

מדינת ישראל

משרדי הממשלה

4

משרד

שם: משרד ראש הממשלה
כתובת: משרד ראש הממשלה - לשכת ראש הממשלה
שם תיק: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק שמיר - ארצות-הברית

תקופת החומר: 12/1986-12/1986
מספר: 5019 / 5 - א
תאריך: 08/11/2012

שם: לשכת ראש הממשלה שמעון פרס ויצחק
מזהה פיזי: 5019 / 5 - א
מזהה לוגי: 43.4/13 - 762
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מס' פריט: 2167268
תאריך: 08/11/2012

מס' תיק מקורי

מחלקה



ארכיון המדינה

משרד ראש הממשלה

טופס מראה מקום להוצאת תעודות יחידות*

חטיבה מס': 43.4
 מיכל מס': 5019/א
 תאריך התעודה: _____
 שם המחבר התעודה: _____
 תיק מס': 5
 שם הנמען: _____

1/12/1986

2/12/1986

3/12/1986

סוג התעודות (סמן ✓ במקום המתאים):

- מכתב
- מברק או הודעת טלקס
- תזכיר או מזכר
- דין וחשבון או זכרון דברים משיחה או דיון
- פרוטוקול של שיחה, דיון או ישיבה

הנמקה**:

שם הבודק אליהו רובין

תאריך 7/9/2010

חתימה _____

* הטופס ימולא בשני עותקים. העותק הירוק יוכנס לתיק במקום התעודה שהוצאה; העותק הלבן יצורף לתעודה שהוצאה.
 ** נא לרשום את ההנמקה רק ביותק חלבן.

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אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רה"ם לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

להלו מה - WST היום

תחנות

Evidence of Important CIA Role in Sale Of Arms to Iran Is Being Investigated

By JOHN WALCOTT
And ANDY PASZTOR

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON - Justice Department and congressional investigators are pursuing new evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency played an important role in selling U.S. arms to Iran and funneling the profits to anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua.

The investigations of the Iran arms scandal so far have concentrated on the role of White House officials. But administration officials said yesterday that the CIA controlled some money generated by the secret arms sales, helped obtain the weapons from Pentagon stocks, and early this year tried to open a pipeline to ship U.S.-made arms from Israel to Iran through the African country of Zaire.

The new information conflicts with previous administration assertions that the CIA and its director, William Casey, weren't deeply involved in the Iranian arms deals. Mr. Casey told congressional officials Nov. 21 that his agency played only a peripheral role in sending arms to Iran.

The new developments, however, suggest that investigators are focusing increasingly on CIA activities as probes of the Reagan administration's covert activities continue to expand. The CIA yesterday

denied reports, which first appeared in the Washington Post, that it had diverted funds to Nicaraguan rebels. Congress had barred the CIA from providing arms to the Nicaragua insurgents until Oct. 1. In response to questions about dealings with Zaire, a spokeswoman yesterday said the agency will disclose its activities to "the appropriate agencies" but won't comment on them publicly.

But other administration officials, speaking anonymously, said senior Israeli officials, acting in concert with the CIA, approached British businessman Roland "Tiny" Rowland this spring for help in secretly shipping U.S.-made arms, American grain, ball bearings, medical supplies, and other cargo from Zaire to Iran.

These sources said David Kimche, then Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and a friend of Mr. Rowland, told the Briton that the operation had been planned in part by the CIA. The sources said officials in Zaire also had approved the proposed U.S.-Israeli covert operation.

But they said Mr. Rowland declined to participate after officials at the U.S. embassy in London told him they couldn't confirm that the proposal was sanctioned by the U.S. government. As a result, the sources said, the arms were flown to Iran last May 28 aboard a CIA-chartered Boeing 707 jet that took off from Israel but on its manifest listed its origin as Mombasa, Kenya.

The sources said Israeli and CIA officials had proposed using Zaire to help ship

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including "מבר" and "מבר" repeated several times.

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U.S. arms to Iran because the African nation maintains friendly relations with both the U.S. and Israel, and because covert weapons shipments to Iran could be intermingled with routine U.S. and Israeli arms sales to Zaire.

U.S. officials also said some CIA aid to Jonas Savimbi, the Angolan anti-communist guerrilla leader, has been delivered through Zaire. The Reagan administration decided a year ago to provide \$15 million in covert aid to Mr. Savimbi's forces, who are fighting the Soviet and Cuban-backed regime in Luanda. The House of Representatives last Sept. 17 rejected a move to cut off the covert assistance to Mr. Savimbi's forces.

Query Made to Armacost

Sources said that when Mr. Rowland asked U.S. diplomats in London whether Washington had approved the proposed arms shipment, as Mr. Kimche had suggested, embassy officials contacted Michael Armacost, the undersecretary of state for political affairs. Mr. Armacost, the State Department's third-ranking official, told the embassy he thought plans to sell U.S. arms to Iran had been abandoned.

But State Department officials said that when the U.S. ambassador to Britain, Charles Price, spoke to the then-national security adviser John Poindexter, Mr. Poindexter didn't answer questions about the proposed arms shipment and suggested that Ambassador Price stop pursuing the matter.

Although embassy officials told Mr. Rowland they couldn't confirm that the proposed Zaire operation had been authorized, State Department officials at the time last May widely assumed the CIA was shipping American arms to Iran.

CIA Tied to Some of Profit

New evidence also suggests that in addition to arranging the delivery of U.S. arms to Iran, the CIA controlled some of the profits generated by the arms sales. Officials said Justice Department investigators believe that in the past few days they have uncovered evidence that some

CIA officials knew about and controlled the flow of funds through a secret Swiss bank account from which millions of dollars were diverted to the Nicaraguan rebels.

According to intelligence sources, however, the exact flow of the funds remains unclear. While it appears some money from the arms sales was comingled with an existing CIA account in Switzerland, sources said the evidence indicated multiple accounts, some outside the CIA's control, eventually were opened to handle the transfer of funds to Nicaraguan insurgents.

Justice Department attorneys and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are believed to be stepping up efforts to unravel the CIA's role in the transactions. But in an unusual, on the record statement, the CIA maintained that "the only funds related to the Iran program that passed through agency hands" involved reimbursing the Pentagon for equipment. The CIA also said flatly that none of the funds it handled were diverted to Nicaraguan rebels.

Leaders of the anti-communist Contra groups have denied that they controlled or had access to any secret Swiss bank accounts.

However, other officials said they expect the issue to be one of the major questions confronting the independent counsel slated to take control of the investigation shortly.

When Attorney General Edwin Meese disclosed last week that at least \$10 million of profit from the arms sales was diverted to the Nicaraguan rebels since the beginning of the year, he said that the money came from accounts "which were under the control of representatives of the forces in Central America" fighting the Nicaraguan government. "So far as we know at this time," Mr. Meese asserted during the same news conference, "no American person actually handled any of the funds" that went to the Nicaraguan rebels.

Last week, Mr. Meese also said that Mr. Casey, Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger didn't authorize or know about the diversion of funds until the administration began its internal investigation of the matter.

In response to questions from reporters earlier this week, Mr. Meese indicated that Justice Department investigators have uncovered additional evidence about the details of the secret payments to the Contras, and that his earlier statements based on preliminary information probably were wrong in "some minor details." Mr. Meese and his spokesmen have declined to elaborate on those comments, and he has ordered all the officials working on the case not to talk about the investigation.

Meese Report May Add Information

Further information about the CIA's activities may become public in the next few days, when Mr. Meese files his formal request with a special appeals court panel for appointment of an independent prosecutor. The documents, which were still being drafted yesterday, are expected to spell out a number of statutes that may have been violated, including prohibitions against funneling funds to the Contras and laws barring the CIA and other agencies from using federal funds for purposes other than those determined by Congress.

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NEWS ARTICLES -- THE IRAN-CONIRA CONTROVERSYISRAEL CONFIRMS AIDE WAS NORTH'S CONTACT: It Denies He Knew Money Was For Contras

Wash. Post, Frankel: The Israeli govt. confirmed that Amiram Nir was a contact of Lt. Col. North but denied that the fired national security aide ever told Nir of the contra connection. Sources in Israel said that Nir, who serves as Prime Minister Shamir's counterterrorism adviser, had a working relationship with North spanning a 27-month period. They said that North and his boss Poindexter brought Nir into the arms deal late last year. The govt.'s statement followed unconfirmed published reports that North told Justice Dept. investigators that he did tell Nir of the secret Swiss bank account into which Israel deposited profits from the Iran deals, was controlled by the contras. An Israeli govt. spokesman also denied that Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli ambassador to the U.N., had ever suggested that Israel become involved with the contras. (4/12/86)

Balt. Sun: Israel Denies North Told Peres Aide Of 'Contra' Link
Phil. Inq.: Israel Denies Official Knew Of Contra Link In Iranian Arms Sale

NORTH TELLS PROBERS OF ISRAEL BRIEFING

Chic. Trib., Broder: The Jerusalem Post reported Wed. that Lt. Col. North told Justice Dept. investigators that he had briefed Amiram Nir on the diversion of profits from the Iran deals to Nicaraguan rebels. Avi Pazner, a Shamir govt. spokesman flatly denied the report. The Post article also quoted that some U.S. officials said they assumed Nir had told his superiors of the contra connection. (4/12/86)

SWISS ACCOUNT CALLED CIA MISTAKE


Wash. Post, Cannon & Woodward: A senior administration official said yesterday that the mixing of profits from U.S. arms sales to Iran and funds from the Saudi and U.S. govt.'s for Afghan rebels in a secret Swiss bank account was the result of a "dumb" action by lower-level CIA employee. One source said that CIA Director Casey maintains that the money from the arms sales was really "Iranian funds" and that the CIA "applied it where it was supposed to be". (4/12/86)

BUSH SAYS 'MISTAKES WERE MADE': But He Defends Reagan On Arms Sale, Handling Of Scandal

Wash. Post, Taylor: Vice President Bush yesterday defended President Reagan's decision to secretly sell Iran arms and praised his handling of the scandal, but did concede that errors had been made and that "our credibility has been damaged."

Balt. Sun: Bush Admits to Mistakes In U.S. Policy But Believes Reagan Will Be Vindicated

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NEWS ARTICLES CONT

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152IRAN ARMS DEALS NOT LIKELY TO DAMAGE US-ISRAEL TIES: Key Question Is Which Country Urged The Sales

Chris. Sci. Mon. Moffett III & Richey: The Iran-contra probe has led to disclosures of a secret Israeli policy of shipping US arms to Iran, both with and without U.S. approval, and these shipments have occurred throughout the course of the Iran-Iraq war. But analysts contend that the affair is unlikely to inflict longterm or permanent damage, although some Israeli officials fear that Israel will be made scapegoat in the matter. One main question is who instigated who in the decision to send arms to Iran in 1985-86. Was it Israeli urging? Or was it U.S. officials who persuaded the Israelis to participate? (4/12/86)

INOUE APPEARS AS FAVORITE TO HEAD 'ARMS DEAL' PROBE

Wash. Times. Spreyacek & Thompson: Capitol Hill sources said yesterday that Sen. Daniel Inouye of Hawaii is the seeming favorite to chair a special Senate select committee to investigate the Iran arms deal controversy. Senate Republican leader Robert Dole has sought to informally set up the committee before Congress convenes on Jan. 6. Senate Democratic leader Robert Byrd said regarding Inouye as potential chairman, "There are several senators on both side...who want him to be on the committee". (4/12/86)

CARLUCCI LAUNCHED CIA OPERATION IN YEMEN THAT COLLAPSED

Wash. Post. Woodward: According to sources, Frank Carlucci, who was named Tuesday as President Reagan's new natl. security adviser, once ran one of the the CIA's unpublicized failures in the Third World. In 1979, as deputy CIA director, Carlucci set up a secret CIA paramilitary effort against South Yemen which was threatening to overthrow pro-Western North Yemen. The operation ended in 1982 after a CIA-trained team of Yemenis was captured trying to blow up a bridge in South Yemen. Under torture, team members disclosed information about their CIA sponsors prior to their executions and the operation ended. (4/12/86)

WEINBERGER 'HORRIFIED' BY IRAN-CONTRAS DEALS

LA Times. Meisler: Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said Tuesday that he had been horrified when he learned of the secret transfer to the contras of monies realized from arms sales to Iran. He praised the appointment of Carlucci as the new White House national security adviser and said that as far as he knows, no Pentagon official has violated the law in any way in connection with arms sales to Iran. (3/12/86)

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4 of 4

OTHER NEWS ARTICLES

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SYRIAN DIPLOMAT SOUGHT IN TURKISH MURDER CASE: Defendants In Ankara Assassination Trial Have Abu Nidal, Islamic Jihad Ties

Wash. Post, Gurseli: A Turkish State Security Court has adjourned until Dec. 16 the trial of nine people implicated in the murder of a Jordanian diplomat, Ziad Sati. Among those accused, Abu Nidal, Islamic Jihad terror groups and the Syrian Embassy. The issue of immunity arose when the court issued an arrest warrant for Syrian Embassy Second Sec., Mohammed Darwiche Baladi, one among the original nine defendants who is being tried in absentia. Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said he had been thinking that there could be some links between western charges of Syrian terrorism and accusations of a "Syrian connection" in terror activities in Turkey. (4/12/86)

COURT RULING ON JUDAISM IS APPEALED

Phil. Inq., (Reuters): Interior Minister Yitzhak Peretz yesterday appealed an Israeli Supreme Court decision preventing the govt. from discriminating against non-Orthodox converts to Judaism. On Tuesday, the Supreme Court ruled that the ministry could not label Shoshana Miller, a convert to Judaism, in her identity papers. (4/12/86)

SCHARNSKY SCORNS NEW SOVIET POLICY

Wash. Times, (UPI): Natan (formerly Anatoly) Sharansky said yesterday that the Soviet Union's new emigration regulations are a step backward and further bar those wanting to leave the Soviet Union from doing so. Scheduled to go into effect Jan. 1, the new rules restrict applicants for emigration to those who have immediate relatives living abroad. (4/12/86)

SHIITES KILL TEACHER IN ATTACK ON PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP

Chic. Trib., (UPI): Shiite militiamen stormed Al Bas, Palestinian refugee camp in s. Lebanon Wed. and executed a school teacher. A police source said that the militia also set 70 homes on fire. (4/12/86)

LA Times: Tanks Lead Shia Drive Against PLO In Lebanon

Wash. Post: 42 Killed In Lebanon In PLO-Shiite Battles: Pope Calls For Peace At Vatican Audience

Phil. Inq.: The Pope Pleads For Peace As Lebanon Fighting Rages

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דפוס.....מחור.....דפים
טווג בטחוני גלוי?
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תאריך וזיחה 16.00 4 דצמ' 86
מס' פנקס

מל: המשרד + בטחון

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מצפ"א

דע: מקשי"ח (ממבטחון)

קונגרס: פרשת איראן - ניקרגואה: עדכון
לשלנו 140 (נר 115 לבטחון) אג' 101.

מנהיגי הרוב והמיעוט בסנט, הסנטורים דול ובירד, הודיעו היום אחה"צ על הקמת וועדה נבחרת (SELECT COMMITTEE) לחקור את הפרשה. כצפוי, וועדה זו תהיה מטעם הסנט בלבד (ולא ועדה נבחרת משותפת מטעם שני הבתים).
ב-15 דנא יודיעו על הרכב הוועדה והממשתפים בה (כבר נודע שהמפתח המפלגתי יהיה 6 דמוקרטים מול 5 רפובליקאים) - וזאת מבלי לקיים מושב מיוחד של הסנט. בכלי החקשורת מעלים את שמו של הסנטור דן אינוויייה כאחד המובילים לתפקיד יו"ר הוועדה.

י.י.
קונגרס - עתונות

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נכנס

חוזם: 2232, 12

אל: המשרד

מ-: נוש, נר: 141, תא: 041286, חז: 1300, חז: ב: ט: 8

נד: 8

סודי ביותר/בהול להזעיק את כל הממוענים

אל: רהמי, שהח, שהוט (בטחון-נר 116)

איראן. לשלנו 11, 34, 78.

1. פרט לפנייה בדרג בינוני מה-FBI כמדורח במברקינו הנל לא היתה חוזר לא היתה שום פנייה אלי אף כי נמגשתי לאצ"ע עם המשנה לשר המשפטים והיו לי שיחות טלפוניות עם אד מיז, האיש המרכזי המטפל בנושא. לא נאמר לי, לא באופן ישיר ולא באופן עקיף, שמצפים למשהו מאתנו.

2. אמפ"י שביום ג' מסרו לנציג המוסד שמצפה לי מכתב פרטמי ובו פירוט ספציפי של הבקשות שבמיהם, לא נתקבל שום מכתב ולא היתה כל פנייה. לעניות דעתי הדבר קרה ברגע שהוחלט למסור את הנושא לחוקר מיוחד. על כן נפטרה החקירה של האגף הפלילי של משרד המשפטים בראשות טרוט (האיש השלישי במערכת משרד המשפטים כאן, אותו נגשתי באקראי אתמול, אך לא התייחס לנושא בכלל).

כל פנייה בנושא, בין לאנשים/מוסדות אמריקנים ובין למוסדות/אזרחים זרים תבוא בשלל זה או מועדות הקונגרס או מהועדה שהוקמה ע"י הנשיא בראשות טאוור (TOWER), או מהחוקר המיוחד.

אם וכאשר תבוא פנייה כזו, נצטרך לשקול אם לבקש פנייה פרטית דרך מחמד" או שנענה ישירות.

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משדד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

דף 2 מתוך 3
עותק 3 מתוך 12

3. לאור הנל אני מאד ממליץ למעול כדלקמן:

(א) לא חוזר לא לתת כל הצהרות בכלי התקשורת או בתדריכים
שלא לייחוס, לאלה המבקשים זאת. הנושא הינו אמריקני
ביטודו ומתייחס בין היתר ובעיקר לייחסי-הגומלין בין
הזרוע המבצעת והקונגרס, כאשר ההיבט של הפרת החוק האמריקני
הוא מרכזי. אין לנו שום ענין שהמקום השולי בו אנו
מצויים כיום ייחפן למוקד למרסום או להתייחסות.

(ב) לא חוזר לא להקים שום גרמי-תאום בארץ בין הרשויות
השונות כי אין שום סיכוי בעולם שהדבר יישאר סודי
ועצם הקמת כתובת כלשהי לטובל בנושא יכולה רק לסבך
אדחכו עוד יותר. אין הדבר מונע כמובן שמי שהיה מעורב
בענין ישמור על החומר שברשותו וירכזו.

(ג) במידה ותהיה פניה כאן או שיאמר דבר כלשהו באופן
יישיר או בנרמז, נדאג לדווח מיד לארץ. מאחר ולא היתה
שום פנייה (פרט לפנייה כאמור בתחילת השבוע בדרג בינוני
מה- FBI) אין שום מקום לקבוע-
אפילו בתוך השגרירות-שאיש זה או אחר ירכז את הטפול. מאחר
דישנם אנשים המטפלים בקונגרס-ואלה המטפלים בממשל
במהלך העבודה הושטפת של השגרירות-במידה ומישהו מהעמיתים
ירצה לבקש טיוע-בוזאי שהדבר ידווח, וירוכז כמובן
על ידי החמ'.

מניח ששמתם לב שבמידה והיו הדלפות (כולל שיחתי עם
מיז)-ההדלפות לא באו מכאן.

(ד) אני מאד ממליץ לא לקיים שיחות טלפון טרנס-אטלנטיות
עם גורמים כאן, אם הללו יפנו-כי אם יסתמכו אחר מכן
בפניות אלינו על מה שנאמר להם בשיחות כנל' קשה יהיה
לקבוע בדיוק מה נאמר-וכמו כן יש להביא בחשבון שכל
שיחה כזו יכולה להיות מסמן לתועלת הנחקרים בחקירות
המתנהלות כאן ע"י הגורמים השונים.

הנושא עבר מהתחום המדיני למשפטי, כשכל איש המוזמן לעדות
מלווה ע"י קבוצת עוד'.

(ה) ממליץ מאד שאנשים ששמותיהם מוזכרים במפורש בכלי
התקשורת יימנעו מלתת הצהרות או תדריכים כי כל הצהרה

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

מחון 3 דף 3
מחון 12 עותק 3

כזו לא רק מתפרסמת אלא גם מצטרפת לחומר החקירה שמצטבר.

* (נ) נקודה שהנושא לא יתפוס את המקום המרכזי שהוא תופס
* היום. עכ"פ אינני סבור שיש להתרגש יתר על המידה וכתוצאה
* מדיווחים עתונאיים-שלא תמיד משקפים את העובדות-נ"תמס
* לבהלה בלשהי או ננקוט בצעדים ארגוניים או אחרים שעלולים
* למגוע בנו. רק אם ננקוט בקו של BUSINESS AS USUAL
* נוכל לאט לאט להגיע למצב שלפחות ההיבט הישראלי לא
* יתפוס מקום מרכזי. הסיבה לכך שישנם גורמים הרוצים
* להבליט את חלקנו- היא-כפי שדווחתי בשעתו- גם משפטית:
* אם ישראל מסייעת לקונטראס- אין בזה פגיעה בחוק האמריקני.
* לעומת זאת, טיוע לקונטראס ע"י ממשל אמריקני בתקופה
* בה דניס, הינה הפרת חוק המורה ועל כן כמובן הקונגרס
* יחקור וירכז את ביקורתו.

* מ"י. רוזן

* חתום: שהח"רה, מנכ"ל

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ד פ ד... 1... מחור... 3... ד פ י
ס ו ג ב ט ח ו נ י ג ל ו י
ד ח י פ ו ת... מ י י ד י
ת א ר י כ ו ז י י ח... 4 10.40 ד צ מ ' 86

אלו המשד + בטחון

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מצפ"א

דע: מקשי"ח (ממבטחון)

קונגרס: פרשת איראן - ניקרגואת : עדכון
לשלנו 122 (נר 104 לממבטחון)

א. הנשיא והמנהיגות הרפובליקאית

1. כמתוכנן, נפגש הנשיא אתמול (3) בשנית עם המנהיגות הרפובליקאית בקונגרס. השתתף גם ראש הסי.אי.איי., קייסי, ולפי התקשורת נשאל שאלות קשות לאור הגילויים בעתון "ווש'פוסט" לפיהם לסי.אי.איי. חשבון סודי בשוויץ בו הופקדו כספים אמריקאים וסעודים לשם מתן סיוע למורדים באפגניסטאן ובאנגולה, בנוסף לקונטרס.
2. לפני ואחרי פגישה זו הצטרף מנהיג המיעוט בבית הנבחרים, ^{קולד גיינץ} למקהלה של הקוראים להתפטרותו של ראש המטה בבית הלבן, דונלנד ריגן. לעומתו, אמר מנהיג הרוב בסנט, בוב דול, אחרי חפגישת שהנשיא סבור שאין צורך בחלפתו של ריגן לאחר פיטורי השניים ב- NSC שהיו מעורבים בפרשה (פוינדקסטר ונורת').

ב. "וועדה נבחרת" מטעם הקונגרס

1. אתמול נפגשו דול ומנהיג המיעוט בוב בירד, ודנו בהקמת וועדה כזו.
2. היום ישוחח הנשיא בנדון עם המנהיגות של שתי המפלגות. לפי העתונות קיימת אפשרות שהוועדה תוקם עד סוף השנה ומבלי שיהיה כינוס מיוחד של הקונגרס.

ג. וועדת המודיעין בסנט

1. אתמול נקרא פוינדקסטר להופיע בשנית בפני הוועדה למשך כשעה. כמו נורת' לפניו, הוא "אימץ" את התיקון החמישי בכדי לא להפליל את עצמו. לאחר השמיעות אמר יו"ר הוועדה דייב דורנברגר שמבחינה משפטית עמדת פוינדקסטר כשרה, אך בפועל הוא עושה משגה.
2. עם זאת עולה ששורר הסכול רב בוועדה מהמבוי הסתום שנוצר והדבר הגיע

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אלו

לבטוי בפיו של בכיר המיעוט בוועדה, פט ליייה, שהתריע על חוסר שיתוף הפעולה של העדים. מחד גיסא הנשיא במבוכת מה לנוכח הבטחתו שהממשל ישתף פעולה באורח מלא עם הקונגרס; ומאידך גיסא חברי הוועדה (ו-וועדות אחרות) ניצבים בפני דילמה: עיימ לזכות לשייפ מצד פוינדקסטר ונורת' הם יכולים להעניק להם חטינות בפני הפללה עצמית, אך אם יעשו זאת הם עלולים להגביל את חוסר התמרון של החובע המיוחד (שטרם מונה) שמוסמך להעמיד אנשים לדין אם תמצאנה סיבות פליליות לכך.

ד. הנשיא והפרשה

הסנטור ארנסט הולינגס (דמי מדרום קרולינה, וחבר בוועדת המודיעין) גרם להתרגשות אתמול בהבעת דעתו בפני מצלמות הטלוויזיה כי "באופן כללי ידע הנשיא את הכל" לגבי הפרשה. הולינגס טען כי לא הגיע למסקנתו עיימ דברים ששמע בשמיעות של וועדת המודיעין, אך הוא הקניט את היו"ר שהגיב באומרו שעל הולינגרס להחליט באם הוא חבר בוועדת או לא.

ה. וועדת החוץ בביה"נ

לידיעתכם, רצ"ב סדר היום של השמיעות הפתוחות בשבוע הבא.

למדן
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FULL COMMITTEE MEETING NOTICE

Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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December 2, 1986

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REGION

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend the following OPEN meetings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held in Room 2172 Rayburn, on U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN AND RELATED ISSUES:

DATE: Monday, December 8, 1986
TIME: 8:30 A.M.
WITNESS: Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary
Department of State

TIME: 2:00 P.M.
WITNESS: Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Former Assistant To The President
For National Security Affairs

* * *

DATE: Tuesday, December 9, 1986
TIME: 9:30 A.M.
WITNESS: Vice Admiral John Poindexter
Former Assistant To The President
For National Security Affairs

* * *

DATE: Wednesday, December 10, 1986
TIME: 9:30 A.M.
WITNESS: Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

John J. Brady, Jr.
Chief of Staff

NOTE: Your prompt attendance will be appreciated at the onset of each hearing, as a QUORUM will be needed to vote to go into EXECUTIVE SESSION at the appropriate time.

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END

סגירות ישראל - דוסינגטון

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The next year Nir married Judy Moses, daughter of the publisher of Yediot Aharonot, Israel's largest circulation daily. When Peres became prime minister in 1984, Nir got the counterterrorism post.

Senior officials of the Mossad spy agency and Shin Bet secret service argued that he was too inexperienced and, as a former journalist, too talkative for the post, sources said, and both services sought to exclude him from data about secret security operations. But Nir worked his way into influence in part by developing strong ties to Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Informed sources said North and Nir first met in Washington on Nir's initial visit after taking the counterterrorism post, and had several more meetings later.

Israel first approached Washington in the summer of 1985 with a proposal to help the United States open a secret channel to Iran. The channel was originally opened by two Israeli arms merchants, Yaacov Nimrodi and Al Schwimmer, who worked through Saudi billionaire Adnan Khashoggi. The latter introduced them to Iranian arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar, the sources said, adding that Nimrodi and Schwimmer are close friends of Peres.

Peres asked David Kimche, then director general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, to seek authorization from Washington for a deal to exchange arms for U.S. hostages held by pro-Iranian Moslem Shiites in Lebanon. Kimche, reportedly believing he had won approval from McFarlane, was then told to oversee Nimrodi's and Schwimmer's dealings.

At least three shipments of arms went to Iran by November 1985 but only one hostage was released. By then North and other Americans reportedly suspected that Nimrodi and Schwimmer were trying to make their own arms deals with the Iranians, while the two Israelis reportedly believed the Americans were handling the dealings in an amateurish manner.

By December, North had decided to push out the Israelis for Nir, sources said. Nir went to Shamir, Rabin and Peres—the three Israeli leaders who had approved the dealings—and argued that he should take over because the Israeli arms dealers had a conflict of interest. He also reportedly said Poindexter and North wanted him to take control. After checking with Poindexter, the sources said, the Israeli leadership approved the switch.

Nimrodi reportedly has told friends that the deal began to unravel after Nir took control. "All I can promise you is that I did my best and put all my efforts into helping the United States and all for nothing," Nimrodi said by phone today. He refused to comment further.

Nir also has refused to comment on the affair.

Four more shipments followed and two more hostages were released before the secret arms channel became public last month. It was profits from these four shipments that were funneled to the contras, sources here contend.

Israel Ready to Cooperate

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Dec. 3 — The Israeli Cabinet decided today that it would allow American investigators to interview members of the Israeli Government involved in the arms deal with Iran, if Washington makes such a request, Government sources said.

The sources said that the decision was made at a meeting of the so-called inner Cabinet, which comprises the 10 senior ministers of the Labor Party and the Likud bloc. The legal advisers of the ministers also took part in the discussion about the legal ramifications of such Israeli cooperation.

"There has been no formal request yet from the United States," a senior Israeli official said. "But if and when a request will be made by the United States, we have decided in principle to cooperate with it. We have nothing to hide."

Quiet, Informal Contacts

The Cabinet decision followed several days of quiet, informal contacts between the United States and Israel on the subject. It underscored the desire of Israeli officials to coordinate as much as possible with the Reagan Administration to prevent any kind of rift from developing between the two countries. A formal request is expected from Washington in the near future.

American investigators are expected to request to speak with David Kimche, the former Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and now a private consultant, who played a key role in making the first official contacts between the United States and Israel in the Iran affair and Amiram Nir, the Prime Minister's adviser on terrorism, who succeeded Mr. Kimche around December 1985 or January 1986 as the official Israeli liaison with Washington in the Iran deal.

Two other Israeli arms dealers, Yaacov Nimrodi and Al Schwimmer, would be able to shed much light on the case, but whether they could be compelled to be interviewed, or would volunteer to do so, is unclear.

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א. הרב דוד רוזנ מ- ~~אאא~~ ~~אדל~~ אאא בירושלים מסר שפרלמוטר ייפגש

מזר 4 עם הקרדינל ושאל אם יש לנו מסר לקרדינל

באמצעותו או הנחיות לגבי יחסי ישראל-ואתיקן וכדומה.

ב. חשבתי שאתה מקיים קשר הדוק עם אוקונור ומסרינו

מועברים דרכך במידת הצורך.

ג. זימנתי רוזנ לפגישה בשבוע הבא שבה אתדרכו בינ היתר

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News Summary December 3, 1986

New York Headlines

The Iran-Contra scandal continues to be front page news. Page 1 of the Times reports that Messe, citing possible crime, asks for special prosecutor; Carlucci named for NSC (see Press Reports) Also on p.1 of the Times, Stock prices have soared to peak in relief over Iran inquiry. Local NY papers also headlined the above.

Editorials

NYT "Acting Like a President" Reagan has started acting like a President again. By appointing Carlucci, he has chosen someone whose public career inspires confidence and makes him seem almost custom tailored for the job. There will still be a round of painful inquiries. But at least Reagan has positioned himself with those who seek the truth, no matter how damaging.

NYP "Don't Blame the Contras for Iran" There's a decidedly unpleasant exercise taking place on Capitol Hill; an effort to punish the contras for the misguided US dealings with Iran.


DN "Reagan Moves: Far, Fast Enough?" Reagan has acted to meet the crisis that besets his presidency. Even with the recent dramatic decisions, there are two clouds currently over the White house that cannot be easily dispelled. One is the implication raised by the length of time it took Reagan to act constructively. The other is that much of the President's inner circle is open to deep doubt. House-cleaning must go further.

Columns

NYT-Reisman "Should We Just Write Off The Hostages?" All Western Governments regularly proclaim that they will not negotiate with terrorists. It's a sound policy. Yet, when nothing else works, our gov't secretly negotiates, all the while proclaiming it is not. Reagan got some of our hostages out. It appears he came close to getting them all out. Its hard to discern any violations here. There are likely to be hostage crises in the years to come. If Congress wants the President to act to secure the release of our citizens, it will have to face reality and allow him wide discretion.

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NYT-Reston - "Reagan Changes His Tune" Reagan has moved part way to quell the crisis but the uproar goes on. Reagan is in an awkward position in terms of cleaning-house. He insists that this whole disaster wasn't a fiasco or even a "mistake" or "Failure." In his mind, it was merely a procedural misjudgement that was carried out without his complete knowledge. The danger for Reagan is that this scandal, unless it is quickly admitted and corrected by new officials and new procedures, will dominate the rest of his term.

WSJ-Ali M. Gha'emi (Iranian Grad Student) "The Ayatollah's African Connection" Recent Iranian contacts with African Marxists points to a new arena where the ayatollah hopes to extend his influence. The most significant initiative was the Iranian President's visit in January to Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique. He met with representatives of SWAPO, the ANC and PAC. Anti-Americanism has also led the Iranians to establish contacts with a series of radical governments and groups such as the PLO, IRA, Cuba, Libya, North Korea. The ayatollah has increasingly been willing to compromise religion in favor of strategic concerns.

DN-Anderson "Turkish Leader Agrees US Must Talk to Iran" The Turkish Prime Minister agrees with Reagan's arms deal with Iran but supports the aborted effort to establish ties. Ozal also indicated in an interview that Turkey would not follow Britain's lead and break relations with Syria, even though Turkish intelligence is certain that the Syrians helped Armenian terrorists who are slaughtering Turkish diplomats and their children.

Press Reports

Shamir Rejects Hint By Reagan

NYT-Freidman-Shamir publicly rejected Reagan's apparent assertion that Israel helped channel money to the rebels. Israeli officials were deeply disturbed by Reagan's remarks in Time Magazine. The Israelis first hoped Reagan was talking about Saudi Arabia but when it became clear that he wasn't, officials sent a formal request for clarification. Deviating from Israel's policy of commenting as little as possible on the Iran affair and seeking to avoid contradicting Washington, Shamir spoke out. This was the kind of exchange Israel hoped to avoid but with his country's credibility on the line, Shamir felt that a clear and forthright denial was necessary. (Cabled) (ND-LA Times)

WSJ-Seib-Israel's participation in the secret sale of US arms to Iran has put it in an uncomfortable position. Israeli officials do not argue with the tactic of exchanging arms for hostages. Israeli officials do not want this dispute to blossom into a crisis of Israel's relations with Congress, which Israelis consider even more important than relations with the White House. US congressional investigators are sure to demand interviews with Israeli officials. Israeli leaders are denying the contra links several times a day but even the officials can't rule out the possibility that private arms dealers handled some of the money. (Cabled)

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Cast of Characters

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NYT-Brief descriptions of the main players in the Iran-arms deal.
Included are David Kimche, Nimrodi, Schwimmer.

Independent Prosecutor to Look into Iran Deal

NYT-Weinraub p.1-Saying that illegal acts may have been committed into the diversion of millions of dollars to rebels from the US arms sales to Iran, the Administration said it was requesting an independent prosecutor to look into the case. Meese said, "We think that we have a statutory basis to believe that a Federal law may have been violated. There may have been people in government who may have violated it." (all papers) (NYT-Transcript of Reagan's speech) (NYT-Transcript of Meese's statements)

Carlucci Named NSC Head

NYT-p.1-Gordon-The appointment of Carlucci was generally praised as a step that would improve management of the NSC and help restore US credibility. The State Dept. openly approved, as did Weinberger. (all papers)

Congress Welcomes Plan for Special Counsel

NYT-Roberts-Congressional leaders said they welcomed Reagan's decision to have a special prosecutor investigate the secret Iran dealings. But lawmakers from both parties said they would push ahead with their own investigations.

Potential for Rivalries Seen

NYT-Taylor-Tension is likely to develop between simultaneous investigations by Congress and the independent counsel, legal experts said. But the experts believe that such conflicts could be resolved without requiring Congress to defer its inquiry.

US Said to Have Made Hostage Offer/Also for Israeli Soldier

WSJ-Walcott-The Administration tried to win the freedom of the hostages and an Israeli soldier last May by offering a swap of some 300 Lebanese Shiite prisoners, a \$2 million ransom and a sale of military spare parts to Iran. The deal collapsed when pro-Iranian militiamen in Lebanon refused to release the kidnapped Israeli soldier. Israeli sources then balked at releasing the Shiites. The ransom was never picked up but the Iranians received the spare parts. Some efforts to free the hostages apparently were not confined to selling arms to Iran. A spokesman in the Israeli Embassy in Washington declined to comment, saying it was too late in the day to reach officials in Israel for a response. According to sources, the plan was worked out by North and with Israeli and Iranian officials. Both North and McFarlane traveled to Iran via Israel in May bring with them spare parts. (Cabled)

NYT-Gwertzman-The revelations about the ransom money was described by a senior State Dept. officials as further evidence of the White House's readiness to violate the Administration's anti-terrorism policy.

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page 2

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0109 / 18 / 5

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Shiite Clergy Blames US for Blocking Hostages' Release

ND-AP-Shiek Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah said that the US prevented the release of American hostages by sabotaging Kuwait's plans to free 17 extremists.

Jacobsen Tells of Buckley's End

DN-Nelson-William Buckley died of medical neglect, not from an executioners bullet, Jacobsen said in a TV interview. He said he was kept in a room with Buckley and that Buckley was delirious and running a high fever.

North Told Group He Often Met With Reagan

NYT-Engelberg-North told a church delegation that he often met with Reagan and briefed him twice a week on terrorism and Central America. Members of the church group said that North told them he had visited Beirut on a mission concerning the hostages. The church meeting took place in Feb. A senior Administration official said that Reagan thought of North as a son.

Capitol Hill After Casey

NYP-Lathem-CIA chief Casey is under increasing pressure to resign because of his role in secret US arms sales to Iran.

CIA Had \$500 Million in Swiss Account

NYP-Wash Post-Congressional investigators turned up a mysterious Swiss bank account managed by the CIA that contains more than a half a billion dollars. The deposits include \$10-30 million representing the profits from the Iran deal, \$250 million from the US Gov't and \$250 million from Saudi Arabia.

NYT-Tagliabue-The one-story building which housed CSF in Geneva appears to have been more widely used in secret channeling of funds than was previously believed. It evidently functioned as something of a clearing house for money transfers between Europe, NY and the Caribbean.

Moscow Reaction Restrained So Far

NYT-Taubman-The Soviet Union's reaction to the foreign policy crisis in Washington has remained restrained and Soviet officials have not written off Reagan as a negotiating partner.

Hijackers Cleared in \$2 Million Achille Lauro Looting

DN-Chicago Trib-The Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro was looted of more than \$2 million in cash and jewels while the Palestinian commandos held the crew and passengers hostage and murdered Klinghoffer. The Palestinians were exonerated and Italian newspapers cited sources who said the crew did it.



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4 Killed in Attack on Pro-Israeli Forces in Lebanon

NYT-Hijazi-At least 4 soldiers of the Israeli-backed SLA were killed and 20 wounded in southern Lebanon in the largest such attack by Moslem guerrillas in 2 months. The Islamic Resistance Movement claimed responsibility and said it wanted to show that the struggle against Israel and its allies had not been overtaken by the combat between them and the PLO.

In Damascus-A Smugglers Paradise Amid Troubles

NYT-Kifner-Syria's economy has hit hard times. Basic necessities are in short supply and sometimes nonexistent. Electricity is cut off for 6 hours in the middle of each day and water is turned off at night. Yet, the shops are busy, restaurants are filled the women are often well dressed in the latest Paris fashions. The dreary state-run stores seem better stocked than their Eastern-European counterparts. At the heart of this dichotomy is the conflict between the Government's struggle to impose socialist orthodoxy and the traditional Mideast spirit of free enterprise. The Gov't is waging a war against smuggling, thus imported goods disappear. In addition to a 60% of the budget military burden, there is a shortage of hard currency in the banking system. A Western economist said "If things continue to decline as sharply, perhaps in 10 years they might approach the point of present day Egypt."

Israeli Court Upholds Convert

NYT-special-The Israeli Supreme Court ruled in favor of a new immigrant from the US who had challenged the Interior Ministry's labeling her a convert to Judaism in her Israeli identity papers.

Jihan Sadat

NYT-Gamarekian-Jihan Sadat has made a new life for herself and divides her time between Cairo and Washington. She is a well paid lecturer and teacher and champions the cause of peace. "The PLO has to recognize Israel and Israel has to recognize the PLO. They must forget the past and start anew. This is the only solution for the Middle East," she said in an interview. One of her consuming interests is the Sadat Foundation. The foundation, whose board of Directors include Jimmy Carter and Philip Habib met recently with Shimon Peres in NY.

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A spokesman for the Israeli Embassy in Washington yesterday declined to comment, saying it was too late in the day to reach officials in Israel for a response.

Some administration officials yesterday claimed that the aborted plan didn't violate U.S. policy because the money was provided by a private citizen, the arms were intended mostly to open channels to moderates in the Iranian government, and the Shiite prisoners were to be released in exchange for the captured Israeli.

According to sources involved in the operation, the plan was worked out by Lt. Col. Oliver North, then a member of the National Security Council staff, with Israeli and Iranian officials. Under the plan, the pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon would release the four Americans and the Israeli at the same time Col. Antoine Lahad's Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army released the Shittes.

Simultaneously, the sources said, representatives of a pro-Iranian terrorist group in Lebanon were to pick up \$2 million in cash provided by Mr. Perot, and the U.S. was to deliver a planeload of spare parts for Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and other weapons to Iran. The plane also carried former national security adviser Robert McFarlane and Col. North, who expected to meet top Iranian officials in Tehran.

Equipment Unloaded; No Hostages

Mr. McFarlane and Col. North flew to Iran from Israel May 28 on a plane loaded with cardboard boxes containing spare parts for the Iranian military. They believed the hostages would be free by the time they arrived in Tehran. But after they arrived, the Iranians unloaded the equipment and Mr. McFarlane called then-national security adviser John Poindexter and discovered no hostages had been freed.

Mr. McFarlane left the White House last December. Col. North was dismissed from his national security post last week and Adm. Poindexter stepped down at the same time.

Administration officials said the plan also called for Terry Waite, a lay representative of the Archbishop of Canterbury, to provide "cover" for the deal. Mr. Waite was to call on Col. Lahad, a Maronite Christian, with letters from Pope John Paul II and from Robert Runcie, the Archbishop of Canterbury, seeking the release of the Shiite captives on humanitarian and religious grounds.

Israeli officials had approved the release, informed sources said. Iranian officials promised Col. North that the American hostages and the Israeli soldier would be freed once Col. Lahad announced he would grant the two prelates' humanitarian request and the ransom and spare parts were delivered.

Some U.S. intelligence sources say the Iranians who arranged the deal had believed Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini was near death last spring, and these sources believe the deal may have collapsed when he suddenly recovered.

On several occasions, most recently last May, the Washington Post reported yesterday, Col. North asked Mr. Perot, the Texas billionaire, for ransom money to free the hostages.

Perot Provided Cash

Mr. Perot said in an interview yesterday that he gave \$2 million in cash to an employee who carried it to Cyprus in a suitcase. No one showed up to claim the money, Mr. Perot said. He also said the U.S. government has asked him for similar ransom money to win the release of hostages "on countless occasions" since 1969.

The sources said the failed plan was based partly on the administration's successful effort to free 39 hostages from a Trans World Airlines jetliner that was hijacked to Beirut in June 1985. Four of the Americans were held by the Hezbollah, or

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Party of God, the same group that now holds Americans hostage in Lebanon.

The TWA hostages were freed after Israel agreed to release some 735 Lebanese prisoners, most of them Shiites that it had seized during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

At the time, both Israeli and U.S. officials asserted that the American hostages had been freed unconditionally. They claimed that that no deal had been made linking the Americans' freedom to the phased release of Israel's Lebanese prisoners.

President Reagan thanked Syrian President Hafez Assad for his role in freeing the hostages. But informed sources said the four Americans held by the Hezbollah were released only after Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, intervened on their behalf.

Administration officials have said President Reagan approved U.S. arms sales to Iran last January in part to open channels to Mr. Rafsanjani and other presumed moderates in Tehran.

Israeli Leader Rejects Hint by Reagan of Role in Aid to Contras

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Dec. 2 — Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir today publicly rejected President Reagan's apparent assertion that Israel helped to channel money to the Nicaraguan rebels.

Israeli officials were deeply disturbed by remarks attributed to President Reagan in an interview with Time magazine, in which Mr. Reagan suggested that an unnamed third country sold arms to Iran for a large profit and then knowingly put the excess cash in Swiss bank accounts controlled by the rebel leaders.

At first Israeli officials thought, and hoped, that the President was referring to Saudi Arabia. But after they ascertained from Israeli diplomats in the United States that he was referring to Israel, the Israeli officials sent a formal request for clarification from Washington late last night.

Then today, deviating from the policy Israel has followed up to now of commenting as little as possible on the Iran affair and seeking to avoid contradicting Washington, Mr. Shamir publicly rejected Mr. Reagan's remarks. This was precisely the kind of exchange Israel had hoped to avoid, but with his country's credibility with Congress and the American public on the

line, Mr. Shamir apparently felt that a clear and forthright denial was necessary.

Mr. Shamir was asked by reporters whether Israel would be investigating its role in the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, and a possible connection with money for the rebels, who are known as contras. He answered: "Israel has informed the United States Government and public that there is no connection between the Israeli Government and the contras. Israel has never helped the contras. The statement attributed to Reagan does not compel Israel to change its public stance. Israel's statements on this are the truth."

Nonetheless, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin has asked to see all documents related to Israeli shipments of American arms to Iran, a Defense Ministry official said today.

The official said that Mr. Rabin was "not conducting an investigation," but was trying both to centralize and piece together all Israeli paperwork related to the Iran affair.

"We are checking and centralizing all the information," said the Defense Ministry official. "We want to be able to piece together the whole picture."

One of the problems in trying to understand the Iran affair, in Israel at least, is that different actors were in-

involved in different aspects at different stages and virtually no one in the Israeli administration has a full and complete picture of Israeli involvement from beginning to end.

Mr. Rabin's move to centralize information may also have been in anticipation of an American request to interview those senior Israeli officials and private citizens who were involved with the United States in working out the arms transfers to Iran.

Israeli officials said they have already received some informal feelers from Washington regarding the possibility that American investigators would speak with Israeli officials and private citizens, particularly David Kimche, the former director general of the Foreign Ministry, Amiram Nir an adviser on terrorism, and Al Schwimmer and Yaacov Nimrodi, arms dealers, all of whom were involved with the affair at different stages.

The most confusing element in the situation remains the questions of exactly how Iran paid for its various arms deliveries and who handled the money. The Israeli Government insists that it did not profit in any way from the deals, and that its representatives did not handle any cash, let alone funnel it to the Nicaraguan contras.

According to an unconfirmed report in an Israeli newspaper, Yediot Aharonot,

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New York Times Dec 3, 1986

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not, "millions of dollars that the Khomeini regime paid for arms that it received from the United States and Israel were transferred to private accounts of some of the central religious leaders in Iran." This was apparently done in the form of kickbacks.

The paper, quoting Swiss sources and American diplomats, said that 15 to 20 percent of the money the Iranians paid for arms supplied to them was deposited in the accounts of religious figures and Iranian Government officials who had been involved in the negotiations with the Americans and Israelis.

"This fact explains the 'disappearance' of significant funds from the money the Iranians paid for the arms," the paper said.

It appears that the Iranians may have paid for their arms in different ways at different stages in their dealings with the United States and Israel between August 1985 and November 1986.

According to Israeli sources, at least one manner of payment may have worked in the following way: A shipment of American arms destined for Iran would be loaded on an Israeli Boeing 707 in Israel. Once the material was on board, a signal would be sent to the Iranians that the shipment was ready and someone would transfer money in the amount of the exact price of the weapons to an account in Switzerland.

That money would then be passed on to an account set up by the United States or Israel.

If, for example, the actual cost of the weapons was \$12 million, that amount would be dispatched to the Swiss account.

While this money may have been transferred by Iranians, it may also have been transferred by a middleman, someone such as Adnan M. Khashoggi, the Saudi Arabian arms dealer who was apparently helping the Iranians finance some of their arms purchases, Israeli sources said.

Once the weapons actually landed in Iran, the Iranian Government would instruct one of its banks in Europe, possibly Bank Meli in London, to transfer funds to a Swiss bank account controlled by the middleman, possibly Mr. Khashoggi.

The middleman would not only be reimbursed by the Iranians for the actual cost of the arms, but also for the cost of shipping them, the insurance and, apparently, some profit for putting the deal together.

The middleman may then have parcelled out the money to various Swiss accounts of those involved, while keeping his share. In this way money may also have found its way to the contras, Israeli arms dealers, Iranians and others, the Israeli sources said.

Israel's Role in the Arms Sales to Iran Puts It at Odds With Reagan, Congress

By **GERALD F. SEIB**

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

JERUSALEM—Israel's participation in the secret sale of U.S. arms to Iran has placed the U.S. ally in an uncomfortable position with President Reagan and Congress.

Israeli assertions that the arms sales were designed primarily to free U.S. hostages in Lebanon fly in the face of President Reagan's explanation that the arms transfers were designed to improve relations with Iran and didn't amount to an exchange of arms for hostages. And, because money from the arms sales went to the Contras in Nicaragua, Israel is deeply worried it will lose backing in Congress, the source of much of its U.S. support.

Strategic questions, such as strengthening Iranian "moderates" and influencing the balance of the Iran-Iraq war, were considered only of secondary importance to freeing the hostages, say Israeli officials who are familiar with their country's role as conduit for U.S. arms to Iran.

"We thought of ourselves through the whole period as only an instrument—and the purpose was linked only to freeing American hostages and not the strategic question," says one Israeli official.

Similarly, Israeli arms dealer Ya'acov Nimrod, who participated in the launching of the Iranian operation, said in a statement this week that the program was born when he was asked by the Israeli government at a 1985 meeting "to try and see if there is any way to bring about the freedom of the American hostages." American hostages in Lebanon have been held by Iranian-influenced Islamic groups.

Deals With Terrorists

Israeli officials don't quarrel with the tactic of exchanging arms for hostages. Indeed, despite its tough anti-terrorism image, Israel has dealt with terrorists to free Israeli prisoners when a military rescue wasn't possible.

U.S. and Israeli versions of the arms-sale story differ on an even more sensitive point: whether Israel funneled arms sales proceeds to Contra rebels in Nicaragua. The Reagan administration asserts that Israel sent profits from the arms sales to Contra bank accounts, while Israeli officials unanimously insist Israel didn't handle any of the money.

Yesterday, in an apparent attempt to prevent a rift with the U.S. over the differing explanations, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin said President Reagan's explanations of his objective were "reasonable and acceptable."

Israeli officials don't want this dispute to blossom into a crisis in Israel's relations with Congress, which Israelis consider even more important to them than the White House. The U.S. version implies that Israel was a leading player in a conspiracy

to circumvent the congressional ban on aid to the Contras. The same lawmakers who banned Contra aid must approve billions of dollars in U.S. aid to Israel. U.S. congressional investigators are sure to demand interviews with Israeli officials.

Contra Links Denied

So Israeli officials are denying the Contra link several times a day. "I know for sure no Israeli prime minister would even think of collaborating in an attempt to circumvent Congress—ever," says Dan Meridor, a prominent member of the Likud bloc and an associate of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

But even Israeli officials say they can't rule out the possibility that private Israeli arms dealers, who floated in and out of the Iranian arms program, handled some of the money.

According to Israeli sources:

Israel began selling arms to Iran in 1981 and 1982, when American-made spare parts were sent to Tehran in a bid to bolster "moderates" then still believed to be in the Iranian army.

Private Dealers' Role

When Secretary of State George Shultz called for an end to shipments of U.S. spare parts, Israel complied. But officials acknowledge that private Israeli arms dealers continued to send Israeli-made weapons to Iran.

The official channels reopened in 1985, when U.S. officials sought ways to free American hostages in Lebanon. Mr. Nimrodi, the arms dealer, made contact with Iranian arms buyers. Saudi Arabian financier Adnan Khashoggi played a role in arranging the connections. The initial arms shipment went in late summer of 1985, and American hostage Benjamin Weir soon was released.

Though it isn't clear whether the U.S. approved that shipment, President Reagan did send a personal message of thanks to Shimon Peres, then Israel's prime minister, for his help in the hostage release.

Government Takes Over

In late 1985, the U.S. asked that the private arms dealers be replaced by Israeli officials, to raise the arms program to what one Israeli calls an "institutionalized, government-to-government level."

Their place was taken by 36-year-old Amiram Nir, a former think-tank academic who is the prime minister's special adviser on terrorism.

More arms were sent in early 1986 and this fall. But Israelis insist that estimates of the amount of arms shipped are wildly exaggerated. One Israeli who was involved estimates that the total market value of the arms sent in late 1985 and 1986 was \$25 million to \$30 million, and that Iran paid \$8 million to \$12 million above that in fees and charges.

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NEWS SUMMARY
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1986
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1986

MAJOR NEWS HEADLINES

REAGAN NAMES NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

President Reagan has appointed Frank C. Carlucci as new national security adviser to replace Vice. Adm. John Poindexter who resigned from the post last week over the Iran controversy. Carlucci is the fifth occupant of the post under the Reagan administration.

Wash. Post: New Security Adviser Has Wide Experience
Phil. Inq.: He Also Names Security Aides: New Adviser An Old Hand, Carlucci Is 'Gutsy, Competent'

NIXON FILES

The National archives released 1.5 pages of Nixon administration documents to the public yesterday. Among these documents, a 1969 memo to Nixon from Patrick Buchanan advised the President not to visit Coretta Scott King on the anniversary of her husband's, Dr. Martin Luther King's, death because many people thought Dr. King a fraud and still "others considered him the Devil incarnate". Former vice president Spiro Agnew too was criticized in the documents.

Wash. Post: Nixon Papers Harsh On Dr. King, Unkind To Agnew
Phil. Inq.: King, Agnew Criticized In Nixon Files

PEROT KICKED OUT OF GENERAL MOTORS

General Motors Corp. removed H. Ross Perot, a sharp company critic, from its board of directors yesterday and stripped him of his chairmanship of Electronic Data Systems Corp., a company he founded and sold to GM. Perot said that GM was "morally wrong" for paying him \$750 million - twice the market value - for his GM stock.

Wash. Post: GM Dusts Perot, Buys Back Stock For \$750 Million
USA Today: Perot Parting Shots: GM Wrong
Phil. Inq.: High Finance: GM Buys Out Maverick Perot For \$700 Million

JONESTOWN CULT MEMBER CONVICTION

Former Peoples Temple member Larry Layton was convicted yesterday of conspiring to murder a U.S. congressman and a diplomat in a 1978 jungle ambush that led to a mass suicide episode at the cult's Jonestown commune.

Phil. Inq.: Jonestown Cult Member Is Convicted
Balt. Sun: Defendant Guilty Of conspiracy In Jonestown Case

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NEWS ARTICLES

2/4 YS 67 MF 143

SHAMIR DENIES ISRAELI ROLE: Aide Acknowledges Contra Aid Requests

Wash. Post, Frankel: Prime Minister Shamir yesterday told Seymour Reich, president of B'nai B'rith Intl. who is visiting in Israel, that Israel was approached several times to supply aid to the Nicaraguan contras, but said that his govt. always "refused to do so". An Israeli official confirmed a report that Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's ambassador to the U.N., had attempted several times to convince the Israeli govt. to provide the contras aid. Meanwhile, top Israeli leaders Shamir, Peres & Rabin sought to quell a new storm over President Reagan's statement in a Time interview that "another country", -later identified by White House as Israel- had funneled profits from secret U.S. arms sales to Iran to the contras. Shamir had instructed Meir Rosenne, Israel's ambassador to the U.S., to contact Sec. of State George Shultz & Atty. Gen. Meese restate Israeli denial. (3/12/86)

Phil. Inq.: Israeli Leaders Deny Funneling Funds To Contras
Wash. Times: Shamir Pledges Cooperation With U.S. Probe

IRAN ARMS CASH IS TIED TO CIA-RUN ACCOUNT AIDING AFGHAN REBELS

Wash. Post, Piccus: Congressional investigators have traced profits from the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran to a Swiss bank account handled by the CIA, into which the U.S. and Saudi governments deposited \$250 million each to underwrite Afghanistan rebels fighting Soviet troops. According to sources, some of the money was also used to buy arms for the Nicaraguan contras. One source said that some of the Swiss bank account money was used to buy arms from dealers in countries such as Israel which were covertly shipped to Afghanistan guerillas and Nicaraguan rebels. (3/12/86)

EXTENT OF ISRAELI ARMS SALES TO IRAN CALLED UNDERSTATED
Tehran's U.N. Envoy Oversaw Purchases, Group Charges

Wash. Post, Weiser: An Iranian dissident group, People's Mujaheddin, alleged yesterday that Iranian dealings with Israel have been far more extensive than has been acknowledged and that Iran's U.N. representative to the United Nations has directly supervised the purchase of weapons in the U.S.. A group spokesman, Ali Safavi, produced documents that included a purported \$136 million contract dated 1981, between Iran and Israeli arms dealer Yaacov Nimrodi. Both Israeli and Iranian sources disputed the authenticity of the documents. (2/12/86)

JACOBSEN SAYS BUCKLEY DIED IN 1985

Wash. Times, (AP): In an interview on NBC's "1986", former hostage David Jacobsen said he believes that another hostage William Buckley, died on June 3, 1985 - five months before his Moslem captors claim they executed him. (3/12/86)
Wash. Post: Ex-Hostage Disputes Date Of Buckley Death



3 of 4

NEWS ARTICLES CONT'D

IRANIAN PLAYED US, ISRAEL FROM BOTH ENDS ON ARMS DEAL

Wash. Times, Sieff: Sources said that Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian agent and key middleman in the Iran deals successfully "stung" the U.S. for arms on the pretext of gaining the release of hostage William Buckley. Brought into the picture by Saudi Adnan Khashoggi, who in turn was pulled into negotiations by Israeli arms dealer Yaacov Nimrodi, Ghorbanifar has played a central role in Israeli arms deals with Iran. He also worked for Israeli intelligence before the fall of the shah. In May 1985, two meetings took place between, Ghorbanifar, Khashoggi, Nimrodi and others. After the second meeting, at the instigation of Lt. Col. North, retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Richard Secord got involved and subsequently about 600 TOW's were shipped to Israel and on to Iran. In Sept. '85 in W. Germany, both Khashoggi and the Israelis expressed anger that no hostages had been released despite the TOW shipment. Eventually, then head of the NSC, McFarlane lost trust in Ghorbanifar as a connection and by the end of '85, he was cut from negotiations. (3/12/86)

POINDEXTER FAILS TO ANSWER SENATE PANEL'S QUESTIONS, North Repeatedly Invokes Fifth Amendment Right

Wash. Post, Wilson & Kenworthy: After President REagan permitted his former advisors to testify, former National Security advisor, Poindexter declined to answer the Senate committee's questions yesterday about the Iranian arms affair. He was, however, interviewed by Sen. Durenberger (R-Minn.) and Sen. Leahy (D-Vt.), prior to his scheduled formal appearance. This development follows one day after national security aide North invoked his Fifth Amendment to avoid the Senate panel's questions on the same subject. (3/12/86)

ISRAELI COURT RULING IS VICTORY FOR NON-ORTHODOX JEWS

Phil. Inq., Fisher: The Israeli Supreme Court ruled yesterday that the govt. could not stamp the word "convert" on the identity documents of an American woman, Shoshana Miller, who was Baptist born and who immigrated to Israel after converting to Reform Judaism. The decision was a victory for secular Jews in Israel and Reform and Conservative Jews abroad. (3/12/86)

Balt. Sun: Israel Can't Label Immigrants Who Converted, Court Rules

Wash. Times: Israeli Court Accepts Reform Converts As Jews

Wash. Post: Israel Court Rejects Orthodox Stand On Convert

ISRAEL CONFIRMS SYRIA HAS CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Wash. Times, Meisels: Israeli Def. Minister Rabin said yesterday that Syria has chemical weapons, including nerve gas, and the means to hit Israeli targets with them. He said that Israel was taking steps to defend itself in the face of this threat. (3/12/86)

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4 of 4

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NEWS ARTICLES CONT

DEPORTATION OF ALLEGED NAZI IS CLEARED

Even. Sun. (AP): The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 vote, rejected arguments that deportation proceedings violated Karl Linnas', the alleged boss of a Nazi death camp, rights. This decision clears the way for Linnas' deportation to the Soviet Union where his execution was ordered 24 years ago. Eli Rosenbaum, a World Jewish Congress spokesman said it was a historic event in the battle to bring Nazis to justice. (2/12/86)

JEWISH POPULATION OUTSIDE ISRAEL SHOWS DECLINE

LA Times. (Reuters): The World Zionist Organization said that the world's Jewish population is declining from the current 9.5 million people to about 6 million, in less than 40 years. However, the Jewish population of Israel is rising as it is less affected by intermarriage. (2/12/86)

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דב שפי, היועץ המשפטי למשרד הבטחון

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פרשת איראן

1. בידינו קובץ מסמכים משפטיים (אמריקאיים) שנוגעים למועצה לבטחון לאומי, העברת נשק, פעולות מודיעין, סיוע לקונטרס, חוקי ההקצבה ועקרונות. הקובץ הוכן ע"י שירות המחקר של הקונגרס ומשתרע על פני 90 (תשעים) עמודים. רצי"ב לוח התכנים.

2. הבריקו נא בחוזר באם להעביר אליכם בפקסימיליה או להמתין לדיפי' הבא היוצא ב-10.12.

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CONTENTS

(This compilation will be expanded and updated as circumstances require.)

- I. National Security Council: Establishment and Functions.....1
- II. National Security Act: Accountability For Intelligence Activities.....2
- III. National Security Act: Funding Of Intelligence Activities.....3
- IV. Arms Export Control Act: Regulates All Arms Sales.....4
- V. "Boland Amendment", 1986.....58
- VI. "Boland Amendment", 1987.....59
- VII. "Pell Amendment".....60
- VIII. Funding, Transfers, and Reprogramming.....61
- IX. Availability of Appropriation As to Purpose.....62
- X. Augmentation of Appropriations.....67
- XI. Unauthorized Expenditures.....79
- XII. Independent Counsel.....80

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל: המשרד, בטחון

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דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת

יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

להלן דברי סגן הנשיא בוש (3,12,86) לפני AEI

תמונות

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VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
ADDRESSING THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
AT THE MAYFLOWER HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1986

Well Mr. President (of AEI), at the outset of these remarks, let me just pay my respects to you and thank you for all you do for this wonderful institution, AEI, an institution for which I have so much respect, and I'm delighted to see you. Bob Millot(?), too. And of course, I was invited some time ago by Paul McCracken to come here. And I hope that you'll all be interested in the topic that Paul asked me to address: special drawing rights, the snake and its affect on disintermediation. (laughter)

No, I am delighted to be here at this AEI forum, and you couldn't have scheduled a better time to discuss public policy. A great many citizens currently are troubled about recent revelations. And I'm grateful for this chance to address some of those concerns of the American people. There has been much criticism and confusion in recent weeks, over the administration's -- our policies regarding Iran. And I understand the skepticism of the American people. The result, as you all know, according to these opinion surveys, is that the administration's credibility has been hurt. And this is especially painful to the President, and to me, as well. And after all, we're in the White House because of the trust that the American people placed in us. And we must restore that trust.

And so today, I'd like to discuss some of the basic concerns that the American people rightfully have about our policy toward Iran. Questions of why we tried to open channels, open channels with a regime that all of us Americans despise; questions of how we can have a policy of not sending arms to Iran, and then seemingly do just the opposite; and questions about the operations of the National Security Council staff.

Let me start with a basic concern: Why did we open a dialogue with Iran? Here was a country that deeply humiliated the United States by kidnapping our diplomats, burning our flag, and we still have vivid memories of blindfolded Americans being paraded around our embassy there in Tehran. And there is, in the hearts of the American people, an understandable animosity, a hatred really, to Khomeini's Iran. I feel that way, myself, to be very honest with you. And so does the President, who has been villified time and again by Iran's radical leaders. We are told that most Iranians feel the same way about us, the country that they call "the great Satan". And so, why have anything to do with it?

I'm sorry I didn't bring a map, but if you look at a map, Iran is all that stands between the Soviets and the Gulf oil states. It's all that stands between the Soviets and

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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a warm water port. Either a disintegrating Iran, or an overly powerful Iran, could threaten the stability of the entire Middle East, and especially those moderate Arab states, our friends, whose stability and independence are absolutely vital to the national security of the United States.

We may not like the current Iranian regime, and I've said we don't. But it would be irresponsible to ignore its geopolitical and strategic importance. And that doesn't mean we should simply appease any Iranian regime. It does mean, however, that we can't ignore this looming transition that will soon take place in Iran.

Khomeini will pass from the scene. A successor regime will take power. And we must be positioned to serve America's interests, and indeed, the interests of the entire free world. Apart from the strategic reasons, humanitarian concern about American hostages in Lebanon provided another reason to open a channel to Iran. The Iranians, themselves, are not holding our hostages. But we believe they have influence over those who do hold some of our hostages.

But let me add something very important. In spite of our bitter feelings toward Iran's leadership, we would have tried to begin a dialogue with Iran, whether we had hostages in Lebanon or not. In fact, for three years prior to the first hostage kidnappings, this administration attempted to find reliable, hopefully moderate, Iranian channels, through which to conduct a responsible dialogue.

And more recently, we've been receiving intelligence that pragmatic elements within Iran were beginning to appreciate certain sobering realities. To the east, in Afghanistan, we estimate 115,000 Soviet troops are committing atrocities on Iran's Islamic brothers. To the north, 26 Soviet divisions, right there on Iran's border, for whatever opportunities might arise. To the west, Iran is engaged in a war of unbelievably horrible human dimensions, the war with Iraq. Twelve-year-old kids, 14-year-old kids, pressed into service, and then ground up in combat.

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AM/126

And at home, Iran is teetering on the economic brink right there in its own front yard -- 40 percent unemployment rate. Many Iranian leaders understand that their own survival, and certainly the rebuilding of their economy, may depend on normalizing ties with their neighbors and with the Western world.

And so we, for our reasons, and certain elements in Iran, for their reasons, in spite of this mutual hatred, began a tentative, probing dialogue, which brings us to another question. How can the United States government have a policy against countries sending arms to Iran, and then turn around, and itself, send arms? I understand -- I know the American people simply don't understand this. And when we started talking to the Iranians, both sides were deeply suspicious of each other -- and remain so, I might say. Those Iranians who were taking enormous personal risks by just talking to us felt that they needed a signal that their risks were worth it. And we were told the signal that they required, and we gave them that signal by selling a limited amount of arms, about one-tenth of one percent of the arms that have been supplied by other countries.

And likewise, we need proof of Iranian seriousness. We required signs of a cessation of Iranian use of terrorism, and help in gaining the release of our hostages in Lebanon. And we did see certain positive signs, we have seen them. They opposed, for example, the Pan American hijacking in Karachi; and immediately after, they denied landing rights. They interceded with the TWA hijackers in Beirut. And of course, three hostages, once in Lebanon by the Islamic Jihad, are today with their families here in the United States of America.

And I -- perhaps President Ford would agree with this -- but when you are president, any American held captive against his will anywhere in the world is like your own son or daughter. I know that's the way our President feels about it. But you must remain true to your principles, and I can tell you that the President is absolutely convinced that he did not swap arms for hostages. And still the question remains of how the administration could violate its own policy of not selling arms to Iran. Simple human hope explains it perhaps better than anything else. The President hoped that we could open a channel that would serve the interests of the United States and of our allies in a variety of ways. Call it leadership.

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FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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Given 20-20-hindsight, call it a mistaken tactic if you want to. It was risky, but potentially of long-term value. The shaping of the Iranian policy involved difficult choices. As complex as the public debate on the issue would be, the matter was further clouded by the way in which the President's goals were executed.

Specifically, allegations about certain activities of the National Security Council staff; clearly, mistakes were made. Our policy of conducting a dialogue with Iran, which was legitimate and arguable, has become entangled with the separate matter of this NSC investigation.

A week ago Monday afternoon, the President learned of possible improprieties -- a week ago Monday. On Tuesday, he disclosed the problem to the public, and instructed the attorney general to go forward with a full investigation. On Wednesday, he created a bipartisan commission, three outstanding individuals, to review the role of the NSC staff and make recommendations for the future. And just yesterday, he moved to appoint, have the court appoint an independent counsel, to insure a full accounting for any possible wrongdoing.

The President pledged full cooperation with the United States Congress, urging it to consolidate and expedite its inquiry. He yesterday, also, named Frank Carlucci, a seasoned professional with broad experience, so well known to many people here, to serve as his national security advisor.

Now, this is fast action in anybody's book. And these are actions I fully support, and which I believe the American people will judge commendable. And the President has moved swiftly, strongly. But let me add this: I am convinced that he will take whatever additional steps may be necessary to get things back on track, and get our foreign policy moving forward.

As the elected representatives of all the people, the president and the vice-president, he and I have a duty to preserve the public trust, and uphold the laws of this country. And we take that duty very, very seriously.

I'd like to say something about my own role in all of this. I was aware of our Iran initiative, and I support the President's decision. And I was not aware of, and I oppose, any diversion of funds, any ransom payments, or any circumvention of the will of the Congress and the law of the United States of America.

And as the various investigations proceed, I have this to say: let the chips fall where they may. We want the truth. The President wants it. I want it. And the American people have a fundamental right to it. And if the truth hurts, so be it. We've got to take our lumps, and move ahead.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 5-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

AM/126

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Politics do not matter. Personalities do not matter. Those who have served the President -- haven't served the President well, don't matter. What matters is the United States of America. And we mustn't allow our foreign policy to become paralyzed by distraction. There can be no denying that our credibility has been damaged by this entire episode, and its aftermath. We have a critical role to play, internationally. And I intend to help the President tackle the challenges that lie before us in the last two years of this administration: Putting US-Soviet relations on a new footing, pursuing a breakthrough in arms reduction, building on the potential that I saw so clearly just this past summer, for making new strides for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, working to end apartheid, and creating a more hopeful future for all Africans, solidifying the remarkable changes taking place in Asia, combatting international terrorism in close conjunction with our allies, and of course, fostering the development of democracy in Central America.

And let me add, the freedom of the people of Central America should not, must not be held hostage to actions unrelated to them. This nation's support of those who are fighting for democracy in Nicaragua should stand on its own merits, not hang upon events related to Iran. The Marxist-Leninist regime in Managua must not benefit from the errors of some people in Washington, D.C. Our administration has a duty to follow a foreign policy that reflects the values of its citizens. This sounds simple, and yet it is often, as so many of you here know, a very complex matter. It's not easy, translating general values into specific foreign policy programs. And this is why there's always so much internal debate over our nation's role in world affairs -- from Iran to arms reduction.

The Reagan administration has two years left in which to pursue our particular vision of how America's foreign policy should fit America's values. There's one thing, however, on which critics and supporters would agree. US foreign policy must

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FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

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move forward. The US has obligations as leaders of the free world. It has opportunities and responsibilities unmatched by any other country to bring stability to the world. And we must move forward with the trust of the American people; to the extent that that trust has been damaged, it must be repaired. And only the truth can repair that. Our government rules not by force or intimidation, but by earning the confidence and respect of the American people. Our duty must be to uphold that confidence and restore that respect.

Sometimes, true bipartisanship is really, is called for. And in my view, now is just such a time, and I have been very pleased that Republicans and Democrats alike have pledged to help get the facts out and move on.

A storm is now raging, but when the full truth is know--and it will be--and when the people of American, American people, come to understand that this strong and honest President moved swiftly to correct what might have been wrong, then a forgiving American people, in spite of their misgivings about Iran and weapons and diverted funds will say: "Our president told the truth. He took action."

Let's go forward together. Thank you very much.

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אל: מנכ"ל מדינה, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת
מנהל לע"מ
ניו יורק

ארה"ב-איראן-ישראל-קונטרס

להלן סכום המצב נכון לאח"צ של 3.12.86.

א. כותרות היום בעתונות ממוכזות בשלושה אספקטים של הספור

1. ספור הכותרת של הושינגטון פוסט על חשבונות בנק אישיותיים - 500 מליון דולר שמתוכנן תרמה סעודיה מחצית הסכום שנועד לממן את המורדים באפגניסטן ובניקרגואה.

2. מניו של פרנק קרלוצ'י הזוכה כאן לציונים גבוהים מאד בעתונות בגלל הרקע המגוון והעשיר בכל החומים הרלבנטיים (מחמ"ד, פנטגון, CIA) ובגלל שהפגין יכולת ביחסיו עם הקונגרס, שטח שממשל רייגן לא הצטיין בו במיוחד.

3. ההחלטה על מניו השופט העצמאי החוקר קודמה כאן בברכה אם כי היתה בהחלט צפויה.

ב. בו בזמן, מופנית תשומת הלב לחקירות הקונגרס, התקשורת הממוכזת עד כה בקולונל נורת' ואדמירל פוינדקסטר ש"לקחו את החמישית" (השחמשו בזכותם לסרב לענות לשאלות העלולות להפיליל אותם).

ג. במישור הפוליטי הפנימי יצא היום סגן הנשיא משתיקתו, בתקשורת האלקטרונית מתפרשת הודעתו של בוש בטעויות כנטילת מרחק מהנשיא. הזרקורים הפוליטיים עדיין מופנים אל דון רייגן והיום כבר אמרו מקורביה של ננסי רייגן כי היתה רוצה בהליכתו. גם מנהל ה-CIA עומד במרכז בדיקה תקשורתית של סתירות בדבריו במהלך המשבר.

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ישראל ממשיכה עד לרגעים אלה להוות ספור צדדי לענין אם כי אנו מתחילים לחוש כמה בקיעים הנובעים בראש ובראשונה ממצוי האספקטים האמריקאיים של הספור והתפנות לעסוק בזויות שלנו.

א. יותר ויותר כתבים מתפנים לבדוק את ההבדל המשמעותי בין דבריו של שר המשפטים מיז והודעת ממשלת ישראל, העובדה שעד היום, למרות נסיונות, לא חזר בו מיז או הממשל מהאשמה שישראל או ישראלים היו מעורבים בהעברת הכספים מתקבלת כאן בתמיהה.

ב. מה שנתן לנייל דחיפה היה הפרסום המעוות שניתן לשיחת הטלפון של השגריר עם מיז. פרסום שגרר אחריו מספר שאלות לא קטן היום.

ג. הידיעה של בליצר ב"פוסט" - זכחה לאזכור בראש מהדורות החדשות ברדיו אך מייד ירדה לטובת דבריו של סנטור אינויה שאמר כי הוא מקבל את הסברי ישראל. (אינויה, יש לזכור, מועמד לרכז את חקירת הקונגרס על ועדותיו כפי שעשה בתקופת ווטרגייט). עם זאת, הספור בודאי יגיע אלינו מהארץ בעתוני המחד עם ההכחשה שלנו ויזכה להמשך טיפול.

בקצרה, לבד מתחושת אי-נוחות הנובעת מהזרמים הרבים המאיימים לפרוץ החוצה אין, נכון להיום, צורך מיידי-הסברתי תקשורתי במאמץ הופעות או פעילות תקשורתית.

המלצתנו היא לא להמנע מהמקרופונים הנחקעים לפיהם ופניהם של פוליטיקאים אצלנו, אך להסתפק בקביעה הכללית של חזרה על ההודעה המפורטת שלנו. בהחלט כדאי להמנע מתדרוכים ובשלב זה מהופעות יזומות בתקשורת.

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מחנכ"ל. מצפ"א, מע"ת, רמ"ח-קט"ח. ניו יורק

3.12.86 חדרון דובר מחמ"ד ליום

MR. REDMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. One announcement: On behalf of the President, the Secretary of State today transmitted the 21st semi-annual report on the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to Senator Alphonse D'Amato, chairman of the commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This report, which covers April 1st, '86 to October 1st, '86 concentrates on Soviet and East European compliance with commitments undertaken in Helsinki and Madrid. Although the record of compliance varied among the Eastern states during the six-month period covered by the report, overall performance remained seriously flawed in the area of human rights and human contacts.

I've read you simply an extract from a longer press release, and you can pick that up, as well as copies of the 21st semi-annual report, in the press office after the briefing. Jim?

JIM ANDERSON (UPI): Does the State Department have any knowledge of a reported Swiss bank account in which funds from the United States and Saudi Arabia were co-mingled and made available to various resistance movements around the world?

MR. REDMAN: I guess we start off today where we've been on several occasions in the past few days, which is to say that there are a number of investigations, people looking into those kinds of questions. And as a consequence, they are not ones that I can help you with.

MR. ANDERSON: The stricture (?) that you've placed in the past, though, has been that you are unable to talk about the Iran arms deal. The question I'm just asking -- you may in fact be independent of that and independent of any profits or proceeds from the Iran arms deal -- does the State Department know anything about such a bank account?

MR. REDMAN: Once again, Jim, under whatever rubric you choose to put that, it's not something I can help you with.

Q Among those investigations, is the State Department attempting to find out about these many subjects that -- important parts of American foreign policy -- that it does not seem to have been privy to? Such as funding for the rebels in Afghanistan?

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MR. REDMAN: Let me just say in a very general sense what I have just said again. That there are a number of groups, a number of investigations underway. Those are the appropriate forum for these particular questions. They are being addressed there, and beyond that, I am just not in a position to help you on those questions.

Q But Chuck, away from the whole issue, I mean, do you -- you don't encourage some countries to support the Afghan resistance? I mean, the official policy of the United States?

MR. REDMAN: On what question?

Q Do you encourage some countries to support the Afghan resistance, or not?

MR. REDMAN: You can refer to the record, and you've been coming to these briefings for any number of months, if not years --

Q But can you refresh our minds?

MR. REDMAN: -- and as a consequence, you know what our position has been on the question of Afghanistan. And that's there for you to see, and it's been there for quite some time.

Q But my question -- have you encouraged some Middle Eastern countries to support the Afghan resistance?

MR. REDMAN: I can't help you on that.

Q (off-mike)

MR. REDMAN: At this point, I still don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q Chuck, do you have any plans, or does the United States government have any plans for sending a United States envoy to the Arabian Gulf States to clear matters, after this whole thing -- Iran arms sale --

MR. REDMAN: I don't know anything concerning any potential envoys, as of now.

Q You've been in contact -- have they been in contact with you?

MR. REDMAN: I have said any number of times that through diplomatic channels, we've been talking to friends and allies around the world. That certainly includes in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere.

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Q What is the status of the AIDS testing for State Department employees -- that proposal, whatever it is? Has it changed since whenever it was we talked about it last week?

MR. REDMAN: No, it hasn't changed at all.

MR. ANDERSON: Do you have a current assessment of what's going on in Lebanon? And particularly -- there is a report out of Lebanon today that there is an Israeli armored force about to move into the southern part of the country. Do you know anything about that?

MR. REDMAN: On that report, I don't have anything. Concerning more generally what we've seen concerning fighting that's been taking place in Sidon and Tyre and Beirut, the United States strongly condemns the continued violence in and around Sidon, Tyre and Beirut. This fighting must stop. We call on all parties to the conflict to work actively for a settlement, which would return the rule of law to all parts of Lebanon. No short-term political objective can justify this violence and destruction which threatens to rob its victims, both Lebanese and Palestinian, of any hope for a peaceful future.

Q Chuck, Evans and Novak, citing conservatives, are saying here with even greater unanimity that Secretary of State George Shultz should go. Any comment?

MR. REDMAN: I've described the status of the Secretary last week --

Q Does that stand today?

MR. REDMAN: And that certainly stands.

Q Chuck, last week you told us that the US would be consulting with its allies on Syria. Can you give us any update on those consultations?

MR. REDMAN: I can't give you anything specific. Those consultations have taken place, as I said they would, first of all in diplomatic channels. Ambassador Brimmer, who's our person in charge of counter-terrorism, will continue those consultations. And we expect him to be consulting with European allies during the coming week. I should say not this week, but next week.

Q We asked you last week about any unilateral actions the US might take. Are any considered at this point?

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MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything further on future actions.

Q Is Ambassador Brimmer traveling with Secretary Shultz? Is that part of the consultation?

MR. REDMAN: There will be parts of the trip, particularly when we're in Brussels, where Ambassador Brimmer will be present. But he also has a separate itinerary before and after.

Q Where will he be going before that? Can you tell us?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have the whole itinerary at this point; Western Europe at the start anyway.

Q Chuck, on the follow-up on the Lebanon statement, can you characterize the Syrian role in these fightings? Do you have any characterization?

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't.

Q Has the process of thinning (?) the embassies of Syria and in your embassy in Damascus been completed, reduction of the diplomatic corps there?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have a status report that would indicate whether or not it's been completed. I'd leave it with what I said last week, that it's underway.

Q When you call on the parties to reach some sort of settlement, are you calling the Palestinians to participate in such a settlement? Or could you be more specific on that?

MR. REDMAN: No, I can't be more specific. Ralph?

RALPH BEGLEITER (CNN): Do you have any readout on the meeting this week between Secretary Shultz and Israeli Ambassador Rosen?

MR. REDMAN: No.

MR. BEGLEITER: Do you know whether Secretary Shultz received a letter from the Israeli deputy prime minister, Foreign Minister Peres, or from Prime Minister Shamir?

MR. REDMAN: Are we still talking about that meeting? Are we talking in some other context?

MR. BEGLEITER: At that meeting.

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MR. REDMAN: I don't know of any. I just don't know, Ralph.

MR. BEGLEITER: Could you take that question, or look into it and see --

MR. REDMAN: No, Ralph, we don't, as you know, give you a full readout of every bilateral meeting that the Secretary of State has.

MR. BEGLEITER: Right. Well, I wasn't asking for a full readout, although of course that would be very welcome; but any kind of readout, such as whether a meeting was held and whether a letter was --

MR. REDMAN: Yes, a meeting was held.

Q (Inaudible.)

MR. REDMAN: You can check with the press office.

Q Do you have any response to the Post piece saying that chances for an arms agreement are pretty nil?

MR. REDMAN: Once again, that's your characterization of the Post piece. I don't know if the Post wants to rebuff that or not. Is anyone here? John is here.

Q (Inaudible.)

MR. REDMAN: I'd just say that following-on on the things I've said before here and other administration officials have said elsewhere, that the path to meaningful agreements is not an easy one. It's what we've always said. Reaching such agreements requires a lot of tough bargaining, patience, perseverance. That's the manner that we approach these negotiations. And, I guess in short then if you ask, "are we pessimistic?" the answer's "no."

Q Do you have anything to go with increasing Soviet indications that as of, after January 1st they will drop their nuclear test moratorium?

MR. REDMAN: No, I don't really have anything that would lead me one way or another in being able to evaluate those particular signals that you've seen.

Q Chuck, (inaudible) again. Does the US object to the return of the PLD to Lebanon?

MR. REDMAN: What's your question, exactly?

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Q Does the US object to the return of the PLO to Lebanon?

MR. REDMAN: Concerning the question of the PLO re-establishing itself, as some reports have claimed, in Lebanon: We've seen these reports for several years that Palestinian fighters have been taking advantage of continued civil strife in Lebanon to attempt to return there. We don't have any hard information on the numbers. No increase in the number of armed elements of whatever group can contribute either to the increased security of civilians or to a peaceful solution in Lebanon. We continue to support Lebanese efforts to re-establish political dialogue leading to political reform and to the restoration of the effective authority of the legally constituted Lebanese government throughout the country. Such efforts are the only acceptable means of achieving a settlement sought by the vast majority of the Lebanese people.

Q But what you say now does not really square with what you said earlier. You cited the fighting in Sidon, Tyre and Beirut, and the fighting is concentrated between Palestinians and Lebanese. Now you are calling Lebanese to reach a settlement and earlier you called on the parties fighting to reach a settlement. Whom do you want?

MR. REDMAN: We call on those to fighting to stop fighting. We call on all Lebanese to participate in this effort to reach a peaceful solution.

Q In otherwords, the Palestinians are recognized as a main party in the Lebanese settlement?

MR. REDMAN: You can go over what I've said. You want to read a lot of implications into what I've said. I'm not going to participate in that. What I've said is where we stand on the question of Lebanon.

Q Chuck, why you are ignoring the Syrian role in all this? You are only saying the Palestinian-Lebanese, what about the Syrian role in this?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything on the Syrian role.

Q Chuck, there were reports this morning that ten children died because of the fact that medical care and food was not being able to reach the refugee camps and everything.

Do you have any expression of concern about the (inaudible) of these people, aside from the fighting that --

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MR. REDMAN: I have to say, first of all, I haven't seen that report, so I have no way to evaluate that report. In a general sense, you know, we deplore the loss of life under whatever circumstances.

Q Do you have anything on reports that a chemical weapons supply is in Syria?

MR. REDMAN: We have expressed in the past our concern that Syria may have a chemical weapons capability. For that reason, we announced on June 5th that we were extending to Syria controls on certain chemical exports useful in chemical weapons production.

Q Can the US do anything to help Israel to counteract the threat?

MR. REDMAN: To help Israel to counteract the threat?

Q The threat from the chemical weapons from Syria.

MR. REDMAN: I just can't help you on that one.

Q Do you have anything about the chemical weapons in Israel, since you have some information on Syria?

MR. REDMAN: I don't --

Q Touche.

Q Can you look at it?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have anything on it.

Q Can you look at it?

Q Do you have an estimate on the Iran-Iraq -- (off-mike) -- the Iranians stepping up their forces at the border?

MR. REDMAN: Don't have anything.

Q Do you have anything about the situation in Surinam, and especially on reports that the government is being advised by 200 Libyan military advisors there?

MR. REDMAN: No.

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Q What is the status of the proposal or the plan to sell Honduras American or Israeli fighter planes?

MR. REDMAN: I don't know of any change, beyond what we've given you in the past when that story had come up.

Q Is the US reassessing any of its policies towards other areas of the world, in the wake of the Iranian chaos?

MR. REDMAN: I can't help you on that kind of question.



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א. הנשיא והקונגרס

בהודעתו בטלויזיה אתמול (2) אמר הנשיא רייגן שהוא מכיר ומבין את הקניין של הקונגרס בכל הפרשה, ושקונגרס רודאי ירצה לחקור במה שקרה. הבירורים הקונגרסיבוליים צריכים להמשיך אך בכדי לא לפגוע בעבודתם חטוטפת של המחוקקים הוא מפצין בקונגרס לשקול הוקמה "מחניזם" (ביחוד - י.ל.) שיאגד את הבירורים שנעשים ע"י הוועדות השונות. הודעה זו התקבלה בכרחה ע"י גורמים שונים בגבעה, אם כי יו"ר הוועדה החודיעין בסנט דייב דורנברגר הודיע שהוועדה לא תירחע (WILL NOT BE DETERRED) ותמשיך בחקירתה.

ב. "וועדה נבחרת" מטעם הקונגרס

עולה מדברי הנשיא הנ"ל שהוא יעדיף הקמת וועדה נבחרת (SELECT COMMITTEE) אחידה מטעם שני גמי הקונגרס, כפי שמציע גם מנהיג הרוב בסנט, בוב דול. אולם נראה שהספיקר המיועד בבית הנבחרים, ג'ייס רייט, מתנגד לזאת, היות ואינו רוצה להצר את פעולותיהן של הוועדות שכבר התחילו להתעניין בהיבטים השונים של הפרשה. תוך התחשבות ברייט, מנהיג הרוב המיועד בסנט, בוב בירד, מכריז בתשובה לשאלוח שלדעתו חוקם "וועדה נבחרת" אך ורק בסנט. בשיחה אגב נושא אחר אישר לי היום המורשה סטיב סולארז שכל הנראה כך יהיה, בעוד שרייט יתן לוועדת החוץ בבינו הנבחרת להיות הוועדה המובילה בגוף זה.

ג. וועדה הוודיעין בסנט

אתמול (2) פוינדקסטר לא חופיע בפני הוועדה כמתוכנן. במקום זאת, נפגש קצרות עם יו"ר הוועדה ובכיר המיעוט (דורנברגר וליייה) ומסר שלא הספיק להתכונן כראוי. בצאתו

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 סמי פברק...

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מנשנוי הוועדה אמר פוינדקסטר לאנשי התקשורת שיופיע נשני הוועדה "IT'S GOOD TIME" (SUB-POENA) עמדה זו של פוינדקסטר הרגיוח חברי הוועדה שהחליטו להוציא צוו (SUB-POENA) על חנת לחייב אותו להעיד בפניהם היום (3).

2. בינתיים שלח ליאונרד גרמנט, פרקליטו של בוב מספרליין, מכתב לוועדה והתלונן על צורת הטיפול בשולחו (שתחקר ביום ב' במשן שבע שעות רצופות). כייכ קבל על "שני סנטורים" שלא שמרו על כללי הוטוריות (הכוונה לדורנברגר ולאגלטון שדברו עם מתקשורת לאחר השמיעות ביום ב', כפי שדווח בטלנו הנייל).

3. מנתיגוח הרפובליקאים בקונגרס והנשיא

1. לאחר נטישה עם הנשיא אתנול, מסר טרנט לוט (מצליף המיעוט נביה"נ) שהזהירו אוו הנשיא שיבולחו לקדם חקיקה שנוגעת גם לעניני פנים וגם לעניני חוץ במשן השנתיים הבאות עלולה להסגע אם לא יפעל נחרצות, ואם לא יהיו שינויים פרטובליים נוספים. יו"ו וועדת החוץ נטנט, ריצ'ארד לוגר, מצטרף בפומבי לדעה זו, ולא זו בלוד שהוא קורא להדחתו של דונלד ריגן אלא שהוא סבור שהצוות הנכיד ושלמותו חייב להיות UNDER REVIEW (רמיזה ל"קייסי ולשולץ, להערכת עתון ניו יורק טיימס).

2. המנתיגים הרפובליקאים אמורים לויגש גם היום (3) עם הנשיא להמשר תחייצעויותיהט, ולסקול ויצעחו של בוב דול לקיים מושב מיוחד של הקונגרס (בייוחת הנשיא).

3/5
 י/ו
 למדו

* 1708

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* תאריך : 08.12.86

* ** נכנס

* סודי ביותר

* דף 1

* עותק 4 מתוך 4

* **
* **
* **

* חוזם: 1708/12

* אל: המשרד

* מ-: נוש'נר: 118, תא: 031286, זח: 1630, דח: מ, טג: טב

* נד: 6

* סודי ביותר/מידוי

* חר"ב

* ממנכל מדיני

* המורשה טיב סולארז ופרשת איראן - ניקדגואה : בהמשך

* לשיחותינו

* 1. התקשרתי עם סטנלי רות', עוזרו הראשי של סולארז (שהמורשה
* ביקשני לעמוד עמו בקשר) ועל פי הנחיותיך מסרתי שבעוד
* אנו מעריכים מאד את פנייתו של סולארז וכו', השר בדעה
* שהביקור ** PREMATURE **.

* 2. רות' קיבל את ההודעה בהבנה. העיר שסולארז מעריך את
* השר, ויש להניח שיקבל את דעתו. עם זאת שאל כיצד נגיב
* אם בכל זאת יחליט סולארז לנסוע ארצה מחר. עניתי שלהערכתך
* הוא יגרום למבוכה (EMBARRASSMENT)

* גדולה. מצידו הוסיף רות' שלבשלעצמו הוא כבר ייעץ לסולארז
* נגד הביקור כי להערכתו יתכן מאד (בייחוד לאור סיפור
* בלוצר בעתון "ג'רוסלס פוסט" מהיום) שה"חדשות
* מישראל לא תהיינה טובות" - ומדוע לסולארז להסתכן
* במעולה שאולי תביא לתוצאה ההפוכה ממה שברצונו להשיג?

* 3. כ"כ מסרתי את תשובתנו למייק ורן - דודן אשר פנה
* אף הוא (כפי שמסרתי לך טלפונית) ושאל באם נסכים לקבל
* קבוצה קטנה של עוזרים בכירים שיבקשו להפגש עם המעורבים
* במרשה. ורן - דודן הודה על המטר, בציינו שהיו רבים
* מקרב צוות העוזרים לרועדת החוץ שטברו שאין זו שעת
* כושר לביקור בארץ, ומוטב שימתינו עד שיתבהרו העובדות.

מס' 25 יומיו 2597

2070

ס ו ק ס ס נ ר ר

ד...1...מחור...2. דפים

סווג בסחוני...קנד?

דחיות...מגדג-טפל...

תאריך וז"ח. 1500. 3. דצמ 86

מס' פנק

1/2

115

המשרד

אל:

אל :- משפט - לשמנכ"ל

ייצוא טכנולוגיה

בהמשך לשלי 84

3.72

בעוברי באגף המדיני - צבאי מסר לי איש המחלקה הרשימה של המשתתפים באנגלית, כולל תואריהם הרשמיים.

לידיעתכם, יחד עם היוז מגיע גם אונאטה וישתחף בכל הסיורים שהיוז מתכנן.

עוד לידיעתכם מטרת נסיעת ליץ' להודו היא לדאוג להגנה לגבי שבכוונת ארה"ב לייצא להודו. לדבריו המו"מ יתנהל עם משרד החוץ ההודי ומשתתפים גם אנשי משרד ההגנה. המשרד לסחר חוץ הוא שותף זוטר בענין.

מתני

CONFIDENTIAL

MS 2/2

2. THE REVISED U.S. DELEGATION LIST FOR THE STRATEGIC TRADE MOU TALKS FOR DECEMBER 9-11 IN JERUSALEM IS AS FOLLOWS:

- G. PHILIP HUGHES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, HEAD OF DELEGATION
- THEODORE W. WU, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR EXPORT ENFORCEMENT
- WILLARD WORKMAN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND POLICY DIVISION, COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
- COL. ROBERT TURNER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- RAFAEL LOPEZ, CHIEF, MUNITIONS CONTROL BRANCH, CUSTOMS SERVICE
- EMIL CASTRO, OFFICE OF EAST-WEST TRADE, STATE DEPARTMENT
- ANDRES D. ONATE, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS OFFICER, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT
- QUINCY KROSBY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, OFFICE OF THE COUNSELOR, STATE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Assistant Secretary G. Philip Hughes will arrive in Tel Aviv via PA 114 at 1610 on December 6.

[Handwritten mark]

CONFIDENTIAL

ט ר פ ס
דף... מתוך 13 דפים
סוג בטחוני... גלוי
דחיפות... מיידי
תאריך וז"ח... 1600 3דצמבר86
מס' מברק

אל: המשרד

1/13

112

אל: ממ"ד/פריפריה

איראן , לשלכם 95



להלן המסמכים המבוקשים.

סכרסאג האנוני לצי

יוסי גל

JJ 0111 YA
 021112 EGNXBD
 REQUEST PERMISSION TO OPERATE CARGO CHARTER FLIGHT TEL AVIV
 TEHERAN 04 JUN STP OUR REFERENCE IS DUDO STP PLEASE CONFIRM
 YOUR AUTHORITY TO WALDEN BRITISH MIDLAND AIRWAYS DERBY EGNXBD

ZCZCFCA 124 021150 AB
 JJ 0111 YA
 021112 EGN XBD
 REQUEST PERMISSION TO OPERATE
 CARGO CHARTER FLIGHT TEL AVIV
 TEHERAN 04 JUN STP OUR
 REFERENCE IS DUDO STP PLEASE
 CONFIRM YOUR AUTHORITY TO
 WALDEN BRITISH MIDLAND AIR
 WAYS DERBY EGNXBD



Document 9:
Israeli entry stamp in Sadegh Tabatabai's passport (lower inset is an enlargement of this stamp).

112
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پیامت مجلس

شماره ۱۸۱۲۸.۱
تاریخ ۱۳۶۲/۱/۱۰

شماره ۱۸۱۲۸
تاریخ ۱۳۶۲/۱/۱۰

پخشانه به کلیه وزارتخانه ها ، سازمانها ، موسسات دولتی و
تبادهای انقلاب اسلامی و نیروهای نظامی و انتظامی

پیرو پخشانه شماره ۱۸۱۲۸ مورخ ۱۳۶۲/۱/۱۰ در خصوص عدم معامله با
آمریکای جهانفروار بند ۲ پخشانه مزبور پیش از الحاق و ایلا میگردد .
بند ۲ - در شرایط اضطراری که تهیه کالای مشابه مورد نظر از کشورهای دیگر امکان
پذیر نباشد و عدم خرید باعث ضرر فاحشه ملت را فراهم کند کالای مذکور با اجازه
کسب زیر مسئول از بازار دیگر کشور ها خریداری و اینگونه موارد بایش توسط وزیر
مربوطه هر ماه به نخست وزیر کتبا گزارش شود .

میر حسین موسوی

وزیر امور خارجه و امور بین الملل

وزارت امور خارجه و امور بین الملل
شماره ۱۳۵-
تاریخ ۱۳۶۲/۱/۱۰

وزیر امور خارجه و امور بین الملل

وزیر امور خارجه و امور بین الملل
شماره ۱۳۵-
تاریخ ۱۳۶۲/۱/۱۰

In the Name of the Most High

Number 1812901
Date July 6, 1983

Memorandum to all ministries, agencies, government institutions,
Islamic Revolutionary organs, and military and security forces

Pursuant to memorandum 18194 dated June 25, 1983 concerning
prohibition of trade with world-devouring America, paragraph 2 of
the said memorandum is hereby presented for your information and
abidance.

Paragraph 2 - Under emergency conditions when the procurement from
other countries of a product similar to that desired is not
possible and failure to purchase would cause excessive loss to the
nation, the said product should, with the written permission of
the responsible minister, be purchased on the market of other
countries. Such cases should be reported in writing each month by
the relevant minister to the Prime Minister.

Mir Hussein Mousavi
Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran

4409...July 11, 1983

Document 10:
Khomeini's Prime Minister desperate for arms.

112
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13

موضوع: دستورالعمل جهت افراجه
 به فرماندهی گردگان
 شماره: ۵۹/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 تاریخ: ۵۹/۳/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 از طرف: فرماندهی و تدارکات نیروی هوایی جمهوری اسلامی ایران
 به: فرماندهی گردگان
 جهت: اجرای دستورالعمل
 شماره: ۵۹/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 در خصوص: افراجه گردگان
 در تاریخ: ۵۹/۳/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 در محل: گردگان

موضوع: دستورالعمل جهت افراجه
 به فرماندهی گردگان
 شماره: ۵۹/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 تاریخ: ۵۹/۳/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 از طرف: فرماندهی و تدارکات نیروی هوایی جمهوری اسلامی ایران
 به: فرماندهی گردگان
 جهت: اجرای دستورالعمل
 شماره: ۵۹/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 در خصوص: افراجه گردگان
 در تاریخ: ۵۹/۳/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 در محل: گردگان

موضوع: دستورالعمل جهت افراجه
 به فرماندهی گردگان
 شماره: ۵۹/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 تاریخ: ۵۹/۳/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 از طرف: فرماندهی و تدارکات نیروی هوایی جمهوری اسلامی ایران
 به: فرماندهی گردگان
 جهت: اجرای دستورالعمل
 شماره: ۵۹/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 در خصوص: افراجه گردگان
 در تاریخ: ۵۹/۳/۳۱/۳۳۰۲/۰۱/۲۰۲/۳۳
 در محل: گردگان

گردگان محرمانه

1304/01/203/192

In the Name of The Most High

From: Deputy of Logistics Command of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran for repairs and maintenance at the armory of Iran
 To: The list of recipients
 Re: Effacement of markings on weaponry
 November 22, 1980

Pursuant to directive number 59/4/31/1604/01/204/63, it has been noticed recently that some arms have markings and signs of some non-Iranian countries and organizations which, from a foreign policy standpoint, is not to the benefit of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

You are requested to direct that necessary action be taken to Direct efface all such signs and markings from the weapons and other articles in accordance and by use of the method specified in the above-mentioned directive.

Deputy of Logistics Command of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran for repairs and maintenance Command Colonel Rezaifar.

copies to the list of recipients for execution as described above.

Head of Logistics, Colonel

SECRET

cc: Transportation Group Command (battalions: 606 - 607 - 609 - 610 - 611) Driving Instruction School - Pasargi - Logistics Command - Third level transportation section of HQ - Engineering post - Sentry Section - Central terminals post command - Jolfa - Andimeshk - Bandar Imam Khomeini

112 $\frac{7}{13}$

7/13

		Flughafen		Frankfurt Main AG	
		OPS Plan			
		Zentrale Verkehrsplanung			
MITTWOCH, 18. APRIL 1984					
FLT.-NR.	FAA	TYPE	STA	ROUTE (INHOUD)	STD TO
IB 412 / 413			B727 1240	WCH WLE WCH	0325 WCH
TU 744 / 745			B727 1240	TUH TUN	1330 TUN
IR 721 / 720			B743 1245	YHR YHR	1400 TNU
UL 502 / 562			L101 1405	AMS AMS	1515 AUM
LY 357 / 1358			B767 1420	TLV TLV	1550 TLV
TZ 431 / 432	SP/SP		B737 1425	TLV TLV	1550 TLV
LT.-NR.	FAA	TYPE	STA	FROM ROUTE (INHOUD)	STD TO
SA 251 / 251	PC/PC		B747 1410	BRU BRU	1725 SID
CC 435 / 438			B747 1410	CPH CPH	1705 STO
LY1822 / 1822	C / F		B747 0120	TLV TLV	2215 CGH
LH4172	C /		B737 0125	BCH WCH	
LH6768 / 6768	H / H		B727 0125	MAN MAN	
LH6662	C /		B707 1720	YHR YHR NYC	
PZ 801 / 800			B707 1725	BRU BRU MAD REC ASU	1550 BRU
SA 251 / 251	PC/PC		B747 1725	4 / SID SID JND	1410 BRU

Document 11:

Part of a telex from Frankfurt Airport, related to flights on Wednesday April 18, 1984, shows that Israeli, South African and Iranian planes have landed at about the same time. The authorities of the Khomeini regime and officials at Tehran's Mehrabad Airport were fully informed about the landing times beforehand.

112
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Transfer of Arms

• Three Israeli airline companies—El Al, Cal Cargo Airlines and Sun d'Or—have continuously shipped to Frankfurt weapons purchased by the Khomeini regime. El Al mainly uses planes with registration numbers as follows:

- 4X-AXD
Plate no: 747-C
- 4X-AXC
Plate no: 747-C
- 4X-AXZ
Plate no: 747-C

A notable point is that the numbers on all Israeli planes start with 4X, and this remains unchanged even if the aircraft is painted in a different color and bears the flag of a different airline. For example, the registration number of one jet (4X-AXZ) remained unchanged even when it was hired by Colombia last year and carried the flag of the Colombian airlines, Avianca.

In addition to the above three planes, El Al has also allocated three Boeing 707 cargo planes to carry arms for the regime. These bear the following registration numbers:

- 4X-ATX
Plate no: B-707-C
- 4X-ATY
Plate no: B-707-C
- 4X-ATD
Plate no: B-707-C

An El Al Boeing 767 cargo plane, 4X-EAC, also carries arms for the regime, as do two Boeing 747 cargo planes, registered as 4X-AXH (Plate no: B-747-C) and 4X-AXF (Plate no: B-747-C), owned by Cal Cargo Airlines, a private Israeli company.

A 707 cargo plane 4X-ATR (Plate no: B-707-C) owned by the Israeli airline company, Sun d'Or, is also used for this purpose.

It should be noted that the above are not the only Israeli aircraft involved in the operation, but that other Israeli cargo planes are also constantly in use.

• The Khomeini regime uses all its passenger and cargo flights, including Iran Air Boeing 707 and 747 cargo planes and 747 passenger jets, for carrying arms and other purchases. Among these are two 707's and two 747's owned by Iran Air, plus two Air Force 747's which were converted into cargo planes for carrying weapons after being damaged by Iraqi air raids on Iranian airports in 1980.

It is interesting that two Iranian planes—one cargo plane and one passenger jet—arrive at Frankfurt to meet each arms-laden Israeli aircraft. This is to avoid any delay in the continuous flow of arms for the war fronts should the cargo plane fail to arrive on time. The airliner would immediately take the maximum volume of arms it can carry.

• It has been arranged for the Israeli and Iranian aircraft to arrive simultaneously at Frankfurt Airport in order to minimize the time taken for the consignment to be loaded onto the Iranian plane.

The flights take place regularly on Mondays and Wednesdays each week. But on many occasions the two regimes have arranged additional flights on Fridays and Saturdays too.

It often happens that the planes arrive within half an hour of each other. A brief look at the daily schedule of flights to Frankfurt Airport reveals how Iranian and Israeli planes have been arranged to arrive simultaneously. This is shown, for instance, by the schedule for Wednesday April 18, 1984, which includes the arrival time of a South African Airways jet laden with arms for Iran.

large military crates built of wood and metal,

• Special precautions overcome the fears of Iranian authorities over the exposure of their activities. Investigations and the reports received have revealed that the Iranian and Israeli aircraft are parked in a very remote part of the airport: zone B5, Gate 43 and zone B45, Gate 30 where the public cannot see them.

The planes are usually parked close together behind tall buildings or reinforced concrete walls. The consignments are then transferred from one plane to the other while most pas-

112 9/13

sengers at Frankfurt Airport remain ignorant about the matter (photographs 1 and 2). Photograph 3 shows the Iranian and Israeli planes parked right beside each other while arms are being transferred to the Iranian plane.

• Immediately after the planes have parked in a remote part of the airport, cargo wagons (photograph 4) transfer the arms to the Iran Air plane. Investigations and observations have shown that most of the consignments airlifted by Israel contain weapons and ammunition ordered by the Guards Corps.

The Israeli planes leave the airport once loading is completed, whereas the Iranian planes usually have to fly out according to schedule the next day.

• Throughout the war, the Khomeini regime has received all kinds of arms and spare parts from an Israeli company called Motorola, which also used to supply the Shah's regime. Among other equipment, the company has sold Iran spares for Bell helicopters, F4, F5 and F14 warplanes, Hawk, Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles, and also spares for radio equipment used by the Guards Corps and the armed forces.

• El Al has ten flights a week to New York and Chicago. The planes usually load in these cities and then fly to Amsterdam and Frankfurt. On their arrival from the U.S., these aircraft have often transferred their load to an Iranian plane parked alongside.

weapons

• Iran also secretly purchases arms from South Africa. The stage is once again Frankfurt Airport and the same mechanism is used.

On Wednesday, April 18, 1984, for example, an Iran Air Boeing 747 was loaded with arms carried by an El Al plane (4X-EAA), flight 842, and by a South African Airways (S.A.A.) 747 cargo plane. The latter came to park beside an Iran Air plane and then transferred its load—

especially for carrying arms, measuring 6 ft. by 3 ft. by 3 ft.

• On Friday April 20, 1984, a 747 plane belonging to the Flying Tigers Airlines, transferred some of its cargo to an Iran Air 747 cargo plane, flight 4704. This took place after an El Al 767 cargo plane had finished loading its arms consignment to the Iranian plane. The Flying Tigers plane (photograph 6) later flew to Tel-Aviv.

On this day, the regime received 35 tons of arms, mostly contained in wooden boxes measuring 5 ft. by 2 ft. by 3 ft., and with special military packaging. On this was written: From Jamaica to New York to Tehran. It seems that an Iran Air label was also stuck on them at Frankfurt.

• The entire load of all Iran Air cargo planes, according to their manifest, is supposed to consist of one-day-old chicks! However, even if any chicks are really carried on some flights they do not make up more than 2 tons of the aircrafts' 90-ton loading capacity. The rest of the load are weapons and spare parts. One can hardly believe that boxes with military markings in photograph 5 are carrying chicks for the army's logistical command center!

• International regulations bar airliners from carrying more than a quarter of a pound of explosives, and even this small amount must not have a detonator. Also, on a passenger flight, the explosives must be separated from passengers by at least three rows of seats if permission for carrying this small amount is to be granted.

But Khomeini's agents, unconcerned about the people's safety, sometimes load passenger-carrying jets with up to 30 tons of explosives. The reason is plain enough: as cargo flights are susceptible to delays, the regime is doing its best not to interrupt the flow of arms to the front. □

112 10/13




Photo 1.2:
Aircraft belonging to the Khomeini regime and Israel (tails visible in picture) during transfer of arms and ammunition shipment at two remote buildings on the outskirts of Frankfurt Airport in West Germany.

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


Photo 3:
 Friday, April 13, 1984, Frankfurt Airport: Center. Iran Air jumbo jet flight number 4704. Short distance to the rear, a Boeing 707 cargo plane belonging to Israel's El-Al airlines, registration number 4X-ATX and flight number 841. Picture taken as Israeli Boeing was unloading the regime's cargo.




Photo 4:
 Saturday, April 14, 1984, Frankfurt Airport: Cargo wagons empty shipment for Khomeini from Israeli El-Al airplane for transfer to the Iranian plane parked nearby behind another building.

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


Photo 5:
Frankfurt Airport: Cargo ready for shipment to Iran. Some crates bear the following information: "Tehran, Pirouzi Street. Logistical Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force: parts and equipment for PC-6 aircraft."

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


Photo 6:
Friday April 20. 1984. Frankfurt Airport: A Flying Tigers
plane unloads its cargo here for delivery to Iran Air 747
Boeing jet.

ס נ ר י
דפוס...!... מחור...!... דפים

אל: המשרד

סוג בסחונני סודי. בקנתה

דחיות.....

תאריך וזיחה.....

מס' פנקס.....

103

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אל : מנכ"ל מדינה, רמשיין, מנכ"ל בטחון

מא"צ עם המשנה לשר המשפטים - Burns - הפגישה ביוזמתו.
השתתף גם מרק ריצ'רד.

- 1) החקירות המתנהלות נגדנו מטעם המכס. עושים מאמצים לזרז ההליכים. ברור היה לי בשיחה שבעוד שריצ'רד מהמחמירים הרי שברנס איננו משוכנע שהחקירה מתנהלת כראוי - לא אמר זאת במפורש - אך הדבר בלט במהלך הויכוח שהיה ביננו בקשר לצורך לקביעת - Guidelines. לדעת ריצ'רד עצם הדיון Guidelines רק יעורר רושם שאנחנו רוצים למנוע חקירות. סוכם בנושא זה - שברנס יראה את החומר ויחזור אלי.
- 2) נושא פולרד. במהלך הדיון על ה-Guidelines ציינתי - והדגשתי שזוהי דעתי האישית-שמתקבל הרושם שגם כאשר אנחנו משתפים פעולה אנו זוכים לביקורת: במקרה פולרד עשינו דבר ללא תקדים שעה ששתפנו אתם פעולה ואחרי מלות תודה באה ביקורת. על כך השיבו לי שמשד המשפטים לא האשים אף פעם את ישראל - באחריות לכך שהאנשים שתשאלו לא דברו אמת. הוא הדגיש כמו כן שלא ברור להם מדוע אנחנו תמיד מבקשים חסינות לפני שנענים לשיתוף פעולה - הם לא יכולים להסכים לעקרון הזה - ומכאן, לדעתו, אחת הבעיות המרכזיות שלנו.

3) בנושא המעמד הקונסולרי. גם כאן בקש Burns לראות את החומר - ולנסות לקדם את העניין. היות ש...
אני... אולי...
מ. רוזן

שמירה, אמת, איכות

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...מס' מבר...

אל: המשרד

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אל : מלפ"א

שוחחתי עם מרפי שמסר לי שהמפגש בלונדון ידון בשלושה נושאים:

1) לבנון (2) ההליך השלום (3) טרור. הוחלט על קיומו מאחר ומאז פברואר לא התקיים מפגש כנ"ל. סכמנו שנפגש עם טובו לכאן.

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ס. רונן

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שגרירות ישראל - רוסינגטון

אל: המשרד, בטחון

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אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת

יועץ שהביט לתקשורת, אה"ן/קשה"

ארה"ב-איראן-ישראל

להלן ספרו המלא של ג'והן וולקוט ביום ב- WSJ

ערוכות

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1986

U.S. Is Said To Have Made Hostage Offer

Plan Called for Parts to Iran, \$2 Million Ransom, Swap Of Prisoners, Sources Say

By JOHN WALCOTT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Reagan administration tried to win the freedom of an Israeli soldier and the American hostages in Lebanon last May by offering a swap of some 300 Lebanese Shiite prisoners, a \$2 million ransom and a sale of military spare parts to Iran, sources said.

The deal collapsed when pro-Iranian militiamen in Lebanon refused to release the kidnapped Israeli soldier, the sources said yesterday.

Israeli officials then balked at releasing the Shiite captives, who were held by an Israeli ally in southern Lebanon. The ransom, to be delivered at sea off Cyprus, was never picked up, but the Iranians did claim the spare parts, administration sources said.

The complex arrangement suggests that the administration's efforts to free the hostages in Lebanon weren't confined to selling arms to Iran. It also indicates that some of the efforts directly contradicted Mr. Reagan's oft-stated policy of not negotiating with terrorists, not paying ransom for hostages, and pressuring other governments to follow suit.

Some elements of the plan have been disclosed over the past few weeks. But it wasn't apparent that the delivery of arms to Iran last May and a Reagan administration request to Texas billionaire H. Ross Perot for ransom money were part of a large, concerted effort to free the hostages.

'No One Knew of It'

Asked about the plan yesterday, White House spokesman Daniel Howard said: "If it happened, according to the National Security Council, no one knew of it, and it certainly was not authorized."

State Department spokesman Charles Redman said the failed plan contradicted U.S. policy, and added: "The United States strongly urges American companies and private citizens not to pay terrorists' ransom demands."

A spokesman for the Israeli Embassy in Washington yesterday declined to comment, saying it was too late in the day to reach officials in Israel for a response.

Some administration officials yesterday claimed that the aborted plan didn't violate U.S. policy because the money was provided by a private citizen, the arms were intended mostly to open channels to moderates in the Iranian government, and the Shiite prisoners were to be released in exchange for the captured Israeli.

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According to sources involved in the operation, the plan was worked out by Lt. Col. Oliver North, then a member of the National Security Council staff, with Israeli and Iranian officials. Under the plan, the pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon would release the four Americans and the Israeli at the same time Col. Antoine Lahad's Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army released the Shites.

Simultaneously, the sources said, representatives of a pro-Iranian terrorist group in Lebanon were to pick up \$2 million in cash provided by Mr. Perot, and the U.S. was to deliver a plane load of spare parts for Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and other weapons to Iran. The plane also carried former national security adviser Robert McFarlane and Col. North, who expected to meet top Iranian officials in Tehran.

Equipment Unloaded; No Hostages

Mr. McFarlane and Col. North flew to Iran from Israel May 28 on a plane loaded with cardboard boxes containing spare parts for the Iranian military. They believed the hostages would be free by the time they arrived in Tehran. But after they arrived, the Iranians unloaded the equipment and Mr. McFarlane called then-national security adviser John Poindexter and discovered no hostages had been freed.

Mr. McFarlane left the White House last December. Col. North was dismissed from his national security post last week and Adm. Poindexter stepped down at the same time.

Administration officials said the plan also called for Terry Walte, a lay representative of the Archbishop of Canterbury, to provide "cover" for the deal. Mr. Walte was to call on Col. Lahad, a Maronite Christian, with letters from Pope John Paul II and from Robert Runcie, the Archbishop of Canterbury, seeking the release of the Shiite captives on humanitarian and religious grounds.

Israeli officials had approved the release, informed sources said. Iranian officials promised Col. North that the American hostages and the Israeli soldier would be freed once Col. Lahad announced he would grant the two prelates' humanitarian request and the ransom and spare parts were delivered.



Some U.S. intelligence sources say the Iranians who arranged the deal had believed Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini was near death last spring, and those sources believe the deal may have collapsed when he suddenly recovered.

On several occasions, most recently last May, the Washington Post reported yesterday, Col. North asked Mr. Perot, the Texas billionaire, for ransom money to free the hostages.

Perot Provided Cash

Mr. Perot said in an interview yesterday that he gave \$2 million in cash to an employee who carried it to Cyprus in a suitcase. No one showed up to claim the money, Mr. Perot said. He also said the U.S. government has asked him for similar ransom money to win the release of hostages "on countless occasions" since 1968.

The sources said the failed plan was based partly on the administration's successful effort to free 39 hostages from a Trans World Airlines jetliner that was hijacked to Beirut in June 1985. Four of the Americans were held by the Hezbollah, or

Party of God, the same group that now holds Americans hostage in Lebanon.

The TWA hostages were freed after Israel agreed to release some 735 Lebanese prisoners, most of them Shites that it had seized during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

At the time, both Israeli and U.S. officials asserted that the American hostages had been freed unconditionally. They claimed that that no deal had been made linking the Americans' freedom to the phased release of Israel's Lebanese prisoners.

President Reagan thanked Syrian President Hafez Assad for his role in freeing the hostages. But informed sources said the four Americans held by the Hezbollah were released only after Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, intervened on their behalf.

Administration officials have said President Reagan approved U.S. arms sales to Iran last January in part to open channels to Mr. Rafsanjani and other presumed moderates in Tehran.



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מלוי המשרד, בטחון

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אל: מנכ"ל מדינה, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

ארה"ב-איראן-ישראל-קונטראס

להלן מה"ו ושינגטון פוסט" וה"נ"י טיימס" (3,12).

עתונות

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ARMS DEAL

Shamir Denies Israeli Role

Aide Acknowledges Contra Aid Requests

By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, Dec. 2—Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir today told an American visitor that Israel was approached several times to supply aid to the contra rebels of Nicaragua, but he said the government had "always refused to do so."

Shamir, speaking to Seymour Reich, president of B'nai B'rith International, did not say who had made the approaches, when they had occurred or what type of support had been requested, a spokesman for the prime minister said.

But an Israeli official later confirmed a local press report that Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, Benjamin Netanyahu, had made several attempts in recent years to persuade the government to provide aid to the contras. The Maariv newspaper said Netanyahu, who is a rising star in Shamir's rightist Likud political bloc, began those efforts while serving as an attache at the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

Meanwhile, Shamir, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres sought to head off a new political storm caused by President Reagan's statement in an interview with Time magazine that "another country"—identified later by White House officials as Israel—had funneled profits to the contras from secret U.S. arms sales to Iran.

All three leaders, who as a committee had approved Israel's role in serving as a conduit in the secret arms-for-hostages exchange between Washington and Tehran, strongly reiterated previous denials that Israel had handled any of the estimated \$42 million paid by Iran for the weapons, which included U.S. antiaircraft and antitank missiles and spare parts.

In the Time interview, published yesterday, Reagan said, "Another country was facilitating those sales of weapons systems. They then were overcharging and were apparently putting the money into bank accounts of the leaders of the contras. It wasn't us funneling money to them. This was another country."

Israeli officials and an arms dealer involved in setting up the Iran connection for the White House have contended Israel had nothing to do with the financial end of the arms sales. Official sources have insisted that the price for the weapons was set by an Iranian arms merchant, Manucher Ghorbanisar, who made financial arrangements, took a commission from the sales and deposited the profits into a Swiss bank account set up by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Officials here privately expressed dismay and anger over Reagan's statement, while spokesmen sought publicly to put the best light on it.

"I'm not so sure the president said what he wanted to say," said one official, adding that Reagan might have been misquoted and also that he had not named Israel.

Speaking on Israel Army radio, Shamir referred to the Reagan interview and his government's statement last week denying it had handled or funneled the contra funds. He said, "The statement that was issued in the name of President Reagan does not oblige Israel to change its statement, since this [statement] is the truth."

A spokesman for Shamir later said Shamir had instructed Meir Rosenne, Israel's ambassador to the United States, to contact Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Attorney General Edwin Meese III to restate the Israeli denial.

Rabin told parliament tonight that Israel "does not maintain contacts or ties with the rebels in Nicaragua, nor does it supply arms from here to them. Israel did not grant permission to any Israeli to assist, supply know-how or sell weapons from Israel to the rebels in Nicaragua."

"As to the rumors concerning the transfer of money to rebels fighting the regime of Nicaragua as a result of the Israeli aid to the United States in the transfer of American weapons to Iran," Rabin said, "I can do no more than repeat what was declared by the Israeli government: We did not know and we did not do it."

But Rabin's carefully worded statement appeared to leave several loopholes and did not address some of the reported possible channels of Israeli money and arms to the rebels.

The Washington Post reported Friday that Israel helped funnel several million dollars to the contras in 1984 at the behest of CIA Director William Casey. That money may have come from previous Israeli arms sales to Iran, sources in Washington said. Rabin's statement did not appear to rule out the possibility that Israel has provided financial aid at some point to the contras.

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Israeli Leader Rejects Hint by Reagan of Role in Aid to Contras

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Dec. 2 — Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir today publicly rejected President Reagan's apparent assertion that Israel helped to channel money to the Nicaraguan rebels.

Israeli officials were deeply disturbed by remarks attributed to President Reagan in an interview with Time magazine, in which Mr. Reagan suggested that an unnamed third country sold arms to Iran for a large profit and then knowingly put the excess cash in Swiss bank accounts controlled by the rebel leaders.

At first Israeli officials thought, and hoped, that the President was referring to Saudi Arabia. But after they ascertained from Israeli diplomats in the United States that he was referring to Israel, the Israeli officials sent a formal request for clarification from Washington late last night.

Then today, deviating from the policy Israel has followed up to now of commenting as little as possible on the Iran affair and seeking to avoid contradicting Washington, Mr. Shamir publicly rejected Mr. Reagan's remarks. This was precisely the kind of exchange Israel had hoped to avoid, but with his country's credibility with Congress and the American public on the

line, Mr. Shamir apparently felt that a clear and forthright denial was necessary.

Mr. Shamir was asked by reporters whether Israel would be investigating its role in the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, and a possible connection with money for the rebels, who are known as contras. He answered: "Israel has informed the United States Government and public that there is no connection between the Israeli Government and the contras. Israel has never helped the contras. The statement attributed to Reagan does not compel Israel to change its public stance. Israel's statements on this are the truth."

Nonetheless, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin has asked to see all documents related to Israeli shipments of American arms to Iran, a Defense Ministry official said today.

The official said that Mr. Rabin was "not conducting an investigation," but was trying both to centralize and piece together all Israeli paperwork related to the Iran affair.

"We are checking and centralizing all the information," said the Defense Ministry official. "We want to be able to piece together the whole picture."

One of the problems in trying to understand the Iran affair, in Israel at least, is that different actors were in-

involved in different aspects at different stages and virtually no one in the Israeli administration has a full and complete picture of Israeli involvement from beginning to end.

Mr. Rabin's move to centralize information may also have been in anticipation of an American request to interview those senior Israeli officials and private citizens who were involved with the United States in working out the arms transfers to Iran.

Israeli officials said they have already received some informal feelers from Washington regarding the possibility that American investigators would speak with Israeli officials and private citizens, particularly David Kimche, the former director general of the Foreign Ministry, Amiram Nir an adviser on terrorism, and Al Schwimmer and Yaacov Nimrodi, arms dealers, all of whom were involved with the affair at different stages.

The most confusing element in the situation remains the questions of exactly how Iran paid for its various arms deliveries and who handled the money. The Israeli Government insists that it did not profit in any way from the deals, and that its representatives did not handle any cash, let alone funnel it to the Nicaraguan contras.

According to an unconfirmed report in an Israeli newspaper, Yediot Ahar-

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not, "millions of dollars that the Khomeini regime paid for arms that it received from the United States and Israel were transferred to private accounts of some of the central religious leaders in Iran." This was apparently done in the form of kickbacks.

The paper, quoting Swiss sources and American diplomats, said that 15 to 20 percent of the money the Iranians paid for arms supplied to them was deposited in the accounts of religious figures and Iranian Government officials who had been involved in the negotiations with the Americans and Israelis.

"This fact explains the 'disappearance' of significant funds from the money the Iranians paid for the arms," the paper said.

It appears that the Iranians may have paid for their arms in different ways at different stages in their dealings with the United States and Israel between August 1985 and November 1986.

According to Israeli sources, at least one manner of payment may have worked in the following way: A shipment of American arms destined for Iran would be loaded on an Israeli Boeing 707 in Israel. Once the material was on board, a signal would be sent to the Iranians that the shipment was ready and someone would transfer money in the amount of the exact price of the weapons to an account in Switzerland.

That money would then be passed on to an account set up by the United States, or Israel.

If, for example, the actual cost of the weapons was \$12 million, that amount would be dispatched to the Swiss account.

While this money may have been transferred by Iranians, it may also have been transferred by a middleman, someone such as Adnan M. Khashoggi, the Saudi Arabian arms dealer who was apparently helping the Iranians finance some of their arms purchases, Israeli sources said.

Once the weapons actually landed in Iran, the Iranian Government would instruct one of its banks in Europe, possibly Bank Meli in London, to transfer funds to a Swiss bank account controlled by the middleman, possibly Mr. Khashoggi.

The middleman would not only be reimbursed by the Iranians for the actual cost of the arms, but also for the cost of shipping them, the insurance and, apparently, some profit for putting the deal together.

The middleman may then have parceled out the money to various Swiss accounts of those involved, while keeping his share. In this way money may also have found its way to the contras, Israeli arms dealers, Iranians and others, the Israeli sources said.

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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ארה"ב - איראן

להלן מעמודו הראשון של הושינגטון פוסט" (3.12)

עתונות

Iran Arms Cash Is Tied to CIA-Run Account Aiding Afghan Rebels

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

Congressional investigators have traced profits from the covert sale of U.S. arms to Iran to a Swiss bank account managed by the Central Intelligence Agency, into which the U.S. and Saudi governments also deposited \$250 million each to underwrite rebels fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Money from the account also was used to buy arms for U.S.-backed contra rebels fighting the government of Nicaragua, informed sources said yesterday, at a time when Congress had forbidden any military support for the contras.

Money from the account in Switzerland was used to buy Soviet, Chinese and other arms from dealers in countries such as Israel, which were then shipped clandestinely to guerrillas in Afghanistan and, more recently, to contras in Nicaragua, according to one congressional source.

This version of how the Iranian profits were handled appears to contradict statements made Nov. 25 by Attorney General Edwin Meese III. Meese said those profits were "deposited in bank accounts which were under the control of representatives of the forces of Central America."

Asked about the apparent contradiction between Meese's statement and the find-

ings of the congressional investigators, one source said the attorney general "may not have been fully informed at the time."

The secret numbered Swiss account this year received \$250 million secretly appropriated by Congress to aid the Afghan Mujaheddin rebels, plus a matching \$250 million from Saudi Arabia.

The account also received the \$10 million to \$30 million profits that Meese has said was funneled to the contras, according to informed sources.

An administration source yesterday acknowledged that a Swiss-based fund had been set up from which "the various accounts involving the Reagan doctrine are

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

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אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, ממכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
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היועץ לבטחון לאומי

להלן קורות חיים של קארלוצ'י ושתי כתבות נרחבות על האיש
(אוברדורפר ב- WP וגורדון ב- NYT).

עתונות

FRANK CHARLES CARLUCCI



BORN: Oct. 18, 1930, Scranton, Pa.

FAMILY: Married Marcia Myers, April 15, 1976. Children: Karen, Frank, Kristin.

EDUCATION: A.B., Princeton University, 1952; postgraduate, School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1956; Wilkes College, Kings College, 1973.

PROFESSIONAL HISTORY: Jantzen Co. in Portland, Ore., 1955-1956; Foreign Service officer, State

Department, 1956; vice consul, economic officer in Johannesburg, 1957-1959; second secretary political officer in Kinshasa, Congo, 1960-1962; officer in charge of Congolese political affairs, 1962-1964; consul general in Zanzibar, 1964-1965; political affairs counselor in Rio de Janeiro, 1965-1969; assistant director for operations, Office of Economic Opportunity, 1969, and director, 1970; associate director, Office of Management and Budget, 1971, and deputy director, 1972; undersecretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 1972-1974; ambassador to Portugal, 1975-1978; deputy director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1978-1981; deputy secretary, Defense Department, 1981-1982; Sears World Trade Inc., 1983-1986.

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New Security Adviser Has Wide Experience

Carlucci Held Diplomatic, Intelligence Jobs

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan's new national security adviser, Frank C. Carlucci, brings to the job unusually close relations with Cabinet members in the foreign affairs field and extensive experience in senior diplomatic, military and intelligence posts for Democratic and Republican administrations alike.

Carlucci is a longtime close associate of Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, having served as deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget and undersecretary of health, education and welfare (HEW) under Weinberger in the Nixon administration and, at Weinberger's insistence, as his deputy secretary for the first two years of the Reagan administration.

A former U.S. ambassador to Portugal who began his long and varied government service as a career Foreign Service officer 30 years ago, Carlucci also has been on good terms with Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who recruited him to lead a study on U.S. foreign aid in 1983 after Carlucci left the Pentagon.

Shultz has put out feelers to recruit Carlucci for senior full-time diplomatic jobs in recent months to no avail, according to State Department insiders.

Carlucci, a deputy director of central intelligence in the Carter administration, is intimately familiar with intelligence operations and is reported to be highly acceptable to William J. Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

At age 56, Carlucci has had more experience across a broader spectrum of top government jobs than almost anyone on the Washington scene. In addition to being a career diplomat and ambassador and holding the No. 2 jobs at the OMB, HEW, CIA and Defense Department, he was director of operations and eventually chief of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the domestic poverty program, under President Richard M. Nixon.

Carlucci has been less successful

in business as president and chief operating officer for the last three years of Sears World Trade Inc., an international business subsidiary of Sears Roebuck & Co. The subsidiary is being folded into other Sears operations next month after losing \$80 million, but "it was not because of him [Carlucci]," said a Sears official who declined to be quoted by name. "The deck was stacked against him to begin with. And the timing [of the trading venture] was atrocious—the world trade climate was anything but propitious."

A senior State Department official said Carlucci's toughness, extensive experience and good relations with top officials throughout government have given rise to optimism that he will bring about a sweeping reorganization of the National Security Council.

Even before recent disclosures concerning Iran and the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, or contras, many officials at the State Department and other agencies had said they considered Reagan's NSC staff a notably weak link in policy-making and coordination.

A White House official said Carlucci will report to work around the first of the year. He reportedly will spend the intervening weeks settling his private financial affairs and studying NSC activities and personnel.

"This is a superb appointment, the best Reagan has made in six years," said retired admiral Stansfield Turner, whom Carlucci served as deputy CIA director in the Carter administration.

Turner said that Carlucci is "a man of integrity, which is essential in this trying situation," and that, as his deputy at the CIA, Carlucci was skilled at management and at hammering out solutions among officials with differing views.

"He sponsored a number of covert operations" at the CIA, Turner said. "I put him in charge of one of the most daring ones, and he took it over and traveled abroad." Turner would not elaborate on the operation.

While testifying before the Sen-

ate Armed Services Committee in January 1981 on his nomination to be deputy secretary of defense, Carlucci said that "my own philosophy is that we all have to compromise. That's what it's all about."

After all the pulling and hauling within government, Carlucci continued, the key question becomes, "Can I live with that decision? In three instances I had prepared to resign. The decisions did not go against me, so I didn't resign." He did not elaborate, and no senator asked what the decisions were.

One question already being raised in some quarters on Capitol Hill concerns Carlucci's relationship with retired Air Force major general Richard V. Secord, believed to have played a key role in guiding the secret contra air resupply operation. As deputy secretary of defense, Carlucci had overall responsibility for the work of Secord, who was several layers down as deputy assistant secretary for the Middle East.

At one point Secord was investigated in connection with charges of massive financial abuses against a transportation firm involved in Egyptian-U.S. military aid programs, according to "Manhunt," a recent book by Peter Maas.

Secord, Maas wrote, "was removed from his key position in the sale of arms to the Middle East, pending a polygraph. But he never took the test. Instead, without any prior notification to the Justice Department, he was abruptly reinstated" by Carlucci.

Francis B. West, Secord's immediate superior at the time as assistant secretary of defense, said he, rather than Carlucci, reinstated Secord after discussions with the Pentagon's general counsel, William H. Taft IV (now deputy secretary of defense), and with the office of the U.S. attorney investigating the case. No charges were brought against Secord, who later won \$1 million damages in a libel suit against one of his accusers.

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At the Pentagon, Carlucci was known as an enthusiastic advocate of polygraph tests. After the leak of secret Pentagon budget data to The Washington Post in early 1982, an angry Carlucci ordered a full-scale investigation, including polygraphs of service secretaries, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other top officials—and took a polygraph himself to set an example.

His view of polygraphs is in sharp contradiction to that of Shultz, who opposes their widespread use and who threatened a year ago to resign if required to submit to such a test.

At the Pentagon and the CIA, Carlucci was noted for his strong opposition to leaks of classified security information. In 1979 he advocated removal of the CIA from

See CARLUCCI, A35, Col. 4

CARLUCCI, From A29

key provisions of the Freedom of Information Act on grounds that confidential sources feared exposure. One of his first acts on becoming assistant secretary of defense in 1981 was to warn Pentagon employees about leaks.

A short, wiry man who was on the wrestling team at Princeton University, Carlucci has been known for his willingness to face imposing obstacles and danger. As a junior Foreign Service officer in the Congo (now Zaire), Carlucci waded into a mob threatening a group of people and was stabbed while executing the rescue. He won a State Department award for bravery.

In a renowned incident at the White House several years later, Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula—who had come to know and trust Carlucci as the local embodiment of the United States—was visibly uncomfortable, peering from person to person in the State Dining Room while visiting President John F. Kennedy.

Adoula asked Kennedy urgently "Où est Carlucci?" (Where is Carlucci?) The president, on learning who was Carlucci, sent for the then-Congo desk officer of the State Department—and other presidents have been doing so ever since.

As a Foreign Service officer, Carlucci served in South Africa, the Congo, Zanzibar and Brazil. While political counselor in Rio, he was known for helping engineer drastic cuts in the size of the embassy staff.

Carlucci has been acquainted with Reagan since the two clashed in 1969 over a California legal assistance agency; Carlucci was an official of the poverty agency and Reagan was governor. Lengthy negotiations that also involved Edwin Meese III, then an aide to Reagan and now attorney general, resolved the dispute. That Christmas, Carlucci later recalled, Reagan sent him a bottle of brandy with a note of thanks.

Staff writers Joe Pichirallo and Caroline Mayer contributed to this report.

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Security Adviser Gets High Marks For Diplomatic and Political Skills

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON Dec. 2 — The appointment of Frank C. Carlucci as President Reagan's national security adviser was generally praised today as a step that would improve management of the National Security Council and help restore the Administration's credibility.

State Department officials, who have been openly at odds with the National Security Council over the Iran affair, cited Mr. Carlucci's background as a Foreign Service officer and his long experience in several Government agencies.

"If you went to central casting, you could not get a better N.S.C. director," one State Department official said.

Pentagon officials cited Mr. Carlucci's experience in managing the Defense Department in the first years of the Reagan Administration and noted his close ties with Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger.

Some officials from the Carter Administration also praised the move.

"He is a man of great integrity and is skilled in bringing divergent views together," said Adm. Stansfield Turner, retired, who was Director of Central Intelligence when Mr. Carlucci held the No. 2 job at that agency. "He understands the political process and how to work with Congress. This Administration needs someone who understands this very much."

Current and former officials said Mr. Carlucci's predecessor as national security adviser, Adm. John M. Poindexter, lacked such political skills.

'Badly Needed' Experience

"Since he has had experience in Democratic and Republican Administrations, he brings an ability to work with people across the political spectrum which is badly needed," R. James Woolsey, Under Secretary of the Navy in the Carter Administration, and a Democrat, said of Mr. Carlucci.

But the new national security adviser is not immune to controversy.

As the day-to-day manager of the Pentagon in the early part of the Reagan Administration, he presided over a delegation of authority to the military

services that some military experts say led to a lack of coordinated budgetary planning.

According to a published report, he also intervened in the case of Gen. Richard V. Secord, who had been removed from his post as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense during a Justice Department investigation of his possible ties to an arms shipment company, Eatisco, that had been fined \$3 million for filing inflated invoices.

According to documents in the possession of General Secord's lawyer, the general was told that if he took a polygraph test and passed it, his suspension would be lifted. But just before he was scheduled to take the test, General Secord "was abruptly reinstated" at Mr. Carlucci's order "without any prior notification to Justice," Peter Maas wrote in his book "Manhunt," an account of the dealings of the convicted arms merchant Edwin P. Wilson.

General Secord has emerged as one of the main figures in the investigations of the supply of arms to Iran and to the Nicaraguan rebels.

Mr. Carlucci's past role in Washington has been primarily that of as a coordinator who has not overshadowed his superiors. While he brings more wide-ranging experience to his post than Mr. Reagan's previous national security advisers, it is likely that he will play less of a role in shaping policy than such past advisers as Henry A. Kissinger, who served President Nixon, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's adviser. Another prominent national security adviser was McGeorge Bundy, who served under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

Mr. Carlucci, a native of Scranton, Pa., was born on Oct. 18, 1930. He has two children by his first wife and one child by his second wife.

He graduated from Princeton University, where he made friends with Donald Rumsfeld, who later picked him for a top job during the Nixon Administration.

Other members of his class at Princeton included James A. Baker 3d, the Secretary of the Treasury and former White House chief of staff, and Robert B. Oakley, former head of the State Department's office of counterterrorism policy.

Mr. Carlucci later attended the Harvard University business school, worked in private industry and served two years in the Navy.

He joined the Foreign Service in 1956 and served in a number of posts in Africa. In the Congo, now Zaire, he was stabbed and beaten by an angry mob after he came to the aid of Americans there.

In Conflict With Reagan

He served as consul general in Zanzibar, Tanzania, and was political counselor in Rio de Janeiro until 1969.

Mr. Rumsfeld then asked Mr. Carlucci to serve as his No. 2 at the Office of Economic Opportunity, the anti-poverty agency, in the Nixon Administration.

Mr. Carlucci assumed the post of director after Mr. Rumsfeld left and found himself drawn into a sharp dispute with Mr. Reagan, then Governor of California.

Mr. Reagan was seeking to end the

California rural legal assistance program, which was financed by Mr. Carlucci's agency. Mr. Carlucci resisted these efforts by Mr. Reagan and the Nixon White House and managed to keep the program alive.

Mr. Carlucci differed strongly with top officials when he served as United States Ambassador to Portugal. He took that job in 1975 after serving as a deputy to Mr. Weinberger at the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

On to the C.I.A.

Mr. Carlucci persuaded the White House to maintain ties with the leftist military government that emerged after a bloodless revolution in Portugal despite strong opposition from Henry A. Kissinger, then Secretary of State, who argued that Portugal should not be supported because it would go Communist.

In 1977, the Carter Administration named Mr. Carlucci as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, an appointment that made him a target of conservatives when Mr. Weinberger later sought to bring his former deputy to the Pentagon.

But conservatives who assailed Mr. Carlucci for serving under President Carter had little to complain about as the Reagan Administration undertook the largest peacetime military buildup in American history.

Mr. Carlucci played a key role in managing that buildup. He initiated a number of widely publicized changes in the buying of weapons. He left his Pentagon post for private industry before these measures could be fully carried out and his effort to reform the Pentagon was, at best, a mixed success, in the view of many Congressional experts and Pentagon officials.

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ייצוא טכנולוגיה

בהמשך לשלי 70 2.12

הרכב הצוות האמריקני סוכס סופית אתמול בערב ולדברי אנשי המחלקה נמסרה אתמול לשגרירותם בת"א להעברה אליכם.

למען הסדר הטוב הריני חוזר עליה :

- פיליפ היוז מחמ"ד - PM . מגיע בטיסת פן-אם מפריס בשבת.

- אנדי אונאטה - עוזרו. היה יועץ בשגארה"ב בבייג'ין. (הוא בא במקומו של ג'רי ליץ'.

היוצא למו"מ מקביל לדלהי באותם ימים).

- קוינסי קרוזבי - מחמ"ד. ממשרדו של אד דרווינסקי.

- קולונל רוברט טרנר - משרד ההגנה.

- ווילרד וורקמן - משרד המסחר.

- טד וו (WU) - משרד המסחר.

- רפאל קופז - מכס.

- אמיליו קסטרו - מחמ"ד - סחר מזרח - מערב. סג' 8 איליפ

עד כאן.

מתני

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חוזם: 11,11533

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מ-:המשרד,תא:281186,זח:1519,דח:מ,סג:ש

נד:8

שמרד/מייודי.

ביקור טגן השר מילוא.

1. טגן השר רוני מילוא יגיע לניו-יורק ב- 3.12.86 בי"טאן אמריקן'י טיסה 101 מלונדון. אנא קבלוהו בשוה.

2. אנו מבקשים שתפגישו את טגן השר מילוא עם הסנטורים ד'אמטד ומדינהן, עם מוריס אייברהם ועם אישים מתאימים אחרים, על פי הבנתך.

המועדים הבאים בחשבון לפגישות הם: יום א' - 7.12 - אחה'צ'.

יום ב' (8.12) ויום ג' (9.12).

אנא טיפולך.

אריה מקל/לשכת רה"מ'.

תפ: שהח, דחמ, מככל, ממככל, מצמא

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

מל: ווט, נד: 512, מ: המשרד
דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 031286, רח: 1530

סודי ביותר/בהול

הטגריד.

איראן - שלך 78. 2.12

על מנת לבסס את צינור הקשר באמצעות מחמייד ולא ישירות עם
השופט החוקר, מוצע שנציג המוסד יאמר בהודמנות לאיש ה-FBI
אשר מדווח לו, כי אנו מצפים שכל פניה תבוא אלינו, אם
תבוא, באמצעות הצינורות הרגילים דהיינו מחמייד.
סייבל=

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תפ: שהח, דהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, שהבט, סייבל, מצפא, רם

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דחיות

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מס' מברק

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מנכ"ל מדיני. ממנכ"ל.

פרשת איראן-ניקראגוה.

1. איש ה- FBI מסר לנציג המוסד כאן שהם קיימו אתמול ישיבה
בראשות השופט וובסטר וסוכם על שיגור מכתב אלי - בו יפרטו את
אשר הם מצפים מאתנו במהלך החקירה. עם קבלת המכתב אדאג כמובן להעבירו
אליכם.

2. כפי שציפיתי ואף הודעתי לכם במברקי מאתמול מתמנה איש מיוחד
שיחקור את הפרשה ועל ידי כך מקוה הממשל להוריד את הנושא מהכותרות.
הגילויים היום-יומיים בכל העניין אינם מקלים כלל ועיקר.

מ. רוזן

לקריאת איתן קיין איכ"ס

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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** ** יוצא

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** אל: ווט, נר: 505, מ: המשרד

** דח: ר, סג: מ, תא: 021286, רח: 1500

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** סודי ביותר/רגיל

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** השגריר

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** משיחה עם הציר יוז.

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** לדעתו גם אם נמכרו כמניות נשק נוספות לאיראן מעבר למוסכם עם

** ארה"ב, לא יגרם נזק שכן אם העברנו נשק למען אינטרסים

** אמריקאים תהיה הנה שדאגנו גם לאינטרסים שלנו. הנטיה הרצינית

** כמונן היא השאלה לגבי מעורבות ישראל בהטבות כספיים לקונטרס.

** גם הוא שאל אם היתה אלינו פניה רשמית בעניין תשאול ותחקור

** נראה מברק רונינשטיין על שיחה עם פיקרינג.

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** מנהל מצפ"א. =

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** תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, סייבל, מצפא, רם

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* 19.12.80 : 25.12.80 *

* 26.12.80 : 01.01.81 *

* 08.01.81 : 14.01.81 *

* 21.01.81 : 27.01.81 *

* 03.02.81 : 09.02.81 *
* 16.02.81 : 22.02.81 *
* 23.02.81 : 01.03.81 *

* 08.03.81 : 14.03.81 *
* 21.03.81 : 27.03.81 *
* 28.03.81 : 04.04.81 *

* 11.04.81 *

* 18.04.81 : 24.04.81 *

משרד החוקים והחלוקות הקשר

דף 1 מתוך 2
עמק 4 מתוך

נכנס **
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חוזם: 12,1088

אל: המשרד
מ-: נוש, נר: 53, תא: 021286, זח: 1335, דח: מ, טג: טב
נד: @

טודו ביותר/מיווד

אל: מכב' ל מדינו

דמש' ב - ניו יורק (נר 4 לניו יורק)

מכב' ל משהב' יט (נר 52 למשהב' יט)

מאת: השגריר/רוואשינגטון

מעמד משלחת משרד הבטחון.

מפגישה עם מרק ריצ'רד, ראש האגף הפלילי במשרד המשפטים
כאן.

לדעתו אין שום סיכוי להגיע להסכם בקשר למעמדם של אנשי
משרד הבטחון וכן לא לגבי ה- GUIDELINES
בקשר לחקירות המתנהלות בגזר - לפני שתתייחס בדיקה
כל התיקים הנובוקים בעת. האוירה לא מתאימה לדיון כזה.
הוא אישר לי, בניגוד לאשר הנחנו בשעתו - שכל אשר
נעשה עד עתה היה ביוזמת מחלקת המדינה. בכון כמו כן
ששעה שהודיעו לו - באמצעות ספייירט שהנושא של מעמד
משלחת משרד הבטחון הוסדר - היה זה משרד המשפטים שהביע
הסתייגות. אוכל כמובן להעלות הנושא במגישה קרובה
עם מיז, מיותר רק לציין שלא זה הנושא המעסיק אותם
כרגע ואין טעם שנזמין תגובה שלילית נוספת מדרג בניר
אחר.

על כן המלצתי היא לחזור לנושא רק בעוד זמן מה. התרשמתי
ממגישתו עם מרק ריצ'רד שגם במשרד המשפטים יש בעט

* דן 2 מתוך 2
* עותק 4 מתוך 4

לשרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* על רשויות המכס כי מסתבר שלגבי חלק מהדברים שחשדו
* בנו - אין להם על מה להסתמך. הוא לא היה מוכן למרט.

* מ. רוזנ==

* תמ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, טייבל, מצמא

נכנס
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חוזם: 12,1093

אל: המשרד

מ-: דוש, נר: 52, תא: 021286, חז: 1323, דח: מ, טג: סב

נד: &

סודי ביותר/מיידו

אל: דניס גולומן - משרד המשפטים

דע: מנכ"ל מדינה, מצפ"א.

מנגלה. מפגישה עם מרק ריצ'רד.

ביקר אצלי אתמול מרק ריצ'רד ובין הנושאים שהעלה היו

גם:-

1. מנגלה.

←←←←←

משרד המשפטים עומד לפרסם בזמן הקרוב את הדו"ח הסופי
שלהם הקובע שלדעתם מנגלה מת - והראיות שהובאו בפניהם
משכנעות. ריצ'רד חושש שלכשהו"ח יתפרסם תבוא תגובה
מצדנו שתשלול את עמדתם. שאלתו של ריצ'רד היא האם
סבורים אנו שישראל תוכל ביום מן הימים להגיע למסקנה
סופית כלשהי בנוון. הרגשתו היא שכל פעם שמגיעים להסכמה
בוינינו - אנו מעלים נקודה חזשה. משרד המשפטים חייב
לפרסם את מסקנתו הסופית - ולא יכולים להשאיר הענין
פתוח. אם ישראל מבקשת, יהיה משרד המשפטים מוכן לפנות
לרשויות הברזיליאניות לערוך בדיקה במכונת אמת של
האשה שנתנה לו מקלט - אן אי אפשר לדעתו לבקש מהברזילאים
ביטול האשמות נגדה בתמורה לנכונותה להגות במכונת
אמת. לצורך זה הם זקוקים לבקשה רשמית מאתנו.

2. הסכם ההסגרה

←←←←←

ריצ'רד רצה לדעת מה העמדה כיום בקשר להצעות שהט הציעו

להשגת הסכם בנושאי ההסגרה - ועריכת רשימת משעים שלגביהם
נסכים להסגיר אזרחים. ריצ'רד מציע שתערך הפגישה
בפרנקפורט כפי שהוצע בשעתו. אודה לך על הנחיות.

מ. רוזנ==

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי ביותר

אל: במחון, נר: 503, מ: המשרד
דח: ב, סג: מ, תא: 021286, רח: 1715

סודי ביותר/בהול טפל

לעיניו בלבד

מר י. בן אהרון מנכ"ל משרד רוהיים

מר ח. כרמון, סמנכ"ל משרד הבטחון

תקירת אורחים ישראלים על ידי שלמונות ארה"ב

להלן סיכום ההתייעצות שהתקיימה בלשכתי ב-2 דצמבר 1986

בהערות לקראת האפשרות שבימים הקרובים תפנה ארה"ב רשמית

בבקשה לחקור אורחים ישראלים באשר למעורבותם בפרשת העברת

הנשק האמריקני לאיראן.

בהתייעצות הוחלט על נקיטת שלושה צעדים:

1. פרסום הודעה נבתגובה לפניה האמריקנית הצפויה (בנוסח הבא):

"יחסי ארה"ב - ישראל מבוטסים על אמון והבנה ובמסגרת זו חשף

ישראל פטולה עם הממשל במטרה לסייע בהצגת הטובדות הקשורות

בנושא כהווייתן. הפרטים באשר לאופן מסירת המידע שבידי ישראל

יסוכמו במגעים מדיניים בין שני הצדדים.

2. מינוי צוות, בראשותו של מר חנן בר און ובהשתתפות נציג

מערכת הבטחון, שיכין את הגירסה הישראלית לפרטיה. גירסה זו

תמסר לעיונם של רה"מ, ממרה"מ ושה"מ ושר הבטחון, בטרם

תחליט ישראל על אופן שיתוף הפעולה עם הרשויות האמריקניות

שתבקנה לחקור אורחים ישראלים.

3. העברת בקשה לשגריר מאיר רוזן כי יודיע למחלקת המדינה

נבחוובה לפנייתה בנושא) על מינוי איש קשר מטעם השגרירות

לרשויות האמריקניות הרלוונטיות.

אנא אישור משרדיכם בהקדם האפשרי

המנכ"ל המדיני

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המשרד

ח.ר.ב.

מנכ"ל מדיני - אל

ולדהיים. בפגישתי אתמול עם מרק ריצ'רד, ראש האגף הפלילי במשרד המשפטים, שאלתיו אם יש כבר החלטה בקשר לוולדהיים - באשר להכללתו ב-watch list השיב בשלילה - ושאל אם נכונה הידיעה שקיבלו מהארץ שמקור רשמי ישראלי כלשהו טען שאין בידי ישראל חומר מרשיע במידה מספקת להאשים את וולדהיים בביצוע פשעים במהלך המלחמה. השיבותי לו שלפי מיטב ידיעתי שום גורם רשמי ישראלי לא אמר זאת. ברור היה לי מהשיחה שהחלטה בנושא זה לא תיפול בעתיד הקרוב.

מ. רוזן

אג"מ
ד"ר אלכ"ה

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נושד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

* תאריך : 12.86

* נכנס **

* טודי ביותר 1 מתוך 16

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* חוזם: 12,1091

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* מ-: רוש, נר: 50, תא: 021286, חז: 1320, דח: מ, טב: טב

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* טודי ביותר/מיידי

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* מנכ"ל מדיני

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* KARL LINNAS

* אחר דחיות ערעורו האחרון על ידי בית המשפט העליון
 * -- בנה אלו אתמול ניל שר ומסר לי שדעת שר המשפטים
 * לשלוח אותו יחד עם מרק ריצ'רד לארץ בנסיון אחרון
 * לשכנע אותנו להסכים לוקש הסגרתו לארץ וזאת כדי למנוע
 * העברתו לבריה"מ. הנושא בדיכוח ציבורי כאן - ועמדתנו
 * ידועה. ניל שר מניח שיתכן ויוזמה זאת באה כדי להוכיח
 * שבליט ברירה מסרו את האיש לידי בריה"מ כי אף מדינה
 * לא רצתה בו.

* גורלו שם לא מוטל בטמק. לדעתי יש לומר לו שבשום אופן
 * לא ינקטו בצעד זה. לאור הנסיבות הנוכחיות יתקבל רושם
 * רע מאד על ידי שירבובה של ישראל וכל גירושים נוספים
 * מיותרים.

* מ. רוזנ==

* תמ: שהח, רהמ, מככל, ממככל, סייבל, מצמא

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רחיפות:	מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק	דף: 1
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		מאת: עתונות, ניו יורק

News Summary December 2, 1986

Editorials

NYT "President Reagan and His Operators" Against news of a startling plunge in his popularity, Reagan has gone from blaming the press for the Iran scandal finally to some constructive steps to end it. He ordered the NSC to stay out of "operations." Generally, policy problems are rooted in people problems. Reagan's first order of business is to choose a new NSC adviser of experience, integrity and strength.

ND "Danger Zone, Twilight Zone" North a "national hero"? The press and "another country" to blame for the Iranian fiasco? Really now, Mr. President. If Reagan is going to maintain the line he took in a Time Magazine article, he will seem more out of touch with reality than the events of the past 3 weeks suggested. Does Reagan really think he can hang the whole affair on Israel? He makes it sound as though the Israeli Gov't dreamed up the payments to the contras rather than acting as a middleman. At the moment the real danger is a president so removed from reality th he seems incapable of dealing with a crisis.

NYP "The nation Needs an Explanation" Reagan must level with the American people. He must not let himself be seduced by foolish advise into weaving a self-imprisoning web of evasion and subterfuge. It may not be in the selfish interests of his aides for the truth to come out but it is in the interest of the President. Virtually no one suspects the President of any personal wrongdoing. Reagan needs to acknowledge that the whole initiative was a mistake. It's plain that this was an effort to negotiate with terrorists.

Columns

NYT-Sisco "Reagan Can Still Rebound" We do not yet know how badly the Iranian scandal has damaged the President. To get out of it he must appoint a special prosecutor, the Adminsitration cannot investigate itself. Regan must be removed. It must be clear that Shultz speaks for foreign policy and he must appoint a competent NSC adviser.

NYP-Anderson "Huffy US Allies Have Long Sold Arms to Iran" You don't have to approve of Reagan's secret arms deal with Iran to be contempt-

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nous of our European allies, After all, they've been selling weapons secretly to Khoemini for years. France has sold thousands of artillery shells to Iran. So much for Chirac's loud protestations of friendship with Iraq. West Germany agreed to sell Iran 4 submarines, with the result that after El Al, Luftansa is the safest airline to fly. The West German Gov't has also authorized arms shipments to Libya. Greece also sells arms to Libya and Iran.

NYP-Tyrrell-"The Presiednt Did Wrong--Let Him Now Confess a Mistake of the Heart" Reagan has done what the UN has failed to achieve over decades--world unity. He has devised a policy that united the world against us. Reagan made a dreadful mistake by shipping arms to Iran. He must now return to the principles on which he was elected.

DN-Herbert "Behind Reagan Lurks Bush" Bush participated in and continues to support the arms sales to Iran. He is linked to supplying arms to the contras. His name has been raised in a federal case involving illegally selling arms to Iran. There is virtually no chance that Reagan will lose his presidency. He's got Bush as insurance.

WSJ-Clark "Oil and Economics: King Fahd Faces a Dilemma" Yamani has had his passport taken away from him. Yamani got the boot in part because he told his king that the royal position on oil prices made no sense. The king's idea seems to be that other OPEC members will be so grateful for Saudi Arabia's tremendous sacrifices that they will cheerfully chop their own output to push up prices. Lots of luck, King. If he supports an \$18 a barrel price, oil revenues will fall. If he maximizes the current value of his oil, oil prices will fall and Iran will be furious.

Press Reports

Israelis Are Baffled By Reagan Remark

NYT-Freidman-Israeli officials said they were baffled by Reagan's remarks suggesting that "another country," apparently Israel--had overcharged Iran for weapons and then knowingly put the profits into bank accounts belonging to the contras. Avi Pazner said "He do not know which the other 'country' the president was referring to. But as regards to israel, I can only repeat our statement of last week that the money for the arms transferred to Iran was paid by an Iranian representative to a Swiss bank, in accordance with instructions of American representatives." Another Israeli official said, "We do not want to be contradicting the President of the US. He is a friend. But if he was talking about Israel, and I assume he was, it is just not true." (cabled)

NTY-Rabbi Alexander Schindler said he was shocked and dismayed that Reagan would suggest that Israel was responsible for diverting arms slaes profits to the contras. "To place blame on Israel for acting at the request of the White House in this affair is an act of ingratitude that, in Shakespeare's words, is 'the most unkindest cut of all.'"

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US Reassessing Iran-Arms Smuggling Trial

NYT-Diamond-The US Attorney in Manhattan got an unusual 10-day court delay to reassess a court case against 18 defendants who planned to sell arms to Iran. Defense lawyers said that such a move often meant that prosecutors would ask for a dismissal of all or some of the charges. The judge noted that one of the defense lawyers suggested that Israel could be an unindicted co-conspirator in the case. (DN-O'Shaughnessey) (NYT-cabled)

NYT-AFP photo of Ali Safavi, a spokesman for the People's Mujahedeen, at a news conference in Washington. He displayed documents that he said proved that Iran has been buying large quantities of US made weapons from Israeli intermediaries since 1980 and that weapons were delivered from the US and South Africa as early as 1984.

Reagan's Approval Rating Dives

NYT-Meislin p.1-Reagan's overall public approval rating has plunged to 46%, from 67% a month ago, amid deep public concern over his Administration's arms deal with Iran and the funneling of the funds to contras, according to a NYT/CBS News poll. The decline is the sharpest one-month drop ever recorded by a public opinion poll. A majority of Americans believe that Reagan is "covering up" facts and that the incident is at least as serious as Watergate. (ND-Freidman)

Reagan Invites the Naming of Special Prosecutor

NYT-p.1-Weinraub -Reagan said that if the Justice Dept. recommended it, he would welcome the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the diversion of millions of dollars to Nicaraguan rebels. At the same time, Reagan ordered his NSC staff not to conduct diplomatic, military or intelligence operations while a 3-member review board examines the operations of the council.

Texas Billionaire Says He Put Up Millions for Hostages

NYT-Weinraub p.1- H. Ross Perot said that for the last 5 years he has put up ransom money in secret efforts with North to try to obtain the release of various hostages held abroad. He said that all the efforts failed. (all papers)

Secret Iran Hearings Underway/North Pleads the 5th

ND-Waldman-The Senate Intelligence Committee heard secret testimony from McFarlane on his Iran dealings. North was the next ex-official to testify and the White House is cooperating.

NYT-Engelberg-North invoked his right against self-incrimination during testimony before the Senate Committee, two sources familiar with the proceedings said. He did not respond to any questions. McFarlane testified for more than 7 hours, and afterward several participants said they had left with the impression that top members of the Administration had known that money from the arms sales were being diverted to the contras.

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Casey OK'd CIA Role in Iran Arms Affair

ND-LA Times-CIA Director William Casey personally approved CIA participation in a secret US-Israeli shipment of arms in Nov. 1985, contrary to the account he initially gave the House and Senate intelligence committees, officials said. Casey apparently ordered CIA involvement before Reagan signed the written "finding" normally required for such covert activity. Casey said he had "misspoken" in prior hearings.

Haig Calls Arms Tale "Hogwash"

DN-Riper-Haig dismissed as "hogwash" reports that he approved of an Israeli sale of US-made spare parts to Iran in 1981. At the same time he said that he supported Israel's attempt to make peace with more moderate elements in Iran saying that he did not find it troubling that anyone would want to seek to open lines with Iran in anticipation of a post-Rhomeini Iran.

US Aides Say Contras Didn't Get All Iran Money

NYT-Brinkley-Administration officials, saying that the Nicaraguan rebels had received less aid than reported by the Attorney General, suggested that some of the money from the Iran arms sales might have been diverted to other countries. State Dept. officials said that although they didn't know for sure, they believe that the money might have gone to rebel groups in Angola and Afghanistan.

Moscow Accuses Iran on Afghans

NYT-Renters-The Soviet Gov't newspaper Izvestia accused Iran of aiding the US in an undeclared war against Afghanistan. The Soviet attack was the toughest in many months against Iran and reflected a downturn in relations between the two countries.

Swiss Company Calls Dealings Legal

NYT-Tagliabue-The chairman of a Swiss finance company thought to have played a role in the Iran deal said his company had done nothing illegal.

Upstate NY Murder in 1983 Linked to Iran Arms Smuggling

NYT-Blumenthal-A slain businessman whose body was found in an upstate NY lake in 1983 was apparently involved in procuring contraband arms for Iran, a former State Police Investigator said. The victim, George Perry was found with 3 bullet holes in his head. The officer said that Perry apparently had been involved with a group of Czechoslovaks and Brazilians dealing in tank and arms parts and that at one point \$20 million allocated for purchases disappeared. The State Dept. and CIA were uncooperative in the investigation.

Reagan Calls Nixon As Crisis Unfolds

NYT-AP-Reagan, trying to resolve his most serious crisis has conferred twice with Nixon recently.

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Iran Threatens Gulf Countries

NYT-Reuters-The Prime Minister of Iran said Iran would retaliate against Persian Gulf countries helping Iraq. Aviation sources said that Iraqi jets that raided an Iraqi oil terminal were allowed to make an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia after they ran low on fuel.

Republican Leaders in Senate Asserts Iran-Nicaragua Affairs Hurts GPO

NYT-Roberts-Sen. Bob Dole said that the Republican Party was beginning to suffer political damage from the Administration's sale of arms and transfer of funds. Dole said the crisis had to be dealt with quickly before the party's prospects in the 1988 elections were permanently impaired.

Fighting Forges Palestinian Unity

ND-LA Times-The fighting in Lebanon has produced unexpected results: the elusive Palestinian goal of unity seems closer than at any time in 3 years, and Syria seems to have alienated many of its close allies in the region. This is seen as a major diplomatic blow for Syria and the failure to maintain a cease-fire makes it seem as though Syria cannot keep order in its own backyard.

NYT-AP-Dozens of people were killed in the 8th day of fighting between Shiites and Palestinians.

Letters

WSJ-The President and VP of the American Jewish Committee writes that the AJC is indeed concerned with the rise of fundamentalists in politics. Israel is not the only concern for American Jewish organizations. The AJC also has a responsibility to promote pluralism and democratic values in the US.

WSJ-Jewish activist writes that he is increasingly alienated by the organized Jewish community and their left-wing agendas. The business of these organizations should be areas of Jewish defense and the promotion of Jewish cultural, educational and religious values.

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tinations other than Iran. Transcripts of telephone conversations among arms dealers, and other material, released in the case, have suggested that American officials wanted documents to show destinations other than Iran to mask the operation.

A trial in the case is scheduled for Feb. 2 if the prosecutors, headed by the United States Attorney, Rudolph W. Giuliani, decide to proceed.

Also yesterday, William M. Kunstler, the lawyer for Nico Minardos, a Los Angeles businessman who is one of the defendants, withdrew an affidavit he submitted on Sunday saying that he would proceed with the case even if the prosecutors asked for dismissal.

Mr. Kunstler, a political campaigner critical of Administrations for the past 20 years, had said that his client did not want the Government "to sneak away from its own enormous misconduct" and that he wanted to investigate the issue further through the courts. He invoked details of the Watergate scandals of the Nixon Administration.

Other defendants had been concerned that Mr. Kunstler's position might lead the prosecutors to continue the case because not all parties would agree to dismissal.

Yesterday Judge Sands called the affidavit "premature," since the prosecutors had not asked for dismissal. He added, "I know of no case or theory in which a defendant insists on being prosecuted against the wishes of the authorities."

Israelis Are Baffled by a Reagan Remark

By **THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN**

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Dec. 1 — Israeli officials said today that they were baffled by President Reagan's remark in a magazine interview suggesting that "another country" — apparently Israel — had overcharged Iran for weapons and then knowingly put the profits in bank accounts belonging to Nicaraguan rebel leaders.

Asked to comment on the President's remarks to Time magazine, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's spokesman **Yehuda Pazner** said: "We do not know which is the other 'country' the President was referring to. But as regards Israel, I can only repeat our statement last week that the money for the arms transferred to Iran was paid by an Iranian representative to a Swiss bank, in accordance with instructions of American representatives."

'It Wasn't Us'

Mr. Pazner went on: "These funds did not pass through Israel and Israel had no knowledge that any of these funds might be going to the contras. We know where we stand on this one."

In his interview with Time, President Reagan said about the arms transfers to Iran: "Another country was facili-

tating those sales of weapons systems. They then were overcharging and were apparently putting the money into bank accounts of the leaders of the contras. It wasn't us funneling money to them. This was another country."

President Reagan's remarks went considerably farther than those Tuesday by Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d, who, when discussing the money transactions, spoke only about Israelis — not necessarily Israeli officials — being involved with establishing the Swiss bank accounts, from which the Nicaraguan rebels, known as contras, were later able to withdraw funds. Mr. Meese's remarks seemed to allow for the possibility that the Israeli Government, as opposed to private arms dealers, was not involved, while the President spoke of "another country."

Speaking not for attribution, another senior Israeli official expressed complete bafflement at the President's remarks — assuming that he was referring to Israel — particularly since it followed an Israeli Government denial of involvement that was cleared beforehand with Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d and Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

"Why did Reagan have to say that?" said one Israeli official. "We do not want to be contradicting the President

of the United States. He is a friend. But if he was talking about Israel, and I assume he was, it is just not true."

Reagan Remark Assailed

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, said yesterday that he was shocked and dismayed that President Reagan would suggest that Israel was responsible for diverting arms sale profits to the Nicaraguan rebels.

"In a welter of rumor and fantasy surrounding the Iranian affair, one fact is clear," Rabbi Schindler said in a statement issued in New York. "Israel acted on the behest, with the knowledge and with the consent of the Reagan Administration in its dealings with Iran. It did so as a friend and ally of our country. To place blame on Israel for acting at the request of the White House in this affair is an act of ingratitude that, in Shakespeare's words, is 'the meanest unkindest cut of all.'"

"It is not Jerusalem but Washington that has an obsession with overturning the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua," Rabbi Schindler said. "One can only express a sense of shock and dismay, therefore, at President Reagan's statement."

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קרדינל או'קונר. בהמשך לשלי 905 מ-26 בנובמבר.


- ראש לשכתו מוסר שיגיעו מעמאן לישראל ב-1 בינואר ויצאו לקהיר ב-5 בו. שעות מדוייקות לכניסתם ולצאתם טרם נקבעו.
- עם הקרדינל יבואו מונסיניור נולן וראש לשכתו מונסיניור ג'ים מק-קרתי. כמו כן יתכן שיצטרפו עוד כישוף או שניים, חברי הבחלת ה-Catholic Near East Welfare Association שהקרדינל הוא נשיאה.
- הם התקשרו כבר עם ארכיבישוף ח'ורי, הנציג האפוסטולי, וביקשו ממלצותיו לגבי הביקור. ממתניבים להשוכחו. בינתים מבקשים שנמתין עם הכינון הביקור.
- בסוף שבוע זה או ראשית הבא יתקשר אתי ואז נסכם את כל הפרטים ואודיעכם מיד.
- כיום חמשי זה יודיע הקרדינל לעתונות שאחר חג המולד יבא לביקור בירדן, ישראל ומצרים. לא ימסור פרטים נוספים. קבענו שאם אשאל ע"י עמובאים אמר שנפגש לארח את הקרדינל בכואו. גם אני אמנע מפרטים. מבקשים שגם בארץ לא ייצארו בינתים דבר.
- באופן פרטי לחלוסין הוסיף מק-קרתי ואמר לי שבהכנה הביקור מבקש הקרדינל להתחשב ברגישויות של הותיקן, של "האגודה הקתולית לפעד במזה"מ" שהיא נשיאה (ושאין לנו בה ידידים), ושל ממשלת ישראל (ושכידוע תוא רואה עצמו כירידה).
- בנספד סיפר לי רביי רונלד טובל, הרב של "ממל עמבואל" הרמודלי, שהוא יריך אישי של הקרדינל, שאו'קונר סיפר לו על הביקור ואמר ששעוניין שמובל וכן גם הרב ג'ים רודין. מגהל "הוועד הבין-דתי" של "האמריקן ג'ואיש קומיטטי", ימלוז אליו. מק-קרתי לא אמר לי על כך דבר ולא שאלתי.
- כאמור אבריק טוב בעוד ימים אחדים ומקווה שאוכל למסוד לכם פרטים סופיים.

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- 12 -

תאריך: 2.12.1986

שם השולח: משה יגר

אישור: 

אמא, חוזמ: 733

אל: וו/ש/49

מ-: המשדד, תא: 021286, חז: 1518, חח: מ, סג: ש,

בבב

שמור/מידי.

שגרי.

מסעות ריצורד מרפי.

סיפר לי דרייפר שהוא ושגרי ר אהים בירדנ הוזמנו ללונדון

לסדוח התיעצויות עם מרפי שיחילו ב-8.12.

לידיעתכם.

אבנת =

סססס

-35-



אאאא, חוזמ: 728

אל: ווש/47, נ

מ-: המשדד, הא: 021286, חז: 1509, דח: מ, סג: ש,

בבב

שמור/מידי.

לונדון, וושינגטון, ניו-יורק, פריס, מבנה.

שני, קוראל, יופה, לבנו.

דע: עהונות לונדון, השגריר סוויצלנד.

יוע ישראלי למורדי מוזמביק.

בנוסף על הודעת דובר משהיח אפשר למסור, לרקע בלבד, שלמרות
התיחסות העתון ייאינדפנדנסיי הלונדוני למקורות בטחון
דומ אפריקאיימי, הופצ הסיפור לראשונה לפני שבועות מספר
על ידי מקורות סובייטיים, אינ להוציא מכלל חשבון שמדובר
בפעולת דיסאינפורמציה המיועדת להכפיש פניה של ישראל
בחקופה בה מגלות מדינות אפריקה ענינ בחידוש היחסים עמה.
מאיפי =

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שמו

כנס

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חוזט: 12,2438

אל: המשרד

מ-: לוטאנגלס, נר: 4, תא: 021286, זח: 1000, דח: ר, טג: ש

נד: 8

רגיל/שמו

נר 2 פר בנפרד

אל: מנכל' מדיני

אל: ממנכל'

אל: מצנא'

אל: מעת'

דע: יוטץ רוהמ' לתקשורת

דע: יוטץ שהבט' לתקשורת

דע: עתונות/הסברה, ורש

מאת: א. אלגר, קונסול הסברה, לא'

ארהב' איראן ישראל. שלנו נר 123.

1. להבדיל משבוע שעבר ירוה ישראל בשלב זה מהנותרות באזורנו וההתמקדות עתה היא בכינון ועדות חקירה.

2. עם זאת לא נעלמנו כליל מתקשורת / מהתקשורת והדגש באספקט הישראלי עבר לסוחרו הנשק.

3. להערכתנו אנו נהנים עתה ממסק זמן, כשתשומת הלב מוסטת לנושאים החוקתיים והטכניים של החקירה, ונחזור

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

למוקד כשיחלו שרב לעסוק בתוכן.

אילן אלגר.

חפ: שהח, רהמ, מנככל, ממנכל, מצפא, סייבל, שמורק, מעת, הטברה, נזנר

1947

1947

1947

טגרירות ישראל - ווטינגטון

אלו

המשרד . תל-אביב

082

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דפוס..... מחזור..... 97
סווג בטחוני... סודג
דחפוט..... מלידי
תאריך זיחה 1800 2 דצמ 86
מס' פרוק

מצפ"א. מזא"ר. בחיב. (פרט-כאן)

פגישה השגריר עם הסנטור קנדי.

בסיום פגישה שנחקימה היום בין השגריר לסנטור קנדי לקראת נסיעתו של הסנטור ארצה, סיפר קנדי לשגריר כי הרוסים הבטיחו חשובה עד יום ששי זה לגבי 2 משפחות נוספות שביקש להוציא מבריה"מ.

ל.פ.
לואיז שימרון

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סגירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אל:

סגירות
דפוס... מחור... דפים
סוג בטחוני
דרישות
מאריך יציאה
שם פנאי

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2/11

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הסנטור התעניין בנעשה ביו"ש ובהשפעת אשיף על תהליך השלום.

בסיום השיחה, שהתנהלה בחדר עבודתו של הסנטור ליד אח בוער באוירה חמימה... שוחח קנדי עם השגריר ב-4 עיניים. דרוח בנפרד.

l.f

לואיד שימרון

ס ו ש ס ס כ ר ר

אל:

המשרד

076

דפנים.....מתוך.....דפים
סודי
סוג בטחוני
מיידי
דחיסות
תאריך וזייה 1500 2 דצמ 86

מסי מברק

מצפ"א.

שוחח אתי שיפטר לפני מספר ימים והעלה שוב את עניין הגירושים -
לרבות גירושו של האזרח האמריקני עמו נפגש בעת ביקורו בארץ.
הביע צער על הדבר ותקווה שאכן אלה מקרים יוצאי דופן.

m.d
מ. רוז

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מאת: נ.צ. רוזינגטון - ק. נהול

דף 1 מתוך 3

סוג כסחוני מוגבל

דחיסות מיידי

תאריך 86 (12) 021600

סימוכין מנ - 0680

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משהבייט - מקשייח - ד"ר אלון
משהבייט - לשכת שהבייט - שליט
שגרירות - ק. קישור לקונגרס

הנידון : ברכות שהבייט לאנשי הגבעה

1. להלן המלצתו של מר למדן יוסף לגבי ברכות שהבייט לאנשי הגבעה.
2. כיתוב האגרות עפ"י המפורט במסמך.
3. בברכה.

דן גנות, רס"ן

קצין 3 ניהול

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SENATORS:

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

JEFF BINGAMAN

ALAN CRANSTON

ALBERT GORE

GARY HART

JESSE HELMS

DANIEL K. INOUE

ROBERT KASTEN

EDWARD M. KENNEDY

JOHN F. KERRY

RICHARD G. LUGAR

SAM NUNN

DAN QUAYLE

JIM SASSER

STEVE D. SYMMS

JOHN W. WARNER

PETE WILSON

The Honorable _____
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator _____:

X 7 X

CONGRESSMEN:

LES ASPIN

DANTE B. FASCELL

LEE H. HAMILTON

JACK F. KEMP

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI

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The Honorable _____
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative _____:

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ס ו ק ס
ס נ ר ד
ד... 4... מחון... דפים
סווג בסחוני שמור
דחיסות... בהול לבוקר
מאריך וזייה 16.30 2 דצמ' 86

אל: המשדד + בטחון

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מסי פבר...

מצפייא - מאו"ר - בטמייח

דע: מקשייח (ממבטחון)

בר (תיא) נציג בר, כאן.

ביקור קנדי

א. לשלכם 503

1. רצויב רשימת העולים מבריהיימ שברצונו של הסנטור להפגש עם.

2. נכון להבוקר קנדי עדיין רוצה לצאת את הארץ ביום ו' (12.12) בין 10.30-11.00 בבוקר.

3. רצויב רשימת הפמלייה. (ככל הנראה הזוג הילי אינם מצטרפים.)

4. על הביקור בהדסה יוחלט במקום עיי ננסי סודרברג שתגיע ארצה ביום ה' כחלוץ הביקור.

ב. שונות

1. קנדי אינו מוכן להתראיין לתכנית "מוקד".

2. היות והסנטור עומד להיות יו"ר וועדת העבודה בסנט החדש מומלץ לקבוע לו שיחה עם שר העבודה והרווחה אם אפשר אולי ב-10.12, אחרי המפגש עם הפלסטינאים.

3. הקבוצה תגיע בטיסת יאל על"י מספר 010, האמורה לנחות ב-15.35.

4. רצויב התכנית הטנטטיבית שנמסרה לסנטור היום עיי השגריר.

5. עקב האחור בהגעת הגלויות השיגו ממקור אחר ולכן לא רצו לקחת את אלה שהגיעונו היום בדיפ' תוך הבעת צער על אי ההבנה. ננסה ל"מכור" אותן לסנטור אחר (בושביץ או בינגמאן).

למדן
2/8/86

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2/3
December 2, 1986

MEMO TO: NEVILLE LAMDAN

FROM: CHRISTA KULJIAN

RE: SOVIET FAMILIES TO MEET WITH SENATOR KENNEDY IN ISRAEL

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The following people were aided by Senator Kennedy to emigrate from the Soviet Union to Israel. We have not kept in touch with these families over the years so we are unable to confirm that they are still in Israel, especially names 6-9.

1. Isai Goldstein and family - arrived in Israel 6/86
2. Grigory Goldstein - arrived in Israel 6/86
3. Dr. and Mrs. Benjamin Levich - left USSR 11/30/78
4. Ms. Regina Isaacouna Berman - left USSR 11/1/78
5. Mr. Lev David Roytburd - arrived in Israel 1/6/81
6. Ms. Gegagena Jacob Rezker - left USSR in 1/79
7. Mr. Vadim Eusay Struzman - left USSR 12/19/78
8. Mr. Alexander Amos Bolshoi - left USSR mid 1979
9. Mr. Michael Anatole Zinberg - left USSR 11/3/80

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TRAVELING PARTY

1. Senator Edward M. Kennedy
2. Teddy Kennedy, Jr.
3. Jean Smith -- Sister
4. Greg Craig -- Staff
5. Chuck Stein -- Security
6. William Barry -- Additional Security
7. Leonard Aronson
8. Sarah Aronson
9. Marvin Rosen
10. Janet Rosen
11. Col. James Rooney -- Military attache
12. Michael Frazier -- Staff
13. Nancy Soderberg -- Staff

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VISIT BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY TO ISRAEL (9-12 December, 1986)

TENTATIVE PROGRAM

9 December: Arrival at Ben-Gurion Airport, aboard El Al #010, ETA 15.35. Met by representatives of Ben-Gurion University;
flight to Be'er Sheba; commemorative dinner.
Overnight in Jerusalem (King David Hotel).

10 December: 09.00 US Ambassador (at hotel)
10.00 President of Israel, H.E. Chaim Herzog
11.00 Minister of Finance, Mr. Moshe Nissim
12.00 Chairman of Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Mr. Abba Eban
12.30 Luncheon with Mr. Eban and members of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee
14.30 Meeting with Palestinians (arranged by US Consulate-General)
16.30 Political Director-General of Foreign Ministry, Dr. Yosef Beilin
17.00 Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr. Shimon Peres
20.00 Dinner, Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Teddy Kollek

11 December: 08.30 Kennedy Memorial
09.00 Hadassah Hospital
10.00 Prime Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir
11.00 Palmachim Air Base; luncheon, flight in Cobra Helicopter
13.15 Merkava Tank (drive and firing range)
14.30 Naval Base, Ashdod; exercise on missile boat
17.30 Tel Aviv; meeting with Defense Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin (not final; alternatively Friday morning)
19.30 Dinner; Secretary-General of the Histadrut, Mr. Israel Kaisar
Overnight, Jerusalem

12 December: 08.30 Mrs. Avital Scharansky (not final)
09.00 Soviet immigrants
09.30 Yad VaShem Holocaust Memorial
10.05 Bethlehem (organised by US Embassy)
(11.00) Departure for Jordan

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דפיס... מתוך... דפיס

סווג בסחובי

דחיסות

תאריך וזמן

מס' מברק

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Q Okay. Now you're going to do an investigation. It's been stated. So can I ask, in the same way, did the Secretary or anybody at the State Department know about funds being given to the Afghan rebels, to the Savimbi people, or to any other insurgent group?

MR. REDMAN: Anything concerning arms shipments, diversion of funds, are simply off limits. I just can't answer them -- for no reason. I'm neither confirming nor denying the stories. I just can't go into them.

Q H. Ross Perot said today, or last night, said that he had been asked by Col. North to provide \$2 million for possible use in ransom for the hostages last May. Did the Secretary know about

this, or the State Department know about this? And could you repeat what our policy is on ransom payments?

MR. REDMAN: We don't have any knowledge of that story in this building. The White House addressed it from their perspective this morning. I think the answer was essentially the same. Our policy on that score -- it's reiterated -- is that U.S. government policy is to make concessions and not to pay ransom to terrorists holding official or private U.S. citizens hostage.

Q Does that mean that the U.S. government will not pay ransom, or does that mean that the U.S. government does not condone the idea of paying ransom, from whatever sources for American hostages?

MR. REDMAN: What I could do, for a more detailed explanation, is to refer you to a document that we put out on a number of occasions. The one

I found was on May 6th, for example, in our press release number 101. In there you will find all of those questions addressed in some detail, but a key line, Ralph, would be that, "The United States strongly urges American companies and private citizens not to pay terrorists' ransom demands."

MR. BEGLEITER: So that would mean that, putting aside whether Perot was or was not asked, but any private individual such as Perot would be urged strongly by the United States government not to do what he is reported to have done. Is that correct?

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..... תאריך זימון: 2.12.86

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MR. REDMAN: I have just read the policy which is, I think, fairly direct and you can find in various ways explanations of that. It goes on for any number of paragraphs.

Q One of the -- I'm unclear on what he said -- the Secretary in Chicago made a reference to do-re-mi in connection with paying ransom or not paying ransom. Do you remember what I'm talking about, last week or the week before last?

MR. REDMAN: I remember --

Q Something about, nobody would care about a little do-re-mi or something to that effect. What was he referring to?

MR. REDMAN: You'll have to check with his office (files?). I can't help you further on that, Matt.

Q Is there a procedure, and I would assume the State Department would be involved, for a cooperation with the Swiss government in actually looking into the contents of the accounts that may have been set up for this? Is there a formal procedure for doing that and has the State Department begun such a procedure?

MR. REDMAN: Once again, you're in the area of arms shipments and that's under investigation and I can't comment.

Q Can you deny or confirm here that you never asked the Kuwaitis to release the 17 prisoners in Kuwait?

MR. REDMAN: Our position on that particular question has been stated and restated.

Q I know, but can you confirm that you never asked them?

MR. REDMAN: As I say, it has been stated and restated.

Q When we were asking about whether Iranian money got diverted to the contras, you were able to give us the impression of independent observers as to whether extra funds had gone to the contras. If we're talking about Angola and Afghanistan now as possibly receiving funds, rebels there, can you tell us again if independent observers in those areas had any indication that rebel groups there were getting extra money from some source?

MR. REDMAN: The reason I can't even volunteer to look into that question is the same one that I advanced earlier. There's an investigation. It all stems from this question of shipments, diversion of funds. As a consequence, I'm not at liberty to give you observations.

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Q Last week you were able to say --

MR. REDMAN: At this point, there is now an investigation and I'm no longer at liberty to give you those kind of observations. Just as the Attorney General said, he had had some things to say at a certain point, he was no longer at liberty to address those questions which he had addressed some days earlier.

Q Okay. Because I was about to remind you that last week you said an independent observation -- you indicated that the stuff didn't get to the contras.

MR. REDMAN: I don't know whether I said it didn't get to them. I just simply said what our objective evaluation showed at that point.

Q Does that mean that you're broadening the blanket of "no comment" to cover any

and all shipments of any and all weapons, any and all supply of funds to any and all areas of the world? I mean, you're not going to discuss the Afghan rebels ever again until this investigation is concluded?

MR. REDMAN: The question I've had doesn't necessarily involve just the Afghan rebels, Ralph. You understood the question. It had to do with diversion of funds for a particular cause. So it stems from the same question. I think that's clear.

Q It stems from the question -- it doesn't stem from the question of diversion of funds to the Contras, and it doesn't stem from the question of supply of weapons to Iran.

MR. REDMAN: What's under investigation, Ralph, are arms shipments to Iran and what happened to funds involved with those shipments.

Q Right.

MR. REDMAN: That's at the root of this question, and therefore, I can't comment on it. Barry?

Q I was going to ask you if you're able to address the reports that the Saudis financed some or a lot of these arms shipments.

MR. REDMAN: No, I can't address that.

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דפי... 7... מתוך... 5... 97

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Q I wonder if there's going to be a way that -- or maybe this is the time to ask to you -- since the Secretary publicly declared that the policy of discouraging friendly governments -- all governments -- from arming Iran was alive and well and being pursued vigorously -- which is what he said upstairs during, I think it was the AID anniversary celebration, or something -- then how is it not germane to ask you if one of your best friends in the Middle East, the Saudis, are helping arm Iran or have helped arm Iran?

MR. REDMAN: Whether or not it's germane to ask, I'm not addressing. I'm simply saying, that's not a question I can help you on.

Q Chuck, do you agree with the Saudi denial that these stories have no basis? Can you agree with that?

MR. REDMAN: You should talk to the Saudi government.

Q The Saudi government issued a statement that these stories are baseless. Can you agree with that or not?

MR. REDMAN: I am not in a position of agreeing or disagreeing with every statement by every government around the world. It's

just a matter of principle. I'm not going to get into that.

Q Well, let me try it this way. Presumably we can talk about the future. I mean, the Secretary stands up and says, "Here is our policy looking ahead." I don't want to talk about the past anymore. I want to look ahead. Looking ahead -- a week ago, he looked ahead and said, "Don't help the Iranians. Don't help terrorist-supporting countries. The embargo that we're trying to put off -- construct against Iran stands." What is the response? Is he getting cooperation from the Saudis, for instance?

MR. REDMAN: The answer to that question is simply a generic one. We're working with all our friends and allies. The policy is as you have explained it. The Secretary addressed it at the AID function. I had some words to say the day after that. That is the policy that we're pursuing. We're pursuing it across the board. But I'm not going to, on a country-by-country or case-by-case basis, evaluate how it's succeeding. I can't do it.

Q Can you give us any general evaluation yet? Are you getting a positive response?

MR. REDMAN: I don't have any general evaluation. Anything else?

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Q Chuck, back in last December, December 6th, the Secretary of State held a news conference here in the State Department. It could well have been his last one here, but I'm not sure of that -- at which he answered a question about the downing of a Nicaraguan helicopter by use of ground-to-air missiles on the part of the Contras. And his answer -- the gist of his answer was, "They found some missiles, they figured out how to use them, and I say I'm all for it -- that's fine." That statement was made on the same day he got his first, full-scale discussion at the White House of the Iran operation. Can you tell us whether he made that statement not knowing that those missiles may have been supplied as part of the operation about which he had been briefed on that day?

MR. REDMAN: Ralph, somebody is not making a connection here, because the Secretary, as well as any other number of Cabinet officials, were first informed about the connection that you are now referring to -- I believe it was Tuesday last when the Attorney General briefed the President and the members of the National Security Council at the White House.

Q Well, all we know is that the Secretary said he had his first full-scale discussion of the -- and I've forgotten how he phrased what it was that was discussed, but he ---

MR. REDMAN: That was in reference to policy toward Iran.

Q To the policy toward Iran, and the broad question that was asked was about the sale to Iran and the missions to Iran, the

weapons supplied to Iran, and the missions that had been undertaken to deal with Iran.

MR. REDMAN: Ralph, the bottom line is concerning any kind of diversion of funds toward Central America. It was not known to anyone until -- at least speaking of the Secretary now -- until he was briefed on Tuesday last at the White House by the Attorney General.

Q Now that a national security advisor has been appointed, is there any change at all in the way that Iran policy is going to be handled from what you said last week?

MR. REDMAN: No.

Q Armacost remains the point man for it?

MR. REDMAN: As I said last week, it will be handled through normal channels. That is an interagency process in which there are a number of agencies that play a role. That includes the National Security Council and when I refer to normal channels, that's exactly what I mean. I don't mean to imply that it's different than in the past. It's just that that policy is being handled in normal channels.

xxx

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ד.ק.מחור...דפיס

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דחיסה

חאריך וזיח...א-א-א

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Q So what now is Michael Armacost doing towards Iran? Is he contacting them or not?

MR. REDMAN: The contents of the policy fall under the purview of diplomatic activity and I don't comment on that.

Q So you have diplomatic activity with Iran now?
(Laughter.)

MR. REDMAN: I say it falls under the general purview and I won't comment.

Q So what is Mr. Armacost's role?

MR. REDMAN: That role has been explained. It hasn't changed. He is the person the Secretary has appointed to be particularly responsible for that policy. He's responsible for a lot of other policies, too. He is not devoting his full time to that particular effort. He has a lot of other responsibilities.

Q The Pentagon's legal counsel issues a very detailed memorandum to the Pentagon about exactly what kind of documents they were looking for. I mean, it's a very detailed thing. Can you -- and he said that was in keeping with what Meese wanted in this memo. Can you give us any guidance or any ---

MR. REDMAN: No, other than to say what I said yesterday that

Q -- particular kinds of documents they're looking for, concerning who, et cetera, et cetera?

MR. REDMAN: No. No, other than what I said yesterday that the legal advisor's office is in charge of that. They've been in contact with the Attorney General and with the FBI, and they're implementing the same kind of instructions as they've been asked to implement by those agencies.

11/11/86
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070

אל - : משפט - לשכת המנכ"ל

ייצוא טכנולוגיה

25.11

לשלכם 377 ?

שוחחתי עם היוז. אני מניח ששגרירותם בת"א מעדכנת אתכם לגבי שמות ומועדים.

א. היוז עצמו מגיע לישראל בשבת ושגרירותם תקבלו בשדה ותביאו למלון לרום. הודיעו נא למזכיר הממשלה אלי רובינשטיין שהבטיח לפוגשו בעת ביקורו בארץ.

אשר לטיפול בהיוז עצמו : הוא יהיה חופשי כל יום א' ורוב יום ב' (פרט לפגישה פנימית של הצוות שימנה 10 או 11 ושגרירותם) שאל לעצתי מה לראות ומה לעשות : ביום שבת הוסבר לו שעליו לדאוג לעצמו. יעצתי לו לגבי יום א' ויום ב' לסייר בירושלים, בית לחם, יריחו ומצדה. לגבי יום ג' שלאחר מכן הצעתי לו ביקור באיזור מגידו. האיש קתולי ומתעניין לא רק במקומות הקדושים אלא באתרים היסטוריים הקשורים לתקופה אותם מכיר היטב מן הספרות הנוצרית. בטוחני שיעשה מה שניתן להשביע רצונו, בתאום עם שגארה"ב.

ב. באשר למפגש עצמו : היוז אמר שהוא אישית רהר לרגע לדחות המפגש בשל אירועי איראן אך במחשבה שניה הגיע למסקנה שאין לקשור דבר בדבר. עודדתי. אמר עוד שמבין הסתייגותנו מ- MOU בשל "החבורה המפוקפקת" - הודו ופקיסטאן - אך אמר שבכל זאת חייבים להגיע להסכם כתוב שיכלול לא רק ההגבלות שניקח על עצמן אלא אף ייכלל בכתובים מה ההטבות הצפויות לנו. אמרתי שאני מניח שהעניין יתפתח במהלך המו"מ ואין אני והוא כאן מנהלים מו"מ של ממש. נראה כלהוט להגיע להסכם כתוב. אינני יודע אם משום רצונו להוכיח הצלחה אישית או משום לחץ עליו. מכל מקום שבתי והדגשתי שרק במהלך המו"מ יתברר אם ניתן יהיה להגיע לסכום כתוב כבר עתה.

ג. אמר שהוחלט בין שגרירותם בת"א ומחלקתו שמעבר למו"מ הנוכחי, שעדיף מבחינתם שהמשך המגעים ייעשו כאן בושינגטון בין מחלקתו ובין השגרירות. אמרתי שאני מניח שלא תהיה התנגדות לכך מהארץ אך עם שובו נסכם לעצמנו ההמשך.

ד. הבטיח להעביר לי סוף סוף רשימה שמית של המשתתפים. אעבירה אליכם עם קבלתה.

מ ת נ י

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Transcript of Reagan's Remarks to His Investigative Panel

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (AP) — Following is a transcript of remarks today by President Reagan to a Presidential panel reviewing the National Security Council, as provided by the White House, and a subsequent exchange with reporters:

Reagan Statement

Senator Tower, Secretary Muskie, General Scowcroft, I'm grateful to all of you for agreeing to serve on this board. I know it'll take a lot of your time. But your experience and expertise in this inquiry are extremely important in evaluating the National Security Council's staff operations and providing recommendations on how it should operate.

The purpose of your undertaking is to review past implementation of Administration policies and to conduct a comprehensive study of the future role and procedures of the National Security Council's staff in foreign and

national security policy.

I would like you to focus on that staff. And one, develop policy; two, coordinate with other agencies; and three, implement the President's policies, and four, oversee the implementation of these policies by others.

I hope that you would take particular care to look into the question of whether and under what circumstances the National Security Council staff was, and should be, directly involved in the operational aspects of sensitive diplomatic, military or intelligence missions such as the Achille Lauro, the T.W.A. hijacking, and Grenada and Iran.

In addition, I have directed the National Security Council staff not to participate in the actual operations associated with such activities pending the outcome of the report by the special review board.

You will have the full cooperation of all agencies of the executive branch and the White House staff in carrying out your assignment. And I want to assure you and the American

people that I want all the facts to come out — about learning of a possible transfer of funds from the sale of arms to Iran, to those fighting the Sandinista Government — we acted to learn the facts. And we'll continue to share the actions we take and the information we obtain with the American people and the Congress.

The appointment of this board and the stature of its membership are a demonstration of a commitment to learn how this happened and how it can be prevented in the future.

The Department of Justice investigation is continuing with my full support and cooperation, and if they determine an independent counsel is called for, I would welcome that appointment.

If we're to maintain confidence in our Government's foreign policy apparatus, there must be a full and complete airing of all the facts. And I am determined to get all of the facts out and take whatever action is necessary. The work of this board and the Department of Justice investiga-

tion will do just that. Just as soon as your findings and recommendations are complete, they will be shared with the American people and the Congress. So with that, I say, go to it.

Questions and Answers

Q. Mr. President, when the Attorney General said you were not fully informed and you said you were not fully informed, did that mean that you never knew anything about contra funding with Iran sales money?

A. Helen, I've answered that question. I'm not going to take — we have a meeting now to go into, but I answered that question a couple of times.

Q. Well, does that mean that you had no knowledge at all?

A. That's what I said.

Q. Mr. President, are you willing to call Congress back in for a special session?

A. That is under discussion, and there's been no decision yet. But we want to work with the Congress.

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דפים.....מחור.....דפים

שמוג בסחוני שמור

דחיסות

תאריך וז"ח. 12.45 2 דצמ' 86

מס' מברק

אל: המשרד

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מנהל משיב

אי"ד - אסיה

למכתבך מה-16.12

1. ניסיתי בשעתו לברר כבקשתכם אח נושא שה"פ בסרילנקה. עקב חילופי גברא במחלקת אסיה וגם בדסק סרילנקה, לא כל כך ידעו בהתחלה ב-א.י.ד. וושינגטון במה מדובר. לאחר ברורים נמסר לי כי אכן א.י.ד. קולומבו ביקשו אישור למימון פרויקט בשי"פ עם ישראל וכי סביר שבקשתם תאושר. הם לא יכלו לפרט לגבי מקור המימון. אודה על עדכון לגבי הפרוייקט הנ"ל ואם יש מקום לפעולה נוספת מצידנו כאן.

2. לגבי הצעתך לקיים שיחה באגף אסיה אני מסכים בהחלט אך לדעתי עלינו לבוא לשיחה כנ"ל מצוידים ברעיונות/הצעות לשי"פ. גם אם אין בידיכם כרגע תכניות מפורטות אודה אם תעבירו אלינו רשימת מדינות ונושאים לגביהם אנו מציעים שי"פ כנ"ל.

קוריאל

1986-12-02 23:13

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קמטרד, בסחון

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אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת
דע: יועץ רה"מ לחקשורת, יועץ שרבי"ט לחקשורת

להלן הודעה הנשיא על מנוי החוקר העצמאי המיוחד לפרשת איראן-קונטרס
והודעתו על מנוי קרלוצ'י לחקיד היועץ לבסחון לאומי.

יוסי גל

ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN
OF A SPECIAL ADVISORY BOARD
TO INVESTIGATE THE IRAN/CONTRA ARMS TRANSACTIONS

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1986
12:00 P.M. EST

PRESIDENT REAGAN: Good afternoon. Since the outset of the controversy over our policy relating to Iran, I've done everything in my power to make all the facts concerning this matter known to the American people. I can appreciate why some of these things are difficult to comprehend, and you're entitled to have your questions answered. And that's why I've pledged to get to the bottom of this matter. As I have said earlier, that I would welcome the appointment of an independent counsel to look into allegations of illegality in the sale of arms to Iran, and the use of funds from these sales to assist the forces opposing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

This morning, Attorney General Meese advised me of his decision that his investigation has turned up reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation by an independent counsel would be appropriate. Accordingly, consistent with his responsibilities under the independent counsel act, I immediately urged him to apply to the court here in Washington for the appointment of an independent counsel.

Yesterday I had my first meeting with the special review board. That review board is made up of three men of unquestioned integrity and broad experience in foreign and national security policy. In a meeting with the board, they promised me a tough, no-nonsense investigation. And I promised them the full cooperation of the

Handwritten notes in Hebrew at the bottom of the page, including names and dates.

1986-12-02 23:15

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מגילת צהר - דו"ח 1002

פיקוד צה"ל
מטה המודיעין
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White House staff and all agencies of the Executive branch. No area of the NSC staff's activities will be immune from review. And when the board reports to me, I intend to make their conclusions and recommendations available to Congress and the American people.

With the appointment of an independent counsel, we will have in place a dual system for assuring a thorough review of all aspects of this matter. If illegal acts were undertaken, those who did so will be brought to justice. If actions in implementing my policy were taken without my authorization, knowledge or concurrence, this will be exposed, and appropriate corrective steps will be implemented.

I recognize fully the interest of Congress in this matter, and the fact that in performing its important oversight and legislative role, Congress will want to inquire into what occurred. We will cooperate fully with these inquiries. I have already taken the unprecedented step of permitting two of my former national security advisors to testify before a committee of Congress.

These congressional inquiries should continue, but I do believe Congress can carry out its duties in getting the facts without disrupting the orderly conduct of a vital part of this nation's government. Accordingly, I am urging the Congress to consider some mechanism that will consolidate its inquiries. Such a step has already been requested by several members of Congress. I support the idea.

In closing, I want to state again that it is my policy to oppose terrorism throughout the world, to punish those who support it, and to make common cause with those who seek to suppress it. This has been my policy and will continue to be my policy. If the investigative processes now set in motion are given an opportunity to work, all the facts concerning Iran and the transfer of funds to assist the anti-Sandinista forces will shortly be made public. Then the American people, you, will be the final arbiters of this controversy. You will have all the facts and will be able to judge for themselves -- yourselves.

I'm pleased to announce today that I am appointing Frank Carlucci (?) as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. A former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Director of the CIA, and Ambassador to Portugal, Mr. Carlucci has the depth of experience in foreign affairs, defense and intelligence matters that uniquely qualify him to serve as my National Security Advisor. The American people will be well-served by his tenure.

Thank you, and God bless you.

אל:

המשרד

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אל - : תפוצות דע - : משפט, מצפ"א (סיבל) תדמור

26.11

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הסכם בין ממשלות בנושא השואה.

לשלך ~~22~~ (מה-26)

423

1. מברק הגיענו רק ביום ב'.

2. כפי שהוזכר בהתברקות הענפה הצעתו המקורית של קריגר היתה לכרות הסכם בין מועצת השואה הלאומית בארה"ב לבין "יד ושם".

3. אולם בדיק התקנון והודיע בטרם הגיעו ארצה כי בהיות המועצה "גורם ממשלתי" שמונה ע"י הנשיא, הייבת היא לחתום הסכם רק עם גורם ממשלתי בארץ ולא עם "יד ושם", ולכן נועד בזמנו עם גולדמן במשרד המשפטים לדון על כל הנושא.

4. לאחר הביקור הביא גלבע הטיוטא המוצעת של הסכם בפני המנכ"ל וגם הוא וגם קריגר המציאו לנו עותקים לידיעתנו.

5. קריגר גם שיתף שגארה"ב בארץ בדיונים מתוך השיקול שהוא מייצג "גורם ממשלתי" בתפקידו הנוכחי.

6. לגבי סעיף 3 במברק, עיינו בטיוטא זהתוכן אינו חוזר אינו מעורר היבטים שליליים לפי מיטב הבנתנו.

7. אנו ערים לחשש שהעלה גלבע שינופח מוסד הנצחה לשואה בארה"ב אך המציאות היא שלמועצה הלאומית בראשה עומד אלי וויזל (וכהונתו חודשה בחודש שעבר לעוד שנים מספר) כבר הוענק מעמד פדראלי קבוע, עם תקציב ציבורי וממשלתי, עם מוזיאון שבתהליך הקמה, סגל עובדים וכד' ולא ניתן לעצור תהליך זה. זאת ועוד : הוקמו מוזיאונים ומועצות להנצחת השואה למיניהם גם בניו-יורק, בשיקאגו, בלוס אנג'לס, בדטרויט, ועוד, כתוצאה משידול הקהילות היהודיות בהן נמצאים רבים שהם ניצולי השואה.

8. אי לכך נראה הדבר סביר כי אמנם ייחתם "מזכר ההבנה" המוצע ע"י קריגר, אולם קצב הביצוע והגשמת הסעיפים יוטלו רשמית על הנהלת "יד ושם" אשר בוודאי תדע במרוצת השנים להשגיח ולווסת החלפת החומר וכד' בצורה שלא תיצור תחרות ו/או התעלמות מרשות לאומית-ממלכתית זו בארץ.

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9. כל הנ"ל מתוך הנחה שהדבר תואם את דיני ישראל ואת מעמד "יד ושם". מניח שתבדקו גם אם קיימים תקדימים לגבי מדינות אחרות.

10. השגריר מוסיף : באשר להיבט העקרוני המוזכר בסעיף 7 - אני מציע שתקיימו דיון בארץ ותסכמו אם אכן אין במתן הלגטימציה פגיעה במעמד הבלעדי שציינו ל"יד ושם" עם הקמת המוסד.



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אל: המשרד + בטחון + ניו יורק

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מצפ"א, פריין

דע: מקשיח (ממבטחון)

ר' מפא"ת (ממבטחון)

רמשיין (ניו יורק)

נספח צה"ל ונציג כרמל כאן.

SDI - בית הנבחרים

לשלנו 238 מה-12.11. (נר 258 לממבטחון ו-73 לני"י).

לידיעתכם רצי"ב מכתב מה-19.11 מאת המורשים ג'ק קמפ וג'ים קורטר לנשיא. המכתב מדבר בעדו, ומשקף דברים שדווחו במברקנו הני"ל.

לתשומת לבכם המלצת המורשים שהצעה מקיפה להצבה בטווח הקצר של מערכת **AT&M** במסגרת תכנית ה- **SDI** תוגש אגב בקשת הממשל לתוספת לתקציב לשי"ת הנוכחית, ואגב בקשת הנשיא לכספי ה- **SDI** לשי"ת 1988.

אם בקשה זו לא תכיל הצעה מסוג זה, בכוונתם של המורשים להציע בעצמם את התיקונים הדרושים.

למזן
אין

JIM COURTESY
NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON AGING

(2/3)

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

November 19, 1986

per G2 A
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The Honorable Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As we survey the post-Iceland, post-election landscape, it has become more apparent to us than ever before that you must take the steps necessary to initiate deployment of strategic defenses for America and her allies.

You know our views on this vital issue, as we have had the privilege of discussing them with you and your senior aides on several occasions. With the Democrats in control of the Legislative Branch and the Soviets once again linking all arms control progress to the virtual abandonment of SDI, it seems that you and your allies in Congress have two stark choices.

The first choice is to submit a Fiscal Year 1988 defense budget which includes almost \$6 billion for continued long-term SDI research and stand by helplessly while the SDI opponents reduce the funding request to barely above the actual 1987 spending level. Simply put, history will repeat itself.

The alternative, which we recommend, is to present a comprehensive proposal for near-term initial SDI/ATBM deployment along with a Fiscal Year 1987 supplemental request and the full Fiscal Year 1988 SDI request. The American people want to be defended against Soviet ballistic missiles and the threats posed by emerging nuclear weapons states. They will follow your leadership, if your Administration will signal its determination to move out smartly in a positive direction, beginning in 1987.

Of course, we are familiar with the many bureaucratic obstacles to our proposal. For that reason, we intend to offer the necessary amendments to the Fiscal Year 1988 defense budget to initiate SDI/ATBM deployment if your budget request does not contain such provisions.

We would prefer not to take such actions, but we feel strongly that 1987 will be a watershed year for the SDI program. If the supporters of SDI do not move boldly and resolutely towards actual deployment, then powerful forces will combine to condemn SDI to the same unfortunate fate suffered by the Army Ballistic Missile Defense program after the 1972 AMM Treaty was signed.

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President Ronald W. Reagan
Page Two
November 19, 1986

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
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We cannot imagine that this is what you intended when you appeared on national television on the night of March 23, 1983. If anything, we understand your commitment to SDI is stronger now than it ever was. Accordingly, we appeal to you to make SDI's promise a reality.

Sincerely,


JIM COURTER
Member of Congress


JACK KEMP
Member of Congress

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דפוס.....מתוך.....דפים

סווג בסחונני שמור

מיידי דחיפות

מאריך וזיחה 12.00 2 דצמ' 86

מס' פניה

אל: המשרד + בטחון

1/2

57

060

מצפ"א, פר"ן

דע: מקש"ח

הסנטור קרל לוין ואמנת ה-ABM

לקראת ביקורו של הסנטור הנ"ל, רצ"ב לידיעתכם כתבה מעתון ווש'פוסט מהיום שמצביעה על דיעותיו לגבי האמנה הנ"ל ונושא ה-SDI.

להזכירכם, הסנטור לוין אינו נמנה על תומכי היוזמה להגנה אסטרטגית, אך הביע נכונות ללמוד על הנעשה אצלנו בנדון.

יוסף זלצמן
למדן

Reinterpretation of ABM Treaty Hit

Sen. Levin Calls View 'Fatally Flawed'; State Dept. Defends It

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration's controversial reinterpretation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, allowing unfettered testing and development of exotic missile-defense technologies, was attacked as "fatally flawed" yesterday by a Senate Armed Services Committee member who has read the classified treaty-negotiating history.

In a strongly worded letter to Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said that, "based on my review" of relevant treaty documents submitted to Congress by the administration, the reinterpretation is "incorrect" and "fatally flawed" because key U.S. negotiators were never consulted.

The reinterpretation, conducted last year by State Department legal adviser Abraham Sofaer, effectively eliminated all legal constraints on development and testing of such exotic technologies as lasers and particle beams under the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars" program.

The official U.S. position had been that the treaty constrained such tests and, to date, the administration has continued to abide by the constraints in what officials describe as a bow to domestic and foreign critics of the reinterpretation.

Nonetheless, the issue has become an important sticking point in U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations in Geneva because the administration has been unwilling to commit itself to the constraints for a definite period. As a result, several senators demanded last summer to see the documents on which the reinterpretation was based.

Levin, first to speak publicly about the documents, charged that Sofaer deliberately manipulated the



SEN. CARL LEVIN
... studied treaty-negotiating history

negotiating record "so as to permit" sophisticated tests of new missile-defense technologies.

"In my view . . . Sofaer had an ax to grind and, after he sharpened it, he buried that ax in the back of the ABM treaty," Levin said.

Levin also said "evidence of Sofaer's selective reading of the record is all too abundant and his intent to minimize or suppress facts which contradict his reading of the treaty is all too apparent."

In particular, he said, Sofaer had "set out to point out ambiguities" in the negotiating record and "to create ambiguities where none existed."

Some of these ambiguities would have been resolved, Levin said, if Sofaer had met with Gerard Smith, chief U.S. arms negotiator at the time; John Rhinelander, legal adviser to the U.S. delegation; Gen. Royal Allison, the Joint Chiefs of Staff delegate; Sidney Graybeal, chairman of a key delegation subcommittee, or Raymond Garthoff, another delegate.

Levin said his conversations with these delegates, and close reading of their memorandums about conversations with key Soviet officials, "clearly indicate that both America and the Soviet Union understood" that the treaty constrained tests of exotic missile-defense technologies.

Previously, Sofaer acknowledged that most of the U.S. negotiators took this view at the time, although one member—Paul H. Nitze—had since changed his mind. But Sofaer also said the Soviets had failed to signal their assent and that, as a result, "we cannot properly be said to be bound by such a commitment."

In a written response to Levin's letter, the State Department yesterday charged that Levin had "distorted . . . Sofaer's statements and work" and said the legal review had been undertaken "not to justify SDI testing and development but in response to legitimate concerns regarding Soviet activities, differences of views between administration departments and the need to develop a coherent view of permitted activities."

The State Department also noted that Sofaer "was assigned the task of analyzing a written record. He was, moreover, fully familiar with the views of all the persons mentioned by Sen. Levin, having read their writings and having appeared with some of them at congressional hearings and public debates."

Levin said, however, that some of the documents "need the explanation of people who were there" before they can be fully understood, and he called for appointment of "an independent panel" to hear testimony from the negotiators and "to study the entire complex of issues raised by the new interpretation."

The State Department responded that "any outside study of the ABM treaty is unnecessary."

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שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

ק.ר.פ. - ק.ר.פ.
97... מחור... דקים
שמוך
סווג בסחוני...
דחיסות... מזגזג...
מארץ וז"ח... 00... 1.1.2... דצמ' 86
מס' פנתי

מלו המשרד

$\frac{1}{3}$ כחול 51

049

מצפ"א
מק"מ (מורחבין)

קונגרס: פרשת איראן - ניקרגואה; יו"ר
לטלנו 025

א. סנט: ועדת המודיעין

Time

1. ה- HEARINGS מטעם הועדה הנ"ל נערכו בדלתיים סגורות ואלכו כ-12 שעות. העידו: מקפרילין, נורת' ומק-מהון (סגן מנהל ה- CIA לשעבר, אשר לדברי הסנטור מוינינהן למרוין קלב ברשת NBC ב-30.11.85, הסכים לתת השירותים הלוגיסטיים של ה- CIA לשם העברת משלוח הנשק הראשון לאיראן בנובמבר 1985 על סמך בקשה בע"פ מאת נורת' - וזאת בהנחה שהבקשה החריגה הזו הייתה על דעת הממונים על נורת'; מק-מהון פרש מה- CIA ללא הסבר בפברואר 86).
2. לאחר ה- HEARINGS, יו"ר הועדה, הסנטור דורנברגר, מטר לאנשי החקשורת שלדעתו העדים מתבטאים בפני הועדה "בכנות הדרושה". לעומת זאת בחקשורת היום, בריש גלי, ידיעות כאילו נורת' "אימץ את התיקון החמישי" לחוקה (המאפשר לאזרח ארה"ב לא להפלייל את עצמו), ולכן לגביו הגיעה הועדה למבוי סתום.
3. הסנטור ה- אג'ר שהתבטא אחרי ה- HEARINGS היה איגלטון ואם כי נזהר בלשונו, הביע דעתו האישית שלא יתכן שאל"מ בחיל הנחתים עירב לבדו וללא הנחיות מלמעלה את ארה"ב במלחמת איראן-עיראק ואף כיון צד אחד למלחמה קניקרגואה.
4. לדברי דורנברגר, שלב זה של ה- HEARINGS בועדת המודיעין ימשך כשבועיים. ב-15 דנא תחליט הועדה באם יש להרחיב את בסיס עבודתה.

ב. מושב מיוחד של הקונגרס

1. הסנטור דול חזר אתמול והמליץ בפומבי על קיום מושב כזה. הודה שלא זו בלבד שברצונו להגן על הנשיא ועל הנשיאות, אלא שיש גם שיקולים מפלגתיים מאחורי הצעתו. (קרי למנוע ככל האפשר פגיעה במפלגה הרפובליקאית בחודשים הבאים).

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including numbers and names.

ס נ ר נ
 ז... 2... מתוך... 3... דסים
 סוג בסחוני...
 דחפוח... מזוז...
 מאיך וזיה...
 ססי פבר...

אלו

2/3 51/49

2. נראה שהצעה זו נחקלה בקשיים. מנהיג הרוב המיועד, הסנטור בוב בירד, מתנגד לרעיון באומרו שקיום המושב המיוחד יוסיף מימד מיותר של בחלה לפרשה, וכן ישח את הסיגנל הלא נכון לעולם הגדול, תוך יצירת אורה של משבר. לדעתו ניתן להמציא לכינוס הקונגרס ה-100 ב-6.1 (כאשר השליטה בסנט מעבור לדמוקרטים). בירד כבר הודיע שבמקום ההפסקה המקובלת לאחר השבעת הקונגרס החדש עד נאום הנשיא על "מצב האיחוד", בכוונתו להתחיל מיד את עבודת הסנט.

3. יתר על כן נראה שנכון ^{אלמלא} הנשיא ריגן איבן מחלהב מהרעיון-ולפי החוקה רין הוא, כנשיא, יכול לזמן מושב מיוחד של הקונגרס.

ג. ועדה נבחרת משותפת

יש לצייין שעם או בלי קיום מושב מיוחד, מנהיגות שתי המפלגות מסכימה על מינויה של ועדה מסוג זה, כך שיש להניח שתוקם עד המחצית הראשונה של ינואר לכל המאוחר. ההצעה המקורית היתה לוועדה אחידה עם נציגים משני הבתים, אך כעת יש המציעים שתורכבנה שתי ועדות מקבילות, האחת מצד הסנט והשניה מצד הבית. בכל מקרה ועידה, או ועדות, מסוג זה תשימנה קץ לפעולות של הועדות ^{גורמות} בשני הבתים שעוסקות כיום בפרשה ותאחדנה את כל הפעולות תחת אחת.

ד. תובע מיוחד

1. עדין משמיעים קולות בקונגרס בכיוון מינוי תובע מיוחד. מנהיג הרוב, הסנטור דול כבר חייב את הרעיון, ואתמול הסנטור דוד בורן הדמוקרטי, היו"ר המיועד של ועדת המודיעין, שיגר מכתב לנשיא בו הפציר בו לעשות מינוי כזה. מצידו הודיע הנשיא שיחייב את המינוי אם משרד המשפטים ימליץ על כך.
2. מבחינת הקונגרס בכלל, יש יתרון בתובע מיוחד כי יוסמך להעמיד חשודים לדין (בנבדל למשל, מ"ועדת טאוארי" שמוסמכת רק לבדוק תפקוד המועצה לבטחון לאומי ולהמליץ המלצות בלבד לגבי שינויים). מבחינת הרפובליקאים בפרט, יש יתרון נוסף והוא שהתובע המיוחד יפעל לפי כלי הסודיות ולכן יפחת הלחץ על הממשל ועל הרפובליקאים כל עוד הנושא בגדל טוביודיצה.

ס 1 ס 2 ס 3
 ד... פתוך... דסיס
 סוג בסחוני... אגורה...
 דמיסות... מידי
 תאריך נדיחה...
 סיכום פסי...

$\frac{3}{3}$ 51/49

ה. פעילויות נוספות

1. ועדה המודיעין בבית הנבחרים הודיעה שתפתח ב- HEARINGS שבוע הבא.
2. הועדה לפעולות ממשלתיות בסנט הודיעה שבכוונתה לקיים HEARINGS גם כן.
3. המנהיגים הרפובליקאים מהקונגרס נפגשים ^{הילרי} עם הנשיא בבית הלבן ודנים עמו על הפרשה.
4. הדמוקרטים ממשיכים לקרוא בגלוי להחלפתו של ראש המטה ^{דובלנד} ^{רייגן}.
הסנטור בירד האיץ בנשיא לעשות זאת בפני מצלמות הטלוויזיה, ואילו השבטור בורן, במכתבו הנ"ל, המליץ על צעד כזה אף הוא.
5. באשר למחליף לפוינדקסטר כראש המועצה לבטחון לאומי, אמר דול בתשובה לשאלה שג'ין קירקפטריק חתיה "בחירה מעולה".

וסול
 למדן

משרד החוץ - מחלקת הקשר

ירצא **

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חוזם: 12,831

אל: דרוט/65, ניר/60

מ-: המשרד, תא: 021286, זח: 1822, זח: ב, טג: ט
נד: 8

טודי/בהול

אל: ירסי גל - רוש
ברוך בינה - ניר

האם לאור ההתפתחויות האחרונות עומדת עדיין המלצתכם שרוה"מ
ממלא מקומו ושה"ח ימנעו לפי שעה מלהשתתף בראיונות מפורטים
בכלי התקשורת בארה"ב.

אנא תשובתכם בנהול.

אבי מזנר.===

נ/א

תפ: שהח, רהמ, מנכל, ממנכל, מצמא, מזנר

למחלקת חוץ טל. 338042, 15764

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מתור: _____		כפול
	טופס מברק	סוג כסחובי:
		טודי
א ל : פזנר - לשכת רה"מ סביר - לשכת ממרה"מ	מברק	תז"ח:
ד ע : גל - ווסינגטון		021830
מאת : עתונות, ניו-יורק		כר : 0087 וול : 15

הופעות בתקשורת
למברק פזנר 60

עדיין סבור שאין לנו בשלב זה עניין מיוחד או צורך חיוני להופיע
בראיונות מפורטים בתקשורת. עיקר הלחץ והאש מופנה כעת אל הבית
הלבן ולא אלינו. ולא נראה לא שיש לנו ענין להכנס בין הנשיא לבין
הקונגרס או המדינה.
ראיון הנשיא ל"טיימס" הריט כאן כמה גבות, לוגובת פזנר ל-DCA דהיוט
היא מספקת לדעתי. וכל המוסיף גורע.
עם זאת, אין להתעלם מן הנזק הסמוך בראיון ובניסוחיו. הרמיזה בדבר
OVERCHARGING מקוממת כמה יהודים כאן. גם אין איש סבור שהנשיא התכוון
במקרה לטעודיה כשדיבר על מדינה שליטית.
אני סבור שבטופו של דבר נצטרך לצאת לתקשורת. אך כרגע איננו
נהונים במצוקה תקשורתית מהסוג שידענו בעבר. זו אולי עוד חכוא
ואני מניח שאז בחכטא.

בינה

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אל: וו/ש/41

מ-: המשד, חא: 021286, חז: 1304, חב: ב, סג: ש, ש

בבב

שמור/הול

תגרי, למדנ.

ביקור אינויה

אינויה נפגש הבקר לשיחה עם ראהמי.

אמר שמינואר יהיה יו"ר חח ועדת ההקצבות לפעולות חוצ
 שתחיל בתהליך החקיקה שתוצאותיה יתנו לנו סיפוק. הוא נפגש
 לפני שבועיים עם שולץ בנושא הריבית והמזכיר היה מוכן לחח
 הצהרה בנדון אך זו נדחתה בשל פרשת איראן. השאלה לא ייאמי
 לתת ההצהרה אלא יימתיי. ברור שיהיה צורך בהקצבה שתכסה על
 הפער שייווצר. כמוכן שההסדר לא יהיה לישראל בלבד אלא
 למדינות שקבלו סיוע צבאי ויעמדו בתנאים מסויימים. הוא
 מניח שבשלב זה המדינות שתהננה מן ההסדר תהיינה מצרים
 פקיסטאן תורכיה ויראל. הקיצופ בריבית יהיה על בסיס שנת
 והזכות להנות ממנו תהיה חלויה בתנאים הכלכליים של המדינות
 תועמדות לקבלו. להערכתו החסכון לישראל יהיה בשעור של
 350 מיליון דולר לשנה. הוא מניח שהקונגרס ירצה לחונ
 בקפדנות רבה את המצב הכלכלי של כל מדינה זכאית והוא
 מקווה שהחסכון במקרה שלנו לא יופנה להגדלת ההוצאה אלא
 לעידוד הצמיחה שכן אחת יהיה קשה להסביר ולהצדיק את
 חקיקה לחקלאים למשל בארוב המצויים באותו מצב. נוכל אבל
 מר לחקלאים שישראל ומדינות אחרות מסייעות לארוב בקידום
 ואינטרסים שלה ולא מוצדק להקשות על מדינות אלו מעבר
 לנכונותן להדק את החגורה על מנת לשפר מצבן הכלכלי.
 אחרי דברי התודה החמים של ראהמי התפחה שיחה שתדווח בנפרד.
 מנהל מצפא

93 -

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ידיעות לעתונות

שצץ

#01 (לע"מ עש"ת) שר האוצר עורך קבלת פנים לכבוד הסנאטור דניאל אינוויי 1.12.86

(נמסר ע"י דובר משרד האוצר)

ירושלים, כ"ט בחשוון תשמ"ז, 1 בדצמבר 1986 (לע"מ עש"ת 5)

"הידידות בין ארצות הברית לישראל בשנים האחרונות היא איתנה, כפי שלא היתה מעולם, ויף הולכת ומתחזקת. שום ארוע או חלוקי דעות הדדיים מפעם לפעם אין בכוחם לערער על ידידות זו, משום שהיא מושתתת על ערכים משותפים של חירות וקידמה ועל האינטרס המשותף של הגנה על העולם החופשי. ישראל היא המעוז היחיד של העולם החפשי במזרח התיכון, ואנו נענים, מעת לעת, לפניות של ידידתנו, הדרושות לאינטרסים אמריקניים."

דברים אלה אמר שר האוצר משה נסים בקבלת פנים שערך היום, יום ב', 1 בדצמבר 1986 (כ"ט בחשוון תשמ"ז) לכבודו של הסנאטור דניאל אינוויי, יושב ראש ועדת ההקצבות של הסנאט האמריקאי. שר האוצר העלה על נס את העובדה שהסנאטור אינוויי מביע בצורה חדה ובהירה את השקפתו על תרומתה הגדולה של ישראל ליעדים האיסטרטגיים של ארצות הברית והעולם החופשי. "הסנאטור אינוויי", אמר השר, "אינו רואה את תמיכת ארצות הברית בכלכלת ישראל ובטחונה כמתת חסד, אלא כגמול נאות לתרומתה של ישראל ליעדים אלה."

בקבלת הפנים השתתפו: שר התחבורה מר חיים קורפו, שר הכלכלה והתכנון מר גד יעקובי, סגן שר האוצר ח"כ עדי אמוראי, מזכ"ל הסתדרות ח"כ ישראל קיסר, יושב ראש ועדת הכספים של הכנסת ח"כ א. שפירא, ח"כ שרה דורון, המנכ"ל המדיני של משרד החוץ ד"ר יוסי ביילין, מר דב לאוטמן - נשיא התאחדות התעשיינים.

לע"מ עש"ת (דף מס' 5)

דמ 22:30

תחת

0#

Press bulletin

JERUSALEM, 1 DECEMBER 1986

.86.12.01

#21 NISSIM LAUDS U.S. SENATOR INOUE

(COMMUNICATED BY THE FINANCE MINISTRY SPOKESMAN)

AT A RECEPTION HELD BY FINANCE MINISTER MOSHE NISSIM TODAY (MONDAY), 1.12.86, IN HONOR OF SENATOR DANIEL INOUE, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, MR. NISSIM SAID THE FOLLOWING:

"FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL HAS NEVER BEEN FIRMER THAN IN RECENT YEARS, AND IS GROWING EVEN STRONGER. NO INCIDENT OR OCCASIONAL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION CAN WEAKEN THIS AMITY, WHICH IS FOUNDED ON THE COMMON VALUES OF LIBERTY AND PROGRESS, AS WELL AS ON THE JOINT INTEREST OF DEFENDING THE FREE WORLD. ISRAEL IS THE FREE WORLD'S ONLY STRONGHOLD IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ON OCCASION OUR COUNTRY ACCEDES TO ITS FRIEND'S REQUESTS, WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL FOR U.S. INTERESTS."

MR. NISSIM PRAISED THE SENATOR FOR HIS CLEAR AND INCISIVE PRESENTATION OF HIS VIEW OF ISRAEL'S LARGE CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRATEGIC GOALS OF THE U.S. AND THE FREE WORLD. THE MINISTER ADDED THAT MR. INOUE DOES NOT CONSIDER U.S. SUPPORT OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMY AND SECURITY AS CHARITY, BUT AS A FITTING RECOMPENSE FOR ISRAEL'S CONTRIBUTION TO THESE OBJECTIVES.

PRESENT AT THE RECEPTION WERE: MINISTER OF TRANSPORT HAIM KORFU, MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND PLANNING GAD YA'AKOBI, DEPUTY FINANCE MINISTER MK ADIEL AMORAI, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF LABOR MK YISRAEL KESSAR, KNESSET FINANCE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN AVRAHAM SHAPIRA, MK SARAH SORON, FOREIGN MINISTRY POLITICAL DIRECTOR-GENERAL DR. YOSSI BEILIN AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, DOV LAUTMAN.

AM/HB
#0

2030 HOURS

1.2
9^ט

מדינת ישראל

תאריך 23-10-1986

רונה

אל:

מאת: לשכת ראש-הממשלה.

פקדון

ממשל החוץ :

אתה מתבקש להיכנס

עם סנאטור אינאוי

ג-1 בקצמבר

ת/כ

עוזר ענין
235 244
524 445

(9^ט א 11^ט)

12/10

מדינת ישראל

תאריך

פגישה כפא - אינווי

אל:

מאת: לשכת ראש-הממשלה.

✓ י. בן-אפרן (לוי)

✓ - ? (ש"ר) א. א. קובינין (אפרן)

✓ צמח אבין (צמח)

✓ אורן אבין

סימוכין: 1-דש-080-6

ארוחת צהרים מטעם ראש-הממשלה לסנטור אינוויי
יום שני 1.12.86, 13:00 בקינג-דיוויד

רה"מ
סנטור אינוויי
זאב וולפסון
שגריר ארה"ב
ארנס
מודעי
יוסי ביילין
שמחה דיניץ
יוסי בן-אהרן
אלי רובינשטיין
צחי הנגבי
אבי פזנר
יוסי אחימאיר
אריה מקל
עודד ערן

עתונאים

תום פרידמן
מירה אברך
רפי מן
עודד ערן
פנתס דרור

סימוכין: 6-080-ט-1

ארוחת צהרים מטעם ראש-הממשלה לסנטור אינוויי
יום שני 1.12.86, 13:00 בקינג-דיוויד

HOST
SENATOR D. INOUE
MR. Z. WOLFSON
HIS EXCELLENCY MR. T. R. PICKERING,
AMBASSADOR OF THE U.S.A.
MR. M. ARENS, MINISTER
MR. Y. MODAI, MINISTER
DR. Y. BAILLIN
MR. S. DINITZ
MR. Y. BEN AHARON
MR. A. RUBINSTEIN
MR. TZ. HANEGBI
MR. A. PAZNER
MR. Y. AHIMEIR
MR. ARYE MEKEL

רה"מ
סנטור אינוויי
זאב וולפטון
שגריר ארה"ב
ארנס
מודעי
יוסי ביילין
שמחה דיניץ
יוסי בן-אזרון
אלי רובינשטיין
צחי הנגבי
אבי פזנר
יוסי אחימאיר
אריה מקל

עתונאים

MR. T. FRIEDMAN
MRS. M. AVRECH
MR. RAPHI MANN
MR. ODED ERAN
MR. PINHAS DROR

תום פרידמן
מירה אברך
רפי מן
עודד ערן
פנחס דרור

* קודם לילה, מאת אנגליה

* (אלמנה גבול)

* גארם

ארוחת צהרים מטעם רה"מ לסנטור אינווי
ביום שני 1.12.86 בשעה 13:00 בקינג-דיוויד

HOST

~~Mr. Z. W.~~
Senator D. Inouye
Mr. Z. W.
His E, The Ambassador
of the USA, Mr. Y. P.
Mr. S. Dinitz
M. A. Rubingstein

רה"מ
סנטור אינווי
זאב וולפסון
שגריר ארה"ב
ארנס
מודעי
יוסי ביילין
שמחה דיניץ
יוסי בן-אהרן
אלי רובינשטיין
צחי הנגבי
אבי פזנר
יוסי אחימאיר
אריה מקל

קק אנגליה
Mr. M. A. Minister
" Y. Modai

Mr. Tom Freidman
Mrs. Mira Avrech
Mr. Raphi Mann
Mr. Oded Eram

עתונאים - 3
תום פרידמן
מירה אברך
רפי מן

Mrs.

אנוכ - ארצות

פנימי (10/11)

כ"צ יוני 1986 - מאת חבר


מתן אולפני

פנקס


10

סמלון
מזרחי
מזרחי

ארוחת צהרים מטעם רה"מ לסנטור אינווי
ביום שני 1.12.86 בשעה 13:00 בקינג-דיוויד



- רה"מ
- סנטור אינווי
- ✓ זאב וולפסון
- שגריר ארה"ב
- ✓ ארנס
- מודעי
- ✓ יוסי ביילין
- ✓ שמחה דיניץ
- ✓ יוסי בן-אהרן
- ✓ אלי רובינשטיין
- ① צחי הנגבי
- ✓ אבי פזר
- ⑤ יוסי אחימאיר
- ① אריה מקל



- עתונאים - 3
- ✓ תום פרידמן
- ✓ מירה אברך
- ✓ רפי מן
- ① ✓ אריה מקל



מדינת ישראל

תאריך _____

אל:

מאת: לשכת ראש-הממשלה.

א/מקס 1301 הודו



מדינת ישראל

תאריך _____

אל:

מאת: לשכת ראש-הממשלה.

תיקס - 371

אספיק

הענף

פנים

צבא

(כניסה יוצא "ישראל" אזורי
הענף אזורי "ישראל" אזורי
שטח האזורי)

אל:

התאריך

מאת:

תיק שש

הנדון:

אל מלגה רבמ' סולטור אינוווי

ביום שני - 1.12.86 בעצה 13⁰⁰ - בקינג-צ'וי 3

רבמ' צמ. הנג'י

סולטור אינוווי

צאב וולפסון

שטיר ארהב

אלנס סמס

מוצ'י

ווס. ביי. אן

שמה פינ'ל

י. בן-אפרן

אל'י רובינסון

אל'י פזר

ווס. אלתימאיר

ארוחת צהרים מטעם רה"מ לסנטור אינווי
ביום שני 1.12.86 בשעה 13:00 בקינג-דיוויד

רה"מ
סנטור אינווי
זאב וולפסון ✓
שגריר ארה"ב ✓
ארנס ✓
מודעי ✓
יוסי ביילין ✓
שמחה דיניץ ✓
יוסי בן-אהרון ✓
אלי רובינשטיין
צחי הנגבי
אבי פזנר
יוסי אחימאיר
אריה מקל

✓ פנחס צור. (בזמן ומיפץ)

עתונאים - 3 ✓
תום פרידמן ✓
מירה אברך
רפי מן

✓ אלוה - אלוה ✓

כי ציגיא קאם - אלא חמר

ש/מין אלוהי .

אקטובער 1912
 אקטובער 1912

12/10

1300

מזכר
 אל:

(להתכתבות פנימית במשרד הממשלה)

התאריך	0
תקן מס'	
מועד:	יום שני - 1.12
הנדן:	קניג - 3.11.12

אין מאגיס רהמ' זנסאר אינוווי

רהמ'	10
זאג וואססין	10
✓ + ארנס (קוב)	20
✓ + מוצג (אולי. פרויס)	30
✓ + שאיר ארנס (האנ)	40
✓ קוני. מעלן (צוה' זאג)	50
✓ + יוסי. ביטין (אליהו. פרויס)	60
✓ + שעה ביני. (זעמ)	70
✓ + אלי. קאסינשטיין (קבורה)	80
✓ קן-אבין. (שוני)	90
אבי. פזנר (זעמ)	100
20 (?)	110
צמי. פזנר	120
אבי. פזנר	120
110 - אימאקא (זעמ)	130
3 + צמאקא	

16-17 112-3113

קניג
 אל
 זאג
 ארנס
 פרויס

צ'ריק אהצמין אט הטאנליס הטאליס

ארארוג - צהריים שרה"ט אורק אכב/ב

הסטור אינאווי קיוס ב' 1.12

ב' ק'נז - ציווי"צ. אלה מצוייקה נאציז אקטאל

הטורוס מצמו.

(קרינה)	א. רובינשטיין א	א רבין	✓
	(מנכ"ל הממשלה)	א ארנס	(2)
	א בל	א מצ'ע	(3)
	*	א שני אנה'ק	✓ (4)
(ele)	בן - טאהרין	א רונ אילטא	(5)
		ב. יעין (אילנס)	✓ (6)
		א. פינף	✓ (7)

ט ר פ ס
דף...!...מתוך...!...דפים

סווג בטחוניסודל
דחיפות...מילדל
תאריך וז"ח. 25. ננב. 1988
מס' מברק

אל:

המשרד

533

522 - 69

אל: מנהל מצפ"א; מאו"ר

דע: מקשי"ח

ביקור אינויה - לשלכח 337

1. נפגשתי עם אינויה היום - כשעה וחצי לאחר הודעת הנשיא ומסיבת העיתונאים של מיס. אישר שבמקור, מטרת הביקור שלו בארץ היתה להתעדכן בנושאים שונים לקראת השנה הבאה אך "ההתפתחויות האחרונות שמחגלות דוקא ברגעי"א אלה מוסיפות מימד חדש לביקור". הוא תקווה שהשרים הנוגעים בדבר יהיו מוכנים לדבר איתו בגילוי לב על חלקה של ישראל בפרשת איראן וספיחיה. **"THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS"** כדבריו, חשוב שישתפוהו ככל האפשר בפרטים - תוך הכרה שמצד אחד הוא (אינויה) מעולם לא הדליף מידע רגיש, ומצד שני מעינינו אנו שיוכל בשובו לווישינגטון לדבר באורח מוסמך עם עמיתו בסנט.

2. הוא מחייב את התכנית שהתגבשה עד כה. הוא מנסה לקבוע (באמצעות מחמ"ד) פגישה עם שג' ארה"ב או ב-2.12 בערב (בת-א) או דבר ראשון בבוקר ~~13.12~~ 13.12 בירושלים. הוא מבקש לא לקבוע פגישות נוספות לשאר היום ה-13.12, כי ברצונו **"TO PLAY IT BY EAR"** ובמידה הצורך לבקש שיחות נוספות במקום אם יש **"UNFINISHED BUSINESS"**

מהימים הקודמים.

3. באשר לתוכן השיחות, הוא ירצה לשמוע במיוחד על:

- מצבה הכלכלי של ישראל.

- מצב נכונותנו הצבאית.

- יחסינו עם מדינות ערב, (ביחוד ירדן, מצרים, סוריה, וסעודיה).

- האוירה הכללית בארץ.

4. הוא מעוניין גם לשמוע על ענין "היחס השוה" (נאטואיזציה) וכן על חלקנו בתכנית

ה- **SDI**. בצה"ל אין צורך לארגן דמונסטרציה של כח האש שלנו וכדומה.

5. הוא מגיע בגפו. יתכן שמר זאב וולפסון יהיה בארץ בזמן הביקור והוא יוכל להצטרף

לכמה מהארועים אך לא (לא) לשיחות הרגישות.

6. על אף הגישושים והצעות מפתות שיתמנה כיו"ר ועדת משנה אחרת של ועדת ההקצבות,

בכוונתו להשאר כיו"ר ועדת המשנה לפעולות זרות.

למדן

** ירצא

שומר

חודם: 11,9263

אל: רוש/337

מ-: המשרד, תא: 241186, זח: 1622, זח: מ, טב: ש

נד: 8

שומר/מידוי

למדן.

ביקור אינדיה.

להלן התכנית במי שהתגבשה עד כה:-

30.11 - הגעה ב-1610 אל-על 008 .

1.12 - 0900 - ראה י"מ

1000 - שה י"ח

1300 - א י"צ - ראה י"מ

1500 - שר האוצר

2000 - א י"צ מטעם שר האוצר.

2.12 - 0800 - א י"ב עם שר הבטחון.

1200 - 0900 - סיור בצה"ל בלורית שר הבטחון

1300 - צהריים וביקור בתעשייה האווירית.

4.12 - 0100 - יציאה בי"אל-על י" 001.

מנהל מצפ"א.==

אחת
 בקל נמסרה באישור

(Red scribble)

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משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

ב/א

תפ: שחח, רהמ, מנבל, ממנבל, מצפא, שמורק, מאור, טקס

218

NOT RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

5096

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ש מ ו ר

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אל: 1101, נד: 632, מ: המשרד
דח: ר, סג: ש, תא: 041186, רח: 1600

ש מ ו ר / ר ג י ל

ד ר ו ר .

ד ט : ל מ ד נ .

א י נ ו י ה .

ד א ה י מ ' י א ר ח ו ל צ ה ר י י מ ב - 1.12 ו ל א כ פ י ש ה ב ר ק נ ו ק ו ד מ ל כ נ .
מ נ ה ל מ צ פ י א .

. ג . ע .

ת פ : ש ה ח , ד ה מ , מ נ כ ל , מ מ נ כ ל , מ צ פ א , ש מ ו ר ק , א ו ר ח י מ

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY

1955

1956

1957

1958

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARY
1959

1960

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARY
1961

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARY
1962

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רגיל/טודי

נר 1 פר ווש בנמרד

אל: מרכז, מצפ"א

דע: שגריר, מתני - רושינגטון

מאת: בנצור, קונכל לוטאנגלט

1) ממקור כאן שטוריה החלה בניצול המסחרי של שדה הנפט אל-טיס, כ-100 ק"מ מערבית לגבול העירקי. תפוקתו 50 אלף חביות ליום. שני שדות נפט אחרים, בא-לורד ואל-אשהרה מפותחים בטביבה. ההנחה היא שכאשר 3 שדות הנפט האלו יגיעו ב-1989 למלוא תפוקתם, תהיה 5 מליון טון לשנה. לפי תחזית זו עשויה טוריה לשפר באורח ניכר מצבה הכלכלי ע"י הגעה לתפוקה כוללת של 11 מליון טון נפט לשנה. בספטמבר החלה טוריה בשאיבת דלק באמצעות צינור באורך 92 ק"מ מדיר אל-צור עד לחוף טארטוס. טוריה השקיעה 100 מליון דולר בחיבור השדות החדשים לצינור קיים מצפון - מזרח טוריה בחוויג'אט שאלוון. טוריה מייצאת כמחצית מהדלק המופק על ידה. מאיוון השוק המקומי מסופק ע"י מדינות כאיראן, לוב ואלג'יר. באוגוסט חתמה טוריה על חוזה עם איראן על 2.5 מליון טון לשנה. כן קיבלה 300 אלף טון מכווית.

2) צינור דלק אחר יוצא מטאמאר שבצפון תימן. יש מומחים הטוענים ששדה נפט שט שבדירנות של רמלאט א-סבסטיאן הוא העשיר באזור. הנשיא עלי עבדולה סלאח הודיע ששלוש חברות דלק הסכימו להקים הצינור מטאמר לנמל חודידה

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

3) צינור דלק אחר מועל עתה לאורך כ-100 ק"מ מעיראק
לכווית . הצינור מחבר אל רומאליה לחוף הכוויתי ומוליך
גז טבעי מרומאליה לזואביר שדות גז אלו לא פעלו
במשך זמן רב עקב מלחמת איראן עיראק . כווית טוענת
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בנצור

תפ: שהח,רהמ,שהוט,מנכל,ממנכל,ר/מרכז,רט,אמן,ממד,מצפא

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News Summary December 1, 1986

Editorials

NYP "Don't Be Dumb About Intelligence" Congress should not overreact. The effort to find out about the Iran arms sales should not be used as an excuse for an all out salvaging of US intelligence agencies.

Editorial Notebook

NYT-Meyer "Mudakhil in Iran, Then and Now" "Persia and the Persian Question" was published in 1892 yet it remains an indispensable guide to Iran. The best chapter is about the Persian Gov't, with its swarm of retainers around the Shah and so many ministers that nobody really knew with whom one was dealing. The glue holding all this together was a cherished "national institution": mudakhil, or official swindling. Iran has not changed much in the last 94 years.

Columns

NYT-Safire "Reagan in the Woodshed" An independent counsel will be appointed; Reagan will be replaced; reporters with fresh revelations will give the scandal more impetus. What will help the Presidency from collapsing? Perhaps the opposition will lessen the viewer's ire at Reagan. Who would have thought that the Ayatollah would have the power to fund the contras or bring about the first major example of Saudi-Israeli collaboration? In this orgy of double-dealing, peacemakers might be able to discover an opening in which to deal.

NYP-Evans & Novak "Iranian Backfire: Radicals Are Even Stronger Now" The botched effort to cozy up to Iran unwittingly handed the keys to the US-Iranian future to the radicals of the Islamic regime just as it faced rising dissension at home. Ironically, that reverses one of the Administrations goals: to induce political change. The regime has been strengthened and Rafsanjani's account rings truer than the case made in Washington: "They started begging us to help them in Lebanon through scores of channels, through Japan, through neighboring countries...."

ND-Kirkpatrick 11/30 "The Buck Still Stops With the President" The difficulties suffered in recent days by Reagan and his administration are self-inflicted and could have been avoided had the aides

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remembered some fairly simple principles: Don't violate the law and the spirit of each man for himself is not only ignoble, it is also unjustified.

ND-Pike 11/30 "A Brigade of Know-Nothings in Charge" The gravest concern is not the arms sales to Iran, it's "Who is in charge here?" Not since the Nazi war crimes trials have so many high gov't officials alleged that they didn't have the slightest idea of what was going on.

DN-Nelson "Ron Remains, But Illusion is Gone" In the last 3 months, Reagan has severely strained--if not destroyed--the illusion that he has all the facts. In terms of Iran there lies one a basic, primitive, blatant, undisguisable, bald fact: a swap. Guns for people. Does Reagan really have all the facts that would justify such a policy? He didn't even know that \$30 million was going to Nicaragua, one of his leading crusades.

DN-Krauthammer "Contras: Sacrificial Lambs?" It is a big deal that the money for the contras came from the Iran-for-hostages swap. It shows a deep disrespect for the law by the Americans involved. It shows an unhealthy willingness to please American representatives by the Israelis involved. But it does not alter the fundamental strategic situation in Central America. The US should support a resistance whose aim is to turn Nicaragua from a Soviet satellite into a friendly country to the US.

ND-Wright 11/30 "What Choice Is There But to Deal With Iran?" Washington has no choice but to attempt reapprochement with Iran. This has nothing to do with the hostages. First, it is clear that Iran will win the war. Second, the Soviets have made inroads in restoring relations with Iran. Disclosure of Iran's dealings with the US and Israel is likely to alienate the extremists of Islamic holy War, Amal and other factions targeting the US and its citizens. One short-sighted goal of the US initiative--the release of the US hostages--may have been endangered by the timing and tactics of this escapade.

ND-Collins "The Newshounds Smell Blood" There is nothing like the sight of a president in trouble to clear the sinuses and get the press' blood pounding. The barely suppressed hope, of course, is that it will lead to disaster.

ND-Wiemer "It's Time for 'Wide World of Scandal'" Now that the real breath and elegance of the arms deal with Iran is emerging, lovers of political intrigue have a chance to savor some truly rococco duplicity. But as usual, the TV networks will probably flub the assignment, just as they did during Watergate.

NYP-Latham "For the V.P., A Question: How Much Did He Know?" It is not clear whether Bush knew that funds were diverted to the contras. But according to NSC insiders--Bush was heavily involved in supplying arms to the contras and was "intimately aware" of North's activities. Shultz appears to have come out a winner.

Press Reports

0015 / 1/1 3/5

Israeli Arms Dealer Denies Profiting in Sale

NYT-Freidman-Nimrodi publicly denied that he had made any profits by shipping American weapons to Iran and insisted he had acted solely on "humanitarian grounds." He said he had become involved in the Iran affair only at the request of the Israeli Gov't and exclusively for the purpose of freeing the American hostages. For the first time, the Israeli Cabinet had been briefed on the affair, but ministers said they had not learned much more than what was already reported in the media. Nimrodi issued the statement to counter reports that Israeli middlemen made millions in profits by arranging the American sales to Iran. He apparently was hoping for an authoritative gov't statement clearing his name and when none came he decided to issue his own. (NYP-Dan; DN-AP)

Israelis Switched Arms Parts to Iran

ND-Pincus (Wash Post) Israeli arms brokers substituted obsolete anti-aircraft missile parts in secret November 1985 arms shipments to Iran, angering the Iranians and causing the Reagan White House to begin sending weapons directly from US military stocks, informed US and Israeli sources said.

New Light on Khashoggi's Israel Ties

NYP-Johnson (gossip page) Khashoggi has been very tight with the Israeli Gov't for years. Israeli agents met with his lawyer, Marvin Mitchelson in 1980 when he was representing the Saudi's wife in a bitter divorce battle. The Israeli agents told Mitchelson "Khashoggi is going to be very important to Israel. There are also of things going on in the Mideast. We can't go into it but Khashoggi could be very helpful. We're just trying to clear this up." Khashoggi began his dealings with Israel in 1978. After Peres became PM, Khashoggi met many times with him in Morocco and other countries, according to the author of a book on the Saudi billionaire.

Reagan's Admission May Hurt Prosecution of Major Case

WSJ-Penn-Reagan's admission that he permitted the secret shipments of arms to Iran may undercut the prosecution of a major federal criminal case in which 18 defendants are accused of illegally plotting to sell arms to Iran.

Rabb Denies Discussing Iran Arms

NYT-Dionne-The US Ambassador to Italy, whose name has risen in a court case involving the sale of arms to Iran, emphatically denied that he had discussed the Iranian arms or hostages with anyone. He specifically denied having discussed arms sales or the release of hostages with Khashoggi, a longtime acquaintance. Nico Minardos also states that he spoke with Rabb about the arms dealings.

NYT-Diamond-Ronald Kessler, author of a book on Khashoggi and Minardos disputed statements by Raab about his conversations with them. Kessler said that Raab did mention the Iranian hostages to him in connection to the Saudi billionaire. Minardos said he saw Raab in Rome and discussed the sale of arms to Iran.

0015 / 1/1 4/5

Congressional Leaders Seek Special Unit on Iran Arms Deal

NYT-Roberts p.1-Congressional leaders from both parties urged that a special committee like the one used during the Watergate affair be set up to control the spreading investigation into the Administration's arms deals with Iran and the funneling of the funds to Nicaragua. The comments reflected a growing sense of crisis in the capital, as Republicans and Democrats alike warned Reagan in urgent tones that if he did not move swiftly, the final two years of his presidency could be irreparably damaged. But the Administration raised the likelihood of confrontation with Congress by declining to provide more information about arms shipments to Iran and suggested it would invoke executive privilege. (all NY papers)

Reagan Tells of "Another Country," Funneling Funds to Iran

NYT-special-in a time magazine interview, Reagan said it was "another country" funneling money to the rebels, not the US. This was an apparent reference to Israel. "They then were overcharging and were apparently putting the money into bank accounts of the leaders of the contras. It wasn't us funneling money to them. This was another country."

Mood at the White House

NYT-Boyd-Most of Reagan's advisers agree that the crisis will linger and that it will get worse before it gets better. There is a mood of despair as damage builds. (DN-Drake)

Reagan Blames the Press

DN Drake-Reagan, speaking with "bitter bile" in his throat blames the press for the failure of his Iran policy and says North is a "national hero." He made his comments in a Time Magazine interview. (ND-LA Times; NYP-Lathem)

Arms Sales Worry & Anger European Officials

WSJ-Browning-Emotions are probably strongest in Britain and West Germany, where some leaders feel betrayed at the Iran arms sales by the US. Policy makers feel their trust was misused and worry that the crisis could spill over into trade issues. Even the French, who secretly enjoyed watching American officials squirm, worry that Western negotiations on arms issues could be weakened, and that moderate Arab nations, angry and embarrassed, will grow more wary of cooperating with the West.

Bush Speaks Out

DN-no biline-Bush defended Reagan's handling of the crisis and denied any involvement in private funding of Nicaraguan rebels. Bush was interviewed by Time Magazine.

Safe House in London

DN-UPI-Secret arms deals to supply US weapons to Iran were arranged by retired US Air Force Gen. Secord from a "safe house" in London, the Sunday Times reported.

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Arms Deal Condemned by Parliament in Iraq

NYT-AP-The Iraqi Parliament condemned US arms shipments to Iran as a "dirty and mean game" that only fueled Iran's war effort against Iraq. The Iraqi PM asked the Arab League to act to confront the dangers posed by the arms shipments.

Contra Chiefs Say Iran Affair May Have Doomed Them

NYT-LeMoyné p.1-The leaders of the Nicaraguan rebels say they may finally face defeat, not inside Nicaragua, but in a Washington political uproar beyond their control. The leaders insist they knew nothing of the scheme that provided them with funds. (WEJ-Greenberger)

52 Killed in Fighting in Beirut

NYT-special-Pierce fighting continued around Palestinian districts in Lebanon and the PLO called for an emergency meeting of the Arab League to discuss the situation. Police report that 52 people were killed and more than 100 wounded in the last 24 hours in and around Palestinian centers, raising the death toll to 500 and 1000 wounded since the power struggle between the PLO and Shiite Amal broke out 6 weeks ago.

Waite Resume Hostage Effort/New York Islamic Group Involved

NYT-AP-Waite said that he had resumed contacts aimed at winning the release of hostages in Lebanon. He said that he did not feel his work had been undermined by the US arms sales to Iran but that some of his contacts with the Shiites had become "a little frayed by all the political mishmash of the last weeks.

NYT-AP photo of Mohammad Mehdi and Dale Shaheen of the National Council on Islamic Affairs, a NY based Islamic group arriving in Beirut. They are there to appeal for the release of the foreign hostages.

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NEWS SUMMARY

רע: ניו-יורק.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1986
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1986
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1986

MAJOR NEWS HEADLINES

TOP STORY: THE IRAN AFFAIR: REAGAN REMARKS

President Reagan, faced with deepening crisis over the Iran-Contra controversy said in an interview with Times magazine called Lt. Col. Oliver North, whom he fired from the NSC last week, "a national hero" and he attacked the media reportage of the controversial disclosures saying "I've never seen the sharks circling like they are now with blood in the water". Meanwhile, Congressional leaders warned that the President must take drastic action to save his administration from the growing scandal.

Phil. Inq.: GOP Leaders Urge Special Iran Probe: Reagan Vows To Stand Firm, Defends Deal

Wash. Post: 'I'm Not Going To Back Off': Reagan Facing A Deepening Crisis, Expresses Defiance, Hits News Media

Balt. Sun: Reagan Blames Press, Calls North 'Hero'

Balt. Sun: Urgent Session Of Congress Sought On Iran

Wash. Post: Dole Urges Recalling Congress For Inquiry

Chris. Sci. Mon: Reagan Faces Aftershocks Of Iran Affair

24 HINDUS KILLED BY SIKHS

Four Sikh terrorists shot and killed 24 Hindus Sunday after ordering them off and separating them from other passengers in Punjab state. Eight others were seriously wounded.

Wash. Post: Sikhs Kill 24 Hindus In Bus Attack

Wash. Times: Terrorists Slaughter 24 Hindus On Punjab Bus

Chic. Trib.: Sikhs Kill 24 Hindus In Punjab

Balt. Sun: Sikh Terrorists Kill Hindus On Indian Bus

Phil. Inq.: 24 Killed In Punjab Massacre: Gunmen Pick Out Hindus On Bus

ACTOR CARY GRANT DIES

Cary Grant, 82, whose debonaire and elegant persona made him one of Hollywood's most legendary and romantic leading men of the big screen. He died Saturday night after a massive stroke in Davenport, Iowa where he was rehearsing a show, "A Conversation With Cary Grant."

Wash. Post: Cary Grant, 82 Dies In Iowa: Hollywood Legend Appeared In 72 Films

Chic. Trib.: Screen's Leading Many, Cary Grant Dies At 82

Balt. Sun: Actor Cary Grant Dies Of Stroke At 82



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ISRAELIS SHIPPED OBSOLETE PARTS: Incident Angered Iranians, Led To Direct U.S. Role

Wash. Post, Pincus: U.S. and Israeli sources said yesterday that the Reagan White House began to send arms directly to Iran after the Iranians became angry when in Nov. '85, Israeli arms brokers sent obsolete Hawk spare parts to Iran in a secret shipment. Sources said that in May '86 parts for Hawks were sent to Iran as replacements for the rejected Nov. shipment. Yaacov Nimrodi confirmed reports yesterday that he organized the first arms shipments to Iran in Sept. '85, when the Israelis began the operation with tacit U.S. approval. He said that these first shipments, which led to the release of hostage Benjamin Weir, were intended to gain U.S. hostages freedom. David Kimche and Al Schwimmer, founder of Israeli Aircraft Industries were other middlemen involved in brokering arms to Iran transactions. When direct U.S. shipments began, including a Feb. delivery of 500 TOW missiles, Col. Oliver North of the NSC became the White House liason with the Israeli govt. on Iran issue, while his counterpart in Israel, selected by then Prime Minister Peres, was Amiram Nir. The idea of arms shipments to Iran to foster contacts in the Khomeini govt. began as early as 1981 when then-Sec. of State Haig gave a tacit okay for an Israeli proposal to send arms to build Iranian military contacts. (1/12/86)

Wash. Post: Israeli Sale Said Allowed By Haig in '81

Balt. Sun: Israeli Arms Dealer Admits To Contact With Iran

Chic. Trib.: Israeli Denies Profiting In Deal

Phil. Inq.: Israeli Says Arms Traded For Hostage

DELAYS STIR CONCERN IN IRAN PROBE: Officials Questioning Document Security, Meese's Participation: FBI Plans To Dispatch Investigators To Israel

Wash. Post, Woodward & Pincus: Sources said that top Justice Dept. officials are concerned about the preservation of White House documents related to the secret arms-to-Iran deals that allegedly yielded profits diverted to Nicaragua rebels. There are reports that Lt. Col. North shredded documents in his office. Some of these officials want Atty. Gen. Meese removed from the investigation. One Justice Dept. official also expressed concern over a delay in involving the FBI in the probe. Another official said that the FBI will, however, send agents to Israel as part of the investigation. (30/11/86)

Wash. Post: Iran-Contra Connection Tipped Scale: Meese's White House Revelation Turned A Flap Into A Scandal

Bost. Globe: US Team Reportedly To Question Israelis Involved In Arms Shipments

SHAMIR ADMITS RISK TO ISRAEL BUT DEFENDS ARMS SHIPMENTS

Phil. Inq., Max: Prime Minister Shamir yesterday said that Israel's role in the arms-to-Iran deal was a "risk" as the weapons sent could be used against Israel. A govt. official said that Israel would cooperate with U.S. investigators probing the diversion of profits from the arms transfers to Nicaraguan contras. (29/11/86)

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NEWS ARTICLES CON'T

ISRAEL TO RESUME SALES TO IRAN WHEN THE HEAT'S OFF

Chic. Trib. Broder: Israeli sources said that despite the hot controversy over President Reagan's arms deals with Iran, Israel will continue limited sales to that country so as to maintain a hold on its strategic interests there. The official Israeli position now is that Israel involved itself in the Iranian arms deals at the request of the U.S. Pinhas Goldstein, a member of Israel's parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Security Committee said that Israel must continue to make decisions on its arms sales "in light of its national interest". (30/11/86)

SYRIA RECALLS BONN ENVOY, EXPELS 3 GERMAN DIPLOMATS

Phil. Inq. Wallace: Syria responded to West Germany's expulsion last Thursday of four Syrian diplomats as a result alleged evidence of Syrian involvement in terrorism by recalling its ambassador from Bonn and ordering three West German diplomats from Damascus. (29/11/86)

Chic. Trib.: Syria Answers West Germany With Diplomat Curbs
Wash. Post: Syria Dusts W. German Diplomats

IRAN-CONTRA LINK SAID TO BE SCHEME OF SAUDI FINANCIER

Wash. Times, Sieff: According to sources, the idea to fund Nicaraguan rebels with profits from U.S. arms sales to Iran came from Saudi Arabian businessman Adnan Kashoggi who pushed the notion on retired US Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard Secord. Secord, in turn, promoted the idea to Lt. Col. Oliver North of the NSC. (1/12/86)

KUWAIT REJECTS HOSTAGE DEAL: Arms Sales To Iran Stiffens Resolve of Key State In Hostage Saga

Wash. Post, Tyler: Interviews with Kuwaiti officials reveals a hardened resolve in that Arab state to reject terrorist demands that Kuwait release 17 Arab prisoners convicted of bombing attacks in '83, in the wake of recent disclosures of secret White House efforts to gain the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon. (30/11/86)

WEINBERGER TO MEET WITH ALLIES IN EUROPE, THE KING IN MOROCCO

Wash. Times, Reuters: Defense Sec. Caspar Weinberger leaves today on a nine-day tour to Europe and Morocco. Weinberger, who has expressed strong disapproval of supplying U.S. arms to Iran, will be the first U.S. Cabinet official to travel for talks with U.S. allies since the Iran-Contra affair exploded. Morocco's King Hussein & French Premier Chirac are among those with whom Weinberger will meet. (1/12/86)

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2/50/45NEWS ARTICLESSENATE PANEL OPENS IRAN ARMS INQUIRY

Wash. Post, Kurtz & Lardner Jr.: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said it has opened an investigation of the secret shipments of arms to Iran and the transfer of profits to Nicaraguan contras while calls for an independent counsel to review possible criminal activities by administration officials increased. ((30/11/86))

Chic. Trib.: Secrets At Risk In Inquiry

Phi. Inq.: Some Call For Probe By Counsel: But Justice Dept. Has Reservations

Bost. Globe: Charges That Aides Destroyed Data Bring New Calls For Separate Probe

ISRAELI WHO TOLD OF ATOMIC ARMS CHARGED AS SPY

Phi. Inq., (wires): Mordechai Vananu was formally charged yesterday in Israel with espionage, aiding an enemy in war and divulging state secrets. State prosecutors asked that Vananu, not present at the court session, remain in custody until the end of his trial. (29/11/86)

Wash. Post: Israel Charges Ex-Technician Aided Enemy

105 DIE AS PLO ADVANCES AGAINST AMAL IN LEBANON

Balt. Sun, (AP): Palestinian fighters claimed to have overpowered the last Shiite Moslem resistance in south Lebanon yesterday. Police said that 105 people were killed and more than 269 were wounded in the latest clash between the two factions. (1/12/86)

Wash. Times: PLO Troops Claim Two Wins Against Shi'ites

NEWS ANALYSISCRITICS QUESTION ISRAEL'S INDEPENDENCE, JUDGEMENT IN IRAN DEAL

Wash. Post, Frankel: Exposure of Israel's role in the Iran connection with the alleged Nicaraguan angle has raised several questions concerning Israel's subordination to the U.S. and the notion that Israel has gone too far in doing Washington's 'dirty work'. The lack of accountability of Israel's leaders, including contradictory statements of motives behind involvement has ministers in Israel concerned. Foreign Min. Peres has spoken of Israel's involvement as a humanitarian gesture to its superpower friend, while Prime Minister Shamir has cited the economic imperative as reason. While Israeli ministers are expressing anger, most analysts believe a rift within Israel over the affair is unlikely, as long as Shamir, Peres and Rabin stick together. Political damage in Washington could prove to be more difficult to handle. (30/11/86)

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NEWS ANALYSIS CON'T

ISRAEL'S OTHER ARMS DEAL: SELLING WEAPONS TO CHINA

Wash. Post, Melman & Raviv: Although China refuses to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and supports the Palestinian cause, Sino-Israeli contacts have increased since Deng Xiao Ping became China's leader. Quiet trade with Israel, out of which the Israelis have supplied the Chinese with military and communications equipment, is part of Deng's modernization policy. Contacts between the two countries are not solely military - for example, both countries have sent trade delegations to visit each other. The relationship, however, is kept low key, yet secret meetings such as the one Israeli Gen. Avraham Tamir undertook in Paris earlier this year have stepped up. Tamir, in disguise, had met with a top official of the Peoples Republic of China and other Chinese diplomats in Paris. Much to the Israelis surprise, the Peking govt. sent a follow-up letter summarizing that meeting - this letter constituted the first official communication from China in 30 years.

(30-11/86 Note: In Wash. Post Outlook Section)

A SPY SPEAKS OUT: Pollard Says He Meant Only to Help Israel, Not Harm U.S.

Wash. Post, Blitzer: In an interview, Jonathan J. Pollard, who awaits sentencing for being the first American convicted of spying for Israel, said he was "heartbroken" by the decision of the American Jewish Community and the Israeli govt. to turn their backs on him after his arrest. Pollard said he supplied Israel with information concerning Arab military threats against Israel because of his love for the country and described himself "a good Zionist". He said he still holds out hope to emigrate one day. Although Pollard ultimately bears responsibility for his criminal actions, the Israeli govt. too shares in part the blame. Pollard is something of a victim of the intricate U.S.-Israeli dual relationship. Pollard said he didn't really spy against the States - but only helped a friendly ally. In a sense, Pollard was cast aside by the Israeli govt. in order to preserve the larger issue of U.S.-Israeli relations. (30/11/86 Note: In Post Outlook Section)

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אל: מנכ"ל מדינה, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

איראן

במסיבת עיתונאים היום בוושנינגטון ע"י דובר המוג'אהדין הופצו היום מספר מסמכים הקושרים את ישראל כביכול לעסקות עם איראן עוד לפני זמן רב.


יוסי גל

להלן סכום מסיבת העיתונאים והמסמכים שהוצגו שם.

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TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY MOJAHEDIN SPOKESMAN ABOUT KHOMEINI'S ARMS DEALS

Let me begin by reading brief excerpts from Hashemi Rafsanjani's Friday prayer sermon on November 28 at Tehran University. He said among other things: "While we may purchase weapons from others, we will not buy weapons from Israel because we consider it illegitimate from inception." Khomeini's representative at the UN said two weeks ago that they will not allow planes loaded with weapons from Israel to cross Iranian air space.

We looked into the matter as far back as we could. What we have obtained so far clearly show that Khomeini-Israeli arms deals existed in 1980 and have continued since. We found a peculiar pattern of weapons arriving just prior to launching of offensives by Khomeini. We also found that the regime's terrorist networks throughout the world are in fact the very same apparatuses which purchase weapons for the regime. Further, we detected that the transfer of arms to Iran is extremely well coordinated through Israel, West Germany and the United States, and is essentially carried out with Israeli planes via the airport in Frankfurt.

This is the very same regime that for the past seven years has executed 50,000 Mojahedin and jailed and tortured 140,000 others on the pretext of liberating Jerusalem through Karbala. It has as, you know, persisted in prolonging the war with Iraq which has cost Iranians alone more than one million casualties and half a trillion dollars in economic damages.

The recent revelations have shaken the foundations of the regime because under no circumstances can Khomeini justify dealing with the US and Israel. The so-called opening to the west is precisely a reflection of the regime's desperation rather than an interest to establish long term and strategic relations with the west. Deadlocked in the war, strapped for cash and unable to contain the organized resistance movement, Khomeini's, is desperate for arms. Prime Minister Moussavi had issued an internal memorandum approving the purchase of weapons from any country if the interests of the regime are at risk. [DOCUMENT 10]

And now about the documents. The first piece is a photocopy of a telex requesting Tehran permission for the landing of a cargo plane from Tel Aviv on June 4, 1981. Document #9 is the photocopy of the passport of Sadegh Tabatabai, Khomeini's son-in-law and personal confidant, revealing that he traveled to Israel beginning in 1980.

The third piece is photocopy of a contract signed between the Khomeini regime and Col. Jacob Nimrodi in July 24, 1981. Before turning into a famous international arms dealer, Col. Nimrodi was military attache in the Israeli embassy in Tehran for ten years, from 1959-1969. Other related documents pertain to September and October of the same year.

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The documents in the order of presentation are:

1). The text of the agreement between the Khomeini regime and the Israeli firm of I.D.E. International Desalination Equipment LTD, which is represented by Jacob Nimrodi. [DOCUMENT 2].

Note that in this document which consists of 16 articles, the terms of payment and arrangements for the delivery of the equipment have been specified. The total amount of money involved in this particular contract is \$135,842,000. The contract is signed by Jacob Nimrodi on behalf of I.D.E. International and Colonel K. Dehghan on behalf of Khomeini's Ministry of National Defense.

Some of the items include: MGM/52 Lance and MIM-23 Hawk missiles, 155mm Type Tampella, 155mm Copperhead plus LTMR Units, 155mm H.E.R.A.P. and 155mm M107.

Note in article 4.1 that the seller is required to provide the export licence through the Department of Defense in Israel, which indicates that the Khomeini regime was fully aware that it was directly dealing with the government of Israel.

As stipulated in article 3.3B, the equipment is to be shipped from Antwerp/Rotterdam to Bandar Abbass.

2). The text of the letter to the Deputy Minister of National Defense for Logistics signed by Jacob Nimrodi. [DOCUMENT 3]. Here, Nimrodi requests further funds because of complications in shipment/loading in Rotterdam/Antwerp.

3). Text of the letter to the Supreme Council of National Defense by Acting Minister of National Defense, dated October, 24, 1981, which proposes the consideration of possible Iraqi ceasefire initiative during the holy month of Mohharam in light of the problems with the delivery of the weapons. [DOCUMENT 4].

4). Text of the response by the Supreme Council of Defense, dated October 26, 1981. [DOCUMENT 5].

5). Three more letters dealing with the same subject. [DOCUMENTS 6,7,8]

It is evident that the highest ranking officials of the Khomeini regime were fully informed and involved in arranging the arms purchases. The Supreme Council of Defense, for example, consists of President Ali Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Prime Minister Mousavi and reports directly to Khomeini. Document 12 is a secret memorandum issued by the deputy logistics command, instructing the removal of all the markings of the countries" which, from a foreign policy standpoint, are not to the benefit of the Islamic Republic."

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During the past weeks, many questions revolved around who gets the weapons that are sent to Iran? Who pays for them? Do any "moderate elements" get them? Some even contended that selling weapons to Khomeini reduces his terrorist activities.

Based upon absolutely reliable information we have received from our sources within the Khomeini regime, the entire network of arms purchases is under the direct supervision of the revolutionary Guards Corps and the minister of the Guards Corps, Mohsen Rafighdoost. This is the very same apparatus that directs the Khomeini regime's terrorist activities abroad.

For example, Rahim Malekzadeh and Hamid Naghashan are members of the Guards corps who work in the "supply section" of the corps and travel frequently in and out of the country. They are normally based in Switzerland and directly engaged in the purchase of weapons.

Prior to the 1979 revolution, Hamid Naghashan spent several years in Lebanon and had established extensive contacts with various terrorist groups in the area which he still retains. Following the revolution, he returned to Iran and began working as a head interrogator at the notorious Evin prison. He is one of the closest aides to Mohsen Rafighdoost, the minister of the Guards Corps. He is also a member of the "Liberation Movements Section" of the corps which is in charge of the export of terror abroad.

Hamid Naghashan was directly involved in the hijacking of the Air France airliner in 1983 from Austria. With assistance from his friends he had smuggled weapons and explosives into the aircraft before hijacking it. He has five different forged passports under various names. As far as we know, he entered Switzerland four days ago to purchase a new order of weaponry for Tehran.

Also in Switzerland, Captain Sarrafan has signed an agreement with a Swiss weapons firm called Orli-Kan. ~~The regime has dispatched two military officers, Col. Daftari and Col. Nargessi to ~~begin~~ to begin negotiation with the ~~firm~~ subsidiary of the same company.~~

What we have presented so far constitutes a limited segment of the regime secret networks in Western Europe. In addition, the regime has established covert and public centers in the United States to purchase weapons.

Specifically, Rajaji Khorassani, the UN representative is one of the key agents involved in purchasing weapons for Khomeini in the United States. For example, Rahim Malekzadeh, the partner of Hamid Naghashan, has systematically forwarded the list of needed equipment to their contact in the United States who operates under Rajaji's supervision. We obtained a copy of a recent list that was submitted by Malekzadeh which included items such as Hawk and Phoenix missiles, F-4 and F-5 jets and spare parts, M-47 and M-48 Tanks and anti-tank Tow missiles.

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In another case, Yaghoob Entessari, another agent of the regime, who was married to an American and is a permanent resident of the US, was arrested in New York city in 1984 following the purchase of large quantity of aircraft parts. He was released after Rajali Khorrasani posted the \$50,000 bail. Entessari, who is currently in Iran, is heavily involved in the regime's terrorist networks.

Another agent who works closely with Rajali Khorrasani to supply weapons for the war is named Dr. Beit Mansour of Arab nationality.

Another method which the regime uses to purchase weapons is through other countries. For instance, a Pakistani national by the name of Saeed Zakaria who purchased weapons under the name of the government of Pakistan. Once they arrived in Pakistan, the weapons were transferred to Tehran. Zakaria was arrested in March 25, 1981, in Washington DC and charged with exporting illegal weapons. He was in contact with Col. Dehghan through the Iranian Ambassador in Pakistan. It is noteworthy that the Pakistani government had informed the Khomeini regime of its willingness to purchase any type of weapons that may be needed for the war.

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מחלקת הקשר ניו-יורק

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סמכ"ל ליאור; השגריר וושינגטון

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הקונסול הכללי, ניו-יורק

מאת :

ג'ורג' נאור בא לראותני היום.

1. חזר עכשו מביקור בלבנון ופטר סקירה מדכאת למדי. מבנון לבש באיץ כסוף דצמבר או תחילת ינואר אך שיבקר שוב בלבנון. אם יזע ואריכות יודיעני מראש מחי יגיע ארצה ואכריז לך. אם לא - יתקשר אצל במישירן בהגיש. מקש לפגוש גם את יוסי ביילין, נמרוד נוביק ואיציק ליאור.

2. ביקש עזרנו להפצת כתב העת שלו Middle East Insight אמיתי לו שהדרך התכליתית היחידה היא הפצה באמצעות חברה מסחרית הקוספת ככה קיבלתי עלי לאתר חברות כאלה. הוא יגש אליהן ויכדוק כמה הדבר יעלה ואז תגיע שוב בקשר למימון. יתכן שיפגוש היום גם את הקרדינל הקתולי של ניו-יורק ג'והן או'קונר ואת מונטיניור נולן המומחה הקתולי כאן לענייני המזרח התיכון בכלל ולבנון בפרט. אני מניח שיבקש עזרתם להפצת כתב העת.

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2.12.1986

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מ-: המשרד, תא: 011286, חז: 1554, דח: מ, סג: ש,

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אל: למדנ

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לשלכמ 573

חביב שרייבר

כל החומר על שרייבר והארגון אותו הקים ועומד בראשו

HOLYLAND STATE COMMITTEE

xxx ההלצל אנד שתאתו סהממיתתו

xxx מצרי בדפדת הסחולה של הליגה נגד השמצה

== xxx יי פרה-אראב פרהפאגאנדא ינ אמוריסא נוחיסלוש אנד בהיסוש

xxx בעמודים 23, 59, 77, 93-94.

חוברת ודאי מצויה בידיכם.

הסברה/מחבי. ==

מב

"PRO-ARAB PROPAGANDA IN AMERICA
VEHICLES AND VOICES

כסטט

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א.א.א, חוזמ: 158

א.ל: ו'ש/19

ג-: המשרד, תא: 011286, זח: 1640, דח: מ, סג: ש,

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שמור/מידי

אל: מתני, אבידן

אתמול בעמוד ראשון סייחארץ יי כותרת יישראל דנה בחשאי
עמ עיראק ירדן מצרים ותורכיה בבעיות מימ יי. בכתבה מדובר
על פגישה משותפת בג'ורגטאון בחסות ג'ויס סטאר שנמשכה
יומיים. את הצד האמריקני ייצג פיטר מקפרסון ראש הסוכנות
לפיתוח בינלי והסנטורים פול סיימון וג'יימס מקלור.
נודה אמ תבררו במה מדובר ותבקשו מג'ויס להרחיב על מהלכ
המפגש.

מזתים - מצפאי. ==

מב

סגסס

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אלו: המשרד + בטחון

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דב שפי, היועמ"ש למשרד הבטחון

דע: לשכת היועמ"ש / משה"ח
מצפ"א, אמל"ט 1

פרשת איראן - ניקרגואה
לשלנו 585 (נר 610 למשה"ח)

בהמשך לשיחתנו הטלפונית הבוקר:

- א. החלטת ההמשך ב-1984 (לקראת ש"ת 1985) נכנסה לתוקף ב-12.10.84.
- ב. החלטת ההמשך השנה (לקראת ש"ת 1987) נכנסה לתוקף ב-17.10.86.
- לידיעתכם, רצ"ב הקטע על מדיניות כלפי אמריקה, ניקרגואה והקונטרס מתוך החלטת ההמשך הזאת (לקראת ש"ת 1987).
- ג. יש לציין ולהדגיש שהשאלות המשפטיות סביב לנושא זה סבוכות ומסובכות, וטובי עורכי הדין האמריקאים לומדים אותן כרגע. כפי שצויין במאמר של לרדנר (מסמך ה' למברקנו הנ"ל) ישנה שורה של חוקים שנוגעים לדבר.

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למדן

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would eliminate the cause or basis for the application of such country of the prohibition contained in the first sentence; and
 (2) the government of such country has taken appropriate law enforcement measures to implement the plan presented to the Secretary of State.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply in the case of any country with respect to which the President determines that the application of the provisions of such subsection would be inconsistent with the national security interests of the United States.

SEC. 126. Section 4, chapter III of Public Law 99-349, dated July 2, 1986, is amended to read as follows: Of the amounts available to the Department of Defense, not to exceed \$5,000,000 shall be available for such claims arising from property losses caused by the explosion of Army munitions near Checotah, Oklahoma on August 4, 1985, and claims determined by the Department to be bona fide shall be paid from the funds made available by this section without a determination of legal liability based on an act or omission of an agent or employee of the Federal Government.

SEC. 127. The Secretary of Defense is to provide the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives with a report by February 15, 1987, containing details of the specific actions proposed to be taken by the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1987 to encourage other member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Japan to assume a greater share of the common defense burden of such nations and the United States. This title may be cited as the "Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1987".

TITLE II—CENTRAL AMERICA

PURPOSES

SEC. 201. The purposes of this title are to promote economic and political development, peace, stability and democracy in Central America, to encourage a negotiated resolution of the conflict in the region, and toward these ends, to enable the President to provide additional economic assistance for the Central American democracies as well as assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, subject to the terms and conditions of title.

POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA

SEC. 202. (a) It is the policy of the United States that—

(1) the building of democracy, the restoration of peace, economic development, the improvement of living conditions, and the application of equal justice under law in Central America are important to the interests of the United States and the community of American States;

(2) the interrelated issues of social and human progress, economic growth, political reform, and regional security must be effectively dealt with to assure a democratic and economically and politically secure Central America; and

(3) the September 1983 Contadora Document of Objectives which sets forth a framework for negotiating a peaceful settle-

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ment to the conflict and turmoil in the region, is to be encouraged and supported.

(b) The United States strongly supports as essential to the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

(1) a long-term commitment of economic assistance to the Central American democracies in amounts recommended by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America;

(2) national reconciliation in Nicaragua and the creation of a framework for negotiating a peaceful, democratic settlement to the Nicaraguan conflict; and

(3) efforts to reach a comprehensive and verifiable final agreement based on the Contadora Document of Objectives, including efforts to encourage the Government of Nicaragua to pursue a dialogue with the representatives of all elements of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition for the purpose of achieving a democratic political settlement of the conflict, including free and fair elections.

POLICY TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA

SEC. 209. (a) United States policy toward the Government of Nicaragua shall be based upon that government's responsiveness to continuing concerns affecting the national security of the United States and Nicaragua's neighbors about—

(1) Nicaragua's close military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies including the presence in Nicaragua of military and security personnel from those countries and allies;

(2) Nicaragua's buildup of military forces in numbers disproportionate to those of its neighbors and equipped with sophisticated weapons systems and facilities designed to accommodate even more advanced equipment;

(3) Nicaragua's unlawful support for armed subversion and terrorism directed against the democratically elected governments of other countries;

(4) Nicaragua's internal repression and lack of opportunity for the exercise of civil and political rights which would allow the people of Nicaragua to have a meaningful voice in determining the policies of their government through participation in regularly scheduled free and fair elections and the establishment of democratic institutions; and

(5) Nicaragua's refusal to negotiate in good faith for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Central America based upon the comprehensive implementation of the September 1988 Contadora Document of Objectives and, in particular, its refusal to engage in a serious national dialogue with all elements of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition.

(b) The United States will address the concerns described in subsection (a) through economic, political, and diplomatic measures (including efforts to secure the cooperation of other democratic nations in such measures), as well as through support for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. In order to assure every opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Central America, the United States will—

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(1) engage in bilateral discussions with the Government of Nicaragua with a view toward facilitating progress in achieving a peaceful resolution of the conflict, if the Government of Nicaragua simultaneously engages in a serious dialogue with representatives of all elements of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition; and

(2) limit the types and amounts of assistance provided to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance and take other positive action in response to steps taken by the Government of Nicaragua toward meeting the concerns described in subsection (a).

(c) The duration of bilateral discussions with the Government of Nicaragua and the implementation of additional measures under subsection (b) shall be determined, after consultation with the Congress, by reference to Nicaragua's actions in response to the concerns described in subsection (a). Particular regard will be paid to whether—

(1) freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and political activity are being respected in Nicaragua and progress is being made toward the holding of regularly scheduled free and fair elections;

(2) there has been a halt to the flow of arms and the introduction of foreign military personnel into Nicaragua, and a withdrawal of all foreign military personnel has begun;

(3) a cease-fire with the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is being respected; and

(4) Nicaragua is refraining from acts of aggression, including support for insurgency and terrorism in other countries.

(d) The actions by the United States under this title in response to the concerns described in subsection (a) are consistent with the right of the United States to defend itself and to assist its allies in accordance with international law and treaties in force. Such actions are directed, not to determine the form or composition of any government of Nicaragua, but to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable agreement among Central American countries, based upon the 1983 Contadora Document of Objectives, including internal reconciliation within Nicaragua based upon democratic principles, without the use of force by the United States.

(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no member of the United States Armed Forces or employee of any department, agency, or other component of the United States Government may enter Nicaragua to provide military advice, training, or logistical support to paramilitary groups operating inside that country. Nothing in this title shall be construed as authorizing any member or unit of the Armed Forces of the United States to engage in combat against the Government of Nicaragua.

POLICY TOWARD THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

SEC. 204. (a) It is the policy of the United States to assist all groups within the Nicaraguan democratic resistance which—

(1) are committed to work together for democratic national reconciliation in Nicaragua based on the document issued by the six Nicaraguan opposition parties on February 7, 1986, enti-

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tled "Proposal to the Nicaraguan Government for a Solution to the Crisis in Our Country"; and

(2) respect international standards of conduct and refrain from violations of human rights or from other criminal acts.

(b) No assistance under this title may be provided to any group that retains in its ranks any individual who has been found to engage in—

(1) gross violations of internationally recognized human rights (as defined in section 502B(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961); or

(2) drug smuggling or significant misuse of public or private funds.

(c)(1) It is recognized that the Nicaraguan democratic resistance has been broadening its representative base, through the forging of cooperative relationships between the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) and other democratic resistance elements, and has been increasing the responsiveness of military forces to civilian leadership.

(2) The President shall use the authority provided by this title to further the developments described in paragraph (1) and to encourage the Nicaraguan democratic resistance to take additional steps to strengthen its unity, pursue a defined and coordinated program for representative democracy in Nicaragua, and otherwise increase its appeal to the Nicaraguan people.

(d) In furtherance of the policy set out in this section, not less than \$10,000,000 of the funds transferred by section 6(a) shall be available only for assistance to resistance forces otherwise eligible and not currently included within UNO, of which amount \$5,000,000 shall be available only for the Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS) and \$5,000,000 shall be available only for the Indian resistance force known as Misurasata.

SEC. 205. (a) There are hereby transferred to the President for assistance to the Central American democracies (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) in accordance with the provisions of chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; \$300,000,000 of unobligated funds from the accounts specified in subsection (b). Amounts transferred under this section shall be administered in accordance with the terms and conditions of chapter 6 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds made available by this section—

(1) shall be in addition to amounts previously appropriated for the fiscal year 1986 and allocated for assistance to Central American countries, and

(2) shall remain available for obligation until September 30, 1987, except that not less than \$100,000,000 shall be obligated on or before September 30, 1986.

(b) Amounts made available by this section shall be transferred from such accounts as the President may designate for which appropriations were made by title II of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1986, title IV of the Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1986, (as contained in Public Law 99-190), and title II of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985 (Public Law 99-10).

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(cX1) The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall—

(A) develop a plan for fully funding the assistance to the Central American democracies (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) proposed in the January 1984 report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America; and

(B) provide a report describing this plan to the President and the Congress no later than March 1, 1987.

(2) The report required by paragraph (1) shall include an analysis and recommendations, prepared in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, on how more effective use can be made of agricultural commodities from the United States in alleviating hunger in Central America and contributing to the economic development of the Central American democracies.

(dX1) There are hereby transferred to the President out of funds appropriated by the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985 (Public Law 99-88), under the heading "Assistance For Implementation of a Contadora Agreement" such sums as the President may require but not more than \$2,000,000, to facilitate the participation of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in regional meetings and negotiations to promote peace, stability, and security in Central America.

(2) Funds transferred under paragraph (1) shall remain available for the same period of time as such funds would have been available under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985 (Public Law 99-88), but for the enactment of this title.

(e) The Congress reaffirms its support for the establishment of a Central American Development Organization, authorized by section 464 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as an effective forum for dialogue on, and the continuous review and advancement of, Central America's political, economic, and social development, including the strengthening of democratic pluralism and respect for internationally recognized human rights. Toward this end, not less than \$750,000 of the funds transferred by this section should be used to establish the Central American Development Organization and its administrative apparatus so as to ensure that Central American development objectives are encouraged.

ASSISTANCE FOR THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

SEC. 206. (aX1) The Congress hereby approves the provision of assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance in accordance with the provisions of this title.

(2) There are hereby transferred to the President for the purposes of this section \$100,000,000 of unobligated funds from such accounts for which appropriations were made by the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (as contained in Public Law 99-190), as the President shall designate.

(b) Notwithstanding the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, not more than 40 percent of the funds transferred under subsection (a) may be available for obligation or expenditure in accordance with this title upon the date of its enactment; not more than an additional 20 percent of such funds may be so available no earlier than

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tober 15, 1986, and 15 days after the transmittal to the Congress of the determination required by section 11(c); and not more than the remaining 40 percent may be so available no earlier than February 15, 1987, and 15 days after the transmittal to the Congress of the determination required by section 11(e).

(c) Funds transferred under subsection (a) shall remain available for the same periods of time, but not to exceed September 30, 1987, as such funds would have been available under the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (as contained in Public Law 99-190), but for the enactment of this title.

COORDINATION OF AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

SEC. 207. (a) The Secretary of State (or his designee) shall be responsible for policy guidance, coordination, and supervision of United States Government activities under this title.

(b) Any agency to which funds transferred under section 6(a) are allocated shall establish standards, procedures and controls necessary to assure that such funds are fully accounted for and are used exclusively for the purposes authorized by this title. Such standards, procedures and controls shall be developed in consultation with the Comptroller General and the appropriate committees of the Congress, and shall include such safeguards as segregation of accounts, monitoring of deliveries, and requirements for the keeping of complete records available for audit by authorized representatives of the United States Government.

FUNDS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

SEC. 208. (a) Of the amounts transferred under section 6(a), \$30,000,000 shall be available only for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

(b) Of the \$30,000,000 made available only for purposes of subsection (a), \$3,000,000 shall be available only for strengthening programs and activities of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance for the observance and advancement of human rights.

APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAWS

SEC. 209. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, funds transferred under section 6(a) shall be available for the purposes described in section 105(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, and all the requirements, terms, and conditions of such section and sections 101 and 102 of such Act, section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, and section 106 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985 (Public Law 99-88), shall be deemed to have been met for such use of such funds.

(b) The use of funds made available under this title is subject to all applicable provisions of law and established procedures relating to the oversight by the Congress of operations of departments and agencies.

(c) Nothing in this title shall be construed as permitting the President to furnish additional assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance from funds other than the funds transferred under sec-

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tion 6(a) or otherwise specifically authorized by the Congress for assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

(d) No limitation or restriction contained in section 10 of Public Law 91-672, section 8109 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986, section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, or any other provision of law shall apply to the transfer or use of funds transferred to the President under this title.

USE OF FUNDS AFTER A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

SEC. 210. If the President determines and so reports to the Congress that a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Central America has been reached, then—

(1) the unobligated balance, if any, of funds transferred under section 6(a) shall be available for the purposes of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in Central American countries in accordance with the authorities contained in Chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to economic support fund assistance);

(2) the President shall terminate any economic embargo of Nicaragua then in effect; and

(3) the President shall take such further actions as appropriate to carry out the policy described in section 2(a)(1) of this title with respect to all Central American countries, including Nicaragua.

INCENTIVES FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

SEC. 211. (a) Assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance under this title shall be provided in a manner designed to encourage the Government of Nicaragua to respond favorably to the many opportunities available for achieving a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Central America. These opportunities include the following proposals:

(1) Six opposition Nicaraguan political parties on February 7, 1986, called for an immediate cease-fire, an effective general amnesty, abolition of the state of emergency agreement on a new electoral process and general elections, effective fulfillment of international commitments for democratization, and observance of implementation of these actions and commitments by appropriate international groups and organizations;

(2) President Reagan on February 10, 1986, offered simultaneous talks between the Government of Nicaragua and the United States Government;

(3) President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador on March 5, 1986, offered an additional dialogue between the Government of El Salvador and the insurgents in El Salvador if the Government of Nicaragua would simultaneously engage in a dialogue with all elements of the Nicaragua democratic opposition; and

(4) The United Nicaraguan Opposition on May 29, 1986, reiterated its support for the six-party proposal described in paragraph (1) as a means to achieve national reconciliation and democratization.

(b)(1) In furtherance of the objectives set forth in subsection (a) and except as provided in subsection (e), assistance to the Nicaraguan

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democratic resistance under this title shall be limited to the following:

(A) humanitarian assistance (as defined in section 722(g)(5) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985);

(B) logistics advice and assistance;

(C) support for democratic political and diplomatic activities;

(D) training, services, equipment and supplies for radio communications, collection, and utilization of intelligence, logistics, and small-unit skills, tactics and operations; and

(E) equipment and supplies necessary for defense against air attacks.

(2) The assistance described in paragraph (1) shall be limited, by type and value, to the matters specified in the classified annex to the communication from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate dated June 24, 1986.

(3) No weapons or ammunition shall be delivered under this title to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance prior to September 1, 1986.

(c) On and after October 15, 1986, an additional \$20,000,000 of the funds transferred under section 6(a) may be made available for obligation and expenditure for assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance 15 days after the President determines and reports to the Congress that—

(1) the Central American countries have not concluded a comprehensive and effective agreement based on the Contradora Document of Objectives;

(2) the Government of Nicaragua is not engaged in a serious dialogue with representatives of all elements of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition, accompanied by a cease-fire and an effective end to the existing constraints on freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and political activity, leading to regularly scheduled free and fair elections and the establishment of democratic institutions; and

(3) there is no reasonable prospect of achieving such agreement, dialogue, cease-fire, and end to constraints described in paragraphs (1) and (2) through further diplomatic measures, multilateral or bilateral, without additional assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, on or after October 15, 1986, funds transferred under section 6(a) may be obligated or expended only if the President determines and reports to the Congress that the Nicaraguan democratic resistance groups receiving assistance under this title have agreed to and are beginning to implement—

(A) confederation and reform measures to broaden their leadership base;

(B) the coordination of their efforts;

(C) the elimination of human rights abuses;

(D) the pursuit of a defined and coordinated program for achieving representative democracy in Nicaragua; and

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(E) the subordination of military forces to civilian leadership; and

(F) the application of rigorous standards, procedures and controls to assure that funds transferred under section 6(a) are fully accounted for and are used exclusively for the purposes authorized by this title.

(2) In making his determination under paragraph (1), the President shall take into account the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political leadership of those Nicaraguan democratic resistance groups receiving assistance under this title, including the ability of that political leadership—

(A) to reflect the views and objectives of the internal and external Nicaraguan democratic opposition;

(B) to function as the spokesman for the Nicaraguan democratic opposition with Central Americans, international organizations, and the United States Government;

(C) to represent the Nicaraguan democratic opposition in dealing with the Government of Nicaragua;

(D) to provide command and control for the military forces of all resistance groups receiving assistance under this title and to establish the goals for their military operations;

(E) to determine the distribution of and maintain accountability for assistance provided under this title; and

(F) to provide the legal mechanisms necessary for the enforcement of standards of conduct applicable to all members of the resistance groups receiving assistance under the title.

(e) On and after February 15, 1987, the restrictions in subsection (b) shall cease to apply and the remaining funds transferred under section 6(a) may be made available for obligation and expenditure for assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance 15 days after the President determines and reports to the Congress that—

(1) the Central American countries have not concluded a comprehensive and effective agreement based on the Contadora Document of Objectives;

(2) the Government of Nicaragua is not engaged in a serious dialog with representatives of all elements of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition, accompanied by a cease-fire and an effective end to the existing constraints on freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and political activity leading to regularly scheduled free and fair elections and the establishment of democratic institutions; and

(3) there is no reasonable prospect of achieving such agreement, dialog, cease-fire, and end to constraints described in paragraphs (1) and (2) through further diplomatic measures, multilateral or bilateral, without additional assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance,

unless the Congress has enacted a joint resolution under section 18 disapproving the provision of additional assistance (other than assistance described in subsection (b)(1) within the limits of funds previously made available).

(f)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (e), no assistance (other than the assistance described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection

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(b)(1) shall be provided at any time to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance under this title if—

(A) the President determines that—

(i) the Central American countries have concluded a comprehensive and effective agreement based on the Contadora Document of Objectives; or

(ii) the Government of Nicaragua is engaging in a serious dialog with representatives of all elements of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition, accompanied by a cease-fire and an effective end to the existing constraints on freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and political activity leading to regularly scheduled free and fair elections and the establishment of democratic institutions; or

(B) the Congress enacts a joint resolution under section 12 disapproving the provision of additional assistance (other than assistance described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (b)(1)).

(2) The prohibition contained in paragraph (1) shall not apply—

(A) with respect to assistance described in subparagraph (D) of subsection (b)(1) if the Government of Nicaragua fails to observe an applicable cease-fire; or

(B) with respect to assistance described in subparagraph (E) of subsection (b)(1) if the Government of Nicaragua acquires additional equipment or materiel to carry out air attacks.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES

SEC. 212. (a)(1) A joint resolution described in subsection (e) of section 11 shall be one without a preamble, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Congress disapproves the provision of additional assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance pursuant to title II of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1987, except as provided in section 11(b) thereof within the limits of funds previously made available."

(2) A joint resolution described in subsection (f)(1)(B) of section 11 shall be one without a preamble, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Congress disapproves the provision of additional assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance pursuant to title II of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1987, except as provided in subparagraph (A) through (C) of section 11(b)(1) and paragraph (2) of section 11(f) thereof."

(b) A joint resolution described in subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) shall be considered in the House of Representatives and in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (3) through (7) of section 8066(c) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (as contained in Public Law 98-473), except that—

(1) references in such paragraphs to a joint resolution shall be deemed to be references to the respective joint resolution set forth in subsection (a)(1) or subsection (a)(2);

(2) references in such paragraphs to Committee on Appropriations shall be deemed to be references to the appropriate committee or committees of the respective House of Congress; and

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(9) references in such paragraphs to the eighth day and to fifteen calendar days shall be deemed to be references to the fifth day and to five calendar days, respectively.

(c) The provisions of this section are enacted—

(1) as exercises of the rulemaking powers of the House of Representatives and Senate, and as such they are deemed a part of the Rules of the House and the Rules of the Senate, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the House and the Senate in the case of joint resolutions under section 11, and they supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of the House and the Senate to change their rules at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of the House or Senate, and of the right of the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives to report a resolution for the consideration of any measure.

COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS

SEC. 213. (a)(1) There is established the Commission on Central American Negotiations (hereafter in this section referred to as the "Commission"), which shall be composed of five members appointed as follows:

(A) One individual appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(B) One individual appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives;

(C) One individual appointed by the Majority Leader of the Senate;

(D) One individual appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate; and

(E) One individual who shall serve as Chairman of the Commission, selected by majority vote of the other members of the Commission.

(2) No officer or employee of the United States may be appointed as a member of the Commission.

(3) The appointments referred to in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph (1) shall be made within 5 calendar days following enactment of this title, and the selection of a chairman referred to in subparagraph (E) of paragraph (1) shall be made within 10 days following enactment of this title.

(b) The purpose of the Commission is to monitor and report on the efforts of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance to coordinate and reform and on the status of any negotiations on the peace, stability, and security of Central America, including negotiations conducted between or among—

(1) the Government of Nicaragua and all elements of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition, including the Nicaraguan democratic resistance;

(2) the governments of Central American countries;

(3) the Government of the United States and the Government of Nicaragua;

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(4) the governments of the Contadora and Support Group countries and the governments of the Central American countries; and

(5) the Government of El Salvador and the insurgents in El Salvador.

(cX1) The Commission may appoint and fix the pay of not more than seven staff personnel, but at such rates not in excess of the rate for GS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.

(2XA) Each member of the Commission shall be entitled to receive the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which such member is engaged in the performance of duties as a member of the Commission.

(B) While away from his home or regular place of business in the performance of duties for the Commission, a member or staff personnel of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including a per diem in lieu of subsistence, not to exceed the expenses allowed persons employed intermittently in Government service under section 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

(3) For purposes of pay and other employment benefits, rights, and privileges and for all other purposes, any employee of the Commission shall be considered to be a congressional employee as defined in section 2107 of title 5, United States Code.

(dX1) A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum.

(2) All decisions of the Commission shall be by majority vote.

(e) The Commission may make such reports in connection with its duties as it deems necessary to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, except that—

(1) not later than 5 days after receipt by the Congress or a report by the President under section 14 the Commission shall prepare and transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report addressing all the matters which are required to be included in reports of the President by paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) of section 14; and

(2) not later than September 30, 1986, the Commission shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on whether the Nicaraguan democratic resistance groups receiving assistance under this title have agreed to and are beginning to implement measures described in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 11(dX1) and an evaluation of the factors described in section 11(dX2).

(fX1) Salaries and expenses of the Commission, but not more than \$400,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate out of the Account for Miscellaneous Items, in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(2) Funds made available to the Commission by paragraph (1) shall be disbursed on vouchers approved by the Chairman, except that no voucher shall be required for the disbursement of the salary of an individual appointed under subsection (c).

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(3) For purposes of section 502(b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the Commission shall be deemed to be a standing committee of the Congress and shall be entitled to use of funds in accordance with such section.

(g) The Commission shall terminate not later than 90 days after transmittal of the reports required by subsection (e).

PRESIDENTIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENT

SEC. 214. The President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress with each determination required by section 11 a report on actions taken to achieve a resolution of the conflict in Central America in a manner that meets the concerns described in section 8(a). Each such report shall include—

(1) a detailed statement of the status of negotiations toward a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Central America, including the willingness of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance and the Government of Nicaragua to negotiate a settlement;

(2) a detailed accounting of the disbursements made to provide assistance with the funds transferred under section 6(a) and a detailed statement of how the accountability standards, procedures and controls established under section 7(b) and 11(d)(1)(F) are being implemented so as to assure that all such funds are fully accounted for and are being used exclusively for the purposes authorized by this title;

(3) a discussion of alleged human rights violations by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance and the Government of Nicaragua, including a statement of the steps taken by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance to remove from their ranks any individuals who have engaged in human rights abuses; and

(4) an evaluation of the progress made by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance in broadening its political base and defining a unified and coordinated program for achieving representative democracy in Nicaragua.

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE

SEC. 215. The provisions of subsections (s) and (t) of section 722 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 shall apply—

(1) with respect to any request described in section 722(p) of such Act submitted by the President to the Congress on or after the date of enactment of this title, and

(2) with respect to any request by the President for additional economic assistance for the Central American democracies to carry out recommendations contained in the report required by section 5(c)(1)(B) (in which case references to a joint resolution in subsections (s) and (t) of section 722 of such Act shall be deemed to be references to a joint resolution without a preamble, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Congress approves the additional economic assistance for the Central American democracies that the President requested pursuant to title II of the Military Construction Appropriation Act, 1987.").

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except that, for purposes of consideration in a House of Congress of a joint resolution under subsection (s) or (t) of such section, amendments to such a joint resolution may be in order but only if such amendments are germane.

LIMITATION ON PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL IN DELIVERY OF ASSISTANCE

SEC. 216. (a) United States Government personnel may not provide any training or other service, or otherwise participate directly or indirectly in the provision of any assistance, to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance pursuant to this title within those land areas of Honduras and Costa Rica which are within 20 miles of the border with Nicaragua.

(b) As used in this section, the term "United States Government personnel" means—

(1) any member of the United States Armed Forces who is on active duty or is performing inactive duty training; and

(2) any employee of any department, agency, or other component of the executive branch of the United States Government; but does not include any officer or employee of the United States General Accounting Office or any employee of the Inspector General of the Department of State and the Foreign Service who is carrying out inspections, investigations, or audits with respect to assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance pursuant to this title.

TITLE III—EMERGENCY RESERVE FOR AFRICAN FAMINE RELIEF

SEC. 301. Title II of Public Law 99-10 is amended, under the heading "Emergency Reserve for African Famine Relief", by striking out "\$225,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$525,000,000".

SEC. 302. Of the funds appropriated under title II of Public Law 99-10, as amended by this Act, \$300,000,000 shall remain available for obligation until September 30, 1987, notwithstanding any other provision of law or this Act.

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 11:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 11, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

(1) Such amounts as may be necessary are hereby appropriated for programs, projects, or activities provided for in H.R. 5205, the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1987, to the extent and in the manner provided for in the conference report and joint explanatory statement of the committee of conference (House Report 99-976) as filed in the House of Representatives on October 7, 1986, as if enacted into law, except that such conference agreement shall be considered as including the following language in lieu of section 331 of H.R. 5205 as passed by the House of Representatives on July 30, 1986:

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אל - : מאס

דע - : פרימור, מצפ"א

הודו - מפגש תקופתי

מקמפ, מחלקת הודו במחמ"ד, בשל אירועי איראן הגיעו למסקנה לדחות המפגש, כנראה לא יאוחר מסוף ינואר. נעמוד עמם בקשר. טרם שמענו אם ברצונכם לנצל המפגש להעברת מסר כלשהו.

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אל :- מצפ"א - מזתיים

סמינר מים
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א. ראו נא שלי 517 מ-25.11.

ב. המדובר בסמינר חוזר סמינר שבו השתתף גם מנכ"ל החקלאות מאיר בן-מאיר וגם אני השתתפתי בו. אין כל חשאיות בענין. הדרמטיות היא כנראה דרך פעולה ליצירת אפקט גדול. "הארץ" מצטט כנראה את הנ"י טיימס מ-29.11 (ראו נא שלנו 003).

ג. על הסמינר כולו, כאמור, אשלח מכתב בדיפ. הקרוב.



מתני

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פגישה עם חבר הוקנגרס להמנ.

א. הפגישה בבית השגריר האמריקאי. הביע רצונו לסייע

בקידום יחסי ישראל ס.ל. ושאל כיצד יוכל לסייע. בין

הרעיונות שהעלה, פגישה עם שגריר ס.ל. בווש ופעולה בקרב

חבריו בוועדות הקונגרס.

ב. על מנת שיוכל לפעול ביעילות ביקש מזכר על יחסי שתי

המדינות. מצדי הצעתי לו שמתני יפוגשו ויעדכנו על מכלול

היחסי והאפשרויות לפעולה. קיבל הרעיון בברכה וממתינ

לטלפון (יגיע לווש ב-8 דצמי).

ג. המלצתי שמתני בתאום עמכם יציע בפניו דרכי פעולה

מצדו ומצד ידידיו.

ד. פעולה זו מצדנו תהיה בה משום מענה לבחשתו של נשיא

ס.ל. ובמקביל הזדמנות טובה להעביר מסר שדבריו האחרונים

של שהיח בפרלמנט כאנ לא נעמו גם לידידי ישראל בארה"ב.

דיבונ

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סססס



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דחיסות...הגלל...

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פסי פברק

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עיראק - איראן

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לדו"ח אירועים מ-30 לנוב.

1. וייז וייט (IIR) בדעה שהכינוס המשולש בדמשק - וליאטי, רפיק דוסט וגילוד נועד לקבלת התמונה האיראנית, כנראה ע"פ בקשת שליטי דמשק וטריפולי, בפרשת היחסים עם ארה"ב בפרט ונושא המלחמה (דוסט) בכלל.

2. ההודעה הסורית בעקבותיה המתקיפה המאמצים הנואלים של ארה"ב וישראל לפצל המזה"ת (הערבי) היא התייחסות סורית ברורה למדיניות האמריקאית כלפי איראן כאשר המכנה המשותף בין דמשק וטהראן נשען על "המלצה" לשמרניות להתפכח ממדיניות ארה"ב במזה"ת, קרי הסכסוך גמ על רקע הקשרה לפרשה. ההודעה ולפניה השיחות עצמן עשויות להעיד ששתי המדינות הנ"ל קבלו הסבר איראני "מניח את הדעת" בסוגיה כשקודם לכן ואולי עדיין, גילוי דאגה ממה שברקם בין וושינגטון וטהראן. בהקשר זה ראוי לשים לב להגובה הרכה של רפסנג'יאני כלפי התייחסות הסובייטית לפרשה.

3. במקביל סובר שהאזהרה האיראנית למפרציות (ר' טהראן 29) נוגעת לפעולת מטוסי ה-F1 העיראקים שפשטו על מאגר הנפט ב-LARAK בקצה הדרומי של המפרץ. סביר שהאיראנים חושדים שהמטוסים זכו לחניית ביניים באחת מהמדינות הנ"ל, אם כי טווח המטוס מספיק לטיסה הלוך וחזור. בהפצצה הושמדו 3 מיכליות - אם (טרם ידועה לו זהותן) דהיינו כאלו המעבירות נפט מהמתקן למיכליות הזרות.

23

אלי אבידן

k/c

סניף
 2.97... סתור... 4... דגים
 סוג מסומן שמור
 דחיסות... מייד
 תאריך וזמן
 מס' פנקס

מלו

2/4

28/25

1. אי התידוע של הקונגרס בכל הקשור לפרשה הינו בגדר "כולי עלמא לא פליצי". בתשובה למרוין קלב גרס יו"ר וועדת החוץ הסנטור ריצ'ארד לוגאר שלהבא הממשל חייב לשתף את הקונגרס במידע על מבצעים מסוג זה, ואילו הקונגרס חייב להבטיח את חקוד המערכת של CHECKS AND BALANCES
2. כ"כ "אליבא דכולי עלמא", הופר החוק האמריקאי-אם לא ככתבו וכלשונו, אז כרוחו. מנהיג הרוב הסנטור בוב דול^{אליב} שבוצעה "עברה חוקתית"; אך לעומתו, עמיתו הרפובליקאי ויו"ר וועדת המודיעין, הסנטור דורנברגר הודה בשיחה עם מק-לוקלין שהוא מתקשה לראות שלא הופרה שורה ארוכה של חוקים.
3. הבטחת "FULL DISCLOSURE" מצד הבית הלבן עומדת בראש דאגתם של המחוקקים. "וועדת טאואר" שמונתה ע"י הנשיא אך תהיה כפופה לתובע הכללי לא התקבלה כחקירה עצמאית. כהוצאה מזה נמשכות הדרישות למינוי הדחוף של תובע מיוחד ואף למנוי של וועדת הסנט נוסח הוועדה שחקרה פרשת ווטרגייט. בהקשר זה הסנטור טול מרחיק לכת: אצל ברינקלי, הוא הציע שבשבוע הבא יכנס הנשיא את הקונגרס למושב מיוחד (נוהל שלא הונהג מזה 38 שנה) ושחממה וועדה נבחרת (SELECT COMMITTEE) משותפת לשני הבתים על בסיס דו-מפלגתי שתחקור הפרשה.
4. מנהיג הרוב המיועד, בוב בירד, וכן ט/יו"ר ועדת המודיעין הדמוקרטי, הסנטור פט ליייהי מסתייגים מרעיון זה, וכנראה מסתמנים הבדלי גישה טביב לנקודה זו בין הרפובליקאים לבין הדמוקרטים. לראשונים חשוב שהנשיא יאזן מחדש את חדמיתו זאת אמינותו בכל הקדמ ואף בעת שהסנט עדיין נותר בידי הרפובליקאים. לעומתם, מרכנים הדמוקרטים להמתין עד תחילת השנה הבאה, שעה שהשליטה בסנט תעבור אליהם בפועל; בינתיים הם מעדיפים להראות בעיני הציבור הרחב כמתנהגים באחריות מבלי לנגח ישירות נשיא פופולרי שהסתכן בידי עוזריו ויועציו. הדמוקרטים יאיינם רוצים בנשיא מתנזה ומבוזבז ("WASTED") כדברי מוינינגן.

סניף
 שם
 סניף נשחוני
 מידע
 דחפוח
 הארץ וז"ח
 סניף

$\frac{3}{4}$ 28/25

מל:

5. הכל תמימי דעים שהנשיא חייב לנער את צוות העוזרים בבית הלבן. בעוד שאין חולקים על מרכזיות של לוט' קולונל נורת', מסופקים מאד באם הוא ופוינדקסטר היו היחידים בבית הלבן ומחוצה לו שידעו על היוזמה. הסנטורים מצפים איפוא - מקי דורשים-פיטורים נוספים. מבלי לנקוב בשמו של "ראש המטה", דונלד רייגן, קיימת צפייה כללית שלא יאריך ימים בתפקידו הנוכחי. הסנטור לוגר סבור שהנשיא זקוק לעזרתם ולייעוצם של "BIG LEAGUERS", וביניהם הנרי קיסינג'ר, הווארד בייקר או ג'ון קירקפטריק, בעוד שהסנטור דורנברגר בדעה שיש לתת למזכיר המדינה "מנדט מלא" כמפקד על מדיניות החוץ של ארה"ב.

6. חיוני, לדידו של דול, שהנשיא יוכיח שידו על העליונה, ושהוא שולט על העניינים. להערכתו הנשיא עדיין חזק אך ברור שיש לו בעיות בקונגרס ובדעת הקהל. אולם נשאר לו בשנתיים הבאות עבודה מרובה וחשובה ועליו לתפקד. הסנטור דורנברגר בדעה דומה: הנשיא רייגן נכס שאין כמוהו לעולם החופשי: עליו להראות לציבור שבשנתיים הבאות לא יחגלעו פערים ("GAPS") נוספים בידיעתו את הנעשה במחיצתו.

ג. חלקה של ישראל

1. לעי"ע "המומנט הישראלי" בפרשה, אם כי מוזכר חדיר, נשאר מוצנע ואינו תופס מקום מרכזי בתפיסת הסנטורים הנ"ל והמראיינים אותם, ככל שניתן לטפוט מהתכניות הנ"ל. קלב וברינקלי לא שאלו דבר על ישראל; לעומתם ביקש מק-לקלין לדעת את חגובת דורנברגר לטענת ישראל שהיא פעלה בכדי להענות לבקשת ידיד (בעוד שהוא - מק-לוקלין-חזר על גרסת מיז מבלי להתייחס להודעתנו הרשמית). בחשובה העיר דורנברגר שלא השתכנע מהטיעון הישראלי (UNIMPRESSED AM I) אם כי הוא מבין אותו. אין לו אמנם כל העובדות אך הוא משוכנע שקיימת שערורבות נרחבת יותר מצד ישראל לגבי איראן; מאידך, לגבי הקונטרס אינו יודע.

2. שתי הערות:

(א) הידיעות בעתונות הישראלית (שמיוחסות לפעמים ל"פקידים בכירים" בארץ). לפיהן חוששים שיש בפרשה זו כדי לסכן אינטרסים ישראליים רבים בקונגרס (ובממשל) אינם משתקפים כלל בדבריהם של המחוקקים בפני כלי התקשורת, ולו ברמז.

ט ו ט ט
 ד.א. מתוך... דפים
 סוג בטחוני... שמור
 דחיסות... מייד
 מאריך וזיח
 מטי מברק

58 / 25 28 / 4

(ב) כ"כ לא (או טרם) הומחש החשש שמעורבותנו בפרשה זו ונכונותנו לעזור באספקת נשק לאיראן ולקונטרס (בנוסף לדרא"פ, כביכול) מפאענה בתמיכת הדמוקרטיים הליברלים בנו.

יש לציין בהדגשה ששתי הערות הנ"ל נכונות לשעת חיבור מברק זה, אך אין פירוש הדבר שניתן לסמוך עליהן ברבות הימים. הקונגרס יתכנס מחזש רק בינואר, ועוד לא שמענו מידידינו הליברלים.

וסוף
 למדן

שגרירות ישראל - וושינגטון

אלו

המשרד

024

ס ר ט
 97.....פתור.....דפיס
 סודי
 טווג בטחוני
 רגיל
 דחיסות
 ומריץ וזיחה 1-4430-1 דאמ 86
 מסי פברק

אל :- מצפ"א
 דע :- מנכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל

פרשת איראן והממשל

נכון לכתיבת המברק, ניתן אולי לסכם כלהלן :

סגן הנשיא : עדין שומר על שתיקה, חרף המסר שבתמיכתו בנשיא. עוזריו ומקורביו מוסרים "שבימים הקרובים" יביע דעתו בנדון ושאינן טעם להביעה לפני עמחבררות העובדות. מיותר לציין שהזהירות היתרה נובעת מהמבט אל 1988, שהפרשה החישה ראשית המרוץ של 1988.

דון ריגן וה- DSC : חרף החזות ש"הכל כרגיל" הרי הכרסום במעמדו של דון ריגן נשאר בעינו. גם בין הרפובליקנים יש הקוראים לסילוקו, בין הוא לבדו בין במסגרת "מבצע נקיון כללי" שיכלול גם את מזכיר המדינה.

אשר לראשות ה- DSC, טרם נפלה הכרעה. נמועמד המוביל עדין ABSHIRE, שגריר לנאט"ו וממייסדי ה- CSIS, רפובליקני פעיל אך חסר הכאריזמה שהיתה נחלת ראשי DSC בעבר הלא רחוק יחסית. בין חסידי "הנקיון הכללי" יש המעדיפים מועמדים בולטים יותר באישיותם ובדעותיהם.

המזכיר : אין ספק שאישית יצא מחוזק עד כה ומחמ"ד זכתה לחיזוק. תת המזכיר ארמקוסט קיבל לידיו ריכוז פרשת איראן בהיבט בינמשרדי. דמותו של שולץ הפכה יותר לדמות האיש ההגון היודע את שהוא רוצה ואשר ניתן לסמוך עליו. התאר INTEGRITY מוזגו זזחד ויזחד בקשר אליו. מאידך, אין זו ערובה לאריכות ימים בתפקיד המזכיר ויש הקוראים להחלפתו איש המיחסים לרעיית הנשיא טינה עמוקה אליו. אם ייאלץ לעזוב, ולפי ההערכה היום אין מדובר בצעד מהיום למחר, הרי יעזוב בקומה זקופה ובתדמית חיובית, היחיד מבין הקבוצה המעורבת בפרשה.

מזכיר ההגנה : שמו מוזכר בפרשה עוד פחות מאשר סגן הנשיא. יש הרואים בו מחליף אפשרי למזכיר המדינה ויש הקוראים להחלפתו יחד עם מזכיר המדינה.

3
 מתני

מ	מ	מ	מ	מ	מ	מ	מ
2	3	1	1	2	1	3	2

דפוס.....מתוך.....דפים

שמוך
סווג בסחוני.....

דחירות.....

תאריך וז"ח..10,30..1. דצמ' 86

מס' מבר.....

אל: המשרד

009

גור אריה, אמלייט ו, מצפ"א

השלכות המשבר בממשל על מדיניותו כלפי אמרכ"ז

למרות שההיבט הקשור בסיוע ל"קונטרס" הוא שהביא למשבר הכבד בו שרוי עתה הממשל, הרי ששאלת מדינות ארה"ב כלפי ניקרגואה ועתידה, היא שולית לחלוטין מבחינת ההתעסקות התקשורתית והפוליטית ומטבע הדברים הכל עסוקים בצדדים החוקיים והאינסטיטוציונליים של המשבר והשלכותיהם.

ניתן לאמר עם זאת שלא קשר לאופן בו תסתיים הפרשה, מדיניות הממשל כלפי אמרכ"ז, נפגעה קשות ואולי אף ללא תקנה והעובדה שהיבט זה מוצנע בשלב זה נעוצה בכך שהענין מרוכז במאבק של הממשל על קיומו הפוליטי בכלל. אחד מחברי הקונגרס ציין כי קולונל נורת' אשר רצה לקדם את מדיניות הממשל באמרכ"ז בכל מחיר, למעשה הרג אותה.

עוד לפני פרוץ הפרשה דיווחנו כי הבעיה העיקרית של הממשל ביחס למדיניותו באמרכ"ז, היתה "אי ההחלטיות" או אי הודאות ביחס ליכולתו לקדם את מדיניותו ובין היתר להבטיח סיוע רצוף ל"קונטרס". ואם קודם לכן היה קשה לחזות מצב בו הקונגרס הבא שכידוע תהיה בו שליטה דמוקרטית בשני הבתים, יאשר את המשך הסיוע על אחת כמה וכמה עתה.

אין ספק שלמשבר תהיה השלכה על עמדותיהן של מדינות אמרכ"ז ועל מידת נכונותן לתמיכה מעשית ורטורית בעמדת ארה"ב, כפי שתהיה לו השלכה על יכולת תפקוד הקונטרס.

המשבר ובמיוחד ההיבט של ערעור עמדתו ואמינותו של הנשיא, מורידות מעל סדר היום אופציה נוספת שגם קודם לכן לא היתה בסבירות גבוהה והיא זו הקשורה במעורבות אמריקאית ישירה או במילים אחרות באפשרות של פלישה אמריקאית לניקרגואה.

אין ספק שלמרות הפרטים שהתפרסמו השבוע על אימון 70 מפקדי "קונטרס" בבסיס צבאי אמריקאי בפלורידה, שלסנדיניסטים במנגואה, סיבות רבות לשמוח.

קוריאל

ס נ ר ר

ד.נ.י. מתוך... דפים

סוג בסחוני שמור

דחיות... 86

תאריך וזייה 1040 דצמ' 86

מס' פנה

אל:

המשרד

005

אל - : מא"ס

דע - : מצפ"א

קוריאה

א. אם כי התקשורת הבליטה ענייני ההפגנות ומעצרי הסטודנטים בסיאול, מתפרסמים לאחרונה גם מאמרים על הסכנה והחומרה שבה רואים בסיאול בניית סכר **KUMGANG** ע"י הצפוניים.

ב. בשיחה עם דסקאי קוריאה לפני זמן מה אמר לי שבדעתם למנות מקצוען בשטח ההידרולוגיה כדי לבדוק הנושא על כל היבטיו, הן בעתות שלום (אספקת מים וכיו"ב) והן כאקט מלחמתי (הצפות וחבלות במורד הנהר כולל סיאול).



מתני

ט ד פ ס
ד.פ. מסחר... דסים
טווג בטחוני... גלוי
דחיסות... בחול
תאריך וז"ח... 1030 ודצמבר 86
מס' מברק

1/3

אל: המשרד, בטחון

3

004

21

אל: מנכ"ל מדינה, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ח

דע: יועץ רה"מ לתקשורת
יועץ שהב"ט לתקשורת

להלן מח"ו ושינגטון פוסט" ה"ח

עיונות

Israelis Shipped Obsolete Parts

Incident Angered Iranians, Led to Direct U.S. Role

1-17-86 Wash Post

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

Israeli arms brokers substituted obsolete anti-aircraft missile parts in a secret November 1985 arms shipment to Iran, angering the Iranians and causing the Reagan White House to begin sending weapons directly from U.S. military stocks, informed U.S. and Israeli sources said yesterday.

Iranian military officers had given the Israelis a list of specific spare parts for a type of anti-aircraft battery known as Improved Hawk, or I-Hawk, but for reasons that are not clear they received parts for an older, less sophisticated version of the Hawk.

The November shipment was eventually returned to Israel, and the incident led the White House to stop using the Israeli arms brokers as intermediaries in the shipments.

Those Israelis had begun the clandestine operation with tacit U.S. approval in the fall of 1985, when two arms shipments to Lebanon resulted in the Sept. 14 release of the Rev. Benjamin Weir, who had been held hostage in Lebanon by pro-Iranian extremists.

The White House opted to begin selling parts directly from the U.S. arsenal for what became four subsequent shipments this year. The Iranians paid millions of dollars more than the \$12 million value of the weapons into a Swiss bank account, and some of those profits were secretly diverted to aid Nicaraguan contras, according to administration disclosures last week.

In a statement released yesterday, Israeli businessman Yaacov Nimrodi confirmed earlier reports that he had organized the

See MISSION, AB, Col. 1

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MISSION, From A1

September arms shipments to Iran as a way "to bring about the freedom of the American hostages."

He said Weir was released as a result of these activities, but that afterward, "the Americans apparently reached the conclusion that it is within their ability to continue efforts for the release of other hostages without my help."

"The negotiations continued without me," Nimrodi said. "At the same time," he added, "my friends and myself were asked to stop dealing with the subject."

Nimrodi's friends have been identified as David Kinche, the former director general of the Israeli foreign ministry, and Al Schwimmer, the founder of Israel Aircraft Industries.

In February, 500 TOW antitank missiles were sent to Tehran directly from U.S. stocks and in late May parts for the I-Hawks were sent as a replacement for the rejected November shipment, according to informed sources.

According to these sources, some of whom were aware of the secret shipments at the time, this new phase of direct U.S. supplies stripped the White House of the "deniability" it had been able to maintain last year, when the arms were brokered by Israelis and taken from Israeli stocks that were eventually replaced by the United States.

When the direct shipments began, Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North of the National Security Council staff was designated as the White House liaison on the issue with the Israeli government. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres selected Amiran Nir, his counterterrorism adviser, to be North's counterpart.

The White House had been told by the Israeli middlemen before Weir was freed that all five living American hostages would be released. Despite the setback in securing only one hostage, the Israelis were told that a shipment of I-Hawk parts would help to free the remaining four Americans. The Israelis chose late November for the shipment, according to one source, in part to mollify the White House in the wake of the arrest of Jonathan Pollard, who was eventually convicted of spying for Israel.

When word of the Iranian anger over the obsolete Hawk parts became known in Washington, former national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane and North, who had helped arrange the September and November shipments, "were damn angry at the Israelis for sending old equipment," said one source familiar with the transaction. The idea of sending arms to Tehran as a sign of U.S. "good faith" had originated in discussions between McFarlane and Kinche in the summer of 1985.

White House officials in the past have said there was a "pause" in the Iran program about this time last year because McFarlane, North and the national security adviser, Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, were changing their "contacts" in Iran.

A Washington source familiar with the Israeli arms deal said yesterday that Nimrodi was not involved in the November shipment and that the substitution of old parts for I-Hawk parts came about because of a "misunderstanding by people who didn't know weapons rather than a desire to cheat the Iranians."

The failure of the November shipment and the subsequent Iranian complaints came at a time when State and Defense department officials were trying to convince Pres-

ident Reagan that he should not use arms shipments as a means for opening contacts with Iran or in seeking help to free the remaining American hostages.

The incident also took place while the arms-to-Iran program was creating controversy within the Central Intelligence Agency. John McMahon, then the CIA's deputy director, agreed to provide agency assistance in getting an airplane for the November shipment after an unusual oral request from North.

At the time, according to congressional sources, North told McMahon that the plane would be carrying oil-drilling equipment. CIA Director William J. Casey was in China at the time, sources said.

McMahon, according to Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), approved North's request but warned that he would require an order from Reagan to do it again. "I'll do it once, but the next time . . . this has to come from the president in writing," Moynihan, on the NBC News program "Meet the Press," quoted McMahon as saying.

In January, the White House received word of the Iranian military's unhappiness with the Hawk shipment, but also a hint that if newer equipment were furnished, talks about the hostages could continue, according to sources.

On Jan. 17, according to White House officials, the president signed a secret intelligence order authorizing the shipment of U.S. arms to Iran as part of a covert program to open contacts and seek help in obtaining the hostages' release.

In February, according to Attorney General Edwin Meese III, the November shipment of old Hawk parts was returned to Israel. In the same month, according to informed sources, the first U.S. shipment of 500 TOW antitank missiles went

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from the United States to Israel and then to Iran. All of this year's shipments were routed from the United States through Israel, and in at least some cases were flown circuitously from Israel through Europe to Iran.

Also in February, the CIA's McMahon quit without explanation. He now works for the Lockheed Corp.

On May 28, McFarlane, North and two others landed in Tehran in a plane carrying parts for the I-Hawks. Iran had the weapons from the 1970s, when it was a close ally of the United States and before revolution swept out the shah and brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power. McFarlane has told friends that he expected all of the remaining hostages to be freed before his arrival.

The United States sent two more shipments totaling 1,500 TOW missiles in August and late October. Two more hostages, the Rev. Lawrence M. Jenso and David P. Jacobson, were released. In September

and October, three more Americans were kidnaped in Beirut and reportedly are held by pro-Iranian extremists.

The idea of sending arms to Iran to cultivate contacts within the Khomeini regime began early in the Reagan administration, according to sources. In 1981, then-Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. gave tacit approval for an Israeli proposal that arms be sent to build contacts within the Iranian military. The Israeli idea, according to Moshe Arens, ambassador to Washington at the time, was to encourage the military leadership to overthrow the Khomeini regime.

No moderates in the armed forces were uncovered, Arens said recently, and U.S. support ended when Haig was convinced by his staff that the arms shipments were contrary to U.S. interests.

For the next five years, until Nov. 4, when the first reports of McFarlane's trip to Tehran ap-

peared, the Reagan administration and the president personally emphasized that the Khomeini regime supported terrorism and that the United States would never pay ransom to extremists holding U.S. hostages. A strong corollary to these antiterrorism policies was Operation Staunch, the worldwide U.S. effort to enlist other countries in the embargo on arms shipments to Iran and Iraq as a means for ending the war.

Meese has reportedly told congressional investigators that all of the funneling of Iranian arms money to aid the Nicaraguan rebels occurred this year, beginning with the February shipment. He also told them that some of the profits from this October's shipment went to the contras, because by then Congress had approved \$100 million in military and other aid to the rebels.

משרד החוץ-מחלקת הקשר

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סודי-ביותר/בהול 596

מל: השגריר, וושינגטון.

בעקבות הדברים המיוחסים לנשיא, שפורסמו ביימיי, מוצע ביי
תפנה בדחיפות האפשרית למיז כהמחור גם טיי הנשיא כמוסר
המידע) וחביר לו כלהלן:

מא, עמדתנו הטובות תוארה בהודעה מן השבוע החולף, ואנא
מסור לו את נוסחה המוברק להלן:

**THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONFIRMS THAT IT HELPED TRANSFER
**DEFENSIVE ARMS AND SPARE PARTS FROM THE U.S. TO IRAN,
**UPON THE REQUEST OF THE U.S.

**THE PAYMENT FOR THIS EQUIPMENT WAS MADE DIRECTLY BY THE
**IRANIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO A SWISS BANK, IN ACCORDANCE
**WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES. THESE
**FUNDS DID NOT PASS THROUGH ISRAEL.

**THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT
**SUPPOSEDLY A PORTION OF THESE FUNDS WAS TRANSFERRED TO
**THE CONTRAS.

**IF SUCH A TRANSACTION TOOK PLACE, IT HAD NOTHING TO DO
**WITH ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAD NO KNOWLEDGE
**OF IT.

**ISRAEL DID NOT SERVE AND WOULD NOT HAVE SERVED AS A
**CHANNEL FOR SUCH A TRANSACTION.

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Attorney General Ed Meese came to me last week and first told me of the possibility of something being amiss. He gave me an idea of what it was. Late Monday afternoon he came to see me, and he said that what he had suspected was true, what he had told me earlier was right. He said, "here it is."

Another country was facilitating those sales of weapons systems. They then were overcharging and were apparently putting the money into bank accounts of the leaders of the Contras. It wasn't us funneling money to them. This was another country.

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אל: מנכ"ל מדיני, ממנכ"ל, מצפ"א, מע"ת

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גל יוס' 10/1

A8 MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1986 *Wash Post*

TRANSCRIPT OF REAGAN INTERVIEW

Following is the transcript of a Time magazine interview with President Reagan, distributed by Los Angeles Times Syndicate. Before Reagan left the White House on Wednesday to spend Thanksgiving at his ranch in California, he talked by telephone with Washington contributing editor Hugh Sidesy.

On his feelings about the turmoil:

I have to say that there is bitter bile in my throat these days. I've never seen the sharks circling like they now are with blood in the water.

What is driving me up the wall is that this wasn't a failure until the press got a tip from that rag in Beirut and began to play it up. I told them that publicity could destroy this, that it could get people killed. They then went right on.

On why the arms shipments began:

The Iranians came to us at first. They wanted to talk about a better relationship. I would not do that with them being a sponsor of terrorism. They said that they were trying to do something about terrorism. We said that if they were really sincere, then they could show us by getting the hostages released. That was an easy way to prove their sincerity.

We got three people back. We were expecting any day to get two others. The press has to take the responsibility for what they have done.

On his discovery that funds had been diverted to the contras:

[Attorney General] Ed Meese came to me last week and first told me of the possibility of something being amiss. He gave me an idea of what it was. Late Monday afternoon he came to see me, and he said that what he had suspected was true, what he had told me earlier was right. He said, "Here it is."

Another country was facilitating those sales of weapons systems. They then were overcharging and were apparently putting the money into bank accounts of the leaders of the contras. It wasn't us funneling money to them. This was another country.

I knew then that for us not to act immediately would be wrong. I told them we must tell the American people and the Congress. And we did. Ed is continuing to check the facts. I've appointed a little group of my own to look into this to see if we can improve the procedures in the NSC [National Security Council].

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On Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, the NSC aide fired last Tuesday:

I do not feel betrayed. Lt. Col. North was involved in all our operations: the Achille Lauro, Libya. He has a fine record. He is a national hero. My only criticism is that I wasn't told everything.

On Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, Reagan's national security adviser who resigned Tuesday:

Adm. Poindexter had gotten some wind of this earlier, but he didn't pursue it. He is a fine naval officer. In keeping with that tradition, even if you are asleep in your bunk when your ship runs aground, you take the responsibility. He took the responsibility.

On the press:

This whole thing boils down to a great irresponsibility on the part of the press. I told them when this broke that there were a whole lot of questions I couldn't answer. I said to them, "Please don't ruin this." [David] Jacobsen, the hostage who had just been released, asked them not to pursue it.

On Congress:

The frenzy in the Congress is not unusual for them. This will not paralyze the government. It will make it more difficult for me, yes. But I still would have risked it.

On whether he now considers the Iran dealings a mistake:

I think we took the only action we could have in Iran. I am not going to disavow it. I do not think it was a mistake. No, it has not worked out the way we hoped. But I don't see anything I would have done differently.

On whether the Iran operation will hurt his presidency:

After my speech, some 84 percent of those people who called in supported me. It was the biggest outpouring of calls they've ever had. The letters coming in are in my favor. This is a Beltway bloodletting. Frankly, I believe that as the truth comes out, people will see what we were trying to do was right. I'm not going to back off, I'm not going to crawl in a hole. I'm going to go forward. I have a lot of things to do in this job.



גולד

1.12.86

אל: רחי התיק
מאת: דני בלור, יועץ לענייני עבודה, וושינגטון

הריני להעביר לעיונך דו"ח נוסף על המתרחש בענייני עבודה ואיגודים מקצועיים בארצות הברית:

תוצאות הבחירות 1986: תוצאות הבחירות לשליש הסנט, כל בית הנבחרים ומספר רב של תפקידים נבחרים בחמישים המדינות של ארצות הברית גרמו ספוק רב למפלגה הדמוקרטית ולאיגודים המקצועיים התומכים בה. בראש וראשונה, משום שנתברר כי הקו של נצחון מתמשך של הרפובליקנים ושל הימין השמרני נבלם ונפסק, ובמרבית המקרים החזירו הדמוקרטים לעצמם את כוחם שאבד בשנים 1978 עד 1984, או לפחות בלמו את הסחף ימינה. שנית, כבש רוב ברור בסנט, לאחר שש שנות מיעוט, ושמירה ואף חזוק מה של הרוב הגדול בבית הנבחרים מהיום נקודת זינוק טובה לקראת הבחירות לנשיאות ב-1988. כמובן, היותם ברוב גם מטיל עליהם אחריות, שיש עמה גם סיכונים, אך מכל מקום זו התחלה טובה עבורם. התוצאות הוכיחו ששום דבר אינו בטוח לאף מפלגה, וכי הבוחר קובע עמדתו יותר ויותר לפי האישים והנושאים שלפניו ופחות לפי נאמנות הסטורית למפלגה. מרבית הבוחרים פיצלו את הצבעותיהם, ולא מעט מקרים שבהם באותו יום נבחרו באותה מדינה מושל וסנטור או חברי קונגרס ממפלגות שונות. הנשיא רייגן לא הצליח במסעו הנמרץ להביא לבחירה של סנטורים רפובליקנים רבים, והוכח כי יוקרתו האישית אינה עוברת יותר אוטומטית למפלגתו ולמועמדיה.

ראוי לציין כי כל הסנטורים הדמוקרטים שהעמידו עצמם לבחירה מחדש הצליחו, בעוד שאצל הרפובליקנים נכשלו שבעה סנטורים במאמצייהם להבחר שנית. הרפובליקנים כבשו רק מושב אחד דמוקרטי - זה של הסנטור איגלטון ממיסורי שפרש. הדמוקרטים כבשו גם שני מקומות מתפנים במדינות מרילנד ונבדה, והצליחו להחזיק שני מקומות שנתפנו בשל פרישה - לואיזיאנה וקולורדו.

לעומת זאת, זכו הרפובליקנים בהישג טוב בבחירות למושלי מדינות, ובחוספת נטו של שמונה מושלים. אך לא זכנ להישג משמעותי בבתי הנבחרים של המדינות שנשארו ברובם דמוקרטים. לתוצאה זו יש חשיבות משום שבתי הנבחרים של המדינות הם הקובעים את מפת אזורי הבחירה לקונגרס, על פי תוצאות מפקד האוכלוסין, והדבר נותן כוח מסויים היכול להשפיע במידה לא מעטה על סיכויי המפלגות.

נוכח תוצאות הבחירות לקונגרס נשאלת השאלה באיזו מידה יוכל הנשיא רייגן לשלוט ולהעביר את רצונו, כפי שעשה במידה רבה בשש השנים האחרונות. ראוי לזכור כי בשיטת הממשל האמריקני אין משמעת סיעתית אוטומטית, והמשמעות של רוב ומיעוט בין שתי המפלגות היא ציקר בענייני נוהל - קביעת סדר היום, נוהל הדיונים וראשות הוועדות. בענייני חקיקה ומדיניות יש תנועה רבה בין המפלגות, וגם בעבר היה על הנשיא לא פעם להעזר ביכולתו

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

לשכנע דמוקרטים שמרנים לתמוך בו כדי לאזן את התנגדותם של רפובליקנים מתונים. בשנתיים הקרובות יקשה עליו לעשות כן כי יוקרתו נפגעה, ונשיא בסוף כהונתו אינו מסוגל לחלק טובות הנאה או ללחוץ באותה עוצמה כפי שהיחה בידינו בעבר. על עצם הפגיעה במעמדו נוכח תוצאות הבחירות, נוספה עתה הפגיעה הקשה ביוקרתו ו בכוח נוכח פרשת הנשק לאירן, פרשה שאמנם אינה דומה במהותה לפרשת ווטרגייט, אך עשויות להיות לה השלכות דומות מבחינת חיזוק כוחו של הקונגרס מול הממשל, והפעם דווקא בענייני מדיניות חוץ ובטחון.

תוצאות הבחירות מבחינת האיגודים המקצועיים: חנקודת ראותם של האיגודים המקצועיים בארה"ב עדיף, כמובן, רוב דמוקרטי בשני הבתים על פני רוב רפובליקני. אך, כמובן, זהו בסיס התחלתי שאינו מבטיח הצלחה בכל. שכן חלק מהדמוקרטים, שמרנים ודרומיים, אינם בהכרח תומכים בקו של האיגודים. ורפובליקנים מתונים לפעמים עדיפים על אלה. אך בסכום הכולל יש לפחות סיכוי לאיגודים שתמצא להם אוזן קשבת, במיוחד שלא מעט סנטורים חדשים נבחרו הודות לתמיכת האיגודים. כשלונם היחיד היה במדינת איידהו. מנהיגות הסנט החדשה היא ברובה אוהדת, ויושבי ראש רוב הוועדות העוסקות בנושאים המעניינים את האיגודים יהיו ידידותיים ובמיוחד טד קנדי, היושב ראש החדש של ועדת העבודה ומשאבי אנוש של הסניף.

סדר העדיפויות של האיגודים בקונגרס יהיה זה: חוקי סחר בינלאומי, למניעת יבוא היצף ותנאי תחרות בלתי הוגנים כלפי הייצור התעשייתי האמריקני, מניעת מינויים עוינים במשרות השפוטיות אדמיניסטרטיביות הקשורות לענייני עבודה, מניעת קיצוצים תקציביים בנושאי עבודה וחברה, ושינויים בחוקים הקשורים לענייני עבודה. הסיכויים הינם טובים למדי במניעת מינויים עוינים ובמניעת קיצוצים תקציביים. חוקי סחר עשויים לעבור בקונגרס, אך ייתקלו בוטו נשיאותי שקשה יהיה להתגבר עליו, והסיכויים לשינויים משמעותיים בתחיקת העבודה אינם גדולים. בנושא אחד - הסחר ובמיוחד הטכסטיל, עלולה להיות התנגשות אינטרסים מסוימת בין ישראל לבין האיגודים.

חיזוק כוחו הלובייסטי של ה-AFL-CIO: בכל מקרה מחזקות תוצאות הבחירות את מידת השפעתם של האיגודים המקצועיים במערכת הפוליטית. יש לזכור כי כוחם הכספי והארגוני של האיגודים המקצועיים הוא הגורם החזק ביותר העומד לשרותה של המפלגה הדמוקרטית, שמשאביה הכספיים דלים לעומת אלה של המפלגה הרפובליקנית. בפעולתו במערכת הפוליטית רואה ה-AFL-CIO לא רק ייצוג האינטרסים המיוחדים של ציבור חבריו אלא גם ייצוג השקפת עולם חברתית, כלכלית מדינית ובטחונית. על רקע זה יש גם להבין את חשיבות יחסיה ההדוקים של ישראל עם הנהגת האיגודים המקצועיים בכל הרמות. שכן מחוץ לקהילה היהודית זהו הגורם הגדול ביותר שיחסו הבסיסי לישראל ידידותי ואוהד, ושידידות זו עמדה כבר במבחנים רבים וקשים. אם היה מי שחשב שאפשר לוותר על ידידתנו ה"ליברליים" ולהשליך את כל יבנו

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

על הגורמים השמרניים בחברה האמריקנית הרי היתה זו טעות חמורה. הידידות של ארצות הברית לישראל מבוססת על שילוב של אינטרסים ואידאות ועל קשת רחבה של ידידים, שבסיסם היא הקהילה היהודית וגורמים ידידותיים מסורתיים אחרים, שידידותם אינה פרי הקוניקטורה וצרכי בחירות עכשוויים. גם בבחירות אלה כשבעים אחוזים מן הבוחרים היהודים הצביעו בעד מועמדים דמוקרטים, כפי שעשה אחוז דומה מבין חברי האיגודים המקצועיים ובני משפחותיהם. הימין השמרני נסוג, ותומכיו בקהילה היהודית הוכו מכה לא קלה. לישראל אסור לותר על אף גורם ידידותי במערכת האמריקנית הפלורליסטית. אך חשוב לטפח ולא להזניח ידידים אמיתיים ומסורתיים לטובת ידידים חדשים שעדיין לא עמדו במבחנים קשים.

בחירות 1988: כל מי שמתמצא במערכת הפוליטית האמריקאית לא ימהר להתנבא בסתיו 1986 מה יקרה בסתיו 1988. אך תוצאות הבחירות שנערכו זה עתה מוכיחות כי המשחק לא הוכרע מראש, לשתי המפלגות יש סיכויים, ולשום מועמד באף מפלגה אין ברגע זה סיכוי מועדף. בשלב מוקדם זה ניתן רק לומר כי רייגן עצמו לא יוכל למלא תפקיד מכריע לא בקביעת המועמד הרפובליקני ולא במערכת הבחירות ב-88. תהא זו מערכת הבחירות הראשונה מאז 1968, שבה לא מתמודד נשיא מכהן ושהבחר אינו מחפש את הקצוות אלא את המרכז, והמערכה תתבסס יותר על תכונות אישיות ופטרונות מעשיים פחות על חידוד הבדלים אידיאולוגיים. הערכות האישיים במפלגות השונות נראת עתה כך: אצל הרפובליקנים: ההתפתחויות האחרונות הורידו כמעט לחלוטין את סיכויי מועמדותו של הסנטור הפורש מנבדה פול לקסלט וגם החלישו את סיכויי סגן הנשיא ג'ורג' בוש. הולך ומתחזק מעמדו של מנהיג הרפובליקנים בסנט - בוב דול. סיכויים יש גם לציר בית הנבחרים ג'ק קמפ ולמנהיג הרוב בסנט לשעבר הווארד בייקר. שמות נוספים הנזכרים הם מושל דלוור לשעבר פייר דו-פונט, וכן אלכסנדר הייג. שמות נוספים המוזכרים הם מושל אילינוי ג'יימס תומפסון ומושל ניו-ג'רזי תום קין. אצל הדמוקרטים: השמות העיקריים הם: הסנטור הפורש גארי הארט, מושל ניו-יורק מריו קומו, הסנטור ג'ו ביידן, ציר בית הנבחרים ריצ'רד גפהארט ומושל אריזונה הפורש ברוס בביט. שמות אפשריים נוספים הם הסנטור סם נון מג'ורג'יה ומושל וירג'יניה לשעבר צ'ארלס רוב (חתנו של הנשיא ג'ונסון). אך עוד הדרך ארוכה ושמות יעלו ויפלו, עד שהמערכה תכנס להילוך גבוה בסתיו 1987.

לאיגודים אין בינתיים מועמד מועדף, וקיים ויכוח אם תמיכה גלויה בבחירות המוקדמות, כפי שניתנה למונדייל ב-84, מועילה או מזיקה. אין לאיגודים גם התנגדות מראש לרפובליקנים, וכמה מן המועמדים עשויים לגשש על אפשרות של תמיכה מסויימת.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

סיום הסכסוך ב"אל-על" ניו יורק: לקראת סוף יולי נסתיים הסכסוך הממושך בין "אל-על" לבין חלק מעובדי החברה בניו יורק השייכים לאיגוד המכונאים. הסיום נתאפשר בקביעה שכל העובדים השובתים יוחזרו בהדרגה לעבוד בחברה והנושאים השנויים במחלוקת יועברו לבוררות. הסכסוך האפיל על יחסי ישראל והאיגודים המקצועיים בשנתיים האחרונות, וגרם לפגיעה במכירות "בונדס" לקרנות הפנסיה של האיגודים ויצרה קשיים ביחסים בתחומים שונים. עם סיום הסכסוך חל שיפור מיידי באוירת היחסים ביננו לבין האיגודים, ואם כי נשאר פה ושם משקעים מסויימים, הרי יש להניח שהזמן ישכיח אותם. לא כאן המקום לערוך ניתוח מפורט של השביתה, ניתן לומר כי בוודאי, לא כל האשמה מוטלת על צד אחד בלבד, וכי ניתן היה להגיע לאותו סיכום במועד מוקדם יותר, אילמלא, התבצרו הצדדים בעמדות יוקרה. לאחר סיום הסכסוך ערך השגריר מאיר רוזן בביתו ארוחת ערב לכבוד הנהגת ה-AFL-CIO, בהשתתפות הנשיא ליין קירקלנד, נשיא איגוד המכונאים ויליאם וינפיסינגר ורבים מראשי הארגון. הארוחה התנהלה באוירה לבבית, והמשתתפים הסכימו לפעול להידוק קשרי הידידות ההדדיים, ובכלל זה מכירות "בונדס" ותמיכה בפעולות ההסתדרות בישראל ובמשור הבינלאומי.

בקור מזכ"ל ההסתדרות: מזכ"ל ההסתדרות ישראל קיסר ערך בסוף אוקטובר בקור בארה"ב. בקור רשמי ראשון מאז נבחר לתפקידו. במהלך בקורו נפגש בווינגטון עם מזכיר המדינה ג'ורג' שולץ לשיחה שהוקדשה לבעיות המשק הישראלי ולתפקידה של ההסתדרות במדיניות לייצוב המשק ולחידוש הצמיחה. שולץ הביע עניין רב בהסתדרות וביקש לכלול בקור בהסתדרות בעת שיבקר בישראל. נשיא ה-AFL-CIO ערך לכבודו של קיסר סעודת צהריים בהשתתפות ראשי ארגונו. כן שוחח קירקלנד וקיסר על דרכים להגברת שיתוף הפעולה בין שני הארגונים בפעולותיהם בעולם השלישי. השגריר מאיר רוזן ערך לכבוד מזכ"ל ההסתדרות קבלת פנים בשגרירות אליה הוזמנו ראשי הקהילה היהודית בווינגטון, קיסר הירצה לפניהם על עמדות ההסתדרות והשיב לשאלות המשתתפים. נשיא איגודי עובדי השרותים ג'ון סוויני ערך ארוחת ערב לכבוד קיסר. בניו יורק נפגש מזכ"ל ההסתדרות עם נשיא האיגודים המקצועיים במדינת ניו יורק אד קלירי וכן טיפל בענייני מגבית ההסתדרות בארה"ב.

מזכר הבנה בענייני עבודה: בראשית נובמבר נחתם בווינגטון ובירושלים מזכר הבנה בין משרדי העבודה של ארה"ב וישראל. המזכר עוסק בחילופי ידע, שיתוף פעולה במחקרים משותפים וקיום סמינרים על בעיות עבודה המעסיקות את שתי המדינות. על המזכר חתמו מזכיר העבודה של א-ה"ב ויליאם ברוק ושר העבודה והרווחה משה קצב. במסגרת המזכר התקיים באמצע נובמבר בישראל סמינר משותף על ענייני תעסוקת נשים.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

נשים ותסיסה בכוח העבודה בארה"ב: נושא תעסוקת נשים מעניין את האמריקאים שכן הגידול הניכר בכוח העבודה מקורו העיקרי הוא בכניסת נשים למעגל התעסוקה. הסבות לכך הן שתיים - גידול ניכר במספרן של משפחות חד הוריות, וירידה בהכנסות המשפחה המחייבת את עבודתם של שני בני הזוג. על פי מחקר שמונים אחוז מהגידול הצפוי בכוח אדם במשך האמריקאי עד שנת אלפיים יבוא מנשים, מהגרים ומיעוטים (שחורים, היספאניים) כששני שלישי מהגידול מקורו בתעסוקת נשים. כבר כיום למעלה ממחצית האמהות לילדים מתחת גיל שלוש עובדות. לעומת 42 אחוז ב-1980, ושיעורים נמוכים בהרבה בעבר. אחוז האמהות לילדים בגילאי בית ספר בכוח העבודה גדל בשנים אלה מ-64 ל-70 אחוז. למעלה משני שלישי מן האמהות לילדים עבדו משרה מלאה. אלו הן מגמות חדשות יחסית בארצות הברית שעדיין לא ערוכה כיאות להשלכות החברתיות של מצב זה - מעונות יום, טפול בילדים בשעות אחר הצהריים ועוד. ממצאי הסטטיסטיקה מוכיחים שרוב מקומות התעסוקה החדשים הם בענפי השרותים המשלמים פחות יחסית מענפי הייצור. אמנם, נכון שפחת מספר המובטלים ונוצרו מקומות תעסוקה חדשים רבים, אך ההכנסה לעובד פחתה והדבר יוצר לחץ על המשפחה. אי השקט החברתי הקיים מתחת לפני השטח בא לידי בטוי בתוצרות הבחירות האחרונות. ולדעת מומחים עשוי בעשור הבא לבלוט על פני השטח אם לא יחול שינוי ביחס הממשל והקונגרס לענייני עובדים. הדבר יבוא לידי ביטוי בלחץ ליותר תקציבים בענייני פנים, על חשבון תקציבי ההגנה וסיוע החוץ.

אזירה פרוטקציוניסטית: מצב זה מביא לאזירה יותר פרוטקציוניסטית כלפי הסחר הבינלאומי. התחושה שיבוא זול גורם אבטלה בארצות הברית, שמדינות המגבילות יבוא מארה"ב נהנות מתנאי שוק חופשי ביצאן לשוק האמריקאי גורמת לתגובה קשה ולתסיסה שתמצא ביטוייה בחקיקה בקונגרס. "ג'נרל מוטורס" נאלצה לסגור שבעה מפעלים המעסיקים 29 אלף פועלים, דבר כזה יוצר מיד כיסי מרירות כלפי יפן ומדינות מתחרות אחרות ומגביר את הלחץ על חקיקה לצמצום היבוא המתחרה. תופעה דומה קיימת בענף הטכסטיל שהשלכותיה קשורות גם ליבוא מישראל.

הסנקציות על דרום אפריקה: ערב פיזורו של הקונגרס לפני הבחירות נתקבלה, חרף התנגדות הנשיא, שורה של סנקציות כלכליות נגד דרום אפריקה. כמו כן גבר הלחץ על חברות אמריקניות גדולות לצאת מדרום אפריקה, וחלקן נענו ללחץ (ג'נרל מוטורס, אי.בי.אם, קודאק) לחץ כבד וחרם מופעלים עתה על חברת "של". בשלב זה השפעת כל הצעדים הללו היא סימלית, אולם היא בטוי למגמה גוברת והולכת אצל חוגים רחבים בארה"ב של אי השלמה עם משטר האפרטהייד בדרום אפריקה וההכרח הבלתי נמנע של מעבר למשטר רוב בדרום אפריקה שאם לא תעשה בדרך מודרגת מוסמכת ודמוקרטית היא תכפה בשפיכות דמים. לא מעטים מידידי ישראל באיגודים המקצועיים מודאגים מהפרסומים הלא-ידידותיים על קשרי ישראל-דרום אפריקה בתחום הסחר, ובעיקר בתחום הסחר בנשק. הם מקוים שישראל תמלא אחר כל

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

הסנקציות המערביות והבינלאומיות כנגד דרום אפריקה ללא יוצא מן הכלל, וזאת מתוך הבנה לצורכי ישראל בקשרים עם הקהילה היהודית בדרום אפריקה. ידידינו מסייעים באחרונה בגיוס כספים למען הבאת משתלמים מאיגודים שחורים בדרום אפריקה למכון האפרו-אסיאני של ההסתדרות. פעולה בנושא תוך שיתוף פעולה בין ארגונים שחורים לבין הקהילה היהודית החלה בסיאטל ובאטלנטה, ויש לקוות כי תתנהל גם במקומות אחרים.

אישים:

- אחד מחשובי ידידנו באיגודים המקצועיים פרש מתפקידו - סול (צ'ייק) צ'ייקין נשיא איגוד עובדי בגדי נשים, ומי שעמד שנים רבות בראש הפעילות למען ההסתדרות. במקומו נבחר ג'יי מייזור, אף הוא יהודי, שבנודאי ימשיך בפעולות הסיוע לנו. צ'ייקין עצמו ימשיך למלא תפקידים ציבוריים שונים והבטיח להמשיך ולעמוד לרשות מגבית ההסתדרות בארה"ב.


- צ'ארלס פילארד נשיא איגוד עובדי החשמל פרש ובמקומו נבחר ג'יי בארי. בארי בתפקידו הקודמים היה ידידותי ובשנה שעברה היה אורח כבוד של ה"בונדס" ברוצ'סטר שבמדינת ניו יורק.

- תום ואן-ארסדייל נבחר לנשיא ה-AFL-CIO בעיר ניו יורק במקום אביו הנרי ואן-ארסדייל שנפטר לפני כשנה. זאת לאחר מאבק קשה עם ויקטור גוטבאום, נשיא איגוד עובדי ערית ניו יורק. בינתיים, סיים גוטבאום את תפקידו כנשיא איגודו בניו יורק ובמקומו נבחר סידני היל, מהכוחות העולים במנהיגות השחורה.

- תום קאהן נתמנה לראש אגף הבינלאומי של ה-AFL-CIO במקומו של אירווינג בראון הותיק שפרש מטעמי בריאות. תום קאהן כיהן עד כה כעוזרולעניינים בינלאומיים של ליין קירקלנד. הוא ביקר בישראל ב-1982.

בחודשים האחרונים נפטרו שניים מידידי ישראל בהנהגת האיגודים - אל היבס, נשיא איגוד עובדי בתי הכל-בו וג'יק ליונס, הנשיא לשעבר של איגוד עובדי המתכת. היבס ייצג את ה-AFL-CIO בועידת ההסתדרות האחרונה. במקומו נבחרה לינור מילר, המזכירה-גזברית של האיגוד. ג'יק ליונס היה החבר הותיק ביותר של מועצת ה-AFL-CIO והאחרון מדור המאחדים מחדש את תנועת העבודה האמריקנית. הוא ביקר בישראל וסייע לנו רבות.

נפטר הרברט לוין, שהיה עד לפרישתו לגימלאות לפני שנתיים מנהל מועצת האיגודים המקצועיים למען ההסתדרות. הרב לוין שהיה פרופסור לענייני עבודה באוניברסיטת רוטגרס בניו-ג'רזי היה אוצר בלום של ידע וקשרים בתחום האיגוד המקצועי, וניצל ידע זה לחיזוק הקשרים עם ישראל וההסתדרות. במיוחד עמל על חיזוק הקשרים בין התאים של האיגודים במדינות השונות ברחבי ארה"ב.


דני בלור