

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

משרד ראש הממשלה

מסוד

המשק מתקן של 8

לשכת ראש הממשלה - ארנה

9/1985



שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס - אר

א - 9 / 4380

מזהה פיוז: 1734794 מס פריט: 43.4/3 - 194 מזהה לוגי: 15/08/2010 כתובת: 02-111-01-07-09

מחלקה

מס. תיק מקורי

4

מגירות ישראל - רוסינגטון

ס ד פ ס
96...ג...מזר...דטים
סוג בשחובי...
דחיות...
מאריך וז"ח. ססט. 12. ספטמבר 65
ספי שבר...

אלו

288

המשרד

21/2

אל: מצפ"א, לשי רה"מ. -למכותבים בלבד.

כדי לנסות לסכם את מועד ביקור רה"מ שוחחנו גם עם היל זעם מקפרלן
שהבטיחו לסייע (כפי שדווח, יש אי ודאות לגבי כל ביקורי ראשי המדינות, בשל
המספר הגדול-70-80 בספטמבר/אוקטובר).

רובינסטיין

מח רה 2
גה 3
גה 1
גה 1

| | | |
|--------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| מספר | מחיצת הקשר ניו-יורק | מספר רוח"מ |
| מספר | טופס מברק | רוס', נאו"ס, ממכ"ל, מצפ"א |
| תז"ח: 121630 | | הרצל ענבר, ניו יורק |
| נר: 309 | | |
| 11: 60 | | |

בהמשך לשלי 308
סעיף 4/א

בגישושים עם לשכת ראש העיר הוצע ע"י עוזרו כיוזמתו חוזר כיוזמתו ביקור בבית אבות. לדעתו יזכה המחווה להר ציבורי וחקשרתי. נראה לנו כי גם אם ראש העיר ילווה את רוח"מ כביקור - הוא יראה פחות קשור למסע הבחירות מאשר לחיצות ידיים עם עובד אורח. הכריזקובא.

ענבר

מח"מ 2
התא 3
גא 3
גא/ג 1
ג3א 1

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|---------------------|----------------------------|
| מס' ת"ח: 121630 | מס' רוח"מ: מסרר רוח"מ |
| מס' כר: 0308 | רוס', נאו"ם, ממנכ"ל, מעפ"א |
| מס' כסחובני: 59:211 | הרצל ענבר, ניו יורק |
| מס' מיידי: | מס' יורק: 100 |
| מס' כסחובני: | מס' יורק: 100 |

- א. להלן סיכום דיון עם אברהם בורג הבוקר לגבי האירועים בדלקמן:
- יום שבת 19.10 - תפילה; הועלו שתי הצעות חילופיות לחללית:
 - תפילה בבית הכנסת "Eftel Ave." (האורתודוכסי) שהוא הקבוץ ביותר למלון. מהלך כ-20 רחובות כל כיוון.
 - אירגון מניין במלון עצמו. אק מתקבלת הצעה ב' יראג בורג להעביר רשימת מוזמנים למניין.
 - יום א' 20.10 - פגישה עם הוגי דעות רכניים (נציגים משלושת הזרמים) - בורג ישלח רשימת אנשים להזמנה. בסך הכל קבוצה של כ-15 איש.
 - יום א' 20.10 - כנס נוער: א. מוקם מטה אירגוני שיקיף את כל התנועות ואירגוני הנוער.
 - האירוע יתחיל בשעה 20:30 ושעה קלה לפני כן יקבל רוח"מ את ראשי האירגונים.
 - אין אפשרות לקיים עצרת נפרדת עם תנועת חל"ם (חל"ם תיסול חלק במטה חנ"ל).
 - יום ת' 24.10 - הליכה ב-Garment District יחד עם ראש העיר: בורקים התיכטים המעשיים וכן מביאים בחשבון כי התאריך הוא כשבוע לפני הבחירות לראשות העיר ועל אף שקוץ' הוא "מועמד בטוח" יש לסקול האם רצויה חופעה משותפת כנ"ל. לחילופין מוצע ביקור בבית אבות יהודי.
 - בנוסף לנ"ל ובעקבות שיחות עם נציג YU על טכס הענקת ד"ר כבוד (יום ב' 21.10).
 - הטכס מחייב התעספות כ"גלומה אקדמית". לשם הכנתה מבקשים לרעת גובה, מסקל וכן מספר הכורע שחובט רוח"מ.
 - מסגרת הזמן המוצעת לחשובת רוח"מ למסבדיו הינה של עד 15 דקות.
 - מלבד קורות חיים וצילומים מבקשים לקבל כתבות דיוקן של רוח"מ שתופיעו בעתונות (לפי בחירתכם).

ג. הכריזונא בהקדם הרכב הפמליה רשמית וכן מספר אנשי כסחובני ועוזריהם.

אנה א' א' א'!

[Handwritten signature]

ענבר

מס' רוח"מ: 100
מס' יורק: 100
מס' כסחובני: 59:211
מס' מיידי: 100

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|-----------|---|----------|
| תחילת: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | 1-: ק"ר |
| סוג בחדר: | טופס מברק | 3-: מתוך |
| תז"ח: | הסברה. ספ"ח. לש' סמנכ"ל. יועץ רוח"ם לחקשורה. סג"א. סמנכ"ל אסיה"ר. לפ"ם. | א 5 : |
| כ"ר : | רושינסון. | 7 ע : |
| 0297 : | | |
| 58 : 611 | | |
| | תחנות. | 882 : |

News Summary September 12, 1985

Editorials

NYT-"The Missing Seven" Israel has now freed the last of its Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners whose release was demanded by the hijackers of a TWA jet. They freed the last 39 passengers on a tactic understanding that Israel would hold true to its previous promise to liberate the 766 captives. If it was a deal, it has been honored. Where does this leave the 7 other Americans imprisoned in Lebanon? Pretty much where they were before the hijacking. The State Dept. insists it is urgently working for their release. Their families say it is not enough. This may be true or false. What is certain is that leaders behave differently when hostages are prime-time news. If the 7 are half-forgotten, the fault lies in ourselves.

Columns

NYP-Rabbi Marc Tannenbaum "A Day of Atonement for the UN" Rosh Hashana has a powerful and moral message spiritual message to address to all foreign ministers and ambassadors who are gathering to take part in the 40th Anniversary of the UN. Today the human community is threatened by an epidemic of dehumanization--the nuclear arms race, famine in Africa, the war between Iran and Iraq, violence in Lebanon, etc...The two greatest threats are totalitarianism and fanaticism, says a State Dept. official. Last month, the New Times, an official Soviet publication, distributed throughout the world in nine languages, printed a vicious anti-Semitic article. In August, only 27 Jews were allowed to leave Russia. Why is the UN impotent in preventing these violations of human dignity? A Day of Atonement for mankind at the UN is what is needed.

Press Reports

Suicide Bomb in South Lebanon

NYT-Hijazi-A suicide car bomber crashed her car into a checkpoint just outside the so-called Israeli security zone. Casualty reports differed. A pro-Damascus group, the National Syrian Social Party claimed responsibility. They said two Israelis were killed. Israel radio

א-סור: עם השולח: חא"ר:

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the word "Pinge" repeated several times.

Son on Hunger Strike for Parents-the Sakharovs

NYT-Gamarekian (photo of Semyonov and Avital Shcharansky) Alexsey Semyonov, the son of Yelena Bonner and stepson of Andrei Sakharov, has been on a hunger strike for 13 days now. He is conducting his protest two blocks from the Soviet Embassy. He says he is desperate because he feels that his parents are in mortal danger. He has a petition asking Reagan and Shultz to intervene. The State Dept. said the Sakharovs' are a high priority in the US Embassy in Moscow.

Former German POW Gives Up

NYT-AP-Georg Gaertner, a former German soldier who said he was living in fear of being captured after he fled from a German POW camp, surrendered to Federal authorities saying he was relieved the ordeal was over. (see NYP-Orin; ND-AP)

Iran-Iraq

NYT-AP-Iraq said its jets raided Kharg Island, Iran said it thwarted the

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11/10/80

11/10/80

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| תחילתו: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | 2 |
| סוג כספוני: | טופס מברק | 3 |
| תז"ח: | | |
| נר : | | |
| 297/58 | | |

said only the driver was killed. The driver was an 18 year old Shiite Moslem.

Saudi Denial on Yamani

NYT-AP-A rumor that Shiek Yamani, the Saudi oil minister had been assassinated or died of an illness is unfounded, Saudi officials said. He is said to be vacationing in an undisclosed location in Europe.

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| רחיפות: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | 3 |
| סוג בכתובי: | שופט מנדק | 3 |
| תז"ח: | | |
| כר : | | |
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attempt. There was no independent confirmation.

New Head of the Administrative Conference of the United States - Breger

NYT-Marshall Breger, a 39 year old lawyer, has been appointed to head the bureaucratic agency that is charged with improving bureaucratic agencies. He joined the White House in 1983 as a special assistant to the President for liason with the academic and Jewish community.

Yeshiva University

ND-Rosenfeld-2 pages on the Jewish university. Yeshiva University is unique in that it offers an Orthodox Jewish undergrad education and a complete secular program.

ITOTUT

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| 297/58 | מחלקת הקשר | 3 |
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ס פ ט
... 97...!...ממור... 2... דפים
... 777... סוג בטחוני...
... 777... דחיסות...
תאריך וז"ח. 12.10.85
... ספי ...

323
323

אל: המשרד

אל :- ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א
דע: נספח צה"ל - כאן

עיסקות הנסק ועמדתנו

1. בעוד יש האטה, כמדות, ביזמות לכוון מסעי מרפי, כנראה אין ספק כי לקראת סוף החודש יוגשו לקונגרס עיסקות נסק לסעודיה ולירדן. אין עדיין תמונה מדוייקת לפרטיהן של העסקות. ההנחה היא כי בשלב זה לא יקבלו הסעודים פריטים כמו מטוסים וטנקים, אך כאשר לירדנים המצב מורכב יותר.
2. ההא אשר תהא תמונת העיסקות, עלינו להידרש שוב לשאלה הנושנה של עמדתנו. כבר נכוינו בעבר (1978, 1981) בעמדות ומסרים מעורפלים וסותרים מישראל, שהיו עילה לבעיות קשות בטיפול בנושא בקונגרס.
3. השאלה מתעוררת גם בממשל עצמו, דהיינו, הסבר גישתנו לפרטיה.
4. עמדת ישראל יכולה להיות מוצגת הן במישור העקרוני (התנגדות למכירת נסק למדינות שבמצב מלחמה עמנו, חשיפתנו המטחונת לסיכונים נוספים; העדר התקדמות בהליך השלום; אילוצנו למרוץ חימוש גדל שאין לנו אמצעים לממנו וכדומה), והן במישור המפורט (משמעותו הפספסית של כל פריט שמוצע בעיסקות הללו).
5. יש להוסיף לכך, כי הממשל ימשיך בוודאי להפיץ שיטנו מקר מירושלים כי אם חוסין ידבר על אי לוחמה כשורות בינינו לירדן, תרוכך התנגדותנו למכירת נסק לו, יש אומרים כי הממשל ימשיך לתפציר בחוסין להצהיר משהו ברוח דו קעצרת האויים או בביקורו כאן, על חנת להקל על אישור העיסקה. ידידינו בקונגרס שואלים על כך.
6. הבעיה בזירה כאן. מורכבת יותר מאשר הנושמה הכללית של התנגדות למכירת נסק למדינות ש מלחמה עם ישראל. זאת, - כאמור - מכיון שיש רבים כאן בממשל, בקונגרס ובקהילה היהודית המצויים תחת הרושם שנוסחה תקשורתית מצד חוסין תספק אותנו. ועוד, ישנם הטוענים כי שמעו מסרים שונים גם כאשר לאיום הבטחוני שבפריטי הנשק להם ככל הנראה מדובר.
7. כאמור : לקחי העבר אינם טובים; הממשל מיהר ב-1978 וב-1981 לעשות שימוש בכל נוסחאות משתמעות לצני פנים של דוברים ישראלים כדי לטהר את העיסקה בקיין טעמים.
8. יש גם הבדל, מבחינת האפקטיביות, בין אמירה כללית של התנגדות ובין פעולה הסברה אקטיבית ונמרצת מצדנו בחוגי הקונגרס, היהודים, התקשורת וגם בממשל.

מחנה שבת 13/10/85
2 3 1 1 1 3 1 4 4
4 3 4 1 1 1 3 1 4

323

ס ר ט ס ר ט

ד... 2... 2... 2... ד... 2... 2... 2... ד...

טווג בסמוני

דחיות

תאריך ז"ח

מסי מברק

9. נכון לעכשיו, ועל פי ההנחיות הקיימות, בדעתנו לפעול אקטיבית נגד העיסקות ונעריך אם נתודרך, לרבות באשר לצד המפורט והספציפי.

10. כשלעצמנו, אם נישאל באשר לענין אי הלוחמה נאמר בשלב זה שבידוע מצב המלחמה עומד בעינינו ^{צירוף}; ויהיו כוונות המלך להיוון מו"מ כאשר יהיו, לפי טעה מתרבים בסיסי טרור של אש"פ כירדן (שאוילי מסכנים גם אותה עצמה, ומבחינתנו הם מקור דאגה חמור). לגופו של דבר, גם אילו מולמלו מילים מעורפלות במקום כלשהו, רחוק הדבר מלהיות תחליף למו"מ והסדר שבקבוצתו יסתיים מצב המלחמה, כדי לשנות גישתנו. אם תמצאו לנכון אנא הודיעונו דעתכם לני"ל. חשוב כמובן כי היא תהא על דעת כל משרדי הממשלה הנוגעים בדבר. הדברים תואמים גם את מברק לשרת מ-15.8, שעל הדברים שבו אנו חולקים.

11. עלינו לציין גם מתדרוך מפורט היום עם "כוח המשימה לענייני ישראל" הארצי של שהוקדש בחלק ניכר לנושא זה ולאסטרטגיות לגביו, כי הארגונים היהודים מצפים לשמעו מאתנו את הקו הישראלי, ואנו עושים כמיטב יכולתנו לפי האמור לעיל (אגב, מטעמים נרורים דחינו כמובן הערות בענין "עיסקה" אפשרית עם הממשל באשר לנושא).

12. למותר לציין כי שרינו בהיותם כאן - ממירו"מ ושהי"ח ^{זה}אבהייט (לפי סדר הביקורים) - יתבקשו להתייחס לכך, בודאי.

רובינסטיין

ס 1 0 2 2
1.2... 2... 2...
סווג כחזוני
דחיות
מאריך 121700. ספט 85
מאי עבר

אל:

320

המשרד

מצפ"א. דע: ממנכ"ל.

מאיר כהנא

ח"כ מאיר כהנא הופיע היום (12.9) בהרצאה במועדון העתונות הלאומית בווינגטון. כהנא פתח כסקירה היסטורית על הגלות, משאיפה לציון והחזרה הביתה ויצירת מדינה יהודית שהיהודים הם בעליה החוקיים - כולל יהודה ושומרון. זכותנו על הארץ היא מחוקקת הדת היהודית.

בהכרזת העצמאות דובר על הקמת מדינה יהודית. - כלומר רוב ליהודים. במסגרת הדמוקרטיה יש לערבים זכות וגם אפשרות להפוך לרוב. כמסגרת הציונות אין להם הזכות לכך. אי לכך קיימת סתירה בין הדמוקרטיה והציונות ויש להכיר בזאת ולקבל זאת.

מנהיגי יהדות ארה"ב אינם מוכנים להכיר בנעיה זו ולהתמודד איתה, (כינה אותם בשמות כגון

שאיפתו להגיע לעמדת כוח ולראשות הממשלה מונעת מרצת משה חמאס, מהטרור התמידי ומשטר הרס. עיקר תמיכתו היא בקרב יוצאי עדות המזרח שכן הם חיו בקרב הערבים ומכירים אותם. הוא מעדיף להיות ולהיות עם שבוא מאשר להיות אהוד ולהטמד באושוויץ.

כהנא בעד חילופי אוכלוסין, כפי שנעשה הדבר לאורך ההיסטוריה (יוון-טורקיה, הודו-פאקיסטן) וברור לו שרוב ערביי ישראל שהנם בעלי כבוד עצמי ירצו בכך, שכן אינם יכולים להיות בכבוד בארץ בה קיים חוק השבות ליהודים בלבד או כעלת המנון מסוג "התקווה".

כהנא טען שהוא רב המאמין באלוהים האמיתי ולא במושג המודרני המסולף שנוצר ושאל הוא גזעני. הוא מקבל בברכה כל מי שרוצה להתגייר. הוא סיים את דבריו במטפטים הבאים: "בעזרת השם אהיה ראש הממשלה, בעזרת השם יחיו הערבים במקום אחר ובעזרת השם נביא את המשיח."

בתשובה לשאלות:

- אין פתרון לבעיית השלום, פרט ל"שלום איסטנט" המחייב בטול מדינת ישראל.
- אי אפשר לנכא אם משלחת משוחפת תביא לשיחות ישירות. אין ערבי מתון. יש רק ערבים המבטאים את מחשבותיהם וכאלה שאינם מבטאים. אך כולם מתנגדים לשלום ללא החזרת ירושלים להסתיים. גם להמנע מדבר עם אשיף. חוכו לשלום עם ירדו שהיא מדינה בלתי חוקית ויכולה גם בהחלט להיות מדינה למלטינאים.

מח 2
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אלו

370 2/2

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- אם ערביי ישראל מוכנים לחיות עם זכויות אישיות אך ללא זכויות לאומיות (כגון זכות הבחירה) - הם יפולים להמשיך לחיות בארץ.
- ממשלת ארה"ב תתמוך בישראל גם אם כהנא יכהן כראש ממשלה שכן היא זקוקה לישראל מתוך אינטרס לאומי.
- הוא מאמין שחילופי תאזרחים יעשו ללא שפך דם, אך אם ישארו הערבים בארץ - תהפך ישראל לאירלנד הצפונית. הם יכולים לעזוב מרצונם ואז יקבלו מיצוי מלא על רכושם, או שיזרקו ללא פרוטה. מאמין שיצתו בדרך הראשונה שכן הם מכבדים כח.
- ישראל היא מדינה פושטת יד. יטב לישראל אם ארה"ב תפסיק את הסיוע.
- החוק שעבר בכנסת הוא מסוכן ומלא סתירות.
- הוא היה רוצה להשליט משטר של מדינת הלכה אך מבין שאין זה מופולארי ולכן מוכן יהיה למשטר דימוקראטי - כאשר לא יהיו ערבים בארץ וזאת כדי למנוע מלחמת אזרחים.
- אם תקום ממשלה בראשות אבן או שריד הוא יתמוך במרי אזרחי ואי ציות לחוקים והוא ירשם בהיסטוריה כמרטין לותר קינג.
- ישראל שונה מדרא"פ מאחר והיהודים שבו לארצם שלהם בעוד שהלבנים באו לדרא"פ.
- הוא שומר על אזרחות אמריקאית על מנת שיוכל לבוא לארה"ב להרצות בפני היהודים ולהזהירם מקטטורפות היכולות להתחולל פה עם התדרדרות המצב הכלכלי ולעודדם לעלות לארץ.

שנה טובה

עתונות

מחלקת המידע והפרסום, משרד החוץ, תל אביב

news

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

STEPHEN WISE CONGRESS HOUSE, 15 EAST 84th STREET • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10028 • 879-4500

78 2/3
Israel E. Levine
Director of Communications
212-879-4500
9/11/85

For Immediate Release

JERUSALEM, Sept. 11 — The following report was issued today by leaders of the American Jewish Congress following a series of visits with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan's King Hussein and Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel.

The statement was released by AJCongress president Theodore R. Mann; Henry Rosovsky, co-chairman of the organization's board of trustees and former dean of faculty at Harvard University; and Henry Siegman, executive director.

The three officials headed a group of 25 AJCongress trustees who arrived in Cairo last Thursday (Sept. 5), went to Amman, Jordan on Monday (Sept. 9) and proceeded to Jerusalem Tuesday (Sept. 10).

The text of the report follows:

REPORT ON MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST

We undertook this trip to Cairo, Amman and Jerusalem to learn first-hand about prospects for progress in furthering the peace process. The American Jewish Congress wishes to play an informed and constructive role in encouraging that process.

We met with the heads of state in Egypt and Jordan, and with leading members of their respective governments. In Egypt, they included President Hosni Mubarak, Foreign Minister Meguid, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali, and Senior Advisor to President Mubarak, Dr. Osama Elbaz.

In Amman, they included King Hussein, Crown Prince Hassan, and Prime Minister Zaid Rifai.

In Israel, we have met with Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Director General of the Foreign Ministry, David Kimche, Professor Moshe Arens, Minister Without Portfolio, and will be meeting with other members of the government.

As a result of our discussions in Egypt and Jordan, we believe that King Hussein and President Mubarak now wish to widen the peace between Egypt and Israel to include other Arab countries. They believe in the urgency of doing so now, before forces of political and religious extremism make the task impossible.

Egyptian and Jordanian officials were unanimous in their declaration that they believed that certain elements of the PLO have moderated their extremism and are prepared to live in peace with Israel if a Palestinian entity, federated with Jordan, were to become a realistic possibility. They stated that this tendency towards moderation would be greatly strengthened if the United States government were to open a dialogue with these elements of the PLO.

(more)

3/8 3/7

- 2 -

It is in this context that Egyptian and Jordanian officials strongly endorsed the so-called Murphy meeting. In response to our skepticism that Arafat would recognize Israel and renounce terrorism as a result of such a meeting, they urged that it is time that the PLO be put to the test.

We expressed to Egyptian and Jordanian officials our strong view that at this time the Prime Minister of Israel is prepared to go as far as any Israeli head of government can in moving towards peace. Egyptian and Jordanian officials concurred with this view. We urged upon them the necessity of direct face-to-face negotiations now, while this possibility exists. We regret that thus far they have failed to do so.

We return to the United States convinced that this is indeed a moment of crucial importance for progress towards enlarging the peace and for the beginning of a solution of the Palestinian problem. We intend to encourage our own government to assist all of the parties concerned in meeting with Israel in direct negotiations.

SA

IEL:pm-091185
AJ:O:R

טגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המסר ד

ט ו פ ס ס כ ר ק
 דף.....מחוק.....רשים
 סוג בטחוני.....גלוי
 דחיסות.....מיידי
 קפט' 12 1700
 מאריך וז"ח.....
 מס' מברק. 313.....

אל: ממנכ"ל. מנהל מצפ"א.
 דע: מנכ"ל אוצר (עבור הלפרין).

בית הנבחרים - סיוע חוץ (הקצבה)
 לשלנו 278

מליאת ועדת ההקצבות בבית הנבחרים התכנסה היום וקיבלה הצעה החלטה המסך קצרה (Short CR) שהוגשה ע"י היו"ר, המורשה גיימי וויטן. הצעה ההחלטה, חוקפת לארבעים וחמישה יום (מ-1 באוקטובר עד ה-15 בנובמבר) והיא קוראת להמסך המימון "בגבהים הנוכחיים" (Current levels) . לא הוגשו תיקונים כלשהם.

הקישור לקונגרס

אהה 2
 מהה 3
 אהה 3
 אהה 1
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 אהה 1
 אהה 3

ס נ ר ק

דף... 1... מסמך... דפים
סוג בשחוני... סודי
דחיות... מלידי
תאריך וז"ח 12.1630 ספט' 85
סטי מברק... 307

אלו: המשרד

אל :- מצפ"א, ממ"ד

מסיחה עם ארון מילר S/P

1. ציין שנראה שהתהליך המדיני, קרי "שליחות מרפי", נמצא כעת ב- Status אך לא הומת לאור הכוזה זו עוסקים כעת במתמיד (אגפו של רודמן שותף לכך) במשמעות עצירת התהליך המדיני ובחיפוש אחר אלטרנטיבות.

2. החידוש ששמעתי מפיו, תוך שהוא מציין שהוא אינו שותף לו ושאינו לו תימוכין במידע הוא שחוסין חוזר וטוען בפני האמריקאים שאם מרפי יפגש עם משלחת משותפת בה יכלול נביל סע' יודיע ערפאת מניה וביה על קבלתו את 242. השלב הבא פגישה עם משלחת אש"פ. חוסין ממשיך ואומר שלאחר שאש"פ ייחפרק מנשקו הוא יהפוך לשותף זוטרי לצידו והוא חוסין ינהל את התהליך. בעקבות זאת ישנם "גורמים בבניין" (ומכאן אישור "לחאבק" תומכי מרפי ב- A A לכין המחנגזים הבאים מה- S/P (א) המוכנים לקנות זאת. (ב) והטוענים שיש להעמיד במבחן את אש"פ/ערפאת, אחת ולהמיד. המזכיר הוא שעצר התהליך השלבים הנ"ל מטתי סיבות (א) לא נוצרה זיקה לשיחות ישירות שתצדיק זאת. (ב) ההתלבטויות ותפיסות באט לחתכן עם אש"פ הבינותי שזוהי גם עמדת הנשיא כאשר המזכיר היה Fair עם מרפי והביא בפני הנשיא את תזכירו.

3. מילר טוען שטרם נמצאו אופציה או אלטרנטיבה חליפית. הכיוון הוא (א) לדחות כאמור את הצעת מרפי, קרי לא להתקדם בנושא המשלחת המשותפת. (ב) להודיע לחוסין, כנראה בביקורו כאן חלה התקדמות מספקת שתיצור Linkage לשיחות ישירות עם ישראל. (ג) נכונות הממשל לביצוע עיסקה הנשק עם ירון.

אלי אבידן

א.א.

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, possibly a checklist or summary, with numbers and some illegible text.

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דף..... מהוך..... דפים
סווג בטחוני..... סודי

דחיסות.....

תאריך וז"ח..... 12 ספט 85

מס' מברק.....

שהח. מוכל. מתוכל. מצפא.

החקר אתי הווארד סקורן כדי למסור לי שבניגוד לדברים המתפרסמים הוא לא יצא עם המשלחת של הקונגרס למצרים, ירון ולארץ וזאת מטתי טיבות:
(א) מפני שהוריו חולים והוא חשט שעלול לקרוה להם משהו בהיעדרו.
(ב) מפני שקיבל את המסר שהועבר דרכי והיו לו ספיקות אם המשלחת הזאת רצויה.

לצערו, הדברים שמתפרסמים היום מטעם חברי המשלחת הצדיקו את חששותיו ומצטער לקבוע שהמשלחת הזאת לא הביאה הועלת.

הוא ביקש להעביר מסר זה לממרוהם ושהח וכן ביקש שתהיה לו אפשרות להפגש עם שהח ל-15 דקות במהלך שהותו כאן ב-15.

כשהעירותי לו שהעובדה שהוא מוסר לי את המידע הזה איננה פותרת עדיין את הבעיה הגדולה שהתווספות בציבור היא שהוא כן היה במשלחת והוא מזדהה עם הדברים שפורסמו מטעמה, השיב על כן שהוא מסר את הדברים גם למחמ"ד.

לדעתו אם עופאת מוכן לקבל את התנאים שנקבעו ע"י ארה"ב הוא יכול לעשות זאת ע"י הודעה פומבית. על כן צאתה של משלחת אמריקנית לעמן לפגישה עם פלטהינאים וירדנים היא מיותרת לחלוטין; כי אחת משתיים או שהיא לא נחוצה מאחר ואסף מקבל את התנאים ואם אין הוא מקבל את התנאים, צאתה של המשלחת יהווה הכרה באסף ע"י ארה"ב ללא קיום התנאים.

במשובה לשאלה אמר שהוא מוכן לומר דברים אלה פומבית אם יישאל.
דאגנו שיישאל.

טוב עונה.

מ. רון

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86 - 172 - 299

אל: הסברה, מע"ח, חצפ"א. ממנכ"ל, יגד, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קט"ח

דף: ניו-יורק. NEWS SUMMARY - THURSDAY - SEPTEMBER 12, 1985

THE PRESS REPORTS

Peres Sees Hussein Plan Taking 'Years'

**WASH. POST-Claiborne-Peres said he is convinced that Hussein is sincerely pursuing peace with Israel, but that the strategy Hussein is following could consume "years and years" before direct negotiations with Israel actually begin. "The Jordanians are saying that time is running out and this is the last chance. Now if we follow the process they propose, it may take years and years before a meeting will take place," Peres said in an interview with the Wash. Post. Repeating his call for immediate direct negotiations between Israel and a delegation including Palestinians not directly affiliated with the PLO, Peres said, "let's start talking sense. Why all these maneuvers?" (This article was cabled in full this morning.)

All Out Effort Required For Mideast Initiatives

WASH. POST-Coshko-The administration is trying to salvage its Middle East initiatives from failure. At stake are the administration's intertwined plans for new arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Jordan despite opposition from a skeptical Congress, and hopes of reviving the moribund Mideast peace process by fostering direct negotiations between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The administration feels that time is running out on the peace process, which is likely to die from inertia unless the US makes a significant gesture to keep Hussein from becoming discouraged. The administration has not indicated whether it has any strategy for overcoming that sentiment other than through intense lobbying. Whether Hussein and the administration will be able to agree on some new step that might change the mood of Congress is far from clear.

US Jews See Key Arabs

**WASH. POST-Claiborne-American Jewish leaders, after unprecedented meetings with Jordanian and Egyptian officials, said that those Arab officials strongly urged the the PLO "be put to the test" by the US on the issue of publicly recognizing Israel's right to exist. Officials in Amman and Cairo also "broadly hinted" that they might be prepared to drop the PLO from negotiations if Arafat refused to make such a declaration after a proposed joint Jordanian-Palestinian meeting with Murphy. The 20-member delegation from the American Jewish Congress met with Hussein and Mubarak and other officials of the two countries in what they described as a "fact-finding mission."

Treasury Finds Bite In Israel Bonds

WASH. POST-Russakoff-It is a truism that the US tax code affects almost every facet

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including "פגירות ישראל" and "מס' מברק".

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.....110 בסחובני

.....מחירים

.....מאריך וז"ח

.....מס' סגור

אלו

86/172/299

of American life, but the Treasury Dept. recently discovered that it also shapes the borrowing patterns of the state of Israel. Thousands of American Jews buy Israel Bonds, although some yield only 4% interest, less than half the market rate, "because they have a feeling for the state of Israel" and want to help finance the country's roads, harbors and other public works. Now the Treasury Dept. has ruled that under the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, those bond-holders face a penalty. The law imposed new taxes on people who make loans at artificially low interest rates as a way to reduce their tax bills.

Egypt And Jordan Hint At Bilateral Peace Talks

THE SUN-Jefferson Price III-Egypt and Jordan have indicated that the international peace conference they have demanded as a framework for Middle East peace negotiations could promptly turn into bilateral talks between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, according to a group of American Jewish leaders. They told reporters yesterday that the Egyptians and the Jordanians with whom they met urged the US to "test" the professed moderation of Arafat.

I May Meet Israel Alone: Hussein

CHICAGO TRIBUNE-Broder - Hussein has "broadly hinted" that he would be prepared to enter alone into direct peace negotiations with Israel if Arafat refuses to accept US-sponsored peace moves, prominent American Jewish leaders said Wed. after talks in Amman with Hussein. Hussein, sounding the theme that time is running out for a Middle East solution, has been pressing since May for a meeting between Murphy and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation as a preliminary for peace talks.

TELEVISION: NIGHTLY NEWS:

The major networks focused their main stories on the Baseball Drug Trial, the Titanic, South Africa, and Duarte's daughter.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

ס ר פ ס
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מאריך וז"ח 1500

אלו
המסרד
בטחון
295
295
171

מתכביל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמי"ח קט"ח.

תדרוך דובו מטמ"ו ליום - 12 - Sept. Thursday

Q Middle East.

MR. KALB: I know you're talking about the peace process in the Middle East.

Q Between Israel and the PLO and --

MR. KALB: Other than to say, "Thanks for the contributions," other than to say what you've heard from here, that the administration remains engaged, other than that, I have nothing new to tell you.

Q On the peace process, Bernie, do you have any response to Prime Minister Peres saying that Jordan is going about it the wrong way, it's too slow?

MR. KALB: Nothing by way of a specific reply to the way you have very specifically phrased your question. But in more general terms, to say that we welcome Prime Minister Peres' reaffirmation of his desire to move forward to negotiations for peace as expeditiously as possible, that we share his assessments and, as I noted to Ralph a moment ago, we are engaged in a process, looking toward the initiation of direct negotiations between Israel and credible Arab interlocutors.

Q You share his assessment, is that right?

MR. KALB: I'm sorry. I should say we share his sentiments. I thank you for the correction.

Q Bernie, I have a question that you may have to ask the lawyers on, but in the Foreign Aid Bill that was signed by the President last month, there is a provision which requires that the President -- that when the -- President notifies Congress of a pending arms sale to Jordan, he has to certify that King Hussein has recognized Israel's right to exist and is ready to move promptly and directly to negotiations under 242. Can we get a statement on whether the State Department feels that that is, under the present circumstances, would be a prohibition on such an arms sale or what is your analysis?

MR. KALB: Let me take that, Ralph.

51158

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including numbers and names.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו

288

המשרד

ט ו ט ט
רפ... א... א... א... א...
סוג בסחובי... א...
דחיות... א...
מאריך וז"ח... א...
... א... א...

אל: מצפ"א, לשי רה"מ. -למכותבים בלבד.

כדי לנסות לסכם את מועד ביקור רה"מ שוחחנו גם עם היל ועם מקפולן
שהבטיחו לסייע (כפי שדווח, יש אי ודאות לגבי כל ביקורי ראשי המדינות, בשל
המספר הגדול-70-80 בספטמבר/אוקטובר).

רובינשטיין

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מגירות ישראל - וויסינגטון

אל: המשרד

סניף סניף

דפוס...מסמך...דפים

טל

סוג מסמך

מיקוד

חיצות

מס' 0915 12

תאריך וזמן

מס' מברק

284

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ממכ"ל. מצפ"א. ממ"ד.

ארה"ב - מזה"ת

בעת חתימת חוק סיוע חוץ ב-8.8.85 התייחס הנשיא ריגאן לנושא המגעים עם אש"פ ובקשת הקונגרס ל- CERTIFICATION לירדן. להלן דבריו של ריגאן באותו המעמד -

Similarly, section 1302(a) correctly describes U.S. policy not to recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This Administration reaffirms that policy and welcomes congressional support for it.

I am compelled, however, as a matter of principle to reiterate my refusal to accept any congressional effort to impose legislative restrictions or directions with respect to the conduct of international negotiations which, under Article II of the Constitution, is a function reserved exclusively to the President. I will, therefore, consider sections 717(b) and 1302(b) as constituting only nonbinding expressions of congressional views on these issues.

I also wish to mention the new certification requirement relating to arms sales to Jordan. I believe that this requirement is unnecessary and inappropriate in light of King Hussein's recent public statements confirming Jordan's commitment to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Furthermore, the King has made and is continuing to make significant and courageous efforts in putting these principles into practice by moving Jordan toward direct negotiations with Israel.

קני-100 (18.11)

Handwritten signatures and notes at the bottom of the page.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tel Aviv, Israel

September 12, 1985

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of the State of Israel
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been asked to convey to you the following message from President Reagan.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"As the Nation of Israel prepares to celebrate Rosh Hashanah, I would like to extend to you my warmest greetings.

"This is a special time to look back on the achievements of the past year and ahead to the promise and challenges of the new. I am gratified by the warmth of U.S.-Israeli relations and the high level of cooperation between our governments, and I know that we will continue to work closely together as partners in the search for peace.


"May the joy of the high holidays be with you.

Sincerely,

S/ Ronald Reagan."

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,


Thomas R. Pickering
Ambassador

JERUSALEM, 18 SEPTEMBER 1985

REAGAN SENDS NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE TO PERES

THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY PRIME MINISTER SHIMON PERES FROM PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN ON THE OCCASION OF ROSH HASHANA. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:

"I WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND TO YOU MY WARMEST GREETINGS.

THIS IS A SPECIAL TIME TO LOOK BACK ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PAST YEAR AND AHEAD TO THE PROMISE AND CHALLENGES OF THE NEW. I AM GRATIFIED BY THE WARMTH OF UNITED STATES-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND THE HIGH LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS, AND I KNOW THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER AS PARTNERS IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

MAY THE JOY OF THE HIGH HOLIDAYS BE WITH YOU.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN."

AC/AC
INS".

21:10 HOURS

ידיעות לעתונות

דף מס' 1

ד' בתשרי תשמ"ו
19 בספטמבר 1985

(לעמ 1) ברכה מנשיא ארה"ב לראש הממשלה לרגל השנה החדשה

(ירושלים) 19.9.85 - נשיא ארה"ב, מר רונלד ריגן שיגר אגרת ברכה לראש הממשלה מר שמעון פרס לרגל ראש השנה. בדברי ברכתו אמר נשיא ארה"ב:

"ברצוני לשגר אליך את ברכותי החמות ביותר. זהו הזמן המתאים להתבונן לאחור על השגי השנה החולפת וקדימה אל אתגרי השנה החדשה. אני שבע רצון מחמימות היחסים בין ארה"ב וישראל והרמה הגבוהה של שיתוף הפעולה בין ממשלותינו, ואני יודע שנמשיך לעבוד ביחד כשותפים בחיפוש אחר השלום".

לעמ/רק/אב/ 08.30



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel Aviv, Israel

September 12, 1985

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of the State of Israel
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been asked to convey to you the following message from Secretary Shultz.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"Please accept my sincerest best wishes as Israel enters the New Year.


"Rosh Hashanah is a joyous occasion, a time for reflection on the past and hope for the future. We look back on a year that has strengthened even further the close ties between our two nations. I add my prayers to yours and those of the people of Israel for the most precious of gifts in the coming year, a lasting peace.


Sincerely yours,


S/ George P. Shultz."

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,


Thomas R. Pickering
Ambassador





משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6141

סודי ביותר 2 סוף 1 סוף 1

מל: המשרד, נד: 317, ס: 1111
דח: ד, סג: ט, מא: 120985, רח: 1800

סודי ביותר/רגיל

שהח, מנכל, ממנכל

ח ד ב

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including a signature and the name 'מנכ"ל' (Director).

חיקון אינדיה (בהמשך לשל הסג"ר 227)

1. א. להשלמת התמונה העובדתית יש להוסיף: 1. בשיחה עם אינדיה השבוע העלינו ספורטוח אח בטיית אי רצוננו למתוח יחסים עם הממשל ובראש וראשונה עם מזכ"ר המדינה, ואינדיה-שכדמוקרט אינו סמאכל לכשעצמו של מבוכות הנגדמות לממשל כהזכ"ר מבחינתנו יחסים בעניין הי'איווקסי'')-מגין את העניין תגובתו היתה כי לא יפטר בלעדיו, ואם נרצה לדחות י'היה מוכן גם להציג כלפי הממשל כאילו רק בלחצנו דחה ההגשה

2. עמדת אנשי איפא'יק היא לדחות לשנה כדי שלא ניראה במסדנים ובפויי טובה לאחר הסכומים שקבלנו השנה.

2. גדר הספקוח הוא איפוא כדלקמן:

א. בצד החיובי-אין חולק על כך שההצעה, אם תמומש, היא ברכה רבה מבחינתנו. אין לנו גם כל עכבה 'סוסרית' בעניין זה, כיוון שילדעתנו ולדעת רבים מילדירינו הסיוע שאנו מקבלים הוא ועום כלפי הממורה האסטרטגית לעולם החופשי ולארהב, וזאת לעומת סכומי העתק הגדולים לאין שיטור שמטקיעה אלהב באירופה ובאסיה במקציבי הגנה בפי שהגדיר זאת אינדיה 'אילו ישראל לא היתה, לא היה לארהב מה לחפש במזרח'.

1. בצד הנטיית'-(1) הממשל אינו אוהד לכך בראש ובראשונה בשל התקררים שהדבר ייצור כלפי מדינות אחרות כמו הסיבה שהיו בדיונים אצלנו שהזכירו אפשרות כי מצרים תרכה אף היא להפתחם ריבית דומה. עד האוצר בייקר במפורש ניקש סער האוצר מודעי כי לא נעודד זאת, ובגלל בעיות התקלאות בארהב, ושולץ חרד על הצורך

משרד החוץ, תל אביב, 1976

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי ביותר

מחוך 2

מחוך 1

מחוך

2 דף

14704

בנהירות מופלגת, גם אם שולץ, או הממשל בכלל, לא ידאו עקרונית
 בתמיכתנו בהצעה צעד בלתי הוגן נראה העיתות עם היל ועם
 בונד-ודאי לא ידוו נחת, וייתצאו ללא ספק דונברים פחות
 ידידותיים מאשר שולץ ידאגו להפיץ כי אנו בפויי טובה בכך
 שלאחר מה שקיבלנו אנו מבקשים עתה עוד לו
 הסיבה, באמור, שאיפקי, למשל, שכמוכן אינו מוצא דופי עקרוני
 בהצעה, מסתייג מהעיתוי השנה.
 (2) גם המצב הקונגרסיונאלי אינו פשוט לחלוטין, שכן אפילו
 סנאטור קסטן, הבא ממדינה חקלאית מעוניין כנראה בי חוק החקלאות
 יאושר לפני כן נאף בי לפי אינויה הוא ינעולי על הנושא
 שלנו. ודאי יהיו גם אחרים סידדינו שיצביעו על קשיים.

(3) אינויה סבור בסיסית כי ניתן להעמיד את ההצעה ידידותו בנה
 ובזונותיו הבסיסיות ללא ספק טובות.

(4) השאלה עתה איננה איפוא אם לתמוך עקרונית בירמה-זאת כבר
 עשינו ונמשה השאלה היא לגבי העיתוי, לנו אסור להיראות כמי
 שמרפים את ידי הרוצים לסייע לנו. לפיכך הגישה הנראית לנו
 סבירה היא הודעה לאינויה כי אנו תומכים ומעמידים בידיו את
 עיקול העיתוי, שהוא מודע כמוכן לכל הבטיות, אך כמוכן נשתף
 פעולה במלוא הצורך-כגון תדרוכים עיי השגריר ואחרים
 לסנאטורים, יתכן שאינויה עצמו ישקול את העיתוי גם לפי נוחות
 קונגרסיונאליה של חבריו כגון קסטן נחוק החקלאות. בכל
 מקרה, הסברינו יהיו לענין לגופו, ולא על-יסוד התנגחות עם הממשל
 כמוכן.

הנל בהתייטות עם השגריר ולסדן.

דובינשטיין

תפ: שהח, מנכל, אמנכל

רהא ארנס

14704

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5759

מחוך 1 דף 1
מחוך 2 עותק 1
סודי ביותר

למח
32/2

מל: המשרד, נר: 277, ט: 110985, רח: 1900
דח: ר, סג: ט, תא: 110985, רח: 1900

סודי ביותר/רגיל

חדר

מל: שה"ח, מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל

חיקון אינויה . מפגישה שבוע עם אינואה-לבדיקת הדרך הטובה ביותר כדי להבטיח סיכויי הצלחה היוזמה, לדעת אינואה ישראל ובמאית לסיוע נוסף מארה"ב בצורת הפחתת הריבית כי ישראל לא תוכלה את התמורה שהגיעה לה בעקבות נסיגתה מסיני. כמו כן קיים שיתוף פעולה מודיעיני ואיסטרטגי רחב ביותר שלא קיים ביחסים עם כל מדינה אחרת.

באשר לעיתוי הגשת הבקשה - על כך לדעתנו אנו צריכים להוועץ ביננו כדי שלא נסמך היחסים עם הארמניסטרציה. הבהרתי לו שאנו בהחלט תומכים ביוזמה אך מאחר וגם מזכיר המדינה וגם שר האוצר כאן הטלו ביוזמתם את הנושא עם השד מודעי כדי לבקש שלא ננקוט בפעולה זו - נשאלה השאלה באשר למידת הנזק שהדבר עשוי לגרום ליחסים שלנו עם הממשל. לאינואה הוציאה שלטון חשיבות הנושא ההחלטה אם לפעול מידית או בעוד זמן מה צריכה להתקבל רק אחר שנתייעץ ביננו - ונדאי שלא צריך לצאת בקאמפניה באותו שבוע. בנו אנו מקבלים אח 250 מליון דולר.

גייס בונד נעוצרו הראשי של הסנטור קסטן (אמר שבוע לטרון שבטוד שהוא תומך ברעיון הורדת שיעור הריבית, אינו שלם עם פעולה מוקדמת, ובוודאי לא לפני קבלת חוק החקלאים - כי הרי כיצד ידאו פני הדברים אם לישראל מתירים דבר שאינם נותנים לחקלאים. בארה"ב בונד מעיר שלאינויה אין לו בעיות עם החקלאים אך לקסטן נמוויסקוסן (י"ש.

נהטרה: יק לציין גם שלאינויה אין בעיות להבחר מחדש בשנה הבאה, ואילו לקסטן (י"ש). מטבר לבעיית העתוי, בונד חולק על המסקינה של אינויה כלנסות להשיג בשלב זה את ההקצבה הדרושה. לשנה התקציבית הנאה בלבד נכ-500 מליון דולר) ועל ידי כך

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

TO: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) DATE: 10/10/50

RE: [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

1. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

2. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

3. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

4. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

5. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

6. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

7. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

8. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

9. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

10. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

11. [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

TO: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) DATE: 10/10/50

RE: [Illegible] (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000) (NY 100-100000)

[Illegible body text - appears to be a memorandum or report with several paragraphs of text.]

[Illegible text, possibly a signature or reference line.]

[Illegible text, possibly a distribution list or administrative notes.]

[Illegible text, possibly a closing or signature.]

[Illegible text, possibly a reference or date.]

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5754

נכנס

דף 1 מתוך

עמק 1 מסוף 6 סודי ביותר

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מאר: המשרד, נד: 246, מ: 111
דח: ד, סג: מ, תמ: 110985, רח: 1000

סודי / רגיל

אל: מנכ"ל משרד רוה"מ - אי"מ
מח: ס. דוין / וויטנאמן

ביקור רוה"מ

אגם לפי המלצתך שוחחתי עם אגם שמוכן להכין דגם של הרונה
דוגמת אשר הכין בצופת. לפי אישוריך אישרתי הדפסת אלף עותקים
בסך כולל של 4500 דולר (ארבעת אלפים חמש מאות דולר)

אגם מליע ארצה בערב ראש השנה ויתקשר אתך בהגיעו כדי להציג
בפניך דוגמה - ולקבל אישוריך לבן

ס. דוין

מח: דח

כאן

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משרד החוץ - תל אביב 10770

משרד החוץ-נוחלקת הקשר

5753

דף 1 מחוך

עוֹתֵק 1 מחוך 2 סודי ביותר

מסמך מס' 14758

אשראי

*המא 2991
מאג 2991 x 1
מאג 2991*

אל: המשרד, נר: 245, מ: 111
דח: מ, סג: מ, מ, חא: 110985, וח: 0930

סודי ביותר / מיידי

אל: - מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מנהל מצפ"א
מאח: רובינשטיין / וושינגטון

ח.ר.ב.

להלן משיחה עם צירלי היל באייצ'י (10/9).

המפגשים עם הצמרת האמריקנית (ביקורי רה"מ' ומסרה"מ'
ושה"ח). אמרתי כי הורג המדיני הבכיר שלנו בודאי יהיה מעוניין
לשוחח עם ראשי הממשל גם מטבר לנושאים הביטחוניים גם על
נושאים רחבים במדיניות הבינלאומית, וכי אני מכין שלרה"מ'
יש עניין בחילופי דעות רחבים עם הנשיא גם לקראת פסגת ריגן -
גורבצ'וב. היל אמר כי הדבר מקובל עליהם לחלוטין. למשל, היו
עמיתים לשמוט הערכותינו בתחומים הבאים שבהם יש לנו פעילות,
התעניינות או מידע עצמאיים - נריה"ם, מרכז אמריקה, אפריקה
ודרום אפריקה. למשל, האם אנו רואים שינויים בנעשה במרכז
אמריקה בשנה ו-18 חודש האחרונים לחיוב או לשלילה. אני מציע
כי הגופים הנוגעים בדבר במערכת הישראלית, במשה"ח ועוד, יכינו
הערכות כאלה למסירה לאמריקנים בארבעת התחומים הללו במפגשים
המדיניים.

ב) ארה"ב - נריה"ם. לשאלתי בדבר ראשים מפגישת המזכיר עם
שברנדורה נהלסינקי, אמר כי שברנדורה עצמו שונה כליל בסגנון
סגרוסיקו, שבשנים האחרונות לא יצר דיאלוג אלא בעצם דיקלם את
שהיה לו לומר. שברנדורה נראה עירני ופתוח. הוא אף חשב בשלב
מסוויים לנהל שיחות בלי ייניירות שיחה"י ובלי רישום, אך
הפקידות שעמו יעצה לו כנגד זאת וקיבל את דעתה. הפקידות בעלת
הנסיין גם הדריכה אותו בכל שלב באיזה נושא לעסוק והוזהירה
אותו מחתחתים. ההנחה היא, עם זאת, כי בהמשך, עם רכישת
הנסיין, יהיה שברנדורה עצמאי יותר. כנראה רואים דמיון בינו
לגורבצ'וב עצמו.
ג) היל אינו מניח כי המרה"ת יהיה בעדיפות גבוהה בשיחות

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מחוך 2 דף 2
מחוך 1 עותק 1
סודי ביותר

הפסקה, לפחות כפי שהאמריקנים רואים זאת - אם כי יתכן
שהסובייטים רואים אחרת. אפגניסטאן תהיה בדרגה גבוהה אצל
האמריקנים.

ד) נושא יהודי בריה"מ ודאי יעלה. אמרתי כי אני מבין שרוצים
להעלותו בחלקים הבלתי פורמליים של המגעים כדי לנסות להגיע
להירכרות טובה יותר. אך רצוי שיהיה גם בסדר היום הפורמלי,
כדי שלא לאותת חלילה להחלשת ההתעניינות. אמר שודאי יהיה תחת
הכותרת של זכויות אדם.

ה) תיקון אינדיה - הפחתת שיעורי הריבית. אמרתי שיאנה ההצעה
הבאה לסייע לנו בהפחתת שיעורי ריבית לשטרות השוררים כיום.
למותר לציין שיוספה כזאת, שמסמעותה הפיננסית גדולה, קודמת
לנו. מוסרתי אנו נכתומכיה בסנאט רואים אותה כמוצקת על יסוד
הנטל הכסחוני הכבד שלנו וה"ינטו"י שבהועלת מצדנו לעולם
החופשי בהשוואה לסיוע הניתן לנו, הנראה שמסעותי אך הוא זעום
לעומת השקעות ארה"ב בנטחון באירופה / אסיה. קשה איפוא להניח
שגישתנו תהיה אחרת מאשר חיובית. עם זאת אין לנו עניין ללכת
בקרי עם המסשל. אמר שאת שולץ מטריד הצד התקדימי בהוכרתי
ההצעה שהיתה גם בענין מצרים, אך עלינו כמובן לפעול לפי
הבנתנו להבינותי שהערכתו אולי היא כי שולץ לא יפגע מפעולה
לגיטימית שלנו שאינה כמובן נושאת אופי של יציאה נגד המסשל
בשלעצמה.

ו) כאשר ליחסי ישראל - ארה"ב נכלל, היל רואה אותם בסובנים
ביותר ואומר כי עליו להרכיב מרי פעם לחברים במחט"ד תקופות
קשות שהיו בעבר. הביט עם זאת חשש מגלישה לחיכוכים. ציין כי
לדעתו הואיל ושולץ הוא מי שהוא, בגישתו החיובית, אין צורך
להציג חששות מהסוג שנשמע לאחרונה בקשר לתהליך הסדיני, כאילו
יפעלו בניגוד לחובינות ולקו שנקטו, ויעשו משהו שלא על דעת
רה"מ וממ"רה"מ ושה"ח. אמרתי כי כולנו, בכל המטרות, מכבדים
את שולץ ורואים אותו כידיד ואיש מפתח ביחסים הטובים השוררים
עם זאת הדברים שמטענו כאן ומפיקרינג בארץ כללו אינדיקציה
להמלצות שבהן מו"מ יסיר נדחק לסופה של דרך שאין רואים או
בקצה מנהרחה, ואלמנט אסי"פי נראה כי"מורקי" לחמונה ומכאן
החשש. טבעית במצבים כאלה, כשאתה סבור כי ישנו נסיון לבחון
אופציות חריגות, עליך לבדוק את המצב. טען כי איפא"ק הגויים
בהצגת הדברים ולפעשה המטענות היו נגד האופציה הקיצונית ביותר
שהוצגה בניירות אמריקנים, ושלא עמדו לבחור בה (הערה: - יחד

TO: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000) FROM: SAC, PHOENIX (100-100000) DATE: 10/10/68

RE: MURKIN - PHOENIX - 100-100000 - NY 100-100000 - 10/10/68

PHOENIX TELETYPE TO NEW YORK 10/10/68. PHOENIX TELETYPE TO NEW YORK 10/10/68.

PHOENIX TELETYPE TO NEW YORK 10/10/68. PHOENIX TELETYPE TO NEW YORK 10/10/68.

PHOENIX TELETYPE TO NEW YORK 10/10/68. PHOENIX TELETYPE TO NEW YORK 10/10/68.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מחוך סודי ביותר
עותק 1 מחוך 2

עם זאת אני מאמין שהיל יודע כי המסומלת הדיפלומטית נעה באורח...
מסמך במעגלות ובאודחות התנהגות כפי שראינו בנושא זה, ולגופו...
של דבר היה צורך בחגובה שתסנע הנעתה לעבר רעיונות קבוצת...
טרפי, שפיקרינג י' בדק את העמתי לגביהם.]

ה) תדרכתיו בקשר לסוים' אסא (שהתיכונ היה מנהלי - משפטי...
פנימי ולא פוליטי ועתה השיחות מתנהלות) ובנושא סוס נכי...
גישתנו חיובית ופתוחה, הבאה לביסוי בהתעניינות פרקטי...
בנושאים המכניים, בהצעות שנדונות גם כרגע עם האמריקנים...
וואת סבלי שיצאנו בהצהרות פוליטיות קולוסליות, אך כאמור חוץ...
גישת חיובית עניינית). התעניין מאוד, והוסיף כי מדינות לא...
מעטות שלטנו לכל העניין של סוס נוכחות עמה לדעת שהמדובר...
בנושא רציני, חשוב ומתקדם.

ח) כשנסבה השיחה על דראי' והסרגדיה עם, הוכרתי כי שהיה...
בושה בניקוד בארץ לפני 7 שנים אטר, ככל הוכר לי, בשיחה...
סגורה עם שהיה דיין וי'ל, דברים שטיקרום עי אם יילחץ ממשי...
דראי' אל הקיר, יעלה את אפריקה בלהבות. היל העיר כי כלכלת...
סספר מדינות שבנות תלויה בדראי' בענייני יסוד.

ט) אמרתי כי במישור השיחוף האסטרטגי ועתי האישיה היא כי...
בהמשך יהיה מקום למסד גם דיאלוג כדרג מדיני, כפי שיש לבעלות...
הברית הפורמליות למיניהן, אף כי אצלנו סרס נבדק הנושא...
בעבודת סטה עד תום וכן עם הדרג המדיני שלנו. אמר כי לדעתו...
הרעיון חיובי, והקושי שהוא רואה הוא ביסודו של לוי פרקטי...
בגלל ריבוי המחויבויות הפורמליות שכלות הדרג המדיני אצלם...
למפגשי בעלות הברית אך דבר זה בודאי ניתן לבדיקה ולהסדרה...
כמוכן כל הניל דיסקרטי ודאי תביאו לידיעת רהים, מסרהים...
ושהיה ושהביים.

יא) לאחר השיחה התקשר הבוקר (11) וילקוקס, כנראה לפי הנחיית...
היל בקשר לסעיף אי' דלעיל. מסרתי לו על הענין שיש לרהים...
לשוחח על נושאים גלובליים כמו בריהים ועל הערות היל בעניין...
סרכו אמריקה, אפריקה ודראי'. אמרתי כי אמליץ להמכוונן בעניין...
זה בארץ.

דובינשטיין

14704 200002 19704

131 אכילה

התאריך
11/9/85

תיק מס'

כסא היי

1/10/85

זיקון אינולי

באגדה האולם טווי האן/קמאל
עם אינולי (אגדה האולם)
הוא קוסט דגל עיני.

רושן אקיר לי מהי ייי
מסכה (רושן עזא אייפאק אינולי)
היכן האגין אגז כמקל.



התורה!
מזכר

(להתכתבות פנימית במשרדי הממשלה)

התאריך: 25/9/51

כא ה"ה

מחוז:

ירושלם

החוק:

הקרון איננו

~~התאריך: 25/9/51~~
~~החוק: מס' 100~~
~~מחוז: ירושלם~~

למא הנתונה של הקרון איננו
מקום של למא למא אולם
כל ימיה מאי כב. לכל בקשה.
זה לא הינו למא למא
של של וצויל לקיים קו מאו
לא מקובלים בענינים כגון - אחרונים
אבל למא למא איננו למא
המקרה.

לא
בני מקרים.

הוא למא לק?

[Handwritten signature]

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

7475

מצי'

ד'10

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5/12

מלוי ני"נ נדו 400, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סנו ס, תא: 110985, וח: 1600

טודי/מיידי

נאום.

נתניהו: ביין.
פגישות רוה"ם בעצרת.

הסדירו נא פגישות לרוה"ם לתקופת שהותו בעצרת החל מ-21.10.
(יגיע 20.10) עד ל-24.10
להלן רשימת ראשי המדינה והממשלה עם סנקשה לשבת רוה"ם
להסדיר הפגישות: 1. רוה"ם בריטניה.

2. קנצלר רפ"ג.
3. רוה"ם איטליה.
4. רוה"ם לונדון/ברג.
5. נשיא פינלנד.
6. רוה"ם פורטוגל (במידה ויגיע).
7. רוה"ם קנדה.
8. רוה"ם אוסטרליה.
9. רוה"ם יפן.
10. רוה"ם סרי לנקה.
11. נשיא ואיר.
12. רוה"ם תורכיה.
13. נשיא יוגוסלביה.

נעביר טוד רשימה משלימה.

ארנ"ל 2.

5

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|--------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|
| רחיכות: סייד | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק | דף: |
| סוג בטחוני: סדר | | סדר: |
| תז"ח - 1116 | | אל המשרד |
| נר : 0218 | | ד |
| | | נאר"ם ניו-יורק |


אל : ארמ"ל 2.
 דק : טמיר/לשכה רה"ם.
 סאת: גביר.

פגישת רה"ם בעצרת. לשלכם 400.

אנו מודעים לכשוח ועובדים על כולן. עוד נודיעכם.

נאר"ם

רה"ם אסיאב ארמ"ל 2
 1 1 3



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| איטור: | עם השולח: | 11.9.85 |
| | ר. גביר | |

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| תאריך: | מסלול הקשר 111-111 | 2 |
| שם כותב: | PTAB P 910 | 4 |
| מחלקה: | | 106 |
| 935 : 72 | | |
| 50-011 | | |

Press Reports

Jordan Arms Deal

NYT-Gwertzman-The Reagan administration will go ahead with planned sales of advanced aircraft and other equipment to Jordan even if it means provoking a major clash with Congress, a high-ranking State Dept. official told a closed-door meeting of the House Foreign Affairs committee. Murphy was told that a resolution would be passed to block the sales. Murphy also stated that the US plans to sell more arms to Saudi Arabia.

NYT-10/9-Clarity-The Administration has decided that there will be no announcement of the new arms sales until after the Jewish holidays. To make the announcements during the holidays would be an affront to Israel, the Administration realized.

Israel Yields Last Detainees to Lebanon

NYT-AP-(photo of Shiite greeted by relatives) The last group of 119 Lebanese and Palestinian detainees held by Israel were freed. They were given a heroes' welcome in Tyre. In Damascus, the Syrian-Gov't news agency said Assad met with leaders of the Party of God, some of whose members were released by Israel. Berri said that he had been told that some of the Kidnapped Frenchmen could be freed when the Atlit prisoners were all released. (see NYP-wire; DN-wire; ND-wire)

Lebanese Shiites Meet With Palestinian Team

NYT-special-Lebanese Shiite and Palestinian leaders met in a new effort to end a week of bitter clashes in south Beirut. Berri met with a Palestinian delegation from Damascus. Fighting continued despite a cease-fire.

New Consul General in New York

NYT-special 9/10-The Israeli Foreign Ministry announced that its new Consul General in New York, Moshe Yegar, would assume his post on Tuesday. (page 2)

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| דתיקות: | מחלקת העשר ניו-יורק | 3 |
| סוג כתיבה: | עיתון | 4 |
| ת"ח: | | |
| 935 | | |
| 50-011 | | |

Jordanian to Visit Soviet Union

NYT-9/10-AP-The Jordanian radio said that Fathi Abu Taleb, the chief of staff, will visit the Soviet Union this month. Jordan has generally turned to the Soviet Union for arms when unable to obtain what it wanted from the US and other suppliers.

Soviet Book Fair

NYT-Schemann-Lines of Russians formed around the most popular exhibits, Baker & Taylor, the State of Israel, and the Association of Jewish Book Publishers. At the Israeli stand, the Russian language section was quickly emptied.

Ex-German POW Ends 40 Years of Hiding/New Evidence on Barbie

NYT-Blumenthal-Georg Gaertner, a WW II prisoner of war, ended 40 years of hiding and surrendered to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It is unclear what his fate will be. Gaertner's exploits are related in a book, "Hitler's Last Soldier in America," published this month by Stein & Day. The FBI and Immigration service said they had no charges against him.

NYT-special-The court that will try Barbie said it had obtained new evidence allowing for more detailed charges in the case. The start of the trial will be delayed at least until the beginning of next year. (see DN-wire)

Bahrain Warship is Luxurious

NYT-Britain has built Bahrain a warship with a sunken bath, 22-Katat gold taps, stereo, etc...The boat is to be used by a very senior minister of the small kingdom. It is armed with a 20-mm gun and anti-aircraft missiles. The 15 man crew will be crammed together in bunks 18 inches apart.

Saudi to Cut Price of Crude

NYT-Saudi Arabia has reached a preliminary agreement with six international oil companies to undercut OPEC's official price structure, a Kuwaiti

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| תאריך: 11/9/85 | מסלול הקשר 111-111 | 4 |
| מסלול מסמכים: | 1111 1111 | 4 |
| מסלול: | | 5 |
| 835 : 11 | | 6 |
| 50-111 | | 7 |
| | | 8 |

newspaper reported.

NY Mosque Up For Sale

DN-Moore-The Harlem Mosque, which a dozen years ago was the center of activity for the Nation of Islam, is one of several properties that New York Muslims are putting up for sale to starve off financial disaster.

Letters-On Oil in Israel/Fundamentalists


WSJ-9/9-4 letters on the cover story 8-22 on US evangelists' efforts to find oil in Israel. Lawrence Gould writes that the evangelists should divert their funds and invest in Israeli high-tech, if they want to really help Israel. A Reverend says that a good deal of today's popular religion has been reduced to opportunistic huckstering. The leader of the oil project, Andrew SoRelle writes that the Asher-Atlit project has been financed by 19 investors, half of whom are professional oil men. No stock was sold and the deal was never promoted. He believes it is God's time to bless Israel. There is oil in Israel, he states, but it is deep. The Lord made it that way because if oil had been discovered at the same time as it was in Saudi Arabia, the British would have never given the land up. Samuel Eisenstat, President of Abjac Energy Corp. writes that Israel remains untested for hydrocarbons. This area provides interesting opportunity. Eisenstat hopes that oil is discovered and approves of all exploration.


Rosh Hasahana

DN-2 full pages of recepies for the holidays.

ITONIT

11.9.85





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ס ל ס ס ל ס
 דף...?...מחור...?...דפים
 סוג בסחונני
 דחיות
 מאריך וז"ח
 סעיף מס' מבק

ז. סודאן. הממשל אינו יציב עדיין. מצרים עוסקת בפיתוח יחסים עם שתי המפלגות העיקריות. אין מדברים עם גרנג שעמו מנטים האמריקנים לקטור קטרים (כנראה אמור היה להיות מפגש בניירובי שבוטל בהתערבות האחיותים הלוחצים על גרנג). כרגע אין איום על חייהם של המצרים מן המשור הקודם בסודאן.

ח. ירדן. אל-באו ממשיך לבקר בה לעיתים קרובות ולקיים את הקטרים עם המלך.

ט. טאבה. אמרתי כי ענין הפישור אינו המצאה לצורך טאבה אלא פילוסופיה שלנו עוד מימי חוזת השלוש) כשהמצרים רצו בכוררות כבר אט לפני שהצדדים חלמו על טאבה. הצענו זאת איפוא גם בענין טאבה לא מחולטת ה"קייסי" שלנו כפי שהיו שניסו לאמר; ה"קייסי" חזק ורצוף ראיות טובות. לכן תנוהה התעקשות מצרים שלא לקבל אפילו את נוסחת פישור/בוררות שהיתה נוסחה אמריקנית ושהמצרים משיגים בה לבסוף את מבוקסם לפי הצורך. אמר שיש מחויבות פומבית של הממשל המצרי לכוררות. אמרתי כי לכל מטבע יש שני צדדים, ואין לצפות מישראל להסכים מפני שהצד האחר רוצה "דווקא". פשרה הולמת צריכה להטביע רצון שני הצדדים. הוטפתי שהנושא ודאי יעלה כפגישת מסרה ושה"אבניו" - יזרק, אך איני יודע אם ידובר על פישור או על נוסחת פישור/כוררות. אישר שתאמריקנים מחפשים גם דרכים אחרות שאיכנ דווקא הליך.

רובינסטיין

ס ו ט ו

דף.....מחור.....דפים
סווג בסחונני סטור
דחיפות.....רגיל
תאריך וז"ח 1949 !!! ספט' 86
מסי מברק.....

אל:
המשרד

269

אל :- מצפ"א ממ"ד

משיחה עם דנפורד (מצרים NEA)

1. החלפת עלי בלוטפי משיקולים כלכליים גרידא. המיזע המועט משגרירותם בקהיר וממקורות אחרים אינו מצביע על מניעים פוליטיים או פגם ביחסים בצמרת. האמריקאים מפרטים את הפתשגד'הכתב שדרי' לוטפי קיבל ממובארק בהנחיות בתחום הביצוע ולא כעיצוב מדיניות כלכלית חדשה. בהתאם לכך דנפורד גם אינו צופה צעדים רדיקלים בתחום הסובסידיות. סיפר שמובארק שבילה בתקופת הקיץ באלכסנדריה הודאג מהמתיחות הפנימית שם, כנראה על רקע כלכלי ומאופן חיפודו של המושל שם. גם בפורט סעיד אובחנה רגישות בעקבות צמצום בהקלות על יבוא סחורות. רה"מ החדש הונחה לפעול להשקטת (ASSUAGE) המצב.

2. דנפורד נוקב ב-3 משימות לאומיות עפ"י סדר העדיפויות : (א) המצב הכלכלי (מעור שיש לכך כמובן השפעה על המצב הפנימי במובן הרחב יותר) (ב) הנושא האזורי-לוב וסודאן. (ג) התחום המדיני שהאספקט הממשי שלו הוא היחסים הבילטרליים עם ישראל. הדאגה מהמצב בסודאן, כשיקוף הנושא האזורי והקנה במקצה ופינתה מקומה לתחום הבילטרלי הישיר עם לוב, בעקבות החזרת פועלים מצריים מטריפולי. מסתבר שנסיונות מצריים למצוא נתיבים למוודים בדרום קרי לאנשי גאונג העלה חרס. בינתיים גם מסתבר שחזרת הפועלים מלוב (אין מספרים) קורה בעה ובעונה אחת עם שובם של פועלים מאיזור המפרץ בעקבות הקיצוצים בתכניות פיתוח. פרוש הדבר ירידה בהכנסת מטיח. לכך יש כמובן להוסיף מצב שוק הנפט.

3. דנפורד לא צופה התפתחויות משמעותיות בתחום היחסים הבילטרליים עם ישראל. הליכתו של עלי נתפסת כאן אמנם בצער ולכך יש גם היבט אמריקאי שכן הוא היה איש עבודה נוח" לאמריקאים כפי דנפורד מגדירו, אך לא תהיה השפעה ממשיכה מדיניותו של מובארק כלפי ישראל. דנפורד צופה המשך הקו הנוכחי של הפשרה מטויימת בתחומי היירות ומסחר. מנגד נראה לו שחלה התפתחות אצל מובארק באשר ליחסים מצרים עם הזירה הערבית. התקוה לחידוש היחסים עם ירדן ימצא המשך טפחה על פניה. דנפורד רואה בביקור ערפאת בקהיר (טרם קיבלו דיווחים על כך) בעיקר מאמץ מצידו להרחיב את מסגרות אש"פ במצרים. מארחיו, עפ"י דנפורד, לא הראו נכונות גדולה ללכת לקראתו וגם מסתבר לא עשו חגיגה גדולה מהארוע כפי שאולי ניתן היה לצפות. אבידן

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the word "אבידן" and various scribbles and numbers.

אברהם

אגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

ס ר ק ס
דף... מתוך... דפים
סוג בטחוני... בלתי...
דחיות... מי...
תאריך וזיח... 11.11.11. ספטמבר 85
מס' הבר...

268 - א
164 - א

אלו

המסרד

אל: מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א
דע: לשכת רה"מ, לשכת ממרה"מ ושה"ח, לשכת משהב"ט

נמסר לנו היום כי הגבי *Grace Smoot* אמה של סאלי לואיס
נפטרה לעולמה הבוקר בגיל 38, לאחר התקף לב, לידיעה. מוצע גם כי יפורסמו מודעות
של השתתפות בצער *בצער צמח*.


רובינשטיין

א 3 א 1 א 3 א 3 א 2
1 1 3 3 2

סגירות ישראל

דף...מאמר...דפי

סוג בסחובני

דחיות

מאריך וז"ח

מס' סגירות

אלו
76 146 250

Private Drive Set To Cut Israel's Dependence On US Aid

WASH. POST-Claiborne-A group of 45 leading industrialists from the US and a dozen other countries began meeting in Jerusalem to launch an ambitious private campaign to help Israel wipe out its chronic trade deficit and reduce its dependence on US aid. Called "Operation Independence," the investment effort is geared at "harnessing the energies of the Jewish community in the world" to boost Israeli exports of consumer goods by \$500 million and increase tourism revenue by another \$500 million in the next three to five years. The group's chairman is Detroit industrialist Max Fisher.

Reagan Expected To Cut 40 F-15s In Saudi Sale

BOSTON GLOBE-(Wire from Post)-The Reagan administration is expected to drop plans to include 40 more F-15 combat aircraft in the arms-sale package for Saudi Arabia that Congress will soon consider. Such a denial would mark the first time Wash. has spurned King Fahd on a major weapons item. Saudi sources said the administration subsequently had informed them of a delay because of the Middle East arms review begun in January but assured them that the aircraft would be supplied eventually.

Planned Speech By Farrakhan Proves Divisive In Los Angeles: Black and Jewish Leaders Disagree On Response

WASH. POST-Mathews-Farrakhan after causing controversy with bitterly anti-Semitic remarks at a July rally in Wash., has deeply divided black and Jewish leaders with his plans for a major speech Saturday in Los Angeles. After several meetings described as friendly but emotional, including some with Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, Jewish leaders say they have failed to persuade black leaders to join them in denouncing Farrakhan before his appearance at what they expect to be a full house of 18,000 at The Forum.

Barbie Trial Delayed

WASH. POST-Dobbs-French magistrates delayed the trial of Klaus Barbie, by ordering further pretrial hearings to examine new evidence. Lawyers said that the trial is now unlikely to begin before the start of next year at the earliest.

TELEVISION: NIGHTLY NEWS

The major networks focused their main stories on the investigation of drug use with baseball violence in the British city of Birmingham, a special on Afghanistan, and the sanctions on South Africa.

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| תחילת: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | דף: 1 |
| טל. כספוני: | טופס מברק | מס' 2 |
| ת"ח: 10100 | הסברה, ספ"ח, לש' סמב"ל, יועץ רו"ם לחקורות, ספ"א. סמב"ל אס"ח"ק, לע"ס. | א ל : |
| נר : 48 011 0220 | רושיונסון. | ר ע : |
| | | דמ : |

News Summary September 10, 1985

Press Reports

Arab Youths Wounded By Israeli Soldiers

NYT-Freidman-Israeli soldiers shot and wounded 3 Arab youths in Hebron after they started to run away from an army patrol approaching to check their ID, the Israeli Army spokesman announced. A 12 year old Arab boy who was standing nearby, was also accidentally wounded by the gunfire. The shooting is the latest in a series of violent confrontations between Arabs and Israelis in the West Bank. Some Israeli columnists have begun to talk about the "civil war" in the territories. A two hour curfew was imposed on Ramallah after an Israeli bus was pelted with stones and rocks. A bookstore in East Jerusalem was closed after military authorities said the store as a front for a PLO information office. Jewish settlers attacked a home in the West Bank with smoke bombs, according to Yediot Ahronot. In Jerusalem, a gasoline bomb was thrown at a bus stop. The West Bank has been reinforced with crack soldiers. A new law will be introduced into Parliament that makes it a crime for any Israeli citizen to have contact with the PLO. Both main parties support the law.

Israel to Release Last Detainees

NYT-special-Israel said that the last of the 1,200 prisoners seized in southern Lebanon are to be freed today. (see ND-combine)

Leader of Christian Militia Goes to Damascus

NYT-Hijazi-Elie Hobeika is the first Christian militia activist to visit Damascus. His visit appeared to underline a shift in policy by the militia, the Lebanese Forces. Until last March, the Lebanese Forces has been aligned with Israel. But Hobeika, age 28, chose a Syrian and Arab role in ending the 17 year old civil war.

Reagan to Press Moscow on Jews

NYT-Tolchin-Reagan told a Jewish delegation that he planned to raise the issue of the plight of Soviet Jews with Gorbachev.

תאריך:

מס' תעודת:

מס' דף:

10312 10/10/85 10312 10312

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|--------------|---------------------|-----|
| דמי פוסט: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | 2 |
| סוג כסחונני: | טופס חזק | 2 |
| חז"ח: | | א ל |
| נר: | | ב י |
| 220 / 48 | | ג ח |

New Stamp to Honor First Head of Yeshiva U.

NYT-Nix-The US Postal System will issue a new stamp bearing the likeness of Dr. Bernard Revel, the first president of Yeshiva U. Yeshiva University will begin celebrating its 100th year anniversary.

Paid Ads

NYT-The Israel Cancer Research Fund announces "A Promise of Hope from the Promise Land" and asks for contributions.

DN-Full page ad placed by the Board of Jewish Education. Headline reads "An Endangered Species: The American Jewish Family."

ITONUT

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| מס' חשבונית: | 10.9.85 | תאריך: |
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MINISTER OF FINANCE
HAKIBYA, JERUSALEM



שר האוצר
הקצין הראשי

10th September, 1985

Mr. G. Bush
Vice President
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Vice President,

It was a pleasure and indeed a great honor to see you again, and to have an opportunity to discuss with you issues relating to both our countries. Your continued support for the State of Israel is very encouraging, and will be, I am sure, most rewarding.

I wish you, Mr. Vice President lots of success and personal satisfaction in your most elevated position.

Yours sincerely,


Yitzhak Moday

cc: Mr. S. Peres, Prime Minister

5247

2

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 1 מתוך 2
עמ' 9 מתוך 10 סודי ביותר

מל: המשרד, נר: 231, ט: 118
דח: ט: סג: ט, תא: 100985, רח: 1830

סודי ביותר למיד

מל: מסוככי, מנהל מצפא-תפוצה מצומצמת.
חבר.

שיחה עם פט ביוכנאן בבית הלון

נפגשתי בירמתי לשיחה עם ביוכנאן כדי לתדבקו בדבר
עמדותינו בנושאים שעל הפרק ולשמוע דעתו לכרכוד נפגשו עם
מנהיגים יהודים כאן בשבוע החולף ז, וכן להתרשם מאישותיו
כמי יצג החלק הפוליטי היואידאולוגי בממשל, לקראת המפגשים
בדרך המדיני עם דיגן / בקרוז.
בפני שדיווחתי בנפרד, התרשמתי כי הוא מודע למגמת האמה בנושא
שליחות מרפי אך סבור שילכו לקראת חוסין בנושא הנשק, אף שיש
בממשל התנהים על כך (אגב, בשלב מסוים התרשמתי כך בנידוד, אחר
כך ניסח עצמו בהירות מופלגת).

האמה החומכים בעיסקות הנשק סבורים כי יש לרכז לקראת חוסין את
המיל הנוסף השני והשלישי, אחרת לא תהא התקדמות ומגלים
אופטימיות באשר לסיכויים עם חוסין. אמרתי כי כל חלקי הממשלה
מעוניינים במוסי עם חוסין, אך השאלה היא הניתן להשיג מוסי
שייר ולא תחליפים מסוככים העלולים להביא לידי קודי האמריקני
עם אשיף. התעניין מאוד בנושא זה, ואסד כי שמע על חששות להכדה
י'דה פקטוי על דרך ישיבה לשולחן מוסי אשיף, עם זאת הערתי
כנבדי שלא ליצור מצבו תחושה שאנו מתלוננים אצל האישים
הפוליטיים בבית הלון כנגד אחרים, כי אנו דואים במזכיר
המדינה איש מהימן וידיד.

הדרכתיו על שיחות עם ועל גישתנו התיובית הבסיסית בנושא

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

1

5246

דף 1 מחוך 2

עמק 9 מחוך 30 סודי ביותר

אלי: המשרד, נד: 230, מ: ווש
דח: מ, סג: מ, מא: 100985, רח: 1730

סודי ביותר/מיד

אלי: מנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל מנהל מצפא - למכונתים ולבד
חבר

התהליך המדיני

1. משיחה באיצי עם צירלי היל היום:

א. מסר כי הוחלט שלא לעשות עתה דבר בטנין עליחות סרפי, לאחר
שבנראה הגיעו למסקנה כי אין משמעות וברכה ברעיונות שהועלו.
פיקרינג עמד למסור על כך לרוה'ים בארץ, וכנראה מסרו או
סוסדים גם לחוסין.

ב. באטר לנשק, ככל הנראה יגישו לקונגרס תחושתו היא שהחישוב
הוא כי גם אם לא יצליח הממשל להטביר את הדברים בקונגרס, מכל
סקום יהיה הדבר נבחינה נסיון למלו' המובטח ע"י הנשיא לחוסין
כמובן - כפי שהעיר - החישובים הללו צריכים להיעשות לא ע"י
מחסי' אלא ע"י הבית הלבן ויועציו הפוליטיים של הנשיא.

ג. כשלטמ' אוסיף כי חשבון רווח והפסד של תבוסה קונגרסיונלית
הוא אלמנט ספתח בהחלטות יועצי הנשיא, המופקדים גם על החשבון
הבללי של רווח והפסד של הממשל בקונגרס ועל יוקדת הנשיא.

ד. בהקשר זה אוכיר, כי נועדתי היום עם פט ביוכנאן יועץ
הנשיא, בשיחה להמרווח בנפרד עלה גם נושא התהליך המדיני
ומכירות הנשק, היא נתקיימה לפני האיחה עם היל, אך התרשמתי גם

ממנו - בלשון רמוים - שנושא התהליך המדיני (מרפי) הוא,
ולעומת זאת עניין הנשק על הפרק, זאת, כיוון שדברים בממשל נלא
ז"ה טעמו עמם (הן בבית הלבן והן במחסי' סנודים כי חוסין
הלך בצרת דרך ויש לעודדו וכמובן ישנה גם מחויבות של הנשיא

מאחרים תוהים, תדרכתיו לגבי עמדותינו.
שה, שאר הנושאים - בנפרד, ודאי תביאו גם לידיעה רה'ים, מס'
דה'ים ושה'ים ושה'ים.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מחוך 6 דף 1
מחוך 12 עותק 8

5244

ננס

מס' 100985

סודי ביותר

מאל: המשרד, נד: 217, מ: 11ט

דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 100985, רח: 1545

סודי ביותר/מיד

סמנכל,

דע: לשכת דוהמ'

לנסענים בלבד

שיחת השר מודעי עם שר האוצר בייקר.

בהמשך לשלנו 178

במצורף תקציר השיחה כפי שנרשמה ע"י אודי פולנסקי

תקציר פגישה השר מודעי עם שר האוצר האמריקאי משרד האוצר

האמריקאי . 5.9.85

השתתפו מהצד האמריקאי: שר האוצר בייקר, עוזר השר מלפורד, סגן

עוזר השר קונרו ודה-פלכו

השתתפו מהצד הישראלי: השר מודעי, השגריר רוזן, דן הלפרין ואודי

פולנסקי

בייקר: סברך על הצעדים הבלכליים השחלטתם לעשות ומאמין שהם

בכיוון הנכון . מקווים שתצליחו

מודעי: מה שמשוב כרגע זה הביצוע . סקירה קצרה על הצעדים האלה:

מה שעשינו היה בהתאם לשיחותינו עמכם . היה קשה לביצוע

בהתחלה וזה תכנית מקיפה ומשתלבת בסכלול הכלכלה הישראלית .

אלה הצעדים העיקריים :

קיצוץ עמוק בתקציב ב- 6 ובסך הכל

פיחות במטבע של כ-25 אחוז .

Handwritten notes in blue ink, including a large diagonal line and illegible scribbles.

מושרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מחוך 6 2 דף
סודי ביותר 12 מחוך 8 עותק 8

הקפאה זמנית של מחירי סחורות ושירותים
עיקור ההצמדה לשכר והסכס על העתיד.

הגבלת האשראי

קיצוץ נוסף בסובסידיות לסחורות ולשירותים
צעדים נוספים בתחום רזרבות מט"ח

בנוסף לכך הפעלנו את חוק עצמאות בנק ישראל שיבוצע בשלושה
שלבים, כאשר בכל שלב נוריד שליש מסך ההלוואות שהממשלה תוכל
לקחת מהבנק.

בייקר: האם בוצע עוד משהו בקשר לבנק
מודעי: לא, אך יש לבנק סמכות להחליט על צעדים מוניטריים ללא
צורך להתייעץ עם הממשלה.

הלפרין: באופן מסודתי קשה לטפר את הנגיד. מה שנעשה זה להגביר
את עצמאותו.

מודעי: צעדים אלה נעשו באמצעות חוקי חרום ע"י הממשלה, ללא
צורך בהתערבות הכנסת. יש הסכמה שננסה לעשות כל זאת בהמשך ע"י
החיקה והסכמים. יש הסכס עבודה שמוריד את רמת ההצמדה של
השכר. מחירי מקסימום לסחורות ושירותים עם היצרנים וכו'. קיצו
ץ בסובסידיות עפ"י הסכמה עם ההסתדרות. פיקוח מחירים...

בייקר: איך אתם מתכוונים לנהוג לגבי פיקוח המחירים?
מודעי: אנו רוצים בקרוב להסיר זאת.

לצינו לצמצם גם את כוח האדם בשירות הציבורי, שהוא מוגזם לכל
הדעות. נעשה זאת בשלבים. בשלב הראשון נצמצם 10,000 עובדים
-לא הרבה, כ-4 אחוז. לא השתמשנו לצורך זה בחוקי חרום. רוצים
לעשות זאת תוך זמן קצר ובאמצעות מו"ם. עד עכשיו צמצמנו 3,000
עובדים, זוהי בעיה קשה, במיוחד לאור העובדה שאינם יכולים
למצוא בקלות עבודות אחרות.
המטרות העיקריות:

1) להוריד אינפלציה מ-15-25 אחוז בחודש ל-2-3 אחוז בחודש.
הסיכויים לכך נראים טובים.

2) לעצור דלדול דורבנות

כמה דברים שקרו היו תוצאה של המדיניות שהולט עליה ושל הפסיכולוגיה הציבורית שנוצרה עקב כך: אנשים רהירים יותר לגבי עמירת מקום העבודה ולגבי בזבוז כספים. לא הדפסנו כספים בתודעים האחרונים אלא אף ספגנו כספים. הדורבנות עלו במקצת - פעם ראשונה מזה הרבה זמן. קיצצנו באשראי והורדנו במקביל ריבית וזאת דרך האשראי המבוקר (כגון לשיכון וכד'). רוב הצעדים הושלמו.

בניקר: בתחום העבודה אתם רציתם 6 אחוז ומבצעים עכשיו רק 4 אחוז? מודעי: כן, אבל עדיין נלחמים על זה. זה קשה. בניקר: האיגודים הם בעיה.

הלפרין: ההסתדרות ביטאל חזקה מאוד, מקיפה 16 אחוז מסך העובדים בעוד בארה"ב רק 10 אחוז.

מודעי: ההסתדרות גם שולטת על כשליש מהכלכלה - בעלת מפעלים וכו'. יש בזה הרבה פוליטיקה. נושא עדין. ההסתדרות בשליטת העבודה וכך גם חלק גדול מהמשלה. לפעמים זה טוב ולפעמים לא. עוד עכשיו אין לי טענות, אך זוהי רק ההתחלה.

הלפרין: לגבי המדיניות הכלכלית רוצה להוסיף:

1) ביטלנו סובסידיות ליצוא, כפי שגם התחייב בהקשר להסכם אס"ח ואף הקדמנו מעבר להתחייבות.

2) מתכוונים לבנות מחדש את השווקים הפיננסיים, לאור העובדה שניקה פחות כסף מנוק ישראל. זהו תהליך ארוך מוח אך בעל משמעות. מודעי: זה נעשה בשלבים.

דבר נוסף - חסכוניות נרילים. לפי חוק, חשבונות יחסבו כחסכוניות ויהנו מריבית רק לגבי סכומים שנמצאים שם מעל לשנה. אם יוציאו את הכסף לפני שנה יטלמו קנס. לגבי חשבונות פתימי אין אפשרות לפתוח חשבונות חדשים.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 4 מתוך 6

עו"ת 8 מתוך 12 סודי ביותר

בייקר: האם הגרעון שלכם הוא 21 אחוזים מהתליג?

מודעי: חס וחלילה. היה 17 אחוז ומנסים להוריד זאת ל-10 אחוז.

הלפרין: אנו מסתכלים על הגרעון הפנימי.

בייקר: האם יש לכם מחשבות לגבי רפורמה במסים?

מודעי: בהחלט ואנו נותנים לציבור להבין זאת. העמקנו את

הגביה. בחודשים האחרונים גבינו 40 אחוז במונחים דאליים מאשר בתקופות מקבילות.

הצעד הבא: הורדת המסים הישירים בין 1/4 ל-1/5, ביטוח

אלאומי-מהווה 30 אחוז מהכנסה הגולמית. מנסים להוריד זאת אבל

זה יקח זמן בגלל שמשוגן אבחוק.

הלפרין: מנסים לגשר על הפער בין כמה שהעובד מקבל ובין כמה

שזה עולה למעביד.

בייקר: אתם רואים את שולץ מחר?

הלפרין: כן

מודעי: 2 צעדים נוספים:

1) מסים - עיצוב מחדש

2) פיקוח על דורבות מטיח- לבן רצינו את הסיוע הנוסף. יתחיל

בשנה הקלנדרית החזשה.

לגבי מחירי מקסימום: אחרי החגים נתחיל לשחרר מפיקוח מוצרים

שונים ונראה איך התגובה.

אילה שלבים מוקדמים ומוקדם לשפוט הצעדים התקבלו טוב עיי

הציבור. לא היו הפגנות אחרי קיצוץ הסובסידיות במזון, תחבורה

ואנרגיה (אין שום סכסוך עם כרגע). סובסידיות שנשארו להם

למטרות מדיניות חקלאית.

נמחליפים דעות על שימוש בסובסידיות למטרות מדיניות חקלאית

וההבדלים בין שתי המדינות בהקשר זה.

בייקר: יש לכם עוד דברים להעלות?

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 5 מתוך 6

עיתק 8 מתוך 12 סודי ביותר

הלפרין : בונדס

בייקר : 7872

הלפרין : דואים שאתה מכיר את העניין . נפגשתי עם פרלמן

וודברתי איתו על זה. עורכי הדין שלנו נפגשו עם קימס. מבקשים

שאת עורתך בביה"נ' לגבי יו"ר ועדת WAYS AND MEANS

בייקר: מילה איתו סוף שבוע על רפורמה במס.

הלפרין: מה שצריך זה פטור שלא יציין את ישראל בפירוש

בייקר: אנו מבינים וננסה לעשות זאת - אם אפשר

אנו רוצים את עזרתכם בעניין יוזמת אינויה. יהיה קשה לנו

לשתתף בזה. החקלאים באים אלינו לגבי סכום של 80 מיליארד

דולר. אם תהיה הצעה כזאת שבה נראה אירושהי תמיכה תעודר בעיות

בייקר: בחקלאות. לא נראה לנו שנוכל להרשות זאת לעצמנו. אם

תוכלו לא לדחוף - יעזור לנו.

מלפורד: קטור גם ליסוע למדינות אחרות.

הלפרין: בבנות, לא הצטנו זאת ואף היו לנו השגות. לא יכולים

להגיד לאינויה לא לעזור לנו. יכולים להגיד לו שזה יהיה על

בסיס שנה אחת לנסיון (שזוה ערך ל-500 מ' דולר). יודע שיצור

בעיות אבל לפחות אינויה מאוד מחוייב לזה.

בייקר: התקדים קשה. הרבה מדינות יעמדו בתור לדבר דומה. לא רק

הם יבואו (בלי לובי בשלכם) אלא גם האוכלוסייה שלנו תמחה.

רוון: זהו אמנם תקדים - אך ישראל במצב מיוחד. 73 שנים של

מלחמה. הוצאות בשחון ועליה.

בייקר: גם כל תקלתי במצב מיוחד. אני מודאג מאוד מזה. החקלאים

לא יבינו זאת לאור מצבם.

רוון: השר היה צנוע בתארו את הצעדים. זהו קיצוץ בעצמות ולא

רק בשומן. התחייבנו כשבקשנו סיוע נוסף לא לבקש הגדלה בסיוע

הרגיל וזה יכול להיות פתרון טוב.

בייקר: לא בשבילנו. כל החקלאות תהיה פה עם 80-85 מיליארד

דולר. אנו נעזור לכם בבונדס.

מברך על הצעדים הקשים שעשיתם. בגוואטמלה היו הפגנות באשר

נעשו צעדים ממתנים ושמה שאצלכם הציבור מקבל זאת. כשתשלים

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible. It appears to be a multi-paragraph document, possibly a report or memorandum, with several lines of text per paragraph. The text is mirrored across the page, suggesting it may be bleed-through from the reverse side.]

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[The right margin contains faint, vertical text that is mostly illegible. It appears to be a list or index of items, possibly page numbers or document identifiers, running down the right side of the page.]

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מחוך 6 6 96

סודי ביותר מחוך 12 עותק 8

תהיה גיבור

מודעי: לא יכולים להרשות לעצמנו להבשל. האנשים מוכנים לקבל
זאת - לא תמיד המנהיגים מוכנים לזה. לא הולך חלק, אבל ממשיכים

בניקד: אלפונסין מארגנטינה נראה שמצליח בצעדים שעושה
קונראו: נראה שהשבתות שהיו שם דק חיוקו אותו כי לא היו
מקיפות כמו שהאיגודים ציפו ונחשבו כנשלון - דבר שחיוק אותו.
מודעי: רוצה להדגיש שצריכים להצמד לפדטים בכדי שהציבור לא
יאבד אימון בתכנית.

כסוף הפגישה

רשם: אודי פולונסקי.

ס.רוזן

תפ: שהח, דהמ, מנכל, ממנכל



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|----------|--|--------------------|------------|
| מ"א 2 | סגירות ישראל - פרטוריה טופס מבוא לפקטימיליה | 37 ילמים ובנקות | F-10 |
| מ"ב | גורן דסאק (אמרת) (ג' באגיו (א)) | | |
| מ"ג | ג'ג'ג' | | |
| מ"ד | פיאמא | | |
| מ"ה | סימן חתום | מספר לשל | כחומר לשלך |

אין בצבא לגב ציאת - אהב

העם כיבן פוה יאמאו ונאילו סלק צאר
באלא.. סאקטינאג' בלן ציאת. שאמין אפלו
בלאגן האקטיביז"

חסר ה, צוא אמטיג אבאג האלוט
אמט מ האמטיג, הצבא אבאלא-אמט אבאלא
האבאלא-אבאלא (האקטיביז)

ממ ה, צוא סקאלאג אבאלא
ממ ה, אהן האבאלא-אבאלא אבאלא
אבאלא פמט האבאלאג אבאלא-אבאלא מ
מ, האבאלאג

אבאלאג אבאלא-אבאלא אבאלא-אבאלא
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official text

DATE: 09/10/85

U.S. OFFICIAL SUGGESTS POSITIVE STEPS FOR SOVIETS IN MIDEAST
(Text; Armacost speech at World Jewry conference) (3,300)

Washington -- A top U.S. State Department official pinpointed the Middle East as an area of tension that directly affects the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Michael H. Armacost, the under secretary of state for political affairs, said in a Washington speech that finding ways to reduce U.S.-Soviet tensions "in regional issues could have enormous benefit for us both." But, he added, Moscow wants a bigger role in the Mideast peace process, "yet has offered nothing but procedural suggestions."

He suggested that one of the steps the Soviet Union could take "would be to lessen its unremittingly hostile propaganda against Israel." Further, he said, it should call upon its friends in the Palestine Liberation Organization "to forswear violence."

Addressing the conference of the International Council of the World Conference of Soviet Jewry, which met in Washington September 8 and 9, Armacost said that "in recent years, as you know better than most, the Soviet human rights situation has deteriorated very sharply."

He cited some examples:

-- Jewish emigration, which peaked in 1979 at over 51,000, fell last year to below 900. A similar fate befell Germans and Armenians living in the Soviet Union and seeking to leave.

-- Soviet leaders sanctioned renewed manifestations of anti-Semitism.

-- Soviet newspapers and television have branded Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists as Zionist subversives.

-- In addition to Jews, Ukrainian Uniates, Lithuanian Roman Catholics, and unregistered Baptists and Pentecostals have come in for severe repression.

On the hopeful side, Armacost told the group that if the new Soviet leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev acts to improve the Soviet human rights situation, "important confidence on other issues can be generated."

Armacost assured the audience that "we have made human rights a very prominent part of our dialogue with Soviet leaders."

He said that the U.S. interest in the Soviet human rights situation is rooted in American culture; "Freedom is fundamental in our society. Americans have always attempted to hold the torch of freedom alive not merely for ourselves but for others around the world."

Armacost's words underscored an announcement by Morris Abram, chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, that President Reagan had assured a group of Jewish leaders September 9, that he would discuss the plight of Soviet Jews during his meeting with Gorbachev.

Following is the text of Armacost's remarks, as delivered:
(Begin text)

It is a great honor to be your speaker this evening. I bring you greetings from Secretary of State George Shultz who, along with



all Americans, shares your deep concern about the plight of Soviet Jewry. I would like to address my remarks this evening to the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, and the impact this has on U.S.-Soviet relations.

First, a comment about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. The world is awash, as you very well know, with commentary on the subject of preparations for the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. The question that leaders on both sides must address is whether the basis for a more durable U.S.-Soviet rapprochement can be established. A distinguished Harvard historian, Adam Ulam, has recently commented that "what concretely upsets ... Americans about the USSR is what the Kremlin does, and what must be a continuing source of apprehension to the Soviets springs from what America is."

American hopes for detente in the 1970s foundered on Soviet efforts to achieve geopolitical advantage in places as far reaching as Indochina, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. Their efforts to back anti-American forces in Central America and the Caribbean, to quash the efforts at liberalization in Poland, and the attempt to build military forces far beyond any reasonable requirement for defense.

If there is to be real improvement in this relationship, these underlying difficulties must be addressed. For our part, we are determined to make such an effort. The task is a great one.

-- We feel a basis must be found for resolving through political means such regional issues as Afghanistan.

-- In coping with problems of the arms race, the propagandistic offers of moratoria on this or that are not the answer. The test is whether we can achieve major, stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear arms now, while examining whether in the future deterrence, or a deterrent system, can be established which relies more heavily upon defense than upon cataclysmic threats of mutual annihilation.

-- In our bilateral relations the range of mutually beneficial contacts and exchanges must be expanded.

At the same time, there is the burden on our relations imposed by the way Soviet authorities treat their own people. We raise human rights questions with our Soviet counterparts not because we are interested in scoring debating points, nor to achieve political advantage, but because of the kind of people we are. Freedom is fundamental in our society. Americans have always attempted to hold the torch of freedom alive not merely for ourselves but for others around the world. It is to this subject that I would like to turn.

In recent years, as you know better than most, the Soviet human rights situation has deteriorated very sharply. In 1980, Andrey Sakharov was exiled from Moscow and placed under house arrest, Jewish emigration was cut in half, and the KGB began moving even more freely against dissident activists.

The KGB, under then Chairman Yuri Andropov, refined existing techniques of repression and developed more sophisticated but no less harsh measures:

-- Many prominent dissidents were allowed or forced to emigrate.

-- Others were arrested on criminal charges or confined in psychiatric hospitals.

-- Induction of would-be Jewish emigrants into the military enabled authorities cynically to claim reasons of "state security" to deny them permission to leave the Soviet Union.

-- The criminal code was revised to make repression of dissidents

less cumbersome, but more brazen.

-- Intimidation of journalists, particularly from the West, was stepped up, to stop their reporting about the dissidents.

Why was this repression intensified? We believe that both internal and external causes were at play. At home Moscow faced serious problems -- an inefficient economy, there was social malaise, there were troubles in the empire from Poland to Afghanistan, and there was uncertainty in the leadership. Abroad, the Soviet regime faced more steadfast resistance by the West and in the Third World following its invasion of Afghanistan and its crackdown in Poland.

One way Soviet authorities reacted to these problems was to intensify the control and repression at home, and to cut back contacts between their citizens and the outside world. Arrests of dissidents increased. All forms of emigration were reduced dramatically. Jewish emigration -- which peaked in 1979 at over 51,000 -- fell last year to below 900. A similar fate befell Germans and Armenians living in the Soviet Union and seeking to leave.

Soviet leaders sanctioned renewed manifestations of Anti-Semitism. In cutting off the safety valve of Jewish emigration, Soviet authorities may have brought upon themselves a new upsurge of religious and national consciousness in one of the Soviet Union's most assimilated minority communities.

They embarked upon a campaign of arresting and convicting teachers of the Hebrew language and others in the forefront of this new awareness and identity. Since little more than a year ago, at least 16 Jewish cultural activists, including nine Hebrew teachers, have been arrested; 13 have been convicted, several on crudely trumped-up criminal charges. Many Jews have also been fired from their jobs or had their apartments searched, phones disconnected, mail seized.

Soviet newspapers and television have branded Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists as "Zionist" subversives. Zionism has been equated with Nazism. World War II Jewish leaders have been accused of helping the Nazis round up Jews for the death camps.

A notorious episode in this campaign was the recent stage-managed television recantation of convicted Moscow Hebrew teacher Dan Shapiro.

Shapiro was given a suspended sentence after agreeing to condemn publicly the movement with which he had become so closely associated. Reportedly, he did so after threats to charge him with treason and to sentence him to death. The choice that Dan Shapiro faced was an extreme form of the dilemma which is faced today by Soviet Jews. How does one survive in an environment in which the authorities are not constrained by the rule of law?

Unofficial religious activity is currently the most vigorous form of dissent in the Soviet Union, but it has been hit hard across the board. In addition to Jews, Ukrainian Uniates, Lithuanian Roman Catholics, and unregistered Baptists and Pentecostals have come in for severe repression.

Nor has there been progress on the cases of major human rights figures, such as Andrey Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, and Yuriy Orlov. Dr. Sakharov, in forced and isolated exile in the closed city of Gor'kiy, was apparently abducted from his apartment last spring after beginning another hunger strike, this time to resurface in a cynical and yet sadly poignant KGB film which showed him eating in a hospital bedroom. What his true condition is today we simply cannot say. Just last week Vasyl Stus, a leading member of the

Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group, died tragically in a Soviet labor camp.

We look for signs of progress on human rights, but the evidence is not encouraging. Monthly emigration figures this year have been up slightly one month, down slightly the next -- to be sure, all at a very low level. Whether these fluctuations represent anomalies or a deliberate tease by Soviet authorities is unclear.

In a slightly more positive vein, one of our long-time dual national cases was resolved this last spring, and three longstanding cases involving the spouses of American citizens have also been resolved. While we welcome these gestures -- however calculated or isolated they may be -- many, many more cases remain unresolved. Meanwhile, the arrests of Hebrew teachers, of religious believers, of human rights activists persist.

Why do we attach such importance to Soviet human rights performance? First, human rights abuses have major impact on American perceptions of the Soviet Union. When Americans hear that Soviet authorities have abducted an Andrey Sakharov from his home, or planted drugs on Hebrew teachers, or treated their own citizens as captives in their own country, they wonder about the possibilities for constructive relations between our two governments. In this way, Soviet human rights abuses influence U.S. public opinion and they circumscribe the flexibility of any U.S. administration to deal with the Soviet Union on a pragmatic basis.

Soviet leaders allege that expressions of our concern amount to interference in their internal affairs. They claim that human rights issues are not legitimate topics for dialogue between governments. Yet, the Soviet Union assumed solemn international obligations, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, to respect specific human rights of their own citizens and to foster contacts with the citizens of other countries. Violations of these obligations cannot but affect perceptions of Soviet willingness to abide by their accords, and to erode political confidence that is needed to make progress on a variety of other issues.

At meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), such as the recent one in Ottawa among human rights experts, we have pressed vigorously for Soviet compliance with the human rights provisions of the final Helsinki act. We hope progress can be made soon in the Stockholm conference. A unique aspect of the Final Act is its recognition that respect for human rights is essential to development of security and cooperation in Europe. In pursuit of this commitment to balanced progress in the CSCE process, we are sending a distinguished delegation, led by former Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel, to the the Budapest cultural forum this autumn. There, and at the human contacts experts meeting in Bern, we will continue to press these concerns.

While we have not hesitated to speak out in international meetings, we have also consistently raised our concerns about these issues in confidential channels with the Soviet government. We have made human rights a very prominent part of our dialogue with Soviet leaders. We have detailed our specific concerns, including those about Soviet Jewry, and made clear their importance to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We tell Soviet leaders that our relations cannot be put on a long-term, constructive basis without significant gains in this area.

On some occasions, we have presented the Soviets with

representation lists of persons who have been denied permission to leave the Soviet Union. One list names about 20 U.S.-Soviet dual nationals, another about 20 Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens, and still another over 100 Soviet families denied permission to join their loved ones in the United States. Many individuals on these lists are Soviet Jews. We also regularly present a list of over 3,400 Soviet Jewish families who have been refused permission to emigrate to Israel.

It is our hope that Soviet authorities are coming to recognize that human rights will remain central to the U.S.-Soviet agenda. We are not asking the Soviet authorities to do the impossible -- we are asking them to live up to their international obligations, and loosen the screws of repression which have been tightened so cruelly in recent years. We watch the patterns of Soviet Jewish emigration, as you do. We are prepared to respond as improvements occur. On this score we appreciate the counsel of groups like yours and others who are interested in this issue.

We do not expect miracles overnight. But Soviet leaders must surely be confident enough of their own ability to lessen repression and increase emigration without endangering the so-called "leading role of the Communist Party." We repeatedly make the point to Soviet leaders that this could benefit the entire range of our relationship.

Soviet officials have hinted that improvements in human rights, including Jewish emigration, can follow an upward swing in overall relationships. There are those who believe that at times in the past better relations have meant more emigration, and there is some plausible evidence for that. Whether or not this is a causal connection, we reject the notion that improvements in human rights can only come last. The reality is that Soviet abuses of human rights undermine the political confidence needed to improve relations, negotiate arms control agreements, and cooperatively lessen tensions in many regional areas.

Soviet leaders seek to create the impression that they are more serious than our leadership in seeking to improve relations. They suggest that better relations depend upon U.S. and Western political "will," not on changes in their behavior. They are mistaken. Let us look briefly at what we have been attempting to accomplish in that relationship and what it bodes for the future.

We will start with bilateral issues. Last year following the commencement of NATO missile deployments in Europe, the Soviets attempted to freeze our bilateral relations. We sought to engage them in a dialogue. We, after some perseverance, ultimately were able to sign some modest accords on consular affairs and modernization of the Hotline. This year we have seen somewhat more progress, mainly the conclusion of a North Pacific Air Safety Agreement, visits of legislative delegations, congressional leaders who have been there only in the last week, the visit by the secretary of agriculture, some modest increase in commercial exchanges. We look forward to a further expansion of exchanges in these areas, and to making progress in maritime boundary talks, peaceful space cooperation, and perhaps progress in cultural and scientific exchanges.

Finding ways to reduce tensions in regional issues could have some enormous benefit for us both. Over the past year, teams of U.S. and Soviet experts have had talks on several regional issues: on the Middle East, on Southern Africa, on Afghanistan, and we will be holding talks later in this week on East Asia. These talks are not designed certainly for the illusory quest of bilateral arrangement of

a solution to regional problems, but rather to avoid miscalculation. We do not wish to exaggerate the expectations from these talks, but exchanges on these issues surely can be of mutual benefit.

Specific steps are needed, too. For example, the Middle East remains a tense area that affects directly the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union seeks a greater role in the peace process, yet has offered nothing but procedural suggestions. One immediate step it could take would be to lessen its unremittingly hostile propaganda directed against Israel. It should call upon its friends in the PLO to forswear violence.

Afghanistan may be the most pressing regional issue for the new Soviet leadership. Their brutal occupation and continuing repression has spurred resistance, not acquiescence, from the brave Afghan people. Informed Soviets ought to realize by now that the hope of building communism in Afghanistan, even in the long term, is a futile quest. In our view it should be possible to find a solution which protects the legitimate interests of all parties, the right of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing, and the Soviet interest in a secure southern border. Soviet commitment to early troop withdrawals would be a good beginning and could promote progress in the U.N. proximity talks on Afghanistan.

The arms control dialogue was revived earlier this year when the two sides agreed to commence nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva. For our part, we are prepared for concrete progress on arms control, based on an enduring and realistic foundation. The president is fully committed to achieving major, stabilizing reductions in nuclear arsenals. He has given our negotiators instructions to engage in give-and-take with Soviet negotiators in Geneva to achieve that end.

We welcome General Secretary Gorbachev's expressed interest, however reluctantly he formulated that interest, in achieving radical reductions, but we must also explore the potential of strategic defenses to strengthen deterrence. We feel that our research in this field is vital to the long-term prospects for maintaining the peace. Soviet work on strategic defenses has long been greater than our own. The Soviets would gain from engaging with us on how strategic defenses -- should they prove technically feasible -- might play a greater role in the future in maintaining the peace to our mutual benefit.

We would like to believe the Soviet Union wants improved relations with us. For our part, we shall take the steps that can lead to that end. In the months ahead, and at the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva this November, we hope that political confidence can be developed that will lead to concrete progress in all areas -- in arms control, in regional discussion on bilateral issues, and on human rights.

Human rights is an essential part of this process. We are willing to discuss our human rights concerns with the Soviets in an atmosphere that is free of rancor, free of recrimination. If the new leadership shows the foresight and the confidence to improve the human rights situation, important confidence on other issues can be generated. Certainly, our willingness to improve trade and other aspects of our bilateral relationship would be enhanced. For our part, we express the hope that Soviet leaders will take advantage of this opportunity. Certainly, both our peoples, indeed the whole world, will benefit if they do.

(End text)

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 סווג בסחונני אמורג.....
 דחירות.... בתגול לבקו...
 תאריך וזיחממ: 9.10.1985
 מסי מברק 237

אל:

המשרד

אל: מ/מנכ"ל, מנהל מצפ"א
 דע: לשכת מנכ"ל האוצר (עבור הלפרין)

בית הנבחרים: סיוע חוץ (הקצבה)

ממקור במשרדו של המורסק ג'יק קמפי.

1. פאסטל מתנגד להצעת חוק ההקצבה לסיוע חוץ כפי שהוכן ע"י אובי בגלל מספר לא קטן של נקודות פוליטיות שאובי חכניס לטיטה (למשל התבייה הסיוע לאל-סלוודור ולמדינות אחרות).
 פאסטל מצייין שוועדה החוץ ומליאה הביח לא הסכימו לנקודות אלה, ואף עומד על כך שהן שייכות לחחום השיפוט של וועדת ההרשמה (ולא של וועדת ההקצבה).
2. כתוצאה מהסתבכות זו, מזמן אובי אח חת- הוועדה שלו לישיבה שתקיים ביום ה' הקרוב (12 במטרה להכין "החלטת המשק קצרה".
 שתוקפה תהיה ל-45 יום (מה-1/10 ועד ה-15/11)
 ג'יס במהלך כזה שחי בעיות מבחינחנו:
- א. הצעת ה-CR חדר על המשך המימון בגבהים הנוכחיים (Current Levels) - פירוט הדבר לא תחשב בהגדלה בסיוע הצבאי לישראל (400 מיליון דולר) ובהגדלה בחיקון ברטן (3 מיליון דולר).
- ב. הטסק החוק יהיה פרופוקציונלי ל-45 יום בלבד, ^{ג'יק} בחוק ההרשמה מורה כידוע על חלוקה חוקמת של הסיוע לישראל (תוך 30 יום) לשנה התקציבית הבאה בשלמותה.
- ג. ^{ג'יק} עם חברינו ננסה להתגבר על בעיות אלה.
5. ועדת ההקצבות של הסנט טרם התחילה טיפולה בחוק הסיוע.

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מס' מבוק... 235

המשרד

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אל:

אל: מ/מנכ"ל, מצפ"א

דע: לשכת מנכ"ל, לשכת מנכ"ל בטחון נספח צה"ל כאן.

3

סנט: מכירת נשק לסעודייה.

1. בנספד מכתב ששיגרו הסנטורים קרב טון, פקוד, דיקסון וד"אמטו לעמיתיהם בטנט במגמה לגייס את חמיכתם להחלטה של Disapproval נגד כוונת הממשל למכור נשק לסעודייה.
2. היזמה באה מצד הסנטור קרנסטון שעמד מאחורי מכתב שנשלח בינואר ש.ז. לנשיא רייגן על חתימתם של 6 סנטורים, בו גם הביעו התנגדות למכירות נשק לסעודייה.
3. להערכת עוזרו של קרנסטון, הממשל טבור שיהיה קל יותר להשיג הסכמה הטנט למכירה נשק לסעודייה מאשר למכירה לירדן, ולפיכך ברצון קרנסטון ושותפיו לאוחת כבר עכשיו לממשל סגט הסכמה הטנט לעיסקה נשק עם סעודייה לא תושג בקלות והעלה מחיר פוליטי לא קטן.
4. העוזר מניח שמאחורי יבטה הממשל לשכנע את ישראל לא להתנגד נמרצות לעיסקה הנשק עם סעודייה ולהסתפק בהודעות "פורמליות" לפי הנוסחה המקובלת שישראל מתנגדת למכירות לכל מדינה במצב של מלחמה עם ישראל (וזאת במיוחד אם "החבילה" עבור סעודייה לא חלול מטוסים).
5. העוזר מקווה שממשלת ישראל תעמוד חזק ולא תנמיך את פרופיל ההתנגדות למכירות נשק לסעודייה כי על ידי כך אנו עלולים להביך את הסנטורים המוכנים להאבק נגד עיסקה זו ולעזור ליד הממשל המעוניין כמובן להשיג הישג מזדני מבלי להשתמש באשראי פוליטי רב.
6. אמרתי שאעביר לירושלים.

גורל אלמ
למדן.

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סגירות ישראל - רוטינגטון

אל: המשרד

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קאמין
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מצפ"א.

דע: מ/מנכ"ל. לטכת מנכ"ל משרד הבטחון.
נספה צה"ל, כאן.

סנט: מכירת נשק לסעודיה

רצ"ב מכתב חוזר בו הסנטורים קרנסטון, פקוד, דילקטון וזיאטו מבקשים את תמיכת עמיתיהם
בנסט ל"החלטה של DISAPPROVAL " להביע התנגדות לכוונת הממשל למכור נשק
לסעודיה.

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
Clearly, neither of these conditions is even near to being met. The Saudis still maintain a state of war with Israel, refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist, and continue their economic warfare which strangles Israel's fragile financial security through the Arab boycott. These negative Saudi actions force difficult sacrifices by Israelis and Americans alike.


Finally, it is worth noting that the anticipated Administration effort to push another enormous Saudi arms package should be halted because if Congress acquiesces in this unwise initiative, we can anticipate another sale--of fighter aircraft to Jordan--then perhaps still another sale--of 40 more F-15's to the Saudis--this year. So the time is now to prevent a whole new cycle of costly, destabilizing arms sales to the volatile Middle East. Such sales can only fuel the regional arms competition, further eroding the technological edge as well as both the economic and military security of Israel, our only stable, democratic ally in the Middle East.

For these reasons, we would like to have your early support on a draft resolution of disapproval to have ready as a deterrent to such a sale and, if necessary, as a legislative vehicle for barring its execution.

If you wish to co-sponsor such a resolution, please contact us, or have a member of your staff contact Gerry Warburg of Senator Cranston's staff at (x43553) or Steve May of Senator Packwood's staff at (x45244).

Sincerely,


Alan Cranston


Bob Packwood


Alan Dixon


Al D'Amato



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 המשרד

תמוכיל, מצפ"א, מעי"ת, רמי"ח קטי"ח.

Tuesday - Sept. 11 - תדור 1111 מת"ו ליום

Q Do you have any comment on the release -- the Israeli release of the last of the Shiite prisoners from --

MR. KALB: Nothing other than what I have said and has been echoed here in the past -- that Israel has consistently maintained its intention to release the Atlit prisoners -- and we welcome the release of all the remaining prisoners.

Q One more question on the Middle East -- can you confirm reports that the Administration has decided to delay a decision on whether to sell the Saudis and the Jordanians aircraft?

MR. KALB: I cannot comment, Jim, on contents of arms packages until final decisions have been made and the Congress has been notified. Other than that, on that subject that you've just raised, I'm not going to have anything to say.

Q What is Mr. Murphy's testimony all about at the House Foreign Relations?

MR. KALB: I don't have anything for you on that. I'll try to find something.

Q On the prisoners that have been released from Atlit -- there anything that you know fresh on what is happening to the seven Americans still being held in Lebanon?

MR. KALB: No, I don't have anything that would go beyond what has been said here, but as a general observation, let me make a statement that, in fact, on more than one occasion been reiterated from the lecturn, that there is, in our view, no relationship between the release of the Atlit prisoners and the continued detention of American hostages. There has never been any justification for the detention of Americans or other innocent civilians in Lebanon, and they should be released forthwith.

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Q Can I come back for just a second to the notification to Congress? Are you notifying Congress today of any sales, regardless of whether or not they contain aircraft?

MR. KALB: I can't get involved in anything along those lines.

Q Will you let us know when the notification takes place?

MR. KALB: I will keep the request in mind.

Q On that also, is there any time limit by which the Administration should submit to Congress?

MR. KALB: I have nothing to offer you on the question of time limits.

Q Have you received the full text of Mr. Arafat's remarks?

MR. KALB: I'm unaware of it.

Q You said the other day there would be a full text.

MR. KALB: Yes, but I'm unaware that the full text is available. I simply haven't checked.

Q -- said last week that it would go forward -- these requests on the arms shipments shortly. Has there been a change in that timetable?

MR. KALB: I think that when I used the timeframe of shortly, I did not circle any dates on the calendar, and my inclination is to stand with what I did say last week by way of expectations and leave dates uncircled.

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
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מצפ"א

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ארה"ק

אכתוב קיים היום תדרוך לעיתונאים. נכחו רוב הכתבים הישראלים. ממה
 שנמסר לנו לא היה בנסוחיו כל חדש בשאלות המרכזיות שעל הפרק.
 בחשובה לשאלה לגבי נאום ערפאת אתמול לוועידת ה-ADC אמר ארמקוסט כי הוא
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 לגבי נסיעה של חרפי - אין כרגע שום חכניה לגבי נסיעה קרובה של חרפי ולגבי
 נשק לירדן וסעודיה - הנשיא טרם החליט על המועד ועל הפריטים.


 יוסי גל

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מסמך זה הוא תוצאה של תהליך דיגיטלי של מסמכים שהיו שייכים לרשות הממשלתית. המסמך אינו מהווה ראיה או תיעוד של אירועים או מעשים.



official text

DATE: 09/09/85

THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES FOR SOUTH AFRICA (340)

(Points in fair employment code for U.S. companies)

Washington -- In 1977, the Reverend Leon Sullivan, a Philadelphia Baptist minister as well as a General Motors Corporation director, formulated a set of six principles for fair employment practices in South Africa.

He encouraged U.S. companies with investments in South Africa to implement these principles, or the "Sullivan Code" as they are also known, in their South African facilities and thus break down the apartheid regulations which allow discrimination against non-white employees.

In his September 9 statement announcing measures against apartheid, President Reagan said "the Sullivan Code...has set the highest standards of labor practices for progressive employers throughout South Africa" and urged all American companies to adopt them.

Following are the Sullivan Principles, or the Sullivan Code:

1. Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort, locker rooms and work facilities.
2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time.
4. Initiation and development of training programs that will prepare blacks, coloreds, and Asians in substantial numbers for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs.
5. Increasing the number of blacks, coloreds, and Asians in management and supervisory positions.
6. Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.

A note on Rev. Sullivan:

Leon Howard Sullivan was born Oct. 16, 1922 in Charleston, West Virginia. He attended West Virginia State College, Union Theological Seminary and Columbia University. He also holds honorary doctorates from more than 30 universities.

Since 1950 he has been pastor of the Zion Baptist Church in Philadelphia, whose membership numbers more than 5,000 persons.

Before formulating his fair employment principles for South Africa, Reverend Sullivan was known for the Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) which he founded in 1964. OIC, now operating in more than 125 cities in the United States and in Africa, sponsors training and retraining of individuals for skilled jobs.

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backgrounder

DATE* 09/09/85

White House Fact Sheet;
REAGAN'S DECISION ON SOUTH AFRICA MEASURES (360)

(The following fact sheet, issued September 9 by the White House, outlines the anti-apartheid measures announced by President Reagan in an executive order.)

-- President sending a strong signal to South African government; apartheid must go; time is now for bold action; actions assert his strong leadership on this issue.

-- U.S. policy has long included measures to disassociate ourselves from apartheid.

-- Actions are consistent with president's intent to maintain active presence and influence of American companies, churches, teachers, diplomats, in pushing for change in South Africa.

-- President shares concerns of American people about racism; his action designed to speak for entire nation and pull American people together on this important issue.

-- President's measures not designed to damage South African economy and hurt those we are trying to help; targeted on specific elements of government apparatus.

-- President wants to work with Congress, on a bipartisan basis, to achieve positive and productive changes in the policies of the South African government.

-- Executive order commits U.S. to maintain strong presence in South Africa, supports fair employment practices of U.S. companies, increases USG funds for scholarships and human rights activities.

-- Executive order prohibits U.S. banks lending to South African government, except loans which would promote welfare of all South Africans.

-- Executive order bans all computer exports to military, police, and other apartheid-enforcing agencies.

-- Executive order prohibits U.S. nuclear exports to South Africa except for items needed for health and safety or for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard programs.

-- Executive order requires firms to adhere to principles similar to voluntary Sullivan program; goal is to maintain voluntarism, but those who do not adhere will be denied USG trade assistance.

-- Executive order requires USG to consult with GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) partners on Krugerrand ban.

-- Executive order requires the secretary of treasury to study feasibility of minting and issuing gold coins.

-- Executive order directs the secretary of state to establish advisory committee of distinguished Americans to provide recommendations on measures to encourage peaceful change in South Africa.

-- Executive order will implement U.N. resolution, which U.S. supported, banning imports of South African arms.

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official text

DATE: 09/09/85

REAGAN ORDERS MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA (1380)

(Text: statement on anti-apartheid executive order)

Washington -- President Reagan signed an executive order on September 9 limiting computer sales, nuclear exports and loans to the South African government by the United States.

The president said the moves are "aimed against the machinery of apartheid."

The executive order also calls for consultations with the United States's major trading partners regarding a future U.S. ban on the importation of gold Krugerrand coins.

It cuts off U.S. government export assistance to American companies employing more than 25 persons in South Africa which have not adhered to the Sullivan Principles of fair employment, and increases U.S. funds available for scholarships for black South African students.

Reagan's action on South Africa came just days before the Senate was expected to approve an economic sanctions bill which was passed by the House of Representatives in July.

He said he believed the measures he has taken "will best advance our goals," and that if Congress were to pass the anti-apartheid bill, "I would have to veto it." But he added:

"That need not happen. I want to work with the Congress to advance bipartisan support for America's policy toward South Africa. That is why I have put forward this Executive Order today."

Following is the text of the president's statement;

(begin text)

I want to speak this morning about South Africa -- about what America can do to help promote peace and justice in that country so troubled and tormented by racial conflict.

The system of apartheid means deliberate, systematic, institutionalized racial discrimination denying the black majority their God-given rights. America's view of apartheid is simple and straightforward; We believe it is wrong. We condemn it. And we are united in hoping for the day when apartheid will be no more.

Our influence over South African society is limited. But we do have some influence, and the question is how to use it. Many people of good will in this country have differing views. In my view, we must work for peaceful evolution and reform. Our aim cannot be to punish South Africa with economic sanctions that would injure the very people we are trying to help.

I believe we must help all those who peacefully oppose apartheid; and we must recognize that the opponents of apartheid using terrorism and violence will bring not freedom and salvation, but greater suffering, and more opportunities for expanded Soviet influence within South Africa and in the entire region.

What we see in South Africa is a beginning of a process of change. The changes in policy so far are inadequate -- but ironically they have been enough to raise expectations and stimulate demands for more far-reaching, immediate change. It is the growing economic power of the black majority that has put them in a position to insist on political change.

South Africa is not a totalitarian society. There is a vigorous

01



United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63903 Tel. 654338 ext. 204
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

opposition press. Every day we see examples of outspoken protest and access to the international media that would never be possible in many parts of Africa, or in the Soviet Union for that matter. But it is our active engagement -- our willingness to try -- that gives us influence.

Yes, we in America -- because of what we are and what we stand for -- have influence to do good. We also have immense potential to make things worse. Before taking fateful steps, we must ponder the key question; Are we helping to change the system? Or are we punishing the blacks whom we seek to help?

American policy through several administrations has been to use our influence and our leverage against apartheid, not against innocent people who are the victims of apartheid.

Being true to our heritage does not mean quitting, but reaching out; expanding our help for black education and community development, calling for political dialogue; urging South Africans of all races to seize the opportunity for peaceful accommodation before it's too late.

I respect and share the goals that have motivated many in Congress to send a message of U.S. concern about apartheid. But in going so, we must not damage the economic well-being of millions of people in South and southern Africa. If we genuinely wish -- as I do -- to develop a bipartisan basis of consensus in support of U.S. policies, this is the basis on which to proceed.

Therefore, I am signing today an Executive Order that will put in place a set of measures designed and aimed against the machinery of apartheid, without indiscriminately punishing the people who are victims of that system -- measures that will disassociate the United States from apartheid but associate us positively with peaceful change.

These steps include;

-- A ban on all computer exports to agencies involved in the enforcement of apartheid and to the security forces.

-- A prohibition on exports of nuclear goods or technology to South Africa, except as is required to implement nuclear proliferation safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency or those necessary for humanitarian reasons to protect health and safety.

-- A ban on loans to the South African government, except certain loans which improve economic opportunities, or educational, housing, and health facilities that are open and accessible to South Africans of all races.

-- I am directing the Secretary of State and the United States Trade Representative to consult with our major trading partners regarding banning the importation of Krugerrands. I am also instructing the Secretary of the Treasury to report to me within 60 days on the feasibility of minting an American gold coin which could provide an alternative to the Krugerrand for our coin collectors.

I want to encourage ongoing actions by our Government and by private Americans to improve the living standards of South Africa's black majority. The Sullivan Code -- devised by a distinguished black minister from Philadelphia, the Reverend Leon Sullivan -- has set the highest standards of labor practices for progressive employers throughout South Africa. I urge all American companies to participate in it, and I am instructing the American Ambassador to South Africa to make every effort to get companies which have not adopted them -- the Sullivan principles -- to do so.

In addition, my Executive Order will ban U.S. Government export

assistance to any American firm in South Africa, employing more than 25 persons, which does not adhere to the comprehensive fair employment principles stated in the Order by the end of this year.

I am also directing the Secretary of State to increase substantially the money we provide for scholarships to South Africans disadvantaged by apartheid, and the money our embassy uses to promote human rights programs in South Africa.

Finally, I have directed Secretary Shultz to establish an Advisory Committee of distinguished Americans to provide recommendations on measures to encourage peaceful change in South Africa. The Advisory Committee shall provide its first report within 12 months.

I believe the measures I am announcing here today will best advance our goals. If the Congress sends me the present bill as reported by the Conference Committee, I would have to veto it. That need not happen. I want to work with the Congress to advance bipartisan support for America's policy toward South Africa. That is why I have put forward this Executive Order today.

Three months ago, I recalled our Ambassador in South Africa for consultations so that he could participate in the intensive review of the southern African situation that we have been engaged in. I am now sending him back, with a message to State President Botha underlining our grave view of the current crisis, and our assessment of what is needed to restore confidence abroad and move from confrontation to negotiation at home. The problems of South Africa were not created overnight and will not be solved overnight, but there is no time to waste. To withdraw from this drama -- or to fan its flames -- will serve neither our interests nor those of the South African people.

If all Americans join together behind a common program, we can have so much more influence for good. So let us go forward with a clear vision and an open heart, working for justice and brotherhood and peace.

(end text)



official text

DATE: 09/09/85

REAGAN* MEASURES WILL NOT HURT SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMY

(Transcript; Reagan question-and-answer session) (1000)

Washington -- President Reagan says the measures against South Africa that he announced September 9 are designed not to hurt that nation's economy and not to harm "the very people we're trying to help."

In a question-and-answer session with journalists following his signing of the executive order, the president said he would not favor congressionally-supported sanctions. "I am opposed and could not sign the bill if it came to me containing the economic sanctions which, as we have repeatedly said, would have harmed the very people we're trying to help," Reagan said.

Following is the transcript of the president's question-and-answer session:

(begin transcript)

QUESTION: Why did you change your mind on sanctions?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: I haven't. I thought here I tried to explain. I am opposed and could not sign the bill if it came to me containing the economic sanctions which, as we have repeatedly said, would have harmed the very people we are trying to help.

Q: But much that's in that -- in your order --

A: But there are -- no, there were many things in that bill that we could agree with and many of those are incorporated in this Executive Order.

Q: Those are basic sanctions, aren't they?

A: Not in the sense of the economic kind of sanctions that the bill called for and that, as I say, would have hurt the economy there.

Q: And this won't hurt the economy?

A: No, I don't believe so.

Q: You've basically put the weakest weakest measures in the congressional package. Why should this satisfy those in Congress who want a strong message sent to South Africa?

A: We have consulted with some of them and found that there is a great deal of improvement for what we're doing here and they see the intent of this.

Q: South Africa's business leaders have been talking about meeting with its black political leaders, but President Botha has described this as disloyal. What do you think?

A: We happen to believe that negotiation is the thing that must take place, and we hope that maybe we can persuade them that they should, with the responsible black leaders, they should negotiate with regard to the solution of the problems.

Q: Can you still call your policy towards South Africa constructive engagement?

A: Yes, you might add the word "active" to constructive, but yes, I do think it is. It is similar to what we have been doing in the past.

Q: What changes would have to take place in South Africa for you to lift these measures?

A: I think the negotiations that lead toward the steps necessary to bring about political participation by all the citizens of South Africa, and when they start those constructive steps, as I've said,



there isn't anything that's going to be achieved overnight. And --

Q: So a dialogue would be enough?

A: No, I think out of that dialogue then would come further steps leading toward, as soon as possible, the end of apartheid.

Q: At what point would you feel free to lift what you've done today?

A: Well, that would be hard for me right now to say. I think you have to see the intent and see whether the steps are being taken in a forthright manner, or whether there is some trying to give in here and there, but still hold off from the ultimate results. So let us wait and see what happens.

Q: What are you saying in your letter to Botha? Basically, is it the same premise?

A: I assured him of our desire to be of help in this and to be of help in the further progress that we hope they intend to make.

Q: How would you describe the kind of message you think this action is sending to South Africa?

A: I think the same kind that we've been using before. It is persuasion, but also indicating that the American people can get impatient with this, that we all feel very strongly about the changes that are needed in that society.

Q: Since the bill is so similar to what you are proposing, why would you veto it?

A: Because, as I say, there were features in there --

Q: What? Which ones?

A: You see, this wouldn't have been necessary if I had what a president should have, which is line-item veto. I could have signed the bill and line-item vetoed out the --

Q: What don't you like?

A: Well, as I say, basically, let me just sum it up and say the actual economic provisions that we thought would have militated against the chance for prosperity and good living of the people we want to help.

Q: Would you tell us, however, if you have discussed this matter with Congress, and what kind of response you are going to get? Aren't you, in effect, stealing their thunder a bit here with what you're doing?

A: No, we have discussed this with leaders of the Congress, and have been very pleased with the reaction that we got.

Q: If these sanctions don't bring progress, the kind of progress you're looking for, will you take stiffer sanctions then?

A: That we'll look at when that comes. But remember, we're talking about a sovereign nation, and there are limits to what another country can do. We can't give orders to South Africa. We're trying to be helpful to them, knowing that there is a large element in South Africa which also wants an answer to this problem.

Q: Do you intend to keep the ambassador there? He was recalled several months ago because of displeasure over policy. Will he remain in South Africa?

A: Yes. I said goodbye this morning.

Q: Have you spoken personally to President Botha about this action?

A: No, I have written him.

(end transcript)



official text

DATE: 09/09/85

REAGAN VIEWS SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS AS THREAT TO U.S. (780)
(Text: Reagan message to Congress)

Washington -- President Reagan said in a message to Congress September 9 that he has authorized taking a series of economic steps against the South African government because its policies and actions "constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States."

Reagan's statement was in a message sent to the U.S. Congress September 9 accompanying a copy of the executive order exercising his statutory authority.

Following is the text of the president's message to Congress;
(begin text)

Pursuant to section 204 (b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703 (b), I hereby report to the Congress that I have exercised my statutory authority to declare that the policies and actions of the government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States and to declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

Pursuant to this and other legal authorities, I have prohibited certain transactions, including the following: (1) the making or approval of bank loans to the South African government, with certain narrow exceptions; (2) the export of computers and related good and technology to certain government agencies and any apartheid enforcing entity of the South African government; (3) all nuclear exports to South Africa and related transactions, with certain narrow exceptions; (4) the import into the United States of arms, ammunition, or military vehicles produced in South Africa; and (5) the extension of export marketing support to U.S. firms employing at least 25 persons in South Africa which do not adhere to certain fair labor standards.

In addition, I have directed (6) the secretary of state and the United States Trade Representative to consult with other parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with a view toward adopting a prohibition on the import of Krugerrands; (7) the secretary of the treasury to complete a study within 60 days regarding the feasibility of minting U.S. gold coins; and (8) the secretary of state to take the steps necessary to increase the amounts provided for scholarships in South Africa for those disadvantaged by the system of apartheid and to increase the amounts allocated for South Africa in the Human Rights Fund, and (9) the secretary of state to establish an Advisory Committee to provide recommendations on measures to encourage peaceful change in South Africa.

Finally, this order (10) commends the efforts of U.S. firms in South Africa that have voluntarily adhered to fair labor, nondiscrimination principles and encourages all U.S. firms to do likewise.

I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order that I have issued making this declaration and exercising this authority.

1. I have authorized these steps in response to the current situation in South Africa. It is the foreign policy of the United States to seek peaceful change in South Africa, and in particular an end to the repugnant practice and policy of apartheid and the

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establishment of a government based on the consent of the governed. Recent developments in South Africa have serious implications for the prospects for peaceful change and the stability of the region as a whole, a region of strategic importance to the United States. The recent declaration of a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts by the government of South Africa, the mass arrests and detentions, and the ensuing financial crisis are of direct concern to the foreign policy and economy of the United States. The pace of reform in South Africa has not fulfilled the expectations of the world community nor the people of South Africa. Recent government actions regarding negotiations on the participation of all South Africans in the government of that country have not sufficiently diffused tensions and may have indeed exacerbated the situation.

Under these circumstances, I believe that it is necessary for this nation to recognize that our foreign policy of seeking change through peaceful means is seriously threatened. In order for this nation successfully to influence events in that country, it is necessary for the United States to speak with one voice and to demonstrate our opposition to apartheid by taking certain actions directed specifically at key apartheid policies and agencies.

2. The above-described measures, many of which reflect congressional concerns, will immediately demonstrate to the South African government the seriousness of our concern with situation in that country. Furthermore, this declaration mobilizes the influence of the private sector to promote an improvement in the economic prosperity, freedom, and political influence of blacks and other nonwhites in South Africa.

(signed) RONALD REAGAN
(end text)

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official text

DATE: 09/09/85

REAGAN HITS APARTHEID AS REPUGNANT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES
(Text: Reagan Executive Order on South Africa) (1985)

Washington -- President Reagan issued an executive order September 9 prohibiting some trade and other transactions involving South Africa.

He said he took the action because "the policy and practice of apartheid are repugnant to the moral and political values of democratic and free societies and run counter to United States policies."

The executive order includes a prohibition on making or approving loans by U.S. financial institutions to the South African government, with certain narrow exceptions; a ban on the export of computers and related goods and technology to certain government agencies; and a prohibition on nuclear exports to South Africa and related transactions, with certain narrow exceptions.

Following is the text of the executive order:

(begin text)

By the authority vested in me as president by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), the United Nations Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287), the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Foreign Service Act (22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. 1), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and considering the measures which the United Nations Security Council has decided on or recommended in Security Council Resolutions No. 418 of November 4, 1977, No. 558 of December 13, 1984, and No. 569 of July 26, 1985, and considering that the policy and practice of apartheid are repugnant to the moral and political values of democratic and free societies and run counter to United States policies to promote democratic governments throughout the world and respect for human rights, and the policy of the United States to influence peaceful change in South Africa, as well as the threat posed to United States interests by recent events in that country,

I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, find that the policies and actions of the government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

Section 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following transactions are prohibited effective October 11, 1985:

(a) The making or approval of any loans by financial institutions in the United States to the government of South Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that government. This prohibition shall enter into force on November 11, 1985. It shall not apply to (i) any loan or extension of credit for any educational, housing, or health facility which is available to all persons on a nondiscriminatory basis and which is located in a geographic area accessible to all population groups without any legal or

administrative restriction; or (ii) any loan or extension of credit for which an agreement is entered into before the date of this Order.

The secretary of the treasury is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out this subsection. The initial rules and regulations shall be issued within 60 days. The secretary of the treasury may, in consultation with the secretary of state, permit exceptions to this prohibition only if the secretary of the treasury determines that the loan or extension of credit will improve the welfare or expand the economic opportunities of persons in South Africa disadvantaged by the apartheid system, provided that no exception may be made for any apartheid enforcing entity.

(b) All exports of computers, computer software, or goods or technology intended to service computers to or for use by any of the following entities of the government of South Africa;

- (1) The military;
- (2) The police;
- (3) The prison system;
- (4) The national security agencies;
- (5) ARMSCOR and its subsidiaries or the weapons research activities of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research;
- (6) The administering authorities for the black passbook and similar controls;
- (7) Any apartheid enforcing agency;
- (8) Any local or regional government or "homeland" entity which performs any function of any entity described in paragraphs (1) through (7).

The secretary of commerce is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out this subsection and to implement a system of end use verification to ensure that any computers exported directly or indirectly to South Africa will not be used by any entity set forth in this subsection.

(c) (1) Issuance of any license for the export to South Africa of goods or technology which are to be used in a nuclear production or utilization facility, or which, in the judgment of the secretary of state, are likely to be diverted for use in such a facility; any authorization to engage, directly or indirectly, in the production of any special nuclear material in South Africa; any license for the export to South Africa of component parts or other items or substances especially relevant from the standpoint of export control because of their significance for nuclear explosive purposes; and any approval of retransfers to South Africa of any goods, technology, special nuclear material, components, items, or substances described in this section. The secretaries of state, energy, commerce and treasury are hereby authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

(2) Nothing in this section shall preclude assistance for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or IAEA programs generally available to its member states, or for technical programs for the purpose of reducing proliferation risks, such as for reducing the use of highly enriched uranium and activities envisaged by section 223 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 10203) or for exports which the secretary of state determines are necessary for humanitarian reasons to protect the public health and safety.

(d) The import into the United States of any arms, ammunition, or military vehicles produced in South Africa or of any manufacturing data for such articles. The secretaries of state, treasury, and defense are hereby authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

Sec. 2. (a) The majority of United States firms in South Africa have voluntarily adhered to fair labor principles which have benefitted those in South Africa who have been disadvantaged by the apartheid system. It is the policy of the United States to encourage strongly all United States firms in South Africa to follow this commendable example.

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(b) Accordingly, no department or agency of the United States may intercede after December 31, 1985, with any foreign government regarding the export marketing activity in any country of any national of the United States employing more than 25 individuals in South Africa who does not adhere to the principles stated in subsection (c) with respect to that national's operations in South Africa. The secretary of state shall promulgate regulations to further define the employers that will be subject to the requirements of this subsection and procedures to ensure that such nationals may register that they have adhered to the principles.

(c) The principles referred to in subsection (b) are as follows:

- (1) Desegregating the races in each employment facility;
- (2) Providing equal employment opportunity for all employees without regard to race or ethnic origin;
- (3) Assuring that pay system is applied to all employees without regard to race or ethnic origin;
- (4) Establishing a minimum wage and salary structure based on the appropriate local minimum economic level which takes into account the needs of employees and their families;
- (5) Increasing by appropriate means the number of persons in managerial, supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs who are disadvantaged by the apartheid system for the purpose of significantly increasing their representation in such jobs;
- (6) Taking reasonable steps to improve the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment with respect to housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health;
- (7) Implementing fair labor practices by recognizing the right of all employees, regardless of racial or other distinctions, to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations, freely and without penalty or reprisal, and recognizing the right to refrain from any such activity.

(d) United States nationals referred to in subsection (b) are encouraged to take reasonable measures to extend the scope of their influence on activities outside the workplace, by measures such as supporting the right of all business, regardless of the racial character of their owners or employees, to locate in urban areas, by influencing other companies in South Africa to follow the standards specified in subsection (c) and by supporting the freedom of mobility of all workers, regardless of race, to seek employment opportunities wherever they exist, and by making provision for adequate housing for families of employees within the proximity of the employee's place of work.

Sec. 3. The secretary of state and the head of any other department or agency of the United States carrying out activities in South Africa shall promptly take, to the extent permitted by law, the necessary steps to ensure that the labor practices described in section (2) (c) are applied to their South African employees.

Sec. 4. The secretary of state and the head of any other department or agency of the United States carrying out activities in South Africa shall, to the maximum extent practicable and to the extent permitted by law, in procuring goods or services in South Africa, make affirmative efforts to assist business enterprises having more than 50 percent beneficial ownership by persons in South Africa disadvantaged by the apartheid system.

Sec. 5. (a) The secretary of state and the United States trade representative are directed to consult with other parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with a view toward adopting a prohibition on the import of Krugerrands.

(b) The secretary of treasury is directed to conduct a study to be completed within 60 days regarding the feasibility of minting and issuing gold coins with a view toward expeditiously seeking legislative authority to accomplish the goal of issuing such coins.

Section 6. In carrying out their respective functions and responsibilities under this order, the secretary of treasury and the secretary of commerce shall consult with the secretary of state. Each such secretary shall consult, as appropriator with other government agencies and private persons.

Sec. 7. The secretary of state shall establish, pursuant to appropriate legal authority, an Advisory Committee on South Africa to provide recommendations on measures to encourage peaceful change in South Africa. The Advisory Committee shall provide its initial report within 12 months.

Sec. 8. The secretary of state is directed to take the steps necessary pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act and related legislation to (a) increase the amount of internal scholarships provided to South Africans disadvantaged by the apartheid system up to eight million dollars from funds made available for fiscal year 1986, and (b) increase the amount allocated for South Africa from funds made available for fiscal year 1986 in the Human Rights Fund up to 1.5 million dollars. At least one-third of the latter amount shall be used for legal assistance for South Africans. Appropriate increases in the amounts made available for these purposes will be considered in future fiscal years.

Sec. 9. This order is intended to express and implement the foreign policy of the United States. It is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

(signed) Ronald Reagan

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official text

DATE: 09/09/85

SHULTZ SAYS U.S. MUST REMAIN ENGAGED IN SOUTH AFRICA (2360)

(Transcript: Shultz Q and A session with reporters)

Washington -- Secretary of State Shultz says it is essential that the United States remain "engaged and involved" in South Africa in order to "exercise our influence...in a constructive, active way."

Speaking to reporters at the White House September 9 following President Reagan's announcement of a series of anti-apartheid measures against the South African government, Shultz said the measures are an attempt "to send a single message to the government of South Africa and the people of South Africa on behalf of all Americans...that apartheid must come to an end, and we look to the government of South Africa to work with blacks, black leaders and others in their country to bring it to an end. That's the message."

Following is a transcript of the Shultz question and answer session with reporters:

(begin transcript)

Q: If the policy is no longer constructive engagement, what are you calling it? And how can you say that these are not economic sanctions, thereby, a reversal of the policy of the president?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The president, in his comments after his statement, used the word "active" as well as "constructive." And, of course, we remain engaged and involved. And I think that has been our approach all along -- the president's approach. And we all feel that it is essential in South Africa, where we have a stake, both a moral stake and a stake in our interests, that we are there and that we exercise our influence; that we are engaged and we do it in a constructive way and an active way.

And I think, beyond that, the more we are there diplomatically, the more our labor people are there, the more our business people are there, the more interplay there is. And that is the way in which we can exercise our influence.

Q: The president said these are not economic sanctions. How can you say these are not economic sanctions and that this is not a policy reversal for him?

A: Well, these are a codification and a setting out, some things that are presently being done, some that are strengthened and made more clear, basically growing on the conference report of the Congress of those things that they had planned to put into effect right away, although with some changes. And these are actions that are designed to register our view against apartheid, as distinct from actions designed to have an effect by depriving people in South Africa of economic livelihood, particularly blacks, of course.

So, the president has tried consistently to make that distinction and in selecting the things in the conference report that were slated, if the bill would pass, to go into effect immediately and not including the overhang of disinvestment and other types of economic sanctions. The president has been true to this purpose.

Q: Why not simply ban Krugerrands -- Krugerrand imports as Congress would have done? Why give it to GATT? GATT doesn't usually --

A: We don't give it to GATT. We are a party to what amounts to a treaty. GATT is a treaty. And when you sign it, you undertake

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certain obligations. And, so, if we want to do something in the field of trade, such as stopping the import of something, then, our treaty obligations under GATT come to bear.

So, we want the prohibition on the import of Krugerrands to be done in a proper way so that it will be effective, and we won't have a major suit on the subject. And so that is the approach we're taking.

I might say this was debated as the bill was being considered, and I think the point is a recognized point.

Q: Could you discuss the details of the letter to Botha or any of its provisions?

A: No, I can't. I don't think it's appropriate -- I know it's not appropriate to discuss or to release the contents of a message from the president to Mr. Botha. However, as the president said, it expressed the concern of the United States, it expresses our desire to be constructively engaged, you might say to coin a phrase, and also the seriousness with which we take this.

Now, I believe that in taking this action, the president has -- and this is part of his intent -- tried to send a single message to the government of South Africa and the people of South Africa on behalf of all Americans, on behalf of all the government, on behalf of the Congress and the presidency, that apartheid must come to an end. And we look to the government of South Africa to work with blacks, black leaders and others in their country to bring it to an end. That's the message.

Q: Are you calling for one man, one vote?

A: We are calling for the parties concerned to engage with each other and discuss the problem and how to resolve it.

My experience on these things is that there is a key break-over point that must be reached, and that is the point at which people conclude that the system, or whatever it is you're seeking to change, but in this case, the system of apartheid is going to end. And that is not the subject of argument. The question is how. And once that psychology is created, then the problems of how you end it and what you do can be worked with in a more operational way and a more satisfactory way. And that is the point that I hope they are reaching in South Africa.

Q: Yes. You all have constantly said that if you put economic sanctions against, it's going to hurt the blacks. Less than one percent of the blacks work in those factories. When Alan Boesak was over here, he said he wanted the privilege to decide what misery he would accept. And my question is, this is not over -- the fight is not over economics with the blacks, this is a side issue. It's over freedom. And aren't you missing the point if you don't attack this from freedom, just as the Americans did during the Revolutionary War? They weren't all economics of freedom. Aren't you missing the point?

A: The statements you made are precisely why the president picked out measures that are aimed at apartheid, like the ban on computer sales to agencies whose activities have a bearing on the administration of apartheid, and not things that would have some major disruptive economic effect.

Now, I think I am fairly stating the point that the economic progress in South Africa and the participation of blacks in it, and I might say with American firms leading the way, has enabled blacks to acquire skills, to have access to on-the-job training, to move up in the skill and managerial ladder, and to have a basis for forming labor unions -- labor unions now being one potential source of expression of

black concerns. All of this is part of the economic base.

And beyond that, of course, is the livelihood of people there, and not only the livelihood in South Africa, but the whole region is interdependent and what happens in South Africa has a great bearing on what happens in Botswana and so on and so on.

Q: Have you received assurances from (Senate Majority Leader Robert) Dole and other legislative leaders that they will put over a vote until March and would you welcome such a move on their part? Do you think that that would help keep the pressure on South Africa to change?

A: I feel privileged that both (Senate Foreign Relations Committee) Chairman (Richard) Lugar and Majority Leader Dole have spent considerable time with me and colleagues in discussing this issue. How they react and what they will decide to do, of course, is for them to say, and no doubt they will give their views.

I believe and the president believes and I feel that they believe, too, that if we can, it is most important that we as a country express our view in a unified way on this subject. And that is why the president has done what he has done. And I might say that if you look at the structure of the Executive Order and much of the content of the bill, you see that there is a great parallelism there.

Q: What are the features of the measures before the Senate today that you find objectionable -- specific features that you object to?

A: The most objectionable feature is the overhang of economic sanctions that stand there as things that might be triggered in at some moment of time. So, as I keep saying, the president has wanted to distinguish between measures directed against apartheid and measures that would wind up with substantial loss of jobs. That's the big distinction.

There are a lot of other distinctions between the Executive Order and the bill, some of them technical such as the slight difference on how to approach the banning of Krugerrands, and there are a number of other things of that kind that distinguish the Executive Order and, we think, improve it over the bill. But the item that I mentioned I think is the principle one.

I might just say, as a matter of something that I would personally be involved in very much, on the subject of an advisory committee. In the bill, the advisory committee provided for is essentially to advise on the labor relations and economic matters, basically having to do with the Sullivan Code. In the Executive Order, the advisory committee is to look at the whole range of developments having to do with the end of apartheid and advise on it. So the mandate is broader. And I hope that it will be possible to have an advisory committee that cannot only make a report at some moment of time, but also be useful in counseling on events as they occur. And we all know there'll be a pattern of events. We don't know what they are. But I hope the advisory committee will be useful in that regard.

Q: Why shouldn't we construe this as the administration being stampeded to cut Congress off at the pass? You weren't for these measures before. You are for them today because you knew that legislation would probably pass. And that appears to be the only reason, and not your burning desire to wipe out apartheid.

A: Some of these measures are in effect now and are being codified. For example, there are prohibitions on sales of computers. There are prohibitions on sales of nuclear materials, since South

Africa has not signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, and so on. So there are things that are now being dealt with that are brought together. I think they're improved, they're strengthened on things like scholarships. The amount of money is somewhat larger, and so on.

I think the president's purpose here is, of course, in part to avoid a fight over something where there is a large measure of agreement. But more important, to reach out to the Congress and reach out to the American people and say together, let us send a message about apartheid and work together as effectively as we possibly can to do whatever we can to bring it to an end. That's the reason for it.

Q: Can you tell us if this Executive Order would have been issued around now in the absence of the imminent passage of the bill this week?

A: Well, there are a whole set of events, of course, that have taken place. There's a real dynamic here. And no one can say -- abstracting something or other if Mr. Botha hadn't given a speech in the middle of August that was a great disappointment, if this, if that, if something else. So I think about the right thing to say is that there is a flow of events here and, under all the circumstances, the president felt that the United States would be well served by this action, and he's taken it.

Q: You said that this package is designed, I think you said something to register United States disapproval of apartheid. Doesn't returning our ambassador on the very same day weaken that message?

A: On the contrary. The ambassador will go with a letter from the president, and I've indicated the general content of it. It will supplement and support the ideas that the president expressed in his statement and are expressed, so to speak, in the Executive Order as such.

Furthermore, the object of an ambassador is to represent us, to represent us with the government, to represent us with groups in the population of South Africa. So, we called him back for consultations.

We've benefitted a lot from having his first-hand views here. And we felt that at this point it's important for him to be at his post and on his job there doing the representational duty that ambassadors do all around the world.

Q: What are the prospects that the South African government might retaliate for the sanctions by withholding strategic minerals that we are very dependent upon?

A: I don't think there is much prospect of that or a desire to do that.

I might say that they're looking for all of the export -- foreign exchange they can get. So I think that's a very unlikely matter. And I hope that the net impact of the president's action will be to focus the attention of South Africa on the importance of really coming to grips with the problem of apartheid and acting on the basis that it is going to end and the question is how. And, of course, we think the "how" should be answered through a process of discussion and negotiation.

Q: -- Ambassador intends to leave?

A: Well, I think the president said he said goodbye to him this morning. And I don't know when he actually takes off. But he's on his way.

(end transcript)



official text

DATE: 09/09/85

U.S. STANDS FIRM ON CONDITIONS FOR TALKING WITH PLO
(Transcript: Armacost Foreign Press Center briefing)(6280)

Washington -- The United States's approach to the Palestine Liberation Organization is the same now as it has been for the past ten years -- no recognition until the PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and accpets Israel's right to exist.

So said the U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs, Michael Armacost, in a briefing for foreign correspondents in Washington September 9.

Armacost said the United States is studying how any meeting that Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy might have would lead to direct talks "between Israel and Jordan, with Palestinians present."

Then in response to a question about views reportedly expressed by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, indicating a willingness to accept peace for territory, Armacost stated; "We have not changed our own approach with regard to the PLO. We've said for ten years we won't recognize or negotiate with the PLO until the Resolution 242 or 338 -- Israel's right to exist -- have been expressed by the PLO in an unequivocal and public way."

Armacost said that if the report on Arafat reflects a move in the direction of a peaceful resolution of the Middle East issues, "that's welcome, but it doesn't alter our own conditions."

In the matter of South Africa, Armacost said that U.S. Ambassador Herman Nickel is returning to Pretoria because it is important to have "authoritative communications" between the United States and South Africa at this crucial time. "It is essential that our ambassador be there on the spot," Armacost told the reporters. He noted that Nickel has been involved in the Reagan administration's review of its policy toward South Africa. Nickel's return was announced by President Regan September 9.

Armacost said that the ambassador will explain the thinking of the Reagan administration on the need for dialogue between the South African government and representative members of the black community. Also, he said Nickel would explain the intention of the American government and people to remain engaged "in the hope that we can make a positive contribution to the dismantling of apartheid and the promotion of racial justice."

On other topics, Armacost made the following comments:

-- Turkish-Greek arms aid. He denied that there is a administration policy to use a ratio formula in requesting arms assistance for Turkey and Greece. Armacost said that the Reagan administration has never accepted "some mechanical devise" for aid amounts to Greece and Turkey. "We have tried to respond to what we regarded as the legitimate requirements for security assistance in Turkey as well as Greece" without establishing any kind of a formula.

-- Canada/Strategic Defense Initiative. While the government of Canada has turned down the U.S. offer to participate in government-to-government research on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Armacost said that he does not foresee this damaging U.S.-Canadian relations. He noted that Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney "has always publicly affirmed his own support for SDI

07



research." He pointed out that most of the SDI research in Canada would be located "any way" in the private sector. Mulroney has left it open for private Canadian firms to bid for SDI research contracts.

-- U.S.-Soviet talks. He noted that the U.S.-Soviet discussions on East Asia scheduled for this week in Moscow are one in a series of talks with the Soviets to "clear the air" and "express our intentions with regard to various regional issues of interest to both countries."

Other discussions this year have focused on the Middle East, Afghanistan and Southern Africa. Armacost said these are not occasions for negotiating but rather represent an attempt to "convey with some precision our own intentions to avoid miscalculations that could be troublesome to ourselves and others."

-- Korea. Without going into the details of the upcoming talks on East Asia with the Soviet Union, Armacost said that the United States has a very strong desire to encourage restraint in the heavily-armed Korean peninsula. He said that it is in the interest of all concerned countries to see that restraint is exhibited in the Korean peninsula.

Following is a transcript of Armacost's briefing:

(begin transcript)

QUESTION: Mr. Shultz described relations between South Africa and the United States as somewhat strained. Sending Ambassador Nickel back, does that mean a resumption of the old policy and the old attitudes, or do you foresee any innovations?

ARMACOST: I think the president announced this morning some steps that we are taking that represent new departures of sorts. The fact of the matter is that an ambassador serves, above all, the purpose of establishing the basis of agreement or disagreement, as the case may be, with foreign governments. We think at a time when there are important things happening in South Africa, when it's important to have authoritative communications between us, that it's essential our ambassador be on the spot. He's been here for some months. He's participated in the review that we've held. It's been very helpful to us to have his knowledge and his experience available to us as we conducted this review.

He will now go back, as you know, carrying a message from the president, and he will explain the thinking of the administration, not only with regard to the need we feel for dialogue between the South African government and representative members of the black community, but also on the intention of our government and our people to remain actively engaged, in the hope that we can make a positive contribution to the dismantling of apartheid, and the promotion of racial justice.

Q: The prime minister of Turkey has gone on record saying he thinks that the seven-to-ten ratio of arms between Greece and Turkey is now outdated. The Turks are also interested in seeking five year commitments for the amounts of arms. Can you comment on the state of military aid to Turkey and whether or not the administration is prepared to seek congressional approval to breach the traditional seven-to-ten ratio?

A: I don't know about tradition. We've never accepted some mechanical device, this ten-seven formula, as something that guided, necessarily, our thinking. We've tried to respond to what we regarded as the legitimate requirements for security assistance in Turkey and, as well, in Greece, but without establishing that kind of mathematical formula.

As you know, we've faced some difficulties with the Congress when it was last in session regarding the amounts of security assistance available to us. So, we face, at this moment the task of either getting those numbers up or apportioning what's available among a number of competing claimants. But we will be guided in that not by some formula of the sort you mentioned but by our assessment of the requirements of the countries who are recipients of our assistance.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: Again, we have regarded Turkey as a very important member of NATO, one of the eastern flank countries in the NATO Alliance. This administration has taken considerable pains to address with the Turks the modernization requirements of their army. We will continue to bear those things in mind as we look at the long-term requirements.

Q: Over the weekend the prime minister of Canada turned down an offer from the administration to participate in "Star Wars", or SDI,

research. But at the same time left it open for Canadian companies to bid on such contracts. I'm wondering what the general reaction of the administration is, and specifically, if you're encouraged by the fact that companies privately are not restricted?

A: Brian Mulroney has always publicly affirmed his own support for SDI research. It is my understanding that as far as government research institutions are involved, they do not engage in very much research and, therefore, most of this would be located in the private sector anyway. And to the extent that that has been left open, I suppose, the impact will be minimized.

I would have to say, I guess, that, of course, we would have preferred that the government-to-government arrangement be available. But this doesn't really obviate the possibility for the private sector, where most of the research is done, to participate.

Q: Do you think that this would damage at all relations between these two allies which are quite close, the fact that Canada, on a government-to-government basis, has refused to participate?

A: No, I wouldn't foresee that. We have very close relations, as you would expect, with a neighbor, and there are hundreds of issues that come up over the course of a year. But the fabric of those ties is so firm and so strong that any single issue isn't going to have that big an impact.

Q: What happens in this (Middle East peace) process after the return of Murphy, especially in the Middle East, they believe he failed? And are you still optimistic in achieving the direct negotiation between the Arabs and the Israelis before the end of the year?

A: Since Ambassador Murphy's return we have continued to ponder how the discussion -- which has been discussed in the press and elsewhere -- between Ambassador Murphy and representatives of the Jordanian government, and representative Palestinians might contribute to facilitating direct negotiation between the parties to the conflict, that is, Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians. And we still are pondering that question. We are hopeful, certainly, that a process can be galvanized, soon, which would permit such direct talks.

It's only through those direct discussions that progress can be made on the underlying question.

Q: Looking at what was described in several newspapers as the Richard Murphy plan, one may get the impression that the administration has given up the precondition that any meeting with the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would leave immediately, right after the direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. So the first question is whether there is any plan called the "Murphy plan"? And second, has the administration given the precondition about direct negotiations, right after the meeting with the delegation?

A: As you know, in our constitutional scheme of things there's only one man who ultimately makes foreign policy in this country, and that's the president. And, therefore, I think Dick Murphy'd be the first to say that there's no "Murphy plan". There are presidential policies in this area.

As I just mentioned, we are still examining how any meeting he might have would lead promptly to direct discussions between Israel and Jordan, with Palestinians present. And it's the answer to that question that we have been after all along. In that respect nothing really has changed. We're still trying to figure out how you get from here to there.

Q: An ANZUS question in four parts. Is a compromise in the works with New Zealand over the ANZUS situation? Do you expect to soften the American position at all? When will you name a new U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand? And how soon after November 1st will he take up his post?

A: You'd better give them to me again. Let's take it one at a time.

Q: Is a compromise in the works with New Zealand over ANZUS?

A: I don't know. Mr. Palmer, the deputy prime minister of New Zealand is coming here next week and will be seeing the secretary of state, I believe, on the 18th of September. At that time, we expect to hear from the New Zealand government how they envisage the legislation, which they have indicated they intend to put forward,

will be compatible with the resumption of normal access over a period of time. So until we talk to him, I can't make a prediction as to whether something can be worked out.

Q: Are the Americans willing to soften their position in any way?

A: Our position has always been that for an alliance to work, there has to be some mutuality of obligations and it is our view that the policy change which affects normal port access is unilaterally altered, the operational basis of the alliance and pending some indication as to how that normal access can be resumed, then we're left with an attenuation of the kind of day-to-day cooperation on defense matters that we normally carry out with our allies and which we would like to resume, of course, with New Zealand.

Q: When will the name of the new U.S. ambassador be revealed and when will he take his post?

A: I can't tell you that because I don't quite know where it stands at the moment in terms of White House clearance. These things are always announced in the White House and until the president announces it, I don't think anybody else can predict exactly when.

Q: You don't expect a delay -- ?

A: It is unrelated to this, no.

Q: There is reported that a civilian airliner has been shot down over Afghanistan. I wonder if you have any information and also whether you're -- any rules of engagement in that war so that this kind of thing, if it has happened, does not happen again?

A: I've only seen the news reports which include denials of the Mujahadin about them shooting down a civilian aircraft and I don't really have anything further to add. As for the rules of engagement, that's really a question that you should direct elsewhere. This is not our conflict.

Q: Yesterday, Yasser Arafat seemed to be addressing himself to American policymakers in a sort of a toned-down approach that seems to indicate he's willing to accept a peace for territory type of arrangement. Do you see any new overtures? And also would that necessitate another round of talks by Secretary Murphy in the region and, if so, when would that take place and what do you hope it would accomplish?

A: With regard to the statement, I've seen nothing more than the news reported this morning. Any movement in the direction of recognizing the necessity for a peaceful resolution to these issues, of course, is welcome. But from our standpoint, we have not changed our own approach with regard to the PLO. We've said for 10 years we won't recognize or negotiate with the PLO until the (U.N.) Resolution 242 or 338 -- Israel's right to exist -- have been expressed by the PLO in an unequivocal and public way. And if this is a move in that direction, that's welcome, but it doesn't alter our own conditions. As for Murphy's travel, there is no plan at the moment for him to travel back to the region at this point.

Q: I'd like to turn to the upcoming U.S.-Soviet conference on East Asia, which is going to take place in Moscow. In your view, what is the significance of this conference and, number two, what are the major objectives?

A: You know, it's not a conference, it is a set of talks paralleling comparable discussions we've had at the expert level with Soviet representatives on other issues. That is, to date, this year we've had comparable discussions on the Middle East, on Afghanistan, on Southern Africa. This will be a part of that series of discussions, of clearing the air, that is expressing our respective intentions with regard to various regional issues of interest to both countries.

I believe in this case Paul Wolfowitz' counterpart will be Mr. Kapitsa, Mr. Rogachev, Mr. Zaytsev as representative members of their foreign ministry, and as we've said with respect to other talks of this kind, we don't regard them as occasions in which we're negotiating and certainly we don't regard these as occasions where the two countries are attempting, through some condominium or collusion to arrange the affairs involving other countries, rather they represent an attempt to convey with some precision our own intentions so that we avoid miscalculations that could be troublesome to ourselves and to others. That's the purpose of these talks which will take place on Thursday and Friday.

Q: Is this a one-time meeting or an ongoing --

A: I don't know what will follow from these. As I said, this will be the fourth set of regional talks this year. They've all been at the assistant secretary level and whether there will be follow-on discussions on these particular subjects will remain to be seen. That would certainly be quite possible. You will remember, last year when the president spoke at the General Assembly he made a proposal for such talks as one means of thickening the communications with the Soviets and we are simply following through on that stated intention which the Soviets picked up on.

Q: Just cutting quickly back to the ANZUS thing, Prime Minister Lange said last week that when Mr. Palmer comes he's expected to invite the United States to send an Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate. Will the U.S. be prepared to send one?

A: I really wouldn't foreshadow that, but -- I'd prefer to wait for Mr. Palmer to come and then perhaps we'll have something to say to the press about details.

Q: Back to the Middle East, sir, a two-part question. The first part is when you're talking about a meeting with the Soviets and talking about the Middle East, do you still oppose an international convention with the participation of the Soviet Union? And do you still regard as one of the preconditions of the Soviets being there the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel? That's the first part. The second part is about --

A: Why don't I take that much? This is not an issue, of course, that will come up in these discussions we were just referring to. Those will be confined to East Asia. We have not essentially changed our view. We've always regarded an international conference as something which might prompt countries to take maximalist positions and promote political theater rather than getting to the task of engaging the parties directly concerned in direct discussion. We do believe that it is important for those who participate to have a relationship with both countries. But we're not really looking for an international conference, per se, of the sort that I think your first question implied, although we recognize the importance to King Hussein to providing an international context of some kind for discussions to proceed. But we're not really looking for that kind of a conference.

Q: We're talking a lot or we heard a lot about the arms sale proposal for Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Could you give us the date that the administration is going to put this proposal in the Congress and what are the items within the list?

A: No, I really can't. What we said was that we were examining these broad issues in the Middle East Arms Transfer study and that study was completed. We have briefed the House and the Senate -- at least at the staff level in the Senate -- I'm not sure the full briefings have been completed as yet -- but the precise items that might be notified to the Congress have not been formally decided. Those are being considered at the moment. The president's pondering those and I can't foreshadow either the date or the specific items that might go on.

Q: If the administration fails to get the approval of the Congress for the sales of arms to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, I hope not, and in the meantime there is no progress toward the peace process itself, how the administration is going to deal with the problem of the Middle East when you have all the leaders of the Arab countries and Israel in the United States during the General Assembly in the coming few weeks?

A: I hope the hypotheses that you outline will not be the ones we have to deal with. There's an irreducible element of conjecture in all foreign policy decisions, but we prefer not to try and specify how we deal with all hypothetical circumstances out in public. Our objective, as I've said before, has been to try and move this process along because we felt this year represented a year of some opportunity. At the same time, we've tried to be helpful to the parties, recognizing that they all face internal and external political pressure and it's for that reason that when King Hussein was here in the spring, the president indicated our hope and our intention to be helpful to him and provide support. We subsequently, as you know, went to the Congress and asked for supplemental economic assistance for Jordan in substantial quantity. The request for arms

is before us, it's under consideration. Our hope, of course, has been that the progress will be made in moving the peace process along and that, of course, would help shape an environment in which the kind of support which we have felt that King Hussein might need would become more politically feasible as well.

Q: A Soviet delegation of the Supreme Soviet is coming this week to town. The question is, who is going to see them in the administration, I mean, apart from the Hill, and what do you expect to tell them?

A: I don't think it has been resolved, quite frankly. There are requests that are being addressed in the State Department today and I can't give you the response as yet. Someone will truly see these representatives and until that's decided, I guess, it would be premature to try and say what we'll talk about, but in our discussions with the Soviet Union, as you know, we have characteristically indicated the desire to engage in dialogue on a variety of issues, some of them of a regional character, to go to the issue we were discussing a moment ago -- some of them relating to our bilateral relations, some of them involving arms control, some involving human rights -- and while these would not be the kind of direct discussions with any representative of the Supreme Soviet that we have with foreign ministry, that would broadly describe the range or the menu of possibilities.

Q: Is it possible that the president will see them?

A: I can't speak for the White House. I'm unaware that that is being contemplated, but I'm not sure.

Q: Could you give me the specific date on the U.S.-Soviet talks on East Asia and secondly, what is the main point of your talks with the Soviet Union concerning the Korean Peninsula?

A: These talks will be on Thursday and Friday, as I remember -- the 12th and 13th. Well, we don't go into these talks in public, but I think it would be fair to say that with respect to the Korean Peninsula we have a strong desire to encourage restraint on the Korean Peninsula, it's a very heavily armed place and those armaments of North and South exist in a very concentrated way right along the Demilitarized Zone. It's important, I think, not only to us and the Korean parties, but to all countries with an interest in the Korean Peninsula to see that restraint is exhibited and the Soviets clearly have some relationship of influence with the North, a relationship of influence that perhaps is growing, and judging from recent military transfers, therefore, I think, among other things, certainly we would always hope that they would encourage their friends in Pyongyang to exhibit restraint and to pursue a discussion with the South with the sincere desire to reduce the tensions on the Peninsula and deal with those outstanding problems in a systematic way. It is encouraging to us at least that these contacts have been proliferating in recent months and the discussions have been directed at very concrete issues of economic exchange, of humanitarian issues, family reunion and so forth.

Q: Last Saturday, President Reagan announced a measure on foreign trade policy, but however, the leader of the Congress said that it is not enough and do you think -- it seems to me that they are going to oppose in saying that it's not enough. And do you think that that measure is enough or are you thinking that another measure which fortifies that measure?

A: We're not, as an administration, keen about protectionist legislation because we have felt that open, free, fair trading is of advantage to us. As Americans, we're all consumers and we benefit from access to high quality, low-priced foreign products. We would like foreign countries to have the same benefit of access to our products where they are competitive and therefore, we have sought as an administration to address these issues through our negotiations on a multilateral basis. As you know, during the last summit, we encouraged another multilateral trade round in order to further reduce the barriers to international trade, on a general basis.

We have particular areas that are of concern to us, in agricultural trade, in trade in high technology, in the services sector, and we would like to see those general barriers reduced.

We have also, in the case of particular countries -- I mentioned Japan in specific terms here because the size of our overall deficit

with them, which some people are forecasting for as much as 50,000 million dollars in 1985, sought to negotiate in specific sectors. And since, I guess, January, we've been engaged in four sectoral discussions, we've made some progress. The Japanese government announced a program on July 30th, as I recall. Some of these, we are hopeful, in some of the negotiations we are hopeful. We have not made as much progress in other areas. I think there's going to be continuing pressure in this country for effective movement on the government to government level, and to the extent those deficits can be reduced, then the likelihood of protectionist legislation, which we would not like to see, is diminished.

We recognize that, to some extent, these trade problems reflect the strength of our dollar and macro economic forces, and that also is the reason, in our discussions with Japan, that we've not limited ourselves to talking about specific market opening measures, but have also, as in Secretary Shultz's speech in Princeton last March, I believe, mentioned a hope that the Japanese government would address the imbalance between the level of savings and the level of investment in such a way as to increase domestic demand and to absorb more of Japan's production internally and also to increase the demand for imports.

So, we've got a lot of measures that we are seeking in relationship to Japan and other trading partners. But we don't think that protectionist legislation is the answer. We recognize that the pressures for such legislation increase in the absence of measures which can reduce the size of these deficits.

Q: At the moment are you satisfied with the Japanese government attitude on this problem? Or do you think that is not enough?

A: I think that Prime Minister Nakasone certainly recognizes the problem and is seeking to work on it, and we're looking forward to discussions that -- at the foreign ministry level in New York, at the end of this month, and we expect we would hear, also, from the prime minister, when he comes, perhaps, in October, if he comes for the UN 40th anniversary. But, in any event, we certainly believe he's engaged with the problem, but we're always looking for evidence that this deficit, which has continued to grow, might diminish.

Q: Back to the Middle East trouble spot, I have two questions. The first one is there were some reports that Israel supplied its Lance missiles with nuclear warheads. What is your comment about this? And the second one is about Jordan. Israel issued several warnings in the last period to Jordan. Do you think these warnings are justified?

A: On the first question, I'm unaware of any such thing. It sounds extremely debatable.

Q: There were some reports that Israel supplied its Lance missiles with nuclear warheads. How do you view this development?

A: Of course, we're not the ones to ask that question to, but it strikes me as extremely implausible.

Q: You're not concerned if there were nuclear warheads being introduced in the Middle East?

A: I have never heard of any such thing.

Q: The second one is about Jordan. Israel warned Jordan several times in the last two weeks. Do you think these warnings are justified?

A: I'm sorry, who warned who?

Q: Israel warned Jordan several times.

A: Oh, about terrorist activity.

Q: Yes. Do you think they are justified?

A: Well, we, obviously, regret the increase in violent incidents. Because there's no question but what that diminishes the prospects for moving rapidly toward resumption of the peace process. And it's in that context, I think, that we certainly share a regret about the increase in such incidents.

Q: Do you think there is terrorist activity coming from Jordanian territory, from Jordan?

A: I'm not going to engage in an effort to corroborate the details of any particular incident. I don't think we have any doubt but that King Hussein himself has no interest in promoting terrorism. Quite the contrary. But I can't get into trying to analyze the particular details of who's responsible for them.

Q: So do you think the warnings are justified?

A: All I would comment, as an American official, is that the increase, or the resumption of these kind of incidents, is unhelpful, and only to be regretted.

Q: This is with regard to the expert level talks held between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on Afghanistan. What is the perception that the U.S. experts are receiving? Is a political settlement anywhere nearer? Or is it still very far away?

A: Well, we didn't hear anything, I think, in our bilateral discussions, that was particularly new on the subject. On the other hand, these took place some time ago. We haven't had recent discussions on that topic.

The basic issue, I think, will be, or at least the place to look for a change, is in the Geneva talks, where proximity discussions between the parties have been taking place, most recently in late August, a second round in the last three or four months. So, the tempo of discussions has picked up. But until there is some indication of Soviet willingness to discuss what is the central problem, as far as we're concerned, namely the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the timetable for that withdrawal, then we won't have seen progress on the central issue.

Q: I have two questions. Last week the Supreme Court of the Philippines threw out the testimony of General Ver in evidence in the Aquino murder trial. Does that have any practical effect on your policy towards the Philippines? And my second question is, last Friday the U.S. government turned over ... the six affidavits of U.S. Air Force personnel, who reportedly were taken control over by Philippine Air Force personnel during the day Senator Aquino was shot.

Are you going to allow these U.S. Air Force personnel to testify in the Aquino trial?

A: With regard to the first question, we have not adjusted our position in relationship to every event in the unfolding of both the Agrava Commission or the judicial proceedings which have followed it. Our objective has always been to see a thorough, prompt, and complete, impartial, investigation into the circumstances of Senator Aquino's killing, and to see that those who were responsible for perpetrating it are brought to justice. And until the end of the judicial process is complete, it seems to me, it's premature to make a judgment on that. I think whatever the expectations of people at one or another time during the Agrava Commission's mandate, the overall result was one which went beyond, I think, initial expectations. And therefore I think it's fair to wait until the outcome is complete before drawing a judgment.

As for the latter matter of putting forward affidavits, it came to our knowledge belatedly that there was some information available to people up at one of the air defense stations that might bear on the judicial proceeding, and we made that available when it was known to our embassy, and those are the affidavits that have been supplied. I don't think a decision has been made on testifying. I wouldn't expect the Americans to testify in that proceeding. I think they have provided their depositions as a means of making available to the court information they have.

Q: Mr. Gorbachev seems to be suggesting that he would be prepared for a radical reduction in the number of Soviet nuclear warheads, in return for limitations on American space weapons research. Does the United States see that as a viable framework for a possible arms control deal? If so, how are you going about trying to find out what he really has in mind? And if not, what would you see as a viable framework for an arms control deal?

A: In the first place, the place we believe to negotiate these issues is in Geneva, and therefore our hope has always been to draw the Soviets into a detailed discussion of the subject at the S.T.A.R.T. and other fora that are operating in Geneva.

There were hints, as you suggest, near the end of the last round of talks, about Soviet willingness to contemplate significant reductions in offensive nuclear arms. But they have not supplied the details of their proposal and, in the absence of details, it's a little hard to draw firm judgments.

They have continued to insist that the relinquishing of SDI research is a prerequisite forward movement and that, we think, is not the formula for getting down to the serious discussion, rather the elaboration of some of the details that might flush out what was only hinted at previously and in doing that in the negotiating forum rather than through press releases, we think, is the best way to establish whether something is possible, but we'll see these negotiations resume shortly and these hints did come at the end of the second round. That was more encouraging than the first round, which produced very little and there's a certain cycle to these negotiations so we'll hope that in the next round we'll be vouchsafe some of the details.

Q: Coming back to the regional talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, will it be wrong to conclude that they are part of the preparatory process for the Geneva summit and, to what extent do you believe multilateral issues will be an integral part of the talks there?

A: Talks where? In these regional --

Q: No, at the summit.

A: I'm sorry. The series of these discussions on regional issues, of course, commenced before there was any summit meeting scheduled or meeting, as we say, and therefore, while they represent yet another means of conveying our respective intentions and to that extent represent a part of the preparation. They were contemplated before a meeting between our leaders was established and I would think perhaps we'll continue, to the extent we find them useful, independent of the meetings between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan, but certainly that communication is helpful. They derived, as I said, from the conviction that last year the dialogue between the two superpowers was pretty thin. It was our conviction that there were a whole host of issues that needed further discussion and these were set up with the intention of filling a perceived gap and we feel that they have been useful, but we wouldn't exaggerate the importance.

I'm not quite sure which multilateral issues you have in mind, therefore --

Q: The very same issues --

A: Oh, the regional? Oh, I think without question these issues will come up, sure.

Q: At the U.S. and Soviet Union talks in Moscow this week, will the Korean Peninsula questions, just like the South and North Korea dialogue, and the Soviet participation of the 1988 Seoul Olympic games should be discussed at that time?

A: I think certainly it would be a fair presumption that in discussions about East Asia, an important country like Korea and the developments that are taking place there would be a subject in that discussion.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you may know that the Nakasone administration has decided in the last week to maintain or hold the so-called "one percent ceiling" of the defense budget of Japan at least for the time being and how are you commenting on that?

A: Well, we have for several years been engaged in discussions with the Japanese government about ways in which we can jointly contribute more effectively to the defense of that area, particularly it's been our hope that Japan would assume progressively a larger share of the burden of its own conventional defense, including the maritime surveillance and patrolling of the sea lanes of Japan and to that extent we have been encouraging it to expand the resources it devotes to this effort. We have tried not to get involved in a discussion over the particular amount or the particular percentage, but we think there is more to be done and that the Japanese government can share a larger portion of this burden. We have to accept the political burdens of very large defense expenditures and we think our allies can do the same.

Q: Is the United States considering any American ideas to help solve the Tabah problem and has the U.S. been in contact with the parties or will it be in contact with the parties in this regard?

A: We have been in contact with the parties for a long time and to the extent we can offer constructive ideas, we try to do that because of the relationship we have with both the parties. Indeed, when the talks were held ... we did have a representative of the State Department present. So we have been engaged, and to the extent we've got ideas we provide them quietly to the parties.

Q: Anything new that you might offer?

A: Well, I hesitate to say these problems, even problems that look to the outsider as small and should be soluble, sometimes take a long time to solve, so I've got nothing to say that would encourage the impression that it's going to be solved within the week or imminently, but we're hopeful that both governments are approaching this in the spirit that might yield a solution before very long.

(end transcript)

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News Summary September 9, 1985

Press Reports

Herzog Assails Kahane/Patrols Ordered to Halt

NYT-special-President Herzog said "it is a disgrace" that a man like Kahane could be accepted in Israeli society. Herzog spoke to high school students. He compared Kach's program to the Nuremberg laws. Recent polls show that if elections were held today, Kach would win more than 10 seats.

ND-wire-Israel ordered armed vigilante to stop patrolling Arab towns on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. The patrols were started last week in response to a string of attacks on Jews.

Shiites Shell Palestinians

NYT-UPI-Shiite Moslem militiamen trying to gain control of a Palestinian refugee area in Beirut, bombarded positions inside the district with mortar shells. Many people were killed. There has been no public word on the Lebanese request for Syrian troops to be deployed in Beirut.

Iran-Iraq

NYT-Reuters-Technipetrol of Italy and Kinetics Technology International, a Dutch company, have jointly contracted to build part of a petrochemical plant in central Iran.

NYT-UPI-Iran said its soldiers recaptured a key mountain post and 8 border villages from Iraqi forces in the north. Iraq had no comment.

11 Neo-Nazis on Trial

NYT-King-The trial of members of a neo-Nazi group called the Order, began amid heavy security in Seattle. The group "declared war" on the the US which they call the Zionist Occupation Government. They believe that Jews are the offspring of Satan. The members are charged with the murder of Alan Berg, arson, robbery etc...

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Books on Sharon to be Published

NYP-Johnson-Sharon is never at a loss for words. Besides the upcoming account on Sharon's battle with Time Magazine by Uri Dan, Sharon's story will be told in an upcoming book due out this fall from Adams Books. Sharon cooperated on this book entitled "Sharon: An Israeli Caesar." He is also cooperating with Simon & Schuster over rights to his life story and the appropriate ghost author.

Gay Synagogue on Long Island

ND-9/7-Baum-The first gay synagogue on Long Island was dedicated on Sunday. The group has 75 to 100 active members. Temple Beth Chai has no rabbi, cantor or Torah. The ceremonies will draw from Conservative tradition. All references to God will be made without referring to gender. Both men and women are involved.

Paid Ad-Jewish Ed

NYP-full page ad placed by the Board of Jewish Education. "If Your Jewish Chances Are Your Grandchildren Won't Be" states the headline.

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אלו התשרד

אבא ציוןמנל

נאום ערפאת - להלן מתדרוך לארי ספיקט לכתבי הכית הלבן היום. הקטע הראשון נאמר ביזמת הדובר.

Mr. Speaker: The Washington Times had a story this morning indicating that Arafat has offered...made a peace for land offer in the statement, though he currently declined or did not comment on the UN Resolutions and the right of Israel to exist which is an important part of our policy.

Question: So what are you saying?

Mr. Speaker: That he did not comment, did not point out the fact of the UN resolutions and the other items that are important to our policy.

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Foes Unite In West Bank Land Fraud As Arabs Lose Land, Jews Lose Funds

WASH. POST-Claiborne-There are an estimated hundreds of victims in the West Bank, including Arabs and Jews, in what officials say is the biggest land fraud uncovered in Israel's 18-year occupation of the West Bank. The source of the farmers' optimism is a series of public disclosures in recent weeks of widespread land fraud during the past several years in which, according to an Israeli Justice Ministry official, as much as \$100 million may have changed hands for thousands of acres of Arab-owned property that was taken through forgery, deceit, intimidation, and occasionally, force. The swindlers were both Arabs and Jews working in concert.

Arafat Offers Israel 'Peace For Land'

***WASH. TIMES-Kritzberg-Arafat offered Israel "peace for land," adopting implicitly a UN formula under which Israel would win Arab recognition in exchange for a pullout from territories occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. However, he did not state that he was accepting 242 and 338. Arafat also expressed hope his plan would get the Reagan administration's support. He spoke by satellite hook - up to the annual convention of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. "With Jordan," Arafat said, "we offered our initiative, peace for land. We hope that this will be accepted by the whole of international public opinion, the UN and especially by the democratic forces inside Israel."

Mubarak Fired On?

WASH. TIMES-(Wires)-Fears of instability and upheaval in the Middle East were heightened over the weekend with reports of a failed assassination attempt on Mubarak. While the reports are still unconfirmed and have not been mentioned in the media, Mubarak is said to have narrowly escaped death last week when an assailant fired on the president's car, killing the driver and grazing the president's head.

US, Israel Spar Over Arms To Arabs

USA TODAY-(Wires)-US and Israeli officials are battling again on a sore topic: the sale of advanced weapons to Arab nations. Israeli officials contend the weapons, including the latest fighter planes, would give the Arab nations an undisputed advantage in terms of sheer military hardware.

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טגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

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מצ"ב קטעים מהעתונות האמריקאית ("וושינגטון פוסט" ו"ניו טיימס"
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אודי פולונסקי

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Saturday, September 7, 1985 $\frac{2}{4}$ 161

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Wash. Post Sept. 7

THE WASH

U.S. Still Shuns PLO, Shultz Assures Israel

\$750 Million in Economic Aid Released

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State George P. Shultz reassured Israel yesterday that the United States will continue to avoid dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organization. In what appeared to be an implied warning to the PLO, Shultz said that "those who perpetuate violence deal themselves out of the [Mideast] peace process."

Shultz's comments, after a meeting with Israeli Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai, were an attempt to ease Israeli concern that the administration might authorize Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy to meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would include Nabil Shaath, an advisor to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat.

Referring to reports that President Reagan plans a major new arms sale to Jordan, Shultz said "it is clear to us that Jordan has definite security problems" and added that "help from the United States is justified."

He insisted, however, that Reagan "has made no final decision about exactly what he might propose or when he might propose it."

Shultz and Modai appeared briefly before reporters to announce that the United States, recognizing Israel's economic retrenchment, is releasing the first \$750 million of \$1.5 billion in special economic aid approved last month by Congress for Israel.

However, they were besieged by questions about possible U.S. moves for new peace talks between Jordan and Israel.

The questioning was so intense that Shultz, recalling his service as treasury secretary in the Nixon administration, remarked to Modai

that "it used to be that I thought economics was important," yet the fact that the United States was turning over to Israel three-quarters of a billion dollars "doesn't even get a question from the press."

"It's a new day," he added wryly. U.S. and diplomatic sources said Thursday that the administration is considering sending Murphy, assistant secretary for Mideast affairs, back to the region to meet with a delegation chosen by Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan.

Shaath's inclusion among the proposed Palestinian members roused Israeli concern that the United States might be abandoning its 10-year policy of refusing to deal with the PLO unless it accepts Israel's right to exist.

U.S. officials deny that any policy change is contemplated. However, they also have said that, since defining precisely what constitutes PLO membership is difficult, it might be contended that Shaath does not belong officially to the umbrella organization of Palestinian groups.

Shultz sidestepped questions yesterday about how the United States would decide whether proposed delegates are PLO members. Instead, the Cabinet member sought to play down the idea that the United States is planning some major policy shift or dramatic move in the Middle East, saying:

"Sometimes I read in the rumor mill of what we're thinking, and I say somebody is insulting us. They must think we have lost our marbles if they think we are considering this, that or the other thing."

Referring specifically to the PLO, he said, "Our conditions for talking with the PLO remain as they have been for many years."

He immediately added: "I would have to say that the upsurge of vi-

olence recently certainly presents a problem . . . I think it is very clear to us that those who perpetrate violence deal themselves out of the peace process."

He did not elaborate. But U.S. officials suggested privately that the remark was intended as a bow to Israeli charges that the increased PLO presence in Jordan is linked to a recent surge of murders and other terrorist acts inside Israel.

The official U.S. response to these charges has been that Hussein is opposed to terrorism and that, while he has permitted the PLO to strengthen its administrative presence in Amman, the Jordanian capital, he has not permitted terrorist groups to operate from Jordanian territory.

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However, the officials suggested that Shultz's comment could be interpreted as a warning that, if the PLO hopes to win a role in the peace process, it must cease terrorism from any source and be more cooperative in fostering negotiations.

State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb, asked whether Shultz's remarks were aimed at the PLO and its possible participation in peace talks, replied: "I would simply say in the most general terms, if the shoe fits, wear it. But I'm not ruling in or ruling out."

In addition to the money for Israel, the State Department announced that it is drawing on appropriated supplemental funds to provide a \$250 million cash transfer to Egypt and \$53 million to Jordan to subsidize commodity imports and school construction.

The department said another \$3 million will be allocated shortly for projects to aid Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Modai, reiterating Israel's refusal to deal with the PLO, said he is "positive that whatever our American friends are discussing with King Hussein and some Palestinian representatives are in line with this basic approach that terrorists are excluded from any discussions"

He also reemphasized Israel's strong opposition to U.S. arms sales to Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

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Wash. Post

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N.Y. Times, Sept. 7 3

1985

Shultz Says Jordanians Need Sale of U.S. Arms

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 6 — Secretary of State George P. Shultz said today that there was "a definite need" for the sale of advanced American arms to Jordan even though his aides said such a deal would lead to a confrontation with Congress.

Speaking to reporters at the State Department, Mr. Shultz said President Reagan had not yet decided on the timing or composition of the long-awaited arms package, which also includes advanced arms to Saudi Arabia. But he added that "it is clear to us that Jordan has definite security problems" and that "help from the U.S. is justified."

Mr. Shultz came down to the lobby of the department to speak to reporters after meeting earlier this morning in his seventh floor suite with Yitzhak Modai, the Finance Minister of Israel. Mr. Modai, when questioned about Mr. Shultz's seeming endorsement of the arms package to Arab countries, answered with his Government's standard response — that Israel "will resent" the supply of arms to Arab countries that do not have normal relations with Israel.

Administration Defends Package

Jordan, which feels threatened by neighboring Syria, has requested an air

defense package from the United States that would consist of advanced fighter planes of a model such as the F-16 or the F-20, new mobile Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and shoulder-held Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Jordan also has requests pending for equipment to outfit a mobile strike force that could be sent to help other Arab countries that came under attack.


The Administration has compiled a confidential study defending the arms sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia and has just completed briefing members of Congress on it. But since last winter, when active discussion of these arms sales began, Congressional supporters of Israel have been making clear their outright opposition to such sales and their willingness to seek a vote to block them.

In fact, the foreign aid authorization bill for the 1986 fiscal year that begins on Oct. 1 contains a nonbinding, but politically significant, "sense of the Congress" section that seeks to bar advanced military sales to Jordan unless that country "is committed to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel."

Effort to Block Sale Threatened

Supporters of Israel have said that if the Administration goes ahead with a military sale to Jordan in the absence of tangible moves toward direct negotiations, an effort will be made to block the sale. There is similar opposition to the sale of two squadrons of F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, along with other equipment.

In an effort to advance the cause of Middle East peace talks, the President is also studying whether to authorize Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, to hold a meeting with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The United States has said it would do so, provided it would lead to direct talks between the Arabs and Israel. But so far, there is no guarantee from Jordan that there would be an early start to direct talks.



King Hussein of Jordan has proposed such a meeting as a first step toward eventual peace talks under an undefined international "umbrella." Mr. Murphy was in the Middle East last month to discuss such a meeting, but failed to get adequate assurances that it would lead to direct peace talks.

Reports Seem to Irk Shultz

In recent days, reports in the Israeli press have asserted that the Administration was considering having Mr. Murphy meet with a group that would include a Palestinian who has held official posts in the past for the Palestine Liberation Organization. Since 1975, the United States has said it would not negotiate with or recognize the P.L.O. until it met certain American conditions, including recognition of Israel's right to exist and certain United Nations resolutions.

Mr. Shultz, insisting that there had been no change in the American policy, seemed irked by the reports. "Sometimes I read in the rumor mill of what we're thinking," he said, "and I say somebody is insulting us, they must think we have lost our marbles if they think we are considering this, that, or the other thing."

Without accusing the P.L.O. directly of involvement, he also expressed concern about a rise in recent violence in Israel. "I would have to say that the upsurge of violence recently certainly presents a problem," Mr. Shultz said.

"I think it is very clear that those who perpetrate violence deal themselves out of the peace process," he said. There has been a series of individual attacks this year by Arabs on Israelis in territories occupied by Israel. Israeli officials have accused the P.L.O. of instigating them, and some Israeli leaders have threatened retaliation against the P.L.O. headquarters in Jordan.

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N.Y. Times

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מתכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קט"ח.

חורף דובר מחמ"ר ליום - Friday - Sept. 9

A statement, some of you may have heard the Secretary here in the lobby this morning after his meeting with the Economic Finance Minister, Mr. Modayee (?), and let me just add to that, that the administration has decided to make an initial apportionment of \$1.08 billion in supplemental economic assistance for Israel, Egypt and Jordan. These funds, part of the FY 1985 supplemental Foreign Assistance appropriation approved in August by the Congress, will be used as follows: Israel, \$750 million for a cash transfer; Egypt, \$250 million for a cash transfer; Jordan, \$50 million for a commodity import program and \$30 million for school construction. In addition, \$3 million will soon be apportioned for projects to assist Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. The total amount of economic assistance for the Middle East provided under the supplemental appropriation is \$2.258 billion and is provided on an all-grant basis.

Q Is Ambassador Murphy going to the Middle East to meet with the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation any time soon?

MR. KALB: To begin with, I have nothing on that. (Laughter.) To supplement that declaration of generous information -- (laughter) -- I'm going to have to ask that no one askan (?) read what the Secretary and visiting Israeli Minister said in the lobby at about 11:00 this morning. What they said, what the Secretary said at that point in reply to several questions that he took, will stand for anything I could say and I'm not in the position to amplify or circle dates or whatever. So you either find your answers there or you may have a problem.

Q Should we infer that the administration is ruling out any PLO members or people closely associated with the PLO as members of that delegation?

MR. KALB: Well, in connection -- what precipitates that question?

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Q In connection to what the Secretary said about the PLO.

MR. KALB: Well, the only thing I would introduce on that point is that I would not rule in or I would not rule out -- I think you're making a reference there to violence -- the allusion that the Secretary had made -- and I would simply say in the most general terms that if the shoe fits, wear it, but I'm not ruling in or ruling out.

Q You're not ruling out PLO members or --

MR. KALB: The ground rules, and I think the Secretary made that clear about who the United States would talk to and the question of the US position on the PLO, it is here, I have just received a transcript, but I haven't had time to go through it, I think that all stands and I think the Secretary made that clear and I will have to

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NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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stay with what he said. But there is no change on the US position vis-a-vis the PLO.

Q But what were you talking about when you said the shoe fits. People engaged -- you may a reference to violence, the question didn't say anything about violence, the Secretary did.

MR. KALB: Well, that was implicit. That was the genesis of the question.

Q Right. So my question is, when you talking about shoes, are you talking about the shoes of members of the PLO who may or may not be engaged in violence? Are you making a distinction between members who are not engaged and members who are so if the shoe of violence fits, then you have to wear it?

MR. KALB: I'm going to leave that last stand as I said it.

Q Bernie, isn't the ground rule still that the Palestinians are men of good will, whatever that formulation is that the Secretary used?

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MR. KALB: The Secretary used that. I know of no indication that anything along those lines has changed. You're talking about the news conference some time ago, yes.

Q And that applied regardless of whether they were members of the PLO or not --

Q Not in the context of --

Q PNC rather, I'm sorry.

MR. KALB: (To staff). Has the transcript been distributed yet? Not yet. It's ready? Right. Okay. Excuse me, Bill.

Q Back on your announcement on the Middle East funds, where shall we go for details on the money for Jordan, the commodity import program?

MR. KALB: What I have is the \$50 million for a commodity import program, \$30 million for school construction.

Q Right. You don't have any more details on what's involved in that program?

MR. KALB: No, but if I could get any, we can make those available.

Q Any comment on the continuing violence at the refugee camps in Lebanon, including 39 reported --

MR. KALB: I think you've heard it often stated from the rostr here that the violence that you're alluding to is to be deplored and only underscores the necessity to move forward on the peace process.

Q Bernie, when Secretary Shultz said that those perpetrate violence deal themselves out of the peace process, is that a warning to PLO to stop attacks or what?

MR. KALB: I regret that you missed the first part of this briefing. We dealt with that at some length and I have reached the outer corner of my abilities to talk about that.

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הדגיש כי מרפי לא ייפגש עם אנשי אסיף.

השר ארנס ציין כי יש פה מילכוד, שכן מיפגש בין ארה"ב למשלחת ירדנית פלסטינאית יקשה על קיומו של מו"מ' יסיר, ואף עלול להפוך מו"מ' יסיר לנכתי אפשרי. אין אנו מטילים ספק בכוונות הטובות של ארה"ב, אך מיפגש כנ"ל יפגע במהלך השלום ויהיה COUNTER PRODUCTIVE, המיפגש יהווה שגיאה גם משום, שהוא יסייע להוביל את חוסיין לדרך מסוכנת שעלולה לפגוע בביצובת מספרו.

השר ארנס הסביר כי חוסיין איננו מתייחס ברצינות הראויה למסכנה הצפויה לו מקרבנו הנוכחית לעראפת, ועל ארה"ב וישראל לשכנעו לסטות מדרך זו.

סג"ר ארה"ב אמר, כי חילוקי הדעות בין ישראל לארה"ב הם לגבי השאלה אם על האמריקנים להפגש עם משלחת של ירדן ו- PLO מוסלמיים PALASTINIANS. הוא שב והדגיש, כי מיפגש כזה יתקיים רק בכוונתם של לקראת מו"מ' יסיר. השר ארנס השיב, שישראל איננה מתנגדת לפגישה עם משלחת ירדנית פלסטינאית ואף מעוניינת בה בתנאי שהנפגשת איננה ארה"ב אלא ישראל עצמה. הוא שב והדגיש את הנוק הפונטנציאלי המסוּן בעצם מיפגש אפשרי של מרפי.

פיקרינג ציין כי המיפגש יתקיים רק אם ניתן יהיה להגיע, בעקבותיו, ל- WORKING GROUP. הוא הוסיף, כי עראפת פועל נגד תהליך השלום, כי "אי אפשר להלחם ולדבר בעת ובטונה אחת".

ב. מצרים.

פיקרינג אמר, שהרוסם של האמריקנים הוא, ששום דבר לא התקדם למעשה בנושא זה.

השר ארנס הסביר, כי על מצרים להנין שאי אפשר שיחסי ישראל - מצרים יהיו תלויים בנושא טאבה. אם מצרים רוצה ביחסים טובים עם ישראל, עליה להוריד את ענין טאבה מן ה- PEDESTAL שעליו הציבה אותו. משיחות עם מצרים עולה כי טאבה כמעט ונחשבת

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**סודי ביותר/מיד

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**דע: לשכת רוהמ' - לנמענים בלבד

**פגישת השר מודעי עם המוכיר

**במצורף החלק הכלכלי משיחת השר מודעי עם המוכיר כפי שדווח ע"י
**אודי פולונסקי.

**תקציר פגישת השר מודעי עם שר החוץ האמריקאי מחלקת המדינה
**6/9/85


**השתתפו מהצד האמריקאי: השר שולץ, תת השר אלן ואליס, פיטר
**מרפי, פיטר מקפירסון, פרופ' סטנלי פישר, פרופ' ביילי לוד,
**פיטרס וטיס האור.

**מהצד הישראלי: השר מודעי, השגריר רוון, הציר אלי דובינשטיין
**דן הלפרין, אודי פולונסקי.

**שולץ: רוצים לשמוע מה שאתם עושים, למרות שאנו עוקבים מקרוב.
**מכירים בזה שיש עוד הרבה מה לעשות. תומכים במה שאתם עושים
**נותנים חצי מ-1.5 מיליארד דולר שכבר מוכנים להעברה. רוצה
**לשמוע על התוכנית. אתן הצהרת תמיכה. אחי' רחצה לדבר גם לגבי
**תוכניות ארוכות טווח יותר של JEPC. רוהימ' בביקורו האחרון
**התייחס לשיפור הכלכלה בטווח הארוך.

**מודעי: מניח שאתה מכיר טוב את הנושא ואציין כמה דברים
**שעשינו. התוכנית מקיפה את כל האלמנטים שדברנו עליהם. הלואי
**והיינו יכולים להיות יותר דרסטיים. ערוב של צעדים כלכליים
**ומינהלתיים. התחלנו תחת חוקי חרום. שמח לומר שכל הצעדים

כמה חשד
החלטת



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מתוך 2 97
מתוך 4 12
סודי ביותר

נלקחו מתוך הסכמה של הצדדים המעורבים .
פחות (18.8 אחוז + 5.4 אחוז) שהיך מעל 24 אחוזים
קיצוץ בחקציב הממשלה, תוספת קיצוץ בכוח אדם - אשר גודלו
בשירותים הוא כמעט כמו ביצרני .

התכנון לפטר 10,000 איש בשנה הפיסקלית הזאת, הצלחנו עד כה
לפטר 3,000 .
ביטול סובסידיות ליצוא בוצע מוקדם הרבה מעבר להתחייבות לפי
הסכם אס"ח .

חסכוניות צמודי דולר נזילים - אי אפשר לחסוך מתחת שנה . לא
מקבלים ריבית על סכומים שמוצאים מהתוכנית לפני תום שנה .
צעדים מנהלתיים - פיקוח מחירים (שאתה שונא)
שולץ : דצוי להפטר מהפיקוח כאשר הלחץ על המחירים רפה .

מודעי: זאת התוכנית. עובדה שמחירים מסויימים נמוכים ממה שנקבע.
רוצים לעשות זאת לאחר החגים. הוכרו לציבור שכך יהיה. לא הוכרו
על איה מוצרים .

לגבי הסכם השכר, עיקרנו את ההצמדה וקיצצנו באופן דרסטי. ל
אחוזים במונחים דיאליים של קיצוץ. כאשר האיגודים טוענים שזה
9 אחוז. ניסינו להשתמש בחוקי חרום לפטר אנשים מסקטור ציבורי
והיתה צעקה. אני לא במפלגת העבודה אבל דוהימי פרס כן ואתה
יכול להנין קטייו בהקשר זה. מקווים שעד סוף השנה הקלנדרית
נשלים מ-3,000 מפורטים ל-10,000 מפורטים. אך יש בעייה-לאן
יילכו? צמצמנו את השוק המקומי ואין הרבה מקומות עבודה פתוחים
בשליבים מצמצמים את האשראי. המערכת המוניטרית נשלטת ע"י
הממשלה. רוצים להעביר את כל המוסדות המשמשים לצורך כך לידיים
פרטיות. בנק ישראל רוצה להוריד את האשראי החופשי ב-10 אחוז.
עד כה הוריד ב-5 אחוז. כאשר במקביל הורידו ריבית בצורה
משמעותית. מסמן על 'קירור' הכלכלה.
ייצוא גבר- התחיל לאט במאי ויוני, יולי אוגוסט-גדילה.

שולץ : לאיפה ?

מודעי: לשוק ולארה"ב

הלפרין : התחזקות הדולר עוזרת בנגד האירופאים להגביר היצוא
לכאן .
מודעי: כן . הפסיכולוגיה על הציבור עוזרת לתוכנית. לגבי האפקט
האמיתי - מוקדם לקבוע. החודשיים האחרונים היו הראשונים מזה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 5
עמק 4 מתוך 12 סודי ביותר

בזמן רב שלא הרפייסו בהם כסף והצליחו לשמור על מידת
הרורבות. הסיבה - היצוא שלה והיבוא ירד, בוברז ע"י נסיעות
ישראלים לחו"ל ירד (בגלל מס הנסיעות הכבד), התיירות שלה.
האווירה חיובית.

(שולץ יוצא מהחדר).

ואמריס : טה לגני BENCH MARKS -בטח מעניין את פיטר.

פיטר: כן. האם לא נדאי להכריז באופן ציבורי עליהם ?

מודעי: הכרזנו עליהם. אולי לא בדיוק כמו שנכתבו

במקור. אינפלציה -אמרנו לציבור שרוצים 3-2 אחוזים בחודש ואלה

הציפיות לאוגוסט. אמרתי - המטרה: ירידה ב-10 אחוזים, ועשינו

ואת. קיצוץ בתקציב -קיצצנו בסה"כ 10 אחוזים וב- 5 נחוץ

מהחוד חובות 6 אחוזים. כמעט בכל משרד ממסלתי חיים באילוץ

הקיצוץ והלחץ גובר. אני צועק כל פעם שזה עולה ומנסים לנצל

רורבות.

פיטר: לפי העתונות נראה שהציבור לא מבין את מטרות הקיצוץ -לא

נראה שהציבור יודע.

מודעי: מפריא אותי, כי הקיצוץ פורסם בכל העתונים לפני

שאמר-התקציב המקוץ. לפי המספרים אף משרד לא חרג, מלבד

משרד הבריאות שמראש ידענו שיצטרך להשתמש ברורבות.

(שולץ חוזר לחדר).

מודעי: דברנו בהעדרך על BENCH MARKS -פרופי פיטר אומר

שהציבור לא מודע למטרה של התקציב. לי נראה שכן אבל אולי צריך

לתחלים לצאת בהצהרה לציבור שתפרט את ה- BENCH MARKS.

הלפרין -אם אני מבין את פיטר, רוצה שיהיה פרסום שגם יחייב את

הממשלה.

שולץ : אם הממשלה מפרסמת לציבור משהו-זה יהיה

ציבורי ייטדי. מצב הכלכלה שלכם היום יותר טוב.



מודעי: אם כולם טובלים או סימן שהנטל מחולק, אך הבעיה היא שהם


כולם לוחצים או השאלה היא אם אפשר לעמוד כנגד זה.

שולץ : הציבור בוודאי מבין שכולם מתחלקים בעול.

מודעי: בשני החודשים הראשונים ההסתדרות צעקה שהם נושאים בעול

מלבד בעוד שהמסטיקים לא. צקו במידה מסויימת, אך רוצה להגיד





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News Summary September 7-8, 1985

Editorials

NYT-9/8-"A Nazi at Rutgers, Revisited" In 1935, Rutgers University in N.J., held a special board of trustees meeting to hear a case between an anti-Nazi German instructor, Lienhard Bergel, and Frederick Hauptmann, a fervent Nazi-sympathizer, who was the chairman of the German Dept. The board found in favor of Hauptmann and dismissed Bergel. In 1940, Hauptmann was found working for Gobbels in Germany. The FBI found that he spied on US Naval movements. Bergel, who continued teaching, is now 80 years old. He is involved in a movement to clear his name. He says it is for the good of all academia. The President of Rutgers will distribute an exposition of the facts.

Columns

NYT-9/8-Sol Linowitz "Invite New Egyptian-Israeli Talks" The US should not heed the calls of those who believe that we should talk to the PLO. That would be moving in the wrong direction, because it would delay rather than accelerate serious talks. We should reactivate the peace process with those who are ready to move forward. The US should recognize that Jordan and the Palestinians are not apt to enter the negotiations soon and invite Israel and Egypt back to the table in order to advance talks on "full autonomy" for the Palestinians, as agreed upon in the Camp David Accords. Peres knows that time is not on his side. Peres has shown a readiness to move forward. This should be supported and encouraged. Mubarak understands that Hussein will not join unless real progress can be made. He is aware that prospects are better under Peres. Jordan and the Palestinians will have to be included, but not now.

Israelis Rate 'Security Zone' a Success

NYT-9/7-Freidman-The debate in Israel over the security zone in Lebanon is over. Uri Lubrani says that the zone has worked better than expected. "We intend to maintain it for the foreseeable future," he states. The mood around headquarters in South Lebanon is relaxed. Although there have been attacks on the zone, only two Israeli soldiers have been killed in five months. For Israel, it is the number of Israelis killed that determine the zone's merits, not the size or number of attacks on

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on the zone. Israel has refrained from attacking the Shiites in recent months. For doing this, Amal has not seriously attacked the zone and has tried to curtail the Palestinians. "Amal knows how far it can go before the iron fist comes down," says an Israeli official. Anyway, Amal is now more interested in gaining power in Lebanon, since the Israeli presence is so small. Analysts say that Israel has allied itself with a Christian militia in a Shiite environment, and that over the long term, they may regret it. (cabled-9/7)

Shultz on Arms Sales to Jordan

NYT-Gwertzman-9/7-Shultz said there was "a definite need" for the sales of advanced arms to Jordan, even though his aides say a deal would lead to a confrontation with Congress. He says that Jordan has definite security problems. Shultz met earlier in the day with Modai, who said that Israel will "resent" the supply of arms to Arab countries that do not have normal relations with Israel, the Israeli standard response. Israeli supporters in Congress are ready to try to block the sale. Shultz has been irked by recent reports in the Israeli press that says Murphy will meet with a group that includes a Palestinian with PLO connections. Shultz insists that there has been no change in US policy towards the PLO. He says he feels "insulted" when he reads such rumors. The upsurge of Palestinian violence in the West Bank "resents a problem," said Shultz. He added that those who perpetrate violence "deal themselves out of the peace process." (see DN-Rehm: photo of Israeli demolition expert checking wounded Arab suspected of planting a bomb in Jerusalem yesterday.) (NYT article cabled-9/7)

US Jews Invite Palestinians' Views

NYT-9/8-no biline-A small group of rabbis and American Jewish organizations are inviting Palestinians to be guest speakers in synagogues. Their purpose, says the rabbis, is not to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, but to break down the assumption that all Arabs are bent on destroying Israel, and to expose US Jews to views rarely heard in synagogues. Statistics on how often his type of meeting has occurred are available but most rabbis say two dozen synagogues are involved, mainly from the Reform branch. Leaders of Jewish groups are mixed on the program. Some, like Rabbi Avi Weiss see it as a shame when Palestinians close to the PLO are allowed in a synagogue. Others, like Nathan Perlmutter saw no problem, "Jews are not ice, they will not melt at another point of

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view."

Beirut Moslems Ask for Syrian Troops

NYT-Hijazi-Lebanon's top Moslem officials asked Syria to send troops to check the worsening fighting. Shelling across the Green Line has broken out. Syria is reluctant to get itself caught up in the Lebanon quagmire and has refused to send in troops to Beirut on earlier occasions. Syria still has 25,000 troops in Eastern Lebanon. (NYT-Hijazi 9/7)

Iran-Iraq

NYT-9/8-Reuters-Iraq said that its warplanes raided Kharg Island twice in the last 24 hours and hit a "large naval target" in the Gulf. The latest raids are aimed in hampering Iranian efforts to repair damage already inflicted on Kharg Island, so Iran could not export any oil.

Cracow Marks Bar Mitzvah

NYT-p.1-9/8-Kaufman (Photo p.1 of Eric reading from Torah with rabbi) The Bar Mitzvah of Eric Storm in Cracow was infused with tragedy and special meaning. Before the war there were 60,000 Jews in and 350 synagogues in Cracow. Now there are 600 elderly Jews. The ceremony caused some conflict between the branches of Judaism. Eric belongs to a Reconstructionist temple who has a woman rabbi. Orthodox groups pressured the Jews in Cracow not to work too closely with the Reconstructionists. In the end, an Orthodox rabbi performed the ceremony. (see DN-wire)

Bomb at Nazi Criminal's Home

NYT-9/7-p.1-Metro-McFadden-A bystander who saw a house on Long Island on fire and ran up to alert its occupants was seriously injured by a bomb intended for the homeowner, a former Latvian policeman once accused of Nazi war crimes. The Gov't sought unsuccessfully to deport Elmars Sprogis last year. He was not hurt in the blast. Newsday received two recorded messages saying "Listen Carefully. Jewish Defense League. Nazi War Criminal. Never Again." Authorities do not doubt that the JDL planted the bomb. Several hours later, a man who had been accused of concealing his membership in the SS died of injuries he suffered three weeks ago in an almost identical bombing in N.J. (see DN)

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Church Marks Moses Sainthood

DN-9/8-Bell-The Greek Orthodox Church celebrated the feast day of Moses, patriarch and saint. He only appears on the saintly honor role in this church, along with many other Old Testament heroes.

Zubin Mehta

DN-9/8-Gladstone-full page article on Mehta. Of Israel he says "The people reminded me of my own people. They are like Parsees; they have kept their racial identity." The Israelis appointed him lifetime director of the Israel Philharmonic. He spends 3 months a year in Israel.

Letters-On Teddy's Jerusalem

NYT Magazine-4 letters on the 8/4 article. Two praise Kollek and the beauty of Jerusalem. Samuel Mozes talks about the Jerusalem Foundation, of which he is in American Planning. Francois Vigier, Prof. of Urban Planning and Design at Harvard writes that Freidman conveniently fails to mention the most salient aspects of the transformation of Jerusalem since 1967: 1) The systematic eviction of Christian and Moslem Arabs by taking away their homes and land in order to annex the territory and 2) A climate of unbridled real estate speculation that defaces a unique city with high rise architecture and worse urban design. Kollek presides over the formulation of a master plan for Jerusalem that is characterized by brutal political objectives aimed at the Palestinians.

התאמת את המידע
 -1-1 מילון המילים
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ניו יורק

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אל: הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לס' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קט"ח
דע: ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - SATURDAY - SEPTEMBER 7, 1985

THE PRESS REPORTS

US Still Shuns PLO, Shultz Assures Israel

***WASH. POST-Goshko-Shultz reassured Israel that the US will continue to avoid dealing with the PLO. In what appeared to be an implied warning to the PLO, Shultz said that "those who perpetuate violence deal themselves out of the Mideast peace process." Shultz's comments, after a meeting with Modaf, were an attempt to ease Israeli concern that the administration might authorize Murphy to meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would include Nabil Shaath, an adviser to Arafat. Referring to reports that Reagan plans a major new arms sale to Jordan, Shultz said "it is clear to us that Jordan has definite security problems" and added that "help from the US is justified." He insisted that Reagan "has made no final decision about exactly what he might propose or when he might propose it." Shultz sidestepped questions about how the US would decide whether proposed delegates are PLO members.

Israeli-Backed Militia Holds Its Own

WASH. POST-Claiborne-Three months after Israel completed the withdrawal of most of its troops from southern Lebanon, the Israeli backed South Lebanon Army has defied skeptics and thus far largely held its own in the "security zone" along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Critics of the plan predicted that the SLA would buckle within a month or two under pressure by Shiite Moslem guerrillas and that defections by Shiites would turn the militia into a skeleton force through which Shiite Moslem Amal militia or Palestinian guerrillas could slip en route to attack Jewish settlements in northern Israel. For the time being, the SLA appears to be holding together more than the pessimists in the Israeli command anticipated. This is due in a major way to the remaining Israeli troops, who are maintaining the same kind of balancing act between conflicting sectarian and political interests in the south as they did beginning with their first withdrawal from Lebanon seven years earlier.

Bomb In Jerusalem Market Injures Bomber

WASH. POST-(AP)-An explosion in an outdoor marketplace filled with shoppers seriously wounded a man who witnesses said was trying to plant a bomb under a car. It was the third attempted attack on Israelis since Tuesday. This blast occurred about noon near the office of Kahane.

Ethiopian Jews Defy Rabbis In Israel

WASH. POST-Vromen-About 500 Ethiopian Jews, shouting "the rabbis are racist,"

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staged a demonstration in Jerusalem Wednesday against demands by Israel's rabbis that the immigrants undergo symbolic conversions before marrying. They said they are fully Jewish and should not have to submit to the rite. Tuvia Semani said: "We came here to be with Israelis, to be part of the Jewish people after suffering for our religion for thousands of years, but the rabbis just show us that they don't like those of our color." A dozen members of Israel's left-wing Mapam Party joined the Falashas' protest.

Shiites, Palestinians Clash In Beirut

WASH. POST-Boustany-Shiite Amal militiamen battled Palestinian fighters in the densely populated refugee camp of Burj al Barajinah for the fourth straight day after night-long street fighting between Moslem militias in West Beirut. This latest round of fighting has raised fears of a second chapter of bloody warfare pitting Amal against Palestinian guerrillas entrenched in the refugee camps around Beirut.

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מסי מברק

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אל: הטברה, מעיית, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, יגר, לסי רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קטי"ח

דע: ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - SUNDAY - SEPTEMBER 8, 1985

EDITORIALS

*** WASH. POST-8/9-"Getting Serious In The Mideast" It is not clear what the US is edging toward in the Middle East. The quest for Palestinians who would talk with Israel has produced Palestinians who would talk with the US. Officials in the State Dept. would take the chance that a US meeting with some of them would give the PLO its long-sought American connection and, with it, a readiness finally to accnt the Israelis. But even Arafat has cast a shadow on that possibility, by retreating from his embrace in Feb. with Jordan and by taking a higher profile in terror against Israel. The US should expect Hussein to show more bravery - to go back to Arafat for some new names. To induce Israel to explore peace, the US is going to have to connect the separate pieces of its policy. To push a wary and divided Israel toward talks while major new arms packages are being offered Jordan and Saudi Arabia is a no go. It will freeze Israeli diplomacy and mobilize the Israel lobby in Washington. The main requirement is that the US be serious. Also, until the administration includes the Syrians, it had better stay in second gear.

THE PRESS REPORTS

Lebanese Premier Urges Return Of Syrian Troops

WASH. POST-Boustany-Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami urged militia leaders to pull their men from the lawless streets of Beirut and called for the return of Syrian troops to maintain order in the Lebanese capital. Karami, made the statement after an emergency meeting with House Speaker Hussein Hussein and Defense Minister Adel Osseirane. Karami said he doubted that any other force could guarantee the safety of the war-plagued citizenry or the implementation of security agreements. The request to Syria is another sign of Lebanon's increasing dependence on Damascus.

New Prime Minister Of Egypt Has Strong Finance Experience

THE SUN-(AP)-A new prime minister with a strong financial background was sworn in three days after the former prime minister resigned as part of an apparent effort by Mubarak to place new emphasis on dealing with the country's rising prices and sluggish growth. Prime Minister Aly Lutfy, 49, former finance minister and economics professor, succeeds Kamal Hassan Ali.

American's Bar Mitzvah Heartens Krakow's Judaism

WASH. POST-Diehl-The vibrant Jewish community that nourished his ancestors is now only a few dozen strong. They tend the neglected splendors of the old synagogues with little joy or hope. But Eric Strom, a 13-year old American from Conn., returned a spark of life to Krakow's surviving Jews. He carried out his bar mitzvah in the 130-year Templum Synagogue of Krakow - a celebration unknown since WWII.

מסי מברק

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Remallah, said Israel radio. The latest attacks on Israelis have been striking for both their audacity and their increasing frequency. Prof. Mark A. Heller was interviewed for his opinions on why this type of terrorism was on the rise. He cites many reasons, including the fact that a large number of terrorists were released into the West Bank in a recent exchange, and the re-establishment of Jor as a base of operational headquarters for the PLO. But the most important reason, Heller believes, is that there is a new breed of Palestinians that has known no other administration than the Israeli military gov't. They see themselves in direct political conflict with Israel and see no real help from Jordan or the PLO. Israel, ready to put a "return address" on every act of violence, points to the PLO at a time when Washington appears ready to talk to a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. The Israelis have hinted that they were ready to consider direct action against the PLO offices in Amman. (Photo of Peres with soldier in Hebron)

Arms to Jordan

WSJ-Greenberger-Congressional sources say they expect the Administration to notify Capital Hill within two weeks of plans to sell arms to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Murphy is going to Amman, perhaps as early as next week. There is strong Congressional opposition to the sales. The Mideast process may move into high gear soon, if Reagan endorses a State Dept. proposal of a meeting between Murphy and four Palestinians. The State Dept. argues that time is running out and that if a meeting doesn't take place within the next month or so, chances for a breakthrough will vanish. (see NYP)

Surprise and Concern in Egypt

NYT-Miller-Egyptian officials and diplomats expressed surprise and concern over the resignation of PM Ali, a close confidant of Mubarak. Ali's resignation removed from the political scene a major symbol of the continuity of Sadat's peace policies with Israel. Ali was known and respected by many Israelis. The new PM has never visited Israel. Egyptian leaders stressed that the change would not impact on Israeli-Egyptian relations. In Israel, the resignation was offset by the successful visit of Avraham Tamir, the head of Peres's office.

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Lebanon Captive Gets Home Visit

ND-combined-Michel Seurat, one of four Frenchmen held by kidnapers in Lebanon, was allowed home to visit his family in West Beirut, his Syrian-born wife said. Mary Seurat said she believed her husband and French journalist Jean-Paul Kauffmann would be released when Israel frees the last Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners from Atlit. A spokesman for PM Peres said the last 119 prisoners would be released within 10 days.

Kuwaiti Expulsions

NYT-Reuters-Kuwait has deported 6,270 people since an attempt to assassinate the Emir, Shiek Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, on May 25. Islamic Holy War took responsibility for the attack.

White Supremacist Gets 20 Years

NYT-UPI-James D. Ellison, the leader of the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, a militant white supremacist group based in Arkansas, was sentenced to 20 years in prison on racketeering and weapon charges. Six other members were also sentenced. Among other things Ellison was convicted of was the burning of a synagogue in Indiana.

Hasidim Protest Trash Plant

ND-Dessent-(Photos of thousands of Hasidim protesting) Thousands of Hasidic Jews marched across the Brooklyn Bridge to protest plans to build a massive incinerator that would convert garbage to energy in their Brooklyn neighborhood. The protesters fear that emissions from the plant would poison the air.

Yiddish Culture

NYT-Freedman-A Yiddish film festival is opening next week at the 92nd Street Y. The festival will include other cultural events as well.

Argentina Rabbi Will Vow Lead Oldest Manhattan Synagogue

ND-AP-Rabbi Marshall T. Meyer, who spent the past 25 years in Argentina

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speaking out about Human Rights Abuses was named to lead Congregation B'nai Jeshurun on the West Side.

Film On Holocaust Premiere

NYT-"Shoah" the epic film on the Holocaust by the French journalist and filmmaker Claude Lanzmann, will have its US premiere on Oct. 23 in NYC. The film runs 9½ hours and will be shown in 2 parts. The film will be at the theater indefinitely.

Paid Ad-Jewish Education

NYT-Full page ad paid for by the Jewish Board of Education. They ask the question: "This Yom Kippur will your child think a Shofer is someone who drives a limousine?" They discuss survival through education.

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Wall street Journal - אה ארנה מאר אפסן

תחום

הוא מרמז וויקי

(מריק)

הוא מרמז וויקי

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including 'WSJ' and 'הוא מרמז וויקי'.

Here's One Issue Ripe for Some Reagan Inaction

In the coming week President Reagan will be asked to decide what the next U.S. step should be in the now-faltering Mideast peace talks. The major media have already declared this fall to be Mr. Reagan's Time of Testing, a season when he must take strong action in areas from tax reform to Soviet summitry. Some of the president's advisers are going to present the Mideast as yet another field on which he must charge forward. In fact, the opposite is true: We will know the Reagan administration is in control of itself if the White House decides not to do anything dramatic about these peace talks at all.

This past spring the Reagan administration, responding to impressive declarations of peaceable intent by Jordan's King Hussein, began trying once again to get Israeli-Jordanian peace talks going. To oblige the king, we said we were willing to negotiate with a group of Jordanians and Palestinians before they had actually pulled their chairs up to the negotiating table with Israel.

The Israelis did not like this road map that we and the king were laying out. They feared that the PLO had figured out how to get in on the negotiations and avoid having to recognize Israel in return. They made this concern felt. King Hussein wanted—and still wants—arms from the U.S. Our Congress declared that there will be no such arms until the king has produced concrete progress from the negotiating route he persuaded us to set out on. But the Israelis could not stir enough concern here to keep the U.S. from march-

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ing forward with the plan. After all, we said that in these new negotiations we would hold to our long-established promise not to negotiate with the PLO unless it recognized Israel. Moreover, the primary U.S. author of the plan was Secretary of State George Shultz. Israeli officials readily admitted that he was a friend of Israel.

Finally, Israel's multiparty governing coalition was nastily divided over the U.S.-Jordanian initiative. Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his allies were making the most far-reaching arguments against it while Prime Minister Shimon Peres was using other channels to send messages of acquiescence.

So the Israelis did not scuttle the plan. Instead, the strategy soon ran aground on its own. Jordan submitted a list of seven Palestinians to negotiate with the U.S., and five turned out to be PLO activists of one sort or another. Richard Murphy, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, flew to the Mideast to try to jog things along, but the king offered no softening of his intention to have the PLO participate in the proceedings.

In short, matters were going nowhere. So, did our Mideast experts come home to Washington and say, "Well, we gave it our best shot"? Of course they said no such thing, because we are dealing here with the hallucinatory politics of the Mideast. Instead, the diplomats are recommending that we go just a bit further on this problem of the PLO: We should talk to them now, and build some momentum that would then carry them over the horrible hurdle of publicly having to acknowledge Israel's actual right to exist.

The scheme now being developed to justify these meetings would have the U.S. talk to the Palestinians, including the PLO-connected ones. We wouldn't call the talks "negotiations," of course. We would try to follow these talks quickly with later sessions that included Israel. The PLO might issue an early statement that we could interpret as satisfying the demand that it recognize Israel. The administration might even get one more private go-ahead from Israel's prime minister. The effect would be somewhat like that of an animated cartoon: If you flip all the pictures in rapid succession, you can produce the illusion of unbroken motion.

The administration began its current initiative in the belief that King Hussein was offering more room for negotiation than the Israelis gave him credit for. This position was certainly a respectable one. But now we have come to the first crunch, with the king's position on the PLO up against not only the Israelis' traditional stance but our own. We have two general choices: We can give notice that we are sticking on this one, calculating that this is the only way to persuade Hussein to figure out how to extend himself a bit more if he wants the talks to keep moving. Or we can indicate that we will talk to PLO types just a little, just this time, in hopes that one more concession on our part will do the critical trick.

As the issue streams upward for decision, proponents of action will—if they are smart—sound the Deaverite theme of Reagan, the Man of Peace. They will warn that if the president intends to hang tough at the coming summit, he cannot afford to look troglodytic everywhere.

But the more concrete realities all point in the other direction. Mixed signals at the moment from the present Israeli government are not going to keep this issue from blowing up quite soon down the road. If you stand back from the proceedings a ways, it becomes impossible to see what national interest of ours requires us to "keep things moving" even at the cost of one of the true underlying promises of a remarkably stable democratic alliance of ours in an area of the world where such things are nearly nonexistent. On a less elevated plane, it is impossible to see why a president with a heavy and worthwhile agenda of his own for the coming months needs to hold himself out for political battering in order to pursue other people's obsessive views of how to get a Mideast peace.

If the White House buys the "one more time" pitch, the inmates on this issue will have been given another six months in charge of the asylum. If the president decides to be more hardheaded, this is an area where we can look forward to some well-directed inaction this fall.

ישיבות

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מצרים - חילופי הממשלה.

א. משיחה עם קובי/המועצה לבטחון לאומי. לשאלתי כיצד רואים האמריקנים את חילופי הממשלה, אמר כי במישור הפוליטי נוצר מצב בעייתי במקצה, שלפיו כל צמרת הממשלה מורכבת מקצוענים - רה"מ החדש לוטפי וסגניו אבו גזאלה, גנזורי, מגיד וואלי (אני מבין שהאחרונים מוכו סגנים עתה) - והאיש הפוליטי היחיד בביכול הוא מובארכ עצמו. בהקשר תהליך השלום יש כמובן משמעות לעזיבתו של עלי, שהיה מאבני היסוד בתהליך והיה השני אחרי מובארכ בעושר נסיונו (הערה כי אנו בוודאי מצטערים על הליכתו של עלי) - עם זאת הקו הוא כשהיה ומגיד, שהוא מקצועי ביותר ולדעת קובי חיובי, נשאר.

ב. משיחה עם מרפי בהסתהפוח מתני: אמר כי סגירותם בקהיר לא צפחה את השינוי מראש (בשעתו דובר על שינויים קלים אך לא משהו בסדר גודל זה), וליוטס דיווח גם כי בליל השינוי ישב עם בכירים מן הסלטון ולא היתה כל אינדיקציה.

ג. טרישת על מוטברת בעיקר בבריאוהו, ומזה זמן נקבע לו טיפול רטואי בשוויץ. ^{אין} טרם נפגש עם מובארכ ועלי לאחר השנוי כדי לוודא לאשורו (ככל הידוע להם היו יחסים טובים ביותר ואחון בין מובארכ לעלי). אין אינדיקציה כי "סולק" או כדומה.


ד. ייתכן גם כי מובארכ, העורך "מתקפה חזיהית" כולל בכלכלה רצה במקצוען בנושא.

ה. מרפי אינו מניח בכל מקרה שעלי ייעלם כליל מן החמונה ויאבד ל"חומכי השלום". ספקולציה אסטרית (ספקולציה בלבד) היא כי עלי יהיה לסגן נשיא, דבר שדובר עליו גם בעבר.

ו. לגופו של דבר אין מרפי רואה את השינויים כבעלי משמעות באשר לגישה מצרים לשלום עם ישראל.

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


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
מרגה מקדאר

אל: לשי רה"מ, מצפ"א

ביקשתי היום מרפ"י בכל לשון (לאחר בקשות קודמות בימים האחרונים ממחמ"ד) לזרז את התשובה בקטר למועדים המוצעים (16/17.10) לביקור רה"מ. אמר שינסה, הקושי לדבריו הוא שהבית הלבן טרם אישר את מועדי הביקורים האחרים של מנהיגי מדינות כאן.

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מגירות ישראל - וויינגסון

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US Plans Arms Sales In Mideast

***WASH. POST-Ottaway-The Reagan administration plans to propose major new arms sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia that promise to trigger another acrimonious battle in Congress over Middle East policy. White House and State Dept. spokesmen confirmed the administration's intent to submit the requests to sell jet fighters and missiles shortly, and officials told Senate staff aides to expect the proposals in "the next 10 days or two weeks." The US has "security commitments to close friends" it must live up to, the White House official said, adding that "security is inextricably linked to forward movement in the peace process." Ambassador Rosenne in his meeting with Amacost yesterday reiterated Israel's "very strong objections" to the proposed Saudi and Jordanian arms sales, asserting that they would alter the Middle East arms balance and place heavy new financial demands on Israel.

Israeli Stabbed in Gaza

WASH. POST-(Wires)-An Israeli tank truck driver was stabbed while delivering gasoline in the Gaza Strip, military sources said. He is the latest victim in a growing wave of violence against Israelis in occupied Arab territories.

23 Dead In Beirut

WASH. POST-(Wires)-Shiite Moslem gunmen battled Palestinian, Christian and Moslem factions as artillery fire rocked the grounds of Gemayel's governmental palace. Police said at least 23 people were killed in the fighting.

US Jewish Group To Take Jordan Trip

***WASH. TIMES-Meisels-In an unprecedented move yesterday, Hussein invited a group of leading Jewish-Americans to Amman. A 25-member delegation of the American Jewish Congress accepted the invitation and is going to Jordan on Monday on what was described as a fact-finding mission. A member of the group said the Americans had no intention of speaking for Israel or meeting with the PLO, Shamir expressed the fear that the visit by the Jewish delegation would be interpreted as an Israeli negotiation by proxy. Peres said he had no objection to the delegation's planned visit, provided the Americans "did not get involved in Middle East politics."

Mubarak Moves To Boost Egypt's Economy By Putting Young Specialists In Cabinet

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Friedman-The changes in the Egyptian govt. are an indication of how seriously Mubarak views the country's economic plight. The govt. changes appear designed to reshape and reorganize economic policy. The changes indicate that Mubarak is seeking young specialists and technocrats to lead Egypt out of the morass of its economic problems and to coordinate continuing reform. Foreign policy will not be affected.

TV: NIGHTLY NEWS - The major networks focused their main stories on the use of drugs among baseball players, the Titanic, AIDS, and South Africa.

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אל :- מצפ"א

נפגשתי לשיחת היכרות עם ג'ורג' לוסקי LEBSKY שמונה סגן בכיר לפיטר רודמן
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 די קשה בהתמודדות הפנימית בחמ"ד בנושא ההליך השלום. לדסקי אינו מנבא לנו
 טובות וצופה "ימים קשים". הדגיש שהמזכיר אמנם חיובי אך מגלה זהירות יתר
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NO ARMS TO JORDAN

Once again Jordan is seeking advanced American weapons. King Hussein wants to acquire, among other advanced systems, advanced combat aircraft, mobile Improved HAWK surface-to-air missiles, Stinger hand-held anti-aircraft missiles, and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

If these arms are provided to Jordan before that country makes peace with Israel, they would:

- * increase the threat of an Arab offensive along Israel's long and vulnerable border with Jordan.
- * reduce Israel's ability to fly combat aircraft even in defense of its own territory.
- * increase pressure on Jordan to participate in a future war by reducing King Hussein's ability to keep out of a conflict.
- * increase Israel's defense burden by forcing Israel to implement costly countermeasures.

Jordan has refused to enter the peace process, and has maintained a hostile attitude towards Israel.

- * Jordan has gone to war with Israel on three occasions.
- * Jordan now shelters the headquarters of the PLO, an organization whose raison d'etre is the destruction of Israel.
- * King Hussein, during a recent trip to Spain, sought to pressure that nation not to open diplomatic relations with Israel.

In the 1970s, the United States waited until after Egypt entered direct peace negotiations with Israel before supplying arms to the Egyptians. This is an excellent principle that also should be applied to Jordan. Providing arms now would reward Jordanian intransigence, and discourage other Arab states from participating in the peace process.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee has incorporated language into the FY1986 Authorization Bill that no U.S. military aid be used to pay for arms purchased by Jordan until the President certifies that King Hussein is publicly committed to enter into direct negotiations with Israel under the terms of U.N. resolution 242 and the Camp David Agreement. This is a sound principle which should guide U.S. policy.

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F-20As: The Threat to Israel

Although originally developed as an "export" fighter with lesser capabilities than the F-16 used by the U.S. Air Force, Northrop has transformed the F-20A into a fighter-bomber with capabilities equal to those of the latest F-16C.

Certain characteristics make the F-20A particularly well suited for use in surprise attacks.

- * The Tigershark has an extremely fast reaction time, because of a quick-starting engine and a laser-gyro inertial navigation system that warms up in less than half the time of older systems. It takes less than a minute for an F-20A to be in the air after a "cold" start.
- * The Tigershark has excellent ground attack capabilities. It can carry five laser-guided bombs or four Maverick air-to-surface missiles. High accuracy using conventional weapons is made possible by an advanced design weapons delivery system.
- * The Tigershark's advanced radar has a "freeze" mode that allows the pilot to turn off the radar, yet still keep a radar-generated map for navigation to the target. This is particularly useful in during surprise attack, since the F-20s cannot be detected by tracking of the signals from their radars.
- * The Tigershark's radar is so precise that it can show individual aircraft on the ground at distances of 10 miles.
- * The Tigershark can fly fifty percent more combat sorties than any other fighter in the world: 6.2 combat sorties per day, compared with only 4.2 per day for the F-16C. Northrop has shown that the F-20 can fly as many as 12 sorties per day.

The F-20A is considered the equal of the F-16C in air-to-air combat.

- * The Tigershark is as agile as the F-16, and has a slightly higher thrust-to-weight ratio.
 - * The Tigershark's radar can detect an F-16 at 48 n. miles, while the F-16 can detect the F-20 at only 35 to 43 n. miles.
 - * The Tigershark's radar can track up to 10 aircraft at a time, the same as for the F-16C.
 - * The Tigershark can carry the AIM-9L, and can be easily modified to fire the AIM-7 or the French Magic.
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Description: Improved HAWK Surface-to-Air Missiles

The Improved HAWK is a radar-guided surface-to-air missile. It has a range of 25 miles, and can hit targets at altitudes of up to 60,000 feet.

A HAWK battery normally consists of two firing sections, each with three triple launchers. The U.S. has also developed a TRIAD organization with three firing units. Normally, one or more firing sections can deploy independently of the main battery (the Jordanian Improved HAWKS lack this capability).

A standard Improved HAWK battery consists of the following elements:

Acquisition and Fire Control Unit -- equipped with several radars and battery control equipment.

2 Firing Sections -- each with three triple launchers and a radar illuminator.

One of the firing sections of the battery can be converted into a semi-independent Improved Assault Fire Unit, consisting of an Improved Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar, an Improved Platoon Command Post, an Illuminator, and three triple missile launchers.

A TRIAD Improved HAWK battery is identical to the standard battery, except that it has one firing section and two Improved HAWK Assault Platoons. These platoons are identical to the Improved Assault Fire Unit.

The Improved HAWK is widely used. Middle East countries that use it include Egypt (12 batteries), Israel (15 batteries), Jordan (14 batteries), Kuwait (4 batteries), and Saudi Arabia (12 batteries).

The HAWK missile has proven to be highly effective when used in battle. During the 1973 October War, Israel fired 75 HAWK missiles and destroyed 25 Arab aircraft. By comparison, Arab forces fired 42 SA-6 missiles for each aircraft downed by that system.

The Improved HAWK is manufactured by the Missile Systems Division of the Raytheon Company, located in Andover, Massachusetts.

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The Danger to Israel from Jordanian Mobile HAWKS

The addition of either 6 batteries or 12 firing platoons of mobile Improved HAWK surface to air missiles would significantly upgrade Jordanian air defense capabilities. Jordan's current Improved HAWK missiles are emplaced in concrete, and cannot be moved. In contrast, the new equipment would be mobile. Such an acquisition would strengthen Jordan in three ways:

1- Increased survivability: Because the existing launchers are emplaced in concrete, their precise location can be identified, facilitating attacks against them. In contrast, the new units can be moved, so that Israel would have to constantly monitor their activity in order to locate them. Since the difficulty in locating air defense equipment is its biggest defense against attack, the mobile missiles would be harder to locate and destroy than those in static emplacements.

2- Support for offensive operations: Mobile Improved HAWKS can provide protection to ground formations attacking across the Jordan River, while the existing missiles are deployed in such a way that they would provide only minimal support for offensive operations. It is impossible to concentrate static missiles in forward battle areas, and the existing missile units cannot be advanced to protect attacking units.

3- Increased effectiveness: The mobile missiles can fill gaps between existing missiles, or be rapidly moved to new areas in order to ambush attacking aircraft. Israel knows where the existing HAWK batteries are located, making it possible to minimize the danger posed by the HAWK missiles to Israeli aircraft flying in Jordanian airspace.

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Jordanian Acquisitions of Improved HAWK Missiles

In 1975 the United States sold Jordan 14 Improved HAWK surface-to-air missile batteries (with 84 launchers) for \$260 million. As a result of Congressional initiatives, the Jordanian missile launchers were mounted in concrete and cannot be moved.

In 1979 a product improvement package worth \$33.4 million was provided to the Jordanians. This was a standard upgrade involving modifications to existing equipment in order to enhance system reliability and effectiveness.

In 1984, the U.S. gave permission for Westinghouse to send an automated air defense operations center with associated equipment to Jordan. This will allow Jordan to take information from radars and other sources to provide centralized control of interceptors and ground antiaircraft weapons.

Jordanian Requirements for Improved HAWK Batteries

According to various reports, the United States Army believes that Jordan needs an additional 14 batteries, increasing the total inventory to 28 batteries. The Jordanians also want to convert the existing static HAWKs into mobile units. Various reports have indicated that despite the requirement for 14 batteries, Jordan may limit its request at the present to six mobile batteries (costing about \$350 million).

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Description: AIM-9L Sidewinders

The AIM-9L Sidewinder is an all-aspect heat-seeking missile. Older versions of the Sidewinder can only be fired at rear of a target plane, where the heat of the engine is the most intense. The AIM-9L, however, is sufficiently sensitive to be fired at the sides or even the front of a target aircraft. This makes it significantly more dangerous than the earlier Sidewinders.

The AIM-9L was used with devastating effect in 1982 by the Israelis in Lebanon and by the British in the Falklands. Most of the 85 Syrian MiGs downed in Lebanon were destroyed by AIM-9Ls. About 80% of the missiles fired successfully destroyed their targets. The British destroyed 19 Argentine aircraft in 23 attempts using AIM-9Ls.

The AIM-9L can be used with Jordan's 36 Mirage F-1 fighters. Either the F-16C or F-20A can carry the AIM-9L. It cannot be fitted to the F-5E or F-5A fighters.

Middle East countries that have the AIM-9L include Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

The AIM-9L is manufactured by Ford Aerospace in Newport Beach, California.

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מצפ"א.

אחמול (5) נפגש שר האוצר עם תת הועדה למזה"ח בבית הנבחרים.

השתתפו המורשים המילטון (יו"ר), גילמן, סילג'נדר, מל לויין, גיידנסון, וייס, לארי סמית, סולארז, דורמן, וולפה, עוזרים בכירים, הלפרין, למדן, קני-טל והח"מ.
השר סקר התכנית ^{הכלא} הישגים, קטיים וציפיות. הודה לנוכחים על עזרתם בנושא הסיוע. בתום דבריו נשאלו שאלות הבחרה. האוירה היחה ידידותית.

טעמי רצ
טובה הרצל

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