# מדינת ישראל

## משרדי הממשלה

משרד ראש הממשלה

משרד

לשכת ראש הממשלה -

ארה"ב

1/11/1955

המשך בעיר מס' 5

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס - אר

מזהה פיזי: **א - 4 / 4381**

מזהה לוגי: 200 - 43.4/3 מס פריט: 1734831

כתובת: 02-111-01-07-10 15/08/2010

מחלקה

סוג חיק סקורי

26

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

קבלה סברה

דף.....מתוך.....דפים

סווג בטחוני: סודי

דחיפות: מיידי

תאריך וז"מ: נובי 7 1900

מספר: 152

(1)

ממנכ"ל. מנהל מצפ"א. מזא"ר.

<u>מפגשי שולץ במוסקבה - דיווח ראשוני</u>

א. ממקורות בבית הלבן (מכלי שני) כי תאוירה הכללית היתה - כמדווח בתקשורת - בלתי נוחה. הסובייטים לא היו מוכנים כהלכה, גורבצ'וב לא נראה מודע לפרטי הדברים. דבריו היו בבחינת "הצהרות מדיניות" אך לא הסבר מהיכן צומחת המדיניות. לדברי אחד המקורות אמר גורבצ'וב כי ארה"ב אינה נכונה לשלום, שכן כלכלתה מבוססת על התעשיה הבטחונית ואינה רוצה איפוא לחסלה. המנטליות הסובייטית, אומרים המקורות, לא איפשרה לדיונים לנוע בדרך הרצויה.

ב. פלאר מתחמ"ד מסר לפרץ כי נושא יהודי בריה"מ הועלה, אך הסובייטים לא הגיבו לפי שעה.

ג. קובי (מהתרשמות מדיווחים ששמע) סבור שלנושא המזה"ת לא הגיעו בצורה של ממש. הסובייטים מעוניינים בראש ובראשונה במירוק החימוש.

ד. באשר לפסגה, קובי סבור שהתקוות הערביות (ושל אנשים מסויימים אצלנו) לתזוזות סובייטיות ו בעניינים שנוגעים לנו אינן נראות רציניות: "הסובייטים אינם נראים מוכנים לזוז".

ה. הגורמים האידיאולוגיים בממשל עדיין חוששים מיתר "כימיה" בין גורבצ'וב לריגאן שבעדה ישלם מחיר.

ו. ראשי ארגונים דתיים מוזמנים מחר לבית הלבן לארוחת צהריים עם הנשיא, ובהם הרבנים ישראל מילר ושטנלי רבינוביץ. השגריר שוחח עם רבינוביץ והח"מ ופרץ עם מילר. יעלו את נושא יהודי בריה"מ באזני הנשיא.

רובינשטיין

[illegible]

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

מ ס ר ב

דף...2...מתוך...3...דפים

סוג בשחוני.....

דחיפות.....

תאריך וזמן.....

מספר מברק...149...

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טוריקלי מאחר שעל הנשיא יוטל לפרש ההחלטה, מבקש להבהיר עמדת הועדה לפיה חייב להיות ברור שאל כינוס פורום ביג"ל עקסי או אחר אשר אין בו התן-דקה של מו"מ לתתפרש כעונה על הדרישות. המילטון: ההערות נרשמו.

לויין יש שהיו מעדיפים נוסח שונה אך הדחיה תינה תוצאה קונסטרוקטיבית - איש לא רצה בקרב. המלך התבטא באו"ם באומץ, כעת יש לנו 120 יום לראות האם מסוגל להתקדם למו"מ ישיר. אם לא - פאלץ לנתח מחדש המצב למשמעות המילה prompt.

הערה: פולרז לא התבטא.

שבה היב

טובה הרצל

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

3/3 148

November 6, 1985

The Honorable Dante Fascell
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representative
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Dante:

I just wanted to follow up on our meeting last Friday concerning the proposed Jordan arms sale. As you know, at that time I expressed to you and to Larry Smith my own concern that reconsideration of this issue on the Senate floor could injure the consensus we achieved to defer the sale to March 1st. I would like to reiterate that concern now. I have had the occasion to review this matter with officials of the Administration. In my judgment, the Administration has assented only to the language of the current Senate bill and not to any other language.

At the same time, I want to assure you that should there be no negotiations by early next year, a disapproval resolution would be considered by the Foreign Relations Committee in a timely manner. I would oppose parliamentary manuvering that would allow the sale to go forward against the wishes of the majority of the Senate. As I have all along said, it is necessary to form a consensus on this issue in order to address the problem of potential appropriations further along in the process.

I hope that this commitment is reassuring to you and to other members of the House. I look forward to working closely with you in order to ensure that the deeply felt views of both Houses are reflected in the final outcome.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Richard G. Lugar
Senate, Foreign
Relations Committee

cc: The Honorable Steve Solarz
The Honorable Larry Smith

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

מ ר ס ר ת

דף...1...מתוך...2...דפים

סווג בשחוני...סודי

דחיפות...דחופה

תאריך ודיים...7.1.1985 נבי 85

מספר מברק...147

אל :- מצפ"א, אירופה 2, ממ"ד

משיחה עם גומרסאול יועץ בשגרירות הבריטית

1. השגריר ניצל דיווח לחברות נאט"ו ששיחות המזכיר במוסקבה היו קשות ולא הביאו לתזוזה כלשהי בעמדות הצדדים. רוב הזמן הוקדש כצפוי לנושא פרוק הנשק. מסגרת השיחות ותאם ניתן לצאת בהודעת סכום. הבריטי לא יודע באם נושא המזה"ת בפרט או הנושאים האזוריים בכלל הועלו שכן בדיווח שניצ'ה מטר לא הוזכרו. מאידך, פרט מדווח ע"ם שיחה עם פלמר שהשתתף במוסקבה שנושא יהודי ברה"מ כן הועלה בצורה רחבה יחסית אך לדברי פלמר ללא סימן ממשי לתזוזה בצד הסובייטי.

2. התחזית הבריטית ע"פ גומרסאול היא שאכן אין לצפות לתוצאות מעשיות כבר בפגישה הראשונה בין ראשי המעצמות בג'נבה. עם זאת מקוים לדיון סובסטנטיבי בכמה מכלולים הגדרת ה- ABM , נושא הנשק הכימי ו- MBFR . המבחן מהזוית הבריטית יהיה בחכרות אישית בין רייגן וגורבצ'וב ופתיחת ערוץ להדברות בעתיד. הבריטים מכל מקום חוזים תהליך ממושך בין שתי המעצמות שעיקר השפעתו החיובית תהיה בשיחות הרגילות בג'נבה בין ארה"ב וברה"מ.

3. לשאלתי בעניין העמדה האירופאית אמר שבריטניה (וגרמניה) מובילות את האירופאיות לעמדה מאוחדת המבוססת על כך שעל ארה"ב להשיב בחיוב ובצורה ענינית ליוזמה הסובייטית בנושא ה- ARMS CONTROL . תאצ'ר בעקבות השיחות עם גורבצ'וב בלונדון משוכנעת שיש לעשות מאמץ רציני לבחינת הנושא על אף הקשיים הרבים. בריטניה זוקפת לעצמה במידה רבה את תשובתו (החיובית) של רייגן להצעות הסובייטיות.

4. נקודת המוצא הבריטית בקשר ל- SDI מבוססת על הסכם 4 הנקודות שהושג בשיחות בין רייגן לתאצ'ר ב-22.12.84 בוושינגטון : (א) מדיניות ארה"ב והאירופאיות אינה מכוונת להשגת עליונות אלא לשמירת האיזון בהתחשב בהתפתחויות בצד הסובייטי. (ב) ביצוע התכנית הוא נושא למו"מ. (ג) המטרה הכללית היא להגביר ההרתעה. (ד) המו"מ הבינגושי מיועד להשגת בטחון בעזרת צמצום מערכות הנשק ההתקפי ע"י שני הצדדים. זוהי מטרת חידוש המו"מ בנושא צמצום הנשק. סיפר שהתסכם בנושא SDI בין שתי הארצות נוגע ל-2 סעיפים: השתתפות בריטית בשלב המקדים של המחקר ומתן אפשרות לחברות בריטיות להשתתף במכרזים על כך.

[illegible]

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

מ ר ס מ ר

דף...2...מתוך...2...דפים

סווג בטחוני.....

דחיפות.....

תאריך וזמן.....

מספר מברק.....147.....

גורמסאול מסיים תפקידו כאן ויוצא לשגרירות בטוקיו לעסוק ביחסי המסחר בין שתי המדינות.

אלי אבידן

תפוצה : שגריר, ציר, מתני, אבידן, כהן, ארכיב

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בטחון

120 144

מספר סדרה

דף 1 מתוך 3 דפים

סווג בטחוני גלוי

דחיפות רגיל

תאריך ודיים

מס' מברק

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח, רמ"ח קש"ח.

תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום - ה. טסט.-Phors.

Q Do you have any word or any information from Beirut about the American hostages?

MR. REDMAN: We cannot confirm any of the information in the telephone calls regarding the alleged execution of the American hostages. We hold the captors fully responsible for the safety of all the hostages, and call upon them again to release the American and other hostages in Lebanon forthwith.

Q You say you hold the captors responsible. Do you know who they are?

MR. REDMAN: We've been through that one before, Jim. I have no further information for you.

Q They say -- one of the callers, at any rate -- said that the Americans would be executed because indirect negotiations with the United States had reached a dead end. Does the US consider that these indirect talks are at a dead end, or do the contacts continue?

MR. REDMAN: We have been making, and continue to make, all possible efforts to obtain the release of our citizens. By their very nature, these efforts must remain confidential. We always, as you know, have been ready to talk about the safety and release of the hostages.

Q Can we assume that to be ongoing?

MR. REDMAN: As I said, we continue to make all possible efforts on behalf of the hostages. And obviously the efforts are ongoing.

Q Have you been able to analyze why it was that the Soviet diplomats were released, what they did that the United States has not been able to do?

MR. REDMAN: I have no characterization at this point that I can share with you. I'd be happy to go through our files at the time of that and see if, in fact, we had any observations. Anything else?

Q Two questions, please. There is a statement that we hear today from Cairo by Chairman Arafat renouncing what the media reports





are calling "acts of violence outside the territory of Palestine," quote. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. REDMAN: No, we have seen only the initial press reports that you referred to. As a consequence, I'm not in a position to give you any comments at this time.

Q Chuck, you cannot confirm the report? Or you can confirm it, but you have no comment on it?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not sure why I am being asked whether or not I can confirm press reports.

Q You said we've seen the reports.

MR. REDMAN: I've seen press reports.

Q Okay, now is that good enough for you to comment, if you have a comment on such a report?

MR. REDMAN: As I say, these are initial press reports. The information is very fragmentary, and as a consequence, I have no comment to offer you at this point.

Q On the Yurchenko case, can you confirm that Yurchenko was taken to Canada, and tell us whether or not Canadian authorities were made aware of that? He was apparently taken there to meet a woman.

MR. REDMAN: I have no information on that.

Q Can we get back to the Middle East thing again? Secretary of State Shultz was at the White House this morning. Can you tell us if he discussed that situation there, with the President or anyone else?

MR. REDMAN: What situation are you referring to?

Q The status of the American hostages and what we know about them.

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't know whether or not he discussed that.

Q Do you have anything on the (inaudible).

Q On Medvid?

MR. REDMAN: I would indicate once again that this is normal operating procedure.

Q Do you have any report on the trilateral talks that began on Monday between the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Japan on the North Pacific air routes.

MR. REDMAN: I don't believe I can help you on that, Bernie. Let me take a look at one bit of guidance I have. No, I can't help you on that. I don't have anything that would give me the answer to that.

Q Back on the Middle East, there are reports in the Israeli press saying that the military authorities on the two-part(?) territories made TV coverage of demonstrations illegal. I supposed you have commented on previous similar cases. Do you have anythinig on this one?

MR. REDMAN: On this one I have no comment.

Q Are you aware of the report?

MR. REDMAN: I have no comment. I have not seen that report.

Q O.K., that is the answer to the question.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בטחון, ניו-יורק

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| | |
|---|---|
| עדכון | שגרירות |
| דף...1...מתוך...1...דפים | |
| סווג בטחוני.גלגל..... | |
| דחיפות.....רגיל | |
| תאריך וזמן.85Nov7.1100 | |
| מספר מברק..... | |

אל:הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח
דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - THURSDAY - NOVEMBER 7, 1985

THE PRESS REPORTS

West Bank Settlers' Paper Warns Of Civil War

WASH. POST-Claiborne-A published call for Jewish settlers in the West Bank to prepare for civil war in case the Israeli govt. decides to offer Jordan territorial concessions for peace has caused a bitter dispute between many hard-line settlers and the govt. of Peres. Peres, replying to a question in Israel's parliament today, accused the settlers' leadership of trying to "sow panic" and of misleading the public about his intentions.

6 Arab Nations Shifting Stance On Iran-Iraq War

WASH. POST-Dickey-The Arab states of the Persian Gulf edged cautiously away from open support for Iraq and toward a more neutralist position on the Iran-Iraq war today as a summit of their leaders looked with alarm at the recent escalation in the six-year-old conflict.In the their final communique, heads of state from Saudi Arabia and the five other GCC members pledged to continue working toward a peace that would "preserve the rights and legitimate interests" of both Iran and Iraq.

Notorious Nazi In Damascus

WASH. TIMES-(Wires)-Fugitive Nazi Alois Brunner escaped postwar pursuers in a carnival holiday disguise and later advised Syrian secret police in a bombing conspiracy against Jews, a West German magazine reported yesterday.

Sudan, Libya In Military Move

WASH. TIMES-(Wires)-The Sudan and Libya will shortly establish a joint military committee, a follow up to the military cooperation protocol signed in June, the Sudanese newspaper reported yesterday. The report said that among other things, Libya was prepared to train Sudanese helicopter pilots.

Oman's Fresh Ties With Soviets Underscore Its Strategic Weight

WASH. TIMES-Kritzberg- The announcement several weeks ago by Oman that it would establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the current summit in Oman of leaders of the GCC have focused attention of the strategic importance of this hitherto isolated Persian Gulf state and its reclusive leader.

בדל מלבד תפוקות שטחים מתקשטחים פרל

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

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

- שמור -

6 בנובמבר, 1985

אל: מצפ"א
מאת: היועץ לענייני הקונגרס

תיקון אינוייה
למברקנו 012

1. לשם השלמת התמונה, רצ"ב לעיונכם:

(א) מכתב ההתנגדות (מה-31/10) מאת מזכיר המדינה, ג'ורג' שולץ, ליו"ר תת- הועדה לפעולות זרות שליד וועדת ההקצבות, הסנטור בוב קסטן.

(ב) מכתב ההתנגדות (גם מה-31/10) מאת מנהל הלשכה לניהול ולתקציב (OMB), ג'יימס מילר, לסנטור קסטן (עותקים זהים נשלחו לסנטורים סטניס, דול, הטפילד ואינוויה).

כפי שדיווח הלפרין, מכתב שולץ פחות חריף מזה של מילר, אולי בגלל שביל שניידר אינו לגמרי בלתי-מרוצה מהתרגילים של קסטן ואינוייה, שבסופו של דבר עשויים להגדיל את הסכום הכולל שנעמד לרשותו לצרכי סיוע חוץ. נא תשומת הלב גם לנושאים האחרים הנזכרים במכתבים אלה, שכוללים את "תיקון ביידן-קרנסטון" ולשון הצעת החוק בדבר מגעים עם אש"פ.

2. כמו כן רצ"ב:

(א) הדוחות שכינו אנשי איפא"ק על הדיונים בתת הועדה לפעולות זרות (29/10) ובמליאת וועדת ההקצבות (31/10).

(ב) שתי כתבות בנושא, הראשונה מאת ג'ון פלטון, מתוך הדו"ח השבועי לרבעון הקונגרסיונלי מה-2 בנובמבר; והשנייה פרי עטו של ג'יימס ראסל, שהתפרסמה בשבועון "דפנס וויק" מה-4 בנובמבר. נימת כתבה שנייה זו איננה נעימה ולדעתי אין להקל ראש ממנה.

בברכה
יוסף למדן

העתק: לשכת מ/מנכ"ל
לשכת רה"מ
לשכת מנכ"ל בטחון
לשכת השר בלי תיק, מר משה ארנס
הציר והציר הכלכלי, כאן

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

October 31, 1985

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I would like to express my admiration for the outstanding work of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Tuesday when it marked up and reported the FY-86 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill. Due to its efforts, the bill now provides military assistance at funding levels contained in the previously-enacted authorization act. I am concerned, however, about several provisions of the Bill and would like to share those concerns with you before the full committee marks up today.

The proposal to "buy down" the interest rate on Israel's outstanding FMS debt falling due in FY-1986 would require appropriation of sufficient funds to reduce the interest rate from their current weighted average of 11 percent to 5 percent. An annual appropriation of up to $532 million ($470 million is the current CBO estimate of what would be needed) would be required to compensate the Federal Financing Bank for interest earnings foregone under the proposal.

We believe the proposal would set a bad precedent for all FMS country recipients, including Egypt, and could be very costly for the United States. It could set in motion efforts to accord similar treatment to domestic and foreign recipients of U.S. loans.

Also, we must consider the proposal in the context of our overall debt strategy, since the implications for the United States of debt forgiveness for developing countries are potentially staggering. With this end in mind, the Administration, including the Departments of State and Treasury, continues to study the implications of the international debt situation. It is clear that the health of the free world economy will be greatly affected by our ability to arrive at a solution.

The Honorable
Bob Kasten, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,
Committee on Appropriations,
United States Senate.

The USG decision last year to move to an all-grant assistance program for Israel and Egypt was in response to their existing debt burdens. Our action puts an effective cap on Israel's FMS debt service burden to the USG, which in Israel's case will peak in 1993 at roughly $1.3 billion and decline thereafter.

Prime Minister Peres and his colleagues have made considerable progress on Israel's economic stabilization program, though much remains to be done. The Administration has supported this effort by disbursing in early September the first $750 million tranche of our supplemental assistance. On October 30 we disbursed $1.2 billion in our regular FY-86 ESF assistance. Additional balance of payments support through debt forgiveness is therefore not necessary at this time or desirable in terms of sustaining Israel's economic reform efforts.

We also oppose language in the bill that would require ESF assistance to Israel to be at least equal to Israel's debt service payments to the U.S. This requirement restricts the President's ability to determine appropriate U.S. budget levels in the out years and could set a costly precedent in terms of our ESF assistance to other countries, including Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and the Philippines.

Similarly, we oppose the language contained in Section 533 of the Subcommittee reported bill pertaining to contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Our policy concerning negotiations with the PLO remains unchanged and firm: U.S. officials do not engage in substantive contacts or discussions with officials of the PLO. However, as President Reagan stated when he signed the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, we cannot accept any Congressional effort to impose legislative restrictions or directions with respect to the conduct of international negotiations which, under Article II of the Constitution, is a function reserved exclusively to the President.

As for our anti-terrorism efforts, you will recall that after one year of careful study, the Inman Panel on Overseas Security, in which Senator Warren Rudman participated, recommended that operational aspects of the anti-terrorism assistance program be placed in a new Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which will operate under the oversight of the Under Secretary for Management. The Department is now moving quickly to implement the Panel's recommendation. The Subcommittee's

restriction on expenditures by any bureau related to the Under Secretary for Management would make implementation of the Panel's recommendation impossible. Thus, the Administration strongly opposes the Subcommittee's restriction.

Finally, the Administration is concerned about the provision concerning Taiwan's membership in the Asian Development Bank, and in particular the Subcommittee's report language stating that Taiwan's designation within the ADB must remain unaltered. That issue is under discussion in the Bank, and no final decisions have been made. In the meantime, we oppose any language which implies that our funding for the Asian Development Bank should be dependent on Taiwan's decision whether it will choose to continue as a member in full standing in the ADB.

In closing, I should not forget to remind you about our general problem with earmarks which impinge upon our overall flexibility to implement our assistance programs efficiently and effectively in these times of extreme budgetary stringency.

I hope you will take these concerns into consideration as you proceed to mark up the FY-86 Appropriations Bill in full Committee on October 31.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

October 31, 1985

Honorable Bob Kasten
Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations Appropriations
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As the Senate Appropriations Committee prepares to mark up the 1986 Foreign Operations bill, I would like to outline the Administrations's position on the Senate subcommittee mark-up of the bill.

While the Senate Subcommittee has made some significant improvements as compared to the House Committee bill, there are a number of provisions to which the Administration objects. The Senate Subcommittee has adopted numerous earmarks, proposed costly new programs, and violated budget accounting principles. Together, these actions severely limit the President's ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The Administration strongly objects to an unprecendented measure adopted by the subcommittee in Title IV (Export-Import Bank). After amending Export-Import Bank's FY 1985 annual direct loan limitation of $3,865 million to extend it for three years, the bill stipulates that any obligations made under this extended authority be scored as new budget authority only in 1985. This scoring understates the effect of the Subcommittee's action in providing spending authority in 1986 and 1987 by attributing the resources provided it to a past year. This is completely inconsistent with established budget accounting principles. The Administration strongly opposes this deviation from long-accepted budget accounting concepts and urges that the Committee insure that Export-Import Bank's activity is reflected accurately. The Administration continues to support its proposed I-Match program in lieu of continued direct lending.

The Administration also strongly objects to the proposal to "buy down" the interest rate on Israel's outstanding Foreign Military Credit Sales debt. The appropriation of an estimated $470 million to compensate the Federal Financing Bank for interest rates foregone under the proposal would set a costly precedent which could also lead to efforts to accord similar treatment to other loan recipients, domestic and foreign, with potential budgetary implications of many billions. These funds would be provided at

IDENTICAL LETTERS SENT TO HONORABLE JOHN C. STENNIS,
HONORABLE ROBERT DOLE, HONORABLE MARK O. HATFIELD
AND HONORABLE DANIEL K. INOUYE

a time when the United States is providing Israel with $1.5 billion from an extraordinary supplemental appropriation. This is in addition to an ongoing annual assistance program of $3 billion in 1986.

The administration also objects to language contained in section 533 of the subcommittee reported bill pertaining to contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Our policy concerning negotiations with the PLO remains unchanged and firm: U.S. officials do not engage in substantive contacts or discussions with officials of the PLO. However, as President Reagan stated when he signed the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, we cannot accept any congressional effort to impose legislative restrictions or directions with respect to the conduct of international negotiations, which, under Article 2 of the Constitution, is a function reserved exclusively to the President.

The enclosed fact sheet discusses more fully the funding and language provisions that are objectionable to the Administration.

I urge the Senate Committee to remove the undesirable provisions included in the Subcommittee bill.

Sincerely yours,

James C. Miller III
Director

Enclosure

October 31, 1985

# FOREIGN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATION BILL, 1986
## OBJECTIONABLE PROVISIONS

## I. FUNDING LEVELS AND LIMITATIONS

- o Use of accounting devices that will distort scoring of EXIM by changing retroactively the authorization for direct loan obligations from a one year to a three year authorization, and requiring that any obligations made under this new authority be scored as new budget authority for 1985.

- o A "buy down" of the interest rate on Israel's outstanding FMS debt will set a costly precedent for all FMS country recipients.

## II. LANGUAGE PROVISIONS

- o Impose legislative restrictions with respect to the conduct of international negotiations, which, under the Constitution, is a function reserved for the President.

- o Change the obligation procedures for the Military Assistance account will encourage accelerated obligation of funds and result in less time for consultation and review with recipient countries.

- o Limit the efficient management of the foreign aid agencies by earmarking funds for specific offices, setting employment floors and ceilings for AID bureaus, and prohibiting certain offices or bureaus from administering anti-terrorism assistance programs.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Staff
FROM: EK
DATE: October 30, 1985

RE: Senate Foreign Ops Mark Up of FY 86 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill

MEMBERS PRESENT: Chairman Bob Kasten (R-Wisc), Ranking Member Daniel Inouye (D-Ha), Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa), Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH), Senator Bennett Johnston (D-La), Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz), Senator Patirick Leahy (D-Vt).

ATMOSPHERE: Friendly and businesslike

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HIGHLIGHTS

As Congresssional committeees have a tendencey to do, the Foreign Ops Subcommittee spent a great deal of time on relatively minor matters such as earmarking funds for solar energy projects in Cyprus, while larger issues passed with little or no debate. Senator D'Amato increased the AHSA Program to $35 million; Israeli institutions are major beneficiaries of this program.

Senators Kasten and Inouye briefly explained their proposal for "Israeli FMS debt reform" for one year only at a cost of $530 million. Kasten noted that the proposal was "contingent upon agreement by the Budget Committee" to accept the Senators' calculation of unspent outlays for last year's EX Im Bank program. If those calculations are accepted, then the overall foreign aid bill comes under its allocated outlay levels. If they are not accepted, the bill would be $182 million above those levels. Kasten was "optimistic" that it can be worked through and Inouye felt "absolutely comfortable" with their interpretation. If the Budget Commitee does not agree with those re-estimates, Kasten added, the two Senators would "re-evaluate" their position. The only discussion of the amendment came in a question by Senator Rudman who wanted to know the budgetary implications of the additional funds. It passed without further discussion as part of the Chairman's overall mark.

The Subcommittee did spend a great deal of time discussing the terms of aid for Egypt. Senator Specter discovered that Egypt was receiving, under the Kasten mark,

$200 million in the form of a cash transfer, rather than the $100 million the administration had requested. He offered to bring those funds down to the requested level. Specter argued that there was little point in rewarding Egypt and in "handing out bouquets" following the events of recent weeks. He felt the Subcommittee should not be more generous than the Administration in its treatment of Egypt. Senator Johnston argued against the Specter amendment. Chairman Kasten then worked out a compromise whereby Egypt's cash transfer program was reduced to the authorizing level-- $115 million-- and Specter agreed to drop report language on Egypt that he had been interested in introducing.

In addition to approving $3 billion in overall aid levels for Israel, the Subcommittee included language in the bill that would prohibit the Administration from reprogramming funds or using emergency funds for an arms package to Jordan.

MEMO
TO: STAFF
FROM: DAF
DATE: 31 OCT. 1985

RE: Senate Appropriations full cmte. markup of For. Ops. bill
MEMBERS PRESENT: Chmn.Hatfield (R-Oreg.), Stennis (D-Miss.), Kasten (R-Wisc.), Specter (R-Pa.), D'Amato (R-NY), Bumpers (D-Ark.), Sasser (D-Tenn.), Mattingly (R-Ga.), DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Lautenberg (D-NJ), Domenici (R-N.M.), Johnston (D-La.), Chiles (D-Fla.), Proxmire (D-Wisc.), Inouye (D-Hawaii), Stevens (R-Alaska), Harkin (D-Iowa), Leahy (D-Vt .), Cranston (D-Cal.)
PRESS: scarce
ATMOSPHERE: business-like

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HIGHLIGHTS

The committee spent most of its time discussing the Inouye/Kasten Israeli buy down proposal in an atmosphere of bipartisan fear of a growing deficit and the committee's commitment to have all subcommittees meet budget authority.

Chairman Hatfield's opening statements at the mark-up centered on the "scorekeeping" and budget issues at stake in the Inouye amendment. He said it was appropriate to be having this debate on Halloween, because "frankly there are some things in this bill that scare me". He had received letters from the State Dept., the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and from Senate Budget Committee Chairman Domenici and Ranking Member Chiles arguing against the Inouye/Kasten proposal. Hatfield insisted that the committee "sustain its basic principles and stay within budget authority and outlay".

House Appropriations chairman Whitten (D-Miss.) wants to extend the existing CR one week past the November 14 deadline, and Senate Appropriations chairman Hatfield feels a three week extension is more in order.

Subcommittee Chairman Kasten argued that the Export-Import Bank had spent only $672 million of the $3.865 billion that was appropriated for the Bank in FY85. Therefore, Kasten argued $700 million of that unused loan authority should be carried over and scored on this year's account. The argument was basically over accounting principles.

Senator Inouye reinforced Kasten's arguments on the basis of the costs Israel has had to absorb as a result of giving back the Sinai to Egypt (loss of oil fields and two airbases) and strengthening its airforce after the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. Inouye blames part of Israel's economic

crisis on the U.S. and insists that "his amendment is in the best interests of the United States". He claims that the Senate Budget and Appropriations committees do not agree on the actual budget authority involved. "This is only a one year measure...it won't solve the debt problem but it's worth the try," commented Inouye.

Sen. Lautenberg supported the amendment stating that "it is not just good judgment but also good business that's in our best interests...The U.S. is dependent on Israel for security in the Middle East."

Sen. Chiles then strongly objected to the amendment by referring to his upcoming conference on the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction amendment. "It feels that I'm in two different worlds here in the committee and there discussing the debt-ceiling...How much money is there available to spend? What is the ceiling ? If it's good for the goose, it's good for the game and all subcommittees can do the same and exceed their budget authority...This bill is budget busting !"

Chairman Hatfield and ranking member Sen. Stennis agreed with Sen. Chiles' assessment. Sen. Stennis summed up the argument stating that "we're in a bad predicament with the financial affairs of this country domestically (ie. farmers). We gotta start showing fiscal responsibility somewhere."

Hatfield was concerned that the bill would be subject to a 7% across-the-board cut on the Senate floor because it was so far above its budget allocations. Should that pass, as all such amendments have so far, other important programs would be drastically reduced in order to accomodate the increases for Israel. Kasten agreed that should such an amendment be introduced, he would introduce a substitute bill that would address those concerns. The bill was then reported out by the Appropriation's committee with the Inouye/Kasten proposal contained in it.

[redacted]

Report No. 85-966 F

Congressional Research Service
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Washington, D.C. 20540

POLICY ALERT

# CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE FOR CONSIDERING LEGISLATION OPPOSING ARMS SALES

Richard F. Grimmett
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
October 4, 1985

## CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE FOR CONSIDERING LEGISLATION OPPOSING ARMS SALES

President Reagan notified Congress on September 27, 1985, that he intends to make new arms sales to Jordan. The administration will be free to proceed with the sales unless Congress passes legislation -- and, if necessary, overides a Presidential veto -- prohibiting or modifying those sales. As legislation to block or modify these sales does seem likely to be introduced, however, a review of the procedures for considering such legislation is timely.

This report finds:

--That under current law Congress must overcome two fundamental obstacles to block or modify effectively a presidential sale of military equipment. It must pass legislation working its will on the sale and delivery of the equipment to the recipient country, and it must be capable of overriding a Presidential veto of this legislation.

--That Congress is free to pass legislation to block or modify an arms sale <u>at any time</u> up to the point of delivery of the items involved.

--That despite explicit procedures set out in law for expedited Senate consideration of arms sale resolutions, it is unclear whether such procedures would apply to a <u>joint</u> resolution introduced to block or modify a proposed sale.

### CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS UNDER CURRENT LAW

Congressional ability to block arms sales is legally more constrained today than it was following passage of legislation in the mid-1970s giving it the authority to prohibit an arms sale by passage of a <u>concurrent</u> resolution. This device's principal appeal was that a simple majority vote in both Houses could stop a specific arms sale, since a <u>concurrent</u> resolution is not subject to the Presidential veto.

The Supreme Court decisions in INS v. Chadha and related cases in 1983 changed this situation. Subsequent to the Court's rulings, the use of the concurrent resolution provisions in the Arms Export Control Act to block an executive branch arms sale decision is generally considered to be unconstitutional. 1/ Moreover, because the applicable congressional procedures, particularly those in the Senate, relate expressly and exclusively to a constitutionally suspect device, their use, without modification, to block a proposed arms sale by a constitutionally acceptable vehicle--such as a joint resolution --seems subject to parliamentary challenge.

In present circumstances then, Congress can block or modify a proposed sale of military equipment only if it passes regular legislation prohibiting or modifying the sale and delivery of the equipment to the recipient country. In all likelihood, it must be capable of overriding a Presidential veto of this legislation. In practical terms, this means that Congress ultimately must be able to muster a two-thirds majority of those present and voting in both Houses to ensure that it can impose its view on the President.

Congress can pass a law to block or modify an arms sale at any time whether or not it has received a statutory or "formal" executive branch proposal to make a particular sale or series of sales. Congressional use of its lawmaking power regarding arms sales is not constrained by the reporting requirements of the Arms Export Control Act. Congress could, for example, pass legislation to

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1/ Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); and U.S. Senate v. Federal Trade Commission, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). The Court's handling of the above cases indicates that both concurrent and one-House disapproval resolutions are unconstitutional even though none of these cases dealt specifically with the disapproval provisions in the Arms Export Control Act.

prohibit or modify the implementation of an arms sale proposal well after the 30 calendar day statutory reporting period had elapsed should it choose to do so--including up to the point of delivery.

There are important practical advantages, however, to prohibiting or modifying a sale, if Congress wishes to do so, prior to the date when the formal contract with the foreign government is signed--which presumably could occur shortly after the 30 day period. These advantages include: (1) limiting political damage to bilateral relations that could result from signing a sales contract and later nullifying it with a new law; (2) avoiding financial liabilities the United States Government might face for breaking a valid sales contract.

The legislative vehicle designed to prohibit or modify a specific arms sale can take a variety of forms, ranging from a rider to any appropriation or authorization bill to a freestanding joint resolution. The only essential features that the vehicle must have are (1) that it is legislation presented to the President for his signature or veto and (2) that it contains an express restriction on the sale and delivery of military equipment (whether specific items or general categories) to a specific country or countries.

## TRADITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL SCHEDULE FOR REVIEW

The traditional sequence of events for the congressional review of an arms sale proposal has been the submission by the Defense Department of a preliminary or "informal" classified notification of a prospective major arms sale 20 calendar days before the executive branch took further action. It has been the practice for such "informal" notifications to be made for arms sale

cases that would have to be formally notified to Congress under the provisions of section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. 2/

Under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment for $14 million or more, defense articles or services of $50 million or more, or design and construction services for $200 million or more. (In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the sale.) Commercially licensed arms sales also must be formally notified to Congress 30 calendar days before the export license is issued if they involve the sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more or defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more (section 36(c) AECA). 3/

It should be emphasized that after Congress receives a statutory notification required under sections 36(b) or 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act and 30 calendar days elapse without Congress having legally blocked the sale, the executive branch is free to proceed with the sales process. This fact does not mean necessarily that the executive branch and the prospective arms purchaser will sign a sales contract and that the items will be transferred on the 31st day

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2/ On February 18, 1976, the Defense Department made a nonstatutory commitment to give Congress these preliminary classified notifications. On July 20, 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that despite the decisions of the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha and related cases and the Administration's long-held belief that the legislative veto provisions in the Arms Export Control Act were unconstitutional, the Administration would continue to report to Congress "under the express statutory provisions" and the "informal prenotification" U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The U.S. Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto. Hearings, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., July 19, 20, and 21, 1983. Washington, G.P.O., 1983. p. 69.

3/ The text of section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) is attached in appendix 1. The text of section 36(c) of the AECA is in appendix 3.

day the statutory notification of the proposal has been made. It would, however, be legal to do so at that time.

CONGRESSIONAL USE OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION PROCESS

As indicated earlier, Congress has a variety of legislative options it can use to block or modify an arms sale. To show how this process might work, one of these options, the use of a joint resolution of disapproval, will be examined in detail. While this illustration presumes the use of the joint resolution after Congress has received a formal notification under section 36(b) of the AECA, it is clear that a properly drafted law could block or modify an arms sale transaction at any time--including before a formal notification was submitted or after the 30 day statutory notification period had expired (so long as the items have not been delivered).

After receiving a statutory 36(b) notification from the executive branch, opponents of the arms sale would introduce joint resolutions in the House and Senate drafted so as to forbid or modify by law the sale and delivery of the items specified in the formal sale notification(s) submitted to the Congress. Under the Arms Export Control Act, the formal notification is to be submitted to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Speaker of the House. The Speaker has routinely referred such notifications to the House Foreign Affairs Committee as the committee of jurisdiction. The next step would be committee hearings in both Houses on the arms sale proposal.

If a majority of the House and Senate committees supported the joint resolutions of disapproval, they would report such resolutions to their respective chambers in accordance with the governing rules of the House and the Senate. Then efforts would be made to seek floor consideration of these measures.

Senate Floor Procedures

At this point, it is important to take note of procedures crafted to expedite the consideration of arms sales resolutions of disapproval and some problems that may exist in the aftermath of INS v. Chadha and related cases. Since 1976, section 36(b)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act has stipulated that consideration of any resolution of disapproval in the Senate under section 36(b)(1) of the AECA shall be "in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976" (P.L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729). 4/ The purpose of section 601(b) was to authorize rules to facilitate timely consideration of any resolution of disapproval in the Senate. (See text of section 601 in appendix 2.) These rules set forth in section 601(b) supersede the standing rules of the Senate and among other things do the following:

1. Give the committee with jurisdiction over the resolution of disapproval [the Senate Foreign Relations Committee] 10 calendar days from the date the formal notification of the arms sale was referred to it to report back to the Senate its recommendation on any resolution.

2. Make it in order for a Senator favoring a disapproval resolution to move to discharge the committee from further consideration of the matter for failing to report it to the Senate by the end of 10 calendar days.

3. Make the discharge motion privileged, limit debate on it to one hour, and preclude efforts to amend or to reconsider the vote on such a motion.

4. Make the motion to consider a resolution of disapproval privileged and preclude efforts to amend or to reconsider the vote on such motion.

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4/ Since 1980, this stipulation has also applied to resolutions of disapproval in the Senate relating to commercially licensed arms sales under section 36(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act. See section 36(c) (3)(A) of the AECA in appendix 3.

5. Limit the overall time for debate on the resolution of disapproval to 10 hours and preclude efforts to amend or recommit the resolution of disapproval.

6. Limit the time (one hour) to be used in connection with any debatable motion or appeal; provide that a motion to further limit debate on a resolution of disapproval, debatable motion or appeal is not debatable.

Despite the explicit procedures set out in section 601(b) for Senate consideration of arms sale resolutions, it is unclear whether such procedures would apply to a joint resolution introduced to block a proposed sale. Section 601(a) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 stipulates that the provisions of 601(b) are to be applied to any resolution "required by law" (e.g., the Arms Export Control Act) to be considered in the Senate in accordance with its provisions. (See text of section 601(a) in appendix 2.) Section 36(b) of the AECA, however, expressly refers to the use of a concurrent resolution to disapprove an arms sale and not a joint resolution. Yet the Chadha case and related cases require legislation (e.g., a joint resolution) to be presented to the President for it to be constitutionally valid.

Because section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act does not "require by law" or envision the use of a joint resolution for disapproval of an arms sale proposal, it is possible that a Senator could make a point of order against the use of the expedited procedures of section 601(b) for consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval. Should the presiding officer of the Senate uphold the point of order, and the Senate sustain his ruling, then the joint resolution of disapproval would have the same status as any other piece of legislation and be subject to all motions and rules governing consideration of regular legislation in the Senate. This could result in notable delays in the consideration of this legislation.

The Senate is constitutionally empowered to amend its rules or to effect rules changes at any time. The fact that an existing rule is in section 601 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is not an obstacle to changing it by Senate action alone. For example, by unanimous consent or by suspending the rules the Senate could apply the provisions of section 601(b) to consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.

House Floor Procedures

The House of Representatives is directed by sections 36(b)(3) and 36(c)(3)(B) of the Arms Export Control Act to consider a "concurrent resolution" for disapproval of an arms sale reported to it by the House committee of jurisdiction as "highly privileged." Generally, this means that the resolution would be given precedence over all other questions of the House except the motion to adjourn. Here again, because concurrent resolutions cannot reverse authorized actions by executive branch officials, it is possible that a point of order could be raised successfully against consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval as "highly privileged." But given the powers of the House Rules Committee to set the framework for floor consideration of legislation, this prospect need not create the problem for timely consideration of such a resolution that might be the case in the Senate. Upon receiving a request for a rule to govern consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval, the House Rules Committee could set a time limit for debate, exclude any amendments to, and waive any points of order against the resolution. If the rule it submitted to the House were adopted, it would govern the manner in which the legislation would be considered.

Final Congressional Action

Presuming that all procedural problems could be overcome and a joint resolution of disapproval passed by both the House and the Senate, a further consideration should be noted. If the versions of the House and Senate joint resolutions were different, a conference committee would have to be appointed to reconcile them and a conference report sent back to the two chambers for final approval. If both the House and Senate approved the conference report, the legislation could then be sent to the President. Once this legislation reached the President, he might well veto it in a timely manner. Congress would then have to muster a two-thirds majority in both Houses to override the veto and impose its position on the President.

PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER OF CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

This example of the process of considering a joint resolution of disapproval illustrates the difficulties the Congress may face if it wishes to block by legislation a proposed arms sale within the 30 calendar day formal review period set out in current law. Yet it is important to note that the President also has the legal authority to waive the 30 day statutory review period set out in the Arms Export Control Act.

If the President states in the formal notification to Congress under sections 36(b)(1) or 36(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act that "an emergency exists" which requires the sale (or export license approval) to be made immediately "in the national security interest of the United States," he is free to proceed with the sale without further delay. He must provide Congress at the time of this notification a "detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the emergency circumstances" which necessitated his

action and a "discussion of the national security interests involved." (See sections 36(b)(1) and 36(c)(1) of the AECA in appendixes 1 and 3.) 5/

CONCLUSION

In the absence of a strong majority of support in both Houses of Congress for legislation to block or modify a prospective arms sale, the practical and procedural obstacles to passing such a law--whether a freestanding provision or one within the existing framework of the AECA--are great. Even if the Congress can pass the requisite legislation to work its will on an arms sale, the President need only veto it and secure the support of one-third plus one of the members of either the Senate or the House to have his veto sustained and permit him to make the sale.

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5/ Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, also allows the President to waive provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under either the AECA or FAA in order to make up to $750 million in cash arms sales and up to $250 million in credits available under the AECA during each fiscal year. Not more than $50 million in credits may be made available to any single country in a fiscal year unless it is a "victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression." To waive the provisions of these Acts related to arms sales, the President must determine and notify the Congress in writing that it is "vital" to the "national security interests" of the United States to do so. Before exercising the authority granted in section 614(a), the President must "consult with" and "provide a written policy justification to" the House Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committees and the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees. The New York Times reported in October 1981 that President Reagan was considering using this waiver authority when he faced considerable opposition in Congress to his proposed sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. New York Times, Oct. 16, 1981.

## APPENDIX 1

### ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT -- Section 36(b)

(b)(1) In the case of any letter of offer to sell any defense articles or services under this Act for $50,000,000 or more,[30] any design and construction services for $200,000,000 or more,[31] or any major defense equipment for $14,000,000 or more,[32] before such letter of offer is issued, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a numbered certification with respect to such offer to sell containing the information specified in

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[30] Sec. 604(a) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329; 90 Stat. 766) redesignated par. (8) as par. (9) and inserted a new par. (8) immediately after par. (7). Sec. 604(c) of the same Act stated that par. (8) would "take effect sixty days after the date of enactment of this Act." (i.e. Aug. 29, 1976)

Par. (9), as redesignated by this amendment, was struck out by Sec. 19(a)(4) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-92; 93 Stat. 709). It formerly read as follows:

"(9) an analysis and description of the services being performed by officers and employees of the United States Government under section 21(a) of this Act, including the number of personnel so employed."

[31] Par. (9) was added by sec. 105(c) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-533; 94 Stat. 3134)

[32] Par. (10), as added by sec. 109(f) of Public Law 96-533, was repealed by sec. 109(d)(2) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-113; 95 Stat. 1326). Par. (10) had required information concerning leases of property valued at over $1,000,000 to a foreign government. Leases of defense articles are now covered under ch. 6 of this Act (page 230)

[30] This figure was increased from $25,000,000 to $50,000,000 by sec. 101 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-113; 95 Stat. 1320)

[31] The words "any design and construction services for $200,000,000 or more," were added by sec. 105(d)(1) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-533; 94 Stat. 3134)

[32] This figure was increased from $7,000,000 to $14,000,000 by sec. 101 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-113; 95 Stat. 1320)

clauses (i) through (iv) of subsection (a), or (in the case of a sale of design and construction services) the information specified in clauses (A) through (D) of paragraph (9) of subsection (a),[82] and a description, containing the information specified in paragraph (8) of subsection (a), of any contribution, gift, commission, or fee paid or offered or agreed to be paid in order to solicit, promote, or otherwise to secure such letter of offer. Such numbered certifications shall also contain an item, classified if necessary, identifying the sensitivity of technology contained in the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services[84] proposed to be sold.[85] In addition, the President shall, upon the request of such committee or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, transmit promptly to both such committees a statement setting forth, to the extent specified in such request—

(A) a detailed description of the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services[86] to be offered, including a brief description of the capabilities of any defense article to be offered;

(B) an estimate of the number of officers and employees of the United States Government and of United States civilian contract personnel expected to be needed in such country to carry out the proposed sale;

(C) the name of each contractor expected to provide the defense article, defense service, or design and construction services[84] proposed to be sold (if known on the date of transmittal of such statement);

(D)[87] an evaluation, prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, of the manner, if any, in which the proposed sale would—

(i) contribute to an arms race;

(ii) increase the possibility of an outbreak or escalation of conflict;

(iii) prejudice the negotiation of any arms controls; or

(iv) adversely affect the arms control policy of the United States;

(E) the reasons why the foreign country or international organization to which the sale is proposed to be made needs the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services[84] which are the subject of such sale and a description of how such country or organization intends to use such de-

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[82] The words to this point beginning with ", or (in the case of * * *" were added by sec. 105(d)(2)(A) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-533; 94 Stat. 3134).

[84] The reference to design and construction services was added by sec. 105(d) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-533; 94 Stat. 3134).

[85] This sentence was added by sec. 20(b) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-92; 93 Stat. 710).

[86] The reference to design and construction service was added by sec. 105(d)(2)(C)(ii) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-533; 94 Stat. 3134).

[87] Subpar. (D) was amended and restated by sec. 21(1) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-484; 92 Stat. 741). It formerly read as follows: "(D) an analysis of the arms control impact pertinent to such offer to sell, prepared in consultation with the Secretary of Defense."

fense articles, defense services, or design and construction services;[94]

(F) an analysis by the President of the impact of the proposed sale on the military stocks and the military preparedness of the United States;

(G) the reasons why the proposed sale is in the national interest of the United States;

(H) an analysis by the President of the impact of the proposed sale on the military capabilities of the foreign country or international organization to which such sale would be made;

(I) an analysis by the President of how the proposed sale would affect the relative military strengths of countries in the region to which the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services[94] which are the subject of such sale would be delivered and whether other countries in the region have comparable kinds and amounts of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services;[94]

(J) an estimate of the levels of trained personnel and maintenance facilities of the foreign country or international organization to which the sale would be made which are needed and available to utilize effectively the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services[94] proposed to be sold;

(K) an analysis of the extent to which comparable kinds and amounts of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services[94] are available from other countries;

(L) an analysis of the impact of the proposed sale on United States relations with the countries in the region to which the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services[94] which are the subject of such sale would be delivered;

(M) a detailed description of any agreement proposed to be entered into by the United States for the purchase or acquisition by the United States of defense articles, defense services, design and construction services[94] or defense equipment, or other articles, services, or equipment of the foreign country or international organization in connection with, or as consideration for, such letter of offer, including an analysis of the impact of such proposed agreement upon United States business concerns which might otherwise have provided such articles, services, or equipment to the United States, an estimate of the costs to be incurred by the United States in connection with such agreement compared with costs which would otherwise have been incurred, an estimate of the economic impact and unemployment which would result from entering into such proposed agreement, and an analysis of whether such costs and such domestic economic impact justify entering into such proposed agreement;

(N)[98] the projected delivery dates of the defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services[99] to be offered;

(O)[98] a detailed description of weapons and levels of munitions that may be required as support for the proposed sale; and

(P)[98] an analysis of the relationship of the proposed sale to projected procurements of the same item.

A certification transmitted pursuant to this subsection shall be unclassified, except that the information specified in clause (ii) and the details of the description specified in clause (iii) of subsection (a) may be classified if the public disclosure thereof would be clearly detrimental to the security of the United States. The letter of offer shall not be issued, with respect to a proposed sale to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, any member country of such Organization, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand, if the Congress, within fifteen calendar days after receiving such certification, or with respect to a proposed sale to any other country or organization, if the Congress within thirty calendar days after receiving such certification,[100] adopts a concurrent resolution stating that it objects to the proposed sale, unless the President states in his certification that an emergency exists which requires such sale in the national security interests of the United States. If the President states in his certification that an emergency exists which requires the proposed sale in the national security interest of the United States, thus waiving the congressional review requirements of this subsection, he shall set forth in the certification a detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the emergency circumstances which necessitate the immediate issuance of the letter of offer and a discussion of the national security interests involved.[101]

(2) Any such resolution shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, except that for purposes of consideration of any resolution with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, any member country of such Organization, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand, it shall be in order in the Senate to move to discharge a committee to which such resolution was referred if such committee has not reported such resolution at the end of five calendar days after its introduction.[102]

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[98] Subpars (N), (O) and (P) were added by sec. 21(a) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Public Law 95-384, 92 Stat. 741.

[99] The reference to defense services or design and construction services was added by sec. 103(d)(2)(C)(ii) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Public Law 96-533, 94 Stat. 3135.

[100] The words in this sentence to this point beginning with "with respect to a proposed sale . . ." were inserted in lieu of the words "if the Congress, within thirty calendar days after receiving such certification," by sec. 102(b)(1) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-113, 95 Stat. 1529).

[101] This sentence was added by sec. 1(b)(1) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979, Public Law 96-92, 93 Stat. 700.

[102] The words to this point beginning with "except that for purposes of . . ." were added by sec. 102(b)(2) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Public Law 97-113, 95 Stat. 1529.

(3) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and adoption of concurrent resolutions under this subsection, a motion to proceed to the consideration of any such resolution after it has been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as highly privileged in the House of Representatives.

(4)[163] In addition to the other information required to be contained in a certification submitted to the Congress under this subsection, each such certification shall cite any quarterly report submitted pursuant to section 28 of this Act which listed a price and availability estimate, or a request for the issuance of a letter of offer, which was a basis for the proposed sale which is the subject of such certification.

## APPENDIX 2

### INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976 -- Section 601

#### EXPEDITED PROCEDURE IN THE SENATE

Sec. 601. (a)(1) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall apply with respect to the consideration in the Senate of any resolution required by law to be considered in accordance with such provisions.

(2) Any such law shall—

(A) state whether the term "resolution" as used in subsection (b) of this section, means, for the purposes of such law—

(i) a joint resolution; or

(ii) a resolution of either House of Congress;

(iii) a concurrent resolution; and

(B) specify the certification to which such resolution shall apply.

(b)(1) For purposes of any such law, the continuity of a session of Congress is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die, and the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the period indicated.

(2) Paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection are enacted—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of the Senate, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the Senate in the case of resolutions described by subsection (a)(1) of this section; and they supersede other rules of the Senate only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the Senate to change such rules at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the Senate.

(3)(A) If the committee of the Senate to which has been referred a resolution relating to a certification has not reported such resolution at the end of ten calendar days after its introduction, not counting any day which is excluded under paragraph (1) of this subsection, it is in order to move either to discharge the committee from further consideration of the resolution or to discharge the committee from further consideration of any other resolution introduced with respect to the same certification which has been referred to the committee, except that no motion to discharge shall be in order after the committee has reported a resolution with respect to the same certification.

(B) A motion to discharge under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph may be made only by a Senator favoring the resolution, is privileged, and debate thereon shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution, the time to be divided equally between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(4)(A) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the consideration of a resolution shall be privileged. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

(B) Debate in the Senate on a resolution, and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.

(C) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with a resolution shall be limited to not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the resolution, except that in the event the manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time under their control on the passage of a resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or appeal.

(D) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a resolution, debatable motion, or appeal is not debatable. No amendment to, or motion to recommit, a resolution is in order in the Senate.

## APPENDIX 3

### ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT -- Section 36(c)

(c)(1)[104] In the case of an application by a person (other than with regard to a sale under section 21 or section 22 of this Act) for a license for the export of any major defense equipment sold under a contract in the amount of $14,000,000[95] or more or of defense articles or defense services sold under a contract in the amount of $50,000,000[96] or more,[106] before issuing such license the President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an unclassified numbered certification with respect to such application specifying (A) the foreign country or international organization to which such export will be made, (B) the dollar amount of the items to be exported, and (C) a description of the items to be exported. In addition, the President shall, upon the request of such committee or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, transmit promptly to both such committees a statement setting forth, to the extent specified in such request a description of the capabilities of the items to be exported, an estimate of the total number of United States personnel expected to be needed in the foreign country concerned in connection with the items to be exported and an analysis of the arms control impact pertinent to such application, prepared in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. A certification transmitted pursuant to this subsection shall be unclassified, except that the information specified in clause (B) and the details of the description specified in clause (C) may be classified if the public disclosure thereof would be clearly detrimental to the security of the United States.

(2)[104] Unless the President states in his certification that an emergency exists which requires the proposed export in the national security interests of the United States, a license for export described in paragraph (1)—

(A) shall not be issued until at least 30 calendar days after the Congress receives such certification; and

(B) shall not be issued then if the Congress, within such 30-day period, adopts a concurrent resolution stating that it ob-

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[104] Par. (4) was added by sec. 16(b) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-92; 93 Stat. 708).

[105] Sec. 107(b) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-533; 94 Stat. 3136) added the paragraph designation "(1)", made several technical changes to par. (1), and added new pars. (2) and (3).

[106] The words "not less than 30 days" which formerly appeared at this point, were struck out by sec. 107(b)(1) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-533; 94 Stat. 3136). This 30-day prior notification requirement is now included in par. (2) of subsec. (c).

jects to the proposed export, except that this subparagraph does not apply with respect to a license issued for an export to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, any member country of that Organization, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand.

If the President states in his certification that an emergency exists which requires the proposed export in the national security interests of the United States, thus waiving the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, he shall set forth in the certification a detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the emergency circumstances which necessitate the immediate issuance of the export license and a discussion of the national security interests involved.

(3)[104] (A) Any resolution under this subsection shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

— need to be changed to include joint resolution

(B) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and adoption of concurrent resolutions under this subsection, a motion to proceed to the consideration of any such resolution after it has been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as highly privileged in the House of Representatives. — OK but need to change CZB

SJRES228

October 29, 1985*

TO: CHAIRMAN FASCELL AND CHAIRMAN HAMILTON

FROM: BILL MOHRMAN

SUBJECT: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF S.J.RES. 228 RELATING TO THE PROPOSED SALES OF ARMS TO JORDAN

(1) What does S.J.Res. 228 do? The resolution (copy attached) which the Senate passed on October 24, 1985, would prohibit the sales of advanced weapons systems to Jordan prior to March 1, 1986, unless ``direct and meaningful peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan are underway''. In other words, the sales could not be made during the next four months unless peace negotiations are underway.

(2) Are there any conditions placed on the sales as of March 1, 1986? No. In the absence of future congressional action the sales can go forward at any time on or after March 1, 1986. Under existing law, the President has general authority to sell military equipment to foreign countries in the absence of a congressionally enacted prohibition or limitation. U.S. financing for the sale, however, would require congressional approval (except to the extent that it would be possible to reprogram funds for this purpose).

(3) Who would decide whether direct and meaningful peace negotiations are underway? S.J.Res. 228 does not expressly address this issue, but implicitly the decision is to be made

by the executive branch since it is the executive branch which must implement the law.

(4) <u>What does ``direct and meaningful peace negotiations are underway'' mean?</u> These terms are not defined in S.J.Res. 228, and they do not have any special legal significance. There is some discussion of this issue during the Senate debate. See especially Sen. Lugar's comments on page S13987 of the Cong. Record of 10/24/85: ``Clearly, the qualifying aspect of this resolution is that an arms sale could progress if face-to-face negotiations occur; negotiations that are substantive, meaningful; that deal with peace; that move away from a status of nonbelligerency [sic] between Jordan and Israel to a question of peace.'' (See also Sen. Metzenbaum's comments on page S13988: ``We are not just saying that we are talking about getting together for direct negotiations, having a meeting, and saying `hello' and `goodbye'. This resolution goes beyond that. It talks about the fact that those negotiations shall be underway; and `underway' means that the parties will actually be involved in meaningful peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan.'').

(5) <u>Can Congress review and/or overturn a determination that peace negotiations were underway?</u> S.J.Res. 228 does not provide for formal notice to the Congress of such a determination, nor does it provide for any formal period for congressional review. The Congress, of course, does retain

its regular oversight perogatives and could pass legislation to stop the sales notwithstanding an executive branch decision that direct and meaningful peace negotiations were underway.

(6) Is resubmission of the proposed sales to the Congress required? No. [Sen. Bradley asserted that resubmission was required, but there is nothing in S.J.Res. 228 to support this, and the remarks of other Senators, especially Sen. Lugar in response to a question from Sen. Levin (p. S13993), make clear that resubmission is not required.]

(7) Is the President required to provide any notice to the Congress before the sales go forward? No. The only applicable notice requirement is the 30 day advance notice requirement under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, which will be satisfied 30 days after October 21.

(8) From a legal and procedural standpoint, would the enactment of S.J.Res. 228 limit what the Congress can do in the future with regard to these sales? No.

(9) Would future congressional action regarding the sales have to occur before March 1, 1986? From a legal perspective, no. The executive branch would not necessarily consumate the sales on March 1 in any case; but even after the sales are consumated, the Congress could pass legislation voiding the sales and/or prohibiting deliveries pursuant to the sales or placing conditions or limitations on the sales and

deliveries. Enactment of such legislation might, however, cause the U.S. Government to incur certain expenses, such as contract cancellation penalties, which would not be incurred if Congress acted before the signing of procurement contracts to implement the sales.

(10) Does S.J.Res. 228 ``approve'' or ``disapprove'' the sales? This is a question of perception more than a question of law. By its terms, the resolution does not expressly either ``approve'' or ``disapprove'' the sales. The effect of the resolution is to prohibit the sales temporarily but conditionally. In that sense, the resolution can be seen as a disapproval of the sales, although not a complete disapproval. On the other hand, one could interpret congressional passage of a law which does not totally prohibit the sales as implicit congressional approval of the sales. The Senate debate, however, makes clear that the purpose of the resolution is to delay the sales, while preserving Congress' option of taking further action regarding the sales at a later time if it deems appropriate.

(11) Which sales are subject to S.J.Res. 228?: The administration has transmitted notice of three proposed sales to Jordan: aircraft, missiles, and BRADLEY vehicles. S.J.Res. 228 does not cite specific transmittal numbers as is the usual practice. It does mention specifically aircraft and air defense systems. There may be some ambiguity, however,

regarding whether S.J.Res. 228 covers the BRADLEY sale; the issue depends on whether the BRADLEY is considered to be an ``advanced weapon system''. I am not aware of any definition of that term. During the Senate debate there is not specific mention of the BRADLEY sale and the emphasis was on the sales of aircraft and missiles. However, that debate makes fairly clear that the general intent was to stop ``the sales'', with no indication that the BRADLEY sale was to be exempted from the requirements of S.J.Res. 228. Even clear legislative history of intent to cover the BRADLEY sale, however, would not necessarily bring that sale under the terms of the resolution unless one can reasonably consider the BRADLEY to be an ``advanced weapon system''.

(12) <u>What does S.J. Res. 228 mean when it says no letter of offer shall be ``valid'', etc.?</u>: It is not clear why the term `valid'' was used in this context. The issue was not mentioned in the Senate debate. I do not recall ever having seen ``valid'' used before with respect to a letter of offer. More commonly we talk about a letter of offer being ``issued'' (see, for example, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and the Kennedy and Fascell resolutions on the Jordan arms sales (S.J.Res. 223 and H.J.Res. 428). Issuance refers to the formal transmittal of the proposed sales contract to the purchasing country for its acceptance. Use of the term ``valid'' suggests that although a letter of

offer may be issued, it can not have operative effect. I can think of only two possible reasons for limiting the ``validity'', rather than the ``issuance'', of a letter of offer: first, to take care of the possibility that a letter of offer might be issued before the enactment of S.J.Res. 228; and second, to allow a letter of offer to be issued before March 1, 1986, or before peace negotiations are underway, but to limit when the sale can become effective notwithstanding the issuance of the letter of offer.

3280 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

** יוצא סודי

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אל: אוסלו, נר: 17, מ : המשרד
דת: מ, סג: ס, מא: 061185, חת: 1300

סודי/מידי

השגרירה.

להלן מתוך שיחת שהח פיקרינג (היום ).
פיקרינג אמר בי שמעו שמובירות אום שוקלת הרחבת פרישת אוניפיל לג'נין ולאורך הבמחון בהוסיפו בי הם חשים שיש פחות מקריות בין צדל לאוניפיל-ושבאורך הנורבגי המצב השתפר מאוד.הה מוסיף אלמנט חיובי גם אם לא יוכל למנוע לחלוטין פעולות מתאבדים.שהח אמר בי נסיונות באלה נמשכים
עצתנו למדינות המרביבות אוניפיל לקיים קשר בלשהו גם בלתי פורמלי עם צדל כמו שיש להן עם אמאל ובוחות מקומיים.הן יכולות לקיים קשר עם הגנרל לאחד שהוא איש טוב ורציונלי.לא יקשה להגיע למודוס ויונדי עמו בדי למנוע אי הבנות והתנגשויות מיותרות.ההולנדים בבר אינם עם ויש שטעות לגבי הנורבגים שבדעתם לעוזב.שהח סיפר שהתרשם בשיחותיו עם שהח סקנדינביה באו"ם שאלה דואגים דאגת עלום חייליהם אך אין להם הוושה של תרומה לשלום ואינם רואים פתרון בעתיד.האירים מעוניינים להישאר.הצרפתים ישארו משום ויקתם ההסטורית ללבנון.ממנכל העיד שהנורבגים שויים להיות מוחורים בשל מחסור בב"א בצבא נורגיה.פיקרינג אמר שאם יוכלו הנורבגים לסייע הוא מקווה שיישארו.מקובלת עליו עצת שהח להתקשרות אוניפיל עם לאחד.

מצצא-אירופה 2

על: שהח,דהם,שהבא,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,אירא,
אירב,מצצא,ארנכ2,שיאון,לוברני,מות"ם

3280 משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר
** יצא סודי
**
**
**

אל: אוסלו, נר: 17, מ : המשרד
רח: מ, 20: ס, תא: 061185, חז: 1300

סודי/מיוחד

הנדרדה.

להלן מסוך שיחת שהח פיקרינג (היום ).
פיקרינג אמר כי שמעו שמכירות אום שוקלת הרחבת פריסת אוניפיל לגינין ולאורר הבטחון בהוסיפו כי הם חשים שיש פחות סקריות בין צדל לאוניפיל-ושבאורר הנורבגי המצב השתפר מאוד.זה מוסיף אלמנט חיובי גם אם לא יובל למנוע לחלוטין פעולות מתאבדים.שהח אמר כי נסיונות באלה נמשכים
עצתנו למרינות הסרביבות אוניפיל לקיים קשר כלשהו גם בכתי פורמלי עם צדל כמו שיש להן עם אמאל ובוחות סקומיים.הן יכולות לקיים קשר עם הנגדל לאחד שהוא איש טוב ורציונלי.לא יקשה להגיע למודוס ויונדי עמו בדי למנוע אי הבנות והתנגשויות מיותרות.ההולנדים כבר אינם עם ויש שמועות לגבי הנורבגים שבדעתם לעזוב.שהח סיפר שהתרשם בשיחותיו עם שהח סקנדינביה באומ' שאלה דואגים דאגת שלום חייליהם אך אין להם תחושה של תרומה לשלום ואינם רואים פתרון בעתיד.האירים מעוניינים להישאר.הצרפתים ישארו משום ויקמם ההסטורית לכבנון.ממנכל העיר שהנורבגים עשויים להיות מוחורים בשל מחסור בכ"א בצבא נורגיה.פיקרינג אמר שאם יובלו הנורבגים לטייע הוא מקווה שיישארו.מקובלת עליו עצת שהח להתקשרות אוניפיל עם לאחד.

מצפא-אירופה 2

גפ: שהח,רהם,שהבם,מנכל,ממנכל,סמנכל,ממד,רם,אמן,אירא,
אירב,מצפא,ארבכ2,שיאון,לוברני,מותים

# official text

DATE: 11/07/85

REAGAN SAYS SDI WOULD SHELTER ALLIES, ADVERSARIES (4600)
(Transcript, 11/6 interview with four news services)

Washington -- President Reagan says he wants his strategic defense system to shelter both allies and adversaries from attack by nuclear missiles, and he would hold an international conference to work out the details.

In an interview with four news services November 6, the president said he hoped development of such a system would lead to the elimination of offensive nuclear missiles. The White House made available a transcript of the interview November 7.

Following is the transcript of the interview:

(begin text)

QUESTION: Secretary Shultz did give rather a bleak news conference in Moscow and seemed to have struck out, coming back empty-handed. That may or may not be true. Maybe you're getting private information otherwise. But is it so, and do you think that the Soviets are being very hardline? And what are your maximum and minimum goals for this summit? What do you really think you can get out of it?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I haven't tried to pin it down to success or failure or terms of that kind. We're going there to try and basically eliminate if we can, or certainly reduce the distrust between our two countries. We have to live in the world together. And it is that distrust that causes the problems and causes the situation with regard to arms negotiations.

As I cited to our Russian friends when they were in here the other day that statement -- it isn't mine, I wish it were, but a statement that I read in the press the other day that summed it up so succinctly¿ and that is that nations do not distrust each other because they're armed, they are armed because they distrust each other.

Q: Well, do you think you can get anywhere near a semblance of an arms agreement? Will you negotiate "Star Wars" at all? Any aspects?

A: Well, I will be presenting the same thing that I told those others. My concept of the Strategic Defense System has been one that, if and when we finally achieve what our goal is, and that is a weapon that is effective against incoming missiles -- not a weapon, a system that's effective against incoming weapons -- missiles -- then rather than add to the distrust in the world and appear to be seeking the potential for a first strike by rushing to implement, my concept has always been that we sit down with the other nuclear powers, with our allies and our adversaries, and see if we cannot use that weapon to bring about the elimination of -- or that defensive system for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

And that, certainly, I will discuss there and try to impress upon them how firmly we believe in this. I don't think the negotiation of facts and figures about which weapon and how many and numbers and so forth in weaponry should take place at the summit. I think that belongs where we have already put it, and that is with the arms control negotiators that are already in Geneva. That's their kind of figuring that should go on. We shouldn't be doing that with all of

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the things we have to discuss at the other -- at the summit meeting.

At that meeting, there are a number of things -- some of them I hinted at in the speech in the U.N.¿ regional situation -- in other words, try to, as I say, eliminate the distrust that exists between us.

Q: Well, that's the maximum goal then?

A: Yes, because the other things would automatically follow.

Q: Mr. President, if I could pursue the SDI a little bit more. Considering what you told the Soviet journalists when they were here last week, there seems to be some discrepancy between your comments to them and your comments today about what the conditions for deployment would be. Could you explain that to us now?

A: Yes, because I have already explained that to our allies at the United Nations, and this was the first misunderstanding that I have seen about it. I went through the transcript of that interview, and I mentioned it three or four times through there in the transcript. And I think it was someone just jumped to a false conclusion when they suggested that I was giving a veto to the Soviets over this¿ that, in other words, if that thing that I've just described to you, that meeting took place and we couldn't get satisfaction, that I would say, "Well, then, we can't deploy this defensive system," I couldn't find any place where that was anything but an erroneous interpretation of what I'd been saying.

Obviously, if this took place, we had the weapon -- I keep using that term¿ it's a defensive system -- we had a defensive system and we could not get agreement on their part to eliminate the nuclear weapons, we would have done our best and, no, we would go ahead with deployment. But even though, as I say, that would then open us up to the charge of achieving the capacity for a first strike. We don't want that. We want to eliminate things of that kind. And that's why we -- frankly, I think that any nation offered this under those circumstances that I've described would see the value of going forward. Remember that the Soviet Union has already stated its wish that nuclear weapons could be done away with.

Q: You say today that you would go ahead with deployment if you had the system and there weren't international agreement on mutual deployment. The other day you said that you would go ahead -- that deployment would be only on condition of what you call disarmament. This misunderstanding, it seems to me, on whoever's part has caused a lot of confusion.

Does that disrupt your negotiations with Gorbachev, and what can he expect when you have said this to his journalists and now you are telling us something different?

A: No, I'm not telling something different. I'm saying that reading that transcript of what I told to the journalists -- someone has jumped to an erroneous conclusion. I don't find anything in there -- maybe it's because I have talked about this with so many individuals, as I've said, at the U.N. and all -- that maybe having more of an understanding of it, I see it more clearly than some others might.

But I have not -- and I have had others now that look at this transcript and they don't get that interpretation, that I'm giving anyone a veto over this defensive system.

Q: May I ask you, Mr. President, it seems that in the recent weeks you are more -- you have been more flexible in the way you have talked about the SDI. You have not said that it could not be a bargaining chip, as you used to say it very often before. Is there -- are you more flexible? Do you want your message to be seen as more flexible? Is there room for compromise?

A: This is the point where flexibility, I think, is not involved. The demands that have been made on us already with regard to arms control are that we stop the research and any effort to create such a defensive system. And I have said that there is no way that we will give that up -- that this means too much to the world and to the cause of peace if it should be possible to have an effective defensive system.

In discussions here in the office I have likened it many times to the gas mask -- 1925, when all the nations of the world after World War I and the horror of poison gas in that war. When it was over all

the nations got together in Geneva and ruled out the use of poison gas. But we all had gas masks, and no one did away with their gas masks. Well, this in a sense is how I see what this could be. The defense that would -- it would be so practical and sensible for any country, including the Soviet Union, to say, why go on building and maintaining and modernizing these horrible weapons of destruction if there is something that can be implemented that makes them useless?

Q: Mr. President, Secretary Shultz held a press conference in Iceland today on his way back to report to you and with him was a senior official -- not identified, but you can guess who it is -- who held a background briefing for reporters and he said that the impression that the American delegation got during the recent -- this weekend's talks in Moscow was that Mr. Gorbachev was concerned that U.S. policy was influenced by a small circle of anti-Soviet extremists. Now, if Mr. Gorbachev said that to you personally, how would you respond, Mr. President?

A: I would respond with the truth as clearly as I could enunciate it. This is one of the things that I talk about -- feel with regard to the distrust -- that the Soviet Union tends to be distrustful and suspicious that things that are presented to them are, perhaps, concealing some ulterior motive. And I want to discuss with him the record -- our own record, that if this were true -- that if the United States was guided by some desire to one day assault the Soviet Union, why didn't we do it when we were the most powerful military nation on Earth right after World War II. Our military was at its height; we had not had the great losses in the millions that the other nations had had that had been there longer, our industry was intact -- we hadn't been bombed to rubble as all the rest had, and we were the only ones with the ultimate weapon -- the nuclear weapon. We could have dictated the whole world and we didn't. We set out to help the whole world.

And the proof of it is, today, that our erstwhile enemies -- and there could never have been more hatred in the world than there was between the enemies of World War II and ourselves -- they are today our staunchest allies. And, yet, here is a former ally -- there are Americans buried in the soil of the Soviet Union that fought side-by-side against the same enemies -- and, so I think we can prove by the record that any fair-minded person would have to see that we did not have expansionism in mind. We never took an inch of territory as a result of the victory of World War II or of World War I, for that matter. And, on the other hand, to point out to him why we are concerned about them -- that their expansionist policy is very evident. The gunfire hasn't stopped for a moment in Afghanistan. We could name all the other spots where they or their surrogate troops are in there. So, this is my hope, that I can convince him, if he's a reasonable man -- and there's every indication that he is -- would see that if we both want peace, there'll be peace.

Q: Mr. President, your remark that you think Mr. Gorbachev is a reasonable man brings me to another question. I assume that you have been doing a lot of reading about Mr. Gorbachev, the man, and Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, and that perhaps you've even seen some video tapes of him in action. What sort of an opponent do you expect to face across that table at Geneva?

A: Well, I would think that any Soviet leader, who reaches the office that he holds, would be a formidable opponent. If he does, subscribe to the party philosophy, he wouldn't be in that position.

Q: Mr. President, this Yurchenko case is very puzzling, baffling to everyone.

A: Yes.

Q: Is it baffling to you?

A: Yes.

Q: And, also -- yes? Have you ordered the -- an investigation of the CIA handling? And have you gone even further to order an investigation of handling by any agency of defectors per se?

A: Right now, the Justice Department is investigating the INF and their --and their --

Q: Right.

A: -- or INS, I mean, and their handling of the Medvid incident down in New Orleans to see just what led to all of that.

I have to say that this -- coming as they do together -- these three particular incidents, you can't rule out the possibility that this might have been a deliberate ploy or maneuver. Here you have

three separate individuals in three different parts of the world who defected and then recanted and, of their own free will, said they wanted to return to the Soviet Union. And in every one of the three incidents, we insisted on and did secure the last word -- the final meeting with each one of them -- to make sure that they understood completely that they were welcome here -- that we would provide safety and sanctuary for them here in the United States -- and in every incident, that was repudiated and we had to say that, of their own free will, as far as we could see --

Q: So --

A: -- and for whatever reason, they wanted to go back.

Q: So were we had by Yurchenko? Was he not a true defector? And is this a sort of a disinformation plant to disrupt --

A: Well, as I say, you can't -- there's no way that you can prove that that isn't so. On the other hand, there's no way you can prove that it is. So you just have to accept that we did our best in view of their expressed desires, and then they did what other defectors before them have not done, and they -- oh, I think here and there, there's been one or two that went back. So you can't rule out personal desire, homesickness, whatever it might be.

I'm sure that, as has been suggested by someone discussing this, that people who go through that must be under quite some strain and it must be a traumatic experience to step forth from the land of your birth and denounce it and say you want to live someplace else, in another country. But there's no way to establish this.

Either they honestly did feel they wanted to defect and then changed their minds, or the possibility is there that this could have been a deliberate ploy.

Q: It sounds like you're leaning toward the latter, that there has been something very systematic --

A: No, I just -- maybe I spent more time explaining why I didn't think you could rule that out but --

Q: But you said at the outset that there seemed to be a deliberate --

A: No, no. I said there is this suspicion that has been voiced by more people than me --

Q: But you don't agree with the --

A: -- and all I have to say is we just have to live with it because there's no way we can prove or disprove it.

Q: Do you think that makes the information that he did give the CIA worthless or perhaps even -- you know, that it was misinformation?

A: Well, actually, the information that he provided was not anything new or sensational. It was pretty much information already known to the CIA.

Q: Oh, really? So that would tend to support your thought, that perhaps this whole thing was cooked.

A: If you want to take it that way. I'm not going to comment on that one way or the other.

Q: Would you say you're perplexed by it?

A: Yes. I think anyone is perplexed by this. I think it's awfully easy for any American to be perplexed by anyone that could live in the United States and would prefer to live in Russia.

Q: Mr. President, if I may --

MR. SPEAKES: You'd better tell them one more time that there's no way to tell either way. You said it about four times, but the answer -- the questions keep coming back.

A: Yes.

Q: We got it.

Q: If I may come back to the -- to the summit preparation. What do you expect from the summit on the human rights issue? You have been very cautious on the human rights issue in the Soviet Union. Is it because you sense that there might be something positive coming out and you don't want to --

A: I have always felt that there are some subjects that should remain in confidence between the leaders discussing them. In this world of public life and politics, if you try to negotiate on the front page -- some items -- you have almost put the other fellow in a corner where he can't give in because he would appear in the eyes of his own people as if he's taking orders from an outside government.

And the greatest success that, I think, has been had in this particular area has been with predecessors of mine who have discussed these subjects privately and quietly with --

Q: Are you encouraged by Yelena Bonner being allowed to have medical treatment in the West or do you think it's just something to diffuse the issue before the summit?

A: I don't know, but I welcome it. It's long overdue, and we're pleased to see it happen. But what I'm -- let me point out also, this does not mean that human rights will not be a subject for discussion. They will be very much so. They're very important to the people of our country and in their view of a relationship with the Soviet Union.

But I don't think that it is profitable to put things of this kind out in public where any change in policy would be viewed as a succumbing to another power.

Q: Mr. President, talking of spies, some months ago -- I forget the date -- in one of your Saturday radio speeches, you said there were too many Soviet and East European diplomats in this country and too many spies among them.

A: Yes.

Q: And you said, in effect or perhaps precisely, that you were going to cut these numbers down. Could you brief us on what has happened since then, sir?

A: Well, we're having discussions about that and reducing numbers. We recognize that when we do anything of this kind it's -- there's going to be retaliation. But what we're trying to do is to simply arrive at agreements that will be mutual and with regard to reductions of staff and numbers in each other's countries.

Q: So when you say you're having discussions, you mean with the Soviet Union and East European countries --

A: Yes, this has --

Q: -- or within this administration?

A: -- this has been done at a ministerial level.

Q: Oh, I see.

Q: Is Weinberger trying to sabotage the summit? And are you trying to overthrow Qaddafi?

A: Let me simply say no. Secretary Weinberger isn't trying to sabotage anything of the kind. He's been most helpful in all of the meetings that we have had on this. And all of the talk that we unhappily read about feuds and so forth -- again, this is a distortion or misinterpretation of my desire for what I have always called Cabinet-type government, where I want all views to be frankly expressed, because I can then make the decision better if I have all those viewpoints. And the fact that we have debate and discussion in that regard, in that way, should not be construed as feuds and battles and so forth. I want all sides.

Q: You want it -- it's okay in the public? It's okay in public and on the front page?

A: Not the way it's been portrayed on the front page. It has been portrayed --

Q: You've been quoted.

A: Well, but it had been portrayed not in the spirit in which I just spoke of it. It has been portrayed as animus and anger and so forth. And it isn't that kind. It's the devil-advocate type of thin where I hear all sides.

Now with regard to Qaddafi, let's just say we don't have a very personal relationship.

Q: What? Were you going to try to overthrow him indirectly?

A: No, we -- no comment on --

Q: No comment on are you trying to overthrow him?

A: No. I never like to talk about anything that might be doing -- being done in the name of intelligence.

Q: Mr. President, your health is vital to the long-range success of any progress that you make at the summit. Why won't you permit the release of the test results from your periodic examinations to reassure the public that there is no recurrence of the cancer?

A: Well, for heaven's sakes. First of all, that term "the recurrence of cancer" -- you've given me an opportunity to give an answer I've wanted to give for some time.

I'm deeply appreciative of the concern of people and the -- all the letters of condolence and good wishes and so forth that I have

received. But I feel the people have been doing this under a little misapprehension. The whole thing has been portrayed as that I was the sufferer of cancer. I had cancer. And then an operation took place, and now I have had a good recovery. No, the truth of the matter was, I had a polyp. It is -- there are two kinds of polyps in the intestines, and one kind, if allowed to go on eventually becomes cancerous and then would spread.

I had a polyp removed. It is true that it, within itself, had begun to develop a few cancer cells, but it was still a self-contained polyp. The only way that type of polyp can be removed is by major surgery. So in reality the only real illness that I suffered in any way and at any time was the incision. And my healing was not a healing of cancer, mine was a healing of a ten or 12 inch incision. So, I'm delighted to get this out and on the table before you.

Now, the -- yes, they gave me a schedule and they said we will want to do this down the line periodically and then it gets farther and farther apart as time goes on. It would mainly be an examination periodically to see if any further polyps of that kind -- if one could start, I suppose another could start. And, then, if so, you'd want to get rid of them.

The examinations that I have had are also spaced out -- like this last time -- are part of the kind of annual physical that I've had for many years and long before I came here. Where, once I used to go into the hospital for a few days and have all the whole physical done, well, now we do it in bits and parts. So this last one, mainly I went in and they simply examined the incision -- wanted to see how the healing was coming -- and then I had some X-rays of the lungs which had nothing to do with the operation, but that are a normal part of the just general physical that I have. Now, there will be another trip there coming up in the near future and that will be the first trip for a look at the intestines for the possibility of polyps.

And, so, when the doctors come out and when the doctors -- they say the same thing to me that has been said to you -- maybe I'll have them say it to you instead of me repeating it. When they stand there in front of me and say, "You've had 100 percent recovery. Everything is just fine. You're as healthy as you could possibly be," I go out and tell you that and you think I'm covering something up.

Q: I just would suggest that, while I'm not suggesting, we don't believe you, it would be reassuring to a lot of people to see the test results and know what's being done and how it's being done and --

A: Well, the test result, in cases of this kind, is simply to tell you what happened. For example, if they do the examination to see -- to check if there's another polyp. Well, the only test is they say to you -- there wasn't one or there is one. And -- whichever way it comes out. So. it's a case of verbalizing -- there isn't any report to be given you that -- oh, incidentally, I also had the blood check taken this time also with the X-rays. But that was done here a few days before, not at Bethesda.

They take a little blood, see what it is and -- And that would be done -- this would have been done, now, even without any physical examination. They always do this prior to a trip abroad, make sure that they've -- they know what's there and in the event of an accident or anything, they know what could be needed.

Q: -- Mr. President, we were talking about Qaddafi, but do you think the U.S. should give some aid to the rebels in Angola, as it is doing in Nicaragua or in Afghanistan?

A: We believe -- we were embarked on a plan of trying to negotiate the Cubans out of Angola and the independence of Namibia and this also involved that in that there would be a reconciliation between UNITA, the Savimbi forces and the present government, which, more or less, was installed by the presence of the Cuban troops.

Now, with the elimination of the Clark Amendment, we are still most supportive of that, that we believe a settlement in Angola should involve UNITA and the people of that country have a choice in making a decision as to the government they wanted to have. And so all of this is going forward.

Q: So there is no -- you don't envision your covert aid to rebels in Angola, because of the Clark Amendment, as you mentioned, having been --

A: No, I think there are some areas where we could be of help to them.

Q: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

A: All right.

Q: Well, how do you feel on your -- the anniversary of your reelection?

A: I feel just fine. I wish the Congress would have a sharp memory of it as they're discussing tax reform and some other things.

Q: Do you have any particular goals for the next three years?

A: Oh, yes, and you know most of them. Tax reform, a program that will set us, even longer than three years, on a course for the elimination of the deficit, then the achievement of a balanced budget amendment, so that once and for all we'll be free of this. And I've had one tucked away in the back of my mind for a long time, that once we can do that, then I would like to see us start on the reduction of the national debt.

Q: Well, then, would you veto the House version of the Gramm-Rudman as it stands now?

A: Now, you know, I never comment on whether I will or will not veto until it --

Q: Except for tax increases.

A: Well, that's, a general -- that's a general thing. This is talking about a particular piece of legislation. I'm going to wait and see what it is.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

(end text)

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News Summary November 6, 1985

Columns

ND-Anderson "Khadafy Likely to be Toppled, Insiders Warn" Khadafy is likely to be toppled by a coup within a year. He has so far survived 22 attempts to assassinate or unseat him. Yet the CIA now rates Khadafy "very vunlnerable." His military support is no longer insured.

Press Reports

West Bank Settlers

NYT-Thomas Freidman-The leadership of Israel's Jewish settlers threatened a campaign of civil disobdience in the West Bank if Peres tries to negotiate any exchange of territory for peace with Jordan. They said they would view any Gov't that tried to give back land as illegal and deal with it accordingly. Meanwhile, an Orthodox Jewish man in his 60's was stabbed in the back as he walked through Damascus Gate in Jerusalem.

Village Voice-11/12 Robert Freidman "Inside the Jewish Terrorist Underground" (Cover Story) About 200 settlers, 65% of whom are of American origin, have moved to Hebron seeking a messianic kingdom. They have threatened to secure and defend the West Bank at any cost, even by taking up arms against the Israeli Gov't. One American settler says that he and his friends deliberately provoke the Arabs into violence hoping that the army will respond by driving them out. As a woman settler showed Freidman around Hebron they spotted a small Arab boy selling combs on a spot where a Jewish settler had been murdered in 1979 by Arabs. The woman slapped the boy across tha face and ordered him to go away. Arab men looked on helplessly, knowing if they intervened, they would be punished by the Israeli Army. "The Arabs are worse than the niagers, but not by much," said this woman Halka. Although members of the two largest terrorist groups in Israel have been jailed, they still recieve wide spread support from the Israeli public and leading military men and politicians. In fact, this support helped Kahane's dramatic transformation. Andy Green, who moved to Israel from the US in 1975, states that the land on the West Bank belongs to the Jews, and he says that the Bible proves

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it. "That's why I see no reason to sit down and talk to the Arabs about comneting claims. Whoever is stonger will get the land," says Green. Green is a member of Kach. Green became Kahane's chief aide and went to prison for acts perpetraed by TNT. A number of attacks on Arabs by Gush terrorists are discussed, as is Begin's response to them. Begin apparently was indifferent to the terrorist groups but Shamir feared the lawlessness would spill over into Israel itself. But after the arrests 18 members of the Gush underground, Shamir began to press for clemency. Many Israelis believe that the brutal occupation of the West Bank is more to blame for recent terrorist attacks on Jews than is the PLO. Thanks to Geula Cohen and her cohorts, the West Bank is fast on its way to becoming "part of the Zionist enterprise." And Green is heartened by the rise of the religious right in Israel. "I'd rather be at war with the Arabs than at peace with them. Let's face it, The Arabs say Tel Aviv is theirs too."

WV-Freidman-"The American Connection" One of the best kept secrets in America's ostensibly liberal Jewish community is the tremendous support it has given to Gush Emunim and Kach. Reuben Mattus, of Haagen-Dazs ice-cream, Yehuda Schwatz and Mexican Arms dealer Marcus Katz, have raised hundreds of thousands of dollars. However, The US Treasuary is pouring hundreds of millions of US taxpayers dollars into building West Bank settlements, through the Israeli Gov't.

Arafat Meets Mubarak

NYT-special-Mubarak met for more than 2 hours with Arafat in an effort to ease strained relations.

Ex-Israeli Guilty in Exports Case

NYT-A Manhattan business executives, Yuri Geifman, has pleaded guilty to exporting electronics equipment with possible military uses to North Korea and the Soviet Union. Geifman, age 34, is a Canadian citizen.

OPEC

NYT-AP-OPEC has not changed its policy on oil prices, but new

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practices may be considered.

Jordanian Arms Deal-Magazine Article

New Republic 11/18-Hirsh Goodman "The Shorter Wick". The Administration still believes that Hussein must be supplied with US weapons if he pursues peace. There are many contradictions in the US arms policy. The US policy rests on 242 and 338. But the more sophisticated and destructive weapons systems Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt obtain, the more Israel must hesitate to make strategic concessions. There is a general consensus in Israel that the West Bank is strategically vital for Israel's security. Israeli strategists must seriously consider the possibility of Hussein's downfall. Nor can the hostility between Jordan and Syria be taken for granted. Political alliances in the Mideast are as unstable as the regimes that make them. Israel has fully exploited its military potential. The Arabs have hardly touched theirs. Moreover, Israel has been forced to cut its defense budget. Qualitative erosion has occured at every level. But no matter how victorious the IDF may be on the field, it can not win a war. Each war undermines the economy, encourages emigration and wipes out another generation of youth. Arms transfers have to be conistent with strategic goals. The contradictions, the double talk, and the half-truths used to justify more weapons sales in an area waiting to explode, have to be seen for what they are.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

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אל :- מנהל פר"ן

דע :- מנכ"ל משהב"ט, אל"מ אבירן - כאן.

SDI

לשלכם בנדון.

1. הנספחות הצבאית , המטפלת בנושא, בדקה בלשכתו של ראש פרויקט ה- SDI (עם דר' מרטין האחראי לקשרי חוץ) הבדיקה העלתה כי אין יסוד לדרישה המוזכרת במאמר. נמסר כי גם ממדינות אחרות לא דרשו זאת.

2. עם זאת היו כנראה "רעשים" בקשר לדיבורים על אחד הפרוייקטים, ואולי "נתקע" משהו.

3. כפלעצמי הפלחי תשומת לב, באמצעות הנספחות, לדברי רה"מ באזני הנשיא ומזכיר ההגנה בעת ביקורו כאן, שהיוו בהחלט "אימוץ" השתתפותנו בפרוייקט.

4. יתכן כי ביקור שהב"ט יהווה הזדמנות נאותה , לפי הצורך, להתיחסות לנדון על כל ההיבטים.

רובינשטיין

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| סוג | סדר |
| דף | 1 מתוך 1 דפים |
| סווג בטחוני | סודי |
| דחיפות | מיידי |
| תאריך וז"ח | 6 נוב' 1820 85 |
| מספר | מברק |

אל :- מצפ"א

דע :- ממנכ"ל

בית הנבחרים : נשק לירדן - לשלנו 96

1. בתום יום של לובי אינטנסיבי ע"י איפא"ק (בגבוי מצדנו במדה שנשאלנו) הודיע דנטה פאסל לבלומפילד שהדמוקרטים בוועדת החוץ התכנסו לפנות ערב וחזרו לתסריט המקורי, דהיינו אימוץ נוסח ההחלטה שהתקבלה בסנט ב-24.10 והעברת הצעת ההחלטה של אי הסכמה חזרת לשולחן הספיקר בבית הנבחרים, כך שניתן יהיה להביאה להצבעה אם וכאשר יראו צורך בכך.

2. עתה, ישיבת ה-MARK-UP שבוטלה אתמול תתקיים מחר (7) אחה"צ.

יוסף נמיר

למדן

שים רק שהמלל בשל בלבול בלבד בלבד רק אם
2 3 1 3 1 1 1 4 ואולם 4

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

מיון מבריק

דף...1...מתוך...3...דפים

סווג בטחוני: קנדי.....

דחיפות.... לא"ב.....

תאריך ודש"מ 13.6.1630 '85

מספר מברק.....

131

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אל :- מצפ"א, ממ"ד

מפגישה עם סודארת'

1. לבנון

שאלתיו לפשר ההצעות החדשות של אמין ג'ומיל ביחס לדרום השיב שעד כמה שידוע לו היוזמה באה מצד המזכ"ל וז'אן קלוד איימה בעקבות השיחות שהיה להם עם אמין בניו יורק, אגב כך גם איש שרוב הפרטים שהובאו בשבוע שעבר בניו יורק טיימס ברובם נכונים שם וכנראה שהודלפו בידי הלבנונים. הערתי תשומת לבו (מברק מנהל המרכז מ-4.11) שמשיחת הריסון עולה שהיוזמה באה דוקא מצד אמין עצמו. סודארת' השיב שלא ער אך יתכן שמזכירות האו"ם PICKED UP מדברי אמין על כך שהיה רוצה לחזור למסגרת נאקורה ולהזיז את נושא הדרום לאחר ההסכם החדש שהושג בדמשק מכולל את הכחיל בחסות סוריה. סיבה נוספת שציין היא העצבנות השוררת בין המדינות התורמות בעיקר הנורבגים, האירים וההולנדים מהמצב הבטחוני למרות הרגיעה היחסית . הדאגה היא לפוטנציאל המסוכן בטווח הארוך. היריבויות בין השיעים - אמ"ל מול חזבאללה. הנורבגים טוענים שמבצעים פעולות שיטור בין אמ"ל והחזבאללה אך לא בקרב צד"ל ונוצר איפוא מצב בלתי מאוזן. גורמי האו"ם מגדירים את המצב סביב ג'יזין וצידון כנפיץ. הסורים אפשר שדוחפים מצדם בנושא הדרום. אין לו מידע מפורש על כך ומכל מקום ממשיכים לדבר על הכבוש הישראלי ושאם לא ימצא פתרון - ישתרר מצב שיאופיין ע"י מכונית חופת. הדגיש שגם האמריקאים מודאגים לטווח ארוך מהמצב שם והפעילות השיעית הגוברת. עם זאת הדגיש שהם עדיין טרם פנו אליהם בנדון. חזרתי על מדיניותנו בנושא הדרום (ברוח המברקים השונים) ושאם הכוונה לחזור על נוסחת נאקורה בלבוש חדש כביכול הרי שתועלת מרובה לא תצא מכך. המצב בדרום הדגשתי, עם כל זה שקיים שם פוטנציאל שלילי, אינו גרוע מזה השורר בטריפולי ובחלקים אחרים והוא חלק מתמונת המצב הכל ליה הקודרת בלבנון. אדרבא, ערב פינוי צה"ל התחזיות הילכו אימים עלינו מהתוהו ובוהו שישתרר באיזור על רקע המשך המצאות יחידות מצה"ל ובעיקר עקב נוכחות צד"ל. דבר כזה לא קרה בהתחשב בנסיבות שם. צריך לקחת את המצב הנוכחי של המצאות צד"ל כגורם מליצה ולנסות להדבר עמו במקום לשגות בתסריטים בלתי מציאותיים. סודארת' השיב שמדיניות ארה"ב היא להבטיח את גבול הצפון אך גם JEFFERSON המצב בשטח. איימה ככל שידוע לו עשוי לצאת לאזור כבר בסוף השבוע ובודאי נלמד ממנו יותר.

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[illegible]

שגרירות ישראל • וושינגטון

אל:

**מברק נכנס**

דף 2.... מתוך 2... דפים

סווג בשחוני.....

דחיפות.....

תאריך וז"ח.....

מספר מברק.....

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ירדן. העמדתי אותו על השוני בדיווח שהציר שמע ממרפי על כך ששני השלבים הראשונים בתהליך השלום המוצע אינם כבר בתוקף (פגישת מרפי) לעומת דברי דברי חסין בלוכסמבורג (סקירת עתונות 6/11) שחזר על 4 השלבים הידועים. סודארת השיב שגם הם שמו לב לכך שהדבר לא תואם את מה ששמעו מהירדנים. שוחח על כך עם מרפי אך אין להם כל הסבר. מניח שהיתה זאת מעין אמירה כללית

ובמסגרת עקרונות המדיניות הירדנית בנושא תהליך השלום אך כאמור אין לו הסבר לכך מתכוונים להעלות זאת בשיחות עם הירדנים. סודארת הוסיף שיש לקחת בחשבון גם מצב רוחו המתוסכל של המלך מכך ששנת 85 מתקרבת לקיצה וטרם נמצאה פריצת דרך בתהליך. יתכן ודברי חסין גם משקפים דאגתו למציאת מוצא להשתתפות הפלסטינאים בתהליך בעקבות שיחתו עם ערפאת.

באשר למימד הסורי עשויים להינת מספר פרושים וגם שונים לפנייתו לדמשק. חסין מעורב בשאיפות ובהתייעצויות עם קשת רחבה של גורמים-סעודים, מצרים, אש"ף, ארה"ב ועכשיו גם האירופאים. התסריט הירדני לדעתו הוא מציאת דרך להביא את אש"ף לקבלת 242 הכרת בישראל ו"אמירה כלשהי" בענין הטרור. בענין אחר ביקור משלחת צבאית ירדנית בוושינגטון בראשות זייד בן שאכר לא חידש בכך שהמדובר בפגישבת במסגרת ה- JMC. האמריקאים כחסין סומכים על זייד בן שאכר כמי שיש לו ותק בהכרה ובטיפול באש"ף. האמריקאים גם רואים בקורת רוח השפעתו הריאליסטית, על חסין, מכל מקום זייד בן שאכר חזר על כך שהצבא על שלוחותיו שולט במצב וער לכל התפתחות שלילית אפשרית. סודארת חזר על כך שהבנתו את הדיאלוג עם סוריה בהיבט הירדני שלו הוא על רקע: (א) פניית סעודיה. (ב) מאמץ להפחית את האיום הסורי באמצעות דיפלומטיה שקטה. (ג) לחץ על אש"ף. בנושא זה הזכיר חילוקי הדעות בין סוריה וירדן בנושא הסכם עמאן.

באשר לסוריה. לא ידוע לו על קיום דיאלוג כלשהו בין וושינגטון ודמשק בנושא התהליך המדיני. ציין ש סוריה כעקרון משחקת תפקיד שלילי כעת מאחר ועמידתה על נוסחת ה- STRATEGIC PARITY עם ישראל. מעריך שפנייה אמריקאית לדמשק תהייה DELAY. בכינוס ועידה / חסות בינ"ל ולא יהיה בה כל תועלת. עם זאת, אינם מתעלמים מכך שלסוריה עשוי להיות תפקיד "אי שמי" בתהליך ע"פ 338/242 ובהקשר לדיון על"טריטוריה סורית".

טרם קיבלו מידע משיחות המזכיר (החוזר מחר) ממוסקבה. הרושם שלא חזר עם מכנה משותף יותר מזה שהיה טרם השיחות, לשאלתי על אודות מעורבותו של השגריר דיק ויץ בנושא המזה"ת בפסגה שהכוונה היא שהוא ביחד עם אחרים ייצא לאיזור לדווח למדינות השונות על תוצאות הפסגה בנדון. ויץ עצמו לא יטול חלק בפסגה אלא ימתין לדיווח אותו יעביר הלאה. הדבר עדיין בחזקת רעיון והדברים טרם סוכמו או גובשו (נדאג ליצור עמו קשר בנוא הזמן).

אלי אבידן

תפוצה: שגריר, ציר, מתני, אבידן, כהן, ארכיב

50

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בטחון, ניו-יורק

24 98 115

קבוץ מברק

דף 1 מתוך 1 דפים

סווג בטחוני: גלגל

דחיפות: רגיל

תאריך וזמן: 85Nov5.1100

מספר מברק:

אל:הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח

דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - WEDNESDAY - NOVEMBER 6, 1985

THE PRESS REPORTS

Arafat Talks 3 Hours With Mubarak

WASH. POST-Bartholet-Following 3½ hours of talks between Muhabrak and Arafat, a senior adviser to the president said, "I think the PLO is going in the right direction." The Palestinians made no comment. Osama Baz described the talks as "very fruitful" and said there were "no disagreements between them and us." Egyptian officials reiterated their commitment to include the PLO in the peace process, but said Mubarak is pressing Arafat to take clear steps to show that he can be a responsible partner at the negotiations. "A chastized PLO would be a useful thing to deal with," siad a senior Egyptian official. The official added that it is important "to get it through their heads that they don't have any other options left."

Stabbing In Jerusalem

WASH. POST-(Wires)-An Israeli Jew was stabbed in the back and seriously wounded by a young Palestinian who escaped into a crowded area of Arab East Jerusalem. It was difficult to establish if the stabbing was politically motivated.

Hussein Says He Might Turn To USSR If US Denies Arms

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-(Wires)- Hussein of Jordan said in an interview published yesterday he might turn to the Soviet Union if the US turned down a request for arms. He insisted he had no intention of negotiating a peace settlement directly with Israel without the PLO. Hussein was interviewed in Amman by the Italian daily Corriere della Sera.

Egypt Said To Mull Its Policies

BOSTON GLOBE-(AP)-Egypt is making what a senior official calls "a fresh assessment" of its position after the recent increase in Middle East violence and has welcomed a string of Arab and Moslem visitors.Envoys from Tunisia and Algeria met with Mubarak earlier yesterday. Iraq's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, brought Mubarak a letter from Saddam Hussein over the weekend

עתונות

ב' ! נגפו בתי צבעונים טמ"ם. נשם טמ"ם

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

| | |
|---|---|
| קושר | שגרה |
| דף 1 מתוך 2 דפים | |
| סווג בטחוני | |
| דחיפות | |
| תאריך וז"ח 06נוב85 | |
| מס' ברק 113 | |

מצפ"א, לשכת ממנכ"ל, דע: לשכת השר ארנס

תיקון אינוית

נא שימת ליבכם למאמר דלהלן ב - DEFENSE WEEK מ - 4 נובמבר
ולנימה הביקרותית שלו. גם פיל גיילין החל מחטט בנושא וקשה להניח שעובה תצמח
לנו מהענין.

עתונות - שגרירות

יוסי

- 23 -

[redacted]

include South Korea, Portugal and Spain.

# Geraldine A. Ferraro

November 6, 1985

820 (1-2)

Prime Minister Shimon Peres
3 Kaplan Street
Hakirya
Jerusalem, 91919
Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with me on my recent and very hurried trip to Israel. It was good to have an opportunity to renew an acquaintanceship and to exchange views.

I have watched with delight the courageous initiative you have taken regarding Jordan. The obvious warmth of your reception on your visit to the United States is an indication of how your role in achieving peace in the Middle East, is viewed by Americans. And of course, I am pleased to see some movement on the Sakharov situation.

My book has been sent under separate cover. I hope you enjoy it.

Cordially,

Geraldine A. Ferraro

GAF:mec

108-18 Queens Boulevard • Forest Hills, N. Y. 11375 • 1-718-793-8811

Jerusalem November 21, 1985

Geraldine A. Ferraro
108-18 Queens Boulevard
Forest Hills, N.Y. 11375
U.S.A.

Dear Mrs. Ferraro,

Thank you very much for your letter of November 6, which touched me deeply.

I am presently in the midst of reading your book, which I find a human and political experience of the first order. I find in it much honesty, and much steadfastness; a great love for the United States, and a great love for people of all ages and in all situations. It is indeed a foremost human document.

Thank you once again -- for having written it, and for having sent it to me.

Sincerely yours,

Shimon Peres

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

כ"א בחשון תשמ"ב
5 בנובמבר 1985

אל : לשכת רה"מ

מאת : לשכת השגריר, וושינגטון

הנדון: הסנטור טרמונד

... במצורף מצאו-נא מכתבו של הסנטור הנ"ל בצרוף תמונה עליה מבקש את חתימת רה"מ.

אנא.

בתודה ובברכה,

לואיז שימרון

STROM THURMOND
SOUTH CAROLINA

# The President Pro Tempore

UNITED STATES SENATE

November 1, 1985

His Excellency, Ambassador Meir Rosenne
Embassy of Israel
3514 International Drive, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Enclosed is a photograph taken during Prime Minister Shimon Peres' recent visit to the United States.

I would consider it an honor if the Prime Minister would autograph this and return it to me as I would like to display this in my office.

Thank you for your kind consideration of my request.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Strom Thurmond

Strom Thurmond

ST/v
Enclosure

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel Aviv, Israel

November 5, 1985

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Prime Minister of the State of Israel
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Secretary Shultz has asked me to pass on to you the following message:

"Dear Shimon:

"It was a great pleasure to welcome you back to Washington after nearly a year. I was pleased and encouraged by our exchanges here and in New York. Your address to the General Assembly on the peace process was an eloquent representation of Israel's desire to work with its neighbors to advance the cause of peace. I was also pleased that we could discuss in general our shared interest in finding ways to promote growth and development in Israel, building on the foundation of the stabilization program which you are now implementing.

"Since we focused during your visit on the peace process and growth and development issues, I would like to share with you some further thoughts on your economic stabilization program. I do so primarily because of the work which is currently underway in Israel on your FY 86/87 budget, which I understand will be presented to the Knesset by mid-December. As you know, the new budget holds the key to continued progress in your fight to reduce inflation and strengthen your balance of payments. I was especially pleased to read in your October 14 letter that the primary goal of the new budget will be to further reduce surplus government demand, and hence the need for money injection from the Bank of Israel. This is absolutely essential since your deficit for the current FY 85/86 budget is still projected to be about 9 percent of GNP, roughly the same as for the FY 84/85 budget. In our view, this deficit

is unsustainable and not consistent with your inflation and balance of payments objectives. Moreover, creation of money to finance the deficit is expected to remain high, notwithstanding encouraging developments over the past few months, because of your sharply reduced capacity to raise funds through domestic bond sales.

"While the budget performance you have achieved since July 1 is in large measure the result of unexpectedly buoyant revenues and the one time 8 percent tax levy on corporations and the self-employed, we believe you may not realize similar substantial revenue gains in the future. This would be all the more true since, as you indicated in your last letter, you intend to proceed quite rightly with much needed tax reform, reducing the stifling level of taxes in Israel. While we agree that this is necessary to promote growth and private sector initiative in Israel, it also means that additional measures will have to be taken to reduce government spending. I believe large additional expenditure cuts may be needed to bring your budget deficit down to a sustainable level. That would enable you to reduce borrowing from the Bank of Israel sufficiently to maintain price stability. To maintain Israel's external reserves without further resort to short-term borrowing would require, I am told, that you cut your present budget deficit by about half. Should tax collection improve with the drop in inflation, less of a spending cut might be required.

"Shimon, I do not underestimate the difficulty of this task, but believe it can and must be done without endangering Israel's security. As always, we will be supporting your ongoing efforts with our assistance, and we have just disbursed 1.2 billion dollars in our FY 86 economic assistance to Israel.

"Turning to our joint efforts to promote growth and development in Israel, I understand our Embassy has had productive discussions with the Ministry of Finance and that preparations on your side are underway. Here, Deputy Secretary Whitehead and Under Secretary Wallis will be in contact with Max Fisher to invite the participation of selected members of Operation Independence in the December session of the JEDG. I believe the practical, entrepreneurial focus of the Operation Independence leaders will prove a good complement to the JEDG efforts to identify and correct the structural bottlenecks to investment and growth, thereby creating a healthier environment for private sector initiative. Together, the two groups should be able to chart a strategy that supports your bold vision of renewed growth and prosperity for Israel.

Sincerely,

S/ George P. Shultz."

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Thomas R. Pickering
Ambassador

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

ש מ ו ר

5 נובמבר 1985

אל :- מנהל מצפ"א
מנהל מזא"ר

מאת :- הציר - וושינגטון

הנדון :- שולץ - זמצוב

פרופ' איליה זמצוב מירושלים היה אחד הפרופסורים שהוזמנו אל שולץ לתדרוך לקראת הפסגה. השיחה היתה בארבע עינים ואח"כ הצטרף ויק מנהל USIA . שולץ התענין בהערכותיו על ברה"מ וביחס הציבור בארץ לנושאי ארה"ב - ברה"מ. כשדיבר זמצוב על זהות הדעות בינינו לבין ארה"ב בתחומים רבים, התבדח שולץ על כך שיש רואים את ארה"ב כאחת ה- States של ישראל. גם זו לטובה, אף אם לא כך נתי הדברים.

ב ב ר כ ה

אלי רובינשטיין

העתק :- ממנכ"ל
לשכת ממרה"מ ושה"ח
ממ"ד / בינ"ל

# official text

DATE; 11/06/85

SHULTZ REPORTS DEEP U.S.-SOVIET DIFFERENCES PERSIST (4070)
(Transcript; Shultz November 5 news conference)

Moscow -- Secretary of State Shultz says deep differences remain between the United States and the Soviet Union as both countries prepare for the November 19-20 meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev.

"Basically, we have a lot of work to do," Shultz said November 5 at a news conference following two days of talks with Soviet leaders.

After 14 hours of exchanging views in "painstaking detail" with the Soviets, Shultz said, there was some narrowing of views; however, he said there had been "no narrowing" of positions on the nuclear and space talks which are moving towards the end of the third round in Geneva.

Shultz met four hours with Gorbachev and for ten hours over two days with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

He said both sides agreed that arms control is an issue of "central importance" but "not the only subject." He said regional issues, bilateral issues and human rights are important subjects for discussion between the two countries.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative was also discussed, and the Soviets "are well aware" of the importance Reagan attaches to it, Shultz said.

Shultz said the purpose of the meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev is not "just to see if we can have a meeting" but whether it is possible "to develop a more constructive relationship" between the two countries.

Following is a transcript of the news conference:

(begin transcript)

SHULTZ: We all have just concluded around fourteen hours of intensive discussion, with General Secretary Gorbachev this morning, with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze yesterday and this afternoon. In addition, a small group from our delegation met with a small group of theirs, and tried to define further some of the issues that we have been talking about. We came here to exchange views, and we did so in a systematic manner; In painstaking detail with the foreign minister, and on a more general basis, or discursive basis, with the general secretary.

This has allowed each of us to explore all the possibilities and to explore the nature of problems and opportunities that involve our two countries, I might say not only in the sense of preparing for the meeting in Geneva between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, but more generally to examine our relationship, thinking of this meeting, and even such a major event as the one taking place in Geneva, as part of a process that we would like to see continued. In evaluating our discussions, I would say that there was nothing surprising in them. We anticipated a frank and thorough review of the issues; that's what we had. And I think this kind of across the board survey is important in its own right, and a useful part of the process of assembling of more constructive relations between our two countries.

As we broke up late this afternoon, as we have had a custom of doing, we now always pick out a few words to use to characterize these

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discussions, and I think we would agree that this meeting, set of meetings, have been an important part of the preparations for the Geneva meeting. They've been frank; we have identified respective positions; we've seen some positive developments; we also see that there are many serious differences between us, which, I suppose, only suggest the need for the meeting that we anticipate. And so as we broke up we wished for success in the upcoming Geneva meeting and beyond, and pledged to each other that we would work hard for continuing preparations, inspired, so to speak, by the importance of this endeavor. If you have any questions, I'd be glad to try them; if they're too difficult, I'll ask Ambassador Nitze or MacFarlane or Hartman to (garble).

QUESTION: You spoke of some positive developments. Could you possibly identify them for us?

SHULTZ: I think first of all, a deep exchange of views in itself is a positive development. We have tried to work at all the issues, and there are quite a range of them. I can't say that anything definitive was settled as such, although we did, I think, narrow our differences in some but as I said there are deep differences remaining.

Q: Would you say now there is an understanding -- not in writing, but a general understanding -- that to pursue the dialogue you spoke of, there ought to be more than one summit meeting, that perhaps, a year or so after this meeting, it would be a good thing for them to meet again?

A: There has been no real exploration of that, although obviously the question of where do we go from here, and undoubtedly a part of where we go from here involves subsequent meetings, not only of the heads but of others. So that question is before us, but nothing has been settled about it.

Q: Could you tell us a little bit about your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, and what the two of you discussed, with as much specificity as possible?

A: Well, I can easily do it with as much specificity as possible, but I think on the whole I'd prefer not to go into the detailed substance of these exchanges, as they're part of a process that we're working on. But it went on for quite a long while -- the General Secretary had to break off a little before two o'clock, as he was dedicating a Lenin statue here -- but so we had close to four hours of, I think the only way to describe it is, vigorous discussion. And he's accustomed to interrupting and expressing a view, and so when in Moscow do as those in Moscow do' we interrupted too. And so we had a very vigorous exchange and I think it helpful to both sides to get a sense of the way each thinks about these issues, the vigor of the view, and so on. So in that sense it was very good, and I would say it covered everything.

There was hardly a subject you can think of that wasn't in some manner referred to or touched on.

Q: Just to follow that up, how do you think he and Mr. Reagan might interrelate on this question of interrupting and having vigorous discussion?

A: Well, that remains to be seen. But the President is an old hand at this, and obviously the General Secretary is, so I, from my standpoint that will be something of a spectator sport. I'm looking forward to it.

Q: Did the subject of Vitaliy Yurchenko come up, and the charges that he has made about the United States?

A: The charges that he has made are totally false. Insofar as what happens to him is concerned, we follow a practice in the case of a person who has given strong indication of a desire to stay in the United States, and that practice will be followed faithfully in this case.

Q: Did it come up?

A: We had a very brief discussion of it at the end.

Q: Can you tell me, please, if the Soviets expressed any interest in Mr. Reagan's remarks about SDI in the interview with Soviet journalists, to wit, that the United States would only deploy this after offensive missiles had been removed?

A: Well, we had a general -- we had a discussion, as I say, about everything, including SDI, but I don't think any particular

statement was picked out in that discussion. But we certainly discussed the issue, and I think they are well aware of the importance the president attaches to this issue.

Q: Did the Soviets here in Moscow give a response to the counter-offer, or counter-counter-offer, whatever one wishes to term it, that was put down by the United States in Geneva just a few days ago, and either in that connection or some other connection, was there here some narrowing of the positions between the two countries on the subject of the arm negotiations which are going on?

A: There was no narrowing with respect to those nuclear and space talks. We presented the U.S. position as it has been presented in Geneva, although in a much briefer style, and they made some observations which they labelled as preliminary, but neither side regarded this as the appropriate place to negotiate on that subject. We have negotiators in Geneva, and that's where we believe the negotiations should take place. So there wasn't any real effort to try to turn this into a negotiating forum as such.

Q: Can you say whether proportionally more time was spent on arms control than on the other subjects? Can you just give us some idea of how time was split up?

A: First, in responding to your question, let me note, as you know, that there's a lot of arms control other than what's being discussed in the nuclear and space arms talks. We presented our views about that subject, and all of the other arms control settings, the positions of the United States and suggestions of the United States. And I don't have in my head how long that took, and they had some responses, and then scattered through our conversations there were references to arms control. I don't know, I haven't toted it up that way, but certainly both sides agree that this is a subject of central importance.

It's not the only subject· regional issues are of great importance, bilateral issues are of importance, human rights issues are of importance. The -- perhaps underneath it all, there is more to be said than perhaps we all realize -- I feel this after these exchanges -- to having frank arguments that kind of bring out to us the fact that the view here of the United States is very different from what we think the reality is. From some of their reactions, maybe they think we don't understand their reality. But at any rate, it's worthwhile to dig in on that basis, and we certainly did that in a major way, and I'm sure that that kind of thing will continue, and there should be that kind of exchange as well in Geneva.

Q: If there was some narrowing of issues and it wasn't in the main arms control area, was it in regional, was it in bilateral, was it in human rights, could you give us some flavor?

A: I don't want to overdo the narrowing of issues. It's -- I was going to say that would be gilding the lily, but I don't know whether the lily is the right image to cast up here. I think that the thorough explanation of what we think on all these various subjects and why, and what we propose, and listening to their responses, hearing their views, we did great deal of that, very painstaking and systematic, with -- going down a list, so to speak. So in that sense, I think, perhaps there was some narrowing. But as I said, I can't -- maybe there are one or two things that we can say yeah, we agreed on that, we agreed on that -- but basically we have a lot of work to do.

Q: With two weeks left before the summit, does it look at all realistic for us to expect anything like an agreement in principle on arms negotiations or a final communique that has any substantive agreements in it, or is it more likely now that it would be, as you've sketched out, more or less a laundry list of where the two sides differ?

A: Well, as far as what likelihoods are for the former part of the question, Bernie, I wouldn't bet the New York Times on it.

Q: You wouldn't bet that there'd be anything (garbled)?

A: No, I wouldn't, but I don't -- I think these things are open, but there is nothing from our discussions today from which to draw that conclusion. But they have made, after quite a distance of time, a counter-proposal to what we put on the table in Geneva, and we have, rather quickly, given a counter-counter proposal. The Geneva negotiations have been extended a little bit, so people are talking, that's -- and that's about all you can say on it.

Q: You say the Yurchenko matter did come up. Did this, and the embassy episode in Kabul and the Soviet seaman -- do these events at all impinge on the atmosphere, or were you totally insulated from these events?

A: I don't think they particularly impinged on our talks. We were very intensive and hardworking on this. Of course, we have been working on the Kabul part before we came here, and as it turned out, it got resolved, I think, during the first day of our meetings, in accordance with the proper application of our principles. It obviously is the sort of thing that takes up time, but we didn't talk about it. We might have if it had dragged on, but it didn't.

Q: What you're describing sounds like a shouting match between you and...

A: No, it was -- there was none. That's -- I think one of the points that needs to be made here is that the atmosphere was far from a shouting match, quite the reverse. The discussions were straightforward, frank, as I said, the atmosphere was quite cordial, and I think reflected a desire to use the time as effectively as could be. So it wasn't -- there was no sense of a shouting match at all.

Q: May I ask a followup, a related question. The groups that were appointed to define further the issues -- could they be called drafting groups?

A: Well, they were not particularly a drafting group. You see, by this time we have a fairly well known to each other set of things that we're struggling with, and we talked about them for more or less eight hours, and then we thought it might be worthwhile to have a smaller group -- I think we had three on each side -- discuss a few of those issues, and see if they could make a little more headway. Now, obviously when you take up a subject, and you want to see whether you agree on it or not, and if you think in a general way you do, it pays to write something down and see if everybody will sign on to that. So in that sense, there's a little drafting involved, but that's not really -- it's not about drafting, it's about trying to see if we really can come to an agreement on some matter.

Q: Do you have an agenda now? Is the American side ready for the summit, or is there some major issue that still needs to be resolved.

A: Oh, there's a lot of work to do, in my opinion. We intend to do it. Whether or not there'll be more set in by the time the middle of November emerges, arrives, or not, remains to be seen. But there are quite a few things that I think may very well yield to further work, and we have agreed, through our respective embassies, and through the negotiating groups that are at work now on various issues -- for instance, there's a trilateral group meeting in Washington starting yesterday on the Northern Pacific air problem, and so on, and there are a lot of these going on -- to keep pushing. So there's lots of work to do. And I would say that while, of course, the fact that there is going to be a big meeting in Geneva coming up tends to be useful as a kind of bureaucratic device to get people to decide things, at the same time life doesn't end in the middle of November, and in fact the whole purpose is not just to see if we can have a meeting where people come and talk, but whether or not through all the things that are going on it is possible to develop a more constructive relationship between these two countries. And we know it's hard, because the differences are wide.

Q: There have been a number of suggestions in the last few weeks that there might be some changes in Soviet human rights policy. Did you pursue those in your meetings, and at the end of the meetings, do you think there is a chance that there would some changes in Soviet human rights policy?

A: The subject was certainly discussed, as a matter of fact rather fully. But I don't have anything that I can tell you. I don't mean that I have some things but I can't tell you, but I have nothing to report as to what possibly outcome there may be.

Q: Will any of the working groups that were established here at this meeting remain in operation? Will anyone remain here or return here between now and the middle of November, or vice-versa, will the members of the Soviet working groups come to Washington to continue that process?

A: The real working groups, of course, are the people who are negotiating different things, like the exchanges agreement, on the consulates, and so on. Those are the designated working groups. As far as the three people who met last night are concerned, that was just kind of a rump session that we put together, and it isn't necessarily to continue. We don't plan to leave anybody behind; the embassy here is very well staffed, and Ambassador Hartman knows more about those issues than anybody, so we're well prepared here to follow through. But if it turns out that we think it's useful to have a little more exchange, we're quite prepared to move people back and forth, and I assume they are too.

Q: Were you disappointed by the lack of progress in narrowing issues?

A: I said in my opening statement that the views expressed were not surprising, and I think that we're still very much in that process of pushing along, and a word like disappointment or elation or whatever is -- it's a function of what your expectations were, as much as anything else, so I guess I'd have to say no, I wasn't turned on or off one way or another. It reminds me a little bit about the other day, I was playing golf, and I had a putt to make, and there was quite a little curve on the green. I asked the caddy how much he thought the putt would break; he said "more than you think." And I stopped and I thought about that a little bit. Same kind of a question.

Q: At this point, do you see the possiblity of agreement on any of the substantive issues outstanding between these two countries at the summit.

A: You give me pretty wide range -- "any." And so I confidently answer that question "yes" (garbled) but that isn't necessarily saying a lot.

Q: Which ones?

A: I'm not going to go into that.

Q: Did you get some news information about Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner?

A: The information that we had about Mrs. Bonner we had before I left Washington, and nothing that I've heard here has changed that, in fact, It's only been confirmed further by the various things that are public knowledge.

Q: Did you discuss the possiblity of Mister Gorbachev appearing (garbled) on American television before the summit?

A: The subject of television appearances, of course, is one of the items in the -- we discuss in the exchanges agreement. But I would point out to you that Mr. Gorbachev appears on American television all the time, because -- when he was in France, he was being interviewed, it was all shown -- that's in the nature of our system. Whoever the news people think the American people want to see, they'll show, and we'd like to see it the other way around as well, but unfortunately it isn't that way. I might say we were disappointed that the interview given by President Reagan was not reproduced in full, and that didn't seem to us quite a fair way to proceed.

Q: After your meetings, do you still believe that the Soviet proposals on disarmament in Euromissiles is aimed at driving a wedge between North America and its Western European allies?

A: I've never said that, so I don't want you to put words in my mouth. On the other hand, I think it is a quite readily observable fact that the Soviet Union for a long time has tried to divide the United States from our allies, and it is quite obviously a tactic that hasn't succeeded, and the alliance is very strong -- not only the North Atlantic Alliance, but our relationships with others around the world. As you know, the president met with five other leaders, European and Japan, in New York, last week, I guess it was, and it was a very successful and warm, and supportive meeting.

Q: You said that in the course of your discussions you've gathered that the view here of the United States is very different from what reality is. What misconception does Mr. Gorbachev have about the United States?

A: Well, I'm not going to try to go into all of those ins and outs, but I suppose it isn't really even surprising that somebody who has never been in the United States, and not been subjected to a wide array of competing flows of information and news and analysis that we

tend to see all the time would have misinformation. So we hope that through the process of discussion and visits here of people and so on that a better picture will emerge.

Q: Could you tell us what proportion of the preparations you feel are completed, and, at this point, what your assessment is of the prospects for a successful summit?

A: Well, the meeting will take place. And we have been preparing. What will be accomplished between now and then will help the meeting to be productive, of course I don't know, we'll work on it. But it's kind of impossible for me to envisage some sort of amount of preparations and then carve a percentage into it. But I do believe that, in the end, both leaders are likely to be very well prepared for this meeting¿ that we have done a reasonable job of creating a mutual understanding of how the meeting will be set up and how it will flow and what topics there will be and things of that kind. And of exploring each other's views enough so that I can give a pretty good rundown to President Reagan of just where the Soviets stand on various things, and no doubt the same can be said on the other side. So I don't know quite how to put a proportion down, but I think that the preparing for the meeting will be pretty good in the end.

Q: And the assessment for success -- do you think, at the end of it, both leaders will be happy with what resulted?

A: Well, I don't have any way of knowing, and success of course is a question of expectation again. I think that, at least in my own judgment, the measure of whether the meeting was worthwhile is most likely, and most importantly for that matter, to be taken by both men themselves, what do they think. And if it was worth the really very large expenditure of time and effort to them, in their view, as they see things unfolding, then I'd say it's a success. If they don't think so, but yet various things happen that lead other people to think it's a success, I wouldn't feel that good about it. So I think it's, at this stage of the game, quite a personal thing, and I know from the side of President Reagan, he is working very hard at it, and is genuinely desirous of seeing not simply a good meeting in Geneva -- that's really not so important in the scheme of things -- in the scheme of things what's important is that the relationship between these two very important countries have a turn for the better. That's the name of the game. (end transcript)

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**משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר** | **טופס מברק צפו·ן**

אל: וושינגטון, ניו יורק.

212 153

דף 1 מתוך 4 דפים

סדרי

סיווג בטחוני:

דחיפות: מיידי

תאריך וזמן רישום 05/1930 5 בנוב' 1985

לשימוש מחלקת הקשר

מס. מברק: 346 / מ

רוזן, רובינשטיין, מתני, אבידן.

דע: נתניהו, קיין.

ממרות'מ ושה'ח קיבל הבדקר לשיחה את השגריר פיקרינג שבא להציג בפניו את קלבריוס. נכחו תאריסון, בראון, בן-אהרון והח'מ.

פיקרינג וקלבריוס הסבירו כי קלבריוס ישמש כיועצו של מורפי לתהליך השלום אלא שתפקידו טרם הוגדר סופית. יתכן והגדרת התפקיד תתגבש ככל שיתפתח התהליך. פיקרינג השווה התפקיד לתפקידו של ליאונרד (סגנו של לינוביץ). קלבריוס יעדכן מורפי בשתרחש, יבקר קדיר בוושינגטון ובכך יחסוך למורפי הטירחה שבמסעים תכופים לאיזור. משהו כך תלקו של קלבריוס בשיחות האוטונומיות העיר פיקרינג שהרבה מהמושגים שהיו קשורים לאוטונומיה עודם רלבנטיים ויוכלו להיבחן שוב. שה'ח אמר כי בשיחתו עם שה'ן מצרים מאגזד באום העלה הנושא, אך הלה השיב שהסכם ק'ד לא עוד רלבנטי לתהליך. מה שמחייב עתה את מצרים זה הסכם ערפאת-חוסין. שה'ח הזכיר מכתבו של מובארק לרוה'מ בגין בו חזר, וציין כי ק'ד הינו המסמך המחייב בבלעדי לפתרון הבעיה הפלשתינאית.

פיקרינג שאל החלה התקדמות במגעים עם מדינות מזא'ר. שה'ח השיב שאנו מעבדים עתה עם פולין פרטי הייצוג ההדדי. הפולנים מעוניינים כי הם משפרים קשריהם עם ישראל שלא במצוות הסובייטים אלא בזכותם הם. ניצר המאמץ הפולני, משיקולי פנים, להפגין עצמאות מסוימת והקשרים עם ישראל הם מגילוייה. שה'ח סיפר כי סוכם גם על ש'פ במחקר בתחום יהדות פולין, חלקה ותרומתה להיסטוריה הפולנית. שה'ח הוסיף שתוהוגרים מעוניינים להרחיב היקף הסחר עם ישראל. אשר לשיחות המזכיר במוסקבה העיר שה'ח שהמזכיר מודע לעמדותנו. דאגתנו הראשונית היא לאפשר ליהודי בריה'מ לצאת ולבוא - אם ניתן ישירות לישראל. זה החשוב מכל. אנו מחשיבים ביותר חידוש היחסים עם בריה'מ אך אין צורך שנשלם בעבור זה, שהרי הנורמלי והמקובל הוא יחסים דיפלומטיים בין מדינות. אין צד אחד עושה טובה לזולתו, והדבר תואם הדוקטרינה הסוביטית של דו-קיום שעיצבה בעידן כרוצ'וב.

השולח: _____ אישור מנהל המחלקה: _____ אישור רשכה המוביל: _____

(לציין תאריך וזמן העברת לקשר)

תאריך חמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח)

שם הנ שרה ושל גלוגל בגרבי הלו-בב בגאה רק אין סיבה

**משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר** **טופס מברק צפו**

אל

דף 2 מתוך 4 דפ

סיווג בטחוני:

דחיפות:

תאריך וזמן רישום
מס. מברק 346/ח

לשימוש מח' הקשר

איש

שה"ח סיפר שהזכיר זאת בזמנו לגרומיקו שהביב כי זה נכון אלא שהמזה"ת מהדוה חריג.

שה"ח ציין כי אנו למדים שהסובייטים מקימים מגע קרוב עם ערפאת שנפגש לאחרונה עם
שגרירי בריה"מ בעמאן ובתונים ואף החליפו עמו איגרות. שה"ח שאל האם המזה"ת עומד
על סדה"י של המזכיר בשיחותיו בשיחת הנשיא - גורבצ'וב. פיקרינג אמר שתחושתו
היא שהנשיא היה מעונין לשמוע דעות ממרוה"מ ורוה"מ בקשר ליהודי בריה"מ. המגמה
היא להשאיר סדה"י גמיש ולא לקבעו מראש במסמרות. גם בנאום הנשיא בעצרת או"ם הושם
דגש על איזורי סכסוך אחרים לצורך הדגמה ולא כביטוי להתעלמות או חוסר ענין. ארה"ב
סבורה שהמזה"ת סבור דיומכדי להעלותו במסגרת או"ם רק לעתים נדירות
ביחוד לאור הרקורד הגרוע שיש לאו"ם בתחום זה. פיקרינג סיפר שהסובייטים העירו
שהמז"ת נפקד מנאום הנשיא והובהר להם שאל להם להסיק שאין לארה"ב ענין בנושא. שה"ח
העיר כי פירוש הדבר שסדה"י של מפיסגה טרם נקבע ופיקרינג אמר שאכן הכוונה לקיים
הדיון ללא דעות קדומות ובפורמט בלתי נוקשה, והעיר שהוא מקווה שבכך הוא מפזר חששותיבד.
פיקרינג ביקש לשמוע הערכת שה"ח על המצב בלבנון. שה"ח אמר שאין הוא מופתע מאכזבת
הסונים. לאלה אין, מסיבות היסטוריות, מיליציה משלהם ולכן מצבם קשה. זה מיעוט חשוב
בעיקר בכלכלת לבנון הנהנה מתמיכה סעודית. היתה תקופה שאשף מילא תפקיד בכוחות המזוייניים
של הסונים. ברור שסוריה מנסה ליצב שליטתה בלבנון ולכן היא עדה אחר פשרה. הסורים
מעונינים ביציבות כלשהי אך איננו בטוחים אם מטרה זו תושג. מכל מקום אין נראה פתרון
באופק לבעית לבנון. הממשלה המרכזית חלשה כשהיתה, והנשיא גו'מאיל נעדר סמכויות.
מבחינתנו ללבנון חלק ממיכלול יחסינו עם סוריה ואנו בוחנים זאת גם מההיבט של כוונת
סוריה לגרום לבעיות לישראל מלבנון. פיקרינג שאל האם להתפתחויות בלבנון השלכות על
דרום לבנון ושה"ח השיב שאין הוא סבור שלטוות הקרוב, תלוי מה התוכנית הסורית בתחום
זה. אם ירצו יבצלו השיעים.

../3

השולח: _____ אישור מנהל המחלקה: _____ אישור לשכת המנכ"ל: _____

(לציין התאריך וזמן הישבות לקשר)

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) _____

**משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר** | **טופס מברק צפו"ן**

אל:

דף 3 מתוך 4 דפים

סיווג בטחוני: _____

דחיפות: _____

לשימוש מח' הקשר: תאריך וזמן רישום

מס. מברק 346/ח

אמאל, נגדפים קיצוניים אחרים אך אין לדעת. שה"ח הוסיף ששמענו שארקהרדט מתכוון לבוא לאזור. פיקרינג אמר כי שמעו שמזכירות אום שוקלת הרחבת פרישת אונ'פיל לג'נין ולאיזור הבטחון בהוסיפו כי הם חשים שיש פחות תקריות בין צד'ל לאונ'פיל - ושבאזור הנורבגי המצב השתפר מאוד. זה מוסיף אלמנט חיובי גם אם לא יוכל למנוע לחלוטין פעולות מתאבדים. שה"ח אמר כי נסיונות כאלה נמשכים. עצתנו למדינות המרכיבות אונ'פיל לקיים קשר כלשהו גם בלתי פורמלי עם צד'ל כמו שיש להן עם אמאל וכוחות מקומיים. הן יכולות לקיים קשר עם הגנרל לאחד שהוא איש טוב ורציוניולי. לא יקשה להגיע למגעים ויונגי עמו כדי למנוע אי הבנות והתנגשויות מיותרות. ההולנדים כבר אינם שם ויש שמועות לגבי הנורבגים שבדעתם לעזוב. שה"ח סיפר שהתרשם בשיחותיו עם שה"ח סקנדינביה באו"ם שאלה דואגים דאגת שלום חייליהם אך אין להם תחושת של תרומה לשלום ואינם רואים פתרון בעתיד. האירים מעוניינים להישאר. הצרפתים ישארו משום זיקתם ההיסטורית ללבנון. ממבט'ל העיר שהנורבגים עשויים להיות מוחזרים בשל מחסור בכ"א בצבא נורבגיה. פיקרינג אמר שאם יוכלו הנורבגים לסייע הוא מקווה שיישארו. מקובלת עליו עצת שה"ח להתקשרות אונ'פיל עם לאחד.

פיקרינג העיר בקשר לידיעה שהנשיא ג'נמאיל רוצה להידבר עם ישראל באמצעות ועדת שביתת הנשק שארה"ב טרם נקטה עמדה בענין זה. טרם היתה פניה לארה"ב בענין.

שה"ח אמר שאנו מוכנים למגע עם 'אמאל' אך אין זה מסתייע.

../4

השולח: _____ אישור מנהל המחלקה: _____ אישור לשכת המנכ"ל: _____

(לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר)

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) _____

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

טופס מרק צפון

אל:

דף 4 מתוך 4 דפים

סיווג בטחוני:

דחיפות:

לשימוש מחלקת הקשר: תאריך וזמן רישום

מס. מברק 346/17

אשר לג'ומאיל צריך לראות עד כמה הדבר רציני ולבדוק בשם מי הוא מדבר.

פיקרינג אמר כי אתמול דיבר עם ממנכ"ל על תלונת המטיף מקנטייר וקבוצת ערבי רגל על בעיות שהיו להם עם הטימשל בקשר לביקורם בכנסיה פרסבטריינית בגדמ"ע. (אחר העיר האריסון שמדובר בברקה ביבל סנטר שע"י בית-לחם) סיפר שקיבל גם מכתב מהסנטור (?) בירד בענין זה. מדובר בפעולה לא מסיונרית ורצוי למנוע רעש מיותר ולמצוא פתרון בערד הפרשה באיבה. שה"ח אמר שמשהב"ט בודאי מודע לענין ומטפל בה כנדרש.

בנצור

השולח: איתן בנצור אישור מנהל המחלקה: אישור לשכת המנכ"ל:

[לציין תאריך וזמן העברה לקשר]

תאריך וזמן חיבור (ימולא ע"י השולח) 5 בנובמבר 1985

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| רחיפות: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | דף: 1 מתוך 2 |
| סווג בסתונית: | טופס מברק | |
| תז"ח: 0516- | א ל : הסברה.מע"ח. לש' סמנכ"ל.יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת. מצפ"א. סמנכ"ל אסיה"ר. לע"מ. | |
| נר : 0133 | ר ע : וושינגטון. | |
| | מאת : עתונות. | |

News Summary November 5, 1985

Press Reports

Sakharov's Speak to West

NYT-p.1-Wren-Andrei Sakharov broke the silence imposed upon him for 6 years by sharing in an anxious phone call to his family in the US. His wife was talking with her mother, son, daughter and son-in-law. Bonner said she would not leave the Soviet Union until the end of November. Soviet authorities offered to let Bonner leave immediately but she wanted to stay with her husband due to his health. Bonner has a three-month visa and then is expected to return to Gorky.

Car Bomb Explosion in South Lebanon

NYT-special-A Lebanese guerrilla group asserted that it had killed or wounded 15 Israeli or Israel-allied troops in a car bomb explosion, but other reports cast doubt on the number of casualties. The bombing was the second attack in two-days. The National Syrian Social Party took responsibility for the bombing that occured 6 miles north of the Israeli border.

Arafat Meets Mubarak

NYT-special-Arafat arrived in Cairo for talks with Mubarak. His talks with Egyptian officials will be aimed at shoring up faltering Jordanian-Egyptian peace initiatives.

Carxi Criticizes US

NYT-special-Craxi criticized the US use of a military base in Sicily in the hijacking crisis, but he strongly reaffirmed Italy's friendship with the US. He also strongly defended Italy's Middle East policies.

Fassbinder Play Given Private Showing

NYT-Jarkham-Abandoning attempts to hold the world premier of "Garbage, the City and Death," the manager of the city's repertory theather instead gave a private showing for critics aimed at difusing criticism that the play is anti-Semitic. The show was applauded by only a few of the critics in the audience and the city's political establishment and most important newspaper has denounced the play. The theater's manager for the first time expressed doubts that the play would be able to be staged for the public.

ITONUT

בדק אדקו סין הבודבר שאתים מאלה טאתי

15

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

098

דף...1...מתוך...1...דפים
סווג בטחוני.....
דחיפות.....
תאריך ודש"מ.....
מס' מברק.....

אל : יוסי בן אהרון, לשכת השר
דע : יחיאל קדישאי מש' רוה"מ
מצפ"א, כלכליה2, כנסיות, משרד החיירות

מאת: יורם אטינגר, היוסטון

בעקבות מידע שהעביר לי אריה שיבי, נציג החיירות בדרום:

1. Smith Thomason , נשיא ה- United Bank of Waco
שהוא בפטיסט מאמין, מארגן סיור בן שבוע לארץ של כ-200 איש הכוללים את יו"ר וחברי חבר המנהלים, בעלי הבנק, ר"ע וחברי מועצת העיר ונשים נוצריות מעשירות העיר (אשר בה Baylor Univ. , האוניברסיטה הבפטיסטית הגדולה בארה"ב).

2. הקבוצה כוללת צבור יעד מרכזי של פעילות הקונסוליה בטכסס ומעבר לטכסס.

3. הסיור נתמך ב- Act of Good Will בעל פוטנציאל כלכלי וחברתי להדוק קשרי ישראל-ארה"ב. הקבוצה תיטע את יער Waco . ארגון הסיור ע"י גיולי גיונס מ- International Centers for Travel

4. הקבוצה מבקשת לפגוש, ולו למס' דקות, את רוה"מ לשעבר, מנחם בגין. הבטרתי הקשיים האפשריים, אך ממליץ להפגיש ולו עם נציג או נציגים בודדים של הקבוצה. כמו כן ממליץ להפגישה עם מ"מ רוה"מ ועם קדישאי, הורביץ ודן מרידור.

יורם אטינגר

שרה רבא אנא גבוה בכסי בחרמי שלמה ב' ומה בנסיות
לחיות

1

SJRES228 3/8 1310

096 /86

October 29, 1985*

TO: CHAIRMAN FASCELL AND CHAIRMAN HAMILTON

FROM: BILL MOHRMAN

SUBJECT: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF S.J.RES. 228 RELATING TO THE PROPOSED SALES OF ARMS TO JORDAN

(1) <u>What does S.J.Res. 228 do?</u> The resolution (copy attached) which the Senate passed on October 24, 1985, would prohibit the sales of advanced weapons systems to Jordan prior to March 1, 1986, unless ``direct and meaningful peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan are underway''. In other words, the sales could not be made during the next four months unless peace negotiations are underway.

(2) <u>Are there any conditions placed on the sales as of March 1, 1986?</u> No. In the absence of future congressional action the sales can go forward at any time on or after March 1, 1986. Under existing law, the President has general authority to sell military equipment to foreign countries in the absence of a congressionally enacted prohibition or limitation. U.S. financing for the sale, however, would require congressional approval (except to the extent that it would be possible to reprogram funds for this purpose).

(3) <u>Who would decide whether direct and meaningful peace negotiations are underway?</u> S.J.Res. 228 does not expressly address this issue, but implicitly the decision is to be made

by the executive branch since it is the executive branch which must implement the law.

(4) <u>What does ``direct and meaningful peace negotiations are underway'' mean?</u> These terms are not defined in S.J.Res. 228, and they do not have any special legal significance. There is some discussion of this issue during the Senate debate. See especially Sen. Lugar's comments on page S13987 of the Cong. Record of 10/24/85: ``Clearly, the qualifying aspect of this resolution is that an arms sale could progress if face-to-face negotiations occur; negotiations that are substantive, meaningful; that deal with peace; that move away from a status of nonbelligerency [sic] between Jordan and Israel to a question of peace.'' (See also Sen. Metzenbaum's comments on page S13988: ``We are not just saying that we are talking about getting together for direct negotiations, having a meeting, and saying `hello' and `goodbye'. This resolution goes beyond that. It talks about the fact that those negotiations shall be underway; and `underway' means that the parties will actually be involved in meaningful peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan.'').

(5) <u>Can Congress review and/or overturn a determination that peace negotiations were underway?</u> S.J.Res. 228 does not provide for formal notice to the Congress of such a determination, nor does it provide for any formal period for congressional review. The Congress, of course, does retain

its regular oversight perogatives and could pass legislation to stop the sales notwithstanding an executive branch decision that direct and meaningful peace negotiations were underway.

(6) Is resubmission of the proposed sales to the Congress required? No. [Sen. Bradley asserted that resubmission was required, but there is nothing in S.J.Res. 228 to support this, and the remarks of other Senators, especially Sen. Lugar in response to a question from Sen. Levin (p. S13993), make clear that resubmission is not required.]

(7) Is the President required to provide any notice to the Congress before the sales go forward? No. The only applicable notice requirement is the 30 day advance notice requirement under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, which will be satisfied 30 days after October 21.

(8) From a legal and procedural standpoint, would the enactment of S.J.Res. 228 limit what the Congress can do in the future with regard to these sales? No.

(9) Would future congressional action regarding the sales have to occur before March 1, 1986? From a legal perspective, no. The executive branch would not necessarily consumate the sales on March 1 in any case; but even after the sales are consumated, the Congress could pass legislation voiding the sales and/or prohibiting deliveries pursuant to the sales or placing conditions or limitations on the sales and

deliveries. Enactment of such legislation might, however, cause the U.S. Government to incur certain expenses, such as contract cancellation penalties, which would not be incurred if Congress acted before the signing of procurement contracts to implement the sales.

(10) Does S.J.Res. 228 ``approve'' or ``disapprove'' the sales? This is a question of perception more than a question of law. By its terms, the resolution does not expressly either ``approve'' or ``disapprove'' the sales. The effect of the resolution is to prohibit the sales temporarily but conditionally. In that sense, the resolution can be seen as a disapproval of the sales, although not a complete disapproval. On the other hand, one could interpret congressional passage of a law which does not totally prohibit the sales as implicit congressional approval of the sales. The Senate debate, however, makes clear that the purpose of the resolution is to delay the sales, while preserving Congress' option of taking further action regarding the sales at a later time if it deems appropriate.

(11) Which sales are subject to S.J.Res. 228?: The administration has transmitted notice of three proposed sales to Jordan: aircraft, missiles, and BRADLEY vehicles. S.J.Res. 228 does not cite specific transmittal numbers as is the usual practice. It does mention specifically aircraft and air defense systems. There may be some ambiguity, however,

regarding whether S.J.Res. 228 covers the BRADLEY sale; the issue depends on whether the BRADLEY is considered to be an ``advanced weapon system''. I am not aware of any definition of that term. During the Senate debate there is not specific mention of the BRADLEY sale and the emphasis was on the sales of aircraft and missiles. However, that debate makes fairly clear that the general intent was to stop ``the sales'', with no indication that the BRADLEY sale was to be exempted from the requirements of S.J.Res. 228. Even clear legislative history of intent to cover the BRADLEY sale, however, would not necessarily bring that sale under the terms of the resolution unless one can reasonably consider the BRADLEY to be an ``advanced weapon system''.

(12) <u>What does S.J. Res. 228 mean when it says no letter of offer shall be ``valid'', etc.?</u>: It is not clear why the term `valid'' was used in this context. The issue was not mentioned in the Senate debate. I do not recall ever having seen ``valid'' used before with respect to a letter of offer. More commonly we talk about a letter of offer being ``issued'' (see, for example, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and the Kennedy and Fascell resolutions on the Jordan arms sales (S.J.Res. 223 and H.J.Res. 428). Issuance refers to the formal transmittal of the proposed sales contract to the purchasing country for its acceptance. Use of the term ``valid'' suggests that although a letter of

offer may be issued, it can not have operative effect. I can think of only two possible reasons for limiting the ``validity'', rather than the ``issuance'', of a letter of offer: first, to take care of the possibility that a letter of offer might be issued before the enactment of S.J.Res. 228; and second, to allow a letter of offer to be issued before March 1, 1986, or before peace negotiations are underway, but to limit when the sale can become effective notwithstanding the issuance of the letter of offer.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

094 / 81 בס"ד

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| דף | מתוך | דפים |
| סווג בטחוני | שמור |
| דחיפות | רגיל |
| תאריך וז"ח | 1000 5 |
| מס' מברק | |

אל: מ/מנכ"ל. מצפ"א.
דע: לשכת רה"מ. מנכ"ל אוצר
מנכ"ל בטחון.

סנס: סיוע חוץ - ו"תיקון אינוייה"

נפלה טעות במברקנו 012 מה-1/11. בתשובה להטפילד, אמר קסטן שאם הצעת חוק ההקצבה לסיוע חוץ תיחקל בבעיות במליאת הסנט, יציע חוק חליפי או יבקש מוועדת התקציב - ולא (אלא) הנשיא, כמדווח - ויתור לגבי התיקרה שנקבעה לסיוע חוץ.

אי לכך הסיפא למשפט השני בסעיף 7 צ"ל: "לחילופין יבקש "ויתור" ( WAIVER ) מוועדת התקציב לגבי גובה התקרה לסיוע חוץ".

אתכם הסליחה.

אסתר למדן
למדן

שרה רחל גושל גלגשי בצבי מרחי מלכי ב' אורה
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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

30

המשרד, בטחון

092

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|---|---|
| דף | מחוק |
| סווג בטחוני | גלוי |
| דחיפות | רגיל |
| תאריך וזמן | 85NOV05 630 |
| מספר | |

מתנב"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח.

תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום TUESDAY-NOV.5

Q You used to characterize the Syrian role in the Middle East as negative. Now King Hussein is going to meet with Assad. Do you see any change in the Syrian role or Syrian attitude in the Middle East? Do you see some signs of positive attitude of the Syrians?

MR. REDMAN: No, I have no information which I could share with you at this point.

Q Do you have any assessment of King Hussein's speech on November 2nd, especially the Israeli government. Shamir, said it is disappointed by the speech while Peres says that it's a positiu speech? Do you have any further assessment of the American position on this speech?

Q Can we change regions?

MR. REDMAN: Yes.

Q (Off mike) -- is back from the Middle East? Is he actually at work meeting with people and so on or is he still setting up an office?

MR. REDMAN: I think it would be more accurate to characterize his current activities as housekeeping.

Q Well, where is the housekeeping taking place? Is it in Jerusalem or is it in Amman or where?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know where he is at this very moment. We have said that he will largely be based in the region.

Q Well, I mean, is he going to have a hotel room in every capital? How's it working?

MR. REDMAN: I'm not that intimate with his housekeeping arrangements to give you those kind of details.

Q Well, the State Department has to pay for it, so don't you think we ought to know?

[illegible]

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

STATE DEPT. 11/5/85 2-6

MR. REDMAN: Well, I can't give you any other information at this point.

Anything else on the Middle East?

Q I have a question on the West Bank. In light of Secretary Shultz' public concern for the well-being of Palestinians under occupation, does the State Department have any comment on the Israeli continuous crackdown on Pal****epeated cases of detention, deportation and house arrest which are going on right now? The State Department had a delegation of Arab-American organizations last week and they handed a list of 10 Palestinians who were detained. Can you look into this?

MR. REDMAN: Our position on those issues is well-known and has been oft reiterated from this podium.

אתקלות

שגרירות ישראל • וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בשחון, ניו-יורק

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מ ר ק ס מ ב ר ר

דף...1...מתוך...1...דפים

פווג בשחוני.בלבד.....

דחיפות.....רגיל.....

תאריך ודיח..85Nov5. 1430

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אל:הסברה, מע"ח, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח

דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - TUESDAY - NOVEMBER 5, 1985

THE PRESS REPORTS

Suicide Bombers In Lebanon

WASH. POST-(Wires)-Arab guerrillas sent suicide bombers on a mule and in a car against positions in Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon and claimed to have inflicted dozens of casualties, but Israeli reports indicated that only the bombers were killed.

Egypt Reassessing Position

WASH. POST-(Wires)-Egypt is making what a senior official calls "a fresh assessment" of its position after the recent increase in Middle East violence and has welcomed a string of Arab and Moslem visitors.Arafat arrived saying he seeks greater Arab unity. "Events that took place in the past few weeks compel us to take a new look, a fresh assessment of our position," Osama Baz told reporters.

Nazi Hunt Reaches Final Climax

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Echikson-With the noose tightening around former SS leader Alois Brunner and the trial nearing of former SS captain Klaus Barbie, Nazi hunting is reaching a climax."These are the two big cases left," explains Serge Klarsfeld along with his German born wife, Beate.

Egypt Offers Help With Israel-PLO Truce

CHICAGO TRIBUNE-(Wires)-Egypt called Monday for a truce between Israel and the PLO and offered to help them negotiate an end to terrorism. "We are always on the side of ending violence and terrorism and defusing tension," said Osama Baz, in announcing the proposal. "We hope a truce will not be one sided because it must be mutual. "We will be more than happy to work with the concerned parties to obtain comitments to renounce terrorism and start a truce to end acts of violence," he said.

המשך

ה ל ל ו ל ו ת פ ר ס ו ם ש ל ח ו ם ר ש מ י ו ם ש ל ח ו ם

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

2534 נבנס שמור
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אל: המשרד, נר: 100, מ : ווש
דת: מ, סג: ש, תא: 051185, רח: 2100

שמור/מיידי

אל: מצרים, מצפ"א, ממ"ד. דע: שגקהיר נ )

ערפאת במצרים.

1. התקשרתי לציר שלבי מן השגרירות המצרית. שאלתי אם נבוונות הידיעות על קבלת הפנים המבובדת שערבו לערפאת בקהיר, אמר שראה רק דיווחי תקשורת. הבעתי תרעומתנו על בבוד זה למי שאחראי למעשה רצח רבים, בולל בפרשת האניה, ואויב השואף להבהיד מדינה שעמה יש למצרים יחסים ולפגוע ביהודים בשל היותם באלה, פנייתי היתה על דעת השגריר.
2. אמר בי מבלי להתייחס ל"פרצדורות", "ממרתם האצילית" היא להפוך אויב היום לידי מחר ולהפיג את החשדות הקולנים. במשובה להערתי אמר בי ביבדו את הפרופיל הנמוך שנקטנו בענין בעיותיהם בפרשת האניה. ביקשתיו להעביר תרעומתנו הביתה והבמה.
3. בראשית השיחה הודה על משלות נאום רוהמ' באו"ים שהעברתי לו לבקשתו.
4. אגב, אבידן שמע מאתרטון היום בי לוליוטים קשיים ומעמדו חחלש אצל המצרים בעקבות התבטאויותיו בפרשת האניה.

רובינשטיין==

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רם,אמן,קידר,מצרים,
סייבל,מצפא,ממד

2632
** יוצא סודי
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אל: ווש , נל , נר: חודם 269, מ : המשרד
דת: מ, מב: ס, מא: 041185, זת: 1800

סודי/מידי

למדן.

שלך 30.

יופה - שלך 20.

נשק ישראלי לדרא"פ.

1. בשגרר ווכפה את שאלת מכירות הנשק לדרא"פ בשיחתו עם רוה"מ' אמר כי רוה"מ' שהמשלה בראשותו לא חתמה על כל עסקת נשק עם דרא"פ. מעבר לזה הענין לא נדון עם רוה"מ'.

2. בשיחת העבודה בראשות המנכ"ל העלה את נושא ש"פ' בתחום הגרעיני והמנכ"ל הסביר ששתוף בזה אינו קיים על אף הדעה הרווחת בעולם כי זו קיימת.

3. בדוות המפורט שנשלח בשעתו ישנה התייחסות לנושא בזכו בהרחבה.

4. כנופו של ענין התשובה מתחלקת לשניים. מחד לא חתמנו על חוזים חדשים מאז הטלת האמברגו ע"י מועב"ם שעליו אנו שומרים מאיתך. בהחלט נכון שלא הפרנו חוזים שהיו קיימים בזמן הטלת האמברגו.

5. יש כדבור שווכפה ביטל הפגישה שנקבעה עם המנכ"ל על אף שהוסבר כי שהוא האיש המסונה על הנושא הדרא"פי במשרד ויוכל לפרט את מהות הקשרים הקיימים.

6. חושש"ם שבאום לא יוכל להגיע ווכפה מלהמשיך להשמיע טענו"ו יחד עם ואת יתבן וירצה לשקול שלדו-שית שלו עם ווכפה

מהיה בכל ואת השפעה ממתנת מסו"מם.

מצפ"א

מפ: שהח,רהמ,מנכל,ממנכל,מצפא

2637 יוצא
סודי
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אל: וושינגטון, נרו: 121, מ: המשרד
רח: מ, סג: ס, תא: 041185, רח: 1800

סודי/מידי

אבידן.

פוק ג'ורדיני.

שלח 556.

לובראני מביר הנ"ל באופן שמחי יחסית. פגש בו בשהיה כאן לפני בחצי שנה כסמינר הבינלאומי על מרוץ של המבון לליקודים אסטרטגיים.
ג'ורדיני (מרוני) היושב קבע בוושינגטון מסוגל להוביל בנראה רשת מרשימה של קשרים בארה"ב ובושר נתוח פוליטי - נכסים מבוקשים ע"י מנהיגים ערביים באיזור.

עם עליית אמין כשלטון הומינו אליו ביועץ אך דרכיהם נפרדו לאחר תקופה קצרה. באשר ביקר כאן נוצר אצל מספר אישים הרושם כי הוא מבקש להציע לנו את שרותיו. אין מניעה להחליף עימו דעות על ההתפתחויות במו"מ.
מודים מצפ"א

הפ: שהח,רהמ,שהנס,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רס,אמן,מצפא,ממד,
ס"יבל

Jerusalem November 4, 1985

Mrs. Geraldine Ferraro
New York

Dear Mrs. Ferraro,

Thank you very much for having so kindly send me a copy of your recent book.

Even before I read the book -- which I intend to do in the very near future -- I have come to know and to value your public courage, your original thinking, and your great charm.

In friendship,

Shimon Peres

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

אל: מר שמעון פרס - ראש הממשלה

מאת: דניאל בלוך, יועץ לענייני עבודה, וושינגטון

4 בנובמבר 1985

277

הנני מעביר לעיונך דו"ח נוסף על הנעשה בתנועת העבודה בארה"ב. דו"ח זה מוקדש כולו לועידת ה - AFL - CIO שהתקיימה באנהיים, בקליפורניה בין ה-25 ל-31 באוקטובר 1985.

הועידה ה - 16 של ה AFL-CIO נתכנסה בסימן שלושים שנה למיזוג בין ה - AFL ל - CIO. בועידה השתתפו כ - 800 צירים המייצגים 13.5 מיליון חברים ב - 96 איגודים מקצועיים. רק ששה מן הצירים השתתפו בועידת המיזוג ב - 1955. מבחינה ארגונית עמדו דיוני הועידה בסימן השימוש הנרחב בחידושי הוידאו - מסכים גדולים הראו את הנואם לכל הקהל, ולכל נושא קדם סרט וידאו קצר שהציג את הנושא.

שני חידושים בעלי משמעות פוליטית היו בועידה- בפעם הראשונה בתקופת ממשל רייגן, הוזמן שר העבודה לנאום בועידה, עם שר העבודה הקודם ריי דונובן היו להנהגת האיגודים יחסים קשים. לעומת זאת עם השר הנוכחי ביל ברוק קיימת מערכת יחסים טובה. נשיא ה - AFL-CIO ליין קירקלנד אף שיבח את נכונותו של ברוק לדיאלוג עם תנועת האיגודים וכן שיבח את פעולתו למען אישורן של אמנות ארגון העבודה הבינלאומי ע"י הסנאט של ארה"ב.

חידוש אחר היה הופעת נשיא איגוד כורי הפחם ריצ'רד טרומקה, לראשונה מאז פרש האיגוד מהפדרציה ב - 1947. קירקלנד הביע תקווה שתוך זמן לא רב יחזור איגוד כורי הפחם לתוך פדרציית האיגודים המקצועיים.

כדרכן של ועידות פוליטיות בארה"ב התנהלו הדיונים בדרך כלל באווירה שקטה וללא חילוקי דעות יסודיים, מלבד בנושא אחד - המדיניות במרכז אמריקה. כאן התנהל ויכוח נוקב בין האגף ה"יוני" וה"ניצי" , כאשר האגף הניצי נוטה לתמיכה בעיקרי מדיניות הממשל במרכז אמריקה, בעוד האגף ה"יוני" תובע הדברות עם ניקרגואה והתנגדות למאבק צבאי. בין הדוברים הבולטים של האגף ה"יוני" היו אד אסנר, נשיא איגוד שחקני הבד, קן בליילוק, נשיא איגוד עובדי המדינה, וג'רי מקנטי, נשיא איגוד עובדי המדינות והעיריות. הם נתמכו גם ע"י דוברים מאיגוד עובדי המכוניות ואיגוד עובדי הטקסטיל. לתמיכה בקו הניצי יותר שבו תומכת רוב ההנהגה התייצבו, בין השאר, ליין קירקלנד עצמו ואל שנקר, נשיא איגוד המורים. ההחלטה שנתקבלה מהווה פשרה והיא מדגישה את הצורך לפתור את בעיות מרכז אמריקה, ניקרגואה ואל - סלבאדור באמצעות תהליך פוליטי ולא צבאי.

נושאי פנים: עיקר עיסוקה של הועידה היה בנושאי פנים. החושת המשתתפים היתה כי יש סיכוי לזינוק מחודש של האיגודים המקצועיים, תוך ניצול יעיל של משאביהם המשותפים לארגון חברים חדשים, מסע תקשורתי וטלוויזיוני לשינוי תדמיתם, ושימוש בכוחם הפוליטי והכלכלי למניעת תהליכים כלכליים בלתי - רצויים של אנטי - יוניוניזם, מעבר חברות לאזורים לא-יוניוניסטיים, או לארצות מתפתחות בהם שכר עבודה נמוך ותנאי עבודה גרועים. 1985 היא השנה הראשונה מזה כעשור שלא חל בה פיחות נוסף במספר חברי הפדרציה, אם כי האיגודים התעשייתיים המשיכו להפסיד חברים בשל המשבר התעשייתי והפגיעה ביצוא האמריקאי הרי איגודי השרותים, התקשורת והסקטור הציבורי גדלו ונתחזקו.

במאמץ להגדיל את כוח המשיכה של האיגודים הוחלט לראשונה להתחיל לפעול בכיוון של שרותים והטבות לחברים, שאינם דווקא חלק מן ההסכם הקבוצי. ה - AFL - CIO כפדרציה יזום, באמצעות האיגודים, שרותי ביטוח שונים, הטבות סוציאליות ואשראי מוזל שינתנו גם לסוג חדש של "חברים נלווים" שהם חברי איגודים שאינם עובדים בהכרח במקום עבודה המיוצג ע"י האיגוד, חובה שהיתה קיימת עד כה כמעט בכל האיגודים.

החלטות אחרות מותחות ביקורת על מדיניות הממשל בנושאי תעסוקה, מסחר בינלאומי, תקציב, מיסוי, יחסי עבודה ושפוט בענייני איגוד מקצועי.

התהליך הפוליטי: הועידה בחנה את לקחי הפעילות בעד מועמדות מונדייל, והחליטה כי המאמץ היה מועיל והוכיח את כוחם הארגוני והפוליטי של האיגודים. הוחלט כי גם בבחירות הבאות יעשה מאמץ לתמיכה מוקדמת באחד המועמדים בתנאי שלפחות שני שליש מן האיגודים יתמכו במהלך זה. כפי שהיה ב - 84. טרם מסתמן מועמד מועדף ע"י האיגודים, והשמות העיקריים המוזכרים באורח חיובי הם הסנטור טד קנדי, מושל ניו-יורק מריו קומו והסנטור מניו-ג'רסי ביל ברדליי. מאבק הבחירות המוקדמות בין קנדי לקומו עלול לפצל את האיגודים ולמנוע תמיכה מוקדמת במועמד מוסכם אחד.

בחירת ההנהגה: כצפוי נבחרו פה אחד לתקופת כהונה רביעית הנשיא ליין קירקלנד והמזכיר - גזבר תום דונהיו. הועידה הוכיחה שוב את מעמדם הבלתי מעורער של השניים. את עבודת הצוות המתואמת בין שניהם ואת יוקרתם האישית כלפי פנים וכלפי חוץ. מבין שאר 33 חברי המועצה, שלהם תואר סגן נשיא, המשיכו בכהונתם 29, ללא התנגדות. 4 פרשו לגמלאות: ג'ון ליונס, נשיא איגוד עובדי המתכת, ג'יי טורנר, נשיא איגוד ההנדסאים, בוב גוס, נשיא איגוד עובדי הכימיה, הנפט והאטום וקן בראון נשיא איגוד עובדי הגרפיקה. על 4 המקומות שנותרו התחרו עשרים מועמדים. היה מאבק קשה על הגדלת ייצוג הנשים, אך הוא נכשל, לעומת זאת נוסף להנהגה עוד נציג שחור. בסופו של מאבק קשה המליצה ועדת המינויים והועידה אישרה בחירתם של ארבעה אלו:

בוב ג'ורג'ין, נשיא איגודי הבניה.

לארי דוגן, הנשיא החדש של ההנדסאים.

ג'ין אופשו(שחור), נשיא איגוד האתלטים המקצועיים ושחקני הפוטבול.

מילן סטון, נשיא איגוד עובדי תעשיות הגומי.

נושאים בינלאומיים: לצד הועידה התקיים סימפוזיון בן יום שלם בנושא הפעילות הבינלאומית של האיגודים המקצועיים, הנושאים המרכזיים שעלו בו: המאבק לשויון זכויות לכל הגזעים בדרום אפריקה; בעיות מרכז אמריקה; והמצב הפנימי המחמיר בפיליפינים. בין המשתתפים היו נציגי השחורים בדרום אפריקה, מנהיגי האיגודים האופוזיציונים בניקרגואה ומזכ"ל האיגודים האנטי קומוניסטיים בפיליפינים ארנסטו הררה, שאף היה חתן פרס ג'ורג' מיני לחרות האדם, בזכות פעולתו בועדת החקירה על רצח מנהיג האופוזיציה אקינו. בין המשתתפים היו אורחים רבים מקנדה, בריטניה, אירופה וארצות העולם השלישי, נשיא ומזכיר הפדרציה הבינלאומית של האיגודים המקצועיים החופשיים, מארצות ערב היו נציגים רק ממצרים ומתוניס. נציג מצרים הפגין ידידות רבה כלפי הישראלים, וכן עשו נציגים רבים מארצות מוסלמיות ואחרות שאינן מקיימות יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ישראל.

את העוינות היחידה הפגין נציג תוניס.

את ישראל ייצגו בועידה אליעזר רפאלי, נציג ההסתדרות בדרום אמריקה, איתן סלע, נציג ההסתדרות באמריקה הלטינית ודניאל בלוך, יועץ העבודה בשגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון ובאוטאווה.

החלטות בנושאי ישראל: כרגיל בלט בועידה היחס הידידותי המיוחד של האיגודים המקצועיים האמריקאיים לישראל ולהסתדרות. הדבר בלט גם בהחלטות בנושאי המזרח התיכון, תמיכה בהסתדרות, תמיכה במאבק יהודי בריה"מ, תמיכה במאבק תקיף והבלתי- מתפשר נגד הטרור וגם ביחס החם והאוהד של ראשי האיגודים. יחס זה לא הועם, למרות הזעם הרב של התמשכות סכסוך העבודה בין איגוד המכונאים לבין "אל-על" בניו-יורק. איגוד המכונאים ותומכיו העלו הצעת החלטה לנקוט בחרם נגד ה"בונדס" כולל פדיון מוקדם של אגרות (האיגודים מחזיקים כיום באגרות בהיקף של כ- 150 מיליון דולר והתחייבו על רכישה נוספת של עוד כ - 50 מיליון). המגעות מרכישות חדשות ומהשתתפות באירועים ישראליים ובביקורים בישראל - ידידינו הרבים, ובראשם ליין קירקלנד, ניסו למנוע קבלת החלטה כלשהי, אך בלחץ נשיא המכונאים ויליאם וינפיסינגר עובדה הצעת פשרה המתייחסת רק ל "אל-על" ולשביתה, בלי התייחסות לישראל ול"בונדס". (החלטה זו והחלטות אחרות בנושאים הקשורים בישראל מצורפים בסוף הדו"ח). המאמץ הרב לטובתנו הוא תוצאה של שיחת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס עם ליין קירקלנד בוושינגטון, הרצון שלא לפגוע בישראל בתקופה כה קריטית לתהליך השלום, ומאמץ ההסברה שלנו שהעכובים האחרונים במו"מ היו יותר באשמת נציגי איגוד המכונאים מאשר באשמת "אל-על". ברור, עם זאת, כי זו הפעם האחרונה שהצלחנו למנוע צעד חריף מטעם ה AFL - CIO והכל מצפים כי הסכסוך ייפתר תוך זמן קצר ביותר ע"י החזרה בהקדם של כל העובדים ששבתו לעבודה מלאה והעברה לבוררות של השאלות השנויות במחלוקת. אף אדם סביר אינו מסוגל להבין מדוע נסחב הסכסוך זמן כה רב (ממרס 1984).

מועצת האיגודים המקצועיים למען ההסתדרות: כיושב ראש המועצה מכהן עתה מורטי בר, הנשיא החדש של ה - C W A (איגוד עובדי התקשורת של אמריקה). הוא בא במקומו של אד שניידר, שנפטר לפני זמן - מה.

המועצה קיימה במהלך הועידה ישיבה במסגרת של ארוחת בוקר, ודנה בדרכים להידוק שיתוף הפעולה בין האיגודים לבין הקהילה היהודית בארה"ב וכן עם ישראל וההסתדרות. בין המשתתפים בפגישה היו ליין קירקלנד ותום דונהיו, נשיאי האיגודים מורטי באר, צ'יק צ'יקין, אל שנקר, ג ק ג'ויס, לארי דוגאן, ופרד או'ניל, סגנית נשיא הפדרציה ג'ויס מילר, המזכירים - גזברים ג'ק שוקמן, רוברט פורטר, ג'יי מזור וג'ון רוג'רס וכן ראשי פדרציות מקומיות ומדיניתיות מניו-יורק, טקסס, פנסילבניה, וושינגטון, אידאהו, ארקנסאו, קליפורניה, העיר וושינגטון ועוד. ככל הזכור היה זה אחד המפגנים המרשימים ביותר מזה שנים רבות של ידידות לישראל ולהסתדרות מצד ראשי ה - AFL - CIO.

ב ב ר כ ה,

דניאל בלוך

נספח: החלטות בנושאים : מזרח תיכון
זכויות האדם
טרור
הסתדרות
הצעת החלטה בעניין "אל-על" (לא נתקבלה)
ההחלטה בעניין "אל-על"

The AFL-CIO reaffirms its historic support for Israel, the only democratic state in the Middle East. There can be no beginning of a solution to the continuing and deep-seated conflicts in the Middle East until the nations of that region recognize mutually accepted borders. This requires the unqualified acceptance of the state of Israel by the Arab nations and their willingness to renegotiate a treaty directly with Israel.

The AFL-CIO also reaffirms its solidarity with Histadrut, the Israeli labor federation, which has played a major role in shaping the democratic life of Israel. We urge our affiliates to continue their support for the American Trade Union Council for Histadrut.

## Labor, National Security and the World

Proposed Amendment by the Resolutions Committee to **RESOLUTION NO. 34**, Book 1, Page 52, to be inserted at the beginning of the resolution.

Democratic governments can neither yield to the demands of terrorists nor give them the satisfaction of perverting our democratic practices. Avoiding both pitfalls, the democracies still have the means, if they can mobilize the will, to fight the scourge of terrorism.

The AFL-CIO endorses the principle that there can be no safe haven for terrorists. Their network of training camps must not be immune from attack. States that sponsor or finance terrorist activities must be put on notice that they will be held accountable by the community of nations. The AFL-CIO calls upon all democratic governments to coordinate efforts to track down terrorists and bring them to justice. The accommodation of terrorists demands by one nation is a threat to all nations. We urge all governments to adopt more effective security measures, consistent with the preservation of civil liberties, to protect their people from terrorist attacks and to apprehend and prosecute those responsible for such attacks.

## Histadrut

**RESOLUTION NO. 274**—By the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union.

WHEREAS, Histadrut, the General Federation of Labor in Israel, has been the architect of the State of Israel imparting to its people a zeal to build a new kind of society based on the highest ideals of justice and democracy; and

WHEREAS, The American labor movement through the American Trade Union Council for Histadrut has extended to Histadrut an inspiring labor solidarity by means of moral and financial support to enable Histadrut to carry on its wide and varied social welfare, educational and cultural programs; and

WHEREAS, AFL-CIO State Trade Union Councils for Histadrut have been set up throughout the country as a means of expressing their sympathy with their fellow trade unionists in Israel; and

WHEREAS, The official policy of the National AFL-CIO is in support of Israel, as expressed in the words of President Lane Kirkland, "The AFL-CIO will, as it always has done, do its level best to keep America on the side of freedom and the side of Israel;" therefore, be it

RESOLVED: That the AFL-CIO repledges its fraternal solidarity with and confidence in Histadrut and affirms its support for the democratic and equitable society Histadrut is determined to build in Israel and urges all its affiliates to do what they can to support the educational and cultural programs of Histadrut, through the National Committee for Labor Israel.

הצעה החלטה שלא נתקבלה בעניין שביתת אל-על:

## El Al Airlines

**RESOLUTION NO. 241**—By the Union Label and Service Trades Department.

WHEREAS, Members of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers have been on strike against El Al Airlines since March 16, 1984, because of management demands for wage concessions, cuts in fringe benefits, and elimination of vital work rules; and

WHEREAS, Management has refused to bargain in good faith, has repeatedly walked out of meetings, has imported strikebreakers from Israel and caused violence on the picket line; and

WHEREAS, Histadrut has condemned El Al's handling of this dispute and expressed full solidarity with the striking employees; and

WHEREAS, Despite continued assurances that the company is determined to settle, there has been no real movement; now therefore, be it

RESOLVED: That until El Al Airlines negotiates a settlement with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, all AFL-CIO affiliates and departments

1. Call in their Israeli Bonds immediately or at maturity,

2. Announce their refusal to purchase Israeli Bonds, or attend Bond dinners and functions, and

3. Urge that union members and officers and their families refuse to visit Israel until a contract is ratified.

Referred to the Committee on Resolutions.

## El Al Airlines

**RESOLUTION NO. 287** -- By the Resolutions Committee

The AFL-CIO declares its full solidarity with the members of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers who have been on strike against El Al Airlines since March 16, 1984.

The strike was caused by management demands for wage concessions, cuts in fringe benefits and elimination of vital work rules. Management has refused to bargain in good faith, has repeatedly walked out of meetings, has imported strike breakers from Israel, has hired union busting consultants and has caused violence on the picketline.

Further, El Al management has resorted to the despicable tactic of forming a company union and has attempted to decertify the IAM as bargaining agent for the employees.

The AFL-CIO condemns the anti-union tactics of El Al Airlines, which projects an unfair image of the nation of Israel and cast a shadow on that nation's heritage of democratic trade unionism.

Despite efforts by the AFL-CIO and the leaders of the Israeli government to bring about a satisfactory settlement, the company refuses to carry on good faith negotiations.

Since July 11, 1984, a boycott of El Al Airlines has been in effect with the full support of all AFL-CIO unions. Only because of the fact that negotiations are now underway between the AFL-CIO and the highest levels of the Israeli government is stronger action against El Al being withheld from consideration at this time.

In this spirit, the AFL-CIO urges the swift resumption of negotiations and the prompt settlement of this dispute.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

097

סודי ביותר (פקסי)

אל :- מ"מ מנכ"ל, מנהל מצפ"א, ממ"ד

דע :- ממרח"מ ושה"ח

**משיחה עם מרפי :**

1. שאלתי כיצד רואה הוא את ה"סנגו" סורית - ירדן ומשמעותו, ביחוד נוכח העובדה שהאיום הסורי על ירדן הוצג ע"י הירדנים (ותממשל) כעילה למכירת הנשק. אמר, כי אולי מתאים לכך שם של ריקוד אחר, "מפחידי" יותר, ומכל מקום סבור שיש לראות זאת כאחד המאמצים התקופתיים המזוהים עם ריפאעי, להפגת מתחים עם סוריה, במגמה להפחית את האיומים כלפי ירדן.

2. הסורים, לדעת מרפי, אינם מעוניינים בתהליך של שלום ולדעתם כל המהלכים מציבים את הצד הערבי במצב של נחיתות. הם מובנים אולי עקיטת למגע עם הירדנים, משני טעמים : (א) השגת יחסים מתוחים פתוח עם ירדן, מה גם שהסעודים תומכים כספית הן בסוריה והן בירדן רוצים בכך;

(ב) אם ניתן לפגוע בערפאת או אף לסלקו , מה טוב (אך משמעות הדבר שהם רוצים לבוא במקומו למו"מ).

3. לשאלתי אם מדינות ערביות אכן פנו לסובייטים לחדש היחסים עמנו כדי שיוכלו להצטרף לתהליך השלום, אמר כי ידוע לו שהירדנים פנו לסובייטים בענין זה, ואומרים (העיר זאת גם בהאנק נראיון חוסין ל- ABC השבוע) כי ידברו עוד. ספק אם הענין הוא לקורת רוחם של הסורים .

4. לשאלתי (בעקבות דברי פלאסן בשלכם 29) להשכילנו במה קונקרקית רואה מחמ"ד את מעבר התהליך מן העיסוק התיפותטי לשלב המוחשי בנושא הייצוג הפלסטינאי וההקשר הבינלאומי, השיב ; (א) ישנה האוירה הכללית . (ב) באשר למישור ההקשר הבינלאומי ישנם דברי ר הי"מ. הזכיר כי רה"מ אמנם הדגיש שאין לדבר על הסובייטים בלי חידוש הייצוג הדיפלומטי. שהזכרתי כי הושין מדבר על מתכונת של ג'נבה (כלומר שאין יחסים דיפלומטיים עם הסובייטים), אמר שהאמריקנים מדגישים באזניו כי ג'נבה היתה אירוע בלתי שלאחר מלחמת יום הכיפורים ולא הלא פני הדברים עתה, אמרתי שהוא מדבר כאילו קרא Talking Points שלנו. כללו של דבר , עצם היאבקותם של הצדדים השונים "בנקודות ברורות" בנושא זה מהווה שינוי מן האביב האחרון, (ג) באשר לייצוג הפלסטינאי - נושא זה כמובן הרבה פחות ברור, עם זאת הזכיר בהקשר זה כי קיבל מדיווחים שונים איזורים לכך שהירדנים נתנו לאש"פ "הצגה נוקשה" בעמאן. השתיקה הירדנית בהודעות מעידה גם היא על כך. אופרטיבית לא יופתע אם ימתינו הערבים לפיסגת ג'נבה כדי לקבוע מה הלאה, כיוון שחלקם מצפים לעיסוק נרחב בנושא המזי"ת בפיסגה, זאת הגם שאין הוא עצמו צופה לכך כרגע. בראשית השיחה שאלתיו בקשר ל"יזמה"

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

097

ס נ פ ח מ ב ר ק
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דח.....מתוך.....לפיס
שידוג דיקרי.....
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מס' מנ' .....

בעניין חידוש שיחות נקורה במגמה לדחוף פרישת יוניפי"ל לגבול הבינ"ל, קרי דחיקתנו ודחיקת צד"ל, הואיל והדיווחים בקשר ל"אבהות" שונים (ג'ומייל או מזכירות האו"ם).

אמר שאינו בקי בפרטים אך ככל הזכור לו גילה ג'ומייל בשיחותיו עם המזכ"ל עניין בהשגת פרישת יוניפי"ל לגבול הבינ"ל. שאל לדעתנו, ואמרתי שאינני יודע דעת כל הגורמים, אך הבנתי האישית היא שאם המדובר בשיחות שמטרתן כאמור לעיל, הרי אין בתן טעם, לכאורה, המצב כיום סביר בסחונית. אמר כי עמדת ארה"ב העקרונית היא כמובן בעד מימוש מנדט יוניפי"ל (החלטת האו"ם 425). לא לחצו עלינו בקשר לכך בטווח הקצר, אך השאלה היא המצב כלפי העתיד, ומה הקריאה של עמדת הסורים, לגופו של דבר יתכן שיהיה בניו יורק השבוע ויפגש עם מזכירות האו"ם, הבטיח לתדרכנו (הזכרתי ביקור שהב"ט בשבוע הבא).

רובינשטיין

# official text

DATE: 11/04/85

REAGAN WOULD WITHHOLD SDI UNTIL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ARE GONE
(Text: Reagan interview with Soviet journalists) (8370)

Washington -- The United States would not deploy any strategic defense system until all offensive nuclear missiles are eliminated, President Reagan says.

Seeking to overcome Soviet fears that his Strategic Defense Initiative is a way to achieve a first strike capability, the president told four Soviet journalists October 31 that, "We won't put...this system in place, this defensive system, until we do away with our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles."

"If the Soviet Union and the United States both say we will eliminate our offensive weapons," he explained, "we will put in this defensive thing in case in some place in the world a madman some day tries to create these...nuclear weapons again."

Reagan repeated his willingness to make defensive weapon technology available to other nations, including the Soviet Union.

Following is the text of interview, made available by the White House November 4:

(begin text)

THE PRESIDENT: May I welcome you all -- it's a pleasure here. And I appreciate very much the opportunity to be able to speak, in a sense, to the people of your country. I've always believed that a lot of the ills of the world would disappear if people talked more to each other instead of about each other. So I look forward to this meeting and welcome your questions.

QUESTION; Mr. president, we appreciate greatly this opportunity to ask you personally questions after you kindly answered our written questions. We hope that they will be instructive and -- well, facilitate success for your forthcoming meeting with our leader.

ANSWER: Well, I'm looking forward to that meeting. I'm hopeful and optimistic that maybe we can make some concrete achievements there.

Q; We are planning to ask our questions in Russian. I don't think -- I think you don't mind.

A: No.

Q; Mr. President, we have become acquainted with the answers which you furnished to our written questions. They basically reflect the old United States proposals. They have been evaluated -- which have been evaluated by the Soviet side as being unbalanced and one-sided in favor of the U.S. side. And you have not answered concerning the new Soviet proposal. And this reply to the new Soviet proposal is what is of greatest interest before the meeting in Geneva.

A: When this interview is over, I will be making a statement to our own press -- well, to all the press -- to the effect that we have been studying the Soviet proposal and tomorrow (Nov. 1) in Geneva, our team at the disarmament conference will be presenting our reply which will be a proposal that reflects the thinking of the original proposal that we had, but also of this latest. Indeed, it will show that we are accepting some of the figures that were in this counterproposal by the secretary general.

There are some points in which we have offered compromises between some figures of theirs and some of ours. But that will all be

-- all those figures will be available tomorrow (Nov. 1), and I will simply be stating today that we have -- that that is going to take place tomorrow (Nov. 1) in Geneva. But it is a detailed counterproposal that -- to a counterproposal, as is proper in negotiations, that will reflect, as I say, the acceptance on our part of some of this latest proposal as well as compromises with earlier figures that we'd proposed.

Q: I would like to have another question for you, Mr. President. According to a survey taken by The Washington Post and ABC-TV on Tuesday (Oct. 29) it was found that 74 percent of the American people as compared to 20 percent said that they would like the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear arsenals and not to have the United States develop space weapons. This seems to be the choice which the American people have made. It seems clear that without stopping the development of weapons in space there can be no reduction of nuclear weapons. This is the position of the Soviet side. So how then will you react, Mr. President, to this opinion expressed by the American public?

A: For one thing, it is based on a misconception. The use of the term "Star Wars" came about when one political figure in America used that to describe what it is we are researching and studying, and then our press picked it up and it has been world-wide. We're not talking about Star Wars at all. We are talking about seeing if there isn't a defensive weapon that does not kill people, but that simply makes it impossible for nuclear missiles, once fired out of their silos, to reach their objective -- to intercept those weapons.

Now it is also true that, to show that this is a misconception on the part of the people when you use the wrong terms, not too long ago there was a survey taken, a poll of our people, and they asked them about "Star Wars." And similar to the reaction in this poll, only about 30 percent of the people in our country favored it, and the rest didn't. But in the same poll they then described, as I have tried to describe, what it is we are researching -- a strategic defensive shield that doesn't kill people, but would allow us one day -- all of us -- to reduce -- get rid of nuclear weapons. And over 90 percent of the American people favored our going forward with such a program.

Now this is one of the things that we will discuss. We are for, and have for several years now, been advocating a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. It is uncivilized on the part of all of us to be sitting here with the only deterrent to war -- offensive nuclear weapons that in such numbers that both of us could threaten the other with the death and the annihilation of millions and millions of each other's people.

And so that is the deterrent that is supposed to keep us from firing these missiles at each other. Wouldn't it make a lot more sense if we could find -- that as there has been in history for every weapon a defensive weapon. Weapon isn't the term to use for what we are researching. We are researching for something that could make it, as I say, virtually impossible for these missiles to reach their targets. And if we find such a thing, my proposal is that we make it available to all the world. We don't just keep it for our own advantage.

Q: Mr. President, with the situation as it stands today in the international arena, attempts to create such a space shield will inevitably lead to suspicion on the other side that the country creating such a space shield will be in a position to make a first strike. This is a type of statement whose truth is agreed to by many people. Now, it's apparent that the American people have indicated their choice, that if it comes down to a choice between the creation of such a space system and the decrease in nuclear arms, they prefer a decrease in nuclear arms. So, it seems to be a realistic evaluation on the part of the American people. And I would like to ask how the American government would react to the feelings of the American people in this regard.

A: In the first place, yes, if someone was developing such a defensive system and going to couple it with their own nuclear weapons -- offensive weapons -- yes, that could put them in a position where they might be more likely to dare a first strike. But your country, your government has been working on this same kind of a plan beginning years before we ever started working on it, which, I think, would indicate that maybe we should be a little suspicious that they want it for themselves.

But I have said, and am prepared to say at the summit, that if such a weapon is possible, and our research reveals that, then, our move would be to say to all the world, "Here, it is available." We won't put this weapon -- or this system in place, this defensive system, until we do away with our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles. But we will make it available to other countries, including the Soviet Union, to do the same thing.

Now, just what -- whichever one of us comes up first with that defensive system, the Soviet Union or us or anyone else -- what a picture if we say no one will claim a monopoly on it. And we make that offer now. It will be available for the Soviet Union, as well as ourselves.

And if the Soviet Union and the United States both say we will eliminate our offensive weapons, we will put in this defensive thing in case some place in the world a madman some day tries to create these weapons again -- nuclear weapons -- because, remember, we all know how to make them now. So, you can't do away with that information. But we would all be safe knowing that if such a madman project is ever attempted there isn't any of us that couldn't defend ourselves against it.

So, I can assure you now we are not going to try and monopolize this, if such a weapon is developed, for a first-strike capability.

Q: Mr. President, I would like to ask you about some of the matters which concern mutual suspicion and distrust. And you indicated at your speech at the United Nations that the U.S. does not extend -- does not have troops in other countries -- but there are -- has not occupied other countries. But there are 550,000 troops -- military personnel outside of the United States. In 32 countries, there are 1,500 military bases. So, one can see in this way which country it is that has become surrounded. And you have agreed that the Soviet Union has the right to look-out for the interest of its security. And it is inevitable that the Soviet Union must worry about these bases which have -- which are around it.

The Soviet Union, in turn, has not done the same. So, how do you in this respect anticipate to create this balance of security which you have spoken about?

A: Well, I can't respond to your exact numbers there that you've given. I don't have them right at my fingertips as to what they are. But we're talking about two different things -- we're talking about occupying a country with foreign troops, such as we see the Soviet Union doing in Afghanistan, and there are other places, too -- Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia.

Yes, we have troops in bases. The bulk of those would be in the NATO forces -- the alliance in Europe along the NATO line -- there in response to even superior numbers of Warsaw pact troops that are aligned against them. And the United States, as one of the members of the alliance, contributes troops to that NATO force.

The same is true in Korea in which, at the invitation of the South Korean government, we have troops to help them there because of the demilitarized zone and the threatening nature of North Korea, which attacked them without warning. And that was not an American war, even though we provided most of the men. That war was fought under the flag of the United Nations. The United Nations found North Korea guilty of aggression in violation of the Charter of the U.N. And, finally, South Korea was defended and the North Koreans were defeated. But they still have maintained a sizeable, threatening offensive force.

Other places -- we have bases in the far Pacific; we've had them for many years in the Philippines. We lease those -- those are bases we rent. In fact, we even have a base that is leased on Cuba that was there long before there was a Castro in Cuba -- a naval base. But this, I think, is a far cry from occupying other countries, including the nations in the Warsaw pact. They never were allowed the self-determination that was agreed to in the Yalta Treaty -- the end of World War II.

So, I think my statement still goes -- that there is a difference in occupation and a difference in having bases where they are there in a noncombat situation, and many where they are requested by the parent country.

Q: If there's a referendum and the Cuban people decide that the base at Guantanamo should be evacuated, would it be evacuated?

A: No, because the lease for that was made many years ago and it still has many years to run, and we're perfectly legal in our right to be there. It is fenced off. There is no contact with the people or the main island of Cuba at all.

Q: Mr. President, you have mentioned Afghanistan. I would like to say that in Afghanistan Soviet troops are there at the invitation of the Afghan government to defend the Afghan revolution against the incursions of forces from abroad that are funded and supported by the United States.

In the United Nations, and in your written replies to our questions, you have indicated that the United States has not attempted to use force, but has fostered the process of democracy by peaceful means. How does this reply fit in with the use of force by the United States in many countries abroad, beginning with Vietnam, where seven million tons of weapons were dropped -- seven million tons more than were in the Second World War, and, also, Grenada? I ask this not to dwell on the past, but simply to clarify this issue.

A: And it can be clarified, yes.

First, of all, with regard to Afghanistan, the government which invited the Soviet troops in didn't have any choice because the government was put there by the Soviet Union and put there with the force of arms to guarantee. And, in fact, the man who was the head of that government is the second choice. The first one wasn't satisfactory to the Soviet Union and they came in with armed forces and threw him out and installed their second choice, who continues to be the governor.

Now, there are no outside forces fighting in there. But, as a matter of fact, I think there are some things that, if they were more widely known, would shock everyone worldwide. For example, one of the weapons being used against the people of Afghanistan consists of toys -- dolls, little toy trucks, things that are appealing to children. They're scattered in the air. But when the children pick them up, their hands are blown off. They are what we call booby-traps. They're like land mines. This is hardly consistent with the kind of armed warfare that has occurred between nations.

Vietnam? Yes, when Vietnam -- or let's say, French Indochina -- was given up as a colony, an international forum in Geneva, meeting in Geneva, established a North Vietnam and a South Vietnam. The North Vietnam was already governed by a communist group and had a government in place during the Japanese occupation of French Indochina. South Vietnam had to start and create a government.

We were invited into -- with instructors, to help them establish something they had never had before, which was a military. And our instructors went in in civilian clothes. Their families went with them. And they started with a country that didn't have any military schools or things of this kind to create an armed force for the government of South Vietnam.

They were harassed by terrorists from the very beginning. Finally, it was necessary to send the families home. Schools were being bombed. There was even a practice of rolling bombs down the aisles of movie theaters and killing countless people that were simply enjoying a movie. And finally, changes were made that our people were allowed to arm themselves for their own protection.

And then, it is true, that President Kennedy sent in a unit of troops to provide protection. This grew into the war of Vietnam. At no time did the allied force -- and it was allied. There were more in there than just American troops. -- At no time did we try for victory. Maybe that's what was wrong. We simply tried to maintain a demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. And we know the result that has occurred now.

And it is all one state of Vietnam. It was conquered in violation of a treaty that was signed in Paris between North and South Vietnam. We left South Vietnam, and North Vietnam swept down, conquered the country, as I say, in violation of a treaty.

But this is true of almost any of the other places that you mentioned. We -- I've talked so long I've forgotten some of the other examples that you used.

Q: Grenada.

A: Grenada. Ah. We had some several hundred young American medical students there. Our intelligence revealed that they were threatened as potential hostages and the government of Grenada

requested help, military help, not only from the United States, but from the other Commonwealth nations -- island nations in the Caribbean -- from Jamaica, from Dominica, a number of these others. They in turn relayed the request to us because they did not have armed forces in sufficient strength.

And, yes, we landed. And we found warehouses filled with weapons, and they were of Soviet manufacture. We found hundreds of Cubans there. There was a brief engagement. We freed the island. And in a very short time, our troops came home, after rescuing our students, rescuing the island. There are no American troops there now. Grenada has set up a democracy and is ruling itself by virtue of an election that was held shortly thereafter among the people, and of which we played no part.

And there is the contrast' The Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan for six years now, fighting all that time. We did what we were asked to do -- the request of the government of Grenada -- and came home.

Q: Mr. President, with relation to the ABM Treaty, which was signed in 1972, Article V of that treaty indicates, and I quote, "that each side will not develop a test or deploy anti-ballistic missile components or systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. Now, some administration representatives say that the Treaty is such that it permits all of these things -- the development, the testing, and deployment of ABM systems. Such an interpretation of that treaty certainly cannot help achieve agreement.

What is the true position of the American administration with regard to the interpretation of this treaty? Will the U.S. abide by the Treaty or not? And certainly the results of your meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev will depend a great deal on that fact.

A: There are two varying interpretations of the treaty. There is an additional clause in the treaty that would seem to be more liberal than that paragraph 5 -- or clause 5. The other hand, we have made it plain that we are going to stay within a strict definition of the treaty. And what we are doing with regard to research -- and that would include testing -- is within the treaty.

Now, with regard to deployment, as I said earlier, no, we are doing what is within the treaty and which the Soviet Union has already been doing for quite some time, same kind of research and development. But, when it comes to deployment, I don't know what the Soviet Union was going to do when and if their research developed such a weapon, or still if it does. But I do know what we're going to do and I have stated it already. We would not deploy -- it is not my purpose for deployment -- until we sit down with the other nations of the world, and those that have nuclear arsenals, and see if we cannot come to an agreement on which there will be deployment only if there is elimination of the nuclear weapons.

Now, you might say if we're going to eliminate the nuclear weapons, then why do we need the defense? Well, I repeat what I said earlier. We all know how to make them -- the weapons, so it is possible that some day a madman could arise in the world -- we were both allies in a war that came about because of such a madman -- and therefore, it would be like, in Geneva after World War I when the nations all got together and said no more poison gas, but we all kept our gasmasks. Well, this weapon, if such can be developed, would be today's gasmask. But we would want it for everyone and the terms for getting it, and the terms for our own deployment would be the elimination of the offensive weapons -- a switch to maintain trust and peace between us of having defense systems that gave us security, not the threat of annihilation -- that one or the other of us would annihilate the other with nuclear weapons.

So, we will not be violating this treaty at any time, because, as I say, it is not our purpose to go forward with deployment if and when such a weapon proved practical.

Q: Mr. President, we've about run out of time unless you had something in conclusion you wanted to state.

A: Well, I -- we haven't covered -- I guess I've filibustered on too many of these questions here with lengthy answers. I know you have more questions there. I'm sorry that we haven't time for them.

But I would just like to say that the Soviet Union and the United States -- well, not the Soviet Union, let us say Russia and the United States have been allies in two wars. The Soviet Union and the United

States, allies in one, the last and greatest war, World War II. Americans and Russians died side by side, fighting the same enemy.

There are Americans buried on Soviet soil. And it just seems to me -- and what I look forward to in this meeting with the general secretary -- is that people don't start wars, governments do. And I have a little thing here that I copied out of an article the other day and the author of the article uttered a very great truth. "Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed. They arm themselves because they distrust each other." Well, I hope that in the summit maybe we can find ways that we can prove by deed -- not just words, but by deeds -- that there is no need for distrust between us. And then we can stop punishing our people by using our wherewithal to build these arsenals of weapons instead of doing more things for the comfort of the people.

Q: Thank you very much, Mr. President, and --

A: Thank you.

(end of formal interview)

(start of informal comments)

Q: -- it's a pity, sir, too, that there can't be enough time to have your answers for all our questions --

A: Well, all right. Okay.

Q: Thank you, Mr. President.

Q: Unfortunately, Mr. President, we cannot discuss with you the history of questions which we just asked already because we have sometimes a very different attitude of that. But no time.

Q: As you know, the world is sort of different.

A: I was waiting for a question that would allow me to point out that, under the detente that we had for a few years, during which we signed the SALT I and the SALT II Treaties, the Soviet Union added over 7,000 warheads to its arsenal. And we have fewer than we had in 1969. And 3,800 of those were added to the arsenal after the signing of SALT II. So --

Q: But still you have more warheads --

A: No, we don't.

Q: -- Mr. President.

A: Oh, no we don't.

Q: Yes, you have -- well, to 12,000 --

Q: You know, it's an interesting phenomenon because in '79, after seven years of very severe -- I would say the -- researching in -- SALT II, the -- President Carter and other specialists told that there was a parity in strategic and military. And then you came to the power and they said -- you said it sounded that the Soviet Union is much ahead. Then, recently, in September, you said almost the same, though the Joint Chiefs of Staffs told this year that there is a parity. What is the contradiction?

A: No, there really isn't. Somebody might say that with the sense of that we have sufficient for a deterrent, that, in other words, we would have enough to make it uncomfortable if someone attacked us. But, no, your arsenal does out-count ours by a great number.

Q: People say that -- The generals -- your generals say that they wouldn't -- switch, you know, with our generals, your arsenal.

Q: I would like to tell you also that those stories about dolls in Afghanistan. I was in Afghanistan there a little bit --

MR. SPEAKES: He's -- maybe we'll have another opportunity --

Q: Yes, we hope so.

MR. SPEAKES: And he's got to go down and tell the general secretary, through our press, what he's going to do.

Q: Thank you very much, Mr. President, and we wish you certainly success and good achievements in your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. We hope for this.

A: Thank you.

(end of informal comments)

RESPONSES TO PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED WRITTEN QUESTIONS

QUESTION ONE: The forthcoming meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and you, Mr. President, is for obvious reasons looked upon as an event of special importance. Both sides have stated their intention to make an effort to improve relations between our two countries, to better the overall international situation. The Soviet Union has, over a period of time, put forward a whole set of concrete proposals and has unilaterally taken steps in various areas directly

aimed at achieving this goal. What is the U.S. for its part going to do?

THE PRESIDENT: I fully agree that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev has special significance, and I am personally looking forward to it very much. I sincerely hope that we will be able to put relations between our two countries on a safer and more secure course. I, for my part, will certainly do all I can to make that possible.

We of course study every Soviet proposal carefully and when we find them promising we are happy to say so. If, on the other hand, we find them one-sided in their effect, we explain why we feel as we do. At the same time we, too, have made concrete proposals -- dozens of them -- which also cover every sphere of our relationship, from the elimination of chemical weapons and resolution of regional conflicts to the expansion of contacts and exchanges, and we hope these receive the same careful attention that we give to Soviet proposals.

Let me give you a few examples. One thing that has created enormous tension in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last few years has been attempts to settle problems around the world by using military force. The resort to arms, whether it be in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or in Africa, has contributed nothing to the prospects for peace or the resolution of indigenous problems, and has only brought additional suffering to the peoples of these regions. This is also dangerous, and we need to find a way to stop attempts to solve problems by force. So I have proposed that both our countries encourage parties to these conflicts to lay down their arms and negotiate solutions -- and if they are willing to do that our countries should find a way to agree to support a peaceful solution and refrain from providing military support to the warring parties. And if peace can be achieved, the United States will contribute generously to an international effort to restore war-ravaged economies -- just as we did after the second world war, contributing to the recovery of friends and erstwhile foes alike, and as we have done on countless other occasions.

Both of our governments agree that our nuclear arsenals are much too large. We are both committed to radical arms reductions. So the United States has made concrete proposals for such reductions: to bring ballistic missile warheads down to 5,000 on each side, and to eliminate a whole category of intermediate-range missiles from our arsenals altogether. These have not been "take-it-or-leave-it" proposals. We are prepared to negotiate, since we know that negotiation is necessary if we are to reach a solution under which neither side feels threatened. We are willing to eliminate our advantages if you will agree to eliminate yours. The important thing is to begin reducing these terrible weapons in a way that both sides will feel secure, and to continue that process until we have eliminated them altogether.

Events of the past ten to 15 years have greatly increased mistrust between our countries. If we are to solve the key problems in our relationship, we have to do something to restore confidence in dealing with each other. This requires better communication, more contact, and close attention to make sure that both parties fulfill agreements reached. That is why we have made literally 40 to 50 proposals to improve our working relationship, expand communication and build confidence. For example, we have proposed an agreement to cooperate on the peaceful use of space. The Apollo-Soyuz joint mission was a great success in 1975, and we should try to renew that sort oft cooperation. We have also made several proposals for more direct contact by our military people. If they talked to each other more, they might find that at least some of their fears are unfounded. But most of all, ordinary people in both countries should have more contact, particularly our young people. The future, after all, belongs to them. I'd like to see us sending thousands of students to each other's country every year, to get to know each other, to learn from each other and -- most of all -- to come to understand that, even with our different philosophies, we can and must live in peace.

Obviously we are not going to solve all the differences between us at one meeting, but we would like to take some concrete steps forward. Above all, I hope that our meeting will give momentum to a genuine process of problem solving, and that we can agree on a course

to take us toward a safer world for all -- and growing cooperation between our countries.

QUESTION TWO: The Soviet Union stands for peaceful coexistence with countries which have different social systems, including the United States. In some of your statements, the point has been made that in spite of differences between our countries, it is necessary to avoid a military confrontation. In other words, we must learn how to live in peace. Thus, both sides recognize the fact that the issue of arms limitation and reduction is and will be determining in these relations. The special responsibility of the U.S. and USSR for the fate of the world is an objective fact. What in your opinion can be achieved in the area of security in your meeting with Gorbachev?

THE PRESIDENT; Well, first of all, I would say that we think all countries should live together in peace, whether they have the same or different social systems. Even if social systems are similar, this shouldn't give a country the right to use force against another.

But you are absolutely right when you say that we must learn to live in peace. As I have said many times, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And this means that our countries must not fight any type of war.

You are also right when you say that our countries bear a special responsibility before the world. This is the case not only because we possess enormous nuclear arsenals, but because as great powers, whether we like it or not, our example and actions affect all those around us.

Our relations involve not only negotiating new agreements, but abiding by past agreements as well. Often we are accused by your country of interfering in your "internal" affairs on such questions as human rights, but this is a case in point. Ten years ago we both became participants in the Helsinki Accords and committed ourselves to certain standards of conduct. We are living up to those commitments and expect others to do so also. Soviet-American relations affect as well regional conflicts, political relations among our friends and allies, and many other areas.

The fact that our countries have the largest and most destructive nuclear arsenals obliges us not only to make sure they are never used, but to lead the world toward the elimination of these awesome weapons.

I think that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev can start us on the road toward the goal our countries have set' the radical reduction of nuclear weapons and steps to achieve their complete elimination. We can do this by finding concrete ways to overcome roadblocks in the negotiating process and thus give a real impetus to our negotiators. Of course, we will also have to deal with other problems, because it will be very hard to make great progress in arms control unless we can also act to lower tensions, reduce the use and threat of force, and build confidence in our ability to deal constructively with each other.

QUESTION THREE; As is well known, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an understanding last January in Geneva that the top priority of the new negotiations must be the prevention of the arms race in space. But now, the American delegation in Geneva is trying to limit the discussion to consideration of the question of nuclear arms and is refusing to talk about the prevention of the arms race in space. How should we interpret this American position?

THE PRESIDENT; You have misstated the January agreement. Actually, our Foreign Ministers agreed to "work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability." Further, they agreed that the "subject of negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and medium range -- with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Since your question reflects a misunderstanding of the United States position, let me review it for you'

First, we believe that the most threatening weapons facing mankind today are nuclear weapons of mass destruction. These are offensive weapons, and they exist today -- in numbers that are much too high. Our most urgent task therefore is to begin to reduce them radically and to create conditions so that they can eventually be eliminated. Since most of these weapons pass through space to reach their targets, reducing them is as important to prevent an arms race

in space as it is to terminate an arms race on earth.

As I noted earlier, we have made concrete, specific proposals to achieve this. Recently, your government finally made some counterproposals, and we will be responding in a genuine spirit of give-and-take in an effort to move toward practical solutions both countries can agree on.

Second, we believe that offensive and defensive systems are closely interrelated, and that these issues should be treated, as our foreign ministers agreed, as interrelated. Our proposals are fully consistent with this understanding. We are seeking right now with Soviet negotiators in Geneva a thorough discussion of how a balance of offensive and defensive systems could be achieved, and how -- if scientists are able to develop effective defenses in the future -- we might both use them to protect our countries and allies without threatening the other. And if we ever succeed in eliminating nuclear weapons, countries are going to require a defense against them, in case some madman gets his hands on some and tries to blackmail other countries.

Specifically, we have proposed.;

-- On strategic nuclear arms, a reduction of each side's nuclear forces down to 5,000 warheads on ballistic missiles. That would be a very dramatic lowering of force levels, in a way that would greatly enhance strategic stability. We have also offered to negotiate strict limits on other kinds of weapons. Because our force structures are different, and because the Soviet Union has complained about having to reconfigure its forces, we have offered to seek agreements which would balance these differing areas of American and Soviet strength.

-- On intermediate-range nuclear forces, we believe the best course is to eliminate that entire category of forces, which includes the 441 SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union has deployed, and our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. If this is not immediately acceptable, we have also offered an interim agreement which would establish an equal number of warheads on U.S. and Soviet missiles in this category, at the lowest possible level.

-- In the area of space and defense, we are seeking to discuss with Soviet negotiators the possibility that new technology might allow both sides to carry out a transition to greater reliance on defensive weapons, rather than basing security on offensive nuclear forces.

So that there would be no misunderstandings about our research program on new defensive systems which is being carried out in full compliance with the ABM Treaty, I sent the director of our strategic defense research program to Geneva to brief Soviet negotiators. Unfortunately, we have not had a comparable description of your research in this area, which we know is long-standing and quite extensive.

Frankly, I have difficulty understanding why some people have misunderstood and misinterpreted our position. The research we are conducting in the United States regarding strategic defense is in precisely the same areas as the research being conducted in the Soviet Union. There are only two differences' First, the Soviet Union has been conducting research in many of these areas longer than we have, and is ahead in some. Second, we are openly discussing our program, because our political system requires open debate before such decisions are made. But these differences in approaches to policy decisions should not lead to erroneous conclusions. Both sides are involved in similar research, and there is nothing wrong in that.

However, this does make it rather hard for us to understand why we should be accused of all sorts of aggressive intentions when we are doing nothing more than you are. The important thing is for us to discuss these issues candidly.

In sum, what we are seeking is a balanced, fair, verifiable agreement -- or series of agreements -- that will permit us to do what was agreed in Geneva in January' to terminate the arms race on earth and prevent it in space. The United States has no "tricks" up its sleeve, and we have no desire to threaten the Soviet Union in any way. Frankly, if the Soviet Union would take a comparable attitude, we would be able to make very rapid progress toward an agreement.

QUESTION FOUR; Mr. President, officials of your administration claim that the United States, in its international relations, stands for the forces of democracy. How can one reconcile statements of this

kind with the actual deeds of the United States? If you take any current example, it seems that when a particular country wants to exercise its right to independent development -- whether it be in the Middle East, in southern Africa, in Central America in Asia -- it is the U.S. in particular, which supports those who stand against the majority of the people, against legitimate governments.

THE PRESIDENT: Your assertion about U.S. actions is totally unfounded. From your question, one might think that the United States was engaged in a war in some other country and in so doing had set itself against the majority of the people who want self determination. I can assure you that this is not the case. I am proud, as are all Americans, that not a single American soldier is in combat anywhere in the world. If every country could say the same, we would truly live in a world of less tension and danger.

Yes, we are very supportive of democracy. It is the basis of our political system and our whole philosophy. Our nation was not founded on the basis of one ethnic group or culture, as are many other countries, but on the basis of the democratic ideal. For example we believe that governments are legitimate only if they are created by the people, and that they are subordinate to the people, who select in free elections those who govern them. But democracy is more than elections in which all who wish can compete. In our view there are many things that even properly elected governments have no right to do. No American government can restrict freedom of speech, or of religion, and no American government can tell its people where they must live or whether they can leave the country or not. These and the other individual freedoms enshrined in our Constitution are the most precious gift our forefathers bequeathed us and we will defend them so long as we exist as a nation.

Now this doesn't mean that we think we are perfect. Of course we are not. We have spent over 200 years trying to live up to our ideals and correct faults in our society, and we're still at it. It also doesn't mean that we think we have a right to impose our system on others. We don't, because we believe that every nation should have the right to determine its own way of life. But when we see other nations threatened from the outside by forces which would destroy their liberties and impose the rule of a minority by force of arms, we will help them resist that whenever we can. We would not be true to our democratic ideals if we did not.

We respond with force only as a last resort, and only when we or our Allies are the victims of aggression. For example, in World War II, we took a full and vigorous part in the successful fight against Hitlerism, even though our country was not invaded by the Nazis. We still remember our wartime-alliance and the heroism the peoples of the Soviet Union displayed in that struggle. And we also remember that we never used our position as one of the victors to add territory or to attempt to dominate others. Rather we helped rebuild the devastated countries, friends and erstwhile foes alike, and helped foster democracy where there was once totalitarianism. Have we not all benefitted from the fact that Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany are today flourishing democracies, and strong pillars of a stable and humane world order? Well, the German and Japanese people deserve the most credit for this, but we believe we helped along the way.

In the areas you mention, we are heartened by trends we see, although there are still many troubling areas. In the southern part of Africa, Angola is torn by civil war, yet we have determined not to supply arms to either side, and to urge a peaceful settlement. In South Africa, the system of apartheid is repugnant to all Americans, but here as well we seek a peaceful solution and for many years we have refused to supply arms or police equipment to the South African Government. In Latin America, great progress in the transition from authoritarian to democratic societies has been made, and now on that continent there exist only four countries that do not have democratically elected governments. Since 1979 seven Latin American countries have made major strides from authoritarian to democratic systems. Over the years, we have been a leading voice for decolonization and have used our influence with our closest friends

and allies to hasten this process. We are gratified by the nearly completed process of decolonization, and take pride in our role.

I should emphasize that our aim has been to encourage the process of democratization through peaceful means. And not just the American government, but the American people as a whole have supported this process with actions and deeds.

American society has long been characterized by its spirit of volunteerism and by its compassion for the less fortunate. At home, we are proud of our record of support for those who cannot manage for themselves. It is not simply that the government, but the American people, through a host of voluntary organizations, who bring help to the needy -- the victims of floods and fires, the old, the infirm and the handicapped. Americans have been no less generous in giving to other peoples. I remember the efforts of Herbert Hoover in organizing the American Relief effort to feed Soviet victims of famine in the 1920's, and these efforts continue to this day, whether it be food for the victims of famine in Ethiopia, or of earthquakes in Mexico.

QUESTION FIVE: The Soviet Union has unilaterally taken a series of major steps. It has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has undertaken a moratorium on any kind of nuclear tests. It has stopped deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the European part of its territory and has even reduced their number. Why hasn't the United States done anything comparable?

THE PRESIDENT; Actually, we have frequently taken steps intended to lower tension and to show our good will, though these were rarely reciprocated. Immediately after World War II, when we were the only country with nuclear weapons, we proposed giving them up altogether to an international authority, so that no country would have such destructive power at its disposal. What a pity that this idea was not accepted.

Not only did we not use our nuclear monopoly against others, we signalled our peaceful intent by demobilizing our armed forces in an extraordinarily rapid way. At the end of the war in 1945, we had 12 million men under arms, but by the beginning of 1948 we had reduced our forces to one-tenth of that number, 1.2 million. Since the 1960's we have unilaterally cut back our own nuclear arsenal' we now have considerably fewer weapons than in 1969, and only one third of the destructive power which we had at that time.

The United States and the NATO allies have repeatedly said that we will never use our arms, conventional or nuclear, unless we are attacked.

Let me add something that might not be widely known in the Soviet Union. In agreement with the NATO countries, the United States since 1979 has removed from Europe well over 1,000 nuclear warheads. When all of our withdrawals have been completed, the total number of warheads withdrawn will be over 2,400. That's a withdrawal of about 5 nuclear weapons for every intermediate-range missile we plan to deploy. It will bring our nuclear forces in Europe to the lowest level in some twenty years. We have seen no comparable Soviet restraint.

If the Soviet Union is now reducing its intermediate range missiles in Europe, that's a long overdue step. The Soviet Union has now deployed 441 SS-20 missiles, each with three warheads -- that is 1,323 warheads. I don't have to remind you that this Soviet deployment began when NATO had no comparable systems in Europe. We first attempted to negotiate an end to these systems, but when we could not reach agreement, NATO proceeded with a limited response which will take place gradually. Today, the Soviet Union commands an advantage in warheads of 7 to 1 on missiles already deployed. Our position remains as it has always been, that it would be better to negotiate an end to all of these types of missiles. But even if our hopes for an agreement are disappointed and NATO has to go to full deployment, this will only be a maximum of 572 single-warhead missiles.

Moreover, President Carter cancelled both the enhanced-radiation warhead and the B-1 bomber in 1978, and the Soviet Union made no corresponding move. In fact, when asked what the Soviet Union would reduce in response, one of your officials said, "We are not philanthropists." In 1977 and 1978 the United States also tried to negotiate a ban on developing anti-satellite weapons. The Soviet

Union refused a ban, and proceeded to develop and test an anti-satellite weapon. Having already established an operational anti-satellite system, the Soviet Union now proposes a "freeze" before the United States can test its own system. Obviously, that sort of "freeze" does not look very fair to us; if the shoe were on the other foot, it wouldn't look very fair to you either.

The issues between our two countries are of such importance that the positions of each government should be communicated accurately to the people of both countries. In this process, the media of both countries have an important role to play. We should not attempt to "score points" against each other. And the media should not distort our positions. We are committed to examining every Soviet proposal with care, seeking to find areas of agreement. It is important that the Soviet government do the same in regard to our proposals.

The important thing is that we both deal seriously with each other's proposals, and make a genuine effort to bridge our differences in a way which serves the interests of both countries and the world as a whole. It is in this spirit that I will be approaching my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

(end text)

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| סווג בסחוני: | טופס מברק | סתור: 3 |
| תז"ח: 041330 | אל: הסברה, סע"ח. לש' סגנכ"ל. יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת. סגנ'א. סגנכ"ל אסיה"ן. לע"מ. | |
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News Summary November 4, 1985

Press Reports

Reagan Cautious on Soviet Jews

NYT-Shipler-In an effort to increase emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and improve Soviet treatment of dissidents, US officials have formulated a carefully calibrated strategy for Reagan to use in his talks with Gorbachev. Reagan will avoid angry accusations and public declarations. Reagan is advised to dwell on the importance of observing international agreements. Traditionally, the Soviets have not liked to discuss human rights at summits, contending the matter is purely an internal matter.

NY-AP-Americans plan scores of rallies throughout the country to pressure the Administration to negotiate a resumption of massive Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. The rallies will also be aimed at convincing Congress that Americans want any deals made with the Kremlin to include provisions for human rights.

Hussein on Arafat

DN-AP-Hussein said he told Arafat that the peace process is in danger unless we "put our act together." He said he was sticking by the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in proposed peace talks with Israel but he demanded that Arafat improve his image. Hussein spoke on NBC-TV's Meet The Press.

NYP-Flick-Hussein will look to the Soviet Union for arms now that Congress has refused to supply him, he said.

Kamikaze Shot in South Lebanon

NYP-A young woman riding a donkey laden with explosives was shot and wounded as she approched a military barracks in south Lebanon. She intended to attack pro-Israeli forces in Jezzine.

Gulf Ledders Meet

NYT-special-Sultan Said opened the annual summit meeting of oil producing

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בלו תפוקות שטחים מתאם שטחים פרט מצתים מדבא

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| סווג בסחונית: | טופס מברק | מתוך: 3 |
| תז"ח: | | אל: |
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Gulf nations with an appeal to the region to work together to fight terrorism.

Iranians Rally

NYT-Reuters-Thousands of Iranian students held a noisy demonstration outside the old US Embassy in the eve of the takeover in 1979.

Leak on Libya

DN-UPI-Reagan, demanding "appropriate action" against the leak of classified information, ordered an investigation into the unauthorized disclosure of a secret CIA plan to overthrow Khadafy.

Koch is "Excommunicated"

NYP-A group of Orthodox Jews with the support of Right to Life candidate Rabbi Yehuda Levin, launched "excommunication" proceedings against the Mayor. The mayor called their action "a vulgarisation of our religion." Koch dedicated a promenade for the Bobov Jewish sect in Brooklyn.

"Shoah"

NYT-11/3-Eli Wiesel-No movie or book could capture the totality of the events that took place in Europe during WW II. The film Shoah must be seen. Wiesel tells of reunions with survivers.

Author Writes on Hasidim

NYT-Berger-Lis Harris, a Jew who wanted to look into her roots spent five years with the Lubavich community in Brooklyn and wrote an illuminating book "Holy Days: The World of the Hasidic Family." Although she says she will not become a Hasid, she began to take her religion a bit more seriously for herself and her family. As a result of her research she felt compelled to visit Israel.

Hermann Goering

NYT-Lehmann-Haupt reviews "The Mystery of Hermann Goering's Suicide" by Ben Swearing. Few have forgotten the impact of his death, how he

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| סווג בטחוני: | טופס מברק | מתוך: 3 |
| תז"ח: | | א.ל: |
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cheated so many out of revenge. Swearinggen does not believe official accounts that Goering poisoned himself in his cell. He concludes that someone other than his wife must have given him the cyanide.

Cartoons

NYT-11/3-Bagget (Atlanta Journal) Arab and other delegates run out of the UN yelling "Help, Save Us" A police officer says "Bomb Scare?" and an Arab says "No, Israeli peace offer."

Letters

ND-11/3-Writer believes that the UN should be restructured or continued without the financial support of the US. It has failed miserably in promoting peace. The press reported that most delegates walked out of the Assembly when Peres spoke but they did not name the delegates by their countries. The people of the US should know their identity.

ITONUT

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| אישור: | שם השולח: לורה קס | 4.11.85 | תאריך: |

[redacted]

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בטחון

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| דף.1....מתוך...3...דפים | |
| סווג בטחוני.....גלוי | |
| דחיפות.....רגיל | |
| תאריך ודש"ח.....85MAY13 | |
| מספר מברק.....36 | |

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח.

תדרוך דובר מחמ"ד ליום - 4.5.85

Q Can you confirm the story in the Post today that the US is stepping up efforts to get Israeli-Jordanian talks started?

MR. REDMAN: I have a very brief comment for you. It's so brief that I can't remember it. We are working intensively to achieve the shared goal of bringing about direct negotiations, but I have no other details to offer at this time.

Q That's pretty brief. What about another --

Q Do you have any details or verification of the story about Qaddafi in the Washington Post yesterday? Do you have any new --

MR. REDMAN: No, I have nothing.

Q Is it to conclude that it is lawful to topple a government, but it is unlawful to assassinate a head of state? (Inaudible.) Can you shed some more light about that?

MR. REDMAN: No, as was made clear I think at the White House over the weekend, we have no comment on these alleged intelligence matters.

Q Does the US support the overthrow of Qaddafi?

MR. REDMAN: I have no comment on these particular stories, allegations.

Q Could you in a more general sense, then, sum up the US policy and attitude towards Qaddafi?

MR. REDMAN: I can limit my remarks to simply saying that we have been concerned for years about Libyan sponsored terrorism and have been working with friends to isolate Libya politically and limit its ability to support terrorist activities.

שים מה עשה קדאפי בעבר נגד סיכל רוחים נגד מ"ל ב"ת

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Q As part of our intense work to get these Jordanian-Israeli talks started, our we suggesting to the Soviets that they resume diplomatic relations with Israel as a way to fashion that international umbrella that every one is talking about?

MR. REDMAN: I have no comment on our diplomatic exchanges, what we might or might not be saying to the Soviets. You are aware that in the past that we have said that we would welcome the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union.

Q We would welcome it. Excuse me. Do we think it would be a prequisite?

MR. REDMAN: I have no comment on that.

עתונות

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בשחון, ניו-יורק

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מבזק

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סווג בשחון: גלוי

דחיפות: רגיל

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מספר מברק:

אל:הסברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח

רע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - MONDAY - NOVEMBER 4, 1985

COLUMNS

THE SUN-William Pfaff-"The Peres Gambit" Peres's proposal for new UN sponsored negotiations between Israel and Jordan is a shrewd, but also a desperate attempt to capitalize on the collapse of the PLO as a political force.He recognizes that this is the moment for which every Israeli govt. has waited: When there is no one left in the Palestinian side. It is a desperate moment because if nothing will come of it - Israel certainly is going to annex the West Bank.Under the Reagan administration, the commitment to Israel had become so without nuance that the policy had lost credibility; and now it has effectively collapsed. The surviving American role in the Middle East is as Israel's ally.Significant for the West and for the people of Israel, is the choice for Israel's future which Peres has posed. It is a decision from which there may be no turning back. It can set Israel on a course where the US will, in the end, refuse to follow.

THE PRESS REPORTS

US Said To Step Up Mideast Efforts

WASH. POST-Claiborne-A senior Israeli official said today that US involvement in secret diplomatic contacts with Jordan, Egypt and Israel over a possible comprehensive Middle East peace agreement is intensifying daily.The official, who asked not to be identified, also said that other nations, such as France, may be used in behind the scenes efforts to reach a breakthrough for direct Israeli-Jordanian talks initiated in an international forum. The main obstacles that are the focus of US attention, are finding a suitable international forum that would lead to direct talks and the nature of Palestinian participation in talks with Jordan and Israel.

Hussein Calls Attacks 'Setbacks'

***WASH. POST-Cashko-Hussein said yesterday that recent terrorist acts were "terrible setbacks" to his efforts to win a role for the PLO in the Mideast peace process, and he hinted that he has called on Arafat to demonstrate the PLO's sincerity about wanting peace. "We hope to come up with some answers in the very near future," was all Hussein would say about his discussions with Arafat over the damage caused by such incidents of the hijacking."It's obvious that for the PLO to participate in the peace process, which is its right, then they obviously have to determine what actions they have to take to clear that path.

ב 14 מדפים שמחוק מתאפשרמחוק חפשדות פרט מצתים

Pro-Israel PACs Giving More To GOP

***WASH. POST-Taylor-Pro-Israel political action committees(PACS) gave more money to Republicans than to Democrats during the first six months of this year, a sharp break from past contribution patterns and one that has triggered a debate among Jews about the costs and benefits of single-issue politics. In 1983-1984, Democrats received nearly 80% of the $3.5 million distributed by the nation's 70-odd pro-Israel PACs, which are the fasters-growing sector of the campaign-finance industry. This year, Republicans are getting 55% of Jewish PACs' money. The leading recipient has been Sen. Robert Kaster Jr. (R.-Wis.)

East Bloc, Israel Inch Toward Ties

WASH. POST-Claiborne-As at least three Warsaw Pact nations inch closer toward restoring some diplomatic links with Israel, the Soviet Union appears to be searching for a way to redefine its relationship with the Jewish state in order to become a player in the arena of Middle East peace negotiations. Still unconfirmed press reports in Jerusalem and in Europe of secret deals involving the imminent transfer of up to 20,000 Soviet Jews to Israel could be part of a Soviet campaign to defuse the emigration before the Geneva summit between Reagan and Gorbachev.

Arab Gulf States Open Annual Defense Summit

WASH. POST-Dickey-Oman, one of the West's most secretive, insular and vital allies in the Arab world, began today what one diplomat called its "coming out party," hosting a summit of six leaders of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The GCC was created in 1981. "In a region that has known considerable instability we are prepared against subversion," Qaboos said confidently."It would be irresponsible not to do so."

Aide To Abbas Named As 6th Hijack Suspect

THE SUN-(Wires)-Investigators have identified a senior aide to PLO official Abbas as a sixth suspect in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, Italian newspapers reported yesterday. The newspapers La Stampa of Turin and Rome's La Repubblica said a man identified as Masar Kadia was believed to have taken two previous cruises aboard the Achille Lauro to scout out the attack.

Sunni Concerns Delay Lebanese Peace Accord

THE SUN-(Wires)-A Syrian backed drive for peace in Lebanon slowed yesterday as Sunni Moslem leaders voiced doubts about proposed political reforsm that have been hammered out by warring militias. A peace pact will be announced when "reservations are removed" over proposed changes to the presidency.

לתגובות

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| תז"ח: 041330 | א ל : הסברה.סע"ח. לש' סמנכ"ל.יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת. מצפ'א. סמנכ"ל אמית"ך. לע"ס. | |
| נר : 0064 | ר ע : וושינגטון. | |
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*News Summary November 2-3, 1985*

*Editorials*

*DN-11/2 "A Pre-Summit Flurry Benefits Bonner" The Soviets have done something worth applauding! Yelena Bonner will be allowed to travel abroad for medical treatment. The move should be seen as a pre-Geneva good-will gesture. But we should not get carried away. Foreign travel for medical reasons and family reunification is a basic right in the free world. The Soviets have long failed to live up to human rights committments. Sacharov says life is not worth living without his wife. The world is watching.*

*DN-11/3 "And, Maybe, Soviet Jews" A summit agreement is in the works to open the gates for thousands of Soviet Jews. If the deal does fall into place it deserves a cheer. As many as 400,000 Soviet Jews are being denied the right of free movement. Israel would gain from the infusion of new immigrants. And the deal would ease a persistant point of US-USSR tension. The dael is risky because it relies on a hanshake. Jewish groups are critical of that. The price is the Jackson-Vanik ammendement but that's not working anyway.*

*Press Reports*

*Peres-Hussein Align Allies*

*NYT-11/3-Week in Review-If peace is to be achieved in the Mideast, Peres and Hussein must get their allies into line. Peres seems to be doing better than Hussein. Peres won a vote of confidence in the Knesset. Jordan and Egypt are urging the Soviet Union to restore ties with Israel. In terms of Arafat and Hussein, the basic strains of their relationship does not seem to have been eliminated by talks last week.*

*Israelis Attacked in Gaza*

*NYT-11/3-AP-Someone tossed a grenade at two Israeli soldiers in the occupied Gaza Strip, slightly wounding them. The soldiers placed a curfew on partsof the Gaza town as they sought the assailant.*

*Freed Russians Tell of Captivity*

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יש מלבד תפוצות שמתוס מתאם שמתוס פרט מצתוס

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| דחיפות: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | דף: 2 |
| סוג כתבונים: | טופס מברק | מתוך: 4 |
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WIT-11/3-Schmemann-Three Russians held captive in Beirut for one month were quoted as saying they were held blindfolded and incommunicado for the entire month and that they were not aware until their release that a fourth Soviet had been killed. The newspaper Izvestia did not disclose what lead to the release of the captives.

Syrian & Lebanese Leaders Talk

WIT-11/3-Reuters photo of Prime Minister Karami and Syria's First Vice President Khaddam, yesterday in Damascus. Discussions focused on approval of a Syrian-mediated peace agreement designed to end the 10 year old civil war in Lebanon.

Gulf Meeting

WIT-11/3-AP-The Iran-Iraq war and terrorism are expected to dominate the annual meeting of the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf nations that is begin in Oman. The meetings are expected to last 4 days. The gulf nations have expressed a fear of terrorism and of the spread of the Iran-Iraq war. The group is expected to renew its call for an end to the war.

Catholics and Jews Reach an Accord

WIT-11/3-Dionne-Leading Catholics and Jews meeting under Vatican auspicies have announced agreement on a joint program "to overcome the residues of indifference, resistance and suspicion." The leaders involved say the agreement is important because it marked an improvement tics after a period of strained relations. Israel remains a thorny issue. Although the Pope has met with Israeli leaders, the Vatican has said that the issues of Palestinian rights and the status of Jerusalem are barriers to formal diplomatic recognition of Israel by the Holy See.

Bonner Preparing to Go

WIT-11/2-p.1-Schemann-Freinds of Bonner said they received a telegram from her saying she will leave the Soviet union at the end of November and that she is preparing her husband "to spend the winter alone." This means Bonner will not leave the Soviet Union before the summit. Soviet sources dismissed a report that appeared in a West German paper stating that an exchange between the US and the USSR is in the works. Shultz also

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the story. (see NYP)

Mayor of LA Says He Erred on Farrakhan

NYT-11/2-Chambers-Mayor Tom Bradley of LA told a convention of Jewish leaders that he might have made a mistake in not publicly denouncing Farrakhan. He said that at the time he was refraining from speaking out in exchange for Farrakhan's pledge not to engage in anti-Semitic oratory. "But Farrakhan respects no one. He broke the committment that he made to the Black leadership of the city," said Bradley.

Rabbi Schindler Lashes At Critics

NYT-11/3-Berger-Rabbi Alexander Schindler, leader of the Reformed movement, lashed back at Orthodox leaders who have challenged the authenticity of his movement and his religious practices.

Director Vows Fassbinder Play Will Be Staged

NYT-11/2-Reuters-Gunther Ruhle, vowed to stage the Fassbinder play even if protests are repeated. Meanwhile, Michel Friedman, a spokesman for the Jewish community in Frankfurt said that his supporters have obtained tickets to all performances. They regard the play as anti-Semitic and vowed to do all to stop it from being performed.

New York Village Lures Kosher Meatpacker

NYT-11/3-New York State has succeeded in a 4-year effort to attract a major new industry, a meat-packing company capable of producing low-cost kosher foods. A plant will be built in Sanford NY by Gartner-Harf Company.

Book Review-Dyaan

NYT-11/3-Knopf reviews "My Father, His Daughter" by Yael Dayan. The passages, Knopf says, account for good reading but create the feeling of voyeurism on the part of the reader. With unmistakable overtones of jealousy, Yael stresses that her father was too good for all his lovers. The book is a melancholy and vibrant portrait of a man who may have become a legend to many but whose daughter knew him better.

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| רחיפות: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | דף: 4 |
| סווג כמחוגין: | טופס מברק | מתוך: 4 |
| תז"ח: | | אל: |
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*Letters*

*NYP-Kahane is an unstable personality but he is Israel's problem. The writer resents Koch's comparision to Farrakhan, an out-and-out racist.*

*NYP-The pop singer Chaka Khan appeared on the podium with Farrakhan and concluded his NY speech with a song. We might reconsider purchasing Khan's recordings.*

*ITONUT*

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| אישור: | שם השולח: לוכה דש | 3.11.85 | תאריך: |

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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נכנס

דף 1 מתוך 2

עותק 4 מתוך 18 סודי ביותר

אל: המשרד, נר: 34, מ : 11ש

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כרמ אלקן

סודי ביותר/מיידי

אל: ממנב"ל, אירופה 3, מצפ"א, מס"ד.

1. הציר נפגש עם גבי רידגיאוו', עורכת המוביל לענייני אירופאיים. נכחו יהושע פרס והחמ'. מצד האמריקאים מייקל באטלר.

2. מצטרפת למשלחת המוביל היוצאת למוסקבה בשבת (2/11) במהלכה שולץ ייפגש עם גורבצ'וב.

3. בכוונת האמריקאים להעלות נושא יהודי בריהמ', כפי שהמוביל עשה זאת במפגשים הקודמים עם שברנדזה ותל מועידת הלסינקי, סיפרה שהאמריקאים הציעו לקיים מפגש משלחות בו כל צד יעלה הנושאים "הכואבים לו".
מרס קיבלו תשובה מהסובייטים בצורה בלשהי.

4. האמריקאים מרגישים שהכוונה לא למחוות של בסיס אישי בגון בענין הגב' בונר (דעייתו של סחרוב). סיפרה שבעקבות נאום רוהמ' פרס באו"ם המוביל שלח איגרת לגורבצ'וב עם שמות ספציפיים. ציינה שהאמריקאים מעודדים מצידם את הסובייטים לחדש יחסים עם ישראל.

5. מרס ידוע לה ביצד נושא המורת הסיכון יועלה בשיחות הפסגה ומה יכלל, אם בכלל בהודעת הסיכום שלה. האמריקאים הבינו שתי נוסחאות, האחת בתחום היחסים הבינלאומיים בפרק העוסק בבעיות איזוריות בגון, דרא"ף, אמרב"ר, מרי"ת ודרום מורח אסיה. השני - מסיבה בקריאת מרכ"ל האו"ם להסדר שלום במרי"ת על בסיס החלטות 242/338 וקריאה לנקוט בכל האמצעים להוציא לאור לפועל.

6. דיווח נרחב יותר בתחילת השבוע הבא כולל בנושא גרמ"ר.

שבת-שלום

אלי אבידן==

# משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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1554 יוצא שמור
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אל: וושינגטון, נד: 34, מ : המשרד
דח: ר, 20: ש, תא: 011185, חז: 1300

רג'יל/שמור

אל:וושינגטון הציר-למדן,

נשק לירדן.

שלכם 645 מ-29.10.

1. בשיחת רובינשטיין -קרצ'קו הצביע האחרון על כך שבמקרה של אמוץ גרסת הסגן כגבי עסקת הנשק דשא' הממשל למכור בתום תקופת הדחיה.יתכן שבית הנבחרים ער לסכנה זו ולכן דוחף לאמוץ החלטה קשוחה יותר בנדון.

2. אנו מעריכים כי מדובר בהקפאת תהליכים ל-4 חודשים באשר הממשל נשאר מחוייב לבצוע העסקה תוך הבנה עם ירדן שהאסטרטגיה והעיתוי יקבעו ע"י הממשל.

3. אודה לכם על פרוס עמדת קרצ'קו ובמקביל ביצד היועצים המשפטיים של שת' ועדות החוץ של הקונגרס מתייחסים לאפשרות שליה הצביע קרצ'קו.

מצפ'א-בינ'ל 1.

עפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבס,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,דס,אמן,מצפא,סייבל,
ממד,משפט

[redacted]

אל: 11ש, נד: 29, מ : המשרד
רח: מ, סג: ס, מא: 011185, חז: 1300

סודי / מיידי

רובינשטיין, מתני, אבידן.

שיחת פלמן ממנב"ל בהשתתפות החמ'.

נתחילת השיחה הבהיר ממנב"ל שהידיעות בעיתונות הישראלית בנוגע לבינון קשרים דיפלומטיים עם מדינה מוארית נוספת, פרט לצולין, הן נטולות לע"ע יסוד, יתכן שהידיעות על הגירת יהודים מבריה"מ קשורות במסע ההסברה הסובייטי לקראת הפיסגה. פלמן אמר כי הוא מבקש לחלוק עמנו עיקרי סיכום מחמ"ד על תהליך השלום אותו הם חולקים עם מספר מדינות ידידותיות, בכללן מצרים. לפי סיכום מחמ"ד, נותרו עדיין אחרי ביקורי מובארק, חוסין ורוהמ' בוושינגטון שתי בעיות פרוצדורליות: אופי הייצוג הפלשתינאי וההקשר הבינל"א שיכווה התהליך, נסוגיות אלו הגיע התהליך מן העסוק ההיפותטי לשכב המוחשי. ברם סוגיות אלו קשות ומסובכות והעיסוק בהן עלול להימשך עוד זמן ניכר. ארה"ב מנסה כסייע בוריאת התהליך. לגבי הייצוג הפלשתינאי גורסת מחמ"ד בסיכומה שקשה למאר תפקיד ומעורבות ישיריים כאשפ' בתהליך המומ' במיוחד כאור המאורעות בעת האחרונה. אפשרות שיתוף אשפ' בתהליך תיתכן רק אם יקבל הארגון התלטות מועב"ט 242 - 338 ויודיע על הסתלקותו מדרך הטרור. ארה"ב מסתייגת מהשתתפות בריה"מ בועידה בינל"א וגורסת שאין ללחוץ על ישראל בענין זה בל עוד בריה"מ לא חידשה יחסיה עם ישראל. ארה"ב מוכנה לשקול הצטרפות סוריה לתהליך ולועידה בתנאי שהדבר לא יגרור האמה מסובנת של תהליך השלום. ארה"ב נגד הקשר בינל"א במטריה למומ' במו"מ. ארה"ב מבינה הרצינול הירדני לגבי ועידה בינל"א אך ארה"ב ספקנית לגבי נכונות בריה"ם וסוריה למלא תפקיד חיובי בתהליך. ארה"ב מתמידה במאמציה לקדם התהליך תוך הנרה שהומן הוא נגס ההולך ומתבובו. ארה"ב סבורה שאנו לקראת תהליך בו מבלול הפרטים

והנתונים יתגבשו לכלל פסיפס אחיד.

פלטן אמר כי בידו מידע מועט על שיחות חוסין - ערפאת בעמאן, המידע שברשותו מבוסס בעיקר על מקורות שליש"ים. בקהילה העיתונאית נוצה הגירסה שהשיחות מתנהלות בסימן של הצלחה לאש"ף. מקורות אחרים מדמורים על שיחות קשות. מקור אחד סיפר שחוסין אמר לערפאת שהתנהגות אש"ף הביבה את ירדן ושעל אש"ף לקבל עמדה חד משמעית בקשר להחלטות מועב"ם 242 - 338 והסדר והאיץ בו לחוק שליטתו בארגון. ערפאת הודה במסיבת עיתונאים ש-242 והמאבק המוויין עכו בשיחותיו עם המלך. אש"ף הביץ גירסה בקרב עיתונאים שסובם על תיאום יתר בין ערפאת לחוסין ושהמלך לא פנה בתקיפות לאש"ף. שגרירות ארה"ב בעמאן מועמת שוו גירסה מטעה.

פלטן הוסיף כי שמעו מסניורה ששמע מאבו ג'יהד שאש"ף יקבל החלטות מועב"ם 242 - 338 אם יקבלו הומנה לועידה בינל"א. או גם יכיר אש"ף פורמלית בישראל.

בנצוד

אל: שהח,רהם,שהבם,מנבל,ממנבל,ד/מרבו,דם,אמן,ממד,מצפא,
סייבל

שגרירות ישראל • וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בטחון, ניו-יורק

5 19 036

מ ו ס ר

דף...1...מתוך...2...דפים

סווג בטחוני.גלבל.....

דחיפות.....רגיל

תאריך ודיים..3.11.85...1400

מספר מברק.....

אל:חטברה, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל חטברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, רובר צה"ל, רמ"מ קפ"מ

דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY NOV. 2, 1985

SYRIA INVITES 4 LEBANESE EX PREMIERES TO PEACE CONFERENCE

CHIC TRIB Syria invited four former lebanese prime ministers to Damascus for peace talks Friday, while in Beirut it was reported the nation's warring militias negotiated the possible mass release of hundreds of lebanese kidnapping victims.

EASTERN BLOC' OVERTURES TO ISRAEL AROUSE BELIEF SOVIET UNION COULD BE NEXT

THE SUN J. PRICE Recently friendly overtures toward Israel by the Soviet Union and some Warsaw pact countries have raised expectations in Jerusalem that Moscow is prepared to restore relations with Jerusalem in order to win greater influence in the Middle East.

SUNDAY NOV. 3, 1985

CIA ANTI QADDAFI PLAN BACKED

B. WOODWARD WASH POST President Reagan has authorised a CIA covert operation designed toundermine the Libyan regime headed by Col. Qaddafi, according to informed government sources.

HUSSEIN OPTIMISTIC ON TIES WITH SYRIA

WASH POST S. KAWAR Jordan's king Hussein, in a lengthy speech at the openning of parliament , spoke optimistically of the prospects of improving his country's strained relations with Syria while mentioning only briefly his ally, the PLO.

IF OIL IS'NT IMPORTANT, WHO IS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ?

WASH POST DAVID MIZRAHI The energy crisis is over, at least for a short term Almost all oil output around the Persian Gulf has been cut by half since 1980. The Iran-Iraq war has slashed the production of those two countries - from the combined output of 9.3 million barrels a day in the mid 70's - to less than 3 million barrels a day now.Saudi Arabia, which was daily pumping 10.3 million barrels in 1981, has tumbled to an unprecented 2 million barrels a day just a few months ago. Who won and who lost from this reversal of fortunes? For that matter , how important is the middle east any more? The answer to these questions will not be found simply by looking at petroleum and petrodollars. The answers are



בדו מלבו שטחים מתאם שטחים בין תבורות מצתים

also tied to the amount of worls termoil these commodities can cause.

DESPITE PERCENT PLO SETBACKS, ARAFAT RETAINS POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD

PHIL INC. T. MASSLANDThe conventional wisdom had Arafat on the ropes last weekend - descredited by the Achile Lauro highjacking, at odds with Egypt and about to be forced by Jordan's King Hussein either to publicly renounce violence or be dropped from Hussein's push for joint peace talks with Israel. The result appeared has been quite the reverse. Not for the first time, Arafat appears to have emerged stronger than expected, at least among his Palestinians and Arab constituency form the latest cycle of Middle East bloodletting.

מלוא

50

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|---|---|---|
| רחיפות: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | רף: 1 |
| סווג בסתר: | טופס מברק | מתוך: 3 |
| תז"ח: 01/30 | א ל : הסברה.מע"ח. לש' סמנכ"ל.יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת. מצפ'א. סמנכ"ל אמית"ן. לע"מ. | |
| נר : 0015 2 CH | ד ע : וושינגטון. | |
| | מאת : עמונרת. | |

*News Summary November 1, 1985*

**Columns**

*Reagan Making Deal on Soviet Jews*

*DN-Nelson-Reagan and Gorbachev are quietly moving toward a deal that will allow Soviet Jews to emigrate. In return for allowing Jews to leave, the Soviets would be rewarded with a presidential waiver of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment. The breakthrough would give Reagan a triumph at a summit that is not expected to produce much movement on the main issue, arms control. Two Israeli diplomats recently visited Moscow on official business.*

*Sakharov's Wife Permitted to Depart*

*NYT-p.1-Gwertzman-The Soviet Union has informed that US that Bonner will be permitted to leave the Soviet Union, said Shultz. At a news conference, Shultz flatly denied that a deal was in the works to free Sakharov and Shaharansky in return for some Eastern bloc spies. (see DN-wire)*

*Sharon Charges Peres With Secret Bid to Hussein*

*NYT-Freidman-Sharon and Neeman accused Peres of holding secret negotiations with Hussein on a plan for joint Jordanian-Israeli rule over the West Bank. Peres dismissed the allegations as "nonsense." Peres and Sharon have been exchanging nasty remarks, straining the relations between Likud and Labor even more than usual. Officials do agree that some kind of paper on joint Israeli-Jordanian cooperation on the West Bank has been circulating in the Prime Minister's office.*

*Arafat Survives*

*DD-Slavin-Despite Israeli and US hopes to the contrary, Arafat is down but very much alive. J ordan and Egypt have not yet abandoned the PLO. The Arab aim is not to destroy the PLO but to control it. Analysts see Jordan's reconciliation with Syria as a pressure tactic against the PLO as well as an attempt to persuade Syria not to sabotage possible peace negotiations. A Western diplomat in Cairo beleives that Hussein will enter negotiations one way or the other but that*

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| תאריך: | שם השולח: | אישור: |

בדו"ח מדפיא תפוזות פרק שטחים אתגם שטחים לצרים

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|---|---|---|
| דחיפות: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | דף: 2 |
| סווג בסתונלי: | טופס מברק | מתוך: 3 |
| תז"ח: | | אל: |
| נר: 15/2 | | דע: |
| | | מאת: |

he can't do it without Palestinian or Syrian support.

Arms in the Mideast

DD-UPI-Militant Islamic factions in the Mideast have obtained increasingly sophisticated weapons and are beyond the control of any gov't, the Institute of Strategic Studies said. In its 1985-86 survey, the respected research center said that Israel maintains a position of military superiority over any of its neighbors in the region. But it said that a belief by Lebanese guerrillas that Israel was defeated and driven out "bodes ill for future peace."

Freed Russians in Beirut

NYT-Hijazi-The three Russians freed this week are suffering from exhaustion and resting, said a Soviet spokesman. It is still not known how they were released.

Western Hostages

ND-AP-Hussein Musawi says that there is no chance of the 5 US hostages and four French hostages being released until Kuwait releases 17 prisoners. (see DN-AP)

Mehdi Denied Visit to Mrs. Klinghoffer

DN-Photo of Dr. M.T. Mehdi, president of the American-Arab Relations Committee holding a photo of Alex Odeh, a PLO supporter who was killed in a bomb attack. Mehdi attempted to visit Mrs. Klinghoffer to plea for a united front against all terrorism. Klinghoffer was not home and the family denied any knowledge of the visit.

Jewish Protesters Halt Fassbinder's Play

NYT-Markham-30 members of Frankfurt's Jewish community walked onto the stage of a theater and prevented the premier of a play by Fassbinder that they denounced as anti-Semitic. The protesters and the audience then spent the next 3 hours debating anti-Semitism and freedom of expression in an extraordinary emotional way. The Jews were not forceably removed from the stage.

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| אישור: | שם השולח: | תאריך: |

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| דחיפות: | מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק | דף: 3 |
| סדוג בסתרנות: | טופס מברק | מתוך: 3 |
| תז"ח: | | אל: |
| נר: 15/2 | | רע: |
| | | מאת: |

Yiddish Musical

NYT-Shepard-The New York Yiddish season is off and running in New York for the 100th year at least. "Match Made in Heaven" receives a positive review.

Adnan Khashoggi in NY

NYP-gossip-Saudi billionaire Adnan Khashoggi hosted a series of luncheo, teas and dinners during the 40th anniversary of the UN. The PM of Turkey, Pres. of Zaire, King Hussein of Jordan and Richard Nixon were guests.

Letters

NYT-Law Prof. from Yale writes that a second murder of a US citizen occured due to the Achille Lauro hijacking but the death was not received with outrage. Alex Odeh's murder consitiuted the first spillover on US soil of terrorism from the Mideast. It is important to remember that the Mideast-style terror was directed not by, but against, an Arab-American group.

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| אישור: | שם השולח: לוכה דן | תאריך: 1.11.85 |

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[redacted]

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

סוג המברק

דף ...1... מתוך ...1... דפים

סווג בשחוני: שמור

דחיפות: מיידי

תאריך ודשה: 1600 1 נובמבר 85

מספר המברק: 026

אל: בר- און

גבירצמן בנושא הסובייטי - ישראלי.

שלך 26.

גם במחמ"ד ( רידג', ווי ופאלמר) אין יודעים על שיחות ירדן- מצרים עם הסובייטים בנושא היחסים עם ישראל. הג"ל משיחות היום בנושא הסורי עוד נברר.

רובינשטיין

שהה מנכ אומנכ מקבל בכבוד הלכיסכ בבית הל אלבן

קיבל בבקשה רמז

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

מברק

דף...1...מתוך...1...דפים

סווג בטחוני: סודי

דחיפות: מיידי

תאריך וזמן: 0930 1 נובמבר 85

מס' מברק: 020

אל: היועץ המשפטי, סמנכ"ל מז"ח

דע: ממי מנכ"ל

טאבה.

בשיחת אקראי סיפר לי השופט סופר, כי פגש אתמול (31) בניו יורק את אל-ערבי המצרי. בין היתר דנו בענייני טאבה. המצרים ירצו לחדש אך איננו בטוח שמיידית. מה שהדגיש בפניו אל-ערבי היה, כי את הועדה הי"שניה" לא יהיו מוכנים לאפיין ולהכתיר כי"פישור", הגם שלא איכפת לו על מה ידברו בה מהותית, אף שהדבר היה ידוע לנו בכללותו (סופר סבר שזהו חידוש), אמרתי כי אין עמדה נוקשה מקרבת סיכוי להסדר; מה גם שדעת הקהל אצלנו עודה נסערת מהרצח בסיני שהמצרים לא מסרו את מלוא תוצאות החקירה. אמר שהזכיר לאל- ערבי נושא זה.

רובינשטיין

שהת רהמ שהבל מנל מומנל סיבל משפל קידר מלרום

שיאון רלארכל ממב רמ אמ

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בטחון

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מסלול מברק

דף.....מתוך.....דפים

סווג בטחוני.....גלוי

דחיפות.....רגיל

תאריך וזמן הגשה

מס' מברק.....

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח קש"ח.

תדרוך דובר מתמיד ליום ד' 1.11.85

Q Bernie, do you have any comment on the New York Times story to the effect that Egypt and Jordan are urging the Soviet Union to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel?

MR. KALB: Nothing, but I think you've heard the Secretary refer to the fact that that would be a welcome development.

Q What do you read into the seeming smoothing over of relations between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat, and what might that augur for any type of PLO participation or even presence in any type of negotiation?

MR. KALB: On the first one, I have been invited to make an assessment several times during this past week, and I have declined. So far as the second part of your question is concerned, I think that the Secretary addressed that yesterday, to which I have nothing that I could add additionally.

Q To put off with the same question, Bernie, now that time has passed by the crisis between Egypt and the United States, how do you characterize the relations between your two countries?

MR. KALB: Could you try me again on that, please?

Q I'm saying that the time enough has passed now. The crisis of relations between the United States and Egypt in the aftermath of the Egyptian airliner --

MR. KALB: Yes.

Q How do you characterize the relations now between the two countries?

MR. KALB: Well, that let me characterize them very quickly. After the events that took place in the wake of the Achille Lauro affair, that our relations with Egypt are strong, and we are confident that they will remain so.

עדכונים

שהה . מנכ מאמנכ מצפא מעת כלארכ מאר

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד / הטחון

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עדכון קבלה
דף....1..מתוך...6...דפים
סווג בטחוני.....סודי
דחיפות.....מידי
תאריך וזמן.נוב' 1 1300
מספר מברק.....

אל: מ/מנכ"ל. מצפ"א.

דע: לשכת רה"מ. מנכ"ל אוצר. מנכ"ל בטחון.

נא: סיוע חוץ - ו"תיקון איכוייה"
לשלנו 761 ו-769.

1. כמדווח, הדיון ב- mark-up של חוק ההקצבה לסיוע חוץ שנערך אתמול (30/10) במליאת הועדה היה קשה, ונסב רובו ככולו על "תיקון איכוייה".

2. יו"ר הועדה, מרק הטפילד, פתח בציינו שקיימות בעיות רציניות לגבי הצעת החוק כפי שהוכנה ע"י תת הועדה לפעולות זרות - בעיות שנוגעות בעיקר לבנק האקסים ולישראל. כבר קיבל מכתבים מוועדת התקציב המעלה הסתייגות נוהליות; ממחמ"ד שמתנגדת להבטים הנוגעים למדיניות חוץ; ומוועדת החוץ שמתייחסת לשאלות הקשורות לתחומי היוריסדיקציה של שתי הוועדות. הצעת החוק כפי שהוגשה עולה על התקרה ל- BUDGET OUTLAY בחצי בליון, וכלשעצמו הוא (הטפילד) אינו מסכים עם ההצעה הן מסיבות מדיניות והן בשל "המספרים".

3. קסטן, כיו"ר תת הועדה, הסביר שהשאלה המרכזית נוגעת לחישובים שנעשו ע"י וועדת התקציב עבור בנק האקסים (ראו-נא סעיף 2(א) לשלנו 717 מה-30/10). מדובר בסעות שמינימלית מגיעה ל-200 מליון דולר ואולי תסתכם ב-960 מליון דולר.

קסטן ציין גם שבכוונת הממשל ליזום בעוד שנה (FY 1987) תכנית כללית לתיקון חובות על סיוע צבאי ( FMS DEBT REFORM ), תכנית שתחול על מספר מדינות. תת-הועדה מציעה להתחיל תכנית זו כבר עכשיו - לשנה אחת - לישראל שסובלת יותר מכולן ממעמסת החובות.

4. איכוייה הירצה על תחיוניות של ישראל לאינטרסים של ארה"ב. בין השאר טען שארה"ב תרמה בחו ידיה למעמסת החובות הרובצת על ישראל (למשל כתוצאה מעיסקת האוואקס). השכמי קמפ-דיוויד (הנסיגה מסיני) עלו לישראל כ-10 בליון דולר לכל הפחות. בשנה האחרונה נקטה ונוקטת ממישראל צעדים חמורים להבראת הכלכלה, ועל הקונגרס להבטיח את קיומה של ישראל ולעזור לה, לשנה אחת לפחות. תוך הכרה ב"שיקולים העקרוניים העמוקים" הוא (איכוייה) מקווה שתוועדה תקבל הצעת תת-הועדה ובמידת הצורך תוכרענה השאלות העקרוניות ע"י מליאת הסנט.

5. לאחר שהסנטור לאוטנברג הביע תמיכה ב"תיקון איוייה", דיבר הסנטור ציילס נגדו באריכות. טיעוניו היו ענייניים ותאמו הקווים הכלליים במכתב (הרצ"ב) שהוא חתום עליו כבכיר המיעוט בוועדת התקציב, יחד עם הסנטור פיט דומניצי (יו"ר ועדת התקציב). כפי שתראו, טיעונים

שתי רמת גשל גלגבו בחומר מקורי אלגה
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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

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14/012



אלה הם עקרוניים על פי רוב, ולא נוגעים לישראל ישירות. הסנטור גיון סטנים הצטרף אף הוא להתנגדות בטענה ש"אין זו הדרך"; אמנם יש לו אחדה לכל מי שנמצא בצרה, אך כיום ארה"ב בצרה כספית וקודם כל חייבים להתחיל בקיצוצים תקציביים. בהמשך הדיון חזר ציילס וטען שהצעת החוק, יש בה כדי "למוצץ את התקציב" ("This bill is a budget buster"). הוא הזה כיצד ניתן לקצץ בכל חוקי ההקצבה האחרים אך לא בסיוע חוץ. החום שטפח ב-70 אחוזים מאז 1980. הביע השתוממות שבכלל ניתן לדבר על הגדלת סיוע החוץ עת שחובותיה של ארה"ב מגיעות לטריליון דולר ושעה שדנים בהצעת גרייתם-רודמן לחיסול הגרעון התקציבי עד 1991.

6. הטפילד הזהיר שמליאת הסנט עלולה להתייחס להצעת החוק כפי שהתייחסה לכל הצעה שגלשה מעבר לתיקרה הנקבעה ע"י ועדת התקציב - וזאת ע"י קיצוצים "Across the board" שבמקרה זה יתבטאו בקיצוצים של כ-7.5 אחוזים בכל הסעיפים ובכל התכניות שבחוק. שאל אם תכניות אלה אינן מהוות אינטרסים אמריקאים גם כן, והוסיף שאפשר למנוע כל קיצוץ בהן אם יעבירו את הצעת החוק ללא "תיקון אינוייה".

7. קסטן הגיב באומרו שהדבר האחרון שהוא חותר לו הינו קיצוץ כללי בהצעת החוק בשיעור של 7.5 אחוזים. לאחר חילופי דברים נוספים עם הטפילד, גרס קסטן שבכל זאת עדיף בעיניו להביא את הצעת החוק למליאת הסנט כפי שהיא, ואם לא תטכים לה המליאה הוא יציע הצעת חוק חליפית ( SUBSTITUTE ) שלא תפגע בשאר הסעיפים בחוק; לחילופין יבקש "ויתור" ( AIVER ) מהנשיא לגבי גובה הבקשה של הממשל לסיוע חוץ. בינתיים הוא יעבוד עם וועדת התקציב ועם לשכת התקציב ( CBO ) תוך תקווה שיסמכו את ידם על חישוב תת-הוועדה לגבי ההוצאות הצפויות של בנק האקסים ועל המלצת תת-הועדה להעביר להשבון השוטף של סיוע החוץ את היתרה של 3.1 בליון דולר מהסכום שאושר לבנק האקסים בשנת התקציבית שעברה (FY 1985). הטפילד העיר שאם קסטן מוכן להציע "חוק חליפי" במליאה אין לו בעיות נוספות - והצעת החוק התקבלת ללא הצבעה (ולאחר תיקונים קלים שאינם נוגעים לנו ועונים במידה מסויימת על השתייגויות וועדת החוץ בנושא היוריסדיקציה).

8. דברי ההתנגדות של ציילס והטפילד היו חזקים ומשכנעים למדי, ויש לציין שאף סנטור, מלבד לאוטנברג, לא התבטא לטובת ה"תיקון". האוירה בדיון היתה קורקטית ו"סנטוריאלית", אך לפעמים הורגשה מתיחות, גם בקרב הקהל (ביניהם עוזרים בכירים שהביעו דאגות מתוצאות הדיון לא רק לגבי תדמיתה של ישראל בשעה שעושים מאמצים עליונים לקצץ בתקציב אלא גם בגלל השאלות העקרוניות הטמונות בהצעת אינוייה - דהיינו הערכה מחדש של תיקרות שנקבעו ע"י ועדת התקציב והעברת כספים להשבון השוטף שהיו אמורים לתיות מוצאים בשנה שחלפה).

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

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סיפס סבר
דף...3...מתוך...6...דפים
סווג בטחוני.....
דחיפות.....
תאריך וז"ח.....
שיטה מס' מברק.....

9. הסנטור אינוייה ניגש לחיים לאחר הדיון והביע שביעות רצונו מתוצאת הדיון - שסללה את הדרך להגשת הצעת החוק במליאת הסנט, ותיקונו בתוכה. כפי שדווח בנפרד ע"י הלפרין, אינוייה רואה מספר דרכים נוהליות לקידום הצעתו אם תיתקל בבעיות מסוג זה או אחר במליאה.

10. נכחו במרבית הדיון הסנטורים הטפילד, קסטן, מטינגלי, ד'אמטו, סטיבנס מצד הרפובליקנים; ואילו אינוייה, פרוקמייר, ציפילס, ג'ונסטון, סאר, דה-קונסיני, ולאוטנברג מצד הדמוקרטים. לחלק מהדיון באו גם רודמן, אנדרוס, גרן, וייקר, ספקטר מהרפובליקנים, ואילו הרקין, לייהי ובומפרס מהדמוקרטים.

11. הצעת החוק ודו"ח הלוואי מטעם תת הועדה בדיפי. לנוחיותכם רצ"ב בינתיים קטע החוק הנוגע ל"תיקון אינוייה".

יוסף לם

למדן

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

October 31, 1985

The Honorable Lowell P. Weicker, Jr.
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Lowell:

In recent weeks, each of the members of this Committee has made tough decisions on domestic spending bills in order to live within our 302(b) allocations. Because of this, we are compelled to raise with our colleagues the serious concerns we have with the 1986 Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill recommended by the Subcommittee.

We do not believe that a bill providing for foreign aid which breaches the Committee's 302(b) allocation by well over $1 billion should be seriously considered by the full Committee.

The bill recommended by the Foreign Operations Subcommittee exceeds the full Committee's 302(b) allocation by at least $1.2 billion in budget authority and $0.5 billion in outlays. The bill could exceed the 302(b) allocations by as much as $2.5 billion in budget authority. For this reason we oppose this bill.

Nevertheless, the Subcommittee has acted to deliberately circumvent its 302(b) allocation by seeking to legislatively waive the scoring of budget authority and protect a variety of foreign aid program increases through ad hoc re-estimates of prior-year outlays. We do not believe such actions are warranted or in the best interests of the Committee or the Senate.

The Subcommittee proposal legislatively prohibits the scoring of an estimated $3.1 billion in unobligated and expired budget authority from the fiscal year 1985 Export-Import Bank appropriation which the Subcommittee seeks to re-appropriate for fiscal years 1986 and 1987. Such an action violates both the spirit and the letter of the 1974 Budget Act. We do not believe that the Senate wishes to have individual committees scoring their own spending proposals.

The Subcommittee further proposes to protect existing foreign aid programs and provide additional funding for significant new foreign assistance efforts through an ad hoc re-estimation of Export-Import Bank prior-year outlays. Such an arrangement would simply allow one subcommittee to manipulate the scoring of their own proposals and second-guess CBO estimates in order to increase spending. We would remind our colleagues, that were we to re-estimate the entire Budget Resolution on this basis, there would be significant downward re-estimates as well. Re-estimation of budget assumptions to protect additional spending, no matter how worthy the specific proposals, are an inappropriate response to budgetary constraints.

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New and unauthorized foreign aid spending proposed in this legislation alone will cost the U.S. taxpayers an additional $7 billion if continued in future years. Such action is clearly inconsistent with the deficit reduction goals so recently set by the Senate. The Subcommittee proposes no offsetting reductions from low-priority existing programs.

The assumptions under which the Appropriations Committee's 302(b) allocations were made would allow for a robust $1.8 billion Export-Import Bank direct loan program and foreign aid levels $200 million higher than those reported by the House Appropriations Committee.

In the final analysis, the Congress must be straightforward in its approach to budgetary problems. We must acknowledge the full impact of each appropriation bill. This Committee, the Senate, and the Congress as a whole will work its will. If the Congress must break its own budget guidelines, then so be it. But it should do so forthrightly, understanding the full fiscal and policy implications of its actions.

Sincerely,

Lawton

Lawton Chiles

Pete

Pete V. Domenici

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14/012

15 FOREIGN MILITARY CREDIT SALES DEBT REFORM

16 For payment to the Secretary of the Treasury such
17 sums as may be necessary, but not more than $531,710,682,
18 which sums shall be used to reimburse the Federal Financing
19 Bank for the adjustment of interest rates charged on financ-
20 ing guaranteed under section 24 of the Arms Export Control
21 Act for Israel pursuant to agreements entered prior to the
22 date of enactment of this Act, notwithstanding section 10 of
23 Public Law 91-672 or any other provision of law: *Provided*,
24 That the Federal Financing Bank shall adjust the rate of
25 interest on such financing to 5 percent per annum, notwith-
26 standing any other provision of law: *Provided further*, That

1 authority for interest adjustment and funds appropriated
2 under this provision shall be available only for interest pay-
3 ments due and owing this fiscal year.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| המשרד | משרד הבטחון | |
| 010 | 8 | |

| | |
|---|---|
| דף...1...מתוך...3...דפים | |
| סווג בטחוני...קודי..... | |
| דחיפות.....מידי..... | |
| תאריך וזמן..011190 נוב 85 | |
| מספר מברק..... | |

ממנכ"ל, מע"ת מצפ"א. דע: יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

דו"ח תקשורת (28.10 - 1.11)

בשבוע שלאחר סיום בקורו של רה"מ בארה"ב ניכרת ירידה דראסטית במידת האינטנסיביות שבעסוק באזורנו ובכסוי של ארועים ואישיותו מזרח היכוניים. הסתערות רוה"מ על התקשורת במהלך שהותו כאן וצרוף הנסיבות שנוצרו לקראת הגיעו (ובעיקר פרשת "אקילה לאורו", הסתבכותו של מובארק בשקר גלוי ופרצופו האמיתי של אש"ם שנגלה לעין כל בקלונו) הביאו למצב שזמן רב לא זכינו לו ומעמדנו בתקשורת שופר לתקופת מה בצורה משכנעת.

גם אלה שאינם נימנים על חובבי ציון ושלא מצאו בנאומו של רה"מ הרבה מן החדוש לא הסתירו התפעלותם מהגישה, מהטון ומהאוירה החדשה. אך מאז תחילת השבוע נראה כי כל המערכת התקשורתית מופנית ומכוונת אל פגישת הפסגה הקרובה ובהקשר זה ניתנות פרשנויות גם לארועי המזרח התכון.

מספר נושאים העסיקו אותנו בשבוע האחרון:

א. חרושת השמועות בנושא יהדות בריה"מ הגיעה בשבוע זה לשיאה. ידיעות על משלחת "אל על" שהתה במוסקבה לדיון בטיסות ישירות לישראל, על חדוש יחסים קרוב בין ישראל לבריה"מ, על שחרורו הקרב של שרנסקי ועל נכונותו של גורבצ'וב לשחרר 15 אלף או 40 אלף (תלוי לפי המקור) יהודים - ידיעות אלו מתפרשות כאן בחלקן הגדול כמאבק על דעת הקהל והתמרונים המוקדמים לקראת ועידת הפסגה רייגן - גורבאצ'וב.בכלל,דומה שכל צעד של אחת המעצמות מתפרש כאן מייד כחלק מההכנות לפסגה ומהנסיון לתפוש את היזמה התקשורתית . בעוד ההערכות על תוצאות הפסגה מכסות את כל קשת האפשרויות הרי שיש פה לא מעט הערכה ליכולת התקשורתית והמניפולטיבית של הנהגה הסובייטית החדשה.

לכל השואלים בענין יהודי בריה"מ ענינו כי נשמח להיות מופתעים אך לצערנו המצב בשטח אינו מורה עד כה על כל שנוי קל במדיניות ההגירה של בריה"מ וכי ישראל תמשיך לעשות הכל לפתיחת השערים ולמען עליתם של יהודי בריה"מ.

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שיהם רמז שהבטן גמל בגדול מגוש בלבד את הסכמה לגב הלאומי
סביב נציגים

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

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קבלת מברק

דף...2...מתוך...3...דפים

סווג בטחוני.....

דחיפות.....

תאריך וזמן.....

מספר מברק.....

ב. הדוית המז"תית האחרת של הפסגה - השאלה האם וכיצד יועלה הנושא שלנו בשיחות אלה - העסיקה רבות את הפרשנים הכותבים באופן קבוע בענייננו. הקו המשותף כמעט לכולם הוא שאם אכן ויתר חוסיין על מפגש אמריקאי עם משלחת ירדנית - אש"פית הרי שמרכז הכובד, בעקבות הסכמת רה"מ לסוג מסוים של ועידה בינלאומית, הוסט לשאלת מעורבותה של בריה"מ בתהליך. רבה כאן מידת הסקרנות כיצד יטפלו האמריקאים בג'ינבה בשאלה כאשר תועלה שם.

עם זאת, באותה נשימה,אומרים הפרשנים שסדר היום לא יותיר מקום רב לדיון בנושאים אזוריים. אנחנו מצידנו חוזרים על נסוחיו של רוה"מ בנאומו באו"ם בכל הנוגע לעמדתנו שלנו לגבי שתופה של בריה"מ בתהליך השלום.

ג. גל הכותרות מן הארץ בתחילת השבוע בעקבות תדרוכים, הדלפות ונחושים בכל הנוגע לנושא תהליך השלום, מפגשים סודיים והסכמים חשאיים העמיד אותנו כאן במצב מביך כאשר בשיחותינו עם אנשי תקשורת הם מספרים לנו ממקורותיהם בארץ ובמחמ"ד על מגעים והתפתחויות שאיננו מודעים להם. במיוחד לא נעים לקבל מהם את פרוט עמדותיה ומהלכיה של ישראל.

הענין העצום שעורר כאן רה"מ עורר את רמת המודעות לנושאים שלנו וסייע לנו בצבירת נקודות זכות רבות במאבק על דעת הקהל. לאחר צאתו של רה"מ פונים אלינו כולם ל - follow-up ולעדכון אך המירב שאנו מסוגלים לעשות, בלי להציג ערוותנו ברבים, הוא לצטט את כותרות העתונות הישראלית ולהוסיף פרשנויות משלנו. עיקר הענין מתרכז סביב התדרוכים שאשרו את קיום מפגשי חוסיין - פרס והדבורים על הסכמים חשאיים עם המלך הירדני.

ד. התקשורת הפגינה השבוע סקרנות רבה ללמוד את תוצאות מפגש חוסיין - ערפאת ואת מפגש ראשי הממשלות ירדן - סוריה. בעוד אשר נכון לציין כי ערפאת אישית והארגון שהוא עומד בראשו ספגו מהלומה תקשורתית, הרי שלא מצאנו כאן עתונאי רציני החושב שניתן להתקדם בתהליך השלום בלי מעורבות מסוג כלשהי של אש"פ, ואנו "מוזהרים" מדי פעם לא להגרר לנאיביות שיתכן שלום נפרד עם ירדן.

בהקשר זה מוצאים כאן ענין בקורה בין ירדן וסוריה. באופן כללי נראית עמידתו של חוסיין על שתוף סוריה כתהליך חיובי באשר רבים וטובים כאן מחזיקים בדיעה שמהלך שסוריה תתנגד לו, סיכוייו מלכתחילה מעטים ומאידך השגת הבנה סורית -

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

3/3

8/10

| | |
|---|---|
| דף...3...מתוך...3...דפים | |
| סווג בטחוני..... | |
| דחיפות..... | |
| תאריך וזמן..... | |
| מספר מברק..... | |

ירדנית יכולה לעקוף את הים כשול האש"פי.

השבועות הקרובים, יש להניח, יוקדשו ליחסי המעצמות ולכסוי בקור שולץ במוסקבה אך לא נמצא "מקופחים" גם אז.

יוסי גל

10/10

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד, בטחון, ניו-יורק

1/2999 6 008

מ ר ב ר י ע ו ל ם

דף...1...מתוך.....נדפים

סווג בטחוני.בלבד.....

דחיפות.....רגיל

תאריך ודפ"מ.85NOV1 11:30

מספר מברק.....

אל:הסברה, מע"ח, מצפ"א, ממנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לש' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קש"ח

דע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY - FRIDAY - NOVEMBER 1, 1985

THE PRESS REPORTS

Israel-Jordan Deal On West Bank Denied

CHICAGO TRIBUNE-(AP)-An opposition party Thursday revealed details of what it said was an agreement between Israel and Jordan for power sharing in the occupied West Bank. Peres denied such an accord existed. Yuval Ne'eman, said the plan calls for Jordanian police presence in the West Bank, the election of West Bank Palestinians to the Jordanian Parliament and Jordanian sovereignty over Jerusalem's Temple Mount.Peres said on Israel Radio that Tehiya's claim was nonsense based on pure invention.

Power Play In Israel

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.-Curtius-Advisers to Peres are actively seeking to force the Likud bloc out of the govt. of national unity. That is the assessment of informed sources who say that at least some of Peres' advisers are convinced they must take advantage of two factors: the deep divisions within the Likud bloc, and Peres' heightened popularity which has dramatically rejuvenated his Labor party. "There is a split in the ranks of those closest to Peres," said one Western observer. "Some, I believe including the prime minister, think they should hold off and drag the Likud to start negotiations with a Jordanian-Palestinian team. Others feel the time to rid of the Likud is now."

Small Steps Toward Peace In East-West And Mideast Arenas

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON -Harsch-Shultz is flying to Moscow over this weekend in a move that reflects at least a tentative wir in Wash. by those who want something to come out of the Geneva summit over those who want only confrontation at the summit.It is the top move in a week in world affairs which also found Hussein accepting, tentatively, the olive branch Peres extended in his UN speech the previous week. In other words, in both East-West relations and in the Middle East the peacemakers are for the moment winning a continuation of a dialogue which still might, and still can, produce substantial results in both areas because the exchanges remain active.

עתונות

קדו מדבא תבודות ברן שטחים מתאם-שטחים בעתי

שגרירות ישראל · וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

004

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|---|---|
| עמוד | מספר |
| דף | מתוך דפים |
| סווג בסתוני | |
| דחיפות | |
| תאריך וז"ה | 85 |
| מס' מברק | |

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א.

להלן מסיבת העתונאים של מזכיר המדינה ב - 31.10 שהתקיימה לרגל נסיעת המזכיר למוסקווה.

עתונות.

MAGDA ABU-FADL (Middle East News Service): Mr. Secretary, on the regional issues, how much weight do you think will be placed, at the summit, on discussion of a Middle East peace process? What might the US propose? And do you foresee a scenario wherein the Soviet Union might participate in an international peace conference?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We think that the way to go in the Middle East is not a big conference, but direct negotiations between Israel and Israel's neighbors. So that's what we have been struggling to help bring about.

King Hussein has spoken about the importance of -- I think his words are, "appropriate international auspices". And Prime Minister Peres has picked up on that. But it's still not clear just how to define "appropriate international auspices".

But however it's defined, the name of the game is to get to direct negotiations. And that's what we are seeking and we're prepared to explain that and explain why, and I don't know how much time will end up being devoted to Middle East issues. But, obviously, it's an important set of subject matters.

Q Mr. Secretar, in view of the events of recent weeks, do you still see the PLO, ultimately, as being a viable partner in that process?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The PLO has been involved, in recent weeks, as in the past, in acts of terror and violence, and I don't see how those who are perpetrating terror and violence against one of the parties deserves a place at a peace table. So, those who are ready to sit down with Israel and try to work out peace, those who accept Resolutions 242 and 338, and those who are prepared to stop the so-called "armed struggle" deserve a place at the peace table, whatever their label may be, and those who aren't willing to do that don't deserve a place, in my opinion.

עתונות

שיחה מחוז שמרון דרום מרכז מזרח ירושלים דרום מרכז מזרח ירושלים
2 3 1 3 1 1 4 1 1 1 3 1 4

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

003 / 003

דף...1...מתוך...1...דפים
סווג בטחוני: שמור
דחיפות: רגיל
תאריך ודייח: 1 0930 בנובמבר 85
מספר מברק:

ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, לשכת ראש הממשלה
דע: אברהם אלון, מח' לקשרים בינ"ל של ההסתדרות, תל-אביב

ועידת ה - AFL - CIO

בועידה שהתקיימה באנהיים, קליפורניה בין ה - 25 ל 31 באוקטובר 85 התקבלו החלטות תמיכה בישראל ובהסתדרות. החלטה בעד מאבק תקיף ובלתי מתפשר בטרור, כולל הזכות לחקוף מחנות ובסיסים של ארגוני טרור, קריאה למתן רשות יציאה ליהודים מברית"מ.

בנושא "אל-על" נתקבלה החלטת תמיכה במאבק איגוד המכונאים נגד "אל-על" ודרישה לסיום מידי של הסכסוך (פרטים במברק נפרד).

במסגרת הועידה נערך אירוע תמיכה בהסתדרות בהשתתפות ליין קירקלנד ותום דונהיו ורבים מנשיאי האיגודים החשובים.
(דו"ח מפורט בדיפ).

דני בלוך

ב ה רהד אנש בלונש אבנא
2 3 3 1 1

2

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד

תל

2 . 002

קוד שגרה

דף...1...מתוך...2...דפים

סווג בטחוני..סודי.....

דחיפות..מיידי.....

תאריך וז"ח, J. 1000, בנובמבר 1985

מספר מס' ברק.....

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ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, כלכלית, לשכת ראש הממשלה, מזכיר הממשלה, לשכת שר האוצר,
לשכת שר התחבורה, עו"ד ע. בלום - משרד המשפטים,
דע: מזכ"ל ההסתדרות י. קיסר,
א. אלון, מח' לקשרים בינ"ל של ההסתדרות, תל אביב.

(5)

ההחלטה בעניין "אל-על" בועידת ה - AFL - CIO

שוב הצלחנו במאמצים רבים למנוע קבלת החלטה על חרם נגד ה"בונדס". אך נראה כי זו הפעם האחרונה שבצליח למנוע החלטה זאת, אם הסכסוך לא ייפתר תוך הזמן הקרוב ביותר. להצלחה הפעם תרמו מספר גורמים: שיחת ראש הממשלה עם ליין קירקלנד בוושינגטון. הרצון של ידידנו בהנהגת האיגודים המקצועיים לא לפגוע בישראל בעיתוי כה קריטי בתהליך השלום, והתחושה, אותה החדרנו, כי בשבועיים האחרונים העכובים בהשלמת המו"מ היו באשמת נציגי איגוד המכונאים מאשר באשמת "אל-על".

נציגי המכונאים, בתמיכת האיגודים הימיים ומספר איגודים אחרים, הגישו הצעת החלטה הקוראת לחרם על ה"בונדס" כולל פדיון מוקדם של אגרות, המנעות מקניית אגרות חדשות וחרם על אירועים הקשורים בישראל ועל ביקורים בישראל. ידידינו בראשות ליין קירקלנד רצו ל"קבור" את ההצעה אולם וינפיסינגר, נשיא המכונאים סירב בתוקף ודרש החלטה של הועידה בעניין "אל-על". מספר ידידים, בעיקר יהודים, הציעו קו פשרה של החלטה שתתייחס רק לשביתה עצמה, ועדת ניסוח בהרכב תום דונהיו, אל היבס וג'וייס מילר ניסחה הצעה שעיקרה תמיכה בשובתים וביקורת הריפה על "אל-על". הצעה זו נתקבלה על דעת וינפיסינגר, ואושרה אח"כ פה אחד במליאת ועדת ההחלטות. בכך נמנע מצב מכיך ולא נעים בועידה, ואגב כך הצלנו גם רכישה של למעלה מ - 10 מיליון דולר בונדס ע"י איגוד עובדי המזון והמסחר שהיתה תלויה באי-קבלת ההחלטה על חרם נגד "ה"בונדס".

כאמור, חלק ניכר מההישג מבוסס על ההבטחה המחודשת של ראש הממשלה כי הממשלה ו"אל-על" יעשו מצידם כל הדרוש כדי להביא לסיום מיידי של הסכסוך.

להלן הקטע העיקרי של ההחלטה:

שתה חדג אנשל ג/אנשל בצפון ברוחי בלל-אל סיבל אשל

אודה שר התחבורה אנשל תחבורה בצבור האנשלה
סוג הבוק/בשרה אנשלים

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: יאל

2/002

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|---|---|
| מספר | מהדורה |
| דף 2 מתוך 2 דפים | |
| סוג בטחוני | |
| דחיפות | |
| תאריך ודי"ח | |
| מספר מברק | |

"Since July 11, 1984 a boycott of EL-AL airlines has been in effect with the full support of all AFL - CIO unions.
Only because of the fact that negotiations are now underway between the AFL-CIO and highest levels of the Israeli government is stronger action against EL-AL being withheld from consideration at this time.
In this spirit the AFL-CIO urges the swift resumption of negotiations and the prompt settelement of this dispute".

דני כלוך