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# מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

משרד

מס' תיק

חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה  
 תת חטיבה: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה  
 שם תיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית.  
 סימול מקורי: 1 תקופת החומר: 9/1990-9/1990  
 מזהה פיזי: 5023 / 8 - א מזהה פיזי: 14/11/2012

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק  
**5023 / 8 - א**  
 מזהה פיזי: 2169256 מס פריט: 43.4/13 - 795  
 מזהה לוגי: 14/11/2012 כתובת: 02-111-02-05-05

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה

אאא, חוזה: 13195

אל: רהמש/782

מ-: ווש, נר: 2136, תא: 140990, זח: 1200, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מיידי

אל : מצפא, ממד, מזאר 1

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

משבר המפרץ והשלכותיו

להלן סיכום שיחה עם קרצר בנושאי דיומא.

1. שת'פ' אמריקאי-סובייטי במזהת:

א) הדרך שבה טיפל הנשיא בסוגיית שתה'פ' עם בריה'מ' ובעיקר הרמזים להידוק שתה'פ' (בהנחה ויהיו שבעי רצון מעמדותיה עד לסיום המשבר) אופיינית לתהליך קבלת ההחלטות בממשל הנוכחי. לדבריו הנשיא קפץ קדימה בתהליך החשיבה והשאיר מאחוריו את הבירוקרטיה. בכך קבע הנשיא עובדה.

ב) בדיון שקיים בוש עם גורבצ'וב העלה שורת שאלות הקשורות למעורבות סובייטית אפשרית בעתיד. לדבריו, הנשיא לא הלך מעבר לכך.

ג) חזר על כך שהנשיא מתנגד עקרונית ללינקאז' בין שני המשברים קרי, לנסיון לפתרון בו זמני של שני המשברים. להערכתו, מהלך הנשיא (בנושא לינקאז') על חבל דק, שעה שמחד גיסא, אינו יכול להעלות את נושא הסכסוך והסוגיה הפלסטינית, שכן כך יראה כמי שנענה לדרישת צדאם לפתרון שני המשברים. מאידך גיסא, התעלמות מוחלטת מהצורך לקדם תהליך השלום עלולה ליצור רושם מוטעה לגבי החשיבות אותה מייחס הממשל לקידום התהליך.

ד) להערכתו, עתיד שתה'פ' האמריקאי-סובייטי מותנה בהתנהגות בריה'מ' במשבר המפרץ. ארהב (ר'ל הנשיא - ש.ש.) אינה שוללת שת'פ' רחב יותר מבעבר (הערה: הנשיא, בשונה מהבירוקרטיה, אינו מגלה כיום אותה מידה של חשדנות שהיתה אופיינית לתקופת המלחמה הקרה. הוא רואה ביחסים עם בריה'מ' אבן פינה ביצירת הסדר הבינלאומי החדש). במידה והתנהגות בריה'מ' (הערה: לשביעות רצון ארה'ב) יש להניח שהיא תרצה להמשיך בדפוס שתה'פ' שהחל במפרץ. (ר'ל האינטראקציה הבינמצמתית במשבר תהווה אבן בוחן לעתיד - ש.ש.).

2. ישראל והמשבר במפרץ:

א) מטרתה העיקרית של ארהב היא : 'TO KEEP YOU OUT' להשגת מטרה זו לא יעשו דבר שעלול לסכן/לחבל ביעד שאותו הציבו לעצמם.

ב) התעסקות בתהליך השלום עלולה לפתוח פתח לאי הבנות וכתוצאה מכך לפגוע במטרה לעיל. יחד עם זאת, אינו מוציא מכלל אפשרות התייחסויות פומביות (תשובות לשאלות) לצורך בקידום התהליך וכו'.

ג) המצב של העדר פעילות בנושא התהליך עלול להשתנות כתוצאה מ-:

1) התארכות המשבר שעלולה להוביל ללחץ מצרי-סעודי על ארהב לפעול לקידום תהליך השלום.

2) שינוי בעמדת אשף. במידה ואשף' ישנה עמדתו במשבר המפרץ, תפתח אפשרות להחייאת התהליך.

(3) ביקור בייקר בסוריה:

(א) דרגי העבודה לא התלהבו מהחלטת הנשיא לשגר את בייקר לסוריה.

(ב) מקווים שהמזכיר 'לא יסחפ' בשיחותיו עם אסאד. המסר שהעבירו לבייקר הוא לנהוג בזהירות.

(ג) מלבד נושא המפרץ, מניח שהמזכיר יעלה את נושא הטרור, השתלבות סוריה בתהליך השלום. בהקשר זה יעלה הצעות לבניית אמצעים מעודדי אמון (CBM) בין סוריה לישראל (הערה: פגישתי עמו התקיימה לאחר שסיים פגישה עם שגריר סוריה. סיפר כי בשיחה עם השגריר הציע כי במסגרת בניית CBM מול ישראל תתמוך סוריה בביטול ההחלטה בנושא ציונות-גזענות ותמנע מהצבעה נגד כתב האמנתנו באום. השגריר לא הגיב).

(ד) מעריך, כי לפני שיחליטו על המשך הדיאלוג, ימתינו לתוצאות שיחת המזכיר עם שהח סוריה בעצרת ואולי לסיבוב נוסף. (הערה: ברור, שעמדת סוריה במשבר המפרץ מעניקה לארהב הזדמנות לחוזר ולנסות TO ENGAGE אותה בדיאלוג בנושאי טרור, לכיוון תהליך השלום).

שטין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, גוברין, מזאר

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 13160

אל: רהמש/778

מ-: ווש, נר: 2130, תא: 140990, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מיידי

אל: מצפא

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

הנדון: ארה'ב- ישראל: ערבויות לדיור ושמיטת חובות

שיחה עם דן קרצר (12.9)

1. ערבויות לדיור:

א. בהמשך לשיחות עם שה'ח הינחו את שגרירם בישראל (ביום רביעי) לבקש נתונים /הבהרות בנושאי תמריצים, סובסידיות ו- FUNGIBILITY.

ב. מתקשה להעריך מה תהיה החלטת הנשיא והמזכיר במידה וההבהרות שימסרו לא יניחו את דעתם.

ג. יכל לתאר לעצמו סצנריו ולפיו, כדי לפתור הנושא ברוח חיובית ינסו להגיע עמנו להבנה לפיה הערבויות ינתנו בתנאי שנחייב בתוך פרק זמן מסוים (שנה) להכניס שינוי בנושאים לעיל. כאמור הכל תלוי בתשובתנו וברצונו הטוב של הנשיא.

2. שמיטת חובות:

א. חזר על כך שמצרים הינה מקרה ייחודי. להערכתם יש לממשל את מספר הקולות הדרושים בקונגרס כדי להעביר הנושא ללא הצמדת ישראל.

ב. באופן לא פורמלי (ומתוך רצון לסייע) העיר כי דרך טיפולנו (הפומבית בנושא) אינה קונסטרוקטיבית.

ג. הטיעון של 'אם מצרים מקבלת גם לנו מגיע בגלל ק. דיוויד' לא תופס. אחרי הכל ישראל (בעקבות ק.דיוויד) קיבלה יותר ממצרים. זאת ועוד מצבה הכלכלי של מצרים אינו דומה למצבנו ('וטוב שאינו דומה').

ד. אם בכל זאת יש בכונתנו לקדם הנושא כדאי שנהיה יותר 'יצירתיים' בדרך הצגת הנושא. לדבריו יש להתרכז בהצגת בעיות לטווח הארוך ולבקש סיוע בארגונו מחדש של המשק הישראלי. לדבריו יש לנסות ולהציג היעדים/והדרכים. ר'ל הטיעון לגבי הצורך במתן יחס שווה כגון ק. דיוויד לא יסייע לנו בהשגת מטרותינו.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב', אוצר, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רס), אמן

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 13160

אל: רהמש/778

מ-: ווש, נר: 2130, תא: 140990, זח: 1800, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מיידי

אל: מצפא

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

הנדון: ארה'ב- ישראל: ערבויות לדיור ושמיטת חובות

שיחה עם דן קרצר (12.9)

1. ערבויות לדיור:

א. בהמשך לשיחות עם שה'ח הינחו את שגרירם בישראל (ביום רביעי) לבקש נתונים /הבהרות בנושאי תמריצים, סובסידיות ו- FUNGIBILITY.

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שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב', אוצר, ר/מרכז, ממד, @ (רס), אמן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 12156  
אל: רהמש/688  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 160, תא: 130990, זח: 1428, דח: ב, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
שמור/בהול

אל: מנהל מצפא  
מנכל אוצר  
מקשח/משהבט

דע: סמנכל צפא ופרנ

מאת: קישור לקונגרס

שמיטת חובות למצרים.

1. רצ'ב הצעת החקיקה של המימשל בנדון שהועברה אתמול (12.9) לידי ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות בביהנ'ב.

2. קיימות שתי אפשרויות לגבי החקיקה:

א. לכללה בחוק סיוע חוץ/הקצבות בסנאט (לשתא' 91).

ה-MARK UP צפוי להתחיל בשבוע הבא או אפילו אולי בשבוע האחרון של ספטמבר.

ב. ב-SUPPLEMENTAL מיוחד שיוקדש למבצע 'מגן המדבר' בלבד ואשר יתמקד אך ורק בעלויות המבצע עד כה (לשתא' 90) החקיקה צריכה להתקבל עד ה-1/10.

3. בהקשר זה נותרו למעשה סה'כ 10 ימי חקיקה.

4. באופן כללי צפוי שנושא זה יקודם במהירות.

5. תחושת אנשי אובי היא, שהמימשל יתנגד לתוספת ישראל לחקיקה זו. הוסיפו כי מבינים שקיימת התנגדות בקרב מחוקקים לעצם הרעיון. אם המימשל ידחוף את היוזמה, היא ככל הנראה תעבור, אולם יצטרכו לעמול קשה כדי לגייס את הקונגרסמנים אובי ומיקי אדוארדס לתמוך בה.

6. הבעייה העיקרית של ישראל כפי שרואים אותה, לאור טיעוני המימשל (OMB) היא, כי את החוב המצרי THEY ARE NOT GOING TO SCORE ואילו את החוב הישראלי הם חייבים TO SCORE.

יהודית ורנאי דרגנר

SEC CANCELLATION OF CERTAIN DEBT. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF LAW

(A) THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE SHALL (1) ISSUE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY SUFFICIENT NOTES OR OTHER OBLIGATIONS TO PURCHASE ALL NOTES MADE BY EGYPT EVIDENCING AMOUNTS OWED BY EGYPT TO THE UNITED STATES (OR ANY AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES), OTHER THAN AMOUNTS ALREADY OWED TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE, AS A RESULT OF LOANS MADE BEFORE OCTOBER

1, 1990, BY THE UNITED STATES (OR ANY AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES) TO EGYPT UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT (ALL SUCH LOANS BEING HEREINAFTER COLLECTIVELY REFERRED TO AS THE AECA LOANS), AND (2) PURCHASE ALL SUCH NOTES MADE BY EGYPT, SUCH PURCHASE BEING CONSIDERED IN DISCHARGE OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE AS GUARANTOR OF SUCH NOTES.

(B) THE PRESIDENT SHALL THEREUPON CANCEL ALL AMOUNTS OWED BY EGYPT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AS RESULT OF ALL AECA LOANS AND

(C) THE PRESIDENT SHALL ALSO CANCEL ALL AMOUNTS OWED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNDER ALL NOTES OR OTHER OBLIGATIONS ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY THAT ARE RELATED TO ANY GUARANTEES OF ANY AECA LOANS, INCLUDING ALL NOTES OR OTHER OBLIGATIONS ISSUED UNDER SUBSECTION (A).

עד כאן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מצרים,  
כהן, סי יבל, אוצר, @ (מקשח/משהבט)

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 11571

אל: רהמש/660

מ-: המשרד, תא: 130990, זח: 1513, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

51847

סודי/מיד

אפד 102.03

אל: פרטוריה גוב-ארי

דע: וושינגטון

הגב' HILLARY MANN מהמחלקה המדינית של שגרירות ארה"ב כאן נפגשה עמי (11) על פי בקשתה. ביקשה לדעת אם חל שינוי במדיניות ישראל כלפי דרא'פ, הסתמכה על התבטאות נגד מנדלה לפני כמה ימים, ושאלה האם התבטאות זו משקפת את עמדת המשרד. השבתי שאין שינוי בעמדת משרד החוץ כפי שבוטאה ע"י סגן שה'ח בכנסת ביוני ש.ז.

אמרה כי מקובל על ארה"ב שדה קלארק מנהל מדיניות שונה מאשר קודמיו והקשתה האם בשל כך נשנה אנו את מדיניותנו כלפי דרא'פ. אמרתי שאנו עוקבים בקפידה אחר עמדות מדינות העולם החופשי בסוגיה זו ובמיוחד אחר שינויים אפשריים בעמדות חברות הקהילה האירופית. אם יחולו שינויים במדיניות הסנקציות שלהן, נשקול אף אנו שינוי במדיניותנו. עד אז אנו מקיימים את כל החלטות הקבינט ממרס וספטמבר 87. בתגובה העירה ששינוי בעמדת הקהילה האירופית לא ייספק את ארה"ב הרואה בבעיית האפרטהייד 'עניין רציונלי בעל קונסנסוס בי'ל', בדומה לנושא המפרץ הפרסי. משום כך הקלה בסנקציות נגד דרא'פ צריכה להתבסס על מכנה משותף רחב ומקיף, כמו למשל מסגרת האו"ם, על אף שידוע שמדיניות הארגון קיצונית כלפי דרא'פ יותר מאשר מדיניות הקהילה. ביקשה לדעת האם בכל זאת, עקב מדיניות דה קלארק יש שינויים כלשהם במדיניותנו. השבתי שהשינוי היחיד עליו אני יכול לחשוב הוא באוירה, והזכרתי את הזמנת דה קלארק לביקור כאן שנעשתה לאחר שביקר בתשע מדינות אירופה והוזמן גם לארה"ב. לפני שנה אף אחד לא היה מעלה בדעתו להזמין רשמית לבקר בארץ. שאלה אם צפויים ביקורים רשמיים נוספים והשבתי בשלילה. ביקשה לדעת אם הזמנו מנדלה או מנהיגים שחורים אחרים, ועניתי שאנו שוקלים להזמין ונעשה כן בעתוי המתאים, תוך הבהרה שהעניין אינו פשוט עקב דבריו על המצאותנו ביו"ש ועזה, התחבקותו עם ערפאת והזכות שלימד עליו על קדאפי ועל קאסטרו. ביקשה תגובתי למידע שקיבלה שגרירותם לפיו הוזמן מנדלה לבקר בישראל ע"י השר אהוד אולמרט בעת שנפגשו בכנס אוסלו לפני כשבועיים. השבתי שלא ידוע לי על הזמנה כזו.

אמרה שעמדת ארה"ב לגבי יחסי ישראל-דרא'פ ידועה לנו והיא הועלתה מספר פעמים בשיחות שקוימו בדרגים גבוהים בין ארה"ב וישראל. שאלה כיצד הייתי מגדיר את יחסה של ישראל לעמדה האמריקאית שבאה לידי ביטוי בשיחות הללו. השבתי שאנו מתייחסים ברצינות לעמדת ארה"ב. בהקשר זה התייחסה לכתבה שפורסמה ב'דבר' לפני כמה ימים, (הועברה אליכם בנפרד), על פיה העלה מזכיר המדינה את נושא יחסי ישראל-דרא'פ בעת פגישתו האחרונה עם שה'ח, ושאלה האם התקיים דיון במשרד בעקבות העלאת הנושא. עניתי שלא התקיים דיון מפני ששה'ח טרם שב מארה"ב. בהתייחסה להחלטות הקבינט המוכרות לה אמרה שלא קיים כל מנגנון קונסטיטוציוני שתכליתו לפקח על ביצוע ההחלטות ויישומן וציינה לדוגמא את הכנסת, או וועדה כלשהי מטעמה, אשר מעת קבלת ההחלטות ועד היום לא קיימה כל דיון לגביהן ולא בדקה כלל אם הן מתבצעות כהלכה. השבתי שההחלטות מתייחסות למיגזר הממשלתי ואנו מקבלים פניות רבות ממשרדי ממשלה שונים כאשר עולים על הפרק נושאים כמו הבאת להקה מדרא'פ, שיגור ספורטאים, ענין כלכלי כלשהו וכדומה. משרדי הממשלה אינם פועלים על דעת עצמם בסוגיה

זו אלא נועצים בנו ומבצעים הנחיותינו וכך נשמרות ומיושמות ההחלטות.

שאלה על החלטת הקבינט בעניין אי חתימה על חוזים בטחוניים חדשים וביקשה לדעת מה פירושה המעשי. על פי הניסוח שלה - האם היקף העיסקות הנוכחי עם דרא'פ מספק את צרכיה הצבאיים של ישראל עתה, והאם הידוק קשרי ישראל עם מדינות אחרות (ציינה את ארגנטינה כדוגמא), יגרום לכך שהזדקקותנו לדרא'פ במישור זה תקטן. השבתי שאיני עוסק כלל במימד הבטחוני של היחסים ואין לי כל מידע המאפשר להשיב על שאלותיה.

במענה לשאלתי על הערכתה לגבי ביקור נשיא דרא'פ בארה'ב בסוף חודש זה השיבה כי לא תהיה פריצת דרך ביחסים בין שתי המדינות ומטרת ההזמנה האמריקאית היא עידוד דה קלארק בדרכו החדשה ותו לא. להערכתה הוא לא יבקש מארה'ב להקל בסנקציות נגד מדינתו, אך אם יעלה בקשה כזו, היא תידחה מפני שלדעת ארה'ב אי די באמצעים שנקט כדי להביא לביטול מערכת האפרטהייד.

מנהל מא'פ 2

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, הדס, מאפ2, בנצור, מצפא

סססס

KESHER-WASHINGTON

1990-09-13 19:03

שגרירות ישראל בוושינגטון  
מועט סנדק

בלטס/בחול לבוקר

דף 1 מתוך 1

תאריך: 13.9.90

זמן חיבור: 17:00

אל : מנחל מצא"א

דעו : מנחל לשכת מנכ"ל

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון

מוסטרונסטי

ראו-נא מנושא בפי שעלה בשאלה בתדרוך דובר המסגורן חיום.

Q The second question is -- a judge issued an order last night in New York, barring a publishing company from distributing a book about the Mossad. Newspapers have reported that the book says the Mossad knew in advance about the terrorist bombing that killed 240 Marines in Beirut several years ago. Has the -- did Israel provide any specific information to the Pentagon or to the US prior to the explosion, and does the Pentagon feel they are well-assisted or well-advised by Israel?

MR. HALL: I just don't have anything for you on that. I'd assume that would be -- if that was the case, it would be one of those things in the intelligence areas but I just don't have anything specific. I'm not even familiar with the court case you're talking about.

להת ירון

להת צ'סלטה רה"ל מנ"ל אמנ"ל מנ"ל  
סיק מנ"ל ר"מ קיב"ב מנ"ל ומסכ"ה

END



אאאא, חוזם: 12038

אל: רהמש/685

מ-: המשד, תא: 130990, זח: 1946, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

בהול סודי ביותר

אל וושינגטון השגריר, עמרני

אתיופיה

להלן T.P. שנמסר ליועץ המדיני לשה"ח (עם העתק למנכל) על ידי הממונה בשגרירות ארה"ב.

# ERITREAN FORCES

WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ERITREAN INSURGENTS ARE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS OR THAT FUNDAMENTALISM INFLUENCES THE VARIOUS ERITREAN MOVEMENTS. THE ERITREAN BATTLE FOR INDEPENDENCE IS BASED ON ETHNIC AND HISTORICAL FACTORS THAT HAVE LITTLE TO DO WITH ISLAM.

THERE ARE AS MANY CHRISTIANS AS MUSLIMS IN ERITREAN AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE EPLF - THE PRINCIPLE INSURGENT MOVEMENT - IS LARGELY CHRISTIAN.

ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION, ARAB AID TO THE EPLF, INCLUDING AID FROM IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA, IS NOT EXTENSIVE, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME MODEST INCREASES IN RECENT MONTHS IN RESPONSE TO THE RESTORATION OF ETHIOPIAN-ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. IN ANY CASE IF AID FROM ARAB COUNTRIES WERE TO CEASE, ERITREAN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE SHUT DOWN. THE SUPPORT THAT REALLY MATTERS TO THE ERITREAN FORCES COMES FROM THE ERITREAN DIASPORA AND FROM CAPTURING SOVIET WEAPONS FROM THE ETHIOPIAN ARMED FORCES. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE EPLF COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD PROVIDE ERITREA A GREAT DEGREE OF AUTONOMY WITHIN SOME FORM OF FEDERAL SYSTEM. HOWEVER, IF ERITREA DOES BECOME INDEPENDENT, WE WOULD NOT EXPECT IT TO BECOME AN ISLAMIC STATE, GIVEN THE ECUMENICAL NATURE OF INSURGENT LEADERSHIP. THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT IS DISSEMINATING A STATEMENT IT CLAIMS IS FROM THE EPLF WHICH SUPPORTS SADDAM HUSSEIN AND CONTAINS ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC. THE EPLF HAS DISOWNED THE STATEMENT. IN FACT, THE STATEMENT DOESN'T SOUND LIKE THE USUAL EPLF STATEMENTS. WE BELIEVE IT TO BE A FORGERY.

## U.S. REQUEST TO USE ETHIOPIAN PORTS

OUR REQUEST TO USE ETHIOPIA'S PORTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INSPECTION AND/OR REPAIR OF VESSELS STOPPED AND SUSPECTED OF TRYING TO EVADE

THE TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ WAS PART OF A  
BLANKET REQUEST MADE TO MANY COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.  
WE HAVE NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO USE ETHIOPIAN PORTS.

מצפא

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, הדס, בנצור, @ (רס)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11003  
אל: רהמש/646  
מ-: ווש, נר: 2119, תא: 120990, זח: 2200, דח: ב, סג: סב,  
בבב  
סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר-חרב.

אל : סמנכל צפא ופרן

דע : לשכת שהח ולשכת רה'מ'

מאת: השגרירות וושינגטון

מפסגת הלסינקי - שיחת השגריר האס (NSC) 12/9.

1. השיחה הוקדשה לקבלת דיווח על תוכן שיחות בוש-גורבצ'וב בנושא המשבר במפרץ.

2. להלן סיכום השיחה, בה השתתפו וולטש (עוזרו של האס) והח'מ'.

א. האס פתח בהביעו את שביעות רצונו של הנשיא מתוכן ההודעה המשותפת וממהלך מסיבת העיתונאים ('התוצאות עלו על המצופה').

ב. הופתעו מהסכמת גורבצ'וב לשגר ON RECORD מסר ברור וחד משמעי לעיראק על כך שמעשיה אינם מקובלים על בריהם. כמו כן שבעי רצון מההבנה שהושגה בנושא אספקת מזון. 'נצטרך בעתיד לעקב בקפדנות אחר יישום ההחלטות בנושא'.

ג. הנשיא היה שבע רצון מהשיחה שהתקיימה לגבי עתיד שתה'פ' במשבר. גם בכך יש כדי לשגר מסר ברור לצאדס.

ד. בהתייחסו לסדה'י של המפגש (תאר המפגש כהתייעצויות נוסח מלטה). ציין כי כ-60 אחוז מהשיחה יוחד למשבר במפרץ יתרת הזמן כ-30 אחוז הוקדש לכלכלת בריהם. הזמן הנותר, הוקדש לדיון קצר בנושאים רגיונליים, פיקוח על החימוש וז'א.

ה. בהקשר לדיון בנושא המפרץ העיר כי ההודעה המשותפת מפגינה הסכמה רחבה יותר מזו שהושגה בשיחה בפועל.

ו. בריהם' הביעה דאגה לגבי האפשרות לשימוש בכח כמו גם לנוכח האפשרות של נוכחות אמריקאית קבועה במפרץ. הנשיא ניסה להבהיר שלארהב אין כוונה לקיים נוכחות קבועה בסעודיה. כמו כן הבהיר כי הצלחת המדיניות תלויה ביישום הסנקציות. הדגיש בהקשר זה כי על בריהם מוטלת אחריות לסייע בנושא לעיל.

ז. ארהב הבהירה כי אינה מאושרת מהמשך נוכחות היועצים בעיראק. מתרשמים כי בריהם לא תפנה אותם מיידי. הסובייטים הבהירו כי כיום מצויים כ-130 יועצים אשר יפנו לכשחוזייהם יסתיימו. האס ציין בהקשר זה כי ארהב החליטה לא להפוך הנושא ל-'BIG ISSUE' מתוך הערכה שהרבה לא ניתן לעשות.

ח. במהלך הדיון הבהיר הצד הסובייטי הבנתו לגבי הסכנה שאותה מציב צאדס. יחד עם זאת הביעו משאלה למציאת נוסחה שתאפשר לצאדס לצאת מהמבוכ אליו נקלע ר'ל נוסחה שתאפשר לו שלא לאבד את פרצופו. לדברי האס בדיון בנושא זה לא ירדו לפרטים. הסובייטים העלו האפשרות למציאת נוסחה דיפלומטית שתקל על עיראק לסגת מכווית. העלו האפשרות של נסיגה עיראקית במקביל להוצאת כוחות ארהב.

האץ הוסיף כי ניכר מאמץ סובייטי למציאת דרכים שתאפשרנה לצאדס דרך החוצה.



הדגיש כי לשני הצדדים ברור שאין כוונה למציאת נוסחה שפירושה התפשרות על היעדים שהנשיא הציב בעקבות פלישת עיראק. ארהב ציין האס סקפטית לגבי סיכויי המאמץ הסובייטי.

ט. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר העריך האס כי נוכחות אמריקאית קבועה ומשמעותית מעסיקה את בריהמ'. ציין קיומם של חילוקי דעות בצד הסובייטי בנושא לעיל בין אנשי אסכולת החשיבה החדשה והישנה.

י. שני הצדדים שוחחו על חשיבות שתהפ' במשבר וההשלכות שיהיו לכך על היחסים הבינלאומיים ויכולתה של ארהב לשתף פעולה בעתיד.

יא. האס סיפר כי בכוונת הנשיא לשגר בעתיד הקרוב מכתב לרהם שבו ידווח לו על תוצאות הפסגה.

יב. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר (בהמשך לכתבו של רוזנטל ב-11/9 בניו יורק טיימס) האס התקיים דיון בנושא הלינקאז' (בין ועידה בינ'ל בנושא המפרץ והסכסוך) ובאיזו מידה הושגו הכנות לגבי מעורבות סובייטית והתפקיד שימלאו בעתיד, ציין האס שבשיחה לא התייחסו הסובייטים להצעות אותן העלה שווארדנזה בנאומו בוולדיוסטוק. יחד עם זאת בדיון שהתקיים הבהיר הצד האמריקאי התנגדותו לעריכת ועידה בינ'ל שתדון במפרץ ובסכסוך. ארהב ערכה הבחנה בין קיום ועידה בינ'ל בנושא המפרץ לוועידה בינ'ל במזה'ת רעיון הדגיש האס כי תומכת ארהב עקרונית בעיתוי ובמבנה המתאימים. חזר על כך שארהב הבהירה שכריכת שני הנושאים אינה מקובלת. אך כאמור ארהב לא דחתה רעיון קיום ועידה לדיון בנושא הסכסוך. ' זו היתה ונשארה מדיניותנו'.

יג. בהקשר לשתה'פ' הבינמעצמתי הצביע האס על מגמה הנמשכת מזה זמן מה של שת'פ במשברים איזוריים דוגמת אפגניסטן קמבודיה אנגולה. הוסיף כי 'אין כל סיבה שהמזה'ת ישאר מחוסן משת'פ'.

יד. מטרת ארהב אינה למנוע מעורבות (סובייטית) אלא להבטיח שזו תהיה חיובית. יבחנו התנהגות בריהמ' במשבר המפרץ שתבהיר באזו מידה היא מוכנה למלא תפקיד קונסטרוקטיבי במוקדי 'משבר נוספים'. ארהב פתוחה בנושא שילוב בריהמ'.

'לארהב אין כעת תכנית מפורטת (BLUE PRINT) יש להמתין ולראות כיצד המשבר במפרץ יסתיים'. לכשיסתיים (המשבר) יפיקו לקחים. האס חזר על כך שאין בכוונתם לדחוק/להוציא את בריהם מהמזה'ת. פתרון משבר המפרץ יצור הזדמנויות חדשות שיאפשרו חשיבה לגבי מתן תפקיד שונה לבריהם. כל מה שרצו (בדיון שקיימו בפסגה ובתגובות בעקבותיה) זה לשגר סגנל על כך שלבריהמ' יש 'POTENTIAL ROLE'.

יד. האס סיכם הנושא כדלהלן:

1. לא הושגה הסכמה עם הסובייטים (לגבי שילובם בנושא הסכסוך).
2. קיימת הבנה טובה יותר (בעקבות הפסגה).
3. ארהב שיגרה לבריהמ' סיגנל של שביעות רצון מהתנהגותה במשבר והבעת תקווה ששת'פ ימשך ויתרחב.
4. בסיום המשבר (ובהנחה שארהב תהיה שבעת רצון מהתנהגות בריהמ) יוצר פוטנציאל לשיתוף/שילוב בריהמ'.
5. ארהב תהיה פתוחה למתן תפקיד לבריהמ'.

טו. לשאלת השגריר האס לאור ההתניות / הסתייגויות (CAVEATS) הרבות שהעלו לגבי שילוב הסובייטים הנושא עדיין קוסם לסובייטים השיב האס בחיוב. לדבריו בריהמ' לא הבהירה בשיחה את עמדתה בנושא לעיל.

טז. בתשובה לשאלת השגריר (האס הסובייטים העלו במפגש הצעות קונקרטיות נוסח אלו שהעלה שווארדנזה בנושא הלינקאז' ציין האס כי הבהירו התנגדותם

לרעיון. הבהירו כי יש למקד את תשומת הלב לפתרון משבר המפרץ. לאחר פתרונו המוצלח יוכלו לשקול מה ניתן לעשות לגבי משברים אחרים.

יז. לשאלת האם האם אנו מודאגים (מהמגמה המסתמנת ש.ש.) השיב השגריר כי הדברים ששמע מזכירים את אוקטובר 1977.

יח. האם התייחס לקואליציה של סעודיה סוריה ומצרים. יש להמתין ולראות האם הקואליציה תמשך לכשהמשבר יסתיים. אם כן יצטרכו להמתין ולראות איזה מדיניות ינקטו. להערכתו המשך קואליציה זו עשויה לפתוח אופציות רבות.

יט. השגריר הוסיף כי הכוונה לאמץ גישה משותפת עם בריהמ' שעלולה להביא לשינוי בעמדת ארהב אינה עולה בקנה אחד עם דברי המזכיר לשהח. תגובת האס היתה 'לא בהכרח'. אינו מוציא מכלל אפשרות יצירת מסגרת שתאפשר שיחות בינינו לפלסטינים. במידה ובריהמ' תהיה מוכנה לסייע על ארהב יהיה לגלות גמישות לגבי השאלה כיצד לבנות המסגרת ואיזה אופי תישא המעורבות הסובייטית. האס הוסיף 'בסופו של דבר בריהמ' תצטרך להיות מעורבת שכן היא מהווה מרכיב חיוני.

עד כאן באשר לפסגה ושילובה האפשרי של בריהמ' בפתרון הסכסוך.

שטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם), אמן, בנצור, גוברין, סולטן

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 10994

אל: רהמש/644

מ-: ווש, נר: 2118, תא: 120990, זח: 2200, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר ח.ר.ב

אל: סמנכ'ל צפא ופרן

דע: לשכת שהח ול' רהם, ל' שהב'ט

מאת: שגרירות וושינגטון

הנדון: סיוע מיוחד לישראל בעקבות משבר המפרץ

1. בשיחתו עם האס (ראה דיווח בנפרד) ניסה השגריר לברר האם התקבלו החלטות לגבי הבקשות אותם העלו מנכל משהבט ושהח בביקוריהם.

2. האס השיב כי טרם קיבלו החלטה. ציין את נסיעותיהם של חלק מהנפשות (מזכירי החוץ וההגנה) והעיסוק במשבר כאחת הסיבות לעיכוב. לא רצה להתחייב לגבי המועד (שבו תתקבל ההחלטה) והפרטים שיסוכמו. הביע תקווה שדיון בנושא יתקיים, ביום שני (עם שובם לווינגטון של בייקר וצ'ייני).

3. האס העיר כי מגלה אהדה והבנה לחלק מדרישותינו.

4. השגריר חזר והבהיר הדחיפות שבקבלת החלטה חיובית נוכח האילוצים שבהם פועלת הממשלה.

שטיין

רש

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהם), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור

סססס



אאא, חוזה: 10991

אל: רהמש/643

מ-: ווש, נר: 2117, תא: 120990, זח: 2100, דח: ב, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/בהול לבוקר

אל: מנהל מצפא

דע: לשכת מנכל, יועץ תקשורת רה'מ הנדון: פרשת אוסטרובסקי

1. ביומיים האחרונים קבלנו פניות רבות בבקשה לפרטים ולתגובות על פרשת 'הספר'.

2. ממקורות עתונאים נודע לנו כי בידי מספר מערכות עתונים (NEWSDAY, NYT, WP) וסוכנויות ידיעות (AP) עותקים מלאים מהספר ש'הוברחו' לכאן מקנדה וכי בכוונתם לפרסם פרקים שלמים מתוכו-: ניוזדיי ייפרסם כנראה, מחר ושני העתונים האחרים - נכון לכתובת שורות אלה-עדיין מתייעצים עם משפטנים בטרם יחליטו אם ומתי לפרסם. בידי עתונים אחרים (LAT, BG) יש כנראה פרקים מתוך הספר, אך לא נוסח מלא.

3. עוד מעתונאים כי בניוירק נמכרו במספר חנויות עותקים 'לא חוקיים' (בנגוד לצו ביהמ'ש) של הספר.

4. במהלך היום נודע לנו ממספר עתונאים כי בידיהם עותק מצו ביהמ'ש הבוקר בניו יורק האוסר זמנית הדפסת והפצת הספר (העתק בנפרד).

תשומת ליבך כי עפ'י הצו שלח אוסטרובסקי למעלה מ-17 000 עותקים למול'ים, חנויות, מועדוני ספרים.

5. בעקבות הוצאת צו ביהמ'ש הבוקר גבר זרם הפניות. ענינו בהתאם עפ'י הנחיותיכם וכמתואם עם הגורמים המתאימים כאן.

6. משמתברר עתה, ברמת סבירות גבוהה, כי פרקים מתוך הספר עתידים להתפרסם מחר ולנוכח הנזק הצפוי שבפרסום- מבקשת לקבל הנחיותיכם לתגובה לפניות הרבות מאוד שבודאי תגענה מחר.

אנא בבהול לבוקר.

רות ירון

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל,  
משפט, רביב, @ (רם)

סססס

12.9.90 / 26 - 27 - 28

40

# U.S. HAILS SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR U.N. IRAQ SANCTIONS

(U.S. looks forward to continued cooperation)

By Dian McDonald

USIA White House Correspondent

Washington -- A White House official September 12 praised Syrian support for U.N. sanctions against Iraq following the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

At a briefing for international journalists at the Foreign Press Center in Washington, Roman Popadiuk, White House Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said the United States appreciates Syria's efforts and looks forward to "continued cooperation in this regard."

Popadiuk was questioned about the objective of Secretary of State Baker's upcoming talks with Syrian leaders in Damascus in the context of the overall U.S.-Syrian relationship and the fact that Syria is still on the State Department's list of countries supporting terrorism.

In the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Arab world, as well as the international community, has become united in opposing Iraqi aggression, Popadiuk replied. "Syria has been very responsible in this respect in terms of supporting the (U.N.) sanctions," he added. President Bush has had at least two telephone conversations with Syrian President Assad, Popadiuk said, also citing a number of bilateral diplomatic communications.

"In view of the consultations that we've been having with a lot of these states that are in the border region around Iraq, that are in the forefront of the sanctions, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia," Popadiuk said, "it's only fitting that...we would have similar conversations and consultations with Syria....Syria has proven itself to be very responsible in this. We appreciate their efforts. And we look forward to continued cooperation in this regard."

"Now as with any country," he added, "there are sometimes shared responsibilities and shared objectives in one area, while there are differences of opinion in another." Noting that Syria remains on the terrorism list, Popadiuk said "its behavior in other aspects is something that gives us concern and is something that we will continue to discuss with the Syrian government. But the fact that we have differences in one area does not preclude us from cooperating in areas where we do have shared responsibilities and shared objectives."

Asked if he expected a payoff for Syria, such as removing that country from the list of supporters of terrorism, or any change in the status of U.S.-Syrian diplomatic relations, Popadiuk replied: "There is no linkage in our policy concerning the

prices.

Over the past 45 years, the countries of Eastern Europe have relied largely on subsidized energy imports from the Soviet Union and thus have been insulated from fluctuating international prices. But beginning next year, after Soviet subsidies are lifted, East European countries will have to use hard currency to pay for their oil imports. This means that both internal and external structural imbalances will be exacerbated and that environmental programs may be set back, as these countries are forced to continue using brown coal -- a major pollutant -- and to keep old and unsafe nuclear plants in operation.

Shakow said he remains optimistic that additional financial resources from reduced military spending around the world can be used to help East European and developing countries adjust to higher oil prices.

"There are still opportunities for an overall reduction in military spending," he said. "Events in the Gulf should not be an excuse for continued military sales to developing countries. The security of many of these countries is not affected by the Gulf situation."

NNNN



attempts to stem Iraqi aggression and any other behavior. There is a set of principles involved here. Iraq has invaded a sovereign country, has annexed that country against all standards of international behavior and international law. The Syrians share this concern. And we are working with them on this concern. But there is no linkage between our mutual cooperation in this effort and other aspects of our relationship."

Asked about Iraq's move to strengthen ties with Iran and the possibility that the blockade of Iraq may be broken in Iran, Popadiuk said, "We expect Iran to abide by those (U.N.) sanctions and by the public words that they uttered supporting those sanctions."

Reiterating U.S. policy on allowing food shipments into Iraq and Kuwait, Popadiuk said, "There is a complete embargo on Iraq...at this time there is no humanitarian need for the shipment of food to Iraq and...the proper mechanism for dealing with this issue is the U.N. Sanctions Committee, which has been meeting over the past few days to discuss the prospects of making a determination on whether or not humanitarian assistance, in terms of food, is necessary for Iraq. No decision or consensus has been arrived at in the sanctions committee. And we'll continue working with the committee...."

Popadiuk said "it is up to each country to decide what it can provide" when he was asked what kind of assistance -- financial or otherwise -- the United States wants from Japan in the effort to deter Iraqi aggression in the gulf.

"We're happy with all assistance that Japan has been providing," Popadiuk added. "And, of course, there are instances in which Japan probably can do more. But in terms of the internal Japanese political situation, that's something that they are going to have to work out internally. But, more importantly, Japan has constitutional limits on the type of assistance it can give militarily."

The Japanese have pledged financial resources and have sent personnel to the Middle East, Popadiuk said, citing medical technicians in particular. "So I think the Japanese government has been very forthcoming" and is cooperating with the United States, he said. "We are pleased with that cooperation and we expect that that cooperation will continue," Popadiuk added. "So, overall, we are quite pleased. But...each country probably can do a little bit more as time goes on. And we'll look forward to that kind of increased assistance."

Popadiuk was asked about a news report stating that, in the absence of a U.S.-Philippine military agreement in 1991, the Philippines will ask for the immediate withdrawal of American forces from Clarke Air Base and a gradual phase-out within

three years from Subic Naval Base.

Noting that there is a target of mid-September to try to resume the base negotiations, Popadiuk said it is difficult to comment on the issue before negotiations have started. However he added, "It's our policy that we will not stay where we are not wanted. We would only maintain our bases where it's the mutual satisfaction and protection of both parties."

NNNN

אאא, חוזה: 10659

אל: רהמש/610

מ-: יאונדה, נר: 54, תא: 120990, זח: 1700, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מידי

אל: ס/מנכל אמי'תק, מנהל הסברה, מצפ'א

דע: וושינגטון, ממד/איסוף

מאת: שגריר יאונדה

הנדון: שידור בקול אמריקה

תשומת ליבכם לשידור אמש (11 דנא) בן שלושים דקות בנושא 'יחסי ארה'ב עם העולם הערבי'. התכנית הצטיינה בתואר מעוות של מלחמות ישראל - ערב, והצגת התמיכה בישראל כגורם כמעט יחידי שמנעה יתר התקרבות של ארה'ב לערב. נאמר שהשקעות ערב בארה'ב, מכירת הנפט יצוא הנשק, הכשרת דור המנהיגות הערבית הצעירה בארה'ב היו צריכים להיות שקולים יותר במאזן מאשר התמיכה בישראל. בין הגורמים האחראים למצב זה העיתונות האמריקאית האוהדת לישראל שהשפיעה על דעת הקהל וההנהגה. רוב הדיעות הנ'ל מפי דוברים אמריקאים כולל ATHERTON .

קינן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, הדס,

מאפ1, רביב, מעת, הסברה, סולטן, ר/מרכז,

ממד, @ (רס), אמן

סססס



אאאא, חוזם: 13876  
אל: רהמש/807  
מ-: המשרד, תא: 160990, זח: 1721, דח: ר, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
שמור/רגיל

אל: השגריר, הציר - וושינגטון

דע: שר התקשורת, תומר (הועבר בנפרד)

הנדון: קול אמריקה  
לשל השגריר ביאונדה נר 54 מ-12.9

למקרא המברק שוחחתי (14.9) עם השגריר בראון. אמרתי כי אחד משגרירינו  
באפריקה הקשיב לשידור, ותיארתי את תוכן השידור על-פי המברק. אמרתי כי  
בשעה שאנו בממשלה עומדים מול מאבק משפטי בקשר לקיום הפרוייקט, שידורים  
כאלה רחוקים מלסייע. ביקשתי בדיקתו והערותיו. הבטיח.

רובינשטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, הדס,  
מאפ, סייבל, משפט, @ (מזכיר הממשלה)

סססס

*Communication department*

מחלקת הקשר

פקסומיליה  
Facsimile

Date: תאריך:

19/ 9/ 90

No. 1036 -780N  
:(71)

To: \_\_\_\_\_ 102/0/11 : JK

Att: 030, 07200 : 17/1

Sender: 106/107 : n/len

Number of pages including cover: 3: מספר העמודים כולל העטיון:

וושׁינגטון,

אל: השגריר, הציר

דע: שר התקשורת, "תומר" - י"פ ג' אצולה ומאסר, אין ציך זיין.

 $\therefore \rho_{\text{max}} = \frac{\mu}{\lambda} = \frac{0.75}{0.6} = 1.25$ 

"קול אמריקה" - תכנית שליכית על ישראל  
בהמשך לשלי ח-14.9

שגריר ארה"ב בראון המציא לי את נוסח התכנית שאליה התייחס השגריר  
ביאוגדח (מועבר בדיפ').

בעקבותי שלחתי לך את המכתב הלוט, המדבר בעדך.

240321

~~Our com. numbers:~~

**Tel: -56**

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**02-528842**

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English: 25224: '5815

Hebrew: 25241 : 1728

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**972-2-303 367**

Area code: 91950 : מיקוד:

THE GOVERNMENT SECRETARY

Jerusalem, Israel

מוכיר הממשלה  
ירושלים

2/3 1036

September 19, 1990.

Ambassador William A. Brown  
United States Embassy in Israel

Dear Bill,

I am taking the liberty to write to you in pursuance to our conversations in which I raised the issue of the Voice of America "Focus" program of September 11, 1990.

As you remember, I told that our attention was drawn to it by one of our Ambassadors in Africa, who listened to it and was appalled by what he described as its distorted contents, inter alia presenting U.S. support of Israel as the almost single factor preventing better U.S.-Arab relations.

Reading now through the program's transcript, I must admit that I agree with the Ambassador. A number of Americans are interviewed reflecting the view generally described above. Some of the commentators present the "sad" picture as the Arab view; but Mr. George Lenczowski, for example, states - as a "fact" - that "Israel, after all, was established as a state by essentially European Jewish immigrants who settled down in a land previously occupied for about 13 centuries by the Arabs. They established their own state and then fought a number of wars with the Arabs usually of a preventive character, that resulted ultimately in the occupation of such Arab territories as East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza strip."

Needless to say, this is a grossly distorted picture, which represents our being here as sheer colonialism. The program did not try to "balance" this unjust description by (a) true facts; (b) some commentators with a different view.

I could go on and on, but I do not have the time. Please convey to Washington my great disappointment, at a time in which we - the government - face a legal struggle in which we work to sustain the Arava Relay station plan. As you know, we - including myself personally






3/3 1036

- have invested great efforts in fulfilling the agreement with the United States government, acting out of belief that this is a part of our mutual relations and cooperation, which all of us have been working hard to develop. Such programs are far from helpful in this respect.

I look forward to any comments Washington may have.

Sincerely,

  
E. Rubinstein

אאאא, חוזם: 20823

אל: רהמש/1328

מ-: המשרד, תא: 251090, זח: 1528, דח: ר, סג: שמ,

בבב

9,240321

9,240321

שמור/רגיל

השגריר ווש

דע: שר התקשורת, 'תומר' (הועבר), מצפא

'קול אמריקה' תכנית שלילית על ישראל

בהמשך לשלנו מ-19.9.90

א. השגריר בראון קרא באוזני מזכר פנימי של VOA שנשלח ל-USIA, ובו התיחסות למכתבי מיום 14.9.90 אליו בו פירטתי תלונה (שהעביר תחילה שגרירנו ביאונדה) על תכנית ששודרה ב-'קול אמריקה'. במכתב נאמר כי ריכים הפניה, ובמיוחד נוכח היחסים הממושכים של VOA עם הח'מ בקשר לפרוייקט הערכה והסיוע לפרוייקט, וכן את הניתוח שבמכתבנו. לגופו של דבר, בבדיקה מדוקדקת אמנם יכלו נקודות מסויימות בתכנית שעליה קבלנו להיות 'טובות יותר', ואולם בעקרון הם אמונים על איזון בנושאים שנויים במחלוקת. מכל מקום אין תוכן התכניות מאומץ ע'י VOA.

ב. אגב, תשובת המדינה לעתירה בבג'ץ בקשר לתחנת הממסר בערבה השתתה בגלל לחץ עבודה גדול בפרקליטות, ואנו מקוים שתוגש בנובמבר.

רובינשטיין

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, בנצור, מצפא, סייבל, משפט, @ (שרהתקשורת), @ (מנכלתקשורת)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 11022

אל: רהמש/641

מ-: ווש, נר: 2121, תא: 120990, זח: 2300, דח: ב, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/בהול לבוקר

אל : שר האוצר, שר החוץ, שר הבטחון

דע : סמנכל צפא ופרן

מאת: נוייבך-ערן

סיוע כלכלי לישראל

החלטת הממשל בארהב למחוק לממשלת מצרים החוב הצבאי בסך 7.2 בליון דולר בגין סיוע בטחוני, יצרה הזדמנות למעין 'זכות' מקבילה לממשלת ישראל. ההחלטה על מחיקת החוב אשר תועבר בימים אלה לקונגרס לדיון ולהחלטה תנוסח בצורה המשאירה לנשיא חפש רב להחלטה.

סביר אם כן להניח שהן נוסח ההחלטה והן הנושא יזכה - וזוכה לביקורת רבה. כידוע גם בתוך ארהב ישנם גורמים רבים המצפים למן מחיקה כזו (סטודנטים, חברות חשמל, חקלאים ועוד) ולכן צפוי דיון קשה בנושא. יחד עם זאת משיחות עם נבחרים רבים התקבל הרשם כי לדעתם שיש הצדקה מסויימת לכרוך את ישראל במין מהלך כזה.

להערכתנו יש כיום מספר חלופות לבקשות סיוע מארהב. להלן החלופות:

1. שמיתת החוב לישראל בגין קבלת סיוע צבאי בעבר במלוות סך 3.2 בליון דולר.

2. תוספת סיוע בטחוני ישיר בסך 200-300 מליון דולר.

3. קבלת ערבויות נוספות לקליטת עליה בסדרי גודל משמעותיים סביב 1 מיליארד דולר.

4. קבלת כל הסיוע הצבאי בתחילת השנה, כאשר המשמעות הכלכלית כ-70 - 60 מ' דולר בשנה הכנסות מריבית.

פירוט החלופות:

1. שמיתת החוב לישראל תעלה לממשל כ-350 מ' דולר בשנה הראשונה ולאחר מכן, ישנה ירידה הדרגתית בהחזרי החוב. מאחר והממשל נחוש בדעתו לסייע למצרים, נראה שהדרישה ליחס זהה עשויה לזכות בתמיכת הקונגרס. יחד עם זאת, לשון החקיקה משאירה לנשיא שיקול דעת רב למי למחול ולמי לא.

ככל שהדברים נראים כרגע, והם נזילים ביותר, בשלב זה להצעה זו יש עדיפות גבוהה ביותר.

2. תוספת סיוע בטחוני ישיר:

האירועים במפרץ יצרו איום צבאי ישיר על ישראל בשונה ממדינות אחרות באזור. טיעון זה בתוספת נתונים כמותיים על עלות הכוננות ומשמעותה והשוואת הסיוע המבוקש על ידינו לכמויות נשק שהממשל מספק ועתיד לספק בעקבות המשבר, יכולים לסייע בעניין.

יחד עם זאת אוירת ועידת התקציב והרצון לצמצם את הגרעון בכל מחיר יוצרים מכשלה אמיתית לרעיון זה. בניגוד למחיקת החוב למצרים בלבד, שתראה ללא השפעה כביכול על התקציב כל תוספת סיוע משפיעה על הגרעון התקציבי.



3. קבלת ערבויות נוספות. הצגה נכונה של המשמעויות הכלכליות עם קליטת 100,000 עולים ראשונים, תוך הצגת מכלול המשמעויות הכלכליות, כולל הרקורד שלנו כמשלמי חובות, יכולים לסייע בכיוון הזה. הנושא טרם נבחן בשטח. מאחר ועדיין אין תקציב ערבויות מחייב אפשר לנסות ללכת בכיוון של עוד 1 מיליארד דולר ערבויות בסדר עדיפות שני ושלישי.

4. קבלת הסיוע בתחילת השנה:

הנושא נדון לאחרונה וזכה בדיר'כ' לתגובות חיוביות השאלה היא האם המאמץ שצריך להשקיע שווה תוספת סיוע שבין 60-70 מיליון דולר בגין ההכנסה מריבית. גם משום לחץ הזמן (שכן כבר בשבוע הבא עלול העניין להיות מוכרע) וגם משום הסכנה שהממשל עלול להסכים לפרטים בודדים ברשימת רכש כזו או אחרת (ואפילו אם נוסף לכך את הקדמת תשלום הסיוע הבטחוני) שלא יגיעו בהקפם לסכומים גדולים, נראה לנו שעדיף לפעול לקבלת חלופות 1 ו-2. לדעתנו חייב שר הבטחון להציג את האיומים והצרכים המיידיים ולטווח ארוך ושר האוצר את העלויות המיידיות של המצב הנוכחי (כוננות, היערכות צבאית, ועלויות הדלק) ולדרוש בשל כך חלופות 1 או 2. הדברים נאמרים על אף האמור במברק המדווח על שיחת סנטור ליהי עם אנשי אייפ'ק.

נויבך-ערן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), מנכל, ממנכל, @ (שהבט), בנצור, מצפא, כהן, אוצר, ר/מרכז, ממד/בינל

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# GULFWATCH

*Analysis of the Gulf Crisis from the scholars and associates of* THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

September 12, 1990

Number Seven

**From Competition to Cooperation: The Helsinki Communique in Perspective**

By Martin Indyk

Did President Bush reverse long-standing policy at Helsinki by inviting the USSR to play a role in Middle East peacemaking?

No. In fact, the summit outcome points to two other conclusions. First, the Bush administration has been willing from the outset to give the Soviet Union a role in Middle East peacemaking commensurate with its less threatening and more constructive regional behavior. Second, any enhanced role for Moscow is predicated on its acting in line with U.S. efforts. Thus, when Secretary of State Baker speaks of an eventual international conference on the Arab-Israel conflict, he means it in the American sense -- as an umbrella for direct negotiations or a rubber stamp to endorse agreements already reached -- not in the Soviet sense -- as a meeting to impose an agreement on Israel.

This policy on the long-standing Soviet demand for an international conference stems from Secretary of State Shultz's formula that the U.S. would agree to a "properly structured" conference "at the appropriate time." In the past 18 months, Baker adhered to this formula while doing everything possible to persuade the Soviet Union and European allies that now was not the appropriate time to convene a conference.

Instead, he argued successfully that they should support his efforts to turn the April 1988 Shamir Initiative into an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in Cairo. He was not averse to mentioning the international conference when he sought to pressure the Shamir government, which continues to oppose the idea. But as Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted yesterday, and a senior official travelling with Baker confirmed, "Secretary Baker is not very enthusiastic about it."

President Bush was more open to the idea itself, and no more reluctant than Baker to use it as a threat to gain leverage. Last June the White House openly discussed "going back to the drawing boards" if the new Shamir government did not accept the Baker Plan. But it quickly recognized that pursuing an international conference was only likely to bog the administration down in another two years of protracted negotiations about modalities rather than substance.

Working with the Soviet Union on Middle East issues, however, was a different matter. When Baker first met Shevardnadze in Moscow in 1989, he proposed joint efforts to resolve regional conflicts. Gorbachev's priorities at the time were bilateral relations and Europe, but a channel was established for Middle East peace process discussions at the Ross-Terasov level (Dennis Ross, the Department of State's Director of Policy Planning, is in charge of the peace process and Soviet regional talks; Genadi Terasov is the Kremlin's special Middle East envoy).

These regular discussions succeeded in persuading the Soviet Union to put support for the Baker Plan ahead of its demand for an international conference. Soviet pressure on the PLO switched from urging it to reject the Cairo talks to encouraging it to acquiesce in them. Moscow also altered its precondition for diplomatic relations with Israel from



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## GULF WATCH

acceptance of an international conference to mere agreement to enter negotiations. Gorbachev also told Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to settle with Israel and rejected his quest for "strategic parity." And Moscow opened its gates to a vast exodus of Soviet Jews to Israel.

Where the Soviet Union had previously sought to undermine and oppose American peace efforts, it now adopted a constructive, cooperative approach. In the broader context of the end of Cold War rivalry and Soviet empire's collapse, the decline in Moscow's willingness to make mischief was matched by a reduced ability to wield influence. Excluding the Soviet Union from the Middle East was no longer worth making a priority nor even an issue.

By February 1990, as Baker prepared for the Cairo talks, the State Department assumed that Moscow would renew diplomatic relations with Israel, clearing the way for its attendance as an observer. Publicly, this was underscored by a Baker-Shevardnadze joint communique that emphasized superpower support for the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.

The failure to get the Cairo talks under way did not end joint efforts. Just before Iraq invaded Kuwait, the superpowers began discussing an effort to promote Middle East arms control talks under Soviet-American auspices. This fit with a broader administration strategy to shift the focus of superpower discussions away from bilateral and European issues -- that were now being resolved -- to joint efforts to deal with regional conflicts.

In this context, the Helsinki communique's commitment to cooperative efforts to resolve all remaining Middle East conflicts was not a reversal but rather a re-affirmation of policy. Indeed, it was precisely those earlier cooperative efforts that made possible the joint superpower communique at the outset of the Gulf crisis that condemned Iraq's invasion. And this U.S.-Soviet accord, in turn, provided the basis for the President's entire multilateral effort.

What is notable about the Helsinki joint communique is precisely the opposite of what some analysts claim: it makes no reference to the Soviet demand for an international conference and specifically de-links a resolution of the Gulf crisis from a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bush appears to have succeeded, as Baker did before him, in bringing the Soviet Union around to supporting America's diplomatic priorities and process.

If Gorbachev adheres to this supportive role through the Gulf crisis, we should expect joint superpower efforts to resolve regional conflicts in its aftermath. But not through a Soviet-style international conference. Instead, the main priority is likely to be on joint arms control efforts, Gulf security arrangements, and Soviet support for a renewal of the American-led Arab-Israeli negotiating process.

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אל: מנהל מצפ' א

מאת: עודד ערן

ברה' מ - ארה' ב.

בארוע חברתי אצל השגריר, שאלתי קרצר לפרס הכתבה ב' ניו יורק טיימס'. על שינוי בעמדת ארה' ב כלפי תפקידה של ברה' מ במז'ת. קרצר אמר שהכתבה מנפחת את חלופי הדברים. הנושא עלה בהלסינקי ובוש אמר לעמיתו הסובייטי כי בעבר התנגדה ארה' ב הן לועידה בינלאומית והן לדריסת רגל בתהליך. התנגדותה לועידה בינלאומית בנוסח הידוע נשארה בעינה אך מתוך כך שבעמדות ברה' מ חלים שינויים (הדגש הוא על כך שהשינויים מתחוללים, אך עדיין לא הבשילו), מוכנה ארה' ב לעיין בנושא. הסובייטים קיבלו אמירה זו בסיפוק רב. קרצר הוסיף, שמסע בייקר לדמשק הונחת עליו על ידי הנשיא בניגוד לעמדת מחמ'ד הרוצה לראות שינויים בגישתה הידועה של סוריה בנושאים שונים כגון טרור, טרם תסכים למהלכים המצביעים על התקרבות.

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תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, גוברין, מזאר, סולטן

סססס



# SIGNING CEREMONY SET FOR GERMAN UNIFICATION DOCUMENTS

(Baker Shevardnadze hold talks in Moscow)

Russ Dybvik

USIA Diplomatic Correspondent

Moscow -- Secretary of State Baker and the foreign ministers of East and West Germany, France, Britain and the Soviet Union are scheduled to sign documents in Moscow September 12 which will culminate six months of negotiations and pave the way for the formal unification of Germany next month.

Baker told reporters that "good progress" had been made in negotiations to resolve the last few remaining issues and Soviet officials moved up the formal signing ceremony by two hours.

Baker said he had "a full discussion" of two-plus-four issues with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze September 10 on the fringes of the Helsinki meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. The secretary had similar discussions during the day in separate meetings with West Germany Foreign Minister Genscher and with British Foreign Secretary Hurd.

Baker and Shevardnadze spent nearly three and one-half hours discussing a wide array of issues and planned to meet again on September 13 before Baker flies to Syria. A senior U.S. official said they had a general discussion on the status of Soviet economic reform plans and regional issues including Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Central America and Iraq.

On the U.N. trade embargo against Iraq, the official was asked about reports indicating there may be serious leaks, including purchases of Iraqi oil by Cuba and Romania. Other reports have suggested Iraq may also be receiving arms from unnamed East European countries.

"I'm not aware of those reports," the official told reporters, adding that one of the issues discussed by the ministers was how to insure the sanctions are enforced.

Asked about the reported reluctance of many NATO allies to provide ground troops for multinational forces deployed in Saudi Arabia and the gulf to counter Iraq's massive military presence, the senior official said it was "a little early to draw the conclusion that this isn't going to happen." Baker met with the allies at NATO headquarters in Brussels September 10 and said the U. S. would welcome further contributions from them to the effort to contain the Iraq threat.

"We were talking about different kinds of contributions that could be made in terms of responsibility sharing," the U.S. official said, but "rather than assess exactly what they are



going to contribute and why; I'd prefer to let a little time unfold and see how they respond."

He said Baker and Shevardnadze want to talk further about the issue of regional security structures and arrangements and how to cope with the Iraqi military threat even if Iraq withdraws completely from Kuwait, and also about Iraq's interest in acquiring a nuclear capability.

"That's something (nuclear capability) that we just have to choke off," the senior official declared.

He said withdrawal from Kuwait would leave Iraq with "a huge military machine which would have an enormous basis on which to coerce, and a leadership that has demonstrated that after it gets involved in adventures, even if they are highly costly, it doesn't necessarily learn the lessons of those adventures."

The official said the proposed regional security structures and arrangements have not yet been defined, but he said they are likely to be "informal" and are likely to involve countries within the region and outside of it. It's likely to have a military dimension and a non-military dimension, he said, possibly a developmental element so that some of the sources of conflict could be dealt with.

"We want an outcome that is also going to enhance peace," he said. "But if we're going to have a structure that in the end is one that in fact produces peace, then I think that all countries in the region will be involved in some form."

The senior official denied a New York Times report asserting there has been a change in U.S. policy characterized by an invitation to Moscow to participate in the search for Middle East peace, and also suggesting that Washington now favors an early international conference to deal with the Middle East peace process.

"There's been no change on either of those points," said the official, who recalled that during Baker's first meeting with Shevardnadze in Vienna, the secretary urged the Soviets to "come on in, the water's fine. We're not making any effort to exclude you" from the Middle East.

Obviously, the senior official said, the Soviets would have to work in a way that demonstrates Moscow is prepared to be "constructive" and also would have to do "the kinds of concrete things that are actually going to enhance the process that promotes peace." He pointed out that the United States has long favored an international conference that is properly structured and at the appropriate time.

Such a conference must also be framed so that "it lends itself

into moving to bilateral negotiations right away," he explained.

Both ministers welcomed reports from Jakarta about a tentative agreement to a Supreme National Council in Cambodia, the senior official said, and both felt follow up work would be required. They had a detailed discussion of how to define the role, responsibilities, and functions of an election commission in Afghanistan; "but there was no closure on that issue," he added.

They also had brief discussions of strategic and conventional arms control negotiations. Soviet and American experts have been working since last weekend in Moscow on details of a Strategic Arms Reduction (S.T.A.R.T.) treaty. Talks have also been underway on a treaty to reduce Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) which is expected to be concluded before midNovember when a summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is scheduled in Paris.

He said the Soviets have not formally proposed lowering U.S. and Soviet troop levels in Central Europe agreed to earlier this year in Ottawa, despite recurring press reports to the contrary. The 195,000 Soviet limit and the 225,000 U.S. limit agreed to in Ottawa form the basic premise for dealing with manpower issues in a CFE agreement.

When Baker and Shevardnadze met in July in Soviet Siberia they agreed the Ottawa limits had been "overtaken by events," because the Soviets have pledged to withdraw all their forces from what is now East Germany within four years. Asked if the U.S. will agree to a reduction of the 225,000 troops allowed under the CFE manpower target, the senior U.S. official replied: "that's something that will ...take some time to work out."

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CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11  
(Burden-sharing)

LEGISLATORS WANT ALLIES TO SHARE GULF COSTS

Members of Congress want U.S. allies to share the cost of defending the gulf from Saddam Hussein's aggression. The Senate September 10 passed legislation formally asking President Bush to take steps that would ensure Kuwait's friends will pay for part of the enormous costs associated with "Operation Desert Shield."

Citing the 40 million dollars that the desert defense consumes daily and the 170,000 million dollar U.S. budget deficit, Democratic Senator Dennis DeConcini, the measure's author, said allies must do more, especially West Germany and Japan. "Even...Bangladesh has sent approximately 5,000 troops," he said. "I do not understand why economic powerhouses are having such difficulty doing more."

Defense Secretary Cheney and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee September 11. Panel members criticized the failure of U.S. allies thus far to bear their fair share of the cost. "What can we do to increase significantly other nations' financial contributions?" asked committee chairman Sam Nunn. "Regrettably," said Republican Senator John McCain, "our two richest allies -- Germany and Japan -- are again offering mere token commitments.... I feel we are under no obligation to maintain our military commitments to Germany, unless Germany provides greater support to our efforts in the gulf. "We need to be equally outspoken with Japan," he said. "Either Japan supports the United States fully in this crisis, or she will no longer be considered a true ally of the United States." McCain had issued a statement September 10 calling on Tokyo to provide 8,000 million dollars for the United Nations-ordered defense of the gulf.

"I strongly support President Bush's initiative to ask for increased burden-sharing by all those nations who benefit from the sacrifices of our servicemen and women," said Republican Senator Strom Thurmond. "We can no longer allow a repeat of the Persian Gulf tanker export experience where the United States paid the bill and our men and women made the sacrifices while oil-consuming nations reaped the benefits." Cheney told the committee that "in most cases, other countries are sharing the responsibility, and sharing it willingly." He cited Kuwait's contribution of 2,500 million dollars to support military operations and an equal amount in economic aid to nations most affected by the crisis. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also have pledged large amounts, he said.

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# U.S. SEES EXPANDED ROLE FOR SOVIETS IN MIDDLE EAST

(Considered part of emerging new world order)

By Alexander M. Sullivan

USIA White House Correspondent

Washington -- The United States sees, as part of the emerging new world order, an expanded role for the Soviet Union in the Middle East, the White House said September 11.

President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev discussed the new approach at the Helsinki summit, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater pointed out, and the matter was discussed in their joint news conference and in the Helsinki joint statement.

Fitzwater told a questioner that "in a sense" this is a new step for the United States, which previously believed -- in Fitzwater's phrasing -- that "a limited Soviet role is the most appropriate.

But, spokesman said, "what we're saying now is that as this new world order is formed, as we see new cooperation between East and West -- between the United States and the Soviet Union -- in solving regional conflicts, that we believe we should be cooperating with the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Exactly how and in what way and so forth -- those are issues that are yet to be decided."

The new U.S. attitude toward resolving the conflict between Israel and the Arab world was not completely clear in Helsinki, perhaps because Bush specifically separated the Persian Gulf crisis from Arab-Israeli relations when asked about an international conference "to solve the Palestinian problem."

Bush declared he sees implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Iraq "separate and apart for the need to solve the other question." But he also noted that Secretary of State Baker has said that such a conference could be considered under some circumstances, and he said he "strongly" supports that view. The president said, however, "I feel strongly...that these issues are not linked. And any effort to link them is an effort to dilute the resolutions.

In their joint statement, Bush and Gorbachev conditioned consultations by their diplomats about new gulf security arrangements on achievement of the goals spelled out by the United Nations resolutions: withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restoration to power of Kuwait's ruling family. But they added: "It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf."

Asked to elaborate on what consultations between Moscow and Washington are contemplated, Fitzwater declined, noting, "there are no specifics. And in fact, they're very clear in

saying they wouldn't address those kinds of matters until after this has been resolved."

On another subject, Fitzwater said Bush will videotape his message to the Iraqi people September 12 and will provide it for telecast to the Iraqi government before week's end. He said Bush is taping the message "on the basis of the public announcement" by Iraq's information minister, who said he would send a team to interview Bush on the U.S. role in the gulf. Fitzwater held the offer was for access to Iraqi television, not for an interview.

He said the eight-to-ten minute message will contain an Arabic translation in both written sub-titles and via a translator's voice speaking over Bush's remarks. The White House will allow an unspecified period of time for Iraq to telecast the statement; it will make the tape available to other nations in English or Arabic after Iraq has broadcast it, or after Washington has determined Iraq is not going to do so.

The message, Fitzwater said, is needed because the people of Iraq lack knowledge about events in their region. "The Iraqi government," he said, "has not been forthcoming in telling the people of that country what's happening. We don't believe the people generally have a good idea of the Arab League action (condemning the invasion and demanding Iraq pay reparations to Kuwait) or of the U.N. resolutions, probably very little idea about the refugee situation and the treatment of Kuwaitis and other nationals by the Iraqi Government. So we think this is a very important opportunity."

He said Bush would bring to Iraqis "the message of the United Nations and the world community" while also telling them "exactly how the world is aligned against their government."

While Washington has not received a formal invitation to provide the message, Fitzwater said, "essentially the invitation was for President Bush to address the Iraqi people, to have access...the method is irrelevant. The president said he'd like to have equal kinds of access to the Iraqi people that the United States had granted to Saddam Hussein, and we assume that that is the essence of the invitation."

Meanwhile, the build-up of forces in the gulf continues, Fitzwater asserting that more Americans are arriving every day. "We are putting in place the forces we believe are necessary to maintain a solid defense of Saudi Arabia," he said, and gave the latest figure on the U.S. commitment of ground, air and sea forces as 100,000 persons.

He acknowledged that there are "small seepages" in the U.N. economic sanctions but noted, "In the largest and most important areas -- including oil import and export and major



commodities coming in by ship -- the sanctions are almost 100 percent effective."

He said the White House, under "normal circumstances," would "welcome" the announcement that Iran and Iraq will resume diplomatic relations following their eight-year war. But he said in the light of world response to Iraq's unwarranted aggression, the development seems "another desperate attempt by Saddam Hussein to reach out and find someone -- anyone, in fact -- that might help him try to circumvent the expressed will of the world community."

Fitzwater predicted the effort will fail, noting that Iran is a member of the United Nations and thus is pledged to observe the complete ban on trade with Iraq. He said Tehran has stated it will comply with the sanctions, adding, "We expect that it will."

He said there is "no indication" of a need to send humanitarian shipments of food to Iraq. "We believe food supplies at this point have not reached a point where humanitarian help is necessary," he said.

A sanctions committee at the United Nations, he noted, makes that determination, and arranges for international organizations to make deliveries.

There is no "specific, credible" threat of terrorism against Americans in the gulf area, he told a questioner, but he declined to discuss the intelligence methods involved in that determination. "We have been watching for signs of Iraqisponsored terrorism since the beginning of the crisis," he said. "The United States would hold Iraq responsible for any act of terrorism undertaken by organizations based in Iraq or operating under Iraqi guidance."

Fitzwater refused to discuss resources available to the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, despite reports that the installation is short of water. "We are not willing to comment," he said, "on the status of their supplies and their condition. Suffice to say that they are in adequate shape at this time. We are in constant contact with Ambassador Howell, and we will take actions to maintain their safety when the time comes."

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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11  
(Gulf activity)

NEWS BRIEFING -- Spokesman Pete Williams discussed the following topic:

TROOPS CONDUCT LIVE FIRE EXERCISES IN SAUDI ARABIA

Beginning September 11, Williams said, U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia will take part in live firing exercises of weapons of calibers up to 105 millimeters. Approval for the exercises was given September 10, he said, adding that the Pentagon is preparing for live fire training for 120 millimeter weapons as well.

"Even though we are in a defensive posture (in Saudi Arabia)," the spokesman told reporters, "live fire training gives a realistic and challenging sense of urgency about the situation. It keeps the troops alert; it's what they're ordinarily accustomed to."

Williams explained that live fire training for naval forces "isn't an issue because we regularly fire naval guns in international waters for exercise purposes and to keep the crews ready."

The posture of Iraqi forces has not changed substantially over the past week, Williams said, noting that about 265,000 Iraqi troops are deployed in and around occupied Kuwait. The figure includes about 165,000 Iraqi troops in the country, and another 100,000 in areas to the north and west of Kuwait, he said.

"They don't treat the Kuwaiti border as a line, so the forces move around in that general area," Williams added. He said while the Iraqi troops' posture "is still a defensive one, (they have) the capability to go to the offensive very quickly." The number of Iraqi tanks in the area "is also more or less unchanged, still about 2,200 or so," the spokesman added.

On a related matter, Williams said, "We are aware of some increase in Iraqi military activity near the Syrian and Turkish borders, but there is nothing to indicate imminent hostilities. And beyond that I cannot characterize that activity for you. It could be a combination of ground and air activity, including training flights."

The spokesman reported that 750 intercepts and more than 40 boardings of shipping in the gulf region have occurred since the operation to enforce the U.N. sanctions against Iraq began. Although some of the boardings have been conducted by naval forces from other countries, the majority -- about 35 -- have been done by U.S. forces, he said.

U.S. PRESS: NYT/ROSENTHAL/BUSH, M.E. TALKS

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

The following article by Andrew Rosenthal headlined "Bush, Reversing U.S. Policy, Won't Oppose A Soviet Role In Middle East Peace Talks" appeared on page A-1 in the New York Times of September 11, 1990.

(BEGIN TEXT)

WASHINGTON -- President Bush dropped the longstanding American opposition to Soviet involvement in Middle East peace efforts during his meeting with President Mikhail S. Gorbachev on Sunday, administration officials confirmed on Monday.

In an apparent change from more than 10 years of American efforts to limit Soviet participation in peace efforts, Bush invited Moscow to play a greater diplomatic role in the region and agreed to consider working with the Soviet Union on problems like the Arab-Israeli conflict, on which Washington has in the past not worked closely with the Kremlin, the officials said.

Bush, who will address Congress on Tuesday night at 9 p.m. on the Persian Gulf crisis, also opened the door to the kind of Middle East peace conference that Moscow has long advocated provided the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is not on the agenda, the officials said.

But the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, cautioned that the issue of a Middle East conference and the entire question of Soviet-American cooperation in the region rested on the outcome of the gulf crisis and on whether Moscow continues what the United States views as helpful Soviet behavior on solving regional conflicts.

The first sign of this change was signaled at the Gorbachev-Bush news conference in Helsinki on Sunday when Gorbachev said he had a "secret" to reveal -- that Bush had confessed that in the past the United States had tried to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East but that now he felt that it was important to cooperate.

The officials on Monday called this aspect of the summit meeting, which was reflected in comments by Gorbachev and in the two leaders' joint statement, a major development that was overshadowed by the two leaders' vow to oppose Baghdad in the immediate crisis and by their apparent divisions over the use of military force.

But it was unclear whether this new American attitude toward Soviet participation in Middle East peacemaking would actually

The Secretary said he would not be visiting Israel on this trip, but pointed out that he met with Israel's Foreign Minister, David Levy, in Washington last week.

(END TEXT)

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

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promote movement toward resolution of long-standing Arab-Israeli issues that through the years have resisted various efforts -- sometimes including the Soviet Union -- at solution.

Administration officials freely discussed the latest development on Monday, although they did not seek to call reporters' attention to it themselves. It was not clear whether the United States had discussed its new willingness to accommodate a Soviet diplomatic role in the Middle East with Israel, which has adamantly opposed the idea in the past.

The Helsinki meeting also produced a clear willingness by Bush to expand American economic and technical assistance to the Soviet Union in light of Moscow's help in the gulf crisis. At the news conference, Gorbachev rather testily asserted that his country was not accepting payment for its actions in the crisis. Bush noted that direct financial aid, like credits and normal tariff treatment, must await the enactment of Soviet economic reforms and passage of a long-promised bill allowing unfettered emigration.

But Bush reiterated his support for perestroika, Gorbachev's program of economic restructuring, and said: "This remarkable cooperation that has been demonstrated by the Soviet Union at the United Nations gets me inclined to recommend as close cooperation in the economic field as possible."

Gorbachev badly needs Western assistance. But it was the apparent shift in American Middle East policy that lay behind his obvious delight when he spoke of changes in American attitudes toward his country. The new willingness to work with Moscow in the Middle East, he said, "does really give me the hope that we'll get by."

For decades, the United States has believed that the Soviet Union was seeking to foment, not resolve, regional conflicts, but at times in the past Washington was compelled to work with Moscow. More recently, the United States opposed Soviet involvement in Middle East peace efforts because Moscow had not restored diplomatic relations with Israel, which it broke in 1967, and because Washington believed that a foothold for Moscow would stack the deck against Israel because of the Kremlin's close ties to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

But administration officials said Soviet behavior in the gulf crisis suggested a new attitude. Assuming that new line continues, the United States is prepared not only to make room for the Soviet Union in Middle East diplomacy but perhaps even to work in tandem with the Kremlin, they said.

The United States believes that the Soviet Union could be helpful in resolving the dispute over the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, in bringing peace to Lebanon, in stemming the

spread of missile technology in the Middle East, and in creating a new security structure for the region once the immediate gulf crisis is over, an official said.

It is too soon to know how expanded Soviet-American cooperation will affect Israel, although Israel is not likely to welcome Soviet involvement in its dispute with the Palestinians and the United States is probably going to have to take pains to meet Israeli concerns.

"There is no blueprint here," an official said, "but there is a recognition that Soviet foreign policy toward regional disputes is changing and that their new thinking deserves to be matched by new thinking here."

The apparent shift in policy was contained in three sentences at the end of the joint statement issued by Bush and Gorbachev in Helsinki.

It said: "As soon as the objectives mandated by the U.N. Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the presidents direct their foreign ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability.

"It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time."

Behind these words, an administration official said, is the prospect of the first serious American effort to engage the Soviet Union in the Middle East peace process in the 13 years since President Carter backed off a proposal for a multinational peace conference to be jointly sponsored with the Soviet Union in the face of powerful Israeli opposition, and the desire of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt to deal directly with the Israelis.

The official said that Bush and Gorbachev reached no specific agreements, but that part of the statement was "intended as a window on the future."

"There is something potentially significant here," he said. "Though we are not out of the woods on this crisis, people are impressed by and large by Soviet policy to date. People recognize the differences, and assuming this trend continues or even grows, it would be self-defeating not to take this into account when we approach other conflicts."

The official said the Soviet Union could play a part in American plans, outlined by Secretary of State James A. Baker



III last week, to create a new security umbrella for the Persian Gulf. "Their efforts to participate in, or at least their willingness not to object to, some kind of new security arrangements, could be important," the official said. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the official said, the Soviet Union could help persuade its allies, including Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization, to reach an accommodation with Israel. "One could imagine them urging countries or individuals to compromise," he said. "Or one could have them reassure certain parties that they need not fear compromising."

The United States opposes an international peace conference that would link the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the Arab-Israeli dispute and other issues. But the official said that if the current crisis is resolved, "one can imagine an international conference, or some type of gathering, in which the Soviet Union and the United States would participate." Gorbachev and Bush both hinted at these prospects at their news conference. Bush said the common ground between the two countries outweighed their differences and added: "We will continue to cooperate with President Gorbachev."

Beaming, Gorbachev said: "That last sentence does really give me hope that we'll get by. In our talks, the president said: 'You know, there was a long time when our view was that the Soviet Union had nothing to do in the Middle East.' This was something that we had to talk through during this meeting here in Helsinki, and what was said is that it's very important for us to cooperate in the Middle East, just as it is on other issues of world politics."

This sort of talk is a powerful symbol for the Soviet Union, which has long been angered by American efforts to cut the Kremlin out of the Middle East peace process.

In December 1973, after the war between Egypt and Israel, the United States and Soviet Union convened a peace conference as co-chairmen in Geneva. But it lasted only a few days, and the United States then did the negotiating between Israel and the Arabs, while the Soviet Union grumbled that Washington was not meeting its responsibility to keep Moscow informed.

After Carter's attempt to convene another conference collapsed in 1977, peace efforts shifted to the American-run Camp David process. Throughout the 1980s, the Soviet Union complained that the United States wanted to talk about cooperation in Afghanistan, Angola, and Central America, but never the Middle East.

(END TEXT)

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

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(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

U.S. PRESS: NYT/IBRAHIM/IRAQ, IRAN TIES

The following article by Youssef M. Ibrahim headlined "As The Iraqis Search For Support, They Will Restore Full Iran Ties" appeared on page A-1 in the New York Times of September 11, 1990.

(BEGIN TEXT)

PARIS -- Iran and Iraq have announced that they are resuming diplomatic relations after two days of high-level talks, the official Iranian press agency reported on Monday.

The move comes as Iraq is asking Iran to help it break the sanctions imposed on Baghdad by the United Nations. After the embargo was announced, Iran said it did not think urgent medical supplies should be included, and some Iranian officials have said that Iran would abide by the embargo. But other Iranians have suggested that the issue was still under debate within their country.

The announcement of diplomatic ties adds another layer of accord to the normalization of relations between the two nations, which has included the release of about 50,000 prisoners of war by both sides and the return to Iran of all territory occupied by Iraq during their eight-year war.

The Iranian decision to accede to Iraq's insistent requests to resume ties comes as the Iraqis continue their effort to enlist assistance in the face of the international commercial and military embargo led by the United States. The embargo is intended to force President Saddam Hussein to abandon his occupation of Kuwait, and, perhaps, bring about the collapse of his government.

Iraq wants Iran to send food and medicine, and, perhaps more important, to help sell embargoed Iraqi oil.

A visit to Tehran by the Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, came after Saddam moved last month to put a formal end to the war with Iran, which began in 1980 and halted with a United Nations-brokered cease-fire in 1988.

Although negotiations on a peace treaty had apparently been stalled, even before Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2, there were increasing signals that the two countries were engaged in secret talks to move toward a final settlement at Iraq's urging.

While the degree of assistance that Iran is willing to give Iraq remains unknown, the Iranian press agency quoted Aziz on Monday night as describing his talks there as "positive,

דמיפות: מידע	שגרירות ישראל / וושינגטון	דף: _____
סוג: גלוי	טופס פרוק	כתוב: _____
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כס' פרוק:		דע: _____
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1051 1/3		כאח: השגרירות, וושינגטון

משבר המפרץ

ראו הניתוח הרצי"ב שנכתב ע"י פויירווגר, חוקר המכו ן הושינגטוני למדינות במזרחית.

אמיתי.

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# GULFWATCH

*Analysis of the Gulf Crisis from the scholars and associates of THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE*

Number Four

September 6, 1990

Can the U.S. Liberate Kuwait Today?

by Marvin Foutwerger

Many commentators and policymakers in Washington are calling for U.S. military action to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait. While this option may be attractive in principle, today it is impossible in practice. Indeed, according to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the U.S. military still has some way to go before it can be confident of its ability to repel even an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia.

How long? Given the deployment's size and distance involved, the U.S. military would be pleased if it can complete its defensive deployment by mid-October. This deployment will presumably place around 100,000 ground forces in the Arabian Peninsula able to block an Iraqi attack should one come when sanctions begin to bite.

Did the Defense Department underinvest in the mobility assets necessary to move U.S. forces to the Mideast? Hardly. Critiques of Defense Department procurement practices miss the problem we face in deploying and sustaining forces to distant regions.

With the 1980 Carter Doctrine, the United States committed itself to defending Persian Gulf nations against a possible Soviet invasion. The Reagan Administration initiated or supported a wide range of programs to improve U.S. capability to deploy forces to the Persian Gulf in years of real defense budget growth.

Many steps were taken to improve U.S. airlift capability, leading to a nearly 75% increase over 1980 in intertheater capability and a doubling of capacity to move outsized equipment:

-- Procurement of 50 C-5B and 57 KC-10A aircraft. The C-5B increased ability to move tanks, self-propelled howitzers, and helicopters without dismantling them. The KC-10 added flexibility to the airlift force because of its capability to operate as a transport aircraft, a tanker, or both simultaneously.

-- In September 1983 the Reagan Administration began a program to enhance the Civil Reserve Air Fleet by adding cargo-convertible features to existing wide-bodied passenger aircraft.

Eighty-five to ninety percent of equipment and munitions must be carried over long distances by sealift. U.S. capacity was enhanced by:

-- Acquisition of eight SL-7 container ships capable of speeds up to 30 knots. The U.S. also converted these to a "roll-on/roll-off" configuration to shorten unloading time. These ships moved the 24th Mechanized Division's equipment early in the crisis.

-- Chartering 12 ships loaded with equipment and supplies for three Marine Brigades, located around the world.



GULF WATCH

3/3

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-- The National Defense Reserve Fleet and the Ready Reserve Force were increased from 26 ships in 1980 to 151 in 1989.

The United States undertook extensive prepositioning programs in Southwest Asia, most notably at Diego Garcia. The U.S. also reached access or prepositioning agreements with several Mideast states but regional political sensitivities limited U.S. presence.

Despite these large investments in mobility, the United States was still unable to deploy major ground forces to the Persian Gulf for many weeks after the decision to commence Operation Desert Shield. But this should have come as no surprise. Given distances of more than 10,000 nautical miles by sea and 8,000 miles by air, Iraq would have enjoyed overwhelming local military superiority under virtually all foreseeable conditions.

Will the U.S. armed forces have offensive options to drive Iraq out of Kuwait? Perhaps over time. In the near-term the United States would be able to mount air strikes against strategic military and economic targets in Iraq that conceivably could lead to an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. This outcome, however, is unlikely. Saddam Hussein is quite right in telling Dan Rather that air power has never been the decisive factor on the ground. Nonetheless, this "air-only" option may prove attractive to those who would like to destroy a good part of Iraq's military capability and reduce Iraq's ability to expand its aggression.

Within several months, the United States could build up forces necessary in the region to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. However, this would probably require a far more extensive buildup than has been planned. Iraq has reportedly deployed 25 divisions to Kuwait and southern Iraq. Any offensive would clearly entail serious American casualties, potentially undermining the very basis of America's activism. The idea of a quick, low-cost strike to liberate Kuwait may be politically attractive but militarily impossible.

Given the likely survival of Saddam Hussein's regime, working out post-crisis security arrangements are vital. This issue is already on the table in order to assure local allies which might otherwise hesitate to help the United States now to risk facing Iraq's revenge later. The difficulty of moving U.S. forces to the scene makes it likely that a long-term placement of American troops and equipment in the region be part of these security arrangements.

If it takes the United States so long to deploy our forces, can we hope to deter future aggression in the Middle East or elsewhere? Yes. Despite clear military superiority in early August, Saddam Hussein did not attack Saudi Arabia or U.S. forces. It is possible that he did not do so because Iraq had no further aggressive intentions. But even assuming that Saddam would have liked to attack such an inviting target, he was likely to have been deterred by U.S. statements of intent and the major air and naval intervention undertaken at the crisis's outset.

The United States would have deterred further Iraqi aggression because of its escalation dominance. While Iraq might have defeated the U.S. forces arrayed against it at that particular moment, it could not have expected to defeat the United States. By contrast, the United States had a clear capability to employ the force necessary to destroy Iraq's economic and military infrastructure.

The danger point for the United States will come in a few years when mid-level powers like Iraq develop the nuclear capability to strike vital American targets. This danger highlights our interest in preventing Iraq's attainment of that capability.

אאא, חוזם: 8582

אל: רהמש/498

מ-: ווש, נר: 2088, תא: 100990, זח: 2030, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר -- מיידי

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

הקונגרסמן אובי ושמיטת חובות למצרים

בהמשך למברקנו בנדון

טרי פיל סיפר לי בא'צ כי בעת פגישת המשלחת הקונגרסיונאלית עם מובארק בשבוע שעבר אמר אובי למוברק כי יתנגד לשמיטת חובות אם תיעשה רק עבור מצרים שכן זוהי בעייה רחבה יותר. מוברק הגיב בכעס מה ושאל את אובי מדוע הוא צריך לבוא לווינגטון כדי לריב עמו (עם אובי).

אנא לא לייחוס ולא לציטוט.

הבוקר נשא אובי הרצאה בווינגטון בה חזר על דבריו הנ'ל ואמר (הפעם באופן פומבי) כי יתנגד למחיקת חובות עבור מצרים בלבד.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), @ (מנכל), ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, מצרים

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 8583

אל: רהמש/496

מ-: ווש, נר: 2087, תא: 100990, זח: 2030, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר -- מיידי

אל: מקש'ח / משהב'ט

מנהל מצפ'א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

בקשות סיוע

מדיק קלארק

1. צ'ייני לוחץ על הצבא האמריקאי בעניין הפטריוט אך פאול מתנגד לשחרר את הסוללות.

2. צפויות תשובות בקרוב בעניין המודיעין וההתקשרות.

3. תשובות חלקיות לגבי ציוד תיתכנה ביום ד' הקרוב.

4. המזכיר מתנגד להקדמת תשלום הסיוע הצבאי בשל חששו מהשלכות לגבי מקבלים אחרים של סיוע צבאי ובעקבות כך על התקציב.

ערן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), @ (מנכל), ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, כנצור, מצפא, @ (מקשח/משהבט)

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 7386

אל: רהמש/431

מ-: ווש, נר: 2072, תא: 090990, זח: 1630, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר/ מידי

אל: מנהל מצפא

דע: לשכת רוה'מ, פמלית שהח' ניו יורק

דע: מנהל מקשח/ משה'ב'ט

מאת: השגריר, וושינגטון

בארוחת ערב שערכו פרד מאלק ופרנק קרלוצי ביום ששי (7 דנא) לכבודי עם סיום תפקידי, נכח גם מזכיר ההגנה צייני.

להלן משיחתי עם צייני:

1. הביע הערכתו הרבה והערכת הנשיא לפרופיל הנמוך שבו נקטה ישראל מאז תחילת המשבר במפרץ.

2. חזר ביוזמתו על עמדותיו בדבר חשיבותה האיסטרטגית של ישראל והביע שביעות רצונו המלאה מהחלפת המידע בין מערכות המודיעין של שתי המדינות.

3. סיפר שביום שני (7 דנא) התקיים בלשכתו דיון בהשתתפות הנרי רואן ( עוזר מזכיר ההגנה ) לענייני מזת בו נדונו בקשותיה של ישראל בעקבות המשבר במפרץ שהוגשו ע"י המשלחת בראשות מנכ"ל משרד הבטחון. הוסיף שקיבל דיווח חיובי מאוד על פגישותיו של שה'ח עם מזכיר המדינה ושהוא מקווה שהממשל יוכל למסור לנו תשובותיהם תוך שבוע עד 10 ימים.

4. צייני נפרד בדברים חמים ומלאי הערכה לגבי מערכת היחסים האישיים בינינו וכן עם קודמו קרלוצי.

ארד

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, @ (מקשח/משהבט)

סססס

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MUBARAK AND BAKER DISCUSS SITUATION IN GULF  
(Transcript: Joint News Conference 9/8/90) (1320)

Alexandria -- Following is an unofficial transcript of a press conference by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker following their meeting here September 8:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I welcome Secretary Baker to Alexandria. We had a good meeting and very good discussions. Of course we discussed the problem of the Gulf hoping that we could reach a peaceful solution. Secondly, we hope that everybody will stick to the sanctions of the U.N. resolutions, which is considered very important. Also we have discussed the peace process and how to keep the momentum of the peace process going. Of course, we touched on bilateral relations and economic reforms and we had very good and fruitful discussions on all of these issues. Thank you.

SECRETARY BAKER: Mr. President, thank you very much for receiving our delegation today here in Alexandria. We are pleased to have the opportunity to be in Egypt. I think the summary you have just given is a full and complete summary, but let me simply say for the record how very appreciative and pleased the United States is with the outstanding and courageous leadership that you have demonstrated from the very beginning of this crisis in the Persian Gulf. I also should add that we in the United States look forward to continuing to work on a credible peace process and continuing to work closely with you and with your country as we were doing in the past. We are strongly committed and determined to see the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. We agree strongly with you that there should not be any diminution of the substance of those resolutions and there should not be any settlements or agreements that in any way minimize or diminish the content and substance of those resolutions. We very much hope that there can be a peaceful settlement of this situation at the earliest possible time.

Q: President Mubarak, can you tell us please, there are reports of the additional Egyptian troops going to Saudi Arabia. Is there some limit on the size of Egyptian troops?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: We have some troops there and we are intending to send other troops. But I'm not in a position to tell you how many or when. We are intending to support the Saudis by all means.

Q: President Mubarak, on the Middle East peace process, what is your reaction to Yasser Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein? Do you think it's time for a change in leadership in the PLO?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I'm not discussing the change in the leadership.



The peace process is not only Yasser Arafat, it is the Palestinian people. ~~So anything done by Yasser Arafat doesn't mean we are going to stop dealing with the Palestinian problem because we know it is the crux of the problem of this whole area.~~

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you please brief us on the position of the American administration towards writing off Egypt's military debt?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm sorry, I'm not understanding your question. Let me come back to you in just one second. But let me add to the question that was just given here. The fact is that I think there is agreement between the United States and Egypt, that in addressing the peace process and the crisis in the gulf we should keep those two situations separate and they should not be linked. I think it's important that we know we are in agreement in that regard. Excuse me now go ahead.

Q: Yes, Mr. Secretary, I'm asking about the position of the administration concerning writing off Egypt's military debt and it's servicing. And there's a little bit of confusion. Could you outline it specifically and what is the feedback from Congress?

SECRETARY BAKER: We have reason to believe that there will be support for the president's decision to write off the Egyptian debt to the United States. This is a matter that will have to go before the Congress and it is a matter that will have to be dealt with through legislation. This of course is an election year in the United States and our Congress will not be in session for a whole lot longer. They were hoping of course to recess sometime in October to campaign for the elections. So we do not anticipate the matter will be concluded perhaps before sometime the early part of next year. And I think it's important that everyone understand that. The decision though, is one that the executive branch feels very firmly about and we think we will have support in the Congress.

Q: Mr. President, can you give us some measure by which to gauge the size of Egyptian troops in Saudi Arabia? You say you can't be specific but can you give us some idea or measure of Egyptian military support in Saudi Arabia at this time?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I could tell you frankly that we are supporting the Saudis as much as we can. We have discussed this with the Saudis and we will send them the forces needed, as agreed upon. We sent some forces, now we are intending to send other forces in the very near future.

Q: What are your expectations, your hopes, for the superpower summit in Helsinki? What further can Gorbachev and Bush do that might help in the gulf situation?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: I hope that Gorbachev and Bush have one line for dealing with this problem. And I don't like any differences, because this will cause a hell of a lot of problems in this area if there are differences.

Q: Mr. Secretary, may I put a question to you? As far as your



current reading on the post-crisis security arrangement in this region: do you envisage the long term or permanent establishment, in the region, of American or other Western forces?

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me simply say that American forces have been in the Persian Gulf since 1947, so if we were to assume, and it would be just an assumption, that American forces, naval forces, would remain in the Persian Gulf it would not be the establishment of a presence. The presence has been there since 1947. We don't have anything specifically in mind. We did discuss, the president and I discussed, the importance of states who are located in the region giving some thought to what form of security arrangements can best guarantee peace and stability in the Persian Gulf after we get beyond this current crisis and after we see full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Q: Do you imagine peace in the Persian Gulf without Iraq's terrible conventional and nuclear arsenal being destroyed?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: We are against chemical weapons, against the presence of missiles, because these are very destructive means. I think peace will never go with the presence of all these forms of weapons in the area.

Q: Does it necessarily have to be a military solution to the gulf crisis?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: That does not mean that the military solution should take place because they have the missiles. We would like, first of all, to try peaceful solutions. We should not go through war solutions at all unless it is a hopeless case peacefully.

Q: President Mubarak, how long should we try to rely on the sanctions and the peaceful solutions before the united front must turn to a military solution? Is it October, is it November, when?

PRESIDENT MUBARAK: You cannot say in October, November, December. It is a matter of estimation how the sanctions will effect in one or two or three months. It may last only one month, maybe two months, but I am telling you that doesn't mean this is going to stay on for one year. Certainly not a year. Thank you.

(END TRANSCRIPT)  
NNNN

(REPEAT OF SU7110909)

BUSH, GORBACHEV REMAIN FIRM AGAINST IRAQI AGGRESSION

(Text: Joint communique)

Helsinki -- Asserting they "are united" that Iraq's aggression "must not be tolerated," President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev September 9 called upon Iraq to "withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and (occupied) Kuwait."

In a joint communique issued at their one-day summit in Helsinki, the two leaders added that "nothing short of a return" to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait "can end Iraq's isolation."

The communique also called upon the world to adhere to U.N. imposed economic sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait while the two leaders pledged "to work individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions." They agreed that U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 permits importation of food, strictly monitored, for humanitarian purposes.

The presidents reiterated their desire to "resolve the (gulf) crisis peacefully" but insisted that "we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the U.N. Charter."

Once the crisis is resolved, Bush and Gorbachev said they will direct their foreign ministers "to work with countries in the region and outside it" to promote peace and stability.

Following is the text of the joint communique:

(begin text)

With regard to Iraq's invasion and continued military occupation of Kuwait, President Bush and President Gorbachev issue the following joint statement:

We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors.

We reaffirm the joint statement of our Foreign Ministers of August 3, 1990 and our support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665. Today, we once again call upon the government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and to free all hostages now

held in Iraq and Kuwait.

Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions is acceptable.

Nothing short of a return to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isolation.

We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian circumstances. The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children.

Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists. However, we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the U.N. Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.

As soon as the objectives mandated by the U.N. Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the presidents direct their foreign ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability. It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time.

(end text)

NNNN



אאאא, חוזם: 7307

אל: רהמש/422

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 90, תא: 090990, זח: 1217, דח: ב, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמס/מיידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת - ארה"ב

דע: ניו יורק - בהול - עבור פמלית שה"ח

רצב הודעת דובר הבית הלבן, מהמטוס בדרך לפינלנד, אודות החלטת הנשיא להקציב 10 מיליון דולר נוספים כסיוע הומניטרי לירדן ותורכיה במטרה לסייע בקליטת ובטיפול הפליטים מעירק המגיעים לשתי מדינות אלה. בכך, מגיע סך הסיוע ההומניטרי האמקאי לנושא זה לסך 28 מיליון דולר.

TEXT OF STATEMENT OF THE PRESS SECRETARY ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE  
EN ROUTE TO HELSINKI/SEPTEMBER 7, 1990

THE PLIGHT OF INNOCENT PEOPLE TURNED REFUGEES BY THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ AND ESPECIALLY KUWAIT, CAUSED BY THE IRAQI INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT; DEMANDS IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE. THE PRESIDENT HAS, THEREFORE, AUTHORIZED THE USE OF DOLLAR 10 MILLION FROM THE EMERGENCY AND MIGRATION ASSISTANCE FUND FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE FLEEING IRAQ AND KUWAIT WHO ARE IN JORDAN AND TURKEY. THIS AUTHORIZATION BRINGS TOTAL U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR THIS HUMANITARIAN PURPOSE TO DOLLAR 28 MILLION.

THE DOLLAR 10 MILLION APPROVED TODAY BY THE PRESIDENT WILL GO FOR FOOD, WATER AND SHELTER AND FOR TRANSPORTING PERSONS BACK TO THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN. EARLIER U.S. HELP CONSISTED OF DOLLAR 13 MILLION IN FOOD ASSISTANCE AND DOLLAR 5 MILLION FOR TENTS, WATER AND OTHER EMERGENCY ITEMS.

WE ARE PLEASED TO NOTE THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THIS URGENTLY NEEDED RELIEF EFFORT. IN PARTICULAR, SAUDI ARABIA, MANY COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, AND JAPAN ARE PROVIDING GENEROUS LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE. SECRETARIES BAKER AND BRADY ARE URGING POTENTIAL DONOR GOVERNMENTS TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION AND ADDITIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID. WE CALL UPON GOVERNMENTS, AND ESPECIALLY THOSE WHOSE CITIZENS ARE AMONG THE REFUGEES, TO MAKE AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATION THAT WOULD FACILITATE THEIR RAPID RETURN HOME. WE ARE ALSO WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES TO ENSURE THAT THE SERVICES AND SUPPLIES REQUIRED BY THE REFUGEES ARE PROVIDED AS QUICKLY AS IS POSSIBLE.

עד כאן  
עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9870

אל: רהמש/576

מ-: לנדן, נר: 2006, תא: 110990, זח: 1900, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מיד

אל: אירופה 2

מאת: הציר, לונדון

51

פסגת הלסינקי

להלן מדיווח אמריקני ( שהועבר ממטוס הנשיא ) לידיעת מס' 10:-

1. בוש ופמלייתו שבעי רצון מתוצאות השיחות עם גורבצ'וב אשר גילה נכונות ושתוף פעולה במרבית הנושאים שנדונו בפסגה.

2. אם כי לא נאמר מפורשות, ברור לאמריקאים שבמידה והסנקציות לא תשאנה פרי, לא יתנגדו הרוסים לפעולה צבאית. יחד עם זאת גורבצ'וב מאמין, וחזר על כך מספר פעמים, שהסנקציות כן יצליחו ובהקשר זה תהיה מוכנה בריהמ' לשתוף מלא ליישומם של העצומים.

3. באשר להוצאת המומחים הסובייטים מעיראק- התחייבו להוצאתם של כ 40 איש מייד ולגבי היתר (כזכור מדובר בך-190) עזיבתם תהיה הדרגתית אם כי בנקודה זו לא היתה התחייבות מפורשת.

4. בניגוד לגורבצ'וב התרשמו ששה'ח שוורדנדה ובמיוחד ראשי הצבא הרוסי היו מסוייגים יותר ביחס למספר נושאים שנדונו אך בסופו של דבר הכריע את הכף גורבצ'וב. כידוע, לעיראק חוב של בין 8-10 מליארד דולר לברהמ'.

5. מאז תחילת המשבר במפרץ, עוד מעת ביקורה של רוהמ' תאצ'ר בכנוס 'אספן' בו השתתף גם הנשיא בוש, קיים שתוף הדוק בין וושינגטון ללונדון. היחסים היום קרובים ביותר וניתן להשוותם לאלה שהיו קיימים בין תאצ'ר לריגן בזמנו.

כל הנל ממקור מהימן.

מרון.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), @ (מנכל), ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, הדס, איר2, בנצור, מצפא,  
גוברין, מזאר1, סולטן

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 8563

אל: רהמש/493

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 106, תא: 100990, זח: 1957, מ: סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / מיידי

אל: ממ"ד, מזא"ר 1, מצפ"א

מאת: השגרירות, וושינגטון

פסגת הלסינקי - סכום ביניים.

שיחות (10.9) עם לימברג (ראש מדור בריה"מ - חוץ ב - INR) וברנס (סגנו של דניס רוס).

1. להלן הערכת לימברג (המתבססת על קריאת ההודעה המשותפת ותמליל מסיבת העתונאים).

א. תוצאות המפגש מהוות הצלחה לשני הנשיאים.

ב. ההבטחה אותה קיבל גורבצ'וב מבוש על כך שבסיום המשבר תפנה ארה"ב את כוחותיה מסעודיה מהווה הישג חשוב לגורבצ'וב.

ג. סביר שנסיון התקשורת להדגיש חילוקי הדעות שהתגלעו מוגזם.

ד. אין בחוסר יכולתם של שני הנשיאים לגשר על המחלוקת בנושא השימוש האפשרי בכח ונוכחות היועצים הסובייטים כדי להפגיע.

ה. למרות הדגשת הנשיא בוש שהמהלך המדיני טרם מוצה וכי המדובר בשלב זה בנושא תיאורטי, היה מעוניין לקבל תמיכתו העקרונית של גורבצ'וב באופציה הצבאית, תמיכה אותה לא קיבל (הערה: למרות שגורבצ'וב בהופעותיו הפומביות לאחר המפגש טרח להבהיר שבריה"מ לא נתנה הסכמתה למהלך צבאי הרי שהמשפט בהודעה המשותפת לפיו מוכנות שתי המעצמות לשקול צעדים נוספים שיעלו בקנה אחד עם מגילת האו"ם משאיר אליבא דארה"ב פתח לשימוש באופציה הצבאית לכשהמהלך המדיני ימוצה).

ו. בנושא היועצים - הצבאיים סבור לימברג כי תגובתו של הנשיא לדברי גורבצ'וב ניתן לפרש כהבעת שביעות רצון ממה ששמע.

ז. אשר ללינקז' בין ועידה בינ"ל לפתרון משבר המפרץ והסכסוך (הערבי-ישראלי), לימברג אינו סבור שניתן לדבר על חילוקי דעות. רואה בשימוש שעשה גורבצ'וב (במהלך מסיבת העתונאים) במילה LINK (בהקשר לעיל) כקשר רציף (SEQUENTIAL LINK) דהיינו לאחר יישוב משבר המפרץ (לו יש קדימות) יש לגשת לפתרון הסכסוך. את תמיכת בריה"מ ברעיון הועידה הבינ"ל מפרש לימברג כנסיון לשפר מעמדה בקרב מדינות ערב.

ח. אשר לשט"פ אמריקאי-סובייטי במזה"ת, לימברג אינו רואה למרות דברי גורבצ'וב חידוש בעמדות המימשל הנוכחי שהבהיר במספר הזדמנויות כי לבריה"מ יש תפקיד במזה"ת. נכונות סובייטית לשט"פ קונסטרוקטיבי בפתרון משבר המפרץ תשפיע לדברי לימברג על נכונות ארה"ב לשתפה במאמץ לפתרון הסכסוך.

2. להלן הערות ברנס:

א. ציפיות הממשל שהפסגה תעביר מסר ברור של סולידריות בין-מעצמתית לצדאם חוסיין ולקהיליה הבינ"ל התגשמו.

ב. שני הצדדים הסכימו שלא להסכים בנושא האופציה הצבאית והיועצים הסובייטים. לדברי ברנס גורבצ'וב לא היה מוכן להכנס אפילו לדיון תאורטי באופציה הצבאית. גורבצ'וב חזר והבהיר (את אשר הבהיר מספר פעמים במסיבת העתונאים) כי בריה"מ ממקדת את מאמציה בפתרון הפוליטי. בנושא היועצים, גורבצ'וב לא נתן התחייבות מפורשת.

ג. בנושא הלינקאז' בין המשבר במפרץ והסכסוך ציין שהסובייטים לא הרחיבו הנושא בשיחות.

ד. מלבד נושא המפרץ נגעו שני הנשיאים קצרות בשורת נושאים נוספים. אפגניסטן (לא הושגה כל התקדמות), CFE, START ותוכניתו הכלכלית של גורבצ'וב.

שטין.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), @ (מנכל), ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, גוברין, מזאר, בנצור,  
מצפא, סולטן

סססס



7305:חוזם:אאא

אל:רהמש/421

מ:-וושנגטון, נר:89, תא:090990, זח:1217, דח:ב, סג:בל,

בבב

בלמס/מיידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת

דע: ניו יורק - בהול עבור פמליית שה'ח

רצב קטעים מדברי הנשיא בוש בהגיעו לפינלד לקראת פגישתו עם גורבצוב :

PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH REMARKS AT AMERICAN EMBASSY IN  
HELSINKI, FINLAND/SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1990

I'LL SIMPLY SAY ONE -- ONE LAST WORD AND THAT IS THAT THIS MEETING TOMORROW WITH MR. GORBACHEV IS INDEED AN IMPORTANT MEETING. WE -- WE ARE VERY FORTUNATE TO BE TRYING TO COORDINATE AND IN A SENSE LEAD IN AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT HERE TO STOP AGGRESSION IN THE PERSIAN GULF, FORTUNATE TO HAVE THE SOVIET UNION VERY MUCH IN ACCORD WITH WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO DO AND WHAT FINLAND IS TRYING TO DO. AND IF YOU WANTED TO THINK OF A COMPLICATED SITUATION, THEN SHIFT THE CLOCK BACK SEVERAL YEARS, AND THINK ABOUT HOW DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO WORK THIS EQUATION NOW, GET THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT THAT HAS BEEN GOTTEN, BUT TRY TO DO IT WITHOUT THE SOVIET UNION BEING A PART OF IT.

SO TOMORROW, WE'LL BE SPEAKING, NOT TO SOME ADVERSARY, BUT TO A LEADER OF A COUNTRY WITH WHOM I THINK WE'RE GOING TO HAVE INCREASINGLY PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS. AND CLEARLY, I HOPE THAT WE'LL COME OUT OF THIS MEETING TOMORROW, NOT WITH EVERY DIFFERENCE IRONED OUT, BUT WITH THE COMMON PURPOSE SO THAT FINLAND AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE ALL -- ALL BE SEEN BY OTHERS AROUND THE WORLD TO BE IN ACCORD IN OUR DETERMINATION TO STOP THIS UGLY AGGRESSION, THIS BRUTAL TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS THAT'S BEING PUT INTO EFFECT BY SADDAM HUSSEIN OF IRAQ. AND WE'VE GOT A MAJOR NATIONAL CHALLENGE, BUT I AM VERY PROUD OF THE WAY THAT COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD HAVE COME TOGETHER. AND I VIEW IT AS A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF MY RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THAT WE KEEP THIS COHESION, AND THAT THE AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ BE RECTIFIED AND THAT THE RIGHTFUL RULERS OF KUWAIT BE RESTORED TO THEIR PLACE.

AND I CAN TELL YOU THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED, AND FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO MIGHT HAVE RELATIVES, BROTHERS, COUSINS, SISTERS, WHATEVER IT MIGHT BE, IN SAUDI ARABIA, LET ME SIMPLY TELL YOU WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS HAVE TOLD ME, AND WHAT GENERAL COLIN POWELL, OUR DISTINGUISHED CHIEF -- CHAIRMAN HAS SAID, AND THAT IS THAT THERE ARE NO -- "NEVER IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES," AND PERHAPS OUR MILITARY ATTACHES WOULD AGREE, 'HAVE WE HAD FINER MEN AND WOMEN SERVING IN THE ARMED FORCES," AND SO WHEN YOU TAKE A LARGE FORCE



LIKE THIS, SEND IT ON A MISSION OF PEACE HALFWAY AROUND THE WORLD, AND SEE THE WAY IT ALL CAME TOGETHER, IT IS PHENOMENSAL OF WHAT OUR MILITARY HAS DONE, AND I'M GRATEFUL TO THEM EVERY SINGLE DAY.

AND IT'S NOT JUST THE UNITED STATES, IT'S NOT JUST THE PRESIDENT THAT'S GRATEFUL, IT'S MANY, MANY OTHER COUNTRIES THAT DON'T HAVE THE FORCES, AND DON'T HAVE THE ABILITY TO STAND UP WHO ARE COUNTING ON US AND COUNTING ON THOSE KIDS THAT ARE OVER IN SAUDI ARABIA, SO I THINK WE -- WHERE EVER WE ARE, IF IT'S HELSINKI OR WASHINGTON, DC, I THINK WE CAN BE GRATEFUL TO THESE YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN WHO ARE SERVING OVER THERE IN 135 DEGREE HEAT, AND ALL OF THAT -- 120 (DEGREES) OR WHATEVER AND THAT -- GET DOWN IN GALLONS OF WATER, BUT THEY'RE DOING A FIRST CLASS JOB AND I JUST WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW PROUD I AM, AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, OF THESE YOUNG PEOPLE, AND WHAT A MARVELOUS SIGNAL IT'S SENT AROUND THE WORLD.

(APPLAUSE.)

עד כאן  
עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 7876

אל: רהמש/446

מ-: המשרד, תא: 100990, זח: 1528, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמס/מיידי

אל: תפוצת דו"ח אירועים יומי

להלן הנוסח המלא של ההודעה המשותפת בוש-גורבצ'וב בתום פסגת הלסינקי:

'באשר לפלישה העיראקית לכווית ולהמשך הכיבוש הצבאי של הנסיכות, מפרסמים הנשיא בוש והנשיא גורבצ'וב את ההודעה המשותפת הבאה:

'אנו מאוחדים באמונה, שאין לסבול את תוקפנותה של עיראק. לא יתכן שום הסדר בין לאומי של שלום, אם מדינות גדולות יוכלו 'לבלוע' את שכנותיהן הקטנות יותר. אנו חוזרים ומאשרים את ההודעה המשותפת של שרי-החוץ שלנו מיום 3 באוגוסט 1990, ואת תמיכתנו בהחלטות מועבי'ט 660, 661, 662, 664 ו-665.

אנו שבים וקוראים היום לממשלת עיראק לסגת ללא תנאי מכווית, לאפשר את הקמתה מחדש של הממשלה החוקית של המדינה ולשחרר את כל בני הערובה המוחזקים עתה בעיראק ובכווית.

כל פתרון שאין בו משום ביצוע מלא של החלטות מועבי'ט של האו"ם, לא יוכל להתקבל. שום צעד, שלא יחזיר את מעמדה של כווית למצב שקדם ל-2 באוגוסט, לא יוכל לשים קץ לבידודה של עיראק.

אנו קוראים לקהיליה העולמית כולה לסייע באכיפת העיצומים שהוטלו על עיראק, ומבטיחים לפעול למען מטרה זו ביחד ולחוד.

עם זאת מכירות ארה"ב וברה"מ בכך שהחלטת מועבי'ט 661 מתירה יבוא של מזון לעיראק ולכווית מתוך נסיבות הומינטריות. ועדת העיצומים תגדיר בפני מועבי'ט את מהותן של אותן 'נסיבות הומינטריות'.

ארה"ב וברה"מ גם מסכימות ביניהן, שעל יבוא כזה חייב לחול פיקוח קפדני מטעם הגופים הבינ"ל המתאימים, כדי לוודא שהמזון יגיע רק לידיהם של אלה שהוא מיועד להם, תוך הענקת עדיפות מיוחדת לצרכיהם של ילדים.

אנו מעדיפים לפתור את המשבר בדרכי שלום ואנו נעמוד מאוחדים מול תוקפנותה של עיראק, כל עוד ימשך המשבר.

עם זאת מנוי וגמור עמנו לדאוג לכך שתוקפנות זו תגיע לקיצה, ואם הצעדים הנוכחיים לא יצליחו להגשים מטרה זו, הרינו מוכנים לשקול צעדים נוספים העולים בקנה אחד עם מגילת האו"ם. עלינו להוכיח מעל לכל ספק, שהתוקפנות אינה משתלמת.

ברגע שיושגו המטרות, שנקבעו בהחלטות מועבי'ט, יורו הנשיאים לשרי החוץ לפעול יחד עם מדינות האיזור ועם מדינות אחרות כדי לפתח מבנה בטחון אזורי ולנקוט צעדים שיקדמו את השלום והיציבות.

יש צורך לפעול במרץ ליישובם של יתר הסכסוכים במזה"ת ובמפרץ הפרסי. שני הצדדים יוסיפו להיוועץ זה בזה וליזום צעדים לקידום מטרות רחבות אלה בזמן

המתאים'.

המרכז

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל,  
ממד, @ (רס), אמן, ארב1, ארב2, פרנ, מעת,  
הסברה, לעמ, @ (מתאסשטחים), תרבות, אוקיאניה,  
מצרים, מצפא, אסיה, מאפ, אמלט, מזתים, מזאר, איר1, איר2, @ (לוברני)

סססס



אאאא, חוזם: 7345

אל: רהמש/426

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 91, תא: 090990, זח: 1217, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמס/מידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת - ארה"ב

דע: ניו יורק - בהול - עבור פמליית שה"ח

רצ'ב ממסהע"ת המשותפת של דובר הבית הלבן והדובר הסובייטי בתום פגישת הפסגה:

SUMMIT BRIEFING BY MARLIN FITZWATER, WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN  
VITALY IGNATENKO, SOVIET SPOKESMAN/HELSINKI, FINLAND

MR. IGNATENKO: (THROUGH INTERPRETER) -- DEAR LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, COMRADES, THE MEETING BEGAN AT 10:07 AND IT LASTED FOR TWO HOURS AND 50 MINUTES. AND I THINK IT WOULD BE JUST IF MY FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE, MR. FITZWATER, BEGAN BECAUSE PRESIDENT BUSH WAS THE FIRST ONE TO BEGIN SPEAKING WHEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS MET TODAY. PLEASE.

MR. FITZWATER: THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAD A VERY GOOD MEETING THIS MORNING. THEY MET, AS VITALY SAID, FOR ALMOST THREE HOURS IN ONE-ON-ONE SESSION, NEVER DID GET A CHANCE TO BREAK INTO THE LARGER GROUP MEETING. THE MEETING FOCUSED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION AND WE ARE UNITED. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VERY STRONG FEELING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF.

THEY DISCUSSED THE UN RESOLUTIONS, OF COURSE. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN FIRM AND TOGETHER IN SEEKING ENFORCEMENT OF THESE SANCTIONS. AND SO WHILE MOST OF THE DISCUSSION THIS MORNING DID FOCUS ON THIS SINGLE ISSUE, WE EXPECT THEM TO CONTINUE THAT THIS AFTERNOON AND TO GIVE YOU THE RESULTS IN THEIR PRESS CONFERENCE LATER TODAY.

MR. IGNATENKO: I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WAS VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FIRST SESSION. HE EVEN SAID HE WAS VERY OPTIMISTIC NOT ONLY ABOUT TODAY, BUT ABOUT TOMORROW, AS WELL. AND THE WHOLE MEETING IS TAKING PLACE IN A VERY OPTIMISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE.

A BASIS FOR THIS ATMOSPHERE WAS LAID OUT IN CAMP DAVID AND BOTH SIDES HAVE REAFFIRMED THIS. I AGREE WITH MARLIN WHEN HE SAID THAT A VERY IMPORTANT DISCUSSION WAS HELD ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT -- THAT WE MANAGE TO ENGAGE IN THIS SITUATION THE UN STRUCTURES WHICH WILL HAVE A GREAT CONSEQUENCE FOR THE WORLD TOMORROW.

Q DID THEY AGREE ON ANYTHING? DID THEY AGREE ON ANYTHING?

MR. FITZWATER: THEY CERTAINLY AGREE ON THE OVERALL COURSE, ON THE PATH THAT THE UN HAS SET IN TERMS OF REMOVING IRAQ FROM KUWAIT, FROM THE -- AND THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT. IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC AVENUES THAT THEY MIGHT PURSUE IN GETTING THIS ACHIEVED, THAT'S SOMETHING THAT THEY'LL WANT TO DISCUSS THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL BE AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU ALL LATER TODAY.

Q WAS THERE ANY DISCUSSION OF A UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, AND WOULD THE US AGREE TO A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE THAT INCLUDED SOVIET TROOPS?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE DON'T WANT TO GO INTO DETAILS HERE THIS AFTERNOON. OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE DISCUSSING A NUMBER OF SPECIFICS, AND THEY WILL HAVE REMARKS IN WHICH THEY LAY OUT THE BASIS OF THEIR CONVERSATION. BUT I JUST DON'T WANT TO PREEMPT THEIR DISCUSSION THIS AFTERNOON.

Q WILL PRESIDENT GORBACHEV PROPOSE AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE?

MR. IGNATENKO: I THINK ABOUT THIS YOU'LL LEARN IN THE EVENING AS WELL.

Q ARE YOU GOING TO ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO DO ANYTHING IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF THE TALKS TAKING PLACE IN HELSINKI?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THEY DID BOTH HAVE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC IDEAS THAT THEY TALKED ABOUT, BUT I'LL LEAVE THOSE TO THEM FOR THIS AFTERNOON.

MR. FITZWATER: IT'S A GOOD SUMMIT. WE'RE OFF TO A GOOD START. WE'LL SEE YOU ALL LATER THIS AFTERNOON. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

MR. IGNATENKO: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

עד כאן  
עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעת, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 6216

אל: רהמש/377

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 75, תא: 070990, זח: 1811, חמ: סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/ מיידי טפל

אל: מזא'ר 1, מצפ'א.

דע: ממ'ד

בריה'מ - ארה'ב: לקראת מפגשי הלסינקי ומוסקווה

1. בשיחה (6.9) עם ורשבאו (מנהל מח' בריה'מ במחמ'ד) התייחס לסדה'י של המפגשים הקרובים (פסגת הלסינקי ובעקבותיו מפגש שרי החוץ במוסקווה) ולצפיות שני הצדדים מהמפגשים.

2. להלן סיכום שיחתנו:

א. פסגת הלסינקי:

(1) חלקו הראשון של המפגש יוקדש לדיון בנושא המשבר במפרץ. (ראה להלן)

(2) נושאים נוספים הצפויים לעלות בזמן שיוותר יהיו:  
- משברים איזוריים: אפגניסטן וקמבודיה (אינו צופה לדיון אלא לאיזכור הבעיות מתוך כונה ששני שרי החוץ יקיימו דיון מפורט יותר בפגישתם במוסקווה).

- נושאים אירופים: איחוד גרמניה (לא יכנסו לדיון מקיף) CFE (ישוחחו על קידום התהליך) ובש'א, START.

- נושאים בילטרליים כלכליים: מצפים לדיון על המצב הכלכלי בבריה'מ ובדרכים שבהם תוכל ארה'ב לסייע (הכונה לסיוע טכני) ליישום הרפורמות הכלכליות. הנשיא יבהיר שאין לארה'ב כונה לנצל הסיוע להתערבות בענייניה הפנימיים של בריה'מ. ורשבאו סיפר בהקשר לעיל על כך שגורבצ'וב מגלה "עצבנות" בנושא הסיוע האמריקאי מאז דברי המזכיר בייקר בדבר כונת ארה'ב להקים קשר עם האופוזיציה. בכונת הנשיא כך ורשבאו להבהיר "כונותיהם הטהורות". בכונת ארה'ב בדיון הכלכלי להסיר מכשולים המונעים קידום שתה'פ הטכני.

(3) משבר המפרץ:

- בניגוד לשווארדנצה הרואה בפסגה נקודת מפנה בפתרון המשבר ציפיות ארה'ב צנועות יותר. לדברי ורשבאו הנשיא מייחס חשיבות פוליטית להופעה משותפת עם גורבצ'וב, במהלכה תופגן פעם נוספת העמדה המשותפת של שתי המעצמות בגנות מעשי צאדם חוסין. למפגש המשותף יש משנה חשיבות על רקע הספקולציות לגבי האמביוולנטיות בעמדה הסובייטית אותה ניתן לפרש כנסיון לשבת על הגדר.

- לממשל ברור שגורבצ'וב ושווארדנצה מחויבים לקו שאימצו. השניים דחו הצעות שבאו מחוגים בצבא ומערביסטים לאמץ עמדה שונה.

- בהתייחסו לדרגי העבודה במשה'ח בריה'מ, הזכיר מעורבות של טרסנקו ("מקבילו של דניס רוס" מבחינת תפקיד וגישה לשווארדנצה) בעיצוב העמדה הסובייטית ובלונגוב שלהערכתם מחוייב פחות למדיניות שווארדנצה. להערכת ורשבאו מנהיגות משה'ח הסובייטי מחוייבת למימד הגלובאלי של המשבר (קרי עדיפות ליחסים עם ארה'ב ש.ש.).

- ורשבאו מעריך שגורבצ'וב ינסה לקדם פתרון פוליטי למשבר. סבור שילחץ בכיוון של ועידה בינ'ל ולחילופין למאמץ משותף לעידוד פתרון ערבי. (מחמ'ד סקפטי לגבי האפשרות האחרונה). - אשר לוועידה הבינ'ל ציין כי במידה וכונת בריה'מ הא לפורום שידון במשבר המפרץ בלבד (במאמר מוסגר סיפר כי בשיחה עם יועץ מזה'ת בשג' בריה'מ, עמו נפגש בעקבות נאום שווארדנצה בולדיווסטוק הבהיר שלא קיים לינקאז' בין המשבר במפרץ לסכסוך. ורשבאו סבור שדברי שווארדנצה אינם חד משמעיים) תהיה ארה'ב

"OPEN MINDED". למרות שאינם מאושרים מהרעיון יאזינו.



הבהיר כי אין בכונת הנשיא לדחות את קטגורית רעיון הועידה. אינו צופה שבמהלך הפסגה תושג הסכמה בין שני הנשיאים בסוגיא לעיל.

- לסיכום סביר שציפית הנשיא היא שהפסגה תהווה מפגן של סולידריות ואחדות בינמעצמית בנושא המשבר והתנאים לפתרונו. - לשאלתי האם צפויה הודעה משותפת בסיום הפסגה השיב כי עד למועד שיחתנו לא נסגר הנושא. משאירים זאת כאופציה. עד כאן אשר לפסגה.

- לשאלתי לגבי המומחים הסובייטים בעיראק השיב ורשבאו כי בייקר העלה הנושא בשיחותיו הטלפוניות עם שווארדנצה. מקווים שהסובייטים יתחילו להוציא בהדרגה יועציהם הכלכליים והצבאיים. לארה"ב הדגיש אין כונה להפוך הנושא לסלע מחלוקת פומבי מה גם שאינם סבורים שהיועצים מסייעים באופן משמעותי למאמץ העיראקי. למרות המשמעות הסימבולית של המצאותם מעדיף הממשל להתרכז לתמונה הכוללת של היחסים. בראיה הרחבה קיימת שביעות רצון מעמדת בריה"מ.

#### ב. מפגש בייקר שווארדנצה

1) סדה'י של המפגש יכלול את הנושאים כדלקמן:  
- איחוד גרמניה (השניים ינסו במידת הצורך לפתור בעיות של הרגע האחרון לפני כינוס ה-2+4 במוסקווה).

- נושאים רגיונליים: אפגניסטן (למרות התקרבות בעמדות קיימים עדיין חילוקי דעות לגבי סמכויות רשות המעבר. לדבריו ניצלו הסובייטים את חופשת הקיץ הארוכה יחסית של נג'יבילה בריה"מ כדי "לרכך" עמדותיו לגבי היקף הסמכויות שיעברו לרשות המעבר. למרות ששיחות שקיימו בשבוע החולף עם השגריר הסובייטי לנושא קוזארוב לא חלה התקדמות, מקווים ששיחות בייקר עם עמיתו יביאו לסגירת הפערים), קמבודיה, בטחון אסיה (שווארדנצה ישוב ויעלה הצעת בריה"מ בנושא), אנגולה (ידונו במצב השיחות בין ה-MPLA לאוניטה) קשמיר וכמובן המשבר במפרץ.

- נושאים בילטרליים (בהמשך לדיון שני הנשיאים בכונת בייקר לנסות ולהשלים את החלטות פסגת מלטה בנושא הכלכלי).

- נושא פיקוח על החימוש (AC): במקביל למפגש השרים יקיים ברטולומאו שיחות עם עמיתו הסובייטי קרפוב בנושאי START ו-CFE. לפיכך מעריך שהשרים יסקרו הנושאים מבלי להכנס לדיון מפורט.

שטין.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל,  
ממד, @ (רם), אמן, מצפא, מזאר 1

סססס

6221:חוזם,אאא  
אל:רהמש/362  
מ:-וושנגטון,נר:70,תא:070990,זח:1702,דח:מ,סג:בל,  
בבב  
בלמס/מיידי

דע: ניו-יורק

מאת: עתונות, וושנגטון

WHITE HOUSE BACKGROUND BRIEFING, SUBJECT: HELSINKI MEETING OF  
PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, ATTRIBUTION: SENIOR  
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL, THE WHITE HOUSE, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1990

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: GOOD AFTERNOON. LET ME MAKE JUST A FEW  
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS BEFORE I TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE PRESIDENT WILL BE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT  
GORBACHEV FOR A FULL DAY OF DISCUSSIONS ON SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 9TH.  
THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF -- OR NOT A CONTINUATION, BUT IT'S  
SUBSEQUENT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AGREEING IN JUNE  
THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE REGULAR, MORE FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES.  
AND IT IS ALSO SIMILAR TO THE KINDS OF DISCUSSIONS AND CONSULTATIONS  
THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS HAD WITH THE -- (BRIEF AUDIO BREAK) -- OF  
IMPORTANT LEADERS IN THE PRESENT GULF CRISIS.

WHILE THAT HAD A LOT TO DO WITH IT AS A PRECIPITATING EVENT FOR  
THIS MEETING, THAT IS NOT, OF COURSE, THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE  
MEETING. THERE WILL BE A DISCUSSION OF OTHER -- OF BILATERAL  
ISSUES, OTHER MULTILATERAL ISSUES. BUT THE PRESIDENT FELT THAT  
SINCE THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN SUCH AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS IN THE GULF, AND INASMUCH AS -- YOU  
KNOW, THIS HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED MORE AND MORE AS THE FIRST KIND OF  
POST-COLD WAR CRISIS, AND PERHAPS THE BEGINNING OR THE UNFOLDING OF  
A NEW WORLD ORDER IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS COULD PLAY A ROLE  
WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO PLAY SINCE ITS ESTABLISHMENT IN 1945,  
'46 BECAUSE OF THE COLD WAR, THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THESE  
TWO LEADERS SIT DOWN, REVIEW WHERE WE ARE NOW, GIVE EACH OTHER THEIR  
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND ON HOW IT WILL DEVELOP.

SO THAT'S BASICALLY WHY THE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE. IT WILL  
BE A CONSULTATION ONLY -- VERY INFORMAL, RELAXED MEETINGS A LA CAMP  
DAVID RATHER THAN -- AND MALTA -- RATHER THAN THE MORE FORMAL  
STRUCTURED MEETINGS OF WHAT WE COME TO CALL FORMAL SUMMITS.

Q DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE ANY PROPOSALS OR ANY NEW  
ANNOUNCEMENTS HE'LL BE MAKING FROM OVER THERE?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: OH, I DON'T THINK ANNOUNCEMENTS, NO. NO.  
AS I SAY, THIS IS --

Q (INAUDIBLE.)

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: NO, THIS IS -- THIS IS -- THIS IS REALLY A DISCUSSION: WHERE ARE WE? YOU KNOW -- HOW DO YOU SEE THE THING DEVELOPING? HOW DO WE SEE IT DEVELOPING? WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF SITUATIONS THAT COULD COME ABOUT? AND SO ON. IT'S MORE THAT KIND OF A MEETING.

Q DO YOU EXPECT SOME KIND OF A JOINT STATEMENT, NONETHELESS, TO ISSUE FROM IT, THAT WOULD MAYBE REITERATE SUPPORT FOR THE EMBARGO AND CALL AGAIN FOR GETTING IRAQ OUT OF KUWAIT, SOMETHING LIKE THAT?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: THE TWO LEADERS DO PLAN A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE END OF THE MEETING. WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANYTHING MORE FORMAL OR STRUCTURED THAN THAT, I DON'T KNOW. BUT I WOULDN'T -- WOULDN'T COUNT ON IT.

Q WOULD THAT BE -- WOULD THE PICTURE OF BUSH AND GORBACHEV TOGETHER AGAIN, IF THEY DENOUNCE THE INVASION, WOULD THAT BE THE STRONGEST PICTURE OR SIGNAL THAT HAS BEEN SENT TO SADDAM SINCE THE INVASION?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I THINK IT'S A VERY HELPFUL SIGNAL TO SEND, AS INDEED HAS THE ACTION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL THROUGH THIS WHOLE THING. I THINK IT IS A VERY, VERY HOPEFUL SIGN THAT IF WE'RE ENTERING A WORLD NOW WHILE THE EAST-WEST, US-SOVIET COMPETITION IS NOT GOING TO BE THE DOMINANT EVENT, THERE ARE GOING TO BE THESE OTHER ISSUES AND CRISES AROUND THE WORLD, AS THERE HAS BEEN, OF COURSE, DURING THE COLD WAR, AND IF THEY CAN BE DEALT WITH BY THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND ITS LEADERSHIP ACTING IN CONCERT, IT'S VERY, VERY HELPFUL.

Q ARE WE GOING TO ASK THE SOVIETS TO PULL THEIR MILITARY ADVISORS OUT? WILL NOTHING CONCRETE COME OUT OF THIS MEETING?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL I'M NOT GOING TO TELL YOU WHAT WE WILL OR WILL NOT ASK. I THINK THAT WILL BE AN ISSUE --

Q WHY NOT?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, BECAUSE WE HAVEN'T HAD THE DISCUSSIONS. THIS -- YOU KNOW, I'M JUST TELLING YOU WHAT -- WHAT IS --

Q IS THAT -- IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE SHOOTING FOR?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I THINK IT -- YOU KNOW, YOU CAN BE SURE THAT THAT ISSUE WILL BE DISCUSSED.

Q HOW DO YOU VIEW SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR EITHER A UN -- AN OVERALL UN UMBRELLA TO THE MILITARY FORCES IN THE GULF OR A UN COMMAND OF SOME KIND, MILITARY COMMAND?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL I THINK -- YOU KNOW, WE HAVE GONE TO THE UN. WE ARE USING THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE, WHICH HAS REALLY BEEN MORIBUND SINCE ABOUT 1950, I THINK. SO THE UN IS BEING INVOLVED. WHETHER -- WHETHER IT IS USEFUL AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT TO TRY TO GET IT MORE FORMALLY IN I WOULD MAYBE QUESTION. AFTER ALL, YOU KNOW, WE NEED TO LEARN TO WALK ON THESE KINDS OF COOPERATIVE VENTURES BEFORE WE RUN. BUT WE ARE CERTAINLY -- WE WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME CLOSER UN



INVOLVEMENT.

Q WOULD YOU URGE THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE FORCES?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, WE'D BE VERY HAPPY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS DO HAVE SHIPS IN THE --

Q BUT GROUND FORCES?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: -- IN THE GULF. WE'D -- I THINK THAT WOULD BE USEFUL.

Q WOULD YOU EXPECT THE PRESIDENT AND MR. GORBACHEV TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE OPTIONS THAT LAY DOWN THE ROAD -- LIE DOWN THE ROAD IN THE MIDDLE EAST? AND IN SUCH A DISCUSSION, WOULD THE PRESIDENT BE LOOKING TO SEE WHICH OF THE OPTIONS WOULD MEET WITH MR. GORBACHEV'S APPROVAL?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, I THINK ALMOST CERTAINLY THEY WILL BE DISCUSSING THE OPTIONS; IN OTHER WORDS, LOOKING DOWN THE ROAD TO DISCUSS HOW EACH ONE SEES EVENTS UNFOLDING AND WHAT ALTERNATIVES MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO DEAL WITH THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH THE SITUATION COULD BE UNFOLDING. ABSOLUTELY. NOW WHAT WILL COME OF THAT, I WOULDN'T WANT TO SAY, BUT --

Q WOULD THE PRESIDENT BE INTERESTED IN HEARING WHICH OF -- BECAUSE -- SINCE THERE ARE QUITE A FEW DIFFERENT OPTIONS -- WHICH OF THEM WOULD MEET WITH MR. GORBACHEV'S APPROVAL?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: OF COURSE HE WILL BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S PERSPECTIVES ARE ON ALL OF THE ASPECTS OF IT, YES.

Q YOU SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO PROVIDE GROUND FORCES. WHY WOULD IT BE USEFUL, AND WHAT KINDS OF GROUND FORCES WOULD YOU ENVISION, AND WHAT ROLE FOR THEM?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, I THINK THAT THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE MULTILATERALNESS OF THE FORCE BY ADDING REPRESENTATION FROM ONE OF THE MAJOR POWERS WOULD BE USEFUL. I DON'T THINK IT'S ESSENTIAL. I THINK THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE FACT THAT THE CALL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN RESPONDED TO BY, I THINK IT'S ABOUT 25 COUNTRIES UP TO NOW, THAT HAVE SENT TROOPS OR SENT MILITARY FORCES -- AND I THINK THERE WILL BE MORE -- IS FINE. YOU CAN GET TO THE POINT, IF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE UN SENT TROOPS, IT GETS TO BE UNMANAGEABLE. BUT --

Q WHAT KINDS OF GROUND FORCES, AND IN WHAT MAGNITUDE, AND WHAT ROLE WOULD YOU ENVISION?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I DON'T KNOW. THAT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE UP TO THE SOVIETS.

Q THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY DEFINITELY ARE NOT GOING TO BE SENDING MILITARY FORCES THERE. ONE, DO YOU HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT THEY MAY BE CHANGING THAT SORT OF HARDLINE STANCE ON THAT? AND TWO, CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT HAS CHANGED FROM THE DAYS -- THE LAST DAYS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, WHEN SHULTZ WAS VERY MUCH OPPOSED TO THE SOVIETS BEING INVOLVED IN ANY SORT OF UN TASK FORCE IN THE GULF? WE REALLY DIDN'T WANT THE SOVIETS PLAYING AROUND

IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. WE DIDN'T REALLY WANT THEIR COOPERATION. WE DIDN'T LIKE THE IDEA OF A UN TASK FORCE.

I UNDERSTAND THE SOVIETS NOW ARE TALKING MORE ABOUT THIS UN NAVAL TASK FORCE. ARE YOU HEARING THAT; AND WHAT IS YOUR POSITION?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: ON WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE OR ARE NOT INTENDING TO DEPLOY ANY TROOPS, I DON'T KNOW. THEY HAVE NOT COMMUNICATED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER WITH US. I THINK WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE 1986 AND '87 IS THAT THE WORLD HAS CHANGED FAIRLY DRAMATICALLY, AND I THINK THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE A FAIRLY IMPRESSIVE DEPARTURE FROM WHAT YOU MIGHT SAY HAS BEEN TRADITIONAL SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THAT POLICY AND US POLICY HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN PARALLEL OR CONVERGING. INDEED, FREQUENTLY THERE HAS BEEN A COMPETITIVE ASPECT TO IT.

NOW THE SOVIETS, I THINK HAVE DEMONSTRATED, BY THEIR SUPPORT AGAINST IRAQI AGGRESSION, THAT THERE -- THEY DO SEE THE SITUATION THERE IN A SIMILAR WAY, AND THEREFORE I THINK A COOPERATIVE APPROACH IS WARRANTED.

Q INCLUDING UNDER A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, I -- YOU KNOW, THE WHOLE OPERATION IS TAKING PLACE UNDER UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. ALL OF THE ACTIVITIES ARE PURSUANT TO THOSE RESOLUTIONS. NOW, DON'T -- YOU KNOW, WE CAN TRY TO RUSH TOO FAST TO GET THE UN MECHANICALLY INVOLVED IN THINGS WHERE WE DON'T HAVE ANY PRACTICE. IT'S WORKING WELL NOW, IT'S PURSUANT TO UN GUIDANCE AND SO ON, THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS THE ONE WHO NOW IS OUT IN FRONT ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT AND SO ON. I THINK WE'RE DOING PRETTY WELL AND WE JUST OUGHT TO EVOLVE THIS THING IN A MORE NATURAL WAY.

Q HOW CAN THE SANCTIONS BE EFFECTIVE IF IRAN AND CHINA ANNOUNCED THAT THEY ARE GOING TO SEND FOOD AND MEDICINE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, AND JORDAN CONTINUES TO VIOLATE THEM?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, I THINK FIRST OF ALL THAT THE SANCTIONS HAVE, AS SANCTIONS GO, HAVE BEEN EXTRAORDINARILY EFFECTIVE. THERE IS THE QUESTION ABOUT WHAT FOOD FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES MEANS, AND THAT THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE OF THE UN IS STILL DEBATING THAT.

I THINK FIRST OF ALL, IT -- WHETHER IT IS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S GOAL TO STARVE INNOCENT PEOPLE -- AND AFTER ALL WE'RE NOT DOING THIS, SADDAM HUSSEIN IS THE ONE WHO HAS BROUGHT THE SANCTIONS ON HIMSELF. IT IS NOT -- IT IS NOT AN OFFENSIVE ACTION BY THE UN MEMBERS. BUT I THINK THERE ARE WAYS THAT THAT ASPECT OF IT CAN BE DEALT WITH. AND THAT IS, HUMANITARIAN FOOD, IF SUCH A THING EXISTS, WE HAVE THINGS LIKE THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, THE RED CRESCENT, WHO CAN VERIFY THE EXISTENCE OF PROBLEMS WHERE HUMANITARIAN FOOD AND MEDICINE WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

Q REGARDLESS OF THE POSITION THAT THE US OR THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE MIGHT TAKE, ISN'T IRAN, WITH ITS LONG BORDER WITH IRAQ, IN THE SAME POSITION JORDAN IS, JUST TO DECIDE UNILATERALLY WHAT IT DETERMINES "HUMANITARIAN FOOD" TO MEAN, AND DEFEND IT, AS JORDAN IS?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: YOU KNOW, IRAN HAS, I THINK, AT LEAST

THUS FAR, MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY SUPPORT THE UN ACTION. AND WE'LL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE. THERE HAVE BEEN -- AS I SAY, THERE ARE THESE DISCUSSIONS GOING ON IN THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, WHAT THIS MEANS. AND IF THERE'S A SINCERE EFFORT TO LOOK AT THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF FOOD, WHY, THEN WE'LL SEE HOW IT DEVELOPS.

Q NOW, APART FROM FURTHER ESTABLISHING HIS CREDENTIALS AS AN INTERNATIONAL GOOD GUY, WHAT DOES GORBACHEV HAVE TO GET OUT OF THIS MEETING?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I THINK HE GETS OUT OF IT, FIRST OF ALL, A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW WE SEE THE CRISIS AND WHY WE HAVE TAKEN THE ACTIONS THAT WE HAVE, WHAT WE SEE ABOUT IT DEVELOPING. AFTER ALL, HE HAS SOMETHING MORE THAN A PASSING INTEREST IN THIS DEVELOPMENT. I THINK IT ALSO BRINGS HIM INTO IT IN A PERSONAL AND PUBLIC WAY THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN, PERHAPS, AS MUCH AS SOME OF THE OTHER MAJOR LEADERS UP TO NOW.

Q SURELY, THOUGH, IT IS THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST -- WHAT HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN KNOWN AS "THE WEST" -- THAT IS MORE DIRECTLY THREATENED HERE THAN THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. AND WHAT IT SEEMS MR. GORBACHEV IS BEING ASKED TO DO IS TO COME AND APPEAR IN A VERY PUBLIC DISPLAY OF UNITY WITH THE WEST ON THIS ISSUE. AND WHILE I HEARD WHAT YOU JUST SAID, I WONDER IF IT REALLY ADDRESSES THE QUESTION OF HOW MR. GORBACHEV CAN FURTHER WHAT HE WOULD SEE AS HIS VITAL INTERESTS.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, I THINK YOU'RE MAKING AN ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS MORE IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST THAN IT IS OF GORBACHEV. AFTER ALL, HE A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO STARTED SAYING THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD BEGIN TO FUNCTION THE WAY IT WAS DESIGNED, AND THAT, TO ME, INDICATES THAT HE SEES THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERESTS IN BEING IN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST THE KIND OF AGGRESSION THAT TOOK PLACE.

Q WELL, THAT'S TRUE, BUT THIS IS CLEARLY AN EMERGENCY FOR THE WEST, AN ECONOMIC EMERGENCY FOR THE WEST. THE SOVIET LEADER FACES A DIRE SET OF ECONOMIC EMERGENCIES OF A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ORIGIN, AND THE QUESTION DOES ARISE, HOW DOES HE HELP HIMSELF WITH THOSE BY ATTENDING A MEETING LIKE THIS, AND WHAT MIGHT WE HAVE TO OFFER HIM, OR WHAT?

SENIOR ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, I THINK YOU'RE TRYING TO PUT A VERY NARROW PERSONAL OR NATIONALISTIC MOTIVE TO HIM, AND I WOULD SAY, YOU KNOW, SIMPLY BY AGREEING WITH THE ACTION AND BY BEING WILLING TO ENFORCE SANCTIONS ON IRAQ WHICH, AFTER ALL, HAS NOT ONLY BEEN AN ALLY, IN MANY RESPECTS, FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, BUT ALSO OWES THE SOVIET UNION A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY AND SO ON AND SO FORTH, INDICATES THAT HE TAKES THIS ISSUE SERIOUSLY, AND I DON'T THINK HE NECESSARILY HAS TO HAVE SOME OF WHAT FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE MIGHT BE PAROCHIAL INTERESTS IN DOING IT. I'M NOT SURE THAT HE DOES NOT SEE WHAT I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED AS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL -- AND -- AND, YOU KNOW, IT IN ADDITION PERHAPS FROM THOSE NARROWER INTERESTS HELPS REDUCE THE CHANCES OF UNILATERAL ACTION ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES BY HAVING HIM INVOLVED AND THE UNITED NATIONS INVOLVED, WHICH MIGHT BE IN HIS INTERESTS.

Q WHAT'S THE CHANCE THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ATTEND THE CSCE SUMMIT IN PARIS BECAUSE THE CFE AGREEMENT ISN'T FINISHED?



SENIOR ADMIN. OFFICIAL: OH, CLOSE TO 100 PERCENT. BUT -- YOU KNOW, ONE OF THE THINGS WE'LL DO -- I DON'T EXPECT THAT THIS WILL BE A -- A MEETING IN WHICH THE DETAILS OF ARMS CONTROL ARE GOING TO BE IN FOR HEAVY DISCUSSION. THERE'S NOT BEEN THAT MUCH THAT IS -- THAT IS AT THE POINT WHERE THE TWO LEADERS HAVE TO RESOLVE THEM. BUT I CONFIDENTLY EXPECT THAT THE TWO WILL AGREE THAT THEY MUST REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS IN ORDER TO FULFILL THEIR HOPES, THE FIRST PART OF JUNE, THAT CFE AND START WOULD BE READY FOR SIGNATURE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. IT'S NOT IMPOSSIBLE, BUT THE YEAR'S MOVING ON.

Q WHAT DOES YOUR 100 PERCENT APPLY TO? THAT WE WOULD NOT GO TO THE CONFERENCE IF THE TREATY'S NOT READY?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WE HAVE --

Q IT WON'T BE READY.

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WE HAVE SAID THAT WE WOULD ATTEND A CSCE CONFERENCE ONLY IF A CFE TREATY COULD BE SIGNED, THAT'S ALL.

Q SO 100 PERCENT DOES NOT MEAN YOU'RE SAYING WILL NOT BE READY --

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: NO, NO, NO. NOT AT ALL.

Q ON THE COMMENT -- ON THE QUESTION OF -- FOLLOWING UP WHAT BRIT WAS TALKING ABOUT. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE WE GOING THERE TO DELIVER A MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV THAT DESPITE THE GULF CRISIS, WE ARE STILL INTERESTED IN DOING WHATEVER WE CAN TO HELP HIM AND HELP HIS ECONOMY, GIVEN THE CONDITIONS THAT WE HAVE LAID OUT IN THE PAST? I MEAN, HOW MUCH OF THAT WILL BE A PART OF THE DISCUSSION, HOW DETAILED IS IT LIKELY TO BE, AND DO YOU SEE ANYTHING COMING OUT ON THAT FRONT?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, I THINK WE WILL -- THE PRESIDENT WILL AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN PERSON AND AT GREATER LENGTH, YOU KNOW, WHAT HAPPENED, FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE HOUSTON SUMMIT, WHAT IT MEANS, OUR HOPE THAT THE IMF AND WORLD BANK REVIEW WILL BE USEFUL, NOT ONLY IN ASCERTAINING HOW THE WEST MIGHT BE ABLE TO BE HELPFUL, BUT IN GIVING SOME GUIDELINES TO THE SOVIETS AS TO WHAT KINDS OF ECONOMIC MOVES MIGHT BE USEFUL. I THINK THAT WILL BE -- CERTAINLY BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE DISCUSSION.

Q THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE CONCERNED THAT THE US WILL WANT TO MAINTAIN A PERMANENT FORCE IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CLEARLY THAT WAS SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE IN US INTERESTS. WHAT POSITION WILL THE US BE CARRYING TO HELSINKI ON THAT -- ON THAT ISSUE?

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: ON A PERMANENT PRESENCE?

Q YEAH, AS PART -- YOU KNOW, HARDWARE -- THERE'S A -- THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF MAINTAINING A LARGE SORT OF ARSENAL OF HARDWARE THERE SO THAT -- AND A SMALL MANPOWER FORCE SO THAT MORE COULD BE AIRLIFTED IN SO THAT THEIR EQUIPMENT WOULD ALREADY BE THERE

SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: WELL, I'D -- YOU KNOW, I DON'T -- I DOUBT THAT WE WOULD GET INTO SORT OF THAT THING, BUT I THINK THAT A

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF SECURITY IN THE GULF, ASSUMING THE  
SANCTIONS WORKED, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD BE A SUBJECT IN WHICH THE TWO  
WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED AND WOULD DISCUSS HOW THAT MIGHT BE -- HOW  
THAT MIGHT BE PRESERVED.

THANKS A LOT.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 7366

אל: רהמש/427

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 93, תא: 090990, זח: 1337, דח: מ, סג: בל,

בבב

בלמס/מיידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת - ארה"ב

דע: ניו יורק - בהול - עבור פמליית שה"ח

1. רצב התמליל המלא של מסיבת העיתונאים המשותפת של הנשיאים בוש וגורבצ'וב בתום ועידת הפיסגה בהלסינקי.

2. תשומת לבכם להתייחסות בנושא ועידה בינ"ל, הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי ותהליך השלום.

חלק 1 מתוך 2

NT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH US PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH AND SOVIET  
SIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV (PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S REMARKS THROUGH  
ERPRETER)/HELSINKI, FINLAND/SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1990

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I'VE BEEN ADVISED THAT I'M TO TAKE THE  
FIRST QUESTION, AND IF SO, I WOULD IDENTIFY HELEN THOMAS OF THE UP.

Q I'D LIKE TO ASK BOTH PRESIDENTS WHETHER WE ARE GOING TO  
HAVE A WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AND I'D LIKE TO FOLLOW UP.

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, WITH YOUR PERMISSION, MR. PRESIDENT, I  
HOPE THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, AND THE WAY TO DO THAT  
IS TO HAVE IRAQ COMPLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. AND I  
THINK THAT PART OF OUR JOINT STATEMENT, TWO SHORT LINES, SAID IT  
MOST CLEARLY: "NOTHING SHORT OF THE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IS ACCEPTABLE." AS SOON  
AS SADDAM HUSSEIN REALIZES THAT, THEN THERE CERTAINLY WILL BE A  
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THIS QUESTION.

Q HOW ABOUT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV? WHAT DO YOU THINK?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: IN REPLYING TO YOUR QUESTION, I SHOULD  
LIKE TO SAY THAT THE WHOLE OF OUR SEVEN HOURS OF MEETING TODAY WERE  
DEVOTED TO THE QUEST FOR A POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THAT CONFLICT.  
AND I BELIEVE THAT WE'RE ON THE RIGHT ROAD.

Q I SAID, YOU ARE INDICATING THAT THERE COULD BE HOSTILITIES.

PRESIDENT BUSH: THE UNITED -- UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO  
SEE THESE RESOLUTIONS ENFORCED, AND I LIKE TO FEEL THAT THEY WILL BE  
ENFORCED AND THAT THAT WILL RESULT IN A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION.

Q MY QUESTION TO MR. PRESIDENT -- MY NAME IS PANYI (PH).  
DO YOU THINK, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE CONFLICT OF THE -- DO YOU



THINK, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE CONFLICT OF THE GULF GIVES THE OPPORTUNITY TO SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST? AND MY SECOND QUESTION IS IF THIS PROBLEM WAS DISCUSSED TODAY WITH MR. GORBACHEV?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, LET ME SAY THAT I SEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE NEED TO SOLVE THE OTHER QUESTION. THAT QUESTION HAS BEEN ON THE AGENDA OF MANY COUNTRIES FOR MANY YEARS, AND IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THAT QUESTION BE RESOLVED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE OTHER DAY, AND I STRONGLY SUPPORT THAT, THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THE CONSIDERATION OF A CONFERENCE OF THAT NATURE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE -- INDEED, IT'S BEEN A PART OF OUR POLICY FROM TIME TO TIME. BUT THE THING THAT I FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT IS THAT THESE ISSUES ARE NOT LINKED. AND ANY EFFORT TO LINK THEM IS AN EFFORT TO DILUTE THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

Q (THROUGH INTERPRETER.) A QUESTION TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM SOVIET RADIO AND TELEVISION. HOW LONG WILL UNITED STATES BE -- TROOPS BE PRESENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THEY WILL BE PRESENT IN THE -- IN THE AREA UNTIL WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE AREA HAVE BEEN MET, AND THAT THESE RESOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH. AND THE SOONER THEY ARE OUT OF THERE, AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED, THE BETTER. I MADE VERY CLEAR TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, AS I THINK HE WILL CONFIRM, THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION KEEPING THEM A DAY LONGER THAN IS REQUIRED. AND SO, I'D LEAVE IT RIGHT THERE.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I'D LIKE TO ADD SOMETHING, AND TO CONFIRM WHAT PRESIDENT -- THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS JUST SAID TO ME IN OUR CONVERSATION, THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DO NOT INTEND TO LEAVE THEIR FORCES IN THE ZONE. AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE CHANGE OR THE NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION, THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION, AND PERSONALLY THE PRESIDENT, WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT THE FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN FROM THE REGION -- FROM THE ZONE. AND THAT'S A VERY IMPORTANT STATEMENT.

Q I HAVE A QUESTION FOR BOTH PRESIDENTS. THE UNITY THAT YOU'RE EXPRESSING TODAY DOESN'T IGNORE THE FACT THAT THERE ARE STILL SOME IRRITANTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. PRESIDENT BUSH, ARE YOU MORE SYMPATHETIC NOW TO SUGGESTIONS OF WESTERN ECONOMIC AID TO THE SOVIET UNION? AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS FROM IRAQ?

PRESIDENT BUSH: FOR MY PART, I AM VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN ASSISTING TO BE SURE THAT PERESTROIKA IS SUCCESSFUL. WE INDEED HAVE A MISSION OF HIGH-LEVEL BUSINESSMEN ON THEIR WAY TO THE SOVIET UNION RIGHT NOW. THEY HAPPEN TO BE IN HELSINKI. THIS IS BUT ONE MANIFESTATION OF THE FACT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO ENCOURAGE ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN AS MANY WAYS AS POSSIBLE. AND WE HAD A GOOD, LONG DISCUSSION IN OUR EXPANDED MEETING THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT THAT. AND I -- I AM GIVEN THE -- THE COMMON STAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE TAKEN AT THE UNITED NATIONS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD BE AS FORTHCOMING AS WE POSSIBLY CAN IN TERMS OF ECONOMICS, AND I PLAN TO DO THAT.

THERE ARE CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS, AS YOU SAY, THERE ARE CERTAIN

NUANCES OF DIFFERENCE. THERE ARE CERTAIN DIFFERENCES, REAL DIFFERENCES. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, I HAVE SAID BEFORE AND I'LL REPEAT IT HERE IN FRONT OF ALL THIS -- JOURNALISTS FROM ALL AROUND THE WORLD, WE, OF COURSE, WANT PERESTROIKA TO SUCCEED. IT IS AN INTERNAL MATTER OF THE -- OF THE SOVIET UNION, BUT I THINK THIS REMARKABLE COOPERATION THAT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE SOVIET UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS GETS ME INCLINED TO RECOMMEND AS CLOSE COOPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD AS POSSIBLE, AND I WILL BE SAYING THIS TO THE CONGRESS WHEN I GET BACK.

WE STILL HAVE PROBLEMS. LOOK, WE'VE GOT SOME BIG PROBLEMS OURSELVES IN OUR ECONOMY, AND WE ARE NOT IN THE POSITION, OPERATING AT THE ENORMOUS DEFICITS, TO WRITE OUT LARGE CHECKS. HAVING SAID THAT, THERE ARE MANY WAYS THAT WE CAN ENDEAVOR TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO THE -- TO THE EMERGING ECONOMY IN THE SOVIET UNION.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: AND THERE WAS A QUESTION ALSO ADDRESSED TO ME. I WOULD LIKE, NEVERTHELESS, ON THE QUESTION WHICH DID APPEAR ALSO TO BE ADDRESSED TO ME -- THE WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET -- I WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE. THE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH IS CONTINUING ON THE WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION. I SEE THAT THERE IS AN ATTEMPT BEING MADE TO LINK -- TO ESTABLISH A LINK BETWEEN THIS AND DISAGREEMENTS OR THE LACK OF DISAGREEMENTS. AND IN RESPONSE TO THAT, I WOULD SAY THE FOLLOWING.

WE BEGAN OUR CONVERSATION TODAY TOGETHER BY REVIEWING THE SITUATION AND REALIZING THAT THE WHOLE OF WORLD SOCIETY AND OUR TWO GREAT STATES ARE UNDERGOING A TRIAL. THIS IS A TEST OF THE DURABILITY OF THE NEW APPROACH TO RESOLVING WORLD PROBLEMS. AND AS WE ENTER UPON A NEW PEACEFUL PERIOD AND AS WE EMERGE FROM THE COLD WAR, WE SEE THAT NO LESS (INAUDIBLE) ARE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO FIND WAYS AND MEANS IN THIS PERIOD OF PEACE TO MEET THE NEW SITUATION AND TO TACKLE ALL PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE.

I THINK IF IT HADN'T BEEN FOR MALTA, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO ACT IN THE VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION WHICH AROSE IN EASTERN EUROPE -- IN EUROPE, AND IN THE SITUATION CONNECTED WITH THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY. I THINK THAT IF, FOLLOWING THAT, THERE HADN'T BEEN WASHINGTON AND CAMP DAVID AND THE OTHER MEETINGS ON THIS LEVEL WITH OTHER PARTNERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WE WOULD NOW BE IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION FACING THE CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

AND THE FACT THAT TODAY WE HAVE TAKEN A COMMON APPROACH TO SUCH DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS WHICH MAY WELL HAVE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WHOLE WORLD, NOT JUST FOR THE PEOPLES OF THAT REGION, DEMONSTRATES THAT WE STILL ARE MOVING FORWARD IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND THAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF RESOLVING THE MOST DIFFICULT AND THE MOST ACUTE PROBLEMS AND TO FIND APPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME. AND THE GREATER PART OF OUR CONVERSATION TOGETHER WAS DEVOTED TO THIS.

AND I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT TO BEAR IN MIND. DIFFERENCES, NUANCES IN THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW, ARGUMENTS -- THESE CAN BE -- THESE ARE NATURAL. IT'S NATURAL THAT THOSE SHOULD ARISE. BUT WHAT WE HAVE SEEN TODAY IS THAT WE HAVE CONFIRMED THE MOST IMPORTANT PROGRESS OF RECENT TIME. NOW I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE IRAQI QUESTION, BUT IN FACT, I HAVEN'T QUITE FINISHED ON THE FIRST SUBJECT.

I WOULDN'T WANT PRESIDENT BUSH'S REPLY TO GIVE RISE TO THE



OPINION THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS GOING TO ALIGN A CERTAIN SUM WITH A CERTAIN BEHAVIOR. WE ARE ACTING IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION. WE ARE FINDING A SOLUTION -- WE SHALL FIND A SOLUTION WHICH WILL BE SATISFACTORY AND, ABOVE ALL, WHICH WILL REMOVE THE DANGER OF AN EXPLOSION. AND THIS IS BECOMING A NORMAL ELEMENT OF THE NEW KIND OF COOPERATION IN TRADE, IN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN EXCHANGE. ALL OF THESE ELEMENTS CHARACTERIZE THE NEW PEACEFUL PERIOD UPON WHICH WE ARE JUST NOW EMBARKED AND WHICH WE HAVE TO GET USED TO.

IT WOULD BE VERY OVER-SIMPLIFIED AND VERY SUPERFICIAL TO JUDGE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE BOUGHT FOR DOLLARS, BECAUSE ALTHOUGH WE DO LOOK FORWARD TO COOPERATION IN THIS VERY SERIOUS TIME OF FAR-REACHING CHANGES IN OUR ECONOMY, AND THAT'S NORMAL, LET'S REMEMBER THE REFORMS OF RECENT YEARS. IN A NUMBER OF STATES, THEY ALWAYS, IN ADDITION TO THE PRINCIPAL EFFORTS MADE BY THE PEOPLES CONCERNED THEMSELVES, THEY ALWAYS INVOLVED ALSO THE PARTICIPATION OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. SO IF ANYBODY WANTS TO TRY TO IMPOSE A DIFFERENT VIEW, THAT'S UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT'S UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES. IT'S UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO ANY OTHER STATE.

NOW, TO MOVE ON TO THE SECOND PART OF YOUR QUESTION CONCERNING OUR EXPERTS IN IRAQ. THEY ARE NOT SO MUCH ADVISERS AS SPECIALISTS OR EXPERTS WHO ARE WORKING UNDER CONTRACT, AND THEIR NUMBER IS BEING REDUCED. WHEREAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, I THINK THERE WERE STILL 196 OF THEM; THERE ARE NOW SOME 150 OF THEM. AND THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP LOOKS UPON THE MATTER THUS, THAT IF THEY HAVEN'T COMPLETED THEIR WORK -- THEIR NORMAL WORK UNDER CONTRACT, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE A MATTER OF WEAPONS, THEN THEY ARE, NEVERTHELESS, LEAVING IRAQ AND THE PROCESS IS GOING FORWARD. SO I DON'T REALLY THINK THERE'S A PROBLEM.

Q (THROUGH INTERPRETER.) IZVESTIYA. QUESTION TO BOTH PRESIDENTS. DID YOU DISCUSS ANY POSSIBLE MILITARY OPTIONS FOR CURBING IRAQI AGGRESSION? AND WHAT WOULD BE THE CONDITIONS, AND WHAT WOULD BE THE POINT WHERE YOU WOULD CONSIDER THAT THE POLITICAL OPTIONS WERE EXHAUSTED AND IT WAS TIME TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TALK ABOUT -- THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDING AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS NO. WE DID NOT DISCUSS MILITARY OPTIONS. AND YOUR QUESTION IS TOO HYPOTHETICAL. AND I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS MATTER PEACEFULLY RESOLVED.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I WOULD LIKE TO SUPPORT WHAT WAS SAID BY PRESIDENT BUSH, AND I STRESS ONCE MORE THAT THE WHOLE OF OUR TIME TOGETHER WAS SPENT ON TALKING ABOUT THIS CONFLICT IN A MUTUAL SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. AND I THINK WE CAN LOOK WITH OPTIMISM IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS ON THE EFFORTS BEING TAKEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WORKING TOGETHER WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE UN.

Q MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH, YOU WERE JUST SAYING THAT IF IRAQ DOESN'T WITHDRAW ITS FORCES PEACEFULLY, THEN IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO TAKE MILITARY STEPS. WHAT KIND OF SOVIET CONTRIBUTION WILL THERE BE TO THOSE MILITARY STEPS? AND WHAT WILL HAPPEN THEN TO THE SOVIET CITIZENS WHO ARE IN IRAQ NOW? AND WHAT WILL THE ARAB FACTOR BE?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: FIRSTLY, I DID NOT SAY THAT IF IRAQ DOES NOT WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY, WE'RE GOING TO HAVE RECOURSE TO MILITARY METHODS. I DID NOT STATE THAT. I DO NOT STATE THAT. AND MOREOVER,



IN MY VIEW, THAT WOULD DRAW US INTO CONSEQUENCES WHICH WE CAN'T AT THIS STAGE FORECAST AND THEREFORE, OUR COUNTRY AND THE UNITED NATIONS AS A WHOLE HAS A WHOLE RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. THEREFORE, I WOULD LIMIT OURSELVES TO THAT AND THEREFORE THE SECOND PART OF YOUR QUESTION IS IRRELEVANT.

Q IF I COULD ASK PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, SPECIFICALLY, IRAQ HAD BEEN YOUR ALLY. WHAT DIRECTLY HAVE YOU DONE IN CONTACT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN TO REVERSE THE SITUATION THERE? AND PRESIDENT BUSH, WHAT SPECIFICALLY HAVE YOU ASKED MR. GORBACHEV TO DO DIRECTLY? HAVE YOU ASKED HIM TO MAKE A DIRECT CONTACT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I SHOULD SAY THAT FROM THE START OF THE CRISIS, WE'VE BEEN ACTIVELY EXCHANGING VIEWS AND CARRYING FORTH DIALOGUE NOT ONLY WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, NOT ONLY WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE USA. THESE TYPES OF CONTACT HAVE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US, BUT WE ARE ALSO HOLDING ACTIVE DIALOGUE WITH LEADERSHIP OF CHINA, OF INDIA, OF ALL THE OTHER EUROPEAN STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AND IN MY VIEW, IT'S THIS DIALOGUE WHICH HAS HELPED US TOWARDS THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH WAS PASSED.

ON TOP OF THAT, WE ARE ALSO ACTIVELY COOPERATING WITH THE ARAB STATES, THE COUNTRIES OF THE ARAB WORLD. AND HERE OUR DIALOGUE IS NO LESS INTENSIVE THAN WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE COUNTRIES I PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, INCLUDING DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT HUSSEIN. AND I CAN STATE THAT WHAT WE HAVE ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY IS ALSO BEING SAID TO PRESIDENT HUSSEIN IN OUR DIALOGUE WITH HIM WHICH ALL MEANS THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE LEADERSHIP OF IRAQ ARE EXPECTED TO SHOW A REASONABLE APPROACH TO STOP AND TO UNDERSTAND WHAT IS IMPLIED BY THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THIS ISSUE.

THIS IS THE DIALOGUE WHICH WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN WITH HIM. AND WE ARE TRYING TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR ARGUMENTS ARE CONVINCING. WE DISCUSSED VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR ENDING THE SITUATION WITH HIM AND WE ARE ALSO ATTEMPTING, AS I ALREADY SAID, TO MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR TO SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT IF IRAQ WERE TO PROVOKE MILITARY ACTION, THEN THE RESULT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY FIRST AND FOREMOST FOR THE IRAQI PEOPLE THEMSELVES, FOR THE WHOLE OF THE REGION AND FOR THE WHOLE OF THE WORLD.

YOU KNOW, THIS IS, OF COURSE, A DIALOGUE IN A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION. BUT WE CONSIDER IT A VERY USEFUL DIALOGUE AND WE DON'T EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING NEW CONTACTS, OF HAVING NEW MEETINGS AT VARIOUS LEVELS. AND THE TYPE OF COMMUNICATION WHICH WE HAVE HAD UP UNTIL NOW WITH THE IRAQIS GIVES US HOPE THAT THOSE LINKS WE HAVE WITH THEM CAN BE USED POSITIVELY FOR THE SAKE OF ALL OF US, FOR THE SAKE OF FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, AND ESPECIALLY OF PREVENTING THE SITUATION TURNING INTO AGGRESSION, IN THIS SITUATION.

PRESIDENT BUSH: (CHUCKLES.) PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ANSWERED THE QUESTION ABOUT THE CONTACT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. AND CLEARLY YOUR QUESTION TO ME IS, HAVE I ASKED HIM TO CONTACT SADDAM HUSSEIN? THE ANSWER IS NO. BUT THE SOVIET UNION IS IN CONTACT. HE HIMSELF RECEIVED THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AZIZ. BUT I WOULD JUST SIMPLY SUM IT UP BY SAYING THE BEST ANSWER TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, OR THE BEST CONTACT IS THE CONTACT THAT TOOK PLACE AT THE UNITED NATIONS WHEN THERE WAS

WORLD-WIDE CONDEMNATION OF THE AGGRESSION.

AND I HAPPEN TO FEEL THAT THIS STATEMENT SHOWING THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES IN ESSENTIAL AGREEMENT HERE IS ANOTHER GOOD STATEMENT FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN. AND HOPEFULLY HE WILL SEE THAT HE IS NOT GOING TO DIVIDE US AND DIVIDE OTHER COUNTRIES AND THAT HE WILL DO WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE DONE SOME TIME AGO, AND THAT IS, COMPLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS. SO -- BUT I DID NOT ASK HIM TO DO THAT, BECAUSE THEY'RE WAY AHEAD OF US ON THAT. THEY ARE HAVING CONTACTS AND TRYING TO BE HELPFUL IN THAT REGARD.

Q (THROUGH INTERPRETER.) PRAVDA. I HAVE A QUESTION TO MR. BUSH. MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT IS YOUR POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF SIGNING A TREATY LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS? AND WHEN DO YOU THINK THAT SUCH A TREATY WILL IN FACT BE SIGNED?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE STILL REMAIN COMMITTED TO A STRATEGIC ARMS TREATY. WE VOWED THAT WE WOULD ENCOURAGE OUR NEGOTIATORS TO MOVE FORWARD MORE RAPIDLY ON BOTH THE STRATEGIC ARMS TREATY AND THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE AGREEMENT. AND I'M STILL HOPEFUL THAT BY THE END OF THE YEAR WE WILL HAVE SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: SHOULD I HIT IT AGAIN? I THINK IT'S WORKING. I'D LIKE TO CONFIRM WHAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAS JUST SAID, THAT WE REALLY HAVE AGREED TO MAKE FRESH EFFORTS TO GIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, BECAUSE WE SEE THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY SUCCESSFULLY TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THOSE TWO FORA AND TO COME UP WITH POSITIVE RESULTS IN THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR.

Q OKAY, MY QUESTION IS -- GOOD EVENING, DORIS AKATARIAN (PH) FROM PALESTINE NEWS AGENCY, Wafa. MY QUESTION IS FOR PRESIDENT BUSH, AND I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HEAR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS ON THAT.

Q PRESIDENT BUSH MENTIONED THAT YOU FAILED TO SEE THE LINK BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND THE PRESENT SITUATION. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW COME IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO IMPLEMENT UN RESOLUTIONS IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE WHEN OTHER STANDING ONES HAVE -- HAVE BEEN FROZEN AND OVERLOOKED AND DISREGARDED FOR SO LONG? SO, I'D LIKE TO KNOW HOW COME THIS AGGRESSION IS SO DIFFERENT FROM OTHER ONES; AND I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ADD THAT I PERSONALLY FEEL THAT THE PALESTINIAN DILEMMA AND QUESTION NEED THE ATTENTION OF THE SUPERPOWERS MORE THAN EVER. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I AGREE THAT IT NEEDS IT, AND WE ARE VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN IMPLEMENTING ~~RESOLUTION 242~~ OF THE UNITED NATIONS. WE'VE BEEN ZEALOUSLY TRYING TO DO THAT AS HAVE MANY OTHER POWERS FOR MANY YEARS. BUT THE FACT THAT THAT RESOLUTION HASN'T BEEN FULFILLED WHEN IT CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES, AND IT SHOULD BE, AND HOPEFULLY WE CAN BE CATALYTIC IN SEEING THAT HAPPEN, DOES NOT MEAN THAT YOU SIT IDLE BY IN THE FACE OF A NAKED AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT. AND THE UNITED NATIONS HAS MOVED, AND THE UNITED NATIONS' RESOLUTIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON THEIR FACE WITHOUT TRYING TO TIE IT INTO SOME OTHER UNDISSOLVED -- UNRESOLVED DISPUTE. BUT I COULDN'T AGREE MORE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THAT QUESTION EVENTUALLY, AND HOPEFULLY SOONER THAN LATER, BE RESOLVED.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I THINK THAT EVERYTHING THAT IS TAKING



PLACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO US, OF EQUAL CONCERN. AND EVEN MORE THAN IN THE CASE OF THE PERSIAN GULF, WE NEED TO ACT MORE ENERGETICALLY IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE COMPLEX OF PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TO COME UP WITH DECISIONS AND TO DEVISE A SYSTEM, TO DEVISE GUARANTEES THAT WOULD ENSURE THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLES AND OF THE WHOLE WORLD COMMUNITY, BECAUSE IT'S A MATTER WHICH IS OF VITAL CONCERN TO ALL OF US. AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE IS A LINK HERE BECAUSE THE FAILURE TO FIND A SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AT LARGE ALSO HAS A BEARING ON THE ACUTENESS OF THE PARTICULAR CONFLICT WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT HERE.

Q A QUESTION FOR BOTH PRESIDENTS, PLEASE. IN YOUR STATEMENT, YOU PLEDGED TO WORK INDIVIDUALLY AND IN CONCERT TO ENSURE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. MAY I INQUIRE WHAT, IF ANY, SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE STEPS YOU HAVE AGREED TO TAKE IN FURTHERANCE OF THAT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE DIDN'T AGREE TO SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE STEPS. I THINK PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN THE CONTACTS HE'S HAD WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN, AND IF -- I MEAN, WITH THE IRAQIS -- AND IF THEY CONTINUE, WILL BE A STEP IN THAT DIRECTION. CLEARLY, THIS MESSAGE ITSELF WILL BE A STEP IN THAT DIRECTION. BUT WE DID NOT SIT AT THIS MEETING AND TRY TO ASSIGN EACH OTHER OR ASK EACH OTHER TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC MEASURES IN KEEPING WITH THAT PARTICULAR -- PARTICULAR PARAGRAPH.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I'D LIKE TO ADD TO THAT THAT THE EMPHASIS HERE IS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POLITICAL FACT THAT WE FEEL NECESSARY TO REFLECT IN THIS STATEMENT, WHICH TESTIFIES TO OUR POLITICAL WILL TO ACT JOINTLY, OR IN PARALLEL -- INDEPENDENTLY REALLY -- IN SEARCH OF THESE NEW STEPS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. I THINK THAT FOR THE MEETING AND THE DOCUMENT ON -- THAT WE'VE JUST ADOPTED IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN OUR ENUMERATING VARIOUS STEPS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN TAKEN HERE. THAT FORMS THE BASIS FOR THE FURTHER ACTIVE QUEST FOR SOLUTIONS.

Q (THROUGH INTERPRETER.) TASS -- SOVIET TASS AGENCY. I ALSO HAVE A QUESTION TO THE PRESIDENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. MR. PRESIDENT -- MR. GORBACHEV FIRST OF ALL. SINCE THE LAST MEETING, IT SEEMS TO BE THAT YOU'VE HAD A GOOD MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. HAVE YOU SUCCEEDED IN DEEPENING THAT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE COURSE OF TODAY'S MEETING AND HOW, IN GENERAL, WHAT BEARING IN GENERAL IS THAT FACTOR HAVING ON THE RESULTS OF YOUR NEGOTIATIONS?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK CLEARLY THERE HAS BEEN A DEVELOPED -- A DEVELOPING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OVER THE YEARS. I LIKE TO FEEL, AND I THINK PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AGREES, THAT OUR MEETING IN MALTA HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH FURTHERING THAT UNDERSTANDING. I'M CONVINCED THAT OUR MEETING IN THE UNITED STATES AT CAMP DAVID PARTICULARLY FURTHERED THAT UNDERSTANDING. BUT I'M NOT -- I THINK THE WORLD SEES CLEARLY THAT IF THIS HAD OCCURRED 20 YEARS AGO, THERE WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN THIS COOPERATIVE FEELING AT THE UNITED NATIONS. AND I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT.

SO I DON'T KNOW HOW ONE QUANTIFIES MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, BUT I FEEL WE'RE MOVING ON THE RIGHT TRACK. NEITHER OF US WHEN WE TALK TRY TO HIDE OUR DIFFERENCES. NEITHER OF US TRY TO INDICATE THAT WE LOOK AT EXACTLY EVERY PROBLEM EXACTLY THE SAME WAY. BUT THE VERY FACT WE CAN TALK WITH THAT DEGREE OF FRANKNESS, WITHOUT RANCOR,



I THINK, ENHANCES MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

AND THEN WHEN WE SEE US ON A QUESTION OF THIS NATURE, STANDING SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH MANY OTHER COUNTRIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS, I THINK IT IS OBVIOUS MANIFESTATION OF THIS DEVELOPING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. IT'S A VERY BROAD PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION, BUT DIFFERENCES STILL REMAIN. BUT THE COMMON GROUND, IN MY VIEW, AT LEAST, SURGES AHEAD OF THESE DIFFERENCES. AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I DON'T KNOW IF I WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TELL YOU A SECRET HERE. I HAVEN'T ASKED PRESIDENT BUSH IF HE'LL LET ME. BUT I MUST ADMIT THAT I'M DYING TO TAKE THE RISK AND TELL YOU, BUT IT'S TOO IMPORTANT TO GIVE YOU AN ANSWER TO THIS PARTICULAR QUESTION. BUT THAT LAST SENTENCE DOES REALLY GIVE ME THE HOPE THAT WE'LL GET BY. IN OUR TALKS, THE PRESIDENT SAID, "YOU KNOW, THERE WAS A LONG TIME WHEN OUR VIEW WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOTHING TO DO IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE WAS -- HAD NO BUSINESS BEING THERE." THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT WE HAD TO TALK THROUGH DURING THIS MEETING HERE IN HELSINKI, AND WHAT WAS SAID HERE IS THAT IT'S VERY IMPORTANT FOR US TO COOPERATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, JUST AS IT IS ON OTHER ISSUES OF WORLD POLITICS. SO THAT IS AN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION.

IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT AT EACH MEETING WE MOVE FORWARD. WE ENRICH OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND I THINK I SHOULD SAY THAT WE INCREASE OUR TRUST. IF TRUST IS ENGENDERED BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF TWO SUCH NATIONS DURING MEETINGS OF THIS KIND, THEN I'M SURE YOU'LL AGREE WITH ME THAT THAT IS TO THE GOOD OF ALL OF US. WHETHER WE WANT IT OR NOT, HISTORY DICTATES THAT A LOT IS GOING TO DEPEND ON WHETHER

עד כאן חלק 1 מתוך 2

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס

7367:חוזם,אאא  
אל:רהמש/429  
מ:-וושנגטון,נר:94,תא:090990,זח:1338,דח:מ,סג:בל,  
בבב  
בלמס/מיידי

אל: תפוצת תקשורת - ארה"ב

דע: ניו יורק - בהול - עבור פמליית שה"ח

המשך לנר 93 - חלק 2 מתוך 2

THE TWO COUNTRIES CAN WORK TOGETHER. THAT'S NOT OUR AMBITION; IT'S JUST THE WAY THAT HISTORY HAS GONE.

SO FAR FROM EXCLUDING SUCH A POSSIBILITY, WE INTEND TO COOPERATE WITH ALL SORTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL, MORE AND MORE. THAT'S HOW WE SEE OUR ROLE IN THE WORLD DEVELOPING.

AND MY LAST COMMENT IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE WAY THE WORLD IS, THE WAY THE WORLD IS CHANGING, IN TODAY'S WORLD, NO SINGLE COUNTRY, HOWEVER POWERFUL, WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE LEADERSHIP WHICH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES FORMERLY TRIED TO PROVIDE, INCLUDING SOME COUNTRIES WHICH ARE REPRESENTED HERE. WE CAN ONLY SUCCEED IF WE WORK TOGETHER AND SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS TOGETHER. THAT IS WHAT IS EMERGING FROM THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT WE CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT.

Q MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH, FROM FRENCH TELEVISION -- I'M GOING TO SPEAK FRENCH IF I MAY. COULD I ASK MR. GORBACHEV WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION IS STILL IRAQ'S FRIEND AS MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ DECLARED IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK? ARE YOU STILL THE FRIEND OF SADDAM HUSSEIN?

AND ANOTHER QUESTION, ALSO DIRECTED TO MR. GORBACHEV: PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN STATED YESTERDAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS A GREAT POWER BY RESISTING GEORGE BUSH'S PRESSURE AND BY SUPPORTING THE BAGHDAD REGIME. COULD YOU INDICATE TO ME, IF YOU WOULD, WHAT YOUR REPLY WOULD BE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I WILL REPLY TO YOU, AND SO I DON'T HAVE TO REPEAT IT ALSO TO SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE SAME REPLY THAT I'VE GIVEN TO PREVIOUS QUESTIONS. MY POSITION IS UNCHANGED. WE SEE OUR ROLE AND OUR RESPONSIBILITY, AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THAT RESPONSIBILITY WE SHALL ACT IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AND IN THIS INSTANCE, I CAN ONCE AGAIN SAY, SINCE WE ARE SITTING HERE, TWO PRESIDENTS TOGETHER, I SHALL INTERACT AND COOPERATE WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

I'D VERY MUCH LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL -- WILL DISPLAY -- I REALLY HOPE THAT HE WILL -- WILL DISPLAY SOBRIETY, WILL LOOK CAREFULLY AT THE WHOLE



SITUATION AND WILL RESPOND TO THE APPEALS AND THE DEMANDS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND THAT HE WILL TAKE STEPS THAT ARE SUITABLE TO THE SITUATION, THAT ARE CAREFULLY WEIGHED IN THEIR WORLDWIDE IMPLICATIONS AND IN THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARAB WORLD TOO.

NO ONE HAS ANY INTENTION OF TRYING TO EXCLUDE IRAQ FROM THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, BUT WHAT THE PRESENT IRAQI LEADERSHIP IS DOING IS -- IS DRIVING INTO A DEAD END, AND I HOPE THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL HEED THIS APPEAL TO HIM.

Q LET ME JUST PRESS ON HERE, IF I MAY. I HAVE A -- LADIES FIRST, RIGHT? OHHH, OKAY, OKAY. I'D LIKE TO ASK MR. GORBACHEV IF YOU HAVE RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THIS EFFORT IN ANY SENSE, EITHER AS PART OF THE NAVAL BLOCKADE OR AS PART OF SOME FUTURE PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE REGION? AND I WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH A QUESTION TO MR. BUSH -- TO WHAT DEGREE THAT WOULD BE A DISAPPOINTMENT TO YOU IF -- IF THAT'S MR. GORBACHEV'S POSITION?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I DON'T SEE THE POINT OF DOING THAT NOW, AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO ACT IN COOPERATION WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ALL OF ITS DECISIONS.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'M NOT DISAPPOINTED IN THAT ANSWER.  
(LAUGHTER.)

Q YOU SAID YOU'RE DETERMINED TO SEE THIS AGGRESSION END, AND YOU'RE -- AND CURRENT STEPS ARE BEING CONSIDERED. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? WHAT COMES NEXT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: IT'S TOO HYPOTHETICAL. WE WANT TO SEE THIS -- WE WANT TO SEE THE MESSAGE GET THROUGH TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE WANT TO SEE HIM DO WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS CALLS ON HIM TO DO. AND THAT STATEMENT CAN BE INTERPRETED ANY WAY YOU WANT TO INTERPRET IT, BUT IT'S OUT THERE AND I WOULD SIMPLY NOT GO INTO ANY HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS THAT WOULD LEAD ME BEYOND WHAT THAT STATEMENT SAYS.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: PLEASE, IF YOU'D -- IF YOU WOULD -- EXCUSE ME, I'LL ADD A COUPLE OF WORDS -- JUST TO WHAT MR. BUSH HAS ALREADY SAID.

YOU KNOW, IN MY VIEW, I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT BOTH THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN SOME COUNTRIES IS IN SOME WAYS SAYING THAT THERE'S A LACK OF DECISION ON SOMEBODY'S PART, THAT WE'RE WITHDRAWING IN THE FACE OF THOSE WHO ARE TRAMPLING ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. I CANNOT AGREE WITH THAT VIEW. IN FACT, IT'S A VIEW WHICH CAUSES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF EMBARRASSMENT TO THE LEADERSHIP OF NATIONS WHICH ARE ACTING THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THIS RESPECT.

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE UP TILL NOW IN ANSWER TO IRAQI AGGRESSION IS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN NOT ONLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT THERE HAS BEEN UNANIMOUS WORLD OPINION -- A KIND OF SOLIDARITY WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN EXPRESSED BEFORE IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD. AND WE HAVE PREVENTED THE AGGRESSION GOING ANY FURTHER. WE HAVE PRESERVED THE FUNCTIONING OF THE STRUCTURES WHICH ARE OF ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE, WHICH WOULD AFFECT SO MANY OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL. AND FINALLY, THE RESOLUTION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON AN



EMBARGO, WHICH IS A VERY STIFF MEASURE, IN REACTION TO THE AGGRESSION.

IN MY VIEW, THIS IS A STRATEGIC WAY OF TACKLING THE QUESTION, WHICH HAS BEEN TACKLED SUCCESSFULLY AT THE FIRST STAGES. AND WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE NEXT STAGE OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION, ACHIEVED POLITICALLY, TO PUT AN END TO THIS ACUTE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND MAKE SURE THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE, THAT IN THIS SITUATION DECISIVENESS, WILLPOWER AND RESPONSIBILITY AND POLITICAL FAITH IN THE POSSIBILITY OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THIS VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE SHOWS THAT THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE WORLD ARE BEING RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR OWN NATIONS AND TO THE WORLD. AND WE DO NOT WANT TO GET CAUGHT UP IN ARGUMENTS ABOUT PRESTIGE AND SO ON.

Q (NAME INAUDIBLE) FROM THE FINNISH TELEVISION. CONCERNING THE HUMANITARIAN AID, DOES YOUR JOINT STATEMENT MEAN IN PRACTICE THAT YOU CONSIDER THAT FOOD SHOULD BE NOW ALLOWED TO IRAQ?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: THE PRESIDENTS FEEL IT NECESSARY TO REFLECT IN OUR JOINT DECLARATION THAT WE SEE THE NEED TO UPHOLD WHAT WAS DECIDED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THIS SUBJECT AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS PREPARED TO ADMIT FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES THE SUPPLY OF MEDICINES AND OF FOODSTUFFS REQUIRED FIRST AND FOREMOST FOR CHILDREN. WE'VE ACTUALLY STATED THIS QUITE PLAINLY IN OUR STATEMENT. AND SO WE'VE TAKEN A VERY CLEAR CUT POSITION ON THAT. BUT WE'VE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THIS MUST TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND BEING MONITORED BY THEM AT STAGES IN THE OPERATION. SO I THINK THAT THIS HAS BEEN STATED IN THE CORRECT TERMS.

PRESIDENT BUSH: (OFF MIKE) -- PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ON THAT POINT, AND THAT THE LANGUAGE IS VERY GOOD BECAUSE IT DOES EXPRESS THE CONCERN THAT BOTH COUNTRIES FEEL IN THE EVENT THERE ACTUALLY ARE CHILDREN AND OTHERS WHO ARE SUFFERING BECAUSE OF LACK OF FOOD. I HOPE THAT NOBODY AROUND THE WORLD INTERPRETS THIS AS OUR VIEW THAT NOW THERE SHOULD BE WHOLESALE FOOD SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ BECAUSE I CAN SPEAK ONLY HERE FOR THE -- FOR THE UNITED STATES WHEN I WOULD CALL ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT WE NEED SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO SEE THAT THERE IS THIS HUMANITARIAN CONCERN AS EXPRESSED, THIS EXCEPTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS EMBARGO FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES, AND NOT ONLY IS IT REQUIRED FOR THIS HUMANITARIAN CIRCUMSTANCE, BUT THAT THE FOOD GETS WHERE IT IS SUPPOSED TO GO.

SO THIS SHOULD NOT BE FROM THE US STANDPOINT INTERPRETED AS A WHOLESALE BIG -- BIG HOLE IN THIS EMBARGO. IT IS NOT THE -- IT WAS NOT OUR INTENTION AND I THINK THE LANGUAGE IS VERY CLEAR ON THAT POINT.

Q A FEW THINGS IF YOU COULD CLEAR UP FOR US. FIRST OF ALL, YOU SEEM TO DISAGREE ON THE MILITARY OPTION. AND WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT FURTHER STEPS BEING TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE -- THE UN SANCTIONS, PRESIDENT BUSH, YOU SEEM TO BE SAYING THE MILITARY OPTION IS STILL OUT THERE. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SEEMS TO DISAGREE. DO YOU DISAGREE ON THAT? DID YOU ASK PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO PULL HIS EXPERTS OUT OF IRAQ AND DID YOU ASK HIM TO SEND TROOPS INTO THE GULF REGION?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I DID NOT ASK HIM TO SEND TROOPS IN. IF THE

SOVIETS DECIDED TO DO THAT AT THE INVITATION OF THE SAUDIS, THAT WOULD BE FINE WITH US. BUT I DID NOT ASK HIM TO DO THAT. I BELIEVE THERE -- WITH THE 23 COUNTRIES

THAT ARE PARTICIPATING ON THE GROUND OR -- 23 COUNTRIES THAT ARE PARTICIPATING ON THE GROUND AND AT SEA THAT THE SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA IS CLOSE TO SAFEGUARDED. WHAT WERE THE OTHER TWO POINTS?

Q DID YOU ASK HIM TO PULL THE EXPERTS OUT OF IRAQ AND DO YOU DISAGREE ON THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE? YOU SEEM TO SAY IT'S STILL AN OPTION; HE SEEMS TO SAY IT'S NOT AN OPTION -- EVER.

PRESIDENT BUSH: WE MAY HAVE A DIFFERENCE ON THAT. I'M JUST -- AS I THINK I'VE ANSWERED OVER AND OVER AGAIN AT HOME -- I'M NOT GOING TO DISCUSS WHAT I WILL OR WON'T DO. AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MADE AN ELOQUENT APPEAL, WITH WHICH I AGREE, THAT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IS THE BEST. SO I'VE LEFT IT OPEN. HE CAN COMMENT ON THE OTHER. BUT I -- AND AGAIN, JOHN, I'M SORRY -- THE SECOND POINT?

Q THE EXPERTS, PULLING THE EXPERTS OUT?

PRESIDENT BUSH: WELL, I THINK IT WOULD FACILITATE THINGS, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, HE'S GIVEN HIS ANSWER HERE. AND THAT IS NOT A MAJOR IRRITANT. YOU'VE SAID THAT HE'S ALREADY -- I THINK HE SAID THAT HE IS REDUCING THE NUMBERS THERE, BUT I THINK I TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION THAT WAS WIDELY BEING RAISED IN THE UNITED STATES, AND IT WOULD FACILITATE THINGS IF THEY WERE OUT OF THERE IN TERMS OF TOTAL UNDERSTANDING. BUT I HEARD HIS ANSWER, LISTENED TO IT VERY, VERY CAREFULLY, AND I MUST SAY THAT I WOULD LET IT STAND AT THAT. IF I WAS JUST SAYING, "WOULD I LIKE TO SEE THEM ALL OUT OF THERE?" I THINK I'D SAY ABSOLUTELY. BUT I'D LET HIM ADD TO THAT.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: IN ANSWER TO ALL THESE QUESTIONS WHICH YOU GAVE US SUCH A CLEAR LIST OF, I'VE ALREADY GIVEN ANSWERS. I REALLY DON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO THE ANSWERS I'VE ALREADY GIVEN.

Q AL AHRAH NEWSPAPER OF CAIRO, EGYPT. QUESTION TO THE TWO PRESIDENTS, PLEASE. YOU MENTIONED SOMETHING ABOUT THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT. IS THE SOVIET UNION GOING TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY KIND OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENT, AND WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE REGION AND THE COUNTRIES OF THAT REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: ON THE FIRST QUESTION, AS WE BEGAN, WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY AND ACTIVELY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ON THE BASIS OF THE DECISIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ADOPTED, WE SHALL ACT ACCORDINGLY. THAT'S THE FIRST POINT.

SECONDLY, AS CONCERNS THE ROLE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, YES, I THINK THAT GENERALLY SPEAKING I WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ARAB FACTOR, NOT YET REALLY HADN'T BEEN BROUGHT TO BEAR IN EFFORTS TO HELP RESOLVE THIS CRISIS SITUATION.

I DON'T WANT TO OFFER YOU OUR ANALYSIS RIGHT NOW AS TO WHY THAT'S THE CASE, BUT NEVERTHELESS I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE IS AN OBVIOUS ACTIVIZATION OF THE QUEST ON THE PART OF ARAB STATES TO FIND THE RESPONSE TO THE URGENT SITUATION WHICH FACES US -- FACES US ALL HERE. WE COOPERATE WITH ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND I MIGHT SAY NOT UNUSEFULLY. THE OUTLINES OF POSSIBLE STEPS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE



BUT IT IS TOO SOON TO BE SPECIFIC. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR COOPERATION WITH ARAB COUNTRIES AND AT A CERTAIN STAGE, WHEN THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED AND HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT -- WHEN THE TENSION HAS BEEN REDUCED, THEN PERHAPS WE MIGHT CARRY THIS FURTHER.

BUT WE SHALL CONTINUE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL -- THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL -- TO GUARANTEE SECURITY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE SHALL SUCCEED IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEM BY POLITICAL MEANS.

PRESIDENT BUSH: MAY I COMMENT ON THAT ONE, PLEASE? I AM VERY GLAD THAT THE ARAB STATES, AT THE ARAB LEAGUE AND IN OTHER WAYS, HAVE STATED THEIR CONDEMNATION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. HE IS TRYING TO MAKE THIS A CONTEST BETWEEN THE ARAB WORLD AND THE UNITED STATES. AND IT IS NO SUCH THING IF YOU WILL LOOK AT HOW THE UNITED NATIONS HAS OVERWHELMING CONDEMNED HIM.

SO THE ARAB STATES HAVE A VERY KEY ROLE IN THIS. MANY ARAB STATES HAVE RESPONDED IN THE DEFENSE OF SAUDI ARABIA: SYRIA, MOROCCO, EGYPT, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE GCC COUNTRIES. SO IT IS NOT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE ARAB WORLD AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. IT IS SADDAM HUSSEIN AGAINST THE UNITED NATIONS AND AGAINST A MAJORITY OF THE ARAB LEAGUE. AND THAT IS A VERY IMPORTANT POINT THAT I WILL CONTINUE -- CONTINUE TO MAKE BECAUSE THE ARAB LEAGUE ITSELF HAS STOOD UP TO HIM AND URGED HIS COMPLIANCE WITH THE SANCTIONS AND CONDEMNED HIS AGGRESSION.

SO IN THIS CASE I SEE THE ARAB STATES AS HAVING A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION, AND THEY HAVE NOT BEEN TAKEN IN BY HIS ATTEMPT TO MAKE THIS THE -- THE ARAB WORLD VERSUS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WHEN IT IS NOTHING OF THE KIND.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I WANTED THE PRESIDENT AND MYSELF TO EXPRESS -- TO CONCLUDE -- THIS PRESS CONFERENCE BY EXPRESSING OUR DEEP SYMPATHIES AND FEELINGS FOR THE PEOPLE OF FINLAND, FOR THE HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO US ON THIS SOIL, AND TO APPRECIATE HIGHLY THE CONTRIBUTION MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THIS COUNTRY AND HIS WIFE TO HAVE MADE THESE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS MEETING.

PRESIDENT BUSH: MAY I SIMPLY ADD THAT PRESIDENT KOIVISTO AND MRS. KOIVISTO HAVE BEEN MOST HOSPITABLE AND I AGREE WITH THIS. WE OWE THEM A GREAT DEBT OF GRATITUDE AND THE PEOPLE OF FINLAND. THANK YOU.

עד כאן סוף חלק 2 ואחרון

עתונות

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רם), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, רביב, מעת,  
הסברה, סולטן, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)





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## NEWSMAKER SUNDAY

**AIR TIMES:** Sunday, September 9, 1990; 10:30 a.m. & 3:30 p.m.

**ORIGINATION:** Helsinki, Finland

**TOPIC:** U.S.-Soviet Summit

**GUEST:** JAMES A BAKER III  
Secretary of State

**MODERATOR:** Ralph Begleiter- Newsmaker Sunday

**WITH:** Charles Bierbauer - Senior White House Correspondent

**EXECUTIVE PRODUCER:** Elissa Free

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Tom Farmer

**ASSOCIATE PRODUCERS:** Lisa Lawrence  
Kelly Wallace

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## NEWSMAKER SUNDAY (CNN) - September 9, 1990

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MR. BEGLEITER: Welcome to NEWSMAKER SUNDAY. I'm Ralph Begleiter at the Soviet-American summit in Helsinki, where the crisis in the Gulf is on the minds of Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush. CNN's Senior White House Correspondent Charles Bierbauer and I will question Secretary of State James Baker on NEWSMAKER SUNDAY.

MR. BEGLEITER: Charles Bierbauer and I will question U.S. Secretary of State James Baker about the situation in the Gulf and other decisions made by the two leaders on arms control and other regional conflict. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Have the signals been sent? Do you think they will be received in Baghdad?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think the joint statement that President Bush and President Gorbachev issued here, Ralph, is a very clear signal, and it's a very clear statement, and it seems to me that it simply points up the absolute isolation of Iraq and of Saddam Hussein in this crisis.

MR. BEGLEITER: President Gorbachev--let me just follow-up--has suggested in his news conference that he talked with Iraq about ways they can get out of it, ways to pull out of it. Did he disclose any of those to you?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, one way they could get out of it, and one way they could pull out of it is to leave Kuwait unconditionally and permit the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait in accordance with the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

And frankly, the joint statement that President Bush and Gorbachev issued calls for nothing less.

MR. BIERBAUER: But we've heard that all along. Those were clear directives from the U.N. to Saddam Hussein. But I think what Ralph is getting at is that Mr. Gorbachev said that he had some specific suggestions that he might have made to the Iraqis. Did he elaborate?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, he did not go into specific suggestions that would in any way diminish or dilute the substance of those two resolutions.

MR. BIERBAUER: But--

SECRETARY BAKER: It's not the suggestion of the Soviets that there be any negotiation short of compliance with those--or discussion short of compliance with those resolutions.

MR. BIERBAUER: But let me then reverse the question. Did he express frustration that his former ally doesn't pay attention to him?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think that they are frustrated that the situation has developed the way it has. You heard what Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said on the third of August when we issued a joint statement of the United States and Soviet Union supporting unconditional Iraqi



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withdrawal. They said something to the effect, when necessary, this is difficult for us to do because Iraq has been a long time friend of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has armed--has done a large part of the arming of Iraq. Other countries have contributed, but I think this, to some extent, weighs upon the Soviet mind.

MR. BEGLEITER: Mr. Secretary, do you think as a result of the two superpowers making this joint statement the situation in the Gulf is any closer to resolution? Will it be resolved faster now?

SECRETARY BAKER: I'm hopeful that that's the case, Ralph. It certainly would not move it in the other direction. If it moves it at all, it would move it toward resolution, because it makes it abundantly clear that there is no separation in the viewpoints of the Soviet Union and the United States. I think Saddam Hussein was hopeful that he could somehow see some sort of a wedge driven between the viewpoints of the two superpowers, and you read that joint statement, you, I think, will readily admit that that's simply not the case.

MR. BEGLEITER: You know, both sides are kind of celebrating the unanimity of the--of Washington and the Kremlin on this issue. There might be one party that might not be so happy about that. Do you think Israel is going to have a problem with seeing the Soviet Union play an increasingly important role, both militarily and diplomatically in the Middle East?

SECRETARY BAKER: I really don't think so. But I would like--I think the Israeli government would--should answer that for themselves. I do not think so, to the extent that U.S.-Soviet cooperation will help resolve this problem. The Israelis want to see this problem resolved, and they want to see it taken care of, because it is a very, very--very dangerous problem. And I have to ask you, where do you think we would be if we were faced with this crisis and we had to deal with it as we would have even five years ago or three years ago looking at it constantly through the prism of an East-West lens. It would be a very difficult thing. Every move we took, every step we made, we'd have to be asking ourselves, what effect will this have on the Soviets? What will the Soviets do? And we don't have that today, because there is an unprecedented degree of worldwide condemnation of Iraq's aggression.

MR. BEGLEITER: Mr. Secretary--we'll be back in a moment with more questions for Secretary of State James Baker when NEWSMAKER SUNDAY continues. Please stay with us.

(Announcements)  
NEWSMAKER TWO

MR. BEGLEITER: Secretary of State Baker, in the Middle East, the Soviet Union said today here at the summit that all issues are equal, of equal concern. President Bush seemed to want to put a distance between the issue of dealing with Middle East peace and the Palestinian and all of the fact, and dealing with the Gulf.

Is there a big of a disagreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union on how to deal with those issues?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't think that being opposed to linking the issues means that you



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think the issues are somehow unequal. We think that all of the issues are extremely important, and we've got to find a way to solve them. Arab-Israeli peace process is an extraordinarily important issue in the Middle East. The issue of Lebanon is a very important issue in the Middle East. The Gulf crisis is a very important issue in the Middle East as well.

But our view is, we shouldn't link them, or we'll hinder solving any of them. And that's if there is a difference, and I don't think there is a difference, but if there's any difference it's that perhaps there might be more willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to see some linkage. But if you take a look again at the joint statement, you'll see that there is no linkage.

MR. BIERBAUER: But Mr. Gorbachev himself did say that he thinks there is a link. So, I don't think there is a semantic difference. There's a policy difference there--that they feel, if you can draw these things together--and it's really what you hear from the Arabs, too, isn't it?

SECRETARY BAKER: No. What we--what I heard on my trip from the Arabs was that these things should not be linked. And, in fact, there have been some communications from Arab countries to the Soviet Union to that effect.

MR. BEGLEITER: Mr. Secretary, CNN has been broadcasting an interview with Abu Abbas who, among things, was responsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking. In that interview, Abbas makes suggestions that his group would involve itself in terrorist acts against the United States, if the United States initiates an attack against what he called "the Arab people."

We're not allowed to say where that interview took place, but what I want to ask you is whether you view Saddam Hussein as someone who is protecting these sorts of people and aiding these sorts of people, and whether that undermines his credibility and his argument in--

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me answer your question, Ralph, by saying that the State Department put Iraq back on the terrorism list here about a week ago, five or days ago, following the statement by the foreign minister of Iraq that Iraq should feel no moral obligation to prevent actions or acts against British, French and American interests and citizens.

So, it doesn't surprise to hear Abu Abbas saying that. It's probably not the first time he has threatened or even participated in terrorism against American interests.

MR. BEGLEITER: Would action of that sort provoke a United States response against Iraq?

SECRETARY BAKER: The president has made it very clear that one of his primary responsibilities is to protect American citizens. Now, what exactly amounts to provocation, where you draw the line, that's a matter, frankly, that the president and the president alone will have to determine.

MR. BIERBAUER: Mr. Gorbachev had a reference in one of his answers at the news conference to the present Iraqi leadership, and almost a sense that he favors a change in the leadership there. Do you share that sense--that he favors a change, as do you?

SECRETARY BAKER: That he favors--well, I wouldn't want--well, we obviously have said we



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would welcome a change in the leadership. It's not--changing the leadership or seeing Saddam Hussein ousted from power is not a stated objective of ours in our Gulf policy. But the president has made no secret of the fact that we would welcome a change in that leadership in light of the actions that that leadership has taken.

I can't speak for the Soviet Union.

MR. BIERBAUER: You didn't have that sense, then--

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I really didn't. But I'm not suggesting that they wouldn't applaud a change. They've been pretty tough in their condemnation of what Iraq has done. And I do think that they feel that they've been, to some extent, put upon by not being leveled with. I mean, it's not secret in my meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Irkutsk in Siberia not long ago, I said we were concerned that there might be an Iraqi attack on Kuwait and they were--the Soviets had been assured by Iraq that that was not the case and so stated.

So, I think they might--it's for them to say whether they would welcome a change.

MR. BEGLEITER: Mr. Secretary, real briefly, you've made the rounds in the Persian Gulf, you've talked with the president of Egypt this week, and obviously the administration's engaged in a broad array of diplomatic contacts to deal with the crisis in the Gulf.

There haven't been any--or at least no public ones--with two important governments that are sort of on the line, making changes in their policies--Jordan and Syria. Syria has committed forces in the area. Are you going to meet Syrian president, Hafez Assad, or other top Syrian officials on this round of diplomacy--and what about Jordan?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we have had discussions with Jordan; and King Hussein, of course, was in Washington on the 16th, I think, and 17th of--it was the 16th of August. And we had a full round of discussions. We've also stayed in communications, diplomatically, with King Hussein since that time.

MR. BEGLEITER: What about Syria?

SECRETARY BAKER: Syria is--of course, we have been--our relations with Syria have been strained for some time. Both President Mubarak and President Assad have been very forceful and forthcoming in the way that they have stood up and in the way that they condemned this unprovoked aggression by Iraq. So, I think that it might be useful for us to have greater dialogue with the government of Syria. And so that would be my answer to your question.

I'd leave it right there for the time being.

MR. BEGLEITER: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We'll be back in a minute to talk about some of the other issues that the two presidents discussed here in Helsinki.

(Announcements)

MR. BEGLEITER: Welcome back to NEWSMAKER SUNDAY. With Senior White House



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Correspondent Charles Bierbauer, For Ralph Begleiter at the Soviet-American summit in Helsinki  
Joining us, Secretary of State James Baker.  
Charles?

MR. BIERBAUER: Mr. Secretary, you and the secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Brady, have been on the mission to drum up support for the Persian Gulf effort from the allies. You seem to have done pretty well with the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, but we don't seem to see a whole lot yet coming from the Japanese and the Germans. Is there more on the way?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, the Germans have really not been--have not been approached, or visited with, if you will. I plan to go to Bonn after my trip to Moscow over the course of the next two or three days, and we'll have discussions with the Germans and with some other European countries. I really can't speak to what--what the situation is in the aftermath of Secretary Brady's trip to Japan, but I understand that his trip overall in Asia, he felt very positive about.

Let me simply say that the Gulf states, the Arab Gulf states have been very, very forthcoming. I don't want to put a total number on it yet, because they haven't authorized us to do that. I've already told you that the government of Kuwait did say that they would contribute \$5 billion between now and the end of the year. The government of Saudi Arabia was very positive, very forthcoming, as was the UAE. So we will see a substantial amount from those three countries. Some of that will be used to defray the direct incremental cost of our force presence there, and some of it will be used to assist front line states that are going to be very adversely impacted, like Egypt and Turkey.

MR. BIERBAUER: Aren't you a little disappointed, though, with the Germans? Are they too much consumed with German unification to be paying attention to the other matter?

SECRETARY BAKER: No--no, I'm not disappointed with the Germans, and I had a telephone conversation with the German foreign minister yesterday looking toward my visit there, and we will be discussing this issue and these things with them, and frankly I think they have reacted very forcefully to what's taken place, given the fact of their constitution that prohibits their sending--sending troops and that sort of thing. So let's not judge--let's not judge German participation till after we have a chance to talk.

MR. BEGLEITER: Speaking of German unification, did the two leaders discuss it today? Did you discuss it with Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze, and are there any roadblocks to initialing of the final settlement later this week in Moscow?

SECRETARY BAKER: We're all very hopeful that we can--that we can sign the final settlement agreement in Moscow on the 12th, when we have the next Two-plus-Four meeting.

There are about three issues that are still outstanding that must be resolved. We're working on those. That was part of what my conversation with the German foreign minister yesterday was all about.

MR. BEGLEITER: Do you think those will be settled?



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SECRETARY BAKER: I hope they will be. We all would like to see it put to bed in Moscow on the 12th, and we're working hard to resolve them. I see two of them coming together, and there are another two we're going to have to work on.

MR. BIERBAUER: Which ones is--

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't--

MR. BIERBAUER: --the problems?

SECRETARY BAKER: I don't want to get into that, Charles, because then I'd be tipping my hand to the people I've got to negotiate with.

MR. BEGLEITER: If that issue is resolved, and it's signed this week, will President Bush go to celebrate German unification with President Gorbachev on October 3rd?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, President Bush is going to be talking to Chancellor Kohl about that, and I'll leave the answer to that question to the outcome of those discussions.

MR. BEGLEITER: All right. We still have some other questions for Secretary of State James Baker. Please stay with us.

(Announcements)

MR. DEGLETER: Welcome back to NEWSMAKER SUNDAY. Secretary of State Baker, did the two leaders discuss arms control issues here in Helsinki, and was any ground broken on some of the nits that have been--that made reaching the START treaty and the conventional forces treaty difficult?

SECRETARY BAKER: There was a general discussion of both treaties. There was a discussion of the importance of concluding the conventional arms treaty before there's a CSCE summit, and a reconfirmation, frankly, by the Soviets of the same--of the position they share with us, and that is that there cannot be a CSCE summit until we get a CFE treaty. Now, I know that's all probably--

MR. BEGLEITER: Gobbledygook to the viewer.

SECRETARY BAKER: --Greek to your listeners, but that answers your question, with respect to that one.

MR. BIERBAUER: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think we're--I think that there's optimism that we will conclude a conventional forces treaty. Let me say, the president--the two presidents did not get into the nitty gritty of each and every specific issue. There was a general discussion of aircraft. There's quite a bit



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of difference between us still on aircraft, and it may be that we've got to--we'll have to proceed with everything we can do and not--and save aircraft for a later time. That decision has not been made, it was not made here.

On the START treaty, it was the same kind of a dialogue. The importance of concluding a strategic arms treaty by the end of the year--hopefully one can be signed at or by the time of the next summit meeting of these two presidents to be held in Moscow at some time as yet undetermined.

MR. BEGLEITER: Just on the conventional forces thing, when you say put it off for another time, does that mean the U.S. is willing to set that aside and go ahead with the CSCE summit regardless?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, it means that there was a discussion of the problems that we're having reaching closure on aircraft.

MR. BEGLEITER: But it would still have to be--

SECRETARY BAKER: And the United States is not willing to do that unless our allies would join in, and if they would join in, we would have to give some consideration to that, because we think it's important to lock in the other elements of the treaty, that is the provisions with respect to armor and personnel carriers and tanks and that sort of thing.

MR. BIERBAUER: Mr. Gorbachev seemed a little bit sensitive to the question of economic assistance or technical assistance--we can't be bought for dollars, I think, were his words. How do you approach it? He needs help. You know he needs help. He knows you know, and so forth. Did you make any progress there?

SECRETARY BAKER: I think we did. I hope we did. It's not a question of saying in any way--never even a suggestion, if you agree to a strong joint statement on the Persian Gulf, we'll be more forthcoming economically. That never--no, not even a hint of that ever entered into the discussions. But we did--we did talk about steps that need to be taken for us to be in a position to assist economically, that is, through technical economic cooperation and otherwise.

We've got to resolve the old debt claims. We need to put that negotiation. The leaders talked about that. We've got to work further on the bilateral investment treaty, so the U.S. companies can go in the Soviet Union and invest.

And we've got to take some other steps. The Soviets have to pass their emigration legislation so that we can get the trade agreement up to the Congress for approval.

MR. BIERBAUER: What's happened to that? Why is that language--

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, they've assured us that it's the press of business in the Supreme Soviet and they're going to push it. That's the kind of progress that was made on the economic front here today.

MR. BEGLEITER: President Bush seemed to indicate, though, that he was so pleased with the

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way President Gorbachev was handling the Gulf situation that he wanted to do more than the United States has been doing up to now to help them economically. Where else...

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Well, it's no secret--

**MR. BEGLEITER:** What you have been charged with to do?

**SECRETARY BAKER:** It was no secret--well, the things I've just mentioned to you are three of them.

**MR. BEGLEITER:** But those are the ones that have been.

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Yes, but pushing it and getting it done, and clearing away the underbrush so that we can improve the economic relationship is pretty much the posture. But let me say that the president is, and we all are very, very pleased with the cooperation that we have received throughout this Gulf crisis from the Soviet Union.

You know, let me--Saddam Hussein sent a message to Gorbachev, and he said, you need to stand up like a superpower and face down the United States. That's not the mark of a superpower. The mark of a superpower is whether or not, during the course of the first real crisis in the post-Cold War era, whether you can cooperate with another superpower to establish a new order, and to establish peace and stability in a very volatile region.

**MR. BEGLEITER:** Thank you very much, Secretary of State James Baker, for joining us on NEWSMAKER SUNDAY. With Charles Bierbauer, senior White House correspondent, I'm Ralph Begleiter, CNN in Helsinki.



September 9, 1990  
Helsinki

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

With regard to Iraq's invasion and continued military occupation of Kuwait, President Bush and President Gorbachev issue the following joint statement:

We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors.

We reaffirm the joint statement of our Foreign Ministers of August 3, 1990 and our support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665. Today, we once again call upon the Government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait.

Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions is acceptable.

Nothing short of a return to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isolation.

We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that UN Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and

Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian circumstances. The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children.

Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists. However, we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.

As soon as the objectives mandated by the UN Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the Presidents direct their Foreign Ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability. It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time.



For Immediate Release

September 9, 1990

PRESS CONFERENCE BY PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH  
AND PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Finlandia Hall  
Helsinki, Finland

5:52 P.M. (Local)

PRESIDENT BUSH: I've been advised that I'm to take the first question. And if so, I would identify Helen Thomas, of the US.

Q I'd like to ask both Presidents whether we are going to have a war in the Persian Gulf. And I'd like to follow up.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, with your permission, Mr. President, I hope that we can achieve a peaceful solution, and the way to do that is to have Iraq comply with the United Nations resolutions. And I think the part of our joint statement, two short lines, said it most clearly: Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions is acceptable. As soon as Saddam Hussein realizes that, then there certainly will be a peaceful resolution to this question.

Q How about President Gorbachev -- what do you think?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: In replying to your question I should like to say that the whole of our seven hours of meeting today were devoted to the quest for a political resolution of that conflict. And I believe that we're on the right road.

Q Mr. President, if I may follow up with you, President Bush. You are saying that hostilities could break out if this is not resolved peacefully.

PRESIDENT BUSH: The question is what?

Q I said, you are indicating that there could be hostilities.

PRESIDENT BUSH: No, I -- the United States is determined to see these resolutions enforced, and I'd like to feel that they will be enforced and that that will result in a peaceful resolution.

Q Do you think, Mr. President, that the conflict of the Gulf gives the opportunity to solve the Palestinian problem through an international peace conference for the Middle East? And my second question is, was this problem discussed today with Mr. Gorbachev?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, let me say that I see the implementation of the United Nations resolutions separate and apart for the need to solve the other question. That question has been on the agenda of many countries for many years. And it is very important that that question be resolved. The Secretary of State said the other day, and I strongly support that, that under certain circumstances the consideration of a conference of that nature would be acceptable. Indeed, it's been a part of our policy from time to time. But the thing that I feel strongly about is that these issues are not linked. And any effort to link them is an effort to dilute the resolutions of the United Nations.

MORE



Q This question to President Bush from Soviet Radio and Television. How long will the United States troops be present in the Persian Gulf area?

PRESIDENT BUSH: They will be present in the area until we are satisfied that the security needs of the area have been met and that these resolutions have been complied with. And the sooner they are out of there, as far as I'm concerned, the better. I made very clear to President Gorbachev, as I think he will confirm, that we have no intention keeping them a day longer than is required. So I'd leave it right there.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I'd like to add something and to confirm what the President of the United States has just said to me in our conversation -- that the United States of America does not intend to leave their forces in the zone. And in connection with the change or the normalization of the situation, the United States' administration and, personally, the President will do everything possible to ensure that the forces are withdrawn from the region, from the zone. And that is a very important statement.

Q I have a question for both Presidents. The unity that you're expressing doesn't ignore the fact that there is still some irritants between the two countries. President Bush, are you more sympathetic to suggestions of Western economic aid to the Soviet Union? And President Gorbachev, would you be willing to withdraw the Soviet military advisors from Iraq?

PRESIDENT BUSH: For my part, I am very much interested in assisting to be sure that perestroika is successful. We, indeed, have a mission of high-level businessmen on their way to the Soviet Union -- right now they happen to be in Helsinki. This is but one manifestation of the fact that we are trying to encourage economic cooperation in as many ways as possible. And we had a good, long discussion in our expanded meeting this afternoon about that.

And I am -- given the common stand that the Soviet Union and the United States have taken at the United Nations, it seems to me that we should be as forthcoming as we possibly can in terms of economics, and I plan to do that. There are certain constraints, as you say. There are certain nuances of difference; there are certain differences -- real differences.

But on the other hand, I have said before and I'll repeat it here in front of all these journalists from all around the world, we, of course, want perestroika to succeed. It is an internal matter of the Soviet Union. But I think this remarkable cooperation that has been demonstrated by the Soviet Union at the United Nations gets me inclined to recommend as close cooperation in the economic field as possible. And I will be saying this to the Congress when I get back.

We still have problems. Look, we've got some big problems ourselves in our economy, and we are not in the position, operating at the enormous deficits, to write out large checks. Having said that, there are many ways that we can endeavor to be of assistance to the merging economy in the Soviet Union.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: There was a question also addressed to me. I would like, nevertheless, on the question which did appear also to be addressed to me -- the Western assistance to the Soviet -- I would like to continue.

The conversation with President Bush is continuing on the Western assistance to the Soviet Union. I see that there is an attempt being made to link, to establish a link between this and disagreements or the lack of disagreements. In response to that, I would say the following: We began our conversation today together by reviewing the situation and realizing that the whole of world society and our two great states are undergoing a trial. This is a test of the durability of the new approach to resolving world problems. And as we enter upon a new peaceful period and as we emerge from the Cold



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War, we see that no less efforts are necessary in order to find ways and means in this period of peace to meet the new situation and to tackle all problems that may arise.

I think if it hadn't been for Malta it would have been very difficult for us to act in the very difficult situation which arose in Eastern Europe -- in Europe and in the situation connected with the unification of Germany.

I think that if, following that, there hadn't been Washington and Camp David and the other meetings on this level with other partners in international relations, we would now be in a difficult situation facing the crisis in the Persian Gulf. And the fact that today we have taken a common approach to such difficult problems, problems which may well have tragic consequences for the whole world, not just for the peoples of that region, demonstrates that we still are moving forward in the right direction and that we are capable of resolving the most difficult and the most acute problems and to find appropriate responses to the challenges of our time.

And the greater part of our conversation together was devoted to this. I believe that this is the most important point to bear in mind. Differences, nuances in the differences of view, arguments, these can be -- these are natural. It's natural those should arise. But what we have seen today is that we have confirmed the most important progress of recent time.

Now I should like to say something about the Iraqi question. But, in fact, I haven't quite finished on the first subject. I wouldn't want President Bush's reply to give rise to the opinion that the Soviet Union is going to align a certain sum with a certain behavior. We are acting in a difficult situation. We are finding a solution. We shall find a solution which will be satisfactory and, above all, which will remove the danger of an explosion. And this is becoming a normal element of the new kind of cooperation in trade, in technology, in human exchange. All of these elements characterize the new peaceful period upon which we are just now embarked, which we have to get used to.

It would be very oversimplified and very superficial to judge that the Soviet Union could be bought for dollars because, although we do look forward to cooperation in this very serious time of far-reaching changes in our economy -- and that's normal -- let's remember the reforms of recent years in a number of states. They always, in addition to the principal efforts made by the peoples concerned themselves, they always involved also the participation of the world community in one form or another. So if anybody wants to try to impose a different view, that's unacceptable to us. It's unacceptable to the United States, it's unacceptable to the Soviet Union. And it would be unacceptable to any other state.

Now, to move on to the second part of your question concerning our experts in Iraq. They are not so much advisors as specialists or experts who are working under contract. And their number is being reduced. Whereas at the beginning of the conflict I think there was still 196 of them, there are now some 150 of them. And the Iraqi leadership looks upon the matter thus, that if they haven't completed their work, their normal work under contract, even though it may be a matter of weapons, then they are nevertheless leaving Iraq and the process is going forward. So I don't really think there's a problem.

Q A question to both. Did you discuss any possible military options for curbing Iraqi aggression? And what would be the conditions, and what would be the point where you would consider that the political options were exhausted and it was time to go to the Security Council and talk about, through the Security Council, demanding an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait?

PRESIDENT BUSH: The answer to your question is, no, we



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hypothetical. And I would like to see this matter peacefully resolved.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I would like to support what was said by President Bush. And I stress once more that the whole of our time together was spent on talking about this conflict in a mutual search for a political solution. And I think we can look with optimism in the final analysis on the efforts being taken by the international community working together within the Security Council of the U.N.

Q You were just saying that if Iraq doesn't withdraw its forces peacefully, then it will be necessary to take military steps. What kind of Soviet contribution will there be to those military steps? And what will happen then to the Soviet citizens who are in Iraq now? And what will the Arab factor be?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: Firstly, I did not say that if Iraq does not withdraw peacefully we're going to have recourse to military methods. I did not state that. I do not state that. And moreover, in my view, that would draw us into consequences which we can't at this stage forecast. Therefore, our country and the United Nations as a whole has a whole range of possibilities of finding a political solution to this problem. Therefore, I would limit ourselves to and, therefore, the second part of your question is irrelevant.

Q If I could ask, President Gorbachev, specifically, Iraq had been your ally -- what directly have you done in contact with Saddam Hussein to reverse the situation there? And, President Bush, what specifically have you asked Mr. Gorbachev to do directly? Have you asked him to make a direct contact with Saddam Hussein?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I should say that from the start of the crisis we've been actively exchanging views and carrying forth dialogue, not only within the Security Council, not only with the administration of the USA. These types of contacts have great importance to us, but we are also holding active dialogue with the leadership of China, of India, of all the other European states, especially those which are members of the Security Council. And in my view, it's this dialogue which has helped us towards the Security Council resolution which was passed.

On top of that, we're also actively cooperating with the Arab states, the countries of the Arab world. And here our dialogue is no less intensive than with our partners in the countries I previously mentioned, including dialogue with President Hussein. And I can state that what we have announced publicly is also being said to President Hussein in our dialogue with him. Which all means that the President and the leadership of Iraq are expected to show a reasonable approach to stop and to understand what is implied by the position taken by the Security Council on this issue.

This is the dialogue which we have undertaken with him. And we are trying to make sure that our arguments are convincing. We discussed various options for ending the situation with him. And we are also attempting, as I already said to make it quite clear to Saddam Hussein that if Iraq were to provoke military action then the result would be a tragedy first and foremost for the Iraqi people themselves, for the whole of the region and for the whole of the world.

You know, this is, of course, a dialogue in a very difficult situation; but we consider it's a very useful dialogue. And we don't exclude the possibility of establishing new contacts, of having new meetings at various levels. And the type of communication which we have had up until now with the Iraqis gives us hope that those links we have with them can be used positively for the sake of all of us, for the sake of finding a peaceful solution to this problem, and especially of preventing the situation turning into



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no need to ask President Gorbachev to contact Saddam Hussein. Clearly, from his answer you can see that -- (microphone goes off.) President Gorbachev answered the question about the contact with Saddam Hussein. And clearly, if your question to me is have I asked him to contact Saddam Hussein, the answer is, no.

But the Soviet Union is in contact. He, himself, received the Foreign Minister Aziz. But I would just simply sum it up by saying the best answer to Saddam Hussein -- or the best contact is the contact that took place at the United Nations when there was worldwide condemnation of the aggression. And I happen to feel that this statement showing the Soviet Union and the United States in essential agreement here is another good statement for Saddam Hussein. And hopefully, he will see that he is not going to divide us and divide other countries and that he will do what he should have done sometime ago, and that is comply with the United Nations' sanctions.

But I did not ask him to do that because they're way ahead of us on that. They are having contacts and trying to be helpful in that regard.

Q I have a question to Mr. Bush. Mr. President, what is your position on the question of signing a treaty limiting strategic offensive weapons? And when do you think that such a treaty will, in fact, be signed?

PRESIDENT BUSH: We still remain committed to a strategic arms treaty. We vowed that we would encourage our negotiators to move forward more rapidly on both the strategic arms treaty and the conventional force agreement. And I'm still hopeful that by the end of the year we will have such an agreement.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I'd like to confirm what President Bush has just said; that we really have agreed to make fresh efforts to give further instructions because we see that there is a possibility successfully to complete the negotiating process in those two fora and to come up with positive results in the course of this year.

Q My question is for President Bush. And I would also like to hear President Gorbachev's comment on that. President Bush mentioned that you fail to see the link between the Palestinian question and the present situation. I would like to know how come it is so important to implement U.N. resolutions in this particular instance when other standing ones have been frozen and overlooked and disregarded for so long? So I'd like to know how come this situation is so different from other ones. And I would also like to add that I personally feel that the Palestinian dilemma and question needs the attention of the superpowers more than ever. Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I agree that it needs it, and we are very much interested in implementing Resolution 242 of the United Nations. We've been zealously trying to do that, as have many other powers for many years.

But the fact that that resolution hasn't been fulfilled when it calls for withdrawal to secure and recognize boundaries -- and it should be, and hopefully we can be catalytic in seeing that happen -- does not mean that you sit idly by in the face of a naked aggression against Kuwait. And the United Nations has moved and the United Nations resolutions should be implemented on their face without trying to tie it in to some other unresolved dispute. But I couldn't agree more that it is important. It is very important that that question eventually, and hopefully sooner than later, be resolved.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I think that everything that is taking place in the Middle East is a matter of concern to us -- of equal concern. And even more than in the case of the Arab-Israeli



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devise a system to devise guarantees that would ensure the interests of all peoples and of the whole world community because it's a matter which is of vital concern to all of us.

And it seems to me that there is a link here because the failure to find a solution in the Middle East at large also has a bearing on the acuteness of the particular conflict we've been talking about here.

Q A question for both Presidents, please. In your statement, you pledged to work individually and in concert to ensure full compliance with the U.N. sanctions against Iraq. May I inquire what, if any, specific and concrete steps you have agreed to take in furtherance of that?

PRESIDENT BUSH: We didn't agree to specific and concrete steps. I think President Gorbachev in the contacts he's had with Saddam Hussein -- I mean with the Iraqis -- and if they continue, will be a step in that direction. Clearly, this message itself will be a step in that direction. But we did not sit at this meeting and try to assign each other or ask each other to undertake specific measures in keeping with that particular paragraph.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I'd like to add to that that the emphasis here is on the significance of the political fact that we feel necessary to reflect in this statement and which testifies to our political will to act jointly or, in parallel, independently really in search of these new steps towards a peaceful resolution of the problem.

I think that, therefore, the meeting and the document that we've just adopted is more important than our enumerating various steps that might have been taken here. That forms the basis for the further active quest for solutions.

Q I also have a question to the Presidents of both countries -- Mr. President, Mr. Gorbachev, first of all. Since the last meeting it seems to be that you've had a good mutual understanding. Have you succeeded in deepening that mutual understanding in the course of today's meeting? And how, in general, what bearing in general is that fact having on the results of your negotiations?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I think clearly there has been a developed -- a developing mutual understanding over the years. I like to feel, and I think President Gorbachev agrees, that our meeting in Malta had something to do with furthering that understanding. I'm convinced that our meeting in the United States, at Camp David particularly, furthered that understanding. But I'm not -- I think the world sees clearly that if this had occurred 20 years ago, there wouldn't have been this cooperative feeling at the United Nations. And I think it's very important.

So I don't know how one quantifies mutual understanding, but I feel we're moving on the right track. Neither of us when we talk try to hide our differences. Neither of us try to indicate that we look at exactly every problem exactly the same way. But the very fact we can talk with that degree of frankness without rancor, I think, enhances mutual understanding. And then, when we see us on a question of this nature, standing shoulder to shoulder with many other countries at the United Nations, I think it is obvious manifestation of this developing mutual understanding.

It's a very broad philosophical question. But differences still remain. But the common ground, in my view at least, surges ahead of these differences. And we will continue to cooperate with President Gorbachev.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I don't know if I would be allowed



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this particular question. But that last sentence does really give me the hope that we'll get by.

In our talks, the President said, you know, there was a long time when our view was that the Soviet Union had nothing to do in the Middle East -- had no business being there. This was something that we had to talk through during this meeting here in Helsinki. And what was said here is that it's very important for us to cooperate in the Middle East, just as it is on other issues of world politics.

So that is -- in answer to your question, it is very important that at each meeting we move forward, we enrich our relationship. And I think I should say that we increase our trust. If trust is engendered between the leaders of two such nations during meetings of this kind -- and I'm sure you'll agree with me -- that that is for the good of all of us, whether we want it or not. History dictates that a lot is going to depend on whether the two countries can work together. That's not our ambition, it's just the way that history has gone. So far from excluding such a possibility, we intend to cooperate with all sorts of other countries as well, more and more. That's how we see our role in the world developing.

And my last comment is also very important. It seems to me that the way the world is, the way the world is changing, in today's world no single country, however powerful, will be able to provide the leadership which individual countries formerly tried to provide, including some countries which are represented here. We can only succeed if we work together and solve our problems together. That is what is emerging from these negotiations. And that we consider the most important aspect.

Q I'm going to speak French, if I may. Could I ask Mr. Gorbachev whether the Soviet Union is still Iraq's friend, as Minister Tariq Aziz declared in Moscow last week? Are you still the friend of Saddam Hussein? And another question also directed to Mr. Gorbachev. President Saddam Hussein stated yesterday that the Soviet Union would demonstrate that it is a great power by resisting George Bush's pressure and by supporting the Baghdad regime. Could you indicate to me, if you would, what your reply would be to Saddam Hussein?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I want to reply to you and so to repeat it also to Saddam Hussein the same reply that I've given to previous questions -- my position is unchanged. We see our role and our responsibility, and within the framework of that responsibility we shall act in cooperation with the other members of the Security Council. And, in this instance, I can once again say since we are sitting here, two Presidents together, I should interact and cooperate with the President of the United States.

I'd very much like to express the hope that President Saddam Hussein will display -- I really hope that he will -- will display sobriety, will look carefully at the whole situation and will respond to the appeals and the demands of the world community, and that he will take steps that are suitable to the situation, that are carefully weighed in their worldwide implications and in their implications for the Arab world, too. No one has any intention of trying to exclude Iraq from the community of nations, but what the present Iraqi leadership is doing is driving into a dead end. And I hope that President Saddam Hussein will heed this appeal to him.

Q As a neighboring country of the conflict -- we're from Turkish press.

Q I think I'm next. I'd like to ask Mr. Gorbachev if you have ruled out the possibility of a Soviet military participation in this effort in any sense, either as part of the naval blockade or as part of some future peacekeeping force in the region? And I would follow up with a question to Mr. Bush -- to what degree that would be a disappointment to you if that's Mr. Gorbachev's position?



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PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I don't see the point of doing that now. And we shall continue to act in cooperation within the Security Council and in strict compliance with all of its decisions.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'm not disappointed in that answer.  
(Laughter.)

Q I mean, you said you're determined to see this aggression and and current steps are being considered. What does this mean? What comes next?

PRESIDENT BUSH: It's too hypothetical. We want to see the message get through to Saddam Hussein. We want to see him do what the United Nations calls on him to do. And that statement can be interpreted any way you want to interpret it. But it's out there. And I would simply not go into any hypothetical questions that would lead me beyond what that statement says.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: Could I add a couple of words? Please, if you would excuse me, I'll add a couple of words just to what Mr. Bush has already said. You know, in my view, I have the impression that both the press and public opinion in some countries is in some ways saying that there's a lack of decision on somebody's part; that we're withdrawing in the face of those who are trampling on international law. I cannot agree with that view. In fact, it's a view which causes a certain amount of embarrassment to the leadership of nations which are acting through the Security Council in this respect.

What has been done up until now in answer to the Iraqi question is very important because action has been taken not only within the framework of the Security Council, but there has been unanimous world opinion, a kind of solidarity which has never been expressed before in the history of the world. And we have prevented the aggression going any further. We have preserved the functioning of the structures which are of economic importance which would affect so many other countries as well.

And finally, the resolution has been taken on an embargo, which is a very stiff measure, in reaction to the aggression. In my view, this is a strategic way of tackling the question which has been tackled successfully at the first stages. And we are convinced that the next stage of a political solution, achieved politically, to put an end to this acute national crisis and make sure that a political settlement should be possible -- that in this situation, decisiveness, willpower, and responsibility, and political faith in the possibility of a political solution to this very difficult issue shows that the political leaders of the world are being responsible to their own nations and to the world. And we do not want to get caught up in arguments about prestige and so on.

Q Concerning the humanitarian aid, does your joint statement mean in practice that you consider that food should be now allowed to Iraq?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: -- is necessary to reflect in our joint declaration that we see the need to uphold what was decided by the Security Council on this subject. And the Security Council was prepared to admit for humanitarian purposes the supply of medicines and of food stuffs, required first and foremost for children. We've actually stated this quite plainly in our statement. And so we've taken a very clear-cut position on that. But we've also made it clear that this mistake is within the framework of certain international organizations and being monitored by them at all stages of the operations. So I think that this is being stated in the correct terms.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I agree with President Gorbachev on that point. And that the language is very good because it does express



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 importance of the Arab factor, not yet really having been brought to bear in efforts to help resolve this crisis situation. I don't want to offer you an analysis right now as to why that's the case, but nevertheless, I am convinced that there is an obvious activation of the quest on the part of Arab states to find the response to the urgent situation which faces us all here. We cooperate with all the Arab countries and I might say, not unusefully. The outlines of possible steps are beginning to emerge, but it is too soon to be specific. We are continuing our cooperation with Arab countries, and at a certain stage when the situation has changed and has been somewhat -- when the tension has been reduced, then perhaps we might carry this further. But we shall continue in the Security Council, the United Nations Security Council, to guarantee security.

I have no doubt that we shall succeed in resolving the problem by political means.

PRESIDENT BUSH: May I comment on that one, please? I am very glad that the Arab states, that the Arab League, and in other ways have stated their condemnation of Saddam Hussein. He is trying to make this a contest between the Arab world and the United States. And it is no such thing -- if you will look at how the United Nations has overwhelmingly condemned him. So the Arab states have a very key role in this. Many Arab states have responded in the defense of Saudi Arabia -- Syria, Morocco, Egypt, say nothing of the GCC countries. So it is not Saddam Hussein and the Arab world against the United States; it is Saddam Hussein against the United Nations and against a majority of the Arab League. And that is a very important point that I will continue to make. Because the Arab League, itself, has stood up to him and urged his compliance with the sanctions and condemned his aggression.

So in this case, I see the Arab states as having a very important role to play in the resolution of this question. And they have not been taken in by his attempt to make this the Arab world versus the United States of America when it is nothing of the kind.

MR. FITZWATER: Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I want, the President and myself, to express -- to conclude this press conference by stressing our deep sympathies and feelings for the people of Finland, for the hospitalities extended to us on this soil, and to appreciate highly the contribution made by the President of this country and his wife to make these excellent arrangements for these meetings.

PRESIDENT BUSH: May I simply add that President Koivisto and Mrs. Koivisto have been most hospitable. And I agree with this. We owe them a great dept of gratitude and the people of Finland.

Thank you.

END

6:46 P.M. (Local)



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ATTN: JORDAN AAMM

USIS PAD/ID/BPAD; AIT FOR CIS; FOR P AND C

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(DIAL-UP MATERIAL: FOLLOWING ALSO MOVING VIA COMPUTER-TO-COMPUTER COMMUNICATION)

U.S., SOVIETS "UNITED" ON GULF, FITZWATER SAYS  
(TRANSCRIPT: BRIEFING WITH IGNATENKO)

HELSINKI -- THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES "ARE UNITED" IN THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THE GULF SITUATION, WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY MARLIN FITZWATER SAID SEPTEMBER 9 AFTER PRESIDENT BUSH AND SOVIET PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HELD THEIR FIRST MEETING AT THE ONE-DAY HELSINKI SUMMIT.

THE LEADERS MET FOR ALMOST THREE HOURS, ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY NOTE-TAKERS AND INTERPRETERS, FITZWATER ADDED IN A JOINT BRIEFING WITH SOVIET PRESS SECRETARY VITALY IGNATENKO. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE MET AT A SEPARATE LOCATION.

BUSH AND GORBACHEV FOCUSED "ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION, AND WE ARE UNITED," FITZWATER SAID. "THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VERY STRONG FEELING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF."

IGNATENKO ADDED THAT GORBACHEV WAS VERY OPTIMISTIC NOT ONLY ABOUT TODAY, BUT ABOUT TOMORROW AS WELL.

THE PRESIDENTS ALSO DISCUSSED THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS REGARDING THE GULF, FITZWATER SAID, NOTING THE TWO NATIONS "HAVE BEEN FIRM AND TOGETHER IN SEEKING ENFORCEMENT OF

THESE (ECONOMIC) SANCTIONS."

THE TWO WERE TO MEET LATER IN THE DAY AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.

FOLLOWING IS A TRANSCRIPT OF THE JOINT BRIEFING BY FITZWATER AND IGNATENKO.

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

MR. IGNATENKO: DEAR LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, COMRADES, THE MEETING BEGAN AT 10:07 A.M., AND IT LASTED FOR TWO HOURS AND 50 MINUTES. AND I THINK IT WOULD BE JUST IF MY FRIEND AND COLLEAGUE, MR. FITZWATER BEGAN BECAUSE PRESIDENT BUSH WAS THE FIRST ONE TO BE SPEAKING WHEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS MET TODAY.

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAD A VERY GOOD MEETING THIS MORNING. THEY MET, AS VITALY SAID, FOR ALMOST THREE HOURS IN ONE-ON-ONE SESSION, AND NEVER DID GET A CHANCE TO BREAK INTO THE LARGER GROUP MEETING.

THE MEETING FOCUSED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION, AND WE ARE UNITED. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VERY STRONG FEELING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF. THEY DISCUSSED THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS, OF COURSE. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN FIRM AND TOGETHER IN SEEKING ENFORCEMENT OF THESE SANCTIONS. AND SO, WHILE MOST OF THE DISCUSSION THIS MORNING DID FOCUS ON THIS SINGLE ISSUE, WE EXPECT THEM TO CONTINUE THAT THIS AFTERNOON AND TO GIVE YOU THE RESULTS IN THEIR PRESS CONFERENCE LATER TODAY.

ANY QUESTIONS?

Q: DID THE PRESIDENT HAVE PROPOSALS, MARLIN?

MR. IGNATENKO: I'D LIKE TO ADD THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WAS VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FIRST SESSION. HE EVEN SAID HE WAS VERY OPTIMISTIC NOT ONLY ABOUT TODAY, BUT ABOUT TOMORROW AS WELL. AND WHILE THE MEETING IS TAKING PLACE IN A VERY OPTIMISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE. THE BASIS FOR THIS ATMOSPHERE WAS LAID DOWN AT CAMP DAVID,



AND BOTH SIDES HAVE REAFFIRMED THIS.

I AGREE WITH MARLIN WHEN HE SAID THAT A VERY IMPORTANT DISCUSSION WAS HELD ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE MANAGE TO ENGAGE IN THE SITUATION -- THE U.N. STRUCTURES, WHICH WILL HAVE GREAT CONSEQUENCE FOR THE WORLD TOMORROW.

Q: WILL YOU MEET TOMORROW AGAIN? WILL THE TWO LEADERS MEET AGAIN TOMORROW?

MR. IGNATENKO: I THINK NOT.

MR. FITZWATER: NO, WE EXPECT TO RETURN THIS EVENING.

Q: DID THEY AGREE ON ANYTHING? DID THEY AGREE ON ANYTHING IN TERMS OF FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION?

MR. FITZWATER: THEY CERTAINLY AGREE ON THE OVERALL COURSE, ON THE PATH THAT THE U.N. HAS SET IN TERMS OF REMOVING IRAQ FROM KUWAIT AND THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT. IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC AVENUES THAT THEY MIGHT PURSUE IN GETTING THIS ACHIEVED, THAT'S SOMETHING THAT THEY'LL WANT TO DISCUSS THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL BE AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU ALL LATER TODAY.

Q: WAS THERE ANY DISCUSSION OF A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE? AND WOULD THE U.S. AGREE TO A PEACEKEEPING FORCE THAT INCLUDED SOVIET TROOPS?

MR. FITZWATER: WELL, WE DON'T WANT TO GO INTO DETAILS HERE THIS AFTERNOON. OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE DISCUSSING A NUMBER OF SPECIFICS AND THEY WILL HAVE REMARKS IN WHICH THEY LAY OUT THE BASIS OF THEIR CONVERSATION. BUT I JUST DON'T WANT TO PREEMPT THEIR DISCUSSIONS THIS AFTERNOON.

Q: -- THAT THIS WAS JUST A GENERAL REVIEW, OR WERE THERE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS BROUGHT FORWARD?

MR. IGNATENKO: THE MEETING WAS HELD TETE-A-TETE, AND THE SECOND PART OF THE DAY THE MEETING WILL BE HELD WITH A WIDER NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS.

AND I MUST SAY THAT IN THE HALL WHERE THE SECOND MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE RUSSIAN ARMS WILL BE PRESENT THERE. I NOTICED THAT TO THE LEFT OF THE PRESIDENT THERE IS A PAINTING ON THE WALL WHICH WAS PRESENTED IN 1855 BY THE RUSSIAN EMPEROR, AND IT SHOWS A FINNISH HUNTER, MR. KANKKUNEN, AND IN HIS HANDS HE HOLDS AN OLD GUN PRESENTED TO HIM BY THE RUSSIAN EMPEROR.

Q: MR. IGNATENKO, DOES PRESIDENT GORBACHEV BRING NEW PROPOSALS ON CFE AND SALT?

MR. IGNATENKO: I THINK YOU'LL LEARN ABOUT THIS IN THE EVENING DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE.

Q: DID PRESIDENT GORBACHEV PROPOSE AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST?

MR. IGNATENKO: I THINK ABOUT THIS YOU WILL LEARN IN THE EVENING AS WELL.

Q: ARE YOU GOING TO ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO DO ANYTHING IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF THE TALKS TAKING PLACE IN HELSINKI?

MR. FITZWATER: THEY DID BOTH HAVE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC IDEAS THAT THEY TALKED ABOUT, BUT I'LL LEAVE THOSE TO THEM FOR THIS AFTERNOON.

Q: WHO ALL SAT IN ON THE MEETING TODAY?

MR. FITZWATER: THE MEETING THIS MORNING INCLUDED THE TWO NOTE-TAKERS AND INTERPRETERS, AND THAT WAS THE EXTENT

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OF IT. SECRETARY BAKER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE  
MET AT THE SAME TIME.

Q: (QUESTION ASKED IN RUSSIAN.)

MR. IGNATENKO: THE QUESTION OF ANOTHER SUMMIT WAS NOT

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DISCUSSED TODAY, BUT I THINK OUR RELATIONS ARE GOING SO  
WELL RIGHT NOW THAT IT'S NOT EXCLUDED.

MR. FITZWATER: IT'S A GOOD SUMMIT; WE'RE OFF TO A  
GOOD START. WE'LL SEE YOU ALL LATER THIS AFTERNOON. THANK  
YOU VERY MUCH.

MR. IGNATENKO: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.  
(LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED)

ITEM

BT

#0407

NNNN

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ACTION USIS INFO CG DPD PDL ACC 5

VZCZCJUU421EHU093  
 03 RUHJU  
 DE RUEHFO #0417/01 2521939  
 ZNR UUUUU  
 O 091939Z SEP 90  
 FM USINFO WASHDC

10-SEP-90 TDR: 05:58  
 CN: 55291  
 CHRG: USIS  
 DIST: USFO  
 ADD:

TO ALL EU POSTS IMMEDIATE  
 RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE  
 ALL AR WF MONITORING POSTS IMMEDIATE  
 ALL NEAR EAST POSTS IMMEDIATE  
 ALL SOUTH ASIA POSTS IMMEDIATE  
 ALL EA WF MONITORING POSTS IMMEDIATE  
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
 RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE  
 RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE  
 RUHFHR/USIS PARIS  
 RUHFML/AMCONSUL MILAN  
 INFO RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE  
 BT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03

USINFO

ATTN: JORDAN AAMM;

USIS PAO/IO/SPAD; AIT FOR CIS; FOR P AND C;

FROM P/PFO

EO 12356 N/A

WF-U24 09/09/90 (1,230)  
 (DIAL-UP MATERIAL: FOLLOWING ALSO MOVING VIA COMPUTER-TO-  
 COMPUTER COMMUNICATION)  
 BUSH, GORBACHEV CLOSE RANKS MORE FIRMLY AGAINST IRAQ  
 (INSIST ON IRAQ WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT)  
 BY ALEXANDER M. SULLIVAN  
 USIA WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT

HELSINKI -- PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV,  
 CLOSING RANKS EVER MORE FIRMLY AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN,  
 ENDED THEIR SUMMIT MEETING IN HELSINKI SEPTEMBER 9 WITH  
 RENEWED DEMANDS FOR IRAQ'S UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM  
 KUWAIT.

THE TWO LEADERS, AFTER SEVEN HOURS OF TALKS, ISSUED A  
 JOINT STATEMENT ASSERTING THAT "NOTHING SHORT OF THE  
 COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION" OF THE FIVE UNITED NATIONS  
 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ "IS ACCEPTABLE" TO  
 THEM OR TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

REFERRING TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TELEVISED ATTEMPT TO  
 DIVIDE WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW, BUSH TOLD A JOINT NEWS  
 CONFERENCE HE HOPES THE IRAQI LEADER WILL NOW SEE "HE IS  
 NOT GOING TO DIVIDE US, DIVIDE OTHER COUNTRIES, AND HE WILL  
 DO WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE DONE SOME TIME AGO, AND THAT IS  
 COMPLY WITH" THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS.



THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, IN UNPRECEDENTED UNANIMITY, HAS CONDEMNED IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT, DEMANDED UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AND IMPOSED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO COMPEL IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE. THE COUNCIL ALSO HAS STATED EXPLICITLY THAT FORCE MAY BE USED TO IMPLEMENT THE SANCTIONS, IF NECESSARY.

WHILE BOTH PRESIDENTS REPEATEDLY DECLARED THEIR PREFERENCE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE GULF CRISIS, THE JOINT STATEMENT DECLARED THEY ARE "DETERMINED TO SEE THIS AGGRESSION END," AND WARNED SADDAM HUSSEIN THEY ARE "PREPARED TO CONSIDER" ADDITIONAL STEPS CONSISTENT WITH THE U.N. CHARTER. "WE MUST DEMONSTRATE BEYOND ANY DOUBT," THEY ASSERTED, "THAT AGGRESSION CANNOT AND WILL NOT PAY."

BUSH REFUSED TO ELABORATE ON WHAT STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN, SAYING THE "STATEMENT CAN BE INTERPRETED ANY WAY YOU WANT TO INTERPRET IT." GORBACHEV, WITHOUT GIVING EXAMPLES, SAID THERE ARE A NUMBER OF STEPS SHORT OF FORCE YET TO BE TAKEN TO MAKE IRAQ COMPLY WITH THE WORLD COMMUNITY'S DEMANDS. HE SUGGESTED SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD "DISPLAY SOBRIETY" AND "RESPOND TO THE APPEALS AND DEMANDS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY" BY RETREATING FROM KUWAIT.

BUSH AND GORBACHEV OPENED THEIR ONE-DAY SUMMIT WITH A THREE-HOUR DISCUSSION OF THE GULF SITUATION, WITH ONLY INTERPRETERS AND NOTE-TAKERS PRESENT. THEIR ADVISERS JOINED THEM FOR THE SECOND PART OF AN AFTERNOON MEETING WHICH BROADENED THE DISCUSSION TO A WIDE ARRAY OF SUPERPOWER CONCERNS, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL, ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS, AS WELL AS A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF AVAILABLE OPTIONS IN THE GULF.

THE LEADERS WALKED SIDE-BY-SIDE INTO THE FINLANDIA HALL NEWS CONFERENCE WHICH ENDED THEIR TIME TOGETHER, AND SAT AT THE SAME TABLE AS THEY RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS FROM REPORTERS FOR 52 MINUTES.

WHILE THERE SEEMED TO BE SLIGHT DISTINCTIONS IN SOME OF THEIR VIEWS, BOTH MEN INSISTED THEY "STOOD SHOULDER TO SHOULDER" ON THE DOMINANT ISSUE -- THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSURING THAT THE DEMAND OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY PREVAIL THROUGH THE UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQ'S INVADING

FORCES FROM KUWAIT, THE RESTORATION OF THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT, AND FREEDOM FOR "ALL HOSTAGES NOW HELD IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT."

BUSH, NOTING THERE HAD BEEN AN EVOLUTION OF "MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING" OVER THE YEARS, SAID HIS MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV IN MALTA AND WASHINGTON HAD "FURTHERED THAT UNDERSTANDING." HE POINTED OUT THAT "THERE WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN THIS COOPERATIVE FEELING" BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW HAD THE GULF CRISIS ERUPTED 20 YEARS AGO, AND HE SUGGESTED THAT MOSCOW'S REASONABLE ATTITUDE IN THE UNITED NATIONS HAD CHANGED HIS MIND ABOUT PROVIDING ECONOMIC AID TO THE KREMLIN.

"I FEEL WE'RE MOVING ON THE RIGHT TRACK," BUSH SAID OF THE RELATIONSHIP, NOTING DIFFERENCES REMAIN. "THE VERY FACT THAT WE CAN TALK WITH...FRANKNESS," HE SAID, "ENHANCES MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. THEN WHEN WE SEE US...STANDING SHOULDER TO SHOULDER...I THINK IT IS AN OBVIOUS MANIFESTATION OF THIS DEVELOPING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING."

AS A RESULT OF THAT CANDOR, HE SAID, "COMMON GROUND SURGES AHEAD OF... DIFFERENCES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE..."

GORBACHEV SAID THE SUMMIT SESSIONS, ESPECIALLY THE INFORMAL SESSIONS LIKE THOSE HELD AT CAMP DAVID, "ENRICH OUR RELATIONSHIP" AND "INCREASE OUR TRUST." HE SAID THAT WHEN "TRUST IS ENGENDERED" BETWEEN SUPERPOWER LEADERS, COOPERATION BECOMES MORE POSSIBLE.

THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF MILITARY OPTIONS AGAINST IRAQ, BUSH TOLD A QUESTIONER, ADDING HE "WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS MATTER PEACEFULLY RESOLVED."

HE SAID HE HAD NOT ASKED GORBACHEV TO SEND GROUND TROOPS TO SAUDI ARABIA, AND PLAYED DOWN THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS IN IRAQ. BUSH SAID IT WOULD "FACILITATE" RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IF THE ADVISERS WERE REMOVED, BUT DECLARED THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE "IS NOT A MAJOR IRRITANT." HE POINTED OUT GORBACHEV IS "REDUCING THE NUMBERS" OF SUCH EXPERTS, PROVIDED UNDER CONTRACT TO THE IRAQ MILITARY.

BUSH SAID HE TOLD GORBACHEV U.S. FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE GULF ONCE THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS ARE COMPLIED WITH AND ONCE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REGION ARE IN PLACE. "WE HAVE NO INTENTION (OF) KEEPING THEM A DAY LONGER THAN IS REQUIRED," BUSH ASSERTED. GORBACHEV CALLED THAT AN "IMPORTANT" STATEMENT OF U.S. AIMS.

BUSH SAID HE HOPED THE STATEMENT'S RECOGNITION THAT HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE MIGHT BECOME NECESSARY FOR IRAQI CIVILIANS WOULD NOT BE MISINTERPRETED AS A "WHOLESALE HOLE" IN THE U.N. EMBARGO. HE SAID THE U.S. VIEW IS THAT THE NEED FOR FOOD MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY, AND THAT ITS DISTRIBUTION MUST BE MONITORED BY AN INTERNATIONAL GROUP SO THAT IT IS NOT MISDIRECTED TO IRAQ'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

ON OTHER MATTERS, BUSH PLEDGED FURTHER ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH MOSCOW "IN AS MANY WAYS AS POSSIBLE." THE PRESIDENT SAID THE U.S. BUDGET DEFICIT CONSTRAINS HIS ABILITY TO "WRITE OUT LARGE CHECKS," BUT HE SAID HE WILL RECOMMEND TO CONGRESS "AS CLOSE COOPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC



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FIELD AS POSSIBLE." HE SAID THERE ARE "MANY WAYS WE CAN  
ENDEAVOR TO BE OF ASSISTANCE," DESPITE THE DEFICIT.

BOTH PRESIDENTS RESTATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVING  
THIS YEAR A TREATY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF EACH SIDE'S

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STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUSH SAID HE AND GORBACHEV HAD "VOWED THAT WE WOULD ENCOURAGE OUR NEGOTIATORS TO MOVE FORWARD MORE RAPIDLY" ON BOTH STRATEGIC ARMS AND A SEPARATE TREATY LIMITING CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

"I'M STILL HOPEFUL," HE ADDED, "THAT BY THE END OF THE YEAR, WE WILL HAVE SUCH AN AGREEMENT."

GORBACHEV ENDORSED THE BUSH SENTIMENT, ADDING THE LEADERS HAD AGREED TO "MAKE FRESH EFFORTS TO GIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS" TO THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS. HE SAID HE SEES THE POSSIBILITY OF "POSITIVE RESULTS WITHIN THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR."

BUSH TOLD A QUESTIONER THE FACT THAT U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON ISRAEL HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH IS NO REASON TO IGNORE IRAQ'S AGGRESSION AGAINST KUWAIT AND SAID HE AGREED COMPLETELY THAT RESOLUTION 242 -- WHICH CALLS FOR ISRAEL'S RECOGNIZED EXISTENCE WITHIN SECURE BORDERS -- SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED FORTHWITH. BUSH EXPRESSED THE HOPE THE UNITED STATES COULD BE "CATALYTIC" IN BRINGING ABOUT COMPLIANCE, STRESSING THAT "IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THAT QUESTION EVENTUALLY -- AND HOPEFULLY SOONER RATHER THAN LATER -- BE RESOLVED."

(LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED)

ITEM

BT

#0417

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED USINFO 091939Z SEP 90/03



אאא, חוזם: 7393

אל: רהמש/430

מ-: נ, נר: 2015, תא: 090990, זח: 2200, דח: מ, סג: סו,

בבב

סודי/מיד

אל: מנהל מצפא

מאת: אורי אורן - נ

שיחת שה'ח עם היועץ לבטחון לאומי (ב-5.9.90)

נכחו ד'ר האס, השגריר ארד, איתן בנצור, אורי אורן

השיחה נפתחה בברכתו של סקורופט לשר 'שמעתי הרבה על פעילותך בתחום מדיניות הפנים. ברוך בואך למדיניות החוץ'.

שה'ח השיב בברכה וציין כי הוא מטפל בימים אלה גם בענייני פנים וגם בענייני חוץ, כי בלימת התוקפנות היא מבחן העולם החופשי.

השר חזר על קביעותיו הבסיסיות בדבר האיום העיראקי המופנה אל עבר ישראל וציין כי בעוד מול עיראק עומדת קואליציה של מדינות העולם החופשי הרי מול ישראל עומדת קואליציה של מדינות ערב, שעיראק היא אחת מהן. שה'ח הדגיש כי מה שיוכרע במבחן מול עיראק יקבע אלו משטרים ישארו ואלו ישתנו. אנו עומדים באירופה בפני עידן חדש. מי שהיה מדבר עליו לפני מספר שנים היה נחשב כמדבר על ימות המשיח. זהו נצחונה של ארהב ונצחון האנושות. אך לא נלקח בחשבון כי אי שם במקומות שם מרוכזת האנרגיה של העולם יקום מטורף ויעמיד בסכנה כל אשר הושג.

שה'ח חזר והזכיר כי ישראל עומדת לימין ארהב ותפעל ככל שתבקש בכל עת שתבקש על ידה במשבר במפרץ. היועץ לבטחון לאומי הטעים כי ארהב מעריכה את גישת ממשלת ישראל, במשבר, והגדירה כ'מסייעת מאוד'. 'זוהי תרומה משמעותית להשגת המטרה שכולנו רוצים בה'. הוא הזכיר את פעולות האמברגו נגד עיראק שמדינות רבות שותפות לה בתמיכת האומות המאוחדות 'ועכשיו נראה איך היא תפעל'. 'אנו נחושים להצליח במטרה זו ואם האסטרטגיה לא תספיק נבדוק מה עוד אנחנו יכולים לעשות'. להלן דיבר מר סקורופט על ההשלכות החיוביות שעשויות להיות לפתרון מוצלח של המשבר, על היחסים בין ישראל לשכנותיה: 'נוכל ליישם את מטרותינו להיא לשינוי מערכת היחסים עם מדינות ערב. העתיד עודנו מעורפל, אך אני חושב כי אפשרות כזו קיימת. נוכל לנצל את הקואליציה של מדינות ערב המתונות שהתקבלה עכשיו, ללכת לקראת היוזמה המדינית של ממשלת ישראל- אמר סקורופט. בדברו על היחסים בין ארהב לישראל למרות 'הזמנים הקשים וחילוקי הדעות שהיו בנינו' הטעים הדובר כי 'אתה יכול להיות בטוח בנחישותינו לקיים מערכת היחסים ששירתה כה טוב את מדיניותנו'. אני מאמין בכינות כי יש לנו נקודות ראיות משותפות ותמימות דעים לגבי המטרות שיאפשרו לנו לפעול ביחד'.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס

אאאא, חוזם: 12109

אל: רהמש/691

מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 195, תא: 130990, זח: 1437, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

9,705317

16783

שמור/מיד

261.22

אל: לשכת שה'ח, סמנכ'ל הסברה, מנהל מע'ת, מנהל מצפ'א, מנהל הסברה, מנהל לע'מ יועץ ראה'מ לתקשורת, דו'צ

דע: שגריר, ירון - וושינגטון

מאת: קונכ'ל/ניו-יורק

הנדון: פגישת שה'ח עם נ'י טיימס

שה'ח נפגש אתמול עם מערכת הנ'י טיימס, נכחה למעשה כל האליטה של העתון כולל מקס פרנקל, ג'ו לליוולד, לסלי גלב, וארן הוג, ברנארד גוורצמן, אנטוני לואיס, אייב רוזנטאל ועוד. השיחה התנהלה באוירת דיאלוג טובה וההדים לה היו טובים מאד מצד הנוכחים. השיחה נגעה לנושאי הועידה הבינלאומית, התפקיד הסובייטי באיזור, יחסי ישראל-ארה'ב, תהליך השלום באיזור, המשבר במפרץ.

שה'ח התמקד בעיקר בארבעה נושאים: - הועידה הבינ'ל ותפקיד בריה'מ - ישראל ממשיכה להתנגד לועידה בינ'ל והיא דוגלת במו'מ ישיר. אם בריה'מ תרצה לשחק תפקיד כלשהו באיזור עליה להוכיח איזון בעמדותיה כולל הקמת יחסים דיפלומטיים. ההתפתחות היא איטית אך בכוון הנכון, השבוע יוצאת משלחת משה'ח למוסקבה ואפגש עם שוורנדרזה בעצרת (בתשובה לשאלת מקס פרנקל).

- שיפור היחסים עם ארה'ב בעקבות השיחות האחרונות בווינגטון. אמנם אין תמימות דעים בכל נושא אך ישנה הבנה בסיסית לגבי ערכה האסטרטגי של ישראל והצורך האמריקאי דווקא לבטא זאת כי ישראל הסכימה לשמור על פרופיל נמוך בהתחשב באינטרס האמריקאי. ישראל לא תשאר עוד בצל ותבטא את תמיכתה בארה'ב כמו שחשיבותה בעיני ארה'ב תבוטא ע'י הממשל.

- סוריה - לא שולל אפשרות של תהליך שלום עם הסורים. אסד אינו סאדאם חוסיין, אמנם אידיאולוגית הוא קיצוני לא פחות, אך הוא מודע למגבלות העצמה שלו (על כך התנהל דיון מפורט בהשתתפות ערה כל של אנטוני לואיס ואייב רוזנטאל).

- המשבר במפרץ - קשה לדעת אם ניתן לסמוך על הקואליציה הערבית אם כי אין אנו מתנגדים לה. יחד עם זאת יש לזכור שקואליציה עולמית שלמה עומדת מול עירק במשבר זה בעוד ישראל עומדת 365 יום בשנה לא רק מול עירק אלא מול קואליציה מלחמתית ומחומשת היטב של לפחות שבע מדינות ערביות. אם עירק היתה מתקיפה את ישראל ולא את כוויית לא היתה קמה בלוקדה או אדמדה כדי להגן עליה. ישראל לא תתפשר על בטחונה וקיומה ואם תותקף תגיב מייד ובעצמה.

קונכ'ל/ניו-יורק



תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל,  
ממד, @ (רס), אמן, מעת, הסברה, @ (קלוורי),  
לעמ, דוצ-ים, @ (דוצ), צנזורצבאי, מצפא, מזאר 1

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 9716  
אל: רהמש/562  
מ-: ניו יורק, נר: 143, תא: 110990, זח: 1746, דח: ר, סג: שמ,  
בבב  
שמור/רגיל  
261.04

אל: מצפ' א'  
מע' ת

דע: יועצת שה' ח לתקשורת  
וושנינגטון - ירון

מאת: עתונות/ניו-יורק

הנדון: ביקור שה' ח - סיכום תקשורת.

1. בביקורו בניו יורק קיים ס/רה' מ ושה' ח תידרוכי מערכת:

א. WALL STREET JOURNAL -

נכחו מצידם 9 איש מנהלים ועורכים בכירים ביניהם ראויים לציון השתתפותם של:

CHAIRMAN AND C.E.O - PHILLIP WARREN

PUBLISHER - PETER KAHN

ב. NEW YORK TIMES -

מצידם 8 איש - עורכים בכירים.

התידרוכים ארכו כשעה וחצי באוירה נינוחה וטובה מאד.

השר דן עימם כמעט בלעדית על המשבר במפרץ ועל שיחותיו בוושנינגטון עם הנשיא ומזכיר המדינה; מחוייבות ארה'ב לבטחון ישראל וחשיבות שמירת עליונותה הצבאית, הערכת הממשל והקונגרס לדרך פעולתה של ישראל עד כה במשבר, התסריטים השונים לסדר החדש במז'ת לאור האפשרויות השונות לסיום המשבר.

2. בהופעתו בועידת הנשיאים נכחו כ 25 אנשי תקשורת (פרט לישראלים) הנחשב להיקף מכובד באירוע זה.

בסיום התראיין לרשת BBC ו WABC המקומי.

תכנים כמברק ס/קונכ'ל נר 122 מ 10 ספט'.

3. השר תידרך אישית את מורט צוקרמן -  
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT  
וכן את אייב רוזנטל מה N.Y.T.

עתונות/ניו-יורק  
יובל רותם



תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), @ (מנכל), ממנכל, סמנכל,  
ממד, @ (רס), אמן, מעת, הסברה, לעמ, מצפא

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 7306

אל: רהמש/420

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 88, תא: 090990, זח: 1006, דח: ב, סג: בל,

בבב

9,705317

בלמס / בהול

אל: מנהל מצפ"א

דע: מנהל מע"ת - בהול להזעיק

יועצת תקשורת שה"ח,

ניו יורק

תפוצת תקשורת ארה"ב

ביקור שה"ח - סכום תקשורת.

1. במהלך ביקורו של סגן רוה"מ ושה"ח כאן התקיימן ארועי התקשורת הבאים:-

א. מסיבת עתונאים (STAKEOUT) במחמ"ד, לאחר פגישת שה"ח עם מזכיר המדינה. שה"ח מזכיר המדינה נתנו לכתבים הצהרות על פגישתם ואח"כ ענו לשאלות הכתבים הרבים שנכחו שם. האירוע כולו נמשך למעלה מ- 20 דקות - דבר שכתבים דיפלומטים וותיקים (כמו תום פרידמן) טרחו לציין כיוצא דופן, ובעיקר לאור החמימות המופגנת של המזכיר במהלך כל האירוע. לחיצת הידיים האיתנה והממושכת של המזכיר לשה"ח אוזכרה אף היא כבטוי שאינו שכיח מבחינת המזכיר, לפגישה המוצלחת בין שני האישים (התמליל המלא של הארוע הועבר אליכם).

ב. מסיבת עתונאים מאולתרת (STAKEOUT) בבית הלבן, בצאת שה"ח מפגישתו עם הנשיא ועם היועץ לבטחון לאומי, בה השתתפו כתבי הבית הלבן (התמליל המלא הוברק אליכם בנפרד). הערה: בגלל סירוב הבית הלבן לאפשר לצלמי טלוויזיה לצלם פגישות הנשיא - שה"ח - הורשו רק צלמי עתונות, ללא מסרטות - לא שודרו גם תמונות מהפגישה.

ג. תדרוך לכתבים ישראלים - ביום הראשון של הביקור (יום ד' 5.9) נפגש שה"ח עם הכתבים הישראליים לתדרוך ממושך. ביום השני לביקור, תדרך את העתונאים השגריר על פגישות שה"ח באותו יום. בנוסף, התראיין שה"ח לקול ישראל, גלי - צה"ל, הטלוויזיה הישראלית, ידיעות-אחרונות ומעריב.

ד. ראיון למקניל-לרר (P.B.S) - השר התראיין לתוכנית החדשות היוקרתית ה"מקניל-לרר". הראיון שודר ביום חמישי 6.9 - לקראת סיום ביקור שה"ח - בערב.

ה. בארוחת - הערב הרשמית שערך השגריר לכבוד שה"ח נכחו אנשי תקשורת רבים ובכירים. ביניהם ראוי לציין את מג גרינפילד - עורכת עמודי המערכת של ה-W.P, ליאונרד דאוני - MENAGING EDITOR של ה-W.P, סטיבן רוזנפלד - בעל הטור וסגן עורך עמוד המערכת, טוני סנו - עורך עמוד המערכת של ה"וושינגטון טיימס", מורטון קונזרקי - הפרשן ובעל-הטור מהשבועון "ניו רפובליק" וללי ויימות'. הערה: הפגישה עם הנשיא - שנקבעה ליום חמישי בבוקר אילצה אותנו לבטל המפגש עם הפרשנים ובעלי הטורים שהיה מתוכנן לאותו מועד.

2. ביקורו של שה"ח כאן זכה לסיקור אוהד בכתבות ב-CNN, כתבות ב-NPR, כתבות ב-NYT וב-WT ואזכור, במסגרת כתבה רחבה יותר ב-WP. (כל הכתבות נשלחו אליכם בנפרד).



הנימה הכללית בדווחים היתה חיובית. צויינה בעיקר, האוירה הטובה ששררה במפגשים ואת העובדה שהמזכיר טרח להפגין אוירה זו גם בארוע עם הכתבים. תכנית, הנושאים שהועלו בסיקור התקשורת היו:-

א. הצהרות שני האישים בדבר נחיצותו של המשך תהליך השלום, ודברי המזכיר כי התקדמות בתהליך השלום תהווה קוטב נגדי ותשובה לתוקפנות צאדם חוסיין.

ב. ההערכה ל"פרופיל הנמוך" ולאיפוק שמגלה ישראל מאז פרוץ המשבר תוך הערכת הסיכונים שמולם עומדת ישראל.

ג. הדגשת מחוייבות ארה"ב לבטחון ישראל ושמירת עליונותה האיכותית. הבנה לצורכי הבטחון של ישראל המתחייבים מהמצב. בתקשורת - הדגשה לנושא ה"פטריוט".

ד. דברי המזכיר על ההתקדמות שהושגה בנושא הערבויות לדיור.

ה. דברי שה"ח כי בנושא מחילת החובות למצרים, ישראל מצפה כי תזכה ביחס שווה מצד הממשל.

למרות ההתעניינות הרבה של הכתבים בביקור, חשוב לציין, כי מבחינה תקשורתית, הנושא המרכזי שסוקר כאן במהלך אותם הימים היה נסיעתו של המזכיר למפרץ ולברה"מ (עמו נסעו גם מרבית הכתבים הדיפלומטים הנכירים) והפסגה המתוכננת בין הנשיא בוש לגורבצ'וב.

רות ירון.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, @ (רס), אמן, מעת, הסברה, @ (קלוורי), לעמ, דוצ-יס, @ (דוצ), צנזורצבאי, @ (נוה/משהבט), @ (אמן/קשח), מצפא, פרנ

סססס

אאא, חוזם: 5934

אל: רהמש/350

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 54, תא: 070990, זח: 1136, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

## מחילת חובות - "גבעה"

1. התגובות הראשונות מפגינות הבנה ותמיכה כללית ביוזמת הממשל לגבי מצרים.

2. במפגש שה"ח עם יו"ר וע' החוץ של ביה"נ (פאסל), יו"ר תת-הועדה למז"ת (המילטון), הרפוב' הבכיר בועדה (ברומפילד) וחבר הועדה לארי סמית, נאמר ע"י היו"ר כי הקלת נטל החוב הישראלי נידונה בעבר ע"י הועדה באופן בלתי-רשמי. לדבריו, לא היה לדבר סכוי כל עוד ישראל בודדה על הכוונת. המילטון הוסיף כי אישור בקשת המחילה למצרים יהיה UNTENABLE ללא מדינות נוספות.

3. בטוי להלך רוח חיובי (יחסית) זה נשמע אף בדבריו של ה"מצליף" הדמוקרטי, הסנטור קרנסטון, אשר חזר מישראל וממדינות ערב גדוש ברעיונות חיוביים, ביניהם מחילת חובות לישראל.

4. הסנטור ספקטר ציין - שלשום - בשיחה שהוקדשה לצרכיה של ישראל, כי עלינו לדרוש מחילת חובות, וכי העביר חוות דעתו בנדון לממשל.

5. כפי שדווח משיחה עם הסנטור רוב, הרי שהתרשמותו היא כי מרבית חברי ועדת החוץ יתמכו בהכללת ישראל בחבילת המחילות.

6. לפי הווש. פוסט (6/9/90) טוען יו"ר ועדת ההקצבות של ביה"נ, אובי, כי מחילת חובות למצרים תתאפשר רק "בהקשר של פתרון רחב יותר של בעית החובות הבלתי- ניתנים- לגבייה של ישראל, פולין (יתכן והתכוון לפילפינים ? - י.א), פקיסטן ותורכיה.

7. מאמר מערכת הווש. פוסט (הנמצא על שולחנות ה"גבעה") קורא היום (9/6) למחיקת חובות קבוצתית כצעד לביצור האינטרס המדיני האמריקאי.

8. המדובר אך ורק בתגובות ראשוניות. עדין לא נעשה "חריש" לבדיקת התחושות בועדות ההקצבות והתקציב. המדובר בתגובות העלולות להשתנות עם הגיע הטרונות מאזורי הבחירה, ועם העלאת נושא הקיצוצים מבית. המדובר בתגובות טרם יישומו של ה- SEQUESTER הצפוי והמכאיב. המדובר בתגובות אשר אולי התעלמו ממשמעויות יום הבחירות בנובמבר.

9. המדובר בתגובות חיוביות מן המצופה לגבי החלת המחילה על ישראל (הנתפסת, כנראה, כמאיץ חיוני למחילת המצרים).

10. לצד ההיבט השלילי (האפשרות כי יחול פיחות בתדמיתנו הכלכלית והפוליטית), ובמקביל להיבט הריאלי (המודעות לצרכים הגואים והמשאבים המוגבלים של ישראל), אפשר להניח כי אי-הצמדתנו ל"יוזמה המצרית" עלול ליצור הרושם כאילו חל פיחות במעמדנו האיסטרטגי בעיני הממשל (שהרי מקור היוזמה הוא שרותיה האסטרטגים של מצרים), וכאילו אין לנו השריר הפוליטי להשיג היעד. ויתור על הטבה מופלגת זאת עלול אף לגרוע מעמדת המקוח של



ישראל לגבי בקשות אחרות.

יורם אטינגר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, כהן, כלכליתב',  
סולטן, רביב

סססס

7.7.90

38

# MIDEAST EXPERTS DISCUSS CRISIS IN THE GULF

(Article on AEI forum on Middle East)

By Norma S. Holmes

USIA Staff writer

Washington -- Saddam Hussein's move into Kuwait represents more than an inter-Arab dispute over oil or territory or an Iraqi effort to redefine the Arab world's dealings with the West, according to Aaron Miller, a Middle East specialist of the U.S. State Department.

"What is at stake in this crisis is the very principle of whether or not negotiations and dialogue can be used to resolve disputes or whether brute force and intimidation will essentially become the wave of the future," Miller said September 6 at a Middle East discussion forum sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy and Research. "As fluid as the situation is now, none of us can predict how this conflict can be resolved," he added.

Miller said it was essential that the world provide a credible alternative to Saddam Hussein's way of resolving disputes. This requires defusing the propaganda symbols that Saddam Hussein manipulates so effectively, he said -- about the presence of foreign in the region, the issue of "have's vs. the have-nots" and the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Miller, who is a Middle East specialist on the State Department's planning staff, was one of a dozen internationally known scholars and negotiators who participated in a one-day colloquium discussing options and strategies for conflict resolution in the region.

Also participating were: Ambassador Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms in Geneva; Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. representative to the United Nations and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; Menahem Milson, professor of Arabic literature at Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Daniel Pipes, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Philadelphia and Orbis; Dr. Ruth Lapidoth, professor of international law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; professor Mordechai Abir, author and professor at Hebrew University; Daniel Elazar, professor of political science at Temple University in Philadelphia; Samuel Lewis, president of the U.S. Institute for Peace; Irving Kristol, editor of National Interest magazine; Martin Indyk, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; George Weigel, of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington; Yakir Plessner, a senior lecturer and specialist in monetary policy at Hebrew University; Martin Peretz, editor in chief of the New Republic; Norman Podhoretz, editor in chief of Commentary magazine; and Fulbright Visiting Professor and author Nathan Yoni.



A senior Bush administration official noted that, inasmuch as the Japanese had already pledged to contribute some 1,000 million dollars worth of assistance to the Gulf effort, "Our suggestion that they increase that contribution might have come as some sort of a surprise to them."

Administration sources have repeatedly called Japan's 1,000 million dollar pledge merely "a good start," and the senior official indicated that an additional amount "in the 1,000 million dollar category" is being sought.

"They're reflective people. ... They're going to think about it" and act in a typically deliberate fashion, he said.

The official added that the Brady group had presented Kaifu with a specific request for funds to assist the so-called front line states near Iraq -- Egypt, Turkey and Jordan -- in weathering the economic crisis. "We asked for a number, and I wouldn't be surprised in the long run if we didn't get very close to that number," he said.

A difference in approach between the United States and Japan reportedly surfaced at the U.S. mission's meeting with Kaifu. While Japan would opt to impose "IMF-type" conditions (the types of conditions the International Monetary Fund (IMF) normally imposes on countries asking it for temporary balanced-of-payments assistance) on the front-line states receiving help, the official indicated, the United States feels that short-term aid, at least, ought to carry very few conditions.

A Japanese foreign ministry source told reporters that Kaifu backed an international response to the crisis in the Gulf region, and said Japan would contribute "as much as possible" toward the effort.

But the source declined to project what further help Japan would provide, saying simply, "We have to do what we have to do."

Alluding to the fact that post-World War II Japan has largely stayed aloof from deep involvement in world affairs, the ministry source said that the nation's role in the Gulf operation is "somewhat unprecedented for us. We don't have any established rule."

The source rejected the premise of a question as to whether Japan resented U.S. pressure to increase its contribution. "The government doesn't characterize this interaction as pressure," the source said.

NNNN

In her assessment of the Iraqi position in the conflict, Jeane Kirkpatrick challenged Saddam Hussein's premise that his invasion of Kuwait was justified because the current boundaries of states in the region are lines drawn up by colonial powers and therefore illegitimate. "To the extent this mythology is taken seriously, no real peace can be possible," Kirkpatrick said.

Indyk, addressing the problem of Iraqi propaganda and disinformation, said that "perceptions in the Arab street are not consistent with reality" and that Iraq, with the second largest oil reserves in the world is not a "have-not" nation.

Lapidath warned of the dangers of linking the resolution of the gulf crisis to other regional conflicts. Noting that the Soviet Union has called for an international conference to discuss both the crisis in the gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lapidath said that "to link these two issues in an international conference would be the absolute end of any chances for peace."

Asked to assess a possible Soviet role in achieving a peace settlement, Kirkpatrick said that with the tremendous upheaval in the Arab world and a worldwide shifting of alliances, "it's too soon to make any assumptions" about a future Soviet role in U.N. conflict resolution. "After the upcoming General Assembly we will know a great deal more," she said.

Kampelman said that the Soviet Union has excluded itself from a possible U.N. role in resolving conflicts in the Middle East for as long as the United Nations is governed by the Sovietsponsored resolution that equates Zionism with racism.

Kampelman said that overshadowing the whole discussion of the Middle East peace process is Iraq and developments in the gulf. "We really can't go very far until we see how that settles itself," Kampelman said, noting that the resolution of the gulf conflict "may very well change the players on the board."

NNNN



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U.S. OFFICIAL URGES WORLD BANK, IMF ROLE IN GULF AID

(Says will be topic at Fund-Bank meetings)

By Ralph Dannheisser

USIA Staff Correspondent

Seoul, Korea - Multilateral financial institutions will play a major role in dealing with the economic fallout of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, a senior Bush administration official says.

The issue, particularly as it relates to the severe problems of the front-line states of Egypt, Turkey and Jordan, will be addressed in upcoming meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, he says.

The official, a member of the mission led by Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady that is trying to build economic support for the gulf operation on the part of U.S. allies, spoke as the group moved through the Asian portion of its whirlwind worldwide trip.

By the time they return home to Washington September 8, the hastily-arranged mission will have taken the group to meet with governmental leaders in London, Paris, Seoul and Tokyo.

The official, who declined to be identified, said that while short-term help must come mainly from individual countries, multilateral institutions will have to step in later as the effort to counter Iraqi expansion continues.

"In the short term the emphasis is on acting quickly, bilaterally, getting a transfusion of aid into these patients," he said.

But there is a widely shared view that the longer-term effort "ought to involve not only the Fund and the Bank but that there ought to be a close coordination, possibly a pooling of some of the resources -- that that is desirable ... to maximize the contributions," the official added.

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund are holding their annual meetings in Washington in late September, and the official said the issue will surely be discussed there.

The administration has estimated that the effort to minimize economic damage to the front-line states will require 3,500 million dollars by the end of this year, and perhaps another 7,000 million dollars if the crisis continues deep into 1991.

That is quite apart from the costs of the U.S. military operation in the area, estimated at 6,000 million dollars through the end of the year and another 1,000 million dollars per month after that.

אאא, חוזם: 6001

אל: רהמש/352

מ-: ווש, נר: 2059, תא: 070990, זח: 1330, דח: מ, סג: סב,

בבב

סודי ביותר / מידי

אל: מנהל מצפ'א

דע: מנכ'ל

מאת: וושינגטון, איתן בנצור

(א) משיחה עם ברתולומיאו:

(1) אמרתי ששמעתי מרון בן-ישי שהוא קלט בפנטגון שארה'ב עומדת לקשור עיסקת נשק נוספת עם ערב הסעודית בהיקף של 8 בליון דולר. ברתולומיאו אמר שהכוונה היא ליצור מצב של תלות מוחלטת של צבא סעודיה בכוחות המזוינים של ארה'ב. ארה'ב מתכוונת להשאיר כח קטן בערב הסעודית גם אחרי שהמשבר במפרץ יבוא על פתרונו. מכל מקום הכוונה היא שהנשק שבידי הסעודים והצבא בכלל 'יופעלו' למעשה ע'י עורף אמרקאי מה גם שכבר עתה המצב דומה לתוכנית הנ'ל.

(2) ברתולומיאו אמר ששיחת שה'ח - בייקר הכריעה להערכתו את הכף לגבי מתן ה'פטריוט' לישראל. ציין ששיחת שה'ח בייקר העבירה הנושא משלב הכוונה לשלב ההחלטה.

(ב) משיחה עם קלי: אמר שסוריה עומדת לשגר דיביזיה לערב הסעודית.

(ג) משיחה עם קורצר: המזכיר מבקש לסיים בהקדם את ענין הערבויות לשיכון. בימים הקרובים יוצגו לנו מספר שאלות הבהרה ואחרי כן יציעו לשה'ח הנוסח הסופי בהסתמך על חילופי הדברים בסוגייה בשיחת שה'ח עם בייקר.

בנצור.

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז, @ (רם), אמן, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן

סססס



אאאא, חוזה: 6237  
אל: רהמש/364  
מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 65, תא: 070990, זח: 1701, דח: מ, סג: בל,  
בבב  
בלמס/מיידי

אל : תפוצת תקשורת

דע : ניו-יורק

מאת : עתונות, וושינגטון

MACNEIL/LEHRER NEWS HOUR INTERVIEW WITH: DAVID LEVY, FOREIGN MINISTER  
OF ISRAEL, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1990

JUDY WOODRUFF: NEXT TONIGHT, WE HEAR FROM ONE OF THE COUNTRIES  
THAT STANDS TO BE MOST AFFECTED BY THE CRISIS IN THE GULF, BUT WHICH  
HAS KEPT ITS PUBLIC COMMENTS TO A MINIMUM UNTIL NOW. ISRAEL'S  
FOREIGN MINISTER DAVID LEVY IS VISITING WASHINGTON, WHERE HE MET  
YESTERDAY WITH SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND TODAY WITH PRESIDENT  
BUSH, THE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SINCE  
IRAQ INVADED KUWAIT.

THIS AFTERNOON, I INTERVIEWED LEVY THROUGH AN INTERPRETER  
PROVIDED BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN A WASHINGTON HOTEL.

(VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW BEGINS.)

MS. WOODRUFF: MINISTER LEVY, WE THANK YOU FOR BEING WITH US.  
YOU HAD MEETINGS TODAY WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, YESTERDAY WITH SECRETARY  
OF STATE BAKER. WERE THESE MEETINGS SUCCESSFUL FROM ISRAEL'S  
STANDPOINT? DID YOU GET WHAT YOU CAME TO HEAR?

MIN. LEVY: I THINK THE ATMOSPHERE WAS VERY GOOD;  
UNDERSTANDING, TOO, AND WE HAVE MUCH IN COMMON, OUR TWO COUNTRIES.  
THE CRISIS IS A VERY SERIOUS ONE, AND THE DECISION OF PRESIDENT BUSH  
TO STAND UP TO AGGRESSION LIKE A BASTION AT THE DAM WAS QUITE  
CORRECT, QUITE GOOD. ISRAEL STANDS BESIDE THE USA. WE ARE AN ALLY  
IN THESE TIMES, TOO, PERHAPS ESPECIALLY IN THESE TIMES.

MS. WOODRUFF: WHAT SPECIFICALLY DID YOU COME TO DISCUSS WITH  
THEM?

MIN. LEVY: WE NEED TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THE VERY LOW  
PROFILE OF ISRAEL DOESN'T MEAN THAT ISRAEL IS NOT THERE, OR THAT ITS  
MIGHT AND STRENGTH IS WHITTLED DOWN, OR THAT OUR FRIENDSHIP IS TO BE  
IN THE SHADOWS.

WE UNDERSTAND AMERICA. WE UNDERSTAND THE COALITION THAT HAS  
BEEN MARSHALLED AROUND THE USA AND WHICH PRESIDENT BUSH IS TRYING TO  
GET TOGETHER. BUT WITH ALL THAT, WE ARE NOT HAVING A NEW ROMANCE,  
WITH US BEING IN THE SHADOWS, NOBODY NEEDING TO KNOW ABOUT OUR

EXISTENCE.

ALL WE ARE DOING, AND ESPECIALLY ALL WE ARE NOT DOING, NOTWITHSTANDING THE DIRE THREATS AND DANGER WE ARE FACED WITH, IS DONE OR NOT DONE THROUGH OUR BEING FULLY CONSCIOUS OF AND COOPERATIVE WITH THE STANCE OF AMERICA AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF AMERICA, WITH OUR WISH NOT TO BE IN THE WAY, NOT TO THROW SPANNERS INTO THE WORKS OF PRESIDENT BUSH, HIS EFFORTS.

MS. WOODRUFF: WHAT WE ARE HEARING ABOUT THESE MEETINGS HAS TO DO, FOR EXAMPLE, TODAY YOU REPORTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS PROMISED ISRAEL AN ADDITIONAL SUPPLY OF ADVANCED WEAPONS INCLUDING THE PATRIOT ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES. YOU HAVE ALSO BEEN ASKING FOR THE F-16 JET FIGHTERS, AND SO FORTH.

WHY DOES ISRAEL NEED ALL THIS ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT?

MIN. LEVY: WELL, WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE THERE IN THE AREA IN WHICH DANGER IS THREATENING ISRAEL. IF ISRAEL WERE TO BE WEAK OR WERE SEEN TO BE WEAKENING, THE ATTACK COULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS -- WHOEVER IS CONSIDERED TO BE WEAK THERE IS TO PAY THE PRICE.

ISRAEL IS THE ONLY REALLY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY IN THAT AREA, AND THUS IT IS OPEN ALL THE MORE SO TO THE DANGERS AND THREATS. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RICH IN ARMAMENTS, HE HAS MISSILES, HE HAS WARHEADS -- CHEMICAL, BACTERIOLOGICAL, AND OTHER KIND AS WELL -- AND WE NEED TO, WE NECESSARILY MUST HAVE TO HAVE THOSE DETAILED ITEMS OF WARFARE THAT CAN DETER -- IF WE CAN DETER, WHEN WE CAN DETER, WE CAN ALSO DEFEND OURSELVES.

WE CANNOT BE INFERIOR, HAVE AN INFERIORITY, AND THAT IS WHY THIS FULL AWARENESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OPENNESS AND READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN THE QUALITATIVE EDGE OF ISRAEL OVER ITS ADVERSARIES.

THIS REMAINS -- AS IT IS, I WAS VERY HAPPY TO HEAR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY -- SECRETARY BAKER TELL US THAT THIS UNDERTAKING, THIS COMMITMENT STANDS AND WILL CONTINUE TO STAND.

MS. WOODRUFF: DO YOU EXPECT THAT IRAQ WILL ATTACK ISRAEL?

MIN. LEVY: I DON'T WANT TO FEEL IT, BUT IT IS ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY.

WE ARE FACING, HERE, A MAN WHO IS NOT RATIONALLY MOTIVATED, AND IF HE FEELS HE WISHES TO OBTAIN SOME GOAL, HE IS CERTAINLY LIABLE AND ABLE TO START ATTACKING ISRAEL -- HAS SAID SO. AND ISRAEL CAN -- MUST NOT BE IN ANY SUBVERSIVE -- SUBSERVIENT POSITION, IN ANY POSITION WHERE IT CANNOT DEFEND ITSELF.

MS. WOODRUFF: YOU'VE ALSO BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION -- YOU ARE CONVINCED THAT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION WILL FORGIVE ISRAEL'S DOLLAR 4.5 BILLION MILITARY DEBT TO THE UNITED STATES, AS IT IS ATTEMPTING -- I GUESS THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS ATTEMPTING TO GET THE CONGRESS TO FORGIVE EGYPT'S DOLLAR 7 BILLION DEBT.

WHAT MAKES YOU CONVINCED THAT THIS IS GOING TO HAPPEN? DID THE PRESIDENT, DID SECRETARY BAKER OR SOMEONE ELSE TELL YOU THIS



DIRECTLY?

MIN. LEVY: WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT MATTER. I CAN ONLY EXPRESS HOPE, HOPE THAT THE EQUILIBRIUM WILL BE MAINTAINED. IT WERE UNTHINKABLE THAT ISRAEL, WITH ALL ITS PROBLEMS, HAVE A DIFFERENT YARDSTICK APPLIED TO IT, AND A DIFFERENT MEASURE. WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT ISRAEL FINDS ITSELF IN A VERY DIFFICULT STANCE, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND FROM A SECURITY POINT OF VIEW. WE HAVE HAD A GOOD ECHO TO THIS, OUR STATEMENT, AND SO WE CAN HELP. NOTHING HAS YET BEEN FINALIZED, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THERE IS UNDERSTANDING AND WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO FINALIZATIONS. THANK YOU.

MS. WOODRUFF: THERE IS NOW THIS IDEA THAT'S BEEN RAISED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN AND OTHERS, NOW THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID THEY LIKE IT, OF HAVING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHERE THERE WOULD BE DISCUSSED NOT ONLY THE FUTURE OF KUWAIT AND THE OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT, BUT THE OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP BY ISRAEL. WHAT IS ISRAEL'S REACTION TO THIS?

MIN. LEVY: THERE IS NO NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE -- TO AGREE TO THE TERMS WHICH HAVE BEEN FORMULATED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, NOT EVEN THE SOVIETS. HE INVADES, HE ANNEXES, AND HE TOLD THE WHOLE WORLD, "WELL, THIS IS IT." IN EUROPE, ONE WOULD CALL IT CAPITULATING, THAT IS SURRENDERING LOCK, STOCK AND BARREL ALL THE WAY, AND ONE NEEDS TO BE VERY, VERY CAREFUL NOT TO FALL FOR THE BAIT OF THIS DICTATOR.

THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF AN IDEAL. THIS IS A MATTER OF AGGRESSION. THIS IS A CONCEPT WHICH, IF IT MAINTAINS ITSELF AND CARRIES ON, WILL APPEAL TO THE MASSES, WILL PUT IN JEOPARDY AND IN DANGER THE REGIMES WHO ARE CALLED MODERATE. THEN THE USA WILL HAVE A STANDING ORDER OF ALWAYS JUMPING IN, GETTING IMPLICATED, HAVE ANOTHER ARMADA, HAVE ANOTHER COALITION TO AGAIN STOP SOMEBODY WITH APPETITE. THEREFORE, AGGRESSION SHOULD BE ROOTED OUT FROM ITS GRASSROOTS. THIS CONCEPT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN DOES REPRESENT, NEEDS TO BE ROOTED OUT.

NOW, WITH REGARD TO PEACE, WE DON'T NEED ANY CLEVER FORMULA. IF THE OTHERS DESIRE PEACE, AND ISRAEL IS DESIROUS OF PEACE MORE THAN ANYBODY ELSE, WELL, LET'S GO AHEAD. DIRECT CONTACT, DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL. WHAT'S SO TERRIBLE? WE WANT TO TALK ABOUT PEACE WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS -- PRECEDENTS.

MS. WOODRUFF: YOU SAID SADDAM HUSSEIN SHOULD BE REMOVED. WHAT DOES ISRAEL VIEW CONSIDER WOULD BE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME HERE? JUST TO GET SADDAM HUSSEIN OUT OF KUWAIT, IS THAT ENOUGH, OR DOES SADDAM HUSSEIN HAVE TO BE REMOVED FROM POWER IN THE VIEW OF ISRAEL?

MIN. LEVY: FIRST OF ALL, WE NEED TO DISTINGUISH -- VERY MUCH DISTINGUISH BETWEEN WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS DONE, AND WHAT YOU CALL THE TERRITORIES IN ISRAEL. ISRAEL WAS ATTACKED. ISRAEL WAS THE VICTIM OF ATTACK, WITH A DESIRE TO DESTROY ISRAEL. ISRAEL WAS ATTACKED AND WISHES FOR PEACE. SADDAM HUSSEIN INVADED AND NEXT -- AND IS NOW PUTTING DOWN LAW AND MAKING CONDITIONS.

NOW WHAT DOES ISRAEL WISH FOR? ISRAEL IS NOT GIVING ANY ADVICE. THE DECISION TO HAVE A BLOCKADE WAS PROPER TO THE USA, ALONGSIDE WITH ITS INTERESTS. ISRAEL WOULD NOT LIKE ANYBODY TO THINK THAT THE USA IS FIGHTING OUR WARS. WE'VE ALWAYS STOOD ALONE

IN OUR WARS. WE HAD SOME DOMESTIC HELP. WE'VE HAD SOME SUPPLIES, BUT WE FOUGHT OUR WARS ALL ON OUR OWN. LET NOBODY FORGET THAT.

NOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH ONE WAY OF -- SOLUTION OR ANOTHER? IF SADDAM HUSSEIN IS MADE TO LEAVE KUWAIT, IF SOME ARRANGEMENT IS ARRIVED AT, THAT WOULD MEAN THAT AS CRIME DOTH PAY, AGGRESSION DOTH PAY. HE CAN START AGAIN. HE CAN START AGAIN, BE HELPED LEFT, RIGHT AND CENTER, AND THAT WOULD BE A PERMANENT DANGER. SO WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL, SADDAM HUSSEIN. IT IS THE VERY CONCEPT OF AGGRESSIVITY, OF FOSTERING THESE FESTERING SORES OF HAVING THE IDEAL, THE LOSS OF PAN-ARAB DREAMS RESURGING AGAIN AND AGAIN, AND CAUSING INTERMINABLE WARS AND AGGRESSIONS. INDEED, IT'S ISRAEL WHO'S STANDING AGAINST IT, BUT IT IS A DANGER FOR EVERYBODY, FOR EGYPT, FOR JORDAN, FOR SAUDI ARABIA, FOR ALL THOSE WHO ARE IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. IT IS DANGEROUS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ITS VERY CONCEPT OF THE GREAT STRENGTH AND THE GREAT MIGHT WIELDED BY THEM NOW, THE STANCE THEY'VE REACHED AND THE SHOW OF STRENGTH, AS IT WERE, TO OVERWHELM AMERICA.

MS. WOODRUFF: SO, YOU'RE SAYING SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS TO BE REMOVED FOR THERE TO BE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME?

MIN. LEVY: I'M NOT SAYING ANYTHING. YOU'RE ASKING ME WHAT I THINK WILL HAPPEN, SO I'M OFFERING SOME COMMENTARY. I'M NOT PUSHING ANYBODY TO OVERTHROW THE INDIVIDUAL SADDAM. LET AMERICA MAKE ITS OWN CONSULTATIONS. IF ISRAEL IS FORCED INTO ACTING, WELL, HE'LL HAVE A PROPER REACTION. I HOPE HE WILL NOT BE TEMPTED TO TRY.

WHAT AMERICA IS TO DO? LET HER TAKE COUNSEL WITH THOSE WHO GO ALONG WITH HIM, NOT WITH ISRAEL, WITH THOSE ARAB REGIMES WHICH THE USA TERMS AS MODERATE. ACCORDING TO HIS STRATEGY, ACCORDING TO THE WHIPPING UP OF FEELING WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN BUT YESTERDAY STARTED WHIPPING UP AGAINST THEM -- EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, ET CETERA.

MS. WOODRUFF: MR. MINISTER, WE THANK YOU FOR BEING WITH US.

עד כאן

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, ר/מרכז,  
@ (רס), אמן, ממד, בנצור, מצפא, סולטן, רביב,  
מעט, הסברה, @ (דוצ), @ (נוה/משהבט)

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 6314

אל: רהמש/386

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 87, תא: 070990, זח: 2241, מ: סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מיידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת שה"ח

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

סנאט: פגישת שר החוץ.

שר החוץ דוד לוי, נפגש ב- 6/9 עם קבוצת סנטורים: ספקטר, ניקלס, ת'רמונד, דנפורט' ודורנברגר. כן נכחו עוזרים.  
(הערה: הסנאט חוזר מפגרה באופן רשמי רק בתחילת השבוע הבא ולפיכך אירגן הסנטור ספקטר את הפגישה בנוכחות הנ"ל).

מציידנו נכחו: שגריר, ערן, בנצור, אטינגר, גורן, אורן והח"מ.

במהלך הפגישה חזר שה"ח על מרבית דבריו בביה"נ.

להלן נושאים נוספים שהועלו והוזכרו בפגישה זו:

1. עסקאות נשק לסעודיה ובקשת ישראל.

לשאלת ספקטור על עסקות נשק עם סעודיה ובקשת ישראל לאספקת נשק חזר שה"ח על העובדה שישראל הגישה רשימת בקשות. הוסיף כי תשובת המזכיר היתה שעומדת להיות הענות חיובית וכי הוא מבין את צרכי ישראל. המזכיר הבטיח לשה"ח להודיעו בימים הקרובים. לדברי שה"ח, אנו מנועים מלפעול שכן אנו מתחשבים בארה"ב. פנה לסנטורים וביקשם לתת דחיפה לנושא. מדובר בקיומה של ישראל. ישראל מעולם לא עמדה בפני מצב שלא יכלה לפעול.

ספקטר - בהתייחסו לדברי שה"ח כי ידי ישראל כבולות, שאל האם יש פעולה שישראל רוצה לבצע ואיננה יכולה לעשות כן בגלל מדיניות ארה"ב.  
שה"ח - הביא הדוגמא של הפצצת הכור ב- '81. היום איננו יכולים לעשות דבר דומה בלי לשאול לעצת ארה"ב, ובצדק. שכן אחרת יאמרו שישראל קלקלה לארה"ב ופגעה בקואליציה הערבית העומדת לימין ארה"ב. לפיכך, אנו לוקחים על עצמנו סיכון. כמו כן יש לזכור כי כל מה שנמכר היום לסעודיה יכול להיות מחר סיכון לישראל. ההבנה בין מדינות ערב היא כמו חולות האיזור. אלה אינם משטרים דמוקרטים בעלי ערכים. לכן אנו מדגישים הצורך בשמירת המאזן ויתרונה האיכותי של ישראל כי ברגע שתורגש (ע"י הערבים) הפרת האיזון, ישראל תיפגע.

ת'רמונד - האם יש התנגדות למתן סיוע לסעודיה?  
שה"ח - יש דאגה במתן סיוע לסעודיה ולישראל - לא.

ת'רמונד - חשבתי שסעודיה בצד שלנו?

שה"ח - יש לראות הצבא הסעודי ומי יפעיל את הנשק. הרי עולה השאלה מדוע אם כן יש בכלל צורך בנוכחות הצבא האמריקאי שם. האם אנו יודעים להיכן יגיע מחר נשק זה? ראינו כמה זמן החזיקה כוויית מעמד. יש לחזק משטר דמוקרטי, ידידה אמיתית, הסכר בפני התוקפנות.

ישראל חזקה תמנע כל רצון לתקוף אותה בעתיד. זהו הבסיס המשותף לשתי המדינות (ישראל - ארה"ב). הנשיא חזר ואמר שזה יקויימ. אני שמח בהכרה ובהודעה על צרכינו.

2. תהליך השלום

דנפורת: ביקש לדבר בגילוי לב ולאמר דברים שלא היה אומרם בפומבי. לישראל עתה תדמית נוקשה בהקשר של פתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית. המצב בארה"ב לגבי ישראל משתנה במהירות עוד טרם פלישת עירק לכווית. למשל הצעת הסנטור דול בנוגע לקיצוצ בסיוע החוץ. ההצעה אומנם נדחתה ע"י רבימ אולם היא היתה אמינה שכן מנהיג המיעוט היה זה שהציעה. עוד בטרם הפלישה שאלוהו בוחריו מדוע ארהב SO FORTHCOMING כלפי ישראל. אומר זאת עתה כי חל שינוי מסוים כלפי ישראל. התדמית של ממישראל היא של נוקשות וקשיחות עורפ לגבי השגת הסדר. מבינ אמנם שמבחינת ישראל זו שאלת חיימ ומות אולם התדמית היא של קשיחות. שינוי נוסף שחל במצב בכל מה שנוגע לארה"ב הוא ש OUR LIFE IS ON LINE היינו, חיי החיילימ האמריקאימ במפרצ.

אתמול (5.9) קרא סדאם למלחמת קודש נגד ארה"ב ולא רק נגד ישראל. יש לסדאם נשק כימי ובליסטי ומנסה להשיג גם נשק גרעיני. הנקודה היא שחייבת להמצא אפשרות לתזוזה כלשהי בנושא הפלסטיני. אם ימצא פתרון כלשהו של הבעיה במזה"ת, יש לנסות להפיג המתח סביב נושא זה (הפלסטיני). שהח: כאשר עומדים בפני קושי, מנסים למצוא סיבות גם אם כלל לא רלבנטיות. הנושא הפלסטיני אינו קשור לסדאם חוסיין. סדאם רוצה לשלוט על מקורות האנרגיה, להתפשט ולספח ולהיות מנהיג העולם הערבי - נאצר מס' 2 על כל הקונספציה הפאנ ערביסטית שלו. המערב עבורו הוא זר. בהקשר הישראלי - פלסטיני, ישראל מהווה עבורו המטרה ואילו הפלסטינימ אינם מהווים את הסיבה. ניתח הנושא עם בייקר והגיע עמו לתמימות דעים לפיה יש לפעול רק כשמדינות ערב יפסיקו מצב המלחמה עם ישראל. נפתור גם הבעיה הפלסטינית. הבעיה איננה רק של ישראל, אלא גם של מדינות ערב. אינ לערב הנושאים. הבעיה היום אינה התוקפנות העיראקית שר החוצ פרט בנושא כבבית הנבחרים. אפילו בייקר אמר כי אינ כל לינקאג' בין הבעיות. יש קודמ כל לטפל בתוקפנות העיראקית ואח"כ ביחד, ישראל וארה"ב, נדחופ ביחד בעתיד את תהליכ השלום עם מדינות ערב.

דנפורת: עם כל הכבוד, כאשר סדאם קורא לעמ הסעודי להתקומם נגד המלך ולעמ המצרי נגד מובראק ולקיימ ג'יהד נגד ארה"ב ועניימ בירדנ מתקהלימ בהפגנות תמיכה בסדאם גם ארה"ב פגיעה בגלל נוכחות חייליה. אני מציע לפעול להפגת המתח (קרי: הבעיה הפלסטינית). שה"ח: אנו מעוניינים לקדם התהליכ ומסכימ שיש לקדמו אולם לא ע"י העמדת בטחונ ישראל בסכנה ומתנ פיצוי לתוקפנ. לכן, על שתי המדינות לדחופ התהליכ וכך גם סכמנו עם המזכיר.

דורנברגר: יש להבינ כי סדאם משתמש במדיה ובתעמולה תקשורתית לגיוס העולם הערבי נכונ אמנם להעלות הנושא הפלסטיני אולם אינ לשכוח התעמולה שהוא מקדמ.

הפגישה ארכה כשעה ובאווירה ידידותית.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל, ממד, @ (רס), אמן, מצפא

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 6314

אל: רהמש/386

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 87, תא: 070990, זח: 2241, דח: מ, סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור/מיידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת שה"ח

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

סנאט: פגישת שר החוץ.

שר החוץ דוד לוי, נפגש ב- 6/9 עם קבוצת סנטורים: ספקטר, ניקלס, ת'רמונד, דנפורט' ודורנברגר. כן נכחו עוזרים.  
(הערה: הסנאט חוזר מפגרה באופן רשמי רק בתחילת השבוע הבא ולפיכך אירגן הסנטור ספקטר את הפגישה בנוכחות הנ"ל).

מציידנו נכחו: שגריר, ערן, בנצור, אטינגר, גורן, אורן והח"מ.

במהלך הפגישה חזר שה"ח על מרבית דבריו בביה"נ.

להלן נושאים נוספים שהועלו והוזכרו בפגישה זו:

1. עסקאות נשק לסעודיה ובקשת ישראל.

לשאלת ספקטור על עסקות נשק עם סעודיה ובקשת ישראל לאספקת נשק חזר שה"ח על העובדה שישראל הגישה רשימת בקשות. הוסיף כי תשובת המזכיר היתה שעומדת להיות הענות חיובית וכי הוא מבין את צרכי ישראל. המזכיר הבטיח לשה"ח להודיעו בימים הקרובים. לדברי שה"ח, אנו מנועים מלפעול שכן אנו מתחשבים בארה"ב. פנה לסנטורים וביקשם לתת דחיפה לנושא. מדובר בקיומה של ישראל. ישראל מעולם לא עמדה בפני מצב שלא יכלה לפעול.  
ספקטר - בהתייחסו לדברי שה"ח כי ידי ישראל כבולות, שאל האם יש פעולה שישראל רוצה לבצע ואיננה יכולה לעשות כן בגלל מדיניות ארה"ב.  
שה"ח - הביא הדוגמא של הפצצת הכור ב- '81. היום איננו יכולים לעשות דבר דומה בלי לשאול לעצת ארה"ב, ובצדק. שכן אחרת יאמרו שישראל קלקלה לארה"ב ופגעה בקואליציה הערבית העומדת לימין ארה"ב. לפיכך, אנו לוקחים על עצמנו סיכון. כמו כן יש לזכור כי כל מה שנמכר היום לסעודיה יכול להיות מחר סיכון לישראל. ההבנה בין מדינות ערב היא כמו חולות האיזור. אלה אינם משטרים דמוקרטיים בעלי ערכים. לכן אנו מדגישים הצורך בשמירת המאזן ויתרונה האיכותי של ישראל כי ברגע שתורגש (ע"י הערבים) הפרת האיזון, ישראל תיפגע.

ת'רמונד - האם יש התנגדות למתן סיוע לסעודיה?  
שה"ח - יש דאגה במתן סיוע לסעודיה ולישראל - לא.

ת'רמונד - חשבתי שסעודיה בצד שלנו?

שה"ח - יש לראות הצבא הסעודי ומי יפעיל את הנשק. הרי עולה השאלה מדוע אם כן יש בכלל צורך בנוכחות הצבא האמריקאי שם. האם אנו יודעים להיכן יגיע מחר נשק זה? ראינו כמה זמן החזיקה כוויית מעמד. יש לחזק משטר דמוקרטי, ידידה אמיתית, הסכר בפני התוקפנות.  
ישראל חזקה תמנע כל רצון לתקוף אותה בעתיד. זהו הבסיס המשותף לשתי המדינות (ישראל - ארה"ב). הנשיא חזר ואמר שזה יקויימ. אני שמח בהכרה ובהודעה על צרכינו.

2. תהליך השלום

דנפורת': ביקש לדבר בגילוי לב ולאמר דברים שלא היה אומרם בפומבי. לישראל עתה תדמית נוקשה בהקשר של פתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית. המצב בארה"ב לגבי ישראל משתנה במהירות עוד טרם פלישת עירק לכווית. למשל הצעת הסנטור דול בנוגע לקיצוצ בסיוע החוץ. ההצעה אומנם נדחתה ע"י רבימ אולם היא היתה אמינה שכן מנהיג המיעוט היה זה שהציעה. עוד בטרם הפלישה שאלוהו בוחריו מדוע ארהב SO FORTHCOMING כלפי ישראל. אומר זאת עתה כי חל שינוי מסוים כלפי ישראל. התדמית של ממשלת ישראל היא של נוקשות וקשיחות עורפ לגבי השגת הסדר. מבינ אמנם שמבחינת ישראל זו שאלת חיימ ומות אולם התדמית היא של קשיחות. שינוי נוסף שחל במצב בכל מה שנוגע לארה"ב הוא ש OUR LIFE IS ON LINE היינו, חיי החיילים האמריקאים במפרצ.

אתמול (5.9) קרא סדאם למלחמת קודש נגד ארה"ב ולא רק נגד ישראל. יש לסדאם נשק כימי ובליסטי ומנסה להשיג גם נשק גרעיני. הנקודה היא שחייבת להמצא אפשרות לתזוזה כלשהי בנושא הפלסטיני. אם ימצא פתרון כלשהו של הבעיה במזה"ת, יש לנסות להפיג המתח סביב נושא זה (הפלסטיני).

שהח: כאשר עומדים בפני קושי, מנסים למצוא סיבות גם אם כלל לא רלבנטיות. הנושא הפלסטיני אינו קשור לסדאם חוסיין. סדאם רוצה לשלוט על מקורות האנרגיה, להתפשט ולספח ולהיות מנהיג העולם הערבי - נאצר מס' 2 על כל הקונספציה הפאנ ערביסטית שלו. המערב עברו הוא זר. בהקשר הישראלי - פלסטיני, ישראל מהווה עבורו המטרה ואילו הפלסטינים אינם מהווים את הסיבה. ניתח הנושא עם בייקר והגיע עמו לתמימות דעים לפיה יש לפעול רק כשמדינות ערב יפסיקו מצב המלחמה עם ישראל. נפתור גם הבעיה הפלסטינית. הבעיה איננה רק של ישראל, אלא גם של מדינות ערב. אינ לערב הנושאים. הבעיה היום אינה התוקפנות העיראקית שר החוץ פרט בנושא כבבית הנבחרים. אפילו בייקר אמר כי אינ כל לינקאג' בין הבעיות. יש קודם כל לטפל בתוקפנות העיראקית ואח"כ ביחד, ישראל וארה"ב, נדחוף ביחד בעתיד את תהליך השלום עם מדינות ערב.

דנפורת': עם כל הכבוד, כאשר סדאם קורא לעמ הסעודי להתקומם נגד המלך ולעמ המצרי נגד מובראק ולקיימ ג'יהד נגד ארה"ב ועניימ בירדן מתקהלים בהפגנות תמיכה בסדאם גם ארה"ב פגיעה בגלל נוכחות חייליה. אני מציע לפעול להפגת המתח (קרי: הבעיה הפלסטינית).  
שה"ח: אנו מעוניינים לקדם התהליך ומסכים שיש לקדמו אולם לא ע"י העמדת בטחונ ישראל בסכנה ומתנ פיצוי לתוקפן. לכן, על שתי המדינות לדחוף התהליך וכך גם סכמנו עם המזכיר.

דורנברגר: יש להבינ כי סדאם משתמש במדיה ובתעמולה תקשורתית לגיוס העולם הערבי נכון אמנם להעלות הנושא הפלסטיני אולם אינ לשכוח התעמולה שהוא מקדם.

הפגישה ארכה כשעה ובאווירה ידידותית.

יהודית ורנאי דרנגר.

לבח

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל,  
ממד, @ (רס), אמן, מצפא

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 6313

אל: רהמש/ 385

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 86, תא: 070990, זח: 2240, מ: סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת שה"ח

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביהנ"ב: פגישת שה"ח עם חברי ועדת החוץ.

שה"ח, דוד לוי נפגש ב-6/9 עם יו"ר ועדת החוץ, פאסל, ועם הקונגרסמנים המילטון, ברומפילד ולארי סמית. כן נכחו עוזרים. מצידנו נכחו: שגריר, ערן. בנצור, אטינגר, גורן, אורן והח"מ.

#### 1. המשבר במפרץ ועסקות נשק

לאחר דברי ברכה מצד הקונגרסמנים, הודה שה"ח ואמר כי אנו עוברים עתה ימים קשים. מערכה זו איננה של ארה"ב בלבד אלא של העולם החופשי כולו כנגד תוקפנות אשר תקבע את העתיד במזה"ת והעולם כולו. הסכנה מכוונת גם כלפי ישראל הפועלת במצב עדין. כל אשר ישראל עושה ואיננה עושה מושפע מההתחשבות בשיקולים ובצעדים של ארה"ב. יש להבין שיש לנו עניין עם אדם בלתי רציונאלי ואי אפשר לדעת אם הכל לא יופנה בסופו של דבר נגד ישראל על מנת להפוך הקערה על פיה.

פאסל - המקום הפגיע לדעתו הוא ירדן.  
שה"ח - בנוגע לירדן, דאגתנו להעביר מסר למלך חוסיין שאנו מעוניינים ביציבות ולא ניתן יד להתערערות משטרו.

פאסל - הדאיגה אותו הודעה שפירסמה ישראל לפיה אם תתקוף עיראק את ירדן תיאלץ ישראל לתקוף. אינו יודע מה היו שיקוליו (הצבאיים) ואף אינו רוצה לדעת, אולם בכ"ז ההודעה מעלה אצלו שאלות.

שה"ח - ביקש להסביר מה עמד מאחורי ההודעה. לדבריו יש לזכור שהיא פורסמה באותם ימים (בתחילת המשבר במפרץ) בהם ארה"ב עדיין לא היתה מוכנה וערוכה במפרץ.

פאסל - זוהי נקודה טובה. שכנעת אותי.  
שה"ח - היה צורך באותה שעה להעביר מסר לסאדם שלא יהיה פטור מתגובה. הוסיף כי ישראל נוטלת על עצמה סכנות באופן מודע. המאזן והיתרון האיכותי מתערערים במהרה. העלה ובדק זאת עם המזכיר ועם סקורופט הביע תקווה שבעיית ישראל לא רק תובן אלא תמצא תגובה חיובית.

פאסל - המזכיר בייקר, בעדותו בפני ועדת החוץ, היה חד משמעתי לגבי ישראל מבחינת המחוייבות לשמירת יתרונה האיכותי בטחוני וכלכלי. "רק פירשתי זאת".

המילטון - הסכים עם פאסל. קיים היום מצב חדש לגמרי. ארה"ב ניצבת בפני בקשות לציוד מתוכם לסעודיה. ההיקף מאד גדול וללא ספק תהיה לכך השפעה על האיזון. הוסיף WE WILL BE RECEPTIVE TO YOUR VIEWS. פלישתו של סאדם לכווית משנה פני המזה"ת במובנים רבים וכן בציוד הצבאי.

ברומפילד - תלוי כמה זמן ישהו הכוחות האמריקנים במפרץ. אם המשבר ימשך זמן רב יהיה צורך בהזרמת ציוד רב.

שה"ח - אנחנו נהיה באיזור זמן מה.

המילטון - החלק הראשון של העסקות לסעודיה ילך תחת ה- EMERGENCY PRESIDENTIAL POWER (ראו מברקנו בנושא) ולאחר מכן תהיה העסקה נוספת גדולה שמועד אספקתה יתפרס על מספר שנים (בינתיים נודע לנו כי בפנטגון מכינים עתה עסקה לסעודיה שהיקפה כ- 8 ביליון דולר נעקוב ונבדוק בימים הקרובים - י.ד.) המילטון שאל כיצד זה ישפיע על ישראל והמאזן.

שה"ח - אנו מצויים תחת איום שאין לגביו תשובה - איום של טילים בליסטיים

וטיילים בעלי רש"קים כימים ובקטריוולוגים. יש לנו ענין עם אדם שהשתמש כבר בנשק כימי ללא היסוס מעבר לזאת יש לנו צורך לא רק בכוח הרתעה אלא גם באפשרות להגן על עצמנו. לכן ביקשנו דברים חיוניים ומיידיים. זה יסייע לישראל לקבל החלטת נכונות. אין מתקבלות החלטות נכונות כאשר ישנה חרדה. יש לנו צורך מיידי למשל במטוסים ומסוקי אפצ'י וסוללות פטריוט. (התייחס לרשימת הציווד שהועברו על ידנו לממשל).

פאסל - האם הרשימה הוגשה והוסכמה.  
שה"ח - הרשימה הוגשה. קיבלתי הסכמה בע"פ מבייקר אולם איני יכול לומר שזה סוכם.

מייק ואן דוזן - לבקשתם של פאסל והמילטון הסביר שהרשימה הוגשה ע"י ישראל אך ארה"ב תרם השיבה.

שה"ח - לשאלת פאסל האם דיוני הועדה המשותפת עדיין נפגשים עתה, הסביר שר החוץ כי נציגי ישראל ביקרו בעיר לפני מס' ימים. לדברי שר החוץ, הפן השני, מעבר לאיום על ישראל, הוא השוני שאנו מתחילים לחוש מבחינת היחס כלפי ישראל. ישראל אומנם שומרת על פרופיל נמוך אולם אין פירושו של דבר שהיא נמצאת בחוץ.

פאסל - "אתם מאוד בפנים. לא רק שאנחנו מבינים אלא מעריכים מאוד את עמדתכם. בהקירי מספר ישראלים, אני יודע עד כמה קשה לכם לשמור על פרופיל נמוך. אנחנו גם יודעים שאתם בבחינת לא ינום ולא ישן".

לבקשת לארי סמית לשמוע על שיחות שר החוץ עם בייקר בנושא עסקות נשק השיב שה"ח: משימות ישראל ידועות. בתחום הבטחוני אסור לנו לפגור אחרת כל הקונספציה הגיאופוליטית של האיזור תשתנה. כדי למנוע מלחמה אין לאפשר ירידת העליונות הישראלית. אמרנו על סאדס חוסיין את אשר ידענו אולם לא שמעו בקולינו. אילו נהגנו אחרת מכפי שנהגנו ב-81' כללי המשחק היום היו אחרים, והסכנות גדולות יותר. גם בימים אלה הוא ממשיך בהכנות לייצור פצצת אטום. ההליכים מתקדמים ביותר בעירק וזאת ע"ס ידיעה מבוססת. עירק זכתה לסיוע בתחום הנשק הכימי והגרעיני ממדינות כמו שויצריה, גרמניה, צרפת ואחרות. איננו רוצים לייצץ לארה"ב שכן כל עיצה תיתפרש כאילו ישראל מעוניינת שארה"ב תעשה את מלחמתנו. אולם אם משהו משלה את עצמו שהסדר כלשהו יתאפשר ללא מיגור המשטר הקיים אינו אלא דוחה את האיום ועלול להגיע לקואליציה קשה יותר.

## 2. שמיטת חובות.

שה"ח התייחס לנושא שמיטת החובות למצרים. ישראל במצב קשה, ואתם יודעים זאת במיוחד כמי שפעלו להוצאת יהודי בריה"מ.

פאסל סיפר כי דנו בנושא באופן בלתי רישמי ושקלו האם לצאת פומבית עם הנושא. הסכימו ביניהם כי אין זה רצוי לצאת פומבית בהודעה ראשונה על שמיטת חובות דוקא עבור ישראל (על מנת לא להבליטה). עתה, מאפשר זאת סאדס חוסיין. אינו יכול אומנם להבטיח דבר אולם בפגישה יושבים ידידיה המובהקים של ישראל שבדאי יטפלו בנושא (התייחס במיוחד לקונגרסמן לארי סמית).

המילטון - כאשר בייקר נישאל בעדותו בפני ועדת החוץ בנוגע למחיקת החובות למצרים הוא ניסה לעשות מהנושא UNIQUE CARE כלומר, עבור מצרים בלבד. מרביתנו חושבים שזו לא עמדה שניתן להחזיק בה לטווח הרחוק. ישנן עוד מדינות חוץ ממצרים - כולל ישראל. אם שמיטת החובות תאושר עבור מצרים היא תאושר גם עבור מדינות אחרות. זו בעיה פיננסית סבוכה אך גם קשה מבחינת תקציב ארה"ב וקשה לי להסביר זאת לבוחרי באינדיאנה. כל בעית מחיקת החובות היא רחבה יותר ומעבר למצרים.

שה"ח - ברגע שיהיה יחס שונה כלפי ישראל זה ישפיע באיזור ובתוך ישראל. זה עלול להיות איתות בבחינת ישראל כבר אינה חשובה. ישראל מצויה בקשיים גדולים וכל חוגש, למרות המצב באיזור, מגיעים ארצה 20 אלף עולים.

## 3. יחסי ישראל - ארה"ב.

המילטון - אנו מודעים לרגישות בתוך ישראל ולחרדה מפני שינוי אפשרי במערכת היחסים בין שתי המדינות. עם זאת, ניתן להסכים ביננו שגם אם יחולו מספר שינויים בגלל המשבר, הרי שלטווח הרחוק מערכת היחסים בין שתי



המדינות היא בסיסית איתנה ומחושלת ולא צפויים כל שינויים. פאסל - אם יש דרך למדוד התרומה של כל אחת מהמדינות באיזור, מבלי להפחית מתרומת מצרים, הרי שהתרומה של ישראל היא הגבוהה והיקרה ביותר מכל מדינה אחרת. "רוצה להבטיח לשר החוץ שאיננו שוכחים את ישראל".

#### 4. ערבויות דיור.

סמית - ביקש לשמוע עמדת הממשל. שה"ח - ישראל מתחייבת שכסף זה לא יושקע ביו"ש. זוהי פילוסופיה לומר שגם אם לא נשקיע כסף זה ביו"ש הוא יפנה כספים אחרים שבאמצעותם ניתן יהיה לפעול ביו"ש. אפילו הסובייטים אינם נוקטים בעמדה זו. נעמוד בהתחייבות זו. אף ממשלה בישראל לא תוכל לאסור על יהודי לגור במקום מסויים כלשהו. סמית - במילים אחרות, הממשל קושר הערבויות להתחייבויות שאינכם יכולים לקחת על עצמכם? שה"ח - הבהרתי למזכיר שאני מוכן להסכים לנוסחה עליה דיברתי. מקווה שתימצא נוסחה מקובלת. סמית - מקווה ג"כ שכן הקונגרס תומך בערבויות.

#### 5. אש"פ ותהליך השלום.

סמית - בשיחות עם המזכיר עלה בודאי נושא אש"פ. בייקר בעדותו בועדת החוץ אמר כבדרך אגב שאין זו הפתעה שערפת תומך בהקמת מדינה פלסטינית. פאסל בהערות ביניים - "יוכלו לקבל את עירק". סמית - המשיך ושאל מה עמדת המזכיר והאם קשר הנושא לערבויות. שה"ח - היתה אוירה טובה בשיחות וניכר מאמץ להבליט המאחד בימים אלה, להתגבר על מכשולים ולמנוע כל מתח ביחסים. לגבי אש"פ/ערפת, אמר למזכיר כי הנ"ל הונה את ארה"ב, המשיך בטרור ובשעת מבחן רץ לסאדם חוסיין. השאלה היא האם להתנהגות כזו ניתן פרס. אם יתרגלו לכך שהתנהגות כזו לא תיחיה נשכרת, תיחיה זו אזהרה לעתיד. ישראל מעוניינת בהמשך קידום תהליך השלום. אך אנו מחוייבים לפיתרון הבעייה הפלסטינית אך גם מדינות ערב. המילטון - האם תוכנית שמיר על השולחן? שה"ח - תוכנית שמיר ופתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית - כן. אש"פ - לא. המילטון - האם ניתן למצוא פרטנרים פלסטינים שאינם אש"פ? שה"ח - אנחנו מוכנים לתת להם שותפות בתהליך ולהיבחר באופן דמוקרטי. נציגיהם יכנסו למו"מ על העתיד. צריך להפתח תהליך מצד מדינות ערב להפסקת מצב המלחמה.

#### 6. האוניברסיטאות בשטחים. (הנושא הועלה בסוף הפגישה).

המילטון - סיפר כי הוגשה לועדה שלו הצעת ההחלטה בנושא פתיחת האוניברסיטאות בשטחים. ישנם תומכים רבים להחלטה. לא פעלנו עדיין בנושא. מבקש לדעת מה עמדת ממשלת ישראל. "זוהי בעיה מיידית שלי". שה"ח - סיפר על פתיחת אוניברסיטת בית-לחם ועל מתן הקלות. הבעייה היא שאם האוניברסיטאות יהפכו שוב למקור תסיסה, לא נוכל בשם הקידמה להעמיד את הביטחון בסכנה. האוכלוסיה החלה להבין זאת. המתח יורד. ישנה פחות פעילות ואנו ממשיכים בתהליך הפתיחה. המילטון - אם תרגישו טוב מבחינה בטחונית, האם אתם מוכנים לפתוח האוניברסיטאות? שה"ח - איננו מעוניינים לשלוט ביד קשה אלא למצוא פרטנרים כמו בבית-לחם.

הפגישה ערכה כשעה באוירה טובה וידידותית.

יהודית ורנאי דרנר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל,  
ממד, @ (רס), אמן, מצפא, כלכליתב'

סססס



אאא, חוזם: 6313

אל: רהמש/385

מ-: וושינגטון, נר: 86, תא: 070990, חז: 2240, מ: סג: שמ,

בבב

שמור / מידי

אל: מצפ"א

דע: לשכת שה"ח

מאת: ק. לקונגרס

ביהנ"ב: פגישת שה"ח עם חברי ועדת החוץ.

שה"ח, דוד לוי נפגש ב-6/9 עם יו"ר ועדת החוץ, פאסל, ועם הקונגרסמנים המילטון, ברומפילד ולארי סמית. כן נכחו עוזרים. מצידנו נכחו: שגריר, ערן. בנצור, אטינגר, גורן, אורן והח"מ.

# 1. המשבר במפרץ ועסקות נשק

לאחר דברי ברכה מצד הקונגרסמנים, הודה שה"ח ואמר כי אנו עוברים עתה ימים קשים. מערכה זו איננה של ארה"ב בלבד אלא של העולם החופשי כולו כנגד תוקפנות אשר תקבע את העתיד במזה"ת והעולם כולו. הסכנה מכוונת גם כלפי ישראל הפועלת במצב עדין. כל אשר ישראל עושה ואיננה עושה מושפע מההתחשבות בשיקולים ובצעדים של ארה"ב. יש להבין שיש לנו עניין עם אדם בלתי רציונאלי ואי אפשר לדעת אם הכל לא יופנה בסופו של דבר נגד ישראל על מנת להפוך הקערה על פיה.

פאסל - המקום הפגיע לדעתו הוא ירדן.  
שה"ח - בנוגע לירדן, דאגתנו להעביר מסר למלך חוסיין שאנו מעוניינים ביציבות ולא ניתן יד להתערערות משטרו.

פאסל - הדאיגה אותו הודעה שפירסמה ישראל לפיה אם תתקוף עיראק את ירדן תיאלץ ישראל לתקוף. אינו יודע מה היו שיקוליו (הצבאיים) ואף אינו רוצה לדעת, אולם בכ"ז ההודעה מעלה אצלו שאלות.

שה"ח - ביקש להסביר מה עמד מאחורי ההודעה. לדבריו יש לזכור שהיא פורסמה באותם ימים (בתחילת המשבר במפרץ) בהם ארה"ב עדיין לא היתה מוכנה וערוכה במפרץ.

פאסל - זוהי נקודה טובה. שכנעת אותי.  
שה"ח - היה צורך באותה שעה להעביר מסר לסאדם שלא יהיה פטור מתגובה. הוסיף כי ישראל נוטלת על עצמה סכנות באופן מודע. המאזן והיתרון האיכותי מתערערים במהרה. העלה ובדק זאת עם המזכיר ועם סקורופט הביע תקווה שבעיית ישראל לא רק תובן אלא תמצא תגובה חיובית.

פאסל - המזכיר בייקר, בעדותו בפני ועדת החוץ, היה חד משמעתי לגבי ישראל מבחינת המחוייבות לשמירת יתרונה האיכותי בטחוני וכלכלי. "רק פירשתי זאת".

המילטון - הסכים עם פאסל. קיים היום מצב חדש לגמרי. ארה"ב ניצבת בפני בקשות לציד מתוחכם לסעודיה. ההיקף מאד גדול וללא ספק תהיה לכך השפעה על האיזון. הוסיף WE WILL BE RECEPTIVE TO YOUR VIEWS. פלישתו של סאדם לכווית משנה פני המזה"ת במובנים רבים וכן בציד הצבאי.

ברומפילד - תלוי כמה זמן ישהו הכוחות האמריקנים במפרץ. אם המשבר ימשך זמן רב יהיה צורך בהזרמת ציוד רב.

שה"ח - אנחנו נהיה באיזור זמן מה.

המילטון - החלק הראשון של העסקות לסעודיה ילך תחת ה- EMERGENCY PRESIDENTIAL POWER (ראו מברקנו בנושא) ולאחר מכן תהיה העסקה נוספת גדולה שמועד אספקתה יתפרס על מספר שנים (בינתיים נודע לנו כי בפנטגון מכינים עתה עסקה לסעודיה שהיקפה כ-8 ביליון דולר נעקוב ונבדוק בימים הקרובים - י.ד.). המילטון שאל כיצד זה ישפיע על ישראל והמאזן.

שה"ח - אנו מצויים תחת איום שאין לגביו תשובה - איום של טילים בליסטיים



וטילים בעלי רש"קים כימים ובקטריוולוגים. יש לנו ענין עם אדם שהשתמש כבר בנשק כימי ללא היסוס מעבר לזאת יש לנו צורך לא רק בכוח הרתעה אלא גם באפשרות להגן על עצמנו. לכן ביקשנו דברים חיוניים ומיידיים. זה יסייע לישראל לקבל החלטת נכונות. אין מתקבלות החלטות נכונות כאשר ישנה חרדה. יש לנו צורך מיידי למשל במטוסים ומסוקי אפצ'י וסוללות פטריוט. (התייחס לרשימת הצידוד שהועברו על ידנו לממשל).

פאסל - האם הרשימה הוגשה והוסכמה.  
שה"ח - הרשימה הוגשה. קיבלתי הסכמה בע"פ מבייקר אולם איני יכול לומר שזה סוכם.

מייק ואן דוזן - לבקשתם של פאסל והמילטון הסביר שהרשימה הוגשה ע"י ישראל אך ארה"ב תרם השיבה.

שה"ח - לשאלת פאסל האם דיוני הועדה המשותפת עדיין נפגשים עתה, הסביר שר החוץ כי נציגי ישראל ביקרו בעיר לפני מס' ימים. לדברי שר החוץ, הפן השני, מעבר לאיום על ישראל, הוא השוני שאנו מתחילים לחוש מבחינת היחס כלפי ישראל. ישראל אומנם שומרת על פרופיל נמוך אולם אין פירושו של דבר שהיא נמצאת בחוץ.

פאסל - "אתם מאוד בפנים. לא רק שאנחנו מבינים אלא מעריכים מאוד את עמדתכם. בהקירי מספר ישראלים, אני יודע עד כמה קשה לכם לשמור על פרופיל נמוך. אנחנו גם יודעים שאתם בבחינת לא ינום ולא ישן".

לבקשת לארי סמית לשמוע על שיחות שר החוץ עם בייקר בנושא עסקות נשק השיב שה"ח: משימות ישראל ידועות. בתחום הבטחוני אסור לנו לפגור אחרת כל הקונספציה הגיאופוליטית של האיזור תשתנה. כדי למנוע מלחמה אין לאפשר ירידת העליונות הישראלית. אמרנו על סאדם חוסיין את אשר ידענו אולם לא שמעו בקולינו. אילו נהגנו אחרת מכפי שנהגנו ב-81' כללי המשחק היום היו אחרים, והסכנות גדולות יותר. גם בימים אלה הוא ממשיך בהכנות לייצור פצצת אטום. ההליכים מתקדמים ביותר בעירק וזאת ע"ס ידיעה מבוססת. עירק זכתה לסיוע בתחום הנשק הכימי והגרעיני ממדינות כמו שויצריה, גרמניה, צרפת ואחרות. איננו רוצים לייצף לארה"ב שכן כל עיצה תיתפרש כאילו ישראל מעוניינת שארה"ב תעשה את מלחמתנו. אולם אם משהו משלה את עצמו שהסדר כלשהו יתאפשר ללא מיגור המשטר הקיים אינו אלא דוחה את האיום ועלול להגיע לקואליציה קשה יותר.

## 2. שמיטת חובות.

שה"ח התייחס לנושא שמיטת החובות למצרים. ישראל במצב קשה, ואתם יודעים זאת במיוחד כמי שפעלו להוצאת יהודי בריה"מ.

פאסל סיפר כי דנו בנושא באופן בלתי רישמי ושקלו האם לצאת פומבית עם הנושא. הסכימו ביניהם כי אין זה רצוי לצאת פומבית בהודעה ראשונה על שמיטת חובות דוקא עבור ישראל (על מנת לא להבליטה). עתה, מאפשר זאת סאדם חוסיין. אינו יכול אומנם להבטיח דבר אולם בפגישה יושבים ידידיה המובהקים של ישראל שבדאי יטפלו בנושא (התייחס במיוחד לקונגרסמן לארי סמית).

המילטון - כאשר בייקר נישאל בעדותו בפני ועדת החוץ בנוגע למחיקת החובות למצרים הוא ניסה לעשות מהנושא UNIQUE CARE כלומר, עבור מצרים בלבד. מרביתנו חושבים שזו לא עמדה שניתן להחזיק בה לטווח הרחוק. ישנן עוד מדינות חוץ ממצרים - כולל ישראל. אם שמיטת החובות תאושר עבור מצרים היא תאושר גם עבור מדינות אחרות. זו בעיה פיננסית סבוכה אך גם קשה מבחינת תקציב ארה"ב וקשה לי להסביר זאת לבוחרי באינדיאנה. כל בעית מחיקת החובות היא רחבה יותר ומעבר למצרים.

שה"ח - ברגע שיהיה יחס שונה כלפי ישראל זה ישפיע באיזור ובתוך ישראל. זה עלול להיות איתות בבחינת ישראל כבר אינה חשובה. ישראל מצויה בקשיים גדולים וכל חוגש, למרות המצב באיזור, מגיעים ארצה 20 אלף עולים.

## 3. יחסי ישראל - ארה"ב.

המילטון - אנו מודעים לרגישות בתוך ישראל ולחרדה מפני שינוי אפשרי במערכת היחסים בין שתי המדינות. עם זאת, ניתן להסכים ביננו שגם אם יחולו מספר שינויים בגלל המשבר, הרי שלטווח הרחוק מערכת היחסים בין שתי



המדינות היא בסיסית איתנה ומחושלת ולא צפויים כל שינויים. פאסל - אם יש דרך למדוד התרומה של כל אחת מהמדינות באיזור, מבלי להפחית מתרומת מצרים, הרי שהתרומה של ישראל היא הגבוהה והיקרה ביותר מכל מדינה אחרת. "רוצה להבטיח לשר החוץ שאיננו שוכחים את ישראל".

#### 4. ערביות דיור.

סמית - ביקש לשמוע עמדת הממשל. שה"ח - ישראל מתחייבת שכסף זה לא יושקע ביו"ש. זוהי פילוסופיה לומר שגם אם לא נשקיע כסף זה ביו"ש הוא יפנה כספים אחרים שנאמצעותם ניתן יהיה לפעול ביו"ש. אפילו הסובייטים אינם נוקטים בעמדה זו. נעמוד בהתחייבות זו. אף ממשלה בישראל לא תוכל לאסור על יהודי לגור במקום מסויים כלשהו. סמית - במילים אחרות, הממשל קושר הערביות להתחייבויות שאינכם יכולים לקחת על עצמכם? שה"ח - הבהרתי למזכיר שאני מוכן להסכים לנוסחה עליה דיברתי. מקווה שתימצא נוסחה מקובלת. סמית - מקווה ג"כ שכן הקונגרס תומך בערביות.

#### 5. אש"פ ותהליך השלום.

סמית - בשיחות עם המזכיר עלה בודאי נושא אש"פ. בייקר בעדותו בועדת החוץ אמר כבדרך אגב שאין זו הפתעה שערפת תומך בהקמת מדינה פלסטינית. פאסל בהערות ביניים - "יוכלו לקבל את עירק". סמית - המשיך ושאל מה עמדת המזכיר והאם קשר הנושא לערביות. שה"ח - היתה אוירה טובה בשיחות וניכר מאמץ להבליט המאחד בימים אלה, להתגבר על מכשולים ולמנוע כל מתח ביחסים. לגבי אש"פ/ערפת, אמר למזכיר כי הנ"ל הונה את ארה"ב, המשיך בטרור ובשעת מבחן רץ לסאדם חוסיין. השאלה היא האם להתנהגות כזו ניתן פרס. אם יתרגלו לכך שהתנהגות כזו לא תיהיה נשכרת, תיהיה זו אזהרה לעתיד. ישראל מעוניינת בהמשך קידום תהליך השלום. אך אנו מחויבים לפיתרון הבעייה הפלסטינית אך גם מדינות ערב. המילטון - האם תוכנית שמיר על השולחן? שה"ח - תוכנית שמיר ופתרון הבעיה הפלסטינית - כן. אש"פ - לא. המילטון - האם ניתן למצוא פרטנרים פלסטינים שאינם אש"פ? שה"ח - אנחנו מוכנים לתת להם שותפות בתהליך ולהיבחר באופן דמוקרטי. נציגיהם יכנסו למו"מ על העתיד. צריך להפתח תהליך מצד מדינות ערב להפסקת מצב המלחמה.

#### 6. האוניברסיטאות בשטחים. (הנושא הועלה בסוף הפגישה).

המילטון - סיפר כי הוגשה לועדה שלו הצעת ההחלטה בנושא פתיחת האוניברסיטאות בשטחים. ישנם תומכים רבים להחלטה. לא פעלנו עדיין בנושא. מבקש לדעת מה עמדת ממשלת ישראל. "זוהי בעיה מיידיית שלי". שה"ח - סיפר על פתיחת אוניברסיטת בית-לחם ועל מתן הקלות. הבעייה היא שאם האוניברסיטאות יהפכו שוב למקור תסיסה, לא נוכל בשם הקידמה להעמיד את הביטחון בסכנה. האוכלוסיה החלה להבין זאת. המתח יורד. ישנה פחות פעילות ואנו ממשיכים בתהליך הפתיחה. המילטון - אם תרגישו טוב מבחינה בטחונית, האם אתם מוכנים לפתוח האוניברסיטאות? שה"ח - איננו מעוניינים לשלוט ביד קשה אלא למצוא פרטנרים כמו בבית-לחם.

הפגישה ערכה כשעה באוירה טובה וידידותית.

יהודית ורנאי דרנר

תפוצה: שהח, סשהח, @ (רהמ), @ (שהבט), מנכל, ממנכל, סמנכל,  
ממד, @ (רס), אמן, מצפא, כלכליתב'

סססס