

4

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

ת.ד. 5026

חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה
 תת חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה
 שם תיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמועון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית.
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שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמועון פרס ויצחק
א - 6 / 5026
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מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה

אאאא, חוזם: 14032
אל: רהמש/603
מ-: המשרד, תא: 101091, זח: 1715, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בכב
88066
סודי/מידי
103.55

א ל: וושינגטון, הציר

הנדון: ערבויות

נודה על קבלת הערכת מצב של השגרירות בנדון, זאת לאור הודעת מחמ'ד.

נבקש שהערכה תכלול צפי והמלצות לדרכי פעולה לשבועות הקרובים (עד יום
ההודיה) שיחיסו למכלול הנושאים הקשורים בנדון.

מנהל מצפ'א
10 באוקטובר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14641

אל: רהמש/645

מ-: ווש, נר: 2241, תא: 091091, זח: 1920, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ' א

דע: מ' מ' רוה' מ' ושה' ח, שר האוצר, מנכ' ל' משה' ח, מנכ' ל' האוצר
סמנכ' ל' צפ' א

מאת: ר' יחידת הקונגרס, וושינגטון

המערכה על הערכויות להלואות.

2054 (חוזם 6571) מה - 6.10.91

להלן התייחסותי למספר נקודות אשר העלית במברק הסודי הנ' ל:

1. כן ! למרות שבחרת להתעלם מכך, הנני מקפיד (מאז תחילת הקיץ ! לאבחן אח
המשוכות שבדרך, להתריע על המגבלות העלולות לפגוע בהישג המרשים של 70
השושבינים, להזהיר מפני שאננות וספירה מוקדמת של הקולות ולהמריץ לפעילות
אינטנסיבית פן ניכשל במשימה ההסטורית.

2. לא ! אין להמתין 120 ימים כדי לשוב ולדון בנושא בקונגרס (אלא אם כן
שואפים לשחק לידי המימשל), אלא יש אכן להמשיך ולפעול לפי התרחיש הגרוע
ביותר. כך הצעתי והדגשתי בשיחותי בקיץ בארץ, ובדווחי, כאשר בין היתר
ביקשתי לתגבר הנוכחות במישורים הכלכלי והמדיני בעשרות מומחים.

3. כן ! המימשל נחוש בדעתו להפוך התחיקה על פיה. תמהני מדוע הינך קורא
'להתכונן למצב בו ידרוש המימשל התניות פוליטיות ו/או כלכליות שלא
ינה נוחות לישראל בלשון המעטה' ?

האם מצב זה אינו שורר לפחות מאז 2.91 ? האם לא קראת את דווחי בנדון ולא
שמעת את התבטאויותי, אשר היו גם אז שונים מדווחים אחרים ? ! האם אין
הקונגרס שותף בכיר בעיצוב מדיניות חוץ ? האם הוא מהווה חותמת גומי
למימשל ? !!!

4. לא ! אינני מתעלם מהתגייסות הקהילה היהודית למשימה אלא שאני יודע
שהפוטנציאל של הקהילה מרשים יותר. ההתגייסות היתה מרשימה לתנאים של
'ספרינט קצר': אך האם יש ספק כי יש צורך דחוף בארגון מחודש של
ההיערכות לתנאי 'מרתון' ? !!! האם עלינו לפעול לפי 'פרספציה', או
אולי לפעול לשנוי ה'פרספציה' ולהתאמתה למציאות וליעדים ? ! האם עלינו
ללכת בחלם המותווה ע'י יהדות ארה"ב, או להנהיג את העם היהודי במשימה
הסטורית זאת ? !

5. כן ! בנגוד להדגשיך העוסקים במשוכות ומתעלמים מן ההישגים, אני שואב
אופטימיות ממאגר הרצון הטוב כלפי ישראל השורר 'ב' גבעה', למרות לחצו
האדיר של המימשל (אשר עדיין לא ירה את מטחיו הצורמים ביותר), ולמרות

הסתיגות ה'גבעה' ממדיניות ישראל (עליה אני מתריע בדווחי) תחושת האופטימיות - המבוססת על עובדות בשטח חיונית גם כדי למנוע הסכנה הטמונה

ב-Self Fulfilling Prophecy.

6. לא! בניגוד לתוכן ולטון הערכותיך, הנני משוכנע שהערכויות הן בהישג-יד מבלי שנידרש להתניות וויתורים מפליגים כפי שדורש המימשל (בניגוד לעמדתה הנוכחית של ה'גבעה'). ההישג ימומש בתנאי שנמשיך במערכה תוך עבודה מאומצת ונחושה להגשמת יעדי המדיניות, ולא לנסות ולהשפיע על עיצובה.

7. תמהני, מדוע הינך מתמקד בהערכות על חולשת הקהילה, מגבלות ה'גבעה', התנגדות המימשל ותרחישים-גרועים-כיותר מבלי להמליץ (בהתייחסותך מ-6.10 ובקודמיה) למשל ליזום מסע הסברה בנושאים העומדים בשורשי המחלוקת הנוכחית: חיוניות יו"ש לבטחון ישראל, ההתמקדות בהנחלויות היא המהווה מכשול מרכזי בדרך לשלום, רעיון הזיקה כבומרנג בנתיב השלום, תרומת ישראל לבטחון ארה"ב.

8. ודאי למדת את תוצאות סקר דע"ק של סטיב כהן (שהוזמן ע"י ה'הועד ה'יהודי האמריקאי') אשר פורסם ב- 4.10.91 ע"י ה-JTA ונערך ביולי-אוגוסט השנה, הסקר קובע כי קיימת מגמת תזוזה ימינה בקהילה היהודית בארה"ב בנושאים הקשורים לתהליך השלום.

9. אני תקווה שחמצא לנכון לקרוא בעיון את דווחי הקודמים הסוקרים את המערכה על הערכויות, כדי להמנע מפירושים מוטעים ומיותרים כפי שהופיעו במברק הנ"ל.

יורם אטינגר.

תפוצה: @ (רהמ)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 12907

אל: רהמש/568

מ:- ווש, נד: 2242, תא: 091091, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בכב

סודי/מידי

אל: סמנכל צפא ופרן

דע: לשכת ראש הממשלה, ממד

מאת: לשכת השגריר, וושינגטון

שיחת השגריר - עוזר המזכיר ג'רגיאן

1. השגריר קיים פגישת היכרות עם עוזר המזכיר ג'רגיאן (9/10). בפגישה נדונו בעיקר רשמי שרותו בסוריה, התייחסותה לתהליך השלום וביקורו הצפוי המזכיר באזור.

2. להלן עיקרי הדברים:

א. כללי:

ג'רגיאן פתח בהכיעו תקווה להמשך שיחוף הפעולה והקשרים ההדוקים בין שתי המדינות.

ציין רצונו לעבוד עמנו בשיתוף פעולה, באימון, בצורה ישירה וכנה גם אם יהיו מצבים של אי-הבנות. הוסיף שנמצא אצלו אוזן קשבת ומאמין שימצא אוזן כזו גם אצל השגריר. השגריר הצטרף לדברים.

ב. סוריה:

2) בתשובה לשאלת השגריר על יחסו של הנשיא אסאד לתהליך השלום ובמיוחד, לגור עמדת סוריה בנושא הועידה המולטילטרית, ועידת המים, רכישות הנשק והורונות, אפיין גרגיאן את אסאד כפרגמטיסט וכמדינאי המודרך עי שיקולים גיאו-פוליטיים. הזכיר שיחה שקיים לפני צאתו לסוריה עם שהבט רבין וציין שעתה לאחר שלוש שנות שרות בדמשק מסכים להערכתו של רבין על כך שאסאד הוא מנהיג אינטלגנטי, קשה למו'מ' אך מי שממלא אחר הבטחותיו.

3) אשר לתהליך השלום, הסכמתו של אסאד להצטרף נובעת ממספר גורמים: השינוי ביחסי ארהב-בריהם והצורך להתאים מדיניותו לנסיבות המשתנות, השינויים באירופה ובעיקר נפילת משטריהם של הונקר וצ'אושסקו, ההכרה שהסובייטים לא יוכלו להעניק לו יתרון אסטרטגי על ישראל. עוד הוסיף שהטיפול בנושא מלחמת האזרחים בלבנון היווה מבחן ראשון ליצירת מכנה משותף עם ארהב. משהניב תהליך זה פירות נוצר בסיס אמון רחב יותר בין סוריה לבין ארהב גם אם הקושי ביחסים נותר (הזכיר טרור, ז'א וסמים). גם מלחמת המפרץ חיזקה אצל אסאד את ההערכה שארהב היא הכוח המרכזי. יתר על-כן, אסאד הבין שאם לא תהיה תגובה לפלישת צדאם לכווית תאבד האמינות של הטיעון הערבי הקורא לשטחים תמורת שלום. כל זאת יחד עם ההצטרפות למלחמה והמגעים עם ארהב יצרו בסיס חדש ויתר אמון מצד אסאד במנהיגות האמריקאית.

גרגיאן סיכם דבריו בסוגיה זו באמרו שתהליך קבלת ההחלטות בדמשק לא היה קל

ולמרות הדימוי הנכון ברוב המקרים של אסאד כשליט כל יכול, דימוי הנו ברוב המקרים, נדרש תהליך של גיבוש תמיכה בהחלטתו בקרב מנהיגות הבעת וצמרת הצבא והמודיעין.

4) לשאלת השגריר לפשר ההסתייגות הסורית מהועידה המולטילטרית ציין ג'רגיאן שאסאד חושש מקיום דיונים מולטילטרליים עם ישראל בסוגיות פליטים, מים, סביבה, פירוק הנשק וכו' משום שרואה בכך ישום נוסחת שלום תמורת שלום הוסיף, שאסאד בא מהאסכולה של שלום תמורת שטחים. שאלות אלו, מבחינת אסאד, ידונו אחרי שיושג ההסדר.

לשאלת הציר האם אסאד אכן מאמין בשלום תמורת שטחים ענה ג'רגיאן שלדעתו מנסה אסאד לתת 'פחות משלום' (תמורת שטחים), אך ארהב, ציין, לא תניח לו לחמוק.

השגריר בתגובה הביע תקוותו שהממשל מבהיר לסורים עמדתה של ישראל בדבר הצורך בשלום מלא וכי כלי זאת אין טעם לדון בנושא הפלשתינאי. גרגיאן ציין שזו אכן המדיניות האמריקאית.

5) בתשובה להערת השגריר שמא אסאד טועה לראות בהתדרדרות היחסים בין ארהב לבין ישראל ומסיק מכך שיוכל להקצין עמדותיו סיפר ג'רגיאן שאין מקום וות. המסר על חוסנם של היחסים ושיתוף הפעולה ההדוק מועבר לאסאד בפגישות שמקיימים עמו אישים אמריקאיים בכלל זאת החשיפה שנחשף בשנים האחרונות לאישים אמריקאיים-יהודים.

עוד ידע לספר שאסאד עוקב בזמן אמת אחר התקשורת הישראלית ובלשכתו עוזר פלשתינאי השולט היטב בעברית המספק לו תמונת המצב.

גרגיאן אף הוסיף שמצא עצמו לא אחת מסביר האירועים בישראל ודיווחי התקשורת ממנה לאסאד.

6) בסכום פרק זה בשיחה הדגיש גרגיאן משמעות פריצת הדרך ההיסטורית שבהסכמת אסאד למו'מ' ישיר. בתשובה להערת השגריר על כך שמדובר בשלטון של איש אחד ציין שפריצת הדרך חשובה במיוחד משום שאסאד אחראי לה והבאים אחריו יעמדו בכך.

ג. פלשתינאים:

7) גרגיאן ציין שהנושא המרכזי בפגישת המזכיר השבוע עם חוסייני ואשראוי וכו' בשבוע הבא באזור הוא הרכבת המשלחת הירדנית-פלשתינאית והטעים, בהקשר שיחכן וביקורו השמיני של המזכיר באזור הוא החשוב ביותר.

אחר-כך, הוסיף יעסקו בארגון הועידה וישראל לא תופתע.

8) בתשובה לשאלת השגריר ציין שכפי הנראה יגיעו לישראל בסוף מסעם באזור כנראה ביום ד' או יום ה' בשבוע הבא.

ד. לבנון:

9) ביזמתו התייחס גרגיאן בסוף השיחה לנושא לבנון. ציין שמבקש להפריך הרושם כאילו ארהב רמזה לסוריה שנותנת לה יד חופשית בלבנון (בתמורה לתמיכת סוריה במלחמה במפרץ או בתהליך) ולא היא. ארהב תומכת בריבונותה של לבנון ונסיגת כל הכוחות הזרים. הוסיף שהבהירו לסורים ציפיהם ליישום הסכמי טאיף כרוחם וכלשונם ובכלל זה נסיגה סורית.

סיפר שבאחת מפגישותיו, לפני כשנה, עם אסאד שאלו האם נכון שאסאד הוא המנהיג הסורי הראשון המכיר בכך שסוריה ולבנון הן שתי מדינות עצמאיות גם אם מדברים על אומה ועם אחד.

לדבריו, אסאד אשר הדברים משום שמבין שסיפוח לבנון או השארת, כוח בכקעה לא תעבור.

10) השגריר בדבריו עמד על הצורך להתייחס לנושא לבנון במזכר או מכתב הערביות וכי דרישת ישראל בנושא מתבססת על ההבנות שהושגו ב-1983 עם ארהב וצריכות להיות כלולות במזכר.

ה. ציונות-גזענות:

בחשובה לשאלת השגריר ציין שהשגריר פיקרינג בודק עם אנשי מזכירות האום שאלת הדרך והמועד להעביר ההחלטה הוסיף שטרם קיבלו החלטות בנושא.

11) בפגישה השתתפו מצידם גרגיאן וברו מצידנו : השגריר, הציר שילה, שטיין, אמיתי והח'מ'.

עמרני

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 12906

אל: רהמש/576

מ-: רוש, נר: 2243, חא: 091091, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בכב

סודי ביותר / מידי

ח.ר.ב.ח.ר.ב.ח.ר.ב.

אל: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"נ - למכוח ב ל ב ד

דע: מנכ"ל רוה"מ, לש' שהב' ט

מאת: לש' השגריר, וושינגטון

עיראק - טיסות.

בסוף שיחת השגריר עם המזכיר ג'רג'יאן (9,10) ביקש האחרון מהשגריר לשוחח
קצת עיניים.

ג'רג'יאן ציין שאינם מערערים על זכותנו לדאוג להגנת ולשמירת בטחונה של
ישראל.

לגופו של ענין הוסיף, אם הייתה לנו הרגשה שאיננו מקבלים מודיעין מלא הרי
מבקש מאתנו להשנות בין המודיעין שניתן לבין הדו"ח

לש' השגריר.

אי =

ת: (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור, @ (שהבט)

ססס

אאא, חוזם: 12906

אל: רהמש/576

מ-: ווש, נר: 2243, תא: 091091, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סב,

כככ

סודי ביותר / מיידי

ח.ר.ב.ח.ר.ב.ח.ר.ב.

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ - למכותב ב ל ב ד

דע: מנכ'ל רוה'מ, לש' שהב'ט

מאת: לש' השגריר, וושינגטון

ציראק - טיסות.

בסוף שיחת השגריר עם המזכיר ג'רג'יאן (9,10) ביקש האחרון מהשגריר לשוחח בארבע עיניים.

ג'רג'יאן ציין שאינם מערערים על זכותנו לדאוג להגנת ולשמירת בטחונה של ישראל.

לגופו של ענין הוסיף, אם היתה לנו הרגשה שאיננו מקבלים מודיעין מלא הרי מבקש מאתנו להשוות בין המודיעין שניתן לבין הדו"ח

לש' השגריר.

אי =

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור, @ (שהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 13960
אל: רהמש/597
מ-: ווש, נר: 2240, תא: 091091, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבכ
סודי/מידי

אל : סמנכל צפא ופרן - למכותב בלבד

דע : לשכת שהבט - למכותבים בלבד

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

ארהב-ישראל-עיראק

הנהלך שיחה עם קרצר (8/10), תאר את התגובה שנמסרה לשגרירותם בת'א אחמול
עקבות הדמאוש מיום שישי כבלתי מספקת ומאכזבת, לדבריו, ההסברים שמסרנו
(ביחס לסיבות להחלטתנו לבצע הגיחה), אינם משכנעים ואינם מסייעים ל'אלו
מביננו המנסים לסייע'.

שטיין

חפוצה: מנכל, בנצור, @שהבט, @ (רהמ)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9935
אל: רהמש/477
מ-: ווש, נר: 2232, תא: 081091, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: סב,
בכבכ
סודי ביותר / מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפא ופרן

דע: לש' רוה'מ

מאת: לש'השגריר, וושינגטון

תהליך

משיחה טלפונית של השגריר עם רוס (081250):

1. רוס אשר בתשובה לשאלת השגריר שמזכיר המדינה יפגוש את חוסייני ואשוראוי בווינגטון בהמשך השבוע. השגריר בתגובה ציין שפגישה זו אינה לרוחנו ולמיטב הבנתו אינה תואמת העמדה האמריקאית לא לנהל דיאלוג עם אש'פ. רוס השיב שלאחר שהשניים היו באלג'יר, שבו ארצה וננקטו צעדים ע'י הממשלה לדעתם אין מניעה לקיום פגישה זו. עם זאת, הוסיף, הסיבה העיקרית לקיום פגישה מוקדמת, עוד לפני בקור המזכיר באיזור, היא שעדיין נותרו שאלות שהפלשתינאים טרם ענו עליהן ואותן ירצו להעביר לבני שיחם.

2. אשר לביקור המזכיר, מתכוונים כפי שהודיעו פומבית לצאת לאזור ב-12.10 ולארץ כנראה ב-16 או ב-17. מועד מדוייק יודיעני בימים הקרובים.

לש' השגריר

תפוצה: שהח, מנכל, @ (רהמ), בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 8840
אל: רהמש/403
מ-: המשרד, תא: 081091, זח: 1405, דח: מ, סג: סב,
כככ
119149
סודי ביותר/מידי
אל: וושינגטון
השגריר
הנדון: ערבויות לקליטת עליה

- א. בשיחחך עם רוס (מברק שטיין נר 2016) ציין האחרון כי נוסח תגובת מחמ'ד (2/10) בנדון, טוב יותר מנוסח שש הנקודות המקוריות.
- בחינה מדוקדקת של סעיפי ההודעה והשוואתה לנוסח הצעת הפשרה בת שש הסעיפים שנמסרה לך ב-9/9 ואח'כ גם ניתן לה פרסום פומבי מלמדת כי:
- (1) הממשל הסתלק כביכול מהתחייבותו שלא לתבוע דחיות נוספות ללא קשר לתהליך המדיני או מצב ההתנחלויות. אדרבא, בהודעה נוספה התנייה המחייבת
- ש-TERMS AND CONDITIONS למתן ערובות המקובלים על הממשל יעובדו כאשר הקונגרס ישוב ויחזור לדון בסוגיה וכך נפתח פתח אפשרי לדחיות נוספות בדיון במתן הערובות בלי כל הגבלת זמן.
- (2) כן נעדרת מהודעת מחמ'ד התיחסות לאופן החקיקתי בו יאושר מתן הערבויות. והשאלה היא האין בכך משום הסתלקות מהתחייבות המימשל להתקין מכשיר חקיקתי לטיפול בנושא הערבויות בקונגרס.
- ג. לאור זאת, ממליץ שבמגעריך עם רוס תבקש הבהרות לסוגיה.

צור ●
8 באוקטובר 1991

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), בנצור

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10069

אל: רהמש/474

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 151, תא: 081091, זח: 2237, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבכ

שמור/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

דע: יועץ משהב'ט לתקשורת
יועץ תקשורת רוה'מ

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

להלן מכתב מדיני ההודעה שכבר נוסחה במחמ'ד ושתינתן מחר בתדרוך הדוברת
שובה לשאלות.

1. ארה'ב מבינה דאגתן של מדינות באזור הרואות עצמן מאוימות ע'י עיראק.

2. סיפקנו לישראל ולשאר בנות הברית של ארה'ב באיזור מידע בנושא.

3. אנו מרגישים שטיפול האו'ם בנושא הוא דרך הפעולה הנכונה והיחידה, וכי
בשלב זה כל פעולה חד צדדי CENILATIRAL תהיה - NOT HELPFUL.

לדברי הכתב כוונת מחמ'ד היתה לפרסם ההודעה הערב, אבל חזרו בהם ויחנו
ההודעה כאמור מחר.

רות ירון

היוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),

אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מזחים,

רביב, מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10024
אל: רהמש/467
מ:- ווש, נר: 2233, חא: 081091, זח: 1630, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בכב
סורי/מידי

א ל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א ופר'נ

ד ע: לש' שר האוצר, לש' רוה'מ

מאת: השגריר וושינגטון

ערבויות

1. כוודאי שמחם לכ לנוסח הודעת דוברת מחמ'ד מה-2.10.91 בעקבות החלטת
מנהיגות הקונגרס לדחות הדיון בערבויות ב-120 יום.

אם משוויים נוסח הדברים לדברי דובר הבית הלבן מה-11.9.91 נראה שהנקודה
השלישית
-תמיכה בעקרון סיוע הקליטה לישראל-חוזקה והמימשל מצהיר על תמיכה
בערבויות, אך קושר זאת לתנאים שיועברו ויהיו מקובלים על המימשל.
שינוי נוסף הוא בנקודה החמישית-נסיון לגייס סיוע בינ'ל-אם בהודעה
מה-11.9.91 דובר על מאמץ כזה אחרי ינואר הרי בהודעת טאטווילר דובר על כך
שמאמץ זה יתחיל ' עתה', ' עתה'.

2. בכוונתי לבדוק בשיחותי במימשל כוונותיהם ומחשבותיהם לגבי גיוס סיוע
בינ'ל.

3. בהמשך למברקך 2079 שהיגיעני אחרי כתיבת שורות אלו אכן בהודעת מחמ'ד
חסרה ההתייחסות לשאלת המנוף החקיקתי וההתחייבות שלא לבקש דחיות נוספות.
יש להניח שהדבר נובע מההקשר- הודעת המנהיגות על-כך שהנושא ידון בתום 120
יום. עוד אציין שרוס בדבריו הדגיש שכוונת דברי טאטווילר לחזק את שש
הנקודות ולא לגרוע מהן, מכל מקום אבדוק ואודיעך.

שובל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, שרהאוצר

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9251
אל: רהמש/405
מ-: המשרד, תא: 081091, זח: 1606, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
כבב
שמור/מיד

אל: השגריר, קהיר

הנדון: פגישה עם יועץ שגרירות ארה"ב

1. ביקרני פאט פטרסון, יועץ שגארה'ב בת'א, כדי להתעדכן במצב היחסים עם מצרים. סיפרתי על הנושאים הביטורליים שסוכם עליהם בביקור ס/רוה'מ ושה'ח במצרים. הרחבתי במיוחד בנושא הסחר שאיננו חשים בו תזוזה. הוספתי שגם לא יוכלנו הזמנה ליריד החקלאי שיערך בחודש הבא בקהיר.

● פטרסון החעניין בנושא חיפוש הנעדדים ומחנה קנדה. סיפרתי לו שאנו בהתאם לאישור מובארכ עומדים לשגר משלחת לאיתור הנעדדים בתקווה שהפעם ישיגו תוצאות בחיפושיהם. בקשר למחנה קנדה, היה מודע לכך שחל עיכוב בהעברת המשפחות מסיבות כספיות. פטרסון הצדיק גישתנו בנושא.

3. העליתי בפני פטרסון ההתייחסויות התקשורתיות הקיצוניות שלחלקן נימה אנטישמית כלפינו, וזאת בשעה שנעשים מאמצים לכינוס ועידת שלום. כמו כן הדגשתי אכזבתנו מעמדת מצרים לגבי הצעת בוש לבטל החלטה 3379. פטרסון מסר שאף הם מאוכזבים ואף הביעו זאת בשיחות פרטיות בפני ראשי השלטון במצרים.

מנהל מצרים
8 באוקטובר 1991

● יצא: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, סולטן, מצרים, בנצור,
מצפא, סיבל, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רם), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10045
אל: רהמש/470
מ-: לוסאנגלס, נר: 32, תא: 081091, זח: 1100, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בכב
בלמס/מיד

אל: מנהל מצפא
דע: לשכת השגריר
מנהל הסברה
ציר הסברה וושינגטון

מאת: קונכל לוס אנג'לס

הנדון: בקורים.

להלן דרוח על בקורים של אחמים השבוע בל.א.:

א. שר החוץ

שר החוץ ופמליתו שהו בעיר 4 ימים (7-4 אוק.). הבקור הוגדר כפרטי אך השר קיים מספר פגישות והרצאות עם ישראלים. בין היתר נאם השר בפני קבוצה של 150 ישראלים וכמו כן בקר בקונסוליה ונפגש עם הקונסולים ובנפרד עם כל עובדי הקונסוליה לשיחה של כשעה.

ב. הגברת שולמית שמיר

הגיעה לבקור של שבוע מטעם ב'ח' אסף הרופא. גב' שמיר תהיה הערב אורחת הכבוד בערב גאלה למען בית החולים שם גם תישא נאום. נראה שיהיה לכך כסוי תקשורתי נרחב. כמו כן, תשתתף באירועים נוספים שיערכו במשך השבוע.

ג. ח'כ רן כהן

ערך בקור של כמה ימים ונשא נאומים מטעם רצ בנושאים פוליטיים ואחרים.

ד. כבוד הרב הראשי מרדכי אליהו

הרב ופמליתו הגיעו לבקור של שבוע רצוף פגישות, תפילות ודרשות. כמו כן, יקיים פגישה אישית עם הנשיא לשעבר רונלד רייגן, אותה תאמה הקונסוליה לפי בקשת הרב.

2. חודש אוקטובר עומד להיות אחד החודשים העמוסים שידענו מבחינת בקורים וארועים שבהם הקונסוליה חייבת לקחת חלק פעיל.

רן רונג.

הסברה

סטסט

נושרד הזוזק-נוחלקת הקשר

* 7584

*תאריך : 07.10.91

*דף 1 מתוך 1

*עווק 2 מתוך 4

* יוצא **

* סודי ביותר

*חוזם: 10,7584

*אל: 2066/וש

*מ-זהמשרד, תא: 071091, זח: 1537, דח:ר, סג:10

*חח: 0 גס:צפא

*נד: 0

*מכתב מוברק

* 86577

* - סודי ביותר -

*אל: וושינגטון-הציר

*מאת: מנהל מצפ"א

*הנדון: ערבויות

* בסוף השבוע שעבר מסר הסגן בשג'ארה'ב כי בעקבות דברי ליהיי נדרשת
 * השגרירות להתמיד במאמצייה לגבש אומדן ההשקעות הממשלתיות במפעל ההתנחלות.
 * ציין את הקשיים במלוי המשימה, בהוסיפו שמדובר בשאלות הגדרה (הקמת
 * ההתנחלויות חדשות ו/או עבוי יישובים קיימים ו/או הרחבת התשתית וכיו"ב).
 * זוכן בבעייה גיאוגרפית (הכוונה לירושלים). לדבריו, ההערכות בשגרירות לגבי
 * השנה שחלפה משתנות לפי ההגדרות השונות ונעות בין כמאתיים מליון דולר עד
 * מיליארד דולר (!). עוד אמר שלדעתו האישית הקביעה לגבי הסכום עשוייה
 * להיות 'פוליטית' וייתכן שיהיה בסדר גודל של חצי מיליארד דולר.

*לידיעתכם בלבד.

*נא לשמור חסיון המידע והמקור.

*ב ב ר כ ה

*העתק: המנכ"ל

*ס/מנכ"ל צפ"א ופר'ן.

*לש

*תפ: מנכל(1), בנצור(1), מצפא(1)

Handwritten notes:
 * יוצא **
 * סודי ביותר
 * חוזם: 10,7584
 * אל: 2066/וש
 * מ-זהמשרד, תא: 071091, זח: 1537, דח:ר, סג:10
 * חח: 0 גס:צפא
 * נד: 0
 * מכתב מוברק
 * 86577
 * - סודי ביותר -
 * אל: וושינגטון-הציר
 * מאת: מנהל מצפ"א
 * הנושא: ערבויות

אאא, חוזם: 8244

אל: רהמש/382

מ-: **רוש**, נר: 2231, חא: 071091, זח: 2010, דח: ב, סג: סב,

ככב

סודי ביותר / בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

דע: יועץ תקשורת שהב'ט, יועץ תקשורת רוה'מ, נספח הגנה - כאן, אמ'ן/קש'ח (לבקשה נספח מודיעין - אנא העבירו ללשכות).

מאת: הדוברת, וושינגטון

NYT - *ביטא הניו יורק*
משך לשלי נר 2224

א. העברתי לפונים תגובתינו כפי שסוכמה עם ד. נווה, לפיה: אין תגובה.

ב. משיחה עם תום פרידמן, הבנתי כי, בסופו של דבר, הכתבה לא חוזר לא תפורסם מחר. סיפר כי על הכתבה עובד פט טיילר מזה כיומיים וכי טרם גמר לבדוק שאלות נוספות הקשורות לסיפור, ולפיכך הפרסום מתעכב.

ג. לדברי תום, המקור לסיפור, הוא, ממקורותיו של טיילר (שהוא כאמור כתב הצבאי של העתון), וכי הוא, (תום) נתבקש לסייע רק בבדיקת מספר שאלות עמנו ועם גורמים במחמ'ד, כך שלדבריו אין לו מידע מלא על מה כולל הספור. אמר מיוזמתו, שאם ידע יותר, יתקשר אלי מחר.

ד. טיילר, שהיה הראשון להתקשר בצהריים כדי לקבל תגובתינו לסיפור היה בשיחה השניה עמי מאוד מסוייג והתעקש שאדבר עם פרידמן. התחמק מדבר בניגוד לפניה הראשונה וחיפש לסיים מהר השיחה.

הגרה:

פטריק טיילר מוכר לי, ועבדתי עמו בעבר על מספר סיפורים. הוא, בדרך כלל, בנוסף להיותו כתב טוב ואמין (נחשב לאחד הטובים בתחומי) - גם איש שיחה לבכי שמערכת יחסיו עמנו טובה. בניגוד למנהגו בעבר, וכאמור בניגוד לפנייתו הבוקר, היה עתה מסוייג חמקן וכמעט סירב לדבר על הנושא. התנהגותו היתה משונה. נותרה בי התחושה שהוא ניסה להסתיר משהו ו/או לחזור בו מכל הפניה אלינו.

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), @ (שהבט), בנצור,
מצפא, @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 8045
אל: רהמש/346
מ-: ווש, נר: 2224, תא: 071091, זח: 1545, דח: ב, סג: סו,
בבבב
סודי / בהול להזעיק

אל: חדר מצב
יועץ תקשורת שהב'ט

דע: מצפ'א, (בהול לבוקר), נ. הגנה - כאן.

מאת: עתונות, וושינגטון

שני כתבי ה - NYT כאן - חום פרידמן הכתב המדיני, ופטריק טיילר הכתב
באי - פנו אלי וסיפרו שהם כותבים כתבה למחר (8.10) על דמרש שהגישו לנו
האמריקנים בסוף השבוע שעבר בעקבות טיסה שלנו מעל שמי עיראק בתחילת
אוקטובר (נקבו בתאריכים 3-5 באוקטובר).
הכתבים ביקשו חגובתינו לצורך הכללתה בכתבה.

אנא הנחיתכם בחוזר בהול.

(הערה: יידעתי כאן הגורמים השונים).

רות ירון.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, @ (נוה/משהבט)

אאא, חוזם: 7623
אל: רהמש/321
מ-: המשרד, תא: 071091, זח: 1558, דח: ב, סג: בל,
בכב
בלמ'ס/בהול לבוקר

אל: כל הנציגויות

הנדון: הסיוע הבטחוני לישראל

להלן מלשכת יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת:

● דיעה לפיה לא אושרה הגדלת הסיוע הבטחוני לישראל בגין נושא הערביות, איננה נכונה.

מדי שנה מקיימים בית הנבחרים והסנאט האמריקאיים דיון בסיוע החוץ האמריקאי. במסגרת זו העלו חברים בוועדה של בית הנבחרים הצעות להגדלת הסיוע למדינות שונות בעולם.

כדיון בוועדה המשותפת לבית הנבחרים ולסנאט הוחלט שלא לאשר הגדלה בסיוע הבטחוני למדינה כלשהי ללא קשר לנושא הערביות לישראל.

הסברה/מידע

7 באוקטובר 1991

● פוצה: @ (רהמ), שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ר/מרכז, רכיב, מעת, הסברה,
בנצור, תורגמן, סולטן, גוברין, יגר

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 7452
אל: רהמש/319
מ-: המשד, תא: 071091, זח: 1457, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבכ
119016
סודי/מיד

אל: וושינגטון
השגריר

1. הסנטור מוינהן התקשר אל נשיא המדינה לרווח לו על החלטות הקונגרס נגד ציונות - גזענות ושפעולת גיוס הקולות לשינויים באו"ם בעיצומה. הנשיא תמיד מוינהן על המצב לאשורו - על הנסיונות לקשור התניות לשינוי בהחלטה. ינהן הגיב כי לא היה מודע לכך וכי בדעתו לזמן אליו פיקרינג כדי להמריצו לפעול ולהבהירו כי יפעל נגד מינוי בוטרוס ראלי למזכ"ל אם מצרים תתמיד בעמדתה בסוגיה זו.

2. מוצע שחיפגש עם מוינהן לעדכנו ולתדרכו.

בנצור

7 באוקטובר 1991

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא, כיינ,
ארבל2, סייבל, רביב

סססס

1034, 103 $\frac{2}{2}$

Allan Gerson

Shamir Didn't Start It

In the controversy between the Bush administration and Israel over its \$10 billion loan guarantee request, popular wisdom has it that Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's uncompromising stance on expanding Israeli settlements in occupied areas forced an exasperated George Bush to lay down the line—no U.S. guarantees if there are to be more settlements. In fact, however, this was a crisis long in the making; the loan guarantee request merely brought to the surface the shift in U.S. Middle-East policy that had begun with President Bush's assumption of office.

Of the two critical issues in an Arab-Israeli peace process—settlements in the occupied territories and the status of East Jerusalem—Bush parted company with the policies of his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, and indeed those of prior U.S. administrations. President Reagan initially deemed settlements to "not be illegal." Later, they were characterized as impediments to the peace process, but there was never a demand for a "freeze" on settlements. It was understood that, depending on circumstances, settlements could be a hindrance or, perhaps, even a spur by attaching a price to Arab evasion of the peace table. Israel's settlements were thus viewed as but one element in peace-making, never, as the tendency today has it, as an automatic or primary obstacle to peace talks.

Regarding the status of East Jerusalem, Reagan repeatedly instructed his U.N. ambassador to veto any Security Council resolution in which Jerusalem was deemed to be occupied Arab territory. The status of East Jerusalem was to be a matter left for final status negotiation, but it was made clear that the United States considered East Jerusalem as separate and distinct from the West Bank. By contrast, Bush has instructed his U.N. delegate to merely abstain on such resolutions, and on two occasions during the gulf war to join in Security Council resolutions (681 and 694) including East Jerusalem as part of the "Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967."

For better or for worse, a significant foreign policy change has occurred between one Republican administration and another, and it has happened quite independently of the Israeli loan guarantee request. Unfortunately, it has been accompanied with little public debate, with the real issues obscured by the broohaha over personality differences between Shamir and Bush and the circumstances of the Israeli loan guarantee. In fact, however, the impetus for the newest surge in a shifting policy has much more to do with U.S. relations with its Desert Storm allies—not least, Syria—than with questions related to the resettlement of Soviet Jewish refugees.

The writer, a professor of international law at George Mason University, was co-chair to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations from 1981 to 1985.

WFP

אאא, חוזם: 6370
אל: רהמש/296
מ-: המשרד, חא: 061091, זח: 1458, דח: מ, סג: סב,
בבב
75144
סודי ביותר
למכותב בלבד

מיידי

אל: וושינגטון
הציר שילה

האת: היועץ המשפטי

דע: מנכ"ל, בנצור, למדן, מזכיר הממשלה
הנדון: דותן

1. בעקבות מברקך 2062 מיום 19.9.91 כונסה פגישה אצל פרקליטת המדינה בהשתתפות מנכ"ל משהב"ט, מזכיר הממשלה, יוהמ"ש משהב"ט, ממונה על הבטחון במערכת הבטחון, מנהל מצפ"א והח"מ.
2. התברר שפרוטוקול עדותו של דותן טרם נמסר לאמריקאים ע"י המשטרה על אף הבטחתנו באגרתנו. פרקליטת המדינה הודיעה שתנחה את המשטרה להעביר החומר מיידי לאמריקאים.
3. כן סוכם שמזכיר הממשלה יודיע לריצ'רדס שאנו מעבירים החומר של דותן ואם לאחר שיקבל החומר ירצה הוא לבוא ארצה ולשוחח עם החוקרים לגבי מסקנות החומר או שאלות נוספות, נקבל אותו ברצון.

לידיעתך.

סיבל
6 באוקטובר 1991

תפוצה: מנכ"ל, בנצור, מצפא, סיבל, @ (מזכיר הממשלה)

סטסט

אאא, חוזם: 14642

אל: רהמש/644

מ-: המשרד, תא: 061091, זח: 1621, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בכב

סודי/מיד

103.55

אל: וושינגטון, אטינגר(הועבר)

דע: שגריר, ציר

הנדון: המערכה על הערביות להלוואות לשלך 1014

1. מדיווחים המגיעים מהשגרירות, מהקונסוליה בנ"י ומשיחות עם אורחים רה"ב עולה תמונה שונה מהותית מזו המצטיירת מדיווחך.

2. הנתונים אותם אתה מציין, אכן שרירים וקיימים, אך נראה כי הם מהווים רק חלק מהמכלול ויש מקום להשלימם כך שמקבלי ההחלטות כאן יוכלו לקרוא את המציאות במלואה, ללא כחל ושרק.

3. נכון ש-70 סנטורים נותנים ידם 'באופן רשמי ופומבי' להיות שושבינים לתחיקה, אך גם מדיווחיך עולה כי אם יפעיל הנשיא שוב את איומו להשתמש בזכות הוטו יקטן מספר זה באופן משמעותי.

4. ברור, מנימוקים שגם השגרירות כבר עמדה עליהם שהמצב בסנאט ובביהנ"ב שונה וחוזק התמיכה בביהנ"ב, במיוחד מול נשיא נחוש, תהיה חלשה יותר מהתמיכה בסנאט.

5. היהדות האמריקאית המאורגנת הפעילה את מלוא כוחה בצורה היעילה והטובה ביותר שיש ביכולתה. היא היתה אולי הכדור המשמעותי ביותר שהיה לנו בקנה כ"ז הפרספציה בממשל ובציבור הרחב היא שהיהודים לא הצליחו. כעת גם בקרב היהדות יש סימנים לשינוי בהתייצבות פה אחד לצידנו (ראה אייב פוקסמן) וגם הממשל והיהודים יודעים שבמערכה החזיתית מול נשיא נחוש, מוגבל כוחנו.

6. באשר לתקשורת, אין זו רק התקשורת הישראלית הרואה את הדברים כפי שצינת אלא גם התקשורת האמריקאית (ראה כדוגמא הנ"י טיימס 3/10).

7. ובאשר לעתיד, בעוד 120 יום כשניתן יהיה לשוב ולדון בנושא בקונגרס יש להתכונן לקראת מציאות העלולה להתרחש ע'פי התרחיש הגרוע ביותר ולא ליצור אוירה של אופטימיות ע'פי התרחיש החיובי ביותר שאם אכן יתרחש נהיה כולנו מרוצים ממנו.

את העלול להתרחש ניתן לראות ולקרוא ע'פ דברי סנטור ליהיי הדורש פתרון לשאלת ה'פנג'ביליטי' ע'י קצוץ ההשקעות כשטחים מהערביות או ע'פ דברים שאמר קונגרסמן אובי בכוון של בדיקת היכולות הכלכליות של ישראל. מגמת הממשל ע'י פרסום דוחות שליליים על כלכלת ישראל במועד הנוכחי, בוודאי אינה מקרית ויש להתכונן למצב שבו ידרוש הממשל התניות פוליטיות ו/או כלכליות שלא תהיינה נוחות לישראל, בלשון המעטה.

8. לסכום כעת מתבקשת בחינה רחבה למכלול כולו, כולל מעמד ישראל בממשל, בקונגרס ותדמיתה בציבור הרחב.

מצפ"א

6 באוקטובר 1991

תפוצה: @ (רהמ)

סססס

2813 7 93

Dy

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

1/18

1014 - נ

שמור / מידי
5 - נ
(התאמה) - חובל

אל: מצפ"א,
דע: ממ' רה"מ ושה"ח (נ.י.), שר האוצר, מנכ"ל האוצר, יועץ רה"מ לכלכלה,
ציר כלכלי, קונכ"לים (ה'תש"ט) מנוכ"ם (ז'תש"ט)
מאת: ר' יזידת קונגרס

הנדון: המערכה על הערבויות להלוואות

1. אמנם, (לפי מברקי העתונות), מכתירות כותרות התקשורת הישראלית את הצגת התחיקה ע"י קסטן ואינווייה כנצחון לממשל ותבוסה לידידי ישראל, אך כותרת הווש' פוסט העוסקת בנושא מדויקת יותר: "70 סנטורים תומכים בתוכנית ההלוואות הישראליות (באותיות גדולות) אושרה בקשת הממשל לדחייה (אותיות קטנות)". מטרת איננה לעסוק בנתון תקשורתי, אלא להבהיר לעצמנו את המצב לאשורו (על רקע דווחים קודמים בנדרון אשר צפו את המצב הנוכחי):
 - 70 הנושבינים נותנים ידם (באופן רשמי ופומבי ולא באישון הליכה) לתחיקה המתייחסת מפורשות לאשור הערבויות בעוד 120 יום;
 - 70 הסנטורים חתומים על תחיקה המתייחסת לסכום של 10 מיליארד דולר משך זמנש שנים;
 - 70 הנושבינים סומכים ידם על תחיקה שאין בה זיקה, וכפי שהבהירו הדוברים בעת הצגת התחיקה קיימת התנגדות לזיקה (לצד הסתייגות/התנגדות להתנחלויות);
 - 70 הוומכים סומכים ידם על SCORING בשעור של 1%;
2. במקביל לנ"ל, מן הראוי לחזור ולשנן כי המצב נכון להיום ! התפתחויות בארה"ב ובישראל בהקשר תהליך השלום, הגרעון התקציבי התופח של ארה"ב, בקשות חדשות לסיוע מצד מזא"ר, ברה"מ והבלטיות והמישור הפוליטי (בחירות בארה"ב ובישראל), ישפיעו על חוסנה של הקואליציה הבינמפלגתית התומכת בתחיקה. יותר מכל, תשפיע על חוסן הקואליציה רמת התמיכה של היהדות המקומית.
3. ההיבט הכלכלי הישראלי צובר תאוצה, כנראה בעוד גורמי ממשל המעוניינים לטרט את התחיקה ע"י השעון כי המשק הכלכלי בישראל אינו תחרותי, לא יהיה מסוגל לעכל המשאבים ביעילות ולא יעמוד בנטל פרעון החובות. קשה להגזים בחשיבות הענקת תשובות מפורסות, מחועדות ואמינות לכל אחת מן השענות המכבצות מדו"ח ה-CRS. היעדר ווגובה הולמת (לכל משרד בגבעה) ישחק לידי מתנגדי התחיקה. הנושא הכלכלי עלול להטות הכף - ביום ההצבעה - לשבט או לחסדו לחשובותינו יהיה משקל בקביעת ה-SCORING.
4. את רוז השעונים הנלכליים והמדיניים יש להתאים להלך הרוח (החיובי-יחסית) ב"גבעה". לעניות דעתי, אין לצפות לשנוי בעמדת הממשל, ויש לוודא טיפוח עמדת ה"גבעה".
5. מצ"ל התבטאויות הסנטורים בעת הגשת הצעת התחיקה.

שהיה סושה"ח רה"מ א"ל בן עזר ארצ"א
וב"ל הסברה

70 Senators Back Israeli Loan Plan

White House Request For Delay Approved

By Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writer

More than two-thirds of the Senate yesterday sponsored legislation to grant \$10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel for settlement of Soviet Jews but agreed to President Bush's request to put off action on the measure until early next year.

The list of cosponsors, which totaled 70, three more than necessary to override a presidential veto, should serve as a signal of the Senate's strong support for the loan guarantees when the fiscal 1992 foreign aid spending bill is considered in late January or early February, senators said.

The move was in line with comments by House and Senate leaders late last month that Congress was prepared to go along with Bush's request for a 120-day delay in order to avoid a bitter confrontation over Israeli settlement policies that could disrupt the fragile Middle East peace process.

But some senators indicated they were agreeing to the delay with considerable reluctance. And the

Twenty-five
Republicans joined
45 Democrats in
cosponsoring the
bill.

agreement did not address the contentious issue of putting conditions on the loan guarantees to discourage expansion of settlements in occupied territories, a move that is being advocated by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) and others.

Leahy did not cosponsor the loan guarantee bill but welcomed the delay. Twenty-five Republicans joined 45 Democrats in cosponsoring the bill. Neither Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) or Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (Kan.) was among them.

The White House issued a statement praising the delay and reiterating its commitment to "absorption aid" but not necessarily loan guarantees. Administration officials said the number of cosponsors does not reflect support for the bill. "It says nothing on conditions. It says nothing on what they might do if we end up having to oppose some package of guarantees. It only says they support absorption aid and so do we," one official said.

An official also said the fading of congressional support for immediate action on the bill amounted to a defeat for the pro-Israeli lobby. "The assumption that the pro-Israeli lobby could not be beat is now gone," the official said.

However, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) interpreted the gathering of 70 cosponsors for the bill as a victory. "We're extremely pleased with overwhelming bipartisan support in the Congress for securing the refugees guarantees," said Toby Derbowitz, spokeswoman for AIPAC.

Staff writer Ann Devroy contributed to this report.

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Senate

(Legislative day of Thursday, September 18, 1991)

The Senate met at 9 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the Honorable HARRY REID, a Senator from the State of Nevada.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Richard C. Halverson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray:
O Lord, show hasti stretched me, and know me. Thou knowest my down-falling and mine uprising. Thou understandest my thought afar off. Thou compassed my path and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways. For there is not a word in my tongue, but lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether.—Psalm 138:1-4.

Eternal God, all wise, all powerful, present everywhere at the same time. You have given us life. You know us in our totality—our personal condition, our relationship with family, our desires and ambitions. You know the future and the past, the end from the beginning of history, and everything in between.

As you know us, Lord, individually and corporately, as You see our need, individually and collectively, cover the U.S. Senate with grace and mercy, with insight and understanding. Inveade this place with Your presence so that no one can doubt that You are here. And work Your will and Your way to perfection.

In His name who is the War, the Truth, and the Life. Amen.

APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore [Mr. Byrd].

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
FURNACE ROOM ENTRANCE,
WASHINGTON, DC, October 2, 1991.

To the Senate:

Under the provisions of rule 1, section 2, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby appoint the Honorable HARRY REID, a Senator from the State of Nevada, to perform the duties of the Chair.

ROBERT C. BYRD,
President pro tempore

Mr. REID thereupon assumed the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

RESERVATION OF LEADERSHIP TIME

The ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE. Under the previous order the leadership time is now reserved.

MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE. There will be a period of time for morning business to be transacted not to extend beyond the hour of 10:30 a.m., with Senators permitted to speak therein, and the time to be equally divided between the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Iwoua] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Kasten].

The Senator from Wisconsin: Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

ABSORPTION GUARANTEE: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR SOVIET AND ETHIOPIAN REFUGEES RESETTLING IN ISRAEL

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, 2 weeks ago, the senior Senator from Hawaii and I discussed an amendment that would relieve the plight of Soviet and Ethiopian refugees in Israel. The amendment is cosponsored by 68 of our colleagues, meaning with Senator Iwoua and myself we have 70 sponsors of this amendment. This represents overwhelming support for this proposal.

There can be no doubt: Our amendment deserves this support. After all,

for two decades, it has been a key goal of American foreign policy to liberate Soviet Jewry from Communist oppression. The bipartisan policy calling for free immigration of Soviet Jews was begun by the late Senator Henry Jackson with his historic Jackson-Vanik amendment, and has remained a foreign policy cornerstone for every administration since Nixon.

At long last, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Communist tyranny, our 20-year effort has succeeded. Since 1949, nearly 300,000 Soviet Jews have immigrated to Israel, and it is estimated that the total will reach 1 million by the end of 1995.

"Next year in Jerusalem" is no longer merely a noble wish; it is a reality, the result of longstanding American policies.

Now that we have succeeded in achieving our bipartisan goal, it would be unconscionable for us to flinch from our responsibility for the consequences. The scope of this current immigration is unlike anything Israel has seen since World War II and the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. It represents an increase of almost 25 percent over the current population.

For the last two decades of the cold war, Israel was the bastion of democracy and pro-Americanism in an extremely dangerous part of the world, surrounded by Soviet allies, back when communism was on the offensive; the State of Israel held the line for our side.

Earlier this year, from Texas to Wisconsin, from Maine to Oregon, we all watched on television as the Scud missiles slammed into Israel. We also saw that the Israelis did not retaliate for these terrorist acts, because America asked them not to.

Israel kept faith with America. We must have the moral sense—the loyalty—to do the same.

And we will, because the American people and their Representatives in

* This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

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Congress do not believe in turning their backs on an ally.

Israel needs our help in resettling this massive influx of refugees. Our amendment would extend to Israel the helping hand it so urgently requires.

Our bill provides loan guarantees to Israel to help defray the extraordinary costs of resettling the refugees. The loan guarantees would amount to \$2 billion for fiscal year 1992, and \$2 billion each of the 4 succeeding fiscal years.

These loans guarantees will respond to the urgent human needs of a reliable and heroic friend. It is important, however, that we also understand what the loan guarantees are not.

The loan guarantees are not U.S. grants. Under our loan guarantee bill, the U.S. taxpayer will not be sending any funds to subsidize Israeli housing.

The loan guarantees are not U.S. loans. The Treasury will not be lending money to resettle the refugees. It will merely guarantee that when private sector lenders lend money for that purpose, the U.S. Government will stand surety for the loan. And we all know that Israel has never defaulted on United States loan guarantees.

The only U.S. budget funds involved in the loan guarantee process are the origination fee, which we estimate will amount to \$100 million. Under our bill, Israel, not the United States, will pay for this origination fee, making United States taxpayer funding completely unnecessary. What a small price to pay to help out such a good friend.

I would like to address, however, one specific issue which has been raised by some in the administration about one of the provisions in the amendment. Some attorneys in the administration have interpreted our legislation as mandating a specific scoring. That is not our intention. Furthermore, we do not believe that the language in the amendment lends itself to such an interpretation, for if we were going to mandate scoring under the budget agreement on the Budget Act or the Credit Reform Act, we would have to have specific provisions waiving those laws.

Our legislation does not include such specific provisions. We do not do that.

Obviously, if lawyers at OMB or elsewhere believe that some of the language needs to be changed in order to clarify this particular point, we would certainly consider such changes. The important point to remember here, however, is that there is no intention to direct or mandate scoring—and as I said, we do not believe our language does that.

In a meeting with President Bush on September 10, attended by myself, the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. ITOYUKI] and the senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. LEAHY] who is the chairman of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, we agreed with the President that we would take a couple of weeks in order to try to gauge with our colleagues in the

Senate not only their sentiment for delayed consideration of this proposal, but also to gauge the support in the Senate of these absorption guarantees.

Mr. President, it is clear to us that our colleagues do not wish a confrontation over the issue of delay, and I do not wish a confrontation on this issue of the delay. Senator LEAHY has suggested, therefore, that we put off consideration of this proposal for the time requested by the President. After exhaustive consultation with our colleagues, Senator ITOYUKI and I believe that we should accede to the administration's request—and consider the proposal when the foreign operations legislation is brought up sometime in late January or early February of next year.

I believe it is important to note at this point that the President and other high officials of the administration have been, by and large, positive on the substance of absorption guarantees. As I stated when we discussed this issue on September 10, "It is our hope that when time comes for its enactment, it will receive enthusiastic support from all quarters of our Government."

During these last 3 weeks, the President and other officials have indicated their support for absorption guarantees. In a letter the President wrote on September 17, he alluded to his support not only for the State of Israel but—and I quote again—"for the successful absorption of Soviet Jewish and Ethiopian refugees."

White House spokesperson, Martin Pittwater, also on September 17, stated that, "there is a commitment that we'll go forth with the loan guarantee." He further stated that, "there is no question for our support for loan guarantees and our interest in helping."

Likewise, the Secretary of State, in a press conference held in Damascus, Syria, on September 18, asserted that there had been no public or private discussions on a "settlement freeze in connection with the question of absorption aid to Israel."

Secretary Baker stressed that the United States has "asked for a delay of 120 days purely in order to give peace a chance. We've asked for a delay because we want to avoid the question of linkage—not promote it. That's the reason we've asked for the delay."

It is also well known that the President has made some six specific commitments on this issue. Most important among them are these: support for guarantees. No additional delay. And the question of scoring will be handled in a reasonable fashion in accordance with the law.

Finally, last Tuesday, Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee. He stated that the administration has an "obligation to assist Israel with the absorption of Soviet Jews . . . that is not the issue of contention."

He further stated in that hearing, in response to an assertion by Senator CHAMBERLAIN that the United States "seems to be linking aid to the peace conference" that "please, Senator, do not assume that we have linked loan guarantees or U.S. aid to the peace process."

Mr. President, I believe that the administration is positive on the merits and substance of this issue and it is therefore proper and right that we accede to the President's request for a delay.

Senator ITOYUKI and I will be working closely with the chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Senator LEAHY, and the administration, so that early next year, we can pass a proposal which will be acceptable to all quarters of our Government. I might say not only be acceptable to all quarters of our Government but be enthusiastically supported by all quarters of our Government.

I thank my distinguished friend from Hawaii for standing with me on this. Mr. President, I would like now to send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself and the senior Senator from Hawaii together with 88 of our colleagues as original cosponsors, and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record, and printed as a document. I further ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment appear in the Record following Senator ITOYUKI's statement.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, on September 10, my colleague, Senator KASTNER and I announced our intention to submit an amendment providing for guarantees for \$10 billion in loans for Soviet and Ethiopian immigrant absorption in Israel.

I believe I should at the very outset underline the fact that this is a loan guarantee. It is not a grant of money to the people of Israel. We are not giving money to Israel. In many ways, this is just an act of friendship.

For example, Mr. President, if a very dear and close friend of mine should go to a bank and seek a loan and the banker tells him, "We'd be very happy to lend you money but you'll have to get someone to co-sign your loan or guarantee your loan," this is all that this bill calls for, that we will co-sign or guarantee the loan made by the State of Israel from banks in the United States to help themselves. We are not providing one penny of taxpayers' money. I believe this point is very important.

At that time we announced our intention, we informed our fellow Senators that a dialog was underway with the administration on certain technical aspects of our proposal and that, once these issues were resolved, we would move swiftly to bring the legislation up for formal debate. This, we

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extend to the State we will do at the earliest possible moment. . . .
 In the meantime, however, the President of the United States has asked that we delay consideration of the guarantee amendment for 120 days. Although Senator Kasten and I would like to proceed expeditiously on this urgent issue, we have agreed to the President's request, confident that ultimately this issue will be brought to a successful conclusion.

And so, Mr. President, our decision this morning to formally introduce our absorption guarantee amendment begins the process of deliberation on this important issue. In doing so, we believe we are remaining true to our colleagues and our commitment to resolve this issue in conformity with the administration.

We believe strongly that this proposal supports American national interests and that it will be treated with the importance it deserves.

In our many discussions, President Bush has assured us that he remains committed to the cause of Soviet Jewry and is cognizant of the significant impact that the influx of nearly 1 million new citizens will have on the Israeli economy—a 25-percent increase in the country's population in just 5 years.

It may be difficult for most Americans to imagine what this entails, but just imagine the whole population of France placed into the United States in 5 years. That is the effect this program will have on Israel.

We believe that the President recognizes the urgency of resettlement. We remain convinced of his sincerity on the matter of Soviet absorption and his willingness to meet this great humanitarian challenge as he has met others in Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Kurdistan, and the Philippines—with compassion, with understanding and with characteristic American generosity.

Similarly, Senator Kasten and I believe that the President recognizes the danger of resurgent Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism and the hardship which any slowdown in absorption could mean to many hundreds of thousands of Jews awaiting emigration.

Undoubtedly, the coming winter months will be difficult for the Soviet people. A counterrevolution, sparked by mass starvation and suffering, could bring totalitarianism back to the Soviet Union and lead, once again, to the captivity of the remaining Jewish population.

We hope and pray that this frightening prospect does not come true. We trust that in requesting a 120-day delay of our guarantee proposal, the President and his advisers have seriously considered this possibility and have drawn up plans accordingly.

Mr. President, over the past several weeks, Senator Kasten and I have sought the bipartisan counsel of our colleagues on the matter of absorption guarantees. We have been most grati-

fied by the overwhelming support which our proposal has received, as evidenced by the number of Democrats and Republicans who have asked to cosponsor our amendment. As my colleague, Senator Kasten, has indicated, 70 U.S. Senators are cosponsors of this amendment.

There should be no doubt that the commitment of the American people to Israel remains strong. There should be no doubt that Congress will support loan guarantees to Israel—not because it is convenient or expedient, but because it is right.

For nearly a quarter of a century, the liberation of Soviet Jewry has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy. As Americans, as free men and women, we have yearned for the day when all of the captive peoples of the Soviet Union would be set free. Today, that time has come.

Let us not squander this great opportunity to make good our vows. History will judge us not by our proclamations, but by our deeds. The Soviet immigrants to Israel need our help. Let us be the first to answer the call.

KENNEDY 1

AMENDMENT NO. 1247

On page 28, between lines 27 and 28, insert the following:

Title III of chapter 2 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 226. LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM FOR RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN ISRAEL.—(a)(1) During the period beginning on October 1, 1967, and ending on September 30, 1968, the President shall issue guarantees against losses incurred in connection with loans to Israel for the purpose of providing economic assistance to Israel and the economy of Israel in connection with the extraordinary costs occasioned by Israel's humanitarian undertaking to resettle and absorb Soviet and Ethiopian refugees. The authority of this subsection is in addition to any other authority to issue guarantees for any such purpose.

"(2) The total principal amount of guarantees which may be issued under this subsection in any fiscal year shall not exceed \$1,000,000,000, except that in the event that less than \$1,000,000,000 of guarantees is issued in any fiscal year, the authority to issue the balance of such guarantees shall be available in any subsequent fiscal year ending on or before September 30, 1968. Each guarantee issued under this section shall guarantee 100 percent of the principal and interest payable on such loans. Loan guarantees shall be made in such increments as the government of Israel may request. The guarantee for each such increment shall be obligated and committed within 30 days of the request therefor, and the issuance of the guarantee for each such increment shall occur within 60 days of such request, unless a later date is selected by the government of Israel.

"(3) The standard terms of any loan or increment guaranteed under this section shall be 20 years, with scheduled payments of interest only over the first 10 years, and with scheduled payments of principal and interest, on a level-payment basis, over the last 10 years thereof, except that the guaranteed loan or any increments issued in a single transaction may include obligations having different maturities, interest rates,

and payment terms if the aggregate principal debt service for all obligations secured in a single transaction equals the debt service for a single loan or increment of the amount having the standard terms described in this sentence. The guarantor shall not have the right to accelerate any guaranteed loan or increment or to pay any amounts in respect of the guarantee issued other than in accordance with the original payment terms for the loan. For purposes of determining the maximum principal amount of any loan or increment to be guaranteed under this section, the principal amount of each such loan or increment shall be—

"(1) in the case of any loan based on a discount basis, the original issue price (including any transaction costs) thereof; or

"(2) in the case of any loan based on an interest-bearing basis, the stated principal amount thereof.

"(4) Before the issuance of the first guarantee under this section, the Government of Israel shall provide the President with written assurance that such loans will be used only for projects or activities in geographic areas which were subject to the administration of the Government of Israel before June 3, 1967, to be stated in the same manner as was provided in the grant agreement with Israel for fiscal year 1964 under chapter 4 of part II of this Act.

"(5) Section 223 shall apply to guarantees issued under subsection (a) in the same manner as such section applies to guarantees issued under section 222, except that subsections (a), (a)(1), (g), and (j) of section 223 shall not apply to such guarantees and except that, to the extent section 223 is inconsistent with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1966, that Act shall apply. Loans shall be guaranteed under this section without regard to sections 221, 222, and 223(c). Notwithstanding section 223(f), the interest rate for loans guaranteed under this section may include a reasonable fee to cover the costs and fees incurred by the borrower in connection with financing under this section in the event the borrower elects not to finance such costs or fees out of loan principal.

"(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees charged for the loan guarantee program under this section shall be an aggregate maximum fee of \$100,000,000, payable on a pro rata basis as such guarantee for each loan or increment is issued."

The loan guarantees authorized pursuant to section 226 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by this Act) for fiscal year 1967 and for each of the four succeeding fiscal years shall be made available without need for further appropriations of subsidy cost as the fees required to be paid by the borrower under section 226(c)(6) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 reduce the subsidy cost to zero.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore, Who yields time?

Mr. EASTEN, Mr. President, I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SPENCER).

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore, The Senator from Pennsylvania is now recognized.

Mr. SPENCER, Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I thank my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin, Senator Kasten.

I commend Senator Kasten and Senator INOUYE for their strong leadership on this very important subject.

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And I applaud the action of some 70 United States Senators who are standing together today on the introduction of this legislation which is an important statement of United States humanitarian concerns and a historic affirmation of the strong United States-Israeli relationship.

At the outset I articulate my own perspective and my own roots and the reasons why the humanitarian absorption guarantees are especially important to this Senator. My parents came from Russia. My father came from a small village, Batchkurina, in 1911, fleeing the oppression of the czar and the virulent antisemitism that was present in the Soviet Union in 1911 and remains to this day. My mother came at the age of 5 with her family from an area of Russia-Poland where the territory had been traded back and forth. So from my earliest days, I have understood the problems of Soviet Jewry and the special considerations in providing an opportunity for Jews to leave the Soviet Union.

In supporting this resolution, I do so as a U.S. Senator with the firm belief that this is very much in the national interest of the United States. And I say that, having been a student of the affairs in the Mideast for more than a quarter of a century. On coming to the U.S. Senate some 11 years ago, I sought membership on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of Appropriations where I have worked with Senator INOURT, Senator KASTEN—Senator KASTEN having been chairman of that subcommittee for 8 years, Senator INOURT having been chairman of that subcommittee for 4 years—and believe that the foreign aid and the humanitarian aid which has come forward from that subcommittee and then to the full Appropriations Committee and then to the Senate has been very important for U.S. national self-interest.

Foreign aid is unpopular, as we all know. And it is with some considerable political risk that 70 U.S. Senators step forward to cosponsor this legislation. This legislation is humanitarian legislation, that is not foreign aid and is a loan guarantee at no cost to the U.S. taxpayer, but it has a symbolic connection with the concept of foreign aid which we allocate for U.S. national self-interest. And the foreign aid allocation, which is about 1 percent of our gross Federal budget, is very important. Much of it might well come within the military budget. And the \$5 billion which is allocated, \$3 billion to Israel in foreign aid and \$2 billion to Egypt, has a very important strategic importance to the United States and, dollar-for-dollar, yields greater results than the \$150 billion which has been allocated on an annual basis to NATO for many, many years. The point is that foreign aid and the separate issue of loan guarantees need to be put in the proper perspective; it's good for promoting U.S. national security interests and global stability.

My preference on the loan guarantee legislation was the preference expressed earlier by Senator INOURT, to proceed with it on our current appropriations bill and not be subjected to 120-day delay. With regard to the notion of linking loan guarantees with settlements—an action by the administration that led to the delay—it should be noted that the Arab nations did not require a commitment to halt settlements as a precondition to come to the peace bargaining table. This linkage issue was injected into the process after the parties had already agreed to meet to discuss peace. Linkage indicates a predisposition to the Arab side and undermines the foundations for a peace conference.

Because Congress was faced with a special request from the President of the United States to delay enacting the loan guarantee legislation, an accommodation was made. But it is the hope of this Senator that the strong statement by 70 Senators today and the strong sentiment which is present in the House of Representatives will be a strong signal that this matter should go forward and be enacted promptly at the end of the 120 days.

I applaud the efforts of the President and the efforts of the Secretary of State in moving forward on the Mideast peace process. And it has been a herculean effort by the Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, in what he has accomplished.

It has been my view for some time, Mr. President, that we had been moving in the direction of a Mideast peace conference—as a result of the changing situation in the Soviet Union—with the loss of Soviet economic support, Syria has been faced with new realities and I believe that they will have to consider the option of peace with Israel.

Egypt and President Mubarak have been supportive of American efforts to create such dialog. In contrast the Saudis owe the United States a great deal—and they owe Israel a great deal as well—for our efforts in defeating the menacing Iraq Army which had invaded Kuwait and which was poised in a position to invade Saudi Arabia.

I say candidly I have been disappointed with the Saudi response and would have expected more, and hope the Saudis yet will be more forthcoming for the Mideast peace process in recognition of Israel's tremendous sacrifice and restraint in absorbing 39 unprovoked Scud attacks and in not responding—at the request of the President of the United States—in order to hold the coalition together; a coalition which created the military victory which liberated Kuwait, saved Saudi Arabia, other Arab Gulf States, and doubtless contributed to the avoidance of tremendous additional destruction.

So the time is ripe to see the peace process go forward and it has been a concern of mine that in acceding to a delay in the request for loan guarantees that there would be a tilt, or the

appearance of a tilt, toward the Arab nations. It is wrong to demand concessions by Israel before the bargaining process had begun. And it is my very firm view that the bargaining process has to be left to the parties and that there should not be any inference of the United States taking one side or the other as the parties move to the bargaining table.

A few years ago some 30 U.S. Senators signed a letter to Prime Minister Shamir urging the trading of land for peace, and I refused to join in that letter. I opposed it because I do not think that from this vantage point, thousands of miles from the frontier of danger in the Mideast, that those of us in this Chamber can tell the Israelis, or anyone else, what to do about issues of national security.

It may well be that Prime Minister Shamir has in his mind concessions on the issues of settlements. That is up to him and up to the negotiating parties to discuss. It ought to be remembered that when Prime Minister Begin negotiated with President Sadat of Egypt, that there was a cessation of the settlements for the time being as a judgment of the negotiating parties. There was also a concession of considerable land for peace when Israel returned the Sinai. So there are historical precedents where some flexibility might be expected. But it is not for the United States and it is not for the Senate to set forward conditions or to prejudice these negotiations in advance.

There have been strong expressions of support for the urgency and importance of loan guarantees from across the country. I regretted the statement which was made by the President about 1,000 lobbyists coming to Washington, DC, on September 12. The representatives of the national Jewish community are not lobbyists, but citizens exercising their rights in our political process.

It is a uniquely different category when citizens come to call upon their elected representatives with three specific guarantees in the first amendment: the right to assemble, the right to petition, and the right to freedom of speech. Such an activity is not a lobbying activity.

It is my hope that this action, with a very strong statement and the very courageous and brilliant leadership by Senator KASTEN and Senator INOURT, will set the stage for moving through with completion of this legislation at the expiration of the 120 days, and in the interim, Secretary of State Baker will continue his road to success in bringing the parties to the bargaining table so that they make strike a balance and move ahead for peace in that very troubled region.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my prepared statement and a letter to President Bush be printed in the Record.

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Mr. BROOKS, Mr. President, I am pleased to yield to the Senator from Illinois, a Senator who has been a pioneer in this noble humanitarian effort to assist the people of the State of Israel.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

LIVING UP TO OUR RESPONSIBILITIES

Mr. SIMON, Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Hawaii. Let me just add, not in relationship to this, and yet in a very real sense in relationship to this, he has been a superb leader on this issue and on other issues. And until this session of Congress, I had not served on a committee with the senior Senator from Hawaii. I serve on the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, as does the Presiding Officer, Senator HARRIS. Senator HARRIS gets no great credit back in Hawaii for his leadership, and he has just done a superb job and I am very grateful to him.

Mr. President, I think what Senator HARRIS and Senator KASTEN have done, and many of us who are cosponsors, it is important for us, among other things, to live up to our responsibilities. We have properly pushed the Soviet Union to permit people to emigrate, but we have in the United States restricted the number of people who can come in. There is only one other place they can go, and that is to Israel.

I happen to differ with the settlement policy of the Government of Israel in terms of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, but only 18 percent of the Soviet immigrants are being settled in those areas, so that is an issue that has been blown out of all proportion.

I think, secondly, speaking candidly, it has not been well handled by the administration. You do not punch your friends in the nose publicly. I think phone calls to the Prime Minister of Israel, as well as the Arab leaders, as well as the leaders of Congress, saying we are just going to postpone this for 120 days would have been much better than proceeding as we are. But I am pleased that there is at least some form of informal agreement to move ahead.

I stress that this is a loan guarantee and up to this point, we have had not a single penny lost to Israel because of loan guarantees, so that we are not talking about money being taken out of the U.S. Treasury if the present pattern continues in terms of Israel.

I will add, I applaud the job that Secretary Baker is doing to bring the parties together.

I think all of us, no matter what our party affiliation, no matter what our inclinations, are appreciative of this. In my own experience in labor management relations and other things, if you can get people together around a table, you are halfway home. It looks like a reasonably good shot that we will get people together around the table.

Finally, Mr. President, Senator STANWELL made a good point in that it is up to the negotiators. What we have to do is to facilitate bringing them together. But at that point it is really up to Israel and the Arab nations to try to work out a settlement. I hope they can. I think there are reasonable prospects that they can.

If we would refrain from talking about East Jerusalem, I think it would be helpful. We raise false fears in Israel and false hopes on the Arab side. I can give you a dozen possible scenarios of solving this problem. Not a single one of those includes dividing Jerusalem again. But, again, I am pleased to be a cosponsor. I commend Senator HARRIS and Senator KASTEN for their leadership on this. I think we have eased ourselves out of a very awkward situation.

I yield the floor.

Mr. DURENBERGER addressed the Chair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?

Mr. KASTEN, Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. DURENBERGER].

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized for 5 minutes.

ISRAELI LOAN GUARANTEE

Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. President, I rise to offer my support and cosponsorship for the measure introduced by my distinguished colleague, Senators KASTEN and BROOKS, regarding loan guarantees for the absorption of Jewish refugees into Israel. This important financial commitment is consistent with America's centuries-old tradition of encouraging the free emigration of people living under oppressive political conditions.

Mr. President, for almost 20 years, a major predicate of America's foreign policy and international trade policy has been the idea that the Soviet Union and other closed societies must permit free emigration in order to secure normal trade relations with us. The Jackson-Vanik amendment was a milestone in U.S. foreign policy. A landmark event in U.S. efforts to free captive peoples. Now they are free.

In the past 2 years, our unwavering commitment to free emigration has finally borne fruit. A massive wave of immigration into Israel began in 1949 and continues today. Since then, nearly 250,000 Soviet and Ethiopian Jews have emigrated to Israel, and it is estimated that the total will reach 1 million by the end of 1955.

Mr. President, as a nation built by immigrants fleeing religious and political persecution we have a special responsibility to assist Israel in absorbing this massive new wave of immigrants. While we have prodded the Soviets for decades to open their borders, we have not raised our own refugee immigrant ceilings to accommodate the vastly increased numbers of Soviet immigrants that have now been allowed to leave.

In fact, ever since the late 1940's, when the United States began in-country immigration processing in the Soviet Union, it has become far more difficult for Soviet citizens to emigrate to the United States than when the Rome-Vienna immigration pipeline was open. Where else can these immigrants turn except to Israel? And is it not our responsibility to facilitate their absorption in Israel if we are unwilling to accept them?

Mr. President, I believe that nearly all of my colleagues and certainly the President of the United States are committed to granting these loan guarantees. Unfortunately, the issue of loan guarantees has become intertwined with the political and diplomatic efforts surrounding the upcoming Middle East Peace Conference.

I have considered the President's request to delay consideration of these loan guarantees on its merits and its implications not only for the peace process, but for its impact on the mission of helping Israel absorb its new citizens.

Although I am not fully persuaded that considering the loan guarantee now would derail the peace process, I believe Congress should defer to President Truman and Secretary Baker in matters of such delicate and sensitive diplomacy. The Congress should support the President in his request for a 120-day delay, and I have done that over the last month.

At the same time, I want to strongly reiterate my view that the flow of the Soviet emigres currently flowing into Israel should not be held hostage to the diplomatic maneuvering that is preceding this peace conference. And there should be no linkage between these loan guarantees and any of the issues that will surely arise in the upcoming negotiations.

Every Arab and Palestinian representative who sits at the peace table should know in advance that the United States will not be looking over the shoulder of the Israeli negotiators second-guessing their bargaining strategy with the threat in January or February of withholding this humanitarian assistance if we disagree with the strategy.

Mr. President, I believe the Israeli Government is making a fundamental political and diplomatic mistake in pursuing the settlement policy in the occupied territories. I have never condoned that policy.

I think we ought to recognize the need to address legitimate Palestinian concerns in the territories. It seems to me that during the course of history, the Palestinians have been caught in the struggle for control of land where they too have lived for many years. That struggle continues today. The land keeps changing hands all of the time, often at the expense of the Palestinian people who genuinely want to live in peace with all their neighbors.

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Mr. President, the legislation I am cosponsoring requires the Government of Israel to provide the President with written assurances that these loans will be used only for activities in geographic areas subject to the administration of Israel prior to June 5, 1947.

Those assurances, however, do not guarantee that new settlements in the occupied territories will not be constructed during the peace negotiations. It only assures that funds obtained with U.S. guarantees will not be used in the occupied territories.

Although I do not believe Israel's settlement policies are helpful in resolving matters that divide Israel and its neighbors, that is a matter that ultimately must be resolved in face-to-face negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Certain segments of Israel's Government and population have insistently refused to give up any of the territories, but Israel has clearly stated that this matter is on the table. It is negotiable.

Mr. President, When we return in January I expect that we will expeditiously move to grant these loan guarantees. I do not expect, and will not accept, any further delays in the grant of this humanitarian assistance. Let the Israelis negotiate all of the difficult issues with Syria, Jordan, and all of the Arab and Palestinian representatives without any linkage to this humanitarian assistance.

This humanitarian assistance should not and will not be held hostage to Israel's bargaining position at the peace conference. Hafez al Assad should know that what he cannot get from the Israelis, he will not get from the Senate.

Mr. President, the United States should be proud of its role in bringing about the increase in Soviet emigration as well as the Ethiopian exodus. My friend, our former colleague, Senator Rudy Boschwitz played a personal and very effective role in helping Ethiopian Jews emigrate. We should now follow through on this decades' long commitment. Helping the new immigrants help themselves is an honorable enterprise, and we should be proud that we can contribute to Israel's efforts.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. KASTEN addressed the Chair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wisconsin yields time.

Mr. KASTEN, Mr. President, I yield what time he may desire to the Republican leader, the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Dole).

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Republican leader is recognized.

Mr. DOLE, Mr. President, I thank my colleague, the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Kasten).

Mr. President, I want to take this time to personally thank my colleague from Wisconsin, Senator KASTEN, and my long-time friend from Hawaii, Senator ILOUYE, for the very constructive

role they have played over the past several weeks. This is a very explosive issue. There have been a number of frustrations expressed by people on both sides of the issue, and certainly it is a matter of great importance to the United States and to the State of Israel.

We do have a very unique relationship with Israel, no doubt about it. It has been there for a long time. It is going to continue. I believe the role that has been played by Senators ILOUYE and KASTEN has been very important in underscoring the importance of that relationship and in keeping everything on sort of an even keel until we can fully discuss this matter sometime early next year. I am not certain whether the Senators have set a date. There are questions to be asked, as indicated by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr. DUMMICK). There will be debate. There will be questions. There will be differences of opinion. But the important point is that now we have temporarily resolved this matter because of the personal efforts of my colleagues, Senator KASTEN and Senator ILOUYE, and for that everyone in this Chamber is very grateful.

So I want to commend the distinguished Senator from Hawaii (Mr. ILOUYE) and in particular, my Republican colleague, the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. KASTEN), for their statements.

The Senate has no more responsible and able Members than the Senators from Hawaii and Wisconsin. And, in a Senate where Israel can count 100 firm friends, it has no stronger supporters than the Senators from Hawaii and Wisconsin.

Today's statements by Senators ILOUYE and KASTEN reflect both of those facts.

There is no question that Senator KASTEN, in offering the proposal on loan guarantees which he cosponsored with Senator ILOUYE, is reflecting the virtually unanimous sentiment in the Senate that we should help Israel absorb the huge influx of Soviet Jews which continues to pour in every day.

We should offer support because of our longstanding efforts to achieve free emigration for Soviet Jews; because of our special relationship with Israel, and our wish to help it face up to this critical challenge; and most of all because it is the right thing to do.

And, judging by the statements of the President and other senior officials, I don't think there is any question that the administration also supports the concept of assisting Israel confront this monumental task.

So the issue is not whether—but how and when.

In agreeing to the President's recommendation that we postpone consideration of this issue until January or February, Senator KASTEN is demonstrating the kind of responsible leadership that has characterized his service in the Senate. He is going for coopera-

tion—not confrontation; he is helping to bring us together on an issue where we should be together—not dividing us.

There will be serious debate and perhaps some differences of opinion over aspects of the Kasten-Ilouye proposal in January, or whenever this issue comes to the floor. While—as I have said—there is near unanimous support for the concept of helping Israel, real questions and concerns remain over just how that should be done; and whether and how our assistance should be related to broader issues, such as Israel's settlements policies. The President certainly has some concerns in these areas, I do, and others do, as well.

So we all look forward to responsible, lively debate in January. It is the way we get things done. It's called the democratic process.

I am confident that, out of that process, we will end up with the best policy and program—the best to help the Soviet Jews, the best to strengthen long-term United States-Israel relations, the best for advancing the chances of peace in the Middle East, and, most important of all, the best for America.

Mr. ILOUYE addressed the Chair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. ILOUYE, Mr. President, I am pleased to yield to a steadfast supporter of this humanitarian effort to assist the people of the State of Israel, the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MCKULSKI).

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Maryland is now recognized.

ISRAELI LOAN GUARANTEES

Mr. MCKULSKI, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations for yielding me this time on the bill he and the Senator from Wisconsin have introduced.

Mr. President, make no mistake, I am a steadfast supporter of this bill, which will provide \$2 billion in loan guarantees for 5 years to the State of Israel to deal with the most compelling humanitarian exodus that Israel has faced in this century and perhaps ever.

Mr. President, I commend my two colleagues, the authors of this bill, for providing the type of leadership that they have on this issue, No. 1, not only to meet the compelling humanitarian situation but No. 2, to go about it in a way that does not exacerbate the discontent either in Israel or the United States on this particular issue.

Mr. President, my constituents have said to me that they are concerned about this issue. They raise many concerns.

In speaking on behalf of the amendment I would like to clarify for them what I think some of their concerns are. As I move around Maryland, whether it is in the suburban shopping

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malls of Montgomery or Prince Georges County, or Hagerstown, Highlandtown, Crisfield, or Cockeysville, people say, Why are we giving \$10 billion this year to the State of Israel?

Mr. President, there is a tremendous misconception. This question is based on an assumed fact. They think we are going to give \$10 billion in cash to the State of Israel or \$10 billion in an actual cash loan to the State of Israel; that is, \$10 billion this year when we have so many compelling needs here in our own country.

Mr. President, I want to set the record straight for both the people of Maryland and for the people of the United States of America.

First of all, let me say that this money we are talking about is not cash to the State of Israel. It is a loan guarantee. It means we back up a loan that Israel will take in the world market to be able to deal with the influx of immigrants. Our loan guarantee will enable Israel to borrow at lower than current interest rates, which means the money will go to help people, and not to pay interest rates. We will not be giving any cash to Israel this year, next year, or the year after on the loan guarantee issue.

When people say what about the needs in our own State, believe me, I am well aware that right this minute Governor Schaefer is looking State troopers in the eye and saying I have to take you off of I-95, the corridor of cocaine, because we are facing budget deficits. Right now the Governor is saying to the people of Maryland, I will have to ground a Medevac helicopter needed to rescue people in the trauma of accidents.

So, Senator BARBARA MIKULSKI is not for some program that would take the money out of the needs of our own country and go to another. Mr. President, I am telling you that this bill will not do that.

Right now, in our own appropriations bill, Marylanders are very much on my mind, whether it is a modest \$3 million to reseed the oyster beds of the great Chesapeake Bay so my Maryland people can be out there earning a good living knowing that in the State of Maryland good environment is good business, or whether it is the funds we have to bring back into Maryland to make public investments in Goddard or the National Institutes of Health, major employers in my State creating new ideas that will lead to new jobs and new products that we can sell around the world. In my own State where we are facing the trooper layoff the Federal Government, with the leadership provided by Senator SARGENT and me, has funds coming in called Project Achilles to go after the drug pushers in the Washington suburbs and in the Baltimore metropolitan area.

So the people of Maryland should know that Senator BARBARA MIKULSKI is absolutely on their side.

While we are looking at that, I also want to say candidly that I was in Israel this summer. I saw a compelling humanitarian need—15,000 Ethiopian Jews settled in 48 hours from an area of great civil war and strife, brought to the State of Israel. The men and women who got off that plane from Ethiopia are not only from this century, because of their rural isolated background, but they are from another millennium. Helping them move into the 20th century, from essentially a 16th-century lifestyle, will take three to five generations. Certainly, we can provide a backup to the State of Israel to help them.

At the same time, we have looked at the collapse of the Soviet Union. The good news is that maybe the cold war is coming to an end. Time will tell. But we do know that with the rising tensions in the Soviet Union there is increased hostility toward Jewish citizens and that the need to move to Israel for all who can go and all who want to go is indeed important. For the Soviet Jews who are able to leave, we must not only work with them to provide housing but to provide the kind of economic stimulation that will attract private investment to create jobs and a viable economy.

Mr. President, I really do support loan guarantees. I really prefer no delays, no linkages, and no conditions. But this Senator does not want to be in a prickly relationship with the President of the United States as he conducts foreign policy. I believe that it is the intent of the Congress of the United States to work with the President on peace in the Middle East. But make no mistake, Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait because he was cranky with Israel over the Arab-Israeli situation. I want to note that only Israel has been asked to make sacrifices; there has been no calling for sacrifices from any of the Arab nations as they move towards the peace talks.

Yes, there are policy differences on the settlements issues. Policy differences always occur in democratic nations. But where there is absolutely no disagreement is the need to help Israel to be able to help itself deal with the migration and immigration of Soviet Jews and Ethiopian Jews. We are not giving them cash. We are giving them a loan guarantee framework to enable them to help themselves and help the people who came, against incredible odds and under compelling needs, to the State of Israel.

So though I regret the delay, perhaps it would give one pause. I hope that the President will cooperate with the Congress in coming forth with a policy and fiscal framework that the House, Senate, and the President can support.

So, Mr. President, I want to once again conclude by thanking Senators LOWRY and KASTEN for their leadership on this. We are moving to a new century. It is a new world order. I

think we need to promote these allies that have stood with us during the old century.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Hawaii has 23 minutes, and the Senator from Wisconsin has 18 minutes.

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I yield each time as he may desire to the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Packwood).

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and my good friend from Wisconsin.

I very strongly support the loan guarantee for the resettlement of refugees in Israel. I want to divide the reasons for my support into two, if I might.

One, let us take the straight out cost factor. This is not going to cost the United States anything. We are guaranteeing a loan to Israel. Israel has never defaulted on any of its debt. This is not some bandit country, some country whose creditworthiness everybody questions, and any time you give them a loan guarantee, you might as well be giving them a grant. That is not Israel.

So let us set aside the cost argument and make sure that the public understands this is not a foreign aid grant. This is a guarantee of credit so that Israel can borrow money at the cheapest possible rates for a short period of time to resettle what is going to be a deluge of refugees.

To put it in perspective, from just Russia alone—Lord knows Israel has been a haven for Jews from all over the world, but from just Russia alone, Israel in the next 2 to 3 years will have to resettle in Israel the equivalent of the United States trying to resettle the entire population of France in the United States.

So it is a mammoth undertaking. But that is the straight kind of cross financial issue. I would hope that no one would quarrel with that.

I would rather now talk about the moral issue. I want to emphasize morality rather than pragmatism. We always talk about Israel as a great ally. They are. America should be so lucky to have such allies elsewhere in the world. We have often said we need this vital listening post, this bastion of democracy in the Middle East. And in an era of troubled relations with all the people in the world, thank goodness we have a good ally.

The problem with that argument is that allies, unfortunately, are shifting acquaintances on occasion. It is amazing that we can fight Germany and Japan, and 5 years after the war is over, they are our strongest allies.

So what I fear, if we put this on a straight pragmatic basis as if, indeed, Russia, the Soviet Union, is finished for a generation as a major power and if, indeed, some of the Arab countries are recasting their views about Amer-

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ice with Russia gone, I would hate to think that there might start to grow in this country a feeling, well, we do not need Israel quite as much anymore, the danger has passed.

No, Mr. President, I want to talk strictly on a moral ground, and I will say it flat out: I think Israel has a better claim to the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria, as it is called, than any other country. If you look at history they have far and away the best claim. If you look at Israel at the time of Solomon, and that is roughly the zenith of the united kingdoms, Israel included all of what is currently Israel and a little of Jordan, and a little of Lebanon, and some of Syria. This was legitimately Israel. The Jewish people in that area were a majority of the population for the better part of 1,400 years.

Then, starting a few hundred years before Christ and continuing on with the Romans, starting with the Syrians, and going through the Romans, the Jews were expelled from their own country, the diaspora. They were forcibly evicted and scattered about the world. And I know nothing in Judeo-Christian, or Anglo-Saxon, or any other law that says you lose your right to your land when you are forcibly dispossessed of it. But they were.

People say that is old history; that is thousands of years ago; that claim does not count. I think it does count, and I think their claim is better than anybody else's.

Let us lay that aside. Who else controlled this area? Rome did for about 600 years. I have seen no one suggest that Italy should get the West Bank because of 600 years of Roman rule. Turkey had it for 1,500 years, roughly, to the end of World War I. I have not heard suggested seriously that Turkey should get the West Bank. Then, of course, at the end of World War I—Turkey having allied itself with Germany—France and Britain took the entire area, except for Saudi Arabia. It is ironic, but nobody wanted it. There was nothing there. France and Britain took the entire area. There were no countries as we understand the countries. It was just a Turkish mandate. Britain and France took the area. France and Britain took what became Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel, and divided it between them.

In the English portion of what is now Israel and Jordan, from that partition, called the Palestinian mandate, there was a promise made that there would be a homeland carved for the Jews. In 1921, England satisfied the Emir Abdullah, grandfather of the present King Hussein of Jordan, who had a good army, and gave him a country that had no history at all—Transjordan, everything east of the Jordan river. It was about 80 percent of the geography of the Palestinian mandate, and world Jewry did not complain. The Jews living in Jordan were expelled. What traditionally and historically had been part of Israel,

Jews were now denied access to Israel had no complaint.

Now we have left to the British mandate what is currently Israel, and during the twenties and thirties, Britain could not keep them. The Arabs did not like them. Soldiers were getting shot and kidnaped. Great Britain said, "we are going to divide this up and get out." In 1937, in the Peel Commission, they suggested a division in which the Arabs would get the Negev, the desert in the south, the West Bank, part of the north; the Jews would get a fair portion in the north, and Britain would keep Jerusalem and a little corridor to the sea, Jerusalem, the holiest city of the Jewish religion—Britain would keep it all. The Jews said they would agree to that. The Arabs turned it down.

In 1938, the Jewish Agency suggested a division of the remainder of the Palestinian mandate, and they suggested—this is a Jewish recommendation—Arabs would get the Negev, the desert from the south, West Bank, and Jerusalem would be divided, half of it being Jewish, Britain keeping the other half. They did not ask for a united kingdom or united Jerusalem at the time. The Arabs turned it down.

After the war in 1946, another partition was suggested by the Jewish Agency. This time Israel would get the Negev. There had been settlements along there. The West Bank and Jerusalem would be internationalized. The Arabs turned it down. In 1947, the British said we are leaving. We have had the King David Hotel blown up, and soldiers were killed, not unlike our experience in Lebanon. They said, "we are leaving," and they gave it back to the United Nations.

The United Nations suggested a partition in which the Arabs get the West Bank, Israel gets the Negev and most of the north, and Jerusalem would be internationalized. The Arabs turned it down. The Jews accepted all of those partitions that were suggested, that Israel should give up land for peace—they have never gotten peace, but they have given up land. They have given up the Sinai three times in 30 years. They took it in 1956, then after the 1967 war, and in the Yom Kippur war. They gave it back every time in the hope of getting peace.

All during these different eras when the British had Palestine, the Arabs could have had peace and the West Bank, and before World War II, the Negev, and a divided or internationalized Jerusalem, on every occasion the Jews accepted, and the Arabs turned it down.

Then when the Union Jack comes down on May 15, 1948, and the United Nations recognizes Israel, Israel is attacked from all sides. How they ever made it, I do not know. In that war for independence, they hung on. The territory that Israel succeeded in holding in that war was slightly expanded from the United Nations partition, but not significantly different. The Arabs

ended up holding the West Bank, and Jerusalem was divided. That was the situation until 1967.

In 1967, of course, Egypt and the Arab countries were getting ready for an attack. Israel's intelligence was good. On the morning Israel thought the Arab attack was probably going to come—because every morning Egyptian pilots were in their planes on the runways—they made a preemptive air strike and destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground before it ever got off.

That morning, Israel told King Hussein of Jordan to just hold his position. He tried to annex the West Bank as part of Jordan. Only Pakistan and Great Britain recognized the annexation. But he had it. Israel said to King Hussein, you just hold your position, and do not move, and we will not attack you. King Hussein could not resist the temptation to drive west toward the Mediterranean. There was only 10 miles from the West Bank to the sea. He wanted to divide Israel north and south. He was unsuccessful in some of the toughest fighting that came in the 1967 war in the West Bank and in Jerusalem. Israel took it. The have held it ever since.

Now the question becomes if we are going to go to this peace conference, the argument is if Israel settles in this area, is it going to disturb the peace conference? Therefore, we should not have any loan guarantees unless Israel promises not to settle—transplanted unless Israel promises to give up their claim to this land.

Mr. President, first they have a better moral claim to it than anybody else—a better moral claim.

Second, Israel has shown time and time again that it is willing to give up land in the hope of getting peace.

I said they gave up Sinai three times, the Sinai Desert four times between 1937 and 1947 with different partition plans which they would not have gotten Jerusalem and would not have gotten the West Bank and would not have gotten the Negev. They said we will accept it. They got turned down by the Arabs every time.

So now we come to this year and this issue and the issue of whether this Senate should authorize the United States to guarantee Israel's bonds so that they can settle principally Russian Jewish immigrants. We are all but saying we are not going to do it if you are going to settle in the West Bank.

I would make this argument: Today it is all right for a Frenchman to buy land in the West Bank and live there. It is all right for a Canadian to buy land. It is all right for an American unless you are Jewish. If you are a French Jew or a Canadian Jew or an American Jew, it is alleged there is something wrong with you buying land in the West Bank.

Mr. President, no settlement—and I do not mean this in the sense of settlers—of the problems in the Middle

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East is going to work unless the parties that have to bargain it actually bargain it and live with it. If it is imposed from the outside, if we think we know the answer, if we think we know how the Jordan River ought to be divided for irrigation purposes, if we think we know where the line ought to be, we say Arabs on one side and Jews on the other, and the parties do not want it, we are going to be like the British in Palestine. We are going to have a quarter of a million troops and try to police our idea. The answer is we would have as much staying power as we had in Lebanon.

So our position ought to be this:

One, Israel has a better claim to the West Bank, Judea, and Samaria than anybody else, a better claim historically, a better claim morally, and it should not be our position to try to tell Israel what they should do with their own land.

Two, the loan guarantees are not going to cost us anything and they are solid.

Three, with the loan guarantees Israel ought to be able to settle their people wherever they want in their historic lands, and that includes the West Bank.

Four, the Arabs have not made a precondition to going to this peace conference. If it ever gets going, they have not made a precondition that Israel must quit settling the West Bank. We seem to be the one that wants to make that condition and we should not.

Five, let this peace conference start. Let us see what demands are made on Israel. Let us see what demands Israel makes of the Arabs. This peace conference may not be over in a month. It may not be over in a year. It may not be over in 5 years. The people in the Middle East lived together for the better part of 3,000 years and they know each other pretty well. And sooner or later peace will come. Sooner or later another Arab country, just as Egypt did, will say it is not worth the candle. Let us sign a peace treaty with them, and in exchange for signing the peace treaty, let us see what they are willing to give. I want to emphasize "what they are willing to give," not what we think they ought to give. And my hunch is Israel will probably give up more land than I would give up given the same situation. But that is not my choice to make; that is Israel's choice.

If it is going to take another 5, 10, 15, or 20 years for final peace to come to the Middle East, the United States should have patience and we should continue to supply Israel and we should make sure we guarantee these loans so they can settle an immense increase in their population. That ought to be the limit of our policy and the end of it—supply and patience.

If we do that, it is not going to be just a victory for Israel. If we do that, it will eventually be a peace settlement in the Middle East, and I would like to

think that that is in America's interest.

So, Mr. President, I very strongly support the efforts of the Senate to pass these loan guarantees, and I would hope it would pass unanimously.

I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SARBON). Who yields time?

Mr. DROUPE. Mr. President, I am please to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Florida.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. President, I appreciate the generosity of the floor manager and our distinguished colleague on this matter.

Mr. President, for more than two decades, the United States has had as one of its priorities in our international relationship with the Soviet Union to have that nation ease its emigration policy. Many of us have been involved over the past several years in individual cases of persons who had been denied the right to emigrate, year after year, for what appeared to be transparent rationale.

We now are seeing the tangible results of those over 20 years of effort to reform the Soviet's emigration policy. Approximately 180,000 Soviet Jews were able to leave the Soviet Union last year, more than any previous year. Hundreds of thousands more are expected to leave in the months ahead.

This is the kind of success that we have been working, literally years to accomplish. This is not the time, now that our policy has succeeded, to walk away from success. We must complete the task.

Let me remind my colleagues that this is a humanitarian task, a task which is in the best traditions of America from the Declaration of Independence to today.

As unrest and uncertainty spread to the Soviet Union, we find ourselves working against the clock to get these people out. There are reports that some Republics are already beginning to throw obstacles in the way of those wanting to emigrate. There is concern that, as the control of the central government is lifted, those enclaves of minority populations within certain Republics may become more vulnerable, more exposed to attack, more subject to anti-Semitism. It is for those reasons, Mr. President, that I strongly support the Inouye-Kasten proposal.

Mr. President, if the Congress decides to delay moving on this legislation, we do so only in deference to a President who has decided that delay is a prudent step to promote peace in the Middle East. I, for one, have serious reservations, whether a delay will improve the chances of gaining approval of these guarantees.

I am convinced that this objective is shared by the majority of this body. The fact that almost 70 of my col-

leagues have co-signed this legislation is evidence of that.

I am deeply concerned that by delaying action until the first of next year, we will live an even more daunting environment.

First, I am most optimistic that the peace process we are now embarked upon will produce the results that we had hoped for. If it breaks down, I fear that Israel will be cast as the responsible party, no matter what.

Second, even if the peace process is successful, I believe it will usher in only a cold peace, much like the one that characterizes the peace between Israel and Egypt.

Third, unless our own economy improves between now and the first of the year, we face an even more difficult task of making the economic argument even though it is clear that Israel will bear the complete cost.

In fact, Israel has a perfect credit record, having never defaulted on a loan. Not only will the U.S. taxpayer be unaffected, but our own businesses actually stand to gain from increased exports as Israel purchases capital goods for industries, equipment, computers, and raw materials.

Mr. President, I would say that in my own State, several of our leading business persons are now actively involved in the resettlement process within Israel, including the provision of facilities for resettlement utilizing United States products to do so.

Despite these facts, a worsening U.S. economy will make it harder to get these points across to the American people.

We have already seen some of the confusion where people thought that the United States was making a \$10 billion grant to the State of Israel or a \$10 billion loan. There has been a failure to clearly communicate what is the character of the economic relationship, which is neither a grant nor a loan but a guarantee of loans which will be undertaken by the State of Israel.

Finally, next year will be a Presidential election year. I do not need to remind my colleagues the problems that that will create in debating this measure in that environment.

Mr. President, I cite these points because I do not want this Senate to walk away from a historically successful policy that will affect literally hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children.

Since the mid to late sixties, the United States has had as a policy goal free and open Soviet emigration. The Soviets were slow to respond. In fact, until the 1960's, the Soviets never recognized emigration as a legal right.

As a result of United States pressure, however, the Soviets began allowing limited emigration in the name of family reunification. Even that stopped as a result of the 1967 war but resumed after the war ended. The numbers climbed to 34,000 in 1974.

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Then the Soviets began to assess an education tax charging those wanting to emigrate the cost of their Soviet education.

That triggered the Jackson-Vanik amendment tying most-favored-nation status and Government credits to open emigration. As a result, Soviet emigration dipped again and then started climbing as the two countries began negotiating SALT II.

Emigration peaked at 51,000 in 1978. Then SALT II stalled, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the relationship soured. Emigration fell off to 1,000 a year during the eighties.

Gorbachev began to turn that around. And now we have a new Soviet law that basically recognizes the right of emigration. Although far from perfect, the law represents a watershed.

Mr. President, the question of loan guarantees is a humanitarian issue, not a peace issue. It is wrong, in my view, for the administration to use humanitarian assistance to impose terms on Israel before negotiations are even under way.

Israel is not only the only democracy in the region but is also a country with which we share cultural and historical ties. A strong and prosperous Israel will help, not hinder, the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

A U.S. commitment to fulfill its two decades of humanitarian commitment to open emigration from the Soviet Union will be true to our Nation's basic principles.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I am pleased to yield to a Senator who has been in the forefront of fighting for the release of Soviet Jews and has been a steadfast supporter of humanitarian efforts to assist the people of Israel, Senator KENNEDY.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his kind remarks. I want to say how much all of us appreciate his leadership and the leadership of Senator KASTEN and others on the issue, but particularly the work that they have done over a long period of time on this issue of Soviet Jewry, as well as on the issue of the security of the State of Israel.

I commend Senators INOUE and KASTEN for their leadership in putting forward this bipartisan proposal for United States loan guarantees to assist the Government of Israel in resettling the record numbers of Soviet refugees flooding into Israel. It is an impressive demonstration of the broad bipartisan support for these guarantees that 70 Senators are sponsoring this proposal.

All of us regret the unfortunate controversy surrounding this issue. In my view, it was an unnecessary, ill-timed, and ill-advised confrontation that undermines Israel and the peace process itself. Now the issue will be delayed until January, but I look forward to working with my colleagues to assure that the guarantees are provided expeditiously and early next year.

The broad support in the Senate for helping to resettle the Soviet Jews in Israel is a reflection of the deep commitment of the American people to helping those in need. The hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews arriving in Israel have become a worldwide symbol of freedom of religion and freedom from persecution. The United States has a responsibility to help them fulfill their dream of "next year in Jerusalem."

For decades, the United States made free emigration a high priority in our relations with the Soviet Union. Since 1974, normal trade relations were linked to a demand that the Soviets let their people go. Advocates of human rights throughout the world wrote letters and engaged in protests and demonstrations in defense of the thousands of Soviet dissidents and refuseniks who were denied permission to choose where they wanted to make their home.

In my own contacts with Soviet leaders, I consistently pressed for the release of these courageous individuals. I recall a memorable and moving meeting I had in 1974 in Alexander Lerner's apartment, where I saw firsthand the intensity of their commitment and the quality of their courage.

The plight of the Soviet Jews was symbolized for many of us by the harsh persecution of Natan Sharansky. Who among us will ever forget the tireless campaign waged by his wife Avital for his release? She stood in front of the White House, in Central Park in New York City, and in many other places and countries urging his release.

These courageous individuals are now living free and safe in Israel. We know their names and their stories and we did not hesitate to help them. Yet today, we risk turning our backs on the hundreds of thousands of other Soviet Jews who may not be as well-known to us but whose stories are no less compelling. Having made free emigration a high priority, the United States cannot now turn aside or walk away.

These innocent victims of years of persecution should not be held hostage to a policy dispute between Washington and Jerusalem. We need to separate the debate over the settlements from the issue of assisting the hundreds of thousands of new immigrants to Israel, the vast majority of whom are not settling in any of the disputed lands.

Since the Berlin Wall fell at the end of 1989, 350,000 Soviet and Ethiopian Jews have arrived in Israel. They have been absorbed into a country of 4 million people, and that process has not been easy. Up to 1 million more are expected over the next 3-5 years. Absorbing that many immigrants in Israel would be equivalent to the United States absorbing the entire population of France—56 million people. Clearly, because of our history and our heritage, we have a responsi-

bility to help these Soviet emigrants establish their new lives in Israel and meet the basic necessities of life.

In fact, the delay is much longer than 4 months. Israel had originally planned to make this request early this year. But last March, the Bush administration asked Israel to hold off until September. Israel complied with that request, only to be faced with a further delay last month that provoked the current controversy.

As we all know, the Israeli settlements in the disputed territories continue to be a contentious issue, both in Israel and in the United States. And yet, of the 350,000 immigrants who have arrived in Israel, only 3,000—1.2 percent—have settled in the West Bank and Golan Heights. Another 5,500—3.6 percent—choose to live in East Jerusalem. In all, 96 percent of the immigrants to Israel have settled within Israel's pre-1967 borders. In effect, the delay is penalizing 340,000 other settlers because of a controversy involving 8,500.

The United States is not being asked to provide any direct funds to assist these immigrants. Israel's request involves loan guarantees by the United States, not direct loans or direct foreign aid. All we are being asked to do is put the stamp of approval of the United States Government behind Israel's borrowing. That action will enable Israel to borrow funds at a somewhat lower interest rate, in order to help as many immigrants as possible.

The strong bipartisan support for this legislation is a tribute to the fact that the American people understand America's own responsibility to these immigrants. While I regret that the Congress will not address these urgent needs until early next year, I look forward to working to ensure that we meet this responsibility.

All of us hope that Secretary Baker's efforts to move the peace process forward are successful, and that Israel will at last be able to live at peace with her neighbors. While many difficult issues are still to be resolved, Secretary Baker's efforts represent the best hope for peace in over a decade, and I strongly support them.

Again, I commend Senator INOUE and Senator KASTEN for this initiative, and I look forward to working with them in the months ahead to achieve the great goals we share for peace and stability in the Middle East.

Mr. President, again I thank Senator INOUE and Senator KASTEN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes and 30 seconds.

Mr. INOUE. I yield 2 minutes and 35 seconds to the Senator from New York.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.

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Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Hawaii.

I am pleased, Mr. President, to be able to join with Senator INOURT and Senator KASTEN in an effort to see to it that the United States keeps its commitment to an ally, a moral promise that was made to the State of Israel during difficult times, to say the least, as Scud missiles came down upon her, as her freedom and the safety of her people, indeed, was placed in peril.

As the only true democracy and certain friend that the United States enjoys in the Middle East, Israel, at our request, withstood incredible provocations. It is our moral responsibility to support this loyal ally.

I have a difficult time understanding how it is that we approve \$5 billion in loan guarantees to Iraq between the years of 1985 and 1990, and now question \$10 billion in loan guarantees for a far different purpose, for a purpose of humanitarian aid to a country that has undertaken a policy which the United States for 20 years has pushed and fought for, and that is to make an opportunity for a home and for safety for those who have none and who were emigrating to the State of Israel.

The fact is, more than \$5 billion of the commercially borrowed money will be spent right here in the United States, creating or retaining up to 100,000 jobs in America.

So I intend to work with Senator INOURT and Senator KASTEN to achieve passage of the loan guarantee program because it is the right thing to do, both for the United States and Israel.

I yield the floor.

Mr. SEYMOUR. Mr. President, I am honored to rise this morning as an original cosponsor of this critical legislation to assist Israel with the greatest demographic challenges the country has ever faced.

Over the next 5 years, approximately 1 million Jews from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia will build new lives and tackle new obligations of citizenship in Israel. This mass movement of humans would proportionally represent the integration of the entire country of France by the United States. The Israelis will have to build approximately 360,000 new homes and 12,000 additional classrooms at a total cost of \$50 billion. Furthermore, the Israeli economy will have to provide another 360,000 jobs for these able-bodied or highly skilled immigrants.

For Israel, the task is clear and its scope is undeniable. The story of the Jewish people during much of our world's history has revolved around persevering minority communities enriching the life of societies everywhere from South America to Eastern Europe.

This story, as all of my colleagues know, has also been repeatedly stained by repression, slaughter, and genocide. In their suffering, however, the Jews

held onto their faith and sharpened their sense cultural identity.

With each passing tragedy, they looked more eagerly to the day when they could settle their own nation, insulated not from the world or fresh ideas, but from the brutality of their oppressors.

For Israel, perhaps more than any other country in the world, the ideas of land and nationhood are eternally linked. And so today, the influx of Soviet Jews presents her nationhood with both another test and another opportunity.

The charter of the United Nations and the foreign policy of this country jealously guard the sovereignty of people and their governments as the unmovable keystones of world order. Israel's sovereignty, Mr. President, uniquely depends on the fulfillment of the homeland dream for any Jewish citizen who wishes to reside in the Jewish state.

Out their theological tradition and precarious social experience, the Israelis forged this concept of sovereignty. To deny or dismiss it would amount to a denial or dismissal of the Jewish people's need for a single gathering place—or a country—with an open yet distinct culture.

In this light, the housing loan guarantees we consider this morning will help Israel to protect the most basic rights that the United States and the United Nations extend to all nations: Those of sovereignty and self-determination.

I must also add, Mr. President, that we do not place such a high value on sovereignty by mistake. Sovereignty and peace have a little-noted but close relationship, even in the turbulent world of the Middle East. As the confidence of the Israelis in their ability to secure the Jewish homeland rises, so will the prospects for a comprehensive regional peace agreement. And very few achievements would raise that confidence more than the successful absorption of 1 million new citizens over the next 5 years.

The housing loan guarantee issue, therefore, has both a philosophical and a practical angle for U.S. policy in the Middle East. I have just spoken at some length about the former. America has a direct moral investment in supporting Israel's efforts to extend the blessings of freedom and independence to people who struggled through the dark age of communism.

But at the end of this national transformation, Israel will stand as a more self-confident, if not populous, country with a practical stake in a peaceful region. She will have citizens who made great personal sacrifices to realize the simple goals of stable employment, healthy families, and safe neighborhoods.

These, Mr. President, are not the attributes of a warrior nation. Rather, they are the signs of a democratic people who will labor mightily to avoid the trauma of war. Nothing

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could better serve America's interest in a world more ready than ever to cast the tyrants and dictators aside.

Thank you, Mr. President, and yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the bill introduced by Senators INOURT and KASTEN to provide loan guarantees to our staunchest ally and best friend in the Middle East, the State of Israel. As I have often stated, my support is founded in my appreciation for the friendship that has served both the United States and Israel so well. But my support rests also in my conviction that such an action, which would be undertaken at little cost to the taxpayer, is humanitarian in nature. It is intended to help Israel integrate into its society the hundreds of thousands of Soviet and Ethiopian Jews whose emigration to Israel we have consistently advocated.

Mr. President, my support for this measure does not lessen my concern over the tension between the governments of the United States and Israel that was occasioned by differences on the loan guarantee issue. That controversy is in neither country's best interests.

Accordingly, I have counseled members of the administration, Israeli Government officials and Members of Congress on both sides of this issue to seek an honest compromise that will meet Israel's urgent humanitarian needs, as well as respect the President's foreign policy prerogatives.

I am satisfied that we are now on such a sensible course. The introduction of this bill will not deprive the President of the 120 days he asked for to continue facilitating peace negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. His leadership in this area has thus far been nothing short of outstanding. I commend the President for his efforts, and wish him continued success.

I am also pleased that there seems to be a growing recognition that the strong, enduring friendship of the United States and Israel be protected from further damage by a continuing dispute on this issue. Rhetoric on both sides has cooled recently, and I was heartened by President Bush' call for the repeal of the obnoxious "Zionism is a form of racism" resolution passed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1975.

I am hopeful that by delaying the consideration of this bill in deference to the President's wishes and in respect for his worthy stewardship of American foreign policy we will restore the full amity and respect that have long characterized United States-Israeli relations. I am confident that at the end of this delay, the United States commitment to a strong Israeli society will be as clear as ever. For that policy goal is most certainly in the best interests of the United States and Israel.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, this is an important measure that the Senators

from Hawaii and Wisconsin are submitting today. It provides a means for the United States to participate in one of the greatest humanitarian efforts of our time, the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Jews from Ethiopia and the Soviet Union.

I am a cosponsor of this amendment because it is right for this Nation to assist Israel in its effort. For a decade and a half this Nation has made free emigration for Soviet Jews a central tenet of all its negotiations with the Soviet Union. Now that we have finally been successful in that effort, it would be wrong to suggest that we have no responsibility for their resettlement.

The amendment presented today allows us to meet that obligation in a manner that serves the needs of both Israel and the United States. Loan guarantees will allow the United States to provide substantial assistance to Israel without using critical resources that are needed to deal with problems at home.

I also understand the President's concerns on this issue. Though I was disappointed to see the discussion over these guarantees moved from the conference room to the airwaves, I remain confident that we will be able to craft a guarantee package that will be acceptable to all involved. However, as we move toward a compromise and as we move toward a Mideast peace conference, it is essential to ensure that we avoid linking the two issues. The humanitarian effort to resettle the Ethiopian and Soviet refugees is an issue separate and apart from the search for progress toward peace in the region. Any attempt to link the two would simply doom both efforts to failure.

In closing Mr. President, I would just reiterate my hope that we can find an agreement on this issue that will allow us to go forward with the guarantees as soon as Congress reconvenes in January. The need is dire and our concern is increased daily as we read reports from the Soviet Union about efforts in some of the Republics to limit or even to stop Jewish emigration. Without the guarantees—and the other moneys from European countries that our funds will drive—Israel will not be able to provide housing and services and jobs, and the emigration will dry up. If that delay were to result in Jews being caught in the Soviet Union or in individual Republics following a breakup of the union, it would be a great tragedy.

I am certain we can avoid that result. I look forward to working with the sponsors of the amendment as they continue to seek a compromise that will allow this measure to go forward.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise as an original cosponsor of this legislation to extend \$10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel for Soviet refugee absorption.

Over the last two decades, the United States has led the world in appealing for the freedom of Soviet Jewry. A number of former refuseniks have stated it was U.S. actions which kept alive their hope of religious freedom and respect for human rights. Not only did the United States support Soviet Jewish emigration, but by limiting refugee entry into the United States, our policy actually encouraged them to emigrate to Israel.

One million Soviet Jews are expected to emigrate to Israel over the next 5 years, which will result in an increase of approximately 20 percent of Israel's population. As their dreams come to fruition, the United States is presented with a historic opportunity to help with their absorption and make good on our commitment to them. I strongly support the proposed refugee guarantees as a cost-effective, humanitarian, and urgent means of assisting with Soviet resettlement.

Developments in the Soviet Union, as encouraging as they are, portend a period of political and economic instability and cast a troublesome shadow on the future and safety of Jews in the region. Ethnic nationalism is on the rise in each of the Republics, and the onset of winter and potential famine could fuel ethnic tensions. Historically, the combination of these factors spell uncertainty for Jews in the former Soviet Union.

Soviet Jews have been arriving in Israel at the rate of about 20,000 a month. These refugees, seeking a new life outside of the Soviet Union, need jobs, housing, and the chance for an independent life. The loan guarantees will help provide those opportunities.

Mr. President, the loan guarantees for absorption that would be extended in this legislation will not cost the U.S. taxpayer any money. These are guarantees the United States is providing, not actual dollars. The \$10 billion dollars will be provided to Israel by banks.

I wish that the administration would convey that message to the American public. These are loan guarantees; there will be no cost to the American taxpayer. That wasn't the case with the forbearance on 7 billion dollars' worth of loans that Egypt owed this country. That was real money. The President worked hard to forgive that debt because he thought it was in the best interest of America's foreign policy. I supported him in that.

Now, helping Israel to absorb refugees is also in our best interest. That there are so many Soviet refugees seeking a new life in Israel is a direct result of our successful foreign policy.

We have window of opportunity now to help provide a safe haven for Soviet refugees seeking a new life in Israel. We have a moral obligation to help them. But the United States has suddenly done an about face on the refugee absorption loan guarantees. The President is walking away from an opportunity to help provide a haven for

those refugees from persecution, from harassment from a long history of second class citizenship.

Mr. President, I support approval of the guarantees promptly, in the most cost effective way possible. I think the President is wrong to link humanitarian loan guarantees with the peace process. He created an issue where none existed.

He is also wrong to link the guarantees with the settlements. We all have high hopes that representatives of Israel and the Arab nations will soon sit down and talk of peace, but there should be no preconditions on our friend and ally, Israel. The United States should not force Israel to concessions before those talks begin. It is wrong to demand that Israel give away the store before she gets to the table.

We can recall that Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat met without preconditions. Yet they achieved a peace that met the needs of their two nations. I was in Israel when Sadat arrived for those historic negotiations. It was one of the most dramatic and moving moments I have ever experienced.

But we've seen nothing dramatic from the Arabs. The Arab nations haven't made any concessions. And the United States has demanded nothing from them. They continue to cling to the hateful Arab League boycott of American companies that do business with or invest in Israel.

They haven't budged one inch on this, even after U.S. citizens put their lives on the line in a war against Saddam Hussein's aggression. They continue to boycott our companies, and the administration looks the other way. It doesn't pressure them to move on this point. Now that doesn't make sense.

Mr. President, it is wrong to hold Soviet Jewish refugees hostage to a peace process over which they have no control. These loan guarantees are separate from the peace process. They are humanitarian in nature.

The United States fought to secure the right to immigrate for these Soviet Jews. The United States encouraged these people to go Israel. And, when Israel sought loan guarantees last year, the administration gave every indication that, if delayed until September, the loan guarantees would be considered. We have a moral obligation to fulfill the pledge we made to those who have left the Soviet Union.

I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation as well.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, along with 89 of my Senate colleagues, I rise today to express my strong support for the Israeli Government's request for \$10 billion in loan guarantees. Although it now appears that the request will not be taken up by the Senate until January—due to the Administration's decision to link the guarantees to the Middle East peace initiative—it is important that we lay the foundation now for the guaran-

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tees' protest and favorable consideration at that time.

I am deeply concerned at the reports I am hearing that treatment of the loan guarantees in January may involve new linkage to the cessation of settlement construction in the West Bank, to Israeli economic reform, or to some as yet unnamed criterion. This last scenario is one I find most disturbing.

Loan guarantees for humanitarian purposes should not be held over Israel's head in order to further the administration's peace initiative. Any peace that is imposed from the outside will come at too great a cost and will not last. The Arab States have not made the loan guarantees an obstacle to peace. It is inappropriate for the administration to inject this issue into the peace process.

My preference would be to move on the question of loan guarantees now. Clearly, a majority of the Senate supports the guarantees. But given my colleagues' preference to give the administration its 120-day delay, we will simply have to wait.

I fervently hope that peace talks are well underway by the time we reconvene in January. But even if they are not, the loan guarantees must be taken up and they must be granted. I look forward to working with my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee to secure approval of the loan guarantees, without linkage, at the earliest possible time.

Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I am proud to be an original cosponsor of an amendment that would allow the United States to assign, or guarantee, \$10 billion in commercial bank loans to Israel over the next 5 years. I salute the primary sponsors, Senators EASTON and BROUKE for their strong leadership on this issue.

Many of my colleagues have correctly pointed out that we are not discussing a grant to Israel, or even a loan, but guarantees of loans that Israel will take out with commercial banks. These guarantees are not slated to cost the taxpayer a dime; the cost of the risk, which is 1 or 2 percent of the loan, will be paid by Israel. So the issue here is not cost.

The issue is that Israel stood by us in our time of need, now it is time for us to stand by Israel.

Let us not forget that a few short months ago the American people watched in horror as deadly Iraqi missiles rained down upon the cities of Israel. We cheered as our Patriot missiles intercepted the Iraqi Scuds, we watched as men, women, and children donned gas masks as we heard the sirens wail through our television sets.

During the war, the United States asked Israel to do what perhaps no nation has ever been asked, let alone expected to do—risk her national security at the request of a close ally. For the first time in her history, Israel agreed not to defend herself by attacking Iraqi missile sites.

Israel made the right decision, but let no one think that it was not an agonizing one for the Israeli leadership, a decision that could have cost the lives of Israeli citizens.

Now Israel is asking the United States for help in absorbing a 25-percent increase in her population, about 1 million Soviet and Ethiopian Jews over the next few years. Already in the past 3 years, Israel has taken in twice as many refugees as the United States, about 100 times as many on a per capita basis.

Israel's stood by us, now we should stand by them. It's that simple.

It is unfortunate that the issue of loan guarantees for Israel has become wrapped up in the peace process. I am strongly opposed to linking Arab demands, such as freezing Israeli settlements, to these loan guarantees, and I opposed delaying consideration for that reason.

Mr. President, I hope these absorption loan guarantees will be approved by the Congress as soon as possible. Again, I thank the sponsors for their good work and look forward to the day that Israel can live in freedom, security, and peace, and in continued close friendship with the United States.

I ask unanimous consent that a letter I wrote to Senator PATRICK LEAHY urging him not to delay consideration of the loan guarantees be inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

U.S. SENATE

Washington, DC, September 4, 1991.

Hon. PATRICK J. LEAHY,
Rm. 3000 Senate Office Building, Washington,
DC.

DEAR SENATOR LEAHY: I understand that you intend to delay consideration of the bill that would provide for loan guarantees to help Israel absorb about a million Soviet and Ethiopian Jews over the next five years.

If Congress delays the provision of loan guarantees for Israel, it would be perceived by the Arab world as a clear invitation to link U.S. humanitarian assistance to Israel to concessions in the peace process. I am strongly opposed to any linkage between humanitarian assistance for Israel and the peace process.

The U.S.-Israel relationship must not become a bargaining chip in the peace process. The alliance between the United States and Israel—the only democracy in the Middle East—must not be held hostage to Arab states' demands against Israel.

Throughout the Gulf war, the United States steadfastly opposed any linkage between the U.S.-Israel relationship and the peace process. Now is not the time to give in to the demands of Arab states which seem more interested in wringing concessions from Israel and the United States than in real peace.

The modern exodus of a million Soviet and Ethiopian Jews is a historic victory for freedom, human rights and the long hard work of many Americans. The exodus is far from complete, and its success should not be taken for granted.

It is America's national interest not to jeopardize the flow of Soviet emigrants to Israel, and to help ensure that the only de-

mocracy in the Middle East successfully completes their absorption.

We should not allow Arab states to deter us from pursuing our own national interest, or to use the United States to extract concessions from Israel. I strongly urge you to facilitate the Congressional consideration of these urgent humanitarian loan guarantees for Israel without delay.

Sincerely,

CONRAD MACK,
U.S. Senator.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise in support of providing Israel with loan guarantees for the absorption of an estimated 1 million Soviet and Ethiopian emigrants. In July, I strongly endorsed the concept of loan guarantees as a purely humanitarian gesture designed to help Israel cope with the massive influx of refugees. This emigration continues apace today. Every month between 10,000 and 15,000 Soviet emigrants arrive in Israel. The United States cannot avert its eyes to the plight of Soviet Jewry, and in my opinion, we have a moral obligation to assist the Israeli Government finance this overwhelming and unprecedented humanitarian effort.

Mr. President, I believe that the administration should be strongly commended for its consummate diplomatic skill in crafting a regional peace conference to be convened later this month. This has been a long and difficult venture. The President has shown a great deal of initiative, leadership, and ingenuity in bringing disparate groups to the negotiating table. Yet the President recently requested that Congress delay loan guarantees for Israel to help keep this peace process on track. In contrast to the administration, I do not believe that these issues should be linked, and I support loan guarantees for three important reasons.

First, Members of this Chamber fought vigorously on behalf of Soviet Jewry, and we should not rest on our laurels. The presently high levels of Jewish emigration we are experiencing should not be taken for granted. Soviet Jews have been persecuted for many years, and receiving exit visas for this group has traditionally been painstaking and difficult process. The situation in the Soviet Union and the various Republics is in a state of flux, and it is imperative that Soviet Jews leave when the door is open. It seems all too plausible that the ethnic strife, nationalism, and political events in the U.S.S.R. could create a internal situation in which this group is again persecuted, or not allowed to leave certain regions of the country for various reasons. We should act while we have this unique opportunity. The extension of loan guarantees will certainly help in this important endeavor.

Second, although I realize that the administration would like Congress to delay consideration of loan guarantees for 120 days, this interim period may actually be more harmful than the White House realizes. For example,

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construction does not immediately follow contracting or the obligation of money. There is always a lag effect, sometimes as long as a year. In Israel, the delay is often around 2 years. For those awaiting housing, this could result in serious consequences.

Finally, I believe that the granting the loan guarantees is the proper and moral course of action. I remain firmly committed to the safety and welfare of Israel, and support the immediate granting of the guarantee.

Mr. SANFORD. Mr. President, I am in favor of the United States assisting the State of Israel in resettling Soviet and Ethiopian Jews by guaranteeing the repayment of sums it borrows for this purpose. This is neither a loan nor a grant; it simply permits Israel to borrow at more favorable rates. We have, it seems to me, a moral obligation to assist in this manner.

The necessity of building new housing and creating new jobs is a result of the acceptance of refugees from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. It has for years been a major policy of this country to press the Soviet Union to permit Jews to emigrate. This resettlement serves our national policy, and illustrates dramatically a historic purpose of the State of Israel, a place where persecuted Jews may come as a matter of right to a homeland.

The President of the United States has expressed a desire to delay consideration of this guarantee until January. This delay has been resisted by a number of people in the Senate and elsewhere. However, in spite of the resistance, it is our President who holds the initiative for the peace talks in the Middle East. For this reason, he is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. We rely on him for the effort to bring to an end the long strife in this region. So, I must support our President's call for additional time.

This does not mean that I will favor linking the West Bank issues with the loan guarantee. I will not.

From the beginning, we have helped keep Israel strong in a hostile neighborhood. Our policy should be to help Israel remain strong, should be to use our good offices to facilitate peace discussions, and we should be willing to let the nations debate and determine between themselves their longstanding differences.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute remaining. The Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. EASTEN. Mr. President, we have had a truly remarkable morning here in the Senate—a discussion that demonstrates the truly bipartisan support for our Israeli allies. We must work together—Democrats and Republicans, Congress, and the President—to work out how this support will be translated into policy.

We go forward in a spirit of compromise and bridge building, because we are fully conscious of the great principles that unite us: Loyalty to allies.

Support for friends. Stability and bipartisanship in foreign policy.

This is what we stand for. As far as the issue at hand is concerned, no cost to taxpayers is involved. These loan guarantees are a consensus policy, and I am glad that we were able to give such strong collective voice to that policy today.

Finally, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article I wrote for the September 19, 1991, Roll Call be printed at this point in the Record. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FROM ROLL CALL, SEPT. 19, 1991
LOAN GUARANTEE FOR ISRAEL: A SMOKE
"YES" FOR A LOYAL ALLY
(By Senator Bob Easten)

For two decades, it has been a key goal of American foreign policy to liberate Soviet Jews from Communist oppression.

The bipartisan policy calling for free immigration of Soviet Jews was begun by the late Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash) with his historic Jackson-Vanik amendment, and has remained a foreign policy cornerstone for every Administration since Nixon's.

At long last—with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Communist tyranny—our 20-year effort has succeeded. Since 1989, nearly 150,000 Soviet Jews have immigrated to Israel—and it is estimated that the total will reach one million by the end of 1996. "Next year in Jerusalem" is no longer merely a noble wish. It is a reality—the result of our long-standing policies.

Now that we have succeeded in achieving our bipartisan goal, it would be unconscionable for us to flinch from our responsibility for the consequences.

The scope of this current immigration is unlike anything Israel has ever seen since World War II and the creation of the state in 1948.

It represents an increase of almost 28 percent over the current population.

For the last two decades of the Cold War, Israel held out as the bastion of Democracy and pro-Americanism in an extremely dangerous part of the world. Surrounded by Soviet allies—back when Communism was on the offensive—the State of Israel held the line for our side.

Earlier this year, from Texas to Wisconsin, from Maine to Oregon, we all watched on TV as the Scud missiles slammed into Israel. We also saw that the Israelis did not retaliate for these terrorist acts—because America asked them not to.

Israel kept faith with America. Will we have the moral sense—the loyalty—to do the same?

I am confident that we will—because the American people and their representatives in Congress don't believe in turning their backs on an ally.

Israel needs our help in resettling this massive influx of refugees, the influx that represents the success of American foreign policy.

Along with Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), I have introduced legislation in the Senate that would extend to Israel the helping hand it so urgently requires.

Our bill provides loan guarantees to Israel to help defray the extraordinary costs of resettling and absorbing Soviet and Ethiopian refugees.

The loan guarantees would amount to \$2 billion for fiscal year 1992, and \$3 billion for each of the four succeeding fiscal years.

These loan guarantees have been requested by the Israeli government, and they rep-

resent what the Israelis believe will be an adequate amount to deal with the housing crisis.

That's what the loan guarantees are—a response to urgent human needs, requested by a reliable and heroic friend. It's important, however, that we also understand what the loan guarantees are not.

The loan guarantees are not U.S. grants. Under our loan guarantee bill, the U.S. taxpayer will not be sending any funds to subsidize Israeli housing.

The loan guarantees are not U.S. loans. The Treasury will not be lending money to resettle the refugees.

It will merely guarantee that when private sector lenders lend money for that purpose, the U.S. government will stand surety for the loan. (There's very little risk in that: Israel has never defaulted on U.S. loan guarantees.)

The only U.S. budget funds involved in the loan guarantee process are the origination fee, which we estimate will amount to \$100 million. Under our bill, Israel will pay for this origination fee, making U.S. taxpayer funding completely unnecessary.

Our bill won't cost the Treasury anything. It will meet a major emergency being faced by one of America's best friends. And it is the honorable thing to do. That's why I will be pressing for the enactment of the Easten-Inouye loan guarantee legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, has morning business expired?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time set aside for morning business has expired.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent there be an additional 10 minutes in morning business, and that Senators may speak therein.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the current political environment is filled with transformation and opportunity. Old structures are in advanced stages of decay and collapse throughout Eastern Europe and what is left of the Soviet monolith. Change is also underway in the Middle East, stimulated by the bold, naked grab for Kuwait and the stinging rebuff administered by the coalition led by the United States. These are historic times, times when new forms, new ideas, rearrangements are possible, a springtime thaw is in the atmosphere.

What kind of new order, forms, concepts, structures, alliances, rules, and arrangements will emerge over the next few years will not be the work of some mystical historic force. History may characterize the forces of history. But, at bottom, what makes a difference is the broad vision and work of individual men, whose human nature has never changed. Now is the time for taking the broad perspective, the long look. Now is the time for putting aside the narrow motives of political campaigns, of posturing for advantage on the margin.

I have commended President Bush in the past for seeking to tackle the in-

12/18

12/16

tractable problems of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The emotions and suspicions run through a deep canyon in the Middle East, and the bridging work is horrendously difficult. This is certainly a time for us to give the President our undivided support in his efforts to construct that bridge. The timing is good, and is more suitable now than it has been for many years. So I congratulate the President for his efforts to bring all the parties to the peace table—all the parties to the peace table—to act as a good-faith broker, for helping establish a fair negotiation, without leading the dice to any party's advantage. Therefore I have supported his effort to delay for a very short time consideration of any major new program of largess for Israel. I have also opposed new arms sales to Arab states for the time being. I think the President is taking the broad view, and I am sure that he needs all the mandate and support from us that he can get. The various parties to the differences in the Middle East watch political events in the United States with a fixation. They look for signs that the United States is playing a role of statesman. Only great statesmanship will help transform the Middle East.

That is the right course. Let us support this President in his efforts to maximize on the military victory that was achieved in the Middle East. Let us give this President the tools which he needs to seek lasting peace in the Mideast. That is what is in the best long-term interest of our friends in the region. Now is not the time to prejudice the outcome of the negotiations. Let us be wise and wait to see what progress can be made and then decide what course is in the best interests of our own Nation and of our friends in the region.

This Senator has not joined in this legislation because I believe it is not possible to know the best course at this time. I want to wait to see if progress is made at the peace table. I want to wait to see if progress is made on the settlements issue. I want to wait to see if the American people are satisfied that these loan guarantees should be granted outright or if there should be certain conditions attached, or if they should be granted at all. There are pressing needs here at home and the American people have a right to have their views considered. They are paying the tab.

They have been paying the tab. And make no mistake about it there will be a tab to pay. I regret that so many in this body appear to have prejudged this issue. That is their right to do, of course. It is my hope that Senators will carefully debate this proposal, with the fundamental interests of this country, the United States, in mind when the time comes to consider it.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER.—The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. DOMENICI Mr. President, how much time remains in the 10 minutes?

The PRESIDING OFFICER.—There remains 3 minutes and 50 seconds.

Mr. DOMENICI I wonder if I might, before I start, ask for an additional 2 minutes under the same conditions?

The PRESIDING OFFICER.—Without objection, it is so ordered.

CLARENCE THOMAS

Mr. DOMENICI Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I rise today in support of the nomination of Clarence Thomas to serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

I have found Clarence Thomas to be a man of strong intellect, integrity, leadership, and achievement. By his qualifications, experience, and character, he has proven that he is a worthy candidate to become a Supreme Court Justice.

I would like to call to the attention of my fellow Senators a response Judge Thomas gave to a question asked by one of our Members, a member of the Judiciary Committee, at hearings on September 13, 1991. Judge Thomas was asked: "I see these two Clarence Thomases: One who has written some extremely insensitive things . . . and then I hear a Clarence Thomas with a heart. . . . Which is the real Clarence Thomas?"

Judge Thomas responded and said the following: "Senator, that is all a part of me. I used to ask myself how could my grandfather care about us when he was such a hard man sometimes." "But, you know," said the Judge, "in the final analysis, I found that he is the one who cared the most because he told the truth, and he tried to help us help ourselves."

Actually, I find that statement, obviously made extemporaneously about a very, very serious subject and a subject of this man's life that deserves a question. I found that answer to be one of the most significant and philosophical statements that he made in the entire process of being questioned.

Let me repeat. He was asked: "Which is the real Clarence Thomas? You have written some extremely insensitive things, and then I hear the Clarence Thomas with a heart." And he said: "Senator, that is all part of me," paraphrasing, as I would put it, "I am some of both. I used to ask myself, how could my grandfather care about us when he was such a hard man sometimes. But, you know, in the final analysis, I found that he is the one who cared the most because he told the truth, and he tried to help us help ourselves."

Frankly, I believe this distinguished

gentleman, whom I happen to know personally and interviewed for a considerable period of time prior to the hearings in Judiciary, could almost seek to be a Supreme Court judge with that philosophy and an intellect and qualification based upon knowing the law. I think that is absolutely, without question, one of the most profound statements made during that hearing and one which gives me great confidence about his future because I believe he is some of both. I believe he will tell the truth, and that is what he said his grandfather did, "and he tried to help us help ourselves."

So, Mr. President, a Supreme Court Justice must be a person of integrity. He or she must be honest, ethical, and fair. A Supreme Court Justice must be a person with strength of character. He or she must possess great courage to render decisions in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and they must never fear if, in fact, they have concluded that such is the law. A Supreme Court Justice must be a person with compassion. He or she must respect both the rights of the individual and the rights of society and must be dedicated to provide equal justice under the law.

Obviously, he is going to be a man of compassion. He just got through answering that part as he discussed the two aspects of living or leading, of growing up, as I just shared them with the Senate.

A Supreme Court Justice should be a person with proper judicial temperament. He or she must understand and appreciate the genius of our federal system; and of the delicate checks and balances between the branches of the National Government.


Mr. President, in the opinion of this Senator, Clarence Thomas possesses these qualities and more. His background and upbringing will bring a unique perspective to this Court. When I began looking into his background to find out more about who he was, I ran across a speech that he gave in 1983 at Savannah State College. I believe it was reported on the editorial page of the New York Times. It was entitled "Climb the Jagged Mountain." It was by this distinguished gentleman.

He was speaking to a group of graduating seniors in preparing them for what they would face. He related the story of his early life as an example of being able to endure adversity to achieve excellence. This story reveals one of the most important aspects of his character and it is moving for all those who read it. At this point, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of that speech, as covered in the New York Times on July 17, 1991, be printed in the Record. I am not sure it is the

1014

5

18/18



מס' 5

1/2

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון
סופס מברק

1015
58 - 6

בלמ"ס/בהול לבוקר
תאריך: 3 אוקטובר 1991
אל: מצפ"א
דע: תפוצת תקשורת
מאה: עתונות וושינגטון

חנדון: הודעת מחמ"ד - ערביות
שלנו: נר 31 מ- 2/10

מצ"ב הודעת מחמ"ד בנושא בקשת הערביות.

עתונות

Handwritten notes in Hebrew, including the words "מס' 5" and "1/2" written again.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman

2/2

1015/58

For immediate release

October 2, 1991

STATEMENT BY MARGARET TUWILER/SPOKESMAN

ABSORPTION ASSISTANCE

WE ARE PLEASED THAT CONGRESS HAS AGREED TO DELAY CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF ABSORPTION LOAN GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL. THIS STEP IS A WELCOME AFFIRMATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT THAT A PAUSE IN CONSIDERING ABSORPTION ASSISTANCE IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE THAT LIES BEFORE US.

THE ADMINISTRATION REAFFIRMS ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF ABSORPTION AID TO ISRAEL AND WILL SUPPORT LOAN GUARANTEES FOR THAT PURPOSE, PROVIDED TERMS AND CONDITIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ADMINISTRATION ARE WORKED OUT WHEN CONGRESS TAKES THE MATTER UP NEXT YEAR. IMMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG ENCOURAGED THE SOVIET UNION TO PERMIT FREE EMIGRATION AND HAS SUPPORTED ISRAEL'S EFFORTS TO ABSORB THOSE IMMIGRANTS WHO HAVE LEFT THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE ADMINISTRATION AGREES THAT SCORING BY OMB FOR LOAN GUARANTEES WILL BE AT THE MOST REASONABLE RATE POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BEGIN NOW AN EFFORT TO SOLICIT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF ABSORPTION AID. IF THERE IS COST TO ISRAEL ASSOCIATED WITH DEFERRAL, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL AGREE THAT SUCH COST BE OFFSET IN THE ULTIMATE PACKAGE.

אאא, חוזם: 4755
אל: רהמש/212
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 58, חא: 031091, זח: 2100, דח: מ, סג: בל,
ככב
בלמ"ס / מידי
אל: מצפ"א

מאת: השגרירות / וושינגטון

עוזר המזכיר ל- NEA

=====

1. ג'ון קלי סיים את תפקידו בסוף השבוע החולף.
2. מחליפו, אד דג'ריג'יאן, נכנס רשמית לתפקיד היום (3.10).

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, ר/מרכז,
ממד, @ (רם), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 3047
אל: רהמש/131
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 32, תא: 021091, זח: 2104, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
בלמ"ס / מידי
אל: מצפ"א

דע: ממ' רה"מ ושה"ח (נ.י.), מנכ"ל האוצר,
יועץ רה"מ לכלכלה, ציר כלכלי.

מאת: ר' יחידת קונגרס.

דון: המערכה על הערבויות להלוואות

1. הבוקר הגישו הסנטורים קסטן ואינווייה באופן רשמי במליאת הסנאט את הצעת התחיקה (כפי שהונחה על שולחן הסנאט ב-10.9.91).

2. בדיון בן השעה וחצי השתתפו 12 נציגי שתי המפלגות (קסטן, דול, דורנברגר, גראסלי, פאקווד, ד'אמאטו וספקטר הרפובליקנים ואינווייה, קנדי, גראהם, סימון ומקלסקי הדמוקרטים).

3. המסר (להוציא את דול אשר כירך את השניים על יוזמתם אך הבהיר כי צפוי עדין DEBATE בנושא) היה: תמיכה בדחייה ל-120 יום (למרות הסתייגות מסוימת מן הדחייה אך תוך היענות לבקשת הנשיא) והתנגדות לרעיון הזיקה (למרות הסתייגות / התנגדות למדיניות ההתנחלויות). הדוברים אף הדגישו את המחויבות המוסרית, את הצורך לסייע למדינה אשר הוכיחה עצמה כבעלת ברית אמינה, את העדר הנטל על משלם המיסים האמריקאי, וכו'.

4. הדוברים ציינו את תמיכת 70 השושבינים ואת המחויבות הבינמפלגתית לאשר התחיקה.

5. בסיום הדיון ביקש יו"ר וע' ההקצבות וממלא מקום נשיא הסנאט, רוברט בירד (המגלה עקביות בהתנגדות ל"תחיקות ישראליות") את רשות הדיבור. הוא הביע תמיכה בנשיא, טען שלערבויות יהיה מחיר שישפיע על משלם המיסים, ביקש להמתין בנקיטת עמדה עד שיובהר לאן פני המו"מ לשלום, וציין כי הוא תומך בהתניות שתוצמדנה לתחיקה.

יורם אטינגר

אאא, חוזם: 3049
אל: דהמש/130
מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 31, תא: 021091, זח: 2112, דח: ב, סג: בל,
בכבב
בלמס/ בהול לבוקר
אל: מצפ"א

דע: תפוצת תקשורת, פמליית השר - ניו יורק
מאת: עתונות, רושינגטון

דעת מחמ"ד - ערבויות.

1. הערב (19:00) פרסמה דוברת מחמ"ד הודעה המברכת על החלטת הקונגרס להענות לבקשת הנשיא, ולדחות הדיון בבקשת הערבויות לתחילת המושב הבא.
2. אין בידינו עדיין (הערב) הטקסט המלא של ההודעה. נבריקו מחר בבוקר.
3. עד אז, להלן עיקרי ההודעה כפי שקבלנו מעתונאים:
 - א. מרוצים מהחלטת הקונגרס ורואים בה אישור לבקשת הנשיא לדחות הדיון.
 - ב. המימשל מחוייב לנושא יהודי ברה"מ, סייע רבות להגירתם, ומחוייב לסייע בקליטתם.
 - ג. המימשל יתמוך בבקשת הערבויות

PROVIDED TERMS AND CONDITIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ADMINISTRATION ARE WORKED OUT WHEN CONGRESS TAKES THE MATTER NEXT YEAR .

ד. המימשל יתמוך בהצעת

... SCORING AT THE MOST REASONABLE RATE AND AS REQUIRE BY LAW.

ה. המימשל יפנה לגורמים בינ"ל ויסייע באיתור מקורות מימון נוספים לקליטת העלייה.

ו. אם תהיינה עלויות לישראל כתוצאה מהדחייה -
SUCH COST WILL BE OFFSET IN THE ULTIMATE PACKAGE.

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעח, הסברה

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 4756
אל: רהמש/206
מ-: וושינגטון, גר: 57, תא: 031091, זח: 2043, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
9,244448
9,753100
שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א
דע: תפוצת תקשורת
הצת: עתונות ווש'

תהליך

מכתבים מדיניים אמריקניים:

- המזכיר מתכוון להגיע למזה"ת (ישראל תחנה ראשונה) בין ה- 10 ל- 15 באוקטובר לסבב שיחות נוסף.

- בכוונת הממשל, מיד לאחר בקור המזכיר, להוציא הזמנות לוועידה (לקראת 17-18 באוקטובר) מתוך כוונה לקיים הוועידה ממש בימים האחרונים של חודש אוקטובר.

- ממספר כתבים שמעתי כי מפקידי ממשל נאמר להם שבכוונת הממשל לקיים הוועידה ב- 29-30 באוקטובר, בלונדון שבשוויץ.
מו כן, שמזכיר המדינה בייקר מסר על כך (כולל המועד והמקום) לשה"ח האירופים עמם נפגש בניו-יורק במהלך העצרת.

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, @ (מצב), ר/מרכז,
ממד, @ (רם), אמן, רכיב, מעת, הסברה, @ (לעמ),
מקצב2, @ (דוצ), דוצ-ים, צנזורצבאי, אומן,
סייבל, משפט, @ (וחו'ב), הדרכה, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 314
אל: רהמש/21
מ-: המשרד, תא: 011091, זח: 1228, דח: ר, סג: בל,
בכב
118427

בלמ'ס/רגיל

אל: וושינגטון
שטיין

דע: מקש'ח משרד הבטחון

הנדון: יוזמת בוש

פנו משגארה'ב לבקש תגובתנו. לאחר התייעצות עם משהב'ט מסרנו תגובה ראשונית ולא פורמלית כדלקמן:

זהו צעד הסטורי בכוון הנכון. כל צמצום של מתיחות בין המעצמות הופך את העולם למקום בטוח יותר, ואנחנו מברכים עליו.

לידיעתכם.

פר'ן
1 באוקטובר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, @ (שהבט), בנצור, מצפא,
פרג, @ (מקשח/משהבט)

סטסט

אאא, חוזם: 2931
אל: רהמש/113
מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 24, חא: 021091, זח: 1618, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בכב
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו יורק - פמלית שה"ח

מאת: עתונות רושינגטון

הנדון: דברי מזכיר ההגנה, צ'ייני, על יוזמת מרוץ החימוש של הנשיא בוש

REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DICK CHENEY TO THE NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER MEETING THE STATE DEPARTMENT TUESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1991

SEC. CHENEY: THANK YOU. (APPLAUSE.) THANK YOU.

YOU KNOW, THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT LAST FRIDAY OF THE NUCLEAR INITIATIVES THAT HAVE NOW CAPTURED THE IMAGINATION, I THINK, OF THE ENTIRE WORLD, CLEARLY WAS A MOMENT OF SOME HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE. I CANNOT OVERSTATE, I DON'T THINK, THE DEGREE TO WHICH THAT REPRESENTS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE WAY THE UNITED STATES HAS THOUGHT ABOUT NATIONAL SECURITY NOW FOR MORE THAN 40 YEARS.

IF YOU LOOK AT THAT PACKAGE OF INITIATIVES THAT THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED, THAT HE OFFERED, SOME OF WHICH WE WILL TAKE UNILATERALLY, SOME OF WHICH WILL REQUIRE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, IT TRULY IS MIND-BOGGLING IF YOU THINK BACK TO HOW WE'VE SPENT THE LAST 40-SOME YEARS IN THIS COUNTRY. FOR EXAMPLE, ON SATURDAY MORNING, I SIGNED THE EXECUTE ORDER ORDERING THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1957, THE UNITED STATES WILL NO LONGER HAVE NUCLEAR-EQUIPPED BOMBERS PARKED ON THE RUNWAY, FULLY FUELED AND LOADED, READY TO GO AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE.

THAT SAME ORDER DIRECTED THAT WE STAND DOWN FROM ALERT STATUS 450 INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, THE OLD MINUTEMAN II FORCE, LARGE SINGLE WARHEAD, THE SO-CALLED "CITY BUSTERS," NOT VERY ACCURATE, ONE OF OUR OLDER SYSTEMS, BUT A SYSTEM THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO GIVE UP WITHIN THE START NEGOTIATIONS, AND OF COURSE, PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS THAT WE ACCELERATE THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF START -- 45 PERCENT OF OUR ICBM FORCE TAKEN OFF ALERT STATUS BY

THAT ACTION ON SATURDAY.

NOW THE FACT IS WE CAN DO THAT SAFELY AND PROCEED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES BECAUSE, OF COURSE, WE'VE GOT A LOT OF OTHER CAPABILITIES THAT WILL GUARANTEE WE CAN MAINTAIN THE DETERRENT. BUT MOST OF ALL WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY NOW, BECAUSE OF WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED IN THE WORLD, BECAUSE OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE WARSAW PACT, BECAUSE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET FORCES FROM EASTERN EUROPE, BECAUSE OF THE FAILED COUP IN THE SOVIET UNION, TO TAKE SOME BOLD STEPS THAT HOPEFULLY WILL BE RECIPROCATED BY THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT -- GOVERNMENTS, IF YOU WILL, IN WHAT USED TO BE THE SOVIET UNION. THE RESULT OF THOSE EFFORTS, TAKING DOWN, FOR EXAMPLE, AND DESTROYING OUR BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, ARTILLERY AND SHORT-RANGE LAUNCHERS; TAKING OUR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OFF OUR SHIPS AT SEA AND BRINGING THEM HOME, PUTTING THEM IN STORAGE -- THE CULMINATION OF THAT WILL BE IF EVERYTHING WORKS AS PLANNED, WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD. THAT'S A SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT.

IT'S ALSO IMPORTANT THOUGH, I THINK, NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE THE TIMING OF THE EXERCISE. THIS OBVIOUSLY IS AN INITIATIVE THAT WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TWO MONTHS AGO OR TWO YEARS AGO. IT'S ALSO AN INITIATIVE THAT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TWO YEARS IN THE FUTURE. BUT RIGHT NOW, WE HAVE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY, IF YOU WILL, IN THE SOVIET UNION WHEN WE HAVE THE FIRST EVER ELECTED LEADER OF RUSSIA IN BORIS YELTSIN, WHO OWES HIS CURRENT POSITION TO DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES AND THE FIRST ELECTION IN THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC TO MR. GORBACHEV, WHO HAS WALKED AWAY FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND INDICATED HE'S PREPARED NOW TO ACTIVELY ENGAGE IN SERIOUSLY PURSUING REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION.

OUR HOPE IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE WISE ENOUGH TO REALIZE THAT WHAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED, WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS PUT ON THE TABLE, IS IN THEIR FUNDAMENTAL LONG-TERM INTEREST; THAT THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE MOST THREATENED BY THE EXISTENCE OF THOUSANDS OF BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE SOVIET UNION ISN'T THE UNITED STATES, IT'S THE PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION; THAT MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER THOSE SYSTEMS AND GETTING RID OF THOSE OLD, OUTDATED SYSTEMS THAT NO LONGER HAVE ANY MILITARY UTILITY, GIVEN THE STAND-DOWN IN EUROPE, IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE, MORESO THAN ANYBODY ELSE, AND THAT THEY'LL RECOGNIZE THE WISDOM OF AGREEING TO RECIPROCATATE IN THE PRESIDENT'S GENEROUS OFFER OF LAST FRIDAY.

I THINK IT'S ALSO IMPORTANT FOR US TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET IS IN DEEP TROUBLE ECONOMICALLY, THAT THEY ARE FACED WITH A VERY HARSH SET OF REALITIES AS THEY LOOK AT THE WINTER AHEAD OF THEM AND THE YEARS AHEAD OF THEM. WITH THE BEST OF POLICIES AND THE MOST SUCCESSFUL POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION, THERE'S STILL GOING TO BE CONTINUED COLLAPSE IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY FOR A GOOD LONG TIME TO COME. IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO LIFT THE BURDEN OF THAT NUCLEAR STOCKPILE AND THOSE ARMAMENTS FROM THEMSELVES, SO THAT THEY'RE ABLE

TO BEGIN THE PROCESS, NOT OF BUILDING WEAPONS, BUT OF BUILDING DEMOCRACY AND BUILDING A FREE-MARKET ECONOMY.

AND WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DONE, WITH ONE BOLD AND DECISIVE STROKE I THINK, IS TO FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE THE NUCLEAR EQUATION OF THE WORLD. THE WORLD IS SAFER TODAY BECAUSE OF WHAT HE DID LAST FRIDAY. AND THE FUTURE, I THINK FOR EVERYONE, AMERICAN AND SOVIETS ALIKE, IS FAR BRIGHTER TODAY IF THE SOVIETS WILL SIMPLY HAVE THE WISDOM TO RECOGNIZE WHAT IT IS HE'S OFFERED THEM AND THE UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY THEY NOW HAVE TO DO WHAT IT IS THEIR LEADERS SAY THEY WANT TO DO, WHICH IS TO SERIOUSLY PURSUE DEMOCRACY, SERIOUSLY PURSUE FUNDAMENTAL REFORM IN THEIR ECONOMY.

GIVEN THAT SET OF INITIATIVES, ONE OF THE TRADITIONAL REACTIONS HERE IN WASHINGTON -- I SUPPOSE IT'S A PREDICTABLE KIND OF REACTION -- IS THAT SOME OF MY FORMER COLLEAGUES AND FRIENDS UP ON CAPITOL HILL HAVE RESPONDED WITH THEIR TYPICAL CRY EVERY TIME SOMETHING DOES HAPPEN IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: CUT THE DEFENSE BUDGET. TRADITIONAL RESPONSE NOW, OBVIOUSLY THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO FIND A WAY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE, THEREFORE, THE SOLUTION TO ALL OF OUR PROBLEMS IS TO DRAMATICALLY CUT DEFENSE SPENDING. AND I WANT TO SPEND JUST A MOMENT TALKING ABOUT THAT THIS AFTERNOON, BECAUSE THE MESSAGE OFTEN-TIMES HASN'T GOTTEN OUT ENOUGH TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY FUNDAMENTALLY TRANSFORMED OUR MILITARY STRATEGY AND OUR BASIC THINKING ABOUT OUR DEFENSE POSTURE, AND THE ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE OF BEING CAUTIOUS, THOUGH, IN TERMS OF HOW WE PROCEED BEFORE WE SIGNIFICANTLY DISMANTLE OUR OWN MILITARY CAPABILITY.

THE PROPOSAL THAT THE PRESIDENT NOW HAS BEFORE THE CONGRESS IS BASED UPON A COMPLETE RETHINKING OF OUR MILITARY STRATEGY AND OUR REQUIREMENTS. WE'VE GONE FROM THE OLD POSTURE, WHICH SAID WE HAD TO HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES TO COUNTER A SOVIET-LED WARSAW PACT ATTACK INTO WESTERN EUROPE, INVOLVING OVER 100 DIVISIONS THAT STARTED FROM THE INTER-GERMAN BORDER, TO ONE IN WHICH WE FEEL WE NO LONGER HAVE TO DEAL WITH THAT KIND OF CONTINGENCY WITHOUT HAVING A LOT OF WARNING TIME SO THAT WE COULD RECONSTITUTE FORCES TO DEAL WITH IT. AND NOW WE FOCUS UPON THE KIND OF REGIONAL CONFLICT, REGIONAL CONTINGENCY WE'VE JUST BEEN THROUGH IN THE GULF.

THAT MEANS A DRAMATIC CHANGE -- JUST THAT ONE ASSUMPTION -- A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE SIZE OF FORCES WE DEPLOY AND HOW MUCH MONEY WE HAVE TO SPEND FOR THEM AND HOW MUCH FORCE WE HAVE OVERSEAS AND HOW RAPIDLY WE HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE. THAT CHANGE OF ASSUMPTIONS IS A CHANGE IN THE PLANNING THAT HAD DICTATED OUR MILITARY POSTURE NOW FOR NEARLY 40 YEARS. AS A RESULT OF THAT, WE ARE EMBARKED UPON A COURSE OF ACTION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF DRAMATIC REDUCTIONS IN US MILITARY SPENDING AND US MILITARY CAPABILITY.

THE GOOD NEWS IS WE CAN DO THAT SAFELY GIVEN THE CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE WORLD. THE BAD NEWS IS THAT EVERY SINGLE TIME WE'VE DONE IT IN THE PAST WE'VE SCREWED IT UP. WE HAVE NEVER ONCE BEEN THROUGH ONE OF THESE PERIODS OF TIME WHEN WE'VE SIGNIFICANTLY DOWNSIZED US MILITARY CAPABILITY WITHOUT FINDING OURSELVES ,FIVE OR TEN YEARS LATER, HAVING TO GO BACK AND RECREATE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCE TO DEFEND AMERICAN INTEREST.

WE ARE EMBARKED UPON A COURSE IF THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM IS APPROVED, IF CONGRESS DOES NOT RADICALLY CUT US BELOW WHAT HE HAS RECOMMENDED, WE ARE EMBARKED UPON A COURSE THAT WILL TAKE US DOWN TO SPENDING A SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET, AND A SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF OUR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ON DEFENSE THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE BEFORE WORLD WAR II. WE'LL ONLY BE SPENDING 18 PERCENT OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET ON DEFENSE BY 1995 AND 1996.

WE'RE DEACTIVATING A THIRD OF THE ACTIVE DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, TAKING 100 SHIPS OUT OF THE NAVY, TEN WINGS OUT OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE. WE'RE GETTING RID OF 521,000 ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD OF TIME.

SINCE I'VE BEEN SECRETARY, I'VE ELIMINATED 70,000 CIVILIAN JOBS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TERMINATED 81 SEPARATE WEAPONS PROGRAMS, AND EMBARKED UPON A PROGRAM TO CLOSE OVER 300 MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES WORLDWIDE.

THAT'S THE PROGRAM THAT'S ALREADY IN THE WORKS. THAT'S WHAT WE ARE ALREADY DOING TO TAKE DOWN US MILITARY CAPABILITY IN RECOGNITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE WORLD IN THE LAST TWO AND HALF TO THREE YEARS.

NOW, MY FRIENDS IN CONGRESS COME ALONG AND SAY, "NOT ENOUGH. YOU'VE GOT TO CUT MORE, YOU'VE GOT TO CUT FASTER." AND OF COURSE THE RESULT WILL BE IF WE START DOWN THAT ROAD, IF WE DO, IN FACT, CUT MORE AND CUT FASTER, TAKE THE FORCE DOWN FASTER IS THAT WE WILL DESTROY OUR ABILITY TO DO WHAT WE JUST DID IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

WHAT A LOT OF MY FRIENDS ON CAPITOL HILL DON'T TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IS THE AMOUNT OF TIME THAT IS INVOLVED IN BUILDING REALLY FIRST CLASS MILITARY CAPABILITY. THEY THINK YOU CAN WRITE A CHECK TODAY AND TOMORROW YOU'VE GOT AN ARMORED DIVISION READY TO GO INTO COMBAT. NOT TRUE. IT TAKE NINE YEARS TO BUILD A MODERN AIRCRAFT CARRIER; NINE YEARS FROM THE TIME CONGRESS AUTHORIZES IT TILL WE'VE GOT A DEPLOYABLE ASSET WE CAN SEND TO SEA.

IT TAKES ABOUT 25 YEARS TO TRAIN AN OFFICER CAPABLE OF COMMANDING A MODERN ARMORED DIVISION IN COMBAT, AT LEAST TEN YEARS TO CREATE A REALLY FIRST-RATE NCO WHO'S CAPABLE OF BEING A SENIOR NCO IN AN INFANTRY COMPANY FOR EXAMPLE.

IF I START TODAY ON A BRAND NEW TYPE OF AIRCRAFT FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY, IT WILL BE 13 YEARS BEFORE WE HAVE ANY DEPLOYABLE CAPABILITY.

YOU SIMPLY CANNOT TAKE THAT FORCE DOWN OVERNIGHT AND THEN GO BACK AND RECREATE IT A YEAR FROM NOW IF YOU NEED IT. YOU'VE GOT TO PROCEED IN A CAUTIOUS, CALM, DELIBERATE WAY IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLAN BASED UPON A FUNDAMENTAL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT ARE OVERALL STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS ARE, IF, IN FACT, WE'RE GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL FIVE OR 10 YEARS FROM NOW THE NEXT TIME WE HAVE TO DO A DESERT STORM.

SO IT'S ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT CONGRESS GIVE US THE FREEDOM AND THE FLEXIBILITY TO UNDERTAKE THESE CUTS IN AN INTELLIGENT FASHION SO THAT WHEN WE GET THROUGH WE PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE QUALITY OF THE FORCE THAT'S NEEDED.

I LIKE TO TELL THE STORY ABOUT THE FIRST TACTICAL FIGHTER WING, FROM LANGLEY, VIRGINIA. A YEAR AGO LAST AUGUST WHEN THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO SEND FORCES TO SAUDI ARABIA TO CONFRONT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND TO STOP HIS AGGRESSION, THE FIRST UNIT WE DEPLOYED FROM THE UNITED STATES WAS THE FIRST TACTICAL FIGHTER WING DOWN HERE AT LANGLEY -- A WING OF F-15S -- AIR-TO-AIR AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER. FOURTEEN HOURS AFTER THE TIME THE PRESIDENT GAVE THE ORDER TO GO, WE HAD AIRPLANES ON THE GROUND IN SAUDI ARABIA. THEY FLEW NON-STOP, REFUELED SEVEN TIMES EN ROUTE AND 14 HOURS AFTER HE SAID, "GO," THAT WING WAS DEPLOYED IN SAUDI ARABIA READY TO DEFEND SAUDIA AIRSPACE AND MAKE CERTAIN SADDAM'S FORCES DIDN'T COME ON FARTHER SOUTH. THAT SAME FIRST TACTICAL FIGHTER WING 10 YEARS AGO FLUNKED ITS OPERATIONAL READINESS EXAM. OUT OF THE 72 AIRCRAFT IN THE WING, ONLY 27 WERE FLYING. THE REST WERE GROUNDED FOR LACK OF SPARE PARTS.

NOW THE KINDS OF DECISIONS THAT WE MAKE IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD ABOUT THE OVERALL SIZE AND QUALITY OF OUR FORCE, IF WE GIVE UP THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CRUCIAL TO MAINTAINING THE KIND OF TALENT THAT WE'VE GOT IN THE MILITARY TODAY, IF WE REFUSE TO TRAIN THEM AND EQUIP THEM PROPERLY AND GIVE THEM THE KINDS OF INCENTIVES THEY NEED TO BE ABLE TO DO THE JOB THEY NEED TO DO FOR ALL OF US, WE WILL END UP ONCE AGAIN WITH A FIRST TACTICAL FIGHTER WING IN THE SHAPE IT WAS IN 10 YEARS AGO WHEN THEY SIMPLY COULD NOT HAVE EXECUTED THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER TO GO TO THE GULF.

I AM REMINDED OFTEN, GIVEN MY RESPONSIBILITIES, THAT THERE'S ONLY ONE REASON FOR THERE TO BE A UNITED STATES MILITARY AND A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. AND THAT'S TO BE PREPARED TO FIGHT, IF NEED BE, AND WHEN WE GO, TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN WE CAN WIN. THERE'S NO OTHER REASON TO HAVE A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. WE'RE NOT A PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT. WE'RE NOT THERE TO CREATE JOBS THAT CONGRESSMEN CAN PASS OUT BACK HOME IN THEIR DISTRICT. WE'RE THERE TO FIGHT AND TO WIN WHEN CALLED UPON TO DO SO.

AND THE DECISIONS WE MAKE NOW IN TERMS OF WHAT WE KEEP, WHAT WE CUT, WHAT WE GET RID OF, AS WE DOWNSIZE THE FORCE, ARE DECISIONS THAT I LIKE TO THINK OF AS PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT TIME, BECAUSE YOU CAN BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT THERE WILL AGAIN COME A TIME WHEN AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO SEND YOUNG AMERICANS INTO COMBAT. AND THE DECISIONS WE MAKE NOW AND THE QUALITY OF THOSE DECISIONS, WHETHER OR NOT WE MAKE THE RIGHT CALLS, WILL HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON WHETHER OR NOT

THE NEXT TIME THEY GO, THEY'LL BE WELL EQUIPPED AND WELL TRAINED AND ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION, AND WILL HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON HOW MANY OF THEM COME HOME AGAIN ONCE IT'S OVER WITH.

Q LITTLE HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC ABOUT THE QUESTION OF THE MILITARY ROLE IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM THE RUSSIAN MILITARY?

SEC. CHENEY: THE QUESTION IS, WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM THE RUSSIAN MILITARY. I MEAN, I THINK YOU TAKE THE SOVIET MILITARY AS WELL AS THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC. I GET CONFUSED ON THOSE TERMS THESE DAYS, TOO, TRYING TO KEEP THEM ALL STRAIGHT.

THE CHANGE THAT HAS OCCURRED WITH YAZOV'S REMOVAL FROM -- HIS DEPARTURE, I THINK IS PRETTY SIGNIFIANT. EVERYTHING WE CAN TELL ABOUT SHAPOSHNIKOV WHO IS HIS REPLACEMENT -- MY COUNTERPART NOW -- HE'S BEEN COMMANDER OF THE SOVIET AIR FORCE, HE IS NOW THE NEW DEFENSE MINISTER -- IS THAT HE APPEARS TO BE PREPARED TO FAIRLY DRAMATICALLY REFORM THE SOVIET MILITARY. LOBOV, WHO IS THE EQUIVALENT OF COLIN POWELL, IN EFFECT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, IS A BIT OF A OLD-LINE OFFICER BUT EVERYTHING WE CAN TELL, IF YOU LOOK AT HIS STATEMENTS PRE-COUP AND POST-COUP, HE APPEARS TO BE GETTING WITH THE PROGRAM AS WELL, TOO, RECOGNIZING THAT THERE HAS TO BE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE SOVIET MILITARY AND IN THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IF THERE'S GONG TO BE ANY REFORM IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY.

SO THEY NOW ARE ACTIVELY TALKING ABOUT GETTING RID OF THEIR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SHAPOSHNIKOV MADE A STATEMENT ALONG THOSE LINES PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE LAST WEEK. NOW, THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT SHRINKING THE SIZE OF THE FORCE EVEN MORE THAN THEY ALREADY HAVE. THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT REDUCING THE LENGTH OF SERVICE THAT THEIR DRAFTEES HAVE TO SERVE FROM TWO YEARS TO EIGHTEEN MONTHS OR TWELVE MONTHS. THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY. IF YOU SPEND MONEY ON PEOPLE YOU'VE GOT LESS MONEY TO SPEND ON HARDWARE. SO, THE IMPRESSION I HAVE IS THAT THEY CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY IF THERE'S TO BE REFORM IN THE SOVIET SOCIETY.

I THINK THERE ARE A LOT OF UNANSWERED QUESTIONS, THOUGH. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE HOW DIFFICULT A TRANSITION THIS IS GOING TO BE FOR THEM. THEY'VE GOT ENORMOUS PROBLEMS SIMPLY TRYING TO FIND HOUSING FOR ALL THE FOLKS THEY'RE BRINGING HOME FROM EASTERN

EUROPE.

THERE ARE MAJOR, MAJOR DEBATES AHEAD OVER WHO IS GOING TO CONTROL THE SOVIET MILITARY. IS IT GOING TO REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CENTER, WHATEVER IS LEFT OF THE CENTER? WILL IT BE CONTROLLED BY THE REPUBLICS? WILL THERE BE SOME KIND OF JOINT CONTROL? WILL THE INDIVIDUAL REPUBLICS DEVELOP MILITARY FORCES? WHO IS GOING TO OWN THE SOVIET NUCLEAR STOCKPILE THREE OR FOUR YEARS FROM NOW? THOSE ARE ALL UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AT THIS POINT. AND I WOULD EXPECT -- (AUDIO BREAK) -- THEY HAVEN'T SOLVED THOSE PROBLEMS YET, SO THERE IS A BIG DEBATE AHEAD. BUT ALL OF THE SIGNS SINCE THE COUP HAVE BEEN VERY POSITIVE FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. THEY APPEAR TO BE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID COMPETITION AMONG THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AFFECT THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED TO GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF AND OTHERS IN THE FIELD DURING THE WAR?

SEC. CHENEY: I THINK THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT WAS AVAILABLE TO US WAS PHENOMENALLY GOOD. I CAN'T SAY THAT WE ALWAYS GOT IT RIGHT. NOBODY EVER DOES. BILL WEBSTER'S THE ONE WHO ALWAYS TAKES THE RAP FOR WHATEVER GRIEF PEOPLE WANT TO VISIT ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, BUT THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS I'VE GOT ABOUT AS MUCH OF IT UNDER MY CONTROL AS HE DOES, AND THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND SO FORTH. THAT IS, A LOT OF IT FALLS UNDER THE MILITARY JURISDICTION.

AND I THINK IT WORKED WELL. THERE WERE PLACES WHERE WE WISHED WE HAD HAD MORE INFORMATION. WE KNEW, FOR EXAMPLE, BEFORE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT WHAT HIS CAPABILITIES WERE. WE COULD SEE HIS FORCES ASSEMBLING ON THE NORTHERN BORDER. BUT WE DIDN'T HAVE MUCH NOTICE ABOUT THE INVASION BECAUSE EVERYBODY SAID HE WOULDN'T INVADE, INCLUDING EVERYBODY IN THE REGION, AND WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY WAY OF KNOWING WHAT WAS INSIDE SADDAM'S HEAD.

WE HAD VERY GOOD INFORMATION FOR OUR STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN. WE KNEW A LOT ABOUT WHAT THE IRAQIS HAD, ABOUT THEIR ORDER OF BATTLE, BUT WE DIDN'T KNOW EVERYTHING. WE'VE LEARNED SOME THINGS SINCE THE WAR, THAT THEY HAD A MORE EXTENSIVE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THAN ANYBODY HAD THOUGHT. BUT I THINK FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THOSE OF US IN POLICYMAKING POSITIONS AND, I THINK, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD, WE HAD MORE INFORMATION QUICKER, REAL TIME, IF YOU WILL, MORE USABLE INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE THAT LET US MOUNT WHAT I THINK IS CLEARLY ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL MILITARY CAMPAIGNS IN HISTORY, AND A LOT OF THAT WAS BECAUSE OF THE QUALITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS AVAILABLE TO US. SO, I THINK OVERALL IT WORKED WELL.

THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH. (APPLAUSE.)

REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHENEY OUTSIDE OF STATE DEPARTMENT
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1991

SEC. CHENEY: THERE CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, NOT ONLY IN THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES, BUT ALSO IN THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. I THINK THAT WOULD BE SOUND POLICY FOR THEM. IT OUGHT TO BE CLEAR TO THEM, GIVEN THE FACT THAT WE'RE DRAWING DOWN OUR FORCES IN EUROPE, REDUCING OUR FORCES TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE, THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ANY KIND OF A THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT THEY CAN SAFELY REDUCE THEIR FORCES. AND THEY NEED TO DO IT FOR THEIR OWN INTERESTS. THEY NEED TO DO IT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO REFORM THEIR ECONOMY.

END

עד כאן

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, (רהמ), (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, (רם),
אמן, (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, (דוצ), (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 27

אל: רהמש/4

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 402, תא: 300991, זח: 2033, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בכב

שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: יועצת תקשורת שה"ח, יועץ תקשורת רוה"מ

מאת: עחונוח, וושינגטון

רייקר - פלסטינאים.

להלן מכתבים מדיניים:-

א. פייסל אל-חוסייני וחנאן עשראווי ביטלו בואם לוושינגטון שכן הובהר להם ממחמ"ד כי גם אם יגיעו לכאן - לא ייפגשו עם המזכיר. לפיכך, החליטו לבטל בואם.

(הערה: דוברת מחמ"ד אישרה היום בתדרוך כי המזכיר לא יפגש עמם השבוע בוושינגטון).

ב. פקידים במחמ"ד מסרו לכתבים (שלא לשימוש) כי הוחלט להעביר מסר כנ"ל ולמנוע בואם של השניים לוושינגטון כדי שלא "לספק עילה" לשום צד (כשנרמז שהכוונה לישראל...). שלא להתקדם בתהליך.

ג. עוד מפקידים (שלא לשימוש) כי במימשל רואים במעשה עשראווי ופייסל אל-חוסייני "מעשה אמיץ", שכן ידעו שבעצם נסיעתם למל"פ הם מסתכנים בהעמדתם לדין עם שובם לארץ. ההערכה כלפיהם היא על שנטלו סיכון כזה מתוך נוע פנימי (שהוכיח עצמו) שרק בעצם פנייתם האישית למל"פ יצליחו להביא לביטול התנגדות אש"פ לועידת השלום. כך, שגם אם הדוברים הממשליים השונים הסתפקו רק בהבעת "שביעות-רצון" מהחלטת המל"פ (דברי המזכיר ביום א' - נשלחו בנפרד) - יש בהחלט הערכה למעשה אל-חוסייני ועשראווי.

חג שמח,

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעח,
הסברה, @ (נוה/משהבט), סולטן, מזחיים

אאא, חוזם: 33
אל: רהמש/3
מ-: ווש, נר: 2101, תא: 300991, זח: 2045, דח: מ, סג: סו,
כבב
סודי / מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל, מז'תים

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

פסגת המים.

השיחתו עם השגריר סיפר דניס רוס כי הבהירו לתורכים שלא ישחפו בפסגה
ידיה וישראל לא תוזמן במעמד זהה ליחר המשחתפות.

שטיין.

אי =

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, סולטן,
מזתים, סייבל, משפט, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רם), אמן

סססס

דחיפות: בהחל לקר	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון טופס פרוק	די: <u>1</u> סתוק: <u>2</u>
סוג: קלמ"ס	תבואת תפוח	זל:
תאריך ושפת מעבר: 28/9/91 14:46	כמ"ס"ג הפק' נ"ו- יורק	צ:
כס' פרוק: הפסד:	עתולת, וושינגטון	את:
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רצ"ה. תיאור המטכ"ל ב"ק"ר
בולצא לפתולת המל"ה, 28/9/87.

עתולת

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman
(New York, New York)

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For Immediate Release

September 28, 1991

REMARKS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
AND
MONGOLIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TSERENPILYN GOMBOSUREN

Prior to Meeting
Waldorf Astoria
September 28, 1991

WORLDWIDE TIPS

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, good morning. Mr. Secretary, there has been a development overnight, as you probably know. The Palestinians have voted overwhelmingly to join the peace process. Do you have any feelings on this development, and what happens next?

SECRETARY BAKER: You know, we've been saying for some time that we think that there is an opportunity here, an opportunity really for all, but particularly an opportunity for Palestinians. Those in the territories, particularly, have probably the most to gain from a peace process and the most to lose if there isn't one. So any time we see support for the prospect of trying to create a peace process in the Middle East, we're very glad to see that.

QUESTION: How are things going with your talks with the Israelis on the letter of assurance?

SECRETARY BAKER: Those discussions are continuing. As a matter of fact, there were discussions yesterday in Washington on that, just as discussions are continuing with other countries on letters of assurance. We will keep moving forward, hopefully, on all of these.

QUESTION: Do you expect some kind of an announcement soon?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not going to put any time frame on anything.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman
(New York, New York)

For Immediate Release

September 28, 1991

REMARKS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
AND
MONGOLIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TSEARNPILYN GOMBOSUREN

Prior to Meeting
Waldorf Astoria
September 28, 1991

10/1/91 7:12 PM

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, good morning. Mr. Secretary, there has been a development overnight, as you probably know. The Palestinians have voted overwhelmingly to join the peace process. Do you have any feelings on this development, and what happens next?

SECRETARY BAKER: You know, we've been saying for some time that we think that there is an opportunity here, an opportunity really for all, but particularly an opportunity for Palestinians. Those in the territories, particularly, have probably the most to gain from a peace process and the most to lose if there isn't one. So any time we see support for the prospect of trying to create a peace process in the Middle East, we're very glad to see that.

QUESTION: How are things going with your talks with the Israelis on the letter of assurance?

SECRETARY BAKER: Those discussions are continuing. As a matter of fact, there were discussions yesterday in Washington on that, just as discussions are continuing with other countries on letters of assurance. We will keep moving forward, hopefully, on all of those.

QUESTION: Do you expect some kind of an announcement soon?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm not going to put any time frame on anything.

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דע: פמליית השר, ניו יורק

מאת: עתונות, רושינגטון

ירוזמת הנשיא בוש בנושא נשק אטומי

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY FACT SHEET ON THE
SIDENTIAL INITIATIVE ON NUCLEAR ARMS / FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1991

THE PRESIDENT IS ANNOUNCING A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES AFFECTING THE
ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED
TO UNDERTAKE THESE INITIATIVES TO DRAMATICALLY REDUCE THE SIZE AND
NATURE OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS WORLDWIDE, ENHANCE
STABILITY, AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RECENT DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE
SOVIET UNION. HE IS CALLING UPON THE USSR TO AGREE TO SIMILAR
MEASURES. THIS FACT SHEET SUMMARIZES THE MAJOR POINTS.

GROUND-LAUNCHED THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

THE UNITED STATES WILL WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS
AND ALL NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR ITS SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES TO
THE UNITED STATES. THESE AND ANY SIMILAR WARHEADS CURRENTLY STORED
IN THE UNITED STATES WILL BE DISMANTLED AND DESTROYED.

-- THE PRESIDENT IS CALLING ON THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW, DISMANTLE
AND DESTROY ALL OF THEIR GROUND-LAUNCHED THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THEIR SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC
MISSILES, NUCLEAR AIR DEFENSE MISSILES, NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS,
AND NUCLEAR LAND MINES. (THE UNITED STATES NO LONGER POSSESSES
EITHER NUCLEAR LAND MINES OR NUCLEAR AIR DEFENSE WARHEADS.)

SEA-BASED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

THE UNITED STATES WILL REMOVE ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
INCLUDING NUCLEAR CRUISE MISSILES, FROM ITS SURFACE SHIPS AND ATTACK
SUBMARINES. WE WILL ALSO REMOVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ASSOCIATED WITH OUR
LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT. MANY OF THESE WEAPONS WILL BE DISMANTLED
AND DESTROYED WITH THE REMAINDER PLACED IN SECURE CENTRAL STORAGE
AREAS.

-- THE PRESIDENT IS CALLING ON THE SOVIET UNION TO SIMILARLY REMOVE ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS SURFACE SHIPS, ITS ATTACK SUBMARINES AND BASES FOR LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT, TO DESTROY MANY OF THOSE WEAPONS, AND TO CONSOLIDATE THE REMAINDER AT SECURE CENTRAL LOCATIONS.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

ALL U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBERS WILL BE REMOVED FROM DAY-TO-DAY ALERT STATUS AND THEIR WEAPONS RETURNED TO STORAGE AREAS.

-- AS A COMPARATIVE GESTURE, THE PRESIDENT IS ASKING THE SOVIET UNION TO CONFINE ITS MOBILE ICBMS TO THEIR GARRISONS. THE U.S. WILL IMMEDIATELY STAND DOWN FROM ALERT ALL U.S. ICBMS SCHEDULED FOR DEACTIVATION UNDER START. AFTER START IS RATIFIED, WE WILL ACCELERATE THEIR ELIMINATION. (START CALLS FOR THE TREATY-MANDATED REDUCTIONS TO OCCUR OVER A SEVEN-YEAR PERIOD.)

-- THE PRESIDENT IS CALLING ON THE USSR TO DO THE SAME.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEACEKEEPER ICBM RAIL GARRISON SYSTEM AND THE MOBILE ELEMENTS OF THE SMALL ICBM PROGRAM HAVE BEEN TERMINATED. THE SMALL SINGLE WARHEAD ICBM WILL BE THE SOLE REMAINING U.S. ICBM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

-- THE PRESIDENT IS ASKING THE USSR TO LIMIT THEIR ICBM MODERNIZATION EFFORTS TO ONE TYPE OF SINGLE WARHEAD MISSILE.

THE NUCLEAR SHORT RANGE ATTACK MISSILE HAS BEEN CANCELED.

THE PRESIDENT IS ANNOUNCING THE CREATION OF A NEW U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, DESIGNED TO IMPROVE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALL U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.

HE IS PROPOSING THAT THE U.S. AND USSR SEEK EARLY AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE ALL ICBMS WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS FROM THEIR INVENTORIES.

THE PRESIDENT IS CALLING ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO JOIN US IN TAKING IMMEDIATE CONCRETE STEPS TO PERMIT THE LIMITED DEPLOYMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSES THAT WOULD PROTECT AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE STRIKES WHATEVER THEIR SOURCE. THE U.S. WILL ALSO PROPOSE INITIATIVES IN THE AREA OF BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING.

JOINT CONSULTATIONS

THE PRESIDENT IS PROPOSING THAT WE BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO EXPLORE COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL, WARHEAD SECURITY AND SAFETY, AND SAFE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION.

עחונרת

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, רביב,
מעח, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 22908

אל: דהמש/1220

מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 397, תא: 280991, זח: 1428, דח: מ, סג: בל,

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בלמס/מידי

אל: תפוצת הקשורת

דע: פמליית השר - ניו יורק

מאת: עחונות, רושינגטון

ניום הנשיא בוש בנושא האסטרטגיה הבטחונית החדשה של ארה"ב

WHITE HOUSE SPEECH BY PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH ON A NEW AMERICAN DEFENSE
ATEGY / THE OVAL OFFICE / 8:02 P.M. ET / FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1991

PRESIDENT BUSH: GOOD EVENING. TONIGHT I'D LIKE TO SPEAK
WITH YOU ABOUT OUR FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF THE GENERATIONS TO COME.
THE WORLD HAS CHANGED AT A FANTASTIC PACE, WITH EACH DAY WRITING A
FRESH PAGE OF HISTORY BEFORE YESTERDAY'S INK IS EVEN DRIED. AND
MOST RECENTLY WE'VE SEEN THE PEOPLE'S OF THE SOVIET UNION TURN TO
DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM AND DISCARD A SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT BASED ON
OPPRESSION AND FEAR.

LIKE THE EAST EUROPEANS BEFORE THEM, THEY FACE THE DAUNTING
CHALLENGE OF BUILDING FRESH POLITICAL STRUCTURES BASED ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND MARKET ECONOMIES. THEIR TASK IS
FAR FROM EASY AND FAR FROM OVER. AND THEY WILL NEED OUR HELP AND
THEY WILL GET IT.

BUT THESE DRAMATIC CHANGES CHALLENGE OUR NATION AS WELL. OUR
COUNTRY HAS ALWAYS STOOD FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY. AND WHEN THE
NEWLY ELECTED LEADERS OF EASTERN EUROPE GRAPPLED WITH FORMING THEIR
NEW GOVERNMENTS, THEY LOOKED TO THE UNITED STATES. THEY LOOKED TO
AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IN BUILDING THEIR OWN FREE SOCIETIES.
EVEN THE LEADERS OF THE USSR REPUBLICS ARE READING THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS WRITTEN BY AMERICA'S FOUNDERS TO FIND NEW IDEAS AND
INSPIRATION.

TODAY, AMERICA MUST LEAD AGAIN AND IT ALWAYS HAS, AS ONLY IT
CAN. AND WE WILL. WE MUST ALSO PROVIDE THE INSPIRATION FOR LASTING
PEACE. AND WE WILL DO THAT TOO. WE CAN NOW TAKE STEPS IN RESPONSE
TO THESE DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS, STEPS THAT CAN HELP THE SOVIET
PEOPLES IN THEIR QUEST FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY. MORE IMPORTANTLY,
WE CAN NOW TAKE STEPS TO MAKE THE WORLD A LESS DANGEROUS PLACE THAN
EVER BEFORE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

A YEAR AGO, I DESCRIBED A NEW STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN DEFENSES, REFLECTING THE WORLD'S CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. THAT STRATEGY SHIFTED OUR FOCUS AWAY FROM THE FEAR THAT PREOCCUPIED US FOR 40 YEARS -- THE PROSPECT OF A GLOBAL CONFRONTATION. INSTEAD, IT CONCENTRATED MORE ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS, SUCH AS THE ONE WE JUST FACED IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

I SPELLED OUT A STRATEGIC CONCEPT, GUIDED BY THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE FORCES REQUIRED TO EXERCISE FORWARD PRESENCE IN KEY AREAS, TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY IN CRISES, TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT, AND TO RETAIN THE NATIONAL CAPACITY TO REBUILD OUR FORCES, SHOULD THAT BE NEEDED.

WE ARE NOW MOVING TO RESHAPE THE U.S. MILITARY TO REFLECT THAT CONCEPT. THE NEW BASE FORCE WILL BE SMALLER BY HALF A MILLION

AS I JUST MENTIONED, THE CHANGES THAT ALLOWED US TO ADJUST OUR SECURITY STRATEGY A YEAR AGO HAVE GREATLY ACCELERATED. THE PROSPECT OF A SOVIET INVASION INTO WESTERN EUROPE, LAUNCHED WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING, IS NO LONGER A REALISTIC THREAT. THE WARSAW PACT HAS CRUMBLLED. IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE ADVOCATES OF DEMOCRACY TRIUMPHED OVER A COUP THAT WOULD HAVE RESTORED THE OLD SYSTEM OF REPRESSION. THE REFORMERS ARE NOW STARTING TO FASHION THEIR OWN FUTURES, MOVING EVEN FASTER TOWARD DEMOCRACY'S HORIZON.

NEW LEADERS IN THE KREMLIN AND THE REPUBLICS ARE NOW QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR THEIR HUGE NUCLEAR ARSENAL. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR STOCKPILE NOW SEEMS LESS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND MORE OF A BURDEN. AS A RESULT, WE NOW HAVE AN UNPARALLELED OPPORTUNITY TO CHANGE THE NUCLEAR POSTURE OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

IF WE AND THE SOVIET LEADERS TAKE THE RIGHT STEPS, SOME ON OUR OWN, SOME ON THEIR OWN, SOME TOGETHER, WE CAN DRAMATICALLY SHRINK THE ARSENAL OF THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY DISCOURAGE THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE CAN RELY MORE ON DEFENSIVE MEASURES IN OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. WE CAN ENHANCE STABILITY AND ACTUALLY REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

NOW IS THE TIME TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. AFTER CAREFUL STUDY AND CONSULTATIONS WITH MY SENIOR ADVISERS, AND AFTER CONSIDERING VALUABLE COUNSEL FROM PRIME MINISTER MAJOR, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, CHANCELLOR KOHL, AND OTHER ALLIED LEADERS, I AM ANNOUNCING TODAY A SERIES OF SWEEPING INITIATIVES AFFECTING EVERY ASPECT OF OUR NUCLEAR FORCES ON LAND, ON SHIPS, AND ON AIRCRAFT.

I MET AGAIN TODAY WITH OUR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND I CAN TELL YOU, THEY WHOLEHEARTEDLY ENDORSE EACH OF THESE STEPS. I'LL BEGIN WITH THE CATEGORY IN WHICH WE WILL MAKE THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN NUCLEAR FORCES IN OVER 40 YEARS: NON-STRATEGIC OR THEATER WEAPONS.

LAST YEAR, I CANCELED US PLANS TO MODERNIZE OUR GROUND-LAUNCHED THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. LATER, OUR NATO ALLIES JOINED US IN ANNOUNCING THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD PROPOSE THE MUTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS FROM EUROPE AS SOON AS SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN WITH THE SOVIETS.

BUT STARTING THESE TALKS NOW WOULD ONLY PERPETUATE THESE SYSTEMS WHILE WE ENGAGE IN LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS. LAST MONTH'S EVENTS NOT ONLY PERMIT BUT, INDEED, DEMAND SWIFTER, BOLDER ACTION.

I'M, THEREFORE, DIRECTING THAT THE UNITED STATES ELIMINATE OUR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS AND SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS.

WE WILL, OF COURSE, ENSURE THAT WE PRESERVE AN EFFECTIVE AIR-DELIVERED NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN EUROPE. THAT'S ESSENTIAL TO NATO'S SECURITY. IN TURN, I HAVE ASKED THE SOVIETS TO GO DOWN THIS ROAD WITH US, TO DESTROY THEIR ENTIRE INVENTORY OF GROUND-LAUNCHED THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NOT ONLY THEIR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES, BUT ALSO THE THEATER SYSTEMS THE US NO LONGER HAS. SYSTEMS LIKE NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR AIR DEFENSE MISSILES AND NUCLEAR LAND MINES.

RECOGNIZING FURTHER THE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY LANDSCAPE, THE UNITED STATES WILL WITHDRAW ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS SURFACE SHIPS AND ATTACK SUBMARINES, AS WELL AS THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ASSOCIATED WITH OUR LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT. THIS MEANS REMOVING ALL NUCLEAR TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILES FROM US SHIPS AND SUBMARINES, AS WELL AS NUCLEAR BOMBS ABOARD AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR SHIPS WILL NOT CARRY TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MANY OF THESE LAND- AND SEA-BASED WARHEADS WILL BE DISMANTLED AND DESTROYED. THOSE REMAINING WILL BE SECURED IN CENTRAL AREAS WHERE THEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF NECESSARY IN A FUTURE CRISIS.

AGAIN, THERE IS EVERY REASON FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO MATCH OUR ACTIONS BY REMOVING ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS SHIPS AND ATTACK SUBMARINES, BY WITHDRAWING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT AND BY DESTROYING MANY OF THEM AND CONSOLIDATING WHAT REMAINS AT CENTRAL LOCATIONS. I URGE THEM TO DO SO.

NO CATEGORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS RECEIVED MORE ATTENTION THAN THOSE IN OUR STRATEGIC ARSENALS. THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY, START, WHICH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I SIGNED LAST JULY, WAS THE CULMINATION OF ALMOST A DECADE'S WORK. IT CALLS FOR SUBSTANTIAL STABILIZING REDUCTIONS AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. PROMPT RATIFICATION BY BOTH PARTIES IS ESSENTIAL.

BUT I ALSO BELIEVE THE TIME IS RIGHT TO USE START AS A SPRING-BOARD TO ACHIEVE ADDITIONAL STABILIZING CHANGES.

FIRST, TO FURTHER REDUCE TENSIONS, I'M DIRECTING THAT ALL UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBERS IMMEDIATELY STAND DOWN FROM THEIR ALERT POSTURE.

AS A COMPARABLE GESTURE, I CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO CONFINE ITS MOBILE MISSILES TO THEIR GARRISONS, WHERE THEY WILL BE SAFER AND MORE SECURE.

SECOND, THE UNITED STATES WILL IMMEDIATELY STAND DOWN FROM ALERT ALL INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES SCHEDULED FOR DEACTIVATION UNDER START. RATHER THAN WAITING FOR THE TREATY'S UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO DO THE SAME.

THIRD, I AM TERMINATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOBILE PEACEKEEPER ICBM, AS WELL AS THE MOBILE PORTIONS OF THE SMALL ICBM PROGRAM. THE SMALL, SINGLE WARHEAD ICBM WILL BE OUR ONLY REMAINING ICBM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. AND I CALL UPON THE SOVIETS TO TERMINATE ANY AND ALL PROGRAMS FOR FUTURE ICBMS WITH MORE THAN ONE WARHEAD AND TO LIMIT ICBM MODERNIZATION TO ONE TYPE OF SINGLE WARHEAD MISSILE JUST AS WE HAVE DONE.

AND FOURTH, I AM CANCELING THE CURRENT PROGRAM TO BUILD A REPLACEMENT FOR THE NUCLEAR SHORT-RANGE ATTACK MISSILE FOR OUR STRATEGIC BOMBERS.

AND FIFTH, AS A RESULT OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ADJUSTMENTS THAT I'VE JUST OUTLINED, THE UNITED STATES WILL STREAMLINE ITS COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES, ALLOWING US TO MORE EFFECTIVELY MANAGE OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.

AS THE SYSTEM WORKS NOW, THE NAVY COMMANDS THE SUBMARINE PART OF OUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT, WHILE THE AIR FORCE COMMANDS THE BOMBER AND LAND-BASED ELEMENTS. BUT AS WE REDUCE OUR STRATEGIC FORCES, THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE MUST BE AS DIRECT AS POSSIBLE.

AND I'VE, THEREFORE, APPROVED THE RECOMMENDATION OF SECRETARY CHENEY AND THE JOINT CHIEFS TO CONSOLIDATE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF THESE FORCES INTO A US STRATEGIC COMMAND UNDER ONE COMMANDER, US STRATEGIC COMMAND, UNDER ONE COMMANDER, WITH PARTICIPATION FROM BOTH SERVICES.

SINCE THE 1970S, THE MOST VULNERABLE AND UNSTABLE PART OF THE US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES HAS BEEN INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES WITH MORE THAN ONE WARHEAD. BOTH SIDES HAVE THESE ICBMS AND FIXED SILOS IN THE GROUND WHERE THEY ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN MISSILES ON SUBMARINES.

I PROPOSE THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION SEEK EARLY AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE FROM THEIR INVENTORIES ALL ICBMS WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS. AFTER DEVELOPING A TIMETABLE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES, WE COULD RAPIDLY MOVE TO MODIFY, OR ELIMINATE, THESE SYSTEMS UNDER PROCEDURES ALREADY ESTABLISHED IN THE START AGREEMENT. IN

SHORT, SUCH AN ACTION WOULD TAKE AWAY THE SINGLE MOST UNSTABLE PART OF OUR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

BUT THERE IS MORE TO DO. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE NOT THE ONLY NATIONS WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES. SOME FIFTEEN NATIONS HAVE THEM NOW, AND IN LESS THAN A DECADE, THAT NUMBER CAN GROW TO 20. THE RECENT CONFLICT IN THE PERSIAN GULF DEMONSTRATES IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR STRONG ACTION ON THIS GROWING THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.

ACCORDINGLY, I AM CALLING ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO JOIN US IN TAKING IMMEDIATE CONCRETE STEPS TO PERMIT THE LIMITED DEPLOYMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSES TO PROTECT AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE STRIKES, WHATEVER THEIR SOURCE, WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE CREDIBILITY OF EXISTING DETERRENT FORCES.

AND WE WILL INTENSIFY OUR EFFORT TO CURB NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION. THESE TWO EFFORTS WILL BE MUTUALLY REINFORCING. TO FOSTER COOPERATION, THE UNITED STATES SOON WILL PROPOSE ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES IN THE AREA OF BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING.

AND FINALLY, LET ME DISCUSS YET ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR COOPERATION THAT CAN MAKE OUR WORLD SAFER. DURING LAST MONTH'S ATTEMPTED COUP IN MOSCOW, MANY AMERICANS ASKED ME IF I THOUGHT SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE UNDER ADEQUATE CONTROL. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT AMERICA WAS AT INCREASED RISK OF NUCLEAR ATTACK DURING THOSE TENSE DAYS. BUT I DO BELIEVE MORE CAN BE DONE TO ENSURE THE SAFE HANDLING AND DISMANTLING OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

AND THEREFORE I PROPOSE THAT WE BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO EXPLORE COOPERATION IN THREE AREAS. FIRST, WE SHOULD EXPLORE JOINT TECHNICAL COOPERATION ON THE SAFE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION, DISMANTLING, SECOND, WE SHOULD DISCUSS EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY AND SAFETY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND HOW THESE MIGHT BE ENHANCED. AND THIRD, WE SHOULD DISCUSS NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND HOW THESE MIGHT BE IMPROVED TO PROVIDE MORE PROTECTION AGAINST THE UNAUTHORIZED OR ACCIDENTAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MY FRIEND, FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, OFFERED A SIMILAR IDEA A SHORT WHILE AGO.

AFTER FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIANCE, AND WHEN THE LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR IS READY, WE WILL BEGIN THIS EFFORT. THE INITIATIVES THAT I'M ANNOUNCING BUILD ON THE NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY THAT I SET OUT A YEAR AGO, THE ONE THAT SHIFTED OUR FOCUS AWAY FROM THE PROSPECT OF GLOBAL CONFRONTATION. WE'RE CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MANY OF THESE STEPS WHICH FIT WELL WITH THE NEW POST-COLD WAR STRATEGY AND FORCED POSTURE THAT WE'VE DEVELOPED IN NATO.

AS WE IMPLEMENT THESE INITIATIVES, WE WILL CLOSELY WATCH HOW THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP RESPONDS. WE EXPECT OUR BOLD INITIATIVES

TO MEET WITH EQUALLY BOLD STEPS ON THE SOVIET SIDE. IF THIS HAPPENS, FURTHER COOPERATION IS INEVITABLE. IF IT DOES NOT, THEN AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY WILL HAVE BEEN LOST.

REGARDLESS, LET NO ONE DOUBT, WE WILL STILL RETAIN THE NECESSARY STRENGTH TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES, AND TO RESPOND AS NECESSARY. IN ADDITION, REGIONAL INSTABILITIES, THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND, AS WE SAW DURING THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF, TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS OF POWER HUNGRY TYRANTS, STILL REQUIRE US TO MAINTAIN A STRONG MILITARY TO PROTECT OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND TO HONOR COMMITMENTS TO OUR ALLIES.

AND, THEREFORE, WE MUST IMPLEMENT A COHERENT PLAN FOR A SIGNIFICANTLY SMALLER, BUT FULLY CAPABLE MILITARY, ONE THAT ENHANCES STABILITY BUT IS STILL SUFFICIENT TO CONVINCE ANY POTENTIAL ADVERSARY THAT THE COST OF AGGRESSION WILL EXCEED ANY POSSIBLE GAIN.

WE CAN SAFELY AFFORD TO TAKE THE STEPS I'VE ANNOUNCED TODAY, STEPS THAT ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF MISCALCULATION IN A CRISIS. BUT TO DO SO, WE MUST ALSO PURSUE VIGOROUSLY THOSE ELEMENTS OF OUR STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WHICH SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE. WE MUST FULLY FUND THE B-2 AND SDI PROGRAM. WE CAN MAKE RADICAL CHANGES IN THE NUCLEAR POSTURES OF BOTH SIDES TO MAKE THEM SMALLER, SAFER AND MORE STABLE.

BUT THE UNITED STATES MUST MAINTAIN MODERN NUCLEAR FORCES, INCLUDING THE STRATEGIC TRIAD, AND THUS ENSURE THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT. SOME WILL SAY THAT THESE INITIATIVES CALL FOR A BUDGET WINDFALL FOR DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, BUT THE PEACE DIVIDEND I SEEK IS NOT MEASURED IN DOLLARS, BUT IN GREATER SECURITY.

IN THE NEAR TERM, SOME OF THESE STEPS MAY EVEN COST MONEY, GIVEN THE AMBITIOUS PLAN I HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED TO REDUCE DEFENSE SPENDING BY 25 PERCENT. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE ANY UNWISE OR UNWARRANTED CUTS IN THE DEFINES BUDGET THAT I HAVE SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS. I'M COUNTING ON CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO ENSURE WE HAVE THE FUNDS NECESSARY TO RESTRUCTURE OUR FORCES PRUDENTLY, AND IMPLEMENT THE DECISIONS THAT I'VE OUTLINED TONIGHT.

TWENTY YEARS AGO WHEN I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE THIS COUNTRY AS AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, I ONCE TALKED ABOUT THE VISION THAT WAS IN THE MINDS OF THE UN'S FOUNDERS. HOW THEY DREAMED OF A NEW AGE WHEN THE GREAT POWERS OF THE WORLD WOULD COOPERATE IN PEACE, AS THEY HAD AS ALLIES IN WAR.

TODAY, I CONSULTED WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, AND WHILE HE HASN'T HAD TIME TO ABSORB THE DETAILS, I BELIEVE THE SOVIET RESPONSE WILL CLEARLY BE POSITIVE. I ALSO SPOKE WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN. HE HAD A SIMILAR REACTION; POSITIVE, HOPEFUL.

AND NOW THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADERS CAN SHED THE HEAVY BURDEN OF A DANGEROUS AND COSTLY NUCLEAR ARSENAL WHICH HAS

THREATENED WORLD PEACE FOR THE PAST FIVE DECADES, THAT CAN JOIN US IN THE DRAMATIC MOVES TOWARD A NEW WORLD OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

TONIGHT AS I SEE THE DRAMA OF DEMOCRACY UNFOLDING AROUND THE GLOBE, PERHAPS, PERHAPS WE ARE CLOSER TO THAT NEW WORLD THAN EVER BEFORE. THE FUTURE IS OURS TO INFLUENCE, TO SHAPE, TO MOLD, AND WHILE WE MUST NOT GAMBLE THAT FUTURE, NEITHER CAN WE FORFEIT THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY NOW BEFORE US.

IT HAS BEEN SAID DESTINY IS NOT A MATTER OF CHANCE, IT IS A MATTER OF CHOICE. IT IS NOT A THING TO BE WAITED FOR, IT'S A THING TO BE ACHIEVED. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS STOOD WHERE DUTY REQUIRED US TO STAND. AND NOW LET THEM SAY THAT WE LED WHERE DESTINY REQUIRED US TO LEAD. TO A MORE PEACEFUL, HOPEFUL FUTURE.

WE CANNOT GIVE A MORE PRECIOUS GIFT TO THE CHILDREN OF THE WORLD. THANK YOU, GOOD NIGHT, AND GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

עד כאן .

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
@אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, רביב, מעת, הסברה, בנצור,
מצפא, פרנ, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט), @אבן יקרה

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 22670
אל: רהמש/1180
מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 379, חא: 270991, זח: 1515, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בכב
בלמ"ס/מידי

א ל: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות רושינגטון

הנדון: תדרוך הבית הלבן ליום 27/9/91

להלן תמליל תדרוך הבית הלבן של היום:-

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC, REGULAR BRIEFING
BRIEFER: MARLIN FITZWATER, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1991

MR. FITZWATER: YES, IT'S JUST A BRIEF LOGISTICAL ANNOUNCEMENT.
WELL, YOU KNOW. PRESIDENT BUSH WILL ADDRESS
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AT 8:00 O'CLOCK TONIGHT FROM THE OVAL OFFICE ON
AMERICA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY. THIS MAJOR POLICY ADDRESS WILL
DISCUSS THE STATUS OF AMERICA'S FORCES IN THE WAKE OF CHANGES IN THE
SOVIET UNION. IT WILL MARK AN HISTORICAL TURNING POINT IN OUR
NATIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE, POINTING OUT A NEW PATH FOR PEACE.

THE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE A NUMBER OF DECISIONS RELATED TO
OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM AND HE WILL DISCUSS WITH THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE OUR TOTAL READINESS TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED
STATES IN A NEW WORLD ORDER. THE ADDRESS WILL LAST APPROXIMATELY 20
MINUTES AND WILL BE OFFERED TO ALL TELEVISION NETWORKS.

I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW THIS BEFORE YOU SEE THE PRESIDENT IN
JUST A FEW MINUTES. BUT WE LOOK FORWARD TO TONIGHT'S ADDRESS.

Q HAVE THESE -- THOSE CHANGES ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED WITH
THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION?

MR. FITZWATER: THE PRESIDENT HAS CONTACTED A NUMBER OF WORLD
LEADERS ON THIS ISSUE. THERE HAVE BEEN CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR
ALLIES AND OTHERS. AND HE'LL OUTLINE THAT FOR YOU TONIGHT.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Q WHY HAS HE DECIDED TO USE THIS FORUM, MARLIN, THE OVAL
OFFICE SPEECH? IS IT --

Q ON FRIDAY NIGHT?

MR. FITZWATER: HE SIMPLY BELIEVES THAT THIS IS SO IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF ITS -- THE WAY IT CHANGES OUR DEFENSE STRATEGY, IN EFFECT, POINTS TO A NEW COURSE IN CONTRAST TO THE ONE WE'VE BEEN ON FOR THE LAST 40 YEARS ALMOST. I THINK WHEN YOU SEE THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF HIS ANNOUNCEMENT TONIGHT, YOU'LL UNDERSTAND THE INCREDIBLE PROPORTIONS OF THESE DECISIONS. AND THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT THESE ARE ISSUES THAT HE NEEDS TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

THANK YOU.

END

עד כאן

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה,
@ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

בסס

אאא, חוזם: 21274
אל: רהמש/1068
מ-: המשרד, תא: 260991, זח: 1303, דח: מ, סג: בל,
כבב
9,244448

בלמ'ס/מידי

אל: כל הנציגויות

הנדון: דברי שה'ח דוד לוי לאחר פגישתו עם מזכיר המדינה ג'יימס בייקר

להלן מדברי שה'ח כפי שהובאו בגל'צ (26/9):

לאחר שיחה בת שעה וחצי עם מזכיר המדינה האמריקני במלון וולדורף אסטוריה בניו יורק אומר שר החוץ לוי - ישראל לא תופתע.

לוי - 'אני בדיוק העליתי את הסוגיה הזו על מנת שלא תהיינה פה טעויות. לאחר העבודה הרבה שעשינו צריך לדאוג כי דברים יסוכמו בטרם ייצאו הזמנות והדבר הזה מובן ומקובל. אנחנו עובדים על נייר של הבנות והסכמות אני מקווה שבימים הקרובים יסוכם. יש התקדמות רבה מאוד וייתכן שתהיה עוד פגישה עם המזכיר'.

בייקר הבטיח עוד לדברי לוי שישראל תוכל לעיין ברשימת המוזמנים הפלשתינים לפני שישוגרו ההזמנות, אם כי לא ברור עדיין אם תהיה זו משלחת ירדנית פלשתינית או פלשתינית - פלשתינית.

וי - 'יחד עם זאת צריך עוד לסיים את העבודה בנושא המשלחת הפלשתינאית על פי אותם עקרונות המוסכמים איתנו וכן להודיע לנו מי הם האנשים. בייקר ביקש שנדע שהוא עובד על זה והוא יוכל אולי בקרוב להודיע לנו שהמלאכה שלו הסתיימה - שעלה בידו להציע בהתאם לאותם העקרונות משלחת כזו של אנשים שהם תושבי יהודה שומרון ועזה כיום'.

הסברה/מידע

26 ספטמבר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצרים,
מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, מזאר, ארבל, 2,
ארבל, 1, הדרכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר, 1, איר, 2,

@(לעמ), מקצב2, אומן, פרנ, מחע, משקוף, חליפה, בטמח, כספים, משפט

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 21884

אל: רהמש/1103

מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 358, תא: 260991, זח: 1604, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בכבב

שמור/מידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: מ"מ רה"מ ושה"ח (ניו יורק), שר האוצר, מנכ"ל האוצר, יועץ רה"מ
לכלכלה, ציר כלכלי

מאת: ר' יחידת הקונגרס

המערכה על הערביות להלוואות - מבט מן ה"גבעה" (עדכון לנרות 320, 1086,
1057, 94 ו- 1029 מ- 24/9, 19/9, 13/9, 10/9 ו- 6/9)

1. מספר השושבינים לתחיקת קסטן - אינוייה, נכון ליום ד' בערב, היה 169
צפויה הודעת צמד הסנטורים על היענותם לבקשת הדחייה של הנשיא, כד בכד עם
הגשה רשמית של התחיקה לסנאט ופרסום המספר המרשים של השושבינים.

2. נמשך מאמץ הגיוס באמצעות הידידים, אנשי קשר לא-יהודים (המהווים את
פוטנציאל ההשפעה היעיל ביותר) ויהודים מחוץ ל"גבעה" ופניות ישירות
לנבחרי העם.

3. במקביל לגיוס המספר המרשים (אחרי חודשי הכנה מאומצים הצליחו יוזמי
חוק הגדלת דמי אבטלה, הצפוי לוטו נשיאותי, להשיג הצבעה של 69 סנטורים),
הצליח הנשיא להשיג דחיית ההצבעה ולחדד הדיון בהיבטים שנויים במחלוקת,
כאופן המעיב לפי שעה על תדמית ישראל. למרות הנ"ל יש להימנע מהתבטאויות
של הכרזת נצחון מחד, או מאנחות חבוסה ומילמולים על הצלח כבוד ופשרות
מפליגות מאידך. שתי החחושות גם יחד אינן משקפות את המציאות וגורעות מן
המאבק להשגת הערביות. המערכה הנוכחית נמצאת בשלביה הראשונים בלבד (אין
מדובר בספרינט של 100 מטר, אלא בק"מ הראשונים של ריצת מרתון).

4. חשיבות השושבינות היא בהתיחסותה לתחיקה ולא להחלטה בלתי מחייבת.
החשיבות אף נעוצה במחויבות (שאיננה בלתי הפיכה, אם כי לא פשוטה להפיכה)
לנוסח המסוים של תחיקת קסטן - אינוייה השולל למעשה את נסיון הזיקה,
מיישם את לקחי תחיקת 400 מליון הדולרים (שהפכו לכדור משחק פוליטי בידי
הממשל) ומתייחס ל- SCORING כלכלי (נמוך) ולא פוליטי. אפשר לציין בהקשר
זה, כי אם הנשיא מעריך (בתקציבו שהוגש לקונגרס בפברואר) את ה- SCORING
לפרוייקט בינוי במדינות מתפתחות (100 מליון דולר) ב- 2.5, אחוז הרי שזה
של מדינת ישראל אמור להיות נמוך יותר.

5. כמו בכל תחיקה אחרת, אין זה תמיכת שושבין 120 יום לפני ההצבעה לתמיכתו ביום ההצבעה, וודאי שלא לתמיכתו ב-VETO OVERRIDE (אם כי התחיקה תוצמד, כנראה, לחוק סיוע החוץ, ולא תהווה מטרת נקודה לוטו או לנסיון הנבחרים לבטל הוטו). יחד עם זאת שואפים המחוקקים להימנע מהתכשורת לשושבינות (ובמיוחד כזו הזוכה לתהודה!), היות והתכשורת פוגעת באמינות ומציגה אותם בעיני הבוחרים כבעלי "עמוד שדרה גמיש".

6. מנהיג הרוב, הסנטור ג'ורג' מיטצ'ל, הנמנע עד עתה מנקיטת עמדה נחרצת בנדון, זימן - יחד עם הסנטור דניאל אינווייה - 30 סנטורים דמוקרטים לארוחת צהריים, אשר הוקדשה לנושא הערכויות ולמאמץ להימנע מהתנגשות חזיתית עם הנשיא. הנושא הדומיננטי בארוחה היה, לדברי הנוכחים, התבטאויות מישראל בדבר קיומה, כביכול, של אלטרנטיבה לגיוס ההון הדרוש, אם כי בריבית גבוהה יותר. התומכים בערכויות מבין הסנטורים, התרעמו על התבטאויות אלו והתריעו על פוטנציאל הנזק הטמון בהן: אם אכן יש לישראל אלטרנטיבה, במחילה מכבודה שתממשה ותיפטור עצמה ואותם מן המעמסה והמחלוקת הנוכחיים; אם אכן יש אלטרנטיבה, הרי שאין מדובר בצורך קריטי בהתגייסותם למאבק. חלקם היו שותפים להערכה כי לישראל אין אלטרנטיבה בגיוס הון כה זמנתי (ואף נמוך ממנו), ואפילו לא בריבית גבוהה יותר. נושא שני ש"כיכב" בארוחה היה הפרופיל שהוענק להקמת צור-יגאל, ותקוותם של תומכי הערכויות כי יעשה מאמץ להקחות הפרופיל. מיטצ'ל זכה לתמיכת הסנטורים בבקשה כי אינווייה ישהה הגשת התחיקה עד למפגש מנהיג הרוב עם הנשיא.

7. הסנטורים קסטן ואינווייה (אשר קשה להפליג בשבחי מעורבותם הפיזית והרגשית במערכה), וכל השושבינים, חוזרים ומדגישים הציפיה (ולעיתים התחינה) כי ישראל תסייע למאבקם הבלתי-שגרתי ועתיר המחלוקות ע"י הימנעות ממעשים והתבטאויות נמהרים (לפחות) בחודשים הקרובים. הדגש הוא על הפרופיל, העתוי (והכוונה לעתוי של בקור אח"מים מארה"ב) והצבע המלווים את נושא ההתנחלויות. הדגש איננו על שינוי מדינות ההתנחלויות. אמנם אין הסכמה עם מדיניות ההתנחלויות, אך יש הסכמה כי על הנושא להיות נדון במו"מ בין ישראל לשכנותיה ולא להיצמד לתחיקה ב"גבעה".

8. אמנם היקף השושבינות (העשוי להתרחב) מרשים, אך אין לקבלו כנתון קבוע עד מועד ההצבעה. יש לשקוד על טיפוחו ושימורו היומיומיים כדי למנוע ירסומו ע"י יוזמות ממשל (אשר לא ירה עדין את מטחיו האחרונים), ע"י יוזמות קונגרסיונאליות (כגון יוזמת ליייה לקיצוץ בערכויות בגין תקציב ההתנחלויות), ע"י רפיון אפשרי של החזית היהודית וע"י צעדים אלו או אחרים בישראל.

9. יש לשקול העלאת יוזמה נגדית/משלימה לזו של ליייה, כמו גם יוזמות אחרות לקידום משימת טיפוח היקף השושבינות ולעיקור מגמות שליליות.

10. יש לנצל הדחייה (כנראה עד פברואר) להעברת מסרים לכל הסנטורים, צירי ביה"נ ועוזריהם באופן אישי. לשם כך יש לחגבר הנוכחות במומחים ישראלים (השולטים בנושאים ובשפה!) בהיבטים המדיניים, כלכליים ואנושיים, אשר ינחילו המידע הן לאוכלוסית ה"גבעה" והן לגורמים הלא-יהודים והיהודים המקיימים קשר עם ה"גבעה".

11. יש להימנע מהיענות מרומזת, וודאי שלא מפורשת, להצעה של הממשל להפסיק הפעולות בנדון עד תום מועד הדחייה. הורדה מתח הפעילות תיפגע קשות באתדות השורה היהודית, תכרסם בחזית התמיכה ב"גבעה", תשדר מסר מטעה על רמת החשיבות המוענקת לנושא, תאפשר לממשל להשיג יעדיו, ותיפגע הן בעניין והן

בקסטן ואינווייה אשר נרתמו לנושא ברמ"ח אבריהם.

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
הסברה, אוצר, כהן, כלכליתב'

סססס

1/11

1190

שמור/מייד

אל: מצפ"א
דע: חזתי"ם
מאח: ק. לקונגרס

הנדון: ביהנ"ב - ועידת חמים בתורכיה

1. רצ"ב מכתב ששוגר אחמול (25/9) לנשיא בוש, בנושא ועידת חמים וחודעת סוריה על השתתפותה המותנית בוועידה אם ישראל תש/תתף אף היא. החותמים 52 במספר משבחים הנשיא על החלטתו לא להתיר השתתפות ארה"ב בוועידה וקוראים לו להעביר מסר למ"מ סוריה שהשתתפותה חיונית לקידום השלום. פעילות סוריה מעוררת השאלה בדבר התחייבות סוריה למזכיר בייקר להכנס למו"מ עם ישראל. המכתב ביוזמת הקונגרסמן חל לויין שעבד על המכתב עם ג'ויס טטאר.

2. במקביל שיגרו אמש 52 החוקקים מכתב לנשיא אוזל בו מביעים הבנה למצב הפוליטי העדין אליו נקלע בעקבות חודעת סוריה ושאר מדינות ערב על חרמת הוועידה אם ישראל תשתתף ומבקשים ממנו למצוא פתרון.

יחודית ורנאי דרנגר
ארכיון ורנאי דרנגר

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including names and dates, such as '10/11/95' and '11/11/95'.

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

September 25, 1991

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

As you are aware, Syria has recently raised an objection to Israeli participation in the Middle East Water Summit that Turkish President Turgut Ozal will be hosting in Istanbul November 4-8. We wish to commend you on the reports that the United States will not attend the Middle East Water Summit if an invitation is not extended to Israel. We share your view that Israel's non-participation would jeopardize the peace process, puts at risk the legitimacy of the conference, and impedes future confidence building measures in the region.


However, we urge you to make it clear to the Syrian government that its participation in the conference along with Israel is essential for the promotion of peace in the region and for the reinforcement of a confidence building framework. Syria's actions call into question its commitment to Secretary Baker to enter into peace negotiations with Israel at the upcoming comprehensive Middle East peace conference.


The organizers of this summit, the Global Water Summit Initiative, have correctly identified water as a critical factor of concern to all parties in the region. This Summit is the first of a planned series of incremental steps that will lead to the formation of an institutionalized framework for the provision of adequate and secure water supplies for all peoples in the region. The Water Summit will help enhance, not aggravate, the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

We urge you to embrace this private initiative as a symbol of U.S. steadfastness in its commitment to the Middle East peace process by explaining to the leadership of Syria that its conditional participation in the conference is unacceptable.

We wish you and Mr. Baker much success in bringing the states of the Middle East into direct negotiations and in attaining peace and security for the region.

Sincerely,


Mel Levine
Member of Congress

1120
2/11

James H. Scheuer
Member of Congress

1120

3/11

Howard L. Berman
Howard L. Berman
Member of Congress

Mleana Ros-Latini
Mleana Ros-Latini
Member of Congress

Lawrence J. Smith
Lawrence J. Smith
Member of Congress

Jim Ramstad
Jim Ramstad
Member of Congress

Sander M. Levin
Sander M. Levin
Member of Congress

Frank Pallone, Jr.
Frank Pallone, Jr.
Member of Congress

Frank Annunzio
Frank Annunzio
Member of Congress

Sam Gerjensen
Sam Gerjensen
Member of Congress

Robert J. Mrazek
Robert J. Mrazek
Member of Congress

Anthony C. Bailenson
Anthony C. Bailenson
Member of Congress

Michael R. McNulty
Michael R. McNulty
Member of Congress

Dick Swett
Dick Swett
Member of Congress

Frank R. Wolf
Frank R. Wolf
Member of Congress

Norman F. Lent
Norman F. Lent
Member of Congress

Gary L. McKeeman
Gary L. McKeeman
Member of Congress

Martin Frost
Martin Frost
Member of Congress

1120

4/11

Henry A. Waxman

Henry A. Waxman
Member of Congress

Ted Weiss

Ted Weiss
Member of Congress

Richard J. Durbin

Richard J. Durbin
Member of Congress

Diak Zimmer

Diak Zimmer
Member of Congress

Robert T. Matsui

Robert T. Matsui
Member of Congress

Les AuCoin

Les AuCoin
Member of Congress

Jose E. Serrano

Jose E. Serrano
Member of Congress

Edolphus Towns

Edolphus Towns
Member of Congress

Tom Lantos

Tom Lantos
Member of Congress

Nail Abramowitz

Nail Abramowitz
Member of Congress

Jim Bacchus

Jim Bacchus
Member of Congress

Barbara B. Kennelly

Barbara B. Kennelly
Member of Congress

Sidney R. Yates

Sidney R. Yates
Member of Congress

George E. Brown, Jr.

George E. Brown, Jr.
Member of Congress

Edward F. Feighan

Edward F. Feighan
Member of Congress

Ronald V. Dellums

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

1120 5/11

Randy "Duke" Cunningham
Randy "Duke" Cunningham
Member of Congress

Major R. Owens
Major R. Owens
Member of Congress

Mike Kopetski
Michael J. Kopetski
Member of Congress

Ron Macthly
Ronald K. Macthly
Member of Congress

James H. Billray
James H. Billray
Member of Congress

Steve Schiff
Steven Schiff
Member of Congress

Charles B. Rangel
Charles B. Rangel
Member of Congress

Barney Frank
Barney Frank
Member of Congress

Vic Fazio
Vic Fazio
Member of Congress

Robert K. Dornan
Robert K. Dornan
Member of Congress

John J. LaFalca
John J. LaFalca
Member of Congress

William J. Hughes
William J. Hughes
Member of Congress

Lane Evans
Lane Evans
Member of Congress

Barbara Boor
Barbara Boor
Member of Congress

Bernard J. Dwyer
Bernard J. Dwyer
Member of Congress

Eliot L. Engel
Eliot L. Engel
Member of Congress

1120 6/11

Bill Green
Bill Green
Member of Congress

George Miller
George Miller
Member of Congress

2

1120
7/11

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

September 25, 1991

H.E. Mr. Turgut Ozal
President
Republic of Turkey
Ankara, Turkey

Dear Mr. President:

We in Congress applaud your efforts in hosting the Middle East Water Summit, November 4-8, 1991, which is being convened by the Global Water Summit Initiative.

The Middle East Water Summit could not be more timely. We commend your foresight in recognizing cooperation on water issues as a critical component of stability in the Middle East. We have watched with keen interest your worthwhile efforts in this area and offer our wholehearted support for the future of this initiative.

It has come to our attention that Syria has raised an objection to the participation of Israel at the Summit. Due to Syria's opposition and the subsequent threat of an Arab boycott, an invitation to Israel has regrettably been delayed.

It is clear to members of Congress that the Middle East Summit offers Syria, and the entire region, tremendous opportunities with respect to donor involvement and investment in the water infrastructure of the region. Real regional solutions to the water crisis are unattainable without Israeli participation. Israel's non-participation would jeopardize the peace process, call into question the legitimacy of the conference, and impede future confidence building measures in the region.

We understand the delicate political situation in which this turn of events has placed you. However, we are confident in your abilities to clarify the international nature of the Summit to the leadership of Syria, and to find a solution that will ensure Israel's participation.

Sincerely,



Mel Levine
Member of Congress



James H. Scheuer
Member of Congress

Howard L. Berman
Howard L. Berman
Member of Congress

1120
Milena Ros-Lehtinen
Milena Ros-Lehtinen
Member of Congress

8/11

Lawrence J. Smith
Lawrence J. Smith
Member of Congress

Jim Ramstad
Jim Ramstad
Member of Congress

Sander M. Levin
Sander M. Levin
Member of Congress

Frank Pallone, Jr.
Frank Pallone, Jr.
Member of Congress

Frank Annunzio
Frank Annunzio
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Sam Gerjenson
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Member of Congress

Robert J. Mrazek
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Anthony C. Bailenson
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Michael R. McIntyre
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Member of Congress

Dick Swett
Dick Swett
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Frank R. Wolf
Frank R. Wolf
Member of Congress

Norman F. Lent
Norman F. Lent
Member of Congress

Gary L. Ackerman
Gary L. Ackerman
Member of Congress

Martin Frost
Martin Frost
Member of Congress

1120

9/11

Henry A. Waxman
Henry A. Waxman
Member of Congress

Ted Weiss
Ted Weiss
Member of Congress

Richard J. Durbin
Richard J. Durbin
Member of Congress

Dick Zinner
Dick Zinner
Member of Congress

Robert T. Matsui
Robert T. Matsui
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Les AuCoin
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Member of Congress

José E. Serrano
José E. Serrano
Member of Congress

Edolphus Towns
Edolphus Towns
Member of Congress

Tom Lantos
Tom Lantos
Member of Congress

Neil Abernethy
Neil Abernethy
Member of Congress

Jim Backus
Jim Backus
Member of Congress

Barbara B. Kennelly
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Sidney R. Yates
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George E. Brown, Jr.
George E. Brown, Jr.
Member of Congress

Edward F. Feighan
Edward F. Feighan
Member of Congress

Ronald V. Dellums
Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

1120

10/11

Randy Dale Curvington
Randy "Dale" Curvington
Member of Congress

Major R. Owens
Major R. Owens
Member of Congress

Michael J. Kopetaki
Michael J. Kopetaki
Member of Congress

Ronald K. Machtley
Ronald K. Machtley
Member of Congress

James H. Bilbray
James H. Bilbray
Member of Congress

Steven Schiff
Steven Schiff
Member of Congress

Charles B. Fangel
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Barney Frank
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Vic Fazio
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Eliot L. Engel
Eliot L. Engel
Member of Congress

1120

Bill Green

Bill Green
Member of Congress

George Miller

George Miller
Member of Congress

11/11

אאא, חוזם: 20999

אל: רהמש/1060

מ-: ווש, נר: 2087, חא: 250991, זח: 2130, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בכבב

סודי ביותר / מידי

אל: רוה'מ

שה'ח (הועבר לג'י)

דע: מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

יקר:

אני יודע שהיית תומך אמיתי בתהליך - כי אתה מאמין שזה לטובת שתי מדינותנו. טוב לאזור וטוב ליחסים. למרות הקשיים של השבועות האחרונים - נוכל להרכיב תהליך, בסיסית על-פי גישת ישראל שיאפשר לכם לשבת במו'מ פנים מול פנים עם שכניכם, ותהייה הזדמנות למו'מ ישיר. אני יודע ששמת לב לדברי הנשיא על ציונות-גזענות. נמשיך לפעול למען כך. אני אופטימי - בפרט אם תהליך השלום יתקדם. כוונתי לפחות לתחילת המו'מ. אנו רוצים לעשות זאת מהר. דניס אמר לי, שזלמן שאל אותו לגבי השמועות כאילו התחייבנו כלפי מישוא, תצטרך לסגת לגבולות '67. אני רוצה שתדעו לחלוטין זה בלתי נכון ובלתי מדוייק. אמרתי קודם שלגבי מכתב ההתחייבויות, לכל אחד אמרנו, שלושה עקרונות:

1. בלי סודות. כולם ידעו לאחר הסיכומים. ולכן לא יהיו מכתבים סותרים.
2. שום שנוי עמדות בסיסיות. ולכן שמועות שכאלו אנו תומכים בהחזרת כל השטחים תמורת שלום, אילו זה היה, זה מהווה שיוני במדינותנו.
3. שום שינוי במתווה וצורת פרשנויות שונות על 242 - והמו'מ עצמו הוא שיצטרך לקבוע את מה זה מבטא. מדיניות ארה'ב היא ש - 242 היא 'שטחים מורת שלום'. ואמרתי שאם אשאל אומר זאת. אבל המו'מ הוא שיקבע את המשמעות המדוייקת של 242. רציתי להבהיר זאת לכם. עמדתנו גם ש-242 ישים לכל החזיתות. גם איננו תומכים בהקמת מדינה פלשטינית עצמאית. כל עמדותינו אלו נהייה חופשיים לבטא - בעיקר אם נישאל. אך לא הבטחנו ולא נבטיח לאף אחד תוצאות התהליך שעשויות לשנות את העמדות המדיניות שלנו. זה חל על המו'מ עם סוריה, עם הפלשטינים ועם ירדן.

דניס וזלמן שוחחו על טיוטת MOU. אמרתי לרוה'מ שאשמח לעשות MOU או מכתב התחייבויות - לפי רצונכם. אני גם אמרתי שהייתי מעדיף לא להיכנס לכך עם הצדדים האחרים - וסביר להניח שגם הם ירצו MOU אם ניתן לכם. אינני יודע אם MOU טעון אישור ממשלתכם?

אמרתי שמכתב ההתחייבויות שלנו מחייב את ממשלת ארה'ב שלא תצריך התחייבויות שלכם כלפינו - בעוד ש - MOU זה דו-סיטרי. עליכם להחליט.

בקשר לשאלת ההזמנות לא נירצה לנהל מו'מ על כל מילה ומילה עם כל הצדדים - אך לא נירצה להפתיעם. זה עלול היה להביא לאי הבנות. אתם רוצים שינויים מסויימים - כנראה נוכל להענות לכמה מהם וגם מהבקשות של הצדדים האחרים. אנחנו עדיין מקווים לשלוח את ההזמנות לא יאחר מהשבוע השלישי באוקטובר - כדי שפתיחת הוועידה תהיה בסביבות ה - 29, 30 באוקטובר. אנו חייבים לכם תשובה על המשלחת הפלשטינית, זה מובן. הם חייבים לנו תשובה. אני מקווה

שבקרוב נראה פלשתינאים מהשטחים (מודגש: מהשטחים) משוחחים בעמאן עם הירדנים. לא החלטתי עדיין אם נחזור לאזור - אך אהיה מוכן לעשות זאת אם זה יעזור. טרם החלטתי - ואבקש את דעתך. אני רוצה להמשיך לעבוד בהידוק אתך ועם רוח'מ. אני חושב שלא היו הפתעות, ואינני רוצה שיהיו - ורק קשר הדוק (מודגש: הדוק) יבטיח זאת. אני מרגיש שהקונגרס בארה"ב בענין הערכויות סבור שיש לדחות את הענין ל-120 יום עפ"י בקשת הנשיא. אולי עוד יקח זמן עד לליכון כל השאלות. זה מה שרצינו כדי להשלים את סדורי תהליך השלום על-פי גישתכם. אמרתי לרוה'מ בזמנו שאני מבין את חוסר היכולת של רוח'מ להיענות אז לבקשת הדחייה, במיוחד לאור דיוני התקציב. אך אולי עכשיו למשך 100 = הימים הקרובים נשים זאת הצידה ונשלים את הסידורים לקראת תהליך השלום. שה'ח: נדבר בגילוי לב - כתמיד. ראשית ברצוני להודות בשם העם והממשלה בישראל, ובשם כל יהודי, על דבריו החמים של השניא באו'מ, על 'ציונות-גזענות'. הדברים של הנשיא ביטאו ערכים של חופש, צדק וראייה נכונה של הרעיון הציוני. יהיו הוויכוחים אשר יהיו - יש תחומים שבהם גם העשייה וגם נקיטת עמדה ע"י ארה"ב, ישארו תמיד בליבנו, ויש יותר מהכרת טובה על הפינה החמה בלב. זה אמור לגבי המאמצים בתקופות השונות לשיחרור אחינו ממסך הברזל, וכן לגבי יהדות אתיופיה ומקומות אחרים. אלה השעות היפות של יחסינו והוכחה לגדולת ארה"ב. הייתי רוצה לשחף אותך בעצבות שהייתה לי הבוקר בקשר לאו'מ. אני מקווה שלא יהיה, כמו בענין הערכויות - תמיכה חמה מחד, ובצוע מאידך. נידחה. אני מקווה שלא כך יהיה.

אני רוצה להעלות נקודה טרייה שהתעוררה: מצריים נתנה ידה לקבלת החלטה בליגה הערבית להחרפת החרם על ישראל. זה נוגד רוח השלום ומחויבותה של מצריים. זה לא תורם לאווירה ולאנרציה הדרושה להתקדם למטרה הרצויה.

בייקר:

ראשית - אנו משתדלים ממש ברגע זה לסייע ליהודים בזאיר לצאת יחד עם אזרחינו. אני לא בטוח אם הכנתי את הערתך לגבי העצב שכליכך. שה'ח: עפ"י שמועות בפרוזדורי האו'מ - ההצבעה על ביטול ציונות-גזענות תהיה תלויה בהתנייות מדיניות.

בייקר:

(מנענע ראשו בשלילה) נעשה מאמצינו ללא קשר לאיזה שהוא נושא אחר - אך עלינו להיות מודעים להשפעה שעלולה להיות לתהליך השלום - למשל, אם כל יני צדיים יציעו תיקונים לביטול - כגון דרישה ל'הגדרה עצמית' לפלשתינים, ואנו רוצים למנוע זאת. ארה"ב (מודגש: ארה"ב) איננה מתנה את המאמץ שלה בשום תנאי מדיני. נשקול יחד עמכם את הדרך הטובה ביותר כדי להתקדם ללא תיקונים שאינם מקובלים עליכם ועלינו. בענין ההערה על החרם - אני אפעל עוד היום בשיחה עם עבדל מגיד. (דניס רוס) - ונמשיך את הטיפול גם אח'כ. שה'ח: מודה על העזרה בזאיר (ומוסר פרטים על מה שקורה בזאיר). לגבי תהליך השלום - קשורות בו התפתחויות שפוגעות בחחושת השלמות שהיתה קיימת עד עכשיו. והדברים נובעים מכל מיני ידיעות על הצהרות כוונות המיוחסות אליך - ושמביאות אט אט למשבר אמון. חוזרים הדברים למצב שהיה פעם שמזכיר המדינה לא יכול לדבר אתנו ישירות ועכשיו אנו שומעים על דברי 'הפקיד הככיר' - וזה כואב. אנו הרי במצב שאנו מדברים בצורה גלויה ביותר - אגם אם יש אי-הבנות ואפילו אם אחא אומר דברים בנוקשות - כך למדנו לעבוד יחד. לדבר באופן הגלוי והישיר - וההודעות מהמטוס מ'פקיד בכיר', מאמרים של תום פרידמן - יוצרים אווירה קשה מאוד. אתה יודע שבצדק יש חששות בישראל. עברנו תקופות קשות מאוד ושילמנו מחיר כבד, והנה תהליך שיפתח תקוות חדשות. יש, בכל זאת, לבטים קשים מאוד ואנו מחקדמים ומעריכים את העובדה הקשה שאתה משקיע - וחבל שידיעות כאלו מעיבות על כל מה שהושג. אם תהיה תוצאה בכל מה שאנו משקיעים - זה יהיה בראש ובראשונה לאמון שאנו רוחשים לארה"ב, ובצדק. לו במקום ארה"ב היה גורם אחר - בודאי לא היה

קיים אותו אמון. כמה דברים פרדוכסליים: ואציין נקודה שנראית לי מכרעת ואיך הערכים עלולים לקלוט אותה. עמדת ארה"ב 'רוצה היטב ובוודאי שלא נחיימר לשנותה, ובאותה מידה, כשאומרים: 'זוהי עמדת ארה"ב' - הערכים קולטים שזו תהיה מחויבות אמריקנית, ערכות אמריקנית, לתוצאות התהליך. זה נדגדג ללוגיקה של מו'מ. אי אפשר לומר שהמו'מ הישיר ייקבע את התוצאות - ומצד שני, השושבין הראשי אומר: זו עמדתנו. במצב של מו'מ עדין מאוד אמירת העמדה הזאת היא גם קביעת עמדה מדינית שיכולה לקבוע את תוצאות המו'מ. שמתי לב לדבריך - אם לא נשאלת (לגבי עמדת ארה"ב) - אתה בוודאי תישאל. זו בעייה קשה וזה הופך את היוצרות. זאת אבקש לקחת בחשבון כאשר ההסכמות יסוכמו. הערכים יגיבו, למשל, שיש כבר התחייבות אמריקנית ל'שטחים תמורת שלום'. אי אפשר להתעלם מעמדותיכם - אז מה התרומה שאתם חביעו אותה מחדש? ויש עוד דבר פרובלמטי - מה מבין מזה אסד? וכבר נאמרו דברים שלא תאמו את הדברים שאנו מעוניינים בהם. יש כאן דבר שמאוד מאוד מקשה. הוא מקשה מבחינת תחושת האמון והבטחון של הישראלים. זה מוסיף לאווירה הלא כל כך טובה שנוצרה בגלל ענין אחר (הערבויות). אם מדובר באווירה ובאקלים חיובי-זה מקשה. אני רוצה לסמוך על התכונה שצריכה לנווט אותנו.

הנושא השלישי: האם ההזמנות יצאו בטרם סיכמנו הדברים שעלינו לסכם עדיין? האם הסוגיות השונות, גם הפרוצדורליות יסוכמו לפני הוצאת ההזמנות? אני מבין שענין המישלחת הפלשתינית טרם סודר. האם יש הבנה ביננו שנדע מי האנשים שישתתפו במשלחת. אלה שאלות מהותיות. צריך לראות שכשמגיעים לוועידה לא יתעוררו דברים לא סגורים. שלא תהיה במה להתנצחויות. לא על כך עבדת כל כך קשה.

אשר לדברים שנאמרים לגבי עמדת ארה"ב על תחולת 242 בכל הגזרות אם נישאל, זו יכלה להיות פצצת זמן. אפילו עכשיו אם תואמר זאת לעתונאים. אנחנו מצוים בזהירות כדי שהערכים לא יסיקו מסקנות מוטעות שיקשו אח"כ. אני מקוה שהעבודה שדנים ושובל התחילו בה תסוכם עוד לפני הוצאת ההזמנות. לגבי ביקור נוסף שלך-אני בעד. כדי שלא יהיה 'טלפון שבור'.

בייקר-אני רוצה להתייחס לדבריך. לפני שנהיית שר החוץ היה לנו מאמץ מתמשך לתהליך השלום, שדי התקדם-אך אופיין תמיד בהאשמות הדדיות בעתונות. הפעם זה לא היה-אם כי גם לכם 'פקידים בכירים', ויש הצהרות מפי 'מקורבים של ווה'מ' שמפריעות-התעלמנו מהם ונמשיך להתעלם. אך לעיתים יש הצהרות ON RECORD שמפריעות. אני יודע שאתה ומישה ורוה'מ מייד

הסתייגתם מדברי זאבי על הנשיא. אך לפעמים יש הצהרות מדיניות שאני מתעלם מהן ואינני מודע לשום הסתייגות בכירה מדברים אלה או אחרים של שר השיכון ואחרים. לכן דברי 'הפקיד הבכיר' אינם בבחינת ענין חד צדדי-אך לא נתן לדברים כאלה להפריע להתקדמות. לגבי הנקודה השניה: שום דבר לא רחוק יותר מהאמת מאשר שאנחנו נבטיח לערכים תוצאה מסויימת. הם רוצים בכך-אך לא עשינו ולא נעשה זאת. אבל בעת ובעונה אחת-יש הבדלים מסוימים בעמדותנו ולא תוכלו לדרוש מאיתנו לשנות זאת. הערכים לא מאושרים מעמדותינו. אסד מאד לא מאושר, הוא רוצה מכתב שיהיה בו שינוי בעמדותינו ולא נעשה זאת.

אם תישאל מה עמדתכם בענין 242 אתה תאמר את עמדתכם. אם אני אשאל-אומר המו'מ יקבע את הפרוש-עמדת ארה"ב ידועה, ולא אסטה מזה, אך לא אמרנו שאנחנו תומכים בתוצאה זו או אחרת. לא נתמוך בהקמת מדינה פלשתינית-אך לא נואמר ש-242 לא חל על כל הגזרות-ותמיד אמרנו הפוך. אסד רוצה שנשנה את עמדותינו ולא נסכים. אמרתי שלא נרצה הפחעות. אנו חייבים תשובה בקשר למשלחת הפלשתינאית. וגם לנו חייבים תשובה מהפלשתינאים והירדנים. אל תדאגו- לא נשלח לכם הזמנה עד שניתן לכם תשובה בנושא הנ"ל.

אם עמדתכם שאיננו רשאים להצהיר על עמדותיה המסורתיות-אימרו לנו שאינכם מעוניינים בתהליך הזה. אך לא נתמוך בתוצאה מסוימת החורגת מעמדותינו המסורתיות-בניגוד למה שהערכים רוצים מאיתנו. אבל אנחנו צריכים להיות חופשיים להצהיר על עמדותינו. אנו משתדלים, די בהצלחה, לקדם התהליך עפ"י עקרונותיכם.

שה'ת: יש לי הצעה קונסטרוקטיבית. איננו דורשים מכם לשנות עמדותיכם אך יש מי שרוצה להתפס בזה ולתת לכך פרוש שונה ממה שאחם רוצים. אתם לא צריכים לחזור כל פעם על עמדותיכם. הן ידועות.

בייקר: אתה מבקש שנחשה לגבי עמדות ידועות שלנו- יהיה עלינו לכלול אותן במכתבי ההכטחות שניתנו לצדדים השונים-לפלשתינאים, לירדנים ולסורים-תוך שאנו מבטיחים שלא נשנה את עמדותינו-אינני מכין את דרישתך. אמרנו זאת לכל הצדדים.

שה'ת: לא ביקשנו שתשנו את עמדותיכם או שתאמצו את שלנו-אבל שושבין ראשי כול להמנע מהבעה פומבית, שכן הערכים יראו בכך קו מנחה לעמדות שלכם-ובישראל יגברו החששות לגבי התהליך. אני חושב שזה COUNTER PRODUCTIVE

בייקר: אם אינכם רוצים ללכת לוועידה, אל תלכו.

שה'ת: לא על כך אנו מדברים.

בייקר: רציתם לשמוע עמדותינו למשל נגד מדינה פלשתינית-הערכים רצו לשמוע מה שחשוב להם. עלינו להיות מסוגלים לאמר: זו עמדת ארה"ב. במסמכים אנו אומרים שמה ש-242 אומר זה אשר יקבע במו"מ הישיר. מה ש-242 מחייב-זב בעצם נשוא המו"מ.

שה'ת: זה בסדר, אין לי הסתייגות מכך.

דניס: אתם חוששים שאם אנחנו מצהירים על עמדה שלנו-הוא שיקבע את תוצאות המו"מ. אבל אנחנו לא הגדרנו את התוצאות-זה תלוי במו"מ. לו חשבו הערכים שבאמת עמדותינו קובעות התוצאות, מדוע הם כל כך דורשים מאתנו לשנות את עמדותינו?

שה'ת: אין לי בעיות עם 242-יישומה וכו' זה נשוא המו"מ-למה אנחנו צריכים להוסיף לזה כותרת? זה לא טוב בישראל בימים אלה וזה לא טוב לגבי הערכים. למה אנחנו צריכים להעמיד את זה ככ? יש אחרים שמפרשים זאת אחרת- וזה לא טוב לתהליך.

בייקר: אמור לי בדיוק מה אתה רוצה שלא נעשה.

שה'ת: בימים שכל אחד רוצה לחפש את המכשול שלו, אנחנו לא צריכים לתת את המיכשול לאף אחד. 242, הגבולות יסוכם בין הצדדים.

בייקר, דניס: זה בדיוק מה שאנחנו אומרים.

שה'ת: לאמר שזוהי עמדה של 'שטחים תמורת שלום' היום מזיק.

שובל: אתם הפכתם את הנוסחה ' שטחים ' תמורת שלום'-שאגב אינה מופיעה
ב-242-למעיןן סיטמה, ואתם מחעלמים לגמרי מהמרכיבים הבטחוניים,
למשל, ב-242-וזה לא טוב.

בייקר: זו נקודה נכונה, זו הצעה טובה.

שובל: זו אינה הצעה אלא הערה.

שובל

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), שהח, ששהח, מנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 20999

אל: רהמש/1060

מ-: ווש, נר: 2087, חא: 250991, זח: 2130, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בכב

סודי ביותר / מידי

אל: רוה' מ

שה' ח (הועבר לנ' י')

דע: מנהל מצפ' א

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

בייקר:

א יודע שהיית תומך אמיתי בתהליך - כי אתה מאמין שזה לטובת שתי מדינותנו. טוב לאזור וטוב ליחסים. למרות הקשיים של השבועות האחרונים - נוכל להרכיב תהליך, בסיסית על-פי גישת ישראל שיאפשר לכם לשבת במו'מ פנים מול פנים עם שכניכם, ותהייה הזדמנות למו'מ ישיר. אני יודע ששמת לב לדברי הנשיא על ציונות-גזענות. נמשיך לפעול למען כך. אני אופטימי - בפרט אם תהליך השלום יתקדם. כוונתי לפחות לתחילת המו'מ. אנו רוצים לעשות זאת מהר. דניס אמר לי, שזלמן שאל אותו לגבי השמועות כאילו התחייבנו כלפי מישהוא, תצטרך לסגת לגבולות '67. אני רוצה שתדעו לחלוטין זה בלתי נכון ובלתי מדוייק. אמרתי קודם שלגבי מכתב ההתחייבויות, לכל אחד אמרנו, שלושה עקרונות:

1. בלי סודות. כולם ידעו לאחר הסיכומים. ולכן לא יהיו מכתבים סותרים.
2. שום שנוי עמדות בסיסיות. ולכן שמועות שכאילו אנו תומכים בהחזרת כל השטחים תמורת שלום, אילו זה היה, זה מהווה שיוני במדיניותנו.
3. שום שינוי במתווה וצורת פרשנויות שונות על 242 - והמו'מ עצמו הוא שיצטרך לקבוע את מה זה מבטא. מדיניות ארה'ב היא ש - 242 היא 'שטחים תמורת שלום'. ואמרתי שאם אשאל אומר זאת. אבל המו'מ הוא שיקבע את ההחלטות המדוייקת של 242. רציתי להבהיר זאת לכם. עמדתנו גם ש-242 ישים לנ' החזיתות. גם איננו תומכים בהקמת מדינה פלשטינית עצמאית. כל עמדותינו אלו נהייה חופשיים לבטא - בעיקר אם נישאל. אך לא הבטחנו ולא נכטיח לאף אחד תוצאות התהליך שעשויות לשנות את העמדות המדיניות שלנו. זה חל על המו'מ עם סוריה, עם הפלשטינים ועם ירדן.

דניס וזלמן שוחחו על טיוטת MOU. אמרתי לרוה' מ שאשמח לעשות MOU או מכתב התחייבויות - לפי רצונכם. אני גם אמרתי שהייתי מעדיף לא להיכנס לכך עם הצדדים האחרים - וסביר להניח שגם הם ירצו MOU אם ניתן לכם. אינני יודע אם MOU טעון אישור ממשלתכם?

אמרתי שמכתב ההתחייבויות שלנו מחייב את ממשלת ארה'ב שלא תצריך התחייבויות שלכם כלפינו - בעוד ש - MOU זה דו-סיטרי. עליכם להחליט.

בקשר לשאלת ההזמנות לא נירצה לנהל מו'מ על כל מילה ומילה עם כל הצדדים - אך לא נירצה להפתיעם. זה עלול היה להביא לאי הבנות. אתם רוצים שינויים מסויימים - כנראה נוכל להענות לכמה מהם וגם מהבקשות של הצדדים האחרים. אנחנו עדיין מקווים לשלוח את ההזמנות לא יאוחר מהשבוע השלישי באוקטובר - כדי שפתיחת הוועידה תהיה בסביבות ה - 29, 30 באוקטובר. אנו חייבים לכם תשובה על המשלחת הפלשטינית, זה מובן. הם חייבים לנו תשובה. אני מקווה שבקרוב נראה פלשטינאים מהשטחים (מודגש: מהשטחים) משוחחים בעמאן עם הירדנים. לא החלטתי עדיין אם נחזור לאזור - אך אהיה מוכן לעשות זאת אם

זה יעזור. טרם החלטתי - ואבקש את דעתך. אני רוצה להמשיך לעבוד בהידוק אתך ועם רוח'מ. אני חושב שלא היו הפתעות, ואינני רוצה שיהיו - ורק קשר הדוק (מודגש: הדוק) יבטיח זאת. אני מרגיש שהקונגרס בארה"ב בענין הערביות סבור שיש לדחות את הענין ל- 120 יום עפ'י בקשת הנשיא. אולי עוד יקח זמן עד לליבון כל השאלות. זה מה שרצינו כדי להשלים את סדורי תהליך השלום על-פי גישתכם. אמרתי לרוה'מ בזמנו שאני מבין את חוסר היכולת של רוח'מ להיענות אז לבקשת הדחייה, במיוחד לאור דיוני התקציב. אך אולי עכשיו למשך 100 הימים הקרובים נשים זאת הצידה ונשלים את הסידורים לקראת תהליך השלום. שה'ח: נדבר בגילוי לב - כתמיד. ראשית ברצוני להודות בשם העם והממשלה בישראל, ובשם כל יהודי, על דבריו החמים של הנשיא באו'מ, על 'ציונות-גזענות'. הדברים של הנשיא ביטאו ערכים של חופש, צדק וראייה נכונה של הרעיון הציוני. יהיו הוויכוחים אשר יהיו - יש תחומים שבהם גם העשייה וגם נקיטת עמדה ע'י ארה"ב, ישארו תמיד בליבנו. ויש יותר מהכרת טובה על הפינה החמה בלב. זה אמור לגבי המאמצים בתקופות השונות לשיחרור אחינו ממסך הברזל, וכן לגבי יהדות אתיופיה ומקומות אחרים. אלה השעות היפות של יחסינו והוכחה לגדולת ארה"ב. הייתי רוצה ל... אותך בעצבות שהייתה לי הבוקר בקשר לאו'מ. אני מקווה שלא יהיה, כמו בענין הערביות - תמיכה חמה מחד, ובצוע מאידך. נידחה. אני מקווה שלא כך יהיה.

אני רוצה להעלות נקודה טרייה שהתעוררה: מצריים נתנה ידה לקבלת החלטה בליגה הערבית להחרפת החרם על ישראל. זה נוגד רוח השלום ומחוייבותה של מצריים. זה לא תורם לאווירה ולאנרציה הדרושה להתקדם למטרה הרצויה.

בייקר:

ראשית - אנו משתדלים ממש ברגע זה לסייע ליהודים בזאיר לצאת יחד עם אזרחינו. אני לא בטוח אם הבנתי את הערתך לגבי העצב שכליבך. שה'ח: עפ'י שמועות בפרוזדורי האו'מ - ההצבעה על ביטול ציונות-גזענות תהיה תלויה בהתניית מדיניות.

בייקר:

(מנענע ראשו בשלילה) נעשה מאמצים לנושא אחר - אך עלינו להיות מודעים להשפעה שעלולה להיות לתהליך השלום - למשל, אם כל מיני צדיים יציעו תיקונים לביטול - כגון דרישה ל'הגדרה עצמית' ל'אשתינים', ואנו רוצים למנוע זאת. ארה"ב (מודגש: ארה"ב) איננה מתנה את המאמץ שלה בשום תנאי מדיני. נשקול יחד עמכם את הדרך הטובה ביותר כדי להתקדם ללא תיקונים שאינם מקובלים עליכם ועלינו. בענין ההערה על החרם - אני אפעל עוד היום בשיחה עם עבדל מגיד. (דניס רוס) - ונמשיך את הטיפול גם אח'כ. שה'ח: מודה על העזרה בזאיר (ומוסר פרטים על מה שקורה בזאיר). לגבי תהליך השלום - קשורות בו התפתחויות שפוגעות בחחושת השלמות שהיתה קיימת עד עכשיו. והדברים נובעים מכל מיני ידיעות על הצהרות כוונות המיוחסות אליך - ושמביאות את אט למשבר אמון. חוזרים הדברים למצב שהיה פעם שמזכיר המדינה לא יכול לדבר אתנו ישירות ועכשיו אנו שומעים על דברי 'הפקיד הבכיר' - וזה כואב. אנו הרי במצב שאנו מדברים בצורה גלויה ביותר - אגם אם יש אי-הבנות ואפילו אם אתה אומר דברים בנוקשות - כך למדנו לעבוד יחד. לדבר באופן הגלוי והישיר - וההודעות מהמטוס מ'פקיד בכיר', מאמרים של תום פרידמן - יוצרים אווירה קשה מאוד. אתה יודע שבצדק יש חששות בישראל. עברנו תקופות קשות מאוד ושילמנו מחיר כבד, והנה תהליך שיפתח תקוות חדשות. יש, בכל זאת, לבטים קשים מאוד ואנו מתקדמים ומעריכים את העובדה הקשה שאתה משקיע - וחבל שידיעות כאלו מעיבות על כל מה שהושג. אם תהיה תוצאה בכל מה שאנו משקיעים - זה יהיה בראש ובראשונה לאמון שאנו רוחשים לארה"ב, ובצדק. לו במקום ארה"ב היה גורם אחר - בודאי לא היה קיים אותו אמון. כמה דברים פרדוכסליים: ואציין נקודה שנראית לי מכרעת ואיך הערכים עלולים לקלוט אותה. עמדת ארה"ב וועה היטב ובוודאי שלא

נתיימר לשנותה, ובאותה מידה, כשאומרים: 'זוהי עמדת ארה'ב' - הערכים קולטים שזו תהיה מחויבות אמריקנית, ערכות אמריקנית, לתוצאות התהליך. זה נוגד ללוגיקה של מו'מ. אי אפשר לומר שהמו'מ הישיר ייקבע את התוצאות - ומצד שני, השושבין הראשי אומר: זו עמדתנו. במצב של מו'מ עדין מאוד אמירת העמדה הזאת היא גם קביעת עמדה מדינית שיכולה לקבוע את תוצאות המו'מ. שמתי לב לדברייך - אם לא נשאלת (לגבי עמדת ארה'ב) - אתה בוודאי תישאל. זו בעייה קשה וזה הופך את היוצרות. זאת אבקש לקחת בחשבון כאשר ההסכמות יסוכמו. הערכים יגיבו, למשל, שיש כבר התחייבות אמריקנית ל'שטחים תמורת שלום'. אי אפשר להתעלם מעמדותיכם - אז מה התרומה שאתם תביעו אותה מחדש? ויש עוד דבר פרובלמטי - מה מבין מזה אסד? וכבר נאמרו דברים שלא חאמו את הדברים שאנו מעוניינים בהם. יש כאן דבר שמאוד מאוד מקשה. הוא מקשה מבחינת תחושת האמון והבטחון של הישראלים. זה מוסיף לאווירה הלא כל כך טובה שנוצרה בגלל עניין אחר (הערבויות). אם מדובר באווירה ובאקלים חיובי-זה מקשה. אני רוצה לסמוך על התבונה שצריכה לנווט אותנו.

הוא השלישי: האם ההזמנות יצאו בטרם סיכמנו הדברים שעלינו לסכם עדיין? האם הסוגיות השונות, גם הפרוצדורליות יסוכמו לפני הוצאת ההזמנות? אני מבין שעניין המישלחת הפלשתינית טרם סודר. האם יש הבנה ביננו שנדע מי האנשים שישתתפו במשלחת. אלה שאלות מהותיות. צריך לראות שכשמגיעים לוועידה לא יתעוררו דברים לא סגורים. שלא תהיה במה להתנצחויות. לא על כך עבדת כל כך קשה.

אשר לדברים שנאמרים לגבי עמדת ארה'ב על תחולת 242 בכל הגזרות אם נישאל, זו יכולה להיות פצצת זמן. אפילו עכשיו אם תואמר זאת לעתונאים. אנחנו מצווים בזהירות כדי שהערבים לא יסיקו מסקנות מוטעות שיקשו אח'כ. אני מקוה שהעבודה שדניס ושובל התחילו בה תסוכם עוד לפני הוצאת ההזמנות. לגבי ביקור נוסף שלך-אני בעד. כדי שלא יהיה 'טלפון שבור'.

בייקר-אני רוצה להתייחס לדברייך. לפני שנהיית שר החוץ היה לנו מאמץ מתמשך לתהליך השלום, שדי התקדם-אך אופיין חמיד בהאשמות הדדיות בעתונות. הפעם זה לא היה-אם כי גם לכם 'פקידים בכירים', ויש הצהרות מפי 'מקורבים של רוה'מ' שמפריעות-התעלמו מהם ונמשיך להתעלם. אך לעיתים יש הצהרות

ON RECORD שמפריעות. אני יודע שאתה ומישה ורוה'מ מייד הסתייגתם מדברי זאבי על הנשיא. אך לפעמים יש הצהרות מדיניות שאני מתעלם מהן ואינני מודע לשום הסתייגות בכירה מדברים אלה או אחרים של שר השיכון ואחרים. לכן דברי 'הפקיד הבכיר' אינם בבחינת עניין חד צדדי-אך לא נתן לדברים כאלה להפריע להתקדמות. לגבי הנקודה השנייה: שום דבר לא רחוק יותר מהאמת מאשר שאנחנו נבטיח לערבים תוצאה מסויימת. הם רוצים בכך-אך לא עשינו ולא נעשה זאת. אבל בעת ובעונה אחת-יש הבדלים מסוימים בעמדותנו ולא תוכלו לדרוש מאיתנו לשנות זאת. הערכים לא מאושרים מעמדתינו. אסד מאד לא מאושר, הוא רוצה מכתב שיהיה בו שינוי בעמדותינו ולא נעשה זאת.

אם תישאל מה עמדתכם בעניין 242 אתה תאמר את עמדתכם. אם אני אשאל-אומר המו'מ יקבע את הפרוש-עמדת ארה'ב ידועה, ולא אסטה מזה, אך לא אמרנו שאנחנו תומכים בחוצאה זו או אחרת. לא נתמוך בהקמת מדינה פלשתינית-אך לא נואמר ש-242 לא חל על כל הגזרות-ותמיד אמרנו ההפוך. אסד רוצה שנשנה את עמדתינו ולא נסכים. אמרתי שלא נרצה הפתעות. אנו חייבים תשובה בקשר למשלחת הפלשתינאית. וגם לנו חייבים תשובה מהפלשתינאים והירדנים. אל תדאגו- לא נשלח לכם הזמנה עד שניתן לכם תשובה בנושא הנ'ל.

אם עמדתכם שאיננו רשאים להצהיר על עמדותיה המסורתיות-אימרו לנו שאינכם מעוניינים בתהליך הזה. אך לא נתמוך בחוצאה מסוימת התורגת מעמדותינו

המסורתיות-בניגוד למה שהערבים רוצים מאיתנו. אבל אנחנו צריכים להיות חופשיים להצהיר על עמדותינו. אנו משתדלים, די בהצלחה, לקדם התהליך עפ"י עקרונותיכם.

שה'ח: יש לי הצעה קונסטרוקטיבית. איננו דורשים מכם לשנות עמדותיכם אך יש מי שרוצה להתפס בזה ולחת לכך פרוש שונה ממה שאתם רוצים. אתם לא צריכים לחזור כל פעם על עמדותיכם. הן ידועות.

בייקר: אתה מבקש שנחשה לגבי עמדות ידועות שלנו- יהיה עלינו לכלול אותן במכתבי ההבטחות שניתנו לצדדים השונים- לפלשתינאים, לירדנים ולסורים- הן שאנו מנחשים שלא נשנה את עמדותינו- אינני מבין את דרישתך. אמרנו זאת לכל הצדדים.

שה'ח- לא ביקשנו שחשנו את עמדותיכם או שתאמצו את שלנו- אבל שושבין ראשי יכול להמנע מהבעה פומבית, שכן הערבים יראו בכך קו מנחה לעמדות ש-ובישראל יגברו החששות לגבי התהליך.
אני חושב שזה COUNTER PRODUCTIVE

בייקר: אם אינכם רוצים ללכת לוועידה, אל תלכו.

שה'ח: לא על כך אנו מדברים.

בייקר: רציתם לשמוע עמדותינו למשל נגד מדינה פלשתינית-הערבים רצו לשמוע מה שחשוב להם. עלינו להיות מסוגלים לאמר: זו עמדת ארה"ב. במסמכים אנו אומרים שמה ש-242 אומר זה אשר יקבע במו"מ הישיר. מה ש-242 מחייב-זב בעצם נשוא המו"מ.

שה'ח- זה בסדר, אין לי הסתייגות מכך.

דניס: אתם חוששים שאם אנחנו מצהירים על עמדה שלנו-הוא שיקבע את תוצאות המו"מ. אבל אנחנו לא הגדרנו את התוצאות-זה תלוי במו"מ. לו חשבו הערבים שרצו עמדותינו קובעות התוצאות, מדוע הם כל כך דורשים מאתנו לשנות את עמדותינו?

שה'ח- אין לי בעיות עם 242-יישומה וכו' זה נשוא המו"מ-למה אנחנו צריכים להוסיף לזה כותרת? זה לא טוב בישראל בימים אלה וזה לא טוב לגבי הערבים. למה אנחנו צריכים להעמיד את זה ככ? יש אחרים שמפרשים זאת אחרת- וזה לא טוב לתהליך.

בייקר- אמור לי בדיוק מה אתה רוצה שלא נעשה.

שה'ח: בימים שכל אחד רוצה לחפש את המכשול שלו, אנחנו לא צריכים לתת את המיכשול לאף אחד.
242, הגבולות יסוכם בין הצדדים.

בייקר, דניס: זה בדיוק מה שאנחנו אומרים.

שה'ח: לאמר שזוהי עמדה של 'שטחים תמורת שלום' היום מזיק.

שובל: אתם הפכתם את הנוסחה 'שטחים תמורת שלום'-שאגב אינה מופיעה ב-242-למעין סיסמה, ואתם מתעלמים לגמרי מהמרכיבים הבטחוניים,

למשל, ב-242-וזה לא טוב.

בייקר: זו נקודה נכונה, זו הצעה טובה.

שובל: זו אינה הצעה אלא הערה.

שובל

תפוצה: @ (רהמ), שהח, סשהח, מנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

25 September 1991

To: The Honorable Elyskim Rubinstein

From: Gidon Gottlieb

Re: Can a confrontation with the U.S. Administration be avoided over the principle of land for peace, over new settlements and over other final status issues?

Even as it was agreed that final status negotiations will be deferred for three years at least, The United States has begun to make plain what it has in mind for the future of the Territories. The assurance that final status matters will not be tackled at this stage of negotiations is not deterring the Administration from making commitments that will seriously affect final status negotiations to come. President Bush has made his views on settlements, on East Jerusalem and on the principle of land for peace plain for all to hear. The State Department is developing the President's positions piecemeal, bit by bit, in the context of assurances and memoranda of understanding to the parties. This is a process in which the Administration matches assurances to one side with assurances to the other side. The full Administration plan has not been articulated, and in fact it appears to have chosen to fill in the "details" of what it hopes to achieve gradually, as the negotiations develop.

If the process continues in the present fashion, Israel will lose any opportunity it may have to develop a broad agreed position with the United States on what will and what will not be permitted to emerge from the peace process. It is a mistake to believe that a formal agreement to defer final status matters will estop Washington from making commitments to Arab rulers regarding a territorial compromise, Jerusalem, new settlements and so on. The opportunity still exists to halt the drift of the Administration's policies in a direction that the Government of Israel cannot countenance.

We have developed in talks with senior personalities concepts (discussion texts) that have met with considerable interest in Washington. They are designed to address issues that will not be dealt with in the first phase of the peace negotiations but on which an early understanding between Israel and the United States is urgently needed. The senior American personalities we talked to are convinced that these are issues that must in some fashion be addressed now if the peace process is to progress. Without some understanding between the United States and Israel about where the process will lead, they are concerned that the whole effort will fall apart and that the US-Israel relationship will be perhaps irreversibly degraded.

We have reason to believe that these materials could serve as the

basis for an understanding between the Administration and Israel on the direction to be given to the peace process. These materials are designed to be compatible with the national interests of Israel as conceived by its present leadership and with the ideological positions of the Likud led government.

a. We developed a new organizing concept for the political rights of the Palestinians: a non-territorial "Confederation of the Palestinian People and Jordan". Such a confederation would not require the creation of a Palestinian "entity" or state that the Government of Israel is committed to oppose. It would separate between the issue of political rights and territorial questions that would be addressed on another basis (see below). The Confederation would be of a political/economic character only without territorial implications. This concept would make it possible to approach at a later stage of negotiations issues regarding Palestinian political rights without prejudice to territorial matters. Thus, for example, powers that would be denied to the Palestinians at the level of a Palestinian Self Government might be addressed at the Confederal level. (An understanding between Israel and the United States on the character of such a Confederation is all the more necessary since American assurances to the Palestinian side may already include references to a possible Confederation with Jordan).

b. In the first phase of negotiations with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the issue of the "political rights" of the Palestinians would be addressed without prejudice to territorial questions that would be considered at a later stage. It may be appropriate to raise in this context questions relating to the "legitimate political rights of the Jewish people in Palestine (Eretz Israel) rights that were confirmed to the Jews in the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. (These are in the nature of acquired rights that cannot be unilaterally rescinded or modified).

c. We also developed a formula to accommodate the rival ideological claims of Jewish and Palestinian nationalists to the land as a whole. This formula would give a recognized juridical status both to the "Land of Israel" (beyond State limits) and to "Palestine" as a Jewish and Palestinian "homeland" respectively. Practically, this would mean that Jews would enjoy defined national rights in the "Land of Israel" beyond the limits of the State of Israel. This far-fetched suggestion was met with considerable interest by senior personalities.

d. The governing concept for addressing the haunting territorial question is that of overlapping functional boundaries and other lines of demarcation on the paradigm of urban zoning for land use. The creation of what would amount to "soft boundaries" was well received and was viewed as compatible with the principle of land for peace even in the absence of a what is known as a "territorial compromise". This would make room for negotiations on different kinds of security zones, early warning stations, redeployment areas as well as on zones for urban and rural settlement. These principles are in effect inside Israel proper where Jewish and Arab populations live

side by side. The principle that Jews and Arabs live side by side applies equally to all parts of the Land of Israel (Palestine). A challenge to this principle would add grist to the mills of the advocates of the "transfer" of populations. The presence of Jewish populations in the Territories should be addressed on terms similar to those regarding the presence of Arab populations inside Israel.

e. The paramount security concerns of Israel would be addressed at two distinct levels: the balance of power with the Arab states and local security concerns. This requires effective police powers such as "joint" forces that would have to be given extensive powers, certainly in the period preceding final status talks.

f. We were also able to reach a general understanding on how to sidestep the issue of sovereignty and to establish a formal procedure for "self determination" that would consist in an up or down referendum on a negotiated agreement between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

g. There was considerable interest in the Administration in the notion that the establishment of new settlements in the Territories could be "privatized" in order to end the involvement of "state" organs. This interest however dates back a few months and may not have survived the recent pronouncements of the President and of the Secretary of State in this matter.

There are officials in the Administration who insist on old formulas and a vocabulary that the Likud led government cannot countenance. If they are allowed to have the upper hand, the diplomatic process will degenerate into a contest of wills between Prime Minister Shamir and President Bush. Neither side would ultimately gain from such a course of events. We are therefore unabashed advocates of the kind of "new thinking" outlined above that could stymie those in the Administration who relish the prospect of a confrontation with the Shamir government. It might even be possible for the Administration to work out with Jerusalem what would amount to a diplomatic "Hail Mary" (a somewhat inept name in the circumstances) to outflank the colliding positions of the Likud and of the Administration.

21 September 1991

Deconstruction of the Principle of Land for Peace.

The Government of Israel will most probably continue to be confronted with the issue of land for peace. The public commitment of President Bush to land for peace requires that efforts be made to analyse and to "deconstruct" this concept notwithstanding the well known opposition of the Government of Israel to a territorial settlement based on it. The following propositions outline some of the inferences that may be drawn consistently with the principle.

- i. Resolution 242 which is the basis for the principle of land for peace has been formally interpreted by the United States and by Israel in the Camp David Accords. Although the United States is not a "party" to the accords, it cannot in good faith argue that the provisions of the accords conflict with the American interpretation of resolution 242;
- ii. Resolution 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israeli "armed forces" from the Territories; it does not call for the withdrawal of other elements of Israeli presence or authority.
- iii. Under the Camp David Accords, the establishment of a Palestinian Self Government in the Territories constitutes an implementation of resolution 242 so long as Israel does not unilaterally annex the West Bank and Gaza;
- iv. The issue of sovereignty over the Territories is best sidestepped altogether. Various formulae have been suggested for this purpose.
- v. The small size of the Territories requires that future uses of the land be determined in a manner analogous to urban zoning. This determination shall be made in the final status talks.
- vi. The principle of land for peace does not require that Israel disclaim the rights confirmed to the Jewish people in the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. This instrument has not been superseded by any other international agreement that is binding under international law. The Camp David Accords are the only other binding international instrument governing the future of the Territories pending an agreement on their final status.
- vii. The principle of land for peace does not require that Jews be excluded from making their home in Territories that form part of the Land of Israel beyond the limits of the State of Israel;

viii. The principle of land for peace need not apply in equal measure to public lands and to privately owned lands;

ix. The application of the principle of land for peace must take into account the fact that the British Mandatory Administration was the last uncontested holder of title to the public lands of Palestine; Jordanian rule in the West Bank was recognized by the U.K. and by Pakistan only. Egypt claims no title to rule the Gaza district.

x. The principle of land for peace must be applied in a manner consistent with the legitimate security interests of Israel and in a manner that would permit the adoption of other security arrangements between the parties;

xi. The principle of land for peace does not require Israel to waive its claims to the portions of the land of Israel that lie beyond the limits of the State of Israel;

xii. The principle of land for peace does not preclude the right of the Jewish inhabitants of the Territories to govern themselves or to exercise their political rights in the framework of Israeli institutions;

xiii. The principle of land for peace does not preclude the right of Israel to exercise control over access to the Territories by armed elements or persons susceptible of constituting a threat to the security of Israel or of its citizens;

xiv. The principle of land for peace does not preclude the establishment of institutions or agencies common to Israel and to the Arab side governing zoning rules and regulations for the use of lands in the Territories and for their development;

xv. The principle of land for peace does not preclude the legitimacy of arrangements vesting title to public lands in the Territories in new institutions or agencies created by agreement;

xvi. The principle of land for peace does not preclude the legitimacy of agreements that would vest sovereignty over the Territories and their natural resources in common instrumentalities created by the parties to an agreement on the future of the Territories;

xvii. The principle of land for peace does not preclude the legitimacy of the exercise of defined aspects of Israeli jurisdiction beyond the limits of the State of Israel under the terms of an agreement on the future of the Territory;

xviii. The principle of land for peace does not preclude the establishment of bilateral, regional or other common institutions or instrumentalities with authority to exercise jurisdiction in the Territories;

xix. The application of the principle of land for peace under the terms of resolution 242 need not be uniform in all parts of the Territories. It can be phased, differentiated and limited to designated areas;

xx. The principle of land for peace does not require that the lands be placed under the authority of any state, agency or institution that has no better juridical title to the contested lands than the State of Israel;

xxi. The principle of land for peace is not inconsistent with the exercise of Jewish national rights throughout the Land of Israel in the manner contemplated by the international community when it established the Mandate for Palestine that incorporated the Balfour declaration;

xxii. The principle of land for peace is not incompatible with the creation of an international juridical status for a Jewish Homeland beyond the limits of the State of Israel in the areas that lie west of the Jordan river in which Jews would exercise defined national rights in the manner contemplated by the League of Nations mandate;

xxiii. The issue of continued Jewish settlement in the Territories is an integral part of the issue of land for peace pressed by the United States. It is therefore best decided in negotiations between the parties.

xxiv. The principle of land for peace governs "state action" only; it cannot extend to the private activities of private persons not acting on behalf of the state; it cannot be allowed to interfere with the exercise of private property rights.

xxv. The issue of land for peace does not preclude the State of Israel from pressing claims regarding the exercise of the legitimate rights of Jews in the areas of Palestine that lie beyond the limits of the State of Israel.

אאא, חוזם: 20002

אל: רהמש/982

מ-: ווש, נר: 2075, תא: 240991, זח: 1900, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בכבב

סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר

אל : שר החוץ, בנצור - ניו-יורק

לשכת רה'מ'

סמנכל מ. רביב

דע : סביר, ניו-יורק

הציר, וושינגטון

ערבויות.

כך או אחרת יושג תוך ימים אחדים, אולי עוד בשבוע זה, סיכום בין המחוקקים לממשל בשאלת הערבויות. לאור מה שאנו קוראים בעתונים אמריקניים וישראלים, ראוי להזהיר מפני הנזק שבהצגת הדברים כנצחון של הנשיא וכשלונם של ישראל-היהודים-איפאק - וידידי ישראל בגבעה. הצגת הדברים בצורה חד-צדדית כזאת היא נטל כבד על המשך המאבק, שכידוע לא הסתיים עדיין, והיא גם שגויה באופן עובדתי. האמת היא שאכן היה כאן ויכוח לא קל אבל גורמים רבים יצרו את מקבילות הכוחות והתוצאה היא סיכום תרבותי שיש בו היענות לבקשת הנשיא אבל יש בו גם הודעה של הממשל והודעה של המחוקקים על כוונתם לסייע לישראל בקליטת העליה וקביעת מועד לטיפול חקיקתי בשאלה זו. זאת ועוד, היהודים היו מלוכדים כפי שלא היו מאז מלחמת ששת-הימים והתייצבות של שני-שלישים (כמעט) של הסנטורים לימין ישראל (בשאלה שיש בה מעורבות כה גדולה של הנשיא) אינה עניין של מה בכך ובודאי אינה מעידה על שית איפאק.

אם אנחנו נמשיך לומר איש לרעהו ולכתוב בעיתונינו דברים כאלה שנכתבו היום (בין על-ידי עיתונאים ובין ע"י מדינאים כח'כ' רבין) שישראל והיהודים - הובסו, נחליש את כוחם של הידידים ואת רצון היהודים להירתם שוב בעתיד.

יורשה לי על כן להציע ש-:

(א) תצא הודעה מטעם רה'מ' או שהח שיהיה בה 'ספין' חיובי, שתכיע הערכה לאמריקנים, תזכיר את חלקם בפתיחת השערים, את הבטחתם לסייע לנו בקליטה ושהוכח פעם נוספת שידדים יכולים להתגבר על קשיים בצורה ציוילית.

(ב) שדברים ברוח דומה ייאמרו על ידי דוברינו ונציגינו לתקשורת האמריקנית.

(ג) שכך ייאמר ליהודים ושאף הם יתבקשו לנהוג כך.

(ד) שגם מהארץ, בהתבטאות אישים ובתדרוך עתונאים תיוצג הגישה שאין מנצחים ואין מנוצחים ואיש לא איבד מכבודו וממעמדו.

שילה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, רביב, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 20002

אל: רהמש/982

מ-: ווש, נר: 2075, חא: 240991, זח: 1900, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/כהול לבוקר

אל : שר החוץ, בנצור - ניו-יורק

לשכת רה'מ'

סמנכל מ. רביב

דע : סביר, ניו-יורק

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ערהויות.

כך או אחרת יושג תוך ימים אחדים, אולי עוד בשבוע זה, סיכום בין המחוקקים לממשל בשאלת הערכויות. לאור מה שאנו קוראים בעתונים אמריקניים וישראלים, ראוי להזהיר מפני הנזק שבהצגת הדברים כנצחון של הנשיא וכשלונם של ישראל-היהודים-איפאק - וידידי ישראל בגבעה. הצגת הדברים בצורה חד-צדדית כזאת היא נטל כבד על המשך המאבק, שכידוע לא הסתיים עדיין, והיא גם שגויה באופן עובדתי. האמת היא שאכן היה כאן ויכוח לא קל אבל גורמים רבים יצרו את מקבילות הכוחות והתוצאה היא סיכום תרבותי שיש בו היענות לבקשת הנשיא אבל יש בו גם הודעה של הממשל והודעה של המחוקקים על כוונתם לסייע לישראל בקליטת העליה וקביעת מועד לטיפול חקיקתי בשאלה זו. זאת ועוד, היהודים היו מלוכדים כפי שלא היו מאז מלחמת ששת-הימים והחייצבות של שני-שלישים (כמעט) של הסנטורים לימין ישראל (בשאלה שיש בה מעורבות כה גדולה של הנשיא) אינה עניין של מה בכך ובודאי אינה מעידה על חולשת איפאק.

אם אנחנו נמשיך לומר איש לרעהו ולכתוב בעיתונינו דברים כאלה שנכתבו היום (על-ידי עיתונאים ובין ע'י מדינאים כח'כ' רבין) שישראל והיהודים - הובסו, נחליש את כוחם של הידידים ואת רצון היהודים להירתם שוב בעתיד.

יורשה לי על כן להציע ש-:

(א) תצא הודעה מטעם רה'מ' או שהח שיהיה בה 'ספין' חיובי, שתביע הערכה לאמריקנים, תזכיר את חלקם בפתיחת השערים, את הבטחתם לסייע לנו בקליטה ושהוכח פעם נוספת שידדים יכולים להתגבר על קשיים בצורה ציוילית.

(ב) שדברים ברוח דומה ייאמרו על ידי דוברינו ונציגינו לתקשורת האמריקנית.

(ג) שכך ייאמר ליהודים ושארף הם יחבקשו לנהוג כך.

(ד) שגם מהארץ, בהתבטאות אישים ובתדרוך עתונאים תיוצג הגישה שאין מנצחים ואין מנוצחים ואיש לא איבד מכבודו וממעמדו.

שילה

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, רכיב, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 19721
אל: רהמש/971
מ-: המשרד, חא: 240991, זח: 1314, דח: ר, סג: בל,
בכב
9,244448
28621

בלמ'ס/רגיל

אל: כל הנציגויות

הנדון: תגובת שר החוץ על נאום נשיא ארצות הברית במליאה

דברי נשיא ארצות הברית, הקוראים לביטול החלטת האו"מ אשר השוותה בין ציונות לגזענות, הם אך טבעיים והם מבטאים היטב את הערכים המשותפים לארצות הברית לישראל ולאומות נאורות נוספות. יש לצפות כי מדינות העולם ילכו אף הן בעקבות ארצות הברית ויביאו בכך לביטולה של ההחלטה האומללה אשר הטילה כתם על היכל השלום של אומות העולם.

מע'ת/הסברה

24 בספטמבר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצרים,
מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, מזאר, ארבל2,
ארבל1, הדרכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר1, איר2,
@ (לעמ), מקצב2, אומן, פרנ, מחע, משקוף, חליפה, בטמח, כספים, משפט

סססס

אאא, חרום: 19615
אל: רהמש/969
מ-: המשרד, חא: 240991, זח: 1117, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בכב
9,244448
118319

בלמ'ס/מיד

215.14

כל הבירות
דע: נאום ניו יורק, ג'נבה

הנדרון: ביטול החלטת 3379 (ציונות) - דברי הנשיא בוש בעצרת האו'ם.

להלן מתוך נאום נשיא ארה"ב בפני עצרת האו'ם ב-23/9:

WE ALSO MUST PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL HARMONY BY ADDRESSING OLD FEUDS. WE SHOULD TAKE SERIOUSLY THE CHARTER'S PLEDGE ' TO PRACTICE TOLERANCE AND LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE WITH ONE ANOTHER AS GOOD NEIGHBORS'.

NGA RESOLUTION 3379, THE SO-CALLED 'ZIONISM IS RACISM' RESOLUTION, MOCKS THIS PLEDGE AND THE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS WAS FOUDED. AND I CALL NOW FOR ITS REPEAL.

ZIONISM IS NOT A POLICY; IT IS THE IDEA THAT LED TO THE CREATION OF A HOME FOR THE JEWISH PEOPLE, TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL. AND TO EQUATE ZIONISM WITH THE INTOLERABLE SIN OF RACISM IS TO TWIST HISTORY AND FORGET THE TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF JEWS IN WORLD WAR II AND, INDEED, THROUGHOUT HISTORY. TO EQUATE ZIONISM WITH RACISM IS TO REJECT ISRAEL ITSELF - A MEMBER OF GOOD STANDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THIS BODY CANNOT CLAIM TO SEEK PEACE AND AT THE SAME TIME CHALLENGE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. BY REPEALING THIS RESOLUTION UNCONDITIONALLY, THE UNITED NATIONS WILL ENHANCE ITS CREDIBILITY AND SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

עד כאן .

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצרים,
מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, מזאר, ארבל2,
ארבל1, הדרכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר1, איר2,
@ (לעמ), מקצב2, אומן, פרנ, מחע, משקוף, חליפה, בטמח, כספים, משפט, בן אבו

סססס

תנ"ח

רח"מ בחל לבוקר	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	101 3
מועד הכתיבה 11/11/51	טופס מברק	
מדינה	א"י מנהל ארבל 2	
ס' 8 1138	ר' 10 מע"ת, מצמ"א	
סמנכ"ל ארבל - נאום ניו יורק		י"ת

הנדון: ציונות 5179; דברי הנשיא בוש בעצרת האו"ם

לרם הטעם מדברי הנשיא בוש בעצרת היום. מוצע שתבריקו מיד לכל הנציגויות.

גורח

יוחנן ביינ

שמה (שמה) מהו גשם (שמה) ג' (שמה) ג'
 רב"ה ג' - חסמה ג' (שמה) ג' (שמה) ג'

אישור	יוחנן ביינ	25.9.51
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קטע מאוך נארוז הנשיא כוש על "ציונות ובזענות"
(מליאת עגרת וזאו'ם 23.9.1991)

"... עלינו לזקק ברציונות אה המחייבותה של מגילת או'ם לקיום
סובלנות ולחיות יחד בשלום כל אחד, עם השני, בשכנות טובה."
החלטת אקצרת הכללים של או'ם 3379, הנקראת כביכול 'ציונות היא
בזענות' שמה ללעג אה המחויבות זו ואה אקציונות עליהם חוקם הארגון
האומות המאוחדות. אנו קורא עכשיו לביטולה.

ציונות איננה מדיניות, זהו ארעיון אשר חולין להקמתו של בית עבור
העם היהודי, למדינת ישראל. ולהשוות אה הציונות עם החטא הנלתי
בטבל של בזענות פרוש הדבר לטלף אה תאסטוריה ולשכוח אה הטבל
הנוראי של היהודים במלחמת הקולט השניים ולמצעה לאורך התסטוריה.
להשוות ציונות לבזענות פרוש הדבר לרחוה אה ישראל כולת - הכרת
בעלת מעמד סוכר באומות המאוחדות.
הגוף הזה איננו יכול לסעון שתוא מחפש שלום וכאואו זמן לשלול
אה זכותה של ישראל לתקיים,
על ידי ביטול החלטת זו, בלו מנאים, האומות המאוחדות יחזקו אה
אמינותם וישרמו אה השלום".

We also must promote the cause of international harmony by addressing old feuds. We should take seriously the Charter's pledge "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors."

UNGA Resolution 3379, the so-called "Zionism is racism" resolution, mocks this pledge and the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. And I call now for its repeal.

Zionism is not a policy; it is the idea that led to the creation of a home for the Jewish people, to the state of Israel. And to equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and forget the terrible plight of Jews in World War II and, indeed, throughout history. To equate Zionism with racism is to reject Israel itself -- a member of good standing of the United Nations.

This body cannot claim to seek peace and at the same time challenge Israel's right to exist. By repealing this resolution

unconditionally, the United Nations will enhance its credibility and serve the cause of peace.



United States Information Service
American Embassy
Tel Aviv

pl

Official Texts

September 24, 1991

**TEXT: PRESIDENT BUSH ADDRESS TO
UNGA 9/23/91**

USIS

71 Hayarkon Street, Tel Aviv 63 432 Tel: (03) 654338, Fax: (03) 660508
19 Keren Hayesod Street, Jerusalem 91 008 Tel: (02) 252376, Fax (02) 242560

The Wireless File

BUSH SEES HISTORIC CHANCE FOR GLOBAL CO-OPERATION

(Text: address to UNGA 9/23/91)

United Nations — President Bush September 23 outlined the challenges of building peace in the post-Cold War era, declaring there is now an historic opportunity for international cooperation.

In an address to the U.N. General Assembly, Bush said that for the first time, there is "a real chance" to fulfill the U.N. Charter's ambition of working "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights."

Following is the text of the president's address:

(begin text)

Mr. President, thank you, sir. Mr. Secretary General, distinguished delegates to the United Nations, I am honored to speak with you as you open the 46th Session of the General Assembly.

I'd first like to congratulate outgoing President Guido de Marco of Malta, and salute our incoming President Samir Shihabi of Saudi Arabia. I also want to salute especially Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who will step down in just over three months. But let me say, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has served with great distinction during a period of unprecedented change and turmoil. For almost 10 years we've enjoyed the leadership of this man of peace; a man that I, along with many of you, feel proud to call friend. So today, let us congratulate our friend, and praise his spectacular service to the United Nations — and to the people of the world, Mr. Secretary General.

Let me also welcome new members to this chamber: two delegations representing Korea, particularly our democratic friends, the Republic of Korea; the Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and new missions from the Marshall Islands and Micronesia.

Twenty years ago, when I was the Permanent Representative here for the United States, there were 132 U.N. members. Just one week ago, 159 nations enjoyed membership in the United Nations. Today, the number stands at 166. The presence of these new members alone provides reasons for us to celebrate.

My speech today will not sound like any you've heard from a president of the United States. I'm not going to dwell on the superpower competition that defined international politics for half a century. Instead, I will discuss the challenges of building peace and prosperity in a world leavened by the Cold War's end and the resumption of history.

Communism held history captive for years. It suspended ancient disputes; and it suppressed ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspirations, and old prejudices. As it has dissolved, suspended hatreds have sprung to life. People who for years have been denied their pasts, have begun searching for their own identities, often through peaceful and constructive means, occasionally through factionalism and bloodshed.

This revival of history ushers in a new era, teeming with opportunities and perils. And let's begin by discussing the opportunities.

First, history's renewal enables people to pursue their natural instincts for enterprise. Communism froze that progress until its failures became too much for even its defenders to bear. And now, citizens throughout the world have chosen enterprise over envy; personal responsibility over the enticements of the state; prosperity over the poverty of central planning.

The U.N. Charter encourages this adventure by pledging "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." And I can think of no better way to fulfill this mission than to promote the free flow of goods and ideas.

Frankly, ideas and goods will travel around the globe with or without our help. The Information Revolution has destroyed the weapons of enforced isolation and ignorance. In many parts of the world technology has overwhelmed tyranny, proving that the age of information can become the age of liberation if we limit state power wisely and free our people to make the best use of new ideas, inventions, and insights.

By the same token, the world has learned that free markets provide levels of prosperity, growth and happiness that centrally planned economies can never offer. Even the most charitable estimates indicate that in recent years the free world's economies have grown at twice the rate of the former communist world.

The Wireless File

Growth does more than fill shelves, it permits every person to gain — not at the expense of others, but to the benefit of others. Prosperity encourages people to live as neighbors, not as predators.

Economic growth can aid international relations in exactly the same way. Many nations represented here are parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Uruguay Round, the latest in the postwar series of trade negotiations, offers hope to developing nations, many of which have been cruelly divided — cruelly deceived by the false promises of totalitarianism.

Here in this chamber we hear about North-South problems. But free and open trade, including unfettered access to markets and credit, offer developing countries means of self-sufficiency and economic dignity.

If the Uruguay Round should fail, a new wave of protectionism could destroy our hopes for a better future. History shows all too clearly that protectionism can destroy wealth within countries and poison relations between them. And therefore, I call upon all members of GATT to redouble their efforts to reach a successful conclusion for the Uruguay Round. I pledge that the United States will do its part.

I cannot stress this enough: Economic progress will play a vital role in the new world. It supplies the soil in which democracy grows best.

People everywhere seek government of and by the people. And they want to enjoy their inalienable rights to freedom and property and person.

Challenges to democracy have failed. Just last month coup plotters in the Soviet Union tried to derail the forces of liberty and reform, but Soviet citizens refused to follow. Most of the nations in this chamber stood with the forces of reform, led by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, and against the coup plotters.

The challenge facing the Soviet peoples now — that of building political systems based upon individual liberty, minority rights, democracy and free markets — mirrors every nation's responsibility for encouraging peaceful, democratic reform. But it also testifies to the extraordinary power of the democratic ideal.

As democracy flourishes, so does the opportunity for a third historical breakthrough: international cooperation.

A year ago, the Soviet Union joined the United States and a host of other nations in defending a tiny country against aggression — and opposing Saddam Hussein. For the very first time, on a matter of major importance, superpower competition was replaced with international cooperation.

The United Nations, in one of its finest moments, constructed a measured, principled, deliberate and courageous response to Saddam Hussein. It stood up to an outlaw who invaded Kuwait, who threatened many states within the region, who sought to set a menacing precedent for the post-Cold War world.

The coalition effort established a model for the collective settlement of disputes. Members set the goal — the liberation of Kuwait — and devised a courageous, unified means of achieving that goal.

And now, for the first time, we have a real chance to fulfill the U.N. Charter's ambition of working "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war; to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person; in the equal rights of men and women in nations large and small; to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." Those are the words from the Charter.

We will not revive these ideals if we fail to acknowledge the challenge that the renewal of history presents.

In Europe and Asia, nationalist passions have flared anew, challenging borders, straining the fabric of international society. At the same time, around the world, many age-old conflicts still fester. You see signs of this tumult right here. The United Nations has mounted more peacekeeping missions in the last 36 months than during its first 43 years. And although we now seem mercifully liberated from the fear of nuclear holocaust, these smaller, virulent conflicts should trouble us all.

We must face this challenge squarely: first, by pursuing the peaceful resolution of disputes now in progress; second, and more importantly, by trying to prevent others from erupting.

No one here can promise that today's borders will remain fixed for all time. But we must strive to ensure the peaceful, negotiated settlement of border disputes.

We also must promote the cause of international harmony by addressing old feuds. We should take seriously the

The Wireless File

Charter's pledge "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors."

UNGA Resolution 3379, the so-called "Zionism is racism" resolution, mocks this pledge and the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. And I call now for its repeal.

Zionism is not a policy; it is the idea that led to the creation of a home for the Jewish people, to the state of Israel. And to equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and forget the terrible plight of Jews in World War II and, indeed, throughout history. To equate Zionism with racism is to reject Israel itself — a member of good standing of the United Nations.

This body cannot claim to seek peace and at the same time challenge Israel's right to exist. By repealing this resolution unconditionally, the United Nations will enhance its credibility and serve the cause of peace.

As we work to meet the challenge posed by the resumption of history, we also must defend the Charter's emphasis on inalienable human rights.

Government has failed if citizens cannot speak their minds; if they can't form political parties freely and elect governments without coercion; if they can't practice their religion freely; if they can't raise their families in peace; if they can't enjoy a just return from their labor; if they can't live fruitful lives and, at the end of their days, look upon their achievements and their society's progress with pride.

Politicians who talk about "democracy" and "freedom," but provide neither eventually will feel the sting of public disapproval and the power of people's yearning to live free.

Some nations still deny their basic rights to the people. And too many voices cry out for freedom. For example, the people of Cuba suffer oppression at the hands of a dictator who hasn't gotten the word, the lone hold-out in an otherwise democratic hemisphere; a man who hasn't adapted to a world that has no use for totalitarian tyranny. Elsewhere, despots ignore the heartening fact that the rest of the world has embarked upon a new age of liberty.

The renewal of history also imposes an obligation to remain vigilant about new threats and old. We must expand our efforts to control nuclear proliferation. We

must work to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them.

It is for this reason that I put forward my Middle East arms initiative, a comprehensive approach to stop and, where possible, reverse the accumulation of arms in that part of the world most prone to violence.

We must remember that self-interests will tug nations in different directions, and that struggles over perceived interests will flare sometimes into violence.

We can never say with confidence where the next conflict may arise. And we cannot promise eternal peace — not while demagogues pedal false promises to people hungry with hope; not while terrorists use our citizens as pawns, and drug dealers destroy our peoples. We, as a result, we must band together to overwhelm affronts to basic human dignity.

It is no long acceptable to shrug and say that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Let's put the law above the crude and cowardly practice of hostage-holding.

In a world defined by change, we must be as firm in principle as we are flexible in our response to changing international conditions. That's especially true today of Iraq. Six months after the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688, Saddam continues to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction and subject the Iraqi people to brutal repression.

Saddam's contempt for U.N. resolutions was first demonstrated back in August of 1990, and it continues even as I am speaking. His government refuses to permit unconditional helicopter inspections, and right now is refusing to allow U.N. inspectors to leave inspected premises with documents relating to an Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

And it is the U.S. view that we must keep the U.N. sanctions in place as long as he remains in power. And this also shows that we cannot compromise for a moment in seeing that Iraq destroys all of its weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. And we will not compromise.

This is not to say — and let me be clear on this one — that we should punish the Iraqi people. Let me repeat, our argument has never been with the people of Iraq. It was and is with a brutal dictator whose arrogance dishonors the

The Wireless File

Iraqi people. Security Council Resolution 706 created a responsible mechanism for sending humanitarian relief to innocent Iraqi citizens. We must put that mechanism to work.

We must not abandon our principled stand against Saddam's aggression. This cooperative effort has liberated Kuwait, and now it can lead to a just government in Iraq. And when it does, the Iraqi people can look forward to better lives; free at home, free to engage in a world beyond their borders.

The resumption of history also permits the United Nations to resume the important business of promoting the values that I have discussed today. This body can serve as a vehicle through which willing parties can settle old disputes. In the months to come, I look forward to working with Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and his successor as we pursue peace in such diverse and trouble lands as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus, El Salvador, and the Western Sahara.

The United Nations can encourage free-market development through its international lending and aid institutions. However, the United Nations should not dictate the particular forms of government that nations should adopt. But it can and should encourage the values upon which this organization was founded. Together, we should insist that nations seeking our acceptance meet standards of human decency.

Where institutions of freedom have lain dormant, the United Nations can offer them new life. These institutions play a crucial role in our quest for a new world order, an order in which no nation must surrender one iota of its own sovereignty; an order characterized by the rule of law rather than the resort to force; the cooperative settlement of disputes, rather than anarchy and bloodshed; and an unstinting belief in human rights.

Finally, you may wonder about America's role in the new world that I have described. Let me assure you, the United States has no intention of striving for a Pax Americana. However, we will remain engaged. We will not retreat and pull back into isolationism. We will offer friendship and leadership. And in short, we seek a Pax Universalis built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations.

To all assembled, we have an opportunity to spare our sons and daughters the sins and errors of the past. We can build a future more satisfying than any our world has ever

known. The future lies undefined before us, full of promise; littered with peril. And we can choose the kind of world we want: one blistered by the fires of war and subjected to the whims of coercion and chance, or one made more peaceful by reflection and choice. Take this challenge seriously. Inspire future generations to praise and venerate you, to say: On the ruins of conflict, these brave men and women built an era of peace and understanding. They inaugurated a new world order, an order worth preserving for the ages.

(end text)

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מ-: ווש, נר: 2074, תא: 210991, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בבב
סודי/מידי

אל : אליקים רובינשטיין, מזכיר הממשלה

נביל למדן, מנהל מצפא

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

קור הרב הראשי אצל פולארד.

קיבלנו אישור לביקור כבוד הרב הראשי מרדכי אליהו אצל פולארד ב-10 באוקטובר כפי שביקש. על הביקור להיערך בין השעות 0900 ו-0300 אחה'צ'. הרב יכול להשאר עם פולארד כמה שעות שירצה ובלבד שיצא מכית-הסוהר בשעה 1500. על הרב ומלויו להגיע לשער הראשי במריון ולבקש את סגן מפקד בית הסוהר מר FRED APPLE. כדאי שהרב ידע שהוא ומלויו לא יורשו להכניס כל חפץ כולל ספרים לבד מסדור חפילה. הם יעברו בדיקה בכניסתם. השלטונות מבקשים מראש את סליחתו והבנתו.

שדה התעופה הקרוב יותר לכלא מריון הוא סנט-לואיס ומשם זמן הנסיעה במכונית הוא שעתיים וחצי.

אבקשכם להודיע כל זאת לאמנון דרור. הזכירו לו בבקשה שעליו להודיענו במהירות למתי מחבקשת פגישת הרב עם הקרדינל לאו. כזכור נקבעה פגישה זו אף היא ל-10 באוקטובר ועכשיו יהיה עלינו לבקש מועד חדש.

לה

תפוצה: @ (מזכיר הממשלה), מצפא

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בלמ"ס / מידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: קונכ"לים ו.י., פילדלפיה. (החז"י)

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון.

1. מצ"ל מכתבו של הסנטור פרוק לאוסוברג (דמוק' - ניו ג'רסי) לנשיא בוש בזכות אישור הערבויות ללא דו"ר.

2. על המכתב חתומים 12 חברי וע' ההקצנות. לאוסוברג ניסח להשיג 15 חתימות (מתוך 29 ח"קדינלים), אך הדרישה לאשר ללא דיחוי והמערכה לגייס הסנטורים גם (ובמיוחד) לשושבינות פגמו במאמציו.

3. שאר הסנטורים החתומים: אינוויטה, דה-קונסיני, מיקולסקי, אדאמס, הארקין, פואלר, ברדוק וריד הדמוקרטים; קסטן, ד'אמאסו וספקטור הרפובליקנים.

י.ר.
יורם.

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Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including names and initials: *מ.ר. 29, מ.ר. 1, מ.ר. 1, מ.ר. 1, מ.ר. 1, מ.ר. 1, מ.ר. 1, מ.ר. 1, מ.ר. 1, מ.ר. 1*

Frank
Lautenberg

United States Senator
for New Jersey



g/g

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15.

For Immediate Release
Friday, September 20, 1991

For Further Information
Steven Schlein 202-224-5885
Jo-Anne Goldman (202) 224-9704

**LAUTENBERG URGES BUSH TO WORK WITH CONGRESS TO
PERMIT CONTINUED EMIGRATION OF SOVIET REFUGEES**

WASHINGTON -- Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ) today sent to the President a letter signed by a majority of the members of the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, which has initial jurisdiction over AID approved loan guarantees, urging that he work with members of the Appropriations Committee to permit continued emigration of Soviet refugees to Israel.

Among the eleven Appropriations Committee members who signed Lautenberg's letter are Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), the Ranking Democrat on the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Foreign Operations Subcommittee Ranking Republican member Sen. Robert Kasten (R-WI), who have drafted legislation to extend refugee absorption loan guarantees to Israel.

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The letter says, "Approval of the refugee guarantees is a humanitarian issue, which is separate and apart from the peace process. The fate of these refugees should not be held hostage to political differences, over which the refugees have no control, between Israel and the Arab nations. We support approval of the guarantees promptly, in the most cost effective way possible."

Lautenberg explained that the loan guarantees would not directly cost the U.S. taxpayer any money. The United States would provide a guarantee on the loans, not actual dollars. The loans will be provided to Israel by commercial banks.

"Recent developments in the Soviet Union, although encouraging, cast a troublesome shadow on the future and safety of Jews in the region," Lautenberg wrote. "Ethnic nationalism is on the rise in each of the Republics, and the onset of winter and potential famine could fuel ethnic tensions. Historically, the combination of these factors spell uncertainty for Jews in the former Soviet Union."

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"Soviet Jews have been arriving in Israel at the rate of about 20,000 a month. These refugees, seeking a new life outside of the Soviet Union, need jobs, housing and the chance for an independent life. The loan guarantees will provide those opportunities," Lautenberg concluded.

Senators signing the letter are: Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), Robert Kasten (R-Wis.), Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.), Harry Reid (D-Nev.), Brock Adams (D-Wash.), Wyclef Fowler (D-Georgia), Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.), and Arlen Specter (R-Penn.)

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APPROPRIATIONS
TRANSPORTATION, CHAIRMAN
COMMERCE, JUSTICE, STATE AND JOBS
DEFENSE
FOREIGN OPERATIONS
HUMAN AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3002

BUDGET
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
SUPERVISOR OCEAN AND WATER
PROTECTION, CHAIRMAN
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
WATER RESOURCES, TRANSPORTATION
AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PLANNING COMMISSION

September 20, 1991

The Honorable
George Bush
President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

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Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our deep concern over the Administration's request that Congress delay consideration of refugee guarantees for Soviet Jewish absorption in Israel.

Over the last two decades, the United States has led the world in appealing for the freedom of Soviet Jewry. A number of former refuseniks have stated it was U.S. actions which kept alive their hope of religious freedom and respect for human rights. Not only did the U.S. support Soviet Jewish emigration, but by limiting refugee entry into the U.S., our policy actually encouraged them to emigrate to Israel.

One million Soviet Jews are expected to emigrate to Israel over the next five years, which will result in an increase of approximately 20% of Israel's population. As their dreams come to fruition, the United States is presented with an historic opportunity to help with their absorption and make good on our commitment to them. We strongly support the proposed refugee guarantees as a cost-effective, humanitarian and urgent means of assisting with Soviet resettlement.

Developments in the Soviet Union, as encouraging as they are, portend a period of political and economic instability and cast a troublesome shadow on the future and safety of Jews in the region. Ethnic nationalism is on the rise in each of the Republics, and the onset of winter and potential famine could fuel ethnic tensions. Historically, the combination of these factors spell uncertainty for Jews in the former Soviet Union.

U.S. loan guarantees to help with the absorption of Soviet Jewry have been discussed for over one year, with the understanding, arrived at between the Israeli government and your Administration last spring, that the Congress would consider their approval this month. As you know, given the Congressional calendar, the additional delay you have now suggested will be far longer than four months, and could stretch well into 1992.

U.S. SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3002

U.S. SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3002

U.S. SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3002

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Soviet Jews have been arriving in Israel at the rate of about 20,000 a month. These refugees, seeking a new life outside of the Soviet Union, need jobs, housing and the chance for an independent life. Further delay in U.S. action will have enormous human costs.

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We believe the U.S. government should act now, without further delay. Approval of the refugee guarantees is a humanitarian issue, which is separate and apart from the peace process. The fate of these refugees should not be held hostage to political differences, over which the refugees have no control, between Israel and the Arab nations. We support approval of the guarantees promptly, in the most cost effective way possible.

It is our hope that you will work with us and other members of the Senate Appropriations Committee to permit the resettlement of Soviet Jews to go forward with a minimum of disruption.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Kasten

Robert W. Kasten

Frank R. Lautenberg

Frank R. Lautenberg

Daniel Inouye

Daniel Inouye

Alfonse D'Amato

Alfonse D'Amato

Arlen Specter

Arlen Specter

Tom Harkin

Tom Harkin

Barbara Mikulski

Barbara Mikulski

Dennis DeConcini

Dennis DeConcini

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Brook Adams

Wythe Fowler

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Harry Reid

Quentin Burdick

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אאא, חוזם: 18710
אל: רהמש/912
מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 400, תא: 200991, זח: 1708, מ: סג: שמ,
בכב
23039
שמור/מידי
355.16

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

לשכת השר, לשכת רה'מ, וושינגטון
מנהל תפוצות

מאת: סגן הקונכ'ל, ניו יורק

הנדון: הופעת השגריר בוועידת הנשיאים

א. להלן עיקרי דברי השגריר בפני מליאת ועידת הנשיאים היום (20).

1. כבר ברור שהמתרחש בימים האחרונים סביב הערכויות הביא להקשחה בעמדת הערבים, כולל הפלסטינאים בעניין תהליך השלום. בעצם תמיד הזהרנו בפני התפתחות זו ולכן אנחנו לא מופתעים ממנה.

2. הסוגייה העיקרית, כמובן, איננה הערכויות או דחייתן, ואף לא נושא ההתנחלויות, אלא עתיד גבולות מדינת ישראל, הרי הצד הערבי אינו מגלה שום רצון להגיע לפשרה, ונושא ההתנחלויות בעצם נגזר מהסוגייה העיקרית שהיא דרישת הערבים לנסיגה מלאה לקווי 1967, דבר שלא יקרה לעולם.

3. האסטרטגיה שננקטה ע'י הקהילה היהודית בארה'ב ופעולותיה בעניין הערכויות היתה ונשארת הגיונית ונכונה. אנו עוסקים בהצלחת חיים יהודיים שנקלעו למצב המתקרב לבלתי נסבל ושומה על כולנו לנסות ולשכנע הממשל והקונגרס בארה'ב תוך הימנעות מעימות.

4. שיחות בייקר בארץ התנהלו ברוח טובה ושני הצדדים מרוצים מהן ואילו הדברים שהושמעו לאחר מכן (במטוס לקהיר מ.ס) לא שקפו הלכי הרוח. כימים האחרונים מושמעים בארה'ב דברים מתונים ומרגיעים יותר. חלה התקדמות בעניין תהליך השלום ויימשכו המגעים לגבי הנקודות שנשארו פתוחות, ושני הצדדים הביעו שאיפתם הכנה והחזקה לא להגיע לעימות בעניין הערכויות. עבודה מאומצת ושכל ישר יביאו בסופו של דבר לתוצאות הרצויות. בשום מקרה לא נפגע בעליה, ולא אינטרסים חיוביים של המדינה.

5. רוב השאלות התמקדו בעניין ההתנחלויות והשגריר ציין שיש יסוד להניח שאפילו אם יוקפאו ההתנחלויות (והרי אלה לא יוקפאו) לא נזכה לתמיכת המימשל במתן הערכויות. הדגישו שוב שסוגיית ההתנחלויות אינה העיקר אלא עתיד גבולותיה של מדינת ישראל. בישראל אינם מאמינים שהמימשל האמריקאי אנטי ישראלי אולם אין זה אומר שמדיניות המימשל והחלטותיו תמיד לטובתנו ומכאן עלינו להמשיך בפעולות השכנוע.

ב. במפגש קצר אחרי ההופעה, בהשתתפות השגריר, שושנה קרדין, הונליין, נציגי אייפק, שילה הקונכ'ל נוייבך והח'מ. התייחסה קרדין ל-VULNERABILITY בו יהודי ארה"ב חשים את עצמם כיום והביעה הסכמחה המלאה עם המגמה להמנע מעימות עם המימשל. דובר על נוסחאות הפשרה האפשריות התופסות תאוצה ואשר יאפשרו להתמקד במאבק המדיני, בשלב מאוחר יותר בהשגת הערכויות עצמן, הקהילה היהודית תמשיך להיות פעילה בנושא שקרובה לליבה ולנפשה.

סופר
20 בספטמבר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, בן אבו, תפוצות

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18568

אל: רהמש/915

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 297, תא: 200991, זח: 1336, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: תפוצת תקשורת

מאת: עתונות וושינגטון

הנדון: התבטאויות מזכיר המדינה, בייקר, בסיורו בישראל ובמצריים

בהמשך לבקשתכם, מצ"ב התמלילים שבנדון:-

REMARKS BY US SECRETARY OF STATE OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES
AS RELEASED BY US DEPARTMENT OF STATE/OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY/SPOKESMAN/KING DAVID HOTEL, JERUSALEM
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1991

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID THE PALESTINIANS AGREE TO JOIN THE
PEACE CONFERENCE?

SEC. BAKER: WE HAVE HAD A GOOD DISCUSSION, AND ACTUALLY
THE DISCUSSION IS STILL GOING ON. SOME OF OUR PEOPLE ARE STILL OVER
THERE. THEY WILL WORK PROBABLY FOR ANOTHER HOUR OR SO TONIGHT. I
THINK THERE WAS A GOOD DISCUSSION, AND WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE SOME
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

Q ARE YOU GOING TO TALK TO THEM AGAIN TOMORROW?

SEC. BAKER: WE MAY TALK TO THEM AGAIN TOMORROW. I WILL
DEFINITELY, OF COURSE, BE MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR
TOMORROW MORNING AT NINE O'CLOCK. OUR PEOPLE ARE STILL THERE
ENGAGED WITH THE PALESTINIANS WITH RESPECT TO THE LETTER OF
ASSURANCES, AND WE WILL KEEP WORKING ON THAT.

Q DO YOU EXPECT AN ANSWER?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, WE'RE GETTING SOME ANSWERS, AND I EXPECT WE

WILL CONTINUE TO.

END

* * *

TEXT OF REMARKS BY US SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
AND PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE FAISAL HUSSEINI
PRIOR TO THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, JERUSALEM
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1991

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID YOU RESOLVE THE LOAN DISPUTE QUESTION
WITH MR. SHAMIR TONIGHT?

SEC. BAKER: WE HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION. WE WILL CONTINUE
THAT DISCUSSION TOMORROW MORNING BEGINNING AT NINE O'CLOCK. AND
THAT'S REALLY ABOUT ALL I HAVE TO SAY TONIGHT. I WON'T HAVE ANY
FURTHER COMMENT ON IT, BECAUSE WE WILL RESUME OUR DISCUSSIONS AT
NINE O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING.

Q MR. HUSSEINI, ARE YOU PREPARED TO TELL SECRETARY BAKER
THAT THE PALESTINIANS WILL ATTEND A MIDEAST PEACE CONFERENCE, AND
IF NOT, WHY NOT?

MR. HUSSEINI: I PREFER TO HEAR FROM MR. BAKER AND THEN WE CAN
ANSWER YOUR QUESTION.

Q IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU HAD A DIFFICULT MEETING, MR.
SECRETARY.

SEC. BAKER: NO, WE HAD A GOOD DISCUSSION. I DON'T MEAN TO
GIVE YOU THAT IMPRESSION. BUT WE WILL BE CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION
TOMORROW MORNING.

Q DID YOU BRING A COMPROMISE ON THE 10 BILLION DOLLARS?

SEC. BAKER: WE HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION, AND WE WILL BE
CONTINUING IT TOMORROW MORNING AT NINE O'CLOCK.

Q WILL YOU HAVE AN ANSWER FOR US LATER THIS EVENING ABOUT
WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS WILL BE ATTENDING A CONFERENCE?

MR. HUSSEINI: ACTUALLY, THERE WILL BE A PRESS CONFERENCE. IT
WILL BE TOMORROW MORNING, NOT THIS NIGHT.

Q AND THERE WILL BE A DEFINITE ANSWER THEN, SIR?

MR. HUSSEINI: TOMORROW WE'LL HEAR, BUT NO, I BELIEVE TOMORROW

WE'LL TELL YOU, THERE WILL BE AN ANSWER.

THANK YOU.

END

* * *

REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III AND FOREIGN MINISTER AMR MOUSSA BEFORE THEIR MEETING AS RELEASED BY US DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY/SPOKESMAN, (CAIRO), SEMIRAMIS INTER-CONTINENTAL HOTEL, CAIRO, EGYPT, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1991

Q MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY MORE "GIVE" IN THE ISRAELI AND US COMPROMISE POSITION TO ISRAEL ON THE LOAN GUARANTEE ISSUE? IS THERE ANY MORE ROOM FOR FURTHER COMPROMISE?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, I THINK THAT WE HAVE BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING IN THE PROPOSAL, THE SIX-POINT PROPOSAL, THAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED. WE HAD TWO GOOD DISCUSSIONS WHILE I WAS IN ISRAEL AND WE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSION IN THE FUTURE. I THINK THAT THIS IS A GOOD PROPOSAL. IT'S ONE THAT WOULD PERMIT US TO GIVE PEACE A CHANCE IN THE SENSE THAT IT WOULD PERMIT A 120-DAY DELAY OF THIS LEGISLATION AND THEREBY AVOID ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES WITH RESPECT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. IT IS THAT, AND THAT ONLY, THAT THE PRESIDENT IS ASKING; SOMETHING THAT IT SEEMS TO US IS A VERY, VERY REASONABLE REQUEST.

Q DO YOU THINK THAT WHEN IT COMES TIME TO FINALLY DEAL WITH THE LOAN GUARANTEE ISSUE IN THE FUTURE, THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME STRINGS ATTACHED TO CONTROL ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENTS POLICY?

SEC. BAKER: I THINK THE BEST WAY TO GIVE PEACE A CHANCE IS TO DO WHAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED AND THAT IS TO DELAY THIS MATTER, DELAY THE DEBATE ABOUT THIS MATTER, FOR 120 DAYS SO THAT WE CAN GIVE PEACE A CHANCE. AND FEELING THAT WAY, I AM NOT INCLINED TO DEBATE THE ISSUE WITH YOU HERE TODAY.

Q MR. MINISTER, COULD I ASK ONE QUESTION? WILL THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS GO TO A PEACE CONFERENCE IF ISRAEL CONTINUES TO BUILD SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES EVEN AS THAT CONFERENCE IS CONVENING?

FOREIGN MINISTER MOUSSA: THE QUESTION OF BUILDING SETTLEMENTS IS A VERY SERIOUS QUESTION FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. IF THE CONFERENCE TAKES PLACE, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE SETTLEMENT POLICY BE RESCINDED. WE HAVE PROPOSED, AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS

PROPOSED, AN EXCHANGE OF STOPPING THE SETTLEMENTS, BUILDING SETTLEMENTS, IN EXCHANGE FOR PUTTING AN END, A TEMPORARY END, FOR THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME, OF THE BOYCOTT. SO WE BELIEVE THAT THE SETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE PRACTICE OF BUILDING SETTLEMENTS ARE DESTRUCTIVE AND VERY SERIOUS, THAT THEY WOULD THREATEN THE PEACE PROCESS.

SEC. BAKER: LET ME JUST ADD TO THAT, IF I MIGHT. THE POINT WE'RE MAKING HERE, THE POINT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH IS MAKING, THAT I'M MAKING IN REQUESTING THIS 120-DELAY, IS SIMPLY THAT THESE ISSUES ARE VERY, VERY IMPORTANT, THEY'RE VERY DIVISIVE, THEY'RE VERY EMOTIONAL, AND THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE DEBATED IN ADVANCE OF THE PARTIES' COMING TO THE TABLE SO AS TO PRECLUDE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH, AFTER ALL, HAVE NEVER TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS, SAVE FOR THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

Q MR. MINISTER, YOU SAID THAT THE SETTLEMENTS POLICY SHOULD BE RESCINDED. IS THAT A PRECONDITION, IN YOUR VIEW, FOR THE ARABS COMING TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE TABLE?

FOREIGN MINISTRE MOUSSA: FIRST, I WISH TO SAY THAT OUR POSITION ON THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE IS NOT EMOTIONAL, BUT IT IS PRACTICAL. BECAUSE IF THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO BUILD SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THEN THEY WILL AFFECT THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RESOLUTION 242 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE. SO WHAT I SAY, OR I WANT TO SAY AND EMPHASIZE IS THAT IT IS A NECESSARY THING, A NECESSARY STEP, TO GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

END

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TEXT OF PRESS CONFERENCE WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III AND EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK AS RELEASED BY THE US STATE DEPARTMENT, ITTAHIDEYA PALACE, CAIRO, EGYPT, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1991

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK THE UNITED STATES FOR THE BIG EFFORT DONE BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE PEACE PROCESS, WHICH IS A VERY COMPLICATED PROBLEM. AND NOW, THESE DAYS, WE ARE APPROACHING THE CONFERENCE IN WHICH ALL PARTIES COULD SIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE ALL THE PROBLEMS SO AS TO COMPLETE SOMETHING FOR PEACE TO PREVAIL ALL OVER THE AREA. I THINK WHENEVER THEY SAY PEACE, I MEAN THAT STABILITY IN THE WHOLE AREA, ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA WILL BENEFIT FROM PEACE. ISRAEL MAY BE BENEFITTING MUCH MORE THAN ANY COUNTRY IN THIS AREA FOR PEACE. THAT'S WHY WE HOPE THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD CONVENE IN OCTOBER SO THAT WE COULD GIVE HOPE TO THE PEOPLE HERE TO AVOID BLOODSHED AND

THE KILLING, AND LIVE IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER AND COOPERATE IN THE WHOLE AREA. THANK YOU.

SEC. BAKER: MR. PRESIDENT, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR RECEIVING ME AND RECEIVING OUR DELEGATION THIS EVENING. THANK YOU FOR THE PRIVATE MEETING WE HAD, FOR THE EXPANDED MEETING AND FOR THE WORKING DINNER. IT'S ALWAYS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO COME TO CAIRO AND HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU AND TO MEET WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER BECAUSE I'VE ALWAYS FOUND THAT OUR MEETINGS ARE PRODUCTIVE AND USEFUL IN TERMS OF OUR COMMON EFFORT TO PROMOTE AN ACTIVE PEACE PROCESS IN THIS REGION.

AND I'D LIKE TO SAY RIGHT NOW THAT OVER THE COURSE OF THIS PAST SIX OR SEVEN MONTHS AS WE'VE WORKED TO TRY AND CREATE AN ACTIVE PEACE PROCESS, I DON'T KNOW ANYBODY WHO HAS BEEN HELPFUL OR MORE INSTRUMENTAL IN TAKING STEPS TO TRY TO BRING THE PARTIES TOGETHER THAN YOU HAVE, MR. PRESIDENT. I'D LIKE TO EXPRESS THE GRATITUDE OF PRESIDENT BUSH, MY OWN GRATITUDE AND THE GRATITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THESE EFFORTS AND I, LIKE YOU, LOOK FORWARD IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, CAN YOU TELL US, IF THE UNITED STATES GOES AHEAD WITH THE DOLLAR 10 BILLION IN LOAN GUARANTEES TO ISRAEL, WILL EGYPT ATTEND THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND DO YOU BELIEVE THE OTHER ARAB STATES WILL ATTEND THE PEACE CONFERENCE OR WOULD THE DOLLAR 10 BILLION IN GIFT TO ISRAEL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU TO ATTEND?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: LOOK, I'M NOT GOING TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM OF THE DOLLAR 10 BILLION. IT IS A PROBLEM BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. BUT ANYWAY, WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE CONFERENCE FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE. WHAT HAPPENED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, IT CONCERNS THE TWO COUNTRIES AND IT CONCERNS THE US AS THE BIGGEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD WHICH IS LOOKING FOR STABILITY AND PEACE ALL OVER THE WORLD. PEACE IS OF GREAT BENEFIT TO US, TO THE UNITED STATES, TO THE ISRAELIS. SO ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE IS A MUST AND ALL THE PARTIES AGREE TO THAT.

Q IS IT A REQUIREMENT FOR THE CONFERENCE THAT ISRAEL STOP BUILDING NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: LOOK, I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS POINT AND GIVEN A STATEMENT BEFORE IN THE LAST VISIT OF THE SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA AND WE HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE GULF COUNTRIES, BUT NOT ALL THE COUNTRIES, BUT I DON'T WANT TO GO THROUGH IT. LET US NEGOTIATE IT NOW AND HURRY UP THE MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE SO AS TO PUT ALL THE CARDS ON THE TABLE, INCLUDING THE BUILDING OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID YOU GET AN ANSWER FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CONCERNING YOUR COMPROMISE, AND IF YOU HAVEN'T, WHEN DO YOU EXPECT AN ANSWER?

SEC. BAKER: WELL, WE DO NOT, AS I SAID THIS MORNING FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, WE'VE HAD TWO GOOD DISCUSSIONS ON THIS TOPIC. WE HAVE NOT, AS YET, REACHED AN AGREEMENT BUT WE ARE CONTINUING TO TALK AND CONTINUING TO WORK. AND I THINK IT'S VERY TRUE THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS, BOTH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WANT VERY MUCH TO AVOID ANY SORT OF A CONFLICT OVER THIS ISSUE.

I ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT I DON'T THINK ANYBODY HAS BEEN ANY MORE ACTIVE OR HELPFUL WITH REGARD TO WORKING WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA TO PERMIT THE FREE EMIGRATION OF THEIR CITIZENS, NO ONE HAS BEEN MORE ACTIVE THAN THE UNITED STATES. AND THIS FREE EMIGRATION IS SOMETHING THAT WE HAVE SUPPORTED AND DO SUPPORT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO TALK TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WITH RESPECT TO THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE, AND I'M VERY HOPEFUL THAT WE'LL ARRIVE AT AN UNDERSTANDING SOON.

Q THE REPORTS IN THE PRESS SAY THAT -- AFTER YOUR VISIT TO ISRAEL, SAYING THAT YOU GAVE ISRAEL A GUARANTEE FOR THE NON-PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINIANS FROM EAST JERUSALEM. THIS IS NUMBER ONE, AND NUMBER TWO, WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO ACCUSATIONS BY ISRAELIS AGAINST PRESIDENT BUSH AS BEING ANTI-SEMITIC?

SEC. BAKER: NUMBER ONE, I DON'T RESPOND TO ALLEGATIONS IN THE PRESS THAT I HAVE NOT SEEN. NUMBER TWO, I DO NOT AND HAVE NOT FOR SEVEN MONTHS CONDUCTED THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE MEDIA, SO WITH RESPECT TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION, I WILL DECLINE TO ANSWER IT BECAUSE I'M NOT GOING TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS THORUGH THE MEDIA, AND WITH RESPECT TO YOUR SECOND QUESTION, I DON'T ANSWER ALLEGATIONS IN THE PRESS THAT I HAVEN'T SEEN.

Q MR. BAKER, CONCERNING THE LETTER OF ASSURANCE, ARE THE PALESTINIANS HAPPY WITH IT AND DOES IT INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE CONCEPT OF THE EXCHANGE OF LAND FOR PEACE?

SEC. BAKER: IF YOU'RE ASKING THAT QUESTION OF ME, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU ASK THE QUESTION OF THE PALESTINIANS. WE'VE GIVEN THEM A DETAILED, VERY DETAILED, LETTER OF ASSURANCES JUST AS WE HAVE GIVEN THE ISRAELIS A DETAILED LETTER OF ASSURANCES AND JUST AS WE WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENTS OF JORDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON DETAILED LETTERS OF ASSURANCE. NOW, WHETHER OR NOT THEY APPROVE OF ALL OF THE ELEMENTS IN THOSE LETTERS, WHETHER THEY THINK THOSE LETTERS ARE SUFFICIENTLY COMPLETE AND COMPREHENSIVE, YOU WILL HAVE TO ASK THEM, NOT ME.

Q IS YOUR LETTER SUFFICIENTLY COMPLETE AND COMPREHENSIVE? DO YOU APPROVE THE ASSURANCE THAT YOU'VE BEEN GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I BEG YOUR PARDON, AGAIN.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, ARE YOU PLEASED WITH, AND SATISFIED WITH, THE LETTER OF ASSURANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES --

SEC. BAKER: I DIDN'T SAY THAT WE WERE GIVING EGYPT A LETTER OF ASSURANCES, I MENTIONED EVERY OTHER COUNTRY EXCEPT EGYPT, BECAUSE LET'S REMEMBER THAT EGYPT IS AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL; EGYPT HAS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

Q (INAUDIBLE) -- MR. SECRETARY, THOUGH, THAT YOU WOULD PROVIDE ALL THE PARTIES WITH COPIES OF ALL THE ASSURANCES? YOU AREN'T DOING THAT?

SEC. BAKER: OH, I WILL PROVIDE THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE WITH COPIES OF THE ASSURANCE LETTERS THAT ARE PROVIDED TO THE COUNTRIES AND PEOPLE THAT RECEIVE ASSURANCE LETTERS. ONCE THOSE ASSURANCE LETTERS HAVE BEEN AGREED TO, RALPH, WHEN THEY'RE COMPLETED AND AGREED TO, THEN WE INTEND TO FURNISH THEM TO EVERYONE; THERE WILL BE NO SECRETS. AND I'M QUITE CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL PROMPTLY LEAK OUT SO YOU HAVE YOUR COPIES AT THAT TIME. BUT THERE IS NO ASSURANCE LETTER FOR EGYPT BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T REQUESTED ONE BECAUSE THEY HAPPEN TO BE AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL.

Q MR. PRESIDENT, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME REPORTS OUT OF ISRAEL THAT EGYPT HAS BEEN WORKING WITH THE PALESTINIANS RECENTLY TO TRY TO COME UP WITH SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE --

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: WILL YOU PLEASE REPEAT THE QUESTION AGAIN?

Q OKAY, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OUT OF ISRAEL THAT EGYPT HAS BEEN WORKING WITH THE PALESTINIANS RECENTLY TO TRY TO COME UP WITH SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF EAST JERUSALEM PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT A PEACE CONFERENCE. WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THIS?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: LOOK, I DON'T WANT TO TACKLE THE EAST JERUSALEM PROBLEM NOW THROUGH THE MEDIA. LET DISCUSSION BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONFERENCE. BUT THAT WE ARE COUNTING THE PALESTINIANS, THAT'S RIGHT, AS A HELPFUL ELEMENT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND FOR THE CONFERENCE TO CONVENE.

Q HAVE YOU PICKED A PLACE FOR THE CONFERENCE YET?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: WE WERE DISCUSSING SOME POINTS CONCERNING THAT, BUT I DON'T THINK THAT THERE IS A FINAL DECISION WHERE THE CONFERENCE IS GOING TO CONVENE.

Q WOULD THE US CONSIDER CO-SPONSORING A YUGOSLAV PEACE CONFERENCE TOGETHER WITH THE USSR?

SEC. BAKER: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS ALREADY CALLED FOR A PEACE CONFERENCE REGARDING YUGOSLAVIA, AN ACTION THAT THE UNITED STATES FULLY SUPPORTS. I THINK IT WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THAT

INITIATIVE IF WE WERE NOW TO JUMP OUT HERE WITH A PROPOSAL OF OUR OWN.

Q MR. SECRETARY, THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WILL BE MEETING SOON IN ALGIERS TO DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS. ON THE BASIS OF YOUR CONVERSATIONS IN JERUSALEM WITH PALESTINIANS THERE, DO YOU EXPECT WHAT YOU WOULD CHARACTERIZE AS A POSITIVE RESOLUTION TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING IN ALGIERS?

SEC. BAKER: I CAN ONLY -- WELL, I REALLY DON'T KNOW. I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT WILL HAPPEN AT SUCH A MEETING. I CAN ONLY TELL YOU THAT THE MEETINGS THAT I HAD WITH PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES LAST NIGHT, THE MEETING I HAD LAST NIGHT, WAS ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIVE THAT I HAVE HAD SO FAR. BUT WE STILL AWAIT WORD FROM THE PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY WILL ATTEND.

AND LET ME TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNIT TO SAY ONE MORE TIME, AS I'VE SAID BEFORE THE AUGUST BREAK, I DON'T THINK ANYBODY HAS MORE TO GAIN FROM A PROCESS SUCH AS THIS THAN DO PALESTINIANS. AND I'M QUITE CONVINCED THAT NOBODY HAS MORE TO LOSE IF A PROCESS NEVER DEVELOPS THAN DO THE PALESTINIANS. SO, I'M VERY HOPEFUL THAT WE WILL GET POSITIVE ANSWERS FROM PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES.

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

עד כאן

עתונות

ד"ר צה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
מעט, הסברה, ר/מרכז, ממד/בינל, מרכזאיסוף,
@ (נור/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 17207
אל: רהמש/824
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 258, תא: 190991, זח: 1036, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בכב
שמור/מידי

א ל: מזכיר הממשלה;
מנהל מצפ"א;

מאת: הציר, וושינגטון

ברתי עם שרות בתי הסוהר ועפ"י דבריהם לא נראה שיהיה קושי עם ביקור הרב
הואשי. לפי בקשתם שלחתי להם איגרת ואני מקווה לשמוע מהם בימים אלה.
סיפרתי זאת טלפונית לאמנון דרור.

ד"ש - שילה

חפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 17504

אל: רהמש/844

מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 263, תא: 190991, זח: 1351, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/מידי

א ל: הפוצת חקשורת

מאת: עתונות רושינגטון

הנדון: התבטאויות מזכיר המדינה, בייקר, בסיורו בישראל ובמצריים

דינו התמלילים הבאים:

REMARKS BY US SECRETARY OF STATE OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES
AS RELEASED BY US DEPARTMENT OF STATE/OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY/SPOKESMAN/KING DAVID HOTEL, JERUSALEM
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1991

REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING AT THE PRIME MINISTRY/JERUSALEM
AS RELEASED BY US DEPARTMENT OF STATE/OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY/SPOKESMAN/(CAIRO, EGYPT)/TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1991

TEXT OF REMARKS BY US SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
AND PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE FAISAL HUSSEINI
PRIOR TO THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, JERUSALEM
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1991

REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III AND FOREIGN
MINISTER AMR MOUSSA BEFORE THEIR MEETING AS RELEASED BY US DEPARTMENT
OF STATE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY/SPOKESMAN, (CAIRO),
SEMIRAMIS INTER-CONTINENTAL HOTEL, CAIRO, EGYPT, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER
17, 1991

TEXT OF PRESS CONFERENCE WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III
AND EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK AS RELEASED BY THE US STATE
DEPARTMENT, ITTAHIDEYA PALACE, CAIRO, EGYPT, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER
17, 1991

במידה ואתם מעונינים בחמלילים אלה, אנא הודיעונו בהקדם.

עחונרת

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעח,
הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 18564
אל: רהמש/925
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 296, תא: 200991, זח: 1336, דח: מ, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: ממ"ד - איסוף - ערב 3

דע: אמ"ג מנמ"ת - רע"ג 30

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

הנדון: מדברי שר ההגנה הכווייתי לאחר החתימה על הסכם ההגנה עם ארה"ב

PRESS TAKEOUT WITH KUWAITI DEFENSE MINISTER ALI AL-SABAH FOLLOWING
SIGNING OF THE US-KUWAITI DEFENSE AGREEMENT / OUTSIDE THE PENTAGON
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1991

MIN. AL-SABAH: LET ME JUST SAY A FEW WORDS. ON THIS OCCASION
OF SIGNING THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT FOR DEFENSE COOPERATION OF KUWAIT AND
THE REGION, IT WAS A PLEASURE AND AN HONOR FOR ME TO BE HERE TO SIGN
THAT AGREEMENT ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT. AND ALSO ON THIS
OCCASION, I WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY THE BEST WISHES OF THE KUWAITI
PEOPLE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA.

Q MR. MINISTER, YOU ALSO MENTIONED AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY
UPSTAIRS THAT YOU HAD PRISONERS WHO WERE STILL IN PRISON IN IRAQ.
WOULD YOU LIKE THE UNITED STATES IN SOME WAY TO HELP YOU GAIN
FREEDOM FOR THOSE PRISONERS?

MIN. AL-SABAH: WELL, I WOULD LIKE THE UNITED STATES AND ALL
THE PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE IN THIS WORLD TO HELP US IN BRINGING BACK
OUR PRISONERS AND OUR DETAINEES WHICH THE IRAQI REGIME IS STILL
HOLDING IN IRAQ.

Q SHOULD THE UNITED STATES USE MORE MILITARY FORCE AGAINST
IRAQ? YOU KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS THE
US WAS PLANNING TO ESCALATE, PERHAPS, ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
THERE.

MIN. AL-SABAH: WELL, WITH A PERSON LIKE SADDAM HUSSEIN, I

THINK HE ONLY UNDERSTANDS FORCE BECAUSE HE HAS LIVED THAT WAY, HE HAS LIVED BY KILLING PEOPLE, KILLING OTHER PEOPLE AND TORTURING SO MANY OF THE IRAQIS AND THE OTHERS, THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE HIM UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WORLD IS A PEACEFUL WORLD, IS A UNIFIED WORLD AGAINST TERRORISM AND AGAINST TYRANTS LIKE HIM.

Q MR. MINISTER, ARE YOU PREPARE TO ALLOW --

Q MR. MINISTER, THIS PROVIDES FOR MUTUAL TRAINING AND MUTUAL EXERCISES BY THE TWO COUNTRIES. IS IT ALSO, IN EFFECT, AN OPEN INVITATION FOR US FORCES, WAR PLANES AND SHIPS, TO COME TO KUWAIT FOR BASING IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY SUCH AS THE GULF WAR?

MIN. AL-SABAH: WELL, WE ARE NOT RULING ANYTHING OUT. THE PRE-POSITIONING OF MATERIALS IN KUWAIT AND IN THE OTHER GULF STATES, THE USE OF KUWAITI FACILITIES -- ALL OF THESE ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF KEEPING THE GULF A PEACEFUL GULF, AND ALSO FOR THE PROTECTION AND FOR THE DEFENSE OF THAT GULF. SO IT IS NOT KUWAIT, IT IS FOR THE WHOLE REGION.

Q (OFF MIKE) -- DO YOU STILL -- DOES KUWAIT OR YOU STILL FEEL THREATENED BY ANY IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION?

MIN. AL-SABAH: IT IS NOT ONLY KUWAIT THAT IS THREATENED BY THE IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, IT IS THE WHOLE REGION, FOR THAT MATTER. AND I THINK IT IS -- THE UNITED NATIONS HAS TO SUBDUE SADDAM HUSSEIN TO COMPLY WITH ITS RESOLUTIONS.

Q DO YOU SEE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THAT --

(CROSSTALK.)

Q IF I MAY, ONE QUESTION.

MIN. AL-SABAH: YES.

Q THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE AGREEMENT THAT YOU'VE JUST SIGNED WITH THE UNITED STATES -- WHAT WOULD YOU SAY THE HIGHLIGHT IS?

MIN. AL-SABAH: THE HIGHLIGHT OF THAT AGREEMENT IS FOR A PEACEFUL GULF -- FOR A SECURE AND PEACEFUL GULF. AND WE DON'T WANT ANY SADDAM HUSSEIN IN THAT AREA ANY MORE.

THANK YOU.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מזחיים,
רביב, מעת, הסברה

סססס

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שטור/מיד
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לוח אהרון

לוח כהן

אל: לשכת שה יח, סמוכיל צפ"א, מנהל מצפ"א
יועץ תפוצות, מנהל תפוצות
מאת: קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק

מצ"ב מכתב הנשיא לשושנה קרדין.

קונכ"ל/ניו-יורק
אורי סכ"ר
19 בספטמבר 1991

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שהח 1
סג"הח 2
מהח 1
מנ"ס 1
הנ"ח 1
מנ"כ 2
ב/אבו 1
אפוקו 1

Fax - 301 -
2527-9293

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 17, 1991

1126

Dear Shoshana:

I have received your letter of September 13 and appreciate your kind words about my support for the State of Israel and for the successful absorption of Soviet Jewish and Ethiopian refugees. I also appreciate your noting that we share aspirations for a Middle East peace conference and direct negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

I am concerned that some of my comments at the Thursday press conference caused apprehension within the Jewish community. My references to lobbyists and powerful political forces were never meant to be pejorative in any sense. As a veteran of many years in the governmental and political arena, I have a great respect for the exercise of free expression in the democratic process. It is essential that all our citizens have the right to present and advocate their positions on issues. Politically organized groups and individuals are a legitimate and valued part of the decision-making process in a democracy.

We obviously disagree on the question of a 120-day delay in the submission of the loan guarantees. I believe, as you do, that we can have honest differences on issues. I also share your belief that we are committed to the same principles and that our areas of agreement far outweigh our areas of disagreement.

I continue to value your thoughtful input and perspective. You are always honest and forthright

1126


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in your comments to me, and that is invaluable as we move forward in this delicate process for peace. The lines of communication will always be open between us.

Barbara joins me in sending you good wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,



Mrs. Shoshana S. Cardin
Chairman
Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations
110 East 59th Street
New York, New York 10022

אאא, חוזם: 17761

אל: רהמש/871

מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 354, תא: 190991, זח: 1848, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בבב

23023

שמור/בהול לבוקר

355.01

א ל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א, יועץ תפוצות, מנהל תפוצות לשכת שה'ח, מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: קונכ'ל/ניו-יורק

יחות ראשונות שלי מאז שובי עם ראשי האירגונים העיקריים - אין ספק ששורת חרדה אמיתית מכך שמהלכי הממשל יובילו להפסד נכסים חשובים ואמיתיים בתחומים קדינליים לנו וליהדות ארה"ב.

א. הערכויות עצמן. גם אלה שאופטימיים לגבי פשרה חוששים שמדובר FACE ב-SAVING ולא בהכטחת הערכויות גם לטווח הנראה לעין.

ב. עמדה חד צדדית של הממשל בנושא תהליך השלום, מתוך מגמה לאלץ הצדדים להתקדם במו"מ לפי התוואי האמריקאי.

ג. דימוי העצמה של הקהילה היהודית - נפגע והצללקת עלולה להיות עמוקה עוד יותר. המצב מתואר ע"י רבים כ- NO WIN SITUATION.

ד. מעמדה של ישראל בדעת הקהל נפגע כעומדת בעימות עם נשיא פופולרי, כמקשה על תהליך השלום ככפויית טובה כלפי בת בריתה הגדולה והחמור מכל כלא מתחשבת בקשיי הכלכלה האמריקאית ושל האזרח האמריקאי.

ה. עת כל בני שיחי נושא ההתנחלויות והבניה בשטחים הוא המאיץ העיקרי כעמדת הנשיא הרואה בבניה מכשול מכוון להתקדמות לעבר שלום הכרחי ואפשרי באיזור וחרמית כלפי ארה"ב.

ו. לדעת ידידינו אסור שסוגיית ההתנחלויות תהפוך לנושא הדיון הציבורי כי אז לא העמוד לנו עוד האחדות היהודית. אשר לפרסומים כאילו ביום ג' הקרוב תקום התנחלות חדשה אמרו כמה מהמנהיגים החשובים ביותר - במקרה כזה תשכחו מאתנו כבני בריח למאבק'.

קיצורו של דבר מצאתי כאן חרדה, אך גם רצון יסודי להמשיך המאבק במוטיבציה ובתבונה.

קונכ'ל/ניו-יורק

אורי סביר

19 בספטמבר 1991

אאא, חוזם: 18184

אל: רהמש/895

מ-: אטלנטה, נר: 23, תא: 190991, זח: 1200, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מידי

אל: מצפא

דע: ווש ציר מדיני, ציר הסברה

מאת: הקונכל אטלנטה

ביום שישי ה 13 לספטמבר היה פול קוברדייל מנהל כוח השלום ומועמד מטעם הרפובליקנים למשרת הסנטור מטעם ג'ורג'יה אורחו של הנשיא בוש לארוחת

לדברי קוברדייל הנשיא לא הרפה כל הערב מסוגיית הערכויות והצטייר כמאוד נחוש ומשוכנע בדעתו שמתן הערכויות לישראל כרגע יפגע בתהליך השלום. כשקוברדייל אמר לו שהוא שומע מתומכיו בקהילה היהודית כי הם מצדדים בעמדת ישראל בסוגיה, שאל אותו הנשיא אם זו עמדת איפאק או עמדת הקהילה היהודית.

הנשיא בוש ביקש מקוברדייל לברר אישית אצל שורה של יהודים רפובליקנים באטלנטה ובמיוחד אצל צ'ארלי אקרמן מה דעתם בנושא.

קוברדייל חזר לאטלנטה ובעקבות דיווחו נפגשו בסוף שבוע עם ארבעת התומכים המרכזיים של המפלגה הרפובליקנית בקהילה היהודית ג'רלד כהן, ג'רווין לו, סון צ'ארלי אקרמן וקלייד רנדבל. הארבעה נסחו מכתב אל הנשיא שציינו: הקהילה היהודית נפגעה מדבריו במסיבת העיתונאים. יש צורך בהצהרה שתרגיע הרוחות ותביע תמיכה עקרונית בסיוע לקליטת העלייה. הבעת תמיכה בבקשת ישראל לערכויות לצד תמיכה במאמצי הנשיא לקידום תהליך השלום. הבעת תמיכה באיפאק והבהרה שאיפאק פועל בסוגיה בשליחות הקהילה היהודית. קוברדייל יצא לוושינגטון המכתב ויעבירו אישית לידי הנשיא.

בגישה שקיימתי עם גרווין לויסון הבוקר הוא מסר לי בשם הארבעה כי להערכתם כפעילים במפלגה הרפובליקנית לא יחמכו חברי הקונגרס הרפובליקנים בסופו של דבר בביטול וטו שיטיל הנשיא בעיקר בגלל נסיבות של פוליטיקה פנימית. הטלת וטו של הנשיא עם פתיחת שנת הבחירות תהיה נצחון גדול למפלגה הדמוקרטית וכשלון לנשיא דווקא בתחום החזק שלו מדיניות החוץ. כרפובליקנים הם לא רוצים לראות התפתחות כזו. כיהודים הם לא רוצים לראות את הנשיא הפופלרי כמו בוש נכשל בפעם הראשונה בהטלת וטו דווקא בנושא בעל אופי יהודי.

אלון ליאל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, בן אבו, תפוצות, רביב

אאא, חוזם: 17812
 אל: רהמש/875
 מ-: ווש, נר: 2060, תא: 190991, זח: 1900, דח: ב, סג: סו,
 בבב
 סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: סמנכל צפ"א ופר'נ

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

בויות-יוזמות אפשריות של הקונגרסמן סולרז והקונגרסמן לארי סמית'

1. ערב יום הכיפורים, (17.9 אחה'צ) החקשר ראש משרדו של הקונגרסמן לארי סמית וביקש להעביר אלינו הצעה של הקונגרסמן (מפאת השעה המאוחרת לא דיווחתי על השיחה). הבוקר (19.9) שוחחתי עמו שוב, ולהלן ההצעה במלואה:-

בשבוע הבא (יום ג' או ד') יקיימו פולי ומיטצ'ל (ואולי גם בהשתתפות המנהיגות הרפובליקנית טרם בדק הנושא) מסיבת עתונאים שבה עיקר דבריהם יהיה:- אנו מוכנים לתת לנשיא, כבקשתו, דחיה של 120 יום ולאחריהם, הקונגרס מחייב להצביע על חבילת הערכויות לישראל.

כדברי אנשי סמית', בינואר תהיה זו הפרוגטיבה של הקונגרס להעביר חקיקה בנושא הערכויות.

להערכת סמית':

תהיה זו התאבדות להעביר החלטה (CONC. RESOLUTION) דוגמת הרעיון של הקונגרסמן סולרז שכן אז מחייבים להצביע את המחוקקים פעמיים (עתה ובינואר)

ON A VERY UNCOMFORTABLE AND VERY UNPOPULAR ISSUE FOR THEIR CONSTITUENTS

ב. התקשורת לא סייעה עד כה בלימוד הציבור שלא מדובר בהלוואות אלא רק בערכויות.

גם הנשיא 'מכר' לציבור (למרות שידוע טוב יותר) את הנושא כנושא פנים כאשר הפך זאת מנושא של מדיניות חוץ (לא אתן ערכויות למדינה זרה ואקח מהעם האמריקני) לנושא פנים ולכן הציבור האמריקני איננו יודע ההבדל.

לפיכך, הציבור האמריקני לא יבין גם שהחלטה (CONCURRENT RESOLUTION) שונה מחוק (LAW) שנועד להעניק הערכויות= (למרות שאנחנו ושאר המחוקקים יודעים ההבדל) והמחוקקים יתפסו ע'י ציבור בוחריהם כמצביעים פעמיים. חשש נוסף שלהם הוא כי= לאחר שיצביעו עתה על התחייבות (באמצעות (CON RES) יחזרו לאיזורי הבחירה שלהם ויהיו נתונים ללחץ ב-4 החודשים הקרובים שלנות הצבעתם. (אמנם צפוי לחץ בכל מקרה אולם לא יהיה זה לחץ ספיציפי לשנות דפוס ההצבעה). אם המנהיגות תודיע על דחיה

IT WILL BE OFF THE FRONT BURNER. WE HAVE TO PUT OFF THE PRESSURES. WE HAVE TO LOWER THE STRESS AND THE BOILING POINT

יהיה קל יותר להלחם בנושא ההתנחלויות ונושאים אחרים אם הנושא יוסר מהעמודים הראשונים של העתונות. יש לנו הזדמנות לעצב את הנושא, בעקבות דברי הנשיא ודחיה ל-120 יום, כפי שאנחנו (הקונגרס) נרצה.

נכון אמנם שאין החייבות המחוקקים כאשר לא מצביעים על החלטה אולם המחוקקים מעונינים ' להתחבא מאחורי המנהיגות'

AND NOW THEY DONT HAVE LEADERSHIP THEY , THE LEGISLATORS, DONT HAVE NOW A COVER. THE COVER IS THAT WE ARE GOING TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE 120 DAYS HE WANTS

רף ינואר (ממשיכים אנשי סמית') יש לנו החייבות ללכת קדימה ולהעביר את חקיקת הערכויות. הקונגרס יכול לאמר שנתנו לנשיא 120 יום כבקשתו אפילו אם הממשל יתנגד. סמית' שוחח כבר עם מחוקקים יהודים, גייפהרדט (מנהיג הרוב) ואחד מעוזריו הבכירים של פולי (יו"ר ביהנ"ב) אשר הסכימו עם גישתו. לדברי אנשי סמית' , גם הסנטור לייהי מסכים לרעיון זה.

בכל מקרה סמית' ימשיך לבדוק הרעיון (יחזור לעיר רק ביום ב' בשבוע הבא 23.9) וע'פ התפתחויות יצור קשר גם עם הסנטור מוטצ'ל.

2. בנפרד טיוטאת הצעת ההחלטה (CO CONC RESOLUTION) של הקונגרסמן סולרז.

ראש משרדו של סולרז מסר לי הבוקר (19.9) כי כל הפעילות נעצרה עד יום ג'.

פגישת המחוקקים היהודים שנועדה ליום ג' - ערב יום כיפור, נדחה ליום ג' בשבוע הבא ועד אז לא יוחלט דבר. ממתינים עתה (כולל המחוקקים היהודים) להתפתחויות וישנן אף שמועות (בעיקר בקרב היהודים) שאולי אין מספיק ג'ולות להעביר החלטה (CON. RES) בצורה משמעותית יש עתה להמתין ולראות מה יחליט הקונגרס היהודי, ואח"כ מנהיגות ביהנ"ב. בכל מקרה אם לא ניתן יהיה להעביר ההחלטה על בסיס BIPARTISAN עדיף לא לפעול לגביה כלל.

אנשי סולרז המשיכו ואמרו כי הרבה תלוי בדעת הקהל האמריקנית ועד כמה המחוקקים WILL GET SCARED. אנשים שבשבוע שעבר, כך אנשי סולרז, רצו להלחם בממשל השבוע החלו כבר לחשוש.

3. בשלב זה ממשיכים הידידים לגייס שושבינים להצעת קסטן אינוייה , וביהנ"ב עוקב אחר התפתחויות בסנאט.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

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שמור / בהול לבוקר

19/9/91

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: סמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"נ

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ערביות - יוזמת הקונגרסמן סולרז

בהמשך לדיווחי בנדון, רצ"ב טיוטאת הצעת ההחלטה (CONCURRENT RES.) של
הקונגרסמן סולרז. הטיוטא כוללת הערות "הידידים" המוסכמות על דעת סולרז

ישראל ונא' זכנא' .
יהודית ורנאי זרנגו

למח' סלמה 1
למח' חסיה 2
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A resolution expressing the sense of Congress that it will expeditiously consider and favorably respond to Israel's request for absorption assistance after the expiration of the 120 day delay period requested by President Bush.

--Whereas it has been the policy of the United States for more than 20 years to persuade the Soviet Union to permit its Jewish citizens to exercise their right of free emigration;

--Whereas the success of this policy has resulted in a situation where ^{350,000 Soviet Jews have arrived in Israel and} more than a million Soviet Jews may emigrate to Israel by 1995;

--Whereas at a time when most other countries are closing their doors to Soviet Jewish emigrants, Israel has opened its doors to every Soviet Jew who seeks to emigrate there;

--Whereas Israel is also in the process of absorbing the thousands of Ethiopian Jews who were rescued in Operation Solomon earlier this year;

--Whereas without substantial help from a variety of sources, including world Jewry, European countries and the United States, Israel will not be able to adequately house, employ and otherwise absorb these emigrants;

--Whereas there are disturbing indications that some Soviet Jews who might otherwise have emigrated to Israel have decided not to do so because of the current economic difficulties in Israel;

--Whereas there is a serious possibility that those Soviet Jews who have decided not to emigrate because of their concerns about their economic livelihood in Israel, could become the victims of a resurgent and virulent anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, particularly if the economic and political situation in that country continues to deteriorate;

--Whereas the United States and the international community must not repeat the tragic mistakes that were made in 1930s, when a Jewish community in peril was abandoned by most of the world;

--Whereas Israel has requested \$10 billion in guarantees from the United States in order to assist it in absorbing both Soviet and Ethiopian emigrants;

--Whereas consideration of the Israeli request is a ^{on its own merits} humanitarian issue that should be decided expeditiously and

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without any linkage to the peace process;
 (on its own merits)

--Whereas Israel's outstanding record in meeting every financial obligation incurred on billions of dollars of prior loans indicates it is extremely unlikely to default on the \$10 billion in new loans that would be generated by approval of the requested guarantees;

--Whereas as a result of ^{there will be minimal} the low probability of defaults by Israel on these loans, which will be repaid to the United States with interest, the guarantees will probably not have to be utilized, and ~~the~~ cost to the US taxpayer of providing them will be insignificant;

--Whereas President Bush, who ^{deserves} enormous credit for his outstanding efforts ^{freeing} on behalf of Soviet and Ethiopian Jewry, has indicated his support in principle for the continued emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel;

--Whereas in order to facilitate the prospects for progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process President Bush has requested a delay of 120 days before the Administration and the Congress consider the Israeli request for these guarantees;

--Whereas the Congress strongly supports the ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict;

--Whereas after this 120 day period, the Bush Administration has stated that it will guarantee a vehicle for action on the loan guarantees, that it will seek no further delays, that it will restate support for the principle of absorption aid to Israel, that it will handle budgetary issues associated with the provision of the guarantees in the most reasonable possible way consistent with legal requirements;

--Whereas the Bush Administration has given additional commitments that after the expiration of the 120 day period, it will mount an international effort to solicit support from other countries for absorption aid, as well as ensure that if there are any costs to Israel as a result of the delay, those costs will be offset in the loan guarantee package;

Now therefore be it resolved... it is the sense of Congress that:

--One of the highest priorities of the Congress, when it reconvenes in January 1992 after the expiration of the 120 day delay period requested by the President, will be to expeditiously consider and favorably respond to Israel's request for absorption assistance.

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reach those for which they were intended.

This resolution will implement the international community's concern for providing Iraqi civilians humanitarian assistance. The way is open now to Iraqi authorities to allow that process to begin.

(end text)
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*NEA410

IMPACT OF COLD, GULF WARS ON MIDEAST, GULF

By Richard Haass (2940)

(The author is a special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council. The following article, entitled "The End of the Cold and Gulf Wars: Consequences for the Middle East and the Gulf," is taken from a recent speech delivered to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.)

1991 has seen the conclusion of two wars. The first, known as the "Cold War," but also as "peaceful coexistence" and "detente," began (depending upon your history) either half or three-quarters of a century ago and ended (again, depending upon your history) in 1990 or this year. The second conflict, the Gulf war, began August 2, 1990, and came to an end this past spring with Iraq's crushing defeat and Kuwait's subsequent liberation.

The United States succeeded in these two very different conflicts for some of the same reasons. In part, we were fortunate in our choice of adversaries. The Soviet Union suffered from

systemic weakness, the victim of its own political and economic ideology. Iraq suffered more from personal flaws, in this case Saddam Hussein's excessive ambition and autocratic decision-making style.

Yet our accomplishments say something about our own efforts. The Soviet Union and Saddam alike might have escaped or at a minimum delayed the consequences of their own errors had it not been for the fact they were met by determined, concerted opposition. What I am referring to is Western strength and American diplomatic and military leadership.

The question before us here and now is the consequence, or better yet consequences, for the region of these twin developments. By "region" I mean the geographic area that stretches from Marrakech to Bangladesh — North Africa, the Levant, the Gulf and South Asia — but in particular the Middle East and the Gulf. I choose to focus on these sub-regions not simply because the South Asian countries tend to be preoccupied with their own concerns, and because the North African countries are separated by geography, but also because technology, politics and demographics are increasingly drawing together the fortunes of the Gulf and the Middle East.

It is useful to look first at the Soviet Union and Iraq. The Soviet Union is likely to be distracted if not consumed by internal problems of political and economic reform and the relationship between the center and the periphery. Iraq too will continue to be confronted by regional and ethnic challenges. But unlike the leaders of the Soviet Union, who can look forward to substantial political and economic support from the outside, Iraq's current leaders face a future of unre-

lenting political isolation and economic sanctions amidst a society trying to recover from the destruction of war.

Thus, for different reasons, neither country will be able to exert as much influence as before on or in the region. In the case of the Soviet Union, I am not sure this is entirely a good thing. Although for decades the Soviets more often than not contributed to regional tensions by arming one or another client state or faction or by working against U.S. diplomacy, in recent months and years the Soviet Union has come to play an increasingly constructive role. Any one who doubts this need only try to imagine a Gulf crisis acted out against the backdrop of Soviet political and military support for Iraq, or a peace process that had to contend with Moscow's machinations at every turn.

A reduced Soviet role does have one drawback, however. Even at the height of U.S.-Soviet geopolitical competition, the Kremlin could normally be counted upon not to allow the rivalry of clients to escalate to the point that direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation became a possibility. Indeed, it is not implausible to deduce that Iraq's war of aggression against Kuwait resulted in part from an Iraqi perception that the Soviet Union was too weak and distracted to do much of anything in the way of restraint. This is the sort of "international deregulation" I spoke of nearly 18 months ago at another Washington Institute session, in this case on the likely consequences of the decline of the Cold War. Unfortunately, it is one of the few predictions I have ever made that came to pass.

In the case of Iraq, there is much less reason to regret its substantially reduced ability to affect the fate of the

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tial civilian needs as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), and also with respect to the privileges and immunities of the United Nations and its personnel implementing this resolution; and to ensure that there are no diversions from the purposes laid down in these resolutions;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

(end text)
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PICKERING SAYS OIL SALE MEANT TO HELP IRAQI CIVILIANS
(Text: remarks to UNSC 9/19/91) (680)

United Nations — The U.N. plan for a one-time sale of Iraqi oil to pay some of Iraq's war debts "is a key step in bringing the gulf crisis to a close," says U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering.

The Security Council September 19 formally authorized the one-time sale of Iraqi oil under U.N. supervision and a plan to administer the profits. The council set up an escrow account for the profits, and the United Nations will oversee the purchase and distribution of humanitarian supplies to the Iraqi people. The vote was 13 to 1 (Cuba), with Yemen abstaining.

After the vote, Pickering said, "this resolution will implement the international community's concern for providing Iraqi civilians humanitarian assistance. The way is open now to Iraqi authorities to allow that process to begin."

He stressed that the resolution provided only limited authorization for the sale of Iraqi oil "within the existing sanctions regime, which remains firmly in place." The oil sale "does not in any way represent a weakening of sanctions," he said.

Following is the text of Pickering's remarks to the Security Council:

(begin text)

Mr. President, the United States is pleased to be a cosponsor of the resolution, the council has just adopted implementing the council's earlier resolution, 706, on humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Security Council Resolution 706 provides a mechanism whereby sum 1,600 million dollars worth of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products can be sold, over a six-month period, primarily to finance Iraqi imports of food, medical supplies, and other essential civilian needs.

It also sets into train the process which will provide funds for an initial contribution from Iraq to the Compensation Fund, so that relief can also begin flowing, at last, to those outside Iraq who have suffered as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

Resolution 706 will further generate funding for the work of the Special Commission, the Boundary Commission, and the return of Kuwaiti property still being held in Iraq. The Security Council has repeatedly stated its concern about Iraq's non-compliance with Resolution 687, particularly with the work of the Special Commission. This resolution will provide essential funding to help us ensure compliance, and it is entirely appropriate that the Iraqi government should pay.

It is important to emphasize that this limited authorization for the sale of Iraqi oil is being made within the existing sanctions regime, which remains firmly in place. It does not in any way represent a weakening of sanctions.

This implementing resolution is a key step in bringing the Gulf crisis to a close and having Iraq meet its responsibilities.

My government wishes to compliment the secretary general and secretariat for their thorough, lucid, and first-rate report on implementing Resolution 706. The secretary general's report on implementing Resolution 706 made much easier the council's job. The secretariat produced a report in a very short time frame, which responded fully to the council's desires, spelling out the practical problems of implementation and making recommendations to overcome these problems.

This implementing resolution responds closely to the secretary-general's report. In drafting it, council members also made a conscious effort throughout to take Iraq's legal standing into account. The implementing resolution sets up mechanisms to implement Resolution 706, supports the secretary general in his implementation role, and provides for ongoing review and assessment of the needs and requirements in Iraq.

A crucial feature of this program, as mandated by Resolution 706 and detailed in the report and recommendations of the secretary general, is that the sale of Iraqi oil, and the procurement and distribution of relief supplies, will be conducted under the close supervision of the United Nations to ensure that the supplies

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Gulf and Middle East. While Iraq's ability to use military force with some effectiveness has not always been unwelcome — one need only think back several years ago to when the West aided Baghdad in its defense against Iran, at that time the more (dangerous would-be regional hegemon — the relative demise of a Saddam-led Iraq is an overwhelmingly positive development. All the states of the region, and all states with a stake in the region, can go about their business knowing that the regional actor until recently most able and likely to threaten their well-being is now much less able to do so.

These changes are not necessarily permanent. We have yet to see what emerges from what we have known as the Soviet Union. With time, one or more of the republics or some reconstituted whole can again be a major force for better or worse in the region. And Iraq, especially an Iraq under an alternative leadership willing to live at peace with its own people and its neighbors, can free itself of its self-created isolation and return to play a central role in the Gulf and Middle East. But for now, however, the key to the future of this region will be the regional states themselves, influenced by outsiders, above all the United States, but also the European Community and others.

Few, if any, conflicts end with consequences either automatic or inevitable. The Cold War and the Gulf War are no exceptions. The end of each could in retrospect be seen as a historic watershed, a dividing line separating dangerous competition from constructive concert — or the conclusion of one or both conflicts could come to be seen not so much as a watershed or even the end of a war but simply the conclusion of a battle that in turn set the stage for new

struggles. In short, wars and their aftermaths constitute opportunities for change; order or disorder can be the result. What will happen in the current context will depend in large part upon how well we and the regional states meet the challenges before us. Let me then look at the principal challenges in the Middle East and Persian Gulf and what remains to be done if we are to translate all that we have accomplished into something lasting and beneficial.

First, it is important to recognize that Iraq is neither disarmed nor transformed. It still poses an actual and potential threat to its neighbors. As a result, we must maintain the pressure on Iraq so long as it is not in full compliance with all the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions — especially Resolution 687 — and all aspects of the cease-fire and so long as it remains under its current leadership. Sanctions, diplomatic and economic alike, can over time weaken what remains of Iraq's ability to make war and persuade the Iraqi people that their future has the potential to be bright only if change in leadership is forthcoming. Moreover, we believe a new, more pluralist political order is possible for Iraq. But for now, we recognize that peace is unlikely to come to the region and to the Iraqi people while Saddam Hussein remains in power. Nothing has changed in our view that Saddam is discredited and cannot be redeemed. As a result, all possible sanctions will remain in place until he is gone. Iraqis will not participate in the region's post-crisis political, economic and security arrangements until there is a change in regime; when there is, we are prepared to end sanctions and consider easing the burden of reparations while facilitating Iraq's reentry into normal international life.

Second, although Iraq's defeat reduces sharply the requirements of a containment strategy, we must still put into place viable defense arrangements able to deter and if need be defeat new threats to Gulf stability. The U.N. observer mission (UNIKOM) is already in place along the Iraq-Kuwait border. Consultations are continuing on a modest Arab peacekeeping force that would be stationed in Kuwait. We have initiated an access and prepositioning agreement with the Government of Kuwait. But more needs to be done. The outlines of what we seek are emerging: an enhanced U.S. naval presence, more regular exercising and training and planning of U.S. projection forces, some prepositioning of equipment, better air lift and fast sea-lift, enhanced cooperation with local states. We are not interested in bases or permanent stationing of U.S. ground forces in the region. The intent is to build an approach that meets security demands without creating political pressures that could threaten the very stability we seek to promote.

The third aspect of what we are doing in the Gulf is in the realm of arms control. We have just seen a harrowing glimpse of a possible future for the region, one in which wars are not confined to battlefields and soldiers and conventional munitions, but a future in which downtowns become battlegrounds, in which civilians become combatants, and in which weapons of mass destruction carried by ballistic missiles complement the familiar but also deadly world of infantry and armor. We cannot simply stand by and observe this phenomenon. We must try to stop or at least shape it.

We are. We have put forward a comprehensive arms control initiative, one involving would-be suppli-

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ers and recipients alike, designed to stem and where possible roll back the proliferation of destabilizing conventional and unconventional weapons as well as the means to deliver them. We have secured agreement among the five leading exporters of conventional arms to the region to consult on arms transfers and to develop guidelines to restrain destabilizing arms exports to the region in the future. There are also grounds for optimism that we can tighten the flow of technology that would enhance unconventional weaponry. At the same time, we envision a multilateral negotiation on arms control and regional security as part of the peace process. Realistically, substantial progress in this realm probably will have to follow political reconciliation; that said, there may be potential for progress in promoting confidence-building measures that would reduce the chance of miscalculation and accidental war. And there is the commitment on our part to explore every possible avenue that might arrest or better yet reverse the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Fourth, we are doing all that we usefully can to energize the Middle East peace process. Our goal is to convene a conference that in turn launches direct negotiations among Israel and the Arab states and Israelis and Palestinians. For the first time, Israel would sit down face-to-face with its Arab neighbors. The principles that guide our effort are well-known: we seek a comprehensive peace, one based upon U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We seek a true peace, one that includes Israel and provides it real security. But at the same time we seek a fair peace, one that provides for the legitimate political rights of Palestinians and finds a solution to the questions of land, water and security central to this region's past, present and future. We undertake this

effort not with a blueprint, not with the ability to create peace, but with the determination to be a catalyst for peace, to help those who truly want to help themselves.

We believe we have a good opportunity to do so. U.S. credibility in the region is high. The conflict in the Gulf was a defeat not only of Iraq but of the forces representing radicalism in the Arab world. The end of the Cold War sent a signal that the Soviet Union no longer represents an alternative to cooperation with the West and the bulk of the world community. More Arab states than ever before are willing to accept Israel's existence and engage in face-to-face talks; the willingness of key Arab states to suspend the economic boycott of Israel if Israel suspends settlement activity is another example of this change. And in Israel, too, there are changes, as the Gulf War demonstrated that territory does not necessarily provide security in an age of unconventional weapons. Whether these new attitudes provide sufficient material for successful peacemaking remains to be seen; what is clear, though, is that would-be peacemakers such as ourselves have more to work with than at any time in recent memory.

In Lebanon, the Taif accords have led to significant progress. A legitimate government is now functioning and extending its authority. Several militias are being disarmed, and normal life is returning to Beirut and beyond. Obviously, much remains to be accomplished before Lebanon is truly sovereign and free of all non-Lebanese forces. Lebanon, too, is on the agenda of the peace conference we are working so hard to convene.

Fifth, we are conscious that stability in this or any region of the world cannot derive solely from relations

between states. Conditions within states also matter. What we are trying to do is encourage greater respect for human rights, greater provision for meaningful political participation, greater encouragement of productive economic behavior and cooperation to foster development. We are seeing some progress in this regard in Kuwait. Elections, scheduled for October 1992, will restore parliamentary life and help restore Kuwait as the Gulf's leading proponent of political participation.

More generally, there is no reason for the peoples and countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf to miss out on the intellectual, political, and economic currents of our time — currents that have improved the lives of men and women around the world. Excessive state control of the political arena or the marketplace has been discredited. All I would add here is a sense of modesty, that we go about encouraging change of this sort recognizing that we cannot write much less dictate the social contract for societies and cultures with long and distinct traditions of their own.

Sixth, our approach to building order in the Gulf recognizes and addresses humanitarian concerns. The United States has taken a leading role in providing and encouraging others to provide the necessary relief for the many refugees that have sought to escape Saddam Hussein's violence and repression. From the outset we have sought to meet these pressing human needs without getting entangled militarily in Iraq's civil conflicts. This would truly turn us into the world's policeman at a time there is no consensus in the world or here at home for us to assume such a role — and no assurance we could succeed even if there were.

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Seventh, we will continue to combat terrorism and work to bring about the release of the hostages. We are encouraged by the lack of terror that occasioned the Gulf crisis; we are also encouraged by signs that the hostage holders may be willing to cease this cynical and inhuman activity. In this regard, if Iran is willing to use all its influence against hostage-taking and abandon the use of terror across-the-board, we are prepared to review our own policies toward Tehran. Iran's performance during the Gulf crisis and since gives us some reason for optimism, but we must see a clear cut change in behavior before we reciprocate.

These, then, are the principal challenges before us. Let me close with two points. Some might say that these challenges are so great that they demonstrate that nothing has changed for the better. This is untrue. No, history has not come to an end in the part of the world where history began. But dealing with the challenges resulting from success, however difficult they may be, is far preferable to dealing with what would have resulted from failure to reverse Iraq's aggression. We have gone a good ways toward establishing a new and more constructive pattern of international affairs in the initial phase of the post-Cold War era. Accepting Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait would have had severe, negative consequences, in the region and beyond. Other would-be aggressors would have drawn the lesson that aggression pays; other would-be victims would have seen that appeasement was the only path. Instead, we have helped set a useful precedent of restraint and cooperation in a region more renowned for its examples of violence and conflict.

Last, I would point out that the United

States can more than any other party from outside the region contribute to solving these remaining challenges. The United States has a key, I would argue unique, contribution to make: as mediator of the region's disputes, as a model and a motivator for political and economic development. But we cannot do it alone no matter how hard we try. In the end, it is the peoples and above all the leaders of the Middle East and Gulf who will exert the lion's share of the influence over just what kind of a future theirs will be. It is they who will determine whether the opportunities created by the successful conclusion of the Cold War and the war in the Gulf are either exploited or squandered.

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CONGRESSIONAL REPORT,
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19
(Gates, Iraq) (430)

COLLEAGUES DISCUSS GATES
ROLE IN IRAN-CONTRA

Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials said September 19 that Robert Gates did not know of the operation run by Oliver North to illegally supply anti-Sandinista insurgents in Nicaragua through profits from the sale of U.S. arms to Iran.

In the third day of hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee on the nomination of Gates to head the CIA, they said that he might have had an idea that some clandestine operation was underway in Central America. But they portrayed him as having no certain knowledge of it or of the details.

Alan Fiers headed the CIA's Central America Task Force during part of the time Gates was deputy director of the agency. He told the Senate committee that he had "serious reason to doubt Bob Gates had extensive knowledge" of what North was doing, noting that Gates did not become deputy director until April 1986 — when the operation was well underway.

John McMahon, who preceded Gates as deputy director, said it was "quite probable" that his successor did not know the National Security Council was conducting such an operation out of the White House under North's direction.

However, former CIA lawyer David Doherty told the committee that he passed Gates a note containing some information on the affair shortly before then director William Casey first testified to Congress about the matter on November 21, 1986. Gates has said that he had no information, even though he was involved in preparing Casey's testimony to the panel.

PANEL LEADERS BACK BUSH
ON RENEWED FORCE

The Democratic and Republican leaders of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee say they will support President Bush if he decides to use force should Saddam Hussein once again fail to comply with lawful orders of the United Nations Security Council.

"It is clear that Iraq is attempting to evade fulfilling its commitments to reveal all facts related to its development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons," declared committee chairman Dante Fascell, a Democrat. "While it is important to un-

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cover Iraqi deception, the fundamental issue is Saddam Hussein's refusal to abide by U.N. resolutions."

The panel's ranking Republican, William Broomfield, said that "it is time to end Saddam's game of hide-and-seek." Under the terms of the cease-fire that ended the gulf war, he asserted, Saddam Hussein agreed to accept U.N. inspection of those weapons programs.

"We should hold him to that agreement — at gunpoint if necessary," Broomfield said.

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HILLS URGES WEST TO OPEN MARKETS TO EASTERN EUROPE
(U.S. to sign trade accord with Singapore) (520)

By Jon Schaffer
USIA Staff Writer

Washington — U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills says Western industrial nations must provide much greater access to the goods of Central and Eastern Europe if global geopolitical stability is to be preserved.

At a press briefing September 19, Hills described as "enormously disappointing" the failure of the European Community to reach agreement with its Central and Eastern European neighbors on further trade liberalization.

The U.S. trade representative had just returned from meetings in Europe with the trade ministers of the European Community, Japan and Canada.

Hills reported that the United States would soon be signing a trade frame-

work accord with Singapore and that the talks on a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Mexico and Canada are proceeding extraordinarily well.

But she said the industrial nations "simply cannot preach market principles with nations around the globe, those who have had restrictive dictators, those who have had command economies, and then say: 'but for your goods, those for which you have comparative advantage, market principles do not apply.'"

Developing open markets for Central and Eastern European goods is not just a question of economics but has much broader geopolitical implications, Hills said.

"If they are deprived of economic opportunity in the areas of agriculture, textiles, footwear and dairy — areas where they have strength — in fact, you can expect instability politically and that will be very detrimental to the long-term global tranquility," she warned.

She said the failure of the EC and Eastern Europe to conclude trade liberalization accords signals the "vital importance" of completing the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The five-year-old trade talks seek liberalization in sectors ranging from agriculture and textiles to intellectual property and services.

Progress in the talks continues to hinge on movement on agricultural reform within the European Community — reform that is not expected until sometime this fall, Hills said.

"October would be optimal" for movement on agriculture, she said, but even then, it would take a mini-

mum of four to six months to complete the Uruguay Round.

With respect to the NAFTA talks, Hills reported that the United States and Mexico exchanged tariff reduction proposals September 19.

The U.S. proposal, she said, calls for eliminating duties in three stages. Duties on products such as textiles, citrus, footwear and glassware — which are considered sensitive because imports may hurt the U.S. domestic industry — could be eliminated last.

Trade ministers from the NAFTA countries will next meet in late October in Mexico.

Hills also announced that she will attend in early October the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting in Malaysia, where she will sign a trade framework agreement with Singapore — the first such trade accord between the United States and a country from that region.

The United States has signed 29 trade framework accords with nations in Latin America. The accords provide a mechanism and agenda for consultations on trade issues of bilateral interest.

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U.S.-KUWAIT SIGN NEW 10-YEAR DEFENSE AGREEMENT
(To enhance Kuwait, Gulf security) (650)

By Jacquelyn S. Porth
USIA Security Affairs Writer

Washington — The United States and Kuwait signed a 10-year defense

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סודי ביותר/מידי

אל: אלי רובינשטיין-מזכיר הממשלה-למכותב בלבד

מאת: הציר וושינגטון

דוּתן

כידוע לך בודאי מתנהלת החכתכות נמרצת בין המטפלים בנושא בירושלים ובוושינגטון.

חרף שיחוף פעולה טוב עד לנקודה מסויימת קיימים חילוקי דעות לגבי רצונם-זכותם של החוקרים האמריקנים לראיין (הם קוראים לזה לראיין אך הכוונה מן הסתם לחקור) את דותן וישראלים אחרים המעורבים בפרשות. לבקשתם זו נענו בשלילה. הם חזרו ופנו אין סוף פעמים בלשון שידול ובלשון איום ובכל פעם נענו בשלילה, לאחרונה באגרת מנומסת אך נחרצת. העניין עולה מפעם לפעם לטונים לא נעימים כי החברים מזכירים לנו (לי ולקוחנובסקי) שבחוקי FMS כתוב שבמקרים כגון אלה חייבת המדינה מקבלת הסיוע לאפשר את קיום הראיונות ואם לאו אפשר לעצור את הסיוע.

היום התקשר אלי מרק ריצ'ארד בעניין השני שאנחנו מטפלים בו (אגב לא תהיינה באותו עניין כל בעיות), וא'כ עבר לנושא דותן ואמר שהוא מתחנן (ממש) שלא נפתח חזית חדשה בנוסף לכל הבעיות שיש לנו היום. הוסיף שהוא בטוח שעם קצת רצון טוב אפשר לפתור את הבעיה והציע שאם אתה מוכן להכנס לזה הוא יבוא במיוחד ארצה כי לדעתו בינו לבינך המצא נוסחה שתניח את דעת הכל.

זה אולי קצת נאיבי אבל אם יש לך חשק להתעניין בזה כדאי שתשוחח עם דב שפי, רובי סייבל ודורית בייניש ותשמע מהם מה הקושי מבחינתנו ואז או שתאמר לי מה למסור למרק או שתתקשר איתו ישירות.

ד'ש וחג שמח

שילה

תפוצה: @ (מזכיר הממשלה)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 17368

אל: רהמש/835

מ-: המשרד, חא: 190991, זח: 1906, דח: ר, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/רגיל

אל: וושינגטון

הסברה, קונגרס, עתונות

דע: נ'י, לוס אנג'לס, - הקונכ'ל

להלן רשום שיחת שה'ח עם חברי הקונגרס ווין אואנס (ד. יוטה), מיק מקנולטי (ד. נ'י), ג'יימס סנסברנר (ר. ויסקונסין) ריצ'ארד ליימן (ד. קליפורניה) שנערכה היום (19/9).

אואנס: פתח בשבחים לנחישותו של שה'ח ורה'מ להמשיך בתהליך השלום חרף המחלוקת בנושא הערביות. הקונגרס הופתע מעמדת הנשיא שהחזיר נושא הערביות כתנאי. אני מפריד בין מדיניות ההתנחלויות לבין שאלת הערביות למרות הבקורת הקיימת בסוגיית ההתנחלויות. בחודש יולי ש.ז. נפגשתי עם המלך חוסיין, הנשיאים מובארק ואסאד והם לא הציגו את שאלת הערביות כתנאי למו'מ למרות שדעתם אינם שלמה עם כך. לפיכך אני מודאג מעמדת הנשיא בוש ולהשפעה השלילית שיהיה לדבריו על תהליך השלום.

שה'ח: מי שחי מהתקשורת עשוי להתרשם שאנו, ישראל וארה'ב, בהליכי גירושין'. היו זמנים שהיו בעיות חמורות מאלו העומדות לפנינו ועם זאת יכולנו לשוחח עליהם בגלוי ולמצוא פתרון. אנו נמצאים בסיטואציה כואבת - שות שנדבר על כך בפומבי נקל על מציאת פתרון. אך בינינו נחוץ שנדבר על שורת בישראל עצבות רבה ושום ביטוי לא ימחיש אותה.

העצב השורר כאן נובע מהתחושה שקבלנו 'סטירת לחי' על ענין כה מקודש כמו קליטת עליה. ארה'ב יכולה, מלכתחילה לומר שלא תחן לנו ערביות. שהרי אין כל חובה מוטלת על ארה'ב להעניק לנו ערביות אלו. פרוש הדבר שאנו עשויים להקלע למצוקה כלכלית קשה אך קליטת העליה היא חובה המקודשת על כולנו ונעמוד בה. כלפי אלו שתקפו את נשיא ארה'ב טענתי שארה'ב מלכתחילה לא היחה חייבת להעניק לנו הערביות המבוקשות ואין להם כל עילה לתקוף את הנשיא.

לכם אני מבקש לומר, עם זאת, עד כמה כואב היה האיזכור בדברי הנשיא של 'סרבנות' ישראל במלחמת המפרץ. שהרי הנשיא יודע איזה אפוק הפגנו בזמן שהנזק והקרבנות היו יכולים להיות רבים לאין שעור לו השתמשו העירקים בנשק הכימי. הפגנו איפוק מירבי למרות ההרס הפיזי שנגרם, למרות תחושת האין אונים שפשטה בקרב ישראלים רבים, למרות הכרסום ביכלת ההרתעה שלנו בעיני הערבים. ואעפ'כ נלחמתי על כך שנאמץ מדיניות של איפוק מירבי. התבטאות מסוג זה של הנשיא לא שמענו בעבר וכל זאת מפני שהעזנו לבקש את עזרת האמריקאים בקליטת העליה. היחסים בין ארה'ב לישראל מהותיים, שורשיים ואמיתיים וזה עצוב שהגענו למצב דברים זה. אין לנו כוונה להתעמת עם הנשיא בוש. יש בין חברי הקונגרס האוהדים אותנו ואין לנו סיבה להתביש בהם או צורך להתעלם מהם. וישנה עוד סכנה בהתבטאויות הללו, הסכנה שהערבים יחשו

כאילו הם מחזיקים את ארה"ב 'בגרונה' כאילו איננה עצמאית להחליט בענין הומניטרי, וכאן אני רואה נזק למערכת הערכים האמריקאית ולעצמאות להחליט.

בינואר 92 הערבים עוד יטענו שארה"ב לא מילאה 'חובתה' ואנו נדרש לשלם את מחיר הלחץ שהערבים מפעילים על ארה"ב. זהו מצב של 'חבית נפץ' שאיש לא רוצה בו.

בנושא ההתנחלויות, עליכם להבין כי לכל ממשלה יש המנדט שלה והשקפת עולמה. ניתן להסכים על כך או לא. למרות הכל, קדמנו את תהליך השלום עד לנקודה שאיש לא יכול היה להאמין. לאחר שהאמריקאים טענו כי המדובר באינטרס לאומי שלהם הסכמנו לצרף את הסובייטים כיו"ר משותף. אח"כ עלה ענין יצוג האו"ם בוועידה ועם כל הסתייגות שיש לנו נגד המוסד הזה על שהשווה הציונות לגזענות הסכמנו להשתתפות סבילה של נציג המזכ"ל. גם להשתתפות האירופאים הסכמנו עם כל ההסתייגות שיש לנו כלפיהם. דווקא כאשר התקרבו להסכמה נתנו האמריקאים 'מתנה' לערבים הקיצונים. אנו רוצים בתהליך השלום אך בהעדר אמון ובטחון נשתתף בו בלב חצוי. יש לנו אמון עמוק בארה"ב בגלל ערכים משותפים וחובתה לקיום המדינה.

בוועידה אנו צפויים להיות תחת לחצים רבים וארה"ב היא המשענת שלנו. אם לא היה לנו אמון ובטחון בארה"ב לא הייתי מציע כלל ללכת לוועידה אלא ללכת למשא ומתן ישיר. שהרי מי שיסרב למו"מ ישיר אינו רוצה בשלום.

זאת אני אומר כמי שאינו קושר בין שני הנושאים. המזכיר בייקר אמר לנו שאינו בעד התנחלויות אך הוסיף כי אמר לצד הערבי שנושא זה צריך לעלות על סדר היום בזמן פתיחת המו"מ. בייקר אף יכול היה לדרוש שכספי הערבויות לא ישמשו להתנחלויות, עכשיו הוא דורש דחיה במתן הערבויות ואינו אומר דבר מה יקרה בתום מועד הדחיה בינואר. נקלענו למצב שאיננו יכולים להתבטא. זהו מצב פאראדוקסלי. ביקשנו להמשיך ולשוחח שהרי אין כאן שאלה של מנוצחים. מצב הדברים הנוכחי לא יתרום לצד זה או אחר.

אואנס : השבוע שחלף היה שבוע איום ביחסי ישראל-ארה"ב. בדרך כלל אינני מבקר הנשיא מחוץ לגבולות ארה"ב. התוכחתי עם דברי הנשיא בתכנית ב-CNN CROSS FIRE ושם טענתי כמה מהטיעונים שהזכרת כאן למרות הבקורת שמתחתי עליכם בנושא זכויות האדם ביש"ע אני מאמין שנושא הערבויות הוא ענין מנטרי. אני שלם עם הרעיון שההתנחלויות צריכות להיות הנושא הראשון בסדר היום של המשא ומתן. יש רוב ניכר בשני הכתים של הקונגרס הרוצה במתן הערבויות עכשיו וללא זיקה. גם אנחנו סברנו שצמצמנו הפערים בתהליך השלום בכל הנוגע ליצוג הפלשתינאים, בסוגיית כינוסה מחדש של הועידה ופתאום בא נאום הנשיא שהתנה הערבויות בתהליך השלום.

רוב הציבור בארה"ב (86 אחוז לפי סקר דעת קהל אחרון) תומך בעמדת הנשיא לדחות את מועד הדיון בערבויות. הנשיא בוש נלחם למען הדחיה ויש לו הכלים לכך. בשבוע שעבר נפגשנו עם יו"ר בית הנבחרים, פולי, והוחלט להציע דחיה עד ינואר אך לא לכרוך נושא הערבויות בתהליך המדיני. למחרת יו"ר בית הנבחרים ומנהיג הרוב בסנט, הסנטור מיטצ'ל נפגשו עם הנשיא. הנשיא בוש קרא אותו בוקר את דברי השר שרון וכעס. השניים, מיטצ'ל ופולי, לא הצליחו להגיע לכל פשרה עם הנשיא ושעתים אח"כ יצא הנשיא למסיבת עיתונאים. הדרך הטובה ביותר שנוותר עכשיו, לדעתי, היא לנסות ולהוציא מהמזכיר בייקר את מירב ההבטחות והבטחונות למתן הערבויות לאחר ינואר 92 ולהסכים לדחיה המבוקשת. נוכל, לדעתי, להעביר החלטה כזו בקונגרס אך לא למנוע וטו נשיאותי. עמות עם הנשיא יביא לנזק קשה ביחסי שתי המדינות ולתהליך השלום ולפיכך עדיף להשיג דחיה תמורת הבטחות מתאימות. אם לא נקבל כל הבטחה בדבר הערבויות אולי ראוי להלחם עליהן עכשיו.

סנסברנר : אנו מדברים על סיוע אמריקאי שנועד לקדם יעדים של מדיניות החוץ של ארצות הברית. אנחנו מצטערים על כן שיש מי שבוחר בדרך שונה ממדיניות החוץ האמריקאית ועדין מצפה לסיוע מארצות הברית. יתכן שהנשיא חש תסכול עקב התבטאותו של השר שרון ופעילות אייפא'ק אך העם האמריקאי עומד מאחורי הנשיא והמשאל האחרון משקף זאת. אם יימשך הלחץ לקבלת הערבויות עשוי הרוב התומך בדחיה (86) אחוז להפוך לרוב המתנגד למתן הערבויות ואז יקשה על הקונגרס לאשר את מתן הערבויות נוכח התנגדות עזה מבית.

שה'ח : הנשיא בוש אמר שיש לתת לנו הערבויות אך ביקש דחיה באשורן. אנו מקבלים עצת הנשיא אך מבקשים שכתום הדחיה נקבל הערבויות. אם השאלה היא רק של דחיה שבעקבותיה ינתנו הערבויות אני תומך בדחיה. השאלה היא מה יקרה בינאר כאשר נהיה תלויים על בלימה. אני מקוה שההגיון יעמוד לנו. איני יודע מי יוצא נשכר מהמצב הנוכחי אך היטב אני יודע מי יוצא מפסיד - היחסים בין ישראל וארצות הברית וכל מה שיבוא בעתיד. עשוי להשתרר מצב חדש בו הקיצוניים מבין הערכים יתחזקו. שהרי מתי הערכים מגיעים למסקנה שנחוץ שלום? כאשר הם נוכחים לדעת שארצות הברית וישראל הם בצוותא מאוחדים. אם ירגישו שהקשר מתנתק ויחלש הם לא ילכו לשלום וינסו להמשיך ולהרחיב הקרע ביננו לבין ארצות הברית.

ס/מנהל מצפ'א /משה פוקס

19 ספטמבר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא, רכיב,
הסברה, בן אבו, תפוצות

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 15297
אל: רהמש/736
מ-: המשרד, תא: 170991, זח: 1313, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
82761
שמור/מידי
106.01

אל: וושינגטון, ק. קונגרס-דרנגר

הנדון: משלחת אואנס

1. רה'מ יקבלם ביום חמישי 19/9 משעה 12.10.
2. בודקים גם אפשרות פגישה עם שה'ח.
3. אנא הבריקי מיירב הפרטים על הקבוצה ומטרת בקורם.

גמר חתימה טובה

ס/מנהל מצפ'א
17 בספטמבר 1991

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, מצב, בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
מאור

סססס

אאא, חודם: 15736
 אל: רהמש/753
 מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 243, תא: 170991, זח: 1414, דח: ב, סג: שמ,
 בבב
 שמור / בהול ליום ה' בבוקר

אל: ס/מנהל מצפ"א

מאח: ק. לקונגרס

ולחת אואנס
 בהמשך לשלכם 538 מה- 17/9

1. אתמול בלילה (16/9) "נשרו" חלק מחברי המשלחת ולפיכך המשלחת עתה כוללת הקונגרסמנים הבאים:-

ווין אואנס, ג'יימס סנסנברנר, ריצ'רד ליימן ומייק מקנולטי. כן הצטרף עוזרתו האישית של אואנס - דיאן טרמבליי. השניים הידידותיים מאד לישראל בקבוצה הם אואנס ומקנולטי.

2. מטרת ביקורם בישראל היא לשמוע על הטיפול בקליטה הערביות להלוואות, מרכזי קליטה וכו'.

3. יוצאים לארמניה כמשקיפים לרפרנדום. בירדן ביקשו פגישה עם המלך אמנם טרם קיבלו אישור לקיומה אולם מניחים שתאושר.

● מירדן יגיעו דרך גשר אלנבי לישראל.

לנוחיותכם להלן שמות חברי המשלחת ומספרי דרכניהם (לצורך המעבר בגשר):

	EXPIRATION		D.O.B	TYPE	NUMBER
31/01/93	26/7/48	OFFICIAL	800491451	ריצ'רד ליימן	
18/10/95	16/9/47	TOURIST	060689939	מייקל מקנולטי	
31/01/93	14/6/43	OFFICIAL	800487705	ג'יימס סנסנברנר	
31/01/93	24/9/50	OFFICIAL	800487706	שריל סנסנברנר	
31/01/93	2/5/37	OFFICIAL	800548671	ווין אואנס	
6/4/99	12/4/68	TOURIST	052292393	דיאן טרמבליי	

5. להלן פרטים על חברי המשלחת -

- ווין אואנס - (דמוקרט יוטה) ידוע ומוכר לכם. יש לציין, כפי שכבר דיווחתי על עזרתו הרבה של אואנס בנושא הערביות לרבות הופעותיו בחקשורת (מסע"ת, CROSSFIRE) ובמליאת ביהנ"ב (נאום במליאה).

- מייק מקנולטי - (דמוקרט ניו יורק). ידידותי מאד לישראל. חבר בוועדת השירותים המזויינים. ביקר בארץ בנובמבר 1990 במסגרת המשלחות הקונגרסיונאליות שביקרו במפרץ. (כן חבר בוועדות הדואר ורעב).

- ג'יימס סנסנברנר - (רפובליקני ויסקונסין). חבר ועדות המשפט, מדע חלל וטכנולוגיה וסמים. איננו מידידיה הקרובים של ישראל.

- ריצ'רד ליימן (דמוקרט קליפורניה) - חבר ועדות האנרגיה ומסחר וועדת הפנים. באופן כללי בסדר אבל לא מן המתלהבים יתרה.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

וצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
מאור

סטסט

אאא, חוזם: 15736
 אל: רהמש/753
 מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 243, חא: 170991, זח: 1414, דח: ב, סג: שמ,
 בכבב
 שמור / בהול ליום ה' בבוקר

אל: ס/מנהל מצפ"א

מאח: ק. לקונגרס

משלחת אואנס
 בהמשך לשלכם 538 מה- 17/9

1. אתמול בלילה (16/9) "נשרו" חלק מחברי המשלחת ולפיכך המשלחת עתה כוללת הקונגרסמנים הבאים:-

ווין אואנס, ג'יימס סנסנברנר, ריצ'רד ליימן ומייק מקנולטי. כן תצטרף עוזרתו האישית של אואנס - דיאן טרמבליי. השניים הידידותיים מאד לישראל בקבוצה הם אואנס ומקנולטי.

2. מטרת ביקורם בישראל היא לשמוע על הטיפול בקליטה הערביות להלוואות, מרכזי קליטה וכו'.

3. יוצאים לארמניה כמשקיפים לרפרנדום. בירדן ביקשו פגישה עם המלך אמנם טרם קיבלו אישור לקיומה אולם מניחים שתאושר.

4. מירדן יגיעו דרך גשר אלנבי לישראל.

לדיווחותכם להלן שמות חברי המשלחת ומספרי דרכוניהם (לצורך המעבר בגשר):

NUMBER	TYPE	D.O.B	EXPIRATION	
ריצ'רד ליימן	OFFICIAL	800491451	26/7/48	31/01/93
מייקל מקנולטי	TOURIST	060689939	16/9/47	18/10/95
ג'יימס סנסנברנר	OFFICIAL	800487705	14/6/43	31/01/93
שריל סנסנברנר	OFFICIAL	800487706	24/9/50	31/01/93
ווין אואנס	OFFICIAL	800548671	2/5/37	31/01/93
דיאן טרמבליי	TOURIST	052292393	12/4/68	6/4/99

5. להלן פרטים על חברי המשלחת -

- ווין אואנס - (דמוקרט יוטה) ידוע ומוכר לכם. יש לציין, כפי שכבר דיווחתי על עזרתו הרבה של אואנס בנושא הערביות לרבות הופעותיו בחקשורה (מסע"ת, CROSSFIRE) ובמליאת ביהנ"ב (נאום במליאה).

- מייק מקנולטי - (דמוקרט ניו יורק). ידידותי מאד לישראל. חבר בוועדת

השירותים המזויינים. ביקר בארץ בנובמבר 1990 במסגרת המשלחות
הקונגרסיונאליות שביקרו במפרץ. (כן חבר בוועדות הדואר ורעב).

- ג'יימס סנסנברנר - (רפובליקני ויסקונסין). חבר ועדות המשפט, מדע חלל
וטכנולוגיה וסמים. איננו מידידיה הקרובים של ישראל.

- ריצ'רד ליימן (דמוקרט קליפורניה) - חבר ועדות האנרגיה ומסחר וועדת
הפנים. באופן כללי בסדר אבל לא מן המתלהבים יתרה.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
מאור

סטסט

אאא, חוזם: 11859

אל: רהמש/583

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 177, הא: 130991, זח: 1707, דח: ב, סג: שמ,

בכב

שמור / בהול ליום א'

אל: ס/מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

CODEL OWENS

1. הקונגרסמן ווין אואנס, עומד בראש משלחת קונגרסיונאלית בת 6 איש שמונתה כמשלחת משקיפים של ארה"ב לרפנדום בארמניה.

2. ככל הנראה יגיעו לישראל ביום ה' 19/9 (כדי להקדים את שבוע חג הסוכות) עם מטוס חה"א האמריקני וינחתו בסביבות השעה 11:00 / 10:00 לפנה"צ. מבקשים לארגן עבורם פגישות (אחה"צ ובשעות הערב המוקדמות) עם רה"מ, שה"ח וח"כ פרס. כן מבקשים לקבל דיווח על קליטת העלייה. לקראת יציאתם את הארץ, עוד באותו ערב (בסביבות השעה 21:00) היו מעוניינים לקיים ארוחת ערב.

3. מסלול נסיעתם הוא: ירדן - פגישה עם המלך, ישראל וארמניה.

4. חברי ה-CODEL הם: -

הקונגרסמן ווין אואנס, הקונגרסמנים ג'ון סנסנברנר ורעייתו, ריצ'רד לימן, מייקל מקנולטי, טימוטי ג'ונסטון והסנטור לארי פרסלר (עדיין טעון שור).

5. פרטים מלאים ומדוייקים נוספים נבריק עם קבלתם.

6. הערה: הקונגרסמן אואנס, פעיל מאד בנושא הערכויות, ואתמול בערב (12/9), לאחר מס"עת של הנשיא הופיע בצורה יוצאת מן הכלל בתכנית "CROSS FIRE" ב-CNN מול מנכ"ל אירגון ה-CNI, דיויד בואן העויין (וגם אנטישמי) וייצג בצורה עניינית ואוהדת מאד את ענינה של ישראל והקהילה היהודית בערכויות לקליטה.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מאור

אאא, חוזם: 15760
אל: רהמש/756
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 246, חא: 170991, זח: 1507, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
ככב
שמור/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
השגריר שובל, מע"ת

דע: תפוצת תקשורת

ערבויות - תדרוך

המידע שלהלן מתבסס על שיחות טלפוניות עם עתונאים בפמליית המזכיר בייקר (שהתקשרו מקהיר), על דווח סוכנויות מקהיר ועל הדווחים (ברשתות החדשות של ABC ו-CBS) ברדיו במשך היום:-

א. במטוס מירושלים לקהיר תידרך המזכיר אישית את הכתבים. התדרוך בדוחי התקשורת, מופיע ומיוחס ל"פקיד בכיר במטוס". המזכיר דיבר בנחישות ובהחלטיות, ולעיתים אף בכעס. הערה: הערכת האנשים עמם דברנו היא כי המזכיר תדרכם לאחר שדיבר עם הנשיא מהמטוס ודווח לו על שיחות הבוקר. לפיכך, להערכתם, הטון והנימה ההחלטית משקפים "השורה התחתונה" של העמדה האמריקנית בנושא הערבויות, כפי שתואמה בין המזכיר לנשיא.

ב. בנושא הערבויות- אמר "המתדרך" (פרפרזה): הצעת הפשרה שהצענו לרוה"מ שימיר היא שש הנקודות שהציג הנשיא - לא נוסף עליהן ולא נתפשר עוד.
טוט:

"THE SIX POINTS ARE DAMN FORTHCOMING... AND WE ARE NOT GOING TO IMPROVE ON THEM... THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER CONCESSIONS"

עוד אמר, כי ארה"ב מעוניינת להמנע מעמות אבל "הכדור במגרש הישראלי".

ג. המתדרך אמר כי ימליץ לנשיא TO GO AHEAD בנאום לאומה מכיוון שמדובר בכספים של משלם המיסים - האמריקני ולכן עליו (הציבור) לדעת.
ציטוט-

I WILL TELL THE PRESIDENT TO GO AHEAD AND TALK TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BECAUSE THE TAX-PAYERS HAS THE RIGHT TO KNOW.

ד. המתדרך טען כי הישראלים רוצים דברים שאנחנו לא מוכנים לתת ולהתחייב עליהם. ציטוט:

"I DON'T WANT TO INDICATE ONE INCH OF FLEXIBILITY BEYOND

THE SIX POINTS THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED...

כשנשאל ע"י הכתבים מה דרשו הישראלים מעבר לשש הנקודות, אמר המתדרך כי הישראלים ביקשו התחייבות לגבי

THE SIZE AND AND THE CONDITIONS OF THE GUARANTEES
ולכך - גם לסכום וגם לתנאים - "לא נחייב": אנחנו עומדים על דחייה של 120 יום, לא נתפשר על שש הנקודות ו- (ציטוט):

"WE WILL NOT AGREE TO IT EVEN IF WE GET ONLY ONE VOTE IN CONGRESS."

ה. בעניין התנחלויות- אמר המתדרך (פרפרזה):-

מה שהישראלים רוצים זה שבינאר לא נציב שום תנאים גם אם הם ימשיכו בהתנחלויות, ולכך לא נסכים. גם בעוד 120 יום נתעקש על הפסקת ההתנחלויות:- (ציטוט)

"IN 120 DAYS WE WILL FACILITATE AND EXPEDITE THE REQUEST...
IN RETURN FOR A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS..."

עוד אמר כי ההתנחלויות, גם בעיני ממשלים קודמים, נתפשו למעשה כבלתי-חוקיות, אך הניסוח הפומבי בו אנו (קרי, הממשל) משתמשים הוא רק "מכשול לשלום".

עם זאת, הרגשתנו כלפי ההתנחלויות היא כי הן אינן חוקיות.

ו. המתדרך סבר, כתשובה לשאלה, כי אם ארה"ב תסכים כיום לבקשת הערכויות הישראליות- מדינות ערב לא תבואנה לוועידת השלום -
"AND WHY SHOULD THEY ?"

ז. המתדרך אמר, לסכום נושא זה, כי סוכם שהשגריר שובל ודניס רוס ימשיכו בדיונים בשבוע הבא כדי לנסות למצוא מוצא שימנע עימות.

עד כאן .

גמר חתימה טובה

ירון רות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, כנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעח,
הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

The Wireless File

Of the 4,744 personnel in the combined task force, Williams said, 3,343 are Americans and the others are from Turkey, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands.

NAVY PLANS TO OVERHAUL AIRCRAFT CARRIER KENNEDY

Williams said the Navy plans to conduct a complex overhaul of the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in 1993.

The work, which will take about 14 months to complete, is intended to "return the carrier to a high state of material readiness," he said. He added that the overhaul is expected to cost about \$400 million, and will extend the life of the ship by about five years.

Earlier the Kennedy had been scheduled for a more extensive overhaul under the Navy's Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) which would have extended its life for 15 to 20 years. But with the Navy planning to cut back from 14 to 12 carriers, Williams said, "they don't need to do the service life extension programs for any of the carriers they had planned...."

PROGRESS ON STEALTH CRUISE MISSILE LAGS

Williams said the Air Force has served notice to Northrop for falling behind in the test schedule for the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM).

The classified program involves both an air- and ground-launched version of a low observable standoff cruise missile. It is the test progress of the air-launched cruise missile which would be launched from B-52 bomb-

ers which concerns the Air Force. (The missile would also be launched from B-2 bombers, and F-16, A-6 and F/A-18 fighter aircraft.)

The Air Force has asked the defense contractor to provide a plan to solve the problem.

The Army will purchase the ground-launched version of the missile for its Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the Navy will be procuring air-launched versions.

NNNN

*NEA205

U.S. PROPOSAL SEEKS TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES WITH ISRAEL

(Transcript: Baker describes proposal, 9/17/91) (540)

Cairo — Secretary of State James Baker said September 17 that the United States has presented Israel with a six-point proposal which attempts to bridge the differences between the U.S. and Israel on the question of absorption aid.

In a press briefing while flying to Cairo following two days of talks with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Baker said that if the government of Israel would agree to the 120-day delay of its loan guarantee request, the administration would agree to:

- seek to develop a "suitable legislative vehicle" for absorption aid in Congress;
- not ask for any further delays;
- state now "our support for the principle of absorption aid";
- "handle the scoring (determine the request's impact on the U.S. budget)

in the most reasonable possible way";
— include in the package any out-of-pocket loss to Israel as a result of the delay;
— try to generate support from other countries.

The following the transcript of Baker's description of the proposal:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

BAKER: This will probably be a bit repetitive from what I said out in front, but let me start by saying that we had two good sessions, as the prime minister said, friendly discussions. And they were, indeed, friendly.

We focused on the absorption aid issue and on the peace process. The experts engaged in a more detailed way on the relevant documents with respect to the peace process, particularly the letter of assurances. And we will continue to follow up on that.

We will also continue to talk on the question of absorption aid. Both countries, I think, are genuinely interested in avoiding a confrontation on the issue, if that's possible. And as a manifestation of our good faith in this regard, we have made a proposal that contains six points, as follows.

First of all, if the government of Israel would agree to the 120-day delay that we are seeking in order that issue not be the subject of a big, divisive debate with attendant adverse consequences for the peace process, the administration would agree as follows: First, that we would work with supporters of absorption assistance in the Congress in January to find/produce a suitable legislative vehicle. Secondly, we would agree that we would not ask for a further delay, come January. Third, we would be

The Wireless File

While he did not confirm press reports that Hungary had shot down two Yugoslav planes, Boucher noted that the United States is concerned about incursions into Hungarian airspace by Yugoslav aircraft.

NNNN

*NEA204

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17 (Kuwait, Philippines, Peru, Operation Provide Comfort, carrier overhaul, cruise missile) (910)

NEWS BRIEFING—Spokesman Pete Williams discussed the following topics:

U.S.-KUWAITI DEFENSE AGREEMENT SIGNING SET

Williams said Defense Secretary Cheney and the new Kuwaiti minister of defense, Ali al-Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, will sign a bilateral defense cooperation agreement September 19 at the Pentagon.

The agreement, which is designed "to enhance post-war security and stability in the gulf," will permit the United States access to Kuwait military facilities and ports and provides for the prepositioning of U.S. military equipment in Kuwait as well as joint training and combined military exercises, the spokesman said.

Williams noted that U.S. officials are discussing similar defense agreements with the other gulf states.

PHILIPPINE DEBATE ON U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE NOTED

Although the Philippine Senate has rejected a treaty which would have permitted the United States to continue using facilities at the Subic Bay Naval Base for 10 more years, Williams said the Philippine government "really hasn't made a decision" on whether it wants "us to stay or not."

The spokesman noted there is "a constitutional debate going on" in the country following President Aquino's call for a popular referendum on the issue.

While Williams applauded Aquino's action and her endorsement of a continued U.S. military presence in the Philippines, he pointed out that the decision to ratify the treaty apparently remains with the Senate and a referendum "wouldn't nullify the Senate action."

Meanwhile, the spokesman told reporters, "we're not doing anything actively right now (in the way of preparations to withdraw)." He stressed, however, that the U.S. Navy ultimately needs a concrete answer on "what's going to happen in the Philippines," so long-range planning can be completed. "We will wait and see," he said, "but we can't wait and see forever."

The spokesman said the Philippine government submitted a diplomatic note to the United States September 16, following the Senate vote rejecting the treaty, which permits either country to give a year's notice to terminate the agreement, but he said there is "no termination date hanging out there."

U.S. SEEKS ANTI-DRUG AID FOR PERU

Williams said the Bush administration has asked Congress to provide \$34 million to Peru in the form of security assistance aimed at halting illegal narcotics activity there, particularly cocaine trafficking.

The money would be used to improve the teaching of basic military skills, to support intelligence and logistical operations and to provide civic assistance in areas such as health and sanitation, the spokesman told reporters.

He noted that there are a few U.S. military personnel in Peru now to conduct and monitor training and "to provide assistance in training to the Peruvian counternarcotics police."

COALITION TALKING ABOUT STATUS OF "PROVIDE COMFORT"

Williams said coalition forces are discussing "what to do in the future with the Provide Comfort Task Force," which was deployed in response to Iraq's harsh treatment of its Kurdish minority and to aid the Kurds who fled from northern Iraq as a result of the Iraqi government's actions.

Regarding the deployment in northern Iraq, he said, no decision has been taken yet on "how long we're going to stay there, with what assets."

As to the deployment of coalition forces in Turkey, the spokesman said, a decision will be made around September 30 on whether to extend their stay for another 90 days, based on a review of the potential Iraqi threat to the Kurds.

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willing now to restate our support for the principle of absorption aid. Next, we would agree to work to handle the scoring in the most reasonable possible way, consistent with the legal requirements.

QUESTION: To handle the what?

ANSWER: Scoring. That is, the determination of the extent to which this would impact on the U.S. budget, and impact on U.S. taxpayers.

Q: Is the term "scoring?"

A: Scoring.

Q: Could we go on with the points?

A: I've given you number four.

And number five, we would find a way to include in any package that might move in January — might move — the out-of-pocket loss to Israel, as a result of a four-month delay.

And lastly, we would undertake to see if we could generate support for this goal from other countries.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

NNNN

*NEA206

IRAQI SHIA GROUPS URGE EXPANDED U.N. ROLE IN IRAQ
(Opposition leaders Khoei, Kobbah in U.S.) (590)

Washington — Two Iraqi Shia leaders meeting with U.N. officials this week are calling on the United Nations Security Council to establish a "military presence in southern Iraq to protect the Iraqi Shia community in the south," similar to that established

by the U.N. to protect the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq.

In a USIA interview September 13, Abdul Majid Khoei, whose father, Grand Ayatollah Khoei, is the most revered religious figure in the Iraqi Shia clergy, and Dr. Laith Kobbah, another Shia Iraqi opposition figure, assailed Iraqi regime practices against the Shia population.

"The Iraqi government has embarked on a dangerous policy against all aspects of Shia heritage in an effort to erase the Shia identity," said Khoei, adding that his father and other close family members and an assistant are currently under house arrest in Najaf, where direct contact with them is strictly forbidden.

Khoei urged Moslems the world over to "work to protect their heritage and religion," stressing that the entire Shia tradition is "part and parcel of the Islamic tradition as a whole."

He dismissed the Iraqi government decision two weeks ago to reopen the Shia religious sites as "a desperate attempt to cover up for the horrible crimes committed by the regime in the aftermath of the popular uprising in the south following the Gulf war."

The religious sites, Khoei stressed, "were not hit in the allied aerial bombardment of Iraq during the war, nor were they damaged during the uprising." However, Khoei added, "we have evidence to suggest that a large number of those sites were razed to the ground and dynamited by the Iraqi security forces as they regained control of the Shia areas."

Dr. Laith Kobbah also called for the establishment of a U.N.-affiliated body of Iraqi nationals to take charge of the distribution of food, medicine, and

other assistance vital to the Iraqi people.

The underlying problem of the Iraqi regime, Kobbah said, is that its political system "doesn't represent the will of the people." He said the key to stability in Iraq and the entire region is "to help establish a regime in Iraq that represents the people and is accountable to them."

On the question of economic sanctions, Kobbah said that his group thinks "the Iraqi people should not be the victim of the sanctions." He stressed, however, "that doesn't mean that Iraqi oil revenues should be given to the Iraqi regime — the regime that proved totally irresponsible."

Khoei and Kobbah, who met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Mack at the State Department September 12, described their meetings with U.S. government officials as "productive."

Mack, in remarks following the meeting, said he had inquired about the conditions of the Shia community in general, including "the considerable destruction of buildings (and) religious sites by the forces of Saddam in the civil strife which took place."

"We asked about his (Khoei's) position about international terrorism and the hostages," said Mack. Khoei "made it quite clear that they condemn and will work against all forms of international terrorism...and would call for the release of all the hostages in Lebanon: Americans, Europeans and Lebanese."

Mack said the United States "has made it very clear, and will continue to insist that the United Nations has access to all parts of Iraq, including southern Iraq."

The Wireless File

NNNN

*NEA207

SUCCESS IN THE GULF HERALDS NEW ERA FOR U.N.

(Tahir Kheli notes Security Council effectiveness)

(1150)

By Berta Gomez
USIA Staff Writer

Washington — The unprecedented success of the United Nations' role in the gulf crisis heralds a new era for that organization, which can, after more than four decades, reclaim the function for which it was originally created, says a top-ranking member of the American U.N. mission.

In a recent speech in Islamabad, Ambassador Shirin Tahir Kheli, alternate U.S. representative at the United Nations for special political affairs, outlined the ways in which the end of the Cold War removed the most troublesome obstacles to international cooperation, and thus injected new life into the world organization.

This changed attitude, she said, was made evident by the "extraordinary" work carried out by the U.N. Security Council, whose members joined together after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and "crossed all kinds of intellectual, political, ideological and economic barriers" throughout the crisis.

"The clout that (the Security Council) has today is a direct outcome of the success with which it handled this operation," Tahir Kheli said. "This was the role that was originally envisioned" for the U.N., "but was thwarted by the use of vetoes" during the Cold War.

The gulf war was about forcing a large, powerful state to withdraw its forces from a much smaller country that was unable to withstand its aggression, she said. And the need for oil did not bring the United States into the gulf, she said in response to that suggestion. "It was not America going after oil, it was Iraq going after Kuwaiti oil that started the war," she stressed.

Tahir Kheli also stressed that the United Nations has not ignored the plight of the Iraqi people in the aftermath of the war. She pointed to the Security Council's August 15 decision allowing Iraq to sell \$1,600 million worth of oil, the proceeds from which may be used for food, medical equipment and other humanitarian needs.

Tahir Kheli, who was introduced as one of the principal architects of the Iraqi sanctions program, also noted that large amounts of food have been allowed into Iraq since the end of hostilities, including 300 million tons during a three-month period.

If segments of the Iraqi population are still in dire need, it is because "we have found that the Saddam Hussein regime has been very selective in the distribution of this food — both in terms of the groups that he is willing to supply and the areas from which he withholds it," she said.

Moreover, Tahir Kheli stressed that Iraq has the power to bring the sanctions regime to an end, simply by complying with the terms of the cease-fire resolution that ended the war.

The unfinished business includes formal demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border; the payment of compensation to victims of Iraq's aggression; and the return of the property looted by Iraq during its occupation of Kuwait,

Tahir Kheli pointed out.

"Just as the decision to go to war rested with Iraq, the decision to comply (with the cease-fire resolution) rests with Iraq," she said. "When that happens, the sanctions will be off."

Looking to the future, Tahir Kheli suggested that a re-invigorated United Nations could be instrumental in helping settle international disputes before they turn into crises.

Indeed, the organization's growing prestige has led some to propose an expanded role for the secretary-general, including the possibility of giving that U.N. official "the wherewithal to engage in preventive diplomacy," she said.

The idea is that "the avoidance of conflict is better than the management of conflict, and the management of conflict is much better than a war," Tahir Kheli explained. "It is a proposal that merits serious consideration, and that should be forthcoming."

Tahir Kheli said that such an expanded role for the secretary-general is thinkable only because of the changed atmosphere within the United Nations — which is itself a product of the markedly improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. "The map of the world, the political world in which I grew up — the post-Second-World-War map — has completely changed," she said.

This change has produced at the United Nations "a more productive environment...in which we can actually look at the issues and see what we...can collectively do," Tahir Kheli said.

She described recent U.S.-Soviet

אאא, חוזם: 15762
אל: רהמש/757
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 247, חא: 170991, זח: 1537, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בכב
שמור/מידי

אל : מנהל מצפא
השגריר - שובל

דע: תפוצת תקשורת

מאח: עתונות, וושינגטון

תדרוך רקע - ערבויות

בהמשך לשלי - השלמות.

1) "המתדרך", שנשאל אם יש הבדלים בינו לנשיא בנושא הערבויות, השיב כי אין כלל הבדל וכל ההצהרות והעמדות מקובלות עליו לחלוטין והתקבלו בהסכמה מלאה בינו לבין הנשיא. הוא מודע לשמועות המספרות על משחק "השוטר הטוב" וה"שוטר הרע" - והגדיר שמועות אלה כ... של סוסים (מילה גסה).

2) עימות בין ארה"ב לישראל יהיה A LOSE - LOSE SITUATION לישראל, לידידי ישראל בארה"ב ולתהליך השלום.

3) בתשובה לשאלה ומה אם רה"מ' שמיר יחליט שלא לבוא לוועידת השלום בגלל משבר הערבויות אמר "המתדרך" כי שמיר WILL NOT LOOK GOOD אם לא יבוא לשולחן המו"מ' רק בגלל שהתבקש לדחות הבקשה ב-120 יום.

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעח,
הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14989
אל: רהמש/735
מ:- המשרד, תא: 170991, זח: 1111, דח: ר, סג: בל,
בכב
9,244448

בלמ'ס/כהול לא להזעיק

אל: כל הנציגויות

הנדרון: סיכום השיחות עם מזכיר המדינה בייקר

להלן דברי רה"מ שמיר ומזכיר המדינה בייקר בתום השיחות היום (17.9) בשעה
:10:30

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE HAVE HAD GOOD AND FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. BAKER, YESTERDAY AND TODAY. WE HAVE RAISED, WE HAVE DISCUSSED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS MANY ISSUES RELATED TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. I THINK WE CAN SAY THAT WE HAVE A CERTAIN PROGRESS, WE HAVE ACHIEVED A CERTAIN PROGRESS IN VARIOUS MATTERS RELATED TO THE PEACE PROCESS. WE WILL HAVE TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ABOUT MANY ISSUES, AND I THINK THAT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS IN THE FUTURE THERE WILL BE MAINTAINED THE SAME SPIRIT OF FRIENDLY COOPERATION. THE SECRETARY IS NOW LEAVING OUR COUNTRY, I HOPE WITH THE FEELING THAT A VERY IMPORTANT WORK WAS DONE AND THERE ARE, WE HAVE BEFORE US GOOD PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE.

SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER: PRIME MINISTER, LET ME SIMPLY ECHO WHAT YOU HAVE JUST SAID IN TERMS OF THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS WE'VE HAD. I SHOULD POINT OUT, AS I THINK YOU DID, THAT WE EXPECT TO HAVE SOME FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. THERE ARE STILL SOME ISSUES BETWEEN US THAT MUST BE RESOLVED AND IT IS THE HOPE, OF COURSE, OF THE UNITED STATES, JUST AS IT IS THE HOPE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, THAT WE WILL FIND A WAY TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES IN THE SPIRIT THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL FOR MANY MANY YEARS. WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY, I THINK A REAL OPPORTUNITY, TO SEE ARABS, ARAB STATES, SITTING DOWN FACE TO FACE IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, AN OPPORTUNITY THAT I KNOW YOU, PRIME MINISTER, AND YOUR COLLEAGUES HERE IN ISRAEL AS WELL AS WE IN THE UNITED STATES WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF. SO WE LOOK FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS. WE WISH YOU A HAPPY HOLIDAY, AND WE WILL EXPECT TO BE IN TOUCH AGAIN SHORTLY.

Q: DID YOU REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF THE LOAN GUARANTEES, OR IS

THAT AMONG THE THINGS THAT REMAIN UNRESOLVED AT THIS TIME?

SHAMIR: IT WILL NOT BE SURPRISING IF I WILL SAY THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE.

Q: WAIT A MINUTE. WHAT ABOUT AN ANSWER? LET'S HAVE AN ANSWER.

SHAMIR: WE HAVE NOT YET RESOLVED, BUT WE HAVE DISCUSSED IT AND WE WILL CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

BAKER: LET ME AGAIN AGREE WITH WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER JUST SAID. WE HAVE NOT FINALLY RESOLVED THIS ISSUE, BUT WE HAVE HAD TWO GOOD SESSIONS, TWO GOOD DISCUSSIONS WITH RESPECT TO IT. I HOPE AND BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS ON IT. WE HAVE MADE CERTAIN PROPOSALS, THE UNITED STATES. THOSE PROPOSALS ARE BEFORE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. THEY HAVE MADE CERTAIN PROPOSALS, AND WHILE WE'VE MADE SOME PROGRESS, WE HAVEN'T TOTALLY COME TOGETHER YET ON THE ISSUE AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

Q: ... THAT ARE NOT LINKED TO SOME KIND OF FREEZE ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES?

BAKER: YOU KNOW THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF POLICY POSITION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. THAT'S NO SECRET. WE HAVE HAD A DISCUSSION OF THAT. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE PRINCIPLE OF ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL FOR THE ABSORPTION OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRES AND, AS THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HAVE DISCUSSED, NO ONE HAS BEEN MORE ACTIVE OVER RECENT YEARS, PARTICULARLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ETHIOPIA, IN TRYING TO PAVE THE WAY FOR IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL THAN HAS THE UNITED STATES.

הסברה/מידע

תפוצה: שהח, ששהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, סמנכל, אוקיאניה, מצרים,
מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, מזאר, ארבל2,
ארבל1, הדרכה, מעת, הסברה, ממד, איר1, איר2,
@ (לעמ), מקצב2, אומן, פרנ, מחע, משקוף, חליפה, בטמח, כספים, משפט

סססס

The Wireless File

*NEA313

U.S., COUNCIL MEMBERS WEIGHING NEXT STEPS AGAINST IRAQ

(Text: Fitzwater statement 9/18/91)
(460)

Grand Canyon, Arizona — In view of Iraq's "clear violation" of a United Nations Security Council resolution permitting "unimpeded" U.N. helicopters in Iraq, the United States and other council members are discussing the "most appropriate means" to continue the search for Iraqi ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said in a statement September 18.

Fitzwater noted that military planners are discussing options to provide helicopters and support necessary to continue the U.N. inspections, but he added that no decision has been made to deploy them. He said such a decision will not be required "if Iraq complies with the provisions of U.N. Resolutions 687 and 707."

Meanwhile, the statement noted, the Saudi government has requested deployment of U.S. Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia "as a deterrent against the continuing Iraqi missile threat."

Following is the text of Fitzwater's statement:

(begin text)

Under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 687 and 707, Iraq is obligated to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile capabilities. Iraq is also required to permit U.N. Special Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency

inspection teams to verify Iraqi compliance.

In order to fulfill its inspection responsibilities, the U.N. special commission needs to be able to use its helicopters and other aircraft over Iraq. Iraq has refused to allow U.N. helicopters to operate unimpeded in Iraq. This is a clear violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 707, which permits the use of helicopters without condition. The U.S. and other members of the U.N. Security Council have therefore been discussing the most appropriate means to continue inspections in Iraq.

Consistent with those discussions, military planners have examined options to provide helicopters and support necessary to continue U.N. inspections. But there has been no decision to deploy these U.S. forces, nor will such a decision be required if Iraq complies with the provisions of U.N. resolutions 687 and 707.

In the meantime, the government of Saudi Arabia has requested deployment of U.S. Patriot units to the kingdom as a deterrent against the continuing Iraqi missile threat. The U.S. has granted the request for this purely defensive system in light of the current Iraqi threat and continued Iraqi non-compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Iraq continues to employ concealment and deception to evade U.N. Special Commission inspection teams and thus to preserve a residual capability to produce and deploy these weapons illegally. We believe Iraq still possesses several hundred scud missiles of the type used against Saudi Arabia during the gulf war.

(end text)

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(Following FS material, based on press reports, is for distribution to mission staff only and not for publication)

NEWS ROUNDUP, WEDNESDAY,
SEPTEMBER 18 (690)

YELTSIN REPORTEDLY HAS MINOR HEART PROBLEM

Boris Yeltsin's secretary said September 18 that the Russian Federation president is suffering from a minor heart complaint and took the day off from work.

The secretary, who declined to give his name, dismissed a report by the independent InterFax news agency that Yeltsin had been hospitalized with a coronary insufficiency. InterFax said Yeltsin would not be delivering a scheduled speech to Parliament on September 19, but the secretary said that as far as he knew, it would be given.

The 60-year-old Yeltsin, who emerged as the Soviet Union's most powerful political figure after the failed coup, has a history of ill health, including cardiac difficulties.

TREASON CHARGES DROPPED AGAINST SOLZHENITSYN

The Soviet Union has dropped treason charges against Alexander Solzhenitsyn, its most famous living writer who now lives in exile in America.

The Soviet Union's chief legal offi-

The Wireless File

U.S.-ISRAELI LOAN ISSUE UNRESOLVED; MORE TALKS EXPECTED

(Transcript: Baker, Shamir remarks, 9/17/91) (720)

Jerusalem — U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir held two meetings in Jerusalem, discussing the Middle East peace process and the dispute over the \$10,000 million U.S. loan guarantees Israel seeks to help resettle Soviet Jews.

Following the second meeting September 17, both Baker and Shamir said that the loan issue was not resolved and that there will be further discussion on the subject.

Following is the official transcript of their remarks:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Ladies and gentlemen, we've had good and friendly discussions with the Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, yesterday and today. We have raised — we have discussed in these discussions many issues related to the peace process and our bilateral relations.

I think we can say that we have a certain progress — we have achieved a certain progress in various matters related to the peace process. We were left to have further discussions about many issues, and I think that in our discussions in the future there will be maintained the same spirit of friendly cooperation. The Secretary is now leaving our country, I hope with the feeling that very important work was done, and we have before us good perspectives for the future. Thank you.

SECRETARY BAKER: Prime Minister, let me simply echo what you have just said in terms of the characterization of the discussions we've had. I should point out, as I think you did, that we expect to have some further discussions.

There are still some issues between us that must be resolved. And it is the hope, of course, of the United States — just as it is the hope of the Government of Israel — that we will find a way to resolve these issues in the spirit that has characterized the relationship between the United States and Israel for many, many years.

We have an opportunity, I think, a real opportunity to see Arabs, Arab states, sitting down face to face in direct negotiations with Israel. An opportunity that I know you, Prime Minister, and your colleagues here in Israel as well as in the United States want to take advantage of. So we look forward to our continuing discussions.

We wish you a happy holiday and we will expect to be in touch again shortly.

Q: Gentlemen, were you able to reach an agreement or a compromise — let's just say an agreement — on the issue of loan guarantees, or is that among the things that remain unresolved at this time?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: The question is to me? Well, we have discussed it.

Q: The question is to both of you.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: To both of us. It will not be surprising if I will say that we have discussed this issue.

Q: Wait a minute, what about an answer? Let me have an answer.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: We have not yet resolved, but we have discussed it, and we will continue these discussions in the next few days.

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me again agree with what the Prime Minister just said. We have not finally resolved this issue, but we have had two good sessions — two good discussions with respect to it. I hope and believe that we've made some progress on it. We have made certain proposals, we, the United States. Those proposals are before the Israeli Government. They have made certain proposals, and while we have made some progress, we haven't totally come together yet on the issue. And we will continue to have further discussions.

Q: (Inaudible) that are not linked to some kind of freeze on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories?

SECRETARY BAKER: You know that there is a difference of policy between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States with respect to settlement activity. That's no secret.

We have had a discussion of that. The United States supports the principle of assistance to Israel for the absorption of Soviet Jewish emigres. And, as the Prime Minister and I have discussed, no one has been more active over recent years, particularly with the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, in trying to pave the way for immigration to Israel than has the United States.

(END TRANSCRIPT)
NNNN

אאא, חוזם: 15760
אל: רהמש/756
מ-: רושינגטון, נר: 246, תא: 170991, זח: 1507, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
שמור/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ"א
השגריר שובל, מע"ת

דע: תפוצת תקשורת

הערבויות - תדרוך

מידע שלהלן מתבסס על שיחות טלפוניות עם עתונאים בפמליית המזכיר בייקר
(שהתקשרו מקהיר), על דוח סוכנויות מקהיר ועל הדווחים (ברשתות החדשות של
ABC ו-CBS) ברדיו במשך היום:-

א. במטוס מירושלים לקהיר תידרך המזכיר אישית את הכתבים.
התדרוך בדווחי התקשורת, מופיע ומיוחס ל"פקיד בכיר במטוס".
המזכיר דיבר בנחישות ובהחלטיות, ולעיתים אף בכעס.
הערה: הערכת האנשים עםם דברנו היא כי המזכיר תדרכם לאחר שדיבר עם הנשיא
מהמטוס ודווח לו על שיחות הכוקר. לפיכך, להערכתם, הטון והנימה ההחלטית
משקפים "השורה התחתונה" של העמדה האמריקנית בנושא הערביות, כפי שתואמה
בין המזכיר לנשיא.

ב. בנושא הערביות- אמר "המתדרך" (פרפרזה): הצעת הפשרה שהצענו לרוה"מ
שמיר היא שש הנקודות שהציג הנשיא - לא נוסף עליהן ולא נתפשר עוד.
ציטוט:

"THE SIX POINTS ARE DAMN FORTHCOMING... AND WE ARE NOT
GOING TO IMPROVE ON THEM... THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER CONCESSIONS"

עוד אמר, כי ארה"ב מעוניינת להמנע מעמות אבל "הכדור במגרש הישראלי".

ג. המתדרך אמר כי ימליץ לנשיא TO GO AHEAD בנאום לאומה מכיוון שמדובר
בכספים של משלם המיסים - האמריקני ולכן עליו (הציבור) לדעת.
ציטוט-

I WILL TELL THE PRESIDENT TO GO AHEAD AND TALK TO THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE, BECAUSE THE TAX-PAYERS HAS THE RIGHT TO KNOW.

ד. המתדרך טען כי הישראלים רוצים דברים שאנחנו לא מוכנים לתת ולהתחייב
עליהם. ציטוט:

"I DON'T WANT TO INDICATE ONE INCH OF FLEXIBILITY BEYOND
THE SIX POINTS THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED..."

כשנשאל ע"י הכתבים מה דרשו הישראלים מעבר לשש הנקודות, אמר המתדרך כי הישראלים ביקשו התחייבות לגבי THE SIZE AND AND THE CONDITIONS OF THE GUARANTEES ולכך - גם לסכום וגם לתנאים - "לא נתחייב": אנחנו עומדים על דחייה של 120 יום, לא נתפשר על שש הנקודות ו- (ציטוט): "WE WILL NOT AGREE TO IT EVEN IF WE GET ONLY ONE VOTE IN CONGRESS."

ה. בעניין התנחלויות- אמר המתדרך (פרפרזה):-

מה שהישראלים רוצים זה שבינואר לא נציב שום תנאים גם אם הם ימשיכו בהתנחלויות, ולכך לא נסכים. גם בעוד 120 יום נתעקש על הפסקת ההתנחלויות:- (ציטוט) "IN 120 DAYS WE WILL FACILITATE AND EXPEDITE THE REQUEST... IN RETURN FOR A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS..."

יד אמר כי ההתנחלויות, גם בעיני ממשלים קודמים, נתפשו למעשה כבלתי-חוקיות, אך הניסוח הפומבי בו אנו (קרי, הממשל) משתמשים הוא רק "מכשול לשלום". עם זאת, הרגשתנו כלפי ההתנחלויות היא כי הן אינן חוקיות.

ו. המתדרך סבר, בחשובה לשאלה, כי אם ארה"ב תסכים כיום לבקשת הערכויות הישראליות- מדינות ערב לא תבואנה לוועידת השלום - "AND WHY SHOULD THEY ?"

ז. המתדרך אמר, לסכום נושא זה, כי סוכם שהשגריר שובל ודניס רוס ימשיכו בדיונים בשבוע הבא כדי לנסות למצוא מוצא שימנע עימות. עד כאן.

גמר החימה טובה

ירון רות

תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

ACTION USIS INFO CG DPO POL ACC

VZCZCJU0113BA0553
 OO RUFHJU
 DE RUEHEG #0816/01 2610719
 ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZZK
 O 190719Z SEP 91 ZFF4
 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6305
 RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4307
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0114
 BT
 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 15815

19-SEP-91 TOR: 05:29
 CN: 00432
 CHR3: USIS
 DIST: PBPA
 ADD:

USIA

DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE
 FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. POPADIUK

USIA FOR P ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, P/PFN, NEA

E. O. 12356 : N/A

TAGS: TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY BAKER'S PRESS CONFERENCE
- CAIRO, EGYPT 9/17/91

THE FOLLOWING IS A CLEARED TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY
 BAKER'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH
 PRESIDENT MUBARAK IN CAIRO, EGYPT - 9/17/91.

BEGIN TRANSCRIPT:

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THANK THE
 UNITED STATES FOR THE BIG EFFORT DONE BY THE PRESIDENT
 AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE PEACE PROCESS, WHICH
 IS A VERY COMPLICATED PROBLEM. AND NOW, THESE DAYS, WE
 ARE APPROACHING THE CONFERENCE IN WHICH ALL PARTIES
 COULD SIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE ALL THE PROBLEMS SO AS TO
 COMPLETE SOMETHING FOR PEACE TO PREVAIL ALL OVER THE
 AREA. I THINK WHENEVER THEY SAY PEACE, I MEAN THAT
 STABILITY IN THE WHOLE AREA, ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE
 AREA WILL BENEFIT FROM PEACE. ISRAEL MAY BE BENEFITTING
 MUCH MORE THAN ANY COUNTRY IN THIS AREA FOR PEACE.
 THAT'S WHY WE HOPE THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD CONVENE IN
 OCTOBER SO THAT WE COULD GIVE HOPE TO THE PEOPLE HERE TO
 AVOID BLOODSHED AND THE KILLING AND LIVE IN LOVE WITH
 EACH OTHER AND COOPERATE IN THE WHOLE AREA. THANK YOU.

SECRETARY BAKER: MR. PRESIDENT, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR
 RECEIVING ME AND RECEIVING OUR DELEGATION THIS EVENING.
 THANK YOU FOR THE PRIVATE MEETING WE HAD, FOR THE
 EXPANDED MEETING AND FOR THE WORKING DINNER. IT'S
 ALWAYS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO COME TO CAIRO AND HAVE THE
 OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU AND TO MEET WITH THE
 FOREIGN MINISTER BECAUSE I'VE ALWAYS FOUND THAT OUR
 MEETINGS ARE PRODUCTIVE AND USEFUL IN TERMS OF OUR

COMMON EFFORT TO PROMOTE AN ACTIVE PEACE PROCESS IN THIS REGION.

AND I'D LIKE TO SAY RIGHT NOW THAT OVER THE COURSE OF THIS PAST SIX OR SEVEN MONTHS AS WE'VE WORKED TO TRY AND CREATE AN ACTIVE PEACE PROCESS, I DON'T KNOW ANYBODY WHO HAS BEEN HELPFUL OR MORE INSTRUMENTAL IN TAKING STEPS TO TRY TO BRING THE PARTIES TOGETHER THAN HAVE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT. I'D LIKE TO EXPRESS THE GRATITUDE OF PRESIDENT BUSH, MY OWN GRATITUDE AND THE GRATITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THESE EFFORTS AND I, LIKE YOU, LOOK FORWARD IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, CAN YOU TELL US, IF THE UNITED STATES GOES AHEAD WITH THE \$10 BILLION IN LOAN GUARANTEES TO ISRAEL, WILL EGYPT ATTEND THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND DO YOU BELIEVE THE OTHER ARAB STATES WILL ATTEND THE PEACE CONFERENCE OR WOULD THE \$10 BILLION GIFT TO ISRAEL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU TO ATTEND?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: LOOK, I'M NOT GOING TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM OF THE \$10 BILLION. IT IS A PROBLEM BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL. BUT ANYWAY, WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE CONFERENCE FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE. WHAT HAPPENED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, IT CONCERNS THE TWO COUNTRIES AND IT CONCERNS THE U.S. AS THE BIGGEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD WHICH IS LOOKING FOR STABILITY AND PEACE ALL OVER THE WORLD. PEACE IS OF GREAT BENEFIT TO US, TO THE UNITED STATES, TO THE ISRAELIS. SO, ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE IS A MUST AND ALL THE PARTIES AGREE TO THAT.

Q: IS IT A REQUIREMENT FOR THE CONFERENCE THAT ISRAEL STOP BUILDING NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: LOOK, I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS POINT AND GIVEN A STATEMENT BEFORE IN THE LAST VISIT OF THE SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA AND WE HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE GULF COUNTRIES, BUT NOT ALL THE COUNTRIES, BUT I DON'T WANT TO GO THROUGH IT. LET US NEGOTIATE IT NOW AND HURRY UP THE MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE SO AS TO PUT ALL THE CARDS ON THE TABLE, INCLUDING THE BUILDING OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DID YOU GET AN ANSWER FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CONCERNING YOUR COMPROMISE, AND IF YOU HAVEN'T, WHEN DO YOU EXPECT AN ANSWER?

SECRETARY BAKER: WELL, WE DO NOT, AS I SAID THIS MORNING FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR, WE'VE HAD TWO GOOD DISCUSSIONS ON THIS TOPIC. WE HAVE NOT, AS YET, REACHED AN AGREEMENT BUT WE ARE CONTINUING TO TALK AND CONTINUING TO WORK AND I THINK IT'S VERY TRUE THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS, BOTH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WANT VERY MUCH TO AVOID ANY SORT OF A CONFLICT OVER THIS ISSUE.

I ALSO MADE THE POINT THAT I DON'T THINK ANYBODY HAS BEEN ANY MORE ACTIVE OR HELPFUL WITH REGARD TO WORKING WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA TO PERMIT THE FREE EMIGRATION OF THEIR CITIZENS. NO ONE HAS BEEN MORE ACTIVE THAN THE UNITED STATES. AND THIS FREE EMIGRATION IS SOMETHING THAT WE HAVE SUPPORTED AND DO SUPPORT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO TALK TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WITH RESPECT TO THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE, AND I'M VERY HOPEFUL THAT WE'LL ARRIVE AT AN UNDERSTANDING SOON.

Q: THE REPORTS IN THE PRESS SAY THAT AFTER YOUR VISIT TO ISRAEL, SAYING THAT YOU GAVE ISRAEL A GUARANTEE FOR THE NON-PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINIANS FROM EAST JERUSALEM. THIS IS NUMBER ONE AND NUMBER TWO, WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO ACCUSATIONS BY ISRAELIS AGAINST PRESIDENT BUSH AS BEING ANTI-SEMITIC?

SECRETARY BAKER: NUMBER ONE, I DON'T RESPOND TO ALLEGATIONS IN THE PRESS THAT I HAVE NOT SEEN. NUMBER TWO, I DO NOT AND HAVE NOT FOR SEVEN MONTHS CONDUCTED THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE MEDIA SO WITH RESPECT TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION, I WILL DECLINE TO ANSWER IT BECAUSE I'M NOT GOING TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE MEDIA AND WITH RESPECT TO YOUR SECOND QUESTION I DON'T ANSWER ALLEGATIONS IN THE PRESS THAT I HAVEN'T SEEN.

Q: MR. BAKER, CONCERNING THE LETTER OF ASSURANCE, ARE THE PALESTINIANS HAPPY WITH IT AND DOES IT INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE CONCEPT OF THE EXCHANGE OF LAND FOR PEACE?

SECRETARY BAKER: IF YOU'RE ASKING THAT QUESTION OF ME, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU ASK THE QUESTION OF THE PALESTINIANS. WE'VE GIVEN THEM A DETAILED, VERY DETAILED, LETTER OF ASSURANCES JUST AS WE HAVE GIVEN THE ISRAELIS A DETAILED LETTER OF ASSURANCES AND JUST AS WE WILL GIVE THE GOVERNMENTS OF JORDAN, SYRIA AND LEBANON, DETAILED LETTERS OF ASSURANCE. NOW WHETHER OR NOT THEY APPROVE OF ALL OF THE ELEMENTS IN THOSE LETTERS, WHETHER THEY THINK THOSE LETTERS ARE SUFFICIENTLY COMPLETE AND COMPREHENSIVE, YOU WILL HAVE TO ASK THEM, NOT ME.

Q: IS YOUR LETTER SUFFICIENTLY COMPLETE AND

COMPREHENSIVE? DO YOU APPROVE THE ASSURANCES THAT YOU'VE BEEN GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I BEG YOUR PARDON, AGAIN.

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, ARE YOU PLEASED WITH, AND SATISFIED WITH, THE LETTER OF ASSURANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES ...

SECRETARY BAKER: I DIDN'T SAY THAT WE WERE GIVING EGYPT A LETTER OF ASSURANCES, I MENTIONED EVERY OTHER COUNTRY EXCEPT EGYPT, BECAUSE LET'S REMEMBER THAT EGYPT IS AT PEACE WITH ISRAEL; EGYPT HAS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

Q: (INAUDIBLE) MR. SECRETARY, THOUGH THAT YOU WOULD PROVIDE ALL THE PARTIES WITH COPIES OF ALL THE ASSURANCES? YOU AREN'T DOING THAT?

SECRETARY BAKER: OH, I WILL PROVIDE THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE WITH COPIES OF THE ASSURANCE LETTERS THAT ARE PROVIDED TO THE COUNTRIES AND PEOPLE THAT RECEIVE ASSURANCE LETTERS. ONCE THOSE ASSURANCE LETTERS HAVE BEEN AGREED TO, RALPH, WHEN THEY'RE COMPLETED AND AGREED TO, THEN WE INTEND TO FURNISH THEM TO EVERYONE, THERE WILL BE NO SECRETS. AND I'M QUITE CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL PROMPTLY LEAK OUT SO YOU HAVE YOUR COPIES AT THAT TIME. BUT THERE IS NO ASSURANCE LETTER FOR EGYPT BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T REQUESTED ONE BECAUSE THEY HAPPEN

Q: MR. PRESIDENT, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME REPORTS OUT OF ISRAEL THAT EGYPT HAS BEEN WORKING WITH THE PALESTINIANS RECENTLY TO TRY TO COME UP WITH SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE ...

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: WILL YOU PLEASE REPEAT THE QUESTION AS A I N.

Q: OKAY, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OUT OF ISRAEL THAT EGYPT HAS BEEN WORKING WITH THE PALESTINIANS RECENTLY TO TRY TO COME UP WITH SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF EAST JERUSALEM PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT A PEACE CONFERENCE. WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THIS?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: LOOK, I DON'T WANT TO TACKLE THE EAST JERUSALEM PROBLEM NOW THROUGH THE MEDIA. LET DISCUSSION BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONFERENCE. BUT THAT WE ARE COUNTING THE PALESTINIANS, THAT'S RIGHT, AS A HELPFUL ELEMENT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND FOR THE CONFERENCE TO CONVEENE.

Q: HAVE YOU PICKED A PLACE FOR THE CONFERENCE YET?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: WE WERE DISCUSSING SOME POINTS CONCERNING THAT BUT I DON'T THINK THAT THERE IS A FINAL DECISION WHERE THE CONFERENCE IS GOING TO CONVEENE.

Q: WOULD THE U.S. CONSIDER CO-SPONSORING A YUGOSLAV PEACE CONFERENCE TOGETHER WITH THE USSR?

SECRETARY BAKER: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS ALREADY CALLED FOR A PEACE CONFERENCE REGARDING YUGOSLAVIA, AN ACTION THAT THE UNITED STATES FULLY SUPPORTS. I THINK IT WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THAT INITIATIVE IF WE WERE NOW TO JUMP OUT HERE WITH A PROPOSAL OF OUR OWN.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WILL BE MEETING SOON IN ALGIERS TO DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS. ON THE BASIS OF YOUR CONVERSATIONS IN JERUSALEM WITH PALESTINIANS THERE, DO YOU EXPECT WHAT YOU WOULD CHARACTERIZE AS A POSITIVE RESOLUTION TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING IN ALGIERS?

SECRETARY BAKER: I CAN ONLY -- WELL I REALLY DON'T KNOW. I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT WILL HAPPEN AT SUCH A MEETING. I CAN ONLY TELL YOU THAT THE MEETINGS THAT I HAD WITH PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES LAST NIGHT, THE MEETING I HAD LAST NIGHT, WAS ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIVE THAT I HAVE HAD SO FAR. BUT WE STILL AWAIT WORD FROM THE PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY WILL ATTEND. AND LET ME TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SAY ONE MORE TIME, AS I'VE SAID BEFORE THE AUGUST BREAK, I DON'T THINK ANYBODY HAS MORE TO GAIN FROM A PROCESS SUCH AS THIS THAN DO PALESTINIANS. AND I'M QUITE CONVINCED THAT NOBODY HAS MORE TO LOSE IF A PROCESS NEVER DEVELOPS THAN DO THE PALESTINIANS. SO I'M VERY HOPEFUL THAT WE WILL GET POSITIVE ANSWERS FROM

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PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES.

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

END TRANSCRIPT.

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RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4305

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0112

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USIA

DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE
FOR MR. FITZWATER AND MR. POPADIUK

USIA FOR P ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, P/PFN, NEA

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY BAKER REMARKS - CAIRO,
EGYPT 9/17/91THE FOLLOWING IS A CLEARED TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS BY
SECRETARY BAKER BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
MOUSSA IN CAIRO, EGYPT - 9/17/91.

BEGIN TRANSCRIPT:

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY MORE
"GIVE" IN THE ISRAELI AND U.S. COMPROMISE POSITION TO
ISRAEL ON THE LOAN GUARANTEE ISSUE? IS THERE ANY MORE
ROOM FOR FURTHER COMPROMISE?SECRETARY BAKER: WELL, I THINK THAT WE HAVE BEEN VERY
FORTHCOMING IN THE PROPOSAL, THE SIX-POINT PROPOSAL,
THAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED. WE HAD TWO GOOD DISCUSSIONS
WHILE I WAS IN ISRAEL AND WE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE
THESE DISCUSSIONS IN THE FUTURE. I THINK THAT THIS IS A
GOOD PROPOSAL. IT'S ONE THAT WOULD PERMIT US TO GIVE
PEACE A CHANCE IN THE SENSE THAT IT WOULD PERMIT A
120-DAY DELAY OF THIS LEGISLATION AND THEREBY AVOID
ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES WITH RESPECT TO THE PEACE PROCESS.
IT IS THAT, AND THAT ONLY, THAT THE PRESIDENT IS ASKING;
SOMETHING THAT IS SEEMS TO US IS A VERY, VERY REASONABLE
REQ UE ST.Q: DO YOU THINK THAT WHEN IT COMES TIME TO FINALLY DEAL
WITH THE LOAN GUARANTEE ISSUE IN THE FUTURE, THAT THERE
SHOULD BE SOME STRINGS ATTACHED TO CONTROL ISRAEL'S
SETTLEMENTS POLICY?

SECRETARY BAKER: I THINK THE BEST WAY TO GIVE PEACE A

CHANCE IS TO DO WHAT WE HAVE SUGGESTED AND THAT IS TO DELAY THIS MATTER, DELAY THE DEBATE ABOUT THIS MATTER, FOR 120 DAYS SO THAT WE CAN GIVE PEACE A CHANCE. AND FEELING THAT WAY, I AM NOT INCLINED TO DEBATE THE ISSUE WITH YOU HERE TODAY.

Q: MR. MINISTER, COULD I ASK ONE QUESTION? WILL THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS GO TO A PEACE CONFERENCE IF ISRAEL CONTINUES TO BUILD SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES EVEN AS THAT CONFERENCE IS CONVENING?

FOREIGN MINISTER MOUSSA: THE QUESTION OF BUILDING SETTLEMENTS IS A VERY SERIOUS QUESTION FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. IF THE CONFERENCE TAKES PLACE, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE SETTLEMENT POLICY BE RESCINDED. WE HAVE PROPOSED, AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS PROPOSED, AN EXCHANGE OF STOPPING THE SETTLEMENTS, BUILDING SETTLEMENTS, IN EXCHANGE FOR PUTTING AN END, A TEMPORARY END, FOR THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME, OF THE BOYCOTT. SO WE BELIEVE THAT THE SETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE PRACTICE OF BUILDING SETTLEMENTS ARE DESTRUCTIVE AND VERY SERIOUS, THAT THEY WOULD THREATEN THE PEACE PROCESS.

SECRETARY BAKER: LET ME JUST ADD TO THAT, IF I MIGHT. THE POINT WE'RE MAKING HERE, THE POINT THAT PRESIDENT BUSH IS MAKING, THAT I'M MAKING IN REQUESTING THIS 120-DAY DELAY, IS SIMPLY THAT THESE ISSUES ARE VERY, VERY IMPORTANT, THEY'RE VERY DEVISIVE, THEY'RE VERY EMOTIONAL, AND THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE DEBATED IN ADVANCE OF THE PARTIES' COMING TO THE TABLE SO AS TO PRECLUDE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH, AFTER ALL, HAVE NEVER TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS, SAVE FOR THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

Q: MR. MINISTER, YOU SAID THAT THE SETTLEMENTS POLICY SHOULD BE RESCINDED. IS THAT A PRECONDITION, IN YOUR VIEW, FOR THE ARABS COMING TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE TABLE?

FOREIGN MINISTER MOUSSA: FIRST, I WISH TO SAY THAT OUR POSITION ON THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE IS NOT EMOTIONAL, BUT IT IS PRACTICAL. BECAUSE IF THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO BUILD SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THEN THEY WILL AFFECT THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RESOLUTION 242 AND

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THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORY FOR PEACE, LAND FOR PEACE,
SO, WHAT I SAY, OR I WANT TO SAY AND EMPHASIZE IS THAT
IT IS A NECESSARY THING, A NECESSARY STEP, TO GUARANTEE
THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

END TRANSCRIPT. KEITH

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אלו מנהל מצפ"א
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תדרוך המזכיר

בהמשך למברקי בנדון. ולמען הסדר הטוב - רצ"ב התמליל המלא של תדרוך הרסע שנתו המזכיר לכתבים במטוט בדרכו מהארע לקהיר (17.9.91) - כפי ששוהרר לפרסום ע"י מחמ"ד.

רות ירוו

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman
(Cairo, Egypt)

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III

Lod, Israel en route Cairo, Egypt
Tuesday, September 17, 1991

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(NOTE: MOST OF THIS BRIEFING IS ON BACKGROUND)

SECRETARY BAKER: This will probably be a bit repetitive from what I said out in front, but let me start by saying that we had two good sessions, as the Prime Minister said, friendly discussions. And they were, indeed, friendly.

We focused on the absorption aid issue and on the peace process. The experts engaged in a more detailed way on the relevant documents with respect to the peace process, particularly the letter of assurances. And we will continue to follow up on that.

We will also continue to talk on the question of absorption aid. Both countries, I think, are genuinely interested in avoiding a confrontation on the issue, if that's possible. And as a manifestation of our good faith in this regard, we have made a proposal that contains six points, as follows.

First of all, if the government of Israel would agree to the 120-day delay that we are seeking in order that issue not be the subject of a big, divisive debate with attendant adverse consequences for the peace process, the Administration would agree as follows: First, that we would work with supporters of absorption assistance in the Congress in January to find/produce a suitable legislative vehicle. Secondly, we would agree that we would not ask for a further delay, come January. Third, we would be willing now to restate our support for the principle of absorption aid. Next, we would agree to work to handle the scoring in the most reasonable possible way, consistent with the legal requirements.

Q: To handle the what?

SECRETARY BAKER: Scoring. That is, the determination of the extent to which this would impact on the U.S. budget, and impact on U.S. taxpayers.

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Q: Is the term "scoring?"

SECRETARY BAKER: Scoring.

Q: Could we go on with the points?

SECRETARY BAKER: I've given you number four.

And number five, we would find a way to include in any package that might move in January--might move--the out-of-pocket loss to Israel, as a result of a four-month delay.

And lastly, we would undertake to see if we could generate support for this goal from other countries.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just want to say to you, ON BACKGROUND, that we believe that that is a very forthcoming package--an offer, I think right now, they feel that they want something over and above that. We're not going to go for anything over and above that. The President and I feel very very strongly about the issue. And we also think that by forcing this now, Israel and her supporters in the United States risk the peace process, which is the main reason that we have come forward and asked for this delay. That's ON BACKGROUND.

Q: (Inaudible)

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to get into that, Don. But they want some things that we're not willing to commit to.

Q: Are they financial things? Are they...?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, yes--staying ON BACKGROUND now--commitments about possible terms and conditions of a package in January.

Q: The size of the package?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The size is one thing.

Q: Conditions?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Conditions is another. And we're not willing to commit to conditions. Staying ON BACKGROUND now, it does get back to the question that Tom asked there out there in front of the Prime Minister's office.

I think, and I'm staying here ON BACKGROUND -- I think that what they want us to do is agree that come January, we would not ask for any conditions on this aid respecting their continued settlement practices. That's just something we are not going to agree to, if we only get one vote.

And it's a question, in our minds at least, of not asking them at all to change their ideology. We have not asked them to change one bit of it in advance of negotiations. They've said themselves they would put the question of settlements on the table in negotiations. We expect that will happen. But by the same token, we don't expect to have to change our position either, on something that we feel extraordinarily strongly about.

And it's a case, frankly, of not being able to justify, in our own minds or to the other parties to the peace process, an unconditional \$10 billion infusion that doesn't have any restrictions other than the usual boilerplate which doesn't have any effect on the question of settlements. And that's what it gets to.

Q. So what you seem to be saying is that you are going to put conditions on this when it comes up.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I'm saying is we are unwilling to say today -- we're unwilling to take a position today that runs counter to our policy position. We're not asking them to take a position that runs counter to their policy position as a condition to -- as a precondition to negotiations, and we're not willing to accept one ourselves.

Q. You keep emphasizing the word 'today' when you say that. Is this indicating some potential future flexibility?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to indicate one inch of flexibility beyond the six points that we have proposed which are 'damn' forthcoming -- and you can use the word 'damn' ON BACKGROUND. (Laughter)

Q. (Inaudible) The six points don't seem to have changed at all from last week?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's what we surfaced last week, that's correct. And it is every bit as forthcoming and beneficial this week as it was last week, and it is certainly forthcoming in terms of a request only for a 120 day delay.

Q. There have been reports that the President wanted to go ahead and essentially have this battle now, and that you persuaded him to come up with this 120 day delay idea. Is that true?

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ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the answer -- the truth of the matter is that everything that we have done, each of us, has been done by agreement between us, and whoever it is that might be peddling the idea somehow that I'm on a different wavelength here than the President is full of horse hockey. I'm the guy who asked him to go -- horse hockey. I'm the guy -- well, I won't get into any more on this except to say --

Q. You're playing good cop-bad cop.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No we're not. We're both playing good cop. Somebody might be pumping that, but that is absolutely not true, and staying ON BACKGROUND -- I'm ON BACKGROUND on all of this -- let me tell you it's my recommendation that the President go to the American people on this issue if that's what it takes. So if you think I'm saying 'Oh, no, we ought to stay away from this', you're absolutely wrong.

I think -- let me go back and say I think the President will be willing to go to the American people on this because it's their tax dollars that would be supporting settlement activity which we used to characterize as illegal and which we now moderately characterize as an obstacle to peace.

Q. What are the prospects now for a peace conference in October?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Dimmer. No, don't take me seriously. Let me say this. I was being facetious -- I said dimmer. But that's really not true, I don't believe.

I think that the Israeli government understands the value to them of having the Arabs finally, after 43 years, come sit with them at the table. And when you look at the popular support in Israel for this process, and when you look at the statements from the leaders of the government, I think that they want the peace process. I think they're going to continue to want the peace process. I think they want to avoid a confrontation with the United States over this. We want to avoid a confrontation with them. But we can do only so much.

Q. Can you give us the value of your thinking on this? Have you guys just decided you've got the issue right now, and you're got the leverage right now, and it's time to rein in Shamir and his boys?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If that was the decision, we would have, I suppose, chosen not to try to avoid a confrontation now, which is -- we have chosen to try and postpone it. Why? Because we think a confrontation really is a lose-lose proposition. It's lose for Israel, lose for the United States, it's lose for the peace process. So we have suggested putting it aside for 120 days.

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If we didn't do that -- let me make sure you understand this -- if we didn't do that, I'm quite confident -- staying ON BACKGROUND -- I'm quite confident the Arabs would not show up, and who could blame them? Every Arab government I've talked to has asked me -- and the Palestinians as well, and they're still asking --

Q. Last night?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL -- last night -- has asked me to make a freeze on settlements a precondition. And I have said no. I've said no, that's a matter for negotiation when the negotiations begin, it is not a matter to be determined in advance. First place.

Second place, I don't think we can produce a settlement freeze, but even if we could, it is a matter for negotiation. So, having done that and still gotten the Arabs to come to the table, if we then say 'Sure, here's \$10 billion more with no restrictions' whatsoever other than the usual boilerplate, they won't come to the table, in my judgement.

Q. After these two rounds of talks that you've just had, do you now have fears that on the other hand Israel will not come to the table if you stick to your position of these six points? Do you now think you're going to have the Arab States there without Israel?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think Israel would not look good if they said we're not going to come to the table because you've asked for a 120 day pause for peace. I just don't believe that.

Furthermore, I just told you I think that the Israeli government, after 43 years of seeking Arab states to negotiate peace with, and the Arabs are about to take the step over that line and change their position after 43 years, I don't think that's going to happen. It might. I can . . . but the point is, we're doing here what's right. We're doing what we strongly believe is right. And if that means they decide not to come, or somebody else decides not to come, so be it.

Q. Where do we stand on the Palestinian representation issue? Have the Palestinians presented a list of names, or have they told you when they will? And what assurances did you give the Israelis and the Palestinians last night?

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ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We gave extensive assurances to both in the form of a written document to each, and we are engaged with them now with respect to their -- the problems they saw in that overnight. And we will continue to be so engaged.

My sense of the real test of Palestinian intentions, which you probably well recognize, is whether or not you see Palestinians in the Territories in Amman. If you see them in Amman, then I think you could draw the conclusion that maybe they are beginning to move. We haven't seen them in Amman yet, and that's -- I would just direct your attention to that.

Q. Is this an open issue?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we had the most serious and substantial discussion we've had last night. I still feel that the Palestinians in the Territories want a process, they stand the most to gain from a process, and the most to lose in the absence of one, and as I said before, I think those are the dynamics that are at work here. Does that mean they'll come under these terms? I don't know. But again, I'm not discouraged.

Let me say this, I'm not discouraged -- I meant it in Alma Ata -- I'm not discouraged about the prospects for the peace process even though we haven't resolved this absorption aid question. I hope and believe that we will find a way to resolve it, short of a big fight, and that's what I'm convinced the government of Israel wants. And that's what we want.

Q. The Israelis have published the text of most of the assurances. Are you prepared to give those to us so that we can determine what is being published and what is being left out?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm not prepared to do that.

Q. Are they giving you the same assurances on the \$400 million? Are those assurances still valid for this \$10 billion?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't engaged on that question. What we're seeking to do is to postpone that debate until later so that it does not present a threat to the peace process. I explained to you why I thought the Arabs wouldn't come to the table because we've turned them down on this request for a freeze on settlements at every stage, and they've said, OK, we'll come. If, then, we don't put some very extensive conditions on the \$10 billion, I don't think they'll show.

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On the other hand, if we have a big debate in the Congress on the nature of those conditions, then I think there's a greater risk that perhaps Israel would have a problem. Right now, I don't think that's where we are, Mary, but we may get there. But again, we're doing what we think is right under the circumstances, and hopefully what has the best prospects for permitting a peace process to develop rather than subverting it.

Q. Since you describe this proposal to us as basically a take-it or leave-it offer, what was the response from Shamir. What's the next move? Do they study this and then say yes or no?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not the basis on which we engaged with them, Owen. That wasn't the basis, but we've made what is a very forthcoming proposal, and we haven't really gotten back anything that I would characterize as forthcoming. So, did you ask me --

Q. (Crosstalk) You don't have a yes or a no.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They still have the proposal. There were some things that they wanted us to agree to that, for instance, we would not raise certain conditions later. I've already explained to you why we can't do that. So that's where we are.

Q. (Crosstalk)

ADMINISTRATION: No, we agreed we would talk. We agreed we would continue to talk.

Q. Here, or in New York?

Q. Might you come back here?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't have a plan to come back on Friday if that's what you mean because they're in the middle of this shut-down period. They'll only have a very brief window, so I would anticipate -- well, I don't know, I can't answer that. But we will continue to -- we talk on the telephone frequently, we'll be engaged.

Q. Would you blame the Arabs if they saw this package as too damn forthcoming? I mean, the Israelis are, in essence, getting what they want anyway, it's just a four month delay and . . .

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ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not what the package says, Warren, if you look at it. You ought to look at what I said. And, it is again, my judgement that the Arabs would walk if this thing just rolled through with no conditions, and it is my judgment that they won't walk if the Israelis were to pick up on the six points because the issues that they really care about are really not compromised by those six points.

Q. Where do you stand on the date and place at this point?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't stand on it. I mean we're still working to -- we're still looking at October, hopefully.

Q. Do you have a problem if it slips beyond October? Is November any worse than October?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not if everybody wants to sit down and talk peace in November. We'll be ready to do it, but I don't want to suggest that we're slipping it?

Q. I just mean is there a danger in the process that since if October becomes unreasonable, then people are going to find new reasons not to engage.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, when you're talking about MidEast peace and Arabs and Israelis sitting down together, they're always things that can come up. It's like I said months ago, they're going to be ups, downs, bumps in the road, and something can always come up -- terrorist activity -- we don't know.

Q. You're going to have to tell these Arabs it's not just a four-month slippage, that you are going to put these tough conditions on it as well.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't have to say anything like that.

Q. To get them to say, alright, we're going to come and sit down that you're not just going to (inaudible) this thing, how do you play that without giving them some indication of the kinds of conditions that you're going to have on it.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They've already said they want to come. They're going to come, but not if before they get there we grease through this.

Q. Has any Arab government or the Palestinians specifically told you that if the Israelis get this \$10 billion now, no strings attached, they're not coming?

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ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have told me in no uncertain terms that they want a settlement freeze as a precondition to negotiations. OK? And I have said no, that is a matter that is to be discussed at the negotiations.

Q. But my question was whether or not they think that it could be greased after they come and sit down when you have the 120-day delay -- they come, they sit down, they get started, but then what happens to the 10 billion then? Don't you have to reassure them that -- what some of these conditions might be?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've already told you, Chris, what my judgment is on whether or not the six points would cause the Arabs to walk, and my judgment is it will not. It will not.

The Wireless File

for several years to save the ABM Treaty from the Reagan administration's "reinterpretation" efforts and to prohibit any SDI tests that would violate the ABM Treaty.

So why should the Senate now approve an SDI plan that would violate the ABM Treaty?

Star Wars has been searching for a rationale for years, and now its supporters think that they have found some new ones — the threat of a very limited, accidental ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launch, and the possibility that a Third World nation might someday be able to launch an ICBM at the United States.

But the system now being proposed cannot meet those threats:

The system would not protect the entire country. The Grand Forks site alone would cover only the middle-third of the United States, according to the Pentagon's own calculations, and only against a very limited number of attacking missiles and warheads. That would leave uncovered the West Coast, the Eastern Seaboard, the Gulf Coast, Alaska and Hawaii, and the system would be overwhelmed by even a slightly larger attack. Many backers of the plan hope the rest of the country will demand more sites for more coverage, thereby creating a constituency for withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, which prohibits nationwide defense.

The system would not counter other nuclear threats. Long-range ballistic missiles are not our greatest fear from the Third World. But short-range missiles, planes, boats or suitcases from nuclear terrorists would be untouched by this Star Wars plan. We need improved defenses against short range missiles like the Scud, and we

certainly need tougher anti-missile proliferation efforts, but Star Wars is not the answer.

While this Star Wars system does almost nothing to protect us from terror attacks, it almost guarantees to plunge us into a new round of arms competition with the Soviets.

The Soviets can respond by adding missiles and warheads to their arsenal to overwhelm a U.S. ABM system. Or they can deploy cheap countermeasures, like decoys and chaff.

The United States has long threatened a similar response if the Soviets developed greater anti-ballistic missile capabilities. Or the USSR might end up withdrawing from the START Treaty just agreed to. Surely, that is not in our interest.

Now is not the time to decide to take Star Wars out of the laboratory. The nation should continue to support research on ballistic missile defense, but this new Star Wars deployment plan goes beyond research by including systems not compliant with the ABM Treaty before any negotiations even begin. That's a unilateral step that will undermine U.S. security, not enhance it.

The alternative is wiser and cheaper. Stick with the ABM Treaty, which has protected us for two decades, and work mutually to strengthen it. Stay on the path of steady reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals and enhance the president's efforts to develop the USSR as a functioning democracy. Prevent other nations from acquiring nuclear and missile technology now with a tough anti-proliferation regime. And focus resources to build the security of our nation here at home.

(PRECEDING IS AN ARTICLE IN PUBLIC DOMAIN; NO RESTRICTIONS ON USE.)

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*NXE205 09/17/91

BAKER HAS "GOOD DISCUSSION" WITH SHAMIR

(Transcript: Baker remarks, 9/16/91) (310)

Jerusalem — Secretary of State James Baker met with Israel's Prime Minister Shamir September 16 in what the secretary described as a "very good discussion" that would continue the next day.

Secretary Baker answered reporters' questions at the American Consulate General in Jerusalem after meeting with Shamir and just prior to his meeting with Palestinian representatives from the occupied territories, including Faisal Hussein.

The following is an official transcript:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you resolve the loan dispute question with Mr. Shamir tonight?

BAKER: We had a very good discussion. We will continue that discussion tomorrow morning beginning at nine o'clock. And that's really about all I have to say tonight. I won't have any further comment on it, because we will resume our discussions at nine o'clock in the morning.

Q: Mr. Hussein, are you prepared to tell Secretary Baker that the Palestinians will attend a Mideast peace conference, and if not, why not?

HUSSEINI: I prefer to hear from Mr. Baker and then we can answer your

The Wireless File

question.

Q: It sounds like you had a difficult meeting, Mr. Secretary.

BAKER: No, we had a good discussion. I don't mean to give you that impression. But we will be continuing the discussion tomorrow morning.

Q: Did you bring a compromise on the 10 billion dollars?

BAKER: We had a very good discussion, and we will be continuing it tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.

Q: Will you have an answer for us later this evening about whether the Palestinians will be attending a conference?

HUSSEINI: Actually, there will be a press conference. It will be tomorrow morning, not this night.

Q: And there will be a definite answer then, sir?

HUSSEIN: Tomorrow we'll hear, but no, I believe tomorrow we'll tell you, there will be an answer.

Thank You.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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*NXE206 09/17/91

BAKER MEETS WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES

(Transcript: Baker remarks, 9/16/91) (210)

Jerusalem — Secretary of State James Baker met with Palestinian representatives from the occupied territories, September 16 including Faisal Husseini, in what the secretary de-

scribed as "good" and continuing discussions.

Secretary Baker answered reporters' questions at the King David Hotel, after his meeting with the Palestinian representatives.

The following is an official transcript:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: Mr. Secretary, did the Palestinians agree to join the peace conference?

A: We have had a good discussion, and actually the discussion is still going on. Some of our people are still over there. They will work probably for another hour or so tonight. I think there was a good discussion, and we will probably have some further discussions.

Q: Are you going to talk to them again tomorrow?

A: We may talk to them again tomorrow. I will definitely, of course, be meeting with Prime Minister Shamir tomorrow morning at nine o'clock. Our people are still there engaged with the Palestinians with respect to the letter of assurance, and we will keep working on that.

Q: Do you expect an answer?

A: Well, we're getting some answers, and I expect we will continue to.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

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*NXE207 09/17/91

WHITE HOUSE REPORTS ON SANCTIONS, ARMS EXPORTS TO IRAQ

(Texts: Reports to Congress 9/10/

91) (5030)

Washington — The White House sent to Congress on September 10 a classified report on the international export to Iraq of nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile technology.

The unclassified summary of the report, which was made available to the press, notes that throughout the 1980's many countries, especially in Western Europe, "were key suppliers of chemical equipment, chemical precursors, and technical expertise for Iraq's chemical weapons program." Similarly, Iraq's "nuclear, missile and biological weapons program also benefited from foreign sources, mainly in Europe," according to the summary.

The report is mandated by the Foreign Operations Act of 1991.

Following is the unclassified summary of that report, as well as the text of the administration's report to Congress on sanctions taken by other countries against Iraq:

(BEGIN TEXT)

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS TO IRAQ:

During the 1980s the international community became increasingly concerned about Iraq's nonconventional weapons proliferation activities. Restrictions on exports of proliferation-related goods and technology were imposed and strengthened throughout the decade by the United States and other Western countries. Nonetheless, companies and individuals in many countries, especially in Western Europe, were key suppliers of chemical equipment, chemical precursors, and technical

אאא, חוזם: 14575

אל: רהמש/703

מ-: ווש, נר: 2053, חא: 160991, זח: 1710, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / ב ה ו ל

אל: סמנכ' ל צפ' א מר בנצור, לש' רוה' מ'

מאת: הממונה, וושינגטון

ערבויות - תמונת מצב לערב יום ב' 16/9:

1. ההנחה הכללית היא שהנשיא יקבל את מבוקשו ושהדחייה ל-120 יום היא עובדה מוגמרת.

להנחה זו שותפים מחוקקים, הידידים והפעילים היהודים.

2. האסטרטגיה כעת היא להביא לכך שקבוצה מרשימה של רפובליקנים תפנה לנשיא (ישר אליו ולא אל מישהו מעוזריו) ותמליץ בפניו שהוא הנשיא, יציע פשרה.

3. להשגת המשקל הנחוץ לפניה כזו ממשיכים הכל לרכז חתימות של סנטורים על מסמך קסטן-אינווה. עד כה נמנו חמישים וחמישה. המספר יגדל ויתכן שיגיע לשני שלישים אבל חשוב לחזור ולהדגיש שאין ולא כלום בין מספר זה לבין האפשרות להביס ווטו נשיאותי. איש אינו מדבר על הבסת ווטו או אפילו על קיומה של הצבעה. ריכוז הכוחות, תכליתו האחת היא להגיע לסיכום יותר טוב ללא קרב.

4. כל פשרה שמזכירים כאן מבוססת על שיפור שש הנקודות או הוספתן של נקודות נוספות באופן ש:

א. לא יהיה ערעור על גובה הסכום - 10 בליון דולר.

ב. החקיקה בתום 120 ימים תהיה ללא זיקה להתנחלויות או לתהליך.

ג. שהכל יושלם ויהיה ישים לשנת התקציב '92.

ד. שלא יהיו עיכובים באימפלמנטציה.

5. כידוע מבקש סולארז להעביר החלטה בקונגרס שעיקריה היענות לבקשת הנשיא ובצידה הודעה שהקונגרס מתכוון להעביר בינואר את החקיקה. הידידים אינם מאיצים בסולארז לממש את יוזמתו זו. בקשר לכך יש ויכוח טקטי בין הידידים לבין המנהיגים בניו-יורק (פוקסמן, רובינ) הטוענים שטרגיל איסוף החתימות הוא השקעת מאמץ לריק וכדאי להתקדם במהירות עם יוזמת סולארז.

6. ההתקפות על הנשיא שנשמעו בישראל זכו לתגובות קשות בכל מקום ובכל הציבורים וניזקם מרובה. הדבר האחר שמושך אלינו ביקורת קשה הוא התחושה שישראל מעמידה את הערבויות כחוב שארה'ב חבה לה, שזה כאילו מגיע לנו כדבר מובן שאינו צריך הוכחה ואינו מחייב אותנו אפילו באמירת תודה. קיבלנו בעינין זה טלפונים מרים ודיווחים קשים מהקונסוליות.

7. הודעה מאכזבת נמסרה הבוקר לידידים על-ידי מנהיג הרוב ג'ורג' מיטשל שאמר כי בדעתו להציע למזכיר פשרה שעל-פיה יסכים הקונגרס לדחייה המוצעת

אם הנשיא יסכים מראש ל-10 בליון ולסקורינג נמוך (אך לא יאלץ להסכים לדי-לינקג'), דיברתי עם הידידים וביקשתי שיאמרו למיטשל שפיקר הבעיה היא ההתנייה הפוליטית ויש להביא את הנשיא לויתור בנקודה זו.

שילה.

תפוצה: שהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 15380
אל: רהמש/743
מ-: שיקגו, גר: 55, חא: 160991, זח: 1500, דח: ב, סג: סב,
בכב
סודי ביותר/בהול

אל: מצפא
דע: ווש'

שיחה עם שר השיכון האמריקני

שוחחתי משך חצי שעה ב-4 עינים עם ג'ק קמפ, שר השיכון האמריקני בשיקגו
הלן תוכן דבריו:

א. נפגשתי עם בייקר ואמרתי לו שכבר גרם להפלת ממשלה אחת ושיהא זהיר לא
להפיל את השניה.

ב. אמרתי לנשיא ולבייקר שנושא ההתנחלויות הוא ענין הומניטרי ולא פוליטי
ואין לקשור אותו בכל נושא אחר כלשהו.

ג. מאמין שנושא הערבויות יוסדר ובסופו של דבר ישראל תקבל הערבויות.

ד. מסכים עם ויליאם ספיר שכתב בנ'י טיימס שאם ישראל תוותר על זכותה
להקים התנחלויות כאילו ויתרה על זכותה לריבונות על יש'ע כאשר יחל
המו'מ.

ה. ההתנחלויות אינן מכשול לשלום. מה שקרה בסיני מוכיח שהטיעון לא נכון.

ו. השר משמיע דעתו לפני הנשיא כשמזדמן לו.

ז. טוען שאם מדברים על כיבוש כי אז מה עם כיבוש זוחל של לבנון בידי
סוריה.

השר התיחס למס סוגיות בנאומו ובראיון טלויזיה ציין שנושא הערבויות הוא
הומניטרי ולא פוליטי. לדעתו תמצא פשרה,

הקונכל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אלפכא

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בלמ"ס-מייד

תאריך: 11/10/91
סימוכין: 1-29

אל: לשכת שר האוצר/מוכ"ל/יועץ כלכלי
נניד בנק ישראל
מצפ"א
מאת: אמנון נויבך, כלכלית, זושינסון

הודון: דו"ח C.R.S. על בקשת ישראל לערבויות

מצ"ב לעיונכם הדו"ח הנ"ל אשר יצא ב-16/9/91 בה סוקר את מכלול הנושאים הקשורים בבקשת הערבויות - לידיעתכם.

אמנון

ש"ח 2 / ס'ס'ת. ר'ת. א'ת' ב'נ'ת' א'צ'ת' 2 ר'ב'ק
א'צ'ת' 3 / ר'ב'ק ב'נ'ק / ר'ת' / ר'ת' (ו'י'ק)

CRS Issue Brief

Israel's Request for U.S. Loan Guarantees

Updated September 16, 1991

by
Larry Q. Nowels and Clyde Mark
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division



Congressional Research Service • The Library of Congress

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Israel's Request for U.S. Loan Guarantees

SUMMARY

Between January 1990 and June 1991, Israel welcomed 300,000 new immigrants, mostly from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. Israel expects between 750,000 and one million Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel over the next 4 years. Israel anticipates spending between \$45 billion and \$50 billion over 5 years to provide housing, infrastructure, clothing, food, education, transportation, training, and other services associated with settling the new immigrants. On Sept. 7, 1991, Israel requested from the United States a total of \$10 billion in loan guarantees over 5 years to finance housing, infrastructure, and job creation for the immigrants. Israel will borrow \$10 billion from U.S. commercial banks, pension funds, corporations, and other sources, and the U.S. Government will guarantee repayment of the loans. Israel will seek another \$10 billion from other nations, \$5 billion in philanthropic donations, and will finance the other \$25 billion in its own national budget.

The A.I.D. Office of Housing and Urban Programs guarantees payment of commercial loans for housing and infrastructure projects in developing countries. For FY1992, a subsidy (a percentage of each loan), based on an assessment of the risk that the loan will not be repaid, will be appropriated and set aside in a U.S. Treasury fund to be held as a reserve for payment of defaulted loans. Many believe that Israel, with a past history of prompt debt servicing and prospects for economic growth, is a good credit risk and should be assigned a low subsidy. Others believe that the Israeli economy will grow slowly and that Israel will not be able to meet its debt service obligations.

On Sept. 6, 1991, President Bush asked Congress to postpone consideration of the Israeli request for 120 days to allow Secretary of State Baker to complete arrangements for a peace conference in October 1991. Apparently, some Members of Congress rejected the President's appeal to wait until 1992, and decided to proceed with legislation to approve the loan guarantees now. The President said, on September 12, that he would veto any loan guarantee legislation that appeared before January 1992.

ISSUE DEFINITION

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Israel requests \$10 billion in loan guarantees over 5 years (in five \$2 billion installments in fiscal years 1992 through 1996) to finance the settlement of an expected one million Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Ethiopia. Should Congress consider legislation now to authorize and appropriate funds for the guarantees or should Congress wait until January 1992, as requested by President Bush? Other issues for Congress may include Israel's credit worthiness, possible conditions on the guarantees that Israel halt settlements in the occupied territories, the rationale for the U.S. assistance, and deciding which U.S. Government agency should administer such a large program.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Israel's Loan Guarantee Request

Israel submitted a formal request to Secretary of State James Baker on Sept. 7, 1991, for a total of \$10 billion in five annual installments of \$2 billion each for fiscal years 1992 through 1996. Israel needs funds to settle the 750,000 to one million Soviet Jews expected to migrate to Israel over the next few years. Israel will use the funds for infrastructure (highways, sewers, water, industrial parks, and residential infrastructure), for job creation (establishing funds for investment in capital goods, machinery, and equipment), and for mortgages on houses and apartments.

The Bush Administration Position

In March 1991 the United States gave Israel \$650 million in Economic Support Fund grants to help Israel repair the damages from the Iraqi missile attacks during the Persian Gulf war. At that time, the Bush Administration and Israel agreed to postpone until September Israel's anticipated request for U.S. loan guarantees to assist in the absorption of Soviet Jewish immigrants. Secretary Baker said on September 4 that the United States needed time to study the proposed loan guarantees, and that he did not want the discussions to undercut the peace conference tentatively scheduled for October. On September 6, President Bush told the press that he had asked Israel and Congress to delay consideration of the Israeli request for 120 days so as not to harm the peace process. In exchange for the delay, according to press accounts, the President was willing to promise that there would be no other delays after January, that the Administration would provide quick action on the request in January, that the United States would compensate Israel for any costs brought about by the delay, that the subsidy rate for the loan guarantees would be low, and that he would solicit funding for Israel from other countries. Despite the President's and Secretary of State's appeals, Israel submitted the request anyway on September 7, and some of Israel's supporters and some Members of Congress proceeded with legislative proposals to approve the loan guarantees now and not wait until January.

On September 11, President Bush said he was not committed to supporting the \$10 billion guarantee; the statement was in response to reports that Israeli officials said that the United States was morally obligated to provide the guarantees, that President

Bush promised to provide the funds, and that Israel wanted the funds now. On September 12, the President repeated that he wanted action on the Israeli loan guarantees postponed until 1992, and added that he would veto loan guarantee legislation in the current session of Congress.

Some observers believed the Bush Administration was using the loan guarantees as leverage to get favorable replies from Israel on several peace conference issues, such as selecting a Palestinian Arab delegation, control of the peace conference agenda, or an Israeli pledge to stop constructing settlements in the occupied territories. Other observers noted that a public discussion of the loan guarantees could have a disruptive affect on the peace conference negotiations and agreed with the President that the request should be delayed. Some Israeli supporters accused the Administration of violating the March agreement to consider the loan guarantees in September. There was also speculation that Administration and Congressional leaders could negotiate a compromise on the timing of the loan guarantees to avoid the confrontation over whether or not to wait until January as the President requested.

Legislative Options for Congress

Congress faces a dilemma: respond to the Israeli government request, as championed by the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington, to consider the request now; or respond to President Bush's request to delay consideration until January 1992. Congress could follow another path; negotiate a compromise between the Israeli approach and President Bush's position that would allow congressional consideration of a bill approving loan guarantees for Israel after a peace conference date has been set but before January 1992. Congress's legislative options include:

- amend H.R. 2621, the FY1992 foreign assistance appropriations bill passed by the House of Representatives and now under consideration in the Senate, by adding an authorization and appropriation for the loan guarantees for Israel;
- introduce clean bills to authorize and appropriate funds for the loan guarantees;
- attach loan guarantee authorizing and appropriating language to a Continuing Resolution that would fund foreign assistance programs after October 1 in the event Congress had not cleared the regular foreign operations appropriation; or
- follow the President's recommendation to wait until January to introduce legislation approving the loan guarantees for Israel.

If Congress proceeds with loan guarantee legislation now (appropriations bill, clean bill, or Continuing Resolution), it may consider the prospects of overriding a veto, as the President warned in his September 12 press briefing.

Soviet Jewish Immigration to Israel

Soviet Jewry may be the most prominent Jewish community still seeking refuge. The United States, through its policies and actions has encouraged the Soviet Union to allow its Jewish citizens to migrate freely. (For example, the Jackson-Vanik

amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, Section 402, P.L. 93-618, denied trade agreements to countries with non-market economies that restricted free emigration.)

In the past, the Soviet Union restricted Jewish religious practices and limited Jews opportunities granted to other Soviet citizens. The Soviet Union did not recognize the right of its citizens to migrate, except for a few Soviet citizens who left the country under family reunification plans. Thus, many Jews who wished to leave were unable to do so. Recently, some restrictions and restrictive practices against Jews have eased, and as part of the reform movement beginning in 1985, the Soviet Union relaxed its emigration ban and allowed Jews to leave. Jewish emigration reached 1,000 per month in September 1989, 3,500 in December 1989, and 10 times that number one year later in December 1990. A new emigration law, passed in May 1991, permits Soviet citizens to have passports, and if and when fully implemented in 1993, will allow free emigration except for draft-age men and those who held jobs involving state secrets. (See also CRS Issue Brief 90083, Soviet Jewish Emigration.)

Current and Future Immigration

In the 10 years between 1980 and 1989, a total of 87,707 immigrants arrived in Israel, 27,715 of whom were from the Soviet Union and about 14,000 were from Ethiopia. With an average of almost 9,000 immigrants per year, Israel could feed, house, process, educate, and train the new immigrants without straining the government machinery or Israeli society. In 1990, 194,941 immigrants arrived in Israel, 181,759 of whom were from the Soviet Union. For the first 6 months of 1991, 86,667 Soviet Jewish immigrants arrived in Israel, and in late May 1991, 14,078 Ethiopian Jews left their civil war-torn country to migrate to Israel. Processing, placing, and integrating the nearly 300,000 immigrants over the past 18 months has strained the Israeli government and society. (Figures from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, the National Council on Soviet Jewry, and the American Association on Ethiopian Jews. See also CRS Issue Brief 90105, Ethiopian Jews.)

There are about 2 million Jews in the Soviet Union. Israeli officials estimated that between 750,000 and one million of the Soviet Jews would migrate to Israel by 1995. Following the August 19, 1991 changes in the Soviet government, Israeli leaders encouraged the estimated 60,000 Jews holding exit permits to leave the Soviet Union immediately. Many observers believed that most Soviet Jews, fearing a more oppressive regime, would emigrate as soon as possible. But with the reversal of the coup on Aug. 21, 1991, Soviet Jewish emigration became more problematic. Some believe that Soviet Jews will be less likely to leave the Soviet Union or the republics now that the democratic forces have prevailed. Others believe that the attempted coup serves as a warning that a less liberal regime could emerge, at some time in the future, and that Jews should migrate to Israel now, while they have the opportunity. Many eyes will be watching the Soviet Jewish community over the next few months to see which way it will react.

It is estimated that between 2,000 and 2,500 Jews remain in the northern provinces of Ethiopia. Israeli authorities assume that all Ethiopian Jews will migrate to Israel in the near future. The population of Israel (pre-1967 boundaries) at the end of 1990 was 4.8 million, of which 3.9 million were Jews.

Immigration Problems in Israel

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The current wave of Ethiopian and Soviet immigrants has created or aggravated a series of problems for the Israeli government, for the Jewish Agency and other philanthropic organizations that support immigrants, and for the Israeli people.

Immigration Costs

The privately funded, independent Jewish Agency and the government of Israel, led by the Ministry of Absorption, provide food, shelter, clothing, job training, health services, education, language training, and cash for immigrants in need. The 9-month, \$30.6 billion Israeli budget, passed at the end of March 1991, included \$5.5 billion for immigration (compared to \$4.8 billion for defense, according to the Mar. 21, 1991, *Washington Jewish Week*). The Jewish Agency has budgeted \$4.25 billion over the next 4 years for immigrants in Israel. According to Israeli sources, the government of Israel and the Jewish Agency provide a subsidy of about \$10,000 per year for each Soviet family of 3. Of that amount, about \$2,600 is a loan. Immigrants are entitled to another \$1,000 loan, repayable over 10 years.

Israeli officials anticipate a total cost of absorbing one million Soviet Jews at between \$45 billion and \$50 billion (one Israeli official said \$60 billion). Of that amount, according to press reports, Israel will ask the United States to provide \$10 billion in housing loan guarantees, European national and commercial sources to provide another \$10 billion in loans, guarantees, and grants, philanthropic sources to provide \$1 billion per year, and the remainder -- \$20 to \$25 billion -- to be financed internally in Israel.

Jobs

Israel will have to find jobs for the new immigrants. Israel's unemployment rate hovered around 5% in the 1970s and early 1980s, moved up to the 6.5% level in the mid- and late-1980s, but jumped to 10% in 1990. Despite a government policy to reduce public sector employment, public sector jobs have grown to 29% of the total 1.6 million work force, so there is little opportunity or incentive to hire immigrants in government jobs. According to Israeli sources, 67% of men and 47% of women immigrants from the Soviet Union will enter the Israeli job market; and the vast majority were professionals in Russia who will be seeking comparable professional jobs in Israel, the most competitive segment of Israel's job market. Israeli officials state that one use for the Housing Loan Guarantees will be job creation. Unemployment among recently arrived Soviet Jews in Israel is variously estimated at between 40% and 70%. Some Soviet Jews are taking semi-skilled, unskilled, and menial jobs usually held by Israeli Arabs or Arabs from the occupied territories. Israeli Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai was quoted over Israeli radio on June 13, 1991, as saying that Israel will need 600,000 new jobs over the next 5 years to accommodate the new immigrants. The government of Israel estimated the cost of job training or retraining at about \$8,000 for each Soviet immigrant unable to find a job in his or her field.

Infrastructure

Israel will need roads, water, electrical power, sewerage treatment, schools, public transportation, and other infrastructure to meet the needs of the expected one-fifth

increase in the population over the next 5 years. Israelis point out that such infrastructure, built with the Housing Loan Guarantee funds, will benefit all Israeli citizens, not just the recent immigrants.

Housing in Israel

New Housing Starts. Israel's 1.4 million housing units have been fully occupied since December 1990 (about 140,000 of those units are Arab owned and occupied). Prior to the late-1989 surge in Soviet migration, Israel needed about 20,000 new housing starts each year to meet the demands of its growing population. In June 1990, amid the influx of Soviet Jews, then Housing Minister, now Foreign Minister, David Levy set a goal of 54,000 new units by April 1991 to meet the needs of the expected Soviet immigrants; Levy's estimate was too low because the number of immigrants increased dramatically. By the end of 1990, Israel needed between 70,000 and 100,000 new housing starts in 1991 to meet the current demand, but, according to Israeli press sources, less than one-tenth of the new housing construction approved by the government in March 1990 had been started by the end of the year. There appeared to be several reasons for the delays: planning was difficult because the numbers arriving from the Soviet Union kept increasing; government bureaucracy was slow to approve necessary licenses and permits; banks were reluctant to approve mortgages for immigrants; construction companies would not start building without government guarantees to purchase the unsold homes; and new construction was delayed while officials debated agency responsibility and policies, such as whether or not to buy prefabricated housing. The current Housing Minister, Ariel Sharon, implemented a plan to purchase some 9,000 prefabricated houses and 33,000 mobile homes (10 by 48 foot, 2 family mobile home units) to meet immediate needs while the Israeli construction industry prepared to meet the new demands.

Finance Minister Modai stated on June 13, 1991, that Israel needed about 250,000 new houses or apartments over the next 5 years just to meet the Soviet immigrant needs alone. And, Housing Minister Sharon has been quoted in the Israeli press as saying Israel needs 500,000 new housing units over the next 5 years.

Housing Costs. By June 1990, housing prices were increasing at a rate of over 30% per year, about twice the consumer price index growth rate of 14% per year. Landlords, anticipating higher profits, raised rents because Soviet Jews were willing and able to pay higher rents with their government/Jewish Agency subsidies. Soaring rents dislocated poorer Israelis, driving many to seek less expensive housing and forcing a few into temporary tent encampments. The Bank of Israel reported in October 1990 that as many as 150,000 families were homeless in Israel (the figure is in dispute). New housing construction costs about \$65 per square foot for the average 1,000 square foot unit. The price on the open market for the average housing unit is about \$100 per square foot (with builders' profit, infrastructure, and other added costs), but the subsidized cost to immigrants is about \$55 per square foot.

Land Use. In the past, Israel assigned higher priority for agricultural and industrial land use than for housing, which resulted in dense concentrations of houses and apartments on less valuable land. Land use policies are the subject of some debate in Israel, with new emerging policies apparently leaning toward allocating bigger and better tracts of land for housing to meet the new demands. The state of Israel controls 92% of the land, most of which was purchased by the Jewish National Fund, which

holds the land in perpetuity for the Jewish people. The state leases land to Jews for 49 years, renewable for another 49 years.

Land use practices in Israel may pose a dilemma for the United States. On the one hand, some could argue that providing U.S. guarantees for Jewish immigrants to build housing on land restricted only for Jews may support ethnic or religious discrimination against Israel's Arab citizens. On the other hand, others may argue that the central problem is the nature and scope of Israel's emergency of providing for 1 million needy Soviet Jews, and that the emergency demands immediate attention that currently overrides other considerations. Israeli government sources claim that the only restriction on Israeli Arabs leasing or renting homes is the preference offered to military veterans for government loans; Arabs do not serve in the military.

U.S. Housing Loan Guarantee Program

U.S. Guarantee Loan Programs: AID's Housing Office

The U.S. Government maintains a wide range of domestic and international loan guarantee programs. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that the United States will issue \$103 billion in new guarantees in FY1991. Because of heavy focus of the Israeli absorption program on housing and related infrastructure, many assume that the new \$10 billion request will be managed through the Agency for International Development's Office of Housing and Urban Programs. Through its Housing Guaranty Program, AID collaborates with foreign governments to develop broad housing and infrastructure projects targeted at population groups falling below the median-income level. Once approved, the borrowing country seeks financing in U.S. capital markets at the most favorable terms available for a U.S. Government-guaranteed loan. Lenders, which include investment banks, commercial banks, savings institutions, life insurance companies, and pension funds, must be U.S. citizens or U.S.-owned corporations, partnerships, or associates. A normal loan is for 30 years, with a 10-year grace period on the payment of principal. Through FY1991, the Housing Office has met its expenses for operations and credit risks through the collection of fees associated with the loans: a 1% up-front fee and 0.5% annual fee on the outstanding principal balance. Although the Housing Office will continue to collect these fees in the future, beginning in FY1992 with the implementation of credit reform throughout the U.S. budget, Congress must appropriate operating expenses and the subsidy value of the guaranteed loans. (See *Assessing the Risk* below.)

Over the past 25 years, AID has guaranteed housing loans totalling \$2.2 billion, largely concentrated in Latin America. Housing guarantees authorized for FY1991 total \$550 million, including a special supplemental for Israel of \$400 million (see *Previous Housing Loan Guarantees to Israel*). AID has requested a program of \$100 million for next year (FY1992) with projects planned in Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Chile.

AID's Housing Office currently manages the Israeli loan guarantee program, and many presume that this arrangement would continue for the larger request. The Israeli immigration absorption initiative and portions that would be financed with U.S.-backed loans appear to go far beyond the traditional AID housing guarantee program. Consequently, it is not entirely clear in advance of the formal request, if the program

would be managed by AID's Housing Office, another part of AID, or by another U.S. Government entity. The Israeli program, both the existing \$400 million program and the proposed \$10 billion program, is far larger than the typical \$100 to \$150 million annual world-wide program operated by AID. Although AID loan guarantees back housing as well as related infrastructure needs, such as roads, sewers, and schools in the immediate neighborhood, it appears that the new Israeli proposal will pursue much broader construction operations than normally are supported with housing loans. In the past, when AID housing guarantees financed major water systems or highway development, for example, AID determined what portion of the project would benefit directly its target population of those below the median-income level. Finally, housing guarantees have not been used, as is planned under the Israeli proposal, to stimulate new employment and job creation outside the construction industry.

Congressional Role in U.S. Loan Guarantee Programs

Until FY1992, Congress approved the total principal amount of the housing loan guarantee program in authorization acts and set annual ceilings on new loan commitments in appropriation bills. Neither of these actions, however, required Congress to authorize or appropriate new funds (budget authority), unless the program had suffered losses due to claims from lending institutions associated with previously approved loan guarantees. For example, Section 222 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes AID's Housing Guaranty Program to maintain up to \$2.558 billion in outstanding principal at any one time, while Title II of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1991, places a limit on new loan commitments for FY1991 at \$150 million. Because loan guarantees were not counted as budget authority at that time, none of this was "scored" against AID appropriations. (In a separate action, however, the legislation appropriated \$48 million for the Housing office's reserve fund to service claims on previous loans.) Likewise, the 1990 supplemental of \$400 million for Israeli housing guarantees had no budgetary impact at the time and required no appropriation of funds.

Budget Implications

Pursuant to the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Congress and the Administration agreed to apply new accounting methods and procedures to U.S. Government guarantee and other credit programs. The Budget Enforcement Act added a new Title V to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, referred to as the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. The new methods and procedures under the Act will apply for the first time in FY1992. Under the Act, OMB coordinates agency estimates of the cost of U.S. guaranteed loans, taking into account such factors as cost of money at the time the loan is issued, the interest rate charged by the lender, and the risk that the United States may be required to make payments in the future if a lender is not paid under the terms of the loan. In short, the new arrangement, or subsidy, represents what the U.S. Government could reasonably expect to lose over the entire life on a credit transaction calculated on a net present value basis. Congress must now appropriate the estimated subsidy. For FY1992, for example, OMB estimated that AID's requested housing program of \$100 million has a subsidy rate of 2.5%, thereby requiring Congress to appropriate \$2.5 million in support of the \$100 million in new principal guaranteed by the program.

Consequently, under the new credit reform rules, the anticipated Israeli request for \$2 billion in loan guarantees in FY1992 and \$10 billion over 5 years almost certainly will have a budgetary impact. OMB is currently in the process of developing an estimated subsidy for the guarantees. Executive branch officials note that due to late enactment of the Budget Enforcement Act last year, the initial methodology used in determining the subsidy rate for guarantee programs, including AID's housing activities, represented a first step and that continued refinement and development would evolve over the coming months in preparation of the FY1993 budget. Therefore, they caution, for this and other reasons, the Housing Guaranty Program subsidy rate of 2.5% estimated in January 1991 for FY1992 loan commitments may not be a good indication of what an estimate for the Israeli request might be. (See *Assessing the Risk of Default*.)

The requirement beginning in FY1992 for subsidy appropriations associated with Federal guarantee loan programs, and consequently for the Israeli request, also has broader implications for the overall U.S. foreign policy budget. The Budget Enforcement Act established a 5-year limit on discretionary Federal spending. For the first three years -- FY1991-FY1993 -- the Act created a process to set discretionary spending ceilings in three distinct categories: domestic, defense, and international affairs. At present, the FY1992 ceiling for international affairs is \$20.9 billion in budget authority; in February 1991, President Bush estimated that the ceiling would be increased to \$34 billion, reflecting enactment of his legislative proposals and adjustments in the ceilings required by the Budget Enforcement Act. Any loan guarantee subsidy appropriation must come from within this international affairs ceiling -- the Act does not permit transfers from another category. As a result, appropriations for the Israeli guaranteed loans will compete with other foreign policy spending and involve trade-offs among those programs. Through FY1993, however, approval of guaranteed loans for Israel would not affect resources available to fund domestic credit programs, including housing subsidies for Americans. After FY1993, there will be a single category and ceiling for discretionary spending that combines domestic, defense, and international affairs. At that time, therefore, subsidy appropriations for Israeli guaranteed loans would compete within the overall ceiling on discretionary spending and not just against other foreign policy programs. It should be noted, also, that the subsidy estimate to back the Israeli loans most likely will be quite small relative to total U.S. discretionary spending.

Assessing the Risk of Default

The Office of Management and Budget coordinates an interagency group that will calculate the amount of the subsidy to be appropriated by Congress. The subsidy, expressed as a percentage of the total loan amount, will be placed in the AID-Treasury jointly managed account to be held in case Israel defaults on its loans to the commercial lenders. The subsidy calculation will be based on Israel's economic performance, its previous debt repayment record, the projected impact of the new immigration on the Israeli economy, on Israel's capacity to acquire and manage the new debt, and on other factors. According to some economists, it may be more difficult to calculate the risk factor for Israel than for some other countries because of Israel's high security expenses, the size of the immigration problem, and the Israeli economy's close link to U.S. foreign assistance.

Israeli officials and Israeli supporters believe that there is little risk in guaranteeing Israel's loans. Israel, they argue, has never defaulted on a loan, has never been late with loan payments, has good credit ratings among international commercial lenders, has experience handling large numbers of immigrants, and has an expanding economy. They point out that Bank of America rates Israel as a "non-problem" country, and that Salomon Brothers wrote a favorable report on Israel's credit standing. The immigrants arriving from the Soviet Union are well educated and highly motivated, and will become productive members of the Israeli society very quickly, they point out. The Israelis also say that in recent years Israel has undertaken a series of economic reforms that lowered inflation, stabilized the currency, increased exports, and restored a steady economic growth rate. Israel improved its debt situation over the past few years and now has a debt picture better than or similar to many industrialized nations.

Others are not as optimistic about Israel. The Israeli economy is tied to U.S. foreign assistance and to philanthropic donations to meet Israel's \$3 billion per year balance of payments deficit. Israel consistently runs a budget deficit, and a trade deficit. Unemployment rose from 6% to 10% over the past 2 years, and appears destined to climb further with the wave of immigrants in search of jobs. Housing and infrastructure construction needed to accommodate the immigrants are falling further behind each month. Economists point out that Israel must be judged not on its past performance but on its capacity to meet the future debt service. Standard and Poor rated Israel as a "BBB-" credit risk for long-term government debt not backed by the U.S. Government, their lowest rating for investment grade bonds. According to the June 25, 1991, *Christian Science Monitor*, Institutional Investor ranked Israel in the upper tier of Third-World countries, just behind Algeria, Venezuela, and Colombia. According to both Israeli and U.S. Government sources, the Export-Import Bank of the United States rated Israel a "C" on an A through F scale. (The Export-Import Bank rating could not be verified because Ex-Im Bank keeps rating matters confidential.)

U.S. Aid to Israel

Between 1949 and 1991, the United States has provided Israel with over \$53 billion in foreign assistance. Of that amount, \$21 billion has been military loans and grants and the remainder economic assistance. From 1985 through 1991, U.S. aid to Israel has been \$3 billion per year (with supplemental grant aid in 1986 and 1991). As of Dec. 31, 1990, Israel owed the U.S. Government \$4.364 billion for previous loans. Also, the U.S. Government is the guarantor for 90% of another \$5 billion in U.S. commercial loans to Israel, loans that were refinanced under the debt reform provisions of P.L. 100-202 of 1987.

The loan guarantees requested by Israel differ from the bulk of U.S. aid currently extended to Israel - assistance that now is provided mainly in the form of economic cash transfers (\$1.2 billion) and military grants (\$1.8 billion). Under a guaranteed loan package, Israel would borrow funds from U.S. private lenders and the U.S. government would back, or guarantee, Israeli payment of the loans. In the event Israel did not make its scheduled payments, the United States would be responsible to pay the lender.

The Loan Guarantee Program for Israel

Beginning in late 1990, journalists in Israel and the United States reported that Israel soon would ask the U.S. Government to guarantee about \$10 billion in commercial loans over a 5-year period to help in the absorption of the anticipated one million Soviet Jewish immigrants. As the Persian Gulf crisis continued to mount in late 1990 and early 1991, Israel also sought additional cash assistance from the United States to cover economic and security costs incurred as a result of the crisis. Following the outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf, Israeli and American officials agreed to a supplemental aid package totalling \$650 million in Economic Support Fund grants for Israel, but with the agreement that Israel would defer any further requests for U.S. assistance beyond the \$3 billion regular annual program until after Sept. 1, 1991. As a result, government officials set aside the matter of U.S. guarantees to help resettle Israel's growing immigrant population.

According to the Israeli request, the loan guarantees will be used to finance programs in the three areas -- housing, infrastructure, and employment -- that represent a significant portion of the costs of absorbing the growing immigration population. The loans would be used to cover part of the expense of constructing about 260,000 new housing units estimated to cost \$12 billion to \$15 billion. Likewise, Israel expects to use U.S. loan guarantees to finance partially a wide range of major infrastructure projects in the next few years -- projects that will include the construction of new main highways, a light rail line, and water and sewerage systems for 20 new towns or cities. The government expects to spend \$3 billion to \$4 billion annually over the next 5 years to improve the Israeli physical base for the economy. Finally, American-backed loans would support employment generating initiatives contemplated by the Israeli government. Borrowed funds would be made available to Israeli private enterprises -- approximately \$600 million to \$700 million per year -- that would enable businesses to import the additional capital goods necessary to stimulate the expansion of operations and more jobs for arriving immigrants.

Previous Housing Loan Guarantees to Israel

Between 1972 and 1980, Israel received \$200 million in housing loan guarantees. In 1990, Israel received another \$400 million (H.R. 4404, P.L. 101-302, May 25, 1990). According to Sections 221, 222, and 223 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (P.L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424, Sept. 4, 1961), U.S. housing loan guarantees are intended for developing countries, are limited to \$25 million per country, should target 90% of the guarantees to families below the median income, and should include two fees, usually a one-time fee of 1% of the total, to be paid to the United States for administrative expenses, and a fee of 0.5% of the remaining principal paid annually to the United States to cover technical assistance and other recurring costs. For the \$400 million loan guarantee for Israel in 1990, Congress waived the \$25 million limit per country, lowered the administrative fees, and waived the stipulation that the housing should be targeted to low income families.

The \$400 million in loan guarantees was not released immediately, contributing to speculation in Israel that Secretary of State Baker was using release of the funds to trade for Israeli concessions in the peace process. Suspicions about Secretary Baker's motives aside, there is some doubt that Israel could have used the loan guarantees because the Government could not agree on a housing plan for the Soviet immigrants.

and the Israeli construction industry did not appear prepared to begin the new construction.

Israeli Use of U.S. Aid in the Occupied Territories

In accordance with U.S.-Israel aid agreements, Israel cannot use any U.S. foreign assistance in the occupied territories: the Gaza Strip; the Golan Heights; or the West Bank, which includes the east Jerusalem area annexed by Israel in 1967. It has been U.S. policy since 1967, that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are illegal under international law (paragraph 6, Article 49, Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that an occupying power may not transfer its civilian population to occupied territories), and that Israeli settlements are an obstacle to peace. On the latter point, U.S. Administrations have argued that the Arabs have little reason to negotiate peace with Israel if they believe that Israel intends to retain the occupied territories as the presence of permanent Israeli settlements indicates. Israel's supporters point out that Israel surrendered settlements in the Sinai in the peace treaty with Egypt, a precedent that should demonstrate that settlements are not an obstacle to peace.

On Oct. 1, 1990, Israeli Foreign Minister Levy stated in a letter to Secretary of State Baker that Israel would not use any of the \$400 million housing loan guarantees in the occupied territories, would not encourage new immigrants to settle in the occupied territories, and promised to provide information on the Israeli Government's financial support for Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Levy's three points appeared to critics in Israel to be conditions that Israel had accepted to get the funds released. Levy was criticized for conceding that Jerusalem was part of the occupied territory and not part of Israel. (Levy's letter said use of the funds would be limited to "geographic areas which were subject to the government of Israel's administration prior to June 5, 1967," which would exclude east Jerusalem.) Baker approved the release of the guarantees on Feb. 20, 1991, (AID began processing loans at the end of March 1991), but it was not clear if Israel had provided the promised information about settlement funding.

The Israeli request presented to the Secretary of State on Sept. 6, 1991, said: ". . . the utilization of funds shall be restricted to the geographic areas which were subject to the Government of Israel's administration prior to June 5, 1967."

Other Issues

Some in the United States have questioned the propriety of providing housing assistance to Israel when there are many homeless people in the United States. They argue that the United States should devote its limited resources to helping its own citizens before helping other countries. Others point out that a housing loan guarantee program would not be effective in confronting the complex economic and social issues that contribute to the U.S. homeless problems.

Another issue involves a U.S. moral obligation to support Soviet Jews once they have left the Soviet Union. Some argue that the United States, through the Jackson-Vanik amendment and other policy pronouncements, championed free emigration, and therefore assumed a responsibility for financing Jewish settlement in Israel or other

safe havens. But others would argue that U.S. support for freedom of movement does not make the United States responsible for resettling all Soviet Jews who emigrate.

Congressional Action

On September 10, Senators Kasten and Inouye inserted in the *Congressional Record* proposed language to add a Section 226 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for loan guarantees for Israel. The proposed language stated that \$2 billion in loan guarantees would be available on September 30 of each fiscal year 1992 through 1996, that the loans would be for 30 years with an interest-only grace period of 10 years, that the loans could be used only inside Israel's pre-1967 boundaries, and that the operating expenses for the total \$10 billion would be \$100 million, or 1% of the total. The proposal states that Israel would pay the \$100 million fee, on a pro rata basis as each increment of the loans was made. There would be no subsidy, thereby cancelling the need for any appropriation.

לשכת השגריר

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מ ב ר ק נ כ נ ס ג ל ו י

אאא, חוזם: 9443

אל: רהמש/461

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 124, חא: 110991, זח: 1940, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בכב

בלמ"ס/מידי

אל: לשכת רוה"מ, מצפ"א

מאת: וושינגטון - לשכת השגריר

השגריר הודיע לקלי לפי בקשת י. בן אהרון, כי הפגישה של מזכיר המדינה עם רוה"מ תתחיל ב- 15:30 ולא ב- 15:00.

לשכת השגריר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא

סססס

א.א.א / חוזם
2. י. בן אהרון

4

אאא, חוזם: 14556
אל: רהמש/717
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 215, תא: 160991, זח: 1718, דח: ר, סג: בל,
כבכ
בלמ"ס / רגיל

16/9/91

אל: מצפ"א
דע: קונכ"לים

מאת: ר' יחידת הקונגרס, וושינגטון

הסנטורים נאן, ראדמן ובראדלי - ערכויות להלוואות
להלן התבטאויות הנ"ל בראיונות סוף השבוע:

1. סם נאן, יו"ר וע' הכוחות המזויינים הנחשב למועמד פוטנציאלי לנשיאות
ב- 1996 ("פגוש את העתונות" בנושא מנוי גייטס), טען כי יחמוך בעמדת
הנשיא כל עוד תתמקד בזיקה להתנחלויות אך לא אם תיגלוש לזיקה לתהליך
השלום.

2. ווארן ראדמן, חבר תת-וע' ההקצבות להגנה, תומך בדחייה למען קידום
תהליך השלום וקורא לישראל וידידיה להגיע להסדר עם הנשיא מחשש לתוצאות
ההתנגשות החזיתית הפוטנציאלית.

3. ביל בראדלי, הנחשב למועמד פוטנציאלי לנשיאות ב- 1996, הביע תמיכה
נחרצת בהענקת הערכויות ללא דחוי.

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב,
הסברה

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 14557
אל: רהמש/701
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 214, חא: 160991, זח: 1717, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
כבכ
שמור / מידי

16/9/91

אל: מצפ"א

דע: שר האוצר, מנכ"ל האוצר, יועץ רה"מ לכלכלה

מאת: ציר קונגרס, ציר כלכלי - וושינגטון

מפגשי דוד ברודט ב"גבעה" - ערבויות להלוואות

1. האחראי על התקציבים, דוד ברודט, הוזמן למפגש עם המחוקקים ע"י מנהיג המיעוט בסנאט רוברט דול, הסנטור דניאל אינוייה ומנהיג המיעוט בכיהנ"ב, בוב מייקל.
2. ברודט נענה לבקשתנו והסכים להאריך ביקורו ל- 3 ימים לקידום המאמץ לאשור תחיקת הערבויות להלוואות.
3. ברודט נפגש עם סנטורים ועוזריהם כדי להשריש מסרים כלכליים, תקציביים ואנושיים שהם כה חיוניים לאשור התחיקה.
4. מסריו של ברודט:
 - היקף ודחיפות הצרכים;
 - ההשפעה הדרמטית של אישור ההלוואות על מעמדה של ישראל בשוק הפיננסי הבינלאומי, על יכולתה לגייס הלוואות נוספות ועל היקף פעילותה הכלכלית;
 - הצמיחה הכלכלית מבטיחה את כושר פרעון החובות של ישראל;
 - המערכת הכלכלית בישראל עוברת תהליך של רפורמה;
 - הערבויות תורמות לאינטרס הכלכלי של ארה"ב.
5. מסרים של ברי השיח:
 - מרבית המפגשים אופינו ע"י שאלות ותשובות בתחומים הנ"ל;
 - בלטה השאיפה לפעול למניעת התנגשות חזיתית עם הממשל;
 - מדי פעם נשמעה האזהרה כי אמנם קימת תמיכה רחבה בתחיקת הערבויות ואמנם אין התלהבות מהחלטת הנשיא לצאת למאבק נחרץ בנדון, אך על ישראל להתכונן (במידה ואכן יגיע הדבר לכלל הצבעה, למורת רוח הממשל) כי היא עלולה להפסיד (בין אם בשלב ההצבעה הראשוני, בין אם בהצבעה על וטו נשיאותי או אף במקרה של הצלחה בשתי מערכות אלו אשר תותיר את הזירה ללא מנצחים ועם נשיא נוטר).

6. מסריו של דוד ברודט התקבלו באמינות הן עקב ההערכה לתפקידו, כמו גם למקצועיותו בהצגת הנחונים (במיוחד במפגשיו האישיים אשר אפיינו את סדר היום, להוציא ארוע יחיד).

7. הארוע המרכזי:

- ארוחת צהריים בהזמנת מנהיגי המיעוט בסנאט ובכיהנ"כ רוברט דול ובוב מייקל והסנטור דניאל אינווייה, יו"ר תת-וע' ההקצבות להגנה;
- 16 סנטורים ו-40 צירי ביה"נ נכחו בארוע (מנהיג המיעוט רוברט דול, הרפובליקנים הבכירים בתת-ועדות ההקצבות לסיוע החוץ והגנה ווע' הכוחות המזויינים, קסטן, סטיבנס, ווארנר, הרפובליקנים פרסלר, קרייג וסימור, ה"מצליף" הרפוב' בביה"נ גינגריץ', יו"ר ווע' המדיניות הרפובליקנית" אדוארדס, סגן יו"ר ה"קוקוס" הרפובליקני, ביל מקקולום, יו"ר ה"קוקוס" הדמוקרטי הויאר, יו"ר ווע' התקציב ותת וע' ההקצבות לסיוע חוץ, פאנטה ואובי ו-33 צירי ביה"נ נוספים).

בנוסף לדו-שיח המקצועי בלטו בארוע התבטאויות צירי ביה"נ דוד אובי (דמוק'-וויסקונסין; יו"ר תת-וע' ההקצבות לסיוע חוץ, עקבי בבקורתו שלפי ישראל) אשר הזהיר את ישראל מעמות עם הנשיא, ציין כי ה"גבעה" והצבור מצפים שישראל תכבד את המערכת הפוליטית האמריקאית, ביקר את מדיניות ההתנחלויות והזהיר מפני כרסום בתמיכה הצבורית בסיוע החוץ (לישראל) והסנטור ג'יימס אקסון (דמוק' - נברסקה) אשר החרה אחרי אובי. השניים זכו לקריאות הסכמה בודדות.

- השגריר עמד על הדחיפות באשור הערכויות תוך ציון תקדים "ועידת אויאן" אשר דחתה הדיון בכעיה היהודית ל-5 שנים; הדגיש נחישות ישראל שלא להתעמת עם הממשל; ציין היכרות ישראל את הצד הערבי, ואת תמיכת ארה"ב בישראל כגורם אשר האיץ את הצטרפות הערבים לתהליך השלום; הזהיר מפני טפוח האשליה כי הערבים יכולים לסחוט ותורים מישראל באמצעות ארה"ב.

8. רשימת המפגשים (בנוסף לארוע המרכזי הנ"ל):

הסנטורים רוברט דול (מנהיג המעוט), ת'ד קוקראן (יו"ר ה"קוקוס" הרפובליקני וחבר וע' ההקצבות) דון ניקלס (יו"ר ה"ועדה המדינית הרפובליקנית" וחבר וע' ההקצבות), טד סטיבנס (הרפובליקני הבכיר בתת-וע' ההקצבות להגנה), קית' בונד (חבר רפובליקני בוע' ההקצבות), דניאל אינווייה והסנטורים היהודים מצנבאום, לאוטנברג לוין ווולסטון; רוברט ריישאבר, ראש משרד התקציבים הקונגרסיונאלי (CBO); בוב הווארד, ראש היחידה הבינל' של ה- OMB; קלייד מארק ואנשיו מ"מרכז המחקר הקונגרסיונאלי"; עוזרי סנטורים מייק סולון (גראם, הקצבות), צ'יפ וואלגרן (דה-קונסיני, הקצבות), ביל לוגאן וצ'רלי פליקנר (דומיניצי, וע' תקציב), צ'רלס סטיבנסון (בנטסן, וע' הממון), פיטר קליבלנד (ראב, וע' החוץ), פול ג'ייקובסון (ראדמאן, וע' ההקצבות), רוקי ריף (נאן, וע' הכוחות המזויינים); סמינר לעוזרים (40) בחסות איפ"ק.

אמנון נוייבך

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, @ (מצב), בנצור, מצפא, רביב, הסברה, אוצר

אאא, חוזם: 14601
אל: רהמש/726
מ-: ני, גר: 2017, חא: 160991, זח: 1500, דח: מ, סג: סו,
בכב
סודי/מידי

א ל: סמנכל צפא -

ד ע: מנהל מצפא -

מאת: ס/קונכל נ'י

גנדון: ערבויות

מפי יהודי המקורב לנשיא בוש ולסובבים אוחו, שבוש אינו מתכוון להרפות ממאמציו להכשיל את תחיקת הערבויות ללא דחיה ושאם יתברר לו שקיימת אפשרות להשגת ה- VETO OVERRIDE, הוא יעלה עוד יותר את הפרופיל הפומבי של התבטאויותיו ויגביר מאמציו בקרב חברי הקונגרס ובציבור.

סופר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 12909

אל: רהמש/644

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 195, חא: 150991, זח: 1653, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

ככב

שמור/מיד

אל: ממ'ד, מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

הנדון: בוש והערבויות/מקבץ התייחסויות

הלן עפ'י דברים שנשמעו במהלך ועידת המכון הושינגטוני למדיניות במזה'ת (13-15 ספט').

1. ריצ'רד האס (13.9) בתשובות לשאלות: חזר קצרות על טיעון הנשיא בדבר הצורך להמנע מויכוח צורב ערב כינוס הועידה. התחמק מחשבה ישירה לשאלה האם בעוד 120 יום יהיו התנאים משופרים יותר.

2. לס אספין, יו"ר ועדת השרותים המזוינים, אמר (14.9 OF THE RECORD) שבקונגרס שורת מבוכה רבה. שואלים מדוע הועלה לפתע נושא הערבויות (בנושא מחלוקת) שעה שהיה ברור שהענין למעשה סגור. הקונגרס חש עצמו תקוע משום שיהא כיוון הצבעתו אשר יהיה- בכל מקרה ישגר סיגנל (לא חיובי):

א. אם יצביעו בעד דיון בערבויות:

1. יפגעו (UNDERCUT) בנשיא .

2. בקונגרס תחושה קשה לפיה יתכן שמולכד (SET UP). עפ'י סברה זו: בוש מניח שההליך איננו עומד להתקדם ממילא. דחיית בקשתו ע'י הקונגרס תאפשר לנשיא, בדיעבד, להאשים את המחוקקים בהכשלת ההתקדמות בתהליך. סברה זו מניחה שמניעי הנשיא נעוצים, בעקרו של דבר, בשיקולי פנים.

ב. אם יצביע בעד בקשת הנשיא:

1. יצור הקונגרס תקדים של ערוב הצבעה בנושאים הומניטריים בתהליך. בעתיד יוכל (הממשל) לחזור ולהשתמש בתקדים זה .

2. ארה"ב תאבד אמינותה כמתווך הוגן (HONEST BROKER)

שלוש עד כאן התבטאויות שנשמעו בפני הפורום. להלן דברים שקלט הח'מ ב'שיחות מסדרון':

א. עפ'י דרך העבודה במחמ'ד, בייקר ידגיש בשיחותיו בירושלים עד כמה נפגע מכך שביקוריו באזור לוו בהקמת התנחלויות. לדעת איש שיחי, הנשיא חותר עתה לעימות עם ממישראל סביב נושא ההתנחלויות. כן עולה מדבריו כי בממשל שורת תחושה שמדיניותו בנושא איננה מנוגדת לדעתם של ישראלים רבים (תחושה

דומה לגבי גישת הממשל קלטתי גם מגורם חוץ ממשלי).

ב. פעיל יהודי אמר (14.9) בעקבות פגישות עם חמישה סנטורים, בהם סטיבנס ואקסון:

א. הצבעה בצל האפשרות של וטו נשיאותו שונה בתכלית מהצבעה ללא אפשרות זו. אין כל בטחון כי סנטורים שהסכימו להצביע בעד דיון בערבויות-יעמדו בהבטחתם גם בשעה שהצבעתם תתפרש לא כהצבעה בעד הערבויות, אלא כהצבעה נגד בקשת הנשיא.

ב. עפ"י ההתבטאויות מירושלים, ראה'מ שמיר נפס כמו שקורא היגר על הנשיא ומנסו לעקפו ולהוכיח שביכולתו להשיג הערבויות למרות בקשת הנשיא, משום שהשפעת ישראל בקונגרס גדולה מזו של בוש. לדעת בן שיחי חשוב שישראל תפריך דושם זה ותנקוט גישה פיסנית CONCILIATORY בשיחות עם בייקר.

מיתי

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם),
אמן, @ (מצב), ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעח, הסברה

סססס