היו מוצאים מחוץ למדינה ולכן מבחינתם באים בחשבון שני הסברים או שארה"ב ידעה על המצאותם (ולא גילתה) או שהמדובר בחוטר זהירות מצדה בכך שלא עלתה על פעילות כזאת קודם לכן. בשני המקרים, נאמר לווייטהוד לתוניסאים לא היה ידוע על המצאותם. וויטהוד עמד על המרירות הגדולה השוררת שם מטילולו ברחובות העיר. הציר הדגיש ההבנה כפי שגם הסברנו בין תוניסיה לבין אש"פ נגדו כוונה הפעולה. הבענו צער על אבדן חיי תוניסאים אך הבנו שאלה שנמצאו בחחום מפקדת אש"פ יעובדים עבורו. לא היתה לנו ואין לנו שום כוונה נגד תוניסיה. אנו עוקבים אחרי מצב היהודים שם (ג'רבה). ווייטהוד הביע הבנה אך סבור שנמצא שתוניסיה פחות מתונה וזו נסיגה באשר לתהליך השלום שכן עכשיו עלינו לסווגה בין הפחות מתונות. צריך למצוא נחיה אליהם. הם מאמינים שהפעולה כוונה נגדם ולא נגד אש"פ. הציר חבטיח להעביר המטר ווייטהוד הוסיף שפעולות כנ"ל גם אם הן מוצדקות הופכות מדינות ערביות ל-ALIGRATE מבחינה ארה"ב ולא תמיד ניתן להחזיר המצב לתיקונו כבמקרה הנ"ל. הציר הזכיר שבנושא הטרור גם ארה"ב וגם ישראל נמצאות באותה הסירה ובאותה חזית של מאבק נלעמים יש מצבים של אין ברירה. אין בהוונת ישראל להביך את ארה"ב או לפגוע בשלום אלא פעולותיה. כווננו נגד אש"פ, וכפי שציין שרי ממשלתנו לא יהיו הטרוריסטים חסינים בשום מקום. ווייטהוד הדגיש שהוא שלם עם מה אמר הנשיא בעניין מעשי תגמול נגד מבצעי טרור אך לפני שמבצעים זאת יש לנהוג בכל הזהירות, עם זאת חזר על הבנתו כי פעולתנו היתה הגנה עצמית. בסיכום *למ' 1/6* ביחסים כפי שציין הציר, אמר ווייטהוד כי חבל שארה"ב תהיה עסוקה כעת בנושא הפסגה בג'רבה ואולי לא תוכל להפנות את כל מאמציה בדרגים הגבוהים לתהליך השלום כנחוץ.

אלי אבידן
f.c.

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New York Times Editorial
October 27, 1985

נ"ג

Dimly Visible in the Mideast Fog

King Hussein of Jordan has for 18 years cloaked his overtures for peace with Israel in fog. Is the fog finally breaking? Can there be substance to this season's peace scare?

Certainly this much, and it is notable: The King has moved toward Israel's Prime Minister Peres, while putting space between Jordan and Yasir Arafat's P.L.O. The two leaders have advanced peace proposals that could be meshed. And Mr. Peres has edged toward Jordan in agreeing to an international conference to support a peace between two nations formally still at war.

The prize would be an agreement that would make Jordan the second Arab state, after Egypt, to come to terms with Israel, and that would give interim autonomy to the Palestinians who inhabit West Bank territories lost by Jordan in the 1967 war. There are obstacles: formidable opposition to any such compromise within Israel, among many Palestinians and by rejectionist Arab states. To grasp for this peace is an act of courage for King Hussein and Prime Minister Peres.

All the more reason to welcome the King's brave praise for Mr. Peres as "a man of vision" and his realism about the domestic pressures that inhibit his only plausible Israeli partner in a peace effort. In a remarkable interview with The Times's Judith Miller, the King equated Israeli hard-liners with those in his own camp "who want to destroy the last chance for peace."

What gives Jordan some room for maneuver is the disarray among the Arab rejectionists. It is an open question who now speaks for the Palestinians. Is it Mr. Arafat's Tunis-based P.L.O., now scrambling

to undo the damage of the Achille Lauro hijacking? Or is it the Syrian-backed wing of the P.L.O., which opposes Mr. Arafat as vehemently as it does Israel? Further confusion arises in the wake of a recent debacle in London. Britain's first meeting with the P.L.O. was abruptly canceled when the pro-Arafat Palestinians refused, finally, to sign an agreed statement recognizing Israel's right to exist.

Still, it is conceivable that West Bank mayors may now join a Jordanian peace initiative. It is also conceivable that Mr. Arafat may finally pay the admission price for a place at the table: repudiation of terrorism and at last recognizing Israel's right to exist.

And there are some other conceivables. King Hussein is dismayed at the Senate vote putting off a generous American arms deal at least until March. But the delay is justified until it is clear that these weapons will never be used against Israel. America may also have a more active role to play, reviving the vital brokerage that yielded the Camp David accord. The momentum needs to be considered against the imperatives of Israeli politics. Mr. Peres is scheduled to turn over his office to his coalition partners in a year. But conceivably, to gain a mandate for peace with Jordan, he might force an election.

Conceivable, conceivably: against all the tragedy, sorrow and confusion that mark the Middle East, such hopes may be merely wishful. But that they are even conceivable is something new.

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NYT-Friedman 10/27-Week in Review-Hussein now hold the keys to both the start of direct negotiations with Israel and the futures of Arafat and Israel's coalition Gov't. Hussein was put into this position by Peres. The Prime Minister's declaration at the UN was seen by some as a brilliant diplomatic house of cards, "The Peres Plan." Most of Israel's right-wingers were aghast. Likud ministers are sharpening their knives and all that could be said was that if Hussein took Peres up on his offer, the coalition Gov't may not be in this world much longer. The constraints upon Hussein are enormous. But there are signs that he is considering entering into low-level talks. It would help ease Hussein's problems with the US sale of arms and would help Peres put together a more flexible Gov't. Murphy and Mubarak flew into Amman to weigh in their support. Arafat went touring the Arab world to gain opposition. So far the Arabs have been afraid to call Arafat's bluff. So Hussein gave an interview to the Times in which he tried to satisfy everybody and nobody at the same time. The move toward Syria may just be a message to Arafat that he is not the only game in town.

DE-10/27-Rehm-The US believes "real momentum" is building toward direct Israeli-Jordanian negotiations that could pave the way for an historic Mideast peace agreement, a senior US official said. He said Peres made "significant concessions" to Jordan. The key question is: Will Arafat allow non-PLO Palestinians to negotiate. If he does he will be shut out of the peace-process.

France Reviews Mideast Policy

NYT-10/27-Miller (Paris) France has decided to review its Mideast policy, particularly in light of the PLO involvement in recent events. France will consult Arab nations on proposals for direct talks between the Arabs and Israel through an international conference and on the status of the PLO. This is seen as wide French displeasure with the PLO actions recently and a large blow to the PLO.

Peres Reports French Offer to Fly Soviet Jews to Israel

NYT-10/28 Miller-Peres said that France had offered to help Jews emigrate from the Soviet Union by flying them directly to Israel if Moscow agreed to permit expanded emigration and such flights. Relations between France and Israel have significantly improved. Peres suggested

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that if Moscow "opened the door" to permit some 100,000 Jews to leave, Israel might accept Soviet participation at a peace conference in absence of a restoration of diplomatic ties. "Governments can't afford to be too formalistic. After all, we formed the state to take care of the Jewish people," said Peres. He also extended an offer similar to the one he made to Jordan but he said he has no indication that Syria was ready to talk. Hussein has said that Syria is willing to engage in an international conference.

Disarray in Israel's Peace Group

NYT-10/27-Freidman (photo of Israelis who favor peace talks with Jordan demonstrating). The cycle of violence in the Mideast has effected members of Peace Now. The mood in the group has changed due to recent events. The most important and threatening event for Israelis was the slaying of 7 Israelis in Sinai on Oct. 5. Israeli peace activists started asking what the peace they worked so hard for was all about. Mubarak called the killings a "minor incident" and some of the Israelis died from lack of proper treatment. Many Israelis say they are afraid to visit Egypt and relations between the two countries have never been so sour. Many organizers are asking themselves what the next step will be. They do still believe that the root of the conflict is still between Israelis and Palestinians and that without Palestinian representatives at the table it will all be for nothing.

Italy Arrests Another Palestinian/Warrant Out for Abbas

NYT-10/27-Reuters-Italian magistrates have issued an arrest warrant for Mohammad Abbas.

NYT-10/26-AP-Rome police have arrested another Palestinian who may have been involved in the hijacking.

Sudan Tries Ex-Aides in Airlift of Jews

NYT-Reuters-Former Vice-President Omar el-Tayeb of the Sudan and four officers of the dissolved State Security Service pleaded not guilty to charges of helping smuggle Ethiopian Jews to Israel. Nimeiry, believed to be in Egypt, will be tried in absentia on similar charges.

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Kohl Meets with Jewish Leaders

NYT-10/26-Blumenthal-Kohl shared a kosher lunch with a group of American Jewish leaders and held what was described as a "soul-baring" discussion about lingering ill feelings from Reagan's visit to Bitburg. Bronfman hosted the lunch. Kohl said the session was "friendly and constructive." Kohl said that on the subject of Soviet Jewry "we will always be at your disposal."

Reagan Meets Klinghoffer Family

NYT-10/26-Boyd-Reagan gave his personal pledge to the family of Leon Klinghoffer that his killers would be brought to justice. Mrs. Klinghoffer told Reagan she was proud of his decision to intercept the plane.

Cartoons

NYT-10/27-Dehrendt (Het Parool, Amsterdam) Arafat says to 3 armed Arafat look alikes "We have nothing to do with all these splinter groups!"

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Cyprian port of Larnaca in Sept. and culminating in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, did severe damage to the momentum both Arab countries had built toward gaining broader acceptance for a PLO role in the peace process.

HIJACK ACCOMPLICE REPORTEDLY HELD

Phil. Inq., AP: Italian news media said police had arrested a Palestinian suspected of being involved in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, and one report said the man might have helped organize the cruise ship's seizure. No Rome police official could immediately be reached for comment on the reported arrest, which was carried Friday by the news agencies ANSA and AGI and the state-run RAI television network. They did not cite the sources.

THE PLO'S ABBAS CALLED A DEFIANT AND WILY SURVIVOR

Phil. Inq., Masland: Growing up poor in a succession of Palestinian refugee camps, Mohammad Abbas dreamed of becoming a pilot. Instead, the burly, extroverted boy was picked when barely into his teens to help organize a Palestinian youth brigade here, and he soon set his sights on rising to the upper strata of Palestinian leadership, say those who have known him longest. His many detractors in the Syrian capital and in its sprawling Yarmouk refugee camp, where the Abbas family moved in 1962, say Abbas eventually showed himself to be a venal self-promoter. He now finds himself accused by the US of masterminding the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, his name and face becoming familiar around the world and his whereabouts the subject of international dispute. "It is a huge joke; people are talking about a big fight between Ronald Reagan and Abbas," said Rashid Abu Shawar, a well-known Palestinian novelist here. "I know he is very happy now, because he wanted to be famous." But his friends and family are proud.

SOVIETS, ISRAEL MOVING TO END AN 18-YEAR CHILL

Chic. Tribune, Broder: After 18 years of severed relations, Israel and the Soviet Union are circling each other in earnest, heightening speculation among diplomatic observers that the countries may be preparing to restore official ties and possibly setting the stage for an international Middle East peace conference. Israeli officials and Kremlin watchers here think a flurry of contacts in the last three months between Israeli, Soviet and Eastern European diplomatic along with a recent agreement by Israel and Poland to restore limited relations, underscore Moscow's desire to re-enter the Middle Eastern diplomatic arena before the meeting next month between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva.

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OPINION/COMMENTARY

MIDEAST WOUNDS THAT DON'T HEAL

The Sun, Peck: Official anger with the Reagan administration and the popular outburst of anti-Americanism in Egypt, this country's key partner in the Arab world, are not simply passing irritations which can be dismissed with a presidential nod and the dispatch of an envoy to soothe wounded feelings. Moreover, estrangement in American relations with the Arab world is not limited to Egypt and Tunisia, nor is it simply a product of Arab terrorism and American reaction to it. From North Africa to Oman, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, there has been a mounting sense of disenchantment with the United States among its moderate Arab friends. ...The fundamental consideration always to be kept in mind is that only the maintenance and nurturing of a broad network of constructive American relations across the Middle East can protect and advance our national interests, including the survival of Israel. Failing that there is the certain prospect of a beleaguered Israel supported by the US against a sullen and alienated Arab world, assuring a continued cycle of yet more destructive violence. That would represent the ultimate triumph of the terrorists.

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News Summary October 25, 1985

Editorials

WSJ "The Scorpion Quadrille" by producing the body of Klinghoffer, Syria gave lie to the PLO apologists who had tried to deny he'd been murdered, and it struck a heavy blow at Arafat himself. Damascus continues its struggle with Arafat. Syria has tried to kill Arafat and lately, according to intelligence sources, Arafat has been getting his own licks through a deadly bombing campaign in the heart of Damascus. Assad has ordered a complete blackout on the bombings. There's a grim satisfaction in seeing terrorism rebound on the people who made it grow. These are the peels, including Jordan, who has helped the Moslem Brotherhood, who are supposed to be the "kingpins" of the peace process. We hope the US can retain its newfound sobriety and leave Arafat and Assad alone in their scorpion dance.

Columns

DN-Buokley, "An UNdeserving reason to Party" Everyone is here to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the UN but there's nothing to celebrate. The UN is the greatest distillery of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, outside of the Soviet Union. It is the greatest assault on moral realism of any institution in the world today.

Press Reports

US Tries to Spur Mideast Peace Bid

NYT-p. 1-Gwertzman-The US sent Murphy to Jordan this week to try to encourage Israel and Jordan toward talks. The disclosure came amid an unusual public exchange of conciliatory statements by Hussein and Peres. The US believes prospects for peace has been advanced and it has decided to step up its role as a middleman. Murphy provided Hussein private assurances from Peres about Israel's desire for negotiations, and with Washington's evaluation that the prospects seemed favorable for the early start of peace talks. Shultz and Murphy flew to NY to confer with Peres. According to the Administration, Peres made a major concession in agreeing to an international conference. Peres is seeking reciprocal concessions from Hussein--to bring to the negotiations only Palestinians who are acceptable to Israel. Peres

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forward with the arms sale deal on March 1. (see NYP; DN Rains)

Carzi is Positive on US Relations/Says PLO Bombing Worse than Hijacking

NYT-special-Crazi says he doesn't blame Reagan for the collapse of his Gov't. He also said the US should realize that the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis was a "political bombing," with even greater consequences than the hijacking of the ship and should have been recognized by the US as such. He called the hijacking of the ship an "unfortunate incident," but said that the bombings would have serious repercussions in the Mideast.

UN Can't Agree on Resolution

NYT-Sotolino-p.1-The UN's birthday was marred by the failure of member nations to agree on a universal declaration of purpose. The sticking point was the Palestinian issue. The 21-member Arab group expressed concern that "the question of the Palestine" remained unresolved. The group called for affirmation of a commitment to work toward "a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem in all its aspects." The US submitted a more general paragraph calling simply for a "comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem in all its aspects." It consistently opposed the word "just." (see NYP-Berlin)

Rabbi Slams Koch

NYP-Arts-A Right-to Life rabbi running for mayor blasted Koch for "running the city like a giant Greenwich Village singles bar." Rabbi Yehuda Levin, the Right-to-Life candidate, launched his attack in the first and only debate of the general mayoral election. "Let me tell you, in the Orthodox Jewish community, you really are a step away from a gay rights parade and attended a gay synagogue." Levin mentioned that Koch took part in a gay rights parade and attended a gay synagogue.

'Shoah' text in Book Form

NYP-The complete text of shoah, the 9 1/2 hour film about the Holocaust has been published in conjunction with the opening of the movie.

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הטף, אך בד בבד עומדים על תשובה אמריקאית עניינית. הולמס /קול והולנבק (עמו קבעתי להיפגש בשבוע) יצאו לשם כך לאירופה וכנראה שגם המזכיר עשוי לצאת לשם טרם הפסקה.

3. הגישה במחמי"ד ובבית הלבן היא שהעקרון של צמצום ב-50% של הנשק האסטרטגי אינו שלילי כשלעצמו בהנחה תיאורטית שכל צמצום אפקטיבי חייב להיות עמוק (No Foudly) אך השאלה המרכזית היא אילו מערכות נשק יכללו בו. הטובייטים הכניסו חחת קורת גג זו את כל מערכות הנשק האסטרטגי שבידי ארה"ב. כולל הטילים בעלי טווח קרוב עבינוני המותקנים במטוסי חיה"א האמריקאי בכל מקום שהוא, הבטיטים מעבר לים וכמובן כלי הנשק האסטרטגי המוצבים באירופה. סנגד, הוציא מכלל חשבון חיה"א הטובייטי באירופה (מיג 25 והמפציצים) בטענה שאינם בעלי טווח הגעה לשופי ארה"ב.

4. אדלמן כאחרים רואה בפתיחות המזארי"ח כלפי ישראל כפי שנהגלחה בשיחות שה"ח שמיר באוי"ם מהלך שמאחוריו ניצבת ברה"מ ולא דווקא יוזמה מקומית שזכתה לאישור מוסקבה במסגרת חופש הפעולה היחסי המוענק למדינות מזא"ר בחחום היחסים עם המערב (תונגריה). החערכה היא שמהלך כזה היה בלתי אפשרי בימי צ'רננקו וקודמיו. גורבצ'וב המנחה את שברנדזה אינו מקבל את ירושת קודמיו בחחום מדיניות החוץ כאקסיומה וכורך טלולה שחייבים להמשיך לצעוד בה. אדרבא האמריקאים התרשמו מהמגעים עם שברנדזה (אדלמן היה בפמליית המזכיר בהלסינקי) שבקרתלין עוברים בקפדנות על כל נושאי מדיניות החוץ. מאידך, גם מוסכם שאין לצפות לשידוד מערכות מהיר כגון ב"תיק הישראלי" שכן לא ניתן להפריגו מהמכלול הרחב של מדיניות ברה"מ במזה"ח. התוצאה - שביל ביניים כשהמשימה, במקרה של ישראל, מוטלת על הגרורות. לשאלתי, ההיסטוטיה (ואולי לא) התייחסותה של ברה"מ להשתתף בוועידה בינ"ל, במידה וסוריה תסרב, השיב שזו אמנם העמיד את ברה"מ בדילמה קשה אך הוא לא שולל מתן תשובה טוביטית חיובית עקרונית. לדעה אדלמן במישור מדיניות החוץ הטובייטית מאז עלה גורבצ'וב לשלטון נוספו יעדים חדשים והנא מצידן 3 כמענינים-יסן (שברנדזה עומד לבקר שם) עומאן וישראל. אלה בבחינת אפקים חדשים (New Horizons) שהמסותף ביניהם - נזנחו ע"י צ'רומיקו, פרו מערביות וקטורות בשי"ט/ברית אסטרטגית עם ארה"ב.

5. במישור הפנימי נמשכים המינוים החדשים של אנשי גורבצ'וב בחחום הכלכלי אם כי יותר במישור המבצעי ופחות "הפיקודי" לאחר מינוי שר סחר החוץ החדש. מבין החילופים שכבר בוצעו או עומדים על הפרק מצידן אדלמן את הדחתו של מאקרוב עוזרו האישי/ ראש לשכתו של צ'רומיקו ב"מיד". אגב, בהקשר זה אדלמן מספר שהבחירה לתפקיד שה"ח נפלה על ורוטניקוב, טרם המינוי אך אחרי שנאמר לג'רומיקו שיוחלף התגלתה "שערורית אי סדרים" שמאחוריה

ט ו ט ט

ד... 3... מתוך... 3... דפים

סוג בסחונני

דחיסות

תאריך וז"ח

636

מס' מברק

עמד מאקרווב . הוחלט להעדיף את שברנדזה בשל נקיונו ובעיקר בשל היותו ידוע כמי שיוצע לעשות סדר/תקופת כהונתו כשר הפנים של גרוזיה. איידלמן גם צופה בהחלפתו של פונומרייב בזאגלדין ובכך שגריטין , קונאייב וטלזין במקום גבות ברשימה. מאידך מנהל "גוספלאן" מונה חבר בפוליטבירו, במקום טיכונוב שהוצא גם משם , קחלפו על פני מועמדים "בטוחים" אחרים. איידלמן מצביע על דמות חדשה בתחום המומחים הסובייטיים על ארה"ב. טראסינקו הנ"ל שהיה ה- DCM בסגרירות הסובייטית בווסטמינגטון בשנות קלינטונים מכהן עתה כסגנו של הסטרטניק במח' ארה"ב ב- "מיד", הפך מלווה קבוע בפמלית שברנדזה לכאן. אדם פתוח, בעל ידע בתחום האמריקאי המוכן להחלק במחשבותיו עם אחרים. מנהל המח' עצמו "נעלם" מהאופק.

6. פוגל. (מברק ממנכ"ל) איידלמן לא שמע על מו"מ המתנהל סביב שצראנטקי וסחרוב. ידוע שפוגל היה מעורב ב- SNAP האחרון של חילופי המרגלים שנערך לא ס' כבר בגרלין הבטיח לבדוק ולהודיע.

אבידן

א אבידן
א.א

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24...ל...מחור...2...דפיס
...טוג בטחוני גלגל
...דמיסות...גל
8509251230...מאריך וז"מ
...מבר...

אל: 616
המשרד, בטחון, ניו-יורק
240 | 478

אל: חסרה, מע"מ, מצפ"מ, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח
דע: ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - FRIDAY - OCTOBER 25, 1985

EDITORIALS

CHICAGO TRIBUNE-25/10-"A Stonewall For Peres..." Peres has told the U.N. that he is prepared to travel to Jordan to negotiate peace in the Middle East. And in true Middle East style, a storm of protest flared to snuff out his words. This time, the knee-jerk condemnation was delivered louder in Hebrew than in Arabic. David Levy, and other members of the Likud wing led an Israeli chorus rejecting Peres' offer. The obstacles Peres faces in the year ahead have been drawn clearly by Hussein, the PLO and the Likue, which must stall Peres' initiative for one year to defeat it entirely. If a meaningful plan for peace cannot progress under Peres, there is little hope a permanent settlement can be drafted when the hawks of the Likue take power.

COLUMNS

***WASH. POST-Richard Cohen-"Jordan Should Grow Up" Seven years ago, I tried to go from Jordan to Israel where I was supposed to meet my wife. My plan was to go across the Allenby Bridge, only I could not. I tried to call my wife in Jerusalem. It was then that I learned the difference between Jordanian rhetoric and reality. Israel, I was more or less told, did not exist. Jordan is always described as a moderate Arab govt. that wants nothing but peace with Israel. But when Peres spoke at the UN the other day calling for peace the Jordanian delegation walked out. Its tin Jordan started behaving serious about its own rhetoric. Moderate or not, Jordan went to war against Israel in 1967. The reason Israel now occupies the West Bank is not because it attacked Jordan, but the other way around. Does Hussein have the courage to cut a deal? History awaits the answer to that question. It is hard to be optimistic when the Jordanian UN delegation steps on the peace process by marching out of the UN. It was petty, rude, insulting, and above all, childish. War is for kids. Peace is for adults. It's time Jordan grew up. (This article was cabled in full today.)

THE PRESS REPORTS

Israel's Peres Steals The Show From US Pre-Summit Maneuvering

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Harsch-The most interesting new development of the past week in world affairs was an Israeli peace proposal minus the usual impossible pre-conditions. What comes of the new Israeli move in the long run is another matter, but it was enough to attract

Pinche Hand Pinche. Peace - אב"מ יום יאזא 1

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8337

** יוצא

יודי

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מל: 110, נר: 901, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, 20: ס, תא: 251085, וחי: 1730

יודי/מידי

מל: נעים

הפלת ערפאת, לשלך 586

מה נ-10 ימים בודקים האם קיים חומר מפליג נגד ערפאת הקושר
אותו ישירות למעשי רצח, פיגועים, הברחות וכו' נגד אישים
ואורחי ארה"ב, אירופה ומדינות אחרות.
עושים כנ"ל גם לגבי אחרים מצמרת אש"ף. איננו בטוחים שקיים
חומר מרשיע חותך או שאפשר לשחרר אותו, לכן מנקטים שכתחילה
לא נתנו פרסום לבדיקה הנ"ל שאנו עורכים לאייפ"כ'
תוכלו למסור שאנו עורכים בדיקה יסודית ומעמיקה ונודיעם
בהקדם.
מנהל הסברה/ערב 2.==

פ: שהח, רהמ, שהבס, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, ממד, הסברה,
מצפא

12764 310043 תר-טר-10

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

פפ : שהח, רהמ, מונכ, ממנכ, דרור, כלכלי תנ', מטפט, תמס, דורת,
אוצר, מונכ, מצפא, מונכלמטפט'ם
תח: תמס פרי טרהמדע

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8651

1010

בלמים

אל: המשרד, נר: 35, מ: יוסטון
דח: מ, סג: ב, תא: 241085, רח: 0930

מייד/בלמים

אל: מצפי"א, מאו"ד.

דע: בן אהרון, לשכת שה"ח

ן. גוביק, לשכת רוהי"מ

נחמן שי, לשכת שהב"פ

דן קוריאלי, וושינגטון.

שמות חברי המישלחת נשלחו אליכם בדי"פ. מכל מקום להלן השמות
:101

הדפוס הכללי, תל אביב, 1976

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1. TONY BONILLA AND MRS. BONILLA - CORPUS CHRISTI, TX
ATTORNEY AT LAW, FORMER PRESIDENT OF L.U.L.A.C. AND
FOUNDER OF THE HISPANIC LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE.
2. DR. ROBERTO CRUZ
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL HISPANIC UNIVERSITY - SAN
FRANCISCO, CA.
3. MR. JESUS CHAVARRIA
PUBLISHER, HISPANIC BUSINESS MAGAZINE WASHINGTON D.C.
AND SANTA BARBARA, CA.
4. SUSAN CORREA
BUSINESS WOMAN AND MEMBER OF THE STATE HUMAN RELATIONS
COMMISSION OMAHA, NEBRASKA.
5. MS. MARIA ELENA HERRERA
LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, PHILIP MORRIS USA, NEW YORK.
6. MR. SKIP CHAVEZ AND MRS. CHAVEZ. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
- SER JOBS FOR PROGRESS, INC. N MIAMI, FL.
7. MR. RICH CASTRO
FORMER STATE LEGISLATOR AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF HUMAN
RELATIONS COMMISSION, DENVER, CO.
8. MR. EDURDO GARCIA
CORPUS CHRISTI, TX. BUSINESSMAN.

11001*

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7926

יציא

יודי

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אלו נוש, נרו 859, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 241085, דח: 1500
נד: סוריה-ירדן

מיזי/100

סוריה ירדן ותהליך השלום- תדרוך.

1. רקע.

א. בהמשך למברק התדרוך השבועי-אין בידינו עדיין מידע מוצק
נאשר לתוכן המפגש הירדני-סודי בג'דה והאם בנוסף להתקדמות
בנושא היחסים הבינלארליים היתה גם התקדמות בנושאים המדיניים
המרבויים (דוגמת הסכם חוסיין ערפאת) ותהליך השלום.

ב. ההודעה שפורסמה בתום המפגש ע"י יורש העצר הסעודי גם אם
אינה מהווה סטייה מהמדיניות הירדנית המוכרת הרי ההודעה
בהודעה על שליכת הסדר נפרד וחלקי עם ישראל יש בה משמעות
לגבי יחסה של ירדן לתהליך המדיני.
2. שאלות

א. כיצד מעריכים בממשל את ההתקדמות הירדנית סודית?
ב. האם דואה הממשל במפגש ובהודעה אפשרות לויתור ירדני על
הליכה משותפת עם ערפאת?

ג. מהי המשמעות בעיני הממשל של שליכת הסדר חלקי ונפרד עם
ישראל (עפ"י נוסחה ההודעה הסעודית) בהקשר של
1. עמדת ירדן בתהליך המדיני.

2. תגובה ירדן לנאום דוה'מי באו"ם-דברי חוסיין ל
ד ז א מהנוכר.

ד. האם תל שינוי כלשהו בתפיסה הירדנית את הועידה הבינלא
ה. האם ניתן להבחין בקיומו או בהתגבשותו של קו פעולה לפיו

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ינסה הממשל לפעול וכדחוף במדץ את המשך התהליך או שמא יעדיף הממשל לעמוד מהצד ולהמתין עד להתבהרות התמונה?
ו. האם במהלך בחינת הארועים באוורנו ניתן להצביע על גישות שונות המסתמנות באשר להמשך התהליך ולאסטרטגיה המוה'תית של הממשל? אנה פרטו.

ו. האם קיים חשש בממשל לאפשרות שבניה'ים תנצל את ה- SETBACKS בתהליך המדיני במתכוונתו הנוכחית וכדי לחדש את חתירתה לצמצום השפעת ארה'ב באוורינו?
ביני'ל 1/ערב 2/ממ'ד.

98 : שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, ממד, מצפא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שומר

7879

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מכ: 1108, נד: 957, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ש, מא: 241085, זח: 1430
נד: דברי וייטהד

מיידי/שומר

סגדיר

פלאטן הפקטר שדובר מחמ"ד הבהיר אמוול ושכשום את דברי
וייטהייך בין השאר גם תוך התיחסות לעדות שולץ על תוניס.
פלאטן אמר שהתשובות התרכו בשלילת ההנחה שוויטהייך גיאר את
פעולת ח"א כמעשה שדור.

מניח שהניסוחים בידיכם. פלאטן הוסיף שדברי דובר מחמ"ד היו
במגובה לבקשתנו להבהרת הדברים.

בר און

פ: שה, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, דס, אמן, ממד, מצפא,
סייב

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8824

נכנס

מס' 1 מתוך 2 מס' 4 מתוך 32 סודי ביותר

מס' 1000

1. הירדנים קיבלו העקרון שרק מדינות משתתפות בוועידה ולכל המדינה נציג אחד בלבד. ישראל וירדן ע"י כוהמ' נ ירדן אולי עשה י"ח ו ארה"ב ע"י מוכיר המדינה. אשר לא ש"י הו"א יוכל לישבת בשורה האתורית. ובהערה, אם ירצו יוכלו לעסוק שהם לא שותפים לדיון.

2. המלך מסכים שהוועידה הבינלאומית תהיה קוסטנטית וקצרה נ אם כי ממקור נוסף נאמר שחיה צדאנס סאח אצטס) וכי המלך משוכנע שהסובייטים יסכימו לכך.

3. לפי אותם מקורות, המלך אומר שגם לפי תוכנית פאו, מדברים על תוכנית מעבר, והטלב הראשון יכול להיות אוטונומיה. אך המקור באדמיניסטרציה אינו לוקח ברצינות המגעים הסורים ירדנים (סתאשר גם ממגעינו במחמ"ד).

מס' 1000

מס' 1000

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק
טופס מברק

דחילוה:
סוג כסחובלי: שסור
תז"ח: 24 2100
נר : 0868
ל" : 224

המשרד

רוסינגטון

נאו"ם ניו-יורק

ארב"ל 2. מצפ"א. דק: שב'רוסינגטון.

נאוט רייגן בעצרת

1. הנאוט הושמע בפני אולם צופי ובחשופה לב מירביה, ולמעשה הסך לחיות האירוע המרכזי של ציון ה-40.
2. אם כי חנוטה ענייני, הרי הושמעו דברים בוטים בנושא החיסוש ונגד מדיניות ברי"מ, כולל בתחרות האידיאולוגי. עם זאת סיים כנכונות לנהל מו"מ פתוח בפסגה.
3. החתייחסות לאיזור צומצמה למשפט אחד שכלל ק.ד. ושתי החחלסות ובכך כמובן חיוב ברור.

אליאב

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רחימות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	1-:71
סוג בטחוני:	טופס מברק	3-:71
תז"ח:	הסברה, פע"ח, לש' סטנכ"ל, יועץ רוח"ס לתקשורת, כצפ"א, סטנכ"ל אסיח"ר, לע"ס.	א ל :
241700		
0843 :	רושינגטון.	7 ע :
220 : 211		
		מחנה :

News Summary October 24 1985

Columns-

Post- Art Buchwald- "Mending Fences"- America must mend fences with Mubarak It will cost about \$2 billion dollars. Better an angry Mubarak than a laughing Egyptian Khomeini. As for the Italians Craxi was our best pal in NATO'S southern flank but he loved the Palestinians. We never interfere in other countries affairs but we were kind of hoping the next Prime Minister would be Lee Iacocca (Newsday)

NYT-Miller-pg 1- " Hussein Welcomes 'Spirit' of Speech on Peace by Peres"

In an interview with the NYT Hussein welcomed the peace proposal by Simon Peres and said that although he was committed to his agreement on Feb. 11 with the PLO he was reviewing their relationship. He restated his view that the only way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict was through an international conference organized by the U.N. He praised Peres as a man of vision. He said he could not reciprocate the declaration to end the state of war that exists between the two countries. The King will meet with Mubarak Thursday. The King also indicated that there were tensions between Jordan and the PLO since the sea-jacking. (Excerpts from the interview are printed)

NYT-Steven Roberts- pg. 1- "Reagan Postpones Jordan Arms Deal"-

Reagan circumed to Congressional pressure and signed a resolution that bars an arms deal with Jordan unless Jordan begins direct talks with Israel. The resolution was a compromise that headed off a certain defeat for the administration. Peres's speech at the U.N. encouraged the lawmakers to set the Jordans arms issue aside. (ND, Post)

NYT- John Tagliabue-

Reports say that one of the four Palestinian seajackers in an Italian jail implicated Mohammed Abbas and said that he was the military mastermind behind the seajacking Justice officials

2-1 מברק מניו יורק - 24/10/85

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in Rome would not confirm the reports which would further embarrass Prime Minister Craxi who was on his way to a meeting with Pres. Reagan. The same terrorist cooperating with Italian officials is the one that killed Leon Klinghoffer (Newsday, Post)

Amsterdam News- Leaders of the South African Jewish community signed a resolution that called for the elimination of all laws of discrimination. The resolution was presented at the National Executive Council of the South African Board of Deputies. These views the board said are based on Jewish values and ethics.

DN- Mubarak and Hussein will meet on Thursday in Amman to discuss the Middle East Peace prospects and the offer by Prime Minister Shimon Peres.

DN- Drake- visiting officials lined up to shake President Reagan's hand at a special reception for visiting dignitaries in town for the United Nations birthday celebration (picture of Peres and Reagan)

DN- Larkin- Celebrities partied at Regines Disco for a private party hosted by Aura Herzog for the Council for a Beautiful Israel. Shimon Peres attended.

DN- Yael Dayan daughter of Moshe is on a cross-country tour to promote her new book

DN- Liz Smiths column: PLO is waiting for fresh funds from Libya. Mubarak will most likely re-open talks with the Soviets. Japanese terrorist Okamoto has gone underground after being released from Israeli prisons.

NYT- Kleiman- "Shoah" has opened in New York to sympathetic audiences. Lines for the documentary wound round the block. Many of those waiting in line had come from Europe during or after WW II or had lost relatives during the Holocaust.

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NYT- Lehmann-Haupt- a review of Holy Days by Lis Harris- What is special about the's book is the authors' combination of openness and skepticism toward her subject. Along with the the history and traditions we learn some surprising things about Hasidism. It is Ms, Harris's literal willingness to emerge herself in the Hasidic culture that produces the emotional climax of her book.

NYT- David K Shipler- Reviews Robin Wrights- Sacred Rage- Miss Wright weaves a skillful disturbing tapestry of warning from the religious history, doctrine, terrorism, politics and social upheaval that has created and sustained the movement of modern Islam. This book stands as a useful sketch of a major phenomenon.

110211 תשלום 24-10-85

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו המשרד

ס ו ס ס

דף.....מחור.....דפים

סוג בשחוני סודי

דחיפות מייד

תאריך וז"ח אוק' 24 1830

ססי מברק 610

אל: מ/מנכ"ל. השגריר רוזן.
דע: לשכת רה"ם (נוביק).

בית הנבחרים: מכירת נשק לירדן

1. המורשה לארי סמית כועס על הסיכום שהושג בין הסנט לממשל בנדון - ללא כל התייעצות עם בית הנבחרים וללא כל תיאום בין שני הבתים.
2. לגופו של עניין, טוען סמית שהסנט וויתר על הכל ("מכר את החנות") לטענתו, אם נוסח החלטת הסנט יתקבל ע"י הבית ויהיה לחוק בחתימת הנשיא, אזי המאבק נגד עיסקת הנשק עם ירדן יתנהל במגרש של הנשיא ולא במגרש של הקונגרס - וידו של הקונגרס תהיה על התחנות. אחרי ה-20 בנובמבר (סיום תקופת ה- NOTIFICATION הרשמית לפי החוק) הנשיא לא יהיה מנוע מלהוציא "מכתב הצעה", ומי יקבע שהמכתב פסול (INVALID) . שואל סמית. אין נוהל הזירוז חל על החלטה משותפת, ומי יבטיח שתקויים הצבעה על החלטת אי-ההסכמה אם תבוקש ניתן, לדעתו, לגייס את המיכתם של שני שלישים בשני הבתים כעת אך גל ההתלהבות (פירוש הדבר, ההתנגדות לעיסקה) לא יחייק מעמד עוד שלושה ארבעה חודשים.
3. הוא לא מוכן איפוא לקבל את עמדת הסנט. בכוונתו (וככל הנראה בכוונת פאסטל) לעמוד על קיום ה- HEARINGS שנקבעו לשבוע הבא, לעיין היטב בהשלכות, לבנות את "ההסטוריה החקיקתית" על הרקורד לכל הצעת החלטה שתתקבל וכו'. לדבריו, הוא לא יוותר על האופציות, ובין השאר הוא מוכן להודות שקיימת האפשרות שבטופו של דבר, לכשתיערך ההתייעצות בין שני הבתים, אכן יתקבל נוסח הסנט או נוסח שמתקרב לו. אבל לעת עתה יש לעבור את כל השלבים המקובלים תוך ראייה לא רק לנוהלים אלה גם ל"ניתן לעשות" (" WHAT'S DOABLE ") מבחינה פוליטית.
4. אי לכך הגיש סמית היום את הצעת החלטה של אי-ההסכמה במליאת הבית - בשוטבינות 273 מורשים. לא ביקש קריאה ראשונה.
5. לדעת אנשי איפא"ק יש בדברי סמית לא מעט " PIQUE " אישי נוכח הסיכום שהושג בלעדיו, אך אין הם שוללים את כל טענותיו כנטולי תוקף. עם זאת הם מעריכים שבטופו של חשבון יקבל הבית את עמדת הסנט וישלים עמו.

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למדן

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המשרד

אל:תמנכ"ל, חצפ"א

- א. התקשר סודארת' סגנו של חרפי כדי למסור (מה שידענו כאן משמועות שונות) כי מרפי אכן היה בעמאן מאז יום ג', חוזר היום וכנראה ידווח למס'.
- בגלל הרגישות שביב המסע שדובר עליו בשעתו ולא יצא לפועל, עשו זאת הפעם בדרך של "דיסלומטיה חשאית". הוא לא נפגש עם פלטהינאים. אין "פריצות דרך" גדולות.
- ב. סודארת' הביע סיפוק על שבוע שבו מדברים ישראלים וערבים טובות אלה על אלה.
- ג. סודארת' עצמו נתלוה לוייטהד למסעו בקהיר ותוניס. המסע היה לדעתו טוב, כדי לספל "ישראליות" שחיו בשני המקומות, ולהבטיח את המשך היחסים הטובים, אף כי כמובן לא הוסרו כל המשקעים. אני מבין שכללית הועלו עם המצרים גם נושאינו (עוד נשמע על כך). הבעתי כמובן גם באוזניו דעתנו על התזהרות בתוניס, ואמר שהיה "טיפול סכני" גרוע בנושא.


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אל:

המסד, בטחון, ניו-יורק

231 460 588

אל: הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לשי רוח"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח
דע: ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - THURSDAY - OCTOBER 24, 1985

THE PRESS REPORTS

Mubarak, Hussein Plan Talks On Israeli Initiative

WASH. POST-Dickey-Mubarak and Hussein are scheduled to meet in Amman Thursday in an apparent effort to move quickly to shape a detailed response to Israel's latest initiative for peace in the Middle East. Arafat also is expected to arrive in the Jordanian capital in the next week to consult on the future course of the peace process, according to senior PLO officials. Aides to Mubarak and Hussein said they have been studying carefully the outlines of the plan put forward by Peres at the UN Monday, although some semiofficial newspapers in Egypt and Jordan were quick to dismiss it.

Arms Sale To Jordan Deferred By Senate

WASH. POST-Walsh & Shapiro-Senate Republican leaders, seeking to avert an embarrassing rejection of the Reagan administration's proposed arms sale to Jordan, reached agreement with opponents of the sale yesterday on a face-saving formula to delay action on the matter until next year. The agreement, embodied in a resolution the Senate is expected to approve today, rules out any sale of advanced arms to Jordan between now and March 1 unless "direct and meaningful peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan" begin before then. Reagan had reluctantly agreed to the delay.

Egypt and Italy Rifts Mending - US Envoy

WASH. TIMES-Belcher-US relations with Italy and Egypt, a special envoy to those nations told Reagan yesterday that the wounds that begun to heal. But Whitehead, unintentionally sparked a controversy with comments some interpreted as a reprimand of Israel for its Oct. 1 raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia. Whitehead, returning from a five day trip to Rome, Cairo and Tunis, told Mr. Reagan that his mission was "a success" said Larry Snokes.

Syrian President Assad Sticks To His Guns

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Cooley-Assad has so far steered his country safely through the dangerous Mediterranean crisis following Israel's Oct. 1 air strike on Tunisia and the subsequent Palestinian hijack of an Italian cruise ship.

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page.

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מגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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אלו המשרד
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שר התחבורה - ירושלים

עו"ד ע. כלום - משרד המשפטים, ירושלים

דע:ראש הממשלה - ניו-יורק, מ"מ רוה"מ ושר החוץ, מזכ"ל ההסתדרות י. קיסר

שר האוצר, ד. כלון, וושינגטון

המועד שהוברק ע"י עו"ד ע. כלום להמשך השיחות גרם אכזבה רבה לאיגוד המכונאים. הם קיוו שאפשר יהיה להמשיך בשיחות חוך שבוע - עשרה ימים כדי לסיים הסכסוך בהקדם האפשרי ולהבטיח שהשוכתים יחזרו לעבודה לפני חג המולד. התאריכים המוצעים לסוף נובמבר אינם מעשיים מאחר והראשון מתנגש בוועידת אגודי העופה והשני הוא קצמן חג ההודיה.

בינתיים מתקרב אף מועד ועידת ה - AFL - CIO העומדת להפתח ב-27 לח.ז. בקליפורניה. בוועידה עלולה להתקבל ההחלטה הבאה:

El Al Airlines

Whereas, members of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers have been on strike against El Al Airlines since March 16, 1984; and

Whereas, this strike was caused by management demands for wage concessions, cuts in fringe benefits, and elimination of vital work rules; and

Whereas, management has refused to bargain in good faith, has repeatedly walked out of meetings, has imported strike-breakers from Israel and caused violence on the picket line; and

Whereas, the present ~~israel~~ government in Israel has pledged to negotiate a fair settlement, but ~~has done absolutely~~ nothing to implement that pledge; *and the official position has been of EL-AL STRIKE*

Whereas, El Al management has resorted to the heinous and dispicable tactic of forming a company union and attempting to decertify the IAM as bargaining agent for the employees;

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THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that until a settlement is negotiated between El Al Airlines and the International Association of Machinists, all AFL-CIO affiliates and departments call in their Israeli bonds; and,

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that all AFL-CIO affiliates and departments announce their refusal to purchase Israeli bonds, or attend bond dinners or functions; and,

BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED, that all union officers and members, and their families, refuse to visit Israel until a contract is ratified.

החלטה זאת תגרום נזק ממשי רב לאינטרסים הכלכליים של ישראל בארה"כ. לדימויה ולכלכל מערכת יחסנו עם פדרצית העבודה האמריקנית. בימים האחרונים קיימתי שיחות עם אנשי האגודים המקצועיים כולל נשיא הפדרציה ואנשי אגוד המכונאים וכן אנשי משרד התיווך הפדרלי ונראה לי שאפשר להביא היכיתה לירי סיום מיידית. לאחר תקופה כה ממושכת ונזק שכבר נגרם, בקבלת הסיכומים הכאים תוך מאמץ להביא להקדמת הדיון המשפטי בבית המשפט בירושלים לפני ה - 17 בנובמבר:

1) The ^{IAA} has proposed that 50% of ~~our~~ strikers be returned on Monday, November 25, 1985 and the remaining 50% be returned by no later than Monday, December 16, 1985.

2) Currently there are two (2) stores and two (2) office clerical employees on strike and even though ~~the Union~~ does not legally represent these employees, ^{they} feel obligated that these four (4) employees should be returned to the El Al Israel payroll when the strike is terminated. This issue can be resolved by the Company giving ~~the~~ Union a verbal assurance in returning these employees.

3) The Union agreed with the Company to eliminate the commissary department and the six (6) employees who are on the payroll as of March 15, 1984 will be able to carry-over their commissary seniority into the cargo agents position and as previously agreed upon through out these negotiations, the Company will absorb these employees in the cargo department. In the event the Company reduces its work force, any commissary or cargo agent employee who may be reduced into a cargo handler position will suffer no loss of pay as a result of their reduction from the higher classification. Further, if the Company re-establishes a commissary department, the six (6) commissary employees who transferred to a cargo agent position will be subject to re-call in the commissary department.

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4) On November 20, 1984 the Company agreed that all employees returning to work and on lay-off will be entitled to vacation accrual under the current agreement as if there was no interruption of their employment.

5) The Company and the Union are very close to resolving the arbitration language that is needed in ~~the~~ back-to-work agreement.

6) As previously agreed also by the parties all new hires that were placed on the payroll on March 16, 1984 and thereafter will be released by the Company no later than December 16, 1985.

טשח הנושאים האלו הם שוליים למדי בהשוואה למה שהושג ולכזק הרב שיגרם לישראל.
 כ - 30 נושאים מועברים כידוע לבוררות בנוסף לדברים המוסכמים ובוודאי תסכימו
 ששיטת נושאים אלו אינם מצדיקים התפתחות כה חמורה.
 ראש הממשלה מבקש להבטיח שיעשה כל מאמץ לטכס הדבר בהקדם האפשרי.

עמוס ערו
 כ/שש



official text

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 2:00 P.M. OCTOBER 24

October 24, 1985

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S U.N. ADDRESS

UNITED NATIONS -- Following is the text, as prepared, of President Ronald Reagan's address to the U.N. General Assembly, October 24, 1985:

(begin text)

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, honored guests and distinguished delegates. Thank you for the honor of permitting me to speak on this anniversary for the United Nations.

Forty years ago, the world awoke daring to believe hatred's unyielding grip had finally been broken -- daring to believe the torch of peace would be protected in liberty's firm grasp.

Forty years ago, the world yearned to dream again innocent dreams, to believe in ideals with innocent trust. Dreams of trust are worthy, but in these 40 years too many dreams have been shattered, too many promises have been broken, too many lives have been lost. The painful truth is that the use of violence to take, to exercise, and to preserve power remains a persistent reality in much of the world.

The vision of the U.N. Charter -- to spare succeeding generations this scourge of war -- remains real. It still stirs our souls and warms our hearts. But it also demands of us a realism that is rockhard, clear-eyed, steady and sure -- a realism that understands the nations of the United Nations are not united.

I come before you this morning preoccupied with peace, with ensuring that the differences between some of us not be permitted to degenerate into open conflict. And I come offering for my own country a new commitment, a fresh start.

On this U.N. anniversary, we acknowledge its successes' The decisive action during the Korean War; negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty; strong support for decolonization; and the laudable achievements by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Nor must we close our eyes to this organization's disappointments' its failure to deal with real security issues, the total inversion of morality in the infamous Zionism-is-racism resolution, the politicization of too many agencies, the misuse of too many resources.

The United Nations is a political institution and politics requires compromise. We recognize that. But let us remember -- from those first days, one guiding star was supposed to light our path toward the U.N. vision of peace and progress -- the star of freedom.

What kind of people will we be 40 years from today? May we answer -- free people, worthy of freedom, and firm in the conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few, but the universal right of all God's children.

This is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set forth in 1948. And this is the affirming flame the United States has held high to a watching world. We champion freedom not only because it is practical and beneficial, but because it is morally right and just.

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United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63903 Tel. 654338 ext. 204
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

Free people, whose governments rest upon the consent of the governed, do not wage war on their neighbors. Free people, blessed by economic opportunity, and protected by laws that respect the dignity of the individual, are not driven toward the domination of others.

We readily acknowledge that the United States is far from perfect. Yet we have endeavored earnestly to carry out our responsibilities to the Charter these past 40 years, and we take national pride in our contributions to peace'

We take pride in 40 years of helping avert a new world war and pride in our alliances that protect and preserve us and our friends from aggression. We take pride in the Camp David agreements and our efforts for peace in the Middle East rooted in Resolutions 242 and 338; in supporting Pakistan, target of outside intimidation; in assisting El Salvador's struggle to carry forward its democratic revolution; in answering the appeal of our Caribbean friends in Grenada; in seeing Grenada's representative here today, voting the will of its own people. And we take pride in our proposals to reduce the weapons of war.

We submit this history as evidence of our sincerity of purpose. But today it is more important to speak to you about what my country proposes to do, in these closing years of the 20th Century, to bring about a safer, a more peaceful, a more civilized world.

Let us begin with candor -- with words that rest on plain and simple facts. The differences between America and the Soviet Union are deep and abiding.

The United States is a democratic nation. Here the people rule. We build no walls to keep them in, nor organize any system of police to keep them mute. We occupy no country. The only land abroad we occupy is beneath the graves where our heroes rest. What is called the West is a voluntary association of free nations, all of whom fiercely value their independence and their sovereignty. And as deeply as we cherish our beliefs, we do not seek to compel others to share them.

When we enjoy these vast freedoms as we do, it is difficult for us to understand the restrictions of dictatorships which seek to control each institution and every facet of people's lives, the expression of their beliefs, their movements, and their contacts with the outside world. It is difficult for us to understand the ideological premise that force is an acceptable way to expand a political system.

We Americans do not accept that any government has the right to command and order the lives of its people, that any nation has an historic right to use force to export its ideology. This belief -- regarding the nature of man and the limitations of government -- is at the core of our deep and abiding differences with the Soviet Union, differences that put us into natural conflict -- and competition -- with one another.

We would welcome enthusiastically a true competition of ideas, welcome a competition of economic strength and scientific and artistic creativity, and, yes, welcome a competition for the good will of the world's people. But we cannot accommodate ourselves to the use of force and subversion to consolidate and expand the reach of totalitarianism.

When Mr. Gorbachev and I meet in Geneva next month, I look to a fresh start in the relationship of our two nations. We can and should meet in the spirit that we can deal with our differences peacefully. That is what we expect.

The only way to resolve differences is to understand them. We must have candid and complete discussions of where dangers exist and where peace is being disrupted. Make no mistake* Our policy of open and vigorous competition rests on a realistic view of the world. Therefore, at Geneva, we must review the reasons for the current level of mistrust.

For example, in 1972 the international community negotiated in good faith a ban on biological and toxin weapons; in 1975 we negotiated the Helsinki Accords on human rights and freedoms; and during the decade just past, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated several agreements on strategic weapons. Yet, we feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are their violations of a number of the provisions in all of

these agreements. Indeed, this is why it is important that we have this opportunity to air our differences through face-to-face meetings -- to let frank talk substitute for anger and tension.

The United States has never sought treaties merely to paper over differences. We continue to believe that a nuclear war is one that cannot be won and must never be fought. That is why we have sought, for nearly ten years, still seek, and will discuss in Geneva radical, equitable, verifiable reductions in these vast arsenals of offensive nuclear weapons.

At the beginning of the latest round of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet Union presented a specific proposal involving numerical values. We are studying the Soviet counterproposal carefully. I believe that within their proposal there are seeds which we should nurture, and in the coming weeks we will seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

The United States is also seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union in Geneva the vital relationship between offensive and defensive systems, including the possibility of moving toward a more stable and secure world in which defenses play a growing role.

The ballistic missile is the most awesome, threatening, and destructive weapon in the history of man. Thus, I welcome the interest of the new Soviet leadership in the reduction of offensive strategic forces. Ultimately, we must remove this menace -- once and for all -- from the face of this earth.

Until that day, the United States seeks to escape the prison of mutual terror by research and testing that could, in time, enable us to neutralize the threat of these ballistic missiles and, ultimately, render them obsolete.

How is Moscow threatened -- if the capitals of other nations are protected? We do not ask that the Soviet leaders -- whose country has suffered so much from war -- leave their people defenseless against foreign attack. Why then do they insist that we remain undefended? Who is threatened if Western research and Soviet research that is itself well-advanced -- should develop a non-nuclear system which would threaten not human beings, but only ballistic missiles?

Surely, the world will sleep more secure when these missiles have been rendered useless, militarily and politically, when the sword of Damocles that has hung over our planet for too many decades is lifted by Western and Russian scientists working to shield their cities and their citizens and one day shut down space as an avenue for weapons of mass destruction.

If we are destined by history to compete, militarily, to keep the peace, then let us compete in systems that defend our societies rather than weapons which can destroy us both, and much of God's creation along with us.

Some 18 years ago, then-Premier Aleksei Kosygin was asked about a moratorium on the development of an anti-missile defense system. The official Soviet news agency, "TASS," reported he replied with these words:

"I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people...maybe an anti-missile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people but to preserve human lives."

Preserving lives. No peace is more fundamental than that. Great obstacles lie ahead, but they should not deter us. Peace is God's commandment. Peace is the holy shadow cast by men treading on the path of virtue.

But just as we all know what peace is, we certainly know what peace is not.

Peace based on repression cannot be true peace and is secure only when individuals are free to direct their own governments.

Peace based on partition cannot be true peace. Put simply, nothing can justify the continuing and permanent division of the European continent. Walls of partition and distrust must give way to greater communication for an open world. Before leaving for Geneva, I shall make major new proposals to achieve this goal.

Peace based on mutual fear cannot be true peace because staking our future on a precarious balance of terror is not good enough. The

world needs a balance of safety. Finally, a peace based on averting our eyes from trouble cannot be true peace. The consequences of conflict are every bit as tragic when the destruction is contained within one country.

Real peace is what we seek, and that is why today the United States is presenting an initiative that addresses what will be a central issue in Geneva -- the resolution of regional conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Central America.

Our own position is clear. As the oldest nation of the new world, as the first anti-colonial power, the United States rejoiced when decolonization gave birth to so many new nations after World War Two. We have always supported the right of the people of each nation to define their own destiny. We have given 300,000 million dollars since 1945 to help people of other countries. And we have tried to help friendly governments defend against aggression, subversion, and terror.

We have noted with great interest similar expressions of peaceful intent by leaders of the Soviet Union. I am not here to challenge the good faith of what they say. But isn't it important for us to weigh the record, as well?

-- In Afghanistan, there are 118,000 Soviet troops prosecuting war against the Afghan people.

-- In Cambodia, 140,000 Soviet-backed Vietnamese soldiers wage a war of occupation.

-- In Ethiopia, 1,700 Soviet advisers are involved in military planning and support operations along with 2,500 Cuban combat troops.

-- In Angola -- 1,200 Soviet military advisors involved in planning and supervising combat operations, along with 35,000 Cuban troops.

-- In Nicaragua -- some 8,000 Soviet Bloc and Cuban personnel, including about 3,500 military and secret police personnel.

All of these conflicts -- some of them underway for a decade -- originate in local disputes but they share a common characteristic. They are the consequence of an ideology imposed from without, dividing nations and creating regimes that are, almost from the day they take power, at war with their own people. And in each case, Marxism-Leninism's war with the people becomes war with their neighbors.

These wars are exacting a staggering human toll and threaten to spill across national boundaries and trigger dangerous confrontations.

Where is it more appropriate than right here at the United Nations to call attention to Article Two of our Charter which instructs members to refrain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...."?

During the past decade these wars played a large role in building suspicions and tensions in my country over the purpose of Soviet policy. This gives us an extra reason to address them seriously today.

Last year I proposed from this podium that the United States and Soviet Union hold discussions on some of these issues, and we have done so. But I believe these problems need more than talk.

For that reason, we are proposing, and are fully committed to support, a regional peace process that seeks progress on three levels.

First, we believe the starting point must be a process of negotiation among the warring parties in each country I've mentioned -- which, in the case of Afghanistan, includes the Soviet Union. The form of these talks may and should vary, but negotiations -- and an improvement of internal political conditions -- are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops and national reconciliation.

There is a second level. Once negotiations take hold and the parties directly involved are making real progress, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union should sit down together. It is not for us to impose any solutions in this separate set of talks. Such solutions would not last. But the issue we should address is how best to support the ongoing talks among the warring parties. In some cases, it might well be appropriate to consider guarantees for any agreements already reached. But in every case the primary task is to promote this goal: verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms.

Finally, if these first two steps are successful, we could move on to the third -- welcoming each country back into the world economy so its citizens can share in the dynamic growth that other developing countries -- countries that are at peace -- enjoy. Despite past differences with these regimes, the United States would respond generously to their democratic reconciliation with their own people, their respect for human rights, and their return to the family of free nations.

Of course, until such time as these negotiations result in definitive progress, America's support for struggling democratic resistance forces must not and shall not cease.

This plan is bold. And it is realistic. It is not a substitute for existing peacemaking efforts; it complements them. We are not trying to solve every conflict in every region of the globe, and we recognize that each conflict has its own character. Naturally other regional problems will require different approaches. But we believe that the recurrent pattern of conflict that we see in these five cases ought to be broken as soon as possible.

We must begin somewhere, so let us begin where there is great need and great hope. This will be a clear step forward to help people choose their future more freely. Moreover, this is an extraordinary opportunity for the Soviet side to make a contribution to regional peace which in turn can promote future dialogue and negotiations on other critical issues.

With hard work and imagination, there is no limit to what, working together, our nations can achieve. Gaining a peaceful resolution of these conflicts will open whole new vistas for peace and progress -- the discovery that the promise of the future lies not in measures of military defense, or the control of weapons, but in the expansion of individual freedom and human rights.

Only when the human spirit can worship, create, and build, only when people are given a personal stake in determining their own destiny and benefiting from their own risks do societies become prosperous, progressive, dynamic, and free.

We need only open our eyes to the economic evidence all around us. Nations that deny their people opportunity -- in Eastern Europe, Indochina, Southern Africa, and Latin America -- without exception are dropping further behind in the race for the future.

But where we see enlightened leaders who understand that economic freedom and personal incentive are key to development, we see economies striding forward. Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea -- India, Botswana, and China. These are among the current and emerging success stories because they have the courage to give economic incentives a chance.

Let us all heed the simple eloquence in Andrei Sakharov's Nobel Peace Prize message: "International trust, mutual understanding, disarmament and international security are inconceivable without an open society with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes to live."

At the core, this is an eternal truth. Freedom works. That is the promise of the open world and awaits only our collective grasp. Forty years ago, hope came alive again for a world that hungered for hope. I believe fervently that hope is still alive.

The United States has spoken with candor and conviction today, but that does not lessen these strong feelings held by every American: it's in the nature of Americans to hate war and its destructiveness. We would rather wage our struggle to rebuild and renew, not to tear down. We would rather fight against hunger, disease, and catastrophe. We would rather engage our adversaries in the battle of ideals and ideas for the future.

These principles emerge from the innate openness and good character of our people -- and from our long struggle and sacrifice for our liberties and the liberties of others. Americans always yearn for peace. They have a passion for life. They carry in their hearts a deep capacity for reconciliation.

Last year at this General Assembly, I indicated there was every reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to shorten the distance between us. In Geneva -- the first meeting between our heads of government in more than six years -- Mr. Gorbachev and I will have that opportunity.

So, yes, let us go to Geneva with both sides committed to dialogue. Let both sides go committed to a world with fewer nuclear weapons -- and some day with none. Let both sides go committed to walk together on a safer path into the 21st Century and to lay the foundation for enduring peace.

It is time, indeed, to do more than just talk of a better world.

It is time to act. And we will act when nations cease to try to impose their ways upon others. And we will act when they realize that we, for whom the achievement of freedom has come dear, will do what we must to preserve it from assault.

America is committed to the world, because so much of the world is inside America. After all, only a few miles from this very room is our Statue of Liberty, past which life began anew for millions -- where the peoples from nearly every country in this hall joined to build these United States.

The blood of each nation courses through the American vein -- and feeds the spirit that compels us to involve ourselves in the fate of this good earth. It is the same spirit that warms our heart in concern to help ease the desperate hunger that grips proud people on the African continent.

It is the internationalist spirit that came together last month when our neighbor, Mexico, was struck suddenly by an earthquake. Even as the Mexican nation move vigorously into action -- there were heartwarming offers by other nations offering to help and glimpses of people working together, without concern for national self-interest or gain.

And if there was any meaning to salvage out of that tragedy, it was found one day in a huge mound of rubble that was once the Juarez Hospital in Mexico City.

A week after that terrible event and as another day of despair unfolded -- a team of workers heard a faint sound coming somewhere from the heart of the crushed concrete and twisted steel. Hoping beyond hope, they quickly burrowed toward it.

As the late afternoon light faded, and racing against time, they found what they had heard -- and the first of the three baby girls -- newborn infants -- emerged to the safety of the rescue team.

Here is the scene through the eyes of one who was there. "Everyone was so quiet when they lowered that little baby down in a basket covered with blankets. The baby didn't make a sound, either. But the minute they put her in the Red Cross ambulance everybody just got up and cheered."

Well, amidst all that hopelessness and debris came a timely -- and timeless -- lesson for us all. We witnessed the miracle of life.

It is on this that I believe our nations can make a renewed commitment. The miracle of life is given by one greater than ourselves. but once given, each life is ours to nurture and preserve -- to foster not only for today's world but for a better one to come.

There is no purpose more noble than for us to sustain and celebrate life in a turbulent world. That is what we must do now. We have no higher duty -- no greater cause as humans. Life -- and the preservation of freedom to live it in dignity -- is what we are on this earth to do.

Everything we work to achieve must seek that end so that some day our prime ministers, our premiers, our presidents and our general secretaries will talk not of war and peace -- but only of peace.

"We've had 40 years to begin. Let us not waste one more moment to give back to the world all that we can in return for this miracle of life.

Thank you, God bless you.

(end text)

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October 24, 1985

THE WHITE HOUSE

ADDRESS BY

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

RONALD W. REAGAN

AT THE COMMEMORATION OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY

OF THE UNITED NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
OCTOBER 24, 1985

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

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For Release at 10:00 am EDT

October 24, 1985

TEXT OF THE ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AT THE COMMEMORATION OF THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

United Nations
New York, New York
October 24, 1985

Forty years ago, the world awoke daring to believe hatred's unyielding grip had finally been broken -- daring to believe the torch of peace would be protected in liberty's firm grasp.

Forty years ago, the world yearned to dream again innocent dreams, to believe in ideals with innocent trust. Dreams of trust are worthy, but in these 40 years too many dreams have been shattered, too many promises have been broken, too many lives have been lost. The painful truth is that the use of violence to take, to exercise, and to preserve power remains a persistent reality in much of the world.

The vision of the U.N. Charter -- to spare succeeding generations this scourge of war -- remains real. It still stirs our souls and warms our hearts. But it also demands of us a realism that is rockhard, clear-eyed, steady and sure -- a realism that understands the nations of the United Nations are not united.

I come before you this morning preoccupied with peace, with ensuring that the differences between some of us not be permitted to degenerate into open conflict. And I come offering for my own country a new commitment, a fresh start.

On this U.N. anniversary, we acknowledge its successes: the decisive action during the Korean War; negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; strong support for decolonization; and the laudable achievements by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Nor must we close our eyes to this organization's disappointments: its failure to deal with real security issues, the total inversion of morality in the infamous Zionism-is-racism resolution, the politicization of too many agencies, the misuse of too many resources.

The U.N. is a political institution and politics requires compromise. We recognize that. But let us remember -- from those first days, one guiding star was supposed to light our path toward the U.N. vision of peace and progress -- the star of freedom.

What kind of people will we be 40 years from today? May we answer -- free people, worthy of freedom, and firm in the conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few, but the universal right of all God's children.

This is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set forth in 1948. And this is the affirming flame the United States has held high to a watching world. We champion freedom not only because it is practical and beneficial, but because it is morally right and just.

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Free people, whose governments rest upon the consent of the governed, do not wage war on their neighbors. Free people, blessed by economic opportunity, and protected by laws that respect the dignity of the individual, are not driven toward the domination of others.

We readily acknowledge that the United States is far from perfect. Yet we have endeavored earnestly to carry out our responsibilities to the Charter these past 40 years, and we take national pride in our contributions to peace:

We take pride in 40 years of helping avert a new world war and pride in our alliances that protect and preserve us and our friends from aggression. We take pride in the Camp David agreements and our efforts for peace in the Middle East rooted in resolutions 242 and 338; in supporting Pakistan, target of outside intimidation; in assisting El Salvador's struggle to carry forward its democratic revolution; in answering the appeal of our Caribbean friends in Grenada; in seeing Grenada's representative here today, voting the will of its own people. And we take pride in our proposals to reduce the weapons of war.

We submit this history as evidence of our sincerity of purpose. But today it is more important to speak to you about what my country proposes to do, in these closing years of the 20th century, to bring about a safer, a more peaceful, a more civilized world.

Let us begin with candor -- with words that rest on plain and simple facts. The differences between America and the Soviet Union are deep and abiding.

The United States is a democratic nation. Here the people rule. We build no walls to keep them in, nor organize any system of police to keep them mute. We occupy no country. The only land abroad we occupy is beneath the graves where our heroes rest. What is called the West is a voluntary association of free nations, all of whom fiercely value their independence and their sovereignty. And as deeply as we cherish our beliefs, we do not seek to compel others to share them.

When we enjoy these vast freedoms as we do, it is difficult for us to understand the restrictions of dictatorships which seek to control each institution and every facet of people's lives, the expression of their beliefs, their movements, and their contacts with the outside world. It is difficult for us to understand the ideological premise that force is an acceptable way to expand a political system.

We Americans do not accept that any government has the right to command and order the lives of its people, that any nation has an historic right to use force to export its ideology. This belief -- regarding the nature of man and the limitations of government -- is at the core of our deep and abiding differences with the Soviet Union, differences that put us into natural conflict -- and competition -- with one another.

We would welcome enthusiastically a true competition of ideas, welcome a competition of economic strength and scientific and artistic creativity, and, yes, welcome a competition for the good will of the world's people. But we cannot accommodate ourselves to the use of force and subversion to consolidate and expand the reach of totalitarianism.

When Mr. Gorbachev and I meet in Geneva next month, I look to a fresh start in the relationship of our two nations. We can and should meet in the spirit that we can deal with our differences peacefully. That is what we expect.

The only way to resolve differences is to understand them. We must have candid and complete discussions of where dangers exist and where peace is being disrupted. Make no mistake: our policy of open and vigorous competition rests on a realistic view of the world. Therefore, at Geneva, we must review the reasons for the current level of mistrust.

For example, in 1972 the international community negotiated in good faith a ban on biological and toxin weapons; in 1975 we negotiated the Helsinki accords on human rights and freedoms; and during the decade just past, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated several agreements on strategic weapons. Yet, we feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are their violations of a number of the provisions in all of these agreements. Indeed, this is why it is important that we have this opportunity to air our differences through face-to-face meetings -- to let frank talk substitute for anger and tension.

The United States has never sought treaties merely to paper over differences. We continue to believe that a nuclear war is one that cannot be won and must never be fought. That is why we have sought, for nearly 10 years, still seek, and will discuss in Geneva radical, equitable, verifiable reductions in these vast arsenals of offensive nuclear weapons.

At the beginning of the latest round of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet Union presented a specific proposal involving numerical values. We are studying the Soviet counter-proposal carefully. I believe that within their proposal there are seeds which we should nurture, and in the coming weeks we will seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

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Surely, the world will sleep more secure when these missiles have been rendered useless, militarily and politically, when the Sword of Damocles that has hung over our planet for too many decades is lifted by Western and Russian scientists working to shield their cities and their citizens and one day shut down space as an avenue for weapons of mass destruction.

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For that reason, we are proposing, and are fully committed to support, a regional peace process that seeks progress on three levels:

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A week after that terrible event and as another day of despair unfolded -- a team of workers heard a faint sound coming somewhere from the heart of the crushed concrete and twisted steel. Hoping beyond hope, they quickly burrowed toward it.

As the late afternoon light faded, and racing against time, they found what they had heard -- and the first of three baby girls -- newborn infants -- emerged to the safety of the rescue team.

Here is the scene through the eyes of one who was there. "Everyone was so quiet when they lowered that little baby down in a basket covered with blankets. The baby didn't make a sound, either. But the minute they put her in the Red Cross ambulance everybody just got up and cheered."

Well, amidst all that hopelessness and debris came a timely -- and timeless -- lesson for us all. We witnessed the miracle of life.

It is on this that I believe our nations can make a renewed commitment. The miracle of life is given by One greater than ourselves. But once given, each life is ours to nurture and preserve -- to foster not only for today's world but for a better one to come.

There is no purpose more noble than for us to sustain and celebrate life in a turbulent world. That is what we must do now. We have no higher duty -- no greater cause as humans. Life -- and the preservation of freedom to live it in dignity -- is what we are on this Earth to do.

Everything we work to achieve must seek that end so that some day our prime ministers, our premiers, our presidents and our general secretaries will talk not of war and peace -- but only of peace.

We've had 40 years to begin. Let us not waste one more moment to give back to the world all that we can in return for this miracle of life.

Thank you.

† † †

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אליהו (ד"ר רחל)

שם _____

סוג כחונני שמור _____

רחיפות רגיל _____

תאריך 23 באוקטובר 85 _____

סימוכין 70/9111 _____

2.7.85

מאת: ג.צ. ורשינגטון - מו"ס - אייל בנאי

440

הש"ב"ט / דו"ע רוח"מ לעינדני טרור מר'ג בוחנימל

סיב"ט / ר' סיב"ט

סיב"ט / מוסי אלון

מפא"ח / מיט"ל

מפא"ח / אל"מ (מיל) שכנר

הנרון: אפשרות לשח"ם בנושא אכטחה

1. בתקופה האחרונה מתנהל חתילהו של מאמץ רכש ע"י ממשלת ארה"ב, שמטרתו הגברת האכטחה על מתקני ממשל שונים. המדובר על רכש בסדר גודל כולל של כארבעה בליון דולר הכוללים:

1.א. מתקני הכורים הגרעיניים - משרד האנרגיה

1.ב. שגרירויות רחרי העילי - משרד החוץ

1.ג. מתקני צנאים שונים - משרד ההגנה

אשרי"ל בית הסוף - אשד הגני

2. במסגרת מאמץ זה, פורסמו כבר מספר RFQ כ CBI והוכנו קבוצות עבודה במסגרות השונות לבחינת ציור, תורות וטכניקות שונות.

3. בפנטגון ישנה קבוצה הדנה ביטום תורות אלו לגבי ה ARMY. מדובר בעיקר באכטחת מפקדות, שיירות, מחסני נשק וסדות תעופה. זו יוניט הללו כשלבים ראשוניים.

4. נוצר קשר ביננו לבין נציג מצוות עבודה זה, Maj. Hefzy. העלנו בפניו אפשרות שישראל תוכל לתשתף בעיצוב ולימוד התורות השונות.

5. מניגור הפטי, כסט הצוות, הביע שכיעות רצונם מאפשרות זו.

6. לאור האמור לעיל, נראה כי ישנה אפשרות ליצור קשרים עם האנשים שיכתבו את הדרישות לקניות בעתיד.

7. לדעתנו, כדאי להמנע מלמסור מידע על מוצרים ספציפיים (כפי שנשלח לנו בעבר, לבקשתנו, כמחסום נגד רכב מתפרץ), אלא לפנות במסגרת כללית יותר ליצירת קשר כללי עם החוות, ומאוחר יותר לרדת למוצרים ספציפיים.

8. המלאתינו, לארגן משהו בעל ידע נחתום זה שיפגש עם נציגי הגופים המוזכרים, הווה אומר הפנטגון. משרד הסדינה והאנרגיה בכדי להתחיל במגעים.

9. אם האשרו בחיוב, נחחיל לפעול בהקדם בכדי לארגן הפגישות.

איל בנאי

ע. נסמח מו"ס לתעשיות

תחילתו:	מחלקת העשר ניו-יורק	תאריך:
מספר כספוני:	עופס : מברק	מספר:
ת"ח:	הסכרה ספ"ח. לש' סטנצ"ל, יוקץ רוח"ם לתקשורת. סנס"א. סטנצ"ל אסיה"ר. לפ"ס.	א ל :
נר :	רושילנסקי.	ר ע :
0790 012 - 011		תאריך:

PRESS SUMMARY OCTOBER 23, 1985

EDITORIALS

ND - "Arms and Mideast Peace Talks" - The apparent progress in the search for peace in the Middle East, showed at the UN General Assembly by Hussein and Peres may be a mirage. Jordan and Syria have signed an agreement to reject any unilateral settlement with Israel and have conjured up a ghost - the 1982 Fez plan, which could only be implemented after a war. Under these circumstances, it hardly makes sense for the Administration to press on an unwilling Congress the proposed arms to Jordan. The Administration used to argue that Jordan need the arms to protect itself against Syria. Now that Jordan is moving toward Syria, the arms sale should be put back on the shelf until it's clear who's for genuine peace and who isn't.

DN - " 'I Will Go To Amman': A Dramatic Bid For Peace" - Peres took a strong incremental step. It was daring and constructive. His offer took political courage. For Hussein to invite Peres, or to meet him on neutral turf, would require even greater courage. But perhaps it's just the moment, with the PLO dramatically unmasked. Hussein will learn what Israel is prepared to offer only if there are talks. Israel's unwillingness to talk with the PLO is hard to quarrel with.

DN - "Fear Can't Beat Terror"- Why did the Italian government conspire to spirit Abbas to Yugoslavia? In the 1970s it negotiated a deal with Arafat, whereby the PLO would not supply arms to Italian terrorists and would not carry out terror operations in Italy, while Rome granted the PLO support and free movement in Italy. This amounts to fighting terror with appeasement. It's morally wrong. Defeating terrorism demands an international common effort. Italy might try to compensate for its actions during the Achille Lauro affair by scrapping its pact with Arafat.

COLUMNS

DN - Lars Erik Nelson - "From Peres, A New Vision, A Chance For Peace" - In 1948 Golda Meir had secret talks with Abdulla, King of Jordan. Peres, in a remarkable moving speech, proposed going to Amman again, this time openly. Hussein has correctly feared a fate similar to that of his grandfather, should he join peace talks with Israel. Peres went further

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the word "פירוש" (interpretation) and other illegible scribbles.

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than any of his predecessors in recognizing that the Palestinians are a people. This is remarkable on two accounts - first, in comparison to Begin who was only capable of seeing them as reincarnations of past devils. Second, because Peres has put the PLO and its Arab backers on the spot. Peres is offering them an alternative to their years of murder and hijacking. It also put the Soviet Union on the spot. If it wants a role in the Middle East - as it so piously proclaims - let it renew diplomatic ties with Israel. JUST when you think that the UN is worthless glass house full of paper and hot air, a Shimon Peres reminds you that it can be a forum for peace.

WSJ - Courter - "Why Abbas Chose Yugoslavia" - It will be a long time before Muhammad Abbas sees the inside of any courtroom. He will more likely be feted than extradited from the countries of his choosing. Yugoslavia is among the worst offenders. The many Palestinian terrorists come to Yugoslavia because the Yugoslavs approve of them. On Sept. 6, 1976, the Yugoslavs gave "Carlos" sanctuary when he was wanted by the West Germans. Yugoslav ties with the PLO are nothing new. In 1978 the Yugoslavs were reported to have built several training camps for the Palestinians near their border. It also accepted evacuated PLO terrorists in 1982. Quiet 'non-aligned' Yugoslavia has encouraged, armed and directly assisted the PLO for many years, and done it as a matter of declared state policy. Mr. Abbas seems to understand that. So should we.

PRESS REPORTS

The Peres Proposals for Peace

NYT - p. 1 - Gwertzman - The Reagan Administration said today that the peace proposals outlined by Peres were "statesmanlike, thoughtful and forward looking". In particular, the Administration focused on the seeming willingness of Peres to take into account Hussein's insistence on the umbrella of international conference. UNTil recently, the Israelis had rejected the idea of such a conference, because they did not want the Soviet Union to participate. Peres seemed much more conciliatory. Peres said on the NBC 'Today' Show that he does not believe anything will happen before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. The President and Secretary Schultz seemed optimistic that some progress might occur 'in the next few days'. Officials said that any optimism was based on the public and private

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utterances of Peres and Hussein, and not on a breakthrough.

WSJ- p.1 - Jordan's ambassador to Britain said that the Peres plan was not acceptable because it excluded the PLO. Right wing members of Israel's government said the Peres speech endangered the future of the coalition. The US welcomed the proposals but didn't endorse the plan.

NYT - Miller (Amman)- Jordanian officials said they were still studying the Peres speech. Newspaper reports quoted a Jordanian official who rejected the proposals but Western and Arab diplomats questioned the credibility of these reports. Jordanian officials and Western diplomats seemed much more interested in the Jordanian-Syrian talks. Jordan has grown impatient with Arafat's waffling on his commitment, diplomats said. A well informed Arab diplomat said that the healing of the rift with Syria signaled further pressure on Arafat and would enhance tension between Jordan and the PLO. He said that there was speculation that under certain conditions, Jordan would be willing to enter peace talks with Syria and the dissident PLO members supported by Syria.

NYT - Friedman - Peres' proposals were criticized by his rivals in the Cabinet, but it appeared that there was no immediate threat to the coalition. Analysts said that if there will be a favorable response from Hussein, the coalition might be threatened. (See ND)

Bombing in Tunis Criticized by US

NYT - Schumacher (Tunis) - Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead criticized the Israeli bombing of PLO bases in Tunis in what appeared to be the harshest US criticism to date. "We deplore it as we deplore all acts of terrorism," he said. 12 Tunisians and 60 Palestinians were killed. According to participants of the meeting, Bourguiba was the friendliest and the testiest was Prime Minister Mzali, Bourguiba's designated successor. Mzali is also an intellectual Arabist known to be predisposed toward moving Tunisia closer to the rest of the Arab world. Officials declined to say whether they would allow Abbas to return to his home though some officials suggested that Abbas was denied entry into Tunisia. The US did not pressure Tunisia to evict the PLO headquarters from Tunis. (see NYP; ND & DN-AP)

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Jordan Arms Sale

DN-AP-73 Republican and Democratic senators introduced legislation that would bar the sale of US arms to Jordan until the opening of peace talks between Jordan and Israel. Passage of such legislation would be an embarrassing defeat for Reagan. Defeat seems likely.

Ex-Hostages Tell House of Hijacking

NYT-Orekes-With two former hostages of the Achille Lauro seated at the witness table, members of Congress argued over whether the US could force foreign cruise lines to tighten security. The former hostages testified that before the ship was seized they had seen no evidence of security precautions. Their bags were never searched or examined. In Egypt, merchants selling jewelry and other wares were allowed on board. The captain of the ship offered the hijackers his life in exchange for the freedom of the ship. (see NYP)

Top Christian Militia Chief Talks With Syrians

NYT-special-Lebanon's top militia chief held talks in Damascus to complete a draft agreement reached by his representatives with Moslem groups for ending Lebanon's 10-year-old civil war. Hobeika met with Syria's First Vice President and was to meet with Assad. As discussions got underway there was fighting between militia groups across the Green Line.

Blocs At UN

NYT-Fein-The centerpiece of the brokering that goes on in the UN is the division of the 159 UN members into blocs. Some observers say that this bloc power is eroding and that the concept of guaranteed voting is ill-founded. The US and Israel are the only nations in the UN that are not members of a bloc or group, but that hardly excludes them from the impact of bloc actions or decisions. Both countries have said that they are victims of bloc voting. But the trend, some say, is toward individual voting. The recent test of Israel's credentials seems to bear this out. "The bloc system has reached its saturation point" said Amb. Netanyahu.

רחימה:

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק

סדרג כסחונכי:

טופס מברק

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גר :

790 / פיו

5 VIPs Meet in Same Room at UN

NYP-Five top targets of global terror will gather in the UN today creating a security nightmare. Reagan, Thatcher, Peres, Ortega and Ghandi will gather at a luncheon for heads of state.

Soviet Jewry

NYP-John Cardinal O'Connor said he hopes to urge Reagan to raise the issue of Jewish emigration at the US-Soviet summit in Geneva. He said he would raise the issue privately and not embarrass the President. "I have a major committment to the Jewish community to raise this issue whenever it is appropriate," O'Connor said.

NYT-Full page paid ad by the Coalition to Free Soviet Jews. Headline is a quote by Gorbachev stating: "I would be glad to hear Jews enjoying anywhere such political and other rights as they have in our country." The coalition wonders of Gorbechev honestly believes people will believe him. Gorbechev should drop the act because he is a neo-Stalinist and has done nothing for the Jews since he came to power. He has gall because Jews are not entitled to the most fundamental freedoms.

Peres Goes Dancing

NYP-gossip-Peres danced the night away at a benefit thrown by the Council for a Beautiful Israel at Regine's.

Letters

DN-Writer says that once again an innocent person is murdered by those PLO animals. He doesn't know why people condemn Israel for striking back at terrorists.

ITONUT

על 7215 עם הטבלה: 23.10.85

אל: ניל-יאיר

דפוס _____ דת _____ סתוד _____

סינוג בנסיון _____

דרישות _____

תאריך זמן לשינוי _____

מס. טברק _____

מס' ת"ק _____

מס' קצ"מ _____

238-1115

זכריאל לבו

דז: א.בן-נתן בבמ"ר להנה.

לאז איה אסי גלה לני אה גמוו זאמן זכרז
 ע'בון פזעלה גור כ בקיה- זמ להנה כדי זלמסו
 גמ דמל זמלג. א- ע'בון נתן זמלמ באמזל-
 זאפה וזפה בנאום או במלנו-טלי 8887000
 זכז 4903. במדה זמ נתן במלמ כני, אזרה אה
 זמנאו ארמ אילי.

כריאה

א.בן-נתן

העובד: א. כריאה

וד כנרס המילקיה: ב/אגל

תאריך זמן חיבור (ימולא עיי השולח)

משרד החוץ

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ד... 2... מחור... 3... דטים

סוג בסחוני.....

דחיות.....

תאריך וז"ח.....

611 מס' פנק.....

לנכון להביא החלטה זו להצבעה). בושיץ טען שזכויות הסנט תורחבנה ע"י הארכת תקופת
 ה- NOTIFICATION, הואיל ולמעשה נבצר מהנשיא מלקדם את עיסקת הנשק, אלא אם
 חתקימנה שיחות שלום רציניות. לעומתם הביע הסנטור דוד חששות חמורים שבנסיבות מסוימות,
 מן הסתם לקראת סוף פברואר הבא, תוגש החלטת אי-ההסכמה, אך לא יוקצב לה זמן להצבעה,
 כך שכל המעולה שנעשתה עד כה תרד לטמיון. הציע איפוא תיקון שיקנה נוהלי הזירו לטיפול
 בנושא מכירת הנשק. לוגאר ציין שסוכם עם כל הגורמים שלא יתקבלו תיקונים ושהנשיא עלול
 לא לחתום על החוק עם הנוסח ישונה. על אף " ASSURANCE " מדול שלא יחסום הצבעה
 על החלטת אי-ההסכמה אם תבוקט, דוד נשאר בשלו והצביע נגד הצעת ההחלטה.
 6. נשלח את הרישום המלא של הדיון בדיפ' לכשנקבל את הרקורד.

Handwritten notes: 3/11, 20/11

למדן

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PRIOR TO MARCH 1 1986, NO LETTER OF OFFER SHALL BE VALID WITH RESPECT TO ANY OF THE PROPOSED SALES TO JORDAN OF ADVANCED WEAPON SYSTEMS INCLUDING ADVANCED AIRCRAFT AND ADVANCED AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEMS, THAT ARE DESCRIBED IN THE NOTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT, SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS ON OCT. 21, 1985, UNLESS DIRECT AND MEANINGFUL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN ARE UNDERWAY.

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דף.....מחור.....דפים	2
סוג בסחוני	2
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מס' ספר	

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אלו

229 / 580

רודי בוטניץ אמט, ושנטל חלק מוביל בכל ההתפתחויות במשך היום.

6. עוזר בכיר בוועדה החוץ ספר שנמסר לחברים כי ישראל לא תחנכו לדחייה. הערתי שלמיטב ידיעתי איש בסגירות לא נשאל בנושא ולא נידב דעה.

ישראל
קטור לקונגרס

577

ס ר ט ס ס ר כ
 דף.....מחוך.....דטים
 סמוך
 סווג בסחובי
 רגיל
 דחיסות.....
 אוקי 23 1630
 תאריך וז"ח
 מס' פנק

אל: מצפ"א. מנכ"ל אוצר.

קונגרס: סיוע חוץ - חוק ההקצבה

1. בית הנבחרים

כזכור יו"ר תת-הועדה לפעולות זרות, המורשה דור אוביי, הכניס להצעת חוק ההקצבה מספר יטודות
 שלועת יו"ר ועדת החוץ, דנטה פאסטל, שייכים לתחום שיפוטת של ועדת החוץ(שהיא הועדה המאשרת).
 הסניים טרם הגיעו לעמק השווה וכתוצאה מכך הצעת החוק עדיין תקועת אצל אוביי ולא זזה.
 לדברי עוזרו של אוביי, הם עדיין מקווים להעביר חוק עד ה-15 בנובמבר, ואולם ככל הנראה
 גוברים הסיכויים שבסופו של דבר תתקבל החלטת המשך (CR).

2. סנט

נוכח הסתבכות העניינים בבית הנבחרים, החליט יו"ר תת הועדה לפעולות זרות בוועדת ההקצבות
 בסנט, בוב קסטן, לנסות מצדו לקדם את החוק. זימן איפוא MARK-UP בתת הוועדה ביום ג'
 הקרוב (29) ובמליאת הוועדה ביום ה' (31).

317
 למדו

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אלו

המסרד

574
 תאריך וזמן 23 אוקטובר 1960
 מחלקת מידע
 סוג מסמך
 מס' מסמך
 מס' מסמך

אל: ממנכ"ל

וייטהד בחוניס
שלך 812.

א. החקשרתי לארני רפאל והבעתי פליאה ותרעומת בעניין ההצהרות המיוחסות לוייטהד, שאותו
 כשלעצמו אנו מכבדים. אמר כי היו במגעים תכופים עם וייטהד ושגתוניס בעניין זה, והדובר הונחה
 להשתמש בנוסח של הודעות קודמות. אמרתי כי אין בכך חשובה מספקת, שכן ההתבטאויות של
 וייטהד מעמידות את פעולתנו בקטגוריית טרור, והניסוחים שהיו בחלקים משונים בין פעולתנו
 לבין פעולות הטרור ע"י הבעת צער על שני הדברים. אמר כי בתשובה לשאלה הונחה הדובר לחזור
 גם על התבטאות שולץ בעניין הגנה עצמית לגיטימית, הוסיף אישית (לא לייחוס) כי הצעת למדי
 מהדברים, ורמז שהוכנו ע"י השגריר בחוניס.
 (להקצא אגנים)

ב. אגב, רפאל שיבח כאחרים בממשל את נאום רה"מ באו"ם, והוסיף כי מוקדם מדי להעריך אם יעלה
 משהו מן הנסיון להביא את ירדן לשולחן (קרי - לשאלה אם ניתן להביאה בלי אש"פ, שהיא שאלת
 המסחך אולי). אנו מבינים שמרפי עוסק עתה בנסיונות בנושאים אלה.

רובינסטין

מה 2
 מה 3
 מה 3
 מה 1
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 מה 4

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל, משרד

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ס ו ס ס

דף... מתוך... דפים

סוג בטחוני... שמור

דחופות... כחול - להזעיק

תאריך וז"ח... 17.9.74

מס' מברק...

עם הוד טביק

אל: סוהר פרי/תמ"ס - טל. בכית: 431182-2
דע: דורו/משרד, דברת/אוצר, רוזנטל/כ"י

כרגע זה כוטל האמברגו על הסדינים מאחר ולטבוכתו הרבה של משרד המסחר הסתבר שטעור בטטטיסטיקה וכי מאז ה"קריאה" שדוקו כ-550,000 ולא 780,000, כלומר, טרם עברנו את הכמות השנתית (660,000) שלפני ה"קריאה". הם מחכים לפגישה אתנו בשבוע הבא וטסכמים כמובן שכדבר ראשון ננסה לפתור את בעיית הסדינים שכן האירס כאמברגו עדיין קיים.

הלפרין

5 1 3 2 2 1
גלס אמת אולר גלאפטיס רהג ס מה גלא גלא
גלס אמת אולר גלאפטיס רהג ס מה גלא גלא
גלס אמת אולר גלאפטיס רהג ס מה גלא גלא

ס ו ק ס
 דף... מתוך... דפים
 סוג בטחוני
 מידע
 דחיות
 אוקי 23 1530
 תאריך וז"ח
 מס' מברק

מצפ"א. מח"ד.

משיחה עם ג'ורג' האריס (מדהי"ת / 10/11)

1. האירועים בזירה המזהייתית *OVERTAKEN* ע"י הצהרות והופעות רוה"מ כאן. ממה שידוע לו המזכיר יצר קשר עם המלך (וגורמים אחרים עם מוראכי) כדי לעמוד על הלך הרוחות בצד הירדני.
2. האריס בדעה שהמלך לא ימהר להחליט והוא ניצב בפני דילמה אמיחית. מעשה "אקילה לאורו" והקשר שלו לערפאת מזה, וביקור ^{12/2} אנשי אש"פ בלונדון מזה, העלו רוגזו (האריס בדעה שגם מוראכי שותף לכעס זה). מאידך, המלך הבהיר וכאן נוטים לקבל זאת כאקסיומה שלא יוכל ללא אש"פ. המרווח הקטן שנותר עפ"י האריס הוא "האם אש"פ ופלטטינים חד הם". המלך נתון בפני מספר אילוצים - (א) מחוייב אישית לקידום השלום. (ב) משמעות המדיניות הישראלית הנוכחית. ג. מרווח הזמן ההולך ומצטמצם גם על פי הגדרתו ("סוף השנה") וגם עפ"י המפה הפוליטית בישראל.
3. האריס מתקשה לצאת בתחזית פוליטית אולם נראה לו שבכל מקרה המשחק הפוליטי המרכזי בחקופה הבאה יהיה סביב נושא הועידה הבינ"ל. (א) משמעות העמדה הישראלית. (ב) פסגת ריגאן-גורבצ'וב. יחכן וזה יהיה המפתח ל"פתרון התשבץ".
4. באש"פ העניינים נראים אף יותר מטובכים. האמריקאים ליקטו שמועה שבריה"מ הפעילה לחצים על אש"פ להמנע מלחתום על המסמך בלונדון חמורת מאמץ לעשיית "שירותים טובים" עבור ~~המשק~~ המשק. הדגיש שהמדובר בשמנעה ותו לא, מעניינת כשלעצמה. הטברו הוא שבריה"מ עשתה זאת במסגרת התנגדותה למחלף מדיני ירדני-אש"פי השואב השראתו מארה"ב. הדבר קשור (א) בהתנגדותה להסכם עמאן. (ב) עליה לקחת בחשבון את הגורם הסורי. הדבר לא מתרץ את *השאלה* נדוע "מילתם לא וח'ורי כן".
5. צומת מרכזי אחר הוא המפגש הסורי-ירדני. האריס מציע לראות זאת על הרקע הכללי של הסאמץ הירדני ליצור אוירת חיובית עם דמשק, שהחל במינויו של זיד אלרפעאי כרה"מ ירדן ולא דווקא בקטע הנוכחי של האירועים, אם כי כמובן הם משמשים תמריץ לכך. אסור גם לשכוח את ה- *DRIVE* הסעודי העומד מאחורי המפגש. לדעתו לשני הצדדים יש עניין בכך כשם שנשאר חשדנים כפי שהיו. חוסיין ואסר, כל אחד עפ"י טעמו השונה, רואים בכך הפעלת לחץ על ערפאת. שניהם רוצים לחיות מדווחים האחד על השני; הסורים על התהליך המדיני, הירדנים מה חושבים עליהם בדמשק. האריס מעריך שגם אם הנושא יתפתח אין הוא תוצה הכנסת תוכן מדיני ליחסים. הוא מזכיר שגם בשיא הידידות לפני כ-10 שנים כשהוקמו ועדות עליונות (הפורומים של אסד-חוסיין ורה"מ)

2 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 4 4 3+1 4

ס ו ס ס נ ר כ
 דף... 2... מתוך... 2... דפים
 סוג בסחונני.....
 תחיות.....
 תאריך וז"ח.....
 מס' מבוק.....

הם עסקו בנושאים טכניים-כלכליים בעיקרם וגם מזה הרבה לא נותר. מכל מקום האריס מציין בהיעדר מידע שחייבים להשאיר מקום להפתעות יוחר בצידו של הוסיין מאשר בזה של אסד.

6. תאריס, שחזר לפני זמן מביקור במצרים ותוניסיה, בדעה שמובראכי שולט בעניינים ושהמסבר הנוכחי הכפול - מצרים-ארה"ב ומצרים פנים, עבר את שיאו ומובראכי שולט במידה זו או אחרת במצב. בתוניסיה (היה שם בעת הפצת חיה"א), הרוגז היה בעיקר בשל הפגישה באזרחים תוניסאים שהיו בבנין, מזאלי עדין בעמדת זינוק טובה אך מתברר שאשתו של בארגיבה שאינה בידידות עמו מנסה לחבל במאמציו. הנחתה שאם יבחר, יבולע לה.

אלי אבידן

L.k.

ס ר ט ס כ ר ת

דף... 2... מתוך... 2... דפים

סווג בטחוני

דחיות

תאריך וז"ח

556... מס' מברק

ע"מ לתרחיק הסיכונים, אף כי בטיסית

רחוק יותר מבחינה פוליטית לעבר הפלסטינים קולג' פחות נלהב מאשי"פ/ערפאת מכפי שאחיו המלך. אין כמובן להפריז בשוני שבין האחים שכן חסן מקפיד ללכת בנתיב שהחווה חוסיין.

4. ג'וריידיני מתקשה להעריך השפעת הארועים האחרונים ובעיקר מדיניות הפתיחות של ישראל (נאום רה"מ באו"ם) על המלך. יש לזכור הדגיש ששני שותפיו, ערפאת מזה ומובראכי מזה "הוכו" לאחרונה והוא חייב לקחת פסק זמן (observance) מסויים כדי לראות מה קורה במישורים - המצרי-אמריקאי, אשי"פ ותהליך המדיני, משמעות הצהרות רה"מ ישראל ופסגת ריגאן-גורבצ'וב (הועידה הכינלאומית), טרם שיעשה הערכת מצב ויסיק מסקנות מצידו. בינתיים הוא ישקוד על צמצום הסיכונים, יצירת דיאלוג עם דמשק צעד מוחשי לכך.

5. באשר לתהליך המדיני, חוסיין עפ"י ג'וריידיני אינו מדבר במונחים של הסדר סופי אלא הכשרה הקרקע לתחילת תהליך מדיני. למיטב ידיעתו, ההתקשות של חוסיין על קיום "חטות בינ"לי" נועדה בין שאר הדברים שכולם מונים הוא להכניס טריז בין סוריה ובריה"מ. הזמנת הסובייטים, להשתתף בפורום הני"ל, אם וכאשר, תעמיד במבחן את יחסי מוסקבה-דמשק. לירדנים ברור, כך נאמר, שהסורים בנסיבות הנוכחיות - קיום הסכם עמאן והשתתפותו של אשי"פ/ערפאת בתהליך יסרבו ליטול חלק בפורום כזה. בריה"מ אמנם תעמוד בפני דילמה אך גם בפני סיכון של החמצת הזדמנויות גמורות במידה ותקבל הכתיב חירי. וניתן כמובן להתווכח עם ארגמונט ירדני זה אך הוא מעניין כשל עצמו א.א.)

6. באשר לעמדה הערבית כלפי מהלך ירדני-פלסטיני, ג'וריידיני טוען שתמיכת עיראק בירדן ובפלסטינאים מובטחת. צדאם חוסיין מעוניין אך ורק בדבר אחד - סיום המלחמה במפרץ. לשם כך נחוצה לו תמונה מדינית וצבאית של ארה"ב, והתייצבות כלל ערבית לצידו. זאת ניתן להשיג ע"י החלפת עוצמת הטכסון הישראלי-ערבי. מבחינה אסטרטגית צדאם חוסיין עם כל הישגיו מול איראן - הקשיים הסוקדים את ייצוא הנפט האיראני בשל הפגיעות בחארג', אסטרטגית מוצא אצמו נחות מול איראן, בשל שני גורמים (א) המפתח לסיום המלחמה נמצא בטהראן ולא בבגדאד. חומייני יכול להכריז על סיום המלחמה לחדשה לאחר חודש או כל דבר אחר שיעלה על דעתו. (ב) תוצאות המלחמה בעיקר בתחום האנושי - אבדות מורגשות יותר בצד העיראקי מאשר האיראני. כך או כך כל דבר שיטנה מאזן זה יהיה כשר בעיניו.

7. ג'וריידיני חזר והדגיש שחוסיין לא יחפו בצעריו או בהסקת מסקנות כלפי ערפאת. חשוב לדעת כיצד ינהגו השחקנים האחרים. מנסיונו הוא נוכח לדעת שע"מ לחוש מה קורה בצד הירדני חייבים להמצא בעמאן ובקרבת המלך עצמו. נדברנו לשמור על קשר.

7. באשר לעתיד, וע"מ שניתן יהיה להתייחס לדבריו בפרופורציה נכונה, חיוני שיהיה ברשותנו כאן, כל מידע רלוונטי שיש בידיד הגורמים בארץ המכירים אותו. אנא.

אלי אבידן

אלי אבידן

2 2 2 2 2
 דף.....מס'.....דפים
בסכומי
דמי
מס' וז"ח
מס'

555
 436
 221

מגזרות ישראל - וועינגטון

11
 15
 -41

אלו

74 Senators Back Jordan Arms Ban

WASH. POST-Goshko-74 Senators introduced a resolution yesterday to block the Reagan administration from selling advanced weapons worth up to \$1.9 billion to Jordan. But, despite warnings from Republican congressional leaders that the sale faces overwhelming opposition, Reagan told them the sale is "essential to create the conditions for a lasting Middle East peace." Shultz urged the Republican members to block an immediate vote on the resolution because he was hopeful that there might be positive developments in the Mideast peace process during the next few days.

US Envoy, In Tunis Deplores Raid

**WASH. POST-(Wires)-Reagan's special envoy said today that the US deplores the Israeli air raid on the headquarters of the PLO outside Tunis as it does "all acts of terrorism." Whitehead, ending a diplomatic fence-mending tour of the area after the Israeli raid and the Achille Lauro ship hijacking, said in a statement "The bombing surprised and shocked Americans as much as it did Tunisians. We deplore it, as we deplore all acts of terrorism wherever they may occur."

Lebanese Parliament

WASH. POST-(Wires)-Lebanon's parliament met for the first time in two months as gunmen battled with machine guns and mortars nearby and Syria held talks on a new plan to end 10 years of civil strife. Fifty-seven deputies reelected Hussein Hussein, a Shiite Moslem, as parliament speaker for a year.

817115

נושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8324

** 0100

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מל: המשרד, נר: 580, מ: 1015
דח: ב, ג, ד, ט, פ, ק, ר, ש, ז, ח, טו, 1800

סודי / נהול לבוקר

מל: ממנכ"ל

דע: נוביק ניו יורק (נר 229), בן אהרון
מאת: יוסף למדן / וושינגטון

סנס: - מכירות נשק לירדן

ערכון (נכון לשעה 1800 שעות מקומי) לשלנו 553 למשרד ו-220
לניו יורק

1) כרגע הכוונה היא להעביר מחר (24/10) החלטה מאוחדת שעומדת
בפני עצמה FREE STANDING JOINT RESOLUTION שתפסול כל
"מכתב הצעה" LETTER OF OFFER למכירת נשק לירדן שיוציא
הנשיא עד ה-3.1.1986. אלא אם עד אז ינהלו ירדן וישראל משא
ומתן ישיר ומשמעותי.

2) לדברי עורכי בועדת החוץ, כל המובילים יי הנוגעים בדבר
(חברי ועדת החוץ ויו"מי החלטה אי ההסכמה מחוץ לוועדה - שהם
המנצחים קנדי, היינץ, קסטן ואינווייטה) מסכימים להמליץ על
הצעת החלטה תוגש ע"י מנהיגי הרוב והמיעוט בסנס גדול ובידור
יחד עם יו"ר ועדת החוץ לזגר ובכיר המעוט בוועדה פל.

3) הנשיא והמזכיר הודיעו ללוגאר שיסלימו עם המהלך
"ACQUIESCE IN IT"

4) להלן בקצור נמרץ השתלשלות העניינים במשך היום מאז חבזר
מבוקנו שנס שנס'מוכין:-

א. בישיבה הכלת פורמלית של וועדת החוץ הבוקר סוכס שהיו"ר
יכתוב מכתב לנשיא ויודיע לו שלועת כל חברי הוועדה עתוי הבקשה
לעסקה אינו יאה INAPPROPRIATE ושל הערככם דבר לא יופסד

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

באם המפול בבקשה יידחה ב-120 יום, נקבעה ישיבה בלתי פורמלית לתחילת השבוע הבא לשם המשך המפול בנושא.

ב. לאחר מכן, חברי המטה הממונה למכירה (מחוץ לוועדת החוץ) איימו בהנאת ההחלטה של אי-הסכמה להצבעה כבר מחר (24). נוכח התפתחות זו ולאור התמיכה הגוברת בדחיית המפול בבקשת הממשל למכירה, נפגשו אחיצי הסנטורים לוגר, בושיץ, הלמס, מצנבאום וספקטר עם מנהגי הרוב דול, שסמך את ידו על הצעת ההחלטה המתוארת בסעיף ו דלטייל ואף הקציב פרק זמן של שעה עמימה לדיון בהצעת החלטה בלוח הימנים של מליאת הסנט מחר (5) יש לציין שרעיון הדחייה של 120 יום, מקודם כנראה אצל הסנטור מצנבאום שהעלה אותו בפני רודי בושיץ אמש, ושנמל חלק מוביל בכל ההתפתחות במשך היום.

6 עויר בביר בוועדת החוץ ספר שנמסר לחברים כי ישראל לא תתנגד לדחייה הערת שלמיסב ידיעתי איש בשגרירות לא נשא בנושא ולא נידב דעה.
יוסף למדן
קשור לקונגרס

99: שהח, דהמ, שהבס, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, ממד, מצפא

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מל: המשרד, נד: 579, מ: 111
דד: ד. סג: ס. תת: 23105, זת: 0270

סודי / דלי

מל: - אידופה ו. מצפיה

דע: - א. פריס

מאת: האגודה / ווינגטון

פנה אלי אתמול שגריר צרפת DE MARGERIE וביקש לפגוש אותי על
מנת לשמוע פרטים על הצעת רוח'ים' בנאום באו'ים. נתבקש לדווח על
כך לשר החוץ דומאס הנמצא בניו-יורק.

נפגשתי עם שגריר צרפת בניו-יורק לשיחה שארכה כשלושת רבעי שעה.
הוא הביע התעניינות משמעותית בדברי רוח'ים. הם מסיקים מנאום
רוח'ים שישראל לא תתנגד לנוכחות סובייטית וסינ'ית אם יקמו
יחסים דיפלומטיים איתנו. לדעת צרפת ספק אם המלך חוסיין יסכים
לנהל מו'ים איתנו ללא אש'ף. דה-מרג'רי ציין שבאש'ף יש פלגים
שונים ועדפת מייצג את המתונים שבהם. הסברתי לו עמדתנו
בנושא אש'ף וכן הדגשתי העובדה שאותה עת ממש שמוברק וחוס'ין
היו בווינגטון תוך נסיון לשכנע את אדה'ב על מתינות אש'ף -
בוצע הדצח בלדקה כמו כן התייחסתי לפרשת המשלחת
הירדנית-אש'ף בלונדון. לדעתו עשו'יה ירדן לחדש את היוזמה
בלונדון ברמן הקרוב.
הסברתי לשגריר צרפת שלעמנו הדרך היחידה היא מו'ים ישיר אם כי
אנו מסיימים לפתיחה שבסיסית של המו'ים על ידי פורום בינלאומי
כלישה.

מחלקת הקשר - 14764

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מפ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, מוניל, טמנכר, ר/מרכי, דם, אמן, פמד, ענוג,
מידא, טצפא

מחלקת הקשר 14764

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7617

יציא

סמור

אלו ווט, נ"י, נר: חנוס 1840, ס: המשרד
דחי ב, סג: ט, תאי 231085, וח: 1900

נהול/סמור

הלפד'ן

דע: רוונסל, לשכת רוה'מ'

טקסטילים

1. שר התמיס החליט להרכיב מיידית משלחת למו'מ' הטקסטילים
שמצא כנראה בשבוע הבא.

2. הדבר מבוסס על ההבנה שהנושא הראשון יהיה פתרון הבעיות
הפיידיות שנוצרו ל'כיתג'.

זוהר פרי

מפ: שהח, רהמ, סנכל, סמנכל, מצפא, סמס, אוצר, דברת, דרורי,
לכליתג', מספס, מנכלמשפט'ס

א"י נ"י, ווט, נרו חווס 1827, מ: המשרד
רחו מ, סגו ט, תאו 231085, רהו 1430

סייד/שמו

א"י/קונכ"ל

דע: רובינשטיין, קונכ"ל, נעיס:מנ"י.
דברי רה"מ' בענין הצלח יהודי אפיופיה מסודאן.
1. בעמנונת ובכ"י התקשורת האלקטרוניס בארץ פורסמו בהנלטה
דברי רה"מ' בפני מנהיגים יהודים הנוגעים לפעולה
האמריקאית להעלאת יהודי אפיופיה מסודאן לישראל במסוסיס
אמריקאית.

2. אנו נשאלים על הודעה זו ומדס קבלנו מכס דווח כלשהו באשר
למסגרת בה דבר רה"מ' בפני המנהיגים היהודים, עקרי דברי
וההדים שהיו להם.

3. הנריכו על התהודה שהיפה להודעה זו בארה"ב וסגרו קטע
עתונות ופרשנות במקור במידה שהופיעו.
4. נעריך תשובה בחור.

גלבוט.

מ: שה, רה, סנכל, סמנכל, מפוצות, מצפא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7569

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MSI'

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אלו ווס, נ' , גנבה , נרו חוום 1926 , מ : המשרד
רחו מ, סג: ש, מאו 231085 , רח: 1400

שמו/מיד'

אל : ממישראל ווינגטון

מאת : המשרד

הכפדין.

דע : השגריר, שטאון ג'נבה, רוונטל ניו-יורק, לשכת הסר תמ'יס,
כלכלית ב' משה'ח.

השר שרון התקשר עם ה- USTR (נייטר) בענין הסלת המגבכות עם
יבוא הסדינים.

פרט את החומרה הרבה של הצעדים שנוקטו במיוחד לאור מצבה של
פעשיית המכסטייל ורגישותה, חכקה המוטרי בסחר המכסטיילים
האמריקני וכן את מעמדה המיוחד של ישראל והנוכ העצום
ל'ביתנו' לאור ההשקעות שנעשו, והפגיעה בתעסוקה וכו'.

הזכיר את אופן שיחתו עם השגריר פיקרינג בה הצביע על כך
שרוה'ים מתכוון להעלות את הנושא ואף מתכוון להציע הצעות
קונקרטיות. פרט אופן ההצעות שרוה'ים התכוון להגיש.

ביקש שהאמריקנים יחורו בהם מהצעדים שנקטו ולאחר שיחוו לנו
אורכה קצרה נהיה מוכנים לקיים דיון מיד' להסדר בנושא
המכסטיילים.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ייטער ציין אה הלחצים העצומים מצד המעצמה, ציין שלא היו תחת
הרגשה שאנו מוכנים כמו'מ' בולט על טבסטי'לים והוא מוכן להעביר
הענין לקרלייל בכוונה להשיב תוך יומיים.

השר הזמין את ייטער כביקור בארץ בהודמנות קרובה.
ייטער ציין את ענינו הרב בישראל ומעורבותו האישית בה.
והד פרי/סחר חוץ.

מב: שהח, דהם, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, דרורי, כלכליתב', מטפס, דברת,
אוצר, תמס, מנכלמטפטיים
תח: תמס פרי

אלי: נ"י, וושינגטון, ניו יורק, 1913, מ: המשרד
דח: ב, סג: ט, תא: 231085, זח: 1100

בהול/סמוך

נמניהו, דובונסטין.

ירדן-סוריה.

ראו נא תדרוכנו השבועי הסודי המסכם כל הידוע עד אמש בנדון.
לשעה זו עדיין אין תגובה ירדנית לנאום דוה'מ'. נשתדל לעדכן
אתכם עם הגעת מידע נוסף.

מנהל המרכז

תפ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מ/מרכז, רס, אמן, ממד, מצפא,
אלי"א, ארבל 2

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7435

י' צא

טודי

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אלו: ווט, תלש, נרו חוום 1932, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ס, מאו 231085, וח: 1600

טודי/מיד

רובינסטיין.

דע: תאי'ל שיאון

הבמ'יד - השתתפות בספית נוספת (שלך 411).

1. החשוב הוא שאכן יוחל בפעולה להרחבת בסיסו הכספי של
הבמ'יד, כזכור, יפן וגרמניה הוזכרו, לא אחת, במועצות
המתאימות לכך.

2. דרך הפעולה והתקמיקה המוצעת ע"י קונסטבל מקובלת עלינו.

3. אכן, מוטב שהבדיקה עם המצרים, בהקשר הגרמני, תעשה על ידו,
שהדי הימים הללו אינם מהנוחים ביותר למגע בינינו לבינם.
כידר. ==

פז: שהח, דהח, שהבט, מנככ, ממנככ, ד/מרכו, רס, אמן, כידר, מצרים,
סייבל, ענווג, אירא, ממד

משרד החוץ-משלחת הקשר

7143

יוצא

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אלי גנבה, ווט, ני, נרו, חווס 1722, ג: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ט, תא: 221085, וח: 1500

מור/מידי

הפרין

דע שגריר, שמאון גנבה, רוונטל ניו יורק, לשכת השר תמס לשכת
דוהמ', ככלית ב' משהח

מכסטי

לאחר שהודעת כי על השלת המכסות על סריגי כותנה התקשרתי לביכ
ברו שידע כבר על הצעדים

בתשובה לתמינתנו על שנקטו בצעדים מיד לאחר יציאת דוהמ'
מושינגטון מבלי לאפשר לנו לפעול עם קבלת הווח על תוצאות
השיחות כפי שביקשו ממנו בשיחה עם, ציינו גם שאף אם מסיבות
של ענינים שברומו של עולם הפוליטיקה לא הועלה הנושא ע"י
דוהמ', במלוא המשקל המתכוונן (אם אמנם כך היה) אין הצדקה
לצורה שפעלו והיו צריכים לתת הודמנות להסדיר הענין. ענה שגם
הוא הופתע מהצעדים

מסרתי לו שלפי הבנתי מעט בהחלטה שהרי אין שום הגיון להכנס
לשיחות כאשר המניע להחלטה חיובית שעמדנו להחליט עליה היה
פתרון ענין הסדינים

ענה שהודיעו על קריאות נוספות על ציפיות וחומים ויפעילו
אותן עניתי שממילא אין שום סיכוי להמשך יצוא ציפיות בלי
הסדינים עצמם וענין המעות שלהם באקריליים ידועה. לכן יש אף
אפשרות שיקטה עלינו בהעדר מניע ממשי להסכים לשיחות בתנאים
שנוצרו אלא אם יבוטלו הצעדים. אמר שאינו מפליץ על גישה זו
אך לא הוציא מככל אפשרות לעצוד את 'הניידת' שכבר הובנה.

המשרד החוץ - תל אביב 1974

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מסרנו לו שיתכן שנקבל אישור השר לשיחות מידיות בתנאי שיוסדר
טיבוב הצעדים. הבטיח אישית לנסות להסדיר זאת היום ויחזור
אלינו אהצ.

סיפרתי לו שאנו מוכנים עתה מבחינה טכנית לשיחות ואינני רואה
עתה בעיה לאחד שהעניין יוסדר

אשר לכיתן הם עורכים בדיקה של מסלולים שנסלחו לאחרונה אך
עדיין לא ידוע להם מה כבר שוחרר

מקווים להעביר רשימה היום או מחר אך מבקשים בנתיים לנסות
לעצור הצעדים בתמורה לקיום השיחות ולא רק בתמורה לשיחרור
מסלולים שבדרך.

לידיעתך שוקלים במקביל נקיטת צעדים לדיון מג'נבה
על מנת להעריך מהות הצעדים עלינו לככל מיד פרטים מדויקים על
הצעדים הצפויים האם מדובר באמברגו כמו שציינת או מבסה
המתחמשת במועד מסויים כך שכיתן יוכל לתכנן מסלולים ולחתום
על חווים כבר עתה

מבינים שאתה מנסה להפעיל את רוהמי מניי
והר פרי/סחר חוץ

תפ: דורוי, כלכלית, משפ, תמס, אוצר, דברת, מנכלמטפטים
תחו: תמק פרי נוביק ממרהמ

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר
סודי

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אל: המשרד, נר: 511, מ: 111
דח: מ: סג: ס, תח: 221085, רח: 0945

סודי/מידי

אל:מצפא,מחי מצרים ממיד

דע:שגקהיר (כ)

משיחה עם היועץ המצרי ביוזמתו.

1. בא לשמוע על ביקור דהימי כאן.
2. מובארך מרגיש עצמו פגוע בידי ארה"ב מכמה סיבות : (א) השיג הסכם עם תוניסיה לקבלת מחבלי הספינה האיטלקית. התוניסאים בראש האחרון קיבלו י"רגלים קרות יי וסרבו לקבלם. לדעתו בלחץ אמריקאי. (ב) הציגוהו כלא ישר וכבלתי אמין ביחס למקום המצאם של המחבלים. טענתו של מובארך כשהמחבלים לא שוהים כבר על אדמה מצרית היתה נכונה שכן באותה עת הם יי'הוטעו למדינה אחרת יי' והוחזרו דק כשהתברר שאיש אישי'פ' שהיה אמור לחכות להם שם (בגבול) לא נכח ומובארך לא ידע על כך באותה עת בה נשאל על הפרשה היועץ סרב לפרסם באיזה מדינה מדובר.
3. המחבלים שוחררו והמריאו במטוס המצרי דק לאחר שהאיטלקים אמרו במפורש, יעל כך חזרו מספר פעמים לטענתו, שאין הם מעוניינים בהסגרת ה-4 אליהם למרות שמעשה החטיפה בוצע בטריטוריה איטלקית. לו הסכימו היו מועברים ללא היסוס הישר לרומא.

4. לשאלתי, לרושם שנוצר שכאילו מובארך יוצא מגדרו בימים אלו להוכיח תמיכתו באשי'פ' אמר שההסכם עם המחבלים על האניה בתיווכו של ערפאת היה שתמורת שחרורם הם ימסרו לערפאת עי'מ' עישפטו בפני ביה"ד של אשי'פ' המצרים רצו לטענתו להעמיד את ערפאת במבחן האם אמנם יקבלו עונש המגיע להם ועיי' כך גם יוכח בעיני האמריקאים שאשי'פ'/ערפאת אכן התמתן ושהוא ראוי לבוא בין משתפי' התהליך המדיני, או שהיה מתברר שערפאת שותף למעשה הסרוד

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

נושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

במידה והלכו לא היו מובאים לדין על ידו. לכן עפ"י טענתו היו גם מסקנות פוליטיות.

5. כאשר לחזית הפנימית, כדור השלג התחיל להתגלגל מבחינת מובארך מ"ד לאחר תקיפת מפקדות המחבלים בתוניס. מובארך וחוסין חדרו מוושינגטון עם הרבה ציפיות לגבי עמדת ארה"ב כלפי תהליך השלום אותן ביטא כלפי דעת הקהל המצרית. באו הארועים האחרונים (מפקדת אש"פ' והאניה) והעמידוהו במצב קשה כלפי הציבור המצרי.

5. מפלגות האופוזיציה התאגדו יחד ובפגישה שהיתה להם עם הנשיא 3 מתוך ה-5 דרשו במפורש ביטול הסכמי ק.ד. נואחי' גם ניתוק היחסים עם ארה"ב, מובארך כמונן סרב. פרשת 'אקילי' לאורו' סיבכה את הנשיא בשתי חריות נוספות - הפונדמנטליסטים שעמדו אחרי ההפגנות בא-ס'י' ובמנצורה ועם הסטודנטים באוניברסיטאות נבעיקר ע"ן שמס. עיקר החשש המצרי הוא מכך שהסטודנטים ינהיגו את המאבק נגד מובארך ויתנו לו גם מימד של מאבק אינטלקטואלי כולל בנושאי האוניברסיטאות (חופש דיבור שניל וכד').

6. הסברו של היועץ לשיפול מובארך במשבר עם ארה"ב (נוישראל) נובע וקשור במצב הפנימי. תוניסיה ו'אקילי' לאורו' חייבו אותו ללכת לקראת 'דעת הקהל' בכך שהשעה את השיחות ויצר משבר ביחסים עם ארה"ב. אחרת מצבו הפנימי היה חמור שבעתיים. כל גילוי מתינות כלפי הנ"ל או נסיון להפוך את הנושא לצדדי היה מתפרש כמתינות בהם וגורם לו נזק רב יותר, אף כי בשיחות עם מנהיגי האופוזיציה הוא מתאמץ להדגיש את הרוחות. פעולת ח' היא האמריקאי פגעה בו אישית לאחר שהוא התחייב כבר ביחס למחבלים.

7. לשאלתי 'מה הלאה', השיב למיטב ידיעתו שהאזירה הכבדה והמציקה בקהיר תשפיע ל'יעוד זמן' י' על היחסים עם ארה"ב והוא אינו חושב ששיחות ו'יטהאד' תסיר המכשולים אם כי בשלעצמו זהו צעד בכיוון הנכון. בניל לגבי ישראל, אם כי בדיווחים המגיעים לשגרירות כאן מקהיר מדגישים התנהגותה הנבונה של ישראל בפרשה דהיינו שמירת פרופיל נמוך בכל מה שקשור להיבט המצרי של הפרשה, ידוע לו שאל דידי במידה ונשאל לחוות דעתו 'מדבר עלינו בחיוב'.

8. נושא לא פחות מרכזי הוא מה ירחש עתה במכלול הירדני-אש"פ עם נגיעה מצרית. לכן, עד לידיעות בתקשורת על פסגה משולשת אך טרם קיבל על כך דיווח מהבית, הערכתו א הערכתו שעדפאת לאור התנהגות מובארך מנסה להשפיע על מצרים שתיטול חלק פעיל ב'שור הירדני' - פלסטניא' ולקיים את הפסגה הנ"ל עוד טרם נואו לשיחות בעמאן. היועץ גם מעדיף שחסי'ן אכן נפגע ממה שארע בלונדון

1477666 שנת ה'תש"ל

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יוצא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אלו: ווט, ני, בריטל, נרו: חווים 1749, מ: המשרד
דח: ב, סג: ס, תא: 221085, וחי: 1600

10 ד"י/נהול

ממרהמ' דעו: דוון, בנצור.

התקשר פלאטן ומסר שהג' ורדניין סיימס הנוקר פרסם בותרת לפיה
ירדן דוחה את ההצעות שרוהמ' העלה בנאומו בעצרת
השלטונות הירדניים התקשרו עם שגארה'ב בעמאן ומסרו לו
שהבותרת בעתון הירדני אינה מסקפה את גישתה של ממשלת ירדן אשר
'מכירה שהנאום היה פתוח ולא מפל בכל אותם הנושאים שלא יכולים
להעשות'.

הנסוח אינו בהיר ולפלאטן לא היו פרושים. אך הוא הוסיף
שהסג'רות בעמאן וושינגטון בקשו להעביר לנו את זאת מיידיית
בר-און.

פ: שהח, רהמ, שהבמ, מנככ, ממנככ, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, מצפא, ממד

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אלו בריסל, וויט, ני, נרו חוום 1757, מ: המשרד
דחו ב, סג: ס, תמו: 221085, וח: 1900

בהול / יודי

ממרה'מ' - דע: יודון בנצור

בהמטן ל-ח/1749 - 'ג'ודדיין טיימס' -
נשיחת ממנכ'ל פלאטן הערב נראו נא דיווח בנפרד (הוסיף פלאטן
הדברים הבאים:

המקור של האמריקאים היה מרזון קאטין מאדמונו של המלך דיפעי
והמלך עיינו בקפדנות בנאומו של רהמ' והירדנים מתכוננים
להשיב בוהירות TO RESPOND CAREFULLY. הדברים
שפורסמו ב'ג'ודדיין טיימס' מקודם ב'פקידים נמוכים'
שפעלו על דעת עצמם' ונשחפו בכהא האירועים.'
הירדנים מבינים כי רהמ' השאיר דלת פתוחה וירדן מתכוונת
להשיב בהתאם.

עד כאן דברי פלאטן.

לשבת בראון. 22.10.85. 343

פ: שה, רהמ, שהבט, מנככ, ממנככ, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, מצפא, ממד

תד"מ:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1
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Jews Summary October 22, 1985

Columns

NYP-Podhoratz "How Experts Fool Themselves" Arafat acted surprised when he was told someone was killed on the ship and he immediately offered his condolences to the family, grotesquely adding a new dimension to the Jewish concept of chutzpah. Experts had decided that Arafat was no longer a terrorist. They really believed that Arafat had nothing to do with the hundreds of incidents of Palestinian terrorism in the past year alone. Only an expert could be so stupid as to believe something like that. The hijacking affair occurred just when Arafat had reached fever pitch with talk of a new partnership between Jordan and the PLO. It remains to be seen how long the old illusions will come back to us.

ND-Gross "An UN-Orthodox Protest of Zionism" In front of the UN yesterday ultra-orthodox men protested Israel with signs like "Zionism is Nazism." They explained that apart from theological reasons, there are other reasons for opposing Israel. They say that Israel would not be able to help Jews in times of trouble. A group of Israeli correspondents paused and gazed with amusement at the spectacle of the demonstration. A radio reporter said "It's nice. We have these people in Israel too. They don't believe in us. So we don't believe in them. Works out nicely."

ND-Slavin "A Distinction Arabs Fail to Make" When the Arabs and their allies attack the Jews—whether verbally, economically or physically they almost always distinguish between people who happen to be Jewish and Zionists. But on occasion, as at Entebbe and on the Achille Lauro, even the pretense of making this distinction is dispensed with. Again and again the Arabs claim that their quarrel is with Israel and not the Jews. But why then, do Jewish civilians and non-Jews get killed by terrorists acts of the Palestinians. Why are Jews always separated from non-Jews? The Jews have long been alone in this world. Now that one nation welcomes all Jews, the Arabs and their allies decide that Israel has no right to exist. But they are careful to point out it's only Israel they don't like, not the Jews. If we believe this, then we can believe that Arafat will be elected the next president of Israel.

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the name "Pinto" and other illegible text.

תאריך: 20/11/77	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	20
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NYP-Wattenberg "Nine Ways US Can Strike Back" The US must realize that the recent hijacking was directed against America. There have been 600-700 terror incidents this year and experts say 30-40% have been directed against the US. Terror is often successful because of our media, and because of our actions...the US did get out of Lebanon. We can't count on much help from our friends...see Egypt and Italy. The Soviets are behind much of the terror. The President should repeal the law against assassination. We should hunt the terrorists down and kill them. We need to appoint marshalls on planes and ships. We should develop short-term economic sanctions for countries that help terrorists. Consider covert or direct strikes against non-Soviet regimes that encourage terrorism. We need to get very tough on terror in the US and fast.

NYP-Fallon "US Hears a Lesson on Human Stupidity" While Klinghoffer was buried, there was a "celebration" at the UN. Anything goes these days and the super-powers must do something to ease the tension.

Press Reports

PERES Speech at UN

NYT - n.1 - Sciolino -In his speech before the UN General Assembly, Peres offered to travel to Jordan. Peres called his announcement "a new diplomatic initiative". There was no immediate reaction from the Jordanians. Officials characterized the speech as a direct response to Hussein's speech and said that the next step is to await Hussein's response. The usual walkout took place. Mr. Peres' remarks included a departure from Israel's opposition to an international conference, although it was unclear from the speech if he meant that the Soviet Union and China could participate. There remained gaps between the ideas proposed by Peres to those of Hussein. (Excerpts of speech) (See DN)

NYP-Dan-Peres' dramatic speech was made without Gov't authorization, political opponents charged yesterday. Peres' speech, which called for a UN-sponsored international peace conference--could spark a major government crisis. However, Shamir said he had been told about the peace plan.

Lebanon Presses Jordan Arms Sale

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NYT-Special-The Reagan Administration formally notified Congress of a plan to provide Jordan with up to \$2 billion in advanced planes and air defense systems despite overwhelming opposition in Congress. The sale will go ahead unless Congress approves a resolution of disapproval by majority votes in both houses within the next 30 days. Congress members believe that they would be able to override a Reagan veto. A deal between the Administration and Congress may be possible. The Israelis oppose the sale not because they fear an attack from Jordan, but because they argue that the US should not sell arms to any Arab state not at peace with Israel. But the US says Jordan needs to bolster its defenses against possible attack from Syria. (see NYP-Latham; JD-Wash Post)

PLO Aide Links Abbas to Mission

NYT-Schmacher-A senior leader of the PLO who did not wish to be identified, dismissed a theory that the hijacking occurred only because the hijackers were caught cleaning their guns. He said that the hijackers had been acting under written orders from Abbas to carry out a suicide attack as soon as the boat docked in Israel. "It was cowardism. They did not want to die," said the official. The four were to open fire at Ashdod docks before customs. They were supposed to kill as many Israelis as possible, before they were both killed, said the official. The PLO official said he was speaking out of anger because of the hijacking and death of Klinghoffer. He said that Arafat had not known about the mission and became so angry when he heard that he ordered Abbas to end it immediately. "If the mission had been successful, Abbas would be a hero today." (Interview took place in Tunis)

NYT-Magliabue-An Italian official said Abbas was surprised when he heard of the hijacking.

US Aide Talks to Mubarak

NYT-Aifner-Whitehead told Mubarak that Reagan hoped Egypt and the US would "put our recent differences behind us." Mubarak had no public comment after the two-hour meeting. Whitehead then flew to Tunisia. Public opinion in Egypt is outraged and there have been clashes between students and riot police--and has put Mubarak in a difficult position.

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Klinghoffer Eulogized as Hero

NIT-Rimer-Klinghoffer was eulogized as a public and private hero. Menachem Begin sent a message of condolence. (see NYP)

The Aftermath of the Archille Lauro-Magazine Article

New York Magazine-Ramer-The first thing to remember about the Mideast is that things are not always as they appear to be and yet the situation has changed little from 5 years ago. The PLO continues to commit random acts of terror in the name of peace. Israel is acting as it always has, striking back with certainty that those who complain are secretly envious. Washington, as usual, isn't exactly sure what it wants to do but is eager that nothing happens without its blessing. Le'ev Chafets, who has witnessed enough peace proposals thinks that Hussein's is just an annual event. For 35 years Hussein has refused to negotiate with Israel. Saudi Arabia's reaction to the Hussein-Arafat proposal was a big blow. "We must not let any power single out any Arab country or people and lead them into bargaining manoeuvres which would destroy the potential of the Arab nation. The message to Hussein was simply to "Cool it." Hussein is offering motion without movement. How else to explain Hussein's insistence on involving the PLO--a non-starter for both the US and Israel. Hussein is trying to keep his relationships in tact with both the US and the Arabs. Washington should deny Jordan the arms it seeks because Hussein knows that if war comes, only intervention by Israel and the US could save him. Compared to Sadat, Mubarak is a pygmy, and he feels fenced in. Cairo's growing dependence on the US hurts national pride. The radical movement is growing. Egypt was supposed to lead the Arab world toward peace but there has to be some reasonable reason to believe that peace is at hand in the future. Today, the PLO is politically and militarily isolated. Now Israel must be the initiator. Israel must do something because life on the West Bank is a master-servant relationship, something most Israelis are disturbed by. But there is no support for a land for peace swap in Israel. But Peres could propose a return to the autonomy plan. Israel cannot be nudged to greater concessions. A scaled down interm agreement makes sense, which is why, given the history of Arab-Israeli relations, such an idea is probably doomed.

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 מס' מברק

בעיתוי הלא מתאים של הביקור בלונדון - פיצוץ מפקדות אש"פ- בתונבסיה ומה שבא
 לאחר מכן. אין זה סביר, ע"פ הבריטי, שיראה סימני מתינות בשעה שמוחקף ע"י
 ישראל "באישור" ארה"ב. גורם נוסף המתווסף עתה למערכת שיקוליו הוא המאמץ הסעודי
 כלפי סוריה - נורמליזציה בין דמשק ועמאן להביא לפתיחת דיאלוג סורי - עיראקי.
 ערפאח חייב לראות מה מתפתח בערוצים הנ"ל שמא ישאר מחוץ למשחק הבינערכי אם דמשק
 תחמיד בהפניית גבה אליו בשעה שמראה "פנים מחייכות" כלפי האחרים.

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LUGAR STATEMENT ON JORDAN ARMS SALE REQUEST

Mark Helake 224-8370
548-3750

WASHINGTON--Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today released the following statement:

"Secretary Shultz informed Senators today that on Monday the President intends to send to the Congress a formal notification for an arms package to Jordan.

"This determination comes at a time when a substantial number of Senators and Members of the House have expressed serious concern about such a sale. Many have indicated that in their view no such sale should be made unless direct peace negotiations have commenced between Israel and Jordan.

"Clearly, concerns of the peace process will have to be taken into account. In the two weeks the Senate has heard directly from Israeli Prime Minister Peres and from King Hussein

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of Jordan. Both have indicated their strong desire to move forward to negotiations in the very near future but have very different perspectives on the arms proposal.

"King Hussein believes he needs the commitment of arms from the United States in order to continue to take the risks for peace that he has embarked upon. Prime Minister Pines is concerned that in the absence of peace, sending sophisticated weaponry to an Arab state still at war with Israel constitutes an unacceptable risk to the security of his country.

"The question before us, therefore, is to discover whether it is possible to find a position that addresses both concerns and that acc. constructively to move the peace process forward while providing for Jordan's legitimate security needs, that is, to link progress toward peace with the provision of arms.

"During the next several days I will be meeting informally with my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee to discuss with them ways in which this might be accomplished. We all share a common goal: peace with security for Israel and between Israel and her Arab neighbors."

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Handwritten notes in Hebrew: *אליגה נאמל ספול פוס לה נאמנה סיסמא :הילנה יי*

SENATOR DOLE: We had a very nice meeting.

MS. THOMAS: Aw, comon!

Q How about arms sales to Jordan?

SENATOR DOLE: That was included, tax reform, the budget. We had a wide range of areas, and —

Q What'd you tell 'im?

SENATOR DOLE: Tell 'im on what?

Q Arms sales. Will they pass? Will it pass?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, it was just sent up yesterday. I think it's a little early to know. But there are a number of senators, speaking with the Senate side, who've indicated by signing a letter that they would vote for a resolution of disapproval. I think the count now stands at 73.

ANDREA MITCHELL (NBC): Is the President willing to accept some sort of conditionality on it, that would tie it to progress in peace talks, in order for it to get through?

SENATOR DOLE: We didn't get into those details but Secretary Shultz indicated that he is in touch with Bob Michel and myself, Senator Lugar, Bill Broomfield, so we hope there's some way to work it out.

MS. THOMAS: But that isn't really your prediction, is it?

SENATOR DOLE: That we'll work it out?

MS. THOMAS: Yes.

SENATOR DOLE: Well, I don't want to make a prediction yet. It seems to me that it was just sent up last night and we know there's considerable opposition to the sale, but there may be ways to satisfy a number of those concerns.

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MR. MICHEL: In the first place, there'd be quite a lengthy time interval between actual delivery of the planes, you know, at least 2-1/2 years. Now, that doesn't say we can just continue the delay, and delay, but I think it does give us, maybe, some wiggle room, to begin laying the groundwork for it. It's got to begin somewhere and then, in the meantime, maybe, conceivably, the King could do a few more things that would convince some other people, that Bob and I have to work with, that it's a possibility. So, you've got to start somewhere.

SENATOR DOLE: I think the important thing is the President kept his word to King Hussein. He sent the request to the Congress. Now we have to deal with it. And there are a number of things we can do without breaking our pick in the next 30 days.

MS. THOMAS: Like what?

MS. STAHL: You're suggesting you'd start the process with sort of points at which you can pull it back, if the King doesn't do X, Y, and Z? Is that what you're saying?

MR. MICHEL: Well, I look at it somewhat from that point of view in the House because, let's face it, you know, today there'd just be no possibility whatsoever, if we were to have it up today, and we wouldn't expect that kind of thing to happen. But the process has got to begin someplace, and then you go from there, and I think that when you hear the Jewish community respond to that, it's generally always, "Well, why don't we do it exactly the way King -- or Anwar Sadat did?" You know, he did more, from an affirmative point of view, before we were responding.

Now, that was -- it gets a little bit more difficult as you get to Jordan, and we ought to recognize that. I had some leaders in my office just a week-or-so ago and, as I say, I've got differences of opinion up there every day, that when someone walks in the door and I want them to come along, they've got to go out the other door with a

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little bit of something in hand, and I think that this is on a broader, bigger scale, and we'll have to use that kind of methodology.

SENATOR DOLE: I would also add that there was some thought that the next appropriation bill that came along might be an amendment, to bring this up very quickly. We believe that that's not the case. We think we ought to have the Foreign Relations Committee take a hard look at it, look at some options, have the hearings, so we're hopeful that there will be no early efforts to sort of rush this through the Congress. We don't believe that would serve the interests of -- certainly not the President, certainly not King Hussein, nor the Prime Minister of Israel, who's, I think, been quite flexible in this area.

MS. THOMAS: Was he flexible on arms to Jordan?

SAM DONALDSON (ABC): His "pick" was flexible.

Q (Inaudible) -- on sales to Jordan?

SENATOR DOLE: I don't think a Prime Minister of Israel would come here and say he could approve a sale, but I think, obviously, they have a lot of respect for King Hussein. There have been a number of things said publicly and, I understand, a number of things said privately that I had no knowledge of, that would indicate that we ought to go through the normal process. Let's not get this all revved up and --

MS. MITCHELL: Does the administration plan -- (inaudible) -- did you basically them to slow this down a little bit because it doesn't help anybody to --

SENATOR DOLE: Well, again, it's been sent up. It doesn't make any difference what we said ahead of time. We did say we thought it was a bad time, from the standpoint the President's fully engaged in preparations -- he's gonna be three days in New York this week -- they're fully engaged in preparations for the Gorbachev meeting, a very, very important meeting. But that was the President's call. We don't quarrel with that. He sent it up and it's up. Now it's in our court and we hope to take care of it some way.

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ממנכ"ל. מצפ"א. לשכת שהבי"ט. רה"מ.

קונגרס: מכירת נשק לירדן
לשלנו 501.

1. מצ"ב הבקשה הפורמלית מטעם הממשל למכירה הנ"ל (מאח גאסט במשרד ההגנה ליו"ר ועדת החוץ של הסנט). כמקובל בקשה זהה נשלחה במקביל ליו"ר ועדת החוץ של הבית.
2. תשומת לבכם ל" CERTIFICATION " מהנשיא בהתאם לחוק ההרשאה לסיוע החוץ (תיקון לארי סמית).

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קיסור לקונגרס

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DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 - 2800

23 OCT 85

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In reply refer to:
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Honorable Richard C. Lugar
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith Transmittals Nos. 86-05A and 86-05B and under separate cover the classified annexes thereto. These Transmittals concern the Departments of the Air Force and Army proposed Letters of Offer to Jordan for defense articles and services estimated to cost up to \$1.81 billion. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media of the unclassified portions of these Transmittals.

You will also find attached a certification as required by Section 130(c) of Public Law 99-83, approved on August 8, 1985, concerning Jordan's public commitment to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Sincerely,

PHILIP C. EAST
LIEUTENANT GENERAL USAF
DIRECTOR

Attachments

Separate Cover:
Classified Annex

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Transmittal No. 86-05A

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer
~~Present to~~ Section 36(b)
of the Arms Export Control Act

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- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Jordan
- (ii) Total Estimated Value: Up to \$1.1 Billion
- (iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered:
Two squadrons of advanced air defense fighter aircraft (F-20 or F-16
Air Defense Variant) totalling 40 aircraft, aircraft spares, support
equipment, training, and 300 AIM-9P4 air-to-air missiles.
- (iv) Military Department: Air Force (SFA)
- (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:
None
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles
or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:
See Annexes under separate cover.
- (vii) Section 28 Report: Case not included in Section 28 report.

Date Report Delivered to Congress: 21 OCT 1985

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POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Jordan - Advanced Air Defense Fighter Aircraft (F-20 or F-16 Air Defense Variant) and AIM-9P4 Missiles

The Government of Jordan has requested the purchase of two squadrons (40) of advanced air defense fighter aircraft (F-20 or F-16 Air Defense Variant), aircraft spares, support equipment, training, and 300 AIM-9P4 air-to-air missiles. The estimated cost is up to \$1.1 billion.

The proposed sale is in the best interests of both the United States and Jordan because it meets Jordan's legitimate security requirements and furthers our mutual objectives of fostering a just and lasting peace in the region. Jordan recently announced intentions to move this year to negotiations among the parties in a non-belligerent environment on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Without the political and military support of the U.S., it would prove difficult for a small and vulnerable state such as Jordan to conclude and help enforce a binding peace agreement.

The sale of 40 advanced air defense fighter aircraft will provide two squadrons, with four attrition aircraft, to replace portions of Jordan's aging interceptor fleet of F-5s and Mirage F-1s and maintain its capability to deter and counter present and projected regional threats to Jordanian airspace, principally from Soviet-armed Syria. The AIM-9P4 air-to-air missiles will provide the necessary armament for these aircraft. Jordan will have no difficulty absorbing these aircraft and missiles into its armed forces.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractors are: F-20 aircraft - Northrop Corporation of Hawthorne, California; F-16 Air Defense Variant aircraft - General Dynamics Corporation of Fort Worth, Texas; and AIM-9P4 missile - Ford Aerospace and Communications Corporation of Newport Beach, California.

Implementation of this sale of advanced air defense fighter aircraft and air-to-air missiles could require the assignment of 20 additional U.S. Government personnel and 25 contractor representatives in Jordan for two years.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.

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Transmittal No. 86-058

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer
Pursuant to Section 36(b)
of the Arms Export Control Act

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Jordan

(ii) <u>Total Estimated Value:</u>	Major Defense Equipment*	\$116 million
	Other	\$594 million
	TOTAL	\$710 million

(iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered:
Twelve Improved HAWK air defense missile Assault Fire Units, two AN/TSQ-73 Missile Minder Systems, 222 I-HAWK missiles, 14 Improved Platoon Command Posts, 14 Improved Continuous Wave Acquisition Radars, all in a PIP III configuration; 224 vehicles, 72 Basic STINGER weapons and 36 missile reload rounds, concurrent spare parts, training and technical assistance.

(iv) Military Department: Army (VLI, VLJ, JFR, OBU and OBY)

(v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:
None

(vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:
See Annexes under separate cover.

(vii) Section 28 Report: Case not included in Section 28 report.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 21 OCT 1985

* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

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POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Jordan - I-HAWK Missiles and Basic STINGER Missile Systems

The Government of Jordan has requested the purchase of 12 Improved HAWK air defense missile Assault Fire Units, two AN/TSQ-73 Missile Minder Systems, 222 I-HAWK missiles, 14 Improved Platoon Command Posts, 14 Improved Continuous Wave Acquisition Radars, all in a PIP III configuration; 224 vehicles, 72 Basic STINGER weapons and 36 missile reload rounds, concurrent spare parts, training and technical assistance. The estimated cost is \$710 million.

The proposed sale is in the best interests of both the United States and Jordan because it meets Jordan's legitimate security requirements and furthers our mutual objectives of fostering a just and lasting peace in the region. Jordan recently announced intentions to move this year to negotiations among the parties in a non-belligerent environment on the basis of U.S. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Without the political and military support of the U.S., it would prove difficult for a small and vulnerable state such as Jordan to conclude and help enforce a binding peace agreement.

The new I-HAWK Assault Fire Units and additional I-HAWK missiles will go far in redressing longstanding deficiencies in Jordan's ground air defense capability and permit employment of missile defenses with some degree of mobility to afford umbrella protection to ground forces. The additional Platoon Command Posts and vehicles will provide assault fire unit capability for one of two firing elements of Jordan's currently immobilized I-HAWK batteries. Modification kits for 14 High Power Illuminators coupled with the 14 Platoon Command Posts and Continuous Wave Acquisition Radars will provide the same capabilities as the 12 new I-HAWK Assault Fire Units. The PIP III configuration is expected to be U.S. Army standard at time of production. The small quantity of the Basic STINGER man-portable air defense missile system will modernize Jordan's existing point defense capabilities (VULCAN guns and REDEYE missiles). With an all-aspect capability, Basic STINGER provides Jordan the ability to counter intruding aircraft that succeed in penetrating the interceptor force and I-HAWK missile batteries. Special security precautions will be imposed as a condition of sale to ensure that STINGER technology is not compromised and that the weapons remain in authorized hands. Jordan will have no difficulty absorbing these I-HAWK Fire Units, additional I-HAWK missiles and STINGER missiles into its armed forces.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor for the I-HAWK systems will be the Raytheon Company of West Andover, Massachusetts. The prime contractor for the STINGER missile systems will be the General Dynamics Corporation of Pomona, California.

Implementation of this sale will require the assignment in Jordan of six additional U.S. Government personnel and ten contractor representatives for three years.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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October 21, 1985

Presidential Certification
No. 86-01

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Certification on Jordan

Pursuant to section 130(c) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83), I hereby certify that Jordan is publicly committed to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

You are authorized and directed to report this certification, together with the justification therefor, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

This certification, together with the justification therefor, shall be published in the Federal Register.

Ronald Reagan
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Justification for Certification

Section 130(c) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83) provides:

CERTIFICATION.--Any notification made pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to a proposed sale to Jordan of United States advanced aircraft, new air defense systems, or other new advanced military weapons, shall be accompanied by a Presidential certification of Jordan's public commitment to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

As demonstrated below, Jordan clearly meets the condition set forth in section 130(c). Moreover, the sale of a limited quantity of defensive arms to Jordan will greatly contribute to Jordan's ability to implement these commitments.

When this certification requirement was first adopted, I placed on record my belief that the requirement was unnecessary and inappropriate in light of King Hussein's public statements and courageous actions. In my letter of September 27 informing the Congress that an informal notification of an arms sale to Jordan would be transmitted, I restated my firm conviction that Jordan's commitment to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 were clearly evidenced by King Hussein's public statements and bold steps toward peace. The King's statements and actions since that time have continued to manifest Jordan's commitment to the principles set forth in section 130(c).

Jordan's commitment to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel based on 242 and 338 is a matter of public record. In 1982, for example, following the emergence of my September peace initiative, the King stated, "I have recognized Israel since I helped in formulating Security Council Resolution 242 and accepted it." This year, King Hussein reaffirmed his acceptance of 242 and 338, as well as his acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist. During his May visit to the United States, he also expressed his desire to move toward direct negotiations with Israel before the end of 1985. Before the September session of the United Nations General Assembly, King Hussein clearly and publicly reiterated his position that "we are prepared to negotiate under the appropriate auspices with the Government of Israel promptly and directly under the basic tenets of Resolutions 242 and 338." The King repeated this position in his subsequent statements in Washington, as well as his conviction that negotiations with Israel would take place in an environment free of belligerent or hostile acts.

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King Hussein has not, however, merely expressed in words his commitment to a peaceful settlement. Last year, Jordan restored diplomatic relations with Egypt, asserting that no state should be isolated for making peace with Israel. In November, in defiance of Syrian opposition, Jordan hosted the Palestine National Council and challenged the Palestinian community to join with him in seeking a negotiated settlement with Israel on the basis of Resolution 242. Most recently, Jordanian officials forthrightly attended a meeting with the British Foreign Minister, even though PLO representatives proved unable to abide by previously agreed ground rules. Finally, Jordan has given ample, and recent, evidence that it eschews violence as the answer to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has done its part for many years to maintain quiet along its frontier with Israel, and it was quick to condemn publicly the murder of the three Israelis in Larnaca.

I am fully aware of the conviction of the Congress that U.S. arms transfers in the Middle East should facilitate our efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in the region. I share that conviction without reservation, and I am convinced that this sale promotes our shared objective. Progress towards peace in the Middle East requires another Arab state willing to negotiate with Israel. Jordan has indicated its willingness to do so.

Jordan, however, is a small and vulnerable state with legitimate security concerns; these concerns are heightened because of its interest in peace with Israel. King Hussein's bold moves toward the negotiating table have provoked repeated overt threats to his regime and associates from those who are determined to prevent a settlement with Israel. Because the sale to Jordan of a limited quantity of defensive arms will enhance Jordan's confidence and self-defense capabilities against such threats, it will enable Jordan more effectively to implement its commitment to peace. Moreover, the sale will convey to King Hussein a clear signal of our political support for his peace initiatives and our refusal to allow acts of terrorism to deter us from pursuit of the peace process. It is, therefore, in the context of our desire to move forward in the peace process that the Administration has notified Congress of our intent to sell to Jordan a limited quantity of defensive arms.

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DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 - 2800

OCT 21

21 OCT 1985

In reply refer to:
I-13724/85ct

Honorable Richard C. Lugar
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 86-06 and under separate cover the classified annex thereto. This Transmittal concerns the Department of the Army's proposed Letters of Offer to Jordan for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$75 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media of the unclassified portions of this Transmittal.

You will also find attached a certification as required by Section 130(c) of Public Law 99-83, approved on August 8, 1985, concerning Jordan's public commitment to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Sincerely,
Philip C. Gast

PHILIP C. GAST
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USAF
DIRECTOR

Attachments

Separate Cover:
Classified Annex

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Transmittal No. 86-06

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer
Pursuant to Section 36(b)
of the Arms Export Control Act

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Jordan
- (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment*	\$52 million
Other	\$23 million
TOTAL	\$75 million
- (iii) Description of Articles or Services Offered:
Thirty-two BRADLEY M3 cavalry fighting vehicles, support equipment, concurrent spare parts, publications, training, training equipment and technical assistance.
- (iv) Military Department: Army (VLH, VLO, OBV, OBW, and OBX)
- (v) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:
None
- (vi) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Articles or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:
See Annex under separate cover.
- (vii) Section 28 Report: Case not included in Section 28 report.
- (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 21 OCT 1985

* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

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POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Jordan - BRADLEY M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles

The Government of Jordan has requested the purchase of 32 BRADLEY M3 cavalry fighting vehicles, support equipment, concurrent spare parts, publications, training, training equipment and technical assistance. The estimated cost is \$75 million.

The proposed sale is in the best interests of both the United States and Jordan because it meets Jordan's legitimate security requirements and furthers our mutual objectives of fostering a just and lasting peace in the region. Jordan recently announced intentions to move this year to negotiations among the parties in a non-belligerent environment on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Without the political and military support of the U.S., it would prove difficult for a small and vulnerable state such as Jordan to conclude and help enforce a binding peace agreement.

This sale of BRADLEY M3 vehicles will provide Jordan's scout and armored cavalry units with a full-tracked, lightly armored fighting vehicle for their reconnaissance and security missions. Jordan will have no difficulty absorbing these BRADLEY M3 cavalry fighting vehicles into its armed forces.

The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be the FMC Corporation of San Jose, California.

Implementation of this sale will require the assignment to Jordan of twenty one additional U.S. Government personnel for 4-6 months and 15 contractor representatives for one year.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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October 21, 1985

Presidential Certification
No. 86-01

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Certification on Jordan

Pursuant to section 130(c) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83), I hereby certify that Jordan is publicly committed to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

You are authorized and directed to report this certification, together with the justification therefor, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

This certification, together with the justification therefor, shall be published in the Federal Register.

Ronald Reagan

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Justification for Certification

Section 130(c) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83) provides:

CERTIFICATION.--Any notification made pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to a proposed sale to Jordan of United States advanced aircraft, new air defense systems, or other new advanced military weapons, shall be accompanied by a Presidential certification of Jordan's public commitment to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

As demonstrated below, Jordan clearly meets the condition set forth in section 130(c). Moreover, the sale of a limited quantity of defensive arms to Jordan will greatly contribute to Jordan's ability to implement these commitments.

When this certification requirement was first adopted, I placed on record my belief that the requirement was unnecessary and inappropriate in light of King Hussein's public statements and courageous actions. In my letter of September 27 informing the Congress that an informal notification of an arms sale to Jordan would be transmitted, I restated my firm conviction that Jordan's commitment to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 were clearly evidenced by King Hussein's public statements and bold steps toward peace. The King's statements and actions since that time have continued to manifest Jordan's commitment to the principles set forth in section 130(c).

Jordan's commitment to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel based on 242 and 338 is a matter of public record. In 1982, for example, following the emergence of my September peace initiative, the King stated, "I have recognized Israel since I helped in formulating Security Council Resolution 242 and accepted it." This year, King Hussein reaffirmed his acceptance of 242 and 338, as well as his acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist. During his May visit to the United States, he also expressed his desire to move toward direct negotiations with Israel before the end of 1985. Before the September session of the United Nations General Assembly, King Hussein clearly and publicly reiterated his position that "we are prepared to negotiate under the appropriate auspices with the Government of Israel promptly and directly under the basic tenets of Resolutions 242 and 338." The King repeated this position in his subsequent statements in Washington, as well as his conviction that negotiations with Israel would take place in an environment free of belligerent or hostile acts.

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King Hussein has not, however, merely expressed in words his commitment to a peaceful settlement. Last year, Jordan restored diplomatic relations with Egypt, asserting that no state should be isolated for making peace with Israel. In November, in defiance of Syrian opposition, Jordan hosted the Palestine National Council and challenged the Palestinian community to join with him in seeking a negotiated settlement with Israel on the basis of Resolution 242. Most recently, Jordanian officials forthrightly attended a meeting with the British Foreign Minister, even though PLO representatives proved unable to abide by previously agreed ground rules. Finally, Jordan has given ample, and recent, evidence that it eschews violence as the answer to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has done its part for many years to maintain quiet along its frontier with Israel, and it was quick to condemn publicly the murder of the three Israelis in Larnaca.

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Jordan, however, is a small and vulnerable state with legitimate security concerns; these concerns are heightened because of its interest in peace with Israel. King Hussein's bold moves toward the negotiating table have provoked repeated overt threats to his regime and associates from those who are determined to prevent a settlement with Israel. Because the sale to Jordan of a limited quantity of defensive arms will enhance Jordan's confidence and self-defense capabilities against such threats, it will enable Jordan more effectively to implement its commitment to peace. Moreover, the sale will convey to King Hussein a clear signal of our political support for his peace initiatives and our refusal to allow acts of terrorism to deter us from pursuit of the peace process. It is, therefore, in the context of our desire to move forward in the peace process that the Administration has notified Congress of our intent to sell to Jordan a limited quantity of defensive arms.

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