מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

מחלקה

מס' תיק מקורי

משרד ראש הממשלה

ארכיון המדינה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מסי: 43.4

מיכל מסי: 5025/1c

תאריך התעודה: _____

שם מחבר התעודה: _____

תיק מסי: 2

שם הנמען: _____

סוג התעודה (סמן √ במקום המתאים):

- ☐ מכתב
- ☑ מברק
- ☐ תזכיר או מיזכר
- ☐ דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון
- ☐ פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

(מ"ר 112) 3/3/1991
4/3/1991
5/3/1991
5/3/1991
12/3/1991
17/3/1991

*הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס ג ל ו י

אאאא,חוזם:20525
אל:רהמש/1298
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:349,תא:190391,זח:1732,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמ"ס / בהול

אל: מצפ"א

דע: קונכ"ל סן-פרנסיסקו

מאת: ראש יחידת הקונגרס, וושינגטון

סיוע חרום בטחוני

1. מליאת הסנאט אישרה את ה- SUPPLEMENTAL הכולל את סיוע החרום בסך 650 מליון דולר ברוב של 98:1. הקול הבודד היה של הסנטור הרפוב' מאורגון - מרק האטפילד.

2. השלב הסופי בחקיקה אשר יתרחש בימים הקרובים שייך לקונפרנס והצבעות נפרדות בשני הבתים על דו"ח הקונפרנס.

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),בנצור,
מצפא,אוצר

סססס

15345 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר תאריך : 03.03.79

** יוצא שמור
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חוזם:3,15345
אל:וושינגטון/281,מצב/2097,מנמת/900
מ-:המשרד,תא:190390,זח:1414,דח:מ,סג:שמ
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

61068
שמור/מידי
אהב 10602

אל: וושינגטון

ביקור קרטר - סוריה

בתום שיחת המנכ'ל עם קרטר אתמול על אתיופיה (דיווח בנפרד) התענין המנכ'ל בנושא סוריה.

קרטר השיב מאז 1978 נפגש עם אסד ארבע פעמים. בביקור הראשון ישב עמו כעשר שעות ונרקמו ביניהם יחסי ידידות ואימון. אסד נוהג להזמינו לארוחת ערב בביתו הפרטי והם יושבים ביחידות, בנוכחות מתרגם בלבד.

בביקור זה נפגשו פעמיים וצברו שש שעות ביחד. סיכם בקיצור נמרץ חלק מהדברים שעלו בשיחות האלה :

- אסד אישר את מחויבותו (כדברי קרטר) לתהליך שיביא לשלום עם ישראל.

- הוא מוכן לשיחות בילטרליות עם ישראל אך רק תחת המטריה של ועידה בינלאומית.

- הוא גמיש לגבי מתכונת ועידה זו בין אם בחסות חמש החברות הקבועות במועב'יט, בין אם בחסות שתי המעצמות הגדולות.

- הוא מבין שהפורום המלא (ה - PLENUM) של הועידה ימלא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

תפקיד מינימלי ויוקדש לדברי פתיחה בלבד, כאשר מייד לאחר-מכן הועידה תתפצל לשיחות בילטרליות.

- הוא מוכן לדון בשאלת רמת הגולן ובכל נושא רלבנטי אחר.

- הינו איש חזק באופיו וכן יש לו סבלנות רבה.

- הוא מוכן להמתין 25 שנה עד לקבלת רמת הגולן חזרה ויעמוד על כך, לא בגלל שהוא מייחס לאיזור ערך אסטרטגי אלא בשל העקרון.

- הוא נוטה (HE IS AMENABLE) לפירוז הדדי, דהיינו פירוז הגולן בתנאי שיהיה פירוז אקוויבלנטי בצד הישראלי.

* כאן הכניס קרטר הערה אישית : להערכתו, סידור כזה לא יעלה לישראל מאומה כי הרי, לדעתו, לא צריך להיות בעייה בפיזור האיזור מתחת לרמת הגולן בצונו.

- אסד לא מתרשם מתהליך השלום הנוכחי אך לא יתערב בו ולא יפריע למהלכים הנוקטים כיום.

- הוא אינו מאמין שהתהליך הנוכחי יוביל לתוצאות וכן אינו מאמין שישראל מוכנה לדבר עם הפלסטינאים ב - GOOD FAITH.

- הוא מרוצה משיפור יחסיו עם מצרים.

- הוא רוצה במימוש הסכם טאיף וסבור שישראל מפריעה בכך.

עד כאן.

מנהל מצפ'א

נא

תפ: שהח,סשהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,@(אמן),ממד,
בנצור,מצפא,סולטן

SENATE CALLS ON ARAB STATES TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL
(Text: Senate Concurrent Resolution 16)

Washington -- A resolution before the U.S. Senate calls on Arab states to recognize Israel and to "end the state of belligerency" with that country.

Following is the text of Senate Concurrent Resolution 16, which passed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations March 19 and will be considered next by the full Senate:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Whereas the state of Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948;

Whereas the armies of six Arab nations, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iraq, invaded Israel immediately after its declaration of independence with the intention of destroying Israel as a nation;

Whereas Israel has fought additional wars against several Arab nations which have continued to seek its elimination and destruction;

Whereas United Nations Security Council resolution 242 and 338 have addressed the Arab-Israeli conflict, calling for a just, lasting, and durable peace for all states in the area;

Whereas all other Arab states continue to maintain a state of belligerency with Israel, refusing to recognize Israel's right to exist;

Whereas Israel suffered some 39 SCUD missile attacks fired by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War;

Whereas the United States was allied with numerous Arab states in the diplomatic and military effort to eject Iraq from Kuwait; and

Whereas the continued state of belligerency between the Arab states and Israel threatens all peoples of the Middle East: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that --

(1) all Arab nations which have refused to recognize Israel and have maintained a state of belligerency with the state of Israel should recognize Israel, end the economic boycott against Israel, end the state of belligerency with Israel, and enter into direct negotiations with Israel for the purpose of concluding peace treaties and establishing full diplomatic

According to government and industry officials, Argentina is the country with the quality and available supply of peanuts best able to supply any increase in U.S. import quotas.

Other potential small suppliers include China, India, South Africa and Mexico; an Agriculture Department official said the Asian peanuts would require blanching or other processing to eradicate disease.

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relations; and

(2) the United States should use all available means to influence and encourage the Arab states which were allied with the United States in the Persian Gulf War to achieve the objectives under paragraph (1).

(END TEXT)

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FIRST KUWAITI DETAINEES RELEASED BY IRAQ RETURN HOME
(Families anxiously awaiting thousands more)
By Jacquelyn S. Porth
USIA Security Affairs Correspondent

Kuwait City -- The first group of Kuwaiti detainees released by the Iraqi government returned home March 22, their return delayed for hours by poor visibility in Kuwait City's smokeblackened skies.

Friends and loved ones were forced to wait hours longer than expected to greet them in rainy, overcast weather.

A wailing siren and the flashing red-and-blue light of a police car signaled that some were home at last. Momentarily three buses full of now free Kuwaiti soldiers and policemen threaded their way through the crowds which had gathered at dawn to greet them. Members of the Kuwaiti resistance and Army tried valiantly to control the press of people and keep a path clear for them.

As each Kuwaiti man stepped from the bus he was showered with flower petals. Brothers and sons applauded and shouted, mothers, wives and daughters cried, their tears mixing with black droplets of gently falling rain. Some fired weapons into the air; it was joy personified.

Each walked immediately into a nearby building, which has been used as a center for missing persons. A computer bank was established there by the Kuwaiti Association to Defend War Victims (KADWV) to record the name of thousands and thousands of people who disappeared, many of whom were believed taken into Iraq throughout the period of Iraqi occupation.

These men had been released from an Iraqi prison in Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's home town. Some tried to glean snatches of information which might reveal the fate of a father, son, brother, uncle, cousin or friend. Relatives pressed their faces against the windows of the building to catch a glimpse of the men inside the processing center.

The men filtered out in small groups when they finished cancelling their names off the lists compiled by the KADWV. There were cries of "habibi" as they were accosted and embraced on the way out by friends and relatives. Some went off arm-in-arm.

Nabil al-Mullah was one of the lucky released detainees. Asked if he had been tortured by the Iraqis, he said, "No, thank God, no." But he said Iraqi soldiers extinguished cigarettes on the skin of his colleagues. The Iraqis were looking for any mistake which the prisoners might make in order to punish them, according to his account.

BUSH WEIGHS PALESTINIAN ROLE IN PEACE PROCESS
(Reviews postwar issues with Mitterrand)
By Alexander M. Sullivan
USIA White House Correspondent

Martinique, French West Indies -- The United States will sidestep at least temporarily the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in discussing the aspirations of Palestinians, President Bush suggested March 14.

Speaking at a joint news conference conducted with French President Mitterrand, Bush recalled his displeasure with the stance of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat during the Persian Gulf war.

The president asserted a solution to the Middle East situation is not possible without talking to representatives of the Palestinian people, but he suggested strongly that does not mean -- at least temporarily -- that Arafat is that representative.

He pointed out Palestinian representatives not prominently associated with Arafat had met recently with Secretary of State Baker, adding, "We'll pursue that track for a while."

Mitterrand suggested the time is ripe for other Palestinians to step forward to speak for their people.

Bush said he wished to "again express my disappointment that Mr. Arafat aligned himself with (Iraqi President) Saddam Hussein far more than he needed to to protect his flank. He simply bet on the wrong horse."

The president's comments about the PLO came following his second exploratory meeting on prospects for progress in achieving a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. In more than three hours of talks at a mountain-top plantation manor house, Bush and Mitterrand discussed issues related to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Europe, and North Africa. Bush discussed many of those same topics March 13 in Ottawa with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney, and will confer in Bermuda March 16 with British Prime Minister Major.

Asked if the PLO would be more welcome in a Middle East peace conference if Arafat were to be deposed as chairman, Bush recalled, "I did say that we were very disappointed with the PLO's stance in solidarity with Saddam Hussein. In my view, they went further, through their spokesman, Mr. Arafat, than they needed to go." This has caused "some concern," Bush noted, among Arab states which had been strong financial backers of the organization.

"In my view," Bush added, "this needs some time. We are not

U.N. TEAM TO ASSESS IRAQI DAMAGE TO KUWAIT
(Seen as prelude to possible reparations claim)
<B>By Jim Shevis
USIA United Nations Correspondent

United Nations -- A high-level United Nations factfinding mission assessing the destruction caused during Iraq's occupation of Kuwait is seen by U.N. diplomats as the first step toward a possible reparations claim against Saddam Hussein's regime.

Sources, including American government officials, say an assessment of the loss in life, Iraqi practices against Kuwaiti civilians and the scope and nature of damages inflicted on Kuwait's infrastructure could be useful in determining compensation due Kuwait.

"It's a logical first step," a diplomat told a USIA reporter. "First, you establish what your enemy has done to your country, then you take him to court."

The 29-member U.N. mission led by Abdulrahim A. Farah, former under-secretary-general of the United Nations, is in Bahrain now; it expects to arrive in Kuwait on Saturday, March 16. Team members include engineers, environmentalists, and humanrights specialists from various U.N. agencies.

The U.N. team came into being after Kuwait's permanent representative to the United Nations, Mohammad A. Abulhasan, formally asked U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to dispatch such a mission to Kuwait.

In a February 27 letter to Perez de Cuellar, the Kuwaiti ambassador said the team's report to the secretary-general -due in about two weeks' time -- "shall, among other things, guide us in drawing up the requirements for the reconstruction of the country."

Perez de Cuellar is expected to brief the U.N. Security Council on the mission's findings. Only then, diplomats say, might a [illegible] be pressed for war reparations according to Council Resolution 674.

Prior to leaving for the Middle East, Farah told newsmen that anyone in Kuwait will be free to talk to his team, either through the government or nongovernmental organizations.

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writing off anything, but we don't have any intention of resuming our dialogue" with the organization. That dialogue had been suspended when the PLO refused to condemn a terrorist attack on an Israeli beach last year.

Bush said again "there has got to be" discussion with the Palestinians to solve the Middle East problem. "That's what Jim Baker was (talking) about," Bush said referring to the secretary of state's meetings with Middle East officials, "and that, of course, is what President Mitterrand, and I talked about a long, long time today."

Bush described his meetings with Mitterrand, Mulroney and Major as explorations of "exactly how we should proceed," in the wake of the Persian Gulf war, with making progress on a general solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

"What we're now doing is trying to find...new approaches, not by dictation, but through consultation," the president explained. "We simply have not settled on one path," he said, "one single approach to try to solve this Palestine-Israel question." He cited the importance of reaching a settlement, adding much of the discussion with Mitterrand covered items he would not mention publicly.

Bush said Mitterrand's idea for a United Nations Security Council summit on the Middle East was discussed, adding he and his host agreed that "if we embrace a common position we want to feel that it is going to bear results. And so that idea is out there."

Bush said the discussions "are not talking about a Palestinian state per se....We are exploring....We do not have a set formula as to how that question should be resolved."

He recalled the U.S. position has been that "a Palestinian state is not the answer. Others happen to think that it is the answer. So let's find common ground. Clearly, we're going to have to address ourselves to the question of a home for Palestinians."

He said Mitterrand had a number of ideas on that topic, but did not reveal them. "What we're trying to do is figure what will work," Bush said.

Questioned about putting pressure for a solution on Israel, Bush objected that the query implied that only Tel Aviv is being intransigent. "What we're trying to do," he said, "is get those who are deemed by one (side) or another as intransigent to come forward." He said he hoped that with adequate arrangements for Israel's security and encouragement of states which have refused to deal with Tel Aviv, a solution could be reached.

Bush said he attaches "priority" to restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty, based on the Taif accords, and objected to a questioner's characterization that Washington has given an "apparent blank check" to Syria's President Assad in dealing with Beirut.

"We were very pleased with Syria's role" in the gulf coalition, Bush said, "very pleased indeed that they were side by side (with Western and Arab troops), on the ground, with forces." He said Baker and Assad had long and hopefully "productive" talks. "Syria is an important country in the area. It's vital to what happens in the Lebanon and of course they are vital in the little longer run in what solutions there are for the Palestinian question."

He said open contact with Syria allows discussion of the differences between the two countries and facilitates finding "common ground." Bush called the current diplomacy "a good, common sense approach, following on the coalition solidarity in the Gulf."

The president made these other points:

-- Although Baker has discussed the plight of Western hostages being held in Lebanon by terrorists, he could not offer any positive reasons for optimism. "Clearly it is in the interest of countries with some control or influence over the hostage (takers) to permit (the hostages) to go. It (release) would be a very helpful thing and would enable the U.S. to play a much more constructive role for peace."

-- It is not the U.S. "understanding" that Iraq is allowed -under terms of the gulf armistice -- to use its helicopters "to quash their own citizens....All that does is make it very, very complicated in terms of bringing about a final, formalized, signed cease-fire."

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AMERICAN OPINION 14.3.91
(A roundup from recent polls)

(Following are some of the issues and questions that Americans are currently thinking about, and what they are thinking about them, as reflected in recent public opinion surveys. The polls are from data compiled by The Roper Center for Public Opinion at the University of Connecticut.)

ELATION OVER RESULTS IN PERSIAN GULF

Polled immediately after hostilities stopped on the ground in the Persian Gulf war and the liberation of Kuwait began, Americans expressed great satisfaction with the way their leaders and the U.S. military handled the situation. On behalf of Newsweek Magazine, The Gallup Organization polled 769 adults in a nationwide telephone survey March 1. Here are their responses to a series of questions:

How things are going in the United States at the present time

Satisfied	65 %
Dissatisfied	28
Don't know/Refused	7

Confidence in the U.S. military

Great deal	59 %
Quite a lot	29
Some	8
Very little	4
None	*
Don't know	*

* = less than .5 percent

Opinion of President Bush

Very favorable	59 %
Mostly favorable	31
Mostly unfavorable	6
Very unfavorable	3

Never heard of	*
Don't know	1

* = less than .5 percent

General Norman Schwarzkopf, CENTCOM commander

Very favorable	71 %
Mostly favorable	22
Mostly unfavorable	2
Very unfavorable	1
Never heard of	[illegible]
Don't know	1

General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Very favorable	54 %
Mostly favorable	32
Mostly unfavorable	2
Very unfavorable	1
Never heard of	5
Don't know	6

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney

Very favorable	47 %
Mostly favorable	40
Mostly unfavorable	3
Very unfavorable	2
Never heard of	2
Don't know	6

Confidence in the ability of the U.S. to deal wisely with present world problems

Very great	39 %

Considerable	49
Little	6
Very little	5
Don't know/Refused	1

Amount of money being spent for national defense and military purposes

Too little	10 %
Right amount	60
Too much	26
Don't know/Refused	4

Expected effectiveness of U.S. military capabilities

As effective	23 %
More effective	72
Less effective	4
Don't know	1

Willingness to use military force to help solve future international problems

Yes	32 %
No	60
Don't know/Refused	8

TREATMENT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

Respondents in the same Gallup survey were asked what steps, if any, the United States should take regarding Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and while they heavily favored his removal from power, the majority did not believe Washington should covertly arrange for his assassination. Their responses were:

Should the U.S. continue economic sanctions and the arms embargo against Iraq?

Yes	79 %
No	13

Don't know	8

Capture him and try him for war crimes?

Yes	75 %
No	22
Don't know	3

Arrange for a covert assassination?

Yes	34 %
No	61
Don't know	5

Agree not to capture and try him if he gives up power?

Yes	24 %
No	69
Don't know	7

GRADING THE PRESIDENT ON HIS JOB PERFORMANCE

President Bush received very favorable marks in another recent telephone survey when it came to grading his job performance concerning international issues. When it came to domestic issues, he "passed," but at a much lower level. The Gordon S. Black Corporation, in conjunction with USA Today, asked 802 adults in a nationwide telephone survey March 2-3 to use an A to F school grading system in which A is excellent and F is very poor, and they had these responses:

President Bush's performance in office thus far

A	47 %
B	37
C	11
D	2
F	3

On dealing with the Soviets

A	52 %

B	35
C	8
D	2
F	2
Don't know	1

On dealing with terrorism

A	44 %
B	32
C	14
D	2
F	3
Don't know	5

On improving the nation's education system

A	10 %
B	30
C	34
D	12
F	9
Don't know	5

On dealing with the nation's drug problem

A	15 %
B	30
C	33
D	10
F	9
Don't know	3

On cleaning up the environment

A	11 %
B	27
C	36
D	13
F	9
Don't know	4

On dealing with the federal budget deficit

A	8 %
B	27
C	34
D	16
F	12
Don't know	3

On managing the nation's economy

A	10 %
B	30
C	35
D	13
F	8
Don't know	4

On developing an effective foreign policy

A	39 %
B	39
C	15
D	2
F	3
Don't know	2

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אל:רהמש/963
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בבבב
סודי/מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ''א
מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

מעצרים מינהליים.

שיפטר ביקש להזכיר לשהב''ט (את פניתו אליו לפני כמה חודשים) לחזור ולבדוק אם אפשר לצמצם את מספר הנתונים במעצר מינהלי (המונים, לדבריו 1,400). הוסיף גם, שהיו רוצים לראות ירידה במספר פיצוצי הבתים (לדבריו, פוצצו בכל אחד מהחודשים ינואר ופברואר 10 בתים). לבסוף ביקש, שהאוניברסיטאות בשטחים, חלקן או כולן, תורשינה לחזור לפעילות אקדמית רגילה.

שילה

אא

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,סייבל,
משפט,סולטן,מזתים,@(מתאמשטחים)

סססס

BAKER: "OUR PURSUIT OF PEACE MUST CONTINUE"
(Transcript: Baker, Levy, Eldar remarks 3/12/91)

Jerusalem -- Following is the official transcript of remarks by Secretary of State James Baker, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy and the mayor of Karmiel, Adi Eldar, March 12:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Mayor Adi Eldar: Honorable Secretary of State Mr. James Baker, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and friend of Karmiel, Mr. David Levy, Honored Guests, Welcome to Karmiel.

Mr. Secretary, Karmiel is the youngest city in the Galilee. Its population, which constitutes a melting pot of people originating from thirty-seven different countries, is proud to be hosting you today. We are a peace-loving people, a nation that wants and needs peace. Our city, surrounded by Arab villages, has proven that peaceful coexistence with the Arabs is possible. During your short visit we tried to show you the absorption process and the immense building effort undertaken for the new immigrants. I am sure that when peace comes--and I pray that you succeed in your mission, and it will indeed come soon--this beautiful part of the country will flourish and grow. I am honored to present you with the key **to the city of Karmiel as a token of the deep appreciation we** feel for you and the American people.

Foreign Minister Levy: Mr. Secretary, I'm blamed in my country for calling you Jim, but I'm very proud of it. And I must say that it may sound naive, but yesterday it was justified and tomorrow it will (inaudible)..

The mayor of Karmiel who is hosting us here, is a friend and we have planned together very beautiful things that you must have seen. We have around here mayors and rabbis and newcomers and all of them--we have even veteran residents--and last but not least those lovely children we have all around us. We have toured the country from above and you saw with your own eyes the miracle: how a small people --a persecuted people--has done more than one could assume.

We can only say that yesterday you saw the testimony at Yad Vashem, when you saw that at days of elation as days of danger, everyday when we go and we see that eternal fire, it's the eternal fire that is in our heart. And we remember it, and we must also know that this will never happen again.

And in this country, we would like to have our national independence that is the dream of generations. All we fought for, all we are striving for, this is something that people try to take away from us, but we won't agree. We have been great fighters but that was not out of our volition. We had to be.

encourage, to speak to the Palestinians in the territories, to assist them politically and financially, to join with us, with Israel, under the umbrella with the participation of Egypt, if it will be needed, the Saudis, to start a move on the Israel-Palestinian issue. Once it will be started, then to turn to the Arab countries.

Q: Do you think Secretary Baker is going out of Israel with new ideas? Did he hear something new here? Did he share it with you?

Rabin: Ask the Secretary of State. I'm not representing him.

Q: (inaudible)

Rabin: I believe it is the beginning of a process. The quicker the United States will be able to crystallize a proposal accepted by the government of Israel, mobilizing Egypt, Saudi Arabia to give a backing, I believe there is a good chance of a beginning. Thank you very much.

(END TEXT)

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We had to develop those arrangements because in this region you must protect yourself. Otherwise you are going to disappear. We cannot lose even one war.

We know that at that stage we have to see that implementation of the return to Zion from everywhere. We must protect our Zion and we must also know that we have at our side a great nation, a just nation, a fighting nation, that has recently drawn back despotism and also violence. And we believe that we have values common to both nations, to both peoples. We must therefore act together to see that that great victory would also bring about the return of those children back home from everywhere to that big national home we have built for them. It wasn't easy, but those who have been absorbed in the past will now absorb the newcomers of tomorrow.

We know that just now you have met with the newcomers. They have brought up questions--economic and others--but immediately they explain, they speak out. And that's their nature, and we are proud of it. We are happy to be like that, and we are also extremely happy that we have that support from you, from your country.

We are, therefore, making not only peace with ourselves; we have to make peace with others. That peace must be a lasting one. We don't want any more wars. We want the resources to be invested in development, in agriculture and that's our dream. And we have a partner for that dream. We know that like that Jewish mother in all generations, we want to impart education and knowledge and this is exactly what's being done in this college. We are just like that Jewish mother who wants to have her children grow up and be educated and know even more every day. And that's true for Jews and non-Jews alike. And that's a very festive day for us.

We thank you so much for having come here, and we hope that you have been impressed by that mosaic of reality that you see around here. And we hope that together we'll be able to implement everything we have promised ourselves to do. We must be strong. We believe in our way, and we think that there is no other way but peace and we hope that God will give that peace to us.

Secretary Baker: Thank you very much, Mr. Foreign Minister, my friend David Levy, Mr. Mayor, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for those kind remarks, and thank you for the key to Karmiel, the Pearl of the Galilee.

And thank you, as well, for the opportunity to visit this wonderful school. It is a real pleasure for me to be here. I come here not only to talk to your government, but also to see and to learn about your beautiful country and its people.

So I'd I had been warned ahead of time that the Government of Israel always makes sure that an official visitor sees one hundred and ten per cent of all of the sites, no matter how little time he may have. And, let me tell you, the Government of Israel has not disappointed me.

And so, let me share some of my impressions with you.

First of all, seeing Israel up close I somehow feel like I have seen it before. Growing up in Texas, in a religious family, we were particularly conscious of two countries--the United States where we lived, and ancient Israel where the basic foundations of the Christian faith were laid. So Israel represents for me, an essential part of the values that I cherish. But Israel is not just a place with a great past. You have a vigorous present, and you have a very bright future.

And that really came home to me yesterday when I visited Yad Vashem. That, of course, is a very grim monument to a grimmer truth, and that is that the evil that men do can lead to terrible despair. Yet as I emerged from the darkened memorial building into the light of modern Israel, I could see that you have built in this country the antidote to despair. Israel is living, thriving proof of man's hope and of the ultimate triumph of good over evil. As the prophet foretold, the dry bones have come back to life. And therefore it is not surprising to me that those Jews of the Soviet Union: those who lost hope there, recover that hope here, and this school is a working, tangible symbol of that hope.

And so, my friends, you are not alone in building the great hope that is Israel today. The American people share your pride, your values, your belief in democracy, your strength in defending existence. And we are proud--proud to be helping as you open your doors to Jews from the Soviet Union and from Ethiopia.

And we share, too, a strategic alliance that enables us to work together on the very most important issues. I can, as a matter of fact, think of few occasions in history when a nation under attack by a merciless foe such as Saddam Hussein, held its breath and through its self-restraint facilitated successful American and coalition efforts to destroy that threat. All Americans supported President Bush's decision to aid Israel with the Patriot missiles and American crews, even as our own forces worked ceaselessly to destroy the Scuds. No one can doubt today, I don't think, the wisdom of Israel's decision for restraint; no one can doubt today that our commitment, the American commitment to Israel's security is firm.

The price of victory, of course, can be very steep. Here in Israel, homes were destroyed, people were injured, and, tragically, lives were lost. But American families are

grieving too, for young men and women, our pride and hope, whose lives ended before their time. And no one can witness, as I have this week, the senseless destruction in Kuwait or hear the tales of atrocities there, without feeling deeply saddened by this terrible tragedy.

And so, I think, we must emerge from these terrible experiences with a renewed determination to say "never again." Let Desert Storm, which was a victory unique in history, be the last great battle in the Middle East. The storm is now over. Everywhere people are trying to pick up their lives and find hope for the future. The nations of the Middle East are, I think, very anxious to close the book of war and to open the book of peace. I would suggest that now it is time for all of us to take the Psalmist's advice "seek ye peace and pursue it."

The sad events of recent days only strengthen our desire to pursue the path of peace. We, the peacemakers, cannot allow ourselves to be held hostage by those who prey on the basest of human emotions. We must not allow the hope of peace to be extinguished by murderers and terrorists. Our pursuit of peace must continue. So today I give you my pledge that working with Israel, with Palestinians and with Arab states, we will continue to seek a lasting peace--a peace that is built on trust and a peace that is built on reconciliation. And I mean peace with Israel's Arab neighbors and peace with Palestinians. And so, I mean peace in the region--lasting peace. Thank you all very much for having me. I hope to be back soon. God bless you all.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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WEDEN OUTLINES U.S. AID TO ISRAEL AND WEST BANK/GAZA
(Text: USAID's Weden before HFAC, 3/6/91)

Washington -- According to Israeli estimates, the country's economy lost some three billion dollars as a result of the Gulf crisis, said USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator Charles F. Weden.

Testifying March 6 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the economic impact of the Gulf war on Israel and the West Bank/Gaza areas, Weden said that the gulf crisis also contributed to the severe economic decline already generated by the Palestinian intifada in the occupied territories.

Following is text of Weden's prepared testimony:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Ladies and Gentlemen; it is a pleasure to appear before you this morning. I will confine my statement to a brief overview of the economic situation facing Israel and the occupied territories in the wake of recent events. I will also describe our programs and plans for FY92.

Economic Impact of the Gulf War:

The Gulf war has had a decided adverse impact on Israel, buffeted as it has been by higher oil costs, a downturn in foreign investment, a dramatic drop in tourism as well as increased civil defense costs. In addition, the need to absorb a large influx of Soviet Jewish immigrants is placing major new challenges upon Israel's economy.

During 1990, Israel received 185,000 immigrants from the Soviet Union, and 200,000 to 300,000 more are expected this year.

The Israeli government unofficially estimates its Gulf-related losses in the range of three billion dollars, including as much as $700 million in tourism losses in the private sector. Estimates for the cost of housing and for providing jobs for the new immigrants run in the neighborhood of $20-30 billion over the next 3-5 years. The impact of the immigrants will also be felt on the Israeli job market, social services and infrastructure.

In the occupied territories, the Intifada had already brought about an estimated 30 percent drop in per capita income before the Gulf crisis. We are now estimating that the Gulf war has caused another 10 percent decline, as a result of both the extensive curfew and loss of worker remittances from the Gulf. Furthermore, over 30,000 Palestinians have lost their Israeli work permits, representing probably 15 percent of the total

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מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: TRAVEL ADVISORY

להלן TRAVEL ADVISORY חדש, שהוציאה אתמול מחמ"ד, ובו נכללת ישראל.

ה- .T.A החדש מחליף את קודמו מה- 25/1.

TRAVEL ADVISORY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS/WASHINGTON, D.C., 20520/MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, SOUTH ASIA -- CAUTION/MARCH 10, 1991

WITH THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF AREA, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS REASSESSING THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA AND WILL BE UPDATING COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TRAVEL ADVISORIES. ALTHOUGH A CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE, TENSIONS STILL REMAIN IN MANY PARTS OF THE AREA. WHILE DEMONSTRATIONS, TERRORIST ATACKS AND OTHER HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAVE SLACKENED, AMERICANS TRAVELING THROUGHOUT THE REGION SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXERCISE CAUTION AND, IN PARTICULAR, AVOID ANY DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH MAY OCCUR.

AMERICANS SHOULD CHECK THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ADVISORIES ON THE PLACES THEY PLAN TO VISIT BEFORE BEGINNING TRAVEL. ADVISORY INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE 24 HOURS A DAY AT TELEPHONE (202) 647-5225. AMERICANS RESIDENT IN OR TRAVELING TO THESE REGIONS SHOULD CONTACT THE NEAREST U.S. EMBASSY OR CONSULATE TO REGISTER THEIR PRESENCE, TO RECEIVE INFORMATION ON THE LOCAL SITUATION, AND IN PARTICULAR, TO SEE IF CONDITIONS HAVE CHANGED.

DURING THE GULF CRISIS, THE US GOVERNMENT REDUCED STAFFING LEVELS AT MANY OF ITS EMBASSIES AND PUT PROCEDURES IN PLACE TO PERMIT VOLUNTARY OR ORDERED EVACUATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS. THE DEPARTMENT IS REVIEWING ITS STAFFING LEVELS ON A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY BASIS. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS PERMITTING NON-ESSENTIAL US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS TO RETURN TO SAUDI ARABIA (JEDDAH AND RIYADH ONLY), QATAR, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, BANGLADESH, INDIA (NEW DELHI AND MADRAS), ISRAEL AND JERUSALEM.

WHILE THE PRECISE HEALTH RISK CAUSED BY THE OIL FIRES IN KUWAIT HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED, TRAVELERS TO THE NORTHERN GULF AREA SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL DANGER. SMALL CHILDREN AND THOSE WITH RESPIRATORY ILLNESSES SHOULD NOT TRAVEL TO THE NORTHERN GULF AREA. IN ADDITION, BLACK RAIN HAS BEEN REPORTED IN SYRIA, IRAQ, IRAN,

AFGHANISTAN, TURKEY AND SAUDI ARABIA.

EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFINITE.

NO. 91-061

THIS REPLACES THE TRAVEL ADVISORIES DATED JANUARY 25, 1991 ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA AND THE ADVISORY DATED JANUARY 16, 1991 ENTITLED WORLDWIDE PERSIAN GULF -- WARNING AND MAKES NOTE OF THE CHANGED SECURITY SITUATION IN THE AREA WITH THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

עד כאן.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,כהן,
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אל:מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

ביקור בוש במזה'ת?.

1. מבירור (12.3) עם מקור במועצה בעקבות גל השמועות בדבר ביקור צפוי של בוש במזה'ת למדתי:

א. אינם מוציאים מכלל אפשרות ביקור הנשיא באיזור.

ב. בשלב זה הנושא היפותתי וספקולטיבי.

ג. הנשיא לא ביקש לקבל הצעות הנושא ודבר לא הוצג בפניו.

ד. החלטתו (של הנשיא) בבוא העת קשורה (בין היתר) להמלצות שיקבל מבייקר בסיום מסעו.

שטיין.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא

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U.S. HOPEFUL TO SERVE AS PEACE CATALYST IN MIDEAST
(Transcript: Baker, Herzog remarks 3/12/91)

Jerusalem -- Following is the the official transcript of remarks to reporters by Secretary of State James Baker and Israeli President Chaim Herzog after their March 12 meeting at the president's residence:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Secretary Baker: Let me say how pleased I am to have had the opportunity to visit with the President. And we have had an opportunity to discuss my trip, and the discussions I've had today with the leaders of the government. And I want to thank the President for giving us this opportunity, and say that I'm looking forward to the chance to return hopefully some day very soon, to Israel. I have certainly enjoyed the visit, and stay here. I had a very illuminating tour -- helicopter tour -- today of the entire country; which is extraordinarily beautiful. I only regret the fact that I've been here for such a short period of time.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what was the most important practical achievement of your present trip?

Baker: Well, I hope it was the ability to spend a considerable amount of time with the leadership of the government; spend time with the President; be here in Israel, a trip that I wanted to make for quite some time. I'm looking forward to coming back. As I said in the press conference last night, I do think that there is perhaps an opportunity here. We have a window as a consequence of what has happened in connection with the resolution of the Gulf crisis. I think we have a window to hopefully move toward peace. This is what the United States would like to try and help and serve as a catalyst for if we can. And I am very encouraged by the meetings that I've had here, as well as the meetings that I had for the two days that I spent on the way, down in Riyadh, with representatives, foreign ministers of some Arab governments.

Q: Do you expect to -- the same way in Syria?

Baker: Well, I don't know. We'll have to see what happens.

Q: Will we see you again, Mr. Secretary, in the near future with President Bush?

Baker: Well, you saw the announcement today that President Bush wants very much to make a trip soon, to the Middle East. He, of course, would like to go to Kuwait. He made a promise

to the Emir of Kuwait to meet in Kuwait City. He wants to fulfill that promise, and he would not, of course, come to the region without coming to Israel.

(President Herzog first responded to questions in Hebrew, which closely paralleled the following in English).

President Herzog: I took the opportunity to express the appreciation of the people of Israel for the leadership of the United States, particularly of President Bush, in doing what they did to save this part of the world from the great dangers that were emanating from Iraq. I hope that he will pass on that message to the President, and also to the people of the United States of America.

Q: Were any specific peace plans discussed in your meeting with Secretary Baker?

Herzog: It was a closed meeting between him and myself. I heard from him of his impressions, and I reacted accordingly, but I don't feel free to disclose the details of the conversation.

Q: Mr. President, the Secretary knows about your own background in intelligence, as well as in politics and military affairs as well. Did he ask you any particular questions? Did he seek any particular perspective from you?

Herzog: No, I wouldn't say that. After all I left all that behind. But I hope that the conversation was constructive.

Thank you.

(END TEXT)

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PALESTINIAN ACTIVIST CALLS MEETING WITH BAKER CONSTRUCTIVE
(Transcript: Husseini-Erekat remarks 3/12/91)

Jerusalem : Following is the transcript of remarks to the press by Palestinian political activists Faisal Husseini and Saeb Erekat after their March 12 meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker at the American consul general's residence:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)
FAISAL HUSSEINI: This meeting was really a constructive meeting. We discussed a lot of things about the situation in these days about his mission, and at the same time we talked about the importance of doing something to stop the settlements in the occupied territories. And then we went to the main issue that there must be a (rebuilding) for the relations between the PLO and the United States. For sure we didn't reach full understanding, but we are happy that we hear from Mr. Baker that the talks between or the dialogue between the PLO and the United States is suspended and not terminated.
Q: Did he say anything about continuing this dialogue?

SAEB EREKAT: I'd like to interfere here, gentlemen. The group of Palestinians that came here today, they came at direct order from the PLO. This meeting would not have taken place for any Palestinian here today, without this message that we received through a third party, saying that you Palestinians must go and meet the secretary.

Q: Did you discuss the position of Mr. Yasser Arafat?
SAEB EREKAT: We said to the secretary that if he is serious about peace, if this Middle East is going to come out of the circles of violence and counter-violence, I think the only way out is for the Americans to restart the dialogue with the PLO, because without the PLO, everybody who talks about peace is not serious about it.

Q: What was the answer?
SAEB EREKAT: We are speaking about Chairman Arafat as the president of the Palestinian state, as the head of the Executive Committee of the PLO, and we said to Secretary Baker also, now it's a test for your credibility. The point about the war you waged against Iraq in the Gulf, (inaudible) it's time to implement Security Council resolutions here, and the question when Mr. Shamir says no to 242 as far as the West Bank and Gaza are concerned -- land for peace as far as the West Bank and Gaza -- because we know that the Israelis speak of 242 concerning Sinai. We want the 242 concerning the West Bank and Gaza, and this will be the test for the Americans and the world. Gentlemen, thank you very much. (END TRANSCRIPT)
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BAKER, U.S. SEES "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY"
(Text: Baker remarks before Palestinian meeting)

Jerusalem -- Following is the official text of remarks by Secretary of State James Baker prior to his meeting with Palestinian representatives in Jerusalem on March 12, 1991:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Q: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY BAKER: (Inaudible) and I thought we had a good meeting. I will say once again what I said last night following the meeting with the Foreign Minister -- I think this is a new day in this anxious situation, I think, in the aftermath of what this region has just gone through, in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, and in the aftermath of the war. And, I would hope that there would be additional flexibility on the part of all so we can take advantage of what could be a really historic opportunity to move toward peace.

Q: And your meeting today with Palestinian representatives, what does that represent?

A: Well, it represents certainly an effort on our part to show that we tend to do what we can, the United States. We intend to use whatever enhanced credibility we might have coming out of this crisis to work diligently for peace. And, I am just saying here to the group that I am very pleased that they have seen fit to ask for this meeting and that we can have this meeting and hope it can be productive and that we can find a way, again, to take advantage of this window -- this window of opportunity.

(END TEXT)

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BAKER, PRINCE SAUD EXPRESS VIEWS ON REGIONAL SECURITY
(Text: Baker/ Prince Saud remarks 3/10/91)

Riyadh -- Following is the official text of remarks by Secretary of State James Baker and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Following GCC, Egypt, Syria and U.S. Ministerial Meeting in the Saudi Arabian capital March 10, 1991:

(BEGIN TEXT)

SECRETARY BAKER: I'll let the Chairman of the meeting say a few words and then I would be glad to.

FOREIGN MINISTER SA'UD: Well, first of all, I speak on the part of all my colleagues from the eight countries who expressed their welcome to the Secretary on this very important occasion. We have, all of us, expressed our great thanks and appreciation for the role that the United States has played as regards the liberation of Kuwait and the security of the region. We especially received with great appreciation also the comments of the President in the Joint Session, particularly about peace in the region.

And we have expressed our appreciation to the position that was declared by the United States and we support this initiative and we especially think that it is a vary positive stop so soon after the and of military action the united States has taken this very important stop of sending the Secretary to the region to review lasting peace in the region. We had a very positive discussion, all of us in here. We think the ideas that were exchanged were very important. We think that the commitment that we had, perseverance that we had both shown -- the eight countries and the United States -- in working for international legality and for the liberation of Kuwait, putting together this perseverance, and as my friend Mr. Baker said, with boldness of vision and determined diplomacy, even the most intractable issues can be resolved. He has the support and the good will of those who have met with His Excellency during his trip so far.

He met with the custodian of the two holy mosques yesterday and there was a statement on that level and we assure him that he will receive from all of us, the eight countries, the same support and appreciation for the position that has been taken.

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me add to that there is a statement that will be given to all of you, a statement from the Chairman of this meeting, on behalf of all of the participants, the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Syria, Egypt and the United States, and you will have that.

We have had an opportunity here to discuss in some detail the four broad areas that we think are important in the aftermath

of this crisis and this war. That is, questions involving regional security arrangements, questions on arms control and proliferation, questions of economic cooperation, and of course, questions involving the Arab/Israeli conflict.

I want to thank the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia for arranging this meeting, giving us the opportunity to meet together to address these very important questions, and I would like to also express my appreciation and gratitude to my colleagues, some of whom have travelled some distance to be here this afternoon so we could have this dialogue.

Q. Did you make any progress, Mr. Secretary, on any of these issues, or anything you can disclose.

SECRETARY BAKER: We have made some very good progress on some of these issues. I think that there is, as His Highness has just indicated to you, a convergence of views with respect to questions of regional security. There is a convergence of views, as well, I think, with questions about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, economic cooperation, the importance of addressing in the aftermath of this significant change in the region that results from the end of this war -addressing the Arab/Israeli conflict. So, I think there in a fair degree of convergence on all of these issues.

(END TEXT)

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BAKER TO PURSUE "TWO TRACK APPROACH" ON MIDEAST PEACE
(Transcript: Baker press briefing, 3/10/91)

Following is the official transcript of the press briefing by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III enroute from Riyadh to Cairo Sunday, March 10, 1991:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me say that I think we've had a good series of meetings today, particularly the meeting with the GCC Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, and myself. After that, I had separate bilaterals with the Ministers from Syria and from Egypt, and before the plenary meeting, I had separate bilaterals with each of the GCC Foreign Ministers.

I know you are interested in the peace process, so let me say a word or two about that and then I'll try and respond to your questions. First of all, as you know, we have been trying to work a two track approach. I've been exploring with our Arab coalition partners what steps they might be able to take to signal their commitment to peace and reconciliation with Israel. Before this trip began, we had communicated to Israel the general outlines of our two track approach and I am now going to have the opportunity when we got to Israel to talk in detail and specifically with their leadership about what steps they might be willing to consider. Let me say, I am not going to go into the specific steps now because we are still exploring that. We still have a long way to go. It is very, very early. We are trying to get a process going and I would simply say that I have a sense that even though it in early, there is a greater willingness to be active on this issue in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis than there was before.

Q. Mr. Secretary, reading the statement tonight, both the Arab portion of it and the latter part, there doesn't appear to be anything here on the track of direct contacts with Israel, state to state. It all refers to the Palestinian issue and I ask you... also, I should tell you that in the public statement of the Ministers today, there was no indication of a willingness to go on that track. We have been told over and over again, this is a two track process. Did you hear anything in private that would dissuade us from the view that the Arab Foreign Ministers and Gulf ministers were only talking about one track?

A: Well, we talked at length about two tracks, and I made it very clear, at a very early stage in what we hope will be a process, we have not as yet even arrived in Israel. We have not had detailed discussions with the Israeli government about what steps they might be willing to consider and so, therefore, I don't think it is surprising that you don't have Arab governments coming out and unilaterally making statements about

steps that they would be willing to take in the absence of knowing a little bit more about what might develop as the process moves forward.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you still are not really saying though whether the two track approach is still alive and the second half of the question is in your statement, you say that the United States plans to signal peace and reconciliation to Israel. Is there any signal here beyond their traditional approach?

A. Well, you read the language. The wording you just read sounds to me like it's like a signal. In terms of whether it's still alive, let me simply say that it was only born very, very recently, so please don't declare it dead until it's actually dead. I happen to think that it's at least alive until we explore the concept and the possibilities with the leadership of Israel. Let me say that I think that the Arab governments with whom we talked generally about this today, exhibited as I have just indicated to you, a greater willingness to be active than they had in the past or than they did before the Gulf crisis was resolved, and I would interpret that to be a willingness to be active along both tracks, assuming it is a process that is embraced by others, including most importantly, Israel.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Arab states with whom you met today, give you specific concrete things they are willing to do assuming that there is reciprocity of some sort on the part of the Israelis?

A. We are not at that point. I did not ask them to commit themselves in the absence of knowing what might or not be possible on the other side of the equation. What I asked them to do was to simply consider the possibility of participating in this process and developing, in due course, some specific steps that they would be willing to consider taking if there was a willingness expressed on the part of the government of Israel.

Q: Have you gotten any response back from your offer to meet with Palestinians when you're in Israel? And, there's a second part to that -- as you go into Israel there are now reports of the Israelis shooting and wounding Arabs after a disturbance. It seems that there's quite a lot of violence. What kind of signal does that send to you as you embark on a peace process?

A: Well, obviously we have expressed our deep concern about violence in the past. I don't know the circumstances of the incident that you're talking about, so I don't want to comment beyond saying what I just said. With respect to the question of meeting with the Palestinians, it's my understanding that we have received some indication very recently that there was an

interest on the part of some Palestinians in meeting with us and as far as I know they're still working that question. I don't have a final answer for you.

Q: Their statement seems to suggest that they did not support all of what President Bush had to say the other night although some participants said they did. Can you tell us whether they supported everything the President said on the issue of ArabIsraeli peace in the speech?

A: Saul, I don't know -- we did not sit down and go line-byline through the President's speech, nor for that matter his interview with -- the recent interview he had, I don't remember who the three journalists were. But in their general comments they were very supportive of the President's speech and conveyed their overall general agreement, I think, with the thrust of what he had to say.

Q: Then I just want to add -- can you tell me what it is you see in this statement that gives you the optimism or the hope that you expressed earlier about their willingness to be more forthcoming and change their view?

A: I didn't suggest to you that my optimism -- don't by the way, don't make me overly optimistic because I don't mean to be -- but whatever sense I have there of a greater willingness to be active derives not just from that formal statement that's been put out.

Q: Can you talk in a little more detail about the Gulf security structure? What kind of role are we going to have, what kind of role would they like us to have, what are your concerns about Iran, and how are we going to get 537,000 troops home?

A: On the last question, I'm not going to get into that because that's basically an operational matter that the Defense Department could better answer for you, except to say that the President continues to make it clear that he wants to bring all of our forces home at the earliest possible opportunity. He continues to make the point that we do not desire a permanent ground presence in the Gulf, a fact that has been communicated in the meetings that I've had with all of these representatives -- all of the governments that I've met with here -- and one, that I feel comfortable telling you, that they not only accept, but agree with.

With respect to the security structure, let me say that we're talking about various levels. We're talking about an enhanced GCC, we're talking about an Arab force such as was indicated by the Damascus Communique of these very countries that I've just meet with that would be, in addition to GCC forces, would contain Egyptian and Syrian elements. We are talking about a role for the United Nations in terms of observers, particularly

with respect to the Iraq-Kuwait border. We are talking about, as well, the possibility that the United States -- not the possibility but the probability -- that the United States will continue it's naval presence in the Gulf which it has maintained for over 40 years, perhaps enhanced. We will be discussing with some countries in the Gulf the pre-positioning of equipment. We will be discussing as well, joint participation in training exercises and things like that.

Q: Thank you.

(State Department Official responds to additional questions on background)

Q: On the Palestinian meeting issue, the PLO and the Palestinians are going through this dance about whether a delegation that meets with Baker would be representing the PLO. Does Baker have some view about whether this delegation can be met representing the PLO? Would that constitute reopening of the PLO dialogue? Or doesn't it matter to him?

A: As you know, Ralph, we do not have a dialogue with the PLO and it's my understanding that individuals who are considering such a meeting with the Secretary, you would have to ask them what their affiliations are, how they would be meeting with him. As he said, this is not yet put to bed, but we have had an indication very recently. When we left D.C. he said if they requested such a meeting, of course he would be willing to meet if indeed the information that we just recently got is that they are requesting such a meeting. It is not coming -- it's my understanding and I want to be careful here because I've only seen one quick cable -- as a meeting as you characterize it, with the PLO. What I have seen are individuals and individuals' occupations of what they currently do.

Q: What about a meeting with Palestinians that have been handpicked or approved by the PLO there? In that a defacto meeting with representatives of the PLO?

A: I'm not going to get into this. These individuals, we have said and Secretary Baker said, if the Palestinians requested a meeting with him he would be, of course, he would meet with them.

Q: (Inaudible).

A: Palestinians is what he said.

Q: If you're going to meet with PLO-affiliated people and you said ask the Palestinians who they represent, so --

A: I said ask -- if such a meeting happens -- you ask the individuals who are in that meeting that question, not us. You

know we do not have a dialogue with the PLO.

Q: You're about to have one. You're saying the United States is setting no conditions for whether or not the Palestinians are PLO officials. You're saying it's up to the Palestinians to define themselves.

A: I really don't have anything further to add to this, Barry, then what the Secretary has said and what I've said tonight.

Q: What you've got out there right now are Palestinian spokesmen, perhaps even including Arafat -- I'm not sure exactly what he said yet -- but other Palestinian spokespersons, saying that a delegation was selected to ask for a meeting with Baker. So, on that basis, does he meet with them knowing that they have been pre-approved by the leadership of the PLO?

A: All I'm going to answer is to continue to answer it the way I've been answering it -- if such a meeting happens, what I have seen come in, in the cable traffic that I have read, in no stretch of the imagination has anyone sent a cable to the Secretary of State or to the State Department saying that we want you to meet with the PLO. What is being requested is a meeting with Palestinians -- that is what the Secretary of State just said to you all ten minutes ago that he would be willing to do. I am not going to answer on behalf -- if there's a meeting of these people if there was a vote in Tunis, if they went to Tunis, if they had a meeting in Tunis, if they're going to stand there and say they're representing Arafat, if they're saying they're members of the PLO -- I'm simply not going to do it for you.

Q: Does Israel have a role in arranging this meeting and have they weighed in with you their opposition to such a meeting?

A: To my knowledge I know of no role that -- I don't know what you mean by role. And I know of absolutely no weighing-in, your characterization, concerning should such a meeting take place.

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BAKER TO PURSUE "TWO TRACK APPROACH" ON MIDEAST PEACE
(Transcript: Baker press briefing, 3/10/91)

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(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me say that I think we've had a good series of meetings today, particularly the meeting with the GCC Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, and myself. After that, I had separate bilaterals with the Ministers from Syria and from Egypt, and before the plenary meeting, I had separate bilaterals with each of the GCC Foreign Ministers.

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A: Well, we talked at length about two tracks, and I made it very clear, at a very early stage in what we hope will be a process, we have not as yet even arrived in Israel. We have not had detailed discussions with the Israeli government about what steps they might be willing to consider and so, therefore, I don't think it is surprising that you don't have Arab governments coming out and unilaterally making statements about

of this crisis and this war. That is, questions involving regional security arrangements, questions on arms control and proliferation, questions of economic cooperation, and of course, questions involving the Arab/Israeli conflict.

I want to thank the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia for arranging this meeting, giving us the opportunity to meet together to address these very important questions, and I would like to also express my appreciation and gratitude to my colleagues, some of whom have travelled some distance to be here this afternoon so we could have this dialogue.

Q. Did you make any progress, Mr. Secretary, on any of these issues, or anything you can disclose.

SECRETARY BAKER: We have made some very good progress on some of these issues. I think that there is, as His Highness has just indicated to you, a convergence of views with respect to questions of regional security. There is a convergence of views, as well, I think, with questions about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, economic cooperation, the importance of addressing in the aftermath of this significant change in the region that results from the end of this war -addressing the Arab/Israeli conflict. So, I think there in a fair degree of convergence on all of these issues.

(END TEXT)

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BAKER, PRINCE SAUD EXPRESS VIEWS ON REGIONAL SECURITY
(Text: Baker/ Prince Saud remarks 3/10/91)

Riyadh -- Following is the official text of remarks by Secretary of State James Baker and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Following GCC, Egypt, Syria and U.S. Ministerial Meeting in the Saudi Arabian capital March 10, 1991:

(BEGIN TEXT)

SECRETARY BAKER: I'll let the Chairman of the meeting say a few words and then I would be glad to.

FOREIGN MINISTER SA'UD: Well, first of all, I speak on the part of all my colleagues from the eight countries who expressed their welcome to the Secretary on this very important occasion. We have, all of us, expressed our great thanks and appreciation for the role that the United States has played as regards the liberation of Kuwait and the security of the region. We especially received with great appreciation also the comments of the President in the Joint Session, particularly about peace in the region.

And we have expressed our appreciation to the position that was declared by the United States and we support this initiative and we especially think that it is a vary positive stop so soon after the and of military action the united States has taken this very important stop of sending the Secretary to the region to review lasting peace in the region. We had a very positive discussion, all of us in here. We think the ideas that were exchanged were very important. We think that the commitment that we had, perseverance that we had both shown -- the eight countries and the United States -- in working for international legality and for the liberation of Kuwait, putting together this perseverance, and as my friend Mr. Baker said, with boldness of vision and determined diplomacy, even the most intractable issues can be resolved. He has the support and the good will of those who have met with His Excellency during his trip so far.

He met with the custodian of the two holy mosques yesterday and there was a statement on that level and we assure him that he will receive from all of us, the eight countries, the same support and appreciation for the position that has been taken.

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me add to that there is a statement that will be given to all of you, a statement from the Chairman of this meeting, on behalf of all of the participants, the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Syria, Egypt and the United States, and you will have that.

We have had an opportunity here to discuss in some detail the four broad areas that we think are important in the aftermath

BAKER, U.S. SEES "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY"
(Text: Baker remarks before Palestinian meeting)

Jerusalem -- Following is the official text of remarks by Secretary of State James Baker prior to his meeting with Palestinian representatives in Jerusalem on March 12, 1991:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Q: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY BAKER: (Inaudible) and I thought we had a good meeting. I will say once again what I said last night following the meeting with the Foreign Minister -- I think this is a new day in this anxious situation, I think, in the aftermath of what this region has just gone through, in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, and in the aftermath of the war. And, I would hope that there would be additional flexibility on the part of all so we can take advantage of what could be a really historic opportunity to move toward peace.

Q: And your meeting today with Palestinian representatives, what does that represent?

A: Well, it represents certainly an effort on our part to show that we tend to do what we can, the United States. We intend to use whatever enhanced credibility we might have coming out of this crisis to work diligently for peace. And, I am just saying here to the group that I am very pleased that they have seen fit to ask for this meeting and that we can have this meeting and hope it can be productive and that we can find a way, again, to take advantage of this window -- this window of opportunity.

(END TEXT)

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U.S. MOVING CAUTIOUSLY IN MIDDLE EAST EFFORT
(NSC's Haass expresses cautious optimism)
By M. C. Jaspersen
USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- Richard N. Haass, senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, says the United States is moving cautiously in the Middle East, lest it miss or undermine some of the opportunities that are emerging.

"I'm sensitive to the idea that there are some new opportunities, but you've got to take them carefully," Haass said March 11 in remarks before a symposium on arms control in the Middle East at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

The Gulf war has made "a tremendous difference," Haass said, but cautioned that "one of the dangers of sometimes trying to get too ambitious, is that you miss the opportunities that are there, and you can undermine some potentially useful ideas by surfacing them too soon."

Haass was optimistic about new security measures in the gulf region, which he said, was "ripe" for security arrangements. "I am very confident we will be able -- working with the local states -- to help devise or bring about a set of security arrangements that will really be impressive," he said. "You can see it all -- you can see the pieces beginning to form. Clearly, there, the war did make a difference in peoples' thinking and attitudes toward violence."

He said the world "will see the greatest accomplishment in the shortest amount of time" in the area of security arrangements . "I don't know how we will fare on the other three -- in terms of a peace process, economics, and arms control. I can't give you, now, a prediction of exactly how those three will relate to one another," he said.

But Haass said he was cautious in his optimism with respect to the settlement of differences in the region. He underscored the choice of words President George Bush used in his address to Congress March 6. "Words matter," Haass said. "And we consciously chose the words 'challenges' (to peace) rather than 'pillars' (of peace), because we are not there yet.... We specifically are not using the word 'pillars,' because pillars implies two things: one, an equalness, and secondly, the idea of a plan."

The president used "challenges" instead of "pillars," because "they are exactly that: These are four areas where we think it is worthwhile for the United States and the states of the region, and others with a stake in the region -- like the Soviets, like the Europeans -- to do some lifting, to do some

work."

As a third-party negotiator working toward peace in the region, Haass said, the United States will be "trying to present an agenda, in a sense, a forward-looking set of endeavors for ourselves and the countries of the region," rather than a plan. "This will give us, I think, for months and years to come...some directions to work toward later on," he said. The objective now, he said, is to listen, and to learn.

Haass answered questions and exchanged ideas with other Middle East experts attending the day-long symposium.

Richard E. Darilek, an expert on arms control at the Rand Corporation, stressed the importance of third parties in negotiating confidence building measures, saying they had been vital in Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations.

"In this multi-lateral forum, where everybody was represented as an individual state, not as an alliance," Darilek said, "neutral and non-aligned states tended to play the role of mediator, or broker," developing compromise texts, which moved the talks forward.

"You could argue that (such third party compromise) was essential, critical to making some deals at important points in the negotiations," Darilek said. In the Middle East, he said, they will be "absolutely essential" in establishing confidence-building measures.

Pierce S. Corden, chief of European Security Negotiations Division of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said he would favor creation of a conflict prevention center for the Middle East. Corden, who said he was expressing his own views and not those of ACDA, is working on a draft of a paper which studies the role of communication in the Middle East.

Also participating in the discussion was Alan Platt, director of a "Arms Control in the Middle East" project funded by the institute. The project will study security issues in the Gulf and the Middle East, including conventional arms transfers, nuclear proliferation, security and confidence-building measures, and arms control verification.

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WILLINGNESS FOR NEW APPROACHES TO MIDEAST PEACE SEEN
(Transcript: Baker-Levy news conf. 3/11/91)

Jerusalem -- Secretary of State Baker says his conversations with Arab leaders on his current Middle East trip have revealed what he considers to be "a willingness to consider new approaches" toward peace in the region.

"Whether that ripens and materializes into specific, concrete commitments will depend in large part upon whether or not there is a similar attitude coming from the other side of the equation. And we hope very much that there will be," Baker told a news conference in Jerusalem March 11.

Speaking to reporters following a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Levy, the secretary said he did not come to Israel or the region "with any specific, particular blueprint with regard to peace. But I do come with...a willingness to explore ideas that might be generated by others."

Levy, asked if he is aware of any change in position by the Arab states toward Israel, said, "What we have heard...certainly shows encouraging signs which we did not see until now. If we do succeed in continuing to cooperate in reinforcing this direction, we will together succeed, with the nations of this region, in coming closer to those goals which seemed so far away until recently."

Following is a transcript of the Baker-Levy news conference:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, either in your talks tonight or in your meeting tomorrow with Prime Minister Shamir, have you or will you ask Israel to commit itself in principle to trading land for peace?

BAKER: I have not asked that during the course of the discussions tonight with David Levy. I don't think it comes as any surprise to all to know that the U.S. policy position calls for a comprehensive settlement based on direct negotiations on the basis of 242 and 338. And of course, President Bush made specific reference to this policy position in his address to the Congress several nights ago. Let me say that I do not come to Israel, to the region, with any specific, particular blueprint with regard to peace. But I do come with ideas. I come with a desire and a willingness to explore ideas that might be generated by others. I have corresponded with the minister about the importance of our developing ideas that might lead to peace. I told the minister and his colleagues this evening that I think that there are great opportunities in the aftermath of the recently concluded war; that I think the time is now for us to try and seize the moment to try and take

remain imbedded.

The political molds that constrain all sides from taking concrete steps toward peace can be broken. Israel's decision not to retaliate against Iraqi Scuds was a recent example. Few would have anticipated such restraint from a country that has sworn it will never be struck without striking back.

We hope for other evidence of mold-breaking as the US peace initiative advances.

(END TEXT)

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

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BAKER: Well, I think that discussions of self-government fall within the definition of political rights. I think that the term is one that needs further definition and is subject to further definition, and perhaps further definition through direct negotiation between the parties.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you spoke of what you sensed in Riyadh which sounds not quite concrete. Did you hear real specific words from any specific Arab leaders of any specific step they're prepared to take to accept Israel, or do you just find a sort of an atmosphere that you find conducive to pursuing this mission? And secondly --

BAKER: Let me answer the first question first, because I'll forget it by the time you ask your third question, so --

Let me elaborate on that by saying that on this trip so far I have seen what I consider to be at least signs of new thinking. I have seen what I consider to be a willingness to consider new approaches. I think that whether that ripens and materializes into specific, concrete commitments will depend in large part upon whether or not there is a similar attitude coming from the other side of the equation. And we hope very much that there will be. I have heard from others that the United States as a consequence of this recently concluded war has acquired an even greater credibility than it had before with Arabs and with Israel; I hope that's true. I don't assume it. And I hope when I say that, that it is understood that I do so without arrogance or without any sort of hubris. But I do want to say that it is the firm hope and desire and wish of my government, of my president, that we will not let what could be an historic opportunity pass for want of a willingness to commit ourselves to do the real hard work of peace.

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side.

BAKER: That's a pretty good way to express it, I think.

I'm encouraged by what I think was a very positive meeting that David and I have just concluded, together with our colleagues. Of course let me say that this war was only recently concluded. We are dealing here -- talking about -- an issue that is extraordinarily intractable, has proven to be so for many, many years. It will take a great deal of work and a great deal of goodwill, and a great deal of good faith on the part of all. The United States is committed to working just as hard as it knows how to contribute to the process. It is our view that we hopefully can serve as a catalyst, but we cannot impose peace. We would not try if we thought we could. We do not intend to engage in what some have referred to as pressure. We intend to reason, to cajole, to plead and to offer our good offices to see if we can seize this opportunity and make progress for peace.

Q: Mr. Baker, you are interested in the Palestinian/Israeli dialogue. There are Palestinians who are facing major problems in the occupied territories, both in the sense that political discourse is not allowed -- it is illegal to have any kind of political meetings -- and economic problems are very difficult with more than 120,000 people out of work. Will you nudge or cajole or plead with the Israelis to legitimize political discourse, including legitimizing support or sympathy with the PLO?

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Sitting around the same table and discussing this peacefully, not in a manner which is marked by murder and destruction. Therefore, the option is open to this population -- the option to choose to respond to this initiative at long last. It is time that this came to pass, just as my friend, the Secretary of State Mr. Baker said, we find ourselves following two parallel courses -- two lines of action -- both of which offer

a definite hope of making progress towards peace. As far as Israel is concerned, peace is the greatest victory of all. To date, there was a refusal among the Arab states to talk faceto-face with Israel about peace. I am pleased that they are beginning to show signs of change, and we will have to work together, patiently, and courageously, with a sense of faith and hope in order to move towards the goal which is bet for all of us -- peace in this region.

Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, are you speaking of the beginning of a change on the Arab side? From the standpoint of Israel have you drawn encouragement from anything Mr. Baker told you about positions expressed by the Arab states where he visited? Is there any change which shows a direction towards Israel? A move to Israel?

LEVY: The discussions which we had this evening first of all from the standpoint of both nations, were frank ones, open ones and constructive ones. We share a common interest -- the United States and Israel. The United States in this regard does not have any interest which runs counter to the need to coordinate with Israel and to agree with Israel on the measures being taken, and we appreciate this deeply.

What we have heard -- and we will of course keep discussing this and working on this -- certainly shows encouraging signs which we did not see until now. If we do succeed in continuing to cooperate in reinforcing this direction, we will together succeed, with the nations of this region, in coming closer to those goals which seemed so far away until recently. We will have to continue working in that direction, but we are closer than we were just yesterday.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you hear any new thinking tonight from Foreign Minister Levy, and do you think that if what Israel offers is the May '89 Shamir Plan, that that will be sufficient for the Arab states, that that will be sufficient political cover for them, to then go ahead with some of the measures you've been talking about with them?

BAKER: Let me say, I think it's important to recognize that all parties should avoid retreating into stating final positions as being non-negotiable demands. We should move -if I can borrow a phrase -- to new thinking and away from old thinking. As I mentioned, the sense I got on my trip was that there is a chance for new thinking. I think you just heard the minister say he was somewhat encouraged by what he heard, and maybe we have a chance now for some new thinking in both directions. We will not make progress on either track frankly, either, if one side or the other says we do not move until after the other side moves. And I did not detect that attitude or position here, tonight. And so to answer your question, I remain cautiously optimistic that maybe we can capitalize on

what has been a very significant event in the region, and in the aftermath of this war, maybe we can begin to grapple with these issues and move toward peace, which is the best guarantee of security for the region.
Q: Would you just answer my question on the May '89 plan?
BAKER: The May '89 plan, I expressed to the minister our pleasure that the cabinet of the government of Israel reconfirmed that plan. As you know we worked very hard for a period of 14 months to implement that proposal, came very, very close, we didn't quite make it at the last minute, but there are many features, and many elements of that proposal that we view very favorably. We think there are elements of that proposal with which the parties can work.
Q: Mr. Secretary, I'm wondering if you feel on this trip, that not enough of the flexibility that you mentioned is expressed. I wanted to know what is the commitment of this administration to keep coming back to the region, and keep trying it again and again, or is this like take it or leave it -- I mean this is an exploratory visit -- are we in a take it or leave it situation if the parties don't do enough for throwing up our hands. That's one point, and the second question is, can you tell us --
BAKER: Let me answer the first one, then you ask the second one. We are certainly not in a take it or leave it. As I just said, we do not come with particular, specific blueprint. We come with some ideas, we hope we'll hear some ideas. I think we've heard some ideas in the first couple of days, I believe we've heard some ideas here this evening. We cannot impose peace. There will not be peace in the region unless the parties themselves conclude that they want peace and are willing to do the hard nitty-gritty work that's involved in getting there. For our part, the United States is willing to do the hard nitty-gritty repetitive work that will clearly be involved if we're going to make progress on this very, very difficult problem.
Q: The support that this administration has shown until now for Soviet Jewish immigration is known here, and I was wondering if you could say definitively that any future assistance, be it in housing guarantees or other form assistance, would be totally unlinked to progress in the peace process, or totally divorced from any movement that you have been speaking of?
BAKER: We have not linked aid to progress on the peace process, and I told the minister tonight that there's one thing of which he and the government of Israel should be very, very sure, and that is that the commitment of the United States to the security of Israel is firm. That will not change; that will not waiver. We are willing to work very, very hard. We think and hope that we can serve as a catalyst, and particularly in the aftermath of what has just taken place in connection with this war. (END TRANSCRIPT)
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KUWAIT EXPECTS "SUFFICIENT FINANACING" FOR RECONSTRUCTION
(Transcript: Al Sultan before House panel 3/11/91)

Washington -- Fawzi Hamad Al-Sultan, former director of the Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program, told a congressional subcommittee hearing on reconstruction of Kuwait March 11 that his country expects to have "sufficient financing to handle all our reconstruction program."

His statement came in response to questions from members of the House of Representatives Small Business Subcommittee on Exports, Tax Policy and Special Problems, holding hearings to determine what role U.S. small businesses might play in rebuilding Kuwait.

Asked if there is going to be "a call upon the World Bank" or "upon the United States or other countries for financial assistance," Al Sultan, who is also executive director of the World Bank, replied:

"So far Kuwait has adequate foreign reserves. Kuwait's financial position remains excellent. And we're hoping that within the next few months we should be able to restore oil production. This is what our oil people have told us. And so that will also add to some of our income.

"...Kuwait is not eligible," he added, "for financing from the World Bank; our income per capita is of high enough level. We expect that we will have sufficient financing to handle all our reconstruction program."

Following is a transcript of the hearing, chaired by Representative Norman Sisisky, Virginia Democrat, in which Mr. Al Sultan outlined the planned stages for Kuwaiti reconstruction:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

REP. SISISKY: (Sounds gavel.) Good morning. The meeting will come to order. As chairman of the House Small Business Subcommittee on Exports, Tax Policy and Special Problems, I've called this hearing today to explore how small businesses in the United States can participate in the rebuilding of Kuwait. Quite simply, I intend for this hearing to be an informational resource for American small businesses seeking to play a role in the reconstruction of Kuwait. Without question there are opportunities and it's just a matter of our businesses knocking on the right doors. Hopefully, after this hearing, those doors will be better marked.

Most certainly we're living in extraordinary times. In a little over a year and a half we've seen the Berlin Wall crumble, the Cold War end and the peace lost and then restored

WILLINGNESS FOR NEW APPROACHES TO MIDEAST PEACE SEEN
(Transcript: Baker-Levy news conf. 3/11/91)

Jerusalem -- Secretary of State Baker says his conversations with Arab leaders on his current Middle East trip have revealed what he considers to be "a willingness to consider new approaches" toward peace in the region.

"Whether that ripens and materializes into specific, concrete commitments will depend in large part upon whether or not there is a similar attitude coming from the other side of the equation. And we hope very much that there will be," Baker told a news conference in Jerusalem March 11.

Speaking to reporters following a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Levy, the secretary said he did not come to Israel or the region "with any specific, particular blueprint with regard to peace. But I do come with...a willingness to explore ideas that might be generated by others."

Levy, asked if he is aware of any change in position by the Arab states toward Israel, said, "What we have heard...certainly shows encouraging signs which we did not see until now. If we do succeed in continuing to cooperate in reinforcing this direction, we will together succeed, with the nations of this region, in coming closer to those goals which seemed so far away until recently."

Following is a transcript of the Baker-Levy news conference:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, either in your talks tonight or in your meeting tomorrow with Prime Minister Shamir, have you or will you ask Israel to commit itself in principle to trading land for peace?

BAKER: I have not asked that during the course of the discussions tonight with David Levy. I don't think it comes as any surprise to all to know that the U.S. policy position calls for a comprehensive settlement based on direct negotiations on the basis of 242 and 338. And of course, President Bush made specific reference to this policy position in his address to the Congress several nights ago. Let me say that I do not come to Israel, to the region, with any specific, particular blueprint with regard to peace. But I do come with ideas. I come with a desire and a willingness to explore ideas that might be generated by others. I have corresponded with the minister about the importance of our developing ideas that might lead to peace. I told the minister and his colleagues this evening that I think that there are great opportunities in the aftermath of the recently concluded war; that I think the time is now for us to try and seize the moment to try and take

advantage of these opportunities; that I sensed during my two days in Riyadh the beginnings of perhaps a bit of a different attitude on the part of some countries; that we would like to pursue the possibilities of peace on a dual track -- moving in parallel on the track of Arab state/Israeli relations and on the path of Israeli/Palestinian relations, dialogue and so forth.

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אל: שילה וושינגטון

להלן תכנית ביקור מזכיר המדינה בייקר ורעייתו - ארה'ב

יום שני 11/3

14.35 - הגעה לנתב'ג בטיסה מיוחדת. נסיעה ל'יד ושם' - ירושלים. 15.30 - ביקור ב'יד ושם' והנחת זר. 16.15 - יציאה לשער יפו. 16.30 - סיור בירושלים עם טדי קולק. 18.00 - חזרה למלון. 18.20 - יציאה למשכן נשיאי ישראל. 18.30 - פגישה עם הנשיא. 19.15 - ישיבת עבודה וארוחת ערב במלון עם שה'ח. לינה: מלון המלך דוד, ירושלים

יום שלישי 12/3

08.20 - יציאה מהמלון למשרד רה'מ. 08.30 - פגישה עם רה'מ בלשכתו. 09.50 - יציאה לכנסת. 10.00 - פגישה עם שהב'ט בכנסת. 11.15 - יציאה למינחת הכנסת. 11.30 - המראה לסיור בצפון. נחיתת ביניים לביקור במרכז קליטה בכרמיאל (חצי שעה). 14.30 - נחיתה בירושלים (מינחת הכנסת). 16.15 - פגישה עם ח'כ שמעון פרס - במלון. 17.30 - פגישה עם ח'כ יצחק רבין - במלון. 19.15 - פגישה עם הנשיא. 20.00 - ארוחת ערב פרטית אצל רה'מ.
לינה: מלון המלך דוד, ירושלים

יום ד' 13/3

09.15 - יציאה לנתב'ג 10.00 - המראה

מאו'ר/מצפא

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,רביב,
מאור

סססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

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מ-:המשרד,תא:060391,זת:1604,דת:ב,סג:סו,
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סודי/בהול

אל: וושינגטון ציר

הנדון: ביקור בייקר
שלכם 2020 מ-5/3

השגרירות האמריקאית הודיעתנו על נכונות המזכיר לטוס מעל יו'ש והגולן.
ביקשו להבטיח כמיסות ההחלטה שכן דליפת הענין עלולה להביא לביטולה.

בנצור

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),בנצור,
מצפא

סססס

אאאא,חוזם:14527
אל:רהמש/941
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:242,תא:130391,זח:1648,דח:מ,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמ"ס/מיידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: בקור המזכיר - תמלילים

ממשרד דוברת מחמ"ד כאן פורסמו התמלילים המפורטים להלן. מניחים שהכל בידיכ ולכן לא, חוזר לא, מעבירים התמלילים. לפיכך, לידיעתכם:-

א. דברי המזכיר בייקר בהגיעו למלון המלך דוד.

ב. דברי המזכיר לפני פגישתו עם קבוצת הפלסטינאים.

ג. דברי שה"ח, המזכיר וראש עירית כרמיאל - בעת הביקור בכרמיאל.

ד. דברי ח"כ רבין לאחר פגישתו עם המזכיר.

ה. דברי פייסל אל-חוסייני וסעיב ארקאת לאחר פגישתם עם המזכיר.

עתונות

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא,סולטן,רביב,
מעת,הסברה,@(דוצ),@(נוה/משהבט)

ששסס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס ג ל ו י

אאאא,חוזם:16907
אל:רהמש/1083
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:281,תא:150391,זת:1617,דת:מ,סג:בל,
בבב
בלמ"ס / מיידי

כט אדר תשנ"א
15 מרס 91

אל:הסברה

דע:מצפא, תפוצות

שיחת תדרוך 15/3/91

מנהל מצפ"א סוקר ביקור בייקר, (איננו מבין מדוע לא קיבלנו מברק סיכום).

התכוננו ללחץ מדיני והורדת הכפפות - הדבר לא קרה.

מטרות ביקורו היו אחרות:הערכת מצב, הבהרת מטרות ארה"ב, הדגשת המומנט ההיסטורי וקיום אפשרויות חדשות לתהליך השלום.

מטרותינו:להפגין מחויבות לתהליך השלום והנכונות לקדמו בהסמתך על יוזמתנו ממאי 1989.

לאפשר לו להכיר את הארץ: מימדיה, חשיפה לבעיות הכלכליות-החברתיות, תיירות- תוך שימת דגש על המקומות הקדושים (ולבקשתו).
התקיים ביקור ביד ושם, 4 שעות במסוק.

השיחות ותוכנן:

נפגש עם שה"ח, שהב"ט ופעמיים עם רוה"מ (במשרד ובבית). כן נפגש עם הנשיא, שני נציגי האופוזיציה ופלסטינאים.

בא"ע עם שה"ח בייקר הציג 4 האתגרים האמריקאים לאזור: ייצוב אזור המפרץ, בטווח קצר ייצוב מועצת המפרץ, כח בין ערבי ונוכחות אמריקאית מעבר לקו האופק.

בטווח הארוך דיבר על בעיות צמצום ופרוק הנשק, שם דגש על נשק לא קונבנציונלי (ABC) .

אנחנו הצגנו בעייתנו מבחינת הנשק הקונבנציונלי וכן נושא הסרת החימוש - ישראל מול 20 מדינות ערב.

נושא שלישי - שיקום ופיתוח כלכלי:הרחבת הייצוב באזור ע"י צמצום הפערים הכלכליים.

מכאן עבר לנושא העיקרי מבחינתנו, הסכסוך פתח במחויבות ארה"ב לבטחון ישראל. הנוסחא של שטחים תמורת שלום - לא תפסה מקום נכבד בשיחות.
העדיף לאמץ הנוסחא של 242 ו-338 .(כאשר הפלש שלהם כולל שטחים תמורת שלום). אמר כי אם מדינות ערב היו משוכנעות שנשנה דרכינו, הרי אצלם היתה קורית תפנית משמעותית ביחסן לישראל. דיבר בחיוב על יוזמת שמיר, סבור שניתן להמשיך ולהתקדם.

רואה ערך לכל דיאלוג - כולל עם הפלשטינאים.לשאלה מה אתה מביא ממדינות ערב היה לו מעט להביע, הוא חש בשינוי - לא היה יכול להציע דבר מעבר לזה.

היה בדרכו לסוריה = ספקני לגבי נכונות אסאד לשלום. הדגיש שפעולותיהם עם סוריה נעשות בעיניים פתוחות.

שימור הקואליציה לאחר המלחמה חשוב להם כמו בתקופה שלפני המלחמה.

שה"ח הדגיש כי נסיוננו עם קואליציות ערביות אינו טוב - יכול להיות שיבוא יום והן (8 חברות הקואליציה) תהיינה נגד ישראל.

על ירדן לא דיבר, כן לא תאר מה יהיו מהלכיו הבאים. טען לצורך חשיבה יצירתית.באשר לועידה אזורית - הסברנו שאנחנו מוכנים לשבת עם מדינות ערב בכל צורה שנראית להם.

בייקר לא נכנס לפרטים - אך רשם לפניו.

באשר לפרוק נשק, יודע שאנחנו מעונינים וביקש לשמוע מחשבותינו בנושא. שאלות

קונכ"ל יוסטון - מה היתה תשובתנו באשר לפרוק נשק.

ת - שה"ח דיבר על הצורך לזהירות מירבית, על הרעיונות להיבחן בקונטקסט הכולל, הציע הקמת צוותי עבודה משותפים, שיהיו אחראים לבחינת הנושא. אם נעבוד עם ארה"ב הסיכויים גדלים בלעדיהם הסיכונים גדלים.

ציר הסברה

תהליך השלום, ברשות הקונסוליות תומר הסברה שקיבלו מהארץ. כאשר מדברים על תכניתנו מ-1989 בנקודה 4 - מדגישים המ"ומ עם הפלשטינאים.

באשר לשאלות לגבי CBM מצידנו מפנה תשומת הלב לדברי שה"ח אותם קיבלנו היום:יעדנו להקל על חיי תושבי השטחים, אולם זה איננו ניתן להעשות יחד עם נקיטת טרור . וכנ"ל גם בדברי רוה"מ ושהב"ט.

- שבועון מז"ת שקיבלנו, סוקר הנעשה בצורה בהירה וטובה.

- כן מפנים תשומת הלב להערכת המצב של דובר צה"ל.

- הסורים רואים כמה יתרונות הין ביחס לארה"ב ואירופה והן כלפי העולם הערבי. יש להפנות תשומת הלב להתחמשותם.

- אשפ - יש נסיון להחלץ מהשפל אליו נקלע.משתמשים בכפל דיבור, בראיון עראפאת היום ב- NYT - יש הוכחה להמשך דרכם הקיצונית. - בתחילת השבוע תגיע לארץ משלחת מנהיגות בית הנבחרים. ההרכב הסופי יועבר לקונסוליות.

- רואים תחילת פעילות אינטנסיבית של הערבים ובמיוחד פלשטינאים, בנושא פני המז"ת לאחר המלחמה במפרץ.

בסמינרים משתתפים : חנן עשראוי, הישאם שרעבי. מוחמד תאלאג' ועוד. מבקשים דיווחים על הסמינרים השונים שיקיימו.

- יהודי אטיופיה - קיבלו הודעת דובר המשרד מאתמול.

- השתלמות תקשורת תיפתח ב-22/4 בוושינגטון.

מהקונסוליות

לוס אנג'לס

1 . מאפייני התקשורת:שבח לגישות הממשל בנושא הנתיב הכפול ופסימיות בנושא ויתורים טריטוריאלים מצד ממישראל.

2 . בערב בונדס לקהילה הישראלית, נשבר שיא:נאספו 8 מיליון דולר.

3 . מושל קליפורניה יקיים טקס ליום העצמאות.

4 . משלחת ראשי הערים חזרה - קיימו במקומותיהם -מסיבות עתונאים ותדרוכים.

5 . השגריר לאו"ם ביקר בלוס אנג'לס , נפגש עם ר/העיר.

6 . ביקור מוצלח של משלחת הנוער.

פילדלפיה

1 . מבקר אותם נוויל למדן - התראיין בעתונות, תדרך הפורום של מקצועני הארגונים היהודיים - הנהגת הפדרציה.

2 . הקונכ"ל ביקר בוושינגטון לפגישה עם המורשים גריי ווישנר - בנושא הפורום של מרטין לוטר קינג.

3 . נערך קונצרט של הפילהרמונית.

ניו-יורק

- מסע בייקר היה במרכז הדיווחים בתקשורת.

- בישיבת פלטבוש בברוקלין הוענק פרס יקיר התפוצות לקונכ"ל ולמלקלום הונלייין.

בוסטון

עסוקים לקראת ביקור הפילהרמונית - קונצרט וארועים מסביב לו.

שיקגו

משלחת הנוער- קיימו ק"פ בבית הקונכ"ל - ישתתף ר/העיר, נכבדים ותקשורת.

אטלנטה

ראשי הערים של שרלוט וקולומביה יוצאים לכנס ראשי הערים בירושלים.
שואל בנושא טאהר שאריטה וציר הסברה מוסר המידע.

יוסטון

כנס ראשי ערים - הקונסוליות חייבות להיות בענין, לא יתכן שהמארגנים לא יתייחסו להמלצות הקונכ"לים מחד ויבואו בתביעות ברגע האחרון.

שבת שלום

עודד בן חיים

תפוצה:שהח,ששהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,בנאבו,תפוצות,
מצפא,מעת,הסברה,ממד

ששסס

PM-MIDEAST-BAKER-ARRIVAL
BAKER ARRIVES IN ISRAEL ON MIDEAST PEACE MISSION

TEL AVIV, Israel, Reuter - Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Israel Monday amid an upsurge of violence to discuss plans for Middle East peace.

He was visiting Israel for the first time in more than two years as secretary of state.

Baker's arrival, covered live by Army Radio, followed stops in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt. He was met by Foreign Minister David Levy as he emerged from his U.S. Air Force plane.

Ten people were killed in Arab-Israeli violence in the 24 hours before Baker arrived.

A Palestinian stabbed four Jewish women to death Sunday and Israeli troops killed six Arab gunmen after they infiltrated from Jordan early Monday.

Before flying to Israel from Egypt, Baker said he would be seeking an Israeli response to Sunday's declarations of broad support for U.S. positions from a group of eight Arab allies.

Israel has already rejected any trading of land for peace as proposed by President Bush. It captured the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt in the 1967 Middle East war.

REUTER
Reut08:27 03-11

PM-MIDEAST-BAKER-TOUR
BAKER CANCELS JERUSALEM TOUR AFTER ARAB KILLS FOUR ISRAELIS

By Carol Giacomo

CAIRO, Egypt, Reuter - Secretary of State James Baker Monday cancelled a walking tour of Jerusalem's Old City after an Arab stabbed four Israeli women to death.

Baker is visiting Cairo on a Middle East tour to seek a settlement of Arab-Israeli issues after the Gulf War defeat of Iraq.

"There is a very emotional climate in Jerusalem," Baker's spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler, told reporters.

"We do not want to inadvertently do anything that contributes to a possible increase in that emotionalism."

Baker cancelled the walking tour after the Arab stabbed the four women Sunday and told his interrogators in the hospital: "This is a message for Baker."

Tutwiler commented: "It's obviously inappropriate to be visiting sites on the heels of an appalling and tragic act of violence."

Baker is in Cairo on the second leg of a 10-day tour of the Middle East and the Soviet Union to try to put together a plan for bringing stability and peace to the region.

Tutwiler said that "as the world looks to a new day to this region, it is obvious that some prefer the violent ways of the past."

"They reject hope and reconciliation. We must not let these rejectionists define what is possible," she said.

Just three days before Baker's visit to Israel, Israeli troops shot and wounded 55 Arabs. Tutwiler said that Baker was also concerned about this kind of violence.

She announced that Baker, on the Israeli leg of the tour, would meet Palestinians Tuesday. She declined to identify them.

REUTER
Reut05:59 03-11

ידיעות לעתונות

לע"מ

ביקור מזכיר המדינה בייקר בישראל

10.03.91. ----------

(נמסר ע"י לשכת העתונות הממשלתית)

ירושלים, כ"ד באדר תשנ"א, 10 במרץ 1991 (לע"מ עש"ת 2)

מזכיר המדינה מר ג'יימס בייקר ורעיתו, יגיעו לביקור בישראל בימים ב'-ד', 11-13.3.91. בזמן הביקור יפעל מטעם לשכת העתונות הממשלתית ומשרד החוץ מרכז תקשורת במלון המלך דוד בירושלים.

על מספרי הטלפון במרכז ושעות הפתיחה המדויקות תבוא הודעה.

לע"מ עש"ת (דף מס' 2)

אא/פי 14:50

NNNN

STATE OF ISRAEL **Press bulletin** GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE

JERUSALEM, 10 MARCH 1991

#21 KING DAVID PRESS CENTER FOR BAKER VISIT

/91.03.10 (GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE)

DURING THE VISIT TO ISRAEL OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER, STARTING TOMORROW (MONDAY) THROUGH WEDNESDAY, 11-13.3.91, THE GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WILL OPERATE A PRESS CENTER AT THE KING DAVID HOTEL IN JERUSALEM. TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF THE CENTER AND ITS EXACT HOURS OF OPERATION WILL BE ANNOUNCED.

SL/DF 14:45 HOURS
#0

ידיעות לעתונות

לע"מ

תכנית ביקור מזכיר המדינה, מר ג'יימס בייקר

11.03.91 ----------

(נמסר ע"י דובר משרד החוץ)

ירושלים, כ"ה באדר תשנ"א, 11 במרץ 1991 (לע"מ עש"ת 4)

יום ב', 11.03.91:

14:35 - הגעה לנתב"ג, יתקבל ע"י ס/רה"מ ושה"ח דוד לוי. אפשרות לצילום בלבד, לא תהיינה הצהרות. צלמים מתבקשים להגיע לשער המכס עד השעה 14:00. הכניסה תותר רק לבעלי תעודות עתונאי בנות תוקף של לע"מ.

15:30 - ביקור ביד-ושם. אפשרות לצילום בכניסה ובאוהל יזכור. "פול" הצלמים: טלויזיה ישראלית, נתי שוחט/פלאש 90, צלם רשמי של מדינת ישראל.

16:30 - סיור בירושלים בליווי ראש העיר מר טדי קולק. המזכיר יבקר, בין היתר, בכנסיית הקבר הקדוש ובכותל המערבי. "פול" הצלמים: טלויזיה ישראלית, ירון קמינסקי, זוהר דורי/פלאש 90, צלם רשמי של מדינת ישראל.

19:15 - ארוחת עבודה עם ס/רה"מ ושה"ח, מר דוד לוי, במלון המלך דוד. אפשרות צילום בתחילת הארוחה. צלמי טלויזיה ועתונות, רק בעלי תעודות עתונאי, מתבקשים להגיע עד השעה 18:30.

לאחר ארוחת הערב, במלון המלך דוד, ייפגשו השר לוי ומזכיר המדינה עם העתונאים וישיבו על מספר שאלות. כתבים וצלמים, בעלי תעודות עתונאי תקפות, מתבקשים להגיע עד השעה 21:00.

החל מצהרי יום ב', 11.03.91, יקיים משרד החוץ מרכז תקשורת במלון המלך דוד. מספרי הטלפון של מרכז התקשורת 02-244940, 02-244841. מספר הפקס: 02-245659

מחלקת העתונות של משרד החוץ תקיים נוכחות במשרד כרגיל. מספרי הטלפון: 02-521325, 02-303345/3. מספר הפקס: 02-303408.

לע"מ עש"ת (דף מס' 2)

וק/וק 12:40

NNNN

STATE OF ISRAEL

Press bulletin

JERUSALEM, 10 MARCH 1991

#21 BAKER'S SCHEDULE AND POOL COVERAGE -- CORRECTION

/91.03.10 (COMMUNICATED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN)
(NOT FOR PRIOR PUBLICATION)

THE FOLLOWING IS THE CORRECTION OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER'S SCHEDULE FOR TODAY, (MONDAY) 11.3.91, AS COMMUNICATED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, TOGETHER WITH POOL COVERAGE OF EVENTS:

MONDAY, 11.3.91:

14:35 - RECEPTION ON ARRIVAL AT BEN GURION AIRPORT BY PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR AND FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY. PHOTO OPPORTUNITY ONLY. PHOTOGRAPHERS ARE REQUESTED TO ARRIVE BETWEEN 13:45 AND 14:15, AT THE CUSTOMS GATE. ENTRY WITH VALID GPO PRESS CARDS ONLY.

15:30 - VISIT YAD VASHEM. PHOTO OPP. AT ENTRANCE. POOL COVERAGE OF VISIT TO MUSEUM BY: T.V -- VISNEWS; STILLS -- AFP, MAGNUM

16:30 - TOUR OF JERUSALEM WITH MAYOR TEDDY KOLLEK. POOL COVERAGE BY: T.V. -- CNN, ANTENNE 2; PRINT -- AP; STILLS -- AP, SABA PHOTOS

19:15 - DINNER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY AT THE KING DAVID HOTEL. PHOTO OPP. AT BEGINNING OF DINNER. STILLS PHOTOGRAPHERS AND T.V. CREWS WITH VALID GPO PRESS CARDS ONLY SHOULD ARRIVE BY 18:30.

AFTER DINNER, FOREIGN MINISTER LEVY AND SECRETARY BAKER WILL MEET THE PRESS AND ANSWER QUESTIONS. JOURNALISTS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS WITH VALID GPO PRESS CARDS SHOULD ARRIVE AT THE KING DAVID HOTEL BY 21:00.

DB/DS
#0

10:45 HOURS

ידיעות לעתונות

לע"מ

תכנית ביקור מזכיר המדינה, מר ג'יימס בייקר מחר, 12.3.91

11.03.91

(נמסר ע"י דובר משרד החוץ)

ירושלים, כ"ה באדר תשנ"א, 11 במרץ 1991 (לע"מ עש"ת 12)

יום שלישי, 12.3.91

08:30 - פגישה עם רה"מ, מר יצחק שמיר בלשכתו.
"פול" ע"י : טלויזיה-ABC, TF1
צלמים : רויטרס, טיים, סיפה.

10:00 - פגישה עם שהב"ט, מר משה ארנס, בלשכת רה"מ.
"פול" ע"י : טלויזיה-ABC, TF1
צלמים : רויטרס, טיים, סיפה.

11:00 - המראה לסיור מסוקים בלויית ס/רה"מ ושה"ח - מינחת הכנסת.
אפשרות צילום.
צלמים,בעלי תעודות עתונאי בלבד, מתבקשים להגיע למינחת עד 11:00.

12:30 - נחיתה בכרמיאל.
מפגש עם עולים חדשים, מכללת "אורט", כרמיאל.
"פול" למפגש עם העולים: טלויזיה-NBC
עתונות כתובה: AP
צלמים : AFP, סיפה.

13:10 - הצהרות ע"י שני השרים, רחבת מכללת "אורט".
כתבים וצלמים בעלי תעודות עתונאי תקפות מתבקשים להגיע למכללת "אורט" עד 12:15.

16:10 - פגישה עם ח"כ שמעון פרס, מלון "המלך דוד".
אפשרות צילום.
הסידורים ייקבעו ע"י שגרירות ארה"ב. מידע נוסף - במרכז התקשורת במלון.

17:30 - פגישה עם ח"כ יצחק רבין, מלון "המלך דוד".
אפשרות צילום.
הסידורים ייקבעו ע"י שגרירות ארה"ב. מידע נוסף - במרכז התקשורת במלון.

19:15 - נשיא המדינה, מר חיים הרצוג, יקבל את מזכיר המדינה במשכן נשיאי ישראל.
"פול" ע"י : טלויזיה-WTN
אפשרות לכיסוי נוסף - הסידורים ייקבעו ע"י לשכת הנשיא.

20:00 - רה"מ ורעייתו יארחו את מר בייקר ורעייתו לארוחת ערב פרטית במעונם בירושלים.
"פול" ע"י : טלויזיה-CBS, ANTENNE 2.
צלמים : AP, גמה.
(FREELANCE)RINA CASTELNUOVO HOLLANDER

אפשר לקבל את תכנית בייקר בלשכת העתונות הממשלתית ובמרכז תקשורת במלון "המלך דוד".

במהלך הביקור יקיים משרד החוץ מרכז תקשורת במלון "המלך דוד"

לע"מ עש"ת (דף מס' 7)
פי 19:00
NNNN

STATE OF ISRAEL

Press bulletin

JERUSALEM, 11 MARCH 1991

#21 BAKER'S SCHEDULE AND POOL COVERAGE

/91.03.11 (COMMUNICATED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN)

TUESDAY, 12.3.91:

08:30 - MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR IN HIS OFFICE.
POOL: TELEVISION -- ABC, TF1; PHOTOS -- REUTERS, TIME, SIPA.

10:00 - MEET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE ARENS AT PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE.
POOL: TELEVISION -- ABC, TF1; PHOTOS -- REUTERS, TIME, SIPA.

11:00 - TAKE-OFF FOR HELICOPTER TOUR WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER FROM KNESSET LAUNCH PAD.
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY: PHOTOGRAPHERS, WITH VALID PRESS CARDS, ARE REQUESTED TO ARRIVE AT THE LAUNCH PAD BEFORE 11:00.

12:30 - LAND IN CARMIEL. MEET WITH NEW IMMIGRANTS AT ORT COLLEGE.
POOL: TELEVISION -- NBC; PRINT -- AP; PHOTOS -- AFP, SIPA.

13:10 - STATEMENTS BY LEVY AND BAKER IN COLLEGE PLAZA.
JOURNALISTS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS WITH VALID PRESS CARDS ARE REQUESTED TO ARRIVE AT THE ORT SCHOOL BY 12:15.

16:10 - MEET WITH MK SHIMON PERES AT KING DAVID HOTEL.
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY. ARRANGEMENTS BY U.S. EMBASSY; INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT HOTEL PRESS CENTER.

17:30 - MEET WITH MK YITZHAK RABIN AT KING DAVID HOTEL.
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY. ARRANGEMENTS BY U.S. EMBASSY; INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT HOTEL PRESS CENTER.

19:15 - PRESIDENT CHAIM HERZOG TO RECEIVE SECRETARY BAKER AT HIS RESIDENCE.
POOL: TELEVISION -- WTN; ADDITIONAL COVERAGE POSSIBLE -- TO BE DETERMINED BY PRESIDENT'S OFFICE.

20:00 - PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. SHAMIR TO HOST SECRETARY AND MRS. BAKER FOR PRIVATE DINNER AT THEIR JERUSALEM RESIDENCE.
POOL: TELEVISION -- CBS, ANTENNE 2; PHOTOS -- AP, GAMMA; FREELANCE -- RINA CASTELNUOVO HOLLANDER.

SL/SL
#0

21:30 HOURS

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אאאא,חוזם:40698
אל:רהמש/3277
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:601,תא:280291,זח:1312,דח:ב,סג:שמ,
בבבב
שמור/בהול

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ביקור המזכיר
==========

הודיעוני עכשיו ממחמ"ד (11:45 שעוננו) שישנה תכנית פרלימינרית שעדיין צפויים בה שינויים והנראית, לפי שעה, כך:

- ייצאו מוושינגטון כנראה ביום ד' 6/3.

- ביום ו' 8/3 יקיימו בריאד, תחנתם הראשונה, כנס בדרג שרי-חוץ עם ברית מדינות המפרץ יחד עם סוריה ומצרים.

- התחנה השניה קהיר.

- התחנה השלישית ישראל ואינם יודעים עדיין מתי יגיעו, אך ודאי לא לפני יום א' ה-10/3 או יום ב' ה- 11.

- התחנות הבאות לפי הסדר: דמשק, אנקרה ומוסקבה.

כאמור, כל זה אינו סופי.

שילה

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא,סולטן

סססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:283
אל:רהמש/34
מ-:המשרד,תא:010391,זח:1242,דח:ב,סג:שמ,
בבבב
3653
שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: וושינגטון - שגריר, ציר

הנדון: ביקור בייקר
לשלכם 601

1. סגן האמריקאי התקשר ומסר כי באופן טנטטיבי אמור מזכיר המדינה לבקר בישראל מיום א', ה-10.3 (נחיתה משוערת 14.15) ועד יום ג', ה-12.3 (המראה מתוכננת 11.30).

2. פאריס מצפה לקבל 'הצעות לתכנית' עוד היום, וכמובן מאליו נודה להמלצותיכם.

3. כאמור במברקנו מאתמול, אנו מחייבים חלק סיורי בביקור.

מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),בנצור,
מצפא

סססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:784
אל:רהמש/73
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:14,תא:010391,זח:1206,דח:מ,סג:שמ,
בבבב
שמור/מיידי

אל:מנהל מצפ"א

דע:לש' שה"ח

מאת:השגריר, וושינגטון

בקור בייקר. שלך 12.

בנפרד נעביר תמונת מצב והערכה לקראת הבקור.

אשר לתכנית מחייבים בקור מוטס ובנוסף לכך קיום מפגש עם עולים מבריה"מ ואתיופיה, בקור בפארק התעשייתי מדעי בירושלים (בו רכוז גדול של עולים מבריה"מ) או במכון ויצמן וכן כמובן סיור בירושלים, נזקי הסקאדים וסוללת פטריוט.

שובל

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),בנצור,
מצפא

סססס

AM-BAKER-ISRAEL (SCHEDULED, PICTURE)

BAKER ARRIVES IN VIOLENCE-TORN ISRAEL ON PEACE MISSION

By Carol Giacomo

JERUSALEM, Reuter - Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Israel for the first time Monday to promote his plan for Middle East peace against a backdrop of deepening Israeli-Arab violence.

Ten people died in the 24 hours before his arrival -- six Arab gunmen killed infiltrating from Jordan Monday morning and four Jewish women knifed to death by a Palestinian Sunday.

"I must say to you that I am deeply saddened by the appalling and horrifying events of yesterday," Baker told reporters.

"What has happened, in my view, is an effort to kill peace. And it makes us even more determined to work just as hard as we can to see if we can arrive at peace between Arabs and Israelis."

Baker, on his first visit to Israel since taking office 26 months ago, had to cancel a walking tour of Jerusalem's Old City because of the upsurge in Arab-Israeli tension.

The attacks could put additional obstacles in the way of Baker's efforts to persuade Israel to move toward peace with its Arab neighbors and Palestinians.

Yossi Ben-Aharon, director general of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's office, told Israel radio: "Of course there are differences of view."

Ben-Aharon repeated Israeli opposition to the U.S. call for the Jewish state to trade land for peace.

Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights in the 1967 Middle East war.

In addition to talks with Israel leaders, Baker arranged to meet Palestinians opposed to the Israeli occupation.

The meeting Tuesday with prominent Palestinians, who support the Palestine Liberation Organization, was arranged after days of uncertainty by both sides. The PLO in Tunis, Tunisia, said it gave the go-ahead for the meeting.

U.S.-PLO relations, strained since Washington broke off talks last June, worsened when the PLO backed Iraq in the Gulf War.

"We're not having a dialogue with the PLO," said a senior U.S. official on Baker's airplane.

Israel bans contact with the PLO, which it brands a terrorist organization. Palestinians consider it their representative.

The senior U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Palestinians and the PLO were in turmoil after Iraq's defeat by the U.S.-led coalition.

He said Baker discovered in three days of talks with Arab allies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that Arabs "generally feel that there's probably going to be some kind of change" in the Palestinian leadership.

The prevailing sentiment was that "no one had any use for (PLO Chairman Yasser) Arafat," and several Arab leaders said they would refuse to sit down with him, the official said.

The official said Americans expected the Palestinians to talk about the PLO Tuesday but Baker will explain why the PLO cannot be in the peace process.

He said Baker felt it important to describe a four-point U.S. postwar blueprint to establish a regional security arrangement, encourage economic cooperation, promote arms control and advance Arab-Israeli peace.

"We see this as a new day in the region, at least

potentially," the U.S. official said. "And if this is a new day, they have to have the courage to step forward."

Baker had never visited Israel, largely because of tensions with its ally over his previous peace effort. A year ago Shamir rejected his call for Israeli-Palestinian talks.

After landing in Israel, Baker was whisked off by Foreign Minister David Levy to Yad Vashem, the national memorial to 6 million Jews killed by the Nazis in World War II.

"A chilling reminder of a tragedy that must never be repeated. With great respect and affection for the Jewish people," Baker wrote in the guest book after laying a wreath before an eternal memorial flame.

REUTER

Reut14:35 03-11

5

To: Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir March 11, 1991
Director General Yosef Ben Aharon

From: Dr. Dore Gold, U.S. Desk, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies

RE: Visit on 7/8 March with Richard Haas (NSC), Aaron David Miller (State-Policy Planning), Steve Simon (State-Political-Military Affairs--Policy Planning), Paul Einehorn (Policy Planning--Responsible for Middle East Arms Control for Dennis Ross).

1. Richard Haas claimed that this is the best chance we have ever had for solving the Arab-Israel conflict. It is now "ripe" he claimed. When presented with the fact that there is not Palestinian party to talk to and that Syria is unchanged, he said that the President was aware of these arguments but he surprisingly operates many times on impulse. It was the President's feeling that now is the time to move forward.

Haas felt that there was more of a chance to work with Syria than I stated. He discounted any separate option with Saudi Arabia.

Asked about the President's address before Congress, he said that he wanted to bring about a change of attitudes in Israel. It was necessary to create "psychological space" for diplomacy. When asked if the address was intended to send a message to Israel before Baker's trip, he simply smiled and covered his mouth with his hand.

Haas then said that Bush was not anti-Israel. What comes out of the President's address, he claimed, was that the President just wanted "fairness", like most Americans. The past administration was too pro-Israel, they just wanted to correct that. He then said that most Americans would agree with the President and even most American Jews. Just a small group of activist leaders have trouble with Bush's policy. He then said that the Baker address before AIPAC in 1989 was not so bad: "imagine a speech like that every month."

I told Haas that it was my personal opinion that the President should not be so rigid with "territories for peace" as the only solution to the West Bank. There are functional solutions as well that can provide both sides with their needs "fairly". He took a copy of my study "Israel and the Gulf Crisis" and seemed interested.

2. Aaron David Miller was asked who Israel will talk to on the Palestinian issue at present. Miller immediately asked to clarify something: "we are not going to work with a reformed PLO, only from a list of insiders". To legitimize the insiders you need several things he explained:

(a) elections

(b) Arab state approval

(c) even Arab state presence at the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating table

I asked Miller if the deportee now will drop from the Palestinian negotiating side. He said that it would remain. If Baker can bring another Arab state to the table, he claimed, then "Shamir can say yes to Baker".

I told him that Secretary of State Baker's pre-occupation with settlements sends a bad message to Israel. It means that the U.S. wants the territories to be "Judenrein" in final status, I asserted. I told him that Israel will never accept a solution to the West Bank like Sinai, where we get out entirely. He answered that no one expects the solution to the West BAnk to be like that.

3. Steve Simon is the director of policy planning within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. He was personally very skeptical about the extent of change in the Middle East. He said that there many in the White House that said to President Bush, "what do you need this (Middle East diplomacy) for...you will just tarnish your reputation after the success of the war." These voices were overruled; the President's own instincts called for greater involvement.

Simon indicated that there would be pressure on Prime Minister Shamir. He also told me that he had begun a study on Israel's security needs in the West Bank. He conducted such a study for Secretary Shultz in 1988 and concluded that the biggest problem was early warning; ground forces would counter-attack along the eastern front directly into Jordan, he explained. Thus back in 1988, they concluded that Israel could return 85 per cent of the West Bank and would retain for itself 15 per cent.

I told him Dayan's thesis that you cannot draw a line separating what is vital from what is less vital in the West Bank since Israeli assets were geographically distributed. He was anxious to read my study on this matter.

4. Robert Einhorn works directly for Dennis Ross on Middle East arms control. He used to work on U.S.-Soviet arms control. He said that the most important thing for Israel to understand was that they were taking this subject very seriously. He indicated that it would be dangerous for Israel to make proposals in this area that it had no intention of carrying out. He hoped that Israeli references to CBM's were serious.

He broke up the U.S. view of Middle East arms control into three parts:

(a) Restrictions on Iraq in particular modeled on the idea of the restrictions placed on Germany after World War II.

(b) regional arms control involving both conventional and non-conventional weaponry. These negotiations would move forward on two tracks at the same time. Secretary Baker was particularly interested in conventional arms control; but in the President's address to Congress, reference to conventional arms control was removed by the White House--perhaps out of consideration for the big Saudi arms sales coming up.

(c) global arms control--MTCR, NPT etc.

Their approach in this matter is to take small steps. They even told the Egyptians to hold off with their nuclear free zone proposals. Israel, they judged, would not want to tamper with its "crown jewels"--at a later stage Israel could close Dimmona or open it to inspection, while the U.S. will not ask what was already produced there.

Procedure: they see the arms control process beginning in a bilateral format at present--between the U.S. and each country; later there would be direct Arab-Israel negotiations. Only in the future might there be an international conference--but not at present.

AIPAC (WASHINGTON OFFICE) FEELS THAT THE $650 MILLION WAS JUST APPROVED WITH BAKER'S SUPPORT. OPPOSING FROM THE WHITE HOUSE WERE DARMAN AND SUNUNU.

מברק נכנס מסווג

אאאא,חוזם:10194
אל:רהמש/698
מ-:קהיר,נר:189,תא:100391,זח:2100,דח:מ,סג:שמ,
בבב
שמור/מידי

אל:מח מצרים

דע:ערב 1, איסוף

מאת:קהיר

הנדון:ראיון בוש ל'אחבאר' - בהקשר הישראלי.

ב'אחבאר' (10/3) ראיון שהעניק הנשיא בוש לעורך העתון, סעיד סנבל, הנוגע לעתיד האזור.

להלן קטעים הנוגעים לישראל.

א. הסכסוך הישראלי ערבי: בוש ציין כי: 'אנו משוכנעים בצורך לבצע את החלטות האו'מ 242 ו-338. אנו דוגלים בעקרון של השטחים הכבושים תמורת שלום...לא יהיה שלום אם לא ניקח בחשבון את זכויות הפלסטינים'. בוש מתח ביקורת על ההנהגה הנוכחית של אש'פ והאשימה ב'הימור על הסוס המפסיד', עמידה לצד התקפן ובבגידה בידידיה. יחד עם זאת ציין כי: 'בטוחני כי ישנם יסודות טובים באש'פ'.

ב. הזכויות המדיניות לפלסטינים: בוש אמר כי: 'לא יהיה שלום עד שתטופל במלואה שאלת מקומם של הפלסטינים. יש האומרים-מדינה. עמדתנו אינה בעד מדינה, ובנושא זה אנו חלוקים עם כמה מידידינו הערבים, אך יש לפתור את בעיית פלסטין. ברור שהמסגרת צריכה להיות בהתאם להחלטות האו'מ אם כי אינן חייבות להיות התשובה היחידה, אך חייב להיות בסיס משותף עליו תסכמנה ישראל ומדינות ערב... בלתי אפשרי שמצב המלחמה ישרור לנצח, וחייב להיות מו'מ... מוכרח להיות פתרון לבעיה הפלסטינית, אנו יודעים וחשים זאת ש ואנו מוכנים למלא תפקיד מועיל. כפי שאמרתי על האנשים (המדינות הנוגעות) לטפל בכל צדדי הבעיה'.

ג. חידוש השיחות עם אש'פ. בוש שלל הרעיון, באמרו כי הנהגתם בגדה בידידיהם וצדדה בצד הלא נכון במשבר.

ד. בוש הביע תמיכתו בקריאת מבארך לצמצום מרוץ החימוש באזור.

קבי ברוש

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),אמן,ממד,סולטן,מזתים,מצרים,בנצור,
מצפא,רביב,מעת,הסברה

ססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס ג ל ו י

אאאא,חוזם:10101
אל:רהמש/688
מ-:המשרד,תא:100391,זח:2043,דח:מ,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמס מיידי

וושינגטון

התקשר השגריר בראון להביע את זעזועו העמוק מן הרצח הנורא של הנשים ע'י המחבל בירושלים , מעשה זוועה שמילים לא יכילוהו.

רובינשטיין.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא

סססס

BAKER: U.S. WARNS IRAQ AGAINST USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS
(Transcript: Taif news conference, 3/9/91)

Taif, Saudi Arabia -- Secretary of States James Baker said the United States had warned Iraq against using chemical weapons to put down the rebellion in Iraq.

Asked by a reporter what caused the administration to issue such a warning, Baker said, "We had reason to believe that they might be planning such activity and we thought it was important that we let them know how we would view that."

Baker, and Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Al-Sabah, met with reporters following what Baker described as his "very productive" meeting here March 9 with the Emir of Kuwait.

Following is the transcript of the news conference:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SECRETARY BAKER: Ladies and Gentlemen, we have just concluded, I think, a very productive meeting with His Highness the Emir. I had the opportunity to visit with the Foreign Minister on the drive up here and of course, we will be meeting together -- the Foreign Minister and I, with the Foreign Ministers of the other GCC states and Syria and Egypt tomorrow in Riyadh.

In our discussions with the Emir we covered the four broad areas with which you are familiar, regional security arrangements, arms control and proliferation, the Arab-Israeli peace process and economic cooperation in the region. I want to thank His Highness for receiving us today.

I'm told that the winds are such that we now can proceed on to nest with the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the other ministers in Kuwait City and we will be doing that as soon as we leave here. Minister, would you like to add or subtract to that?

FOREIGN MINISTER AL-SABAH: Thank you very much and I would like to say that the Emir was very pleased to meet with Secretary Baker for the first time after the liberation of Kuwait. And we have talked, as Secretary Baker mentioned, of security in the region and we also talked about the meeting that will take place tomorrow in Riyadh with the other members -- the Foreign Ministers. And today the secretary, of course, will visit liberated Kuwait to meet with the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. I would like to say through the American media that we would like express our appreciation -- we are grateful to the American people, to the American public, to everyone, grateful to every man, woman and child, for their support and their stand with Kuwait during the crisis. Thank you very much.

Q: Mr. Secretary, has the United States issued a warning to Iraq about the possible use of chemical weapons to put down the rebellion there?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, we have.
Q: What caused you to issue such a warning?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we had reason to believe that they might be planning such activity and we thought it was important that we let them know how we would view that.

Q: Do you think that they have used chemical weapons yet?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think I'd leave it right there.

Q: What would be the consequences if they do use chemical weapons?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think I'd leave it right there.

Q: The Foreign Minister didn't mention in his summary of' the meeting that you discussed the one area that you talked about, mainly the Arab-Israeli conflict. Did you make any progress on that point when you discussed it with the Emir?

SECRETARY BAKER: We made our views known to the Emir and listened to the views of the government of Kuwait about that issue and we will be having further discussions tomorrow in Riyadh and I expect to have a discussion of it with the Crown Prince and Prime Minister when we get to Kuwait City.
Q: Mr. Secretary, after speaking to the Saudis and the Kuwaitis are you picking up anything that might be characterized as new thinking on the Arab-Israeli crisis?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I don't know that I would characterize it that way, Norm, I think the point that we Ire making is that the situation is changed, there's a new dimension and hopefully a new dynamic in the aftermath of this war as far as the region as a whole is concerned and we think it's important that we consider and explore with our coalition Arab allies what might or might not be possible, just as we intend to do with our ally Israel when we get to Israel.

Q: Is there any flexibility there -- any new flexibility that you see?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'd rather leave it right there until we complete these consultations.
(END TRANSCRIPT)
NNNN

BUSH, ROCARD AGREE ON U.S.-FRENCH ROLE IN GULF
(Transcript: Photo Opportunity 3/11/91)

Washington -- President Bush and French Prime Minister Michel Rocard agreed March 11 that the unity between France and the United States in the Persian Gulf war "sent a very strong message," in Bush's words, to other nations.

Rocard described the coordination of troops of the two nations under a single command as an "efficient idea."

The two officials made their comments during a photo opportunity for the press in th Oval Office.

Following is an unofficial transcript of the event:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: Mr. President, what is your expectation for the Israeli talks?

PRESIDENT BUSH: They know I don't take questions in these photo opportunities, but they occasionally ask in spite of the ground rules. Once in awhile I violate my own rules and then it throws things off.

MINISTER ROCARD: That is for you, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT BUSH: It is up to you to answer if you would like to.

Q: Mr. Rocard (inaudible)?

MINISTER ROCARD: I didn't get the question.

We are pressing for resolution and we think in the Middle East, as I think the American authorities and certainly the President who -- President Bush, who said that last week the Israelis and Palestinians have to find an issue, and if the international community can contribute to create the conditions for their direct meeting, any type of institution of conference will be useful, the heart of the matter, the substance more than the procedure. We proposed once -- one. We do hope there will be a resolution in a way, and I am sure the United States and France will act in a converting (sic) way to resolution.

PRESIDENT BUSH: That, I am certain of. You know, one of the great things about this recent effort was that we were just solidly together, and I think that sent a very strong signal to others around the world, and I hope you will convey to the President my thanks and my sentiments of deep appreciation on behalf of the American people, because France is a key, terribly important country with special knowledge and interest in that part of the world, and we just came together -- the UN,

elsewhere, and it was a wonderful thing. So carry my thanks back to everybody that was involved, please, sir.

MINISTER ROCARD: Mr. President, thank you very much for those words. We were happy to be again very close together as we have been in many difficult periods of history, but there again, we are very close and acting together, and having victory together.

PRESIDENT BUSH: That's right. That's right. I mentioned your distinguished general -- my French is terrible -- but Roquegeofre, but General Schwarzkopf was very high in his praise of him in the way he conducted the French forces, led the French forces. So all of that worked out. You remember in the very beginning there were all these predictions that with these different countries, that it would be very hard to sort out a proper structure for coordinating them, and it came -- it came fine.

MINISTER ROCARD: Quite well. And the idea of coordinating the soldiers of both countries under the same command was the efficient idea.

PRESIDENT BUSH: We have got some business to do, so with all appreciation for this interest and concern, thank you very much.

(End Transcript)

NNNN

אאאא,חוזם:9174
אל:רהמש/623
מ-:ניויורק,נר:168,תא:080391,זח:1705,דח:ב,סג:שמ,
בבבב
שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'ן
מנהל מצפ'א

דע: ראש אגף ארב'ל
מנהל ארב'ל 2
לשכת שר החוץ
יורם אטינגר, הציר לענייני קונגרס, וושינגטון

מאת: אהרן יעקב, נאו'ם.

הנדון: שיחת השגריר עם המורשה סולרז.

1. השגריר קיים היום ארוחת צהריים עם המורשה סטיבן סולרז (ביזמת השגריר).

2. סולרז המליץ כי לקראת או במהלך ביקור בייקר בארץ תעשה ישראל מחוות כלהלן, כולן או חלקן:

א. פתיחת מוסדות החינוך בשטחים, תוך הבהרה שהם יסגרו אם ישמשו בסיס למהומות.

ב. הודעה על מתן אפשרות לאיחוד משפחות מסיבות הומניטריות.

ג. הקדמת השחרור של עצירים מינהליים העומדים בפני שחרור ממילא.

3. סולרז הוסיף כי המחוות הנ'ל אינן כרוכות בסיכונים חמורים מדי מבחינת ישראל , מה גם שישראל נוקטת בכמה מן הצעדים הללו ממילא. הוא סבור כי הצעדים שעליהם הוא ממליץ ישתלמו בכל מקרה, בין שהערבים יעשו כלפי בייקר מחוה נגדית ובין שלא יעשו כן.

4. לפי הבנת סולרז, העיקרון של שטחים תמורת שלום אינו עומד בעיני הנשיא בסתירה לתכנית האוטונומיה כפתרון ביניים.

אהרן יעקב, נאו'ם.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),ביין,ארבל2,
בנצור,מצפא,סייבל,משפט,סולטן,מזתים,
@(מתאסשטחים)

סססס

מברק נכנס מסווג

אאאא,חוזם:9209
אל:רהמש/633
מ-:ווש,נר:2053,תא:080391,זח:1620,דח:מ,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי / מיידי

אל: מנהל מצפ''א

דע: לשכת רוה''מ, מקש''ח / משהב''ט

מאת: ק. לקונגרס, וושינגטון

ביהנ''ב: בעקבות אישור סיוע החירום לישראל.

1. יש לציין שהמזכיר בייקר, יחד עם איגלברגר וג'אנט מולינס (עוזר מזכיר המדינה לענייני קונגרס) עמלו קשות ופעלו נמרצות למען סיוע החירום לישראל. המזכיר נאבק בהתנגדותם של סקוקרופט, סונונו ודרמן ''ששתולל'' עוד אתמול (7/3) בבוקר (ראו דווחנו בנושא). בייקר נטל על עצמו המשימה לקדם העברת הסיוע לישראל. אגב הנשיא, ''הידידימ'' מסרו כי פגישת הסנטרוים הרפובליקנים שהתקיימה ביום ה' שעבר בבית הלבן עם הנשיא לא היתהטובו עם הנשיא לא היתה טובה, והנשיא שאל מדוע יש לסייע לישראל.

2. ההחלטה על הסיוע לישראל עברה לאור העובדה שהממשל היה זה שהגישה והגדירה החירום. יתכן שהערכת הממשל את נכונות הקונגרס ליזום בקשת סיוע חירום עבור ישראל היתה נכונה, אולם בכ'ז פסימית מידי מצידם אין ספק שהתמיכה והאהדה לישראל בקונגרסם הם בשיאם. אם זאת, גם מהדיון שהתקיים אתמול במליאת ביהנ'ב (ראו דיווחינו) וגם בשיחות פרטיות עם ידידנו הקרובים (מחוקקים) הובהר יותר ויותר שנשמו לרווחה בידעם שהממשל היה זה שהגיש הבקשה. גם מסיבה זו זכה הסיוע לעבור יחסית בקלות. אם הממשל לא היה מגיש בקשת הסיוע עבור ישראל, היינו ככל הנראה מצליחים להניע את הקונגרס להגיש בקשה. הבעיה היתה עולה, אם הנישא היה מתנגד לבקשה ואז זקיפת ה-650 מיליון דולר היתה נעשית ע'ח פונקציה 150 וגוררת עמה SEQUESTER . ככל הנראה, היינו מצליחים אף לגייס הקונגרס TO OVERRITE THE VETO אולם מאבק כזה היה עולה לנו ביוקר רב מבחינה פוליטית הן בקונגרס והן בבית הלבן.

3. השגת הסכם בינינו לבין הממשל והבאתו לידיעת המחוקקים באופן פומבי בועדות (הקצבות וחוצ) ובמליאת ביהנ'ב סייעה לנו להכין הקרקע ולידע המחוקקים לגבי כוונת ממישראל ובקש בספטמבר ערבויות לקליטת עלייה בגובה של 10 ביליון דולר.

4. בהמשך לדיון אמש בביהנ'ב, כדאי לתת הדעת למספר נושאים שהועלו בדיון שיהיו בעלי השלכות לעתיד:-

א. קיום דיון מחודש במתכנות, היקף ומטרות סיוע החוץ.

ב. מגמה להגבלת הפסקת מכירות נשק לאיזור והשלכותיו החמורות על מימון תכניות פנימ(בנאומיהם, אתמול במליאת ביהנ'ב, של המתנגדים לסייע לישראל שאינם חוזר אינם מייצגים הלך הרוחות בקונגרס כלפי ישראל נשמעו טיעונים בנושאי פנים ומצוקות תקציביות - במדינות והערים השונות בתכניות דיור, ביטוח רפואי וכו', אשר להם שותפים כל חברי הקונגרס).

5. נראה שעתה, לאחר שכל המכשולים הוסרו, והספלמנטל הכולל את הסיוע לישראל אושר סופית אתמול (7/3) בערב בביהנ'ב, תוקל עבודת הסנאט לקראת העברה מהירה יותר של הספלמנטל.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),בנצור,
מצפא,@(מקשח/משהבט)

סססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס ג ל ו י

אאאא,חוזם:9429
אל:רהמש/658
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:157,תא:080391,זת:1649,דת:מ,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמ"ס / מיידי

כב אדר תשנ"א
8 מרס 91

אל:הסברה

דע:מצפ"א, תפוצות

הנדון:שיחת תדרוך 8/3/91

הציר סוקר השתלשלות ההתפתחויות בנושא יישור ההדורים ואישור הסיוע המיוחד שהתחלקו ל-4 פרקים:

א. בהענות לצרכי הבטחון של ישראל וההוצאות שחלו מאוגוסט 1990 , ארה"ב מעניקה לנו 650 מליון דולר.

ב. בנושא סוללות הפטריוט שהוצבו בישראל יתקיים דיון מאוחר יותר.

ג. לא נוסיף בקשה נוספת של סיוע כלכלי בגין נזקי מצב החרום.

ד. נדחה הגשת בקשתנו למתן ערבויות לקליטת עליה עד לאחר 5/9/91
נושא שני הינו נאום הנשיא ונסיעת מזכיר המדינה למז"ת, בדברי הנשיא אין חדש בהשוואה לעבר.
מאזכר דברי בני בגין בנייטליין, דברי שה"ח בראיונות לתקשורת.
נראה שממישראל תחדש יוזמתה ממאי 1989 וכי יש
אפשרות לפתיחה נוחה יותר - כתוצאה מכך שתהיה "הרפיה" ביחס מדינות ערב עמן ישוחח המזכיר.
מזכירים כי אנו מעונינים במו"מ ישיר עם מדינות ערב וללא תנאים מוקדמים.
קונ"כל בוסטון - מציין שהיינו צריכים זה כבר לקבל קריאת כיוון מהארץ בנושא התגובות לנ"ל.

ציר הסברה:

1. מציין מברק סמנכ"ל הסברה, שקיבלנו עתה- בנושא נאום נשיא ארה"ב.

2. אש"פ - עירק - הקונסוליות קיבלו איגרת שגרירנו לאום למזכ"ל, מאזכרים חומר הרקע של האידיל בנושא.

3. טאהר שאריטה מבהיר ברוח המידע שקיבלנו.

מהקונסוליות
לוס-אנג'לס
1. בל"א טיימס כי ישראל דחתה ההצעה שטחים תמורת שלום.
2. קיימו יום ישראל באוניברסיטת NORTH RIDGE .
3. יצאו כמה משלחות לארץ - יציאתן זכתה לכיסוי תקשורתי: משלחת ראשי ערים, נציגות למשלחת UJA, שראל וסולידריות מפניקס.
4. הקהילה היהודית תומכת בישראל באשר לצורך במו"מ ישיר עם מדינות ערב ושאין לערב אש"פ בתהליך.

בוסטון

1. באזורם שני מועמדים לנשיא ארה"ב = דיוות בנפרד.
2. דיבר בפני מנהיגי LABOR, ובאוניברסיטת הרוורד.

סן פרנסיסקו
קיבלו טלפונים רבים בנושא שאריטה.

שיקגו
1. ב-4 באפריל תצא משלחת סולידריות גדולה.
2. מאזכר זכית חב' אפשטיין במכרז לבניית 20 אלף יחידות דיור.
3. משלחת הנוער פועלת יפה.

אטלנטה
1. חזר כרגע מביקור ב-CNN שם נפגש עם שני סגני נשיא שקיבלו ידיעה, כי אש"פ יתיר לפלסטינים להפגש עם בייקר.
2. אליעזר יערי - עורך מסע סיורים והרצאות אינטנסיבי - כולל בקמפוסים.
3. התגובות למשלחת הנוער מצוינות.
4. השר נסים יגיע אליהם , ידאגו כי יחנוך לשכת המסחר עם ישראל.

מיאמי
1. יתנו חסות להקרנת שני סרטים ישראליים בשבוע הסרט.
2. השר אולמרט יבקר מטעם בני ציון.
3. שולחים ברכות לקונכו"ל, שיצא ארצה לרגל חתונת בנו.

עד כאן

שבת שלום עודד בן חיים

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,הסברה,מעת,
מצפא,בואבו,ממד

סססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:8181
אל:רהמש/574
מ-:ווש,נר:2039,תא:070391,זח:1600,דח:ב,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר / ח.ר.ב. / בהול

אל: בן-אהרון,בנצור, שובל - למכותבים בלבד

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

בבוקר יום ד' (6.3) צלצל לארי איגלברגר וביקש לדבר עם השגריר. במקרה שוחחתי באותה שעה עם שובל (שאך זה הגיע לתל-אביב), העברנו את השיחה ונשארתי על הקו לרישום הדברים כדלקמן:

איגלברגר: יש לנו בעיה חמורה ידידי. צלצלו אלי עכשיו מהגבעה ומסרו לי שאנשי השגרירות טוענים שאמרתי לך, שאם הקונגרס יכניס פטריוטים לחקיקה, זה יהיה בסדר והם מכינים עכשיו את החקיקה הזאת.

שובל : אמרת שבתנאים אלה 'תוכלו לחיות עם זה'...

איגלברגר: חשבתי שאמרתי שהפטריוטים אינם בעיסקה ואף פעם לא אמרתי שנעשה זאת בסמפלמנטל הזה. זאת היתה הבנתי הברורה, שעכשיו נעביר את ה-650 וסוף פסוק.

שובל : אני הבנתי 650 ודיברנו על שתי סוללות טילים ואמרנו שאתם לא תגישו, אבל תוכלו לחיות עם זאת אם היזמה תעלה ע'י אחרים ואת הערבויות נדחה לספטמבר.

איגלברגר: אני הבנתי שהפטריוטים לא יטופלו בספלמנטל הזה ואם הנושא יעלה מאוחר יותר, נוכל לחיות עם זה. הכל גרוע הוא שהשגרירות דוחפת את הענין. 'יותר מאוחר', אמרתי. אין זה חלק מהספלמנטל הנוכחי.

שובל : ואם לא בספלמנטל הזה, אז בכל זאת בעתיד הנראה לעין ? יש לכך פתרון טכני אפשרי?

איגלברגר: אולי, אבל לא בחקיקה הזאת, אנא בוא נעבור את זה בשלום ובוא לא נהרוס את הכל עכשיו.

שובל: אני כך הבנתי וכך מסרתי, אבל אמסור את דבריך ועוד נחזור אליך.

עד כאן השיחה הטלפונית.

אח'כ דיברתי עם השגריר וסיכמנו שאוריד את אנשינו ואת הידידים מהגבעה ושאלך ללארי לנסות למצוא איתו פתרון.

בשעה 13:00 נפגשתי עם לארי, שהזמין אליו גם את קרצר, התנצל על שנשמע נרגז בטלפון וחזר והסביר את האופן בו הבין הוא את שיחתו עם השגריר. הוסיף, שאילו המורשים היו עושים זאת מיוזמתם, היו מתמודדים עם זה ונאבקים ביוזמה כפי שהם עושים במקרים אחרים, אבל מעורבות השגרירות מתקבלת אצל המזכיר כאילו אנחנו מנסים לעקוף הסכם שאך זה עתה הושג. חזרתי והסברתי לו איך הובנו דבריו ואמרתי שאם לא לכך התכוון, אפשר לדבר לכל היותר במונחים של HONEST MISTAKE. שאלתי למה התכוון בכל זאת באומרו 'נוכל לחיות עם זה' והשיב שהתכוון שיוכלו לחיות עם זה במועד מאוחר יותר, אבל לא ממש עכשיו.
שאלתי אם ידוע לו על אפשרות (חקיקתית) להסדיר זאת במועד קרוב ואמר שאינו יודע, אבל שאל: 'למה אתם כל-כך לחוצים? הרי אף אחד לא מתכוון להוציא עכשיו את הפטריוטים מישראל'. בנקודה זו קיבל (כאילו לפי הזמנה) טלפון והמזכיר היה בצד השני. איגלברגר (שרק את הצד שלו של השיחה שמעתי) ניסה

להרגיע אותו והבטיח שהוא מטפל בענין עם השגרירות. חזר מהטלפון ואמר שאם הפטריוטים יוכנסו, יאלצו להילחם על לווטו נשיאותי ועד בכלל. אמר שצריך לתת לביקור של בייקר לעבור בשלום ושאפשר 'לקחת את בייקר הצידה' בארץ ולדבר איתו בפרשת הסוללות. הוסיף, שהוא מקווה, שלא שובל ולא הוא 'יצטרכו להתאבד' בעקבות אי-ההבנה הזאת.

דיווחתי טלפונית לשובל ולבנצור על שיחה זו.

הבוקר, 7/3, התעורר קושי חדש כאשר דארמן, הממונה על התקציבים, סירב למסור לבית-הנבחרים את המכתב מטעם המימשל (הנותן הסכמתו לחקיקת 650 לישראל). אובי הודיע, שבהעדר מכתב לא יוכנס הסכום עבור ישראל לחוק. דארמן ביקש, על ידי עיכוב המכתב, להבטיח שאיש לא 'יגניב' ללשון החוק דברים נוספים ל-650. לשם כך, אמר יעכב את מסירת המכתב על לאחר גמר ההליך בבית והסנאט.
התקשרנו שוב לאיגלברגר שהבטיח שהוא 'רץ' לדבר עם דארמן.

דארמן הגיש את המכתב בזמן והכל הסתדר.

שילה

לבח

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור

סססס

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הנדון: נאום הנשיא בוש

THE WHITE HOUSE ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, DC
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 1991

SPEAKER FOLEY: MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS CUSTOMARY AT JOINT SESSIONS FOR THE CHAIR TO PRESENT THE PRESIDENT TO THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS DIRECTLY AND WITHOUT FURTHER COMMENT. BUT I WISH TO DEPART FROM TRADITION TONIGHT AND EXPRESS TO YOU, ON BEHALF OF THE CONGRESS AND THE COUNTRY, AND THROUGH YOU TO THE MEMBERS OF OUR ARMED FORCES OUR WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE BRILLIANT VICTORY OF THE DESERT STORM OPERATION. (APPLAUSE, CHEERS.)

MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS, I NOW HAVE THE HIGH PRIVILEGE AND DISTINCT HONOR OF PRESENTING TO YOU THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. (APPLAUSE, WHISTLES, CHEERS.)

PRESIDENT BUSH: MR. PRESIDENT. AND MR. SPEAKER, THANK YOU, SIR, FOR THOSE VERY GENEROUS WORDS, SPOKEN FROM THE HEART, ABOUT THE WONDERFUL PERFORMANCE OF OUR MILITARY. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS: FIVE SHORT WEEKS AGO, I CAME TO THIS HOUSE TO SPEAK TO YOU ABOUT THE STATE OF THE UNION. WE MET THEN IN TIME OF WAR. TONIGHT, WE MEET IN A WORLD BLESSED BY THE PROMISE OF PEACE.

FROM THE MOMENT OPERATION DESERT STORM COMMENCED ON JANUARY 16TH, UNTIL THE TIME THE GUNS FELL SILENT AT MIDNIGHT ONE WEEK AGO, THIS NATION HAS WATCHED ITS SONS AND DAUGHTERS WITH PRIDE -- WATCHED OVER THEM WITH PRAYER. AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, I CAN REPORT TO YOU: OUR ARMED FORCES FOUGHT WITH HONOR AND VALOR. AND, AS PRESIDENT, I CAN REPORT TO THE NATION -- AGGRESSION IS DEFEATED. THE WAR IS OVER. (PROLONGED APPLAUSE.)

THIS IS A VICTORY FOR EVERY COUNTRY IN THE COALITION, FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, A VICTORY FOR UNPRECEDENTED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DIPLOMACY, SO WELL LED BY OUR SECRETARY OF STATE, JAMES BAKER. IT IS A VICTORY FOR THE RULE OF LAW AND FOR WHAT IS RIGHT.

DESERT STORM'S SUCCESS BELONGS TO THE TEAM THAT SO ABLY LEADS OUR ARMED FORCES -- OUR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OUR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS: DICK CHENEY AND COLIN POWELL. (APPLAUSE, WHISTLES.)

AND WHILE YOU'RE STANDING -- (LAUGHTER) -- THIS MILITARY VICTORY ALSO BELONGS TO THE ONE THE BRITISH CALL THE "MAN OF THE MATCH" -- THE TOWER OF CALM AT THE EYE OF DESERT STORM -- GENERAL NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF. (APPLAUSE, CHEERS.)

AND LET US -- RECOGNIZING THIS WAS A COALITION EFFORT, LET US NOT FORGET SAUDI GENERAL KHALID, BRITAIN'S GENERAL DE LA BILLIERE, OR GENERAL ROQUEJOFFRE OF FRANCE, AND ALL THE OTHERS WHOSE LEADERSHIP PLAYED SUCH A VITAL ROLE. AND MOST IMPORTANTLY -- MOST IMPORTANTLY OF ALL, ALL THOSE WHO SERVED IN THE FIELD. (APPLAUSE.)

I THANK THE MEMBERS OF THIS CONGRESS -- SUPPORT HERE FOR OUR TROOPS IN BATTLE WAS OVERWHELMING. AND ABOVE ALL, I THANK THOSE WHOSE UNFAILING LOVE AND SUPPORT SUSTAINED OUR COURAGEOUS MEN AND WOMEN: I THANK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. (APPLAUSE.)

TONIGHT -- (APPLAUSE CONTINUES) -- TONIGHT, I COME TO THIS HOUSE TO SPEAK ABOUT THE WORLD -- THE WORLD AFTER WAR.

THE RECENT CHALLENGE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CLEARER. SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS THE VILLAIN; KUWAIT THE VICTIM. TO THE AID OF THIS SMALL COUNTRY CAME NATIONS FROM NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE, FROM ASIA AND SOUTH AMERICA, FROM AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD -- ALL UNITED AGAINST AGGRESSION.

OUR UNCOMMON COALITION MUST NOW WORK IN COMMON PURPOSE TO FORGE A FUTURE THAT SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE HELD HOSTAGE TO THE DARKER SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE. (APPLAUSE.)

TONIGHT IN IRAQ, SADDAM WALKS AMIDST RUIN. HIS WAR MACHINE IS CRUSHED. HIS ABILITY TO THREATEN MASS DESTRUCTION IS ITSELF DESTROYED. HIS PEOPLE HAVE BEEN LIED TO -- DENIED THE TRUTH. AND WHEN HIS DEFEATED LEGIONS COME HOME, ALL IRAQIS WILL SEE AND FEEL THE HAVOC HE HAS WROUGHT. AND THIS I PROMISE YOU: FOR ALL THAT SADDAM HAS DONE TO HIS OWN PEOPLE, TO THE KUWAITIS, AND TO THE ENTIRE WORLD -- SADDAM AND THOSE AROUND HIM ARE ACCOUNTABLE. (APPLAUSE.)

ALL OF US GRIEVE FOR THE VICTIMS OF WAR, FOR THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT AND THE SUFFERING THAT SCARS THE SOUL OF THAT PROUD NATION. WE GRIEVE FOR ALL OUR FALLEN SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES, FOR ALL THE INNOCENTS CAUGHT UP IN THIS CONFLICT. AND YES, WE GRIEVE FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ -- A PEOPLE WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN OUR ENEMY. MY HOPE IS THAT ONE DAY WE WILL ONCE AGAIN WELCOME THEM AS FRIENDS INTO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS.

OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST DOES NOT END WITH THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT. SO TONIGHT, LET ME OUTLINE FOUR KEY CHALLENGES TO BE MET:

FIRST, WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE SHARED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION. OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST RECOGNIZE THAT THEY WILL BEAR THE BULK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIONAL SECURITY. BUT WE WANT THEM TO KNOW THAT JUST AS WE STOOD WITH THEM TO REPEL AGGRESSION, SO NOW AMERICA STANDS READY TO WORK WITH THEM TO SECURE THE PEACE.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN STATIONING US GROUND FORCES ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, BUT IT DOES MEAN AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN JOINT EXERCISES INVOLVING BOTH AIR AND GROUND FORCES. IT MEANS MAINTAINING A CAPABLE US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE REGION, JUST AS WE

HAVE FOR OVER 40 YEARS. LET IT BE CLEAR: OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS DEPEND ON A STABLE AND SECURE GULF.

SECOND, WE MUST ACT TO CONTROL THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MISSILES USED TO DELIVER THEM. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF WERE NOW, IN THE WAKE OF WAR, TO EMBARK ON A NEW ARMS RACE. IRAQ REQUIRES SPECIAL VIGILANCE. UNTIL IRAQ CONVINCES THE WORLD OF ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS -- THAT ITS LEADERS WILL NOT USE NEW REVENUES TO REARM AND REBUILD ITS MENACING WAR MACHINE -- IRAQ MUST NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR. (APPLAUSE.)

AND, THIRD, WE MUST WORK TO CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THE NIGHT I ANNOUNCED OPERATION DESERT STORM, I EXPRESSED MY HOPE THAT OUT OF THE HORRORS OF WAR MIGHT COME NEW MOMENTUM FOR PEACE. WE'VE LEARNED IN THE MODERN AGE, GEOGRAPHY CANNOT GUARANTEE SECURITY AND SECURITY DOES NOT COME FROM MILITARY POWER ALONE.

ALL OF US KNOW THE DEPTH OF BITTERNESS THAT HAS MADE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS SO PAINFUL AND INTRACTABLE. YET, IN THE CONFLICT JUST CONCLUDED, ISRAEL AND MANY OF THE ARAB STATES HAVE FOR THE FIRST TIME FOUND THEMSELVES CONFRONTING THE SAME AGGRESSOR. BY NOW, IT SHOULD BE PLAIN TO ALL PARTIES THAT PEACEMAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST REQUIRES COMPROMISE. AT THE SAME TIME, PEACE BRINGS REAL BENEFITS TO EVERYONE. WE MUST DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES -- AND BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS. THE TACTICS OF TERROR LEAD ABSOLUTELY NOWHERE -- THERE CAN BE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR DIPLOMACY. (APPLAUSE.)

A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE MUST BE GROUNDED IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE. THIS PRINCIPLE MUST BE ELABORATED TO PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND RECOGNITION, AND AT THE SAME TIME FOR LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS. ANYTHING ELSE WOULD FAIL THE TWIN TESTS OF FAIRNESS AND SECURITY. THE TIME HAS COME TO PUT AN END TO ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. (APPLAUSE.)

THE WAR WITH IRAQ IS OVER. THE QUEST FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS IN LEBANON, IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, AND IN THE GULF MUST GO FORWARD WITH NEW VIGOR AND DETERMINATION. I GUARANTEE YOU: NO ONE WILL WORK HARDER FOR A STABLE PEACE IN THE REGION THAN WE WILL.

FOURTH, WE MUST FOSTER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS. THE PERSIAN GULF AND MIDDLE EAST -- AND MIDDLE EAST FORM A REGION RICH IN NATURAL RESOURCES WITH A WEALTH OF UNTAPPED HUMAN POTENTIAL. RESOURCES ONCE SQUANDERED ON MILITARY MIGHT -- MILITARY MIGHT MUST BE REDIRECTED TO MORE PEACEFUL ENDS. WE ARE ALREADY ADDRESSING THE IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IRAQ'S AGGRESSION. NOW, THE CHALLENGE IS TO REACH HIGHER -- TO FOSTER ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION.

BY MEETING THESE FOUR CHALLENGES WE CAN BUILD A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE. I'VE ASKED SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO BEGIN THE PROCESS. HE WILL GO TO LISTEN, TO PROBE, TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS, TO ADVANCE THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY. I'VE ALSO ASKED HIM TO RAISE THE PLIGHT OF THE HOSTAGES HELD IN LEBANON. WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THEM AND WE WILL NOT FORGET THEM. (APPLAUSE.)

TO ALL THE CHALLENGES THAT CONFRONT THIS REGION OF THE WORLD, THERE IS NO SINGLE SOLUTION, NO SOLELY AMERICAN ANSWER. BUT WE CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE. AMERICA WILL WORK TIRELESSLY AS A CATALYST FOR POSITIVE CHANGE.

BUT WE CANNOT LEAD A NEW WORLD ABROAD IF, AT HOME, IT'S POLITICS AS USUAL ON AMERICAN DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY. IT'S TIME TO TURN AWAY FROM THE TEMPTATION TO PROTECT UNNEEDED WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND OBSOLETE BASES. IT'S TIME TO PUT AN END -- (APPLAUSE) -- IT'S TIME TO PUT AN END TO MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, MICRO-MANAGEMENT THAT HUMILIATES OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND HAMSTRINGS OUR DIPLOMACY. (APPLAUSE.) IT'S TIME TO RISE ABOVE THE PAROCHIAL AND THE PORK BARREL -- TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY, WHAT'S RIGHT, AND WHAT WILL ENABLE THIS NATION TO PLAY THE LEADERSHIP ROLE REQUIRED OF US.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF REACH FAR BEYOND THE CONFINES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. TWICE BEFORE IN THIS CENTURY, AN ENTIRE WORLD WAS CONVULSED BY WAR. TWICE THIS CENTURY, OUT OF THE HORRORS OF WAR, HOPE EMERGED FOR ENDURING PEACE. TWICE BEFORE, THOSE HOPES PROVED TO BE A DISTANT DREAM, BEYOND THE GRASP OF MAN.

UNTIL NOW, THE WORLD WE'VE KNOWN HAS BEEN A WORLD DIVIDED -- A WORLD OF BARBED WIRE AND CONCRETE BLOCK, CONFLICT, COLD WAR.

NOW, WE CAN SEE A NEW WORLD COMING INTO VIEW. A WORLD IN WHICH THERE IS THE VERY REAL PROSPECT OF A NEW WORLD ORDER. IN THE WORDS OF WINSTON CHURCHILL, A "WORLD ORDER" IN WHICH "THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY ... PROTECT THE WEAK AGAINST THE STRONG...." A WORLD WHERE THE UNITED NATIONS, FREED FROM COLD WAR STALEMATE, IS POISED TO FULFILL THE HISTORIC VISION OF ITS FOUNDERS. A WORLD IN WHICH FREEDOM AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FIND A HOME AMONG ALL NATIONS.

THE GULF WAR PUT THIS NEW WORLD TO ITS -- ITS FIRST TEST. AND MY FELLOW AMERICANS: WE PASSED THAT TEST.

FOR THE SAKE OF OUR PRINCIPLES -- FOR THE SAKE OF THE KUWAITI PEOPLE -- WE STOOD OUR GROUND. BECAUSE THE WORLD WOULD NOT LOOK THE OTHER WAY, AMBASSADOR AL-SABAH, TONIGHT, KUWAIT IS FREE -- (APPLAUSE) -- AND WE'RE VERY HAPPY ABOUT THAT. (APPLAUSE.)

TONIGHT, AS OUR TROOPS BEGIN TO COME HOME, LET US RECOGNIZE THAT THE HARD WORK OF FREEDOM STILL CALLS US FORWARD. WE'VE LEARNED THE HARD LESSONS OF HISTORY. THE VICTORY OVER IRAQ WAS NOT WAGED AS "A WAR TO END ALL WARS." EVEN THE NEW WORLD ORDER CANNOT GUARANTEE AN ERA OF PERPETUAL PEACE. BUT ENDURING PEACE MUST BE OUR MISSION.

OUR SUCCESS IN THE GULF WILL SHAPE NOT ONLY THE NEW WORLD ORDER WE SEEK, BUT OUR MISSION HERE AT HOME.

IN THE WAR JUST ENDED, THERE WERE CLEAR-CUT OBJECTIVES, TIMETABLES AND, ABOVE ALL, AN OVERRIDING IMPERATIVE TO ACHIEVE RESULTS. WE MUST BRING THAT SAME SENSE OF SELF-DISCIPLINE, THAT SAME SENSE OF URGENCY, TO THE WAY WE MEET CHALLENGES HERE AT HOME.

IN MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS AND IN MY BUDGET, I DEFINED A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY.

OUR FIRST PRIORITY IS TO GET THIS ECONOMY ROLLING AGAIN. THE FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY CAUSED BY THE GULF CRISIS WERE UNDERSTANDABLE.

BUT NOW THAT THE WAR IS OVER, OIL PRICES ARE DOWN, INTEREST RATES ARE DOWN, AND CONFIDENCE IS RIGHTLY COMING BACK. AMERICANS CAN MOVE FORWARD TO LEND, SPEND AND INVEST IN THIS, THE STRONGEST ECONOMY ON EARTH. (APPLAUSE.)

WE MUST ALSO ENACT THE LEGISLATION THAT IS KEY TO BUILDING A BETTER AMERICA. FOR EXAMPLE: IN 1990, WE ENACTED AN HISTORIC CLEAN AIR ACT, AND NOW WE'VE PROPOSED A NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY. WE PASSED A CHILD CARE BILL THAT PUT POWER IN THE HANDS OF PARENTS, AND TODAY, WE'RE READY TO DO THE SAME THING WITH OUR SCHOOLS, AND EXPAND -- EXPAND CHOICE IN EDUCATION. WE PASSED A CRIME BILL THAT MADE A USEFUL START IN FIGHTING CRIME AND DRUGS. THIS YEAR, WE'RE SENDING TO CONGRESS OUR COMPREHENSIVE CRIME PACKAGE TO FINISH THE JOB. WE PASSED THE LANDMARK AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT. AND NOW, WE'VE SENT FORWARD OUR CIVIL RIGHTS BILL. WE ALSO PASSED THE AVIATION BILL. THIS YEAR, WE'VE SENT UP OUR NEW HIGHWAY BILL.

AND THESE ARE JUST A FEW OF OUR PENDING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND RENEWAL.

SO, TONIGHT, I CALL ON THE CONGRESS TO MOVE FORWARD AGGRESSIVELY ON OUR DOMESTIC FRONT. LET'S BEGIN WITH TWO INITIATIVES WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE ON QUICKLY: TRANSPORTATION AND CRIME. AND THEN, LET'S BUILD ON SUCCESS WITH THOSE AND ENACT THE REST OF OUR AGENDA. IF OUR FORCES COULD WIN THE GROUND WAR IN 100 HOURS, THEN SURELY THE CONGRESS CAN PASS THIS LEGISLATION IN 100 DAYS. (APPLAUSE.) LET THAT BE A PROMISE WE MAKE TONIGHT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

WHEN I SPOKE IN THIS HOUSE ABOUT THE STATE OF OUR UNION, I ASKED ALL OF YOU: IF WE CAN SELFLESSLY CONFRONT EVIL FOR THE SAKE OF GOOD IN A LAND SO FAR AWAY, THEN SURELY WE CAN MAKE THIS LAND ALL THAT IT SHOULD BE. IN THE TIME SINCE THEN, THE BRAVE MEN AND WOMEN OF DESERT STORM ACCOMPLISHED MORE THAN EVEN THEY MAY REALIZE. THEY SET OUT TO CONFRONT AN ENEMY ABROAD, AND IN THE PROCESS, THEY TRANSFORMED A NATION AT HOME.

THINK -- THINK OF THE WAY THEY WENT ABOUT THEIR MISSION -- WITH CONFIDENCE AND QUIET PRIDE. THINK ABOUT THEIR SENSE OF DUTY, ABOUT ALL THEY TAUGHT US, ABOUT OUR VALUES, ABOUT OURSELVES.

WE HEAR SO OFTEN ABOUT OUR YOUNG PEOPLE IN TURMOIL; HOW OUR CHILDREN FALL SHORT; HOW OUR SCHOOLS FAIL US; HOW AMERICAN PRODUCTS AND AMERICAN WORKERS ARE SECOND CLASS. WELL, DON'T YOU BELIEVE IT. THE AMERICA WE SAW IN DESERT STORM WAS FIRST-CLASS TALENT. (APPLAUSE.)

AND THEY DID IT -- THEY DID IT USING AMERICA'S STATE-OF-THE-ART TECHNOLOGY. WE SAW THE EXCELLENCE EMBODIED IN THE PATRIOT MISSILE AND THE PATRIOTS WHO MADE IT WORK.

AND WE SAW SOLDIERS WHO KNOW ABOUT HONOR AND BRAVERY AND DUTY AND COUNTRY AND THE WORLD-SHAKING POWER OF THESE SIMPLE WORDS.

THERE IS SOMETHING NOBLE AND MAJESTIC ABOUT THE PRIDE, ABOUT THE PATRIOTISM, THAT WE FEEL TONIGHT.

SO, TO EVERYONE HERE, AND EVERYONE WATCHING AT HOME, THINK ABOUT THE MEN AND WOMEN OF DESERT STORM. LET US HONOR THEM WITH OUR GRATITUDE. LET US COMFORT THE FAMILIES OF THE FALLEN AND REMEMBER EACH PRECIOUS LIFE LOST.

LET US LEARN FROM THEM AS WELL. LET US HONOR THOSE WHO HAVE SERVED US BY SERVING OTHERS.

LET US HONOR THEM AS INDIVIDUALS -- MEN AND WOMEN OF EVERY RACE, ALL CREEDS AND COLORS -- BY SETTING THE FACE OF THIS NATION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, BIGOTRY AND HATE -- ELIMINATE THEM. (PROLONGED APPLAUSE.)

I'M SURE THAT MANY OF YOU SAW ON TELEVISON THE UNFORGETTABLE SCENE OF FOUR TERRIFIED IRAQI SOLDIERS SURRENDERING. THEY EMERGED FROM THEIR BUNKER -- BROKEN, TEARS STREAMING FROM THEIR EYES, FEARING THE WORST. AND THEN THERE WAS AN AMERICAN SOLDIER. REMEMBER WHAT HE SAID? HE SAID: "IT'S OKAY. YOU'RE ALL RIGHT NOW. YOU'RE ALL RIGHT NOW."

THAT SCENE SAYS A LOT ABOUT AMERICA, A LOT ABOUT WHO WE ARE. AMERICANS ARE A CARING PEOPLE. WE ARE A GOOD PEOPLE, A GENEROUS PEOPLE. LET US ALWAYS BE CARING AND GOOD AND GENEROUS IN ALL WE DO. (PROLONGED APPLAUSE.)

SOON -- VERY SOON -- OUR TROOPS WILL BEGIN THE MARCH WE'VE ALL BEEN WAITING FOR -- THEIR MARCH HOME. AND I HAVE DIRECTED SECRETARY CHENEY TO BEGIN THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF AMERICAN COMBAT UNITS FROM THE GULF.

LESS THAN TWO HOURS FROM NOW, THE FIRST PLANELOAD OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS WILL LIFT OFF FROM SAUDI ARABIA HEADED FOR THE USA. (STANDING OVATION.) THAT PLANE WILL CARRY THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE 24TH MECHANIZED INFRANTRY DIVISION BOUND FOR FORT STEWART, GEORGIA. THIS IS JUST -- (LAUGHTER) -- THIS IS JUST THE BEGINNING OF A STEADY FLOW OF AMERICAN TROOPS COMING HOME.

LET THEIR RETURN REMIND US THAT ALL THOSE WHO HAVE GONE BEFORE ARE LINKED WITH US IN THE LONG LINE OF FREEDOM'S MARCH. AMERICANS HAVE ALWAYS TRIED TO SERVE, TO SACRIFICE NOBLY FOR WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE RIGHT.

TONIGHT, I ASK EVERY COMMUNITY IN THIS COUNTRY TO MAKE THIS COMING 4TH OF JULY A DAY OF SPECIAL CELEBRATION FOR OUR RETURNING TROOPS. THEY MAY HAVE MISSED THANKSGIVING AND CHRISTMAS, BUT I CAN TELL YOU THIS: FOR THEM AND FOR THEIR FAMILIES, WE CAN MAKE THIS A HOLIDAY THEY'LL NEVER FORGET. (APPLAUSE.)

IN A VERY REAL SENSE, THIS VICTORY BELONGS TO THEM -- TO THE PRIVATES AND THE PILOTS, TO THE SERGEANTS AND THE SUPPLY OFFICERS, TO THE MEN AND WOMEN IN THE MACHINES, AND THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO MADE THEM WORK. IT BELONGS TO THE REGULARS, TO THE RESERVES, TO THE NATIONAL GUARD. THIS VICTORY BELONGS TO THE FINEST FIGHTING FORCE THIS NATION HAS EVER KNOWN IN ITS HISTORY. (PROLONGED APPLAUSE.)

WE WENT HALFWAY AROUND THE WORLD TO DO WHAT IS MORAL AND JUST AND RIGHT. WE FOUGHT HARD, AND -- WITH OTHERS -- WE WON THE WAR. WE LIFTED THE YOKE OF AGGRESSION AND TYRANNY FROM A SMALL COUNTRY THAT MANY AMERICANS HAD NEVER EVEN HEARD OF, AND WE ASK NOTHING IN RETURN.

WE'RE COMING HOME NOW -- PROUD. CONFIDENT -- HEADS HIGH. THERE IS MUCH THAT WE MUST DO AT HOME AND ABROAD. AND WE WILL DO IT. WE ARE AMERICANS.

MAY GOD BLESS THIS GREAT NATION -- THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH. (STANDING OVATION.)

עד כאן.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רס),@אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא,פרנ,רביב,
מעת,הסברה,סייבל,סולטן,@(לעמ)

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אל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: נאום הנשיא בוש

THE WHITE HOUSE ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, DC
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 1991

SPEAKER FOLEY: MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS CUSTOMARY AT JOINT SESSIONS FOR THE CHAIR TO PRESENT THE PRESIDENT TO THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS DIRECTLY AND WITHOUT FURTHER COMMENT. BUT I WISH TO DEPART FROM TRADITION TONIGHT AND EXPRESS TO YOU, ON BEHALF OF THE CONGRESS AND THE COUNTRY, AND THROUGH YOU TO THE MEMBERS OF OUR ARMED FORCES OUR WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE BRILLIANT VICTORY OF THE DESERT STORM OPERATION. (APPLAUSE, CHEERS.)

MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS, I NOW HAVE THE HIGH PRIVILEGE AND DISTINCT HONOR OF PRESENTING TO YOU THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. (APPLAUSE, WHISTLES, CHEERS.)

PRESIDENT BUSH: MR. PRESIDENT. AND MR. SPEAKER, THANK YOU, SIR, FOR THOSE VERY GENEROUS WORDS, SPOKEN FROM THE HEART, ABOUT THE WONDERFUL PERFORMANCE OF OUR MILITARY. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS: FIVE SHORT WEEKS AGO, I CAME TO THIS HOUSE TO SPEAK TO YOU ABOUT THE STATE OF THE UNION. WE MET THEN IN TIME OF WAR. TONIGHT, WE MEET IN A WORLD BLESSED BY THE PROMISE OF PEACE.

FROM THE MOMENT OPERATION DESERT STORM COMMENCED ON JANUARY 16TH, UNTIL THE TIME THE GUNS FELL SILENT AT MIDNIGHT ONE WEEK AGO, THIS NATION HAS WATCHED ITS SONS AND DAUGHTERS WITH PRIDE -- WATCHED OVER THEM WITH PRAYER. AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, I CAN REPORT TO YOU: OUR ARMED FORCES FOUGHT WITH HONOR AND VALOR. AND, AS PRESIDENT, I CAN REPORT TO THE NATION -- AGGRESSION IS DEFEATED. THE WAR IS OVER. (PROLONGED APPLAUSE.)

THIS IS A VICTORY FOR EVERY COUNTRY IN THE COALITION, FOR THE

UNITED NATIONS, A VICTORY FOR UNPRECEDENTED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DIPLOMACY, SO WELL LED BY OUR SECRETARY OF STATE, JAMES BAKER. IT IS A VICTORY FOR THE RULE OF LAW AND FOR WHAT IS RIGHT.

DESERT STORM'S SUCCESS BELONGS TO THE TEAM THAT SO ABLY LEADS OUR ARMED FORCES -- OUR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OUR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS: DICK CHENEY AND COLIN POWELL. (APPLAUSE, WHISTLES.)

AND WHILE YOU'RE STANDING -- (LAUGHTER) -- THIS MILITARY VICTORY ALSO BELONGS TO THE ONE THE BRITISH CALL THE "MAN OF THE MATCH" -- THE TOWER OF CALM AT THE EYE OF DESERT STORM -- GENERAL NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF. (APPLAUSE, CHEERS.)

AND LET US -- RECOGNIZING THIS WAS A COALITION EFFORT, LET US NOT FORGET SAUDI GENERAL KHALID, BRITAIN'S GENERAL DE LA BILLIERE, OR GENERAL ROQUEJOFFRE OF FRANCE, AND ALL THE OTHERS WHOSE LEADERSHIP PLAYED SUCH A VITAL ROLE. AND MOST IMPORTANTLY -- MOST IMPORTANTLY OF ALL, ALL THOSE WHO SERVED IN THE FIELD. (APPLAUSE.)

I THANK THE MEMBERS OF THIS CONGRESS -- SUPPORT HERE FOR OUR TROOPS IN BATTLE WAS OVERWHELMING. AND ABOVE ALL, I THANK THOSE WHOSE UNFAILING LOVE AND SUPPORT SUSTAINED OUR COURAGEOUS MEN AND WOMEN: I THANK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. (APPLAUSE.)

TONIGHT -- (APPLAUSE CONTINUES) -- TONIGHT, I COME TO THIS HOUSE TO SPEAK ABOUT THE WORLD -- THE WORLD AFTER WAR.

THE RECENT CHALLENGE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CLEARER. SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS THE VILLAIN; KUWAIT THE VICTIM. TO THE AID OF THIS SMALL COUNTRY CAME NATIONS FROM NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE, FROM ASIA AND SOUTH AMERICA, FROM AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD -- ALL UNITED AGAINST AGGRESSION.

OUR UNCOMMON COALITION MUST NOW WORK IN COMMON PURPOSE TO FORGE A FUTURE THAT SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE HELD HOSTAGE TO THE DARKER SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE. (APPLAUSE.)

TONIGHT IN IRAQ, SADDAM WALKS AMIDST RUIN. HIS WAR MACHINE IS CRUSHED. HIS ABILITY TO THREATEN MASS DESTRUCTION IS ITSELF DESTROYED. HIS PEOPLE HAVE BEEN LIED TO -- DENIED THE TRUTH. AND WHEN HIS DEFEATED LEGIONS COME HOME, ALL IRAQIS WILL SEE AND FEEL THE HAVOC HE HAS WROUGHT. AND THIS I PROMISE YOU: FOR ALL THAT SADDAM HAS DONE TO HIS OWN PEOPLE, TO THE KUWAITIS, AND TO THE ENTIRE WORLD -- SADDAM AND THOSE AROUND HIM ARE ACCOUNTABLE. (APPLAUSE.)

ALL OF US GRIEVE FOR THE VICTIMS OF WAR, FOR THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT AND THE SUFFERING THAT SCARS THE SOUL OF THAT PROUD NATION. WE GRIEVE FOR ALL OUR FALLEN SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES, FOR ALL THE INNOCENTS CAUGHT UP IN THIS CONFLICT. AND YES, WE GRIEVE FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ -- A PEOPLE WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN OUR ENEMY. MY

HOPE IS THAT ONE DAY WE WILL ONCE AGAIN WELCOME THEM AS FRIENDS INTO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS.

OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST DOES NOT END WITH THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT. SO TONIGHT, LET ME OUTLINE FOUR KEY CHALLENGES TO BE MET:

FIRST, WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE SHARED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION. OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST RECOGNIZE THAT THEY WILL BEAR THE BULK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIONAL SECURITY. BUT WE WANT THEM TO KNOW THAT JUST AS WE STOOD WITH THEM TO REPEL AGGRESSION, SO NOW AMERICA STANDS READY TO WORK WITH THEM TO SECURE THE PEACE.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN STATIONING US GROUND FORCES ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, BUT IT DOES MEAN AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN JOINT EXERCISES INVOLVING BOTH AIR AND GROUND FORCES. IT MEANS MAINTAINING A CAPABLE US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE REGION, JUST AS WE HAVE FOR OVER 40 YEARS. LET IT BE CLEAR: OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS DEPEND ON A STABLE AND SECURE GULF.

SECOND, WE MUST ACT TO CONTROL THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MISSILES USED TO DELIVER THEM. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF WERE NOW, IN THE WAKE OF WAR, TO EMBARK ON A NEW ARMS RACE. IRAQ REQUIRES SPECIAL VIGILANCE. UNTIL IRAQ CONVINCES THE WORLD OF ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS -- THAT ITS LEADERS WILL NOT USE NEW REVENUES TO REARM AND REBUILD ITS MENACING WAR MACHINE -- IRAQ MUST NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR. (APPLAUSE.)

AND, THIRD, WE MUST WORK TO CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THE NIGHT I ANNOUNCED OPERATION DESERT STORM, I EXPRESSED MY HOPE THAT OUT OF THE HORRORS OF WAR MIGHT COME NEW MOMENTUM FOR PEACE. WE'VE LEARNED IN THE MODERN AGE, GEOGRAPHY CANNOT GUARANTEE SECURITY AND SECURITY DOES NOT COME FROM MILITARY POWER ALONE.

ALL OF US KNOW THE DEPTH OF BITTERNESS THAT HAS MADE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS SO PAINFUL AND INTRACTABLE. YET, IN THE CONFLICT JUST CONCLUDED, ISRAEL AND MANY OF THE ARAB STATES HAVE FOR THE FIRST TIME FOUND THEMSELVES CONFRONTING THE SAME AGGRESSOR. BY NOW, IT SHOULD BE PLAIN TO ALL PARTIES THAT PEACEMAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST REQUIRES COMPROMISE. AT THE SAME TIME, PEACE BRINGS REAL BENEFITS TO EVERYONE. WE MUST DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES -- AND BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS. THE TACTICS OF TERROR LEAD ABSOLUTELY NOWHERE -- THERE CAN BE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR DIPLOMACY. (APPLAUSE.)

A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE MUST BE GROUNDED IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE. THIS PRINCIPLE MUST BE ELABORATED TO PROVIDE

FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND RECOGNITION, AND AT THE SAME TIME FOR LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS. ANYTHING ELSE WOULD FAIL THE TWIN TESTS OF FAIRNESS AND SECURITY. THE TIME HAS COME TO PUT AN END TO ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. (APPLAUSE.)

THE WAR WITH IRAQ IS OVER. THE QUEST FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS IN LEBANON, IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, AND IN THE GULF MUST GO FORWARD WITH NEW VIGOR AND DETERMINATION. I GUARANTEE YOU: NO ONE WILL WORK HARDER FOR A STABLE PEACE IN THE REGION THAN WE WILL.

FOURTH, WE MUST FOSTER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS. THE PERSIAN GULF AND MIDDLE EAST -- AND MIDDLE EAST FORM A REGION RICH IN NATURAL RESOURCES WITH A WEALTH OF UNTAPPED HUMAN POTENTIAL. RESOURCES ONCE SQUANDERED ON MILITARY MIGHT -- MILITARY MIGHT MUST BE REDIRECTED TO MORE PEACEFUL ENDS. WE ARE ALREADY ADDRESSING THE IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IRAQ'S AGGRESSION. NOW, THE CHALLENGE IS TO REACH HIGHER -- TO FOSTER ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION.

BY MEETING THESE FOUR CHALLENGES WE CAN BUILD A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE. I'VE ASKED SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO BEGIN THE PROCESS. HE WILL GO TO LISTEN, TO PROBE, TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS, TO ADVANCE THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY. I'VE ALSO ASKED HIM TO RAISE THE PLIGHT OF THE HOSTAGES HELD IN LEBANON. WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THEM AND WE WILL NOT FORGET THEM. (APPLAUSE.)

TO ALL THE CHALLENGES THAT CONFRONT THIS REGION OF THE WORLD, THERE IS NO SINGLE SOLUTION, NO SOLELY AMERICAN ANSWER. BUT WE CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE. AMERICA WILL WORK TIRELESSLY AS A CATALYST FOR POSITIVE CHANGE.

BUT WE CANNOT LEAD A NEW WORLD ABROAD IF, AT HOME, IT'S POLITICS AS USUAL ON AMERICAN DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY. IT'S TIME TO TURN AWAY FROM THE TEMPTATION TO PROTECT UNNEEDED WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND OBSOLETE BASES. IT'S TIME TO PUT AN END -- (APPLAUSE) -- IT'S TIME TO PUT AN END TO MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, MICRO-MANAGEMENT THAT HUMILIATES OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND HAMSTRINGS OUR DIPLOMACY. (APPLAUSE.) IT'S TIME TO RISE ABOVE THE PAROCHIAL AND THE PORK BARREL -- TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY, WHAT'S RIGHT, AND WHAT WILL ENABLE THIS NATION TO PLAY THE LEADERSHIP ROLE REQUIRED OF US.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF REACH FAR BEYOND THE CONFINES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. TWICE BEFORE IN THIS CENTURY, AN ENTIRE WORLD WAS CONVULSED BY WAR. TWICE THIS CENTURY, OUT OF THE HORRORS OF WAR, HOPE EMERGED FOR ENDURING PEACE. TWICE BEFORE, THOSE HOPES PROVED TO BE A DISTANT DREAM, BEYOND THE GRASP OF MAN.

UNTIL NOW, THE WORLD WE'VE KNOWN HAS BEEN A WORLD DIVIDED -- A

WORLD OF BARBED WIRE AND CONCRETE BLOCK, CONFLICT, COLD WAR.

NOW, WE CAN SEE A NEW WORLD COMING INTO VIEW. A WORLD IN WHICH THERE IS THE VERY REAL PROSPECT OF A NEW WORLD ORDER. IN THE WORDS OF WINSTON CHURCHILL, A "WORLD ORDER" IN WHICH "THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY ... PROTECT THE WEAK AGAINST THE STRONG...." A WORLD WHERE THE UNITED NATIONS, FREED FROM COLD WAR STALEMATE, IS POISED TO FULFILL THE HISTORIC VISION OF ITS FOUNDERS. A WORLD IN WHICH FREEDOM AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FIND A HOME AMONG ALL NATIONS.

THE GULF WAR PUT THIS NEW WORLD TO ITS -- ITS FIRST TEST. AND MY FELLOW AMERICANS: WE PASSED THAT TEST.

FOR THE SAKE OF OUR PRINCIPLES -- FOR THE SAKE OF THE KUWAITI PEOPLE -- WE STOOD OUR GROUND. BECAUSE THE WORLD WOULD NOT LOOK THE OTHER WAY, AMBASSADOR AL-SABAH, TONIGHT, KUWAIT IS FREE -- (APPLAUSE) -- AND WE'RE VERY HAPPY ABOUT THAT. (APPLAUSE.)

TONIGHT, AS OUR TROOPS BEGIN TO COME HOME, LET US RECOGNIZE THAT THE HARD WORK OF FREEDOM STILL CALLS US FORWARD. WE'VE LEARNED THE HARD LESSONS OF HISTORY. THE VICTORY OVER IRAQ WAS NOT WAGED AS "A WAR TO END ALL WARS." EVEN THE NEW WORLD ORDER CANNOT GUARANTEE AN ERA OF PERPETUAL PEACE. BUT ENDURING PEACE MUST BE OUR MISSION.

OUR SUCCESS IN THE GULF WILL SHAPE NOT ONLY THE NEW WORLD ORDER WE SEEK, BUT OUR MISSION HERE AT HOME.

IN THE WAR JUST ENDED, THERE WERE CLEAR-CUT OBJECTIVES, TIMETABLES AND, ABOVE ALL, AN OVERRIDING IMPERATIVE TO ACHIEVE RESULTS. WE MUST BRING THAT SAME SENSE OF SELF-DISCIPLINE, THAT SAME SENSE OF URGENCY, TO THE WAY WE MEET CHALLENGES HERE AT HOME.

IN MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS AND IN MY BUDGET, I DEFINED A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY.

OUR FIRST PRIORITY IS TO GET THIS ECONOMY ROLLING AGAIN. THE FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY CAUSED BY THE GULF CRISIS WERE UNDERSTANDABLE. BUT NOW THAT THE WAR IS OVER, OIL PRICES ARE DOWN, INTEREST RATES ARE DOWN, AND CONFIDENCE IS RIGHTLY COMING BACK. AMERICANS CAN MOVE FORWARD TO LEND, SPEND AND INVEST IN THIS, THE STRONGEST ECONOMY ON EARTH. (APPLAUSE.)

WE MUST ALSO ENACT THE LEGISLATION THAT IS KEY TO BUILDING A BETTER AMERICA. FOR EXAMPLE: IN 1990, WE ENACTED AN HISTORIC CLEAN AIR ACT, AND NOW WE'VE PROPOSED A NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY. WE PASSED A CHILD CARE BILL THAT PUT POWER IN THE HANDS OF PARENTS, AND TODAY, WE'RE READY TO DO THE SAME THING WITH OUR SCHOOLS, AND EXPAND -- EXPAND CHOICE IN EDUCATION. WE PASSED A CRIME BILL THAT MADE A USEFUL START IN FIGHTING CRIME AND DRUGS. THIS YEAR, WE'RE SENDING TO CONGRESS OUR COMPREHENSIVE CRIME PACKAGE TO FINISH THE JOB. WE PASSED THE LANDMARK AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT.

AND NOW, WE'VE SENT FORWARD OUR CIVIL RIGHTS BILL. WE ALSO PASSED THE AVIATION BILL. THIS YEAR, WE'VE SENT UP OUR NEW HIGHWAY BILL.

AND THESE ARE JUST A FEW OF OUR PENDING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND RENEWAL.

SO, TONIGHT, I CALL ON THE CONGRESS TO MOVE FORWARD AGGRESSIVELY ON OUR DOMESTIC FRONT. LET'S BEGIN WITH TWO INITIATIVES WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE ON QUICKLY: TRANSPORTATION AND CRIME. AND THEN, LET'S BUILD ON SUCCESS WITH THOSE AND ENACT THE REST OF OUR AGENDA. IF OUR FORCES COULD WIN THE GROUND WAR IN 100 HOURS, THEN SURELY THE CONGRESS CAN PASS THIS LEGISLATION IN 100 DAYS. (APPLAUSE.) LET THAT BE A PROMISE WE MAKE TONIGHT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

WHEN I SPOKE IN THIS HOUSE ABOUT THE STATE OF OUR UNION, I ASKED ALL OF YOU: IF WE CAN SELFLESSLY CONFRONT EVIL FOR THE SAKE OF GOOD IN A LAND SO FAR AWAY, THEN SURELY WE CAN MAKE THIS LAND ALL THAT IT SHOULD BE. IN THE TIME SINCE THEN, THE BRAVE MEN AND WOMEN OF DESERT STORM ACCOMPLISHED MORE THAN EVEN THEY MAY REALIZE. THEY SET OUT TO CONFRONT AN ENEMY ABROAD, AND IN THE PROCESS, THEY TRANSFORMED A NATION AT HOME.

THINK -- THINK OF THE WAY THEY WENT ABOUT THEIR MISSION -- WITH CONFIDENCE AND QUIET PRIDE. THINK ABOUT THEIR SENSE OF DUTY, ABOUT ALL THEY TAUGHT US, ABOUT OUR VALUES, ABOUT OURSELVES.

WE HEAR SO OFTEN ABOUT OUR YOUNG PEOPLE IN TURMOIL; HOW OUR CHILDREN FALL SHORT; HOW OUR SCHOOLS FAIL US; HOW AMERICAN PRODUCTS AND AMERICAN WORKERS ARE SECOND CLASS. WELL, DON'T YOU BELIEVE IT. THE AMERICA WE SAW IN DESERT STORM WAS FIRST-CLASS TALENT. (APPLAUSE.)

AND THEY DID IT -- THEY DID IT USING AMERICA'S STATE-OF-THE-ART TECHNOLOGY. WE SAW THE EXCELLENCE EMBODIED IN THE PATRIOT MISSILE AND THE PATRIOTS WHO MADE IT WORK.

AND WE SAW SOLDIERS WHO KNOW ABOUT HONOR AND BRAVERY AND DUTY AND COUNTRY AND THE WORLD-SHAKING POWER OF THESE SIMPLE WORDS.

THERE IS SOMETHING NOBLE AND MAJESTIC ABOUT THE PRIDE, ABOUT THE PATRIOTISM, THAT WE FEEL TONIGHT.

SO, TO EVERYONE HERE, AND EVERYONE WATCHING AT HOME, THINK ABOUT THE MEN AND WOMEN OF DESERT STORM. LET US HONOR THEM WITH OUR GRATITUDE. LET US COMFORT THE FAMILIES OF THE FALLEN AND REMEMBER EACH PRECIOUS LIFE LOST.

LET US LEARN FROM THEM AS WELL. LET US HONOR THOSE WHO HAVE SERVED US BY SERVING OTHERS.

LET US HONOR THEM AS INDIVIDUALS -- MEN AND WOMEN OF EVERY

RACE, ALL CREEDS AND COLORS -- BY SETTING THE FACE OF THIS NATION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, BIGOTRY AND HATE -- ELIMINATE THEM. (PROLONGED APPLAUSE.)

I'M SURE THAT MANY OF YOU SAW ON TELEVISON THE UNFORGETTABLE SCENE OF FOUR TERRIFIED IRAQI SOLDIERS SURRENDERING. THEY EMERGED FROM THEIR BUNKER -- BROKEN, TEARS STREAMING FROM THEIR EYES, FEARING THE WORST. AND THEN THERE WAS AN AMERICAN SOLDIER. REMEMBER WHAT HE SAID? HE SAID: "IT'S OKAY. YOU'RE ALL RIGHT NOW. YOU'RE ALL RIGHT NOW."

THAT SCENE SAYS A LOT ABOUT AMERICA, A LOT ABOUT WHO WE ARE. AMERICANS ARE A CARING PEOPLE. WE ARE A GOOD PEOPLE, A GENEROUS PEOPLE. LET US ALWAYS BE CARING AND GOOD AND GENEROUS IN ALL WE DO. (PROLONGED APPLAUSE.)

SOON -- VERY SOON -- OUR TROOPS WILL BEGIN THE MARCH WE'VE ALL BEEN WAITING FOR -- THEIR MARCH HOME. AND I HAVE DIRECTED SECRETARY CHENEY TO BEGIN THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF AMERICAN COMBAT UNITS FROM THE GULF.

LESS THAN TWO HOURS FROM NOW, THE FIRST PLANELOAD OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS WILL LIFT OFF FROM SAUDI ARABIA HEADED FOR THE USA. (STANDING OVATION.) THAT PLANE WILL CARRY THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE 24TH MECHANIZED INFRANTRY DIVISION BOUND FOR FORT STEWART, GEORGIA. THIS IS JUST -- (LAUGHTER) -- THIS IS JUST THE BEGINNING OF A STEADY FLOW OF AMERICAN TROOPS COMING HOME.

LET THEIR RETURN REMIND US THAT ALL THOSE WHO HAVE GONE BEFORE ARE LINKED WITH US IN THE LONG LINE OF FREEDOM'S MARCH. AMERICANS HAVE ALWAYS TRIED TO SERVE, TO SACRIFICE NOBLY FOR WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE RIGHT.

TONIGHT, I ASK EVERY COMMUNITY IN THIS COUNTRY TO MAKE THIS COMING 4TH OF JULY A DAY OF SPECIAL CELEBRATION FOR OUR RETURNING TROOPS. THEY MAY HAVE MISSED THANKSGIVING AND CHRISTMAS, BUT I CAN TELL YOU THIS: FOR THEM AND FOR THEIR FAMILIES, WE CAN MAKE THIS A HOLIDAY THEY'LL NEVER FORGET. (APPLAUSE.)

IN A VERY REAL SENSE, THIS VICTORY BELONGS TO THEM -- TO THE PRIVATES AND THE PILOTS, TO THE SERGEANTS AND THE SUPPLY OFFICERS, TO THE MEN AND WOMEN IN THE MACHINES, AND THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO MADE THEM WORK. IT BELONGS TO THE REGULARS, TO THE RESERVES, TO THE NATIONAL GUARD. THIS VICTORY BELONGS TO THE FINEST FIGHTING FORCE THIS NATION HAS EVER KNOWN IN ITS HISTORY. (PROLONGED APPLAUSE.)

WE WENT HALFWAY AROUND THE WORLD TO DO WHAT IS MORAL AND JUST AND RIGHT. WE FOUGHT HARD, AND -- WITH OTHERS -- WE WON THE WAR. WE LIFTED THE YOKE OF AGGRESSION AND TYRANNY FROM A SMALL COUNTRY THAT MANY AMERICANS HAD NEVER EVEN HEARD OF, AND WE ASK NOTHING IN RETURN.

WE'RE COMING HOME NOW -- PROUD. CONFIDENT -- HEADS HIGH. THERE IS MUCH THAT WE MUST DO AT HOME AND ABROAD. AND WE WILL DO IT. WE ARE AMERICANS.

MAY GOD BLESS THIS GREAT NATION -- THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH. (STANDING OVATION.)

עד כאן.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),@אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא,פרנ,רביב,
מעת,הסברה,סייבל,סולטן,@(לעמ)

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אאאא,חוזם:8275
אל:רהמש/570
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:144,תא:070391,זח:2025,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפא .
דע : מקשח/משהב"ט.
מאת : ק. לקונגרס .

הנדון : ביהנ"ב - סיוע חירום לישראל .

1. היום בערב אושר סיוע החירום לישראל בסך 650 מיליון דולר .

תוצאות ההצבעה על הספלמנטל הכולל את הסיוע לישראל :

365 בעד 43 נגד

2. להצבעה קדמו 4 תיקונים שקראו לקיצוץ בסיוע לישראל .

א. תיקון טים ולנטיין (דמוקרט מצפון קרוליינה) ביקש לקצץ את כל הסכום של ה-650 מיליון דולר מספלמנט החירום.

תוצאות ההצבעה :

נגד התיקון : 397
בעד התיקון : 24 (13 דמוק, 11 רפוב')

התיקון נפל .

ב. תיקון טרפיקנט 1 :

לקצץ 250 מיליון דולר ולאשר סיוע לישראל בגובה 400 מיליון דולר .

ג. תיקון טרפיקנט 2 :

לקצץ 50 מיליון דולר ולאשר סיוע לישראל בגובה 600 מיליון דולר

ד. תיקון טרפיקנט 3 :

לקצץ 13 מיליון דולר ולאשר סיוע לישראל בגובה 637 מיליון דולר .

שלושת התיקונים נפלו, 2 הראשונים ב-VOICE VOTE והאחרון בהעדר קוורום שיאשר הצבעה אלקטרונית .

את ההצבעה האלקטרונית על התיקון האחרון ביקש הקונגרסמן גאס סבאג' מאלינוי .

על הנאומים בדיון בנפרד .

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),בנצור,
מצפא,סייבל,אוצר,@(מקשח/משהבט)

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1/21 1054 - משהה

שמור / בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצכ"א

דע: תצוגת תקשורת

נאום הנשיא בקונגרס

1. כתב הוושינגטון- פוסט העביר לנו הערב (19:30) את התמליל המוקדם של הנאום שעתיד הנשיא לשאת הערב בפני שני בתי הקונגרס. הטקסט מצ"ב (את התמליל המלא והמדוייק נעביר אליכם מחר אחרי שנקבלו במערכת).

2. הנאום מתמקד בהישגי ארה"ב במלחמת המפרץ ובהצגת ראיית הממשל את "העולם שלאחר המלחמה" - תוך הדגשה שמחוייבות ארה"ב לשלום במזה"ת אינה כוללת אתגרים נוספים הכוללים -:

א. עדוי בשוון אזוריים.

ב. מניעת פרוליפרציה של נשק השמדה המוני וטילים.

ג. יצירת אפשרויות חדשות לשלום ויציבות במזה"ת - כולל הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי (יפורט בהמשך).

ד. עידוד פתוח וצמיחה כלכלית באזור.

3. פרק הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי כולל -:

א. הדגשת עקרון שמחים תמורת שלום המעוגן בהחלטות 242 , 338 .

ב. "טגיות הפער" בין ישראל למדינות-ערב ובין ישראל לפלסטינים. (הערה: נטוי לגישה הדואלית שהציג בבר המזכיר).

שהם מלשה רקע שסבל נשל בלשל בנשמר בבשיל פרט
רב'ב בעל הסברה רובתב מלמה רק אילן ס'ב מלין

1054 2/21

ג. הבטחת במחוז ישראל וההכרה בה ביחד עם הזמנות הזכויות הפוליטיות הלגיטימיות של הפלסטינים.

ד. הגיאוגרפיה אינה יכולה להבטיח בטחון - ובטחון אינו נשען על כוח צבאי בלבד.

ה. הגיע הזמן לסיים הקונפליקט הערבי-ישראלי.

4. עד כאן. כאמור התמליל המוקדם של הנאום. הערה: ההדגשות בטקסט הן במקור.

רות ירון

להלן הטקסט:

3/21 10JK

DRAFT

JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS
THE CAPITOL
MARCH 6, 1990
9:00 PM

MR. PRESIDENT. MR. SPEAKER. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS: FIVE SHORT WEEKS AGO, I CAME TO THIS HOUSE TO SPEAK TO YOU ABOUT THE STATE OF THE UNION. WE MET THEN IN TIME OF WAR. TONIGHT, WE MEET IN A WORLD BLESSED.... BY THE PROMISE OF PEACE. //

FROM THE MOMENT OPERATION DESERT STORM COMMENCED ON JANUARY 16, UNTIL THE TIME THE GUNS FELL SILENT AT MIDNIGHT ONE WEEK AGO, THIS NATION HAS WATCHED ITS SONS AND DAUGHTERS WITH PRIDE -- WATCHED OVER THEM WITH PRAYER. // AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF, I CAN REPORT TO YOU: OUR ARMED FORCES FOUGHT WITH HONOR AND VALOR. AS PRESIDENT, I CAN REPORT TO THE NATION -- AGGRESSION IS DEFEATED. THE WAR IS OVER. ///

THIS IS A VICTORY FOR EVERY COUNTRY IN THE COALITION -- AND FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. A VICTORY FOR UNPRECEDENTED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DIPLOMACY -- SO WELL LED BY OUR SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER.// IT IS A VICTORY FOR THE RULE OF LAW -- AND FOR WHAT IS RIGHT. //

* CAN NOT BE USED UNTIL IT IS DELIVERED!

4/21
1054

DESERT STORM'S SUCCESS BELONGS TO THE TEAM THAT SO ABLY LEADS OUR ARMED FORCES: OUR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND OUR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS: DICK CHENEY AND COLIN POWELL. //

AND OF COURSE, THIS MILITARY VICTORY ALSO BELONGS TO THE ONE THE BRITISH CALL THE "MAN OF THE MATCH" -- THE TOWER OF CALM AT THE EYE OF DESERT STORM -- GENERAL NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF. ///

AND LET US NOT FORGET SAUDI GENERAL KHALID, OR BRITAIN'S GENERAL DE LA BILLIERE, OR GENERAL ROQUEJOFFRE OF FRANCE -- AND ALL THE OTHERS WHOSE LEADERSHIP PLAYED SUCH A VITAL ROLE. // AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, ALL THOSE WHO SERVED IN THE FIELD. //

I THANK THE MEMBERS OF THIS CONGRESS -- SUPPORT HERE FOR OUR TROOPS IN BATTLE WAS OVERWHELMING. AND ABOVE ALL, I THANK THOSE WHOSE UNFAILING LOVE AND SUPPORT SUSTAINED OUR COURAGEOUS MEN AND WOMEN: I THANK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. ///

5/21
1054

TONIGHT, I COME TO THIS HOUSE TO SPEAK ABOUT THE WORLD -- THE WORLD AFTER WAR.

THE RECENT CHALLENGE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CLEARER. SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS THE VILLAIN -- KUWAIT THE VICTIM. TO THE AID OF THIS SMALL COUNTRY CAME NATIONS FROM NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE, FROM ASIA AND SOUTH AMERICA, FROM AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD -- ALL UNITED AGAINST AGGRESSION. //

OUR UNCOMMON COALITION MUST NOW WORK IN COMMON PURPOSE -- TO FORGE A FUTURE THAT SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE HELD HOSTAGE TO THE DARKER SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE. //

6/21
1056

TONIGHT IN IRAQ, SADDAM WALKS AMIDST RUIN. // HIS WAR MACHINE IS CRUSHED. // HIS ABILITY TO THREATEN MASS DESTRUCTION IS ITSELF DESTROYED. // HIS PEOPLE HAVE BEEN LIED TO -- DENIED THE TRUTH. AND WHEN HIS DEFEATED LEGIONS COME HOME, ALL IRAQIS WILL SEE AND FEEL THE HAVOC HE HAS WROUGHT. // AND THIS I PROMISE YOU: FOR ALL THAT SADDAM HAS DONE TO HIS OWN PEOPLE, TO THE KUWAITIS, AND TO THE ENTIRE WORLD -- SADDAM AND THOSE AROUND HIM ARE ACCOUNTABLE. ///

ALL OF US GRIEVE FOR THE VICTIMS OF WAR. FOR THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT -- AND THE SUFFERING THAT SCARS THE SOUL OF THAT PROUD NATION. WE GRIEVE FOR ALL OUR FALLEN SOLDIERS, AND THEIR FAMILIES -- FOR ALL THE INNOCENTS CAUGHT UP IN THIS CONFLICT. AND YES, WE GRIEVE FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ -- A PEOPLE WHO HAVE NEVER BEEN OUR ENEMY. MY HOPE IS THAT ONE DAY WE WILL ONCE AGAIN WELCOME THEM AS FRIENDS INTO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. ///

7/21
1054

OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST DOES NOT END WITH THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT. SO TONIGHT, LET ME OUTLINE FOUR KEY CHALLENGES TO BE MET:

FIRST, WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE SHARED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE REGION. OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST RECOGNIZE THAT THEY WILL BEAR THE BULK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIONAL SECURITY. BUT WE WANT THEM TO KNOW THAT JUST AS WE STOOD WITH THEM TO REPEL AGGRESSION -- SO NOW AMERICA STANDS READY TO WORK WITH THEM TO SECURE THE PEACE.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN STATIONING U.S. GROUND FORCES ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA -- BUT IT DOES MEAN AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN JOINT EXERCISES -- INVOLVING BOTH AIR AND GROUND FORCES. AND IT MEANS MAINTAINING A CAPABLE U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE REGION -- JUST AS WE HAVE FOR OVER FORTY YEARS. LET IT BE CLEAR: OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS DEPEND ON A STABLE AND SECURE GULF.

8/21
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SECOND, WE MUST ACT TO CONTROL THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MISSILES USED TO DELIVER THEM. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF WERE NOW, IN THE WAKE OF WAR, TO EMBARK ON A NEW ARMS RACE.

IRAQ REQUIRES SPECIAL VIGILANCE. UNTIL IRAQ CONVINCES THE WORLD OF ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS -- THAT ITS LEADERS WILL NOT USE NEW REVENUES TO REARM AND REBUILD ITS MENACING WAR MACHINE -- IRAQ MUST NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR. ///

THIRD, WE MUST WORK TO CREATE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ON THE NIGHT I ANNOUNCED OPERATION DESERT STORM, I EXPRESSED MY HOPE THAT OUT OF THE HORRORS OF WAR MIGHT COME NEW MOMENTUM FOR PEACE. WE HAVE LEARNED IN THE MODERN AGE, GEOGRAPHY CANNOT GUARANTEE SECURITY -- AND SECURITY DOES NOT COME FROM MILITARY POWER ALONE. //

91/21

INCI

ALL OF US KNOW THE DEPTH OF BITTERNESS THAT HAS MADE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS SO PAINFUL AND INTRACTABLE. YET, IN THE CONFLICT JUST CONCLUDED, ISRAEL AND MANY OF THE ARAB STATES HAVE FOR THE FIRST TIME FOUND THEMSELVES CONFRONTING THE SAME AGGRESSOR.

BY NOW, IT SHOULD BE PLAIN TO ALL PARTIES THAT PEACEMAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST REQUIRES COMPROMISE. AT THE SAME TIME, PEACE BRINGS REAL BENEFITS TO EVERYONE. WE MUST DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES -- AND BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS. THE TACTICS OF TERROR LEAD NOWHERE -- THERE CAN BE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR DIPLOMACY.

A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE MUST BE GROUNDED IN UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE. THIS PRINCIPLE MUST BE ELABORATED TO PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND RECOGNITION, AND AT THE SAME TIME FOR LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL RIGHTS. ANYTHING ELSE WOULD FAIL THE TWIN TESTS OF FAIRNESS AND SECURITY. THE TIME HAS COME TO PUT AN END TO ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. //

10/21

1054

THE WAR WITH IRAQ IS OVER. THE QUEST FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS IN LEBANON, IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, AND IN THE GULF MUST GO FORWARD WITH NEW VIGOR AND DETERMINATION. I GUARANTEE YOU: NO ONE WILL WORK HARDER FOR A STABLE PEACE IN THE REGION THAN WE WILL. //

FOURTH, WE MUST FOSTER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS. THE PERSIAN GULF AND MIDDLE EAST FORM A REGION RICH IN NATURAL RESOURCES -- WITH A WEALTH OF UNTAPPED HUMAN POTENTIAL. RESOURCES ONCE SQUANDERED ON MILITARY MIGHT MUST BE REDIRECTED TO MORE PEACEFUL ENDS. WE ARE ALREADY ADDRESSING THE IMMEDIATE REMOVAL CONSEQUENCES OF IRAQI AGGRESSION NOW, THE CHALLENGE IS TO REACH HIGHER -- TO FOSTER ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL PEOPLE OF THE REGION. //

11/21
1059

BY MEETING THESE FOUR CHALLENGES WE CAN BUILD A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE. I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST, TO BEGIN THIS PROCESS. HE WILL GO TO LISTEN, TO PROBE, TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS -- TO ADVANCE THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY. I HAVE ALSO ASKED HIM TO RAISE THE PLIGHT OF THE HOSTAGES HELD IN LEBANON. WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THEM -- WE WILL NOT FORGET THEM. ///

TO ALL THE CHALLENGES THAT CONFRONT THIS REGION OF THE WORLD, THERE IS NO SINGLE SOLUTION -- NO SOLELY AMERICAN ANSWER. BUT WE CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE. AMERICA WILL WORK TIRELESSLY AS A CATALYST FOR POSITIVE CHANGE. //

12/21
1054

BUT WE CANNOT LEAD A NEW WORLD ABROAD IF, AT HOME, IT'S POLITICS AS USUAL ON AMERICAN DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY. IT'S TIME TO TURN AWAY FROM THE TEMPTATION TO PROTECT UNNEEDED WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND OBSOLETE BASES. IT'S TIME TO PUT AN END TO MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS -- MICRO-MANAGEMENT THAT HUMILIATES OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND HAMSTRINGS OUR DIPLOMACY. IT'S TIME TO RISE ABOVE THE PAROCHIAL AND THE PORK BARREL -- TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY, WHAT'S RIGHT, AND WHAT WILL ENABLE THIS NATION TO PLAY THE LEADERSHIP ROLE REQUIRED OF US. //

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF REACH FAR BEYOND THE CONFINES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. // TWICE BEFORE IN THIS CENTURY, AN ENTIRE WORLD WAS CONVULSED BY WAR. TWICE THIS CENTURY, OUT OF THE HORRORS OF WAR HOPE EMERGED FOR ENDURING PEACE. TWICE BEFORE, THOSE HOPES PROVED TO BE A DISTANT DREAM, BEYOND THE GRASP OF MAN. //

13/21
1054

UNTIL NOW, // THE WORLD WE'VE KNOWN HAS BEEN A WORLD DIVIDED -- A WORLD OF BARBED WIRE AND CONCRETE BLOCK, CONFLICT AND COLD WAR. ///

NOW, WE CAN SEE A NEW WORLD COMING INTO VIEW. A WORLD IN WHICH THERE IS THE VERY REAL PROSPECT OF A NEW WORLD ORDER. IN THE WORDS OF WINSTON CHURCHILL, A "WORLD ORDER" IN WHICH "THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY... PROTECT THE WEAK AGAINST THE STRONG...." A WORLD WHERE THE UNITED NATIONS -- FREED FROM COLD WAR STALEMATE -- IS POISED TO FULFILL THE HISTORIC VISION OF ITS FOUNDERS. A WORLD IN WHICH FREEDOM AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FIND A HOME AMONG ALL NATIONS. //

THE GULF WAR PUT THIS NEW WORLD TO ITS FIRST TEST. / AND MY FELLOW AMERICANS: WE-PASSED-THAT-TEST. //

[illegible] THE WORLD WOULD NOT LOOK THE OTHER WAY -- [illegible] BUT BE FREE. ///

* כך בלקוח *

14/21
1054

TONIGHT, AS OUR TROOPS BEGIN TO COME HOME -- LET US RECOGNIZE THAT THE HARD WORK OF FREEDOM STILL CALLS US FORWARD. / WE'VE LEARNED THE HARD LESSONS OF HISTORY. THE VICTORY OVER IRAQ WAS NOT WAGED AS "A WAR TO END ALL WARS." EVEN THE NEW WORLD ORDER CANNOT GUARANTEE AN ERA OF PERPETUAL PEACE. BUT ENDURING PEACE MUST BE OUR MISSION. //

OUR SUCCESS IN THE GULF WILL SHAPE NOT ONLY THE NEW WORLD ORDER WE SEEK -- BUT OUR MISSION HERE AT HOME. //

IN THE WAR JUST ENDED, THERE WERE CLEAR-CUT OBJECTIVES -- TIMETABLES -- AND, ABOVE ALL, AN OVERRIDING IMPERATIVE TO ACHIEVE RESULTS. WE MUST BRING THAT SAME SENSE OF SELF-DISCIPLINE -- THAT SAME SENSE OF URGENCY -- TO THE WAY WE MEET CHALLENGES HERE AT HOME.

IN MY STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS AND IN MY BUDGET, I DEFINED A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY.

15/21
1054

OUR FIRST PRIORITY IS TO GET THIS ECONOMY ROLLING AGAIN. THE FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY CAUSED BY THE CRISIS IN THE GULF WERE UNDERSTANDABLE. BUT NOW THAT THE WAR IS OVER, OIL PRICES ARE DOWN. INTEREST RATES ARE DOWN, AND CONFIDENCE IS RIGHTLY COMING BACK. AMERICANS CAN MOVE FORWARD -- TO LEND, SPEND AND INVEST IN THIS, THE STRONGEST ECONOMY ON EARTH. ////

WE MUST ALSO ENACT THE LEGISLATION THAT IS KEY TO BUILDING A BETTER AMERICA. FOR EXAMPLE: IN 1990, WE ENACTED AN HISTORIC CLEAN AIR ACT -- NOW WE'VE PROPOSED A NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY. WE PASSED A CHILD CARE BILL THAT PUT POWER IN THE HANDS OF PARENTS. TODAY, WE'RE READY TO DO THE SAME THING WITH OUR SCHOOLS, AND EXPAND CHOICE IN EDUCATION. WE PASSED A CRIME BILL THAT MADE A USEFUL START IN FIGHTING CRIME AND DRUGS. THIS YEAR, WE'RE SENDING TO CONGRESS OUR COMPREHENSIVE CRIME PACKAGE TO FINISH THE JOB. WE PASSED THE LANDMARK AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT. NOW WE'VE SENT FORWARD OUR CIVIL RIGHTS BILL. WE ALSO PASSED THE AVIATION BILL -- THIS YEAR, WE'VE SENT UP OUR NEW HIGHWAY BILL.

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AND THESE ARE JUST A FEW OF OUR PENDING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND RENEWAL.

TONIGHT, I CALL ON CONGRESS TO MOVE FORWARD AGGRESSIVELY ON OUR DOMESTIC FRONT. LET'S BEGIN WITH TWO INITIATIVES WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE ON QUICKLY: TRANSPORTATION AND CRIME -- AND THEN, LET'S BUILD ON SUCCESS WITH THOSE AND ENACT THE REST OF OUR AGENDA. // IF OUR FORCES COULD WIN THE GROUND WAR IN 100 HOURS -- THEN SURELY THE CONGRESS CAN PASS THIS LEGISLATION IN 100 DAYS. // LET THAT BE A PROMISE WE MAKE TONIGHT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. //

WHEN I SPOKE IN THIS HOUSE ABOUT THE STATE OF OUR UNION, I ASKED ALL OF YOU: IF WE CAN SELFLESSLY CONFRONT EVIL FOR THE SAKE OF GOOD IN A LAND SO FAR AWAY -- THEN SURELY WE CAN MAKE THIS LAND ALL THAT IT SHOULD BE. // IN THE TIME SINCE THEN, THE BRAVE MEN AND WOMEN OF DESERT STORM ACCOMPLISHED MORE THAN EVEN THEY MAY REALIZE. THEY SET OUT TO CONFRONT AN ENEMY ABROAD -- AND IN THE PROCESS, THEY TRANSFORMED A NATION AT HOME. //

17/21
1054

THINK OF THE WAY THEY WENT ABOUT THEIR MISSION -- WITH CONFIDENCE AND QUIET PRIDE. // THINK ABOUT THEIR SENSE OF DUTY -- ABOUT ALL THEY TAUGHT US -- ABOUT OUR VALUES. ABOUT OURSELVES. //

WE HEAR SO OFTEN ABOUT OUR YOUNG PEOPLE IN TURMOIL -- HOW OUR CHILDREN FALL SHORT -- HOW OUR SCHOOLS FAIL US. HOW AMERICAN PRODUCTS AND AMERICAN WORKERS ARE SECOND-CLASS. // WELL, DON'T YOU BELIEVE IT. // THE AMERICA WE SAW IN DESERT STORM WAS FIRST-CLASS TALENT. //

AND THEY DID IT USING AMERICA'S STATE-OF-THE-ART TECHNOLOGY.

WE SAW THE EXCELLENCE EMBODIED IN THE PATRIOT MISSILE -- AND THE PATRIOTS WHO MADE IT WORK. //

AND WE SAW SOLDIERS WHO KNOW ABOUT HONOR AND BRAVERY AND DUTY AND COUNTRY -- AND THE WORLD-SHAKING POWER OF THESE SIMPLE WORDS. ///

18/21
1054

THERE IS SOMETHING NOBLE AND MAJESTIC ABOUT THE PRIDE -- ABOUT THE PATRIOTISM -- THAT WE FEEL TONIGHT.

SO, TO EVERYONE HERE -- AND EVERYONE WATCHING AT HOME -- THINK ABOUT THE MEN AND WOMEN OF DESERT STORM. LET US HONOR THEM WITH OUR GRATITUDE. LET US COMFORT THE FAMILIES OF THE FALLEN -- AND REMEMBER EACH PRECIOUS LIFE LOST. //

LET US LEARN FROM THEM AS WELL. LET US HONOR THOSE WHO HAVE SERVED US / BY SERVING OTHERS. //

LET US HONOR THEM AS INDIVIDUALS -- MEN AND WOMEN OF EVERY RACE, ALL CREEDS AND COLORS -- BY SETTING THE FACE OF THIS NATION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, BIGOTRY AND HATE. ///

I'M SURE MANY OF YOU SAW ON TELEVISION THE UNFORGETTABLE SCENE OF FOUR TERRIFIED IRAQI SOLDIERS SURRENDERING. THEY EMERGED FROM THEIR BUNKER -- BROKEN, TEARS STREAMING FROM THEIR EYES, FEARING THE WORST. / AND THEN THERE WAS THE AMERICAN SOLDIER. REMEMBER WHAT HE SAID? HE SAID: "IT'S OKAY. YOU'RE ALL RIGHT NOW. // YOU'RE ALL RIGHT NOW." //

THAT SCENE SAYS A LOT ABOUT AMERICA -- A LOT ABOUT WHO WE ARE. // AMERICANS ARE A CARING PEOPLE. WE ARE A GOOD PEOPLE -- A GENEROUS PEOPLE. LET US ALWAYS BE CARING AND GOOD AND GENEROUS IN ALL WE DO. ///

SOON, OUR TROOPS WILL BEGIN THE MARCH WE'VE ALL BEEN WAITING FOR -- THEIR MARCH HOME. I HAVE DIRECTED SECRETARY CHENEY TO BEGIN THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF AMERICAN COMBAT UNITS FROM THE GULF. //

LESS THAN TWO HOURS FROM NOW, THE FIRST PLANELOAD OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS WILL LIFT OFF FROM SAUDI ARABIA -- HEADED FOR THE U.S.A. //

20/21

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IT WILL CARRY MEN AND WOMEN OF THE 24TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION BOUND FOR FORT STEWART, GEORGIA. THIS IS JUST THE BEGINNING OF A STEADY FLOW OF AMERICAN TROOPS..... COMING HOME.

LET THEIR RETURN REMIND US THAT ALL THOSE WHO HAVE GONE BEFORE ARE LINKED WITH US IN THE LONG LINE OF FREEDOM'S MARCH. AMERICANS HAVE ALWAYS TRIED TO SERVE -- TO SACRIFICE NOBLY FOR WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE RIGHT.

//

TONIGHT, I ASK EVERY COMMUNITY IN THIS COUNTRY TO MAKE THIS COMING 4TH OF JULY A DAY OF SPECIAL CELEBRATION FOR OUR RETURNING TROOPS. THEY MAY HAVE MISSED THANKSGIVING AND CHRISTMAS -- BUT I CAN TELL YOU THIS: FOR THEM AND FOR THEIR FAMILIES, WE CAN MAKE THIS A HOLIDAY THEY'LL NEVER FORGET. //

21/21
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IN A VERY REAL SENSE, THIS VICTORY BELONGS TO THEM -- TO THE PRIVATES AND THE PILOTS, TO THE SERGEANTS AND THE SUPPLY OFFICERS, TO THE MEN AND WOMEN IN THE MACHINES, AND THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO MADE THEM WORK. IT BELONGS TO THE REGULARS. TO THE RESERVES. TO THE GUARD -- THIS VICTORY BELONGS TO THE FINEST FIGHTING FORCE THIS NATION HAS EVER KNOWN. ///

WE WENT HALF WAY AROUND THE WORLD TO DO WHAT IS MORAL AND JUST AND RIGHT. WE FOUGHT HARD, AND -- WITH OTHERS -- WE WON THE WAR. WE LIFTED THE YOKE OF AGGRESSION AND TYRANNY FROM A SMALL COUNTRY THAT MANY AMERICANS HAD NEVER EVEN HEARD OF -- AND WE ASK NOTHING IN RETURN. //

WE'RE COMING HOME NOW -- PROUD. CONFIDENT -- HEADS HIGH. THERE IS MUCH THAT WE MUST DO -- AT HOME AND ABROAD. AND WE WILL DO IT. WE ARE AMERICANS. ///

MAY GOD BLESS THIS GREAT NATION -- THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

# # #

END

Hughes testimony

*NXE305 03/06/91

ISRAELI ECONOMY SEVERELY AFFECTED BY GULF CRISIS

(Text: Weden testimony before House panel 3/6/91) (750)

Washington -- The Gulf crisis has damaged Israel's economy in the form of higher oil costs, higher civil defense costs; a downturn in foreign investment and a "dramatic drop" in tourism, an official from the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) told members of Congress on March 6.

In a prepared statement, Deputy Assistant Administrator Charles Weden told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that unofficial estimates place Israel's Gulf-related losses in the range of 3,000 million dollars.

The testimony also describes the effect of the Gulf crisis on the Israeli-occupied territories. The per capita income in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which had already fallen about 30 percent before the crisis, is estimated to have dropped an additional 10 percent in the last seven months, according to Weden.

Following is the text of Weden's statement, which was submitted to the House panel:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Ladies and Gentlemen; it is a pleasure to appear before you this morning. I will confine my statement to a brief overview of the economic situation facing Israel and the occupied territories in the wake of recent events. I will also describe our programs and plans for FY92.

Economic Impact of the Gulf War:

The Gulf war has had a decided adverse impact on Israel, buffeted as it has been by higher oil costs, a downturn in foreign investment, a dramatic drop in tourism as well as increased civil defense costs. In addition, the need to absorb a large influx of Soviet Jewish immigrants is placing major new challenges upon Israel's economy.

During 1990, Israel received 185,000 immigrants from the Soviet Union, and 200,000 to 300,000 more are expected this year.

The Israeli government unofficially estimates its Gulf-related losses in the range of 3,000 million dollars, including as much as 700 million dollars in tourism losses in the private sector. Estimates for the cost of housing and for providing jobs for the new immigrants run in the neighborhood of 20,000 million

over the years with a harsh police state. Now that his -- the myth of his invincibility has been shattered, as all of those thousands of members of the Iraqi military who fled Kuwait now move north and go back home to their homes in various places in Iraq they're going to carry with them the word of the disaster that has befallen Saddam Hussein's forces in Kuwait.

Given the tensions that exist inside Iraqi society, given the cultural and religious and ethnic diversity there are likely to be some real strains and we're watching that very closely. At this point, I'm not certain that there's much that can be done about it other than to make certain that we provide for the security of Kuwait, for example, that that kind of unrest and turmoil that we now see developing in parts of Iraq hopefully won't spread over into other areas in the neighborhood. But it is a subject of concern that we are watching very carefully.

Q: Thank you.

SEC. CHENEY: I'm told I've got to leave. But again, let me, as I depart I really am very sincere in wanting to thank all of you and your organizations for your great support in this enterprise. There are times when you -- in the midst of an exercise such as this, when the President's making some very difficult decisions, when public opinion is not united, when the path ahead is not clear at all in terms of how it's all going to sort out, but you've got some basic, fundamental principles you're trying to judge a situation by, it's enormously, enormously helpful to know that out there across the country there are groups and organizations and folks like those all of you represent here today supporting the effort, understanding what's at stake, knowing that it's absolutely essential that we show the kind of determination and dedication that's been the hallmark, I think, of Desert Storm. It meant a great deal to the President, it meant a great deal to me to know that all of you were out there supporting us. Thank you very much.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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dollars to 30,000 million dollars over the next 3-5 years. The impact of the immigrants will also be felt on the Israeli job market, social services and infrastructure.
In the occupied territories, the Intifada had already brought about an estimated 30 percent drop in per capita income before the Gulf crisis. We are now estimating that the Gulf War has caused another 10 percent decline, as a result of both the extensive curfew and loss of worker remittances from the Gulf. Furthermore, over 30,000 Palestinians have lost their Israeli work permits, representing probably 15 percent of the total Palestinian labor force in the territories. This situation remains fluid and is affected by several factors: the ongoing Intifada activities, heightened security concerns related to Palestinian support for Iraq in the Gulf war, and added pressures on the job market resulting from the inflow of Soviet Jewish immigrants.

Status of AID Programs in Israel and West Bank/Gaza:

Israel: AID has just authorized the $400 million Israel Housing Guarantee. We expect that the Israelis will be able to begin borrowing by the end of this month. For FY92, the Administration is requesting a cash transfer for Israel at previous years' levels to provide needed balance of payment support. At this time, AID has no plans to request additional funding or housing guarantees.
West Bank/Gaza: For the West Bank and Gaza, we propose to continue assistance at previous years' levels. The Gulf war forced a number of U.S. staff of the private voluntary organizations temporarily to depart from the occupied territories. All are prepared to return when security conditions permit. In the meanwhile, programs are continuing to function, albeit at a slower pace.

We hope that the pace of activities can resume to normal, since they are meeting a critical need by providing for family health and social services, employment creation, food for the poorest sector of the population, and community infrastructure.

Through our program we are attempting to strike a balance between the short term provision of basic services to meet immediate needs of families and longer term sustainable employment creation. In the latter case, we are attempting to draw on indigenous business and voluntary organizations to stimulate employment and expand access to basic services.
I appreciate having the opportunity to appear before you today to outline our programs and plans. I will be happy to answer your questions. (END TEXT)
NNNN

*NXE307 03/06/91

OFFICIAL DISCUSSES U.S.-ISRAELI DEFENSE COOPERATION

(Text: Hughes testimony to HFAC, 3/6/91) (2035)

Following is the text of prepared statement by Arthur H. Hughes, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near East and South Asian affairs, submitted to the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, March 6, 1991:

(BEGIN TEXT)

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss our security assistance program for Israel, how it benefits both the United States and Israel, and, in general, the status of U.S.-Israeli defense relations.

You are all very familiar with the scope and nature of our security relationship with Israel over the years and the success we have made in the three main areas of logistics, planning, and exercises, as well as others. I believe that the most telling point in our defense relationship with Israel recently is that the institutional and day-to-day personal relationships that have developed over the years have proved their worth in a very difficult situation. The depth of these relationships was what made possible the rapid response to pressing security concerns and needs as a result of Saddam Hussein's aggression against Israel's citizens.

I am convinced that strategic cooperation and the close defense relations we have with Israel gave Israel the confidence in its own strength and in the U.S. as a partner to pursue a policy which was supportive of our efforts and those of our coalition forces against Iraqi aggression.

Since President Reagan announced the concept of strategic cooperation with Israel in 1983, we have made great strides to implement this concept into specific initiatives and programs that further our defense relations. A specific initiative was the formation of a Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG), and various joint subcommittees, to explore ways to improve military cooperation in such areas as logistics, contingency planning, and joint exercises. Though the JPMG meets twice a year, joint subcommittees meet more frequently and their members stay in constant touch with one another, carrying on a dialogue, debating and agreeing on various initiatives, and drafting plans, procedures, and schedules.

Let me take this point one step further. Though I have spoken in terms of structure, the frequency and depth of our dialogue

has led to deeper personal relations between individuals in both our governments who are responsible for issues central to our strategic relationship. These are the very meaningful personal associations so essential for a truly long term friendship. This depth of cooperation for instance contributed significantly to our rapid deployment of patriots to Israel. Within 24 hours of deployment we had one Patriot battery operational.

One area of mutual cooperation which significantly benefits both the U.S. and Israeli military is our joint training program with Israel. This program provides excellent and realistic training opportunities for our naval, air, and marine corps forces serving in the region. It has become a routine aspect of our military-to-military relationship, one that we strongly desire to continue; the number of ship visits to Israeli ports has also increased substantially over the last several years. Israel has become a favorite spot for U.S. Navy. In addition, the U.S. Navy has greatly expanded its use of Israeli shipyards for fleet repairs. This access helps maintain our ships at peak readiness and provides work and income to Israel's ports and yards. Last year we had some 32 ship visits to Israel.

U.S.-Israeli cooperation extends to many other areas as well, including our extensive security assistance program, joint research and weapons development projects, engineer/scientist exchanges, operator exchanges, individual exchange programs between our military schools, and various defense-industry symposiums.

Objectives for our security assistance with Israel are to continue funding requirements for aircraft programs (F-15, F16, and F-4 upgrade), the naval modernization program, upgrades in their attack and utility helicopter fleet, and improvements in Israel's armor corps and artillery units; assist Israel in maintaining the qualitative edge upon which it relies for its security; promote economic reform and stability through balance of payment support; and encourage a comprehensive settlement of disputes in the region to promote stability and security, to accomplish these objectives, DOD believes the United States must maintain Israel's security assistance at the current level of funding.

We are particularly pleased with our cooperative efforts with Israel on joint armaments programs. We have active engineer/scientist exchanges, weapons co-development projects, and foreign weapons evaluation projects with Israel. Israel also has been included with several other friendly nations in a category of nations called "major non-NATO ally" for the purposes of participating in joint r&d and industrial coproduction programs. In this same spirit, Secretary Carlucci signed a revised memorandum of understanding on joint r&d and

procurement with Minister of Defense Rabin on December 14, 1987. This revision of an earlier agreement in existence since 1979 closely parallels agreements we have with our NATO allies.

U.S. readiness and military capability have also benefited from Israel's defense industry. In 1989, we spent $1.5 million in evaluating Israeli military products. We are currently evaluating Israeli tank munitions and long-range guided bombs, such as the popeye missile, which the Strategic Air Command has already decided to buy.

Israeli defense sales to the U.S. increased from only $9.4 million in 1983 to about $345 million in 1989, we are still calculating fy 1990 sales. Examples of joint r&d programs include an anti-tactical ballistic missile project, helicopter night targeting systems, and counter-obstacle vehicles. The joint project to develop an Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM), called the "arrow", is a $160m project already underway under the sponsorship of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO). We are currently negotiating a follow-on series of experiments for an additional $230 million.

It is clear our highly successful security assistance and r & d cooperative programs with Israel have been significant contributions to Israel's military requirements and assured that Israel is fully capable of dealing with any combination of likely adversaries. I believe the accomplishments of both countries in establishing a formalized and highly effective military relationship have been significant.

As I said earlier, the security relationship and level of cooperation we have built with Israel over the years contributed to our ability to provide the kind of support Israel needed during this crisis. This level of cooperation also gave Israel the confidence in its own security to pursue policies which supported Coalition efforts in the Gulf. Our bilateral programs will be continued and enhanced in the coming years. We remain steadfast in our commitment to Israel's security and to the policy that the security of Israel must be assured in order for the Middle East peace process to succeed. The Department of Defense's cooperative programs with the Israeli military reflect this U.S. commitment to Israel and should give Israel the confidence to move forward to peace.

(END TEXT)

NNNN

אאאא,חוזם:6437
אל:רהמש/459
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:106,תא:060391,זח:1628,דח:מ,סג:בל,
בבבב
גלוי/מיידי

אל : מצפ"א

דע : מקש"ח/משהב"ט

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

הנדון: ביהנ"ב - סיוע חירום לישראל

היום (6/3) לפנה"צ אישרו (ב-MARK-UP) ועדת המשנה לאירופה והמזה"ת ומליאת ועדת החוץ, את סיוע החירום לישראל בסך 650 מיליון דולר.

הודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),בנצור,
מצפא,@(מקשח/משהבט)

סססס

1991-03-06 04:10 MASHABAT KESHER 1409095 01

15

גלוי/ בהול לבוקר
אל: מנהל מצפ'א
דע: מקש'ח /משהב'ט
מאת: ק. לקונגרס.

משיב - 1040 - 1/2
מטאן - 84

הנדון: ביחנ'ב - סיוע חירום לישראל.

א. חיום אושר סיוע החירום לישראל בסך 650 מיליון $.
ב. חיום 5/3/91 בצהריים (14:00) התכנסה ועדת ההקצבות (מליאה) ל-MARK-UP של חוק תוספת התקציב (SUPP. 1) ל"סופת המדבר" וחוק תוספת התקציב (SUPP 2) בעניני פנים. חלק מ-SUPP. 2 (עניני פנים) אשר חוגש ע'י הממשל הוגדר כ-DIRE EMERGENCY וכלל בתוכו כספים עבור טכנויות הממשל (FBI, CIA מחמ'ד וכו') אשר הושפעו מ"סופת המדבר".
ג. הקונגרסמן אובי, יו'ר ועדת המשנה לפעולות דרות, הגיש תיקון לטפלמנטל השני, לחלק שהוגדר כחירום (רצ'ב הנוסח המדוייק של התיקון). לאחר שהוקרא נוסח התיקון שעיקרו 650 מיליון $ במזומנים וכמענק וזאת בגין הוצאות נוספות הנובעות מהקונפליקט במפרץ
אמר אובי: - אני מציע התיקון בשמי ובשם הקונגרסמן אדוארדס (בכיר המיעוט) לפי בקשת הממשל. נערך דיון לגבי גובה הסכום הנאות לפצות את ישראל על הכוננות הגבוהה. ישראל בקשה 910 מ' דולר והממשל הציע בסופו של דבר 650 מליון דולר שהוא סכום מתאים (APPROPRIATE), וזאת לאחר דיונים אקסטנסיביים. הסכמה על סכום זה הושגה בלווית הבנה שהושגה עם ממ' ישראל שלא תגיש בקשה לכספים נוספים עד לאחר LABORDAY (הערה: אין זה מתייחס לסיוע החוץ הרגיל של 3 ביליון $ - י.ד.) תקופה שבמהלכה יוכל הממשל לברוק סיוע נוסף. זהו תיקון חשוב ואני קורא לעמיתי לתמוך בו.
מיקי אדוארדס: (בכיר המיעוט) זהו סכום (והסכם) שהממשל וממ' ישראל הסכימו עליו. הסכום המקורי הוסחת ויותר חשוב הוא THIS IS IT FOR THE YEAR' TILL LABORDAY.
ד. התיקון - סיוע החירום עבור ישראל בסך 650 מיליון דולר-התקבל לאחר שעבר ב-VOICE VOTE.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

שלחה פשהה רהמ מנכ מנמל בנלור מדפא סיבל
בהן בהמיתב' אוזר
3

Judy

~~364-5140~~
364-5609

Mr. Obey and Mr. Edwards

2/2 1040
84

On page 6 following line 15, insert:

ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL

Economic Support Fund

For an additional amount for the "Economic Support Fund", $650,000,000, to provide for additional costs resulting from the conflict in the Persian Gulf, which shall be made available only for Israel: Provided, That such sum shall be made available on a grant basis as a cash transfer and shall remain available for obligation until September 30, 1991: Provided further, That such sum may be used by Israel for incremental costs associated with the conflict in the Persian Gulf, notwithstanding section 531(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: Provided further, That such funds may be obligated and expended notwithstanding section 10 of Public Law 91-672.

and amend the Report accordingly.

Israel sup

אאאא,חוזם:4992
אל:רהמש/364
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:97,תא:050391,זח:1956,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבבב
9,244448
בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל: תפוצות, מצפ'א, הסברה.
דע: סביר/נ"י, קונכ'לים.

מועדון הנשיאים

1. מועדון הנשיאים כנס ישיבה מיוחדת בוושינגטון, להבעת סולידריות עם הממשל ועם ממשלת ישראל. בישיבה בה נכחו כ-300 איש, נציגי הארגונים השונים, נאמו מהצד הישראלי - רוה'מ (באמצעות הטלפון), השגריר ויועץ שה'ח לתפוצות (שהקריא מסר משה'ח), מצד הממשל האמריקני - שר ההגנה צ'ייני ודניס רוס מצד הקונגרס - הספיקר פולי מנהיג המיעוט בבית הנבחרים מייקל ומנהיג הרב בסנאט מיצ'ל וכמו כן מרטין אינדיק וריצ'רד פרל.

2. ידיד הבריק בניפרד דברי רוה'מ ומסר שה'ח.

3. להלן עיקרי דברי הנואמים:

שגריר

נצחון בנות הברית מגביר הסיכויים ליציבות במז'ת בו השתנו דברים. משמעויות הנצחון לגבי ישראל:

א. עיראק שהוותה איום - הוכתה.

ב. דברים שאמרנו שנים - התאמתו - אש'ף אינו יכול להיות בן-שיח, חשיבות השטחים גם בעידן של טילים.

ג. הבנה טובה יותר עם ארה'ב.

ד. הנושא הפלסטיני איננו הגורם המרכזי לאי היציבות במז'ת. על ארה'ב לשכנע מדינות ערב שהאינטרס שלהן מחייב מו'מ עם ישראל. על הפלסטינים להבין שעליהם לפעול עם ישראל ולא נגדה. לאחר סיום המלחמה חשוב להתמסר לקליטת יהודי ברה'מ.

צ'ייני

היחסים עם ישראל הדוקים יותר מאי פעם מאז 1948, שבח הקשר עם שהב'ט במהלך המלחמה ובין שני משרדי ההגנה. סיפר על אמצעי תקשורת מיוחדים שאפשרו לארה'ב להעביר לישראל אזהרות בזמן אמת בנושא שיגור סקאדים. לאספקת הפטריוטים חשיבות מעשית וסמלית. החלטת ישראל שלא להגיב על ירי הסקאדים זכתה לכבוד והערכה בעולם כולו. אין כל ספק שלצה'ל היכולת לפעול ביעילות נגד משגרי הסקאדים שבמערב עיראק, אך פעולה כזו היתה מסייעת לאסטרטגיה של צדאם לגרור את ישראל למלחמה, ואז יתכן שמדינות ערביות כירדן היו מצטרפות למלחמה לצד עיראק. אמינות ההרתעה של ישראל לא נפגעה. השת'פ האסטרטגי בין ארה'ב לישראל אפשר לישראל להגיע להחלטה שלא לפעול שהיתה באינטרס הן של ארה'ב והן של ישראל.

ללא יחסי ההגנה עם סעודיה (25 אחוז מהסיוע האמריקני מופנה לפיתוח בסיסים ותשתית) לא היו ברשות בנות הברית ה-FACILITIES שאפשרו הנצחון. סעודיה שאינה יכולה להגן על עצמה אינה תורמת ליציבות באיזור. ארה'ב מחוייבת ליתרון האיכותי של צה'ל.

שני לקחים מרכזיים מהמלחמה:

1) כל תוקפן בעתיד יצטרך לקחת בחשבון מה תהיה התגובה.

2) אמינות התחייבויות ארה'ב. הודה לקהילה היהודית על תמיכתה בממשל.

בובי קילברג

קראה מכתב ברכה מהנשיא בוש המשבח את ישראל על הריסון, מביע מחוייבות לבטחון ישראל ולפעולה משותפת למען השלום.

דניס רוס

ארה'ב מעריכה את מדיניות הריסון, ויודעת שישראל מעריכה פעולת ארה'ב לחיסול האיום העיראקי. חזר על ארבעת יעדי פעולת הממשל לאחר המלחמה- בטחון איזורי, שת'פ כלכלי, פיקוח נשק ותהליך השלום בעל ה-TWO TRACKS APPROACH ביחס לתהליך השלום.

מיצ'ל

מנה את "פשעי" הממשל בפיתוח היחסים עם עיראק עד לאוגוסט 90' (חידוש יחסים, הוצאה מרשימת המדינות המסייעות לטרור, עידוד סחר, אספקת מידע מודיעיני) והדגיש שהלקח הוא שהרודן שאנו מחמשים היום יכול לצאת נגדנו מחר ואסור לחזור על טעות זו ביחס לאסד. היחסים ההדוקים עם ישראל נובעים מערכים משותפים (דמוקרטיה) מקווה שישראל תקבל סיוע מתאים כהכרה על התפקיד שמלאה בזמן המלחמה. בקידום תהליך השלום יש לדרוש ממדינות האיזור, ראשית כל להכיר בכך שישראל היא עובדה קיימת. יש לפעול לפי תקדים קמפ - דיויד - על ארה'ב לסייע לצדדים אך לא להכתיב הסדר.

פולי

המשבר הביא לשיפור שת'פ עם ישראל, להרס המיתוס של אחדות ערבית ולפגיעה באש'ף, כולל בעיני הערבים. ישראל בת-ברית עם ערכים משותפים. נגד כפיית הפתרון בתשובה לשאלה ביחס לועידה בינ'ל אמר פולי - הדגש על מו'מ ישיר. הדרך להביא הצדדים למו'מ ישיר היא משנית.

מייקל

יש להתחיל במו'מ בילטרלי, ואח'כ למצוא אם יש צורך במסגרת על.

אינדיק

המלחמה הראתה לארה'ב שישראל היא בת ברית אמינה ולישראל שארה'ב היא בת ברית אמינה.

פרל

בנצחון שותפים גם תאצ'ר, אוזאל ובנדר. יש לתת חלק מהאשראי למדיניות רייגן לפיתוח הכח הצבאי האמריקני.

יש להבהיר למדינות ערב שניצול הבעיה הפלסטינית על ידם מזיק להן בסופו של חשבון. יש להבהיר למדינות המפרץ שמו'מ עם ישראל משרת את היציבות באיזור.

פלג -ידיד.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),אמן,ממד,תפוצות,בואבו,בנצור,
מצפא,כהן,רביב,מעת,הסברה,@(לעמ),מקצב2

ספסס

אאאא,תוזם:4991
אל:רהמש/365
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:96,תא:050391,זח:1955,דח:מ,סג:שמ,
בבבב
9,244448
שמור/מיידי

אל: מנהל מע'ת, מנהל מצפ'א, מנהל הסברה,
דע: יועצת תקשורת שה'ח, יועץ תקשורת רוה'מ,
יועץ תקשורת שהב'ט, דובר צה'ל - שי.
מאת: עיתונות וושינגטון.

ביקור המזכיר - עיתונאים.
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1. עם מזכיר המדינה יגיעו לארץ גם כ-20 מבכירי הכתבים המדיניים הוושינגטוניים כולל: תום פרידמן (NYT) דויד הופמן (WP), בוב גרינברגר (WSJ), וורן סטרובל (WT), בארי שבייד (AP), קרול גיאקומו (רוייטר) רלף ייגלייטר (CNN), ג'ון מקוו'תי (ABC), ביל פלאנט (CBS), ג'ון דנסי (NBC), מרגרט וורנר (ניוזוויק) ואחרים.

2. מרביתם פנו אלינו בבקשה לארגן להם פגישות נוספות וכו'. לאור חשיבות הקבוצה - מרביתם הכתבים הבכירים ביותר בעיר המכסים באופן שוטף הנושאים שלנו, אני ממליצה שנתייחס לביקורם בארץ כהזדמנות - פז כדי להשמיע להם ולהראות להם באופן בלתי אמצעי את מסרינו. נכון הוא שהם נילווים למזכיר המדינה ו"מכסים" את ביקורו, אך גם בביקור כזה ישנו זמן (בעת פגישות מדיניות, למשל) שכדאי לנצלו כדי לטפל בעיתונאים הללו.

3. לפיכך ממליצה -:

א. לארגן עבורם תדרוכי רקע עם סגן שה/ח, דובר צה'ל, קצין אמ'ן בכיר, או אחר.

ב. במידה ויאורגן סיור במסוק למזכיר, מאוד ממליצה - למרות העלות הגבוהה שבוודאי כרוכה בכך - לארגן לכתבים גם כן סיור במסוק תוך ליווי צמוד של קצין בכיר שיסביר נושא הגבולות וכו'. הדבר חשוב מאוד לא רק לאותם הכתבים שמבקרים בארץ. פעם ראשונה - אלא גם לאלה שביקרו כבר בעבר: טוב מראה עיניים... הדבר אינו מיותר ובהחלט יסייע להבנת מסרינו.

ג. במידת האפשר - לארגן אירוע של מפגש (פתות פורמלי) עם אנשי אקדמיה, אנשי צבא, או נפגעי הסקאדים או עולים חדשים מבריה'מ.

4. ברור לי שבזמן ביקור המזכיר, כל המערכות עסוקות במזכיר ובפגישותיו - כדאי מאוד וחשוב שיוקדשו גם מחשבה, זמן ואמצעים לטיפול צמוד בעיתונאים הנילווים - ובאירגון תכנית נוספת עבורם. הם מצפים לכך וישמחו לשמוע ולקלוט מה שיש לנו להציע.

רות ירון.

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),אמן,רביב,מעת,הסברה,@(לעמ),מקצב2,
בנצור,מצפא,@(דוצ),@(נוה/משהבט)

ספספ

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:4725
אל:רהמש/379
מ-:ווש,נר:2014,תא:050391,זח:1150,דח:מ,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי / מיידי

אל: סמנכ'ל בנצור
מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

הנדון: ביקור המזכיר

להלן מקרצר:

1. המזכיר יגיע לישראל בשעות אחה'צ ביום ב' ויעזוב ביום ד'.

2. בכל הארצות בהן יבקר וישראל בכללן ידון בארבעה הפרקים הבאים: בטחון אזורי, תהליך השלום, שינויים כלכליים, פיקוח על הנשק. במקומות השונים ניתן משקל שונה לכל אחד מהפרקים האלה.

3. לגבי התהליך, אפשר להניח, שהמזכיר ישאל את הנאספים בריאד, מה הם מוכנים לתת, אבל בודאי ישמע מהם גם מה הם מבקשים מישראל. אם יאמרו לו 'אין מה לדבר עמם ושהכל צריך להיות נדון רק עם פלשתינאים', ישיב להם שזה אינו מספק אותו. הוא לא יסתפק בתשובות המסורתיות לא אצל הערבים ולא בארץ.

4. המזכיר יקבל לפני הגיעו ארצה את דיווחו של מקורמיק על השיחות הכלכליות ואפשר להניח שיעלה בשיחותיו עם רה'מ את שאלת הרפורמות הכלכליות.

5. אם לא תהיה התקדמות ברורה בשיחות שמקיים מארק פארס עם דוד ברטוב אפשר להניח שהמזכיר יעורר אצל רה'מ את שאלת הדליפה של מהגרים יהודים לאמריקה.

שילה

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא

סססס

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אל:רהמש/358
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:92,תא:050391,זח:1745,דח:מ,סג:בל,
בבב
בלמ"ס/מיידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: תוכן מכתב הנשיא בוש לועידת הנשיאים היהודיים

TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS/WASHINGTON, DC TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 1991

I AM DELIGHTED TO SEND GREETINGS TO ALL THOSE GATHERED IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FOR THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS' NATIONAL LEADERSHIP ASSEMBLY. THIS IS A WELCOME OPPORTUNITY FOR ME TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR STRONG SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY DURING THESE PAST FEW MONTHS. YOUR FIRM BACKING OF OUR TROOPS SERVING THE PERSIAN GULF HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY HEARTENING.

THERE ARE TIMES WHEN WE AMERICANS MUST FIGHT TO PROTECT THE PRINCIPLES WE HOLD DEAR. AS YOU KNOW, OUR BRAVE SERVICE MEN AND WOMEN HAVE DONE JUST THAT IN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO LIBERATE KUWAIT AND TO DETER UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT, AS A RESULT, WE HAVE TAKEN A STEP TOWARD SECURING A SAFER, MORE PEACEFUL WORLD.

ON THIS SPECIAL OCCASION, IT IS FITTING THAT YOU PAY TRIBUTE TO THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL, WHO DEMONSTRATED EXEMPLARY COURAGE AND RESTRAINT DURING THE CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WELL-BEING, AND WE ARE LIKEWISE COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THAT NATION'S LEADERS IN THE SEARCH FOR A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

BARBARA JOINS ME IN SENDING BEST WISHES FOR A PRODUCTIVE AND ENJOYABLE MEETING.

(SIGNED) GEORGE BUSH.

END

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא,סולטן,תפוצות,

בנאבו,רביב,מעת,הסברה

ספסס

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בבבב
סודי/מיידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ
מנהל מצפ'א

מאת:לשכ' השגריר, וושינגטון

ביקור בייקר

דניס רוס אמר לשגריר שלדעתו ישמח המזכיר על קיום סיור מוסק עם אפשרות נחיתה ביו'ש ובגולן בזמן ביקורו בארץ.

ציין שיהא זה מועיל אם בסיור זה יתלווה למזכיר גם ס/הרמטכל ברק או האלוף שחק.

עד כאן בשם אומרם.

לשכ' שגריר

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),בנצור,
מצפא

סססס

*NXE304 03/06/91

CHENEY TELLS JEWISH GROUP ARMED SAUDIS HELP THE PEACE

(Transcript: Remarks to Jewish leaders 3/5/91) (5570)

Washington -- Secretary of Defense Cheney told a meeting of Jewish leaders here March 5 that arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the U.S. defense relationship with that country "over many years" have contributed to the defeat of Iraqi military forces and have helped the "long term peace and stability in the Middle East."

"Without the defense relationship that we have developed with Saudi Arabia over many years, we would not have had the facilities that made our military operation possible," Cheney told the Conference of Presidents of American Jewish Organizations.

"More than 25 percent of Saudi Arabia's military purchases from us have gone to developing bases and infrastructure. These are the facilities, indeed, some of the best in the world, and they are oriented toward the defense of Saudi Arabia. They do not threaten Israel or any other country," he added.

"It would not have been possible for us to undertake the deployment of half a million Americans half way around the world to achieve our military objectives if it had not been for those facilities.

"No one can say now, as some have over the years, that Saudi Arabia has no one it needs to defend against. Moreover, Saudi forces performed well and played a vitally important role in this conflict," Cheney said.

"A Saudi Arabia that could not defend itself at all, that would be completely vulnerable to threats from dangerous neighbors in the neighborhood, would be forced into actions and policies that would not only harm US interests, but also broader interests for long-term peace and stability in the Middle East."

Following is an unofficial transcript of his prepared remarks and a follow-up question-and-answer session.

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SEC. CHENEY: Thank you. (Applause.) Thank you very much. Well thank you all very much for that warm welcome.

The session you're having here today is something that I deeply appreciate, and that is specifically your session, you're organized specifically around the proposition of supporting

independently, fighting for their freedom, fighting against the Iraqis -- will they be able to return to life under a monarchy?

AMB. AL-SABAH: Well, Harry, Kuwait was never, ever what is termed as you said, a monarchy. It's never total monarchy. We have had our constitution, we've had democracies. There is going to be major changes inside Kuwait, within the people, within the whole system inside Kuwait, and I believe the change is going to be for the better always. And let's wait and see until we restore all peace and security, and then we could sit quietly and sort out our domestic problems, and I am quite confident that things will turn out for the better.

MR. SMITH: And when will it be safe? There are thousands and thousands of Kuwaitis in Egypt, in Europe, in Saudi Arabia. When will it be safe for them to go home?

AMB. AL-SABAH: Well, they all want to go home as soon as possible, but, you know, we have to take care of them with regard to their security inside Kuwait. We have to restore all the services inside Kuwait. As Skip was saying -- Ambassador Gnehm was saying with regard to the water and the power and all the services, it is going to be difficult to take them in before we can restore all those services. So it's going to take a couple weeks until I think this has been completed, and we are working extremely hard to restore all the services and facilities, so that they will come back comfortably rather than under such hard circumstances.

MR. SMITH: Ambassadors, gentlemen, thank you.

AMB. GNEHM: Harry --

MR. SMITH: Quickly. Go ahead.

AMB. GNEHM: I was going to say it is really not a safety question, it really is services. There is just not food and water, and it would be difficult for people to come back.

MR. SMITH: All right. Very good. Ambassadors, thank you both very much for joining us this morning.

AMB. AL-SABAH: Thank you. Good luck, Skip.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

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Operation Desert Storm and the President's policies.

Those of us who have been involved for the last several months in the effort to roll back Saddam Hussein's aggression, and especially I know our men and women in the Gulf, many of whom have now spent months of their lives away from their normal pursuits in order to serve our great objective, are deeply appreciative of the fact that we've had such widespread support here at home, but especially from your organizations. It has meant a great deal to those of us advising the President, and I know it's meant a great deal to him to have the kind of breadth of support that's been so crucial to being able to make the right decisions that have produced the result that we now all obviously are pleased to observe.

I think it's special and appropriate, too, at this time that we take just a moment to remember that while this has been a tremendous victory it was not achieved without cost. And I refer specifically to those who gave their lives, and to their families they left behind, in order for us to be able to defend freedom and to liberate Kuwait and to stop aggression before it could consume even more nations.

What I'd like to do today if I can is be fairly brief in my remarks. I'd like to talk specifically about how the relationship with Israel worked during Operation Desert Storm and then I'd be happy to stop and answer questions and have a bit of a dialogue with many of you in this room who I know have followed these developments very closely.

I think I can safely say that the relationship between the United States and Israel during the seven months of the crisis, and particularly during the past six weeks of the war, has been especially close, perhaps as close as it has ever been during the more than four decades of our historic relationship.

I was in frequent contact with Moshe Arens, my counterpart. We met in person before the war and then again in the middle of the conflict. More importantly, we were in constant contact through a special secure communications link that was established between us at the direction of the President and the Prime Minister. At the height of the Scud attacks we frequently talked several times a day.

There was extremely close contact between our Defense Department and the Israeli Ministry of Defense. David Ivery (ph) was a frequent visitor to the Pentagon. And when the Scud attacks began we sent one of our best generals, Major General Mack Armstrong, to work with the Israeli defense forces in Tel Aviv to give us better ideas about how we could go after the Scuds. We used the secure communications link to pass real time warning of missile attacks to Israel for use by their civil defense authorities. Without this unprecedented

arrangement there would have been no air raid sirens going off before the missiles landed.

Perhaps most important of all we deployed Patriot missile batteries to Israel in record time and sent US troops to man them. The value of this was obvious to everyone, but I think the symbolism was just as important because it was a dramatically visible demonstration of the US commitment to Israel's security at a very critical and politically sensitive time.

All of this, I believe, helped contribute to Israel's truly historic decision to exercise a degree of restraint in the face of provocation that has earned the respect and admiration of the entire world. Let me make it clear, though, that I know everyone here knows, as well, that Israel was fully prepared to act in its own defense. The IDF had the forces and the skills and certainly the courage to undertake a major operation against the Scuds in Western Iraq. Israel refrained from doing so out of a recognition that this would play into the hands of Saddam Hussein's political strategy, and be damaging to both Israeli and American interests.

There should also be no doubt about the credibility of Israel's deterrent. Anyone who thinks Saddam Hussein has been able to attack Israel and get away with it should just look at the photographs that I have seen of the destruction of Iraq's nuclear facilities at Tuatheh, or the chemical and biological plants, or for that matter, the entire Iraqi warmaking machine.

This whole experience has been a demonstration of the value of maintaining Israel's strength, and her ability to defend itself, and also the value of the strategic cooperation between our two countries. An Israel that was not strong and confident might have found it difficult to act with such restraint. Although strategic cooperation was developed with a different purpose in mind to enable us to act together in a coordinated way, it has proved equally valuable in this crisis in enabling Israel not to act. Without the close, consultative machines that we have developed, it would have not been possible for us to move quickly on Patriot deployments and other actions to give Israel assurance that we were doing as much as could possibly be done to eliminate the Scud threat.

Israel's restraint was very much in Israel's own interest. It was not a matter of excessive concern about Arab sensitivities. In fact, some courageous Arab statesmen, like Hosni Mubarak, publicly acknowledged Israel's right to retaliate. However, Israel's involvement would have played into Saddam Hussein's hands, and perhaps even allowed him to salvage a political victory from the jaws of a humiliating military defeat. What's more, if you think about the geography for a minute, and think

about how stubborn the Scud problem was, you will quickly realize that an Israel response would not have been a quick, neat operation involving only Israel and Iraq. It was likely, indeed, nearly certain, to turn into a whole second front that would have drawn Jordan actively into the war; and perhaps even succeeded in drawing in other countries.

It is the essence of our cooperative relationship that we each go the extra mile to consider our partner's interest without sacrificing our own. Israel's restraint was in Israel's interest, but it was also in ours perhaps even more so. Our action on behalf of Kuwait served American interest and our interest in a better world order. But it was very much in interest of Israel, as well.

One of the results of this war has been to eliminate the offensive military capability of a ruthless dictator who had been the greatest single threat to Israel's security and survival. What's more, if the aggression against Kuwait had been allowed to stand and Iraq had been allowed to dominate the Gulf with its enormous riches, the resources available to Iraq to threaten Israel five or ten years from now would have been even more terrible.

From that perspective, let me say a word to this group about arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other moderate countries in the region, even though I know they are controversial. Without the defense relationship that we have developed with Saudi Arabia over many years, we would not have had the facilities that made our military operation possible. More than 25 percent of Saudi Arabia's military purchases from us have gone to developing bases and infrastructure. These are the facilities, indeed, some of the best in the world, and they are oriented toward the defense of Saudi Arabia. They do not threaten Israel or any other country. It would not have been possible for us to undertake the deployment of half a million Americans half way around the world to achieve our military objectives if it had not been for those facilities.

No one can say now, as some have over the years, that Saudi Arabia has no one it needs to defend against. Moreover, Saudi forces performed well and played a vitally important role in this conflict. A Saudi Arabia that could not defend itself at all, that would be completely vulnerable to threats from dangerous neighbors in the neighborhood, would be forced into actions and policies that would not only harm US interest, but also broader interest for long-term peace and stability in the Middle East.

As we look to the future, it is important to maintain a strong Israel that is able to defend itself. It is important to maintain the qualitative edge that offsets Israel's quantitative inferiority. But it is also important to recognize

that the threat to Israel has been reduced substantially by this war and that Israel's qualitative edge has accordingly increased substantially.

There are a number of lessons that come out of this war, but two, it strikes me, are foremost. First of all, that aggressors need to take note. To the extent there are wouldbe aggressors in the world contemplating the possibility of doing the same thing Saddam Hussein did, they have to be given pause by the way in which the entire world, not just the United States but the entire world, responded to the aggression of Saddam Hussein against Kuwait.

Secondly, I think the world will take note of the value of a US commitment: that when the government of the United States, when the American people commit to defend the security of another nation, that that commitment has substance, and that we have the will and the ability to back it up.

Finally, I think it's appropriate before I take your questions to say just a word about the leadership of the President in this endeavor. There's been a lot of comment in recent days, now, in the glow of victory as people try to analyze what worked and what didn't work and what went right. There are plenty of talking heads of commentators on television, some, I note giving a totally different line than they did a few weeks ago before we won the war.

But foremost in my experience as secretary of defense through this enterprise, in addition to the enormous respect I have for the troops who carried out the orders in the Gulf of our commanders, like General Colin Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf and all the other commanders who made the operation possible, foremost is the enormous respect and admiration I have for the President of the United States. Admittedly, he's my boss. He's also the third president I've worked for and the fifth that I've watched up close during my political career going back 20-some years now in Washington.

And what made the entire operation possible was the fact that President Bush knew from the very beginning, from the very earliest days, when a lot of people were advising that the appropriate course of action was for us to let Saddam Hussein have Kuwait, that all we had to do was make certain he didn't go any further, or when others were advising that he should be allowed to keep part of Kuwait, that we should appease the aggressor by giving him islands or a hold on some of the Kuwaiti oil fields, time after time after time, when the conventional wisdom was that we could tolerate this aggression, the President said, "Absolutely not."

He made the decision that first week in August that this aggression would not stand, and from that basic, fundamental

principle, time after time after time when he had to make difficult decisions and choices about committing hundreds of thousands of Americans, about whether or not to begin the air campaign, about whether or not to accept half a loaf or to put up with anything less than total and complete victory, he made the right call. He made the decision that this aggression would not be permitted to stand.

He also, in terms of the conduct of the campaign itself, performed, I think, magnificently because he gave us broad strategic guidance. He gave us in the Pentagon a specific, clear-cut military objective that you could achieve by the application of military force, and then he told us to go do it, and he allowed us to do it in a way that guaranteed that we would make military judgments based upon how we could have maximum impact upon our adversary at minimum cost in terms of American lives and American casualties.

And it was that leadership style as much as anything that's produced the dramatic result that we've seen today. There were no halfway measures. There was no policy of gradual escalation. There were no artificial political restraints upon targeting. There was no holding back in terms of our military activity. There was the determination to succeed and the provision of the resources we needed to do it, and then the very successful marshaling of world and American public opinion to guarantee that our troops had the kind of support they deserved.

With all of that, I am obviously pleased to have been a part of the operation, but in the final analysis, I think we all recognize -- the President would be the first to emphasize this -- in the final analysis, the security and safety of the United States of America and our friends around the world depends first and foremost upon the willingness of young Americans to put on the uniform of the United States military and go in harm's way if need be when called upon. And to our great (fortune ?) -- we were never better represented than we have been over the last seven months by the young Americans of Operation Desert Storm.

With that, I'll stop. I'd be happy to respond to questions on those or other subjects.

MS. CARDIN: Will you ask the first question, please?

Q: William Rapfogel (ph). I'm with the Institute for Public Affairs of the Orthodox Union. Mr. Secretary, I'm sure on behalf of all of us, again we want to thank you for all your efforts and the efforts of the Pentagon. There's a great deal of trust that our community has with your office and you in particular, and I think something that we are anxious to get a sense of relates directly to the issue of the

confidencebuilding measures that are required to have the Middle East reach a new peaceful accord.

You've dealt with the Saudi Royal Family, with the Kuwaiti Emir, with the Syrians and so on. And I think perhaps you better than anybody else at this particular moment could give us a sense of the change, if in fact there is that kind of sea change within the Middle East, that could lead to this new order of regional security and peace in the region. So if you would, we'd appreciate greatly if you could tell us something about the relationship that you see resulting from this new world order.

SEC. CHENEY: Well, I'd be happy to try. I cannot claim to be an expert in the Middle East, although I know more about it now than I did seven months ago.

I am struck by several things. I think the -- there are commentators, pundits who've suggested that the coalition would never hold, that you would never get an allied force that included significant contributions by Arab nations to join with the United States and other powers from outside the Middle East to cooperate in a military operation against Saddam Hussein. Others who suggest now that the United States is a source of animosity on the parts of many in the Middle East, as they look at the United States and see what we've done to Saddam Hussein. I don't buy any of that.

My impression is, and time will tell whether or not it's a valid judgment, but that there has indeed been a sea change in terms of how people in that part of the world look at the role of the United States, look at questions of collective security, understand the value of efforts and arrangements designed to enhance peace in the years ahead. When you think about what transpired here, the fact that we had a majority of the Arab world supporting the United States and our policies, actively leading the effort -- men like President Mubarak of Egypt, half of all the Arabs in the world live in Egypt -- that not only did they support us diplomatically and at the United Nations and through the Arab League, but also in terms of actually sending forces to fight alongside US and allied forces in the desert to liberate Kuwait, that's a very, very significant development.

I think the fact that's been borne out by the results of the last few weeks, that King Fahd in Saudi Arabia was prepared to invite US forces into the Kingdom to defend against aggression. Always before, the attitude in the Gulf had been that US presence was okay, but it ought to be over the horizon out of sight. We didn't want to see you too close around in the neighborhood. That's changed since August 2nd.

But it's changed for the better, and it changed for a couple of

reasons. It changed because there no longer can be any doubt in anyone's mind in the Middle East that we are prepared, that we have the capability and the will, to come to defend our friends. We did it, we proved it conclusively, and no one has any doubt about the worth and the value of that kind of commitment from the United States.

The other thing, though, that it showed, that I often think about, was the -- why the Arab members of the coalition were willing to work with the United States, and it was captured best by what King Fahd told me when President Bush sent me out there in August to first discuss the possibility of deploying US forces to Saudi Arabia to defend Saudi Arabia and oppose Saddam Hussein's aggression. A point that was foremost in his mind was that he trusted the United States of America. He knew we would come with sufficient force to do the job. He knew we would stay until we were no longer needed, but he knew when we were longer needed we were prepared to leave, the same basis upon which we operate all over the world. And it was that element of ability and capability and military force, coupled with our moral statute in the world, that made all of that possible.

Now, I can't believe that all of those who participated in this successful exercise in international diplomatic and military activity aren't going to be fundamentally affected by it. I can't say in what ways, I cannot spell out for you exactly what the world's going to look like in the years ahead in that part of the world, but I'm more optimistic than I've ever been that the cooperation that has been displayed in support of decency, the sovereignty of independent nations in opposition to aggression and the brutality of Saddam Hussein isn't going to have a lasting impact upon the prospects for peace and stability in the region. I certainly hope so. And I think that the challenge is up to us, the United States, as well as our friends and allies in the region to find ways to make it happen.

Q: Evelyn Summer (ph), President of (Windsong?). We came to Washington to celebrate the great victory, Mr. Secretary, and it's a great pleasure to express our gratitude to you and through you to the President of the United States. The Middle East in the last few years has become a supermarket of weapons of mass destruction. I was wondering whether you have given some thought on a program of action to avoid the situation in the future?

SEC. CHENEY: It -- the problem of weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation is of grave concern. Anyone who watched the operation of the Scud missile firings at Israel and Saudi Arabia, or spent hours, as I did, trying to figure out how serious the threat of chemical and biological weapons was to US forces engaged in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, has to be

concerned about it. As I look at that part of the world, I see, over the next 10 years the likelihood that some 15 nations will have ballistic missile capability, half of those may have nuclear weapons, a good many of those are located in the Middle East. There is no question but what the threat, in terms of ever-increasing sophisticated -- ever- increasingly sophisticated military capability is something we're all going to be forced to deal with.

I'm not sure what the answer is. I am reasonably confident that the vast bulk of the hardware and a lot of the equipment that Saddam Hussein used to acquire his capability came from nations, or firms doing business in nations, that are friends and allies of the United States. There are only so many places in the world you can go to get that kind of sophisticated technology, and I think it behooves all of us to find ways to see what we can do to limit, eliminate, or significantly reduce that proliferation. But it's not an easy task. It's a relatively simple proposition, now, to develop the capacity to produce biological weapons -- biological agents.

We've seen the proliferation of things like Scuds, not a very accurate weapon, basically a weapon of terror, no great military purpose, but clearly it's there and it's something that we're going to have to deal with. So I think part of the administration's policies in the years ahead and as we now try to build a more secure situation in the Middle East, will be to focus on the question of the proliferation of those kinds of systems.

But I -- I don't want to be unduely optimistic about it. I think we also need to spend time investing in defenses against that kind of capability. The President made the point the other day, when he was up at Raytheon where they make the Patriot, that the people of Israel were fortunate that when the Scuds started flying they had something more than an abstract doctrine of deterrence to defend them. They had the Patriot. And it's vitally important that we go forward in terms of developing our own capabilities, things like SDI -- strategic defense initiative -- which is, after all, where the capability will be developed that will allow us to defend in the future against ballistic missile attacks. If there was ever evidence that supported the notion for aggressively going forward with the program, it would seem to me it was watching those Scuds fly at Tel Aviv and Riyadh.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I'm Aaron Rasty (ph) from the Orthodox Union. I, too, have to express our congratulations and gratitude for all your masterful efforts. My question is what decisions, if any, have been made towards leaving behind in the region military hardware from the Desert Storm operation, and if such a decision has been made, what consideration has been given towards diverting a proportionate amount of such

equipment towards Israel?

SEC CHENEY: The -- at this point we have not made any decisions about leaving equipment behind. There are, I suppose, sort of two categories of equipment or two kinds of decision that might lead to a decision to leave some equipment behind. One would be that we have some that's surplus or excess to our own needs that we want to leave to enhance the capabilities of another nation, like Israel, for example. We've not made any decisions in that area, yet. The other is whether or not we want to leave behind prepositioned equipment that would make it possible for us to get back more quickly in the future than we could this time, and we haven't made any decisions there either. These are the kinds of issues that to some extent will be discussed in the next few weeks with our allies and friends in the area, and going to turn on questions about what kind of security structures are worked out with respect to the future, some assessment of what the threat is, what kind of continuing US military presence in the region is warranted.

At this point, I can't give you any more than that because it really is too early -- we simply haven't made decisions. We're now in the midst of pulling together the plan for redeployment of our forces back to the states and some back to Europe. And within that overall context we'll be making decisions about what equipment we want to bring back as well as what we might want to transfer to others.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I, too, want to add my voice to thanking you and the President, General Schwarzkopf and General Powell for the superb defense of the United States. I want to ask you on a different note, has Israel in the last few years contributed to the defense of the United States, and will she continue to contribute in light of arrangements, and what can you tell us about that?

SEC. CHENEY: There's no question in my mind but that the strategic relationship between the United States and Israel is an important one that's contributed to the security of both nations. I think the kind of cooperation that we engaged in in this most recent exercise, because of the coordination we'd had over the years and the cooperation military to military, it was relatively easy for us to come together in terms of working the Scud threat, for example -- sharing information, using our systems in terms of early warning, but also getting some very useful ideas that we were able to apply in going after the Scuds that were after all threatening our own forces as well as threatening Israel. So, I think it's been a good relationship. I think it will continue to grow, and certainly one that we want to strongly support.

Q: Rabbi Holser (sp), the Rabbinical Council of America. Mr.

Secretary, what do you envision -- again on the military hardware -- what do you envision will happen to the planes, the war planes, that were parked by Saddam Hussein in Iran?

SEC CHENEY: Well, the -- an interesting story. About, we estimate 140, Iraqi aircraft -- a ball park figure, give or take a few aircraft -- but about 140 aircraft parked in Iran. And there was one point during the conflict when the Iranians announced that they had about 25 or 30 Iraqi aircraft. And I asked one of my assistants, I said, how can that be -- we know they've got 140, but they're only saying they've got 25 or 30. And he said, well, he said, obviously the Iranian air force just grew by 110 -- that they only plan to give back 25 or 30. I don't know whether that's true or not, but I would assume that that'll be the subject of some hard bargaining between the Iranians and the Iraqis, and I wouldn't want to predict the outcome. The Iranians, I must say, while clearly we do not have a relationship of any kind at this point with Iran from a diplomatic governmental standpoint, they did when they said they would be neutral in the conflict, they were indeed neutral. They did impound the aircraft; they did not allow the Iraqis to take them back. And we appreciated the fact that they kept their commitment of neutrality.

Q: Mr. Secretary, Becky Baily with Mutual and NBC Radio. Will a large group of US troops be coming home this week, and will you and President Bush greet them?

SEC. CHENEY: There's all kind of speculation about what will happen with the troops. I will simply say that I don't have any announcements to make today, but we're working on it very aggressively and I would expect an announcement in the near, very near future, in the next few days. And I hope I have the privilege -- I'm confident I will have the privilege -- to spend some time with our forces when they get back. They've done a tremendous job and I think they deserve the best possible welcome we can all give them when they come home. One more.

Q: Following up on the question of Iran, Mr. Secretary -- I'm Fred Margolis (sp), the Conference of Jewish Organizations of Nassau Country and the Jewish Political Caucus. My question to you, sir, is there seems to be a festering now between the Shiite and Sunni Muslims in Basra particularly. What do you see as the danger to the security of Saudi Arabia particularly as well as to other countries in that region with the Iranian fundamentalism festering once again in that part of the Middle East?

SEC. CHENEY: Well, it is of concern to us. There is clearly -- based on public reporting as well as other sources it's clear that there is significant unrest right now inside parts of Iraq. It's not surprising given the way Saddam Hussein ruled

over the years with a harsh police state. Now that his -- the myth of his invincibility has been shattered, as all of those thousands of members of the Iraqi military who fled Kuwait now move north and go back home to their homes in various places in Iraq they're going to carry with them the word of the disaster that has befallen Saddam Hussein's forces in Kuwait.

Given the tensions that exist inside Iraqi society, given the cultural and religious and ethnic diversity there are likely to be some real strains and we're watching that very closely. At this point, I'm not certain that there's much that can be done about it other than to make certain that we provide for the security of Kuwait, for example, that that kind of unrest and turmoil that we now see developing in parts of Iraq hopefully won't spread over into other areas in the neighborhood. But it is a subject of concern that we are watching very carefully.

Q: Thank you.

SEC. CHENEY: I'm told I've got to leave. But again, let me, as I depart I really am very sincere in wanting to thank all of you and your organizations for your great support in this enterprise. There are times when you -- in the midst of an exercise such as this, when the President's making some very difficult decisions, when public opinion is not united, when the path ahead is not clear at all in terms of how it's all going to sort out, but you've got some basic, fundamental principles you're trying to judge a situation by, it's enormously, enormously helpful to know that out there across the country there are groups and organizations and folks like those all of you represent here today supporting the effort, understanding what's at stake, knowing that it's absolutely essential that we show the kind of determination and dedication that's been the hallmark, I think, of Desert Storm. It meant a great deal to the President, it meant a great deal to me to know that all of you were out there supporting us. Thank you very much.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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אאאא,תוזם:5993
אל:רהמש/412
מ-:ווש,נר:2012,תא:040391,זת:1820,דת:מ,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי / מיידי

אל: ממ''ד, מצפ''א, מז''תים - למכותבים בלבד.
==========

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

סעודיה / התהליך המדיני.

דן מריאשין וג'ורג' ספקטר (בני ברית) נפגשו ביוזמתם (1.3) עם איש השגרירות הסעודית עאדל אלג'ובייר (AL-JUBEIR . על כרטיס הביקור שלו מצויין -). SPECIAL ASSISTANT TN THE AMBASSADOR

שמו של ג'ובייר הוצע להם ע''י פאול סיקרט, דסקאי סעודיה ב N.E.A לאחר שהביעו בפניו את ענינם בפגישה עם איש השגרירות ספקטר סיכם באוזני הח''מ (ב - 4.3) את דברי אלג'ובייר כלהלן:

1. על רקע מלחמת המפרץ קיים שיוני גמור (SEA CHANGE) במדיניות סעודיה.

2. הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי אינו נתפס עוד ע''י סעודיה כקונפליקט דתי או אידאולוגי. אלא כסכסוך פוליטי העשוי להפתר באמצעות מו''מ בין שני הצדדים רציונלים. שינוי זה התפתח במהלך השנים האחרונות, בהן הושלכו כל המיתוסים (ובמשתמע מדבריו - מלחמת המפרץ האיצה השנוי).

3. סעודיה ציינה לעצמה שיהודים אמריקאים לחמו בה. לדבריו, ''יהודים נוצרים ומוסלמים לחמו יחדיו נגד הכופר (INFIDEL) צדאם''. כשביקר בדהראן, אנשי המקום ציינו באוזניו כי כאשר פוגעים טילים בת''א - הם מבינים כיצד חשים תושביה, סעודיה, וחברות אחרות בקואליציה מבינות שאין להאשים את ישראל בכל צרות האיזור. מלמת המפרץ לא נגרמה ע''י ישראל.

4. סעודיה מבינה שהיא צריכה ליטול את היוזמה לפתרון סכסוך ישראל ערב, ג'ובייר אמר שביקור בירושלים, דוגמת יוזמת סאדאת, איננה סגנונו של פהד, אך-אליבא דספקטר - נתן להם להבין שסעודיה צפויה לנקוט צעד מקביל בערכו לוזמת סאדאת. התייחס להצהרה (STATEMENT) שתועלה בשבוע הקרוב, או בחודשים הקרובים, ואמר שאם יוזמת פהד (82) כללה הכרה משתמעת בישראל, הרי ההצהרה הנוכחית תהיה הכרה מפורשת בעיקרו של דבר (BASICALLY EXPLICIT). אשר להכרה פורמלית, צריך יהיה להמתין לפתרון הבעיה הפלס'. כנשאל, בתגובה, האם המדובר ב''שני המסלולימ'' (קרי הישראלי-פלס', והישראלי-ערבי) - השיב בחיוב.

5. אש''פ גמור, ולא יוכל לכפר (על מעשיו בעת המשבר). ערפאת וכל חבריו חייבים ללכת. לשאלה אם על אש''פ לשנות האמנה הפלס' השיב - שאלת האמנה אינה רלבנטית. יקומו מנהיגים פלסטינים חדשים, שיבחרו עפ''י תוכנית שמיר, והם ינהלו את המו''מ עם ישראל. לאש''פ לא תהיה זכות וטו. למל''פ יהיה SAY , אך לא לאש''פ (הערתי בתגובה שהמל''פ הוא חלק מאש''פ).

6. לשאלה מה ימנע בעד אש''פ מלהשתמש בטרור (לבלימת התפתחות זו) השיב שלדברי המודיעין שלהם - פלס' רבים בשטחים מאוכזבים (DISILL- USIONED) מאש''פ, וזה אבד הרבה מהשפעתו בקרבם. יש לצפות שמהערכת הבינ''ל תושפע מהחלשות מעמד אש''פ בעולם הערבי, ותחליש תמיכתה בארגון, משום שזה יצר (בעבר) מעמד ו הבי''נל בשל ענינן של המדינות השונות בחוזים (כלכליים)

בעולם הערבי.

7. אמר שהבעיה עם ישראל איננה בעיה אידאולוגית אלא בעיה של קביעת (SETTING) גבולות. נשאל אם כוונתו לתיקוני ADJUSTMENTS) גבול - השיב בחיוב... ציין שלא יהיו אלה גבולות בין ישראל לבין מדינה פלס' עצמאית, אלא בין ישראל לבין ירדן, או מדינה שתירש אותה. דבר על עלית מדינה פלס' מתונה בעמאן. אמר שחוסיין גמור בעיניהם משום שצעד הרבה מעבר לנדרש בתמיכתו בעיראק. ציין, בין השאר שהמלך הניח לרשתות הטרור העיראיקות להפגש בעמאן.

8. סוריה בהחלט
ON BOARD . ציין שנוסף להצהרה מריאד (ס' 4 לעיל) צפוייה הכרזה דומה של כל חברות הקואליציה (הערביות י.א.). בפגישה עם הסורים בתחילת המשבר, הזכירו הסורים שבעבר קבעו שלעולם לא יקיימו מגעים עם מצרים כל עוד היא מכירה בישראל, רמזו, בהקשר זה, שיתכן שאף עמדתם כלפי ישראל איננה כה נוקשה. להלן ציין שאיש לא צפה שהסורים ילחמו - אך הם לחמו, וקיימו הבטחותיהם לשת''פ במסגרת הקואליציה ובמאבק הטרור. הם ישתפו פעולה גם בעתיד, משום שאבדו את המשענת הסובייטית, ויוסיפו להזדקק לסיוע אמריקני וסעודי.

9. בפתח דבריו העלה ג'ובייר קווים דומים לישראל וסעודיה: לשתיהן משטרים שמרניים, בעיות דתיות (קרי- עם גורמים פונדמנטליסטיים) מס' אוכלוסין דומה (?). בתגובה להתייחסות הסכים ששתיהן פגיעות (VULHERABLE). במהלך הדברים רמז שסעודיה אסירת תודה לישראל על הריסון שנקטה במהלך המשבר.

10. ירושלים היתה הנושא היחיד לגביו הדגיש שהוא מעלה את השקפותיו הפרטיות:
קבע שסעודים בולטים מסכימים עמו שנושא זה אינו בעיה. ישראל יכולה להוסיף לקיים שליטה פוליטית (POLITICAL CONTROL) בירושלים, אך צריך יהיה להכיר ACKNOWLEDGEMENT) בכך שזו עיר קדושה לשלוש דתות, באמצעות הקמת מועצה דתית (RELIGOUS). COUNCIL (השווה הסיטואציה האפשרית לזו של ראש העיר LORD MAYOR) בלונדון.
לשאלה האם צריך דגל ?
תשובה - לא צריך בדגל.

11. ספקטר סיכם:

א. ג'ובייר העביר הרושם שהם עומדים ליטול את ההובלה (LEAD) בעולם הערבי, ומבקשים להפעיל מירב השפעתם בעד התחזקות הרדיקאלים.

ב. נראה שהסעודים אסירי תודה לישראל, ולא רק כלפי ארה''ב, ועל ישראל לבחון ההזדמנות.

ציין שעומד לתדרך בנושא גם את מנכ''ל בני ברית שיינר שיפגש השבוע עם ראה''מ, וביקש מאד לשמור על חשאיות המידע. אנא.

12. על גישותיה החדשות של סעודיה - ראו גם מאמר ג'ים הוגלנד (וש-פוסט 3.3).

אמיתי.

תפוצה:@(רהמ)

סססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:3233
אל:רהמש/231
מ-:המשרד,תא:040391,זח:2122,דח:ב,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר/בהול

ח.ר.ב.

למכותבים בלבד

אל: וושינגטון-שגריר,ציר,קישור לקונגרס
דע: משרד רה'מ- מנכ'ל, משרד הבטחון-מנכל,אוצר-מנכ'ל

סיוע חירום
לשלכם 2007

מבינים את מצוקת הממשל, ועם זאת הצעת בייקר ותנאיה (סעיף 3 במברקכם הנ'ל) אינם מקובלים עלינו.

אנו ניגשים לחבילת סיוע החירום בשני מישורים:

א. החלק הצבאי- הנחיות מפורטות יועברו אליכם ממשרד הבטחון.

ב. החלק האזרחי- להלן מבן-אהרון:

1. מתוך התחשבות בבעיות הכלכליות של ארה'ב ובקשיים התקציביים, לא נגיש בקשה לפיצויים בגין הנזקים האזרחים מאז תחילת המשבר באוגוסט אשתקד.

2. מאידך, לאור החיוניות של העלייה ומימדי האתגר אין אנו יכולים לוותר על הבקשה להרשאת ערבויות בסך כולל של 10 (עשרה) בליון דולר כבר השנה (לקראת שת'א 1992) כאשר הרישום ייחשב כ-OFF BUDGET. רצינו שהאישור בפועל של ערבויות אלה ייעשה במשך 5 (חמש) השנים הקרובות החל מהשנה הנוכחית (שת'א 1991) ואנו עדיין תותרים לזאת. אולם אם הדבר יקל על ארה'ב ותקציבה, נוכל להסכים לדחיית שיחרור בפלח הראשון (שני בליון) עד לשת'א 1992.

מובן מאליו שעליכם לעשות הסינתזה של תשובתנו על שני מרכיביה הנ'ל וגם להחליט לגבי הטקטיקה הרצוייה בשיחותיכם בממשל וגם בגבעה.

מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,@מנכלאוצר

סססס

20/6

*תאריך : 02.03.91 1081 *
*דף 1 מתוך 5 *
*עותק 2 מתוך 9 סודי ביותר נכנס ** *
* *
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* *
*חוזם:3,1081 *
*אל:המשרד *
*יעדים:רהמש/117,מצב/195 *
*מ-:וש,נר:@,תא:010391,זח:2300,דח:מ,סג:סב *
*תח:@ גס:צפא *
*נד:@ *
*סודי ביותר/חרב/מיידי *
*אל:שהח *
*דע:רוהמ *
*סמנכל צפ'א ופר'ן *
*מאת:השגריר, וושינגטון *
*בקור מזכיר המדינה בישראל *
*כללי *
שנתיים אחרי כניסתו לתפקיד, ולראשונה בחייו, יערוך מזכיר המדינה בקור
*בישראל. *
בעבר, בתשובה להזמנות שנתנו לו לבקר בארץ, שמענו מהמזכיר ומקורביו שהוא
נמנע מלקיים בקור כזה כדי לא ליצור ציפיות מוגזמות וכי בקורו צריך להיות
*קשור בהתקדמות תהליך השלום. *
עתה, עם סיום המלחמה במפרץ ולקראת כינון הסדרי בטחון ושלום באזור,
משולבת ישראל במסע באזור כאשר מבחינת הממשל אין הבקור רק בבחינת הכרות
מקרוב עם המציאות בישראל, הבעת הערכה למדיניות האפוק שלה מאז ה-2.8,
אלא, חשוב מכך, מסר אשר לסדר היום של הממשל וכוונותיו. אם בחודשים
האחרונים נמנע המזכיר מלבקר בישראל כדי לשמור על אחדות הקואליציה הרי
עתה השגת המטרות: כנון הסדרי בטחון באזור המפרץ בפרט, והמזה'ת בכלל,
פתרון סכסוכים אזוריים קרי ישראלי-ערבי, ישראלי-פלשתינאי מחייב
*ENGAGEMENT של ישראל. *
לא מן הנמנע שאחרי בקור זה, המיועד מבחינת המזכיר בעיקר לצורך שמיעה
*ולמוד, יבואו ביקורים נוספים. *
*
*אוירה *
'הדיפלומטיה חוזרת למגרש' ולסדר היום האמריקני, כאשר אין להמעיט באתגר
האישי של המזכיר, המעוניין להרשם כמעצב וארכיטקט של פתרון בעית המזה'ת

[illegible]

ואינו רוצה שטיפולו בסוגיות המזה'ת יראה ככשלון. הוסף לכך שנצחון
האסטרטגיה האמריקנית הנזקף לזכותם האישית של הנשיא, מזכיר ההגנה
והרמטכ'ל פאואל יחד עם שאיפות פוליטיות (נשיאותיות) של בייקר יחזקו
המוטיבציה שלו להצלחה. הממשל, גם אם לא יצהיר זאת בפומבי, ינסה לתרגם
ההישג הצבאי (חסר התקדים במונחים הסטוריים לפי פרשנים שונים) להישג
מדיני תוך שמוש בכל האמצעים. מעמדו של הנשיא בדעת הקהל האמריקנית,
התמיכה לה הוא זוכה בקונגרס (גם מצד אותם שהתנגדו למלחמה) יהפכו את
*הממשל בתקופה שנותרה עד הבחירות לנחוש והחלטי מתמיד.

*סדר יום

*על סדר היום שני נושאים מרכזיים שחשוב לנו להעלותם על הכתב גם בבחינת
*לוח זמנים או 'SEQUENCE' הטיפול בהם:
*הראשון, לטווח קצר, דיון ב-POST CRISIS ENVIRONMENT כיצד לסיים המלחמה,
*עתידה של כווית וביטחונה, עתיד הכוחות האמריקאים במפרץ. לטווח הארוך,
*שאלת הסדרי הבטחון באזור המפרץ. בהקשר זה גם כיצד TO CONTAIN ולהבטיח
*חיסול האיום העירקי על כל אופניו: קונבציונלי ולא קונבציונלי וכן שאלת
*הבטחון האזורי במסגרתו הרחבה יותר: פקוח נשק, צמצום המרוץ, איום נשק
*כימי, גרעיני וכו'.
*תוצאות ההתמודדות והטיפול בנושא הראשון יאפשרו התקדמות בתחומים אחרים
*בכללם הנושא השני, תהליך השלום כאשר הקולות שאנו שומעים עתה מהממשל הם
*שיש לפעול בשני מסלולים נפרדים, אם כי לא תלויים בהתקדמותם בהכרח אחד
*בשני: ישראלי-ערבי וישראלי-פלשתינאי. נראה שהמזכיר יבדוק, בין היתר,
*במדינות ערב בהן יבקר נכונותן להתקדם לשלום. משיחות אחרונות ומברורי
*המזכיר, איגלברגר וקימט בשיחותי עמהם נראה שמחשבה רבה ניתנת לסוריה. גם
*אם הם עצמם פסימיים אשר לסיכויים.

*חדוש תהליך השלום:

*אל לה לישראל להסתפק בהבעת נכונותה לחדוש תהליך השלום ויזמת הממשלה ממאי
*89 בלבד, כמו כן, עדיף שלא ניצור ליינקייג' בין קביעת הסדרי בטחון במפרץ
*לפתיחת שיחות או דיונים בקדום תהליך השלום. הממשל, והנשיא ומזכיר המדינה
*בראש ובראשונה, עדיין בתחושה שפריצת דרך היתה אפשרית במרץ 90 וכי החלטה
*פוליטית ישראלית מנעה השגת יעד זו. חשוב להביע הנכונות והמחוייבות
*הישראלית בפני המזכיר ע'י הצבת שורת צעדים והצעות של ישראל.
*לממשל אין עדיין תמונה ברורה של כוונותיו ויעדיו, הצבת יעדים וצעדים
*ישראליים עשוייה לעצב דרך טפול הממשל כשם שבמרץ 89 אומצה יוזמת רה'מ
*והפכה בסיס לפעילות הדיפלומטית של הממשל. בהצבת רעיונותינו והצעותינו
*חשוב לקבוע עם המזכיר מכנה משותף עקרוני של תאום ואי הפתעה הדדיים. רצוי
*לאמר בצורה הברורה ביותר האילוצים האסטרטגים והפוליטיים, מה ישראל יכולה
*לקבל ומה אינו אפשרי מבחינתנו. בהקשר זה מוצע לשקול להציע הצהרה של
*המזכיר המביעה התגדות להקמת מדינה פלשתינאית ו/או מתן תפקיד לאש'פ
*בתהליך המדיני. הצגת התאום כיעד ואמצעי לקדום התהליך תתרום, להערכתי, גם
*לשפור הקשר האישי והאמינות הישראלית בוושינגטון. יש לומר במירב הבהירות
*שישראל מצפה שארה'ב תשים את כל כובד משקלה על שותפותיה הערביות
*בקואליציה לנקוט כבר עתה צעדים לקידום השלום עם ישראל: הפסקת מצב

*דף 3 מתוך 5
*עותק 2 מתוך 9

הלוחמה, ביטול החרם. נושאים אלה צריכים להיות על סדר היום של ארה'ב
במגעיה עם אותן מדינות ערביות. עוד לפני הגעת המזכיר מוצע שרוה'מ יקרא
לפלשתינאים לפתוח עמנו בדיאלוג ואולי ששהב'ט יכריז על הסרת העוצר. יהיה
בכך לתרום לשיפור אוירה, להוכחת רצינות כוונות ישראל ומעל לכך, להסיר
*נושא מסדר היום של המזכיר.

*עקרונות ההסדר:

*רצוי להמנע מדיון בפרטי תכנית שלום ו-MODALITIES. במקום זאת רצוי לדון
*ולסכם עקרונות ברוח הבאה:

א. שיחות שלום בילטרליות, פתיחת מו'מ בין ישראל לבין כל אחת משכנותיה.
יש לחזור ולהדגיש שהתקדמות תהליך השלום עם מדינות ערביות צריכה לבוא
קודם לנושא הפלסטינאי, לא כתנאי אלא כהנחת עבודה משותפת. כזכור בעקבות
יזמת השלום ממאי 89 שמענו מהאמריקאים שהתגובות שקלטו במדינות ערב הן
שחייבת לבוא קודם התקדמות בנושא הפלשתינאי. מציע, עקב השיעור מניסיון
זה, לקשור ביזמתנו ובתאום עמם התקדמות במישור הפלשתינאי בהתקדמות תהליך
*עם מדינות ערב.

ב. שיחות בין ישראל לפלשתינאים במסגרת משלחת משותפת כאשר ישראל לא תוכל
להסכים למעורבות ישירה או עקיפה של אש'פ בתהליך. בהקשר זה מוצע לעקוף
*סוגיית המחלוקות ממרץ-אפריל 90: יצוג מגורשים ומזרח ירושלים.

*ג. קביעת מכניזם של בניית אמון:

1. הסדרי בטחון אזוריים בכלל זה פקוח נשק, פרוק נשק להשמדה המונית.
*מנגנוני בטחון ברוח הצעת טראסוב (מרכז משברים).

2. תכנית כלכלית אזורית כאשר מחד,אלמנט של השקעות חיצוניות באזור כולל
סיוע בינלאומי לפתרון בעיות הפליטים באיזור ומאידך, התנייה בפתוח קשרים
*כלכליים אזוריים.

3. מרכיב של הסדרי ביניים ושלבי מעבר: הכרה הדדית פומבית, הבעת רצון
*לפתרון סכסוכים בדרכים מדיניות, אוטונומיה לפלשתינאים.

*שאלת הועידה הבינלאומית ומעורבות האו'מ

המשבר במפרץ יצר מציאות בינ'ל חדשה. לא בכדי מדברים הנשיא, מזכיר המדינה
ואחרים על כונון סדר עולמי חדש, הסדרים שיבטיחו יציבות בעולם כמו אחרי
*מלח'ע השניה.
מחד, נעשה שמוש נרחב באו'מ ובהחלטות מועבי'ט ליצירת קואליציות ומאידך,
חשוב באותה מידה, שת'פ עם אירופה ובמידה כזו או אחרת של ספוק או אי
*נוחות עם ברה'מ.
שותפות ארה'ב בקואליציה: ברה'מ, צרפת ובוודאי מדינות ערב (סוריה) יעלו
הצורך בכנוס ועידת שלום למזה'ת. אחרים ידגישו הצורך לתת תפקיד מרכזי
יותר לאו'ם. נכון לעכשיו להערכתנו ידחה הממשל שתי המגמות גם יחד. קימט

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*דף 4 מתוך 5
*עותק 2 מתוך 9

סיפר לי שמשתוף הפעולה עם האו'ם למדו לקח ולא יערבו אותו בסכסוך במזה'ת.
אין ספק ששמוש באו'ם יש בו כדי לכבול חופש הפעולה של ארה'ב ביחוד עתה
באופורית ההישג האמריקאי, אך לא מן הנמנע שהנשיא והמזכיר עשויים לחשוב
*גם אחרת. גם נסיונות לכנס ועידה בינ'ל ידחו בשלב זה כלא בעיתם.
הממשל ינסה תחילה לעבוד עם הצדדים ולקדם פתרון, אך אל לנו לטעות, חרב
הועידה הבינ'ל תונף כל עת ויכוח או מחלוקת. אמירה נוסח 'אנו זקוקים
למשהו לעבוד עמו' תהיה שגורה בשיחות הדיפלומטיות. מכאן, גם דחיפות יתירה
*לקביעת תאום מדיני בין ישראל לבין ארה'ב ויעדים משותפים.

*ישראל-ארה'ב-בילטרלי

על סדר היום מספר נושאים נוספים, חשובים בפני עצמם, אך קשורים לנושא
*המרכזי, תהליך השלום.

1. מלחמת המפרץ תוכיח בטווח ארוך חשיבות שני מרכיבים עיקריים ביחסי
*ישראל-ארה'ב:
האחד, שתוף הערכים, מסורת יהודית- נוצרית, דמוקרטית. השני, שת'פ
אסטרטגי, חשיבות ישראל כגורם הרתעה באזור זה של העולם, גם בתום עידן
המלחמה הקרה (אם אכן תם..) מול סכנות אחרות כגון הפונדמנטליזם האיסלמי
ולאומנות תוקפנית נוסח סאדאם חוסיין- או שילוב של השניים, שחרור כוחות
אמריקניים, הסבירות הנמוכה של צורך בהחלצות צבאית אמריקנית לעזרת ישראל
*כמו גם התרומה המודיעינית, תכנונית של ישראל למאמץ האמריקני במפרץ.
*המלחמה גם הוכיחה הצורך בהגדלת ה-PRE-POSITIONING של ציוד ואמל'ח
אמריקני באיזור ועלינו להשתדל שזה יעשה בישראל. יש גם להציע שבקרוב יפתח
דו-שיח עם הממשל על עתיד התכנים החדשים של השת'פ האסטרטגי כאשר מבחינת
*ישראל יש בכך לחזק הברית בין שתי המדינות ונכונות לנקוט צעדים.

2. אשר לסיוע כלכלי בהקשר הרחב של המאמץ לקליטת עולי בריה'מ וכן סיוע
החרום הקשור במלחמה במפרץ ונזקיה מוצע לחכות שהמזכיר יעלה הנושא כדי
*למנוע אותן תחושות ששררו כאן לאחרונה.

3. ככלל, לא מוצע לפרוט השיחות עם המזכיר למעות קטנות של נושאים האמורים
*להפתר בדרגי עבודה: מחשבי על וכו'.

*סיכום

התחושה שאני ואנשי הצוות קולטים בשיחותינו עם אנשי הממשל שאין רואים
הביקור כמכוון להשגת מטרה ספציפית כלשהיא, אלא תחילה של לימוד והתיעצות
*כדי לעצב מדיניות ומהלכי הממשל בעתיד.

נראה לי לכן חשוב שהשיחות שאתה וראש הממשלה תקיימו יעסקו בעקרונות
ובקוים המנחים מבלי להכנס לדיון מפורט מדי. למותר לציין שהביקור יהווה
הזדמנות להנהגת המדינה ואולי אף לדעת הקהל הישראלית להביע הערכה ותודה
*פומבית למנהיגות הנשיא, המזכיר וארה'ב כפי שהוכחה במפרץ.

*שובל

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*דף 5     מתוך 5
*עותק 2    מתוך 9
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*תפ: שהח(2),סשהח(1),רהמ(0),מנכל(1),ממנכל(1),בנצור(1)
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מברק נכנס מסווג

אאאא,חוזם:1081
אל:רהמש/117
מ-:ווש,נר:@,תא:010391,זח:2300,דח:מ,סג:סב,
בבבב
סודי ביותר/חרב/מיידי

אל:שהח

דע:רוהמ

סמנכל צפ'א ופר'ן

מאת:השגריר, וושינגטון

בקור מזכיר המדינה בישראל

כללי

שנתיים אחרי כניסתו לתפקיד, ולראשונה בחייו, יערוך מזכיר המדינה בקור ישראל.
נעבר, בתשובה להזמנות שנתנו לו לבקר בארץ, שמענו מהמזכיר ומקורביו שהוא נמנע מלקיים בקור כזה כדי לא ליצור ציפיות מוגזמות וכי בקורו צריך להיות קשור בהתקדמות תהליך השלום.
עתה, עם סיום המלחמה במפרץ ולקראת כינון הסדרי בטחון ושלום באזור, משולבת ישראל במסע באזור כאשר מבחינת הממשל אין הבקור רק בבחינת הכרות מקרוב עם המציאות בישראל, הבעת הערכה למדיניות האפוק שלה מאז ה-2.8, אלא, חשוב מכך, מסר אשר לסדר היום של הממשל וכוונותיו. אם בחודשים האחרונים נמנע המזכיר מלבקר בישראל כדי לשמור על אחדות הקואליציה הרי עתה השגת המטרות: כנון הסדרי בטחון באזור המפרץ בפרט, והמזה'ת בכלל, פתרון סכסוכים אזוריים קרי ישראלי-ערבי, ישראלי-פלשתינאי מחייב ENGAGEMENT של ישראל.
לא מן הנמנע שאחרי בקור זה, המיועד מבחינת המזכיר בעיקר לצורך שמיעה ולמוד, יבואו ביקורים נוספים.

אוירה

'הדיפלומטיה תוזרת למגרש' ולסדר היום האמריקני, כאשר אין להמעיט באתגר האישי של המזכיר, המעוניין להרשם כמעצב וארכיטקט של פתרון בעית המזה'ת ואינו רוצה שטיפולו בסוגיות המזה'ת יראה ככשלון. הוסף לכך שנצחון האסטרטגיה האמריקנית הנזקף לזכותם האישית של הנשיא, מזכיר ההגנה והרמטכ'ל פאואל יחד עם שאיפות פוליטיות (נשיאותיות) של בייקר יחזקו המוטיבציה שלו להצלחה. הממשל, גם אם לא יצהיר זאת בפומבי, ינסה לתרגם ההישג הצבאי (חסר התקדים במונחים הסטוריים לפי פרשנים שונים) להישג מדיני תוך שמוש בכל האמצעים. מעמדו של הנשיא בדעת הקהל האמריקנית, התמיכה לה הוא זוכה בקונגרס (גם מצד אותם שהתנגדו למלחמה) יהפכו את הממשל בתקופה שנותרה עד הבחירות לנחוש והחלטי מתמיד.

סדר יום

על סדר היום שני נושאים מרכזיים שחשוב לנו להעלותם על הכתב גם בבחינת לוח זמנים או 'SEQUENCE' הטיפול בהם:
הראשון, לטווח קצר, דיון ב-POST CRISIS ENVIRONMENT כיצד לסיים המלחמה,

עתידה של כווית וביטחונה, עתיד הכוחות האמריקאים במפרץ. לטווח הארוך, שאלת הסדרי הבטחון באזור המפרץ. בהקשר זה גם כיצד TO CONTAIN ולהבטיח חיסול האיום העירקי על כל אופניו: קונבציונלי ולא קונבציונלי וכן שאלת הבטחון האזורי במסגרתו הרחבה יותר: פקוח נשק, צמצום המרוץ, איום נשק כימי, גרעיני וכו'.
תוצאות ההתמודדות והטיפול בנושא הראשון יאפשרו התקדמות בתחומים אחרים בכללם הנושא השני, תהליך השלום כאשר הקולות שאנו שומעים עתה מהממשל הם שיש לפעול בשני מסלולים נפרדים, אם כי לא תלויים בהתקדמותם בהכרח אחד בשני: ישראלי-ערבי וישראלי-פלשתינאי. נראה שהמזכיר יבדוק, בין היתר, במדינות ערב בהן יבקר נכונותן להתקדם לשלום. משיחות אחרונות ומברורי המזכיר, איגלברגר וקימט בשיחותי עמהם נראה שמחשבה רבה ניתנת לסוריה. גם אם הם עצמם פסימיים אשר לסיכויים.

חדוש תהליך השלום:

אל לה לישראל להסתפק בהבעת נכונותה לחדוש תהליך השלום ויזמת הממשלה ממאי 89 בלבד, כמו כן, עדיף שלא ניצור ליינקייג' בין קביעת הסדרי בטחון במפרץ לפתיחת שיחות או דיונים בקדום תהליך השלום. הממשל, והנשיא ומזכיר המדינה בראש ובראשונה, עדיין בתחושה שפריצת דרך היתה אפשרית במרץ 90 וכי החלטה פוליטית ישראלית מנעה השגת יעד זו. חשוב להביע הנכונות והמחוייבות הישראלית בפני המזכיר ע'י הצבת שורת צעדים והצעות של ישראל.
לממשל אין עדיין תמונה ברורה של כוונותיו ויעדיו, הצבת יעדים וצעדים ישראליים עשוייה לעצב דרך טפול הממשל כשם שבמרץ 89 אומצה יוזמת רה'מ הפכה בסיס לפעילות הדיפלומטית של הממשל. בהצבת רעיונותינו והצעותינו חשוב לקבוע עם המזכיר מכנה משותף עקרוני של תאום ואי הפתעה הדדיים. רצוי לאמר בצורה הברורה ביותר האילוצים האסטרטגים והפוליטיים, מה ישראל יכולה לקבל ומה אינו אפשרי מבחינתנו. בהקשר זה מוצע לשקול להציע הצהרה של המזכיר המביעה התגדות להקמת מדינה פלשתינאית ו/או מתן תפקיד לאש'פ בתהליך המדיני. הצגת התאום כיעד ואמצעי לקדום התהליך תתרום, להערכתי, גם לשפור הקשר האישי והאמינות הישראלית בוושינגטון. יש לומר במירב הבהירות שישראל מצפה שארה'ב תשים את כל כובד משקלה על שותפותיה הערביות בקואליציה לנקוט כבר עתה צעדים לקידום השלום עם ישראל: הפסקת מצב הלוחמה, ביטול החרם. נושאים אלה צריכים להיות על סדר היום של ארה'ב במגעיה עם אותן מדינות ערביות. עוד לפני הגעת המזכיר מוצע שרוה'מ יקרא לפלשתינאים לפתוח עמנו בדיאלוג ואולי ששהב'ט יכריז על הסרת העוצר. יהיה בכך לתרום לשיפור אוירה, להוכחת רצינות כוונות ישראל ומעל לכך, להסיר נושא מסדר היום של המזכיר.

עקרונות ההסדר:

רצוי להמנע מדיון בפרטי תכנית שלום ו-MODALITIES. במקום זאת רצוי לדון ולסכם עקרונות ברוח הבאה:

א. שיחות שלום בילטרליות, פתיחת מו'מ בין ישראל לבין כל אחת משכנותיה. יש לחזור ולהדגיש שהתקדמות תהליך השלום עם מדינות ערביות צריכה לבוא קודם לנושא הפלסטינאי, לא כתנאי אלא כהנחת עבודה משותפת. כזכור בעקבות יזמת השלום ממאי 89 שמענו מהאמריקאים שהתגובות שקלטו במדינות ערב הן שחייבת לבוא קודם התקדמות בנושא הפלשתינאי. מציע, עקב השיעור מניסיון זה, לקשור ביזמתנו ובתאום עמם התקדמות במישור הפלשתינאי בהתקדמות תהליך עם מדינות ערב.

ב. שיחות בין ישראל לפלשתינאים במסגרת משלחת משותפת כאשר ישראל לא תוכל להסכים למעורבות ישירה או עקיפה של אש'פ בתהליך. בהקשר זה מוצע לעקוף סוגיית המחלוקות ממרץ-אפריל 90: יצוג מגורשים ומזרח ירושלים.

ג. קביעת מכניזם של בניית אמון:

1. הסדרי בטחון אזוריים בכלל זה פקוח נשק, פרוק נשק להשמדה המונית. מנגנוני בטחון ברוח הצעת טראסוב (מרכז משברים).

2. תכנית כלכלית אזורית כאשר מחד,אלמנט של השקעות חיצוניות באזור כולל סיוע בינלאומי לפתרון בעיות הפליטים באיזור ומאידך, התנייה בפתוח קשרים כלכליים אזוריים.

3. מרכיב של הסדרי ביניים ושלבי מעבר: הכרה הדדית פומבית, הבעת רצון לפתרון סכסוכים בדרכים מדיניות, אוטונומיה לפלשתינאים.

שאלת הועידה הבינלאומית ומעורבות האו'מ

המשבר במפרץ יצר מציאות בינ'ל חדשה. לא בכדי מדברים הנשיא, מזכיר המדינה ואחרים על כנון סדר עולמי חדש, הסדרים שיבטיחו יציבות בעולם כמו אחרי מלח'ע השניה.
מחד, נעשה שמוש נרחב באו'מ ובהחלטות מועבי'ט ליצירת קואליציות ומאידך, חשוב באותה מידה, שת'פ עם אירופה ובמידה כזו או אחרת של ספוק או אי נוחות עם ברה'מ.
שותפות ארה'ב בקואליציה: ברה'מ, צרפת ובוודאי מדינות ערב (סוריה) יעלו הצורך בכנוס ועידת שלום למזה'ת. אחרים ידגישו הצורך לתת תפקיד מרכזי יותר לאו'ם. נכון לעכשיו להערכתנו ידחה הממשל שתי המגמות גם יחד. קימט סיפר לי שמשתוף הפעולה עם האו'ם למדו לקח ולא יערבו אותו בסכסוך במזה'ת. אין ספק ששמוש באו'ם יש בו כדי לכבול תופש הפעולה של ארה'ב ביחוד עתה באופורית ההישג האמריקאי, אך לא מן הנמנע שהנשיא והמזכיר עשויים לחשוב גם אחרת. גם נסיונות לכנס ועידה בינ'ל ידחו בשלב זה כלא בעיתם.
הממשל ינסה תחילה לעבוד עם הצדדים ולקדם פתרון, אך אל לנו לטעות, חרב הועידה הבינ'ל תונף כל עת ויכוח או מחלוקת. אמירה נוסח 'אנו זקוקים למשהו לעבוד עמו' תהיה שגורה בשיחות הדיפלומטיות. מכאן, גם דחיפות יתירה לקביעת תאום מדיני בין ישראל לבין ארה'ב ויעדים משותפים.

ישראל-ארה'ב-בילטרלי

על סדר היום מספר נושאים נוספים, חשובים בפני עצמם, אך קשורים לנושא המרכזי, תהליך השלום.

1. מלחמת המפרץ תוכיח בטווח ארוך חשיבות שני מרכיבים עיקריים ביחסי ישראל-ארה'ב:
האחד, שתוף הערכים, מסורת יהודית- נוצרית, דמוקרטית. השני, שת'פ אסטרטגי, חשיבות ישראל כגורם הרתעה באזור זה של העולם, גם בתום עידן המלחמה הקרה (אם אכן תם..) מול סכנות אחרות כגון הפונדמנטליזם האיסלמי ולאומנות תוקפנית נוסח סאדאם חוסיין- או שילוב של השניים, שחרור כוחות אמריקניים, הסבירות הנמוכה של צורך בהחלצות צבאית אמריקנית לעזרת ישראל כמו גם התרומה המודיעינית, תכנונית של ישראל למאמץ האמריקני במפרץ.
המלחמה גם הוכיחה הצורך בהגדלת ה-PRE-POSITIONING של ציוד ואמל'ח אמריקני באיזור ועלינו להשתדל שזה יעשה בישראל. יש גם להציע שבקרוב יפתח דו-שיח עם הממשל על עתיד התכנים החדשים של השת'פ ההאסטרטגי כאשר מבחינת ישראל יש בכך לחזק הברית בין שתי המדינות ונכונות לנקוט צעדים.

2. אשר לסיוע כלכלי בהקשר הרחב של המאמץ לקליטת עולי בריה'מ וכן סיוע החרום הקשור במלחמה במפרץ ונזקיה מוצע לחכות שהמזכיר יעלה הנושא כדי למנוע אותן תחושות ששררו כאן לאחרונה.

3. ככלל, לא מוצע לפרוט השיחות עם המזכיר למעות קטנות של נושאים האמורים להפתר בדרגי עבודה: מחשבי על וכו'.

סיכום

התחושה שאני ואנשי הצוות קולטים בשיחותינו עם אנשי הממשל שאין רואים הביקור כמכוון להשגת מטרה ספציפית כלשהיא, אלא תחילה של לימוד והתיעצות כדי לעצב מדיניות ומהלכי הממשל בעתיד.

נראה לי לכן חשוב שהשיחות שאתה וראש הממשלה תקיימו יעסקו בעקרונות ובקוים המנחים מבלי להכנס לדיון מפורט מדי. למותר לציין שהביקור יהווה הזדמנות להנהגת המדינה ואולי אף לדעת הקהל הישראלית להביע הערכה ותודה פומבית למנהיגות הנשיא, המזכיר וארה'ב כפי שהוכחה במפרץ.

שובל

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור

סססס

אאאא,חוזם:1065
אל:רהמש/114
מ-:ווש,נר:2006,תא:010391,זח:1930,דח:מ,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי / מיידי

אל: ממ''ד, מצפ''א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

התהליך המדיני / סוריה

1. ממקור ב - NEA המקורב לנושא התהליך (ב - 28.2).

א. נושא הסדרי הבטחון במפרץ יהיה בראש סולם העדיפויות של ביקור המזכיר. אשר לתהליך, העריך שיאמר לישראל ולמדינות הערביות, כי קיימת הזדמנות גדולה, על אף שפע האילוצים. אינו מעריך שבייקר מגיע עם ''תוכנית אב''. במשתמע מדבריו עלה שבייקר יבקש לשמוע את עמדת הצדדים: ''מה אפשרי ומה נדחה לחלוטין''. מה רוצים לקבל ומה מוכנים לתת. מהו סדר העדיפויות, בטווח הקצר, הבינוני והארוך.

ב. הדגיש כי חשוב שכל אחד מהצדדים יבטח (CONFIDE) במזכיר, שיעלה עמדותיו באורח אמין בפני הצד האחר. להמחשה הזכיר את קיסינג'ר. בהקשר זה שאלתי להערכתו לגבי הל''וז להתקדמות. השיב - ''התהליך יהיה חשוב עפ''י מידת החשיבות שאתם, המצרים והסורים תעניקו לו''.

ג. עמדת סוריה כלפי התהליך: במחמ''ד קיימת קשת הערכות - ''איש אינו מעריך שהם השתנו אסטרטגית. השאלה הנשאלת היא האם החלו לחשוב על שינוי אם לאו''. בן שיחי פסימי, ומעריך שהשת''פ במפרץ שיקף מפגש אינטרסים לגופו. מאוכזב בעיקר מכך שלא חל כל שנוי בנושא הטרור. נושא זה מהווה מבחינת ארה''ב קריטריון לבחינת המגמות הסוריות משום שהוא דורש מהלכים קונקרטיים.
העיר עוד: ''רק קיבלו כסף - וכבר נסע טלאס למוסקווה לרכוש אמל''ח''.

2. מהאריס, ראש מחקר המזה''ת ב - I.N.R : קבע (1.3)
כי אינו יכול להעריך לפי שעה, האם השנוי במדיניותה האזורית של סוריה ישליך לגבי עמדותיה בתהליך.
העריך שמגעי המזכיר בדמשק יהיו החלק החשוב ביותר במסעו, האמור להקנות אינדיקציה לגבי המגמות הסוריות.

אמיתי.

תפוצה:שהח,ששהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רם),אמן,ממד,בנצור,מצפא,סולטן

ששסס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:898
אל:רהמש/87
מ-:ווש,נר:2002,תא:010391,זח:1400,דח:ב,סג:סו,
בבבב
סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפא, מקש'ח משהב'ט

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

סיוע חרום לישראל

בהמשך לשלי 2234

א. הפגישה אתמול (28/2) בבית הלבן היתה INCONCLUSIVE.
דרמן עדיין מהווה הבעיה המרכזית. טיעונו העיקרי הוא שהסיוע לישראל יפתח פתח לבקשות של מדינות אחרות.

ב. מדיווחים נוספים על פגישת המנהיגות אתמול עם המזכיר בייקר מתרשמים משתתפים שבכוונת המימשל (יתכן שאיגלברגר) לפנות לממישראל ולשאת ולתת עמה על גובה סכום הסיוע.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה:שהח,ששהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,@(שהבט),
@(מקשח/משהבט)

ששסס

אאאא,חוזם:1055
אל:רהמש/110
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:34,תא:010391,זח:1857,דח:מ,סג:בל,
בבבב
בלמ"ס/מיידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: תפוצת תקשורת, ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: בוש - מסע"ת

להלן התמליל המלא של מסיבת העתונאים שנתן הנשיא היום אחה"צ. נא תשומת לבכם לנקודות החשובות הבאות בתמליל:-

א. תהליך השלום -

קידום תהליך השלום במזה"ת או...ועידת שלום...מתקשר לשאלות הפלסטינית, הלבנונית וכמובן החזרת עירק למשפחת העמים...הדברים האלה יידונו במסעו של בייקר...שוחחנו כך גם עם...הגרמנים והאחרים...אני נחוש בדעתי שלארה"ב יהיה תפקיד מועיל בכל שא השלום במזה"ת שיכלול שלוש הקטגוריות שלעיל (קרי: פלסטינאים, לבנון ועירק)...ור הזמן יגיד אם יהיה זאת בדרך של ועידת שלום (PEACE CONFERENCE) או רעיונות חדשי אחרים.
הערה: במהלך התשובות לשאלות, חזר מספר פעמים על שלוש הקטגוריות לעיל.

ב. ירדן -

היו בינינו חלוקי דיעות...על הירדנים לפתור זאת בעצמם...עליהם להכיר באמת - עיראק הובסה...ייקח זמן, אבל...איננו רוצים לראות ערעור היציבות בירדן, אין בליבי על המלך, נצטרך לחכות ולראות.

ג. נושא הנוכחות האמריקנית במפרץ -

עדיף שהנושא יטופל ע"י המדינות הערביות...גם בכך ידון המזכיר במסעו...אולי יה מקום לכוח או"ם.

ד. בריה"מ -

...היא מדינה חשובה, עיקרית ויש להתייחס אליה בכבוד...יש לה ענין וידע רבים בנ המזה"ת, ולכן נעבוד עמם על בסיס של כבוד הדדי...יש מקום גם לאו"ם במתכונתו החד שהינו חיוני ומשמעותי במאמצי השלום...וכך בריה"מ...וחשוב לעבוד עמם...האו"ם יכ בהחלט לסייע...בריה"מ חשובה...אנו ניישר ההדורים וחילוקי הדיעות עם בריה"מ...ו אוכל להבטיח להם שהם חיוניים בהמשך הדיפלומטיה המולטילטרלית שתרמה עד כה תרומה משמעותית לפתרון בעיות המזה"ת.

עד כאן.

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM
FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: GOOD AFTERNOON. IN THE HOURS SINCE WE SUSPENDED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF WAR, CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN MOVING TOWARDS A CEASE-FIRE AND POSTWAR PLANNING.

AS OUR FORCES MOVED INTO KUWAIT CITY, AND AS THE FACES OF THESE JUBILANT KUWAITI CITIZENS HAVE WARMED OUR HEARTS, THE COALITION LEADERS STARTED THE ARDUOUS TASK OF ADDRESSING THE NEXT STAGES OF THE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION.

AS A FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS THIS AFTERNOON, I WANT TO THANK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THE AFFECTION AND SUPPORT THAT THEY HAVE SHOWN FOR OUR TROOPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN TOWNS AND CITIES ACROSS THIS NATION, OUR CITIZENS HAVE FELT A SENSE OF PURPOSE AND UNITY IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OUR MILITARY THAT IS A WELCOME ADDITION TO THE AMERICAN SPIRIT. AND AS OUR SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN BEGIN COMING HOME, AS THEY WILL SOON, I LOOK FORWARD TO THE MANY CELEBRATIONS OF THEIR ACHIEVEMENT.

IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE FOCUSED ON THE MANY DIPLOMATIC TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH ENDING THIS CONFLICT. GENERAL KHALID, GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF AND OTHER COALITION MILITARY LEADERS OF OUR FORCES IN THE GULF WILL MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF IRAQ TOMORROW AFTERNOON, MARCH 2ND, IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS TO DISCUSS THE RETURN OF POWS AND OTHER MILITARY MATTERS RELATED TO THE CEASE-FIRE. WE WILL NOT DISCUSS THE LOCATION OF THE MEETING FOR OBVIOUS SECURITY REASONS. BUT THIS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN SECURING THE VICTORY THAT OUR FORCES HAVE ACHIEVED.

WORK IS PROCEEDING IN NEW YORK AT THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ENDING THE WAR. WE'VE WELCOMED HERE IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEK THE ENVOYS OF SEVERAL OF OUR CLOSE FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

AND SHORTLY, SECRETARY BAKER WILL BE LEAVING FOR A NEW ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS THAT I AM CONFIDENT WILL ADVANCE PLANNING FOR THE WAR'S AFTERMATH.

AGAIN, AND AS I SAID WEDNESDAY EVENING, THE TRUE CHALLENGE BEFORE US WILL BE SECURING THE PEACE.

SO THANK YOU VERY MUCH, AND NOW WHO HAS THE FIRST QUESTION?

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU'VE ALWAYS SAID THAT YOU WERE NOT TARGETING SADDAM UNDER THE UN MANDATES, AND THAT THE COALITION HAS NO CLAIM ON IRAQI TERRITORY. IS THAT STILL THE CASE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE ARE NOT TARGETING SADDAM, AND WE HAVE NO CLAIM ON IRAQI TERRITORY.

Q WELL, WILL WE TRY TO HUNT HIM DOWN FOR ANY KIND OF WAR

CRIMES TRIAL?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I'M NOT GOING TO SAY THAT, NOT "HUNT HIM DOWN," BUT NOBODY CAN BE ABSOLVED FROM THE RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE WAR CRIMES ASPECT OF THAT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, ALONG THAT LINE, THE REPORTS OF ATROCITIES IN KUWAIT APPARENTLY GO FAR BEYOND THE HORROR STORIES THAT YOU'VE ALREADY DESCRIBED IN RECENT WEEKS. WHO WILL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THOSE, PERHAPS THOSE IN SADDAM'S? DO YOU THINK THAT THE ALLIED FORCES WILL HOLD ANY PART OF SOUTHERN IRAQ AS A SECURITY ZONE FOR ANY TIME?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK ON THE FIRST QUESTION, FIRST PART, I THINK THE -- I AGREE THAT THE REPORTS ARE JUST SICKENING THAT ARE COMING OUT OF KUWAIT. WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT IT. EARLY ON IN ALL OF THIS, I EXPRESSED THE CONCERNS THAT I FELT. BUT I THINK WE JUST HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE, BECAUSE I THINK THE PERSON THAT ACTUALLY PERPETRATED THE TORTURES AND THE INSIDIOUS CRIMES WILL BE THE ONES THAT ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE.

NOW, HOW YOU GO ABOUT FINDING THEM -- BUT I THINK BACK TO THE END OF WORLD WAR II, THAT PROCESS TOOK A LONG TIME TO EVOLVE, BUT JUSTICE WAS DONE. I CAN'T SAY IT WAS COMPLETE, CAN'T SAY EVERYBODY THAT COMMITTED A WAR CRIME WAS TRIED. BUT IT'S A VERY COMPLICATED PROCESS, BUT THE ANSWER IS, THE PEOPLE THAT DID IT. NOW, A LOT OF THEM OBVIOUSLY TOOK OFF AND FLED OUT OF KUWAIT. BUT SOME OF THE KUWAITIS KNOW WHO THEY WERE, SO WE'LL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE ON THAT ONE.

AND WHAT WAS THE SECOND PART, TERRY?

Q THE SECOND PART WAS ABOUT A SECURITY ZONE. YOU KNOW, YOU'VE HAD ALL THIS DESTRUCTION. IS THERE ANY THOUGHT OF AN ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY ZONE TO PROTECT THE WEST?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, ON THE QUESTION OF SECURITY ZONE AND ARANGEMENTS OUT THERE, THESE MATTERS WILL BE DISCUSSED WHEN JIM BAKER IS OUT THERE WITH THE COALITION PARTNERS. I DON'T BELIEVE THEY WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE MILITARY MEETING TOMORROW.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT ARE YOUR OPTIONS, SIR, IF THE MEETING TOMORROW AND SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS DO NOT PRODUCE PROMPT SATISFACTION TO YOU THAT OUR EPWS OR POWS WILL BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I REALLY, BRIT, DON'T WANT TO GET INTO THE HYPOTHESIS BECAUSE I'M CONVINCED THEY WILL. I REALLY BELIEVE WE WILL GET SATISFACTION ON THAT. AND THEY KNOW THAT THEY MUST COMPLY, AND I BELIEVE THEY WILL COMPLY. AND PUT IT THIS WAY: THEY BETTER COMPLY.

Q WELL, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS, SIR, ALREADY FROM THE EARLY DAYS OF THE AIR WAR THAT ONE OF THE AIRMEN, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS KILLED, HIS BODY DRAGGED THROUGH THE STREETS OF ONE OF THE TOWNS. DOES THE UNITED STATES PLAN TO SEEK ANY KIND OF RETRIBUTION BECAUSE OF THAT, OR WILL THERE BE MEASURES TAKEN IN THAT REGARD?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I'VE ADDRESSED MYSELF TO WAR CRIMES TRIALS, AND ABUSE OF PRISONERS CERTAINLY IS PROVIDED FOR, AND I -- YOU KNOW, THE GENEVA CONVENTION CITES HOW PRISONERS SHOULD BE TREATED. I HAD NOT HEARD THAT REPORT, AND I DON'T WANT TO LEAVE IT STAND THAT I KNOW OF IT OR KNOW OF ITS ACCURACY, BUT IT WOULD BE A HORRIBLE THING IF THAT HAPPENED.

Q I KNOW YOU'VE HEARD THOSE REPORTS FROM THE LE MONDE NEWSPAPER. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER SAYS HE KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE ALGERIANS HAVE WORKED OUT A DEAL WITH SADDAM THAT HE CAN COME THERE FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM. FIRST OF ALL, HAVE YOU HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT THOSE REPORTS? AND IF NOT, HAVE YOU -- DO YOU AGREE WITH YOUR CHIEF OF STAFF, MR. SUNUNU, THAT IT'S AN UNSTABLE SITUATION FOR HIM AND HE MIGHT BE OVERTHROWN?

PRESIDENT BUSH: JOHN, I THINK THAT SUBSEQUENT TO YOUR DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY BAKER, THE ALGERIANS DON'T REALLY KNOW ABOUT THE STABILITY INSIDE.
THERE ARE RUMORS, BUT THAT -- I THINK IT'S EARLY. IN MY OWN VIEW, I'VE ALWAYS SAID THAT IT WOULD BE -- THAT THE IRAQI PEOPLE SHOULD PUT HIM ASIDE AND THAT WOULD FACILITATE THE RESOLUTION OF ALL THESE PROBLEMS THAT EXIST, AND CERTAINLY WOULD FACILITATE THE ACCEPTANCE OF IRAQ BACK INTO THE FAMILY OF PEACE-LOVING NATIONS.

Q EVEN THOUGH THAT REPORT FROM ALGERIA APPARENTLY IS ERRONEOUS, THERE WAS SOMETHING INTERESTING IN THERE. IT SAID THE ALGERIANS HAD WORKED OUT A DEAL WHERBY THE ALLIES INCLUDING YOURSELF HAD AGREED THAT SADDAM IF HE CAME THERE, HE WOULD NOT BE TRIED FOR ANY WAR CRIMES. YOU HAVE SAID THAT NO ONE CAN BE ABSOLVED. WOULD YOU NOT AGREE TO ANY DEAL WHEREBY HE GOT POLITICAL ASYLUM?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I WOULD LEAVE IT STAND THAT WE CANNOT ABSOLVE ANYONE FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. BUT -- I MEAN, THAT -- THAT -- WE WERE NOT APPROACHED ON THAT AT ALL. SO, THE REPORT IS SIMPLY FALLACIOUS IF IT INCLUDED THAT.

Q BUT TO GET HIM OUTY, YOU WOULDN'T AGREE TO NOT TRY HIM.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I WOULD LEAVE THAT MATTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, AND WE CANNOT ABSOLVE SOMEBODY. I CANNOT WAVE A WAND AND ABSOLVE SOMEBODY FROM THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT CAN KING HUSSEIN DO TO GET HIMSELF OUT OF THE US DOGHOUSE? AND IF IT TURNS OUT -- (LAUGHTER) -- THAT JORDAN WAS VIOLATING THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ, CAN HE DO SO?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK, YOU KNOW WE HAVE HAD DIFFERENCES WITH JORDAN, AND IT'S GOING TO TAKE SOME TIME. I THINK THE JORDANIANS HAVE TO SORT OUT THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS THE WAY THEY LOOK AT THIS MATTER. THE JORDANIANS, I DON'T BELIEVE, HAVE EVEN RECEIVED THE TRUTH AS TO WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES. FROM JUST WATCHING FROM AFAR, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THEY HAVE BEEN DENIED THE TRUTH, AND THE TRUTH IS WE HAVE DESTROYED IRAQ'S

ARMOR. AND I SEE PEOPLE DANCING AROUND IN THE STREETS STILL TALKING ABOUT A VICTORY OR STILL SAYING THAT WE HAVE SUED FOR PEACE BECAUSE WE WERE DONE IN BY SADDAM.

SO, THE FIRST THING THAT HAS TO HAPPEN IN JORDAN -- THE TRUTH HAS TO HIT THE STREETS. AND THEN -- THEN IT'LL BE TIME TO -- TO DISCUSS FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS. WE HAVE NO LASTING PIQUE WITH JORDAN. AS EVERYBODY KNOWS, WE HAVE HAD VERY PLEASANT RELATIONSHIPS WITH JORDAN IN THE PAST. BUT, I HAVE TRIED TO BE VERY FRANK WITH HIS MAGESTY, THE KING, AND WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN, POINTING OUT A CERTAIN SENSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT THAT ALL AMERICANS FEEL THAT IT -- THAT THEY MOVED THAT CLOSE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. BUT I THINK IT'S JUST GOING TO TAKE TIME, AND I CAN'T SAY HOW MUCH, BUT CLEARLY WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE A DESTABILIZED JORDAN, I HAVE NO PERSONAL ANIMOSITY TOWARDS HIS MAJESTY, THE KING, SO WE'LL JUST HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

Q SIR, WHY DO AMERICANS HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT GERMANY AND JAPAN DIDN'T CARRY THEIR WEIGHT IN THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS, AND THEY FIND GERMANY'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND SCUD MISSILE OPERATIONS PARTICULARLY ODIOUS? WHAT CAN THE GERMANS AND THE JAPANESE DO TO REHABILITATE THEMSELVES IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: FULFILL THE COMMITMENTS THAT THEY ALREADY HAVE MADE. I'M TOLD THAT THE GERMAN -- THE GERMANS HAVE ALREADY COME IN WITH A SUBSTANTIAL -- CLOSE TO 50 PERCENT OF THEIR COMMITMENT, AND I AM ALSO TOLD THAT THE JAPANESE DIET YESTERDAY APPROVED THIS DOLLAR 9 BILLION PAYMENT, AND SO I WOULD SIMPLY SAY JAPAN AND GERMANY HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS -- THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MAY OR MAY NOT UNDERSTAND THAT -- CONSTRAINTS THAT KEPT THEM FROM PARTICIPATING ON THE GROUND IN THE COALITION, BUT I HAVE TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT BOTH OF THEM HAVE STEPPED UP AND HAVE OFFERED TO BEAR THEIR SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY BY PUTTING UP SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF MONEY.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU HAVE MENTIONED IN YOUR SPEECHES THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS HELD BY THE IRAQIS. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS IN THE LAST FEW DAYS OF THEM TAKING HOSTAGES, KUWAITI HOSTAGES, ON THE WAY OUT. MAY I ASK ABOUT WHAT SEEMED TO BE BEFORE A RATHER OPTIMISTIC STATEMENT BY YOU WHY YOU THINK THEY'RE GOING TO COME TO THE TABLE TOMORROW AND DO THE RIGHT THING?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, THE QUESTION OF THIRD-PARTY NATIONALS OR KUWAITI DETAINEES WILL BE PRESENTED BOTH AT THE MILITARY MEETING ON THE BORDER AND IT IS BEING DEBATED AND PRESENTED AS ONE OF THE DEMANDS IN OUR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. I'M NOT SUE THA THAT MATTER WILL BE RESOLVED TOMORROW, THAT PART OF IT.

BUT I HOPE THAT WE SEE AN UNDERTAKING BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TO SO THAT WHICH THEY SHOULD DO, AND THAT IS TO GIVE FULL ACCOUNTING AND IMMMEDIATE REPATRIATION OF THESE PEOPLE. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THEY'LL DO IT OR NOT, BUT THERE WILL BE -- THERE MUST BE -- A FULL ACCOUNTING, AND SO WE ARE GOING TO BE WATCHING VERY CAREFULLY TO SEE OF THEY ARE RESPONSIVE TO THESE CONCERNS.

Q TO CONTINUE WITH THE RESOLUTION THAT YOU ARE PUSHING, THERE IS A CONTINUED PUSH FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, CONTINUED MENTION OF WAR REPARATIONS, IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE HOLDING OVER SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HEAD AS LEVERAGE FOR COMPLIANCE ON THE PRISONERS.

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, WE JUST WANT COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS AND COMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN DECENCY, AND THAT IS TO RELEASE THESE PRISONERS AND RELEASE THESE THAT HAVE BEEN KIDNAPPED, AND OF COURSE WE WANT THE PERPETRATORS BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

FRANK (SESNO)? INCIDENTALLY, I'M TOLD THIS MAY BE YOUR LAST APPEARANCE HERE, BUT I -- GOOD LUCK TO YOU. GO AHEAD.

Q THANK YOU SIR, I APPRECIATE THAT. MR. PRESIDENT YOU'VE TALKED A GREAT DEAL THROUGHOUT THESE MANY MONTHS AND WEEKS ABOUT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WHAT YOU WANT TO SEE HAPPEN IN A POST-WAR MIDDLE EAST.

I'D LIKE TO ASK TWO QUESTIONS. FIRST OF ALL, PROVIDED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS TOPPLED, OUSTED AND OR LEAVES THE COUNTRY, WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE ABOUT THE US HELPING TO REBUILD IRAQ? AND SECONDLY, HOW DO YOU FEEL NOW ABOUT A PEACE CONFERENCE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST TO DEAL WITH THESE LARGER ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTIONS THAT YOU SAID WOULD BE AMONG THE ISSUES ON THE TABLE ONCE THIS WAR WAS OVER?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, ON THE SECOND ONE OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OR THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF TRYING TO BRING PEACE TO THE REST OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND I WOULD SAY IT RELATES TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. IT RELATES TO THE LEBANESE QUESTION. CLEARLY, IT RELATES TO HOW IRAQ IS BROUGHT BACK INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS.

ALL OF THOSE THINGS ARE GOING TO BE DISCUSSED NOW WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS, BY JIM BAKER. WE ARE ALSO DISCUSSING IT, AS I SAID, WITH THOSE EMISSARIES THAT HAVE BEEN HERE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GERMANS DON'T HAVE FORCES, BUT THEY HAVE SOME VERY GOOD IDEAS ON HOW ALL OF THESE MATTERS CAN BE BROUGHT FORWARD. I WANT TO REPEAT MY DETERMINATION TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES PLAY A VERY USEFUL ROLE NOW IN THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THAT INCLUDES ALL THREE OF THESE CATEGORIES. AND WHETHER IT PROVES TO BE A PEACE CONFERENCE OR SOME BOLDER NEW IDEA, TIME WILL TELL. BUT WE ARE BEGINNING VERY SERIOUS CONSULTATIONS ON THIS.

IN TERMS OF REBUILDING IRAQ, MY VIEW IS THIS. IRAQ, HAD THEY BEEN LED DIFFERENTLY, IS BASICALLY A WEALTHY COUNTRY. THEY ARE A SIGNIFICANT OIL PRODUCER. THEY GET ENORMOUS INCOME. BUT UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THIS REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, THEY HAVE ELECTED TO PUT A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF THEIR TREASURE INTO ARMS, AND THEY HAVE THREATENED THEIR NEIGHBORS. AND NOW, THEY INVADED -- UP TO NOW HAVE INVADED A NEIGHBOR. AND SO IRAQ HAS A BIG RECONSTRUCTION JOB TO DO, BUT I'LL BE HONEST WITH YOU, AT THIS POINT, I DON'T WANT TO SEE ONE SINGLE DIME OF THE UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS MONEY GO INTO THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ.

NOW, YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT HELPING A CHILD, YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT HELPING DISEASE, SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE, OF COURSE THE

UNITED STATES WILL STEP UP AND DO WHAT IS HUMAN, THAT WHICH WE'VE ALWAYS DONE. LAY ASIDE THE POLITICS AND HELP THE HEALTH CARES REQUIREMENTS, OR HELP THE CHILDREN ESPECIALLY.
I MEAN, BUT NOT RECONSTRUCTION AND NOT -- THEY MUST WORK THESE THINGS OUT WITHOUT ANY HELP FROM THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER.

Q IF I MAY FOLLOW, MR. PRESIDENT, YOU'VE SAID YOUR ARGUMENT HAS NEVER BEEN WITH THE IRAQI PEOPLE --

PRESIDENT BUSH: RIGHT.

Q -- THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT SEEK THE DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ.

PRESIDENT BUSH: EXACTLY.

Q IF SADDAM HUSSEIN IS GONE AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE APPEAR TO NEED HELP BECAUSE OF THIS CRISIS IN LEADERSHIP THAT YOU SPOKE ABOUT, WHY NOT, IF NOT CONTRIBUTING --

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE'LL GIVE THEM A LITTLE FREE ADVICE. AND THE ADVICE WILL BE: USE THIS ENORMOUS OIL RESOURCE THAT YOU HAVE, FURTHER DEVELOP YOUR OIL RESOURCE AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES, LIVE PEACEFULLY, AND USE THAT ENORMOUS MONEY TO RECONSTRUCT AND DO THE VERY QUESTIONS YOU'RE ASKING ABOUT. AND IN ADDITION TO THAT, PAY OFF THESE PEOPLE THAT YOU HAVE SO BADLY DAMAGED.

THEY'VE GOT A BIG, BIG, BIG ROLE AHEAD OF THEM THERE. THAT'S THE WAY I LOOK AT IT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, TODAY YOU DECLARED AN END TO THE VIETNAM SYNDROME. AND OF COURSE WE'VE HEARD YOU TALK A LOT ABOUT THE NEW WORLD ORDER. CAN YOU TELL US, DO YOU ENVISION A NEW ERA NOW OF USING US MILITARY FORCES AROUND THE WORLD FOR DIFFERENT CONFLICTS THAT ARISE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, I THINK BECAUSE OF WHAT'S HAPPENED WE WON'T HAVE TO USE US FORCES AROUND THE WORLD. I THINK WHEN WE SAY SOMETHING THAT IS OBJECTIVELY CORRECT, LIKE "DON'T TAKE OVER A NEIGHBOR OR YOU'RE GOING TO BEAR SOME RESPONSIBILITY," PEOPLE ARE GOING TO LISTEN, BECAUSE I THINK OUT OF ALL THIS WILL BE A NEW-FOUND -- PUT IT THIS WAY, A REESTABLISHED CREDIBILITY FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. SO, I LOOK AT IT -- I LOOK AT IT THE OPPOSITIVE. I SAY THAT WHAT OUR TROOPS HAVE DONE OVER THERE WILL NOT ONLY ENHANCE THE PEACE BUT REDUCE THE RISK THAT THEIR SUCCESSORS HAVE TO GO INTO BATTLE SOMEPLACE.

Q BUT SURELY YOU DON'T MEAN THAT YOU WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO DO THIS AGAIN?

PRESIDENT BUSH: DO WHAT AGAIN?

Q YOU SAID FIRST, IF YOU THOUGHT YOU NEEDED TO.

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK THE UNITED STATES IS ALWAYS GOING TO LIVE UP TO ITS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

Q SIR, I'M STRUCK BY -- I KNOW THESE ARE SERIOUS TOPICS, BUT I'M STRUCK BY HOW SOMBER YOU FEEL -- YOU SEEM, AT LEAST HERE. AND I WAS WONDERING, ISN'T -- AREN'T THESE GREAT DAYS? ISN'T THIS -- IS THIS THE HIGHLIGHT OF YOUR LIFE? (LAUGHTER.) HOW DOES THIS COMPARE TO BEING SUCKED OUT OF THE OCEAN A COUPLE OF YEARS BACK?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, YOU KNOW, TO BE VERY HONEST WITH YOU, I HAVEN'T YET FELT THIS WONDERFULLY EUPHORIC FEELING THAT MANY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FEEL. AND I'M BEGINNING TO. I FEEL MUCH BETTER ABOUT IT TODAY THAN I DID YESTERDAY.

BUT I THINK IT'S THAT I WANT TO SEE AN END. YOU MENTIONED WORLD WAR II. THERE WAS A DEFINITIVE END TO THAT CONFLICT. AND NOW WE HAVE SADDAM HUSSEIN STILL THERE, THE MAN THAT WREAKED THIS HAVOC UPON HIS NEIGHBORS. WE HAVE OUR PRISONERS STILL HELD. WE HAVE PEOPLE UNACCOUNTED FOR.

SO I THINK -- I'M BEGINNING TO FEEL THAT THE JOY THAT AMERICANS ALL FEEL NOW IS PROPER. IT HAS TO DO WITH A NEW WONDERFUL SENSE OF PATRIOTISM THAT STEMS FROM PRIDE IN THE MEN AND WOMEN THAT WENT OVER THERE.

AND NO QUESTION ABOUT IT, THE COUNTRY'S SOLID. THERE ISN'T ANY ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT OUT THERE. THERE IS PRIDE IN THESE FORCES, A HANDFUL OF VOICES, BUT YOU CAN'T HEAR THEM.

AND SO I THINK WHAT HAPPENED THE MINUTE WE SAID THERE WILL BE NO MORE SHOOTING, THOUSANDS, HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF FAMILIES AND FRIENDS THAT SAID, "MY KIDS ARE GOING TO BE SAFE." AND I THINK I WAS FOCUSING A LITTLE MORE ON WHAT'S LEFT TO BE DONE.

BUT IT IS CONTAGIOUS. WHEN I WALK OUT OF THAT WHITE HOUSE, OR WHEN I GET PHONE CALLS IN THERE FROM OUR KIDS FROM DIFFERENT STATES, OR WHEN I TALK TO WHOEVER IT IS THAT HAVE JUST COME FROM MEETING -- THE VICE PRESIDENT'S BEEN OUT AROUND THE COUNTRY AND BARBARA HAS BEEN OUT AROUND THE COUNTRY, AND OTHERS HERE -- I SENSE THAT THERE IS SOMETHING NOBLE AND MAJESTIC ABOUT PATRIOTISM IN THIS COUNTRY NOW. IT'S THERE. AND SO I'LL GET THERE, BUT I JUST NEED A LITTLE MORE -- A LITTLE MORE TIME TO SORT OUT IN MY MIND HOW WE -- I CAN SAY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IT'S OVER FINALLY, THE LAST "T" IS CROSSED THE LAST "I" IS DOTTED.

Q BACK OF THE ROOM.

Q SO DOES THAT MEAN -- (INAUDIBLE) -- SO IT WON'T BE OVER FOR YOU UNTIL SADDAM HUSSEIN IS OUT OF --

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, BECAUSE I'M GETTING THERE. AND I'M NOT -- I'M NOT GLOOMY ABOUT IT. I'M ELATED. I -- BUT I JUST WANT TO FINISH MY JOB, MY PART OF THE JOB. AND THE TROOPS HAVE FINISHED THEIR PART, IN MY VIEW. THEY'VE DONE THEIR JOB. THEY DID IT IN A HUNDRED DAYS, THOSE GROUND -- (CORRECTING HIMSELF) -- A HUNDRED HOURS, THOUSE GROUND FORCES. AND THE AIR FORCE WAS SUPERB. AND THAT'S WHAT THE FAMILIES SENSE, THAT'S WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SENSE. BUT I STILL HAVE A LITTLE BIT OF AN UNFINISHED AGENDA.

Q SIR, YOU'VE BEEN CALLED YESTERDAY THE GREAT LIBERATOR OF KUWAIT. YOU'VE BEEN INVITED THERE. PEOPLE ARE WAITING FOR YOU THERE. WHEN ARE YOU GOING?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I HAVE NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO GO, BUT I WANT TO GO. BUT I HAVE NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO DO THAT.

BUT I WANT TO -- THIS -- THIS IS THE TRIUMPH OF THE PEOPLE ON THE GROUND. THIS IS THE GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF AND THE COALITION, GENERAL KHALID, AND THE TRIUMPH OF OUR MILITARY. SO THEY -- THEY SHOULD -- WE SHOULD -- WE SHOULD KEEP OUR FOCUS ON THAT FOR A LITTLE BIT. BUT I -- I WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO GO THERE AT SOME POINT AND TO -- TO BE ABLE TO SEE FOR MYSELF, FEEL FOR MYSELF A LITTLE BETTER WHAT OUR -- WHAT OUR SONS AND DAUGHTERS HAVE DONE.

Q WHAT ABOUT THE BIG CONFERENCE OF THE -- ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COALITION, DO YOU ENVISION THAT SOON?

PRESIDENT BUSH: OH, I DON'T -- YOU MEAN OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT? I DON'T -- I DON'T KNOW OF ANY PLANS FOR SUCH A THING AND I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE REQUIRED. THERE ARE SO MANY AND IT'S SO DIFFICULT.

Q THANK YOU. (TO REPORTER FOR YIELDING).

I KNOW YOU SPOKE LAST NIGHT WITH PRIME MINISTER BOLGER OF NEW ZEALAND. DO YOU NOW ENVISION IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THEM, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE GULF EFFORT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WHAT I TOLD HIM WAS THAT WE -- I HAVE NOT HAD A DIMINISHED FEELING OF ANY KIND ABOUT THE PEOPLE IN NEW ZEALAND. WE'VE HAD ONE MAJOR DIFFERENCE WITH NEW ZEALAND. THEY KNOW WHAT IT IS, WE KNOW WHAT IT IS. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO RESOLVE THAT BECAUSE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE NEVER WAIVERED IN THEIR AFFECTION FOR THE PEOPLE OF NEW ZEALAND. AND THIS GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF THE COALITION, AND WE'RE NOT GOING TO FORGET THAT. WE'RE VERY PLEASED WITH THAT.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, GOING INTO THE SECURITY TALKS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST, ARE YOU WILLING TO CONSIDER A LONG-TERM PRESENCE OF AMERICAN TROOPS AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, OR DO YOU THINK THAT WOULD BE BETTER HANDLED BY ARAB NATIONS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK IT WOULD BE BETTER HANDLED BY ARAB NATIONS. THERE WILL BE A UNITED STATES PRESENCE. THERE WAS BEFORE THIS. BUT THERE WILL BE -- ONE OF THE THINGS THAT SECRETARY BAKER IS TALKING ABOUT IS ALL THESE DIFFERENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. PERHAPS THERE WILL BE A ROLE FOR A UN FORCE. PERHAPS THERE WILL BE A ROLE FOR AN ALL-ARAB FORCE. CERTAINLY THERE WILL BE SOME SECURITY ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES, BUT I WOULD REPEAT HERE, I DO NOT WANT

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),@(שהבט),מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,
@(רס),אמן,בנצור,מצפא,סולטן,רביב,מעת,
הסברה,@(דוצ),@(נוה/משהבט)

סססס

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חלק 2 מתוב 2 של נר 34

TO SEND OUT THE IMPRESSION THAT US TROOPS WILL BE PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN THE GULF. I WANT THEM BACK.

SO WE'RE STILL WORKING -- WE'RE JUST BEGINNING TO WORK OUT THESE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, BUT ONE OF -- A PART OF IT WILL NOT BE A CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF US TROOPS. I'D LIKE TO SEE THEM ALL OUT OF THERE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT THERE ARE SOME SHORTER-RUN SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT I DON'T WANT TO UNDERESTIMATE.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, A QUESTION YOU MAY THINK IT IS TOO EARLY TO ANSWER, BUT I KNOW THAT A LOT OF PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES ARE WONDERING WHAT IS IN THE FUTURE FOR GENERALS POWELL AND SCHWARZKOPF. WILL YOU PROMOTE THEM?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK THAT'S A LITTLE EARLY TO ANSWER.

Q WOULD YOU CARE TO TAKE A SHOT AT IT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I DON'T KNOW -- I DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY WANT TO DO, BUT THEY'RE BIG ENOUGH TO DO ANYTHING THEY WANT TO DO, AND WE OWE THEM A VOTE OF PROFOUND GRATITUDE, AND SO WE'LL -- WE'LL TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY IN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION TO SAY ONCE AGAIN TO BOTH OF THEM, THANK YOU VERY MUCH ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BUT THEN THE -- THEIR FUTURES CAN SORT THEMSELVES OUT.

Q TO FOLLOW, SIR, THE UNITED STATES HAS GOT A TRADITION OF TAKING SUCCESSFUL GENERALS AND TURNING THEM INTO POLITICIANS. DO YOU SEE THAT HAPPENING HERE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK I WOULD DIRECT THAT QUESTION TO EITHER OF THEM, OR BOTH OF THEM. ANN?

Q YOU HAVE -- CLEARLY, THE UNITED STATES AND YOU HAVE GAINED A GREAT DEAL OF PERSONAL APPROVAL AND STRONGER APPROVAL IN THE PERIOD THAT'S -- IN WINNING THE WAR AND HOW YOU'VE HANDLED THIS. DO YOU FEEL ANY URGENCY TO USE BOTH HEIGHTENED RESPECT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND HEIGHTENED APPROVAL OF -- OF HOW YOU'VE ACTED IN THIS CRISIS TO PRESS URGENTLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OR ARE YOU MORE PRONE TO TAKE THE PRUDENT AND CAUTIOUS APPROACH AND DO A LOT OF CONSULTING AND SORT OF BUILD THAT APPROACH THE WAY YOU DID LEADING UP TO THIS CONFLICT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I -- I -- LEAVE OUT THE POLLING FIGURES, OR

THE RENEWED -- CERTAINLY, INDIVIDUALLY -- OR THE -- OR THE -- WHAT I THINK IS A NEW RESPECT AND -- FOR THE US'S CREDIBILITY. I WANT TO MOVE FAST, AND I WANT TO GO FORWARD, PARTICULARLY IN THE THREE AREAS I'VE MENTIONED -- RESOLVING THE MIDDLE EAST. AND I ALLUDED TO THAT IN A SPEECH I GAVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND NOW I WANT TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON IT -- AND I THINK I HAVE MADE THAT VERY CLEAR TO THE -- TO THE -- CAN'T HEAR YOU, ANN --

Q -- (OFF MIKE) --

PRESIDENT BUSH: NO, BECAUSE I WANT TO FINISH THAT ANSWER. I HAVE MADE THAT CLEAR TO JIM BAKER WHO TOTALLY AGREES WITH THAT. I HAVE TALKED TO SECRETARY CHENEY AND GENERAL POWELL ABOUT IT BECAUSE OBVIOUSLY THEY'LL HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE SECURITY END OF ALL OF THIS. BUT, NO, WE ARE GOING TO MOVE OUT IN A LEADERSHIP ROLE, BUT WE HAVE TO HAVE PROPER CONSULTATION BEFORE WE DO THIS.

Q YES, SIR. (LAUGHTER.) SIR, WILL YOU WORK JUST AS HARD FOR MACHINERY FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD HEREAFTER AS YOU HAVE WORKED ON THIS WAR?

PRESIDENT BUSH: YES, SARAH.

Q AND IN CONNECTION WITH THAT, WILL YOU SEE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS QUIT SELLING ARMS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I WILL WORK VERY HARD FOR PEACE, JUST AS HARD AS I HAVE IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR. AND INTERESTING YOU MENTION THE ARMS SALES. I DON'T THINK THERE WILL BE ANY ARMS EMBARGO BECAUSE WE ARE NOT GOING TO LET ANY FRIEND COME INTO A ROLE OF -- WHERE ITS SECURITY IS THREATENED. BUT, LET'S HOPE THAT OUT OF ALL THIS, THERE WILL BE LESS PROLIFERATION OF ALL KINDS OF WEAPONS, NOT JUST UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

Q MR. PRESIDENT -- THANK YOU, SIR. A FOLLOW-UP ALONG THOSE LINES. SO MANY BOXES OF AMMUNITION MARKED "JORDAN" HAVE BEEN FOUND INSIDE ABANDONED IRAQI BUNKERS IN KUWAIT. GOING BACK TO THE JORDAN QUESTION, WHAT DO YOU MAKE OF THAT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'LL BE HONEST WITH YOU -- THAT HAS NOT BEEN CALLED TO MY ATTENTION. AND I'LL HAVE TO LOOK AT THAT BECAUSE WHETHER THAT MEANS THERE HAS NOT BEEN COMPLIANCE WITH THE -- THE EMBARGO, I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T WANT TO JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS. I REALLY HAVE NOT HEARD THAT. AND IF IT WERE A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE URGENCY OR A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT, I BELIEVE I WOULD HAVE KNOWN ABOUT IT. BUT, I DON'T WANT TO COMMENT FURTHER BECAUSE I JUST DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER.

Q TO FOLLOW UP, SIR, ALONG THE SAME LINES, ARE YOU CONFIDENT NOW THAT ALL IS SAID AND DONE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT SUPPLYING ARMS TO THEIR CLIENT, IRAQ, DURING THIS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE HAVE HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN DURING THIS, THAT THEY HAVE VIOLATED THE EMBARGO.

Q MR. PRESIDENT YOU'VE SAID THAT HE TRUE CHALLENGE NOW IS

SECURING THE PEACE. DO YOU DETECT ANY CHINKS OF LIGHT EITHER ON THE ARAB SIDE OR ON THE ISRAELI SIDE WHICH REALLY WOULD LEAD TO A LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, IT'S A LITTLE EARLY BECAUSE THESE CONSULTATIONS ARE JUST BEGINNING, BUT WHAT I REALLY BELIEVE IS, IS THAT THE CONDITIONS ARE NOW BETTER THAN EVER. AND IT'S NOT SIMPLY THE RESTORED CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR EXAMPLE. THERE ARE A LOT OF PLAYERS OUT THERE, THERE'S A LOT OF PEOPLE THAT KNOW A LOT ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH AND OTHER COALITION PARTNERS ARE VERY INTERESTED IN MOVING FORWARD.

SO I CAN'T TELL YOU THAT ANYTHING SPECIFIC IN WHAT WENT ON IN THE LAST 100 DAYS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THIS, BUT I CAN TELL YOU THAT EACH OF THE PEOPLE THAT I HAVE TALKED HAS SAID "NOW, LET'S GET ON WITH THIS." AND SO, WE WANT TO DO IT, IT IS THE INTEREST OF EVERY COUNTRY THERE, IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES, IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF ISRAEL, IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. SO I SENSE A FEELING (OF) LOOK, THE TIME IS RIGHT, LET'S GET SOMETHING DONE. BUT I CAN'T TIE IT TO -- MAYBE I MISSED THE THRUST OF YOUR QUESTION -- I CAN'T TIE IT TO ANY SPECIFIC, YOU KNOW, HAPPENING.

Q DO YOU FEEL IT'S A MORE HOPEFUL SCENARIO NOW THAN IT HAS BEEN FOR SOME YEARS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THIK SO -- I THINK SO AND I'VE BEEN WRESTLING WITH THIS, YOU KNOW, IN SOME ROLE OR ANOTHER SINCE UN DAYS BACK IN '71 AND '72. AND PART OF THIS IS THE NEW-FOUND VIABILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. PART OF IT IS THAT EVEN THOUGH WE HAD SOME NUANCES OF DIFFERENCE HERE WITH THE SOVIETS, THAT THAT VETO-HOLDING POWER IS WITH US, IS TOGETHER WITH US IN FEELING THAT THERE MUST BE AN ANSWER. CHINA IS DIFFERENT THAN IT WAS IN THOSE EARLY DAYS WHEN IT FIRST CAME TO THE UN AND THEY'VE BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF THE RESOLUTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.

AND SO YOU'VE GOT A WHOLE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND I'D SAY IN COUNTRIES OUT THERE. THERE'S STILL SOME HISTORIC PREJUDICES, HISTORIC DIFFERENCES EXIST. BUT I THINK YOUR QUESTION IS ON TO SOMETHING. I THINK THERE IS A BETTER CLIMATE NOW AND WE'RE GOING TO TEST IT, WE'RE GOING TO PROBE. WE'RE GOIMG TO TRY TO LEAD TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN DO SOMETHING.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, YOU HAVE PUT TOGETHER A --

Q DO YOU BELIEVE, ONCE THE TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN --

Q YOU HAVE PUT TOGETHER A SOLID AND IMPROBABLE COALITION. WHAT WILL YOU SAY TO THOSE WHO SAY THAT IN THE LONG TERM THERE IS GOING TO BE RESENTMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD FOR THE DAMAGE UNITED STATES HAS INFLICTED UPON IRAQ?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, YOU KNOW, I'VE HEARD THAT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. THAT WAS ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WAS THROWN UP TO ME AS TO WHY NOT TO USE ARMED FORCE, WHY NOT TO -- WHY I SHOULDN'T COMMIT THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE GROUND, OR IN THE AIR; THE

ALLEGATION BEING THIS WILL CREATE RESENTMENT. THERE WERE PREDICTIONS BACK THEN THAT THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD WOULD EXPLODE IN OUR FACE AND THAT EVEN THE COUNTRIES THAT WERE SUPPORTING US IN THE COALITION WOULD PEEL OFF. DO YOU REMEMBER THE FRAGILITY OF THE COALITION DAYS?

AND THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN. AND I THINK THE REASON IT DIDN'T HAPPEN IS THAT PEOPLE IN THE ARAB WORLD COULD NOT CONDONE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INVASION OF KUWAIT. AND THEN I THINK THEY ALSO HAVE SEEN THE BRUTALITY -- NOT TOTALLY YET, BECAUSE YOU HAVE SOME CLOSED SOCIETIES THAT HAVE BEEN DENIED THE NEWS. YOU HAVE SOME WHO HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN LESS CLOSED, AND I CITE JORDAN, WHERE THE NEWS HAS BEEN DENIED OR SLANTED SO MUCH THAT THE PEOPLE HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MIND.

BUT ONE OF THE REASONS THERE HAS NOT BEEN THIS EXPLOSION THAT HAD BEEN HIGHLY PREDICTED IS THAT THAT THESE ARE DECENT PEOPLE AND THEY CAN'T CONDONE IN THEIR HEARTS THE BRUTALITY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. THEY'VE KNOWN HE WAS THE VILLAGE BULLY FOR A LONG TIME. THEY DIDN'T HAVE THE WHEREWITHAL OR THE SUPPORT TO STAND UP AGAINST IT. EVEN SOME OF THE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING HIM, THEY KNOW HE'S BEEN AN EVIL PERSON.

AND SO, I THINK THAT -- I THINK WE'RE IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE ON THIS. AND I THINK WE'VE GONE OUT OF OUR WAY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR ARGUMENT WAS NOT WITH THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ BUT WITH THIS DICTATOR, YOU SEE, AND I THINK THAT'S HELPED A LITTLE BIT. WE'VE TRIED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE CULTURE, TRIED TO UNDERSTAND AND EMPATHIZE WITH THE RELIGIOUS PERSUASIONS OF THESE PEOPLE.
BUT THERE'S NOTHING IN THERE, IN ISLAM THAT CONDONES THE KIND OF BRUTALITY THAT WE'VE SEEN FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN. SO WHEN HE WAS POSTURING AS A MAN OF RELIGION, IT CAUSED UNEASE EVEN FROM SOME OF HIS SUPPORTERS. I THINK THAT'S A REASON THAT THIS HAS NOT -- THE ARAB WORLD HASN'T EXPLODED. AND WE WILL GO THE EXTRA MILE TO MAKE CLEAR TO ALL THESE COUNTRIES THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO BE THEIR FRIEND AND THAT WE CERTAINLY HAVE RESPECT FOR THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND THEIR CUSTOMS AND THEIR TRADITIONS AND ALL OF THAT. AND THAT'S THE WAY TO HANDLE IT.

Q WHAT WOULD YOU SEE IS THE ROLE OF THE UNITED -- OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS POST-WAR (PERIOD)?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, THE SOVIET UNION IS A MAJOR, SIGNIFICANT COUNTRY THAT SHOULD BE TREATED AS WE WOULD OTHER COUNTRIES, WITH THE PROPER RESPECT. THEY HAVE LONG-STANDING KNOWLEDGE OF AND INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AND SO WE WILL DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS WITH MUTUAL RESPECT, FOR THAT REASON AS WELL AS FOR THE FACT THAT TO HAVE THIS -- THE NEW UNITED NATIONS BE VIABLE AND MEANINGFUL IN ITS SO-CALLED PEACEKEEPING FUNCTION, THE SOVIET UNION IS NECESSARY TO BE WORKING WITH THEM.

I DON'T WANT TO SEE THE UN IN 1991 GO BACK TO THE WAY IT WAS IN 1971, WHERE EVERY VOTE, WE FOUND OURSELVES -- THE UN -- PUT IT THIS WAY. THE UN FOUND ITSELF HAMSTRUNG BECAUSE OF THE VETO FROM THE SOVIET UNION, OR SOMETIMES FROM THE UNITED STATES. SO, AS WE WORK WITH THEM ON COMMON GOALS IN FOREIGN POLICY, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE GREAT

DIFFERENCES WITH THEM ON SOME THINGS -- WE'VE SPELLED IT OUT HERE ON THE BALTICS AND USE OF FORCE IN THE BALTICS AND ALL OF THAT. I WANT TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THEM, AND WE'LL TRY VERY HARD TO WORK WITH THEM BECAUSE, ONE, THEY HAVE SOME GOOD IDEAS. I NEVER RESENTED THE IDEA THAT MR. GORBACHEV
WAS TRYING TO BRING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THIS QUESTION AND I TOLD HIM THAT. I'VE SEEN SOME CARTOONS THAT SUGGESTED I WAS BEING SOMETHING LESS THAN STRAIGHTFORWARD, BUT I REALLY DIDN'T. THE TROUBLE WAS IT STOPPED WELL SHORT OF WHAT WE AND THE REST OF THE COALITION COULD ACCEPT.

SO THEY WILL BE IMPORTANT PLAYERS. AND I AM VERY GLAD, I'LL SAY THIS, THAT WE WRESTLED WITH THIS WHOLE PROBLEM OF THE GULF TODAY, YESTERDAY, WITH SOVIET COOPERATION AS OPPOSED TO WHAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN LIKE A FEW YEARS AGO IN THE COLD WAR DAYS WHEN EVERY AMERICAN WAS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY THING THE SOVIETS WANTED WAS ACCESS TO THE WARM WATER PORTS OF THE GULF.

AND SO THE PROBLEM, WHICH IS HIGHLY COMPLEX IN DIPLOMACY, HAS BEEN MUCH MORE -- MUCH EASIER TO WORK BECAUSE OF THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FIVE VETO-HOLDING POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. AND I WANT TO CONTINUE THAT BECAUSE THE UN WILL HAVE A ROLE. IT'S NOT GOING TO HAVE THE ONLY ROLE. WE'VE GOT A COALITION ROLE, WE'VE GOT BILATERAL DIPLOMACY ROLE, WE'VE GOT A CERTAIN MILITARY ROLE IN ENCOURAGING THE STABILITY OF THE GULF.

BUT THE UNITED NATIONS CAN BE VERY HELPFUL. AND THE SOVIET UNION IS IMPORTANT. AND WHEN I HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH MR. GORBACHEV OR WHEN WE HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIETS WE'LL STATE THEM; WE'LL STATE THEM OPENLY, BUT WE WILL TREAT THEM -- WE WILL DEAL WITH THEM WITH RESPECT AND WE WILL IRON OUT OUR BILATERAL DIFFERENCES. AND THEN I WILL REASSURE THEM THAT THEY ARE NECESSARY TO CONTINUE THIS MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY THAT HAS MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.

THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH.

END

תפוצה:שהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,@(שהבט),ר/מרכז,ממד,
@(רם),@(אמן),סולטן,בנצור,מצפא,רביב,
מעת,הסברה,@(דוצ),@(נוה/משהבט)

ספסס

אאאא,חוזם:799
אל:רהמש/74
מ-:בוסטון,נר:7,תא:010391,זח:1100,דח:מ,סג:בל,
בבבב
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9,035271092

בלמ/מידי

אל: מע'ת,מצפ'א,ווש,נ'י ,משרד רה'מ - (בהול לבוקר)

דע: הסברה,לע'מ,פזנר,דוברים

מאת:הקונכ'ל בוסטון

תקשורת בוסטון

1.הראיון (הבלעדי לארה'ב) עם רה'מ מתפרסם הבוקר (1) בכותרת ראשית ב'בוסטון גלוב':
SHAMIR SAYS HUSSEIN SHOULD HAVE BEEN OUSTED

הראיון עם גרינווי משתרע על פני ע' 3.עיקריו:
'ככל שסדאם יישאר בשלטון יחפש הזדמנויות להתקיפנו..תמיד יישאר אוייב'.
חברות הקואליציה שותפות לתחושה זאת 'מחפשות דרך שלא להמשיך שלטון צדאמ'.

אינו מקבל ההערכה שצדאם אינו מסוכן יותר.ניתן לבנות צבא מחדש. אם ישאר צדאם בשלטון יראו בו גבור.
'שאלת גמול (על התקפות הסקאדים) אינה קיימת,אינה חשובה.חשוב לנו לסלקם ולמנוע התקפות נוספות..
יש משהו בחשבון (עם עירק) אנשים יזכרו זאת,זה הכל'..
אין קשר בין ההתקפה על כווית לנושא הפלסטיני. התקפות הטילים לא שינו השקפתנו בענין העמק האיסטרטגי.
ירדן - בעיה לישראל ואולי 'בעיה עבור עצמה' בשל תמיכתה בעירק, אך 'אולי ישנה (המלך עמדתו) שוב'.
'ישראל מוכנה למו'מ עם כל מנהיג ערבי,עם כל ממשלה ערבית ללא תנאים מוקדמים' שאלות טריטוריאליות חלק מהמו'מ.

תושבי השטחים - רצוי 'לשים קץ לאלימות ,,אם יבואו למו'מ,,יהיו הרבה שפורים בחייהם..יותר סיכויים לשאיפותיהם בעתיד'.
סיוע מארה'ב - מעת לעת בקשנו מארה'ב סיוע בשל הצורך בכך..אין ויכוח (עם הממשל) על כסף ואין צורך 'לשלם (לישראל) עבור דבר'.
(מועבר במלואו בפקס לווש,מצפ'א ופזנר).

2.גרינווי גם מפרסם מאמר OP -ED ב'גלוב'(1) שסכומו:
אירוניה בכך שבבגדד צוהלים על הפס'א ופלסטינים בשטחים ובירדן עגומים...ראוי שיזכרו שכאשר צדאם החל במו'מ להפס'א הרי נושא ראשון שזרק היה הלינקג'..תחושתי שמכונת המלחמה של צדאם הוכנה עבור 'אם המלחמות' העתידית - עמות עתידי עם ישראל...גם ישראלים חשדו בכך לפיכך השמחה בישראל על נפילתו מהולה בידיעה שצדאם עדיין חי ומתפקד חולם ומתכנן לעתיד ישראל.

4.העמדת צדאם לדין על פשעי מלחמה מעסיקה מאוד התקשורת האלקטרונית כאן.מופיעים אקדמאים ומומחים למיניהם.

5.ב'הרלד' (1) כתבה לרוחב 2 עמודים בכותרת:
SADAM HUNTED MAN WORLD WIDE
הכל רוצים בראשו. ממשל בוש כווית,גולים,ישראל.

6.ב'הרלד' (1) מאמר מערכת - לקחי המשבר - פציפיזם ופייסנות - מדיניות לא אפקטיבית.התיידדות עם דיקטטורים גורמת למלחמות.תמיכה בדמוקרטיות יוצרת שלום'.

7.ירדן - ב'מוניטור' (27) כותרת ראשית 'ייתכן וירדן עזרה לעירק להעביר כספים ולעקוף האמברגו'.

יעקב לוי

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),ממנכל,רביב,מעת,הסברה,@(לעמ),
@(לעמ/תא),מקצב2,ר/מרכז,ממד,@(רם),
אמן,סולטן,בנצור,מצפא

ססס

U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RESOLVE GULF CRISIS
(Text: State Department fact sheet 3/1/91)

Following is the text of a fact sheet on "State Department Diplomatic Efforts to Resolve the Gulf Crisis" released by the Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs March 1, 1991:

(BEGIN TEXT)

From the time Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, until the expiration of the U.N. deadline for Iraqi withdrawal on January 15, 1991, Secretary of State James A. Baker III led a diplomatic effort to end the conflict peacefully. This effort involved extensive cooperation with the Soviet Union, the NATO allies, the European Community, our friends in the Middle East, and, most importantly, with the United Nations and the Desert Shield coalition that was formed under the U.N. mandate.

Ten Trips

Secretary Baker discussed the Gulf crisis on every trip outside Washington, D.C. between August and January -- a total of 10 diplomatic missions -- and he held many other talks in his State Department office and over the telephone.

Working with International Institutions

President Bush emphasized that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait threatened the vision of a "new world order" that could otherwise replace the "Cold War" tensions that have characterized world politics since World War II. Secretary Baker concentrated heavily upon involving the institutions that will likely characterize the "new world order" -- especially the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a NATO that includes newly unified Germany, and the European Community (EC). The CSCE, EC, and NATO condemned Iraq's aggression -- and all NATO states and many CSCE and EC countries joined the Gulf coalition.

Working With the U.N.

For only the second time in its history, and for the first time in its history, and for the first time with the Soviet Union's support, the United Nations formally authorized the use of force against an aggressor nation. Twelve U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted over a period of more than five months clearly laid out the path of peace for Iraq. These resolutions demand that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait, establish an economic embargo backed by force, and authorize the use of all necessary means to expel Iraq from Kuwait if the Iraqis did not withdraw by January 15, 1991.

Secretary Baker engaged in personal diplomacy at the U.N. to secure passage of these resolutions -- including two historic sessions that involved foreign ministers of all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council: on September 25, when the council authorized an air embargo of Iraq and the use of force to impose sanctions; on November 29, when it mandated that use of "all means necessary" to evict Iraq from Kuwait after January 15, 1991.

US-USSR Cooperation

The crisis began as the Secretary was on a diplomatic mission in Mongolia. The next day he flew to Moscow for talks with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the issuance of a joint USUSSR statement that condemned the Iraqi action. This was the first of nine US-Soviet meetings of the Gulf crisis that included talks in Washington in January 1991 after the war began.

Going the Extra Mile for Peace

On January 3, President Bush stated that he was "ready to make one last attempt to go the extra mile for peace." Therefore, Secretary Baker met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz on January 9. Even after Iraq's intransigence caused that meeting to end in failure, the Secretary held out hope for 11th-hour efforts by U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and by the EC, which ultimately were unsuccessful. At 4:50 pm EST on January 16 -some 17 hours after the U.N. deadline expired -- the coalition forces launched Operation Desert Storm to force Iraq into complying with the 12 U.N. Security Council resolutions. On February 27, 1991, President Bush announced that Kuwait had been liberated -- and offered cease-fire terms to Baghdad.

SUMMARY

-- More than 200 contacts with foreign dignitaries (bilaterals-meetings-events).

-- Six congressional appearances.

-- 103,421 miles traveled

-- 165 days between August 2, 1990, and January 15, 1991.

Trips

1990

Aug. 3: Moscow

Aug. 5-10: Ankara, Brussels (NATO)

Sept. 6-15: Jeddah, Taif, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, Alexandria, Helsinki, Brussels, Moscow, Damascus, Rome, Bonn

Sept. 26-Oct. 5: New York (United Nations and CSCE ministerial)

Nov. 3-10: Manama, Dhahran, Taif, Jeddah, Cairo, Ankara, Moscow, London, Paris

Nov. 15-26: Brussels, GTeneva, Paris, Jeddah, Sanaa, Bogota

Nov. 23-29: New York (UN)

Dec. 9-12: Houston (US-USSR ministerial)

Dec. 16-28: Brussels (NATO)

1991

Jan. 6-14: London, Paris, Bonn, Milan, Geneva, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Taif, Cairo, Damascus, Ankara, Ottawa

Meetings

Secretary Baker has held more than 200 meetings since August 2, 1991; with:

-- Soviet officials (35 meetings):

-- Representatives of every NATO member (15 nations);

-- CSCE signatories (33 nations);

-- All Gulf nations, except Iran;

-- Cuba (which, with Yemen, voted against UN Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force).

US-Soviet Gulf Crisis Discussion, 1990-91

Aug. 3, 1990	Moscow	Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Sep. 9	Helsinki	President Bush, President Gorbachev, Secretary Baker, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Sep. 11-13	Moscow	Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Sep 26-Oct 5	New York	President Bush, President Gorbachev, Secretary Baker, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Nov. 8	Moscow	Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Nov. 18-21	Paris	Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Nov. 28	New York	Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Nov. 29	New York	Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at meeting of five UN Security Council permanent representatives (China, France, UK, US, USSR)
Dec. 9-12	Houston, Washington	President Bush, Secretary Baker, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
1991		
Jan. 26-29	Washington	President Bush, Secretary Baker, Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh

(END TEXT)

NNNN

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בבבב
בלמ"ס/מיידי

אל:מצפ"א

דע:סמנכ"ל צפ"א

מאת:לש' השגריר, וושינגטון

אגרת שה"ח הועברה ליעדה.

לש' השגריר

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא

ששסס

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PHONE - 972-2-303402 - טלפון
FAX - 972-2-303367 - פקסמליה
No. - 3299 - מספר נר

מ ש ר ד ה ח ו ץ
ירושלים

מחלקת הקשר

אאאא,חוזם:38502
אל:פקס/3299
מ-:המשרד,תא:270291,זח:1136,דח:ב,סג:בל,
בבב
9,385491

בלמ'ס/בהול לבוקר

אל: לש' רה'מ - לידי דוד גרנית
פקס' 02 - 385491

הנדון: בקור סנטור ג'והן סימור

הסנטור סימור (רפובליקאי מקליפורניה) ועוזרו פאט מקקארטן ישהו בישראל מה-1/3 עד 4/3 (בבוקר).

הסנטור מונה ע'י המושל ווילסון כיורשו. הוא חבר בועדות האנרגיה, חקלאות וממשל.
סימור נחשב לרפובליקאי מתון וירוץ לבחירות ב-1992.

ק. לקונגרס בוש' קושרים הבקור מבחינתנו להצבעות הצפויות בתחום הסיוע הבטחוני והאזרחי ולאור האתגרים המדיניים שיעמדו בפנינו עם תום המלחמה.

הסנטור מבקש פגישה עם רה'מ.

מטפלת בבקור חנה דביר במאו'ר 303561 וליאורה הרצל במצפ'א 303244.

תודה על עזרתך.

מצפ'א

סססס

+ יועץ פוליטי - מורי וקסבים (יהודי)

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

28/2 1157

282000

1/2

שמור / רגיל

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

הקונגרסמן ג'ים סקסטון: עיראק לאחר המלחמה.

לאחר שחזר מביקורו בארץ שיגר הקונגרסמן סקסטון את המכתב לנשיא בוש.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

שהם קשרי רחם גשל בגלגל בעזרת הבשר

3514 INTERNATIONAL DRIVE, N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008 • TEL: (202) 364-5500 • FAX: (202) 364-5607 • TELEX: 89 604158

TAXTON
NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEES:
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND INSURANCE
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND COINAGE
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
SUBCOMMITTEES:
FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION AND ENVIRONMENT
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OCEANOGRAPHY

SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING
SUBCOMMITTEES:
HEALTH AND LONG TERM CARE
TASK FORCE ON SOCIAL SECURITY AND WOMEN

1157 2/2

February 27, 1991

President George Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Bush,

With an overwhelming victory at hand, I believe the United States should urge the United Nations to add two more stipulations to any cease fire.

First, Saddam Hussein should agree to come before an international court to be tried for war crimes. The atrocities he has committed against the citizens of Kuwait are many. As I write this letter, I am told that Kuwaiti citizens are still be executed and herded to Baghdad.

Second, the United Nations should demand the complete elimination of Iraq's terrorist capability, including the disarmament of its Scud missiles. We cannot allow a terrorist such as Saddam Hussein to hold onto his weapons of fear.

Even though are not part of the United Nations resolutions, the stipulations address hard realities which arose after the war commenced. No war criminal should go unpunished and Iraq should not be left with the capability of terrorizing its neighbors, including Israel.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

H. James Saxton
Member of Congress

REPLY TO:
☐ 324 CANNON BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20515 (202) 225-4765
☐ 115 HIGH STREET MT. HOLLY, NJ 08060 (609) 261-6500
☐ 69 SHEATWOOD VILLAGE SHOPPING CENTER WHITING, NJ 08759 (908) 350-0333
☐ 1 MAINE AVENUE CHERRY HILL, NJ (609) 428-0[illegible]

1.3.

מברק נכנס מסווג

לקבוץ עם רה"מ

אאאא,חוזם:33113
אל:רהמש/2732
מ-:ניויורק,נר:423,תא:210291,זת:1852,דת:מ,סג:שמ,
בבב
19622
שמור/מידי
103.01

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

דע: ס/שה'ח, מנהל הסברה

מאת: קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

מיודענו יו"ר מועצת ניו יורק ANDREW STEIN (מס' 2 בעיר), שהה בארץ בין ה-4.3-28.2 במלון המלך דוד בירושלים בלווית הסופר SIDNEY ZION הכותב ספר היסטורי אוהד על ישראל מטעם ISRAEL WITHUOT SHAME - SIMON AND SHUSTER. כמו כן יתלוו אליו שני אנשי בטחון. ביום א' בלילה ילונו בבית אל.

מבקש התכנית הבאה: פגישה קצרה עם ראה'מ, שהב'ט (מכיר אותו), ס/שה'ח (ידיד אישי), השר שרון (מאורגן ע'י ZION), שלמה להט (ביקור באתרים שנפגעו), יהודי בריה'מ (אם ניתן מפגש בנתב'ג עם עולים חדשים, אם לאו ביקור במרכז קליטה), תדרוך מודיעין.

שטיין מאוהדינו הקבועים והגדולים בעיר גם בימים הקשים ביותר. הוא מועמד כמעט וודאי לבחירות הבאות לראשות העיר.

קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק
אורי סביר

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,רביב,
מאור,הסברה

ססס

מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס מ ס ו ו ג

אאאא,חוזם:33121
אל:רהמש/2737
מ-:ניויורק,נר:422,תא:210291,זח:1852,דח:מ,סג:שמ,
בבב
19622
שמור/מידי
103.01

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

דע: ס/שה'ח, מנהל הסברה

מאת: קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

מיודענו יו'ר מועצת ניו יורק ANDREW STEIN (מס' 2 בעיר), ישהה בארץ בין 4.3-28.2 במלון המלך דוד בירושלים בלווית הסופר SIDNEY ZION הכותב ספר היסטורי אוהד על ישראל מטעם SIMON AND SHUSTER - ISRAEL WITHUOT SHAME. כמו כן יתלוו אליו שני אנשי בטחון. ביום א' בלילה ילונו בבית אל.

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שטיין מאוהדינו הקבועים והגדולים בעיר גם בימים הקשים ביותר. הוא מועמד כמעט וודאי לבחירות הבאות לראשות העיר.

קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,רביב,
הסברה,מאור

סססס

אאאא,חוזם:2535
אל:רהמש/168
מ-:המשרד,תא:040391,זח:1431,דח:מ,סג:שמ,
בבב
שמור/מידי
903.01

אל: יהודית דרנגר-ורנאי- קישור לקונגרס.

הנדון: המורשה תום קמפבל (קליפורניה)

1. ליוותי הנ'ל בין התאריכים 27-28 פברואר. נפגש עם רוה'מ, שהב'ט, ס/שה'ח, עם מתאם הפעולות בשטחים, יועץ ראש עירית ירושלים, וראש עירית ת'א ביקר במרכז קליטה ובאתרי נפילת הסקאדים. נפגש גם עם נציג החברה להגנת הטבע.

2. במהלך ביקורו הביע קמפבל את תמיכתו ואהדתו לישראל ולתושביה ועל כן בחר להגיע לארץ דווקא בתקופה קשה זו ע'מ להביע הזדהות. הדגיש גם שהוא המורשה היחידי מאזורו (מעוז ההתנגדות למלחמה) שהצביע בעד המלחמה.

3. בפגישות עם רוה'מ ושהב'ט הביע דאגתו מאי-הסרת איום הטילים העיראקים על ישראל ועל הצורך לספק בטחון מלא לתושבי ישראל. הביע גם את חששו מהאיום המוחשי של סוריה והתעניין באפשרות לפתיחת הדברות עם סוריה.

4. קמפבל ציין את אכזבתו מעמדתה של ירדן והדגיש שלדעתו ניתן בהחלט לפתור הבעיה הפלשתינית תוך הסתמכות על רוב הפלסטיני בירדן והפיכתה של זו למדינה פלשתינית. בהקשר הזה התעניין במעמדה הבינל'מ של ירושלים, בזכויות האדם בשטחים (אם כי לא בהבלטה כפי שניתן היה לצפות ממי שמייצג אזור ליברלי). אגב, קמפבל הוזמן לבית לחם ע'י זוג חברים ובקש להגיע אליהם או לחילופין שהחברים יגיעו אליו למלון. הבקשה נדחתה - עקב היות האיזור שרוי תחת עוצר. והפגישה לא יצאה לפועל. למיטב הערכתי קבל את הנושא בהבנה.

5. קמפבל גם התייחס בחיוב לאפשרות שתושבי איו'ש ועזה יקבלו על עצמם אחריות רבה יותר לחיי היום-יום שלהם גם כתחליף לאש'פ, ובתאום עם ארגוני הצדקה השונים הפועלים באזורים אלה.

6. להערכתו, אש'פ וירדן הם המפסידים הגדולים עקב עמדתם במהלך המלחמה לכן יש צורך במציאת תחליפים הולמים שיוכלו לנהל מו'מ עם ישראל. הביע גם את תקוותו שערב הסעודית וכווית, וכן שאר מדינות המפרץ תשננה עמדתן ביחס לישראל ויפתח תהליך של התקרבות עד כדי שלום עמן. לעומת זאת, הביע דאגתו שהפסקת האש במלחמה אין פרושה שלום מיידי וכי יש לפעול להסרה של האיום הערבי על ישראל (סוריה).

7. לאורך הביקור גילה קמפבל התענינות רבה במתרחש וגם בקיאות וידע בנושאי המזה'ת. קמפבל היה חיובי מאד בגישתו לנושאינו ובמיוחד הנושא הכלכלי (הביע בטחונו שהסיוע המיוחד אותו מבקשת ישראל אכן יאושר). בקש לדעת במה יכול לסייע לנו בגבעה. התרשם מאד מהש'פ הצבאי בין ארה'ב וישראל - שבא לידי ביטוי בעת ביקורו בסוללת הפטריוט.

8. בשיחות ציין גם שהוא בוחן את האפשרות ל'רוץ' לסנאט בבחירות 1992 כמתחרה על אחד משני המושבים המתפנים בקליפורניה. ציין שהדבר תלוי בקוניוקטורה הפוליטית במדינת קליפורניה ומי יהיו המתמודדים הנוספים.

9. לסיכום, ביקור בהחלט טוב שהיה גם בעיתוי מוצלח ביום הכרזת הפסקת האש וההכנות לביקור מזכיר המדינה בייקר (שלדברי קמפבל 'מי קרח צוננים זורמים בעורקיו גם בכל הקשור לישראל'...). האיש הביע ידידותו ומבחנו בוודאי יהיה בהצבעות השונות הקשורות בנושאנו.

אילן מור, ארב'ל 2

תפוצה:שהח,סשהח,@(רהמ),מנכל,ממנכל,בנצור,מצפא,רביב,
הסברה,סולטן,@אילנמור/ארבל2,ר/מרכז,
ממד,@(רם),אמן

ססס

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

34194 תאריך : 23.02.91

** נכנס שמור
**
**
**

חוזם:2,34194
אל:המשרד
יעדים:רהמש/2810,מצב/3952
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:459,תא:220291,זח:2029,דח:ב,סג:שמ
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

שמור / בהול ליום א'

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביקור הקונגרסמן תום קמפבל

1. היום אחה"צ, יום ו' 22/2 התקשרו ממשרדו של קמפבל והודיעו כי הוא יוצא לביקור בישראל להביע סולידריות. יגיע ביום ג' הקרוב בטיסת אל-על 008 הנוחתת בשעה 14:00. יעזוב את ישראל ביום שבת ה- 2 במרס בטיסת אל-על 103 היוצאת בשעה 21:00.

2. נושא הכספים מתואם עם איפ"ק אשר ישא כנראה בהוצאות. נודיעכם פרטים מדוייקים ביום א' טלפונית או ביום ב' בבוקר. האם המשרד יוכל להעמיד רכב לרשותו של קמפבל במשך שהותו בארץ? אנא הזמינו חדר עבורו במלון המלך דוד ו/או בתל-אביב עפ"י התכנית שתארגנו עבורו.

3. להלן רשימת הבקשות/המלצות של משרדו ושלנו:- פגישות עם שה"ח, ו/או פגישה עם ס/שה"ח ושהב"ט. פגישה עם תא"ל דני רוטשילד (קמפבל בעייתי בנושא השטחים), תדרוך צבאי על מצבה של ישראל בהקשר למלחמת המפרץ, פגישה עם עולים חדשים וביקור במרכז קליטה, ביקור באתר הפטריוט ובאתרים שנפגעו בהתקפות הטילים. פגישה עם השר מרידור (עמו נפגש כבר בעבר וגילה עניין לאור היותו גם חבר הועדה המשפטית). לידיעתכם שקמפבל קצת בעייתי בנושא הפלסטיני והתהליך המדיני וכן לא הצביע באופן חיובי בנושא ירושלים. לשיקולכם אירגון פגישה עם ר"ע בית לחם פרייג' וקיום פנל במשה"ח בנושא המדיני.
שאלו האם יש מקום לארגן גם פגישה עם שגארה"ב.

4. קמפבל רפובליקני מקליפורניה. ידיד ישראל. חבר בועדות המשפטים, חל' מדע וטכנולוגיה ובנקאות. (אין לו ענין מיוחד בביקור במפעלים. ענינו יותר פוליטי).

5. נדמה לי שלקמפבל אספירציות סנטוריאליות (קרי - מירוץ לסנאט בזמן

תאריך : 23.02.91 34194

שמור נכנס **
**
**
*:

חוזם:2,34194
אל:המשרד
יעדים:רהמש/2810,מצפ/3962
מ-:וושינגטון,נר:459,תא:220291,זח:2029,דח:ב,סג:שמ
תח:@ גס:צפא
נד:@

שמור / בהול ליום א'

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ע. לקונגרס

ביקור הקונגרסמן טום קמפבל

1. היום אחה"צ, יום ו' 22/2 התקשרו ממשרדו של קמפבל והודיעו כי הוא יצא לביקור בישראל להביע סולידריות. הוא יגיע ביום א' הקרוב בטיסת אל-על 008 הנוחתת בשעה 14:00. יעזוב את ישראל ביום שבת ה- 2 במרס בטיסת אל-על 003 היוצאת בשעה 21:00.

2. נושא הכספים מתואם עם [illegible] אשר ישא כנראה בהוצאות. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ביום א' [illegible] [illegible] ביום ב' בבוקר. האם המשרד יוכל [illegible] [illegible] לרשותו של קמפבל במשך שהותו בארץ [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

3. [illegible] פגישה עם שה"ח. ו/או פגישה עם [illegible] פגישה עם [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
האם יש [illegible]

4. קמפבל [illegible]
[illegible]

5. [illegible]

הקרוב).

6. מתנצלים על ההתראה הקצרה. אודה על כל סיוע מצידכם.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

אק

תפ: שהח(2),סשהח(1),רהמ(0),מנכל(1),ממנכל(1),בנצור(1),מצפא(4),רביב(1),
מאור(1),הסברה(3)

[illegible]).

8. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

DIM: [illegible](5),[illegible](1),[illegible](8),[illegible](1),[illegible](1),[illegible](1),[illegible](4),[illegible](1),
[illegible](1),[illegible](5)

XXXX