

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

(3)

משרד ראש הממשלה

תת חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה

שם תיק:

לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית

סימול מקורי :

2 תקופת החומר : 11/1986-11/1986

מזהה פיזי:

5019 / 4 - N

08/11/2012



: DV

לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצח

5019 / 4 - X

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כתובת:

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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יציא

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מחוך 16
מחוך 4
סודי ביותר

אל: ווט, בטחון, נר: חורם 6871, מ: המשרד
דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 301186, רח: 1730

סודי ביותר/בהול

השגריר - וושינגטון.

דע: ממי דהמי ושר החוץ. שהבייט.
איראן.

התקטר פיקרינג ושאל אם קבלנו הודעות כלשהן על בקשה לתשאול
ישראלים בנושא אירן. בירורו היום בווינגטון העלה כי לא
היתה פניה. אמרתי שלמיטב הידוע לי לא היתה פניה כזאת. ביקש
שנחזיקו בתמונה וכך יעשה גם הוא.

דובינסטין=

ל/ח

תפ: שהח, דהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, סייבל
תח: מזכיר הממשלה

1006 / 173 / 74 2/16

NYT-Mansour Farhang (Prof. Bennington College) "Naive President Machiavellian Iran" Of all the errors and mistaken judgements that contributed to the current crisis, among the most foolish was the belief that it was dealing with Iranian "moderates." The claim that arms shipments could help some imaginary "moderates" or facilitate an end to the war betrays incomprehensible ignorance and naivete about the character of Khomeini's theocracy. Normal ties between Washington and Iran will one day be established. But the only thing Washington can do now is to except the new reality in Iran and be open to expand non-military trade when the Islamic republic wishes to do so.

NYT-Allen Weinstein (Prof. Boston U.) "A Bipartisan Rescue is Necessary" A judicious mix of executive personnel changes, Congressional investigations and an improving relationship between the two branches of gov't can help restore public confidence and credibility.

NYT-Holand (columnist for Nation Mag) 11/30 "The Origins of the Problem" This controversy has its origins in the Administrations first 100 days. It represents the inexorable working out of a frame of mind that has dominated Reagan's thinking since the beginning. Reagan and his closest advisers have a profound mistrust of bipartisan foreign policy and the bureaucracies that have carried it out in the past 25 years.

DN-Will 11/30 "Caught Standing at Inattention" The crowning fallacy of the whole operation was to take the approach to Iran, which was in itself baroque, and make it rococo by connecting it, through Swiss bank accounts to the contras. Reagan's desire to delegate responsibility is disproportionate to his insistence on wisdom in his subordinates.

Press Reports

Evidence Points to Significant Saudi Role

NYT-Gerth p.1 11/30 Emerging evidence shows a significant Saudi role not only in secret arms shipments to Iran but also to the supply of military equipment to the rebels in Nicaragua. Evidence indicates that North and his associates were in direct contact with the Saudis. The Saudi motives were said to be the furthering of a strategic relationship with the US and to open a dialogue with Iran. The dealings generated huge profits for some involved, so commercial and diplomatic considerations overlapped, as is often the case in the Mideast. The Saudi role offers a new perspective on how the contras were supplied at a time when the US Gov't was prohibited from aiding the contras. It also suggests that the Israelis may have played a less central role. In some cases Saudi and Israeli interests intersected. Khashoogi had dealings with Israeli arms dealers and was acting as an unofficial liaison between Saudi and Israeli leaders. But according to Israeli, American and Saudi sources, the ties to Iran were forged more by Saudi Arabia than by Israel, when a Saudi confidant of King Fahd, Ali Bin Mussallam, made contact with Khomeini. (cabled)

20 Planeloads of US Arms Reported

NYT-11/29 AP-Sources in Iran said as many as 20 planeloads of US weapons were delivered to Iran in May when McFarlane visited Teheran. The sources have intimate knowledge of the internal workings of the Iranian gov't and

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128

1006 / 173 / 74

3/6

on the condition that they not be identified. If the report is correct, it suggests a much larger shipment of arms than had been previously reported. (DN)

Shamir Says US Has Not Asked to Question Israelis on Arms Deal

NYT-Freidman 11/29 (photo of Pollard) Shamir said the US had not asked the Israeli Gov't for permission to question Israelis in connection with the Iran affair. But he said if an approach was made, Israel would consider it. In the Iran affair, there has been no suggestion that Israeli officials have been involved with violations of US law. It is anticipated that American investigators will ask to speak with those Israelis who helped coordinate arrangements between Washington and Iran. The Israeli officials with the most knowledge would be David Kimche and Amiram Nir. In addition, the two Israeli arms dealers might be able to shed some light on the workings of the Swiss bank account. At least in some cases, it is highly doubtful that the private transactions could have taken place without the knowledge of the Israeli Gov't. (Cabled)

Iran Says Reagan Lied-Has Tapes/Outlines Deal for Hostage Release

NYT-Miller 11/29-Irans says it has taped conversations between the White House and McParlane showing that Reagan has lied to the American people, according to statements by an Iranian official and published reports in Paris and Bonn. (NYP-Reuters)

NYF-AP 11/29-Teheran will help free the American hostages in Lebanon if "America stops being a bully" and delivers weapons bought by the Shah, the speaker of Iran's Parliament said.

Seante Tells White House to Save Files

NYT-Shenon-p.1-11/29-Amid new indication that White House officials had destroyed sensitive documents, the Seante Intelligence Committee urged the White House to retain all material relating to the sale of arms to Iran and the transfer of money to the Nicaraguan rebels. Poindexter and North are believed to have destroyed stacks of sensitive documents last weekend as part of routine procedures. (DN; NYP)

NYT-special 11/29-Officials at the White House and the NSC were ordered to preserve all records about the diversion of profits from Iran sales to rebels in Nicaragua.

Reagan OK'd Plans

DN-Nelson 11/30-John McMahon, former deputy director of the CIA, arranged a secret and apparently illegal flight of US weapons to Israel and Iran last year, but then dug in his heels and demanded formal authorization of any such flights in the future, according to sources. This may have cost him his job. Reagan then agreed to issuing a formal "finding" authorizing the secret shipments and in Jan. 1986, McMahon unexpectedly retired.

DN-UPI 11/29 North told associates he had direct access to Reagan and frequent approval for sensitive foreign policy operations. P. Andy Messing, who is involved in conservative causes in Central America said

11/26 228 1006 / 173 / 74 4/6
"I'm positive the President signed off on North's work in Iran based on what North told me about other operations he worked on. "Reagan is not as detached and sleepy as many people think."

US Employed Sting Operation for Arms to Iran

NYT-Diamond 11/29 p.1-The US Gov't set up a major sting operation last year, complete with phony bank accounts to catch arms merchants dealing with Iran. The operation occurred at the same time the Administration was secretly shipping arms to Iran. All of the 17 defendants in the case have pleaded not guilty saying they had the approval of high Administration officials. Legal sources close to the US Attorney's Office said the office was not aware of the Administration shipments when the case was filed and that the shipments might seriously undercut their case. (NYP)

NYT-Diamond 11/30-One of the defendants said he would oppose a dismissal of the charges against him even if the Gov't asked for it. Nico Minardos, a LA businessman said he was jailed for 3 months in lieu of \$2 million bail. Not all of the defendants want to proceed. The Israelis involved want a dismissal.

Bush Plans to Speak Out

NYT-Apple 11/30 p.1-Bush, who has been all but invisible since the crisis over shipments erupted, intends to make a public statement soon. Bush's behavior has been closely watched because he formerly headed the CIA, which played a role in the shipments; because he and a member of his staff have links to contras and because he is the leading candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1988. (DN)

Iranian Says Iraq Got Foreign Help

NYT-Reuters 11/30-Iran's President says a long-range Iranian air raid on Iran's oil export terminal at Larak was made possible by use of bases provided by "reactionary countries." Mideast sources say the aircraft used Saudi bases.

Afghan and Angola Involved

NYP-Lathem & Flick 11/29-Profits from the sale of arms to Iran have been funneled to guerrillas in Afghanistan and Angola. North and Secord are said to have directed the diversion of funds.

The \$1 Billion Wild Card in the Iran Deal

NYT-Wachtel 11/30-If there was a trade for the hostages the ransom probably would involve the more than \$1 billion in Iranian assets held by US banks than the \$50 million worth of arms bought from the US. In fact, the release of some of the hostages coincided at least as much with the release of some of those assets as with the delivery of arms.

West Europeans Fear Crisis Crippling Washington's Foreign Policy Ability

NYT-Lelyveld 11/29-Governments in Western Europe and elsewhere are contemplating the possibility that the crisis over arms sales have crippled the Administration's ability to deal with foreign policy.



1006/173 174 5/6

Most European governments have not spoken out because they do not want to make the matter worse. American diplomats around the world are said to be mortified at the revelations.

Can Reagan Recover?

NYT-Appel 11/30-It is clear that Reagan will not admit that he made a mistake. Much depends on whether Reagan is shown, in the months ahead, to have been simply inept or unwise or both, or to have knowledge of criminal acts, and worse, lied to conceal that knowledge.

NYT-Boyd 11/30 p.1-Reagan tried to draw attention away from the Iran arms crisis by urging Americans not to forget that "there are many other issues that concern us."

Regan Sat in on Briefings by Messe

NYT-11/30-Engelberg-Donald Regan attended meetings this week in which Messe presented details about his inquiry into the Iran arms deal. Regan says that he is unaware that funds had been diverted to Nicaragua. Nonetheless, several veteran law enforcement officials suggested that Regan should voluntarily withdraw from sitting in on the meetings.

North Said to Be Doing OK

NYT-11/30-Christian-North is prepared to take the blame like a mixture of martyr and soldier. Friends say he was heartened by a phone call from the President who said that the revelations of the recent days would make a great movie.

Vanunu Charged With Spying

NYT-special 11/29-Vanunu was charged with aiding an enemy during war and aggravated espionage. The first charge, which did not cite the enemy in question, carried a maximum penalty of death. The defendant was not in the court when the charges were brought. (NYP & DN)

Syrians Oust 3 West German Envoys

NYT-11/29 special-Syria ordered 3 West German diplomats to leave the country in retaliation for Bonn's ouster of 3 Syrians. Syria is also withdrawing its Ambassador until further notice.

Battles Rage in Lebanon

NYT-AP 11/30-Shiite Moslem forces closed in on Shatila. Fighting also raged south of Shatila. (NYT-11/29)

Oman Holds War Games

NYT-Middleton 11/30-British and Omani naval, air and ground forces are engaged in war games. On the surface this is just another exercise, but due to the timing and location, the operation has a larger significance. A senior British officer said the exercise "should tell the Iranians something about the mobility of modern forces."

1006/173/74 6/6

Tunisia Cracks Down on Dissidents

NYT-Schumacher-The Tunisia Gov't is cracking down on dissent as uncertainty grows over who will succeed Bourguiba.

Kuwait Dooms Iraqi For Attempt to Kill Emir

NYT-Reuters 11/30-One of five Iraqis charged with plotting to kill the Emir of Kuwait was sentenced to death. Another defendant was sentenced to life in prison and 3 were acquitted.

Movie Focuses on Moral Dilemma of Fighting Terrorism

NYT-O'Connor 11/30-"The Sword of Gideon", a HBO movie, turns out to have a few surprises. Instead of getting an Israeli Rambo, we end up with a thoughtful man pondering complicated moralities. This movie is not likely to please supporters of Israel who are aggressively partial to "my country right or wrong" attitudes. The sympathies of the movie are closer to the country's Peace Now movement. The movie raises interesting questions, and that is a distinctive accomplishment for a TV movie.

Letters

NYT-11/30-5 letters on the Iran issue. One writer wonders why Saudi policy has not been sharply undercut or criticized.

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דפוס..... מתוך..... דפים

סוג בסחונות 10/10

דחיות.....

מאריך וזיחה.....

מס' סדר.....

אל: ממשלה + משרד החוץ

586

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1/2

אל: מצפא-מאור-בטח

דע: מקשה (ממבטחונ)

ביקור קנדי. להלן על סמך שיחה עם ננסי סודרברג:-

(א) למברקם 421

(1) הפמלייה-כמברקי מ-24.11- בהוספת רעייתו של מרוין רוזו (גבי גינט - JANET ROSEN) ורעייתו של ליאונרד אהרונסון (SARA יחיא ישראלית). השתתפות רובת הילי ורעייתו טרם סוכמה.

(2) כמברקי הנל, טרם הוחלט על השתתפות מאבטח שני. כעת מדובר באחד, בשם ציאק שטיין, (CHUCK STEIN). ישא נשק ויתאם עם כוחותינו

(3) טוב-ראו נא להלן

(4) הביקור בשגארהיב: אינו הכרחי-אפשר לוותר עליו אם לא יסתדר

(5) התכנית הצבאית (גם לשלכם 450): הם מאוכזבים-היא דלה מדי. מבקשים הארכתו (עד שעה 1830 לפחות) ועיבוייה. מעל הכל מבקשים ACTION PROGRAMME אחת, קנדי ישתעמם, כדברי ננסי. לפיכך מבקשים שיחה עם מפקדים, בשדה, והסעת טנק אם אפשר. אני מציע איפוא ביקור בבסיס חיא בפלמחים, ושיחה עם מפקדי הבסיס.

(6) הלביא: אינ זה נכון שהסנטור אינו מעוניין בפרוייקט. אם אפשר, נא להכלילו בתכנית.

(7) אייע עם קיסר: מודים-מקווים שתאושר

(8) כמברקי הנל, טרם סוכם מועד ושעת יציאתו. משרד קנדי עדיין ממתינ לחשובת הירדנים אך ככל הנראה הסנטור ופמלייתו יעברו את הגשר ביום וי(12/12) בבוקר בדרכם לפטרה ולעקבה. עוד נבריק.

(9) שצירנסקי: עדיין מקווים להפגש עם אביטל וגם עם עולים מבריהים שהסנטור השיג את שיחרורם ב-1978 וב-1986 (השמות אצל שג-ארהיב)- וזאת יחד עם האמהות

(10) כאמור הביקור בשגארהיב אינו הכרחי. מבקשים איפוא לקיים את הפגישה עם הפלסטינים אצל קונכיל ארהיב בירושלים, כמקובל.

(11) הנשיא: הבקשה לקבוצה מצומצמת נמסרה מזמן והוסברה בשנית. הם שואלים (בשם קנדי) אם הנשיא יסכים ל- PHOTOC עם כל הפמלייה ואזי יקבל את הסנטור במתכונת מצומצמת (ואפ סגורה). בדרו-נא.

PP

(12) הסעה/הטסה: העניין הובהר להם לא-פעם. ננסי עדיין בשלה לגבי מטוס ממנחת הקרייה (אחרי השיחה עם רה"מ) למנחת ממבטחונ (לקראת תשיחה עם שר הבטחונ)

(13) כלי הרכב/אבטחה: נושא זה מטריד משדון של קנדי (לנוכח רציחות שני אחיו). להערכתם הסנטור הינו אי-איש (ייסיכונ גבוהי) ועלינו להבטיח לו הבטחה דומה לזו שסופקה לסגן הנשיא בוש. במסעות קנדי בחיל הם רגילים ל... מוטורקדהי - שמורכבת מלימוזינה חסינה לכדורים לסנטור, מיניבוס לפמלייה, שני רכבי אבטחה (אחד קדימה, אחד אחורה) ושוטרים באופניים. היות ומדובר על אבטחה, בדרכ כלל המדינה הנאחזת מספקת (מה גם שקשה לשכור לימוזינה חסינה לכדורים). לדברי ננסי, אם לא נוכל לדאוג לסידורי אבטחה כאלה, יצטרכו לשקול מחדש את עצמ קיום הביקור. הסברתי לה באריכות שאין זה צורת העבודה שלנו - א"ה היא בשלה. העלות אינה מפריעה להם.

(14) הגלויות: השאלה תמוהה. מבחינת קנדי... פישלמ יי, והחמצתם את המועד - וכפי שצויין במברקי הנל, אי-אפשר לגייס את שגארהב משלב זה-אז מה יש לאשר?

(ב) למברקכם 450

- (1) שר האוצר-תודה
- (2) התכנית הצבאית-ראו-נא דלעיל
- (3) הביקור בשגארהיב-כנל
- (4) שצירנסקי-ראו נא דלעיל
- (5) תכנית, מוקדיי- לא ניתן לתת תשובה עד יום די, ה-3.12. להערכת ננסי, הסנטור לא יסכים.

(6) האירוע בבייש ב-9.12: כל הקבוצה ישתתפו- למעט גבי גיין קנדי סמית, שתעלה לירושלים ישר מנתביג.

(ג) כמוברק בשלנו 609, ננסי סודרברג תגיע ארצה ב-4.12 בבוקר במגמה לסכם את הסידורים הסופיים. היא טסה היום למזהית, וכבר אין אפשרות של קשר עמה.

(ד) השגריר יפגש את קנדי ביום גי (2.12) ומבקש תכנית כמעט סופית עד יום בי (1.12) בערב. אנא.

י. למדנ

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ש.נ.ר. ש.נ.ר. ש.נ.ר.

דפוס... מחור... דפים

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PUBLIC LAW 98-473—OCT. 12, 1984

98 STAT. 1837

***Public Law 98-473**
98th Congress

Joint Resolution

Making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1985, and for other purposes.

Oct. 12, 1984
[H.J. Res. 648]

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I

That the following sums are hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and out of applicable corporate or other revenues, receipts, and funds, for the several departments, agencies, corporations, and other organizational units of the Government for the fiscal year 1985, and for other purposes, namely:

Sec. 101. (a) Such sums as may be necessary for programs, projects, or activities provided for in the Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1985 (H.R. 5743), to the extent and in the manner provided for in the conference report and joint explanatory statement of the Committee of Conference (House Report Numbered 98-1071), filed in the House of Representatives on September 25, 1984, as if such Act had been enacted into law.

Agriculture,
rural
development
appropriations.

(b) Such sums as may be necessary for programs, projects, or activities provided for in the District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1985 (H.R. 5899), to the extent and in the manner provided for in the conference report and joint explanatory statement of the Committee of Conference (House Report Numbered 98-1088), filed in the House of Representatives on September 26, 1984, as if such Act had been enacted into law.

D.C.
appropriations.

(c) Such amounts as may be necessary for programs, projects or activities provided for in the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985, at a rate of operations and to the extent and in the manner provided as follows, to be effective as if it had been enacted into law as the regular appropriation Act:

Post, p. 1838.

*Note: The printed text of Public Law 98-473 is a reprint of the hand enrollment, signed by the President on October 12, 1984.

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PUBLIC LAW 98-473—OCT. 12, 1984

98 STAT. 1935

Army Reserve, Army National Guard or Air National Guard occupied by, or programed to be occupied by, persons in an active Guard or Reserve status: *Provided further*, That none of the funds appropriated by this Act may be used to include (civilian) military technicians in computing civilian personnel ceilings, including statutory or administratively imposed ceilings, on activities in support of the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Army National Guard or Air National Guard.

SEC. 8064. (a) The provisions of section 138(c)(2) of title 10, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to fiscal year 1985 or with respect to the appropriation of funds for that year.

(b) During fiscal year 1985, the civilian personnel of the Department of Defense may not be managed on the basis of any end-strength, and the management of such personnel during that fiscal year shall not be subject to any constraint or limitation (known as an end-strength) on the number of such personnel who may be employed on the last day of such fiscal year.

(c) The fiscal year 1986 budget request for the Department of Defense as well as all justification material and other documentation supporting the fiscal year 1986 Department of Defense budget request shall be prepared and submitted to the Congress as if sections (a) and (b) of this provision were effective with regard to fiscal year 1986.

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

SEC. 8065. Appropriations or funds available to the Department of Defense during the current fiscal year may be transferred to appropriations provided in this Act for research, development, test, and evaluation to the extent necessary to meet increased pay costs authorized by or pursuant to law, to be merged with and to be available for the same purposes, and the same time period, as the appropriation to which transferred.

SEC. 8066. (a) During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.

(b) The prohibition concerning Nicaragua contained in subsection (a) shall cease to apply if, after February 28, 1985—

(1) the President submits to Congress a report—

(A) stating that the Government of Nicaragua is providing materiel or monetary support to anti-government forces engaged in military or paramilitary operations in El Salvador or other Central American countries;

(B) analyzing the military significance of such support;

(C) stating that the President has determined that assistance for military or paramilitary operations prohibited by subsection (a) is necessary;

(D) justifying the amount and type of such assistance and describing its objectives; and

(E) explaining the goals of United States policy for the Central American region and how the proposed assistance would further such goals, including the achievement of peace and security in Central America through a compre-

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Nicaragua.

Report.

98 STAT. 1936

PUBLIC LAW 98-473—OCT. 12, 1984

hensive, verifiable and enforceable agreement based upon the Contadora Document of Objectives; and

(2) a joint resolution approving assistance for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua is enacted.

(c)(1) For the purpose of subsection (b)(2), "joint resolution" means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the report of the President under subsection (b)(1) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Congress approves the obligation and expenditure of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua."

(2) The report described in subsection (b)(1) shall be referred to the appropriate committee or committees of the House of Representatives and to the appropriate committee or committees of the Senate.

(3) A resolution described in paragraph (1) introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in paragraph (1) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Such a resolution may not be reported before the eighth day after its introduction.

(4) If the committee to which is referred a resolution described in paragraph (1) has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) at the end of fifteen calendar days after its introduction, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of such resolution and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(5)(A) When the committee to which a resolution is referred has reported, or has been deemed to be discharged (under paragraph (4)) from further consideration of, a resolution described in paragraph (1), notwithstanding any rule or precedent of the Senate, including Rule 22, it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution, and all points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(B) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than ten hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(C) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in paragraph (1), and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

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PUBLIC LAW 98-478—OCT. 12, 1984

98 STAT. 1987

(D) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in paragraph (1) shall be decided without debate.

(6) If, before the passage by the Senate of a resolution of the Senate described in paragraph (1), the Senate receives from the House of Representatives a resolution described in paragraph (1), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the House of Representatives shall not be referred to a committee.

(B) With respect to a resolution described in paragraph (1) of the Senate—

(i) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the House.

(C) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution originated in the Senate.

(7) If the Senate receives from the House of Representatives a resolution described in paragraph (1) after the Senate has disposed of a Senate originated resolution, the action of the Senate with regard to the disposition of the Senate originated resolution shall be deemed to be the action of the Senate with regard to the House originated resolution.

(8) This subsection is enacted by Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in paragraph (1), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(d) During fiscal year 1985 funds approved by the resolution described in subsection (b)(2) for the purpose of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, shall not exceed \$14,000,000.

Sec. 8067. So far as may be practicable, Indian labor shall be employed, and purchases of the products of Indian industry may be made in open market in the discretion of the Secretary of Defense: *Provided*, That the products must meet pre-set contract specifications.

Sec. 8068. None of the funds made available by this Act shall be used in any way for the leasing to non-Federal agencies in the United States aircraft or vehicles owned or operated by the Department of Defense when suitable aircraft or vehicles are commercially available in the private sector: *Provided*, That nothing in this section shall affect authorized and established procedures for the sale of surplus aircraft or vehicles: *Provided further*, That nothing in this section shall prohibit such leasing when specifically authorized in a subsequent Act of Congress.

Sec. 8069. None of the funds made available by this Act shall be used in any way, directly or indirectly, to influence congressional

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Prohibition on Assistance to Nicaragua.—

The House included a general provision prohibiting funds from being obligated or expended for the purpose of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. The Senate did not include any type of prohibition concerning funds for Nicaragua.

The conferees have included a provision which prohibits funds from being obligated or expended to support, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua unless after February 28, 1985, the President submits a report to Congress and a joint resolution approving such assistance is enacted by Congress. A ceiling of \$14,000,000 is placed on such obligations and expenditures during fiscal year 1985.

The joint resolution is subject to expedited procedures in both Houses similar to procedures for the MX missile procurement resolution provided elsewhere in the bill.

Members will report these provisions.

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BOLAND], the ranking member of the committee.

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, the compromise which we have worked out on Nicaragua preserves the House position with one proviso. No funds may be spent on the secret war in Nicaragua until February 28, 1985. Thereafter if the President certifies that Nicaragua is supporting anti-government forces in any other country in Central America, and if he requests more funds for the war, a vote is guaranteed on a joint resolution providing such funds. This is an MX-type guaranteed vote—an expedited process that ensures a vote on the President's request.

The joint resolution, if approved by both Houses, would remove the prohibition on the use of already appropriated funds for the war. In any event, no more than \$14 million could be

spent during the balance of the fiscal year.

This approach goes as far as I believe the strong House position would permit. Only if Congress affirmatively provides for a renewal of funding for the war could any funds be used for that purpose.

Let me make very clear that this prohibition applies to all funds available in fiscal year 1985 regardless of any accounting procedure at any agency. It clearly prohibits any expenditure, including those from accounts for salaries and all support costs. The prohibition is so strictly written that it also prohibits transfers of equipment acquired at no cost.

The compromise allows the President and the Congress to see how several key matters develop in the next 5 months. Those are: Proposed talks between the Government of El Salvador and the Salvadoran rebels, the continued bilateral talks between the United States and Nicaragua, the resolution of the Contadora Draft Treaty, and the Nicaraguan elections. The President—whenever he may be—will no doubt take into account events affecting these four matters if he makes a request for funds. If he does make a request, it will be a new Congress, a new Intelligence Committee and those new facts which will influence the action of the House and Senate.

To repeat, the compromise provision clearly ends U.S. support for the war in Nicaragua. Such support can only be renewed if the President can convince the Congress that this very strict prohibition should be overturned.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a couple of questions?

Mr. BOLAND. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman enlighten me: Does this prohibition prevent any expenditure of funds, direct or indirect, for arms or weapons or use of force in Nicaragua by the United States?

Mr. BOLAND. If it is directed against the Government of Nicaragua, the answer would be in the affirmative, yes.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Are there no exceptions to this prohibition?

Mr. BOLAND. There are no exceptions to the prohibition.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. So in the unlikely event that tanks were to roll from Nicaragua into Honduras, the United States would be prohibited from taking any action; is that correct?

Mr. BOLAND. Insofar as activities inside Nicaragua are concerned. That is correct. We could, of course, help inside Honduras.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I thank the gentleman for enlightening me.

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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Legislation on
Foreign Relations
Through 1985



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CURRENT LEGISLATION AND
RELATED EXECUTIVE ORDERS

VOLUME I

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
U.S. SENATE

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House of Representatives and Senate respectively

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(5) U.S. Involvement in Military or Paramilitary Operations in
Nicaragua—Fiscal Year 1985

Partial text of Public Law 98-473 [Continuing Appropriations Act, 1985; H.J. Res. 648], 98 Stat. 1837 at 1935, approved October 12, 1984

A JOINT RESOLUTION Making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1985, and for other purposes.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums are hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and out of applicable corporate or other revenues, receipts, and funds, for the several departments, agencies, corporations, and other organizational units of the Government for the fiscal year 1985, and for other purposes, namely:

Sec. 101. * * *

(h) Such amounts as may be necessary for programs, projects or activities provided for in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1985, at a rate of operations and to the extent and in the manner provided as follows, to be effective as if it had been enacted into law as the regular appropriation Act:

AN ACT Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1985, and for other purposes.

Sec. 8066. (a) During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose of which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.

(b) The prohibition concerning Nicaragua contained in subsection (a) shall cease to apply if, after February 28, 1985—

(1) the President submits to Congress a report—

(A) stating that the Government of Nicaragua is providing materiel or monetary support to anti-government forces engaged in military or paramilitary operation in El Salvador or other Central American countries;

(B) analyzing the military significance of such support;

(C) stating that the President has determined that assistance for military or paramilitary operations prohibited by subsection (a) is necessary;

(D) justifying the amount and type of such assistance and describing its objectives; and

(E) explaining the goals of United States policy for the Central American region and how the proposed assistance would further such goals, including the achievement of

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peace and security in Central America through a comprehensive, verifiable and enforceable agreement based upon the Contadora Document of Objectives; and

(2) a joint resolution approving assistance for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua is enacted.

(c)(1) For the purpose of subsection (b)(2), "joint resolution" means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the report of the President under subsection (b)(1) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Congress approves the obligation and expenditure of funds available for Fiscal Year 1985 for supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua."

(2) The report described in subsection (b)(1) shall be referred to the appropriate committee or committees of the House of Representatives and to the appropriate committee or committees of the Senate.

(3) A resolution described in paragraph (1) introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in paragraph (1) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Such a resolution may not be reported before the 8th day after its introduction.

(4) If the committee to which is referred a resolution described in paragraph (1) has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) at the end of 15 calendar days after its introduction, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of such resolution and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(5)(A) When the committee to which a resolution is referred has reported, or has been deemed to be discharged (under paragraph (4)) from further consideration of, a resolution described in paragraph (1), notwithstanding any rule or precedent of the Senate, including Rule 22, it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution, and all points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(B) Debate on the resolution, and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

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(C) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in paragraph (1), and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(D) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in paragraph (1) shall be decided without debate.

(6) If, before the passage by the Senate of a resolution of the Senate described in paragraph (1), the Senate receives from the House of Representatives a resolution described in paragraph (1), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the House of Representatives shall not be referred to a committee.

(B) With respect to a resolution described in paragraph (1) of the Senate—

(i) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the House.

(C) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution originated in the Senate.

(7) If the Senate receives from the House of Representatives a resolution described in paragraph (1) after the Senate has disposed of a Senate originated resolution, the action of the Senate with regard to the disposition of the Senate originated resolution shall be deemed to be the action of the Senate with regard to the House originated resolution.

(8) This subsection is enacted by Congress—

(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in paragraph (1), and it supercedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(d) During Fiscal Year 1985 funds approved by the resolution described in subsection (b)(2) for the purpose of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, shall not exceed \$14,000,000.

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(6) Activities in Nicaragua—Fiscal Year 1985

Partial text of Public Law 98-618 [H.R. 5399], 98 Stat. 3295 approved November 8, 1984

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1985 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985".

TITLE VIII—ACTIVITIES IN NICARAGUA

MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES

Sec. 801. No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or by the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1984 (Public Law 98-215) may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual, except to the extent provided and under the terms and conditions specified by House Joint Resolution 648, making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1985, and for other purposes, as enacted.¹

¹ See page 560 for the pertinent text of H.J. Res. 648.

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(7) Mining of Nicaraguan Ports

Partial text of Public Law 98-369 [Deficit Reduction Act of 1984; H.R. 4170], 98
Stat. 494 at 1210, approved July 18, 1984

AN ACT To provide for tax reform, and for deficit reduction.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,*

* * * * *

MINING OF NICARAGUAN PORTS

Sec. 2907. It is the sense of the Congress that no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated in any Act of Congress shall be obligated or expended for the purposes of planning, directing, executing, or supporting the mining of the ports or territorial waters of Nicaragua.

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(8) Covert Assistance for Military Operations in Nicaragua—
Fiscal Year 1984

Partial text of Public Law 98-215 [Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984; H.R. 2968], 97 Stat. 1473, approved December 9, 1983

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1984 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, for the Intelligence Community Staff, for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984".

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

LIMITATION ON COVERT ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
NICARAGUA

Sec. 108.¹ During fiscal year 1984, not more than \$24,000,000 of the funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.

CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS

Sec. 109. (a) The Congress finds that—

(1) the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua has failed to keep solemn promises, made to the Organization of American States in July 1979, to establish full respect for human rights and political liberties, hold early elections, preserve a private sector, permit political pluralism, and pursue a foreign policy of nonaggression and nonintervention;

(2) by providing military support (including arms, training, and logistical, command and control, and communications facilities) to groups seeking to overthrow the Government of El Salvador and other Central American governments, the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua has violated article 18 of the Charter

¹ Sec. 775 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-212) provides the following:

"Sec. 775. During fiscal year 1984, not more than \$24,000,000 of the funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual."

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of the Organization of American States which declares that no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state;

(3) the Governments of Nicaragua should be held accountable before the Organization of American States for activities violative of promises made to the Organization and for violations of the Charter of that Organization; and

(4) working through the Organization of American States is the proper and most effective means of dealing with threats to the peace of Central America, of providing for common action in the event of aggression, and of providing the mechanisms for peaceful resolution of disputes among the countries of Central America.

(b) The President should seek a prompt reconvening of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States for the purpose of reevaluating the compliance by the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua—

(1) with the commitments made by the leaders of that Government in July 1979 to the Organization of American States; and

(2) with the Charter of the Organization of American States.

(c) The President should vigorously seek actions by the Organization of American States that would provide for a full range of effective measures by the member states or bring about compliance by the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua with those obligations, including verifiable agreements to halt the transfer of military equipment and to cease furnishing of military support facilities to groups seeking the violent overthrow of governments of countries in Central America.

(d) The President should use all diplomatic means at his disposal to encourage the Organization of American States to seek resolution of the conflicts in Central America based on the provisions of the Final Act of the San Jose Conference of October 1982, especially principles (d), (e), and (g), relating to nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries, denying support for terrorist and subversive elements in other states, and international supervision of fully verifiable arrangements.

(e) The United States should support measures at the Organization of American States as well as efforts of the Contadora Group, which seek to end support for terrorist, subversive, or other activities aimed at the violent overthrow of the government of countries in Central America.

(f) Not later than March 15, 1984, the President shall report to the Congress on the Results of his efforts pursuant to this Act to achieve peace in Central America. Such report may include such recommendations as the President may consider appropriate for further United States actions to achieve this objective.

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**(9) U.S. Involvement in Military or Paramilitary Operations in
Nicaragua—Fiscal Year 1984**

Partial text of Public Law 98-212 [H.R. 4185], 97 Stat. 1421, approved December 8,
1983, H.R. 4185

AN ACT Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following
sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not oth-
erwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984,
for military functions administered by the Department of Defense,
and for other purposes, namely:*

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(10) U.S. Involvement in Military Activities in Nicaragua—Fiscal Year 1983

Partial text of Public Law 97-377 (Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 1983; H.J. Res. 651-26 Stat-1530, approved December 21, 1982

A JOINT RESOLUTION Making further continuing appropriations and providing for productive employment for the fiscal year 1983, and for other purposes.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and out of applicable corporate or other revenues, receipts, and funds, for the several departments, agencies, corporations, and other organizational units of the Government for the fiscal year 1983, and for other purposes, namely:

TITLE I

FURTHER CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1983

Sec. 101. * * *

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this joint resolution, such amounts as may be necessary for programs, projects or activities provided for in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1983, at a rate of operations and to the extent and in the manner provided, to be effective as if it had been enacted into law as the regular appropriation Act, as follows:

AN ACT Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1983, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1983, for military functions administered by the Department of Defense, and for other purposes, namely:

Sec. 793. None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a country's armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.

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A12 WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1986

THE RE

Prosecution Seen Possible

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Attorney General Edwin Meese said yesterday that the Justice Department is trying to determine whether any U.S. laws were broken in the international shell game that transformed U.S. arms for Iran into \$20 million to \$30 million worth of cash for the contras in Nicaragua.

But legal experts and administration critics said they felt sure there are more than enough criminal statutes on the books to provide for prosecution. They also suggested that an independent counsel—not the Justice Department—ought to be making the determination.

"These dealings not only raise very serious questions regarding transfer of arms to Iran, they also raise the real possibility that officials at the highest levels of the executive branch have violated federal law," House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter W. Rodino Jr. (D-N.J.) and Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) said in a letter to Meese. "The credibility of the president and his ability to govern are threatened . . . An independent investigation is the only way to restore the confidence of the American people," they wrote.

According to Meese, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, the key National Security Council staff member involved in the secret operation,

"knew precisely" about the arrangement whereby Israeli intermediaries evidently marked up the prices on \$12 million worth of arms that they shipped to Iran and then funneled the profit to Swiss bank accounts for the contras fighting the Nicaraguan government.

There was widespread agreement on Capitol Hill that this violated the spirit and probably the letter of the Boland Amendment that remained in effect in varying forms from October 1984 to last month. It was aimed at barring the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Department and "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" from using any funds—other than those explicitly earmarked by Congress—to support, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.

The law, however, contains no explicit penalty provisions. Legal experts said yesterday that other statutes would have to be used if anyone were to be prosecuted. They cited many possibilities.

"If there's one thing about the federal criminal code," said Steven R. Ross, general counsel to the clerk of the House, "it covers situations where people are trying to hide things or fool other government agencies. The law has many weapons to attack that with."

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THE WASHINGTON POST

AGAN ADMINISTRATION'S SECRET ARMS

Under Range of Laws; Ind

THE CONTRA CONNECTION AND THE LAW

The Justice Department is investigating whether laws were broken by the secret diversion of money to the Nicaraguan contras. Among the laws in question:

- **Export Administration Act:** Controls exports of all types; generally prohibits sale of commodities and goods to countries engaged in state-sponsored terrorism.
- **Arms Export Control Act:** Regulates and controls arms transfers in general; requires that Congress be notified of any arms shipment of more than \$14 million.
- **Omnibus Antiterrorism Act:** Amended the Arms Control Act to prohibit transfer of commodities in excess of \$1 million to any country engaged in state-sponsored terrorism.
- **National Security Act of 1947:** Set up Central Intelligence Agency; requires that Congress be notified beforehand of covert operations. If prior notification is not feasible, lawmakers must be told in "timely" fashion.
- **Boland Amendment:** Prohibited funds for military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities to any group or individual, not part of a country's armed forces, for the purposes of overthrowing the Nicaragua government. The restriction was allowed to die this year in the provision of \$100 million in military and other aid to the contras.

SOURCE: United Press International

Rep. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Judiciary subcommittee on criminal justice, said through an aide that he had four statutes in mind that he intends to mention to the Justice De-

partment next week in a formal report, including one whose most famous workout was at the 1974 Watergate cover-up trial of President Richard M. Nixon's top aides. It is the catchall federal conspir-

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acy law prohibiting two or more persons from conspiring "either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose."

It was applied, successfully, at the cover-up trial to a conspiracy to defraud the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the CIA and the Justice Department "of the government's right to have the officials of these departments and agencies transact their official business honestly and impartially, free from corruption, fraud, improper and undue influence, dishonesty, unlawful impairment and obstruction."

Without more facts, former attorney general Benjamin Civiletti said he could not say "what the particular remedies are for this particular tricky business." But he said that for laws that include no specific penalty provisions, "you have to look at the general laws—to find out whether or not there's been a conspiracy to violate a law of Congress or whether there's been a breach of government duty."

"There's no easy answer," Civiletti said. "It could be a civil wrong or it could be a criminal wrong. The question of intent has a lot to do with it."

Conyers led 11 House members last month in calling for an indepen-

dent counsel (formerly known as a special prosecutor) to investigate North and others for their controversial dealings with the contras. In renewing that call yesterday, he also cited a criminal law forbidding misuse of public money, a federal fraud and false statement statute, and a statute outlawing false statements.

"Somewhere along the line, somebody must have filed some paper to get this deal moving," said former House counsel Stanley M. Brand. "The failure to characterize what was really going on could be a crime . . . If the situation is bad enough, somebody will find a law to which it applies."

"I'm sure a serious prosecutor wouldn't have any trouble coming up with a long list of laws that have been violated here," said Morton Halperin, Washington director of the American Civil Liberties Union, which joined in the calls for an independent counsel. He said it is important that the counsel's mandate be broad enough "to cover all aspects of our secret dealings with Iran and all U.S. aid to the contras, including the private stuff," assistance ostensibly provided by private parties.

Staff writer Mary Thornton contributed to this report.

2710
 321 201

37

אאאא
אל:המשרד,
מ-:ווש,נר:609,תא:281186,זח:1900,דח:ב,סג:ש,
בבב

שמור/הול לבוקר

חורג-לשכת מנכל.דע:מצפא.

ביקור הסנטור קנדי.

נא להודיע למנהל מצפא כלהלן:

(1) ננסי סודרברג ממשרדו של קנדי והאחריות להכנות הביקור, תגיע ארצה (דרכ ירדן ומצרים) ביום ה', ה-4 בדצמבר. היא תתקשר אחכ טלפוני מחר (29) וגם בהגיעה עמי לשוחח על פרטים. היא עוזרת מעולה, ידידותית, פעם ראשונה בארץ-ובוודאי תצו לעזור לה ככל האפשר, גם בימים שהיא בארץ לפני הגעת קני ופמלייתו (9.12).

(2) מדיקים החשובות למברקי מצפא-מאור 421 ו-450 בנפרד.

שבת שלום

למדנ

סססס
ע

-23-

חודש: 11/11533

אל: בני/1060

מ-: המשרד, תא: 281186, דח: 1519, דח: מ, טג: ש

נד: 8

שמו/מיוזר.

ביקור סגן השר מילוא.

1. סגן השר רוני מילוא יגיע לניו-יורק ב- 3.12.86 ב' מאן אמריקן' טיסה 101 מלונדון. אנא קבלוהו בשוה.

2. אנו מבקשים שתפגשו את סגן השר מילוא עם הסנטורים ד'אמטר ומרינהן, עם מוריס אייברהם ועם אישים מתאימים אחרים, על פי הבנתך.

המועדים הבאים בתשכון למגישות הם: יום א' - 7.12 - אחה'צ'.

יום ב' (8.12) ויום ג' (9.12).

אנא טיפולך.

אריה מקל/לשכת דה'מ'.

תמ: שהח, דהמ, מבכל, ממככל, מצמא

УДК

СССР

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 1
ИЗДАНИЕ 1
ВВЕДЕНИЕ
УДК

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УДК

1. ВВЕДЕНИЕ
УДК

2. ВВЕДЕНИЕ
УДК

3. ВВЕДЕНИЕ
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УДК

11930

תאריך: כשנכדו תסוץ-מוחלקת הקשר

✓

ככנס **

סודי

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**

חוזם: 11,11930

אל:המשרד

מ:-לוטאנגלס,נר:136,תא:281186,זח:1300,דח:ר,טג:ט

נד:ט

רגיל/סודי

נר 16 פר דוש בנמרד

אל: מצמ"א

מרכז

דע: שגריר + מתני, רושינגטון

מאת: בנצור, קונכל לוטאנגלס

ממקור כאן שאיראן חתמה באחרונה על הסכם סודי עם וויטנאם
על אספקת כשק וחלקי חילוף אמריקאים שנתפסו בזמנו
ע"י צבאן וויטנאם במלישה לדרום. הציווד כולל, מטוס
F-5, הליקופטרים, קוברה, טנקים M-48, טילי סויווינדר
ונגמשים. היוקף העיטקה 400 מיליון דולר.

בנצור

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהבט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רט,אמן,ממד,מצמא

מועצה החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

11302

תאריך: 29.11.66

דף 1 מתוך 3

עותק 3 מתוך 12

סודי ביותר

ארכ

נכנס

חוזם: 11/11302

אל: המשרד

מ-: רוש, נר: 577, תא: 281166, חז: 1030, מח: 1030, סב: 1030

נד: 6

סודי ביותר / מידוי - ח.ר.ב.

אל: - בן - אהרן, מנכ"ל משרד רוה"מ - ללא תמוצה נוספת

דע: - מנכ"ל מדינה - ללא תמוצה נוספת

מאת: מתני / רושנינגטון

מגישה עם מזכיר המדינה - לשלן 835

מזכיר המדינה קיבל הבוקר (28/11) את השגריר. נכחו בפגישה ארנולד רייפל, ווילקוקס והחמ"א. אחרי הברכות ותודת רוה"מ על טפחו של מילטון פרידמן שהמזכיר של לרוה"מ קרא השגריר את המסמך (והשאר אחכ' העתק בידו ווילקוקס).

מזכיר המדינה בחגובה, אשר שהוא מתייחס רק להערה אחת המתייחסת לנושא הטריטוריאלי (משורה 3 בעמוד 2 של המסר) והיא שעמדת ארה"ב היא להגיע למומי בילטרלי בין ישראל לירדן, בהשתתפות נציגים פלסטינים כאשר ארה"ב נוטלת בהט חלק. את מומ' בזה יתקיים הרי עמות ארה"ב היא כמי עבדאח ע"י הכשרא ב-1/9/62 (י'תכניה וריגן י').

השגריר: - מבלי שנכנס לדיון על מהות, ברצוני רק להעיר שהמסמך שכיום מחיב את ישראל, מצרים וארה"ב - הוא הסכם קמפ-דיוויד. מאחר ואין צד ערבי שמוכן למומי אין טעם שנכנס לדיון בינינו על הנושא הזה.

המזכיר: - הסיבה לקיום שיחות היא שלא כל אחד מסכים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 3
עותק 3 מתוך 12

* עם כל אחד. העיקר הוא שצריך שהתהל ימשך
* והחשוב הוא על מה שהצדדים יסכימו ביניהם. אפשר
* בקלות לכתוב תכניות מנאן ייעל כשא נוח'י אן החשוב
* הוא מה שהצדדים יסכימו ביניהם, כן שלמעשה אין שום
* חילוקי דעות ביניהם. אני מסכים איתן.

* השגרים:- מסקנותי מנסיוני במומ' של עשרים השנה האחרונות
* היא שאי-הבנות קורות רק כאשר ארה"ב וישראל
* מנהלות ביניהן מומ', עוד לפני שיוודעים אם בכלל הצד
* השני יסכים לעמדה של ארה"ב או להצעותיה לישראל, כן
* שבמקום מומ' בין הצדדים מתנהל מומ' עם ארה"ב. על
* כך אני שמח שאנחנו מסכימים שאין טעם בדיון מהותי
* לפני שיש בכוונות ערבות למומ'.

* המזכיר:- אכן נקודה זו שלן היא FAIR. תכנית 1/9/82
* היא יוזמה ועמדה שארה"ב תנקוט במומ'. תמיד
* ארה"ב נמנעה ממאמצי הערבים לשאת ולתת עמם במקום שאלה
* יישאו ויתנו עם ישראל. תמיד ארה"ב אמרה לערבים שהחשוב
* והעיקר הוא ניהול שיחות בינם לבין ישראל.

* השגרים:- הטעות הגדולה של הערבים היא שדור את ק"ד
* שהיו בו יתרונות רבים לערבים.
* המזכיר:- כולל בחירות ואוטונומיה ליו"ש.
* השגרים:- אבל איש מהם לא היה מוכן למד'ם.
* המזכיר:- זו אחת הטעויות והיו טעויות גדולות מצידם
* במשך כל הזמן.
* השגרים:- בזעה אישית:- קיימת עמדת ישראל, קיימת עמדת
* מצרים ויש תכנית 1/9/1982.
* אט אין הסכם ק"ד הרי יהיה הסר אחד המסמכים הבסיסיים
* שלגביו יש הסכם בין שלושה צדדים ובהסכם זה ישראל
* עשתה ויתורים רבים.

* המזכיר:- תודה ומסורא בישראל בקשר לביקור רוה"מ
* שאנו רוצים בו, שהוגשה בקשה לבית-הלבן
* מציודנו. אן אין תשובה בקשר לתאריך הביקור. עוד ייקבע
* ותימסר לן הודעה על כך.

* השגרים:- מודה על כל העזרה של האומיניסטרציה בכלל
* ושל שולץ בפרט על כל אשר עשו למען ישראל
* ובוודאי גם בנושא הכלכלי שהוא אחד מהיסודות החשובים

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מתוך 3

דף 3

מתוך 12

עותק 3

שאיפשר לישראל לפתור חלק מהבעיות הכלכליות.

מתני

תמ: שהחברה, המנכל/מדיני

1000

$$\frac{2}{-1}$$

524 / 608

- א. ישראל בהחלט מוזכרת בצורה מאסיבית כמעט בכל ידיעה הנוגעת לספור שלפנינו, אך ההתרכזות בהחלט אינה בווית שלנו בספור. גם באותם מקרים בהם ישראל היא מוקד הספור כמו בחברות "ניוטליין" ו"מקניל-להרר" איננו משמשים מרכז הספור.
- ב. מקובל כאן אצל הרבה מן העיתונאים שאם אכן דברה ישראל אמת בנושא אי ידיעתה את הקשר לקונטראס הרי שמהסבוב הנוכחי היא תצא בזול. הזוית האיראנית מתקבלת אמנם כהזנה ישראלית לנקשת הממשל אך באותה נשימה גם כנצול ישראלי אח בקשת האמריקאים ל"הלבין" את חטאיהם מן העבר בנושא זה.
- ג. טעות עושים אנשינו באי, ואנו רואים עקבות גלויות בעתונות, המתדברים בנימוח שליליות כלפי הממשל וכדאי כלפי מיד שהפך להיות כאן המושיע הגדול של הנשיאות באותה נשימה רצוי שנחזק מן הלכסיקון שלנו אח ההשוואות לפולארד. הגדיל לעשות המקור שספר לווישנגטון פוסט כי כמו בפרשה ההיא גם כאן נשתה פעולה באופן מלא, מיותר לציין שהמקבילה הזאת אינה באינטרס שלנו כאן.
- ד. גם המקור בטגרירות שספר לכתבים כי אנו מודאגים ממניווי של אדם מסוים לוועדה הנשיאותית לא ידע על מה שהוא מדבר (וועדת מאסקי, סקורופט וטאור תחקור אח דרכי פעולת ה-NSC) וחבל.
- ה. עם כל הנ"ל נעשה טעות להתפשט לשאננות בטווח הבינוני והרחוק בהחלט נראה כאן התפתחויות שאמנם אינם החוסם התקשורת אך כדאי להצביע עליהן כי התקשורת כבר מטפחת אותם:

3/3 584/608

מל:

1. דבריה החריפים של ג'ויס סטאר במאמר היוושינגטון טיימס" שהובקע בנפרד הם בהחלט חלק מן המגמה עליה אנו מצביעים זה זמן רב - תדמיתה השלילית של ישראל שהפכה זה מכבר שם נרדף למלחמת לבנון, פולארד, שב"כ, ועוננו וכי הלאה. זוהי אמנם התפרצות חד פעמית אך כשירגעו כאן הרוחות ישאלו כולם שוב מי גרר אותנו לכל זה ובכלל הדיבור של ישראל עם סערוריה גסה שכזאת ויהיו מביענו אשר יהיו אינה לטובתנו.
- מאמרה של סטאר מצביע גם על תופעת ידידי ישראל הקורכים והמוזהים שימחרו להשמיץ את קול מחאתה.
2. מומלץ לקרוא את מאמרו של דויד שיפלר (נ"י טיימס 27.11). גם הוא מצביע על המקור הבא של צרותינו כאן. הפנית האצבעות לעבר הרשת היהודית שהשתלחה על מנגנון המועצה לבטחון לאומי - טיימר, רוס, לאדין ואחרים. אין צורך להיות גאון כדי להבין שהללו יחשבו פעמיים גם לפני השיחה הכי חמימה עמנו. ללא חשדן באיש היינו גם מזיקים שמאמרו של שיפלר משהו בחושים אנטישמיים.
3. בעיר כזאת שבה הכל גלוי ופחות אפילו חדריו של ה- CIA הרי שגם גלוייו של בוב וודווארד (ווישינגטון פוסט 28.11) על קרבתו הגדולה מדי של קיסי לישראל יטאירו רשומם.
4. ולבסוף בטוח הארוך, אם חלילה יקרה משהו לממשל זה נחזור בחובבים רבים

ל- Square One

יורי גל

כאמור, כל הנ"ל בחינת מחשבות לטובת ארור.

סגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

30

97.....מחור.....דט"ס
 100 בשחוני שמור
 דחפוט...בהול לבוקר
 86730 1730
 מאריך וז"ח
מנחם

משה"ט, משה"ח

אלו

583 -
 607

אל: יועץ תקשורת לשח"ט קסי: נא להעביר כפוף לזקן אליה חזר!

דע: מע"ת, מצפ"א
 יועץ תקשורת לרה"מ
 יועץ תקשורת לשח"ח

ברעם - נשק לאיראן

התקשר היום מייק וואלס מ-"Go minutes" המכין לתכניתו הקרובה
 (מחר) כתבה על חבורת ברעם ושותפיו. במרכז הכתבה תהיה האירוניה
 בעובדה שבעוד ממשלות ישראל וארה"ב מודות כי עסקו בהעברת נשק לאיראן הרי
 שהמכת, בגלל אי ידיעתן את הספור, עומד על משפט לברעם ואחרים.

וואלס ראיין את ברעם הטוען כמו אחרים שמעשיו נעשו על דעת משרד הבטחון.
 וואלס אמר שאינו רוצה שגראת כמגוחכים להמשיך להכחיש מה שהיום הוא כבר אמת
 ידועה לכל.

בידיהם הקלטה של מנדי מרון האומר כי ישראל לא מכרה ואינה מוכרת נשק לאיראן
 וכי ברעם פעל על דעת עצמו. מובן שגם דבריו של שהב"ט מאותה עת ניתנים לאחור בקלות.

השאלה היא

א. האם הצהרותיו של שהב"ט (ברעם היה מוסמך למכור את תצויד כמו שאני מוסמך
 למכור את האמפייר-סטריט) בעינה עומדת?

ב. האם יש לנו, לאור ההתפתחויות האחרונות, ענין בחגובה אחרת?

בכל מקרה, כדאי שנגיב במשחו ולא נסתפק בחוסר תגובה.

אנא בטלפון הביתה 365-1138 (301).


 יוסי גל

2 3 3 2
 מה היה ג'א 3 1 2
 מה היה ג'א 3 1 2
 מה היה ג'א 3 1 2

דף.....מס'.....דפים

אל:

סוג כסחוני.....סדר

דחיות.....מס'.....

מס'.....28.10.86

המשרד

606

רוה"מ. למען בלבד

האגרה למזכיר. התקשר ווילקוקס ומסר שהמזכיר מאד מודה על המכתב
שגרם לו להנאה רבה.

מ. רוז

3

מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	1
סופט מברק	2
תז"ח: 981300	א ל : לשב' ממב"ל, אמית"ק, מע"ת, מעפ"א, ממ"ר, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
0975	יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח, הסברה
72	ר ע :
מאת : עיתונות, ניו יורק	

Iran Money Reported Diverted in '85

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 27 — The first diversion of money from United States arms sales to Iran took place in late 1985, months earlier than acknowledged by the Reagan Administration, according to people here and abroad familiar with the transactions.

Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d said at a news conference Tuesday that the program to funnel proceeds from the arms transactions to the Nicaraguan rebels, or contras, began in 1986.

But people who are familiar with the transactions say Iran paid millions of dollars to Israel for several shipments of weapons made from September to December of 1985. Much of the money failed to reach the Israeli Government, they said, and was instead used either for commissions to arms dealers or for some other purpose.

Israel Sought Replacements

The issue is significant because several months later, the Israelis demanded that the United States replace the anti-tank missiles and other material sold to Iran. The Israelis, however, said they could not pay for all the weapons because money had disappeared in the transaction. After discussions between the two countries, the replacement weapons were shipped to Israel, even though the United States was not fully reimbursed.

The possible mishandling of money in 1985, these people said, was one of the reasons that the Central Intelligence Agency was brought into the arms deal in last January. At that time, President Reagan ordered the C.I.A. to arrange covert shipments through Israel of weapons taken directly from American stocks.

The diversion of money in late 1985 could help explain the conduct of Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, then the White House national security advisor, several Administration officials speculated.

Mr. Meese said this week that Admiral Poindexter knew about diversion of money to the contras but failed to do anything about it. Several officials described Admiral Poindexter as one of the most cautious officials in Washington and said he would have reacted this way only if the operation had been approved by a higher authority or had been in progress when he took the job.

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28/11/85

שם השולח:

תאריך:

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Admiral Poindexter's predecessor as national security advisor, Robert C. McFarlane, resigned in December 1985. Mr. Meese said he did not learn of the diversion of money to the contras until 1986.

The 2 Accounts Conflict

Details of the Israeli deals in 1985 remain unclear, but one thing is certain: The accounts provided by the United States and Israel are in conflict.

A senior Israeli official, for example, said last week that "everything we did, including shipping arms to Iran, we did with the explicit approval of Washington."

But Mr. Meese said this week that Israel's shipment to Iran in September 1985 was not authorized. "To my knowledge," he said, "nobody authorized that particular shipment specifically."

"The Israelis did it on their own?" a questioner asked at the news conference.

"That's my understanding," Mr. Meese replied.

Various officials in the Reagan Administration and Israel have given conflicting accounts of how the operation started and who participated in such critical elements as the diversion of money to the contras.

Israel's Version

The Israeli description of events begins in mid-1985, when a Saudi arms dealer named Adnan M. Khashoggi made contact with Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian expatriate businessman with ties to the Teheran Government. Mr. Khashoggi is a friend of Al Schwimmer, founding president of Israeli Aircraft Industries, and Yaacov Nimrodi, an Israeli arms dealer and former military attaché in Teheran.

Mr. Schwimmer was authorized to hold talks with Mr. Ghorbanifar by Shimon Peres, then Israel's Prime Minister. A senior Israeli official has said the talks turned to arms for hostages.

According to several officials, the initial meetings with Mr. Ghorbanifar also involved Michael Ledeen, a consultant to the National Security Council who worked closely with Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North. Colonel North was dismissed from the council staff last week after having reportedly arranged the diversion of money to the contras.

In late summer of 1985, the director general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, David Kimche, came to the United States and met with Mr. McFarlane. Here the accounts diverge.

According to the Israelis, Mr. Kimche received a green light to ship arms to Iran at this meeting. But the Administration and Mr. McFarlane insist that no such permission was given.

'After the Fact'

Mr. Meese, speaking this week of the September shipment, said, "Our information is the President knew about it after the fact and agreed with the general concept of continuing our discussions with the Israelis concerning these matters."

Mr. Meese said a second shipment in 1985 was made without approval "although there was probably knowledge on the part of people in the United States."

Several pieces of evidence have surfaced that challenge Mr. Meese's version of events. An arms shipment in November 1985 was carried by a company set up and overseen by the C.I.A. Talks between Israel and the United States over the price of replacement weapons for those shipped date to late 1985, suggesting that there was official sanction for the deliveries to Iran.

Israel and the United States also disagreed about what happened in after Jan. 17, 1986, when President Reagan signed an order authorizing the covert shipments by the C.I.A.

'Forces in Central America'

Mr. Meese said that "bank accounts were established as best we know by representatives of the forces in Central America."

And this information," he said, "was provided to representatives of the Israeli Government — or representatives of Israel, I should say — and then these funds were put into the accounts."

The Israeli Government, in a statement issued the same day of Mr. Meese's news conference, said: "These funds did not pass through Israel. The Government of Israel was surprised to learn that supposedly a portion of these funds were transferred to the contras. If such a transaction took place, it had nothing to do with Israel, and the Government of Israel had no knowledge of it."

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מגירת ישראל - אשכנזי

מל: מחסור

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אל: אונכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, ממ"ד

להלן הודעת דובר מחמ"ד.

STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
NOVEMBER 28, 1986

The Allied Kommandatura, consisting of the French, United Kingdom and United States representatives in Berlin, has decided to expell a substantial number of Syrian nationals from Berlin. These individuals, if encountered in the Western sectors of th city will be expelled into the German Democratic Republic. The Kommandantura's decision was reached November 27 following an extraordinary session convoked in response to the Berlin Court's decision in the Hasi case.

We believe these actions, which are separate from those taken by the Federal Republic of Germany, are an especially valuable example of Allied cooperation in combating terrorism.

We are consulting with our Berlin Allies on additional steps to make clear that Syria's support for international terrorism is unacceptable.

מחמ"ד

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סודי
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מלידי
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אל:

המשרד

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תאריך וז"ח...1200, 28, 86

מס' מבר...

מצפ"א. מאסוי"ק. שגמנילה. דע: נשיא המדינה.

פגישה עם שגריר הפיליפינים בווינגטון.

נפגשתי אתו בביתו של סטיב סולארז' אמש. ~~הביע~~ הביע צער על דחיית ביקורו של הנשיא בפיליפינים והביע תקווה שהביקור יתקיים במועד אחר. כמו כן סיפר לי על שיחות הנשיאה אקינו עם שר הבטחון שלה לפני השינויים בקבינט. לפי דבריו התנהל הנ"ל על מי-מנוחות - ולמעשה שר הבטחון שפוטר היה שבוי בידי עוזריו - והוא עצמו "שמח" על ששחררוהו מתפקידו (לפי דברי השגריר).

מ. רודן

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1966-11-22 8:40

שגרירות ישראל - רוסינגטון

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אל: מנכ"ל מדינה, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

להלן מה"וושינגטון טיימס" היום.

עתונות

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CRISIS AT THE WHITE HOUSE

Erosion of ethics blamed for Israeli role in arms deal

By Martin Sieff
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Israeli experience in the Lebanon war sapped the country of "belief in a higher order of ethics in politics," and that lack led the Israelis into unwise involvement in the U.S.-Iran arms deal, according to a leading Middle East analyst.

"This is the Watergate of the 1980s," said Joyce Starr, director of the Near East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "How could the Israelis so miscalculate the fiber of the American people as to think they were all like Mr. [John] Poindexter and Lt. Col. [Oliver] North?"

"The Israeli involvement is a result of the Lebanon war. They've lost all confidence and belief in a higher order of ethics in politics, and that's the mistake in their thinking."

She added: "We can understand, after all the Israelis went through in Lebanon, that they would come to these conclusions. But we can't condone that they also came to these conclusions for us."

"Israel has always been, or attempted to be, a light unto the nations. But as a result of the actions of senior Israeli and U.S. leaders, that light has been tarnished. It's a time for soul-searching in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem," Miss Starr said.

After American citizen Jonathan Pollard was convicted of spying for Israel, his controller, Rafi Eitan, a legendary figure in the Israeli intelligence community who helped kidnap Adolf Eichmann in 1960, was given a plum job as head of Israel Chemicals.

Said Miss Starr: "Eitan paid Pollard to tangle him in a web he couldn't get out of, the Jerusalem Post reported last week. And now Eitan has been promoted to be the head of Israel Chemicals!"

In the Shin Bet scandal, the head of the Israeli counterintelligence service, Avraham Shalom, was forced to resign this year after revelations that his agents had killed two Palestinian terrorists who had been captured after a 1984 bus hijacking.

The most controversial aspect of the affair was the apparent willingness of the Shin Bet leaders to allow a regular army officer, Brig. Yitzhak Mordechai, to be blamed for the killings. A controversial presidential pardon was granted to the agents. There has also been speculation about whether Mr. Shalom issued the order to kill the terrorists with the knowledge of Mr. Shamir, who was prime minister at the time.

Meanwhile, Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at Israel's nuclear power plant, has been brought back to Israel from Britain by means which are still unclear, after reveal-

ing to the London Sunday Times what the paper said were details of Israel's nuclear weapons program.

Criticism in the affair has centered on the failure to identify Mr. Vanunu as a security risk despite his open support for the Palestinian cause. The government also is criticized for the embarrassment that his disappearance from Britain may have caused to Israeli-British relations, and for the delay in formally charging him when he was already being held in an Israeli jail.

Both Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud bloc and Labor Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who swapped positions last month under the rotation agreement of Israel's National Unity Government, have had extensive experience in clandestine diplomacy and intelligence affairs.

Mr. Shamir was a longtime veteran of the Israeli secret service before entering government under then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Whereas Mr. Begin was notorious for provocative remarks that plunged him into wars of words with other international leaders, the low-profile Mr. Shamir has proved to be a skilled exponent of low-key diplomacy.

However, critics say his intelligence background left him with an exaggerated dependence on secret operations and an inadequate sense of open democratic debate.

NEWS ANALYSIS

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

המשרד

585

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דף... מתוך... דפים
סוג בטחוני... שמור
דחיות... רגיל
תאריך וד"ח 1300 28 נוב 86

שם פרטי

אל :- מצפ"א
דע :- מנכ"ל מדיני

מתוך שיחה עם ווילקוקס אמר : שיש להבחין בין שני גופים שמטפלים בפרשת איראן.
הועדה שמינה הנשיא, תפקידה לבדוק דרך עבודת NSC ואופן קבלת החלטות בו ואילו
במסגרת הנשק לאיראן עצמה מטפל ה- FBI .

לידיעתכם.

מתני
האחורה

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מגירות ישראל - וויסנאסון

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דפ...מחור...דפים

סוג בסחוני...סודי

מחשבות...מיידי

תאריך וז"ח 28.10.86

אל:

582

המשרד

מצפ"א.

מא"ע בביתו של סטיב סולרז :

1. לדעתו אם יוכח שישראל לא ידעה שהכספים שנתקבלו עבור מכירות הנשק מועברים לקונטראסט לא ייגרם לישראל נזק כלשהו בדעת-הקהל-האמריקנית.
2. יש להניח שהחקירה בה מתחילים הימשר זמן רב מאד - אולי עד הבחירות לנשיאות.
3. סולרז רוצה לדעת אם מדיניות ממשלה ישראל - גם ללא פנייה מארה"ב - היא לספק נשק לאיראן.

מ. רונן

הנהגה סוכן 1
הנהגה סוכן 3
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המשרד, בטחון

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אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, מחנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת
 דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

ארה"ב - איראן - ישראל - קונטרס

להלן מה"וושינגטון פוסט" היום (28.11)

עתונות

Probes of Iran Deals Extend To Roles of CIA, Director

By Bob Woodward
 Washington Post Staff Writer

Justice Department and congressional investigations of the secret sales of arms to Iran and subsequent transfer of profits to help the Nicaraguan contras are extending beyond the White House to a detailed study of the roles played by the Central Intelligence Agency and its director, William J. Casey, according to informed sources.

Two areas of inquiry involving the CIA, sources said, are its role in setting up a Swiss bank account used to transfer Iranian payments for U.S. arms and its efforts on behalf of the Nicaraguan rebels.

Knowledgeable sources have said that in 1984, when Congress refused to provide aid to the contras, Casey was involved in overtures to third countries, including Israel, to

explore whether they could secretly supply assistance to the contras.

Casey is saying that the funneling of money from Iranian arms sales to the contras is a matter of concern only to those "inside the Beltway" and that when all the investigations are over "no one will go to jail," according to informed sources.

Casey, the sources said, maintains that he was only aware of "gossip" about the secret funneling of money to the contras until this week. Casey has acknowledged to members of Congress that the CIA set up a Swiss account to accept Iranian payments for American arms, but it is not clear whether that account was used to transfer funds to help the contras. Under rigid agency procedures, the movements of funds through any CIA

See CASEY, A30, Col. 9

account would have to be carefully monitored, sources said.

In addition, sources said Casey was one of the handful of officials who over the last year regularly received copies of top secret communications intercepts that reportedly provided the clues last week that allowed Justice Department officials to begin to unravel what had happened.

Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, who resigned Tuesday as President Reagan's national security adviser, has said privately that Casey was "heavily involved" in the secret sale of U.S. arms to Iran, according to informed sources. Poindexter said this before it was publicly known that profits from the arms sales were diverted to the contras, and it is not known whether he meant to implicate Casey in that part of that operation as well.

Attorney General Edwin Meese III said Tuesday that no one in the CIA, including Casey, knew about the \$10 million to \$30 million in proceeds from arms sales to Iran that went to aid the contras.

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Casey has been one of the contras' strongest backers inside the Reagan administration. Official sources said the CIA has intensely followed the progress of the Nicaraguan rebels, providing regular, sometimes weekly intelligence assessments of their efforts to the White House.

In 1984, Casey sought to obtain funding for the contras from other



WILLIAM J. CASEY

... sought outside contra aid in 1984

countries, according to sources with firsthand knowledge of his efforts. Casey has denied that any formal requests for third-country aid were made, insisting that the efforts were "unofficial."

A source familiar with Casey's actions in 1984 maintained that Casey's inquiries to other countries came after Congress balked at providing a CIA request for \$21 million more for the Nicaraguan rebels but before Congress passed legislation prohibiting any U.S. assistance—including by the CIA—to the contras.

"There was a window of several months when it would have been proper," this source maintained.

As reported last year, U.S. and Israeli sources have said that in 1984 Israel found a way of secretly providing several million dollars to

the Nicaraguan rebels. One source said this was done through Marine Lt. Col Oliver North, then a key National Security Council aide.

North was fired this week for his alleged role in secretly diverting to the contra cause profits of arms sales to Iran.

Officially Israel has denied it provided help to the Nicaraguan rebels. An Israeli source who confirmed the 1984 aid to the contras said it was a "golden, clean and cheap" way of repaying the CIA for intelligence favors it had done for Israel.

U.S. sources said that Israel was indebted to Casey for his decision in 1981 to supply Israel with sensitive satellite reconnaissance photos. Inside the Israeli intelligence agencies, the satellite photos were often called "Casey's gift" and were considered invaluable.

When Casey took over the CIA in early 1981, he was determined to increase U.S.-Israeli intelligence cooperation. He visited Israel and struck up good relations with the heads of its intelligence services. His predecessor, Stansfield Turner, had refused Israeli requests for access to information directly from satellite photos—information the Israelis maintained was of great tactical importance because of the threat from neighboring Arab states.

Casey granted access to the photos, sources said. Soon afterward, Israel used the photos to pinpoint an Iraqi nuclear reactor that was bombed by the Israeli air force on June 8, 1981. Casey then restricted Israeli access to reconnaissance

photography that could be used only for "defensive" purposes relating to Arab states directly on or near the Israel border, the sources said.

Intelligence cooperation between the countries expanded in 1982 during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and into 1983 when Iranian-supported terrorists struck at U.S. installations in Beirut.

"The two services were in bed," said one U.S. intelligence source, though relations were sometimes strained by accusations that one country or the other was holding back some important intelligence.

In April 1984 the CIA was down to its last \$1 million of congressionally authorized funds for the contras. Sources said Casey dispatched a senior official in the operations directorate to seek secret contra funding from Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi government reportedly declined, at least initially. At that point, Casey turned to the Israelis.

It has never been clear how Israel might have been able to raise several million dollars in 1984, but sources said that Israel at the time was selling arms to Iran. Profits from those sales could have provided the necessary funds, as they did for the 1986 diversion of funds to the contras.

Said a senior administration source, "We always assumed in 1984 there was funding flowing from third parties [to the contras]. The amount of money was small and whoever did it would get enormous good will with the White House."

574

סמנכ"ל מז"ת - מנהל מצפ"א

דע: הממונה אנקרה, הקונכ"ל איסטנבול

כנס מועצת נאטו באיסטנבול

לשלנו 178

להלן מתוך שיחה עם אייאן בוטרוורת', עוזר לסנטור רות', ראש המשלחת מהסנט לכנס הנ"ל.

1. הסנטור רות' התייחס לנושא יחסי ישראל-תורכיה פעם במפגש עם שר החוץ התורכי (בו השתתפו סנטורים ומורשים ללא עוזרים) ופעם בשיחה עם רה"מ תורכיה (בהשתתפות עוזרים). בשיחה זו, אגב דברים אחרים, ציין הסנטור כי בקונגרס ארה"ב התרשמו לטובה מהשיפור ההדרגתי במערכת היחסים בין תורכיה לישראל, כי ארה"ב מחייבת הידוק הקשרים בין בנות בריתה באזור. רה"מ תורכיה, בתשובתו, לא הגיב לנקודה זו, אך בוטרוורת' משוכנע שהמסר נקלט היטב לנוכח רגישות התורכים לכל הנאמר ע"י מחוקקים אמריקאים.

2. אם כי לא נכח, כאמור, בפגישה עם שה"ח תורכיה, הוא מניח שרות' ניגש לנושא בצורה דומה, ושגם כאן השר התורכי שתק אך שם לב.

למדן
א/א

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דף.....מחור.....דפים
שמו
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אל: המשרד

תאריך וזי"ח. 15.10.28 נוב' 86

573

משרד חוץ

מצפ"א, הסברה

Habib Schreiber

ממשרדו של סנטור ידידותי מבקשים פרטים על הנ"ל המוכר כאן כישראלי ותעמולן
פרו-ערבי קצוני, שעומד בראש גוף הקרוי Holyland State Committee.
ארגון זה מנסה ליזום פעילויות אנטי ישראליות, בין היתר על גבעת הקפיטול
ובסביבותיה. הבריקו נא.

למדן
כ/ז 22/11

אמא, חוזמ: 147

אל: ווש/ 16

נ-: המשרד, תא: 011286, חז: 1554, דח: מ, סג: ש,

בבב

שמור/ מידי

אל: למדנ

משלכמ 573

חביב שרייבר

כל החומר על שרייבר והארגון אותו הקים ועומד בראשו

HOLYLAND STATE COMMITTEE

xxx חהלצלאלנד שתאתו סהמיתתו

xxx מצרי בדפדפת הסחולה של הליגה נגד השמצה

xx יי פרה-אראב פרה-פאגאנדא ינ-אמוריסא נוחיסלוש אנד נהיסוש

xxx בעמודים 23, 59, 77, 93-94.

חבורת ודאי מצויה בידיכם.

הטבח/ מחזבי. ==

מ

"PRO-ARAB PROPAGANDA IN AMERICA
VEHICLES AND VOICES

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... ■ THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1986 A21

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S SECRET ARMS DEAL

Israel Denies Meese Claim That It Handled Money From Iran Arms Sales

By Glenn Frankel

Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, Nov. 26—The Israeli government, fearing it is being sucked into the controversy over secret American arms sales to Iran, today vehemently denied any financial role in the shipments and suggested that a politically wounded and confused Reagan administration had blundered by distorting Israeli involvement in the affair.

A combative Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who was prime minister when the shipments were initiated, insisted to the Knesset that Israel had only played the part of unwitting conduit and knew nothing of the estimated \$10 to \$30 million profits from the sales that Attorney General Edwin Meese III said ended up in Swiss bank accounts of the Nicaraguan rebels, known as the contras.

"Israel didn't earn one red cent from this," Peres shouted at opposition lawmakers who persistently interrupted and heckled his remarks. "This is not an Israel operation, this is a matter for the United States, not for Israel. Our purpose was to help a friendly country save lives. Israel was asked to help and it did."

Peres branded charges that Israel had funneled money to the contras "absolute nonsense—the money never passed through Israel. We had no connection to it whatsoever . . . We did not sell arms. We received arms and we delivered arms."

While Peres was careful not to attack Washington publicly, another senior Israeli official blamed Meese's charge yesterday that Israeli representatives had passed the money to the contras on "the large disarray in the White House." The official, who asked not to be named, said "some people there may be trying to divert attention from what's really going on to someone else and Israel was put in the eye of the storm."

The official noted that "Meese came out with an unfinished inquiry without even talking to us. Our part in this whole story is marginal and we are not the prob-



Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, in Knesset debate yesterday, defends Israeli government's role in Iran arms deal.

lem. The real problem is in an administration that doesn't seem to know what its own people were doing."

The official said he believed Israel had averted a political uproar following Meese's press conference by issuing a quick statement early this morning confirming its involvement in shipping arms to Iran at the behest of the White House but denying any role in funneling a portion of the Iranian payments to the contras.

But other officials involved in assessing and limiting the political damage done by Meese's disclosure were less sanguine. They said the alleged contra connection

had opened up an entire new area of controversy that could anger Congress and jeopardize Israel's position as the foremost strategic ally of the United States in the Middle East.

"My concern is not so much with Israel's standing with the administration but with Congress," said yet another senior official.

"There are two major ideological issues right now in American foreign affairs—arms control and Central America—and if somebody wrongly gets the impression that Israel helped the administration circumvent

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Congress, that can cause a lot of long-term damage for us," he added. "We're saying we didn't know anything about the contras and the money, so now the onus is on the other side to prove we did."

The official said his government was also concerned about the prospect of having two separate U.S. investigations, one by the Justice Department, the other by the Democrat-controlled Congress, delving into the affair simultaneously. He said Israel fears U.S. investigators may insist, as they did in the case of Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard, upon access to documents and to government officials and private arms dealers reportedly implicated in the chain of events that has led to the Reagan administration's major foreign policy crisis.

The one-paragraph Israeli statement this morning followed a two-hour emergency session among Peres, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Peres confirmed that during that meeting he telephoned both Meese and Secretary of State George P. Shultz from Shamir's office to inform them of Israel's denial that it aided the contras.

Peres told the Knesset that Meese welcomed the statement and that Shultz gave him no indication that relations between the United States and Israel had been damaged. Other sources said the phone calls to both men had been brief.

The statement left many questions, which Israeli officials refused to answer. Among them was why Israel made at least two shipments of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 before President Reagan authorized the sales by signing a waiver of the U.S. embargo on weapons sales to Tehran. Israel has said all shipments were "authorized," but has refused to explain by whom or to reconcile the discrepancy between its statement and Meese's contention to the contrary.

It is also unclear who set a price for the arms to Tehran and who set up and controlled the Swiss bank accounts into which profits from the sales were chan-

neled. Conflicting reports here have alleged that either the CIA or the Mossad, its Israeli counterpart, was responsible.

Peres and Rabin lead the left-leaning Labor party and Shamir heads the right-wing Likud bloc. The rival political groups share power in Israel's national-unity government and the three leaders have formed an inner Cabinet that determines policy on sensitive security issues. Sources have said the three men approved in the summer of 1985 a secret approach to the White House in which Israel volunteered to serve as a conduit in a deal to exchange U.S. arms for hostages held in Lebanon by Shiite Moslems under Iranian influence.

Because the leaders of both major blocs were involved, few analysts here believe the exploding controversy could topple the government or lead to departure of senior figures similar to yesterday's resignation of national security advisor John Poindexter or the firing of his aide, Lt. Col. Oliver North.

But sources indicated that one likely candidate for dismissal was North's Israeli interlocutor, Amiram Nir, who is counterterrorism adviser to the prime minister and formerly a top aide to Peres.

Nir took control of the Iran connection sometime in the second half of 1985 from Yaacov Nimrodi and Al Schwimmer, two Israeli arms merchants who received the first overture from Iran indicating an interest in dealing secretly with Washington, sources said. One said Nir was inadvertently tipped to the operation at a meeting with Poindexter, who was unaware that Nir had been excluded from the closely held dealings.

Some sources contend it was the relatively inexperienced Nir who let the operation get out of control. Others have accused Nimrodi of setting up the deal and overstating the potential gains in order to promote his own arms sales to Iran. But no source here has accused either man of setting up the money flow to the contras. Both men have refused to comment.

Although Shamir, Rabin and Peres all bear responsibility for Israel's role, only Peres appeared before the Knesset today to answer allegations by leftist minority parties, four of which filed motions of no confidence in the government. He sat alone, with no member of the Cabinet joining him until late in the session, while opponents fired a withering barrage of allegations and questions about Israel's role in the affair.

"What haven't you said and how haven't you lied?" asked Yossi Sarid of the Citizens Rights Movement, who accused Peres of improperly circumventing both the Cabinet and

the Knesset in the secret dealings and aiding a terrorist state in Iran. "We must not get involved in Washington intrigues," he added, "because we are playing with fire."

Sarid said the affair reminded him of Israel's ill-fated 1982 invasion of Lebanon, "because it's a matter of going from adventure to adventure to adventure."

Another critic, Mordechai Virshubski of the Shinui party, said Israel had "acted like a banana republic or even worse." He and others called for a government commission of inquiry.

"The money never passed through Israel"

— Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres

Peres, who with the government's solid Knesset majority could have ignored the attacks, instead went on the offensive, calling his critics "slanderers" and "liars," and branding a Communist opponent "a Soviet agent."

Noting that the United States had assisted Israel in rescuing Ethiopian Jews from potential starvation, Peres demanded of his critics: "We're allowed to ask the United States to help save the Ethiopian Jews, and they are not allowed to ask our help in something else. Have to be embarrassed because I helped the United States? ... I don't ask forgiveness for anything. We took our decisions on a moral basis."

A senior official later contended Peres had appeared alone because he wanted to be the one to defend policies undertaken during his premiership. As for the leadership trolka, the official said, "they are working together very closely without political undertones."

After Peres' response, one of the no-confidence motions was struck from the agenda and three others were sent to a committee from which they are not expected to emerge.

572 571

THE WASHINGTON POST

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1986

4/4

THE REGAN ADMINISTRATION'S SECRET ARMS DEAL

Israelis Say U.S. Lags In Probe of Iran Deal

Sources Say CIA Channeled Contra Funds

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, Nov. 27—U.S. federal investigators have made no attempt to question the Israeli government or private Israeli citizens in the Justice Department's investigation of the secret channeling to Nicaraguan rebels of profits from American arms sales to Iran, Israeli officials said today, adding that Israel is prepared to cooperate with the probe if asked.

"There has been no request made for our cooperation," said a senior Israeli official who asked not to be identified. "But if we are asked, I presume we would attempt to cooperate because we have nothing to hide in this matter."

The official noted that in the case of Jonathan J. Pollard, a U.S. naval intelligence employee charged with spying for Israel, the Israeli government allowed Justice Department investigators to travel here and question several officials allegedly involved in the affair who had access to documents. Pollard later was convicted of espionage and is awaiting sentencing.

"The cooperation in the Pollard case was done by special arrangement, and it would have to be in this case too," the official said.

Meanwhile, Israeli sources, seeking to rebut charges in Washington that Israel played a role in funneling money from the Iran arms sales to the contras, added some details to a blanket denial issued yesterday in which the government stated it had no knowledge of or involvement in the payments to the contras.

The sources insisted that it was the CIA, not Israeli representatives, that opened the secret Swiss bank account into which money from the sales was deposited earlier this year. They also contended that the price for the arms had been determined by Iranian middleman Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, who made all arrangements, including opening letters of credit to pay for the transactions, and took a commission on the sales.

"There was no involvement with any Israeli official or private individual in either opening the account or depositing the money," said an informed source. "Iranian counterparts made all the arrangements with Tehran. They got the money and paid it into the account, and what the CIA did with it was nobody else's business."

Ghorbanifar is a business associate of Adnan Khashoggi, a multimillionaire Saudi Arabian businessman and arms merchant who has maintained contacts with Israel's former prime minister Shimon Peres for at least six years. It was Khashoggi and Ghorbanifar who made the first contacts in Europe with Israeli arms merchant Yaacov Nimrodi that led to Israeli involvement in the arms deal, sources said.

The two men asked Nimrodi's help in approaching the United States to seek support for pro-western military officers in Tehran in an internal power struggle against radicals. He went to the Israeli government, which in turn approached the White House. Each side demanded a show of good faith from the other,

sources said, with the Iranians insisting upon U.S. shipments of antitank and anti-aircraft missiles and military spare parts while the Americans demanded the release of U.S. hostages held by a pro-Iranian Shiite Moslem group in Lebanon. That began the controversial exchange of arms for hostages.

The Jerusalem Post today quoted unnamed U.S. officials in Washington who said they believed Khashoggi, operating on behalf of the Saudi government, had partially financed the arms sales to Iran and had played "a direct role" in funneling the profits to the contras. Israeli sources confirmed Khashoggi's involvement in arranging the arms deals but said they could not implicate him in the contra connection.

[The Saudi Arabian government today denied U.S. press reports of Khashoggi's involvement as "planted lies." The Associated Press reported from Riyadh. A dispatch from the official Saudi Press Agency, referring to reports earlier this week in The Washington Post and New York Times, said the government regretted "speculation attributed to unidentified American and Israeli sources." Saudi Arabia professes neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war but reportedly supplies financial assistance to Iraq.]

Israeli elder statesman Abba Eban, chairman of the Knesset's foreign affairs and defense committee, today sharply criticized Israel's role in the arms dealings.

Speaking to Israel radio from Ottawa, Eban said Israel has no enemy more dangerous than the Moslem fundamentalist regime of Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. "We shouldn't have sold them so much as a broken typewriter," he said.

He was also sharply critical of Peres, a political ally of Eban and now Israel's foreign minister, for not disclosing the Israeli role in the arms deal to his Knesset committee, which under law has oversight powers on security matters.

He said it was "totally inadequate" that Peres had kept the sales secret from the panel and demanded that he give the panel a detailed accounting of the sales when it meets again next Tuesday.

END

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News Summary November 27-28, 1986

New York Headlines

The Iran arms deal is still headline news in the electronic and print medias.

Editorials

NYT 11/28 "Threatening the Balance in Iran" The arms provided to Iran can be a significant factor in how the Gulf war will proceed. All previous US goals in the area have now been imperiled. The US is a natural ally to Iran, or at least a counterweight to the Soviets. But after years of manipulation by Western powers, Iranians have another priority: to restore their self-esteem as a nation. The form of restoration: messianic fundamentalism, is hardly attractive to outsiders, but the purpose is understandable. The White House was right to explore possible openings with Teheran. But its manner of approach invited derision. The high road soon became lost and an arms-for-hostage deal was the worst of possible trades. The Administration's fumbling grope for a quick fix to the mess has put off, who knows for how long, the natural reconciliation of interests between the US and Iran.

NYT 11/27 "What the Secret Has Cost" Though there's much to learn about the arms-to-Iran-for-hostages-plus-money-for-the-contras scandal, one thing is already clear. The price the Overt Covert contra War against the Sandanista Gov't has just risen. The recent stunning embarrassment is only the latest milestone. It further evidences Reagan's determination to get his way on Nicaragua despite public skepticism and despite law,

DN 11/27 "Dark Days in the White House" The real damage comes not from the mistake but from mishandling in the aftermath. Reagan must make a full convincing report to the American people. The credibility of his Administration and his capacity to lead is threatened with catastrophe.

ND 11/28 "Won't Be Easy" Reagan must now act with uncharacteristic ruthlessness and speed in order to save his presidency. He must reveal every bit of information he has on the Iran dealings.

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Columns

WSJ-Pinchas Landau 11/28 "Israeli Economy: Stability Isn't Enough" After an initial show of bravery, and an extraordinary run of good luck, the people who call the shots in Jerusalem will miss an opportunity unlikely to come again for years, unless they follow up on their breakthrough. The economy has been stabilized but that has not solved a single of the very real problems that beset the Israeli economy. The gov't still directed employs 35% of the work force, with quasi and local gov't bodies employing another 30%. The budget is almost the same size as the GNP. The former isn't shrinking and the GNP is barely growing. Taxation has become as onerous as ever. Investments and savings are plunging. Yet there is no longer any serious debate about what needs to be done. The public is living off its past savings and the presents that OPEC, the US and the world economy have given it. In Washington, a lame duck administration has no time left to worry about what Israel will look like at the end of the 1980s.

NYT-Flora Lewis 11/28 "Come Clean, Hold Firm" A new Watergate is avoidable. There are many lessons to be learned. The first is for the press and Congress. Many people knew there were foolish things being done in the name of slogan policy, and that end runs were being made to circumvent Congress. The problem is that the media and politicians were bedazzled, even intimidated, by the Presidents popularity. The sudden torrent of criticism is a dam burst of knowledge that had been piling up. In addition to needing a better staff, Reagan needs to set a navigable course.

NYT-Wicker 11/28 "Humpty Dumpty's Fall" It's wishful thinking that Reagan will be able to "act to get this all behind us." No matter what he does now, things can't be the same because things did happen.

DN-Buckley 11/28 "Now, to Clean Up the Mess" There is fundamental work to be done. Congress must write an intelligent law that explains what "timely" means in alerting Congress to covert activities. Reagan must formulate a coherent policy on Nicaragua.

DN-Raspberry 11/27 "Is the Teflon President Stuck?" It is possible but not really conceivable that the official version of the truth we heard was really the truth. Reagan has followed his advisers advice and now he'd better be prepared for a siege of "what did the President know and when did he know it." But nothing will undo the damage. He is now branded as wither out of touch incompetent or an out of control liar.

DN-Nelson 11/28 "Who Will Run the Railroad?" The good news and the bad news of the Iranian fiasco is that it is almost purely a structural crisis within the Reagan White House. It was just plain bad management of foreign policy apparatus. The White House ignored all the assets it has.

NYT-Anthony Lewis 11/27 "The Fault, Dear Brutus" The roots of Reagan's disaster lie in Nicaragua. He was obsessed by the desire to overthrow the Sandanista Gov't. To that end he aided terrorists. He mocked international law and the constraints laid down by Congress. It is laughable to suggest that all responsibility stops with North. The truth will eventually come out and it will hurt. Presidents who consort with terrorists and ignore the law seal their own fate.

0986 / 73 / 168

3/8

NYT-Safire 11/27 "Only a Bay of Pigs" We can hope that the ransom scandal will turn out to be only a Bay of Pigs and not another Watergate. Reagan must admit that a mistake was made but that the goals were worthy.

NYP-Wattenberg 11/27 "Iran Scandal: An Ugly Moment in US History" Today there is growing legitimate concern about the process and substance of Reagan's foreign policy. The scandal is unfolding into an ugly feeding frenzy that threatens to poison everyone involved. The press has been frustrated for 6 years of a Teflon presidency. The press will probably be thought of as under a much better president, a bumbling, fumbling president. What is indefensible has been Reagan's inability to keep order among his clerks. He did not learn early enough how to kick ass among his aides, who are now covering theirs.

WSJ-McColm & Payne (Freedom House Center for Caribbean and Central American Studies) "No US Effort to Stop Libyan Beachhead in Suriname" Suriname's brutal dictator, has desperately been calling on new friend Khadafy to help him maintain his regime. If America's already low profile in Suriname sinks further in light of this week's foreign policy crisis, it appears likely that the Libyans will have a beachhead in this hemisphere.

Press Reports

Israeli Involvement/Defense of Iran Deal

NYT-Freidman 11/27-Peres went before Parliament to defend Israel's participation in the Iran arms affair. He said that everything Israel did was at the behest of the US and that Israel did not know that some of the money was going to the contras. (Cabled 11/27) (NYP-Dan; DN-Meisels)

NYP-Dan & Latham 11/28 Peres reportedly knew profits from the sales were going to the contras, the Post has learned. White House officials with Reagan reacted with a terse "no comment" when asked about Peres's role. It is not known when Peres learned where the money was going but well informed sources said he became aware "at some point." Sources insisted Peres' knowledge suggested that the contra operation was approved at a very high level. Reportedly, Peres, Shamir and Rabin are nervous over the growing US investigation.

NYT Chiprow 11/27 The US has apparently sent Israel differing signals over the past 7 years on the acceptability of arms sales to Iran. (cabled 11/27) (see WSJ-Walcott 11/28 "Israel Said to Have Sold Weapons to Iran Since 1981 With Tactful Approval of the Reagan Administration.")

WSJ-Kossel 11/28-For the moment, the dispute in Israel is focused on who made the decisions and how, rather than on the policy itself. The Israeli statement that was issued after Reagan announced that money went to the contras, did not address assertions made in Washington that Israel had exported arms to Iran over and above those shipments authorized by the US. An Israeli official confirmed to AP that private Israeli arms dealers sold additional arms until early this year. He said the Gov't approved the shipments partly in the hope that they would help in efforts to track down Israeli soldiers missing in Lebanon.

NYT-special (Wash) The first diversion of money from US arms sales to Iran took place in late 1985, months earlier than acknowledged by the Reagan Administration, according to people here and abroad familiar with the transactions. These sources say that Iran paid millions of dollars to Israel for several shipments of weapons in 1985. Much of the money failed to reach the Israeli Gov't they said, and was instead either used as commissions to arms dealers or for some other purposes. The issue is significant because several months later, the Israelis demanded that the US replace the materials sold to Iran. The Israelis, however, said they could not pay for all the weapons because the money had disappeared in the transactions. The replacements were eventually shipped to Israel even though the US was not fully reimbursed. Details remain unclear but one thing is certain: The accounts provided by the US and Israel are in conflict. (Cabled 11/28)

DN-Tamayo (Knight-Ridder Newspapers) It is probable that no more than a fistful of senior gov't officials and trusted weapons merchants know the exact quantity and value of Israeli war materiel that has found its way to Iran since the start of the war. Technically, all exports of Israeli war materiel and weapons sales involving Israeli merchants must be reported to SIBAT. But two veteran gun merchants said that they had no doubts that the Israeli Defense Ministry and Mossad turned a blind eye to the fact that some of the shipments allegedly going to places like Argentina were actually headed for Iran.

Saudi Asked Israel to Sell Iraq Arms Too/Saudis Deny Report

NYT-Miller 11/27-Khashoggi offered late last year to have Israel sell arms to Iraq but Israel rejected the offer. The reported offer raises questions about Khashoggi's assertion that he had been acting on behalf of certain Saudi officials in what amounted to diplomatic overtures through arms sales. (Cabled 11/27)

NYT AP 11/28 Saudi Gov't officials said that reports that Saudi billionaire Khashoggi arranged financing for Iran's purchase of US arms are "planted lies." The Saudis said that the claim that they were involved was based on "speculation attributed to unidentified American and Israeli sources."

Jane's Says Iran 'Will Take Anything'

NYT-AP 11/28-Iran has acquired arms from sources in numerous countries, often at above-market prices, and the US arms transfers are only the tip of the iceberg, Jane's Defense weekly said. As for Israel, the magazine said, "Israel...has supplied the Iranians through backdoor shipments, camouflaged through third and even fourth parties."

NYT-Reuters-Belgium's Foreign Minister denied that Belgium sold arms to Iran since the 1980 embargo.

North Said to Destroy Papers

NYT-Shenon 11/28 p.1-The Gov't has information indictating that North destroyed several documents from NSC files last weekend. One Administration official said the destroyed documents were crucial to the investigation.

0986 / 73 / 168 5/8

The destruction occurred as Messe was conducting a private inquiry into the weapons sale without the assistance of the FBI. (DN-Nelson)

3 Agencies Said to Have Received Data About Iran Money Transfers

NYT-Engelberg-11/27 p.1-The Defense Dept., NSC and CIA recieved messages intercepted last year suggesting that money from the Iran arms deal was being diverted to Nicaraguan rebels, according to officials in positions to know. It is not clear whether anyone in the Gov't understood the significance of the fragmentary intercepts. But one source said the messages should have raised questions in the minds of responsible gov't officials. The Administration has said that only two gov't officials and one former official knew that proceeds from the arms sales had been funnelled to the rebels. (DN-Volz)

Businessman Says He Tipped Off US

NYT-Diamond-An Oregon businessman said he was told by Gov't intelligence sources early this year that the Defense Dept. was planning to buy weapons for Nicaragua rebels from profits from the sale of arms to Iran. The businessman, Richard Breneneke said he informed a senior military assistant to Bush and was told "We will look into it." The businessman's statement, which could not be independently confirmed, would place knowledge of the Nicaraguan connection at wider and higher levels in Washington and at an earlier time than had been disclosed. Disclosure of the businessman's memos, which are marked "confidential" was resisted by the US Attorney's office in NY but finally made public this week. He said that he had been made aware of the information about Iran through a variety of business contacts who have become well known in arms sales efforts to Iran. His memos are being used in the case now on trial in NY in which various defendants contend that they were assured through intermediaries that high US officials, including Bush, needed their services in shipping arms to Iran.

Signs of 'Board' of Middlemen Emerge

NYT-Brinkley 11/28-Administration officials said that the Justice Dept. was investigating people outside the gov't who may have served as a "board of directors of sorts," as a senior official put it, handling Iranian payments diverted to the Nicaraguan rebels.

Reagan Names 3 to Examine NSC/Other Iran Inquiries Widen

NYT Weinraub p.1 11/27 Reagan has appointed a three-member panel to investigate the role of his NSC staff. On Capitol Hill, several Democratic committee chairman made it clear that they intend to press their own inquiries. The Justice Dept. broadened its investigation and announced that the inquiry into the affair had become a major criminal investigation that would include the FBI. (all NY papers)

Bush or Shultz May Visit Mideast to Ease Concern

NYT-Gwertzman-The US is considering sending Bush or Shultz to the Mideast in an attempt to bolster American standing there, State Dept. officials said. Cablegrams went out to US Ambassadors who were told to inform their host governments that the US would not hide the facts of the affair.

0086 / 73 / 168

6/8

Aides said that Shultz was aware that the US had lost prestige in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and other Arab countries and that the revelations had embarrassed Israel.

Senators' Panel May Subpoena 3 Ex-US Aides

NYT-Engelberg p.1 11/28-A Senate committee has tentatively decided to subpoena three former White House officials. The White House said that Reagan would not be questioned in the Justice Dept. inquiry.

DN-Volz 11/28-it may be a big mistake to have asked Messer to head the investigation. He is seen as a Reagan crony who has already made up his mind. He has already said that it has been established that Reagan, Bush and other top Cabinet officers knew nothing about the diverted funds.

Regan

ND-Friedman 11/28-Many long time friends of Reagan are pushing him to replace Don Regan with someone who knows the issues, places the President's well being before his own ambitions and who can work with Republican leaders. (NYP; DN)

Iranian Whom Met McFarlane Is Tied to Takeover of US Embassy

NYT-Reuters-The Iranians who met with McFarlane included a former leader of the students who stormed the Embassy in 1979, said Bani-Sadr. He also said that Iran's attitudes toward the US was changing and that the Foreign Minister had circulated a secret document in his ministry citing the merits of links with the US. Bani Sadr also said that remarks by Israeli leaders on the secret arms shipments had angered Teheran, resulting in the arrest of the parliamentary representative of Iran's 20,000 strong Jewish community. The Jewish leader reportedly, according to Teheran newspapers, been arrested on charges of illicit sexual relations involving young boys and girls.

NYT-Reuters-The speaker of Iran's Parliament said that Teheran deserved credit for sowing discord in the US.

NYT-Sciolino-Iran's leaders are treating the growing foreign policy uproar in the US as a major diplomatic and propaganda victory. Western analysts say they are being asked by oil companies and banks whether they should switch allegiance from Iraq to Iran in the war. People are becoming convinced that Iran will now win the war.

Swiss Believe Flow of Iran Money is Legal Under Their Laws

NYT-Tagliabue p.1 11/27-Swiss Gov't officials said that financial transactions by which payments from Iran for Western arms were passed through Swiss bank accounts to the Nicaraguan rebels were probably legal.

0986

/ 73 / 168

7/8

Most Americans Think Reagan is Lying

NYP-A majority of Americans believe Reagan is lying about the Iran arms scandal and think he knew the funds were diverted to Nicaraguan rebels. An ABC News poll showed Reagan's standing has dropped 14 points since Sept.

Cuomo Says He Hopes Reagan Didn't Know

NYT-AP 11/27-Cuomo said that the Reagan Administration was "in collapse" because of revelations about arms shipments to Iran and that he hoped the trail would end "before it got to the very top."

Fluke Could Save Poindexter & North

DN-A "fluke" in the Ethics in Gov't Act appears to exempt Poindexter and North from the provision of the ethics act for special counsels to investigate official wrongdoing. Neither earns enough to be covered by the law.

Iranians Want to Be Penpals With Americans but Americans Shun Them

NYT-AP 11/28 The International Friendship League says it has received more than 1000 Iranians' requests to correspond with Americans but it cannot find Americans to write back.

Iran Expels 3 Italian Aides on TV Lampoon of Khomeini

NYT-AP 11/28-Iran ordered 3 diplomats from Italy to leave the country because an Italian TV program mocked Khomeini.

48 Are Killed as Iranian Missile Hits Baghdad

NYT-AP (AP photo of crowds around ruins of building) An Iranian missile devastated an entire block of Baghdad in a residential district, killing 48 and wounding 52. Iraqi warplanes bombed 7 Iranian targets in retaliation.

Israeli Jets Raid Palestinian Bases

NYT-Hijazi 11/28-Israeli jet fighters attacked Palestinian positions near Sidon in an area where Palestinian guerrillas and Lebanese Shiite militias have been engaged in clashes. The Israeli military spokesman said the planes struck 10 targets south of Sidon belonging to Al Fatah and other groups. (NYP-AP photo of smoke rising from Palestinian camp)

Palestinian-Shiite Battles Rage

NYT-Hijazi 11/27-Pitched battles raged between Palestinians and Shiites in Beirut and southern Lebanon as fears grew of a full scale Palestinian-Lebanese war.

Syria Called Unsettled On Terrorism and Iran

NYT-Kifner 11/28 (Damascus) Revelations of Syrian involvement in international terrorism have left Assad deeply embarrassed, according to

0986 / 4.3 1/68 8/8

Arab and Western diplomats. Moreover, the disclosures of secret arms deals between the US, Israel and Iran have stunned the Assad gov't. The latest blow came as West Germany ordered the expulsion of 3 Syrian diplomats and downgraded its relations with the Assad Gov't, a day after a West Berlin court implicated Syrian officials in a bombing in the city last March. The day before, the West Germans issued an international arrest warrant for the second-ranking officer in the Syrian Air Force intelligence. Col. Said is the deputy of one of Assad's closest friends and advisers. He was also implicated in the El Al case. Trials are also pending in Ankara, Genoa, Karachi, Vienna and Madrid. All are expected to implicate Syria. As for the arms deal, the Syrians are said to be asounded. Western diplomats believe that the Syrians are embarrassed that Iran has gotten arms from its mortal enemy, Israel, especially after Syria has been criticized for supporting Iran. (NYT-Markham 11/28 p.1; WSJ-Gumbel; NYT-Markham 11/27)

Demjanjuk

NYT-AP-11/27-Demjanjuk trembled in court as he denied being a sadistic guard who prodded Jewish into Nazi death chambers with a sword and turned on the gas that killed them. (DN-Meisels photo of Demjanjuk)

Letters

NYF-5 letters on the arms deal. 2 letters support the President, 3 call him a liar.

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Peres over the telephone, apparently for prior approval, to Attorney General Meese and to Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

Speaking of President Reagan in Parliament today, Mr. Peres said: "As an Israeli and as a human being, I am full of admiration for a President who has 230 million citizens, and even so, when there are six who are kidnapped, he does not rest for a moment."

Mr. Peres had to fend off challenges from the left-wing opposition in the Parliament, which accused the Government for getting embroiled in yet another scandal.

In the last 12 months, the Israeli Government has been involved in a spy scandal in Washington, a domestic intelligence scandal over the cover-up of the murder of two Palestinian bus hijackers, and now the Iran affair.

"Israel's name is mixed up in dirty business for the umpteenth time in the sale of arms to Iran," a legislator, Jossi Sarid of the left-wing Citizens Rights Party, told Mr. Peres. "In so doing, we have damaged our best friends in Washington."

Other opposition members said the three Government leaders had appropriated too much unregulated power, and this was one of the reasons for some of the problems in which Israel has found itself.

"You are obligated to respect and brief Parliament," Elazar Granot of the left-wing Mapam Party told Mr. Peres. "You did not even brief your own Cabinet. Three people are making up the foreign policy of the state of Israel. Who gave you this right? This is a democracy."

"I thought I had to keep quiet," responded Mr. Peres. "I was asked to help and I was asked to help secretly."

Throughout his defense, Mr. Peres portrayed Israel as nothing more than an ally of the United States that was called on to help in the release of hostages.

This picture is not wholly correct, according to several Israeli sources. While the United States was exploring options of how to deal with Iran in early 1985, Israel went out of its way to offer contacts it had established in Iran.

It was an offer that Israeli officials depicted as containing the possibility not only of freeing the hostages, but effecting a strategic relationship with certain elements in Iran who were of more moderate nature and interest in establishing ties to the West.

Given the small number of Israeli officials involved in the Iran affair and their close-knit cooperation, it would be difficult to prove that any of them had any knowledge of the Nicaraguan connection.

The same applies to private Israeli arms dealers involved in the operation — Yaacov Nimrodi and Al Schwimmer — who may have been involved at least in setting up the Swiss bank accounts.

One of the problems in sorting out responsibility in the affair is that the line between private individuals and governments has been blurry, in a way that left all the key governments — except the United States — with the power to shape events but also with the alibi to deny anything embarrassing.

Mr. Nimrodi and Mr. Schwimmer — who may have been involved at least in setting up the Swiss bank accounts —

One of the problems in sorting out responsibility in the affair is that the line between private individuals and governments has been blurry, in a way that left all the key governments — except the United States — with the power to shape events but also with the alibi to deny anything embarrassing.

Mr. Nimrodi and Mr. Schwimmer, though private citizens, also happen to be friends of Mr. Peres. The Iranian contact man, also an arms dealer, Manachur Ghorbanifar, was linked to Prime Minister Hossein Mousavi of Iran. But the Iranian arms dealer, too, had no official status.

Finally, Adnan Khashoggi, who brought Iranians and Israelis together, is a private Saudi Arabian citizen, but one who has a long record of carrying out tasks on behalf of the Saudi Government, particularly Defense Minister Prince Sultan.

958/70

2/6

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Saudi Reportedly Asked the Israelis to Sell Arms to Iraq,

By JUDITH MILLER

Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Nov. 26 — Adnan M. Khashoggi, the Saudi billionaire who is said to have been a key intermediary in American and Israeli arms sales to Iran, offered late last year to have Israel sell arms to Iraq, according to Western officials and sources familiar with the weapon sales.

The sources said Israeli officials had rejected Mr. Khashoggi's offer to serve as a middle man in such sales.

Mr. Khashoggi's proposal is the latest indication that the Saudi businessman has played a major role in commercial and diplomatically sanctioned sales of weapons to Iran, and possibly also to the other side in the six-year-old Iran-Iraq war.

On Tuesday, Israeli and American sources said Mr. Khashoggi, who is close to several Israeli arms dealers, was a key figure in arranging to have arms transferred by Israel to Iran on behalf of the United States. They said

they thought he might have been acting on behalf of Saudi Arabia.

The reported offer to help Israel sell military equipment to Iraq also raises questions about Mr. Khashoggi's assertion to private businessmen and even to Government officials that he was acting on behalf of certain Saudi officials in what amounted to diplomatic overtures through arms sales.

Recent disclosures that Saudi Arabia has been secretly trying to ease relations with Iran has helped fuel a vitriolic power struggle under way for months in the Saudi ruling family, according to businessmen and Western officials.

One Arab source knowledgeable about internal Saudi affairs said the issue of friendlier relations with Teheran had become divisive within the royal family, pitting King Fahd, who favored the rapprochement, against princes opposed to any support for the radical Shiite regime.

The source said, and one Western official confirmed that Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister, was dismissed by King Fahd not only because he opposed the \$18-a-barrel price for oil sought by Iran, but also because he opposed the warming of relations with Iran in general.

Sheik Yamani has been told not to try to leave the kingdom, the sources said. One Arab businessman said his passport had also been confiscated.

Yamani and Oil Glut

Sheik Yamani had championed the strategy of flooding the market with oil and driving oil prices down, which he argued would drive marginal oil producers out of the business. This would eventually enable the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries eventually to secure a rise in the price of oil to \$13 or \$15 a barrel. This amount would be sufficient for Saudi Arabia's needs, he maintained, but not high enough to enable marginal producers

Too

to re-enter the market. But King Fahd, these sources said, ultimately agreed with members of the royal family, including Prince Sultan, the Defense Minister, that bridges with Teheran should be opened, since it was unlikely that Iraq could win the war.

Saudi Arabia has been known as one of Iraq's staunchest supporters. But in recent months, Western officials and a source close to the Saudis said, Saudi Arabia decided to carry out its secret armamentation with Iran after Iranian troops stunned what was judged to be militarily superior Iraqi forces by capturing the Iraqi port city of Fao. After that Iraqi defeat, Arab officials and business sources said, King Fahd approved in principle shipments of badly needed fuel oil to Teheran.

American and Israeli officials said Tuesday that Saudi Arabia had also helped finance Iran's purchase of arms from Israel and the United States. Arab sources could not immediately confirm this report.

a/c
of/ASV

The White House Crisis: The Israeli Stake

Israel Reportedly Got Mixed Signals From U.S. on Weapons Sales to Iran

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 26 — The United States has apparently sent Israel differing signals over the last seven years on the acceptability of arms sales to Iran. Sometimes Washington has vigorously opposed deliveries of weapons and spare parts to the regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and sometimes it has approved them.

According to present and former officials, the Administration has fairly consistently used the State Department to express objections. But at certain times, even before President Reagan's secret approach to Iran began 18 months ago, the Israelis have reportedly obtained tacit approval from the White House for small shipments.

Now, the Administration's secret overture to Iran appears to have been the product, in part, of Israel's growing role in shaping Washington's assessments of the Middle East's turbulent rivalries.

Increasingly, academic experts and former Government officials observe, White House aides with close personal and professional ties to Israel seem to have absorbed Israeli views on the ability of well-placed weapons sales or military action to influence the internal politics of Middle Eastern nations. The Administration's clandestine contacts and arms sales designed to bolster pro-Western moderates inside Iran, for example, had been strongly advocated by Israel from 1979 to 1982, and then again in the last two years.

Strategic Cooperation Grows

The interaction between Israel and the United States, their wariness of each other's motives and their entanglement in the current Iran affair illustrate the extent to which "strategic cooperation" by the two allies has

deepened in recent years. The concept — agreed upon at the end of 1983 by Mr. Reagan and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir — involves joint military exercises, enhanced sharing of intelligence information and periodic meetings of a joint military committee.

In some measure, it is the result of a longterm Israeli campaign to portray itself as a "strategic asset" of the United States, a stable ally with a democratic system and an affinity for the American desire to contain Soviet influence.

But while Israel has made the argument largely to promote its aid requests, the campaign has also enticed Washington to make demands on Israel. At least twice the Reagan Administration has reportedly tried to get the Israelis to help the White House circumvent a Congressional ban on military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels, known as contras.

According to a former American official, the Israelis first declined to supply "bridging financing" with weapons and training in 1984 and then refused to

a request to "launder" and relay American funds to the contras. The Shamir Government was afraid of damaging its relations with Congress, on which Israel depends for military and economic aid.

Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d has now accused unidentified Israeli "representatives" of transferring profits from arms sales to Iran to the contras through a Swiss bank account. Israel has denied it, asserting that Iran made the payments directly into the account, not through Israel.

258 / 70
4/6

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Early Episode Described

An episode involving arms shipments to Iran was described today by Morris Amitay, who had just left his post as executive director of the American-Israel Political Action Committee in December 1980, after Mr. Reagan's election. He was approached by the Israeli military attaché in Washington, Gen. Menachem Meron, and asked to find out what the incoming Administration's attitude would be on Israel's selling weapons to the Khomeini regime.

Mr. Amitay quoted General Meron as saying that before Americans were taken hostage at the embassy in Teheran in November 1979, the Carter Administration had not been opposed.

Mr. Amitay went to Richard V. Allen, who headed Mr. Reagan's transition team and later became his national security adviser. "I told him that the Israelis had an understanding that they could ship small amounts of spare parts to Iran," Mr. Amitay said. "What is the attitude of the Reagan Administration?"

"He thought for a moment and then he said, 'Tell your friends I heard what you said.' To me, that meant they're not against it. In this town that goes as a wink and a nod," Mr. Amitay said that he had conveyed the sense of approval to General Meron.

Mr. Allen denied giving approval. "There was never, to my recollection, a situation in which I would have approved any shipment of arms or condoned anybody else shipping arms," he said. "There never was tacit consent given by me - never. I'm not an Iran-lover. I'm an Iran-hater."

Israel's impact on White House thinking had been enhanced according to some former officials, by several National Security Council aides who are strong Israel supporters and are attracted by Israeli intelligence abilities and political analysis. Among them have been Robert C. McFarlane, Mr. Reagan's former national security adviser, who made a secret flight to Teheran last May on a plane with military equipment; Dennis Ross, the current Middle East specialist in the National Security Council; Howard Teicher, the N.S.C.'s senior director of political-military affairs; the late Donald R. Fortier, who was a Deputy Assistant to the President, and Michael Ledeen, who served as a consultant to the National Security Council.

Mr. Ledeen, who was reportedly instrumental in the Israeli-American approach to Iran, is a founder of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs in Washington, which supports a close alliance with Israel.

In the opening stages of the Iran initiative, Mr. Ledeen reportedly met with David Kimche, who was director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and had also been a high official of the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency that had maintained contacts inside Iran. Mr. Kimche is said to have put the White House in touch with an Iranian businessman who, American officials came to believe, spoke for the Iranian Government in urging contacts.

"We got sucked into some Israeli scheme," said a former official in the National Security Council. Initially, he said, the White House resisted Israeli support for using weapons sales in the approach.

"There was agreement that it would be good to have contacts with Iranians," the former official said. "There was disagreement over arms. There was agreement that if there were Iranians who could use arms to change the regime, yes. But to supply arms to the regime, no."

Intelligence Gains Cited

The Israeli argument holds that cultivating Iranian military men can provide badly needed intelligence about events in Iran and may enhance the influence of pro-Western elements in the leadership that succeeds Ayatollah Khomeini. Given Iran's strategic importance as an oil producer, a barrier between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to Arab countries in the region, Israeli policymakers have long seen Israel and the United States as sharing interests in maintaining channels to Teheran.

Israel found the White House aides considerably more receptive to this analysis than State Department specialists, some of whom express skepticism about the Israeli approach and cite the importance of American ties with Arab nations.

458/70
5/6

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"I would think the Israeli geopolitical way of talking was very convincing to an Administration that has no policy," said Judith Kipper, a Middle East specialist at the American Enterprise Institute. "This Administration, which has tended to see everything through the Soviet dimension, really does not understand what is at work there."

One also accused the White House of "using the military as the first instrument of diplomacy rather than the last," a practice of which Israel has been accused as well. As in Lebanon, where Israel provided weapons to Christian forces to help them install a pro-Western Government in Beirut, the delicate mechanism of internal politics in the Middle East has proved less easy to manipulate than either Israel or the United States has expected.

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מקו.סוכיה חכלית של
ישראל בניו יורק

CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK N.Y. 10017
OXFORD 7 5500

ס/עורר החוץ ב-NYT: האש כרגע מכם והלאה, אבל אנחנו נבדוק. נני בני שיחי הצביעו על הסתירה בין הודעתנו להודעת מיו.

לקראת ערב יום אתמול התגבר במידה מסוימת העניין בנו. "מקניל/להרר" שידרו כתבת פוקוס ארוכה על ההיבט הישראלי, בה התראיינו אנשים כעמוס גלכוע ויהושע שגיא שדיברו על האינטרס האסטרטגי של ישראל באיראן, וולף בליצר ואחרים. כל חדשות הערב שידרו בהרחבה על הדיון כנגסת והביאו את המסר העיקרי בדברי ממרה"מ: ישראל סיועה לארה"ב ואינה מתנצלת. "נייטליין" הקדישה חכנית שלמה להיבט הישראלי, תחת הכותרת "שערוריה כשתי הבירות, וושינגטון וירושלים". הובלט דמיון מסוים בין החקירות הנערכות בשתי הארצות. דין ריינולדס סיפר על תעשית הנשק הישראלית שהמוניטין הקרבי שלה גדול (זאת על רקע תמונות מבירות '82) ואשר חייבת למכור כדי להתקיים. ציין גם היבט יהודי איראן. בדיון אח"כ השתתפו אחד אולמרט ווולף בליצר. אולמרט הדגיש כי ישראל סיועה לארה"ב כשם שארה"ב סיועה לישראל במילוט יהודי אתיופיה, למשל, וכן כי לא היה לישראל רוח חומר. הבוקר מקדיש ה-NYT כמעט עמוד שלם להיבט הישראלי (מוברק בנפרד).

לסיום, כשלב זה נראה כי אין זה לסובתנו להופיע כראיונות, על אף הבקשות הרבות. העיסוק בזוית הממשל ומדיניות החוץ האמריקנית הוא הכולט והעיקרי ומבחינתנו כל המוסיף גורע. הכיוון הבא אותו מנסת התקשורת לבדוק, לפי מה ששמעתי עד כה, הוא ההיבט הסעודי וגם כאן אין לנו מה להוסיף. ממילא עוד תחזור התקשורת גם אלינו.

כינה



אאאא, חוזמ: 11121
אל: ווש/449
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בבב
שמור/רגיל
אל: שגריר, מחני
חייית שולץ סגירח משרד אשפי
למברק ניו יורק 149
נדה על העתק המכתב והערכותיכם לגבי סרוב שולץ להורות
על סגירח המשרד, אמ המידע הנלי מדוייק.
מצפא' ==
מב

סחסח

- 22 -



משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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יציא

סודי ביותר

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עותק 4 מתוך 12

אל: ווש, נר: 859, מ: המשרד
דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 271196, זח: 1830

סודי ביותר/בהול

אל: ווש

הטגריר

כלי התקשורת הישראליים מדווחים כאילו הובע עיני מקור ישראלי
באזני כתבים ישראליים חשש שהרכב הועדה שמונתה עיני הנשיא
רייגן לבדיקת נוהלי המועצה לבטחון לאומי אינו נוח מבחינתה
של ישראל. הכתבים מצביעים במיוחד על מאסקי שלגבי עמדותיו
חששים בטגרירות. אנו מאוד ממליצים ומבקשים ששום גורם
בטגרירות לא יביט דעות על עמדות אישיות כביכול של אישים
אמריקאים אלה או אחרים.

מנכל מדיני

א/נ

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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אל: המשרד

מ-: רוש"נר: 560, מא: 261186, זח: 1800, זח: מ, טג: טב

בנד: פ

סודי ביותר/מידוי

רוה"מ, מ"מ, רוה"מ, ושה"ח

משיחה עם מקס בישר:

1. שוחח עם המזכיר ערב חג ההודיה ולמי זכרון-המזכיר

אמר לו שלדעתו החקירה עליה הוחלט לא תימשך זמן רב

2. ההרגשה בממשל היא שמעמדו של שולץ התחזק דווקא בגלל

אומץ-הלב שגילה בנקיטת עמדה שונה מעמדת הנשיא.

מ.רוזן

תמ: שהח, דהמ, שהוט, ממנכל, ממנכל, מרכז, דט, אמן, מצמא, סייובל

מסמך 10863/11-27

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* חוזם: 11,10860 *

* אל: המשד *

* מ-: דוש, נר: 556, תא: 261186, זח: 1700, דח: מ, טג: טב *

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* טורי ביותר/מיד *

* אל: רהמי, ממרהמי ושהח *

* ברשת איראן *

* אחז שיחות שקיימתי כאן עם אנשי ממשל, סנטורים ומספר *

* עתונאים, הערכתי הינה: *

* (1) ועדת החקירה שהוקמה שהוטמכה לחקור את הענין על *

* כל היבטיו - ללא כחל ושרק, תבדוק הנושא על כל היבטיו. *

* (2) החשדות לביצוע מעשים פליליים הולכים ומתגברים ומבחינת *

* הראיות נוצר מצב - שהאנשים המוזכרים הינם בחזקת השודים *

* - כשנסטל ההנחה באשר ליעד אליו העברו הכספים יהיה *

* עליהם. *

* (3) במסגרת החקירה שתוערך יקבלו חברי ועדת החקירה סיוע *

* מהרשויות המופקדות על נושאים אלה, דהיינו ה- FBI *

* - כשחלקו של ה- *

* CIA יהיה מדגבל יותר-מאחר וברור כבר שכשיר שאנשי *

* ה- CIA *

* מעורבים בענין. *

* (4) כפי שהנחתי במברקי מה- 21 יש לצפות לזימונם של כל *

* מי שהוזכרו בקשרים בפרשה, ביניהם מיוקל לדון, אל *

* שרדמר, דוד קמחי, עמירם ניר. כפי שצוינתו יש תקומים *

* בהם הופיעו אנשים הנהנים מחסינות דיפלומטיות בפני *

* ועדות הסנס. הדבר נעשה אז באופן וולונטרי-ואנו עשויים *

* בקרוב להמצא במצב בו תהיה פנייה אלינו לאפשר עדותם *

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*של ישראלים שהיו מעורבים בעניין. מובן שבמישור המשפטי
במידה ומישורו מעל בשם ממשלת ישראל וגם הופיע בתור
*שכזה בפני גופים אמריקניים - יוכל לטעון לחסינות-לא
*כן הדבר לגבי מי שהנו אזהר אמריקני שלגביו טענת חסינות
*יותר מסובכת. אם כי אני מתוודע להיבט החסינות, ברור
*שאם תהיה פנייה אלינו-לאפשר מתן עדות כזו לגלות את
*האמת במרשם הנוגעת ללב לבו של ממשל ארהב שעה שהנשיא
*של ארהב במצוקה, קשה מאד יהיה לנו להימנע ממתן תשובה
*חיובית.

* (קיסובג'ר אמר אמש שהודעת ממשלת ישראל מתיוחסת דק
* לאי-מעורבות ממשלת ישראל, אך אין זאת אומרת שישראלים
* יחיוס לא היו מעורבים).

5*. לאור הטבירות הגבוהה שאכן יוצאו זימונים למתן עדויות
*וכדי למנוע כל אי-הבנות-אני ממליץ מאד שלא ניצור
*צנזרות מקבילים לקשר עם אנשי הממשל של ארה"ב כי הדבר
*יגרום רק לתסבוכות מיותרות כשכל אמירה וכל ציטוט
*של אמירה עשוי לסבך אותנו יותר ויותר- ובעיקר לא
*לקיים שיח טלפוני ישירות בנושא זה שעה שכל אמירה
*עשויה להיות מזכרת במהלך החקירה ההולכת ומסתעפת.

6*. יש להניח שהאמריקנים המעורבים בפרשה ישתדלו להעביר
האחריות להרבה מן המעשים לישראל. הדבר יהיה כוח מבחינתם
גם כדי להמלט מאחריותם האישית וגם כדי להגן על נשיא
ארהב הנמצא במצוקה רצינית. הלוראי ואתנזה אן הרגשתי
הינה כבר היום-יוזאת מקריאת מספר מאמרים בנדון-שיטענר
בצדק או שלא בצדק שישראל שימשה לא דק כגורם מסייע
אלא כמניע ולאן דווקא שוללי.

7. באשר לתגובות כאן-מניח אני שהדיווחים מהעתונים
*מצליחים לשקף את האווירה שנוצרה בה. לראשונה מאז הגיע
*יריגן לשלטון-שומעים מפי סנטורים וחברי קונגרס דמובליקנים
* וגם ממי שתומאים שהינם אהודי הנשיא-התייחסויות לשני
הקונטים חמורים שלזעתם התגלו באישיותו של הנשיא.

*הַדָּשׁ הַזֶּה לַעֲבוֹדַת ה' 75:

INCREDIBILITY (N★)

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[illegible]

1. Директор предприятия - Иванов И.И. (подпись)
 2. Главный бухгалтер - Петрова С.С. (подпись)
 3. Начальник отдела кадров - Сидоров А.А. (подпись)
 4. Начальник отдела снабжения - Козлов В.В. (подпись)
 5. Начальник отдела сбыта - Морозов Е.Е. (подпись)
 6. Начальник отдела технического контроля - Соколов Д.Д. (подпись)
 7. Начальник отдела охраны труда и техники безопасности - Федотов Г.Г. (подпись)
 8. Начальник отдела охраны окружающей среды - Жуков И.И. (подпись)
 9. Начальник отдела охраны здоровья - Орлов К.К. (подпись)
 10. Начальник отдела охраны имущества - Павлов Л.Л. (подпись)

INCREDIBILITY

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*זיכרון (רענד ירתר נזזה) *

תשובה (8*)

1. תחלוצ לשמור על פרופיל נמוך-ולסרב להתראוין בכלי

2. עלינו להתכונן בבר עכשיו לתגובה שתינתן על ידינו

(א*) הוֹדֵיָהוּ בְּמִדְּוָיִם שֶׁל כָּל אֱלֹהִים שֶׁעָלָו מִטַּעַם מַמְשֶׁלֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל

(ב) גילוי כל המסמכים הקשורים להעברות הנספחים

(ג) וילוויו כל קונו הנשק ופרטי המשלוחים שנשלחו מן

*לגרוי כל תנל עלינו במדבר לצאת מתוך הנחה שעל פי ההסכם

במקלות בנחשתם של זרועות ממשל ארהב

*טל ידו שימוש בבנקים שווייצרים. במקרה האחרון שיתוף

☆ 1777

*תחב: שהח,רהט,מנכל,ממנכל,שהבט,(בנפרד),מצפא,טייבל

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

6661

NS17

בלע'ס

אל: בון , בריסל , האג , לונדון , פריס , רומא , אתונה ,
קהיר , קופנהגן , שטוקהולם , אוסלו , בוקרשט , ברן ,
הלסינקי , ליסבון , בנגקוק , טוקיו , קנדה , אוסטה ,
לוסאנגלס , מונטריאול , טורונטו , אמסטרדם , בוסטון ,
יוסטון , מיאמי , פרנציסקו , פילדלפיה , שיקגו , פטוריה ,
ביידס , מכסיקו , מונטבידאו , קרקס , ברזיליה , לימה ,
נר: חוים 1601, מ: המשרד
דח: מ, סג: ב, תא: 261186, דח: 1700

בלעס/מ'ידי

スロ

1. אמש (25.11) התקיימה התיעצות בהשתתפות רוהמי, מים
 וזהם ושהח ושהבט שבסיימה הוחלט לפרסם את הודעה הבאה:
 "ישראל סייעה בהעברת נשק הגנתי וחלקי החילוף מארהב
 לאיראן, עלפי בקשתה של ממשלת ארהב, והתשלום בעבור ציוד זה
 הועבר במישרין על ידי נציג איראני לבנק שווייצי, על פי הוראות
 הנציגים האמריקאים, מבלי שבספים אלה יעברו דרך ישראל.
 ממשלת ישראל הופתעה מהידיעה, כאילו חלק מבספים אלה הועברו
 לקונטרס. ובר זה, אין לו כל קשר לישראל ולממשלת ישראל לא
 היתה כל ידיעה על כך. מובן שישראל לא היתה ולא תהיה מוכנה
 להיות צינור להעברת כלי נשק."

2. ההודעה לידיעתכם ולא לשימוש יזום.
לשבת מנוכל

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

פ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, רס, אמן,
אוקיאניה, מצרים, מצפא, אירא, אירב, מואר, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט,
מוחים, ארבל, מעת, הסברה
תח: פונר ממרהמ

ירצא

בלמס

חוזם: 11/10494

אל: רוש/412, כי/967, וינה/81, גנבה/122

מ-: המשרד, תא: 261186, זח: 1548, דח: מ, סג: ב

נד: 8

בלמס/מיידי

1. אמש (25.11) התקיימה התיעצות בהשתתפות רוהמ"י, מ"מ רוהמ ושהח ושהבט שבסיומה הוחלט לפרסם את ההודעה הבאה:

ישראל טייעה בהעברת נשק הגנתי וחלקי החילוף מארהב לאיראן, עלפי בקשתה של ממשלת ארהב, והתשלום בעבור ציוד זה הועבר במישרין ע"י נציג איראני לבנק שווייצרי, על פי הוראות הנציגים האמריקאים, מבלי שכספים אלה יעברו דרך ישראל. ממשלת ישראל הודתה מהידועה, כאילו חלק מכספים אלה הועברו לקונטראס. דבר זה, אין לו כל קשר לישראל ולממשלת ישראל לא היתה כל ידיעה על כך. מובן שישראל לא היתה ולא תהיה מוכנה להיות צינור להעבר כדורי.

2. ? ההודעה לידיעתכם ולא לשימוש יזום.

לשכת מנכל

תפ: שהח, רוהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, רם, אמן, אוקיאניה, מצרים, מצמא, אירא, אירב, מזאר, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מדתים, ארבל, מעת, הסברה, מזנר

רחיטות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	1-97
סווג בטחוני:	טופס מברק	8-מחור
תז"ח:	א ל : לשכ' ממנכ"ל, אמית"ק, מע"ת, מצפ"א, ממ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת	
261700	יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח, הסברה,	
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News Summary November 26, 1986

New York Headlines

The President's admission that US arms payments from Iran were diverted to the contras in Nicaragua is the major story in the news. "Contra-gate" is being called the worst scandal of the Reagan Administration and there is no reason to believe that the story will end here.

Editorials

NYT "The Facts Roar for Themselves" Poor policies and reckless aides can be replaced, trust cannot, and now the powder trail runs right to the Oval office. It's hard to know which would be more alarming, Presidential ignorance or arrogance. The whole affair, from Israeli arms shipments through Swiss bank accounts to subsidizing the contras, smacks of a pattern of lawlessness. Little serious business can be done home or abroad until the truth is explored fully and the Administration reaffirms sound judgement and respect for the law.

WSJ "A President's Trouble" Most likely, the departures of Poindexter and North will be blood in the water. Reagan should have said, yes, I sent the money to the contras in pursuit of my powers as commander-in-chief. The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf is beyond doubt. In terms of realpolitik, it's hard to identify what foreign-policy disaster has occurred. On the home front, though, Reagan is in trouble and performing badly. This is a shame considering the past 6 years.

ND "Contra to Everything" Let's hope that this bunch learned from Watergate that a cover-up may ultimately be worse than the original misdeed. What is it about Reagan that encourages such rash behavior from his staff. Or is he so out of touch with the everyday events of his administration that nobody thought it was necessary to tell him? In this administration it is not implausible to think that. Reagan has done the correct thing by calling for an investigation. But Messer, a Reagan crony, should not be the one to conduct the investigation. Reagan needs to get his house in order immediately. He should start by firing Don Regan.

NYP "Come Clean, Mr. President" The Reagan presidency is at stake. The only thing to do is tell the American people everything, hold back nothing. Use what has been cultivated, a relationship with the people built on

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trust and affection. The departures of Poindexter and North were not enough. It's hard to imagine that Don Regan did not know what was going on inside the White House. His extraordinary mismanagement of the Iran episode has made his remaining in office untenable.

DN "Meanwhile in Washington" The recent revelations threatens to paralyze the Presidency. Candor and housecleaning are obviously needed.

Columns

DN-Nelson "Reagan Pays the Price" Reagan stood before the nation as a man betrayed. Poindexter allowed the President to be persuaded to abandon his deepest beliefs, against paying ransom to terrorists. Reagan clearly didn't know last week that the US repeatedly channeled arms shipments through Israel in return for the release of US hostages. He stood before the nation for half an hour and denied the obvious--and then had to issue a correction as soon as he got off the air. He didn't know about the perhaps \$30 million funneled from Iran to the contras. No one expects the President to be familiar with all the labyrinthine intrigues of the Mideast. But we have the right to expect him to have someone at his side who does understand and who could protect him from being humiliated. Reagan has paid the price for having amateurs on the NSC.

NYT-Moe (Mondale's chief of staff during the Vice Presidency) "Taming the NSC" In its zest for covert operations, the NSC has not only circumvented the State Dept, the CIA and Congress, but may have kept the President in the dark as well. Yet the tragedy here is not just with the arms-for-hostages policy, which in itself is flawed. It also lies with the White House's misuse of the NSC, by allowing it to become operational.

NYP-Evans & Novak "Iran Now Imperiling Entire Mideast" Even if Poindexter knew about the Nicaraguan connection, he was in the dark about certain other aspects of the deal. That ignorance explains why administration insiders and congressional probers now fear Iran may have acquired enough military power to sweep the entire Middle East with its fanatical Islamic Revolution, a potential disaster for both the West and the Arabs. If the arms result in Hussein's fall, Reagan's present political problems will be dwarfed. He will face a resurgent Islam sworn to destroy Israel and obliterate every Western vestige from what it regards as holy Islamic soil.

NYT-Reston "The Truth at Last, Maybe" One thing is clear, all this could never have happened to a president in charge. The President has created a climate of stealth, covered up by slick propaganda, disreputable of the Sec. of State and distasteful of the concerns of Congress and his allies.

NYT-Stanley Reed "Hardly a Threat to Damascus" The Administration's sanctions against Syria hardly add up to a coherent or effective answer to the problems posed by Damascus. Of late, Assad's success in frustrating US and Israeli goals in Lebanon has helped shore up his once shaky position at home and increased his regional prestige at the expense of Jordan, Egypt and other moderates. Moscow has provided Syria with large scale military aid and now Syria has more tanks and active combat aircraft than Israel. Israel may be tempted to launch a pre-emptive strike while the Syrians can easily and cheaply be defeated. This Administration needs to make strong gestures of support to its Arab friends in order to cut Syria down. America also needs to make at least a show of promoting efforts to find a solution to the Palestinian problem. Odds are stacked against any significant progress but the illusion of movement would be far better than the gloom and cynicism one now encounters in Cairo or Amman.

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Washington never followed through with the Reagan Plan. Hussein and Arafat were left to carry the load by themselves. It's not surprising that Syria and Israel were easily able to block their initiatives. It would be a shame if the arms shipments to Iran caused the US to shy away from the Mideast once again. To do so would concede victory to Assad.

NYP-Anderson "How American 'Friend of the Arabs' Met His Death" The ultimate futility of trying to ransom American hostages with arms or money were demonstrated tragically last spring, a few days after the US raids on Libya. Peter Kilburn, a gentle pro-Arab librarian at American U in Beirut was murdered when his kidnappers tired of waiting for \$3 million the Administration was hoping to raise for his release. He was sold to the Libyans who wanted revenge.

Press Reports

Iran Payment Found Diverted to Contra; Reagan Security Adviser and Aide Out

NYT-p.-Weinraub-Reagan said he had not been fully in control of his Administration's Iran policy, and the White House said that as a consequence up to \$30 million intended to pay for American arms had been diverted to rebel forces in Nicaragua. At the same time, Reagan announced that two men he held responsible, left their posts. The President's disclosures seemed to deepen the sense of disarray within the Gov't. He now faces the most serious crisis of his tenure. After Reagan's announcement, Messe said the Justice Dept. was investigating how Nicaraguan rebel forces received the funds paid "to representatives of Israel" funneling the arms to Iran. Several questions are unanswered: Whose idea was it to use the money to help the contras and who authorized the Israelis to make the deposits? Which Israelis handled the transactions and the deposits to the contras' accounts, and were they officials or private individuals? Did other US officials know of the plan to aid the contras? When did POindexter first mention it to the White House? Details of the way the funds were siphoned to the contras were not clear. By all indications, the Israelis overcharged for the arms and the additional money was placed in a bank account of the contras. But it was left unclear if the plans to overcharge was made at the request of US or Israeli officials. Perhaps the clearest explanation came from Wright, the new House majority leader. He said that Messe told Congressional leaders that Israel and the Iranians had negotiated the price. The deal struck was greater than the cost to the US Gov't. (see Text of Reagan's and Messe's remarks-NYT) (NYP-Latham; DN-Drake; WSJ-Greenberger & Mayer) All papers have charts or maps showing how the secret funds moved.

Israelis Say It Sent Arms At Request of US

NYT-special-In its first official comment on the Iran affair, the Israeli Gov't announced that it had transferred arms to Iran "upon the request of the US" and did not know that some of the payments for these weapons had been channeled to the Nicaraguan rebels. After a meeting that lasted past mid-night, Shamir, Peres and Rabin issued a statement. The statement formally puts on the record the Israeli contention that it acted at the behest of the US, a line apparently aimed at refuting suggestions by Messe and other Administration officials that Israel engaged in some unauthorized arms sales to Iran in the fall of 1985. The Israeli statement did

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not deny that private Israeli individuals could have been involved. It is possible that the Swiss accounts were set up by Schwimmer and Nimeiri, two Israeli arms dealers, and that the Israeli Gov't was never aware of how the money flowed through them. There is reason to doubt this because Schwimmer, the founder of IAI, is one of Peres's best friends. Israeli officials said the Israeli leaders risk a stinging embarrassment if it turns out that they knew of the operation and did not inform Reagan, Shultz or Poindexter. Even worse, if the Israeli leadership knew of the matter and did discuss it with Washington, then to admit so publicly would contradict the Administration's statement that only North knew about the money transfers. (NYP-Dan; DN-Dan)

NYT-no biline-A former American official who routinely reviewed US intelligence reports said that the Administration made at least two attempts in 1984 to use Israel to circumvent a Congressional ban on military aid to the contras. The Israelis declined, arguing that such action, if discovered, would damage Israel's relations with Congress. Then, the Administration asked Israel to, in effect, launder American funds for the contras. Again, the Israelis declined, but did offer to sell weapons to the contras. At that time, however, the contras had no money available to make the purchases from the Israelis, the official said.

Saudi Arms Dealer Linked to Iran Purchases

NYT-Friedman-A Saudi Arabian arms dealer played a central role in financing the Iranian purchase of US weapons, Israeli and American sources said. The sources said Khashoggi, who is close with several Israeli arms dealers, was a key figure in putting together the deal. Some of the sources said they believed Khashoggi may have been acting either tactically or explicitly on behalf of the Saudis. Saudi Arabia may have been tactically prepared to underwrite the arms purchases because it feared that Iran might ultimately win the war and it wanted to have a link with Teheran as insurance. The sources could not say whether the Saudis had known that the deals were providing money for the contras. A Reagan Administration official denied that the Saudis had anything to do with the arms deal and said that the Iranians had more than enough money to pay for the arms and that the Saudis had been "very upset" at the revelations of the American arms sale to Iran. It has been striking while the leaders of Iraq, Jordan and Egypt all denounced the sale, Saudi Arabia has remained silent. "Stop worrying about the Saudis," said a source familiar with the deal. "They are in it." Throughout the years, Khashoggi has done many favors for Israel and visa-versa. It was the Saud who introduced Israeli officials to Nimeiry. He even met with a prominent Israeli Cabinet minister in Khashoggi's residence in Kenya. It was through this arrangement that the deal to allow some 18,000 Jews to flee Ethiopia through the Sudan and be airlifted to Israel. Sources also say that Peres met with Khashoggi at the Regency Hotel in NY in the fall of 1984. The Saudis no more care to see a powerful Iraq again asserting itself in the gulf than a victorious Iran.

Contra Supplies Explains Mystery

NYT-Brinkley-The disclosure that millions of dollars paid for US arms sent to Iran were channeled through Swiss bank accounts to the rebels may explain much of the mystery behind the covert program to supply the contras. The supply operations, directed by North, was said to need many millions of dollars to keep it going. As a Congressional investigator

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said, "We were never able to figure out the funding." (ND-Gutman)

Nicaraguan Denies Knowledge of Deal

NYT-special-Civilian leaders of the United Nicaraguan Opposition, said they knew nothing of secret transfers of funds to their organization arranged by North.

A Presidency Damaged-Analysis

NYT-Apple p.1-After 6 years of seemingly invulnerability, Reagan has been grievously damaged by the crisis over secret arms shipments to Iran. With unanimity rare in Washington, Democrats and Republicans alike agreed that the disclosures of the Nicaraguan connection probably hurt more than helped. Some think the damage will be irreparable. There is now an image of a President isolated, stuck with an unpopular policy and uncharacteristically defensive. The disclosures produced a sensation in Washington, unmatched, perhaps, since the days of Watergate. Envoys in Europe said US Mideast policy was "in the worst shape it has been in many years." Bush seems to have suffered considerably, although so far he has escaped direct involvement. Shultz appears to have emerged as the winner. On the other hand, Reagan loyalists will probably sooner or later, try to punish Shultz for having tried to distance himself and his department from the Iran policy once it became known. Don Regan says he knew nothing of the payments to the contras. If that is so, he must take part of the blame. (DN-Rehm; NYP-Lathem)

Administration's Account Is Widely Challenged

NYT-Engelberg-The Administration's assertions that Israel made unauthorized arms shipments to Iran and that only two officials in Gov't knew that the money was being diverted to Nicaragua were immediately challenged by knowledgeable officials, intelligence experts and members of Congress. Sources familiar with Iran arms dealings disclosed that Israel's 1985 arms shipments were flown to Iran by a company with close links to the CIA. Later that year, before the Administration acknowledged any role in the Israeli shipments--American and Israeli officials met to negotiate the price to be paid by Jerusalem for replacing missiles sent to Iran.

Iran-Arms and Nicaragua-Complex Legal Issues Raised

NYT-Taylor-The disclosure of an operation to provide Nicaraguan rebels with millions of dollars from sales of American arms through Israel to Iran, raises questions under several criminal statutes and other laws. Whether criminal charges could be brought against anyone involved in the Iran-Israel-Nicaraguan connection would depend both on other facts that are not yet clear and on interpretations of very general laws in the context of a highly unusual situation. (DN-rainie; ND-Sloyan)

Top Legislators Promise Inquiry

NYT-Roberts p.1-Congressional leaders expressed astonishment and vowed to investigate the Administration's actions. The leaders assert that several laws have probably been violated. (ND-Waldman)

0937 / 162 / 67 6/8

Reagan Tells Shultz to Run Policy on Iran From Now On

NYT-Gwertzman-Shultz was given control of US policy toward Iran by Reagan, ending the NSC's secret dealings, the State Dept. said. There is still uncertainty over Shultz's decision to stay in the Administration, given the strains with others in the gov't.

Poindexter and North Have Limited Options

NYT-special-Poindexter is eligible to retire with a pension, although military sources said he might try to return to active naval service. North will not be eligible to retire with a pension for another 18 months. He might return to the Marines but his future is clouded by an indication that he might face criminal charges.

WSJ-Walcott-No one worked harder or believed in Reagan more than North, who now stands accused of having masterminded the worst scandal of the Reagan presidency. Former colleagues say it seems inconceivable that North and his staff of two aides and two secretaries singlehandedly and without the approval of their superiors diverted more than \$10 million from Iranian arms sales to Nicaragua. Those who have worked closely with him insist that he doesn't make up his own orders. But in the case of Iran and Central America, several senior administration officials say that North deliberately left on his own because his superiors wanted to keep their hands, and those of the Presidents, clean. "He was ordered not to tell anyone what he was doing, and not to listen to anybody else," says one senior official. (DN-Parry; NYP-Lathem; DN-Jackman)

DN-Sniffen-Messe personally questioned North two days before he was fired. North was interviewed for nearly 12 hours.

DN-wire-It was Poindexter who directed the Libyan disinformation campaign and was the architect of the successful plan to hijack the Achille Lauro hijackers who were on an Egyptian airliner.

Keel Named Acting NSC Adviser

NYT-Boffery-Alton Keel is described as a bright and hard-working staff man who provides indispensable support to his superiors but has seldom taken a visible leadership role himself. Over the past 4 months he has served as dep. assistant to the President for national security affairs.

Kissinger and Wiesel Speak Out

NYP-Orin-Kissinger joined Republicans and Democrats in suggesting that the Iran arms scandal may indicate that Reagan is not in control of his administration. Kissinger was at an Israel Bond Organization dinner in NY.

NYP-Goldstein-Elie Wiesel said in remarks to an Israel Bond dinner that Washington is trying to make a scapegoat out of Israel because of its role in the covert arms sale to Iran. "They mention Israel too much and its wrong, even if Israel actually was used by the US to help out a friend. Israel owes so much to the US, that I could understand why Israel couldn't refuse to do certain things.

0937/162/67

7/8

Iraq Hits Oil Terminal; Iran Uses Its F-4's

NYT-AP-Iraqi warplanes flew their longest mission in more than 6 years of fighting, rocketing Iran's Larak Island oil terminal in the southern Persian Gulf and setting two tankers ablaze. The attack came 6 hours after reports that Iranian US made F-4 jets raided a French operated oil platform off the UAE.

Sister of Hostage Praises Reagan for Courage

NYT-Blair-The sister of Terry Anderson, long a critic of Administration policy on the hostage issue, has written a letter to Reagan in support of his Iran initiative and expressed she had a "deep sense of shame" that she had not spoken out sooner.

Fighting in Lebanon Continues

NYT-special-Hevay fighting broke out again in southern Lebanon. Amal gained complete control of Maghdusheh after it had been taken by the Palestinians. But the Palestinians say they were still holding part of the village. In Beirut fighting spread to another Palestinian district. Talks to end the confrontation have been going on in Syria for more than a week.

The Battle for Children in Israel

Village Voice-Hentoff-Ran Cohen talks about his lack of guilt for fighting in Sharon's bloody war in Lebanon, a war he strongly opposed. Coehn in a respected colonel in the reserves. He lectures on the ethics of war and says "I teach them to kill, if they ve to, but not to murder, not to run amok in the heat of battle. He also visits schools and sometimes debates Geula Cohen. He is deeply concerned by what he sees as the growth of racism in Israel. The roots of such racism is in the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza that has stripped the Palestinians there of all their political rights. He says that the children in schools have become convinced racists by what they have experienced all their lives. Even though most school children do not support Kahane, they do support his views. Hentoff went into the schools and describes student attitudes. For example, one girl stated "An Arab will stab you in the back at any opportunity."

JDL Leader Freed in Grenade Case

ND-AP-Victor Vancier, the self proclaimed leader of the JDL, arrested with a tear-gas grenade outside a hotel where a Soviet dance troupe stayed, was freed on bond. He was charged with a federal weapons violation that could bring him 10 years in jail.

Soviet Curbs Denounced

NYT-Morris Abram, who is chairman of the Ntional Conference on Soviet Jewry, denounced recently published Soviet regulations on Soviet emigration as "a new face on an old policy." He said that Gorbachev used the emigration rules as "a very successful disinformation tool," but that in reality, the situation of Soviet Jews has deteriorated since he came to power.

0937 / 162 / 67 8/8

Magazine Editorials and Articles

The Nation-11/29 "And the Junta Knows..." A military junta has deposed the State Dept., and now runs foreign policy for the Reagan Administration. They dreamed up the Iran weapons deal, supply the contras and ordered the "peacekeepers" to bomb Druse villages in 1983. For the first time, it was clear that the White House make-up department could not apply enough pancake charisma to hide the Ricard Nixon under Ronald Reagan.

The New Republic 12/8 "Dealing in Deception" Reagan traded away two established principles of US foreign policy. One was neutrality in the Gulf war, the other, the hard line against terrorists. The allies were just beginning to see the American logic. Now this hard-won victory for US diplomacy is gone. Of course, Israel too has always preached a hard line on terrorism. Yet it quite willingly served as a go-between in the arms-for-hostages swap. This was consistent with past Israeli shipments to Iran, which date back to 1983. The Israelis valued their assessment of their national security interest so highly that they were willing to damage the moral authority of their stance against state-sponsored terrorism in order to advance it. It will be a long time before the US can repair the damage it has done.

The Nation-11/29 Timmerman "Chirac's Hostage Dilemma" Chirac's efforts to get French hostages released from Lebanon have taken on all the trappings of a discussion between rug merchants, with Chirac getting the worst part of the deal. The wild vacillation of his public statements has robbed him of credibility. Since taking power last month, Chirac has met Iranian demands that were repulsed by previous French governments and has refused to back Britain, despite France's firm belief that Syria was behind the September bombings in Paris. It has been strongly suggested that the strategy of groups working for Iran and Syria, are working.

French Troop Pullout

ND-wire-About one-half of France's troops in Lebanon will be withdrawn following public controversy in Paris over attacks by pro-Iranian Shiites.

Jerusalem Dispute

ND-wire-Arab spiritual leaders in Jerusalem clashed over the need for an international peacekeeping detail to halt a wave of anti-Arab violence sparked by the killing of a Jewish student.

Cartoons

DN & ND-both cartoons depict Reagan as being confused.

Letters

NYP-6 letters supporting Reagan on the Iran arms issue.

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שמו

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דחיות

תאריך וזיח. 16.30 26 נוב' 86

מס' פנקס

אל: המשרד + ניו יורק

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מצפ"א

דע: ס/קונכ"ל ניו יורק

סגירת משרדי אש"ף בארה"ב

למברק ידיד 853 למשרד (נר 149 לווי')

1. מסתבר שהמזכיר שולץ לא השיב לאיפא"ק (שלא פנו אליו) אלא למורשה ג'ק קמפ (ראו נא מברקנו 315 מ-23.10).

רצ"ב החשובה בה שולץ מביא את הבסיס המשפטי שמאפשר את קיום המשרדים הנ"ל ומתוך הדברים האלה עולה במשתמע שאין בדעת וביכולת מחמ"ד להביא לסגירתם, לעת עתה לפחות.

2. במקביל למכתב קמפ, מנהיג הרוב בסנט שלח לנשיא מברק יחד עם עשרה סנטורים, בו הפצירו לסגור משרדי אש"ף גם כן (ראו נא שלנו 551 מ-21.10).

רצ"ב חשובת ביניים קצרה שויל בול שלח לדול, המדברת בעד עצמה.

למדן
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED

NOV 14 1986

JACK KEMP, MC
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 12, 1986

Dear Jack:

I am responding to your letter of October 16, concerning the Palestine Liberation Organization Information office in Washington and the PLO Observer Mission in the UN in New York.

Like all Americans, I was outraged by the recent bombing near the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, which claimed the life of an Israeli soldier. I join you in condemning this reprehensible and cowardly attack.

I share your deep concern about the claims of responsibility by elements of the PLO for this attack. However, the continued existence of the PLO Information Office in Washington neither reflects nor requires the approval of the United States Government. The PLO Information office is registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, with the Department of Justice and is subject to the provisions of that legislation. The Department of Justice has informed us that so long as that office regularly files reports with the Department of Justice on its activities as an agent of a foreign organization, complies with all other relevant U.S. laws, and is staffed by Americans or legal resident aliens, it is entitled to operate under the protection provided by the First Amendment of the Constitution.

The PLO Observer Mission in New York was established as a consequence of General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX) of November 22, 1974, which invited the PLO to participate as an observer in the sessions and work at the General Assembly. The PLO Observer Mission represents the PLO in the U.N.; it is in no sense accredited to the U.S. The U.S. has made clear that PLO Observer Mission personnel are present in the United States solely in their capacity as "invitees" of the United Nations within the meaning of the Headquarters Agreement. While we therefore are under an obligation to permit PLO Observer Mission personnel to enter and remain in the United States to


The Honorable
Jack Kemp,
House of Representatives.

[Handwritten signature]

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carry out their official functions at UN headquarters, we retain the right to deny entry to, or expel, any individual PLO representative directly implicated in terrorist acts. It is moreover, the policy of the U.S. to restrict the travel of members of the PLO Observer Mission to within a 25-mile radius of Columbus Circle. Special permission must be received to travel beyond this area. Such permission is granted only for humanitarian purposes.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 27, 1986

cc: SB, JW, AL
File
ORIGINAL TO
SENATOR

Dear Senator Dole:

The President has asked me to thank you for your October 17 telegram, cosigned by ten of your colleagues, urging that steps be taken to close the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington, D.C.

As you know, President Reagan shares your abhorrence of international terrorism and condemns it in all its forms. He appreciates your strong support in this regard, and has asked me to share your serious statement of concern with his foreign policy advisers. Your recommendation will be afforded prompt and careful attention, and you will be receiving a further response in the near future.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



William L. Ball, III
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Bob Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510



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סניט
דפוס.....מחור.....דפים
סווג בסחוני.....סודי
דחיסות.....
תאריך וזי"ח...16.30...26 נוב'
מס' מבר.....

מצפ"א

דע: מקשיח

פרשת איראן

רצ"ב, לידיעתכם, סיכום השמיעות הסגורות שנערכו ב-21 דנא על ידי הועדה המיוחדת לענייני מודיעין בסנט. סיכום זה מתבסס על שיחות עם עוזרים למשתתפים וכן עם אנשי התקשורת שראיינו את המשתתפים בתום השמיעות.

2. כמו כן רצ"ב מכתב שסגן יו"ר הועדה שלח לנשיא בעקבות השמיעות הנ"ל.

3. המסמכים האלה מדברים בעד עצמם.

למדן

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TO: STAFF
FROM: DAF
DATE: 11/21/86

RE: Senate Select Intelligence Committee CLOSED Hearing on U.S. secret arms sales to Iran.

SENATORS PRESENT: Chairman Durenberger (R-MN), Vice-chairman Leahy (D-VT), Minority Leader Byrd (D-WV), Nunn (D-GA), Warner (R-VA), Specter (R-PA), Bentsen (D-TX), Moynihan (D-NY), Eagleton (D-MO), Boren (D-OK), Murkowski (R-Alaska)

WITNESS: CIA Director William Casey

PRESS: Overwhelming coverage -- over 20 cameras, 50 photographers, 100 reporters representing all major networks, newspapers, etc.

ATMOSPHERE: Press pool waited with anticipation to aggressively question and photograph Senators as they came out of the closed hearing.

SUMMARY

After hearing from CIA Director William Casey today, both Republicans and Democrats continue to criticize the President for failing to notify Congress, as prescribed by law, in "a timely fashion" of the U.S. secret arms deal with Iran. Senate Select Intelligence Committee Chairman Dave Durenberger (R-MN) and Vice-chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) agreed this hearing is only the "beginning of a process of what the facts are" and that this is a "national foreign policy disaster." Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd (D-WV), soon to become Majority Leader in January, promised "fast hearings" on this matter where "the story will be told."

Sen. Durenberger confirmed that the committee discussed the participation of third parties in the arms transfers to Iran. However, when questioned twice by reporters whether countries other than Israel were involved, Durenberger refused to discuss the matter. No direct questions on Israel's involvement were asked.

Highlights of Statements by Senators

It appears that while Senators are grateful that the President has finally authorized his top key advisors and Cabinet members to thoroughly brief Congress on the Iran matter, a major problem in the implementation and formulation of U.S. foreign policy exists and must be analyzed and corrected immediately. Sen. Byrd (D-WV) suggested that Secretary of State George Shultz be appointed to chair a committee to study this matter. Moreover, the question of whether the President broke the law and whether CIA Director William Casey broke his agreement with Congress to notify them of all covert activity remains unanswered. In addition, Senators expressed the difficulty in obtaining all the facts on the matter, since no one person appears to have all the answers to their questions.

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The following are abstracts of statements to the press by Senators in the order they emerged from the closed hearing:

Sen. Bentsen (D-TX) : "Nothing I heard in there changed my mind...More needs to be done." Bentsen also said that it is one thing "to talk to opposition to Khomeni but in no way is it okay to give Iran arms." He said there was "no timely fashion" notification of Congress and suggested that CIA Director Casey had broken the law by not informing Congress.

Sens. Eagleton (D-MO) and Boren (D-OK) then left the hearing without making any statements.

Sen. Specter (R-PA) : Specter at first hesitated in facing the press but finally went to the microphones only to dodge questions by repeatedly stating, "There's nothing I can say." He did mention that there was a misuse in not informing the Senate Intelligence Committee and that there is "a lot going on that is influencing U.S. actions in Iran." "Great questions have to be answered." Specter concluded by observing that "I've never seen these many cameras and microphones in my six years on this committee."

Sen. Murkowski (R-Alaska) : Murkowski left almost totally unnoticed. However, some reporters caught him down the hallway where he remarked, "I think the hostages were among the paramount reasons for the President's selling arms to Iran." He confirmed that the committee was "debating the timeliness of the law" [i.e. notifying Congress of the covert arms sale]. When asked if he was "angry" in there, Murkowski responded, "No."

CIA Director Casey then left with no comment.

Sen. Byrd (D-WV) : "The whole genesis and carrying out of the operation was very clumsy and amateurish....The elected representatives and the people were cavalierly treated by an order that the CIA not report to Congress according to law....The President needs to say its a mistake because if he doesn't, he will know it through hearings and there will be fast hearings and the story will be told." Byrd then suggested that Secretary of State George Shultz be put in charge of a study on "How U.S. Foreign Policy is Conducted". Byrd would not comment at this time on whether Casey broke the law by not informing Congress in a "timely fashion."

Sen. Moynihan (D-NY) : Moynihan appeared with Sen. Byrd and was the most colorful spokesman, stating, "I can't believe what I heard and I don't." When asked why the President would listen to some of his advisors and not to Congress, Moynihan remarked, "The President doesn't appoint members of Congress." When questioned on whether it was necessary to inform Congress of the secret arms sale to Iran, Moynihan responded, "If the President approved [the plan] then it's deemed significant [to notify Congress]." Moynihan stated that Casey was under instructions by the President not to inform Congress. Moynihan also mentioned that the committee has a copy of the President's January 17 Executive Order which approved the arms deal. Moynihan hinted that the general public understanding of the content of the letter was accurate.

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Sen. Nunn (D-GA) : The hearing today "doesn't change my mind." The plan was still "ill-conceived and ineptly implemented."

The final remarks were made jointly by Chairman Durenberger and Vice-chairman Leahy. They mentioned that they met with NSC Chairman Poindexter this morning and that more hearings are planned. The attached letter was sent to the President by the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Sen. Durenberger (R-MN) : "This is the beginning of a process of what the facts are....We must begin anew our policy on the Middle East. This [Iran arms deal] affects U.S. intelligence operations, national policy, foreign policy, and our counter-terrorism efforts....Poindexter is not the issue; it's the President." When asked were other countries besides Israel involved, Durenberger wouldn't discuss the matter. When asked if the CIA broke the law, Durenberger stated that he needed to know all the facts first but that it was "intended not to inform Congress and the people." Durenberger seemed amazed that the Reagan Administration would trust the Iranians more than the U.S. Congress to keep this operation quiet. Durenberger expressed the "feeling that Congress wouldn't have been informed until it [secret arms deal] went public." Durenberger now believes Reagan officials involved are being "totally honest" but that "nobody has all the facts." Durenberger noted that "the success of Congressional oversight is when such [secret] operations are kept out of the press."

- Sen. Leahy (D-VT) : "We must 'repair the damage and go on....' Leahy was upset over what was done and how Congress was not informed. When asked if some Reagan officials should resign, Leahy said there shouldn't be resignations but rather a correction of the problems. "This is a national and foreign policy disaster, not a publicity disaster." When asked if there was "timely" notification of Congress, Leahy responded, "No, not 10 months after [the operations began]." Leahy noted that the President approved the covert arms deal plan on January 17, 1986 but planning probably started 18 months ago. Leahy also stated in response to questions about the effect of the publicity of the arms sale on the fate of the hostages that it makes "no darn difference to the hostages' release." He went on to say that "the tragedy is selling arms to Iran and giving terrorists the message that all you have to do to get arms from the United States is to take Americans hostage." In reference to the benefits to Congressional oversight of covert U.S. actions, Leahy echoed Durenberger's comments, "You don't hear about the successes, but there are notable ones....The President benefits from the checks and balances."

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DAVE BURENBERGER, MINNESOTA, CHAIRMAN
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT, VICE CHAIRMAN
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LLOYD BENTSEN, TEXAS
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DAVID L. BOREN, OKLAHOMA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO

BERNARD F. MENACHIN, STAFF DIRECTOR
ERIC D. NEWSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

November 21, 1986

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Select Committee on Intelligence has now been briefed by the Director of Central Intelligence on the CIA's role in the covert contacts and arms transactions with Iran. We have also, on behalf of the Committee, met with your National Security Advisor to discuss this matter, particularly the role of the NSC staff and other Presidential advisors.

The Committee is most appreciative of your direction to Bill Casey and John Poindexter to fully brief us on the details of these activities. While many questions regarding the facts in the case have been answered, both Mr. Casey and Mr. Poindexter are themselves still engaged in piecing together the full record of this operation.

It is not yet clear how the arms transactions in 1985 came about, what they contained, and how these transactions -- and especially the U.S. role in shipment of arms -- fit within applicable law and Executive Orders. It is also unclear how calculations of risk were made and how they affected decisions on such matters as whether to inform this Committee of these operations and whether to undertake specific offers, transactions or meetings with Iranian officials.

The Committee has been told that a major concern was the fear that publicity could lead to the deaths of U.S. hostages in Lebanon. We do not understand how that concern would permit the sending of a well-known former U.S. official to meet with a variety of Iranian officials in Tehran. This Committee cannot accept, moreover, a logic in which such a high-risk meeting is acceptable, while the comparatively minor risks inherent in informing the Committee or the smaller group of eight Senate and House leaders are used as a justification for keeping Congress unaware of such significant intelligence activities pursuant to a Presidential Finding.


The President
November 21, 1986
Page Two


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Mr. President, the Committee is deeply disturbed by the absence of proper notice of this highly significant covert program and the long delay in providing any notification at all. Excessive compartmentation of this program may have led to mistakes in its formulation and implementation. In particular, failure to notify Congress, even on the limited basis provided in the law, removed a valuable opportunity for consultation and for the advice every President needs, and could ultimately undo much of the progress that has been achieved in recent years in limiting discussion of such matters on Capitol Hill.

Respectfully,


Dave Durenberger
Chairman


Patrick Leahy
Vice Chairman

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סגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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תאריך וזי"ח 16.30.26 נוב' 86

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אל: המשרד

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מצפ"א

בית הנבחרים : איראן
לשלנו 501

לעיונכם, רצ"ב ההתבטאות הכתובה שווייטמד הקריא לחברי ועדת החוץ בתחילת השמיעות הפתוחות, שדווח עליהם במברקנו הנ"ל.

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STATEMENT
BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

November 24, 1986

Mister Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I have been asked to discuss with you our policy toward Iran in light of the recent events. I look forward to sharing with you our assessment of our policy toward the region, our goals in the Iran-Iraq war, the reactions of our friends to the revelations in the media, and our future objectives.

It is important to point out that the extreme sensitivity of the undertaking prompted implementation be held to the smallest group possible. Consequently, the State Department had no operational role. We in the Department still do not have a detailed record of what happened, and I am therefore not able to address specific questions of what may have occurred.

As you are aware, our government has had contact with the Iranian government over the last eighteen months. The goals of such contact have been:

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- the resumption of a stable relationship with Iran;
- an honorable end to the Iran-Iraq war and greater stability in the Gulf region;
- the countering of Soviet attempts to influence developments in Iran and the Gulf;
- the elimination of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism and subversion;
- and the safe return of all of our -- and others' -- hostages.

We have also had several other avenues of communication with Iranian officials. These include the Iran-US Claims Tribunal at The Hague; Federal Reserve and Treasury officials and Iranian bankers; communications through third parties; and occasional exchanges in international fora.

About eighteen months ago, the President authorized a more directed dialogue with Iranian officials. It was not an easy decision to begin and pursue such a dialogue. Serious obstacles remain:

- Iran's determination to use its war with Iraq as a means of overthrowing the Iraqi government and establishing a radical fundamentalist government in its place;



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--Iran's continuing support for terrorism;

--Iran's continued financial, logistical, and material support for radical Shias living in the Gulf, Lebanon, and elsewhere; and

--Iran's association with hostage takings in Lebanon, including the recent abduction of three American hostages there.

The Iranians understand our position. There is no need for further signals of the seriousness of our intentions through arms transfers. The President publicly stated on November 17 that we will not be shipping any further arms to Iran. Our arms embargo is in effect. Operation Staunch remains in effect.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND ARMS TRANSFERS

Our policy on the Iran-Iraq war remains unchanged. We continue to be deeply concerned about the terrible loss and disruption which this war has brought to the people of both Iran and Iraq, and we remain concerned at the possibility that miscalculation or misunderstanding might lead to a widening of the war. Since the beginning of the conflict in September

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1980, we have worked for the earliest possible end to the war - one which preserves both the independence and territorial integrity of both states. To that end, the U.S. has followed several paths. These include:

--A policy to deny Munitions List items to both Iran and Iraq.

--Pursuit of Operation Staunch -- our attempt to discourage arms supply from others to Iran -- this had been relatively effective until word of our Iran shipments became public. We believe we played an important role in reducing the global volume of arms sent to Iran. We will now have to redouble our efforts to restore the credibility of this policy, which remains the best means to bring the Iranians to accept a mediated or negotiated settlement.

--Support for diplomatic efforts to encourage Iran to join Iraq in working toward a peaceful end to the war. These efforts include active U.S. encouragement of the U.N. Secretary General, the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement and various other efforts -- by Sweden, Japan and Algeria among others -- to draw Iran into talks.

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TERRORISM

Secretary Shultz has recently reconfirmed the fundamental premises of our counterterrorism policy:

--opposition to all acts of terrorism, not just those against Americans;

--refusal of terrorist demands;

--willingness to use all available means to defend ourselves against terrorists; and

--seeking the cooperation of our friends and allies in combatting terrorism and isolating those nations which sponsor or shelter terrorists.

In particular, we believe that those nations which sponsor or support terrorism must remain outside the family of civilized nations until they cease their support of terrorists. We seek the cooperation of all civilized nations in our efforts. We strongly believe that our firm policy is

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the best guarantee of protecting American citizens and interests world-wide.

Let me say a special word about our remaining hostages in Lebanon. We will continue to seek the safe release of all American hostages. We will talk to anyone, any group or any government about them and their safe return. In doing so, however, we will not undermine the basic tenets of our policy.

IRAQ

Our bilateral relations with Iraq have improved markedly over the past few years, as Iraq has increasingly modified its traditional hardline regional policies and has established closer diplomatic working relationships with moderate Arab states with whom we have long-standing ties. Iraq has made clear its rejection of terrorism as an instrument of state policy by expelling the notorious Abu Nidal. Unlike Iran, Iraq seeks an early negotiated end to the war. We want to keep relations with Iraq on an even keel, even though the news of the limited arms shipments to Iran have been very unwelcome in Baghdad. After the war ends, we will continue to have a stake

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and equity in Iraq's pursuit of its modified regional policies. Trade, commerce, and investment in Iraq's ambitious post-war development plans will be of great interest to us. Iraq's distancing itself from support for international terrorism has been substantial -- the trend is clearly in the direction we encourage.

THE GULF STATES


The non-belligerent Gulf Arab states, while they understand our reasons for establishing contacts with Iran, strongly disapprove of the transfer of arms. Our ties with these states are close, and we want to do whatever we can to assure that there will be no lasting damage to our mutually beneficial security relationships. Nothing has changed to affect our policy of support for the security and territorial integrity of these good friends. The GCC states continue to believe that their security and stability are in American interests and understand our determination to protect those interests.

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566 $\frac{8}{9}$ CONCLUSION

To conclude, let me say that the U.S. recognizes the importance of Iran in the region and the Islamic world. The emergence of leaders willing to change Iran's unacceptable international behavior and seek a normal relationship with the international community cannot be ignored by the U.S. The President has made clear the importance the U.S. attaches to a stable relationship with Iran and the benefits which can accrue to the region and to the West should such a situation evolve. We will persevere in efforts to pursue a dialogue to reach the goals I have noted. But we will do so only in the context of our strong and firm commitment to the security of the Gulf states, our desire to see an end to the war, our relationship with Iraq, and our promise to combat terrorism.



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המשרד

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מל : - מצפ"א

קונגרס : פרשת איראן - הערכה ראשונית

1. הודעת הנשיא ומסיבת העיתונאים של התובע הכללי אתמול הסעירו את הרוחות (המחוממות ממילא) בגבעה. זרם בלתי פוסק של סנטורים ומורשים מתראיין בכלי התקשורת וכפי שמדווח על ידי הדובר הם מתבטאים במושגים של זעזוע, חוסר הבנה ודאגה בהיקף ובאינטנסיביות משתנה, על פי רוב לפי קווים מפלגתיים.

2. באופן כללי נראה ש"התורכים הצעירים" בקרב הדמוקרטים רואים בפרשה שוט כדי להכות בממשל בו, אך דמוקרטים בכירים יותר מנסים להתעלות מעל למישור המפלגתי ולפעול מתוך גישה דו-מפלגתית ולאומית. מנהיג הרוב המיועד בסנט, הסנטור בירד, הוביל בלחצים - המוצלחים-להביא למינויה של וועדת חקירה עצמאית (במקום לוועדה פנימית מטעם משרד המשפטים כהצעתו המקורית של מיס). סנטורים אחרים כמו סאם נאן (היו"ר המיועד של וועדת השירותים המזויינים) ולויד בנטסן (היו"ר הבא של וועדת הכספים) תיוודעים שיצטרכו לעבוד עם הממשל בנושאים יקרים להם (ל בנטסן, דמוקרט שמרני מטקסס, מעוניין בהמשך הסיוע לקונטרס) מכלכלים את צעדיהם כזהירות, אם כי לא חוסכים בביקורתם. לעומת זאת, במשך השבועיים האחרונים שרה בקרב תרפובליקאים הרגשה של מבוכה ואי-נחת, נדמה שאתמול והיום נתעודדו קמעה לאור גילוי הלב של ריגן ומיס, פיטורי פוינדקסטר ונורת', ומינוי וועדת חקירה. עם זאת, נשאר משקע קשה שהגיע לביטוי בדברי הסנטור דורנברגר (יו"ר וועדת המודיעין) שאמר לתקשורת שלדעתו יעברו ימים רבים עד שהקונגרס יסכים לתת סיוע בוטף לקונטרס ומן הסתם לוט' - קולנל נורת' המית את התכנית האהובה עליו.

3. על יסוד שיחות לא מעטות אתמול והיום (עם הסנטורים אינוויה, בינגמאן, איגלטון ועם עוזרים במשרדי הסנטורים ובוועדות) מתקבל הרושם - נכון להיום - שבראש עניינם ודאגתם ²² שאלות הקשורות למדיניות ארה"ב בנושא הטרור, לניהול מדיניות החוץ בכלל, שאלות משפטיות ומעמד של הנשיא והנשיאות, בעוד חלקה של ישראל בפרשה אינו מעסיק re/lla יתר על המידה ג'רי כריסטיאנסון. מי שעו³ להיות מנהל צוות העוזרים לוועדת החוץ בסנט, אמר לי היום שלא קיבל שאלה אחת לגבי ישראל ואף לא שמע מלה אחת של ביקורת על ישראל מאף סנטור. לעתונות הרצ"ב מטעם הסנטור ג'ון, שאין בה התייחסות לישראל, אפיינית למדי - אם כי יש לציין גם שאנשי התקשורת אינם מרפים מהיבט זה של הנושא - וגלן שנשאל על מעורבות ישראל בפרשה, השיב שמערכת היחסים מטבוכה שעונת בדיקה.

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4. "האספקט הישראלי" שכן מושך עניין מינו הסתירות בין דברי מים על חלקנו בהעברת הכספים לשוויץ עבור הקונטראס לבין הנאמר בהודעה שלנו. עניין זה בוודאי יהיה נושא לשאלות ב-HEARINGS למיניהם שיחקיימו בימים ובשבועות הקרובים.
5. הערכה זו (שכמובן יכולה להשתנות בן-לילה אם יהיו חגליות נוספות שמסבכות אותנו בפרשה) מקבלת תימוכין משיחרת וגישושי ידידינו באיפא"ק. מעניין לאיין שאף משרד בגבעה לא סבר אלינו מיוזמתו וביקש הבהרות.

יוליאן פ.ל.ס
למדו

Senator John Glenn

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: NOVEMBER 25, 1986
CONTACT: DALE BUTLAND 202/ 224-7784

News Release

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN ON THE SECRET TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO THE CONTRAS IN NICARAGUA

Not only has the President failed to put the arms deal with Iran behind him -- now he's got illegal funding for the Contras looming in front of him.

Once again today, President Reagan specifically refused to admit that his arms deal with Iran was a mistake. But everyone else in Washington knows that negotiating with terrorists and trading arms for hostages is a mistake -- and so is the deception that accompanied it. We'll run out of arms before they run out of hostages.

But as bad as the Iran deal was, it now looks like the least of the President's problems. Because with today's extraordinary revelations, a very disturbing picture emerges. It is a picture of U.S. foreign policy in complete and total disarray. It is a picture of a President who is clearly not in charge, either of his Administration's foreign policy or even of his own staff. And it is a picture of a National Security Council that has become nothing less than a rogue elephant trampling over the laws of this nation on its rampage through the jungles of Nicaragua.

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And perhaps that is what is most disturbing of all. Because after what Attorney General Meese told us today, it now appears that the administration has flatly broken the law of this land by sending money to the contras in direct violation of the Boland Amendment.

Now frankly, I find it difficult to believe that a single man -- Lt. Col. Oliver North -- was able to both formulate and carry out this incredible plan entirely on his own without ~~anyone else~~ in the Administration knowing about it except -- belatedly -- Admiral Poindexter. But either way, it is a sad commentary on the President of the United States. If he knew about it, then he has wilfully broken the law. If he didn't know about it, then he is failing to do his job. After all, we expect the President to know about the foreign policy activities being run directly out of the White House.

In any event, the need for a Congressional investigation of this whole situation is clear and compelling. And as Chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs ^{Committee}, in the new Congress, I'm looking into conducting hearings on the role of the NSC in the conduct of U. S. foreign policy.

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אלו המשרד, בטחון

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אל: מנכ"ל מדינה, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

להלן ראיונות עם שר המשפטים מיז ל
(ABC) Good Morning America ול
(NBC) Today Show תבוקר. (26.11).

עיונות

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ABC GOOD MORNING AMERICA
DAVID HARTMAN AND STEVE BELL
INTERVIEWING
ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWIN MEESE

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1986

MR. HARTMAN: There are many unanswered questions about the US-Iranian arms deal and about the transfer--we're told of millions of dollars from the deal to the Contras in Nicaragua. Edwin Meese, the Attorney General, is the man President Reagan has asked to find out the answers, and he is with Steve Bell this morning in Washington. Good morning, Mr. General (sic).

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Good morning.

MR. HARTMAN: Across the world, and particularly here at home, of course, the headlines are just kind of blazing out here: this is the worst foreign policy debacle and credibility gap the administration's ever had. How else can it be described?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: I think it can be described as a difficult situation and certainly a serious one, but it can also be described as a situation where a president found something wrong, stepped in immediately, took command, made sure all the facts were brought out immediately to the American public and to Congress and is now taking the steps, first of all to get to the bottom of it by ordering an investigation; secondly, bringing in a commission to change whatever procedures need to be changed and make sure it doesn't happen again; and thirdly, going on with the pursuit of his strategic objectives in foreign policy. So, I think any administration, and each administration has had problems like this, it's a question of how a president reacts. And I think President Reagan shows once again that he instinctively has taken command and is ahead of the situation.

MR. HARTMAN: Now Senator Pressler, who was a big supporter of President Reagan, this morning told us on our program that rather than having come out and said what he had to say quickly enough and answering the questions, that the appearances by the President have suggested more questions than they've answered and that he thinks that he needs to come out, lay it all out--a quick press conference--put everything on the table, get rid of Mr. Reagan, put a new team in there right away, or this thing is going to drag out too long with your commission idea.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I don't think it's going to drag out at all. As a matter of fact, when you figure that the President first heard about this situation on Monday about what we had found, and on Tuesday morning he laid it out before the American people and leaders of Congress, and I think he's acted decisively and quickly. At the same time, he's not going to go around doing a lot of rash things, making people walk the plank who had no involvement in something, simply to try to show some artificial cleaning of house or anything like that. This President, throughout his entire six years, almost six years now, has shown that he does know what to do and what to do at the right time.

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FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

3/9

ABC/MEESE-11/26/86

-2-

MR. BELL: Mr. Attorney General, the biggest credibility problem you've got is that I haven't talked to anyone in this town who believe that two career military men--and there's no reason to believe they aren't patriots in every sense of the word--people trained to take orders from the top would go off on their own and do something like without having the feeling that the people above them were giving them a green light.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, Steve, I can only say this--we've looked into that aspect of it, the people at the top of the White House, for example the President, the Vice President, the other cabinet members,--

MR. HARTMAN: Chief of Staff?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: --Chief of Staff Don Regan, and it's pretty clear to us that they were not involved.

MR. HARTMAN: Will people like Regan be asked to testify under oath?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, we will be getting to the bottom of this by talking to everyone that may have had any involvement whatsoever, and that's what I mean by getting to the bottom and getting out all the facts. Already we've had terrific cooperation by all the people that have been involved.

MR. BELL: What about the idea of a special prosecutor that would be independent of the White House, independent of the Congress?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, that's what they have. They have the Justice Department, which is independent of both. And I think that we've demonstrated already that we're going to get the facts and get them out.

MR. BELL: You know what I'm talking about--an official special prosecutor, the post-Watergate phenomenon.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I think that there's a difference. In Watergate you had at least the allegations that people were trying to conceal things. In this situation, both the Justice Department and the President have done just the opposite of this. There's been no attempt to conceal anything. As a matter of fact, yesterday, in presenting the facts as we knew them, we departed from our usual precedent of waiting until the end of an investigation simply to get it out and make clear there will be no concealment and that we're going to get all the facts out and they will be ultimately presented to Congress and the American people.

MR. HARTMAN: Realistically, how long do you think this might take, Mr. General?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: I don't know. It's just, obviously we're just getting started. But we will move as quickly as possible because we want to get to the bottom of it as rapidly as we can.

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FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA62
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4/9

ABC/MEESE-11/26/86

-3-

MR. BELL: One question. The Contra officials are denying that they ever got any funds at the same timeframe or anything. Is it possible that these funds ended up in the hands of the people that Hasenfus and other so-called "soldiers of fortune" were working for?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, Steve, I'm not going to speculate. Our investigation will bring out whatever did happen, and I think I will have to wait until then to make those conclusions as to what exactly did occur.

MR. HARTMAN: Mr. Meese, we want to break for a commercial. Can you stay a couple more minutes with us?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Okay. Sure.

MR. HARTMAN: Thank you. Let's break for a commercial. We'll be back with the Attorney General right after this.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

MR. HARTMAN: And we have more with Attorney General Edwin Meese. Steve, go ahead.

MR. BELL: Mr. Attorney General, your investigation has been going on since yesterday's news conference. Do you know of any other people who might have been involved beyond Admiral Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel North?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Steve, it appears that there were some others involved, and that's what we're looking into now. But I don't have any definitive information at the present time other than there are other leads that we are pursuing, and there will be a considerable number of people who will be talked to in the course of this investigation.

MR. BELL: But are we talking about people who are a part of the United States government?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: At this stage I couldn't tell you for sure or say that there are not such people. There are some consultants involved and other people who have a tangential relationship to the United States government that we'll be talking to.

MR. BELL: Are people like this being put under oath as you talk to them?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, this remains to be seen in the course of the investigation. Part of it will be whether there is any indication of criminality, and of course, then it would be presumably, a grand jury would perhaps be involved.

MR. HARTMAN: Mr. Meese, you've spent a lot of time working over there--you're very close to the President, you've worked with him for many, many years, long before you came to Washington. You know how

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FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

534 NI 550

5/9

ABC/MEESE-11/26/86

-4-

the White House works, you know all those people. He concerned are you that if this is, and you complete the investigation of what we calling a cowboy operation or whatever, that that in itself suggests gross incompetency on the part of how the NSC and that part of the White House operation has been run. How much does that concern you personally?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, that particular thing doesn't concern me in terms of gross neglect or anything like that. There are regular processes for reviewing the work of the National Security Council staff. There are regular chain of command procedures. The problem is what happens when something is violated. And I think we have to recognize here that it was the President on Friday that set in motion the questions, or the questioning, that led to the discovery of what happened.

MR. HARTMAN: What does concern you? I mean, I'm looking at you as somebody who is so close to this man and to the White House and the country at the highest levels for so long--what concerns you? When you got up this morning, what's your greatest concern?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, the greatest concern is that people did take actions for whatever motives, probably well motivated in their own mind, that in the long run have hurt the President and have hurt his policies. And what is of most concern to me right now is to take the actions to remedy that situation, to get the situation corrected as the President has directed, and to get back pursuing the very excellent policies. He's had tremendous success in foreign policy in six years. We have tremendous opportunities in almost every section of the world to work for peace, to work for stable situations, to work against exploitation of the continuing situations around the world by our potential adversaries. The President needs to get on with that. That's why we want to get this investigation over with, get the necessary procedural changes made in the NSC staff, and get on with the work of leading this country, and being, in effect, the leader of the free world.

MR. HARTMAN: President Truman had that sign on his desk, "The Buck Stops Here." How much blame, if any, for any of this, down the road do you think it would be correct for the President to have to take? How much heat?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: I think that's a conclusion that others will have to make. I think the important thing is--shouldn't the President get considerable appreciation by the people of the United States that he took the steps to find this out, and that as soon as it was found out, he immediately shared the information with the Congress and the American people. I think if you look at that in contrast with some of the things we've seen over the years, here's a president, even though it might hurt him temporarily, is not going to conceal anything. He's been completely honest with the American people and he's going to continue to be.

MR. HARTMAN: Mr. Attorney General, thank you.

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NBC TODAY SHOW
INTERVIEW WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWIN MEESE

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1986

BRYANT GUMBEL: On Close-Up this morning, more on the fallout from US arms sales to Iran. At the center of the storm: Attorney General Edwin Meese, who joins us now from our Washington newsroom. Mr. Attorney General, good morning and welcome.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Good morning.

MR. GUMBEL: We have so far called this a foreign policy flap, a fiasco, a controversy. May I yet call it a scandal?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I think that it would be a scandal if we weren't proceeding to investigate and get to the bottom of things. I think that it's important to recognize that this President wants to be sure that all the facts come out and that it doesn't become a scandal.

MR. GUMBEL: In your view, how damaged is this President right now?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I don't think the President personally is damaged, because he has done the right thing and brought the facts to the attention of Congress and the American people. There's no question that what was done is a serious problem in regard to some of our foreign policy goals, but I think this can be overcome by the prompt and decisive action that the President is taking.

MR. GUMBEL: At best, does this not show that a man who is supposed to be in charge was not in full control of his own people?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Oh, I don't think it shows that at all. Quite the contrary, no one can be sure of what each person in a large government like this is doing. I think the measure of whether he's in control is demonstrated by the fact that he did take the steps to find out what was going on, and then as soon as he found out the facts, took decisive and quick action to remedy the situation and to make sure that it doesn't happen in the future.

MR. GUMBEL: Does it not speak poorly of a Chief Executive's apparatus, that one man could run such a rogue operation?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, remember, this -- we don't know all of the details yet. We don't know all of the reasons how this was able to exist. But the number of transactions involved at this point seem to be relatively few.

MR. GUMBEL: As you are hearing this morning, there are an awful lot of observers that are noting that it defies credibility that one man could have involved himself with four countries and millions of dollars and acted alone in all this. How does that sit with your sense of logic and reason and the way Washington works?

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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63

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7/9

NBC TODAY/MEESE-11/26/86

-2-

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: I think it's entirely possible that there were other people involved. As a matter of fact, our investigation will reveal just who was involved. But as far as anyone in the top levels of government, let's say at the department head level or top people in the White House, such as the Chief of Staff, certainly the President or Vice President or any Cabinet members being involved, we've pretty clearly established at this point that that has not happened. But we will be pursuing this, and whoever is involved, I'm convinced that our investigation will show clearly what the facts are.

MR. GUMBEL: Doesn't, then, the question become why weren't the proper questions asked?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, the proper questions were asked, and that's why it was the administration itself --

MR. GUMBEL: I'm talking about those people who say they didn't know.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, it was a matter of something being concealed, but it was the fact that questions were asked, that an inquiry was made last week, that brought this to light. Remember, it's the President himself who, by his effective action, brought this matter to public attention. He was the one who ferreted it out. If it had not been for the President's decisive action, this might have been concealed for many months.

MR. GUMBEL: You sat across from Col. North and talked with him for several hours. In your view, sir, did he serve his country well and his President poorly, or do both a disservice?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, my job will be to find the facts, not to draw conclusions about what people did or didn't do, or what their motives were. I think what we want to do is come out with the facts first, and then I think those kinds of conclusions will speak for themselves.

MR. GUMBEL: Because this all for the moment fits together so conveniently, aren't you going to have a real problem dispelling the notion that Lt. Col. North, and perhaps also Admiral Poindexter, are being made scapegoats in all of this for an administration, a President, in trouble?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, there will not be scapegoats for this administration. People who have done things will be accurately portrayed, and if necessary, actually prosecuted for what they have done, if there's anything criminal. People who have not done anything wrong, the facts on that will come out, too. There's not going to be any scapegoats. There's not going to be any concealment. We're going to get the facts, and then we're going to present those facts to the Congress and to the people just as we have throughout this already relatively new inquiry.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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NBC TODAY/MEESE-11/26/86

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MR. GUMBEL: Won't you allow that you provide, shall we say, a convenient cover for those who may choose not to answer questions as this proceeds?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, this depends on what happens. That's one of the facts that -- one of the situations that we'll handle in the course of the investigation. But I can assure you that we will get to the bottom of all the facts and find out exactly what did happen.

MR. GUMBEL: There are so many unanswered questions still. Should we expect a regular and constant outpouring of information? Or will this thing all be quieted over right now, and we'll only know the rest when all the loose ends are tied down?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, right now our job is to go ahead with the investigation. We have made the facts as we know them clear to the public. We will go ahead with the investigation, and when that investigation is complete or we've reached a milestone, when we have a certain amount of information, then that will be shared with the Congress and the public also.

MR. GUMBEL: Let me talk about your involvement, if I might, Mr. Attorney General. You said at your briefing yesterday that this is a time when all who would remain a part of this administration should stand shoulder to shoulder with the President and be loyal. Do you not see a conflict in expressing that kind of loyalty while claiming the role of an impartial investigator?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Not at all, because my greatest loyalty to the President and to the people is to go ahead and find the facts and come out honestly with all the information we can. That's what I think best served the President over the weekend in bringing those facts to light and getting them to the President. This President does not want any concealment, any dissembling (?), or anything other than getting the truth out. And in that regard I think that there's no question I can be loyal to him and also loyal to the country while doing my job.

MR. GUMBEL: How would you view calls for a special investigator, for someone outside this administration? Would you resent them?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I think it depends. If we come to a point where the laws pertaining to an independent counsel come into play -- for example, depending on who the people involved are -- there's certain covered persons under the law, or if there are -- and this also, of course, requires some indication of criminality -- then we will utilize those laws. But I think that the best way to get the facts out and to get to the truth is to proceed as the President has done, and that is have the proper agencies of government go ahead with a full investigation, and that's what we're going to do.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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NBC TODAY/MEESE-11/26/86

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MR. GUMBEL: As a result of all what's happened, Mr. Meese, is the President now going to have to be a different kind of President than he has been in the past, a more detailed President, a more hands-on President? I guess what I'm asking is, does he read any lessons in all of this?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, the President is a hands-on, detailed President. He is vigorously involved in the Cabinet process. He meets regularly with the National Security Council, often several times a week. The President knows what's going on. What you have here is in the organization some place some things going on that were deliberately concealed from the President. There's no executive any place that can always be able to be aware of things like that. I think the important thing is that this President did not allow it to stop there. He ordered me and others in the administration to look into the matter, and that's how this came to light. So remember, it was the President's action that brought it to light. It was the President's action that ordered us to make the facts available to Congress and to the public. And so I think the President demonstrated that he was in command and in control.

MR. GUMBEL: Attorney General Edwin Meese. Sir, thank you very much for joining us this morning.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Thank you.

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 דחיפות...
 תאריך וזיח 1.4.40, 26. נוב 86
 ס' 275

משיחה עם ויין וייט (עיראק - איראן, סוריה / IR)

2. איראן - עיראק. וייט חוזה עליית כוחו של המימסד בטהראן, בהדגשה שהמדובר בכוחות משמרות המהפכה ולא בצבא הרגיל שלא מהווה, ולדעתו גם לא יהווה רעיון גורם משמעותי בפוליטיקה האיראנית. תהליך "המיליטריזציה" של המשטר באיראן שלאחר ח'מייני הוא כמעט בלתי נמנע (א) הסדר כלשהו בין איראן ועיראק כגון הפ"אליה" למעשה "שלום מזויין" מעין מצב השלום בין ישראל וסוריה ברמה"ג ועמדת המשמרות המהפכה והיות מכרעה גם מעמדת הכח שלאורך הגבול אך מריכוז מחציתם בבירה. (ב) הקבוצות היריבות בטהראן שתאבקנה על השלטון לאחר ח'מייני בהנחה שתהליך כזה יהיה מציאותי תזדקקנה לסיוע צבאי ורק קבוצה שתהיה מאחוריה "מליציה" חזקה, תשרד במאבק על ההנהגה. ישנם כבר כמה קבוצות כגון של רפטניג'אני הלוקחות זאת בחשבון ומנסות לטפס גורם זה וזו רדעה שתהליך של נרדף צבאי לקבוצות האיראניות וטהראן עשוי לעורר בקרב המשמרות שאיפות או אמביציות פוליטיות משלהן. הוא אינו מתרשם שהמנהיגים הנוכחים או אלה המופקדים עליהם כגון השר דוסט יהיו אלה שיעמדו בראש משמרות המהפכה, אלא דווקא מה שהוא מכנה "שכבת הקולצ'יט" דהיינו אותם מפקדים שישבו בבונקר הפיקוד בחזית ^א משם את המלחמה בחזית והביאו להשגים צבאיים מול עיראק. וייט מודה שלמודיעין האמריקאי אין כל מידע על שכבה זו וכשם שהוא משוכנע שהם הם האחראים להשגים הללו ולא "מועצת ההגנה העליונה" ממנהלת ע"י כהני דת חסרי כל ידע צבאי, כן הוא מאמין שבקרב חלקים במשמרות קיים גם תרעומת נגד גורמים במגזר האזרחי על שלא ניהלו את המלחמה בעיראק כפי שהיה צריך ולא ילצל הצלחות צבאיות מקומיות ב-82/81 למהלכים רחבים. טהראן עצמה, שלדעת וייט צריכה לחשוש מג זה ככל שהוא הולך ומתמסד מבחינה צבאית בשל אורך המלחמה מטילה איפול מלא על שכבת המפקדים הצבאיים הנ"ל ומעלימה אותם מידעת הציבור. לא ידוע לו על כאלה מתוכם שנחשפו או שזכו לא הצטיינות ואם כן הדבר נעשה בחזית עצמה ללא טכסים רבי משתתפים בבירה. אין לו ספק שלשכבה השלטת בטהראן על כל רבדיה אינטרס למנוע כל הופעה של גורם כח עצמאי שאיגו מכוון ומבוקר והנהגה חזיתית. השאלה היא האם יצליחו

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

ס 2 ס 1
ד... 2... בחור... 4... דפים
סוג בסחוני
דחיות
מאריך וזיה
מס' מבר

אל:

2/4

547

אמיתי" בין טהראן ובגדאד אלא בהפא"ש טקטית בהסכם כלשהו גם אם לזמן ארוך יחסית, משוכנע שחמישים האזרחי יהיה חייב בשל האיום העיראקי האסטרטגי על איראן גם לאחר סיום פורמלי של המלחמה להזרים משאבים, כ"א וטכנולוגיה למשמרות המהפכה שיחליפו במשך הזמן הצבא הסדיר שכמעט ולא קיים לפחות לא כגורם כח משמעותי במערכת האיראנית. וייט מנסה לגזור גזירה שונה או לפחות להסתמך על הנסיון קאירופאי בתחום זה כאשר הוא מציין שאלו שהעלו את המגזר הצבאי לשלטון בגרמניה ובאיטליה לפני מלחמה"ע ה-2, חיילים משוחררים שחזרו מתוסכלים בתום מלחמה"ע ה-1 על אופן ניהול המלחמה בידי ההנהגות הפוליטיות שם. תופעה אפשרית נוספת ע"פ תיאוריה זו, שהיא בבחינת חזון לעתיד היא שהנטל הכלכלי המוטל על האוכלוסיה בטהראן עשוי לפרוץ החוצה. המצב הנוכחי ע"פ דוחות ומאגזינים שחזרו משם מורה על התגברות תקשיים הכלכליים בעקבות ההפצצות העיראקיות. עדי ראייה סיפרו על תור של מכונות באורך של כ-3 קמ' הממתינות לדלק. השגת מצרכי מזון, שאספקתו מצומצמת בלאו הכי, נעשה קשה יותר. ברגע שישתחרר הלחץ בחזית כאשר המלחמה תסתיים כך יתגברו לחצי האוכלוסיה בתחום הכלכלי, ציבור הנוצר עצמו כל זמן "שהמולדת בסכנת קיום". אין לו ספק שבתסריט כזה הכח הצבאי קרי המשמרות ימלאו אז תפקיד לא קטן. וייט כואח מצב דומה בעיראק אם כי בפחות חריפות מזה באיראן. צדאם חוסיין באופן שטחי נמנע מלטפח את שכנת הקולנלים, לאו דווקא מפקדי הדיוויזיות או אוגדות שברובם הם מינויי מפלגה אותה שכבה "החוטמת בגופה" התקדמות או פריצת האיראנים למרחבי עיראק. כדוגמה הוא מציין שהענקה אותות הצטיינות למפקדים עיראקיים שהצטיינו נוגעת לדרגות הנמוכות של הקצינים, בעיקר סרנים וסגנים אך לא לשכבה הנ"ל, שמא הדבר יהווה עידוד לטיפוח ולתפיכתה

גם לעוצמה פוליטית ברבות הימים.

לגבי ההתפתחויות בעיראק התסריט הנראה לו במקרה של העלמו של צדאם חוסיין הוא לאו דווקא שלטון צבאי טהור אלא הופעת מעין "אסד עיראקי" דהיינו הופעת גורם מתוך המערכת המפלגתית אך עם נסיון צבאי דהיינו בלוויית עוצמה שיקים "תנועת חיקונים" עיראקית לנקיון בית כללי מאלה האחראים למלחמה ולאופן ניהולה. התוצאה במקרה כזה עשויה להיות, בשונה מסוריה, חיזוק המפלגה, באם הגורם יבוא מתוכה אך בצורת ניהול והכוונה שונה מאלו של צדאם חוסיין לפחות בתקופה הראשונה שלאחר העל⁴. אעיר שהתאוריה שפיתח וייט ושהוא מנסה ללכוד אחריה במציאות מעניינת כשלעצמה אם כי נראית מוגזמת, לפחות במקצת באשר למעבר החד, בייחוד באיראן, עליה מצביע וייט, אך גרעין פוטנציאלי לכך נראה שאכן קיים. מכל מקום הוא מציג שגם בישראל יעקבו אחריה בראיה ארוכת טווח יותר מהמציאות המיידית או אף בטווח הביניים. כאמ המעקב בהעדר מידע מה מתרחש בתוך שכבה והאם היא קיימת בכלל ככזו עשויה להיות נקודת התחלה לבחינת התקופה הפוסט מלחמהית. ויין גם בדעה, ועל כך נטוש כאן ויכוח, שהאיראנים בסופו של דבר כן עשויים לממש המתקפה,

ס.נ.ט. 3.96... מחור... דפים
סוג בסחוני
דחיות
תאריך וז"ח
שם מ"מ מברק

3/4

אל:

547

עליה מדובר זה חוששים מספר, בצורה לא שגרתית כגון בחודשי דצמ' - ינואר - פבר' חור
ניצול גורם ההפתעה בצד העיראקי ומחור ידיעה שניהולה בתנאי התקף הקשים יכבדו
אמנם עליהם אך בעיקר על הצבא העיראקי בכל הקשור להנעת רכב כבד בתנאים בלתי עבירים
ולסיוע אווירי בתנאי ראות קשים. וייט מנמק זאת בכמה סיבות (א) ח'מייני נסופו של דבר יטיל
מרותו בענין. (ב) מאמץ להטות הלחץ הכלכלי כתוצאה מההפצצות העיראקיות ההולך ומכביד. (ג) גיוס
האוכלוסיה הנאנקת תחת העול הכלכלי ועצירת סימני נרגנות.

3. הגורם הכורדי (מברק ממ"ד 341). וייט מבטל משמעות ש"פ בן תנועתו של ברזאני לזו של טלבא
כגורם אופוזיציוני שיוכל לשמש איום על המשטר בעיראק. וייט מבטל זאת על מספר גורמים:
(א) נסיון העבר ביניהם מלמד "שברית" כזו לא החזיקה מעמד, כגון ההסכם שהגיעו אליו בחודש
ינואר 5.ז. שארך חודש כלבד. (ב) ניגודי אינטרסים. טלבאני משחק על מספר אופציות וגם עתה
ובמקביל, כך סיפר, הוא ממשיך לשאת ולתת עם העיראקים להשגת תנאים והישגים לאזור שלו. מבין
השניים טלבאני הוא הפחות יציב וההפכפך. (ג) ניגודים שכתיים ופיצול גיאוגרפי. כוחות
טלבאני מרוכזים בעיקר סביב הערים סולמניה וא רביל בשעה שעיקר כוחות של הברזאנים הוא בצפון
מזרח הרחוק. וייט שחזר לא מכבר מסיוור באיזור ביקר גם בערים הנ"ל ולא ראה שום תופעה חריגה,
כזו המורגשת ע"י מבקר, ביחס לפעילות. הכורדית. וייט גם בדעה שהכורדים מחמת פיצול וניגודי
אינטרסים אינם מהווים איום ממשי כנגד הצבא העיראקי. אמנם העיראקים אינם במצב של
הקצאת כוחות מהחזית לטיפול שורש בכורדים, אך גם הכוחות המוצבים שם מספקים לטפל במצב.
במקרה הטוב וייט רואה ^{בכורדים} גורם מטריד, אך לא מעבר לכך.

4. סוריה. וייט רואה בסוגיית בריאות אסד את המפתח להבנת ההתפתחויות בסוריה בשלושה מגזרים
(א) טרור. (ב) כלכלה. (ג) לבנון. אמנם למוזיעין האמריקאי אין תיק רפואי מעודכן סביב
מחלת אסד - לב, סוכר, דם אן וייט תחת הרושם שמצבו בחודשים האחרונים לא שפיר (להזכירכם
שרופאו האישי ביקר כאן לא מכבר). סימוכין לכך, אמנם לא מבוססים דיים הוא מוצא בהתנהגות
אסד עצמו (א) העלמו מחאיבור בתקופה של כחדשיים ממחצית ספט' עד למחצית נוב' - עד להופעתו
המורכזת במסגד, (14.11) ובפני האיגודים המקצועיים (16.11) במשך כל התקופה הנ"ל אסד
פשוט נעלם מעיני הציבור, תופעה בלתי שגרתית אצלו. (ב) המנעותו מפגישות עם שרים גם בענינים
לכאורה בוערים. שרים המבקשים להתקבל על ידו נדחים ללא קביעות מועד כלשהו (על כך שמעתי גם
מגורמים אחרים) וייט מציין במיוחד את העובדה שעמאדי שר הכלכלה לא זומן לאסד למרות המשבר
הכלכלי, זה תקופה ארוכה. (ג) אסד איבד ממשקלו וכראה כ"שלד מחלך". וייט אמנם מודה שלא
דווקא מדובר בחופעה רפואית מסוימת וגם אם לא ארע דבר חריג בחודשים האחרונים, הסך הכל
מודה שקיימת תופעה של עיכפות מצטרות אצל הנשיא הסורי.

4/4

ס ו ס ס כ ר ד

דפ...4...מחור...4...דטים

סווג בסחונ'י

דח'פוח

מארין וז'יה

מארין וז'יה

התיאוריה של וייט, אם תופעה זו נכונה היא שאסד אינו מסוגל לטפל במספר נושאים כנ"ל בעת ובעונה אחת. בנחתו היא שבמקרה כזה (א) העדיפות ניתנת לנושא הטרור, על כל פיבטיו, ע"ח שאר נושאים בוערים. הדיווחים המשוגרים מדמשק (הצוות שם בנוסף לשגריר צומצם בעקבות הסנקציות ומתקשה בכיסוי טוב של השטח) מאשרים שהמאמץ הסורי מכוון עתה למניעת בידודה בעקבות משפטי הטרור באירופה. לשאלתי כיצד משפיעה פושט איראן - ארה"ב, השיב שישנו אמנם פיתוי לכך, בעיקר כלפי הזירה הבינערבית אך להערכתו אסד ימנע מלעשות בה שימוש משתי סיבות, ראשית שלא להכביד על יחסיו עם איראן, שנית ההכרח האמריקאי שכביכול ניתן לאיראן אינו מסוגל להכשר שאסד מכיר בו, דהיינו שהוא יזדקק לארה"ב ע"מ להצדיק זיקתו לאיראן בעיני הגורמים הערבים. (ב) גדלה השפעת הסובבים אותו, במצב בריאותי נחות. וייט מציין במיוחד שני גורמים-המשמר הנשיאותי בכלל ואלח'ולי בפרט, שבנסיבות הנוכחיות הוא ללא תחליף (indispensable), גם אם יתברר שהסתכן בפרשת אל על ללא ידיעת אסד. וייט בדעה שגורם זה - אלח'ולי ואולי אחרים ימלאו תפקיד נכבד במאבק על הירושה גם אם טרם נמצא לו ביטוי בדמשק. וייט בסקרו את פוטנציאל המועמדים לרשת אותו מעריך שמסקנת אסד היא שלא רק שאין לו יורש טבעי אלא שהבחירה, לו אף תנתן בידו בעוד מועד, היא בין הגרועים יותר לגרועים פחות. וייט סובר שהמערכת סביבו תשאף להעביר את השרביט ללא התפרצויות של כח שעלולה לסחוף את המדינה למלחמת אזרחים שהתוצאה ממנה תהיה השמדת השלטון מידי העלווים. בתסריט כזה עשויה להיות הסכמה סביב מועד פיגורטיבי, דוגמאות נגיב בשעתו במצרים כאשר גורם או גורמי הכת יופיעו על הבמה מאוחר יותר. גורם העלול לשנות תמונה "פסיפית" זו הוא הופעת גורם כזה שמוחוץ למערכת הנוכחית, ובראש ובראשונה רפעת. וייט מעריך את סיכויי כזעירים ביותר ככל שהוא מחוץ למערכת השלטונית רואה בו גורם שדווקא ירצה לשנות בכח, בעזרת תומכיו שעדיין קיימים אם כי קשה לעמוד על כוחם, הסדרים שיקבעו אחרים. בסיום וייט חזר על החשיבות שבניכוח מאמץ למעקב אחרי המתרחש באיראן ובסוריה וביקש להסתייע במידע שברשותנו.

אלי אבידן

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4. המשך ה- HEARINGS, כמצויין במברקנו הנ"ל, יחקיים מה-8 ועד ה-10 בדצמבר, עם הופעת שולץ ב-9.12. כעת מתנהלים מ"מ על טיב השמיעות - פתוחות או סגורות. המורשה לי המילטון דוגל בגישת שמיעות פתוחות (אפילו במחיר הנטיות התיאטרליות של כמה מחברי הועדה), בעוד שהעדים הראשיים ובמיוחד מנהל ה-סי.אי.אי. קייסי, מתנגדים לכך.

5. רצ"ב מכתב מה-5.11 לנציא מאת פאסטל והמילטון וכן, חשוב יותר, תדרוך שהוכן ע"י צוות מליאת הוועדה עבור השניים הנ"ל לקראת ה- HEARINGS ב-24.

יוסף לנגר

למדן

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

November 5, 1986

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The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

For two days now, we have been attempting to obtain the basic facts and an explanation from the Administration regarding press accounts of a U.S. secret mission to Iran earlier this fall, reportedly led by former National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane. The total denial of information or explanation to date is simply unacceptable.

Without going into great detail in this correspondence, a number of foreign policy objectives are unnecessarily being jeopardized by the Administration's handling of this matter. These include such serious issues as our long-standing policy of not negotiating with terrorists, the Administration's policy of remaining neutral in the Iran-Iraq War, and coordinating policies with our friends and allies.

Due to the fundamental impact this matter is having on the credibility of the U.S. Government and the preservation of a wide variety of national security interests in the Middle East, we respectfully seek your immediate cooperation in fully advising the Congress as to the decisions leading to this matter and subsequent events.

With best wishes, we are

Sincerely yours,

Lee H. Hamilton

Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence

Dante B. Fascell

Chairman

Committee on Foreign Affairs

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
CONCERNING U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

GA N
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November 20, 1986

Memorandum

TO: Ron Sable, National Security Council

FROM: Robert K. Boyer
Senior Staff Consultant

SUBJECT: Response to Fascell/Hamilton Letter, re: Iranian Situation

With respect to the letter from Chairman Fascell and Chairman Hamilton, it is reasonable to assume that the Members of the Committee will want complete and detailed information about the diplomatic initiative with respect to Iran that the President made last week. It will facilitate the Committee's meetings with representatives of the Administration if such information can be made available for review prior to those meetings.

From a congressional perspective, there are obviously many unanswered questions about this matter, but as of today it would appear that among the information the Members may be particularly interested in having the following information set forth:

- (1) A chronology of the events leading up to the President's decision to undertake the initiative with respect to Iran, and a chronology of the actions taken since that decision. This should specifically include direct or indirect contacts by any private individual, present or former members of the staff of the National Security Council, or by other Government personnel with Iranian Government personnel or with elements in that country, as well as any such contacts with officials or other individuals from any other country.
 - (2) Any agreement or understandings resulting from those contacts.
 - (3) Any Presidential directives or other documents to any department or agency of the Government with respect to this initiative, specifically including documents sent to the Director of Central Intelligence concerning Central Intelligence Agency support for the initiative or concerning disclosure to the Congress.
 - (4) A description of the military equipment (including spare parts), dual-use items, or other goods, commodities, or equipment which were made available by the United States Government or which
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were made available with the approval or knowledge of the United States Government in conjunction with the initiative: when that equipment was delivered to Iran; what the source of that equipment (that is, was it procured from DOD stocks, by the CIA, from the inventory of the armed forces of another country, from commercial sources, or from other sources); what the nature of any participation of third countries or other third parties in providing that equipment was; the value of that equipment; and how the equipment was paid for (specifically whether any appropriations were charged for any expenses relating to the transfer of equipment to Iran).

(5) A description of obligations or expenditures by any United States Government department or agency in connection with or in support of the initiative, including arms transfers, and an identification of the appropriations or non-appropriated funds used, and the legal authority under which the obligations or expenditures were made.

(6) A description of the involvement of departments or agencies of the Government (other than the National Security Council staff) in activities carried out pursuant to the initiative.

(7) Any foreign policy or intelligence assessments prepared by the National Security Council staff or by any department or agency of the Government with respect to the initiative.

(8) Any legal opinions by the Attorney General or other Government personnel with respect to activities carried out pursuant to this initiative.

*

סווג בשחונ'י סודי

מיידי

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דע: לשכת המנכ"ל המדיני

מקשי"ח (ממבטחון)

להלן מתוך שיחה עם מייק וון דוזן, מנהל צוות העוזרים לוועדת המסנה לאירופה ולמזה"ת בבג"ט (25.14).

4. נושא כלכלת מצרים ^{הדומיננטי} ברוב השיחות שם. ראש ממשלת מצרים ^{נאילו} אישיות מרשימה. ^{סוף} בירוקרט מובהק, ואנשי המגזר הפרטי אינם יודעים כיצד להעריכו. מחד גיסא מפריע להם שמעולם לא התנסה בעולם המסחר, ומאידך גיסא רואים בו פקיד יעיל ומקוורם שחכונה זו מתרוט לתפקוד ולייעול המערכת הממשלתית.

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5. ישראל - השיחות אצלנו היו מצויינות, ומודים על הסידורים המוצלחים.

6. אשר שדו"ח ה-GAO בנושא הלבאי יימסר רק בראשית השנה הבאה. הסיבה לכך - פוטים ומספרים נוספים שהועברו על ידינו ל-GAO. בינתיים המילטון קיבל דו"ח ביניים קצר (כשלושה עמודים) בסוג סודי ביותר (לא פירט התוכן). באם יבנה הלבאי או חלופה, עולה מכל הדיונים בנושא שעלות מטוסי קרב בעשור הבא היא כה גבוהה שעל ישראל לתת את הדעת כבר עכשיו לבעיה נשיאתה תוך ההנחה שבעתיד הנראה לעיין אין לצפות להגדלה בסיוע הצבאי שלנו.

ולחם

למדן

2.12

מסמך חוזר: 10607

אל: 423/א

מ: המשרד, תא: 261186, זח: 1801, דח: מ, סג: ש.

בהב

שמור/מידי

גיו יעקב

וטכמ בין-ממשלות בנושא השואה.

1. לפני כעשרה ימים הגיש לנו המזכיר הראשון בשגארהב גיוספ סאליוואן הצעת טיוטה לחתימה מזכר הבנה בין הממשלות

שתיים בנושא השואה. ~~החלטת הממשלה~~ ~~מסמך~~

2. כידוע היה בארצ בסופ אוגוסט ריצירד קריגר מנכ ~~xxx~~ ~~החלטת הממשלה~~ ~~מסמך~~ ~~xxx~~ ~~והביא עמו טיוטת הסכם בין הממוריאכ ויייד ושמי. קריגר כנראה העלה הנושא במחמד ומכאן ההצעה~~

הפורמלית של השגרירות בתיא.

3. ביום חמישי השבוע נקיים דיון אצל רובי סייבל אליו נזמן כל הנוגעים כדי לדון בנושא.

נהגש לקבל עד אז חוות דעתכם המפורטת.

4. סאליוואן ציין שב- 4 בדצמבר עומד להערכ בוויינגטון ניקס כלשהו בממוריאכ ושמחמד כביכול היתה רוצה לחתום על המזכר באותה הזדמנות. בקש לדעת אם אנו מקבלים הנוסח שלהם. (מניחים שתוכלו לקבל הטיוטה בוויינגטון) ~~הדמור/תפוצות~~

מזטט

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אאאא, חו זמ: 10592

אל: וו/ש/421

מ-: המשרד, הא: 261186, חז: 1742, דח: ר, ס: ג, ס:

בבבב

סודי/רגיל

למדנ,

ביקור קנדי

1. משגארהב קבלנו רשימה חלקית של הפמליה:
גיינ קנדי סמית, 3 עוזרים. 2 אנשי בטחון, קולונל
גיימס רוני, הכתב הווינגטוני של הבוסטון גלוב רוברט
הילי ורעיתו, ידידיו מרוינ רוזנ וליאורנרד אהרונסון.
נבקשכם להמציא בהקדם הרשימה המלאה של הבאים כולל פרטים
עליהם.
2. בדרו אמ אנשי הבטחון נושאים נשק.
3. נקבעה פגישה עם שר הבטחון ב- 11.12 ב- 1200
4. שגארהב מבקשת שמיד לאחר מכן יבוא קנדי לשגרירות
למחצית השעה.
5. התכנית הצבאית תוכל להתחיל איפוא רק ב 1330
ותימשך עד 1630-17000 לכל היותר (אור יום) וברור
שלא הוכל לכלול כל הפריטים שבקש. שגארהב טוען שקנדי ביקש
גם להסיע טנק המרכבה ובמסגרת זו הדבר לא מתאפשר.
6. שגארהב טוענת שאינו מעוניין בבקור בלביא. אשדונא.
7. ערב ה 11.12 מתוכנן לאיע עם קיסר (טרם נקבע).
8. לפי שגארהב עשוי קנדי לצאת הארץ כבר ביום ו'
לעקבה לבקור בפטרה אם יצליח להשיג מטוס צבאי. חייבים לסכל
בהקדם מועד יציאתו. לידיעתכם המעבר בגשר בשנה
ה 13.11 מאושר.
9. במסגרת העכשוית מהוכנן המפגש עם שצירנסקי ואמהוה
מסורבוה עליה ליום ו' ה 12.11 בבוקר.
10. אמ יצא כבר ביום ו' מהכננה השגרירות המפגש עם
הפלשתינאים ל- 10.11
11. שגארהב בקשה שכל הפמליה תצטרף לפגישה עם הנשיא.
הסבירונא שרק פמליא מצומצמת תוכל להצטרף בשל בעיות לוגיסטיות
בבית הנשיא.
12. יש להבהיר שהבקשה להטיסו ממקום למקום בארץ מהווה בעיה
(לא רק תקציבית) אלא לעתים מסרבלה ואפ מאריכה הדרכ כמו טיסה
מי-מ לתיא דרכ עטרוה ושדה דב או טיסה לבאר שבע דרכ חצרים
או עטרוה או לחלופין אפ לוד - חלוי גם במזג האויר.
הנסיעה ברכב מפשטת הגישה ונבקש הסתהו רק כאשר הדבר מקצר
ומייעל. מודעים לבעיות הגב של הסנטור אך גם הטיסה במסוס אינה
נוחה.
13. אנא בקשר שיורו לשגארהב לטפל בחסדר הרכב לכל מסלול
הבקור זאח כדי להקל מעלינו הסחבכוה לגבי החזר הוצאות.
אשדונא שככ הוסכם.
14. ההועבר הטפול בגלוייה לשגארהב. אנא השובריםכמ.
מצפא - מאור

סססס

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דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
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עד כאן - קריאת המצב נכון לרגעים אלה. כעקרון אנו ממליצים להמנע מחשיפת יתר כגון הענות לתכניות מלל שונות (והבקוש קיים) דבר שרק יגדיל הזוית הישראלית.

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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אל:

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 דף... 1... מתוך... 4... דפים
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 תאריך וז"ח... 26. 2. 2000
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קטחין 530

המשרד 542

אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, ממבכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח
 דע: יועץ רוח"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

ארה"ב - איראן - ישראל - קונטרס

להלן מהושינגטון פוסט והניו יורק טיימס היום.

עקב/נכס

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CONTRA SUPPLIES: MYSTERY UNRAVELS

Officials Note the Disclosure
Helps to Explain Network

By JOEL BRINKLEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 — The disclosure that millions of dollars from the Government of Iran were channeled through Swiss bank accounts to the Nicaraguan rebels may explain much of the mystery behind the covert program to supply the rebels, Congressional investigators and Reagan Administration officials said today.

When a C-123 cargo plane crashed inside Nicaragua last month and one of its American crew members, Eugene Hasenfus, was captured by the Sandinistas, investigations showed that a vast supply operation had been delivering weapons and ammunition to the rebels for the last two years, the period during which Congress banned direct military aid to them.

Numerous Administration officials said the supply operation had been coordinated and directed by Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North of the National Security Council staff. But as a Congressional investigator said today, "We were never able to figure out the funding."

Rebel officers and Administration officials, including Colonel North, repeatedly asserted that the many millions of dollars needed to keep the supplies flowing had come from anonymous private donors in the United States and other countries.

Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, said today: "We did not know who was providing the funds. There were a thousand rumors, Texas millionaires and so forth, and we didn't know."

At a news conference today, Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d said that "somewhere between \$10 and \$30 million" in what amounted to profits on the arms sales to the Government of Iran had been deposited in Swiss bank accounts for the contras, as the rebels are generally known. The man directing all that, Mr. Meese said, again was Colonel North.

Today President Reagan said Colonel North "has been relieved of his duties on the National Security Council staff."

It is clear, officials said today, that not all the rebel military supplies were financed by the money from Iran. A senior Administration official said the supply operation had consisted of "hundreds of flights" over the last two years, most of them originating at the El Estero air base in El Salvador.

Before the start of the current fiscal year on Oct. 1, the Congressional ban on aid to the rebels had been in place for two years. But the Israeli shipments of arms to Iran apparently began in the fall of 1985. Attorney General Meese said Iranian payments began last January.

At the same time, numerous officials have said the pace of the rebel supply operation increased noticeably last spring.

Today Representative Jim Wright, the House majority leader, said he had learned at a White House briefing that the Iranians had paid the Israelis \$19 million for the arms. Of that, \$3 million had been paid back to the United States Defense Department, \$4 million was paid in fees to arms brokers and the remainder, \$12 million, went to the contras' Swiss bank accounts.

Rebels Deny Knowing of Deal

Special to The New York Times

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica, Nov. 25 — Civilian leaders of Nicaraguan rebel groups said today that they knew nothing of secret transfers of funds to their organization arranged by Colonel North.

There was concern among the Nicaraguan exiles that the policy uproar in Washington might prove seriously detrimental to their cause.

Israel Now Says It Sent Arms at Request of U.S.

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Wednesday, Nov. 26

— In its first official comment on the Iran affair, the Israeli Government announced early today that it had transferred arms to Iran "upon the request of the United States" and did not know that some of the payments for these weapons had been channeled to the Nicaraguan rebels.

After a meeting that lasted past midnight, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin issued a statement that said: "The Government of Israel confirms that it helped transfer defensive arms and spare parts from the United States to Iran upon the request of the United States."

"The payment for this equipment was made directly by an Iranian representative to a Swiss bank, in accordance with instructions from the American representatives," it added. "These funds did not pass through Israel. The Government of Israel was surprised to learn that supposedly a portion of these funds was transferred to the contras. If such a transaction took place, it had nothing to do with Israel and the Government of Israel had no knowledge of it. Israel did not serve and would not have served as a channel for such a transaction."

The statement puts formally on the record the Israeli contention that it acted at the behest of the United States, a line apparently aimed at refuting suggestions by Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d and other senior Reagan Administration officials that Israel engaged in some unauthorized arms sales to Iran in the fall of 1985.

Mr. Meese said Tuesday that the Swiss bank accounts were established with the help of "Israelis" and other principals. He did not specify Israeli officials. Neither did the Israeli statement deny that private Israeli individuals could have been involved.

It is possible that the Swiss accounts were set up by two Israeli arms dealers who are reported to have been involved in the affair, Yaacov Nimrodi and Al Schwimmer, and that Israeli Government officials were never aware of how the money flowed through them.

It may also be doubtful because Mr. Schwimmer and Mr. Nimrodi, a former military attaché at the Israeli Embassy in Teheran, were said to have been shoved out of the deal, around January or February 1986, when the United States no longer felt comfortable dealing with private individuals and insisted on dealing only with an official of the Israeli Government.

Mr. Schwimmer and Mr. Nimrodi reportedly were replaced by Amiram Nir, Mr. Peres's adviser on terrorism.

Israeli officials said that the Israeli leaders risk a stinging embarrassment if it turns out that they knew of the operation, either before or after Mr. Nir joined it, and did not inform their

principal contacts in Washington — President Reagan, Secretary of State George P. Shultz or Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter.

Even worse, they said, if the Israeli leadership knew of the matter and did discuss it with Messrs. Shultz, Poindexter or Reagan, then to admit so publicly would be to contradict the Reagan Administration's statement that the only American official who really knew about the money transfers was Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North.

Money Laundering Request

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 — A former American official who routinely re-

viewed intelligence reports said today said that the Reagan Administration made at least two attempts in 1984 to use Israel to circumvent a Congressional ban on military aid to the contras.

NY Times

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Israel Denies Funding Contras

Government Confirms Role in Arms Transfers to Iran

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

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JERUSALEM, Nov. 26 (Wednesday)—Israel's government early this morning confirmed its involvement in shipping arms to Iran at the behest of the White House but strongly denied it had played any role in funneling a portion of Iranian payments to U.S.-backed Nicaraguan rebels, or contras, in apparent violation of U.S. law.

In a terse statement issued after a two-hour emergency meeting of the country's three top leaders, Israel said the funds were paid directly by an unnamed Iranian representative into a Swiss bank account "in accordance with instructions from the American representative. These funds did not pass through Israel."

The statement, which did not name the American involved, added that "the government of Israel was surprised to learn that supposedly a portion of these funds was transferred to the contras. If such a transaction took place, it had nothing to do with Israel and the government of Israel had no knowledge of it. Israel did not serve, and

would not have served, as a channel for such a transaction."

The Israeli statement appeared to provide a different account of what had taken place from that given by U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese III at a press conference in Washington yesterday, although Meese's remarks left open a possible distinction between the Israeli government and individual Israelis who may have been involved as arms traders and intermediaries.

Under questioning about whether persons other than National Security Council aide Lt. Col. Oliver North, who was fired yesterday, were involved in money transfers, Meese said:

"Bank accounts were established, as best we know, by representatives of the forces in Central America. And this information was provided to representatives of the Israeli government . . . or representatives of Israel, I should say . . . and then these funds were put into the accounts."

The hastily drafted Israeli explanation did not give any details about the kind of equipment that was shipped to Iran or the dates of the shipments, nor did it say why some shipments were made that apparently were not approved before the fact by the United States.

It also did not disclose the amount of money involved, nor explain how some of the money—reportedly \$13 million—was paid to the United States while the rest—estimated by Meese to be \$10 million to \$30 million—was not.

Israeli officials are likely to be further pressed to explain how much money was involved and how it was that they did not know where the money from the arms sales was destined to go.

The statement marked an abandonment of the government's previous strategy—adopted three weeks ago when an Israeli role in secret arms sales to Iran was first disclosed—of making absolutely no public comment in the hope that the

issue would fade away. Officials stuck to that strategy even when disclosures in Washington and unofficial leaks in Jerusalem built into a flood.

But yesterday's statement by Meese was too serious and too authoritative for the Israelis to ignore, officials said last night.

An emergency meeting of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin was held at Shamir's office here.

Also attending were the military secretaries of both Shamir and Rabin, and Amiram Nir, Shamir's counter-terrorism adviser, who is said to have coordinated Israel's role in the arms connection.

No one appeared here to have been warned in advance of the U.S. statement, nor of the resignation of National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter and the firing of North, a key deputy.

The news hit here around dinner time, when many senior officials and their aides had just arrived home—and it sent them racing back to their offices to formulate a response.

They faced a difficult decision in part because their own information was scarce, informed sources said, since the financial details of arms dealings with Iran were closely held.

"I would venture to say that perhaps no more than three or four people in Israel know the full story," one source said.

In the past week, informed sources here have outlined for the first time the various phases and details of Israeli arms shipments to Iran—which date back to 1979—and they have given Israel's version of its role as middleman in opening a secret channel between Washington and Tehran.

The sources have insisted that Israel was acting primarily as a service to its strategic ally and protector, the United States, and denied allegations from Washington that Israel took advantage of limited authorization from the White House to step up its own arms sales to Tehran.

This morning's statement, read by Avi Pazner, Shamir's spokesman, confirmed that Israel had "transferred defensive arms and spare parts from the U.S. to Iran upon the request of the United States."

It gave no further details.

Israel has had to defend itself against charges—both from Washington and from some critics here—that it enticed White House amateurs into a high-risk, low-gain

adventure in Iran based on shaky intelligence from self-interested Iranian and Israeli arms dealers and others.

Some commentators also have questioned the official view that Israel's interests are best served by supporting Iran in its protracted war with Iraq.

Informed sources here have said Israel furnished Iran with U.S.-made TOW antitank missiles and Hawk antiaircraft batteries, along with Israeli-manufactured ammunition for howitzers, mortars and recoilless rifles, and had deposited payments from Tehran into Swiss bank accounts believed to be controlled by the CIA, with Israel's diminished stocks of the weapons replenished by Washington.

But no source here was prepared last night to state whether any Israeli—official or private citizen—knew who controlled the accounts or that some of the money was being transferred to the contras, as Meese disclosed.

Nor was anyone prepared to say whether the Israelis involved were operating under the belief that the contra connection was authorized by the White House.

Sources said there were three main Israeli figures who might be able to shed light on the transactions: arms dealers Yaacov Nimrodi and Al Schwimmer and former foreign ministry director general David Kimche.

Iranian exiles in France and Britain who serve as agents and middlemen in providing arms to the Iranian military first approached Nimrodi in 1985 with a plea that he arrange contacts between Washington and Tehran to support pro-Western senior military officers in their internal power struggle against Shiite Moslem radicals.

He and Schwimmer, a business associate of Nimrodi and a close adviser to then-prime minister Peres, approached Kimche and Peres with the idea; it was approved by senior Cabinet members and then passed on to the White House. There the matter was dealt with by former national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane and his aide, Lt. Col. North.

Sources here said Kimche came away from a meeting with McFarlane in the summer of 1985 convinced he had received authorization to send a limited arms shipment to Tehran.

Wash Post

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But White House officials now say the Israelis misconstrued McFarlane's statements and that the first arms shipments were not authorized, although the White House later condoned them.

Nimrodi, who lives in London, could not be reached for comment. Kimche's wife said Kimche was out of Israel and she would not say where. Schwimmer told a reporter, "I can't help you. I don't know anything about it."

Other sources said Swiss bank accounts and an unnamed Swiss trading company have played a role in Israeli arms shipments to Iran since 1979, when Israel first began selling military equipment to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary regime.

"This is an American problem," said an Israeli source involved in assessing and controlling the political damage the White House disclosures may cause Israel. "You get the bank account numbers from North and he says, 'Look, put the money in Switzerland,' and that's all you want to know."

Still, the source conceded, "no one in Israel can claim he didn't know it was illegal to launder money for the contras. If it looks like we were going behind the back of Congress and the president, then we are in trouble."

Earlier yesterday, before the White House disclosures, Shamir came closer than any Israeli official so far to acknowledging Israel's role in the White House-Iran connection.

"I can only say it is not our policy to export weapons to Iran," Shamir told Israeli television. "That's the rule but sometimes there can be exceptions to the rule."

"But I don't think we have to talk very much about this, even in this case where there is a storm in the United States and the president is being blamed and perhaps Israel will be blamed pretty soon as well. I don't think there is anything to blame Israel about. Israel is acting to defend itself—and storms come and go."

Israel was a longtime supplier of tanks, patrol boats, rifles, ammunition and radar and radio equipment to the rightist Nicaraguan regime of the late Anastasio Somoza, and it was encouraged by the Reagan administration and especially the CIA to give support to the contras, according to a book by Aaron Klieman, a Tel Aviv University political scientist who is the country's leading academic expert on arms sales.

While Somoza "provided Israel with its best opportunity in the region," Klieman wrote, "since then, even though that outlet has been shut, the threat posed by the new regime in Managua to other countries in the region has served to provide Israel with new and unprecedented potential opportunities."

Klieman cited news reports that Reagan administration officials in 1983 leaked word that, at the request of the United States, Israel had agreed to send weapons captured from the Palestine Liberation Organization during the 1982 Lebanon war to Honduras for eventual use by the contras.

Such supplies contradict the principle that Israel sells arms only to recognized governments and creates other dilemmas for Israeli policy makers, Klieman said.

"On the one hand, Israel is so beholden to the United States that it becomes not only difficult but unpleasant to turn down such requests," he wrote.

"Yet on the other hand, to acquiesce in such adventures exposes Israel to the charge of being used in a proxy, interventionist role similar to that played by Cuba for the Soviet Bloc," he added.

Wash Post

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר שמור

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שמור/מידוי

אל:מצמא אירופה ב' מזתים

מאת:הציר לונדון

רוברט מקמלן- אירן

מקמלן הופיע אמש כאורחה השנתית של המגבית . בנאום
נרגש ששמע ידידות לישראל הגן על המדיניות כלפי אירן.
אמר שהסודיות של המעולה היתה מחויבות המציאות.
הטביר בי הקווים המנחים של גישת ארהב בשיחות עם האירנים
היו:

1. בעוד שארהב מקבלת (ACCEPTS) את המהפכה באירן
היא מתנגדת לנסיונות טהרן להוציא את ארהב מהמזת ולהתפשטות
בנדה של המהפכה מעבר לגבולות אירן.

2. ארהב מתנגדת בתוקף לטרור לא תעשה דיתורים לטרוריסטים
ולא תתרום בצורה כלשהי להמשך הטרור.

3. לארהב אינטרסים בטחונים במזת התואמים גם את האנטרסים
עם עירק. ארהב קוראת להסדר מדיני שיושג במומי ומוכנה
לסייע אם אירן ועירק ירצו בזאת.

5. ארהב אינה צופה לחידוש הדיאלוג במורמלי עם אירן
לפני שיחזור החטופים.

מקמלן הוסיף שבהתחשב במצב ההמכסן באירן בשבע השנים
האחרונות קשה לדעת מתי שלטונות אירן יקבלו העקרונות

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דלעיל. בינתים אתם נקידים הפועלים בשם ארהב

A PROFOUND OBLIGATION TO ASSURE THAT THEY ACT IN
WAYS ALWAYS COMPATIBLE WITH AMERICAN LAW AND VALUES

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תפ: שהחירה, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכלר, מרכז, רם, אמך, ממד, מצמא, ענרג,
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THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO METHODS OF
A PROFOUND OBLIGATION TO ASSURE THAT THEY ACT IN
WAYS ALWAYS COMPATIBLE WITH AMERICAN LAW AND VALUES

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THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO METHODS OF
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דחיסות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	ר"ה: 1
סוג בטחוני:	טופס מברק	מחור: 4
תז"ח: 251130	לש"ממנכ"ל, אמית"ק, הסברה, מצפ"א, ממ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת	א ל: יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח.
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News Summary November 25, 1936

New York Headlines

Headline stories in the NYT deal with Reagan conferring with aides on the Iran furor and how many allies have sold arms to Iran (see Press Reports). The attempted coup in the Philippines is also a p. 1 story. The US is proposing drilling for oil in a huge wildlife refuge on Alaska's Artic coast. Headlines in local papers deal either with the manhunt for the man who shot 6 police officers or the fact that 2 small children died in a fire at an unlicensed day care facility. Top story in the Wall Street Journal deals with the problems of drugs and corruption in Mexico.

Editorials

NYP "Don Regan: A Time to Depart" During Don Regan's tenure at the White House, blunder has followed upon blunder. The Iran blunder threatens to transform the last two years of Reagan's presidency into a meaningless lame duck tenure. The Bitburg affair began a disastrous pattern and it ended with Reagan being pushed--woefully unprepared--before a hostile White House press corps to advance and defend claims that simply were not credible.

Columns

NYP-Podhoretz "Watergate Trap?" For the Democrats there was good news and bad news in Reagan's disastrous press conference last week. The Democrats emerged from Reagan's refusal to admit that the arms he had been secretly sending to Iran represented the payment of ransom to hostages. He even refused to admit he made a mistake. In deciding to stonewall, Reagan threw away what was probably the last chance to limit the damage to his presidency. The Reagan magic is gone. Never had he looked so weak, so uncertain, so vulnerable, so old. Yet Reagan is not Nixon. He is a beloved leader to whom most Americans feel grateful for making them feel good about their country again. Any effort by the democrats to destroy him and is likely to create a gigantic wave of sympathy for him. It remains to be seen whether the Democrats can stage a sequel to Watergate without thus ending up as its main political victims.

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שם השולח: 25.11.88

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Press ReportsIsrael-South Africa

ND-Walt-New revelations about Israel's military support for South Africa has partly lifted the countries' close links, a friendship believed to be crucial to the morale of Botha's beleaguered gov't. The Israeli sale of two refueling tankers to the South African military will allow its forces to strike at virtually any point in sub-Saharan Africa. In response, Zimbabwe's Defense Minister flew to Moscow to discuss acquiring advanced Soviet ground-to-air missiles. Until now, military trade between Israel and South Africa has been mostly secret, although acknowledged by the two governments. South Africa bought about 35% of all Israeli arms exports during the 1970s. But in recent months, Israel has had doubts about its support of the apartheid gov't. Peres visited Cameroon and pledged to act against apartheid. Israel also announced that it would follow the US lead on economic sanctions. But US sanctions has not come into law and Israeli policy seems in doubt. Trade between Israel and South Africa has jumped in the past year. Dani Golan, the Israeli economic attache in Johannesburg says, "From our point of view, our main concern in trading with South Africa is the Jewish Community here. For one thing, the agreement allows the Jews to invest in Israel."

Anti-Israel Fervor at Funeral

NYT-special-Arabs who attended the funeral of a prominent Palestinian moderate in East Jerusalem sought to turn the gathering into a nationalist demonstration, shouting anti-Israel and nati-Jewish slogans as the funeral procession marched. The demonstration was an apparent recation to anti-Arab violence by Jews since a Jewish student was murdered on Nov. 15. Religious mourners gained the upper hand, however, and maintained order. Teddy Kollek has blamed extremists for stirring emotions and anti-Arab violence, which he said was the worst Jerusalem had seen in 20 years.

Peres Withholds Details in Briefing to MP's on Iran

NYT-Freidman-Peres appeared before Parliament's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee but declined to reveal precise details about Israel's participation in the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, committee sources said. Peres told the committee he would consider briefing a more secret subcommittee on the exact elements of the contacts. The full committee does not have a good record of confidentiality. A senior official said that both Shamir and Peres believe that at this time, the less said the better. The leaders are eager not to embarrass the US. The assessment is that Reagan will ride out the storm and that Israel should not panic and disclose information that could add fuel to the controversy. Although elements of the press and Parliament are putting pressure on the gov't to disclose details, the public is not doing so. (ND-LA Times; DN-wire)

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Iran Finds A World of Willing Arms Suppliers

NYT-Sciolino p.1-During its war with Iraq, Iran has bought more than \$9 billion worth of arms from America's allies and enemies alike, according to a high ranking Administration official. While North Korea and China are Iran's most important suppliers, Western countries provide about 20% of Iran's purchases. Officials and arms analysts contend that recent disclosures of US shipments to Iran through Israel will make it impossible for the Administration to stem the flow. The American-Israeli link to Iran shows that Iran will buy from almost anybody. In the last year, Israel has become the major supplier of modern American-made parts to Iran. But many European nations and Syria and Libya have also made significant shipments.

Iranian Disputes Reports

NYT-Reuters-The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament said in remarks published in an Iranian newspaper that the quantity of arms supplied by the US to Iran was smaller than has been reported in Washington.

3 in Iran Smuggling Ring Receive Prison Sentences

NYT-UPI-A Navy vet and a divorced couple from Virginia were sentenced to prison for their roles in a plot to smuggle \$10 million worth of stolen F-14 jet parts to Iran. They were given sentences of 1-2 years.

US Not Likely to Find Ally in Iran Soon

WSJ-Ibrahim & Seib-Few, if any Americans, including Reagan's emissaries, have had any personal contact with Iran's leadership. But Iran watchers in the US and such countries as Turkey and France agree that the basic thrust of Iran's external policies is the export of messianic fundamentalism, combat until victory, and hostility to the US and Soviet Union. Experts who know Iran say none of the tactical or personal differences are wide enough to offer much possibility to the US or other nations that seek to have meaningful influence. The article goes on to describe doings by and between the heir apparents to leadership in Iran.

Iran-Iraq War

NYT-AP-Iran said that Iraqi aircraft had bombed two Iranian ports, killing 10 civilians and wounding 60. Iran also said that Iran had shelled Iraqi military and industrial targets in retaliation for recent attacks.

President Confers on Iran; State Dept is Upset

NYT-Gwertzman p.1-Reagan held an extraordinary two-hour meeting with advisers to review the Iran situation as the State Dept. publicly denounced its isolation from the decision-making on Iran and called on the White House to "undo the damage quickly." The results of the meeting was closely guarded. The President continues to defend his policy.
(all NY papers)

Justice Dept. Probes Iran Deal

ND-Wash Post-The Justice Dept. has begun a high-level inquiry to determine

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whether ant US laws were violated in the secret arms shipments to Iran before Reagan waived the US arms embargo.

Hussein Tells Delegates of Being Duped

NYT-AP-Hussein said Washington had urged him to help with an arms blockade of Iran only days before American shipments to that country were revealed, the leader of a Congressional delegation said in Amman.

Buckley Linked to CIA

DN-UPI-William Buckley, the frist of 9 Americans taken hostage in Lebanon since 1984, ran the CIA's office in Beirut and was tortured by his captors before he died last year, the Washington Post reported. One source said that Buckley eventually broke down and revealed information about CIA operations in Beirut. (ND-Wash Post)

Syria Prodes Allies to Move Against PLO in Lebaon

NYT-Kifner-Syria pressed i allies among Lebanese leftists to crush the Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon. The Palestinians reported a victory in which they overran Shiite strongholds near Sidon. The Syrian calls came in meetings between VP Khaddam and Lebanese militia leaders. Jumblatt was also in Damascus, a striking development because before he had been a supporter of the Palestinains. Palestinian sources said they have been infiltrating arms and men by sea from Cyprus into Sidon. There are also caches of arms from before the israeli invasion, the sources said.

Verdict Due in Berlin Bombing Case

NYT-special-The prosecution demanded stiff sentences for two Arabs who have confessed to placing a bomb at an Arab social club in West Berlin. He asked that the defendants be sentenced to 13-14 years. Senior West German officials said that they would not break off relations with Syria as Britain did.

Israeli Court Clears Way for Trial of Nazi Camp Guard

NYT-AP-Justice Shoshana Netanyahu of the Supreem Court rejected an appael for the release of Demjanjuk. The ruling cleared the way for the trial to begin on Wednesday.

Media Notes

NYT-Jones-Malcolm Hughes, ed-in-chief of UPI, resigned from the stuggling news agency after a dispute with the organization's new president.

NYP-Patrick Purcell was appointed publisher of the New York Post and exec. VP of newspapers for News America Publishing Inc. Purcell is the publisher of the Boston Herald.

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מאת : עמנואל גורדון		

פרשת איראן

למען הסדר הטוב אני מעלה על הכתב את עיקרי הדיווח שהעברתי סלפונית למנהל מע"ת. + עדכונים:
 רגע סיום מסיבת העיתונאים חוקר הוצפנו בשאלות וכעיקר בבקשות לראיונות. בהתאם לכלל
 הנקוט בידינו בנושא כמובן לא התייחסנו. סרבנו בשלב זה לראיונות כלשהם.

השאלות מתמקדות סביב:

1. אישור ישראלי - כיחור להיכס "קונסראס"
2. היקף העסקות, הסכומים המדוברים, סוגי תנשק והציוד
3. מניעי ישראל
4. איך נוצר הקשר הישראלי-אמריקני? האם חשפתקנו בקולונל אוליבר נורת' בלא שנבקש אישור מוטמד יותר? מי יזם את הקשר?

נכון לרגע כתיבת הדברים בערכו של יום עמוס עוסקות כרגע כל מהדורות החדשות המקומיות של
 ניו-יורק בדיון קרחתני בפרשה. ההיכס המרכזי הוא המבוכה בבית הלבן וכן מי מנהל את
 מדיניות החוץ תאמריקנית, המוגדרת כ-CHAOTIC. אולם מקום רב מאד מוקדש לקשר הישראלי.
 השדרנים מדגישים את העדר התגובה הישראלית עד כה, ומראיינים (כין באולפן ובין בראיונות
 חוקלטים מראש) דוברים ערביים שונים. אלה מגנים בכל לשון של גינוי את פעולות הממשל
 המבצע לדבריהם "מדיניות חוץ ישראלית" ונגרר אחרי ישראל שלא בטובתו... חלק מהשדרנים
 מציינים שבהעדר תגובה ישראלית פנו אל הצד השני..

ברשהות מתוכננות תכניות מיוחדות בנושא הערב. CBS תשדר "דו"ח מיוחד" בשעה 8.00
 ו-NBC בשעה 9.00 "נייטליין" תקדיש לנושא שעה שלמה. חדשות הערב של ABC יורחבו
 בהתאם. תכניות הבוקר תעסוקנה גם הן בנושא בהרחבה ולכר פנו לבקש ראיונות.

בינה

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ואריר: 25.11.86	שם השולח: ברוך בינה	אישור: 4
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דף... מתוך... דפים

סוג בטחוני... שמזד...

דחיפות... מקידי...

תאריך וזיח... 25.11.1900

מס' מברק...

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אל: מצפ"א, מאו"ר, - לשם - שטיין (לשכת מנכ"ל)

דע: מקשיח

ביקור הסנטורים בינגמאן ולוין

1. כמתוכנן נפגשתי היום (25) עם הסנטורים בינגמאן שסמך את ידו על המסגרת הקונספטואלית לביקור שהצגתי בפניו (על יסוד שיחתי הטלפונית אתמול עם לשם-שטיין הוא מקוה שביום האחרון בירושלים נוכל לשבץ את שאר הבקשות עליהן דווחנו במברקנו הקודמים, להערכתי אפשר לצרף את שני הסנטורים לא"הצ של אבא אבן ב-10,12 לכבוד הסנטור קנדי), בינגמאן מעוניין לשמוע על חלקנו בתכנית ה- **SDI** והמחקר על **ATBM'S**.
2. כמו לוין, גם הוא מבקש שאשתו תשתתף במרבית התכנית, לרבות שיחות מדיניות אלא אם תהיינה בסוג "סודי ביותר" ונוכחותה לא מתאימה. אי לכך אין צורך לארגן תכנית נפרדת לנשים- מלבד אולי ביום ג' ה-9 בדצמבר, אם לא ניתן להכליל אותן בסיור לגולן ולצפון.
3. בנוסף לשני הסנטורים, הפמליה היא:

Mrs. Anne Bingaman
Mrs. Barbara Levin
Mr. Edwin S Jayne (Legislative Director to Senator Jeff Bingaman).
Mr. Edward McGaffigan (Legislative Assistant to Senator Jeff Bingaman).
Mr. Gordon Kerr (Administrative Assistant to Senator Carl Levin).
Lt. Col. D. J. Matthews (Military Escort Officer).

4. הקבוצה תגיע בשבת ה-6 בדצמבר בטיסת פן-אם מס. 114 מפאריס.
 5. יעזבו את הארץ כמתוכנן ב-11.12, אך טרם סוכם באח פניהם לירדן, למצרים או למרוקו.
 6. אין צורך להגיש רשימת פלסטינים לארוחת הבוקר של קונסול ארה"ב ב-11.
 7. בינגמאן עוזב את וושינגטון ביום ה' הבא (ה-4 בדצמבר) וברצונו לראות "תכנית פורמלית" עד יום ד', ה-3 בדצמבר. אנא לחשומת ליבכם. הבריקו נא עד יום ג' בערב.
- בחודה מראש,

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אל:הסברה, מע"ה, טעפ"א, סמנכ"ל, סמנכ"ל הסברה, לט' רוה"מ, לע"מ, דובר צה"ל, רמ"ח קט"מ
וע:ניו-יורק.

NEWS SUMMARY
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1986

MAJOR NEWS HEADLINES

TOP STORY: IRANIAN CONTROVERSY

President Reagan met with his top advisors yesterday after which he told reporters again that he had made no mistake in sending arms secretly to Iran. He also said "I am not firing anybody".
Wash. Times: No Mistake, No Firings, Reagan Says
Chic. Trib.: Reagan: I Won't Fire Anyone: Iran Deal No Mistake
USA Today: Reagan: 'I Didn't Make Mistake'

PHILIPPINES

President Aquino's press secretary Benigno said yesterday that it was rumors of a coup attempt and escalating pattern of violence in the Philippines that prompted Aquino to remove Enrile as Defense Minister. He said that a small group of conspirators had plotted to overthrow the government this past weekend.
Phil. Ing.: Coup Fears Prompted Aquino To Sack Enrile
Chic. Trib.: Plot To 'Bump Off' Aquino Told
Wash. Post: Official Says Enrile's Ouster Removed 'Dagger'
In Manila: Replacement Asks If Plot Ever Existed
Wash. Times: Aquino's Troubles With The Military Are Not Over Yet

ANOTHER SOUTH AFRICAN PULLOUT

Barclays Bank of Britain announced yesterday that it will sell its interests in south Africa, becoming the first British enterprise to do so. The move constitutes one of the most significant antiapartheid disinvestment moves yet.
Wash. Post: Barclays Bank To Sell South African Holdings

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NEWS ARTICLES

142/519/529

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3PERES DEFENDS ISRAELI ACTIONS: Some Fear Arms Deal May Hurt U.S. Ties

Wash. Post, Frankel: Foreign Minister Peres briefed the a parilamentary committee in a closed door session on Monday on Israel's role in the Iran deals just as concern is rising in Israel that Washington disclosures may damage strategic cooperation between Israel and the U.S. Sources said that Peres did not explicitly outline the Israeli role in the affair, nor did he provide details about arms shipments originating from Israel. Peres appearance was intended to stem criticism from committee members that the government had been mistaken in not reviewing the matter with them before the decision to sell arms to Iran was made. (11/25/86)

LA Times: Israel Pressed To Explain Its Iran Arms Role

Balt. Sun: Peres Withholds Data On Arms During Appearance Before Panel

SHULTZ AIDE FAULTS NSC IN IRAN DEAL

Phil. Inq., McCartney: Just as administration infighting continues to escalate, Deputy Secretary John Whitehead, the number-two man in the State Dept. yesterday told a House committee that State had been denied knowledge of the covert arms to Iran operation. Whitehead, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee shocked committee members by publicly disagreeing with President Reagan on whether Iran has abandoned terrorism and said that there is continuing evidence that Iran is still involved with terrorist activities. He also sharply criticized the National Security Council's role in the affair. Whitehead said that Sec. of State Shultz was never told exactly what the U.S. had shipped to Iran and that the State Dept. still does not know. (11/25/86)

Wash. Post: Shultz Deputy Disputes Reagan, Says Iran Still Backs Terrorism: Whitehead Also Urges Review Of NCS's Role In Operations

Balt. Sun: State Dept. Asks NSC Constraints After Iran 'Affair'

Balt. Sun: Many Express Ignorance of Iran Operations Details

CAPTIVE CIA AGENT'S DEATH GALVANIZED HOSTAGE SEARCH: Buckley's Plight Became Agency Crusade

Wash. Post, Woodward & Babcock: The kidnapping of William Buckley, one the CIA's leading experts on terrorism by pro-Iranian Islamic Jihad in March 1984, turned into a preoccupation for the Reagan administration and the CIA. For CIA director William Casey, Buckley's plight became a "private hostage crisis" and the search for him a crusade. Sources said the CIA spent a small fortune on trying to locate Buckley - an effort failed. Buckley reportedly died in Beirut in June 1985. Sources said that Buckley's death intensified administration interest in other hostages, resulting in a personal order from Reagan led to increased efforts to find and have them freed. (11/25/86)

Phil. Inq.: CIA Had 'Private Hostage Crisis' In Futile Search For Buckley



NEWS ARTICLES CON'TIRAN DEAL LEAVES BUSH WITH DELICATE PROBLEM: He Backs Operation But Remains Silent

142/519-529 3/3

Wash. Post, Hoffman: The Iran controversy poses a particular problem for Vice President Bush who has said he totally supports both the president and the operation which he has chosen not to discuss. The problem is a delicate one for Bush as he is planning a 1988 presidential bid in which the Iran affair could prove to be a political liability. Bush has been in charge of a special task force on terrorism that seems now to have been undercut by the revelations of secret arms shipments to Iran. (11/25/86)

5 SENTENCED FOR SELLING PLANE PARTS TO IRAN

Wash. Times, (wires): Five people were sentenced to prison for their role in a \$10 million scheme to send plane parts to Iran through London yesterday, despite claims that such shipments were sanctioned by the Reagan administration. All five sentenced had been charged with conspiring to defraud the U.S. by stealing and shipping equipment. Federal Judge Leland Nielsen of San Diego, California said that press reports about Iran deals coming out of Washington are "of no concern here". (11/25/86)

BERLIN PROSECUTORS SAY SYRIAN OFFICIALS HELPED IN BOMBING: Stiff Allied Response Seen If Court Agrees

Wash. Post, McCarney: State prosecutors in West Berlin charged yesterday that Syrian officials helped two Arabs in a terrorist bombing attempt in that city in March. Western diplomats, meanwhile, said that the three Allied powers that have joint control over West Berlin were likely to bar Syrian diplomats from coming to the city from East Berlin in the court rules that Syria bears some responsibility in the bomb attempt. (11/25/86)

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Q Are you in a position to be able to tell us what it was that McFall was briefing the Secretary on?

MR. REDMAN: No, I'm not.

BARRY SCHNEID (AP): Yesterday, in his testimony on the Hill, the Deputy Secretary differed with the President's assessment of whether Iran had ceased its support for international terrorism in recent months. Do you have any evidence to back up what the Deputy Secretary said?

MR. REDMAN: Let me answer that the best I can, which may seem to you a bit general, but what the President was talking about, as I understand, was a timeline, to the effect that there had been some evidence of declined Iranian participation in terrorism. The Deputy Secretary was pointing out that there is some participation of terrorism also continuing. The Secretary, in his speech in Chicago, gave at least one example which is on the record, which was Iranian efforts to insert terrorists into the Pilgrimage to Mecca this past summer.

Q Do you think that at issue, Chuck, some of this terrorism that the President was talking about, he was talking about not directed against Americans versus just terrorism, support for terrorism in general--is that one of the distinctions?

MR. REDMAN: That could again be another of the distinctions. I've just attempted to pull this out as best I can piece it together. The President in his speech talked about lessening involvement; he talked about some progress being made. The Deputy Secretary was pointing out that at the same time there continues to be some involvement, and that one area is one I can specify.

Q (Inaudible) -- that the State Department will be brought into the whole issue of relation with Iran and the Contras (inaudible) --

MR. REDMAN: Yes, I do.

Q When?

MR. REDMAN: Immediately. The -- let me start by saying, I guess, to reiterate that, as I said it from this podium a week or two ago in the early going, that the Secretary fully supports the President's policy. It's the correct policy. It's a policy that he has supported throughout. Those were the goals the the President outlined in his speech. I'll read those to you if you want, but I think you're all aware of those. The President now intends that the management and implementation of that policy be handled in normal channels. In short, that means under the direction of the Secretary and the Department of State. And, in that regard, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Armacost will be the official responsible for that policy.

141 / 517 / 528

MR. REDMAN: Obviously it's the man in charge of that policy. He'll be fully involved in it. The Attorney General made clear that there's going to be a special review committee or commission established to investigate further, and I'm sure that the Under Secretary as well the Secretary and all of us will likewise be fully informed.

MR. REDMAN: At this point I'm not in a position to promise what's going to be done beyond the fact that the Attorney General has said that there will be this special review commission.

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any other details on that.

MR. REDMAN: The details of that policy and it's implementation, I'm still not going to go into publicly from this podium, but the President and others have addressed themselves in general to that question.

MR. REDMAN: I can't answer the question, Ralph, simply because at this stage I don't know enough about the question, which the Attorney General has just addressed in the last few minutes.

141 / 518 / 528

Q Will Armacost in his role as the head of the Iranian policy department, if you will, -- will he be cast also with contributing to that investigation insofar as that connection between the two policies is involved; or is that strictly going to be in Justice Department?

Q Does the State Department expected to be represented on that panel?

Q Yesterday, Mr. Whitehead said on the Hill that Israel had not been approached for any information about this deal. Is that still the case? And can you explain why that's the case?

MR. REDMAN: I just can't help you any further on that.

Q -- requirement that there will be investigation of both,
Iran and Iraq --

MR. PEDMAN: I'm not adding anything to what the Attorney General said concerning this inquiry. That's what I know. So, whatever he says to -- I can't expand on that.

Q But from State Department, for instance, there should be investigation of Iran-United States relationship, right?

MR. REDMAN: Really at this point, I am not commenting on any other inquiries, investigations, other than the one we've referred to.

Q The Attorney General indicated that this entire policy began as a result of a conversation between the National Security Adviser, who I presume was McFarlane at the time, and a representative of the Israeli government, who I presume was David Kinche (?), because he would have had the corresponding role at that time. My question is, and could you take it -- you don't have the answer -- did the idea then come from Israel? Was this extraordinary change in American foreign policy an Israeli idea?

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141 / 518 / 528

MR. REDMAN: I can't answer that question. Those are the kind of questions that will come out in testimony, if the record is developed. There are many questions, I suppose, of that nature --

of a more technical or detailed nature -- and I don't think I'm yet in a position to get into the process of taking all those and trying to answer them for you.

Q You indicated before, or did I hear you correctly, that Mr. Whitehead had not disagreed with the President?

MR. REDMAN: I was explaining to you why he said what he said and why the President said what he said.

Q Did he misspeak, then, when he said, "I hate to disagree with the President, but --"?

MR. REDMAN: You'll have to ask him whether or not he misspoke. I'm just trying to explain to you where the two men were coming from.

Q You don't see disagreement on that?

MR. REDMAN: I could reconcile them.

Q When he became aware of the situation, Chuck, can you pinpoint that? Was it yesterday or the day before? Some of the deputy secretary's comments to the committee yesterday seemed almost prophetic, in terms of review of the NSC and so forth. When was that information known in the State Department?

MR. REDMAN: As I understand it, the kind of information you're talking about that the President announced this morning was made known to the assembled group this morning at the White House. Now, obviously, to the extent that people had been talked to over the weekend about these other questions, that issue was known at that time.

Q Going back to the original question, the magnitude that the Attorney General

was talking about 10 to 30 million dollars worth of weapons in the course of about a year. It's not peanuts. It, in a relatively small force, would be noticed. Are you, in effect here, saying that the State Department people who were in charge of liaison with the Contras did not notice that they were unusually well-armed?

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141 / 518 / 528

MR. REDMAN: What I'm saying, Jim, is at this stage I'm not prepared to comment on those kind of questions. The nature of the commission, as it's been established, is to look into what happened, I suppose; I don't know what its charter will be exactly. I'm not sure that any of us are operating in full knowledge of all the facts, as to how much money eventually went there, for what purposes. I just don't know that. As a consequence, I just can't comment on your question at this point. Chris?

Q Chuck, what is the Department's role in these hearings on the Hill going to be? And let me explain what I mean. Yesterday Mr. Whitehead went up there with about an hour and a half or two hours of notice that he was going to be going there, and clearly knew nothing and kept saying that. And he was not even the point man on this subject, who is Armacost, I guess you announced last week, and then you've said it again now. So as far as you're concerned, what is the role going to be?

MR. REDMAN: Just to answer your question in two phases, the Deputy Secretary was as fully informed as was possible to be yesterday. The fact that it was a different person does not mean that he knew less than any other person that went up there. That's simply the nature, the state of affairs. The Secretary has said that the Department, as always, is willing to cooperate to testify. And that's our standing position; we'll do that.

Q So he will go up there on December 8th, or whenever it is -- the Secretary, that is?

MR. REDMAN: As far as I know, there's been no testimony scheduled. What you refer to is a meeting with some members of Congress.

Q Chuck, coming back to Jim's question for a minute -- earlier -- when Whitehead testified yesterday, he was asked a lot of questions about what the State Department and what he knew about this operation with Iran. You know, he repeatedly said, as Secretary Shultz has said, that the State Department was uninformed or very scantily informed. At the time he testified, had Whitehead been spoken to by Attorney General Meese or by anyone in the Justice Department on the subject of the diversion of funds, the apparent overcharging for the American weapons that were shipped, the number of shipments, the knowledge that the President had of the Israeli shipments that the Attorney General mentioned, and all of those questions, had he been spoken to, was he aware of, had that information been passed on to him by the Secretary or anyone else since the weekend?

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141 / 518 / 528

MR. REDMAN: The Deputy Secretary spoke to the information that has been available to us. Concerning what we knew about any aspect of this case, we have simply been responsive to the questions posed by the Attorney General, and fully cooperative; the Secretary included.

Q So that means when the Attorney General and his staff, over the weekend, interviewed the Secretary and others in the Department, it was a question of merely asking questions, not of informing the State Department of the nature of the investigation or the conclusions that the Attorney General was reaching at that time?

MR. REDMAN: Beyond the fact that the interviews were conducted, Ralph, I don't know their contents, so I can't answer that.

Q Could you clarify something? You just seemed to say that the Secretary was not aware of any of these transfers of funds from Iran to the Contras until this morning? Is that what you said --

MR. REDMAN: The Attorney General briefed people this morning on his findings. What the Secretary -- what may have come out in his conversations over the weekend, for example, I just don't know whether the Attorney General gave him any indication of what he was pursuing. I could speculate, but I don't know. What I am saying is that the Secretary -- excuse me, the Attorney General's findings were presented this morning at this meeting with the President.

Q Until this weekend, did Secretary Shultz have any idea whether some of this money was going to Central America?

MR. REDMAN: The Attorney General addressed that question very clearly.

Q Has Secretary Shultz offered his resignation?

MR. REDMAN: The Attorney General addressed that question, too, very clearly.

Q Did he threaten to resign?

MR. REDMAN: Beyond, I'm just not going to get involved in that question.

Q Have you talked to the Secretary since the meeting this morning?

MR. REDMAN: Yes, I have.

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Q Is he satisfied with the way things have evolved over the past 24 hours?

MR. REDMAN: The Secretary, as you know, has been a participant in meetings the last couple of days. Beyond that, it's his practice not to comment on these sort of internal deliberations. And following that rule, I'm not going to engage in that either.

Q When Poindexter was appointed, the Secretary came to this room to commend the appointment and say what a good appointment it was. Does he have any regrets that Poindexter is leaving?

MR. REDMAN: The Secretary believes that Admiral Poindexter has been an able, patriotic, dedicated colleague. He has appreciated the opportunity to work with him, and he wishes him well in his new duties.

Q What about Colonel North? (Laughs.)

MR. REDMAN: I just don't have anything on Colonel North.

Q That's great!

Q Regarding another comment by the Attorney General, the Attorney General, in the context of discussing dissent within the highest reaches of the administration over the Iran policy, was asked if he thought the Secretary should resign, and I believe he said something to the effect that it was his belief that you either line up behind the policy or you get out. Do you have any observation to make on that?

MR. REDMAN: I noticed he also said he was speaking only for himself, and not for any other Cabinet members. Only to reiterate what I said earlier, that the Secretary wholeheartedly supports the President. The President has acted decisively based on the information presented to him, and that the Secretary fully supports the President's policy.

Q One further question, which is not exactly a follow-up, if you don't mind. On this committee or commission or board, or whatever it is that's supposed to look into

the conduct of American foreign policy and national security policy, do you know anything about the composition of that group?

MR. REDMAN: That was asked before you came in and the answer is, no, I don't.

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141 / 518 / 528

Q This decision that the Iran policy would revert to the normal channels, how is that being implemented in the government? Is there a presidential order now that says that or how is this being made to the rest of the world?

MR. REDMAN: To my knowledge, it doesn't take that formal a shape. There will be a meeting tomorrow or in the very near future in any case at which those people responsible on an interagency basis for dealing with that policy will get together and begin to chart the course.

Q And at the point other elements of the US government will be told that the State Department is once more in charge and the man in charge of this specific policy will be Armacost?

MR. REDMAN: It doesn't take that formalistic style, Jim. Meetings are convened, they are chaired, they are run in a very normal basis.

Q Do you expect that to continue your contacts with the Iran-Israeli --

MR. REDMAN: That question was asked earlier.

Q I realize I sound repetitious in asking this every day but circumstances keep changing. Are there any special plans now in light of the announcement today for briefing or informing America's Middle East friends, Persian Gulf allies and so on, any kind of explanation papers or documents or emissaries or anything?

MR. REDMAN: At this point, I don't know of anything that would take it further than what we've said in the past.

Q Does the Secretary intend to give a press conference on the subject?

MR. REDMAN: As of now, I don't know of any plans for a press conference, but I'll keep you informed.:

Q Has the President rescinded his finding on Iran?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know.

Q Can I try Israel one more time? Did the Israelis come forward at any point in volunteering information about this transfer of funds to the Swiss bank accounts?

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MR. REDMAN: I've given you details, which include a lot of material, including construction materials.

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141 / 518 / 528

Q Does the Secretary count on having a voice in the selection of Admiral Poindexter's successor?

MR. REDMAN: Those are the decisions made by the President. That's all I can say. How the President goes about making that decision, that's not for me to comment on.

Q I'm sorry to go over this again. You said, though, that the Secretary fully supports, in the present tense, the President's policy is a correct policy; the goals of the President "as outlined." As outlined in his speech?

MR. REDMAN: That's right, the four goals that were set forth in his speech.

Q Which includes the authorization --

MR. REDMAN: And I said, by the way, Ann, past tense. He has fully supported, wholeheartedly supported those goals.

Q How can you say, though, that he has supported those goals when Whitehead himself says, "I hate to disagree with..."

MR. REDMAN: I just refer you to the goals, Ann, and if you look at those goals, those are goals which the Secretary has fully supported.

Q Okay, so the Secretary is able to make a distinction between the goals and the intent of what the President wanted to do and the way in which that policy was conducted.

MR. REDMAN: I've talked about the goals.

Q Can you explain that? Is that correct?

MR. REDMAN: No, I'm just -- I'm not going to take it any further than what I've given you. I've given you a clear explanation of how the Secretary feels.

Q Does he agree with the tactics?

Q -- that he's made known that it wasn't a mistake to do this?

MR. REDMAN: The Secretary has not commented on that.

Q Did he disagree with the arms sales policy?

MR. REDMAN: Secretary Whitehead said that yesterday.

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141 / 518 / 528

Q Does he agree, then, with the continuation of those efforts with the Iranians, as the President said?

MR. REDMAN: He agrees with what the President has said. And we've had that question now two times. That's where it stands.

Q Chuck, the President did say in his speech that he authorized a shipment of weapons to Iran. Has the Secretary, in the past tense, to use the way you phrased it, does he support that part of the President's speech?

MR. REDMAN: I just answered George's question, which was exactly that line, to say the Deputy Secretary addressed that yesterday and answered it.

Q Well, no, no -- wait --

MR. REDMAN: He said the Secretary had opposed arms shipments.

Q All right, so you're saying that the Secretary supports the goals that the President listed in his speech, but that the Secretary does not necessarily support everything else the President said in that speech.

MR. REDMAN: I'm not going to go through every line of that speech to say what he supported and what he didn't support. What I'm saying is, the President's policy is the correct one, and it's the one that's supported by the Secretary.

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ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN
AND ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWIN MEESE
REGARDING THE RESIGNATION OF
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JOHN POINDEXTER

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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1986
12:05 P.M. EST

PRESIDENT--REAGAN: Last Friday, after becoming concerned whether my national security apparatus had provided me with a complete factual record with respect to the implementation of my policy toward Iran, I directed the Attorney General to undertake a review of this matter over the weekend and report to me on Monday. And yesterday, Secretary Meese (sic) provided me and the White House Chief of Staff with a report on his preliminary findings. And this report led me to conclude that I was not fully informed on the nature of one of the activities undertaken in connection with this initiative. This action raises serious questions of propriety. I've just met with my national security advisors and congressional leaders to inform them of the actions that I'm taking today.

Determination of the full details of this action will require further review and investigation by the Department of Justice. Looking to the future, I will appoint a special review board to conduct a comprehensive review of the role and procedures of the National Security Council staff in the conduct of foreign and national security policy.

I anticipate receiving the reports from the Attorney General and the special review board at the earliest possible date. Upon the completion of these reports, I will share their findings and conclusions with the Congress and the American people.

Although not directly involved, Vice Admiral John Poindexter has asked to be relieved of his assignment as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and to return to another assignment with the Navy. Lt. Colonel Oliver North has been relieved of his duties on the National Security Council staff.

I'm deeply troubled that the implementation of a policy aimed at resolving a truly tragic situation in the Middle East has resulted in such controversy. As I have stated previously, I believe our policy goals toward Iran were well founded. However, the information brought to my attention yesterday convinced that in one aspect, implementation of that policy was seriously flawed. While I cannot reverse what has happened, I'm initiating steps, including those I've announced today, to assure that the implementation of all

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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future foreign and national security policy initiatives will proceed only in accordance with my authorization. Over the past six years, we have realized many foreign policy goals. I believe we can yet achieve, and I intend to pursue the objectives on which we all agree -- a safer, more secure and stable world.

And now, I'm going to ask Attorney General Meese to brief you --

MR. FLANTE: Do you still maintain you didn't make a mistake, Mr. President?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: Hold it.

MR. FLANTE: Did you make a mistake in sending arms to Tehran, sir?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: No, and I'm not taking any more questions. In a just second, I'm going to ask Attorney General Meese on what we presently know of what he has found out.

Q Is anyone else going to be let go, sir?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: No one was let go. They chose to go.

MR. DONALDSON: What about Secretary Shultz? Can you give Secretary Shultz a vote of confidence, if you feel that way?

PRESIDENT REAGAN: May I give you Attorney General Meese?

MS. THOMAS: -- national security. Why won't you say what the flaw is?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: That's what I'm going to say, what it's all about.

Q Why was wrong? Why can't he?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Why don't I tell you what is the situation and then I'll take your questions?

On Friday afternoon, or Friday at noon, the President asked me to look into and bring together the facts concerning particularly the implementation of the strategic initiative in Iran and, more precisely, anything pertaining to the transfer of arms. Over the weekend, this inquiry was conducted. Yesterday evening I reported to the President. We continued our inquiry and this morning the President directed that we make this information immediately available to the Congress and to the public through this medium this noon.

Let me say that all of the information is not yet in. We are still continuing our inquiry but he did want me to make available immediately what we know at the present time. What is involved is

525 $\frac{4}{21}$

that in the course of the arms transfers which involved the United States providing the arms to Israel and Israel in turn transferring the arms -- in effect, selling the arms to representatives of Iran. Certain monies which were received in the transaction between representatives of Israel and representatives of Iran were taken and made available to the forces in Central America which are opposing the Sandinista government there.

In essence, the way

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA



525 $\frac{5}{31}$

in which the transactions occurred was that a certain amount of money was negotiated by representatives outside of the United States with Iran for arms. This amount of money was then transferred to representatives as best we know that can be described as representatives of Israel. They, in turn, transferred to the CIA, which was the agent for the United States government under a finding prepared by the President, signed by the President in January of 1986. And incidentally, all of these transactions that I'm referring to took place between January 1986 and the present time.

They transferred to the CIA the exact amount of the money that was owed to the United States government for the weapons that were involved, plus any costs of transportation that might be involved. This money was then repaid by the CIA to the Department of Defense under the normal procedures, and all governmental funds and all governmental property was accounted for, and statements of that have been verified by us up to the present time.

The money -- the difference between the money owed to the United States government and the money received from representatives of Iran was then deposited in bank accounts which were under the control of representatives of the forces in Central America.

Q How much money, sir? How much did it cost?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: We don't know the exact amount yet. Our estimate is that it is somewhere between 10 and 30 million dollars.

Q How did it come here (inaudible)?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: In the course of a thorough review of a number of intercepts and other materials, the hint of a possibility that there was some monies being made available for some other purpose came to our attention, and then we pursued that with the individuals involved.

HELEN THOMAS (UPI): Why wasn't the President told?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: The President was told as soon as we found out about it.

MS. THOMAS: He knew nothing about it?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: The President knew nothing about it until I reported it to him. I alerted him yesterday morning. We still had some more work to do. And then I gave him the details that we had yesterday afternoon.

Q Attorney General Meese --

Q Attorney General --

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Wait a minute, one at a time. Right here.

525 6/31

REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

3-2

Q Is this what you were looking for when you began, or is this something that turned up in the course of your weekend investigations?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: This turned up in the course of the investigation. The first thing that triggered, if you will, an inquiry was the fact that as people prepared their testimony, because this had been done

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA



S25 7/31

in a rather compartmentalized way. As people prepared their testimony for the Hill on Friday, there were certain things where there appeared to be more facts out there than we had already put together and it was a matter then of the President requesting me to talk with everyone who had any participation at all because one agency was doing one thing, another agency was doing another thing, there was very little paperwork and to determine precisely what all of the facts were because he wanted to be sure that he had all of the information about anything that may have occurred in the course of this whole situation. It was during the course of that inquiry that this information was found and then was followed out to the conclusions that I have mentioned.

Q Can you tell who is running national security policy? Can you clear up for the American people -- is Secretary Shultz staying, who is the new National Security Advisor and what are you recommending in terms of possibly restructuring the White House staff?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: In answer to your questions in order, at the present time, upon Admiral Poindexter actually leaving his post, Al Keel, his deputy, will be the acting Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The President has not yet selected a replacement, but he will do so as soon as possible. Secretary Shultz is remaining in his position as Secretary of State. That has not been a matter of conjecture or discussion or inquiry and the third part of your question -- oh, what recommendations will we make? We will make whatever recommendations for further proceedings come out of it, but more particularly, the President will be appointing a small commission which will look into the procedures and role of the NSC staff and will make specific recommendations to him as far as the process for the future?

Followup question and then we'll get the rest.

MS. MITCHELL: We've been told that the President was operating, from the beginning of this operation in June or July of 1985 on legal opinions, not written but oral, from you. Now one can ask then are you at this point sorry that you gave the advice that the NSC should do this operation, overlocking the objections of State and Defense?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: The only legal opinion that was involved had to do with the routine concurrence, with the finding of January, 1986. That's the only legal advice that was asked for or that was given.

MR. WALLACE: Who in the NSC was aware that this extra amount of money was being transferred to the so-called "contras" or under their control? Did Admiral Poindexter specifically know who else knew and did the CIA know? Was CIA Director

CONTINUED ON PAGE 6-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

525 8/21

Casey aware of this?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: The only persons in the United States government that knew precisely about this -- the only person -- was Lt. Colonel North. Admiral Poindexter did know that something of this nature was occurring, but he did not look into it further.

MR. WALLACE: If I could follow up, sir, what about CIA Director Casey?

MR. SPEAKES: CIA Director Casey, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, myself, the other members of the NSC, none of us knew.

MR. WALLACE: When you say that Poindexter knew, do you mean he approved of it?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: No. Admiral Poindexter knew generally that something of this nature was happening. He did not know the details.

MR. WALLACE: He did not try to stop it, however.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: He did not --

MR. WALLACE: He did not try to stop it, sir?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: I don't know precisely when he learned it. He knew of it sometime during last year. He did not try to stop it.

MR. PLANTE: General Meese, let me ask you this. In the course of your investigation, did you satisfy yourself that you know exactly how many shipments of arms went from the United States or Israel to Iran, and exactly what they contained? There's quite a bit of controversy over that.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: We are fairly sure that we know of the shipments of arms, because we have some control. We know it was shipped out of DOD stocks. We only know at this time what the United States participated in. We don't know of any other arms sales that may have been made, but we do know those the United States participated in.

MR. PLANTE: Well, let me just follow up. Have you established, in your investigation, whether anyone in the United States government gave a wink, a nod and accord (?), or any kind of approval, for shipments which Israel or any other third country may have made?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, all of the shipments in which the United States equipment was involved were made by Israel -- through Israel -- were made by Israel.

MS. THOMAS: Was that legal?

4

525 $\frac{0}{21}$ ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Yes.

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Attorney General, do I understand, sir, that what you're reporting on this morning, and what the President reported on this morning, is the discovery of diversion of funds? The central questions that have been asked for the last three or four weeks, about the propriety of shipment of arms to Iran, about the US arms embargo at the time, the questions that the Hill has been asking, you have, if I understand correctly, we have heard nothing new on those questions today. Is that correct?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: We have heard nothing new that hasn't been testified to essentially on the Hill. There may be -- we may have more information than has been brought to light already. We've talked with Congress basically. I think Director Casey gave you a pretty full exposition.

MR. DONALDSON: But with this today, the discovery and the announcement, rather, today of the diversion of funds, we take it by Col. North, does not drive to any of those other questions. Did what Col. North do, is that a crime? Will he be prosecuted?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: We are presently looking into the legal aspects of it as to whether there's any criminality involved.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 6-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

A

S 20

121
21

We're also looking precisely at his involvement and what he did so that the conclusions as to whether there is any criminal acts involved is still under inquiry by us.

Q Isn't at this time likely, even preferable, from your point of view that a special prosecutor be appointed to examine these questions? I'm talking not only about the law about the Iranian transactions or the congressional -- (inaudible) -- against the military aid to the contras. Isn't it now time for a special prosecutor?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No, if we find that there is any criminality, which, as yet, there have been no conclusions and if we find that anyone who is a covered person under the Independent Counsel Act is involved, then that would be the time to request an independent counsel as we would in any other matter.

Q Is a grand jury taking evidence on this?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No, there is no grand jury at the present time.

MS. MITCHELL: Are you still saying that the policy was not a mistake?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I think the policy, as the President said, to re-establish our relationship with Iran, to try to bring any end to the Iran-Iraqi war, to try to decrease the participation of Iran in terrorism in the Middle East and to get our hostages, all of these objectives certainly were not a mistake.

MS. MITCHELL: The way it was carried out led to this diversion of funds, by not including the other agencies.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: It didn't lead to the diversion of funds. The funds were transferred and that's one of the things that has disturbed me and has disturbed the President. That was not an inherent part of anything having to do with the policy itself. Instead, it was actually an aberration from the policy and from everything that had been described to the President and to the other members of the National Security Council.

Q -- Congress had been notified, don't you think it would have been unlikely for this to happen?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No, I think exactly the same thing could well have happened because this was something that was unknown to any of the officials that gave authorization for this in the first place to discover it.

MR. DONALDSON: How did you discover it?

Q Could you tell me what these funds were used for?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I don't know. I don't know that anyone does. They were just provided to the contras through this bank account and that was the end, so far as we know, of anyone in the United States government knowing anything about what happened.

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FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

6-2

S28 11/21

MR. DONALDSON: How did you discover it, Mr. Attorney General?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: How did we discover it? In the course of a review of documents, we came across a reference to the possibility of differences in amount between the funds being paid by Iran and the amount of the actual weapons -- that was one thing. And secondly, there were some references to this in one particular document that we found, while it didn't reveal the whole situation, we then used that as the basis for proceeding further and discussing with

CONTINUED ON PAGE 7-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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one of the participants what this all meant, and that's how this --

Q Did he admit that he had done this?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I will talk about the facts. I think as far as anything that might possibly be involved in legal action, as to who admitted what, I think it would not be appropriate for me to go into that.

MR. DONALDSON: How did Col. North -- let me put it this way -- these transfers of monies, did they only go through one man, Col. North? Were there no other people involved?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: No transfers of money went through anyone. Bank accounts were established as best we know by representatives of the forces in Central America. And this information was provided to representatives of the Israeli government -- or representatives of Israel, I should say -- and then these funds were put into the accounts. So far as we know at this stage, no American person actually handled any of the funds that went to the forces in Central America.

MR. DONALDSON: Israel deposited money into an account that they had been asked to deposit the money to.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: These are some of the details that we're still going into, because we haven't had a chance to interview everyone.

MS. THOMAS: (Inaudible) with the President.

Q Have you made any finding regarding the use of the National Security Council staff as an operational wing of the government, that it would result in something like this?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: This is what the board or the commission that the President will set up will presumably be looking at. We will probably be making recommendations in this regard. Helen, you haven't talked.

MS. THOMAS: You made the long march with the President from California, and there are many, many reports that his California friends and supporters do think there should be a real shake-up at the top. Yesterday the number two man at the State Department really damaged the President's position in a way publicly by opposing it, differing. Do you think that Secretary Shultz has behaved in proper style, and should he stay on? And what do you think should happen? What's happening to the President?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, Helen, I think you know that for the almost six years that I've been here, I've never commented on the conduct or tried to characterize the acts of any other member of the administration. I'm not going to change that now. I do think -- I will say this -- I think every member of the administration owes it

525 12
31

to the President to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with him and support the policy decisions that he has made, as well as to stand by him when something has happened which the President didn't know, as in this case, and where he has very courageously, I think, made it immediately available to the American public and to the Congress. And I intend to do that. Other people can speak for themselves.

MR. PLANTE: Yeah, but Mr. Meese, leaving aside what the President didn't know until last night about the diversion of funds, you have the spectacle of the top members of this administration fighting one another like cats and dogs over policy, and the President's credibility being damaged as a result. Have you done nothing to address that? Has anyone here addressed it?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I think again this would involve commenting on other members of the administration, which I won't do. I've already said what my position is, and my position is clearly that I think anyone who is a member of the President's staff or the President's Cabinet has an obligation either to

CONTINUED ON PAGE 8-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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525 14
2

Q Do you know how the Israelis sold them for 73 million dollars more than that?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: That's the best of our understanding at the present time, yeah.

Q Did we know they were selling them at a premium?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No one at a command level in the United States government did, no.

Q Just to follow up further, what was the purpose, as you've determined it, for setting up this special -- given the funding that's been approved, why was it that -- someone in the White House told me yesterday -- you funnelled this extra money to the Contras.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Well, I don't know precisely, except that this was all done during a period when the funding was not being provided by the Congress. This was all done prior to the first of this fiscal year when funding was resumed. So, it was at a time when no funds were being provided by the United States government.

Q Is this definitely in violation of the law though?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: That's something we're looking at at the present time, because it depends on two things: precisely what was done, and precisely who did it in terms of what people who are United States officials or United States citizens actually participated and what their conduct was. That's what we're still looking at.

Q In your conversations with Admiral Poindexter, how does he explain not having alerted anyone that this was going on? As you said, he was aware that something was happening.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Again, I'm not going into any precise conversations with anyone while the inquiry is still proceeding. Let me just say that he did not notify anyone of this, particularly the President, or any of the other members of the National Security Council.

Q General. Did he quit or was he fired?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Admiral Poindexter resigned, or actually requested reassignment to the Navy of his own accord. Before anyone ever raised any question about this, he did this of his own volition because he felt that it was his responsibility to take that action to avoid any possible confusion over this matter, and to allow the President to have a new start in terms of his national security operation.

Q When did he do it?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: He discussed it with me yesterday.

525-15
21

support the policy decisions of the President or get out. Frank. Tom.

Q Would you clear up a discrepancy?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Let me get to Tom's and Frank's question, and then we'll get the discrepancy.

Q Thank you, Ed. Specifically though, there have been published reports that you have recommended to the President or to Mrs. Reagan, or to someone, that a change needs to be made at the White House staff. Is that so?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No.

Q No so?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I have not -- the published reports I've seen are those which said that I was in link somehow with a "group of Californians" which had to do with major shakeups in the government. I have not had any conversations with any Californians about such a group, or making such recommendations.

Q -- thing Donald Regan said?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No.

Q You have not called Drew Lewis?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No, I have not called Drew Lewis and he has not called me about getting the job. Now, the discrepancy back there.

Q Is the job open?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No.

Q You said that between ten and thirty million dollars surplus funds from the Iranian arms sale may have been diverted to --

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I said may have been transferred.

Q The published reports and what the White House has said suggests that only \$12 million total was spent.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: That's right.

Q Okay, so what is the total cost of the arms?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Well, the difference is, it was twelve million dollars, approximately, worth of arms that was transferred from DOD stocks --

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Q After the information had come out, about this diversion of funds to the Contras --

ATT. GEN. MEESE: It was during the same conversation that I discussed it with him that he mentioned what his feeling had been as to what he ought to do in regard to the whole matter.

Q After he was aware that this had become public and you knew about it.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No, it had not become public at that time.

Q You knew about it, correct?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: This is correct. However, I was led to believe that he had already planned to resign prior to his conversation with me, and he actually told the President this morning.

Q You urged that members of his administration should support the President, or get out. Where does that leave the Secretary of State?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I'm not talking about any particular person. Conclusions are your business, not mine. Yes.

Q Would you please clarify the whole question of the President's condoning a third country's shipment prior to signing this order, the intelligence finding in January? Exactly what did the President know, and when did he know it, and who told him what the details were in terms of Israel shipping arms to Iran? Apart from this additional question of shipping arms to the Contras.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Well, this is still being looked into. The President did not have full details of all of the aspects of transactions that took place prior to the finding. There were -- there was at least one transaction that we know about in which Israel shipped weapons without any authorization from the United States. There was another transaction of a similar nature, although there was probably knowledge

CONTINUED ON PAGE 9-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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525 17
71

on the part of people in the United States about it and this is one of the -- there was a transaction -- one transaction -- in late August or September -- and there was another transaction --

Q -- of '85?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: -- of '85 -- in November. In the November transaction, actually those weapons were returned to Israel, it's our understanding. Both of those transactions took place between Israel and Iran did not involve at that time the United States.

Q Did the President know about this afterwards? At what point did the President know? You say he didn't have the full details. What details did he have about this transaction and when did he have them?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: The President -- this is one of the things that we're recollecting now. The President was informed generally that there had been an Israeli shipment of weapons to Iran sometime during the late summer, early fall, of 1985 and then he later learned in February of 1986 details about another shipment that had taken place in November of '85 which had actually been returned to Israel in February of '86.

MS. MITCHELL: Why did he call Shimon Peres to thank him right after Benjamin Weir's release? Why did he call the then-Israeli Prime Minister to thank him for his real help in sending that shipment of arms?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: He called -- I don't know because that is something I have not discussed with the President, specifically the call to Shamir (sic), but I think there was no question that the Israelis had been helpful in terms of their contacts with other people in regard to Weir.

MR. DONALDSON: But, Mr. Attorney General, Admiral Poindexter has told reporters that the President verbally authorized that shipment in September of 1985 from Israel to Iran. Does your information dispute that?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Our information is that the President knew about probably after the fact and agreed with the general concept of continuing our discussions with the Israelis concerning these matters. That's the information I have.

MR. DONALDSON: Who has the authorization ability, if not the President?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: To my knowledge, nobody authorized that particular shipment specifically.

MR. DONALDSON: The Israelis did it on their own?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: That's my understanding, yes.

MR. PLANTE: You know the Israelis claim that they never did anything without the full knowledge, understanding and consent of

NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

AM WHITE HOUSE-11/25/66

9-2

525 18
31

of the United States.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: My understanding is that in terms of that particular shipment -- and this is one of the things --

Q Are you talking about September, '65?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: August or September -- it's either August or September -- that on that particular occasion it was done on their own motion by the Israelis, it was known to us and it's uncertain as to whether it was known before or after --

Q Didn't Bud McFarlane meet with an Israeli official --

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Wait a minute. Let me finish my answer. And that it was, however, after the fact at least was condoned by the United States government.

(Several questions at once.)

ATT. GEN. MEESE: One at a time.

MR. SPEAKES: Hold it. Let's let the Attorney General call on one person. He's called on you and conclude because he has a lunch.

Q You corrected yourself to make a distinction between the Israeli government and Israelis that were involved in the diversion of funds. Are you implying that there was somebody outside the government and that they are in fact the kingpins behind this operation to divert the funds?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: One of things that's very difficult is to be talking about this in the middle of an inquiry which is not yet complete. We don't know all the facts. And so as far as things that are happening other than involving United States persons or United States government officials that we have talked to, we don't all the facts. That's why I'm being very careful to say that, as best we know, they were representatives of Israel, whether they were specifically authorized by the government or not, is one of the things that I would assume we will find out.

MS. MITCHELL: Will there be more resignations?

Q Andrea has had a few questions already. (Laughter.) What's to prevent an increasingly cynical public from thinking that you went looking for a scapegoat and you came up with this whopper but it doesn't have a lot to do with the original controversy?

CONTINUED ON PAGE 10-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

2

REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

10-1

526 18
31

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, the only thing that I can say is that we have been very careful to lay out the facts for you and for the American public just as rapidly as we've gotten them, much different than we would do in a normal inquiry or investigation, where we usually wait until the inquiry is complete. But the President felt that in the interest of getting the full story out, that he should make the statement that he did today, and that I should appear before you and answer questions, which I think you will agree is doing everything we can to be sure there is no hint that anything is trying to be concealed.

Q Mr. Meese, how high did this go? In other words, do you believe, and are we being asked to believe, that a Lt. Colonel took this initiative and had these funds transferred, and that only Admiral Poindexter knew about it? How high did it go?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: What you have just said is an accurate picture of what we know at this time. And to the best of our knowledge -- and we have checked this rather extensively -- it did not go any higher than that.

Q Was General Singlaub or General Sicourt (?) or anybody in the network of providing aid to the Contras, were they involved in this?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I can't tell you, because we have not completed our inquiry. And the only names that I have used are people with whom we have already talked and have pretty good information as to who's who.

Q -- talked about giving us the information about the funds to Nicaragua. Congress specifically forbade you, in the Boland amendment, from directing or providing support to the Contras. Haven't you, based strictly on the information you've given us today, violated the Boland amendment? And hasn't one of the President's staff members overseen that?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: This is something that we are looking into at the present time as to the specific applicability of a variety of laws and whether the acts that particular persons committed were in violation of those laws. I'm not prepared at this time to make a legal conclusion, because that's still under consideration.

Q -- that the Boland amendment might have been violated, and that's why you were taking this action?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: My answer remains the same. Yes?

Q You say Admiral Poindexter is being reassigned. Should he be reassigned without any determination being made as to whether or there has been any criminality involved here?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, he is a Naval officer, a very distinguished Naval officer. He has asked to be returned to the

REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

10-2

525 20
54

Navy, and the President has agreed to allow him to do that. So it's a matter of him deciding to relinquish his position as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, so he automatically goes back to the Navy, as he's requested.

Q -- several instances when the President did not have information. Do you believe, or has the President expressed to you, some concern that perhaps he needs to change some of his staff operations in order for him to receive more information and have more of a hands-on Presidency?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: It's not a matter of having a hands-on Presidency. It's making sure that those people who are working for him are following the procedures. That's the reason why he has this commission, which will be reviewing specifically what those procedures and what those standards of conduct are. As far as what the President didn't know, I only mentioned two times -- one time where he knew nothing, which was the transfer of funds to the forces in Nicaragua; the other thing was where he didn't have complete information at the time regarding the November transaction; and in the summer, the August situation, in which he was informed of that, but after the fact. And it's my understanding that the United States individuals involved were also informed after the fact.

Q But he believed that he had been badly served (inaudible) by this.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I think what that is calls for a conclusion. I'm just talking about facts. Back there.

Q What does this do to your credibility with Congress? I mean, how can your people now go down to Congress and look them in the eye when, you know, they passed a law opposing (?) funds for the Congress, and your administration, however it happened, wound up sending that money?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I think the same way you do when anybody in the administration does something that is not correct; and that is, you go down to Congress and you tell them exactly what happened, which is what the President and what I did today. I don't think anyone can be responsible if someone on the lower echelons of government does something that we don't feel, or that objectively viewed is not correct. But when that happens and you find out about it, you investigate it and you take the necessary action, which is exactly what we did and what the President has done.

Q (Inaudible.)

Q Well, will you cooperate with Congress?

MR. SPEAKER: One second. Let's let the Colonel have the privilege of asking the concluding question.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me just follow up on the previous one. Mr. Attorney General, will you cooperate with Congress?

REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

10-3

526 21
51

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: I don't like to -- I want to get Larry's permission, but I'm not really a sado-masochist. Now I think -- did I hear a question here?

MR. DONALDSON: Congress will undoubtedly require its own investigation on the theory that the administration cannot properly investigate itself in this matter. Will you cooperate with the congressional investigation?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Well, I don't accept your premise that Congress will feel that we can't investigate ourselves. We're not investigating ourselves. We're investigating certain people within the administration. There is no question whatsoever, or no implication, that anything that was done was administration policy or directed by top administration officials. However, the President has already directed, as he told you, I think, almost two weeks ago, that he wanted all members of the government to cooperate fully with the Congress so that all the facts would be presented to them. And that's why such an immediate presentation to the Congress was made, as it was this morning. Okay?

Q Sir, can I ask you, what did Col. North actually tell you? Why did he do it? And where was the money deposited? Was it in one bank, or several banks?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: I'm not going to go into specific conversations, for the reason that I mentioned earlier. The information we have at the present time is that it was done because this was during a period when

CONTINUED ON PAGE 11-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

11-1

525 22
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Congress had not provided money to the contras. It was done during a time in which it is my understanding that provisions had been made by Congress to permit the United States to seek funding of the forces in Nicaragua from third countries and -- what was the other part of your question --

Q Bank accounts.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: And bank accounts, my understanding was that the bank accounts were in Switzerland and that they were -- where normal deposits are made into numbered accounts and then this was withdrawn by the representatives of the forces in Nicaragua?

Q Was Adolfo Calero involved? Was he the man --

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I'm not going to be able to talk about people -- I don't know specific facts, Frank.

Q Do you expect further resignations?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: It's very hard. Until we get silence --

COLONEL O'LEARY: I've already been called on.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: All right, Jerry. It's your turn.

COLONEL O'LEARY: I would like to know what's going to become of Lieutenant Colonel North and if he's going back to the Marine Corps.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Lieutenant Colonel North has requested to return to the Marine Corps and that has been accomplished. As a matter of fact, my understanding is I believe that he has already indicated that he is retiring from the Marine Corps, but that I would have to check.

Q You said that it is time for the President's men to stand shoulder-to-shoulder. That is your belief. But specifically, what has the President instructed of his Cabinet members and in that meeting yesterday that lasted for two hours that he wants to have happen now?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: You know that I never comment on meetings with the President and who said what?

Q Could you say, since that money was owed to the US government, the \$30 million or \$40 million, are you going --

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No, it was not owed to the US government. All the money that was owed to the United States government was paid to the United States government.

Q Are you going to require that that additional money that went to the contras come back to the US government?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: We have no control over that money. It was never United States funds. It was never the property of United States officials. So we have no control over that whatsoever.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400

REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

11-2

525 23/37

Q What about the role of Bud McFarlane, sir, the former National Security Advisor?

Q On congressional criticism of the arms sale itself, you throw in this additional fact of the possible violation of the -- (inaudible)? Can the President legitimately expect to get anything accomplished on Capitol Hill unless he makes some changes?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Well, I think the President has already indicated that he will make some changes. One of things he's going to do is to have a commission to review the procedures and the role of the National Security Council staff. Already, Admiral Poindexter has requested return to the Navy so that the President can make some changes in that particular spot. So I think the changes are already underway.

MR. WALLACE: What about the role of Robert McFarlane, the former National Security Advisor, who was deeply involved in this whole project, did he know about his diversion of funds to the contras?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Bud McFarlane knew about it. He was told about it in the middle of the year -- April or May of 1986 -- at a time when he was no longer in the government.

MR. WALLACE: He was aware of this while it was going on?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: That's my understanding.

MR. WALLACE: A possibly illegal act and an illegal diversion of funds.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: You're coming to conclusions that we haven't made yet.

Q General, did you suggest that the administration decided not to send medicine and humanitarian aid and isn't it true that if you had decided to go that route, you wouldn't be in the mess you're in?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Well, that's a matter for foreign policy expertise. Justice is my routine.

Q Do you expect further resignations or some other way for this administration to establish its credibility and to show that its Cabinet is functioning?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I think that the administration has already demonstrated its credibility by the full disclosure of the facts. I think there's no question the Cabinet is functioning right now, as witness the meetings we've had yesterday and today and I know of no other resignations that are either contemplated or requested.

Q Do you mean to suggest, sir, that the Congress may have authorized what Colonel North did in seeking funds for the contras from third countries?

1986-11-26

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11-3

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Certainly, Congress never specifically
horized what Colonel North did. The question that has to be looked
as a legal matter is whether he committed any violation of law at
time he did that.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 12-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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525

24

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REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

12-1

525 25
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Q Were you suggesting the the intelligence committee may have given a go-ahead to the CIA, for instance, to raise money from --

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No, I did not. I did not comment on that aspect of it at all. All I said -- the only point that I'm making is that before determining whether there is any criminal offense, you have to find out what -- how the law applies to specific acts, and that's going on at the present time.

Q Could you explain how it is that President's National Security Adviser, who has the President's ear, did not at least inform the Chief of Staff, Mr. Regan, of this?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I can not explain it other than the fact that it happened.

Q Since no-one, other than those two men, knew about this, and since the President insists that he did not make a mistake in the Iran deal to begin with, why have the investigations begun? Why did he come to you last week, and say, "Look into this."?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: He didn't. I came to him.

Q Why?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: He didn't. I came to him.

Q Why?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Because, as the various -- I had been in meetings, in looking at the various aspects of the testimony, and there appeared to be things that we didn't know. Because one person had done this and one person had done that, and because of the very necessary secrecy involved in this, and the highly compartmentalized nature of the operation, a lot of people did not know certain things that were going on that were being done by others. My suggestion to the President was that we get all of the facts together to be sure that anyone testifying before Congress was being absolutely accurate, not only as to what they knew, but as to other facts, since they were representing the administration.

The President suggested that that be done -- the facts all be pulled together. It was in the course of that that this information came to light.

Q Mr. Meese, in your inquiry, did you determine how much information the State Department has gotten? Not in reference to Contra money, but in the whole respect of this Iran connection. Were they informed or weren't they?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Well, I think Mr. Shultz has said that he participated in certain meetings and did get certain information that

REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

12-2

525 26
21

he had opposed the concept of any transfer of arms, and that he was not involved nor was he informed about any of the implementing steps, and everything I have found, including my discussions with Mr. Shultz himself, verify that that is essentially correct.

Q Whose money was misappropriated? If it wasn't the United States government funds?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I don't know that anybody's money was misappropriated.

Q Can you explain a little more about how the pricing of these weapons took place? I mean who it was who set the price for the Iranians and how that occurred? Was it North? Was it the Israelis?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: My understanding is that all of that took place in negotiations between people we might call loosely representing Israel and people representing Iran. And so this was not done in the presence of or with the participation of any American person, to the best of our knowledge, at this time. That's one of the things that we'll be looking into.

Q Did the Israeli officials know that this money, then, was being transferred to the contras, that that was the goal, or the target of it?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I don't know whether Israeli officials, as opposed to representatives, depending on who the people were, knew. That's one of the things, again, that we will be looking at.

Q Who were the Israelis and who were the Iranians?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Again, I can't mention any names until we actually have those things pinned down, which is one of the things we will be looking at.

Q Is this Colonel North's idea? Was it Colonel North's idea? If we can bid up the amount of money the Iranians are paying, we can take that extra money and divert it to the contras. Did he come up with the original idea? Was it an Israeli idea? And the second question, sir, there have been allegations that Vice President Bush was involved in supplying money or aiding the supply of money to the contras. Do you know whether or not he was aware of this project at all?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: First of all, I don't know precisely what the conversations were. Who said what to who, when this thing first got started. Again, it's a matter that is still under investigation. I do know that the vice president did not know about any of this until yesterday when I informed him of essentially the same information I had given the President.

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REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

12-3

525 27
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Q How is it that so much of this can go on and the President not know it? He is the President of the United States. Why doesn't he know?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Because somebody didn't tell him. That's why. And remember, we're talking about three situations over a period of some six or eight months, and the people who were involved in the situation didn't tell anybody, including the President. So, it's common understanding why the President wouldn't know because no-one in the chain of command was informed. Yes.

Q Mr. Meese, if they weren't U.S. funds, whose money was this?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Well, I think that's -- I would assume that it either belonged to the party who had sold the weapons to the Iranians,

CONTINUED ON PAGE 13-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

13-1

525 28
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or it belonged to the party who had bought the weapons and given the money. But I think it would probably be the party that sold the weapons to the Iranians.

Q Are any other principals on the Iranian or the Israeli side, were they involved in cases where the Justice Department was prosecuting or investigating separately?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Not to our knowledge, in answer to your question.

Q Were those -- is there any evidence or indication those bank accounts were set up by the CIA?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: No, there's no indication at all.

Q -- with the help of the CIA?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: No, there's no indication whatsoever. To the best of our knowledge, no one in the CIA knew anything about it.

Q Can you explain, sir, why the people who are leaving today, they are the ones who proposed to the President the idea of arms shipments to Iran, if perhaps they kept other information from the President on that policy as well, why doesn't the President ask for a re-examination of that policy? Perhaps the four goals that you mentioned, which they proposed, that there's a question about them as well. Perhaps the President has been misled about this larger policy as well, since we know that Secretary Shultz opposes it, that Secretary Weinberger opposes it, and the main advice came from NSC, from the people who are now leaving. Don't you think the President should re-examine that policy as well?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: No, because the people who are leaving today were not the people that proposed the policy to the President. The policy was proposed initially as a result of conversations with Israel. It was then presented to the President by the then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It was discussed with all of the members in January, with all the members to the -- or with almost all the members of the National Security Council. And then on the National Security Council, there was a split of opinion. But after hearing all of the arguments pro and con, the President decided that the potential for achieving the goals of effecting peace in the Middle East, helping secure that area, stopping a war and obtaining our hostages, was worth the risks that were involved.

Q When the President made that decision, who was his National Security Advisor?

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Admiral Poindexter was actually -- it really was at the time when Bud McFarlane was leaving. The discussions with the President about this specific series of events had gone on under Mr. McFarlane during 1985, and the specific

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REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

13-2

discussions of some of these things that led to the finding in January had actually started in December, while Mr. McFarlane was here. He was transferring out during the latter part of December and the early part of January. At that time, Admiral Poindexter came in.

Q He knew about details of this operation, but didn't tell anyone in the administration --

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Mr. McFarlane?

Q Yes.

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: He didn't learn of this, the transactions involving the forces in Central America, until probably April

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FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA



REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

14-1

or May of 1986.

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Q Why did he not say anything to the President?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I don't know.

Q But he did go on a mission for the President in May of that year, right? He was a representative of the President.

ATT. GEN. MEESE: That's correct. Whether he talked with the President during that period of time, I don't know.

Q Why did the President take these people's advice, sir?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Well, because the President didn't just take these people's advice as to the overall policy. He had the advice of the entire range of his National Security Advisors.

Q They all agreed with him?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: Some of whom advised against it, some of whom advised in favor of it?

Q Who advised in favor of it besides members of the NSC?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: As you know, I don't talk about who gives advice to the President.

Q The people who you say profited from this diversion of funds, these then are the people that we were working with -- these people perhaps that were even aboard the plane with Mr. McFarlane into Iran?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: No, no. The people who profited? I don't know that anyone profited.

Q In Israel who you say owed this money that got diverted into --

ATT. GEN. MEESE: The money that was transferred to the forces in Nicaragua, I don't know that anyone who was involved in that transaction was necessarily on the plane with Mr. McFarlane.

Q We know now of three specific shipments -- it was our mistake -- the one in late August, early September, as you've described it; one in November which was returned to Israel and; then another one in May. The diversion of funds took place from which of those or all three of those?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: There were several shipments -- there were, I believe three or four shipments during 1986. I can't give you the precise dates. The transfer of funds were involved with at least and possibly three of those shipments during the period from roughly January of 1986 or February through probably September of 1986.

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REAGAN/MEESE-11/25/86

14-2

Q Mr. Meese, Mr. Hasenfus is in jail in Nicaragua, as you know, from running supplies into Nicaragua to help the contras. Did his mission, can you now say, was it any way funded by any of these diverted funds?

ATT. GEN. MEESE: I have no knowledge and I doubt if we'll ever find out, since we have no information about how those funds were used, once they were ultimately received.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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מאריך וזיח. 25.11.20. 86

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אל :- מצפ"א, ממ"ד/סוריה

משיחה עם דאג גרין (סוריה/NEA)

1. השלכה אמנם ראשונית מהסנקציות שהטילה ארה"ב היא שהסורים מבקשים להמשיך עזה "בעסקים כרגיל" והדיאלוג היומיומי בעניינים שוטפים, כווינגטון ובדמשק, נמשך כהרגלו ופרט להוצאת השגרירים (ג'ואג'תי כזכור עזב כאן לפני כחציית השבוע כלקח לסוריה כשנתיים ואז עזב קודמו ועד למינויו) קשה לאתר לפי סימני מתיחות או שינוי דפוסי היחסים בין שתי המדינות.
2. גרין מונה בספר סיבות לפרופיל הסורי הנמוך. פרט לתקשורת ולהתבטאויות, כלפי ארה"ב אף שמדיניות שהסורים יכולים לשנות זאת בן לילה (א) לסוריה יש אינטרס בסיסי מובהק לקיים דיאלוג עם ארה"ב. (ב) נושא הסנקציות שכולס מסכימים שאין בהם פגיעה חמורה בדמשק נבלע בתוך הפרשה האיראנית ולא זכה, יחזית, לתהודה בינ"ל כבנסיבות אחרות, כשידוע שהסורים חרדים ביותר לתדמית הבינ"ל. (ג) אסד ממחין, וכהרגלו אינו נחפז, לראות כיצד יפול דבר בזירה הפנימית כאן בעקבות פרשת איראן. (ג) ויכוח פנימי אפשרי בצמרת הסורית ביחס לתגובה לסנקציות. נקודה זו עולה בדיווחי השגרירות האמריקאית בדמשק, בייחוד בקרב המפלגה בין כאלה הדורשים צעדי נגד חריפים לבין כאלה המגלים יתר זהירות. גרין העיר שדעה זו של קיום ויכוח בהנהגת הבעת' הסורי או בדוגים אחרים אינה מקובלת עליו ואין בידינו מידע שיאשר זאת פרט לוויכוח הנ"ל (שאל האם ידוע לנו על כך).
3. השאלה העניינית המשיך היא איזו השפעה תהיה על פרשת אל על בלונדון על הנדיניות בתורם הטרור בעתיד. גרין בדעה שהסורים לא יניחו ממדיניות הטרור שלהם - זו המיוחסת לאבו נידאל - כגון בברלין, מדריד וקראצ'י מאחר שזו שרתה אינטרסים סורים ואף הגיבה פירות. בתחום זה גרין מבחין בין טרור סורי המכוון נגד פלסטינאים, יריבים-ערבים-ואף-ישראלים כגון במקומות הנ"ל לבין פרשת אל על בלונדון שהדעה לגביה לפחות שלו, שהיא בבחינת "חריג" ולפי שעה ללא הסבר נאות באשר למעורבות אסד בה. יעדיה וכד'. מכל מקום גרין מגדיר כ"פעולה אמוציונלית" בשעה שהמדיניות הסורית בעבר בייחוד כלפי פלסטינאים היתה מחושבת ומקצועית יותר.
- מסקנת הביניים של גרין היא שהסורים ינהגו בסוגיה בפרופיל נמוך בסדרה המידית.
4. גרין גם לא מאתר השפעה כלשהי בזירה הפנימית. המצב הפנימי, המלווה במשבר כלכלי שאין לו נגיעה לתחום הפוליטי, רגוע יחסית ולא מאותרת פעילות כלשהי של גורמי אופוזיציה כגון פיוגועי חבלה וכד'. במעמדם של נושאי תפקידים כגון ח'ולי ואחרים לא חל שינוי שניתן להצביע עליו.

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גרין התלוצץ אסד, בענין הטרור, נמצא להבדיל במצב דומה לזה של ריגן בפרשת איראן ליישניהם קשה לתודות ששגו". בתחום אחר - בריאות אסד המשתמש אינדוקטור לנעשה בסוריה, לא נמצאו תימוכין לכך שחלה הרעה מעבר לרגיל. נשיא חבי הנפט (אמריקאית) שגפגש עמו לאחרונה לשיחה בת שלוש שעות מציין שלא נוכח בשום תופעה חריגה והרושם הוא שהנטיא הסורי מתפקד כרגיל.

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מס' פנימי...

מצפ"א, ממ"ד/לבנון, מזתי"ם

משיחה עם דיבל פילו (לבנון / NEA)

1. מאפיין את המצב בלבנון פרט לדרום, כסטטי בעיקרו. גורמי הכח מצפים לראות כיצד ניתן לתרגם את מה שמעריכים כחולשה סורית בלבנון ובידודה בזירה הבינ"ל לשפה של נכסים עבורם.

2. אין בידיו אינדיקטורים ברורים לכך אך נדמה לו שהנ"ל ובייחוד הנוצרים, קרי הכח"ל (מיותר להוסיף שאינו נמנה על המחבבים אותם) עשויים להגיע לקריאה לא נכונה של המפה הסורית ולצאת במהלך מדיני שיהווה מעין התגרות בסורים ויחייבם להגיב על כך. כל זמן שהנוצרים ישחקו במגרשם, כגון דוגמאת חידוש פני החזית הנוצרית הרחבה הדבר יתקבל ע"י הסורים "בסלחנות" נקיטת יוזמה מדינית מעבר לכך ושחניב פרות כגון בועדת החלבורה הנשולשת עלולה להוציא את סוריה משלווה. האמריקאים גם בוחנים הנעשה באמ"ל כאינדיקציה להערכתה את עמדת סוריה. בתנועה קיים לחץ פנימי על נביה ברי לנקוט במהלכי פיוס כלפי מתנגדיו שם, בייחוד אלה שהודחו על ידו בבחירות הפנימיות האחרונות. יש כאלה באמ"ל הטוענים שברי אדוק מדי בביצוע התכתיב הסורי שבסופו של דבר הפך את אמ"ל לעוד ארגון חסות סורי, בשעה שנביה ברי לא השכיל לקטוף פירות מהליכתו בתלם הסורי כגון בתחום המאבק עם אש"פ בעיקר סביב צידון והמאבק המתמיד עם החיזבאללה. אינדיקציה למגמת התבדלות של אמ"ל דהיינו חוסר ביטול עצמי בפני סוריה וניהול קו עצמאי יחסית גדול יותר עשויה להיות את מוקר הפעילות האיראנית הנוכחית בלבנון. דיבל אמנם מציין שהיא נוגעת בראש ובראשונה לגיבוש הממנה השיעי בלבנון אך היא עשויה נחופו של דבר לגעת ביחסים עם סוריה, שספק אם היא מתלהבת מפעילות זו בתחום הנתון לשיפוט.

3. מדיניות ארה"ב. (מברק מרכז/לבנון 142) פילו כגרין שלל ההודעה המיוחסת לשגריר קלי "אלאנואר" (10) בנוגע לתפקיד סוריה בלבנון. (א) לא ידוע שקלי התבטא בצורה כזו ומדיעת האיש הוא מטיל ספק בכך שהיה מנצל פורום כזה להודעה בעלת חשיבות מדינית לו תיאורטית היתה נכונה. היומן לדעתו שיכש דברים ואפשר לומר במסגרת ביקורת כללית על עמדת סוריה בנושא הסרור.

4. יוניפי"ל. פילו מטיל ספק בתוצאות פעילות כלשהי בנושאי יוניפי"ל/לבנונים על פריסת צל אין ממש. האו"ם במקום, עקרונית, מתנגד להכניית של פריטה משולבת עם יוניפי"ל ואילו ישראל לא תסכים להרחבת תכנית נאקורה כך שלדעתו לא צפוי שיבוי בשטח. הקרית מכונית החופת עם חיילי פיגיי מסבכת המצב. טרם מוגיה בידיו המונה ברורה של משמעות הפיגוע מבחינת המבצעים, המטרה

ס 210 ס 220
ד 91...1...מחור...דפים
סוג בטחוני...שמור...
דחיות...הכנס...
תאריך וזמן...1130 25 נוב' 86
מס' פנימי...

2/2

ס 218

ד 2... מתוך... דפים

סוג בסחונת

דחיות

מאריך וז"ח

מס' סדר

וחאם הוא מסמל חידוש הפעילות בתחום זה.

לא צפויה גם פעילות אמריקאית מדינית יוצאת דופן, אם כי עלול להיווצר מצב מעין שנושא חידוש המנדט 19.1.86, וקודם לכן דו"ח המזכ"ל בנדון יבוא טרם כינוס הקונגרס לריון בנושא הקצבה להמשך פעילות הכח. הממשל עדיין מתאבק עם משרד ה- BMS טרם שהנושא יובא לפני הקונגרס. הרושם של פילו הוא שעניין חידוש המנדט ל-6 חודשים נוספים עשוי להיקלע למצב קשה למרות שהצופים הסירו לפי שעה אינדיקציה בסוגיה. אגב, לדעת פילו הפעילות האלג'יראית בתחום לבנון נוגעת למאמצי פיוס בין הטיעים ואש"ף ולא עפ"י הידוע לו לנושא יוניפי"ל.

5. מגעי אמין - סוריה. פילו כדעה שהצדדים נחונים עדיין בשלב של גישושים כאשר "סר היום" שלהם עדיין שונה, הסורים טרם השתכנעו בכוונותיו של אמין כלפי פגישת כדור והמבחן טרם קיומה יהיה בנושא ההסכם המשולש וכן בכוונותו לרסן את הכיחל קרי ג'עג'ע. בשני התחומים עליו להוכיח נקיון כפיו. אמין לעומת זאת עפ"י הערכת פילו עדיין מתמרן ומנצל במתווכים למתן דרישת הסורים. מסתיר עמדתו האמיתית בנושא ההסכם המשולש ואינו מוכן להסתכן בעימות פנימי עם הכח"ל שמא תתפרש עמדתו כשינוי ביחסו כלפי ההסכם הנ"ל. הסורים הזויים יותר מאשר אמין, שאיש לא מוכן להישבע לאן פניו.

6. ביקורי אישים לבנוניים. פילו ציין שידוע על ביקור אילי סאלם שנפגש עם המזכ"ל וכן חרירי שנועד מרפי, על אחרים לא שמע. פילו מציין שרובם היו דלא תכלית מוגדרת אך הודה שסאלם בא בשליחות אמין לגשש בדבר הזמנתו לווינגטון, המזכיר שהעניין דרכו ברכת "חזק ואמץ" לאמין הדגיש שביקור כזה אינו במקום מאחר וארה"ב לא רואה מקום לפעילות מדינית מצדה בתחום הלבנוני ההסבר לכך נעוץ עפ"י פילו בכך שארה"ב אכן לא רואה כל תכלית בביקור כזה אך גם אינה מכינה פשר מסעותיו של אמין בזירה הבינ"ל. המדיניות האמריקאית היא שלא להשורר עצמה למדיניות אמין ועיקר עניינה בלבנון הוא מעקב אחרי סוריה, שם כולל עניין החטופים ופנעשה בדרום - יוניפי"ל חרירי שנפגש מרפי בא בכיסוי של טיפול בקרן ע"ש אך ביקש בזהירות לדווק מה נדוש בממורה לגילוי עמדה אמריקאית פעילה יותר בלבנון. פילו מציין שהשיחך היתה בלתי משמעותית שכן האמריקאים איבדו אמונם בחרירי ונוהגים בו יחס של הסתייגות (להזכיר שגם הסעודים נוקטים כלפיו באותה אמה). פילו סיפר שמשרד ההסברה הלבנוני כאן פנה אליהם להפגיש את סעאדה עם ראשי האגף. בדיון שהתקיים הוחלט שמוכנים להפגישו עם הדרג של רוקי סודארת, דהיינו סגנו של מרפי ומטה, גלספי ואף הדסקאים, אך לא מעבר לכך.

אלי אבידן

h/c

ס ו ס ס ב ר י

דף...ל...מחור...!...דפים

סווג בסחונני...שמור...

דחיפות...שמור...

תאריך וז"ח...הגדל...25/400

מס' פנק...

אל:

המשרד

517

אל :- ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א

דע :- מנכ"ל מדיני

1.12

סמינר מים ב- CSIS

הסמינר התקיים כמתוכנן בהשתתפותו של מאיר בן מאיר, מנכ"ל ממחקלאות ומנט"ר
חדאדין נשיא רשות עמק הירדן מירדן.

השתתפו באורח פעיל גם ולק ווראל סמנכ"ל קשרי כלכלה בילטרליים במשה"ח התורכי
והשגריר המיועד לטהראן וכן הרולד רוד, מנתח מדיני במשרד מזכיר ההגנה, ראג' קרישנה
מהבנק העולמי וכן זליג טאובנבלאט מבקטל.
פרטים והמלצות בדיפ.

בנתיים בודאי תשמעו הפרטים ממר בן מאיר החוזר ארצה עוד השבוע.

מתני

23-

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513

97...!...מתוך...?

סיוג בסיוני סמור

דחיסות..... מידות

סמ"ר וז"ח 1015 25 117 86

מבית מדרש 'מבית'.

משיחה עם ווניק (רמ"ח מזא"ר במחמ"ד)

2. הונגריה. הרושם הוא שהמצב הכלכלי עם עדיף לאין ערוך על זה שביוגוסלביה או ברומניה ובהשוואה למקומות הנ"ל אף שורר שיפור במצרכי מזון בחנויות אך גם שם ניתן להבחין בכך שהכלכלה דורכת במקום. מתרבים הדיבורים על הצורך ברפורמות כלכליות גם שם באם רוצים למנוע רגעים בסווארך יותר. הבעיה המרכזית - מחלה כרונית במ"א"ר - הביורוקרטיה החוסמת כל שינוי או גישה חדשנית בתחום זה.

לשאלתי. כיצד מסביר האינטרס היוגוסלבי השיב שיוגוסלביה רוצה להיות מעין גשר בין גוש הבלקן ואתר"ב. לכווגייה יש מימד אמריקאי והוא הויכוח הפנימי במחמ"ד בין הספקנים בתועלת שבדיאלוג עם יוגוסלביה בנושא לבין כאלה ובתוכם המזכיר המבקשים לגלות אורך רוח. נושא שני שתפס מקום בדיונים היה המאבק בטרור הבינ"ל. היוגוסלבים טענו שהם נגד מעשי טרור וכדי אך האמריקאים לחצו לדיון מהותי בנושאים ספציפיים של הש"פ למלחמה בטרור והוסכם להמשיך הדיונים בחוות זה.

המשלחת יצאה ברומס קסה מהביקור בעיקר בנעשה בתחום הכלכלי. שר הכספים Rikardovic השווה את הביקור בווינגטון ונפגש עם גיימס בייקר הבטיח שינתן מקום רחב יותר לפעילות גורמים שונים בכלכלה היוגוסלבית ושתוך חודש - חודשיים הממשלה תנקוט במספר רפורמות כלכליות אך הבעיה

[illegible]

2/3

513

היא כפולה (א) הנשך היריבות בין חלקיה השונים של הפדרציה המרכיבה את הרפובליקה כאשר ברוב המקרים, אז לא בכולט השיקולים המקומיים מכריעים את אלה של הרפובליקה. (ב) רה"מ מיקוליץ אינו מגלה נחישות והחלטיות מספקיה ומהורה אכזבה לא קטנה ממה שציפו ממנו טרם שנכנס לתפקיד.

4. רומניה. הנושא המרכזי היה זכויות האדם. ווניק מציין שהפגישה החיובית ביותר הייתה עם צ'אושסקו מאשר עם שה"ח Totu. עניין מיוחד היה נושא הקהילה היהודית ופרשת שריפת ביהכנ"ס בבוחוש שעלו בשיחה עם סגנית שה"ח Groza וקודם לכן עם הרב רוזן. האחרון שסיבז את פעולת השלטונות בפרשת בוחוש קשר את השריפה לגילויים אנטישמיים אחרים ובייחוד לחוסר תגובת השלטונות להם, היוצרת תנאים לתופעות כנ"ל בעתיד. האמריקאים שוחחו ברוח זו עם Groza תוך שהדגישו שאם מעשים כאלה יימשכו הם עלולים ליצור בעיות ביחסי ארה"ב - רומניה באמצעות הקהילה היהודית בארה"ב לרבות בנושא ה-MFN. סגנית שה"ח שחזרה על הגירסה של מכיעים פליליים, המסתגר שמאחורי המעשה, הבטיחה שהממשלה לא תרשה גילוי אנטישמיות.

הרושם הכללי מהביקור בבוקרשט מדכא. תורים ארוכים ללחם וחוסר במצרכי מזון. אמנם צ'אושסקו שנראה במלוא כוחותיו זכה בהישג של הורדת מחצית החוב החיצוני שעמד על כ-12 ביליון אך זאת במחיר הורדת רמת החיים בצורה דרסטית וקיצונית.

5. פולין. המשלחת האמריקאית נפגשה עם פקידי משה"ח הפולני בראשות סגן השר KINAST שהגיע לשם כך לוינת. המטרה "תסדר מחדש" (RE-ENGAGEMENT) של היחסים על בסיס של צעד אחר צעד. השינוי יבוא, כך ווניק חוזה, במחצית השנה הבאה, בשני תחומים (א) מעמד ה-MFN. (ב) חידוש אשראי ממשלתי. בטיחה שהיתה קשה ביוזור ובה הוחלפו האשמות הדדיות מי אחראי להידרדרות היחסים, חתגלו חילוקי דעות בעיקר בשאלת באילו תחומים להתחיל. הפולנים עמדו על שני תנאים דלעיל ואילו האמריקאים מבקשים להתחיל דווקא ב"עניינים קטנים" כגון טיב הדיאלוג בתחומי המדע, טכנולוגיה ומסחר, התנו התקדמות בנושאים קרדינליים בשני תנאים (א) מיסוד מדיניות ליברלית והתפייסות בין המגזרים השונים בפולין ולאורך זמן ולא רק בתופעה של שחרור עצירים פוליטיים. (ב) המנעות ממדיניות ענישה כלפי אנשי סולידריות והכנסיה. בסכום ווניק אפיין מערכת היחסים הנוכחית בין פולין וארה"ב כמערכת הנמצאת במצב של נזילות STATE OF FLUX. להערכתי בדבר המשבר בתחום המספנות בגדנסק בעקבות סדרת מאמרים ב"ווישינגטון פוסט" לא מכבר על כך שהמספנות, אחד ממוקדי ההצלחה הפולנית בתחום התעשייתי בעבר, לא עומדות בהתחייבותן ופולין נאלצת למסור פרויקטים לגורמי חוץ מתחרים, העיר שהמשבר בתחום התעשייתי נעוץ בטחי סיבות מרכזיות (א) חוסר מוטיבציה לעבוד. (ב) השימוש בטכנולוגיות מיושנות.

ס ו פ ס ס נ ר ר

דף 3...מחור...דפים

סוג בסחוני

דחיות

מאריך וז"ח

מס' פנקס

אל:

3/3

513

6. ברה"מ - מזא"ר. ווניק מציין כתופעה שחזרה על עצמה בסיוור (רידג'וואי ביקרה (לבדה) גם בבולגריה) היא שבכל אותה מהמדינות הנ"ל הדוברים חזרו בפני האמריקאים על כך שיש לתת לגורבצ'וב הזדמנות להוכיח עצמו מאחר שהוא כנה ביחס לשינויים ששואף להנהיג בתחומי המפלגה והבירוקרטיה ויש לתת לו אשראי של אורך זמן. ווניק מעיר שבוודאי אפשר להתווכח בנקודה זו אך על כך שהמזאריים היו רוצים בכך אין ויכוח.

אלי אבידן

10.10

ט ר פ ס
ד... מתוך... דפים

סוג בטחוני... דאטא

דחיפות

תאריך וזיית: 25-11-86

מס' מברק

משרד, כחול

489 504

מחן מדינת ישראל (25/11)

IN POST

Wash Post 11-25-86

JACK ANDERSON and JOSEPH SPEAR

JACK AN

Arms Deals and the Israeli Connection

It should have been no surprise that Israel was the middleman used by the Reagan administration for its secret shipment of weapons to Iran. For years the Israelis have been up to their shoulder holsters in the murky world of international arms traffic.

Purchase orders, bills of lading and other documents obtained by our associates Corky Johnson and Donald Goldberg relating to Central Intelligence Agency "front" corporations show a mysterious Israeli thread woven through weapons deals conducted by the CIA.

In 1969 the CIA set up a front called Associated Traders, which funneled millions of dollars through the First National Bank of Maryland to pay for huge arms shipments. Two weapons brokerage firms, Sherwood International Export Corp. and Shimon Ltd., handled the transactions for the CIA.

Shipping papers show that several of these arms shipments originated in Israel. Sherwood has had a close working relationship with Israeli defense officials, our sources said, and several former Israeli military officers have worked for the company.

Shimon is a Cayman Islands company believed to be associated with Sherwood but little is known about it. Michael Kokin, president of Sherwood, did not return our telephone calls.

One interesting CIA arms shipment handled by Shimon in 1982 can be traced from the Israeli Mediterranean port of Ashdod to Lagos, Nigeria, where the trail ended. The CIA reportedly operates an air cargo service out of Lagos, and may have delivered the \$4 million in weapons to

U.S.-supported rebel groups, including those fighting in Angola.

The Israeli shipment was part of a \$9.4 million transaction in which Shimon sent weapons to Lagos from several locations, including Portugal, the former colonial power in Angola. Portugal is a major transshipment point for arms; some of the U.S. shipments to Iran went by way of Portugal, according to our sources.

In another CIA arms deal, the agency's front company, Associated Traders, received 57 radio transceivers manufactured in Israel. The units, which cost \$128,250, were purchased by Sherwood and flown from Tel Aviv to Washington-Dulles International Airport.

In 1984, Sherwood and an Israeli shipping firm, Merico, were involved in a little-publicized incident after Italian officials seized the Merico freighter Viking, which was loaded with weapons that they feared were destined for the Red Brigades terrorists.

Merico told the Italians that the ship's cargo was headed for Brazil in a deal arranged by Sherwood. Brazilian officials at first denied they were importing the arms, but later said they had contracted with Sherwood for the weapons.

According to court papers, Sherwood was recently stopped by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) from importing 17,000 frames for Browning .30-cal. machine guns. The seller was the Israeli Defense Ministry. Sherwood executives said they wanted to assemble the machine guns for sale to "friendly foreign governments."

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including "מחן מדינת ישראל" and various numbers and dates.

אמא, חוזמ: 9929

אל: ווש/ 377

מ-: המשד, תא: 251186, חז: 1700, חח: מ, סג: ש,

בבב

שמור/ מיד

מתני.

יצוא טכנולוכי - שלכ 333.

1. ביקור היוז - שגארהייב מזאי (פרנק שפארהאו) מרכזת הביקור ודואגת לו. הצענו עזרתנו - אמ יזדקקו לכך. ככ' ננסה לארגן ארוחת צהרים או ערב מטעם המשד להיות עוד בטרם יפתחו השיחות.

2. המומי - אינ לנו בקשות ו/או דרישות מיוחדות לקראת פגישתך עם היוז.

3. השיחות יתנהלו באולם הישיבות של תמייס ומקס ליבנח הוא יוייר משלחתנו.

משפט-לשי ממנכלי

ל/ח

-36-

סססס

ווינגטון, בוקשט.

הגריד. א. אבידנ.

משיחה עם פוירורגר משגי אהיב:

1. שאל בדבר הידיעה ביהאצי (24) על נכונות
דיהימי לכוונן יחסים קונסולריים עם ישראל (מפי
הדובר הסובייטי גרסימוב מסגרת תדריך לסתבי חוצ).
השבנו כי מהלכו אותו תדריך, כפי שפורסם עיי טאסיס
לא כלל כל התייחסות לנושא. מנסים לאתר הנוסח בענינו
אם היה, וחששו.

2. סיפר על דו"ח מנהל מזאיר במחיד, ווניק,
שתלווה לוויטהד בביקור ברומניה.

משיחה נפרדת עם גבי גרוזה, ס/שהיח (4/11) העלה
בין הנושאים את הירידה במספרי ההגירה (הכילית).
השוו מספרים. לפי גרוזה עזבו, בין ינואר לאוקטובר
1649 לאהיב ו-1210 אושרו לישראל. אושרו גם כ-000
12 גרמנים לאהיב. לדבריה הכמות מעידה על ייחוס
רומניה לקראת אהיב, ואף הדגישה כי חלק מהמקרים
אושרו עקב תביעות אמריקניות ספציפיות.

וויניק העלה התופעות האנטישמיות כפי שמצאו ביטוי
בתונות (המאמר והשיר המפורסמים שזכו לחגולתו הבוטה
הרב רוזנ). וויניק העיר כי אמנם אינו מבקש להחזיר
בעניני פנים אכ מדגיש ההשפעה השלילית על יהדות
אהיב.

גם וויטהד העלה נושאי האנטישמיות, בשיחה עם שהיח טוטו.

תגובת השניים היתה כי רומניה הוקיעה תמיד אנטישמיות
ומה שהופיע בעתונות לא היה בעידוד השלטונות.

3. ביקור גבי רידגיווי בולגריה: נפגשה (10) עם
ס/שהיח גוטסב לשיחה שהתקיימה בנושאים בילטרליים
ומזרח-מערב. מטרתה היתה לזהות נושאים של הסכמה ואכן
נמצאו בשטח המלחמה בסמים וקשרי תרבות.
ניסתה גם לקדם איחוד משפחות, הזכירה מספר פעמים דאגה
מיחס בולגריה למיעוט התורכי. הביעה מורת רוח מחסימת
מגעים, משגי אהיב, עם אזרחים - בולגרים ייעימם
ניתן לעשות עסקים.
נגעה בשתיפי בולגריה - ארגוני טרור, תוכ הבעת דאגה
עמוקה, תבעה גינוי לטרור ותחזתה מדוע חשב נחקבל בסופיה.
מסרה שלפי דוחות שבידה סייעה בולגריה לחמש ואבו נידל
וכי נשק בולגרי נתגלה בידי טרוריסטים.

כל זאת גם מזגמה לדברי ס/שהיח כי בולגריה מתנגדת
לטרור אכ תומכת בתנועות שחרור לאומי. ס/שהיח קבל
להאשמות מפי אישים אמריקנים (כגון קייסי ושולצ)
הצביע על הבדלי גישות בין צרפת ואהיב במקרה הינדאווי.
תהה מדוע על בולגריה דווקא לצדד בעמדת אהיב.
תבע עמדה מחונה יותר כלפי בולגריה.

רידגיווי, על סמך המידע שבידה, חזרה וניסתה לסתור
את טענות ס/שהיח.

משיחה עם שהיח מלדנוב, דחה זה גיכ את טענות רידגיווי
בנושא הטרור. (שאל אם היא אחראית להאשמות שהתפרסמו
מפי אישים אמריקנים).

רידגיווי, תוכ הבעת סיפוק משתויפי בנושא המלחמה
בסמים, בקרה חריפות את דיכוי זיא, בניגוד להסכמי
הלסינקי.

אמרה שאהיב תמשיך לחצוץ בנושא זה כבנושא הטרור.

הצביעה על כמעט הסכמה שהיתה בין אהיב לבדיהימי
בנושא הטרור (לפחות בביטויי חטיפות מטוסים
וכו'). הסכמה שנכללה בהודעה המשותפת (אשר, כידוע
לא פורסמה בסופו של דבר).

הורם.

מסמס

לא קוראים

אמא, חוזמ: 9924

אל: ווש/374

מ-: המשרד, תא: 251186, זח: 1700, דח: ר, סג: ש,

בבב

שמור/רגיל

קוריאל.

דע: השגריר.

WAIVER-AID

אאא ~~צאיר-איד~~ אאא לתהייל. מברק השגריר 468.

בדוק נא אם בכוונת מקפדסונ להודיע על סיכום ה-

WAIVE

אאא ~~צאיר-איד~~ אאא במכתב לתהייל ישירות או באמצעותכם. תהייל מאוד מעונינים באישור בסתב.

מנהל משי"ב=

ל/ח

-22-

סססס



** נכנס

שמור

חוזם: 11,9990

אל: המשרד

מ-: פילולמיה, כר: 11, תא: 251186, זח: 1300, דח: ר, סג: ש

נד: @

שמור/רגיל

מצב: א.

דע: שגריר, וושינגטון.

סנטור ג'ון היינס (ר' פנסילבניה)

נודע לי שהנ"ל השמיע אתמול בחרג סגור בפילולמיה ביקורת
על משלוחי הנשק הישראליים לאיראן שנעשו בלא חוזה בלא
ידיעתו של הממשל. דבריו היו מתונים יחסית.

דורח נוסף בדיפ.

בן-דב.

ג.ע.

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, ר/מרכז, ממד

** נכנס

שמור

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חוזט: 11/10327

אל: המשרד

מ-: לוטאנגלט, נר: 123, תא: 251186, זח: 1300, דח: מ, טב: ש

נד: @

מיוזי/שמור

נר 14 פר ווש בנפרד

אל: מנכלי מדיני

אל: ממנכלי

אל: מצמא

אל: מעת

דע: יועץ ראש הממשלה לתקשורת

דע: יועץ שהבס' לתקשורת

דע: עתונות/הסברה, ווש

מאת: א. אלגר, קונסול הסברה, לא

איראן - ישראל - ארהב

1. מעורבות ישראל בפרשת אספקת הנשק לאיראן עברה עתה לעמודים הראשוניים בעתונות במערב ארהב. ה"לא" טיומס"י מהמובילים בחשימת וכיסוי הפרשה, עוסק עתה באינטנסיביות רבה באספקט הישראלי. בדיווחים מהארץ מדובר על משלוחי נשק לאיראן הנמשכים מאז 1979. באלו מושינגטון מודגשות הסתירות בין הגרסאות האמריקניות והישראליות.

2. המגמה המסתמנת:

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* תאריך : 11.86

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* עותק 4 מתוך 16

* נכנס **

סודי ביותר

* **

* **

* חודש: 11,10315

* אל: המשרד

* מ-: רוש, כר: 527, תא: 251186, זח: 1620, זח: מ, סג: טב

* נד: @

* סודי ביותר/מיוז

* אל: ממנכל מדיני, ממנכל, מצמא

* התקשר דיוויד איבשיין בשם מונדויל המיועץ שממשלת ישראל
* תפרט מידות את גירסתה המלאה והמפורטת על הפרשה
* מבלי להמתין ולא טיפין - טיפין, כי הסיפור לא יורד
* מכותרות העתונים ומסד היום וגילויים חלקיים, אט
* אט, רק יחריפו את התגובה.

* דני בלון

* תפ: שהח, רהמ, ממנכל, ממנכל, מצמא

[illegible]

אנא חוזם: 9260

אל: 338/וש

נ-ה: המשור, תא: 241186, זח: 1616, דח: ר, סג: ש,

בבב

שמור/רגיל

מודנ.

ביקור קנדי.

1. ב-10.12 - 1000 - הנשיא - מתבקשת פמליא מצומצמת בלבד.

1200 - חייכי אבנ.

1230 - אייצי עם חברי ועדת החוצ והבטחונ.

1630 - דרי ביילינ.

1700 - ממי רוהיימי ושהייח.

איייע עם טדי קולק.

11.12 - 1000 - רוהיימי.

2. אנא הודיעונו מי מחברי הפמליה מצטרפ לשיחות ומי לסיור הצבאי. שלחו תשימה שמית מפורטת + פרטימ של כל הבאימ.

3. הועלתה בקשה להפגישו עם אמהות בנימ מסורבי עליה. נסדיר זאת יחד או בנפרד עם שצירנסקי.

4. אנא בררו מה כלול במסגרת כסוי ההוצאות על ידו כי ברור שמסביב לבקור תהיה עלות גבוהה ובמיוחד כשמדובר בהטסת חק או כל הפמליה.

5. להערכתנו יהיה יעיל וטוב יותר להעמיד לרשות קנדי עצמו לימוזינה ולכל היתר מיניבוס. הודיעונו אם מקובל.

6. מעדיפימ שהבקשה בקשר לגלויות תטופל עיי שגארהייב. אארונא.

7. האמ מצטרפ אליו מאבטח. מצדנו פנינו לשבייכי.

מצפייא - מאויר.===

א/פ

סטסט

** יוצא

שומר

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חודם: 11,9263

אל: 337/ש

מ-: המשרד, תא: 241186, זח: 1622, דח: מ, טג: ש

נד: 8

שומר/מיד

למדן.

ביקור אינדיה.

להלן התכנית במי שהתגבשה עד כה:-

30.11 - הגעה ב-1610 אל-על 008.

1.12 - 0900 - ראה'מ'

1000 - שה'ח

1300 - א'י'צ' - ראה'מ'

1500 - שר האוצר

2000 - א'י'צ' מטעם שר האוצר.

2.12 - 0800 - א'י'ב עם שר הבטחון.

1200 - 0900 - טיור בצה'ל בלוויית שר הבטחון

1300 - צהריום וביקור בתעשייה האווירית.

4.12 - 0100 - יציאה ב'אל-על' 001.

מנהל מצפ'א.==

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

א/ב

תפ: שהח, רחמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצפא, שמורק, מאור, טקס

משרד החוץ

[illegible]

July 1941

אל: קהיר, נר: 303, מ: המשרד
דח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 241186, רח: 1530

שמו/רגיל

אל: ווש, דע: קהיר

אבידן.

מצרים - לשיחתך עם דן קורצר. שלך 424 מ' - 20.11.

1. תודה על המידע המעניין והמועיל. לענין הדילמה האמריקאית בשאלת החובות הצבאיים התיחסנו בעדכון השבועי של המרכז.

2. על עמדת מבארכ' בשאלת הרפורמות הכלכליות נס' 4 בשלב: לדעתנו מבארכ' מודע היטב לצורך בביצוע רפורמות כלכליות, אולם החרדה מההשלכות הפוליטיות של ביצוע רפורמות דרמטיות וגם אישיותו 'המתלבטת' הם הגורמים לעיכוב הרפורמות. שילוב זה בין המודעות לצורך ברפורמות והחשש מתוצאותיהן התבטא בשנים האחרונות במדיניות של צעדים כלכליים מרסנים והיריס והתיקרויות זוחלות שבהן לא היה כדי להביא לשיפור משמעותי בכלכלה.

3. אין בידינו סימנים שמבארכ' מתכוון לחרוג בשנה הקרובה מדפוסים אלה. חילופי הממשלה כשלעצמם אינם מספקים אינדיקציה בכיוון זה או אחר משום שהקו יוסיף להקבע כנעבר ע'י מבארכ'.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Illegible]

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

4. אשר לעמדות רוח'ימי' החדש צדקי במידה שהן משמעותיות :
השבועון הכלכלי 'יאל-אהראם אל אקתצאדי' פרסם (11.17) המלצות
הועדה הכלכלית של מועצת השווא שבאשה עמד צדקי ובהן - חורה
על פנוסחאות המוכרות של הצורך לכוון הסובסידיה לנצרכים - ולא
לבטלה, והצורך בשני שערי מטבע - ולא לאחד השערים.

5. יודגש כי להערכתנו, אם המשטר יאליץ, תחת לחצי קרן המטבע
והמדינות בעלות החוב, לנקוט במדיניות כלכלית רדיקלית יותר
מזו שנקט עד כה, עלולה התפתחות זו להיות כרוכה בדיכוי
האופוזיציה המתסיסה והמצרה את מרחב התמרון של המשטר.

6. מצרים ופרשת עסקת הנשק לאיראן : תגובתה המאופקת של מצרים
הרשמית נובעת מחלטה בסיוע האמדיקני, וספציפית מעניינה
בהצלחת שליחות אבו-ע'יזאלה לוויי. נ יצויין שהעתונות הממסדית
גינתה את הממשל בחריפות - במאמרי מערכת, קריקטורות וטורים.
המפגש עם חוסין ספק למבארכי הזדמנות לאמר בקול רם דברים קשים
יותר.

7. יחסי מצרים - סעודיה - מדינות המפרץ : מורגש שיפור ביחסי
מצרים עם מדינות אלה, בעיקר בתחום שתה'פי' המעשי. כך, למשל,

משלחת משקיטים סעודים ביקרה לאחרונה במצרים נלראשונה מאז
79' ונפגשה עם מבארכ'. שר ההסברה המצרי ביקר בבחריין.
מבארכ' אף ציין בנאומו האחרון שסעודיה סייעה למצרים בקרן
המטבע.

8. ההתייחסות המצרית להתבטאות קדומי על טאבא : התגובה האחת
בה נתקלנו - טור בעתון האופוזיציוני 'יאל-ופדי' מ' 30.10
הכותב שדברי קדומי משחקים לידי ישראל ועלולים לסייע לה
בבורות. ברור שאין למצרים אינטרס להתנצח עם אש'יף בענין זה.

1. THE FIRST LINE OF THE TEXT IS THE SUBJECT
OF THE REPORT. THE SECOND LINE IS THE NAME OF THE
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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ממ"ד - טרנ .1 ==

א/פ

תפ: שהח, דהמ, שהבט, מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכו, רס, אמן, ממד, קידור,
מצרים, מצפא

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דחיסות: פירי	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	1 3
טובג במחשבי: שמוד		
תנ"ח: 2413	א ל: מצפ"א, הסברה, צוות העיון, ממ"ד/איסוף, מא"ס	
נר: 0747	ר י: ארב"ל 3, וושינגטון/ נעים-אכידו	
134 e11		
מאת: יעקב רוזן, ניו יורק		

ועידת החברה המזרחית האמריקאית (MESA). סיכום ראשוני.

א. בתאריכים 20-23/11/86 התקיימה בכוסטון הועידה השנתית ה-20 של הארגון. לעומת אשתקד הייתה הועידה מאורגנת כדבעי עם פיצול הגיוני של פנלים ורמה סבירה של דיונים. השתתפו בוועידה כ-2,000 איש.

ב. מבחינה הסברתית יש לציין:

1. גולת הכותרת של הועידה היתה העימות בין פרופ ברנרד לואיס לפרופ אדוארד סעיד על "המלומדים, התקשורת והמזה"ת". בעוד שפרופ לואיס התנהג לגנאליות בריסוי אבהי היה אדוארד סעיד סוער, כוסה ופניק. הוא תקף את התקשורת האמריקאית, אקדמיאים כגון לואיס, כדורי, דניאל פזינס ואת "מכון יובתן" על שכולם עוסקים בתעמולה אנטי ערבית ואנטי מוסלמית. גם ספרו של בנימין נתניהו הוזכר בהקשר זה. הקהל שברובו המכריע במנה עם הסטרא אחרא לווה את שברי אדוארד סעיד במחאות כפיים ומשואות. הווכוח צולם בוידאו ועם קבלתו נעביר לצפייתכם. רשמים בלתי אמצעיים תוכלו לקבל מפרופ אמנון כהן.

2. הצעת ההחלטה נגד ישראל בשל פטורי נשיא אונ' אלגנאח "מבקה" ע"י יו"ר ועדת האתיקה ולא הגיעה לכלל הצבעה.

3. חברת XEROX הציגה מכונת צלום ממוחשבת מערבית עם הדגמה (בערבית) של מפת המזה"ת בק מצויה פלסטין. נציגי ה-א.ד.ל. והועד היבוודי אמריקאי שנכחו בוועידה יודעים על כך ויפעלו כהתאם.

4. סרטים ישראלים שהועברו לוועידה ע"י ארגון ISFI הוצגו במהלכה יחד עם סרטים מזרח תיכוניים אחרים. נכחנו גם בפעילויות ה-OUTREACH.

דחיסות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק טופס מברק	2
סוג מסמך:		3
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נר : 0747 134-011		ר י :
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5. האגודה ללמודי ישראל (ISA) שהתקבלה השנה כארגון כלוזה ל MESA ערכה ק"פ בה נכחו כ-60 איש וכן ערכה פנל.
6. אפמ"ח ארגן פנל על תהליך השלום במזה"ת ובו הוצג בין השאר נייר על ידי שבחוניסט ירדני שהציג עמדת ירון.
7. נערכו לפחות שש פנלים שהיתה להם נגיעה ישירה לישראל - כל הפנלים היו על רמה עניינית והוגנת בנגוד לשנים קודמות בהן היתה השתוללות פראית. נושא ישראל דרא"פ לא עלה בדיונים.
8. יש לציון שדוברים פלסטינאים - כולל מכיר זית, נקטו לשון מתונה ואקדמית המקנה להם אמינות.

ג. מכחינה איסופית יש לציון:

1. כל הפנלים בעלי נגיעה למדינות ערב השכנות ואיראן כוסו ע"י הסדרתנים הישראליים השוהים בשבתון כאן. הם כולם התגייסו למאמץ זכך גילו נוכחות בפנלים העוסקים בישראל. התרשמות ראשונית מגלה שלא היו תירוצים מסקרים פרט להרצאות של גוהן דכליון על גורמי יציבות משטר אסד (הנייר מוצג בנפרד לממ"ד).
2. כמעט ולא ניתן היה לרכוש PAPER וכל שנעבירכם יהיה מבוסס על רישום ושמיעה.
- ר. לנשיא MESA לשנה הכאה 87/88 נבחר מיודענו ביל קוואנדט. השנה ממלא את התפקיד מייקל האדסון.

דיווח:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	2
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ני : 0747		ר י :
134-24		נאח :

ה. משלחת המזרחנים הסינים הסתובבה שלושה ימים בועידה, חבריה נכחו בפנלים שעסקו בתהליך השלום במזה"ת, ישראל והסוביה הפלסטין ונתקלה (עד כמה שרק ניתן היה) בישראלים.

אמן אפה
ו. מלבד נוכחות דיפלומטית ישראלית (ארתור אבנון והח"ם) זיהינו בקהל גם איש נציגות עראק לאו"ם בשם אלחדיתי (כרטיס בקור בדים) שעבד והקליט כל הפנלים שנגעו למלחמת הספרץ ולמורכיה.

ז. פרוס מלא בריפים הקרובים.

רוזן

אישור:

רוזן

שם השולח:

תאריך: 24.11.86

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רחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	7
סוג כטחוני:	סופס מברק	5
תז"ח: 9414	לש' ממנכ"ל, אמית"ק, הסברה, מצפ"א, ממ"ד, יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת	א ל : יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, דו"צ, קש"ח.
0769 68-110 140-011	ד ע : רושינגטון	
	מאת : עתונות, ניו יורק	

News Summary November 24, 1986

New York Headlines

The Iran story continues to dominate the front page of the New York Times. Today there are page 1 stories that deal with anger against Shultz in the White House and how the Israeli population is pushing the Gov't for an explanation on Israel's role in the Iran affair (see Press Reports). The problems in the Philippines is also a major story in the Times. Top stories in the Wall Street Journal tell of the boom in the art market and the political problems in Indonesia. Local NY papers all headlined the story about the fugative who shot 6 policemen in the Bronx.

Editorials

ND "Two Who Must Go" It has become painfully clear that Reagan has not been served well by his staff. It isn't clear who is in charge anymore. What is clear is that Don Regan lacks the judgement to be chief of staff and Poindexter has been a disaster as national security advisor. If Reagan is to get his house back in order he should fire both men.

NYP "Time for a Change of the Guard" Reagan has a serious staff problem. Its clear that the White House would benefit from a major staff shake-up, top to bottom. Then it will be time for the nation to put the Iran episode behind it.

ND 11/23 "Reagan is Flouting Intelligence Oversight" The Administration has made a mockery of a fundamental legal restraint on American intelligence agencies by waiting 18 months to tell Congress of its activities in Iran. If the Iranians hadn't leaked the story, its possible that the President would have never said a word.

Columns

WSJ-Poindexter "The Prudent Option in Iran" When countries of strategic significance like Iran, are in the midst of transitions, one can choose to sit back and ride it out or try to be active and shape the emerging reality. Neither the US nor its regional allies have an interest in Iran's disintegration. Iran is a critical buffer that physically seperates the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf. The US is working to enhance the long-term stability of the region. (cabled)

אישורי:	שם השולח: 24-11-86	תאריך:
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ND-Kirkpatrick 11/23 "Seeing the World as Moral Melodrama" The media's descriptions of the reactions of our allies was simply mistaken, inaccurate and wrong. This past week it has been confirmed that many of our European allies have also sold arms to Iran. It was acceptable for the US to open a channel of communication with Iran, whose people suffer under the Khomeini rule and whose geography makes it strategically important for the US. However, it was not useful to trade or seem to trade hostages for arms. Paying blackmail to those who trade in human beings almost never works.

NYT-Anthony Lewis "The Hollow Center" The Gov't of the US has at its center a man who is not informed about the substance of foreign policy, who is unable or unwilling to grasp the hard questions, who operates on instinct and hope. The Iran affair has shown us something frightening. Some are pushing for the ouster of Shultz. The departure of the Sec. of State would intensify the most dangerous aspect of the Iran affair: the arrogance of power it represented. There is a contempt in the executive branch for the way the American system works.

NYT-Safire "Enough Already" The truth is too awful to admit: Reagan, basher of Khadafy, exemplar of standing tall, turned out to be a softy on terrorism. The geopolitical excuse offered now is a feeble coverup. Hostage dickering was the reason for the Iranian arms shipments and Reagan should admit it.

ND-Will "Is Reagan Operating on 'Outsider' Information?" The Iranian episode radiates incompetence--in its substance, execution and apologia. This, after the Daniloff affair and the Iceland episodes, has encouraged the judgement that aides in close contact with the President today are the least distinguished group to serve any President since WW II. The Administration needs new talent, which means, for starters, a new national security adviser.

NYP-Anderson "Two Helped Forge Hostage Deal" Two former high-ranking gov't career officers were an integral part of the secret arms-for-hostages negotiations with Iran. They are retired Maj. Gen. Richard Secord and Thomas Clines, a onetime top CIA man. Both have excellent Mideast contacts and were dispatched to the region to dicker over the hostages' release.

NYP-Latham "Dems Gunning for Veep in Iran Probe" Senate Democrats are seeking to politicize the investigation of the administration's secret dealings with Iran by trying to link George Bush to the fiasco. Bush is the forerunner for the 1988 GOP nomination. Bush's office isn't talking.

Press Reports

Israelis Pressing Leaders to Bare Iran Arms Role

NYT-Freidman p.1-After days of silence, the Israeli leadership is under increasing pressure to explain exactly what Israel's role was in arms shipments to Iran. Israeli leaders have refused to make any public comments on the affair, other than to say that Israel always stands ready to help a friend. Both Peres and Shamir have agreed to appear before the Parliament's Defense and Foreign Affairs committee, in closed sessions to explain Israel's involvement. Because there is virtually no opposition

769/62/140 3/5

party in Israel today, the press has taken over this role. This has become especially true since the gov't lost much credibility over the past year in its handling of the Pollard case, the Shin Beth domestic scandal and the Vanunu case. In every case, the Gov't first denied any knowledge of irregularities and was then forced to acknowledge them under pressure of news reports that began abroad.

Anti-Arab Riots in Jerusalem

NYT-Photo of an Arab shielded from demonstrators by an Israeli soldier as about 700 people marched through Jerusalem to protest the murder of a Jewish student last week. Some of the demonstrators smashed windows and broke doors. Three were arrested. (NYP-wire photo & story; DN-wire)

Rival Palestinian Factions Are Said to Be Discussing Reconciliation

NYT-Kifner (Damascus) A reconciliation effort between Arafat's wing of the PLO and a Syrian based faction is underway. If successful, it would change the political lineup in the Mideast. Abu Jihad and George Habash are in Moscow discussing the plan. The thrust of the effort is two-fold. Arafat would openly sever his peacemaking accord with Hussien. In turn, several Damascus-based factions would rejoin the mainstream PLO, thus ending their ties to Syria. The prospects are considered good, mainly because of Jordan's recent tactic power-sharing agreement with Israel on the West Bank one of whose aim is undercutting the PLO powerbase. This is forcing Arafat's hand. Syria's apparent decline in regional power has lessened its hold over Damascus based Palestinian factions.

Iran Deal Dismays Arab Allies

ND-Phelps (Cairo) Two of America's strongest allies in the Arab world condemned US arms shipments to Iran, using blunt words not usually used among friends in the muted diplomacy of the Mideast. (NYT-photo of Hussein and Mubarak)

White House Criticizes Shultz

NYT-Gwertzman p.1-Pressure mounted for Reagan to disclose more details of his Administration's dealings with Iran, and new criticism began to focus on Shultz. In recent days, Reagan has resisted strong appeals to end the furor by acknowledging publicly that Washington's dealings with Iran were a mistake. The sudden criticism of Shultz by Administration officials and Senators reflected unhappiness that he had tried to distance himself from the White House over Iran by indicating that he was opposed to the sales. Reagan raised the possibility that Reagan might be losing patience with Shultz's attitude. (ND-combined)

769/68/140 4/5

Reagan's Friends Ask For Changes

NYT-Boyd-Some longtime political supporters of Reagan have discussed how to engineer high-level staff changes at the White House and in the Cabinet in an effort at repairing political damage that he has sustained because of the Iran dealings. The group is said to be seeking the ouster of Shultz, Regan, Poindexter. (WSJ-Hume; ND-Sloyan; NYP-Lathem)

Reagan's Distrust of Establishment Helped Create His Troubles

WSJ-Walcott-Analysis-Reagan's foreign policy is in trouble partly because too much is homemade. The Iranian affair is devastating because it has revealed an impatient White House that dismissed the opinions of its own expert advisors and its allies, bypassed Congress and believed it could lie to the public. Reagan's inner circle has shown a contempt for past foreign policies, the people who made them and the agencies that carried them out.

Despite Reagan Assertions, Aides Still Say Iran Promotes Terrorism

NYT-Sciolino-Despite Reagan's assertion that there was no recent evidence of Iranian-backed terrorism against Americans, officials in his Administration say they believe that Iran continues to use terrorism as an important component of its foreign policy. Most important are Iran's military training and financial support of terrorist groups in Lebanon and its military and ideological training of Islamic radicals in Iran. An official said "What makes it so difficult to document is that Iran has been more careful than either Syria or Libya."

US Aides Assert Some Arms Sent to Iran Were for Afghan Rebels

WSJ-Walcott-Some of the US arms shipped to Iran were intended for Moslem guerrillas battling Soviet forces in Afghanistan, US intelligence sources said. As part of their efforts to explain the administration's dealings with Iran, Poindexter and other officials told Congressional leaders that one purpose of the Iran operation was to open a new supply route to the hard-pressed Afghan rebels.

Gulf Strategy: Both Powers Gain

NYT-Trainor-Analysis-In the almost 7 years that the Gulf War has been going on-both superpowers have done much to improve their ability to fight in the region, according to military experts. The Soviets are known to have improved their communications and command in the area. The buildup is mostly related to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Russians seem more intent on wooing Iran than threatening it.

Libya Set For More Terror

DN AF Libya appears to be readying itself for involvement in terrorist activity following a lull in the wake of US bombing raids, a State Dept. official said. "Their agents are getting more and more active," the official said.

END

769 / 62 / 140 S/S

Young Jews Preserve Their Heritage

ND-Benkoe-A group of young Jews have dedicated themselves to restoring an old synagogue in Manhattan.

TV Movie Review-On Revenge for Munich Murders

WSJ-Higgins reviews HBO's "Sword of Gideon." The thesis of this fictionalized account is that in the aftermath of the Munich murders in 1972, the Mossad secured Golda Meir's approval for a revenge mission. The movie does not receive a positive review.

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