

מדינת ישראל

משרד הממשלה

2

מס' תיק

משרד

מס' תיק: משרד ראש הממשלה

תחום: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה

שם:

לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית

סימול מקורי: 5 תקופת החומר: 8/1990-7/1990

מזהה פיזי: א - 5023 / 14/11/2012



שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק

א - 5023 / 5

מזהה פיזי:

מזהה לוגי: 43.4/13 - 792 מס פריט: 2169168

כתובת: 02-111-02-05-05 14/11/2012

מחלקה

מס' תיק מקורי

טנאט - טנקצירות על עיראק

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1. רצ"ב הנוסח הסופי של החלטת ההתקבלת אמש מאוחר כלילה בחצבעה בתוצאה 0 : 97

2. הצטרפו כשועבנים להצעת ההחלטה: קטבאום, בוטביץ, קוטס, קנדי, דוד, דהקונסיני, אדמס, מורקאובסקי, מקייין, קסטן, וילסון, פורד, בנטסון, ליברמן, ריד, ברו, אינוות, טנפורד, דומיניצי, פיל גרנט, חורמונד.

ח. לקונגרס

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SENATE RESOLUTION
CONDEMNING
IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT

Offered by

Senators Pali and Helms (for themselves and
Senators Moynihan, Boaschwin, D'Amato, Biden, Kassebaum,
Cranston, and Coats)

Thurmond
Brent, Sanford, Hump
Simpson, Domenici, Gramm

Kennedy, Dodd, Mahan, McCain, DeLoach, Adams
Patterson, Murkowski, Ford, Bentsen

Whereas Iraq during the 1980's, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, has demonstrated a blatant disregard for international law and all standards of human decency, building a heinous record of atrocity and carnage;

Whereas in 1980 Iraq's invasion of Iran began the Iran-Iraq war, which became one of history's bloodiest;

Whereas, beginning in 1981, Iraq initiated and made extensive use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war;

Whereas this chemical slaughter constituted the most significant violation of the Geneva Protocol in the 65-year history of that international treaty, to which Iraq is a party;

Whereas Iraq's use of chemical weapons culminated in 1988 in a massive attack on its own Kurdish minority, causing tens of thousands of deaths and more than 65,000 refugees;

Whereas Iraq may be proceeding to develop biological weapons in violation of the 1972 international convention prohibiting the manufacture or possession of such weapons;

Whereas Iraq has continued illegal efforts to acquire nuclear weapons technology in violation of United States export laws and Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

Whereas, domestically, Iraq's human rights record is one of continuing barbarism, characterized by arbitrary imprisonment, government-sanctioned murder, and even the torture, mutilation, and killing of children as a means of terror against their parents;

Whereas Iraq's effort to depopulate the Kurdish regions of Iraq is tantamount to a policy of genocide;

Whereas Iraq stands in flagrant violation of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

Whereas, in 1982, in response to Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, the United States Senate on three

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occasions passed legislation imposing comprehensive sanctions against Iraq;

Whereas, on July 27 this year, the Senate passed the Iraq International Law Compliance Act in a continuing effort to secure Iraqi compliance with the rule of law;

Whereas in recent days Iraq mobilized forces on its border with Kuwait, issuing a series of bellicose threats, aimed not only at Kuwait but also at Israel and the United Arab Emirates;

Whereas Iraq, on August 1, without provocation and under contrived pretence, invaded the sovereign nation of Kuwait, seizing control of its capital and all essential territory;

Whereas the President, on August 2, issued an executive order freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States, and embargoing all trade with Iraq;

Whereas Iraq's military power in the Persian Gulf area is virtually unchallenged, and its record of callous brutality, opportunism, and belligerency demonstrates that no policy of appeasement or cooperation will constrain the threat Iraq now poses to the security of nations throughout the entire Persian Gulf region and to the international order;

Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved:

That Congress commends the President for his initial actions and urges the President to act immediately, using unilateral and multilateral measures, to seek the full and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory; and, specifically, to:

(1) Proceed to enforce against Iraq, unilaterally, all provisions of United States law, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to impose -

- (a) sanctions against a country engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,
- (b) a sustained freeze of all Iraqi assets, and
- (c) a sustained ban on any export of United States goods and services to Iraq; and

(2) Undertake, multilaterally, a concerted diplomatic effort, through the United Nations Security Council and all other available channels, to achieve collective international sanctions against Iraq, to include -

- (a) a cessation of all arms shipments, and all transfer of military technology to Iraq, with emphasis on -

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- (i) all Soviet-supplied arms and spare parts, as promised by the Soviet Union immediately after Iraq's invasion;
- (ii) all arms and spare parts supplied by other major suppliers; and
- (iii) all material and technical assistance from any source that could contribute to the development or employment of ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons;
- (b) a cessation of trade with Iraq and a worldwide freeze on Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets;
- (c) a suspension of all economic development activities within Iraq, with emphasis on:
 - (i) oil development activities; and
 - (ii) construction and other projects supported by American, European, and Japanese industry;
- (d) the imposition, under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, of a full economic blockade against Iraq; and
- (e) if such measures prove inadequate to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, additional multilateral actions, under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, involving air, sea, and land forces in order to maintain or restore international peace and security in the region.

END

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[August 2, 1990: 11:30 AM]101st CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. _____

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. FASCELL (for himself,) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To impose sanctions on Iraq.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the "Sanctions Against Iraq Act
5 of 1990".

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1 TITLE I--IMPOSITION OF TRADE EMBARGO
2 SEC. 101. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY REGARDING THE IRAQI INVASION
3 OF KUWAIT.

4 The Congress--

5 (1) condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait;

6 (2) supports the actions that have been taken by the
7 President in response to that invasion;

8 (3) calls for the immediate and unconditional
9 withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

10 (4) supports the efforts of the United Nations
11 Security Council to end this violation of international
12 law and threat to international peace;

13 (5) calls for the imposition of multilateral
14 sanctions against Iraq; and

15 (6) calls on United States allies and other countries
16 to support the efforts of the United Nations Security
17 Council, and to take other appropriate actions, to bring
18 about an end to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

19 SEC. 102. CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS.

20 The President shall keep the Congress fully informed, and
21 shall consult with the Congress, with respect to current and
22 anticipated events regarding the international crisis caused
23 by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, including with respect to
24 United States actions.

25 SEC. 103. IMPOSITION OF EMBARGO.

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1 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR EMBARGO.--The President shall
2 immediately impose the following sanctions with respect to
3 Iraq, using the authorities of the International Emergency
4 Economic Powers Act:

5 (1) All property and interests in property of the
6 Government of Iraq, its agencies, instrumentalities, and
7 controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iraq that are
8 in the United States, that hereafter come within the
9 United States, or that are or hereafter come within the
10 possession or control of United States persons, including
11 their overseas branches, shall be blocked.

12 (2) The following transactions shall be prohibited:

13 (A) The import into the United States of any
14 goods or services of Iraqi origin, other than
15 publications and other informational materials.

16 (B) The export to Iraq of any goods (including
17 agricultural commodities and the products thereof),
18 technology (including technical data or other
19 information controlled for export pursuant to section
20 5 of the Export Administration Act of 1979), or
21 services from the United States, except publications,
22 other informational materials, and donations of
23 articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as
24 food, clothing, medicine, and medical supplies
25 intended strictly for medical purposes.

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1 (C)(i) Any transaction by a United States person
2 relating to transportation to or from Iraq.

3 (ii) The provision of transportation to or from
4 the United States by any Iraqi person or any vessel
5 or aircraft of Iraqi registration.

6 (iii) The sale in the United States by any person
7 holding authority under the Federal Aviation Act of
8 1958 of any transportation by air which includes any
9 stop in Iraq.

10 (b) EXCEPTIONS TO AND LIFTING OF EMBARGO.--The
11 requirements of subsection (a) shall not apply to the extent
12 that the President so notifies the Congress in advance.

13 (c) RELATION TO TITLE II SANCTIONS.--The sanctions
14 required by this title are in addition to, and not in lieu
15 of, the sanctions required by title II of this Act; and the
16 requirements of title II apply without regard to whether the
17 authority of subsection (b) of this section has been
18 exercised with respect to the requirements of subsection (a)
19 of this section.

20 TITLE II--ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAQ
21 SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

22 The Congress finds that--

23 (1) the Government of Iraq is a party to the
24 International Covenants on Human Rights and is obligated
25 under the Covenants, as well as the Universal Declaration

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1 of Human Rights, to respect internationally recognized
2 human rights;

3 (2) the State Department's Country Reports on Human
4 Rights Practices for 1989 again characterizes Iraq's
5 human rights record as "abysmal";

6 (3) Amnesty International, Middle East Watch, and
7 other independent human rights organizations have
8 documented extensive, systematic, and continuing human
9 rights abuses by the Government of Iraq, including
10 summary executions, mass political killings,
11 disappearances, widespread use of torture, arbitrary
12 arrests and prolonged detention without trial of
13 thousands of political opponents, forced relocation and
14 deportation, denial of nearly all civil and political
15 rights such as freedom of association, assembly, speech
16 and the press, and the imprisonment, torture, and
17 execution of children;

18 (4) since 1987, the Government of Iraq has
19 intensified its severe repression of the Kurdish minority
20 as evidenced by the expulsion of approximately 500,000
21 Kurds and Assyrians from their mountain villages, the
22 deliberate destruction of villages, and the forcible
23 resettlement of Kurds and Assyrians in specially built
24 towns far from their normal means of livelihood;

25 (5) in August 1988, the Iraqi armed forces launched

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1 an offensive against Kurdish rebel forces using chemical
2 weapons against guerrillas and innocent civilians, in
3 which up to 5,000 people were killed;

4 (6) the Government of Iraq is engaged in a consistent
5 pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
6 human rights;

7 (7) in violation of international law, Iraq
8 repeatedly used chemical weapons against Iran, which also
9 used chemical weapons against Iraq;

10 (8) Iraq continues to expand its chemical weapons
11 capability, and in a speech given on April 2, 1990,
12 President Saddam Hussein threatened to use chemical
13 weapons against other countries, if attacked;

14 (9) Iraq has developed ballistic missile systems with
15 a range of greater than 300 kilometers;

16 (10) there are strong indications that Iraq has taken
17 steps to produce nuclear weapons;

18 (11) Iraq attempted to smuggle from the United States
19 components for triggering devices used in nuclear
20 warheads whose manufacture would contravene the Treaty on
21 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which Iraq
22 is a party;

23 (12) Iraq is increasing its support for Palestinian
24 groups that have conducted terrorist acts; and

25 (13) an enhanced Iraqi capacity to support terrorist

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1 operations will add to further instability in the Middle
2 East.

3 SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ.

4 (a) FMS SALES.--The United States Government may not sell
5 to Iraq any item on the United States Munitions List.

6 (b) COMMERCIAL ARMS SALES.--Licenses may not be issued
7 for the export to Iraq of any item on the United States
8 Munitions List.

9 (c) CONTROLS ON CERTAIN EXPORTS.--

10 (1) PRESUMPTIONS OF DENIAL OF LICENSES FOR CERTAIN
11 EXPORTS.--There shall be a presumption of denial of any
12 license application under the Export Administration Act
13 of 1979--

14 (A) for the export to Iraq of any goods or
15 technology that could enhance the ability of Iraq to
16 support acts of international terrorism,

17 (B) for the export of any goods or technology to
18 an end user in Iraq that is engaged in missile or
19 chemical or biological weapons proliferation
20 activities, or

21 (C) for any export where there is a risk of
22 diversion to missile or chemical or biological
23 weapons proliferation activities in Iraq.

24 (2) DENIAL OF LICENSES FOR EXPORTS RELEVANT TO
25 CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION.--Licenses may

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1 not be issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979
2 for the export to Iraq of any chemical or biological
3 agent that the President determines may be used primarily
4 in the production of chemical or biological weapons or
5 may be otherwise devoted to chemical or biological
6 warfare purposes.

7 (3) REQUIREMENT FOR VALIDATED EXPORT LICENSE FOR
8 CERTAIN ITEMS.--

9 (A) LIST OF ADDITIONAL ITEMS SUBJECT TO LICENSING
10 REQUIREMENTS.--In accordance with section 6(1) of the
11 Export Administration Act of 1979, there shall be
12 established--

13 (i) a list of goods and technology whose
14 export to Iraq is to be controlled pursuant to
15 this paragraph in order to enhance United States
16 foreign policy of nonproliferation of chemical
17 and biological weapons or missile technology; and

18 (ii) a list of goods and technology whose
19 export to Iraq could enhance the ability of Iraq
20 to support acts of international terrorism.

21 (B) REQUIREMENT FOR VALIDATED EXPORT LICENSE FOR
22 LISTED ITEMS.--After the end of the 60-day period
23 referred to in subparagraph (C), an individual
24 validated license shall be required under section 6
25 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 for the

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1 export to Iraq of goods or technology on either list
2 established pursuant to subparagraph (A).

3 (C) EFFECTIVE DATE OF LISTS; PUBLICATION.--The
4 initial lists pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be
5 established and published in the Federal Register not
6 later than 60 days after the date of enactment of
7 this Act.

8 (4) REQUIREMENT FOR VALIDATED EXPORT LICENSE FOR
9 CERTAIN END USES.--

10 (A) END USES SUBJECT TO REQUIREMENTS.--An
11 individual validated license shall be required under
12 section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
13 for the export of any goods or technology to Iraq--

14 (i) if the exporter knows, or has reason to
15 know, that the goods or technology would be used
16 in the design, testing, manufacture, or use of
17 missiles or chemical or biological weapons; or

18 (ii) if the exporter knows, or has been
19 informed by the Department of Commerce, that the
20 goods or technology would be used to support acts
21 of international terrorism.

22 (B) EFFECTIVE DATE.--Subparagraph (A) applies
23 with respect to exports occurring more than 30 days
24 after the date of enactment of this Act.

25 (5) RELATION TO OTHER EXPORT LICENSE

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1 REQUIREMENTS.--The requirements for a validated license
2 for exports to Iraq that are imposed by paragraphs (3)
3 and (4) are in addition to other requirements for
4 validated licenses for exports to Iraq that are imposed
5 under the Export Administration Act of 1979.

6 (d) NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND TECHNOLOGY.--

7 (1) NRC LICENSES.--The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
8 may not issue any license or other authorization under
9 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for the export to Iraq of
10 any source or special nuclear material, any production or
11 utilization facility, any sensitive nuclear technology,
12 any component, item, or substance determined to have
13 significance for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to
14 section 109b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or any
15 other material or technology requiring such a license or
16 authorization.

17 (2) DISTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS.--The authority
18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 may not be used to
19 distribute any special nuclear material, source material,
20 or byproduct material to Iraq.

21 (3) DOE AUTHORIZATIONS.--The Secretary of Energy may
22 not provide a specific authorization under section 57b.
23 (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for any activity
24 that would constitute directly or indirectly engaging in
25 Iraq in activities that require a specific authorization

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1 under that section.

2 (4) EXPORT LICENSES.--The Secretary of Commerce may
3 not issue any license under the Export Administration Act
4 of 1979 for the export directly or indirectly to Iraq of
5 any goods or technology--

6 (A) that are intended for a nuclear related end
7 use or end user;

8 (B) that have been identified on the Commodity
9 Control List pursuant to section 309(c) of the
10 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 as items that
11 could, if used for purposes other than those for
12 which the export is intended, be of significance for
13 nuclear explosive purposes; or

14 (C) that are otherwise subject to the procedures
15 established pursuant to section 309(c) of the Nuclear
16 Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

17 (e) ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL

18 INSTITUTIONS.--The United States shall oppose any loan or
19 financial or technical assistance to Iraq by international
20 financial institutions in accordance with section 701 of the
21 International Financial Institutions Act.

22 (f) DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK.--Credits
23 or credit guarantees through the Export-Import Bank of the
24 United States shall be denied to Iraq.

25 (g) DENIAL OF OTHER ASSISTANCE.--All forms of assistance

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1 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (other than
2 emergency assistance for medical supplies and other forms of
3 emergency humanitarian assistance) and the Arms Export
4 Control Act shall be denied to Iraq.

5 **SEC. 203. CONTRACT SANCTITY.**

6 For purposes of the export controls imposed pursuant to
7 subsections (c) and (d)(4) of section 202, the date described
8 in section 6(m)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
9 shall be deemed to be August 1, 1990.

10 **SEC. 204. EXPIRATION.**

11 Section 202 shall cease to apply at the end of the 4-year
12 period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act.

13 **SEC. 205. WAIVER.**

14 The President may waive the requirements of any
15 subsection of section 202 if the President certifies to the
16 Congress--

17 (1) that the Government of Iraq--

18 (A) has demonstrated, through a pattern of
19 conduct, substantial improvement in its respect for
20 internationally recognized human rights;

21 (B) is no longer acquiring chemical, biological,
22 and nuclear weapons and delivery systems and
23 components for such weapons, and has forsworn the
24 first use of such weapons;

25 (C) has recommitted itself to abide by the 1925

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1 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War
2 of Asphyxiating, Poisoning or Other Gases, and of
3 Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; and

4 (D) does not provide support for international
5 terrorism; and

6 (2) that he has determined that it is essential to
7 the national interests of the United States to waive the
8 requirements of that subsection;

9 except that any such waiver shall not take effect until at
10 least 60 days after the President's certification is
11 submitted to the Congress. Any such certification shall
12 include the justification for the President's determination
13 under each subparagraph of paragraph (1) and under paragraph
14 (2).

15 SEC. 206. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.

16 The Congress calls on the President to seek multilateral
17 cooperation--

18 (1) to deny dangerous technologies to Iraq;

19 (2) to induce Iraq to respect internationally
20 recognized human rights; and

21 (3) to induce Iraq to allow appropriate international
22 humanitarian and human rights organizations to have
23 access to Iraq, in particular the areas in northern Iraq
24 traditionally inhabited by Kurds.

END

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EXECUTIVE ORDER

BLOCKING IRAQI GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
AND PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAQ

By the authority vested in us as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code,

I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that the policies and actions of the Government of Iraq constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

I hereby order:

Section 1. All property and interests in property of the Government of Iraq, its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iraq that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, including their overseas branches, are hereby blocked.

Section 2. The following are prohibited, except to the extent provided in regulations which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this Order:

(a) The import into the United States of any goods or services of Iraqi origin, other than publications and other informational materials;

(b) The export to Iraq of any goods, technology (including technical data or other information controlled for export pursuant to Section 5 of the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2404)) or services from the United States, except publications and other informational materials, and donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for medical purposes;

(c) Any transaction by a United States person relating to transportation to or from Iraq; the provision of transportation to or from the United States by any Iraqi person or any vessel or aircraft of Iraqi registration; or the sale in the United States by any person holding authority under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1514), of any transportation by air which includes any stop in Iraq;

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Section 3. This Order is effective : diately.

Section 4. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Order. Such actions may include prohibiting or regulating payments or transfers of any property or any transactions involving the transfer of anything of economic value by any United States person to the Government of Iraq, its instrumentalities and controlled entities, or to any Iraqi national or entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by Iraq or Iraqi nationals. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal government. All agencies of the United States government are directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this Order, including the suspension or termination of licenses or other authorizations in effect as of the date of this Order.

This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 2, 1990

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THE LEGIS AFFAIR

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EXECUTIVE ORDER

BLOCKING KUWAITI GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

By the authority vested in ~~me as President~~ by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and 3 U.S.C. 301.

I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States, find that the situation caused by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States and have declared a national emergency to deal with that threat.


I hereby order blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Kuwait or any entity purporting to be the Government of Kuwait, its agencies, instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Kuwait that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, including their overseas branches.

For purposes of this Order, the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, juridical person organized under the laws of the United States or any person in the United States.

The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to carry out the provisions of this Order.

This Order is effective immediately and shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 2, 1990



3544: חוזם, אאא
אל: רהמש/192
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 57, תא: 030890, זח: 2122, דח: מ, סג: שמ,
בבב
שמור/מידי

אל: מצפ"א
מאת: ק. לקונגרס

בין"ב: פלישת עירק לכוויית

מאז היוודע על פלישת עירק לכוויית (ביום ד' אהה"צ 1/8) החל הקונגרס להגיב במהירות ולזרז פעילותו התחקיתית. (חוק סנקציות של ברמן בביה"נ והחלטת הסנאט בצורת תחושת הקונגרס - עברו ב- 2/8).

מחוקקים הביעו שאט נפשם מסאדם חוסיין התנגדותם ודאגתם מאיומיו ומהלכיו כלפי האיזור, ישראל ויציבות כלכלת ארה"ב והמערב. כללית, התמקדו התגובות ב:-

א. בסאדם חוסיין האיש שאיפותיו האיזוריות הסכנה שהוא מהווה לאיזור ונסיונו בתחום הצבאי, (גרעיני כימי בליסטי)

ב. עליית מחירי הנפט - ההשלכות על כלכלת ארה"ב בכלל והאזרח האמריקני בפרט, והשאלה כיצד על המערב להגיב. התגובות מבחינת ישראל:

1. ישראל נתפסת כמדינה היחידה היכולה לסייע (צבאית) במצב הנוכחי. חשיבותה של ישראל כבת ברית איסטרטגית וכ- STRONG ALLY (לא רק במובן של הקירבה לארה"ב אלא במובן הצבאי שלו) בולטת עתה עוד יותר על רקע חולשתן של מדינות המפרץ (כוויית וסעודיה בשלב זה) ושתיקתן של מדינות ערב. אם היו כאלה שניסו להפחית מחשיבותה הבטחונית של ישראל (בקונטקסט היחסים עם ארה"ב) בגלל הבעייה הפלסטינית, הרי שהפלישה מבטלת לפי שעה טיעון זה.

2. איכותה הסגולית, צבאי-מערבי-יציבותי של ישראל בולט עתה יותר מתמיד. הפלישה מוכיחה מדוע ארה"ב זקוקה לישראל, המדינה היחידה שניתן לסמוך עליה באיזור (TO RELY UPON).

3. הפלישה העירקית מעלה שאלות ודאגה לגבי בטחונה של ישראל לאור הדגשת רודנותו והתנהגותו של סאדם חוסיין המסוגל לממש איומיו על ישראל בלחיצת כפתור.

4. היום ברור יותר מאשר איפעם כי ישראל מצויה באיזור מסוכן ומוקפת במדינות אויב מסוכנות. מכל המדינות באיזור ישראל מהווה כוח מייצב. הכוח-במשמעות המליאה של המילה - היינו כוח צבאי המסוגל להתמודד עם איומי סאדם חוסיין, וכן להגן ולהבטיח איזורים מסויימים כמו למשל ירדן (מאחר והעורקים מודעים לכך שישראל לא תאפשר להם להתקרב לירדן).

5. פלישת עירק לכוויית מוכיחה את טענתה הנמשכת של ישראל שהבעייה במזה"ת איננה ממוקדת רק בבעייה הפלסטינית.

6. הפלישה והעיסוק בהשלכותיה ממקדים תשומת הלב, בתחום אחר, ב- BAD GUY ומסיטים תשומת הלב מישראל, הבעייה הפלסטינית ותהליך השלום למכלול העירקי - מפרצי. כפי שאמר לי אחד

העוזרים -

ISRAEL IS OFF THE HOOK ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.
עם זאת, סוגיית הבעייה הפלסטינית לא נעלמה אלא פשוט מהווה
בעייה נפרדת שאין עוסקים בה עתה.

7. התרחשויות היומיים האחרונים כסיכומו של דבר, גרמו ליצירת
פרספציה מדויקת יותר של האיזור במיוחד לאור השטפון
התקשורתי שהתמקד בחודשים האחרונים, מבחינתה של ישראל, כמעט
רק בשטחים.

8. גם הסקפטיים בין המחוקקים כמו למשל: - מחוקקים דרומיים
שאינם נוטים להצביע בעד סיוע חוץ ו/או ישראל, או כאלה שדגלו
בדיאלוג עם סאדס, ואחרים, תומכים בישראל ומביעים הערכה
למעמדה וחשיבותה האיזורי-איסטרטגי ולקשריה ההדוקים עם
ארה"ב.

9. בנפרד התבטאויות של מחוקקים ביומיים האחרונים בנושא
הפלישה.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, כנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

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(refiling to fix time in slug)

xxx sovietunion."

Moscow has supplied weapons to Iraq, while the United States has long supported Kuwait as a moderate nation among the oil-producing states. During the final phase of the long Iran-Iraq war, Kuwaiti oil tankers were operating under American flags to provide U.S. protection as they moved down the crucial waterway.

To put some pressure on Iraq, Bush said, he signed an executive order freezing Iraqi assets and transactions with that country. He also signed an order blocking Kuwait assets so they cannot be grabbed by "the illegitimate authority that is now occupying Kuwait."

"We call upon other governments to take similar action," he said.

The lightning conquest of Kuwait by Iraq appeared to stun administration officials although Bush said he was "not totally surprised" and had "good intelligence."

At a news conference in Washington, Saud Nasir al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti ambassador, called for outside help for his country — including military intervention by the United States.

"We don't stand a chance if we don't get help from the outside," Sabah said, adding, "We can't afford to be choosy where that help comes from."

The Iraqi ambassador, Mohamed al-Mashat, was summoned to the State Department where administration officials formally expressed the U.S. condemnation of the invasion and called for Iraq to withdraw its troops.

Bush said he could not predict the impact of the gulf crisis on U.S. oil supplies and prices, but pointed out that Energy Secretary James Watkins was summoned to the morning White House session.

Bush recalled that he had often noted that "we are dependent for close to 50 percent of our energy requirements on the Middle East."

"And this is a matter of considerable concern, not just to the United States, I might add," he said.

Asked if the Iraqi threat was limited to Kuwait, Bush said he had seen "no evidence" other states were in peril, but called for Hussein's troops to get "out of Kuwait."

He acknowledged that Saudi Arabia, another close U.S. ally and the No. 1 oil producer in the Middle East, is "very concerned ... about this illegal action."

"I'm sure there will be a lot of frenzied diplomatic activity," Bush told reporters, emphasizing the need to "work in concert with our friends around the world."

Others attending the early White House meeting included Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint of Chiefs of Staff, Undersecretary of State Robert Kimmit, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, CIA Director William Webster, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, White House chief of staff John Sununu, budget director Richard Darman and Vice President Dan Quayle.

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U.S. urges NATO allies to join commercial embargo

By CHARLES GOLDSMITH

BRUSSELS, Belgium (UPI) — The United States urged its NATO allies

at a special meeting Thursday to join a commercial embargo of Iraq and freeze Iraqi assets in response to its invasion of oil-rich Kuwait, sources said.

NATO called the invasion a "clear violation of the charter of the United Nations."

"NATO strongly condemns Iraq's military aggression against Kuwait and calls for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory," an alliance spokesman said in a statement.

NATO's political committee later held a special meeting, lasting close to 90 minutes, at which the United States asked other countries to join in a complete commercial embargo of Iraq, including an arms embargo, NATO sources said.

The United States also urged the other 15 NATO countries to freeze Iraqi assets in their countries and to take steps to prevent Iraq from taking over Kuwaiti assets, the sources said.

NATO's international staff said it was preparing a paper on the economic consequences of a commercial boycott of Iraq. Early indications suggest the impact would be very severe, the sources said.

No decisions were made at the meeting, which was described as a "valuable forum" for sharing information about the Iraqi invasion.

The U.S. request for sanctions against Iraq will be relayed to national capitals and another special meeting of NATO's political committee is scheduled for Friday.

"It is important that the international community act together to ensure that Iraqi forces depart immediately," President Bush said in Washington.

The 12-nation European Community and its member states "strongly condemn the use of force by a member state of the United Nations against the territorial integrity of another state," the EC said in a statement.

The EC said its members "ask for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait territory."

No immediate EC sanctions against Iraq were announced but the EC said its member states "maintain the matter under review and are ready to take into consideration further initiatives."

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Bush rejects military moves against Iraq

By HELEN THOMAS

UPI White House Reporter

WASHINGTON (UPI) President Bush denounced Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Thursday as "totally unjustified," banned all trade with Iraq including oil imports and froze Iraqi assets in the United States, but held back from U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf crisis.

Citing concerns about U.S. dependence on oil from the region, Bush said he was considering a host of other possible responses, although he offered no details, and called for international condemnation of the Iraqi blitz against Kuwait, a small but oil-rich emirate that has been

closely identified with U.S. interests in the area.

"We remain committed to take whatever steps are necessary to defend our long-standing interest in the gulf," the president told reporters before holding an emergency meeting with his top national security advisers at the White House.

But the president said, "We're not discussing intervention." He added, "I would not discuss any military options even if we agreed upon them. But I'm not contemplating such action."

In an executive order freezing Iraqi assets in the United States, Bush also banned all commercial transactions and a Treasury Department official said that action forbids imports of oil as well as other goods, and exports to Iraq from the United States.

The official, who asked not to be identified, was unable to comment on the consequences of the embargo. But, according to government figures provided to reporters, Iraq is currently the sixth largest supplier of oil to the United States, providing an estimated 450,000 barrels per day.

In 1989, Iraq provided 6 percent of U.S. oil imports. In the first five months of this year, Iraqi oil was 8 percent of the U.S. import total.

The official had no estimate of the value of Iraqi assets frozen by the presidential order, but said, "I believe it is significant."

While Bush was being cautious about his military options, a U.S. naval task force with a dozen ships was reported to be steaming toward the gulf from the Indian Ocean. The aircraft carrier Independence has been operating in the area and U.S. forces had been conducting aerial refueling exercises with the Kuwaiti air force.

Bush spoke with reporters Thursday morning in the Cabinet Room before departing for Aspen, Colo., for a meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Although Bush planned to deliver a speech on post-Cold War foreign policy during his trip to Colorado, he scrapped a planned overnight stay and arranged to return to Washington Thursday night.

In response to the developments, oil prices went up on world markets and the U.S. dollar performed strongly against the currencies of Japan and Europe, which are more dependent on Persian Gulf oil.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had made threats against Kuwait in the past two weeks over what he claimed was excess Kuwaiti oil production that was holding down oil prices.

Iraqi forces swept into neighboring Kuwait overnight and occupied the small nation, driving its government to seek refuge in Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, which has some of the world's richest oil fields, is located at the head of the Persian Gulf, wedged between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

In his morning comments at the White House, Bush said, "The United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait. We call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces.

"There is no place for this sort of naked aggression in today's world," Bush said.

Bush praised the U.N. Security Council for its "quick and overwhelming vote" condemning the Iraqi action and said additional U.N. action would be contemplated.

Bush said he and Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, had conferred by telephone with Secretary of State James Baker, who was in Mongolia.

Baker, he added, had discussed recent tensions in the gulf with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during the past two days in Siberia, "and so far I've been pleased with the reaction of the Soviet Union."

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(complete writethru _ kuwaiti appeal to u.s., arab states; iraqi statement; britain freezes kuwaiti assets; updating)

Kuwait appeals for U.S., Arab military intervention

By LEE STOKES

CAIRO, Egypt (UPI) _ Kuwait, invaded and occupied by its militarily superior Persian Gulf neighbor Iraq, appealed Thursday for U.S. military intervention and urged Arab allies to activate a defense pact against Iraq.

President Bush denounced the Iraqi blitz as "totally unjustified" and immediately froze Iraqi assets in the United States, but said he was not contemplating intervention in the crisis by U.S. military forces.

The assault followed a collapse in talks between the two nations on Iraq's territorial and oil claims against Kuwait and amid a massive buildup of Iraqi forces near the Kuwaiti border.

Heavy casualties were reported and the crisis wreaked havoc on world currency, oil and precious metals markets.

"We have made a universal cry for help to all our friends," Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Sheik Saud Nasir al Sabah, told reporters at a news conference in Washington. "We don't stand a chance if we don't get help from our friends."

"My country is under occupation and my people are suffering," he said.

Al Sabah said the invasion forced Kuwait's Emir, or ruler, to flee to Saudi Arabia, confirmed that Iraq "is commanding the whole country with their fingers" but that Kuwaiti troops outnumbered by Iraq's by 5-to-1 were putting up resistance.

"There is still fighting in the streets, and especially around the palaces of the Emir and crown prince. We can hear gunfire and explosions," a resident of the Kuwaiti capital told United Press International.

Witnesses in Kuwait said the brother of Kuwait's Emir Sheikh Fahad al Ahmad al Sabah, head of the oil-rich emirate's Olympic Committee, was killed in action while defending the royal palace.

Iraq claimed the invasion was to support unspecified revolutionaries who had overthrown the Kuwaiti government and its troops would be withdrawn when order is restored which could be "a matter of days or weeks."

"The Iraqi forces will be withdrawn as soon as the situation is settled down and as soon as the free government of Kuwait" is established," said Iraqi ambassador to the United States, Mohammad al-Mashat. "We hope this will be a matter of a few days or a few weeks at the latest."

"We reject any foreign interference in the current events," al-Mashat said in a brief statement to reporters in Washington. "Such interference will only aggravate the situation."

The U.N. Security Council, in an emergency session early Thursday, condemned the invasion in a resolution that demanded Iraqi President Saddam Hussein withdraw his troops "immediately and unconditionally."

U.S. diplomats in the Persian Gulf region said Washington sent 12 warships, including an aircraft carrier, to reinforce its seven vessels already in the strategic waterway.

The Arab League convened an emergency session to consider its response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which asked its Arab allies and the United States to intervene militarily.

"Kuwait has asked Arab nations to prepare an allied expeditionary force to liberate its territory from Iraqi occupation," said one of the

diplomatic sources, who are attending an Arab League foreign ministers meeting in Cairo.

The sources said Kuwait asked the Arab League to activate the joint Arab defense pact and come to the emirate's aid "as soon as possible." The pact has never been activated before, even in an Arab-Israeli war.

Kuwait's defense is no numerical match for the Iraqi military. Baghdad boasts a battle-hardened armed forces of 1 million men, a formidable air force and substantial tank divisions. Kuwait's armed forces total about 20,000.

Ambassador Al Sabah said he asked for U.S. military intervention, which Bush said he was not contemplating.

"We're not discussing intervention," Bush told reporters. "I would not discuss any military options even if we agreed upon them. But I'm not contemplating such action and I would not discuss it if I were."

Citing concerns about U.S. dependence on oil from the region, Bush said he was considering a host of other possible responses, although he offered no details, and called for international condemnation of the Iraqi blitz.

Bush also signed an executive order that froze Iraqi assets and property in the United States. The order also froze Kuwaiti assets to prevent takeover by the invading Iraqi forces. Britain also froze Kuwait's substantial assets.

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xxx substantial assets.

Iraq had made threats against Kuwait in the past two weeks over what he claimed was excess Kuwaiti oil production that was holding down oil prices and dealing a blow to the Iraqi economy. Iraq had accused its neighbor of drilling for oil in a disputed border well and demanded \$2.4 billion in compensation.

Talks to resolve their oil and border disputes held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, ended in a stalemate, and Iraq rejected a Saudi proposal for a summit meeting with Kuwaiti leaders after the talks failed, Arab diplomats said.

Official Kuwait Radio quoted a Kuwaiti Defense Ministry spokesman as saying Iraqi forces penetrated the northern borders at 2 a.m. local time and swiftly overtook Kuwait -- a hot, dry nation of nearly 2 million sandwiched between the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, a nation of more than 17 million.

Diplomats estimated Iraq deployed an estimated 60,000 troops in its invasion and used Mirage fighter jets to bomb Kuwait City. One Yugoslav diplomat reported that 350 Iraqi tanks rolled into the Kuwaiti capital. The Iraqis also used artillery against Kuwaiti frontier posts.

The Kuwaiti ambassador to Washington said Kuwait's Emir Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmad Al Sabah escaped from his palace by helicopter and was in Saudi Arabia, organizing resistance to the Iraqi invasion.

The ambassador also told reporters that along with the emir, the prime minister and all the other Kuwaiti ministers also were safe.

Several hundred elite Kuwaiti forces put up what one French diplomat described as "heroic resistance" to the Iraqi assault. The

forces and six Kuwaiti helicopter gunships tried to retake the ruler's palace and other installations back from the Iraqi troops.

"We have been able to hear shelling and see plumes of smoke from the center of the town," a witness told the British Broadcasting Corp.

Official Iraqi radio reports and officials in Baghdad said Iraq had overthrown the Kuwaiti leadership, imposed a state of emergency throughout Kuwait and sealed the borders.

"The Iraqi Revolutionary Council states that Iraqi forces are backing (the revolutionaries), and this is being done in case of intervention from outside in the affairs of Kuwait and the state of Kuwait's revolution," said a statement carried on state-run Baghdad Radio.

"Iraq will withdraw when the situation stabilizes," the statement said. "We issue this warning to anyone who dares to challenge us, and we will make Iraq proud, and make Kuwait a graveyard for anyone who might dare to launch aggression."

Iraq's ambassador al-Mashat in Washington confirmed the earlier claim.

"The interim free government has asked the Iraqi government to extend assistance for maintaining law and order with the view of sparing the people of Kuwait any harm," al-Mashat said. "The Iraqi government has decided to extend the assistance requested on the basis of this consideration and none other."

Monte Carlo radio, an independent Moslem-owned radio station based in Paris, saying a "provisional" Kuwaiti government was formed in Baghdad.

Official Kuwait Radio appealed to its citizens "to stand together against the Iraqi invasion," but Monte Carlo radio reported that thousands of Kuwaiti residents were fleeing to Saudi Arabia to the south.

Kuwaiti delegates attending a meeting in Cairo wept openly upon hearing news of the Iraqi invasion, and a group of some 50 Kuwaitis residents in the Egyptian capital chanted, "Death to Saddam" of Iraq.

Arab diplomatic sources in Cairo said the Iraq-Kuwait talks broke down when Iraq urged Kuwait to lease the strategic Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan to Iraq for 99 years. Leasing the island would help Iraq re-establish oil exports through the Persian Gulf. During Iraq's nearly eight-year war with Iran _ suspended under a 1988 cease-fire _ Baghdad exported oil through a Saudi pipeline.

Global currency and precious metal markets reacted sharply to the Iraqi invasion with dealers clamoring to buy U.S. dollars and gold as safe havens for investments threatened by the instability in the Middle East.

Oil prices shot up and the U.S. dollar performed strongly against the currencies of Japan and Europe, which are more dependent than the United States on oil from the Persian Gulf.

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Several hundred elite Kuwaiti forces put up what one French diplomat described as "heroic resistance" to the Iraqi assault. The forces and six Kuwaiti helicopter gunships tried to retake the ruler's palace and other installations back from the Iraqi troops.

"We have been able to hear shelling and see plumes of smoke from the center of the town," a witness told the British Broadcasting Corp.

Official Iraqi radio reports and officials in Baghdad said Iraq had overthrown the Kuwaiti leadership, imposed a state of emergency throughout Kuwait and sealed the borders.

"The Iraqi Revolutionary Council states that Iraqi forces are backing (the revolutionaries), and this is being done in case of intervention from outside in the affairs of Kuwait and the state of

Kuwait's revolution," said a statement carried on state-run Baghdad Radio.

"Iraq will withdraw when the situation stabilizes," the statement said. "We issue this warning to anyone who dares to challenge us, and we will make Iraq proud, and make Kuwait a graveyard for anyone who might dare to launch aggression."

Iraq's ambassador al-Mashat in Washington confirmed the earlier claim.

"The interim free government has asked the Iraqi government to extend assistance for maintaining law and order with the view of sparing the people of Kuwait any harm," al-Mashat said. "The Iraqi government has decided to extend the assistance requested on the basis of this consideration and none other."

Monte Carlo radio, an independent Moslem-owned radio station based in Paris, saying a "provisional" Kuwaiti government was formed in Baghdad.

Official Kuwait Radio appealed to its citizens "to stand together against the Iraqi invasion," but Monte Carlo radio reported that thousands of Kuwaiti residents were fleeing to Saudi Arabia to the south.

Kuwaiti delegates attending a meeting in Cairo wept openly upon hearing news of the Iraqi invasion, and a group of some 50 Kuwaitis residents in the Egyptian capital chanted, "Death to Saddam" of Iraq.

Arab diplomatic sources in Cairo said the Iraq-Kuwait talks broke down when Iraq urged Kuwait to lease the strategic Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan to Iraq for 99 years. Leasing the island would help Iraq re-establish oil exports through the Persian Gulf. During Iraq's nearly eight-year war with Iran _ suspended under a 1988 cease-fire _ Baghdad exported oil through a Saudi pipeline.

Global currency and precious metal markets reacted sharply to the Iraqi invasion with dealers clamoring to buy U.S. dollars and gold as safe havens for investments threatened by the instability in the Middle East.

Oil prices shot up and the U.S. dollar performed strongly against the currencies of Japan and Europe, which are more dependent than the United States on oil from the Persian Gulf.

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Presidential order freezes assets, bans trade

By VINCENT DEL GIUDICE

UPI Business Writer

WASHINGTON (UPI) _ The presidential order freezing Iraqi assets imposes a sweeping trade embargo on imports of oil and other goods from the Persian Gulf nation and bans nearly all U.S. exports, a government official said Thursday.

Iraq is the sixth largest supplier of oil to the United States, providing an estimated 450,000 to 500,000 barrels per day _ accounting for 8 percent of all imports in the first five months of the year, government figures show.

In 1989, Iraq provided 6 percent of U.S. oil imports.

"Imports of goods and services would be blocked" by the order issued in retaliation for Iraqi's lightning invasion of Kuwait, the senior Treasury Department official told reporters.

Although he declined to comment on the effects of blocking the Iraqi oil imports to the United States, the official insisted, "Our goal is not to injure U.S. parties or other innocent parties."

The Treasury official, who requested anonymity, was not able to detail the amount of Iraqi assets, such as bank accounts, securities accounts and real estate, that will be frozen by the order but said, "I believe it's significant."

As for the freezing of Kuwaiti government assets in the United States, the Treasury official said that action was taken at the request of the Kuwaiti government to protect it from possible Iraqi seizure.

The official also said a decision has yet to be reached on whether the trade embargo applies to Iraqi imports under contract and in transit, such as oil loaded on tankers steaming toward the United States.

He also said he was unable to determine whether the ban would apply to any seized Kuwaiti oil that Iraq tries to export.

Covered on the ban of U.S. exports to Iraq are all goods with the exception of published material, relief supplies and "medical supplies intended strictly for medical purposes," the presidential order said.

It also prohibits anyone in the United States from acting as an agent for Iraqi imports, and for arranging exports to the country.

The penalty for criminal violation of the ban includes prison sentences of up to 12 years, fines of up to \$500,000 for corporations, and up to \$250,000 for individuals, the official said.

There are also stiff civil penalties.

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economists comment on effects of trade embargo)

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Norman Robertson, chief economist at Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, said it is difficult to determine how the trade embargo — especially the oil ban — will affect America's weakening economy and inflation.

"It all depends on the extent to which that shortfall is made up by other areas," Robertson said. "If we import oil from Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Mexico, Malaysia or whatever country it shouldn't have a material impact."

But "if the shortfall couldn't be made up, the consequence would be one of pushing prices higher," Robertson said.

Robert Dederick, chief economist at Northern Trust in Chicago, agreed, saying: "The key thing is not the availability of oil. The key thing is the price that's going to have to be paid."

"We're not vulnerable to any supply shock, it's a price shock that we're vulnerable to," Dederick said.

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154 upi 08-02-90 05:23 ped

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Bush, who planned to cut short his trip and return to Washington Thursday night, responded cautiously to another question about his response to a plea from Saud Nasir al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti ambassador, who called for U.S. military intervention.

"We don't stand a chance if we don't get help from the outside," Sabah said at a Washington news conference, adding, "We can't afford to be choosy where that help comes from."

Asked about the appeal, Bush replied "we're considering what the next step" for the United States, the Arab states, and the United Nations should be.

While Bush was being cautious about his military options, a U.S. naval task force with a dozen ships was reported to be steaming toward the gulf from the Indian Ocean. The aircraft carrier Independence has been operating in the area and U.S. forces had been conducting aerial refueling exercises with the Kuwaiti air force.

Before leaving for Aspen, Bush spoke with reporters Thursday morning at the White House before a meeting with his top national security advisers.

"We remain committed to take whatever steps are necessary to defend our long-standing interest in the gulf," he said.

While Bush said, "We're not discussing intervention," he added,

"I would not discuss any military options even if we agreed upon them. But I'm not contemplating such action."

The president's first concrete action was the signing of the executive order cracking down on Iraq economically, although a top administration official who met with reporters could not predict the consequences of the embargo.

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The official had no estimate of the value of Iraqi assets frozen by the presidential order, but said, "I believe it is significant."

In response to the developments, oil prices went up on world markets and the U.S. dollar performed strongly against the currencies of Japan and Europe, which are more dependent on Persian Gulf oil.

Iraq's Saddam had made threats against Kuwait in the past two weeks over what he claimed was excess Kuwaiti oil production that was holding down oil prices.

Kuwait, wedged between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, has some of the world's richest oil fields.

In his morning comments at the White House, Bush said, "The United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait. We call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces."

Bush said he and Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, had conferred by telephone with Baker, who was in Mongolia, and noted Baker has discussed tensions in the gulf with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during the past two days in Siberia.

"So far, I've been pleased with the reaction of the Soviet Union," Bush said.

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(complete writethru _ bush comments in colorado; freshening and updating throughout)

Bush blasts 'naked aggression' by Iraq

By HELEN THOMAS

UPI White House Reporter

WASHINGTON (UPI) _ President Bush denounced Iraq's "naked aggression" against Kuwait Thursday and banned all trade with Iraq _ including oil imports _ but held back from a decision on U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf crisis.

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The president flew to Aspen, Colo., for a scheduled meeting Thursday with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the two leaders spoke with reporters late in the afternoon.

"We are concerned about this naked aggression, condemning it," Bush said as Thatcher stood at his side, "and hopeful that a peaceful solution will be found that will result in the restoration of the leaders of Kuwait to their rightful place."

The Kuwaiti government fled as Iraqi troops poured over their common border at the top of the Persian Gulf and took refuge in Saudi Arabia.

Both Bush and Thatcher looked to concerted action by other Arab states as a possible way to resolve the conflict. While Bush deftly avoided questions about possible U.S. military action, Thatcher repeatedly and pointedly referred to possible action by the United Nations under Chapter 7 of its charter.

That language allows the U.N. Security Council to impose economic or military sanctions short of using armed force against any country that refuses to abide by its resolutions. At U.S. urging, the Security Council already has adopted a resolution assailing the Iraqi invasion.

Bush said he was heartened by word he has received from various Arab leaders about possible joint actions to resolve the crisis and also welcomed word that the Soviet Union long a backer of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had cut off arms shipments to Baghdad.

The president also said Secretary of State James Baker planned to stop in Moscow on his way home from Mongolia to confer with Soviet officials on the situation.

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(6grafld-pickup5thgraf: accompanying the Bush no longer rules out military action)

U.S. military options few and far between

By ROBERT MACKAY

WASHINGTON (UPI) President Bush had few military options available to him Thursday to counter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, with the only substantive U.S. force in the region being the aircraft carrier USS Independence.

The carrier and its six-ship battle group were in the Indian Ocean, near the Persian Gulf, and the carrier's 80 fighter and attack jets were within range of Iraq, said a Pentagon spokesman, Marine Lt. Col. Stuart Wagner.

Bush said early Thursday he was not contemplating the use of U.S. military force. But later, after discussions with his national security advisers, Bush said, "We're not ruling any options in, but we're not ruling any options out."

He refused to discuss what action the United States might take, but he had few immediate military options available outside of an air strike by carrier-based jets or the call-up of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops.

A Pentagon official said Bush was first going to try to "freeze" Iraqi President Saddam Hussein out through economic measures.

The USS Independence will remain in waters outside the Persian Gulf, officials said. The Pentagon has never sent a carrier into the

gulf because that would make it "too big a target" in a small space, Wagner said.

Accompanying the Independence were two cruisers, a guided-missile destroyer, two frigates and an ammunition ship. The battle group entered the Indian Ocean earlier this week as apart of its regularly scheduled deployment.

In addition to the carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean, the United States has eight warships in the Persian Gulf. Known as the Joint Task Force-Middle East, the contingent consists of the command ship, USS LaSalle, one guided-missile cruiser, one destroyer and five frigates.

No substantial U.S. ground troops are in the region.

The closest U.S. ground force is a Marine amphibious landing group in the Mediterranean, but that force consists of only about 2,000 men. The Iraqis are believed to have two divisions, or 30,000 troops, occupying Kuwait.

In addition, Iraq has an army of about 1 million men and 5,500 battle tanks.

"We don't have the forces to go in there and drive them out of Kuwait," Wagner said. "To get that size of a U.S. force there would take some time."

Bush also has to consider the safety of the 3,800 Americans in Kuwait, but it is unclear what the United States could do to get them out of the city already occupied by Iraqi troops.

Wagner said there were no indications the Americans in Kuwait "are in harm's way."

If Bush were to consider an air strike, the USS Independence carries about 20 F-14 Tomcat jet fighters, 20 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, 20 A-6 Intruder attack planes and six helicopters. Iraq has about 513 combat aircraft.

Bush would have to decide what to hit in an air strike the Iraqi capital of Baghdad or Iraqi troops in Kuwait and he would also have to consider the chances of a full-scale U.S. involvement in a conflict with Iraq.

"Is the United States going to go to war over Kuwait?" one Pentagon official asked. "I don't think so."

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xxx bush said.

Moscow has supplied weapons to Iraq, while the United States has long supported Kuwait as a moderate nation among the oil-producing states. During the final phase of the long Iran-Iraq war, Kuwaiti oil tankers were operating under American flags to provide U.S. protection as they moved down the crucial waterway.

The blitz against Kuwait appeared to stun administration officials although Bush said he was "not totally surprised" and had "good intelligence."

The Iraqi ambassador, Mohamed al-Mashat, was summoned to the State Department where administration officials formally expressed the U.S. condemnation of the invasion and called for Iraq to withdraw its troops.

Bush said he could not predict the impact of the gulf crisis on U.S. oil supplies and prices, but pointed out that Energy Secretary James Watkins was summoned to the morning White House session.

Bush recalled that he had often noted that "we are dependent for close to 50 percent of our energy requirements on the Middle East."

He acknowledged that Saudi Arabia, another close U.S. ally and the No. 1 oil producer in the Middle East, is "very concerned ... about this illegal action."

"I'm sure there will be a lot of frenzied diplomatic activity," Bush said, emphasizing the need to "work in concert with our friends around the world."

Others attending the morning White House meeting included Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint of Chiefs of Staff, Undersecretary of State Robert Kimmit, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, CIA Director William Webster, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, White House chief of staff John Sununu, budget director Richard Darman and Vice President Dan Quayle.

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(combining into two takes; correcting 15th graf _ ships won't enter gulf)

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(3grafld-picksup2ndgraf: iraq is _ araq announces it will halt interest payments on u.s. government loans)

Presidential order freezes assets, bans trade

By VINCENT DEL GIUDICE

UPI Business Writer

WASHINGTON (UPI) _ The presidential order freezing Iraqi assets imposes a sweeping trade embargo on imports of oil and other goods from the Persian Gulf nation and bans nearly all exports, a government official said Thursday.

In retaliation, Iraq said it will halt interest payments on loans from the U.S. government "until the American president reconsiders this unjust decision which is not based on logical reasons."

The Treasury Department said the loans total more than \$2.4 billion.

Iraq is the sixth largest supplier of oil to the United States, providing an estimated 450,000 to 500,000 barrels per day _ accounting for 8 percent of all imports in the first five months of the year, government figures show.

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(complete writethru _ iraq settingaup provisional government; soviet suspension of arms; baker to moscow for joint condemnation; details, quotes)

Iraq warns against foreign interference in Kuwait

By LEE STOKES

CAIRO, Egypt (UPI) _ Iraq invaded and overthrew the leadership of its militarily inferior Persian Gulf neighbor Kuwait Thursday and warned against foreign interference while it helped to install an Iraqi-backed provisional government.

President Bush denounced the Iraqi blitz as "totally unjustified" and immediately froze Iraqi assets in the United States and slapped a trade embargo on the Persian Gulf nation. But he said he was ruling out the immediate use of force despite an urgent appeal from Kuwait.

The Soviet Union, a main weapons supplier to Iraq, demanded the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and suspended arms shipments to Baghdad.

Secretary of State James Baker said he will cut short his visit to Mongolia and stop off in Moscow, where he and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze were to make a joint statement condemning the Iraqi action.

The pre-dawn assault Thursday followed a collapse in talks between the two nations on Iraq's territorial and oil claims against Kuwait and a massive buildup of Iraqi forces near the Kuwaiti border.

Heavy casualties were reported. The State Department said no casualties were reported among about 3,000 U.S. citizens in Kuwait.

A State Department official said "some American employees of oil companies" in Kuwait had been taken "under protection by Iraqi forces," but did not elaborate.

The Iraqi invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait drove up oil prices and wreaked havoc on world financial markets.

"We have made a universal cry for help to all our friends," Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Sheik Saud Nasir al Sabah, said in Washington. "We don't stand a chance if we don't get help from our friends. My country is under occupation and my people are suffering."

Al Sabah said that "casualties are many."

The ambassador said Kuwait's Emir, or ruler, managed to flee to Saudi Arabia, and he confirmed that Iraq "is commanding the whole country with their fingers" but that Kuwaiti troops, outnumbered by Iraq's 5-1, were putting up resistance.

"There is still fighting in the streets, and especially around the palaces of the Emir and crown prince. We can hear gunfire and explosions," a resident of the Kuwaiti capital told United Press International.

Witnesses in Kuwait said the brother of Kuwait's Emir Sheikh Fahad al Ahmad al Sabah, was killed in action while defending the royal palace.

Iraq said the invasion was mounted to support unspecified revolutionaries who had overthrown the Kuwaiti government and that its troops would be withdrawn when order is restored and "the free government of Kuwait" is established. It said this could be "a matter of days or weeks."

Iraq's ambassador to the United States, Mohammad al-Mashat, issued a brief statement saying, "We reject any foreign interference in the current events. Such interference will only aggravate the situation."

The U.N. Security Council, in an emergency session early Thursday, voted 14-0 to condemn the invasion in a resolution that demanded Iraqi President Saddam Hussein withdraw his troops "immediately and unconditionally."

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"Kuwait has asked Arab nations to prepare an allied expeditionary force to liberate its territory from Iraqi occupation," said a diplomatic source attending an Arab League foreign ministers meeting in Cairo.

Other sources at the meeting said Kuwait asked the Arab League to activate the joint Arab defense pact and come to the emirate's aid "as soon as possible." The pact has never been activated before, even in an Arab-Israeli war.

Western diplomats said Kuwait's Arab allies would most likely condemn the invasion but not resort to force.

Kuwait's defense is no numerical match for the Iraqi military. Baghdad boasts a battle-hardened armed forces of 1 million men, a formidable air force and substantial tank divisions. Kuwait's armed forces total about 20,000.

Al Sabah, the Kuwaiti envoy to Washington, said, "U.S. intervention at this stage is of paramount importance," but Bush said he was not contemplating military action.

"We're not discussing intervention," Bush said. "I would not discuss any military options even if we agreed upon them. But I'm not contemplating such action and I would not discuss it if I were."

Bush signed an executive order that froze Iraqi assets and property in the United States. The order freezing Iraqi assets also imposed a sweeping trade embargo on imports of oil and other goods from Iraq and bans nearly all U.S. exports to the Persian Gulf nation. Iraq is the sixth largest supplier of oil to the United States.

France followed suit and froze both Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, and Britain froze Kuwait assets.

Kuwait's ambassador to Washington said Iraqi troops "are moving south of Kuwait where the oil facilities are."

An energy expert at Shearson Lehman Hutton said an Iraq-Kuwait oil producing bloc would be only second to Saudi Arabia, producing a total of 5.4 million barrels a day compared with the Saudi capacity of 7.5 million barrels a day.

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Iraq had made threats against Kuwait in the past two weeks over what he claimed was excess Kuwaiti oil production that was holding down oil prices and dealing a blow to the Iraqi economy. Iraq had accused its neighbor of drilling for oil in a disputed border well and demanded \$2.4 billion in compensation.

Talks to resolve their oil and border disputes held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, ended in a stalemate, and Iraq rejected a Saudi proposal for a summit meeting with Kuwaiti leaders after the talks failed, Arab diplomats said.

Official Kuwait Radio quoted a Kuwaiti Defense Ministry spokesman as saying Iraqi forces penetrated the northern borders at 2 a.m. local time and swiftly overtook Kuwait -- a hot, dry nation of nearly 2 million sandwiched between the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, a nation of more than 17 million.

Diplomats estimated Iraq deployed an estimated 60,000 troops in its invasion and used Mirage fighter jets to bomb Kuwait City. One Yugoslav diplomat reported that 350 Iraqi tanks rolled into the Kuwaiti capital. The Iraqis also used artillery against Kuwaiti frontier posts.

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The ambassador also told reporters that along with the emir, the prime minister and all the other Kuwaiti ministers also were safe.

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"We have been able to hear shelling and see plumes of smoke from the center of the town," a witness told the British Broadcasting Corp.

Official Iraqi radio reports and officials in Baghdad said Iraq had overthrown the Kuwaiti leadership, imposed a state of emergency throughout Kuwait and sealed the borders.

"The Iraqi Revolutionary Council states that Iraqi forces are backing (the revolutionaries), and this is being done in case of intervention from outside in the affairs of Kuwait and the state of Kuwait's revolution," said a statement carried on state-run Baghdad Radio.

"Iraq will withdraw when the situation stabilizes," the statement said. "We issue this warning to anyone who dares to challenge us, and we will make Iraq proud, and make Kuwait a graveyard for anyone who might dare to launch aggression."

Iraq's ambassador al-Mashat in Washington confirmed the earlier claim.

"The interim free government has asked the Iraqi government to extend assistance for maintaining law and order with the view of sparing the people of Kuwait any harm," al-Mashat said. "The Iraqi government has decided to extend the assistance requested on the basis of this consideration and none other."

Monte Carlo radio, an independent Moslem-owned radio station based in Paris, saying a "provisional" Kuwaiti government was formed in Baghdad.

Official Kuwait Radio appealed to its citizens "to stand together against the Iraqi invasion," but Monte Carlo radio reported that thousands of Kuwaiti residents were fleeing to Saudi Arabia to the south.

Kuwaiti delegates attending a meeting in Cairo wept openly upon hearing news of the Iraqi invasion, and a group of some 50 Kuwaitis

residents in the Egyptian capital chanted, "Death to Saddam" of Iraq.

Arab diplomatic sources in Cairo said the Iraq-Kuwait talks broke down when Iraq urged Kuwait to lease the strategic Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan to Iraq for 99 years. Leasing the island would help Iraq re-establish oil exports through the Persian Gulf. During Iraq's nearly eight-year war with Iran _ suspended under a 1988 cease-fire _ Baghdad exported oil through a Saudi pipeline.

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(complete writethru _ updating throughout, adding comments from speech, details)

Bush endorses 25 percent cut in U.S. military

By NORMAN D. SANDLER

ASPEN, Colo. (UPI) _ On a day that dramatized the limits of American influence, President Bush endorsed a 25 percent reduction in U.S. military forces Thursday to keep America "strong and engaged" and adapt to new dangers of the post-Cold War world.

In a speech to a public policy conference sponsored by The Aspen Institute, Bush said that because of "changing strategic circumstances," the United States is in a position to cut its active-duty armed forces by 25 percent by 1995.

But while bowing to budget-cutting pressure from Congress, he warned against reductions that are too swift or too deep and emphasized U.S. forces must not merely be pared to "a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present."

In their place, he cited a need to concentrate on "contingencies that are no longer likely" _ most notably a Soviet invasion of Western Europe _ and instead create a smaller force of elite, mobile and high-readiness units "to meet emerging challenges."

Calling for a revamped defense strategy that recognizes changed geopolitical realities, Bush said the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait illustrates the dangers that will create a continued need for strong _ if leaner, meaner and more mobile _ military in the 1990s.

"Even in a world where democracy and freedom have made great gains, threats remain," he warned. "Terrorism, hostage-taking, renegade regimes and unpredictable rulers _ new sources of instability _ all require a strong and engaged America."

Ironically, his declaration that America "remains a pivotal factor for peaceful change" came a day after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein defied veiled threats from the United States by sending elements of his formidable military machine _ the strongest in the region _ across the border into Kuwait.

Mindful of the risks and losses the United States has experienced from past intervention in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, U.S.

officials Thursday were playing down military options and instead emphasized the need for international pressure on Iraq.

The Persian Gulf, however, is the kind of flashpoint for which military planners believe U.S. forces must be better prepared in the years to come.

For his part, Bush acknowledged that the chance of a Soviet invasion "with little or no warning" — the threat that has dominated Western defense strategy for 45 years — "is more remote than at any other point in the postwar period."

Bush outlined a far-reaching restructuring would emphasize flexibility, versatility, readiness and mobility and create a more specialized force of reserves while active-duty forces continue to show the American flag in Europe, Asia and on the high seas.

In an admonition to Congress, he predicted his proposed force cuts and reconfiguration could be achieved in five years, "provided we proceed with an orderly reduction, not a fire sale."

And with his defense budget cuts under sharp attack on Capitol Hill, where the Senate Armed Services Committee has voted to cut \$18 billion from his 1991 request and its House counterpart a full \$24 billion, Bush made a plea for the B-2 Stealth bomber, a pair of land-based missile programs and the "Star Wars" antimissile program, which are among the prime targets of congressional budget cutters.

To make the case for new strategic weapons, Bush noted that some vestiges of the Cold War — a huge Red Army and modernized Soviet strategic arsenal — remain. Congress, however, has taken a skeptical view of his assertion that the expensive new nuclear weapons are needed at a time when the superpowers in some cases are negotiating them into obsolescence.

The 25 percent force cut, the fiscal implications of which were not discussed, grew out of deliberations over the past few months by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress may well demand a faster and even more dramatic retrenchment, making it more difficult for Bush to point to areas like the Persian Gulf, where American military might failed to deter Hussein, to protect his defense priorities.

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Iraq warns against foreign interference in Kuwait

By LEE STOKES

CAIRO, Egypt (UPI) — Iraq invaded and overthrew the leadership of its militarily inferior Persian Gulf neighbor Kuwait Thursday and warned against foreign interference while it helped to install an Iraqi-backed provisional government.

President Bush denounced the Iraqi blitz as "totally unjustified" and immediately froze Iraqi assets in the United States and slapped a trade embargo on the Persian Gulf nation. But he said he was ruling out the immediate use of force despite an urgent appeal from Kuwait.

The Soviet Union, a main weapons supplier to Iraq, demanded the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and suspended arms shipments to Baghdad.

Secretary of State James Baker said he will cut short his visit to Mongolia and stop off in Moscow, where he and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze were to make a joint statement condemning the Iraqi action.

The pre-dawn assault Thursday followed a collapse in talks between the two nations on Iraq's territorial and oil claims against Kuwait and a massive buildup of Iraqi forces near the Kuwaiti border.

Heavy casualties were reported. The State Department said no casualties were reported among about 3,000 U.S. citizens in Kuwait.

A State Department official said six American employees of a U.S. oil company in Kuwait, which he would not identify, were missing and that there had been unconfirmed reports that six Americans were seen with Iraqi forces.

"We've reminded the government of Iraq that they have a commitment to the security and the welfare of U.S. citizens (in Kuwait) since Iraq invaded a sovereign country," the official said.

The Iraqi invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait drove up oil prices and wreaked havoc on world financial markets.

"We have made a universal cry for help to all our friends," Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Sheik Saud Nasir al Sabah, said in Washington. "We don't stand a chance if we don't get help from our friends. My country is under occupation and my people are suffering."

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אל:רהמש/87

מ:-וושנגטון,נר:22,תא:020890,זח:1302,דח:ב,סג:בל,

בבב

בלמס/בהול

אל : מצפ"א,מע"ת,ממ"ד

דע: הסברה, יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, יועצת
תקשורת שה"ח, לע"מ פר"נ, מזא"ר, אמ"ן/מנמת - ר' משמרת,
דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק.

מאת : עתונות וושינגטון

להלן:-

- הודעת הבית - הלבן, מאתמול, על הפלישה לכווית
- על הדיווח לנשיא בוש ע"י סקוקרופט ותגובת ארה"ב,
מהבוקר.

THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY,
AUGUST 1, 1990 STATEMENT OF THE DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY

THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE IRAQI MILITARY
INVASION OF KUWAIT AND CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND
UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL IRAQI FORCES. WE HAVE
CONVEYED THIS MESSAGE TO THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN
WASHINGTON AND TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THROUGH OUR
EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD. WE DEPLORE THIS BLATANT USE OF
MILITARY AGGRESSION AND VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER.
TOGETHER WITH KUWAIT WE ARE CALLING FOR AN EMERGENCY
SESSION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

STATEMENT BY THE DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY RELEASED BY THE
WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY/ WASHINGTON,
DC/ THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BRENT SCOWCROFT HAS BEEN
CHAIRING AN INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE IN THE SITUATION ROOM
MONITORING THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT. THE
PRESIDENT WAS INFORMED OF THE INITIAL SIGNS OF THE IRAQI
ACTION AT APPROXIMATELY 9 P.M. YESTERDAY BY NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER SCOWCROFT AND HAS BEEN RECEIVING
PERIODIC UPDATES SINCE.

THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS BLATANT
ACT OF AGGRESSION AND DEMANDS THE IMMEDIATE AND
UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL IRAQI FORCES. WE DO NOT
HAVE EXACT DETAILS AT THIS TIME CONCERNING THE EXTENT OF
THE IRAQI ACTION, ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEARLY EXTENSIVE. WE
HAVE NO REPORTS OF ANY HARM TO AMERICAN CITIZENS. THE

STATE DEPARTMENT IS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH OUR
EMBASSY IN KUWAIT CONCERNING THE STATUS OF US CITIZENS.

AT THE URGING OF KUWAIT AND THE UNITED STATES, THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WILL BE MEETING EARLY
THIS MORNING TO CONSIDER THIS MATTER. IN ADDITION, WE
HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WILL BE
CONVENING TO REVIEW THE SITUATION. WE ARE URGING THE
ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO CONDEMN THIS
OUTRAGEOUS ACT OF AGGRESSION.

THE UNITED STATES IS REVIEWING ALL OPTIONS IN ITS
RESPONSE TO THE IRAQI AGGRESSION.

עד כאן
עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, (רהמ) @, (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, כנצור, מצפא, פרנ, רביב,
מעת, הסברה, לעמ, גוברין, מזאר, סולטן, מזתים, דוצ-ים

סססס

2264:חוזס:אאאא

אל:רהמש/86

מ:-וושנגטון, נר:21, תא:020890, זח:1302, דח:ב, סג:בל,

בבב

בלמס/בהול לבוקר

אל : מצפ"א, מע"ת, ממ"ד

דע: הסברה, יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת, יועצת
תקשורת שה"ח, לע"מ, פר"נ, אמ"ן/מנמת - ר' משמרת,
דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק.

מאת : עתונות וושינגטון

להלן הודעת הבית הלבן על הקפאת נכסים ורכוש של עיראק
וכווית הנמצאים בארה"ב. מיד אחרי ההודעה מצבי"ם
(בנפרד לעיראק וכווית) צוים-מנהליים, המפרטים הקפאת
הנכסים והאוסרים עסקאות עם עיראק וכווית, החתומים בידי
הנשיא בוש:-

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE STATEMENT BY THE DEPUTY PRESS
SECRETARY/ THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1990

THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING SIGNED AN EXECUTIVE ORDER
FREEZING IRAQI PROPERTY AND ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND OVERSEAS BRANCHES. IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT SIGNED
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER FREEZING KUWAITI ASSETS AND PROPERTY
IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEIR TAKEOVER BY THE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT. WE CALL ON ALL OTHER STATES TO UNDERTAKE
SIMILAR ACTION.

EXECUTIVE ORDER BLOCKING IRAQI GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND
PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAQ, THE WHITE HOUSE,
THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1990

BY THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME AS PRESIDENT BY THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS
ACT (50 U.S.C. 1701 ET SEQ.), THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
ACT (50 U.S.C. 1601 ET SEQ.), AND SECTION 301 OF TITLE 3
OF THE UNITED STATES CODE.

I, GEORGE BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, FIND THAT THE POLICIES AND ACTIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ CONSTITUTE AN UNUSUAL AND
EXTRAORDINARY THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND HEREBY DECLARE
A NATIONAL EMERGENCY TO DEAL WITH THAT THREAT.

I HEREBY ORDER:

SECTION 1. ALL PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, ITS AGENCIES, INSTRUMENTALITIES AND CONTROLLED ENTITIES AND THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ THAT ARE IN THE UNITED STATES, THAT HEREAFTER COME WITHIN THE POSSESSION OR CONTROL OF UNITED STATES PERSONS, INCLUDING THEIR OVERSEAS BRANCHES, ARE HEREBY BLOCKED.

SECTION 2. THE FOLLOWING ARE PROHIBITED, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT PROVIDED IN REGULATIONS WHICH MAY HEREAFTER BE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THIS ORDER:

A. THE IMPORT INTO THE UNITED STATES OF ANY GOODS OR SERVICES OF IRAQI ORIGIN, OTHER THAN PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS;

B. THE EXPORT TO IRAQ OF ANY GOODS, TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING TECHNICAL DATA OR OTHER INFORMATION CONTROLLED FOR EXPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 5 OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT (50 U.S.C. APP. 2404) OR SERVICES FROM THE UNITED STATES, EXCEPT PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS, AND DONATIONS OF ARTICLES INTENDED TO RELIEVE HUMAN SUFFERING, SUCH AS FOOD, CLOTHING, MEDICINE AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES INTENDED STRICTLY FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES;

C. ANY TRANSACTION BY A UNITED STATES PERSON RELATING TO TRANSPORTATION TO OR FROM IRAQ; THE PROVISION OF TRANSPORTATION TO OR FROM THE UNITED STATES BY ANY IRAQI PERSON OR ANY VESSEL OR AIRCRAFT OF IRAQI REGISTRATION; OR THE SALE IN THE UNITED STATES BY ANY PERSON HOLDING AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, AS AMENDED (49 U.S.C. 1514), OF ANY TRANSPORTATION BY AIR WHICH INCLUDES ANY STOP IN IRAQ;

D. THE PURCHASE BY ANY UNITED STATES PERSON OF GOODS FOR EXPORT FROM IRAQ TO ANY COUNTRY;

E. THE PERFORMANCE BY ANY UNITED STATES PERSON OF ANY CONTRACT IN SUPPORT OF AN INDUSTRIAL OR OTHER COMMERCIAL OR GOVERNMENTAL PROJECT IN IRAQ;

F. THE GRANT OR EXTENSION OF CREDITS OR LOANS BY ANY UNITED STATES PERSON TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, ITS INSTRUMENTALITIES AND CONTROLLED ENTITIES;

G. ANY TRANSACTION BY A UNITED STATES PERSON RELATING TO TRAVEL BY ANY UNITED STATES CITIZEN OR PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN TO IRAQ, OR TO ACTIVITIES BY ANY SUCH PERSON WITHIN IRAQ, AFTER THE DATE OF THIS ORDER, OTHER THAN TRANSACTIONS NECESSARY TO EFFECT SUCH PERSON'S DEPARTURE FROM IRAQ, OR TRAVEL FOR JOURNALISTIC ACTIVITY BY PERSONS REGULARLY EMPLOYED IN SUCH CAPACITY BY A NEWSGATHERING ORGANIZATION; AND

H. ANY TRANSACTION BY ANY UNITED STATES PERSON WHICH EVADES OR AVOIDS, OR HAS THE PURPOSE OF EVADING OR AVOIDING, ANY OF THE PROHIBITIONS SET FORTH IN THIS ORDER.

FOR PURPOSES OF THIS ORDER, THE TERM "UNITED STATES PERSON" MEANS ANY UNITED STATES CITIZEN, PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN, JURIDICAL PERSON ORGANIZED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ANY PERSON IN THE UNITED STATES.

SECTION 3. THIS ORDER IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

SECTION 4. THE ESECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, F IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ESECRETARY OF STATE, F IS HEREBY AUTHORIZED TO TAKE SUCH ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE PROMULGATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ORDER. SUCH ACTIONS MAY INCLUDE PROHIBITING OR REGULATING PAYMENTS OR TRANSFERS OF ANY PROPERTY OR ANY TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING THE TRANSFER OF ANYTHING OF ECONOMIC VALUE BY ANY UNITED STATES CONTROLLED ENTITIES, OR TO ANY IRAQI NATIONAL OR ENTITY OWNED OR CONTROLLED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY IRAQ OR IRAQI NATIONALS. THE SECRETARY MAY REDELEGATE ANY OF THESE FUNCTIONS TO OTHER OFFICERS AND AGENCIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. ALL AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ARE DIRECTED TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES WITHIN THEIR AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ORDER, INCLUDING THE SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF LICENSES OR OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS IN EFFECT AS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER.

THIS ORDER SHALL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS AND PUBLISHED IN THE "FEDERAL REGISTER."

SIGNED, GEORGE BUSH

עד כאן
עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, סמנכל, מצפא, פרנ, מעת,
הסברה, לעמ, דוצ-ים

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 2031

אל: רהמש/68

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 19, תא: 020890, זח: 1009, דח: כ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמ"ס/בהול

אל : מצפ"א, ממ"ד, מע"ת.

דע: הסברה, יועץ רוה"מ לתקשורת, יועצת שה"ח לתקשורת, יועץ
שהב"ט לתקשורת, לע"מ, פר"נ, אמ"ן/מנמת - ר' משמרת,
מזא"ר, דובר צה"ל, ניו-יורק.

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון.

להלן דברים שאמר הנשיא בוש בוש, הבוקר, בפני כתבים על
הפלישה העיראקית לכווית, 2.8.90:-

PRESIDENT BUSH: LET ME MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT HERE ABOUT RECENT EVENTS. THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE IRAQI MILITARY INVASION OF KUWAIT. AND WE CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE IRAQI FORCES. THERE IS NO PLACE FOR THIS SORT OF NAKED AGGRESSION IN TODAY'S WORLD, AND I HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO INDICATE THE DEEP CONCERN THAT I FEEL OVER THE EVENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

LAST NIGHT I INSTRUCTED OUR AMBASSADOR AT THE EUNITED NATIONS TOM PICKERING TO WORK WITH KUWAIT IN CONVENING AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WAS CONVENED AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR THAT. A QUICK, OVERWHELMING VOTE CONDEMNING THE IRAQI ACTION AND CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. TOM PICKERING WILL BE HERE IN A BIT, AND WE'RE CONTEMPLATING WITH HIM FURTHER UNITED NATION'S ACTIONS.

SECOND, CONSISTENT WITH MY AUTHORITY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWER'S ACT I'VE SIGNED AN EXECUTIVE ORDER EARLY THIS MORNING FREEZING IRAQI ASSETS IN THIS COUNTRY AND PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAQ. I'VE ALSO SIGNED AN EXECUTIVE ORDER FREEZING KUWAITI ASSETS. AND THAT'S TO ENSURE THAT THOSE ASSETS ARE NOT INTERFERED WITH BY THE ILLEGITIMATE AUTHORITY THAT IS NOW OCCUPYING KUWAIT. AND WE CALL UPON OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION.

AND THIRD, THE EDEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GOVERNMENTS AROUND THE WORLD URGING THAT THEY, TOO, CONDEMN THE IRAQI AGGRESSION AND CONSULT TO DETERMINE WHAT MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO BRING AN END TO THIS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED ACT. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACT TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT IRAQI FORCES DEPART KUWAIT IMMEDIATELY.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE VIEW THIS SITUATION WITH THE UTMOST GRAVITY. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NECESSARY TO DEFEND OUR LONG-STANDING VITAL INTERESTS IN THE GULF. AND I'M MEETING THIS MORNING WITH MY SENIOR ADVISORS HERE TO CONSIDER ALL POSSIBLE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO US. I TALKED TO SECRETARY BAKER JUST NOW, GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND I WERE ON THE PHONE WITH HIM. AND WE WILL -- AFTER THIS MEETING, I WILL PROCEED TO DELIVER A LONG-STANDING SPEECH. I WILL HAVE CONSULTATIONS -- SHORT ONES -- THERE IN ASPEN WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, AND I WILL BE RETURNING HOME THIS EVENING TO BE -- AND I'LL BE HERE IN WASHINGTON TOMORROW.

I MIGHT SAY ON A MUCH MORE PLEASANT NOTE, I JUST HUNG UP FROM TALKING TO MR. AND MRS. SWANSON, THE PARENTS OF TIM SWANSON, THE EPEACE CORPSF VOLUNTEER WHO HAD BEEN HELD AGAINST HIS WILL, HELD HOSTAGE OR KIDNAPPED THERE IN THE EPHILIPPINESF. AND I WANT TO THANK EVERYBODY IN THE US GOVERNMENT THAT WAS SO INSTRUMENTAL IN WORKING FOR HIS RELEASE. AND BOB, I HOPE YOU'LL CONVEY TO THE AMBASSADOR AND TO OTHERS IN OUR PHILIPPINES COUNTRY TEAM.

Q MR. PRESIDENT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: YEAH, HELEN?

Q DO YOU CONTEMPLATE INTERVENTION AS ONE OF YOUR OPTIONS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE'RE -- WE'RE NOT DISCUSSING INTERVENTION. I WOULD NOT DISCUSS ANY MILITARY OPTIONS, EVEN IF WE'D AGREED UPON THEM. BUT ONE OF THE THINGS I WANT TO DO WITH THIS MEETING IS HEAR FROM OUR ESECRETARY OF DEFENSE, OUR CHAIRMAN AND OTHERS, BUT I'M NOT CONTEMPLATING SUCH ACTIONS.

Q YOU'RE NOT CONTEMPLATING ANY INTERVENTION --

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT CONTEMPLATING SUCH ACTION, AND I, AGAIN, WOULD NOT DISCUSS IT, IF I WERE.

Q WHAT IS THE LIKELY IMPACT ON US EOILF SUPPLIES AND PRICES?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THIS IS A MATTER THAT CONCERNS US, AND I DON'T KNOW YET -- AGAIN, WE'RE GOING TO -- I'M GOING TO HEAR FROM OUR EXPERTS NOW, OUR ESECRETARY OF ENERGYF IS HERE, HERE, AS YOU'LL NOTE, AND OTHERS WHO UNDERSTAND THIS SITUATION VERY WELL INDEED, OUR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND WE'LL BE DISCUSSING THAT. BUT THIS IS A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN. AND NOT JUST TO THE UNITED STATES, I MIGHT ADD.

Q ARE YOU PLANNING TO BREAK RELATIONS --

PRESIDENT BUSH: YOU'VE HEARD ME SAY OVER AND OVER AGAIN, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE DEPENDENT FOR CLOSE TO 50 PERCENT OF OUR ENERGY REQUIREMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. AND THIS IS ONE OF THE REASONS I FELT THAT WE -- WE HAD NOT NOT

LET OUR GUARD DOWN AROUND THE WORLD.

Q ARE YOU CONTEMPLATING BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE -- I'M DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH OUR TOP ADVISORS HERE IN JUST A MINUTE.

Q IS THIS ACTION, IN YOUR VIEW, LIMITED TO KUWAIT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I -- I SEE NO -- THERE'S NO EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, BUT WHAT I WANT TO DO IS HAVE IT LIMITED BACK TO IRAQ AND HAVE THIS -- THIS INVASION BE REVERSED AND HAVE THEM GET OUT OF KUWAIT.

Q DO YOU THINK SAUDI ARABIA'S THREATENED OR ANY OF THE OTHER EMIRATES?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I THINK SAUDI ARABIA IS VERY CONCERNED AND I WANT TO HEAR FROM OUR TOP OFFICIALS HERE, OUR DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND OTHERS, AS TO THE WORLDWIDE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ILLEGAL ACTION THAT HAS BEEN CONDEMNED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

Q AND YOU WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE?

PRESIDENT BUSH: NOT TOTALLY BY SURPRISE BECAUSE WE HAVE GOOD INTELLIGENCE, AND OUR INTELLIGENCE HAS HAD ME CONCERNED FOR SOME TIME HERE ABOUT WHAT ACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN.

THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH. AND I WILL --

Q MR. PRESIDENT, DID YOU --

PRESIDENT BUSH: -- I WILL SAY SOMETHING FURTHER BECAUSE I'M HAVING A JOINT PRESS MEETING WITH MARGARET THATCHER, AND AT THAT TIME I MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE A FEW MORE QUESTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. BUT THE MAIN THING I WANT TO DO NOW IS HEAR FROM OUR ADVISORS, AND THEN WE WILL -- WE WILL GO FORTH FROM THIS MEETING WITH -- WITH A -- ALL ON THE SAME WAVELENGTH.

I'M SURE THERE WILL BE A LOT OF FRENZIED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. I PLAN TO PARTICIPATE IN SOME OF THAT MYSELF, BECAUSE AT THIS TIME IT IS IMPORTANT TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH OUR MANY FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD. AND IT'S IMPORTANT THAT WE WORK IN CONCERT WITH OUR FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD.

Q GORBACHEV ?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

STAFF: LIGHTS, THANK YOU.

PRESIDENT BUSH: OBVIOUSLY SOME OF YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED, THIS MATTER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AT VERY HIGH LEVEL BETWEEN SECRETARY BAKER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND SO FAR I'VE BEEN PLEASED WITH THE SOVIET REACTION.

Q WELL, DO YOU EXPECT TO MAKE --

PRESIDENT BUSH: THAT'S ALL I'VE GOT TO SAY RIGHT NOW.
WE'VE GOT TO GO ON WITH THIS MEETING.

Q THANK YOU.

סופ

דא

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רס),
אמן, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, סולטן, רביב, מעת,
הסברה, לעמ, גוברין, מזאר, דוצ-יס

סטסט

$\frac{1}{3}$
$$\frac{11867}{11}$$

310N
10/7

אל: מצפ"א, פר"ן
דע: מקש"ח/משחב"ט
מאת: ק. לקונגרס

1. היום התקיים אה"צ ה-MARK-UP על הצעת החוק של הקונגרסמן ברמן במליאת ועדת החוץ.
הצעת החוק (בנסרד) בנוסף לתיקון של הקונגרסמן --כריס סמית (בנוגע לת-
עירק כלפי כווית) עברה סה אחד.

2. אולם מליאח ועדת החוץ היה מלא ממה לפת. נכחו הקונגרסמנים:
פאסל, המילטון, וולטה, ג'יד'נסון, לנטוס, לארי סמית, בדמן, לוין, פיהן,
טד וייס, אואנס, ג'ונסטון, אנגל, ברומפילד, גילמן, רות', סנר, כריסטופר,
סמית, בדטון, ג'ין מייס, מילר, חטון, גוס, ורוס-לטינג.

חלק מחקונגרסנים נשאו נאומי פתיחה. בולם חמכו בהצעת ברמן.
א. חקונגרסמן ברוטסילד - לאחר שהביע תמיכתו וציין כי הצעת החוק
מהווה מסר חשוב עבור הממשל כי עליו לסיים בהקדם אפשרי ח- REVIEW
שהוא עורך כלמי עירק, מסר כי ישנן ידיעות לפיהן מלשו כוחות עירקיים
לכוויח.

לכוויות. ב. תקונגרסמנים גילמן, מירס, ברטון, ויטרון, לנטוס, לזיון, התבטאו כולם באותה רוח: הגיע הזמן לשלוח מסר לעירק להפסיק לאיים ולפעול ככוח נגד מדינות אחדות במזרח. התייחסו לשמוע בנשק כימי, הפרת ז"א, איומים כלפי ישראל, מיתוח טילים בליסטיים, מיתוח נשק גרעיני, מקלט לטרוריסטים (אבו-עבס), אפשרות חמלישה לכוויות (גילמן) התייחס לרובי ברומפילד).

ג. מיירס - הוסיפה כי מעבר להבעת התנגדות כלפי עירק יש לחטיל סנקציות כך שיסגנו לא רק בארה"ב אלא גם בעירק (למשל ביבוא אמריקני מעירק כנפט).

ד. פאסל - בתגובה למיירס ציין כי אל לה לארצ"ב לחיות מוחזקת כבת ערובה בידי משטר רודני בתחום החקלאות והנפט ואם כך המצב, יש מיד לבדוק מדיניות ארצ"ב מחדש.

לברוק מדיניות ארצי"ב מחוש.
ה. הקונגרסמן ברמן, הציג בפירוט רב את הצעת החוק שלו.
בנוסף לדברים שנאמרו לעיל, חוסיף ברמן כי עירק במזח"ת ואיום על הפאן ערביזם ולא רק על כווית.
מחווה מכשול לשלום הממשל וחקונגרס לא

יש למעול נגד עירק ולשלול בין השאר זכויותיה ל- CCC ובנק EXIM. חבל

הממשל ג"כ לא הגיע למסקנה זו.
לאור דברי ברוםפילד, תקותו כי הממשל יערוך POLICY REVIEW ומאחר חזרת
הקונגרס מפגרת הקיץ בספטמבר ישנה הממשל עמדתו.

4. כאמור לעיל, התיקון שהגיש הקונגרסמן בריס סמית (בנסרד) בדבר איומי עירק נגד כורית - הזת כוחות וכו', התקבל פה אחד.

5. חקונגריסמן לאורי סמית חביש תיקון (בנפרד) אשר עיקרו לכלול בסנקציות

5. חקונגריסטון לארי סמית חניש תיקון (כנסת) אטו
 להח פסגה רהט מ'ס מ'ס מ'ס מ'ס מ'ס
 פר' סקסן רוארלס מ'ס מ'ס מ'ס מ'ס

גם מדינות נוספות ממשיכות באופן פעיל לעירק.
בהתייחסו, לחצת ברמן אמר כי זוהי הצהרה מדינית חשובה. הארועים הנוכחים
(בין עירק לכווית) מאיימים על יציבות האיזור ועל יציבות כלכלת ארה"ב. זהו
נסיון של דיקטטור בעירק להעביר דולרים אליו. הוא מתנהג כנאצר של שנות
ה-90. יש להתנהגותו של סאדם חשש על האיזור על ארה"ב ובנות
בריתה המערביות.

לאחר הצבת התיקון ע"י סמית, התבטאו גיידנסון, ברמן, לנטוס, לויין
והמילטון וניסו לשכנע את סמית לחסיר את התיקון ולעבדו מחדש לקראת הדיון
במליאה. שני הטיעונים העיקרים של הקונגרסמנים לעיל היו:
א. התיקון (לדברי גיידנסון) משמעותו סנקציות גם על מדינת כמו גרמניה
(בהנחה שחברה גרמנית תמצא כמסייעת לעירק). היינו מציב בעייה בנוגע
לייצוא של בנות הברית.
ב. חשוב עתה להניע החוק כפי שהוא. התיקון יכפיל התנגדות הממשל לסנקציות
ויתן בידו תירוץ נוסף לחטיל וטו.
בסופו של דבר חסכים לארי סמית לחסיר התיקון לאחר הבטחת מצד יו"ר הועדה
סאטל לשמר ולעבד חנוטה של סמית ולאפשר לו להגישו בשלב מאוחר יותר
במליאה.

6. רצ"ב החודעה לעתונות של הקונגרסמן ברמן.

יהודית ורנאי-דרנגר.

1017, 11 $\frac{2}{3}$

CONGRESSMAN HOWARD BERMAN

NEWS RELEASE

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14600 Roscoe Blvd., Suite 506 • Panorama City, CA 91402 • 818-891-0543

August 1 1990

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

1017 3
11 3
Contact: Graham Cannon
(202) 225-4695)

BERMAN IRAQ SANCTIONS BILL SENT TO HOUSE FLOOR

Legislation by Rep. Howard L. Berman, (D-CA), imposing comprehensive sanctions on Iraq, was today approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This action clears the way for consideration by the full House.

"This bill will deny Saddam Hussein the chemical, nuclear and missile technology he wants. We must stop Hussein because we know he will use everything and anything he has to force his will on the region," said Berman. "He has already used weapons of mass destruction on his own people. Now he is trying to coerce his neighbors into adopting policies to subsidize Iraq's military buildup."

Commenting on Administration opposition to his bill, Berman said, "History has tragically taught us that appeasing a dangerous bully only makes him bolder."

"The President tragically misunderstands the nature of this regime if he believes turning a blind eye will persuade Hussein to end his nuclear, chemical and missile buildup and improve his appalling human rights record," continued Berman. "If the Administration will not act on Iraq, then Congress must."

Berman's bill contains restrictions on so-called "Dual-Use" items. These are goods, such as computers, electronics and communications equipment, and certain airplane parts that have both civilian and military application.

"The U.S. should not be helping Saddam Hussein acquire technology that can enhance either his military capability or his ability to support international terrorism," said Berman.

Berman's bill would also sever Iraqi access to the U.S. Export-Import Bank. "There is no reason whatsoever for the U.S. to underwrite Iraqi purchases while Hussein is conspiring to gouge American gasoline consumers," said Berman.

END

אאא, חוזם: 906

אל: רהמש/27

מ-: המשרד, תא: 010890, זח: 1830, דח: ר, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/רגיל

אל: ווש -השגריר, ציר.

הגברת תלונה של ארה"ב ביבוא נפט.

שגארה'ב בראון הפנה תשומת לבי, בעת א'צ ב- 30/7 במסגרת כינוס הועדה המשותפת לפתוח כלכלי ארה"ב-ישראל (JEDG) לעובדה שארה"ב הגבירה תלונה ביבוא הנפט מ- 5 אחוז בשנת 1973 ל- 52 אחוזים היום.

השגריר ביקש שנעייין בפרטיכל של שמוע בסנט מה- 27/7 כנדון:

צטט מספרים שניתנו ע"י סנטור דויד בורן מאוקלהומה שארה"ב מיכאת 600 אלף ח'י מעיראק, מיליון וחצי ח'י מסעודיה ומגבירה תלונה ביבוא ממקורות חיצוניים, עד כדי סיכון בטחונה ויכולתה לקבל החלטות בלתי תלויות.

לדברי בראון לו היה חבר בשדולה הישראלית היה עוסק במיוחד בהדגשת הסכנות לעוותים בשקולי מדיניות חוץ האמריקנית כתוצאה מהגברת התלות בנפט. הערכת בורן ואחרים היא שתוך עשור תלונה של ארה"ב תגבר עוד יותר ותגיע ל- 80 אחוזים במקום 52 אחוזים היום.

מה שזעזע את בורן היא יכולתו של סאדאם חוסיין להביא באמצעות איומים ורכוז צבא בגבול עם כונית, לעליה של מחירי הנפט ב- 5 דולר תוך שישה ימים. הוסיף להתפתחות מדאיגה העובדה שתוך עשור ארה"ב תצמצם ייצור הנפט ב- 7 אחוזים מידי שנה ומסקנתו היתה שהצבור האמריקני יצטרך לשלם סכום של 2 טריליון דולר עבור יבוא הנפט ועוד יותר עבור ההזנחה של העדר מדיניות לצמצום תלות ביבוא נפט ממז'ת. התמונה אותה צייר בראון כתוצאה מהדיון וממידע רלוונטי אחר היתה חמורה ביותר וכללה נתוח ההשלכות של הגברת תלונה של ארה"ב ב- 80 אחוזים מהנפט המיובא על היחסים עם מדינות מז'ת בכלל ועם ישראל בפרט.

יעקב כהן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, כהן, כלכליתב', חרם, בנצור,
מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 408
אל: רהמש/14
מ-: המשרד, תא: 010890, זח: 1302, דח: ר, סג: בל,
בבב
בלמ'ס/רגיל
א.ד. 245.

אל: וושינגטון/אמיתי

להלן עיקרי דבריו של שגריר ארה"ב בסוריה דג'רג'יאן במסע'ת
מ-30.7:

1. הממשל האמריקאי תומך ללא סייג בהסכם טאיף ובהודעתה
האחרונה של מ'מ' לבנון. השג' הדגיש שוושינגטון ודמשק תמימות
דעים שיש לתמוך בהודעה זו ולבצע את הנאמר בה.

2. ציין שממשלתו מקיימת קשרים עם כל הצדדים הנוגעים לבני
הערוכה המערביים בלבנון, ובכלל זה עם מ'מ' סוריה, בתקווה
שהסורים יצליחו לתרום לשחרורם.

3. ארה"ב חותרת להסדר שלום בלבנון כמנותק מהסכסוך הערבי
הישראלי, וכי אינה רואה התקדמות בפתרון המשבר הלבנוני
כמותנית בפתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית (ר' מונטה קרלו, 30).

ערב/4-ממ'ד

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, §(רהמ), §(שהנט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
§(רס), אמן, ממד, כנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מזתים,
§(לוברני)

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 20260

אל: רהמש/1283

מ-: המשרד, תא: 220890, זח: 1615, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

83254

סודי/מיד

913.11

אל: וושינגטון

הנדון: אמריקאים ממוצא ערבי: TRAVEL ADVISORY

להלן מתוך שיחה עם הסגן האמריקאי, מרק פאריס:

1. במחמ'ד עדיין שוקלים פירסום TRAVEL ADVISORY בנדון (למרות תשובתנו הכתובה). בשבוע שעבר העריכו בשגרירות שמועד הפירסום הינו קרוב ('IMMINENT') אך בינתיים הנסיבות משתנות עקב המשבר מפרץ והשלכותיו האזוריות. לפיכך סיכם אתמול (21/8) עם מחמ'ד שבטרם יוציאו את ה-ADVISORY, יעבירו לשגרירות את הטיוטא להערותיהם.

2. הצעתי שאם וכאשר יקבלו טיוטא, יפנו אלינו על בסיס בלתי רשמי במידה שיש לו שאלות וקיים מקום להבהרות. פאריס לא התחייב אך העיר שכל האפשר נוקטת השגרירות במדיניות 'נטולת הפתעות' (NO SURPRISE POLICY).

מנהל מצפ'א

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, כנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 4043

אל: רהמש/ 236

מ-: המשרד, תא: 050890, זח: 1627, דח:ר, סג: שמ,

בבב

9, 250890

49349

שמור/רגיל

אל מתאם הפעולה ביש'ע
מזכיר הממשלה



רע'ן דבל'א מפצ'ר
מטא'ר - רמ'ד זרים - עמית העבירונא
מטא'ר - ר' חוליית ביקורת גבולות - עמית העבירונא
נתב'ג - מנח'ט בטחון
נתב'ג - ר' יחידת בקורת גבולות
משרד הפנים, סגן מנהל אוכלוסין (י. טוב)
משרד התיירות - סמנכ'ל שרותי תיירות (א. יושע)
מנהל מצפ'א
מנהל מז'ת 2
מנהל קונסולרית
מנהל ארב'ל 2

מאת : לשכת היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: ארה'ב TRAVEL ADVISORY

שלנו חוז'ם 27630 מה-31.7

בהמשך לשלנו, מצ'ב הנייר בניסוחו הסופי - שנמסר לשגרירות
ארה'ב.

לידיעתכם.

בן-רפאל

1. WE WERE CONCERNED TO RECEIVE YOUR TALKING POINTS
ADVISING OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. MAY ISSUE AN
UPDATED TRAVEL ADVISORY TO AMERICAN CITIZENS.

IN OUR JUDGEMENT THERE HAS BEEN AN IMPROVEMENT
IN RECENT MONTHS IN THE ONGOING LIAISON PROCESS
BETWEEN THE ISRAEL AUTHORITIES AND THE U.S. EMBASSY.
IN AUGUST 1989 FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EMBASSY,
A SPECIAL LIAISON BUREAU WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE
INTERIOR MINISTRY AT BEN-GURION AIRPORT TO FACILITATE
'ON THE SPOT' RESOLUTION OF SUCH PROBLEMS AS ARISE.

MOREOVER, AN UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED THAT EVEN IN CASES WHERE THE BORDER CONTROL AUTHORITIES HAVE REASON TO DOUBT THE BONA FIDE INTENTIONS OF A U.S. TOURIST, HIS PASSPORT WILL NOT BE WITHHELD.

PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS, INCLUDING U.S. CITIZENS IN THE TERRITORIES AND ON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE AT THE AIRPORT AND ALLENBY BRIDGE, HAVE BEEN ACCORDED SPECIAL ATTENTION. WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFICULTIES, EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO DEAL WITH THEM PROMPTLY.

2. PERMIT US TO ADDRESS THE GENERAL POINTS RAISED IN THE U.S. PAPER.

A) FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE CONSULATE OR EMBASSY OF THE DETENTION OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN:

CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED REQUIRING THAT U.S. CONSULAR OFFICERS BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY, WHENEVER A U.S. CITIZEN IS DETAINED AND SO REQUESTS. IN MANY CASES CONSULAR OFFICERS ARE INFORMED AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES, EVEN WHERE NO SUCH REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE.

THERE CAN BE, HOWEVER, OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES IN ENSURING PROMPT NOTIFICATION. SOME OF THE NON-ISRAELI NATIONALS ARRESTED IN THE TERRITORIES ARE DUAL NATIONALS HOLDING U.S. CITIZENSHIP. THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP OF A DETAINED PERSON IS OFTEN NOT KNOWN AT THE TIME OF ARREST AND HE MAY NOT IDENTIFY HIMSELF AS SUCH.

YET IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT FAMILIES OF DETAINEES ARE ALWAYS INFORMED OF THE ARREST AND THAT THEY USUALLY ADVISE CONSULAR OFFICERS (WITHOUT NECESSARILY INFORMING THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES THAT THE DETAINEE IS A U.S. CITIZEN).

B) DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF DETAINEES TO COMMUNICATE WITH U.S. CONSULAR OFFICERS DURING THE INTERROGATION PERIOD; DELAYS IN CONSULAR ACCESS:

A PERSON DETAINED ON REGULAR CRIMINAL CHARGES IS GRANTED PROMPT ACCESS TO A LAWYER, AS DETERMINED BY LAW, AND IN THE CASE OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL, ACCESS TO HIS CONSUL.

HOWEVER, AS IS THE CASE IN MANY COUNTRIES, ACCESS MAY BE DEFERRED IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES (GENERALLY OF A SECURITY NATURE) WHERE THE NEEDS OF THE INVESTIGATION SO REQUIRE. NEVERTHELESS, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES EITHER ICRC REPRESENTATIVES OR CONSULAR OFFICERS

ARE GIVEN ACCESS NOT LATER THAN 14 DAYS FOLLOWING THE DETENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ICRC.

C) TRIALS OF YOUTHS OVER THE AGE OF TWELVE AS ADULTS:

CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 12 ARE NOT DETAINED OR PROSECUTED. YOUTHS BETWEEN THE AGES OF 12 AND 15 INCLUSIVE ARE NEITHER DETAINED NOR PROSECUTED, OTHER THAN IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

IN PRACTICE, THE AUTHORITIES ARE OFTEN MORE LENIENT IN DEALING WITH MINORS THAN THE LAW PERMITS. I.D.F. LEGAL ADVISERS ARE CONSULTED WHENEVER A YOUTH UNDER 14 IS ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH A CRIMINAL ACT. IN THOSE EXCEPTIONAL CASES WHERE YOUTHS ARE DETAINED, THEY ARE HELD SEPARATELY FROM ADULTS, AND IF BROUGHT TO TRIAL ARE SUBJECT TO A MORE LIMITED PUNISHMENT. NO YOUTHS UNDER THE AGE OF 17 MAY BE HELD IN ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION.

D) LACK OF TRANSLATORS FOR DETAINED U.S. CITIZENS WHO DO NOT SPEAK HEBREW:

INTERROGATION OF A DETAINEE IS ALWAYS CONDUCTED IN A LANGUAGE IN WHICH HE IS CONVERSANT.

WHILE PROSECUTION PROCEEDINGS ARE CONDUCTED IN HEBREW, ARABIC TRANSLATORS ARE ALWAYS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE ACCUSED. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO FRAMEWORK FOR SPECIFICALLY ENGLISH TRANSLATORS, ON THOSE FEW OCCASIONS WHERE SUCH A TRANSLATOR IS NECESSARY (I.E. THE ACCUSED DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ARABIC OR HEBREW), TRANSLATION IS PROVIDED ON AN AD HOC BASIS. OFTEN THE JUDGE OR A LAWYER ACTS AS THE ENGLISH TRANSLATOR IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

E) PROLONGED QUESTIONING AND SEARCHES (INCLUDING BODY SEARCHES) BY SECURITY PERSONNEL ON DEPARTURE OR ARRIVAL:

ENTRY INTO ISRAEL AND THE TERRITORIES AT BORDER POINTS (INCLUDING AIRPORTS) POSES SPECIAL SECURITY PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE TERRORIST THREAT FACING ISRAEL. SOME TRAVELLERS CAN BE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF. THEY MAY ALSO BE USED UNWITTINGLY BY SUCH GROUPS AS COURIERS OR EVEN OPERATORS. FOREIGNERS, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE BEEN SO EMPLOYED, BECAUSE OF THE 'SENSE OF IMMUNITY' THAT A FOREIGN PASSPORT IMPARTS.

THE FOREIGNERS IN QUESTION MAY BE RESIDENTS OF THE TERRITORIES OR OF ARAB STATES, OR PERSONS WHO FREQUENTLY TRAVEL TO AND FROM ARAB STATES. HENCE, VERY CAREFUL SECURITY SCREENING IS ESSENTIAL AND IT IS DONE FOR THE SAFETY OF THOSE INNOCENT TRAVELLERS QUESTIONED NO LESS THAN FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHER PERSONS.

ISRAEL ALSO TAKES SERIOUSLY THE PROBLEM OF NARCOTICS AND LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES CANNOT BE OBLIVIOUS TO THIS THREAT AT BORDER POINTS.

THE SECURITY MEASURES ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY SPECIFIC POPULATION GROUP. THE EXTENT OF THE SCREENING IS DETERMINED BY A VARIETY OF INDICATORS AS APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING TIME, PLACE AND POINT OF ORIGIN. GENERALLY, IT CAN BE STATED THAT BODY SEARCHES ARE VERY UNCOMMON AT THE AIRPORT. HOWEVER, AN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION EXISTS AT THE ALLENBY BRIDGE, WHICH DESPITE INHERENT THREATS HAS BEEN STEADFASTLY KEPT OPEN SINCE 1967. THE FACT THAT PERSONS ENTER FROM COUNTRIES, INCLUDING JORDAN, WHICH CLAIM TO BE IN A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL, AND THAT THEY ARE MORE OFTEN THAN NOT NATIONALS OF THESE COUNTRIES, NECESSITATES MUCH MORE RIGOROUS SCREENING. AN 'ARAB SURNAME' IS NOT IN ITSELF THE BASIS FOR A BODY (OR 'STRIP') SEARCH. WHEREVER SUCH SEARCHES ARE CONDUCTED, SECURITY PERSONNEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO UNDERTAKE THEM WITH COURTESY AND RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

3. THE U.S. IS OF COURSE AWARE OF THE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS FACED BY ISRAEL AND OF THE DIVIDENDS WHICH ISRAEL'S VIGILANCE HAS PAID. IN OUR ESTIMATION ISRAEL'S RECORD AS REGARDS THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE TALKING POINTS DOES NOT FALL SHORT OF THAT WHICH COULD BE EXPECTED FROM OTHER STATES OF THE FREE WORLD IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES.

WE CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH U.S. CONSULAR AUTHORITIES TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS WHICH MAY ARISE.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, סייבל, משפט, קונס,
בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מזתים, ברנע, ארבל,
@ טוב/מינהלאוכלוסין/ממפנים, @ (שובל/תיירות), @ (מתאסשטחים)

אאאא, חוזם: 4044

אל: רהמש/ 231

מ-: המשד, תא: 050890, זח: 1627, חמ: סג: שמ,

בבב

9, 309110

49655

שמור/ מידי

אל: וושינגטון

דע:

מתאם הפעולות בשטחים
מזכיר הממשלה
רע'ן דבל'א מפצ'ר
מטא'ר - רמ'ד זרים; ר'חוליית ביקורת גבולות
נתב'ג - מנח'ט בטחון; ר'יחידת ביקורת גבולות
משרד הפנים - סגן מנהל מינהל אוכלוסין
משרד התיירות - סמנכ'ל שירותי תיירות (בנפרד)
מנהל מצפ'א
מנהל מז'ת 2
מנהל קונסולרית
מנהל ארב'ל 2

הנדון: TRAVEL ADVISORY

בהמשך לנייר שלנו שהוברק בנפרד

1. הקונכ'ל בשג' ארה'ב בת'א זומן (במקום פריס שנעדר בשל התחייבות אחרת) 2.8 לסיבל לקבל את תשובתנו TALKING ל-POINTS. השתתפו למדן והח'מ.

2. לאחר עיון בנייר הישראלי אמר מטרינקו כי לא ייתייחס כעת באופן ספציפי לנאמר, אם כי יכול היה להצביע על מקרים חריגים לגבי כ'א מהנקודות. הוא ביקש שנראה את מושג ה-ADVISORY כפרספקטיבה. הודעות כאלה מתפרסמים כמעט מדי שבוע לגבי מצבים במדינות שונות וחלקן INNOCUOUS. הממשל חש מחויבות משפטית לפרסם ADVISORIES, בין היתר, בעקבות הביקורת מפרשת 'פאן אם'. בשטחים מצב מיוחד ולממשל חובה להזהיר נוסעים אמריקנים לגבי הבעיות האפשריות. כבר ישנה TRAVEL ADVISORY בתוקף בנושא השטחים והמדובר עתה על עדכון. ארה'ב איננה נוהגת להודיע למדינה מראש על כוונתה להוציא הודעה כאמור. הדבר נעשה במקרה של ישראל לאור היחס המיוחד.

3. בהתייחס לסידורי הבטחון בכניסה לארץ סיבל אמר שמדאיג אותנו שארה'ב מטילה ביקורת דווקא על צעדים שמטרתם להבטיח את שלומם של כל הנוסעים, כולל אלה שנבדקים. באשר לגשר אלנבי, ששם הבדיקות קפדניות ביותר (להבדיל מנתב'ג ששם בדרך כלל אין בדיקות גופניות), יש לזכור שמדובר במעבר מארץ אויב על כל המשתמע מכך.

4. למדן הדגיש את חוסר האיזון בגישת ארה'ב. מאות אלפי אמריקנים מבקרים בישראל מדי שנה ואינם נאלצים להצטייד מראש באשרות כפי שדורשים מישראלים - תהליך שמאפשר סינון מוקדם. ככלל המערכת פועלת ללא תקלות.

5. מטרינקו הגיב כי מה שמפריע במיוחד לאמריקנים היא התחושה שאזרחים ממוצא ערבי זוכים לטיפול מפלה.

6. הובהר לו כי אופן הטיפול נקבע לפי מספר אינדיקטורים. נוסעים מכל מיני ארצות ומוצאים עלולים לעבור תשאול מפורט בנתב"ג; ובגשר אלנבי כמעט כל הנוסעים עוברים בדיקות גופניות.

7. באשר למעצרים, מטרינקו הודה כי בישראל (להבדיל מהשטחים) אין כל בעיה בקבלת הודעות על דבר מעצר. שיבח את ש"פ של משטרת ישראל.

8. באשר לשטחים, בעיית ההודעה ומתן גישה לעציר חמורה. למטרינקו לא זכור אפילו מקרה אחד מאז תחילת המאורעות שהמנהל האזרחי דיווח ביוזמתו על מעצר אזרח אמריקני. השגרירות אמנם מרוצה מהנוהל המאפשר להם גישה ישירה למנהל האזרחי (לדבריו), כאשר בשעתו כל פנייה נותבה דרך משה"ח, הטיפול היה לקוי, אולם בנושא מתן הודעה, אין ש"פ מטעם המנהל.

9. סיבל הגיב כי בסוגייה זו דנו עם הגורמים והובטח שבכל מקרה שיוודע דבר מעצרו של אזרח אמריקני והוא יבקש זאת, יעדכנו את הנציגים הקונסולריים. הצענו כי אם בעתיד יתקלו בבעיות יפנו אלינו לבירור העניין.

10. בסיום ביקש למדן שבמידה וימצאו לנכון, על אף הבהרותנו, להוציא עדכון ל-ADVISORY, רצוי לכל הפחות שידגישו שהמדובר בשטחים ולא בישראל גופא.

משפט

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, סייבל, משפט, קונס, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מזתים, ברנע, ארבל, 2, @ (מתאשטחים), @ (אינטרפול), @ (שובל/תיירות), מירשסאוכלוסין

סססס

27630:חוזם,חאא
אל:רהמש/1097
מ:-המשרד,תא:310790,זח:1547,דח:ב,סג:שמ,
בבב
9,250890

49349
שמור בהול טפל

אל מתאם הפעולה ביש'ע



רע'ן דבל'א מפצ'ר
מטא'ר - רמ'ד זרים
מטא'ר - ר' חוליית ביקורת גבולות נתב'ג - מנח'ט בטחון
נתב'ג - ר' יחידת בקורת גבולות
משרד הפנים, סגן מנהל מינהל אוכלוסין (י. טוב) משרד התיירות
- סמנכ'ל שרותי תיירות (א. יושע) מנהל מצפ'א
מנהל מז'ת 2
מנהל קונסולרית
מנהל ארכ'ל 2

מאת : לשכת היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: ארה'ב TRAVEL ADVISORY

בהמשך לסיכום הדיון מה-30.7, מצ'ב הנוסח המוצע. בכוונתנו
למסור את הנייר לאמריקנים ביום חמישי ה-2.8. במידה ויש
הערות העבירונוא בחוזר טלפונית לדוד בן-רפאל - טל: (ע:
303592 - 303761, ב: 02-635915) עד תום יום העבודה ב-1.8.

בן-רפאל

העתק: מזכיר הממשלה

1. WE WERE CONCERNED TO RECEIVE YOUR TALKING POINTS
ADVISING OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. MAY
ISSUE AN UPDATED TRAVEL ADVISORY TO AMERICAN
CITIZENS.

IN OUR JUDGEMENT THERE HAS BEEN AN IMPROVEMENT
IN RECENT MONTHS IN THE ONGOING LIAISON PROCESS
BETWEEN THE ISRAEL AUTHORITIES AND THE U.S.
EMBASSY. IN AUGUST 1989 FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE EMBASSY, A SPECIAL LIAISON BUREAU WAS
ESTABLISHED BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY AT
BEN-GURION AIRPORT TO FACILITATE 'ON THE SPOT'
RESOLUTION OF SUCH PROBLEMS AS ARISE. MOREOVER,
AN UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED THAT EVEN IN CASES

WHERE THE BORDER CONTROL AUTHORITIES HAVE REASON TO DOUBT THE BONA FIDE INTENTIONS OF A U.S. TOURIST, HIS PASSPORT WILL NOT BE WITHHELD.

PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS, INCLUDING U.S. CITIZENS IN THE TERRITORIES AND ON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE AT THE AIRPORT AND ALLENBY BRIDGE, HAVE BEEN ACCORDED SPECIAL ATTENTION. WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFICULTIES, EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO DEAL WITH THEM PROMPTLY.

2. THE U.S. PAPER DOES NOT LIST ANY SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS. THUS WE WILL ADDRESS THE GENERAL POINTS RAISED.

A) FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE CONSULATE OR EMBASSY OF THE DETENTION OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN:

CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED REQUIRING THAT U.S. CONSULAR OFFICERS BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY, WHENEVER A U.S. CITIZEN IS DETAINED AND SO REQUESTS. IN MANY CASES CONSULAR OFFICERS ARE INFORMED AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES, EVEN WHERE NO SUCH REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE.

THERE CAN BE, HOWEVER, OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES IN ENSURING PROMPT NOTIFICATION. SOME OF THE NON-ISRAELI NATIONALS ARRESTED IN THE TERRITORIES ARE DUAL NATIONALS HOLDING U.S. CITIZENSHIP. THE U.S. NATIONALITY OF A DETAINED PERSON IS OFTEN NOT KNOWN AT THE TIME OF ARREST AND HE MAY NOT IDENTIFY HIMSELF AS SUCH.

MOREOVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT FAMILIES OF DETAINEES ARE ALWAYS INFORMED OF THE ARREST AND THEY USUALLY ADVISE CONSULAR OFFICERS.

B) DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF DETAINEES TO COMMUNICATE WITH U.S. CONSULAR OFFICERS DURING THE INTERROGATION PERIOD; DELAYS IN CONSULAR ACCESS:

A PERSON DETAINED ON REGULAR CRIMINAL CHARGES IS GRANTED PROMPT ACCESS TO A LAWYER, AS DETERMINED BY LAW, AND IN THE CASE OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL, ACCESS TO HIS CONSUL.

HOWEVER, AS IS THE CASE IN MANY COUNTRIES, ACCESS MAY BE DEFERRED IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES (GENERALLY OF A SECURITY NATURE) WHERE THE NEEDS OF THE INVESTIGATION SO REQUIRE. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, ICRC REPRESENTATIVES OR CONSULAR OFFICERS ARE GIVEN ACCESS NOT LATER THAN 14 DAYS FOLLOWING THE DETENTION

IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ICRC.

C) TRIALS OF U.S. CITIZEN YOUTHS OVER THE AGE OF TWELVE AS ADULTS:

CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 12 ARE NOT DETAINED OR PROSECUTED. OTHER THAN IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUTHS BETWEEN THE AGES OF 12 AND 16 ARE NEITHER DETAINED NOR PROSECUTED. IN MOST CASES OF INVOLVEMENT IN DISTURBANCES, THE AUTHORITIES SIMPLY DO NOT ARREST OFFENDERS WHO ARE YOUTHS.

WHERE SUCH YOUTHS ARE DETAINED, THEY ARE HELD SEPARATELY FROM ADULTS, AND IF BROUGHT TO TRIAL ARE SUBJECT TO A MORE LIMITED PUNISHMENT. NO YOUTHS UNDER THE AGE OF 17 MAY BE HELD IN ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION.

D) LACK OF TRANSLATORS FOR DETAINED U.S. CITIZENS WHO DO NOT SPEAK HEBREW:

INTERROGATION OF A DETAINEE IS ALWAYS CONDUCTED IN A LANGUAGE IN WHICH HE IS CONVERSANT.

WHILE PROSECUTION PROCEEDINGS ARE CONDUCTED IN HEBREW, ARABIC TRANSLATORS ARE ALWAYS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE ACCUSED. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO FRAMEWORK FOR SPECIFICALLY ENGLISH TRANSLATORS, ON THOSE FEW OCCASIONS WHERE SUCH A TRANSLATOR IS NECESSARY (I.E. THE ACCUSED DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ARABIC OR HEBREW), TRANSLATION IS PROVIDED ON AN AD HOC BASIS. OFTEN THE JUDGE OR A LAWYER ACTS AS THE ENGLISH TRANSLATOR IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

E) PROLONGED QUESTIONING AND SEARCHES (INCLUDING BODY SEARCHES) BY SECURITY PERSONNEL ON DEPARTURE OR ARRIVAL:

ENTRY INTO ISRAEL AND THE TERRITORIES AT BORDER POINTS (INCLUDING AIRPORTS) POSES SPECIAL SECURITY PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE TERRORIST THREAT FACING ISRAEL. SOME TRAVELLERS CAN BE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF. THEY MAY ALSO BE USED UNWITTINGLY BY SUCH GROUPS AS COURIERS OR EVEN OPERATORS. FOREIGNERS, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE BEEN SO EMPLOYED, BECAUSE OF THE 'SENSE OF IMMUNITY' THAT A FOREIGN PASSPORT IMPARTS. THE FOREIGNERS IN QUESTION MAY BE RESIDENTS OF THE TERRITORIES OR OF ARAB STATES, OR PERSONS WHO FREQUENTLY TRAVEL TO AND FROM ARAB STATES. HENCE, VERY CAREFUL SECURITY

SCREENING IS ESSENTIAL AND IT IS DONE FOR THE SAFETY OF THOSE INNOCENT TRAVELLERS QUESTIONED NO LESS THAN FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHER PERSONS.

ISRAEL ALSO TAKES SERIOUSLY THE PROBLEM OF NARCOTICS AND LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES CANNOT BE OBLIVIOUS TO THIS THREAT AT BORDER POINTS.

THE SECURITY MEASURES ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANY SPECIFIC POPULATION GROUP. THE EXTENT OF THE SCREENING IS DETERMINED BY A VARIETY OF INDICATORS AS APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING TIME PLACE AND POINT OF ORIGIN. GENERALLY, IT CAN BE STATED THAT BODY SEARCHES ARE VERY UNCOMMON AT THE AIRPORT. HOWEVER, AN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION EXISTS AT THE ALLENBY BRIDGE, WHICH DESPITE INHERANT THREATS HAS BEEN STEADFASTLY KEPT OPEN SINCE 1967. THE FACT THAT PERSONS ENTER FROM COUNTRIES, INCLUDING JORDAN, WHICH CLAIM TO BE IN A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL, AND THAT THEY ARE MORE OFTEN THAN NOT NATIONALS OF THESE COUNTRIES, NECESSITATES MUCH MORE RIGOROUS SCREENING. AN 'ARAB SURNAME' IS NOT IN ITSELF THE BASIS FOR A BODY (OR 'STRIP') SEARCH. WHEREVER SUCH SEARCHES ARE CONDUCTED, SECURITY PERSONNEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO UNDERTAKE THEM WITH COURTESY AND RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

3. THE U.S. IS OF COURSE AWARE OF THE SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS FACED BY ISRAEL AND OF THE DIVIDENDS WHICH ISRAEL'S VIGILANCE HAS PAID. IN OUR ESTIMATION ISRAEL'S RECORD AS REGARDS THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE TALKING POINTS DOES NOT FALL SHORT OF THAT WHICH COULD BE EXPECTED FROM STATES OF THE FREE WORLD.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, סייבל, משפט, בנצור, מצפא,
סולטן, מזתים, קונס, ברנע, ארבל, 2, טוב/מינהלאוכלוסין/ממפנים,
(שובל/תיירות), (מזכירהממשלה)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 21951
אל: רהמש/876
מ-: המשרד, תא: 250790, זח: 1309, דח: ר, סג: שמ,
כבב
9,309110
שמור / מידי

48959
א ל : מתאם הפעולות בשטחים

רע'ן דבל'א, מפצ'ר
מטא'ר - ר' חולית ביקורת גבולות
נתב'ג - ר' יחידת ביקורת גבולות
נתב'ג - ממונה בטחון (ד. שחר)
משרד הפנים - מנהל מחלקת אשרות
משרד התיירות - מנהל לשכת המנכ"ל
מנהל מצפ"א
מנהל מז"ת 2
מנהל קונסולרית

מאת : לשכת היועץ המשפטי

הנדון: איום ב-TRAVEL ADVISORY של ארה"ב בגלל בעיות טיפול
באזרחים אמריקנים העצורים ביר"ש ובכניסתם ויציאתם
מהארץ.

א. שגריר ארה"ב מסר למשרד החוץ ולמזכיר הממשלה נייר
המצ'ב לפיו ארה"ב מתריעה כי תוציא TRAVEL ADVISORY
המזהיר את אזרחיה מהסכנות הכרוכות בביקור בישראל בשל
בעיות הטיפול באזרחים אמריקנים ממוצא ערבי כמפורט
בנייר.

ארה"ב מוכנה להמנע מפרסום אם ישראל תודיע לה על צעדים
שננקטים לפתור את הבעיה. שגריר ארה"ב ביקש
טיפול דחוף על מנת למנוע פרסום ההזהרה.

ב. המכותבים או נציגיהם מוזמנים לדיון אצל היועץ המשפטי
של משרד החוץ שיתקיים ביום ב' ה-30.7.90 בשעה 10:00
באולם שרת.

אשרונא השתתפותכם (טל: 02-303761 או 02-303592).

ד. בן רפאל
לשכת היועץ המשפטי

העתק: מזכיר הממשלה

AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY NOTED TO THE PREVIOUS
GOVERNMENT, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF

AMERICAN CITIZENS, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF ARAB DESCENT, BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES.

- WE HAVE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC CONCERNS:
- REPEATED FAILURE OF ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO NOTIFY THE CONSULATE OR EMBASSY WHEN AN AMERICAN CITIZEN IS ARRESTED IN THE WEST BANK.
- DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF DETAINEES TO COMMUNICATE WITH U.S. CONSULAR OFFICERS WHILE THEY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING INTERROGATED.
- DELAYS IN CONSULAR ACCESS TO ARRESTED AMERICANS.
- TRIALS OF U.S. CITIZEN YOUTHS OVER THE AGE OF TWELVE AS ADULTS.
- LACK OF TRANSLATORS FOR DETAINED U.S. CITIZENS WHO DO NOT SPEAK HEBREW.
- PROLONGED QUESTIONING AND SEARCHES BY SECURITY PERSONNEL ON DEPARTURE AND/OR ARRIVAL.
- STRIP SEARCHES OF BOTH MEN AND WOMEN WITH ARAB SURNAMES, OR WHOSE SPOUSES HAVE ARAB SURNAMES, AT THE ALLENBY BRIDGE AND AT THE AIRPORT.

WE HAVE RAISED THESE PROBLEMS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL ON MANY OCCASIONS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS.

NEVERTHELESS, PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO OCCUR ON A REGULAR BASIS.

WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO WARN AMERICAN CITIZENS OF PROBLEMS THEY MAY ENCOUNTER WHILE TRAVELLING OR RESIDING ABROAD.

WE BELIEVE WE MUST ISSUE AN UPDATED TRAVEL ADVISORY WARNING AMERICAN CITIZENS OF POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES THEY MAY ENCOUNTER; BUT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS A NEW GOVERNMENT, WE WANTED TO GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES PROMPTLY.

THIS IS THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE WITH THE NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

WE WANT YOU TO KNOW IN ADVANCE OF OUR INTENTIONS. IT IS POSSIBLE TO AVOID THIS TRAVEL ADVISORY, BUT TO DO SO I NEEDED TO HAVE CLEAR ASSURANCES ABOUT WHAT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סיכל, משפט,
סולטן, מזתים, קונס, אשרות/פנים, ממנכלפנים,
(מזכירה ממשה) @, (אינטרפול)

"JSS with a/ide" with regular T.P. - 2
1977 - 2 20th of 1977

-- As we have repeatedly noted to the previous government, we are concerned about the treatment of American citizens, particularly those of Arab descent, by Israeli authorities.

o We have a number of specific concerns:

- o Repeated failure of Israeli authorities to notify the consulate or embassy when an American citizen is arrested in the West Bank.
- o Denial of the right of detainees to communicate with U.S. consular officers while they are in the process of being interrogated.
- o Delays in consular access to arrested Americans.
- o Trials of U.S. citizen youths over the age of twelve as adults.
- o Lack of translators for detained U.S. citizens who do not speak Hebrew.
- o Prolonged questioning and searches by security personnel on departure and/or arrival.
- o Strip searches of both men and women with Arab surnames, or whose spouses have Arab surnames, at the Allenby Bridge and at the airport.

-- We have raised these problems with the government of Israel on many occasions over the last two years.

-- Nevertheless, problems continue to occur on a regular basis.

-- We have an obligation to warn American citizens of problems they may encounter while travelling or residing abroad.

-- We believe we must issue an updated travel advisory warning American citizens of potential difficulties they may encounter; but in view of the fact that there is a new government, we wanted to give you an opportunity to deal with these issues promptly.

-- This is the first time we have raised the issue with the Israeli government.

-- We want you to know in advance of our intentions. It is possible to avoid this travel advisory, but to do so I need have clear assurances about what steps are being taken to solve the problem.



71 223413
August 2, 1990

49187

1. We were concerned to receive your talking points advising of the possibility that the U.S. may issue an updated travel advisory to American citizens.

In our judgement there has been an improvement in recent months in the ongoing liaison process between the Israel authorities and the U.S. Embassy. In August 1989 following discussions with the Embassy, a special liaison bureau was established by the Interior Ministry at Ben-Gurion Airport to facilitate "on the spot" resolution of such problems as arise. Moreover, an understanding was reached that even in cases where the border control authorities have reason to doubt the bona fide intentions of a U.S. tourist, his passport will not be withheld.

Problems relating to the treatment of foreign nationals, including U.S. citizens in the territories and on arrival and departure at the airport and Allenby Bridge, have been accorded special attention. Where there have been difficulties, every effort has been made to deal with them promptly.

2. Permit us to address the general points raised in the U.S. paper.

a) Failure to notify the Consulate or Embassy of the detention of an American citizen:

Clear instructions have been issued requiring that U.S. consular officers be notified immediately, whenever a U.S. citizen is detained and so requests. In many cases consular officers are informed at the initiative of the Israel authorities, even where no such request has been made.

There can be, however, objective difficulties in ensuring prompt notification. Some of the non-Israeli nationals arrested in the territories are dual nationals holding U.S. citizenship. The U.S. citizenship of a detained person is often not known at the time of arrest and he may not identify himself as such.



Yet it should be noted that families of detainees are always informed of the arrest and that they usually advise consular officers (without necessarily informing the Israel authorities that the detainee is a U.S. citizen).

- b) Denial of the right of detainees to communicate with U.S. consular officers during the interrogation period; Delays in consular access:

A person detained on regular criminal charges is granted prompt access to a lawyer, as determined by law, and in the case of a foreign national, access to his consul.

However, as is the case in many countries, access may be deferred in exceptional cases (generally of a security nature) where the needs of the investigation so require. Nevertheless, in such circumstances either ICRC representatives or consular officers are given access not later than 14 days following the detention in accordance with principles set forth in an agreement between Israel and the ICRC.

- c) Trials of youths over the age of twelve as adults:

Children under the age of 12 are not detained or prosecuted. Youths between the ages of 12 and 15 inclusive are neither detained nor prosecuted, other than in exceptional circumstances.

In practice, the authorities are often more lenient in dealing with minors than the law permits. I.D.F. legal advisers are consulted whenever a youth under 14 is arrested and charged with a criminal act. In those exceptional cases where youths are detained, they are held separately from adults, and if brought to trial are subject to a more limited punishment. No youths under the age of 17 may be held in administrative detention.

- d) Lack of translators for detained U.S. citizens who do not speak Hebrew:

Interrogation of a detainee is always conducted in a language in which he is conversant.



While prosecution proceedings are conducted in Hebrew, Arabic translators are always made available to the accused. Although there is no framework for specifically English translators, on those few occasions where such a translator is necessary (i.e. the accused does not understand Arabic or Hebrew), translation is provided on an ad hoc basis. Often the judge or a lawyer acts as the English translator in these circumstances.

- e) Prolonged questioning and searches (including body searches) by security personnel on departure or arrival:

Entry into Israel and the territories at border points (including airports) poses special security problems because of the unique terrorist threat facing Israel. Some travellers can be members of terrorist organizations or acting on their behalf. They may also be used unwittingly by such groups as couriers or even operators. Foreigners, in particular, have been so employed, because of the "sense of immunity" that a foreign passport imparts. The foreigners in question may be residents of the territories or of Arab states, or persons who frequently travel to and from Arab states. Hence, very careful security screening is essential and it is done for the safety of those innocent travellers questioned no less than for the safety of other persons.

Israel also takes seriously the problem of narcotics and like other countries cannot be oblivious to this threat at border points.

The security measures are not directed against any specific population group. The extent of the screening is determined by a variety of indicators as appropriate, including time, place and point of origin. Generally, it can be stated that body searches are very uncommon at the airport. However, an exceptional situation exists at the Allenby Bridge, which despite inherent threats has been steadfastly kept open



since 1967. The fact that persons enter from countries, including Jordan, which claim to be in a state of belligerency with Israel, and that they are more often than not nationals of these countries, necessitates much more rigorous screening. An "Arab surname" is not in itself the basis for a body (or "strip") search. Wherever such searches are conducted, security personnel are instructed to undertake them with courtesy and respect for the dignity of the individual.

3. The U.S. is of course aware of the serious security problems faced by Israel and of the dividends which Israel's vigilance has paid. In our estimation Israel's record as regards the issues raised in the talking points does not fall short of that which could be expected from other states of the free world in similar circumstances.

We can assure you that we will continue to work closely with U.S. consular authorities to resolve problems which may arise.

אאא, חוזם: 27256

אל: רהמש/1085

מ-: המשרד, תא: 310790, חז: 1142, חמ: סג: שמ,

בבב

14327

שמור/מיידי

צ.ס.

אל: שגרירות

הנדון: ארה"ב-חרם

1. בעת דיוני הועדה המשותפת לפתוח כלכלי ארה"ב-ישראל ב-30/7, העליתי נושא החרם הערבי. הועדה התכנסה בירושלים בראשות סגן שר החוץ האמריקני לעניינים כלכליים מק-קורמק ומנכ"ל האוצר יעקב ליפשיץ.

2. בעת הדיון העליתי הנקודות הבאות:

א. השלכות ההחלטה של שרי חוץ הליגה הערבית במחצית יולי בתוניס ביוזמת אש"ף להפעיל מנגנון החרם הערבי כדי להחרים חברות המסייעות להנאתם ולקליטתם של העולים מברה"מ. ציינתי שלא שמענו תגובה פומבית לא של ארה"ב ולא של אירופה על איום בחרם נגד חברות המסייעות העולים, חברות הספנות המובילות חפציהם, בתי מלון המאחסנים אותם בדרך, חברות הבטוח המבטחות אותם ואת חפציהם וחברות בניה המציעות לנו בסטונות מכירה של בתים טרומיים והרכבתם בארץ.

השגריר בראון ענה בתגובה שנציגי ארה"ב בארצות ערב הגישו דמרש ושימשיכו לעשות זאת. לא התיחס להעדר תגובה פומבית. כשאמר שלא כל מדינות ערב מאושרות מההחלטה עניתי שההחלטות של הליגה מתקבלות פה אחד ואם מדינה זו או אחרת, היתה מתנגדת להחלטה, היא לא היתה מתקבלת.

ב. הקהילה - חרם. פרטתי דרישתנו מהקהילה להרמוניזציה של חוקים, לחקיקה לאומית ולהכנסת סעיף אי אפליה בהסכם עם המפרציות מבלי לרוקנו מתוכן ע"י חליפת מכתבים, זאת בהמשך לדבריו של שר החוץ בעת בקור טרויקה והרצאתי בפני המנכ"לים המדיניים ב-24/7, שהועברו אליכם בנפרד.

מר קורמק ענה שארה"ב תעלה נושא החרם בעת התיעצויות התקופתיות עם הקהילה האירופית. אמר שידגיש בפני האירופים שתי נקודות והם שארבע מבין שמונה מדינות הקהילה חוקקו חוקים נגד חרם ושהעדר חוקים במדינות שונות לעומת מדינות בהם קיימים חוקים והחברות הכלכליות בהם כבולות ע"י חוקים אלה יוצר מצב של תחרות לא הוגנת. שאל באיזה מדינות הבעיות הם חמורות ועניתי שמתוך ארצות הקהילה המצב הכי גרוע הוא בבריטניה ואחר כך בגרמניה המערבית ובצרפת. ציינתי לרעה התנהגותה בהקשר לחרם של שוודיה. מק-קורמק שאל על המצב באיטליה ופרטתי את קשריה המסורתיים עם מדינות ערב כולל לוב.

ג. יפן-חרם. פרטתי השפעת החרם הערבי ביפן ואת עזרתו של קודמו בתפקיד ואליס שהעלה נושא זה לדיון מספר פעמים עם היפנים. מק-קורמק ענה שהוא ידאג אישית להעלאת נושא החרם בדיונים התקופתיים עם יפן. אמר, שהעלאת הנושא עם היפנים לא תניב להערכתו תוצאות מעשיות. מה שנחוץ לדבריו הוא לחץ צבורי (עתונות וקונגרס) ועסקי על יפן. הוסיף שאת העצה שנחוץ לחץ הוא נותן על בסיס פרטי ומבקש שלא ליחוס.

ד. השפעות כלכליות של החרם: ציינתי העדר השקעות ושיפוע תעשיתי עם מדינות אירופה ויפן. העדר קשרים עם חברות רב לאומיות ושההפסד בהשקעות בגין החרם, מוערך ע"י כלכלנים בסכום שנתי של 400 מליון דולר לשנה.

ה. החרם ותהליך השלום: הפניתי תשומת לב כל אלה המדברים על מתון בעמדת הערבים להחרפת החרם דווקא ע"י מדינות הקרובות מתונות כמו סעודיה, כוויית המפרציות ירדן וכו'. בקשתי בהמשך לקריאתו של המזכיר בייקר לערבים מה-24.5.89 לבטל החרם פעולה של הקהילה הבינ"ל, בהנהגת ארה"ב בנדון כחלק מה-CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.

מקורמק הציע בהקשר זה, הקמת קבוצת עבודה כלכלית שתדון במרכיב הכלכלי של תהליך השלום, לכשיפתח. פרטים בנפרד.

3. נוסח דברי בפני הוועדה המשותפת ארה"ב-ישראל - בדיפ.

4. מקורמק הוא ידיד שמוכן לסייע.

יעקב כהן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן, ממד, כהן, כלכליתב', חרם, הדס, איר1, איר2, אסיה, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר, סולטן, מצרים, סייבל, משפט, אוצר

סססס



14327

שמור/מייד
ז.ס.

אל: וושינגטון, ניו-יורק, תפוצת מאיה, ג'נבה, ברן,
אוסלו, שטוקהולם, הלסינקי, וינה, טוקיו, בודפשט, וורשה, קהיר

הנדון: ארה"ב-חרם

1. בעת דיוני הועדה המשותפת לפתוח כלכלי ארה"ב-ישראל
ב-30/7, העליתי נושא החרם הערבי. הועדה התכנסה בירושלים
בראשות סגן שר החוץ ואחריקני לעיניים כלכליים מק-קורמק
ומנכ"ל האוצר יעקב ליפשיץ.

2. בעת הדיון העליתי הנקודות הבאות:

א. השלכות ההחלטה של שרי חוץ הליגה הערבית במחצית יולי
בתוניס ביוזמת אש"ף להפעיל מנגנון החרם הערבי כדי להחריס
חברות המסייעות להבאתם ולקליטתם של העולים מבריה"מ. ציינתי
שלא שמענו תגובה פומבית לא של ארה"ב ולא של אירופה על איום
בחרם נגד חברות המסייעות העולים, חברות הספנות
המובילות חפציהם, בתי מלון המאחסנים אותם בדרך, חברות
הבטוח המבטחות אותם ואת חפציהם וחברות בניה המציעות לנו
בסטונות מכירה של בתים טרומיים והרכבתם בארץ.

השגריר בראון ענה בתגובה שנציגי ארה"ב בארצות ערב הגישו
דמיון ושימשיכו לעשות זאת. לא התייחס להעדר תגובה פומבית.
כשאמר שלא כל מדינות ערב מאשרות מההחלטה עניתי שההחלטות
של הליגה מתקבלות פה אחד ואם מדינה זו או אחרת,
היתה מתנגדת להחלטה, היא לא היתה מתקבלת.

ב. הקהילה - חרם. פרטתי דרישתנו מהקהילה להרמוניזציה של
חוקים, לחקיקה לאומית ולהכנסת סעיף אי אפליה בהסכם עם
המפרציות מבלי לדקנו מתוכן ע"י חליפת מכתבים, זאת בהמשך
לדבריו של שר החוץ בעת בקור טרויקה והוצאתי בפני המנכ"לים
המדיניים ב-24/7, שהועברו אליכם בנפרד.

מק קורמק ענה שארה"ב תעלה נושא החרם בעת התייעצויות
התקופתיות עם הקהילה האירופית. אמר שידגיש בפני האירופים
שתי נקודות והם שארבע מדינות שמזנה מדינות הקהילה חוקקו
חוקים נגד חרם ושאר ערבים במדינות שונות לעומת מדינות
בהם קיימים חוקים והחברות הכלכליות בהם כבולות ע"י חוקים
אלה יוצר מצב של תחרות לא הוגנת. שאל באיזה מדינות הבעיות
הם חמורות ועניתי שמתוך ארצות הקהילה המצב הכי גרוע הוא
בברזיל וואחד כך בגרמניה המערבית ובצרפת. ציינתי לדעה
התנהגותה באקשר לחרם של שוודיה. מק-קורמק שאל על המצב
באיטליה ופרטתי את קשריה המסורתיים עם מדינות ערב כולל
לוב.



ג. יפן-חרם. פרטתי השפעת החרם הערבי ביפן ואת עזרתו של קודמו בתפקיד ואלים שהעלה נושא זה לדיון מספר פעמים עם היפנים. מק-קורמק ענה שהוא ידאג אישית להעלאת נושא החרם בדיונים התקופתיים עם יפן. אמר, שהעלאת הנושא עם היפנים לא תניב להערכתו תוצאות מעשיות. מה שנחוץ לדבריו הוא לחץ צבורי (עתונות וקונגרס) ועסקי על יפן. הוסיף שאת העצה שנחוץ לחץ הוא נותן על בסיס פרטי ומבקש שלא ליחוס.

ד. השפעות כלכליות של החרם: ציינתי הגדר השקעות וש"פ תעשיתי עם מדינות אירופה ויפן. הגדר קשרים עם חברות רב לאומיות ושרהפסד בהשקעות בגין החרם, מוערך ע"י כלכלנים בסכום שנתי של 400 מליון דולר לשנה.

ה. החרם ותהליך השלום: הפניתי תשומת לב כל אלה המדברים על מתון בעמדות הערכים להחרפת החרם דווקא ע"י מדינות הקרויות מתונות כמו סעודיה, כווית המפרציות ירדן וכו'. בקשתי בהמשך לקריאתו של המזכיר בייקר לערכים מה-24.5.89 לבטל החרם פעולה של הקהילה הבינ"ל, בהנהגת ארה"ב בנדון כחלק מה-CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.

מקורמק הציע בהקשר זה, הקמת קבוצת עבודה כלכלית שתדון במרכיב הכלכלי של תהליך השלום, לכשיפתח. פרטים בנפרד.

3. נוסח דברי בפני הועדה המשותפת ארה"ב-ישראל - בדיפ.

4. מקורמק הוא ידיד שמוכן לסייע.

יעקב כהן
31 ביולי 1990

אאא, חוזם: 27255

אל: רהמש/1084

מ-: המשרד, תא: 310790, חז: 1142, חמ: סג, שמ,

בבב

14326

שמור/מיידי

צ.ס.

אל: וושינגטון

השגריר-ציר

בעת דיוני JEDG - הועדה המשותפת לפתוח כלכלי (ארה"ב-ישראל) העלה תת שר החוץ לעניינים כלכליים מק-קורמך, פעמיים (פעם באופן פרטי ופעם בעת הדיון על החרם הערבי) רעיון הקמת קבוצת עבודה שתדון בנושאים כלכליים במקביל לדיון המדיני - במסגרת התהליך המדיני לכשיפתח. הוסיף שהמרכיב הכלכלי חשוב ביותר ליצירת CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES כחלק מתהליך השלום. השגריר בראון העיר שהשר בייקר, כמו קודמו כיהן כשר האוצר וכאיש עסקים והנושא הכלכלי קרוב לליבו. מק קורמק אמר שאחרי שובו לווינגטון יגיש הצעה מפורטת למזכיר בייקר, לגבי תכנים, מבנה ארגוני של קבוצת העבודה לרבות רעיונות לגבי ש"פ כלכלי איזורי.

כששאל לתגובתי עניתי שהנושא הכלכלי לא נדון לעומק בעת המו"מ על הסכם קמפ-דויד שהיו לכך השלכות. לגופו של ענין אעביר ההצעה לעיונו של שר החוץ. ספרתי לו שקיימים בארץ הצעות לש"פ כלכלי איזורי בשטח המים, התפלת מי ים, ניצול משותף של חומרי גלם יחד עם מדינות שכנות, אנרגיה תלופית, שקום מחנות לפליטים וכו'. כן אמרתי שבמקביל וללא קשר עם ממוש הרעיון חשוב שארה"ב תתמוך בשילובה של ישראל בתכניות כלכליות האיזוריות והבינאזוריות (אירופה-ים תיכון) הנדונות לפרקים.

יעקב כהן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב', סייבל

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 186
אל: רהמש/11
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 320, תא: 310790, חז: 1955, חמ: סג: סו,
בכב
סודי/מידי

אל: מא"פ 1

דע: סמנכ"ל אפסו"ק; מצפ"א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

אתיופיה

1. בשיחה עם דיוויסון, מנהל מח' מזרח אפריקה במחמ"ד (31.7) התייחס לביקור שה"ח טספאיי דינקה ולתמונת המצב הפוליטית.

2. להלן עיקרי הדברים:

א. ביקור שה"ח אתיופיה

- יש לראות את שאלת הגירת יהודי אתיופיה כסיבה המרכזית לקיום פגישה ברמת מזכיר המדינה בפועל, איגלברגר. בקיום הפגישה אף ביקשו לאותת לאתיופים, שמנחינת ארה"ב הסיכום כפי שהושג עם קאסה קאבדה - בעינו.
ברוח זו, הוסיף, המסר הוא שהמימשל מוכן לגמול לאתיופיה על הענותה לדרישות / תנאי ארה"ב לשיפור יחסים.
- הערכת הצד האמריקאי, כמו, אליבא דבן שיחי, גם האתיופים, שהשיחה היתה טובה, כאשר ס/המזכיר מציע להשאיר המחלוקות שהעיבו על היחסים בעבר להיסטוריה ולהביט קדימה לשיפור היחסים. ציין בחיוב הרפורמות הכלכליות שאימצה ממאתיופיה, נכונות לפתיחת מאסווה, שיחרור אסירים פוליטיים וכן המו"מ בתיווכו של קרט. איגלברגר הוסיף בנקודה זו, שרוצים לראות התקדמות בעניין הפלשי.

- שה"ח אתיופיה ציין רצינות כוונותיהם תוך שמציין שמבינים תנאי ארה"ב ורוצים להתמקד בתוכן היחסים ולא דוק בנושאים סימבוליים (החלפת שגרירים. - י.ע).

בנושא היהודי חזר על דברים שאמר בפומבי, לפיהם אין הפסקת ההגירה תלויה בסיוע ממשל וזי אינם סוחרים באנשים. הוסיף, שהעיכוב נובע מרצון משותף, שלהם ושל ישראל, לבדוק הליכי היציאה, כדי למנוע יציאת לא יהודים. בנקודה זו העיר דיוויסון, שברור היה למשתתפים האמריקאים שזהו שקר. איגלברגר הסתפק באומרו, שארה"ב מסרה לישראל על התנגדותה למכירת נשק מצד גורם כלשהו וכי רוצה שדינקה ידע על כך.

- עוד בשיחה, סגן המזכיר אמר, שארה"ב תשמח להחליף שגרירים עם אתיופיה לכשתחול ההתקדמות המבוקשת. דיוויסון טרח לציין, שהיה זה שינוי סגנוני שתוכנן מראש ותרם לתחושת הסיפוק האתיופית מהביקור.

- לשאלתי על הערכתו הוא את המפגש, ציין התרשמותם החיובית מטספאיי והדרך בה ניהל השיחות. אם לפני שנה, פגישה שקיים דיוויסון עם טספאיי באדיס עמדה לפני פיצוץ, הרי עתה התקיים נוסף על כך, האתיופים נתפסים עכשיו כגורם חיובי המאמץ עמדות קונסטרוקטיביות בעוד המורדים מציבים מכשולים.

ב. פתיחת מסאווה

- משלחת ה- W.F.P., שהיתה אמורה לבדוק ההיבט הטכני של פתיחת נמל מאסווה, תזרה לג'יבוטי לאחר שה- E.P.L.F. לא איפשר ירידתם לחוף, בטענה ששליחותם לא תואמה עם המורדים. אתמול שיגרו המורדים מסר למזכ"ל האו"ם בו מביעים נכונותם לקיים דיון על הגעת צוות הבדיקה.

- התנהגות ה- E.P.L.F. בסוגיית פתיחת נמל מאסווה אופיינית, לדברי דיוויסון, להתנהגותם גם בנושא השיחות בחסות קרט, כאשר המורדים משנים דעתם ודבר הנאמר על ידם אינו סופי. הדרך לטפל ב- "משוגות אלו", לפי דיוויסון, היא בהתעלמות מהמורדים, שתביאם, כך הוא מקווה, לראות הדברים כהווייתם. עוד הוסיף, שאין עתה דחיפות קריטיות בפתיחת הנמל. אמנם, ארה"ב סוברת, שמאמץ סיוע דרך מאסווה יעיל וזול יותר מאשר דרך אסאב, אך אין לחץ המחייב מעורבות פעילה של ארה"ב כדי להביא לפתיחת הנמל.

- את אי רצון ה- E.P.L.F. לפתוח מאסווה הסביר באסטרטגיית הלחימה שלהם, המבקשת לנהל מלחמת התשה במטרה להשיג השליטה באסמארה.

ברור למורדים, שכל מאמץ סיוע דרך מאסווה, עתיד להגיע גם לאסמארה ומכאן לחזק השליטה של כוחות הממשלה בה. נוסף על כך, בעקבות הצלחותיהם האחרונות, התחזק האגף הצבאי ה- E.P.L.F. וקולם של המתונים נאלם. סיפר, שמברוריהם עולה, שאסייז נמצא באריתריאה תוך שמירה על פרופיל נמוך.

ג. תיווך קרט

- גם בנושא זה חובת ההחלטה על המורדים. אלה מגלים פחות ופחות אמון בקרט ולמעשה, דחו יזמתו. לשאלתי, אלו אלטרנטיבות קיימות, ציין (במונחים ידועים לנו), ש"זהו המשחק היחיד בעיר" וכי בסופו של דבר, אחרי קרבות וקרבנות נוספים, יחודש המו"מ בצורה זו או אחרת. עם זאת, אינו מאמין בפריצת דרך קרובה כל עוד לא הוכרע גורל אסמארה.

3. בהתייחסות למעורבות הסובייטית ציין שהנושא עתיד להידון בין מזכיר המדינה לעמיתו הסובייטי בפגישתם מחר, גם אם אינו יודע מה יכול דיון כזה להשיג. עפ"י המידע שברשותם, ממשיכים הסובייטים בסיוע צבאי לאתיופיה וכי, להערכתו, טועה מי בין עמיתיו שחושב, שהסובייטים עתידים לעזוב את אתיופיה. כל שאמרו, הוסיף, הוא שלא יחדשו את ההסכם בין שתי המדינות.

4. בתשובה לשאלה על אפשרות הפיכה נגד מנגיסטו וסיכויי טספאיי גברה קידאן להחליפו (לשל אדיס 175) ציין, שקרא מספיק דיווחים מודיעיניים החוזים נפילת מנגיסטו ודבר לא קרה. יתר על כן, במקום לשאול מתי יפול, רצוי לענות על השאלה מדוע לא נפל עד כה.

צבא אתיופיה אינו צבא נוסח מדינות אפריקאיות אחרות ולמרות המכות הרבות שספג ובעיות מורל, ממשיך להילחם ולהחזיק מעמד.

עמרני

הערת קשר: נא השמידו המברק המצוי בידיכם בסווג בלמס, הזהה לתוכן מברק זה-תודה.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן, ממד, הדס, מאפ, כנצור, מצפא, תפוצות

1990-07-31

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KESHER-WASHINGTON

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1476
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1990

Dear Seymour and Malcom:

Thank you for your letter of June 15.

Frankly, I don't agree that we have placed the onus solely on Israel for finding a way to move the peace process forward. In fact we have used an Israeli initiative to challenge the Palestinians and Arabs to move forward. For over a year, we worked hand in hand with Prime Minister Shamir and Foreign Minister Arens on an Israeli initiative that we believed had great promise. We made this effort the centerpiece of our diplomacy and beat back a number of other proposals that would have unfairly prejudiced Israel's interests.

As I said, we came close to bringing about an historic dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians that would have implemented Israel's initiative. We were in a position to get Palestinians from the territories to come to the table and talk about elections with Israel. Unfortunately, the government fell. I hope we can pick up with the new government and go forward on a credible basis, a basis that Palestinians are able to accept, much as they were able to accept the basis we worked out in February.

I believe that we are facing a rare opportunity to move the peace process forward in a way that will allow Israel to talk to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza and to break down barriers between Israel and the Arab states. This process involves risks for all the parties. But I believe that the risks can be managed and that the benefits of peace outweigh them. The United States is committed to moving ahead. But we cannot go forward unless the parties want to do so and are willing to muster the courage and creativity required. This is the challenge for all the parties. I sincerely hope that they are willing and able to rise to the occasion.

Mr. Seymour D. Reich and
Mr. Malcolm Hoenlein
Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations,
515 Park Avenue,
New York, New York.

- 2 -


1476

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3

I look forward to meeting with Foreign Minister Levy, and I am hopeful that working together we will find a common basis on which to move forward. However, as I have made clear to him, we are interested in real progress to move an Israeli initiative forward in a way that can result in a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. We are not interested in a process that creates only the illusion of progress toward peace. You can help us make this point because I know from your past help for our efforts that you agree.

Thank you for your views. I know you care deeply about Israel, and so do I. I know also that you very much want to see Middle East peace. I have worked hard to promote that peace, pursuing a realistic, step-by-step approach. I want you to know that I value your support for our efforts to try to move toward a just and lasting peace in the region.

Sincerely yours,



James A. Baker, III

אאא, חוזם: 26982

אל: רהמש/1080

מ-: ווש, נר: 2170, תא: 300790, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / מיידי

אל: מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

פגישת השגריר עם הסנטור ספקטר.

ביום ו' ה - 27/7 נפגש השגריר עם הסנטור ספקטר. נכחו עוזריו פלדבאום, ברוקס ובטגלייה ומצידנו אטינגר והח'מ.

עירק והחלטת הסנקציות.

1. השגריר פתח בהבעת הערתכו להצבעת התמיכה של ספקטר (שעות ספורות לפני כן) בהצעת הסנקציות על עיראק (התקבלה בתוצאה 83:12). לשאלת ספקטר מה תהיה השפעת ההחלטה על עיראק השיב השגריר כי היא מועילה. יש לשלוח לסאדם חוסיין מסרים תקיפים והממשל נקט בדרך מועילה ע"י הזזת הכוחות האמריקאים במפרץ.

2. ספקטר סיפר כי שוחח יום קודם לכן עם קימט אשר עדכנו לגבי זימון שגארה'ב, אפריל גלספי, ע"י סאדם חוסיין. הוסיף כי על רקע עלייה צפויה במחירי הנפט, צפויה התנגדות דעה'ק האמר' לסאדם חוסיין. השגריר הסכים ובר כי אין ספק שסאדם עומד מאחורי עליית המחירים באופ'ק וכך אכן יזהה זאת הציבור האמריקני. סיפר כי נפגש (ביום ו') עם דניס רוס אשר מסר לו כי הממשל בודק מחדש את מדיניותו כלפי עיראק ושוקל שיגור מסר לסאדם לפיו יובהר כי מדיניותו אינה חיובית. מאידך יזהרו שלא לתת תירוץ לסאדם להפעיל כח ואיומים (TO BULLY) נגד כוויית.

ועידה בינ'ל מעורבות הממשל בתהליך השלום.

1. ספקטר העלה הנושא ביוזמתו ואמר כי אולי יש מקום לפסגה ישראלית - סורית. השגריר חייב הרעיון ואמר כי רה'מ שמיר כבר הציע זאת אולם לא התקבלה תגובה סורית. לשאלת ספקטר 'נניח שההזמנה תבוא מצד ארה'ב ובריה'מ ? אסד לא יבוא לירושלים. הוא זקוק לכיסוי' השיב השגריר כי לאסד יש מספיק סיבות לבבוא. ספקטר אמר כי יתכן אמנם שיש לו סיבות אך אסד לא יבוא לישראל.

2. ספקטר סיפר כי מאז פגישתו עם שהב'ט ארנס, נפגש עם הנשיא בוש. לדבריו הוא (ספקטר) מנסה לדחפו להתרכז במזה'ת שכן בייקר מתרכז רק בהצלחות. הוסיף כי שלח מכתב לשה'ח בו ביקש לעדכנו לגבי עמדותיו. בפגישתו עם הנשיא בוש, היה האחרון מאד מודאג לגבי כוויית. להערכת ספקטר, מפגש ישראלי - סורי יכול להשפיע על עיראק. נזכר שלפני שערך ביקורו בעיראק בדצמבר האחרון, נפגש עם שגעיראק וכאשר הזכיר (ספקטר) את הנשיא הסורי, התבטא שגעיראק בצורה קשה נגד אסד וביקש לא להזכירו בנשימה אחת עם סאדם. ספקטר הוסיף כי הוא מציע רעיונות ומעוניין במעורבות יתר של בייקר. מעוניין לשבת עמו ולערבו יותר (TO MOTIVATE) במזה'ת.

השגריר בתגובה אמר כי אם ספקטור יצליח לשכנע את בייקר לבקר במזה"ת תהיה לכך השפעה חיובית. נפגש בימים האחרונים עם סקורופט ורוס ואינו סבור שיש צורך TO MOTIVATE את המזכיר. לדברי ספקטור, בממשל מודאגים ומעוניינים לעשות משהו. אולם, לא ישקיעו זמן ומאמץ אם לא ידעו מראש שיצליחו. בייקר מאד מתוסכל ועשה דברים טפשיים כתוצאה מתסכול זה. סבור שיש לעודד (את הממשל). יעודד את בייקר לערוך ביקור במזה"ת. פגישה בין בייקר למובראק עשויה להניב תוצאות שכן מצרים עומדת בקשר הן עם עיראק והן עם סוריה. יש להניע גם את מרוקו ומדינות ערביות נוספות. בסוף דבריו התייחס ספקטור לסנטור דול ואמר כי הוא יכול להיות בן ברית מועיל. דול רוצה להיות HELPFUL ומוכן לעבוד עמי (עם ספקטור). ספקטור הבטיח שבמקרה כזה הוא יטול את המנהיגות.

3. השגריר סיפר על הביקור הצפוי של שה"ח ב - 9/10/8 וביקש שספקטור יפגש עמו. ספקטור השיב כי הוא מעוניין להיפגש עם שה"ח וידאג שיהיה זמין, אם לא בווינגטון אזי בניו יורק.

הערה: בנפרד, העתקי המכתבים ששיגר ספקטור לשה"ח לוי ורוה"מ שמיר. המקור יגיע בדיף.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

א"י =

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, סולטן

סססס

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Baker's Mideast Gamble

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1403, 417, 44

Overruling White House worry that Israel's right-wing government wants only more delay, not peace, Secretary of State James A. Baker III is gambling on help from American Jewish leaders to persuade the new Likud regime to get serious on talks with Palestinians.

Jewish leaders here, alarmed by signs of diminishing U.S. support for Israel, are sending a stream of warnings, including one from Democratic Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.), the first Orthodox Jew ever elected to the Senate. In Jerusalem the other day, the senator said the \$3 billion annual U.S. aid is not sacrosanct and, given budget wars and the fact that Israel no longer has an "enthusiastic majority" in Congress, may be cut.

Baker's key Mideast diplomats, who are in constant touch with leading American Jews, say privately that warnings like Lieberman's may be influencing an Israeli leader unknown in the West but crucial to Baker's plan for Palestinian elections: Foreign Minister David Levy, the first chief diplomat in Israeli history unable to speak English.

When Levy's boss, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, wrote President Bush in June about Palestinian peace, the White House read his words as a death sentence for the Baker plan. But Baker's diplomats, inveterate optimists, saw a glimmer of light. "The prime minister clearly does not want to close the door," one of them told us.

With that conclusion, Baker persuaded the White House to make one more attempt to resurrect the Baker plan, which calls for talks with a broad range of Palestinians, including some who have obvious links to Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization. When Levy comes here for the first time on Aug. 9, he will get a warm reception but a cold warning: We'll talk if you're serious.

If President Bush and Baker decide Levy is dithering or cannot deliver without breaking up the far-right government, the United States will move on to a series of new peace efforts, including one whose likely highlight will be talks between Washington and such Arab leaders as Syria's President Hafez Assad. But Baker believes he has a shot.

His gamble to get Levy's attention fits in with pressures from American Jewish leaders who have been beating a path from Bush's Oval Office to Baker's State Department to Shamir's office near the Israeli Knesset. Henry Siegman, executive director of the American Jewish Congress—a pillar of Jewish sentiment in this

country—got heavy notice in The Jerusalem Post, which quoted him as saying that another American Jewish organization was "reckless and irresponsible" for not telling Shamir that the U.S.-Israeli relationship "is in the process of being undone."

His target was Seymour Reich, current chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations—a group with automatic access to the White House, State Department and Shamir. Siegman complained that Reich and some other Jewish leaders are afraid that if they tell Shamir the truth about Israel's decline in the United States, they will be barred from his office.

Reich denied to us that he has played such games and said that Siegman claims he was misquoted. Reich agreed, however, that he has no dispute with Theodore R. Mann, a past chairman of the Conference of Presidents, who wrote to Baker on June 8 praising the U.S.-PLO dialogue that is anathema to Israel's Likud leadership.

Mann's letter said that of course the United States must insist on Arafat's denunciation of the aborted raid by the PLO's Abul Abbas against the Tel Aviv beaches and persuade Arafat to discipline such terrorists. But the U.S.-PLO talks, he said, have "proved to be a valuable channel . . . to advance the peace process" and should be re-started as soon as possible. Reich told us: "I agree with Ted Mann on that."

Reich, Mann and Siegman are only the visible sliver of an iceberg of Jewish opinion here that Baker's men at State hope is chilling orthodox Likudnik politicians like David Levy—and even Yitzhak Shamir. Shamir's statement last week to Yoel Markus, Ha'aretz's eminent columnist, was unexpected. The prime minister, who compares Arafat to the devil, said he would have no objection if Palestinian negotiators consult with the PLO during talks with Israel—so long as the PLO does not try "to run the whole thing."

Baker will discover soon enough whether that represents a new voice of reason by the famed old Jewish freedom-fighter, a terrorist himself in the war of independence. If Shamir has listened to his Jewish friends here as intently as they have been speaking, the optimists at State may look shrewder than the skeptics in the White House.

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דחיות:	שגירות ישראל / וושינגטון	ק: 1
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142	ת. קוויגרים	פאת:

הנדון: עיראק-סנקציות (ליזמת הסנטור דאמטו)

1. היוזמה הוצגה כתיקון ל- *Farm Bill* המהווה מוסד תחיקתי רב השלכות כלכליות ופוליטיות-פנימיות (מקצת חקופה של 5 שנים, וכולל תמריצי מחקאות המהווים פרה קדושה" במספר מדינות). החצקה להצטרפות לחק חשוב זה היא האשראי ליצוא חקלאי לעיראק, המהווה מרכיב ברשימת הסנקציות. הכוונה הייתה גם, למשך תשומת לב למחוקק-אשר השקיע בכך דם, יזע, ודמעות-ולתחיקתו.
2. קדמו... התקון מגעים רבי-שעות בין אינזיניה (המוביל בליזמת הסנקציות המקיפה יותר של אינזיניה-קסטן לבין דאמטו, אך לשוא. לבסוף הודיע אינזיניה על תמיכתו בתיקון דאמטו.
3. הדיון על התיקון ארך כ- 3 שעות (עד 12:30 אחר חצות), ואכן משך תשומת לב.
4. ההצבעה התרחשה הבקר, ותוצאותיה מעל ומעבר לציפיות: 111:83 המתנגדים אינם כוללים אף אחד ממנהיגי הסנאט הבכירים: פורן, פרייזר, מקלור, קרו, באמפרט, בוקס בוב, קארי, אקסון, דנפורט, ג'ורדס, קונראד, ואייפיי המבטאים-בד"כ - אינטרס של קבוצות לחץ ואוכלוסיה חקלאיים.
5. אישור הסנקציות במקגרת ה- *Farm Bill* מחזק את הסנקציות שאושרו (יזמת קסבאום) ב- *Banking Bill*, וצפוי אולי תגבור נוסף בדמות תיקון אינזיניה - קסטן לחק סיוע החוץ - הקצבות. *הסנאט לא יאשר את הסנקציות*
6. התמיכה המסיבית התרחשה למרות הפצרות הממשל! בטוי למאמץ הממשלי ניתן בשימועים שקדמו להצבעה, בתדרוכים שוטפים, בדבריו הנרגשים של הסנטור הבכיר *אוקאר* (בא ראה סעיף 7) והדברים הנמרצים של הסנטור דומיניצ'י (אשר יחד עם לוגאר, סימפסון ודול נחשבים למקורבים ביותר לממשל). היה גם נסיון של הסנטור גראם להציל את כבוד הממשל כאשר הודיע על תמיכתו בתיקון, אך גם הציע לכלול תיקון-משנה המאפשר לשר החקלאות לבטלו, אם אכן יקבע כי התקון פוגע בחקלאי ארה"ב יותר מאשר בעיראק. 57 הסנטורים *16730* נגד הצעת גראם, ובכך ניתן למעשה האות כי הממשל נכשל במאמציו. הברירה שנתרה היתה בין תמיכה בסנקציות, או התעלמות מתוקפנות צדאם והשלכותיהן ההומנטריות והאסטרטגיות.

תפוצה: 7- מה סשה מו סהט גלגל גלגל גלגל

מנצח גלגל סהטו מנצח גלגל מנצח גלגל מנצח גלגל

דחיות:	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	ד: 2
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7. הסנטור ספקטור חמך בתחיקה, וא פשר להניח כי לדבריו הארוכים בליל הדיונים הארוך הייתה השפעת מכשול על חבריו. (בבוקר ההצבעה נפגש, לבקשתו, עם נציגי CIA וקיבל סקירה על הפרופיל של צדאם. לדבריו, לא היה נוסע לבגדד אילו ק הסקירה לפני ביקורו שם). הסנטור דול טען לפני הדיון, כי התחיקה לא תקבל תמיכה מרשימה, והצביע על ספקטור כבלם מרכזי בפני דהירתה במליאה. אפשר להניח כי דברי ספקטור השפיעו על תמיכת דול בתחיקה. גם לוגאר ודומיניצי, תמכו בתחיקה למרות שיצאו חוצץ נגדה בנבחרתם.
- שניהם, ובמיוחד לוגאר, ציינו כי הממשל דורש להמנע מסנקציות, וכי זכות הממשל לנהל מדיניות חוץ עצמאית. דומיניצי הזכיר כשלון האמברגו על ברה"מ. ספקטור העדיף שלא תוגש ההצעה (כדי להמשיך ולתמוך בה מאשר להתנגד לה. התנגדות-לדבריו-תשלח איתוח שגוי, מטעה ומסוכן לבגדד, וימריץ את צדאם להמשיך ולאיים על שלום וכלכלת העולם. בשווייץ, אשר היה צפוי עד לרגע האחרון לשאת דברים נגד התחיקה (מיניסוטה היא מדינה חקלאית, והסנטור מתמודד השנה) אך להצביע בעדה, נשא נאום משכנע בזכות הסנקציות. הבהיר כי אין מדובר (אין איסור למכור לעיראק) אלא במניעת הטבות, הדגיש איומי צדאם על האיזור מן המסע עד צפון אפריקה במהלך הדיון תמר הסנטור פל בלהט בתחיקה, וכך גם קסבאום (ממדינת החיטה קנזס), דה - קונצ'ני ומוינתן. בנוסף ללוגאר (אשר טען שתממשלחושט שחשקציות יגרעו מהשפעת ארה"ב) ולדומנצ'י, יצא גם ליידי חוצץ נגד קשירת התיקון לחק חקלאי, גם ג'ונסטון (שנחם מלואיזיאנה - חקלאות) וצ'ייפי (מיניסוטה) למתנגדים לתחיקה.
8. דיאמטו הציג התחיקה בצורה אופינית-ציורית. החייתס מספר פעמים. ל "Red Day of the East" ול "Litanies of horrors" של צדאם. לגלג על התרפסות הממשל-ואלו המשחרים לפתחו של צדאם שליט עיראק.
9. ישראל הוצנעה בדיון במליאת הסנאט, ומה טוב! התחושה שהוחדרה להכרת הסנטורים, היא שמדובר באיום על אינטרס ארה"ב, על מדינות ערביות מחוננות ועל יציבות האזור והעולם בתקופה של שגשוג הגלסנוסט. להערכתו, שפך הדיון אור על נכס ישראלי מדיני / הסברתי: תמיכה משטרי ערב. אח הנכס הזה יש להשריש ולטפח. תוצאות ההצבעה מבהירות כי יש להכות על ברזל האיום המשותף לארה"ב ולישראל כל עוד הוא לוחט.

תפוצה:

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

24996

תאריך : 28.07.90

נכנס **

סודי

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חוזם: 7,24996

אל: המשרד

יעדים: להמש/1007, מצב/2368, אביב/1761, בטחון/1870

מ-: ווש, נר: 2158, תא: 270790, זח: 1700, דח: מ, סג: סו

תח: גס: אפסוק

נר: ג

סודי / מיידי

אל: סמנכ"ל אפסוק, יועץ שה"ח לתפוצות

דע: מצפ"א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

יהודי אתיופיה

1. סימור רייך דיווח לשגריר על שיחתו בנושא עם ע. המזכיר
לאפריקה, הרמן כהן.

2. ע"פ דיווחו, ציין כהן שהמימשל מקנה עדיפות עליונה ליציאת
יהודי אתיופיה וכי תחושה זו הוחלה לשה"ח אתיופיה במהלך
בקורו כאן ופגישותיו עם ס/המזכיר איגלברגר וכהן עצמו. כהן
הוסיף שזה המפגש הגבוה ביותר שהתקיים עם אתיופיה בעשור
האחרון.

3. שה"ח אתיופיה אמר בשיחותיו במימשל, ע"פ דברי כהן שהטיפול
(PROCESSING) בבקשות היציאה יקח חודשים ולא, הדגיש רייך,
שנים.

כהן ציין שהנושא בטיפול ישראל, וכי עליה לקבוע הסדרים עם
ממאתיופיה.

4. סימור רייך העלה בקשות אתיופיה לנשק והחשיבות שיהודי
אתיופיה לא יהיו בני ערובה. שאל מה תהיה תגובת ארה"ב אם

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Lawyers Committee for Human Rights

ראו-נא פרק בדו"ח הארגון לעיל העומד להתפרסם ב-29.7.90.

שמו לב לבקורת המופנת נגד ע. המזכיר, שיפטר.

לשכת שגריר

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In a report released today, the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights found that the United States Department of State's annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1989* are more objective than previous years' reports and reflect the eroding influence of the Cold War divide. Several reports, however, continue to be influenced by extraneous foreign policy concerns. For example, the Philippines, El Salvador, Israeli-occupied territories and Singapore reports are marred by a failure to hold the government accountable for numerous human rights violations.

The 269-page *Critique* analyzes the State Department's reports on 47 countries. Each was monitored closely throughout 1989 by the staff of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and by volunteers. This is the eleventh successive year that the Lawyers Committee has produced a critique of the *Country Reports*. The *Critiques* for the third through tenth years were prepared jointly with Human Rights Watch.

According to the Lawyers Committee, "[r]eports on the communist or formerly communist states in general are no longer unduly harsh; if anything, the reports on the Soviet Union and Romania, for example, are overly optimistic on certain key issues." In the introduction to the *Critique*, the Lawyers Committee points out that "the report on China should serve as a model for all country reports," adding that this report includes frank assessments of the human rights situation, assigns blame to the government and does not accept official versions of many of the

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momentous events of 1989. The reports on several U.S. allies, such as Liberia, Brazil, Indonesia, Kenya and Chile, are detailed and do not try to excuse or ignore human rights violations.

Despite overall improvements, the Lawyers Committee found certain weaknesses in many of the reports, including:

- * State Department's failure to offer its own independent analysis and assessment: the reports on Jordan, Kuwait and the Israeli-occupied territories fail to assess the credibility of allegations of torture;
- * Confusing the ratification of a treaty or the enactment of a statute with the actual human rights situation: for example, the Egypt report correctly states that the law requires warrants for searches, yet does not mention that this law is rarely enforced;
- * Failing to draw the logical inference from the failure to hold the government or armed forces accountable for human rights violations: an example cited is the Haiti report which states that soldiers who commit abuses act on their own while acknowledging that soldiers or their commanding officers are rarely punished for these violations;
- * Criticizing human rights groups for their supposed biases and failures: the report on the Philippines charges that a human rights group has links with the Communist party but fails to support this claim with any evidence;
- * Omitting essential background information: the Kenya report notes that the government screened Kenyan citizens of Somali origin but the report does not describe the harassment and intimidation accompanying the screening;
- * Failing to follow State Department definitions and guidelines: for example, guidelines issued to all embassies to use in preparing the reports direct the author to include a description of prisons if conditions "constitute a threat to life or health" or are "grossly disparate" from general conditions in the society, yet the United Kingdom report omits any discussion of the well-known deficiencies in Britain's penal system; and
- * Inadequate analysis and description of laws: the Indonesia and Singapore reports should have noted that many laws enacted are intentionally vague and allow the executive broad discretion in implementation.

In addition, the Lawyers Committee calls on the State Department to monitor carefully the work of numerous government-sponsored and controlled "human rights commissions." Such commissions have been established in a number of countries, including the Philippines, Togo, Haiti, Uganda and Zaire. According to the Lawyers Committee, an unstated purpose of many of these commissions is often to deflect outside criticism of human rights abuses while promoting the appearance of government concern for human rights observance.

Since 1978 the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has worked to promote international human rights and refugee law and legal procedures in the United States and abroad. Its work is impartial, holding each government to the standards affirmed in the International Bill of Human Rights. The Committee has investigated and reported on human rights abuses in all regions of the world. The Chairman of the Lawyers Committee is Marvin E. Frankel; Michael H. Posner is its Executive Director; and Arthur C. Helton is the Director of its Refugee Project.

Thirteen staff members and 49 volunteers combined to write the *Critique* which was edited by William G. O'Neill, Deputy Director of the Lawyers Committee. Copies will be available for \$15.00 from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 330 Seventh Avenue, 10th floor, New York, New York 10001.

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CRITIQUE

Review of the Department of State's
Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1989

July 1990

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights

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The State Department's assessment of human rights conditions in the occupied territories is disappointing. The report is marked by some of the same flaws we criticized last year. It also departs from the more balanced approach and tone which we found and applauded in the 1988 report. The difference is immediately apparent by comparing the introductions to the two reports. In the 1988 report, the State Department found "a substantial increase in human rights violations" as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded to the widespread civilian unrest of the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, which began in December 1987. In the 1989 report, however, the State Department refrains from offering, as it does in other country reports, an overall assessment of the scope or frequency of human rights violations. State Department sources interviewed by U.S. journalists confirmed in February 1990 that the office of Richard Schuler, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, "cut out the wealth of details and statistics on beatings and other excesses and played up intra-Palestinian violence."¹ By many accounts, including those of the U.S. Consulate staff in Jerusalem,² the human rights situation in the territories worsened in 1989. Instead of saying so in a straightforward and clear manner, the report instead chooses the language of diplomacy, noting that the human rights situation in the territories "remains a source of deep concern to the United States."

The report's discussion of the use of excessive force by the Israeli security forces is marked by a lack of detail, even though statistics and other information from both Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups were widely publicized and easily obtainable. The report's introduction states tersely: "Overall, there were more Palestinian deaths in 1989 than in 1988." What the State Department does not say is that more Palestinians were shot and killed by the Israeli security forces in the intifada's second year (285) than in the first (270), and that this occurred despite the fact that, in the words of former Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin in June 1989, "[w]e have managed to put an end to the major violent demonstrations, which are

¹T. Phelps, "U.S. Official Toned Down Israel Critique," New York Newsday, Feb. 22, 1990.

²See J. Anderson and D. Van Atta, "Human Rights Report Irks Israel--Again," Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1990.

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virtually nonexistent." The report also neglects to mention that in the intifada's second year there was a dramatic rise in the number of Palestinian children aged 16 or under who were killed by Israeli security forces. It should have noted that, in 1989, 80 children under the age of 17 were shot and killed, compared to 51 in 1988; and that 28 children under the age of 12 were killed in 1989, compared to 9 in 1988.

Regarding these shooting deaths, the State Department uses statements that move away from the harder-hitting findings of the 1988 report. For example, the 1988 report stated: "Soldiers frequently used gunfire in situations that did not present mortal danger to troops, causing many avoidable deaths and injuries." The 1989 report states: "IDF guidelines often were not followed, resulting in avoidable deaths and injuries."

The State Department again this year appears to have difficulty addressing the issue of so-called "non-lethal" plastic bullets used by the Israeli security forces. We criticized the 1988 report for its abbreviated and misleading discussion of plastic bullets, which had caused the death of 47 Palestinians between August 1988 and January 1989. In this year's report, plastic bullets are mentioned only once, and inadequately: "Misuse of plastic and rubber bullets continued to result in death and serious injury." The State Department did not note that, according to the IDF's own data, 125 Palestinians were killed by plastic bullets between July 20, 1988 and January 8, 1990. It also did not point out, as it should have, that the number of Palestinians killed has increased rather than decreased since the introduction of this so-called "non-lethal" ammunition, which former Defense Minister Rabin announced was designed to reduce fatalities.

To the State Department's credit, the analysis of the IDF's investigation and prosecution of misconduct by its soldiers and officers was not softened. The 1988 report found that there were "many cases of unjustified killing which did not result in disciplinary actions or prosecutions" and that when soldiers were held accountable, punishment was lenient. This year's report reaches a similar conclusion: "[R]egulations often were not vigorously enforced, many cases of unjust killing did not result in disciplinary action, and punishments were often lenient."

The report's treatment of political and extrajudicial killings is uneven, and concentrates on the killing of Palestinians by other Palestinians. In both 1988 and 1989, the State Department found that

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there were "many cases" of unjust or unjustifiable killing of Palestinians by the Israeli security forces. By the State Department's own definition, extrajudicial killings include cases of "deliberate and illegal use of lethal force by the police against criminal suspects". Despite this, the report does not discuss extrajudicial killings and focuses brief attention on political killing only, stating that "[p]olitical killing is not condoned by Israel [I]n 1989 there were allegations that Palestinian activists were intentionally killed by Israeli security forces or Palestinians working for them." No additional details about the allegations are supplied, which included specific cases of shooting deaths investigated and publicized by both Amnesty International and Al-Haq, the Ramallah-based human rights organization. The short discussion of the issue ends with a single sentence: "Israel categorically denied these charges."

The State Department notes correctly that in 1989 there was a "significant increase" in the use of force by Palestinians against other Palestinians, including the killing of 128 people and the injury of many more. While the report acknowledges that "[m]any of the victims were working with the Israeli security authorities," it refrains from assessing two controversial issues related to the killing of so-called "collaborators." First, it repeats without comment a view much-publicized by some Israeli officials: "Israelis state that a number of the victims of intra-Palestinian violence have been killed for seeking to express moderate views." The State Department does not say whether it finds this contention supportable by the facts. Second, the report states that "Palestinians claim that some of [the victims] were armed and provided information leading to arrests of uprising activists." The report should have noted that, by their own admission, Israeli military and security forces have supplied weapons to some Palestinians, and rely on them to provide intelligence and to identify suspects wanted for arrest. The Israeli practice of recruiting and arming certain Palestinians to carry out security force activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is a contributing factor in the escalation of violence. It should have been noted in the report, rather than described by the State Department as a "claim" by Palestinians, which implies that confirmed facts are mere allegations.

The State Department, as it did in both the 1988 and 1987 reports, does not provide its own assessment of continuing and persistent allegations of torture, beating and other forms of abuse by the Israeli security forces against Palestinian prisoners, detainees and other residents of the territories. It notes, for example, that "reports continue of harsh and demeaning treatment of prisoners and

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detainees" but does not say if it views any of these reports as credible. Curiously, the State Department refuses to even use the word *torture* in its discussion of allegations by others. The continuing reluctance of the State Department to comment in its own voice about the actual practice of torture in the territories stands in sharp contrast to its straightforward assertions about allegations of torture in this year's reporting on Egypt (reports of torture are termed "convincing") and Iraq ("... it is clear that both physical and psychological torture are used by the authorities ..."). The State Department notes that at least 10 Palestinian deaths in 1989 "can be attributed to beatings." However, it further notes that there are "allegations of beatings of suspects and detainees, including during house searches," without providing its own assessment of these claims. The report also says that "Palestinian and international human rights groups claim that other cruel practices -- including enforced standing in one position for prolonged periods, hooding, sleep deprivation, and cold showers -- have continued", but the "claims" are not given weight by the State Department's own assessment about whether these practices in fact take place. Instead, the reader is provided with only one vague sentence: "Physical and psychological pressures are particularly severe in incommunicado detention during investigation and interrogation."

Again this year, the State Department does not fully describe the October 1987 report of the government-appointed Landau Commission, which was formed in June 1987 to investigate the interrogation methods used by the Shin Bet, Israel's domestic intelligence service. As we wrote last year, the Commission recommended that Shin Bet interrogators be permitted to use "a moderate amount of physical pressure." The State Department should have made it clear that the term "moderate physical pressure" was not defined in the public section of the Commission's report. (The Landau Commission's findings were published in a two-part report: a public document, and a second part which was not publicly released "in order to preserve State security.") This is significant because the Israeli Cabinet adopted the Commission's findings and recommendations in November 1987, which the State Department also neglects to mention. This calls into question the 1989 report's unequivocal assertion that: "Torture is forbidden by Israeli law, and Israeli authorities assert they do not condone its use in the occupied territories." The Cabinet's official endorsement of the use of moderate physical pressure against in-custody detainees contravenes the universally recognized right to be free from "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" and should have been so noted by the State Department.

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As we found last year, this year's report is uneven in its coverage of administrative sanctions imposed on Palestinian residents of the territories by the Israeli military. First, the reader has no sense of how the Israeli authorities' use of administrative sanctions in 1989 has affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. Among these sanctions are curfews, including extended curfews, on towns, villages and refugee camps. Although the State Department notes that curfews "caused severe hardship" and that there were "hundreds" of them in 1989, "some lasting several weeks," it should have noted that more than 700,000 Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip lived for most of 1989 under a continuous dusk-to-dawn curfew. It also should have mentioned that curfews are sometimes accompanied by disconnection of telephones, electrical lines and the water supply, rather than simply noting without comment that: "Telephone service to specific areas is sometimes interrupted by the authorities." The report does not mention if the State Department considers these cut-offs of essential services collective punishment.

The State Department does not provide an accurate picture of the restrictions imposed on the foreign travel of Palestinian residents of the territories, who must first obtain a *laissez-passer* travel document from the Israeli authorities in order to leave Israel. The State Department misrepresents the situation when it says: "Israel imposed travel restraints on some political activists and on family members of some deportees." No additional information is provided to the reader. It should have mentioned that some Palestinians in 1989 were simply prohibited from traveling abroad, without reasons being provided. This was the case with the coordinator of fieldwork for Al-Haq, who applied in May for permission to travel to a human rights conference in France in June. He was repeatedly summoned to the military commander's office; in June he was informed that his application to travel was rejected, without any reasons provided. The State Department also neglects to report that in 1989 the Israeli authorities imposed travel restrictions on entire towns and villages in the West Bank. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) petitioned the High Court of Justice in the cases of the village of Kafr Malik and the town of Qabitiya after the authorities had not permitted any of the residents to travel abroad for over one year. The exit ban was lifted in October, three days before the scheduled court session. Similar bans were imposed during the last six months of 1989 on the villages of Batir, Taluza, Burqin and others, which should have been described in the report.

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The report correctly notes that as of January 1, 1990, 1,271 Palestinians were being held under administrative detention, but its discussion of the practice of imprisonment without charge or trial is abbreviated. The Israeli government states that administrative detention is used against individuals "because of the danger they pose to the lives and safety of others, and because of their ongoing involvement in violence-related acts." The report repeats the government's assertion that administrative detainees are interned not for "political acts, but only for hostile and illegal activity." Last year's report challenged this assertion, specifically mentioning that Israel detains "[m]any individuals, including academics, journalists, and human rights workers, who have not engaged in or advocated violence or other acts threatening security." Regrettably, the 1989 report retreats from this straightforward finding and substitutes more tentative language: "[I]n a number of cases persons appear to have been detained for nonviolent political activities." It fails to mention that Palestinian lawyers, doctors, academics, trade unionists, journalists and others were imprisoned without charge in 1989, and omits mention of any individual cases. Among those detained in 1989 were: Dr. Ghassan Andoni of Beit Sahour, a participant in that town's non-violent tax revolt that captured international attention, who was administratively detained in the fall of 1989; Shawan Jabarin, a human rights fieldworker for Al-Haq, who was arrested in October and issued a one-year administrative detention order; Adnan Abu Leila, a prominent defense attorney from Nablus, was administratively detained for three months beginning in September; and Muhammed Shadid, a defense lawyer from Tulkarem, was placed in six months administrative detention in March.

Since the Israeli authorities admit that administrative detention is used in place of trials in a court of law, and since, as the report notes, the amount of time that a detainee can be imprisoned without charge or trial was doubled in 1989 from 6 to 12 months, the State Department should have devoted more than one brief sentence to the use of "secret" evidence in administrative detention proceedings. It should have noted that most Palestinians are detained on the basis of evidence that the military authorities contend must be kept secret in order to protect the lives of informers and other intelligence sources, leaving the detainees and their lawyers unable to confront the general allegations offered in appeal hearings before military judges.

The 1988 report's clear, informative discussion of the Israeli military's practice of bulldozing, dynamiting or sealing Palestinian homes is replaced this year by text that obfuscates major issues. The

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report correctly notes that house demolition and sealing is carried out only against Palestinian residents of the territories and not Jewish settlers, and that these measures are "nonjudicial administrative punishments." It does not highlight, as it did last year, that the places of residence of individuals *suspected* but not *convicted* of security offenses are demolished or sealed, sometimes even before an arrest. In the overwhelming majority of cases, demolition orders are carried out prior to conviction. It also should have noted that the majority of the demolition cases involved the parents' houses for suspicion against their sons, and that the IDF demolished homes because family members were on "wanted" lists. The report also neglects to mention that in 1989 the IDF broadened the use of demolition to include the destruction of a home if one of its residents was merely suspected of throwing a Molotov cocktail or stones; that in January 1989 the IDF demolished the homes of three young men suspected of stone throwing; and that B'Tselem, the Israeli human rights group, cited several cases where suspicion of incitement and resisting arrest were reasons given for issuing demolition orders.

The State Department declined again this year to say straightforwardly that the destruction and sealing of homes is collective punishment that violates Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which reads: "No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited." Instead, the report notes that: "The United States believes demolition and sealing as punishment of families contravenes the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel, however, holds that the Convention permits demolition under imperative military considerations." This juxtaposition of differing opinions, without assessing which interpretation is appropriate based on the facts leaves the impression that each interpretation of the Convention is equally valid.

The report records only 170 Palestinian houses demolished or sealed in 1989; B'Tselem documented, through November, 216 destroyed or sealed homes. In contrast to the 1988 report, which noted that 1,000 people were affected by the 154 demolitions and sealings that took place that year, this year the State Department dropped any mention of the number of Palestinians who suffered from house demolition and sealing. B'Tselem estimated that 2,400 people were affected in 1989.

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The report notes that 26 Palestinians were deported in 1989 following unsuccessful appeals to the High Court of Justice yet fails to mention that among this group were academics, journalists and trade unionists. The report states, correctly, that: "[t]he deportation process is characterized by a lack of formal charges and the use of secret evidence not disclosed to the suspect or his attorney." It should have added that none of the 58 Palestinians expelled since the beginning of the intifada was tried, convicted and sentenced before a court of law. The report also misleads the uninformed reader when it states without further elaboration: "Palestinians under deportation orders may appeal to the Israeli High Court." The appeals process, however, is fundamentally flawed because it denies deportee-designates and their attorneys access to the "secret" evidence that forms the basis for expulsion orders. The report's comment that the High Court has never overturned such an order should have been analyzed in this context.

The report barely comments about the military detention center at Ketziot in the Negev Desert within Israel proper. Last year's report noted that the number of Palestinians from the territories detained there in 1988 ranged from approximately 1,200 to nearly 3,000. The 1989 report comments only that "serious overcrowding continued," making no mention of the approximately 4,200 prisoners held at Ketziot by early December 1989 in an enlarged facility. The report failed again this year to mention the extreme isolation of the detainees and prisoners held at Ketziot and that there have been no family visits since the facility opened in March 1988. Reports from lawyers and others, including the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), continued throughout 1989 about inadequate health care, sanitary facilities and protection against the rigors of the harsh desert climate; shortages of food and water; and the lack of materials for intellectual, educational and recreational pursuits. The report also should have mentioned that lawyers' visits are severely restricted, with attorneys often allotted only 15 minutes to see 15 clients, in a setting that is not private. Detainees and attorneys also continued to complain about long delays in receiving clothing packages and correspondence from families, about severe limitations on the number and types of books allowed, and about seemingly arbitrary interruptions in the distribution of daily newspapers and the playing of radio news and music from the camp's loudspeakers.

The report only briefly mentions Megiddo prison, which is also located in Israel proper. It should have noted the study released

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by the Israel branch of Defense for Children International, prepared in part by Dr. Menahem Horowitz, the dean of Hebrew University's law faculty. The report found that 65 Palestinian minors aged 14 to 17 (out of a total prison population of 1,400) were held in overcrowded conditions with inadequate sanitary arrangements, subjected to harsh interrogation before reaching prison and permitted family visits only once a month.

The report's discussion of arrest, detention and the military courts is uneven.

** The report correctly notes that any Israeli soldier can arrest, without a warrant, anyone suspected of having committed a security offense in the territories, and that detainees "are often not told the reasons for their detention." To its credit, the State Department accurately notes that security offenses are "broadly defined" and "cover Palestinian nationalist activity of a nonviolent character."

** The section on the military courts suffers from a major omission. The State Department does not mention the two boycotts of the military courts in 1989 by West Bank and Israeli lawyers: the first from January 2 until March 12; the second from July 20 until August 20. The boycotts were called to focus attention on problems related to the functioning of the military courts, after the lawyers found that their repeated complaints to the authorities were unsuccessful. The lawyers' grievances included: lack of immediate notification of arrest and the location of detention; denial of access to clients, often in an arbitrary fashion; severe restrictions on the length of lawyer-client meetings; systematic denial of bail; extended pre-trial detention; and arbitrary sentencing.

** Last year's report understated the problem of notification of arrest: "At times families of some detainees did not know if or where relatives were being held." The 1989 report states the problem in clearer terms: "Denial of notification of arrest to immediate family members, attorneys, and consular officials is common and under law can be extended for up to 14 days." In mentioning that in September Israel announced improved family notification procedures, the State Department should have noted that the improvements came as a result of a lawsuit filed with the High Court of Justice by ACRI.

** The report is misleading when it states without further explanation that: "Suspects are entitled to counsel." The report should have noted that detainees are denied access to their lawyers until the

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period of interrogation is completed, which can last from 15 to 30 days after arrest, or even longer.

** In a previous section, the report notes that: "The normal pretrial detention period is 60 days." And in its discussion of denial of fair public trial, the report seems to justify this by explaining: "[I]n 1989 there were long delays before trial because military courts were overburdened by the large number of uprising-related security cases." The State Department also should have cited the complaints of Palestinian and Israeli lawyers practicing in the military courts, who reported that since December 1988 detainees have been held for three months, on average, between arrest and the first trial date. The lawyers also found that prosecution witnesses often do not appear for scheduled court appointments, resulting in the postponement of trials and longer periods of pre-trial detention for their clients. As West Bank lawyers said in a press release in January 1989: "It does not pay to plead innocent before a military court In all cases, the detainee stays in detention for a period of time that can be longer than the period he would have served if he had in fact pleaded guilty to the offence charged to him." The report should have considered long pre-trial detention periods in light of its earlier observation that "[s]ecurity detainees are usually denied bail."

** The report significantly understates the element of coercion which is a systemic part of Israel's treatment of Palestinian suspects arrested for security offenses. As noted elsewhere in the report, suspects "normally" are not allowed access to counsel until "after the interrogation is completed and a confession, if obtained, has been made." Yet the report remarked in one section that, "[m]ost convictions in security cases are based on confessions," while in another section several pages later the following qualifying statement appears: "[t]he absence of bail, long pretrial delays, and physical and psychological pressures increase the likelihood of confessions." Even this observation is a significant change from the 1988 report, which read: "There are numerous affidavits that confessions are often obtained by physical and psychological coercion. The 1987 Landau Commission report confirmed such practices on the part of the Shin Bet, as well as systematic perjury before the military courts." Evidence of physical and psychological coercion during interrogation continued to mount in 1989 (as noted above in the discussion of torture) and should have been independently assessed by the Department of State.

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** The report omits relevant information about confessions. While it correctly states that confessions "are usually recorded in Hebrew, which many defendants are unable to read," it should have made clear that interpreters are not provided to read these confessions to detainees before they sign them. The ICJ found that this violates Article 72 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The report is misleading when it states: "Forced entries, which are a regular part of IDF operations, have resulted in beatings, destruction of property, and arrests." The report should have stated that forced entries have included beatings, destruction of property and arrests as integral aspects of IDF operations, not, as the State Department seems to imply, as unintended consequences. The report also should have noted that forced entry resulted in Palestinian deaths and injuries in 1989. One incident, publicized by Knesset member Haim Oron, occurred on December 22 in the West Bank village of Jaba. Witnesses charged that the IDF, trying to arrest a wanted man, sprayed gunfire into a room in which he was barricaded along with his family. The suspect, 22-year-old Muhammad Alawneh, was shot in the legs, his 15-year-old sister, Shifa, was killed; two other siblings, one four years old, the other 18, were wounded. In affidavits taken by ACRI, the family said that the shooting continued even after family members shouted to the soldiers that there were casualties. The *Jerusalem Post* reported that: "Windows of the room were covered with metal grilles, which would have made it impossible for the wanted man to escape."

we found last year, there are major omissions in the discussion of worker rights. The report misleads when it states, using identical language as in last year's report, that: "Israeli authorities, citing security concerns, actively discourage union activities in the West Bank." It also notes, further on in the discussion, that: "Union leaders have been among those detained for alleged security offenses." There is no mention that in August five Palestinian trade union leaders were deported. The report also neglects to mention that, as reported by Al-Haq, in 1989 "dozens of trade union activists have been placed under administrative detention . . . and in early 1989, at least 26 trade union offices were still closed under orders issued in 1988, although most of these have now reopened."

A last point is related to the report's coverage of the government's attitude regarding international and nongovernmental investigation of alleged violations of human rights. In its notes on preparation of the country reports, the State Department says that it

1420

 $\frac{16}{16}$ *Israeli-Occupied Territories*

is "particularly appreciative of, and make reference in most reports to, the role of nongovernmental human rights organizations, ranging from groups in a single country to major organizations that concern themselves with human rights matters in larger geographic regions or over the entire world." The 1988 report on the occupied territories noted that: "The Government of Israel stepped up pressure on indigenous human rights organizations in 1988." The State Department mentioned two of these organizations by name: Al-Haq, which is based in Ramallah, and the Palestine Human Rights Information Center, which has offices in East Jerusalem. In contrast, in the 1989 report the State Department appears to go out of its way to avoid mention of Palestinian human rights groups by name. The report states: "Individuals working for a prominent Palestinian legal rights organization were detained, beaten, prevented from traveling freely, and harassed at military checkpoints." Clearly, the State Department is referring to Al-Haq; it should have identified the organization. Also, additional details should have been provided, as is the methodology in other country reports, when members of locally based human rights groups are arrested, detained or beaten by the authorities. In particular, the case of Al-Haq fieldworker Sha'wan Jabarin should have been highlighted. In October, he was arrested and beaten, once severely, and ordered to serve a one-year term of administrative detention.

אאא, חוזם: 25845

אל: רהמש/1036

מ-: ווש, נר: 2165, תא: 290790, זח: 1600, חמ: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי / מיידי

אל: מצפ'א

דע: לש' שהב'ט

מאת: שג' וושינגטון

שיחת השגריר - שיפטר (26/7)

1. בשיחתו עם השגריר לקראת נסיעתו ארצה פירט הנושאים אותם בכוונתו להעלות בשיחתו עם שהב'ט.

2. שיפטר ציין כי מעוניין לחזור לדוות למזכיר על נכונות שהב'ט TO BE ENGAGED IN A POLICY REVIEW

וכי יש נכונות מצידו לשפר המצב.

3. להלן פירוט הנושאים אותם ירצה להעלות בשיחתו עם שהב'ט:

א. הריסת בתים:

1) בכוונתו לבקש להעלות את הסף לקבלת ההחלטה בדבר הריסה. אין לאפשר למפקד בשטח להחליט על הריסת בית אלא לאחר בחינה מפורטת של כל מקרה ומקרה.

ב. מעצרים מינהליים:

1) לדבריו יש ניצול לרעה של התקנה. יש צורך בתהליך נוקשה יותר של אישור מעצר מינהלי. סיפר כי יש גורמים במחמ'ד הסבורים שניתן לעשות שימוש במעצר מינהלי שנה אחת אחרי סיום פעילות האיבה. תקופה זו טוענים אותם גורמים הסתיימה ב-68. הוסיף כי מעדיפים הליך שיפוט בפני ערכאות צבאיות רגילות.

2) ירצה לבדוק האם ניתן להודיע למשפחות לאחר המעצר ולאפשר להן גישה לעצורים.

ג. תהליך אימות/הכחשת האשמות בדבר פגיעה בז'א

1) שיפטר ציין כי מעוניין ליצור תהליך שבו יפגשו אנשי שגרירות עם אנשינו כדי לנסות ולבדוק יחד האשמות (ALLEGATIONS). לדבריו, נסיונות לקיים הדברות זו, לא עלו יפה.

2) מנה בהקשר לתהליך בדיקת האשמות, ארבע קטגוריות:

- העלאת האשמות אשר לאחר תהליך של בדיקתן מתברר שאינן נכונות.

- האשמות שאמיתותן מתבררת בעקבות בדיקה המחייבות קבלת הסבר.

- האשמות המתבררות כנכונות שהינן תוצאה של הפרת נהלים. השאלה במקרה זה היא האם מפרי הפקודה באו על עונשם.

- האשמות המתבררות כנכונות הנובעות ממדיניות.

3. שיפטר ציין כי מעוניין לדון בקטיגוריה הרביעית (פגיעה בז'א כתוצאה ממדיניות) כאשר לגבי שלוש הקטיגוריות הראשונות מעוניין ליצור מיכניזם.

4. שיפטר הוסיף כי יאמר לשהב'ט שבמידה וניתן יהיה לטפל בנושאים לעיל כמכלול יוכל לציין בדו"ח ז'א שתחת שה'בט ארנס חל שיפור. לקביעה מעין זו (בדו"ח ז'א) תהיה לדבריו השלכה ישירה על נושא הסיוע לישראל. ציין כי לנושא ז'א יש אימפקט בגבעה.

5. חזר לסיום פעם נוספת וציין שיכולתו לדווח למזכיר שהיו לו שיחות טובות עם שהב'ט שהתחייב לשפר המצב תסייע לנו רבות.

בשיתה השתתפו עוזרו של שיפטר והח'מ.

שטיין

לנח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סיבל, משפט,
סולטן, מזתים, @ (מתאסשטחים)

סססס

משדד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* תאריך : 28.07.90 *
* דף 1 מתוך 2 *

* עותק 1 מתוך 2 *

* יוצא ** *

* ** *

* *** *

* חוזם: 7,24424 *

* אל: ווש/2319, רהמש/973, בטחון/1803, אביב/1701 *

* מ-: המשד, תא: 270790, זח: 1218, דח: ב, סג: סב *

* תח: גס: מפסוק *

* נד: ש *

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* בהול לבוקר *

* 80603 *

* סודי ביותר/חר'ב/מיידי *

* אל: וושינגטון - השגריר - לעיניו בלבד *

* אתיופיה - פגישה המנכ"ל עם פאריס *

* 1. המנכ"ל יזם אתמול (26/7) פגישה עם הממונה פאריס בנושא אתיופיה. נכחו מצידנו, הדס, בנצור, למדן, סופר וששכרוף ומצידם ברו והרבסט.

* 2. המנכ"ל סקר את המצב כיום והסביר את מדיניותנו כלפי אתיופיה המכוונת לאפיק אחד בלבד - הבאת היהודים ארצה. הוא עמד על הלחץ שמפעיל עלינו מנגיסטו לקבלת נשק ועל החזקת היהודים שם כבני ערובה. קבלנו בקשות נמרצות של האתיופים לאספת אמ"ח מגוון וההיענות להם עוכבה זמן רב. המצב הגיע עתה לרגע אמת כאשר מזה למעלה מחודש יציאת היהודים הופסקה כמעט כליל. לפיכך הוחלט לספק ציוד צבאי מצומצם ולא קטלני. חוזר לא קטלני וללא רכיבים אמריקניים. לא נכנסנו לשום פיירוט.

* 3. במקביל יימשך הסיוע הכלכלי וההומניטרי, ומשלחת כלכלית בראשיתו של אורי לובראני תצא לאדים בעתיד הקרוב. המנכ"ל ביקש מפאריס לפעול להפסקת הפרסומים חסרי השחר מוושינגטון על סיוע צבאי מסיבי שישראל כביכול מספקת למנגיסטו והדגיש כי אין ולא תהיה נוכחות צבאית ישראלית באתיופיה.

* 4. פאריס, הגיב שארה"ב מעריכה מאד את רצוננו לעדכן אותם ושלארה"ב אין ספקות לגבי המניעים העומדים בבסיס מדיניותה של ישראל כלפי אתיופיה. ארה"ב מצדדת בהושטת סיוע כלכלי והומניטרי לאתיופיה אך מתנגדת לכל סיוע צבאי שיביא להארכת

מושרד - החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מסוד-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 2
עוהק 1 מתוך 2

המלחמה שם. אם אכן יהיה כך, אספקת הציוד הישראלי יוודע
בפומבי, דבר שיחייב את ארה"ב להגיב באורח שלילי. ציין
שאגלברגר עומד להפגש היום עם שה"ח אתיופיה טספאי דינקה,
וזאת לאחר שמגיסטו הסכים לפתיחת נמל מסאוה. הרגיש שארה"ב
תמשיך להבהיר לאתיופים שתנאי יסוד בפיתוח יחסיה עם אתיופיה
הוא מתן חופש הגירה ליהודים.

5. לשאלת פאריס השיבו המנכ"ל והדס שאין בכוונתנו כלל
לספק למגיסטו את כל בקשותיו בתחום הצבאי, אלא חלק מיזערי
מהן בלבד, וחזרו והרגישו שבכל מקרה ישראל תספק אך ורק ציוד
צבאי לא קטלני. הדס ציין שבכוונתנו להזמין ארצה משלחת
אתיופית לנהל מו"מ עמנו בנושא; הודגש שיציאת היהודים
הנותרים בארץ תוצמד באורח נמרץ למו"מ זה, שיתכן ימשך לא
מעט זמן. הוסיף שלישאל, כמו לארה"ב אין סימפטיה כלפי
מגיסטו אך לפי שעה, הוא שולט בארץ וממשיך לשלוט שם גם אם
אסמארה תפול.

6. המנכ"ל בקש שהאמריקאים ילחצו על שה"ח טספאי דינקה
לחפש פתרון מדיני שכן על ידי כך יופחת הלחץ עלינו לספק
ציוד צבאי. הוסיף שנשמח לשגר לווינגטון שליח בכיר מהמשרד
כדי לעדכן את מחמ"ד על ההתפתחויות לפני פגישת שה"ח לוי עם
בייקר. וכי בכל מקרה נמשיך לעדכןם. פאריס קידם הצעה זו
בברכה בציין כי ארה"ב תמשיך לעקוב מקרוב אחרי הסוגייה.

7. לבסוף בקש הדס מפאריס לנהוג במידע שנמסר לו
בדיסקרטיות רבה ולצמצם התפוצה למינימום האפשרי.

8. בנפרד נעביר בקשותינו ביחס לעדכון הארגונים היהודיים
וזאת בהמשך לשיחות שר הבטחון בניו יורק לאחרונה.

לשמנכ"ל

17

תפ: שהח, סשהח, מנכל, ממנכל, (הרהמ), (שהבט), הדס, בנצור, (הדס)

[illegible]



4

ד' באב תש"ן
26 ביולי 1990
913.11

80628

- סודי -

א ל : שה"ח
ס/שה"ח
מנכ"ל וחברי הנהלה
מנהלי מחלקות
ראשי נציגויות צפ"א

הנדון: דפ"מ צפ"א 70
לשבועיים עד ה- 26.7.90

א. ארה"ב

1. ביקור שה"ח ביוש'

הפגישות בווישינגטון נקבעו ל - 9-10 באוגוסט. בתיאום עם השגרירות פועל אגף צפ"א על הכנת תיק הביקור. האמריקנים ביקשו, כי לצד נושא תהליך השלום, יידונו גם נושאים בילטרליים (ערבויות לשיכון, סיוע וכד') וכן נושאים אזוריים (ירדן, סוריה ועיראק) ופר"ניים.

2. ביקור שהב"ט בווישינגטון

- שהב"ט קיים ביקור קצר בווישינגטון ונפגש עם עמיתו צ'ייני ב-20.7.90. הלה הביע הסכמתו לתמוך בשלב ב' של פיתוח הטיל "חץ". השר ארנס הופיע בפני פורום מצומצם של מועדון הנשיאים כשבמרכז דבריו האיום העיראקי, נושא "החץ" ומצוקת יהודי אתיופיה. בתקשורת האמריקאית הקדישו כיסוי מועט לביקור.

3. JSAP

ביוזמת ארה"ב נדחו לחודש ספטמבר השיחות לשיתוף אסטרטגי שנועדו להתקיים בשבוע המתחיל ב - 20.7.90. הממשל הסביר כי הוא מצוי בדיונים עם הקונגרס לגבי התקציב ולא היה רוצה להופיע כאילו סיכם עם ישראל את גודל הסיוע לשנת התקציב 1992 מ"אחורי גבו של הקונגרס". דוברי ממשל שונים הדגישו כי אין בדחייה משום מסר פוליטי, או איתות על כוונה לצמצם היקף הסיוע. מאידך נקלטו ידיעות ממקורות עתונאיים כאילו יש בדחייה משום לחץ על ישראל ואיתות בנושא תהליך השלום.



4. יהודי אתיופיה

סגן המזכיר איגלברגר הדגיש באוזני השגריר ארד (24/7) כי ארה"ב מתנגדת נמרצות למכירת נשק לאתיופיה. לדברי איגלברגר, הרקע להבהרה התרשמות ארה"ב כי ישראל עומדת תחת לחץ גובר מצד אתיופיה לספק לה נשק. איגלברגר הזהיר, כי אם תחליט ישראל לספק נשק למנגיסטו, ארה"ב תגנה זאת פומבית. מאחורי קו זה ניצב המזכיר בייקר, אשר לדברי דניס רוס "מבין את חומרת הבעיה... ומבין גם שארה"ב תצטרך לנקוט בפעולות מהירות כדי לפתרה". (הזכיר חידוש היחסים המלאים כדוגמא).

5. סנטור ספקטור מציע ועידה בין"ל מצומצמת

הסנטור ספקטור הציע בפגישה עם הנשיא בוש, כי ארה"ב תפעל לכינון ועידה בין"ל בהשתתפות סוריה ובחסות ארה"ב ובריה"מ. לדבריו, אסד שינה טעמו ועתה הוא מוכן גם לוועידה בדפוס מצומצם. ספקטור הוסיף, כי דה"מ שמיר הסכים בעבר לוועידה בהשתתפות 2 המעצמות. בשיחה עם השגריר ארד סיפר הסנטור, כי הנשיא הגיב שישראל "ודאי לא מוכנה למהלך כזה" והיה "NON-COMMITAL" לגבי עצם הרעיון. עם זאת הנשיא הטיל על סקורופט להיפגש עם ספקטור כדי לדון בנושא. השגריר הבהיר לסנטור ספקטור הסתייגותה של ישראל מהצעותיו.

6. כבשני טיטניום לעיראק

על רקע פירסומים בתקשורת ומחאות בקונגרס, עצר הממשל האמריקני שיגורם של מספר כיבשני טיטניום שנועדו לעיראק. הכיבשנים עשויים לשמש בתהליך יצור של מערכות נשק מתקדמות (מטוסים, טילים ונשק אטומי). האמריקנים בודקים עתה את היישומים האפשריים של הכבשנים ואת ההיבט המשפטי של עיכוב מכירתם לעיראק.

7. VOA

בדיון מועצת התכנון העליונה (24.7.90) נדונה מחדש ההחלטה הקודמת לעכב את אישור הפרוייקט עד להשלמת ביצוע סקר הציפורים. ההחלטה המעודכנת הינה לא לעכב את אישור הפרוייקט, לקיים את הסקר במקביל וליישם את מסקנותיו חור כדי ביצוע הפרוייקט. ההמלצה החיובית מועברת עתה לאישור הממשלה. נציגי ישובי הנגב הודיעו על כוונתם לעתור לבג"צ. טרם לדיון המועצה, הבהירו האמריקנים (הן בווישינגטון והן באמצעות השגריר בראון), כי דחייה נוספת באישור הפרוייקט תובן על ידם כסתימת הגולל עליו. לאחר הדיון קבלו את ההחלטה כבדכה.

8. הפטריארך היווני האקומני דימטריוס

בוטלה פגישת הפטריארך עם המנהיגות היהודית, שנועדה להתקיים בשיקאגו. עפ"י דיווח הקונסוליה, סיבת הביטול אינה קשורה למכלול האירועים סביב הבית ברובע הנוצרי אלא למערכת יחסיו העדינה של דימטריוס עם שלטונות תורכיה המעדיפים כי לא יחרוג מהתחומים הרוחניים-דתיים אל מה שעשוי להראות - כבעל משמעות מדינית ואנטי תורכית.



9. בעיות קונסולריות עם אזרחים פלסטינים ממוצא אמריקני

שגריר ארה"ב הפקיד השבוע T.P. (נקודות לשיחה) בידי מזכיר הממשלה וסמנכ"ל צפ"א ופר"ן. הנקודות מתייחסות לבעיות המתעוררות לגבי אזרחים אמריקנים ממוצא פלשתיני. בראון ביקש התייחסותנו הרצינית לפנייה תוך ציון מעורבותו האישית של המזכיר לסוגייה.

ב. קנדה

1. העמות בין האינדיאנים לממשלת קנדה וממשלת קב"ח

העמות בין האינדיאנים לממשלת קנדה וממקב נמשר. הגופים היציגים בקהילה האינדיאנית פנו לאו"ם בבקשה לשגר כח לשמירת השלום אך קבלו תשובה שלילית. אחד ממנהיגי האינדיאנים תקף בחריפות את שה"ח קלרק שמיהר לגנות את ישראל על שמנעה מזון מהפלסטינאים אך אינו רואה פגם במעשה דומה הדבר נעשה בקנדה. השגריר גור אריה קיבל אף הוא מכתב ובו בקשת סיוע "מהאחים והאחיות בישראל, אשר גם כן ירשו את ארץ אבותיהם". לבקשתם, השגריר אמר להיפגש עם נציגי האינדיאנים ביום ו' ה - 27 דנא. נשיא הקונגרס היהודי הקנדי יצא בקריאה לפתרון הבעייה שלום תוך הבעת דאגה שהמשך המצב הקיים יהווה קרקע פורייה להחרפת העוינות וביטויי גזענות.

2. פגישת תדרוך לשר ההגנה הקנדי

השגריר גור-אריה קיים פגישת תדרוך עם שר ההגנה הקנדי ביל מקנייט ערב צאתו לביקור אצל כוחות האו"ם הקנדים באזורנו. השר התעניין במיוחד במצב תהליך השלום ומהות תכנית האוטונומיה. רמז שבהשפעת התקשורת נוצרה אוירה ביקורתית המחייבת אותו להנמיך פרופיל הביקור בישראל. מקנייט ציין שמראה עיניים משנה סטיראוטיפים וכך אכן קרה לו כאשר ביקר ברמה"ג ואזור קלקיליה ולמד לדעת מורכבות הבעיות הבטחוניות שלנו. בעת סיורו, יבקר לאחרונה מקנייט בארץ ובין היתר ייפגש עם שר הבטחון.

3. הפגוע בחוף תל-אביב

אתרי סגירת דף זה אירע בשבת ה - 28 בחודש, הפגוע "בחוף ירושלים" שבת"א. נהרגה צעירה בת 17 מקנדה ומבין 17 הפגועים היו שלושה צעירים קנדיים שבאו ארצה בקבוצה מטעם הפדרציה הציונית הקנדית. שה"ח קנדה הוציא הודעה חריפה בגנות התקרית והטרור.

ג. בלגיה

- מצורפות 2 סקירות שהוכנו לאחרונה במחלקה:

* סיכום המחלוקת בענין צוללות הדולפין.

* סיכום תוצאות הסקרים האחרונים העוסקים בתדמית ישראל בארה"ב.

ב ב ר כ ה.
3.11
יוסף למדן



כ"ד בתמוז תש"ן
17 ביולי 1990
103.11

79599

- ש מ ר -

הנדון: צוללות הדולפין - סיכום המחלוקת בענין "חליפת הלחימה"
(מתוך דיווחי הרמש"ן וקישור לקונגרס)

1. מזה מספר חודשים מתנהל דיאלוג ער בין מספר חברי הקונגרס ממדינות רוד איילנד, בראשם הסנטור פל (יו"ר ועדת החוץ) של הסנט לבין מערכת הבטחון שלנו, בענין "חליפת הלחימה" (מערכת ה-SONAR) של צוללות הדולפין (הנבנות ברפ"ג). חברי הקונגרס מייצגים כאן את האינטרסים של חב' רייתיאון הממוקמת במדינת רוד איילנד ושהיתה מעונינת בפיתוח המערכת.
2. מערכת הבטחון החליטה מתוך שיקולים ענייניים מבצעיים לבחור בחברה גרמנית לייצור המערכת ([REDACTED]).
להלן תמצית הנימוקים העיקריים:
 - א. בהתקשרות אפשרית עם רייתיאון אנו נוטלים סיכוני פיתוח גדולים וכאן מדובר בכל צי הצוללות הישראלי.
 - ב. קיים מחיר מבצעי וכלכלי משמעותי ביותר במקרה של פיגור באספקה.
 - ג. הצבענו על דו"ח של ה-G.A.O. (החשב הכללי הפדרלי) משנת 87 אשר הצביע על פיגורי פיתוח בפרוייקט דומה שבו שותפה רייתיאון.
3. חברי הקונגרס של רוד איילנד פתחו במסע ציבורי נגד החלטת מערכת הבטחון לרכוש המערכת הגרמנית. הסנטור פל (המתמודד על מושבו בסנט בבחירות בנובמבר) פנה גם למשרד ה-G.A.O. ודרש בדיקה מקפת של:
 - (א) החוזה "לחליפת הלחימה" של הדולפין ודרך הקצאת כספי ה-F.M.S. (הסיוע הצבאי) למימונו, וזאת לכל משרת תקופת החוזה.
 - (ב) בדיקת השימושים שישראל עשתה ב-O.S.P. (כספי הסיוע המיועדים לרכש מחוץ לארה"ב, בישראל בעיקר) במשך חמש השנים האחרונות.
4. בשבוע שעבר (11/7), נערכו שתי פגישות הבהרה בין הרמש"ן (בליורי הציר וקישור לקונגרס) לבין חברי הקונגרס: הסנטורים פל וצ'ייפי והמורשים מאטלי שניידר ותום סוויאר. בעקבות שיחה זו אורגנה פגישה גם עם נציגי רייתיאון ובהשתתפות חברי הקונגרס. במפגשים אלה הבהרנו שהאחריות לכשלון המו"מ עם רייתיאון מוטלת על החברה שכן אנו העמדנו שני תנאים שחברה זו לא היתה מוכנה לעמוד בהם:
 - א. קביעת אבן דרך קריטית אשר בה תימדד עמידתה בפרוייקט, וסיום החוזה מחמת הפרה אם החברה לא תעמוד באבן הבוחן הנ"ל.



ב. נטילת אחריות, ללא הגבלת סכום, כדי לשאת בתנאי הפיצויים למספנות בגרמניה אם אלה ינבעו מאי עמידת רייתאון בלו"ז או במפרטים.

5. חברי הקונגרס מצידם השמיעו שני טיעונים מרכזיים :

א. התנאים החוזיים שהעמדנו דרקוניים מדי.

ב. הקצאת נתח עבודה לחברה גרמנית עלולה לחבל בסיוע הבטחוני לישראל ובמיוחד ה - O.S.P.

6. עפ"י הערכות הרמש"ן והציר לקונגרס ניתן לסכם שחברי הקונגרס גילו הבנה לשיקולים והמניעים שהנחו אותנו. הערכה המתחזקת לנוכח הודעת פל בעקבות הפגישה (רצ"ב) ודיווח הקונסוליה בבוסטון על התגובות הפומביות המתמתנות בנושא.

7. בשיחה שהיתה לרמש"ן ב - D.S.A.A (האגף בפנטגון האחראי בין השאר לשימוש בכספי הסיוע הצבאי). לאחר הפגישה עם חברי הקונגרס נמסר שהם מודעים לשיקולים שעמדו ביסוד החלטתנו ואלה מקובלים עליהם.

8. עם זאת לאור פניית הסנטור פל, כבר הוחל במו"מ בין ה - G.A.O והפנטגון ביחס לביצוע הבדיקות המבוקשות. לדבריהם ה - G.A.O מנסה לצמצם תחולת הבדיקות שביקש הסנטור פל בנושא F.M.S. כך גם בנושא השימוש ב - O.S.P, כשאין להוציא מכלל אפשרות שהבדיקה תשתרע על עיסקאות בישראל.

9. במקביל נמסר לנו על החלטתם הסופית של ה - D.S.A.A בענין מימון "חליפת הלחימה" של הדולפין והיא כוללת :

א. מימון מתוך הסיוע הצבאי הכללי - 46.05 מ' \$.

ב. מימון מתוך כספי O.S.P - 8.1 מ' \$.

ג. מקורות ישראלים - 41.1 מ' \$.

הם מוכנים להנפיק האישור מיידית ובלבד שנציג להם התוזה בחוספח בקשת מימון מתאימה.

א. בן-מתתיהו



כ"ב בתמוז תש"ן
15 ביולי 1990
103.01

79433

- ש מ ר -

הנדון: ארה"ב - תדמית ישראל בדעת הקהל

1. לאחרונה נערכו בארה"ב מספר סקרי דעת קהל העוסקים בישראל. חרף הקושי בהשוואה מתודית בין סקרים אלה (בשל חוסר בסיס משותף), להלן מספר מגמות העולות מן הממצאים:

- גוברת התמיכה במתן מולדת לפלסטינים - ביולי 1988 - 40% תמכו בכך ואילו ביוני 1990 - 47% (סקר ניו-יורק טיימס ו- CBS).

- גוברת האהדה לדרישות הפלסטינים - ביולי 1988 - 26% טענו שעל ארה"ב לגלות יתר אהדה לפלסטינים ואילו ביוני 1990 - 38% טענו כך (CBS-NYT).

- פוחתת האהדה לישראל (יחסית לכלל מדינות ערב) - היחס כיום מינו 2:1 לטובת ישראל. בראשית שנות ה-70 היחס היה 5:1 (CBS-NYT). כאשר השאלה מתייחסת לישראל מול הפלסטינים: באפריל 1988 55% אהדו את ישראל ואילו ביוני 1990 31% (ADL).

- גוברת ההסתה לנטישת ישראל לתהליך המדינה - בספטמבר 1989 - 46% סברו שמנהיגי ישראל שוחרים הסדר שלום ואילו ביוני 1990 - 37% סברו כך (סקר ADL).

- גוברת הנטייה לתמוך בקיצוץ הסיוע לישראל - באפריל 1989 - 25% תמכו בהקטנת הסיוע ואילו ביוני 1990 - 33% (CBS - NYT).

2. בחינת מגמות על פני זמן מצביעה על כירסום במעמד ישראל בדעת הקהל האמריקנית וזאת בשלשה מישורים:

- בסוגיות נקודתיות (כמו - מולדת לפלסטינים).
- בהתייחסויות כלליות (אהדה לישראל מול אהדה לערבים).
- ובהמלצות האופרטיביות (קיצוץ בסיוע, הפעלת לחץ על ישראל לקידום תהליך השלום).

3. ניכרת הבולטות של הסוגיה הפלסטינית ומשקלה בכירסום תדמיתה של ישראל. (מחצית מתוך 45% שאינם מתרשמים לטובה ממשלת ישראל (יוני ADL-1990), חשים כך עקב הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני. (וככל שההדגשים הינם על סכסוך "בין-קהילתי" ולא "בין-מדינתי" - הדימוי של ישראל נזרק יותר).

4. התייחסות סטטית אל הנתונים מלמדת כי התמיכה בישראל עולה בהרבה על התמיכה בערבים. 64% מן האמריקנים מעדיפים את ישראל כבת-ברית על פני כל מדינת נפט ערבית (21% מעדיפים את האחרונה כבת-ברית). האמריקנים סולדים מערפאת (68%) סבורים שאש"ף בולם את מאמצי השלום (62%) ושהינו עדיין ארגון טרור (57%) (ADL).

אבי גיל

אאא, חוזם: 24065

אל: רהמש/970

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 257, תא: 260790, זח: 1429, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

מאת: עודד ערן

פגישה עם יו"ר המפלגה הדמוקרטית.

נפגשתי אתמול עם רון בראון לשיחה בת 45 דקות. הודיתי לבראון על פעולתו הנמרצת לסיכול החלטות בוועידות של המפלגה במדינות השונות. בראון אמר שהוא עושה זאת מתוך שכנוע עמוק והצביע על נאומי הנסיסי בנושא (בוועידת ה-A.D.L. - ע.ע). בראון אמר, שאמנם יש גורמים במפלגה הדמוקרטית המבקרים אותו על גישתו, אך הדבר לא ירתיע אותו. הוא התעניין בקורה בתהליך השלום ועדכנתיו בנושא. (אמרתי ששר החוץ לוי מגיע לביקור בווינגטון, אך נמנעתי מלהציע פגישה, הן בשל הרגישות המדינית והן מתוך כך שאינו יודע אם מקבילו הרפובליקאי, לי אטוטר, נמצא במצב של קיום פגישות). העליתי בפני בראון, על אף שאינו קשור ישירות לכך, את נושא סיוע החוץ ואת הסכנות הנובעות מקיצוץ דרסטי בו בעקבות קשיי התקציב כאן. ציינתי כמובן את האספקט הישראלי לאור הסכנות המצטברות במז"ת. בראון אמר שהוא מקווה שהפסגה התקציבית תצליח להגיע לפשרה שלא תפגע בסיוע החוץ וכי בשיחותיו עם אנשי הקונגרס יצביע על הצורך לתת לארה"ב לענות לצרכים החדשים בלא לפגוע באינטרסים הקיימים. בראון, שבעבר גילה עניין בנושא דרא"פ, לא העלה אותו כלל. סיפרתי לו בקצרה על מצוקת יהודי אתיופיה ועל הצורך לחלץ במהירות כ- 17,000 נפש.

ערן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן, ממד, כנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 22944

אל: רהמש/913

מ-: המשרד, תא: 260790, חז: 0124, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בכב

סודי/מיידי

יהודי תימן

יחיא דאוד צברי. עניינו של צברי הועלה כבר מספר פעמים עם שלטונות תימן על ידי ארה"ב על פי בקשתנו. האיש זקן, כבן 84, עריירי וחצי עיוור. בנו שלום צברי החי בישראל עשה מאמצים רבים למען הוצאת אביו ולא הצליח. עתה שובת הבן שתית רעב מול בית רה"מ למען הוצאת אביו מתימן. הפניתי תשומת ליבו של השגריר כראון שוב לפרשה וביקשתי שארה"ב תלחץ על מתימן להתיר יציאתו של האב.

אנא פנו למחמ"ד כדי לחזק את בקשתנו ואת דחיפותה.

בן-אהרון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, סולטן, מזתים, תפוצות,
בנצור, מצפא, @ (רם)

סססס

1400 2/3

AMENDMENT NO. _____ EX. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: To require a report on PLO attacks on American citizens

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES -- 101 CONG. 2ND SESSION

S. 2749

H.R. _____ (or Treaty _____)

short (title) To
provide supplemental authorization of appropriations for fiscal
year 1991 for the Department of State.

- () Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed
- () Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

Intended to be proposed by Mr. _____

Viz: At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

"Sec. __. None of the funds authorized by this Act for the purpose of paying arrearages to the United Nations shall be made available until the President reports to Congress on the extent of PLO involvement in each of the following terrorist attacks on American citizens; provided that such report shall include the names of all PLO personnel known or suspected by US government agencies of being involved in the planning, financing or execution of each attack:

AMERICANS VICTIMIZED BY PLO TERRORIST ATTACKS

3/3 1400

American victim, date, type of attack

1. George Shultz: March 1988; car bomb attempt foiled near his hotel in Jerusalem.
2. Gail Klein: wounded; October 1988; bomb attack in Jerusalem.
3. Alberto Ospina: killed; April 1988; killed in bombing of TWA flight 840.
4. Maria Klug: killed.
5. Demetra Klug: killed.
6. Demetra Stylianopoulos: killed.
7. Leon Klingnoffer: killed; October 1985; Achille Lauro ocean liner hijacked. Klingnoffer was shot and thrown overboard.
8. Ahron Gross: killed; July 1983; Gross, an American seminary student, was stabbed to death by three terrorists.
9. One American: wounded; September 1981; grenade attack against tourists in the old city of Jerusalem.
10. Stephen Himes: killed; September 1978; bomb attack in Jerusalem.
11. Richard Fishman: killed; June 1978; University of Maryland student killed in a bomb attack on a bus in Jerusalem.
12. Gail Rubin: killed; March 1978; killed in bomb attack on tour bus in northern Israel.
13. Harold Rosenthal: killed; August 1976; casualties of grenade and submachine gun attack at the Istanbul airport.
14. Nona Shearer: wounded.
15. Lucille Washburn: wounded.
- 16 through 24. Nine Americans; hostage; June 1976; Air France Flight 139 hijacked from Tel Aviv to Paris.
25. Francis Meloy: killed; June 1976; U.S. diplomats shot to death in Lebanon.
26. Robert Waring: killed.
27. Zohair Moghrabi: killed.
- 28 and 29. Two Americans; wounded; March 1976; casualties of arson attack on Part Hotel in Netanya, Israel.
30. One American: killed; November 1975; killed in bomb attack in Jerusalem.
31. Herman Huddleston: kidnapped; October 1975; kidnapped by armed Palestinians in his Beirut home.
32. Charles Gallagher: kidnapped; October 1975; kidnapped in East Beirut.
33. William Dykes: kidnapped; October 1975; kidnapped in East Beirut.
- 34 through 36. Three Americans; kidnapped; August 1975; occupied and held hostages at U.S. embassy in Malaysia.
37. Mark Katz: wounded; July 1975; bomb attack in Jerusalem.
38. Deborah Levine: wounded; July 1975; bomb attack in Jerusalem.
39. Col. Ernest Morgan: kidnapped; June 1975; kidnapped in taxi in Beirut.

Jerusalem.

41. Cleo Noel: killed; March 1973; Noel, U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan and Moore, the Deputy Chief of Mission were assassinated.
42. George Moore: killed; March 1973; Noel, U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan and Moore, the Deputy Chief of Mission were assassinated.
- 43 through 58. 16 Americans; killed; May 1972; terrorists open fired at passengers at Lod Airport, Tel Aviv.
59. Joseph Kennedy: hostage; February 1972; Lufthansa flight 649 from New Delhi to Athens was hijacked.
60. One American: killed January 1972; killed in machine gun attack on car in Gaza strip.
61. One American; hostage; August 1971; detained dependent of U.S. Dept. of Defense officer in Beirut.
- 62 through 66. Five Americans; wounded; September 1971; wounded in grenade attack in Jerusalem.
67. John Stewart; kidnapped; September 1970; kidnapped in Amman.
68. Sgt. Ervin Graham; hostage; September 1970; hijacked TWA flight to Jordan.
- 69 through 71. Three Americans; hostage; September 1970; hijacked Pan Am flight to Jordan.
- 72 through 74. Three Americans; hostage; September 1970; hijacked Swissair flight to Jordan.
75. One American; hostage; July 1970; Olympic Airways flight from Beirut to Athens hijacked over Rhodes.
76. Maj. Robert Perry: killed; June 1970; shot to death in Amman.
- 77 and 78. Two American women; raped; June 1970; broke into and looted the homes of U.S. officials in Amman, Jordan. Raped officials' wives.
- 79 through 86. Eight Americans; hostage; June 1970; armed takeover of two hotels in Jordan.
87. Morris Draper: kidnapped; June 1970; held hostage for two days in Amman, Jordan.
88. Cpt. Robert Potts: wounded; June 1970; shot and wounded at roadblock in Amman, Jordan.
89. Mrs. Robert Potts: wounded; June 1970; shot and wounded at roadblock in Amman, Jordan.
- 90 through 95. Six Americans; killed; February 1970; bombed Swissair flight.
- 96 and 97. Two Americans; wounded; June 1969; street bombing in Jerusalem.
- 98 and 99. Two Americans; wounded; August 1968; grenade attack in Jerusalem.

END

אאא, חוזם: 23327

אל: רהמש/930

מ-: המשרד, תא: 260790, חז: 1339, חד: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

80546

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל: וושינגטון

השגריר

(1) בא'צ עם קורצר, בראון, פאריס, למדן והח'מ סיפר קורצר שבביקור מאגיד בווישינגטון ובמנעים אחרים עם המצרים עלו יוזמות מצרים למו'מ אזורי על פרוק נשק. אשר ליוזמת מובארק לפרוז האזור מנשק השמדה המוני הבהירה ארה'ב למצרים שאין בדעתה להעביר הצעת מצרים לישראל. על מצרים - אם תחפץ - להעביר ההצעה לישראל במישרין. גילה כי גם באחרונה קיימו שיחות עם מצרים על האפשרות שמצרים תזמין ישראל לשיחות על צמצום מרוץ הטילים במזה'ת ורמז שמצרים שוקלת הזמנת ישראל וארה'ב לשיחות על סוגיה זו.

(2) אישר שארה'ב שוקלת רעיון של ועידה מז'תית לפרוק נשק במקביל לתהליך השלום. אמר שבדיונים במחמ'ד החליטו לעודד גורמים אקדמאיים ליזום דיונים וכנסים בנושאים אלה שכן האקדמאים הקדימו המדינאים בהקשר לצמצום מרוץ החימוש בין המזרח למערב. סיפר שכאשר טרסוב השמיע את סידרת המלצותיו לגבי צמצום המתיחות במזה'ת הפתיעו רוס כאשר העמידו על הרעיון האמריקאי הנ'ל.

בנצור

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, סולטן, מצרים, סייבל

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 22856

אל: רהמש/918

מ-: ווש, נר: 2139, תא: 250790, זח: 1600, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל אפאסו'ק

דע: לשכת רה'מ, סמנכ'ל צפ'א, מנהל מצפ'א,
יועץ שה'ח לתפוצות

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

הנדון: מכירת נשק לאתיופיה.

בהמשך לשלי 2134 מאתמול.

צלצל הבוקר דניס רוס, בקש להוסיף כי בשיחה הבוקר עם המזכיר
עלה הנושא שוב. הם מודעים למצוקה ההומניטרית הקשה בפניה
ניצבת ישראל והם יעשו מאמצים כנים ומיוחדים לסייע בפתרון
בעיית יהודי אתיופיה, והוצאתם.
עם כל ההבנה וההערכה לרצונה של ישראל להציל היהודים לא
יוכלו לתת גיבוי למכירת נשק ע"י ישראל לאתיופיה. חזרתי
והבהרתי עמדתנו.

ארד

אא

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, @שהבט, הדס, מאפ1,
בנצור, מצפא, תפוצות, @רס)

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 22521

אל: רהמש/891

מ-: המשרד, תא: 250790, זח: 1930, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

80492

סודי ביותר/מיד

אל: וושינגטון - השגריר, הציר, שטיין.

הנדון: פגישת המנכ"ל עם דן קורצר

1. הפגישה הנ"ל התקיימה ב-27/7 בהשתתפות השגריר בראון ומצידנו הראל ויששכרוף.

2. קורצר הסביר את שתי הסיבות לבואו לארץ יחד עם נציגי ה-CIA והמודיעין הימי:

א. להסביר כיצד הגיע הממשל למסקנה חותכת לגבי מעורבות הלובית בפיגוע בחוף ניצנים על ידי איתור ספינת השיגור בנמל בלוב באמצעות תמונות לוויין ומידע אחר.

ב. להודיענו שארה"ב פועלת בבירות האירופאיות על מנת להבהיר המשך מעורבותו הפעילה של קדפי בטרור. מבחינתם הראיות הללו מהוות ה"SMOKING-GUN" המצביע חד משמעית ששליט לוב ממשיך לעסוק בטרור. השגריר בראון הוסיף שברשות ארה"ב תמונות לוויין של המתקנים ברבחה שהובילו את ארה"ב למסקנה שהשריפה במתקן הייתה תכסיס ולא תאונה אמיתית.

3. בראון ביקש להביא לידיעתנו שארה"ב פנתה בדימושים לבירות ערביות (דמשק במיוחד, רבת עמון וקהיר) באורח נמרץ בכל הקשור לשימוש בגלשונים וכלי טייס קלים לצורך טרור. כן מסר שפנו בנפרד בדמשק בנושא ההתקלות בגבול סוריה ירדן לפני ימים אחדים בה רגנו כוחות ירדניים ארבע מחבלים. ציין שמטרות המחבלים היו מדאיות ביותר (לא פירט).

4. קורצר התעניין במפגש השר עם הטרוויקה. המנכ"ל תיזרז את בני שיחו בהתאם, ובמיוחד הדגיש את הסיכום לגבי המשך הדו-שיח עם הקהילה הן ברמה של שרים והן בדרג של מומחים. המנכ"ל מסר שכוונתו של השר לוי לתדרך את שה"ח איטליה לאחר פגישתו עם המזכיר בייקר באוגוסט. קורצר התעניין אם הטרוויקה התייחסו לצורך להרחיב את פעילותן למדינות ערב בהקשר לסכסוך. המנכ"ל הסביר שלמעט הצגת רעיונה של הקהילה לגבי שת"פ בים התיכון הנושא לא הועלה על ידי הטרוויקה.

5. קורצר שאל אם ניתן להסיר את המכס על יבוא בתים טרומיים מארה"ב (אין המכס על יבוא בתים מאירופה) כך שחברות אמריקניות תוכלנה לפחות להתחרות במכרזים שיפורסמו. ציין שהדבר יתקבל 'בעין יפה' בארה"ב. בראון העלה התקנות החדשות לגבי יבוא מכוניות מעל 2500 סמ"ק בציינו שהרוויחו צעד אחד קדימה עם השגת פתרון למכוניות הונדה ועתה נסוגו חמישה צעדים אחורה בשל התקנות החדשות. המנכ"ל הבהיר שהתקנות לא היו מכוונות נגד ארה"ב. השגריר הגיב שהתקנות בכל זאת פוגעות במכוניות אמריקניות שהן מהבטחות בעולם וכי הוא מתכוון להעלות את הסוגיה עם שר התחבורה בקרוב.

6. קורצר ביקש לציין שלקראת פגישת שה'ח לוי והמזכיר, נעשית עבודת הכנה אצלם למרות הלו'ז העמוס ביותר של המזכיר, וקיים הרושם שלשני השרים תכונות משותפות רבות שתאפשרנה לשניהם להבין היטב אחד את השני. ציין שבייקר היום הוא למעשה ה-ACTION-OFFICER בכל הנוגע לתהליך השלום וכי הוא קורא בעיון רב דבריו והמסרים של השר לוי ומצפה לפגישה ('EYEBALL' TO EYEBALL) פורה. קורצר הבהיר שארה'ב מחוייבת ליישום היוזמה הישראלית בכללותה, ולמרות שלא הצליחו בכל המרכיבים, המזכיר מעלה את נושא יחסי ישראל-מדינות ערב בכל הזדמנות נאותה כגון פגישתו לאחרונה עם שה'ח ירדן. המזכיר ממשיך לנסות. לבסוף ציין קורצר, שבלי להמעיט בחשיבותה של תזוזה משמעותית, הקרנת הרושם של תזוזה היא גם חשובה ובמיוחד כדי לא לספק תירוצים לאלה שאינם מעוניינים בכל קידום בתהליך השלום.

לשכת מנכ"ל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רם), אמן, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 22985

אל: רהמש/921

מ-: לוסאנגלס, נר: 131, תא: 250790, זח: 1200, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בכב

שמור/מיד

אל: מצפ'א

קישור לקונגרס, וושינגטון

דע: ציר הסברה, וושינגטון

הסברה מרחבי

ועידת המפלגה הרפובליקנית בסן-דיאגו

1. בועידה שהתקיימה בסוף השבוע בסן דיאגו, ניסו גורמים פרו ערבים במפלגה להעלות 2 הצעות החלטה נגד ישראל (ראו נא, מברק משה רם בנדון). לפי אחד הפעילים למען ישראל בועידה הסתבר שרוב הפעילים האנטי-ישראלים היו מוסלמים, הודים ופקיסטנים (שהפגינו בורות בסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי), ולא פלסטינים.

2. אחת מהצעות ההחלטה הביעה גאווה כבוש עבור מנהיגותו החזקה נגד הפרות זכויות אדם, בין השאר ב'אדמה הפלסטינית הכבושה במזרח ירושלים, הגדה המערבית, עזה ורמת הגולן של סוריה.' הצעת ההחלטה קראה לבוש לבוש ולממשל לתמוך בהגדרה עצמית, הזכות לבחור ממשלה, והזכות לאושר (PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS) מילים שנלקחות מהכרזת העצמאות האמריקנית לכל אדם (ועם) בין השאר עבור כל הפלסטינים. (נוסח הצעת ההחלטה בדיפ')

3. אייפאק פעל נגד הצעות ההחלטה, וכן הסנטור פיט ווילסון ואנשיו עזרו רבות להביס את המהלך נגד ישראל. הצלחתם התבטאה בכך שהצעות ההחלטה נפלו טרם הבאתן להצבעה.

4. המפלגה הרפובליקנית בקליפורניה מתכנסת פעמיים בשנה (פעם בצפון המדינה ופעם בדרום). הועידה הבאה תתקיים בסקרמנטו בפברואר 1991. לפי אחד הפעילים של אייפק בלוס אנגלס, הגורמים הפרו ערבים מתארגנים וצפויים לישראל בעיות בועידה הבאה.

צוריאל רפאל

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת, הסברה

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 23008

אל: רהמש/925

מ-: ווש, נר: 2145, תא: 250790, זח: 2000, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בכב

סודי/מידי

אל: סמנכ'ל צפ'א

דע: מקש'ח משהב'ט

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

שיחת השגריר - תת-המזכיר לסיוע בטחוני מדע וטכנולוגיה
ברטלומיאו (24.7)

1. בשיחה (ביוזמת השגריר) נדונו הנושאים הבאים :

קביעת מועד לשיחות JSAP, נושאי שיחתו של שהב'ט עם צ'ייני ומכירת מחשבי על.

2. השתתפו בשיחה קובי (סגנו של קלי), שני עוזריו של ברטלומיאו והח'מ.

להלן סיכום השיחה :

א. JSAP.

1. השגריר הבהיר כי על רקע הספקולציות שהיו בעקבות החלטת הדחיה ככל שנקדים לקבוע תאריך למפגש כן ייטב.

2. ברטלומיאו העיר כי ביקורו של שהב'ט וההודעה בדבר בקור שה'ח מנעה המשך הספקולציות ביחס לסיבות לדחיה.

3. אשר לקביעת מועד ציין כי חשב על מחציתו השניה של ספטמבר. כגלל החגים ינסה למצוא תאריך במחצית הראשונה של ספטמבר.

ב. ביקור שהב'ט :

השגריר סיכם בקצרה הנושאים (כדלהלן) שעלו בשיחת שהב'ט - צ'ייני :

1. האיום הגובר על רקע מרוץ החימוש שלו תורמות מדינות רבות ובתוכן ארה"ב (ברטלומיאו העיר כי דוחה טענה זו). הזרמת הנשק הגורמת לשחיקת הפער האיכותי בין ישראל לשכנותיה.

- ברטלומיאו בתגובה ציין כי לפני כל עסקה עם מדינה ערבית כותנים האימפאקט על בטחון ישראל. לדבריו הם אינם נוקטים צעדים (כתחום ייצוא נשק למדינות ערב) הפוגעים במחויבותם לבטחון ישראל ובשמירה על מעמד ישראל במאזן בינה לבין מדינות ערב.

- ברטלומיאו התייחס לסוגיית הפרוליפרציה כאלמנט חדש במאזן

הכוחות האיזורי.2. האיום העיראקי :

- השגריר הביע תקווה שארה"ב תרתם למאמצים לסכל כוונת עיראק להשגת יכולת לא קונבנציונלית.

- ברטולומיאו ציין כי ערים למאמץ העיראקי ויפעלו VIGOURSLY בעקבות קבלת מידע. סיפר על פניות שעשו לממשלות רפ"ג הודו וסין בנדון בעקבות מידע שקבלו בעבר. לדבריו מנסים לראות כיצד להדק הפיקוח על ייצוא אמריקאי ואחר לעיראק המהווה "בעיה אמיתית לאורך כל הקו".

- השגריר העיר כי במהלך מלחמת עיראק-איראן היו כאלה שסברו שצאדם שינה מדיניות וסדרי עדיפויות. התנהגותו בשנה האחרונה מלמדת שלא חל שינוי בעמדותיו הבסיסיות. אין להתייחס בקלות להצהרותיו בחודשים האחרונים במיוחד לאחר שהוכיח נכונותו לעשות שמוש בנשק כימי נגד אוכלוסיות.

- ברטולומיאו בתגובה ציין כי לא נמנה על אלה שסברו שעיראק תמתן מדיניותה. מטרת צאדם היא לחזק מעמדו באזור. צאדם נתן אינדיקציות לכך שמוכן לשחק משחק מסוכן. סבור, שהצהרתו באפריל (איומו על ישראל ש.ש.) היתה מסוכנת. מודע לכך שלמילים, במיוחד במזה"ת יש דינאמיקה. ציין כי ארה"ב מודאגת ביחס לעיראק. העיר כי צאדם בהתנהגותו מחוויר לעומת אסאד.

- כתשובה לשאלת השגריר לגבי הצבת עיראק על רשימת הטרור ספר קובי כי במסגרת ה- REVIEW שעושים בנושא העלו הסוגייה בפני קהילת המודיעין. למרות שהבדיקה טרם הסתיימה, סבור כי מעשי עיראקי אינם מספיקים (מבחינת דרישות החקיקה) כדי להציבה ברשימת הטרור. ציין כי תהליך הבדיקה לא יימך זמן רב. גם אם בסיום התהליך לא יצרפו עיראק לרשימת המדינות העוסקות בטרור, ימשיכו לעקוב אחרי התנהגותה בנושא. הוסיף כי גם אם עיראק לא תצורף לרשימה, ימשיכו להטיל מגבלות חמורות על ייצוא לעיראק.

3. פרויקט ה"חץ": השגריר חזר על רצוננו בהמשך מעורבות אמריקאית בשלב השני. סיפר כי צ'ייני גילה עניין ומחויבות עקרונית להמשך המעורבות האמריקאית במחקר. הוסיף כי כעת יש לדון בגובה ההשתתפות האמריקאית. הביע תקווה שיחס המימון יישמר.

- ברטולומיאו ציין כי מבין שצ'ייני הביע תמיכתו ב-FOLLOW ON של החץ וכעת כוונתו (של צ'ייני) לבדוק נושא הקצאת המימון וכיצד החץ יתאים לצרכי ארה"ב.

- קובי הוסיף כי בשיחת שהב"ט - צ'ייני דנו בנושא מערכת התראה ושילובה עם החץ. לדברי קובי ממתנים לקבל מאיתנו מידע לגבי מערכת ההתראה לפני שיקבלו החלטה. בתגובה ללינקאז' אותה העלה קובי לגבי עמדת ארה"ב בנושא חץ והחלטתנו לגבי מערכת ההתראה, ציין השגריר כי על פי הבנתנו מחויבות צ'ייני להמשיך בשלב השני של פיתוח החץ, אינה מותנית. קובי אישר שזוהי גם הבנתו.

ג. מחשבי - על :

1. השגריר ביקש לדעת מה קורה. ציין כי אנו מופתעים ונבוכים

מכך שהחלטה מתעכבת זמן כה רב.

2. ברתולומיאו בתגובה העיר כי יש לנו סיבות טובות להיות נבוכים.

3. לגופו של ענין סיפר (OFF THE RECORD) על פגישה שזימן בשבוע שעבר בה השתתפו נציגי המשרדים המטפלים בנושא (רואן מהפנטגון, להמן, ראש ALDA וקלוסקי ממשרד המסחר), במטרה לנסות ולזרז קבלת ההחלטה.

4. לדבריו, הוא נמצא כיום במצב שבו יכול להביא הנושא להכרעת הקבינט. בשלב זה, לא ברור לו אם יפעל בכיוון זה. מכל מקום, אופציה זו קיימת.

5. ברתולומיאו הוסיף, כי במקביל לטיפולו באישור הבקשות מישראל, מעוניין להביא לרויזיה של תהליך קבלת החלטות לגבי ייצוא מחשבי-על. לדבריו, דחית תהליך זה אינו חייב בהכרח להשפיע על ההחלטה לגבי מכירת מחשבי-על לישראל. בהקשר לצורך בעדכון מדיניותם התייחס לדילמה בפניה ניצבים שעה שמחד גיסא מודאגים מהפרופיליזציה אך מאידך גיסא מודעים לכך שההתקדמות הטכנולוגית הפכה את מדיניותם לבלתי אמינה. בכוונתו להתאים מדיניותם לנסיבות המשתנות.

6. לשאלת השגריר לגבי מועד קבלת ההחלטה, ציין כי מאחר ונכווה בעבר, אינו מוכן להתחייב לגבי מה (יוחלט) ומתי יוחלט. העיר כי עד וכמה שהדבר תלוי בו, ינסה להגיע להחלטה לפני עזיבתו של השגריר.

שטין

אא

תפוצה: שהח, טשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, פרנ, סייבל

סטסט