

1

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד ראש הממשלה

משרד

המשק בת"ק מט 10

לשכת ראש הממשלה -

ארה"ב

4/1985 - 3/1985

המשק בת"ק מט 12

מס. תיק מקורי

3

מחלקה

שם תיק: רה"מ פרס - ארה"ב

מזהה פניי: 4378/11-א

מזהה פריט: R0001g9h

תאריך הדפסה: 20/10/2022

כתובת: 2-111-1-7-9

טופס חברה גלו

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

דף 3 מתוך 1

אל: הסכרת, מע"ת, לש' מנכ"ל, יועץ רוח"ם לתקשורת, טכ"א.

לש' יגר

דף: רושניגסון

03/330

0064

תאריך חיד:

מס. סדר:

מאח: עתונות

12-011

News Summary April 3, 1985

Press Reports

1000 Lebanese Prisoners Moved to Israel

NYT-Freidman-The Israeli Army transferred more than 1000 prisoners from its Ansar detention center in southern Lebanon to Israel and is due to release 600 others today. The most violent prisoners were moved temporarily so they wouldn't obstruct the Israeli troop withdrawal. The pullout is expected to be complete by late May or early June. The released prisoners are being freed as a "good-will" gesture toward communities in the south. One Israeli soldier was killed and three others were wounded by bombs set near their vehicles. The transfer raises questions of international law. The Israeli Government never declared southern Lebanon as an "occupied area," and therefore the Fourth Geneva Convention was not operative. Technically, the detainees are not prisoners of war, but simply Lebanese civilians arrested by Israel. The IDF said the detainees took active part in terrorist activities against Israel. (see NY-LA Times-photo of prisoners in Ansar detention camp.)

NYT-AP-Amnesty International expressed concern about the welfare of what it said were 1025 people arrested by Israel troops in Lebanon since December. The organization said all but a handful have been denied access to lawyers. Many have been held for long periods and have not been told of specific charges against them.

Kidnapped French Diplomat Freed

NYT-AP-A French diplomat who was kidnapped and held for 10 days was freed in Lebanon. Peyrolles was the fourth kidnapped victim to gain freedom in less than a week. He said he was held in Syrian territory and treated well. His kidnappers said they were members of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions and "explained they are against the Israeli and against the Americans and that they wanted the liberation of their friend who is a prisoners in France." Abdul-Kader Saadi is being held in France on suspicion of involvement in the murders of an American military attaché and an Israeli Ambassador. (see NY-LA)

Battles in Sidon

NYT-special-Eight more people were killed and 12 wounded in continuing fighting in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Gov't prepared to dispatch troops to the port city.

תאריך: השולח: אישור מנהל המחלקה: תחבית:

טופס מברק גלוי

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

דפים 3 מתוך 2

סינון בטחוני:

דחיות:

תאריך חתימה: 64/12
מס. מברק: 1000

אל:

97

חמב

US Warns Qaddafi

NYT-special-The Reagan administration criticized Qaddafi of a "Pan Arab command" to carry out acts of violence against the US, other Western nations and moderate Arab regimes. The US warned that Qaddafi would be held wholly responsible for Libyan terror against the US. Qaddafi said on Sunday that "there is no alternative to confronting the enemy with violence." He praised the suicide attacks on Americans and other instillations in the region. Nimeiry said he thwarted a plot by Moslem fundamentalists, armed by Iran, to overthrow his regime last week. (see "NYT-Lathem")

Iraq to Buy French Reactor

NYT-Dan-Iraq is on the verge of buying a new nuclear reactor to replace the one destroyed by Israel in 1981. Mitterand also wants to sell Israel two reactors as a way to "politically legitimize" the deal. Peres wants the reactors but doesn't want to give Mitterand an excuse to sell the reactor to Iraq. Peres is under intense pressure from the Reagan administration not to accept the French deal. No objections have been raised in Washington over the Paris-Baghdad deal.

Carter Offer to Broker Mideast Peace

NYT-Jimmy Carter suggested that he would be called upon by Reagan to help broker a Mideast peace agreement. He said only Reagan, Shultz or a top official would have the clout to sound out all the leaders of the Mideast.

Jews of West Germany

NYT-p.2-Markham-23,000 Jews call West Germany home but they are generally not comfortable there. For the Jews in Germany there is much pain, guilt and uneasiness, especially with the 40th anniversary of the defeat of the Nazis coming up. Lately, German commentaries are stressing the bombed German cities and the refugees driven from their homes by the advancing Red Army. They dwell on the collapse instead of seeing the rise of Hitler as the collapse of Germany. Last year the number of Israelis applying for West German passports doubled to 2,000. This steady trickle of Israeli Jews has helped mask the stigma of other Jews who live in Germany. Most of the Israelis say they were drawn to Germany for economic prospects.

תאריך: _____ השולח: _____ אישור סגן המחלקה: _____ חתימה: _____

סגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: ה מ ש ר ד

$\frac{1}{2}$ 101

ס ו ג ר ד
דף...ל...מחור...ל...דפים
סוג בטחוני גלוי
דחיות מידי
תאריך וזיחאפר' 3
22:00
מס' מברק

ממנכ"ל. מצפ"א
דע: אוצר

וועדת החוץ של בית-הנבחרים אישרה היום חוספת סיוע לישראל בסך 1.5 מיליארד
דולר. (האגו גם קטל דיון מבוקר. נוסים מלאים הנכוד.
מצ"ב היינן שהיט די העלאה קטל למח נאסר, קוואטילז
והילמן.

קני-טל
קני-11

היה שם מלך מלחמה מלחמה מלחמה מלחמה

WCM460

101 $\frac{2}{2}$

[April 3, 1985]

AMENDMENT TO THE COMMITTEE PRINT (DATED 3/29/85)

OFFERED BY MR. HAMILTON

(for himself, Mr. Fascell, Mr. Broomfield and Mr. Gilman)

Page 21, line 24, before the closing quotation marks,
insert the following:

- 1 In addition to the amount appropriated by Public Law 98-473,
- 2 there are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this
- 3 chapter \$1,500,000,000 for fiscal year 1985, which shall be
- 4 available only for Israel.

*

55

2938 2828

119 ב'סיון'.....שמו.

5237-217000-018777

מחיר 11.800... אפר 85

91

הבדון : יוניפיל

לתמוך בהארכה לששה חודשים. נימוקם שאם ינסו לעשות כל שינוי הדבר יפתח פתח לדיון על המנדט וארה"ב מעוניינת להמנע מכל דיון מאחר והדבר בהכרח יביא לדיון בנושא הפריסה על הגבול הבינלאומי ועמדת ישראל ידועה בנדון.

ארה"ב איפוא תתמוך בהארכה המנדט הנוכחי תוך מינוס דיון.

סיבל



Good I bank ~~and~~ ^{Gx10} 1032 ✓ Wn/A Lend Give am me
pic pic Pn and Pinst
6

2722 2212

דעם... 2... דעם... 2...

... 2... 2...

... 2... 2...

... 2... 2...

... 2... 2...

... 2... 2...

ניו-יורק

בעתון

המשרד

20

59

85

אל: הסברה, מע"ח, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לש' רוה"מ, דובר צה"ל. דע: ניו-יורק.
רמ"ח, קש"ח

NEWS SUMMARY WEDNESDAY APRIL 3, 1985

COLUMNS:

LEBANON CAN'T BE CALLED ISRAEL'S VIETNAM

ZEEV CHAFETS BOSTON GLOBE There are three principal beneficiaries from the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon: the Israeli troops, who will no longer have to face the hatred and fanaticism of the Lebanese; the Shiite and other residents of south Lebanon who have fought the occupation; and American pundits and editorial writers who will not have to write an article entitled: "Lebanon: the Israeli Vietnam".

THE PRESS REPORTS

1,000 DETAINED LEBANESE ARE MOVED TO ISRAEL

E. WALSH WASH POST The Israeli army transferred more than 1,000 Lebanese prisoners to a detention facility inside Israel today in preparation for the closing of its Ansar prison camp in southern Lebanon on Wednesday.

FRENCHMAN, CAPTORS HELD, THEN FREED IN LEBANON

(AP) WASH POST A Frenchman kidnaped 10 days ago was freed yesterday and said today that he was kept in a Syrian-controlled territory by a group that treated him very well.

U.S. MESSAGE SENT ON CAPTIVES

D. OBERDORFER WASH POST The Reagan administration has warned Iran of unspecified serious consequences in case of a death of US hostages seized by a pro-Iranian group in Lebanon.

JEWISH GROUP SAYS EMIGRES ARE THWARTING HUNT FOR NAZIS

(AP) WASH POST More than 30 Baltic and Ukrainian emigre groups have stepped up a campaign to thwart the Justice Dept. investigation of Nazi collaborators, World Jewish congress officials charge today.

MIDEAST ARMS DEBT MAY OFFSET ECONOMIC AID

D. OTTAWAY WASH POST Israel and Egypt, which are still very much at many odds issues, have found an unusual common cause - a military burden that is forcing them to use most of the economic aid they receive from the US to make payments on previous US arms purchases.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: משרד

ס ר פ ס

דף...4...מתוך...1...דפים

סווג בסיווגי שמור.....

דחיפות.....דלוג...

תאריך וז"ח 1100, 3. אמריקא

מס' מברק...70

אל: מצפ"א

סיוע חוץ- בחשך למבקש למדן 57

לדעתי אין צורך בתיקון בנושא מילונת ומענקים.

התיקון הקודם מכסה מילונת שקיבלנו בעבר דבעתיד איננו מתכוננים לקבל מילונות.

חלפריץ

שרה רחמי נחש מ/א 366-6 אורח
אורח

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: משרד

ס ר פ ס

דף...1...מתוך...1...דפים

סוג בטחוני. שמר.....

דחיפות.....רגל...

תאריך וז"ח 1100, 3. אמרזל 5

מס' מברק...70

אל: מצפ"א

סיוע חוץ- בהמשך למבקש למדן 57

לדעתי אין צורך בחיזוק בנרשא מילדות ומענקים.

החיקון הקודם מכסה מילדות שקיבלנו בעבר דבעתיד איננו מתכוננים לקבל מילדות.

חלפריץ

שרה רחמי מנחם אל (בה' 66) אל 37
אדמו

(3)

עגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

ס ו ס
דף... מתוך... דפים
סוג בשחובי
דחיפות... רגיל
תאריך וז"ח - 104 3 אפר' 85
מס' מברק... 69

אל :- משפט, מצפ"א

עצורי אנצאר

שוחחתי עם קרצ'קו. הסברתי לו עמדתנו (כפי שהבנתי מהעתונות). חגיב שמתכוונים להוציא הודעה שהדבר סותר את האמנה הרביעית אך גם יתיחסו להצהרתנו שבדעתנו לשחרר רוב האנשים לאחר השלמת הנסיגה.


ס ב ל

למה זהה שהם חתם מ/מט מפרטו משפ ר/מץ מאז רמ א/מ
(יוזר אבנו)

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

בלמים

אל: המשרד, נד: 101, מ: 111
 דח: מ, סג: ב, תא: 030485, ח, ב, יח: 2200

בלמס/מיידי

אל: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א.

דע: אוצר.

מאת: קני-טל עס וושינגטון.

וועדת החוץ של בית-הנבחרים אישרה היום תוספת סיוע לישראל
 בסך 1.5
 מיליארד דולר. האשור בא בסוף דיון מרתוני. פרטים מלאים
 בנפרד.
 מצ"ב התיקון שהוגש ע"י המידטון בשמו ובשם פאססל, ברומפילד
 וגילמן.

(APRIL 3, 1985)

AMENDMENT TO THE COMMITTEE PRINT (DATED 3/29/85)

OFFERED BY MR. HAMILTON

(FOR HIMSELF, MR. FASCELL, MR. BROOMFIELD AND MR. GILMAN)

PAGE 21, LINE 24, BEFORE THE CLOSING QUOTATION MARKS,

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

INSERT THE
FOLLOWING:-

1 IN ADDITION TO THE AMOUNT APPROPRIATED BY PUBLIC LAW
98-473,

2 THERE ARE AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED TO CARRY OUT
THIS

3 CHAPTER 1,500,000,000 DOLLARS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985,
WHICH SHALL BE

4 AVAILABLE ONLY FOR ISRAEL.

קניימל

תפ: שהח, דהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, משפט, ר/מרכר, ממד, דרורר,
14 צר

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

200

נכנס

שמוד

(2)

אל: המשרד, נד: 95, מ: 11
דח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 030485, וח: 1620

שמוד/רגיל

אל:מצפ"א. מ"ד.

סודאן - משיחה עם ריצ'ארד בוגוסיאן נהמח' למזרח אפריקה ב-
3.4-1 (NEA)

ביקור נמיירי

1. פתח ואמר שנמיירי בא לבדיקות רפואיות נהיום א ולזכות בתמיכת ארה"ב במשטרו. יי התמונה בניי טיימס'י נשלו ושל רייגן א מספרת את כל הסיפור של הביקור יי. לשאלתי ביצר נכרך נושא הסיוע הכלכלי והודעת הנשיא על שחרור הסכומים המוקפאים אמר שהדבר לא נקלח בחשבון בעת שהביקור תוכנן לפני מספר חודשים. השיחות עם נמיירי היו בזר'בי טובות הגם שתאר אותו כאיש צבא נוקשה ובעל אופי יימתוספס של איברי'.
2. הנושא הכלכלי אמור היה להסגר עוד בביקור בוש בחירטום סגן הנשיא הודיע לנמיירי חד וחלק, שלא קבלת תנאי הקרן במלואם לא יחודש הסיוע. במעמד זה ייצג בוש את הגורמים הבינ"ל המסייעים לסודאן. יתר על כן, בניגוד למצבים דומים בעבר עת נפנף נמיירי באופציה של הסיוע הערבי, עתה התברר לו שדווקא אלה (הסעודים) נמנים עם בעלי הקו הנוקשה התובעים ממנו ביצוע הרפורמות הנדרשות לפני כל דבר. מסתבר שנמיירי אכן נתן הסכמתו לבך אלא שנותר פער בין מה שמובן היה ליטול על עצמו לבין מה שתבעה הקרן. פער זה נסגר סופית ביום בואו לווז'ינגטון.
3. הנושא הקשה עבור הסודנים היה ענין ביטול הסובסידיות נמיירי התברר פה שמצרים מסבסדת את מוצרי היסוד בב-2 ביליון דולר בעוד שסודאן רק בחצי סכום זה. נמיירי חייב עתה לשפל ב-3

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

- נושאים: טנין הבצורה והטברת הפליטים מדרתה, ביצוע הדפודמות הכלכליות (נה- IMF) הקימה ועדת מעקב לשם כך (טנין הדרום בוגוסיאן רואה בבעית הדרום את הבעיה בה' הידיעה, לבעיה שני פנים: התמיכה מבחוץ - אחיופיה, ופער העסדות והניגוד האישי בין נמירי למנהיגי המורדים, כל הנסיונות לקרב או להפגיש בין השנים נכשלו.
4. המהומות בחידמות ויציבות המשטר. אפיין את 3 ההפגנות כך - הראשונה התפרצות ספונטנית, השנייה נוצלה בידי גופים שמאלניים אמנם מעטים אך שולטים באיגודים המקצועיים החשובים - דופאים, מהנדסים וכו' וכן בקרב האינטליגנציה, השלישית (היום) היתה הגדולה ביותר בין 20-10 אלף איש וגם המבחן התמור ביותר עבור נמירי עד כה. עמידתו בלוי' של הביקור, למרות שהאמדיקאים נטו לגרום שיקצר וישוב הביתה עדות לתמיכה, הגם שלא מברעת בנמירי. מספר גורמים פעלו לטובתו: ראשית, מסתבר שסגן הנשיא שולט בעניינים ונאמן למשטר. ב. נמירי דאג שלא לערב את הצבא אלא אך ורק כוחות הבטחון בטיקד משמרה (בוגוסיאן מציין שמחבנתם דומה לזו של המשטר הלאומי בארה"ב) שגילתה יעילות מרובה. ג. ואולי לא פחות חשוב, האחים המוסלמים למרות טימותם עם המשטר נמנעו מלשיף עם הגורמים השמאלניים. נמירי הפגין בצורה קצת יוצאת דופן לשליט אפריקאי שהוא שולט בעניינים גם מרחוק. מכל מקום הדגיש בוגוסיאן העימות הפנימי שדם הסתיים. החשש הוא שמה ההפגנות ייצאו משליטת כוחות הבטחון.
5. המרה"ת. הנושא כלל לא עלה פרט לכך שנמירי יצא ידי חובה כשאמר שצריך (ארה"ב) לעשות משהו לטובת הפלס' ושהוא יחמוך בהחלטות הדוב הערבי. שלל הפרסומים על שיחות גישוש לעבר קדאפי ושיחסיו עם מצרים הדוקים כשהיו. בוגוסיאן מעיר בהקשר לזה שמובארק יותר זהיר במחויבותו לנומירי מאשר סאדאת בזמנו.
- אלי אבידן . =

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

266

נכנס

סודי ביותר

מחור 4
מחור 32

דף 1
עותק 4

(11)

אל: המשרד, נד: 100, ט: 110
דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 030485, זח: 1845

סודי ביותר/מיד

אל: שר החוץ

מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מנהל מצפ"א
הנדון: ארנס - שולץ

היום 3 אפר' נפגש השר ארנס עם המנכ"ל שולץ. נכנס: ארנ'
דפאל, פיל ווילקוקס, השגריר רוזן, סיבל.
לכונן

שולץ: סיפר על המצב החמור בלונדון והוסיף כי יש להץ מהקונגרס
להוציא משם בכלל את נציגות ארה"ב אך שולץ מתנגד לכך והטי"ר כי
ברטולומיו הינו גיבור אמיתי. הסכים לדברי ארנס כי למעשה אין
ממשלה בלונדון והוסיף כי אם הסכם ה-17 במאי היה מתקיים הדברים
היו נראים אחרת.
ארנס: מי שמוע קיום ההסכם במונח היו הסודים. הטרור נמשך
נגדנו כיום אך אין מאחורי זה כל הגיון לאור התלכדותו לסגת.
שולץ: ברטולומיו מעריך שהסיבה לטרור נגדכם נעוצה בתחרות
פנימית לסנהיגות בקרב העדה השיעית. במונח מסויים השיעיים
אינם מפצים בעריבתם.

ארנס: אכן אין לשיעיים מנהיגות המקובלת עליהם להבדיל מהדוריים
איתם ניתן להגיע להסכמים. בתשובה לשאלת שולץ על הצפוי ש
השיב כי אנו חוששים שמעשי הטרור עלולים להמשיך גם לאחר
הנסיגה. יתכן שבחירת המזרחית אשר עד עכשיו הייתה שקטה יפתח
טרור באמצעות אנשי אבו-מוסה בעידוד סודי. בגלל אופי
האובלוסיה המעורבת במזרח אין לצפות לפעילות שיעית משם.
התקוה היחידה טבורנו הינה, כפי שרביץ הביט אותה שהאובלוסיה
השיעית תקלוט את המסר שהטברנו להם על אי כדאיות פעולות טרור.
אך בסיכום איש אינו יכול לצפות מה יהיה בלונדון.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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מחור 4

דף 2

סודי ביותר

מחור 32

עומק 4

איראן - עיראק

שולץ: סיפר שטריק עדיין היה אצלו לפני שבוע וסיפר שעיראק מתנגדת להצעת איראן להפסקת אש חלקית. לדעת העיראקים יש לחתוך לסיום המלחמה והפסקת אש רק יוריד הלחץ מהאיראנים.

ארנס: מה היתה תגובת העיראקים לנושא השימוש בגזים?

שולץ: אני העלתי הנושא עם טריק עדיין אך הוא בכלל לא הגיב, לא התווכח, למעשה התעלם מהעדות. ביציאה ממסמך כאשר נשאל על ידי עתונאים הגיב שהוא לא זוכר שאני העלתי את זה. ארנס: מעניין מה היה קורה עם לעיראקים היתה עדיין היכולת הגרעינית שהתחילו לפתח.

שולץ: מדאיג אותנו מאוד נושא לוחמה כימית. דווקא בנושא הפירור הגרעיני יש התקדמות. לפני מספר שנים דיברו על כך שלב-20 מדינות תהיינה יכולות גרעינית אך לא כך התפתחו הדברים כיום. יאנשים מעריכים שרק לישראל ולהודו יש יכולת ובנוסף לכך ברזיל ופקיסטאן ARE FUSSING AROUND THE EDGES.

בנושא המלחמה הכימית יש אומנם הסכמה כללית האוסרת שימוש בדבר אך המצב מדאיג. המצרים סיפקו לעיראקים טכנולוגיה בנושא. קשה לייצר נשק גרעיני אך קל יותר לייצר נשק כימי. הצלחנו עד עכשיו לעבוד בצורה טובה עם הסובייטים על נושא הפירור הגרעיני ואני מקווה שנוכל להתקדם בנושא הנשק הכימי.

במקביל לעזרה המצרית לעיראק ידוע לנו גם על עזרה סורית לאיראן.

ארנס: יש ליכור עם זאת שאם לא היו נלחמים אחד בשני יתכן והיו נלחמים במקום אחר. בימנו כוונות המפרץ רעו מפחד. מורקיה

שולץ: היה אצלי אוזל והוא מרשים. הוא הצליח לקיים יחסים טובים הן עם עיראק והן עם איראן.

דוון: היינו מבקשים שתעלה איתו יחסי ישראל-מורקיה. שולץ: אכן הוצע לי לעשות זאת.

דוון: דבר ספציפי שהיו יכולים לעשות הינו העלאת הדרך של

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 4
מחור 4 מתוך 32
סודי ביותר

היצוג הדיפלומטי שלנו מצלם הם הורידו את הייצוג עד לדרגת מזכיר שני.

שולץ: אני מוכן לעלות זאת. אם ישראל תהיה מחוץ ללבנון ביוני המועד יכול להיות נוח לשורקים לתת אות חיובית על ידי העלאת דרג הייצוג.

נפג

שולץ: סיפר שהסטודים חשים בחריפות את ירידת מחירי הנפט ומקמינים את דרישות מטבע החוץ שלהם. גם הסובייטים סובלים מירידת המחירים ותקנות ארה"ב שגם הלובים יחתילו להגיש זאת. הוסיף שבישיבת שגרירי מרית שהתכנסה נזכרו שבפגישה הקודמת ב-31 היה ברור להם שלחה דברים שלטון השאח ימשיך, לא תהיה עוד מלחמה ישראלית-ערבית, ומחיר הנפט לא יעלה יותר מ-4 דולר לחבית. מאז ארה"ב החליטה לא להיות נביאים במרית.

יהדות ברה"מ

ארנסט: שאל לגבי סיכוי העליה.

שולץ: להערכתנו עם שיפור היחסים עם ברה"מ אנו עשויים לזכות בתגובת לבקשתנו בנושא. אנו תמיד מעלים זאת איתם וזה הועלה גם בפגישה סגן הנשיא עם גורבצ'וב אשר הגיב בועם כי ארה"ב מפרה זכויות האדם במדינות אחרות. ארה"ב תמשיך לשמור את הנושא על סדר היום שלה. ארה"ב תמשיך לתת לפתיחת קונסוליה בקייב ואם היא תפתח הדבר עשוי לעזור לקהילה היהודית. בתמורה הסובייטים מבקשים קונסוליה בניו-יורק וארה"ב מסכימה לכך והם גם רוצים לחדש טיסות אירופיות. בתשובה לשאלת ארנסט השיב כי קמפלמן עושה עבודה מעולה בג'נבה אף כי עדיין מדברים שם על נושא פרוצדורה. הוא בטוח שקמפלמן ידע איך להעלות מידע פנים את נושא זכויות האדם.

התפתח דיון קצר על אופי המפלגה הדמוקרטית כאשר המזכיר הגיע אמונו בדמוקרטים מאסכולת סקוף ג'קסון.

כלכלת ישראל

בתשובה לשאלת ארנסט הסביר המזכיר שממדת ארה"ב הינה לסייע לישראל להסדיר את בעיותיה הכלכליות. זוהי גם מטרת הרב סטיין וסטנלי פיישר.

ביקור המזכיר בארץ

המזכיר ציין שהוא בא לישראל במאי מטעם הנשיא על מנת לציין

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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ס' בל

90 : שנה, דהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ד/מנכל, ד, אמן, מפצמ, קידד

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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85 100 - 017H: 11710 1985

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78576, פ' 11' 22' 00, השגד' 1717, ס' 71.

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* * * להוציא ממנו בכלל חם וצ"א ומה' חם שולל סתם לומר והח' ב' * *

*#07161718 11' 712' 713' 01307 7177 0178 719805 1'N

*ממשלה בלון והוסיף כי אם הסכם ה-17 במאי היה מתקיים הדברים **

1978 01 17

* * * מ' שמוע קיום ההסכם בליל ה'ו הסודי'ם . הסודי'ם

*** 11741 ב' 01 מ' מ' 11741 ב' 01 מ' מ' 11741 ב' 01 מ' מ' ***

* * * : ברגלולמ'ו מטר'ך שהסיבה לרגל'ך בבס'ו וס'ה ברח'ח

** 19 ימים למנהיגות בקרב העדה השמיעית . במובן מסוימים השמיעים **

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宗 宗

#מדרגים: אבן, א"ן, לשיטתם מנהיגות המקובלת עליהם להודיע מהדדיותם:

* * * * * 1957 ל' ז' תשנ"ז

* * * * * אנו חוששים שמעשי הטרוגר שליליים להטות את האחר

*הנ"ס"גה. יחבן שבתז'ת המזדז'ת אשר עד שבז'י הי'תה שקטה י'תת

* * * 7771 7770 7771 7770-12N 7771 7770 7771 7770

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התקלה היחידה שבוצעה, 93'17"17, 14'14"17, 17'17"17

*החשיטית תקלומ את המסד שהטברנו להם על אי בדאיות פטולות 777

* * * * * וְסִיכּוּם אִישׁ אִינוֹ יָכוֹל לִפְנוֹת מֵהַ יְהוָה בְּלִבּוֹן .

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 4
 עותק 8 מתוך 32
 סודי ביותר

איראן - עיראק

שולץ: סיפר שמדיק טריו היה אצלו לפני שבוע וסיפר שעיראק
 מתנגדת להצעת איראן להפסקת אח חלקית. לדעת העיראקים יש לחתור
 לסיום המלחמה והפסקת אש רק יוריד הלחץ מהאיראנים.

אדנוס: מה היתה תגובת העיראקים לנושא השימוש בגזים?
 שולץ: אני העלתי הנושא עם טריק טריו אך הוא בכלל לא הגיב,
 לא התווכח, למעשה התעלם מהערת. ביציאה ממסמך באשר נשאל על
 ידי עתונאים הגיב שהוא לא זוכר שאני העלתי את זה.
 אדנוס: מעניין מה היה קורה עם לעיראקים היתה עדיין היכולת
 הגרעינית שהתחילו לפתח.

שולץ: מדאיג אותנו מאוד נושא לוחמה כימית. דווקא בנושא
 הפירור הגרעיני יש התקדמות. לפני מספר שנים דיברו על כך
 שלכ-20 מדינות תהיינה יכולת גרעינית אך לא כך התפתחו הדברים
 כיום יאנשים מעדיכים יי שרק לישראל ולהודו יש יכולת
 ובנוסף לכך בדויל ופקיסטאן ARE FUSSING AROUND THE EDGES

בנושא המלחמה הכימית יש אומנם הסכמה כללית האוסרת שימוש בדבר
 אך המצב מדאיג. המצרים סיפקו לעיראקים טכנולוגיה בנושא. קשה
 לייצר נשק גרעיני אך קל יותר לייצר נשק כימי. הצלחנו עד
 טכניו לעבוד בצורה טובה עם הסובייטים על נושא הפירור הגרעיני
 ואני מקווה שנוכל להתקדם בנושא הנשק הכימי.

במקביל לעזרה המצרית לעיראק ידוע לנו גם על עזרה סורית
 לאיראן.
 אדנוס: יש ליכוד עם זאת שאם לא היו נלחמים אחד בשני יחבן והיו
 נלחמים במקום אחר. בימנו ביכור לך מדינות המפרץ רעדו מפחד.
 סורקיה

שולץ: היה אצלי אוזל והוא מרשים. הוא הצליח לקיים יחסים
 טובים הן עם עיראק והן עם איראן.

דוון: היינו מבקשים שתעלה איתו יחסי ישראל-סורקיה
 שולץ: אכן הוצע לי לשחות זאת.

דוון: דבר ספציפי שהיו יכולים לשחות הינו העלאת הדג של

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מחוז 4 סודי ביותר
עותק 8 מחוז 32

הייצוג הדיפלומטי שלנו מצלם הם הורידו את הייצוג עד לדרגת
מזכיר שני.

שולץ: אני מוכן לשלוח זאת. אם ישראל תהיה מחוץ ללבנון
ביוני המועד יכול להיות נוח למורקים לתת אות חיובית על ידי
העלאת דרג הייצוג.

נפח

שולץ: סיפר שהסטודים חשים בחדיפות את ירידת מחירי הנפט

ומקצינים את רזרבות מאבט החוץ שלהם. גם הסובייטים סובלים

מירידת המחירים ותקוות ארה"ב שגם הלובים יתחילו להרגיש זאת.

הוסיף שבישיבת שגרירי מז"ת שהתכנסה נזכרו שבפגישתם הקודמת

ב-37 היה ברור להם שלחה דברים שלטון השאה ימשך, לא תהיה עוד

מלחמה ישראלית-ערבית, ומחיר הנפט לא יעלה יותר מ-4 דולר

לחבית. מאז ארה"ב החליטה לא להיות נביאים במז"ת.

יהדות ברה"מ

ארנס: שאל לגבי סיכוי העליה.

שולץ: להערכתנו עם שיפור היחסים עם ברה"מ אנו עשויים לזכות

בתגובת לבקשתנו בנושא. אנו תמיד מעלים זאת איתם וזה הוטלה גם

בפגישת סגן הנשיא עם גורבצ'וב אשר הגיב ברעם כי ארה"ב מפנה

זכויות האדם במדינות אחרות. ארה"ב תמשיך לשמור את הנושא על

סדר היום שלה. ארה"ב תמשיך לתת לפתיחת קונסוליה בקייב ואם

היא תפתח הדבר עשוי לעזור לקהילה היהודית. בתמורה הסובייטים

מבקשים קונסוליה בניו-יורק וארה"ב מסכימה לכך והם גם רוצים

לחדש מיסות אירופיות. בתשובה לשאלת ארנס השיב כי קמפלמן עושה

עבודה מעולה בג'נבה אף כי עדיין מדברים שם על נושא פרוצדורה

הוא בטוח שקמפלמן ידע איך להעלות מידע פעם את נושא זכויות

האדם.

התפתח דיון קצר על אופי המפלגה הדמוקרטית כאשר המזכיר הביע

אמונו בדמוקרטים מאסכולת סקוף ג'קסון.

כלכלת ישראל

בתשובה לשאלת ארנס הסביר המזכיר שצמרת ארה"ב הינה לסייע

לישראל להסדיר את בעיותיה הכלכליות. זוהי גם צמרת הרב סטיין

וסטנלי פישל.

ביקור המזכיר בארץ

המזכיר ציין שהוא בא לישראל במטעם הנשיא טל מנח לציין

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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* * * : שנה חמישה עשר, מנכ"ל, מנכ"ל, ד"ר/מנכ"ל, אמן, מצפון, קיד

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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דף 1 מתוך 2

עונת 7 מתוך 34 סודי ביותר

אל: המשרד, נר: 30, מ: 1105
 דח: ד, סג: מ, תא: 020485, נח: 1030
 נד: ארה"ב-תהליך השלום

סודי ביותר/רגיל

אל:ממיד, ביניל 1

ארה"ב -תהליך השלום

שלכם 9

1. בשלי 204 ציינתי את שתי הגישות המתרועעות בממשל בסוגיית תהליך השלום -
 א. הגישה המסורתית הערבית - המעמידה את הנושא הפלסטיני במרכז המאמצים. המצדדים בגישה זו סבורים שיש להכיר בעקרון של הגדרה עצמית עבור הפלסטינים ולהדבר עם ערפאת כמוהיג הפלג המתון באש"ף.
 ב. הגישה השנייה, מבקשת לנפנף בלפי ערפאת "באשליית ההכרה" ובכדי להניעו לתת אור ירוק לחוסיין להצטרף לתהליך המדיני.
 שעה שחוסיין מצטרף לתהליך השלום יש להפנות תגב בלפי ערפאת.
 אסכולה זו אינה מעוניינת להעניק הכרה עצמית לפלסטינים. גישה זו רואה בחוסיין שחקן בלעדי.
 2. איפא"ק רואה מספר בעיות עם הגישה השנייה בסטיף בי' דלעיל:
 א. הערבנים בממשל מצטרפים למצדדים בגישה המודרנית השנייה אולם משחקים משחק שונה מהם והוא תמיכה בהכרת ארה"ב באש"ף.
 ב. דיבורים על אפשרות הכרה באש"ף של ערפאת יגרמו, בסופו של דבר, חיכוכים בין ארה"ב לבין ישראל.
 ג. הממשל מחייה את ערפאת כשחקן שעה שהוא בשיא חולשתו. עיי' החיאת ערפאת סיכויי חוסיין לנהל מו"מ עם ישראל פוחדים במקום לגדול.
 ד. המשחק הדו-משמעי המקופל בגישה השנייה מקנה יתרון למי שמנוסה יותר במשחקים כפולים כאלה. ערפאת נוקט בפל לשון זה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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** שנים רבות וקיים חשש מוצדק שגם הפעם יצליח לתמרן הממשל להכרה **

** 1. אני תקווה שההכרות אכן הועילו הפעם **

** קני-טל. = **

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** תפ: שהח, רהט, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכי, רס, אמן, הצפא, משפט **

** תח: ממד בינל/1 **

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

דף 1 מתוך 2
עותק 4 מתוך 34

אל: המשרד, נד: 30, מ: 111
דח: ר, סג: מ, תא: 020485, נח: 1030
נד: ארה"ב-תהליך השלום

סודי ביותר/רגיל

אל:ממיד, ביניל 1

ארה"ב -תהליך השלום

שלכם 9

1. בשלי 704 ציינתי את שתי הגישות המתרוצצות בממשל בסוגיית תהליך השלום -

א. הגישה המסורתית הערביסטית - המעמידה את הנושא הפלסטיני במרכז המאמצים. המצודים בגישה זו סבורים שיש להכיר בעקרון של הגדרה עצמית עבור הפלסטינים ולהזכר עם ערפאת כמנהיג הפלג המתון באש"ף.

ב. הגישה השנייה, מבקשת לנפנף כלפי ערפאת 'באשליית ההכרה' בכדי להניעו לתת אור ירוק לחוססין להצטרף לתהליך המדיני. שעה שחוססין מצטרף לתהליך השלום יש להפנות הגב כלפי ערפאת. אסכולה זו אינה מעוניינת להעניק הכרה עצמית לפלסטינים. גישה זו רואה בחוססין שחקן בלעדי.

2. איפא"ק רואה מספר בעיות עם הגישה השנייה נסעיף ב' דלעיל

א. הערביסטים בממשל מצטרפים למצודים בגישה המורכבת השנייה אולם משחקים משחק שונה מהם והוא תמיכה בהכרת ארה"ב באש"ף. זיבורים על אפשרות הכרה באש"ף של ערפאת יגרמו, בסופו של דבר, חיכוכים בין ארה"ב לבין ישראל.

ג. הממשל מחייה את ערפאת כשחקן שעה שהוא בשיא חולשתו. עיי התייאת ערפאת סיכויי חוססין לנהל מו"מ עם ישראל פותחים במקום לגדול.

ד. המשחק הדו-משמעי המקופל בגישה השנייה מקנה יתרון למי שמנוסה יותר במשחקים כפולים כאלה. ערפאת נוקט בפל לשון זה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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**שנים רבות וקיים חשש מוצדק שגם הפעם יצליח לתמרן הממשל להכרה
 **בו
 **אני תקווה שההבדלות מכן הועילו הפעם
 **קנ"ט-טל. =

***תש"פ: שהת, דרהם, שהבט, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, ר/מנכ"ל, רס, אמך, מצא, מצא

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** יציא

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

אלו ווט, נרו: 47, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 020485, זח: 1200

שמו/מ"ד

השגריר.

הנוקר מסרנו טלפוןית לשגרירות ארה"ב את אסכמת הממשלה
למיון מר THOMAS PICKERING בשגרירה החדש של ארה"ב
בישראל. כן בקשנו הצעת מועד לפרסום הודעה רשמית בו זמנית,
בישראל ובארה"ב.

לידיעתך.

טקס. =

תפ: שהח, דהמ, מונכ, ממנכ, מצפא, טקס, יגר, מעת

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

טופס מברק גלוי

אל: משגר רח"מ

רע:

מאת: השגריר, נאו"מ

ר: _____ מתוך _____

סיכום בסחונני:

דחיפות:

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תאריך ח"ח:

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מס. סדר:

לשכת
הקשר

לשכת רח"מ

העברנו מכתב רח"מ לשגריר קירקסטריק.

לשכת השגריר

23

דפים 4 פתוח 1

אל: המברק, פק"ח, לש' ממנכ"ל, יועץ רוח"פ לחקשורה, מבצ"א.

סינון בטחוני:

לש' יגד

רמ"פוח:

דף: ורשינגטון

021300

תאריך ח"ח:

הערה
הקשר

8:00

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מס. מברק:

מאח: פחונות

News Summary April 2, 1935

Press Reports

Carter on Mideast

NYT-Mohr-Former President Carter said that new peace negotiations could be built on the "tremendous amount of common ground" in positions already held by Israel, Arab Governments and Palestinians. He criticized Reagan for not exploiting the opportunities. He applauded Reagan's 1982 peace initiative but said there was no follow-up. Carter believes that "US involvement in Lebanon left the Soviet Union and Syria as dominant in the region. He also thinks the US must become involved in talks with Arafat. (see ND-Owens)

US Cautions Iran on Americans Seized in Lebanon

NYT-p.1-Gwertzman-The "US warned Iran it will suffer consequences if Americans held in Lebanon are executed. There is concern that Shiites holding Americans will kill them. The US believes that Iran has close connections with the Shiite extremists in Lebanon.

Abducted Dutch Priest Slain in Lebanon

NYT-A7-The body of a missing Dutch priest was found in the Bekaa valley. Rev. Nicholas Kluiters disappeared March 14. A note was found in his car that he was taken by the Vengeance Party, a previously unknown group. He had worked in Lebanon for 20 years. (see D1-A7)

Fourth Jew is Abducted in Lebanon

NYT-special-Unidentified gunmen abducted the head of Lebanon's Jewish community on Sunday. Ishan Sassoun worked for a Lebanese company. He was the fourth Jew abducted in the last three days. There are about 100 Jews in West Beirut.

Lebanon Sends Soldiers to the South

NYT-Hijazi-The Lebanese Gov't prepared to dispatch more troops to southern Lebanon in an effort to halt two weeks of clashes around Sidon. The fighting has claimed 40 lives and left 40,000 homeless. Pro-Israeli Christians are blamed, in the press, for provoking the violence.

טופס מברק גלוי

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

דפים 4 2

שיווג בטלפון:

דחיות:

תאריך ח"ח:

מס. מברק:

36/8

לשכת
הקשר

אל:

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מאמ:

NYT-special-The 19 nations involved in UN peacekeeping have told the UN Secretary General that "serious security risks" are facing their soldiers in southern Lebanon and are causing "increasing concern." The Israeli withdrawal from the south and the intensified fighting have raised questions about the effectiveness of the UN forces in Lebanon.

Palestinians-Israelis in Lebanon

NYT-AP photo of Palestinian woman carrying child past Israeli soldiers near Tyre.

US Releasing Aid for Sudan

NYT-Boyd (Photo n.1 of Nimeiry & Reagan) The Reagan administration moved to help Sudan by releasing \$67 million in US assistance that had been withheld while Washington pressed the Sudanese Gov't for a series of austerity measures. The administration is satisfied that Sudan's actions have been sufficient. Riots have occurred in Sudan due to the strict austerity recently imposed.

NYT-Reuters-Sudanese authorities have arrested leading doctors and lawyers and charged them with anti-government activity. Doctors and lawyers have called for a national strike to seek political change and protest police brutality in quelling recent food riots.

Iran-Iraq

NYT-AP-Iraq said its jets raided Iran's capital for the 13th time in 13 days. Iranian officials said the attacks would not drive the Gov't to the negotiating table. Iran said in retaliation jets bombed Iraqi military and economic installations in Meidan. Heavy casualties were reportedly inflicted on both sides.

NYT-Scioline-Cuellar said he would not visit Iran and Iraq because Iran had refused to state it would discuss all aspects of the war.

NYT-special-The brother-in-law of Massoud Rajawi, the Paris based leader of the People's Mujahadeen, was executed in a prison in Teheran.

Mideast Hijacking Ends

NY-AP-A hijacker commandeered a Middle East Airlines jet with 76 people

תאריך: השולח: אישור מנהל המחלקה: תחית:

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דף מס' מחור

שיווג בטחוני:

דחירות:

36/8 תאריך חידוש: 1978
מס' מברק: 1978

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aboard but surrendered to authorities in Jidda. No one was hurt. The hijacker demanded money for the Lebanese National Resistance Front.

Jews Assail Book on Passover

NYT-The Jewish Welfare Board's Book Council and other major Jewish Organizations have protested the release of a new children's book about Passover calling it misleading because it includes a painting of Jesus at the Last Supper and violates what the Council calls the traditional holiday story. The book's publishing house is the largest publisher of Bibles in the country.

Garbage in Egypt

WSJ-p.1-Seib-Nearly everyone's garbage is disposed of in a strange way in Cairo. Egyptian peasants guide 1,600 donkey carts and pick up garbage. They then sort through it for valuables. Tons of refuse is tossed into the streets daily. The era of the garbage truck may be around the corner. The peasants are reluctant to give up their donkeys.

Grand Rebbe of Lubavitch to be Honored

NYT-Clarify-The 33rd Birthday of Menachem Schneerson will be celebrated today in the Caucus Room at the Russell Senate Office Building. Sponsors of the event include Jim Wright of Texas and majority leader Robert Michael of Illinois.

Letters

NYT-Rabbi Alexander Schindler writes that journalists who choose to enter the war zone in Lebanon, in defiance of clear warnings, take a fearsome risk.

Arabists in Washington-Magazine Articles

The Nation-3/30-Bird and Holland-Now that "moderate" Arab leaders are flooding to Washington, the voices of the so-called Arabists can be heard again. A memorandum written by Henry Sizer, who served in Tunisia, Yemen and Oman exemplifies Arabist thinking, which like the Palestinian problem, hasn't changed much over the years. The report was written in 1972 and states: "One has to conclude that the most active Palestinian leaders are unlovely people who don't deserve to be acknowledged cordially.... Just as the Zionist movement in the international context... led irresistibly to an independent Israeli state, the logic of

טופס מברק גלוי

החלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

דפים 4 מתוך 4

סיכום בטחוני

רשימות:

תאריך חידוש: 36/8
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second half of the century dictates there will be an independent Palestine.

Israel-China-Arms

*** The Nation-Bird and Holland-Once a strong supporter of the PLO, Beijing has become a customer of Israel's largely gov't-owned arms industry. There are reports of 200 Israeli advisors in China. Any commerce between the two countries has major foreign policy implications, particularly for the balance of power between China and the USSR. Both the Chinese and Israeli Embassies in Washington deny that sales have taken place. It is believed that the arms were "laundered" through Hong Kong. No objections have been raised in Washington but some in the Pentagon are disturbed by Israeli technology, much of it of US origin, is being supplied to "good" communists.

ITOMUT

המסמך נמצא בלתי בטוח + 17
מסמך

תאריך: 2-4-77 השולח: 7577 אישור פנהל המחלקה: חתימה:

המסרד

.....54..... מס' מברק

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אל: המשרד

..... 53 מלכות אלהי' בע' מברק

דע: אוצר

סידע ליטראל

חת ועדת מזה"ת בועדת החוץ של הבית קיימה פגישה סגורה עם וואליס (מחמ"ד, ביל שניידר (מחמ"ד ופרופסור סטיין. מצ"ב עדותו של סטיין בעת הישיבה, וסיכום של חילופי הדברים במהלך הישיבה.

קני-טל

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RE: Initial report on Foreign Affairs Subctme. Closed hearing

I heard the following information:

1. Undersecy of State Wm. Schneider testified rather than Undersecy. Wallis due to schedule conflict AND Herb Stein.
2. Tomorrow before Foreign Ops. Subcmte. Schneider, Treasury Deputy Secy Mulford, Stein, and Stanley Fischer will testify with prepared statements that will be available.
3. At today's closed hearing, Schneider and Stein asked the subcmte. to defer action on the supplemental "until our dialog has further progressed." They asked Congress not to short-circuit their efforts. Stein argued for the need for benchmarks in certain areas particularly on budget.
4. There was little argument if any about Stein's assessment of Israel's economic problems and the need for changes.
5. The disagreements were more about timing. Larry Smith in particular said why delay further, Israel really needed the money, its reserves were running out, etc. And that working the supplemental legislation thru to the floor could easily take six weeks, so the Admin. would have more time in which to continue talking with Israel.

But witnesses said that if the U.S. were to announce its intent to go ahead with the full supplemental now, that would be counterproductive and the current sense of emergency would be undermined.

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Statement of

202/862-5899

HERBERT STEIN

to

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

April 2, 1985

I appear here today as a private citizen. Although I am a consultant to the State Department on the economy of Israel, I do not represent the views of the Department or of the U.S. Government. The opinions I express on the problems of the Israeli economy and on the policy options are my own.

For several years the economy of Israel has been on an unsustainable course. It has been a course that depended for its continuation on a large and increasing flow of foreign loans and grants that will not in fact continue indefinitely. The only question is when and how painfully this course will end. The policy issue for Israel is how to end it in an orderly and constructive way, a way that will set the country on a path of renewed growth. The policy issue for the U.S., I take it, is how to help Israel do that.

This unsustainable economic process begins with extremely high government expenditures. There is some confusion in America about the size of Israel's budget, because their accounting system is unlike ours. But, on definitions similar to ours, government expenditures excluding the military imports for which the U.S. paid and excluding debt repayment were about 60 percent of Gross National Product in the last

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fiscal year. Even excluding all defense costs, domestic as well as foreign, expenditures were almost 50 percent of GNP -- compared with less than 30 percent for federal, state and local non-defense expenditures here.

This large budget cannot be financed by taxes. Israel is already at or very close to the point where further increases of tax rates would reduce, not raise, the revenue, although there may be some small room for raising additional revenue by tax reforms. So Israel runs large budget deficits. In the fiscal year that has just ended, the deficit was more than ten percent of GNP, even after deducting the amount of U.S. military and economic aid from the deficit.

As a result of large deficits, the public debt held by Israelis has reached a level where little more debt can be sold, in present economic conditions, in the form of ordinary marketable debt that is not indexed for inflation or for the exchange rate of the shekel. In fact, the Government expects to have to make substantial net repayments of domestic bonds [as well as of some foreign loans] in the new fiscal year.

The government is therefore forced to borrow from the Bank of Israel, the central bank, which in turn raises funds by creating money or assets very similar to money. The excess demand caused by the large deficits financed in the way may not show up fully and immediately in a rise of the inflation rate in Israel. Since Israel is a very open economy, having trade and capital flows with the outside world that are large relative to her economic size, the excess demand may appear at first as an excess demand for imports or for foreign assets [including U.S. greenbacks]. But this runs down the reserves and forces the

government to devalue, which raises the domestic price level. Because of their frequent experience with large devaluations and inflation, Israelis are unwilling to hold money in its ordinary forms, except in very small quantities, and hold most of their liquid assets in forms that are linked to the exchange rate or to the price level. Largely for this reason, but also because of the wage indexation system and the accommodating nature of the monetary policy, devaluations do not serve to reduce real internal demand. Therefore the excess demand originating in the budget translates into a loss of reserves. This generates the threat of a crisis and increases the need for U.S. aid.

This process has serious costs, for Israel and, as a consequence, for the U.S. It creates a high level of uncertainty, anxiety and struggle over economic policy within Israel. It creates excessive dependence on foreign sources of loans and grants. Most important, it has destroyed the vigor of the Israeli economy, which only a few years ago was growing remarkably. It has diverted the energies of the people to coping with an inflation that can surge to a rate of 1,000 percent a year, discouraged foreign direct investment, and encouraged the wasteful absorption of labor in the public sector because financing by money-creation made it seem cheap. If Israel could have continued the growth rate of 4 or 5 percent a year that it had a few years ago, instead of lapsing to zero, the gains to Israel would have far exceeded the value of all U.S. aid.

As far as I can see, there is little disagreement either in Israel or among informed observers here about the need to stop this process or about the steps needed to do that. The indispensable measure is a substantial cut in government expenditures. Along with this should come

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reforms in the financial structure and policy that would permit the monetary system to resist inflation rather than accommodate it. Beyond that there will need to be a reduction of marginal tax rates and a general freeing-up of the economy.

Some steps have been taken. The most important was the adoption last week of a budget for the fiscal year 1985-86 that would reduce expenditures and the deficit below the actual level of 1984-85. That was accompanied by an Act designed to prevent budget over-runs unless they had the approval of the Government. Some measures to make the public's financial assets less liquid have been adopted.

But there is a long way to go. Even on the crucial matter of the budget there has only been a tentative start. The budget for the fiscal year that just began is highly vulnerable. There are many points at which the expenditures may exceed the budgeted amounts and revenues may fall short. Moreover, to stop the unsustainable rise in government debt relative to the GNP there will have to be further expenditure cuts next year. And there has been only a beginning towards establishing an anti-inflationary monetary policy.

I do not have to elaborate for this Committee the difficulties of doing what Israel must now do. We have our own experience on how hard it is to agree to cut expenditures even where there is universal agreement on the need for cutting. And we also have experience with the reluctance of governments to accept the temporary adversities that go with stopping inflation, including unemployment, even when it is known that much worse consequences will result from allowing the inflation to continue. But we also know that contrary to common cynicism about



politicians around the world, they are capable of making hard decisions when that is absolutely necessary.

The Government of Israel is now trying to develop the needed program. The question for the United States is how it can help. I believe that additional temporary economic aid from the U.S. can make a useful contribution as a supplement to an adequate Israeli program. Solution of the Israeli economic problem requires a shift of labor into production for export out of government and other employments. If there is an Israeli program for effecting this shift, U.S. aid can provide a little more time for accomplishing it and make the process a little easier.

But U.S. aid cannot be a substitute for an effective program and should not precede its adoption. A decision to provide supplemental aid before the program has been established can only weaken the sense of urgency about developing the program. Initiation of the needed program would be deferred, possibly until some future crisis. For the U.S. to encourage this would not be helpful to Israel.

I do not think it will be sufficient, either for its own policy processes or for its external relations, for the Government of Israel simply to announce a program, however promising the program may be. Steps for assuring execution of the program should be taken, and milestones designated for measuring performance. For example, as the Minister of Finance of Israel, Mr. Modai, has suggested, quarterly targets could be set for carrying out the annual budget.

In cognizance of such a program, with plans for its execution, the U.S. might provide supplemental aid with some confidence that it would be temporary. Such aid should, in my opinion, be disbursed in

installments in the light of evidence that the program which justified it was being carried out. There should be continuing close working relations between economic officials of the two governments, and that will require a good understanding from our side of the nature of their problems and from their side of the nature of our interests. As I have been able to observe the cooperation of the two sides in discussing economic policy in the past year, I believe that the basis for such understanding exists.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו

המשרד

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ד.ד. מתוך ... 4 דפים

סוג בסחובי... שקל...

דחיפות. מיד?

תאריך וז"ח. 2.8.85

מס' מברק... 52

אל :- ממנכ"ל , מצפ"א

דע :- האוצר

סיוע לישראל

מצ"ב תשובות הממשל לפניות חברי הקונגרס מק - קיין וביל גרין בנושא הסיוע.

קני טל 11.11

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 25, 1985

Dear John:

This responds to your letter of February 19, 1985 in which you express your concern about delays in the Administration request for an economic assistance package for Israel.


As you know, the Administration has worked very closely with the Government of Israel and its experts in pursuit of a program for economic reform which would ensure the effectiveness of whatever special assistance the U.S. is able to provide. Throughout these protracted discussions, we have had very much in mind just the kinds of concerns that you mentioned.

We had an excellent round of meetings with Israeli Finance Minister Modai, at the end of which we decided together to try to construct an agreed framework for economic performance with which Israel would be comfortable and which could give us confidence that our aid would have the desired constructive effect. To this end, a round of intensified discussions is already underway.

In the meanwhile, I am pleased that the Administration is going ahead with a request for FY 86 ESF for Israel in the amount of \$1.2 billion, and I can assure you that we will continue to approach this complicated problem in the most realistic way we know how.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable John McCain
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 28 1985

Dear Mr. Green:

The Secretary has asked me to respond to your letter of February 27, 1985, in which you and your colleagues urge the Administration not to delay any longer in submitting a request for FY 86 Economic Support Funds and for extraordinary assistance in the form of an FY 85 supplemental.

We of course share your concern for the security and economic well-being of Israel. Our request for \$1.8 billion in FMS assistance for FY 86, an increase of \$400 million over FY 85, is one reflection of this concern. We believe this level of assistance will meet Israel's military needs and help it maintain its qualitative edge in military capability over potential aggressors.

On the economic side, we have been concerned for some time by the steady deterioration in the Israeli economy. The decline in reserves which you cite has been evident since 1983 and is, together with the high inflation, the most tangible evidence of the need for Israeli economic reforms. Since the July 1984 elections we have stepped up our discussions with the Israeli Government in order to help Prime Minister Peres and his new unity government address the economic challenge through a comprehensive economic program that would deal effectively with the fundamental imbalances in the Israeli economy.

The Israeli Government has taken a number of steps to stabilize the economy, and we are impressed by the leadership Prime Minister Peres has demonstrated. However, the continuing fall in reserves suggests strongly that further efforts will be necessary if the Israeli Government is to develop a program that can achieve its goals and if additional U.S. assistance is to have a durable effect.

The U.S. has repeatedly indicated its willingness to provide additional extraordinary assistance in support of a comprehensive Israeli economic program. As a result of the recent visit of Israeli Finance Minister Modai, we have now intensified our dialogue with the Israelis, and we hope that this will lead to agreement on an approach in which additional U.S. assistance could be associated with an effective Israeli program. Pending the outcome of these discussions, we intend to defer a request for an FY 85 supplemental. In the meantime the Administration supports regular ESF for FY 86 for Israel in the amount of \$1.2 billion.

The Honorable
Bill Green,
United States Senate.

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We appreciate the Congressional desire to deal with the question of assistance to Israel as expeditiously as possible, both out of concern for Israel's welfare and stability and the FY 86 Congressional budgetary timetable. We are hopeful that the delay on the question of an FY 85 supplemental will be short and appreciate your continued patience and understanding.

Sincerely,



J. Edward Fox
Acting Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

טגרירות ישראל - וויזינגטון

אלו

ש.נ.ס. ש.נ.ס.
ד.ד. 9...מחוד...ד.ד. 9...דפים
טווג בטחוני
דחיסות
מאריך וזימ
50...מכר

למשתתפים הפלסטינאים. אותו גורם עיתונאי מעיר שערפאת עשוי לא לפסול אפשרות של משלחת כזו בתנאי שהמדובר באישים בעלי זיקה לאש"פ כן שהוא ^{יוכל להציג} את התהליך כדיאלוג למעשה בין אש"פ וארה"ב. אגב, המקורות הנ"ל הפחיתו באפשרות שהמדובר בגורמים פלסטינאים בעלי אזרחות אמריקאית אלא באישים מהאזור עצמו.

אלי אבידן

. /c/c

שבירות ישראל - וויסניגסון

2739 2812

97.....מחור.....97

.....גלוי.....

.....ללל.....

מחירך ודמי. 021700. אמר 85

.....מחירך

קטחין
49

המשרד

מל:

46

מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, מע"ח. רמ"ח קט"ח

בהמשך ל-40 - תדרון מחמ"ר 2.4.85

Q Do you have any reaction yet to Colonel Khadafy's call for a kind of Pan-Arab group of terrorists to overthrow the moderate governments in the region?

MR. KALB: As a matter of fact, I do have something on that. The world cannot tolerate the lawlessness and terrorism which Khadafy so openly advocates. He should know this, and be aware, that Libya will be held accountable for its actions. Our own views on terrorism and Colonel Khadafy are well known. He will hold Khadafy fully responsible for Libyan terrorism against Americans and other U.S. interests, whether carried out abroad or in the U.S. Likewise, we will continue our consultations and cooperation to assist governments threatened by Libyan aggression.

Q Is this swift and effective retribution here, Bernie?

MR. KALB: I'm not going to define anything beyond what I've said.

Q In light of this, has there been any increased security at U.S. installations abroad?

MR. KALB: I think whatever steps are usually taken in circumstances that warrant any increase in alert will be taken. But I have nothing by way of any specific reply, to tell you what embassies will, in fact, be doing.

—UJL

המחירך ודמי. 021700. אמר 85
מחירך
מל:
המשרד
קטחין
49
46
2.4.85
בהמשך ל-40 - תדרון מחמ"ר

מל: המשרד

...35... פתח

דע: לשכת ראש הממשלה - ד"ר נ. נוביק, א. נויבך. לשכת שר התחבורה. מנכ"ל אוצר.

אל - יל

ביום חמישי התנהלו דיונים ברוח טובה וחלה התקדמות, ביום שישי חלה נסיגה בעמדתה"ל-על
בשתי נקודות:

(א) הם מוכנים לקבל בחזרה את כל העובדים, פרט לשבעה העובדים ביחידה שהועברה להפעלה בידי קבלן - משנה. (ב) מנהל "אל-על" בניו יורק שניידר חודיע שאל-על איננה מוכנה לבררנות רסעיפית שושארו לא - מוסרתיים, לטענתו, "אל-על" הייתה מוכנה לבררנות רסעיפית

החזרת העובדים ששבתו, אך לאחר שויתרה בנושא הזה אין היא מוכנה לבוורות בנושאים אחרים. כשהוצג בפניו מברקו של קיסר לקירקלנד אמר שניידר כי מברק זה אינו מחייב א "אל-על" (לידיעתכם): מברק זה בא לאחר שיחת קיסר - הרלב, ובעקבות מכתבו של בלום לראש הממשלה ושיחת חנן בראון עם ליין קירקלנד).

המכונאים פנו בבקשה רשמית לקבל את התחלטה בעניין חרם על ישראל. קן יונג מסר לי כי קירקלנד מחוץ לעיר ועד שובו בעוד ימים מספר לא יעשה דבר. לדבריו, כל שהמכונאים דורשים הוא מימוש ההבטחות שקבלו מאתנו, באמצעות קירקלנד: (1) החזרת כל העובדים ללא יוצא מן הכלל. אם יש צורך בצמצומים, הרי הם יעשו אחרי החזרת לעבודה על פי ותק או על ההליכים הקבועים בהסכם העבודה. (2) מסירת השאלות האחרות לבורו לדברי המכונאים לקראת סיום הדיונים ביום חמישי, נסתמנו 5-6 נושאים עיקריים שיש להעבירם לבורות.

למוחר להוסיף כי דברי שניידר טוב פוגמים באמינות שלנו כלפי קירקלנד, ומורגשת כבר עייפות בלשכתו.

אנא, חשובתכם ופעולתכם המהירה. הנ"ל גם על דעת דן הלפרין.

21

מה שהיה אצלנו ביום זה
 היה אצלנו ביום זה
 היה אצלנו ביום זה

3 7 3 8 2 2 7 8
 97.....מסוד.....דשים
 1000 גמנוני...גלוי
 1000.....דמימות
 85.021600.021600.021600
מס' 1000

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 47

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 40

מצפ"א, ממכ"ל, מע"ח, רמ"ח קטיח
 תדריך דובר מחמ"ד 2.4.85

Q Anything today on the Israeli aid situation?

MR. KALB: No, I haven't anything on that question.

Q Do you have any comment on this report coming from Israel that a harsh dispute has erupted between the United States and Israel over the contents of broadcasts to be transmitted to the Soviet Union via the Voice of America relay station to be built in Israel?

MR. KALB: I have nothing on that.

Q Have you got anything on the Ben-Veniste (?) report? You said you might have something.

MR. KALB: Nothing. Apparently they have not yet seen the exact report and so up until they actually do a fine scrutiny, I have nothing for you.

מחנך

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

2 באפריל 1985

240

שמור

אל: ממנכ"ל ח. בראון

מנהל מצפ"א א. בנצור

יועץ ראש הממשלה ד"ר נ. נוביק

מנהל המח' לקשרים בינ"ל בהסתדרות א. אלון

השגריר מ. רוזן

מאת: דניאל בלור, ושינגטון

הנידון: המפלגה הדמוקרטית וקירקלנד

מתוך שיחות עם אישים שונים בהנהגת ה - AFL - CIO: הערכות פסימיות לגבי סיכויי הדמוקרטים לכבוש את הרוב בסינאט ב - 1986 ואת הנשיאות ב - 1988, אלא אם כן תחול תפנית רצינית לרעה במצב הכלכלי. המפלגה הדמוקרטית אינה מצליחה להפיק לקחים מן הכשלון ב - 84, ואילו הרפובליקנים כבר מתארגנים לעבודה בשטח - רישום מצביעים חדשים וחברים חדשים, לא מתבלט במפלגה הדמוקרטית מועמד טבעי שיצליח להניע את המפלגה לכיוון מרכז - קצת ימינה מן המרכז בענייני חוץ, הגנה ומיסוי וקצת שמאלה מן המרכז בענייני חברה. קנדי מתחיל להשמיע רמזים על מועמדות, ומאבק קנדי - קומו - הארט בתבלין ג'יסי ג'קסון לא יחזק את תדמית הדמוקרטים, מאבק כזה גם ימנע התלכדות האיגודים המקצועיים סביב מועמד מוסכם. לפי הערכת בני שיחי רייגן מיעד את בוש כיוורשו, ואם רייגן יישאר פופולארי, כי אז קשה יהיה לעצור בעד בוש. "כרטיס" של בוש ואשה - ג'ין קירקפטריק או אליזבת דול יהיה אגוז קשה עבור הדמוקרטים. (אגב, בראיון ב - "Meet the Press" הכחישה קירקפטריק כל כוונה לרוץ מול הסנטור מתיאס במרילנד, אך השאירה אופציות פתוחות לגבי מרוץ לסינאט או לסגנות הנשיא).

ב ב ר כ ה,

דני בלור

Իսկ ըստ Գրեյսի միջոցով հայտնի է, որ

1/20/85
T.V.
Lough
3/12

April 1, 1985

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of the
State of Israel
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you sit down to the seder dinner, please accept my best wishes for the Passover holiday. The festival of unleavened bread is symbolic of freedom and redemption -- themes close to the heart of peoples of all faiths. On this occasion let me say that I am gratified by the warmth and strength of the relations that our two nations currently enjoy. I look forward to continuing close cooperation as we strive to meet the great challenges before us. Mrs. Shultz and I wish you and Mrs. Peres a very happy holiday.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

George P. Shultz

1/1/85 - 103/17

T.V.
be-ly
3/12

April 1, 1985

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of the
State of Israel
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Please accept my best wishes on this Passover holiday. The triumph of liberty over tyranny symbolized by the Jewish exodus is a shining example to freedom-loving people everywhere. This time of remembrance brings to mind the common values and traditions that bind our two nations, and it is a fitting occasion to reaffirm our steadfast commitment to the security and well-being of Israel. Mrs. Reagan joins me in wishing you and Mrs. Peres the happiest of Passovers.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald Reagan

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4926

NY

שומר

חל: 11/11/73, נר: 43, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 010485, רח: 1930

(6)

שומר/מיידי

סייבר

דע: מנכ"ל ממפנים

בפגישה עם ברו, נספח כלכלי בשגארה'ב, בהשתתפות שוקרון ואלסטר
נדונו הנושאים הבאים:

א. אגני החמצון: דו"ח EPA על המתקן היירדני בעקבה למעשה
גמור, ואין בו המלצה להירי את המתקן למקום אחר. הדו"ח על
המתקן הישראלי עדיין בשלבים המוקדמים ביותר. לדבריו מבקר
הדו"ח את המתקן שלנו התולך ונבנה 5 ק"מ צפונה מאילת, בטענה
שהוא אינו מספיק ויהיה OVERLOADED כמעט מידיו ברו הוסיף
שהרופא שבמשלחת EPA העלה בדו"ח את הסכנה התברואתית
שקיימת היום מהזרמת חומר ביוב לתוך מפרץ אילת במרחק של
כ-200 מהגבול. לדבריו זה יכול להביא למחלת HEPATITIS, מחלה
שמתגלית רק בעבור 8-12 שבועות. הואיל ושאלת היות המתקן
היירדני אינה מתעוררת, הם נוטים להתייחס ל- CONTINGENCY
MEASURES למנוע מצבי שפיכה או משברים. אם כי היירדנים אינם
מובנים בכלל לשקול אפשרות של פעולה משותפת בלשהי עם
ישראל, שוקלת המשלחת, לדבריו ברו, את האפשרות של מערכת צנרת
'סודית' בין שני המתקנים כמעין BACK UP הדדי למקרה של
סכנת שפיכה.

ב. תחנת הכוח: העלינו את חששותינו לגבי סכנת ריחום הים והאוויר
מתחנת הכוח היירדני, ובמיוחד לאור הזדמנות נפט מדציף במפרץ של
התחנה. ברו לא ידע דבר על התחנה והבטיח לפנות אל הגורמים
השונים, כולל שגרירותם ברבת עמון כדי לקבל פרטים
בנדון. הודענו לו, בצורה בלתי פורמלית, שהובא לידיעתנו דו"ח של
IMO על הסכנות האקולוגיות הכרוכות בהקמת תחנת

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

הכוח, וכי הדו"ח מצביע על ליקויים חמורים מאד. בהקשר לזיהום האויר, העיר ברו כי העשן מרציף האשלג הידדני במפרץ מייק לאלמוגים הוסיף כי הארכת קו הרכבת על ידינו לאילת כדי לאפשר ייצוא אשלג מנמל אילת תגרום גם היא לזיהום האויר.

ג. צינור הנפט ירדן עיראק: מלבד שמועות על תיווה מצד חברת בכטל לא שמע דבר.

ד. העברת טכנולוגיה/מחשבים: מסר כי החבר לאמריקנים -לאחר שהותיר המחשב ארצה-כי אין המדובר אלא בכבלים למחשב וחלקי חילוף ובעצם דוב מהומה על לא מאומה. שאלנוהו מה יקרה אם תתבע אותנו חברת לדג על ההפסדים -השיב שזו בעיה בן מסר כי קבל הנחיות מווינגטון שבסוף אפריל מתכוונת לבוא לארץ משלחת בכירה כדי לדון בענייני הרחבת טכנולוגיה מתקדמת בייקד

הפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, דס, אמן, משפט, מצפא, ממד

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שמו

אל: ווש, נר: 937, מ: המשרד
 דח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 310385, וח: 0930

שמו דגיר

למדן

חוק סיוע חוץ לשלך 653, 202

1. לרשימת התיקונים יש להוסיף גם את זה המאשר לישראל שימוש במענקים לפני השמוש במלוות (שלך 202 עמ' 5)
2. האם התוספת IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SO REQUEST בתיקון הלבית לא יוצר פתח לבעיה? האם הבקשה מצד ישראל צריכה, לפי נוסח זה, להיות מוגשת בצורה פורמלית או האם עצם השימוש מהווה ניצול הזכות לבקש? אם האפשרות השניה תקפה אולי כדאי להחליף המלה REQUESTS ב- DESIZES זאת על מנת למנוע את האפשרות לפרשנות שלפיה יש כאלו דרך בבקשה נפרדת

מצפא

תפ: שהח, דהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, דרורי, אוצר, כלכליתב

SECRET

"DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
AND I JUST MET THE FIRST ETHIOPIAN JEWS WHO ARRIVED
ON THE AMERICAN AIR FORCE PLANES AT RAMON AIR FIELD.
) WHEN OUR HELICOPTER LANDED WE SAW THEM LYING ON THE
GROUND AND KISSING THE HOLY LAND.

) 3. ALL OF US ARE DEEPLY MOVED AND VERY GRATEFUL FOR
YOUR MOST UNFORGETTABLE EFFORTS TO SAVE THE LIVES OF
THESE PEOPLE.

) 4. ON BEHALF OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE,
I WANT TO EXPRESS OUR HEARTIEST THANKS TO THE PRESIDENT,
) TO YOU, AND TO THE U.S. AIR FORCE FOR CONCLUDING
SO GRACIOUSLY OPERATION MOSES. SIGNED: SHIMON PERES"

סגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

ה מ ש ר ד

ס ו ס ס ס ב ר ק

דפ... 1... רמ"מ

סווג בטחוני... שמור

דחיפות... רגיל

תאריך וז"ח... 1645

מס' מברק... 24

מצפ"א.

סנט: סיוע לישראל - תיקון הלבאי.

משיחה עם מייק קראפט:

- א. לשון התיקון אכן דו-משמעית. להערכתו, אין צורך בבקשה פורמלית, אך ממילא אם תרצה ישראל להשתמש בכספי הלבאי, תצטרך לבקש אותם בצורה זו או אחרת.
- ב. מאוחר מדי לשנות לשון התיקון כי כך התקבל במהלך ה- mark-up.
- ג. לעומת זאת ניתן לרכז לשון דו"ח הוועדה (שקראפט מכין כעת). רצ"ב גטיוטל הרשאות שלו המתייחסות לתיקון הלבאי ולישראל בכלל.

למדן

ולמ"מ 3/3

להחיות את האנשים האלה... 3

(DRAFT)

for FMS section by section insert

(Last year's sec. 210)

24 $\frac{2}{8}$

SECTION 210 INSERT

ISRAELI FMS-LAVI

Section__ contains the Administration request of \$1.8 billion in FMS grants for Israel and includes an amendment authorizing a portion of the funds to be used for helping Israel develop and produce its new jet fighter plane, the Lavi. The amendment offered by Senator Boschwitz, is virtually identical to the measure the Committee approved last year on a motion by Senator Percy. The amendment allows \$150 million to be used for research and development in the United States and \$250 million for R & D and production in Israel for the Lavi. This amendment slightly modifies the version passed last year and contained in the fiscal year 1985 Continuing Resolution by stating that the funds would be used for the Lavi if the government of Israel ^{SO DESIRES} ~~represents~~. This ^{GIVES MORE FLEXIBILITY} ~~is merely~~ in the case the government of Israel decides to stretch out the program or for other reasons such as emergency requirements, decides to use the funds for the regular FMS program.

It is the Committee's belief that the support for the Lavi program, which the new government of Israel is continuing, will help assist the Israeli economy and security and this is in the overall U.S. national interest.

*

Israel

24 3
1

Israel's efforts to deal with its economic crisis and the intensive discussions between U.S. and Israeli officials on the subject were taken into account during the Committee's consideration of the fiscal year 1986 foreign assistance bill.

The Committee approved the Administration's request of \$1.2 billion in grant ESF for Israel in fiscal year 1986, the same level Congress approved for fiscal year 1985. The Committee also approved several amendments intended to assist Israel's economy.

During the markup on March 27 and 28, the Committee did not take action on proposals for a fiscal year 1985 supplemental for Israel. At the time of the markup, Administration officials had not decided on Israel's request for an FY 1985 supplemental to help cope with its economic problems, particularly the rapidly falling foreign currency reserves. Israel has requested a supplemental of \$1.5 billion, to be spread over two years.

Secretary of State Shultz, in testifying before the Committee on March 15, declined to say exactly what criteria he was using in making a decision but indicated he believed the Israeli government would and should take additional economic reform measures, some of them involving legislation expected to be passed by the Israeli Knesset during March and April.

There is an emerging consensus among Administration officials and members that some form of transitional supplemental assistance will be necessary as the Israeli economy and society feels the impact of the austerity measures, including planned deep budget cuts, reductions in subsidies and increased unemployment. Richard Murphy, the Assistant Secretary of

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24 2/3

State for Near East and South Asia Affairs, testified March 21 that " I think some transitional assistance will be required. The amount, the rate, the criteria by which it is disbursed is the subject of our continuing discussions with the Israeli government." Mr. Murphy also told the hearing by the Near East and South Asia subcommittee that he expected the Congress would receive a message from the Administration on the subject in the near future.

As a result of the testimony and informal discussions with Administration officials, the Committee deferred action on a supplemental while reporting out the regular fiscal year 1986 bill. In delaying action, members indicated a preference to work in cooperation with the Executive Branch if possible and allow the Administration additional time to decide upon a recommendation.

The Committee, however, expects that an Administration proposal will be made before the bill reaches the Senate floor. Members indicated they will give it sympathetic consideration in view of the widespread concern over Israeli's economic situation and the importance of a healthy economy to the security of Israel. Some members felt the Administration was proceeding too slowly on the issue. Senator Sarbanes, the ranking minority member of the Near East and South Asia subcommittee, expressed concern that "there are some who are a little too much wedded to pure economic theory or the textbook analysis of what should take place and are not giving sufficient weight to the fact that there has been a major political breakthrough" which provides an opportunity to deal with the economic and foreign policy problems in the area.

The economic situation. Israel's economic problems began developing with the October 1973 war which prompted an emergency U.S. airlift to help replace the equipment destroyed by the Syrian and

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24 5/8

Egyptian surprise attack. U.S. foreign assistance to Israel had been relatively low until then. As a result of the war, the United States provided Israel with FMS loans to help replace damaged or destroyed equipment and to modernize its armed forces as the Arab countries began utilizing their increased oil revenues to buy sophisticated military equipment in large quantities from the U.S., Western Europe, and the Soviet Union.

The 10-year grace period on these FMS loans during which Israel paid the interest but not the principal is expiring. The debt repayments began sharply rising.

The growing debt problem was compounded by a series of fluctuating economic management and consumer-oriented policies. The political situation in which the previous Likud government held a narrow three-vote margin in the Knesset made it difficult to implement economic reforms. The new National Unity government elected last year however has been able to start a reform and austerity program which, Israeli officials estimate, may require a 2 or 3 year transition period.

Reform Measures. Israel's economy is showing some signs of modest improvement. A series of economic austerity and reform measures instituted by the Israeli government are already taking effect. Major problems remain however. The decline in foreign currency reserves, increases in foreign debt, and a growing unemployment rate as the austerity measures impose what amounts to a recession remain a major concern. Israeli and American government economists are generally agreed upon the nature of remaining steps to be taken. Assessments somewhat differ over the speed with which the Israeli government can move on measures which increase unemployment and may cause at least temporary strains on the country's social and economic fabric, such as

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additional budget cuts and layoffs of government workers in which a third of the working force is in the public sector.

Among the measures already taken are a number of steps to curb the hyper-inflation, government deficits. The steps include an eight month second wage-price agreement with labor unions and the manufacturers, reductions of between 18 and ⁵15 % in subsidies for food, energy and other items, a six-month ban on the imports of certain luxury goods, tightened foreign exchange control regulations and higher taxes for Israeli travelers. The shekel was devalued by 8 per cent and further devaluations are continuing, although not as fast as urged by Secretary Shultz.

The Knesset on March 28 also approved cuts of about \$2 billion from the 1984 government budget of more than \$24 billion (about half of which goes for debt service). The cuts include \$1.1 billion in subsidies for food and various services and \$300 million in defense spending.

The total external debt continued to rise sharply, reaching \$24.4 billion. Israel is scheduled to pay back to the U.S. government this year about \$1.1 billion on FMS loans and other loans it has received since the 1973 war.

Two major problems continue to deeply concern Israeli officials however--the drop in foreign currency reserves and the increase in unemployment.

Foreign currency reserves are currently estimated at about \$2.3 billion. They had been falling at a rate of about \$200 million a month, which would leave Israel with less than enough to cover six weeks month's imports by this summer.

Unemployment has risen to a record 6.7%--extremely high by Israeli

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been increasing since 1983. The unemployment is affecting not only Israeli Jews, but Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza, many of whom had been employed in the Israeli construction industry.

As part of the efforts to assist Israel through its economic crisis, the Committee approved, as it did last year, several amendments affecting economic and military aid. Senator Boschwitz, chairman of the Near East Subcommittee, offered them as a package. They permit Israel to:

--Receive its ESF on an expedited basis during the first quarter. The amendment, co-sponsored by Senators Biden and Cranston, allows Israel to draw its FMS during the first 30 days of the fiscal year, which is what the Administration allowed last October for the fiscal year 1985 funds. This is intended to help shore up Israel's foreign currency reserves.

--Utilize FMS grants provided in any fiscal year before drawing down on any remaining FMS loans from earlier years. The Amendment, also co-sponsored by Senators Biden and Cranston, enables Israel to delay adding to its debt burdens until the loans are needed to cover financing requirements for previously ordered aircraft or other U.S.-made equipment.

--Use up to \$150 million of the FMS assistance to finance research and development in the United States for the new Israeli fighter plane, the Lavi, and \$250 million for research, development and procurement in Israel. The amendment by Senators Boschwitz and Biden, is similar to one approved last year except that the full amount would not need to be used unless ^{sought} requested. This is in the event the government decides to stretch out the Lavi program.

--Bid on AID contracts for construction and engineering. The

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allow countries which receive direct U.S economic assistance, such as Israel, Turkey and Lebanon, to bid on construction contracts as was the case before 1980.

The assistance approved by the committee is intended to help the reform efforts and alleviate the impact of the austerity measures. As the Committee stated in its report last year, American assistance cannot solve Israel's economic problems. It is the Committee's hope and expectation that the U.S. assistance will help Israel through this difficult transition period.

The Committee notes that the Israeli government and people have made major efforts to deal with the economic problems. These efforts are encouraging and, it is expected, will continue for U.S. assistance can help alleviate the impact of Israeli reform measures but cannot be a substitute for the Israeli efforts. It is the Committee's view, as reflected in delaying consideration of a supplemental, that continued close cooperation and consultation on possible additional steps is necessary between the Israeli government on one hand, and the Executive Branch and Congress on the other in determining the most effective future steps to help Israel's long term economic strength.

Military In fiscal 1984, the FMS assistance was \$1.7 billion, half loan, half grant. Last year, as part of the effort to alleviate Israel's debt repayment burden, an agreement was worked out to provide all-grant FMS but at a reduced overall level of \$1.4 billion. The fiscal year 1986 proposed military assistance level of \$1.8 billion ^{in grant} was agreed upon by the U.S. and Israeli governments for submission to Congress after Israeli initially requested \$2.2 billion.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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מצפ"א. מצרים.

סנט: סיוע למצרים - לשלנו 702 עמ' 8.

1. לדברי קראפט, מק-פרטון (מנהל הא.י.ד) זועם על החיקון שמורה על העברת 200 מליון דולר במזומנים למצרים.

2. בושביץ לא קרא את התידרוך שהוכן לו מראש ולא הבחיר שתיתכן העברת הכספים מ-2.4 בליון הדולרים מכספי ה-א.י.ד שנתקעים בצנרת (דהיינו מתקציבים קודמים). כתוצאה מזו, לדעת היועצים המשפטיים, על א.י.ד לבצע את ההעברה מהכספים שביקשו עבור פרויקטים במצרים ל-1986 FY (515 מליון דולר).

למדן

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MR. KILB: I have nothings that I have to share with you and
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Fighting in Lebanon

NYT-p.1-Reuters photo of Palestinian refugees fleeing into Sidon after their camp was shelled. Artillery shelling and automatic gunfire shook Sidon as Christian forces battled Moslem and Palestinian guerrillas for the third day. At least 51 people have been killed and over 140 wounded during the weekend fighting.

Westerner Released

NYT-AP-Danielle Perez, a French Embassy employee was freed unharmed after 10 days in captivity. Six other Westerners are still missing after disappearing since March 14. The police in Beirut said a rash of kidnappings of Lebanese Jews continued with the abduction of Ishag Sassoun. He is the fourth Jew abducted in four days. (see NY-combined)

Thousands March in Paris

NYT-Bernstein (photo of French personalities marching against anti-Semitism) Thousands of Parisians marched through the narrow streets of the old Jewish quarter demonstrating against what they said was a renewal of racist violence in France. The march was called to protest the bombing of a Jewish film festival but many people had a larger concern: that a mood of generalized racial animosity is intensifying in France. There has been a number of incidents involving the French and Arab immigrants in recent weeks.

Camp David Top in US Policy

NYT-Glymer-The US public regards the Camp David Accords as Washington's most successful foreign policy venture in recent years, according to a NYT poll. The poll suggests that successful diplomacy appeals more to the American public at least as much as successful military activity.

Iran-Iraq

NYT-Scioloro-The Secretary General of the UN began a 10-day tour of four Persian Gulf countries and he was conferring with his colleagues about whether or not to visit Iran and Iraq to help end the war. He will visit Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar.

NYT-Miller-Iraq announced it carried out air raids against five Iranian towns, just hours after an explosion shook Baghdad. The blast is

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to have occurred due to missiles fired by Iran.

ND-UPI-The US secretly warned Iran it faces military retaliation if Americans recently kidnapped in Lebanon are tried or executed, the London Sunday Times reported. (see NYT-wire)

Survivors March

ND-Withers-Thousands of Nazi death camp survivors marched to Auschwitz-Birkenau's infamous railway ramp where Nazi's "selecte-" candidates for the gas chambers. They commemorated the passing of 40 years since the Holocaust. There were few Westerners present.

Karim Khalef Dead at 50

NYT-AP-Karim Khalef a former Mayor of Ramallah, who was maimed in a 1980 bombing, died of a heart attack. He had been recently mentioned in the Israeli press as a possible member of a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to proposed Mideast peace negotiations.

Consulate Employee Meets Reagan

NYT-AP photo Uri Palti, chief information officer at the Israeli Consulate in New York greeted Reagan on the street in Washington yesterday. They discussed the latest happenings in the Mideast and Reagan congratulated Palti on the fine job the Israeli Consulate in New York is doing...

Jewish Single Groups Try to Preserve Future of Judaism

NYT-Gruson-Many single groups have been organized in the past to years in response to growing concern about the large number of Jews who intermarry. The Jewish population is diminishing in the US. Jews are among the least prolific group in the US, not bearing enough children to replace themselves.

Book Reviews

NYT-Haupt reviews Shah of Shas by Ryszard Kapuscinski. The author is a Polish journalist and he helps to give Iran's revolution a fresh and more objective perspective.

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שם פרטי מלא

מספר תעודת זהות - 111-111

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שם משפחה מלא

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מספר תעודת זהות

מספר פנקס

ND-3/31-Moskin reviews "The Blood of Abraham" by Jimmy Carter. The book is based on the tour of the Mideast Carter took in 1983 and a conference about the area he chaired. The book is dull. Carter attacks Reagan's Mideast policy and believes that the US can one day be an honest broker in the area. He believes that the PLO must be negotiated with for they are they responsible for the Palestinians. Yet, he says that the PLO has not gained anything for the Palestinians. He tells an anecdote of his visit to Israel, which does more to illuminate his naive mind-set that Carter brought to the Mideast in 1983 than the tensions he found there: he recalls a morning in Jerusalem when he went jogging around the old city. Two Israeli soldiers joined and said they would lead the way. On Jericho road a group of old Arab men sat reading their newspapers. There was much room on the sidewalk but Carter says the soldiers cut in front of the Arabs and knocked their newspapers out of their hands. Carter was angry at the soldiers for acting in such a belligerent manner. The soldiers told him that one never knows what is behind a newspaper.

ND-3/31-Three works of fiction are reviewed. They all deal with the Arab world. Saudi, by Laurie Devine; Tara, by Noel Barber and Levantine by Peter Delacorte are discussed by Kathleen Christison. Only Delacorte's book mentions Israel and it is portrayed in a negative light.

US-Israel Free Trade Agreement-Magazine Article

Forbes-4/8-Nesh Kestin-Unofficial Washington and Jerusalem see the free trade agreement as having less to do with Israel than a slew of other nations. The US has had little luck in negotiating multilateral tariff-dropping agreements so the US has decided to try it one country at a time. The choice of Israel had more to do with political considerations than anything else. The US will probably not be able to sell more to Israel. Israeli exports are hardly a threat to the US but a great opportunity for Israel--if it can pull up its socks and get to work.

Ancient Egypt on PBS

NYT-Corry-A four part series begins tonight that examines ancient Egypt.

Letters

NY-The Exec. Dir. NY Commission on Human Rights, Alberta Fuentes, says Reagan should visit Tachau.

ITOTUT (Happy April Fool's Day)

חתימה:

מספר תעודת זהות

מספר פנקס

מספר תעודת זהות

מספר פנקס

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official text

DATE: 03/29/85

(Following is **first** of five segments of advance text. All are embargoed and not for release until 1315 GMT, April 2.)

U.S. REPORTS CONTINUING SOVIET EXPANSION OF FORCES, WEAPONS
(Weinberger preface to 'Soviet Military Power 1985')

Washington -- U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger says the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies continue to expand, modernize and deploy with increasingly capable weapons systems designed for the entire spectrum of strategic, theater-nuclear, and conventional conflict.

In the preface to "Soviet Military Power 1985," an annual assessment produced by the U.S. Defense Department, Weinberger said the Soviet Union also continues to upgrade its heavily layered strategic defenses and is giving "extremely high priority" to its military-related space program.

Following is the text of the preface:
(begin text)

A valuable starting point from which to measure the current and projected strength, trends, and global military capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, as well as the forces of its Warsaw Pact allies, is the following assessment presented in the introduction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 1984 official publication, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- Force Comparisons:"

"The Warsaw Pact maintains large-scale strategic nuclear forces, intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces, and massive conventional forces. Moreover, Warsaw Pact military strategy as shown by its literature and military exercises calls for large-scale penetration into enemy territory in order to secure strategic objectives, it continues to emphasize the element of surprise and the necessity of rapid offensive operations."

The forces of the USSR and its allies continue to expand, modernize, and deploy with increasingly capable weapons systems designed for the entire spectrum of strategic, theater-nuclear, and conventional conflict. The Soviet Union has made no secret of certain of these advances. For example, in the autumn of 1984, the Soviet Defense Ministry announced that the USSR was beginning to deploy a new generation of nuclear-armed, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. The Soviets also revealed that nuclear-armed, short-range ballistic missiles had been forward-deployed from the USSR to operational sites in Eastern Europe and that additional ballistic missile submarines were on patrol in the Atlantic and the Pacific. In a speech before the Politburo, General Secretary Chernenko said that further actions would be taken to strengthen the Soviet Union's military capability. These announcements serve notice of the increasingly ambitious Soviet procurement and deployment of major categories of new armaments. The success that the Soviets have achieved in both quantity and quality of systems is based on combining an aggressive R&D program with a systematic effort to target and obtain advanced Western technologies.

Some of the more significant developments reported in this, the fourth edition of Soviet Military Power, are:

-- Test firings continue for the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25 ICBMs, the new, fifth-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles. The



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SS-X-25 violates Soviet obligations under SALT II. The level of deployed MIRVed ICBM warheads continues to rise with overall modernization of the Soviet strategic missile force.

-- Two units of a new DELTA IV-Class of strategic ballistic missile submarine have been launched; they are the likely platform for the USSR's newest, most accurate submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-NX-23.

-- A third 25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class strategic ballistic missile submarine has completed sea trials, joining the two TYPHOON units already operational, each fitted with 20 SS-N-20 SLBMs, with each missile capable of delivering six to nine MIRVed warheads to ranges of 8,300 kilometers.

-- The new supersonic, swing-wing BLACKJACK bomber continues in advanced test and development. New strategic BACKFIRE bombers continue to join operational Soviet forces at a rate of at least 30 a year. New BEAR-H strategic bombers are emerging from Soviet aircraft plants and deploying with the 3,000-kilometer-range, air-launched, nuclear-armed AS-15 cruise missile.

-- The USSR is continuing to devote extremely high priority to its military related space program. A major emphasis is on space systems for long-duration, manned missions engaged in military research. They are developing new heavy lift launch vehicles, capable of launching 150-ton payloads, for the space shuttle and manned space station programs. The USSR is continuing research on ground-based and space-based high-energy lasers for use in antisatellite roles. The Soviets currently have the world's only deployed anti-satellite weapons system that can attack satellites in near-earth orbit.

-- The USSR continues to upgrade its heavily layered strategic defenses with expansion of ballistic missile detection and tracking systems and the development of new early warning and air surveillance radars. Silo-based high-acceleration interceptor missiles are replacing older above-ground launchers in the antiballistic missile system ringing Moscow, bringing increased capabilities to the world's only deployed ABM system. A new, large, phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk violates the ABM Treaty. The USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. In addition, the Soviets are actively engaged in extensive research on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles.

Modernization of Soviet forces at the strategic level is mirrored by force improvements at theater-nuclear and conventional levels:

-- The Soviets have pressed ahead with construction of new SS-20 missile bases in both the western and eastern USSR, enabling a substantial increase from the 378 MIRVed 5,000-kilometer-range nuclear missiles reported last year to a new total of about 400. In parallel, new SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles are now deployed with Soviet divisions in East Germany, and more accurate 900 - kilometer-range SS-22/SCALEBOARD missiles have been forward-deployed to East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

-- Soviet Ground Forces, which in 1981 numbered 181 divisions, have now grown to 199 motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions. New main battle tanks continue to flow from Soviet factories -- some 3,200 in 1984 -- upgrading tank division capabilities, which are equipped from an USSR inventory of 52,000 tanks.

-- The fourth 37,000-ton KIEV-Class aircraft carrier is fitting out, preparing to join the already operational carriers Novorossiysk, Minsk, and Kiev. Construction continues on the lead unit of an

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last decade, the Soviet military has absorbed an increasing share of the nation's estimated gross national product (GNP), a share now estimated at 15-17 percent. Even in a period of slowing economic growth, the Soviet military sector continues to maintain its priority claim on the Soviet Union's economic resources.

Industrial Base and Production

The large economic investment in military programs has enabled the Soviet military industrial base to expand to become the world's largest weapons producer. During the past decade, industry supporting the Soviet military is estimated to have grown more than 30 percent. The USSR's ability to produce large quantities of armaments in all categories has enabled them to equip and modernize their forces and those of their allies and still export large quantities of weapons to proxy and Third World nations.

As the West has turned increasingly to automated production methods, the Soviet Union has also been introducing computers and automation into its military production process. The use of such production methods was a Soviet goal first articulated in the 1960s. Through both legal and illegal acquisition of modern Western production techniques, the Soviets are establishing more efficient, integrated, and technologically advanced capabilities for the production of highly sophisticated weapons.

Soviet Doctrine and Strategy

According to the Soviet definition, military doctrine is concerned with the essence, purpose, and character of a possible future war and the preparation of the country and its Armed Forces for conducting such a war. Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics are components of Soviet military art. These three encompass the actual practice of preparing the country and its Armed Forces for war as well as planning and conducting strategic operations. Specifically, military strategy is concerned with defining the strategic tasks of the Armed Forces, carrying out measures to prepare the Armed Forces, the economy, and the population for war, determining potential adversaries, and determining the size and composition of military forces necessary to wage war. According to the Soviets, strategy and politics are closely interrelated.

Concerning the character of a possible future war, Soviet military writings state that such a conflict would be a decisive clash between two diametrically opposed socio-economic systems -- socialism and capitalism. Most of the world's nations would be involved and the conflict would be global. The division of the world into two distinct and opposing camps means that a future world war would be a coalition war, fought by two major groupings of nations, each pursuing specific political and military objectives. The Soviets believe that an outcome favorable to their interests depends on complete unification of the political, economic, and military forces of all countries of the socialist coalition. To this end, the Soviets have concentrated on developing and implementing a single strategic policy for the entire Warsaw Pact forces. Marshal Kulikov, Commander in Chief (CINC) of the Warsaw Pact, has referred to his command as a unified combat formation.

The Soviets believe that a world war might begin and be waged for a particular period of time with conventional weapons only. Although general nuclear war is not considered to be inevitable, the Soviets believe it is possible that a conventional war will escalate to a nuclear conflict. Despite the fact that strategic nuclear forces

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would play the dominant role in such a war, the Soviets recognize the crucial function of ground armies in seizing and occupying their ultimate objectives. They also believe that a world war could be relatively brief -- several weeks -- or that it could develop into a protracted conflict. Great importance is attached to the initial phase of a war because to a large degree it would determine the course of all subsequent actions. This accounts for the extraordinary attention the Soviets pay to their overall mobilization capability and their perceived requirement to effect the transition of high-level political-military control organs rapidly from peacetime to wartime to take maximum advantage of the initial period of war.

Soviet doctrine envisions a future world war of wide scope waged over vast territories. Such a war would be characterized by an absence of continuous fronts, rapid and sharp changes in the strategic situation, and deep penetrations into rear areas of the forces involved. Forces would rely on mobility and maneuver to wage an intense struggle to seize and maintain the initiative. The Soviets emphasize the primacy of the offensive, stating that military and political objectives are ultimately achieved only through aggressive and continuous offensive actions. Although defensive actions occasionally would be necessary, they would be active and innovative operations undertaken with the purpose of either supporting nearby offensive operations or creating favorable conditions for resuming the offensive.

The Soviets believe that victory in war is possible only through the combined and coordinated efforts of all services and troop branches. As a result, Soviet military strategy, which views warfare as a series of interdependent large-scale operations, is the same for all the services. The Soviet concept of combined arms warfare specifies that the various services and independent units must be brought together under a single unified commander at the army, front, and theater of military operations (TVD) levels. This permits the most effective use of all forces and weapons and ensures their united and coordinated employment in achieving overall strategic objectives.

The major Soviet strategic goal in a war in Europe would be the defeat of NATO military forces, the frustration of NATO's overall warfighting capability through the destruction of crucial command and control elements located in the NATO rear area, and the eventual dismantlement of the Alliance itself. Priority targets would be nuclear delivery systems and weapons, command, control, and communications centers, air defense weapons and control points, and government control centers.

Specific Soviet aims in a global war would be to:

- defeat NATO forces at any level of conflict, occupy NATO countries, and use Europe's economic assets to assist Soviet recovery,
- separately neutralize the United States and China by disorganizing and destroying their military forces,
- and dominate the post-war world in which "socialism" would replace "capitalism" as the basic politico-economic system in all nations.

From an internal viewpoint, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leadership would seek to maintain its control over the Soviet government, military, police and internal security organs, and the civilian population. Efforts would be made to minimize losses to the Soviet leadership, scientific-technical elites and other essential personnel, to the general population, and to the economy. Repair and

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recovery operations would be organized to limit war-related damage.

Soviet Force Capabilities

During peacetime the five Soviet forces function as administrative service entities for the purpose of equipping, training, and maintaining their respective force components. During wartime, however, all Soviet forces would be combined under the executive leadership of the General Staff to form the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. The Soviet forces would be formed into a single war machine that would bring to bear all systems and forces as needed in a unified and effective manner. This combined arms concept is not simply the joint use of weapons systems and forces, rather, it is the unified application of all military assets to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

The following discussion of Soviet force capabilities addresses the Soviet command structure, wartime command and control, and combined arms warfare. As part of their combined arms concept, the Soviet Armed Forces are prepared to fight any type of war, nuclear or conventional, at any level. To the Soviets, the level and intensity of conflict -- rather than being compartmented by operational plans -- are influenced both by political objectives and enemy operations. Moreover, a nuclear exchange could occur in a limited or large-scale manner at the tactical, operational, strategic, or intercontinental level -- or all simultaneously. Should the Soviets execute a nuclear attack, they would expect to continue conventional operations to exploit the results.

Combined Arms Warfare

Over the past two decades, Soviet forces have steadily expanded and upgraded every category of weapons systems. Soviet ground force divisions have been reorganized, enlarged, and equipped with increasingly modern tanks, artillery, and helicopters. Soviet naval forces continue to receive larger and more capable ships and submarines. Soviet air forces are being modernized with high-performance aircraft. In addition to these force enhancements, Soviet military planners are adapting operations to the capabilities of new systems and changing political objectives as part of the dynamics of combined arms warfare.

The Soviets envision as many as three theaters of war: Western, Southern, and Far Eastern, each with a set of political objectives affecting military operations within the theater. More importantly, in planning for such military operations, the Soviets could divide a theater, for operational command and strategic planning purposes, into theaters of military operations (TVDs). Soviet planning for the Western Theater, encompassing all of Europe, envisions three continental TVDs -- Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern -- and two oceanic TVDs, Arctic and Atlantic. This organizational concept enables military planners to formulate military strategy and tactics to achieve political objectives in the geographic region, taking into consideration the capabilities of the missiles, aircraft, ships, and ground forces at their disposal. The same planning process occurs for Soviet objectives in the Southern and Far Eastern Theaters. While a strategic operation within the various TVDs may be conventional only, nuclear strikes are also planned within the operational concept down on the division level.

Soviet forces for conventional warfare consist of the assets of ground, air, naval, and air defense forces. Each of these services is discussed in more detail in the following chapters. In wartime these

services would form the combined arms forces of the Soviet Union.

With the reorganization of Soviet Air Forces, the growth in the number of longer-range intermediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) missiles, and the high state of readiness of forward-deployed forces, the USSR is capable of executing the initial phase of an attack without mobilization of additional forces. However, if the order should be given to go to war, the Soviets would implement their national mobilization plan, drawing upon some nine million recently trained reservists. These reservists would be used to bring understrength units, cadre units, and mobilization bases to full manning in a matter of days. While mobilizing and moving over 200 divisions is an extremely large task, the Soviets can assimilate the reservists, train them for combat, and be ready to conduct offensive operations in less than 60 days. To the Soviets, a combined arms battle would be fought by a highly integrated formation of ground, air, and air defense forces, with attached units of other service branches. In maritime sectors these formations would include naval forces as well. The use of nuclear weapons and the participation of the various service branches or forces, in conjunction with great troop mobility, would impart an especially decisive and maneuver-oriented character to combined arms warfare.

With the advent of longer range and more capable aircraft and missiles, coupled with increased troop mobility and maneuverability, Soviet concepts for employment of combined arms units and formations are evolving accordingly. The Soviets believe that modern warfare would substantially exceed the framework of front operations. As a result, they envision a larger scale military operation, which they refer to as a theater strategic operation. In such an operation, the front commander would be responsible for the conduct of two or more front operations in succession. While the Soviet concept of the front as a large combat formation in the field remains essentially intact, the Soviets are now focusing on operations by groups of fronts.

The contemporary Soviet concept of the theater strategic operation has expanded in scope and complexity. The Soviets now plan for a theater operation to consist of several fronts conducting dynamic, fast-moving operations to seize strategic ground objectives located 600-800 kilometers away. These land offensive operations would be conducted in coordination and mutual support with air, anti-air, assault (airborne, amphibious, or joint), and naval operations to attain the Soviets' strategic goals within the TVD. The air operation is a massive offensive campaign designed to gain air superiority and disrupt and destroy an enemy's command and control and nuclear capability. Front forces would contribute to the air operation by attacking enemy air and air defense facilities with rocket, artillery, and ground forces. In turn, the air operation, by degrading and disrupting enemy command, control, and communication, as well as its aviation and nuclear capabilities, would create favorable conditions for the fronts to accomplish their objectives quickly.

A theater-wide anti-air defense operation involving tactical and strategic air defense assets coordinated at the theater level would be conducted to defend Warsaw Pact forces from residual enemy aircraft. In addition, naval forces would operate in the waters off a coastal flank to destroy enemy naval forces, secure the coastal flank of the theater, participate in amphibious operations, and thwart the enemy's attempt to employ amphibious forces.

If the war escalated to the nuclear level, the Soviets could

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employ a massive theater-wide nuclear strike involving the coordinated use of ground, Strategic Rocket Force (SRF), naval, and aviation systems. This strike would be exploited by the rapid advance of front forces, taking advantage of the shock and disruption produced by massive nuclear employment.

The development of these complex operations has required the Soviets to develop theater-level commands to exert proper coordination and control. To support high commands in theaters, the Soviets have deployed an extensive fixed and mobile communications structure and constructed numerous hardened or bunkered command facilities. In addition, the Soviets may have established peacetime permanent theater commands for several TVDs.

As many as five fronts could exist in a TVD. The highest commander in a TVD would be at least a three-star general who is directly responsible to the Supreme High Command (VGK). The commander would be supported by a combined arms staff with the responsibility of overseeing and coordinating the activities of the various operational formations.

In wartime the General Staff would operate as the executor of the VGK and would develop plans for control of the forces. As stated earlier, the Soviets have organizationally structured their forces to form a unified command structure under the VGK. This provides the Soviets with the command structure to apply the totality of their military power in warfare so that the whole of the operation would be greater than the sum of its parts.

Soviet Command Structure

Supreme leadership of the USSR's Armed Forces is vested by the Soviet Constitution in the CPSU and the higher bodies of Soviet State power -- the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. Party control of the military, however, is facilitated by the existence of the Defense Council, an organization that is chaired by the CPSU General Secretary and consists of top Party, government, and military leaders. The Defense Council is the most senior decision-making body for all aspects of national security policy. It also forms the nucleus of what would be expanded in wartime to the highest Party-state body responsible for establishing unified strategic leadership of the USSR and providing centralized direction to the national economy and the entire war effort. In this regard, it would perform functions similar to the USSR's World War II State Defense Committee.

Party dominance of the Soviet Armed Forces is assured through the Party's role in determining military doctrine and strategy and its control of budgetary resources and senior personnel assignments. The top Party leadership establishes military doctrine and approves military strategy as developed by the General Staff. The Defense Council, dominated by the Party leadership, controls the defense budget and makes the decision to develop and deploy each new major weapons system. Senior military officers are selected from a Central Committee list, and all major organizational changes in the Soviet military must be approved by the Defense Council. Party control of the military is also underscored by the fact that the Party General Secretary, in addition to being Defense Council Chairman, is also Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

Direct control and administration of the daily activities of the Soviet Armed Forces is entrusted to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), headed since 1976 by Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU) Dmitriy

Ustinov, until his death in December 1984. His replacement, MSU Sergey Sokolov, is expected to continue the policies initiated by Ustinov. As Minister of Defense, Sokolov is charged with maintaining the condition and overseeing the development of the Armed Forces, including officer recruitment and conscription of enlisted personnel, equipping the forces with weapons systems and military materiel, developing military strategy, operational art, and tactics, training the forces, and ensuring high standards of military discipline and political loyalty. The Ministry of Defense is also responsible, in coordination with local Soviet government organizations, for the Civil Defense program.

Within the hierarchy of the Ministry of Defense there is a Collegium that functions as a consultative body and policy review board. Chaired by the Minister, the Collegium discusses and resolves issues connected with the development of the Armed Forces, their combat and mobilization readiness, and the effectiveness of military and political training. Membership includes the Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and other top military leaders. Collegium decisions normally are implemented as orders of the Minister of Defense.

Minister of Defense Sokolov exercises control of the Armed Forces through First Deputy Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Defense. The First Deputy Ministers are: Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff since September 1984, MSU Viktor Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces since 1977, and former CINC of the Ground Forces, Vasilii Petrov. Five of the 11 Deputy Ministers are CINCs of the Services -- Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Navy, Air Defense Forces, and Air Forces. The five service CINCs are responsible for the peacetime administrative management, including combat and political training of the forces. Operational control of the forces rests with a peacetime variation of the V GK and is administered by the General Staff. Six other Deputy Defense Ministers are in charge of civil defense, rear services, the main inspectorate, construction and billeting, personnel, and armaments.

The most important element in the Soviet Ministry of Defense for peacetime forces management, as well as wartime control of operational formations, is the General Staff headed by Marshal Akhromeyev. As the central military staff organ, the General Staff exercises operational control over the Armed Forces and is responsible for coordinating the activity of the main staffs of the five services, the staffs of 16 military districts, four groups of forces, four fleets, rear services, civil defense forces, and the main directorates of the Ministry of Defense. The General Staff coordinates military planning, advises the Defense Council on matters of military policy, develops military strategy for approval by the Defense Council, and directs functions common to all of the services. The major responsibilities of the General Staff in peacetime are to ensure that military forces reach and sustain a high level of combat readiness, and to prepare strategic operation plans in the event of war. During wartime, the General Staff would be the primary organization to implement operational orders of the Supreme High Command.

Territorially, the Soviet Armed Forces located within the USSR are organized into 16 military districts (MDs). An MD is a high-level administrative command element that contains military units up to army level, training institutions, recruitment and mobilization offices or

military commissariats, and other military establishments. The primary mission of a military district is to train military units and ensure their high level of combat readiness. Other important responsibilities include registration and induction of draftees, mobilization, civil defense, and pre-military and reserve training. In the event of war, certain military districts, such as those on the periphery of the USSR, could generate fronts or other operational field forces, either singly or in combination. Soviet units stationed in East Europe are organized into four Groups of Forces located in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Military districts and Groups of Forces are subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and General Staff. They contain their own organic staff elements responsible for political affairs, personnel administration, training, rear services, construction and billeting, and civil defense. Each MD and Group of Forces command staff has officers who serve as chiefs of their respective service components. Soviet naval forces are assigned to four fleets, all of which have command and staff organizations and relationships similar to those of military districts. Naval fleets are also operationally subordinated to the General Staff.

Command and Control

The Soviets believe in a rapid and efficient transformation of their peacetime national security organization into an operational command capable of successfully achieving all major political and military objectives in the event of general war. To this end, they have established a peacetime control system that closely approximates the anticipated wartime structure. The Soviets have created peacetime national security and high-level military organizations. These organizations are headed by the Defense Council and can function as the strategic command element in wartime with very little change. This wartime management structure would provide a unified system of command for the Armed Forces, the Soviet Government, and the national economy capable of exerting centralized direction but designed to permit a degree of autonomous operations required by modern warfare.

The current Defense Council probably would be expanded to include representatives of the highest Party, state, and military leadership. It would function in a manner similar to the World War II State Defense Committee, ensuring centralized political direction of the entire war effort. Soviet military writings state that concentration of the leadership of the country and its Armed Forces in the hands of the highest political agency of government control is a necessary condition for attaining victory in war. The creation of single organs of military and political leadership underscores the Soviet emphasis on the interdependence of politics and military strategy. In addition to directing the conduct of military operations, the Defense Council would supervise the nation's economy and its support of the war effort through control of the vast ministerial structure of the Soviet Government.

Direct leadership of the Armed Forces would be the responsibility of the Supreme High Command (VGK), headed by the Party General Secretary as Supreme Commander in Chief. Former Defense Minister Ustinov provided public during an awards ceremony in late September that Chernenko occupies such a position even in peacetime. The Party General Secretary would also head the General Headquarters (Stavka) of the VGK. The Stavka would be responsible for the preparation and conduct of military campaigns and strategic operations. It would also

resolve issues concerned with the overall wartime situation of the country.

The MOD Collegium would probably provide the foundation for the wartime Stavka VGK, which would include, in addition to the CPSU General Secretary, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff and other First Deputy Ministers of Defense, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and the five Armed Forces Commanders in Chief. Supreme Party control of the entire war effort is confirmed by the fact that, in addition to being Party General Secretary and the senior Politburo member, the Party General Secretary would also function as wartime Defense Council Chairman, Supreme Commander in Chief, and head of the Stavka VGK.

The General Staff would serve as operational staff and executive agent for the Stavka VGK. Working in conjunction with the main staffs of the five services, the main Operations Directorate of the General Staff would draft plans for strategic operations for consideration by the Stavka VGK. Once approved, these plans would be issued to operational commanders as orders of the VGK. The General Staff would be responsible for ensuring compliance with all VGK orders and directives, including timely and precise execution of VGK military campaign plans by the operational commands.

In order to ensure both centralized control of strategic planning and decentralized battle management of the Armed Forces, the Soviets in wartime would employ intermediate High Commands in TVDs that would be subordinate to the VGK and would be responsible for directing the efforts of subordinate formations. Commanders for four of the probable TVD High Commands are: Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov; Army General I.A. Gerasimov; Army General Y.P. Maksimov; and General I.M. Tret'yak. In certain circumstances the VGK might create High Commands for specific strategic directions, i.e., a major axis or avenue of attack not already under the control of a High Command in a TVD.

The Soviets also have created an elaborate system of emergency relocation facilities, many of which are bunkered, designed to ensure the survival of Party and State control through the protection of high-level Party, government, and military leaders. These facilities are equipped with hardened communications equipment and would serve as alternate command and control posts for the top leadership in wartime.

In addition, managers and factory personnel of critical industries would be evacuated with critical machinery out of urban areas and away from immediate battle areas to emergency locations to facilitate their continued operation. All these measures are designed to provide uninterrupted functioning of various elements of Soviet strategic leadership and the national economy in wartime, including nuclear war.

The Soviets have carefully thought out and continue to develop the details of their system of strategic leadership. To a large extent, the system designed for war fighting and war survival is already in place. The nucleus of critical Party-State control organs and high level military command elements that would be needed in wartime exists during peacetime in the form of top political and military organizations. These peacetime organizations could shift their activities to wartime operations with minimal organizational disruption and little augmentation in membership. The peacetime Soviet national security apparatus and its likely wartime counterpart are structured with the sole purpose of ensuring the continued survival of the CPSU through the successful conduct of military operations and consequent achievement of overall political objectives.

Technology Transfer

The Soviet Union continues an intensive, carefully executed program -- both legal and illegal -- to acquire advanced Western technology. The Soviets have been forced to turn increasingly to illegal technology acquisition efforts in response to U.S. Government tightening of export control laws and procedures. The illegal business of technology acquisition is an expensive proposition for the Soviets and often involves rings of professional thieves who work through networks of phony companies in various countries.

Acquisition of sophisticated technology, essential to many Soviet military advances, involves operations not only against the United States but also, increasingly, against other world technological leaders, including Western Europe and Japan. For example, in October of 1984, the Soviets tried to divert a photomicrodensitometer from West Germany to East Germany, having failed in two previous attempts to obtain the equipment through legal means from the United States. The equipment -- militarily useful for analysis of streak camera photography -- was bound for the Lebedev Institute in Moscow when it was detained at the East German border by West German authorities at US request.

Soviet industrial modernization programs are supported by an elaborate network for the collection of foreign scientific and technological information. Guidelines for introduction of advanced manufacturing systems, involving computer-aided design and automated manufacturing systems, include a constant monitoring of available Western technology. No areas of Western technology are given higher priority than computers and electronics. KGB and Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) agents are targeted against Western sources for these critical technologies in order to determine exactly where and how the hardware and software can be acquired. Collection requirements are coordinated with the USSR weapons development and production system. Weapons designers and technologists submit their requests directly through the KGB departments located at each facility. The turnaround time for the receipt of the desired design information or "hardware" can be a matter of weeks. Standing science and technology (S&T) requirements are continually updated by the S&T elements of the KGB and GRU, as well as by the State Committee for Science and Technology, many of whose staff members are KGB and GRU officers. In addition, the USSR Academy of Sciences and several of its institutes follow Western S&T, even tapping into Western data bases through a growing number of transnational computerized networks dedicated to S&T collection and dissemination.

It is estimated that Western military-related technology acquired by Soviet intelligence has saved the Soviet defense industry billions of dollars; for example, classified reports were obtained on advanced U.S. weapons systems still under development. The classified reports included information on the F-15 lookdown/shoot-down radar system, the B-1 bomber radar system, PHOENIX air-to-air missiles, PATRIOT surface-to-air missiles, the improved HAWK surface-to-air missiles, and a NATO air system. The effect on the Soviets of illegal diversion attempts has been quantified for the first time in a Department of Defense pilot study. Surveying a sample of denied export license applications in 1983-84, it was determined that had these exports been approved, the Soviets would have saved between 6,600 and 13,300 million dollars in primary military research costs during the 1990s and beyond. The Soviets stand to save hundreds of millions, if not

thousands of millions, of dollars by now being able to utilize proven U.S. designs to field counterpart systems -- as well as effective defense and countermeasure systems -- in a much shorter time and with less risk. Protection of Western technology is an integral part of our total defense posture.

Arms Control Compliance

In considering the totality of Soviet military power it is essential to monitor closely the Soviet Union's performance, or lack thereof, in honoring formal international obligations bearing on that power.

As President Reagan stated in his January 1984 Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, "If the concept of arms control is to have meaning and credibility as a contribution to global and regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them." However, the Soviet Union has violated many of its major arms control obligations and political commitments when it was in its interest to do so. Some of these violations and probable violations were documented in two official U.S. reports and in an independently produced advisory study on arms control compliance that were forwarded by the President to the Congress at its request.

The first report, submitted on 23 January 1984, presented seven cases in which the Soviet Union has violated or probably violated its arms control obligations. The advisory study was prepared independently by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament and sent to the Congress on 10 October 1984. This more comprehensive study covered Soviet compliance practices under arms control commitments from 1958 to 1983. The conclusions of both reports give cause for serious concern regarding the Soviet Union's conduct with respect to observance of arms control agreements.

The second U.S. report on Soviet noncompliance, forwarded to Congress on 1 February 1985, addressed 13 compliance issues and stated that other compliance issues remained under review. It reaffirmed the conclusions of the January 1984 report that the Soviet Union has violated the Helsinki Final Act, specifically the requirement of advance notification of certain military exercises; has violated the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention by maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and capability; has violated the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention by the production, transfer, and use of chemical agents and toxin weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia; and has violated two provisions of SALT II -- telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization -- by encrypting telemetry deliberately to impede verification and by testing an ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the ICBM throwweight, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited second new type. The 1985 report also reaffirmed that the Soviet Union has probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II and has likely violated the yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty by conducting some tests that exceeded 150 kilotons.

In the 1985 report, the U.S. Government also concluded that the Soviet Union has violated the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by constructing the Krasnoyarsk radar; has violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty by causing radioactive matter to be present outside its territorial limits; and has violated the SALT II prohibition against more than one new ICBM by developing and testing both the SS-X-24 and

the SS-X-25. With respect to the ABM Treaty, the 1985 report concluded that the Soviet Union potentially violated the prohibition on the development of a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, by the development of components of a new ABM system that apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little or no preparation. It also concluded that the Soviet Union has probably violated the prohibition on testing surface-to-air missile (SAM) components in the ABM mode by conducting tests that have involved SAM air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which is prohibited.

With regard to these compliance issues, the United States has tried through appropriate diplomatic channels, including the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), to persuade the Soviet Union to explain its actions and to take corrective measures. Unfortunately, thus far, the Soviet Union has not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions that would alleviate our concerns.

President Reagan stated in both reports, "Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. It increases doubts about the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner and thus damages the chances for establishing a more constructive US-Soviet relationship." Moreover, Soviet violations cast serious doubt on some of the key assumptions about arms control that have guided U.S. policy and Western public opinion for 30 years. Specifically, they call into question that the risk of detection would generally deter the Soviets from violating their arms control obligations, or in the rare instances when the Soviets would not be deterred, they would suffer serious penalties.

Our verification capabilities have not deterred the Soviet Union from violating arms control agreements. Moreover, if the Soviets are not made to account for their actions, it is unlikely that they will be deterred from more serious violations. We must approach arms control today more carefully than we have in the past.

We must fully consider the Soviet compliance record as we develop arms control policy and defense policy in the future. We must seek better means of detection, more comprehensive treaty provisions for verification, and more careful treaty drafting that might help deter cheating. However, by themselves these measures are not enough; alone, they cannot enforce compliance. Most fundamentally, the USSR must adopt a more responsible policy toward compliance. The traditional Soviet effort to achieve unilateral advantage through arms control treaties demonstrates that the West's determination to maintain a military balance is crucial to significant, equitable arms reductions.

The Soviet Union will have no incentive to accept such reductions unless it is convinced that the West will not allow it to achieve unilateral advantage within or outside the arms control framework.

(Preceding material for release at 1315 GMT, April 2)



official text

DATE: 03/29/85

(Following is **second** of five segments of advance text. All are embargoed and not for release until 1315 GMT, April 2)

COST OF SOVIET MILITARY EXCEEDS U.S. BY LARGE MARGIN
(**'Soviet Military Power'** from **'Soviet Military Power 1985'**)

Washington -- The cumulative cost of the Soviet military program for the period 1974-1983 exceeded that of the United States "by a large margin, despite a slowdown in the rate of overall Soviet economic growth," according to "Soviet Military Power 1985," the new U.S. Defense Department document on Soviet defense programs.

In a chapter titled "Soviet Military Power," the booklet says the estimated dollar cost of the total Soviet military program is 35 percent more than the comparably defined U.S. defense outlays, while the cost of Soviet weapons procurement is 50 percent greater than that of the United States for the same 10 year period.

Following is the text of the chapter:

(begin text)

Chapter I

Soviet Military Power

The Soviet Union has long relied on military power as the principal instrument of expansionist policies aimed at the extension of Soviet control and influence throughout the world. Soviet Armed Forces are equipped, trained, and readied for employment to further these aims. The threat posed by these forces is manifested in the mounting arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons systems as well as the coercive leverage, short of actual use of force, that the USSR's Armed Forces are able to exert.

The USSR's willingness to threaten and use military force under certain conditions to achieve external State objectives is documented by a lengthy, stark record of invasion and military suppression of other nations. Recall, for example, that the Red Army partitioned Poland with the Nazis in 1939 and attacked Finland later that winter. In 1940, Finland was forced to cede territory to the Soviets, and the Red Army occupied Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the Romanian province of Bessarabia.

In 1950, the North Korean invasion of South Korea was made possible by Soviet material support. The Soviets moved 20,000 to 25,000 troops to border areas of North Korea, and Soviet pilots defended the Yalu River bridges until the Chinese entered the conflict.

In 1953, the Soviets assisted the East German regime in putting down a popular uprising. In October 1956, Khrushchev threatened to use Soviet military force in Poland, and in October-November 1956, Soviet tanks crushed the Hungarian revolution. In August 1968, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces occupied Czechoslovakia to destroy a socialist regime "with a human face." In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and executed one Communist prime minister to install a more tractable one. In 1980-81, the threat of Soviet military intervention was used several times to pressure Polish authorities to crack down on the Solidarity Labor Movement. Polish officials imposed martial law to avert a Soviet invasion.

The role of military power in the Soviet Union can be best comprehended by understanding the State's full commitment to



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developing, supporting, and sustaining armed forces for internal, regional, and global use. This examination begins with a review of the extraordinarily great resources the USSR devotes to its military, the resulting overall nuclear and conventional force capabilities, and the nature of the Soviet political and military command structure overseeing the development of Soviet military doctrine and strategy.

Military Expenditures

The cumulative cost of the Soviet military program during 1974-83 exceeds that of the United States by a large margin, despite a slowdown in the rate of overall Soviet economic growth. For this decade, the estimated dollar cost of the total Soviet military program is 35 percent more than the comparably defined U.S. defense outlays, while the cost of Soviet weapons procurement is 50 percent greater. Although the dollar cost differences have narrowed with the recent growth in U.S. defense spending, the magnitude of the Soviet military effort in important specific categories, such as R&D, still surpasses that of the United States. Moreover, there is clear evidence of an upturn in Soviet weapons procurement beginning in 1983.

The rate of increase in spending does not give an appreciation of the large stocks of strategic and conventional weapons systems deployed by the Soviets during the past decade. Despite the procurement plateau of the late 1970s, when the Soviets emphasized R&D for next-generation systems, spending was so high that during the period 1977 through 1983, Soviet forces acquired 1,500 ICBMs, more than 1,300 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 250 bombers, 5,000 fighters, some 15,000 new tanks, and substantial numbers of new additional major surface combatants, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and attack submarines. During the same period, the United States added to its inventory 135 ICBMs, 390 SLBMs, no bombers, 3,000 fighters, 5,000 tanks, and 106 major warships.

Soviet efforts to develop advanced weapons systems continue in the 1980s, at least at the rapid pace of the previous two decades. Among these weapons are fighter and airborne control aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, space systems, and submarines. The new systems cover the full range of technologically advanced weaponry the Soviets will need to modernize all their forces. New, complex, and increasingly expensive weapon systems -- such as the new, fifth-generation ICBMs, air-superiority fighters such as the MIG-29/FULCRUM, and new, nuclear attack submarines such as the MIKE, SIERRA, and AKULA-Class -- are all contributing to the upturn in procurement costs.

The sustained Soviet economic commitment to the military is further revealed by the flow of resources to and growth of the machinery industry. This key sector of the economy, broadly divided into military and civilian machinery production, is the source of the Soviet Union's military weapons, civilian investment goods, and consumer durables. The machinery sector continues to experience the most rapid growth in the economy, and, in 1984, when overall industrial growth was 4 percent, the machinery sector expanded by some 7 percent. The military machinery portion of this sector now accounts for 60 percent of total machinery output and has been receiving nearly all the additions to the machinery sector's labor force, leaving little or no labor growth for the civilian sector.

Current estimates of Soviet military spending, in rubles from the early 1970s through the early 1980s, show a significant increase at a rate faster than overall economic growth. As a result, throughout the

entirely new class of aircraft carrier that will be about 65,000 tons displacement.

-- The second unit of the 28,000-ton nuclear-powered KIROV-Class cruisers has joined the Soviet fleet. A third unit of these heavily armed guided-missile cruisers is on the building ways.

-- Nine separate classes of Soviet submarines are in production, these classes include four nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of carrying the new SS-NX-21 land-attack sea-launched cruise missile.

-- The Su-27/FLANKER all-weather, air-superiority fighter will soon be deployed, further adding to the capability of Soviet tactical aircraft.

The Soviet military is not a home-based garrison force as attested by the more than 30 ready divisions forward-deployed throughout Eastern Europe, the divisions in combat in Afghanistan, the brigade in Cuba, and military advisers throughout the Third World. The Soviet Navy is the most visible element of the USSR's growing global reach. In Vietnam, for example, the Soviets have transformed Cam Ranh Bay into their largest forward deployment naval base in the world, adding more Tul6/BADGERS and a squadron of MiG-23/FLOGGER fighters. As the Navy adds to the capabilities of its submarine, surface, and air units, the USSR continues to press for greater access to overseas facilities for its Armed Forces and continues to support the establishment and strengthening of regimes sympathetic to and supportive of Soviet purposes. The continuing flow of increasingly advanced weapons to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is a prime example.

Soviet Military Power 1985 examines the unceasing introduction of new nuclear and conventional Soviet military capabilities. It examines the doctrine guiding the organization, control, and employment of Soviet forces, and it chronicles key developments in each element of the Soviet Armed Forces, highlighting the continuing increases in Soviet military power.

To contribute to a clearer understanding of these forces and their capabilities, this year's edition of Soviet Military Power not only draws on the 1984 NATO force comparisons study, but also provides comparative data on developments in US forces. These comparative data serve to highlight even more vividly the magnitude and the dimensions of the threatening challenge posed by Soviet force developments. As I have noted, comprehensive information on the forces of the U.S. is regularly made available to the public in such publications as the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the Congress and the Military Posture Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is incumbent upon the United States and its allies to have a full and precise understanding of the Soviet challenge as we take the steps necessary to preserve our freedom, to ensure an effective deterrent to the threat and use of force, and, at the same time, to seek genuine and equitable arms reductions, contributing to global stability and to our transcending goal as a free people -- the goal of peace and security.

Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense

(Preceding material for release at 1315 GMT, April 2)



official text

DATE: 04/01/85

(Following is **third** of five segments of advance text. All are embargoed and not for release until 1315 GMT, April 2.)

SOVIETS MAKING MAJOR UPGRADES IN STRATEGIC DEFENSES (6470)
('Strategic Defense and Space Programs' from SMP 1985)

Washington -- The Soviet Union is making major improvements in its deployed strategic defenses and is investing heavily in ABM-related developments, according to "Soviet Military Power 1985," an annual assessment of Soviet military strength by the U.S. Department of Defense.

In a chapter titled "Strategic Defense and Space Programs," the document says strategic defenses are "vital to the overall Soviet strategy for nuclear war. The operations of Soviet defensive and attack forces are closely coupled; attack strategies are geared in large part to the reduction of the defensive burden."

Following is the text of the chapter:

(begin text)

Chapter III

Strategic Defense and Space Programs

Strategic defenses are vital to the overall Soviet strategy for nuclear war. The operations of Soviet defensive and attack forces are closely coupled; attack strategies are geared in large part to the reduction of the defensive burden. In the Soviet concept of a layered defense, effectiveness is achieved through multiple types of defensive capabilities compensating for shortcomings in individual systems and for the likelihood that neither offensive strikes nor any one layer of defense will stop all attacking weapons. The Soviets are making major improvements in their deployed strategic defenses and are investing heavily in ABM-related developments.

Soviet Military Power 1983 and 1984 outlined the continuing expansion into space of the Soviet drive for military superiority. In the past year, some 80 percent of Soviet space launches have been purely military in nature, with much of the remainder serving both military and civil functions. This is an increase from 70 percent in previous years. The Soviet military space program dominates the USSR's overall space effort. Soviet military doctrine establishes requirements for the military space program.

Laser/Energy Weapons Systems

Soviet directed-energy development programs involve future Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) as well as anti-satellite and air-defense weapons concepts.

By the late 1980s, the Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for ballistic missile defense. Testing of the components for a large-scale deployment system could begin in the early 1990s. The many difficulties in fielding an operational system will require much development time, and initial operational deployment is not likely in this century. However, with high priority and some significant risk of failure, the Soviets could skip some testing steps and be ready to deploy a ground-based laser BMD by the early-to-mid-1990s.

Ground- and space-based particle beam weapons for ballistic missile defense will be more difficult to develop than lasers. Nevertheless, the Soviets have a vigorous program underway for



particle beam development and could have a prototype space-based system ready for testing in the late 1990s.

The Soviets have begun to develop at least three types of high-energy laser weapons for air defense. These include lasers intended for defense of high-value strategic targets in the USSR, for point defense of ships at sea, and for air defense of theater forces. Following past practice, they are likely to deploy air defense lasers to complement, rather than replace, interceptors and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The strategic defense laser is probably in at least the prototype stage of development and could be operational by the late 1980s. It most likely will be deployed in conjunction with SAMs in a point defense role. Since the SAM and laser systems would have somewhat different attributes and vulnerabilities, they would provide mutual support. The shipborne lasers probably will not be operational until after the end of the decade. The theater force lasers may be operational sometime sooner and are likely to be capable of structurally damaging aircraft at close ranges and producing electro-optical and eye damage at greater distances.

The Soviets are also developing an airborne laser. Assuming a successful development effort, limited initial deployment could begin in the early 1990s. Such a laser platform could have missions including anti-satellite operations, protection of high-value airborne assets, and cruise missile defense.

The Soviets are working on technologies or have specific weapons-related programs underway for more advanced antisatellite systems. These include space-based kinetic energy, ground- and space-based laser, particle beam, and radiofrequency weapons. The Soviets apparently believe that these techniques offer greater promise for future anti-satellite application than continued development of ground-based orbital interceptors equipped with conventional warheads.

The Soviets also believe that military applications of directed energy technologies hold promise of overcoming weaknesses in their conventional air and missile defenses.

The USSR's high-energy laser program, which dates from the mid-1960s, is much larger than the U.S. effort. They have built over a half dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges, and they have over 10,000 scientists and engineers associated with laser development. They are developing chemical lasers and have continued to work on other high-energy lasers having potential weapons applications -- the gas dynamic laser and the electric discharge laser.

They are also pursuing related laser weapon technologies, such as efficient electrical power sources, and are pursuing capabilities to produce high-quality optical components. They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generator which produces 15 megawatts of short-term electric power -- a device that has no counterpart in the West. The scope of the USSR's military capabilities would depend on its success in developing advanced weapons, including laser weapons for ballistic missile defense.

The Soviets have now progressed beyond technology research, in some cases to the development of prototype laser weapons. They already have ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites. In the late 1980s, they could have prototype space-based laser weapons for use against satellites. In addition, ongoing Soviet programs have progressed to the point where they could include construction of ground-based laser anti-satellite (ASAT) facilities at operational sites. These could be available by the end

3

of the 1980s and would greatly increase the Soviets' laser ASAT capability beyond that currently at their test site at Sary Shagan. They may deploy operational systems of space-based lasers for anti-satellite purposes in the 1990s, if their technology developments prove successful, and they can be expected to pursue development of space-based laser systems for ballistic missile defense for possible deployment after the year 2000.

Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have had a research program to explore the technical feasibility of a particle beam weapon in space. A prototype space-based particle beam weapon intended only to disrupt satellite electronic equipment could be tested in the early 1990s. One designed to destroy satellites could be tested in space in the mid-1990s.

The Soviets have conducted research in the use of strong radio frequency (RF) signals that have the potential to interfere with or destroy components of missiles, satellites, and reentry vehicles. In the 1990s, the Soviets could test a ground-based RF weapon capable of damaging satellites.

Soviet programs for the development and application of directed-energy technologies to strategic defense have been very vigorous in the past and will continue to be so in the future, irrespective of what the U.S. does about new strategic defense initiatives.

In the area of kinetic energy weapons, using the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism, the Soviets have a variety of research programs underway. These programs could result in a near-term, short-range, space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Longer range, space-based systems probably could not be developed until the mid-1990s or even later.

Early Warning

The Soviets maintain the world's most extensive early warning system for both ballistic missile and air defense. Their operational ballistic missile early warning system includes a launch-detection satellite network, over-the-horizon radar, and a series of large phased-array radars located primarily on the periphery of the USSR. Their early warning air surveillance system is composed of an extensive network of ground-based radars linked operationally with those of their Warsaw Pact allies.

The current Soviet launch-detection satellite network is capable of providing about 30 minutes warning of any U.S. ICBM launch and of determining the general area from which it originated. The two over-the-horizon radars the Soviets have directed at the U.S. ICBM fields also could provide them with 30 minutes warning of an ICBM strike launched from the United States, but with somewhat less precision than the satellite network. Working together, these two early warning systems can provide more reliable warning than either working alone.

The next layer of operational ballistic missile early warning consists of 11 large HEN HOUSE detection and tracking radars at six locations on the periphery of the USSR. These radars can distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the satellite and over-the-horizon radar systems, and provide target-tracking data in support of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployments.

Current Soviet air surveillance radar deployments include more than 7,000 radars of various types located at about 1,200 sites.

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these deployments provide virtually complete coverage at medium-to-high altitudes over the USSR and in some areas extend hundreds of kilometers beyond the borders. Moreover, the over-the-horizon radars provide additional warning of the approach of high-flying aircraft. Limited coverage against low-altitude targets is concentrated in the western USSR and in high priority areas elsewhere. Since 1983, the Soviets have begun to deploy two new types of air surveillance radars. These radars assist in the early warning of cruise missile and bomber attacks and enhance air defense electronic warfare capabilities.

The new large phased-array radar for ballistic missile early warning and target-tracking discovered in 1983 in Siberia is still under construction. This new radar closes the final gap in the combined HEN HOUSE and new large phased-array radar early warning and tracking network. Together, this radar and the five others like it form an arc of coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the northwest, around Siberia, to the Caucasus in the southwest. The new radar violates the 1972 ABM Treaty in that it is not located on the periphery of the Soviet Union, nor is it pointed outward as required by the Treaty. Its orientation and function indicate it is for ballistic missile detection and tracking -- not space object tracking as claimed by the Soviets. The complete network of these radars, which could provide target-tracking data for ABM deployments beyond Moscow, probably will be operational by the late 1980s.

The Soviets may establish a network of satellites in geostationary orbit designed to provide timely indications of ballistic missiles, including submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. Such a network could be operational by the end of the decade.

The USSR has a strong research and development program to produce new early warning and other air surveillance radars as well as to improve existing systems. More than 15 types of these radars are currently in development. In addition, the Soviets are continuing to deploy improved air surveillance data systems that can rapidly pass data from outlying radars through the air surveillance network to ground-controlled intercept sites and SAM command posts. These systems will continue to be deployed until all areas are equipped with them.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The Soviets are continuing a major upgrading of their ballistic missile defense capabilities. The Moscow missile defenses are being enlarged and equipped with a new generation of radars and interceptor missiles. Developments aimed at providing the foundation for widespread ABM deployments beyond Moscow are underway.

The new SA-X-12 surface-to-air missile, which incorporates ballistic missile defense capabilities, is nearing operational status, while research on directed-energy BMD technology continues apace.

The Soviets maintain around Moscow the world's only operational ABM system. This system is intended to afford a layer of defense for Soviet civil and military command authorities in the Moscow area during a nuclear war rather than blanket protection for the city itself. Since 1980, the Soviets have been upgrading and expanding this system around Moscow within the limits of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The original single-layer Moscow ABM system included 64 reloadable above-ground launchers at four complexes for the GALOSH ABM-1B, six TRY ADD guidance and engagement radars at each complex,

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and the DOG HOUSE and CAT HOUSE target-tracking radars south of Moscow. The Soviets are upgrading this system to the 100 accountable launchers permitted under the ABM Treaty. When completed, the new system will be a two-layer defense composed of silo-based long-range, modified GALOSH interceptors designed to engage targets outside the atmosphere; silo-based high-acceleration interceptors designed to engage targets within the atmosphere; associated engagement and guidance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. The first new launchers are likely to be operational this year, and the new defenses could be fully operational by 1987.

The Soviets are developing a rapidly deployable ABM system to protect important target areas in the USSR. They have been testing all the types of ABM missiles and radars needed for widespread ABM defenses beyond the 100 launcher limit of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Within the next 10 years, the Soviets could deploy such a system at sites that could be built in months instead of years. A typical site would consist of engagement radars, guidance radars, above-ground launchers, and the high-acceleration interceptor. The new, large phased-array radars under construction in the USSR, along with the HEN HOUSE, DOG HOUSE, CAT HOUSE, and possibly the Pushkino radar, appear to be designed to provide support for such a widespread ABM defense system. The aggregate of the USSR's ABM and ABM-related activities suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

In addition, the Soviets are deploying one surface-to-air missile system, the SA-10, and are flight testing another, the mobile SA-X12. The SA-X-12 is both a tactical SAM and antitactical ballistic missile. It may have the capability to engage the LANCE and both the PERSHING I and PERSHING II ballistic missiles. The SA-10 and SA-X-12 may have the potential to intercept some types of U.S. strategic ballistic missiles as well. These systems could, if properly supported, add significant point-target coverage to a widespread ABM deployment.

Air Defense

The Soviets have deployed numerous strategic and tactical air defense assets that have excellent capabilities against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes. Although their capability to intercept low-flying penetrators is marginal, they are in the midst of a major overhaul geared toward fielding an integrated air defense system much more capable of low-altitude operations. This overhaul includes partial integration of strategic and tactical air defenses; the upgrading of early warning and surveillance capabilities; the deployment of more efficient data transmission systems; and the development and initial deployment of new aircraft, associated air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.

Over the years, the Soviets have invested enormous resources in their air defense systems. This sustained effort has produced an array of weapons systems designed for a variety of air defense applications. For example, they have fielded 13 different surface-to-air missile systems, each designed to cover a specific threat regime.

The Soviets have made significant shifts in the subordination of their air and air defense assets. The reorganization has resulted in a streamlined organization that merged strategic and tactical air and air defense assets in most land border areas of the USSR. The air

defense (APVO) interceptors became part of a new structure, the Air Forces of the Military District (MD), which also includes most of the assets of the former tactical air armies. The Air Forces of an MD include all air assets in their geographic area (excluding Strategic Aviation and transport assets). These assets can be used either offensively or defensively as the situation requires. The new structure improves defensive capabilities, but its most significant impact is on the capability to conduct massed offensive air operations. Technological advances in weapons systems and in command, control, and communications have made its implementation possible.

In terms of numbers alone, Soviet strategic and tactical air defense forces are impressive. Moreover, with the continuing deployment of new systems like the SA-10 SAM and impending deployment of the SA-X-12, these numbers are increasing along with capability. Currently, the Soviets have nearly 10,000 SAM launchers at over 1,200 sites for strategic defense, along with more than 4,000 launch vehicles for tactical SAMs, subordinated to nearly 445 launch units. More than 1,200 interceptors are dedicated to strategic defense, while an additional 2,800 Soviet Air Forces (SAF) interceptors could also be used. Further, the Soviets are continuing the MAINSTAY AWACS aircraft program and test and evaluation is underway. The MAINSTAY will substantially improve Soviet capabilities for early warning and air combat command and control, especially against low-flying aircraft. The MAINSTAY will also provide Soviet air defenses with overland and overwater capabilities to detect aircraft and cruise missile targets flying at low altitudes. Additionally, the MAINSTAY could be used to help direct fighter operations over European and Asian battlefields and to enhance air surveillance and defense of the USSR. MAINSTAY production could be about five aircraft per year.

The 1,200 all-weather interceptors assigned to strategic defense are primarily based in central air defense regions of the Soviet Union, in addition to fighter/interceptors subordinate to the military districts that are generally located on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The interceptor force is composed of a wide variety of aircraft with varying capabilities.

The deployment of the supersonic MiG-31/ FOXHOUND interceptor, the first Soviet aircraft with a true look-down/shoot-down and multiple-target engagement capability, continued during 1984. The FOXHOUND, comparable in size to the US F-14 TOMCAT, is deployed at several locations from the Arkhangelsk area to the Far East Military District. More than 70 of these aircraft are operational.

The MiG-25/FOXBAT A/E is a high-altitude, high-speed interceptor that comprises approximately one-quarter of the strategic interceptor force. The upgrade program of the FOXBAT A to the newer FOXBAT E configuration provides a limited look-down radar capability. The remaining FOXBAT A aircraft are expected to be modified to the FOXBAT E configuration during 1985.

The MiG-23/FLOGGER B/G fighter comprises approximately one-third of the total strategic interceptor forces. This variable-geometry-wing fighter is equipped with a limited look-down radar. The remaining aircraft employed as interceptors (the older FLAGON, FIDDLER, and FIREBAR) comprise less than one-third of the force.

Two new fighter-interceptors, the Su-27/ FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM, have true look-down/shoot-down capabilities. The FULCRUM is a single-seat, twin-engine fighter similar in size to the

US F-16. First deployments of the FULCRUM to the Soviet Air Force military districts have begun, and more than 30 are now operational. The FLANKER is a larger, single-seat, twin-engine fighter similar in size to the U.S. F-15. Both aircraft have been designed to be highly maneuverable in air-to-air combat.

The three latest Soviet fighter-interceptor aircraft are equipped with two new air-to-air missiles, the AA-9 designed for the FOXHOUND and the AA-10 designed for the FULCRUM and the FLANKER. The AA-9 is a long-range missile that can be used against low-flying targets; the AA-10 is a medium-range missile with similar capabilities.

The FLANKER and the FULCRUM, as well as the FOXHOUND, are likely to operate under certain circumstances with the new MAINTSTAY AWACS aircraft.

Soviet strategic SAMs form barrier, area, and terminal defenses. They afford broad coverage for medium- and high-altitude defenses under all weather conditions. Five systems are operational -- the SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and SA-10. Of these, only the SA-10 is capable of defending against targets with a small radar-cross-section such as cruise missiles.

The first SA-10 site reached operational status in 1980. Nearly 60 sites are now operational and work is underway on at least another 30. More than half of these sites are located near Moscow. This emphasis on Moscow and the patterns noted for the other SA-10 sites suggest a first priority on terminal defense of wartime command and control, military, and key industrial complexes. Over the years, the Soviets have continued to deploy the long-range SA-5 and have modified the system repeatedly. Further deployment and upgrading of the SA-5 to enhance its capability to work in conjunction with low-altitude systems like the SA-10 are likely in the future. In keeping with their drive toward mobility as a means of weapons survival, the Soviets are developing a mobile version of the SA-10 SAM. This mobile version could be used to support Soviet theater forces but, perhaps more importantly, if deployed with the territorial defense forces, it would allow the Soviets to change the location of SA-10 sites in the USSR. The mobile SA-10 could be operational sometime this year. The 1980 air defense reorganization permits efficient integration of strategic and tactical SAM systems. Most tactical SAMs are not as range-capable as strategic SAMs, but many have better low-altitude capabilities. A mixed and integrated system of aircraft, SAMs, and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) provides the Soviet Union with the most comprehensive air defense system in the world. Over 4,600 SAM launcher vehicles and 11,500 AAA pieces are deployed at regimental through front level. In addition, as many as 25,000 shoulder-fired SAM launchers are found at battalion and company level and with non-divisional units. The standard air defense for a tank or motorized rifle regiment is a battery of SA-9/13 SAMs and ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AAA pieces. The SA-9 system, mounted on a wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), is being replaced by the SA-13 on a tracked TEL. A follow-on to the ZSU-23/4 is expected shortly. The standard SAM at division level is the SA-6 or SA-8, although some divisions still have an AAA-equipped air defense regiment. A new division-level SAM, the SA-11, is beginning to enter the inventory. It features an onboard radar that increases mobility and target-handling capability. The standard weapon at army and front levels is the SA-4, soon to be replaced by the SA-X-12. The SA-X-12 has good low-altitude air defense capabilities as well as the

ballistic missile defense capabilities noted above. Soviet tactical SAM development is both broad-based and active. New tactical SAMs and improvements to older ones are now under development. The largest concentration of SAM launchers and AAA pieces -- over 8,100 -- is found opposite European NATO; over 4,200 are opposite the Sino-Soviet border and in the Far East; there embrace the territorial leadership, national economy, and general population. The Soviets regard passive defense as an essential ingredient of their overall military posture and war planning. In conjunction with active forces, the Soviets plan for a passive defense program to ensure the survival and wartime continuity of:

- Soviet leadership;
- military command and control entities;
- war-supporting industrial production and services;
- the essential workforce; and
- as much of the general population as possible.

As this program has expanded, elements of it have been designated by the Soviets as "civil defense." Use of this term in its normal Western context does not convey the full scope of Soviet Civil Defense.

Extensive planning for the transition of the entire State and economy to a wartime posture has been fundamental to Soviet passive defense preparations. The Soviet General Staff and Civil Defense officials have supervised the development of special organizations and procedures to implement a rapid transition to war and have emphasized the mobilization and protection of all national resources essential to the successful prosecution of war and recovery.

The senior Soviet military establishment has also supervised the 30-year program to construct hardened command posts and survivable communications for key military commanders and civilian managers at all levels of the Party and government. Likewise, protective hardening, dispersal, and wartime production plans for Soviet industry have all been coordinated with the wartime requirements of the military and supervised by Civil Defense personnel. The protection of the general population through evacuation procedures and extensive sheltering in or near urban areas is the most visible aspect of the passive defense program.

The passive defense program reflects the Soviets' belief of their wartime need. The wartime management system would be the militarized system of national administration in which peacetime government bodies become Civil Defense components under direct military subordination. This would extend to Soviet territorial administration at all levels and to specialized functional components such as industrial, transport, power, and communications ministries. Soviet authorities at all levels would serve as uniformed chiefs of Civil Defense and command their respective organizations in a military capacity. Soviet Civil Defense thus serves both as a vehicle to administer peacetime preparations and training and as the infrastructure that would keep together civil and military bodies in the unified wartime management systems.

Soviet commanders and managers at all levels of the Party and government are provided hardened alternate command posts located well away from urban centers. This comprehensive and redundant system, composed of more than 1,500 hardened facilities with special communications, is patterned after similar capabilities afforded the Armed Forces. More than 175,000 key personnel throughout the system

are believed to be equipped with such alternate facilities in addition to the many deep bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities.

Soviet passive defense efforts include measures to maintain essential production and services even during a nuclear war. Elaborate plans have been set for the full mobilization of the national economy in support of the war effort and the conversion to wartime production. Reserves of vital materials are maintained, many in hardened underground structures. Redundant industrial facilities have been built and are in active production. Industrial and other economic facilities have been equipped with blast shelters for the workforce, and detailed procedures have been developed for the relocation of selected plants and equipment. By ensuring the survival of essential workers, the Soviets intend to reconstitute vital production programs using those industrial components that can be redirected or salvaged after an attack.

The annual military and civilian cost of four elements of the program -- pay and allowances for full-time Civil Defense personnel; operation of specialized military Civil Defense units; construction and maintenance of facilities for these units; and shelter construction -- is less than 1 percent of the estimated Soviet defense budget. If duplicated in the United States, these four elements would cost roughly \$3 billion annually. The cost of construction and equipment for leadership relocation sites over the past 25 years is between 8 and 16,000 million rubles, or 28-56,000 million if acquired in the United States.

North American Defense Forces

United States and Canadian interceptor forces assigned to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) maintain continuous ground alert at sites around the periphery of the United States and Canada. Alert aircraft intercept and identify unknown intruders. At present, there are no SAMs for US continental air defense. In a crisis, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could provide additional interceptors. Supported by AWACS aircraft, these forces could provide a limited defense against bomber attacks.

To meet the increasing Soviet bomber and air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) threats, U.S. interceptor squadrons assigned to NORAD are being equipped with newer more advanced F-15 and F-16 aircraft. These modern fighters will provide a look-down/ shoot-down capability to detect and engage enemy bombers penetrating at low altitudes. The Canadians are upgrading their air defense forces with the CF-18. Joint United States and Canadian improvements to long-range surveillance include modern microwave radars for the Distant Early Warning line and over-the-horizon back-scatter radars looking east, west, and south.

Soviet space-oriented military systems pose a threat to the land, sea, and air forces of the United States. Some Soviet satellites are designed to support targeting of Soviet antiship cruise missiles launched against U.S. surface ships. The U.S. ASAT program, centering on the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle, is part of the response to this and similar threats.

Finally, the United States has called for a research program to explore the possibility of strengthening deterrence by taking advantage of recent advances in technology that could, in the long term, provide an effective defense against ballistic missiles. This Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is discussed in the concluding chapter.

The Soviet Space Program

The Soviets believe in the combined arms concept of warfare in which all types of forces are integrated into military operations to achieve the desired goals. Space assets play a major role in this equation in the areas of anti-satellite warfare, intelligence collection, command, control, and communications, meteorological support, navigational support, and targeting. The military support systems are linked to ground, naval, and air forces through earth terminals. Thus, Soviet forces can receive orders and information via satellite from command headquarters thousands of miles away. Their reliance on these systems is growing. Space weapons also play an important role in their strategic operations.

The late Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii included space in a statement defining the modern concept of a theater of military operations. The Soviet drive to use space for military purposes is an integral part of Soviet military planning. The Soviet coorbital ASAT system, while launched from the ground, is a space weapon system. The Soviets also have two ground-based lasers that are capable of attacking satellites in various orbits. These systems suggest that the Soviets are willing to use space for military purposes that are more ominous than those for which it has been used thus far.

The Soviets are currently developing a version of the U.S. space shuttle, a heavy-lift booster system, a space plane, and directed-energy weapons and have engaged in military-related experiments aboard the SALYUT-7 space station. The Soviets continue to pursue their manned space programs, maintaining in orbit the SALYUT space station, which is manned during most of the year. This gives the Soviets the capability to perform a variety of functions from space, including military R&D and using man to augment their other reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. In addition, there are other developments indicating Soviet research on space-based ballistic missile defense.

Anti-satellite Systems. Since 1971, the Soviets have had the capability to attack satellites in near-earth orbit with a ground-based orbital interceptor. Using a radar sensor and a pellet-type warhead, the interceptor can attack a target in various orbits during the interceptor's first two revolutions. An intercept during the first orbit would minimize the time available for a target satellite to take evasive action. The interceptor can reach targets orbiting at more than 5,000 kilometers, but it probably is intended for high-priority satellites at lower altitudes. The anti-satellite interceptor is launched from Tyuratam, where launch pads and storage space for interceptors and launch vehicles are available. Several interceptors could be launched each day. In addition to the orbital interceptor, the Soviets have two ground-based, high-energy lasers with antisatellite capabilities. The Soviets also have the technological capability to conduct electronic warfare against space systems and could use their ABM interceptors in a direct-ascent attack on low-orbiting satellites.

Space Boosters. The Soviets currently maintain eight space launch systems that are used to place objects in orbits ranging from low-earth to geosynchronous and beyond. They are developing two more systems -- a TITAN Class medium-lift launch vehicle and a SATURN V-Class heavy-lift vehicle. Also, they are developing their version of the U.S. shuttle orbiter, which seems almost identical to its U.S. counterpart, except for the absence of main engines. It is estimated

that the new heavy-lift vehicle will be used to launch their orbiter as well as other large payloads. This vehicle should be able to lift as much as 150,000 kilograms to low-earth orbit, giving the USSR a tremendous capability to orbit heavy objects, such as the components for a large, manned space complex. The estimate for the medium-lift vehicle is a payload capacity of approximately 15,000 kilograms. This system may be used to launch their space plane, discussed below.

Manned Space Program. The Soviets have emphasized man in space since the beginning of their space program. In 1961 they placed the first man into orbit. Their SALYUT space stations have accommodated cosmonauts for extended periods, setting several records in the process. In 1984, three cosmonauts set a new record, spending 237 days aboard SALYUT 7. In 1982, two Soviet cosmonauts spent 211 days aboard the space station. At the end of 1984, Soviet cosmonauts had accumulated 3,691 mandays in space, compared to the U.S. astronaut total of 1,289. In the spring of 1984, Soviet cosmonauts demonstrated their capability to perform on-orbit maintenance and repair by conducting extra-vehicular activity (EVA) five times, gaining valuable experience in on-orbit repairs. During one EVA, the cosmonauts added new solar panels to SALYUT 7. During another EVA, the Soviets accomplished another space first -- a space walk by a female cosmonaut, Svetlana Savitskaya.

The Soviets have made known their plans to replace SALYUT 7 with large space complexes, supporting 20 or more cosmonauts on a permanent basis. Such a complex will enhance their space-based military support and warfighting capabilities. Missions could include military R&D, on-orbit repair of satellites, reconnaissance, imagery interpretation, ASAT support operations, and ballistic missile defense support operations. Their shuttle orbiter will likely be used to ferry cosmonauts to this station as well as to place satellites in orbit.

The Soviets apparently have already found some military utility in their manned space program. They have stated that "earth surface surveys" were conducted during past manned missions, but none of the photographs has ever been published. The continuation of photographic and other missions aboard SALYUT 7 indicates the Soviets are aware of the potential value of manned space stations in an actual wartime situation.

The Soviets have been experimenting with a test vehicle that is apparently a scale model of a larger, manned space plane. This vehicle has been orbited unmanned on four occasions, landing in water each time. Similar in appearance to the earlier US Dyna Soar craft, this plane's possible missions include reconnaissance, crew transport, satellite repair and maintenance, and ASAT operations. It could also be used as a manned space station defender. A clue to its purpose is found in a 1965 Soviet definition of antispace defense: "A component part of air defense. The main purpose antispace defense is to destroy space systems used by the enemy for military purposes, in their orbits. The principal means of anti-space defense are special spacecraft and vehicles (e.g., satellite interceptors), which may be controlled either from the ground or by special crews."

The Soviets have openly discussed their plans for ambitious planetary exploration in spite of their apparent decision not to match U.S. lunar expeditions. In 1992, the conditions for a launch to Mars will be favorable, and the Soviets are considering a manned expedition to that planet at that time. They have stated that the recent manning of the SALYUT space station for increasingly longer periods of time is

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to stimulate the time it would take to conduct a Mars mission. This timeframe also coincides with the 75th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and with the 500th anniversary of Columbus' discovery of the New World. Such an expedition would add great prestige to the Soviet Union and would further demonstrate the capability of its space technology.

Military Space Systems. Soviet space systems dedicated to military missions include satellites that perform reconnaissance, missile-launch detection and attack warning, command and control, and ASAT operations. Dual-purpose satellites that perform some civilian functions are used for communications, navigational support, and weather prediction and monitoring. The United States has no counterpart to Soviet ocean reconnaissance satellites, the Electronic Intelligence Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (EORSAT), or the nuclear-powered Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (RORSAT). Their mission is to detect, locate, and target U.S. and Allied naval forces for destruction by anti-ship weapons launched from Soviet platforms. These systems track naval and merchant shipping. Four such satellites were launched in 1984, two of which were of the same type (RORSAT) that crashed in 1978, one spreading radioactive debris across northern Canada.

The Soviets have recently employed a new radar-carrying satellite system. Designed for mapping ice formations in polar regions, these satellites will greatly enhance the ability of the Soviet Navy to operate in icebound areas. The system can be used to aid in the navigation of northern sea routes to assist in moving naval ships from construction yards in the western USSR to new ports in the Pacific.

The launch rate of satellites to geostationary orbits has risen in recent years. In the period 1974-78, one to two launches per year were conducted. In 1979, the rate increased to five per year, and eight launches occurred in 1984. These satellites are presumed to be for communications, although not all may have been for that purpose. The Soviets have filed their intent with international organizations to place almost 40 satellites in 21 different positions in the geostationary belt. Many of these satellites are years overdue, but the Soviets are apparently determined to fill the announced slots. The Soviets are also in the early stages of developing a satellite system called GLONASS, which, when fully developed, should provide the Soviets with accurate positioning data worldwide.

For the most part, Soviet satellites do not have lifetimes as long as those of their U.S. counterparts. This is especially true of their reconnaissance platforms, necessitating frequent launches of replacements. However, the Soviets have shown great flexibility in maintaining these systems in orbit, augmenting them with extra satellites as warranted by changing situations. They have demonstrated a launch surge capability that could be a distinct advantage in time of hostilities. In 1984, the Soviets orbited a reconnaissance satellite that stayed in orbit far longer than previous ones. This could indicate a new system or an advanced modification of an old one, demonstrating their increasing sophistication and capabilities.

In late 1984, a new Soviet auxiliary ship was seen arrayed with extensive radomes and antennae. The ship, named after the first commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshal M.I. Nedelin, appears to be a new space and missile support ship capable of a variety of missions, including support to strategic forces worldwide.

On its maiden voyage the NEDELIN transited directly from the Baltic to the port of Vladivostok, the headquarters of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. This ship will significantly upgrade the Soviet capability to test new generations of missiles as well as support the expanding Soviet space program. The NEDELIN joins a growing fleet of Soviet space support ships that provide assistance to manned and unmanned missions. An additional ship of the NEDELIN-Class is under construction.

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(Following is **fourth** of five segments of text of "Soviet Military Power 1985")

SOVIETS SEEK ROLE AS 'DOMINANT WORLD FORCE' (8230)
('Global Ambitions' from 'Soviet Military Power 1985')

Washington -- The U.S. Defense Department's publication, "Soviet Military Power 1985," sees a determined Soviet effort to extend Moscow's power and influence throughout the world, to promote the Soviet Union as the dominant world force.

In a chapter titled "Global Ambitions," the new document says the quest for additional overseas facilities, matched by the Soviet Union's continuing improvements in strategic mobility and the growth in the Soviet Navy's distant-area capabilities, is "part of the unceasing effort by the USSR to give its Armed Forces enhanced global capabilities."

This effort, the document says, is coupled with the Soviet Union's use of "all other instruments of power projection -- military assistance, diplomacy, trade, aid, propaganda and espionage -- in its determined effort to extend Soviet power and influence throughout the world to promote the USSR as the dominant world force."

Following is the text of the chapter:

(begin text)

Chapter VII

Global Ambitions

The Soviet Union has long sought a dominant role in the international arena. The most visible aspect of Soviet ambitions has been territorial expansion. Prior to World War II, the Soviet Union's efforts to extend its influence and control beyond its national borders resulted in the annexation of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and the absorption of territory from Romania and Finland. Following the war, the Soviets annexed territory from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Japan. Similar moves were made against Iran and Austria but were rebuffed by Western actions. The annexations and the imposition of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, transformed the Red Army from a force for enforcing Communist goals in the homeland into an offensive arm of Soviet imperialism.

The creation of strong alliances by the West has helped halt the Soviets' territorial expansion in the east and west, although these alliances have not diminished Soviet desires to be the dominant world force. A major manifestation of the Soviet Union's global ambitions since the 1960s has been its steadily expanding presence and reach beyond Soviet borders to the most distant oceans and throughout the Third World. Reflecting the continuing increase in Soviet military force capabilities, this military presence abroad has supported a continuing, aggressive Soviet foreign policy aimed at expansion of Soviet influence around the world.

As the USSR's ability to project power has improved, the Soviet forces abroad have grown apace and today include:

- worldwide naval and air deployments;
- frontline combat forces positioned throughout Eastern Europe and Mongolia and engaged in battle in Afghanistan;
- additional ground and air defense troops in Cuba and the



Middle East, and

-- military technicians and security advisers in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

In extending its military reach, the Soviet Union has developed a global network of communications and intelligence collection sites; it has underwritten the military combat, support, and advisory roles of its Cuban and East European proxies; and it has tenaciously pursued increased access to military facilities -- land, sea, and air -- in a growing number of Third World nations.

The attainment of rough strategic nuclear parity with the United States by the mid-1970s, combined with the fielding of large, modern ground and air forces and increased naval and airlift assets, provided the Soviet Union with a stronger base for the implementation of more aggressive activities abroad. Events in the Third World also provided new opportunities for Soviet involvement. The results have often been less successful than the Soviets hoped, but in a number of instances, Soviet activities have worked to the detriment of Western interests. The outbreak of civil war in Angola provided an opening for the Soviets and their Cuban allies to install a pro-Soviet regime. In Ethiopia, following the overthrow of Haile Selassie and the subsequent request for Soviet aid by the new regime, the Soviets and Cubans were quick to respond with massive military aid, military advisers, and Cuban combat forces. That significant Soviet and Cuban presence continues today. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the ensuing Sino-Vietnamese clash led to Soviet access to Vietnamese naval and air facilities. In Central America, guerrilla movements presented new opportunities for Soviet, East European, and Cuban exploitation.

Military Assets Abroad

Given the effectiveness of Alliance deterrence since the end of the Second World War, the Third World has taken on new importance to Soviet strategists. Soviet or proxy forces now regularly appear -- and are often used -- during regional crises or confrontations. Approximately 24,000 military advisers -- quadruple the 1965 figure -- are stationed in about 30 countries. Soviet combat or air defense units have operated in Afghanistan, Cuba, Syria, and Vietnam. Naval aircraft are stationed in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and Vietnam and periodically deploy to Cuba, Angola, Syria, and Libya. Soviet military transport aircraft are on loan to various countries. Naval communications facilities are in Cuba, Angola, South Yemen, and Vietnam. Intelligence collection sites have been established in Cuba, South Yemen, and Vietnam.

In addition to the presence of these forces, the Soviets are striving to develop and sustain an interlocking and pervasive infrastructure of influence through treaties of friendship, active and informal alliances, penetration and training of Third World military cadres, the acquisition of overflight rights, and a world-wide base support system for the Soviet forces.

The USSR currently has limited capability to inject home-based military forces quickly into rapidly changing overseas situations. In order to advance its interests further, the Soviet Union is placing considerable reliance on the enhancement and use of in-place military assets abroad, both in peacetime and during regional crises.

The Soviet Navy is the most visible element of the Soviet Union's forward military presence. The Navy has vastly increased its capabilities since the mid-1960s for the projection of power. Except for combat forces in Afghanistan, no other Soviet military asset has

played as significant a role in Soviet policy toward the Third World. Soviet Naval forces can play roles of major significance in power projection in peacetime -- with missions ranging from showing the flag to threatening strategic areas and waterways -- in regional conflicts, as well as in the initial period of global hostilities. Despite geographic constraints on its forces and limited operational flexibility in distant areas, the Soviet Union's military and political strategy in the Third World has been tailored to maximize its strengths while minimizing weaknesses. In general, this strategy has yielded relatively high returns for the Soviets.

The acquisition of and access to facilities in the Third World are integral parts of the Soviet Union's policy of extending its global reach. These bases, ports, and anchorages contribute to the operational readiness of Soviet naval air, surface, and submarine forces. Access to facilities for Soviet combatants, auxiliaries, and aircraft includes understandings with Third World countries for occasional port visits, berthside provisioning and minor maintenance, bunkering of fuel oil, and use of local shipyards for repair or overhaul; it also includes, however, the additional right in some countries to construct and operate exclusive installations for the support of land, sea, and air units; for command and control; for logistics storage; housing of personnel; and intelligence collection.

From the USSR's perspective, the acquisition of naval access privileges in nations bordering distant deployment waters serves both operational and political purposes. Operationally, the Soviets' use of foreign facilities contributes to their ability to sustain worldwide deployments. It provides an opportunity for peacetime reconnaissance of Western naval forces that could extend into the early stages of hostilities. Politically, naval forces abroad can reinforce the Soviets' response to regional crises, underscore their commitment to specific policies or local regimes, and support their efforts either to strengthen ties or to destabilize individual governments.

The USSR has succeeded in gaining military access to countries where the local regime needed military support against domestic opponents, was faced with a major external threat, or desired Soviet military or economic aid. Currently, every country in the Third World having Soviet military facilities or providing military access has been the recipient of substantial Soviet arms aid, political support, or a combination of both.

Access to overseas facilities, deployed repair ships, and protected anchorages extend time-on-station of both Soviet naval surface combatants and submarines. Land-based sites offer redundant communications links and improved reception in distant areas. The fivefold increase in the amount of time Soviet naval air units have spent in overseas deployments since 1979 reflects the increasingly important contribution of such aircraft to Soviet ocean surveillance capabilities, which also include satellites, shore-based high-frequency direction-finding sites, naval combatants, merchant and fishing ships, and human sources.

The Soviets now have military sites and capabilities in every major region of the world. Cuba is the USSR's most important ally in the Third World and is the base for Soviet access to the Caribbean and Latin America. Vietnam may eventually play a similar role in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. A Soviet combat brigade of more than 2,500 men is continuously deployed in Cuba and engages in regular

field training exercises.

Cuba's proximity to the United States greatly enhances Soviet intelligence collection activities. Access to Cuban naval and air facilities provides valuable benefits to the Soviets in peacetime and could be advantageous in wartime. If the Soviet Union decided to pursue an even more active military role in the region, Cuba would have more than sufficient port capacity for the naval surface and submarine forces the Soviets might wish to deploy to the area. Cuban airfields, which already provide intermittent basing for surveillance aircraft, could serve as recovery bases for bombers, thereby extending the range that Soviet planes would have for attack missions in the region. Massive Soviet military aid and training assistance have raised the status of Cuban military and paramilitary forces to the position of the second largest military power in the Western hemisphere. In addition to its usefulness as a Soviet proxy, Cuba now has the capability to threaten sea and air lines of communication in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the southeastern United States.

In Africa, Soviet naval ships of the West African Patrol have the capability to intervene in regional crises. Operating astride vital international sea routes in the southern Atlantic, where the West does not routinely operate naval or air units, the Soviet patrol could inflict damage and disruption out of proportion to its size and offensive capability should conflict occur. The largest Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA) detachment abroad is deployed to Angola. Soviet Navy maritime patrol aircraft fly missions over the Indian Ocean from Al-Anad airfield in South Yemen. A naval repair and replenishment facility at Dahlak Island in the Red Sea provides support for the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron, which normally ranges from 20 to 25 units, including surface combatants, attack and cruise missile submarines, and auxiliaries. South Yemen's port of Aden and Socotra Island also support and provide anchorages for Soviet naval ships. The Soviet communication and intelligence collection facilities in South Yemen could greatly assist the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron's capabilities during any crisis.

The Mediterranean and the Middle East have historically been the most active regions of the Third World for Soviet military forces. The Mediterranean Squadron, which includes cruisers, frigates, destroyers, attack submarines, intelligence collection ships, and auxiliaries, is one of the largest, most capable Soviet naval forces operating beyond the USSR's home waters. During peacetime, the Squadron spends time on the surveillance of Western naval forces. The Squadron also supports Soviet interests by its influence-exerting presence on the nations of the Mediterranean littoral and its military support for client countries. Access to ports in the region, such as Tartus, Syria, allows the Squadron to deploy for extended periods without returning to home waters for maintenance and repair.

Soviet advisory personnel provide a ready capability to aid a client state during a crisis -- aid ranging from increased participation in the operation of sophisticated equipment for the client state's armed forces to covert participation in combat operations. For example, Soviet advisory personnel in Syria are being used to improve the overall effectiveness of the Syrian Armed Forces. The SA-5 surface-to-air missile equipment in Syria, in addition to enhancing Syria's air defense, provides a dramatic symbol of Soviet support. The potential stationing of Soviet troops in Syria, while of questionable military utility, would send a strong political message

to both Syria and its potential foes. In the event of war, the Mediterranean Squadron would be tasked with gaining sea control of the eastern Mediterranean and protecting the Soviet Union's southwestern flank. Soviet pilots serving as advisers in Syria, and to a lesser extent in Libya, could be used to fly reconnaissance or combat missions in the region.

In Asia, Soviet forces and facilities in Afghanistan could provide an established support base in the event of military operations in the Persian Gulf area and against Pakistan. Development of Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, into a Soviet facility of increasing importance has allowed the Soviets to sustain the growth of its naval and naval air forces in the South China Sea. Cam Ranh is now the center of the largest concentration of Soviet naval units outside the USSR. Approximately 30 units -- including surface combatants, conventional and nuclear-powered submarines, and naval auxiliaries -- operate in the South China Sea. The adjacent air base supports long-range naval reconnaissance, strike, and tactical fighter aircraft. This base provides the Soviets with strategic geographic positioning from which to follow U.S. operations in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean. Operating from this base, Soviet air and naval forces could strike U.S. military units and bases in the Pacific as well as interdict sea lines of communication in the South China Sea. Soviet signal intelligence facilities in Vietnam, combined with reconnaissance aircraft operating from Cam Ranh Bay, provide Soviet military forces with significant capabilities in peacetime or wartime to monitor U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific.

Instruments of Power Projection

The Soviets have been persistent in their efforts to gain influence and deter Western access to the Third World. They have followed a somewhat pragmatic approach in dealing with governments and opposition groups regardless of their ideological views. In addition to deployed forces, the Soviets have developed a variety of instruments to gain access and influence, including treaties of friendship, military assistance, the use of proxies, naval port calls, visits by high-level dignitaries, limited economic aid, propaganda, and covert activities.

Military assistance has been the most effective Soviet foreign policy instrument. From 1955 through 1984, the Soviets delivered almost 90,000 million dollars worth of arms to Third World clients. The training of client state personnel and the dispatch of advisers and instructors are major parts of the Soviet arms export package. Over the past three decades, some 69,000 Third World military personnel have received training in the USSR and other Communist countries. The Soviets also make extensive use of proxies to act in their behalf, promoting military coercion and terror in the Third World. The most active of these proxies are Cuba, Vietnam, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Economic and humanitarian aid, however, is meager. For example, the USSR has not made a major contribution to the relief of starvation in Ethiopia.

Soviet activities in the Third World contribute to a strategy designed to undermine U.S. and Western influence by creating instability while avoiding direct confrontation. Soviet aims in the Third World are to:

- promote the destabilization of democratic, pro-Western governments;

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- assist in the accession to power of Communist regimes and strengthen their control over the indigenous populations;
- gain access to overseas air and naval facilities;
- obtain political support from Third World countries;
- increase the potential to limit or impede Western access to strategic resources; and
- increase the USSR's prestige and standing as a global superpower.

Latin America

Soviet involvement in the Caribbean Basin has increased markedly over the past few years. The Soviet approach has been varied and tailored to the conditions found in different countries in the region. The strategic objective of the USSR, supported by Cuba and Nicaragua, is to install pro-Soviet regimes in as many nations as possible throughout the region. "Soviet Military Power 1984" chronicled the failure of the Soviet and Cuban effort in Grenada. This setback notwithstanding, the USSR pressed ahead with its Western Hemisphere strategy in 1984. Cuba plays a vital role in Soviet strategy by serving as a base from which to expand Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba's importance to the USSR is reflected in the massive amount of economic aid and subsidies provided -- some 4,100 million dollars in 1983 and an estimated 4,000 million in 1984 -- the presence of 6,000 to 8,000 civilian advisers and technicians, over 7,000 military personnel, and the provision of over 5,000 million dollars in military aid to date. From 1981 through 1984, the Soviets delivered almost 3,000 million dollars in military equipment to Cuba. This massive military buildup has modernized and expanded the country's military capabilities and facilitated the transshipment of weapons throughout the region in support of guerrillas. Soviet military arms to Cuba also serve as Soviet payment for the use of Cuban facilities by Soviet forces.

In addition to the presence of the combat brigade, the USSR uses Cuba for both naval and naval air deployments. In March-April 1984, for example, a Soviet task force, including the helicopter carrier LENINGRAD, the lead unit of the new UDALOY-Class of destroyers, and the oiler IVAN BUBNOV deployed to Cuba for Caribbean operations -- the 23rd Soviet naval task group to deploy to the Caribbean since 1969. The 24th Soviet task group arrived at Havana at the end of December 1984. The Soviets use these deployments for joint training with the Cuban Navy and to establish a periodic Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean. In addition, Northern Fleet Tu-95/BEAR D and Tu-142/BEAR F naval reconnaissance and antisubmarine aircraft have made some 50 deployments to Cuba. The Soviets also have extensive signal intelligence facilities in Cuba. At the Lourdes complex near Havana, the Soviets have three separate sites dedicated to signals intelligence collection. These sites are targeted primarily against U.S. commercial satellites.

In Nicaragua, the Soviets are openly supporting the government and have induced other socialist or sympathetic nations to provide additional assistance. An estimated 40 to 50 Soviet military personnel are in Nicaragua. The Soviet military contingent is augmented by military advisory groups similar in size from East Germany, from the Middle East (PLO and Libya), and from North Korea. Approximately 6,000 Cubans, including about 3,000 military and security personnel, are now in Nicaragua. The Soviets, along with their Cuban counterparts, act as advisers to key members of the Armed

Forces. Soviet military personnel are also closely involved in plans to reorganize and improve the Nicaraguan military services, particularly the Air Force. Soviet pilots and technicians accompanied deliveries of An-2/COLT transport planes and about ten Mi-8/HIP helicopters that began in 1981. Soviet advisers are now assisting Nicaraguan forces with the even more capable Mi-24/HIND D attack helicopters delivered in 1984. Nicaragua now has about 150 tanks, including some 120 Soviet T-55 medium tanks and nearly 30 light amphibious tanks, as well as 200 other armored vehicles, which provide mobility that Nicaragua's neighbors cannot match. Nicaragua has also steadily built up its inventory of other military vehicles. Additionally, the deployment of some 50 Soviet 152-mm and 122-mm howitzers and 24 122-mm multiple rocket launchers from Soviet Bloc suppliers has been confirmed. The rocket launchers and howitzers, in addition to 350 tanks and armored vehicles, give Nicaragua firepower and mobility unequalled in the region.

Looking further at the military infrastructure of Nicaragua, one major new airfield is under construction and significant improvements are being made to four others.

Preparations for introducing Soviet combat aircraft into Nicaragua have been underway for more than four years. In 1980, a first group of Nicaraguans was sent to Eastern Europe for flight training in MiGs. Palestine Liberation Organization pilots and mechanics have been in Nicaragua to provide assistance to the Nicaraguan Air Force. Aircraft revetments have been built at Sandino Airfield and the new military airfield at Punta Huete. When completed, Punta Huete will have a runway long enough to accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet inventory.

As Soviet military influence in Nicaragua has increased over the past four years, the Soviets have grown more assertive in their efforts to consolidate their position. For example, a review of military tonnage delivered directly by Soviet ships from 1981 through 1984 reveals significant increases each year for Soviet seaborne carriers. Soviet-delivered tonnage jumped by nearly 400 percent from 1981 to 1982, and by 157 percent from 1983 to 1984. By the end of 1984, total deliveries by the Soviets and their surrogates since 1981 had exceeded 33,000 metric tons. The 1984 increase has further upgraded Sandinista military capabilities with the delivery of Mi-24/HIND D helicopters as well as the Mi-8/HIP helicopter.

In contrast to previous Soviet ships that had made intermediate stops, the direct passage of the Soviet ship BAKURIANI from the port of Nikolayev on the Black Sea to Corinto on the west coast of Nicaragua in November 1984 marked a new, more assertive turn in Soviet efforts.

Primarily through its clients Cuba and Nicaragua, the Soviets are fostering guerrilla warfare in El Salvador and Guatemala and are urging Honduran leftists toward future revolutionary activity. Over the past 20 years, a large number of leftists from the Caribbean Basin have received paramilitary instruction in Cuba. Because most of the training is provided by other countries, principally Cuba, the USSR is able to continue to deny direct involvement.

In South America, the Soviet Union has followed a two-pronged effort to increase its influence that combines pursuit of government-to-government contacts through the traditional diplomatic, economic, and military channels of foreign policy with covert ties to pro-Soviet groups. The Soviets are also using a number of overt and

covert activities, including an extensive propaganda campaign. Each year, the USSR provides a large number of scholarships to students throughout Latin America for study in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with the goal of influencing recipients to become and remain sympathetic to the policies of the USSR and Cuba.

Soviet economic aid to South America between 1954 and 1984 amounted to about 1,000 million dollars, of which nearly 65 percent was provided after 1975. By concentrating on highly visible showcase projects, the Soviets have sought maximum political benefits at relatively small cost. East European countries provided an additional 1,600 million dollars during the same period. Peru is the only South American country to receive large amounts of Soviet military equipment. Beginning with the sale of Mi-8 helicopters and T-55 medium tanks in 1973, the Soviet Union began a comprehensive program of training and military equipment sales that has amounted to over 1,600 million dollars. As part of this program, an estimated 3,000 Peruvian military personnel have received training in the Soviet Union. Approximately 150 Soviet military advisers and technicians provide maintenance and instruction on Soviet-made military equipment in Peru, including instruction on the Soviet SA-3/GOA missile in the Peruvian air defense school.

In return for such assistance, the Soviet Union has gained access to Peruvian ports over the past 14 years for logistics support and maintenance of their nearly 200 fishing vessels that operate off the coast of South America. The Soviet Aeroflot office makes Lima, Peru, the crossroads for most of the Soviet travel in South America. Over 1,200 Soviets transit Peru each month, about 800 of whom are merchant seamen and fishermen rotating between Moscow and Peru on Aeroflot's four round-trip flights a week.

Sub-Saharan Africa

In the mid-1980s, the USSR is heavily involved in maintaining its gains of the 1970s in Sub-Saharan Africa. Two increasingly successful insurgent movements continue to fight against the regimes in Angola and Mozambique. These are the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). In addition, the Marxist regime in Ethiopia faces serious challenges from several insurgent groups, particularly in the north, where government counter guerrilla campaigns have been unsuccessful.

The USSR has continued military support to both Angola and Mozambique. In 1984, Mozambique took delivery of additional MiG-21/FISHBED fighter aircraft, increasing its total to at least 44. Angola received large quantities of Soviet equipment, including initial deliveries of the SA-2 SAM system and MiG-23/FLOGGER and Su-22/FITTER aircraft, as well as additional helicopters, tanks, APCs, field artillery, trucks, and other equipment. Soviet access to military facilities in Angola and Ethiopia has continued. In Luanda, the Soviets have maintained since mid-1982 an 8,500-ton capacity floating drydock capable of handling most major Soviet naval combatants. Luanda is the most important port for Moscow's West African naval units. Further, the airfield at Luanda continues to serve Tu-95/BEAR D maritime reconnaissance aircraft, which deploy in pairs about three or four times per year.

Since 1975, the Soviets have furnished Ethiopia with about 3,000 million dollars in military assistance and signed agreements for 1,000 million dollars more. In return, the USSR has gained naval and air

access at Dahlak and Asmara. The Dahlak installation is a maintenance facility and supply depot for Soviet naval combatants operating in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. The facility includes an 8,500-ton floating drydock, floating piers, helipads, fuel and water storage, a submarine tender, and other repair ships. Guided-missile cruisers and nuclear-powered submarines regularly call at Dahlak for repair and supplies. The USSR also deployed two Il-38/MAY anti-submarine warfare and maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Asmara Airfield until they were destroyed by Eritrean rebels in May 1984.

In Guinea, the USSR uses Conakry harbor routinely as a facility for its West African patrol. Although access for BEAR reconnaissance aircraft was terminated in 1977, Conakry airfield is still used as a stopover point for military transport flights to Angola.

In the Indian Ocean, the Soviets are attempting to increase their influence in the Seychelles, with the probable intent of gaining regular access in the islands for naval ships and naval air units. In February 1984, Soviet military transport planes began using the islands for stopovers enroute to southern Africa. The Soviets have also provided visible political support by having naval vessels call whenever President Rene is absent or when there is a disturbance on the island.

The most important instrument for the spread of Soviet influence in Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be military aid. The Soviets have kept their lead as the largest provider of weapons through military sales agreements with 21 nations. Soviet advisers and technicians serve in 16 nations in the region. Since the mid-1970s, arms sales agreements in Sub-Saharan Africa have totaled nearly 10,000 million dollars; the value of equipment delivered was about 9,000 million dollars. Some 3,900 Soviet military advisers and technicians are serving in Sub-Saharan Africa, and at least 1,500 African military personnel are receiving training in the USSR.

The Middle East and North Africa

The Soviet Union attempts to influence the Middle East by the exploitation of intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli conflicts. Entree to the Middle East has been provided to the Soviets by their willingness to supply vast amounts of military equipment, including advanced models of weapons systems that have not even gone to their Warsaw Pact allies. While the Soviets still rely heavily upon some of their major Arab arms clients, (e.g., Syria and Libya) to further their influence in the region, there has been a growing effort to use arms sales to improve relations with moderate Arab states such as Jordan and Kuwait.

It is useful to recall that in 1970 the Soviets deployed about 10,000 air defense personnel to Egypt to expand and control that country's air defense system. Their subsequent expulsion from Egypt in 1972 was a major reversal but did not halt Soviet activities in the region. The Soviets continued to develop their naval and airlift capabilities to enhance their ability to support political objectives and to project limited military power in the Third World.

--capabilities demonstrated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when the Soviet Union performed an airlift of 850 flights over three and one-half weeks for emergency resupply of military equipment to Iraq, Syria, and Egypt.

Syria

The Soviet-Syrian relationship remains the centerpiece of Soviet Middle East policy. Syria is Moscow's second largest arms client in the Third World, having contracted for nearly 17,000 million

dollarsworth of military equipment. There are more Soviet military advisers in Syria -- approximately 4,000 -- than in any other Third World country with the exception of Afghanistan. These include 1,100 Soviet ground force advisers, 800 assigned to the Syrian Air Force, 2,000 air defense advisers, and about 100 advisers assigned to the Navy. Since the Syrian defeat by Israel in June 1982, the Soviets have augmented, by approximately 600, their advisory presence, primarily in the area of air defense. Highlighting the Soviet upgrading of the Syrian air defense are two operational SA-5/GAMMON missile complexes located at Dumayr and Homs -- the first operational SA-5s outside the Soviet Union. All other advanced C3 and electronic warfare equipment is either manned or supervised by Soviet personnel.

Soviet military advisers are headquartered in Damascus. Directly subordinate to the Soviet General Staff and in communication with Moscow, advisers are assigned to the Syrian Ministry of Defense, the headquarters of all three services, operational units, repair and maintenance facilities, and various schools and military academies. Additional Soviet personnel are assigned to administrative or communications support of the military advisory group or as guards. The Soviet military presence in Syria includes naval access to the port of Tartus and naval air deployments to Tiyas airfield. Tartus is the primary maintenance facility for Soviet submarines operating in the Mediterranean. A Soviet submarine tender, a yard oiler, and a water tender are stationed there. Periodically, the Soviets deploy pairs of Il-38/MAY antisubmarine warfare aircraft to Tiyas.

In contrast to their normal, frugal use of economic aid, the Soviets have provided extensive economic assistance to Syria. Communist aid was Syria's only sustained source of economic assistance until 1974, when OPEC governments began to extend nearly 1,000 million dollars per year for balance-of-payments support. The burden of the roughly 2,000 million dollars Communist aid commitment extended through 1983 was nearly equally divided between Eastern Europe and the USSR, with Eastern Europe assuming responsibility for oil refineries, a phosphate plant, land reclamation, power, and light industrial plants. The Soviet Union's showpiece was the Euphrates dam. The USSR also contributed to oil development, improvement of the railroad system, and expansion of ports.

Syria's economic infrastructure is being built for long-term centralized control, dependent on Soviet technical expertise and spare parts. The 800-megawatt Al-Thawra dam across the upper Euphrates, built with Soviet aid and completed in 1978, supplies up to 70 percent of all energy produced in Syria. The dam also created the 12,000 million-cubic-meter Al-Assad Reservoir, which should ultimately have the capacity to irrigate 640,000 hectares.

The Soviet Union has played a major role in the development of Syria's energy industry. Oil exploration with Soviet help began in the 1960s. In 1983, the Soviet Union provided over 300 million dollars in new credits for nuclear power and thermal power projects.

More than 9,500 Syrian technicians and students have received training in the Soviet Union. In addition, more than 35,000 Syrians have been trained as skilled workers, technicians, and engineers at secondary and higher educational institutions in the Soviet Union. Over the past 10 years, the Soviet Union has maintained a constant civilian technical presence in Syria averaging slightly over 1,000 personnel. The various economic aid projects, dependent on Soviet expertise, necessitate the continuous presence of Soviet personnel in

the form of engineers, designers, and other technical experts.

Libya

Soviet relations with Libya are based largely upon mutual military and economic benefits. Since the first arms agreements in 1970, the Soviets have supplied Libya with large amounts of equipment for its armed forces. Of over 15,000 million dollars in sales, approximately 10,000 million dollars in Soviet equipment has been delivered.

There are approximately 1,400 Soviet Air Defense, Air Force, Army, and Navy advisers in Libya. The Soviet mission assists with the assembly and maintenance of MiG-25/FOXBATS, MiG-23/FLOGGERS, MiG-21/FISHBEDs, Su-22/FITTERs, and Mi-24/HIND helicopters. Soviets are also assigned to Tu-22/BLINDER bomber maintenance and assist with BLINDER, Il-76/CANDID, and An-26/CURL operations. There are Soviet pilot instructors and control tower personnel in Libya, and the Soviets provide on-site pilot training. Soviet and East European advisers also assist in training Libyan military personnel and in maintaining the large amounts of Soviet-supplied armor and other equipment that Libya has in storage.

The Soviets have limited, although increasing, military access to Libyan ports and airfields. Periodic Soviet naval combatant port visits and Il-38/MAY ASW aircraft deployments to Libya have taken place since mid-1981.

Algeria

Although Algeria currently maintains a nonaligned policy, the Soviets remain Algeria's main supplier of military equipment, and there are approximately 1,000 Soviet military advisers in-country. Approximately one-half of the advisers work in the various Algerian academies, schools, and training centers, with the remainder assigned to equipment repair installations and individual combat units. These include T-62 and T-72 tank units; MiG-21, -23 and -25 aircraft squadrons; and air defense units with Soviet SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles.

Through 1984, Soviet-Algerian military aid agreements totaled close to 5,400 million dollars, with deliveries of over 5,000 million.

In 1981, the Soviet Union strengthened its economic relationship with Algeria by concluding several hundred million dollars worth of agreements for the construction of development projects. During 1982 and 1983 this relationship continued, and in 1983, the Soviets extended about 250 million dollars in new credits for railway construction. The Soviets also maintain an extensive technical presence in Algeria, with some 6,000 civilian advisers in the country. It has been reported, however, that Algerians have expressed discontent with the quality and reliability of Soviet equipment and have indicated a willingness to diversify to Western, including U.S., sources.

Southwest Asia/Indian Ocean

Southwest Asia has significant strategic importance to the USSR because of its proximity, its large energy resources, and its chronic instability. Among the moderate oil-producing Arab States of the Persian Gulf, the Soviet Union maintains official links only with Kuwait. The Soviets have signed arms contracts worth over 300 million dollars with Kuwait that include weapons such as the SA-8/GECKO surface-to-air missiles and FROG-7 surface-to-surface rockets. Soviet interest in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf is high because of the West's dependence on oil from this area. The

Soviet Union relies extensively on the provision of military assistance to maintain its position in the region. Since 1954, Moscow has provided over 19,000 million dollars worth of military equipment, including 3,000 million to Iraq since 1983, more than 2,000 million to South Yemen since 1968, and over 1,000 million to North Yemen since 1979. Arms sales have often led to the stationing of military advisers who perform maintenance and provide training for Soviet-supplied equipment. An estimated 2,500 Soviet military advisers are presently in the region.

Iran

The USSR's influence in Iran is at a low level primarily because of the Khomeini regime's hatred of atheistic Communism, the Soviet provision of arms to Iraq, and the continued Soviet occupation of Muslim Afghanistan. The Soviets have been frustrated by Iran's unwillingness to negotiate a peace with Iraq, the suppression of the Tudeh Communist Party, and its provocative anti-Soviet campaign following the expulsion of 18 Soviet diplomats in May 1983 on charges of spying. Despite these problems, however, the USSR has continued to attempt to expand contacts with Iran in the hope that a government more sympathetic to Moscow will eventually come to power.

Iraq

Soviet relations with Iraq improved in 1982, when Moscow resumed arms shipments that had been embargoed after the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. In 1983, in an effort to win its war with Iran, Iraq obtained more military assistance from the USSR than any country in the Third World and has continued to be one of the Soviet Union's best arms customers in 1984, with large shipments of sophisticated equipment such as MiG-25/FOXBAT fighter aircraft and T-72 tanks.

In 1984, Iraq resumed normal diplomatic relations with the United States; however, this relationship does not include military assistance because of continued U.S. neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war.

South Yemen

For more than a decade, the Soviet Union has maintained strong ties to the Marxist regime in South Yemen. Initial ties with the regime were an outgrowth of Soviet support given to leftist groups in South Yemen's war of independence from 1963 to 1967 and the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. In 1970, the state was reconstituted as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) under a Marxist regime.

Since 1977, when the USSR was expelled from Somalia, South Yemen has been a major focus of Soviet attention. In October 1979, a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the USSR and South Yemen. Since then, the USSR has developed more pervasive influence in South Yemen than in any other country in the region. A pattern of increasingly large aid agreements has served to bind South Yemen more closely to Soviet policies. The USSR supplies virtually the entire South Yemen military arsenal and, to date, Soviet military deliveries have totaled over 2,000 million dollars. In addition, about 1,000 military advisers from the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Cuba provide assistance.

The USSR enjoys almost unlimited access to the country's main port in Aden. The facilities there are used for delivery of military and economic aid, transshipment of petroleum products, transshipment of cargo to Ethiopia and other parts of Africa, crew rest and recreation, fueling and provisioning, and alongside berthing and anchoring space for naval combatants, cargo ships, and units of the

fishing fleet. Soviet Il-38/MAY naval reconnaissance aircraft began using Aden International Airport in November 1978, and, subsequently, Al-Anad military airfield to monitor Western naval operations. The Soviet Navy also has a high-frequency radio transmitting and receiving station in the Bir Fuqum area.

North Yemen

The USSR has been economically, militarily, and politically involved in North Yemen for more than 20 years. The Soviets' position in North Yemen was enhanced in 1979 by the conclusion of an arms agreement worth approximately 1,000 million dollars. To date, more than 2,000 million in arms have been delivered. In 1984, the USSR signed a new treaty of friendship with North Yemen, which extended a 1964 accord between the two countries. The Soviet Union has a 500-man military advisory group in North Yemen. Military technicians provide maintenance, repair, and technical guidance for the Soviet-made equipment in the Yemeni inventory. Soviet aid was a significant factor in North Yemen's success against the National Democratic Front insurgency sponsored by South Yemen. Seeking to play both sides of the conflict, the USSR also provided small amounts of support to this insurgency. This involvement with the insurgents by the Soviets, as well as North Yemen's strict nonaligned foreign policy, has undermined Moscow's attempts to gain military access to North Yemen's facilities.

Additionally, North Yemen's eagerness to accept U.S. military assistance weakens Soviet influence there.

South Asia

India

Of significant importance to the USSR, India is the predominant power in South Asia due to its size, strategic location, regional dominance, and leadership in the Nonaligned Movement. The USSR employs military assistance as the primary instrument to strengthen its ties and cultivate a special relationship with India. In this connection, the 1982 Indian-Soviet arms agreement was valued at nearly 3,000 million dollars. Former Defense Minister Ustinov's visit to New Delhi in March 1984, his second in two years, highlighted the Soviet Union's commitment to provide its MiG-29/FULCRUM fighter aircraft to India, the first Third World nation to receive this most advanced Soviet aircraft -- even before full deployment of the FULCRUM to Warsaw Pact forces.

Delivery of the An-32/CLINE tactical transport aircraft began in July 1984, and deliveries of the first of the Il-76/CANDID heavy transport aircraft are expected to begin in the spring of 1985. Meanwhile, delivery of T-72 tanks continues, and preparations are underway for the coproduction of this modern main battle tank in India. The extent of Soviet arms aid and the high technological level of the equipment being provided, combined with excellent prices and extremely favorable pay-back terms, characterize the Soviet Union's efforts to remain India's primary foreign arms supplier and to counter Indian efforts to diversify its arms purchases abroad through the acquisition of Western military hardware.

Along with military assistance activities, the USSR has stepped up its disinformation campaign in India to cultivate anti-U.S. feelings by attempting to exploit the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Afghanistan

In December 1984, the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan entered its sixth year, making Soviet combat involvement longer than that of

the Second World War. Despite indiscriminate bombing of the countryside and a year of increased military operations, the Soviets still control little of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and other smaller urban areas. The Soviet Army in Afghanistan now numbers approximately 115,000 troops.

There is no indication that the Soviets have any intention of withdrawing from Afghanistan. The Afghan Government, installed by the USSR after its invasion force had deposed and executed Afghan President Amin, is less capable than ever of surviving without Soviet military support. Soviet efforts to develop a viable Afghan Army to assume control have been frustrated by a steady stream of desertions that has reduced the former 100,000-man Afghan force by more than half. The Soviets have implemented a national program of conscription to rebuild the ranks but, while able to conscript Afghans faster than they can desert, they cannot stop the qualitative decline of the force.

In contrast to the Afghan Army, the effectiveness of the Afghan resistance has continued to improve. In response, the Soviet's 1984 military campaign was the largest and most aggressive thus far of the war. The initial 1984 operation was a Soviet assault on the Panjshir Valley, the stronghold of the resistance forces of Shah Ahmad Masood. The operation, which broke a 16-month truce, was in response to Masood's increasing ability to cut important Soviet lines of communication, putting the Soviets' control of Kabul at risk. The attack on the valley in April 1984 included for the first time high-altitude bombing conducted by BADGER bomber aircraft staging from bases in the southern USSR. While Soviet motorized infantry advanced up the valley, air assault troops were helicoptered behind the resistance in an effort to cut off retreat. During this operation, the Soviet forces again demonstrated their disregard for world opinion and the rules of war by indiscriminate assaults on villages and wide-scale attacks on the populace. The Soviets have adopted a new tactic of forcing Afghans to leave their homes in order to end popular support of and assistance to the resistance forces.

The Panjshir Valley campaign was immediately followed by Soviet assaults on resistance forces in Herat, in western Afghanistan, and a series of major operations in eastern Afghanistan designed to cut insurgent supply routes. The Soviet Union's new aggressiveness increased casualties on both sides. Soviet press coverage has increasingly acknowledged the likelihood of a prolonged and difficult conflict, indicating that the Soviet Union has no intention of accepting peace initiatives that would call for their withdrawal.

The USSR's actions in Afghanistan have resulted in a deterioration of Soviet relations with the government of Pakistan, which has been faced with accommodating large numbers of Afghans fleeing Soviet oppression. In July 1984, the Soviets presented Pakistan with a demarche protesting Pakistan's aid to the Afghan resistance. The Soviets then cancelled a scheduled meeting between foreign ministers. In August, Afghan aircraft and artillery began cross-border strikes against villages in Pakistani territory. In view of the total Soviet control of the Afghan Armed Forces, such an escalation would have been highly unlikely without direct Soviet authorization. On August 31, the Soviet publication Izvestiya labeled Pakistan's support to the freedom fighters "a risky gamble" that "poses dangers above all for Pakistan itself." The high tension between Pakistan and the USSR caused by the Soviet invasion and

occupation of Afghanistan continues.

East Asia

The expansion of Soviet military forces in the Far East has been an integral part of the USSR's efforts to extend its power and influence in the region. Soviet forces in the Far East include over 50 Soviet divisions along the Sino-Soviet border and northeast Asia, supported by some 1,700 aircraft, excluding BACKFIRE bombers, and about one-third of the total Soviet SS-20 missile force.

Soviet activities in Asia are conditioned by Sino-Soviet relations, geographic barriers between the USSR and key nations of the region, and the generally anti-Communist orientation of these Asian states. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the September 1983 shootdown of the South Korean airliner, Soviet support to North Korea in the wake of the October 1983 Rangoon bombing, and recurring expulsions of Soviet covert operations personnel from a number of Asian states have reinforced regional suspicions of Soviet intentions.

The Soviets continue to work to reduce the influence of China, their major competitor in the region. Soviet relations with Japan are shaped by the USSR's determination to retain the Northern Territories -- four islands above Japan's northernmost island of Hokkaido -- and to prevent Japan from strengthening its military forces. This policy is moderated somewhat by the desire to obtain Japanese involvement in the economic development of the Soviet Far East. Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated in 1983 with the shootdown of the Korean airliner and outspoken Japanese support for U.S. defense policy. In 1984, the Soviets responded positively to Japanese efforts to reopen a dialogue but have remained unyielding on the issue of the Northern Territories.

Pacific and Southeast Asia

The Pacific Islands, a region of great stability with sound relationships to Western nations, continue to attract persistent Soviet attention. Moscow's renewed efforts to negotiate fishing agreements, coupled with increased ocean research activities in the region, highlight Soviet intentions to acquire influence in these island states.

Soviet military and economic assistance to Vietnam continues at a high level in return for expanding Soviet use of the former U.S. naval facilities and air base at Cam Ranh Bay. In addition, the USSR supports Hanoi's occupation of Kampuchea both in world forums and in discussions with the ASEAN member states -- Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Vietnam is dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance to support its economy, maintain its occupation of Kampuchea, and counter Chinese military pressure along the Sino-Vietnamese border. From 1978 through 1984, the Soviets provided over 5,000 million dollars in arms aid to Hanoi. Over 2,500 Soviet military advisers are in Vietnam to support this program. In addition to more than 4,000 million dollars in Soviet economic assistance through 1983, Vietnamese membership in the Communist Council for Mutual Economic Assistance obligates the Soviet Union's East European allies to provide aid to Vietnam.

In return for this support, the Soviets have transformed Cam Ranh Bay into the largest Soviet naval forward deployment base outside the Warsaw Pact. With the arrival of 7 additional Tu-16/BADGER aircraft in late 1984, the squadron at Cam Ranh now totals 24 reconnaissance or combat aircraft, with 8 BEARs and 16 BADGERS, including 10 with strike

capabilities. The BADGERS' range from Cam Ranh Bay extends the strike capability of the Soviets over an area that includes not only regional states but also the U.S. territory of Guam and the western portion of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Support facilities have also been upgraded for additional permanently deployed aircraft, including a squadron of MiG-23/ FLOGGER fighters. The Soviets deploy between 25 and 30 ships to the South China Sea, including surface combatants, attack and cruise missile submarines, and naval auxiliary ships. The V/STOL aircraft carrier MINSK has called at Cam Ranh as part of its distant-water operations.

Conclusion

The quest for additional overseas facilities, matched by the USSR's continuing improvements in strategic mobility and the growth in the Soviet Navy's distant-area capabilities, is part of the unceasing effort by the USSR to give its Armed Forces enhanced global capabilities. This effort is coupled with the Soviet Union's use of all other instruments of power projection -- military assistance, diplomacy, trade, aid, propaganda, and espionage -- in its determined effort to extend Soviet power and influence throughout the world to promote the USSR as the dominant world force.



official text

DATE: 04/03/85

(Following is **fifth** of five segments of advance text. All are embargoed and not for release until 1315 GMT, April 2.)

U.S., ALLIES MUST HAVE STRENGTH TO DETER SOVIETS (5,980)
('Response to Challenge' from 'Soviet Military Power 1985')

Washington -- The United States and its allies must maintain a military capability sufficient to convince the Soviets that "the costs of aggression far outweigh any possible gain," according to "Soviet Military Power 1985."

In a chapter titled "Response to the Challenge," the new U.S. Defense Department document says "We must be equally steadfast in our resolve to defend the security of all free nations. These are the preconditions to the long-sought goals of arms reductions and world peace."

Following is the text of the chapter:

(begin text)

Chapter VIII

Response to the Challenge

The preceding chapters document the most recent developments in the Soviet Union's upgrade and expansion of its nuclear and conventional forces, confirming a full-scale continuation of the USSR's major military buildup over the past 25 years. The Soviets have accumulated a stock of military assets much larger than our own. Soviet military research and development continues to grow rapidly, and a number of advanced new weapons systems are nearing deployment. Heavy investment in military research and development, coupled with the purchase and theft of Western high technology, is most disturbing because it has eroded the qualitative advantage that the West has relied on to establish a military balance.

These trends have led to three major developments in Soviet military capabilities that pose new challenges to our defense policy:

-- the Soviet military buildup, both quantitative and qualitative, has produced a major shift in the nuclear and conventional balance;

-- the Soviet military offensive capability has increased dramatically; and

-- the Soviets have significantly extended the global reach of their military forces, enhancing their ability to project influence and power, especially in the Third World.

Since the end of World War II, the primary security objective of the United States has been deterrence of Soviet aggression to ensure the freedom of the United States and of all nations that cherish liberty. Our policies and strategy are designed to strengthen deterrence by restoring the military balance between the Free World and the Soviets and by increasing allied confidence in U.S. capabilities and commitments. Our commitment to collective security is based on the understanding that defensive alliances are necessary, both to deter attack -- by demonstrating that any potential aggressor would encounter a resolute and united defense -- and to share the responsibility of defending freedom.

As the Soviets expand their military capabilities and global reach, the need for greater allied defense efforts can subject our alliances to new and increased strains. Indeed, the Soviets devote



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considerable efforts to attempting to weaken the ties among the nations of the Free World. While the interests of the United States and those of our allies are not always congruent, the importance of shared interests far outweighs any issue that we might view from different perspectives.

Our alliances remain healthy today. Close cooperation continues to be the watchword within NATO, particularly in light of the threat posed by the Soviet longer range inter-mediaterange nuclear forces deployed in Warsaw Pact countries. Our appreciation of the Communist threat we face was again firmly underscored in 1984 by the publication of the second edition of the Alliance's authoritative report, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- Force Comparisons." We continue to work with our European Allies to improve Alliance defense capabilities, with special emphasis on conventional defense capabilities in Europe.

In Asia, we have strengthened our relationship with Japan, which is increasingly committed to playing a greater role in its self-defense. We have also strengthened our ties with Korea. Our alliance with Australia and New Zealand preserves peace and stability in a region that is of growing economic importance. This alliance, like our other alliances, is based on a shared set of democratic ideals and traditions as well as a resolute commitment of each ally to world peace. We have also developed a more substantive relationship with the People's Republic of China.

Outside the formal alliance structure, we have also improved relations with our friends and those nations that support our mutual interests. We have, for example, continued to expand our security relationships with Middle Eastern and southwest Asian states. Our security has been strengthened by closer ties to our neighbors, and various initiatives for the Caribbean Basin are underway, holding out new promise in a vital region.

Restoring the Nuclear Balance

Today, the destructiveness of modern weapons systems, both nuclear and conventional, has made the prevention of global conflict of paramount importance. The U.S. policy of deterrence is based upon this imperative; however, recognition of this on our part alone is not enough. The Soviet leadership must also recognize and understand this if we are to be able to maintain a credible deterrence. As the Scowcroft Commission so succinctly stated:

"Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to simple quantification. Deterrence is the set of beliefs in the minds of the Soviet leaders, given their own values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It requires us to determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering aggression, even in a crisis -- not to determine what would deter us."

The decade of the 1970s, marked by the massive Soviet military buildup while the U.S. maintained a virtually static posture, left our nation in a clearly disadvantageous position. This dangerous shift in the global balance unmistakably demonstrated Soviet intentions to attain a position of military superiority. Should this trend continue unchecked, one must assume -- given Soviet writings, force deployments, and strategic force exercises -- the Soviet leadership could conclude that they had acquired the capability to fight and win a nuclear war. As discussed in earlier chapters, such initiatives as their development of a potential first-strike force of SS-18s and SS-19s, their plans to reload ICBM silos, and the extensive hardening and dispersal programs designed to protect their key assets provide

clear indications of this Soviet attitude. It is this conclusion that we seek to prevent. To do this, we must convince Soviet leadership that, because of our retaliatory capability, there can be no circumstance in which it would benefit them to attack us or our allies at any level. Our goal, then, has been to restore the balance -- to revitalize our deterrent posture. Toward that end, we have embarked on two separate but mutually reinforcing paths: modernization of our deterrent forces and pursuit of arms reductions.

Modernization Programs

Strategic Nuclear Forces. At the beginning of the 1980s, the most evident US shortfall existed in the military effectiveness, survivability, and age of our Strategic Triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine forces, and bomber systems, as well as their supporting command, control, and communications (C3) systems. The Strategic Modernization Program, begun in October 1981, has begun to redress these deficiencies.

Our ICBM force was faced with the twin problems of a decreasing of hard-target capability due to Soviet silo-hardening programs and the increased vulnerability of our current systems to the threat of their SS-18s and SS-19s. To counter this, we are pursuing a dual approach of initially deploying the hard-target-capable PEACEKEEPER (MX) missile in selected MINUTEMAN silos and the development of a new small ICBM that will be deployable in a variety of survivable basing modes to ensure the continued viability of our ICBM force.

The SLBM force, which in 1980 consisted primarily of POSEIDON submarines built nearly 20 years ago, faced the problems of impending block obsolescence and a lack of hard-target capability. Both will be remedied as we continue production of TRIDENT submarines and begin deploying, toward the end of the decade, the TRIDENT II missile, possessing requisite hard-target capability. Finally, to enhance our deterrent capability in the near term, the deployment of the nuclear TOMAHAWK land attack cruise missile, begun in 1984, will be continued.

Our B-52 bomber force has served us well, adapting to significantly upgraded Soviet defenses over the past 25 years. However, the Soviet air defense capabilities continue to grow and, as a result, it has become difficult for the B-52 to perform its penetration mission. Once again, the B-52 is being adapted -- assuming an additional stand-off role, carrying cruise missiles. To continue to provide the needed bomber force penetration capability, production of 100 B-1B bombers, with an initial operational capability (IOC) of 1986, is planned. In addition, development of an advanced technology bomber (ATB), with an IOC in the early 1990s, continues. As the ATB is deployed, older models of the B-52 will be retired, and B-1Bs will assume the cruise missile carrier role, thus maintaining a mix of bomber stand-off and penetration capability well into the 21st century.

Steps also have been taken to bolster our C3 networks to ensure that these systems are survivable and able to function through the full spectrum of possible Soviet attacks. In addition, we are upgrading our tactical warning and attack assessment systems to ensure that the National Command Authorities receive timely, unambiguous, and accurate data.

Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces. Following the unwarranted Soviet buildup of SS-20s that resulted in a new and dangerous threat to Europe, the NATO Alliance in 1979 formally adopted a dual-track approach toward restoring stability. The Allies agreed to deploy 464

ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and 108 PERSHING II ballistic missiles, while at the same time offering U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations on these systems. In the absence of such a negotiated agreement, implementation of this intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) program began in 1983 and is scheduled to continue through 1988 in accordance with the 1979 decision. Similarly, enhancements of our short-range nuclear force capabilities will continue when we replace our aging stock of artillery-fired atomic projectiles with projectiles that possess improvements in range, accuracy, and security. INF aircraft modernization continues with additional deployments of F-16 and TORNADO dual-capable fighter-bombers and new tactical weapons with improved capabilities and enhanced safety and security features.

In October 1983, NATO decided to withdraw 1,400 nuclear warheads from Europe. When fully implemented, this decision will bring to 2,400 the total net removal of nuclear warheads from Europe since 1979. The earlier withdrawal of 1,000 warheads was mandated when NATO made its 1979 dual-track decision to modernize longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces and to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The current reduction will bring NATO's nuclear stockpile to the lowest level in over 20 years. Moreover, since one nuclear warhead will be removed for each PERSHING II or ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) warhead deployed, the stockpile will not be increased by deployment of new LRINF missiles.

Strategic Defense Initiative

Looking to the many challenges posed by the Soviet Union to the security of the United States and our allies, we are continuing to examine the feasibility of strategic defenses against ballistic missiles. To achieve this goal, the research and technology programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Nuclear Agency, Department of Energy, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency that relate to missile defense were consolidated in 1984 under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The SDI program is chartered to explore key technologies permitted by the ABM Treaty so that a future President and Congress will have technical options to decide whether to embark on development and deployment of strategic defenses against ballistic missiles. While many technical questions remain, we are confident that new technologies offer great promise for fulfilling the President's goal of eliminating the threat of nuclear ballistic missiles. The fruits of the SDI research can also provide the impetus for further significant arms control measures to eliminate ballistic missiles, as the President has proposed.

To facilitate the destruction of ballistic missiles, it is important to be able to attack them at many places during their flight with different types of systems. The flight of a MIRVed ballistic missile has four basic phases. The first is the boost phase, in which the first- and second-stage rocket engines of the missile are burning. Missiles in this phase produce an intense and unique infrared signature. In the second, or post-boost phase, the bus -- warhead carrier -- separates from the main engines, and the multiple warheads are deployed from the bus, along with any penetration aids such as decoys and chaff. In the third, or mid-course phase, the multiple warheads and penetration aids travel on ballistic trajectories through space, well above the earth's atmosphere. In the fourth, or terminal phase, the warheads and penetration aids reenter the earth's atmosphere, where they are again affected by atmospheric conditions.

The SDI program seeks to explore technologies enabling the engagement of attacking missiles in all four phases of their flight.

There is an advantage in engaging the missiles in the boost phase because the multiple warheads and penetration aids have not yet been deployed. There is also a military advantage in engaging the bus during the post-boost phase before all the warheads and decoys have been deployed. After deployment, we must be able to discriminate warheads from the decoys so we can target only the real threats. The technologies for the terminal defenses are also likely to be applicable to defense against the shorter range nuclear ballistic missiles that have brief flight times, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and theater-range ballistic missiles.

To manage research efforts, the Strategic Defense Initiative program is divided into five major elements. The first of these, surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill assessment, is chartered to explore the technologies needed to detect, identify, locate, and track ballistic missiles or their components during the boost, mid-course, and terminal phases of their trajectory.

The second program element consolidates the directed-energy weapons projects. Here, the research is conducted in the four general classes of directed-energy weapons applicable to missile defense: space-based lasers, ground-based lasers, X-ray lasers, and particle beams.

The next program element directs research on kinetic energy weapons that are designed to destroy ballistic missiles or their components by direct impact. Research is focused on "smart bullets" that could be fired from the ground or space. An example of kinetic energy weapons research is the U.S. Army's successful demonstration last July of the technologies needed to intercept and destroy a ballistic missile warhead in space using non-nuclear techniques.

The fourth, and one of the most critical program elements, is system architecture and battle management. In this area, we are conducting research on how positive command and control might be structured for a defensive system. During 1984, ten contracts were awarded for the study of strategic defense architecture options.

The fifth and final program element of the Strategic Defense Initiative encompasses survivability, lethality, and key technologies.

Here, research is being focused on the problems of space electrical power, launch vehicle requirements, and the critical areas of ballistic missile lethality and defensive system survivability.

This approach allows a coordinated and focused research program that would permit decisionmakers, perhaps by the early 1990s, to make informed choices on whether to proceed to development of strategic defenses against the ballistic missile threat to the United States and its allies.

If the decision were ultimately to be made to develop and deploy a strategic defense, the implementation would logically have several phases:

- Research Phase: The current phase is the time from the President's 23 March 1983 speech to the early 1990s, when a decision on whether to enter systems development could be made by a future President and a future Congress.

- Systems Development -- or full-scale Engineering Development -- Phase: Assuming a decision to go ahead, the period of time beginning in the early 1990s when prototypes of actual defense system components will be designed, built, and tested.

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-- Transition Phase: The period of incremental, sequential deployment of defensive systems. The intent is for each added increment, in conjunction with effective and survivable offensive systems, to increase deterrence and reduce the risk of nuclear war. During this period, as the United States and Soviet Union deploy defenses against ballistic missiles that progressively reduce the value of such missiles, significant reductions in nuclear ballistic missiles could be negotiated and implemented.

-- Final Phase: The period of time during which deployments of highly effective, multiphased defensive systems are completed and during which ballistic missile force levels would reach a minimum. If similar technical progress in defense against other means of nuclear attack has been attained by this time, such defenses could also be incorporated.

Faced with effective defenses, Soviet military planners could not count on successfully attacking the required military objectives with ballistic missiles, and they would have strong military and economic incentives for negotiated ballistic missile force reductions. The end result will be improved stability, a reduction in the likelihood of war, and a safer world.

Nuclear Arms Reduction

The second element of our two-tracked approach to enhanced deterrence is one for which the US has long strived -- arms reductions. Since the advent of the nuclear age, the US has led the way in attempting to reduce nuclear stockpiles -- both in strategic and tactical weapons. On our own, we have made substantial reductions; in the 1960s, our nuclear stockpile was one-third larger, and its destructive capability was four times greater than it is today.

To go further, we are seeking militarily effective, verifiable, bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union that establish a nuclear balance at greatly reduced levels and the resumption of Soviet compliance with the many existing arms control agreements that the USSR is currently violating. The United States has proposed substantial reductions under President Reagan's S.T.A.R.T. initiatives, as well as the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons in the INF negotiations. In both negotiations, the United States has added ample flexibility to its proposals to meet Soviet concerns. Despite the past record of Soviet intransigence in both areas, the United States remains ready to work toward arms reductions as a top priority.

It is the intent of the United States to continue to pursue these complementary efforts with the end objective of restoring the nuclear balance at lower levels, enhancing deterrence, promoting stability, and ensuring a safer world.

Conventional Forces

Our conventional forces must maintain capabilities sufficient for two purposes: first, and most important, to deter aggression worldwide against the United States, our allies, and our friends; and second, should deterrence fail, to limit military conflict and to restore peace on favorable terms at the least cost in lives and resources.

U.S. conventional forces, in cooperation with allied forces, can deter aggression in key areas as long as they are strong and flexible enough for effective responses in each area and are supported by adequate airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning. Should conflict

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nevertheless arise, U.S. military responses would be governed by alliance commitments, general strategic priorities, specific circumstances, and force availability.

We have made great strides in rebuilding our conventional deterrent force over the past four years, and this has contributed importantly to our ability to counter -- and therefore deter -- threats around the world. Nonetheless, much remains to be done by ourselves and our allies to ensure an adequate counter to the growing Soviet conventional buildup.

Although often incorrectly used as a synonym for warfighting capability, readiness -- the people, training, spare parts, and maintenance to keep our forces prepared to deploy and fight -- is only one of four components that, when integrated and maintained in balance, form the pillars of our total combat capability. The other three components are sustainability -- inventories of munitions, spare parts, fuel, and other needed items to provide the staying power our forces would need to prevail in conflict; modernization -- the equipping of this force structure with more technically sophisticated and capable weaponry and facilities; and force structure -- the number and characteristics of air wings, battalions, and ships in the Armed Forces.

Our objective has been, and continues to be, to improve the combat capability of our forces through measured and balanced progress in each of the four pillars. These pillars provide an especially meaningful way to summarize our conventional force improvements and, along with greater emphasis on our Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Reserves, form the framework for the discussion to follow.

Readiness.

Our military forces must be able to reach full combat potential under the most demanding circumstances and time constraints. Should deterrence fail, warning time could be so short that peacetime readiness would become the key factor in determining success. For this reason, one of our top priorities is building and maintaining a combat-ready force -- one that is adequately manned, trained, supplied with modern equipment in good working order, and supported by adequate facilities.

We have significantly improved our readiness posture and ability to bring more forces to bear in the critical early phases of any potential conflict. Readiness, however, is not a one-time investment.

Continued growth in readiness will be required to maintain and improve selectively our readiness posture as our force structure is increased and its weaponry modernized. Since ours is fundamentally a defensive strategy, it is essential that we maintain our readiness at or above that of potential aggressors.

Sustainability

We recognize that our forces, even with high readiness, might become a "hollow" deterrent if we cannot sustain them in combat. Adequate logistics support for our forces -- munitions, fuel, equipment, and repair parts -- is necessary for successful deterrence and defense.

Our current level of sustainability is barely adequate for credible deterrence. In Europe, for example, our sustainability remains inferior to that of the Warsaw Pact. We will continue, in conjunction with our allies, to emphasize increases in sustainability to fortify the deterrent value of our forces.

Building upon the gains made during the past four years, we seek

a level of conventional sustainability to ensure deterrence of the Soviet threat. Besides providing sufficient quantities of stocks to maintain the staying power of our forces in combat, we seek forces of superior quality equipped with our most modern and effective conventional munitions.

Force Structure

Besides improving combat readiness and sustainability, we are developing a force structure well designed to meet potential threats. We have worked to mold our conventional forces to be more responsive and flexible, with greater projection and striking power.

Land Forces. The U.S. Army, hit especially hard by the 1970s decade of stagnation, is well on the road to rebuilding its capability to respond to aggression over a broad spectrum of conflict, ranging from counterterrorist operations to full-scale armored and mechanized warfare. The latter remains the most dangerous challenge, especially for those forces committed to the forward defense and rapid reinforcement of NATO; conflicts at the other end of the spectrum are more likely to occur.

Maritime Forces: We need a strong Navy, Marine Corps, and Merchant Marine to support our forward defense strategy, to fulfill the responsibilities associated with our network of overseas alliances and global commitments, and to protect the vital sea lanes to Europe and to southwest and northeast Asia. We also rely heavily upon our maritime forces in peacetime to respond to a wide variety of crises, a role to which their global reach, high responsiveness, and integrated combat power are particularly well suited.

The Navy's modernization program is most dramatically reflected in the evolution of major surface combatants. Fitting out continues on the carrier THEODORE ROOSEVELT, which will form the nucleus of a fifth nuclear-powered carrier battle group (CVBG). The battleship USS NEW JERSEY completed an extended first deployment, which included operations in the western Pacific, Central America, and in the Mediterranean, where the ship provided naval gunfire support to the multinational force operation in Lebanon. The NEW JERSEY was the first U.S. ship to deploy with the TOMAHAWK long-range, anti-ship, cruise missile. USS IOWA, the second battleship, was recommissioned in 1984 and will be followed by MISSOURI and WISCONSIN, each forming the nucleus of a surface action group.

USS TICONDEROGA (CG-47), the first ship of a new guided-missile cruiser class, completed a highly successful initial deployment to the Mediterranean in 1984. The ship with its AEGIS combat system adds a new dimension to modern naval warfare by being able, in concert with carrier aircraft, to defeat intense, coordinated attacks by enemy aircraft, submarines, and surface ships. Twenty-seven AEGIS-equipped ships are planned. The ARLEIGH BURKE-Class (DDG-51) guided-missile destroyer will incorporate the AEGIS system with a vertical launcher that accommodates a variety of anti-air and antisubmarine weapons and long-range TOMAHAWK cruise missiles. Twenty-nine ships of this new class are planned as one-for-one replacements for the aging DDG2 and DDG-37-Class guided-missile destroyers. The lead ship has been authorized for FY 1989 delivery.

Tactical Air Forces: Well-trained and properly equipped tactical air forces can quickly engage targets on land and at sea as well as provide an air defense umbrella in support of ground and naval forces worldwide. The Western Alliance continues to depend heavily on such tactical airpower to counter the significant numerical advantage in

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ground forces of the Soviets and their allies. Our forces have long been considered superior to the Soviets in air combat capabilities, but our advantage has been diminishing. The Soviets' new generations of Soviet fighter, attack, and bomber aircraft, along with their introduction of the MAINSTAY AWACS, now challenge our air superiority. We continue to rely on superior personnel to exploit fully the potential of our aircraft. We stress realism in training and pilot initiative.

Special Operations Forces. The United States must be prepared to respond to low-intensity conflict when it threatens our vital national interest. The Soviets and their surrogates, as a matter of policy, have both encouraged and supported this form of aggression as a way of achieving their objectives without direct confrontation with the Free World. Today, more than 20 insurgencies are threatening peace in the Third World, and one out of every four countries around the globe is engaged in some form of conflict.

Low-level conflict will likely be the most pervasive threat to Free World security for the rest of this century. Special Operations Forces provide us the ability to respond to a range of crises in a flexible manner. They contribute to our ability to deter and defeat a major conventional attack by their capability to disrupt the enemy's rear, engage in unconventional warfare, psychological operations, counterterrorism actions, or intelligence missions.

Reserve Forces. Under the Total Force Policy, the Reserve Components have in recent years played an increasingly important role in our conventional defense capabilities. We have, for example, improved the equipment, training, force structure, and manning of Army and Marine Corps Reserve units and the Air National Guard. Following the "first to fight, first to be equipped" policy, early deploying Army National Guard and Reserve units are receiving modern weapons systems before active component units that would deploy later.

U.S. Strategic Mobility

The U.S. must be able to sustain deployed forces and to redeploy in response to combat needs. Forces able to meet these objectives should be adequate for virtually any other contingency.

Our capability to move troops and equipment by air is unmatched by any country in the world. U.S. airlift assets include the transports of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) augmented by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) in time of emergency. Current MAC strategic mobility transports include 70 C-5 and 234 C-141 aircraft. Under the CRAF program, US civilian airlines augment the military with an additional 61 cargo and 221 intercontinental passenger aircraft. The combined cargo carrying capability of these U.S. aircraft is more than twice that of the Soviet Union's military and civilian aircraft. When distance to a region of possible conflict is considered, however, this 2:1 ratio favoring U.S. cargo capacity changes significantly in terms of maximum number of tons deliverable per day.

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) currently owns or has under charter 31 ships, which include 17 ships under MSC charter for the Near-Term Pre-positioning Force (NTPF). NTPF ships are fully loaded and positioned overseas. They are intended to be used primarily for contingencies in southwest Asia, but they could be used in any overseas contingency. The Maritime Pre-positioning Ship (MPS) program will place an additional 13 ships under MSC contract. The MPS program increases our afloat pre-positioning capabilities by providing additional unit equipment, POL, supplies, and ammunition for three

Marine Corps amphibious brigades. The MPS program will extend to the eastern Atlantic, western Pacific, and Indian Ocean, thereby improving our capability to respond rapidly to any worldwide contingency.

Security Assistance

U.S. security assistance programs respond to the global Soviet challenge and contribute directly to the national security of the United States by helping friendly and allied countries defend themselves. Through the sale of equipment and services, some of which are supported by financial assistance, our programs enable recipient countries to make better use of their own resources, assist in furthering greater military self-reliance, and help advance the shared goal of collective security and regional stability around the world.

These programs also promote closer military working relationships between U.S. forces and the armed forces of other countries, help strengthen our alliance relationships, and improve forward defense capabilities through access to overseas facilities and retention of base rights abroad. They also enhance our ability to interact with other friendly forces through improved commonality of equipment and training, thus adding a force multiplier to US capabilities. In each instance, security assistance has been an essential foreign policy tool for obtaining or retaining these defense benefits.

The foreign policy contrast between the United States and the Soviet Union is starkly evident in the provision and implementation of security assistance in general and especially to the Third World. The U.S. program is the most open in the world. Soviet assistance, by contrast, is not subject to public review or internal criticism; no justification for decisions is provided.

The Soviet Union stations more than 20 times the number of permanent military technicians abroad than does the United States, even though the United States has security assistance relationships with a far larger number of countries. The United States attempts to develop greater self-reliance in the recipient countries; the sale of support, spares, and services contributes the greatest portion of U.S. security assistance exports. The Soviets, on the other hand, seek to foster military dependence through the sale of military hardware which they prefer to maintain themselves, rather than training others to repair. This policy permits them to place Soviet personnel on-site in the recipient countries.

Both countries have host training programs for foreign military personnel. In the USSR, foreign officers are segregated from Soviet society and subjected to heavy doses of political indoctrination. In the United States, there are no special restrictions on training of foreign personnel, and exposure to U.S. society is encouraged.

U.S. Industrial Base

The United States defense-related industrial base consists of both privately owned and Government-owned industrial facilities needed to produce and maintain military items required by the Armed Forces. Public law mandates that maximum reliance be placed on the private sector for the provision of goods and services. As a result, the Government-owned base is limited in most instances to a capability that is unique or that has little, if any, civilian equivalent. Examples are ammunition, artillery tubes, or other military-related items that could not be sufficiently produced and maintained by private investment. The present U.S. Government-owned base consists of 72 production plants and 43 maintenance facilities. Only one Government-owned plant has been constructed since 1965.

The Soviet military production base is kept relatively active and, in effect, is close to or on a wartime footing with the capability to expand rapidly. Many items produced by the Soviets can be simplified by removing technologically sophisticated subsystems, resulting in an ability to produce larger quantities of less complex weapons. By contrast, U.S. reliance on high-technology weapons, combined with a decline in heavy industry and traditional manufacturing methods, constricts the U.S. ability to expand production capability as rapidly in the event of a crisis.

To counteract the Soviet threat, the United States is continuing a number of important initiatives that are beginning to result in industrial expansion and modernization. We have seen significant positive results from the policies and programs established in recent years. The Congress has supported increased funding for surge industrial responsiveness. Further activity involves an Industrial Modernization Incentives Program to provide contract incentives that encourage industry to make productivity-enhancing capital investments.

A healthy and responsive industrial base has been and will continue to be an important element of U.S. national security. As such, it requires vigilant attention to quality, productivity, and efficiency while, at the same time, maintaining a sufficient reserve capability to meet any potential crisis.

Technology Security

A strong industrial base is vital to our ability to meet the Soviet challenge of superior numbers of men and weapons. Rather than trying to match the Soviets in terms of numbers, we rely on our technological superiority to help deterrence. The quality that makes the U.S. industrial base responsive, healthy, and competitive in the world marketplace is the very quality missing in the Soviet industrial system: innovation fueled by competition. The Soviets have mounted an all-out effort to acquire Western, principally U.S., high technology for incorporation into their weapons systems. Preventing the loss of strategically significant technology to the Warsaw Pact is one of the most cost-effective defense policies we can pursue in the structure of our national defense.

The United States is committed to an efficient and effective program of combatting the loss of strategic technology across the board, whether from direct Soviet attempts or inadvertent acts of our own. Much remains to be done. As we have proceeded to bar Soviet access to U.S. technology, the Soviets increasingly have turned to alternate sources -- Europe, the Far East, and elsewhere.

We are seeking to increase the incentives for other countries to cooperate with us in denying the Soviets the technology that undermines the security of the Free World. We are also increasing the disincentives for non-cooperation. A well-managed and effective control of the transfer of strategically significant technology from the West to the Warsaw Pact is critical for the security of the West. We must continue to make strides with our allies and friends.

Conclusion

For the United States and our allies the challenge is clear. Together, we must maintain a military capability sufficient to convince the Soviets that the costs of aggression far outweigh any possible gain. We must be equally steadfast in our resolve to defend the security of all free nations. These are the preconditions to the long-sought goals of arms reductions and world peace. Our strategy of nuclear and conventional deterrence -- given sinew by forces that are

well-manned, well-equipped, and well-trained -- has thus far been effective in preventing major war. It is incumbent upon the United States and its allies to have a full and precise understanding of the Soviet challenge as we take the steps necessary to preserve our freedom, to ensure an effective deterrent to the threat and use of force, and, at the same time, to seek genuine and equitable arms reductions, contributing to global stability and to our transcending goal as a free people -- the goal of peace and security. We must stay the course.

(Preceding material for release at 1315 GMT, April 2)

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק צפוי

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סיווג בטחוני: סודי

דחיפות: מיידי

אל: רושינגטון

(9)

3119-85 במרץ 31: תאריך וזיח: } לשירות
936 מס. מברק: } מח: }
הקשר

השגריר.

ביקור רה"מ תורכיה בווינגטון.

1. להלן ממקור באיסטנבול בעת ביקורי בתורכיה בשבוע שעבר:
במהלך ביקורו בריאד, ערב צאתו לארה"ב, נתבקש אוזאל ע"י המלך פאהד להעביר
לנשיא ריגן מסר כפול:

א. ארה"ב חייבת להפגין מאמצים אינטנסיביים יותר כדי להדק האמברגו
הבינ"ל על מכירת נשק לאיראן ועיראק. זוהי הדרך היחידה לכבות את
הדליקה המסוכנת העלולה להתפשט למפרץ.

ב. על הממשל להמנע בקונסטלציה המזתיית הנוכחית מלתמוך בצורה כה מופגנת
בישראל. עמידה פומבית חד משמעית לצד ישראל מחלישה את המתונים בעולם
הערבי ומרוקנת האויר מהתהליך המדיני.

המקור אשר שמע הדברים מאישיות בפמליה של אוזאל מוסיף כי רה"מ התקבל ע"י
הסעודים אחר כבוד אך תוצאותיו המעשיות של הביקור אינן ברורות. אוזאל
נמנע מלבקש מענקים או מלוות. הציע בעיקר השקעות סעודיות בפרויקטים משותפים.
הסעודים הבטיחו, מבלי להתחייב ספציפית.

2. צפוי להערכת אותו מקור כי אוזאל יתמקד גם בארה"ב במאמץ להפנות הון, השקעות,
יזמות וטכנולוגיה אמריקניים לתורכיה, כולל פרויקטים משותפים לפיתוח אוצרות
טבע וחמרי גלם.

אוזאל ידגיש נחישות תורכיה להצמד למערב כל עוד הוא מכהן כרה"מ, חזרתה
לדמוקרטיה פוליטית וכלכלית (ליברליזציה של הייבוא) ויבקש לסייע לו כגורם
מייצב וממתן באיזור להתגבר על השלב הקשה אותו עוברת תורכיה עתה.
אחרת, יזהיר אוזאל, עלולה לחול במדינה תזוזה שמאלה (גורמי השמאל שלא הורשו
להשתתף בבחירות הכלליות כבר מתדפקים על דלתות הפרלמנט. מפלגתו של ארדל אינו
SODEP הפכה בבחירות המוניציפליות לכח השני במדינה ורה"מ לשעבר אצ'ביט "מתגנב"
לזירה באגף השמאל באמצעות מפלגה שמקימה אשתו).

3. בשיחה עם רוברט שטראוס-הופה באנקרה, הדגיש שגארה"ב דאגתו מפני התוצאות
וההשלכות לטווח רחוק במידה ומסעו של אוזאל יתברר או אף יצטייר ככשלון.

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק צפ-1

דפים 2 מתוך 2 דפים

אל:

סיווג בטחוני:

דחיפות:

תאריך וז"ח: } לשימוש
מס. מברק: 936 } מח
הקשר

התורכים מייחסים לביקור חשיבות "הסטורית". זוהי היציאה הראשונה של ראש ממשלה תורכי לארה"ב מאז ביקור ניהאט ארים לפני 14 שנה. לצד הציפיות הגבוהות מתלווים אינה/אספה/אספה פגיעה בכבוד הלאומי התורכי אם יופגן לעין כל יחס של איפה כלפי תורכיה כבת חורגת של המערב.

(אג), הקיצוץ של 39 מליון דולר מהצעת סיוע החוץ לתורכיה בוועדת החוץ של הבית שחיסל הסיכוי לשבור את היחס של 10 - 7 עם יוון הוסיף שמן למדורה).

שטראוס הופה חושש מקבלת פנים עויינת בגבעה וממקלות שיטמינו השדולה היוונית והארמנית בגלגלי הביקור. להערכתו עשויה תורכיה, על רקע אכזבות מן המערב לנוע לכוון נייטרליות מהסוג שהופגן ע"י איסמאט אינונו במלחמת העולם השנייה.

מנהל מזתיים

שהיה זה מנהל מזתיים קיבץ מסימנים וכו'
האישור מנהל המחסקה:

ליאור

אישור המנכ"ל:

אישור מנהל המחסקה:

השוחח:

תאריך:

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ס' יולג בסא'ני :

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תשרי תשס"ח

171-011

NYT-3/31 Meir Marhav "The PLO Cannot Be Ignored" Israelis are making a grave mistake in deciding never, ever, to talk to the PLO. As detestable as the PLO may appear, it is the only plausible representative of the Palestinian people. The crux of the recent peace initiatives is to get the Israelis to talk to the Palestinians...there can be no peace without this occurring. The Israelis are willing to talk to moderate Palestinians but no Palestinian, however "moderate" in Israel's eyes, will waive the right of self-determination, over a small homeland of their own. Israel may reach a settlement with some Palestinians but other Palestinian groups would shoot it down immediately. Israel would therefore look conciliatory and at the same time have nothing come from the talks. In the end, the Palestinian problem is Israel's problem. It is certain that no Palestinian would be able to sign an accord not acceptable to the PLO. It is not clear that the PLO wants to abandon its "armed struggle" with Israel. But if Israel wants peace, it must make peace--with its mortal enemies above all. (adapted from an article in the Jerusalem Post)

NYP-3/30-Kraft "Mideast Muddle: Approach With Caution" The latest flurry of diplomatic activity teaches one lesson. Devising plans for making peace in the area comes easy and goes easy. The thing that counts is to find partners to negotiate with each other, that is not easy, therefore the administration is cautious. The accord has been hailed as a breakthrough by some Arab leaders. Peres, looking to appear flexible-in part to show that the withdrawal from Lebanon can have a negotiating payoff, in part to please the US, which is sitting on an economic aid program, and to show the Israeli public that he is more inclined to bring peace than Shamir, indicated approval for the Mubarak package. The US has good reasons for skepticism. The PLO began to backslide away from the accord. Hussein said PLO members would have to be included in talks. Syria can if it wants pull Jordan and the PLO back from any negotiations. If the US embraced the accord tension with the Israelis would have mounted. If Peres tried to develop a mandate in elections, he could lose. Hardliners would be back in power. The rule is not to negotiate until you see the whites of a lot of eyes, the Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, Russia's and Syria's.

NYT-3/30-Menachem Z. Rosensaft (Chairman of International Network of Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors) "Reagan Errs on the Holocaust"
Reagan apparently believes that all Germans alive today are under 60 years old. According to him "very few" Germans today even remember

האדיר: _____ השולח: _____ אישור טנהל המחלקה: _____ חתימה: _____

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let alone took part in World War II. This is his rationale for not going to visit Dachau. Yet, many of those who took part in the annihilation of the Jews were young and not in battle. Many in their 60's and 70's are alive and well living in Germany. The Holocaust must remain always with the German people for the "final solution" was planned under their name. Sharon doesn't want to offend anyone in Germany. His view is morally offensive.

N-3/31 Nelson "Radio Liberty: The Static Continues" Buckley says only a portion of Radio Liberty's broadcasts have provoked accusations of anti-Semitism or pro-Nazism. A tiny portion is all it takes to destroy the station's credibility. It would be a shame to cripple a good radio station because a few top execs refuse to concede they are doing anything wrong. But they still seem to think that all the criticism is unjustified.

Press Reports

Israel-Lebanon

*** N-3/31-p.1-Week in Review-Friedman-A new consensus appears to be atking in Israel regarding Lebanon. As Israel withdraws and focuses on securing its northern border, the divisions over Lebanon appear to be easing. The only issue that remains concerns how much force should be used to protect the border. The old limited approach may not apply since Lebanon has gone through so many changes. The historical debate over "who lost Lebanon?" is just beginning. There has been a tendency to blame only Sharon. But the thinking and illusions behind Israel's mistakes were held by Likud and Labor parties alike. Many misconceptions about Lebanon persist among the Israeli population. Israel now faces a myriad of small Shiite, Communist and Palestinian groups many who are opposed to Israel on religious ground. They are intertwined with the population and it is virtually impossible to get them out without killing civilians. They are all called "terrorists" in the Israeli press and govt communiques. Ze'ev Schiff blames Israel for this change in the Lebanese population. "The madness wasn't Shiite, it was Israeli," he states.

Fighting in Lebanon -Moslems/Christians /Palestinians/Israelis

NYT-3/31-AP-Christian gunners hammered Palestinian refugee camps and Moslem militia positions in Sidon killing at least 40. Israeli troops raided a Shiite Moslem village outside their occupation zone and said to have killed 50. Thousand of people fled their homes. Palestinian and Moslem fighters could be seen firing automatic rifles and RPG's in response to artillery

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מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

מל:

נר:

ממ:

fire from Christian villages. (see NYI-3/30-special)

NYI-3/30-special-Some 450 PLO fighters were brought into Lebanon by sea for battles with Christian irregulars. PLO forces loyal to Arafat have infiltrated the south during the past two days. (see NYP-3/30)

NYI-3/30-special-The Pope told a delegation from the Lebanese Parliament and told them they should seek a Lebanon free of foreign intervention.

Kidnapped Briton Freed

NYI-3/30-special-Brian Levick a British businessman was freed unharmed after 16 days of captivity. He was freed by a little-known group called Khaibar Brigade.

Blast In Jewish Film Festival in Paris

NYI-3/31-Bernstein-Politicians and Jewish leaders warned against an upsurge of racism and anti-Semitism in France after a bombing that wounded 18 people. No group has taken responsibility for the attack. In the past few weeks, two Arab residents of France were killed in racially motivated attacks. (see NYP & DN-3/30)

Discontent in Egypt

*** NYI-Miller-The national and opposition press have been filled with grim news in Egypt. Press reports have deplored Mubarak's trip to the US calling it a failure. Harsh attacks on the US can be seen more readily than in the past. The public and press is angry at the US's 100% backing of Israel. An Israeli flag was burned last week at a Cairo trade fair. Cairenes are also upset at an apparent upsurge of rape in the city. Calls for more modest behavior of women have begun. 3/30

Kahane's US Citizenship Reviewed

NYI-3/31-Hatch-The Kahane matter of his US citizenship and plans to have it revoked is still under consideration.

Basement in Jerusalem Yields 3000 Years of History

NYI-Freidman 3/31-Theo Siebenberg has uncovered 3000 years of Jewish history under his house in the old city of Jerusalem. He is turning his basement into a museum and has given the house to the Government in his will.

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

0788

NYT-p.1-3/30-AP-More than 2000 people have been detained in the capital in a gov't crackdown on demonstrators. Thousands more have been sent away. Nimer is in the US to hold talks with the administration. He wants a restoration of about \$80 million in US aid frozen by the administration to express displeasure with the Sudan's economic policies.

NYT-Ruters-Senior US officials expressed concern over the stability of Nimelir's Government.

Britons in Baghdad Warned

NYT-3/30-British nationals were advised by their Government to move out of central Baghdad because of the danger of explosions. The US Embassy told the 50-100 Americans living in Baghdad to avoid the center of the city and to have their passports ready in case evacuation becomes necessary.

Neo-Nazi Sentenced

NIT-UPI-Gary Lee Yarbrough, a chief lieutenant for a violent neo-Nazi group was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

Letters

NYT-3/30-William Stricker writes that Austria welcomed Hitler and that a recent poll indicates that 78% of all Austrians consider themselves anti-Semitic. Austria has not dealt effectively with its past.

DN-3/30-NY writer states that politicians are talking about freezing Social Security while giving Israel and Egypt \$1.5 billion in aid. Let's keep our money here. Charity begins at home.

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חת'מה:

אישור סנהל המחלקה:

תאריך: 31.5.52 חשולח:

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

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מחור 1
מחור 34

אל: המשרד, נד: 754, מ: 1100
דח: ר, א, סג: מ, תא: 310385, זח: 1330

סודי ביותר/רגיל

אל: מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מנהל מצפא
הנדון: ההליך השלום

במסגרת פגישת למדן והתי"מ' עם בריגר, בנושא חוק ברמן נדאו
דווח למדן [התייחס בריגר להליך השלום.
סיפר כי נדמו לו מהממשל שיש לצפות להתפתחות מכון ירדן
בשבותות הבאים. הוסיף כי יש 'חשוקה' בממשל לקראת התפתחות
כזו ואף שולץ נתן ברכתו לתפיש דרך.

לדברי בריגר יש הרגשה בממשל שתמורת ג'יסטה אמריקאית כלפי
'גורמים מחונים' באש"פ יוכל חוסיין לקבל ברכה אש"פ
למשלוח משלחת ירדנית - פלסטינאית (כלא אש"פ) משותפת
לנושנינגטון בצעד מקדים לשיחות עם ישראל.

הג'יסטה יכולה להיות קבלת המשלחת המשותפת על ידי הנשיא
לבריגר נאמר כי יתכן ויחבש לפעול למטן גיוס תמיכה בקרב
הקהילה היהודית לצעדים כאלו.

סיכום

תפ: שהח, רהמ, שהבמ, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, ר/מרכי, רס, אמן, מצפא, משפמ

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8847

נכנס

דף 1 מחוך 1

עומק 4 מחוך 34

סודי ביותר

אל: המשרד, נר: 754, מ: 111
 דח: ד, א, סג: מ, תא: 310385, זח: 1330

סודי ביותר/רגיל

אל: מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מנהל מצפא
 הנדון: תהליך השלום

במסגרת פגישת למדן והחיים' עם בריגר, בנושא חוק ברמן נראו
 דעות למדן (החיים' בריגר לתהליך השלום
 סיפר כי נדמו לו מהממשל שיש לצפות להתפתחות מכון ירדן
 בשבועות הבאים. הוסיף כי יש 'חשוקה' בממשל לקראת התפתחות
 כיון ואף שולץ נתן ברכתו לחפש דרך.

לדברי בריגר יש הרגשה בממשל שתמורת ג'סטא אמריקאית כלפי
 'גודמים מחונים' באש'פ' יוכל חוסיין לקבל ברכת אש'פ'
 למשלוח משלחת ירדנית - פלשת'נאית (כלא אש'פ') משותפת
 לוויש'נגטון בצעד מקדים לשיתות עם ישראל.

הג'סטא יכולה להיות קבלת המשלחת המשותפת על ידי ה'אש'א.
 לבריגר נאמר כי יחבן ויתבקש לפעול למען ג'וס המינה בקרב
 הקהילה היהודית לצעדים כאלו.

סיבל

תפ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, ד/מרכב, דס, אמן, מצפא, משפס

מדינת ישראל

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משרד החוץ
ירושלים

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תאריך: כ"ד שבט תשמ"ה

15 בפברואר 1985

מספר:

אל : מנהל לשכת רוה"מ

מאת : המחלקה לאורחים רשמיים


הנדון : ביקור Diane Feinstein

ראש עיריית סן-פרנציסקו

גב' פיינשטיין תגיע לארץ בלוויית פמליה של 9 איש
(את שמותיהם ותאריהם טרם קיבלנו).

בעת שהותה בארץ 27/3-3/4, מבקשת הגב' פיינשטיין
להפגש עם ראש הממשלה.

נודה על תשובתכם.



ב ב ר כ ה ,

חנה דביר

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ניו-יורק

בעתון

המשרד

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אל: הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לש' רוה"מ, דובר צה"ל. דע: ניו-יורק.
רמ"ח, קש"ח

NEWS SUMMARY FRIDAY MARCH 9, 1985

COLUMNS

EGYPT'S POOR-MOUTHING PERFORMANCE

JACK ANDERSON WASH. POST Egyptian Presideant Mubarak was in tow n earlier this month seeking more aid for his impoverished country. He resorted to poor-mouthing , just like any national leader looking for a handout from Uncle Sugar.

THE PRESS REPORTS

RIVAL MOSLEM MILITIAS FIGHT IN TRIPOLI; 6 DIE, 11 INJURED

(UPI) WASH TIMES Rival Moslem militias battled in the streets of Tripoli yesterday, killing 6 people and wounding 11 in fighting that threatened an eight month old Syrian-mediated truce between Lebanese Moslem factions.

ISRAEL ASKS 'SOFTER' RHETORIC

WASH TIMES Israel will ask Radio Free Europe to tone down it's anti Soviet rhetoric as a condition for an agreement to broadcast from a relay station in Jerusalem, according to a government official.

PLO ROLE IN TALKS PUSHED

C. WILKIE BOSTON GLOBE The PLO and it's new negotiating partner, Jordan, are both adamant that the PLO be included in any Mideast peace talks.

ISRAELIS DEBATE 'LAND FOR PEACE' QUESTION

M. CURTIUS SCI MON Westerns analysts believe that both Arabs and Israelis are interested in reaching some sort of negotiating settlement. The Arabs have realized, these observers say, that they cannot defeat Israel militarily. At the same time, Israel's economic troubles and its demoralizing occupation of southern Lebanon have convinced a growing number of Israelis that they need to make peace with their enemies.

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Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including a large signature and some illegible scribbles.

סגירות ישראל - וויסנגטון

אלו האשר

751

ס.נ.ס. ס.נ.ס.
דף... מתוך... דפים
סוג בטחוני...
דחיות...
תאריך וז"ח...
מס' מברק... 751

מנכ"ל, מצפ"א, משפט

דובר מתמיד על תפקיד סוריה

ולקוט התקשר, התייחס לדברי דובר מתמיד באשר לרצון לשלב סוריה בתהליך השלום (שצוטט בדויטש). סיפר שהדובר תוודע מראש שאם יישאל באם מורפי נוסע לסוריה, עליו להשיב באמרה כללית "שאינה מעוניינת בשילוב סוריה בתהליך השלום". בטעות הדובר הקריא קטע זה בתשובה לשאלה אחרת ע ועל כן יצא שאינה כאיילו יוזמת פעילות כלפי סוריה אך לא זאת היתה כוונת מתמיד.

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מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, מע"ת.

State Dept Briefing March 29, 1985

Q Are we expecting any announcement from you after the meeting between the American Middle East Ambassador with Murphy, for the whole week? I mean, are we expecting anything, a review of policy or anything like that?

MR. DJEREJIAN: No. You mean a statement of policy emanating from —

Q Yes, because you said there is a review of the Middle East policies --

MR. DJEREJIAN: No.

Q -- after the Ambassador's meeting.

MR. DJEREJIAN: No, the next step, quite frankly, will be Assistant Secretary Murphy's travel to the area. Secretary Shultz has cited a number of possible stops that Ambassador Murphy will be making. I could say that Assistant Secretary Murphy would welcome another opportunity to consult with Syrian officials. But no itinerary has been set for his forthcoming trip. You know that we have maintained a high level dialogue with Syria in recent years, on a variety of subjects, including Lebanon and the peace process, and we think that this is important and we value these exchanges, and we hope to continue and intensify this dialogue in the hope that both of us can better understand the other's policies and objectives in the region.

While there are obvious differences between our position on the peace process and that held by Syria, the United States is

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STATE DEPT. BRIEFING 3/29

-6-

is committed to supporting movement toward peace between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors. Our consistent goal has been to bring about direct negotiations between Israel and all its Arab neighbors, including Syria, on the basis of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.

Q When is Mr. Shultz going to Israel? There have been some reports suggesting that he is going.

MR. DJEREJIAN: Yes, I think that was announced in terms of his going to Israel on May 10th to take part in the commemoration of the holocaust. Let me double check. Yes, it is May 10th, that is correct.

Q Can we take the statement that you just read about Syria as asked or a request for an invitation from Syria for Murphy to visit, that there is none now and that we want one?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I would steer you away from that. I'm just stating -- I'll leave that statement on its own merits.

Q Why are you calling special attention to Syria? I mean, there are a lot of countries in the Middle East.

MR. DJEREJIAN: Assistant Secretary Murphy will be traveling to several countries in the Middle East that are involved in the peace process.

Q Any comment on the agreement between France and Israel to provide Israel with two nuclear reactors?

MR. DJEREJIAN: I have nothing for you on that.

Q Since you mentioned Syria, do you have any comment on the new front which was formed between leftwing Syrian and Palestinians?

MR. DJEREJIAN: No, I have nothing for you on that.

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דפים 5 1

אל: המברק, מע"ח, לש' מפכ"ל, יועץ רוח"מ לחקשורת, מכס"א.

סינון בטחוני:

לש' יצר

רשימות:

דע: רושנינסקי

מאריך היד:

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לש' יצר
מס. מברק

מאח: קרונות

News Summary March 28-29, 1985

Editorials

WSJ 3/29 "Israeli Independents" Some Israelis from the Aiznaut Party demonstrated in front of the US Embassy against US economic aid to Israel. The tiny group is raising a big issue. It argues that any economic aid to its government merely reinforces the rigid statism of Israeli society. There is growing signs that the Congress will grant Israel supplementary aid. Israeli officials have said to the US that they are getting their house in order. Others charge that the changes are only on paper. Rather than more dollars to squander, the Israeli government need supply-side reforms. If the US pushes the aid through, it will only make Israel more dependent on half-measures and threaten Israel's long-term chances for real prosperity. It would endanger Israel's security in the long run. Congress should not flinch now.

NYT-3/26 "Strangers No More" Nimerv wanted no publicity for a simple act of decency-permitting the US to airlift 800 stranded Ethiopian Jews to Israel. He deserves much credit, but it is appalling that he felt compelled to downplay so modest a gesture. No doubt his need for economic aid, and a planned visit to Washington played a role in his decision. Still it took courage.

DN-3/29 "An Act of History" Efforts to continue to bring the Ethiopian Jews to their literal "Promised Land" deserve to be supported by the entire world. The Israeli Gov't mounted an astounding effort which secretly lifted 7,800 Ethiopian Jews from Sudan. The US Gov't gave substantial support-well before the latest airlift-including diplomatic persuasions by Bush. Throughout the Mideast, blind victimization of Jews continue.

NYP-3/29 "Churches Must Pull Together on Behalf of the Soviet Jews" A new and ambitious program has been announced to exert pressure on the Soviets to free Soviet Jews. A massive international petition is called for. Community leaders will urge NY based diplomats to involve their governments more vigorously on the issue, business executives will press the issue with the Soviets. If Soviet Leaders cannot be converted to virtue, they can be embarrassed into behaving well. With the exception of the Pope, most Christian leaders have forgotten their persecuted brethren. The role of the World Council of Churches has been particularly shameful. They downplay the Soviet persecution of Christians in Russia.

טופס מברק גלוי

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

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Columns

NYT-2/18 Eric Breindel (Prof-Georgetown U) "Israel Cannot Afford to Pull Iron Punches" Israel's "Iron Fist" policy is arousing considerable moral indignation in American and Western Europe. A second look at what is actually happening on the ground is in order. Israel's goals are to withdraw its forces in an orderly manner and protect its northern border. It should not be hard to understand the wish to free its border from shelling. The Shiite terrorism on the rise may have less to do with the Israeli occupation has Lebanese domestic politics, Libyan aid and Khomeinite ideological inspiration. Must Israel be once again judged by a moral standard so uniquely harsh that it does not even include the right of self-defense?

Press Reports

Senate Committee Clears Aid to Israel

WSJ-3/29-Lachica-The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Reagan administration requests for aid to Egypt and Israel.. \$3 billion for Israel and \$2.1 billion for Egypt was approved.

CBS-Israel

NYT-3/28-Kaplan-CBS confirmed that it cancelled its broadcasts from Israel during Easter. A CBS spokesman said the show was canceled because they were "celebratory in tone, and no one was in the mood to celebrate." The segment cancellation does not constitute a protest.

How Airlift Got Started

ND-3/28-photo of refugees in Sudan camp) Powers (LA Times) Operation Moses was planned and directed on the ground by an officer in the US Embassy in Khartoum. While Israel and US Jewry financed the airlift, the Israelis neither planned nor directed its most crucial elements. The US officer was awarded during Bush's visit to Sudan.

Riots in Sudan

NYT-3/29-Reuters-Riots over food prices erupted for the second day in Khartoum. Three people were killed, 1400 arrested and several US Embassy cars were smashed. The riots began as Mimery left for talks in the US. The demonstrations were student led. But Moslem

תאריך: השולח: אישור מנהל המחלקה: חתומה:

טופס מברק גלוי

מחלקת חשד - ניו-יורק

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Brotherhood leaders went into hiding after being accused of inciting arrest. (see NYT-UPI 3/28)

Iran-Iraq

NYT-Miller 3/29-Iraq announced it attacked six cities in central and Western Iran and a "very large naval target" in the northern part of the Gulf. The Iraqi raids are designed to pressure Iran into a settlement. Iran wants a moratorium on attacks on cities but Iraq refused until all fighting ceased. Iran has announced to its neighbors that their support of Iraq placed them in jeopardy. (see NYT-p.1-Miller 3/28)

UJA-NY Visits Washington

DN-Rainie-Some of the most powerful members of New York's Jewish community came to Washington to see political power brokers. They talked about Israel and the budget and met with more than one dozen law makers. Donald Reagan also briefed them. The participants were treated very well.

Marc Chagall Dead at 97

NYT-p.1-Russel-Marc Chagall, a Jew from Russia died in France. His work is loved world-wide and shown in almost every museum in the developed world.

Magazine Articles-Israel-Lebanon; Soviet Jewry

The New Republic 4/8-Editorial "Not Only Jews" Soviet regimes have persecuted not only Jews, but Christians and Moslems, democrats and poets. It is important for Americans and US Jews to keep this in mind. It is true that Jews have been singled out for the harshest repressive measures. The Jew is "alien" and labeled as much on his passport. The proposed arrangements by Jewish organizations are morally obtuse. It suggests in the grossest possible way what anti-Semites have always charges: that Jews care only about Jews. Jewish leaders who try to strike bargains with the Soviets represent single-mindedness. They combine the worst features of special-interest politics with the most naive features of liberal foreign policy.

The New Republic 4/8-Tieseltier "The Wrong War; Israel Meets Iran in Lebanon" Israeli soldiers have nothing to do in southern Lebanon but die. Even peace in the Galilee won't come to pass. The Israelis

טופס חברק גלוי

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

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took over where the PLO left off. An Israeli occupation is another occupation to the Shiites and nothing else. The "Iron Fist" policy ratifies their reason for making war against the Jewish state. Israel now faces the Iranian revolution in southern Lebanon. The most catastophic consequence of the war is that Israel created a border between itself and Iran. The Palestinians are murderers who wish to kill. The Shiite terrorists are murderers who wish to die. The Shiites are at home, they can't be expelled like the PLO. The Israelis can't do a damn thing about them but they can make things worse by staying. What are the Israelis tough against--Islam?

ITOMUT

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טופס חבירה גלוי

מחלקת חקירה - גיו-גורק

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מחיר ח"ח: 90 סכר

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NEW YORK TIMES
EDITORIAL
MARCH 26, 1985

Strangers No More

President Nimeiry of the Sudan wanted no publicity for a simple act of decency — permitting the United States to airlift 800 stranded Ethiopian Jews to Israel. He deserves much credit for going ahead with the decision, but it is appalling that he felt compelled to downplay so modest a gesture.

Ethiopia calls its Jews "talashas," a derogatory word for stranger. For centuries they have been ignored or persecuted by a succession of Ethiopian rulers. Israel was slow to acknowledge their plight, but in 1973 its Parliament formally recognized their claim to citizenship under the Law of the Return.

Some 15,000 Ethiopian Jews have immigrated to Israel, and perhaps 10,000 remain in ancestral vil-

lages, caught in the crossfire of civil war. The immigrants include 8,000 who escaped through the Sudan, where they were flown to Israel via Belgium on charter planes. When that airlift made headlines last year, President Nimeiry suspended it to placate Arab radicals.

Nonetheless, he agreed to an American rescue, on condition that it be kept quiet. No doubt his need for economic aid, and a planned April visit to Washington, played a part in his decision.

But it also took courage. All the Jews from the Sudan now are in a country where they will no longer be strangers, and there is hope for deliverance of those still in Ethiopia. That is what will be remembered.

החלטת ממשלה
מחיר ח"ח: 90 סכר

תאריך: השולח: אישור סנהל המחלקה: חתימה:

מצפ"א.

סנט: חוק סיוע חוץ: לשלנו 653.

1. בשעה מאוחרת אתמול בלילה (27) ולאחר יומיים של עבודה מאומצת, סיימה וועדת החוץ של הסנט את תהליך ה- mark-up לחוק סיוע החוץ. קבלה תיקון בדבר ה- ESF שכולל בין היתר סיוע אזרחי עבורנו בסך של 1.2 בליון (ראו להלן) וכן כמה וכמה תיקונים הנוגעים לנו ישירות ובעקיפין. חברי הוועדה לא (א לא) חזרו לנושא חוספת חירום (supplemental) עבור ישראל.

2. רשימת התיקונים הרלוונטים וניסוחיהם בנפרד. להלן הערות מספר:

(א) הסיוע האזרחי: תשומת לבכם לסעיף (4) (b) (ו) (A) של התיקון המחייב סכום גלובלי בסך של 2.015 בליון עבור "מדינות קיד" (ישראל ומצרים), לעומת סכום גלובלי בסך של 1.826 בליון עבור כל שאר המדינות המקבלות סיוע אזרחי. זו הפעם הראשונה שה- ESF עבורנו מועבר בצורה כזו. הנוסחה נכתבה ע"י גרייטס בנרמן, אחר מעוזריו של לוגאר בצוות העוזרים לוועדת החוץ, ולטענתו:

1. היו צריכים להכין התיקון בצורה כזו מאחר וטרם התקבלה הבקשה הפורמלית מהממשל לסיוע אזרחי עבור ישראל.

2. עדיין ייתכן נסיון במליאת הסנט לקצץ הסיוע האזרחי לכל המדינות, ולכן רצוי להפריד בין הסיוע המוענק לישראל ולמצרים לבין הסיוע הניתן לאחרות.

עוזרים אחרים (לרבות מייק קראפט) ואנשי איפא"ק הצביעו על הצורה המזוהה

(והבלתי מקצועית כמעט) של ניסוח התיקון, באומרם שתיאורתית לפחות יוכל הממשל

לחלק כרצונו את הסכום הגלובלי המוקצב לישראל ולמצרים ביחד (במקום 1.2 בליון

עבור ישראל, והיתרה עבור מצרים), מה גם שהממשל אינו חייב להעביר את הסכום במלואו

מאחר ולא כתוב "לא פחות" מ-2,015 בליון ("

שהיא הנוסחא המקובלת. הערות אלה הובאו לידיעת יו"ר הוועדה, ובתום המושב האחרון

הסמיכו חברי הוועדה את צוות העוזרים לערוך "שינויים טכניים" כמתבקש בניסוחי

התיקונים שנתקבלו. לדברי קראפט, יוסיפו העוזרים תתי סעיפים לסעיף (4) (b) (1) (A),

שיציינו הסכומים הנפרדים המגיעים לישראל ולמצרים; ייתכן גם שישלבו את נושאי

ההעברה המוקדמת של הסיוע לישראל מצד אחד, והעברת המזומנים למצרים מצד שני.

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סוג בשחזר

דחפוט

מאריך וזיה

723...מס' 723

אל:

(ב) תוספת חירום (Supplemental) עבור ישראל: כאמור, חברי הוועדה העדיפו לא להתייחס לנושא זה במסגרת חוק סיוע החוץ. מתבקש איפוא חוק נפרד בנידון - ראו דיווח בנפרד.

(ג) חלביא: השינוי העיקרי הוא תוספת המילים "If the Government of Israel requests that funds be used for such purposes."

שינוי דומה הוכנס לתיקון שהתקבל בתחומה למזיית שליד וועדת החוץ של בית הנבחרים, ולדברי בושביץ (שהגיש התיקון) מטרת השינוי היא לאפשר לישראל לבקש מימון זה, מבלי לחייבה לקבלו אם לא תבקש אותו.

(ד) העברת כספים מזומנים למצרים: תיקון זה יצירתו של בושביץ שהתייחס לחוסר היעילות של הביורוקרטיה במצרים ולסכום של יותר משני בליון בכספי ה-AID שנתקעים ב"צנרת". התיקון נועד, לדבריו, לספק את הצרכים המיידיים של מצרים. בשיחות פרטיות, טוען בושביץ שהתיקון מכוון להקל על התנגדות חברי הוועדה להענקת תוספת חירום (Supplemental) למצרים. נציגי הממשל שהשתתפו ב-mark-up התנגדו לתיקון מהסיבות המפורטות בע"מ 2 למברקנו 644 (ואילו אנשי איפא"ק חולקים על יכולתו ורצונו של בושביץ לתוספת חירום עבור מצרים אם וכאשר תוגש).

(ה) איסור על מגעים עם אש"פ: בשלב מתקדם במהלך ה-hearings שקל בושביץ הכנסת שינוי בנוסח תיקון זה: השמטת "שלילת הטרור" מרשימת שלושת התנאים שעל אש"פ לקבל טרם שארה"ב תקיים את המגע עמו. לדברי קראפט, מרפי היה זה שהציע רעיון זה לבושביץ בעת שיחתם ב-18/3 (ראו נא שלנו 456). נגשתי לבושביץ בעת ה-mark-up והפצתי בו לא להשמיט תנאי זה מאחר והוא יכרסם בעמדה מוצהרת של הממשל; הוא נשאר בשלו, בטיעונו שהוצאת "שלל הטרור" אינה מחלישה העמדה הרשמית. לבסוף, נרתע מלפעול לאחר שקראפט הראה לו מכתב ממק-פרלין (רצ"ב) מה-8/3, בו מאשר האחרון מחדש את עמדת הממשל כלפי אש"פ, לרבות "Disavows Terror".

(ו) אי-שימוש בסיוע חוץ לפעולות צבאיות או צבאיות למחצה בניקרגואה: לכאורה תיקון זה אינו בוגע לבו, אך הוגש ע"י הסנטור דוד יחד עם סעיף נוסף שנועד להפסיק מתן סיוע לכל מדינה שתומכת כספית או חומרית בפעולות צבאיות וצבאיות למחצה בניקרגואה. במהלך הדיון היה ברור שבמשתמע הצעה זו מתייחסת בין השאר גם לישראל והעזרה שלפי כלי התקשורת אנו הושטנו ל"קונטרס" בניקרגואה. שייכותנו לנושא נעשתה

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אלו

מפורשת כאשר לוגאר הודיע שבכוונתו להתנגד להצעה מפני שייתכן שבאחד מהימים תרצה ישראל לעזור לארה"ב בניקרגואה, ומצדו הוא (לוגאר) אינו רוצה לסגור כל אופציה. הצעתו של דוד, על שני חלקיה, נפלה בהצבעה (10 קולות נגד לעומת 8 בעד); ולאחר מכן הציע פל החלק הראשון (הכל לי יותר) שהתקבל ברוב של 10 קולות מול 8.

3. ירדן

לדברי קרפאט, שקל בוטביץ תיקון שיתייחס לירדן בדומה לזו שגרמה לסערה בתח הוועדה למז"ח שליד וועדת החוץ של הבית, אך לאור ההתנגדות הנמרצת של הממשל, וויתר.

למדן

3/10/75

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1984

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Rudy
Dear Senator Boschwitz:

Thank you very much for your recent note regarding U.S. contact with the PLO and Palestinian refugee statistics. Please rest assured that there has been no change in the U.S. commitment not to negotiate with the PLO, unless that organization formally recognizes Israel's right to exist and disavows terrorism. It is indeed tragic that the PLO bureaucracy remains more interested in its own survival, as opposed to improving the quality of life of the people whom the PLO purports to represent.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Bob

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable
Rudy Boschwitz
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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 בחול לבוקר
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 תאריך וז"ח 1400 28 מרץ 85
 מס' מברק 715

אל: שר האוצר, מנכ"ל אוצר

הלפרדז

תמוצה: שגירה, יופעמדינו, קונגוס. האפיין, איכ'ד

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דף...!...מחור...דפים
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מזא"א. ממ"ד.

הנידון - בריה"מ פנים

מתוך שיחה עם דונלד גרייבס (מחמ"ד INR - בריה"מ פנים)
בהשתתפות אלי אבידן.

1. גרייבס ציין כי גורבצ'וב יפעל במרץ רב בכדי לבסס את שלטונו עוד לפני עריכת קונגרס המפלגה. השיתוק שאחז במדיניות הקאדרים בשנים האחרונות של ברז'נייב יצר הזדמנות פז עבור מנהיג צעיר ונמרץ. גרייבס הצביע על 4-5 משרות פנויות בפוליטבירו, על 3 משרות במזכירות (חקלאות, קאדרים, אידיאולוגיה).
2. גרייבס מעריך כי וורוטניקוב הינו כנראה מועמדו של גורבצ'וב למשרת רוה"מ. מעריך כי מינוי זה יכול לבוא בעת הפלנום של הסובייטי העליון ובכך תיפתר הבעיה הפרוטוקולרית שהיתה עלולה להתעורר בעת ביקורו של גורבצ'וב לרגל עצרת האו"ם ופגישתו האפשרית עם הנשיא ריגאן. גרייבס ציין כי העדר תואר נשיא הסובייט העליון לא מנע ביקור ברז'נייב בארה"ב ופגישתו עם ניקסון בקיץ 1973, אולם הדגיש כי הסובייטים לא חשו אז בנוח ולכן העדיפו להציג הפסגה האפשרית כפגישה בין שני נשיאים. גרייבס מעריך כי גורבצ'וב מונה כבר ליו"ר ה- Defense Council (דבר שכנראה בא עם משרת המזכ"ל) והשאלה היחידה היא מתי יודיעו על כך.
3. גרייבס מעריך כי בעת פלנום הועד המרכזי באפריל ייתכנו מינויים למזכירות המפלגה. מעריך כי ליגאצ'וב, המקורב לגורבצ'וב, יקבל תיק הקאדרים. גרייבס הצביע על הציפייה שדולגין יתקדם. ציין כי דולגין מונה לועדה שהיתה אחראית על קבורת צ'רננקו וזה סימן כי מעמדו יתחזק. ציין כי דולגין לא כיהן בועדות הדומות שהוקמו לטפל בקבורת ברז'נייב ואנדרופוב. גרייבס רואה במרשל סוקולוב, שר ההגנה, דמות לתקופת מעבר. כמו כן, גרייבס צופה כי מעמדו של גרומיקו ישקע בהדרגה בשנים הבאות. שביר להניח כי גורבצ'וב יפקיע מידי גרומיקו הטיפול בנושאים מרכזיים (ארה"ב, פירוק הנשק, מערב אירופה, סין) וישאיר בידיו של שה"ח הנושאים האחרים. לשון אחרת, גרומיקו יחזור ויתפקד בצילו של גורבצ'וב כפי שבעבר פעל בצילו של ברז'נייב ושל אנדרופוב. כבר בסדרת המגעים עם אישים שונים בעת הלווית צ'רננקו התברר כי גרומיקו נדחק לקרן זווית.

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אל: ה מ ש ר ד

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מצפ"א.

ס י ו ע - Mark-up

ועדת החוץ של בית הנבחרים המשיכה בדיון על המלצות תת הוועדות השונות. בתום הסיבוב הנוכחי החליט יו"ר הוועדה פאסל לדחות את המשך הדיון לשבוע הבא. בכך נמנעה הוועדה להתחיל בפועל את ה- Mark-up. הממשל הגביר בימים האחרונים את המאמצים להסיר מהצעת חוק הסיוע הנושאים השנויים במחלוקת ואף זימן מורשים שונים לפגישות במחמ"ד. שמעתי הערכות שספק אם הוועדה תספיק לסגור כל העניינים בשבוע הבא ולכן טביר שהוועדה תשוב ותדון בכך עם שובה מפגרת הפסחא בשבוע השלישי של אפריל.

קני-טל
11.11

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CBS תקרית

הראל

מה היה ענין ה' לך
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CBS News Clarifies Stand on Canceling of Broadcasts From Israel

By PETER W. KAPLAN

CBS News confirmed yesterday that, in the wake of the killing of two of its news crew members by Israeli tank fire in southern Lebanon last Thursday, the network was cancelling a week of "CBS Morning News" broadcasts from Israel just before Passover and Easter.

"CBS Morning News" had planned a week of broadcasts from Israel by its correspondent Bill Kurtis beginning next Monday. A CBS News spokesman, Ann Morfogen, said yesterday that the broadcasts were canceled because they were "celebratory in tone, and no one was in a mood to celebrate."

Miss Morfogen said that the cancellation of the "CBS Morning News" segments did not constitute a protest, but that they now seemed simply "inappropriate."

Initial Protest

On Tuesday, after Ernest Leiser, a CBS News vice president, met with Prime Minister Shimon Peres and other Israeli officials in Jerusalem on

Monday to discuss the incident, the network issued a statement that departed from its initial protest of the shelling that killed a cameraman, Talik Ghazawi, and a soundman, Bahije Metni, and injured a driver, Ayad Hassan Harake, all Lebanese nationals.

In the statement, Edward M. Joyce, the CBS News president, said that despite earlier eyewitness accounts that put the Israeli tanks at "between 500 and 800 yards away" from the film crew, "it may have been a good deal farther, perhaps as much as a mile and a half."

"If this were the case," Mr. Joyce said, "it is entirely possible that the tank crew was unable to make out the camera and the press signs on the car."

Mr. Joyce also disputed an Israeli contention that the CBS crew had been among a group of "armed men."

"A high Israeli official has indicated that this claim is in error," he said. "The group in question was, of course, the crew itself." Mr. Joyce was in Mos-

cow and could not be reached yesterday.

Requested Investigation

CBS had requested an investigation of the incident, but the Israeli Government declined on Monday. The network called it a "matter of regret that the Prime Minister has elected not to investigate the incident further, and plans no measure which could prevent a recurrence of last week's tragedy."

The initial CBS statement last Thursday cited eyewitnesses as describing an "unprovoked and deliberate attack" on a press car that was "unmistakably marked."

Prime Minister Peres reacted the next day by expressing his sorrow but stating that "the tank crew did not deviate from strict orders concerning

the protection of innocent bystanders." He went on to contend that the cameraman "took a position in the midst of armed men who were engaged in acts of hostility against the Israeli Defense Forces."

One CBS News source called the Israeli decision not to investigate the killings "less than reassuring."

Speaking to reporters after his meeting with Prime Minister Peres, Mr. Leiser had initially called the cancellation of the "CBS Morning News" segments an expression of grief. There has been no response by the Israeli Government to the cancellation.

CBS News currently has other crews working in southern Lebanon, all of whose members are Lebanese nationals. It has no correspondent currently in southern Lebanon.

אל:

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ניו-יורק

בטחון

המשרד

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אל: הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לשי רה"מ, דובר צה"ל. דע: ניו-יורק.
רמ"ח, קשי"ח

NEWS SUMMARY MARCH 28, 1985

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

WHILE ISRAEL WITHDRAWS

WASH. POST It is strange that that the very day Post columnist Ph. Geilin complains of Israel as 'The iron fist that stayed too long' (march 1), the Post news columns described Israel's announced intention to speed plans for withdrawal. (From a letter to the editor by Helene Karpa, Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington).

THE PRESS REPORTS

BEIRUT KIDNAPERS RELEASE BRITON

WASH. POST Kidnapers yesterday freed British Scientist Geoffrey Nash, one of nine westerners abducted in Lebanon this month.

UNITY WORTH ANY PRICE TO LEBANESE LEADER

*** E. ROGERS WASH. TIMES Mustafa Saad, a nationalist leader who was maimed and blinded by an explosion on Jan. 21, (that according to him was set by Israeli forces or their Lebanese collaborators), said in a press conference yesterday that nothing short of a total Israeli withdrawal and restoration of a united Lebanon will stop the bloodshed in his homeland.

POLITICS OF TERROR (OP-ED)

FLORA LEWIS THE SUN The danger by the terrorists forces in the Middle East is that short term calculation and tactical reflexes (like the current problem of the Shiite guerrilla) will block longer terms policy needs.

LOOKALIKES

*** THE SUN In two photos released by Israeli officials show one man holding a video tape camera, and other an anticraft rocket launcher, from a distance of 1.5 miles one cannot possibly tell the difference.

ARABS SHOULD BE OUSTED FROM ISRAEL, KAHANE DECLARES

(RT) THE SUN Rabbi Kahane debating Harvard Law School Prof. Alan Dershowitz said that when he will become Prime Minister of Israel "Not a single Arab will be killed in Israel, because not a single Arab will be there".

מגרידום ישראל - 11011011

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MORMON PLAN FOR A BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY SITE IN JERUSALEM IRKS SOME ISRAELIS

M. CURTIUS CHRIS SCI MON Ultra orthodox Jews are trying to stop Brigham Young University from building a center that they charge will house Mormons missionaries dedicating to converting Jews.

FRENCH PROPOSAL TO SELL N-PLANTS TO ISRAEL IRKS US

W. ECHIKSON CHRIS SCI MON French and Israeli sources confirmed that talks are underway for the sale of two reactors to the Jewish State.

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ממכיל. מצפ"א.

ארה"ב - תהליך השלום

להלן ממרסין אינדיק (איפאייק).

Policy

1. אינדיק שוחח עם מקורות בממשל אשר סיפרו כי בשבוע שעבר התקיים ב-Planning Staff

דיון על תהליך השלום במזהיית שבוהל ע"י פטר רודמן. התמנו שתי גישות:

א. גישה המבקשת לתת בונוס לערפאת ע"י הדברות עם משלחת משותפת ידרנית-פלסטינית, הדברות שתוביל בסופו של דבר להכרה.

ב. גישה המבקשת לבצל און "יאושו של ערפאת" תוך נפנוף באפשרות של הדברות במסרה להניע אותו לתת אור ירוק לחוסיין להכנס למו"מ. המצדדים בתפיסה זו טבורים שאם ערפאת יתפתה לתת לחוסיין האור הירוק ניתן ברגע האחרון להתכחש להבנה עם ערפאת ולשלול השתתפותו בתהליך.

2. המצדדים באסכולה השניה אינם מוותרים על עקרון המו"מ הישיר, אלא נוקטים גמישות טקטית שתסלול הדרך למו"מ בין הצדדים ללא השתתפות אש"פ.

3. בגישה השניה הזו מצדדים בדרג העבודה אישים כגון טיישר מ- NSC, פטר רודמן, וצירלי היל ממחמ"ד.

4. המקורות סיפרו לאינדיק כי תפיסה זו הוצגה בפני הנשיא לפני מסיבת העיתונאים האחרונה שלו, אולם ריגאן התקשה לרדת לסוף דעתם של המתדרכים. למחרת שולח ומק-פרלן שוחחו עם הנשיא ובעקבות זאת פורסמה הודעת הבהרה של הבית הלבן ומחמ"ד.

5. בנפרד מאמר שכתב אינדיק אחרי מגעיו עם אנשי הממשל ובו מתריע על הסכנה של הליכה לפי הקו המוצע ב-1 בי לעיל. אינדיק ציין באזני טיישר כי קיימת סכנה ניכרת באימוץ גישה זו משום שקשה לפקח לגמרי על המשך התהליך. טיישר סבור שקיים סיכון מסויים באימוץ קו זה, אולם באותה העת זו הדרך היחידה לאפשר לחוסיין להצטרף לתהליך המדיני. טיישר סבור כי כתוצאה ממהלך זה יחלש ערפאת עוד יותר וייתכן שהסורים יחליטו בעקבות זאת לחסלו פיסית.

קני-טל ק.א.

המחלקה לביטחון לאומי
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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: ה מ ש ר ד

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703
מס' מברק

ממנכ"ל. מצפ"א.

ארה"ב - תהליך השלום

מצ"ב מאמר שנכתב ע"י מרטין אינדיק (איפא"ק) עבור ה- WSJ ..

קני-סל קנ"א

זה היה אמר מאמר
ואשר למד
הוא היה אמר מאמר
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GIVING THE PLO A VETO

by Martin Indyk

The Reagan Administration is currently contemplating how best to promote the Middle East peace process. It has three local partners - Israel, Egypt and Jordan - who are at least interested in talking about negotiations. But there is a fourth party waiting in the wings which wants desperately to insert itself in the process - not to make peace but rather to make peace impossible. This fourth party is Yasir Arafat's PLO.

Crippled by its military defeat in Lebanon and torn apart by a Syrian-sponsored rebellion, Arafat's PLO is in serious political decline. This decline has not been accompanied by any rethinking of the PLO's phased strategy for the destruction of Israel - there is still no willingness to recognize Israel, no renunciation of terrorism, no revision of the PLO's Covenant, no change in the PNC Resolutions which define its strategy, and therefore no acceptance of Resolution 242.

But Arafat's decline has been accompanied by a desperate struggle to achieve a significant political victory which would dispel his image of almost complete impotence and irrelevance. His is the real "last chance" in the Middle East and it lies in acquiring U.S. recognition for the PLO.

Some non-Arabists in the policy-making community believe that the U.S. should exploit Arafat's desperation to achieve one of King Hussein's longstanding preconditions for direct negotiations with

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Israel - a green light from Arafat that will provide the King with cover against Arab rejectionists.

Their idea is not to bring Arafat to the peace table since they recognize that the PLO is by no means reconciled to Israel's existence and that his presence will be unacceptable to any Israeli government. But they feel that by holding out an illusory promise of reward, the U.S. can persuade Arafat to give Hussein the green light to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians.

The first step in this complex game was taken by President Reagan when he announced at his last press conference that the U.S. would meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation without the PLO.

Before this meeting takes place, however, its proponents should think again. Inadvertently, they have embarked on a process that will resuscitate Arafat's PLO and give it a veto over peace negotiations.

Meeting with this Jordanian-Palestinian delegation may seem safe enough if it does not contain "declared members" of the PLO. But Arafat can be relied upon to make it clear - indeed his aides are already doing so - that the Palestinian participants have been authorized by the PLO. The meeting itself will be trumpeted by the PLO as de facto U.S. recognition. And its purpose will be to persuade the United States to support "self-determination" for the Palestinians - a code-word for an independent Palestinian state.

For its part, having agreed to the meeting, the United States

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will not want it to end in failure. Arabists will seize the opportunity to argue for a forthcoming response. And the Reagan Administration will therefore be sorely tempted to express support for Palestinian "self-determination," albeit "in association with Jordan."

If it does anything remotely like this, the U.S. will have managed to get itself into an indirect negotiation with the PLO - aimed not at making peace with Israel but rather at achieving formal U.S. recognition of the PLO.

However small the bonus for Arafat that results, it will remove any incentive he might have had for agreeing to Hussein negotiating with Israel. Why should he if even the slightest hint emerges from this meeting that the U.S. might be prepared to give him a better deal than Hussein is offering?

Recall the events of early 1983, when Hussein refused to enter negotiations with Israel after failing to gain Arafat's approval. According to Hussein's own testimony (to Karen Elliot House in the Wall Street Journal), he failed because of hints transmitted by Saudi Arabia and Morocco to Arafat that Washington was prepared to deal indirectly with him and support Palestinian "self-determination" through a "confederation" with Jordan.

To avoid a repetition, the Reagan Administration must strengthen Hussein's hand in his dealings with Arafat. This can only be achieved by sending a clear and consistent signal that the U.S. has nothing for the PLO and is only interested in dealing with

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Jordan. If the U.S. opens the door even a crack to Arafat, Hussein will be undermined and the peace process will be doomed. The overriding concern must be to avoid giving the PLO a role and therefore a veto over the negotiations. Accordingly, the U.S. should not meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Instead, the Reagan Administration should stand by the principle which has served it so well to date: an insistence on direct negotiations between Jordan - with Palestinians in its delegation - and Israel. This strengthens Hussein, weakens Arafat and therefore makes peace more possible.

Martin Indyk is Executive Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and author of Sadat's Jerusalem Initiative (Harvard Middle East Institute).

דד... 15... דפים
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מחיר זרים
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אלו המשרד

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מצפ"א.

סנט: חוק סיוע חוץ - לשלנו 653.

1. וועדת החוץ של הסנט סיימה אמש (27) מלאכתה - MARK-UP לחוק הנ"ל. רצ"ב
התיקונים שהתקבלו ושנוגעים לנו ישירות או שיש לנו עניין בהם:

א. ESF - הרשאת הסכומים הגלובלים לסיוע האזרחי, לרבות 2,015 בליון עבור
"מדינות ק"ד"; תיקון חדש הוגש ע"י היו"ר.
ב. העברה מזורזת (תוך שלושים יום) של הסיוע האזרחי לישראל: - כאשתקד - הוגש ע"י
בושביץ.

ג. תכנית הלבאי: כאשתקד, עם שינויים מסויימים - בושביץ.

ד. השתתפות במכרזים של ה-AID לפרוייקטים בתחום הבנייה וההנדסה; כאשתקד - בושביץ.

ה. איסור על מגע ומו"מ בין ממארה"ב ושולחיה לבין אש"פ; כאשתקד - בושביץ.

ו. העברת כספים במזומנים למצרים; תיקון חדש - בושביץ.

ז. הפסקת הסיוע האזרחי וצבאי ללבנון; חדש - בושביץ.

ח. ייעוד (EARMARKING) של הסיוע האזרחי והצבאי עבור תוניסיה; חדש

בושביץ.

ט. AWACS - ההתחייבויות שניתנו בעת מכירת המטוסים האלה לסעודיה; חדש -

קרנסטון.

י. אי-שימוש בתרומות לאירגונים בינלאומיים לשם פעולות או עבור מדינות התומכות

בטרור; כאשתקד, תוך הוספת סוריה לרשימה (הכוללת בין השאר אש"פ, לוב איראן) -

פרסלר.

יא. איסור על שימוש בכספי סיוע החוץ לשם פעולות צבאיות וצבאיות למחצה בניקרגואה;

חדש - פל.

2. הערות בנפרד.

למדן

3/11/80

3/11/80 3/11/80 3/11/80 3/11/80 3/11/80 3/11/80 3/11/80 3/11/80 3/11/80 3/11/80

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א. סיני אורח

1 "CHAPTER 4--ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

2 "SEC. 531. AUTHORITY.--(a) (1) The Congress recognizes
3 that under special economic, political, or security conditions
4 the national interests of the United States may require economic
5 support for countries or in amounts which could not be justified
6 solely under chapter 1 of part I. In such cases, the President
7 is authorized to furnish assistance to countries and organizations,
8 on such terms and conditions as he may determine, in order to
9 promote economic or political stability. To the maximum extent
10 feasible, the President shall provide assistance under this
11 chapter consistent with the policy directions, purposes, and
12 programs of part I of this Act.

13 "(2) To the maximum extent feasible, funds made available
14 pursuant to this chapter for commodity import programs or other
15 program assistance shall be used to generate local currencies,
16 not less than 50 per centum of which shall be available to
17 support activities consistent with the objectives of sections 103
18 through 106 of this Act, and administered by the agency primarily
19 responsible for administering part I of this Act.

20 "(3) The Secretary of State shall be responsible for policy
21 decisions and justifications for economic support programs under
22 this chapter, including determinations of whether there will be
an economic support program for a country and the amount of the

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702

program for each country. The Secretary shall exercise this responsibility [in cooperation] with the Administrator of the agency primarily responsible for administering part I.

"(4) As part of the annual presentation materials for foreign assistance submitted to the Congress, the agency primarily responsible for administering this chapter shall provide a detailed justification for the uses and the purposes of the funds provided under this chapter. Such material shall include, but not be limited to, information concerning the amounts and kinds of cash grant transfers, the amounts and kinds of budgetary and balance-of-payments support provided, and amounts and kinds of projectized assistance provided with funds made available under this chapter.

"(b) (1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out the purposes of this chapter --

"(A) \$2,015,000,000 for the fiscal year 1986 for the following countries signing the Camp David agreement: Israel and Egypt; and

"(B) \$1,826,000,000 for the fiscal year 1985 for countries other than the countries referred to in clause (A).

"(2) Amounts appropriated to carry out this chapter are authorized to remain available until expended.

"(c) Amounts appropriated to carry out this chapter shall be available for economic programs only and may not be used for military or paramilitary purposes.

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ב. העברה מזוהזת של הסיוע האזרחי לישראל

TAB B

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Ex. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES— 99th Cong. 1st Sess.

S. 666

H.R. _____ (or Treaty _____) SHORT TITLE

(title) To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1951, the Arms
Export Control Act and the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954, to authorize development and
security assistance programs for fiscal year 1986, and for
other purposes.

() Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

() Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

INTENDED to be proposed by Mr. Boschwitz

Viz:

1 On page 16, at the end of ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND section,
2 insert the following new section: Cash Transfer--Israel
3 "The total amount of funds allocated for Israel under this
4 chapter for fiscal year 1986 shall be made available as a cash
5 transfer on an expedited basis within the first 30 days of the
6 fiscal year."

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א. פרזיקט הלביא

(title) To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms
Export Control Act and the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954, to authorize development and
security assistance programs for fiscal year 1986, and for
other purposes.

() Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

() Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

INTENDED to be proposed by Mr. Boschwitz

Viz:

1 On page 2, after SEC. 101 (3), insert the following:

2 "Of this amount, if the government of Israel requests that
3 funds be used for such purposes, up to \$150,000,000 shall be
4 available, for research and development activities in the United
5 States for the Lavi program and not less than \$250,000,000 shall
6 be for the procurement in Israel of defense articles and defense
7 services, including research and development."

8
9 On page 2, after inserting section on Lavi program,
10 insert the following:

11 "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Israel may
12 utilize any loan which is or was made available under this
13 Act and for which repayment is or was forgiven before
14 utilizing any other loan made available under this Act."

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ד. השתתפות במכרזי הא.י.ד.

TAB D

52

1 **TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS**
2 **PROCUREMENT OF CONSTRUCTION AND**
3 **ENGINEERING SERVICES**

4 Sec. 1001. Section 604(g) of the Foreign Assistance
5 Act of 1961 is amended by inserting immediately before the
6 period at the end thereof "and which are not receiving any
7 direct assistance under chapter 1 of part I or chapter 4 of
8 part II of this Act".

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ה. איסור על מגע ומח"מ עם אש"פ

4 CODIFICATION OF POLICY PROHIBITING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

7 SEC. 1019. (a) The United States in 1975 declared in a memorandum of agreement with Israel, and has reaffirmed since, that "The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338."

16 (b) The United States hereby reaffirms that policy. In accordance with that policy, no officer or employee of the United States Government and no agent or other individual acting on behalf of the United States Government shall negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, except in emergency or humanitarian situations, unless and until the Palestine Liberation Organization recognizes Israel's right to exist, accepts Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounces the use of terrorism.

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1. העברת כספים במזומנים למצרים

(title) To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1951, the Arms
Export Control Act and the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954, to authorize development and
security assistance programs for fiscal year 1986, and for
other purposes,

- () Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed
- () Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

INTENDED to be proposed by Mr. Boschwitz

Viz: Egyptian Cash Transfer

1 Of the total amount of funds made available for Egypt
2 under economic support assistance, ^{UP TO,} BUT NOT LESS THAN \$165,000,000,
3 available in fiscal year 1986 as a cash transfer, all of which
4 shall be reallocated from project support funds, to help
5 encourage the Egyptian government's economic reforms and its
6 own developmental efforts.

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ז. המסכת סיוע אזרחי וצבאי ללבנון

LEBANON

At the appropriate section of the bill,

(a) No Economic Support Assistance Funds authorized for FY 1986 shall be provided for Lebanon.

(b) No Foreign Military sales assistance fund for FY 1986 shall be provided for Lebanon.

ח. ייעוד הסיוע לחוניסיה.

Tunisia Earmark

Amendment to S.660 offered

by Mr. Boschwitz

On page 23 of the markup sheets, insert the following new Subsection:

"Of the funds authorized to be appropriated to the President under Section 531(b)(1), not less than \$20,000,000 shall be made available only for Tunisia and of the funds authorized under Section 504(a)(1) not less than \$5,000,000 shall be made available for Tunisia."

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SAUDI AWACS DELIVERIES

DPK11K .D

AMENDMENT TO THE 1986 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BILL
OFFERED BY SENATOR CRANSTON

Add the following at the end of title I of the bill:

1 SEC. . CERTIFICATION CONCERNING AWACS SOLD TO SAUDI
2 ARABIA.

3 (a) THE PRESIDENT'S 1981 AWACS COMMUNICATION TO THE
4 SENATE.--(1) The Congress finds that in his October 28, 1981,
5 communication to the Senate concerning the proposed sale of
6 AWACS aircraft and F-15 enhancement items to Saudi Arabia
7 which was then being reviewed by the Congress (hereafter in
8 this section referred to as the "1981 AWACS
9 communication"), the President stated the following:

10 "Transfer of the AWACS will take place ... only after
11 the Congress has received in writing a Presidential
12 certification, containing agreements with Saudi Arabia,
13 that the following conditions have been met:

14 "1. Security of Technology

15 "A. That a detailed plan for the security of
16 equipment, technology, information, and supporting
17 documentation has been agreed to by the United States and
18 Saudi Arabia and is in place; and

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1 "B. The security provisions are no less stringent
2 than measures employed by the U.S. for protection and
3 control of its equipment of like kind outside the
4 continental U. S.; and

5 "C. The U.S. has the right of continual on-site
6 inspection and surveillance by U.S. personnel of security
7 arrangements for all operations during the useful life of
8 the AWACS. It is further provided that security
9 arrangements will be supplemented by additional U. S.
10 personnel if it is deemed necessary by the two parties;
11 and

12 "D. Saudi Arabia will not permit citizens of third
13 nations either to perform maintenance on the AWACS or to
14 modify any such equipment without prior, explicit mutual
15 consent of the two governments; and

16 "E. Computer software, as designated by the U.S.
17 Government, will remain the property of the USG.

18 "2. Access to Information

19 "That Saudi Arabia has agreed to share with the
20 United States continuously and completely the information
21 that it acquires from use of the AWACS.

22 "3. Control Over Third-Country Participation

23 "A. That Saudi Arabia has agreed not to share access
24 to AWACS equipment, technology, documentation, or any
25 information developed from such equipment or technology

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1 with any nation other than the U.S. without the prior,
2 explicit mutual consent of both governments; and

3 "B. There are in place adequate and effective
4 procedures requiring the screening and security clearance
5 of citizens of Saudi Arabia and that only cleared Saudi
6 citizens and cleared U.S. nationals will have access to
7 AWACS equipment, technology, or documentation, or
8 information derived therefrom, without the prior,
9 explicit mutual consent of the two governments.

10 "4. AWACS Flight Operations

11 "That the Saudi AWACS will be operated solely within
12 the boundaries of Saudi Arabia, except with the prior,
13 explicit mutual consent of the two governments, and
14 solely for defensive purposes as defined by the United
15 States, in order to maintain security and regional
16 stability.

17 "5. Command Structure

18 "That agreements as they concern organizational
19 command and control structure for the operation of AWACS
20 are of such a nature to guarantee that the commitments
21 above will be honored.

22 "6. Regional Peace and Security

23 "That the sale contributes directly to the stability
24 and security of the area, enhances the atmosphere and
25 prospects for progress toward peace, and that initiatives

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1 toward the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region
2 have either been successfully completed or that
3 significant progress toward that goal has been
4 accomplished with the substantial assistance of Saudi
5 Arabia."

6 (2) The Congress finds that the President also stated in
7 the 1981 AWACS communication that should circumstances arise
8 that might require changes in the arrangements described in
9 that communication, "they would be made only with
10 Congressional participation".

✓ 11 (b) REQUIREMENT FOR PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.--As
12 provided in the 1981 AWACS communication, before the E-3A
13 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft which
14 were the subject of that communication are transferred to
15 Saudi Arabia, the President shall submit to the Congress a
16 written Presidential certification, containing agreements
17 with Saudi Arabia, that the conditions set forth in that
18 communication have been met.

19 (c) CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN CHANGES IN AWACS
20 ARRANGEMENTS.--In order to facilitate the congressional
21 participation provided for in the 1981 AWACS communication,
22 the President shall notify the Congress promptly of any
23 changes being considered by the United States in the
24 arrangements described in that communication.

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7. אי שימוש בכספים לשם פעולות ומדיניות התומכות בטרור.

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Ex. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: To prohibit use of funds for international organization
activity that supports terrorist organizations or nations which
support terrorism.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES— _____ Cong. _____ Sess.

S. _____

H.R. _____ (or Treaty _____) SHORT TITLE

(title) _____

() Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

() Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

INTENDED to be proposed by Mr. Pressler

Viz: At the appropriate point in the bill, add the following new section

1 Sec. Notwithstanding any other provision of law or this
2 Act, none of the funds provided for "International organizations
3 and programs" shall be available for the United States' pro-
4 portionate share for any programs for the Palestine Liberation
5 Organization, the Southwest Africa Peoples Organization, Libya,
6 Iran, ~~or~~ Cuba, or Syria.
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ד"ר. אי-שימוש בכספי סיוע חוץ לפעילות צבאית בניקרגואה.

SEC. PROHIBITIONS RELATING TO MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA.

(a) PROHIBITION ON USE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FUNDS FOR MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA.--Funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may not be obligated or expended for the purpose of supporting or if the effect would be to support, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any group, organization, movement, or individual.

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סגירות ישראל - וויזינגסון

(n)

אל: המשרד

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דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סוג בשחוני טודי

רגיל דחירות

תאריך וז"ח 1050 28 מרס 85

699

מס' פברק

אל :- ממנכ"ל , מצפ"א, משפט

סיוע

סיפרו לי מרשל בריגר ופיל ווילקוקס ששולץ ממתיך לצעדים ישראלים מוסכמים במסגרת "סימני דרך". הערכת מחמ"ד שהדבר יקח לבו כ-3 שבועות ולאחר מכן המזכיר יגיש לקונגרס את הבקשה לתוספת סיוע.

ס י ב ל



עם זה לא נא לאשר את ההחלטה

עגירות ישראל - וויזינגטון

אל: המשרד

(1)

דף..... מחזור.....
שוג בשחובי שחור
דחירות רגיל

תאריך וזיח 1020.28.25

698

שחור... שחור...

אל :- ממנכ"ל , מצפ"א , משפט , מצרים

טאבה

בעת אירוע חברתי סיפר לי חלמי, היועץ המצרי, שמצרים מוכנה עתה לפסגה מובארכ - פרס בתנאי שישראל תתחייב מראש לבוררות בנושא טאבה, קביעת הבורר וקביעת מועד לסיון תהליך הבוררות.

י. ב. ל.

סיה רחא טהבא גאא א/גאא גצבא קיחא גצבא
גסרס ו/גאא גאא רחא א/אן סיאל

אל: המשך

0187.....7188.....97

שמואל

מ"ד

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0900 28 Y7M
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(3)

ספרד

3. המורשה ההסיפני רוברט גרסיה מחנכן ביקור של חברי קונגרס היספניים שיבקרו ביולי בישראל ואחר מכן בספרד במגמה לשכנעה לכוון יחסים דיפלומטיים עמו. יצויין כי גרסיה היה מעורב בעבר במאמצים בנידון ואף קיבל מכתב מרוחיימ ספרד בו הובעה תקווה שכינון היחסים קרוב.

קב"ט - טל

11.8

היה זהו המלך המשיח
הוא המלך המשיח

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שמו

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אל: ווש, נרן 864, מ: המשרד
דח: ר, סג: ש, תח: 280385, רח: 1600

שמו/רגיל

השגריר למזן קניטל

סנטור ברדלי

1. נודע לנו שהנל יבקר בסין העממית ובבריהמ' במאי. בהמלצת סטיב גרינברג מהמגבית ואחרים, נבקשם להזמין לבקר בארץ בתום הביקור. לבקשת לשכת רוהמ' כללו נא בהזמנה נכונות רוהמ' לקבלו בעת הביקור. הודיעונו תשובתו בהקדם. תודה.
2. עזרתו מרשה אהרונוב מוכרת לאנשי המנהיגות הצעירה של המגבית והם מתכוונים להזמין ארצה בנפרד.

מצפא==

תפ: שהח, דהמ, מוכל, ממנכל, מצפא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

8065

1101

סודי ביותר

מחור 18

מחור 2

דף 1

עומק 7

(4)

אלו המשרד, נרו, 701, מ: 1005
דח: 7, 10: 20, 280385, 1200

סודי ביותר/רגיל

אלו שה'ח, מנכ"ל-משה'ח, ממנכ"ל-משה'ח, מצפ"א/משה'ח
משפמ/משה'ח

דע: לשכת שהב'מ

הנדון: 'מלחמת הכוכבים'

סיפורה כי וונדי צ'מברלין מהוסק הישראלי כי מחמ'ד המליצה
לא לכלול את ישראל בין רשימת המדינות שארה'ב תפנה אליהן
להציע שיתוף פעולה בנושא S.O.S. ('מלחמת הכוכבים')
ג'מבוקי מחמ'ד היו ישראל רגישה לנושא של פעילות גבריה וגד
גבריהם וכן אין כל תקציב מימון לשיתוף פעולה, הוסיפה שלמעשה
מדובר בתרגיל יחסי ציבור אשר מטרתו לגבש תמיכה מדינית
ביוזמה ולא כל כך שתוף פעולה מעשי, המלצת מחמ'ד התקבלה על
ידי הפנטגון (אדמיטאג') והמועצה לבטחון לאומי (קובי), קלפיהם
נמצאו כאשר ריצ'ארד פרל תדרך את העתונים על הפניה והתייחס גם
לישראל
ישראל, איפוא, תקבל בקרוב פניה לשמית מווינברגר המופנית
לשהב'מ בה נתבקש להשיב תוך 60 יום באם אנו מעוניינים לשתף
פעולה בתכנית, צ'מברלין הוסיפה, לדבריה, על דעת הפנטגון
והמל'ב, שיינון אם אנו כלל לא נשיב לפניה.

הערתי שאמנם יש לנו רגישות אך מאידך יתכן ויש תועלת בעצם
שיתוף הפעולה, השיבה טוב, שכרגע אין כל תקציב אמריקאי לשיתוף
פעולה כזה ומדובר בצער מדיני-הסברתי.

ס'בל

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

טו"ד ב' יו"ר

מח' 2

דף 2

מח' 18

עמ' 7

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מפ' ש.ה.ר.ה.מ. מנכ"ל, מנכ"ל, מצפא, משפט

מח' 14764 339042 מ"ר

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

מחור 1

מחור 18

דף 1

עמק 4

(2)

מל: המשרד, נר: 665, מ: 1100
דח: ד, סג: מ, תא: 270385, רח: 1000

סודי ביותר / רגיל

מל: - שר האוצר, שר החוץ.

מהכית הלכן נודע לי היום שבכוונת הממשל לדחות אישור ה-

SUPPLEMENTAL עד לאחר הבחירות להסתדרות.

מ. דוין

תפ: שהם, דהם, טנכל, טמנכל, דדור, מצפא, שדהאוצר

דף 3 מחזור 1

אל: המבנה, מע"ח, לש' מבנכ"ל, יועץ רוח"מ לתקשורת, מבנ"א.

לש' יגד
יועץ מבטון

מאת: קרונר

סיווג בטחוני:
דחיות:

תאריך חידו: 9711
מס. מבנכ: 0668

News Summary March 27, 1985

Editorials

NYT "CBS Only Has Clouded the Eye on the Mideast" If CBS had expressed grave concern about the incident and called for a prompt and full Israeli investigation, it would have been fully justified. But its first reaction went much further. Joyce simply accepted the accounts of non-Israeli witnesses who had, in effect, accused Israel of murder. Yesterday, Ernest Leiser, the CBS VP who visited Israel, retreated. He did not think the killings were "deliberate," though he felt that excessive force had been used. CBS's initial readiness to accept the guilt of the Israeli's and its refusal to apologize for false accusations of murder confirm the feelings of many Israelis that the media operates under a double standard in the Mideast. They condemn Israel but feel unconcerned about any Syrian involvement in the kidnappings of Americans, just as they shied away from reporting on the PLO's tactics of intimidating journalists when they controlled southern Lebanon.

Press Reports

Israel Will Speed Up Pullout

NYT-p.l-Friedman-Both Rabin and Peres has said that Israeli forces will withdraw from Lebanon alot sooner than generally thought. These remarks indicate that Israel has given up its gradual approach to the withdrawal and that the IDF could be out by mid-May. Rabin said in an interview that 90% of attacks on Israelis were carried out by Shiites but that he had information suggesting that the Syrians were allowing Palestinian fighters to cross their lines and join in the operations against the IDF. Rabin also stated that never, while he is in power would Israel be concerned with Lebanese politics and that Israel's only concern would be the security of its borders in the north. The Israeli radio quoted Rabin as saying that Israel would pursue a "scorched-earth policy" in south Lebanon if guerrilla attacks were persured against Israel's northern border.

CBS Eases Its Tone

NYT-special-Ernest Leiser said he now believed the Israeli tank crew did not deliberately shell a CBS camera crew. He made the statement

תאריך: _____ השולח: _____ אישור מנהל המחלקה: _____ חתימה: _____

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

טופס חברה גלוי

מחלקת חקשר - ניו-יורק

3 28
ד"ר

אל

סינון בטחוני

דיווח

ד"ר

668/AM
מחלקת חקשר
ד"ר

חבר

after a half-hour meeting with Peres. "Knowing what I now know, we might have qualified our language somewhat," said Leiser. But he stopped short of apologizing. Uri Savir said that Peres had not asked for an apology. "We don't want to go into a futile exercise of trading accusations," Savir said. But Harry Wall of the AOL said he was disturbed that an organization from which Americans get their facts should first make accusations, then take punitive action and then examine the facts. (see ND-combined; DN-combined)

NYT-Ruters-Edward M. Joyce, the President of CBS issued a statement from NY stating that the Israeli tank "may have been a good deal further" away from the CBS crew than witnesses reported. He expressed regret that Peres "has elected not to investigate the incident further and plans no measures that could prevent a recurrence of last week's tragedy."

Iran-Iraq

NYT-special-Iraq warned that it was prepared to expand the Gulf war to "every corner of Iran" unless Tehran agreed to a comprehensive peace settlement. Iraqi war planes were said to have attacked three Iranian cities and merchant ships.

NYT-special-The Secretary General of the UN has presented a proposal to Iran and Iraq to "reduce the level of conflict and to promote a cessation of hostilities."

NYT-A2-The State Dept. accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against Iranian troops. Kate said the "S had received confirmation of such use from West European doctors who have treated the Iranians.

Survivors Angry at Reagan

DN-The Committee of Auschwitz survivors in Israel says it is "deeply disturbed" by Reagan's explanation about why he will not visit a concentration camp during his visit to West Germany in May.

Canadian Wins Appeal on Anti-Jewish Book

NYT-Martin-A court in Alberta ruled that a small-town schoolteacher could keep a book that had been confiscated on the grounds that it was anti-Semitic. This was the latest development of the Government's drive to crack down on hate literature. The teacher was dismissed from his duties in 1983 for teaching that the Holocaust was a Zionist

מאריך: השולח: אישור מנהל המחלקה: חתימה:

טופס מס' 100

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

תאריך: 3.3.71

מל:

סיווג בטחוני:

דחיות:

פ:

תאריך חידוש: 6.6.71
מס. מסמך: 144

ממ:

hoax, and that the world is ruled by a Zionist conspiracy. The book where he got his ideas was imported from the US and later confiscated for being in violation of customs rules.

Kosher Pig?

WSJ-Davis-The US Agency for International Development has found an Indonesian swine that appeared to chew its own cud, making it the world's first kosher pig. That's a big deal because Jewish legend says that a cud-chewing pig is a portent of the Messiah. But Rabbi David Bleich, an authority on Jewish dietary law claims that the bahirusa is likely a mutation of a swine. He concludes that a bahirusa, whose mother is a pig can't be kosher.

ITONUT

חתימה:

אישור מנהל המחלקה:

תאריך: 27.3.71
העולה: 144

(4)

אל' -: מצפ"א , ממ"ד

משיחה עם פרנק ריקרדונה - עיראק / NEA ב-27.3

טארק עזיז

1. שה"ח העיראקי שהגיע בסוף שבוע שעבר (23.3) לאוי"מ לדון עם המזכ"ל בנושא תווך האוי"מ להפסקת הלוחמה, הוזמן ע"י שולץ לבוא לווישינגטון. בפגישה בין חשניים התייחס המזכיר בתקיפות לשימוש שעיראק עושה בגז החרדל נגד חיילים איראנים. אמר שאינו מסתמך רק על דיווחים איראנים אלא שבידי ארה"ב בוכחות מוצקות לכך. ריקרדונה אמר שזו לא הפעם הראשונה שהנושא משמש לשיחות בין שני משה"ח, אך הפעם המזכיר דיבר בלשון שאינה משמעת לשתי פנים. שה"ח העיראקי כמעט שלא ענה פרט להכחשה רפה, שאף אחד לא התייחס אליה ברצינות. (ריקרדונה מעיר שפרט למחאות החריפות אין לארה"ב הרבה מה לעשות בנדון). שה"ח העיראקי בדרכו החוצה החוצה נתקל בעיתונאים ששאלוהו האם הנושא הועלה ע"י המזכיר, טארק עזיז (ריקרדונה מעיר-בטפשותו) ענה "שלא זכור לוי" (I can't recall). הדבר העמיד את מחמ"ד במצב עדין וע"מ שלא להסתבך הודיע הדובר מאוחר יותר ששולץ העלה את הנושא "באופן פרטי". גורמים במחמ"ד חוששים שנושא השימוש בגז עשוי להתרחב ולהיות מנוצל בקרב ארגוני טרור למיניהם שכן התהליך הכימי לאחר השגת החומר הוא פשוט יחסית. ארה"ב פנתה למספר רב של מדינות, כשם שעשתה בנושא הספקת הנשק, להגביר את הפיקוח על יצוא חומרים להכנת גז. המקורות העיראקים, כולם ממפעלים פרטיים הם מגרמניה (במידה הרבה יותר פחותה מבעבר. הנושא הועלה בעת ביקור קוחל כאן), שויץ, הולנד ואף ארה"ב. סיפר שלפני זמן לא רב עוכב בהגז האחרון משלוח שעמד לצאת מנמל התעופה לאחר שהתגלה שחברה אמריקאית, מן הגדולות (פרב לגלות) חתמה עם עיראק על הסכם בנדון.

2. טארק עזיז בפגישתו עם המוכ"ל דה-קויאר המריצו לנהל פעילות אקטיבית יותר ע"מ לאלץ את איראן להסכים להסדר. מנגד האיראנים הודיעו שמוכנים לחתום מחדש על הסכם אי פגיעה באוכלוסיה ובמטרות אזרחיות וכן על אי שימוש בגזים אך בשום אופן לא יסכימו להפסיק את המלחמה היבשתית או המצור הימי. בשאלה זו, ארה"ב, מתייצבת בצידו העיראקי של המתרס. לא שאינה מחשיבה יישוב הנושאים הנ"ל אך מחייבת הסדר מעבר לכך.

3. שה"ח העיראקי נשאל כאן על ביקור חוסין ומבאר בבגדאד. דיבר בהתרגשות רבה וציון, עפ"י ריקרדונה, שדמעות עמדו בעיני צדאם חוסין שראה את מובארק יורד מכבש המטוס. באשר לעצם השיחות, ציון טארק עזיז, שהמדובר בביקור של מספר שמות ולא היה זמן להכנס לפרטים. עם זאת ריקרדונה מציין שבמה שנוגע לנושא ירדן - אשי"פ קרי תהליך השלום, טארק

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מגירות ישראל - זושנגטון

אל:

המשרד

(1)

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ד.ד.א. ... מחון. 2. דפים

סוג כסחוני... סודו...

דחיות... הגיל...

מאריך וזיהוי: 1745.27.85

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מסמך מס' 690

אל :- שה"ח, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א

פגישת ס. שה"ח - ס. מזכיר המדינה

היום, נפגש ס. שה"ח, רוני מילוא, עם ס. המזכיר, קנט דאם. נכתו : פלסראו, אבינגטון וטיבל.

מילוא : העלה נושא הצורך בחוספת הסיוע המבוקשת. הסביר שממשלת ליכוד הלאומי קמה למעשה עקב חומרת המצב הכלכלי, הרזרבות של ישראל יורדות ונושא הסיוע הינו חיוני. דאם : הגיב שארה"ב מבקשת שישראל תציג תכנית שתבטיח כי בעיותיה הכלכליות הולכות ונפתרות כך שיהיה ברור שארה"ב אינה רק "Bailing Israel out". השיחות עם מודעי היו פרודוקטיביות ביותר וגם הכלכלנים פושר ושוטיין חזרו ודיווחו בדג בכיר שהם מעודדים מהצעדים שננקטים. הוא, דאם, סבור שאם ננקוט בצעדים מסויימים הממשל האמריקאי יוכל לעבד הסדר משיע רצון לצורך זה נחוץ שישראל תציג Credible Program. ארה"ב ערה לבעיות הכלכליות הכרוכות בביצוע תכנית והם ערים לתפקיד ההסתדרות. אך על ישראל להביא בחשבון שאם משקיעים יתחילו להוציא כספיהם מישראל לא תסייע לנו הטענה שנאלצנו לפעול, כפי שפעלנו, מסיבות פוליטיות פנימיות. עם זאת, דאם אופטימי שיימצא הסדר עם משרד האוצר הישראלי. שולץ וג'ים בייקר מטפלים בזה אישי.

מילוא : אמנם אנו במצוקה אך יש לזכור תמיד שהבסיס הכלכלי של ישראל הוא איחן. אשתקד ייצאנו ביותר מ-10 ביליון דולר והייצוא שלנו לנפש עולה על זה של יפן.

דאם : אנו יודעים זאת אך לפנינו עומדת בעיה שער החליפין שלכם אשר אינו מתאים ובעיה זו עליכם לפתור. נחוצה אצלכם החלטה מדינית מאחר וזה לא רק נושא לטכנאים. כידוע, גם בארה"ב יש לנו בעיות של קדימויות.

מילוא : העלה נושא המשך תהליך השלום. ציין שק.ד. נשאר הבסיס המוסכם וישראל לא תנהל מו"מ ישיר או עקיף עם אש"פ.

נושא יו"ש הינו נושא מרכזי עבור בטחון ישראל. מרכזי אוכלוסיתה של ישראל הינם קרובים ביותר ליו"ש והאיזור מהווה למעשה לב ישראל. אם נסטה מק.ד. אנו עלולים להידרדר לכיוון מדינה אשפיי"ת ביו"ש.

אש"פ סיבה את הטקטיקה שלו אך לא את יעדיו. הם מדברים עתה על מדיניות בשלבים, קודם מדינה ביו"ש, לאחר מכן החזרת הפליטים ולבסוף מדינה "חילונית". למעשה כוונתם נשארה להשמיד את ישראל. על אף חילוקי הדעות בישראל יש תמימות דעים בענין שלילת כנון

ד.ד. 9. 9. 77
 סוג בשחוני
 דחיות
 תאריך וזמן
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 מס' מברק

מדינה פלסטינאית ביו"ש. כמו כן מקובל בישראל שק.ד. הינו הבסיס הטוב ביותר והדרך להתקדם הינה באמצעות מו"מ ישיר עם ירדן ומצרים תוך מעורבות אמריקאית. התערבות אש"פ בתהליך לא קבילה ותביא רק נזק. שמחנו על כי ארה"ב איתנה בדעתה בנושא זה.

באשר ליחסי ישראל - חצרית הדגיש מילוא שמצרים לא מילאה את התחייבויותיה להחזיר את השגריר, תיירות והפסקת התעמולה האנטי ישראלית. לולא ישראל ויתרה על סיני וסיני היתה עדין בידינו היתה לנו הספקת נפט שכיום עולה לנו 2 בליון דולר לשנה. המצרים עצמם מכנים זאת כיום "שלום קרי". התקדמות ביחסי ישראל - מצרים תקל על התקדמות עם ירדן.

דאם : המצרים ערים לכך ובודקים מערכת היחסים אתכם, לרבות טאבה.

מילוא : על טאבה צריך לדון במסגרת כלל היחסים עם מצרים. יש כ-40 הסכמים שהמצרים לא ממלאים ואנו מוכנים לדון על טאבה אך יש לדון גם על נושאים אחרים.

פלטראו : בתשובה לשאלת דאם, ציין שהחזרת השגריר קשורה בשאלת טאבה. אך לא ניתן תשובה ברורה כאשר נשאל אם זה התנאי היחיד.

דאם : להערכתנו יש כיום נכונות לתזוזה בעולם הערבי. ארה"ב מצדה לא תסטה ממדיניותה לגבי אש"פ.

פלטראו : יש שיפור משמעותי בדיאלוג בין ישראל למצרים.

מילוא : עד כמה שידוע לי הכל היה לפני ביקור מובארכ בארה"ב.

אנו מעוניינים להתקדם בתהליך השלום אך יש תמיד לזכור הסכנות האורבות לישראל, התיחס לאיומי אסד בועידת הבעתי האחרונה.

דאם : יש הרבה פעילות כיום והשגרירות שלכם מקיימת אתנו קשר טוב וזה חשוב במיוחד בתקופה נזילה זו. מאשימים את הממשל האמריקאי בכך שלא נותנים חשומת לב מספקת לבעיות מז"ת. למעשה, השאלה היחידה היא האם היינו צריכים לפעול בפרופיל גבוה או להמשיך כפי שאנו פועלים בשקט בשטח. מרפי מתכוון To take Soundings ולאחר שישוב נבדוק עמדותינו.

להערכתנו שליו בדרג בכיר יותר או בפרופיל גבוה היה מזיק בעולם הערבי.

אנו ממשיכים לדגול במו"מ ישיר ובתכניה הנשיא מה-1 לספט'. לדעתנו חשוב להמשיך לדבר עם הערבים ולעודדם להצטרף לתהליך. ישראל מצדה צריכה להיות מוכנה להאזין לקולות החדשים הנשמעים בעולם הערבי. ארה"ב תפעל לעידוד מו"מ אך לא תנסה לעודד את ישראל לנהל מו"מ עם אש"פ.

9.9.77

הנהלת שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון
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אל: אירופה 3. מצפ"א. ממ"ד.

בריה"מ. משיחה עם מרתה מאוטנר (סגניתו של בראז) במחלקה הסובייטית ב-INR.

1. הניחושים סביב גורבצ'וב האיש ומדיניותו נמשכים. טרם סוכמה הערכה מוצקת לגביו, פרט לקווים הכלליים.

2. הנושא בעדיפות מבחינתו הוא ביטוס מעמדו ומציאת נוסחה עם אלה הסובבים אותו, שלפחות חלקם אם לא רובם יצטרכו לפנות מקומם. הגורם המכריע אצל גורבצ'וב הוא הזמן. לא שלא קיימות בעיות אך גורם הזמן מהווה אילוץ עבורו. גורבצ'וב מבקש להכניס שינויים אירגוניים ומהותיים (לפי סדר זה) מוקדם ככל האפשר.

3. המבחן הקרוב עבורו יהווה כינוס הועדה המרכזית, במחצית אפריל. כנס נוסף של מדינות ברית ורשה שיערך אף הוא באפריל לחידוש ההסכם שיפוג ביוני 85 יהווה סימן לבאות באשר לסגנון היחסים עם הגרורות. מאוטנר מציינת גם היא שכדאי לשים לב ל-3 אישים סביב גורבצ'וב וורוטניקוב, ליגצ'וב (ואף סגנו פאבל סמולסקי) וכן דולגיג. מינוי וורוטניקוב כרוה"מ R.S.F.S.R מפחיתה מסיכויי להכנס לפוליטבירו. אחד האישים הראשונים שיצטרך כנראה להפריד מכסאו הוא רוה"מ טיכונוב. מאוטנר לא נשלת מינוי של גויידר אלייב לתפקיד. אחד התחומים שגורבצ'וב מגלה "חולשה" כלפיו הוא תחום מדיניות החוץ שאמנם לא נמצא בעדיפות ראשונה אך גורבצ'וב, כך טוענת, לא יאפשר לגרומיקו להיות "מלך בגדוד". גרישין "גמר את הסוט" והוא בבחינת קופץ על עגלתו של גורבצ'וב. מערכת היחסים בין גורבצ'וב ורומנוב סתומה. רומנוב אינו ברשימת המינויים ומשיך בתפקיד כאחראי על חת"ש והמנגנונים הבטחוניים. הבעיה של גורבצ'וב היא שאין אפשרות להסיר הצידה את רומנוב וגם מסוכן להשאירו בחוץ. מה שנותר הוא לשים לב לכוחו שלא יתחזק יתר על המידה בקרב המנגנונים הנ"ל. הכנסים הנ"ל כולל מושב הסובייט העליון הם תחנת ביניים בדרך לתחנה המרכזית - כנס ועידת המפלגה לקראת סוף השנה. אלה הם למעשה "100 ימי החסד" שיהיו לגורבצ'וב כדי להכניס התהליכים למסלול הרצוי לו.

4. בתחום מדיניות החוץ הנושא הראשון הוא כנס מדינות ברית ורשה. הערכתה של מאוטנר היא שגורבצ'וב ^{יהיה} יאגיש עם הגרורות בכל הנוגע ליחסיתן עם המערב בתחום הכלכלי, וייתכן אף שיאפשר למדינות נוספות לנהל מדיניות פנים ליברלית דוגמת הונגריה. אך הוא ללא ספק יהדק את החגורה הפוליטית באשר לקשריהם עם מוסקבה. גבי מאוטנר מפחיתה בערך הידיעות על הנזיפה לה זכה זיא אולחק במוסקבה. לא שוללת שהידיעות חודלשו במכוון מהפקיסטנים. לדעתה, ועד כמה שידוע לה הסובייטים חזרו על הקו שממשיעים באופן טורתי כלפי פקיסטן.

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MR. KALB: I would like to confirm your lack of high hopes. I've got nothing on that.

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עגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

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ד.ד. 1. 2. דפים
סוג בשחובי גלגל
דמיפוט מייד?
מאריך וזיהא 27.12.85
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הסברה, מצפ"א.

המודעה הרצי"ב - של ה - AAAA התפרסמה הבקר ב"כריסטין סיינס מוניטור".

הראל


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Advertisement

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Did you know?

American taxpayers pay twice to support Israeli industry

Since 1980, over 85% of all Israeli imports have entered the U.S. duty free and competed directly with similar American products, costing a loss of tens of thousands of American jobs. During that time, American taxpayers have given almost \$14 billion in foreign aid to Israel's socialized economy, aid which has further helped subsidize Israeli industries and kept the price of Israeli products artificially low.

Now Israel is seeking nearly double its free foreign aid—\$5 billion of our tax dollars. While Israel seeks \$5 billion more, pro-Israel members of Congress want to enact legislation—the Free Trade Act with Israel—that will provide free access of subsidized Israeli products to American markets.

Congress will now decide how much more for Israel and how much less for American industries and workers.

Is it fair to double aid to Israel's socialized economy and permit duty-free, subsidized Israeli imports while reducing assistance to many Americans?

Tell your congressman and senators, when it comes to allocating scarce American resources, our own workers and businesses ought to come before Israeli industry.

We think you have a right to know!



National Association of Anti-Americans

2033 M Street, N.W. Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20036-3399

Your contributions help present this message.

Chris Sci Mon

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urged an "independent investigation" into what it said appeared to be "deliberate fire by Israeli forces on unarmed and neutral journalists."

During a meeting today with Peres that Leiser described as "amiable," Peres turned down a request for a special investigation but said CBS would be given a summary of the Israeli Army's review of the action. Peres' spokesman, Uri Savir, said Peres "sees the case as closed" and had "expressed regret that CBS jumped to conclusions and issued its original condemnation of Israel before hearing the Israeli side."

CBS already had announced cancellation of special broadcasts here next week in connection with the Jewish festival of Passover and the Christian Holy Week. Leiser said "that decision is not going to be changed," but he denied charges that it was made in retaliation for the killings.

"We had planned a series of celebratory broadcasts, and under the circumstances we don't feel like celebrating," he said.

In its original account of the incident, the Israeli Army said that the tank fired on "armed men who had taken firing positions" and that it had appeared that the television crew members "were among the armed men in the village."

Later accounts by the Army dropped references to the presence of armed guerrillas in the area but contended that from the distance involved it was impossible to distinguish between a man aiming a television camera and a man aiming an antitank weapon.

According to the Israelis, the U.S.-built M60 tank, stationed outside a village being searched at the time, was about 1 1/4 miles from the journalists, not 500 yards as witnesses said.

Yesterday, Leiser and Warren Lewis, the CBS bureau chief in Tel Aviv, were flown by helicopter to southern Lebanon, where they met Brig. Gen. Erwin Levy, the division commander of the units that conducted the searches last week.

Levy briefed the CBS officials on the Army's findings. They were

flown to within about two miles of where the tank fired, but could not land because of bad weather.

Col. Raanan Gissin, the chief Army spokesman in Jerusalem, who accompanied Leiser on the trip, said Israeli units in Lebanon have standing orders to fire on "moving targets" that appear armed. He said the tank crew spotted what it took to be a group of armed men, but because of the distance it first radioed this information to its battalion commander and got permission from him to fire.

After the first shell, the journalists ran for their cars, Gissin said, and the CBS employees were killed

by the second and last shell fired by the tank.

Gissin conceded that the most common antitank weapon used by the Lebanese guerrillas—rocket-propelled grenades—could not reach a tank at the distance described by the Israelis. But he said that there are weapons that could and that the tank crew "followed regulations."

Joyce, in his statement, said: "Although all the facts are not clear, two salient points have been clarified: first, the CBS news crew was not among a group of armed men as originally claimed by the Israel Defense Forces. A high Israeli official has indicated that this claim was in error, stating that the tank fired at

"a group of people who the Israelis thought was armed"

"Second, it appears that contrary to earlier eyewitness reports, which placed the Israeli tank at 500 to 900 yards away, it may have been a good deal farther, perhaps as much as a mile and a half. If this were the case, it is entirely possible that the tank crew was unable to make out the camera and press signs on the car."

"CBS News is appreciative of the open and cooperative manner in which Prime Minister Peres has dealt with Mr. Leiser and the access he was given to the military in south Lebanon. It is all the more a matter of regret then, that the initial [Israeli Army] statement on the matter was both distant and unresponsive to our concerns."

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מגזרות ישראל - 11 מרץ 1982

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CBS Sees Shooting As 'Tragic Error'

Aide Now Doubts Israeli Attack Deliberate

By Edward Walsh
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, March 26—A vice president of CBS News said today he believes the killing last week of two CBS camera crew members in southern Lebanon was not deliberate but resulted from a "tragic error" by the Israeli Army tank crew that fired on a group of journalists.

Ernest Leiser, who was taken near the site of the shooting in Lebanon yesterday, made the comment following a meeting here today with Prime Minister Shimon Peres.

"I came to the conclusion that it was not somebody shooting deliberately at a camera crew," Leiser said in a telephone interview. "It was somebody shooting at what they thought were armed men about to fire at them."

But Leiser said questions still remained over the tank crew's decision to fire before the target had been identified clearly. "It could be a case of someone firing before they could reflect or be sure," he said.

In New York, CBS News President Edward M. Joyce, who last week had called the shooting "an unprovoked and deliberate attack," said that in the light of new information, "it is entirely possible that the tank crew was unable to make out the camera and press signs on the car" of the CBS crew.

But Joyce called it "a matter of regret" that Peres "has elected not to investigate the incident further, and plans no measures which could prevent a recurrence of last week's tragedy."

The two men were killed Thursday in an area where Israeli Army units were searching villages for Lebanese guerrillas.

According to journalists in the group fired on, the two Lebanese employees of CBS, Toufiq Ghazawi, a cameraman, and Bashir Metni, a sound technician, were killed by a shell fired from a tank about 500 yards away. The witnesses said that the group was clearly identifiable as journalists and that the tank appeared to fire at them deliberately.

Based on these accounts, CBS

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PLEASE HANDCARRY TO JACK SMITH A.S.A.P.

TO FOLLOWING IS A FINAL APPROVED STATEMENT BY JOYCE WHICH IS BEING
PUBLISHED BY MORFOGEN'S DEPARTMENT AND DISTRIBUTED TO ALL BUREAUS

REGARDS,
ROBERTS

FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, CBS NEWS HAS BEEN CONDUCTING AN
EXAMINATION OF THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF TWO
CBS NEWS JOURNALISTS IN LEBANON WHILE COVERING ISRAELI RETALIA-
TORY RAIDS NEAR SIDON. THIS INVESTIGATION HAS INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS
BY CBS NEWS VICE-PRESIDENT ERNEST LEISER WITH ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER
SHIMON PERES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS, AS
WELL AS INTERVIEWS OF VILLAGERS AND JOURNALISTS WHO WERE EYE-
WITNESSES TO THE SHELLING OF THE CREW BY AN ISRAELI TANK.

ALTHOUGH ALL THE FACTS ARE NOT CLEAR, TWO SALIENT POINTS HAVE
BEEN CLARIFIED:

FIRST, THE CBS NEWS CREW WAS NOT AMONG A GROUP OF ARMED MEN,
AS ORIGINALLY CLAIMED BY THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES. A HIGH
ISRAELI OFFICIAL HAS INDICATED THAT HIS CLAIM WAS IN ERROR,
STATING THAT THE TANK FIRED AT "A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO THE
ISRAELIS THOUGHT WERE ARMED." THE GROUP IN QUESTION, WAS OF
COURSE, THE CREW ITSELF AND OTHER JOURNALISTS NEARBY.

SECOND, IT APPEARS THAT CONTRARY TO EARLIER EYEWITNESS REPORTS WHICH
PLACED THE ISRAELI TANK AT BETWEEN 500 AND 900 YARDS AWAY,
IT MAY HAVE BEEN A GOOD DEAL FURTHER, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS A MILE AND
A HALF. IF THIS WERE THE CASE, IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT THE TANK
CREW WAS UNABLE TO MAKE OUT THE CAMERA AND THE PRESS SIGNS
ON THE CAR.

CBS NEWS IS APPRECIATIVE OF THE OPEN AND COOPERATIVE MANNER IN
WHICH PRIME MINISTER PERES HAS DEALT WITH MR. LEISER AND THE ACCESS
HE WAS GIVEN TO THE MILITARY IN SOUTH LEBANON. IT IS ALL THE MORE
A MATTER OF REGRET, THEN, THAT THE INITIAL IDF STATEMENT ON THE
MATTER WAS BOTH DISTANT AND UNRESPONSIVE TO OUR CONCERNS.

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IT IS ALSO A MATTER OF REGRET THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ELECTED NOT TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT FURTHER, AND PLANS NO MEASURES WHICH COULD PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF LAST WEEK'S TRAGEDY.

WE HOPE THAT IN THE WEEKS REMAINING IN THE WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON, THE ISRAELI MILITARY WILL DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO PROVIDE JOURNALISTS ACCESS TO THE COMBAT ZONES, SO REPORTERS CAN REPORT FULLY TO THOSE WHO HAVE A VITAL INTEREST IN THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN THE NEAR EAST.

BROADCAST AND PRINT JOURNALISTS WILLINGLY COVER COMBAT SITUATIONS KNOWING FULL WELL THEIR VULNERABILITY. COUNTRIES WHICH PROFESS A COMMITMENT TO AN OPEN AND FREE MEDIA SHOULD INSURE THAT JOURNALISTS HAVE ACCESS TO THESE COMBAT AREAS.

THE CBS CAMERA CREW DIED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO BRING ACCURATE AND FAIR INFORMATION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. THEY WERE BRAVE, COURAGEOUS MEN WHO WILL BE REMEMBERED BY CBS NEWS AS INDIVIDUALS WHO SYMBOLIZED THE WILLINGNESS OF JOURNALISTS TO FULLY COVER THE NEWS, EVEN AT GREAT PERSONAL RISK, BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

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MENGELE REWARD STIRS NEW ENERGY FOR PURSUIT

J. HOLMES WASH. TIMES The Washington Times offer of a 1 million \$ reward for the apprehension trial and conviction of Nazi war criminal Josef Mengele yesterday was praised by congressmen and human rights supporters as a "great service to humanity" and a "resonant affirmation of decency".

ISRAEL SAID TO REJECT IMF RECOMMENDATION FOR STEEPER BUDGET CUTS

H. ROWEN WASH. POST The Israeli government has rejected an IMF recommendation that Israel double a planned budget cut of about \$1 billion, according to sources here.

טופס מברק גלוי

מחלקת הקשר - ניו-יורק

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אל: הסברה, מע"ח, לש' מפכ"ל, יועץ רוח"ם לתקשורת, מצפ"א.

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News Summary March 26, 1985

Editorials

WSJ "Free Radio Free Europe" Recently, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have come under attack. Charges of anti-Semitism are unfounded and men of such impeccable credentials as Frank Shakespear and Ben Wattenberg have gone on the record saying so. Staff members of Radio Liberty are Jewish and one-third of the listenership in the Soviet Union are Jewish. The budget allotted to the stations is less than many weapons and missiles we hope we never have to use. The radios serve as hope and our congressmen should remember that.

Columns

NYP-Podhoretz "Israel's 'Freinds'--There They Go Again" Because of the veritable blizzard of abuse the Israeli invasion of Lebanon cause, one might think that Israel's withdrawal would be greeted by applause. But no: the withdrawal is only serving as the occasion for a new wave of anti-Israel invective. At least the "iron fist" policy hasn't been compared to Nazism. Three years ago "friends" of Israel opposed the invasion because they opposed the main objective: to destroy the PLO. The Israeli war against the PLO ended in victory. A new flurry of diplomatic activity has begun.

DY-Buckley "Turning Our Charges of Anti-Semitism" In recent weeks, several journalists and authors have suggested that Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe has been insensitive to shards of anti-Semitism that have burst into broadcasts beamed to the Soviet Union. The charge is too preposterous to be taken seriously. One third of the staff are Jewish, etc...

Press Reports

CBS Aide Sees Death Scene

NYT-special-Ernst Leiser viewed the area where two CBS crew members were killed. He saw the scene from an Israeli Air Force helicopter and he met with the commander of the area. The IDF denied his request to speak to the commander of the tank whose shellfire killed the two men. Israeli officials said he acted under orders from superiors.

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Anti-Arafat Forces Start New Unit

NYT-Reuters-Six Palestinian guerrilla groups opposed to Arafat said they had formed the Palestinian National Salvation Front to fight Israel. Representatives of the group attacked the Arafat-Hussein accord.

US Says Iraqis Use Poison Gas

NYT-p.l-Gwertzman (Reuters photo of Iranian soldier suffering effects of poison gas in West Germany) US intelligence analysts have concluded that Iraq used lethal chemical weapons in repelling Iran's latest offensive, administration sources said. Doctors in Austria and West Germany said soldiers they treated had been under attack by mustard gas. Shultz met with the Iraqi Foreign Minister who was in NY but the State Dept. avoided accusing Iraq of using the chemical weapons. There was no immediate explanation why the US did not publicly disclose its information about Iran's use of chemical weapons. One source said there was a desire not to embarrass Mr. Aziz. Another official said the US didn't want to compromise its intelligence sources.

ND-combined-A powerful blast demolished an apartment building in Baghdad, reportedly killing dozens of civilians. Iran said it fired a missile into the city. Iraq responded with air raids on Tehran and other cities.

2 More Westerners Seized in Lebanon

NYT-Hijazi-A British journalist working for a UN agency was abducted by unidentified gunmen and a French official working in Tripoli was reported missing and feared kidnapped. They were the 7th & 3th Westerners to disappear in Lebanon in the past 12 days. The Brit, a New York resident, was the first known UN employee to be kidnapped. The Lebanese Revolutionary Armed Factions, an underground Christian Marxist group took responsibility for the abduction of the French official. (see D1-AP)

Oman

NYT-Gerth and Miller (photo of Robert Anderson former US Treasury Sec.) Among the foreign advisers who have played a major role in the Persian Gulf nation of Oman is a former CIA official who heads a US corporation that manages the country's most strategic region. Tetra

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Tech International, has a contract with the Gov't of Oman to manage the development of the area that sits astride the Strait of Hormouz, which separates the area from Iran. For Americans, even congressional members, the area is off-limits. Tetra Tech is a subsidiary of Honeywell Inc. a leading US military contractor. The role of Westerners in Oman has become a subject of dispute because most of these Westerners have ties to intelligence agencies.

Cuomo Attacks Reagan on Holocaust Comment

NYT-Carroll-Gov. Cuomo accused Reagan of being "extraordinarily insensitive" about the Holocaust and said he had written a letter to the White House expressing that view. A White House spokesman issued a statement regarding Cuomo's charges. Cuomo believes that Reagan's decision not to visit a concentration camp while in Germany could be seen as him saying, "Let's forget about the Holocaust." (see DN-Kramer)

Rabbi Authur Hertzberg

NYT-Curtis-The voluble Rabbi Authur Hertzberg has always been at some odds with his community, whether Jewish or the world. He is publicly opposed to Israel's plans to establish new settlements on the West Bank and argued against annexation. He called for the resignation of Begin and Sharon after Sabra and Shatilla. Yet, he is loved and admired for hischutzpah. Hertzberg is leaving his temple to teach at Dartmouth.

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החומר נמצא בתיק 634/140
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אלו המשרד

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מצפ"א.

סנט: סיוע חוץ - סיוע לישראל

1. הבוקר החל בוועדת החוץ של הסנט תהליך ה- mark-up בחוק סיוע החוץ ל-1986. הועדה קיבלה פה אחד הצעה (בשושבניות היו"ר והסנאטור דוד) בה כלולים סיוע צבאי עבור ישראל בסך של 1.8 בליון דולר והנחה (assumption) של סיוע אזרחי בסך 1.2 בליון. בפתחת הישיבה הדגיש לוגאר שהשנה, לאור בעיותיה התקציביות של ארה"ב, חייבים לבחון בקפדנות מירבית את סיוע החוץ. בין השאר, ציין לוגאר שהוא ער ל"דאגה הניכרת" (considerable concern) בקרב חברי הוועדה רבים בדבר הסיוע האזרחי וגם תוספת החרום עבור ישראל; הביע תקווה ש"נושא זה" (הערה - כאילו מדובר במכלול אחד) ייפתר במהלך ה- mark-up היום (26) ומחר (27).
3. לאחר דיון כללי בו הצטרפו מספר סנאטורים לרצונו המוצהר של היו"ר להשלים עבודת הוועדה בהקדם האפשרי, הגיש לוגאר, יחד עם דוד, הצעת חבנויה באופן כללי על נוסחא לפיה כל הקטנה בסיוע שהוצעה ע"י הנשיא, בעוד שמקפויאים, ברמה של השנה התקציבית 1985, כל סיוע שהנשיא ביקש להגדילו - להוציא הסיוע הצבאי לישראל ולמצרים. רצ"ב טבלה המפרטת הצעת לוגאר-דוד. תשומת לבכם לשתי ההערות בתחתית הדף.
4. כפי שתראו מהטור הרביעי ("savings"), מסתכמים הקיצוצים בהצעה בסך של 600.9 מליון דולר (לעומת הצעת הנשיא). קיצוצים אלה מרחיקים לכת ב-184 מליון דולר מעבר לגודל הקיצוצים שהמליצה וועדת התקציבים לפני זמן-מה. לכן הציעו הסנאטורים פל ומתיאס להחזיר מספר "add-backs" להצעת לוגאר-דוד, שמסתכמים ב-184 מליון דולר. החזרים אלה (בטור החמישי של הטבלה הרצ"ב) התקבלו בשינויים קלים, כך שהסכום הכולל לסיוע החוץ (כולל, כאמור, הסיוע האזרחי והצבאי לישראל) מסתכם עתה בסך הכל ב-12,824.9 בליון (סכום גלובלי שתואם המלצת וועדת התקציב ועודנו 415 מליון דולר פחות מהצעת הנשיא).
5. בהמשך הדיון, הגיש לוגאר רשימה של נושאים שאינם שנויים במחלוקת (רצ"ב). כפי שתראה, היא מכילה שלושה נושאים שנוגעים לנו:
א. מספר 2 - סיוע צבאי לישראל
ב. מספר 3 - פרויקט חלביא
ג. מספר 6 - ביטול הוראות מיושנות הקשורות לסודאן ולישראל (מדובר בתנאי תשלום

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ד... 2... 5... 5... 5...
סוג כסחוני
דחיסות
מחיר וזים
653
מחיר מוכר

אל:

שאינם תופסים היום כאשר הסיוע לישראל כולו מענק). סוכם פה אחד לא לדון בנושאים ברשימה זו.

6. לאחר מכן עברה הוועדה לנושאים שכן שנויים במחלוקת (רצ"ב הרשימה גם כן). כפי שתיווכחו, אין ברשימה זו אף נושא הקשור בנו.

7. ה- mark-up יימשך מחר (27). טרם הוגשו התיקונים הנוגעים לנו ולמדינות האזור.

למדן

20/1
למדן

653 $\frac{3}{5}$

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Lugar/Dodd Mark
(\$ millions)

	FY '85 CR	FY '86 Request	Lower of CR or Request	Savings	Mathias Full/Dodd
Agriculture	755.6	792.4	755.6	36.8	
Population	286.8	250.0	250.0	0	+20
Health	223.1	146.4	146.4	0	+43.2
Child Survival Fund	25.0	0.0	0.0	0	+25
Education	177.1	183.5	177.1	6.4	
Energy, SDA	188.0	210.1	188.0	22.1	
Science & Technology	12.0	13.0	12.0	1.0	
Sahel	97.5	80.5	80.5	0	
PRF Transfer	-16.0	-20.0	-16.0	-4.0	
Subtotal AID Functional:	1,749.1	1,655.9	1,593.6	62.3	
ASMA	30.0	10.0	10.0	0	+20
OEPA	25.0	25.0	25.0	0	
PRF Revolving	16.0	20.0	16.0	4.0	
HIG's	(160.0)	(45.0)	(45.0)	0	
HIG's Reserve	40.0	0.0	0.0	0	
AID Operating Expenses	391.5	387.0	387.0	0	
TOTAL AID:	2,251.6	2,097.9	2,031.6	66.3	
*ESF	3,841.0	4,024.0	3,841.0	183.0	
Total Economic Assistance:	6,092.6	6,121.9	5,872.6	249.3	
MAP	805.1	949.4	805.1	144.3	
IMET	56.2	65.7	56.2	9.5	
**FMS	4,939.5	5,655.0	5,464.5	190.5	
Guaranty Reserve	109.0	0.0	0.0	0	
Subtotal Military:	5,909.8	6,670.1	6,325.8	344.3	
Peacekeeping	44.0	37.0	37.0	0	
Anti-Terrorism	5.0	5.0	5.0	0	
TDP	21.0	20.0	20.0	0	
International Narcotics	50.2	57.5	50.2	7.3	
IO&P	358.7	196.2	196.2	0	+72.5
TOTAL AID:	12,481.3	13,107.7	12,506.8	600.9	
Peace Corps	128.6	124.4	124.4	0	
IAP	12.0	8.7	8.7	0	+3.3
AOP	1.0	1.0	1.0	0	
TOTAL:	12,622.9	13,241.8	12,640.9	600.9	
	525				
Equivalent SBC Standard Totals	13,147.9	13,241.8	12,640.9		

*This mark assumes \$1.2 billion ESF for Israel across the board.

**The mark provides a \$400 million increase for Israel and a \$125 million increase for Egypt.

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653 $\frac{4}{5}$

Non-Controversial

- Item 2 Israeli earmarks FMS
- Item 3 Lavi earmarking
- Item 5 Egyptian earmarking FMS
- Item 6 Repeals of obsolete
Sudan & Israel provisions
- Item 7 Administration surcharge
- Item 8 Catalogue Data
- Item 9 Contract Administration Services
- Item 12 Reporting Requirement
- Item 13 Contracting Administration Services

- Item 16 Official Reception & Representation Expenses
- Item 20 Military Assistance Costs
- Item 22 Stockpiling for Korea
- Item 25 Exchange Training
- Item 26 Training in Maritime Skills
- Item 28 Peacekeeping Emergencies
- Item 30 Emergency Assistance
- Item 31 Elimination of Earmarks & Provisions from previous
bills
- Item 32 Development Assistance Policy
- Item 40 PVO in Overseas Reporting
- Item 44 Disadvantaged Children
- Item 57 Narcotics Reporting Requirements
- Item 60 Completion of Plans & Cost Estimates
- Item 62 Streamlining Reprogramming Requirements

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653 $\frac{5}{5}$

Item 63 Reprogramming Thresholds IMET & NARC
Item 67 Illegal Immigration from Haiti
Item 68 Participant Trainer Costs
Item 70 Repeal of Provisions
Item 71 Technical Amendments
Item 72 FY 87 Authorization (delete)

Needs discussion

Item 4 FMS Market rate extended repayment (Murkowski)
Item 10 Sales Credits Concessional (Murkowski)
Item 11 Guaranty Reserve (Murkowski)
Item 17 Safety Related Equipment
Item 18 Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)
Item 21 Waiver of Net Proceeds on MAP Sales
Item 23 Security Assistance Organizations (6 pers.)
Item 41 Development & Illicit Narcotics Production -
 education subsection (2)
Item 42 Housing Guaranty Program
Item 43 Trade Credit Insurance Program
Items 45-53 Central America Provisions
Item 61 Prohibitions Against Assistance - PRC
Item 64 Training Provision
Item 69 Assistance for Afghanistan
Item 74 Peace Corps Publications - revenue
Item 14 Quarterly Reports (classified)

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סגירות ישראל - וויסנגטון

שלי: **המשך**

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שמואל

דעם צווייטן טאג פון די פארשטייטליכע
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מצפ"א.

סנט: תוספות חירום לישראל

שאלתי את גרייהם בנרמן (מחבר העוזרים לוועדת החוץ) לפרש הדברים שהשמיע לוגאר בפתיחת ה-mark-up בוועדת החוץ של הסנט היום, כאשר הביע תקווה ששאלת הסיוע האזרחי (ESF) ותוספת החירום (supplemental) עבור ישראל תיפתר במשך היומיים הבאים - וזאת בהתחשב בעובדה שבהצעתו של לוגאר, שהתקבלה בוועדה היום (דיווח בנפרד), רשומה הנחה שסיוע האזרחי עבור ישראל לשנה הבאה יהיה 1.2 בליון דולר.

2. בנרמן השיב שלוגאר היה מעדיף להשאיר את העניין כן, ולתגלע לסיכום שאמנם בנא העת תהיה תוספת חירום, אך לא תיכלל בחוק סיוע החוץ - פירוש הדבר, תועבר בחוק נפרד ובמידת הנחוץ בטיפול מזורז (fast track).

3. בנרמן הדגיש שגישה זו איננה אלא אחת מכמה וכמה רעיונות שנשקלים כעת ע"י סנטורים שונים. כידוע, קיימת מחשבה לשנות שערי הריבית (גישה שבאופן אישי בנרמן שולל מאחר והיא עלולה להשפיע, להערכתו, באורח שלילי על תדמיתה של ישראל ומעמדה בעולם הפיננסי).

4. בנוסף למחשבה זו, מסר בנרמן שאתמול (25.3) ביקש בוטביץ שיבדקו את האפשרות של ביטול הריבית על החובות לארה"ב שישראל חייבת לשלם בתקופה מעכשיו עד תום השנה התקציבית הבאה (1986). בנרמן כבר בדק את הנושא באופן פרלימינרי. לדבריו, מדובר ב-348 מליון דולר ברבע האחרון של שנה זו (1985), וב-1 עד 1.1 מיליון בשנה הבאה בשלמותה (1986). לשאלתי אם אין צורך בהקצבה (appropriation) ע"מ לאזן ביטול כזה, השיב בנרמן כי לדעת היועצים המשפטיים ניתן לנסח תיקון ברוח זו גם או בלי ההקצבה, אך כמובן אם לא תהיה הקצבה, יתפרש המהלך כמעין "פשיטה על האוצר" (Raid on the treasury). אף על פי כן, סבור בנרמן שגישה זו (שתחסוך לישראל כ-1.5 מיליון דולר) רצויה יותר מאשר הקצבה נוספת לישראל "בשנה מכאיבה זו לארה"ב". לשאלתי אם ביטול כזה משמעותו וויתור על תוספת חירום כלשהי לישראל, ענה בנרמן שאינו יודע.

5. כמובן נמשיך לעקוב.

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אל

המשרד

(11)

אל :- שהיח, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א

דע :- רובינשטיין

פגישת ס"שה"ח מילוא והשגריר רוזן עם מרפי
מצד : פלטרוא ואבינגטון. מצדנו : הח"מ.

1. מרפי פתח בכך שבשיחתו השניה של אלמצרי והמזכיר (22.3) הועלה נושא הועידה הבין-לאומית. שה"ח הישראלי הדגיש שידועה לו התנגדות ארה"ב ושירדן אינה רואה הועידה כתחליף למו"מ ישיר אלא כ"מטריה" לכך. השאלה היא, כך אמר, איך לטפל (Cope) בסוריה. ירדן מאמינה שהועידה Won't work out. מבארך הציע מה שהציע (בעתונות) אני באתי לראות כיצד ניתן להזיז את התהליך ומה על ארה"ב לעשות לשם כך. המזכיר השיב שארה"ב לא דחתה (Rebuffed) הרעיונות והשלבים שהוצעו, "נשפוט אותם ע"פי מידת תרומתם לתהליך השלום". מובארך ואלמצרי, הדגיש מרפי יצאו מכאן בדעה ברורה שארה"ב לא התחייבה, אך גם לא דחתה הצעותיהם. אלמצרי שאל : "מה יהיה אם ירדן והפלסטינאים יודיעו שמוכנים לשאת ולתת על בסיס 242 והזכויות הלגטימיות של הפלסטינאים ואם ערפאת יגיד בפומבי שמקבל זאת". המזכיר השיב שזה יהיה אמנם חיובי אך לארה"ב טרם ברורה תקפות Validity הסכם חוסין - ערפאת. מרפי

הוסיף שידוע עם זאת שבהסכם נכללו החלטות מועביט ושצריך לשאת ולתת על שלום. מאידך הוסר (Dropped down) נושא מדינה עצמאית. השאלה איך כל זה מוליך לשיחות ישירות עדיין לא ברורה לארה"ב. שולץ העיר לאלמצרי שתקופת המעבר מחוייבת לפני קביעת מעמד הסופי של השטחים. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר האם ק.ד. הוזכרה בשיחה, ענה פלטרוא שהמזכיר אכן הזכיר זאת בהקשר לתקופת המעבר. אלמצרי ענה שזה נלקח בחשבון כבר בפאס.

2. סגן השר ביקש הבהרה על עמדת ארה"ב ביחס לדיונים עם משלחת כזו. מרפי ענה שאלמצרי, הנוקט בגישה ישירה והוא businesslike הודה שמהו אמנם זו באש"פ אך עדיין לא בצורה מספקת, ירדן לא תוכל לזוז בלעדיו, אך יש טרנספורמציה בארגון. מרפי בתשובה לשאלה אחרת מצד סגן השר האם אש"פ יסכים למשלחת ללא נוכחות אנשיו, ענה שאלמצרי דחה הרעיון ואילו מובארך דיבר על משלחת פלסטינאית ולא אשפ"ית. כל זה, הוסיף מרפי, עדיין Inconclusive. השגריר שאל באשר להקמת "אש"פ חדש" בסוריה ונענה ע"י מרפי שהאמריקאים לא הופתעו מהמהלך בדמשק שהיה צפוי. זהו נסיון (סורי) השלישי לעשות משהו בעזרת פלגי אש"פ לאחר שהקודמים לא הצליחו. מכל מקום אש"פ טרם קבע עמדתו בנושא המשלחת אך ע"פ מנהיגותו על הארגון להיות מעורב בכך. סגן השר שאל מה אש"פ ישיג על כך ונענה ע"י מרפי - הכרה בו בדובר הפלסטינאים, מתן אישור לירדן לשאת ולתת וכן בנושא הקונפדרציה. סגן השר :

שם השר היה שאל את מנהל הארגון האם ירדן תסכים להשתתף במשלחת
הארגון לא הצליח להשיג תשובה

הרי הם מדברים קודם כל על מדינה משלהם? מרפי: לירדנים ברור ששום דבר לא יזוז ו' אם אשייפ יעמוד על שתי מדינות ("דאולהתיין").

3. בתשובה לקביעת סגן השר שלא נכנס לתהליך שיביא להקמת מדינה פלסטינאית ביהודה ושומרון, ענה מרפי שזהו ואריינט אפשרי של האוטונומיה עפ"י ק.ד. אם כך, הקשה סגן השר מדוע שלא נמשיך במה שהושג בק.ד. לגבי האוטונומיה כדי להבטיח אי הקמת מדינה פלסטינאית שלא נקבלה בשום תנאי. נענה, ע"י מרפי, שבנושא זה יש בלבול לשוני באש"פ אבל הוא ירד מנושא המדינה. השגריר הזכיר שיש כמה גרסאות להסכם עמאן כולל השינויים, אך השאלה היא מה עמדת ערפאת בנידון, וככל שאנו יודעים ערפאת בדעה שמדבר גם בשם של הפלסטינאים בירדן שהם 65% מהאוכלוסיה. זה מסביר את הבלבול בניסוחים, סיים מרפי. עוזר המזכיר אמר שטרם קבע מועד בואו לאזור אך "לא לפני מחצית אפריל" וכן באיזה מדינה יתחיל הסיור. בדעתו להתחיל בצד הערבי. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר מה ידוע על שיחות בוש ממוסקבה בנושא יהודי ברה"מ, נענה בידי מרפי שאין לו מידע בנדון וגם לא נפגש עם סגן הנשיא.

4. סגן השר העלה את נושא היחסים עם מצרים ושאל האם יש מקום לאופטימיות בנוגע להחזרת השגריר והפסקת התעמולה. מרפי הדגיש שדנו עם מובארכ ארוכות, כולל בשיחות בבית הלבן. הובהר ש"ארה"ב לא תוכל להשיג תהליך של שלום אלא אם כן יהיה שינוי בחוץ זה, ורואה בנושא ההפשרה סימבוליות של היחסים (מצרים - ישראל). מובארכ בנוסף לתנאים להפשרה עם דגש על טאבה, העלה נושא דיר אלסלטן "איך אפשר להביא 6 מליון קופטים לישראל לנוכח מה שקורה בדיר אלסלטן" אמר. השגריר השיב שהשאלה לא יכולה להיפתר בין הממשלות אלא בבית המשפט העליון. סגן השר הדגיש שמעלה את נושא היחסים עם מצרים משום שמאמין שה-good faith בישראל כלפי מצרים תלוי בעמדתה והתנהגותה. אם התשובה שבחמורה לסיני, לנפט לא נהרגים חיילים ישראלים בגבול, הרי גם בגבול הירדני שורר מצב דומה ללא הסכם שלום. מרפי העיר שוושינגטון מתמקדת בנושא החזרת השגריר ושאל מה סגן השר היה רוצה לראות קודם ונענה על ידו - הפסקת התעמולה בתקשורת המצרית. הוסיף שמתקרב יום השנה ה-6 להסכם ואין בישראל הרגשה של חגיגות. ישנה הרגשה שהקו בתקשורת מונחה מלמעלה. מרפי שאל אם הבחנו בין תעמולה אנטי ישראלית לאנטישמית ונענה ע"י השגריר שאכן כך ושיתלח לו קובץ של מאמרים אנטישמיים בעתונות המצרית. מרפי הדגיש שהנשיא רייגן אמר שלא יסבול גישה אנטישמית, אך למובארכ "אין שליטה של 100% התקשורת". לבסוף השגריר הזכיר שבעת המו"מ בק.ד. במצרים כינו את רה"מ בגין "שיילוק" והדבר הופסק ע"י הנחיה.

דף 3 מחור 3 דפים

אל:

סוג בטחוני

דחופות

תאריך וזמן

646

מס' מב

5. בתשובה לשאלת סגן השר באם יבקר בסעודיה ומה ידוע על גישת הסעודים, השיב מרפי שקרוב לוודאי שיבקר בריאד למרות שטרם השלים לתכנן המסע שיכלול ; מצרים, ירדן סוריה וישראל. באשר לעמדת הסעודים, אמר שהם עושים "קצת מאד" אינם מתנגדים אך גם לא תומכים. הסיבה - עומדים על קיום הקונצנזוס הערבי. הזכיר שחידוש יחסי ירדן - מצרים זכה לביקורת מינימלית בריאד, בנוסף שיש לעשות זאת ע"י קונצנזוס. הסעודים בדעה שיש לשמור צנורות פתוחים עם כולם. עליהם גם לארח את הפסגה, אם וכאשר. גישתם - נתמך במה שחוסין וערפאת יסכימו. צמנו של פייצל הוא היה "חותך" את הנושא ללא היסוס ומודיע שלא מתערב או מעורב. לפהד יש רגשות ואף מיוחד ממנה וכ"כ קיימת תכנית על שמו ויש לו יד בפאס.

6. סגן השר חזר לנושא המשלחת המשותפת של ירדן והפלסטינאים והתהליך הבא כדי שנוכל לסכל התפתחויות שלא נתמך בהם. מרפי הדגיש שקיימת רגישות Sensitivity באשר לעמדת ישראל, אך חייבים לבחון את המתרחש עתה, בייחוד בתוך אש"פ, בינו לבין סוריה והאם אכן קרה משהו בין כנוס המלי"פ בעמאן להסכם חוסין - ערפאת. התשובות עדיין לא ברורות. סגן השר הסכים שאמנם יש סימנים לשינוי באש"פ אך לא בכיוון חיובי, דהיינו שינויים טקטיים לשם מאבק בשלבים בישראל; קודם מדינה ביהו"ש דרך החזרת הפליטים, אח"כ ערביי הגליל. לדוגמה, יבקשו להתאחד עם המדינה הפלסטינאית ולבסוף "מדינה דמוקרטית" בכל פלסטין. הזכיר דברי אבו איזאד לאחרונה בכווית בענין השלבים, והדגיש שישראל יודעת עם מי יש לה עסק ועל האמריקאים לקחת זאת בחשבון. הירדנים והמצרים שותפים לשלום על בסיס ק.ד. וללא אש"פ. ישראל לא תרצה להיות מעורבת בשום תהליך שאש"פ ישתתף בו ישירות או בעקיפין. מרפי : השאלה האם חוסין יוכל לעמוד בזאת ולהתקדם.

7. מרפי שאל להערכת סגן השר מה מידת התמיכה באש"פ בגדמ"ע והאם לא ניכרת השלמה עם ישראל. נענה שבסיסית המצב לא השתנה אם כי יתכן שאש"פ נחלש. הקיצונים מכל מקום תומכים בו ואלה הם הרוב שם. הם מדברים על "שחרור פלסטין" ושישראל לקחה אדמתם ובתייהם. יתכן, הוסיף, שישנה השלמה טקטית אבל לא אמיתית. סיכס שהוא אינו אופטימי באשר לתהליך העשוי להתפתח פרט לתהליך ק.ד. דרכו נוכל להבטיח בטחון ישראל.

ל/ה

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

(11)

אל: ה מ ש ר ד

ט ו פ ס מ ב ר ק
דף.....מתוך.....דפים
סווג בטחוני.....שמו
דחיפות.....מיידי
תאריך וזיח.....מרץ 26 1700
מס' מברק.....645

מצפ"א. מחלקת לבנון. ממ"ד
דע: רובינשטיין.

לבנון

1. טרם שנכנסנו לפגישת סגן השר- מרפי, הגדיר אבינגטון את המצב בלבנון כתוהו ובוהו מוחלט ושהאוי"ם שוקל פינוי הצוותים משם לנוכח גל החטיפות.
2. אין שינוי ביחסי הכוחות בין המורדים (קבוצת ג'ע'ע) והנשיא אך הסורים מגבירים בשטח או לחציהם עליו.

אלי אבידן
א.א.

מחלקת סודית
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640.....

המשך

תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום ג' 26.3.85

$\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{8}$

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נשחוני
חיסום
מאריך וזמן

אלו

Q Bernie, can you elaborate on the steps that were taken by the Sudanese government --

MR. KALB: No, I don't have the itemized list here.

Q -- anything on the Israeli incident?

MR. KALB: No, I have nothing on that.

Q Has Iraq used gas?

MR. KALB: On your question, reports of the examination of victims by West European doctors complement other indications available to us on the question of Iraq of -- on the question of Iraq using gas is what we're talking about. Let me just repeat what I have just said. Reports of the examination of victims by West European doctors complement other indications available to us which I will not detail. Based on this preliminary evidence, we conclude that Iraq used CW, chemical weapons, against the recent Iranian invasion attempt. We condemn the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law and convention whenever and wherever it occurs, including this latest instance.

Q Did you discuss that with Iraqi Foreign Minister yesterday?

MR. KALB: Without getting involved in the specifics of the Secretary's discussion yesterday with the Iraqi Minister, I can confirm that the Secretary has raised this issue on repeated occasions with senior Iraqi officials.

Q (Inaudible).

MR. KALB: I'm not going to get involved in diplomatic exchanges. I have made the statement the way I have chosen to.

Q What was the Iraqi reaction?

MR. KALB: I have nothing for you on the Iraqi reaction.

Q The U.S. has not yet named its Ambassador to Baghdad though the Iraqis have. Will this matter affect that process of establishing improved diplomatic relations?

MR. KALB: I have nothing on that, Ralph.

Q Could you take that question?

MR. KALB: No.

Q I think that's a legitimate question to ask, and a legitimate one for the State Department to answer. The U.S. and Iraq agreed to lift relations to a full status. Do these matters -- are these matters related to that promise by the U.S.?

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דפי... 4... מחור... 3... דד

..... בטחוני

..... דחיות

..... תאריך וזיית

640 עמ' גבר

אל:

Q - Going back to the chemical weapons, Iraq denied flatly that they used chemical weapons. What is your comment on that?

MR. KALB: I say what I just said.

Q On the 22nd of March, you were reading a guidance which said that there were no indications, no evidence, of such. What happened since last — what? Four days?

MR. KALB: I don't know how precisely it was phrased, but there has been, obviously, for the judgment that I have just announced today an accumulation of evidence.

Q But at that time you said that you cannot confirm it — that you cannot confirm that Iraq used chemical warfare in the current campaign.

MR. KALB: What I am saying today is that based on this preliminary evidence, we conclude ... and I've made the statement.

MR. KALB: yes.

Q Any intentions or is anyone from NEA (Near East and Asia Bureau) going to be meeting with Mustah Fasad (?), the Shiite leader, who was — who lost his sight in an explosion in southern Lebanon, purportedly an Israeli attempt on his life, and if —

MR. KALB: Is anybody going to meet with him?

Q Yes, from NEA while he's in town? And if you don't have anything on that, could you check on it, please?

MR. KALB: Yes. I don't have anything. I can check on that.

Q Has the United States retreated from its position as expressed in the Reagan peace initiative and that it does not want to play an active role in the peace process in the Middle East?

MR. KALB: No.

Q Then you stick with what the President said in his peace initiative?

MR. KALB: I'll stay with what the President said September 14, 1982, yes.

Q What about the April 1st deadline for General Walters? There has been some talk that it is being sort of rubberized. Is there any indication that this deadline is now gone or any steps are going to be taken —

MR. KALB: I have heard nothing about sort of rubberizing the deadline. But I have to repeat what I said before. To the degree that there is going to be information in connection with General Walters, it has been delivered by Larry Speakes at the White House.

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FOR EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

639 $\frac{2}{4}$

PROGRAM CBS Evening News

STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network

DATE March 25, 1985

7:00 PM

CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT Investigation of Deaths at Ifar Melki

DAN RATHER: Debate continued today over the killing in Southern Lebanon last week of two CBS News camera team members and the wounding of another by Israeli soldiers.

Don McNeil reports the Israelis now have changed their original official story of how and why it happened.

DON MCNEIL: This is where members of the CBS camera team died last Thursday. The shell holes from two rounds of 105-millimeter ammunition fired by an Israeli tank.

Originally, the Israeli army and government said that the journalists were in the middle of a group of armed terrorists. Today, a high ranking Israeli officer in South Lebanon dropped that claim. He told a CBS News vice president investigating the incident that the tank crew saw activity involving a group of people who the Israelis thought were armed.

A man raised something to his shoulder. The tank commander requested permission to fire, and got it.

In Beirut today, the surviving member of the CBS News team, driver Arayet Haraki, emphatically denied that any gunmen or militia were nearby at the time of the shooting.

The villagers of Ifar Melki said the tank was not 600 to 900 yards away as foreign journalists who were at the site claim, as foreign journalists who were at the site claim, but a mile-and-a-half away as the Israelis say.

639 $\frac{3}{4}$ 2

The press sign on the CBS was of the type normally used for identification at road blocks, but may well have been too small to be seen at that distance.

On this last tape shot by the crew a few miles from the spot where they were killed, tanks can be seen and the sound of gunfire heard, indicating they were in an area of considerable military activity.

Many observers feel the tragedy was the result of savage conditions in South Lebanon, a place where everybody seems to shoot first and ask questions later.

Don McNeil, CBS News, Tel Aviv.

RATHER: Ernest Liser is the CBS News vice president who is in Israel on the fact finding mission concerning the case. He reports tonight that the Israeli government and military officials again have expressed regret about the killing and wounding of CBS News employees, and Liser says he has had some cooperation in the CBS News effort to resolve conflicting accounts of exactly what happened.

*

CBS Official Is Given Israeli Account

of Cameramen's Deaths

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, March 24 — A vice president of CBS News, Ernest Leiser, met today with senior Israeli officials and said he received a detailed explanation of how two CBS cameramen were killed by an Israeli tank shell in Lebanon last week.

Mr. Leiser met for two hours at the Prime Minister's office with Uri Savir, the spokesman for Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and Lieut. Col. Raanan Givati, from the Israel Defense Force spokesman's office.

Mr. Leiser said in an interview after the meeting that "if the Israeli Defense Force account is to be believed, the shooting could have been a tragic mistake."

He added: "The Israeli tank crew could have been far enough away so that they could not have identified the cameramen. However, the Israeli account does not jibe with what we were told, and are continuing to hear, from witnesses in Lebanon, who said that the Israeli tank commander could easily see that the CBS car was a press car, with a press crew, and that no shooting was coming from around them."

Tank Fires at Car

The two Lebanese-CBS News crew members were killed last Thursday outside the southern Lebanese village of Kfar Melki when an Israeli tank fired a shell at their car during an Israeli security sweep for Lebanese guerrillas in the vicinity.

Mr. Leiser said he had requested an opportunity to speak with the tank commander firsthand, to visit the area where the incident happened and also to discuss the shooting with Prime Minister Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The requests are being considered by Israeli authorities, Mr. Leiser said.

Commenting on today's meeting, Mr. Savir said: "I was sorry that conclusions were drawn before we had had a chance to discuss the matter fully. Mr. Leiser said that he came here to look into the matter and to possibly meet with the Prime Minister and to make sure that things like this do not happen again."

"He received a detailed account from Lieutenant Colonel Givati, who explained that there was terrorist activity emanating from this area the night before the incident. As a result, action was taken the next day to locate the terrorists in that area. Also, the I.D.F. had warned journalists a few days earlier about the danger of moving in that area. The I.D.F. also warned the local population not to move around during their operation."

'Dangerous Situation' Noted

What happened, continued Mr. Savir, was that "the tank commander saw from a distance of a mile or so, in an area where there was to be no movement, what he thought was someone lifting a weapon, and he fired."

"This was the result of a very dangerous situation being faced by Israeli

troops. We are extremely sorry. There was no intention whatsoever to deliberately shoot at newsmen. During the course of the war our interest has been to facilitate free coverage and safeguard journalists, taking them into Lebanon in armed convoys."

Mr. Leiser said of the Israeli explanation: "We got the first more or less complete explanation from their point of view, with maps, of what happened. They said that the tank fired at what they saw as movement and what they thought was a weapon being raised. They said the tank was between 2.5 and 3 kilometers away."

The Israeli version, said Mr. Leiser, "does not jibe" with that given by a CBS News employee who survived the incident, or with the account of three other witnesses who were there and

said the Israeli tank was only 500 yards away. He added that the Lebanese witnesses said the Israeli tank commander was easily close enough to tell that the car had a press sign on it and that the men were taking pictures with cameras.

Israeli Express Resentment

There is a great deal of resentment within official Israeli circles over the reaction of CBS News to the affair and its strong and repeated denunciations of Israeli behavior. Even President Chaim Herzog today criticized the approach of CBS News, noting that when reporters entered a battle area they knew they were putting their lives in danger.

CBS News has canceled plans to broadcast its "Morning News" program from Jerusalem during the week of Easter-Passover in protest over the killing of the two newsmen. According to The Jerusalem Post, CBS News had already invested more than \$100,000 in advance preparation for the special.

"CBS had a gut reaction," said a senior Israeli official, who declined to be identified. "They came to their verdict, called us every name in the book, punished us, and then they said they were sending someone over to investigate what happened."

At the same time, however, many Israeli officials concede, in conversations not for attribution, that the original Israeli Army statement about the incident was seriously flawed in that it contained few details about how the killing happened and was totally lacking in any sense of regret.