מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד ראש הממשלה

המשך מעיר מס' 11

משרד

3/1986 - 7/1986

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס - אר

מזהה פיזי: א - 12 / 4383

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כתובת: 02-111-01-07-10 25/08/2010

סוג תיק: תוכן

סוג תיק: משרד

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**    **                                  נבנם                      **
**  **                                  סודי ביותר                  **
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**אל: המשרד, נר: 131, מ : וש                                       **
**תח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 060986, חת: 1900                               **
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**סודי ביותר/מידי                                                  **
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**אל:מנכ"ל משה"ח, יועץ משפטי -משהמם                                **
**ממנכל משהח, יועץ משפטי-משהח                                      **
**                                                                 **
**למשין.                                                           **
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**וי נר 49                                                         **
**נמחון נר 138                                                     **
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**שבתאי                                                            **
**                                                                 **
**א.במתמ"ד היו ויכוחים וקונאק מרוצים מאד מהשגת ההסכם .קונאק      **
**המשנה ליועץ המשפטי העיר כי אמנם יוועה לו אי הנחת הנסיבות      **
**שירנו על העדר השתתפות מחמ"ד במומי, אך היה בכך גם יתרון        **
**לאנשים במשרד המשפטים לא תוכל להיות טענה שבאילו נכנעו לכחץ     **
**מחמ"די. (הערה:עוד צריך יהיה למצוא הדמנות לבדוק באורח          **
**מתאים את דברי טייפ בי ביקש במתמ"ד בשעתו                        **
**שיבדקו עמנו לפני הוצאת הצוים ,ולא נענה : בשלב זה מרם          **
**ברורה בעיני הכתובת במתמ"ד לכך ,אך זו תסמונת אופיינית          **
**לתקופה).                                                        **
**ב. מארק ריצ'ארד הפציר בי היום , כי אנשינו יחלו בהבנת         **
**המסמכים ובשיתוף הפעולה מהר ככל האפשר. אמר כי התגובות          **
**במערכת שלהם היו בצפוי (גם אלה של המבקרים ).                   **
**                                                                **
**ג.מתגובת מי שאינם ידידינו : רולי אוונס ("אוונס וונבאק")       **
**טען באוזני היום "שוב סידרתם אותנו" (בהשגת ההסכם ).            **
**כמובן שמע תשובה באנגלית בסיסית.                                **
**                                                                **
**רובינשטיין                                                     **
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**                                                  מתוך 2  דף 2    **
**     **                                                           **
**   **                                  סודי ביותר  מתוך 14 עותק 4 **
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**תפ: שהת,רהמ,מנכל,מנכל,סיבל                                       **
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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר



** 7592
** דף 1 מתוך 3 נבנס
** עותק 4 מתוך 34 סודי ביותר
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**אל: המשרד, נר: 169, מ: וושו
**דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 886, 0, ח: 2400
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**סודי ביותר-מידי
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**אל:ממנכ"ר ממד"ר,מנהל מצפא,מתאם הפעולה ביוש"ו ואזה.
**שיתה עם דניס רוס על רשמי הביקור.
**
**א. מדוצה.בחלק תבר בו מתרכזים הכל במפרי"ד,יש חיוב בהצהרה
**מסוג ו' של בוש בסוף הביקור על האלמנטים המשותפים.יש גם
**ויואנסים ספציפיים חדשים:
**
**1. הניסוח,על דעת הירדנים,המביא מפורשות בחשבון את צרכי
**הבטחון של ישראל (אמנם יחד עם צרכי בטחונם של אחרים ושאיפות
**הפלשתינאים). מה שבוטא מכללא ב-242 בוטא כאן מפורשות.
**2. נכונות ישראל ל"הגדרה גמישה" של פלשתינאים.נקודות אלה הן
**התפתחות של שנה אחת.
**
**ב. עמדתה הבסיסית של ירדן היא הרצון לשיפור מעמדה ביוש"
**ועזה, ולשתוף פעולה שבשתיקה (TACIT) עם ישראל להמצת
**התנאים באזור.המגמה-החלפת חשיבת אשף וקידום הירוב הדוממי
**השרוי באיומים.
**ג. לדברי מוכנים הירדנים להוציא כספים על הסדרי בטחון
**הערבים המוכנים לשמש ראשי ערים ועל קידום הכלכלה,ולפתח הנהגה
**מתונה שתעבוד עמם.לי הבלשת הפרופיל.לשאלה כיצד ייעשה הדבר
**אין עדיין תשובה הולמת.
**
**ד. ציין התפתחויות מעניינות,כמו פסקם פרו-ירדני שפירסמה
**ועדה לשיתוף פעולה ירדני-פלשתינאי.אין לדבריו תקדים לפרסום
**אנשי אשפי בזה.כמו כן מרוצה מהופעות שאוה בשלוליה.
**ה. בתחום הבטחון (נגד אשף הרדיקלי) מחפשים הירדנים דרכים
**סבירות, ואינם בטוחים שישראל עושה די להגנת המתונים.נכון
**שאין הללו רוצים להיראות בתלויים בישראל,אך הירדנים מבקשים
**שישראל תפעל נגד החזית העממית לשחרור פלשתין ביוש'.

1. אין האמריקנים רואים שו מדינה ערבית הרוצה במדינה פלשתינאית עצמאית.

2. לשאלתי מה מידת התיאום עמנו, במהלכים את האורדים, לה מובנים אורדנים, אמר כי אינו יודע עד כמה מוגים לתאם בפועל, אך רוצים שהשות דברים המועילים לשני הצדדים, והתיאום עשוי לקרות בדרכים שונות. שני נושאים קונקרטיים אפשריים:

1. במתון ידעתם כבר היו ראשי ערים על כנם, אלולא האיום כתריהם.

2. נושאים מוניציפליים הירדנים משובנעים שההבנסות שמפיקה שראל מן האורים אינן תורות לאורדים. יתכן שיהיה אפשרי לקדם פרויקטים, כמו בתי חולים, שכל צד יכול לתרום להם, והירדנים כבול מובנים.

3. האמריקנים רואים חידוש חיובי בעמדתנו המוכנה 'לבנות' את משמדם של הירדנים ביו"ש. הירדנים מצידם 'העלו את דרגת הרצינות' שבה מתיחסים לאפשרויות שיפור מצבם באורים.

4. את התגובה באורים להודעת 19.2 קיבלו הירדנים בהלם. הם גם צופים בדאגה עצבנית בשינויים הדימוגרפיים, בצמיחת אוכלוסיה עירה המשמשת קרקע פורייה לאידיאולוגיה רדיקלית ולאיום על ירדן עצמה. מכאן הרצון לבנות בתים פוליטי גם באמצעים כלכליים.

5. נוכח בעיית הרדיקליות באורים והתפישה של רבים מהתושבים כי רק אשף הרדיקלי יוכל לפעול נרבים הצבי-ו על כך שאת ישראל מציאו מלבנון, בביבול, המוסלמים הרדיקלים, וקוקים הירדנים כבר שיוכח כי רק עמם אפשר להתקדם להסדר. היחס הירדני לערפאת כיום אינו שונה מאד מעבר, אך הוא עלול להשתנות, שכן חוסין עלול אינו סוגר אופציות. לפי שעה הגישה היא כי אינו מסוגל לשחק תפקיד, ולכן נוקטים צעדים כתמיכה באבו נעים, סגירת המשרדים וכדומה.

6. מאהב מצפים הירדנים לכסף ועידוד לפעולה באורים (הערת: עד כמה אינו נהנים מעבודת הקונסוליה בירושלים, וגם אם דיפר עצמו אינו שלילי, ש 'מיסוד' לא טוב).

7. בצד הכספי אין לאמריקנים תקציבים של ממש מעבר ל-4 מליון. המבנים לתיאום עמנו בהוצאת בספים אלה אינו ברור.

8. בתהליך השלום במזרח הרחב יותר אין הירדנים מובנים עתה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 3 מתוך 3
עותק 4 מתוך 34 סודי ביותר

להרבה מעבר למה שכבר עשו.עמדת ארהב בשלנו באשר לפורום
בינלאומי,קרי סקפטיות,אך אם הדבר יסייע ליידנים ולא יהיה
מכתיב אלא הסכם בומ' ישיר בתוך המסגרת,אין התנגדות.אין זה
בטוח שהדבר אפשרי.
כללית אין לדעתו מקום לייאוש.אמנם בגישה הערביסטית
הקלאסית העומדת עד צירוף אשף אין ברגע תקוות גדולות
מאגב,סודאת שוחח עמי השבוע בשון נוגה של העדר סיכויים בשוים
הקרובות,אך בכל זאת יש תמונה נאיבית: מפגש רהמ'-חסן,התקרבות
סטודית למצרים בדיוק כשעינן מאבה מתקדם כהתקרבות-גם בגלל
מלחמת עיראק-איראן,ספקולציות שהמשורים ידעו על מפגש
רהמ'-חסן מראש,ומאמר חיובי ביסיאסה' הכוויתי על המפגש. אמנם
אין בכל אלה דברים ' מוחש'מ' ותידוש עוד התבגרות של
הפלשתינאים. חרף צינית העתונות באשר לביקור,חש אופוא כאורח
אופייני למי שעסק במהלכים הקשורים בו,כי ישנן אינדיקציות
להתפתחות חיובית וההצהרה שנשא בוש היא בינהן.

מצרים. 1. בראש וראשונה התעניינו המצרים בנושא הבלבלי.הם
מוסים דפורמות יותר מבעבר,אך אין די בכך.ארהב מאד מעוניינת
בשלוון-אך אין בסף

2. המצרים רוצים להישאר מחוברים לעולם המערבי,ואין נסיגה
מכך.
3. אנו גוראלה מודע לפונדמנטליזם אך לדבריו אינו רואה בעיה
מתחום זה בצבא,אלא דק בצורך בשיפור הכלכלי.
4. לא ירדה מחיובות מצרים לאשף,והם ממשיכים לקוות למציץ את
ערפאת לבוא למו' עם ירדן. תקותם היא בנראה לחלוף למה שהוצע
משתקד- משלחת ירדנית פלשתינאית שערפאת עצמו אינו בתוכה.יש גם
הבדל בטון בין התבטאויות פרטיות לפומביות.

בושנשטין

cc: שהת,רהמ,שהבט מנכל,ממנכל/מרכז,רם,אמן,סייבל,מצפא,
ורד,ששחים,מאמשחים

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

1/3 34 96 093

משרד החוץ

אל:הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח

דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY
TUESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1986

MAJOR NEWS HEADLINES

TOP STORY: REAGAN CALLS FOR DRUG TESTING FOR CABINET MEMBERS
As part of his new campaign aginst drug abuse, President Reagan endorsed mandatory drug testing for federal employees in safety and health related jobs and voluntary testing for other government employees, including Cabinet members.
Wash. Times: President Endorses Drug Tests For Feds
Chic. Trib.: Drug Test Urged For Cabinet
Phil. Inq.: Reagan Outlines Goals For Anti-Drug Crusade

SOUTH AFRICA: THATCHER EASES HER STANCE ON S. AFRICA SANCTIONS
Two days after a meeting between Commonwealth leaders whose subject was S. Africa, Britain's Prime Minister Thatcher changed her stance toward South Africa and has agreed to adopt two modest voluntary bans to show its protest against apartheid.
Chic. Trib.: Britain Bows A Bit On S. Africa Sanctions
Phil. Inq.: Thatcher Backs Mild Sanctions: Changes Stance On South Africa
Wash. Times: Thatcher Averts Major Split By Giving On Sanctions Issue

SEN. JESSE HELMS ACCUSES STATE DEPT.'s ABRAMS OF PROMOTING A FALSE STORY
Sen. Helms yesterday accused Elliot Abrams, an assistant secretary of state of circulating false reports that one of his aides leaked classified information to Chile.
Wash. Times: Helms Charges State's Abrams Pushed Leak Story

OPEC AGREES TO OIL CUTS
OPEC oil ministers came to unanimous agreement last night on Iran's proposals to drastically cut back production to raise prices, according to OPEC president Rilwanu Lukman.
NYT: OPEC Reaches Tentative Accord On Iranian Plan To Limit Output
Phil. Inq.: Oil Cuts Accepted By OPEC

NEWS ARTICLES AND ANALYSIS

SOVIETS AND ISRAELIS CONFIRM MEETING THIS MONTH IN HELSINKI:
Moscow Official Says Talks Could Lead to Consular Relations

Wash. Post, Bohlen: After 20 years of no diplomatic relations, Israeli and Soviet Union officials will meet in Helsinki in mid-August and will explore prospectsfor a more conclusive meeting in Tel Aviv at a later date. Gennadi Gerasimov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry information department said that the meeting will consist of bilateral talks on nonpolitical and consular issues. Abba Eban in Jerusalem said that this step,despite that the Soviet spokesman said it was a low level matter, is a very positive move. (8/5/86)
Phil. Inq.: Soviet-Israeli Meetings May Bring Renewed Ties

U.S. MULLS ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH-COST ISRAELI JET

Wash. Times, Andrews: Concern over the cost the Israel's U.S.-financed Lavi jet fighter has led to a Pentagon study, to be completed late this year, of alternatives to the project. Reagan administration officials said that the study is aimed at convincing the Israelis to abandon the Lavi plan. Among the alternatives being listed is a co-production agreement between Israel and an American defense contractor. Another possibility is the use of Israeli gun-and-missile-control systems combined with an American built plane. Israel has estimated that each Lavi will cost $15 million but U.S. officials have rejected that figure as unrealistic. U.S. sources said that although the Israelis have publicly said they will go ahead with the Lavi plan, privately they have expressed interest in U.S. alternatives. (8/5/86)

DON'T EXPECT HANDOUT, BUSH TELLS EGYPT LEADER

Chic. Trib., Horrock: in Egypt at the end of his 12-day Middle East trip, Vice-President Bush said he told Egyptian President Mubarak that domestic budget considerations prevent the U.S. from providing Egypt with additional aid. Egypt is already one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid. Even so, Egypt faces the worst financial crisis in three decades. Egypt wants the pace of its receiving aid monies quickened and to ease the burden of its growing military debt. These issues were addressed during Bush and Mubarak talks. (8/5/86)
Phil. Inq.: Aid In Short Supply, Bush Tells Egyptian

הסוכנות היהודית - ירושלים
אל:
3/3
Aug. 5, 1986 תאריך 17:00

NEWS ARTICLES CON'T

U.S.-ISRAELI TIES STRONGER THAN EVER - THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Wash. Post, Babcock: This year's Tom Dine report on U.S.-Israeli relations for AIPAC is more positive than ever, with Dine describing the relationship as having reached new heights. One source described Israel as being not unlike a 51st state. The special relationship is relected by the fact that Israel is the recipient of the largest U.S. foreign aid package of $3 billion and the country receives preferential treatment in how that aid isdistributed. The U.S. agreement to financially back the new Lavi jet fighter is another recent aspect of that relationship. There are several circumstances since 1982 that have given rise to the increased closeness in relations. The wave of terrorism generated from the Arab world has pushed public opinion in a more favorable direction toward Israel. Also, Secretary of State Shultz has played a positive role in forwarding relations. Originally, Shultz's stance on the Middle East was the cause of concern from pro-israeli sectors, but by 1983, Shultz position had shifted. The closeness between the two countries is hailed as envious and what Dine described as a new era or relations should make us secure that "what is good for America is good for Israel". (8/5/86)

ISRAEL, EGYPT SAID TO BE NEAR ACCORD ON BORDER

Wash. Post, Hoffman: Israeli and Egyptian negotiators have reached "substantial agreement" on the Taba dispute according to U.S. officials and the agreement plan could be announced before Vice President Bush completes his Mideast tour today. When complete, the agreement would set up procedures so that the dispute could be submitted to international arbitration. It is expected that settlement of the issue would result in the reestablishment of an Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv and possibly a summit meeting between Peres and Mubarak. The dispute has been a primary block to thawing out the cold peace prevailing between the two countries. (8/5/86)

PEACE PLAN ROLLS AS LEBANESE TROOPS MOVE SOUTH

Wash. Times, (Agence France Presse): Syrian troops were deployed into Beirut's Shi'ite dominated southern suburbs yesterday and escorted Lebanese troops as part of a stage in the Damascus peace plan for Lebanon. The move came after west Beirut was pacified under a Syrian sponsored agreement between Moslem militias. Meanwhile, two people were killed and several injured when a bomb planted in a suitcase exploded in Beirut's Chirstian sector. (8/5/86)

Deborah Stone
Itonut

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** 6806 **
** ** נבנס **
** ** דף 1 מתוך 4
** ** עותק 4 מתוך 14 סודי ביותר
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**אל: המשרד, נר: 60, מ: 11ש **
**זת: ב, סג: מ, תא: 040886, זת: 1830 **
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**סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר **
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**אל:מנכל משהת, ממ' היועץ המשפטי-משהב"ט **
**ממנב"ל משהת, היועץ המשפטי-משהת **
**רשף **
** **
**נשתון נר 66 **
**נ' נר 23 **
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**שבתאי **
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**א.אירעה היום אתה"צ התפתחות מדאיגה,נבון לשעה זו. **
**ב.בשעות הבוקר, לאחר דיון בן למעלה מארבע שעות,הושג בדיוני **
**משלחתנו עם ריצ'ארד וט"ף ההסכם המוברק להלן עם האמריקנים, **
ונמכר לנו כי דרושים רק אישורים פורמליים עמדנו לקרוא הגהות
ולחתום בר"ת נקוחנובסקי עם ריצ'ארד, ולקבוע שעה לחתימה מלאה
**(תח"מ' עם מרום). **
**ג. בשעה שנקבעה לר"ת הודיע לנו ריצ'ארד קדורנת כי יש **
**"צרות גדולות" שהעניין נספק. ביקש שנשוב ונהיה בקשר מחר **
**בבוקר.אנו מנסים לבדוק במה הענין , ובמובן נחויקכם מחר **
**בתמונה. **
**רובינשט"ין **
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** MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING **
** **
**1. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL(GOI) AND THE UNITED STATES **

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

**GOVERNMENT (USG) ARE ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO
**THE SERVING AND ATTEMPTED SERVING OF GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS
**ON NINE EMLOYEES OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE/ISRAELI
**MILITARY INDUSTRIES , IN CONNECTION WITH A USG
**INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO ILLEGALLY
**EXPORT CLUSTER MUNITIONS EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY,
**CONTRARY TO, AMONG OTHER THINGS, A 1982 PRESIDENTIAL
**STATEMENT.
**2. WHILE THE GOI HAS EXPRESSED ITS STRONG BELIETF THAT USG
**OF THE SUBPONAS IS INAPPROPRIATE IN CONNECTION WITH
**ATTEMPTS TO SECURE THE TESTIMONY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
**OF A FRIENDLY ALLY, AS WELL AS ITS POSITION REGARDING THE
**INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES APPPLICABLE TO THOSE EMPLOYEES,
**IT HAS NONETHELESS EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE
**ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER, SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON
**THE GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES TO BE EMPLOYED.
**
**3. PURSUANT TO THE ABOVE , THE USG AGREES TO WITHDRAW TH E
**SUBPOENAS. FURTHER, THE PARTIES EXPRESS THEIR INTENTION TO
**CONTINUE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID THE
**FUTURE NEED FOR SUBPOENAS, IN RECOGNITION OF THE USG'S
**WITHDRAWAL OF THE SUBPOENAS, GOI AGREES THAT IT WILL USE
**ITS BEST EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT ANY OR ALL OF THE GOI
**EMPLOYEES IDENTIFIED BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHO WERE SERVED
**WITH SUBPOENAS PREVIOUSLY, OR ANY AUTHORIZED
**REPRESENTATVIE DEEMED ACCEPTABLE TO THE USG , WILL BE
**AVAILABLE IN TH UNITED STATES FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS AND
**WILL URGE THEM TO RECEIVE SAID PROCESS, IDENTICAL IN FORM
**AND CONTENT; IN THE EVENT THAT THE USG DETERMINES THAT
**SUCH SERVICE IS REQUIRED IN THE FUTURE. IN ADDITION, IF
**THE USG DETERMIES THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO QUESTION THE
**FOUR EMPLOYEES IDENTIFIED BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON WHOM
**SERVICE WAS ATTEMPTED BUT NOT COMPLETED, THE GOI AGREES TO
**USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO MAKE THEM, OR ANY AUTHORIZED
**REPRESENTATIVE DEEMED ACCEPTABLE TO THE USG, AVAILABLE IN
**THE UNITED STATES FOR SERVICE OF GRAND JURY PROCESS. ALL
**ACTIONS UNDER THIS PARAGRAPH ARE SUBJECT TO PARAGRAPH 4
**BELOW.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

**4. BOTH PARTIES AGREE THAT THE GOI'S ACTIONS AND EFFORTS AS DESCRIBED IN THIS MOU ARE NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS A WAIVER OF ANY OBJECTION THE GOI HAS TO THE USE OF THE GRAND JURY PROCESS WITH GOI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THOSE BASED ON ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND DIPLOMATIC AND/OR CONSULAR IMMUNITIES OF ITS OFFICES AND EMPLOYEES AND THAT THIS MOU WILL NOT PREJUDICE, IN ANY MANNER, THE INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS OR CLAIMS THEY MAY OTHERWISE HAVE IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUBPOENA SERVED ON THEM. THE GOI AGREES NOT TO USE THE FACT OF THE USG WITHDRAWAL OF THE SUBPOENAS AS A BASIS TO SUPPORT OR ESTABLISH ANY OF ITS CLAIMS REGARDING THE INVALIDITY OF SUCH SUBPOENAS.

**5. IN THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND AS A VOLUNTARY MATTER, AND WITHOUT WAVIER OF THE GOI'S SOVEREIGN AND DIPLOMATIC RIGHTS AND THE GOI'S AND GOI EMPLOYEE CLAIMS OF IMMUNITY OR OTHER LEGAL OBJECTIONS OR OTHER CLAIMS:

**A. THE GOI WILL PROVIDE COGNIZANT USG OFFICIALS ACCESS TO GOI DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION REFERRED TO IN SECTION 1 ABOVE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

** 1) THE USG WILL IDENTIFY TO THE GOI, IN WRITING, THE SPECIFIC COPMPANIES AND TRANSACTIONS WITH REGARD TO WHICH THE DOCUMENTS ARE SOUGHT.

** 2) THE PARTIES WILL AGREE UPON A REASONABLE PERIOD FOR ACCUMULATION OF THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT, WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE MATERIALS IN REASONABLE INCREMENTS AS AGREED UPON.

** 3) THE DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVIDED WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE AT A LOCATION IN THE UNITED STATES TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE GOI.

** 4) AFTER EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS BY USG OFFICIALS, THE USG MA Y SECURE COPIES OF ANY DOCUMENT IDENTIFIED FOR COPYING DURING THE REVIEW.

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** ** מתוך 4 דף 4 **
** ** סודי ביותר מתוך 14 עותק 4 **
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** 5) INTERNAL DOCUMENTS OF THE GOI WILL NOT BE MADE **
**AVAILABLE. **
** B. IN AN ATTEMPT TO FURTHER UNDERSTANDING OF THE **
**UNDERLYING CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN THE USG **
**INVESTIGATION, THE USG MAY PROVIDE AT ITS DISCRETION TO **
**THE GOI A LIST OF QUESTIONS RELEVANT TO THE INVESTIGATION **
**THAT ARE DESIGNED TO ELICIT SPECIFIC INFORMATION FROM GOI **
**REGARDING THE SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS UNDERLYING THE USG **
**INVESTIGATION. THE GOI, ACTING IN THE FARME- WORK OF ITS **
**SOVEREIGN DISCRETION, WILL RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE TO SUCH **
**QUESTIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION. IN THE COURSE OF **
**THE COOPERATIVE EFFORT, THE USG WILL CONSIDER THE GOI'S **
**REQUEST FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THE LEGAL BASIS **
**FOR THE INVESTIGATION. **
** **
**6. BOTH PARTIES EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT AGREED UPON **
**PROCEDURES WILL CONSTITUTE AN EFFECTIVE METHOD FOR **
**RESOLVING ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE BETWEEN THE PARTIES **
**CONCERNING THIS INVESTIGATION. **
**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL **
**BY-- BY-- **
**DATE--- DATE--- **
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**סוף: שהת,דהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,סיבל **

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**   **                                  סודי ביותר                   **
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**אל: המשרד, נר: 80, מ: 119                                          **
**דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 050886, דח: 1300                                 **
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**סודי ביותר/מידי                                                    **
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**אל:מנהל מוסים, מנהל תפוצות,מנהל מצפ'א                              **
**דע:ממ'ד/ערב 2                                                      **
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**תפוצה מצומצמת                                                      **
**                                                                   **
**חטופים בלבנון .                                                    **
**                                                                   **
**משיחה עם השגריר אוקלי,המונה על היחידה ללוחמה בטרור               **
**במחמ'ד,שלילה את האב ג'נקו במסע שיבתו הביתה.                       **
**                                                                   **
**א.אתחיל מהחלק המצער: אין בפי ג'נקו מידע בקשר על גורלם של         **
**החטופים היהודים מלבנון או חיילינו הנעדרים . החטופים              **
**האחרים (מלבד אמריקנים ) שהיה לו שמץ ידיעה עליהם הם שניים         **
**-שלושה צרפתים (מתוך 8 צרפתים חטופים ) שהיו בבניין שבו            **
**נמצאו החטופים האמריקנים ,בירות.על כל השאר לא היתה לו בל         **
**ידיעה.                                                             **
**                                                                   **
**ב.לקראת שחרורו הוסע ג'נקו ע"י חוטפיו לאיזור דרום הבקעה שבו**     **
**שוחרר ומשם חזרו הללו ,בפי שהובן ,לבירות.                         **
**ג. ג'נקו אינו יודע בדיוק מי חטפיו, בל מגעם של החטופים הוא **     **
**עם שומריהם ולא עם מישהו שמעל לשומרים .בששאלו החטופים את **     **
**השומרים האם הם הג'יהאד האסלאמי,הגיבו הללו בצחוק פרוע ותו **     **
**לא.ההנחה היא בידוע שהג'יהאד האיסלמי הוא חלק מחיזבאללה.         **
**                                                                   **
**ד. לשאלתי מי תרם לשחרור ג'נקו השיב שהיתה זו ביסודה החלטת **     **
**החוטפים . הללו מושפעים מאשושה מקורות- בראש וראשונה איראן **    **
**,אח'ב' סוריה ואח'ב' השפעות ''אינדיבידואליות''.                   **
**ההחלטה היתה בנראה קומבינציה של ההשפעות השונות.לא ברור הרקע**    **
**להסכמה האיראנית ,אם היתה.הסורים מנסים בידוע לחזוק על **        **
**חיזבאללה בבירות . בששאלתי מהופעת גורמים כמו שרי ויים שהיה **   **
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** דף 2    מתוך                                                      **
** עותק 1    מתוך 4          סודי ביותר                              **
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**הבניסה האנגלית היתה התשובה, בעצם ,בי ויים שוב בסמקד תשומת **
**הלב, בך שניתן מן הצד לעבוד ב''דיפלומטיה שקטה''. לשאלתי אם **
**היו ביקורים אמריקנים בזמן האחרון מהסוג שפורסם ,שנה ב,,אין **
**תגובה'', אך הוסיף שגם אם היו (במובן בנוסף לאלה שבגלוי במו **
**קונגדסמן דורנאן או סיי אחות החטוף אנדרסון ), ספק אם הם    **
**סיימו להחלטה החוטפים לאחר.אגב, מלבד גב' פפנדריאו גם פידל**
**קסטרו נוסל אשראי בנושא דנן .                                     **
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**ה.לג'נקו בשלעצמו אין ידיעה באשר לרקע ההחלטה לשחרר.              **
**ו. המסר הסודי שנשא ג'נקו לאפיפיור,לריגן ובדומה הוא              **
**בנראהנאוקלי לא רצה לומר בפורש) שוב בעניין מוס' עם בוית על**
**שחרור האסירים שם ; אך הסינה המיוחדת לכל המסע למשרו ,הוא   **
**הרצון להקל על חיי האמריקנים שנשארו בידי החוטפים ולמנוע **
**התעמרות ציותרת בהם , ש'' מבות ובדומה נועלולה לקרות אם לא **
**חשבו החוטפים שהעביר את המסרים ). בניגוד למשוחרר הקודם   **
**,האב הפרוטסטני WEIZ , שגילה אהדה מסוימת לחוטפים ,אין זה **
**המקרה לגבי ג'נקו, הרואה בהם רשעים .                            **
**ו. בסיכום :סימני שאלה רבים לגבי הגורמים המשפיעים על     **
**החוטפים והחלטתם ; למרבה הצער אין חדשות בנושאי היהודים   **
**ונעדרינו.                                                        **
**רובינשטיין                                                       **
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**תפ: שהח,מנכל,ממנכל,תפוצות,מצפא,קידר,מותים,ד/מרכז              **
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(הלא)

14769 מדפוס ירושלים

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**  1903                                                          **
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**אל: וש , כטחון , נר: חוגם 247, מ : המשרד                     **
**תח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 050886, זח: 1400                           **
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**טורי ביותר/בהול לבוקר                                        **
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**וברינשטיין - קוהנובסקי - וושינגטון.                          **
**רם: מנכ"ל משהב"ט.                                            **
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**שבתאי.                                                        **
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**הריטון העיר הבוקר שלפי הדווחים שבידיהם יש לקוות שההסכם      **
**יגמר היום.                                                   **
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**כל-און - 306 - 5.8.86                                        **
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**ע/ב.                                                         **
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**סוף: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,סיינל                               **
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August 4, 1986

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of the State of Israel
Jerusalem

Dear Shimon,

As I look back at the last two years and Israel's accomplishments during this time, I think there is much to be proud of and grateful for, and I am pleased we were able to cooperate in various ways. One of our most important efforts was the establishment of a dialogue through the Joint Economic Development Group which grew out of your first meeting with President Reagan. Your Government's very successful economic stabilization program as well as our emergency assistance were major items discussed in the JEDG.

As you know from our exchanges, I believe that stabilization is only the first phase of restructuring Israel's economy to create growth. I recall vividly our first discussions in which you eloquently described the need for a "ray of hope" so that Israelis could look forward to a more prosperous future. I am convinced that this hope cannot be realized without a bold program of structural economic reform, and that the need to adopt such reforms soon is urgent.

We see economic growth as a strategic imperative for Israel's future security. Indeed, growth is no less critical than maintaining military security and achieving peace with the Arabs. Unless Israel can achieve a higher rate of growth and productivity, it will be difficult to sustain the high level of defense that you need, the major social welfare benefits Israelis demand, and the rising incomes they expect. I am especially concerned that the aspirations of many of your most talented and productive citizens, who are in demand worldwide, will not be fulfilled unless there is greater promise that income levels will move toward the level of major industrial nations. Only sustained growth can create the new resources you need to boost per capita income,

especially since increased foreign aid will probably not be available in the next few years. I fear that if growth is not renewed soon, the result will be slow erosion of your economy which will sap Israel's strength and undermine its competitive position.

Israel has extraordinary human and intellectual resources that could be mobilized for economic growth. However, most Israeli and American private economists agree that Israel's economy, as presently structured, cannot use this great potential to achieve the levels of growth you need and which are possible through structural change. They believe that major reforms are needed to provide incentives for new growth and productivity. I am convinced that they are right, and that this can be done.

Because the need is so urgent, it seems to me that the time has come for a concrete new Israeli effort to restructure your economy for growth. This is unlikely to happen through day to day efforts. What is needed, in our view, is a bold new program that would translate the desire of Israelis for growth into practical action.

I realize that a major reform program can only grow out of a political process in which discussion and debate produce public support. We have been thinking of ways such a process could be launched, and it occurs to us that a comprehensive growth program commissioned by your Government and prepared by Israeli experts would be a good way to start. The economists agree, and we concur, that the major areas for reform include the tax system, development of effective capital markets and privatization of State enterprises. The kind of program we think is needed would examine these and other critical areas in detail, in a way that has not been done in the past, and would make specific, operational recommendations for reform, according to a schedule. To stimulate a policy process, such a program should be ambitious and far reaching, whether or not all of its goals could be achieved in the short run. We would be pleased to offer support and advice, if needed, from American economists such as Herb Stein, Stan Fischer, and others. Also, perhaps Max Fisher and his colleagues in Operation Independence would be interested in supporting such an effort in some specific way, because of their dedication to Israeli economic growth. As a final thought,

it may be useful to associate such a study with the JEDG, as a way of giving new energy to the JEDG, whose main purpose is to support Israeli growth.

I understand that you have already received some proposals from your advisors for new growth policies. Perhaps these proposals, which we have not seen, could be the basis for the kind of effort I have described. I would value your personal thoughts in this private channel on how you plan to proceed, and how we might support your efforts. If you agree, I would suggest that Tom Pickering also explore this subject soon along similar lines with Foreign Minister Shamir and Minister of Finance Nissim. I am looking forward to meeting Minister Nissim when he visits Washington in September, and the growth issue will be at the top of our agenda.

Shimon, I hope you will agree that a major effort of this kind is urgently needed to begin a process of change and reform. You and your colleagues in the National Unity Government showed courage and creativity in your successful stabilization program, and Israelis responded with patriotic support. Structural reform is a more far reaching process, but your stabilization program is an encouraging precedent. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how to launch a new effort to meet the urgent challenge of growth.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ George

George P. Shultz

1609

תאריך : 09.08.86

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי נכנס **
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חדזם:8/1609
אל:המשרד
מ-:ני/נר:174/תא:080886/זח:1300/דח:ר/סג:ס
נד:@

1. לשימת לב אלוניה ראה
2. אנא שימת לב ה.ב.ה.
14/8/86

סודי/רגיל

אל:ורד/כנסיות.

דע:נאום. מנכל. וושינגטון (נר 38) רומא ממרהמ'.

מאת:קונסל ניו יורק.

קרדינל ג'והן אוקונר.

ב-7 באוגוסט בבוקר נפגשתי עם הקרדינל אוקונר. הפגישה נערכה בביתו ולא במשרדו. בזכור הוזמנתי אליו בעקבות ארוחת הבוקר שראש עירית ניו יורק אד קוצ' ערך לשגריר נתניהו ולקרדינל. (ראו מברק נאום מ-17 ביולי). ישבתי עם הקרדינל לבדו ללא עוזרים.

השיחה החלה בכך שאמרתי לו שערד בנובמבר שעבר ביקשתי לראותו בגלל שהי סיבות: האחת, לערוך אצלו ביקור נימוסין מקובל לרגל כניסתי לתפקיד, והשניה לברר את טיב השמועה ששמעתי לפיה נקבעה לו פגישה עם רוהמ' שמעון פרס באוקטובר שעבר ושרוהמ' לא הגיע לפגישה. אמרתי לו שרציתי לברר מי קבע פגישה זו שכן לא היה ידוע לי עליה דבר ושעד עכשו לא הצלחתי לגלות מי קבע פגישה זו בשמו של רוהמ'.

הוספתי שהתקבלתי אז לשיחה עם ראש לשבתו, האב מק-קרתי שאמר לי שאוזמן לקרדינל בינואר השנה, אך עברו חדשים ולא הוזמנתי.

או'קונר התנצל על שלא הודמנתי אליו קודם לכן והסביר שכלל לא הובא לידיעתו שביקשתי לראותו. לגבי הפגישה עם רוהמ' שלא יצאה לפועל אמר שמישהו קבע פגישה זו והוא המתין כשעה לרוהמ' שלא בא. אחר כך טלפנו ממשרדו לקונסוליה ובאמר לו שרוהמ' יטלפן אליו בשעה מסויימת. הוא המתין גם לטלפון זה שלא הגיע. אמרתי לקרדינל שאני שומע על עניין הטלפון לראשונה, שאינני יודע מי הסדיר כל זאת ושהייתי מודה לו היה מסייע בידי לברר זאת. מכל מקום התנצלתי ואמרתי שאין לי ספק שרוהמ' עצמו אינו יודע על כך מאומה.

או'קונר הוסיף די במרירות שהיוזמה לפגישה עם רוהמ' לא היתה שלו ובכלל לא ידע מדוע ראש ממשלת ישראל מעוניין לפגוש אותו, אך משתבקש הסכים לפגישה.

אמרתי לו שידידותו לישראל ותמיכתו הנמרצת בה בנאומים שונים ובהופעותיו ידועים לנו ושאנו מעריכים זאת ושבגלל כך רצה רוהמ' להזמינו לביקור בארץ. הוספתי שלפני שובו ארצה הודה לי רוהמ' להזמינו באורחנו לביקור רשמי או פרטי בפי שימצא לנכון ושעכשו, אחר ביקורו בלבנון, נדמה לי שביקור כזה יהיה אפילו יותר מועיל וחשוב מאשר לפני כן.

בנקודה זו התלונן הקרדינל במרירות די רבה על ההתקפות הרבות שהותקף מצד אישים וארגונים יהודים ללא כל הצדקה לדעתו. בתקופה האחרונה לבד קיים שש שיחות נפרדות עם משלחות של ארגונים יהודיים או אישים בודדים, מלבד פגישתו עם נציגנו לאום. גם ההתקפות עליו בעתונות הבעיקרון מאד, מה עוד שהוא רואה עצמו ידיד הקהילה היהודית וידיד ישראל והוכיח זאת בגלוי פעמים רבות. על פעולותיו בנושאים יהודיים כמו סבייתו לריגן שלא יסע לביטבורג או נערכותו המתמדת בעניין יהודי בריהמ' לא זכה אף פעם להכרת תודה. הוא מבין את חשיבות הקהילה היהודית בניו יורק לישראל ומעריך זאת. הוא יודע שגם לתפקידו בקרדינל הקתולי של ניו יורק יש מימד מיוחד בגלל הקהילה היהודית בעיר זו.

אמרתי לו שהוא יודע במרבי שבקהילה היהודית באן יש פלורליזם, עם זאת אעשה את המעט שביכולתי בדי לבטרת ולטייע להפחתת הלחצים. עניינה של הקהילה היהודית בישראל ודאגתה לדמותה משותפים לנו ואנו מעריכים זאת, אך לגבי

עמדות ישראליות רשמיות הצעתי שיקיים קשר במישרין רק עם הנציג הרשמי של ישראל בעיר ולא באמצעות מתווכים. לדעתי גם ביקור בארץ ופגישות עם אישיים ישראליים יסייעו לו בכך.

לגבי ביקור בארץ אמר שעקרונית מעוניין, אך שלוח הזמנים שלו דחוס ושמישהו מידידיו אמר שעליו למהר ולבקר לפני אוקטובר ביוזע הרוטציה וזה בלתי אפשרי. הבטחתי לו שיהיה אורח רצוי ומכובד של ממשלת ישראל גם אם יבוא בתארין מאוחר יותר. אמרתי שאם יחליט לבוא נשמח לארחו בכל מועד שיקבע.

ענין כיבוך יחסים דיפלומטיים עם הותיקן הועלה על ידו וביוזמתו. הוא אמר שהוא מעוניין בכך ופועל להגשמת הדבר ומקווה שיחסים ייבוכו עוד בחייו. עמדתו בענין זה ידועה בותיקן וגם לאפיפיור אישית.
אין הוא יודע
מתי הדבר יקרה. דבר אחד ודאי הוא שרק האפיפיור אישית יבריע בסוגיה זו. הוא ביקש שנדע שהדבר כרוך בשלוש סוגיות בעלות חשיבות רבה מאוד לותיקן:

1. הסתד מדינת בקהילות הנוצריות בארצות ערב ובארצות מוסלמיות אחרות.

2. הצורך להתקדם בפתרון בעיית הפלסטים. ישראל אינה אשמה בבעיה זו. הוא מעולם לא אמר דבר כזה ולחיננו התקיפותו של כך, אך חובת כל ארצות המזה"ת לתרום לפתרון הבעיה. הוא יודע מה שישראל עשתה כבר בתחום זה, אך הדברים לא ידועים במידה מספקת בותיקן ובעולם בכלל וזה, לדעתו, כשלון ישראלי הסברתי. משיחות עם האפיפיור הוא יודע שסוגיה זו חשובה בעיניו מאוד ובאורח אישי.

3. בעית ירושלים והגישה למקומות בקדושים.

או'קונר אמר כי בבעת שמנהיגים יהודים שונים טוענים כאשר אינם מתייחסים ברציבות מספקת לכובד משקלם של שלושה גורמים אלה בעיני הותיקן.

השבתי שלגבי ירושלים מעולם לא נהנתה העיר מגישה חופשית כזו למקומות הקדושים לכל הדתות בפי שקיימת מאז 1967 ושיווכח בכך בעצמו אם יבוא לביקור. לגבי בעית הפלסטים

אני משוכנע שעשינו במשך שנים רבות ככל יכולתנו להביא
את הטיכור בולר לידיעת דעת הקהל בעולם, אך שלטוניה
זר אני מוכן להקדיש דיון נפרד. לגבי מצב העדות הנוצריות
בארצות ערב אמרתי לו שאני מבין את חרדתם אך איננני
הדשב שהיא מוצדקת. הצעתי לו שיזמין מחקר הסטורי
שיסקור את ההתפתחויות מאז תום מלחמת העולם הראשונה
ואילך. המחקר יוכיח שבכל ארצות ערב הלך והתדרדר מצב
הקהילות הנוצריות בלי כל קשר לציונות או לישראל.
הזכרתי במיוחד את לבנון ואת עזרתנו הממושכת למארונים.

הפגישה שהחלה בקרירות-מה נמשכה שעה וחצי. בסופה נפרדנו
בחיוכים וביידידות רבה. הקרדינל אף שאל אם רעייתי
ואני נסכים לבוא אליו לארוחת ערב. העברתי לו את ספרו
של יגאל לוסין "עמוד האש" (באנגלית) וכן גם את
ספרי על האסלאם במאליזה הבריטית. הוא העניק לי מדליון
מיוחד של הקרדינלות שלו.

לסיכום, אין ספק שאריקנר רואה עצמו יוזם הקהילה היהודית
ויזיד ישראל. הוא מגרדמר באמת ובתמים על הפרדוקסים
השליליים שזכה להם בעקבות ביקורו בבירות ובדמשק
ושלדעתו אינם מוצדקים. הוא לא אמר זאת במפורש אך
נדמה לי שיערין אם אעזור לו בתחום זה. הוא כעלב מכך
שהמתין לשוא לביקור של רוהמי אך נדמה לי שקיבל את
הסברי ואת התנצלותי, מה עוד שנוצר איזון מסויים בכך
שגם אני המתנתי חדשים כה רבים לפגישה אתו. מכבידה
עליו העובדה שבניו יוצרק יש כל כך הרבה גורמים מתוכים
למיניהם על ייצוג ישראל ומדיניות החוץ שלה. התרשמתי
שהוא רוצה לקדם את יחסי הותיקן-ישראל אך הוא בהשפעתו
המוגבלת בתחום זה. שניין ביקורו בארץ בשאר תלוי באויר.
צריך יהיה להמתין זמן מה לפני שאדע אם יבוא.

יגר.

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,מצפא,ורד,נבטיות

תאריך : 09.08.86

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי נכנס **
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מרזם:8/1584
אל:המשרד
מ-:בי/נר:183/תא:080886/זח:1500/דח:ר/טג:ס
נד:@

1. שיחה ר' ל.
2. [illegible]
3. שיחה ל- [illegible]

סודי/רגיל

אל:ורד/כנסיות

דע:וושינגטון(נר 42) רומא הועבר ממרהמ'.

מאת:קונסל ניו יורק

קרדינל ג'והן או'קונר.

לפגישתי עם הקרדינל עליה דיווחתי היום במברק נפרד קדמה התיעצות שערכתי יום קודם לכן עם נציגי ארגונים יהודיים הערוכים ביחסים עם הכנסיה הקתולית.

מלקולם הובלירן דיווח על פגישה שנערכה ב-29 ביולי עם הקרדינל בהשתתפות מרים אברם וקן ביאלקין. הם ביקשו לראות את או'קונר מיד עם שובו מבירות במרומא אך עברו שבועות אחדים עד שנענו. נושאי השיחה היו דומים מאד לאלה שהיו בפגישת או'קונר-נתניהו ב-27 ביולי ופגישתי אתו ב-7 באוגוסט. לדברי הובלירן הנושא המרכזי בשיחה היו קובלנותיו של הקרדינל על הארגונים היהודים והאישים שהתקיפוהו. ביחוד אדגר ברונפמן. הוא הזכיר את מעורבותו החיובית בנושאים יהודיים, עיסוקו למען יהודי בריהמ', השתתפותו בטקסי הזכרון לשואה ובירצא בזה והדגיש שאף איש בכורה קתולי בניו יורק לא הודה לו לא בהג כן. הוא טען כי יהודי ניו יורק לא הודו לו על כל אלה, אך כאשר חזר לאחרונה מרומא דבה לגל של דואר שלילי. לדבריו צוטט בעתונות לא נכון. הוא קרא לפתרון בעיית הפליטים ולא לניתוק מדינה פלסטינית או למתן "ביבית" להם. הוא לא הטיל אחריות על ישראל

ובבלל לא מתח עליה ביקורת. הוא רואה עצמו כיהיד ישראל ותומך בביבון יחסים דיפלומטים עם הותיקן, אם כי אינו יכול לומר זאת בפומבי. גם בשיחה זו הזכיר את פרשת פגישתו עם רוהמ' באוקטובר שעבר שלא יצאה לפועל. היה ברור שעניין זה פגע בו.

נציג האי.די.אל. סיפר שגם משלחת של אוגנדה ביקרה אצל הקרדינל. הם שמרו ממנו דברים דומים. בשיחה זו אמר או'קונר שהזאגה העיקרית של האפיפיור, המונעת התקדמות ביחסים עם ישראל, היא החשש לגורל הקהילות הנוצריות בארצות ערב. חשש זה גבר בעקבות ביקור שערן סילבסטריני בדמשק לפני כחדשיים, שכנראה שמע אז איומים מפורשים.

בעקבות כל השיחות והפגישות האלה אני מבקש שני דברים:

1. השיגי נא הסכמת רוהמ' שישלח מכתב לקרדינל בו יאמר שרק עכשו נודע לו על הפגישה שלא התקיימה באוקטובר 1985 ושהוא מצטער על הקלה זו. במכתב זה יזמין רוהמ' את הקרדינל לבקר בארץ. אם רוהמ' יסכים - אשלח הצעת טיוטה למכתב.

2. נעשי נא למצוא מזרחן נוסף שיסכים להבין במהירות סקירה הסטורית באנגלית על מצב הקהילות הנוצריות בארצות הערביות השונות מאז קיבלו עצמאותן ועד ימינו אלה.

בימים הקרובים אזמן אלי שוב את נציגי הארגונים היהודים בנסיון להביא להפסקת מתיחת הביקורת על הקרדינל ואם אפשר גם להפחתת מספר הפגישות שהוא נאלץ לקיים עם כל כך הרבה גורמים נכרדים. המתיחות שנוצרה ביבו לבין כמה חוגים יהודים בעיר אינה מסייעת לבו.

באשר לפגישה שלא נערכה ביבו לבין רוהמ' הרי מבירורים שונים שערכתי קשה לי לקבוע בזיוק מי האחראי לתקלה אך בנראה שתרמו לבך מערבות בלתי מועילה של לשבת ראש העיר קוצ', עורייבתו של ראש לשבת הקרדינל ואי סדר אצלבו. כזכור, יותר מדי אנשים התערבו אז בתכבון ביקור רוהמ' מבלי שבקבע בשעתו גורם אחראי מתאם ומרבזי.

יגר.

תפ: שהה, רהמ, מבכל, ממבכל, ורד, בבסיות, מצבא, תפוצות

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5460
** יוצא
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שמור

אל: נר , ווש , נר: 989, מ : המשרד
וח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 150886, וח: 1500

שמור/רגיל

יגד

מכתב רהמ' לאוקונור.

מברקך 328 סעיף 6.

לשכת רה"מ מכירה המכתב בתאום איתנו. נסיות.

חב

גפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,כנסיות

3/3

בישיבה טלפונית עליה לשאול עוסת.
ולעל עיתוך על הישיבה.
① היתקלה ② הישיבה. ③ שעלה לדיון בינ-עמן.

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רח: 1 מחור: 3	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	רחיפות: סווג כטחוני:
א ל: לש'ממנכ"ל, מע"ת, סמנכ"ל אמית"ק, הסברה, כצמ"א, רו"צ מפ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ם לתקשורת, לע"מ		תז"ח: 101130
ד ע: וושינגטון	סדר בטחון	נר: 0204 רוש: 45 משהב"ס: 15
מאת: עתונות, ניו יורק		

News Summary August 9-10, 1986

Columns

DN-Cal Thomas 8/10 "Libya Raid Backlash Muted" Soothsayers who predicted the worst imaginable catastrophy following the US raid on Libya have proven wrong--again. Standing up to Khadafy has worked.

Press Reporst

Israel Starts Deporting Black Hebrews

NYT-AP 8/9 Israel has started deporting members of the US-based Black Hebrew sect. The Israeli authorities refused to provide any details about the deportations. The Supreme Court ruled last week that 46 members had been living in the ocuntry illegally and upheld an earlier decision to deport them. An Interior Ministry spokesman, Yizhak Agassi, said that many more Black Hebrew members were living in Israel illegally and could also be deported.

Arabs Report Progress Toward Ending PLO Rift

NYT-Bijazi 8/10 Three factions of the PLO have reported progress in efforts to heal a three-year rift within the group. The assessments, made public in Beirut, came after a meeting of the factions in Moscow. The Kremlin has been pressing the PLO to close ranks in preparation for any possible Mideast peace conference, which the Russians would like to take part. According to PLO sources, the next step would be for the Democtaic Alliance and Palestine National Salvation Front to consult while Soviet officials contact the Syrian Gov't in an effort at ending the strain between Arafat and Assad. If these efforts prove successful, the PNC would be asked to meet in a special session to elect a new PLO Executive Committee. Algeria has offered to be the host.

Egypt-Sinai

NYT-Wren 8/10 4 years after Israel evacuated the Sinai, Cairo's ambitions for the area have been blunted by economic realities. The territories primary significance remains political. Egypt wants to show the world it can turn Sinai into something valuable. The real wealth of the Sinai lies in offshore oil fields. Egypt wanted its masses to move to the desert but few have been willing to leave the Nile villages, where

תאריך: 8.8.86	שם השולח: לורה ליס	אישור:

ב ו מפנו מרכ תפוצה עיתים מתפעלים

family ties run deep, to work in alien lands. Egypt has deliberately sought no help from Israel, which has pioneered techniques of cultivating the desert. The country is bent on proving it can made better use of Sinai than Israel did.

Effort to Free Lebanon Hostages

NYT-Rohter 8/9 Terry Waite said his mission to free the hostages in Lebanon is "on standby" until there was a response from the group holding the hostages. He said Islamic Holy War has not replied to recent suggestions of his that negotiations for the release of the hostages be resumed. The State Dept. will not negotiate and Waite thinks this is unfortunate because it seems to indicate "there can be no communication." (see ND-wire; NYP-Crowley)

NYT-special 9/10 A statement purportedly issued by Islamic Holy War warned the US that its policy in Lebanon was harming the case of American hostages held there. The statement also appeared to reject appeals in NY on Friday that negotiations for the release of the hostages be resumed. A photo of one of the hostages accompanied the letter letter, which was distributed to offices of international news agencies.

Car Bomb in Beirut

NYT-Hijazi 8/9 (photo p.1 of woman fleeing scene of car-bombing) Another huge bomb exploded in the Moslem sector of Beirut killin 17 and wounding 90. The explosion was followed by 2 hours of artillary and rock and rocket exchanges across the Green Line. The violence of the past two weeks has left more than 70 dead and 400 wounded. A previously unknown group was reported to having taken responsibility. A man who said he represented the "Revolutionary Liberation Cells" telephoned the Voice of Lebanon and said his group set off the bomb. The bombings are seen as attempts to sabatoge efforts to restore security and to head off political dialogue. (see all NY papers)

Morocco's Jews & Arabs Continue to Wage Peace

ND-Kunstel 8/9-Jews and Arabs have been coexisting amicably in Morocco for more than 200 years and Hassan seems determined to keep the peace. A Jewish elected to the city council in Casablanca says "There are absolutely no problems. We have absolute confidence in the King."

Malta-Libya Relations Reported to Cool

NYT-Miller-Long-time ties between Malta and Libya have cooled in recent months despite continued statements of support on both sides, according to Maltese officials and diplomats. The primary resaon for this is that Malta's association with Libya failed to touch off a widely expected economic boom. Political friction has also mounted. The Maltese PM recently refused a Libyan request to place 1000 Libyan military "advisers" with Malta's 1000 member armed forces. He is also said to have reversed a longstanding practice of allowing Libyans safe haven in Malta to plan terrorist attacks.

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Soviet Dissidents Now Work Alone

NYT-Taubman 8/10 The Soviet Human Rights movement, battered by a decade of Gov't crackdowns, has turned increasingly inward, each man focused on his own case, few interested in the common improvement of human rights. A reminder of the isolation came with the brief letter distributed to US reporters in Moscow last week. Iosif S. Irlin, a Soviet scientist announced that he would begin a hunger strike to generate attention for his request to emigrate to Israel. He writes that now "most people are afraid and just want to leave." Despite the fact that Soviets and Israelis will meet in Europe to discuss the opening of consular ties, the climate remains hostile for bold political dissent, emigration is at a standstill and the human rights situation has not improved. Hebrew teachers continue to be arrested and political prisoners are treated harshly.

The "Islamization" of Pakistan

NYT-Weisman 8/10-9 years after Pakistan started to make its laws conform with the teaching of Islam, religious and political leaders agree that changes in the country have been largely marginal or cosmetic. At the same time, Pakistan's "Islamization" drive continues to stir debate and controversy and Gov't leaders insist they want to expand the program.

Arabs & Jews in Israel

New York Times Magazine-Shipler (article adapted from book "Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land" to be published next month) For nearly 40 years, Jews and Arabs have been entangled in a twilight war. Now the minds of the young have become the battleground. The prejudices that are conveyed by each side to its children, stem from clear-cut hostility that no longer embraces the full scope of Arab-Jewish relationships. Arabs and Jews will remain locked into this weary land, whatever happens in war or diplomacy. Integration is not wanted in schools, by Arabs or Jews. Of all the scattered efforts in Israel to revise Jewish and Arab thinking about each other, the one with the greatest potential is an ambitious program to reform the cirriculum in Israel's schools. The plan faces serious resistance from many school officials but the Ministry of Education gave formal endosement to the program. A prgram for teenagers at Neve Shalom is detailed. At the end of the program, some Arab and Jewish teenagers have fallen in love. But the program ends and many of the youngsters feel the ending drawing them heavily back beneath the old burdens that lie outside.

ITONUT

תאריך : 09.08.86

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי נכנס **
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הדזם:8/1584
אל:המשרד
מ-:ני/נר:183/תא:080886/זת:1500/דח:ר/סג:ס
נד:ם

סודי/רגיל

אל:ורד/כנסיות

דע:וושינגטון(נר 42) רומא הועבר ממרהמ'.

מאת:קונסל ניו יורק

קרדינל ג'והן או'קונור.

לפגישתי עם הקרדינל עליה דיווחתי היום במברק נפרד קדמה התיעצות שערכתי יום קודם לכן עם נציגי ארגונים יהודים העוסקים ביחסים עם הכנסיות הנוצריות.

מלקולם הונליין דיווח על פגישה שנערכה ב-29 ביולי עם הקרדינל בהשתתפות מרדיס אברם וקן ביאלקין. הם ביקשו לראות את או'קונר מיד עם שובו מבירות ומרומא אך עברו שבועות אחדים עד שנעשנו. נושאי השיחה היו דומים מאד לאלה שהיו בפגישת או'קונר-נתניהו ב-77 ביולי ופגישתי אתו ב-7 באוגוסט. לדברי הונליין הנושא המרכזי בשיחה היו קובלנותיו של הקרדינל על הארגונים היהודים והאישים שהתקיפוהו. ביחוד אדגר ברונפמן. הוא הזכיר את מערכותו החיובית בנושאים יהודיים, עיסוקו למען יהודי בריהמ', השתתפותו בטקסי הזכרון לשואה וביוצא בזה והדגיש שאף איש כמוהו קתולי בכיר באהב לפניו לא נהג כן. הוא טען כי יהודי ניו יורק לא הודו לו על כל אלה, אן כאשר חזר לאחרונה מרומא זכה לגל של דואר שלילי. לדבריו צוטט בעתונות לא נכון. הוא קרא לפתרון בעיית הפליטים ולא לכינון מדינה פלסטינית או למתן "ביתי" להם. הוא לא הטיל אחריות על ישראל

רבבלל לא מתח עליה ביקורת. הוא דואה עצמו בידיד ישראל ותומן בביצון יחסים דיפלומטים עם הדתיקן, אם כי אינו יכול לומר זאת בפומבי. גם בשיחה זו הזכיר את פרשת פגישתו עם רוהמ' באוקטובר שעבר שלא יצאה לפועל. היה ברור שעניין זה פגע בו.

נציג האי.די.אל . סיפר שגם משלחת של ארגונו ביקרה אצל הקרדינל. הם שמעו ממנו דברים דומים. בשיחה זו אמר או'קונר שהדאגה העיקרית של האפיפיור , המונעת התקדמות ביחסים עם ישראל, היא החשש לגורל הקהילות הנוצריות בארצות ערב. חשש זה גבר בעקבות ביקור שרון סילבסטריני בדמשק לפני כחדשיים,שכנראה שמע אז איומים מפורשים.

בעקבות כל השיחות והפגישות האלה אני מבקש שני דברים:

1. השיגי נא הסכמת רוהמ' שישלח מכתב לקרדינל בו יאמר שרק עכשו נודע לו על הפגישה שלא התקיימה באוקטובר 1985 ושהוא מצטער על תקלה זו. במכתב זה יזמין רוהמ' את הקרדינל לבקר בארץ. אם רוהמ' יסכים - אשלח הצעת טיוטה למכתב.

2. נסי נא למצוא מזרחן טוב שיסכים להכין במהירות סקירה הסטורית באנגלית על מצב הקהילות הנוצריות בארצות הערביות השונות מאז קיבלו עצמאותן ועד ימינו אלה.

בימים הקרובים אזמן אלי שוב את נציגי הארגונים היהודים בנסיון להביא להפסקת מתיחת הביקורת על הקרדינל ואם אפשר גם להפחתת מספר הפגישות שהוא נאלץ לקיים עם כל כך הרבה גורמים נפרדים. המתיחות שנוצרה בינו לבין כמה חוגים יהודים בעיר אינה מסייעת לנו.

באשר לפגישה שלא נערכה בינו לבין רוהמ' הרי מבירורים שונים שערכתי קשה לי לקבוע בדיוק מי האחראי לתקלה אך כנראה שתרמו לכך מעורבות בלתי מועילה של לשכת ראש העיר קוצ', עורייכותו של ראש לשכת הקרדינל ואי סדר אצלנו. כזכור, יותר מדי אנשים התערבו אז בתכנון ביקור רוהמ' מבלי שנקבע בשעתו גורם אחראי מתאם ומרכזי.

יגר.

תפ: שהה,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,ורד,כנסיות,מצפא,תפוצות

תאריך : 09.08.86

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

סודי נכנס **
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מזדם:8,1609
אל:המשרד
מ-:ני,נר:174,תא:080386,זח:1300,דח:ר,סג:ס
נד:@

סודי/רגיל

אל:ורד/נסיעות.

דע:נאום. מנכל. וושינגטון (נר 38) רומא ממרהמ'.

מאת:קונכל ניו יורק.

קרדינל ג'והן או'קונר.

ב-7 באוגוסט בבוקר נפגשתי עם הקרדינל או'קונר. הפגישה נערכה בביתו ולא במשרדו. בזכור הזמנתי אליו בעקבות ארוחת הבוקר שראש עיריית ניו יורק אד קוצ' ערך לשגריר נתניהו ולקרדינל. (ראו מברק נאום מ-17 ביולי). ישבתי עם הקרדינל לבדו ללא עוזרים.

השיחה החלה בכך שאמרתי לו שעוד בנובמבר שעבר ביקשתי לראותו בגלל שתי סיבות: האחת, לערוך אצלו ביקור נימוסין מקובל לרגל כניסתי לתפקיד, והשניה לברר את כשר השמועה ששמעתי לפיה נקבעה לו פגישה עם רוהמ' שמעון פרס באוקטובר שעבר ושרוהמ' לא הגיע לפגישה. אמרתי לו שרציתי לברר מי קבע פגישה זו שכן לא היה ידוע לי עליה דבר ושעד עכשיו לא הצלחתי לגלות מי קבע פגישה זו בשמו של רוהמ'.

הוספתי שהתקבלתי אז לשיחה עם ראש לשכתו, האב מקרתי שאמר לי שאוזמן לקרדינל בינואר השנה, אך עברו חדשים ולא הוזמנתי.

או'קונר התנצל על שלא הודמנתי אליו קודם לכן והסביר שכלל לא הובא לידיעתו שביקשתי לראותו. לגבי הפגישה עם רוהמ' שלא יצאה לפועל אמר שמישהו קבע פגישה זו והוא המתין בשעה לרוהמ' שלא בא. אחר כן טלפנו ממשרדו לקונסוליה ונאמר לו שרוהמ' יטלפן אליו בשעה מסויימת. הוא המתין גם לטלפון זה שלא הגיע. אמרתי לקרדינל שאני שומע על עניין הטלפון לראשונה, שאינני יודע מי הסדיר כל זאת ושהייתי מודה לו היה מסייע בידי לברר זאת. מכל מקום התנצלתי ואמרתי שאין לי קשר שרוהמ' עצמו אינו יודע על כן מאומה.

או'קונר הוסיף זו במרירות שהיזמה לפגישה עם רוהמ' לא היתה שלו ובכלל לא ידע מדוע ראש ממשלת ישראל מעוניין לפגוש אותו, אך משתבקש הסכים לפגישה.

אמרתי לו שידידותו לישראל ותמיכתו הפומבית בה בנאומים שונים ובהופעותיו ידועים לנו ושאנו מעריכים זאת ושבגלל כן רצה רוהמ' להזמינו לביקור בארץ. הוספתי שלפני שובו ארצה הורה לי רוהמ' להזמינו באורחנו לביקור רשמי או נרמזי בכי שימצא לנכון ושעכשו, אחר ביקורו בלבנון, נדמה לי שביקור כזה יהיה אפילו יותר מועיל ותשוב מאשר לפני כן.

בבקודה זו התלונן הקרדינל במרירות זו רבה על ההתקפות הרבות שהותקף מצד אישים וארגונים יהודים ללא כל הצדקה לדעתו. בתקופה האחרונה לבד קיים שש שיחות נפרדות עם משלחות של ארגונים יהודיים או אישים בודדים, מלבד פגישתו עם נציגנו לארם. גם ההתקפות עליו בעתונות הבעיסהר מאד, מה עוד שהוא רואה עצמו ידיד הקהילה היהודית וידיד ישראל והוכיח זאת בגלוי בעמים בה רבות. על פעולותיו בנושאים יהודיים כמו פנייתו לריגן שלא יסע לביטבורג או מעורבותו המתמדת בעניין יהודי בריהמ' לא זכה אף פעם להכרת תודה. הוא מבין את חשיבות הקהילה היהודית בניו יורק לישראל ומעריך זאת. הוא יודע שגם לתפקידו בקרדינל הקתולי של ניו יורק יש מימד מיוחד בגלל הקהילה היהודית בעיר זו.

אמרתי לו שהוא יודע כמוני שבקהילה היהודית כאן יש פלורליזם, עם זאת אעשה את המעט שביכולתי כדי לנסות ולסייע להפחתת הלחצים. עניינה של הקהילה היהודית בישראל ודאגתה לרווחתה חשובים לנו ואנו מעריכים זאת, אך לגבי

עמדות ישראליות רשמיות הצעתי שיקיים קשר במישרין רק עם הנציג הרשמי של ישראל בעיר ולא באמצעות מתווכים. לדעתי גם ביקור בארץ ופגישות עם אישיים ישראליים יסייעו לו בכך.

לגבי ביקור בארץ אמר שעקרונית מעוניין, אך שלוח הזמנים שלו דחוס ושמישהו מידידיו אמר שעליו למהר ולבקר לפני אוקטובר ביוזע הרוטציה רזה בלתי אפשרי. הבטחתי לו שיהיה אורח רצוי ומכובד של ממשלת ישראל גם אם יבוא בתארין מאוחר יותר. אמרתי שאם יחליט לבוא נשמח לארחו בכל מועד שיקבע.

ענין כינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם הותיקן הועלה על ידו ובירוזמתו. הוא אמר שהוא מעוניין בכך ונועל להגשמת הדבר ומקווה שיחסים ייכונו עוד בחייו. עמדתו בענין זה ידועה בותיקן וגם לאפיפיור אישית.
אין הוא יודע
מתי הדבר יקרה. דבר אחד ודאי הוא שרק האפיפיור אישית יכריע בסוגיה זו. הוא ביקש שנדע שהדבר כרוך בשלוש סוגיות בעלות חשיבות רבה מאוד לותיקן:

1. הפחד מרדיפת בקהילות הנוצריות בארצות ערב ובארצות מוסלמיות אחרות.

2. הצורך להתקדם בפתרון בעיית הנליטים. ישראל אינה אשמה בבעיה זו. הוא מעולם לא אמר דבר נזה ולחיננם התקיפוהו על כך, אך חובת כל ארצות המזה"ת לתרום לפתרון הבעיה. הוא יודע מה שישראל עשתה כבר בתחום זה, אך הדברים לא ידועים במידה מספקת בותיקן ובעולם בכלל ונזה, לדעתו, כשלון ישראלי הסברתי. משיחות עם האפיפיור הוא יודע שסוגיה זו חשובה בעיניו מאוד ובאורח אישי.

3. בעית ירושלים והגישה למקומות בקדושים.

או'קונר אמר די בבעם שמנהיגים יהודים שונים טוענים כאשר אינם מתייחסים ברציונות מספקת לבובד משקלם של שלושה גורמים אלה בעיני הותיקן.

השבתי שלגבי ירושלים מעולם לא נהנתה העיר מגישה חופשית כזו למקומות הקדושים לכל הדתות כפי שקיימת מאז 1967 ושירובה בכך בעצמו אם יבוא לביקור. לגבי בעית הנליטים

אני משוכנע שעשינו במשך שנים רבות ככל יכולתנו להביא
את הסיפור כולו לידיעת דעת הקהל בעולם, אך שלטוניה
זו אני מוכן להקדיש דיון נפרד. לגבי מצב העדות הנוצריות
בארצות ערב אמרתי לו שאני מבין את חרדתם אך איננני
חושב שהיא מוצדקת. הצעתי לו שיזמין מחקר היסטורי
שיסקור את ההתפתחויות מאז תום מלחמת העולם הראשונה
ואילך. המחקר יוביח שבכל ארצות ערב הלך והתדרדר מצב
הקהילות הנוצריות בלי כל קשר לציונות או לישראל.
הזכרתי במיוחד את לבנון ואת עזרתנו הממושכת למארונים.

הפגישה שהחלה בקרירות-מה נמשכה שעה וחצי. בסופה נפרדנו
בחיוכים וביידידות רבה. הקרדינל אף שאל אם רעייתי
ואני נסכים לבוא אליו לארוחת ערב. העניקתי לו את ספרו
של יגאל לוסין "עמוד האש" (באנגלית) וכן גם את
ספרי על האסלאם במאלאיה הבריטית. הוא העניק לי מדליון
מיוחד של הקרדינלות שלו.

לסיכום, אין ספק שאו'קונר רואה עצמו ידיד הקהילה היהודית
וידיד ישראל. הוא ממורמר באמת ובתמים על הפרסומים
השליליים שזכה להם בעקבות ביקורו בבירות וברומא
ושלדעתו אינם מוצדקים. הוא לא אמר זאת במפורש אך
נדמה לי שיעריך אם אעזור לו בתחום זה. הוא נעלב מכך
שהמתין לשוא לביקור של רוהמי אך נדמה לי שקיבל את
הסברי ואת התנצלותי, מה ערד שנוצר איזון מסויים בכך
שגם אני המתנתי חדשים כה רבים לפגישה אתו. מבבידה
עליו העובדה שבניו יורק יש כל כך הרבה גורמים מתוכים
למיניהם על ייצוג ישראל ומדיניות החוץ שלה. התרשמתי
שהוא רוצה לקדם את יחסי הותיקן-ישראל אך הודעה בהשפעתו
המוגבלת בתחום זה. עניין ביקורו בארץ נשאר תלוי באויר.
צריך יהיה להמתין זמן מה לפני שאדע אם יבוא.

יגר.

תפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,מצפא,ורד,נכסיות

1011 First Avenue
New York, NY 10022

August 25, 1986

Your Excellency:

My warmest thanks for your kind letter of August 8, 1986 and for your gracious visit of August 7. I would very much appreciate your advising Prime Minister Shimon Peres that in my judgment I consider our failure to meet as proposed, during his October 1985 visit to the United Nations, a pure "no fault" accident. While I regret an opportunity that would have been for me an honor, my inquiries into the circumstances make it quite clear to me that your office was in no way responsible.

Be assured that I take quite seriously and as a privilege the invitation of your Government, conveyed during our discussion, that I visit Israel. Because of exceedingly heavy demands and schedule conflicts during the next several months, it is impossible for me to predict at the moment precisely when such a visit would be feasible. May I ask, however, that you convey to your Government my deepest appreciation for the honor extended and my assurance that I shall be in continuing touch with you on this matter.

I regret that my office inadvertently failed to provide an earlier opportunity for us to meet; and hope that you and Mrs. Yegar will be able to join me for dinner in my residence in the near future.

With sentiments of highest esteem, I remain

Faithfully,

+ John Cardinal O'Connor

Archbishop of New York

The Honorable
Dr. Moshe Yegar
Consul General
Consulate General of Israel
800 Second Avenue
New York, New York 10017

1011 First Avenue
New York, NY 10022

August 25, 1986

Your Excellency:

My warmest thanks for your kind letter of August 8, 1986 and for your gracious visit of August 7. I would very much appreciate your advising Prime Minister Shimon Peres that in my judgment I consider our failure to meet as proposed, during his October 1985 visit to the United Nations, a pure "no fault" accident. While I regret an opportunity that would have been for me an honor, my inquiries into the circumstances make it quite clear to me that your office was in no way responsible.

Be assured that I take quite seriously and as a privilege the invitation of your Government, conveyed during our discussion, that I visit Israel. Because of exceedingly heavy demands and schedule conflicts during the next several months, it is impossible for me to predict at the moment precisely when such a visit would be feasible. May I ask, however, that you convey to your Government my deepest appreciation for the honor extended and my assurance that I shall be in continuing touch with you on this matter.

I regret that my office inadvertently failed to provide an earlier opportunity for us to meet; and hope that you and Mrs. Yegar will be able to join me for dinner in my residence in the near future.

With sentiments of highest esteem, I remain

Faithfully,

+ John Cardinal O'Connor

Archbishop of New York

The Honorable
Dr. Moshe Yegar
Consul General
Consulate General of Israel
800 Second Avenue
New York, New York 10017

	מחלקת המשר ניו-יורק **טופס מברק**	רח"פ: סווג בטחוני: סודי
		תז"ח:
נר: 0008	ד"נ: נוביק ממרה"מ ; וושינגטון	
	מאת: קונס"ל ניו-יורק	

קרדינל או'קונר.

ב-25 באוגוסט שלח לי הקרדינל מכתב אדיב המכלל את הנקודות העיקריות הבאות:

1. מבקש להודיע לרה"מ שאיש אינו אשם בכך שהפגישה ביניהם לא יצאה לפועל. הוא מצטער שהוחמצה הזדמנות זו, אך ברור לו שהקונהכלי"ת אינה אחראית.

2. מודה על ההזמנה לבקר בארץ אך בגלל לו"ז עמוס בחדשים הקרובים אינו יכול לקבוע עכשו מתי יוכל ביקור כזה להתבצע. מכטיח לחזור אתי בקשר בעניין זה.

המכתב עצמו יועבר לכם בדיפ הקרוב. אגב, טרם קיבלתי את מכתב ההזמנה המובטח מאת רה"מ. חשוב מאד להערכתי שמכתב כזה יימסר לידי הקרדינל.

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אישור:

	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	
סוג בטחוני: סודי		
תז"ח:		
נר: 0008		
אל: נרביק שגרה"ס ; וושינגטון		
מאת: קונב"ל ניו-יורק		

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CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

CONVERSATION WITH JOHN CARDINAL O'CONNOR, JUNE 27, 1986

On Friday afternoon of this date, about 2 p.m., Msgr. Jim McCarthy, personal secretary to Cardinal O'Connor telephone me to say that the Cardinal could meet with me at 4:30 p.m. I was eager to get a first-hand sense of his views and feelings on his Lebanon and Rome trip, and therefore went to see him. (Ted Ellenoff could not make it; and David Gordis was not in the office.) We met in his small guest room and were alone for about an hour.

The Cardinal began by thanking me for my brief comment in the New York Times that said that he is "a friend of the Jewish people and a supporter of the security and well-being of the State of Israel." I immediately told him that even though that was a small excerpt of what I had said to the N.Y. Times reporter who called me from Rome, I have received a number of criticisms for defending him, I showed him a letter from a rabbi in Englewood, N.J., who said that while he understood what I was trying to do, let the Cardinal defend himself. I told the Cardinal that that rabbi and others who called me were disturbed by reports of what the Cardinal had said about "the Palestinian homeland" and his implication that Israel alone was responsible for their plight.

There was similar consternation over his statements that somehow Israel held the key to peace in Lebanon, and that Israel has some role to play in assuring the security of some 8 million Christians in the Arab world. I made the point forcefully that since 1982, it is Syria, the Shiite and Sunni Muslims, and Druse who hold the key to Lebanon's peace and to the future of Christians in Lebanon. Did he really intend to scapegoat Israel?

As to Israel's guaranteeing the security of Christians in Arab lands, I found that incomprehensible. Should he not have been addressing that responsibility to Arab leaders, not Israel?

On the Palestinian homeland, that is precisely what Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres was about in seeking out aggressively talks with King Hussein, searching for a formula in some "Jordanian option." It was King Hussein who publicly declared that the PLO's Yassir Arafat torpedoed that option. Why did he not deal with that fact fairly, and in a balanced way?

There was a lot of defensive phumphing back and forth. It is clear that he knows very little about the complexities of the Middle East. It is also clear - and I referred to it - that his tour was arranged by Msgr. John Nolan, head of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association, which for decades has been involved in refugee care for Palestinian refugees. I mentioned that Msgr. Nolan has had a long-established reputation for being pro-Arab and anti-Israel, and he blinked vigorously.

Along the way in our polite but increasingly sharp talk, the Cardinal said a number of things of significance:

1) He made a number of pro-Palestinian, pro-Arab statements in order to establish his credibility in the Arab world. (He blurted that out in an almost confessional way.)

2) He knew he was risking some of his credibility in the Jewish community, but hoped that his good record on Jewish issues - particularly Soviet Jewry, the Nazi Holocaust, and anti-Semitism - would help

prevent too much erosion of his standing with the Jewish community.

3) He has been given "a semi-mandate" by Cardinal Casarolli and Archbishop Silvestrini of the Vatican Secretariat of State to become a principal "actor" for the Vatican on the Middle East. He said that while other Cardinals and Bishops have made occasional statements on the Middle East, none has concentrated on it as a central concern. He said he plans to do that. (Historically, Cardinal Spellman played such a role, but in a quieter, more diplomatic but politically potent way. Cardinal Cooke, a former social worker, contented himself with the social welfare aspects mainly of Palestinian and other Arab refugees.)

4) He said he favors "Vatican full diplomatic relations with Israel" but first a number of obstacles have to be gotten out of the way. He said tha status of Jerusalem is not a problem; "the international statute" is a matter of formality. The preconditions for establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, he suggested, have to do with some resolution of the plight of the Palestinians; reinforcing peace in Lebanon; and somehow trying to assure the secuirty of Arab Christians in the Middle East.

5) He made in somewhat emotional manner a big point that he had a two-hour audience with the Pope John Paul II at which he reported on his Lebanon trip. He said the Pope would not abandon the Arab Christians and would do nothing that would lead to their further massacres.

O'Connor then said that if the Vatican were to establish diplomatic relations with Israel tomorrow, there is no question but that thousands of Christians would be killed in reprisal. We have to find a way to prevent that from happening.

In a nice way, I "presumed" to say that the Vatican is now paying the price for allowing itself to be intimidated and blackmailed by the extremist Muslims and Arabs. I reminded him that during Vatican Council II Nasser threatened reprisals against Arab Christians if Nostra Aetaete would be adopted. Cardinal Bea refused to be intimidated. He made a public statement that the declaration was spiritual issue and has nothing to do with politics. He then secretly sent then Msgr. Willebrands to Egypt and Iraq to mollify the Arabs, but Bea proceded undeterred in having the declaration adopted. Most of the threats petered out.

As Israel and American foreign policy have demonstrated, the Arab-Muslim leaders respect strength and exploit weakness. He just listened.

6) If he plans to become active in the Middle East, I then said, it is essential to his credibility that he visit Israel and meet with Prime Minister Peres and other Israeli political and religious leaders. He then asked me to explore that possibility with Peres' office since I was leaving for Israel on Sunday. He said he wanted to meet with the Prime Minister; only the question of schedule has to be worked out. I told him I would be glad to do that. Once the decision is made, he would be hearing from me and/or from an appropriate Israeli official.

7) During our talk, he repeated several times that Vatican diplomatic relations would be helped if Israel made some public declaration of concern for the Palestinians, and the peace of Lebanon. I replied that Peres and other Israelis have done that often before; the issue is not statements but the political will of the Arabs to negotiate peace. But he would be free to discuss that with Peres and other Israelis.

Dr. Marc H. Tanenbaum

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

JUN 5 1986

1011 First Avenue
New York, NY 10022

June 3, 1986

Dear Marc,

Thank you so much for your letter --dated May 6th, (!) but only received by our office last week! I also very much enjoyed the opportunity to meet with you and Theodore Ellenoff. I appreciate very much the honesty and thoughtfulness that you both shared with me.

I am grateful for your willingness to arrange a meeting between myself and Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Should that develop as a possibility, I will be certain to be in touch. During the meeting with the bishops at Collegeville next week I will have the opportunity to explore possibilities with Cardinals Krol, Bernardin and Law, regarding the meeting we discussed.

Thanks again for your prayers and good wishes. I can not begin to tell you how much they mean to me.

Faithfully,

+John Cardinal O'Connor

Archbishop of New York

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum
Director
Internation Relations Department
The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56 Street
New York, N. Y. 10022



JUN 5 1986

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New York, NY 10022

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Archbishop of New York

Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum
Director
Internation Relations Department
The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56 Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

משרד החוץ – מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק צפון

אל: הקונכ"ל ניו-יורק

מאת: ~~יועץ משפטי לראה"מ~~

דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים

סיווג בטחוני: שמור

דחיפות: בהול

תאריך וזמן רישום: 1113

מס מברק: 911

לשימוש מח' הקשר

יבר

לפלן מלשכת רה"מ:

רצ"ב העתק ממכתב ראה"מ לקרדינל אוק'ונור . אנא העבירו לתעודתו.
המקור נמצא - והוא יועבר בדיפ' הקרוב.

לשכת ברכה

שהה הרה"מ [illegible] בניו יורק בנסיעתו

בר - כנסיה

השולח: ו. ברכה אישור מנהל המחלקה: אישור לשכת המנכ"ל:

(לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח)

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem August 19, 1986.

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911 כ)

His Eminence John Cardinal O'Connor
Archbishop of New York
NEW YORK CITY
U S A

Your Eminence,

On behalf of the Government of Israel, I would like to extend to you a hearty invitation to visit Israel, at your earliest convenience. I will be delighted to welcome you here as an honored guest of the Government of Israel.

It was my intention to extend this invitation to you in person when I visited New York in October 1985. It was my understanding that a meeting between us could not be arranged. Hence, I was deeply distressed to learn only recently that you awaited me. Please accept my sincere apologies for this most unfortunate misunderstanding.

As I am considering a brief visit to the U.S. in September, I would welcome an opportunity to make your personal acquaintance while in New York. I have asked Ambassador Moshe Yegar to advise your office of my travel plans once finalized.

I am very much looking forward to meeting you either here in Jerusalem, or earlier in New York.

Sincerely yours,

Shimon Peres



1011 First Avenue
New York, NY 10022

September 18, 1986

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am deeply appreciative of your gracious letter of August 19, 1986, which, unfortunately, was not received in my office until September 14th, or you would have heard from me at a much earlier date. Ambassador Moshe Yegar, however, was kind enough to convey to me orally your invitation that I visit Israel, and to inform me that you would be visiting New York in September.

You are very kind to apologize for our failure to meet on the occasion of your visit in October. There was unquestionably a mix-up in communications, and nothing more, so that I certainly needed no apology.

As I wrote recently to Ambassador Yegar, I would very much enjoy visiting Israel when scheduling problems can be resolved. In the meanwhile, it will be a pleasure to see you here in New York, if a visit meets your convenience.

With sentiments of highest esteem, I remain

Faithfully,

John Cardinal O'Connor

Archbishop of New York

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of Israel
c/o Consulate General of Israel
800 Second Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017

דחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 1 מתוך: 2
סווג בטחוני:		
תז"ח: 081200	אל: לש'כמנכ"ל, מע"ת, סמנכ"ל אמית"ק, הסברה, מצפ"א, דו"צ מפ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ם לתקשורת, לע"ס	
נר: 0171 וש: 37 משהב"ס: 14	ר ע: וושינגטון	
	מאת: עתונות, ניו יורק	

News Summary August 8, 1986

New York Headlines

The top story in the **New York Times** and the headline of **Daily News** deals with the asylum granted by the Soviet Union to ex-CIA agent Edward Lee Howard. US officials say that Howard's defection has caused immeasurable damage to national security. Other top story reports on hte continuing effort of the US to stamp out drug abuse. The White House plans to propose a $100 million program aimed at combating the use of drugs in schools. **Newsday's** headline deals with "Crack" abuse. Also on page 1 of the **Times:** An American arms control delegation is going to Moscow in the next few days with no specific agenda, but with the expectation that the Soviet Union may respond to recent US proposals. Top stories in the **Wall Street Journal** deal with Japanese firms buying up US firms involved in high tech and the problems of US steel workers.

Press Reports

Israeli Mission to South Africa

NYT-special-Israel sent a high level delegation to South Africa to negotiate a renewal of trade and credit agreements. Officials in Israel said the Gov't continued to oppose apartheid totally but would not join the wave of economic sanctions by individual nations. "Whatever decision will be taken by the mainstream Western countries, we're joining," said Ehud Gol. "Whatever we do," he added, "we'll take into consideration an element that does not exist in other countries--the Jews living in South Africa." The 100,000 South African Jews have been generous supporters of Israel. One of the subjects to be discussed is an arrangement permitting South African Jews to transfer investment funds to Israel. Israel's main interests in South Africa are coal for its power stations and fishing rights. Economic talks between Israel and South Africa have been held annually for the past 7 years.

Hussein-Mubarak Talks

NYT-Reuters-Hussein and Mubarak ended 24 hours of talks on Mideast peace prospects amid a news blackout. (see ND-wire)

תאריך: 8.8.86	שם השולח: שולה ף	איתור:

ב' 1 נצפו פרק ראשון שלחים תמוז שלחים

171/37/14 2/5

Libyan Funds Frozen to Cover Italian Debt
NYT-special-An Italian court has frozen $4.9 million in Libyan Gov't funds on deposit to cover longstanding debts owed to two Italian companies. The Libyan Gov't will soon appeal the judgement.

Iran-Iraq

NYT-AP-Iraq said its warplanes hit Kharg Island oil terminal 3 times and an oil refinery, a power station and two generators were hit.

Saudi Prince Admits to Smuggling Falcons

WSJ-p.1-Taylor-After months of negotiations, the US wrung a public admission of guilt to the smuggling of wild falcons from the US to Saudi Arabia by Prince Badr, a dep. commander of the Saudi National Guard and member of the Saudi's ruling inner circle. By apologizing and contributing $150,000 to US wild-life enforcement, the prince staved off the possibility of criminal charges. More Saudi embarrassment could be on the way. Canadian authorities say they are investigating falcon smuggling allegations against other members of the royal family.

Shanghai's Wartime Jews Are Object of Study

NYT-no biline-The Chinese Gov't has agreed to join an American inter-faith foundation in undertaking a study of the Eastern European Jews who found refuge in China in WW II. Two clergy men, Rabbi Alexander Schneier and Rev. Vincent O'Keefe, said they noticed "a dramatic and positive shift" in Peking's attitudes toward religion.

Yarmulkes Not Allowed in Armed Forces

ND-wire-By just 2 votes, the Senate turned down a proposal to let members of the armed forces wear religious articles, an amendment prompted by a Supreme Court ruling on yarmulkes. (see NYP-Broderick)

Book Reviews

NYT-Motgang reviews "The Ayatollah in the Cathedral" by Moorhead Kennedy and "The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu Nidal" by Yossi Melman. Kennedy's prescriptions for dealing with terrorism are lame. He says that "our best defense" is "resolve, patience and capacity for sacrifice." Melman's book provides a working analysis of the PLO and other terrorist groups. It all reads like a top secret briefing from an intelligence agency. The author sees no end to terrorist attacks. Terrorists, he believes, cannot be bought off. "The enire raison d'etre of such nations as Libya or Syria, which are based on revolutionary ideology, is the continued use of terror." The only optimistic note the author sounds is that Western nations are finally trying to coordinate their responses and take preventive measures.

Letters

NYT-Conn. resident writes that there should be a clear distinction between being anti-Semitic and being alert to Zionism.

ITONUT

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

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המשרד, בטחון נ.א.
68 176 188

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח. ניו יורק

8.8.86 תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום

Q Do you have any comment on the arrest of the American in Tehran?

MR. REDMAN: When the official Iranian press reports first indicated that John Pattis, an American citizen, had been arrested, we asked the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, which protects our interests there, to make inquiries about the case. The Swiss Ambassador in Tehran met with Iranian foreign ministry officials who confirmed that Pattis had been arrested. To date, despite repeated requests by the Swiss, the Iranians have not granted a consular visit.

Q Do you have any answer to their allegations that he had an Italian passport? Forged Italian passport.

MR. REDMAN: Why that should be an allegation, to have an Italian passport, I'm not sure. But no, I--we don't know what the charges are against him. We've not been able to get access, I should say the Swiss, on our behalf, have not had access to him. Basically what I have given you is all the details I can give you, and because of Privacy Act considerations I can't give you any more personal information.

Q There are reports in some Arab media that United States government is drawing a new peace plan with the participation of all parties including Israel and the PLO, especially after the visit of Mr. George Bush to the area these past few days. Do you have any comment on this?

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't.

Q Okay. Do you have any advancement in the idea of the United States accepting an international peace conference with the five members of the Security Council members, Mr. Peres will come to it, Mr. Shamir rejected. Where do you stand on this issue, again?

MR. REDMAN: Again?

Q Yep.

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MR. REDMAN: I'm glad you added that so that I'm not the only one that looks redundant when I answer this. Our views, our views on an international conference are well-known. We understand the importance for King Hussein of an international context for direct negotiations with Israel. We would support any arrangement acceptable to all the parties which furthers the goal of direct negotiations.

Q Usually whenever a statement is raised about the possibility of the United States either endorsing or participating in anything involving negotiations with the PLO, there's a precondition always expressed from the podium there about talks with the PLO, what preconditions would exist. And you didn't do that in this case.

MR. REDMAN: I didn't talk about negotiations with the PLO. There's been no change in our policy concerning contacts, dialogue with the PLO, but if you look at the statement I made, it didn't address that question.

Q Is the United States proposing, possibly through George Bush, that there be a meeting of the heads of government, heads of state, to address the Middle East problem?

MR. REDMAN: Not that I know of.

Q Chuck, Jesse Jackson is coming. Is he meeting with somebody here today? Do you know what the purpose of it might be?

MR. REDMAN: No, don't have anything on that.

Q Chuck, do you have anything on the meeting in Moscow of several PLO constituent groups, that the specific--on in general, the Soviets efforts to reunify the PLO?

MR. REDMAN: No. In the back.

Q I'm left with the impression that there is some sort of review on

your Middle East policy?

MR. REDMAN: There seems to be a review among your colleagues. (Laughter) But, beyond that, I don't have anything else. No.

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Q Do you have a comment on the role that Terry Waite played in the release of the hostage recently?

MR. REDMAN: Let me give you a more general reaction. A number of groups and individuals have been working for the release of the hostages in Lebanon. Terry Waite has been one of the most persistent and effective in this endeavor. We believe that his efforts have been helpful, and we appreciate all he has done.

Q Do you have any comment today on the letter of Solarz. He wrote to George Shultz concerning the Austrian President Kurt Waldheim.

MR. REDMAN: Nothing beyond the answer we posted two days ago.

Q On Tuesday, August the 5th, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee sent a cable to the Secretary of State protesting the appointment of Major General Amos Yaron as the military attache to the Israeli Embassy in Washington because, according to the charges, he was involved in criminal charges in the massacres of Sabra and Shatila. Have you had the time to respond to this? Or will you comment on such request from an Arab-American organization? To bar the interests of Mr. Yaron to the United States?

MR. REDMAN: Don't have anything on that.

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אל: השגרה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, מחנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל השגרה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח

דע: ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY
FRIDAY, AUGUST 8, 1986

MAJOR NEWS HEADLINES

TOP STORY: INVESTIGATORS WANT WHITE HOUSE AIDE DEAVER CHARGED WITH PERJURY

Congressional sources said that investigators for a House Subcommittee panel will recommend next week that former presidential aide Michael Deaver be cited for perjury.

Wash. Post: U.S. Probe Of Deaver May Widen: House Panel to Vote On Whether To Urge Perjury Investigation
Wash. Times: Probers Want Deaver Charged With Perjury
Balt. Sun: Panel To Weigh Perjury Charges Against Deaver

EX-CIA AGENT GRANTED ASYLUM IN SOVIET UNION

Former CIA agent Edward Lee Howard, who allegedly sold secrets to the U.S.S.R. and exposed several U.S. agents in Moscow, has been granted political asylum by the Soviet Union, according to reports from the Soviet news agency Tass.

Wash. Post: Soviets Grant Asylum To Fugitive CIA Agent: Howard Sold Key U.S. Secrets To Moscow
Wash. Times: Turncoat Former CIA Agent Granted Asylum By Soviets
Chic. Trib: Ex-CIA Agent Flees To Russia

TWO SOVIET ACROBATS DEFECT TO THE U.S.

A husband and wife team - Bertalina Kazakova & Nikolai Nikolski - star acrobats of the Moscow Circus asked for political asylum in the United States while on their first tour outside the Soviet Union.in Argentina.

Wash. Post: 2 Soviet Acrobats Defect: High Wire Act Escapes
Balt. Sun: Soviet Circus Couple DEfects To U.S.

DEFECTOR REVEALS 1981 SOVIET ALERT OF IMPENDING U.S. ATTACK

A British double agent and U.S.S.R. defector, Oleg Gordievsky, said that the Soviet's London KGB station was placed on alert in 1981 by a Moscow directive stating that the U.S. was preparing to attack the Soviet Union.

Wash. Post: Defector Told of Soviet Alert

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NEWS ARTICLES CON'T

HOSTAGES SAID TO BE KEPT MOVING TO PREVENT RESCUE ATTEMPT

Wash. Times, (wires): Interior Minister Abdallah Rassi said that in order to avoid rescue attempts, the kidnappers of three American hostages have been moving their captives from one secret prison to another. He aslo said that the Syrian govt. was helping in efforts to free the hostages. (8/8/86)

PLO OFFICIAL SAYS HE WOULD NOT PROTEST AUTONOMY FOR WEST BANK

Bost. Globe, (AP wire): Mohammed Milhem, a senior PLO official heading the dept. on occupied territories affairs said that he agreed in principle with appointing Palestinian mayors for West Bank cities. He said he also would not object with autonomy for the Israeli occupied territories as a transitional step. Milhem's position is seen as more flexible than other PLO officials. (8/7/86)

MAN LINKED TO BLACK HEBREWS FACES CHARGES

Chic. Trib., Possley: James Nelson, 31, connected with the Black Hebrews was arrested and sent to Michingan to face charges of enslavement and conspiracy. Eight men including Nelson will be tried on these charges in Michigan relating to the operation of a camp in Allegan Country, Mich., where a 12-year old boy was beaten to death. William A. Lewis, 63, known as the "Prophet", operated the House of Judah camp and is also among those indicted in connection with the case. The Black Hebrews group, which originated in Chicago,has recently attracted law enforcement officials in other crime related cases. (8/8/86)

SAUDI PRINCE SETTLES FALCON-SMUGGLING CASE: $150,000 Paid To U.S. Government

Wash. Post, Kurtz: The Justice Dept. has snared an unnamed senior Saudi Arabian prince in "Operation Falcon", a Lands and Natural Resource Division undercover probe for falcon smugglers.Gyrafalcons sell for up to $30,000 apiece during the Arabs buying season. The prince settled the case by paying $150,000 to the U.S. govt.Justice officials said that it would have been impossible to prosecute the prince, who denied knowing that he violated the U.S. Endangered Species Act, since the U.S. has no extradition treaty with Saudi Arabia. (8/8/86)

Deborah Stone
Itonut

3/3

67 175 187

NEWS ARTICLES AND ANALYSIS

ISRAEL HAS COMPLEX BOND WITH JEWISH AMERICANS

Wash. Post, pg. 1, Babcock: Last of a four part series - The Special Relationship. In what is perhaps the most special aspect of the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel, is the emotional nature of the relations between Jewish Americans and the Jewish state. A major debate among American Jews centers around how they should relate to Israel, how important Israel is to the U.S. Jewish community and how much energy ought be devoted to the cause. Despite a large Israeli sentiment that the best thing American Jews can do for Israel is make aliyah, the majority of Americans don't think so. From its inception Israel has relied on the U.S. for monetary support. Last year, Americans invested $400 million in Israel Bonds, used to finance public works projects. Factors such as the historical pride in the creation of Israel and war victories; the sense of responsibility over the 1973 near war loss; and Holocaust memories all underscore American Jewry feelings toward Israel. One recent exception that had American Jews criticizing Israel was the Pollard case, a minor issue in light of the overall complex bond. (8/8/86)

KING, MUBARAK MUM ABOUT BUSH

Wash. Times, (Reuters): Jordan's King Hussein and Egypt's President Mubarak issued a joint communique one day after talks appealing to Arab nations to support Iraq's call for an end to its war with Iran in the Persian Gulf. No mention was made in the communique about Vice President Bush's recent Mideast trip nor to the five "points of commonality". The communique reiterated their support for an international conference on Middle East peace. In Cairo, Israeli, Egyptian and U.S. officials continued wrapping up talks on the Taba dispute so it can be forwarded to arbitration. (8/8/86)

KHOMEINI REFUSES IRAQI PLEA TO END WAR

Wash. Times, (wires): Iranian leader Khomeini answered an Iraqi plea to end the Gulf war by sending fresh Iranian troops to the front for a new offensive. He said that peace would be "among the biggest of sins" and contrary to Islam. A joint communique by Hussein and Mubarak called on Arab nations to implement the Arab mutual defense pace and reflects a growing Arab fear that Iraq is losing ground in the Gulf War. (8/8/86)

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:
המשרד

סיווג ד.ר.ר
דח...!...מהור...!...דחיפ
סווג בטחוני..סודי
דחיפות...מיידי
תאריך ושעה.1610 8 אוג 86
עשרים פס' ברק.....

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אל :- מצפ"א

בית הנבחרים : סיוע חוץ

אגב שיחה בנושא אחר (ביקור שהב"ט) הודיתי למורשה אובי על הצורה שהוא וניהל את המאבק בדבר הסיוע בוועדת המשנה ובמליאת וועדת ההקצבות ובתוך זה היגן על מלוא הסיוע שלנו, בהתאם להבטחה שנתן בקונגרס לציר הכלכלי ולה"מ. אובי שמח לשמוע שאנו מעריכים את מאמציו והוטיף לידיעתנו (לידיעתנו) כלהלן :

(א) להערכתו הצעת החוק לא תידון במלאה עד לאחר פגרת הקיץ, כלומר רק אחרי ה-3.9.

(ב) יעשו מניין קולות מראש ואם יתברר שאין רוב במליאה בעד ההצעה יעזיף לא לקיים עליה דיון בכלל אלא להעבירה כחלק של החלטת המשך (CR).

(ג) יש, לדעתו, לעשות נפשות לטובת ההצעה, בעיקר אצל הרפובליקאים המקורבים לנשיא שיודעים על התנגדות הממשל להצעה כפי שהיא (בשל המספרים הנמוכים בתוכה, שהם מהוויבי המציאות לגובה חוק גר"ר).

(ד) מאידך, הוא מעריך שהתנגדות הממשל כפי שהגיעה לביטוי במכתב שולצה עדיין מנהל ה- WSJ רק מוטיפה קולות בעד החוק מצד הדמוקרטים, ולכן איבו מצטער על שקבל מכתב זה.

(ה) ייתכן שבמהלך הדיון במליאה (אם ולכשיתקיים) יציע וקונגרסמן קמפ "החליף" (substitute) להצעת החוק, אך אין לו סיכויים.

(ו) אם יהיה צורך בקיצוצים אוטומטים תוא יסיר את ההצעה ויכין חוק חליפי משלו שיתאים את הקיצוצים המתחייבים אך לא בצורה שרירותית (ACCORDS THE BOARD), ושוב יראג לייאינטרס שלנו", כדבריו. (מעורר לא לשלוח על הסוללות.

יוסף לנקין
ל מ ד ו

שדה רמה גנסל גולדנר בדנר הורי טלפיה אלוף
3 1 2 1 3 3 פ

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

הממשרד

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סוג מברק

דח...!...מהון...!..דחוף

סווג בטחוני...גלוי

דחיפות...רגיל

תאריך ודחת.8.1225.8.אוג 36

מס' מברק.....

אל :- מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, אוצר-דברת

בית הנבחרים : סיוע חוץ

הדיון בחוק ההקצבה להגנה נדחק כעת במליאת בית הנבחרים. מסיבות שונות הוא הסתבך והתארך מעבר למצופה ולא מן הנמנע שיימשך עד סוף השבוע הבא, מועד צאת הקונגרס לפגרה. פירוש הדבר ששאלת סיוע החוץ אשר היתה אמורה מלכתחילה להיות נדונה בשבוע הבא לא תעלה לפני שוב המורשים לעבודה בשבוע השני של ספטמבר.

טוביה הירש
קישור לקונגרס

שהה רהמ מנט ממנט מדפו פחות כלכלית בי בקשת אוצר

דחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1
סווג בטחוני:	טופס מברק	סה"כ: 3

תז"ח: 0713	אל: לש'ממנכ"ל, מע"ח, סמנכ"ל אסי"ק, החברה, מצמ"א, דג"ע מפ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ס לתקשורת, לע"מ
נר: 0133 רוש: 96 שהב"ס: 11	ר ע: וושינגטון
	מאת: עתונות, ניו יורק

News Summary August 7, 1986

New York Headlines

Israel's Supreme Court ruling on the Presidential pardons for several Shin Beth officials is reported on page 1 of the New York Times (see Press Reports). Top story in the Times deals with a bill which Reagan vetoed that would have placed strict limits on imports of textiles from 12 countries, most of them in Asia. The House of Representatives voted to uphold Reagan's veto despite fears of lost American jobs. On the Rehnquist memos, it appears that nothing has emerged to suggest he was involved in questionable activities during his years working under Nixon. Also on p.1, the State Dept. said they expected Terence Todman, the US Amb. to Denmark to remove himself from consideration as envoy to South Africa. William Schroder died 620 days after receiving an artificial heart and photo on the front page shows Japanese gathered at a memorial service marking the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima. Top stories in the Wall Street Journal deal with the problems of US steelmakers and the fact that nuclear plants in the US are vulnerable to attacks by terrorists.

Press Reports

Israelis' Pardon in Scandal Upheld

NYT-p.1-Kifner-In a move that may prevent the spread of a major scandal, Israel's Supreme Court upheld the legality of presidential pardons given the head of the Shin Beth and three aides in the deaths of two captured Palestinian bus hijackers. Officials say the ruling has opened the way for lower-ranking agents to seek similar pardons. 8 agents are said to have requested pardons after the verdict was made. The court said security considerations were a major factor in its decision. The general reaction of the Gov't and political leaders seemed to be one of relief. The case appears to have raised little interest among Israelis. (see photo of copies of the decision being distributed to lawyers and journalists) (see NYP-Dan; ND-wire; DN-wire)

Egypt & Israel Report Progress in Taba Dispute

NYT-Wren (Cairo) Under renewed pressure from the US, Egypt and Israel

תאריך: 7.8.86	שם השולח: שולמית לוי	אישור:

ב' ו' בכסלו פרק שלושים ושלושה שלושים ושלושה

were reported to be near agreement on final technical details that could lead to the settlement of a border dispute. Taba is the most sensitive of 15 border disputes that have marred relations between Israel and Egypt. Although Bush failed to achieve a breakthrough when he was in the Mideast, Egyptian officials credit him and Murphy for giving the talks fresh impetus to the slow moving talks. Taba has come to symbolize Egypt's claim to the entire Sinai. Israel has sought assurances that Egypt, in return for concessions on arbitration, will take steps to improve not only diplomatic relations but also the faltering trade and tourism between the two countries.

Hussein Flies to Alexandria

NYT-special-Hussein flew to Egypt for brief consultations with Mubarak that were thought to focus on Bush's recent visit to their countries as well as new frictions between Jordan and the PLO. Egypt has stressed that it wants to help defuse tensions created when Jordan closed PLO offices in Amman. Abu Jihad, a senior PLO representative was also in Cairo this week for separate talks with Egyptian officials, who according to a PLO source, were willing to mediate with Jordan.

Parliament Toughens Law on Meeting With PLO

ND-wire-The Israeli Knesset toughened the law against meeting with officials of the PLO. Opponents called the move a setback for peace prospects. The bill was passed in a trade-off with leftists in return for outlawing racial incitement. The bill calls for 3 years imprisonment for anyone holding contacts with a member of a terrorist organization.

Cyprus Attack Seen as Work of New Terror Group

NYT-special (Beirut) Diplomats in Lebanon say rocket attacks against a British air base in Cyprus appears to have been the work of a new underground group with Libyan links. The group is a product of a merger a month ago of several Arab nationalist factions upholding the philosophy of Nasser and Khadafy. Although not much is known about the group, it is believed to be devoted to striking at British interests in the Mideast and elsewhere. The action suggests that it was long in preparation with a great deal of effort invested in it. The new group could well be a combination of Lebanese and Palestinian guerrillas who cooperate with Abu Nidal. There is press speculation in Lebanon that Syria was in the process of curbing Nidal's activities.

Iranian-Saudi Talks Created OPEC Pact

NYT-Tagliabue-The agreement by OPEC was fundamentally a political accord forged in hours of bitter haggling by the oil ministers of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Hirschfeld Says Remarks Were a Joke

NYT-Oreskes-Abe Hirschfeld's thick European accent has become an issue in the race for lieutenant governor of NY, either, as his opponents say,

because he is exploiting is Jewish heritage for political advantage, or as Hirschfeld said, because his sense of humor was misunderstood. Hirschfeld is a Polish immigrant who became a millionaire owning parking garages in NY. His opponent is Gov. Cuomo's choice for the position. There is intense interest in the race because if Cuomo runs for President, the Lieutenant Governor becomes Governor. On Friday, Hirschfeld said that Cuomo did not support him because "I'm Jewish or I have an accent." The comment provoked a furor. Hirschfeld sent Cuomo a letter of apology.

Media Notes

New York Magazine-Diamond "The Harsh New World of the Networks" An indepth article on news programming in the US. Network news is in a transitional state. News shows are now expected to make money. Never before has there been so many other, non-network sources of news and entertainment. The three-network share of prime-time audiences has gone from 87% less than 5 years ago to 77% last year.

NYP-Carmony-16 employees of CBS "Nightwatch" were fired, reducing the late-night news program's roster to 21. Nightwatch, which originated from Washington, provided the capital's power structure air time on CBS. It is not certain that the show will remain on the air.

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אל:

המטרד

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אל: מצפ"א

שיחה עם דון גרג (בעקבות ביקור סגן הנשיא).

א. מלא סיפוק מהביקור בישראל ובמדינות האחרות, מכל הבחינות, וקובל במקצת על הכיסוי העתונאי שאינו מבחין בחשיבות שבהשגת ההצהרה על דעת ארבע המדינות בתום הביקור, בראשונה מקבלה במזה"ת.

ב. מבחינתו האישית למד רבות על ישראל, גם ובמיוחד מן האירועים החברתיים והאישים שעמם נפגש.

ג. סיפר מהביקור בירדן, כי כשהראו למלך את 10 הנקודות במרוקו תמה מדוע היתה תגובת חסן שלילית בשעה שהנקודות חיוביות.

ד. חוסיין יפעל לחיפוש שותפים פלשתינאים ביו"ש ועזה. אבו עודה ראה בהיזוב רב והתפאר בתמיכה בחוסיין שפירסמו ערבים ביו"ש. גרג ראה גם הערכה הדדית בין הרמטכ"ל שלנו ובין בן שאכר הירדני. לכן הוא סבור כי במהלכים סבלניים תהיה התקדמות. עם זאת, חוסיין זקוק לתמיכה ערבית.

ה. הממשל האמריקני שאין לו תקציב כלשהו לתת לפעילות ירדנית ביו"ש מעבר ל- 4.5 מיליון הדולאר, יפעל אצל הגרמנים והיפנים לכך.

ו. טאבה. האמריקנים, כולל גרג אישית, לחצו מאוד על מגיפ ואל-באז לוותר בעניין המפה (לא ראו מקום ללחוץ על ישראל שבצדק לא רצתה במפה המעניקה יתרון למצרים), המצרים לא רצו לבטל את הסיכון, אך מרפי נשארנ[illegible] .

ז. מצרים - כלכלה. דיבר בטון מרירי במקצת שהאוצר האמריקני לא אשר כסף כלשהו למשאלות המצרים, אך ימשיכו לעסוק בכך, ואכן בוש שוחח עם ביקר כדי לקדם זאת.

ח. לדבריו מצא בוש שפה משותפת טובה עם רה"מ וממרה"מ כאחת.

רובינשטיין

שגרירות ישראל • וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בסחוך ב.ד.

59 160 157

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח, ניו יורק

7.8.86 תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד לירדן

Q Plans for Mr. Murphy to go to Morocco? When is he due back to Washington?

MR. REDMAN: For Mr. Murphy?

Q Yes.

MR. REDMAN: I don't believe there are any plans for him to go anywehere other than come straight back from Cairo to Washington.

Q And when is that?

MR. REDMAN: At this point, I can't predict when that will be. He's still in Cairo today, and I have to take this on a day-by-day basis.

Q Do you have any comment on the group which have this attack in Cyprus against the British air base? Is it a resurgence of the pro-Libyan groups working against Western interests, or something like that?

MR. REDMAN: The group to which you are referring is the United Nasserite Organization, which has claimed responsibility for the attack on the British air base. We can't confirm those reports. Concerning the group itself, the most I can say is that it appears to be a new name, but that could be a cover name for a previously existing group or groups. So, we are looking into this, but I don't have any other details.

Q And you can't confirm that here?

MR. REDMAN: The British can confirm that the attack has taken place. I am talking about confirming whether or not this group actually carried out the attack.

Q But you can't substantiate it in relation to Libya? Can you?

MR. REDMAN: I can't.

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Aug. 7, 1986...
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אל:הסברה, מע"ת, אצ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ רובר צהי"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח
דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY
THURSDAY, AUGUST 7, 1986

MAJOR NEWS HEADLINES

TOP STORY: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL
The Reagan administration is sending a delegation to Moscow next week to discuss nuclear and space issues and prospects for the next summit. Meanwhile, Reagan yesterday denied reports that he would bargain on the Strategic Defense Initiative in talks with the Soviets and said that SDI would be deployed once research and testing are complete.
Wash. Post: U.S. Team of Arms Advisors To Visit Moscow Next Week
Wash. Times: Reagan Pledges To Deploy SDI, Not Trade It Away

REAGAN VETO VICTORY ON IMPORTS
The House of Representatives lost a congressional victory to President Reagan by eight votes in trying to override Reagan's veto of a bill that would have significantly limited textile imports.
Wash. Post: House Fails To Override President: Effort To Revive Bill Restricting Imports Defeated By 8 Votes
Chic. Trib.: Reagan Victory Stops Import Limits
Phil. Inq.: Trade-Bill Veto Upheld In House

RECORD-HIGH BUDGET DEFICIT
The Reagan administration predicted that this year's federal budget deficit could escalate to a record $230.2 billion due to slow economic growth , added defense spending and farm price supports.
Wash. Post: Budget Deficit May Top $230 Billion
USA Today: Record High Deficit Spells Budget Cuts

ARTIFICIAL HEART RECIPIENT DIES
The longest living artificial heart recipient, William J. Schroeder, died yesterday of multiple strokes.
Wash. Post: Longest-Living Recipient Of An Artificial Heart Dies
Balt. Sun: Artificial-Heart Recipient William Schroeder Dies

NEWS ARTICLES & ANALYSIS

PRO-ISRAEL LOBBYISTS TARGET SALE OF U.S. ARMS TO ARABS

Wash. Post, Babcock: Israel's military superiority is the result of the longstanding special relationship between Israel and the United States. Israel's military edge is maintained in two ways. One, Israel buys sophisitcated U.S. weaponry. Two, Israeli supporters work to block arms sales to Arab nations. An example of how pressure from groups such as The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) works to produce results favorable to Israel is the recent diluted Saudi arms package. Another, is the proposed Jordanian arms deal which died in the wake of the Achille Lauro incident. The watering of the Saudi deal lead to a deal between Saudi Arabia and Britain. Since they could not get get F15s from the U.S., the Saudis bought 72 Tornado fighters in 1985 instead, which some defense experts say are more dangerous to Israel than the F15s. With AIPAC continually applying Congressional pressure, Congress hasbecome seemingly so pro-Israel that it votes against Arab arms sales as if 'reflex action'. (8/7/86)

PARDON OF 4 UPHELD IN ISRAELI BUS DEATHS: Court Rules 2-1 For Secret Service Official

Wash. Post, Frankel: Israel's High Court of Justice upheld Israeli President Herzog's pardons, in a two-to-one ruling, granted to Avraham Shalom, chief of Shin Bet and three aides for their alleged roles in the killing of two Palestinian terrorists and subsequent cover-up. The court decision upheld the president's right to issue blanket pardons for security reasons. There were unconfirmed reports that eight other Shin Bet subordinates would seek pardons for their role in the affair. (8/7/86)

Wash. Times: Top Israel Court Upholds Shin Bet Leader's Pardon
Chic. Trib. : Pardon Of Israeli Agent Is Upheld
Chris. Sci. Mon.: Israeli High Court Upholds Pardon Of Security Men IN Palestinian Deaths

ISRAELIS HOLD 4 PALESTINIANS, TRY TO SILENCE JORDAN CRITICS

Wash. Times, (wires): Military sources said that four Palestinians in the West Bank have been jailed this week as part of a new crackdown on Palestinian nationalism, as well as criticism of Jordan in the West Bank press. Also, the Knesset yesterday passed an anti-racism bill that makes it illegal to incite racism. The bill was originally intended to curb radical Rabbi

Chic. Trib.: Knesset Passes Diluted Bill To End Racism

NEWS ARTICLES CON'T

BUSH HAS LITTLE TO SHOW FOR MIDEAST VISIT

Wash. Times, Sieff: Vice President Bush returned from his Mideast tour with little to show in real terms but some "hot" photographic footage aimed to win Jewish votes in the 1988 presidential election. Bush's aims to capitalize on the Peres-Hassan summit did not pan out. Bush's meeting with Jordan's King Hussein failed to yield much and the king reiterated his support of the PLO despite problem's with PlO leader Arafat. Hussein rejected Bush's call for direct talks with Israeli leader Peres. Also, it appears that Jordan is renewing its relations with Syria. The Taba dispute remains unresolved despite speculations that significant strides would be made before the end of Bush's visit. Bush had no good news for Egypt, which is currently in the throes of severe economic hardship. (87/86)

MALTA SPOTTED U.S. BOMBERS, BUT LIBYA IGNORED WARNING

Wash. Times, (AP wire): According to Maltese spokesman Paul Mifsud, Malta warned Libya of approaching planes at about 30 minutes before the April 15 U.S. raid on that North African country - but Libya did not react to that information. He said that Malta's passing of this information to Libya was in accordance with a 1984 pact of friendship between the two countries. A Defense Dept. spokesman, Capt. Jay Farrar said that he had nothing to say that supports the Maltese claim and that the raid had been a "tactical surprise". (8/7/86)

PRO-ISRAEL POLITICAL ACTIVISTS ENFORCE 'PERCY FACTOR'

Wash. Post, Babcock: Some ultra pro-Israeli political activists such as Morrie Amitay, Washington Political Action Committee treasurer, were unsatisfied with the cutdown of this springs' proposed $3 billion Saudi arms sale to $265 million. Amitay and some of his counterparts have the clout to sway decision making in Israel's favor. Amitay and others like him exercise what has come to be called 'the Percy factor' - or targeting senators and representatives who vote against Israeli interests - for example, for the Saudi aid package. (8/7/86)

Deborah Stone
Itonut

שגרירות ישראל • וושינגטון
אל: המשרד
1/3 מ 144 144

אל: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

להלן ארגיון עם סגן הנשיא בוש ב- NBC TODAY SHOW (7.8)

עתונות.

NBC TODAY SHOW
WITH VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

THURSDAY, AUGUST 7, 1986

BRYANT GUMBEL: We turn our attention to Washington, where Vice President George Bush has just returned from a 12-day trip to the Mid-East. He joins us this morning from our newsroom in Washington. Mr. Vice Fresident, good morning, and welcome home.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Glad to be back.

MR. GUMBEL: Right off the top, what do you think was accomplished by your trip to the Mid-East?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, it's awfully hard to say. In the first place, I think we showed, again, at reasonably high levels of our government, our interest in the peace process. And secondly, Bryant, we did work out with President Mubarak and King Hussein, and the Prime Minister of Israel, Shimon Peres, a point of, a paper on common principles. None of them is particularly new by itself, but the very fact that three leaders who differ on a lot of things can come together on a broad set of principles is very important in terms of the Middle East. So I felt good about that.

MR. GUMBEL: As soon as you left the region, King Hussein flew to Egypt for talks with President Mubarak. Can you shed any light on that meetig for us?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: No, except I knew it was going to happen. I talked, after I left Egypt, I talked to both King Hussein and President Mubarak about the meeting. They are hopeful to try to find ways to get the peace process moving. You see, several things are happening, not just this paper that we produced of common principles, but then you had the King Hassan of Morocco meeting with Shimon Peres, and there's a little movement now. I don't want to overstate its potential, but the very fact that King Hussein is flying to Alexandria to see President Mubarak is positive. It's a little bit of motion there on the peace process.

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MR. GUMBEL: What's the movement a result of? I mean, certainly we saw no new initiatives tendered. We so no agreements come out of this. We saw no change to any of the fundamental differences that divide the region.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: I think you did see something new, and that is the agreement of three leaders on things like Palestinian representation, like Israeli security, like the need for negotiations. Now, you have to have dealt with the Middle East and all its nuance and all its shadow to understand that that in itself is important. Also, you have to add to that the meeting between King Hassan and Shimon Peres that took place earlier on. You have to understand rotation in Israel. And all of these things come together to make me feel that there is some hope, more hope for peace. I'm not saying we, you know, solidified the peace process, but it's--there's a desire for peace there that I believe is more acute than ever before.

MR. GUMBEL: But you know as I do that term you just used, "Palestinian representation," is a very nebulous one.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: That's right.

MR. GUMBEL: I mean, are we any closer to finding satisfactory Palestinian representatives who would be acceptable not only to Israelis but also to militant Palestinians elements?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Bryant, I sat there with Aba Ibon(?) who I've known since I was ambassador at the UN in '71 and '72, now chairman of their senate foreign relations and their equivalent to that and their defense committee, and heard him read off a forumula acceptable to the labor party that talked about a way to get the Palestinians to come to the table with King Hussein. I can't tell you--it's a good question. And I don't know whether we're any closer today than we were a week ago.

MR. GUMBEL: Did you get any sense of any increased flexibility on the part of Israel's leadership--increased flexibility brought on by the fact that a more conservative leadership is going to take over in October?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, no. But I did have long talks with Shimon Peres, and I had long talks with Shamir. And I believe that Shamir, who will be come the, now the Deptuty Prime Minister, then to become Prime Minister, has a flexibility about him that will follow on pretty much in what Peres has tried to do. Now, he has some problems on his right pulling him back a little bit, but I think you're going to see a continuation of the Peres initiatives. And they haven't yet resulted in peace, or getting King Hussein to the table, but you have a very different mood in Israel today.

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MR. GUMBEL: You went there to show high profile involvement in the pursuit of peace.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes.

MR. GUMBEL: And yet you didn't meet with Syria's Hafiz Assad without whom there can be no comprehensive peace in the region. Now, why not?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, you may recall that the minute that King Hassan meet with Peres, the minute that happened Hafiz Assad in Syria jumped all over the meeting, denounced it. And it would make it very hard to sit down at that particular moment when we were encouraging the meeting, and saluting it after it took place, to go to Syria. And so I think there has to be a little different climate before the Vice President of the United States or the President, or perhaps the Secretary of State can go to Syria.

MR. GUMBEL: But wouldn't any expression of goodwill have been valuable, particularly with some of our people still being held in Lebanon, and the possibility that there is a role Hafiz Assad could play in the release?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I think that when I sent my greetings, and the President expressed his appreciation for facilitating the handover of Father Jenco, that Syria knows we're interested in the amenitities. They know that we're iterested when they do do something that we salute--and we did. We thought that when Jenco came into their hands they promptly transferred him to the American Embassy there, and that's good. And I think we should salute something when they do it that way. But that's quite different than their desire to still, you know, berating any Arab that talks to Israel, our best friend in the Middle East. And we can lend creedence to that by seemed to salute Hafiz Assad.

MR. GUMBEL: As you well know, at least one person inside the White House said your trip was nothing but politics. One Egyptian official went so far as to say his nation was being used as the first American primary. How do you view those kinds of criticisms?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Hey, listen, I've had them so long. You know, a year-and-a-half ago I got off the plane in China and the first question was: Are you in China to help yourself in the 1988 elections? I gotta just roll with the punch on those political criticisms and try to do my job in support, in this instance, of the peace process. And I think most leaders over there will tell you -- that the visit contributed to peace. So you take a shot here or there--it doesn't bother me.

* * *

שגרירות ישראל • וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

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אל: מנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, הסברה

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

להלן ראיון עם סגן הנשיא בוש ב- CBS MORNING NEWS (7.8)

עתונות

CBS MORNING NEWS
INTERVIEW WITH VICE PRESIDENT
GEORGE BUSH

THURSDAY, AUGUST 7, 1986

MR. MORTON: Vice President George Bush has returned to the United States with words of hope about Mideast peace talks. Mr. Bush spent ten days meeting leaders of Egypt, Jordan and Israel. He says he found areas of agreements among the three nations, agreements which could pave the way to an Arab-Israeli summit. Vice President Bush joins us this morning from our Washington bureau.

Mr. Vice President, thank you for coming by. Let me start by asking you a little about the Middle East. It seems to me people have been coming back from there and saying optimistic things all my adult life. Syria is still not a player. The PLO is still not a player. Where does your optimism at the end of this trip come from?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Only because you've just seen another Arab leader meet with a leader of Israel, seen King Hassan meet with Mr. Peres. You've seen an agreement, as a result of our trip, on principles, each of which may have been agreed by one or another, but never have been agreed by all three principles before -- Jordan, Egypt and Israel. And I think anyone who's been there recently and talked to the leaders of Israel, or to King Hussein, or to President Mubarak, gets the feeling that there is much more that they're closer together.

Now I don't want to be wrong about this and indicate I think peace is at hand. But there's come much more common purpose on Palestinian representation, on Israel's security, on the need and way of negotiating. So I am a little optimistic about it.

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MR. MORTON: There's still no willingness, is there, on the part of King Hussein of Jordan to meet with the Israelis?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes, there's a willingness, but it would have to be under, at the outset, under some international umbrella. But the good thing about that, Bruce, is that the Israelis seem to be willing to do that. And if they are, the parties are. A first step would be some international forum, and that would, I think, lead to face-to-face negotiations. It would include face-to-face negotiations. So there is more agreement on that point than I think most people focus on.

MR. MORTON: Can you come to some sort of peace arrangement in the Middle East without Syria? I mean, the Golan Heights is one of the disputed territories. Syria is the big military power. How do you --

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: You can't solve it all, but you have a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, and Syria not only wasn't a player there, but they were strongly negative about that, just as they were negative about Prime Minister Peres meeting with King Hassan. Before the landing gear was up on Peres's plane, the Syrians blasted the meeting. So it's a step-by-step process, and I think you can make progress without Syria. Eventually, if they have total peace in the area, Syria is going to have to come to the table.

MR. MORTON: Well, the other missing player is the Palestinians, presumably through the PLO, which is the organization which they seem to feel they want to represent them. And there's no movement there, is there?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, no, but there is movement in terms of having -- not more movement as a result of my visit -- but there is movement as a result -- in terms of having Palestinian representatives be with King Hussein when he meets with the Israelis or meets at this international forum. So there is some flexibility on that. And there's not only flexibility on King Hussein's side on that, but on Israel's side. I sat with Aba Iban (?) in a senior committee in the Knesset and heard him read off a willingness to have an umbrella of an international forum.

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MR. MORTON: Let me ask you, Mr. Vice President, about a process at least as complicated as the Middle East.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: I know what's coming!

MR. MORTON: That's the Michigan Republican precinct caucuses this week, two years ahead of the Presidential election. Are you pleased with how you did?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Very, very pleased, and I am glad it's over now, for awhile. But they accelerated the process; they accelerated the rules of the game. We had to play by the rules of the game. And from all reports, we did very, very well. And yes, I'm pleased. I'm glad to have it behind me, too.

MR. MORTON: The new potential candidate who is turning up in the columns these days is Paul Laxalt, the Senator from Nevada and the President's close friend. Have you talked with Senator Laxalt at all about '88, in view of -- would you welcome him in, or welcome him out? How would you feel about that?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I haven't discussed '88 with him. I see him quite a bit, and we have a very good, cordial relationship. And my view is, you know, come on in, the water's fine -- once I get in that water. But I don't know what he's going to do. But if he got serious about it, he would be a serious contender for the Republican nomination. He's highly regarded; he's a good senator. And he has a lot of national contacts.

MR. MORTON: Mr. Vice President, thank you very much for being with us.

END OF INTERVIEW

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אל: ראה"מ

מאת: נמרוד

הנדון: מפיקרינג

1. טאבה

בגלל התמשכות שיחות חוסיין-מובראק עבדל מאגיד נשאר באלכסנדריה. דייב ואברשה יוצאים לאלכסנדריה בעוד שעה ויקיימו עמו דיון הלילה.

הועלתה הצעת פשרה חדשה בענין המפה (שימוש במפת הסכם השלום בקנה מידה של 50,000 : 1). המצרים לא יוכלו לתת תשובה סופית בענין הצעה זו לפני שבת. המשלחת שלנו אמורה לחזור ארצה מחר בערב, ולשוב לקהיר לצורך טיפול בסימון בשטח ובחירת הבוררים.
מרפי שוקל לחזור לארה"ב מחר. אם תשובת מצרים בענין המפה תהיה חיובית הענין יטופל ע"י אלן קרצ'קו. במקרה של תשובה שלילית מרפי או סופר יחזרו מיד לקהיר.
המצרים מוכנים להשלים הנוסח ולהכריז על כך באמצעות מכתב אמריקאי גם לפני בחירת הבוררים והסימון בשטח. החלטה מצרית חיובית בענין המפה תניב מכתב כזה ביום א'.

2. נאום בוש

המצרים והירדנים שוקלים הודעה משותפת או שתי הודעות נפרדות בענין זה בתום שיחותיהם. האמריקאים מוסיפים לפעול כדי להבטיח הודעות כאלה. העתונות המצרית של הבוקר כבר משקפת גישה חיובית כלפי 11 הנקודות.

נמרוד נוביק

דחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 1/4 מתוך:
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	מאת : עתיונות, ניו יורק	

News Summary August 6, 1986

New York Headlines

The top story in the New York Times deals with the Reagan Administration backing down on access to memorandums and legal opinions written by Rehnquist when he was a Justice Dept. official under Nixon. The action came in the face of an open revolt by Democrats who want to study the memos as part of confirmation hearings. Also on page 1 of the Times, the US and Soviet Union are planning exchanges in scientific and cultural fields; Pretoria is imposing area trade limits on Black nations after the announcement of new economic measures against Pretoria by the Commonwealth nations. Preston Robert Tisch, president of Loews and major Jewish philanthropist, is expected to be named Postmaster General. Both the Times and the Wall Street Journal reports on OPEC on its front pages (see Press Reports). The other top story on p.1 of the Journal describes the power Don Regan welds at the White House. Newsday and the Daily News headlines the Rehnquist memos.

Press Reports

Bush Ends Mideast Trip

WSJ-staff-Bush finished his Mideast tour by announcing a set of principle agreed upon by Israel and moderate Arabs, but the principles do not break new ground. Bush's announcement seemed designed mostly to provide an appearance of progress and momentum in the search for Mideast peace negotiations to resolve the Palestinian issue. Bush released a list of 6 points that he said all leaders he visited could accept as the basis for a peace process. Bush was unusually explicit in saying that Washington could accept an international conference attended by the Soviet Union. (see NYP-Lathem)

ND-Phelps (Analysis) Bush left the Mideast with little to show for his 8-day tour. There was nothing new in his statements that would suggest any progress towards breaking the current stalemate. The VP's tour was widely seen as a campaign trip, designed to garner publicity. He brought no new proposals from Washington and was unable to capitalize on the Peres-Hassan summit. In fact, Hassan wouldn't even see him.

תאריך: 6-8-86	שם השולח: שרה רש	אישור:

ב+ו אפשא בדק תפוצה שהוים מתאפשהים

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US Withdraws Subpoenas For Israelis in Arms Case

NYT-Shenon-The Justice Dept. announced that it had withdrawn subpoenas that would have required several Israeli officials to testify about allegations that Israel illegally tried to export US technology for making cluster bombs. The subpoenas were withdrawn "without prejudice in return for cooperation by the Gov't of Israel." Leaders of Jewish groups welcomed the decision to withdraw the subpoenas but criticized recent disclosures to news organizations about the case. (see ND-Mitchell)

Rabbis Want to Build Synagogue on Temple Mount

NYT-Kifner (photo of Rabbi Goren & Gershon Salomon) In a step that defied both civil and religious law in Israel, a group of prominent rabbis issued a formal call for the construction of a synagogue on Temple Mount, considered sacred to Moslems and forbidden to Jews. They also called for public prayers on the site. The rabbis' statement took the form of a religious edict called halacha and was the latest expression of increasingly militant Jewish religious fervor. Officials warned that the plan could provoke Moslem-Jewish clashes. The area is fully controlled by Moslem religious authorities. The head of the Supreme Moslem Council said that Moslems will never permit Jews to pray at Temple Mount and added that "The Moslems are prepared to die for this."

Antiracist Law in Israel--Some Exceptions Permitted

NYT-special-The Israeli Knesset approved of an antiracism law so diluted that the parties that first suggested it voted against it, and Meir Kahane, the rightist whose activities the bill was aimed to curtail, voted in its favor. Kahane seeks the segregation of Israeli Arabs. While the new law makes "incitment to racism" illegal, it exempts acts for purposes of religious worship or intended to preserve Israel's "unique character."

Peres on Soviet Role

NYT-AP-Peres said Israel would accept Soviet participation in Mideast peace talks if the Kremlin renewed full diplomatic ties. (see ND-wire)

Matlta Says Libya Got Tip on US Raid

NYT-p.1 Miller (Valletta) The PM of Malta said his country had given Libya advance notice of the American air attack in April and would do so again if it has similar information. "We've committed ourselves to exchange information with all friendly countries, north and south," he said. PM Bonnici denied reports by Arab and Western diplomats that Libya had long used Malta as a base for terrorist operations elsewhere. Malta seeks a reduction of US and Soviet forces in the area.

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Italy Warns Libya

NYP-Craxi warned Libya not to attack Italy. He said Italy would take military action if Libya again made "absurd threats of attack," such as those issued by Khadafy against Italy and other countries in the weeks leading up to the US air raid on Libya.

Fighting in Beirut

NYT-Reuters-Gunners exchanged mortar fire across the Green Line, killing a policeman and marring Syrian security in the area.

Iran's Reemergence

WSJ-Seib-Iran is rapidly reemerging as a confident, sophisticated and militarily potent force in the Mideast, a development that has broad implications for the Persian Gulf war and Western interests in the area. This week's Iranian-engineered agreement to curb oil production by OPEC is the latest example of Iran's emerging ability to shape events. Tehran's many enemies are shivering. The Iranians appear poised to launch their biggest and most lethal offensive yet in the war, and analysists are speculating about an Iranian victory in the 6-year old conflict. Iran has also shown new diplomatic maturity that is reducing its international isolation. It is handling its economy better than expected and is in better financial shape than Iraq. The Islamic regime appears stable and there is no reason to believe that there would be a sharp swing on ary front once Khomeini dies.

OPEC

WSJ-p.1-Ibrahim-OPEC may have announced their first production-sharing pact in its 26-year old history that could actually survive long enough to increase oil prices. But the political tensions under which the agreement was forged are already straining its delicate fabric. Most give the agreement a few weeks, at most.

NYT-The Reagan Administration criticized the OPEC agreement to increase oil prices by limiting production as unwarrented interference in the free market and a possible threat to national interests.

France Boycotts Oil From Libya

WSJ-Ibrahim-France has become the first European country to follow the US in boycotting Libyan oil. While the amount of oil is small, the decision is another indication that Chirac is acting more in concert with the US. French gov't sources denied there is a boycott calling such reports "totally unfounded."

Top Jews Blast Hirschfeld--He Seeks NY Office

NYP-Dicker-A number of Jewish leaders in NY urged Abe Hirschfeld to quit the race for lietenant governor because he did an "indecent thing" by suggesting Gov. Cuomo is anti-Semitic.

0108 / 22/8 7/4

Slain Drug Dealer is Son of Israeli Gangster

NYP-Dan & Fagen-The alleged drug-dealer shot to death by an FBI agent after a wild car chase in Manhattan last week was the son of a notorious Israeli gangster who met a similar fate. Israeli national Chaim Mizrachi, who had been living in the US illegally for 5 years was the son of Joseph Mizrachi, a well known crime figure in Israel. Mizrachi was shot after FBI agents arrested him after he purchased 750 grams of Heroin. Mizrachi fled with another man, Moshe Elkoby. Agents captured Elkoby.

Media Notes

NYT-Rover-CBS has been criticized from within over relinquishing CBS Morning News in favor of an entertainment prgram.

Cartoons

NYP-Rigby-Bush arrives to US customs after his Mideast trip. One officer asks him if he has anything to declare. Bush replies, "Peace in the Mideast within 10 years!!" Another officer says, "Let him through, I feel sorry for him."

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official text

DATE: 08/06/86

U.S. CONTINUES TO SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS (3540)
(Text: report to Congress on interim restraint and SALT)

Washington -- The United States says its nuclear arms objectives continue to be to "seek common ground in negotiating deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals."

This policy is spelled out in President Reagan's "Report to the Congress on U.S. interim restraint policy and on representative Soviet and U.S. forces with and without SALT One and Two." The report, which was made public August 5, is an unclassified version of a classified report which the president provided to Congress on June 19.

Following is the text of the report:

(begin text)

I. INTRODUCTION -- U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY AND U.S. RESPONSES TO SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE

This report is an unclassified version of a report forwarded to the Congress on June 19, 1986, in response to the requirements of the FY 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act (Title X, Section 1001 (b)) for a report on certain data and assessments related to U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces and on possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to changes in the U.S. policy of interim restraint. As requested by this legislation, the report covers a five-year period. It is provided in conjunction with material including the president's statement of May 27 and a White House fact sheet of the same date on U.S. Interim Restraint Policy: Responding to Soviet Arms Control Violations.

The U.S. policy of interim restraint as first announced by the president in 1982 has been that, in spite of the flaws inherent in the SALT agreements and in an effort to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions, the United States would not undercut the expired SALT One Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972 or the unratified SALT Two Treaty of 1979 so long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.

In three detailed administration reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, and through diplomatic channels including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, the president has consistently made clear that this U.S. policy required Soviet reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup and uncorrected Soviet noncompliance.

In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy and our efforts to build a framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States has not taken any actions that would undercut existing agreements. We have continued scrupulously to live within all arms control agreements, including the SALT One and Two strategic arms agreements. Unfortunately, while the United States has been attempting to hold to the structure of SALT through our policy of interim restraint, the Soviet Union has undercut the very foundation of that structure through its continued violations.

In June of 1985, the president went the extra mile. He decided to dismantle a U.S. POSEIDON submarine, in order to give the Soviet Union adequate time to correct its noncompliance, reverse its

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unwarranted military buildup, and seriously pursue equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has so far failed to move constructively in these three areas.

In spite of our expressed concerns and our diplomatic efforts for corrective Soviet actions, the Soviet Union has not corrected its noncompliance. Concerning SALT Two, the president's most recent report, of December 23, 1985, to the Congress cited as Soviet violations: (1) the development of the SS-25 missile, a prohibited second new type of ICBM; (2) extensive encryption of telemetry on ICBM missile flight tests, which impedes verification; (3) concealment of the association between the SS-25 missile and its launcher during testing; and (4) exceeding the SALT Two numerical cap of 2,504 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs). In addition, the president's report cited three areas of ambiguous Soviet behavior as involving possible violations or other problems with regard to SALT Two: (1) SS-16 ICBM activity, (2) the BACKFIRE bomber's intercontinental operating capability, and (3) the BACKFIRE bomber's production rate. Concerning SALT One, the president's report cited a violation in the Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs. These SALT Two and SALT One violations and other ambiguous situations involving these treaties remain matters of serious concern, as does Soviet violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 and of other major arms control agreements.

The administration has now concluded a comprehensive review, and extensive consultations with our allies and friends abroad and with members of the Congress, on the continuing Soviet pattern of noncompliance, the Soviet strategic arms buildup and the lack of progress by the Soviets at the Geneva negotiations. The president announced on May 27 that in the future, the United States would base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, not on standards contained in the flawed SALT structure, which has been seriously undermined by Soviet noncompliance.

In his May 27 announcement on U.S. interim restraint policy and on the U.S. response to continued Soviet noncompliance, the president pointed out the inappropriateness of continuing with the SALT Two agreement. SALT Two codified continuing major arms buildups. It was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was never ratified by the U.S. Senate and was clearly headed for defeat before the president's predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it. With SALT Two the Soviets have nearly doubled their strategic ballistic missile warheads from about 5,000 to 9,000 and with SALT Two they could legally undertake a further significant increase. Even if SALT Two had been ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985.

Finally, continued Soviet violations have seriously undercut the agreement for several years in spite of repeated U.S. requests for corrective Soviet action. (Concerning SALT One, this agreement expired in 1977, and since it was signed in 1972, the Soviet Union has quadrupled the number of its strategic nuclear warheads. As for the United States, even if we did not retire older systems, the United States would, under current plans, remain in technical observance of the SALT One numerical limits until mid-1989.)

The president made clear in his May 27 announcement that the United States would continue to exercise utmost restraint in the future, seeking to meet U.S. strategic needs, given the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. The president stated that as we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit, and that we do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic forces. He also indicated that, assuming no significant change in the threat we face as we implement the Strategic Modernization Program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

The president also noted that, as a result of his decision to dismantle two older POSEIDON submarines, the United States will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT Two Treaty for some months. He continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this additional time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, the president has stated that this would be taken into account.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of our full Strategic Modernization Program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our allies. The Strategic Modernization Program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis that can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

In his May 27 statement, the president emphasized that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and will continue to receive, his highest priority. We hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached by the president and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting last November to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations. It was agreed to focus, in particular, on areas where there is common around, including the principle of 50 percent reductions, appropriately applied, in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, as well as an interim agreement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

The classified report transmitted to the Congress on June 19 provided a comparison of representative U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons dismantlement that would be required over the next five years if both countries were actually to observe all of the quantitative limits of the SALT One and SALT Two agreements. It then presented representative projections of the strategic offensive forces of the two sides assuming that the SALT One and SALT Two limits no longer apply. Finally, it provided an assessment of possible Soviet political and negotiating responses, insofar as these are understood and anticipated at present. For security reasons, the present,

unclassified version provides the information concerning U.S. and Soviet forces in substantially abbreviated form.

At the outset, it must be noted that there are important uncertainties in the assessments presented herein. With respect to the data on Soviet forces, the projections represent broad trends -- based on both evidence and assumptions -- and are not intended to be precise forecasts. On the basis of U.S. experience, it is unlikely that Soviet strategic forces five years from now will be identical (or necessarily even extremely close) to these force projections. Nevertheless, we believe that Soviet strategic forces in the next three to five years can be reasonably characterized, based on evidence of ongoing programs that would be difficult to alter radically in this timeframe.

By contrast, the size and complexion of future U.S. strategic forces are relatively easier for the Soviets to determine. We must contend with potential increases in Soviet strategic programs and capabilities. However, the principal source of uncertainty for Soviet planners about the scope and size of future U.S. strategic programs is, in all likelihood, the extent to which future U.S. programs may be reduced by congressional or executive branch action.

The data presented here assume full implementation of the administration's Strategic Modernization Program. It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their noncompliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

II. PROJECTED SOVIET AND U.S. DISMANTLEMENTS

This section of the report provides representative projections on dismantling that would result if SALT limitations were extended. They should be considered to be approximations, and would be subject to alteration by policy decisions or programmatic adjustments by either side. It should be pointed out that, as documented in the president's December 23, 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, the Soviet Union's SALT-accountable strategic nuclear delivery vehicle level is above the SALT Two cap of 2,504, in violation of the Soviets' political commitment not to undercut the Treaty.

Representative Soviet Dismantlements

The Soviet Union has several programs underway to introduce new strategic delivery systems that would necessitate dismantling of older systems if the Soviets were to restrict their overall force to SALT levels. Under a representative projection of such programs, consistent with SALT limits over the next five years the Soviets would deploy significant numbers of new delivery vehicles, including SS-25 and SS-X-24 ICBMs, TYPHOON- and DELTA-type SSBNs, and BACKFIRE bombers and ALCM carriers.

If SALT One and Two limits were to be complied with, these actions would necessitate dismantling some older systems in the Soviet inventory, as well as some more modern systems. The older systems include SS-11 and SS-13 ICBMs, SS-N-6 SLBMs on Y-class SSBNs, and

BISON and BEAR aircraft. Because the Soviets already are very close to the SALT Two sublimit of 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers, deployment of the MIRVed SS-X-24 would require dismantling of existing MIRVed ICBMs -- most likely SS-17s and possibly some SS-19s -- to stay within the ceiling. Similarly, with the continued deployment of SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 SLBMs, their total of MIRVed missile launchers would exceed the ceiling of 1,200 in a year or two; then they would need to dismantle more MIRVed ICBMs or some SS-N-18 launchers on relatively new D-III-class SSBNs to continue observing the cumulative sublimit of 1,200 MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers. They have, for some time, been at the limit of 62 modern SSBNs established by SALT One; thus deployment of new SSBNs would require continued dismantling of older submarines.

The dismantlements that would derive from these actions probably would total over the next five years slightly more than 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), with some 1,000 to 1,200 associated ballistic missile warheads. (The SNDV figure also includes heavy bombers judged to have a capacity for some 300 nuclear weapons.) Some dismantling of older systems would occur eventually in any case, with or without SALT limits.

These projected dismantling actions do not take into account the Soviet potential for additional cheating, while nominally observing SALT numerical limits. This might be intended to avoid compensatory dismantlement of other ICBMs, including MIRVed ICBMs.

Representative U.S. Dismantlements

With respect to U.S. programs and dismantlements, full implementation of the Strategic Modernization Program would require continued dismantlements under SALT of U.S. older strategic program systems, most of which are nearing the end of their useful life based on both military and economic considerations.

III. PROJECTED SOVIET AND U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES

Projected Soviet Forces

In projecting Soviet strategic offensive force deployments, assuming SALT limits no longer apply, the caveats discussed above regarding assumptions and uncertainties underlying such projections are relevant.

To place these figures in historical perspective, since 1972 when SALT One was signed, there has been a four-fold increase in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads (missile warheads and bombs) and nearly a doubling of Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight. Indeed, since the signing of SALT Two in 1979, the number of Soviet strategic ballistic missile warheads has nearly doubled from about 5,000 to more than 9,000. This great expansion in Soviet strategic forces has been possible for the most part with SALT. (The agreements limited launchers, and only indirectly affected deployed weapons.) As noted, however, the Soviet Union has also violated the arms control limitations imposed by these agreements.

The Soviet Union now has about 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons (missile warheads and bombs). The SALT One and Two Treaties, even if fully complied with, would not prevent a very substantial further expansion of Soviet capabilities. Even assuming future Soviet compliance with SALT Two -- other than the continuation of current Soviet violations -- deployed Soviet weapons are projected to increase to over 12,000 in the next five years. Moreover, by further violating the agreements, the Soviets could plausibly add in the same time period a relatively modest increase of even more weapons to their

forces.

It is difficult to predict precisely what the Soviets might do absent SALT constraints. They would not necessarily expand their forces significantly beyond the increases discussed above -- which are very large and would appear, in our judgment, more than enough to meet reasonable military requirements. Thus there might well be little appreciable difference, in terms of total weapons, between the forces that the Soviets might deploy with and without SALT constraints. It is reasonable to expect that in the absence of SALT, the Soviets would not dismantle all their older systems as rapidly as under SALT. Some classes of weapons (e.g., SSBNs) might not be dismantled at all during the next five years without SALT constraints. Given the great extent of the Soviet strategic modernization program, however, many of these older systems would have relatively little impact on the overall threat to U.S. security.

The Soviets have the potential to expand their forces somewhat further, should they decide to do so for either military or political reasons. If a deliberate effort were made by the Soviet Union to expand its strategic forces beyond SALT Two levels, they might increase their forces somewhat further, to about 15,000 weapons by 1991.

However, the costs associated with such an expansion of capability, on top of an already very aggressive and expensive modernization program, would be a disincentive against any such Soviet effort.

With or without SALT, the Soviets are in any case likely to modernize their intercontinental nuclear attack forces further by replacing most of their currently deployed land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers by the mid-1990's. This impressive Soviet modernization program, which will result in significantly improved survivability, flexibility, and hard-target capability, has been in train for a long time.

Projected U.S. Forces

The United States could achieve roughly 14,000 weapons by FY 1991 in a no-SALT environment by introducing the full Strategic Modernization Program without undertaking the dismantlements that would otherwise be required by SALT.

IV. SOVIET POLITICAL AND NEGOTIATING RESPONSES

It is difficult to predict specific moves the Soviets might decide to take politically or in the negotiations to try to increase criticism of, and build pressure against, the president's May 27 decision. They have already leveled a propaganda campaign against the decision. Ironically, in light of ongoing Soviet violations of SALT Two, including violation of the Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles numerical limit, they have warned that they will go beyond the SALT limits if the United States does. While they have stated that they would take the "necessary practical" steps, e.g., increasing missiles and warheads, it is not at all clear that they would further expand their forces beyond the increases already planned, as discussed above. However, they are likely to portray any expansion, including that already planned, as a response to U.S. actions.

The Soviets may decide to make political or negotiating moves as a matter of tactics that seek to discredit the U.S. decision.

However, the May 27 decision is not likely permanently to alter their basic, overall objectives for negotiations, or for a summit. These objectives include increasing opposition to the U.S.

modernization program, particularly the Strategic Defense Initiative, and weakening the Western Alliance.

We hope that the Soviet Union will join us in a framework of truly mutual restraint. For its part, the United States will continue to exercise utmost restraint in the future seeking to meet U.S. strategic needs, given the Soviet continuing buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face as we implement the Strategic Modernization Program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

No policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. We hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached by the president and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting last November to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations.

Our objectives in Geneva remain the same as stated at the summit: to seek common ground in negotiating deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviet Union how we could enhance deterrence and stability by moving toward a world in which we would no longer rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation to preserve the peace. We hope the Soviets will negotiate seriously with us toward these important goals.

(end text)

official text

DATE: 08/06/86

SDI PROMOTES PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION (1650)
(Excerpts: Reagan remarks to SDI supporters)

Washington -- President Reagan says the "serious prospect" for nuclear arms reduction "can be traced" to the impact of his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

In remarks to a group of backers of the concept August 6, the president said SDI "can take the profit out of the Soviet buildup of offensive weapons."

Following are excerpts of the president's remarks.

(begin excerpts)

We're at a critical point now on national security issues, and we need your help. Many of our citizens are still unaware that today we are absolutely defenseless against the fastest, most destructive weapons man has ever created -- ballistic missiles. Yet, there are still those who want to cut off, or severely cut back, our ability to investigate the feasibility of such defenses. Congressional action on the defense authorization bill is coinciding with increasing diplomatic activity with the Soviet Union.

Yet, at the same time, we're in the midst of a budget fight which could take away the very leverage we need to deal with the Soviets successfully.

Back in 1983, I challenged America's scientific community to develop an alternative to our total reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation, an alternative based on protecting innocent people rather than avenging them; and alternative that would be judged effective by how many lives it could save, rather than how many lives it could destroy.

All of you know that during the past three decades, deterrence has been based on our ability to use offensive weapons to retaliate against any attack. Once an American president even had to make the excruciating decision to use such weapons in our defense. Isn't it time that we took steps that will permit us to do something about nuclear weapons, rather than simply continue to live with them in fear? And this is what our SDI research is all about, and there can be no better time than today, the 41st anniversary of Hiroshima, to rededicate ourselves to finding a safer way to keep the peace.

Many people believe the answer lies not in SDI, but only in reaching arms control agreements. Trust and understanding alone, it is said, will lead to arms control. But let's not kid ourselves, it's realism, not just trust, that is going to make it possible for adversaries, like the Soviet Union and the United States, to reach effective arms reduction agreements. Our SDI program has provided an historic opportunity; one that enhances the prospects for reducing the number of nuclear weapons. Technology can make it possible for both sides, realistically, without compromising their own security, to reduce their arsenals. And the fear that one side might cheat -- might have a number of missiles above the agreed upon limit -- could be offset by effective defenses. Clearly, by making offensive nuclear missiles less reliable, we make agreements to reduce their number more attainable. Particularly is that true where one side now is an economic basket case because of the massive arms buildup that it's been conducting over the last few decades -- the Soviet Union.

OT 1

There has been progress. There's a serious prospect today for arms reductions, not just arms control; and that by itself is a great change, and it can be traced to our Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI can take the profit out of the Soviet buildup of offensive weapons and, in time, open new opportunities by building on today's and tomorrow's technologies.

I say this fully aware of the Soviet campaign to convince the world that terminating our SDI program is a prerequisite to any arms agreement. This clamoring is nothing new. It also has preceded steps we've taken to modernize our strategic forces. It was especially loud, for example, as we moved to offset the unprovoked and unacceptable Soviet buildup of intermediate-range missiles aimed at our allies by deploying our Pershing IIs and cruise missiles.

When I made it clear that we would no longer base our strategic force decisions on the flawed SALT treaties -- and let me add that that action was taken when there was ample evidence that the Soviet Union was already in clear violation of key SALT provisions -- the cry went up that it was the death knell of arms control and the beginning of a new, even more destructive nuclear arms race.

Well, let me just point out, in case no one noticed, the naysayers' predictions have been about as accurate as the time my old boss, Harry Warner, of Warner Brothers' film company, said when sound films first came in, "Who the hell wants to here an actor talk?"

Today we continue to negotiate with the Soviets and they are negotiating with us. In fact, their recent proposals -- in stark contrast to those gloomy predictions -- are somewhat more forthcoming than those of the past. We are giving serious consideration to what the Soviets have recently laid upon the table in response to our own concrete reduction proposals. Also, we are looking toward the next summit between General Secretary Gorbachev and me, as we agreed upon last November, where nuclear arms reduction will be one of several significant issues to be discussed.

Forecasting is not useful, but let me just say again, I am optimistic. It is demonstrably in the interest of both our countries to reduce the resources that we commit to weapons. If the Soviet Union wants arms reduction -- strategic, chemical, or convectional -- the United States stands ready to commit itself to a fair and verifiable agreement.

As for SDI, let me again affirm, we are willing to explore how to share its benefits with the Soviet Union, which itself has long been involved in strategic defense programs. This will help to demonstrate what I have been emphasizing all along -- that we seek no unilateral advantage through the SDI.

There's been some speculation that in my recent letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, I decided to seek some sort of "grand compromise" to trade away SDI in exchange for getting the Soviets to join with us in the offensive reductions. Now, to those who have been publicizing what is supposed to be in that letter -- aren't offended to find out that they don't know what's in that letter because no one's really told them. I know. Let me reassure you right here and now that our response to demands that we cut off or delay research and testing and close shop is: No way. SDI is no bargaining chip, it is the path to a safer and more secure future. And the research is not, and never has been, negotiable. As I've said before, it's the number of offensive missiles that needs to be reduced, not efforts to find a way to defend mankind against deadly weapons.

Many of the vocal opponents of SDI, some of them with impressive scientific credentials, claim our goal is impossible; it can't be done, they say. Well, I think it's becoming increasingly apparent to everyone that those claiming it can't be done have clouded vision. Sometimes smoke gets in your eyes. And sometimes politics gets in your eyes. If this project is as big a waste of time and money as some have claimed, why have the Soviets been involved in strategic defense themselves for so long, and why are they so anxious that we stop?

I'm more than happy with the strides made in our ability to track and intercept missiles before they reach their targets. The goal we seek is a system that can intercept deadly ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight, including, and in particular, the boost phase -- right where they're coming out of the silos. Our research is aimed at finding a way of protecting people, not missiles. And that's my highest priority and will remain so.

And to accomplish this, we're proceeding as fast as we can toward developing a full range of promising technologies. I know there are those who are getting a bit antsy, but to deploy systems of limited effectiveness now would deter limited funds and -- or divert them -- and delay our main research. It could well erode support for the program before it's permitted to reach its potential.

We and the other free people of the world are on the edge of a giant leap into the next century. That turning point in thirteen and a half years, will not only mark the end of a century, but the beginning of a new millenium. And the free people of the world are ready for it. Our research on effective defenses helps to point the way to a safer future. The best minds from some allied countries are already working with us in this noble endeavor, and we believe others will join this effort before too long. In SDI, as elsewhere, we've put technology that almost boggles the mind to work -- increasing our productivity and expanding the limits of human potential. The relationship between freedom and human progress has never been more apparent.

But our freedom and security, as we are sorely aware, depend on more than technology. Both diplomacy and our internal debate are at a critical juncture, and your active support is imperative. Together, we must make it plain that this is the worst time to undermine vital defense programs and take away America's needed negotiating leverage.

If we cut back on our own forces unilaterally, we will leave our adversaries no incentive to reduce their own weapons. And we will leave the next generations not a safer, more stable world, but a far more dangerous one. The future is literally in our hands. And it is SDI that is helping us to regain control over our own destiny.

I'll just leave you with this thought once again. When the time has come and the research is complete, yes, we're going to deploy.

(end excerpts)

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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אל:הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל השברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח
דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 6. 1986

MAJOR NEWS HEADLINES

TOP STORY: SOUTH AFRICA HITS BACK AGANIST BRIT & COMMONWEALTH SANCTIONS
South Africa's Prime Minister Pie Botha said that his regime will not take the new British and Commonwealth sanctions "lying down" and in retaliation, South Africa would impose import levies on Zimbabwe and Zambia.
Wash. Post: S. Africa Hits New Sanctions: Import Tax Planned On Neighbors In Commonwealth
Wash. Times: Both Warns Nearby States To Expect Levies On Imports
Balt. Sun: S. Africa Plans Import Levies For 2 Neighbor States

REAGAN NOMINEES: REHNQUIST AND SCALIA
The Reagan administration has agreed to allow Senate challengers to Chief Justice-designate Rehnquist look at government documents he wrote years ago. This decision has broken the impasse that has threatened to hold up Senate review of both the Rehnquist nomination and the nomination of Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia to fill Rehnquist's seat on the court.
Balt. Sun: Rehnquist Documents Released: Accord Clears Way For Scalia Hearings
Wash. Post: Rehnquist Told in 1974 Of Restriciton In Deed: Reagan Permits Access To Some Documents

SHUTTLE NEARLY LAUNCHED WITH NOT ENOUGH FUEL 3 WEEKS BEFORE DISASTER
The Rogers Commission released new information that fatigue among launch-control workers at Kennedy Space Center nearly resulted in the shuttle being launched without enough fuel on Jan. 6, only 22 days before the challenger disaster occured.
Wash. Post: Shuttle Nearly Launched With Insufficient Fuel: Rogers Panel Cites Patigue Among Space Center Workers As 'Potential Threat To Safety'
Balt. Sun: Report Reveals Jan. 6 Shuttle Narrowly Aborted

NEWS ARTICLES AND ANALYSIS

U.S. DROPS SUBPOENAS OF ISRAELIS: Cluster Bomb Probe Cooperation Pledged

Wash. Post, Thornton: The Justice Dept. yesterday withdrew subpoenas of Israeli citizens unter investigation for allegedly trying to illegally procure cluster bomb technology. Associate Attorney General designate Stephen Trott said that the subpoenas have been withdrawn in exchange for pledges of cooperation from the Israeli govt. Administration officials said that that Israeli Embassy officials told Trott they would claim diplomatic immunity for the Israelis subpoenaed. The Israeli Embassy press office declined comment on the matter. There are reports in the Israeli press that Israeli representatives have urged that the State Dept. take over the case form the Justice Dept. so the case could be handled as a diplomatic matter. (8/6/86)

PERES LINKS SOVIET PEACE ROLE TO FULL TIES

Wash. Times, (wires): In his first comment on the upcoming Israeli-Soviet Union talks, Prime Minister Shimon Peres said that Israel would accept Soviet participation in Middle East peace talks if the Kremlin renewed full diplomatic relations. He said that Israel faced two major problems in dealing with the Soviets: Soviet Jewry and the fact that the Soviet Union is the biggest supplier of arms to Syria and Libya. (8/6/86)
Wash. Post: Soviet Role In Mideast Talks Suggested
Phil. Inq.: Soviet Role In Mideast Talks Hinges On Renewal Of Ties

DIFFERENCES PERSIST AFTER BUSH'S VISIT: Mideast Goals Stated But No Accord On Taba

Wash. Post, Hoffman: Vice President Bush, in concluding his Middle East trip said that the leaders of Israel, Jordan and Egypt had agreed on a statement of common goals which, falling short of bridging Arab-Israeli basic differences, form a basis on which negotiations can progress. The statement advocates five goals: The first; lasting peace, the second; that negotiations should produce peace treaties based on the right of all states in the region to peace and security. The third goal was that Israel's security needs as well as the Palestinian peoples be taken into account. The fourth called for the resolution of the Palestinian question and that the basis for this could be acceptance of U.S. Security Council resolutions 242 & 338. On Taba, Bush said that negotiations are close to resolution. (8/6/86)

NEWS ARTICLES CON'T

HOW U.S. CAME TO UNDERWRITE ISRAEL'S LAVI FIGHTER PROJECT

Wash. Post, Babcock: Part II in the series 'The Special Relationship'. Recount of the story of the story of the Lavi and how Israel persisted in promoting the projects' development for years - to no avail. By 1983, Israel began making some significant headway and the project has steadily progressed since then. Two weeks ago the first prototype was unveiled. Jack Kemp (R-NY) who attended unveiling ceremony said that the jet fighter is exemplary of the partnership between Israel and the U.S. Details of U.S. involvement are included, tracking the events that have lead to the U.S. underwriting of the plane, despite the fact that it could well compete with U.S.-made aricraft for Third World sales. The cost issue has been the center of the controversary surrounding the Lavi, within Israel itself and between Israel and the United States. (8/6/86)

SCHARANSKY URGES ONE PRECONDITION: Ex-dissident Wants Emigration Eased For Jews Before Israel Talks With Soviets

Bost. Globe, (Reuter): Former dissident Anatoly Shcharansky advised Israel yesterday not to negotiate with the Soviet Union unless Moscow changes its policy towards Soviet Jews and allows more emigration.. Shcharansky, whose family will be allowed to leave the Soviet Union, said that Soviet talks with Israel should not serve as a cover for Moscow to pursue its policy against Jews who want to leave. (8/5/86)

D.S. Deborah Stone
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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

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ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מצ"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח. ניו יורק

תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום AUGUST 6, 1986 15:00

Q Do you have any comment on the President of Iraq's open letter to the Iranian people, calling for peace?

MR. REDMAN: Yes. We are in favor of a peaceful solution to the Iran-Iraq war. Iran's rejection of Saddam Husayn's open letter is the most recent example of its intransigence in this conflict. We continue to hope that Iran will reconsider its pursuit of the war, which has cost both countries dearly in human and economic terms.

Q Chuck, any reaction to the President of Malta saying that Malta warned Libya in advance of the US raid?

MR. REDMAN: First, on the specifics of the story, we have no reason to disbelieve the account rendered by the Maltese prime minister. But whatever happened, as the Department of Defense has said already, I believe, the raid was a tactical surprise. Concerning the general comments, we would note that Malta is geographically close to Libya and has historically had close trade ties with that country. However, we have repeatedly expressed our concern to the Maltese that they are allying themselves too closely with Libya, in violation of their avowed policy of neutrality and non-alignment. In that vein, this is the first time that Malta has described Libya as an ally.

And finally, since we're covering the water front, he also mentioned cooperation with other countries in the fight against terrorism. Malta has often stated that it will help in any way possible in the fight against terrorism. Malta cooperated with the United States in the Egypt Air hijacking. It's also cooperated with other countries in a variety of ways in anti-terrorism.

Q -- cooperate with the United States in the Egypt Air hijacking?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any specifics. Well, I'd refer you to the briefings at the time, which were fairly lengthy.

Q I mean, you know, it's hard to imagine how Malta --

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Q --that they would share information with any allies, with any Maltese allies.

MR. REDMAN: Yes.

Q So, would with the Egypt Air incident, did Malta consider the United States an ally? Did Malta consider the United States an ally? Did Malta consider Italy an ally, or Egypt?

MR. REDMAN: I can't speak for the Maltese. I believe in the account I saw. The Prime Minister referred to a number of other cases which he considered to be relevant, and I simply said that the Maltese were helpful in the Egypt Air hijacking.

Q But the United States--

Q How can you square their description of Libya as an allie with their promise to fight terrorist states? Do those things not seem mutually exclusive?

MR. REDMAN: I can't do any better in explaining what's behind their policy, now.

MR. SCHWEID: Chuck, can I try on something else? Is the United States in indirect communication with Fatah of the PLO faction through the Egyptians?

MR. REDMAN: Do you have a specific--

MR. SCHWEID: Well, there's a Kuwait newspaper report which I've been advised is innaccurate. It suggests that George Bush met with Abu Jihad now.

MR. REDMAN: It is in fact totally false.

MR. SCHWEID: Fine. But the Egyptians are supposed to be, according to this report, the arrangers of this, which you say never happened. Let's take it back a step, though. Is the United States, is Egypt conducting some indirect discussion between the United States and the PLO?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything on that, Barry. All I would reiterate is that our conditions for engaging in a dialogue with the PLO are longstanding and they have not changed.

MR. SCHWEID: Do they apply to an indirect dialogue through the good auspices of Mubarak?

MR. REDMAN: I believe that question has been addressed. Nothing has changed on that score.

Q Can you give us an assessment of the whole visit of Mr. Bush to the area in light of the five points that was mentioned in the papers this morning, that his communique, vague communique as the Washington Post called it?

MR. REDMAN: I'd begin by saying that Vice President Bush's statement speaks for itself. It sets out a number of points on which the Vice President noted the governments of Israel, Jordan and Egypt, as well as the United States are in agreement. Those points are a measure of the steady, incremental progress that has been made toward the goal of a negotiated peace. The statement does not announce any change in policy. It expresses our recognition of the commitment of all three governments to the common goal of a just and lasting peace in the region.

We note in particular Vice President Bush's call to Palestinian representatives, persons of peace and good will who reject violence and terrorism to recognize this opportunity to shape their own future. We intend to continue to work closely with Egypt and Israel in order to achieve an expeditious settlement of the Taba issues. We will also continue to consult with the Jordanian and Israeli governments about ways to enhance the quality of life of the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank in Gaza.

Q Can I follow-up? There was a, the point there that he said or was spoken that on his behalf, that he wants a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation of people to meet with Israelis. He didn't mention anything about a role for the United States to be undertaken. Does this mean that this is the end of the attempt by Murphy to bring about a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to meet with the United States and later on with Israel? Would you interpret this?

MR. REDMAN: Based on that account, and having not seen the full context, I just can't interpret that at all for the moment.

Q The story in the Washington Post on Israel -- Has the U.S. dropped attempts to subpoena Israeli officials on the cluster bombs case?

MR. REDMAN: I refer you to Justice.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

43/119/13

Q You don't expect an agreement on Taba, since Mr. Murphy stayed behind Mr. Bush in Egypt for this purpose?

MR. REDMAN: I can't move the story beyond what I said yesterday, which is that progress has been made. Assistant Secretary Murphy has stayed on; he's there again today in Cairo, continuing to work on the issue. But I'm not in a position to predict when and if a final resolution will happen.

Q In another area, the same area, any comment on Mr. Peres's statement that the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union will qualify the Soviet Union to enter into the Middle East peace discussions?

MR. REDMAN: We have long said that we would welcome constructive Soviet contributions to peace in the Middle East. We and Israel agree that full diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel would be a positive step. We hope that the Soviets will take a more constructive attitude toward the problems in the Middle East and the peace process. And of course, we'll be consulting closely with Israel.

Q Can we get some of these statements that you read earlier about Bush's visit, and the other ones that you've mentioned? I asked and asked, but you didn't respond.

MR. REDMAN: Somebody would be happy to read them to you again.

Q Can you read your answer now -- that you specify full diplomatic relations with Israel. I mean, if consular relations are restored between the Soviet Union and Israel, (inaudible) positive or anything like that?

MR. REDMAN: I addressed that almost exact question on Monday, so it's in the transcript.

Q In your statement about Malta, I thought you were suggesting that they had been helpful to Libya in other instances in addition to this early warning. Could you be specific as to what they have done to assist Libya?

MR. REDMAN: I don't believe I suggested that.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

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פצצות המצרר

להלן מאמרי עתונות מהיום (6.8)

עתונות

U.S. Drops Subpoenas Of Israelis

Cluster Bomb Probe Cooperation Pledged

WP 8-6-86

By Mary Thornton
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Justice Department yielded to Israeli requests yesterday and withdrew subpoenas of Israeli citizens under investigation for allegedly trying to illegally acquire U.S. technology for manufacturing cluster bombs, officials said.

"The subpoenas have been withdrawn without prejudice in return for pledges of cooperation by the government of Israel," said Associate Attorney General-designate Stephen S. Trott. Eight Israelis subpoenaed by two federal grand juries will not testify, but will "provide evidence relevant to the inquiry," he said, refusing to elaborate.

Exports to Israel of cluster bombs—canisters that contain hundreds of small bombs—have been banned by the United States since 1982 because of reports that Israel used them in its invasion of southern Lebanon.

Administration officials, who requested anonymity, said Israeli Embassy officials told Trott they would claim diplomatic immunity for the Israeli citizens subpoenaed in the case. "They didn't want a long, litigious battle over immunity," one source said.

The Israeli Embassy press office declined comment because the matter is a "judicial proceeding."

The confrontation began July 8 when the U.S. Customs Service served subpoenas and search warrants on employes of the Israel Military Industries office in New York. Subpoenas and search warrants were also served on three U.S. companies in connection with the investigation. They were Vector Corp. of Marion, Iowa; Bexco International in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and Assembly Machines Inc. of Erie, Pa.

See CLUSTER, A23, Col. 5

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Subpoenas Withdrawn In Cluster Bomb Case

CLUSTER, From A1

A source familiar with the investigation said at the time that Israel Military Industries officials approached Vector Corp., which makes high-speed machinery that can be used for products ranging from medical capsules to munitions, early last year. The Israelis allegedly suggested that the description of the machinery they wanted to export be changed so it would not appear to be related to making cluster bombs.

Grand juries in Cedar Rapids and Erie are hearing evidence in the case, and the Justice Department hoped to bring the Israelis before the grand juries later this week.

Federal officials said representatives of the subpoenaed Israelis met Trott last week to discuss the investigation and suggested that the Israelis are protected by diplomatic immunity. The representatives asked that the Israelis be allowed to submit affidavits rather than being questioned before a grand jury.

Meanwhile, Israeli news outlets have reported that Israeli representatives urged the State Department to take over the case from the Justice Department so it could be handled as a diplomatic issue.

The Israeli Defense Forces Radio reported July 22 that "Israel and the United States are examining the possibility of transferring the discussion on the cluster bombs affair from U.S. courts to diplomatic channels. The intention is that the subpoenas . . . delivered to members of the Defense Ministry mission in New York be canceled."

The broadcast also reported "talks with the Americans about the question of whether to give members of the Defense Ministry mission a consular status."

Another broadcast by the Jerusalem Domestic Service July 24 said that Israel "insists on a cancellation of the subpoenas."

One prosecutor said discussions had been under way about whether the Israelis are protected by diplomatic immunity and whether the New York office is technically sovereign Israeli territory.

He said that the property is heavily protected by Israeli guards carrying Uzi submachine guns, so that the execution of a search warrant there presented a problem if the Israelis did not cooperate.

A State Department official, who requested anonymity, confirmed that the question of diplomatic immunity is a central one. He said the Israelis were likely to file a lawsuit if the United States ruled negatively on the immunity question.

The Israel Military Industries New York office has about 200 employes who negotiate thousands of contracts each year with U.S. companies, spending about $1.8 billion in funds from military aid grants.

CLUSTER BOMBS

U.S. drops subpoenas; Israelis to assist probe

Balt Sun 8-6-88

The Justice Department announced yesterday that it had shelved its attempts to subpoena a number of Israelis in an investigation of Israel's alleged attempt to illegally acquire U.S. technology to manufacture cluster bombs.

In exchange for withdrawing the subpoenas, the Israeli government has pledged to cooperate in the probe, the Justice Department said.

The agreement follows a series of negotiations, including a meeting yesterday at the Justice Department between assistant attorney general Stephen Trott and officials from the Israeli Embassy.

The investigation centers on allegations that Israel tried to obtain technology from private contractors in the United States, said Dave Hoover, a U.S. Customs Service spokesman.

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U.S. Withdraws Subpoenas For Israelis in an Arms Case

By PHILIP SHENON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5 — The Justice Department announced today that it had withdrawn subpoenas that would have required several Israeli officials to testify about allegations that Israel illegally tried to import American technology for making cluster bombs.

The subpoenas, which had drawn angry protests from Israel, were withdrawn "without prejudice in return for pledges of cooperation by the Government of Israel," the Acting Associate Attorney General, Stephen S. Trott, said in a written statement.

The Israeli officials worked in their nation's military purchasing office in New York and had been scheduled to answer questions about Israel's purported effort to import the United States bomb technology.

Cluster bombs are metal pods containing large numbers of tiny bombs that explode over a wide area. The United States halted shipments of the technology to Israel in 1982 after cluster bombs were reportedly used against civilian targets in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

'Look for Least Resistance'

Another Justice Department official with knowledge of the diplomatically sensitive case said prosecutors had agreed to withdraw the subpoenas after the Israeli Government promised to provide valuable information to grand jury investigations in Iowa and Pennsylvania.

"You always look for the path of least resistance," the official said. "It's easier if you can get them to cooperate without slapping them with subpoenas."

An official of the United States Customs Service, which began the investigation, said that the agency was concerned by the Justice Department's decision to withdraw the subpoenas.

"Customs has no information on this and was not consulted," said the official, who spoke on condition that he not be named.

Today's agreement was completed at a meeting between Mr. Trott and representatives of the subpoenaed Israelis, Administration officials said.

Another law-enforcement official said that Israeli officials vigorously protested the subpoenas at a meeting with Mr. Trott last week and argued that at least some of the subpoenaed Israelis were protected from testifying by diplomatic immunity.

A third Justice Department official said that the department was prompted to reach agreement with the Israelis "because we didn't want to get tied down in litigation on the diplomatic immunity question, which had been threatened."

The Israeli Embassy in Washington and the Justice Department issued identical statements today, saying that "the matter is the subject of a continuing inquiry and therefore further comment would be inappropriate."

Senior Israeli diplomats have denied there was wrongdoing, saying that Israel has been making cluster munitions in its own facilities and under its own design. They said all United States equipment imported by Israel had the appropriate licenses. Under export law, any technology related to weapons cannot be exported without a State Department license.

United States law-enforcement officials said that the sites of the grand juries investigating the case were chosen because they are near the offices of the companies that had been tied to the inquiry.

Officials said that the Customs Service conducted warrants at three companies in Iowa and Pennsylvania last month.

Leaders of Jewish groups welcomed the decision to withdraw the subpoenas but criticized recent disclosures to news organizations about the case. Israeli officials have repeatedly charged that some Administration officials are trying to harm American-Israeli relations through the disclosures about espionage cases involving Israel.

One of the companies that underwent a search was Assembly Machines Inc. of Erie, Pa. A company spokesman, Donald S. Stevens, said the company was aware that the machinery would be used for military purposes.

He said the equipment to be produced by his company was designed by the Israelis, and that the company did not apply for an export license since the equipment was being delivered to Israel Military Industries, the Government-run arms maker, in New York.

official text

DATE: 08/05/86

WORLD TRADE IN AGRICULTURE IN CRISIS, OFFICIAL SAYS (2690)
(Text: Deputy USTR Woods before Senate committee)

Washington -- Highly subsidized agricultural exports, principally by the European Community (EC), and protected foreign markets have brought world trade in agriculture to a state of crisis, according to Deputy U.S. Trade Representatives Alan Woods.

"As I take stock, I conclude that there is a certain lawlessness in the conduct of international agricultural exchanges; past efforts at reform have been largely failures; and there is a growing propensity for conflicts to get worse," Woods told a Senate Foreign Agricultural Policy subcommittee August 5.

He said that the world can't wait the normal five or six years it takes for multilateral negotiations to achieve a major reform of agricultural policies, but that negotiations should be accelerated.

Such negotiations, expected to be launched at the upcoming ministerial meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in Punta del Este, Uruguay, should aim at eliminating import restrictions on agricultural products in developed and developing countries alike and treating agricultural export subsidies no differently than subsidies for industrial products, Woods said.

He acknowledged that differences over agricultural trade were one of the key issues that stood in the way of agreement on a draft ministerial declaration by a GATT Preparatory Committee charged with setting up the agenda for the September meeting.

"I am not particularly concerned about this situation," Woods said. "I am confident, however, that when I join the trade ministers of the 92 GATT countries during the week of September 15 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, we will be able to take the necessary political decisions to launch the new round and include trade in agriculture on the agenda."

The deputy U.S. trade representative also outlined attempts to deal with agricultural trade in past rounds of trade negotiations and why they have not been very successful.

He made the following additional points:

-- Current GATT rules on agriculture are "weak, vague, and easily circumvented."

-- Subsidizing agricultural trade has become exceedingly expensive, costing the EC and the United States 25,000 million dollar or more each for agricultural support programs this year.

-- Liberalization of agricultural trade rules would help Europe improve its allocation of economic resources and increase its economic growth, and help developing countries relieve their debt problems.

Following is the text of the Woods statement:

(begin text)

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss what's at stake for the United States -- and the world -- in the new round of multilateral trade negotiations, particularly in the field of agriculture.

The United States is the preeminent exporter of agricultural products in the world. Domestically, we consume only a little over half of our grain and soybean production, and less than half of our

cotton production. The balance of these products goes for export, which alone added about 21,000 million dollars to gross farm incomes in fiscal year 1985. Put simply, we need internationally agreed and enforced disciplines over the use of agricultural import restrictions and export subsidies to ensure continued export sales.

The problem is that world trade in agriculture is in a state of crisis, largely as a consequence of highly subsidized agricultural exports, principally by the European Community, coupled with protected foreign markets. American farmers are losing market shares abroad because they simply cannot compete with these foreign subsidies, yet few new market opportunities are available.

Last Friday afternoon, the president took action that should lead to expanded export sales for American farmers. He decided to allow grain to be sold to the Soviet Union at current world market prices in sufficient quantities to fulfill the terms of the U.S.-Soviet Long Term Grain Agreement. The unfulfilled portion of the contract calls for the Soviets to purchase four million metric tons of U.S. wheat by September 30. This action is designed to help make the American farmer competitive by putting him on an equal footing with his foreign counterparts.

This is not the only action the administration has taken to aid the American farmer and promote expanded export sales. Indeed, the importance of export markets was driven home in the debate surrounding passage of the 1985 farm legislation. We recognized that we were cutting ourselves off from foreign customers by loan rates which made us uncompetitive vis-a-vis other exporters. The answer by Congress and the administration was to lower the loan rates while providing essential income support to growers through deficiency payments. Our message to other exporters was clear: we would no longer hold an umbrella over world market prices and we would again be competing for export markets.

We have had some disappointments. The recovery in our export volumes has not been as rapid as many would have liked. One reason is because the effects of recent policy changes haven't completely settled in yet. Also, during the period when we held an umbrella over world market prices, competing producers increased their production and exports, but demand in importing countries did not grow correspondingly. As a consequence, world stock levels have increased markedly and it has become a buyers' market characterized by fierce competition among exporters.

These steps, and others like them, can alleviate pressures in the short-term, but cannot address the fundamental problems affecting international trade in agriculture. The long-term situation is simply intolerable. We must end the chaos that now characterizes the international marketplace by bringing agriculture under effective and enforceable multilateral rules. We must eliminate import restrictions on agricultural products, treat agricultural export subsidies no differently than subsidies for industrial products, and eliminate other barriers to market access in developed and developing countries alike.

For the past seven months we have been working with our trading partners in the GATT to develop an ambitious, comprehensive agenda for new multilateral trade negotiations. The Preparatory Committee completed its work late last week, but was unable to reach agreement on a single draft ministerial declaration that encompassed the full range of issues that must be addressed. One of the key outstanding

issues is the treatment of agriculture -- a subject which, from our perspective, simply must be included in the negotiations in a comprehensive way.

I am not particularly concerned about this situation. We are all well aware of the political sensitivities of agriculture trade, and it is not surprising that the technical level negotiators in Geneva were unable to resolve what is, in essence, a political problem. I am confident, however, that when I join the trade ministers of the 92-GATT countries during the week of September 15 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, we will be able to take the necessary political decisions to launch the new round and include trade in agriculture on the agenda.

Negotiations are urgently needed because the rules governing trade in agricultural products in the general agreement are insufficient and unenforceable, thereby leading to distortions in foreign markets. From its inception, GATT has provided exceptions from the rules for agricultural trade. GATT members can apply import quotas on agricultural products if they in turn restrict domestic production and can subsidize exports so long as they do not take more than an equitable share of world trade.

The rules on agricultural trade are weak, vague, and easily circumvented. On the import side, countries do not need to apply quotas to restrict access to their markets. They can obtain the same effect with variable levies, minimum import prices or through the monopoly powers of marketing boards. These practices are not specifically covered by the GATT, and countries do not have to limit production to employ them as is required when import quotas are applied. In some respects, the United States' waiver for Section 22 quotas is partly to blame for this state of affairs. Countries do not feel compelled to live closely by the GATT obligations on quantitative restrictions when the United States is exempt from them by virtue of the waiver.

On the export side, trying to define an illegal subsidy is like shooting at a moving target. The principal criterion, "more than equitable share" that exports have taken is extremely difficult to prove, given the many ups and downs in market shares as a result of weather vagaries, livestock diseases and changes in importing country needs or policies.

We have attempted to deal with these problems in past negotiating rounds, but we have not been very successful.

In the Kennedy Round, we sought improved disciplines over the European Community's system of variable levies. We hoped to treat the variable levy as we would the traditional import duty -- that is, to reduce and bind it against future increases.

The United States proposed that there be no distinction between agricultural and industrial products in the Kennedy Round negotiations. We suggested that where fixed tariffs were the only barrier, they should be cut; where barriers other than fixed tariffs existed, protection should be reduced by a comparable amount.

The EC, however, wanted to base negotiations on domestic support programs. For products subject to variable levies and other forms of internal price or income support, they proposed to bind the margin of support for three years. Variable levies could be changed to make up the difference between the bound internal price and the actual world price. Exporters would bind existing subsidy levels. If no subsidy existed, the exporter would be bound not to institute one.

The United States and other exporters found the EC proposals

unacceptable principally because they would eliminate price as a mechanism for adjusting production and trade patterns and therefore discriminate against more efficient producers. Since the European Community subsidized far more products than did other countries, the EC proposals on export subsidies were similarly unacceptable.

During the Tokyo Round the United States focused upon obtaining greater discipline on export subsidies on agricultural products. The Subsidies Code specifically prohibits export subsidies on non-primary products. For farm products, export subsidies are permitted under the code, so long as the subsidizer does not obtain more than an equitable share of world trade or materially undercuts prices of other suppliers to the same market. "More than an equitable share" was defined to include displacement of another exporter in a third country market.

U.S. experience with resolving agricultural disputes under the code has not been satisfactory. A panel appointed to review EC export subsidies on wheat flour reported that it could not make a determination as to whether the EC had obtained "more than an equitable share of world trade" because the term "equitable share" was not precise enough.

A panel which reviewed EC export subsidies on pasta found that pasta was not a farm product and, therefore, export subsidies on it were prohibited. However, the panel decision was blocked by the European Community and other European countries who maintained that such export subsidies should be permitted to the extent the subsidy only compensated for the high cost of durum wheat in the European Community.

As I take stock, I conclude that there is a certain lawlessness in the conduct of international agricultural exchanges; past efforts at reform have been largely failures; and there is a growing propensity for conflicts to get worse. At the same time, I believe that the atmosphere is more conducive to reform today than in past negotiations. I am optimistic for two basic reasons.

First, subsidizing agricultural trade is exceedingly expensive and growing more so. Both the European Community and the United States will spend 25,000 million dollars or more on agricultural support programs this year. Each of us will also have massive surpluses to deal with, notwithstanding that enormous expenditure, and sometimes because of it. In the United States we currently hold almost one year's wheat production in storage and one half year's corn production. Dairy stocks are gigantic in both countries. The European Community has beef mountains and wine lakes.

Neither of us can go on like this. The tremendous expenditures that each of us is making in agriculture, and the fact that those expenditures only seem to be leading to greater surpluses, is likely to be the driving force that causes us to come together to reform GATT agricultural trading rules in the new round.

Second, many other countries share our deep-rooted concern about the future of agriculture trade. A large group of both developed and developing countries have called for negotiations to bring meaningful disciplines to trade in agriculture and intend to take part in those negotiations. Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay have joined together under the name of "non-subsidizing agricultural exporting countries" to pursue their common interests in the negotiations. While they have thrown brickbats recently at the United States' agricultural export policies, they have not spared the European Community or Japan from as much or more censure. Because

their economies are so greatly dependent on agricultural exports, I believe that these exporters will be a positive force in developing more market-oriented rules for agricultural trade. I look to them for support in reaching -- and implementing -- early results for agricultural trade problems.

The principal issue to be addressed during the negotiations will be to define the extent to which national treasuries can stimulate production and exports and what types of restrictions can be placed on imports. A special committee within the GATT has prepared a list of options for strengthening the rules and disciplines on agricultural trade. We expect these options to form the starting point for negotiations on agriculture, which are expected to commence early next year. It is imperative that the negotiations move on a fast track. The world just can't wait five or six years for a major reform of agricultural policies in many countries, including ours.

Aside from the agriculture issue per se, there are a number of other subjects that we want to tackle in the new round that will help strengthen and improve the trading system and enhance the competitive opportunities for American farms, as well as industry. These include:

-- Dispute settlement: If the international business community is to retain confidence in the GATT system, an expeditious and effective dispute settlement mechanism is essential. The current mechanism is grossly deficient, and the negotiations should aim for a quantum improvement.

-- Import restraints: Current GATT rules allow countries to restrict imports on a temporary basis when faced with a surge in imports that injures a domestic industry. The problem is that, in practice, such actions are not temporary, limited in scope, phased down over the life of the measure, or open to international scrutiny. Both developed and developing countries alike would substantially benefit from improved rules in this area.

-- Improvement in the MTD codes of conduct: Five years experience with the agreements negotiated during the Tokyo Round indicates that there are a number of areas where improvements are needed in the codes. We want to strengthen the codes on subsidies, procurement, and standards by clarifying ambiguous applications and extending participation in and coverage of the agreements.

-- Significant tariff barriers also remain and we will need to analyze what creative new approaches might be considered in this area.

There is much to be gained for U.S. agriculture in a new round. We are a competitive producer of agricultural products and as such it is in our long term interest to have agricultural trade based on the principle of comparative advantage. It is in Europe's interest as well to liberalize trade in agricultural products. Liberalization would help Europe to improve the allocation of economic resources and increase economic growth. Increased export opportunities for developing countries would help relieve their debt problems and allow them to develop more market oriented import policies.

There are lots of good reasons for committing ourselves to reforms in agricultural trade. The question we and other GATT members have to ask ourselves is whether we have the political will to actually carry out the task. I intend to make a very strong case at the trade ministers meeting in Uruguay that we have no alternative -- we must end the chaos in international agriculture through new multilateral trade negotiations.

(end text)

official text

DATE: 08/05/86

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SHULTZ DISCUSSES SOVIET GRAIN SALES (1740)
(Transcript: interview with USA Today)

Washington -- Secretary of State Shultz discussed grain sales to the Soviet Union, arms control, South Africa, terrorism and the Middle East in an interview published August 5 in USA Today.

Following is the transcript of the interview.

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(begin transcript)

Question: The decision to subsidize wheat sales to the Soviets was a domestic political decision. What impact did it have on foreign policy?

Answer: I don't think it's good for the United States to develop a system of protectionism. Subsidies are a form of protection, just as much as a quota or a tariff. What I see is a sweep of protectionist sentiment in a variety of forms. The reasons I think this protectionist threat is so important right now are, of course, economic reasons.

Q: Such as?

A: Adverse effects on the U.S. standard of living. Because of the reduced consumer choice, it will raise prices here, it will take off some of the competitive edge and thrust that our industries have to face up to, and it will be bad for us in the long run. And it will tend to bring about retaliation. Thereby it will tend to reduce world trade and reduce our standard of living, as in the 1930s. Beyond that, I think protection carries a political message.

Q: Which is?

A: We have been striving hard in this country over decades -- and it's been a particular hallmark of the Reagan administration -- that we fight for freedom all around the world. And we're seeing, on both the political side and the economic side, people rallying more and more to that cause. So just as we're winning this battle, what do we do? In the face of difficulties, we turn our backs on freedom.

Q: So the effect of the grain sale is --

A: The Soviet Union must be chortling at having sales to them subsidized and scratching their heads about a system that says we're going to fix it up so that American taxpayers make it possible for a Soviet housewife to buy American-produced food at a price lower than an American housewife. So I think there are a lot of problems with this, but obviously there must be a lot of pluses or it wouldn't have been decided. I can't think of any pluses myself.

Q: What can we do to get back on the track that you and most other economists feel is preferable?

A: The lesson of history is that if we want to see our economies develop, open them up. And I say let's not turn our back on that lesson, even though for some people there may be difficulties.

Q: As both an economist and secretary of state, what do you see in the long run for us with a trade deficit of the magnitude that we're running?

A: I think our trade deficit is related, reasonably directly, to our fiscal deficit. And we have to come to grips with that fiscal deficit and finance our own investments and not dip into the savings pool of the rest of the world to do it for us.

Q: On arms control, is it true that President Reagan is offering to hold off on Star Wars for seven and a half years?

A: I don't have any comment to make on the content of the president's letter to Gorbachev. The Soviets, toward the end of the last round, put on the table a set of proposals in response to those the president had put there the previous November. They were studied carefully and responded to, so what we see now is a more serious dialogue. But I'm not in a position to comment on the details.

Q: Why not?

A: Because we want to make that proposal to the Soviets privately. We hope to have a serious negotiation directly with them, rather than a statement that they make to the press, and we read, and then we make one back, and they read it, and so on. It's better to talk directly to them.

Q: What effect is Congress' push for sanctions in South Africa having? Do you think it should butt out?

A: Of course, the Congress is an independent branch of the government, and people have views which they push. It's a legitimate thing for them to do. I believe, having said that, there is a great desirability for the president to have reasonable flexibility to conduct the foreign policy of the country. Many in Congress, not all, apparently disagree with the president and me on the desirability of additional economic sanctions right now. We don't think so. We think that the thing to concentrate on is what should be done in South Africa.

Q: What should be done?

A: Apartheid should be ended. There's a way for that to be accomplished. A different constitutional system that gives everybody a chance to participate can be designed. In order for that to happen, many of the people who we would normally want to talk to, who have a constituency, ought to be let out of jail. There are a wide array of so-called sanctions in place. The question is whether or not important additional economic sanctions ought to be put in place. We think the answer to that is no. The assumption that somehow all the blacks in South Africa want that is certainly not borne out by polls. I think also we need to keep in mind the problems of the countries of southern Africa who are, many of them, virtually totally dependent on South Africa.

Q: What effect has the congressional push for sanctions had?

A: Well, there are areas where it could have an effect. One is U.S. domestic political tone. The second is attitudes in the government of South Africa. It's a little hard to say what the impact is on actual trade and investment, but the fact of the matter is that the financial market and regular business considerations have been restricting heavily the flow of money into South Africa. Actually, there's been an outward flow, and I've advanced the idea that it's more powerful to let the economic sanctions in effect -- that is, those in the marketplace -- speak for themselves, rather than to place a political barrier in there, and thereby allow the South Africans to think that if only they took away these political barriers, there are people dying to invest in the country. That's not true.

Q: The picture of South Africa looks pretty bleak. Is there any

basis for optimism?

A: I think it looks pretty bleak. But I think it's a very important area for us. First, because there are so many people involved. Second, because there are such deep issues and principles for us and others involved. Third, because it's an area of great strategic significance. So, what that means to me is that we shouldn't just throw up our hands and walk away, disengage ourselves from the problem. We need to be there.

Q: It's been a few months since the raid on Libya without any major terrorist incidents. Do you believe there's been a permanent downturn of terrorism?

A: I think our actions, not only the raid against Libya but our whole coordinated set of actions, have had a good effect and are helping us in the effort to win the war against terrorism. The war is far from over, but I think we've made important progress. There's no doubt that the president's actions had an impact on Libya. Libya has been isolated, and we also got the attention of other states involved in terrorism as well. So I think it's been a very good presidential action. I thought it looked very good in prospect, but I think as you look back on it and see what's happened since the strike, it's a better and better decision.

Q: Vice President Bush says he's optimistic for a general settlement in the Middle East. What's the basis for optimism?

A: What he said was that he found a yearning for peace. And I'm sure that's true. He's a very perceptive person, sensitive, and he felt that. There are also great difficulties. People yearn for peace, but they have a hard time arranging themselves so that direct negotiation between Israel and Israel's neighbors can take place. The vice president went there just as the meeting between the prime minister of Israel and the king of Morocco was winding up. That was kind of a marker, I think a rather important one -- not so much for substance of what was discussed, but just from the fact of the meeting.

Q: There are still several U.S. held hostages in Lebanon.

A: Three.

Q: And the families of those hostages are pretty bitter about what they feel is resistance on the part of our government to helping them very much. Are we just assuming that they're lost?

A: Of course not. The president and everyone work hard and continuously on the hostage problem. We've struggled for a way to have effective contacts with anyone who might be able to help us get those hostages out of there. And we'll never stop working on it. The president feels, and I fully agree with him, that it would be wrong for us to go to Kuwait and some way get those people in jail in Kuwait, who are murderers, released. That's what the people who presumably hold our hostages say they want. That's something that shouldn't be done. But that doesn't mean that we don't work hard on every other conceivable avenue to persuade them that they should release the hostages. We're never going to give up on them.

Q: Do you think there's a chance we're going to get the rest of them out?

A: I've got to believe there is.

Q: Soon?

A: I don't want to put any time scale down.

Q: You just said there are three hostages. Has the administration confirmed that William Buckley is dead?

A: I'm not going to comment on that.

(end transcript)

official text

DATE: 08/05/86

U.S. WILL NOT DEPLOY MORE STRATEGIC WEAPONS THAN SOVIETS
(Text: Reagan message to Congress) (700)

Washington -- The United States "will not deploy" more strategic weapons than the Soviet Union, President Reagan assured Congress August 5.

Although he has decided to no longer abide by the numerical limits of the SALT Two agreement, the president once again pledged to retire older nuclear components as his strategic modernization program brings new weapons into the arsenal, provided that meets national security requirements.

Assuming "no significant change" in the nature of the Soviet threat, he said in a message to Congress that the United States "will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union."

The White House made available the text of the letter, which accompanied an unclassified version of a secret report given Congressional committees in June. The message to Congress came as the Senate and the House of Representatives began debate on the defense authorization bill, which would provide more than 290,000 million dollars to the military; the exact amount is to be determined in the debate. Reagan had asked for 320,000 million dollars.

Reagan said he does not believe the Soviet Union will increase its nuclear forces without SALT Two beyond the projections with the agreement in force, since the Kremlin's forces are already "very large and...more than enough to meet reasonable military requirements."

Following is the text of the letter.

(begin text)

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Enclosed is an unclassified version of a classified report which I provided on June 19 in response to related congressional requests, including a request for projections and comparisons of U.S. and Soviet strategic force dismantlements, inventories, etc., in terms of adherence to existing arms control agreements.

As I noted in my letter of June 19 transmitting the classified report, it is clear that SALT II and I codified a very major arms buildup including a quadrupling of Soviet strategic weapons (warheads and bombs) since SALT I was signed in 1972 and near doubling of Soviet ballistic missile warheads from about 5,000 to more than 9,000 since SALT II was signed in 1979.

The report further found that the SALT I and II agreements, even if fully complied with, would not prevent a very substantial further expansion of Soviet capabilities. We believe that, absent SALT II, the Soviets would not necessarily expand their forces significantly beyond the increases already projected with SALT II since the Soviet forces are very large and would appear, in our judgment, more than enough to meet reasonable military requirements.

In my letter of June 19, I noted that in view of the adverse implications of Soviet noncompliance for our security and for the arms control process, I had determined on May 27 that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure

which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

I have also noted that the full implementation of the Strategic Modernization Program is critical both to meeting our future national security needs and to appropriately responding to Soviet noncompliance. However, we will exercise utmost restraint. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as national security requirements permit. We do not anticipate any appreciable growth in the size of U.S. strategic forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat, we will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

I want again to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions continues to receive my highest priority. This is the most direct path to achieving greater stability and a safer world.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Ronald Reagan

(end text)

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	מאת : עתונות, ניו יורק

News Summary August 5, 1986

New York Headlines

Two stories concerning Israel were printed on page 1 of the New York Times. The top story deals with Israeli-Soviet consulate relations, the other, discusses Israelis who work in the Defense Mission and are contesting subpoenas from the US in regard to possible illegal export of US technology. (see Press Reports) Other major articles discuss British approval of limited sanctions on South Africa; the problem with the US deficit, which is $30 billion above its ceiling in the budget-balancing law, and the continuing fight in New York against the drug "Crack." The top story in the Wall Street Journal discusses the problems of journalists in South Africa due to daunting restrictions.

Columns

NYP-Lathem "October Deadline in the Mideast" Behind the diplomatic flurry in the Mideast is a deep-seated fear in the Reagan Administration that the peace process there is facing a deadline. The deadline is October when Peres rotates his position with hardliner Shamir. The gregarious Peres has long been a favorite of Reagan and his senior advisers. US officials point to the fact that the Labor Party has endorsed the "territories for peace" concept that is a key consideration for Arab leaders like Hussein. Shamir, in contrast, is more private and formal and his dealings with the US have often been inconclusive. Compounding US fears about Shamir is growing suspicion that he sanctioned the recruitment of Pollard when he was PM. The Administration appears to be working on a strategy to strike while Peres is in a negotiating mood and to set Israeli foreign policy on a course toward compromise that Shamir will be forced to follow.

NYT-Viorst "Bankrupting the Ayatollah" The Saudi-Kuwaiti oil policy has nothing to do with greed. It is pure military strategy. The worry is a victory for Khomeini in the Iran-Iraq war. The Arabs worry that an Iranian victory will open the floodgates to a tidal wave of Islamic fundamentalism that would destroy America's Mideast interests and engulf Israel as well. Washington has shown little concern. With oil in surplus supply, the uS behaves as if it has no worries in the Gulf region. So Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have to act on their own. Experts believe Khomeini will stop fighting only when he is broke. Low gas prices are nice but the Saudis are really doing Washington a favor.

אישור:	שם השולח: שולמית לוין	תאריך: 5.8.86

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Press Reports

Soviet Union and Israel Agree to Begin Consular Talks

NYT-Barringer (Moscow) The Soviet Union announced it would start discussions with Israel this month on the opening of consulates. In Jerusalem, Israeli officials, in confirming the announcement, said the meeting would set ground rules for discussing "purely consular affairs." At a Moscow news briefing, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Soviet Gov't was seeking relations to better oversee Soviet real estate holdings in Jerusalem. He insisted that the agreement to open consular discussion signified no basic change in Soviet policy toward Israel. Anyone interpreting the move as a step toward restoration of full diplomatic relations "engages in wishful thinking," said the spokesman. Despite the disclaimer, any improvement in relations is likely to affect the roles of the various players in the Mideast, where the Soviet Union has long sought more of a role in the peace process. Israel said it would not consider attending a Soviet-sponsored peace conference until the Soviet Union restores diplomatic relations. The proposed discussions may represent a demonstration of diplomatic flexibility on the part of Gorbachev and may also affect Soviet attitudes toward the emigration of Jews. (see ND-Sedor; DN-AP)

NYT-special-Shcharansky urged the Israeli Gov't not to hold the proposed talks unless more Soviet Jews are allowed to emigrate. He said the Soviet Union was interested in playing a more important role in the Mideast, which would not be in Israel's interest.

Israelis Contest US Subpoenas

NYT-Shenon-Israeli officials are contesting subpoenas from Federal grand juries investigating whether Israel illegally tried to export US technology to manufacture cluster bombs, Administration officials said. There were indications that the Justice Dept. planned to enforce the subpoenas, but one Administration official suggested that a last-minute agreement might permit the Israelis to submit affidavits instead. "This whole thing is fluid right now," said another US official. Senior Israeli officials have denied any wrongdoing. Barukh Binah refused to comment on developments in the case. "We are in constant deliberations with the Department of Justice, and we cannot really comment on these contacts yet, Binah said. The Justice Dept. had no official comment on the case. One Administration official said the Israelis "attempted to get the subpoenas quashed in order not to set a precedent" for grand jury appearances by Gov't munitions buyers.

Bush in the Mideast

NYT-Boyd (photo of Bush and Mubarak) Bush told Mubarak that domestic budget considerations would not allow the US to provide additional aid to help Egypt meet pressing financial needs. Administration officials spent the day trying to work out language that would help clear the way for Israel and Egypt to resolve the Taba dispute. US officials hoped the Taba dispute could be resolved while Bush was in the Mideast as a

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tangible example that Bush's trip had enhanced the prospects of peace in the region. (see NYP-Lathem)

NYT-Boyd-In many ways, Bush's trip to the Mideast has been a journey of photo opportunities, a trip of nuances. A key image that Bush aides wanted to emerge was one of Bush as a leader capable of wading into the maze of seemingly irreconcilable differences that other US leaders have been unable to solve. Part of Bush's problem is that he is traveling as the VP rather than as a top US official. For example, Bush wanted to meet with Peres shortly after arriving in Israel. But the PM said his schedule did not permit such a private session until Bush's last day in Israel. Jordanian officials were miffed by unplanned remarks by Bush that the next logical step in the peace process would be direct negotiations between Peres and Hussein. Bush initially defended the statement as US policy and then slightly retreated once in Jordan.

Syrian Troops Start Patrols In Shiite Outskirts of Beirut

NYT-Hijazi-Lebanese troops and policemen backed by Syrian soldiers deployed in the Shiite Moslem southern suburbs of Beirut as an explosion ripped through a cafe in Esat Beirut, killing 2 and wounding 30. This is the first time that Syrian troops have patrolled these suburbs since before the Israeli invasion in 1982. Syrian officials have said that the security plan will include efforts to locate and free US and other Western hostages. (photo p.1-NYT of Syrian soldiers in Beirut)

British Base in Cyprus Attacked

NYT-AP-Guerrillas fired mortars, grenades and machine guns at the British air base in Akrotiri and at a beach crowded with families of servicemen. A pro-Libyan group took responsibility. In Beirut, a previously unknown group calling itself the Unified Nasserite Organization said it carried out the attack in retaliation for Britain's help to the US during US airstrikes against targets in Libya. The statement also charged that the base helped Israeli warplanes attack the Tunis headquarters of the PLO last October.

OPEC

NYT-special-Ministers of OPEC unanimously reached a tentative agreement on an Iranian proposal to limit the group's production in a bid to stop the steep decline in prices. Crude oil prices around the world went up immediately after the decision was made. (WSJ-Ibrahim)

Small Jewish Congregations Attracting More Worshipers

NYT-Berger-Makeshift synagogues, tucked away in tiny homes or brownstones are flourishing this decade. People go to such synagogues do so because they prefer the intimacy of a smaller place of worship.

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Book Review

ND-Christison-"The Ayatollah in the Cathedral" by Moorhead Kennedy is reviewed. Kennedy was a US hostage in Iran and pleads for a bit of reason in all aspects of foreign policy. On terrorism, Kennedy views the proper response as a mixture of hard and soft. He supports measured military action and the selective assassination of terrorist leaders. But he also urges greater understanding of the terrorists' motives. The book is controversial and badly written but his message is reasonable.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

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המשרד, בטחון,

סוג סבר

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סוג בשחוני....בלמיס..

רחיפות...מיידי/בהקדם/רגיל

סווג ביטחוני: סודי ביותר

תאריך וז"ח.....

מצרר.

לוטה ההודעה לעתונות בתשובה לשאלות.

רובינשטיין

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The subpoenas have been withdrawn without prejudice in return for pledges of cooperation by GOI and agreement on providing information relevant to the inquiry. Beyond that the matter is the subject of a continuing inquiry and therefore further comment would be inappropriate.

הצוים בוטלו תוך שמירת זכויות, בחמורה להתחייבות של שיתוף פעולה ע"י ממשלת ישראל ולהסכמה על אספקת מידע שהוא רלבנטי לחקירה. מעבר לכך, הנושא מצוי בחקירה נמשכת ולכן תגובה נוספת תהיה בלתי הולמת.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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המשרד, בטחון, ניו יורק

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דחיפות....בהול לבוקר (בהול להזעיק למזג"א שבב 0800)

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לוט ההסכם.

רובינשטיין

שיחת רבה מנכ"ל ממנכ"ל סוופל

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Memorandum of Understanding

1. The Government of Israel (GOI) and the United States Government (USG) are engaged in discussions relating to the serving and attempted serving of grand jury subpoenas on nine employees of the Ministry of Defense/Israeli Military Industries, in connection with a USG investigation concerning the alleged attempt to illegally export cluster munitions equipment and technology, contrary to, among other things, a 1982 Presidential statement.

2. While the GOI has expressed its strong belief that use of the subpoena process is inappropriate in connection with attempts to secure the testimony of government employees of a friendly ally, as well as its position regarding the international immunities applicable to those employees, it has nonetheless expressed its willingness to cooperate on the substance of the matter, subject to agreement on the government-to-government procedures to be employed.

3. Pursuant to the above, the USG agrees to withdraw the subpoenas. Further, the parties express their intention to continue cooperative efforts to agree on terms and procedures for the interviews of the nine employees in question in an attempt to avoid the future need for any grand jury subpoenas. In recognition of the USG's withdrawal of the subpoenas, GOI agrees that it will use its best efforts to ensure that any or all of the GOI employees identified between the parties, who were served with subpoenas previously, or any authorized representative deemed acceptable to the USG, will be available in the United States for service of process and will urge them to receive said process, identical in form and content, in the event that the USG determines that such service is required in the future. In addition, if the USG determines that it is necessary to question the four employees identified between the parties on whom service was attempted but not completed, the GOI agrees to use its best efforts to make them, or any authorized representative deemed acceptable to the USG, available in the United States for service of grand jury process. All actions under this paragraph are subject to paragraph 4 below.

4. Both parties agree that the GOI's actions and efforts as described in this MOU are not to be construed as a waiver of any objection the GOI has to the use of the grand jury process with GOI employees, including those based on its sovereign rights and diplomatic and/or consular immunities of its offices and

employees, and that this MOU will not prejudice, in any manner, the individuals' rights or claims they may otherwise have in opposition to the subpoena served on them. The GOI agrees not to use the fact of the USG withdrawal of the subpoenas as a basis to support or establish any of its claims regarding the invalidity of such subpoenas.

5. In the spirit of cooperation and as a voluntary matter, and without waiver of the GOI's sovereign and diplomatic rights and the GOI's and GOI employee claims of immunity or other legal objections or other claims:

A. The GOI will provide cognizant USG officials access to GOI documents within the scope of the current grand jury investigation referred to in paragraph 1 above, in accordance with the following procedures:

1) The USG will identify to the GOI, in writing, the specific companies and transactions with regard to which the documents are sought.

2) The parties will agree upon a reasonable period for accumulation of the documents sought, with the opportunity to provide materials in reasonable increments as agreed upon.

3) The documents to be provided will be made available at a location in the United States to be designated by the GOI.

4) After examination of documents by USG officials, the USG may secure copies of any document identified for copying during the review.

5) Internal documents of the GOI will not be made available.

B. In an attempt to further understanding of the underlying circumstances involved in the USG investigation, the USG may provide at its discretion to the GOI a list of questions relevant to the investigation that are designed to elicit specific information from GOI regarding the specific allegations underlying the USG investigation. The GOI will respond to such questions in the spirit of cooperation consistent with its exercise of appropriate sovereign discretion. In the course of the cooperative effort, the USG will consider the GOI's request for further information regarding the legal basis for the investigation.

6. Both parties express the hope that agreed upon procedures will constitute an effective method for resolving

issues that may arise between the parties concerning this investigation.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY: _____

DATE: August 5, 1986

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

BY: _____

DATE: August 5, 1986

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

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ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח. ניו יורק

5.8.86 תדרוך דובר מתמיד ליום

Q Chuck, do you have any comment on the story in the Washington Post today abut Secretary Shultz like to, (inaudible) relation between Israel and the United States strategic cooperation?

MR. REDMAN: Yes. The US-Israeli relatinshi is strong and flourishing. Support for Israel has, of course, always been a cornerstone of our Middle East policy. For example, we now have agreements with Israel on trade and strategic cooperation. And during the Vice President's visit, we initialed an agreement for the establishment of a VOA relay facility in Israel. We believe strong relations between the US and Israel and US-Israeli cooperation in many areas furthers the cause of peace in the region. The US also has strong and friendly relations with many Arab states in the Middle East and we're working to expand these ties which are important to the US and to strengthening the atmosphere for peace. The foundation of our policy has been and remains to have good relations with both Israel and friendly Arab states.

Q Could we have a copy of that?

MR. REDMAN: Yes.

Q As far as you know, is Israel fully cooperating with the investigation of the cluster bomb matter?

MR. REDMAN: That's an investigation, and I'd have to refer you to Justice.

Q What is the State Department position on whether or not the eight Israelis indicted in New York have diplomatic immunity?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have a position.

MR. BEGLEITER: Could you take that question, please? That's a question that affects--

MR. REDMAN: It's a part of the investigation and I won't take it.

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MR. BEGLEITER: Why is it--wait a minute--why is it part of the investigation? A question of whether certain Israeli government officials have diplomatic immunity arises totally apart from any investigation that may or may not be going on.

MR. REDMAN: That's your interpretation, Ralph.

MR. BEGLEITER: Well, I'd like to ask the question. I mean, if I ask the question--does the Israeli Ambassador to the United States have diplomatic immunity?--I'm sure there would be an answer forthcoming. Could I please ask that you take the question of whether these Israeli officials, or we can pose it more generally if you would prefer, have diplomatic immunity?

MR. REDMAN: I've answered the question.

MR. BEGLEITER: You haven't answered the question.

MR. REDMAN: The answer to the question is, I'm not taking the question, Ralph.

Q Chuck, on the same subject, only to clarify your position. You

apologize for Israel, about cluster bomb secrets--I mean is that from accusations recently? Have you, or not? Can you please find --

MR. REDMAN: No, don't have anything on that.

Q He did not apologize?

MR. REDMAN: Nothing on the story.

Q At the outset, people in this building said those people do not enjoy diplomatic immunity. Has something changed since the investigation began?

MR. REDMAN: An investigation has begun. That's what's changed.

Q Congressman Solarz apparently wrote a letter to Secretary Shultz about Waldheim, that it violates the Austrian state treaty that he is president of Austria because, you know, it's in this treaty that no member of the (SA?) should be serving in the military. What's the answer?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything on that at all.

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Q Do you have anything about Taba or Murphy? Is he still in the area?

MR. REDMAN: On the question of a possible agreement in the Taba talks, all I can say is that progress has been made in the talks. The Vice President addressed this question in his press conference, which took place this morning in Cairo. As to the request of the Egyptian government, the Vice President asked Assistant Secretary Murphy to remain in the area for an additional day or two.

Q Is it possible that Murphy will be there for the signing of an agreement?

MR. REDMAN: I can't speculate beyond that.

Q Because originally, Vice President Bush said that he might be there even for the signing of an agreement, and --

MR. REDMAN: I'm just not in a position to speculate. The Vice President addressed those same kind of questions and I can't do any better than he did.

Q Do you have any comment on the Saudis saying that they will defend themselves against any Iranian aggression against themselves or Kuwait? Do you have any comment on that?

MR. REDMAN: No, it's not a position I find strange.

Q You wouldn't support the Saudis?

MR. REDMAN: I think you can find plenty of references in the record concerning our relationship with the Saudis.

RALPH BEGLEITER (CNN): Chuck, any comment on the OPEC decision to cut production next month for a month or two?

MR. REDMAN: Yes, I do. (Refers to guidance book.) We have long felt and continue to believe that the free market and the laws of supply and demand should determine oil price and supply levels. We do not think governments should interfere with markets by attempting to set oil prices. The administration has accordingly worked to deregulate US domestic energy markets and to remove restrictions on international oil markets.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד, בטחון, נ.א

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יחסי ארה"ב-ישראל

להלן מאמר ראשון בסדרה בנושא, מה"וושינגטון פוסט" מהיום.

עמירם נרדור

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

First of Four Articles

U.S.-Israeli Ties Stronger Than Ever

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

Every year since President Reagan took office in 1981, Tom Dine has prepared a report card on U.S.-Israeli relations for the annual meeting of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the influential lobbying group he heads. Each year, the assessment had been a mix of ups and downs. Not this year.

"We are in the midst of a revolution that is raising U.S-Israel relations to new heights," Dine told more than 1,000 AIPAC members at the Washington Hilton Hotel April 6.

Gone, Dine said, are the days when some U.S. officials considered Israel "a liability, a hindrance to America's relationship with the Arab world, a loud and naughty child." Gone is the dark period during 1982 and 1983, when Israel's invasion of Lebanon strained the longstanding special relationship that goes back to Israel's founding in 1948.

No longer did Israel have to depend just on its friends in Congress, Dine said. Now, there were sympathetic officials at every level of the government, at the State and Defense departments, at the Central Intelligence Agency, at agencies that deal with science, trade and agriculture—all places, he said, where support for Israel had been weakest.

Leading the charge, he said, was Secretary of State George P. Shultz, the same George Shultz who came to office after heading a corporation doing billions of dollars in business in the Arab world and then scared some in the Jewish community by declaring that he wanted to resolve the "legitimate

See RELATIONSHIP, A12, Col. 1



TOM DINE
... a "revolution" in relations

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U.S.-Israeli Link Gains Strength

RELATIONSHIP, From A1

needs and problems" of the 1.5 million Palestinians living on Israeli-occupied land.

By autumn 1983, Shultz had turned around and embraced an idea that previous administrations had rejected- "strategic cooperation," which envisions Israel as a strategic asset that can help protect U.S. interests in the Middle East from Soviet incursions.

Dine said Shultz even had told him privately that he felt so strongly about Israel's strategic importance that he wanted to "build institutional arrangements so that . . . if there is a [future] secretary of state who is not positive about Israel, he will not be able to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the U.S. that we have established."

Scores of people interviewed here and in Israel agree with Dine that the relationship, which has always been special, is closer now than ever before, a shift that concerns some Middle East experts. The relationship is bolstered by:

- The largest U.S. foreign aid package—$3 billion last year and this year—for any country in the world. Egypt is second with $2.3 billion, a direct result of its signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979.
- A decision two years ago to give Israel only grants, or loans that need not be repaid, to cap Israel's debt to the United States at $10 billion in principal and $15 billion in interest—a major drain on Israel's economy.
- A special joint committee in which Israeli and American officials agree on the size of Israel's aid package, which then goes to Congress for approval. "We negotiate everything with them. We don't do that with anyone else," according to one knowledgeable U.S. official.
- Preferential treatment in how that foreign aid is distributed. For example, Israel gets all its economic aid in the first month of the fiscal year, a congressional decision that allows Israel to invest whatever it doesn't need immediately and keep the earnings.
- An agreement to pay for the development of Israel's new jet fighter ($2 billion earmarked so far). Israeli officials expect that the United States will pay for the production of the plane, too (up to $10 billion more), but are embroiled in a dispute with U.S. officials over the projected cost.
- A Free Trade Agreement, designed to help Israel's struggling economy by giving its exporters to the United States an edge over other countries. The agreement comes as American industries are asking for protection from this kind of cheaper foreign competition.

One former AIPAC lobbyist, Richard Straus, said the relationship is so close now that Israel is akin to a "51st state"; when Israel has an economic crisis, the U.S. government steps in. Others, only half jokingly, say statehood would be a disadvantage because Israel then would have only two senators—instead of the bloc of more than 50 senators who consistently back Israel.

One reason for Israel's support in Congress is the political clout of the American Jewish community, which has rewarded its friends with campaign support and has organized to defeat its enemies. But the basis of the relationship is rooted as much in emotion as in politics: 2,000 years of Judeo-Christian tradition, a remembrance of the Holocaust and a shared belief in democratic government.

Public opinion polls reflect these feelings. A Washington Post-ABC News poll in June found the public was more sympathetic to Israel than to the Arab nations by 62 percent to 13 percent—the largest margin in four years of asking the question.

But some persons interviewed for this series of articles, including officials in the Carter and Reagan administrations, said the relationship has become so close, so special, that it has upset U.S. policy in the Middle East—a delicate balance of protecting Israel's security while maintaining close ties to moderate Arab nations.

Harold Saunders, Carter's assistant secretary of state for the region when Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David accords in 1979, said, "There's a cancer growing on the relationship," arguing that it has become a "one-way street" and that Congress has given Israel "a virtual blank check."

Saunders said, "You can say there is more money being given to Israel, more cooperation . . . . So it looks closer. But it can't be close if it is mindlessly close. It is closer when people on both sides are grappling with the tough issues," such as the peace process.

Geoffrey Kemp, the Reagan administration's Middle East expert on the National Security Council staff from 1981 to 1985, said, "We now face a very serious problem in terms of long-term Middle East policy . . . . The United States must remain sensitive to its relations with Moslem countries in the region and to the fact that oil is important no matter what the price is."

The administration's credibility has been eroding in the Arab world, according to several officials, because it promised sizable arms packages to Saudi Arabia and Jordan and then failed to push them through Congress.

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Among some Israelis, there is another concern: that Israel has become too dependent on the United States, that U.S. aid has become a way to avoid making hard decisions about how to revive an economy burdened by one of the highest per capita debts in the world.

But advocates of a closer relationship say the United States is taking the course that makes the most sense. Israel is a dependable ally, they say, while the Arab nations are not; by being close to Israel, the United States will force the Arab countries to recognize the reality of a Jewish state and improve the possibility of peace.

One leading supporter of the special relationship, Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), put it this way in a speech: "We should put to rest the myth of a 'balanced' U.S. policy in the Middle East. We should tell all the nations in the region that we will not take a 'balanced' view of PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] terrorism or those who aid and abet terrorism, or of Syrian or Libyan or Iraqi extremism."

Terrorism, perhaps more than anything else, has hurt the image of the Arab countries in the public's eye and, thus, has undermined support for an even-handed U.S. policy in the Middle East, several officials said.

"Basically, Americans have come to accept as a given that it is American policy to be friendly to Israel," said Hyman Bookbinder, longtime Washington representative of the American Jewish Committee. "It is a genuine, visceral feeling, not all that carefully thought out. It is part of the culture of America. But the reason none of us [in the Jewish community] can really relax is that some day, some president may be different."

The Shultz Conversion

In 1982, there was no revolution; there was despair.

At AIPAC's annual meeting in May, Dine had few words of optimism; he called Reagan's foreign policy "confused" and "misguided." Things quickly got worse. Israel invaded Lebanon and bombed Beirut, bringing public criticism from U.S. officials. Reagan came out with a peace proposal that was rejected immediately by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Lebanese Christian militiamen massacred hundreds of Palestinian refugees at the Sabra and Shatila camps outside Beirut and an investigation began into whether Israel had any responsibility for it.

Meanwhile, there was concern in much of the American Jewish community about the newly appointed Shultz. He replaced Alexander M. Haig Jr., whom the Israeli government saw as an ally. Haig had tried to persuade Reagan to establish formal U.S. ties to both Israel and friendly Arab nations as a way of deterring Soviet influence; he called this plan "strategic consensus." Israel and the United States signed such an agreement in the fall of 1981 but the United States suspended it almost immediately after Begin unexpectedly decided to annex the Golan Heights.

Many Jewish groups were sorry to see Haig leave. They approached their first meetings with Shultz with some trepidation.

In September 1982, Shultz met with a contingent of American Jewish leaders to ask for their support for Reagan's peace plan. According to several participants, his manner was cold and dour as they refused. Some other Jewish leaders, including Dine, did endorse the Reagan plan—which immediately brought criticism from other American Jews and some Israeli officials.

This period was one of the lowest in recent U.S.-Israeli relations. A combination of events and personalities healed the rift.

The key figure turned out to be Shultz. From the beginning, Shultz was troubled that he was viewed as pro-Arab, according to officials close to him. He talked about the problem with Frank Carlucci, then deputy secretary of defense, who suggested that he seek out Robert C. Ames, the CIA's senior intelligence officer for the Middle East. Ames would give Shultz a balanced view, Carlucci said.

Throughout the fall and winter, Shultz consulted frequently with Ames, who acted as a kind of personal guide to the politics and personalities in the Middle East. At the same time, Shultz was being wooed by Israel's top officials in Washington—Moshe Arens, the Israeli ambassador, and his deputy, Benjamin Netanyahu. Both men understood American politics; they were raised in the United States and were graduates of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They knew how to talk to Shultz.

"The American Jewish community got down on Shultz something fierce . . . unrelenting pressure. He hated it. It was terrible—very, very strong. Moshe Arens saw this and rebuilt a relationship on a personal basis," said one senior official intimately involved in formulating the administration's Middle East policy.

In late 1982, Shultz got a first-hand look at the strength of Israel's support. He butted heads with AIPAC and Congress over a $200 million increase in aid to Israel. He lost. From Dine's point of view, "That's the real turning point. It was a measure of strength and both sides recognized the other's interests."

Some officials at the State Department saw it differently. They saw Israeli officials grow more stubborn

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after AIPAC's show of strength in the foreign aid battle—particularly Ariel Sharon, then Israel's defense minister, who became "more impossible to deal with," according to one senior U.S. official.

They also saw Shultz becoming increasingly frustrated with the Arabs, who had not agreed to negotiate with Israel on the basis of the Reagan peace plan.

Then, on April 18, 1983, a Moslem fundamentalist group bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing more than 60, including Ames, who was there for meetings on terrorism. The bombing shocked Shultz and the American public.

During the summer of 1983, four of Shultz's staff members, Lawrence Eagleburger, James Roche, Peter W. Rodman and M. Charles Hill, encouraged him to turn more toward Israel. Part of their rationale for a new "strategic cooperation" effort was tactical—to counter Syria's moves in Lebanon. By the fall, Rodman had prepared position papers on the new policy.

Shultz, joined by a top national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, took the policy to Reagan, arguing that the closer alliance would block any Soviet thrusts in the region. Reagan accepted their view over the objections of CIA Director William J. Casey and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, who argued—as they had in 1981 against Haig—that Arab countries would feel the pact was aimed at them, not the Soviets.

In late October, less than a week after the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 Americans, President Reagan signed top-secret National Security Decision Directive 111, which set out the guidelines for strategic cooperation.

William Quandt, the Middle East expert on the National Security Council staff in the Carter administration, said Arens deserves much of the credit for selling strategic cooperation. "He would give speeches about NATO getting billions and say an investment in Israel is cost-effective . . . . It let them say, 'We're not a basket-case economy asking for help, but a security asset you should invest in.' "

One former AIPAC lobbyist said strategic cooperation fit with the Reagan administration's tendency to see global problems in East-West terms. "It was wise to sell it that way to Republicans," he said.

Looking back on how the relationship was mended, Samuel Lewis, the U.S. ambassador to Israel at the time, pointed out the irony of Lebanon. "The U.S.-Israeli relationship, paradoxically, was repaired throughout this period," Lewis said. "We were much less inclined to blame Israel for everything that went wrong in Lebanon after we got more involved ourselves and saw what a mess it was."

A Closeness to Envy

In April 1984, six months after the directive was signed, Tom Dine again spoke at AIPAC's annual meeting in Washington. For the first time in several years, he was upbeat. "We meet at a significant moment," he said. "It is spring in this beautiful city, it is springtime in the U.S.-Israel relationship . . . . We are making breakthroughs in fundamental areas."

Soon after strategic cooperation was announced, the administration set up two committees to meet privately with Israeli officials on political-military and foreign aid issues. Shortly after Shimon Peres was elected prime minister in 1984, a third committee on the troubled Israeli economy was established. It is the kind of closeness that other countries envy.

On the military front, strategic cooperation has led to joint naval maneuvers, increased intelligence cooperation focused particularly on terrorism, and a secret U.S. agreement to prepposition military supplies in Israel, according to several sources.

On foreign aid, the two nations have met for the last few years to agree on a figure to present to Congress. In the past, AIPAC and other supporters lobbied Congress for more money than the administration had budgeted. "I think Shultz decided he was wasting energies, so why not come to some agreement," said Dan Halperin, Israel's economics minister in its embassy here.

Last year, as Israel's economy continued to flounder, Shultz endorsed giving Israel $1.5 billion in emergency aid. But behind the scenes, he pushed the Israelis to make changes in their economy that would reduce soaring inflation. So far, the reforms have worked.

Special treatment for Israel began before strategic cooperation was announced in 1983. For example, most other countries receive aid that is tied to specific projects and overseen by U.S. aid officials. Congress allows Israel to get its money without any strings.

In 1984, Congress approved an amendment recommending that Israel's economic aid package be large enough each year to pay the debt, about $1 billion a year, on old loans to buy U.S. equipment. As the debt increases, this clause could ensure an automatic increase in Israel's economic aid, which comprises $1.2 billion of its $3 billion in aid.

Israel gets one-fifth of total U.S. development, economic and military aid; 45 African countries share one-fifteenth of the aid package. That disparity is more apparent in terms of wealth and population. Israel, with 4.2 million people and a per capita income of $5,300 a year, gets more than $700 per person in U.S. aid. Egypt, with 50 million people and a per capita income of less than $700 a year, gets about $50 per person. The 45 African nations, with a combined population of 460 million and average per capita income of $646, receive $2.13 per person in U.S. aid, according to U.S. figures.

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"The foreign aid program with regard to Israel and Egypt is not debated," said Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), longtime chairman of the House subcommittee that oversees the foreign aid bill. "It is assumed they will be carried at about the same levels automatically."

So far, Israel and Egypt have been protected from the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget squeeze for fiscal 1987; meanwhile, other areas of the world such as Africa face aid cuts of up to 50 percent.

"We've probably got to begin to rethink the whole foreign aid program," Hamilton said. "It has changed very dramatically in the last 15 years. We now send money to countries on a political rationale basis, not on a humanitarian need basis."

A New Era

For some of the 6 million Jewish Americans, supporting Israel is a significant part of their lives. They and other Americans send more than $4.0 billion a year to Israel each year by buying Israel Bonds. They donate another $300 million or more to Israel in the form of tax-exempt contributions to the United Jewish Appeal.

In addition, many support Israel indirectly by contributing to pro-Israel political candidates or committees.

In the early years, supporters of Israel were wary about pressing for too much assistance for the new Jewish state. AIPAC's founder, I.L. (Si) Kenen, now 81, recalled in a recent interview that he asked then Rep. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) in 1951 to cut a proposed $100 million aid amendment to Israel to $50 million because foes of the new Jewish state "couldn't attack a moderate sum like that."

Those days are gone. At the AIPAC meeting last April, Tom Dine told his audience:

"We know the U.S.-Israel relationship is strong, but that Israel is not safe yet. But we also know that what we do today will help secure the Jewish state and the Jewish people tomorrow. And now, in this new era in which the United States and Israel are allies in the defense of our freedom, we also know that we can pursue our mission, ourselves secure in the knowledge that what is good for America is good for Israel."

NEXT: The $2 billion plane

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

ISRAEL AT A GLANCE

- **POPULATION:** 4,172,000 (estimated).
- **AREA:** 7,992 square miles (about the size of New Jersey).
- **GOVERNMENT:** Parliamentary democracy.
- **RELIGIONS:** Jewish, 83 percent; Islamic, 13.1 percent; Christian, 2.3 percent; Druze and other, 1.6 percent.
- **LEADING EXPORT PARTNERS:** United States, 26 percent; Great Britain, 8 percent; West Germany, 7 percent.
- **PRINCIPAL EXPORTS:** diamonds, $1.2 billion; textiles, $450 million; iron and steel, $358 million; fruit, $245 million.
- **LEADING IMPORT PARTNERS:** United States, 19 percent; West Germany, 11 percent; Britain, 8 percent; Switzerland, 6 percent.
- **ECONOMY:** National budget, $21 billion a year; foreign debt, $24 billion (one of the highest per capita in the world); gross national product, $25 billion.

WASHINGTON POST POLL

U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL HAS NEVER BEEN HIGHER...

Q. In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or the Arab Nations?

	MARCH 1982	SEPT 1982	SEPT 1983	JULY 1985	JUNE 1986
Israel	54%	48%	49%	49%	62%
Arab Nations	18	27	13	11	13
Neither	13	12	14	18	13
No Opinion	14	13	24	22	12

...BUT THAT SUPPORT IS NOT AS STRONG TOWARD U.S. AID TO ISRAEL...

Q. Aid to Israel should be...

Same or higher	30%
A little less	13
Somewhat less	18
A great deal less	20
Eliminated	13

...ALTHOUGH THE CONCERN APPEARS TO BE WITH THE AID PROGRAM, NOT WITH ISRAEL.

PEOPLE WHO SAID...	BACK ISRAEL OVER ARAB NATIONS BY...
Same or higher	80-8%
A little less	66-13
Somewhat less	61-11
A great deal less	52-20
Eliminated	39-21

NOTE: No opinion in the last two questions is not shown.
Based on interviews with 1,505 people conducted in June 1986

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THE WASHINGTON POST

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

MILITARY AID



ECONOMIC AID

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד, בטחון

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סוג מברק
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אל: ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

דע: יועץ רח"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

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מצעות מערה

להלן מ"הניו יורק טיימס" היום.

עתונות

Israelis Contest U.S. Subpoenas In Inquiry on Bomb Technology

ידיעות 8-5-86 פ"ז

By PHIL SHENON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 4 — Israeli officials are contesting subpoenas from Federal grand juries investigating whether Israel illegally tried to export American technology for manufacturing cluster bombs, Reagan Administration officials said today.

The subpoenaed Israelis work in their country's military purchasing office in New York. It remained unclear whether they would soon be required to make appearances before grand juries in Iowa and Pennsylvania.

There were indications that the Justice Department planned to enforce the subpoenas, but one Administration official suggested late today that a last-minute agreement might permit the Israelis to submit affidavits instead.

According to officials, at least eight Israelis were subpoenaed to testify about whether American companies and representatives of Israel's weapons industry conspired to provide Israel with American technology to make cluster bombs, which contain many smaller bombs that separate and explode over a target.

Last week, officials said, representatives of the subpoenaed Israelis met with the Justice Department's chief criminal prosecutor, Stephen S. Trott, to discuss the investigation.

The Israelis offered "vigorous" protests to Mr. Trott and asserted that at least some of the subpoenaed Israelis were protected by diplomatic immunity, one official said. "If they go all the way to meeting with Trott, it must have been pretty vigorous," he said.

'Whole Thing Is Fluid'

The outcome of the meeting could not be determined. Another Administration official said, "This whole thing is fluid right now."

The official said that two grand juries were investigating the case: one in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the other in Pennsylvania. He said he was unsure where the Israelis would appear if they were called to testify.

The locations in Iowa and Pennsylvania were chosen because they were near the offices of the manufacturers that have been tied to the investigation. A law-enforcement official said he believed the subpoenas required at least

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Israelis Contest U.S. Subpoenas In Inquiry on Bomb Technology

Continued From Page A1

some of the Israelis to testify this week.

Senior Israeli officials have denied wrongdoing, saying that they had been making the weapons in their own facilities and under their own design. American equipment was exported to Israel with all appropriate licenses, they said.

A spokesman for the Israeli consulate in New York, Baruth Binah, declined to comment on developments in the case. "We are in constant deliberations with the Department of Justice, and we cannot really comment about these contacts yet," he said.

According to the Reagan Administration, the United States has a standing policy against allowing the export of any equipment to Israel for cluster bombs. Shipments were halted in 1982 after they were used against civilian areas in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Question of Image

Officials said the Customs Service executed search warrants at three companies in Iowa and Pennsylvania last month and said records had been subpoenaed from at least a dozen companies.

They said investigators were looking into charges that representatives of the state-run Israeli Military Industries had participated in a plan to evade American export laws.

At the meeting with Mr. Trott, the Israelis "attempted to get the subpoenas quashed in order not to set a precedent" for grand jury appearances by Government munitions buyers, one Administration official said.

The official said he would be surprised if the Israelis were permitted to forgo testimony and instead supply affidavits. Such a plan, officials suggested, might give the appearance that the Justice Department had given in to Israeli demands.

The identity of the Israeli officials who participated and their rank was not immediately known. The Justice Department had no official comment on the case today.

According to Administration officials, at least one Israeli purchasing agent buying equipment from an American company suggested that the export license be edited to eliminate words indicating its military purpose.

Officials have said they suspected the case could involve machinery designed for one purpose that is exported and then converted to weapons manufacture. Under export law, any technology related to weapons cannot be exported without a State Department license.

Disclosure of the investigation, which is being carried out by the Customs Service and the Justice Department, infuriated Israeli officials, who asserted that some Administration officials were trying to harm American-Israeli relations.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד, בלאו

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סוג בטחוני: גלוי
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מס' קבוע:

אל: ממכ"ל, מצפ"א, מעי"ת, ממ"ד

דע: יועץ רהיים לתקשורת
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לביא

להלן מה"וושינגטון טיימס" היום,

עתונות



Above, in Tel Aviv recently, is the prototype of the Israeli-designed, U.S.-financed Lavi jet fighter, costs of which are said to have spurred a Pentagon study of alternatives.

U.S. mulls alternatives to high-cost Israeli jet

By Walter Andrews
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Pentagon is studying alternatives to Israel's U.S.-financed Lavi jet fighter project, the skyrocketing costs of which concern top officials in the Reagan administration, government sources said yesterday.

The study, which is in the initial stages, is the latest administration move to convince the Israelis to quietly abandon plans to build 300 Lavis, sources said.

The Lavi project, still in its development phase, already has absorbed more than $1 billion in American military aid, even though production is not slated to begin until 1988.

The Pentagon study follows letters to the Israeli government last June, in which Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger expressed concern that the United States was being "stonewalled" into continuing financial support for the Lavi.

One government source said the study, which should be completed sometime in October or November, will probably present the Israelis with a "menu of alternatives" such as the possibility of using Israeli gun- and missile-control systems combined with an American-built plane.

Another possibility described by sources would be a co-production agreement with an American defense contractor, which could make it easier to sell the fighter to other countries.

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One drawback to the Lavi has been the poor prospect of sales to Third World nations, many of which are Arab or Islamic countries.

A Pentagon spokesman, Maj. Larry Icenogle, confirmed that the study had been launched.

"Hopefully at the end of the study, a conclusion will be reached to continue with the Lavi or begin work on an alternative aircraft," he said.

"As always," Maj. Icenogle said, "it will be the Israelis' decision." But he added: "We expect their full cooperation."

Israeli government officials have publicly said the nation will stick with the Lavi. Privately, they have reiterated that position but have asked what the alternatives are, the U.S. sources said.

The aim of the study is to answer that question, sources said, and provide some specific choices. The Israeli defense industry's strong suit is its weapons-control technology.

A likely combination would be an American airframe with Israeli avionics, the sources said.

Possible American candidates would be the Air Force F-16, the Navy's F-18, or the Northrop Corp. F-20 fighter plane.

Israel has estimated the cost of each Lavi at $15 million. But U.S. officials have dismissed this figure as unrealistic, saying that it does not include money for such things as spare parts, research and development or an inflation allowance.

The officials estimate that annual Lavi costs could rise to about $1 billion in 1989 when the Israelis begin producing 24 Lavis a year. The cost of the Lavi program, including inflation and research and development, could total about $15 billion.

Israeli planning for the Lavi also assumes that U.S. military aid will not go below the current $1.8 billion annual level. U.S. officials say this is not a safe assumption, in light of the budget reductions required by Gramm-Rudman law.

A study by the Jaffe Center of Tel Aviv University recently concluded that because of other Israeli defense needs and Gramm-Rudman it would be difficult to fund the Lavi.

Because of fears that Lavi would take money away from other Israeli military programs, the Israeli defense ministry recently imposed a $550 million annual spending cap on the aircraft project.

AUG 05 1986

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בטחון, ניו יורק

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סוג בטחוני: סודי

דחיפות: מיידי

תאריך: 5 אוגוסט 86

אל: מכ"ל, משהב"ט, ממ' היועץ המשפטי - בטחון.
ממכ"ל, היועץ המשפטי - משה"ת
רמש"ן

שבתאי.

התקשר איתי יו"ר מועדון הנשיאים מוריס אלברם ומסר לי שבעקבות פרסום המאמר ב"ניו יורק טיימס" ואחר שהיתה פניה אליו מכתב העתון, הוא עומד לפרסם הודעת שידיה של ישראל נקיות בכל הפרשה והוא משוכנע בכך עקב הבדיקה שערך ודעתו שאנשים בדרג בינוני שאינם שבעי רצון משתוף הפעולה ההדוק בין ישראל וארה"ב, רוצים לפגוע ביחסים אלה.
עדכנתי אותו לידיעתו בלבד ולא לפרסום, בכל הקשור במו"מ שמתנהל כיום.

מ. רוזן

משרד החוץ – מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק צפו

אל: וושינגטון.

דף _____ מתוך _____ דף

סיווג בטחוני: סודי

דחיפות: מיידי

לשימוש מח' הקשר

תאריך וזמן רישום: 81830

מס מברק: 1248

השגריר, הבא הלה.

להלן נוסח הודעה של ראש ממשלת מ.ו.מ. 86.8.4. הנאמרת בכינוס.

מקור מלבד

שבה רמג גשג גנגנק גבפו
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השולח: _____ אישור מנהל המחלקה: _____ אישור לשכת המנכ"ל: _____

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) _____

(לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, August 27, 1986
Ref.: 1-DSR-653-1

Dear George,

I wish to thank you for your letter of August 4th 1986. Having shared its contents with my colleagues, we are unanimous in our appreciation of the friendly manner and supportive spirit in which it was written.

The last two years were indeed most significant in demonstrating that a supportive public and sound professional advice can produce the decisive action needed to alleviate an economic crisis situation, bring stability, and lay the groundwork for growth.

Concurrently, these two years have witnessed a whole new dimension in U.S.-Israel relations. Having followed these relations since the establishment of the State, having witnessed both peak moments and difficult hours, there is no doubt in my mind that we have reached an unprecedented degree of friendly intimacy, coordination and cooperation, stemming from the ability and desire of both governments to focus on the important and permanent, while playing down the transitory. Washington's share in our economic success to date is certainly a significant manifestation of the new era. Hence, I wish to take this opportunity to express my own personal gratitude, as well as that of the people and government of Israel, to President Reagan and to the American Congress, for the generous material support provided us, and to you, George, for having stood by us with friendly — yet penetrating — analysis and advice.

As we have discussed so often in the past, I fully share with you the conclusion that while delivering the economy from the jaws of hyper-inflation and bankruptcy was a major — indeed critical — accomplishment, it is, in itself, but the pre-requisite for the next phase: that of economic reform.

Secretary of State
George Shultz
Washington, D.C.
United States of America

As you may already know, the Minister of Finance and I have asked a team of experts -- the same team that we commissioned to prepare the stabilization plan of July 1985 -- to formulate a follow-up economic plan. The team has already presented an initial document, which is now under consideration. We have, however, already accepted two of its most urgent recommendations: to re-adjust the budget, and to adopt a restraining income policy. The first step, taken in order to meet our deficit targets, was the August 17th government approval of a cut in expenditures of IS420 million. Subsequently, on August 24th, the Finance Minister and the Histadrut Secretary-General signed a wage agreement for the public sector, providing for a 2-3% increase in 1986 salaries above 1985 levels. We trust that this agreement will allow us to sustain economic stability, in accordance with our low inflation targets.

The next meeting of the JEDG will also be a good opportunity to continue the fruitful economic dialogue between our respective experts. We will be pleased to expand the scope of subjects discussed by this committee, should this be mutually agreeable.

As I expect to be in Washington next month, as will Minister of Finance Nissim, we shall both be prepared to share with you our thoughts on the reform of the capital market, on income tax reform and future programs. Our joint efforts and your continued support are a promising formula for success.

Sincerely yours,

Shimon Peres

Shimon Peres

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

- סודי -

4 באוגוסט, 1986
כ"ח בתמוז, תשמ"ו

אל: מ/מנכ"ל. מצפ"א.

קונגרס: נאטואיזציה

1) בהמשך למכתבי בנדון מה-28 ביולי, רצ"ב לנוחיותכם טבלא המסכמת בצורת דו"ח ביניים את הנעשה בקונגרס ארה"ב בנושא הנאטואיזציה (המתקרא בימים אלה "יחס שווה").

2) הוספתי לרשימת התיקונים את התיקון הקורא להחלת NATO MUTUAL SUPPORT ACT על מדינות נוספות. לאמיתו של דבר, יש לציין שלא היתה לנו יד בהשראת תיקון זה, אך הוא משתלב היטב במסגרת הנאטואיזציה ויבוא להקל על רכישות אמריקאיות בישראל - דבר אליו אנו חותרים.

3) באופן כללי, ניתן לאמר שהצעות חוקים הנוגעים בדבר (חוק כספי הפנטגון וחוק הבינוי הצבאי) עברו את שלבי הטיפול בועדות המשנה ובמליאות הוועדות לשירותים המזויינים. כעת הצעות אלה אמורות להידון במליאות הסנט ובית-הנבחרים (במועדים שטרם נקבעו, אך סביר עד אמצע חודש זה). אין אנו צופים בעיות עם התיקונים הקשורים לנושא הנאטואיזציה ויש לקוות שהם יכנסו לתוקף עד סוף השנה - בתנאי, כמובן, שהנשיא לא יטיל ווטו על חוקים אלה מסיבות שקשורות לקיצוצים הגדולים בתקציב הבטחון.

4) בוודאי תרצו לעיין היטב במסמכים הנילווים לטבלא.

בברכה
יוסף למדן

העתק: לשכת השר. לשכת המנכ"ל. ממ"ד/בינ"ל ו. לשכת היו"המש
לשכת שר הבטחון. לשכת מנכ"ל בטחון.
ר/מפא"ת. ר/אגף התקציבית במשרד הבטחון.
לשכת רה"מ. לשכת מנכ"ל האוצר.
נספח צה"ל. נספח מו"פ. הרמשי"ן.
הציר. ציר כלכלי. קצינת הקישור לקונגרס.

נאטואיזצ ("היחס השווה")

דו"ח ביניים על הנעשה בקונגרס ארה"ב

(סוף יולי 1986)

מס' סידורי	יוזם התיקון	מטרת התיקון	מעמד התיקון בתהליך החקיקתי	השלבים הבאים בתהליך החקיקתי	הרשאת/הקצבת כספים	הערות	מסמכים נלווים לדו"ח זה
א	וורנר (=נאן)	מו"פ משותף עם "Major non-NATO allies"	בהצעת הסנט לחוק כספי הפנטגון (הרשאות)	אימוץ הצעה ע"י מליאת הסנט ← Conference	40 מיליון דולר "Cost Sharing" on an "equitable basis" (אין להשתמש בכספי ה-FMS)	על שר ההגנה ומזכיר המדינה להגיש בראשון לינואר מידי שנה רשימת ה- "Major non-NATO allies"	1) לשון התיקון בהצעת החוק; 2) לשון דו"ח הלוואי
ב	קוויל (מס' 1)	מתן פטורים ("WAIVERS") להקלת ייצור משותף	כנ"ל	כנ"ל	----		3) לשון התיקון בהצעת החוק; 4) לשון דו"ח הלוואי
ג	קוויל (מס' 2)	מו"פ משותף לשם הצבת מערכת ATBM'S	בהצעות הסנט וביה"ן לחוק כספי הפנטגון (הרשאות)	אימוץ הצעות החוק ע"י מליאות הסנט וביה"ן	50 מיליון דולר	הכספים מאושרים על בסיס של "Matching Funds"	5) לשון התיקון בהצעת הסנט; 6) כנ"ל בהצעת ביה"ן; 7) לשון דו"ח הלוואי (סנט); 8) כנ"ל (ביה"ן)
ד	משרד ההגנה	הצבה מראש בישראל	בהצעות חוק הביניו הצבאי (הרשאות) של הסנט ושל ביה"ן, וכן בהצעת חוק ההקצבות של ביה"ן	כנ"ל	31.2 מיליון דולר צבא: 4 מיליון $ ח"י: 15.7 מיליון $ ח"א: 11.5 מיליון $	מופיע ללא פירוט והסבר בהצעות החוק. "Line Item" בחלק הדו"חות הקרוי "Overseas Classified"	9) ה-Line Item מתוך דו"ח הלוואי לחוק הביניו הצבאי (הקצבות של ביה"ן)

מס' סידורי	יוזם התיקון	מטרת התיקון	מעמד התיקון בתהליך החקיקתי	השלבים הבאים בתהליך החקיקתי	הרשאת/הקצבת כספים	הערות	מסמכים נלווים לדו"ח זה
ה	צוות העוזרים לוועדת השרותים המזויינים בביה"ן	בדיקת מערכות נשק קונבנציונלי שקיימות אצל מדינות מערביות (מחוץ לארה"ב), ואימוצן לשם הצטיידות כוחות ארה"ב	בהצעת חוק כספי הפנטגון (הרשאות) של ביה"ן	אימוץ הצעת החוק ע"י מליאת ביה"ן Conference ←	מאושרים הכספים הדרושים לצורך בדיקת המערכות	מערכות ישראליות לבדיקה: - הדמייה תרמית (FLIRS) - מערכת להגה נקודתית - מערכת פיזור נורי הטעייה א/ק ימות - פצצה מונחית ארוכת טווח א/ק - טילי נ"ט ארוכי טווח - רדנ"טים	10) לשון הצעת החוק בדבר ה-CDI 11) לשון דו"ח הלוואי בנדון
ו	צוות העוזרים לוועדת השירותים המזויינים בסנט	החלת החוק ל-"NATO Mutual Support" על מדינות נוספות לרבות אלה שמקיימות תרגילים משותפים עם ארה"ב, או שמסכימות להצבה מראש אצלן, או ל-Home-Porting של אניות ח"י האמריקאי	כנ"ל	כנ"ל	----	שינוי זה יאפשר לארה"ב לרכוש אצל המדינה המארחת שירותים לוגיסטיים (מזון, דיור, הסעה, אחזקת בסיסים וכו')	12) לשון הצעת החוק 13) לשון דו"ח הלוואי בנדון

(b) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I).—Of funds appropriated for fiscal year 1987, not more than $488,857,000 shall be available for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence for research, development, test, and evaluation of electronic warfare systems. Of such amount, not less than $125,000,000 is available only for the development and demonstration of the Integrated Communication Navigation Identification Avionics and the Integrated Electronic Warfare System and the Associated Very High-Speed Integrated Circuit Based Modular Architecture programs.

(c) LASER PANTOGRAPHY.—Of the amount authorized to be appropriated for the Defense Agencies in section 201 for Microwave/Millimeter Wave Monolithic Integrated Circuit Technology efforts, $4,000,000 is available only for the Laser Pantography project.

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R+D.

SEC. 207. CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—In this Act, Congress commences a program of Conventional Defense Initiatives to provide an emphasis on improving the conventional weapons of the Armed Forces (and the testing of such weapons) and to enhance cooperation with the other member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The initiative is intended to improve the fighting power and survivability of the combat

forces of the United States and to raise the threshold for nuclear war.

(b) AMOUNT AUTHORIZED.—Of the amount authorized in section 201 for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, $462,313,000 is available only for the Conventional Defense Initiatives program.

SEC. 208. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

Of the amount authorized in section 201 for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Defense Agencies, not more than $3,400,000,000 is available for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.

SEC. 209. TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Defense shall provide that the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) of the Department of Defense shall carry out a research, development, and test program in accordance with this subsection. The program shall be carried out through a separate office established within the SDIO. Through such program, the Secretary shall carry out research, development, and test of systems for defense against tactical ballistic missiles. In carrying out such program, the Secretary shall, to the extent practicable, make use of technologies for defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles developed through programs of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION (RDT&E)

The following tabulation compares the amount authorized and appropriated for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) for fiscal year 1986 with the amount requested for fiscal year 1987. A summary of the committee adjustments to the fiscal year 1987 RDT&E authorization is also provided.

RDT&E COMPARISON, FISCAL YEAR 1986 AND 1987

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Fiscal year 1986 request	1986 authorization Public Law 99-145	1986 appropriation Public Law 99-190	1986 adjusted amount post-sequestration	Fiscal year 1987 request
Army	5,279,900	4,848,663	4,798,172	4,563,062	5,550,300
Navy	11,264,300	10,106,401	10,065,239	9,572,042	10,586,800
Air Force	15,578,500	13,719,721	13,718,208	13,046,016	17,275,400
Defense agencies	7,157,400	6,813,969	6,755,886	6,426,072	8,517,400
Total	39,280,100	35,488,754	35,337,505	33,607,192	41,929,900

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1987 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION AUTHORIZATION REQUEST

[In thousands of dollars]

Department	Fiscal year request	Recommended change	Recommended authorization
Army	5,550,300	(732,236)	4,818,064
Navy	10,586,800	(1,489,711)	9,097,089
Air Force	17,275,400	(3,146,342)	14,129,058
Defense agencies	8,517,400	(838,618)	7,678,782
Total	41,929,900	(6,206,907)	35,722,993
Special foreign currency	3,500	0	3,500

OVERVIEW

The Department of Defense request for the fiscal year 1987 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) program totaled $41,929,900,000, an increase of $8,322,708,000 over the amount appropriated by the Congress for fiscal year 1986 and reduced by the March sequester. The Department's request reflected a 25 percent increase over the amount provided for fiscal year 1986. In recognition of budgetary constraints to reduce the federal deficit, the committee recommends reducing the request for RDT&E by nearly 15 percent.

The committee emphasized in its report accompanying H.R. 1872, the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, that the RDT&E account has grown by 100 percent in less than four years. Although some of this growth was necessary, the committee noted a growing emphasis on developing systems rather than on expanding technology and taking full advantage of products emanating from the technology base. The committee found that each service was developing unique equipment, that joint programs were not

being pursued when appropriate an
ment programs resulted in needless d

The committee, in reviewing the
firmed these findings and concludes
program of weapons systems develop
The fiscal year 1976 RDT&E budget
elements. The program elements co
and several thousands smaller projec
1986 RDT&E program contained 805
of 1,630 major projects and again, s
Not only has the number of program
percent, but the number of progra
scope have increased from 594 in 197

The significance of these statistics
velopment dollar invested in [redacted] ad
scale engineering phases of the weap
ess generates a requirement for ten
to-ten year period for procurement,
and ancillary support costs. Therefor
be given to the investment of resear
the Department of Defense is to rea
ment. The committee finds that the r
far less than satisfactory as a consequ
grams to meet the same general requ
by the Joint Tactical Information Dis
fiscal year 1986, the committee recon
Navy and Air Force version of JTIDS
ment of Defense representatives alleg
impractical, if not impossible, objectiv
on a single system was, in part, the
Navy system. This year, the Air For
into Navy aircraft—an initiative th
years ago by the Department of Defe
saved millions of dollars of investment

Consistent with its findings, the co
number of program cancellati[redacted]s and
1987. Additionally, the comm[redacted]e is
phasis on "emerging technologies" s
Speed Integrated Circuits, Remotely
bility of Intercept Sensors, and Preci
tions and Munitions. The committee i
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allies as well as other allies such as I
that are very good, low in cost and wo
of U.S. requirements. The latest vers
Missile is nearly 95 percent successful
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for savings by licensing U.S. firms to
oped systems.

EVELOPMENT, TEST AND ON (RDT&E)

pares the amount authorized and velopment, Test and Evaluation h the amount requested for fiscal mmittee adjustments to the fiscal s also provided.

CAL YEAR 1986 AND 1987

ds of dollars]

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ISCAL YEAR 1987 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST THORIZATION REQUEST

ds of dollars]

	Fiscal year request	Recommended change	Recommended authorization
	5,550,300	(732,236)	4,818,064
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	8,517,400	(838,618)	7,678,782
	41,929,900	(6,206,907)	35,722,993
	3,500	0	3,500

VIEW

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s report accompanying H.R. 1872, thorization Act, 1986, that the 0 percent in less than four years. s necessary, the committee noted g systems rather than on expand- dvantage of products emanating mmittee found that each service it, that joint programs were not

being pursued when appropriate and that far too many development programs resulted in needless duplication of effort.

The committee, in reviewing the fiscal year 1987 request, confirmed these findings and concludes that the Department, in its program of weapons systems development, is trying to do too much. The fiscal year 1976 RDT&E budget request contained 610 program elements. The program elements consisted of 1,061 major projects and several thousands smaller projects. In contrast, the fiscal year 1986 RDT&E program contained 805 program elements consisting of 1,630 major projects and again, several thousand smaller ones. Not only has the number of program elements increased by over 30 percent, but the number of programs less than $100 million in scope have increased from 594 in 1976 to 734.

The significance of these statistics is that every research and development dollar invested in the advanced development and full-scale engineering phases of the weapon systems development process generates a requirement for ten or more dollars within a five-to-ten year period for procurement, operations and maintenance, and ancillary support costs. Therefore, careful consideration must be given to the investment of research and development funds if the Department of Defense is to realize a good return on investment. The committee finds that the return on investment has been far less than satisfactory as a consequence of multiple service programs to meet the same general requirements. This was evidenced by the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS). In fiscal year 1986, the committee recommended consolidation of the Navy and Air Force version of JTIDS into a single system. Department of Defense representatives alleged that such an action was an impractical, if not impossible, objective. The committee's insistence on a single system was, in part, the reason for termination of the Navy system. This year, the Air Force version will be integrated into Navy aircraft—an initiative that should have been taken years ago by the Department of Defense and one that would have saved millions of dollars of investment.

Consistent with its findings, the committee has recommended a number of program cancellations and consolidations for fiscal year 1987. Additionally, the committee is recommending a greater emphasis on "emerging technologies" such as Stealth, Very High-Speed Integrated Circuits, Remotely Piloted Vehicles, Low-Probability of Intercept Sensors, and Precision and Terminal Submunitions and Munitions. The committee is also emphasizing NATO Cooperative Research and Development because many European allies as well as other allies such as Israel have developed systems that are very good, low in cost and would meet 95 percent or more of U.S. requirements. The latest version of the Milan Anti-Tank Missile is nearly 95 percent successful in its tests and has been offered to the United States under a firm fixed-price contract of under $8,000 per unit. The committee finds that the concerns related to NATO matter of NATO Cooperative Research and Development has been more of a rhetorical rather than a substantive nature and that the United States has missed many opportunities for savings by licensing U.S. firms to manufacture European-developed systems.

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launch is delayed to another year, in which case the Air Force receives credit toward a future launch.

This revolving fund concept benefited the Air Force because it allowed for budgeting based on launch plans and benefited NASA because it allowed for planning on funding in amounts known well in advance. However, the Agreement did not envision a situation as catastrophic as the loss of Challenger in January and the necessary suspension of Shuttle operations for one to two years, coupled with prospective reductions in flight rate, payload capacity, etc. The terms of the Agreement now appear inappropriate to both parties in that the Air Force must budget for Shuttle flights it can not obtain, while also purchasing additional expendible launch vehicles to provide substitute service. Meanwhile, NASA would receive payments for flights it could not deliver while in later years, it would deliver flights for which it had been paid years earlier. The result would be to lower the NASA budget now but to raise it significantly within a few years.

The committee believes that the agreement must be rewritten in recognition of the current situation. The Air Force has sufficient credits to pay for any launches that could occur in fiscal year 1988. Accordingly, authorization is denied for ride charges in the fiscal year 1987 budget in the expectation that the new agreement will not call for payments during that year.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SURVIVABILITY

Authorization and appropriation have been provided to the Air Force to develop and test the Surveillance and Tower Restoral Vehicles (SRV and TRV) as part of the Air Traffic Control Survivability project. This program is designated as a small business set aside. To date, the funds have not been utilized. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to transfer $3.9 (sec. 201) million from prior year funds to complete the evaluation of the development proposals received and award a contract. The committee further authorizes $6.039 million in fiscal year 1987 for this effort within the Air Traffic Control Survivability project.

ARAPAHO

The Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-190) provided $5.0 million to the Army for procurement of the Arapaho helicopter support system. These funds have not been utilized. The committee understands that the Army needs to perform additional evaluation of this concept prior to making a procurement decision. The committee directs that the $5.0 million of fiscal year 1986 appropriation be transferred (sec. 201) to the Army Research, Development, Test and Evaluation account and that the Army utilize these funds for the development of an Arapaho prototype.

11(B) R+D

CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE INITIATIVE

The committee recommends authorization totalling $462.0 million for a Conventional Defense Initiative. The committee is concerned that insufficient attention has been given to conventional

force modernization and that the fo
March 23, 1983, has been on strate
President stated, "At the same tim
the risk of a conventional militar
war by improving our non-nuclear
sess now the technologies to attain
in the effectiveness of our conven
ceeding boldly with these new tec
reduce any incentive that the Sovi
attack against the United States or

Since the President's address the
has been accomplished to correct
are critical to U.S. conventional de
the anti-armor capability of the A
today as it was in World War II a
attempting to develop a system to
for over a decade—the so-called mi
have developed several ca[illegible]le mi
footsoldier is still left wanting.

Our naval forces first expressed t
a day-night sensor that would ena
frequency silence—a Forward-Lo
Hundreds of millions of dollars ha
but not a single FLIR system has b

The committee concurs entirely
that we do have the technologies
effectiveness of our conventional n
the response to the President's obj
than substantive.

Accordingly, the committee reco
fense Initiative (CDI) be formally
1987 and be given the same impo
Initiative (SDI). Unlike the SDI,
Initiative is not intended as a techn
technology for Conventional Defen
and overseas. In many instances
and need not take a decade to tra
weapon systems and subsystems.
Vehicles (RPV) for example, the
the Sprite—a low-cost RP[illegible]hat c
connaissance, targeting and other
dom and Israel have developed FL
the Rafael FLIR, respectively—t
naval ships in a matter of months

Section 207 would express the s
tional Defense Initiative be establ
proving conventional weaponry of
cooperation with NATO allies wit
fighting power and survivability c
the threshold for nuclear war.

The committee's recommendatio
ing areas:

(1) Mine Flails—The committe
$10.0 million for the Army and $

...in which case the Air Force re-...
...nefited the Air Force because it al-...
...plans and benefited NASA be-...
...ding in amounts known well in ... did not envision a situation as ... in January and the necessary ... for one to two years, coupled with ... rate, payload capacity, etc. The ... inappropriate to both parties ... for Shuttle flights it can not ... expendible launch vehicles ... while. NASA would receive pay-... while in later years, it would ... paid years earlier. The result ... now but to raise it significant-

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...SURVIVABILITY

...have been provided to the Air ...illance and Tower Restoral Ve... Air Traffic Control Survivabil...ated as a small business set ... utilized. The committee di... to transfer $3.9 (sec. 201) mil...lete the evaluation of the devel... a contract. The committee ... fiscal year 1987 for this effort ...vability project.

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...priation Act, 1986 (Public Law ... Army for procurement of the ... These funds have not been uti... that the Army needs to perform ... prior to making a procure... that the $5.0 million of fiscal ... (sec. 201) to the Army Re...luation account and that the ...lopment of an Arapaho proto-

...DEFENSE INITIATIVE

...ation totalling $462.0 mil... Initiative. The committee is con... has been given to conventional force modernization and that the focus of the President's address of March 23, 1983, has been on strategic defense. In this address, the President stated, "At the same time we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear war by improving our non-nuclear capabilities. America does possess now the technologies to attain very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional non-nuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies."

Since the President's address the committee finds that very little has been accomplished to correct deficiencies in many areas that are critical to U.S. conventional deterrent objectives. For example, the anti-armor capability of the Army's infantrymen is as lacking today as it was in World War II and Korea. The Army has been attempting to develop a system to seek and destroy enemy mines for over a decade—the so-called mine flail system. European allies have developed several capable mine flail systems while the U.S. footsoldier is still left wanting.

Our naval forces first expressed the requirement 15 years ago for a day-night sensor that would enable the fleet to operate in radio frequency silence—a Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) system. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on development, but not a single FLIR system has been deployed.

The committee concurs entirely with the President's assessment that we do have the technologies available to greatly enhance the effectiveness of our conventional non-nuclear forces. Unfortunately, the response to the President's objective has been more rhetorical than substantive.

Accordingly, the committee recommends that a Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI) be formally established during fiscal year 1987 and be given the same importance as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Unlike the SDI, however, Conventional Defense Initiative is not intended as a technology exploitation program. The technology for Conventional Defense Initiative exists—in America and overseas. In many instances the technology is not expensive and need not take a decade to translate into operationally useful weapon systems and subsystems. In the area of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) for example, the United Kingdom has developed the Sprite—a low-cost RPV that could be used for surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting and other functions. Both the United Kingdom and Israel have developed FLIR systems—the Sea Archer and the Rafael FLIR, respectively—that could be deployed on U.S. naval ships in a matter of months and not years.

Section 207 would express the sense of Congress that a Conventional Defense Initiative be established to provide emphasis on improving conventional weaponry of the armed forces and enhancing cooperation with NATO allies with the objective of improving the fighting power and survivability of U.S. combat forces and raising the threshold for nuclear war.

The committee's recommendations place emphasis on the following areas:

(1) Mine Flails—The committee recommends authorization of $10.0 million for the Army and $5.0 million for the Air Force for

evaluation of the United Kingdom-developed Aardvark system or the Federal Republic of Germany Mak system for integration on the U.S.-developed Logistics Vehicle Support (LVS) ten-ton truck. This truck has been developed for the Marine Corps and is the most logical choice for a mine flail system.

(2) Chemical Warfare—The committee has recommended authorization of $2.0 million for actual field testing of the United Kingdom/United States-developed U.S. 10 Protective Mask. The mask developed by the Army—the XM-40—has experienced constant difficulty; however, the U.S. 10 has met all of its requirements, is in production for all United Kingdom services and is planned for use by four other NATO countries.

(3) Anti-Armor Capability—The committee recommends authorization of $83.313 million for the Fiber Optics Guided Missile (FOG-M); $25.0 million for the Infantry Anti-Armor Weapon; $2.0 million for a Ground-Launched Hellfire Missile system; $20.0 million for the Tank Breaker system; $25.0 million for the evaluation of multipurpose assault weapon system; and $20.0 million for the Milan II missile. The committee's intention on the FOG-M and Tank Breaker systems is delineated elsewhere in this report, however, the committee emphasizes that it is recommending authorization for the accelerated development of both systems. The committee is aware of at least one application of fiber optic technology in a remotely controlled hand-held lightweight—less than 35 pounds—anti-armor weapon for the infantrymen that could be developed within 20 months at a cost of less than $30 million. Similarly, the Tank Breaker technology has been demonstrated and an expensive long-term research and development program is not required or necessary. The Army is encouraged to examine all European-developed light infantry anti-armor weapons that could be deployed to the force at an early date. Accordingly, the $25.0 million authorized for this purpose is intended to procure systems for evaluation and not for research. The authorization for the Milan II system is intended for procurement of missiles for field tests and evaluation, to establish a U.S. source for production and to transition from development to procurement.

The authorization for the multipurpose assault weapon system is for the Army to conduct competitive proof of principle evaluation of systems capable of defeating light armor and various structural/fortified targets. The purpose of this evaluation is to equip the individual soldier with a single multipurpose weapon for urban or similar combat scenarios as a replacement for the discontinued M72A3 LAW and the interim AT-4 anti-tank weapons.

The committee intends that there be a comparative operational test of shoulder-fired squad-level anti-tank weapons comparing, at a minimum, the following existing weapons: the German Panzerfaust III, the Swedish AT-4 (or U.S. variant), the UK LAW 80, the French Apilas, the French Strim, the USMC's SMAW, the Israeli B-300, and the U.S. 3.5" rocket launcher with modern Belgian ammunition.

The tests should include maximum rate-of-kill firings against realistic, moving, company-size or larger tank target arrays by average-skill gunners. Each target array shall be presented over realistic European-type terrain under operational conditions (e.g., on

courses unfamiliar to the gunner), w
300 meters. The pair of gunners sh
firing in each target array presen
rounds that would normally be car
rifle squad.

The tests should compare the w
supervision of the Joint Live Fire
combat-loaded Soviet tanks.

The U.S. Army, the USMC, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense
pendent reports addressing the ade
sults, and a recommended best wea

The committee has authorized
light-weight, towed mount for th
75mm antitank cannon and the
cannon. The cannon should be t
firing against company-size or lar
realistic European-type terrain at
meters, under the supervi[illegible] of th

In order to improve U.S. infa
enemy tank forces accompanying i
mored forces, the committee inten
or developmental rifle-launched
mum the Belgian Mecar, French
HEATER and the Rifleman's Asau

The tests should determine the
the individual soldier's firepower
the efficiacy of infantry defensive
the test weapons versus current e

The operational utility of equip
with the test weapons should also
conducted under the supervision
gram with reports submitted to C
of the tests, the results, and reco
ons.

(4) Armor Vehicles—The commi
$10.0 million for the procuremen
many-developed Weasel Armor
mends authorization of $9.0 milli
U.S./FRG diesel engine fo[illegible]armor
of the low-cost multi-pur[illegible]e We
mentary adjunct to the Bradle
weighs less than three tons and
beyond the forward edge of the b
cle, for reconnaissance and surve
and communication vehicle. The
is to continue development of a
engine that could be retrofit int
installed in future tanks and arm

(5) Close-In Air Defense—The
tion of $10.0 million of which $7
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mand and $2.5 million for evalu

dom-developed Aardvark system or
any Mak system for integration on
ehicle Support (LVS) ten-ton truck.
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mmittee has recommended authori-
l field testing of the United King-
J.S. 10 Protective Mask. The mask
M-40—has experienced constant dif-
s met all of its requirements, is in
om services and is planned for use

ıe committee recommends authori-
Fiber Optics Guided Missile (FOG-
y Anti-Armor Weapon; $2.0 million
Missile system; $20.0 million for
million for the evaluation of multi-
and $20.0 million for the Milan II
ın on the FOG-M and Tank Break-
e in this report, however, the com-
ommending authorization for the
systems. The committee is aware
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—less than 35 pounds—anti-armor
at could be developed within 20
$30 million. Similarly, the Tank
ıonstrated and an expensive long-
ɔrogram is not required or neces-
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ıs that could be deployed to the
, the $25.0 million authorized for
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ld tests and evaluation, to estab-
and to transition from develop-

ɔurpose assault weapon system is
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nti-tank weapons comparing, at
weapons: the German Panzer-
variant), the UK LAW 80, the
the USMC's SMAW, the Israeli
ncher with modern Belgian am-

m rate-of-kill firings against re-
ger tank target arrays by aver-
shall be presented over realis-
perational conditions (e.g., on

courses unfamiliar to the gunner), with target distances from 30 to 300 meters. The pair of gunners should have available to them for firing in each target array presentation the number of antitank rounds that would normally be carried by foot by a combat-loaded rifle squad.

The tests should compare the weapons for lethality, under the supervision of the Joint Live Fire Test Program, against actual combat-loaded Soviet tanks.

The U.S. Army, the USMC, the Army National Guard and the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress independent reports addressing the adequacy of the tests, the firing results, and a recommended best weapon.

The committee has authorized funds for the development of a light-weight, towed mount for the existing U.S. developmental 75mm antitank cannon and the existing Israeli 60mm antitank cannon. The cannon should be tested for maximum rate-of-kill firing against company-size or larger tank targets presented over realistic European-type terrain at ranges from 250 meters to 1250 meters, under the supervision of the Joint Live Fire Test Program.

In order to improve U.S. infantry capabilities to engage an enemy tank forces accompanying infantry and attack advancing armored forces, the committee intends that there be tests of existing or developmental rifle-launched munitions, including as a minimum the Belgian Mecar, French Luchaire, Israeli IMI, the U.S. HEATER and the Rifleman's Asault Weapon (RAW).

The tests should determine the operational utility of increasing the individual soldier's firepower with the test weapons, comparing the efficiacy of infantry defensive operations when equipped with the test weapons versus current equipment.

The operational utility of equipping "rear area support troops" with the test weapons should also be assessed. The tests should be conducted under the supervision of the Joint Live Fire Test Program with reports submitted to Congress addressing the adequacy of the tests, the results, and recommendations for the best weapons.

(4) Armor Vehicles—The committee recommends authorization of $10.0 million for the procurement of the Federal Republic of Germany-developed Weasel Armor Vehicle. The committee recommends authorization of $9.0 million to continue development of the U.S./FRG diesel engine for armor vehicles. The committee is aware of the low-cost multi-purpose Weasel that would provide a complementary adjunct to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The Weasel weighs less than three tons and could be used to transport troops beyond the forward edge of the battle area, as an air defense vehicle, for reconnaissance and surveillance and as a command, control and communication vehicle. The authorization for the diesel engine is to continue development of a contemporary fuel-efficient diesel engine that could be retrofit into existing U.S. armor vehicles or installed in future tanks and armored personnel carriers.

(5) Close-In Air Defense—The committee recommends authorization of $10.0 million of which $7.5 million is for continued development of the Army's Spike system developed by its Missile Command and $2.5 million for evaluation of foreign-developed systems

such as the Israeli Adams to meet the Army's air defense requirements.

(6) NATO Cooperative Research and Development—The committee recommends authorization of $31.0 million for the Army; $30.0 million for the Navy; and $30.0 million for the Air Force for cooperative research and development. This is one of the most significant elements of the Conventional Defense Initiative because it will greatly improve defense return on investment by avoiding needless duplication of effort.

(7) Navy Surface Ship Enhancements—The committee recommends authorization of $90.0 million of which $30.0 million is for sensor upgrades; $35.0 million for engagement improvements; and $25.0 million for advanced anti-air warfare weapons. The committee recognizes that the evolution of anti-shipping cruise missiles constitutes a severe threat to our maritime forces resulting in an urgent requirement for improved self-defense capabilities. Sensors suites on naval ships other than those associated with the modern Aegis cruisers require improvements in detection and reaction time performance. The Navy must exploit the upgrade potential of its shipboard sensors through the integration of infrared and electronic signal measurements as well as radar assets. The effort should be designed to provide timely and cost effective improvements to the largest portion of the active fleet. Electronic countermeasure systems developed by our allies such as the Heatrap infrared flare rocket dispenser should be examined and evaluated as adjuncts to our shipboard sensors. In the area of engagement improvements, threat speed and maneuverability dictate corresonding improvements in U.S. surface ship defense. The threat of submarine launched cruise missiles require a responsive quick reaction missile system that can engage the threat outside the range of the close-in weapon system. The rolling airframe missile developed by the Navy is not the right answer to this problem. Improvements to existing missile systems such as Sea Sparrow and new engagement alternatives such as the hypervelocity missile and other low cost candidates should be explored to increase firepower and effectiveness. Of the $35.0 million recommended for engagement improvements, $16.0 million is for the Surface Ship Self-Defense Hypervelocity Missile system feasibility demonstration. In the area of advanced anti-air warfare weapons systems, studies conducted by the Navy indicate that its self-defense weapons systems will be outpaced by the threat of the mid-to-late 1990's. The development cycles associated with modern weapon system developments approaches ten years. Initiating the development of an advanced combat system for short-range air defense during fiscal year 1987 is imperative. Accordingly, $25.0 million is authorized for this purpose.

(8) Naval Air Safety and Reliability Enhancements—The committee recommends authorization of $16.0 million to upgrade the Marine Corps AV-8B Pegasus Engine and $10.0 million to complete development and initiate integration of the Floating Beam Avionics Rack (Sec. 204) for the S-3A anti-submarine warfare aircraft. The modifications to the Pegasus engine will greatly enhance pilot safety and result in a substantial improvement in reliability. The investment will be amortized in just a few years as a consequence

of lower maintenance hours per
obstacle to acceptable availability
design of the avonics racks that
The Navy has expended years of
no concomitant results. The Navy
a floating beam avionics rack de
Navy's own reports gave the sys
reason, the Navy has failed to in
new rack on the S-3A and aircra
it should be. The committee, the
of $10.0 million for accelerated i
aircraft and section 204 would r
the floating beam avionics rack.

(9) Conventional Attack Stand
ommends authorization of $5.0 r
ate conventional attack standoff
that are more capable and/or le
committee is aware of the Israe
bomb for high value targets. It is
with much greater range of the
flexibility and target acquisition
Israeli Air Force and is immedia

This summarizes those areas
evaluation that should be emph
deterent objectives in the earlie
systems, in addition to those hi
the committee in pursuing th
NATO-developed torpedoes, the
oped by Israel, the German Par
squad-level anti-tank weapons a
of systems that could contribu
tional Defense Initiative.

COPPERHEAD

Section 203 would prohibit fu
this or any previous Act from
or modification to the Army's
the Secretary of the Army cer
source contract for Copperhea
Navy's 5-Inch Guided Projecti
provide maximum commonalit
pleted.

The lack of commonality bet
tiles and the lack of competiti
of the committee. The price of
management of both programs
waste and abuse. Service par
money and is adversely imp
Army's fuze, for example, is
service uses its own fuze. The
sive and further ahead in de
Army continues to spend mill
croprocessor. The prospects fo

of lower maintenance hours per flight hour. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to acceptable availability of the S-3A aircraft is the poor design of the avonics racks that contain the sophisticated avionics. The Navy has expended years of effort and substantial money with no concomitant results. The Navy has, however, successfully tested a floating beam avionics rack developed by a small business. The Navy's own reports gave the system the highest rating. For some reason, the Navy has failed to implement its plan to integrate the new rack on the S-3A and aircraft availability is much lower than it should be. The committee, therefore, recommends authorization of $10.0 million for accelerated integration on the S-3A and other aircraft and section 204 would restrict this authorization only for the floating beam avionics rack.

(9) Conventional Attack Standoff Weapon—The committee recommends authorization of $5.0 million for the Air Force to evaluate conventional attack standoff weapons developed by U.S. allies that are more capable and/or less costly than the AGM-130. The committee is aware of the Israeli long-range air-to-ground guided bomb for high value targets. It is an electro-optical standoff weapon with much greater range of the AGM-130 with greater operational flexibility and target acquisition capability. It is operational in the Israeli Air Force and is immediately available for evaluation.

This summarizes those areas of research, development, test and evaluation that should be emphasized to improve U.S. conventional deterent objectives in the earliest possible timeframe. Many other systems, in addition to those highlighted above, are of interest to the committee in pursuing the Conventional Defense Initiative. NATO-developed torpedoes, the long-range anti-tank missile developed by Israel, the German Panzerfaust III and the French Apilas squad-level anti-tank weapons are just a few of the many examples of systems that could contribute to the objectives of the Conventional Defense Initiative.

COPPERHEAD GUIDED PROJECTILE

Section 203 would prohibit funds authorized for appropriation by this or any previous Act from being used for product improvement or modification to the Army's Copperhead Guided Projectile until the Secretary of the Army certifies to the Congress that a second source contract for Copperhead production and production of the Navy's 5-Inch Guided Projectile has been awarded and a plan to provide maximum commonality of all subsystems have been completed.

The lack of commonality between Navy and Army guided projectiles and the lack of competition has been a long standing concern of the committee. The price of these projectiles is excessive and the management of both programs by both Army and Navy has led to waste and abuse. Service parochialism is wasting the taxpayers' money and is adversely impacting on our combat forces. The Army's fuze, for example, is far superior to the Navy's yet each service uses its own fuze. The Navy's microprocessor is less expensive and further ahead in development than the Army's. Yet the Army continues to spend millions of dollars to develop its own microprocessor. The prospects for commonality of both projectiles ex-

(6) · QUAYLE - ATBM'S

(b) FUNDING.—Of the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization in section 201 for the Strategic Defense Initiative, up to $50,000,000, shall be available to initiate development and deployment of an antitactical ballistic missile system.

SEC. 210. MODIFICATION OF LINKAGE OF DEPLOYMENT OF THE MX MISSILE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL MOBILE MISSILE.

(a) LIMITATION.—The Secretary of Defense may not deploy more than 10 MX missiles until—

(1) the major elements (including the guidance and control subsystems) of a mobile missile weighing less than 37,000 pounds as a part of an intercontinental ballistic missile system have been tested;

(2) the major elements of the prototype small mobile intercontinental ballistic missile system (including the missile, the prototype mobile transporter-launcher basing system, and the command, control, and communications system) have been designed and functionally integrated and the system has been validated;

(3) contractors for the full-scale engineering development of such missile system have been selected and full-scale engineering development contracts have been awarded to those contractors;

(7) QUAYLE: ATBM'S (SENATE REPORT)

Other SDI-Related Issues

Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Defenses: Last year, the committee expressed its concern about the serious threat to high value NATO targets posed by Soviet short—and intermediate-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional, chemical and nuclear warheads. The committee felt that this was an area in which defensive systems could make a positive contribution to U.S. and allied security in the near term. However, the committee felt that insufficient emphasis was being given to this area within the SDI program. The SDI Organization was encouraged to coordinate with Department of Defense activities on anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) development options, and consult closely with our allies on these activities.

Since that time, there has been a growing recognition both in the United States and abroad of the serious implications of these Soviet tactical ballistic missile systems for our security and that of our allies. As indicated by recent public statements like that of West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, the development of a defense against Soviet tactical ballistic missiles is an essential element in NATO efforts to improve its conventional defense posture. NATO spokesmen have spoken in terms of an "expanded air defense", which would utilize upgrades of existing air defense systems to meet the tactical ballistic missile threat in the short term. Such an approach is consistent with the evolutionary approach to theater defense that the committee supports.

U.S. allies in regions other than NATO Europe also face tactical ballistic missile threats, and thus have strong interests in the development of anti-tactical ballistic missile defenses. Syrian SS-21 tactical ballistic missiles pose a very serious threat to the security of Israel, and Soviet tactical ballistic missiles pose a threat to our allies in Asia. These nations should be encouraged to participate in the development of anti-tactical ballistic missile defenses as well.

The committee conducted two hearings on this subject during its consideration of the fiscal year 1987 defense budget request. The first hearing focused on the Soviet tactical ballistic missile threat, the role of tactical ballistic missiles in Soviet military doctrine, and the vulnerability of key NATO targets to this threat. The second hearing focused on the activities within the Department of Defense to address this threat. These hearings confirmed the seriousness of the Soviet tactical ballistic missile threat, as well as the committee's view that the job of addressing this threat is receiving insufficient attention within the Department of Defense.

Recommendation: To facilitate and support the development and deployment of an anti-tactical ballistic missile defense system, the committee has identified up to $50.0 million within the SDI program for the purpose of accelerating research and development ac-

tivities associated with an ATBM system. The committee has included bill language identifying funds for this purpose. None of these funds should be used in a manner inconsistent with the 1972 ABM Treaty. The funding added by the committee should be used to accelerate the development of relevant technologies to support the full scale engineering development of a system in fiscal year 1988, with a view towards deployment in the early 1990's.

It is the committee's view that the development of an ATBM system should be a cooperative development program involving our allies, and that U.S. activities should be designed to support such a cooperative development. The committee is aware that system architecture efforts are being undertaken in fiscal year 1986 to define the threat and identify the system requirements for a theater defense system. In the committee's view, the development of a theater defense system should be undertaken on a matching fund basis with substantial contributions from allies involved in the program. Before more than 25% of these funds are expended, a Memorandum of Understanding or other formal agreement outlining the contributions of various parties and the milestones for this development program should be executed.

Prior to the initiation of full scale engineering development, the Secretary of Defense is required to provide the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report outlining the estimated costs and schedule associated with meeting these objectives. This report should also address the status of efforts to integrate all elements of a theater defense, including both active and passive measures.

SDI Countermeasures: The committee requests that future versions of the administration's Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative contain a section on Countermeasures similar to Appendix A of the 1986 Report. The committee would like to commend the SDI Organization for establishing a countermeasures office, and urges that it be operated in a manner that provides independent and objective analysis of all potential countermeasures to a strategic defense system.

(8) ATRM's (HOUSE REPORT)

Basis for committee action

The goal of the SDI program, as stated in the Administration's March 1986 *Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative*, is to conduct a program of vigorous research and technology development that may lead to strategic defense options that would eliminate the threat posed by ballistic missiles. The report further states that SDI seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support an informed decision in the early 1990s on whether or not to develop and deploy a defense of the United States and its allies against ballistic missiles.

The committee is in general agreement with the stated goals but is concerned about the lack of focus in the program and the ability of the program to efficiently utilize the large increase requested in authorization. The committee believes that an authorization of not more than $3.4 billion (sec. 208) provides for a reasonable growth of 24 percent, a level that is adequate to support the stated goal while providing an incentive to focus and efficiently manage the overall SDI program.

The committee is increasingly concerned with the Soviet short-range missile threat in Europe and with the lack of meaningful progress for the theater defense system that would offer protection to the members of the NATO alliance from these tactical ballistic missiles. At the same time, however, the committee recognizes that the Strategic Defense Initiative organization is conducting a research program to respond to this need and, through the Army Strategic Defense Command, has demonstrated applicable interceptor technology with the successful intercept flight test in June 1986.

Recognizing the significant work to date but also the need for actions that are bold and fruitful, section 211 would direct the Secretary of Defense to establish a separate office within the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to carry out research, development, and test of systems for defense against tactical ballistic missiles.

Section 211 further specifies that up to $50 million the amount authorized for the SDI would be available to initiate development of a system for defense against tactical ballistic missiles. None of these funds could be used in a manner inconsistent with the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The committee believes that the development of a tactical ballistic missile defense system should be cooperative development program involving our allies, and that U.S. activities should be designed to support such a cooperative development. The committee is aware that system architecture efforts are being undertaken in fiscal year 1986 to define the threat and identify the system requirements for a theater defense system. In the committee's view, the development of a theater defense system should be undertaken on a matching fund basis with substantial contributions from allies involved in the program.

VERY HIGH-SPEED INTEGRATED

Committee recommendation

The committee recommends addition
lion to the Air Force request for $1
High-Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC

Basis for committee recommendation

The purpose of this program is to ad
in integrated circuits to provide enh
ability of weapon and weapon support
year of program development, and all
have been met. That the program is on
uted to additional authorization and a
Congress for four consecutive years.

Currently, two objectives remain i
first objective is to reduce the cost of
circuits from several thousands dollar
requires a vigorous manufacturing t
in progress. The second objective is to
integrated circuits to the sub-micron
level. This is referred to as the VHSIC

The committee recommends additi
accelerate the manufacturing techn
second phase of the VHSIC program
that the Department of Defense req
program is underfunded, hence the
committee emphasizes that of the $
available to continue the laser pant
prime scale prototype of sub-micron
cuits for Defense applications that r
formance digital data process
syst

SPECIAL CONSID

ADVANCED MEDIUM RANGE

The committee continues to be con
and cost of the Advanced Medi
(AMRAAM). Authorization for the A
upon the Secretary of Defense adv
that the certification required by Pu
design, performance and cost of the
more than $39 million is available
would limit the use of funds for the
guidelines.

AIR FORCE SHUTTLE

The Air Force budgets and pays
partment of Defense payloads one y
practice has been embodied in three
second of which is currently in effe
Air Force to pay for a ride once s

(9) Prepositioning. (House Approps report)

(AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

INSTALLATION & PROJECT	BUDGET REQUEST	HASC AUTH COMPARED TO BUDGET	HOUSE RECOMMENDED	HOUSE COMPARED TO BUDGET
GLCM-ADD/ALTER PHYSICAL TRAINING FACILITY	2.100	-2.100	---	-2.100
GLCM-BASE THEATER	1.300	-1.300	---	-1.300
GLCM-CONSOLIDATED SUPPORT CENTER	8.800	---	8.800	---
TRI-AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE FACILITY	680	---	680	---
TRI-LIBRARY	1.050	-1.050	---	-1.050
TRI-VISITING AIRMEN QUARTERS	1.300	-1.300	---	-1.300
RAF BENTWATERS				
2ND ECHELON MEDICAL LOGISTICS STORAGE FAC	1.250	---	---	-1.250
ALTER UNACCOMP ENLISTED PERS HOUSING	3.700	-3.700	---	-3.700
CENTRAL POST OFFICE	650	-650	---	-650
DIGITAL EUROPEAN BACKBONE FACILITY	1.200	---	1.200	---
RECREATION CENTER	2.250	-2.250	---	-2.250
WATER STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM	1.400	---	1.400	---
RAF CHICKSANDS				
ADD-ALTER WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM	950	---	950	---
RAF CROUGHTON				
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY	630	---	630	---
RAF FAIRFORD				
ADD-ALTER VEHICLE MAINTENANCE FACILITY	1.700	---	---	-1.700
ORG MAINT AND SUPPORT EQUIP COMPLEX	2.750	---	---	-2.750
RAF GREENHAM COMMON				
GLCM-TEMPORARY LIVING FACILITY	2.100	-2.100	---	-2.100
RAF LAKENHEATH				
BASE SUPPLY STORAGE SHED	500	---	500	---
GYMNASIUM	2.500	*	2.500	---
POST OFFICE	1.200	-1.200	---	-1.200
RAF MARTLESHAM				
DIGITAL EUROPEAN BACKBONE FACILITY	1.650	---	1.650	---
RAF MILDENHALL				
UNACCOMPANIED ENLISTED PERSONNEL HOUSING	4.700	---	4.700	---
RAF UPPER HEYFORD				
ADD-ALTER VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP	2.300	-2.300	---	-2.300
DIGITAL EUROPEAN BACKBONE FACILITY	1.200	---	1.200	---
UNACCOMP ENLISTED PERS HSG ALTERATION	4.500	---	4.500	---
UNACCOMPANIED ENLISTED PERSONNEL HOUSING	6.000	-6.000	---	-6.000
RAF WELFORD				
GROUND DEFENSE MUNITIONS STORAGE IGLOOS	830	---	830	---
MUNITION SURVEILLANCE AND INSPECTION SHOP	760	---	760	---
RAF WETHERSFIELD				
2ND ECHELON MEDICAL LOGISTICS STORAGE FAC	650	---	---	-650
RAF WOODBRIDGE				
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	---	-3.400
SUPPLY WAREHOUSE	1.650	-1.650	*	-1.650
TOTAL, UNITED KINGDOM	74.800	-30.180	38.270	-36.530
OVERSEAS CLASSIFIED				
ARMY				
CLASSIFIED PROJECT	4.000	---	4.000	---
NAVY				
MAGAZINES	15.700	---	15.700	---
AIR FORCE				
BASE THIRTY				
TRI-UNACCOMP ENLISTED PERSONNEL HOUSING	2.950	---	2.950	---
US AIR FORCES IN EUROPE				
CLASSIFIED PROJECT	11.500	---	11.500	---
TOTAL, OVERSEAS CLASSIFIED	34.150	---	34.150	---
[illegible]				
ARMY				
VARIOUS LOCATIONS				
NAVY				
VARIOUS LOCATIONS				
HOST NATION INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT	300	-300	---	-300
PRE-POSITIONED WAR MATERIAL FACILITIES	4.900	-4.900	---	-4.900
AIR FORCE				
US AIR FORCES IN EUROPE				
AUXILIARY SEISMIC NETWORK	3.953	---	3.953	---
DEFENSE AGENCIES				
VARIOUS LOCATIONS				
CONFORMING STORAGE FACILITIES	18.137	-18.137	---	-18.137
TOTAL, OVERSEAS VARIOUS	27.290	-23.337	3.953	-23.337
NATO				
NATO INFRASTRUCTURE	247.000	---	247.000	---
WORLDWIDE UNSPECIFIED				
ARMY				
PLANNING AND DESIGN	131.640	-200	131.440	-200
UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION	20.000	---	20.000	---
GENERAL REDUCTION - PROJECTS IN GERMANY	---	---	-10.000	-10.000
NAVY				
ACCESS ROADS	5.400	---	5.400	---
PLANNING AND DESIGN	143.770	---	143.770	---
UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION	15.000	---	15.000	---
AIR FORCE				
PLANNING AND DESIGN	127.260	---	127.260	---
UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION	16.000	---	16.000	---
DEFENSE AGENCIES				
CONTINGENCY CONSTRUCTION	5.000	---	5.000	---
PLANNING AND DESIGN	110.700	-22.500	78.200	-32.500
UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION	4.000	---	4.000	---
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD				
PLANNING AND DESIGN	19.000	---	19.000	---
UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION	4.647	---	4.647	---
AIR NATIONAL GUARD				
PLANNING AND DESIGN	15.420	---	15.420	---
UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION	2.130	---	2.130	---

(h) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 138 of such title is amended by striking out the item relating to section 2341 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"2341. Authority to acquire logistic support, supplies, and services for armed forces of the United States deployed outside the United States."

(1)

WARNER (=NUNN)

SEC. 1210. COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WITH NON-NATO ALLIES AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds—

(1) that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Research and Development program instituted during fiscal year 1986 has served to increase cooperation in research and development among NATO nations; and

(2) that additional benefits of cooperation in research and development might ensue from an extension of the program to include countries which have mutual security or mutual assistance treaties with the United States or which share with the United States a commitment to freedom and individual liberties.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST FOR COOPERATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.—The Congress urges and requests the President and the Secretary of Defense to pursue diligently opportunities for the United States and our major non-NATO allies to cooperate—

(1) in research and development on defense equipment and munitions; and

(2) in the production of defense equipment.

(c) FUNDS FOR COOPERATIVE PROJECTS.—Of the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorizations in section 201, not more than $40,000,000 shall be available only for cooperative research and development projects with major non-NATO allies.

(d) RESTRICTIONS.—(1) A memorandum of understanding (or other formal agreement) to conduct a cooperative research and development project may not be entered into under this section unless the Secretary of Defense determines that the proposed project enhances the ongoing multinational effort to improve conventional defense capabilities through the application of emerging technology.

(2) Each cooperative project shall require sharing of the costs of research between the participants on an equitable basis.

(3) The Secretary may not delegate the authority to make a determination under paragraph (1) except to the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

(e) RESTRICTIONS ON PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES.—(1) In order to assure substantial participation on the part of major non-NATO allies in cooperative

research and development projects, funds made available under subsection (c) for such projects may not be used to procure equipment or services from any foreign government, foreign research organization, or other foreign entity.

(2) A major non-NATO ally may not utilize any United States military or economic assistance funds, grants, or loans for the purpose of making its contribution to a cooperative research and development program entered into with the United States under this section.

(f) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit a letter to Congress not later than January 1 of each year enumerating those countries eligible for participation with the United States in a cooperative research and development program authorized by this section.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section:

(1) The term "major non-NATO ally" means a country with which the United States has a mutual security treaty or mutual security assistance treaty or a country which shares with the United States a mutual commitment to freedom and individual freedoms.

(2) The term "cooperative research and development project" means a project involving joint participation by the United States and one or more major non-NATO allies under a memorandum of understanding

(or other formal agreement) to carry out a joint research and development program—

(A) to develop new conventional equipment and munitions; or

(B) to modify existing military equipment to meet United States military requirements.

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SEC. 1211. SENSE OF THE SENATE RELATING TO SALT II COMPLIANCE

It is the sense of the Senate that it is in the national security interests of the United States to continue voluntary compliance with strategic offensive arms agreements with the Soviet Union by recognizing the central numerical sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery systems contained in such agreements so long as the Soviet Union complies with such sublimits.

SEC. 1212. SENSE OF THE SENATE RELATING TO STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS

It is the sense of the Senate that, consistent with international law, it is not in the national interest of the United States to continue compliance with any strategic arms agreement that the Soviet Union has clearly violated.

2.

COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WITH NON-NATO ALLIES AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

Last year, the Senate proposed, and the Congress enacted into law, a program to promote greater cooperation in armaments research and development between the United States and its NATO allies. This initiative has led to substantial interest among our NATO allies in greater cooperation in defense research and development. As a result, it has been suggested that greater cooperation with selected non-NATO countries could also be beneficial. The committee recognizes that the benefits from U.S. collaboration in defense with non-NATO countries may be more limited than for collaboration with NATO, but the committee believes that several non-NATO countries have substantial technical capabilities in selected areas of defense technology. Accordingly, the committee recommends that the DOD have authority to engage in collaborative defense research and development projects with other non-NATO countries but on a lesser scale than for the NATO Cooperative Research and Development Program.

The committee recommends approval of a provision which provides that the participants shall share the costs of a cooperative project on an equitable basis. The committee intends this language to assure that each country will contribute its fair share of the costs of the project, in part determined by the expected return to the country involved. The committee does not intend this language to require that each country should bear an equal share of the costs associated with a project.

"§ 2407. Acquisition of defense equipment under cooperative projects".

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 141 of such title is amended by striking out the item relating to section 2407 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"2407. Acquisition of defense equipment under cooperative projects."

(12)

SEC. 1209. ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS

(a) AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS WITH COUNTRIES OUTSIDE EUROPE.—Section 2341 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"§ 2341. Authority to acquire logistic support, supplies, and services for armed forces of the United States deployed outside the United States

"Subject to section 2343 of this title and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of Defense may—

"(1) acquire from the Governments of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and from North Atlantic Treaty Organization subsidiary bodies logistic support, supplies, and services for elements of the armed forces deployed in Europe and adjacent waters; and

"(2) acquire from any government not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in which armed forces of the United States are deployed, or are to be deployed, logistic support, supplies, and services

for elements of the armed forces deployed (or to be deployed) in such country or in the military region in which such country is located if such country—

"(A) has a defense alliance with the United States;

"(B) permits the stationing of members of the armed forces of the United States in such country or the homeporting of Naval vessels of the United States in such country;

"(C) has agreed to preposition materiel of the United States in such country; or

"(D) serves as the host country to military exercises which include the armed forces of the United States or permits other military operations by the armed forces of the United States in such country.".

(b) CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS.—Section 2342 of such title is amended to read as follows:

"§ 2342. Cross-servicing agreements

"(a) Subject to section 2343 of this title and to the availability of appropriations, and after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense may—

"(1) enter into agreements with the government of any North Atlantic Treaty Organization country and with any North Atlantic Treaty Organization subsidi-

ary body under which the United States agrees to provide logistic support, supplies, and services to military forces of such country or subsidiary body deployed in Europe and adjacent waters in return for the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies, and services by such country or subsidiary body to elements of the armed forces deployed in Europe and adjacent waters;

"(2) enter into agreements with the government of any country designated by the Secretary of Defense which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization under which the United States agrees to provide logistic support, supplies, and services to the armed forces of such country in return for the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies, and services by such country to elements of the armed forces of the United States deployed in such country or in the military region in which such country is located; and

"(3) enter into agreements with the government of any country referred to in clause (1) or (2) under which the United States agrees to provide logistic support, supplies, and services to the armed forces of such country in return for the reciprocal provision of support, supplies, and services for the armed forces of the United States from such country while the armed forces of such country are stationed in North America

or are performing military exercises or training in North America.

"(b) A country may not be designated by the Secretary of Defense for cross-servicing agreements under this section unless the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of State, has determined that the designation of such country for such purpose is in the interest of the national security of the United States.

"(c) The Secretary of Defense may not use the authority of this chapter to procure from any foreign government as a routine or normal source any goods or services reasonably available from United States commercial sources.

"(d) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that contracts entered into under this chapter are free from self-dealing, bribery, and conflict of interests.".

(c) METHODS OF PAYMENT.—Section 2344(b) of such title is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting "or other foreign country" after "country" in the material preceding subparagraph (A); and

(2) in paragraph (3), by inserting "or other foreign country" after "country".

(d) LIQUIDATION OF ACCRUED CREDITS AND LIABILITIES.—Section 2345 of such title is amended—

(1) by inserting "(a)" before "Credits" at the beginning of such section; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(b) Payment-in-kind or exchange entitlements shall be satisfied within 12 months after the date of the delivery of the logistic support, supplies, or services.".

(e) LIMITATIONS ON AMOUNTS THAT MAY BE OBLIGATED OR ACCRUED BY THE UNITED STATES.—Section 2347 of such title is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by inserting "(1)" after "(a)"; and

(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(2) Except during a period of active hostilities in the military region affecting a country which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but with which the United States has one or more acquisition or cross-servicing agreements, the total amount of reimbursable liabilities that the United States may accrue under this chapter (before the computation of offsetting balances) with such country may not exceed $10,000,000 in any fiscal year, and of such amount not more than $2,500,000 in liabilities may be accrued for the acquisition of supplies (other than petroleum, oils, and lubricants). The $10,000,000 limitation specified in

this paragraph is in addition to the limitation specified in paragraph (1).";

(2) in subsection (b), by inserting "(1)" after "(b)"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(2) Except during a period of active hostilities in the military region affecting a country referred to in paragraph (1), the total amount of reimbursable credits that the United States may accrue under this chapter from such country (before computation of offsetting balances) may not exceed $10,000,000 in any fiscal year. The $10,000,000 limitation specified in this paragraph is in addition to the limitation specified in paragraph (1).".

(f) INVENTORIES OF SUPPLIES NOT TO BE INCREASED.—Section 2348 of such title is amended by striking out "to military forces of any North Atlantic Treaty Organization country or any North Atlantic Treaty Organization subsidiary body".

(g) DEFINITION.—Section 2350 of such title is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(3) 'Military region' means the geographical area of responsibility assigned to the Commander of a Unified Command of the armed forces of the United States excluding Europe and adjacent waters.".

(h) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 138 of such title is amended by striking out the item relating to section 2341 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"2341. Authority to acquire logistic support, supplies, and services for armed forces of the United States deployed outside the United States.".

SEC. 1210. COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WITH NON-NATO ALLIES AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds—

(1) that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Research and Development program instituted during fiscal year 1986 has served to increase cooperation in research and development among NATO nations; and

(2) that additional benefits of cooperation in research and development might ensue from an extension of the program to include countries which have mutual security or mutual assistance treaties with the United States or which share with the United States a commitment to freedom and individual liberties.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST FOR COOPERATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.—The Congress urges and requests the President and the Secretary of Defense to pursue diligently opportunities for the United States and our major non-NATO allies to cooperate—

(13) REPORT -

ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICE AGREEMENTS

Last year the administration forwarded to the Congress proposed legislation to amend the NATO Mutual Support Act (P.L. 96-323, 10 U.S.C. 2341 et.seq.) to allow the exchange of logistic support, supplies, and services with the armed forces of the Republic of Korea as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. Congress, however, did not act on the proposal at that time.

The NATO Mutual Support Act was enacted to remedy certain difficulties that the United States encountered in exchanging logistic support, supplies, and services with her NATO allies. The NATO Mutual Support Act does two principal things:

—Facilitate acquisition by the United States from NATO allies of host nation logistical support and services (rations, billeting, transportation, base support, etc.) by waiving certain provisions of U.S. domestic procurement law.

—Enable the United States to provide similar services and supplies to NATO nations through cross-servicing agreements without having to treat each transaction as a foreign military sales case under the Arms Export Control Act.

The effect of the legislation has been to enhance the readiness and the rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of NA[redacted] forces.

During hearings held by the committee in review of the fiscal year 1987 Department of Defense Authorization Bill, both Admiral Hays, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command and General Crist, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command expressed support for the concept of extending the NATO Mutual Support Act to other friends and allies within their Command. Additionally, Secretary Weinberger has indicated his support for the idea of extending the NATO Mutual Support Act beyond NATO and the Republic of Korea.

Therefore, the committee recommends approval of a proposal to extend the terms of the NATO Mutual Support Act to countries with which the United States has defense alliances or conducts joint exercises, or which allow the stationing or positioning of United States forces or materiel. It would authorize the Secretary of Defense to enter into agreements with specified countries to permit the Department of Defense to acquire host nation logistic support for U.S. forces deployed overseas. In addition, U.S. forces could enter into cross-servicing agreements with designated countries for reciprocal logistic support in overseas areas and logistic support to foreign forces stationed or training in North Americ[redacted] This would enhance U.S. readiness at minimal cost by making it possible for U.S. forces to make use of existing host nation logistic capabilities. It would increase the effectiveness of combined military operations by allowing each country's forces to support the other's when necessary and by allowing them to practice mutual support procedures during combined exercises.

The proposal would permit the conclusion of cross-servicing agreements only on the basis of full reciprocity; U.S. forces would be assured of receiving as much support as they provide. Furthermore, the proposal would not be used for the transfer of major defense end items. The security assistance program would continue to be the primary means of U.S. support to foreign military forces pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act.

in accordance with the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).

(f) SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY.—The authority of the Secretary of Defense under this section is in addition to the authority of the Secretary under chapter 138 of title 10, United States Code, or under any other provision of law.

(g) DEFINITION.—For the purpose of this section, the term "Weapon System Partnership Agreement" means an agreement between the United States and one or more other NATO nations participating in the operation of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, entered into pursuant to the terms of the charter of such Maintenance and Supply Organization, for the common logistic support of a specific weapon system common to the participating nations.

(3)

QUAYLE

SEC. 1208. COOPERATIVE PROJECTS

(a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—(1) Section 27 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2767) is amended—

(A) in subsection (b)—

(i) by inserting ", in the case of an agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or with one or more member countries of that Organization," after "project' " in paragraph (1);

(ii) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (1);

(iii) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and

(iv) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph:

"(2) the term 'cooperative project', in the case of an agreement entered into under subsection (j), means a jointly managed arrangement, described in a written agreement among the parties, which is undertaken in order to enhance the ongoing multinational effort of the participants to improve the conventional defense capabilities of the participants and which provides—

"(A) for one or more of the other participants to share with the United States the costs of research on and development, testing, evaluation, or joint production (including follow-on support) of certain defense articles;

"(B) for concurrent production in the United States and in the country of another participant of a defense article jointly developed in accordance with subparagraph (A); or

"(C) for procurement by the United States of a defense article or defense service from another participant to the agreement; and"; and

(B) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

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"(j) The President may enter into a cooperative project agreement with any friendly foreign country not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization under the same general terms and conditions as the President is authorized to enter into such an agreement with one or more member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if the President determines that the cooperative project agreement with such country would be in the foreign policy or national security interests of the United States.".

(2) The section heading for such section is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 27. AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT TO ENTER INTO COOPERATIVE PROJECTS WITH FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—".

(b) TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE.—(1) Section 2407 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking out "North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)";

(B) in subsection (c)(2), by striking out "NATO";

(C) in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (e), by striking out "NATO" each place it appears; and

(D) by striking out the section heading and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"§ 2407. Acquisition of defense equipment under cooperative projects".

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 141 of such title is amended by striking out the item relating to section 2407 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"2407. Acquisition of defense equipment under cooperative projects.".

SEC. 1209. ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS

(a) AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS WITH COUNTRIES OUTSIDE EUROPE.—Section 2341 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"§ 2341. Authority to acquire logistic support, supplies, and services for armed forces of the United States deployed outside the United States

"Subject to section 2343 of this title and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of Defense may—

"(1) acquire from the Governments of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and from North Atlantic Treaty Organization subsidiary bodies logistic support, supplies, and services for elements of the armed forces deployed in Europe and adjacent waters; and

"(2) acquire from any government not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in which armed forces of the United States are deployed, or are to be deployed, logistic support, supplies, and services

4. (WAIVERS) שלילת הוראות

COOPERATIVE PROJECTS שיתוף פעולה

Section 1102 of the 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act authorized the President to enter into agreements with other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for cooperative armaments projects. Such projects are to be jointly managed, described in written agreements and undertaken to further alliance rationalization, standardization and interoperability. To carry out such projects, the Secretary of Defense is permitted on a case-by-case basis, subject to certain reporting requirements, to require subcontracts to be awarded to particular subcontractors and to waive certain laws prescribing contract procedures and U.S. preference requirements.

The committee believes that Section 1102 provides an important new tool for the United States to pursue collaboration on conventional defense improvements with our NATO and non-NATO allies. The committee is of the view that further improvements in conventional defense could be achieved by increasing the number of friendly countries with which the United States can cooperate, to include, among others, Australia, Israel, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

Therefore, the committee recommends for approval a proposal that Section 1102 be extended to other friendly countries.

ISRAELI REQUEST

- IN A JULY 3 NON-PAPER, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ASKED THAT THE US COMMIT ITSELF TO "EQUAL TREATMENT" FOR ISRAEL IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE MATTERS, NOTING THAT ISRAEL "DID NOT ENJOY" THE "PRIVILEGED TREATMENT" ACCORDED TO COUNTRIES WITH WHOM THE US HAD FORMAL DEFENSE TREATIES.

- THE PAPER CITED AS EXAMPLES OF SUCH TREATMENT "COLLABORATIVE DEFENSE PROGRAMS," "TWO-WAY DEFENSE TRADE," "R&D AND PRODUCTION OPPORTUNITIES" AND "ACCESS TO CSP".

US-NATO COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

OVERVIEW

S E C R E T STATE 275678/01

O CONGRESSIONALLY AUTHORIZED TREATMENT OF US TREATY ALLIES, PARTICULARLY NATO, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, IS INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN US DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL US AND PROVIDES INCENTIVES FOR RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF US AND ALLIED DEFENSE INVENTORIES.

O THE TREATMENT AFFORDED THESE ALLIES IS ALSO DESIGNED TO DIRECTLY BENEFIT, IN A READILY QUANTIFIABLE MANNER, US FORCES BASED IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHO ARE CO-BASED IN OR OPERATE FROM HOST-COUNTRY FACILITIES.

COLLABORATIVE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

O CONGRESS HAS AUTHORIZED DOD TO EXPEND FUNDS FOR MAJOR NATOWIDE DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH DIRECTLY AUGMENT THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF BOTH NATO AND US PERSONNEL IN THEATER. RECENT EXAMPLES OF COLLABORATIVE DEFENSE PROGRAMS OF THIS TYPE ARE POINT AIR AND PORT DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND NATO ACQUISITION OF AWACS AIRCRAFT.

O TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL NATO INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE BENEFIT OF BOTH US AND HOST-COUNTRY FORCES, A NATO INFRASTRUCTURE FUND HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, FUNDED BY US AND ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS. THE FUND IS USED FOR NATO INFRASTRUCTURE-RELATED MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION.

TWO-WAY DEFENSE TRADE

O CONGRESS HAS ENCOURAGED TWO-WAY US-ALLY DEFENSE TRADE AS AN INCENTIVE FOR STANDARDIZATION OF US-ALLIED INVENTORIES AND AS A MEANS OF ENCOURAGING CLOSER US-ALLIED COOPERATION PRIOR TO WEAPONS SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT.

O THE US HAS MOA'S GOVERNING TWO-WAY DEFENSE PROCUREMENT WITH ALL NATIONS WITH WHOM WE HAVE DEFENSE TREATIES, PERMITTING ALLIES TO BID UPON DOD CONTRACTS SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS BASED ON US DEFENSE MOBILIZATION BASE AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS.

O ADDITIONALLY, THE "NUNN-QUAYLE" LEGISLATION PROVIDES SPECIAL MONETARY INCENTIVES FOR US-NATO JOINT DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS.

R&D AND PRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS

UNDER PRE-NUNN COOPERATIVE PROJECT LEGISLATION, THE US HAD ENTERED INTO A VARIETY OF JOINT R&D AND PRODUCTION EFFORTS WITH ITS ALLIES, BUT ADDITIONAL INCENTIVES WERE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO ENCOURAGE BROADER COOPERATION AND INCREASED STANDARDIZATION.

O IN ADDITION TO REVISION OF SECTION 27 OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT TO ENCOURAGE INCREASED NATO COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND AS A MEANS OF STIMULATING ALLIES TO INCREASE THEIR SHARE OF THE NATO DEFENSE BURDEN, THE NUNN-QUAYLE LEGISLATION ESTABLISHED A $200 MILLION FUND ("SEED MONEY") FROM WHICH US CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOINT R&D PROJECTS COULD BE DRAWN.

O IN BRIEF, THE NUNN-QUAYLE MEASURES WORK AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE US AND PARTICIPATING ALLIES IDENTIFY CANDIDATE PROJECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION; A LETTER OF AGREEMENT IS NEGOTIATED ON APPROVED PROJECTS, DEFINING THE WORK TO BE DONE AND THE NATURE OF THE JOINT FUNDING ARRANGEMENT.

-- THE US AND PARTICIPATING ALLIES WILL AGREE TO EACH CONTRIBUTE AN "EQUITABLE SHARE" TO THE PROJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.

- US FUNDS, WHETHER DRAWN FROM THE SPECIAL $200 MILLION FUND OR ELSEWHERE, CAN ONLY BE SPENT IN THE US; ALLIES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROJECT MUST BE FROM NATIONAL FUNDS, AND CANNOT RPT CANNOT BE DRAWN FROM FMS CREDIT FUNDS.

ONCE A PROJECT HAS COMPLETED THE R&D PHASE, IT MAY BE CONSIDERED FOR JOINT PRODUCTION; IF APPROVED, DOD PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS, INCLUDING WAIVER OF "BUY AMERICAN" PROVISIONS, ARE STREAMLINED TO FACILITATE THE JOINT PRODUCTION/ACQUISITION EFFORT.

O 1985 CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION LANGUAGE REQUIRES THAT AN "ARMS COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES DOCUMENT" BE PREPARED AT AN EARLY POINT IN THE DOD DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL PROCEDURE, INDICATING WHETHER A PROJECT SIMILAR TO THAT BEING CONTEMPLATED BY DOD IS IN R&D OR PRODUCTION STATUS WITHIN NATO. IF SO, A RECOMMENDATION MUST BE MADE WITHIN DOD AS TO WHETHER US-NATO JOINT DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT (OSP) AND OFFSETS

O NO EXCEPTION FROM US LAW HAS BEEN MADE WITH RESPECT TO THE INELIGIBILITY OF NATO MAP AND FMS RECIPIENTS TO USE THOSE CREDITS FOR OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT.

A GROUP OF NATO MEMBERS, THE EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS GROUP (EPG), HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO USE THEIR NATIONAL FUNDS TO PRODUCE AND PROCURE F-16 COMPONENTS FOR DOD

S E C R E T

REQUIREMENTS -- AMOUNTING TO A 15% OFFSET ARRANGEMENT ON ULTIMATE PURCHASE BY THESE COUNTRIES OF THE F-16; TURKEY IS AUTHORIZED TO USE ITS NATIONAL FUNDS (BUT NOT FMS CREDITS) FOR AN OFFSET ARRANGEMENT RELATED TO F-16 ACQUISITION.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

O GREECE AND SPAIN RECEIVE FMS CREDITS, AT TREASURY RATES: FOR FY 1987, PROPOSED LEVELS ARE DOLLARS 500 MILLION AND 400 MILLION, RESPECTIVELY.

O PORTUGAL AND TURKEY RECEIVE FMS AND MAP ASSISTANCE AT MIXED TREASURY AND CONCESSIONAL RATES: FOR FY 1987, PROPOSED LEVELS ARE DOLLARS 66.5 AND 600 MILLION FMS, RESPECTIVELY AND DOLLARS 75 MILLION AND 220 MILLION MAP, RESPECTIVELY.

NON-RECURRING COSTS (NRC) WAIVER

O CHARGES FOR RECOVERY OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TOOLING AND ENGINEERING (RDT&E) AND PRODUCTION COSTS ARE COLLECTED BY DOD ON EACH DEFENSE ITEM SOLD OR AUTHORIZED TO BE COPRODUCED.

O DOD COLLECTS ABOUT $300 MILLION/YEAR IN NRC CHARGES, WHICH ARE APPPLIED AS AN OFFSET AGAINST THE DOD BUDGET, I.E. DOD IS ALLOWED TO BUDGET AGAINST THE EXPECTED RECEIPT BY THE US TREASURY OF ANTICIPATED NRC CHARGES.

O CONGRESS HAS GIVEN DOD DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO WAIVE NRC CHARGES ON A CASE-BYCASE, NON-RETROACTIVE BASIS FOR NATO, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

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CONGRESS SPECIFIED THAT SUCH WAIVERS WERE TO BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF BENEFITS TO THE DOD THROUGH STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT, AND AS AN INCENTIVE FOR THE STANDARDIZATION OF DEFENSE INVENTORIES BY THE ALLIES WITH US EQUIPMENT AND ENCOURAGEMENT FOR PURCHASES OF US MATERIEL.

C CURRENT USG POLICY IS NOT RPT NOT TO GRANT WAIVERS WITHOUT RECEIPT OF A #MATERIAL BENEFIT" TO THE US IN RETURN. THIS BENFFIT HAS BEEN DEFINED AS A MATERIAL BENEFIT OF AS EQUAL A NATURE AS POSSIBLE TO THE NRC CHARGE WAIVER GRANTED.

C WAIVERS ARE NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY ON A VERY LIMITED BASIS TO THE NORTHERN TIER NATO STATES, NONE OF WHOM ARE FMS OR MAP RECIPIENTS. VIRTUALLY NO WAIVERS ARE GRANTED TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, AND NONE TO JAPAN.

O EXCEPTIONS TO THIS POLICY HAVE BEEN MADE IN CONNECTION WITH MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITIONS (TRIDENT, AWACS, PATRIOT), BUT IN EACH CASE A SIGNIFICANT (AND READILY QUANTIFIABLE) BENEFIT WAS PROVIDED BY THE RECIPIENT OF THE WAIVER. (E.G., FRG AGREED TO TURN OVER ROLAND MISSILE DEFENSE UNITS TO THE US AND TO PROVIDE FULL MANNING AND MAINTENANCE FOR CERTAIN PATRIOT UNITS.)

O IN CONSIDERING WAIVER REQUESTS FOR THESE COUNTRIES, THE CRITERION REQUIRED IS THAT TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO THE US BE DEMONSTRATED IN RETURN FOR THE WAIVER BEYOND STANDARDIZATION ALONE, WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR A NRC WAIVER.

O ONLY MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (MAP) RECIPIENTS ARE TREATED IN A DIFFERENT FASHION WITH RESPECT TO WAIVERS. SOUTHERN TIER MAP RECIPIENTS (TURKEY/PORTUGAL) ARE GRANTED CASE-BYCASE NRC WAIVERS ON A MORE LENIENT BASIS.

O THE US REQUIRES EFFORTS BY THESE RECIPIENTS TOWARDS STANDARDIZATION, AS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW, BUT DOES NOT REQUIRE THE SAME DEGREE OF RECIPROCAL BENEFITS AS IN THE CASE OF THE NORTHERN TIER MEMBERS.

O DOD HAS ADOPTED THIS LESS STRINGENT POLICY FOR MAP RECIPIENT STATES BECAUSE MAP CAN ONLY BE USED FOR FMS PROCUREMENT FROM THE US, AND CANNOT BE USED IN OFFSET/OSP ARRANGEMENTS.

O THE AMOUNTS OF WAIVED NRC CHARGES FOR THE MAP RECIPIENT STATES ARE RELATIVELY SMALL; FROM 1981-1985 PORTUGAL RECEIVED DOLLARS 546 THOUSAND, CUMULATIVE; TURKEY AVERAGED DOLLARS 4-10 MILLION PER YEAR UNTIL 1985. GREECE RECEIVED DOLLARS 2.5 MILLION FOR 1981-1985, CUMULATIVE.

LEASING ARRANGEMENTS

O WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CERTAIN NATO-US UNIQUE SYSTEMS (PRIMARILY US-ALLIED COMMONLY USED COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS), THERE ARE NO SPECIAL NATO LEASING ARRANGEMENTS.

MILITARY TRAINING

O DOD IS AUTHORIZED TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS WITH NATO COUNTRIES, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND JAPAN TO FURNISH TRAINING ON A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL BASIS AND CHARGE ONLY DIRECT COSTS (I.E., ONLY CHARGE FOR ACTUAL PER-STUDENT INCREMENTAL COSTS, RATHER THAN RECOVERY OF PRO-RATED SHARE OF FULL PROGRAM COSTS) PROVIDED THAT THE AGREEMENTS ARE BASED ON RECIPROCITY.

COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT

O DOD IS AUTHORIZED TO ENTER INTO ARRANGEMENTS WITH NATO, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND AND THE ROK TO PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT AND RELATED SUPPLIES/SERVICES IN RETURN FOR US RECEIPT OF SUCH SUPPORT.

NON-NATO SPECIFIC SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS

SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS FUND (SDAF)

O THE SDAF WAS ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE DELIVERY TIME IN CRISIS SITUATIONS TO FOREIGN PURCHASERS OF US-STANDARD ARMS AND TO REDUCE THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF SUCH DELIVERY ON US READINESS AND INVENTORY LEVELS.

O THE FUND HAS A DOLLARS ONE BILLION CEILING, BUT HAS BEEN ONLY PARTIALLY CAPITALIZED TO DATE.

BECAUSE OF THE ROLE THE SDAF SERVES IN PROVIDING AN EMERGENCY STOCK FOR US FORCES, ONLY WEAPONS STANDARD TO THE US INVENTORY ARE TO BE PROCURED.

Q THERE IS NO REDUCTION IN COST FOR FMS-FINANCED PURCHASES FROM THE SDAF, AS OPPOSED TO PURCHASES THROUGH THE REGULAR FMS PIPELINE.

ACTUAL COST VS. REPLACEMENT COST OF ISRAELI ACQUISITIONS

O ISRAEL, ALONG WITH ALL OTHER COUNTRIES, IS ELIGIBLE TO ACQUIRE SURPLUS STOCK FROM THE SERVICES AT "ACTUAL COST," I.E, AT THE COST THE SERVICE ORIGINALLY PAID FOR THE ITEM.

O NEW MATERIEL, NOT SURPLUS TO SERVICE NEEDS, MUST BE PAID FOR AT CURRENT REPLACEMENT COST. ANY ACQUISITION FROM NON-SURPLUS STOCKS NOT PAID FOR IN THIS MANNER WOULD REQUIRE THE SERVICES TO ABSORB THE ADDITIONAL SUM REQUIRED FOR REPLACEMENT.

O NO WAIVER FROM THE REPLACEMENT COST REQUIREMENT FOR NON-SURPLUS ITEMS IS GRANTED TO NATO OR OTHER COUNTRIES.

CURRENT US-ISRAEL ARRANGEMENTS

COLLABORITAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

O THE US AND ISRAEL ARE ALREADY ENGAGED IN A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE, INCLUDING JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING, JOINT EXERCISES, LOGISTICS PLANNING, AND PREPOSITIONING, CONDUCTED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE JPMG.

O "COLLABORATIVE DEFENSE PROGRAMS" WHICH EXIST IN THE NATO-US RELATIONSHIP ARE QUITE DIFFERENT IN SCOPE AND NATURE. THEY REFLECT THE UNIQUE NATURE OF POST-WORLD WAR II WESTERN EUROPE, WITH MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF US ARMS AND PERSONNEL PRESENT. IN NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES, FULLY SHARING IN COMMON USE OF FACILITIES AND INTEGRATED INTO A COMMON DEFENSE AGAINST A SINGLE, MUTUALLYAGREED THREAT

TWO-WAY DEFENSE TRADE

O THE 1979/1984 US-ISRAEL MOA ON DEFENSE SALES IS ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL IN SUBSTANCE TO THE MOA'S WE HAVE WITH TREATY ALLIES.

O WITH RESPECT TO THE VOLUME OF TWO-WAY DEFENSE TRADE, THOSE COUNTRIES WHOSE INVENTORIES AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY ARE LARGELY STANDARD WITH THE US INVENTORY POSSESS AN ADVANTAGE. THE ABILITY OF VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF NATO MEMBERS TO FORM A CONSORTIUM TO JOINTLY COMPETE FOR "BIG-TICKET" US PROCUREMENT BIDS ALSO PROVIDES AN ADVANTAGE.

C AT ALL TIMES, COMPETITIVENESS IS THE KEY CRITERION; DIRECTED PROCUREMENT OR QUOTA SALES LEVELS ARE CONTRARY TO US LAW AND CONTRACTING POLICY.

O IN ADDITION TO COMPETITIVENESS, SOME US CONTRACTS FOR DEFENSE SERVICES/MAINTENANCE SPECIFY THAT PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT MUST BE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF A SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.

O THESE RESTRICTIONS ARE BASED ON MILITARY OPERATIONAL READINESS CONSIDERATIONS, STEMMING FROM A NEED TO MAINTAIN MATERIEL WITHIN A SPECIFIC AREA AT ALL TIMES, INCLUDING DURING MAINTENANCE. THESE RESTRICTIONS ARE NOT INTENDED TO DISCRIMINATE IN FAVOR OF OR AGAINST ANY PARTICULAR COUNTRIES.

R&D AND PRODUCTION OPPORTUNITIES

O THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTS CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS, CONTAINED IN FY 1987 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION, TO EXTEND NUNN-QUAYLE COOPERATIVE PROJECT AUTHORITY TO ISRAEL, AS WELL AS OTHER NON-NATO ALLIES AND FRIENDLY COUNTRIES.

OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT AND OFFSETS

O ISRAEL IS AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS TO USE UP TO DOLLARS 300 MILLION PER YEAR IN OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY. THIS PROGRAM IS UNIQUE TO ISRAEL, AND THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO OUR WORLD-WIDE POLICY PROHIBITING THE USE OF FMS OR MAP CREDITS FOR THIS PURPOSE.

C AS NOTED EARLIER, ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS FOR

EXTENDING A MORE LENIENT POLICY ON WAIVERS OF NON-RECURRING COSTS CHARGES TO MAP RECIPIENTS IN NATO'S SOUTHERN TIER IS THEIR INABILITY TO USE MAP OR FMS ASSISTANCE FOR OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT.

O SIMILARLY, ISRAEL IS THE ONLY COUNTRY AUTHORIZED TO USE FMS CREDITS FOR DIRECTED COMMERCIAL OFFSETS. ALL OTHER COUNTRIES PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE IN OFFSET ARRANGEMENTS MUST USE NATIONAL FUNDS, AS OPPOSED TO FMS OR MAP CREDITS.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

O ISRAEL IS THE SINGLE LARGEST RECIPIENT OF US FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE WORLD. ALL FMS IS IN THE FORM OF FORGIVEN TREASURY CREDITS, AN ARRANGEMENT UNIQUE TO ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

TRAINING

O IN 1984, THE SEPARATE PRICING SCHEDULE FOR NATO AND SELECTED COUNTRIES WAS REPEALED IN FAVOR OF INCREMENTAL PRICING FOR ALL NATIONS, INCLUDING ISRAEL. IN 1985, CONGRESS REINSTATED THE FULL COST PRICING STRUCTURE FOR FMS RECIPIENTS, SUCH AS ISRAEL, BUT CONTINUED TO ALLOW REDUCTIONS FOR NATO COUNTRIES.

O CONGRESS TOOK THE POSITION THAT A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF ALL COSTS SHOULD BE SHARED EQUALLY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE STUDENTS ARE US OR FOREIGN. IN THE CASE OF NATO, REDUCTIONS IN PRICE WERE JUSTIFIED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND NATO THAT TRAINING COSTS WOULD BE BASED ON EQUITABLE RECEIPT OF RECIPROCAL BENEFITS.

ISRAELI ACCESS TO NATO MARKETS

O WHILE THE US HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE ISRAELI FIRMS WITH INFORMATION ON ACCESSING THE NATO MARKET, CONTRACTING POLICIES OF INDIVIDUAL NATO MEMBERS ARE DETERMINED ON A SOVEREIGN BASIS.

END TEXT OF NON-PAPER.

רחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 1 מתוך: 3
סווג בשגרה:		

תז"ח: 041400	א ל : לש'ממנכ"ל, מע"ת, סמנכ"ל אמית"ק, הסברה, כצמ"א, דו"צ ממ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ם לתקשורת, לע"ם
נר : 0036 ווש : 10 משהב"ם: 5.	ד ע : וושינגטון
	מאת : עתונות, ניו יורק

News Summary August 4, 1986

New York Headlines

The top story in the **New York Times** tells that the Soviet Union will allow Shcharansky's family to emigrate to Israel. (see Press Reports). Other page 1 stories deal with South Africa, Britain warned the Commonweath nations of the dangers of "economic warfare" in southern Africa. The Soviet economy still lags; Midwest farmers in the US have major grain storage shortages; and travel is up in the US but below expectations. Photo on p.1 shows Bush posing with US soldiers in the Sinai. Top story in the **Wall Street Journal** discusses the fall of corporate profits in US businesses. Headlines in the **Daily News** & **New York Post** deal with a young NY woman who murdered her ex-boyfriend in self-defense.

Presss Reports

Bush is Hopeful on Mideast Peace

NYT-Boyd-Bush said he believed peace would "certainly" come to the Mideast within a decade. Bush's view contrasted sharply with a bleak assessment of peace prospects offered by officials in Jordan on Saturday. A major reason for Bush's beliefs are that Arab leaders, he says, now see war as "costly." (see DN-AP)

Ex-PLO Aide May Join Hussein in Talks With Israel

NYP-Lathem-The former intelligence chief of the PLO has emerged as a possible partner with Hussein in Mideast peace talks. US officials traveling with Bush said they were told that Ahmed Caim is on a new list of potential members of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to talk to Israel. Officials said the new list was the reason why Bush is so optimistic about Mideast peace. The officials also reported that Peres asked Bush to give Hussein the message that he will be "flexible" as to who the king chooses to join him at the peace talks. Hussein also was said to tell Bush that he was pleased by Peres' trip to Morocco. While Bush aides cautioned that there was no sign of an immediate breakthrough, they said the willingness of both leaders to be flexible was a sign of major progress.

תאריך: 4.8.86	שם השולח: שרה דק	אישור:

כל + גלבוע שלחים לשלום עמיתים כרגע תנועה

Lebanon Kidnappers Deny Reports of Secret Messages

NYT-Hijazi-A statement published in Beirut that purported to come from Islamic Holy War denied that the group had given a freed hostage messages to carry to Reagan, the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury. It also repeated its threat that it would kill the other remaining hostages unless its demands are met. The group said it would negotiate with no one. Experts speculate that the group is embarrassed because it looks as though they are willing to negotiate and that perhaps they informally talked to Jenco about terms for freeing the hostages and that was misconstrued as some kind of formal message. (see ND-Gumucio)

Shcharansky's Family to Leave Russia

NYT-special-p.1-The mother and brother of Shcharansky have received permission to join him in Israel, the brother said. He said he was told last Monday that they would be free to leave the Soviet Union and must depart no later than August 23. His wife and two sons will be able to leave with him. Shchansky speculated that the Russians delayed the family's emigration in the hope of making a "big deal" on the eve of a summit meeting. Western diplomats said the approval was a sign that Gorbachev was prepared to resolve some human rights cases to improve relations with the West and limit unfavorable publicity. But they said that despite the Shcharansky case and others like it, there has been no improvement in the treatment of dissidents or an increase in the number of people allowed to leave. (see NYP)

Khadafy Bought Hostages to Kill Them

NYP-AP-Khadafy bought three hostages in Lebanon allegedly for $1 million each and had them killed in revenge for the US raids on Lebanon, a Congressman said yesterday. Rep. Robert Dornan (R-Calf.) said the bounty was paid to the captors of Peter Kilburn, and two British citizens, all of whom were found dead on April 17.

OPEC

NYT-Tagliabue-OPEC is bogged down in what experts believe is one of the most serious crisis in the groups history. Despite the political infighting, many people who follow the organization say much of the bitter dissent is more the product of psychology than of politics. OPEC is unable to deal without instant gratification. (WSJ-Ibrahim)

Art & Jewish Themes

NYT-Brenson (8/3) "Jewish Themes/Contemporary Artists II" is significant not so much for the quality of the work--although some are first-rate--as for what it says about the possibilities for art in the post-modern era. The exhibition suggests that the more the past recedes, the more the Jews are brought back into it. There seems to be a need among these artists in their 30's to examine the Holocaust.

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36/10/5 3/3

Media Notes

New Network Signs Many Stations Across US

NYT-AP-The Fox Broadcasting Company moved closer to its goal of becoming a network with nationwide coverage by signing affiliation agreements with 79 stations. The stations represent practically every major market and give Fox coverage of 80% of the US.

CBS-Tisch

WSJ-Barnes-CBS Inc. directors, increasingly uneasy about the intentions of Larry Tisch, the company's largest shareholder, have been seeking to force the investor to disclose his plans for the broadcaster. They are concerned that Tisch is trying to take control of the company without a legal tender offer.

PUSH Ends Boycott of CBS

NYT-AP-The civil rights group Operation PUSH will end its 11-month boycott of WBBM-TV in Chicago, because it has improved its minority hiring practices.

ITONUT

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אל: ווש , בטחון , נר: חורם 181, מ : המשרד
דח: ב, סג: ס, תא: 040886, זח: 1530

בהול/סודי.

רובינשטיין-למדן.

דע:מנכל משהם,מנכל אוצר,לשכת רוהמ'
סואש - סוקציות של דראפ' שכבה 25 ו- 28
לאור המצב שנוצר עם קבלת החיקונים של מתיאס ואורנם בשלואם
ברור שאנו עומדים בפני מצב סרוך מאד פעילות גלוי'ה מדי נגד
התקדן מחשידה אותנו ואין במעם כל ספק שהחשדות אלו יופיעו
בתקשורת במוקדם או במאוחר,בולל המאמצים לפעול נגד קבלת
הטעיף.מאידך אין ספק ש'ש לפעול למען הורדת הטעיף - אני
ממשיך להיות בדיעה ש'סבוב' הטעיף אולי הדרך העדיפה,דהיינו
בקו שנקמת בו בשיחתך עם מתיאס

האם לדעתך היה נא בחשבון טעיף המדבר אך ורק על אישור מחדש
של האמברגו של מועבי'ם מבלי נקימת צעדי עונשין אמריקאים חד
צדדים.יתכן שהצעה מעין זו היתה יבולה לענות על כמה
מהדאגות שמתיאס השמיע מאחר והיא עוקפת את הסוגיה של
ההתחיבות של אהיב למדינות נאט'ו
ברור שיש להמשיך בניהול בכל הסוגיה הואת בהירות דבה ביותר
של מנת שלא יוצר הרושם שלו נתנה ברים דומן בנד
ב'מו,דהיינו י'שעל האש הגנב בועד הכובשי'
בר אוו-86 8 4-299(3).

אס.

מפ: שהם,דהם,מנכל,ממנכל,מצפא,פרימור,מאפ,אוקיאניה,
שרהאוצר

דף...1...מתוך...4...דפים
מזוג בשתוני.....
דחיפות.....
תאריך וחתימה August 4 1986
שם ומס' מבצע.....

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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לשכת השלחן ב'

אל:הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, ממנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח
דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY
MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1986
SAT., AUG.2 & SUN., AUG. 3, 1986

MAJOR NEWS HEADLINES

TOP STORY: PRESSURING THATCHER FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA
Leaders of six Commonwealth nations began a three day meeting this week to press British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to take sanction actions against S. Africa and to discuss that country's policy of apartheid.
Wash. Post: Leaders Try for Pact On S.Africa: 6 In commonwealth Oppose Thatcher, Push For Sanctions
USA Today: Pressure Is On For sanctions

REAGAN'S ATTACK ON DRUGS
President Reagan began a a drug abuse crusade this week and he blamed entertainers, musicians and actors for making drugs popular and he called for their help in his anti-drug campaign.
USA Today: Drug War; Reagan Enlists, Hits Hollywood

NICARAGUAN LEADER ORTEGA GETS ADVISE
Rep. Robert Dornan gave Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega image propping advise. Ortega is currently on a U.S. tour aimed to rally opinion against the Reagan administration's support for the contras.
Wash. Post: For Ortega, A Taste Of Political Image Building

ב+1 מלבו תפקידי פרץ שטחים התאפשרות

2/4 24 68 063

NEWS ARTICLES AND ANALYSIS

DISSIDENT'S KIN TO EMIT U.S.S.R.: SCHARANSKY FAMILY GAIN PERMISSION TO LEAVE FOR ISRAEL

Wash. Post, Frankel: Freed Soviet dissident Anatoly Scharansky said that his mother Ida, brother Leonid and other family members would be allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union to Israel. He attributed the release decision to a recent thaw in Soviet-Israeli relations that may result in the resumption of diplomatic ties between the two countries. He said that U.S. diplomatic pressure also contributed to the decision to release his family. Friday, officials said that Israel and the Soviet Union would soon meet in western Europe. (8/4/86)
Phil. Inq.: Scharnasky's Family to Leave Soviet Union
Wash. Times: Dissident's Kin may Immigrate

ISRAEL LINKED TO ARMS DEAL

Chic. Trib, Frantz: Another add in the already strained U.S.-Israeli relationship - the Bermuda affair. The Israeli govt. last Friday reaffirmed its denialof having any involvement in a scheme to smuggle $2 billion worth of American-made weapons to Iran. Samuel Evans, among those indicted in connection with the operation and the lawyer who set up the deal, reportedly said on a secretly tape recorded conversation said that he expected to meet with Defense Minister Rabin to discuss the weapons deal plan. In other recordings he said that he had met with Defense Ministry officials who pledged their cooperation in the scheme. 202 tape recorded conversations were made during a four-month undercover operation. The undercover informant in the deal, Cyrus Hashemi, claimed that the plan had been approved by Israeli defense officials. On April 21, 13 men, four among them Israelis were charged with conspiracy to sell weapons to Iran which has been prohibited by the U.S. since 1979. The implicated Israelis include: Abraham Bar-Am, a retired general arrested in Bermuda in April, Rafael Eisenberg and his son Guriel, and Isaac Hebroni. In May, those arrested in Bermuda were extradicted to the U.S. All ten defendents in custody have pleaded innocent. Hashemi, the financier-turned-informant died two weeks ago. (8/3/86)

LAWMAKER: LIBYAN PAID TO HAVE THREE HOSTAGES KILLED

Phil. Inq, Wilson: Rep. Robert K. Dornan said that Gadhafi bought three hostages in Lebanon and had them killed in revenge for the U.S. raid on Libya. The three men were found dead two days after U.S. air strikes on Libya on April 17. A Reagan administration officials said the Dornan account may be true. The three hostages murdered were American Peter Kilburn, and British citizens Philip Padfield and John Douglas. (8/4/86)

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NEWS ARTICLES, CON'T

BUSH SAYS MIDEAST PEACE IS RIPE FOR PEACE; Officials Cite Hassan Talks

Wash. Post, Hoffman: Vice President Bush predicted that a "comprehensive peace" could be established in the Middle East within a decade and that there is increasing consensus among Mideast nations for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He said there is a notable change in mood in the region. One official described this change as a greater desire to negotiate. (8/4/86)

SUSPECT LIST LONG IN SPATE OF BEIRUT BOMBINGS: MOTIVE MAY BE TO DESTROY SYRIAS CREDIBILITY, FOIL ITS CONTROVERSIAL SECURITY PLAN

Wash. Post, Boustany: The string of car bombs in Beirut this past week has led to speculation that Syria's attempt to crackdown on the several militias operating in Lebanon is being resisted. Three bombs have left 58 dead this week and numerous injured. Some believe that the Hezbollah group and other groups with anti-Syrian motives may be behind the recent violence. (8/3/86)

SEPHARDIM STRADDLE ISRAELI, ARAB PEACE HOPES

Chic. Trib., Broder: Sephardim, or Jews from Arab countries, are emerging as potentially important factors in any future peace precess in the Middle East. Increasingly, Sephardim sense that a basic change is occuring among moderate Arab states and their attitude toward Israel. These Israelis have ties in both spheres - to their homelands and to Israel - and their importance lies in that they understand the Arab mentality and therefore can help facilitate contacts. The intermediary role that Rafael Edri, a Moroccan born parliamenatarian played recently alongside Prime Minister Peres during the Peres-Hassan talks, is an example of the potential bridge-like role Sephardim can fulfil. (8/3/86)

THE FATE OF PALESTINIANS: The Arabs Too, Give Them Second-Class Status

Wash. Post, Massarueh: Palestinian refugees in Arab countries face harsh circumstances as do those in the Israeli occupied territories. Their problems however, are somewhat different and center around how to support their families, and how to get work permits and visas. The apathy in the Arab world toawrd Palestinians borders on total disregard and racism. some of these refugees problems stems from the declining economic situation in the Arab world these last few years. The prospects for Palestinians working in the Gulf states, for example Kuwait - changes in the labor market will leave 1.5 expatriate workers jobless. (editorial, 8/3/86)

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NEWS EDITORIALS

THE MIDDLE EAST MEETING THAT BROKE TABOO

Wash. Post, Kirkpatrick: The Peres-Hassan meeting was an act of substantial importance which did not receive the public attention that it deserved. The meeting broke the most important taboo of Arab politics. This is no small development given that Arab governments are serious in denying the existence of the Israeli state. The Morocco meeting threw spotlights on some significant facts about the current Mideast situation. It clarified that the rejectionist position toward Israel is only strongly supported by radical Arab states today; Syria, Algeria and Libya. Syria alone broke diplomatic relations with Morocco, thus revealing that it holds the extremist rejectionist position. Also, evidence has been mounting indicating Syria's role in terrorism. Nevertheless, Syria's Assad has been fairly successful in cleaning up his image and has recently attempted a more salient tole in Mideast politics. Strengthening Assad, however, is not in U.S., Israeli or moderate Arab states interest. The Peres-Hassan meeting is a reminder of the alternate choices open the the U.S. in Middle Eastern politics. (editorial, 8/4/86)

Deborah Stone
Itonut

(16)

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

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סוג ... פנימי
דח...מהור...דחוף
סווג בסחוני..סמור
דחיפות..מידי
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מספר מברק.....

אל: מצפ"א ממנכ"ל
דע: לשכות מנכלי אוצר,משהב"ט, רוהי"מ

קונגרס;חוק גרי והסיוע לישראל

1. כזכור, לפני זמן מה פסק בית המשפט העליון שהמֻבָּצַע שקבע החוק לקיצוץ אוטומטי נוגד את החוקה. בשבוע שעבר אישרה מליאת הסנט (36;63) מֻבָּצַע חליפי, חוקתי, פירוש הדבר: השיטה של קיצוץ אוטומטי בתקציב (אם המטרות שהציב החוק לצמצום בגרעון לא יושגו בדרך אחרת) בעינה עומדת.

2. להזכירכם, הבעיה החוקתית היתה של ערוב סמכויות בין הזרוע המבצעת והזרוע המחוקקת. ביצוע הקיצוץ האוטומטי היה בידי החשב הכללי הכפוף במידה מסוימת לקונגרס, בעוד ביצוע התקציב אמור ע"פ החוקה להיות בידי הממשל. כעה הסנט החליט שה Office of Budget and Management השייך במלואו לממשל,הוא שיהיה אחראי לקיצוץ האוטומטי. החלטה זאת עתידה להידון ב- conference בין שני הבתים,והדעה נותנת שתתקבל.

3. ע"פ חוק גראם רודמן, על הגרעון הפדרלי להצטמצם בשנת 1987 לכדי #144 ביליון דולר. ב 15 דנא חובה על ה- OMB וה- CBO (המשרד הקונגרסיונלי לתקציב) להגיש "הצלום מצב" אודות התחזיות לגודל הגרעון לשנת 1987. אם התמונה תציין גרעון הגדול בעשרה ביליון או יותר מהסכום הנ"ל (וכך אומנם מעידים מהסימנים רבים והניתוחים הכלליים) יופעל מנגנון הקיצוץ האוטומטי.

4. בנפרד הערכנו שכל הנראה תאשר מליאת בית הנבחרים את מלוא הסיוע המבוקש לישראל— 3 ביליון דולר. אולם אם הקיצוץ האוטומטי אומנם יצא לפועל, ישראל לא תהיה מחוסנת, ותצטרך לספוג את הקיצוץ ביחד עם היתר. יש אומנם להניח שהממשל והקונגרס יפעלו ככל יכולתם למנוע קיצוצים דרסטיים ערב הבחירות בנובמבר,אולם אם רוב התחזיות בדבר מימדי הגרעון יתאמתו, לא יהיה מנוס מכך.

יוסי למדן

למדן

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

052

סוג פנייה
דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים
סווג בטחוני סודי
דחיפות רגיל
תארין וזמן אוג' 4 1700
מס' קבלת

אל: מצפ"א. מחנכ"ל.
דע: לשכות מנכ"ל אוצר. משהב"ט. רה"מ.

בית הנבחרים: סיוע חוץ

1. כמדווח, בבית הנבחרים עבר תהליך ההקצבה לסיוע חוץ שני שלישים מדרכו: ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות ומליאת ועדת ההקצבות. כעת נותר השליש האחרון: מליאת בית הנבחרים, והסימנים מעידים שזה יהיה השליש הקשה: ככל שהדיון הופך לרחב יותר, הוא הופך לפומבי יותר והמקים לביקורת על הקצבה נדיבה לארבע מדינות - ישראל, מצרים, פקיסטן ואירלנד, תוך קיצוץ משמעותי ביתר - הילך וגדל.

2. להזכירכם, שלפני הדיון בועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות לא היתה ודאות מוחלטת האם היו"ר דיויד אוביי, יציע לשמור על רמת הסיוע למדינות הללו כפי שביקש הממשל, או שיציע קיצוץ אחיד לכולם, ואז אחד החברים היה מציע תיקון ה"שומרי" על ישראל, עם חשומת הלב והפרסומת השלילית שהיו ללא ספק נלוות לצעד כזה. בסופו של דבר פעל אובי כפי שקיווינו וכפי שהבטיח לנו, והותיר לממשל לחלק את הסכום שנותר לפי ראות עיניו.

3. גם לפני הדיון במליאת הועדה היו דיבורים על הצעה לקיצוץ אחיד. בסופו של דבר לא הוגש תיקון כזה, ומליאת הבית תדון בהצעה (כפי שהוגשה בתחילה) ה"שומרתי" על ארבע מדינות תוך שהיא מקצצת בשליש עד חצי ליתר. במהלך הדיון התבטא אפילו יחיד מובהק כמו ג'ק קמפ בנוסח ש"ההצעה בסדר גמור אלא חי במזרח התיכון, אבל היתר?". רוח הדברים שהושמעו בתמצית: אופן חלוקת המשאבים מבטא אמנם אינטרסים, אך אינו מבטא מדיניות.

4. במידה רבה, זיהה גם עמדת הממשל. בשלנו 866 נוסח מכתב מג'יימס מילר מנהל ה- OMB לראשי הועדה המודיע שאם הצעת החוק תתקבל, הוא ימליץ לנשיא להטיל עליה וטו, מהטעם שההגבלות שמטילה ההצעה על הוצאת כספים מעבר לתקרה מסויימת פוגעת ביכולת הממשל לנהל מדיניות חוץ. בינתיים נראה שמילר הסכים לקחת חזרה את המכתב אולם התבטאויות פומביות ופרטיות של דוברי ממשל, לפיהן אין מעצמה הרוצה לתפקד ככזאת, יכולה להגביל את עזרתה (ואת תהום השפעתה) לאזורים מצומצמים ביותר, בעינן עומדות.

5. ייתכן שהדיון במליאת בית הנבחרים יתקיים בשבועיים הקרובים, עוד לפני הפגרה ומוקדם לדעת מה יתרחש שם (או בסנט שטרם פתח פורמלית בתהליכים). לא מן הנמנע שגם במליאה נשמע התבטאויות בעד קיצוץ אחיד, שמקורן לאו דווקא בחוסר אהדה לישראל או ליתר המדינות המוגנות אלא ברצון כן להמשיך ולשמור על רמת הסיוע - וההשפעה - גם באזורים אחרים. בכל מקרה, עפ"י הידוע לנו כעת לא צפוי שנתקל השנה בבעיות קשות במיוחד. והסיוע לישראל יאושר כנראה ברמת

אשתקד - 3 בליון דולר.

6. כמובן שאין להוציא מכל ההתבטאויות הניאל שיקולים פוליטיים פנימיים. הממשל תמך בחוק גראם-רודמן והמתנגדים לחוק (ואובי וקמפ בתוכם) טורחים להדגיש שאם רוצים למלא אחריו אזי אין ברירה אלא ללמוד לחיות עם האילוצים שיצר. כייב ודאי לא נגרע חלקם של שיקולים מפלגתיים נשנת בחירות זאת. בכל זאת, העובדות מדברות בעד עצמן: חוק גראם-רודמן מחייב הקיצוץ. פנים, תוך שהוא שומר ואף מגדיל הוצאות הקשורות בהגנה. עדיפויות הקונגרס, ובעיקר הבית-הדמוקרטי ברובו - הפוכות.

7. למזלנו, לפחות בנושא אחד - הסיוע לישראל - קיימת, נכון לעכשיו, זהות אינטרסים בין הממשל והחוקקים. הסיבה לאינטרס הניאל ידועה ואין צורך להרחיב את הדיבור. אולם אם, כפי שהסימנים מעידים, ההקצבה לסיוע בכלל אומנם תחשיך להצטמצם בשנים הבאות, אין שום ודאות למרות הרצון הטוב, שחלקה היחסי של ישראל, הגדל פרופוציונלית לקיצוץ בצעדי ענק, יוכל להשמר. בל נשכח שתהליך ההקצבה ל-87 הוא הראשון המתקיים תחת צילו של חוק גראם-רודמן. אם השנה יכולנו לתאר אירומים שנמוגו בטרם מומשו, אין שום ודאות שנוכל לצייר בשנה הבאה תמונה דומה; ככל שהקיצוץ המתחייב מחוק גראם-רודמן ילך ויעמיק, יקשה על ידידינו (בגבעה ומחוצה,לה) העומדים על השמר הסיוע לישראל למנוע הוצאת האירומים הללו מן הכח אל הפועל.

טובה הרצל

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

סודי ביותר
סודי
דחיפות רגיל
תאריך וז"ח Aug 4, 1986
מספר מברק

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19 53 046
המשרד בטחון נ.א.

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח. ניו יורק

Aug 4, 1986 תדרוך לעיתונאי מחמ"ד ליום

TIME: 12:30 P.M. - EDT

DATE: MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1986

BRIEFER: CHARLES REDMAN

Q Chuck, do you expect that Mr. Shultz and Mr. Schevardnadze will follow-up on the exploratory talks held between Murphy and Polyakov in Stockholm a few weeks ago, which will include discussion of the Middle East issues?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any details on the exact agenda other than to reiterate what I just told you, that they would review all of the areas which were addressed by the President and the General Secretary in the summit in November. And as usual, these talks are expected to cover all of the areas of the US-Soviet relationship. You know those areas. But beyond those general comments, I'm not prepared now to give you any details on the--

Q The five areas that the President mentioned in his speech, which does not include the Middle East--this is why I'm asking about specifically if the Middle East will be the main topic or among other topics discussed there. If you want to take this question and give us an answer later on--

MR. REDMAN: I don't think we're going to be in a position to start confirming details of the agenda now, no.

Q (Off-mike) related topic, do you have any comment on meetings between Israel and the Soviet Union which may re-establish diplomatic relations?

Aug. 8, 1956

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MR. REDMAN: Before I go to that question, let me give you my second announcement--which is, that an on-the-record briefing will be held today at 2:00 P.M. in this room regarding a new bilateral aviation agreement with Switzerland. The agreement calls for substantial deregulation of airfares between the United States and Switzerland, enable Swiss Air to serve a new US city, and it contains other important provisions. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation Affairs, Jeff Shane(?) will be speaking. That's at 2:00 here in this room.

Now, your question concerning Soviet-Israeli relations--

Q --Israeli diplomatic relations, meetings to that effect?

MR. REDMAN: My answer is that I have no specific comments. And to refer you to both Israel and the Soviet Union for specific reports.

I could do is say what we have said in the past which is that it has been our consistent position that Israel should enjoy diplomatic relations with the widest possible number of foreign governments.

Q Do you have anything on the reports of discussions on consular relations to be satisfy the phrase that you just used, the diplomatic relations?

MR. REDMAN: If I said I had no specific comments on these talks and for what these talks, as reported, are meant to do or could lead to, I would have to refer you to the governments involved. I simply reiterated our general position concerning the question of diplomatic relations.

Q Can you tell us then, Chuck, whether the United States has been involved or will be involved in facilitating these meetings between the Soviet Union and Israel?

MR. REDMAN: These are meetings between the Soviet Union and Israel.

Q So the United States will not be involved officially on it?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any comment on our role.

Q Do you anticipate, if a consular section will be established between Moscow and Israel, that now the Soviet Union will be in the driver's seat when it comes to the point of the five Security Council members for an international conference in the Middle East?

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MR. REDMAN: The question is hypothetical and speculative. I'm not going to deal with it, no.

Q It is not hypothetical because of the fact that Bernie Kalb said a few weeks ago, or a few days ago, that one of the conditions for the Soviet Union to be a participant or to be considered for participation in an international conference is to restore diplomatic relations with Israel.

MR. REDMAN: What we've said on that question is that, when people have asked, What are the kinds of things -- kinds of things -- the Soviet Union could do to show that it is willing to play a responsible role in the Middle East, one of the things on that list has included establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. There have been other things on the list, such as a more forthcoming position on Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union, ending support for regimes like the Qaddhafi regime. And it is in that context that the question of relations with Israel has arisen. Yes?

Q The President would like the members of his cabinet to take voluntary drug tests to set an example for the rest of the country. Do you happen to know Secretary Shultz's position on that?

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't, nor have I seen this position of the President to which you make reference -- in those terms, in any case.

Q It's in an interview with Newsweek, and it's going to be part of an announcement today. He specifically spells out that he would like his cabinet to do so. Can you take the question of finding out the Secretary's view?

MR. REDMAN: I'll look at it as it comes forth.

Q Do you have any comment on the attack by Iranians against a U.S.-owned tanker in the Gulf?

MR. REDMAN: Nothing that will help you very much, other than to say that the tanker Mercedes is a Liberian tanker with an Italian crew and owned by a U.S. company. And beyond that, to say that the United States has repeatedly stated the importance we attach to the principle of freedom of navigation, and our determination to maintain open access to the Gulf.

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Aug 4, 1982

Q Do you have any reaction to, or assessment of, Mr. Bush's trip to the Middle East, and his difference about the possibility of peace within a decade with one of his entourage senior official, I think State Department official?

MR. REDMAN: What is your last question?

Q He was -- you know, the assessment that he said that within a decade there will be peace in the Middle East, and a State Department official said, you know, he laughed it out or something like that. Or you know, he wasn't giving it credibility. He said it's not possible that peace within a decade will be in the Middle East. . . --

MR. REDMAN: I did not see those comments reported in that context at all. I could tell you, as we've said in the past, that we are engaged in a process in the Middle East, a process looking towards the initiation of direct negotiations between Israel and credible Arab interlocutors. By its very nature, progress will be of a step by step sort. We remain committed to a negotiated peace between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors -- that by way of a general exposition of U.S. policy, but without direct comment on your question.

Q Is Mr. Shultz planning a trip to Syria in the near future?

MR. REDMAN: He has no plans to go to the Middle East.

Q On the last question -- credible Arab interlocutors. This is something, a new definition that you are putting in your answers about the Middle East -- credible. This used to be before by Mr. Murphy about credible Palestinians, now you are "credible Arabs". What is -- there is credible and noncredible? Can you explain what you mean by "credible" here?

MR. REDMAN: No, I can't help you any further on that. Let me go to this fellow here who didn't get the first question asked.

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Q What would be the impact do you think on the relations between Austria and the U.S. in case the Justice Department decides to bar Waldheim from entering? Do you think it would be a wise decision in the light that it's the head of state of a friendly country who doesn't even plan to come to the States in his next six years -- I mean, understandably. And at the same time, the discussion showed that for the first time since '45, there was a strong tendency of anti-Americanism in Austria. It's unique. So what do you think the result will be? When can we expect it, and what's the official position? And don't you think it would be a double standard in the light that the White House didn't avoid to receive people like Marcos or the Shah, which I don't think have been innocent or had an innocent conscience?

MR. REDMAN: The answer to your question is relatively simple, in that no decision has been taken, as of now, by the Justice Department. And therefore, since no decision has been taken, any commentary on any possible decision would by hypothetic1 and I don't see any reason to engage in that.

Q Yeah, but when can we expect this decision?

MR. REDMAN: You'll have to talk to Justice.

Q Chuck, do you have any comment on Congressman Dornan about Qaddafi and the American, buying American hostages and killing them?

MR. REDMAN: I can only refer to what we said in the immediate timeframe about that question. So I'd start by saying that these reports aren't new, in effect. Following the murder of two British hostages in April, British Foreign Secretary Howe publicly implicated Libya in those two murders. I don't have any details to add beyond that.

Q How about the American?

MR. REDMAN: As I said, I have no other details to add.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Islamic Jihad statement--can we stay on that for just a second? You're saying that the situation has not progressed at all--the US investigation, or the US information on Qaddafi's role, if any, in Peter Kilburn's death, has not progressed since the timeframe of the original reports, is that correct?

Aug 4, 1986

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MR. REDMAN: What I said was, I have no other details to share. That's all I'm saying.

Q Well, all right. The question is, then, has the US investigation of Peter Kilburn's death, if any--if any investigation--progressed since Sir Geoffrey Howe linked Qaddafi to the deaths of two British hostages who may have been held with Kilburn?

MR. REDMAN: On the more general question of investigations, what you call an investigation, clearly the United States is intensley interested any time one of its citizens is murdered abroad. As a consequence we do everything we can to look into those cases and obtain the maximum amount of information possible. But in answer to your specific question concerning this case, the answer is, I don't have any comment.

Q Do you have any comment on the Islamic Jihad's latest statements, threats, to kill the remaining three Americans, or, and other statements they made to an-Nahar?

MR. REDMAN: Nothing beyond what is really the minimum we can say, which is we have to deplore such threats against innocent civilians.

Q Is there anything on the timetable of when the report that President Reagan requested from MacPherson and Shultz on Southern African development in his South Africa speech will in fact be ready?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything on that.

Q What can you tell us about the American who is reported to have been missing in the Bekaa?

MR. REDMAN: What I can tell you is that it concerns an American by the name of Fiak Wareh, W-A-R-E-H--

Q What's that name?

MR. REDMAN: Wareh, W-A-R-E-H; F-A-I-K, although that may

may be a transliteration. I'm not sure of that Faik Wareh -- his family in the United States contacted the Department July 29th to advise that he was traveling from Beirut to Damascus, probably by road, through the Bekaa Valley, and is about four weeks overdue at his destination in Damascus. Our embassies in both capitals are making inquiries about Mr. Wareh's whereabouts.

In conjunction with that, I will take the occasion to reiterate that we have a long-standing advisory against any travel to Lebanon, noting that the situation there is extremely hazardous. The Bekaa Valley in particular is dangerous for Americans.

Q Why was he traveling in that area?

MR. REDMAN: Because of the Privacy Act, I can't give you any other details as to the nature of his business there.

Q He was born in Syria. Do you know if he had any Syrian traveling papers, or if he was traveling with a U.S. passport?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know.

Q Can you spell his last name --

MR. REDMAN: The spelling I have is Wareh, W-A-R-E-H.

Q Last week, Bush also said in Cairo that significant progress has been made in terms of talks between -- not talks, rather, relations between Israel and Jordan. Was he referring to recent progress, or the progress in the last six months? He said that no progress was made in terms of direct negotiations, but that King Hussein did want to resolve disputes regarding the West Bank.

MR. REDMAN: I'd refer you to the Vice President's party. He has a press corps traveling with him, and I'm sure those kind of questions will be asked.

Q You've come -- go ahead.

Q The Schcharansky family has now apparently gotten exit visas from the Soviet Union. Have you got reaction to that? And also, Anatoly Schcharansky said that this came about because of additional pressure from the State Department. Can you illuminate that statement for us?

Aug 4, 1986

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any comment on what you refer to as additional pressure, other than to say, as you all know, that we've been extremely interested in this case, as well as in many, many other cases of a similar nature. And we continue to work all of those cases to the best of our ability.

Concerning the story, we do have indications that it's true, but we have not yet been able to confirm it directly. We welcome this news, if true, as a positive gesture. We hope it's a sign of Soviet determination to move forward with significant, sustained progress on Jewish emigration.

Q Chuck, on the American in the Bekaa', do you know whether he is a U.S. government employee?

MR. REDMAN: He is not A U.S. government employee.

Q Does his family live in Florida?

MR. REDMAN: Are we going to play 50 questions?

Q No, no, no. It's not. I have a friend by this name who lives in Jacksonville, Florida. I want to know if this is my friend who is missing. Is his first name F-a-i-z or F-a-i-k?

MR. REDMAN: What I have is F-a-i-k, and because of the Privacy Act, I just can't you any more information on him.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

סודי ביותר

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סוג בטחוני: שמור

דחיפות: מיידי

תאריך וז"ח: 4 אוג 86 1420

סימוכין: מצפ"א

אל:

המשרד

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אל :- מצפ"א , ממ"ד

שיחה עם ביל ברנס

א. אמר שהבוקר מסר לפוינדקסטר הערכתו שאף אם תסתיים פרשת טאבה אין להעריך שהמצרים ירצו שהחתימה תהיה בנוכחות סגן הנשיא. הוא אמר שמקורות שהערכתו תהיה מוטעית.

ב. לגבי חוסין - ברה"מ (מכתב ממ"ד 309 מ-20.7) אמר שההזמנה לחוסין קיימת מזמן וחוסין שולף אותה כל אימת שרדבר בנוח לו. לא ידע על מועדים או הכנות קונקרטיות כלשהן כמו כן לא ראה שינוי משמעותי לגבי מקורות אספקת הנשק של ירדן.
איבני יודע להעריך אם תניל הוא מתוך מעקב אחר המאורעות או מתוך אי ידיעה משום שאינו מעורכן.

ג. אשר ליחסי מצרים - ירדן (מכתב ממ"ד 313 מ-24.7) הוא כמומחה למצרים, עליה כתב ספר, רואה בעיקר את הזווית המצרית וחשיבות שמצרים מייחסת להיותה מקובלת על העולם הערבי באמצעות מחוות לאש"פ וכי יחסיה לאש"פ מורכבים (הבדלי תגובות ביחס לביקור רה"מ במרוקו, למשל) הוא אמר עוד שלפעמים מצרים אינה מתיחסת לנתק "לזמן קצר או ארוך" שיש לירדן עם אש"פ בקובעה עמדותיה בסוגייה. לא ידע דבר על נסיון חוסין לקרב את מצרים לסוריה, כשם שאינו מאמין שחוסין ישיג דבר כלשהו בנסיונותיו אצל אסד כלפי צדאם חוסיין. הערכתו היא שחוסין נזעק לאסד כדי לשוב ולהדגיש שהשליח המרוקני ששהה בירדן בסמוך לביקור זכי ירדן אינה משחקת מאחורי גבה של סוריה. לחוסין יישנה הסתייגות מאופן התנהגותו של המלך חסן, כולל עניין ביקור רה"מ וחששו של חוסין הוא שהביקור עלול להאדיר את אש"פ, בסופו של דבר.

ד. אשר לנושא המטחים (חוזם 163) טען שהתכנית גרנדיוזית, ללא כיסוי מעשי וכספי. ידע שסגן הנשיא הודיע על העברת 4,6 מליון דולר מעודפים בסעיף סיוע מסוים לכוון סיוע ליוש, אך אמר שזה רק צעד ראשוני בהליכי אישור ארוכים שצריכים לעבור דרך הגבעה וממנה למשרדי א.י.ד. בעמאן כדי לדון על מטרת ההוצאת. לדבריו, יעבור עוד זמן עד שהדבר יתממש.

ה. ביקש לשמוע הערכה על המצב במלחמת המפרץ ויחסי הכוחות איראן - עיראק. תודרך קצרות הערתו היתה שהבעיה היא כיצד להמחיש לצדאם חוסין שהרצון למנוע השתלטות חיומיניסטית על עיראק אין פירושו תמיכה אוטומטית בשאיפותיו האישיות של צדאם.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

סוג סכרה

דף...2...מתוך.....דפים

סווג בסחוני.....

דחיפות.....

תאריך ודיית.....

[redacted].....

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ו. ביקש תדרוך על דרנס אפיה אך הצעתי מועד אחר בשל קוצר הזמן.

ז. אמר שמראשית ספטמבר יתמנה AL KEEL המכסה נושא ה- NSC ב- OMB בסגן לפרינדקסטר ובמקומו של פורטיר, הרתוק למחלתו, בהעדר טגן מצא ברנס עצמו מדווח עד עתה לפיטר רודמן, מכרנו.

מ ת נ י

כלנקוד

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** יוצא שמור
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אל: וש, נר: 544, מ : המשרד
רח: ב, סג: ש, אא: 030886, ח: 1800

שמור/בהול

אל:מנכ"ל שגרירות ישראל-וושינגטון

מאת:אמנון נויבך,יועץ בלכלי לראש הממשלה
בתגובה למברקכם מיום 28.7.86 מס. 728, בנושא מדיניות ארה"ב
על מדיניות המים כמהי"ת- עניכם הנאמן עוסק בנושא במשרד ראש
הממשלה.

אנא הודיעו לגבי SUARR כי תיצור אתי קשר בהקדם האפשרי.

אמנון נויבך.

ג.ש.

נפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,מצפא
חח: נויבך ממרהמ

דחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	דף: 1 מתוך: 4
סווג בטחוני:		
תז"ח: 031300	א ל: לש'ממנכ"ל, מע"ח, סמנכ"ל אמית"ק, הסברה, מצפ"א, דו"צ ממ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ס לתקשורת, לע"מ	
נר: 0025 וש: 3 משהב"ס: 4.	ר ע: וושינגטון	
	מאת: עתונות, ניו יורק	

NEWS SUMMARY AUGUST 2-3, 1986

New York Headlines

Top stories in the Sunday NY Times deal with South Africa. The leaders of the Commonwealth nations are urging Thatcher to back sanctions. A recent poll in South Africa shows a rise in Whites' distaste for Apartheid. Also on p.1, a clash between democratic Senators and Congressmen and the Reagan Administration is looming over Justice Rehnquist. The FBI is seeking to determine whether Senator Jesse Helms passed intelligence information over to the Chilean Gov't. Headlines in Daily News, Newsday and a top story in the Times tells of the death of lawyer Roy Cohen. It is said that the controversial attorney died of Aides.

Columns

DN & ND 8/3 Kirkpatrick "Hassan Lays It on the Line for Israel" By openly talking to Peres, Hassan broke ranks with Arab rejectionists on the basic question of dealing with Israel. It was an act of substantial importance that Americans do not seem to realize. Already Mubarak says he feels less lonely and if Hassan can talk to Israel maybe Jordan will do the same. Syria's role has been clarified. It is the only state that broke diplomatic relations with Morocco. This comes at a time when Assad is seeking to polish his image, but it is clear that he is the principle supporter of the most extreme rejectionist position. Hassan's opening to Israel and Assad's rupture of relations should remind us of the choices and opportunities available in the Mideast. When we turn a blind eye to Syria's destructive role, we strengthen violent adversaries and encourage other nations in the region--such as Jordan and Iraq--to look to Syria.

NYP 8/2 Evans & Novak "Bush's Travail" The failure of Bush's effort to allow Wolf Blitzer to enter Jordan cast a shadow over his Mideast tour. It was too much to ask of a troubled state that is home to a million Israel-hating Palestinians and borders powerful Syria.

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Press Reports

Bush Differs With Jordanian on Peace Prospects

NYT-Boyd 8/3-Bush arrived in Egypt after disagreeing with the Jordanian PM about the prospects of advancing Mideast peace. Bush said in a press conference that he senses agreement that an atmosphere exists to advance the peace process. But PM Rifai was less optimistic. He said Jordan's immediate objective was to help the Palestinians in territories occupied by Israel, who, he said, were under "rather heavy-handed occupation." He also said Bush brought nothing new from Peres. (see NYP-Lathem 8/1. Photo NYT-p.1 8/1 of Hussein and Bush on boat in Aqaba)

Hassan Plays Middleman

NYT-Miller 8/3Hassan's meeting with Peres was the sort of dramatic surprise that the king relishes. Morocco is by no means a key player in the Arab-Israeli dispute, but Morocco carries special weight in Arab circles. Relations between Hassan and Hussein of Jordan are strained. Hussein has decided not to follow Hassan's example. Hassan has weakened the Arab taboo against meeting with Israel. But he apparently has not given the peace process the jolt he intended.

PLO Struggles to Keep Mandate

NYT-Wren 8/3-The PLO, frustrated by attempts to wage both war and peace since its expulsion from Lebanon, is now struggling to protect its mandate to be the sole representative of the Palestinians in any Mideast settlement. According to Palestinians sources in Tunis, the closure of Fatah offices in Amman and Hassan's meeting with Peres, has divided the PLO leadership. PLO officials predicted that the organization would recat to the latest developments by increasing armed operations against Israel any by seeking unity among the fractious Palestinian groupings. "We have no opion but to increase our military activities against occupation," Arafat said. Saleh Khalef, a top PLO aide maintained that "armed struggle is permanent politics for the PLO and cannot be a reaction to any political action." Arafat repeated a pledge he made not to attack targets outside of Israel.

Israeli Faulted in '82 Is Named Attache

NYT-Kifner 8/2-An Israeli general who was reprimanded and stripped of his command for his role in the Palestinian masscares in the Palestinian quarters of Beirut in 1982 was named military attache to the US. The Washington assignment that Maj. Gen. Amos Yaron will take is considered one of the most prestigious in the Israeli military. In Washington a Pentagon official who knows Yaron said he is held in high regard in military circles and added that the general's role in Israel's invasion of Lebanon would make no difference. (Cabled 8/2)

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Israel-USSR Ready to Renew Relations

NYP-Dan 8/2-For the first time in nearly 2 decades, the Soviet Union and Israel may establish diplomatic ties. A meeting to create consular relations is expected to take place somewhere in Western Europe within the next few days, sources said.

Jenco Gives Reagan Message

NYT-Weinraub 8/2-Jenco gave Reagan a private message from his Shiite kidnappers and implored them to release the remaining hostages. The White House later issued a statement saying the captors would be responsible for the remaining hostages. (see NYP-AP)

NYT-AP 8/3-A statement that purported to come from Islamic Holy War rejected any negotiations with the Reagan Administration, the Pope or the Archbishop of Canterbury. The message again threatened to kill the hostages if demands were not met.

NYT-Shipp 8/3 Thousands in Jenco's home town came out to welcome him

Bombs in Beirut

NYT-Hijazi 8/2 A large bomb exploded at a busy intersection in Christian East Beirut killing one and wounding 30. It was the second attack in the Christian area in 5 days and the third bombing in the capital this week. (see photo of wrckage NYT 8/3)

Palestinian Extradicted in Achille Lauro Case

NYT-AP 8/2-A Palestinian suspected of providing false passports to the hijackers of the Achille Lauro has been extradicted to Italy from West Germany. Salek Hamade had requested political asylum and was refused. A second Palestinian, convicted in absentia in Italy, continued to be questioned in West Berlin. Yussef Nasser was arrested on charges of possessing a false passport.

Summer in Sinai for US G.I.'s

NYT-Wren 8/2-p.2-The assignment to the Sinia is a shock for US servicemen. They are employed in static positions and told to avoid confrontations. The daily enemy is not terrorism, but boredom.

OPEC at Impasse

NYT-Taqliabue 8/3-An emergency meeting of OPEC ministers ended in virtual shambles amid recriminations that Saudi Arabia was seeking to depress oil prices to cripple Iran's war effort against Iraq.

Waldheim

DN-Rainie 8/3-The seating of Waldheim as president of Austria and commander in chief of its armed forces apparently violates the State Treaty of Austria--its most important constitutional document--because the treaty bars any ex-Nazi from serving in the

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military. This disclosure was made by Rep. Steve Solarz who said that he urged the Reagan Administration to seek Austrian compliance with the 1955 treaty.

Milestone for Conservative Judaism

NYT-Cummings 8/3-The first large Conservative congregation placed a woman in a pulpit role. Rabbi Leslie Alexander began an appointment as assistant rabbi of Adat Ari El in Los Angeles. The Conservative Movement sees this as a major historical milestone.

Letters

NYT-8/2-Rafi Danziger and Phil Baum, of the American Jewish Congress, berates Ted Turner for participating in a shameful coverup by not allowing Israel to participate in the Good Will Games.

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דחיפות:	**מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק**	דף: 1
סווג בטחוני:	**טופס מברק**	מתוך: 4
תז"ח: 011330	א ל: לש'ממנכ"ל, מע"ת, ממנכ"ל אמית"ק, הסברה, מצפ"א,דו"צ ממ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ס לתקשורת, לע"מ	
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News Summary August 1, 1986

New York Headlines

Photo on page 1 of the Times shows delegations of Israelis and Egyptians holding seperate talks on Taba strip. The trip's purpose was to let each side point out its proposed border before the dispute goes to arbitrators. Senate hearings on Justice Rehnquist continues to be front page news in the Times and in Newsday. Reagan refused to allow members of the Senate to see internal memorandums that Rehnquist wrote when he worked for the Justice Dept. under Nixon. The documents dealt with issues concerning civil rights, civil liberties, wiretapping and surveillance of radical groups. It has also been found that a 1969 deed to a second Rehnquist home has a 'whites only'clause. Also on page 1 of the Times, the US and Japan has resolved a bitter trade dispute concerning the sale of microchips; the Senate Foreign Relations Committee defeated a proposal to mandate the withdrawal of all American investment from South Africa. But a majority of the panel clearly favored imposing severe sanctions on the Pretoria Gov't. The Air Force said it was planning a nwe fleet of unmanned rockets and would close its new shuttle-launch facility on the West Coast. The US and Soviet Union concluded a round of talks on ways to improve methods for verification of underground testing of nuclear weapons and agreed to meet again in Sept. On the local front, the Times discussed the power of Irish politicians in NY. The Wall Street Journal's top story deals with the continuing problems for farmers due to the drought in the southeast. The New York Post headlines the problems of drugs in NYC.

Editorials

NYP **"Jordan's 'Moderation' Unmasked"** Wolf Blitzer, an American citizen, was denied entry into Jordan because he is the Washington Bureau Chief for the Jerusalem Post. This is a small, but instructive incident--worth remembering the next time someone discusses the "moderate" Jordanians and their yearning for peace with Israel. The mere fact that Blitzer works for an Israeli newspaper is sufficient reason for Hussein's Gov't to refuse to allow him entry. And people wonedr why its tough to get Hussein to the negotiating table.

תאריך: 1.8.86	שם השולח: שרה לין		אישור:

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Press Reports

Jordan to Funnel US Aid to West Bank

NYT-Boyd-US officials said that the Reagan Administration had decided for the first time to funnel through Jordan a portion of US development aid for Palestinians living in Israeli-occupied territories. The decision is expected to make it more difficult for Israelis to determine how all American aid is spent in the territories, as they have been able to do until now. The US also appeared to be seeking to provide Hussein with US support in his dispute with the PLO. A senior US official said the change in the aid program did not reflect a major policy shift. Nevertheless, it lends US support to a key goal of Hussein, who has called for a 5-year, $1.2 billion economic and social development plan for the area. The official said the US aim was a desire by Shultz and others to improve the lot of the Palestinains. It is unclear why the announcement was made by an official in the US and not by Bush who is in Jordan. The US overture appears aimed at continuing American efforts to enable peace talks to get underway by bolstering Palestinian leaders who are not closely associated with the PLO or Arafat. (NYP-AP)

Blitzer is Bumped

NYT 7/31 King & Weaver-Blitzer has been invited, uninvited, invited and univited once again in his quest to cover Bush's trip to Jordan. Bush aides insist that they wanted him there but a Jordanian official called Blitzer saying he would not be permitted to enter. This is just the type of attention Bush's staff hoped to avoid. (see DN)

Beirut

NYT-Hijazi-Two devestating car bombings in as many days has generated fears that unless the country's continuing political deadlock is broken, another cycle of violence is unavoidable. With Christian hostility to the Syrian role in Lebanon becoming more pronounced, concern is growing that East and West Beirut may remain on a collision course during the remaining two years of Gemayel's term. The Christians are blaming the Syrians for the increased attacks and Syria is blaming Israel.

Palestinian Terrorist Trained in Syria

NYP-AP-A Palestinian suspect in the West German disco bombing was trained in Libya and two accomplices in another attack were trained in Syria, according to prosecutors.

Former Hostages Reunited

NYT-AP photo of Rev. Jenco embracing Rev. Weir, another American who had been held hostage in Lebanon.

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OPEC

WSJ-Ibrahim-After 4 days of inconclusive negotiations on a scheme to voluntarily cut oil production, OPEC turned its attention to an Algerian proposal that would assign obligatory quotas. There is little hope such a plan would work. Delegates report that the cartel seemed to be heading nowhere and operating with little genuine resolve.

Magazine Articles On Assad and Mengele

Penthouse 8/86 Laqnado (Senior Associate of Jack Anderson) "Syria Must Be Our Next Target" Assad is more active in support of terrorism than Khadafy. He is also responsible for many more American deaths. The US persists in focusing attention on Libya rather than Syria because of State Dept. Arabists who have prevailed on Reagan to follow a hands-off policy toward Syria. Large sections of the State Dept. believe we must "get along" with Assad. But Assad only dispatches more terrorists to strike against additional American targets. Damascus has become the terrorist capital of the world yet the State Dept. protects the Assad regime. During the Lebanon war of 1982, Syria was directly responsible for the attacks on the Marines. Instead of pushing for a showdown with Syria, State Dept. Arabists persuaded Reagan to pressure Israel instead. They repeatedly argued that Israeli "aggression" was at the root of the problem. Once Israeli troops were out of Lebanon, our diplomats said, the Syrians would be much more compliant and would stop their anti-American attacks. The Israelis did leave. The Syrian Army stayed. That is just what the Soviets wanted. But the State Dept. experts dismiss Soviet support for Syria as well. They argue it is not due to Syria's policies but for the US support for Israel. The diplomats insist that if only the US were friendlier toward Syria, the Russians would disappear from Damascus. US policymakers have failed to learn an important lesson: to appease a bully only prompts him to strike again.

Penthouse-Lagnado-An article and interview with some of Mengele's twins, children who were used in horrifying experiments. They have never gotten over the experiences.

Penthouse-Posner-The author interviews Rolf Mengele. Rolf has become the only Mengele family member to break ranks and speak to the public.

Media Notes

NYT-Correction-A Tel Aviv dispatch by AP, on Israel's planned explusion of 45 American-born black Hebrews, misidentified the Mayor of Dimona. He is Eli Halleli; Jacques Amir was his predecessor.

ND-Goldman-2 page article on Gordan Van Sauter, the head of CBS News.

NYP-Fanto-Joan Lunden of ABC's "Good Morning America" has reached an agreement with the network on a new contract that gives her equal

billing with David Hartman, whose own future with the show is uncertain. If Hartman leaves, Lunden's partner is expected to be Stone Phillips of ABC News.

NYP-Gross-Channel 5, now owned by Ruppert Murdock, has a new late-night news-magazine called "A Current Affair." Maury Povich is the anchor of this disappointing show. The show is unsure of whether it will be serious or entertainment.

Letters

NYP-Queens resident writes that the Peres-Hassan summit was an event of great historical significance. An Arab leader had the courage to meet with an Israeli leader, a major accomplishment.

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official text

DATE: 08/01/86

U.S. POLICY REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING (4590)
(Text: State Department special report)

The United States is committed to a national security policy which includes both a strong deterrent to aggression and an active pursuit of deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in Soviet and American nuclear arms as well as effective verification arrangements for existing limitations on nuclear testing. Under existing conditions, neither a comprehensive ban nor a moratorium on nuclear testing would enhance the cause of security, stability, or peace. This special report sets forth the principles underlying U.S. policy toward limitations on nuclear testing.

Recent Developments

Shortly before this special report went to press, the White House announced that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to have experts meet, without preconditions, to discuss issues related to nuclear testing. An initial meeting of experts was held in late July 1986 at Geneva.

As this report details, the United States has long sought a meeting with the Soviets to present our concerns about the verification provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). This meeting of experts allows the United States to present its ideas and concerns to the Soviets -- and to hear Soviet concerns. The United States is ready to present and discuss our views on verification improvements in existing agreements which we believe are needed and achievable at this time. If we are successful in addressing these verification concerns, we would move forward on ratification of these two treaties.

A Collective Security Issue

The maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent has for four decades ensured the security of the United States and the freedom of our allies and friends. Therefore, while a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of the United States and while we are actively investigating technologies that could one day reduce and ultimately eliminate our dependence on offensive nuclear arms for our security, nuclear weapons will remain the key element of deterrence for the foreseeable future. During such a period, where both the United States and our friends and allies must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression, nuclear testing will continue to be required.

A carefully structured nuclear testing program is necessary to ensure that our weapons are safe, effective, reliable, and survivable. The directors of both the Los Alamos and Livermore national weapon laboratories have stated that, while non-nuclear tests sometimes detect problems with the nuclear component of warheads, the most serious problems with the nuclear weapons stockpile are only revealed and solved by actual nuclear testing. Even a seemingly minor modification in a weapon design could seriously undermine confidence in the weapon's effectiveness unless the modified design can be tested with a nuclear yield. Testing also allows us to take necessary steps to modernize our forces to counter the continuing Soviet military buildup, particularly in offensive nuclear capabilities.

The United States has long sought to achieve agreement with the

Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations that could strengthen security for all nations. In 1963, both sides ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. The LTBT also prohibits the release of radioactive debris outside the boundaries of the state conducting a nuclear explosion. In 1974 and 1976, respectively, the United States and Soviet Union signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. These treaties prohibit underground nuclear explosions having a yield that exceeds 150 kilotons. Neither side has ratified the TTBT or PNET, but each has stated that it would respect the 150 kiloton limit.

Verification Problems and Soviet Violations

The United States is not currently seeking ratification of the TTBT and PNET because we cannot effectively verify Soviet compliance with the 150-kiloton threshold on underground nuclear explosions. The remote seismic techniques we must rely on today to monitor Soviet nuclear tests do not provide yield estimates with the accuracy required for effective verification of compliance. Nor will the treaties' verification provisions solve this problem. The TTBT itself provides only for an exchange of data. This data would be of limited value in verification and, in any event, cannot be independently validated by the U.S. government. This means, for example, that we would have no way of knowing whether the Soviets were providing data for all geophysically distinct testing areas. Yet if the Soviets withheld such knowledge from us, they could conduct high-yield tests in excess of 150 kilotons that, from the perspective of a seismic observer outside Soviet boundaries, could appear to fall within the 150 kiloton limit.

The verification provisions of the PNET Protocol would not resolve the problem of TTBT verification because they are not applicable to weapons tests. They would permit mandatory onsite inspection only of peaceful nuclear explosions -- and then only in very restrictive circumstances. Specifically, onsite inspection is mandatory only for a group of explosions whose aggregate yield exceeds 150 kilotons. In fact, since 1976 the Soviets have not conducted any group nuclear explosions of the size which would have required them to permit such inspection. Thus, even if we were to ratify the treaties and implement their verification provisions today, our concerns regarding Soviet compliance with the TTBT would not be resolved.

These verification deficiencies have become a matter of great concern in light of the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements including existing limitations on nuclear testing. As stated in the president's December 1985 "Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements," the Soviet Union's testing practices have resulted in the release of radioactive debris and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the LTBT. The report notes that Soviet venting has occurred on numerous occasions. In his 1984 report, the president concluded that "while the available evidence is ambiguous, in view of ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and in view of verification uncertainties, and (while) we have been unable to reach a definitive conclusion, this evidence indicates that Soviet nuclear activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the TTBT." In his 1985 reports the president reiterated this concern, finding "that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the TTBT of 1974...."

U.S. Presidential Initiatives

President Reagan has long advocated a dialogue with the Soviet Union to arrive at the required improvements in monitoring procedures for effective verification of the TTBT and PNET, which are the necessary first steps if there is to be progress in the area of nuclear testing limitations. The United States has taken the following initiatives:

-- On several occasions in 1983, the United States unsuccessfully sought to engage the Soviet Union in discussions on verification improvements to these treaties.

-- In September 1984, the president proposed, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly, that the United States and the Soviet Union

find a way for Soviet experts to come to the U.S. nuclear test site and for our experts to go to the Soviet test site to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

-- In July 1985, the president invited Soviet experts to come to the U.S. test site to measure the yield of a U.S. test with any instrumentation devices they deemed necessary for measuring yield. There were no conditions or requirements for a reciprocal visit. The president's purpose was to begin a process to build confidence and cooperation between our nations regarding limitations on nuclear weapons testing.

In December 1985, the president proposed to General Secretary Gorbachev that U.S. and Soviet experts on nuclear testing limitations meet in February to discuss our respective verification approaches and to address initial tangible steps to resolve this issue.

The President's Proposal of March 1986

In his most recent initiative, on March 14, 1986, the president urged the Soviet Union to begin bilateral discussions to find ways to reach agreement on essential verification improvements of the TTBT and PNET. The president provided General Secretary Gorbachev with a technical description of a specific method known as CORRTEX, which is an accurate method for measuring the yield of a nuclear explosion (see Appendix 1). The president also proposed, on a unilateral basis, that Soviet experts visit our Nevada test site in April to discuss verification methods, examine the CORRTEX system more closely, and monitor a planned U.S. nuclear weapon test. The president stated that if the United States and the Soviet Union could reach agreement on the use of an effective verification system incorporating CORRTEX, the United States would be prepared to move forward with the ratification of the TTBT and PNET.

The president's proposal offers an opportunity for the Soviets to demonstrate that they take testing limitations seriously and recognize that compliance with such agreements is necessary. The United States must stand by its standard of effective verification with respect to the TTBT. Anything less would harm U.S. security interests, undermine our ability to demand effective verification in other arms control areas, and undercut the objectives of the TTBT.

Comprehensive Test Ban

A Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains a long-term objective of the United States. As long as the United States and our friends and allies must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression, however, some level of nuclear testing will continue to be required. We believe such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability and when we have achieved broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces. For our part, the United States is energetically pursuing negotiations and discussions with the soviet Union on concrete steps in all of these areas. We have made clear our strong and continuing view that Soviet calls for an immediate and unverifiable nuclear testing moratorium are not a basis for meaningful progress to this end.

At the same time, the United States has supported international discussion of verification and compliance problems related to nuclear testing limitations. Discussions have taken place in past years at the multilateral Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, in both a technical-level ad hoc group of scientific experts and in the Nuclear Test Ban Working Group. We continue to support consideration of scope, verification, and compliance issues related to a CTB in these two groups at the CD.

APPENDIX 1

CORRTEX System of Direct Yield Measurement

CORRTEX (Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiment) is a hydrodynamic yield measurement technique that measures the propagation of the underground shock wave from an explosion. This technique uses a coaxial cable which can be emplaced in a hole parallel to the device emplacement hole. Precise measurements are made of the length of the cable by timing the return of low energy electrical pulses sent down to, and reflected from, the

cable end. When the nuclear device is detonated, a shock wave emmanates through the ground, crushing and shortening the cable. The rate by which the cable length changes is recorded via measurements of the changing pulse transit times. This rate is a measure of the propagation rate of the explosive shock wave through the ground which is, in turn, a measure of the yield of the nuclear explosion.

CORRTEX has been shown to be accurate to within 15 percent of the more accurate, radio-chemical yield measurements for tests of yield greater than 50 kilotons and in the geologic media of the U.S. test site in Nevada. Use of CORRTEX-measured yields at the Soviet Shagan River test site should provide accuracies to within 30 percent. The U.S. estimate is based on its use in over 100 tests with the sensing cable in the device emplacement hole and four tests with cables in a satellite hole. The accuracy of the technique is believed to be relatively, but now wholly, independent of the geologic medium, provided the satellite hole measurements are made in the "strong shock" region near the nuclear device explosion. At greater separation distances, the properties of the medium become much more important factors. A satellite hole separation distance of 14 meters (46 feet) is appropriate for a test near 105 kilotons.

The electronic device that provides the timing signals is a battery-powered, suitcase-sized unit that may be remotely controlled. All equipment for power, recording, and data reduction can be contained in a small trailer.

APPENDIX 2

The President's Letter to Majority Leader Dole, March 7, 1986

In early 1986, the U.S. Congress debated a joint resolution "To Prevent Nuclear Testing." The president expressed his reservations with regard to this resolution in a letter dated March 7, 1986, to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole. Referring to provisions of the resolution, the president noted: "They would undercut the initiatives I have proposed to make progress on nuclear test limitations issues, and they would set back prospects on a broad range of arms control efforts, including the achievement of deep, stabilizing, and verifiable arms reductions." Following is the full text of that letter.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1986

Dear Bob,

As you know, on February 26 the House of Representatives passed H.J. Res. 3, "To Prevent Nuclear Testing," and this issue is now before the United States Senate. The resolution calls for the immediate ratification, without needed verification improvements, of both the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). It also calls for the resumption of negotiations with the Soviet Union toward a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), despite the fact that the U.S. government has made clear its very serious reservations in taking such a step under present conditions.

Any limitations on nuclear testing must be compatible with our security interests and must be effectively verifiable. Because of the continuing threat that we face now and for the foreseeable future, the security of the United States, its friends and its allies must rely upon a credible and effective nuclear deterrent. A limited level of testing assures that our weapons are safe, effective, reliable and survivable and assures our capability to respond to the continued Soviet nuclear arms buildup. Such testing, which is conducted underground, is permitted under the existing agreements on nuclear test limitations, all of which the United States fully complies the with -- the TTBT, the PNET, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).

A CTB remains a long-term goal of the United States. However, it must be viewed in the context of achieving broad, deep and verifiable nuclear arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, a greater balance in conventional forces and at a time when a nuclear deterrent is no longer as essential an element as currently for international security and stability.

A first, priority step toward this goal is the pursuit of equitable and verifiable arms reductions in the current negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and space arms. We are, at the same time, seeking Soviet agreement to enhanced verification measures for the TTBT and PNET and are discussing verification problems of a CTB at the

Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Our concerns are heightened by the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with its arms control obligations, including current agreements on limiting nuclear testing.

Our efforts to achieve essential verification improvements include three approaches to the Soviets in 1983 to engage in discussion. In 1984 I proposed an exchange of Soviets land U.S. experts to measure directly the yields of tests of nuclear weapons at each other's test sites. In mid-1985, I unconditionally invited Soviet experts to measure such a test at the Nevada Test Site, bringing with them any instrumentation devices they deemed necessary. In December, 1985, I proposed to Secretary General Gorbachev that U.S. and Soviet experts on nuclear testing limitations meet in February, 1986, to discuss our respective verification approaches and to address initial tangible steps to resolve this issue.

Regrettably, the Soviet Union has thus far not responded either to the serious U.S. concern in this area or to any of our initiatives to address these concerns in a constructive manner.

The actions called for by H.J. Res. 3 do not serve the interests of the United States, our allies and our friends. They would undercut the initiatives I have proposed to make progress on nuclear test limitations issues, and they would set back prospects on a broad range of arms control efforts, including the achievement of deep, stabilizing, and verifiable arms reductions.

Sincerely,

Ron

APPENDIX 3

Lessons of the 1958-61 Moratorium

The United States does not believe that a testing moratorium is a prudent, effective, or constructive step along the path toward our goal of a safer world. A look back at the 1958-61 testing moratorium demonstrates why the United States believes that moratoria are never acceptable substitutes for negotiated, equitable, and effectively verifiable arms control agreements.

There were three unilateral, voluntary pledges to suspend testing in the late 1950s: the United States and the United Kingdom acted in 1958, followed by the Soviet Union in 1959 (although the Soviets suspended testing in November 1958). These suspensions amounted to a de facto moratorium. There was, however, no joint formal agreement. Thus, given a de facto moratorium by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union beginning in late 1958, the question is: who was the first to resume testing? The verdict of history is clear: it was the Soviet Union.

The following is a chronology of key statements and actions related to the 1958-61 moratorium:

1958

March 31. The Soviet Union unilaterally suspends testing after a major test series but just prior to an announced U.S. test series. The United States and the United Kingdom reject the Soviet call to suspend testing, but President Eisenhower proposes a meeting of technical experts to study the practical problems regarding international control of an agreed disarmament program.

July 1. An exchange of letters between Eisenhower and Soviet leader Khrushchev results in the convening of a Conference of Experts in Geneva to study the problems of verifying a test ban.

August 21. The Conference of Experts reports that it is technically feasible to establish a workable and effective system, using available capabilities, to monitor compliance with a worldwide suspension of nuclear testing.

August 22. Based on the experts' report, Eisenhower proposes trilateral negotiations on a verifiable test ban. He also expresses willingness to suspend testing for one year (on a renewable basis) beginning October 31, 1958, the date of the opening of the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The United Kingdom follows suit.

September 23. The United Kingdom ends testing series begun in May 1958.

September 30. The Soviet Union resumes testing.

October 30. As promised in August, the United States ends testing. The Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Testing

convenes the following day.

November 3. The Soviet Union ends testing.

November 7. Eisenhower states that, in light of Soviet tests after the opening of the Geneva conference, the United States considers itself free from its pledge. He adds that the United States, nevertheless, would continue the testing suspension and hopes the Soviet Union will do the same.

1959

January 5. The United States reopens the verification issue based on the finding by U.S. seismic experts that earlier assessments by the Geneva experts regarding verification of underground tests were too optimistic. The Soviets refuse to consider the new U.S. data.

August 26. Eisenhower extends U.S. moratorium until the end of the year. Two day later, the Soviets pledge "not to resume nuclear test...if the Western Powers do not resume the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Only in the case of resumption by them of nuclear weapons tests will the Soviet Union be free from this pledge." It should be noted that given the Soviet emphasis on "resumption," the term "Western Powers" can only refer to the United States and the United Kingdom -- the only Western Powers to have tested at that time.

December 29. Eisenhower denounces the intransigence of Soviet technical experts in Geneva, who refuse to address deficiencies in seismic monitoring of underground nuclear explosions. He announces that "the voluntary moratorium on testing will expire on December 31. Although we consider ourselves free to resume nuclear testing, we shall not resume nuclear weapons tests without announcing our intention in advance of any resumption. During the period of voluntary suspension of nuclear weapons tests the United States will continue its active program of weapon research, development and laboratory-type experimentation."

December 30. Khrushchev states that the Soviet Union would not resume testing until the "Western Powers" resume.

1960

February 13. France, which had indicated its intention to become a nuclear power as early as March 1957, conducts its first test.

April 1. France conducts a second test.

December 27. France conducts a third test.

1961

April 25. France conducts a fourth test.

May 15. The Soviet Union states that "if France continues" testing, the Soviet Union would be compelled to test.

August 30. Although the French have not conducted another test, the Soviet Union announces it would resume testing -- contrary to its statements of August 28, 1959, and May 15, 1961.

August 31. Khrushchev tells visiting British parliamentarians that he decided to resume testing with a bomb of unprecedented proportions to shock the Western Powers into negotiations on Germany on his terms, and into accepting his demand that Geneva test-ban negotiations be merged with those on general and complete disarmament.

September 1. The Soviet Union resumes atmospheric testing.

September 5. President Kennedy authorizes underground testing, which resumes on September 15.

November 4. The Soviet Union concludes its test series, of over 40 tests, including the largest single explosion in history.

November 7. Seven months after the Soviet warning against continued testing, France conducts a fifth nuclear test.

The preceding chronology clearly demonstrates that the Soviets broke their own pledges as well as the moratorium then still being observed by the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, Khrushchev's candid admission of August 1961, and the size of the ensuing test series, undercuts arguments that French testing or Eisenhower's December 1959 statement in any way "justified" the Soviets' breaking of the moratorium. Indeed, Soviet evidence of bad faith was so clear that, in an address to the American people in March 1962, Kennedy summed up the experience as follows:

On September 1 of last year, while the United States and the United Kingdom were negotiating in good faith at Geneva, the Soviet Union callously broke its moratorium with a two-month series of more than 40 nuclear tests. Preparations for these tests had been secretly

underway for many months. Accompanied by new threats and new tactics of terror, these tests -- conducted mostly in the atmosphere -- represented a major Soviet effort to put nuclear weapons back into the arms race....

Some may urge us to try it (a moratorium) again, keeping our preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep topflight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain date in the future. Nor can large technical laboratories be kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for some other nation to break an agreement. This is not merely difficult or inconvenient -- we have explored this alternative thoroughly, and found it impossible of execution.

President's Statement, March 14, 1986

I want to make an announcement today concerning the question of limitations on nuclear testing, an important arms control area which has been the subject of special correspondence which I have had recently with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, the leaders of six nations known as the New Delhi Group, and Senate Majority Leader Dole.

I have conveyed to General Secretary Gorbachev today a new, very specific, and far-reaching proposal concerning nuclear testing limitations, a proposal which could be implemented immediately. In this new initiative, I urged the Soviet Union to join us without delay in bilateral discussions on finding ways to reach agreement on essential verification improvements of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET).

In the field of nuclear testing, as in arms control generally, effective verification is a central element. It has also long been one of the most difficult problems to resolve. We are seriously concerned about the past pattern of Soviet testing as well as current verification uncertainties and have determined that a number of Soviet tests constitute likely violations of obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974. The inadequacy of the monitoring regime provided for in that agreement is underscored by the Soviet Union's own questions concerning the yields of particular U.S. tests, all of which, in fact, have been below the 150-kiloton threshold.

The United States places the highest priority in the nuclear testing area on finding ways of ensuring effective verification of the TTBT and PNET. I have already made several specific suggestions to the Soviet Union in this regard. My new initiative is a further attempt to build the necessary basis for confidence and cooperation between our nations regarding such limitations.

As a reflection of our resolve to make tangible progress, in my new proposal I identified to Mr. Gorbachev a specific new technical method -- known as CORRTEX -- which we believe will enable both the United States and USSR to improve verification and ensure compliance with these two treaties. This is a hydrodynamic yield measurement technique that measures the propagation of the underground shock wave from a nuclear explosion. I provided to Mr. Gorbachev a technical description of CORRTEX designed to demonstrate how this method will enhance verification procedures.

To allow the Soviet Union to examine the CORRTEX system more fully, I further proposed that Mr. Gorbachev send his scientists to our Nevada test site during the third week of April 1986. At that time, they could also monitor a planned U.S. nuclear weapons test. I would hope this would provide an opportunity for our experts to discuss verification methods and thus pave the wave for resolving the serious concerns which have arisen in this area.

In making this offer, I made clear to General Secretary Gorbachev that, if we could reach agreement on the use of an effective verification system incorporating such a method to verify the TTBT, I would be prepared to move forward on ratification of both the TTBT and PNET.

What is unique about this new initiative is its specificity and concreteness and the detailed new technical information we have provided to the Soviet Union in trying to solve these verification uncertainties. It is important that the Soviet Union engage with us now in this first practical step to improve the confidence we each must have in treaty compliance with the 150-kiloton threshold on underground tests. If this can be achieved, we believe we will have significantly improved the prospects for verifying other arms control agreements as well through improved verification regimes.

(Note: The president's March 7 letter to Senate Majority Leader Dole, to which reference is made in the above statement, is included in Appendix 2.)

DATE: 1 AUG 1986

RE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MARKUP OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SANCTIONS BILL
ATMOSPHERE: HECTIC, AT TIMES CONFUSED
PRESS: LIVE C-SPAN, TV, PRINT

The major area of interest for us was the introduction of an amendment by Senators Mathias and Evans which could have the affect of cutting U.S. military aid to Israel, if the President determines that Israel is supplying weapons to South Africa in violation of international sanctions. It passed by 10-7 on the third vote on the amendment.

HIGHLIGHTS

Specifically, the Mathias-Evans amendment states that within 179 days of passage, the President shall conduct a study of which countries supply arms to South Africa in violation of the sanctions, with the view of terminating U.S. assistance to those countries. The termination of this aid would take place in a year, at the option of the President, and only if South Africa did not take serious steps to deal with apartheid by that time.

The amendment was passed 11-5, defeated 8-9 and then passed again 10-7 in a series of confusing votes, in which members were not always totally sure whether a "yes" vote was for or against the amendment.

The opposition to the amendment was led by Senators Murkowski, Boschwitz and Zorinsky, with Cranston and Helms also voting against it three times.

The first vote was taken shortly after 8 AM, with many proxies and amid confusion on what it meant. Mathias-Evans passed 11-5. Pell, who was apparently unclear as the the implications for Israel during the first vote, with the support of Murkowski, offered an amendment to reconsider two hours later; they prevailed 9-8, deleting the more harmful aspects of Mathias-Evans. All would have been well if the process had stopped at this point.

Senator Dodd then began to complain that he had cast a "wrong vote" when he supported the Pell amendment; Senator Biden then came in from the Renquist hearings to say that his proxy, which had been cast by Senator Pell, was not how he would have voted. Senator Kerry then introduced an amendment to restore Mathias-Evans. This passed 10-7, with Mathias, Evans, Kassebaum, Lugar, Trible (by Proxy--he was at former governor Dalton's funeral), Dodd, Sarbanes, Eagleton, Biden, and Kerry voting for the amendment; and Murkowski, Boschwitz, Pressler, Helms, Pell, Zorinsky, and Cranston voting against. Israel was never mentioned in the actual debate in the committee.

Comments by members outside of the markup

Dodd told me that he felt he had to be consistent--he could not vote against killing people by fire irons in South Africa and then vote that supplying weapons was acceptable. He said that his first vote (against Mathias-Evans) was wrong and he had hoped for a chance to rectify this mistake. He said that "Israel must do what it wants, but we (the U.S.) have our own obligations also. ... We must have a moral foreign policy toward South Africa".

Kerry used the same line of reasoning and told me that the cut of aid in a year would be at the discretion of the President and thus would never happen. He said that he offered his amendment at the request of Dodd and Biden, who felt that they were inconsistant when they had voted against Mathias-Evans. He said, "don't worry, no one seriously will cut aid to Israel because of this".

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Evans claimed that he did not have Israel in mind when he suggested the amendment and would let the Presidential study determine which nations were involved. He told me that the amendment would not even come into play for a year and should only be seen as another way to show South Africa that the U.S. is serious. (Committee sources indicated that they had the clear impression that the authors had Israel specifically in mind when they drafted the measure).

Zorinsky told me that he had discussed the implications for Israel with Dodd and others and was surprised at Dodd's switch. Boschwitz also discussed this with Dodd.

3. LJD - DB - Rather than reopen this part of the debate on the Senate floor, it is our intention to deal with the matter in conference.

It should be noted that we have raised this possibility with Israeli officials for quite some time and always been assured GOI is in compliance with embargo. If that is true, our Senate friends are fond of pointing out, then Israel has nothing to worry about. It should be clear by now that South Africa is as popular here as Syria and Libya are in your town. No one cares about excuses for GOI dealing in arms with South Africa.

Disposition: delete

12

028

אל:מ/מנכ"ל ,סמנכ"ל פרימור

דע:לשמנכל בטחון

סנט: סנקציות על דראיפ- שלנו 25, 27 לבטחון

נודע לנו על אפשרות של דיון במליאת הסנאט כבר ביום ג' (5) הקרוב, אם כי הדבר אינו סופי.אי לכך נודה לדגובכם ,ולו הראשונית, לשלנו בסיוכין.

ט.ה.

קישור לקונגרס

16

ממשלת ישראל - משרד האוצר

אל: המשרד

מאת - שר

025 27 9

סוג בטחוני: סודי
מידי
תאריך וז"ח: 11815 אוג 86

אל: מ/מנכ"ל, ס/מנכ"ל פרימור, מא"פ, מצפ"א, אוצ'אנ"ס
דע: מנכ"ל, מנכ"ל בטחון, מנכ"ל האוצר, לשכת רוה"מ.
השגריר פרטוריה
נספח צה"ל, רמש"ז

הפוצה מצומצמת

סנס: סנקציות על דרא"פ

נהמשך לשני מברקיי הקודמים בנדון מהיום

1. במענה לפנייתי הטלפונית אתמול (31.7) התקשר הסנטור מתיאס לפנות ערב היום (1.8). בזהירות רבה הסברתי לו את אי-הנחת שלנו מהתיקונים תוך שימת הדגש לא על התוכן אלא על הכיסוח אשר דורדאל לא במתכוון (כביכול) חתכה האילו מכוון נגד ישראל.
2. מתאיים אמר מייד שלא היתה כוונה כלשהי לפגוע בישראל ושאל כיצד ניתן לתקן את המעוות. השיבותי לו כ"הנשב בקל רם" שאם הכוונה היא לזהות את כל המדינות המפרות את האמברגו, יש גם להת לכולן להבין שהם At risk .
לא ייתכן שארה"ב תזהה את כל החרסאים, אך תעניש רק מקבלות הסיוע. מתאיים אמר שהוא מסכים עם הגיון זה, אך בעת הכנת התיקונים הגיעו למסקנה שלארה"ב יש "מנוף" על מקבלות הסיוע בלבד, ולא על מדינות אחרות. שאלתיו, תוך היסוס רב, מה דעתו אם תוזכר הפסקת ש"פ עבאי עם מדינות שלישיות ע"י הפסקת הסיוע למדינות מקבלות. מתאיים הגיב באמרו שזו "מחשבה מעניינת" וכן "תרומה מועילה". עם זאת תהה באם תוספת כזו תתנגש בהתחייבויות ארה"ב למדינות נאטו. ואם לא מוטב לאיים בפגיעה ביחסים כלכליים אם יש כאלה. בסוף הוא ביקש להרהר על כך. במשך סוף השבוע, וסיכמנו שאתקשר עימו שוב בראשית השבוע הבא.
3. בנפרד, ועוד לפני השיחה הנ"ל, התקשרה כרים דוסון, עוזרתו של אוואנס, המופקדת על ענייני החוץ אצל הסנטור, שוחחנו ברוח השיחה עם מתאיים אך גילית אצלה מעט מאוד הבנה (כרגיל), לטענתה התיקונים אינם מכוונים נגדנו, ואין אנו עוזרים לעצמנו במשיכת תשומת הלב לעברם (תוך שעלה מדבריה ברמיזה ש"על ראש הגנב בוער הכובע"). הסכימה להביא את הערותינו לידיעת אוואנס, וסיכמנו שנשוב ונדבר בשבוע הבא גם כן.

אנא הנחיותכם.

יוסי למדן
למדן

שדת רהמ מנפ ממנפ פרימור אלקיאנוה משלח אוזר
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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

כ.

אל: המשרד

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סוג פנייה
דף...ב...מתוך...ב...דפים
סווג בטחוני...סודי...
דחיפות...בהול לבוקר...
תאריך וזמן...29.11.86 אוג 86
מספר מברק.....

אל: מ/מנכ"ל, ס/מנכ"ל פרימור, מא"פ, מצפ"א. שולץ'אנ"ה

הפוצה מצומצמת

דע: המנכ"ל, מנכ"ל בטחון, מנכ"ל האוצר, לשכת רוה"מ.

השגריר פרטוריה

נספח צה"ל, רמש"ן

סנט: סנקציות על דרא"פ

למברקי הקודם בנדון מהיום

1. למותר לציין את חומרת המתרחש בוועדת החוץ הבוקר. נכון שהתיקון הקורא לדו"ח על המדיניות המפרות את אמברגו הנשק אינו מזכיר אף מדינה בשם, אך כל בר דעת יבין שהכוונה המפורשת להפסיק מתן המידע הצבאי ל"מפרות" מכוונת נגדנו. כ"כ נכון שהאפשרות של הסנקציה הזו תישקל רק בעוד שנה ובתנאי שעד אז לא תושג התקדמות בדרא"פ, אך הרעיון "נכנס ללקסיקון", ואם הוא יכול להתקבל בסנט ברוזמת רפובליקאים מתונים, על אחת כמה וכמה ביידוף ע"י דמוקרטים ליברלים בבית הנבחרים. מובן גם שמבחינת החקיקה אנו נמצאים רק בראשית הדרך והנושא יחזור ויפקוד אותנו בשלבים הבאים. מעבר לזאת, סביר להניח שאלה שאינם משפיעים אותנו בארה"ב (ובראשם חוגים מסויימים בקרב השחורים), דמחיצה לה (בעולם הערבי ובניגריה אפריקה) יקפצו על התיקונים הנ"ל כמוצאי שלל רב. מאידך, אנו ניצבים בפני דילמה ומרחב תמרונינו מוגבל, כאשר אין לנו לכאורה ממה לחשוש מהבדיקה הזו ואנו מכבדים את האמברגו של האו"ם.

2. במיקור הטקטי בקונגרס, עלינו לבדוק האופציות העומדות בפנינו. כמחשבה ראשונה, עדיין ניתן אולי להרויח את יציעת התיקונים, כך שלא יידאה כאילו הם מכוונים אך ורק נגדנו. אם כן, יש לשקול היטב כיצד (באמצעות מי) ומתי (במליאה/ב- Conference) יש לפעול.

יוסף לוצקי
למדן

2 3 1 8 1 1

שיחה נשף מ/מנכ"ל עד כמה פרימור שולץ'אנ"ה בנוף שוולב תדא

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

023

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים
סווג בשחוני: סודי
דחיפות: בקול לבוקר
תאריך ודיית: 1615 1 אוג 86

אל :- מ/מנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל פרימור, מא"ם, מצפ"א, אוריאן"ה

דע :- מנכ"ל בטחון, לשכת רה"מ, מנכ"ל אוצר
השגריר פרקוריה
נספח צבאי, רמטין

תפוצת מצומצמת

סנט :- סנקציות על דרא"פ
למברקינו 859 ו-864 ולמברק ממנכ"ל 513

1. ב-HEARINGS הבוקר, באוירה של בילבול ומתח, התקבלו (בין היתר) תיקוני מתאיים ואוזנם הקוראים לנשיא :

(א) להגיש דו"ח תוך 179 יום שיזהה את המדינות שמפרות את אמברגו הנשק, במגמה להפסיק את הסיוע הצבאי למדינות אלה.

(ב) לשקול בעוד שנה, בין שאר הסנקציות הנוספות שיוטלו אם לא תושג התקדמות בדרא"פ, איסור על מתן סיוע צבאי למדינות שיזוהו בדו"ח הנ"ל.

2. להלן נוסח התיקונים :

(א)

Not later than 179 days after the date on enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the extent to which the international embargo on the sale and exportation of arms and military technology to South Africa is being violated, indentifying those countries engaged in such sales and exportation with a view to terminating U.S. military assistance to those countries.

(ב)

(2) prohibit military assistance to those countries that the Presidential report called for in section ___ of this Act identified as continuing to circumvent the international embargo on arms and military technology to South Africa;

שמה גשם גלגל פרגוד אוקיאנוס
גשם רמה גבעה אוכלה דרומי

3. תיקונים אלה, יחד עם תיקונים נוספים, שולבו בהצעת החוק בנושא הסנקציות שהוגשה ע"י יו"ר וועדת החוץ. בתום ה-HEARINGS, הצעת החוק בשלמותה התקבלה ב-15 קולות בעד מול שניים (הלמס ופרסלר) נגד. ההצעה תועבר בימים הקרובים (ייתכן עוד היום, ה-18) לדיון במליאת הסנט, ואישורה שם מובטח.

4. להלן באופן תמציתי השתלשלות העניינים :-

(א) אתמול בערב נראה היה (בשלב) הושגה הבנה בקרב העוזרים ששני התיקונים הנ"ל יושמטו. לאחר המעשה, התברר שה"הבנה" הורכבה ממרכיבים רבים (שלא נגעו לנו במישרין או בעקיפין), ובאשר חלק מהם נדחו ע"י הסנטורים מתאיים ואוואנס התפרקה התבילה.

2. בכוונת הדמוקרטים היה להצביע נגד כל מסכת התיקונים של מתיאס ואוונס כמקשה אחת אם דרישותיהם לשנויים (לא יתקבלו, בפועל הדמוקרטים בוועדה חזרו בהם מאיום זה, משהבינו שמוטב להסכים למוצע מאחר ולא ישיגו יותר מזה.

3. בכל מקרה בנושא "שלנו" סוכם שהסנטור רודי בושביץ יציע "תיקון משלים" ע"מ להביא את העניין AD ABSURDUM כפי שנדברנו ממנכ"ל והח"מ. במהלך הדיון בוועדה, העדיף בושביץ לא לעשות כך (מסיבות ששמורות אצלו)

(ב) עם פתיחת ה-HEARINGS בבוקר, חברי הועדה שבו לדיון בנקודה שהפסיקוהו אתמול, שמעו את אוואנס מסביר את התיקונים שהגיש יחד עם מתאיים, ואז מורקאוסקי הביע התנגדותו לשני התיקונים הנוגעים לנו (במשתמע) ודרש הצבעה על הצעתו להשמיטם. השעה היתה מוקדמת מאד (08.30) ורוב הסנטורים בוועדה טרם הגיעו, אך תיא"ר ובכיר המיעוט הוסמכו להצביע בעד הנעדרים. אקל בכיר המיעוט התבלבל וחשב שעורכים הצבעה על תיקון אחר של מורקאוסקי. כתוצאה מטעות זו, הצביע בשמו ובשם הסנטורים הדמוקרטים שנעדרו "בכיוון הלא נכון" (!), כך שהצעת מורקאוסקי תוכשלה ב-11 קולות מול 5.

(ג) כעבור כשעה וחצי פל הבין שהוא שגה, והוחלט לקיים את ההצבעה מחדש. הפעם הצעת מורקאוסקי התקבלה ב-9 קולות מול 8, ושני התיקונים נתבטלו. מייד אחרי כן העיר מתאיים בזעם שבעת שמנקים לסגור LOOPHOLES נגד דרא"פ, חברי הוועדה יצרו אחד במו ידם.

(ד) בהמשך, ובהקשר אחר, טען הלמס שאין להטיל סנקציות על ממרא"פ מבלי ללחוץ בו זמנית על ה- ANC. לשם כך הציע שהסנקציות לא ייכנסו לפועל אם ה- ANC לא יפסיקו את שרפת קורבנותיהם בשיטת ה-NECKLACING. אוואנס הגיב רחוק שלפיו דקות מספורות החליטה הוועדה בחודו של קול אחד שמותר למכור כלי משחית לממרא"פ - כיצד איפוא ניתן להתנות ביצוע הסנקציות בעימת קץ לשיטת ה- NECKLACING? הסנטור דוד הצטרף לדיון ושאל אם ניתן לשוב לנושא דו"ח הנשיא על מפרות האמברגו, ואילו הסנטור ביידן שהגיע בשלב זה הודיע שאמנם הוא נתן יפוי כח לבכיר המיעוט, אך עתה, לאחר שלמד הנושא ברצונו TO RESERVE HIS POSITION ואף לשמור את זכותו לחזור לנושא במליאת הסנט.

בייחוד לאחר שהובהר לו שהפסקת הסיוע הצבאי בעוד שנה היא אופציה אחת מיבי רבות, ולפי שיפוט הדעת של הנשיא (DISCRETIONARY).אחרי דיון נוהלי,תוחלט - באורח חריג מאד - לקיים הצבעה חוזרת בעניין בטעם השלישית. התוצאות : 10 קולות בעד החזרת התיקונים שנתבטלו,מול 7 נגד.

המצביעים בעד היו לוגר, מתאיס,קאסבאום, אוואנס,סריבל (בהעדרותו) מצד הרפובליקאים ; ודוד, ביידן, סרבנס, איגלטון וקרי מצד הדמוקרטים : ואילו המתנגדים היו מורקאוסקי בושביץ, הלמס ופרסלר מצד הרפובליקאים; ופל,קרנסטון וזורינסקי מצד הדמוקרטים.

5. בדיפי הצעת החוק כפי שהוצעה ע"י לוגר.

6. כאמור, השלב הבא - הדיון במליאת.

יוסף לשם

ל מ ד ן

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

94

022

סוג	סודי
דף	1 מתוך 1 דפים
סווג בטחוני	שמור
דחיפות	מיידי
תאריך וזמן	11716 אוג 86
מספר	

אל: מצפ"א, לשכת מנכ"ל בטחון.

לביא

לשלנו 784 (גנ לבטחון)

התחלנו לפעול בנבעה ולהביא תוכן מכתב מזכיר ההגנה לשהב"ט וסגנונו לידיעת המעוניינים, הון בקשה שיפעלו. הביעו נכונות לפעול. מאידך, המורשה מל לרמן (יוזם אחד המכתבים לשולץ, וויינברגר, פוינדקסטר) שמע חיוה (לא ידוע לנו ממי) שאומנם יש הסכם בין ישראל וארה"ב ברוח מכתב וויינברגר. אם אומנם כך הוא אינו רוצה למצוא עצמו מנהל מערכה, כאשר ישראל כבר הסכימה למה שרוענים האמריקאים. [illegible]

אנחנו מבינים מהתקשורת ששהב"ט הכחיש הדברים שיוחסו לו ב"איירוספייס דיילי" כמבוקש בשלנו שאסימוכין. נודה אם תעבירו נוסח ההכחשה מיידית ע"מ שנוכל להעבירה לידידנו בתחילת השבוע הבא.

למדן - הרצל

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון
לשכת הנספח הצבאי
018

אל:הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, מטנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ת
דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY
FRIDAY, AUGUST 1, 1986

MAJOR NEWS HEADLINES

TOP STORY: DEMOCRATIC FUROR OVER CHIEF JUSTICE NOMINEE REHNQUIST
A second deed of a house owned by Rehnquist has been found and presented before the Senate Judiciary Committee that includes racial restrictions barring sale of the house to anyone but whites. Sen. Edward Kennedy continued yesterday the Democratic attack on the qualifications of William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States.
Wash. Post: Reagan Uses Executive Privilege To Keep Rehnquist To Keep Rehnquist Memos Secret: Racial Restriction Found In 2nd Deed
Chic. Trib.: Rehnquist On Hot Seat: Kennedy Cites Race Ban On Home Deed
Wash. Times: Kennedy Angers Rehnquist Backers

JAPAN: U.S & JAPAN COME TO COMPUTER CHIP TRADE AGREEMENT
The U.S. and Japan ended a longstanding trade dispute with Japan agreeing to stop undercutting U.S. sales in the semiconductor industry. The Japanese concession was made in order to avoid U.S. retaliatory protectionist measures. The U.S.-Japanese pact could boost U.S. semiconductor sales by $2 billion.
Wash.Post: U.S., Japan Agree On Chips Pact: American Companies May See Increase In Semiconductor Sales
Wash. Times: Japan Gives Way On Computer Chips
Balt. Sun: U.S., Japan Reach 'Difficult' Accord On Computer Chips

AIR FORCE SEEKS FUNDING FOR NEW SPACE ROCKET FLEET
The Air Force said it will ask Congress for $2.6 billion for a new fleet of unmanned rockets to put satellites into orbit. The new space boosters are needed, according to the Air Force, in order to help recover from three space disasters that have left the Defense Dept. with no launching surveillance and wheather satellites.
Wash. Post: Air Force To Seek Funds For More Space Boosters

ב' 1 אוגוסט תפוצות פרט שלחים מתוקשטים

NEWS ARTICLES AND ANALYSIS

CASEY'S ROLE ON VISITS TO SYRIA, ISRAEL CALLED 'EXERCISE IN CRISIS PREVENTION'

Wash. Times: CIA director William Casey may have acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria to avert another Mideast war. Tensions between the two countries have been high this year. Despite Damascus denials, U.S. administration officials confirmed that Casey went to Syria and also that he frequently visited Israel. Speculations are still circulating that Casey went to Syria to gain the release of Americans held hostage in Lebanon. Experts conjecture that Casey's mission to these countries was an exercies in crisis prevention. British journal, Jane's Defense Weekly predicts that Syria will opt to wage a war against Israel this year to regain the Golan and that October could be the month they may strike as Israel will be preoccupied with the Prime Minister rotation. (8/1/86)

U.S. TO FUNNEL WEST BANK AID THROUGH JORDAN: Aim Is To Improve Palestinians' Life

Balt. Sun, Price III: The U.S. will funnel 4.5 million in aid through Jordan for distribution in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza, according to a top U.S. official traveling in the Mideast with Vice President Bush. This marks the first time that Jordan will distribute U.S. aid to the Israeli-occupied territories. Officials said that the additional allocated funds added to Jordan's overall aid package this year of about $100 million, represents the U.S. contribution to Jordan's 5-year economic plan for the Palestinians living in the occupied lands. The Israelis still retain their veto power; Israel tends to veto monies for projects believed to be connected with the PLO or Palestinian nationalism. (8/1/86)

ISRAEL HIGH COURT DENIES APPEAL OF BLACK HEBREWS FACING OUSTER

Bost. Globe, (AP wire): The Israeli Supreme court ruled yesterday that the government can expel 45 American Black Hebrews for overstaying their visas and spokesman Yitzhak Agassi said they will be deported to the U.S. within a few days and that as many as 1,500 Black Hebrews living in Israel are also there illegally and thus, as illegal aliens, will be deported. (8/1/86)

NEWS ARTICLES CON'T

U.S. CHARGES LIBYA WITH LATIN TERROR

Wash. Times, Morrison: According to a new State Dept. report titled "Libyan Activities in the Western Hemishphere", the U.S. suspects Libya is using its Islamic religious centers in Latin America and the Caribbean as covers for "intelligence links" to terrorist groups. The report identifies 32 countries in Central and South America where Libya has armed and trained guerilla groups under the cover of Islamic centers or people's bureaus. (8/1/86)

RECENT BLATANT ANTI-SEMITISM ALARMS JEWS IN PARAGUAY

Wash. Times, Debusmann: There has been a rash of anti-Semitic activity and rise in negative sentiment towards Jews in Paraguay that has the Jewish community in that country rattled. This development has included anti-Semitic slogans and posters and an abortive attempt to celebrate a requiem mass for Hitler. (8/1/86)

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Deborah Stone
Itonut

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

תמשרד

016

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1/1

סוג	סדר
דף...מתוך...דפים	
סוג בטחוני..שמור.....	
דחיפות....רגיל.....	
תאריך ושעה 15:1 אוג' 86	
מס' סבורים.....	

אל :- מצפ"א, לשכת מנכ"ל בטחון

בית הנבחרים - לביא

רצ"ב תשובת מזכיר המדינה לחברי קונגרס שפנו אליו בענין הפשרת ההוזים (שלנו 676).

טובה הרצל
טובה הרצל

שה רהג גשק גלגנט גבנו
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 26, 1986

Dear Mr. Levine:

This is in response to your July 17 letter, signed by several other Members, regarding the Lavi fighter aircraft project.

We are seriously concerned over the costs of the Lavi project and the effect those costs will have on our entire FMS program in Israel. A US Government study, prepared on the basis of the best available Israeli and US data, estimates that the total cost of the Lavi project will considerably exceed the current Israeli estimates and will create a severe "crowd-out" of other FMS programs during the entire production run of the Lavi. Israeli figures projected in then-year dollars indicate similar serious effects on other aspects of our FMS assistance to Israel. The Israeli Ministry of Finance has stated that no funds (other than US-provided FMS) will be available to make up any Lavi project shortfall.

Given these serious concerns and budgetary constraints in both the US and Israel, we have been engaged for some time in a dialogue with the Government of Israel over the future of the Lavi project. We are sensitive to Israeli concerns that the Lavi program has major technological and employment implications, and that any solution to the Lavi question would have to take those considerations into account. Accordingly, we have agreed to undertake a study of alternatives to the Lavi; the study will reflect Israeli interests and concerns and will be conducted with the cooperation of the Government of Israel.

Both of our governments hope that upon completion of this study a mutually acceptable final decision can be made regarding the Lavi project and alternative aircraft. In the meantime, DOD has authorized funding of the five contracts to which you referred in your letter until the study is submitted to Israel. Further funding of these or other Lavi-related contracts beyond that point will depend upon a decision on the alternatives question.

The Honorable,
Mel Levine,
House of Representatives.

3/3

I wish to assure you that, as we proceed on this complex and important issue, we will work for a cooperative approach which we hope will produce a mutually acceptable final resolution.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

George P. Shultz

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

015

כ ו ס ס פ ג ר ה

דף...1...מתוך.....דפים

סווג בטחוני: גלוי.....

דחיפות: רגיל.....

תאריך וזמן: 1.0920 אוג' 86

מספר מברק.....

אל :- מצפ"א, מזא"ר, ממ"ד בינ"ל ו

בית הנבחרים : זכויות אדם בברה"מ

אשתקד קיימו ועדות המשנה לז"א ולאירופה ומז"ת בועדת בחוץ דיון משותף בדיפות נגד יהודים בברה"מ. השבוע קיימו דיון מקביל בהתייחסות לבני דתות אחרות.

בחצי הראשון של הדיון העידו מטעם הממשל עוזר המזכיר לענייני ז"א ריצ'ארד שיפטר, ויועץ מחמ"ד אד דרבינסקי. החצי השני הוקדש לעדויות נציגים אמריקאים של מעוטים בברה"מ, ושם התבטא המורשה בוב דורנן (רפ. קליפורניה) נמרצות בעד מתן פרסומת רבה למדיניות ברה"מ כלפי חופש דת, וכבר עשה זאת במליאה.

להלן תמצית הדיון עם דוברי הממשל :

דרבינסקי אמר שידוע על 10000 אסירי מצפון בבתי כלא ובתי חולים פסיכיאטרים. ההתייחסות הסובייטית משתנה מקבוצה לקבוצה. כעת ההתייחסות לכנסיה הרוסית אורתודוקסית היא הטובה ביותר, בעבר, ובהקשר של התקרבות לעולם הערבי, היתה הנטיה להעדיף דווקא את המיעוט המוסלמי אולם כעת הוקפח היחס אליהם, מחשש פונדמנטליזם. לעתים יש קשר (כגון אצל הלטבים) בין רדיפות דתיות והתגברות הלאומנות. ארה"ב מקוה ליישום הסכמי הלסינקי. בכל מקרה, אלא אם יהיה שיפור משמעותי בתחום זה יהווה הדבר מכשול נכבד לשיפור כלל מערכת יחסי המיזרח-מערב. בתחום חופש הפרט, חופש הדת הינו עיקרי ובכך יהיה על הסובייטים to shape up.

עדותו של שיפטר (במליאה בדיפ.) היא ניתוח של כיצד המערכת הבירוקרטית מונעת התקדמות של אנשים דתיים הנחשדים בנאמנות כפולה, ולא רק למפלגה. עמד על ההבדל בין יהודים (הנתפסים כקבוצה אתנית, ללא כל קשר לאמונה) ויתר הקבוצות אצלן נדרשת פעילות דתית כדי להיות נרדף או מופלה.

המורשה סולומון (בכיר המיעוט בועדה לז"א) תאר את ההבדלים בין השיטה הסובייטית וזו הנוהגת בארה"ב - הם אינם רק כלכליים אלא אידיאולוגים. קרל מרקס היה בראש ובראשונה אתאיסט והקומוניזם שלו בא משנאת הנצרות ויתר הדתות. כלומר האתאיזם הוא שמביא לקומוניזם ולא להיפך. כיום, 69 שנים אחרי המהפכה, התגברות הפעילות הדתית היא שיא חמרי תאזרחי. לאמנות שונות עם ברה"מ אין שום תועלת כל עוד היא משמשת בית סוהר להמונים.

שפה רהב גשם גלגלי גדרו בצורה ריגרע גגת בה

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

טיפס מברק

דף...2...מתוך.....דפים

סווג בטחוני.....

דחיפות.....

תאריך וזמן.....

סימוכין מברק.....

יו"ר ועדת המשנה לז'א גוס יטרון שאל באיזו מידה על השיטה הסובייטית להשתנות כדי לאפשר חופש דת. דרבינסקי : פורמלית קיים חופש דת אולם מולו קיימות מערכות אתאיסטיות המאזנות אותו. ז'א שהסובייטים ייאלצו לשנות את כל המערכת. יטרון : ביקש השוואה למדינות קומוניסטיות אחרות. דרבינסקי : תלוי במשך הזמן שהשיטה הקומוניסטית נוהגת. בפולין, בגלל שכולם קתולים, המפלגה לא הצליחה לדכא את הדת, יש מדינות (יוגוסלביה) בהו יש זהות ביז קבוצה דתית וקבוצה אתנית. בבולגריה אפליה נגד תורכים הופכת מטבע הדברים לאפליה נגד מוסלמים. שיפטר מוסיף שאלבניה מהווה שיא באנטי דתיות. בברה"מ המצב גרוע מאשר ביתר מדינות מזא"ר : עבור אותו פשע העונש ברומניה או יגוסלביה הוא 3-2 שנים, בברה"מ - עד 12 שנות מאסר והגליה. יטרון שואל באיזו מידה בנות הברית האירופאיות שלנו פועלות כלפי מזא"ר. שיפטר : רמת הפעילות ביחס לקבוצות עמן יש להם קשר, אז ליטא כאיזן.

סולומון : שואל על האוכלוסיה המוסלמית בברה"מ, 30 מליון, וקצב הריבוי המהיר שלה. דרבינסקי סבור שמדובר ב-50 מליון, אולם יש מיעוטים רבים אחרים - מחצית מאוכלוסיית ברה"מ אינה רוסית. במקרת של המוסלמים הם נטולי מנהיגות שכן בעלי השכלה הרוצים להתקדם חייבים לוותר על דתם. לאחרונה יש התעוררות דתית, כיבוש אפגניסטאן גרם לתחושת אי-נוחות בקרב המוסלמים כאשר החיילים הפשוטים (הנלחמים באוכלוסיה המקומית) הם המוסלמים ומפקדיהם - רוסים. לשאלת סולומון מה עמדת הממשל כלפי ברה"מ בנושא חופש דת והאם עדיפה מדיניות פומבית או פרטית. בילטרלית או מולטילטרלית השיב שיפטר שלעתים היה ניתן מו"מ שקט על מקרים בודדים אולם זה חריג. לצורך פתרון יסודי של הבעיה יש צורך בפרסום ולכן המישור המולטילטרלי מסייע.

לטיריסלי השיב שעד כה לא ראו שינוי תחת גורבצ'וב בהתייחסות לדת, והשונה את מצב היהודים בברה"מ למצב השחורים בדרא"פ - אפליה על בסיס לידה. ההתעוררות הדתית של צעירים בעולם הקומוניסטי מתרחשת בשל חלל רוחני אולם מהוה גם ביטוי להזדהות לאומית. לבקשה להשוות זאת למצב המוסלמים השיב שאין הרבה מידע אולם יש השתתפות גוברת בתפילות והפונדמנטליזם תודר; הרשת המופעלת מאיראן פועלת. לשאלת טורישלי האם ביקורים אצל אלו הרוצים לקיים מצוות הדת היהודית או הנוצרית מעיעים השיב שיפטר שאין ספק וזאת משתי סיבות : התחושה שאינם לבד, ורצון הסובייטים בתדמית טובה.

זשאו אימץ את השואת שיפטר בין יהודים בברה"מ ושחורים בדרא"פ ושאל לדעתו על הטלת סנקציות על ברה"מ. שיפטר סבור שהמצב שונה ממדינה למדינה, ודעתו האישית היא שאין לשנות כעת את המדיניות כלפי ברה"מ. מאידך, הרי אין לפנות לצד המוסרי שלהם ולכן ניתן להבהיר שהקלה בתחום הדת תתפס בארה"ב כ- quid pro quo זשאולוחץ, שיפטר מזכיר את ג'קסון - וניק

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

סוג	בנדי
דף	3 מתוך 3 דפים
סווג בסחוני	
דחיפות	
תאריך וזיית	
מס' מברק	

ואומר שלא נקל מדיניותינו אלא אם נקבל משהו בתמורה. זשאר מבקש השואה בין ברה"מ וניקרגואה, שיפטר אומר שזו אמנם קיימת. בראשית ימי החונטה, כמו בתחילת המשטרים הקומוניסטים, היו רק שני תיקים בידי הקומוניסטים - הבטחון והפנים, ובמלים אחרות - כל נושאי הנשק היו נאמני המפלגה.

לארי סמית' שאל מה תרצה ברה"מ כלכלית כדי לאפשר הגירה ושיפטר השיב שיהיה צורך במיקוח קשה . אין ודאות איזה צד צריך להתפטר ראשון. בכל מקרה מהעבר השני יש אנשים קשוחים, נאסור למסור להם את כל החנות בטרם יראו תוצאות.
דובינסקי הוסיף שבסופו של דבר ייאלצו הסובייטים להתאים עצמם ללחצים הפנימיים בברה"מ אך אין עדות שיעשו זאת בקרוב.

טובה הרצל

שגרירות ישראל • וושינגטון

מלו, 011

המברד, 6 בטחון 4 נ.י.

8-1-86 ...16:00 תאריך ושעה

מנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח. ניו יורק

16:00
AUGUST 2, 1986 תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום

STATE DEPARTMENT

REGULAR BRIEFING

FRIDAY, AUGUST 1, 1986

BRIEFER: BERNARD KALB

MR. KALB: I don't have any idea because actually you don't have a specific number. Are you asking about the final number that emerged, or the impact? Impact? Yes, well, I can deal with that.

The House Appropriations Subcommittee -- we're dealing, of course, here with the yesterday action, as reported today -- essentially ratified the levels adopted by its foreign operations subcommittee about a week ago. These levels represent a cut of $2.5 billion, or 16 percent, from the request submitted by the Administration. These levels are totally inadequate to meet U.S. foreign policy and national security needs. The Subcommittee also mandated that, notwithstanding the cut in the overall levels, certain countries be funded at the level requested by the Administration. This -- let me use the word "earmarking" -- this earmarking compounds the difficulties the Administration faces by limiting the Administration's flexibility to allocate whatever resources are ultimately appropriated, in accordance with policy priorities. Full funding for some countries necessarily disproportionate reductions in all others.

The bill, this bill, if enacted as adopted by the House Subcommittee, would force the United States to retreat from responsibilities and intiatives that the Administration and Congress have jointly approved over the last five years. For example,

support for security and democracy in Central America and the Phillipines, and other cooperative relationship with states in various regions of the world. You've seen the OMB letter as it has been published, and the OMB letter, in fact, makes some of these points that I have just sought to itemize. And the State Department agrees with that.

Q Can you put that 16 percent into proportion, given the amount that is earmarked for Israel, Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey? The 16 percent that was cut, how much will be cut in the balance of foreign aid?

MR. KALB: I have not run it through the computer that would punch up the figures on a country-by-country, dollar-by-dollar basis. But I think what I have called attention to and what I have just read with you is that full funding for some -- that is to say, what I referred to as earmarking -- necessarily means disproportionate reductions in all others. And I think the extrapolation of that is pretty obvious, that anybody running through the earmarked figures and then working through the alloted number, as fixed now, although not in final terms, can see the disproportionate impact, et cetera.

Q I am trying to find the size of that disproportion. The non-earmarked countries, how much will they be cut, using the numbers in this bill?

MR. KALB: I have not done the arithmetic, the subtractions and so forth.

Q Would Peter here help us?

MR. KALB: I don't know that Peter has that, but, if you want, you might raise that with him later. But you are familiar -- and we could get that for you, I suspect -- with the original roster of numbers, when the entire package was first set forth, when the Secretary was testifying before a variety of committees a couple of months or so ago. They had the numbers, and I think those of us who were on a flight with the Secrtary a month or two ago heard the Secretary deal with the subject very extensively and very powerfully. And at that time, we made available a sheet or two of paper which ahd a breakout of the kind you're talking about. Let me see if I can get that for you, Jim.

Q Does this mean that you would rather that some countries no be earmarked -- that Israel, Egypt and Pakistan not be earmarked, or that they be earmarked at a loure level?

3/4 4/16/11

MR. KALB: I am going to stay with the langauge I have here. Yes, Ralph?

Q The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has approved legislation

imposing some sanctions, some punitive, economic sanctions on South Africa. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. KALB: Do not. Do not. Joanne.

Q Congressman Obey and the other democrats on the appropriations committee hold that the measure they've approved is consistent with the Gramm-Rudman restrictions that the administration supports and that there was no other way they could do it. What is your response or your feelings in regard to the link between the aid you want increased and the Gramm-Rudman restrictions that madate cuts?

MR. KALB: I think that I've heard the Secretary address that question in the following way: that the overall budget proposal submitted by the administration was the one that it preferred obviously to see. And had it been dealt with that way there would have been no response of this sort to the decision, to the voting action taken by the subcommittee.

LESTER KINSOLVING: Bernie, yesterday you said that you would seek a lot of further information on assorted questions about why the State Department has decided for the first time to channel $6 million in unused funds to West Bank, to the government of Jordan, which isn't anywhere in the West Bank, and not to the government of Israel, which is in charge of the West Bank. And my question is: how can you show us, Bernie, that this is not an insult to our ally Israel and is not favortism to Jordan whose army seized the West bank by force in 1948 and kept Christian, Moslem and Jewish residents of Israel from visiting any of the holy places? Can you explain--

MR. KALB: Curiously, curiously, although I have difficulty with some of the problems, with some of the questions that were put to me yesterday, for some reason I'm confident that I confident your particular question yesterday. So, if you want me to do a recap--

MR. KINSOLVING: Well, all right. I just wondered, could I rephrase it? Has the--

4/4 4/6/11

MR. KALB: No, don't rephrase it.

Q All right. Has the State Department --

MR. KALB: Don't rephrase it. Please don't rephrase it.

Q All right, let me go to a related. Has the State Department ever concluded who is the legal owner of the West Bank? Or is it your position that this must be determined by negotiation between the two countries, one of whom sees the West Bank in '48, and the other which did so in 1967?

MR. KALB: I think that anybody who tracks the diplomatic and military story of the history of the Middle East, since, say, 20 or 30 years or so, has no problem whatever with the question that you have just put to me. And I would --

Q Cyrus Vance did in a press conference, when I asked him about it.

MR. KALB: And I would think that includes you. However, since you have admitted that you need a refreshing course, let me do it for you. And I ask the indulgence of everybody in this room to run through that. US policy toward the occupied territories, et cetera: The United States considers the West Bank and the Gaza strip as territory under the military occupation of Israel. The US does not recognize Israel's sovereignty over territories occupied as a result of the June 1967 war, and considers UN resolution 242, embodying the principle of land for peace, as the basis for negotiations on the final status of these territories.

Q And that includes East Jerusalem.

MR. KALB: Jerusalem? I have something that I can share with you on Jerusalem, but I'm confident that you're familiar with the US policy toward Jerusalem, Les.

Q Thank you, Bernie.

###

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

סיווג	סודי
דחיפות	מיידי
תאריך וזמן	1099 1 אוגוסט 86
מספר	

005 1/2

המשרד

אל: עוזיים, ממ"ד, מצפ"א,
דע: לובוצי

לבנון.
משיחה בשבוע החולף עם שגארה"ב לשעבר רג'נלד ברתולומיאו.

א. אמנם המצב הנוכחי בלבנון, לדעת בן-שיחי, יכול להימשך עוד זמן רב, שכן נהפתחה יכולת הישרדות בתנאים הקיימים. אין המצב חסר תקוה; לדעתו ראה בתקופה האחרונה של שירותו סימנים לחשיבה חדשה אצל חלק מהדמויות הבולטות. בקראו עתה, לקראת תפקידו החדש, את הספרות על מלחמת האזרחים בספרד, הוא מתרשם כי עומק השנאה ההדדית שם היה אולי אילם מאשר בלבנון, ובכל זאת המצב נשתנה. בלבנון עד כה היתה החשיבה שיהא המצב גרוע ככל שיהיה, התוצאות של תזוזה קיצונית יהיו גרועות עוד יותר. כרגע יתכן שחשיבה זו משתנה במובן זה שהמשך המצב הנוכחי יביא לגרוע יותר, ולכן כדאי אולי "לצאת מזה". הסיכויים לכך שמגמה זו תתממש אולי אינם נהדרים, אך - כאמור - לא חסר תקוה.

ב. הסורים.
1. אמנם אינו עוקב בפרטות אחר ההתפתחויות האחרונות, אך דומה שאין להם מדיניות של ממש בלבנון מאז כשלון ההסכם המשולש. הסכם זה נקטל ע"י אמין כיוון שהיה "כנגד מכתי שיכלה העגלה לשאת" (אגב, ביטוי שהרבינו לשמוע מפי חביב בשעתו). זאת, במיוחד כשמצאו בני בריה מוסלמים רבים כל כך שלא אהבו את ההסכם. מבחינת הסורים, היתה זו שגיאה מודיעינית מסיבית; אסור היה להם לצאת בתמיכה בהסכם, אך לא העריכו כי רבים כל כך יתנגדו; הערכתם היתה להיפך, כי המצב גרוע כל כך, שהכל יעמדו על הברכיים לבקשם להשתתף. אסד רצה במשחק אך לא בתוצאות.
2. קשה להעלות על הדעת מה אירע במערב בירות בשנתיים האחרונות. ראס בירות היה לא מקום בלבד אלא "הרבוה" שלמה, שהפכה עתה לג'ונגל.
3. לדעתו הסורים נגררו להכנס לבירות עתה בין השאר כיוון שכדי לקיים שליטה כלשהי על חיזבאללה יש צורך בנוכחות. יחד עם זאת, הצעד הוא שינוי משמעותי בגישתם של הסורים, שכללית אין איש שיחי סבור שהם מעוניינים ב"כיבוש" או שליטה ישירה.
4. התייחס לתקריה האוטובוס במערב בירות, שאירעה ימים אחדים לאחר שכנענו המפקד הסורי דיבר על השטח כבטוח. הדבר היה פגיעה ביוקרתם.
5. לדעתו יכולים הסורים "לטגור" את חיזבאללה בבקעה (השיחה היתה ערב שחרור ג'נקו), אך הדבר בעייתי בגלל היחסים עם האיראנים, לאיראן, לדבריו, שני נושאים במדיניות החוץ - המלחמה

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

סוג מסמך
דף...מתוך.....דפים
סווג בטחוני.....
דחיפות.....
תאריך וזמן.....
מספר מברק.....

5 ב 2

עם עיראק וייצוא המהפכה ללבנון. ברתולומיאו סבור כי אסד רוצה לשחרר את בני הערובה - כיוון שהנושא ממקד תשומת לב ופוגע בתדמיתו, הוא מעוניין לעשות כן בדרך שבה כולם יהיו מרוצים, כולל חיזבאללה, ושלא תעלה חמת האיראנים.

6. ברתולומיאו אישית סבור שלא רצוי היה כי בוש יבקר בסוריה [illegible].

ג. דרום לבנון.

1. איש שיחי לא ביקר מעולם בדרום. הגיע עד צידון, אך לא לצור ולנבטיה. הקושי- בטחון; ברי פחד מדי פעם ליטול על אחריותו.

2. א) הוא בעד המשך יוניפיל, הנחוץ לדעתו, ראשית, כ"כיסוי" פוליטי להסדרים, שקשה יהיה לספק אם ייעלם, לכל הנוגעים בדבר - לשיעים, לסורים ולישראל.

ב) אמר בגילוי לב כי יש סיבה נוספת לתמיכתו ביוניפיל: אם ייעלם, יהיה לחץ על ארה"ב לפעול, לנהל מו"מים וכדומה, ואילו עתה יש תשובה מזומנת בפי האמריקנים: האו"ם מטפל.

ג) אם יוניפיל ייעלם, לדעתו יסייע הדבר לחיזבאללה ולפלשתינאים יותר מאשר לברי (עם ברי ניתן לדעתו להגיע להסכם בר ביצוע").

3. הנפשות הפועלות בלבנון (ציין כללית ממלחמות בדרך כלל מצמיחות מנהיגים חדשים, אך דבר זה לא אירע בלבנון והדמות החדשה היחידה היא ברי):

א). אמין, לדעת ברתולומיאו יש זלזול בלתי מוצדק בכוחו של אמין. כשהוא בצרה - הוא טוב יותר בביצועיו. היכולת לאמר "לאו" לאסד באשר להסכם המשולש מדגימה זאת. הוא אמנם כבד=מהלכים, אך שמו מסייע לו, וכאמור, בעתות משבר הוא פועל ביתר הצלחה.

ב) התרשמתי שברי בעיניו חערובת של פקחות ונאיביות. אינו מתוחכם, אך לדעתו הוא, ניתן מכל מקום, לשיתוף פעולה, ואינו מטורף; הוא פוחד - ולכן זקוק לאינצנטיבות ולכיסוי שיתקבל על דעת הסורים.

ג) גוינבאלט "נורמלי" ולא בלתי שפוי, ואפשר לומר גם כי הוא איש מבריק, אך מדיניותו חייבת להיות בעקלתון של פעם ימין ופעם שמאל, בגלל הסדס שהוא נתון בהם. הוא בדילמה: מצד אחד אינו יכול לפתח את אזורו בלי איכלוס, מן הצד האחר הוא פוחד מהחזרת הנוצרים, שהיו המחסיס הכלכלי העיקרי מטעמים בבורים. היה שמח אילו חזרו בתנאיו ובדומיננטיות שלו, אך הם אינם רוצים בבני חסות ("דיימיים").

ד). באשר ללבנונים בארה"ב, הוא מחייב מגע (אם ניתן - וספק) עם השגריר בו-חביב, שיש לו קשר טוב לאמין, לכוחות הלבנונים ולפלנגות ויֵדַע טוב (מספר כי בבוא בו-חביב לשירות היה ברתולומיאו מתחין ימים אחדים עד שנפגש עמו, ואז יכול היה לשמוע ממנו רבות). ודֵעַ חדאד איש טוב (וכידוע מוכן לעמוד עמנו בקשר) אך המידע שלו כנראה פחות עתה.

רובינשטיין

705
** יוצא שמור
**
**
**

אל: וושנגטון, נר: 511, מ : המשרד
רח: מ, סג: ש, תא: 010886, לח: 1230

שמור/מיידי

מתני.

כמ"ד. שלך 836.

אנו מתייבים מובן פעולתכם.

כל-און 1.8.86 (286)(3)

ל/ח

אפ: שהח,רהמ,שהכמ,מנכל,ממנכל,ל/מרכז,רם,אמן,ממד,קידר,
מצרים,מצפא,סייבל
אח: אורן שחור

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**                                                                  **
** דף 1    מתוך 8                                          נכנס    **
** עותק 4   מתוך 16        סודי ביותר                      **      **
**                                                                  **
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**                                                                  **
**                                                                  **
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**אל: המשרד, נר: 27, מ : 111                                       **
**תח: 1, סג: מ, תא: 010886, חת: 1730                               **
**                                                                  **
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**סודי ביותר/בהול טפל ליום א'                                      **
**                                                                  **
**אל:מנכל משהח, מ"מ היועץ המשפטי-משהבט                             **
**ממנכ"ל משהח, היועץ המשפטי-משהח רמשן                              **
**                                                                  **
**נמחוק נר 29                                                      **
**ו' נר 10                                                         **
**                                                                  **
**שבתאי                                                            **
**                                                                  **
**להלן דוח עדכני:-                                                 **
**                                                                  **
**א. הישורה התחתונה" היא כי ישנה נכונות אמריקנית עקרונית          **
**ארגימול הצוים בכפוף להסכמה של ממשלת ישראל כי תאפשר מצדה         **
**מסירתם מחדש אם יראו האמריקנים צורך בכך בהמשך .בלי ויתור על"     **
**שונותיה לגבי תקפות הפרוצדורה :הדבר יחול על כל התשעה (גם        **
**אלה שבארץ ) אף כי בשמירת כל שענה שיש להם :יפתח תהליך של        **
**דיאלוג שמהלכו ,על בסיס של רצון טוב שלנו, יקבלו האמריקנים       **
**מידע בצורת מסמכים ושאלונים .כך הגל ינוסח בהסכם שפרטי          **
**עובדו בישיבת ניסוח ביום ב',ושטיומה 'שראלית לו מצורפת .הכל"     **
**-בכפוף לאישורכם .אין הסכמה בשלב זה לתהליך של תשאול או בקשה"   **
**כרגע מצדם בענין זה.                                             **
**ב. ההשתלשלויות:                                                 **
**                                                                  **
**1. הנוקב מסר מארק ריצ'ארד בשיחה בלתי פורמלית,כי על בסיס        **
**הדיונים עם התובעים המחוזיים ,אינו רואה יבולת מצדם להסכים       **
**ארגימול הצוים בלי הבטחה גמורה של היבולת לחדשם לפי הצורך       **
**לפי האנשים .חזר להצעה של דחיית מועד הצוים .החימי הודיע         **
**כי זהיה אינה מקובלת עלינו, ובי אנו יכולים להבטיח כי ממשלת      **
**ישראל תעשה מיטב מאמציה במקרה של צורך בחידוש, תוך שמירת        **
**וכויותיה .הביע סקפטיות.                                         **
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דף 2 מתוך 8
עותק 4 מתוך 16 סודי ביותר

1. נתקיימה אחר כך ישיבה של למעלה משעתיים עם שרון, השתתפות ריצ'ארד, מייך ורוס ומצדנו קוהנובסקי,נוף, רישי והחים

אשרון פתח ואמר,כי דנו ארובות בנושא גם עם התובע המחוזי בפונקילבניה. הקונסוס עם שני התובעים המחוזיים הוא,שבאשר לחסינות לאנשים מעודבים, השלב הנוכחי של החקידה מוקדם מדי לדיון בנושא זה.הקונגרס מתעניין בדברים מסוג זה. משום כך, אמרות רצונם הטוב ניחסים עם ישראל ועם השגרירות-הדבר מוקדם מדי. פירושו של דבר הוא שכאשר תתקדם החקירה, יתכן שניתן יהיה לעשות משהו,אך הדבר יקח זמן. יהיו מובנים גם, בטגרת הזמן, להעמיק לדון יותר בשאלת החסינויות למיניהן. הצעתם ברגע זה הוא שהם רוצים כמונו להימנע מעימות בבית משפט הטוב ביותר הוא לדחות את הצוים בשלושים יום. הדבר שומר את הסטטוס קוו, מאפשר לפתח את הנושא ולשקול היטב יותר. ריצ'ארד הציע ואת אף הוא.

2. החימי השיב כי דבר זה גורם לישראל בעיה חמורה הציבור והתקשורת מתעניינים בכך ובדיונים המתקיימים. דחיה משמעה, כי החרב עדיין מונפת. לא נוכל להסכים לכך. לבד מן ההיבט הציבורי אנו מעוניינים להגיע להסדר לגופו של ענין, והדחיה לא תועיל מאחר ובענין זה אנשינו בארץ ובאן יודעים את הקושי בעניין הסינויות. אך של ארהיב לבטל את הצוים, גם אם בשלב זה תשמור בכוונות לחדשם, אף כי תקוותנו היא שנגיע למצב שלא יהיה צורך בכך. אנו מובנים להסכים ל- BEST EFFORTS של ממשלת ישראל לגבי המסירה,אם בעתיד תרצה ארהיב לחדש את הצוים, תוך שמירת כוונותינו לטעון נגדם. משמעות הצעת ארהיב לדחיה היא שלא תשלח תכלית השיחות, ושוב יועלה הדבר לדרג ממשלה ובדומה לפרוט שאר-ולכך חזרו פעמים רבות בהמשך הדיון -האם ניתן להביא לכך שהנוגעים בדבר בעלי הצוים יחתמו על קבלתם חזר ושאל כיצד יהיו נמוחים שתהיה להם אפשרות המסירה בעתיד. אמרנו שהמדובר בעובדי מדינה, שאינם מעוניינים להיות במצב שלא יוכלו להיבנס לארהיב, ויש להם מה להפסיד. ואולם, אין מקום להיבנס לעמוד של חתימתם כרגע. הממשלה תעשה מיטב מאמציה, בכפוף לכוונותיה. טייך הקשה כי אין בהבטחות ממשלה משום בטחון במאה שהעדים יקבלו הצוים. החימי הסביר כי אמנם אין בטחון מאחר אחורים, אך יש משמעות רבה למיטב המאמצים הבנים של הממשלה, וכבן ישנה הדרך של שימוש בחוק העזרה המשפטית המבוסס על אמנת האג. בבד נפגעו פגיעה עמוקה מעצם הצוים וההדלפה

דף 3 מתוך 8
עותק 4 מתוך 16 סודי ביותר

1. האם יש גם סיכון של אחוז קטן שהאנשים לא ישתפו פעולה, יש לקחת זאת. סייף טען שיש מדינות שהבטיחו ביימאה אחוז יי פורמלית קבלת צוים עיי אנשים גם אם ברור שאין זה כך בפועל. אמרנו שאין בדעתנו להבטיח דבר שאינו משקף את המציאות עם ראת, האנשים סטוניינים בי והיה מאחוריהם וכך גם אנו רוצים, ולכן יהיה בוודאי תיאום.

2. לאחר מכן הגשנו להם הצעה ברוח האמור לעיל, סרוש אמר שקשה להם נוכה טיעונינו לסרב למשאלה לקבל את התפיסה הכללית שלנו, אך עליהם להיוועץ בתובעים המחוויים. ואולם, הם מבקשים בדי להצדיק את ביטול הצוים בלי בשחון גמור ביכולת הפיסית שלהשם, כי ההסדר יחול גם על אלה שנמצאים בארץ ולא קיבלו את הצוים. אמרנו כי אינו להתייעץ עם הבית. סרוש אמר כי זו הקופה של יאין סודותיי ויתבנו תגובות נכון דיבר על נושאי הפרסומים בתקשורת). סייף הדגיש שחשוב כיצד יידאו הדברים בתערבת האמריקנית.

3. כאן יצאו האמריקנים להתייעצות וכן התיעצה משלחתנו. סרוש אמר בשובם, כי יהיו מוכנים לתפיסה שלנו בתנאים אלה: ממשלת ישראל תעשה את מיטב המאמצים גם לגבי האחרים (שבארץ) כך שתוכל להיות מסירה בארה"ב: יהיה שאלון אלינו ומסירת מסמכים כפי שהוצע בשעתו. במו כן ביקש שחמשת אלה שבארה"ב יוסיפו התייחסות למסמך ה- BEST EFFORTS. ביקשו עוד כי נסביר שמסירת המסמכים תחול על כל חברה שיבקשו בעתיד, ושאנו נספק את רשימת החברות, וכן שההסדר יחול על כל מי שירצו למסור לו צו בעתיד.

4. השבנו:

1. הסבמנו לשאלון.

2. לגבי 4 הנוספים - בשלחת אנו מוכנים להמליץ אך הדבר תלוי בגאישור. סירבנו לפתיחת האופציות לאנשים נוספים.

3. לגבי המסמכים - יש לדון באופי הדבר. סירבנו ל"שוק פתוח" בהחינתנו לגבי רשימת חברות.

4. איננו מסכימים לחתימות התמישה, הדבר גם אינו מעשי, כי יכול בצדק לשוד משלהם והעניין יימשך. האמריקנים שאלו אם ניתן להודות הצוים בימים אחדים, בשהם עצמם יוהלו מו' עם האנשים

אחינו ראת. לשאלת שרוט ביצד ניתן להבטיח שכשידצו לחדש הצוים
אלא יבנו האנשים רוצ'ד, השיב קוחנובסקי כי עיי כך שהאנשים
יפיפו חתימתם ,כבר אין זה מסמך ''מיטב המאמצים ''.

באשר למסמכים .קוים דיון ממושך ,בשבסופו של דבר סוכם על
נכונות מצידנו למסירת מסמכים גדוח מה שהופיע בניייר שהעברנו
אליהם נבלומר,יפנו אלינו בדשימת חבדות קונקרטית , והמסמכים
אלא יבלו חומר פנימי ישראלי ובוי- אך הדבר יהיה מחוה
שראלית שאינה פוגעת בנכויותינו וחסינותנו ובוי. במו כן
הצענו הסכמה על המשך הדיאלוג ,במגמה להגיע למצב שאין צורך
בחידוש הצוים , והנתינת חסינות.
הסיכום היהבייום ב' בבוקר תקוים ישיבת ניסוח שלקראתה
כינו שוי הצדדים הצעות בכתב על הבסיס הבא:-

1. ההצעה שלנו המוברקת להלן .

2. התיחסות BEST EFFORTS שלנו לבל התשעה , שאם יהיה צורך
בחידוש המסירה יהיו ומינים בארהיב (אפשר עיי שליח) לקבלתם
,בכפוף לשמירת בל הנכויות.

3. שאלון .

4. מסירת מסמכים לפי המסמך שלנו תוך שמירת נכויות ובמתוה
העדות:

1.הדוות בהסדר המוצע מבחינתנו הוא בניסוד הצוים .ארהיב שומרת
את הזכות לחדשם ,אך פסק הזמן שנוצר, בצירוף העובדות של
דיאלוג נמשך , שאלונים ומסמכים -פותח פתח סביר לדיונים
שנעקבותיו נקוה שלא יהיה צורך בחידוש הצוים .אם חלילה יגיעו
מים עד נפש והצוים יחודשו, שמורות לנו בל הזכויות והטענות
באשר לתוקפם . נוכח הרגש שהיה, יש גם לקוות שלא ימהרו לחדשם

2. החלת ההסדר גם על האנשים שלא קיבלו את הצוים ,נראית
כאפשרות ב- GIVE מצדנו ; אך בבל מובן מעשי לא יבלו האנשים
הללו ממילא לחזור לארהיב ואף היו צפויים לסיבוגים של
''רדיפה'' משפטית אמריקנית, וממילא מעשית איפוא לא נגרע מצבם
שהרי צריבים היינו אנו והם להתמודד שם בעיתם .במובן

דף 5 מתוך 8
עותק 4 מתוך 16 סודי ביותר

רכויותיהם עצמם נשמרות במלואן , אף כי ברור שתהיה זו הפרת
אמון מבחינת ממשלת ישראל אם היא לא תעשה מיטב מאמציה לגבי
המסירה אם זו תהיה תחודש.

3. אין בשלב זה תהליך של תשאול

4. לום נייר שבדעתנו להציג ביום ב'

5. הול על דעת המשלחת.נודה על אישורכם לקו שנקטנו לקראת
סיכום ביום ב'

רובינשטיין

**1. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL (''GOI'') AND TH E UNITED
**STATES GOVERNMENT (''USG'') ARE ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS
**RELATING TO THE SERVING AND ATTEMPTED SERVING OF SUBPOENAS
**ON NINE GOI EMPLOYEES IN CONNECTION WITH A USG
**INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO EXPORT
**CLUSTER MUNITIONS EQUIPMENT CONTRARY TO A 1992
**PRESIDENTIAL BAN. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH PARTIES HAVE
**EXPLAINED THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS REGARDING THE
**VALIDITY OF THE PROCEDURE, BUT HAVE NOT YET REACHED
**AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE.
**2. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS
**TO COOPERATE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER, SUBJECT ITS
**RESEVATIONS REGARDING THE PROCEDURE AND TO NEGOTIATIONS
**REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT- TO-GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES TO BE
**EMPLOYED IN THIS INVESTIGATION. PENDING THE RESULTS OF
**SUCH NEGORIATIONS, THE USG HAS AGREED TO WITHDRAW THE
**SUBPOENAS AND NOT TO SERVE ADDITIONAL SUBPOENAS, WITHOUT
**PREJUDICE TO ANY CLAIM REGARDING THEIR VALIDITY. IN RETURN
**, THE GOI AGREES THAT IT WILL USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO
**ENSURE THAT THE GOI EMPLOYEES REFERRED TO ABOVE WILL BE
**AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS. IDENTICAL IN FORM AND

**CONTENT, IN THE EVENT THAT THE USG DETERMINES THAT SUCH
**SERVICE IS REQUIRED, BOTH PARTIES AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT
**SUCH EFFORTS ARE NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS A WAIVER OF ANY
**OBJECTION THE GOI INCLUDING THOSE BASED ON ITS SOVEREIGN
**RIGHTS AND DIPLOMATIC AND /OR CONSULAR IMUNITIES OF ITS
**OFFICES AND EMPLOYEES TO THE USE OF THIS PROCESS WITH GOI
**EMPLOYEES, AND THAT THOS AGREEMENT WILL NOT PRESUDICE, IN
**ANY MANNER, THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF GOI EMPLOYEES.
**3. THE GOI FURTHER AGREES NOT TO USE THE FACT OF THE USG
**WIGHDRAWAL OF THE SUPBOINAS AS A BASIS TO SUPPORT OR
**ESTABLISH ANY OF ITS CLAIMS REGARDING THE INVALIDITY OF
**SUCH SUBPOENAS.
**THE SAME TIME , THE USG AGREES THAT THE GOI AND ITS
**EMPLOYEES WILL PRESERVE ALL CLAIMS REGARDING THE
**INVALIDITY OF SUCH SUBPOINAS THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE
**WITHDRAWAL OF THE SUBPOENAS.
**4. IN ANY EVENT , PRIOR TOE THE USE OF ANY SUBPOENAS BY
**THE USG IN THE CLUSTER MUNITIONS INVESTIGATIONS WITH GOI
**EMPLOYEES, IF THE USG BELIEVES THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR
**SUCH, THE USG WILL CONSULT WITH GOI REPRESENTATIVES
**REGARDING THIS METTER IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID RECOURES TO
**THIS PROCESS THROUGH COOPERATION EXTENDED BY THE GOI. IN
**THIS CONTEXT, BOTH SIDES WILL USE THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO
**AGREE UPON PROCEDURE THAT WILL BE APPLICABLE TO THIS
**INVESTIGATION SO THAT USE OF THE SUBPOENA PROCESS B Y
**THE USG WILL BE CONSIDRED AS A LAST RESORT ONLY.
**5. NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONTINUING NEGORIATIONS REGARDING
**THE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES TO EMPLOY, IN THE SPIRIT OF
**COOPERATION AND AS A VOLUNTARY MATTER, AND WITHOUT WAIVER
**OF THE GOI'S SOVEREIGN AND DIPLOMATIC RIGHTS AND THE
**GOI'S AND GOI EMPLOYEE CLAIMS OF IMMUNITY OR OTHER LEGAL
**OBJECTIONS AND ANY OTHER CLAIM, THE GOI WILL PROVIDE
**COGNIZANT USG OFFICIALS ACCESS TO GOI DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE
**SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION REFERRED TO IN SECTION 1 ABOVE,
**IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:
**A. THE USG WILL IDENTIFY TO THE GOI, IN WRITING, THE
**SPECIFIC COMPANIES AND TRANSACTIONS WITH REGARD TO WHICH
**DOCUMENTS ARE SOUGHT.

**B. THE PARTIES WILL AGREE UPON A REASONABLE PERIOD FOR
**ACCUMULATION OF THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT , WITH THE
**OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE MATERIALS IN REASONABLE INCREMENTS
**AS AGREED UPON.
**
**C. THE DOCD
**
**C. THE DOCUMENTS TO BE PROVIDED WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE AT
**A LOCATION IN THE UNITED STAES TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE
**GOI.
**D. AFTER EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS BY USG OFFICIALS, THE
**USG MAY SECURE COPIES OF ANY DOCUMENT IDENTIFIED FOR
**COPYING DURING THE REVIEW.
**
**E. DOCUMENTS THAT ARE INTERNAL TO THE GOI WILL NOT BE MADE
**AVAILABLE.
**
**6. IN RECOGNITION OF THE GOI'S VOLUNTARY COOPERATION AND
**IN AN ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE THE PARTIES UNDERSTANDING OF THE
**UNDERLYING CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN THE USG
**INVESTIGATION, THE USG WILL PROVIDE TO THE GOI A LIST OF
**QUESTIONS RELEVANT TO THE INVESTIGATION THAT ARE DESIGNED
**TO ELICIT SPECIFIC INFORMATION REGARDING THE SPECIFIC
**ALLEGATIONS UNDERLYING THE USG INVESTIGATION. THE GOI WILL
**RESPOND PROMPTLY TO SUCH QUESTIONS IN TH SPIRIT OF
**COOPERATION. IN ADDITION, THE USG WILL PROVIDE TO THE GOI
**ALL DOCUMENTS THAT ESTABLISH THE 1982 PRESIDENTIAL BAN
**REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE.
**7. BOTH PARTIES DESIRE AND ANTICIPATE THAT COOPERATIVE
**EFFORTS THROUGH AGREED UPON PROCEDURES REFRESENT THE BEST
**APPROACH TO DEALING WITH AND RESOLVING THE USG
**INVESTIGATION.
**8. THE PARTIES WILL USE THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO AVOID PUBLIC
**DISCLOSURE OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS AGREEMENT, BEYOND A
**STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TOE MEDIA QUESTIONS AGREED UPON
**BETWEEN THEM .
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דף 8 מתוך 8

עותק 4 מתוך 16 סודי ביותר

תפ: שהח,דהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,סייבל

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**    331                                                              **
**    **                                                               **
**  **                                  מתוך 2      סודי ביותר        **
**  **                                  מתוך 1      עותק 1 דף 1       **
** **                                                                  **
****                                                                  **
**                                                                    **
**                                                                    **
**אל: וש, נר: 1005, מ : המשרד                                         **
**דח: מ, סג: מ, תא: 310766, חח: 1700                                  **
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**                                                                    **
**                                                                    **
**סודי ביותר/מיידי                                                    **
**                                                                    **
**שגריר, ציר.                                                         **
**                                                                    **
**א. בשיחת הפמליות בלשכת רוה"מ נעם ס/הנשיא ורוה"מ נועדו **
**לפגישה בנפרד) ואחרי שמנוביל השמיע השגותיו על טיפול המישל **
**בסוגיית המצרר, ראה גרג, יועץ ס/הנשיא לבחון לאומי להעיר **
**בלהלן: כמי שעוקב זה מכבר אחרי יחסי ישראל - ארה"ב היגעתי **
**למסקנה שיש אמריקאים עמם קשה יותר לעסוק (WITH DEAL TO)    **
**בעניני ישראל מאשר עם ישראלים, עד לדרגה שזה יעורר **
**תגובתם והתנגדותם של אמריקאים אחרים.                               **
**                                                                    **
**                                                                    **
**ב. אין להוציא מכלל חשבון שהערה חמורה זו של גרג, אולי **
**היותר מרחיקת לכת שהושמעה באחרונה, מתייחסת לאיפא"ק - ברור **
**שהדבר מחייב מישנה זהירות בכל הקשור במגעים עם איפא"ק למען **
**לא ייפגע אירגון זה שהוא בה חיוני לאינטרסים המובהקים של **
**ישראל בארה"ב.                                                      **
**                                                                    **
**מנהל מצפ"א.                                                        **
**                                                                    **
**ע/ז.                                                                **
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**                                                                    **
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**מפ: שהח,מנכל,ממנכל,מצפא                                            **
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רה"מ שרה

14764 משרד החוץ תיא טל 03-5303333

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6209 נכנס

דף 1 מתוך 6

עותק 4 מתוך 14 סודי ביותר

אל: המשרד, נר: 867, ש : 1138

דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 310786, זח: 1930

סודי ביותר/בהול טפל לבוקר

אל: מנכל משהח, היועץ המשפטי-משהבט. ממנכל משהח, היועץ המשפטי-משהח

לשין

נמחון נר 776
נוי נר 241

שבתאי

להלן עיקרי המגעים עם הממשל היום. הדברים מחייבים,כפי שתראו,התייחסות מיידית שלכם עד מחר בשעות הבוקר שלנו.

א. בשיחה בלתי פורמלית עם החימ' הבוקר אמר ריצ'ארד בי הדרך שהנראית לו אישית היא זו שעליה שוחח עמי אמש,קרי ביטול הצווים תוך הצהרתנו על תביעת החסינות הדיפלומטית והנכונות לאפשר לשאול האנשים , בכפוף לטעון חסינות בלתי ולחסינות ''שימוש'' מאוחר שוב ושוב על כך ש''חסינות עיסקה'' בלתי אפשרית. בהצעה בלתי פורמלית שלנו(על דעת הצוות) שאלתי אם יהיו מוכנים בנקום אנשים , למסור לנו שאלות שעליהן נשיב,ואילו מומ' נענייין התשאול יידחה.אמר שאפשר לשלב שתי התפיסות אך הם רוצים להיות אין אנשים ,אחרת אין בכך ''התפשרות' מצדנו ,שכן אנו מוכנים בביטול הצווים והם נשארים בכי יכולת לקדם חקירה עד כתבי אישום אם יש בכך צורך .אמרתי שהמטרה אינה צריכה להיות כתב אישום ,אלא להגיע להסדר של שיתוף פעולה שאיננו בכיוון ה.מבחינתנו חשוב העקרון ,שהרי אנו מאמינים בי האנשים בסדר. סבור שבלי תשאול לא יילך.

ב. בסקביל עדכנתי,למען הסדר הטוב,את קוואק ממ' היועץ המשפטי נמחמ"ד, ואת וילקוקס בלילת בדיונים .קוואק מסר בתשובה שהערה שלי בקשר לרצוננו העקרוני בהשתתפות מחמ"ד, שמדיות כפי היא להשאיר הכל למשרד המשפטים .וילקוקס מסר, בהקשר

דף 2 מתוך 6
עותק 4 מתוך 14 סודי ביותר

אחר,בי ניתנה הנחיה להעביר למשרד המשפטים בעבורנו חומר בנושא
הוראתה 1982, אף בי לא חומר פנימי.
ג. בצהריים נערכה פגישה ארוכה אצל פרופ, בהשתתפות מארק
ריצ'ארד ,שייף , טייג (התובע המחוזי מאיובה) ,רוס,
תנובסקי,נוף ,דישי והחים.
להלן עיקריה:-

1. פרופ פתח ואמר כי בדקו הצעתנו המהותית נקרי ביטול הצווים
והקבמה לתישאול בתנאי חסינות גמורה לתיק), והם מחפשים דרך
ישב בין האינטרס שלהם ושלנו.הם מעריכים דבריו שאין בדעתנו
התפרייע לחקירה.ואולם מתן ''חסינות עיסקה''כ לתיק) לפני חקירה
יופך את החקירה ל''לא- חקירה''. משרד המשפטים אינו עוסק
בחקירות מינהליות אלא פליליות, ולוותר על קיים מראש-קשה
מאד. לבן הם בוחרים בחסינות שימוש'' לאינדיבידואלים
ולועתם רצוי שנקבל ראת.אם האנשים יאמרו אמת,אין להם מה
לחואוג לגבי שימוש בחומר נגדם .אם יושג משהו ברוח זו,יהיו
מוכנים לבטל את הצווים .

2. לשאלת החימי מה היו שושים ,בחוקרים , אילו היה מדובר
במקרה שגם לשיפתם יש בו חסינות דיפלומטית חמקו ואמרו שיש
להראות בל מקרה לגופו ומה שניתן נתן .מענ,עם ראת,בתשובה
לשאלת רישי מה אם נניח (להלכה בלבד) בי מישהו פעל בשעות
ובהיסח דעת -כי בעבר הגישו נגד עובדי מדינות ידידותיות
בתבי-אישום .שייף סען כי מחמיד היתה בתמונת הצווים ,ומכאן
שאין זו התלטה סתם של משרד המשפטים .

3. החימי אמר, כי הצעתנו היא לבטל את הצווים ; גם מוכנים כי
ארהיב תגיש לנו שאלון בקשר לנושאי החקירה,ותשתוך לעצמה את
הזכות לשותח עמנו על ראיונות וראת כשתדע יותר על התובן .באשר
להערת שייף , ציינתי בי נפגענו קשות מהצווים .מי שהחליט עליהם
,במחמיד או בסקום אחר ,צריך היה לדעת שאם יולפו בפי שהוהרנו
תיפגע ישראל בצורה קשה ביותר.
4. פרופ וריצ'ארד שאלו:אם יבוטלו הצווים וישראל תשיב לשאלון
,מה יהיה אם הממשל ירצה לראיין אנשים -הרי לא יהיו בידו
אמצעי בפיה נהיינו , קיים ת אפשרות שלא ניתן יהיה לבצע
מסירת צווים לאנשים) אמרנו שבידיעת החומר אנ , יוכלו להגיע
להסדר שבו נשמור על עקרון החסינות ל,,עיסקה''
נראתר מכן נשארו האמריקנים להתייעצות פנימית).
5. לאחר ההתייעצות פתח ריצ'ארד ואמר:כדי להסיר את הצווים ,דבר

דף 3 מתוך 6
עותק 4 מתוך 14 סודי ביותר

שהם מוכנים לו, יש צורך ב- ASSURANCES, שאם הריונים בקשר להתאיונות לא יעלו יפה, יהיה אפשרי להשיב את הסטטוס קוו על כנו. כלומר, הם יוכלו להגיש מחדש צווים, ואנו נוכל לפתוח בהתדיינות על תסינות. יש צורך במכניזם לכך, האלטרנטיבה היא החותנל 'יסלקי' את התאריך ל מהצווים, ולהשאיר את הצווים תלויים ועומדים כשבינתיים ארה'ב תמשיך בחקירתה בנפרד. אפשרות אחרונה היא עדיפה בעיניו.

6. החימ' השיב כי האפשרות השניה אינה באה בחשבון כלל. אין פרוצדורת הצווים מקובלות עלינו מכל וכל, ונפגענו מכך. באשר לאפשרות הראשונה, אנו שתי מדינות תרבותיות; ארה'ב פוחדת שהאנשים לא יהיו-אך אנחנו, כממשלה, לא נהוה מכשול לנוכחות הפיסית של האנשים (כמובן בכפוף לרצונם שלהם). האין דרך תרבותית לפתור את נלי חרב הצווים מחדש. ריצ'ארד אמר שאם יפנו לאיש בלשהו לאחר ביטולהצווים לא תהיה דרך לאכף בוזו לבית המשפט, דבר שישנו בידם כעת, עם הצווים. החימ' אמר כנעקבות התדיעצות הצוות) כי כל צד ישמור לעצמו את הזכויות לכל עמדה. ריצ'ארד תרע ל כך שבהעדר צווים אין אמצעי עיכה נגד מי שעסרב להעיד. החימ' השיב כי אנשים שלא יגיבו לצווים כמובן נושאים עליהם סיכונים של סגירת הדרך לארה'ב למשל. ק. טייג התובע המחוזי מאיווה, אמר שצעד הסרת הצווים צריך להיות מלווה בבטחון שניתן יהיה לחדשם. החמ' השיב, על דעת הצוות, שעמדתנו ברורה: צווים אינם מקובלים עלינו, ולא ניתן לצפות ליתתימתנו באשר לחידושם. עם זאת כל צד יובל לשמור על זכויותיו, ואנו נוכל להעביר עמדת ארה'ב לממשלתנו ולאנשינו כי לדעתר תוכל לחדש את הצווים. ריצ'ארד שאל אם נהיה מוכנים ל- DEPOSITIONS בישראל. השבנו כי עלינו לבדוק זאת. עם זאת העיר ריצ'ארד עצמו, כי הפרוצדורה של חיקור דין בישראל נקפי (הנק הערה המשפטית) כפופה להגנת הסעיף הפוליטי נקרי סעיף 7 (חוק) ובשיחה אחיכי הוסיף שמדינות רבות בסיטואציות דומות מפעילות סעיפים באלה.

8. ברוס סיכם כי רצונם להבטית שהאנשים יסכימו לקבל צווים אם ירצו לחדשם.

9. ציינו כי לדעתנו נוכל להעביר לממשל ולאנשים את העובדה שהצווים מבוטלים עתה, ואנו נבנסים לפרוצדורה לא פורמלית של שאלונים - אם יסכימו האמריקנים -בשעה שארה'ב שומרת לה את הזכות לחדשם.

10. ברוס אמר כי ישיבו לנו באשר לעמדתם במפגש מחר בצהרים.

דף 4 מתוך 6
עותק 4 מתוך 14 סודי ביותר

1. בשיחה לאחר מכן עם ריצ'ארד תיאמנו כי נאשר לתקשורת את קיום המפגשים והדיונים, ותו לא. ריצ'ארד חזר ודיבר על חכופת החיית הצוים, והחי' רחה ואת עם ואת אמר בענין השאלונים כי התונעים המחוריים אינם מעוניינים בל בך בואת, כי אינם מאמינים בערבם (שבחינתנו כמובן הדבר מציג נכונות לש'פ).

2. סיכום והערכה:

1. בהנחה כי מובן להם שאין דחיית הצוים מקובלת עלינו ואנו זורשים ביטולם, ישנן ברגע שתי חלופות:

א) הינותם לגישתנו, קרי ביטול הצוים שכל צד שומר על זכויות לגבי העתיד לטקרה שירצו לחדש (וכמובן שאלונים בין המשלות, אם יחרו לכך).

ב) עמידתם על הדרישה שהאנשים יסכימו להתחייב כי יקבלו את הצוים בעתיד, תוך שמירת זכויות שלנו על טענותמשפטיות נגד תקפות הצוים.

2. גישתנו הנחרצת היתה ביטול הצוים. מסרנו להם במהלך השיחות על נכונותנו לחתום על הסכמה לקבלת הצוים בעתיד, ביון שתהיה בכך הברה עקרונית בנושא שאינו חוזר סעיף 2.

2. גישתנו הנחרצת היתה ביטול הצוים. מסרנו להם במהלך השיחות על אי נכונותנו לחתום על הסכמה לקבלת הצוים בעתיד, ביון שתהיה בכך הברה עקרונית בנושא שאינו מקובל עלינו. עם זאת תבן מאד כי יעמדו על דעתם. אין, בכל הנראה, סיכוי סביר ביטול בכי שישמרו להם אופציה לחידוש נאם כי היו מוכנים לפי תנאיהם, קרי "חסינות שיפוטי" לגבי מה שנאמר בתשאול, ושמירת טענות שיש לכל צד.

3. מוברקות להן שתי שיטות אלטרנטיביות שנשטיבות שהובנו מצלנו ("א" לשיטתנו 1-"ב" לשיטתם). למותר לציין כי גישתנו היא לשאוף שלא להגיע למבוקש על-ידיהם, ונעשה בל מאמץ בביצוע זה במישור העקרוני והמעשי, אך עלינו להיות נכונים לבל אפשרות.

4. אנו מבקשים אישורכם להמשך ניהול מו' הסכמתכם כי נגיע להמת משתי החלופות בכולל הפתות נוחה). המשטעות תהיה בבל מקרה ביטול מיידי של

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**                                                                  **
**    **                                  מתוך 6      דף 5          **
**  **                      מודי ביותר    מתוך 14     עותק 4        **
** **                                                               **
****                                                               **
**                                                                 **
**הצוים .ועם ראת השארת האופציה לאמריקנים לחזור לכך .הדוות       **
**מפחינתנו הוא כי הביטול יקנה פסק זמן למגעים נוספים שאולי       **
**ימנעו את הצורך בעתיד בפתיחת צוים מחדש, אף כי האפשרות         **
**העקרונית מבחינת האמריקנים תישאר פתוחה-בשאנו שומרים על        **
**עמדותינו .מבחינתנו אירוא ישנו הרווח הציבורי והמעשי שבביטול**
**הצוים .ובדאי מצנו לא יעשה גרוע יותר.                          **
**                                                                **
**5  עלינו להביא בחשבון אלמנט נוסף :בהתיעצות היום עם עויד     **
**גוסים ממשרד קמפימן הובהר כי מצנו בהליך נגדי לא יהיה          **
**מהיר, והעניין גם עלול להסתיים תוך שבועות ולא יותר.הואיל      **
**וגם האמריקנים הביעו אי רצון להתדינות בבית משפט,ודאי אין     **
**מנו צורך לדחוף לכך.                                           **
**6  הנל על דעת כל הצות                                         **
**                                                                **
**                                                                **
**7. להלן  2 הנוספים                                            **
**                                                                **
**                                                                **
**                                                                **
**                                                                **
**                                                                **
**THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL (''GOI'') AND THE UNITED STATES       **
**GOVERNMENT (''USA'') ARE EMGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS RELATING       **
**TO THE SERVING OF SUBPOENAS ON GOI EMLOYEES IN CONNECTION      **
**WITH A USG INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO     **
**EXPORT CLUSTER MUNITIONS EQUIPMENT CONTRARY TO A BAN.          **
**PENDING THE RESULTS OF SUCH NEGORIATIONS .THE USG HAS          **
**AGREED TO WITHDRAW SUCH SUBPOENAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY     **
**CLAIM REGARDING THEIR VALIDITY. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOI       **
**AGREES NOT TO USE THE FACT OF THE USG WITHDRAWAL OF THE        **
**SUBPOENAS AS A BASIS TO SUPPORT OR ESTABLISH ANY OF ITS        **
**CLAIMS REGARDING  THE INVALIDITY OF SUCH SUBPOENAS;            **
**HOWEVER, IT WILL PRESERVE ALL CLAIMS REGARDING THE             **
**INVALIDITY OF SUCH SUBPOENAS THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE           **
**WITHDRAWAL OF THE SUBPOENAS. IN ANY EVENT, PRIOR TO THE        **
**REVEWAL OF ANY SUBPOENAS BY THE USG, THE USG WILL CONSULT      **
**WITH GOI REPRESENTATIVES REGARDING THIS MATTER IN AN           **
**ATTEMPT TO AVOID RECOURSE TO THE SUBPOENA PROCESS.             **
**2(                                                             **
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**THE UNDERSIGNED EMPLOYEES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
**ISRAEL(''GOI'') RECOGNIZE THAT THE SUBPOENAS SERVED THEM
**ON JULY 8, 1986 HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN BY THE UNITED STATES
**GOVERNMENT(''USG'') AS A RESULT OF ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS
**BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOI AND USG. IN THE EVENT
**SUCH NEGORIATIONS DO NOT RESULT IN A DECISION BY THE USG
**NOT TO EMPLOY THE SUBPOENA PROCESS WITH SUCH INDIVIDUALS
**IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE WITHDRWN
**SUBPOENAS, THE UNDERSIGNED AGREE THAT SUBPOENAS IDENTICAL
**IN FORM AND CONTENT MAY BE SERVED UPON THEM OR, IN THEIR
**ABSENCE, ON-----, WHO HAS BEEN APPOINTED THEIR AGENT FOR
**SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT ONLY. IT IS AGREED
**THAT SUCH SERVICE, IN ANY EVENT , WITLL NOT PREJUDICE IN
**ANY MANNER THE PARTIES CLAIMS REGARDING IMMUNITY OR THE
**INVALIDITY OF SERVICE ON SUCH INDIVIDUALS IN ANY EVENT ,
**PRIOR TO THE RENEWAL OF SUBPOENAS BY THE USG, THE USG WILL
**CONSULT WITH GOI REPRESENTATIVES RZRARDING THIS MATTER IN
**AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID RECOURSE TO THE SUBPOENA PROCESS.

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

טופס מברק צפון

אל: וושינגטון

דף 1 מתוך 10 דפים

סיווג בטחוני: שמור

דחיפות: מיידי

לשימוש מח' הקשר
תאריך וז'ח': 3118
מס. מברק: 1011

לרובינשטיין.

ביקור בוש - חתימת הסכמים.

1. אתמול בחתמו שני המסמכים בבואם.

א. מזכר התיירות. עותק בדיפ. האמריקאים לא הסכימו שהתאריך ומיקום החתימה יופיעו כמקובל בגוף ההסכם ולפני החתימות והסכימו לבסוף שירושלים והתאריך יופיעו מתחת לחתימות.

ב. VOA בראשי תיבות.

בקשר ל- VOA להלן כמה הבהרות:

1. אתקן להסכם (הגולאי) ו אסיבות הוקמו באזרין ממנכ 966.

2. אם כי בוסח המכתב קיבל הסכמת רוה"מ, שר החוץ, שר התקשורת, חבן בראון - הסכמנו לבוסח של סעיף 2 בכתב תוך הבנה עם פלאטן, ולדבריו על דעת סמיט עמו התקשר טלפונית במהלך המשא ומתן כי במילים Funds to be obligated under the establishment agreement - הכוונה לכל הסכום כולל סכום ה- Government Furnished Equipement (GFE) (הציוד לתחנה שעשוי להירכש ישירות ע"י האמריקאים); דהייבו סה"כ סכום עלות התחנה. (לדברי פלאטן סמיט לא הסכים להוספת המילה total אותה הצענו).

3. באשר לסיפא של סעיף 2, לדברי פלאטן סמיט לא הסכים לבוסח אשר סיכמנו עמו (פלאטן) לפיו The funds... will be disbursed directly to Israeli entities

ועמד על כך שיכתב spent directly through Israeli entities

והסכים לבסוף להוסיף במילים In accordance with the spirit of this letter

לא ברור לנו מדוע התנגד סמיט להצעתנו הנ"ל.

הבנתנו הינה שהמילה through אינה כוללת את תומר כ- Israeli Entity

2/..

שהה [illegible] מנהל התקשורת [illegible]

תאריך: [illegible] השולח: [illegible] אישור מנהל המחלקה: [illegible] אישור המנפיל: [illegible]

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

שופס מברק צפון

אל: xx

דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים

סיווג בטחוני: _____

דחיפות: _____

לשימוש מח' הקשר: תאריך וז"ח: _____ מס. מברק: 1011

- 2 -

נסה נא לברר עמו סיבת התעקשותו לגבי המילה through וזאת מבלי להסביר לו את האפשרות של פרשנות מצמצמת לפיה המילה throughעשויה גם לכלול את "תומר" דהייבו שאפילו אם 60% מהכסף יוצא באמצעות תומר על פי מכרז והזוכה תהיה חברה אמריקאית - יהיה הדבר תואם את סעיף 2 ואזי לא הרווחנו בכך מאומה.

xxxxx הבהרנא שתי הנקודות הנ"ל עם סמיט בטרם יחתום על המכתב והודיענו.

חשיבות ההבהרות הנן משמעותיות גם לאור העובדה שבעקבות המכתב ויתרנו על הסיפא של סעיף (e) וקיבלנו הנוסח האמריקאי לגבי הפתיחה של סעיף 2.

4. לגבי סעיף (B) 2 - האמריקאים טענו שלא הסכימו להוציא המילים Methods of Contracting ואי לזאת השארנו הסוגריים המרובעים וההסכם נחתם תוך הבנה שנקודה זו טרם סוכמה.

5. לא דנו בנקודות האחרות שנשארו פתוחות.

6. כל ההסכם כולל חילופי המכתבים טעונים כמובן אישור הממשלה לפי הפרוצדורה המקובלת לפני שניתן יהיה לחתום עליו בחתימה מלאה.

משפט

ח. גולן

תאריך: 31.7.86 השולח: xxxxxxxx אלעזר אישור מנהל המחלקה: _____ אישור המנכ"ל: _____

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, Tel. 654338

July 30, 1986

Mr. Yoram Alster
Director-General
Ministry of Communications
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Alster:

With reference to the project to build a radio relay station in Israel and our negotiations toward that end, which resulted in the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel for the establishment and operation of a radio relay station in Israel, I would like to reaffirm a basic fact--namely that the economic benefit accruing to Israel from this project will be substantial. Two points are relevant in that connection:

1. I can assure you that Israeli firms will be able to compete on an equal basis with American firms for the site specific design contract.

2. Based on the experience of the Voice of America, and given our discussions of the establishment and operating agreement to date, it is our mutual understanding that not less than half of the funds to be obligated under the establishment agreement for the facility will be spent directly through Israeli entities in accordance with the spirit of this letter.

Sincerely,

Morton S. Smith
Deputy Director
Voice of America

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF A RADIO RELAY STATION IN ISRAEL.

WHEREAS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAS REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THAT A RADIO RELAY STATION (HEREINAFTER "THE RADIO FACILITY") BE ESTABLISHED IN ISRAEL;

AND WHEREAS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS, IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST, AGREED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A STATION;

AND WHEREAS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA INTENDS TO BEAR THE COSTS OF THE PROJECT AND INTENDS TO ENSURE THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE RADIO FACILITY IN ISRAEL'S ARAVA AREA WILL BE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE AREA; AS WELL AS TO THE BENEFIT OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMY THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ENDEAVOURING TO ENSURE THAT TO THE MAXIMUM FEASIBLE EXTENT THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE RADIO FACILITY SHALL BE CARRIED OUT BY ISRAEL ENTITIES;

THEREFORE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAVE AGREED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT IN ISRAEL OF THE RADIO FACILITY AS FOLLOWS:

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1. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AGREE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RADIO FACILITY IN ISRAEL TO RELAY PROGRAMS BROADCAST BY THE VOICE OF AMERICA AND THOSE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING (HEREINAFTER "THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES").

   THIS ARTICLE APPLIES TO THE EXISTING RADIO STATIONS OPERATED BY THE ABOVE ENTITIES.

2. IN RECOGNITION AND IN APPRECIATION OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE PREAMBLE IT IS AGREED THAT:

   (A) THE RADIO FACILITY SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AND OPERATED BY THE TRANSMISSIONS OF MIDDLE EAST RELAY PROJECT MANAGEMENT OR THE MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS OF ISRAEL (HEREINAFTER "TOMER") IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEPARATE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION AGREEMENT(S) TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN TOMER AND THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES.

   (B) THE SEPARATE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION AGREEMENT(S) WILL DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF THE FACILITY, THE EQUIPMENT IT WILL CONTAIN, "[THE METHODS OF CONTRACTING] ITS OPERATIONS AND OTHER NECESSARY DETAILS. OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED MAY BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN TOMER AND THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES.

   (C) ALL CONTRACTS TO BE AWARDED UNDER THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT(S) AND ARRANGEMENTS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2(B) ABOVE WILL BE AWARDED AND MANAGED BY TOMER IN ACCORDANCE WITH ISRAELI LAWS, REGULATIONS AND EXECUTIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVES, PROVIDED THAT THESE CONTRACTS WILL BE AWARDED ON THE BASIS OF NONDISCRIMINATORY FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AMERICAN FIRMS.

   (D) THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT(S), ARRANGEMENTS, OR CONTRACTS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPHS 2(A), 2(B) AND 2(C) ABOVE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ISRAEL LAW AND JURISDICTION.

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3. THE RADIO FACILITY WILL RECEIVE PROGRAMS FROM THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES FOR RELAY TO AGREED SPECIFIC LANGUAGE AND COVERAGE AREAS OUTSIDE ISRAEL AS SPECIFIED IN THE ANNEX TO THIS AGREEMENT. ANY CHANGES IN LANGUAGES OR COVERAGE AREAS WILL BE THROUGH MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES WILL USE THE RADIO FACILITY ONLY FOR RADIO RELAY PURPOSES AND NOT FOR ON-SITE PROGRAM ORIGINATION.

4. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL UNDERTAKES TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE SPECIFIED SITE FOR THE RADIO FACILITY FOR THE PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT.

5. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL PAY ALL COSTS ARISING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE RADIO FACILITY.

   ANY COST, HOWEVER, WHICH APPEARS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO BE UNJUSTIFIABLE OR UNREASONABLE IN NATURE, WILL BE DEALT WITH IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 16.

6. THE RADIO FACILITY SHALL BE FOR THE PRIMARY USE OF THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS COMMENCING ON THE DATE OF THE FIRST OPERATIONAL RELAY TRANSMISSION (HEREINAFTER "THE COMMENCEMENT DATE"), DURING WHICH PERIOD THE TITLE TO THE EQUIPMENT AT THE RADIO FACILITY WILL BE HELD BY THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES. AFTER FIFTEEN YEARS FROM THE COMMENCEMENT DATE, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS ENTITLED, AT ITS REQUEST, TO RECEIVE TITLE TO ANY EQUIPMENT AT THE RADIO FACILITY AT NO COST. THE GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT AFTER FIFTEEN YEARS FROM THE COMMENCEMENT DATE, UPON REQUEST OF EITHER GOVERNMENT, NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD BETWEEN THEM TO REVIEW THIS AGREEMENT. SHOULD SUCH A REVIEW TAKE PLACE, THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES SHALL CONTINUE TO HAVE PRIMARY USE OF THOSE FACILITIES FOR THE REMAINING YEARS SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THE REVIEWED AGREEMENT.

   SUBSEQUENT EXTENSIONS WILL ALSO BE CONCLUDED ON A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE BASIS.

A.R.

7. SUBJECT TO THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES' PRIMARY USE REQUIREMENTS BEING SATISFIED, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SHALL BE ENTITLED TO USE THE FACILITY FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES, AS MUTUALLY COORDINATED WITH THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES.

8. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SHALL TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RADIO REGULATIONS OF THE ITU AND THE PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL RADIO REGULATIONS, TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES THE AGREED RADIO FREQUENCIES REQUIRED FOR TRANSMISSION BY THE RADIO FACILITY.

9. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL AGREE ON HOW THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES WILL IDENTIFY THEMSELVES. CHANGES OF THIS IDENTIFICATION WHICH MIGHT RELATE TO THE SITE IN ISRAEL, SHOULD THEY BECOME NECESSARY, WILL BE MADE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.

10. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AFFIRMS THAT THE LONGSTANDING PRINCIPLES PROHIBITING THE BROADCAST OF MATERIAL CONTAINING INCITEMENT OR MATERIAL DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ADVOCATING RACIAL AND/OR RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION OR INTOLERANCE WILL APPLY TO ALL BROADCASTS RELAYED FROM ISRAEL.

11. THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES SHALL NOT RELAY FROM THE RADIO FACILITY PROGRAMS DETRIMENTAL TO THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF ISRAEL OR TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN A JEWISH COMMUNITY IN A COUNTRY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THAT COUNTRY.

A.R.

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12. IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONSIDERS THAT THE PRINCIPLES STATED IN ARTICLES 10 AND 11 ABOVE HAVE NOT BEEN ADHERED TO, IT SHALL INFORM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND REQUEST THAT IMMEDIATE STEPS BE TAKEN TO CORRECT THE SITUATION. SHOULD THE PROBLEM NOT BE RESOLVED, THE MATTER SHALL BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVELS, WHICH SHALL JOINTLY TAKE SUCH ACTION AS MAY BE REQUIRED TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION.

13. EACH COUNTRY TRANSMITTING FROM THE RADIO FACILITY WILL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTENT OF ITS BROADCASTS.

14. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AFFIRMS THAT THE RADIO FACILITY IS BEING ESTABLISHED AT U.S. GOVERNMENT REQUEST AND ACOORDING TO U.S. GOVERNMENT PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT DUE TO THE ABOVE AND TO THE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES APPLYING TO THE AREA, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL NOT ASSUME INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AND PRESENCE TO THE RADIO FACILITY IN ISRAEL, AND BROADCASTS BY THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO FORESTALL ANY ACTION BY A THIRD STATE DETRIMENTAL TO ISRAEL REGARDING THE ABOVE. FURTHER, THE GOVERMNENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL ACTIVELY OPPOSE CRITICISM AND WORK TO DEFEAT ACTIONS INITIATED BY THRID STATES, INCLUDING IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, AGAINST ISRAEL ARISING FROM THE ABOVE. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WILL SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THAT RESPECT.

15. (A) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SHALL INDEMNIFY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, ITS OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AGAINST ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE ON ACCOUNT OF INJURY TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY ARISING FROM THE OPERATION OR USE OF THE RADIO FACILITY. THE ABOVE WILL INCLUDE LOSS OR DAMAGE OCCURRING TO THIRD PARTIES.

A.R.

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(B) WHERE, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BELIEVES THAT SUCH LOSS OR DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL ACT OF AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, AND THIS IS DISPUTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, THEN THE ISSUE SHALL BE SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 16.

16. A JOINT COMMITTEE SHALL BE FORMED IN ORDER TO SETTLE ANY DISPUTES OR DIFFERENCES CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT. IF THE JOINT COMMITTEE FAILS TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE OR DIFFERENCE IT SHALL BE SUBMITTED FOR NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

17. AMENDMENTS TO THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE BY THE CONSENT OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

18. IN THE CASE OF IMPERATIVE NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS, AS DETERMINED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL MAY TEMPORARILY SUSPEND TRANSMISSIONS FROM THE RADIO FACILITY. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SHALL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INFORM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN ADVANCE OF SUCH ACTION AND TO RESTORE OPERATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

19. (A) THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE TERMINATED BY MUTUAL CONSENT OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

(B) THE GOVERNMENTS REALIZE THAT DUE TO THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF THE ORGANIZATION, DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF THE RADIO FACILITY, EXTRAORDINARY AND UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT NECESSITATE THE TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT BY EITHER GOVERNMENT. IN THE EVENT SUCH EXTRAORDINARY UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD OCCUR, THE GOVERNMENTS SHALL EXPEDITIOUSLY NEGOTIATE A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY TERMINATION ARRANGEMENT. SUCH ARRANGEMENT SHALL ALSO DEAL WITH POSSIBLE QUESTIONS OF LIABILITY.

A-R.

20. (A) PRINCIPAL ESSENTIAL ITEMS, TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN TOMER AND THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES AND LISTED IN ANNEXES TO THIS AGREEMENT (HEREINAFTER "PRINCIPAL ITEMS") IMPORTED AND FURNISHED DIRECTLY BY THE U.S. BROADCAST ENTITIES, SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY IMPORT DUTIES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, CUSTOMS, PURCHASE TAX, SURCHARGE AND COMPULSORY PAYMENTS).

(B) CUSTOMS PAYMENTS ACCORDING TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE ISRAEL TARRIF AND V.A.T. PAID ON PRINCIPLE ITEMS IMPORTED OR LOCALLY PURCHASED BY TOMER WILL BE REFUNDED.

(C) TOMER WILL BE REGISTERED AS AN "AUTHORISED REGISTERED DEALER" IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PREVAILING V.A.T. LAW AND AS SUCH WILL OBTAIN A SET-OFF OR REFUND OF V.A.T. FOR WHICH IT IS ELIGIBLE.

21. AN AGREED NUMBER OF U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN ISRAEL TO WORK ON THE RADIO FACILITY.

THERE WILL BE AN EXCHANGE OF OFFICIAL LETTERS CONCERNING THIS MATTER.

22. BOTH GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES.

JERUSALEM, 30 JULY 1986

FOR THE GOVENMENT OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL

A. R.

FOR THE GOVERMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

משלחת משרד הבטחון—נת יורק

מספר מברק 1/4

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סודי

סיווג בטחוני

מידי

דרגת דחיפות

311700 111 :ווש

אל : מנכ"ל

לידיעת: לשכת שר הבטחון, כראון - ממנכ"ל משרד החוץ, הנלם"כ

מ"מ יועץ משפטי - שפי, רובינשטיין - וושינגטון - לוואן מלבב.

מאת : רמש"ב

תאריך : 7.31.86

מספר : 1601-4.1/0242

רצ"כ נקודות וארועים הקשורים לענין פגזי המצרר אותם העלינו מתוך המצוי והידוע לי.

ישראל

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31.7.86

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ארועים עיקריים בנושא פגזי מצרר

1. ביולי 1952 נחתם הסכם בין ישראל לארה"ב: MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT
לפיו השימוש באמל"ח אמריקאים ע"י ישראל יהיה מוגבל למטרות של הגנה עצמית לגיטימית ובמחוז פנים.

2. ב-1976 הוחלף החוק מ-1952 בחוק כולל יותר בשם: ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT
- לעניין המגבלות על השימוש בנשק אמריקאי אין כנראה הבדלים בין החוקים.
- לפי החוק על הנשיא לדווח לקונגרס בכל מקרה "שיש חשש שנעשתה פגיעה בחוק" ואמנם בכל הפעמים שיוזכרו בהמשך השתמש הנשיא בנימוח זה של החוק כאשר דיווח לקונגרס.
- דיווח פורמלי לקונגרס שהחוק הופר מחייב הפלת סנקציות הכוללות הפסקת הסיוע האמריקאי ומכירות הנשק כפי שהדבר נעשה כאשר האמריקאים הטילו אמברגו על טורקיה לאחר פלישתה לקפריסין.

3. בדצמבר 1976 הסכימה ישראל במכתב של שגריר ישראל בוושינגטון לעזר מכיר ההגנה להגבלות מסוימות על השימוש בפצצות מצרר (CBU) ופצצות מונחות לייזר (LGB) שהן מתוצרת ארה"ב או המיוצרות על ידי ישראל וההמבוססות במישרין או בעקיפין על ידע/ציוד אמריקאי.

4. ב-5 לאפריל 1978 לאחר מיבצע ליטני הודיע הנשיא באמצעות מזכיר המדינה לקונגרס כי החוק הופר.

5. ב-11 לאפריל 1978 חזרה ישראל במכתב של שר החוץ לשגריר האמריקאי על ההתחייבות מ-1976 והסכימה לנוהלים נוספים באשר לשימוש בנשק אמריקאי שעליו הוטלו מגבלות (CBU ו-LGB)

6. ב-[illegible] למאי 1979 לפי הערה בכתב יד על מכתב שר החוץ (דיין) מ-11 לאפריל 1978 אישרה ישראל שהמגבלות מ-1978 חלות גם על פגזי מצרר.

7. באוגוסט 1979 דווח מזכיר המדינה לקונגרס על הפרה נוספת של ההסכם מ-1952 ונאת כמעמות התקפות אויר של שישראל על לבנון ב-22 ליולי 1979.

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8. ב-12 למאי 1980 אישרו האמריקאים באמצעות מכתב "הצעה וקבלה" מכירת 10.000 פגזי מצרר מ"מ M483A1 העסקה כונתה XNF.

9. ב-1981 דיווח מזכיר המדינה לקונגרס על הפרת החוק ע"י ישראל כתוצאה מתקיפת הכור הגרעיני בעיראק.

10. ב-20 לאפריל 1982 מדווחת המשלחת לארץ על דחייה באספקות פגזי המצרר בעסקות XNF ו-XHD כתוצאה מליקויים טכניים בפגזים (אמינות נמוכה).

11. ב-20 ליולי 1982 ממש"ן 2 מודיע לראש מנה"ר ב-LTC. GONSELL מ- DARCOM הודיע מלפונית כי משרדו קיבל הנחיה ממשרד ההגנה בעקבות הנחיות הנשיא לעכב משלוח 4000 פגזי מצרר שתוכנן לסוף יולי 1982.

12. ב-28 ליולי 1982 לאחר מבצע של"ג הוציא נשיא ארה"ב צו נשיאותי האוסר על מכירת פגזי המצרר M483- לישראל והפסקת כל המשלוחים של ההזמנות הקיימות XHD-XNF סה"כ 26,000 פגז. הצוו נישלח מהמועצה לבטחון לאומי בצורת מזכר אל מחמ"ד

BUREAU OF POLITICAL / MILITARY AFFAIRS
ADMIRAL JONATHAN T.HOWE
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL PHILIP C.GAST-DIRECTOR DSAA

הצו מתייחס ל -

"M483 PROJECTILE AND COMPONENTS THEREOT"

וכולל (או שכיתן לו פרוש כזה) איסור העברת כל אינפורמציה טכנית בנושא פגזי מצרר לישראל.

הצוו היכנס בתוקף עד לביטולו לפי הוראה מהבית הלבן.

13. ב-26 לאוגוסט 1982 פונה סרמש"ן לרכש לרובינזון (M.C רשיונות יצוא מחלקת המדינה) ומבקש לקבל רשיונות יצוא למרעומים M577 משום שהם מיועדים לפצצות תאורה הבקשה הקודמת לרשיון יצוא על מרעומים אלו מ-7 ליולי 1982 נדחתה משום שהם מתאימים לפצצות מצרר.

14. ב-22 לנובמבר 1982 פונה GAST לרמש"ן ומבקש הסבר לאיזה סוג של פגזים יורכבו 32,000 החלקים להרכבת מרעומים M577MT60 שלהם בוקשה המשלחת רשיון ב-5 לנובמבר 1982.

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15.ב-23 לאוקטובר 1983 פונה מנכ"ל התע"ש למנכ"ל משהב"ט ומבקש לשקול פניה מחדש לארה"ב לביטול ההקפאה שהוטלה על רכש מרעומים 577 ונאת כדי לאפשר זרימת מידע יצורי שותף לתע"ש ליצור עצמי של המרעומים.

16.כסוף נובמבר 1983 בשיחות רה"מ ושהב"ט בוושינגטון הודיעו האמריקאים כי הם נכונים לחדש מכירת פגזי מצרר לישראל בכפוף להסכם חדש על מגבלות שימוש.

17. ב-1 לינואר 1984 בתשובה על בקשת סמטוס עיסקה IS-D-AHD כותב גלן ראד מ-DSAA לרמש"ן כי "אין אפשרות עדין למכור מרעומים אלו לשימוש בתחמושת מצרר.

18.ב-9 לנובמבר 1984 מבקש רמש"ן במכתב לגנרל CHAIN מנהל המשרד לענינים פוליטיים צבאיים לאשר לתע"ש לרכוש מרעומים 565 מדרום קוריאה.

19.בהתאם למכתב דוכינשטיין למנכ"ל משרד החוץ ב-6 לדצמבר 1985 נימסר על ידי מד מקנמרה למנכ"ל משהב"ט התיקון המוצע על ידי האמריקאים להתחייבות מ-1978 הנוסח החדש מתיחס כמפורש לפגזי מצרר (בנוסף לפצצות מצרר ולייזר) ממיל איסור על מכירת תחמושת למדינות צד שלישי ללא אישור מוקדם של ארה"ב בין אם המדובר בתחמושת צד שלישי ובין אם המדובר בתחמושת שיוצרה בארץ והנשענת ישירות או עקיפות על רכיבים וטכנולוגיה אמריקאית.
הנוסח החדש ממיל מגבלות נוספות גם על אפשרות השימוש בתחמושת זו ועל תהליך ההחלטות הקשור בהפעלתה.

20.ב-19 לפברואר 86 מבקש שר הבטחון להגיע להכרעה עם ארה"ב באשר לגורף פגזי המצרר 155 מ"מ

21.ב-12 למרץ 1986 בשקבות ביקור ארמיטאג' בישראל מציינים האמריקאים ב-NOM PAPER מהשגרירות שמכיוון שישראל לא מוכנה להיכנס למו"מ על הגבלות שימוש בפגזי מצרר ארה"ב אינה מוכנה לשחרר הפגזים שהוחרמו או למכור לישראל תחמושת מסוג זה ללא מו"מ על הגבלות נוספות בשימוש.

22.ב-27 למרץ 1986 פונה הרמש"ן ל-DSAA ומבקש למצוא קונה לפגזים המוחרמים ולהחזיר לישראל הכסף.

23.ב-8 ליולי 1986 נמסרת האגרת והצווים ומתפרסמת באמצעי התקשורת ההקיזה שעורך המכס ביהס לשעונות על יצוא ללא רישוי מנואים של הציוד ליצור פגזי מצרר.